^♦* dSta V,/ .vsSffc-. v.* /i .»•. ^ ^ oV v .v§ a- -^ p-*, y^ ENGLAND AND GERMANY 1740 — 1914 BY BERNADOTTE EVERLY SCHMITT M.A. (Oxon.), Ph.D. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS I9l6 Copyright, 1916, by Princeton University Press Published April, 1916 ji APR 20 1916 ©CU427771 TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER AND MOTHER PREFACE This book is not entirely a product of the Great War. The Anglo-German problem first came under my notice some years ago, when I was an undergraduate at Oxford. A beneficiary of the Rhodes Trust, I was imbued with the idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity, to promote which Cecil Rhodes founded the scholarships which bear his name. But, instead of harmony, I found discord. Some of my Oxford friends were members of the British Navy League, and from them I learned that the German navy was re- garded as a menace to England's traditional supremacy of the seas. When I travelled in Germany I encountered considerable animosity to England in several places, and I saw little banks, in the shape of war-ships, which tempted patriotic Germans to make contributions for the propa- ganda of the German Navy League. At every turn one was made conscious of this rivalry between two kindred nations, each of which professed to fear the aggressive in- tentions of the other. The most contradictory statements were heard, and the stranger was at a loss to comprehend them. In time, as I studied the problem, I collected a quantity of material from different sources and of varying value: this book is the result. I have used very sparingly the voluminous literature which has appeared since the war began, except, of course, the official documents published by the belligerent governments. Nearly all of the evidence upon which my conclusions are based was in my hands before August, 1914; indeed, the first six chapters, and the eighth, were practically written by that date, although viii PREFACE they have since been rewritten. I have tried to present the subject of Anglo-German relations from a historical point of view, and if I have taken sides it is because the available evidence seemed to warrant certain conclusions. The book has been delayed by the severe pressure of pri- vate affairs, but the lapse of time has not essentially mod- ified the opinions formulated before I began to write. Several of the chapters treat of topics that have been discussed already in greater detail by other writers, but their inclusion seemed warranted in a synthetic treatment of my subject. I am well aware of the difficulty of writing a history of recent diplomatic affairs, for few documents are available, but the main course of events is not in doubt. The archives will throw fresh light upon the mo- tives of statesmen and their reactions in definite crises ; they may even disclose fresh facts; but, until they are opened, it is perhaps worth while to attempt to digest the enormous amount of unofficial evidence already ob- tainable. My best thanks are due to my colleagues, Professors Samuel Ball Platner, Henry E. Bourne, and Elbert J. Benton, who have read the manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions. Bernadotte E. Schmitt. Western Reserve University, Cleveland, 30 September, 1915. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Introduction i II. Modern England 12 III. The German Empire 35 IV. German Expansion 70 V. Commercial Rivalry 96 VI. Anglo-German Relations to 1890 . . . . 116 VII. The Quarrel 139 VIII. The Admiralty of the Atlantic 173 IX. The Triple Entente 219 X. The Near East 253 XL Agadir and Its Aftermath 302 XII. The Eve of the War 358 XIII. The Crisis of 1914 394 XIV. Armageddon 435 XV. The Anglo-German Rupture 468 Appendix 499 Index 507 MAPS Africa End of the Volume The "Drang Nach Osten " ....""" ix ENGLAND AND GERMANY, 1740-1914 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION "The central fact in the international situation to-day is the antagonism between England and Germany." So ran the first sentence of the first article of the first number of the Round Table (November, 1910), a non-partisan jour- nal of the politics of the British Empire. A French writer described this rivalry as "the essential fact which domi- nates the whole policy of our time, which thrusts itself into all events to embitter and warp them, and which is to be found at the bottom of all the political crises by whose succession Europe is periodically agitated." 1 In Germany "the English danger" was discussed in countless books and pamphlets, and the press of the world took up the cue. An American magazine published an article, entitled "Will England and Germany Fight?" in which the issues were represented as irreconcilable and the results fraught with incalculable consequences for the whole world. 2 In fact, no such spectacular international quarrel had been seen since the days of the great Napoleon; its existence was recognized by people to whom diplomacy is usually intangi- ble; while the inhabitants of both England and Germany were subjected to enormous taxes on account of the colossal 1 Rene Pinon, L' Europe et VEmpire Ottoman, p. xii. 2 William Bayard Hale, World's Work, February, igog. 2 ENGLAND AND GERMANY armaments which both caused and were caused by the strained relations between their governments and the mu- tual distrust of the two peoples. In a broad sense, the issue in the struggle has been the balance of power, which, in the words of Bishop Stubbs, the great English historian, "is the principle which gives unity to the political plot of modern European history." * For since the days of Cardinal Wolsey and Henry VIII, four hundred years ago, Great Britain has been the prin- cipal factor in the maintenance of a European equilibrium : her statesmen have consistently held that, in spite of the North Sea and the Channel, the "precious stone set in the silver sea" was not secure "against the envy of less happy lands" if a single Power achieved the ascendency of the Continent. To prevent this consummation England waged successful war against Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. And because in the early years of the twentieth century Germany bestrode the European continent like a colossus, it was inevitable that she should find ranged against herself the weight of British public opinion and the resources of British diplomacy. 2 A generation ago, when Anglo-Russian rivalry domi- nated the European situation, it was the fashion to speak of the struggle between the elephant and the whale, and at first sight Anglo-German tension presents a similar aspect. The British Empire is a maritime confederacy, with far- flung battle lines protected by an enormous fleet; Ger- many is primarily a land power, whose strong right arm is the mighty army assembled within her European frontiers. But a closer inspection reveals a situation singularly remi- 1 Lectures on Medieval and Modem History, p. 258. 2 "No nation can maintain the mastery of the continent of Europe as long as a strong and independent England exists on its flank. A nation which strives for supremacy in Europe is bound to attack Great Britain earlier or later. All the rulers from Julius Caesar to Napoleon, who have striven to become supreme in Europe, have made war upon Great Britain." (J. Ellis Barker, Modem Germany, p. 243, edition of 1012.) INTRODUCTION 3 niscent of the eighteenth century. In that period of Euro- pean history Great Britain was repeatedly at war with France for the nominal purpose of preserving the balance of power in Europe, but the actual result of this policy was to make the island kingdom the leading commercial nation of the world, to secure for it the control of the seas in time of war, and to obtain the fairest colonies of France for the extension of her own empire. Similarly, in our own age England abandoned her former friendship for Germany when that Power deliberately challenged Britain's tradi- tional supremacy of the seas, became her doughty com- petitor in the markets of the world, and expressed in no uncertain voice the opinion that Britain possessed far too many of the undeveloped regions of the world, and Ger- many far too few. That England took up the challenge from across the North Sea was due, not to jealousy and envy of Germany, as has been so often asserted, but to the instinct of self- preservation; which, however, did not exclude the possi- bility of an accommodation between the two Powers and did not prevent repeated agreements for the delimitation of their respective ambitions. But in one matter England remained adamant. Drawing the food of its people and the raw materials for its factories from every corner of the globe, and dependent upon its export trade as the staff of life, the United Kingdom was irresistibly driven to main- tain a supreme navy. And that was intolerable to Ger- many after she had ceased to be a congeries of petty states held together in a loose confederation and became in fact the leading nation of the Continent. Furthermore, by the application of science and patience to industrial problems, she developed an overseas trade second only to that of England. Germany therefore argued that she must pos- sess a fleet sufficient to protect her expanding foreign com- merce, lest it should exist on the mere sufferance of the 4 ENGLAND AND GERMANY overwhelming British navy; in spite of the fact that every stage in the development of her fleet was followed by still larger additions to that of England. The colonial situation provided a third element of dis- cord. Colonies serve a nation in various ways. They offer markets, which may be controlled by tariffs, for the surplus products of national industry; they may, with proper management and exploitation, supply the mother country with raw materials for that industry; and under favorable climatic conditions they afford opportunities for settlement to those who do not find the circumstances of life profitable or pleasant, but who wish to preserve their own institutions and their native allegiance in a new land. In the actual organization of the world, Germany possessed almost no colonies suitable for settlement and few terri- tories worthy of exploitation. The British Empire, on the other hand, was spread over a quarter of the globe, em- braced every kind of land, and might, if an imperial pro- tective tariff were adopted, become a self-sufficing, eco- nomic entity from which German competition would be excluded. France likewise possessed a magnificent colo- nial domain in Africa and Asia in which she did not wel- come the German merchant and the German capitalist. Germany must also expand overseas, unless she was to be outdistanced in the economic struggle, which is the basis of modern civilization. It is further to be noted that as in the eighteenth cen- tury the British Empire was pieced together in a fit of absence of mind as the result of British Continental policy, so the maintenance of the balance of power has led to fur- ther increases of the empire in the latest age, increases which were not counterbalanced by the acquisitions of Ger- many. For in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when Great Britain stood more or less aloof from Conti- nental politics, she added Egypt, Burmah, large stretches INTRODUCTION 5 of Africa, and finally the Boer republics to her already vast possessions, not to speak of extending her influence in Af- ghanistan and the Persian Gulf; while Germany had to be content with the least desirable lands in Africa and a few islands in the Pacific. Germany therefore boldly de- manded "a place in the sun." France she despised as a decadent and sterile nation whose colonies were an anomaly; Russia she patronized as an unorganized mass, powerless for either good or evil; Belgium and Holland she perhaps hoped to dispossess of their holdings in Africa and the Far East; but Britain she feared as the great obstacle to the realization of her ambitions. Not that Germany really de- sired to become mistress of certain British colonies; it is more probable that her appetite was to be satisfied by the annexation of North Africa. If France were deprived of this, the richest and most accessible part of her colonial empire, she would be seriously weakened as a European Power and her decline as a great nation sensibly accentu- ated. Germany, in turn, would become a Mediterranean Power, thus laying the foundation of a future supremacy in that sea when the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire should endow her with Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. But the German Government was under no illusions as to the attitude of Great Britain toward such a transaction, which would at once upset the balance of power and en- danger the route to India, and it therefore became the great purpose of German diplomacy to prevent that rap- prochement and friendship between England and France which the statesmen of those countries were bent on achiev- ing. This is the key to that antagonism between England and Germany which finally led to war, and it is truly aston- ishing that, although Germany had learned, first in 1905 and again in 191 1, that England was prepared to resist excessive demands upon France, the imperial chancellor should, on the eve of the war, have asked the British 6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Government to stand aside while Germany appropriated the French colonies. Behind these rivalries of commerce, sea power, and col- onies there loomed the challenge of culture. "Is the world to become English?" was a question frequently to be found in German discussions of international politics. The nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon over every continent, often by means highly questionable from an austere moral standard; more than a million Germans settled in lands whose civilization was essentially English and there preserved but few links with their fatherland; English promised more and more to be- come the world language, so far as that honor was reserved for a particular speech. For generations French culture had enjoyed a wide popularity outside France itself; and even backward Russia was represented in the Balkan penin- sula and the vast expanses of Siberia, not to mention the remnants of Spanish influence from the Rio Grande to the Straits of Magellan. Was there no place for "the German idea in the world"? demanded a well-known Pan-German book of that title. 1 German philosophy long dominated the abstractions of men, the researches of German science were appropriated by all nations, the battles of Sadowa and Sedan were held to establish the superiority of German education, and German discipline and thoroughness were eagerly imitated by the more sluggish but ambitious na- tions. Whatever the precise territorial ambitions of Ger- many, she demanded that no obstacle be raised if she offered her national culture to a world that had shown it- self receptive, and the fact that English influence actually dominated a large part of the non-European world was all the more an incentive for challenging it and for proving the equality of the German spirit. In this connection the profound difference between Eng- 1 Paul Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912). INTRODUCTION 7 lish and German ideals must be recognized. It is doubt- less true, as was often asserted by those who sought to minimize the issues of the Anglo- German quarrel, that no European nations are so near in blood, in mental and phys- ical characteristics, and in the conditions of their economic life as England and Germany. But the parallel can easily be carried too far. For centuries Englishmen have stood forth as the champions of individual liberty, have resented the interference of the state in their private affairs; and, while in recent years a newer ideal of social obligation and the pressure of German competition have compelled them more and more to adopt the corporate theory of life, the national reluctance to discard traditions handed down from generation to generation has been frequently observed. In the mental development of such a people, the idea of com- pulsion obviously can play, and actually has played, but a minor role. In all the great crises of English history the desire for an amicable settlement has ever been to the fore, till the fondness for compromise, and the ability to effect it, has become notorious. And in the nineteenth century a genuine abhorrence of war was instilled into the hearts of Englishmen by statesmen like John Bright and Richard Cobden on the one hand and Lord Salisbury on the other, whose teachings were reinforced by the colossal slaughter of the Crimean War and the mismanagement of the struggle in South Africa. The British Empire has, indeed, waged many wars in the last hundred years, but the vanquished have always been generously treated, and the cause of human freedom has been immeasurably advanced by the exploits of British arms. In Germany, on the other hand, the state has long lorded it over the individual. Prussia has become notorious for regulation and bureaucracy, and her ideas have slowly penetrated the other German states, where, it may be re- marked, there were old traditions of governmental inter- 8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY ference which the Prussian example has galvanized into renewed popularity. Nor can it be denied that the mate- rial prosperity of Germany has been quite as much the result of official guidance as of the zeal and capacity of its people. In fact, "efficiency," as we understand the term, has been forced upon the world by the precept and practise of Germany. From the historical point of view, Germany was neces- sarily a military state. By sheer valor of arms the electors of Brandenburg extended their dominions and created the modern kingdom of Prussia, and the kings of Prussia by similar means accomplished the unification of Germany. It would be surprising if the German, who read in his his- tory how for hundreds of years his fatherland was the parade-ground of foreign armies, did not believe that the new empire must rely upon its military strength alone and be able to resist any kind of attack. And the main- tenance of peace for forty-three years, during which Ger- many ceased to be a mere geographical expression and became a Great Power, was for the German a convincing argument for military preparedness and a thoroughgoing concentration upon the problems of national defense. But there is a sinister aspect to the picture. After 1870 there grew up, first in one, then in another, and ultimately in almost every European country, a suspicion and a fear that united Germany would one day attempt to repeat the exploits of Bismarck, and the reputation for aggressive- ness thus acquired was the most potent factor in the forma- tion of the coalition now in arms against her. Unfortu- nately for every one, Germany did little toward creating a different impression of her policy beyond proclaiming its peaceful character. Rather, she did not hesitate, on numer- ous occasions, to rattle the sabre, till she was persuaded that this was sufficient to enforce her will. Also, she regu- larly took advantage of every ruffle in the international INTRODUCTION 9 situation to increase the strength of her army, and more lately to accelerate the construction of her fleet, with the avowed object of becoming the supreme power on both land and sea. 1 In other words, at a time when most na- tions were asking themselves if war were not out of date, and economically unprofitable, Germany was frankly pro- claiming that force, and force alone, was worthy of con- sideration as the solvent of international difficulties. It will doubtless long be a matter of controversy as to how far the religion of war was accepted by the German people, for the evidence published during the last genera- tion is contradictory. They have been alternately por- trayed, by competent observers, as rabid jingoes and as lovers of peace at any price. General Bernhardi declared that "the political power of our nation ... is fettered externally by its love of peace," 2 and his writing is so far removed from passion or prejudice that his deliberate statement must be considered sincere. On the other side, innumerable writers so freely propounded his doctrine of the duty to make war, albeit without his learning or candor, that a people like the Germans, who are accustomed to have their views on political questions compounded for them by specialists, must have been more or less poisoned by the constant asseveration that might is right. Either thesis can be proved to the satisfaction of one who sets out to do so. The opinion of the present writer is that, if the mass of the German people did not show positive enthusiasm for war as war, they did desire the fruits of war, and that they were less eager to restrain their military leaders than any nation in Europe. In this respect the thoroughly undemo- cratic character of their political institutions gave the mili- tary party an enormous advantage, monopolizing as it 1 "I shall reorganize my navy so that it shall stand on the same level as my army" — which was the most powerful and formidable in the world. (William II, 1 January, 1900.) * Germany and the Next War, p. 12. io ENGLAND AND GERMANY did the high offices of state, and controlling with an iron hand the press and the educational machine, which in other countries create an independent political opinion. It is a significant commentary upon the two countries that the British Government went to war only after taking Parlia- ment into its confidence, while the German Emperor first declared war and then appealed to the country to present a united front. A general view of the situation reveals Germany as the challenging nation. England would have been quite con- tent to let things stand as they were. Mistress of the seas for two hundred years and guarantor of the balance of power in Europe, the mother of many daughter nations, and in consequence of her position in the world rather inclined to ignore the susceptibilities of other peoples, her com- placency received a profound shock by the advent of a Power that demanded recognition as an equal and strove for the means to secure it. The dominant note of English writing anent the controversy with Germany was that of determination to keep the heritage of the past, of insistence upon the status quo. To this point of view it was difficult, not to say impossible, for Germany to accede. "There can be no standing still or stopping for us, no permanent re- nunciation of national expansion: we have to choose be- tween loss of rank among the imperial peoples and a struggle for a place beside the Anglo-Saxons;" 1 in Gen- eral Bernhardi's phrase, "world power or downfall!" 2 If each power held to its course in all stubbornness, war was indeed inevitable. 3 The most tragic feature of the Great War, however, is 1 Rohrbach, Der deutscke Gedanke in der Welt, p. 8. 8 Germany and the Next War, chap. 5. 3 Price Collier remarked that an autocratic, philosophical, and continental race was pitted against a democratic, political, and insular one, and that never the twain should meet. The only remedy, in his opinion, was for them to let each other se- verely alone. Unfortunately, in the conditions of the modern world no nation can live without contact with all other nations. {Germany and the Germans, p. 565.) INTRODUCTION 1 1 that in the two years preceding it Anglo-German relations had "sensibly improved," to use the language of Sir Ed- ward Grey, and that the British Government was willing "to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggres- sive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and [England], jointly or sepa- rately." * Great Britain and Germany had co-operated during the Balkan Wars to restrain their friends or allies, and the peace of Europe had been preserved. The long naval rivalry had been considerably appeased by Admiral von Tirpitz's acceptance of a sixteen-to-ten ratio in the construction of Dreadnoughts ; on the very eve of the war a treaty had been drafted which established a harmony of views as regards the Baghdad railway and African colo- nial questions ; the animosity between the peoples, so long an obstacle to official negotiations, had to a large extent burnt itself out. A few years more and their sound com- mon sense would, one likes to think, have convinced both Germans and Britons that, despite their rivalries in all parts of the globe, the world was large enough for them both. The friendship of the two countries would have become a bulwark for the peace of the world, and British statesmanship might then have addressed itself to the most pressing of all international problems, the reconcilia- tion of France and Germany; after which an alliance of the three Powers would have inaugurated a new era in the history of Europe and of mankind. 1 Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, 30 July, 1014, Great Britain and the European Crisis, no. 101. CHAPTER II MODERN ENGLAND It will be readily admitted, even by those to whom the fact is unpalatable, that since the end of the Napoleonic wars England has been the dominant nation of the world, and that her participation in the Great War will probably be the decisive factor in its length, if not in its termination. Why should so commanding a position belong to a couple of islands whose population was less than that of France (until a few years ago), Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia? For none of these nations has accepted British hegemony as a law of the universe. The answer is to be found in the accidents of history and geography, with which must be reckoned certain traits of character that are the product of free institutions and a peculiar consciousness of national unity. First of all, at the end of the eighteenth century a series of remarkable inventions, for which English genius must receive full credit, transformed England from an agricul- tural into an industrial country and vastly stimulated its already thriving commerce. By chance this revamping of the national life coincided with the French Revolution and the first Napoleonic Empire, a period during which the con- tinent of Europe was devastated by a succession of wars and thereby prevented from imitating the new English system. Though England was an active and the most steadfast participant in the long struggle to crush Napoleon, her territory was not invaded, and her sea power enabled her at once to destroy the foreign trade of the Napoleonic states and to establish her own monopoly in the Americas MODERN ENGLAND 13 and the Far East. When peace was signed in 181 5, the United Kingdom had secured such a lead that in a hundred years no rival nation has overcome it. France was about half a century behind England in appropriating the new industrialism, Germany nearly seventy-five years, and Russia's development has begun in the last generation. If Great Britain is no longer the "workshop of the world," as the Cobdenites of the mid- Victorian period were pleased to call her, she is still the premier industrial state and the richest. But wealth alone, in spite of its power, would not enable her to exercise such preponderant influence all over the world: that she owes to the empire which the seafaring in- stincts of her people have built up in the seven seas. Here the accident that Great Britain is an island assumes ex- traordinary interest. For centuries the sea has been the life of England, and the fact has penetrated deep into the national consciousness. Not, of course, that Englishmen have enjoyed any iron-clad monopoly of the maritime spirit. The fleets of Italian and Hanseatic cities in the Middle Ages, the argosies of Spain, and the merchantmen of Hol- land recall days when England was a self-sufficient island kingdom; and in our own time Greece, Norway, and Ger- many have again shown their flags in the waters familiar to their fathers. But in no people has the tradition of the sea and an appreciation of its importance for the national destiny been so permanent, so abiding, and so all-pervading as in the inhabitants of the British Isles. If the first dis- coverers were Portuguese or Spaniards or Italians, from the middle of the sixteenth century Englishmen were in the forefront of that movement which colonized the New World and brought the Far East into close relations with the markets of Europe. Colonial adventure and explora- tion came as second nature to a race bred to the sea and by virtue of liberal political institutions free to work out so- 14 ENGLAND AND GERMANY cial and economic problems without the interference of a bureaucratic government. Moreover, from the first, the desire to find new markets for English goods never slack- ened. Until the eighteenth century woollen and linen goods were the chief articles of the export trade; after the industrial revolution, when the country was no longer able to subsist on its home-grown food-supply, and when the output of the huge manufacturing establishments far ex- ceeded the domestic demand, it was imperative to find outlets abroad for the commodities which must pay for the imports of food. Thus English commerce made an empire necessary; the hardihood of her seamen and the weight of an enlightened public opinion permitted the gov- ernment to pursue a policy which in the course of three centuries has brought a fifth of the globe and a quarter of its population under the rule of England and her daugh- ter nations. Other peoples have at times been inspired by the imperial ideal — Portugal, Spain, Holland, France — , but their ad- ventures beyond the seas have ever been secondary to their purely European interests, and they lost their colonies because of European complications. Great Britain, as an island, was happily relieved of such embarrassments. Her territory inviolate through the might of her fleet, she could not, on the other hand, extend her boundaries by annexa- tion or conquest, in spite of the innumerable wars to which she was a party lest some Continental nation should be- come dominant in Europe. But she invariably recouped herself by the acquisition of lands in America, Asia, or Africa, till in 1815 she alone of the Great Powers possessed a colonial empire worthy of the name. Thus her geo- graphical situation and the political and economic genius of her people had secured for the United Kingdom an accumu- lation of wealth and a position in the world quite out of proportion to her own human and material resources. MODERN ENGLAND 15 To protect this empire and its commerce, to see that Britannia ruled the waves in time of war, has been the first duty of every British government in modern times. Charles I was able to collect ship money without consent of Parliament in order to renew the fleet which his father James had allowed to fall into decay. The Common- wealth stopped at nothing to secure naval supremacy in home waters and to show the British flag in the Medi- terranean, and the one creditable achievement of Charles II was his insistence on naval efficiency. In 1689 began the intermittent duel with France, which lasted till 181 5; when it was over, the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland had been swept from the seas, and the Congress of Vienna tacitly accepted the maritime supremacy of the state whose resources had enabled the Continental nations to drive Napoleon from Europe. British power was not al- ways wisely used in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- turies, for Holland fell a victim to its jealousy, and in 1807 Denmark had to witness the destruction of her fleet in the harbor of Copenhagen at a moment when she was at peace with England. Likewise the laws relating to capture at sea and the right of search in time of war, which are con- sidered illiberal in many quarters, are based mainly on British practises in the Napoleonic struggle. But, what- ever one may think of the mistress of the seas, her over- whelming ascendency throughout the nineteenth century is the most important fact in the development of her for- eign and colonial policy. Since 18 15 Great Britain has utilized her position to marvellous advantage. At that date only the fringes of Canada, Australia, and Cape Colony had been touched; no settlement had been made in New Zealand. Africa was almost an unknown continent. In India, although the foundations of British power had been laid, the great work of regeneration and reform which has justified British 1 6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY domination was yet to be conceived. How little the possi- bilities of this splendid heritage were appreciated by the mass of Englishmen is the favorite theme of modern im- perialists. For fifty years after the treaties of Vienna, by which Great Britain retained only such conquests as were necessary to control the route to India, the aphorism of Turgot, that colonies were only fruits which fell from the tree when they were ripe, commanded general assent. The grant of self-government to the Canadian and Aus- tralasian colonies was almost welcomed as the preliminary of independence, and the military authorities repudiated responsibility for their defense. Perhaps the mother coun- try was too absorbed with the political and social problems born of the industrial revolution to consider the prospect of a Greater Britain beyond the seas; but the revolt of the thirteen American colonies was still fresh in men's minds and another rule of conduct was hard to imagine. Gradually, however, the old tradition reasserted itself. The enormous increase of population, the expansion of in- dustry under the free-trade system adopted in the 'forties, and the subsequent decline of agriculture in both Great Britain and Ireland kept before the country the problem of food and the necessity of foreign markets. For these reasons Canada and Australasia began to fill up with Brit- ish emigrants and a policy of expansion was pursued in India; coaling-stations or points of strategic value were picked up here and there. The Crimean War was fought to prevent a Russian domination in the Near East, which was conceived to endanger, the Mediterranean route to India. Finally, the genius of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, whose rise from a Jewish obscurity to the leadership of the Conservative party and finally to the office of prime minister reveals one of the most spectacular careers of modern history, endowed Victorian England with the ideal of an empire which should be the greatest political MODERN ENGLAND 17 and civilizing force in the world, provided that empire was conscious of its future and responded to the needs and aspirations of its myriad races and peoples. Nor was the father of modern British imperialism con- tent with fine phrases and lofty speeches. During his sec- ond premiership (1874-80) he inaugurated a policy the results and continuation of which provided British states- men with perplexing problems for nearly thirty years. He bought the Suez Canal for England in 1875, and the following year began to interfere in the financial affairs of Egypt. To South Africa he sent as high commissioner a soldier-statesman who had a vision of the later Union and allowed a subordinate to annex the Transvaal Republic to the British Empire. In 1877 Queen Victoria was pro- claimed Empress of India, an act which gave the people of that land a new sense of loyalty and made possible a spon- taneous and unanimous rally of the Indian princes at the outbreak of the present war. Lord Beaconsfield next in- tervened in the Near East to secure a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano, which promised to make the Balkan penin- sula a Russian protectorate, and when in revenge Russia turned to the Middle East and instigated the Ameer of Afghanistan to resist British pretensions, the challenge was taken up and war declared against the sturdy little coun- try which, in 1839-42, had inflicted notable reverses on British arms. 1 Lord Beaconsfield resigned office in 1880, and died the next year, before he could devise a satisfactory solution for any of the four great problems created by his diplomacy. The new ministry, under Mr. Gladstone, was bound to at- 1 For this and succeeding paragraphs, reference may be made to Ernest L6monon, L' Europe et la Politique britannique, 1 882-191 1, a detailed and impartial study which abounds in quotations from the press and the speeches of politicians; and to Alfred L. P. Dennis, "Tendencies in British Foreign Policy since Disraeli," in Proceedings of the American Political Science Association (1909), a brief but illuminating account of British policy in its broadest aspects. 1 8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY tempt a settlement of some kind in each case, but, because it was not sympathetic with this imperial policy and was not gifted with the imagination of the Conservative leader, it managed to store up much trouble for the future while apparently extricating itself with fair success from difficul- ties not of its own making. How the splendidly conceived plans of Disraeli scored a posthumous victory will be seen in subsequent paragraphs, but for the moment something must be said of Gladstone's efforts to upset them. (i) Many provisions of the " peace with honor" dic- tated at Berlin by Lord Beaconsfield (1878) had not been carried out, for it satisfied neither the Turks nor the Rus- sians, the two most interested parties. With the help of Prince Bismarck, Lord Granville, whose work at the for- eign office is still the subject of controversy, patched up a tolerable solution, but it involved the alienation of Turkey and the abandonment of that pro-Turkish policy which Lord Beaconsfield and many of his predecessors had con- sidered essential for the checking of Russian designs. Yet Great Britain did not win Russian good will by this change of front; rather Anglo-Russian rivalry in Near Eastern politics was quite pronounced until the first years of the twentieth century. (2) The campaign in Afghanistan had resulted badly for the invaders, who were saved from complete destruction only by the famous march of Lord (then Sir Frederick) Roberts to Kandahar. The position was so delicate that in 1881 the British troops were withdrawn and the Ameer was left free to intrigue with the Russians if he desired. The latter interpreted the evacuation as a sign of British weakness. Resuming their aggressive policy, they occupied Afghan territory at Pendjeh in 1885, and war was narrowly avoided by the conciliatory policy of the Gladstone gov- ernment. Not till the new century was British influence fully and definitively asserted. MODERN ENGLAND 19 (3) In South Africa the annexation of 1877 na -d pro- duced bitter resentment among the Transvaal farmers, and rebellion followed. The defeat of a British force at Majuba Hill (February, 1881) strengthened Mr. Gladstone's ob- jections to an imperialistic policy, and the Convention of Pretoria, reinforced by the London Convention of 1884, recognized the independence of the Boer republics. But the last word had not been said, for the problem was closely bound up with Cape Colony and Natal and was not un- connected with the disposition of the surrounding African lands. (4) In Egypt, where the Anglo-French control of finances was working badly, trouble was brewing. In 1882 Arabi Pasha, a colonel in the Egyptian army, organized a revolt, and there was a massacre of Europeans at Alexandria. The Turkish Government showing no disposition to rescue the Western Powers from their predicament (Egypt was an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire), Great Britain decided to intervene. But, recognizing that since Bonaparte's expedition in 1798 France had cherished a strong sentimental interest in the Nile valley and that her financial claims were considerable, Lord Granville invited the Republic to join in the armed demonstration. France refused. If she believed that England would not act alone, she was mistaken. A British squadron bombarded Alex- andria, and in 1883 Sir Garnet Wolseley overthrew the Khedive's army at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, which was followed immediately by the "occupation" of Egypt. But for Great Britain as many problems were created as had been solved. Lord Granville- had incautiously declared that the occupation would end when order had been re- stored, but various circumstances made a fulfilment of this promise impracticable. So the French Government, which was much piqued by the turn of events and bitterly re- gretted its own lukewarmness in the critical days of 1882, 20 ENGLAND AND GERMANY was always able to call attention to this obligation of Great Britain, and in a variety of ways to add to the difficulties under which the British administration of Egypt labored for many years. This hostility and tension, originally local, rapidly envenomed the general relations of France and Eng- land, caused both countries much trouble, and permitted Germany to lord it over the Continent at will till the open- ing years of the twentieth century. Thus Gladstonian diplomacy had secured for England the active opposition of both France and Russia, and had failed to ameliorate the situation inherited from the Bea- consfield government. This was the more unfortunate be- cause the 'eighties and 'nineties witnessed a scramble on the part of the Great Powers for those regions of the world which were open to colonization or exploitation by Euro- pean governments and peoples, viz., most of Africa, parts of Asia, and the islands of the Pacific. And so systematic and regular were the conflicts between Great Britain and the two powers of the Dual Alliance (finally consummated between 1891 and 1896) that Englishmen came to regard these countries as their natural and hereditary enemies, and some confidently predicted that one day the innumer- able quarrels would be settled by the arbitrament of war, which, in fact, more than once loomed on the horizon. The French occupation of Tunis, which was felt to prej- udice British commercial interests; intrigues in Morocco; rivalries in the Congo and Niger basins and elsewhere in Africa, which culminated in the affair of Fashoda; the hostility of English missionaries to the French penetration of Madagascar; English fears that the French conquests in Tonkin and Siam would endanger the northeastern fron- tiers of India and affect British commercial supremacy in the Yangtze valley; disputes about the Newfoundland fisheries which dated back to the Seven Years' War; and the problem of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in MODERN ENGLAND 21 the Pacific — all these show the inflammable character of Anglo-French relations. Twice, in 1893 about a Siamese question, and in 1898, when Lord Kitchener compelled Major Marchand to retire from Fashoda, war seemed pos- sible, if not inevitable. Any of these disputes could have been settled with a little good will on both sides. But when an English statesman (Joseph Chamberlain) dared advise France to "mend her manners," and when the French press daily warned its readers against the wiles of per fide Albion, each government delighted to administer "pinpricks" 1 to the policy of the other and left the direc- tion of world policy to more sensible Powers. With Russia Great Britain had much the same experi- ence. Finding every move in the Balkans blocked by the policy of the British Government, Russia continued her advance in Central Asia, which brought her in time to the frontiers of Afghanistan and India itself. She acquired a preponderant position in Persia, and seemed likely to push on to the Persian Gulf, which for a century had been the special preserve of England. To the latter, who refused to admit Russia's need of an outlet on warm waters, these enterprises betokened but one aim, the invasion of India, an opinion concurred in by Doctor Arminius Vambery, the famous orientalist of the University of Budapest. In the Far East the construction of the Siberian railway across Manchuria foreboded the disintegration of China, where British commercial interests were extensive — a fear accen- tuated by the intervention of France and Russia (with the help of Germany), after the Chino- Japanese War, to com- pel the surrender of Port Arthur by Japan, only that Russia might seize it for herself. Also, Russian intrigues in Tibet promised nothing good for the northern regions of 1 The phrase was used by Sir Edmond Monson, British ambassador to France, in a public speech in Paris on 6 December, 1898, and caused great resentment. Cf. Sir Thomas Barclay, Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906, p. 157. 22 ENGLAND AND GERMANY India. Kipling's phrase about "the bear that walks like a man" expressed accurately the opinion of the man in the street, who incidentally regarded Russian officialdom as synonymous with corruption, inefficiency, and oppres- sion. Here, then, was a situation full of danger for the British Empire if British policy were at any time to become in- transigent. Fortunately for England, her rulers declined to push home the quarrel with either France or Russia, but reserved their attention for another problem. Scarcely had the autonomy of the Boer republics been conceded when the discovery of diamonds brought pro- spectors and speculators by the thousand into the Trans- vaal. Mainly Englishmen, with a sprinkling of Americans, they chafed under the political system of President Kriiger, who compelled them to pay heavy taxes but denied them any share in the government. On i January, 1896, Doctor Leander Starr Jameson and a band of raiders, operating from British territory, led an expedition against the Boer Government, only to be routed and captured. Instead of cutting the Gordian knot, they had tied it tighter, because Boer pride and British stubbornness were stimulated, and the inevitable war broke out in October, 1899. Without discussing the merits of that struggle, it may be remarked that both races learned to respect each other, and came to see that only by co-operation could they pre- serve South Africa for the white race; also, that the war made possible that unification of the land which its en- lightened statesmen had long desired. To Englishmen the war disclosed three very unpalatable facts. (1) It had cost £250,000,000 and more than 25,000 men, yet the grant of self-government to the conquered Boer states con- ceded the very points for which the war had been fought. (2) The efficiency of the British army was called in grave question, and there were rumors that all was not well with MODERN ENGLAND 23 the fleet. (3) The war had revealed an astonishing and un- expected hatred of England, her institutions, and her policy all over the Continent. In France, Russia, Austria, and Germany, especially the last-named, the press had used the most abusive language and had gloated over each re- verse of British arms. It was known that more than one attempt had been made to organize a coalition against Britain, which would, at the very least, have prevented the prosecution of the war in South Africa and might have precipitated the collapse of the whole Empire. It is often said that only a sledge-hammer blow will per- mit a new idea to penetrate an Englishman's consciousness. If so, the recurrent shocks of the Boer War were of great value, for they compelled the country to readjust its polit- ical spectacles. Men began to reject the old conception of imperialism, to see that "the appetite for domination belongs to an outworn phase of patriotism," to apply Mr. Balfour's description of German ambitions. 1 At last the Empire had territory enough, and if that Empire was not to follow the example of its Roman predecessor, which crumbled under the pressure of continuous warfare, its energies must be diverted to the arts of peace and civiliza- tion. The dominant idea encountered in responsible and serious writings of the last decade is that "peace is the greatest of British interests." Englishmen further realized that they could neither ignore the opinions of Continental peoples nor dictate to those nations their principles of conduct, an admission the more galling because for gen- erations past these islanders had judged other men by their own standards, and had, accordingly, either given Conti- nental complications a wide berth or interfered metic- ulously in the affairs of all nations. But for the future England could not shun Europe; on the other hand, her action must be circumspect, her attitude considerate of 1 England and Germany (191 2), p. 7. 24 ENGLAND AND GERMANY the susceptibilities of those with whom she must live in contact. How deeply these new conceptions took root in the pop- ular mind is seen in the failure of the Conservative party, which had made the Boer War and was associated with jingoistic tendencies, to recover power after the disastrous elections of January, 1906. The rise of the Labor party, the tone of the Liberal press, the flood of pacificist litera- ture, the objurgations of Conservative politicians, and the reluctance for war manifested between 23 July and 4 August, 1914, leave no doubt that the temper of twentieth-century England was anything but bellicose. The United Kingdom desired only to be left alone to enjoy the heritage of the past and, if possible, to set an example to the more warlike nations. Not that militarism was entirely disposed of. Lord Salisbury's famous remark, "The living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the seeds and causes of conflict among civilized nations will speedily appear," ! included the suggestion that England should be prepared for any eventuality and afforded a small but noisy party the chance to demand larger mili- tary and naval establishments. But the country was not converted to the gospel of force. Ten years of agitation for a conscript army made but little impression, and the navy was allowed to fall below that two-power standard adopted by the Naval Defense Act of 1889; it was becom- ing increasingly difficult to maintain a full or sufficient per- sonnel on either establishment; and, as will be seen in a later chapter, the government which declared war against Germany resolutely endeavored to keep down the ever- mounting expenditure on armaments. Isolation being impossible, what should be the aim of "a new departure" (Lord Lansdowne's phrase) — by what policy could the British Government perform its duty as 1 Albert Hall, London, 4 May, 1808. MODERN ENGLAND 25 a member of the European community and at the same time do justice to its position as the trustee of a vast em- pire? The diplomacy of Downing Street since the conclu- sion of the South African war would seem to have been dictated by five considerations: the taking of a definite side in the balance of Europe; the settlement of outstand- ing disputes with foreign nations; the reorganization of the military and naval forces of the crown against an attack on the United Kingdom or the Empire; the revival of the concert of Europe; and the development of international arbitration. 1 It will be convenient to treat these tend- encies in reverse order. International arbitration, if not of Anglo-Saxon origin, has been chiefly practised by that race. 2 It dates from 1794, "when England and the United States concluded an arbitration treaty to deal with questions arising under the peace treaty of 1783. ... La Fontaine, the learned his- torian of the subject, estimates that from 1794 to 1900 there were actually 177 instances of this arbitrament, of which he assigns no less than 70 cases as shared in by Great Britain, 56 by the United States, and 26 by France, with other nations relatively nowhere." 3 For our present purpose, the landmark is the Anglo-French treaty of 1903, which, though it reserved from arbitration questions affect- ing the honor, independence, or vital interests of either country, was an important step in advance, in that it has been copied by practically all civilized nations. Great Britain has since negotiated similar treaties with thirteen different governments. It has gone further. In 191 1 it signed with the United States, and its example was fol- lowed by France, a treaty by which any and all differences 1 George Peel, The Future of England, pp. 152-153. 2 For a discussion of the historical origins of international arbitration, see the notes to vol. V of John Bassett Moore, International Arbitrations of the United States. 3 George Peel, The Future of England, p. 156. 26 ENGLAND AND GERMANY arising between the two governments might ultimately be submitted to arbitration. Though the amendments of the United States Senate practically nullified this happy ar- rangement, so that the treaty was not ratified, the good will of Great Britain was demonstrated; so much so that she revised her alliance with Japan to prevent its application against a country with which either party had signed a treaty of general arbitration. Once at least in the new century, thanks to the leader- ship of the British Government, the concert of Europe did yeoman service in the cause of European peace. The out- break of the Balkan War, in October, 191 2, threatened to set all Europe by the ears, for it had long been assumed that the liquidation of the Macedonian problem would bring various Great Powers into the arena. But at the first sign of tension Sir Edward Grey proposed a confer- ence of the ambassadors in London; with their assistance he piloted Europe through the most dangerous crisis that had arisen in fifty years. He had tried to assemble a con- ference in the crisis of 1908-9, and in July, 1914, he made a vain effort in the same direction. Under his direction British policy was true to the teaching of Lord Salisbury, that the concert is "the embryo of the only possible struc- ture of Europe which can save civilization from the deso- lating effects of a disastrous war." With respect to British military policy, the details will be set forth in a subsequent chapter. Here it is sufficient to point out that the whole Empire felt the necessity of an adequate system of defense. Before the war all of the self-governing colonies instituted military training of some description and, with the exception of South Africa, began to create naval forces. So far from this imperial develop- ment being a danger, it promised to become more and more a guarantee of peace, for the British Government had un- dertaken the task of consolidating these scattered outposts MODERN ENGLAND 27 of the Empire's power into an effective enterprise animated by a single ideal. But the price of this direction was the admission of the overseas dominions to the arcana of the foreign office, 1 and, given the diversity of British, i. e., imperial, interests, given the increasing influence of the colonies over foreign policy, it was unthinkable that the Empire should be plunged into war did not the constituent parts thereof believe it necessary and just. The policy of settling extra-European disputes had been begun long before the altered situation in Europe made a conciliatory attitude incumbent on the foreign and colonial offices. The success of this give-and-take policy and the wide range of British interests may be gauged from the one hundred treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements, and exchanges of notes to which the British Government was a party between 1882 and the conclusion of peace with the Boer republics twenty years later. France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Ethiopia, Zanzibar, China, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Brazil make a formidable list of possible antagonists; to have made amicable and satis- factory arrangements with each and all of them is surely a record of which any government might be proud and to which it might point as evidence of its pacific policy. Be- tween 1902 and the outbreak of the present war sixty- seven more agreements of a similar character were con- cluded with twenty-five governments. 2 It is true that most of the disputes so adjusted were petty matters, but after 1902 the same principle was ap- plied to the larger problems of the Empire and its relations to the Great Powers. The first step was to negotiate an 'This was done at the imperial conference of ign, and helps to explain the readiness of the colonies to support the mother country in the present war. 2 A partial list of these agreements is given in Professor Dennis's paper, op. tit., p. 118. The British and Foreign State Papers do not at present extend beyond ign ; for the years 1911-14 the Parliamentary Papers must be consulted. 28 ENGLAND AND GERMANY alliance with Japan, which consolidated Britain's position in the Far East, where the Russian designs on Manchuria were awakening deep suspicion. The same year the Hay- Pauncefote treaty with the United States guaranteed that British interests in the Panama Canal would be protected; while the renunciation of a clearly denned treaty right to share in the construction of that canal earned for England the friendship of the United States and proclaimed that British and American policies in the New World were harmonious. These two momentous bargains left Lord Lansdowne, who had become foreign secretary in No- vember, 1900, a free hand to deal with the European situation. The settlement of the Fashoda affair had cleaned the slate with France; M. Delcasse, the French foreign min- ister, was determined to achieve a reconciliation with Eng- land; and the accession of Edward VII, an ardent lover of France and a prime favorite of the Parisians, was not without bearing on the problem. The arbitration treaty of 1903 paved the way. Finally, on 8 April, 1904, there was signed in London a series of declarations which soon secured a world-wide fame under the name entente cordiale. By far the most important feature was the recognition by France of the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco, so far as Great Britain was con- cerned. Other points referred to Newfoundland, the Niger region, Madagascar, Siam, and the New Hebrides; some secret articles, not published till November, 191 1, elabo- rated the policy of the two governments with respect to Egypt and Morocco. Some of the disputes were of long standing — none involved grave questions of national exist- ence, all were the source of much trouble to both govern- ments and prevented them from presenting a united front in the tense situation developing in Europe. By a few strokes of the pen two eminently wise statesmen relieved MODERN ENGLAND 29 their respective countries of much anxiety and set an ex- ample which proved profitable and contagious. A change of government in England installed Sir Edward Grey at the foreign office in December, 1905; but he was pledged to follow the policy of his predecessor. Accord- ingly, an exchange of notes with Spain in May, 1907, for which the ground had been prepared by the marriage of King Alfonso to Princess Ena of Battenberg, bound the British and Spanish Governments to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic. When Italy was brought into this system by an agreement with France, the Mediterranean, which is the highway of the British Empire, seemed permanently secure. With Egypt practically a British protectorate, and with Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus as naval bases, it was reasonable to suppose that the British fleet could guarantee the safe transit of the grain ships which brought from Russia the major portion of England's food-supply, and insure the free passage through the Suez Canal of the countless liners that bore the commerce of England and India. In Asia, where the difficulties of the British Government had always been great, the situation had been cleared by the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan, who in August, 1905, renewed and extended her alliance with Great Britain. There was no longer any danger of a break-up or partition of China, and the Indian frontier was secure, more especially as the Ameer of Afghanistan had at last accepted freely and fully the proffered friendship of the Indian government. "Scientific frontiers," which were the obsession of Lord Beaconsfield and predicated a "for- ward policy," were no longer necessary. It was therefore possible to negotiate with the Russian Government, which was struggling with revolution at home and saw its inter- ests in the Balkans threatened by its inability to stem the Austro-German advance. Incidentally, St. Petersburg ap- 30 ENGLAND AND GERMANY predated that warnings from London, in 1903, that Japan was in earnest as regards Manchuria had been given sin- cerely and in the true interests of Russia. In the circum- stances of the hour an Anglo-Russian agreement was more than a desideratum, it was a necessity. By the convention of 31 August, 1907, which astonished the world even more than the entente cordiale, both governments agreed to re- frain from intrigues in Tibet, which in the past had been profitable to neither. Afghanistan was declared to be un- der the protection of Great Britain. Persia was divided into three spheres of influence, one (Russian) in the north, one (British) along the Gulf of Oman, and the third, a neutral zone, lying between the other two. By a letter annexed to the convention, Russia recognized the predom- inance of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. The bar- gain merely gave expression to existing facts, but it was worth while to remove all distrust by a frank explanation, and from the English point of view, as it was hoped, to secure a lever against any future move of Russia in those regions. There remained two problems for a constructive British diplomacy to solve. The first, the future of the Near East, was not pressing. Established in the Nile valley, and pro- tected on her flank by the young Balkan states, with which her influence was considerable, Great Britain could be in- different to the expulsion of the Turk from Europe. At the same time she was willing to co-operate in any scheme of reform which would enable the Sick Man to retain Mace- donia, for a forcible solution of that problem might precipi- tate a general European war, which it was the great aim of British policy to avoid. The other task, however, was of appalling difficulty — British relations with Germany. With this Power there was no historical quarrel, for such disputes as had arisen in the last generation had been promptly settled. Until a MODERN ENGLAND 31 few years previous there was a tradition of friendship; any differences belonged to the future rather than to the past. At scarcely any point throughout the world were the two countries in contact, yet their diplomacy was animated by opposing motives, and public opinion on both sides of the North Sea was becoming irritated, suspicious, threaten- ing. And a solution of the enigma was the more impera- tive because Germany was unquestionably the dominant power of the Continent. Were she to assume an attitude frankly and unreservedly hostile to Great Britain, the latter might be called upon to stake her own and her em- pire's existence upon a gigantic struggle with the greatest military machine in the world. The preoccupation of the British foreign office after the Boer War was, therefore, to arrange a modus vivendi with Germany. And precisely because the latter did not, until too late, as it will be the main thesis of this book to show, respond to the overtures of Great Britain, the resources of British diplomacy and the weight of British public opinion were thrown into the scale in favor of those Powers whose interests were also the object of German attack, lest Ger- many by subduing them should be free to concentrate her energies upon a still greater enemy. For this reason Eng- land supported France and Russia in the diplomatic bouts of the decade preceding the Great War. But it will be seen that she made repeated efforts to secure the friend- ship of Germany, and, in the opinion of the present writer, she declared war reluctantly and only because she was convinced that no permanent understanding was possible. The new foreign policy of the British Government was accompanied by a new treatment of certain imperial prob- lems. Speaking generally, there was a reversion to the laissez-faire traditions of the mid- Victorian period. Just as the Whig aristocracy, which controlled England from the Reform Act of 1832 to the Reform Act of 1867, had extended 32 ENGLAND AND GERMANY self-government to such colonies as were ready for full- blown parliamentary institutions, so the Liberal govern- ment, which held office from 1905 to 1915, was quite dis- posed to make large concessions to the national aspirations of the non-English peoples of the Empire. In some cases the concessions were granted under pressure, but they were made, and once made were loyally respected. In 1899 England went to war with the Boer republics of South Africa for reasons that, to say the least, are open to criticism; in course of time she defeated them and took away their independence. Four years after the treaty of peace was signed, the government of Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman had the courage to grant complete self-govern- ment to the late enemies of the crown, even at the risk of placing the English element in South Africa at the mercy of the Dutch majority. What has been the answer ? The reconciliation of British and Boer and, in this supreme crisis of the Empire's history, unswerving loyalty and devotion except on the part of a few misguided irreconcilables. The capture of German Southwest Africa by an Anglo-Boer force, led by General Botha, is surely one of the most dra- matic episodes of modern history, illustrating at once the antithesis between freedom and force and the conclusive superiority of the former. In India and Egypt England has governed by force, and although her rule has been one of tolerance, not of oppres- sion, it has been to some extent resented by the educated classes and the champions of nationality. In keeping with the spirit of the age, Lord Morley, as secretary of state for India, and Lord Kitchener, as British representative in Egypt, made reforms which have introduced those oriental lands to the privileges of self-government, and have shown that the ideal of liberty still rules, as it has made, the Brit- ish Empire. Hence that spontaneous and unanimous offer of their lives and their substance from the seven hundred MODERN ENGLAND 33 princes of India, who might have seized the golden oppor- tunity to sever the imperial connection; hence the refusal of Britain's Mohammedan subjects to be seduced by the attractions of a holy war. As Mr. Asquith recently re- marked, England is "now gathering in, in the hour of trial, the fruits of a wise and far-sighted imperial policy." 1 Best of all is the case of Ireland. After a century of agitation a British Government has conceded Home Rule, with what magnificent response from a grateful Ireland Germany knows to her own confusion. "I say to the gov- ernment that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the south will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the north." 2 In these words, ut- tered in the House of Commons on 3 August, 19 14, John Redmond produced his best argument for the cause he had so long advocated. On paper the British Empire is not an empire at all. There is no single authority for the vast dominions which acknowledge the Union Jack. The interests of the com- ponent parts are by no means identical; in many cases there are actually conflicting interests which, on the eve of the Great War, threatened to strain the loose-jointed imperial fabric to the uttermost. In the self-governing dominions the forces of nationalism seemed to point away from a contracted imperialism. There was no imperial army, the navy was in large measure the creation of the United Kingdom. All attempts to create an imperial ex- ecutive or an imperial legislature were defeated by the opposition of mother country and colonies alike. A few years ago it was difficult to discover any common bond which held the entire empire together, and many compe- 1 Guild Hall, London, ig May, 1915. J 5 Bansard, kv, c. 1829. 34 ENGLAND AND GERMANY tent and experienced observers gave expression to the fear that it would not stand the test of a great European war. With the world in the crucible, nothing is more aston- ishing than the unity of the British Empire and the en- thusiasm of the outlying parts for the successful prosecu- tion of a war waged far from their immediate touch. When one considers the haphazard imperial organization of the past and remembers the reluctance of the self-governing dominions to place their armed forces at the disposal of the British Government, it is evident that beneath the surface there has lain dormant a subtle and elusive spirit which defies calculation and responds only to the call of an all- pervading ideal. The British Empire is assuredly fighting for its interests, but it believes that it is also struggling for something greater and more ennobling, human liberty and humanity itself. As a French writer has said: "La con- quete a pu fonder l'Empire. C'est la liberte qui le main- tient." l ] Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Revue des Deux Monies, i January, 191 2, p. 85. CHAPTER III THE GERMAN EMPIRE "The new German Empire is the most perplexing quan- tity in the modern world, and as unavoidable as it is per- plexing." 1 So wrote an English observer two years be- fore the war. That Germany was unavoidable the war itself is proof. And it may be fairly asked whether the war has made her any the less perplexing. Americans at least have not ceased to wonder why a nation which had kept the peace for forty-three years, and had reached a dizzy height of wealth and prosperity within that period, should risk this solid achievement by an appeal to the sword, and that, too, in an issue not of immediate concern to itself. Never was it more true that "the roots of the present lie deep in the past." Nearly seventy years ago, or, to be precise, in 1848, Germany bore little resemblance to the mighty empire of to-day. The land still merited the name of "the Ger- manies," as the French, with their aptness for accurate expression, had long called it. Divided into thirty-eight states, and possessed of only a shadowy union in the confederation established by the Congress of Vienna, it was a prey to particularism and local jealousies, which were kept alive, on the one hand by autocratic Austria, and on the other by lesser princes who feared the growing prestige of Prussia and her traditions of aggression. The idea of German nationality was not popular in high polit- ical circles; it was cherished by a handful of professors and 1 G. H. Perris, Germany and the German Emperor, preface, p. v. 35 36 ENGLAND AND GERMANY historians, who painted the glories of the mediaeval em- pire or glorified the un-German development of Prussia in the last two centuries. Suddenly, as by a miracle, liberal sentiment, which, though repressed by the system of Met- ternich, had not evaporated, produced a revolution that forced the proudest monarchs, Frederick William IV of Prussia and Ferdinand I of Austria, to grant constitutions to their dissatisfied subjects, and sought, by means of a national assembly, to transform the broken confederation into a united Germany governed by its democracy. Almost overnight Germany became a nation, in the sense that it was animated by a definite ideal of union and liberty. That movement failed, for reasons that need not here be adumbrated, but amid the welter of those years, 1848 and 1849, two incidents stand out boldly. First, King Fred- erick William, on the outbreak of the troubles, proclaimed that Prussia was henceforth merged in Germany. Sec- ond, relying on the royal promise, the democracy of Ger- many, assembled in the Frankfort Parliament, offered to him the imperial crown which should be the symbol of a new and free fatherland. The vacillating monarch de- clined the offer, if for sound Prussian reasons; but for Germany a unique opportunity was lost. The particular- ist spirit of the lesser princes had been broken, their gov- ernments had collapsed, and a great king would have found in the Frankfort assembly the force required to deal with the ambitions of Austria, who essayed to preserve indefi- nitely a disordered Germany subservient to her own in- terests. It was not to be. Democracy had played its hand and lost. For the future, blood and iron, not parliamentary majorities, the genius of Otto von Bismarck, and not the theories of 1848, must prevail. By the might of Prussian arms, wielded in three successful wars against Denmark, THE GERMAN EMPIRE 37 Austria, and France, the King of Prussia became German Emperor, and Prussia herself not only the bulwark of German union but the model according to which the other states of Germany were invited to fashion their own life in all its details. It is worth while to inquire (1) what this has meant for Germany and (2) how far Prussia has suc- ceeded in her self-imposed task; for the modern German Empire is not the creation of the German people, who long disliked and distrusted Bismarck and his coadjutors and were reconciled to their work only after the glittering tri- umphs of the three wars. It is notorious that the old Germany was highly ideal- istic, cultured, cosmopolitan. It was largely responsible for the Protestant Reformation, it produced some of the world's greatest philosophers, musicians, and men of letters : Leibnitz, Kant, Beethoven, Goethe, to name but a few of the illustrious galaxy of men who made German culture the heritage of the human race. But this liberal spirit, which was never concentrated in one capital, such as Paris or London, and thereby struck deep roots in the German character, was unconcerned with political affairs. The spectacle of a Goethe who was not humiliated by the Napo- leonic conquest of Germany suggests, indeed, an abnormal view of life. Not until the nineteenth century did Ger- man thought attempt seriously to cope with the problems of internal disunion or foreign intrigue. Its remedy was parliamentary government, but the revolutions of 1848 showed the futility of such ideas; so that it was left for Bismarck, by seizing a tradition of order, discipline, thor- oughness, and frankly material aims, to lead the German nation out of the shadows of the Holy Roman Empire and the Confederation of 181 5 to the reality of a Prussian- governed autocracy. Since 1871 Germany has been in the iron grip of Prussia. 38 ENGLAND AND GERMANY For under the imperial constitution the governing force is the Bundesrath, which is an assembly of delegates from the confederated governments, and the votes are so ar- ranged that Prussia's will is, for all practical purposes, law. The chancellor and his ministers take their orders from the Emperor, to whom alone they are responsible. The Reichstag, though elected by universal suffrage, which was Bismarck's one concession to the spirit of the age, in theory holds the purse-strings, but, since no taxes can be changed without the consent of the Prussian Government, it is really little more than a debating society and sits powerless in the palace guarded by the statue of Bismarck. Five times since the foundation of the Empire has the Reichstag been dissolved for resistance to the imperial will, and in each election the opponents of the official policy have been pilloried as traitors and invited to leave a country they could not appreciate. It is scarcely too much to say that there is no way for the people of Germany to limit the ac- tion of their government except by open rebellion, against which the memories of 1848, a standing army of nearly 1,000,000 men, and an omnipresent and omnipotent bu- reaucracy have hitherto operated as effective restraints. This ascendency of the executive over the legislature has not passed unchallenged, for the Radical and Socialist parties protest against it. The latter, in particular, realiz- ing clearly that political reform must precede any social revolution, has for years demanded a responsible ministry, freedom of speech and of the press, control of war and peace by the Reichstag, and the other concomitants of a democratic state; all of which are anathema to the govern- ing classes. Bismarck endeavored to repress the agitation by harsh legislation, Emperor William has violently de- nounced its supporters as grumblers and traitors, but with each general election the movement has gathered force. THE GERMAN EMPIRE 39 But for their refusal to co-operate with the other opposi- tion parties, whom they despise as representing the black- coated and white-collared classes, the socialists would long since, on paper, have become a menace to the self-perpetu- ating government they profess to abhor. ADVANCE OF SOCIALISM Year Total vote Socialists Percentage Seats in Reichstag 1890 1893 1898 7,228,560 7,674,000 7,757,7oo 9,495,586 11,262,800 12,206,806 1,127,300 1,786,700 2,107,076 3,010,771 3,259,000 4,250,329 10. 11 19-74 23-30 31-71 28.94 34-82 35 44 56 81 43 no 1903 1907 1912 Many competent students looked forward to the day when the socialist avalanche should overturn the auto- cratic system, and it is not impossible that the fear of this eventuality was among the factors which induced the im- perial government to precipitate a war that promised to end speedily in a resounding triumph. But such estimates of the situation overlooked three important facts. First, to make the chancellor responsible to the Reichstag would endanger Prussia's supremacy in Germany, for, under the existing arrangements, he is always the Prussian prime minister. The commons of England had to cut off the head of one king and drive his son from the throne to secure even partial control of the executive; France, since 181 5, has indulged in three revolutions for the same end. Let the Reichstag choose the chancellor, and that mouth- piece of the Emperor may well be the bitter opponent of the Prussian King. Before granting such a concession, the Emperor is more likely to follow the advice of a well- 40 ENGLAND AND GERMANY known Conservative and send a lieutenant with ten men to "close up the Reichstag." 1 Second, by no means one-third of the German people are Socialists. Most of those who voted the Socialist ticket in the Reichstag elections did so to protest against the government's policy and not against the government, which was chiefly criticised for its vacillating conduct of foreign affairs. Not more than a million genuine Social- ists paid dues to the party organization; the other three millions were well aware that the Socialist programme was not a matter of practical politics, and if its realization had seemed probable they would promptly have rejoined one of the national parties. r Third, the Socialist members of the Reichstag have never really joined issue with the government. They have talked vaguely about disarmament and have rendered lip homage to the principle of arbitration, but they have always voted for the vast appropriations demanded for increasing the army and navy, which the government, cleverly enough, raised at the expense of the middle and upper classes. Thus the Socialists were able at once to save their prin- ciples and to further the national policy which could be represented as purely defensive. It is well to remember that after the Morocco crisis of 191 1 Herr Bebel, the So- cialist leader, declared that if Germany were attacked he would shoulder his musket and go to the front like all other good Germans. The Socialists accepted as fully as the other parties the necessity of national expansion, and to expect, as some writers have done since the war began, that they would raise their voices against a war upon which the future of German expansion depended, was to associ- ate with them a philosophy of conduct which they never promulgated and never accepted. For this very reason 1 Herr von Oldenburg, quoted by F. W. Wile, Men Around the Kaiser, p. 94 \ THE GERMAN EMPIRE 41 they never accorded their sympathy to the propaganda of Jaures and the French syndicalists, who aimed at creating an international solidarity among the working classes that would render mobilization a farce. But not only has popular control been excluded from the German constitutional system: south and non-Prussian Germany have been deprived of any real voice in the con- duct of affairs, and these regions, traditionally rather liberal and easy-mannered, have in no small degree been infected by the Prussian spirit. According to Prince Biilow, whose Imperial Germany is an admirable statement of the Prus- sian official doctrine, German idealism has been in this fashion tempered by Prussian realism. Both are neces- sary for Germany, so that the government rules in Prussia with the help of the Conservative party, in the Empire with the support of liberalism. From the fusion of these two elements a national spirit is being evolved which will preserve the united fatherland from both the black peril of clericalism and the red peril of socialism. But he is thoroughly convinced that Prussia must bear the brunt of the burden. That proud kingdom, he says very fitly and succinctly, "always has been, and still is, a nation of soldiers and officials," l and it could not well be otherwise. Prussia is not a geographical necessity, as is France or Italy, but an artificial patchwork of lands without natural limits on either eastern or western frontiers. Nor is it the heir of a great historical tradition, which provides Austria-Hun- gary with an excuse for existence. Three hundred years ago the Hohenzollerns ruled but the Mark of Brandenburg, a small district lying mainly between the Elbe and the Oder, and two small provinces in south Germany. Thus the Prussian state of our time is the creation of half a 1 Imperial Germany, p. 227. 42 ENGLAND AND GERMANY dozen warrior kings and a few more statesmen of tran- scendent ability. In the middle of the seventeenth century the Great Elector found himself possessed of disjointed dominions stretching from Konigsberg to the Rhine. He therefore got rid of the mediaeval estates which restricted his abso- lute authority, and established a standing army out of all proportion to the number of his subjects but abundantly useful for the acquisitive policy he elected to pursue. From the great principles thus laid down his successors have never departed. Reduced to a science and success- fully applied by Frederick William I (1713-40) and Fred- erick the Great (1740-86), they did not save the kingdom from the Napoleonic onslaught and the humiliation of Jena (1806). A new era seemed to open in Prussian history when, on 22 May, 181 5, Frederick William III promised his people a constitution. But, under the influence of Metternich, the promise was speedily forgotten till vividly recalled by the revolution of 1848. At the end of that episode Fred- erick William IV granted a constitution which is still the public law of Prussia. This instrument was framed in the atmosphere of absolutism, and the King, in opening the first Diet, declared that he would never let a scrap of paper stand between him and his divine mission to govern the people of Prussia. The real power was left in the hands of the King, who appointed the ministry and re- tained complete control of the army. The legislature, though elected nominally by universal suffrage, was ren- dered harmless by the three-class system. The largest tax- payers, who together pay one-third of the taxes, form one class; the next largest class, paying another third, form a second class; and the rest of the voters a third. Each class in a constituency chooses the same number of electors, who in turn choose the deputy; the rich and the well-to-do in- THE GERMAN EMPIRE 43 evitably control the Diet. At the election of 1908 the system worked as follows: Party Votes Seats earned Seats obtained Social Democrats 598,522 499,343 404,343 354,786 318,589 120,593 63,612 112 94 76 67 60 22 11 7 104 19 152 65 36 60 Catholic Centre Nationalists Conservatives National Liberals Radicals Free Conservatives Total 2,360,247 443 443 As the Conservatives support the government unreservedly, there is no outlet or hope for democracy. Despite the liveliest discontent, the system has withstood all attacks, and the laws of the Medes and Persians were not more sacred than this antiquated franchise in the eyes of the privileged voters. And even if the Conservatives should go into opposition, a thing unthinkable, the government could, as Bismarck did from 1863 to 1866, rule without the Diet by means of the army. Thus, in spite of the autonomy left to the other confed- erated states by the constitution of 1871, the control of Prussia over Germany is complete, which, to be sure, is merely the logic of history. Furthermore, that control is vested, not in the Prussian people, but in an autocratic government operating through the most efficient and highly organized bureaucracy in the world. Recruited, at least in its higher ranks, from those classes which have profited most from the enlightened absolutism of the past — the land- » x ,- owners, the capitalists, and the military — this bureaucracy^ resents the slightest concession to democracy. Number- ing more than two million officials, it regulates the life of 44 ENGLAND AND GERMANY the land to the last detail; so that the cities are uncannily! clean, the schools hall-marked for efficiency, and more I things forbidden by ubiquitous notices than are dreamed j of in our American philosophy. That the German people/ like this all-pervading governance, and, in fact, need its direction, has often been asserted, is probably true, and, true or not, is of no immediate concern to the outside world. But we are bound to observe that the deadening traditions of acquiescence in official action play into the hands of the government and permit it to march serenely along the course it has staked off, especially in foreign affairs. Similarly, the German press is sharply differentiated from that of Great Britain or the United States, which subjects every act of government to meticulous criticism and creates that public opinion upon which free government is ulti- mately dependent. It would be a great mistake to suppose that all German newspapers are inspired by government departments or subsidized from secret funds; on the con- trary, many of them are exceedingly outspoken, and con- victions for Use-majeste are quite common. But, generally speaking, the function of German newspapers is to set forth a view of men and events that will aid and abet the plans matured in official circles; so that public opinion is rather a lever in the hands of the government than a check upon its activities — is, as it were, made to order and regu- lated according to the necessities of the moment. Espe- cially has this been true in times of international crisis, when the tone of the press invariably reflects the attitude of the foreign office. The leading publicists are professors in the state-controlled universities, retired officials and military men, or aristocratic and titled landowners, all of whom are by tradition committed to the existing system. Against such forces a free-lance like Maximilian Harden, or the So- cialist journals, tilt in vain. In the great reviews there is THE GERMAN EMPIRE 45 rarely an interpretation of international problems from any point of view not exclusively German; whereas reputable English periodicals have never hesitated to publish articles by foreigners bitterly denouncing British policy and all its works. Internal politics are, indeed, discussed with more freedom, but, when all is said, the imperial government seldom allows itself to be deflected from its policy by press utterances. It may therefore be said, in answer to the first of our two questions, that Prussian ascendency has pretty thor- oughly obscured any recollections of liberalism which may have survived the Bismarckian triumphs of half a century ago; whatever Germans may think, Americans cannot re- gard the loss of political liberty as desirable, even though efficiency and thoroughness are acquired in its place. As regards the second question, it was indubitable, before the war, that Prussian policy had not stimulated the real unity of Germany, despite the gilded trappings of the imperial edifice. "Bismarck," says the English publicist quoted at the beginning of this chapter, "found his country politically anarchic but morally united; he left it with a semblance of political union and a plague of moral anarchy that has become increasingly evident since the veil of his person- ality has been removed from the facts." 1 With every al- lowance for the Englishman's prejudice, the charge rings, true across the fifty years that have elapsed since the great chancellor entered the Prussian ministry. Then men were willing to sacrifice everything for German unity; on the eve of the present war sectionalism and class feeling were rampant. The Germans themselves admit it. Are we not told, in private letters and public despatches, that the war has generated a feeling of unity hitherto unknown? Germany, like ancient Gaul, is divided into three parts. East of the Elbe lie the Mark of Brandenburg and the old 1 Perris, Germany and the German Emperor, p. 276. 46 ENGLAND AND GERMANY duchies of East and West Prussia. Won by the sword in the Middle Ages, and retained by the energies of German colonists, these lands are the heart of the Prussian mon- archy. They are thinly populated, given over to agricul- ture, and dominated by the landed nobility, who exercise quasi-feudal privileges. These gentlemen are described by Bismarck himself, who was one of them and knew the breed, as "the most reactionary class in Europe." De- voted to king, army, and church, whether Lutheran or Catholic, they are the pillars of the autocracy and look with bitter contempt upon the ravages of modern indus- trialism. Along the Rhine are the provinces secured by Prussia during the Napoleonic wars. Here are located the great industries which are the glory of modern Germany, here social democracy, the eternal enemy of junker priv- ilege, has been most formidable and assertive. Then there is non-Prussian Germany. In south Germany, which joined the empire reluctantly in 1871 (the Prussian spirit was distasteful to its more liberal and democratic ideas), Prussianization has made considerable progress, for it has been found conducive to material prosperity and Catholic interests. But in the provinces acquired by Prussia in the last century — Posen, populated chiefly by Poles; Schles- wig-Holstein, containing a number of irreconcilable Danes; and Alsace-Lorraine, with its cherished remembrances of the more liberal French rule — a Prussianizing policy has egregiously failed, as every such policy must fail which sins against the undying facts of national life and character. Finally, across the whole empire there looms the shadow of the Catholic Church, roused to life by the Bismarckian Kulturkampf and indifferent to ordinary political animosi- ties, but ever ready for any bargain that will advance her interests; with the curious result that for thirty years the Protestant government of a Protestant empire has main- tained a majority in the Reichstag only with the help of THE GERMAN EMPIRE 47 the Centre or Catholic party ! This, too, in spite of Prince Billow's argument that Prussia's mission is to preserve Germany from socialism and clericalism. 1 This lack of real unity is at the bottom of the autocratic regime imposed upon Germany. "We are not a political people," constantly asseverates Prince Bulow of his coun- trymen, and it is intelligible that German statesmen, re- calling the long centuries of disunion and weakness, should be unwilling to test the new-born unity by experiments in self-government. Not unnaturally, perhaps, have they argued that the age-old centrifugal forces could be obliter- ated only by the power, dominion, and majesty of the Prus- sian state, and that the transformation could not be speedily accomplished. They have yet to learn that self-government and national unity go hand in hand, and that sectionalism has been perpetuated precisely because the non-Prussian regions distrust the Prussianizing policy of the imperial government. Thus events move in a vicious circle, the slightest manifestation of a provincial spirit being coun- tered by the application of more rigorous Prussian methods. The treatment of the conquered provinces fearfully illus- trates the bankruptcy of Bismarckian and Guilelmian state- craft. Until the Iron Chancellor conceived the idea of Germanizing the province of Posen by expropriating the lands of the Polish inhabitants and forbidding the use of the Polish language, the Poles were loyal subjects of Prussia who appreciated the blessings of ordered government in comparison with the harsh treatment of their brethren in Russian Poland. At a cost of $120,000,000 the Prussian Government has established 110,000 Germans in the prov- ince, but their presence has been useless to the cause of Teutonism, and the Poles have become not only martyrs to the idea of nationality but actually dominant in eco- nomic as well as political affairs. Prince Bulow himself, 1 Imperial Germany, part 2, chap. 2, "National Views and the Parties." 48 ENGLAND AND GERMANY while ardently supporting the official policy, admits that it has failed — and can suggest no alternative but more of the same diet! 1 In Alsace-Lorraine inconsistency has been added to stu- pidity. In the opinion of the writer, Bismarck was justi- fied in demanding the provinces from France in 1871, for, if Napoleon III had been victorious in the war, he would have extended the French frontier toward the Rhine at the expense of Germany. But the official ground for the annexation was that the people of Alsace and Lorraine were German in descent and feeling, and must therefore belong to a united Germany. If so, were they not entitled to be treated like other non-Prussian Germans? Like the Bavarians, for instance, who, although enemies of Prussia in the war of 1866 and unwilling partners in the enterprise of 1870, were allowed to retain autonomy and the emblems of their historical sovereignty ? But no. The Alsatians and Lorrainers, transferred against their will, were treated like Frenchmen and subjected to the full force of Prussian bureaucratic methods. To their persistent de- mand for self-government, which would have reconciled them to their new allegiance, no adequate answer was ever given, for the constitution of 191 1 preserved the reality of power in the hands of the Statthalter, who was appointed by the Emperor. If German statesmen had not been so unwilling to learn from English experience, a reluctance born of their horror of parliamentary government, they would have at least conceded to the provinces privileges similar to those granted to Quebec in 1774, which have kept a population of bigoted French Catholics splendidly loyal to the British crown. It is impossible to say whether the people of Alsace-Lorraine desired reunion with France, but no one will assert that they were satisfied with the Prussian regime that culminated in the affair of Zabern. 1 Ibid., chap. 4, "The Eastern Marches." THE GERMAN EMPIRE 49 In the autumn of 1913 an ardent lieutenant of the gar- rison reviled the inhabitants of Zabern for their attach- ment to France, and when the compliment was returned by the populace, he took to shopping under an escort of soldiers with fixed bayonets. One day he struck with his sabre a lame shoemaker who brushed him in the street. An uproar followed, martial law was proclaimed, and the colonel of the regiment threatened to "shoot up" the town. A man was arrested for laughing, and also several govern- ment officials who protested against the supersession of the civil authority. The climax was reached when a court martial exonerated the officers involved, and formally sus- tained the pretensions of the military; while the gallant colonel received the Order of the Red Eagle. Moltke, who in 187 1 demanded Metz for military reasons, said that the provinces might be reconciled in fifty years; after Zabern all signs of friendliness disappeared, and the return of the Tricolor seems to have been enthusiastically hailed in Alsace. The supreme test of statesmanship is the ability to gov- ern well and to their own satisfaction a helpless and con- quered people, and judged by this standard the German imperial system has ignominiously failed. To Americans, with an ancient heritage of self-government and political freedom, it is almost unintelligible why autonomy, which breeds loyalty and contentment, should have been denied to Prussian Poland and Alsace-Lorraine. But German polit- ical philosophy demands formal connection with and con- trol by the central government of all phases of the national life, and behind this conviction, it must be admitted, there lies the peculiar history of Germany, which is in marked contrast to the slow and orderly, almost paradoxical, evo- lution of England. The Norman conquest saved the island state from the worst evils of feudalism, and precisely because the English SO ENGLAND AND GERMANY king during the Middle Ages was able to maintain order and to rest his military and financial system on sound principles, he could concede to his subjects privileges and liberties which the more absolute monarchs of the Continent were bound to regard with abhorrence. In the fulness of time a Parliament grew up and waxed strong, which was the king's most valiant support as long as he respected its rights, as was apparent when the brilliant Tudor mon- archs of the sixteenth century erected a despotism prac- tically with the consent of Parliament. Then, with this despotic machinery to hand, the Stuarts endeavored to dispense with Parliament altogether, but they found, to their sorrow, that the liberties of Englishmen were far stronger than any power the crown might secure, and their fate we know. Since then the inalienable rights of Parlia- ment and people have remained secure against all attacks. On the other hand, even in the palmy days of the Holy Roman Empire, the Emperor never exercised absolute power. Feudalism ran its logical course in Germany, as in no other country, for it managed to destroy the effective power of the central government, which alone could pro- tect the land against oppression and misgovernment by a host of princes now responsible to no higher authority. In such a system, or the lack of it, there was no place for popular rights, so that in 1848 the Frankfort assembly had to waste six precious months in elaborating the funda- mental rights of the German nation. Not until very re- cent times was there in Germany any strong authority which could satisfy the needs of the German people. When order was finally evolved out of chaos by the will of a single state, and Germans were thereby enabled to achieve internal peace and material prosperity, it is small wonder that they hastened to idealize and deify the state as some- thing above themselves, upon whose strength and power their own happiness depended. The very failure of the THE GERMAN EMPIRE 51 movement of 1848, based as it was on the attempt to in- troduce English practises into Germany, and the resound- ing triumphs of 1864, 1866, and 1871 compelled a belief in power and force and war. And an English scholar ad- mits that "only a powerful state could disregard the grum- blings of that provincial patriotism which was still so deeply rooted in the German character, or could face with equa- nimity the international situation created by Bismarck's policy of blood and iron." J The most vivid expression of the doctrine of power is to be found in the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke, who from 1874 to 1895 was professor of history in the Uni- versity of Berlin. Owing to the profound respect and ap- proval with which professorial utterances are received in Germany, the occupant of this chair has a unique oppor- tunity to obtain a hearing; his position is decidedly more inportant than in America is the presidency of Harvard or Columbia University. Treitschke was also the editor of the Preussische Jahrbucher, which is the German equiva- lent of the North American Review. His teachings were not less calculated to please because he was by birth a Saxon, and in his earlier years, before the wars of unification, had been an advocate of liberal institutions. He had, as it were, accepted the logic of events, and adjusted his polit- ical theories to the new situation. He was, however, no toady. Deeply versed in ancient and modern history, he tried to formulate his conclusions on the basis of human, or rather national, experience. Nor is it always easy to refute his argument, as when he says that "the state is the public power of offense and defense," 2 that is, it ex- ists to administer justice and to make war. At the time 1 H. W. Carless Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, p. 134. Though written after the outbreak of the Great War, the book is a fine piece of scholarship and treats Treitschke with considerable sympathy. 2 Mr. Davis's translations have been generally used; occasionally I have bor- rowed from A. L. Gowan, Selections from Treitschke's Lectures on Politics, 1014. 52 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Treitschke wrote, such were the chief and almost the only functions of the state. It must also be remembered that he did not propose to elaborate a system of politics suitable to all peoples under all conditions; he wrote for Germans, and he sought to interpret their problems from the German point of view. If he was often prejudiced, especially against English practises and institutions, he must be given credit for entire sincerity and frankness. The extent of his influ- ence in contemporary Germany is a matter of dispute. In his lifetime he was certainly the most noted apologist of the Bismarckian system, his theories found much favor with Pan-German writers after his death, and his inter- pretation of history was boldly appropriated 'by General Friedrich von Bernhardi for his Germany and the Next War; his ascendency among German political thinkers was also assumed by the late Professor Cramb in his Germany and England. But Mr. Sidney Whitman, whose experience of Germany goes back fifty years, states that Treitschke's in- fluence has been on the wane for some time. 1 The point is perhaps immaterial, for his work had been done. He preached to the generation which now dominates Germany, and the doctrines he popularized have been highly regarded since the foundation of the empire. The gist of his teaching, as exemplified in the Politik and as already suggested, is that the state is power. "Of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against the Holy Ghost." All other purposes are subordinate to the acquisition of power, which, in plain language, means the ability to make war. For without war, which "is the only remedy for ailing nations, " as well as the instinct of mighty peoples, the state cannot indulge "the craving to impress the seal of its nature upon barbaric lands"; nor without war will Germany be able to acquire the colonies 1 " Germany's Obsession," Fortnightly Review, October, 1914. THE GERMAN EMPIRE 53 upon which her future depends. Consequently, the mecha- nism of the state must be ordered with the view of conduct- ing a successful war. That is to say, individual rights, except the privilege of independent thought, cannot be tolerated, for they may conflict with the highest interests of the state, which the individual cannot appreciate. "On principle the state does not ask how the people is disposed; it demands obedience : its laws must be kept, whether will- ingly or unwillingly. It is a step in advance when the silent obedience of the citizens becomes an inward, rational consent, but this consent is not absolutely necessary." "With reference to the best form of state, all that the historian can assert without presumption is that, since the state is primarily power, the form of state which will take the government into its own hands and make itself inde- pendent best fulfils the idea." Parliamentary government, which he admitted was admirably suited to eighteenth- century England, he disliked because the parties indulged in a struggle for office; it worked in England only because there was no difference of principles between the parties, both of which were aristocratic to the core. But in Ger- many, where " the kingship is almost the only force of polit- ical tradition which unites our present with our past" and where parties profess different principles that are irrecon- cilable, parliamentary government is ridiculous. The ex- istence of the German state demands that any discrepancy between king and ministers be promptly reconciled, "how- ever inconvenient this may be for the ministers concerned." In fine, the idea of popular government is in contradiction with the whole imperial system. "We have reason to congratulate ourselves that we do possess a vigorous mon- archical civil service, which, in virtue of its own services, of its social position, and also of the authority of the crown, has a real and absolute importance. We have no ground whatever for wishing that it should be otherwise." Mon- 54 ENGLAND AND GERMANY archy, in short, is the best lorm of government, for Ger- many at any rate, because "the will of the state is repre- sented by one single individual," whose authority "is not transmitted, but rests on its own right." The monarch will be supported by the aristocracy, who, Treitschke says, must be maintained by the masses. "The masses will always remain the masses. There can be no culture with- out the masses." They may rind "a certain superficial consolation from universal suffrage," but the nobility must do the governing, for they, and they alone, possess that will to rule which is the first principle of power. Such, in brief and very inadequate form, is the philo- sophic justification of the German autocratic government, which has ever been indifferent to justification. The German people, as a whole, have no complaint about its working, and the very limited success of parliamentary government in countries outside of England does not sug- gest that it would be more suitable to Germany where every tradition is against it. There is, then, no ground for ridiculing or abusing Germans for not trying a system for- eign to their history, and probably abhorrent to their char- acter, which has always required leadership, direction, command for adequate development or assertion. But when the cult of power breeds an excessive devotion to distasteful ideals, it is necessary to repudiate the premises from which such conclusions follow and to express the belief that the extension of this system of life and political or- ganization beyond the confines of Germany cannot only rouse no enthusiasm, but demands our hearty disapproval. The second Prussian tradition, militarism and the re- ligion of war, which is the concrete expression of the doc- trine of power, finds no little justification from a historical point of view. The annals of the Hohenzollerns, from their purchase of the Electorate of Brandenburg in 141 5 to the THE GERMAN EMPIRE 55 proclamation of the new empire at Versailles in 1871, are/ synonymous with military prowess : the two black episodes of Prussian history should convince even the antimili- tarist that military weakness is the prelude to national dis- grace and humiliation. In 1806 Napoleon shattered the inefficient Prussian army at Jena and proceeded to parti- tion the kingdom. In 1850, when Austria had crushed the revolutionary movements in her own territories, she de- manded that Prussia forego her plans for a German state under her direction and consent to the re-establishment of the old Confederation of 181 5; and because of her military unpreparedness, Prussia was constrained to yield. The modern history of Germany may be said to date from this incident, for when the vacillating Frederick William IV ( 1 840-1 861) was succeeded by William I the first task of the new monarch was to reform the Prussian army in all its details. How Bismarck provided the genius to carry through the reform against the wishes of the Diet and then used the new army to achieve the unification of Ger- many, is a story that need not be told here. But we must not ignore the moral. Germany was created by the sword, and only the sword, firmly wielded, it was believed, could preserve her from the greed and jealousy of the older na- tions that resented her sudden and dramatic entry into the European family. Ohne Armee kein Deutschland, to borrow a saying of Bismarck. No reasonable person has ever denied the necessity for Germany to maintain a strong army. Unless she was to undergo again the horrors of the seventeenth and eigh- teenth centuries, when her fair provinces were overrun by armies from every country in Europe, and her people suf- fered untold miseries, she must be a match for any probable combination of enemies. Also it was well recognized that, faced as she was on her western frontier by her hereditary enemy (even the Kaiser spoke of France as the Erbfeind), 56 ENGLAND AND GERMANY and on the east by a Power possessing inexhaustible re- sources of men, that might and did ally itself with France, Germany was entitled to be strong, to be prepared for any eventuality, to be even "touchy" on the matter of other nations' armaments. In addition, universal mili- tary service has been an important factor of internal policy. Two years of barrack and camp life, after the strenuous thoroughness of the schooling period, mean much for the physical health and strength of the German peo- ple; there is also generated a sense of discipline and a regard for authority which is quite necessary for both government and governed if the existing political institu- tions are to be maintained or the German character to remain what it is. Like many other aspects of German life which are foreign to American ways of thinking, the Ger- man army finds no little justification in the light of German history and German problems. But Prussian ascendency in Germany has been respon- sible for foisting upon the country two unnecessary develop- ments of the doctrine of conscription: the reckless and in- human increase of armaments, which Germany's neighbors have been compelled to emulate ; and the deliberate exalta- tion of the military spirit, which has not unnaturally made other nations of Europe suspicious of her intentions. It may be admitted that the first steps in the heaping up of colossal armaments were taken by France. The German imperial constitution provides that the army on its peace footing shall represent one per cent of the population, and as long as Bismarck remained at the helm of state this pro- portion was not exceeded. Starting at 401,000 in 1871, the army was raised to 427,000 in 1881, and to 468,000 in 1887. France, however, had gone beyond this, especially in the Boulanger law of 1886, which gave her an army of above 500,000, although her population was less than 38,- 000,000. In fairness to Germany let it not be overlooked THE GERMAN EMPIRE 57 that she has never kept as large a proportion of her people with the colors as has France, and Germans have not un- naturally argued that France must be preparing for a war to recover the lost provinces. As the French military attache wrote in March, 1913: "Moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France, with her 40,- 000,000 inhabitants, has no right to compete with Germany in this way." * To which it may surely be retorted that Germany ought not to consider herself in the running with Russia ! The expansion of the German army is chiefly the work of William II. The half -million mark was passed in 1893, and further increases in 1899, 1905, and 191 1 merely pre- served the constitutional ratio of one per cent between army and population. But the law of 1893 reduced the term of service from three to two years, thereby increasing the number of trained men nearly fifty per cent. Twelve years later France followed the example of Germany, and by abolishing all exemptions and privileges was able to create a peace army of 567,000, including 28,000 colonial troops stationed in France. Even this left her behind Ger- many by more than 50,000. Indeed, it was this disparity in troops, threatening each year to become more marked by reason of her stationary population, that led the Republic to conclude the alliance with Russia, which has been its overwhelming offense against Germany. But France could scarcely do otherwise. She believed that the war of 1870 had been forced upon her by the malevolent intrigues of Bismarck; she was convinced that in 1875, and again in 1887, she would have been the victim of an unprovoked attack had not the Tsar interfered to restrain the military party in Berlin. On the other hand, the conclusion of the alliance gave Germany an excuse for increasing her own forces indefinitely. 1 Yellow Book, no. 1, enclosure 1. 58 ENGLAND AND GERMANY This was delayed for some years, for huge sums were lavished on the fleet, but after her diplomacy had failed in 191 1 to solve the Moroccan imbroglio satisfactorily to herself Germany frankly abandoned the old ratio of one per cent. To the statement of the Prussian minister for war, in 191 1, that "there was no government which either desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany," was opposed the chancellor's remark that "Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed aside." The population stood at approximately 66,000,000; the army was, by the law of 1912, raised to 723,000. In addition, the machinery of mobilization was improved by raising ten corps on the frontier almost to their war footing and by creating an additional number of reserve officers; likewise various technical improvements, which by the law of 191 1 were to be spread over a period of five years, were to be completed at once. The military budget, which in 1905 stood at 698,000,000 marks, was raised to 945,000,000, an increase of 129,000,000 over that of 1911. But these measures were nothing compared with the herculean effort of 1913, when, according to the chancellor, "the events taking place in the Balkans had changed the balance of power in Europe." By this, the last army law before the Great War, the peace strength of the German army was fixed at 870,000 men. The cost of this colossal addition was met by increased taxation for the recurring expenditure (over £9,000,000 a year), and for the non- recurring expenditure by an extraordinary property levy, estimated at £26,100,000. Unquestionably the collapse of the Turkish power before the onward rush of the young Balkan states had deprived Germany of a potential ally in a general European war, and the aggrandizement of Serbia increased considerably the difficulties in the way of an Austrian forward movement in the Balkans, so that, if the Triple Alliance were at war with Russia, the bulk of the THE GERMAN EMPIRE 59 fighting would indubitably fall upon Germany. From this point of view and on the assumption that Germany, con- trary to the advice of Bismarck, would make Austria's Balkan policy her own, a general strengthening of the army was imperiously necessary. But when the Cologne Gazette, without the slightest provocation, declared on 10 March, 1 9 13, that "never has the relationship to our western neighbor been so strained as to-day, never has the idea of revenge been exhibited there so nakedly, and . . . that it is perfectly certain Germany will have to cross swords with France," the rest of Europe doubted whether the latest army measures were really directed against Russia, and could assert in good conscience that Germany, and Germany alone, was responsible for the burden of arma- ments. It was inevitable that the other European countries should follow her example. France returned to the rule of three years' service, at a cost of £20,000,000, the bill being passed on 16 July, seventeen days after the German measure. Belgium introduced universal military service, which promised to give her an army of above 300,000 men in the course of several years. In Russia the term of service was lengthened to three and a quarter years, and some £15,000,000 provided for emergency expenditure in 1914. Great Britain alone of the Entente Powers, who were supposedly hostile to Germany, made no change in her military establishment. The proof, then, is absolute that in the last phase of the armament curse, "the white man's burden," the pace was set by Germany, and "it is difficult to believe that some startling coup was not even then being planned by the military party." x This suggestion is thoroughly justified by the popularity in modern German thought of the religion of war. The bible of this doctrine is, of course, General Friedrich von 1 Why We Are at War, by members of the Oxford School of Modern History, p. 46. 60 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Bernhardi's Germany and the Next War, and, although the book has been widely read, a brief analysis seems called for. Germany, the general argues, can acquire that "place in the sun" which is her due only by a war of aggres- sion, because the Powers of the Triple Entente — Russia, France, and England — , each and all endowed with vast possessions which they cannot adequately use, surround her with a ring of iron; yet to avoid the appearance of aggres- sion she must "initiate an active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England that both these states will feel compelled to attack" her. • There is also a labored analysis of war as a " biological necessity"; "the maintenance of peace never has been, and never can be, the goal of a policy." Equally striking, per- haps, is the remark about the "dangerous agitation" of social democracy: "A war may be forced upon a statesman by the condition of home affairs." When the war comes, and we are told that an Anglo-German war is "inevitable," it is to be waged ruthlessly, "frightfully," with the object of destroying the balance in Europe and without regard to treaties or vested rights — 'the neutrality of Belgium is only "a paper bulwark"; "in this war we must conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as a world Power by the side of, and in spite of, England." From first to last the argument is directed against England. Thus, "we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy." It is a small mat- ter that such a consummation could not be reached without the crushing of Russia as well, for the general, like all Ger- mans, has a poor opinion of Russia's capacity for war, and he does not believe that "Russia would now be inclined to make an armed demonstration in favor of France." Eng- land, he admits, will make a hard fight, but her colonies will revolt, the Turks will attack Egypt, and her relations THE GERMAN EMPIRE 6 1 with America will increase the difficulties of her situation. Germany, therefore, needs but to increase her navy until it can cope with the armada of England and victory will be sure. "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine that we have some prospect of success." Such is the monstrous theory which seems primarily re- sponsible for the present war. It is necessary to point out that the cult of militarism is an old story in Germany, or at least in Prussia. In 1836 Clausewitz, a Prussian general who fought against Napoleon and whose book on War is the basis of scientific study of the subject, laid down the doctrine that war is "the continuation of policy by other means," a doctrine the successful application of which in the unification of Germany not unnaturally commended it to the governing classes of the next generation. Even the great Bismarck was aware that militarist influence might escape the bounds which his personality and character im- posed upon it. Discussing the question whether diplomacy can ever be justified in deliberately causing war, he says, in his Reflections and Reminiscences: "I have always opposed the theory which says 'yes'; not only at the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justi- fied unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical de- velopment according to one's own calculation. It is natural that in the staff of the army not only the younger active officers, but likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of the troops led by them and their own ca- pacity to lead, and of making them prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if this spirit of the spirit did not exist in the army; the task of keeping its result within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the mili- tary, heads of the state. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and 62 ENGLAND AND GERMANY even down to the most recent times, the staff and its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace, lies in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forego. It only becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of pro- portion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifi- able influences." i The reference to the present Emperor is obvious (the Reflections and Reminiscences were written after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890), but William II has from the beginning of his reign flattered, caressed, and exalted the military- spirit. His first act, after his accession, was to issue a proclamation to his army, not to his people as his father Frederick III had done, and he has seized every occa- sion since then to preach from the same text. True, his speeches abound in phrases proclaiming his love of peace, but there is always the implication that peace rests upon the strength of the German army, which is ready for in- stant use if the interests of the fatherland are in question. In no other country but Germany could seven thousand books dealing with war have been published in the ten years preceding the great conflict: General von Bernhardi is simply the ablest, the most scholarly, and the most sin- cere exponent of the militarist thesis. We in America re- main convinced, despite the denials of German apologists, that he reflected the sentiments of his countrymen; as the late Price Collier put it: "It is a commentary upon the three countries that in Germany the soldier receives a re- duced rate when travelling, in England the golfer pays a reduced rate, and in America, until lately, the politicians were given free passes." * The fact that the operations of the German army and the German navy in the war have followed so closely the strategy outlined by General von Bernhardi raises the suspicion that official inspiration had something to do with its writing. 1 Vol. II, pp. 101-2. 2 Germany and the Germans, p. 441. THE GERMAN EMPIRE 63 Germany and the Next War appeared in the spring of 191 2, or some six months after the last Moroccan crisis, in which Germany was badly worsted. That defeat was universally attributed, and properly, to the intervention of Great Britain. General von Bernhardi takes up the challenge in true Prussian fashion, at the very time when Norman Angell, in The Great Illusion, was insisting on the uselessness and improbability of war. It is surely sympto- matic that the general's book could be written, and, if it did not commend itself to the "general reader" until a few months ago, it was thoroughly digested and reviewed in the leading journals of France and Great Britain, where it was accepted as a semiofficial statement of German policy. It was promptly translated into English at least. Even so, it was difficult for Englishmen to take its out- pourings seriously. "If General Bernhardi would come to this country," wrote Lord Esher to the Times, "and move among the best elements of our people, among our university students, among our workers in great cities, and among our peaceful agricultural population, it would amaze him not to find a single soul, unless it be here and there a lover of paradox, that could be got to understand his point of view. . . . For those of us who hope always to see Germans and French stand shoulder to shoulder with our own people in the van of enlightened thought, it is piteous to see a German writer, so dis- tinguished in the technical field of military strategy and tactics, plunging so forlornly into a quagmire of international politics and ethics, created, let us hope, by himself." J One is indeed reluctant to believe that any considerable or influential section of a nation, especially if that nation be distinguished for its industrial and commercial enter- prise, and fond of asserting that its civilization is not only the glory of this age but the promise of generations to come, can have gone so completely war-mad. Nevertheless, am- 1 Weekly edition, 5 April, igi2. 64 ENGLAND AND GERMANY pie corroboration of such a melancholy temper may be found in a report on German public opinion prepared by French diplomatic agents in Germany and printed in the French Yellow Book. The document is not above suspi- cion, for, dated 30 July, 1913, it contains a reference to Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the German foreign secretary who died in the last days of 191 2. But the materials on which the report is based may have been collected before the latter date; there is certainly no analysis of German sentiment with respect to the Balkan Wars of 191 2-13, which were universally regarded as a decisive set-back for German policy. That the testimony of the French report was not a figment of the imagination may be seen from the interview with "An Ambassador" published by the Berlin Lokal Anzeiger in the spring of 1914. According to this anonymous personage, supposedly Sir W. E. Goschen, then British ambassador in Berlin: "Jingoism has made indisputable progress in the German popu- lation. I am convinced that there exists among the German peo- ple a latent jingoism which is much more dangerous than that of England, Russia, or France. German jingoism recruits its partisans from the highest classes of the nation — nobility, clergy, army and navy, university and gymnasium professors and students, and the entire scholastic world. . . . Everywhere among the cultivated classes it is made a dogma that the German Empire does not take its proper part in world politics. Everywhere the great organs of public opinion spread the dangerous and irritating doctrine that German prestige is going down. And so patriots clamor for ac- tion." 1 It therefore seems fair to cite the French report in this connection. "German public opinion," it says, "is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized 1 Nation (New York), 9 July, 1914, "Foreign Correspondence." THE GERMAN EMPIRE 65 and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor-plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Eng- land. The forces consist of the following elements: the bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants . . . those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business . . . numerous manufacturers, merchants, and financiers in a mod- erate way of business . . . Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig-Holstein . . . finally, the governments and all the governing classes in all the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and the grand duchy of Baden. . . . These sup- porters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. "People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the pur- pose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and for- midable for the intimidation of the government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a deter- mination that is at once thrilling and fixed. "Those in favor of war are divided into several categories. . . . Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is inevitable. . . . Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the out- side interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses. Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. . . . Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed. . . . "War alone can prolong the prestige of the aristocracy and sup- port its family interest. The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. . . . Amongst the 'Bis- marckians' must be reckoned officials of all kinds. . . . They find 66 ENGLAND AND GERMANY disciples and political sympathizers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and the universities," which, "if we except a few distin- guished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. . . . Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists of Ger- man Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. . . . We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists." x The most conclusive proof of this bellicose temper was vouchsafed in the fateful days of July, 1914. Early in the month the German press vigorously demanded the severe punishment of Serbia for the murders at Sarajevo. When the Austrian ultimatum was presented, satisfaction was universally expressed, and after war had been declared upon Serbia by the Dual Monarchy there was general rejoicing throughout Germany that at last the hated little nation which blocked the designs of both Germany and Austria was to be brought to book. Finally, the Kaiser's ultima- tum to Russia, followed promptly by the declaration of war, was the most popular act of his reign, if one may judge from the excitement of the Berlin street crowds and the truculent tone of the press. The hysteria of both Ber- lin and Vienna stands out boldly against the calm of Paris and London; in St. Petersburg there was dignified enthu- siasm, splendid determination, but no delirious outburst, no thanksgiving that "the day" had come. We do not hear that either press or populace in Germany regarded the failure of the negotiations as an unspeakable calamity. Not less than the French in 1870 did the nation enter upon war "with a light heart," for, until Great Britain plunged into the conflict, few doubted that the carefully prepared plan of the general staff would make the war a short one and that the profits would make the game worth the expense. 1 Yellow Book, no. 5. THE GERMAN EMPIRE 67 No account of modern Germany would be complete without some reference, even at the risk of being hackneyed, to the Emperor William II. That redoubtable monarch is the most enigmatic individual of our time. Restless in his physical make-up, endowed by nature with an active mind and a picturesque imagination, possessed of a tena- cious memory, and imbued with boundless self-confidence, he combines an ardent belief in mediaeval political doc- trines with an enthusiastic devotion to every phase of modern life. There would seem to be no branch of human knowledge or activity in which he has not participated or indulged an inordinate love of speechifying. Thus, in ad- dition to the ordinary vocations of an emperor and king, he has shown an intense interest in the development of German commerce, preached stirring sermons on land and sea, criticised severely the national educational system, and attempted to dictate styles of architecture. He has designed yachts for the Kiel regatta, which he himself in- spired, directed* productions in the royal opera-house, con- ducted an orchestra, composed music, painted pictures, and discussed archaeology with learned professors. Till the outbreak of the war the world was alternately alarmed and amused by the vagaries of the royal arbiter. Outside of Germany he was often regarded as a dilettante, but thou- sands of his subjects looked upon him as a genius who united in his own person the myriad talents of the German nation. This many-sided activity was partly explained by a feverish desire to lead the German people to great things and to impress them, if that were necessary, with the sense of their greatness; with it was coupled a deep- seated sense of responsibility and a personal charm that was universally admitted. On the other hand, William II is the greatest living cham- pion of reaction and militarism. Of the extent to which his people have been infected by the latter disease enough has already been said: the Emperor is more responsible 68 ENGLAND AND GERMANY for this than any other single person or circumstance, having for twenty-six years, by both speech and deed, labored to make the army the most important institution of the national life. His political philosophy is summed up in an unswerving allegiance to the divine right of kings, flaunted in innumerable speeches and practised at every turn. Thus, in 1890 he declared that "it is a tradition in our house to consider ourselves as designed by God to govern the people over whom it is given us to reign." In August, 1 9 10, after a long period of comparative silence, he used these words at Konigsberg: "Here my grandfather, by his own right hand, placed on his head the royal crown of Prussia, once more declaring with emphasis that it was bestowed upon him by God's grace alone, and not by par- liaments, national assemblies, or the popular voice; so that he regarded himself as the chosen instrument of Heaven, and as such he performed his duties as ruler. . . . Look- ing upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, regardless of the views and opinions of the hour, I shall go my way." The imperial views were admirably summarized by the reactionary professor who enumerated Pobel, Presse, und Parlamentismus as the three evils which must be extermi- nated from the life of Germany by the vehement assertion of the monarchical power. On a par with these antiquated beliefs, which reveal some of the Hohenzollerns in a sorry light, and which even Thomas Hobbes, the great apologist of monarchy, did not care to defend, has been William's intolerance of opposi- tion. His most famous utterance, perhaps, is: "There is but one master in this country — it is I, and I will bear no other." He has proclaimed that "an opposition of the Prussian nobility to their king is a monstrosity," and trans- formed the old Latin adage into Voluntas regis suprema lex. He has been his own prime minister, reducing his chan- cellors to the position of clerks and getting rid of each, THE GERMAN EMPIRE 69 from Bismarck to Biilow, at the least sign of insubordina- tion, and he has persecuted to the limit of the law all who dared to criticise him or offer unwelcome advice. Much might also be made of his unusual ability, as a Protestant monarch, to rule his empire with the help of the Catholic (Centre) party and to cultivate an advantageous friend- ship with the Caliph of Islam; or his vacillations might be examined, for his policy has been now threatening, now pacific, in both tone and action. But William II must re- main an enigma for yet a long time to come; indeed, it may well be doubted whether he has always known his own mind or thought out the problems he set himself to solve. It is highly characteristic that his exact measure of respon- sibility for the war is not yet determined. Had he planned with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand to resume a vigor- ous German- Austrian policy in the Balkans, or was he, when he returned from Norway late in July, overborne by the military party which thought its chance had come? In any case William II is the embodiment of his people in their inconsistencies, their idealism, their will to power, and their utter inability to see any point of view not en- tirely their own, or to grasp the psychology of a situation. What is the world to think when it is told in the German White Book that Russia is responsible for the war, and that "shoulder to shoulder with England we labored inces- santly" in the cause of peace; while the chancellor before the Reichstag accuses Great Britain of having precipitated the great struggle in order to preserve the balance of power ? This lack of consistency, this confusion of thought is ap- parent in every phase of German life, from court and official circles to the socialists who are not socialists, and this chapter may well conclude with the sentence quoted at its beginning: "The new German Empire is the most per- plexing quantity in the modern world, and as unavoidable as it is perplexing." CHAPTER IV GERMAN EXPANSION Undoubtedly that feature of modern Germany which has commanded popular attention is her rise to the second position among the industrial and commercial nations of the world, and the promise that she would one day over- come the traditional supremacy of Great Britain. Yet there is nothing remarkable about this. Taking the coun- try as a whole, the Germans were probably the most suc- cessful business people of the Middle Ages. Their prac- tical genius found an outlet in the Hanseatic League of north Germany, which controlled the commerce of the Baltic and North Seas and exercised enormous political power in northern Europe. Along the Rhine and in south Germany cities like Cologne, Augsburg, and Nuremberg, located as they were on the trade routes between Italy and the north, throve splendidly. Not even the collapse of the mediaeval empire and the subsequent growth of disorder could destroy the foundations of German pros- perity, and at the opening of the sixteenth century, in the height of the Renaissance, the cities of Germany were famous for their comfort, wealth, and culture. Unfortu- nately, the failure of German rulers to create a strong na- tional state, coupled with that schism in religion which ultimately led to the devastating Thirty Years' War, left the land a prey to foreign ambitions and local jealousies; so that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was the shuttlecock of diplomacy and the battle-ground of foreign armies, while frontier provinces which it could not defend were left open to foreign aggression. No wonder 70 GERMAN EXPANSION 71 that its population fell below that of France, that its eco- nomic effort was pitiful compared with the marvellous out- burst of English energy associated with the industrial revo- lution, or that no colonies were secured at a time when the maritime nations were appropriating desirable lands all over the globe. Yet the heart of the nation remained sound. At the end of the eighteenth century the reforming zeal of Fred- erick the Great and some of the lesser princes promised well, the romantic movement indicated that a new spirit was awake, and, curiously enough, the cataclysmic wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire actually ad- vanced the clock of civilization. Not only were the three- hundred-odd states of Germany reduced to a tenth of their number; after the catastrophe of Jena in 1806, which placed Prussia and Germany at the feet of Napoleon, the Prus- sian Government set an inspiring example to the smaller states by abolishing serfdom and sweeping away the ves- tiges of mediaeval restrictions and privileges. Nor were the lesser governments loath to act upon its advice, and by 1850 both agriculture and industry were free throughout Germany. The Zollverein, or customs union, founded by Prussia in 1828, and gradually extended until it included all the German states except Austria, laid the foundations of a new economic life which possessed boundless possi- bilities under a national government able to concern itself with the problems of the country as a whole. When unity was accomplished in 187 1, Germany responded to the call of the shop and the factory with the enthusiasm that char- acterized her undertakings in the centuries when she was the dominant Power in Europe. It would, indeed, have been ridiculous if a nation which had fought its way to the political hegemony of the Continent and whose educa- tional system was the envy of other lands had not proved, its ability in the economic sphere as well. 72 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Furthermore, Germany had to catch up with countries like England and France, which had achieved their national unity centuries before, were thoroughly industrialized, and had long dominated the markets of the world. Germany could meet their competition only by hard work and sci- entific endeavor. So, while rendering all honor and praise to the thoroughness of her business methods and the sus- tained enthusiasm of all classes for the national cause, let us remember that, in the light of her history and in the face of existing conditions, Germany was bound to make a tremendous effort, and her astonishing success has not un- naturally persuaded many neutral observers, not to men- tion the Germans themselves, that the-Allies now ranged against her are actuated chiefly by motives of commercial jealousy. The prodigious character of Germany's economic en- terprise may be grasped from the following brief table — 187 1 marks the first year of the new Empire, 1888 the acces- sion of the present Emperor, 1900 the year in which the ten- sion with England first attracted general notice, and 19 13 the last for which complete figures are available. 1871 1888 1900 19 13 Population 4i,o6o,7g2 48,693,836 56,367,178 66,505,825 Savings deposits. . M. 8,800,000,000 *i7,8oo,ooo,ooo Railways.. . 6,549 miles 24,036 3i»i73 *38,426 Revenue. . . M. t59°,726,30o 1,225,926,000 2,025,770,000 3,696,033,200 Imports.. . . M. 3,464,600,000 3,429,400,000 6,043,000,000 10,695,000,000 Exports M. 2,465,200,000 3,356,400,000 4,752,600,000 9,912,600,000 Shipping. . . 982,355 tons 1,240,182 1,737,798 3,153,724 * Figures for ion. t Figures for 1872. The measure of this advance may be gauged from the fact that in less than half a century Germany has risen to second place in the struggle for economic supremacy. In 1913 GERMAN EXPANSION 73 the national wealth was estimated at 300,000,000,000 marks, the income at 40,000,000,000 marks, figures which are ex- ceeded only by those of the United Kingdom. Thus the early years of the twentieth century saw Ger- many well advanced along that road to economic supremacy which she believed to be her goal, and probably most Ger- mans anticipated such a realization within the next ten or fifteen years. But about one condition of that tri- umph, the most essential condition, in fact, they were en- titled to be anxious. They were well aware that the pop- ulation of the fatherland had increased faster than its capacity for food production, an actual demonstration of the Malthusian principle, if the ability to purchase food abroad is not considered. In the last decade of the nine- teenth century the average increase of population ex- ceeded half a million yearly, more recently was above 800,000. Yet even this was not sufficient: for some years before the Great War it was necessary to bring in some 750,000 casual laborers annually from Russia, Poland, and Italy to harvest the magnificent crops of the eastern prov- inces. Emigration, which in 1880 amounted to 200,000 a year, dwindled to 20,000 after 1900, and of that number comparatively few were dissatisfied with the conditions of life they left behind. A competent authority estimated that, given normal conditions, there would be, in 1925, 80,000,000 people living within the boundaries of the German Empire. On the other hand, and this is the governing fact, 50,000,000 represented the maximum for which food could be grown within the same area. 1 But it was open to doubt if the land would receive such intensive cultivation, for the proportion of the people engaged in agriculture had both relatively and absolutely declined since 1871, as is evident from the following table : 1 Paul Rohrbach, Deutsckland unter den Wcltvolkern, igi2, p. 17. 74 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Population Agricultural Percentage 1882 1895 1907 45,222,113 51,770,284 61,591,367 19,225,500 18,501,300 17,681,200 42 35-6 28.5 Indeed, without the stimulus of a protective tariff on agri- culture, which the war would seem to have justified from a national as opposed to the consumer's interest, Germany would have been almost in the position of Great Britain, which practically depends on the produce of other nations. As it was, Germany ceased to be self-subsistent after 1883; in 1900 food imports amounted to 29 per cent of the total imports, and in 191 2 to 30 per cent. To pay for these foreign food supplies, two courses were open to Germany. She might pay cash or she might ex- port in exchange native raw materials and manufactured articles. The first could take the form of investments abroad or the interest thereon, or be discharged by the services of German shipping. In both of these respects Germany had just cause to be proud of her achievements. The amount of capital invested abroad has been esti- mated at some 20,000,000,000 marks, the interest on which amounts to 1,000,000,000 marks. 1 The profits of the mer- chant marine amounted to more than 250,000,000 marks in 1899. 2 But, when all was said, exports had to constitute the bulk of the payments, and this would be increasingly true in years to come. Now, next to cheap labor, the necessary condition of successful manufacturing is an adequate supply of cheap raw materials, and, unfortunately for Germany, she is less 1 Dr. Karl Helfferich, Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888- 1913, p. 113, an English edition, issued by the Germanistic Society of Americajof Deutschlands Volkswohlstand, 1888-1913. 2 Henri Lichtenberger, Germany and Its Evolution in Modern Times, p. 46. GERMAN EXPANSION 75 well endowed with natural resources than any of the Great Powers. She lacks in precious metals, the supply of coal and iron is limited, there is no native production of cotton or silk. In other words, Germany has to import practically all the materials consumed by the throbbing factories of Saxony and the Rhineland, copper, woods of various sorts, rubber, oils, and a large part of the minerals. Without a steady and sure supply of these and other stuffs her in- dustries cannot live. Furthermore, it is essential that the finished articles shall find ready markets in foreign lands. Germany, in short, has become a replica of the United Kingdom, a nation living by its foreign commerce; let this cease, and she "would be the victim of a crisis compared with which the crisis in English industry when the American Civil War deprived its spindles of cotton would seem a child's play." 1 Observing that Great Britain's commerce was most highly developed with her colonies, and that the proportion of this colonial commerce with respect to the total volume of British trade was steadily increasing, Germans not un- naturally argued that their commercial future depended upon the possession of large and flourishing colonies. The late German ambassador to the United States, Baron Speck von Sternberg, might declare that "Germany needs no colonies: what she wants is merely free co-operation on all seas, the open door, and the right to co-operate freely on an equal footing with all other commercial and industrial nations, in opening up and developing yet un- opened districts and markets." 2 But the voluminous lit- erature of the expansionist idea, the trend of official policy, and the increase of the navy warrant the belief that such statements were intended to dispel American suspicions 'Paul Rohrbach, "L'Evolution de l'AUemagne comme puissance mondiale," Revue Politique Internationale, July, 1914, p. 26. 2 "The Truth about German Expansion," North American Review, March, 1908, P- 322- 76 ENGLAND AND GERMANY and did not in any way represent the attitude of the Ger- man Government. The imperial chancellor's famous bid for British neutrality on the eve of the war---the promise to take only the French colonies in case of a German vic- tory — revealed unblushingly the true purpose of German policy; as an English writer quite sympathetic with Ger- man ambitions remarked a few years ago: "Behind the colonial movement, as it has been reawakened and rein- spired during the past few years, lies a virtually united nation," 1 without distinction of party, from Conservative to Social Democrat. To such a people, who considered the lack of colonies the one defect in an otherwise perfect civili- zation, the teaching of Norman Angell, as set forth in The Great Illusion, that the political ownership of colonies does not in any way affect the wealth of the possessing country, was a voice crying in the wilderness. As a matter of fact, the colonial question is not so sim- ple and unprofitable as Mr. Angell would have us believe. All governments do not follow the English — and the Ger- man — practise of treating all nations equally in the matter of colonial trade. The French allow differential tariffs to their nationals throughout their extensive colonial domin- ions; the Japanese have been accused of similar sharpness in Manchuria, despite their treaty obligations to maintain the open door; and the Russians have always managed to keep their Asiatic possessions more or less as their own pre- serve. In the self-governing colonies of the British Empire preferential rates are imposed upon imports from the mother country, and since 1896 there has been much talk of an imperial customs union which would make England's astonishing aggregation of lands and peoples a self-sufhcing economic entity. The fact that the trade of Germany with British, French, and Russian colonies is of modest volume has not deterred Germans from asking: What is 1 W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany, p. 398. GERMAN EXPANSION 77 to prevent any of these countries, in a moment of jealousy or blindness, from taking measures which would exclude German commerce altogether? And Germany does im- port a considerable share of her raw materials from British and French colonies. It is also true that the commerce of Germany with her own colonies is ridiculously small, considering the large sums that she has sunk in their devel- opment; indeed, the total amount, both imports and ex- ports, represents less than one-half of the trade of those colonies, which in iqio was valued at £17,387,000. In the same year Great Britain did business with her colonies to the extent of £329,853,099, and France, whose foreign com- merce is far behind Germany's, carried on a colonial trade of £21,043,000. Is it any wonder that Germany believed overseas possessions to be both valuable and necessary, and declined to admit that, because she had made no great success of the colonies she did possess, she was. doomed to similar failure if she were given a wider opportunity under more favorable conditions? Patriotic Germans were willing to admit that, as matters stood in the business world, they were doing very well, but they doubted whether, a hundred years hence, when the vast dominions of Great Britain, France, and Russia, not to speak of the United States, had been adequately developed, the position of the fatherland would be secure: even if in old Europe she should completely outdistance her present rivals, they, by virtue of their far-flung empires, would wield political power far superior to her own. Also, without adequate colonies, Germany would be unable to spread her culture throughout the world and found daugh- ter nations who should rise up and call her blessed, after the way of the English, whose imperial record it was de- sired to emulate and surpass. Thus the maintenance of peace, however much it might add to Germany's pros- perity in the immediate future, must in the end tell against 78 ENGLAND AND GERMANY her, unless, which was not likely, her rivals were disposed to surrender to her some of the lands won by long years of persistent effort and enterprise. Germany had, indeed, fared rather shabbily in the scram- ble for colonies which absorbed so much European energy in the nineteenth century, especially in the last quarter. Her first acquisitions were Togoland and Angra Pequena, in 1884. By 1900 she had added the Cameroons, South- west Africa, East Africa, German New Guinea, with numer- ous islands in the Pacific, and the concession of Kiao-Chou in the Shantung peninsula of China: a total area of 1,130,- 000 square miles and a population of more than 13,000,000, of whom, however, white persons represented, in 1910, only 25,758, and of that number officials of one kind or another accounted for 8,856. On the other hand, since 1 87 1 France had acquired most of her enormous colonial dependencies (4,776,126 square miles; 41,653,650 inhab- itants); Russia had pushed on into Central Asia till her frontier marched with that of British India; England had added Burmah, Egypt, South Africa, half a dozen other African colonies, and sundry Pacific islands; even little Belgium had, under the will of King Leopold, received in the Congo a domain more valuable than all of Germany's colonies together; and sleepy Portugal had consolidated the remnants of her former power into extensive holdings, which were abused by inefficient government and stag- nated under the blight of slavery. Germany, whose col- onies were the least valuable of all the African lands and were not suited for exploitation and settlement, must have her "place in the sun." "To talk of saturation, as in the time of Bismarck," said one of her sanest and most moder- ate publicists, "or of the possibility of Germany being sat- isfied with her present frontiers is, under all circumstances, rank foolishness." x 1 Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern, p. 23. GERMAN EXPANSION 79 It is worth while to ask why Germany has been placed at such a disadvantage among the Great Powers of the world : and the historian is bound to answer that the great statesman to whom modern Germany owes its existence, Prince Bismarck, is primarily responsible. The colonial movement, in its present form of capitalistic exploitation, began in the 'seventies of the last century, when the explora- tion of Africa by Livingstone, Stanley, and others opened men's minds to the possibilities of that continent as an outlet for the surplus energy and capital of Europe. In those days Germany had every opportunity to stake out for herself a splendid colonial domain, inasmuch as the whole continent, except for Algeria, Cape Colony and Natal, and the Transvaal and Orange Free State, where French, English, and Dutch had already established them- selves, was open to the first comer. But Germany neglected her opportunity. The people were interested in commer- cial and industrial development, the government was busy fighting the Catholic Church and the socialists, and a steady stream of emigration still directed itself to America and Australia, whose temperate climate was preferred to the fevers and jungles of tropical Africa. But even more decisive was the attitude of Bismarck. Not only did he oppose the acquisition of colonies by Germany — from his conversations with Dr. Busch, as recorded in Some Secret Pages of Bismarck's History, and from the diplomatic cor- respondence, we know that he encouraged France and England to colonial adventures with the expectation of fishing in troubled waters. The French occupation of Tunis, in defiance of Italian aspirations in that direction, effected a breach between the Latin nations which threw Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria; similarly, the rivalry of England and France in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa paralyzed the Continental policy of both coun- tries for nearly twenty-five years. Nor, until 1883, would 80 ENGLAND AND GERMANY the Iron Chancellor give any support to various German explorers who, in English fashion, were seeking treaties with native rulers in the hope that the pressure of opinion at home would force the government to action. By such expedients Bismarck managed to preserve his mastery of Europe, but in the interval the future enemies of Germany picked up the most desirable lands of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, and when the mighty empire finally claimed its share of the feast it had to be content with the scraps. Even then Bismarck had no heart for this policy, for he was pushed into it by the Reichstag and the pressure of public opinion, both of which he detested. In the early 'nineties, when German trade began to make enormous strides forward, public opinion awoke to the unsatisfactory results of Bismarck's colonial policy, and demanded more vigorous action by the government, which, inspired as it was by the cult of power, confronted by the challenge of Social Democracy in domestic politics, and encouraged by the Emperor himself, was the more disposed to welcome such manifestations of a truly national sentiment. The most positive expression of this idea was observed in the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Bund). Founded in 1886, it had at first attracted little notice, but after its reorganization in 1893, under the presidency of Ernest Hasse, a Leipzig professor, it began a propaganda on behalf of German expansion that no student of inter- national affairs could either take very seriously or yet ignore altogether. An organization counting but 50,000 members was scarcely representative of German opinion, according to English and American standards, but German political opinion was so machine-made, and the agitation of the Pan- Germans was so vociferous that an accurate measuring of its influence was impossible. Its close rela- tions with the powerful and vigorous Navy League does not suggest a state of innocuous desuetude, and it is worth GERMAN EXPANSION 81 noting that its more provocative outbursts were usually followed by militant proceedings at the German foreign office and a period of great tension among the European Powers. On the other hand, the great newspapers were hostile, especially those of the capital which dared to cut loose from official communiques and the inspiration of the Wilhelmstrasse. Very likely the average German was not a little confused between the ultimate goal for which the league stood and the programme it put forward for imme- diate execution. The theoretical basis of Pan-Germanism is logical enough. Of more than 80,000,000 Germans in Europe fewer than 70,000,000 enjoy the blessings of the new Empire. Ten millions reside in Austria, a few more in Bohemia, where they are intermingled with the Czechs, and still others are found in Switzerland and the Baltic provinces of Russia. On the assumption that German nationality is synonymous with the German race, which, in reality, is far from the case, German unity is not complete. In addition, the Dutch are of Teutonic race, and their fertile country not only once belonged to Germany (up to 1648 in law, in practise to 1555), but actually controls the mouth of the German Rhine; Holland would also profit economically by being incorporated in the German Empire. This doctrine of racial kinship would make the Dutch of South Africa sub- jects of the Kaiser, and in southern Brazil there is a large German population. Finally, there was Belgium, whose historical connection with the Holy Roman Empire lasted till the French Revolution, and whose Flemish provinces could be claimed with as much justification as their Dutch neighbors to the north. If we remember how Louis XIV claimed the left bank of the Rhine for France on the ground that ancient Gaul had extended to that river, we can at least comprehend the historical reasoning which would justify the incorporation in the modern German 82 ENGLAND AND GERMANY state of all lands which had ever belonged to the Holy Roman Empire; and considering the favor with which the doctrine of nationality has been received in the last half-century, we should have to admit the moral right of any German communities to join the German Empire if they so wished. As a piece of practical politics, the extension of Hohen- zollern sovereignty over any such territories or peoples was unimaginable, and the Pan-Germans themselves never set a date for the apotheosis of their grandiloquent schemes, which postulated the handling of provinces and nations like pawns on a chess-board, after the fashion of the eigh- teenth century. Indeed, their argument, in spite of its plausibility, was really fallacious. Was Bohemia, for ex- ample, to be included in Pan-Germany, and the Czechs added to the already formidable list of irreconcilables, or, if only Austria proper were taken over from the Dual Monarchy, which the Germans of that province would vehemently oppose, were the Germans of Bohemia to be left to the tender mercies of Russia, toward whom Bohemia would inevitably gravitate? The Dutch, though recog- nizing their kinship with Germany, were nothing if not tenacious of their independence; so was Belgium, whose culture, moreover, was rather French than German. In the Baltic provinces only the nobility and townsmen were German, the peasantry was Lithuanian or Finnish; geo- graphically, also, any connection with Germany would be ridiculous. There is very little evidence to show that the people of Germany were seriously enamoured of the Pan-German ideal, although they might give it a theoretical approval, and would probably have welcomed the incorporation of Holland and Belgium in the present Empire. General von Bernhardi, albeit a despiser of small states and the cham- pion of aggression, does not mention Pan-Germanism by GERMAN EXPANSION 83 name; on the contrary, he opines that any lands which once belonged to Germany, but are now under other con- trol, are "permanently lost," and does not in any form demand territorial aggrandizement in Europe. 1 However much he may wish to see the balance of power over- turned to the profit of Germany, he would have that revolution effected by superiority of armament and the arbitrament of battle; Germany can then achieve her des- tiny in the colonies she has taken from the vanquished. But so many distinguished professors have associated them- selves with the Pan-German movement, its typical repre- sentatives have been so swashbuckling and jingoistic, and the German masses have such a reputation for docility, that foreign observers not unnaturally ascribed to Pan- German- ism an importance which it did not possess; as a definition of the European ambitions of German policy, it can be placed on a par with the American aspiration which de- mands the annexation of Canada as the consequence of our "manifest destiny." There was, however, another aspect of the Pan-German movement which aroused much enthusiasm, namely, its colonial programme, and it is therefore desirable to ascer- tain, with as much precision as possible, what Germany hoped, or might reasonably expect, to obtain beyond the confines of the old Continent. Here we are met by the difficulty that the German Government never admitted any definite ambitions, that is, of course, in the last twenty years since the problem entered into the calculations of its diplomacy. But by process of elimination we can ar- rive at certain plausible conclusions. At the opening of the century, when the break-up of China seemed imminent, Germany was fully determined to claim her share of the booty; nor did she endeavor to prevent the Russo-Japa- nese War, which, had Russia been victorious, must have 1 Germany and the Next War, p. 195. 84 ENGLAND AND GERMANY hastened the collapse of the Celestial Empire. The tri- umph of Japan, however, meant the end of European ex- pansion in the Far East, and since then Germany has been the champion of both Chinese integrity and the open door. The rich Dutch colonies in the Malay Archipelago were forbidden fruit unless Holland itself were absorbed. Persia was practically divided between Great Britain and Russia. 1 India and Australasia were jewels of the British crown, and their conquest would be exceedingly difficult even if Great Britain were crushed and her sea power destroyed. South America, where sundry German settlements might possibly become political outposts of the fatherland, was guarded by the Monroe Doctrine and the pride of the South Amer- ican nations themselves. 2 There were left Africa and the Ottoman Empire, the former in large measure under the dominion of other Powers, the latter still in the throes of that mortal illness diagnosed by the Tsar Nicholas I in 1853, when he described the Sultan as "the sick man of Europe." In these two regions Germany seemingly desired and planned to satisfy her colonial ambitions. Her designs on the Belgian Congo were long suspected, and were ad- mitted in the Franco-German treaty of 4 November, 191 1. Not only did Germany receive from France two strips of the French Congo that brought the frontier of the Cam- eroons to the Congo River, which is the northwestern bound- ary of the Belgian Congo, but she induced France to forego her right of pre-emption over the Congo, any change in the status of which should henceforth be determined by all the African Powers. The sudden Italian occupation of Tripoli is believed to have been stimulated by the sus- 1 It will be seen in a later chapter that Germany cherished certain ambitions with respect to Persia, but her policy in that country was never very aggressive. 5 Many persons, of course, believe that Germany has very real designs on South America; but obviously she could not prosecute them until she had disposed of her rivals in Europe, and particularly of England. GERMAN EXPANSION 85 picion that Germany was herself preparing to seize it. An Anglo-German agreement of 1898 envisaged the parti- tion of the Portuguese colonies in case Portugal were ready to part with them. Finally, German interest in Morocco, which kept Europe on tenter-hooks for six years, probably arose out of a desire to acquire some part of that country for colonizing purposes. As regards Turkey, German pol- icy was equally determined, centring around the Baghdad railway scheme, but not overlooking the other possibilities of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Morocco and Asia Minor, indeed, occupied a special place in German colonial plans. Quite apart from the desire for more colonies of the plantation or exploitation type, it had long offended the national pride that Germany, next to Russia the most prolific nation in Europe, possessed no settlement colonies comparable to those of England, France, or Russia. It was intolerable that a German emi- grant was not able to settle in a land ruled by his Kaiser's government which was at the same time endowed with an equable climate, but must proceed to the United States, South America, or one of the British self-governing domin- ions, where he rapidly lost touch with his native land and was usually assimilated to his new surroundings. Of re- cent years, this aspect of the German colonial problem has been greatly modified by the decline of emigration, but in the 'nineties, when the new colonial movement took form, a considerable number of Germans were still leaving home each year, and a renewed impetus might at any time be given by economic depression or any of the other forces which have from time immemorial led men to try their fortunes abroad. This is clearly the thought of General von Bernhardi when he says: "The importance of Ger- many will depend upon two points : first, how many mil- lions of men in the world will speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the German 86 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Empire?" Or again: "The dominion of German thought can only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act in conformity with this idea we shall be untrue to our duties toward the human race." 1 Now, in the latter years of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century Morocco and Asia Minor (up to 1899 tne Boer republics as well) were precisely the regions of the world that might be suitable for German colonization; in fact, they were the only lands not already appropriated by other Powers. They were, it is true, in- habited by a considerable indigenous population, but their civilization, at once oriental and the prey of effete admin- istration, seemed to clamor for German treatment; natural resources were abundant, and in some parts the climate was suitable for white settlement. Here Germans could settle and spread their Kultur, which must sooner or later take its place beside English imperialism as one of the world's great dynamic forces; here German capital could find an adequate opening for its energies, and German business lay the foundations of a permanent prosperity. There was nothing unreasonable in this ambition to make Morocco and Asia Minor parts of the German Empire; indeed, the programme was modest enough compared with the actual conquests of England and France in various parts of Africa or the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Unfortunately, however, both Morocco and Asia Minor were already ear-marked by the very Powers whose colonial preponderance Germany wished to diminish; the former was regarded by the French, established, as they were, in Tunis and Algeria, as the natural limit of their North African empire; the latter had long been dominated, polit- ically and economically, by Great Britain and Russia, while France had an outpost in Syria. Germans none the less turned with longing eyes to these regions, and pub- 1 Germany and the Next War, pp. 83, 77. GERMAN EXPANSION 87 lie opinion quickly responded to any move of the foreign office which promised to advance the national ambition. The popularity of Heinrich Class's little pamphlet, West- Marokko deutsch !, not to mention other literature of the same description, and the expression, Unser Baghdad, which is said to have been widely used, indicated a genuine desire to see German policy triumphant in these Mediterranean lands, and it is safe to say that the people of Germany were not only convinced .as to the justice of their cause but fully determined to support the government when the hour of decision should come. Twenty years of striving, however, brought but a mod- erate success with the Baghdad railway, which was the epitome of German policy in Asia Minor, and, instead of a share of Morocco, only a small stretch of the French Congo, which was surrendered as the price of a French protectorate over Morocco. The disappointment in Ger- many was universal, being reflected in the language of the press, which the government made no effort to restrain. And Germans of all classes, instead of criticising the diplo- macy of the imperial government, except to assert that it had not acted with sufficient vigor, convinced themselves that their legitimate ambitions had been blocked at every turn by the jealousy of Great Britain, as well in Morocco as for the Baghdad railway. The truth of this charge will be presently examined, but probably no amount of exposi- tion and argument would have convinced Germany that she was not the victim of a grand conspiracy to deprive her of her coveted "place in the sun." This conviction, which has been dinned into the masses by ardent publicists and a zealous press, throws an inter- esting light on German armaments. Prince Biilow notes the "curious fact that in the most military and warlike of the European nations" — a striking admission, in the face of German post-bellum propaganda — "the parties have re- 88 ENGLAND AND GERMANY signed themselves so unwillingly to the new demands for the defense of the empire that it has taken more than three and a half decades to achieve unanimity, at least among the middle-class parties." 1 The Reichstag of 1907 was the first to give the government a majority for its world policy that was not dependent on the Centre, which is opposed to colonial expansion; up to that time the Radicals refused to vote for the numerous army and navy laws which have been so prominent. a feature of the reign of William II. The elections of 1907 were fought on the issue of German imperialism, and the government got a majority of Conservatives and Liberals, who were sympathetic with its expansionist schemes. In 191 2 all the middle-class parties supported the army and navy bills, and even the Socialists indirectly, since they voted the supplies for the increased establishments. At last there was a national majority for the national policy. The government always demanded additional troops or more ships in the interest of German world-diplomacy; as one class after another was converted to the imperialistic programme the opponents of military expansion lost ground, until there stood behind the Emperor and his government a united nation, which, however torn by party faction and class feeling on matters of domestic concern, was determined that Germany should take her lawful place among the great colonial and mari- time nations. Throughout the summer of 1911, when the Morocco controversy was in process of solution, public opinion was, on the whole, more aggressive than the gov- ernment, and after the settlement with France had been disclosed there was a wild outburst of rage in the Reichs- tag from all parties, because the national interests had been sacrificed to the Emperor's love of peace. From that time there was no difficulty in passing measures for the increase of armaments, in spite of the fact that Germany's 1 Imperial Germany, p. 193. GERMAN EXPANSION 89 relations with England underwent considerable improve- ment and that the world was disposed to render a due meed of praise to the Emperor for not appealing to the sword in the Morocco business. Without asserting posi- tively that the German people were itching for war, one is justified in saying that they wanted all the fruits of war, and from such a state of mind the transition to war itself is neither difficult to make nor long to be avoided. The national attitude toward questions of foreign policy and armaments was prodigiously affected by a profound change in the German character, a change much remarked upon by innumerable travellers, students, and publicists for many years back. The generation which witnessed the wars of unification was still in the grip of that roman- tic and cosmopolitan feeling which had distinguished the early nineteenth century. Life was simple, for money was scarce; high thinking was the order of the day; the ideal of a free and united Germany still was widely cherished, except in official society. Treitschke himself, writing in 1 86 1, could say: "How lifeless, how sterile are the supporters of absolutism in their opposition to the demands of the nations for liberty ! . . . Everything new which the nineteenth century has created is the work of liberalism. The enemies of liberty can only persist in negation, or waken to the semblance of new life the ideas of days which have long since been submerged." 1 To-day the spirit of Germany is frankly material and expresses itself in commercial values. Nor is this surpris- ing. The enormous increase of the population since 1870, the expansion of industry and commerce, the changed con- ditions of every-day life brought about by great wealth on the one hand and a restless proletariat on the other, 1 From Die Freiheit, quoted by Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, p. 9. 90 ENGLAND AND GERMANY and the cult of thoroughness and efficiency — all these and other factors have intensified the struggle for bread and pushed the humanities into the background. A German writer has well described the transformation, not without some lament for the old, easy days: "One is often pained and overcome," writes Herr Fuchs, "with longing as one thinks of the German of a hundred years ago. He was poor, he was impotent, he was despised, ridiculed, and de- frauded. He was the uncomplaining slave of others; his fields were their battle-ground, and the goods which he had inherited from his fathers were trodden under foot and dispersed. He shed his blood heroically without asking why. He never troubled when the riches of the outside world were divided without regard for him. He sat in his little bare room high under the roof, in simple coat and clumsy shoes; but his heart was full of sweet dreams, and uplifted by the chords of Beethoven to a rapture which threat- ened to rend his breast. He wept with Werther and Jean Paul in joyous pain, he smiled with the childish innocence of his naive poets, the happiness of his longing consumed him, and as he listened to Schubert's song his soul became one with the soul of the universe. Let us think no more of it — it is useless. We have become men, and the virtues of our youth are ours no more. We can but face the inevitable and overcome it." 1 A professor at Jena asks: "Have we Germans kept a harmonious balance between the economic and the moral side of our development, as was once the case with the Greeks? No; with the enormous increase of wealth dark shadows have fallen on our national life. In the nation as in the individual we see with the increase of wealth the decrease of moral feeling and moral power." Professor Paulsen complains: "For new institutes of natural science and medicine new millions are always ready, but is any liberality shown toward the modest needs of philology or philosophy?" 1 This and the two following quotations are taken from Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany, pp. 5, 8. For an excellent description of conditions in Germany before 1870, cf. Sidney Whitman, German Memories, chap. 2. GERMAN EXPANSION 91 It does not become an American to throw stones at the ideals of wealth or bigness, which are our besetting sins in the eyes of Germans themselves. But, with all our op- timism and boastfulness, we remain an introspective and critical people. Germans, however, came to believe, with the Emperor, that they were "the salt of the earth," l and they looked with good-natured contempt upon their neighbors. The inability of the French to multiply and replenish the earth, the difficulties of the British in the Boer War, and the colossal failure of the Russians in Man- churia impressed unfavorably a people who performed their military service as a cheerful duty and smiled at the suggestion that the nations should turn their swords into ploughshares. The heads of all but the most conserva- tive were indeed affected by the praises which a wondering world showered upon the upstart empire and its spectacu- lar Kaiser. Wherever Germans turned they observed that their star, lately risen in the heavens, shone brilliantly amidst the dimmed rays of the older planets; its glory would be even more effulgent if some of the other stars were deflected from their ancient courses. Germany's place in the sun was not commensurate with her achievements in the other fields of human endeavor ; her genius was corre- spondingly cramped and her "historical mission " unfulfilled. Every self-respecting nation places a high value on its peculiar culture. Some years ago a famous British states- man, who is still living, dedicated a book to "those who believe that the British Empire is, under Providence, the greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen." 2 A French professor has recently described the civilization of his country as the forme exquise de justice et de verite uni- verselles. 3 And there is the famous Russian prophecy that 1 Speech at Bremen, 22 March, 1905. 2 Hon. G. N. (now Lord) Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 1894. 5 M. Alfred Croiset, in Bulletin de la Societe autour du Monde, January, 1915. 92 ENGLAND AND GERMANY "the Slavs stand on the threshold of the morning," while the other European peoples have already reached their apogee. But no nation has carried the obsession of its superiority to such a pitch as the present-day Germans. With all our marvellings at their progress in industry and commerce, our efforts to copy their system of municipal government, our fondness for their music, and our enor- mous debt to their science and philosophy, it comes as a distinct shock to read the following in the pages of General von Bernhardi: "No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and ap- propriate all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it received. . . . To no nation, except the Ger- man, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self, ' that which is given to mankind as a whole.' We often see in other nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which specially fits us for the leadership of the intellectual world, and imposes upon us the obligation to maintain that position." l This is national egotism raised to the nth. power, and the first impulse is to dismiss it as the ravings of a military fanatic. But the utterances of the gallant general can be duplicated at every turn. If the reader will consult a remarkable work entitled The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Englishman who married the daughter of Richard Wagner and has be- come thoroughly German, he will rind developed there such astonishing theories as that Christ was not a Jew, or that all the races of Europe — Celt, Slav, Latin, and German — sprang from the same original stock and may therefore be called German. In the eyes of Chamberlain all that is best in European civilization is essentially German, and the Germans are the chosen people. His bulky book has 1 Germany and the Next War, pp. 73-74. GERMAN EXPANSION 93 sold by tens of thousands, and "is, by the majority of Ger- mans, considered to be a higher revelation of truth un- fathomable." * Other writers argue, on the basis of phi- lology and archaeology, that the great artists of the Italian Renaissance, and even Jesus himself, were Germans. Or there is the statement of Herr Alfred Kerr, a well-known critic, as reported by M. Georges Bourdon, in his valuable analysis of German opinion, The German Enigma: "It is a law of history that the elder societies shall cede their place to the younger, and this is the condition of the perpetual regeneration of humanity. . . . Nothing has any power against the destiny of history. The German with his red corpuscles has arrived, and I believe his hour has come. The law of life ordains that the least strong shall be eliminated, and the real conquerors are the famished. That is to say, we Germans. The money that we have earned has given us the taste, and conquered prosperity has increased our appetite. When the German contemplates the rest of the world, he finds that he has not been spoiled, and that all that has been left him are the stale remains of a good dinner. But this share is merely a provisory one in his mind, and I believe that some day a new redistribution will take place." 2 Only since the war began has it been fully understood to what extent the virus of national conceit has permeated the German consciousness. From no other country has there poured forth such a deluge of articles, books, and pamphlets asserting the superiority of German culture in all its aspects, and in many instances proclaiming that it must be forced on a reluctant world. The most astonish- ing outburst, that of Professor Adolf Lasson of Berlin, deserves to be quoted. In two letters to a friend in Hol- land, written at the end of September, 1914, he says: "One cannot rest neutral in relationship to Germany and the German people. Either one must consider Germany as the most 1 Emil Reich, Germany's Swelled Head, 1907, p. 13. 2 Interview with Herr Alfred Kerr, p. 171. 94 ENGLAND AND GERMANY perfect political creation that history has known, or must approve her destruction, her extermination. A man who is not German knows nothing of Germany. "We are morally and intellectually superior to all: without peers. It is the same with our organizations and our institutions. "William II, delicics generis humani, has always protected peace, right, and honor, although it would have been possible for him by his power to annihilate everything. The greater his success, the more modest he has become. His chancellor, Herr von Bethmann- Hollweg, the most eminent among men who are now alive, does not know any higher cares than those of truth, loyalty, and right. Our army is, as it were, the image in miniature of the intelligence and morality of the German people." "We are breathing, with full chest, the full breath of history, and we know nothing about this wretched bourgeois existence [of Holland]. "We have no friends. All fear us and look upon us as dangerous, because we are intelligent, active, and morally superior. We are the freest people in the world. For we know how to obey. Our law is our reason. Our force is the force of the mind; our victory the victory of that. That is why we are able to triumph against numerous enemies, as did Frederick II in other days. "The European conspiracy has woven around us a web of lies and slander. As for us, we are truthful, our characteristics are humanity, gentleness, conscience, the virtues of Christ. In a world of wickedness, we represent love, and God is with us !" Such examples of perverted scholarship and distorted history are amusing, but they are also significant. There must be fire to produce so much smoke. And the fire has evidently been burning for some time. The German lit- erature of international politics, so voluminous in recent years, abounds in references to decadent France, inefficient Britain, mediaeval Russia; the whole case for German ex- pansion rests on the assumption that the world badly needs German Kultur to reach the highest plane of devel- opment, and the conviction has become firmly rooted, as any one who travelled in Germany or talked with Germans GERMAN EXPANSION 95 was bound to discover, that the fatherland was fully capable of imposing its will upon the other Powers of Europe. The world has not condemned Germany blindly; rather it has been convinced, against its will and from a study of the available evidence, that her ambitions are too subver- sive of others' rights and her people too militaristic for these peace-loving times. If her position among the im- perial and colonial nations was less favored than seemed her due, the fault was her own, either of her tragic past or of her recent diplomacy. She made no brilliant record in the colonies she did possess; they were costly to main- tain, unproductive from both commercial and human stan- dards. With all of England's faults and despite the ques- tionable methods often resorted to in the expansion of her empire, she has done much for the advancement and pros- perity of her subject peoples. Germany can adduce no such claim. On the contrary, her mechanical and bu- reaucratic policy has more than once produced rebellions that were suppressed with great cruelty. Hence German colonial ambitions, legitimate as they often were, arouse no sympathy outside of Germany, and if the argument must be reduced to General von Bernhardi's formula, "world power or downfall," the unmistakable answer is that the world can and will get along without Prussian militarism, a Prussian reorganization, or even a Prussian world peace. CHAPTER V COMMERCIAL RIVALRY It is a fixed idea with Germany and her sympathizers that Great Britain was drawn into the war from jealousy of Germany's advance toward the commercial conquest of the world. They point to the law of 1887, by which the British Parliament required all goods of that origin to be stamped "Made in Germany," lest Englishmen should un- wittingly patronize foreign industries, and they laughingly remark that the law in no small degree failed of its pur- pose, because the superiority of German-made commodi- ties soon commended them to English buyers. From the German point of view, British commercial supremacy has been in jeopardy for at least two decades from the ex- traordinary expansion of German trade; sooner or later it must succumb to the intensified attack of its rival. Therefore, when Germany found herself at war with France and Russia, the temptation to the nation of shopkeepers was irresistible. The armies of other nations would fight her battles on land, her own navy would bottle up Ger- man merchantmen, and British manufacturers and tra- ders would recover the markets filched from them by the superior genius of Germans. Such is the indictment, which rests on two assumptions : first, that Great Britain and Germany are rivals, one of whom must destroy the other; and second, that the United Kingdom cannot hold its own against the upstart Power across the North Sea. Before examining the argument in detail, let us frankly admit that Great Britain has not viewed the competition of Germany with pleasure or un- concern. From a host of writings bearing on the matter, 96 COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 97 the following quotations may be given because they are free from prejudice or envy: Lady Phillips, in A Friendly Germany : Why Not ?, writes : " The rapid development of German trade within the last two decades undoubtedly bears part of the responsibility for the ill feeling harbored against Germany in some quarters." 1 H. G. Wells, in Social Forces in England and America, writes: "We in Great Britain are intensely jealous of Germany. We are intensely jealous of Germany not only because the Germans outnumber us, and have a much larger and more diversified coun- try than ours, and lie in the very heart and body of Europe; but because in the last hundred years, while we have fed on platitudes and vanity, they have had the energy and humility to develop a splendid system of national education, to toil at science and art and literature, to develop social organization, to master and better our methods of business and industry, and to clamber above us in the scale of civilization. This has humiliated and irritated rather than chastened us, and our humiliation has been greatly exacer- bated by the swaggering bad manners, the talk of 'Blood and Iron' and Mailed Fists, the Weltpolitik rubbish, that inaugurated the new German phase." 2 An impartial American could say: "In the great total of Germany's trade, and in the rapidity with which it has risen to its present volume and value lies the reason for the anti-German agitation in England. On the surface this antagonism is political, and relates to armaments, but its roots lie in the trade of the world, and it is fed upon commercial rivalry." 3 The historical fact that the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century arose out of English jealousy of Hol- land's control of the carrying trade, may perhaps be ad- duced to support the theory that Great Britain has de- clared "war on German trade." Or we may believe that the American Revolution came about because the greedy 1 P. 78. s P. 42. « James Davenport Whelpley, The Trade of the World, p. 42. 98 ENGLAND AND GERMANY merchants of Great Britain demanded the enforcement of the Navigation Acts in restraint of colonial trade. More recently, as far back as 1885, a royal commission on the depression of trade and industry suggested that Brit- ish business men were making an ineffective opposition to German competition. 1 If it be added that the tariff reform movement, associated with the late Mr. Chamber- lain, justified itself on the ground that only a protective tariff could preserve British industry from the vigor of the German attack, and that the consumers of the United Kingdom were invited by spasmodic appeals to insist upon British goods, it may sound absurd to assert that com- mercial considerations were not very much to the fore when the neutrality of Belgium was ostensibly the cause of Britain's declaration of war. Here, again, one is con- fronted with the difficulty of analyzing accurately the tem- per of a nation, but the available evidence points to the conclusion that English opinion had pretty thoroughly absorbed the teaching of Norman Angell, that war and business were contradictory terms. Sir Edward Grey, in his speech to the House of Commons on 3 August, 1914, certainly brushed aside commercial considerations. "For- eign trade," he said, "is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end." 2 On this very ground the Radical wing of the Liberal party opposed his policy, and the Socialists conducted demonstrations against war, even after the vio- lation of Belgian neutrality. The great banking houses of the city are also believed to have been against the war. A few years ago Great Britain and Germany did appear to be locked in a death-struggle for the commercial domina- tion of the world, for the statistics of the last generation 1 Parliamentary Papers, cd. 4715. Second report of the royal commission on the depression of trade and industry, 3 March, 1886, pp. 21, 43-44, 48-5°, 54. 57. °4» 67-68, ng-122, 124-125, 128, 130, 140, 193, 221, 265, 283. 2 s Hansard, lxv, c. 1823. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 99 showed German trade to have grown far more rapidly than that of England. 1 In Millions of £ Sterling (20 Marks=£i) United Kingdom Germany Imports Re-exports* Exportsf Imports Exports 1870 1880 1890 1900. 1910 3°3 411 420 523 678 44 63 64 63 104 200 223 263 291 430 I73J 142 214 302 465 I25t 145 166 239 382 *Of foreign and colonial produce. tOf British produce. t Figures for 1872, the first year for which they are available. In forty years British imports increased 130 per cent, as opposed to an advance of 170 per cent for Germany; for the export trade the figures stand at 115 per cent and 194 per cent, respectively (119 per cent for England, if re- exports are included). It is quite evident, therefore, that in a general way the establishment of the new German Empire was followed by a prodigious expansion of foreign trade, beside which the slower progress of England was in marked contrast. Even in the first decade of the twentieth century, after Germany had made up for the time lost in a century of disunion, her effort was more pronounced than that of her long- established competitor. From all parts of the globe com- plaints began to pour in that Germany was displacing Great Britain in the markets which had belonged to the latter since the early days of modern industry. Whether one reads the reports of consuls and commercial attaches, or is content with articles in newspapers and reviews, there 1 Except where otherwise indicated, the statistics cited in this chapter are culled from the Statesman's Year Book, the Statistisches Handbuch des Deutschen Reiches (1907), and the Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich (annual). IOO ENGLAND AND GERMANY is the same story. German business methods — cheap goods, efficient advertising, competent salesmen, catering to individual and national tastes,, governmental assistance — were challenging the supremacy of the British trader. South America, Africa, the Ottoman Empire, China, and even British colonies figured in the imagination of scare- mongers, who could see no limit to German cupidity or German ingenuity, as lands where the British position would soon be seriously threatened. In fact, the British nation was told by Joseph Chamber- lain that "during the last thirty years . . . our general ex- port trade has remained practically stagnant" (Newcastle, 20 October, 1903). "Cotton will go"; "wool is threat- ened"; "your iron trade is going." Such phrases of the Conservative statesman indicated a pessimism which de- manded either retaliatory measures or a complete over- hauling of the national industrial machine. Even the great staple industries seemed to be losing their hold, as the following statistics of production show: Date Coal Production Iron Ore Production United Kingdom Germany United Kingdom Germany 1880 1890 Tons 146,969,000 181,614,000 225,181,000 264,433,000 Metric Tons 46,974,000 70,238,000 109,290,000 152,828,000 Tons 18,026,000 13,781,000 14,028,000 15,226,000 Metric Tons 7,239,000 11,406,000 18,964,000 28,710,000 1910 Date Pig Iron Production Crude Steel Production United Kingdom Germany United Kingdom Germany 1880 Tons 7,749,000 7,904,000 8,959,000 10,012,000 Metric Tons 2,713,000 4,651,000 8,507,000 14,794,000 Tons 3,579,000 4,901,000 6,515,000 Metric Tons 2,232,000 6,362,000 12,281,000 1890 1900 1 metric ton =2,204 pounds. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 101 Even in the cotton trade Germany had become quite in- dependent of England, as evidenced by the number of bales imported at Liverpool and Bremen. 1 Liverpool Bremen 1885-1886 2,558,798 3,690,800 530,451 2,792,000 1911— 1912 Finally, in a province wherein the English were wont to reign supreme Germany made marvellous progress, the shipping industry. The Hamburg-America Company and the Norddeutscher Lloyd are the two largest shipping con- cerns in the world. A generation ago they usually bought their ships in the British Isles, but no one will now dispute the ability of the German yards to build as good ships as any in the world. In most aspects of agriculture German production has, thanks to the high protection obtained by the Conservative party, forged considerably ahead of England. To these undoubted facts of German competition may be added the pitiful misery of the lower orders of English society, which moved the late Sir Henry Campbell-Banner- man to declare that twelve millions of the people lived on the verge of hunger and "in the grip of perpetual pov- erty"; 2 the collapse of many enterprises under the pressure of German competition and the inevitable growth of un- employment; the persistence of the tariff reform agita- tion for ten years; and the endless discussion as to what British manufacturers should do to prevent the capture by the Germans of the markets which were left. It is not surprising, therefore, if the casual observer assumed that Great Britain belonged to the nations with a past, and was correspondingly jealous of the new German state which prom- ised ere long to become the wealthiest nation in Europe. 1 These and the immediately preceding figures are taken from Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 230-231, 297. 2 At Perth, 5 June, 1903. 102 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Yet the figures in the case do not reveal England as deca- dent and listless. Unluckily for the tariff reformers, they argued too closely from the condition of England on the morrow of the Boer War. The additional taxation which that enterprise entailed was naturally reflected in the busi- ness world and, furthermore, the competition of Germany was still so recent that the possibility of meeting it had not been thoroughly grasped. The statistics of British and German foreign trade for the fifteen years 1899-1913, during which the former is usually represented as at the mercy of the latter, are very instructive. In Millions of Pounds Sterling United Kingdom Germany Imports Re-exports Exports Imports Exports 1899 485 524 522 528 543 55i 56s 607 645 593 625 678 680 745 769 65 63 68 65 69 70 78 85 92 80 91 104 102 112 109 264 291 280 283 291 301 33° 376 426 377 378 43° 454 487 525 289 302 286 290 316 343 372 422 45° 404 443 405 477 55o 534 218 239 225 241 255 265 292 324 355 324 343 382 405 454 495 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 During the Boer War and a few years afterward British trade remained practically stationary; that of Germany expanded rapidly. From 1905 to 1907 both countries felt the stimulus of a world-wide boom, and both were badly hit the following year by the collapse of credit which fol- lowed the American panic. After 1909 there was a general COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 103 recovery, in which — and this is the point — Great Britain fared quite as well as Germany. INCREASE 1909-1913 (In Millions of Pounds Sterling) Imports Exports 146 9i 148 (with re-exports 177) 152 Germany But these figures do not consider the growth of population, which was greater in Germany than in the United Kingdom. 1900 IQIO Per cent increase Great Britain . Germany 41,605,323 56,367,178 45,365,599 64,903,423 11. 4 Examined on this basis, the export trade of the United Kingdom is seen to have been increasing its margin of superiority. EXPORTS PER HEAD OF POPULATION > United Kingdom Germany £ 6 9 10 s. 14 2 3 d. 9 7 £ 4 5 6 5. 1 6 10 d. 3 Average 1907-19 10 1912 Increase 3 18 10 2 18 9 To contend, as many have done, that Great Britain was falling behind as an industrial and commercial nation is obviously absurd. The growth of the import trade was another sign of Brit- ish prosperity. In America we are accustomed to think 1 Liberal Year Book, 1913, p. 172. io4 ENGLAND AND GERMANY that a balance of international trade "in our favor" is essential to our happiness, and it is true that our greatest prosperity has been attained under such conditions. "Our English cousins look at these things from a different point of view, for it is equally true that England's fattest years have been those in which, as we say, her balance of trade has been 'against' her. It is when her imports exceed her exports by the most millions that business is good and profitable." 1 The surplus of imports represented, not an unfavorable balance of trade, but the tribute of the world for the services of British shipping and the interest on British investments abroad. The larger the excess of im- ports, the greater the activity of Britain's merchant ma- rine, the more productive her capital in foreign countries, and, of course, the greater the supply of commodities for home consumption. Despite the growth of Germany's merchant marine, -de- spite the capacity of her shipyards, the United Kingdom still enjoyed an overwhelming supremacy among maritime nations. She owned approximately 50 per cent of the ton- nage of the world, and she built more ships annually than the rest of the world together. Her position was, indeed, in little danger of being challenged for an indefinite period. NET REGISTER OF TONNAGE 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1912 United Kingdom Total '5,690,789 6,S74,Si3 7,978,538 9,304,108 ",555,663 11,894,791 Steam 1,112,934 2,723,468 5,042,517 7,207,610 10,442,719 10,992,073 Germany Total 982,355 1,181,525 1,433,413 1,941,645 2,903,570 3,023,725 Steam 81,994 215,758 723,652 1,347,845 2,396,733 2,513,666 1 J. D. Whelpley, The Trade of the World, p. 47. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 105 If, on the one hand, Germany achieved a larger percentage of increase than the mistress of the seas, the latter strength- ened her general lead by 4,162,632 tons and her ascendency in steam shipping by 7,447,467 tons. British supremacy was as fully apparent in the construction of new ships. NEW TONNAGE United Kingdom Germany 1881-1885 3,313,431 tons 4,126,093 " 248,504 tons 612,112 " In 191 2, the last year for which figures are complete, new tonnage to the amount of 1,738,514 gross tons was constructed in the shipyards of the United Kingdom, as opposed to 1,163,255 for the rest of the world, and 480,038 for Germany. In perhaps no other phase of world busi- ness was the ascendency of Great Britain so overwhelm- ing, and there was no sign of a change for the worse. 1 The capital invested abroad by Englishmen and Ger- mans is difficult to estimate. Sir George Paish, the editor of the Statist, credited Britain with £1,681,000,000 in her overseas dominions and £1,837,000,000 in foreign coun- tries, a total of £3,518,000,000, on 31 December, 1912. This was capital publicly subscribed, and the private invest- ments probably brought the total up to £4,000,000,000, from which the nation derived an income of about £200,- 000,000, or one-tenth of the national income. 2 The amount of German capital sent abroad has probably been exagger- ated. For the year 1900 20,000,000,000 marks (£1,000,- 1 Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 305 Jf. 1 Liberal Year Book, 1913, p. 181. io6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 000,000) was quoted by several authorities; 1 but Dr. Karl Helfferich, director of the Deutsche Bank, writing in 1913, stated that "the estimate of 20,000,000,000 marks for all Germany's investments of capital abroad seems rather too high than too low," adding that "new invest- ments abroad have, within the last few years, been con- siderably restricted owing to the enormous home demand for capital for industrial and public purposes." 2 The ratio between Great Britain and Germany stood at four to one, and was certainly not diminishing. The export trade of Great Britain and Germany must be further compared, as regards the geographical distribu- tion. 3 In Millions of Pounds Sterling United Kingdom Germany Average 1899-1903 1904-8 1912 1899-1903 1904-8 1912 Europe Extra - European , ex- cept British Empire British Empire 108 75 94 132 in 118 175 128 188 173 43 9 224 65 11 337 91 19 Two conclusions seem warranted from these figures. First, the bulk of Germany's foreign commerce was with coun- tries of the European continent, and in these regions she had pushed considerably ahead of England. The latter, on the other hand, did an increasing business with her vast Empire, where Germany's hold was quite slender; even though the mother country had refused to adopt a protective tariff for the benefit of her colonies, her exports went to them in increasing quantity and increasing per- 1 E. g., Wolf von Schierbrand, Germany, p. 101. 1 Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913, p. 113, an Eng- lish edition, issued by the Germanistic Society of America, of Deutschlands Volks- woklstand, 1888-1913. * Geoffrey Durham, "The Foreign Trade of Great Britain and Germany," in Contemporary Review, October, 19 10. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 107 centage. It was, of course, only natural that Germany should have the stronger position on the Continent, for she was advantageously placed for developing close com- mercial relations. Similarly, political considerations, and in the case of the self-governing colonies preferential tariff treatment, secured Great Britain the commercial ascend- ency in her own Empire. Thus the main field for competi- tion between Great Britain and Germany lay in the non- British territories outside of Europe. The results of that competition over a period of ten years are indicated as follows : EXPORTS (In >£i,ooo; 20 marks=;£i) China Japan Dutch Indies Siam Korea Congo French Colonies Portuguese Colonies . . . German Colonies Persia Liberia United States Argentina Brazil Chile Rest of South America West Indies Central America Mexico United Kingdom 1902 ,142 ,142 ,155 251 So 102 ,319 ,596 117 369 52 ,760 ,871 ,389 ,839 ,612 ,379 718 ,170 1912 i4,3H 12,229 6,233 1,086 3i9 367 3,867 2,357 S83 878 93 31,355 20,505 12,658 6,159 8,156 2,956 i,352 2,508 Germany 1902 i,845 2,490 i,i75 no no 30 290 295 357 55 35 22,460 2,360 2,190 1,700 1,770 710 325 1,705 1912 4,275 5,6oo 3,765 320 20 100 1,100 620 2,865 180 7o 35,3oo 11,970 9,640 5,600 5,i35 1,805 630 2,263 In not a single region of the world was the British trade being expelled, or even seriously hampered, and the import figures would demonstrate the same fact with perhaps 108 ENGLAND AND GERMANY even more conviction. Finally, not to dishearten the reader with endless figures, it may be remarked that Germany was the best customer of the United Kingdom, and exported to it more goods than any country except the United States. In 1913 the reciprocal trade of the two countries exceeded £121,000,000, not counting re-exports from England to the amount of £19,878,000. Even if German imports to England increased more rapidly than the reverse trade, the fact remained that British commerce with Germany represented one- tenth of the trade of the country: a most excellent reason why war would be a calamity to both parties. 1 Still, it may fairly be asked whether Englishmen accepted this point of view. The most convincing evidence is that in three general elections (January, 1906, January, 19 10, December, 1910) they declined to adopt the new gospel of tariff reform. The baldly avowed purpose of a protect- ive tariff was to save British industry from German com- petition, but ten years' discussion merely served to con- vince the majority of the voters that free trade was the only possible system for a country which imported the greater part of its food and the raw materials for its in- dustries. On the eve of the war tariff reform was quite distinctly in the background. Similarly, as regards the imperial aspects of that controversy, Englishmen seemed instinc- 1 The German view of Anglo-German trade rivalry is well expounded by Pro- fessor von Schulze-Gaevernitz in Deutschland und England (1908). He recog- nizes that Germany has profited enormously by the free-trade system of England, but believes that German competition will force the adoption of a protective tariff sooner or later; also that war is not impossible for this very reason. "Let us not forget" the fate of Holland; and "what the Spain of Philip II and the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon were, Germany is to-day: the enemy" (p. 33). But he concludes with the observation: "If once Germany and England realize that neither can be annihilated and that third parties will be the only gainers from a war between them, all danger thereof will disappear, despite all the jingoes on either side." See also his article in the American Review of Reviews, November, 1909. The book is reviewed by C. S. Goldman in the Nineteenth Century, February, 1909. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 109 tively to realize that the best guarantee for the preservation of their Empire lay in maintaining a fair field for all, with favors for none; so that throughout the vast British dominions, except in the self-governing colonies, British manufacturers and traders enjoyed no privileges which were not equally available for Germans. 1 Nor is it with- out bearing on the question that the British Government, after years of hesitation, withdrew its opposition to the Baghdad railway, which was calculated to stimulate Ger- man commerce in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, a field of endeavor long sacred to British enterprise. So far as public sentiment was reflected in the great reviews, the bugbear of German competition disappeared when the trade figures showed that British exporters were getting their share of the increased volume of business so charac- teristic of the last decade. For two years before the war England experienced such a boom as she had not known for many a day, and if in the spring of 1914 there were signs of relaxation, the favorable conditions of English in- dustry were indicated by the comparative lack of unem- ployment. The impartial observer will probably recognize, in the pressure of German competition, a stimulus much needed by the easy-going Briton of the late Victorian era. The United Kingdom had so long dominated the markets of the world that the advent of a serious rival was difficult to imagine or understand. With true British insularity, her manufacturers had insisted on selling to foreign cus- 1 Since these lines were written German propagandists in the United States have sought to create the impression that German trade is discriminated against in the colonies of the British Empire and that this policy is intended for further develop- ment. Nothing could be farther removed from the facts; except, of course, as regards the self-governing dominions. But in those countries the British Govern- ment has absolutely no control of fiscal policies. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa have granted preferential treatment for British goods primarily for economic, and not for political, reasons, and it will be seen in Chapter VII that the German Government has accepted the principle that in tariff matters the Brit- ish self-governing colonies enjoy complete autonomy. no ENGLAND AND GERMANY tomers the same commodities that were acceptable to Englishmen. They expected peoples who spoke every lan- guage but English to peruse catalogues written in English. They ignored shipping directions, and they were indiffer- ent about the appearance of their product. British goods were supposed to rest on their reputation for quality; if they were not acceptable as they stood, it was not the fault of their makers. And so ad infinitum. The carelessness and lack of initiative on the part of manufacturers, the in- ferior quality of their agents abroad, and the utter absence of governmental assistance, the conservatism of investors and the positive ignorance of foreign lands, all contributed to reduce British industry almost to stagnation. This lassitude was not confined to business circles. The recklessness with which the country plunged into the Boer War, in the expectation of an easy victory, was an index of that feeling of smugness which Englishmen were wont to exhibit in their dealings with other people, and which had recently found expression in the Diamond Jubilee of 1897. The conduct of the war, however, suggested that national complacency had been carried to a dangerous pitch, and the Prince of Wales (now King George V) was moved to exclaim, in a famous speech, "England, wake up !" It was indeed high time that she did. Her educa- tional system, according to the then prime minister, Mr. Balfour, was "chaotic, ineffectual, utterly behind the age." The Irish problem still remained unsolved ; there were vast questions of social reform which must be faced unless the conscience of Englishmen was utterly dead, and a new period in international affairs was clearly opening. The pursuit of pleasure and the love of sport, the luxury of the rich and the indifference of the middle classes were slowly sapping the creative power of an ancient and famous people, who seemed to have forgotten their glorious past and were now content to rest complacently upon the COMMERCIAL RIVALRY in laurels of a bygone age. In his book England and the English the late Price Collier has a brilliant chapter on "The Land of Compromise." Modern England, he sug- gests, has refused to face the problems of the modern world, and has sought refuge in her traditional policy of compro- mise; she is a national ostrich that hides its face in the sands, a twentieth-century Belshazzar who will not read the handwriting on the wall. "The world has changed, but the Englishman has changed least of all," and a casual reader of Mr. Collier's indictment must have despaired of a really United Kingdom or an Empire which was more than a name. There can be little question, however, that in the last ten years a new England has been in the making. One does not need to defend all the policies and actions of the Liberal government which took office in December, 1905, to recognize that it honestly endeavored to cope with the multitude of problems accumulated in the late Victorian period. Social reform, economic readjustment, Ireland, even the constitution itself — nothing escaped the attention of this zealous and able cabinet. We cannot judge as yet of the value or soundness of their measures, but we are very much aware of a deep awakening in the national life of the most conservative people in Europe. Contemporary England is, indeed, a kind of Rip Van Winkle, roused from slumber by the loud and persistent energy across the North Sea, and neither the world at large nor England herself has fully realized the significance of this awakening. What other country could have weathered so easily and so calmly the storms produced by the great strikes of a few years ago? Seamen, railway servants, transport workers, dockers, miners, etc., seemed suddenly to have been infested by the virus of syndicalism, and their in- transigeance for a while threatened to destroy the entire edifice of national prosperity. They unquestionably pos- 112 ENGLAND AND GERMANY sessed many just grievances, for of the increasing wealth of the country they were receiving little advantage, but were, on the contrary, adversely affected by the general rise of prices. Nor is it clear how far these elements of English society were satisfied with the concessions which their employers made with tolerable good will. Yet in spite of the very considerable dislocation of the national life caused by these recurring strikes, British commerce continued to expand rapidly (cf. table on p. 102) and the chancellor of the exchequer was able to count on a progress- ive increase of revenue from customs. Between 1909 and 1 9 14, a period during which the revenue increased from £151,442,837 to £188,853,233, there was no increase of taxation — a striking contrast with Germany, where the imperial government was able to make both ends meet only by heavy borrowing (£59,3 53>97°) • "There is no sign of decadence in England. By contrast with the rapid development of Germany and of the United States she seems, however, to be progressing but slowly. It needs but a glance at the vast figures of her foreign trade, encompassing as they do the world-wide field of human endeavor and industry, to gain some understanding of what has yet to be accomplished to retire her to second place. To British ports come vessels of every nation and to every seaport in the world are sent British-owned vessels on trading missions. Millions of tons of staples are bought by England in the country of their origin, loaded on British ships, and delivered to her customers elsewhere without touching British ports. In the warehouses along the Thames and elsewhere are concentrated the supplies of the world, in many notable articles of commerce. The ivory of India and Africa are first brought here. The furs of the world are sold at auction in the London fur -market. Mahogany logs lie on the London docks awaiting transshipment to countries much nearer to their native growth than England. In brief, this little island is the commercial heart of the world, and the slowing or quickening of its pulses is reflected on the bourses of the nations of the earth. With all the internationalizing of finance which has come about in recent years, England still keeps tight hold upon the purse-strings. The London bank rate is a governing factor from COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 113 New York to Peking. England has been for generations and still is the great creditor nation. More than £200,000,000 is scattered abroad annually. It is her money which builds the pioneer rail- roads, opens mines, dams the waters, and finances the lesser nations. From all these enterprises her people take their toll and seek new outlets for this increment. That too much money and too many men have been sent abroad" attracted by promise of greater returns is probably true. She has bled herself too freely, and the heart now shows some signs of weakness. The rivalry of younger and more daring and strenuous peoples for the trade of the world is a severe test of her seasoned strength." 1 Personal impressions are doubtless of little value, but in 1 91 3, when the writer revisited England after an absence of five years, he was not conscious, either in conversation with Englishmen or in reading the daily press, of that national depression and pessimism which was so noticeable in the first decade of this century. Domestic politics, not foreign affairs, were the subject of controversy. Of anti- German sentiment there was little or no evidence. The country had got used to the German navy, and except for a few extremists welcomed Mr. Churchill's efforts to strike a bargain with Admiral von Tirpitz. Trade was flourishing, unemployment rare, prosperity general. The possibility of war had almost faded from the popular mind, the more so as Anglo- German relations had "sensibly improved" during the Balkan Wars. It would be foolish to assert that when the war did come there was not in the back of the English mind the idea that if the royal navy could control the seas a severe blow would be inflicted on German foreign commerce, but such a result was regarded as the means to an end, not the end itself. There is no evidence at all to show that the destruc- tion of Germany as an economic Power was considered by Parliament in deciding to support the policy of Sir Ed- ward Grey. And since war was declared the sober and 1 J. D. Whelpley, The Trade of the World, pp. 63-65. ii4 ENGLAND AND GERMANY responsible journals have insisted that the annihilation of Germany, of the German people, was neither possible nor desirable for Great Britain to accomplish. No looser statement can be made than that British participation in the great conflict was dictated by cupidity or jealousy, for if sheer profit were the only" consideration England would never have risked her very existence in a struggle which must cost infinitely more than the sum total of Germany's foreign trade for many, many years. As a matter of fact, in the summer of 19 14 there appeared to be no reason for a war to destroy German commerce, even if one had been planned by Great Britain, for the economic condition of Germany was far from roseate. The first nine months of 191 2, a period of great commercial expansion, were followed by a disorganization of the rail- way service which occasioned great losses. Then came the Balkan Wars and the consequent collapse of a profitable market, so that during the year 1913 the shortage of cap- ital, first noticed at the time of the Agadir crisis, became quite serious. An issue of Prussian four-per-cent treasury bonds, offered at 99 and redeemable in 191 7, was only half taken up in March; a second loan in June fared little better, and even imperial-government consols could be sold only to 80 per cent of the issue. New industrial enter- prises decreased from £134,000,000 in 191 1 and £146,000,- 000 in 1912 to £87,000,000 in 1913; the throbbing factories of Westphalia had to curtail considerably; and the building trade, which had been depressed since 191 1, was saved only by large orders from the military authorities. In Bavaria the toy, hat, pencil, brush, and india-rubber trades suffered considerably, and in the case of baskets, cane furniture, granite, and paint, which had been sent chiefly to England, the market was lost by the competi- tion of British manufacturers ! Unemployment assumed a dangerous dimension, and was the more serious because COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 115 of the constant rise in the cost of living. It is also be- lieved that the yield of the great war tax of 1913 was far less than had been expected. Economically, therefore, Germany on the eve of the war was getting into difficulties for the first time since the period of expansion began, nor was the outlook for better times favorable. This may well have weighed with the military authorities in deciding that the time for war had come; with equal emphasis it would suggest to Great Britain that she had only to wait for a financial crisis in Germany to recover whatever ground had been lost in the heyday of German prosperity. 1 1 This paragraph is a summary of the British consular reports, published in the appendix to Ford Madox Hueffer, When Blood is Their Argument. CHAPTER VI ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 The relations of England and Germany, as regards modern international politics, begin with the year 1740. Not that before this date the two countries were disinter- ested the one in the other. The captivity of Richard the Lion-Hearted in the twelfth century; the election of Richard of Cornwall as King of the Romans in the thir- teenth; the appointment of Edward III as Vicar of the Empire on the eve of the Hundred Years' War; the im- portance of the Steelyard in London as an outpost of Hansa commerce, an experiment which insular jealousy forced Queen Elizabeth to terminate; the inspiration which Eng- lish reformers drew from the teachings of Luther and Zwingli; and the vacillating interference of James I in the Thirty Years' War: these episodes testify to a connection between the two lands usually political, sometimes eco- nomic, and latterly religious, but none the less constant if viewed in the perspective of centuries. In the interval between the close of the religious wars and the expansion of European politics to America and India, that is to say, during the growth of French ascendency in the age of Louis XIV, England and Brandenburg — the forerunner of Prussia, which was in turn the creator of Germany — discovered a mutual interest in the preservation of Hol- land from French acquisitiveness and in the protection of Protestantism against the onslaughts of the Most Chris- tian King. Throughout the eighteenth century Germans played an important part in English history. On the extinction of 116 ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 117 the house of Stuart in 17 14, it was a German, the Elector of Hanover, who mounted the English throne as George I. Though his positive services to his adopted country were not conspicuous, he brought Handel to England, and, from his ignorance of the English language and English politics, made parliamentary government both possible and nec- essary. German soldiers were repeatedly the agents of British expansion. Thus, Gibraltar was captured, with the assistance of the British navy, by a force under Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt. English battles on the Con- tinent were fought by Hanoverians or other German troops in English pay, and in the War of the American Revolu- tion Hessians were used in a manner quite familiar to us. Before that war there had begun an emigration of Ger- mans to British colonies which continued unabated until a generation ago; many Germans went to England itself, and rose rapidly in the business world. "England and its dominions have wisely honored and welcomed these men, and no lists of notables in any part of the British Empire could be made without including softie of German birth or German extraction." 1 But not till the reign of Frederick the Great of Prussia did the mistress of the seas appreciate the importance of a fixed policy with respect to German affairs. That policy came to rest on two considerations, the possession of Han- over by English kings and a determination to resist French predominance in Europe. Of "Germany" or of its future there was no conception. As long as the house of Hapsburg remained the enemy of France, British statesmen found an Austrian alliance the natural basis of the balance of power. But the refusal of Maria Theresa to defend Hanover on the eve of the Seven Years' War and her overtures for an alliance with Louis XV threw England into the arms of the King of Prussia. From the Convention of Westmin- 1 Lady Phillips, A Friendly Germany, Why Not ?, p. 48. n8 ENGLAND AND GERMANY ster (January, 1756) and later treaties under which William Pitt subsidized Frederick to the extent of £670,000 a year immense consequences flowed. Frederick raised Prussia to an equality with Austria, and began the creation of that Germany which in recent years has been the preoccupa- tion, if not the terror, of Great Britain; while by conquering America and India on the plains of Germany the island kingdom laid the foundations of that colossal Empire which is to-day the envy of united Germany. In the light of this strange development, it is not surprising that German historians regard the abandonment of Frederick by Lord Bute and George III an act of treachery which might be repeated by a modern English cabinet to escape from an unprofitable alliance with the Germany of to-day. Fred- erick, it may be noted, recouped himself by leaving England to "stew in her own juice" when confronted by the Franco- American alliance of 1778. During the Napoleonic wars British policy was at one with German interests, to achieve the overthrow of imperial France. That Great Britain thought mainly of her in- sular security and the preservation of her Empire did not deprive her action of results advantageous to Germany. Without her subsidies to the allied armies, the pressure exerted by Wellington's troops in Spain, and her resistance to the Continental system which impelled Napoleon to undertake the fatal Russian campaign — above all, without the example of her steadfast refusal to make terms with the Corsican adventurer, Germany to this day might have been, if not a province of France, at least an outpost of French culture, a travesty of race and national honor. German historians, although they contend that Waterloo was won by Blucher and his Prussians, and complain of England's refusal at the Congress of Vienna to allow the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Prussia, recognize the debt of the Continent to English wealth and English stub- ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 119 bornness from 1793 to 181 5. Englishmen in turn have always thrilled at the thought of Prussia in 1813. Crushed, partitioned, and humiliated after the catastrophe of Jena, her people, under the guidance of Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Hardenberg, had risen as a nation in arms and given to the world an inspiring picture of what may be accomplished by a great idea and a lofty purpose. If the relations of England and Germany in the following century had continued the traditions of Napoleonic days, the two nations would have avoided the death-struggle in which they are now locked and have stood shoulder to shoulder as the apostles of peace and progress. Dis aliter visum. During the great peace, from 1815 to 1848, Great Britain settled down to the work of political regeneration, economic development, and humanitarian legislation. She quickly recovered from the strains of the war, and became the workshop of the world. Her colonial Empire expanded on all continents, her fleets policed and dominated the seas, and her institutions became the model for Continental nations. Still struggling to be free, and rent by internal dissensions, the latter enjoyed, if they did not merit, the mingled contempt and dislike of the island Power, to whose interest it was that they remain in a condition of innocuous desuetude. The pages of Thackeray reflect the attitude of aristocratic society toward the European peoples among whom they sought their pleasures, and the middle or lower classes were too prejudiced or too ignorant to regard "for- eigners" dispassionately. English insularity was probably at its worst in the years before nationality began to be the controlling factor in European affairs. Germany, unfortunately, entered upon an inglorious period in her history. In 181 5 Frederick William III of Prussia was hailed as the leader of Germany, for he was to achieve its unity and endow it with those liberal institu- 120 ENGLAND AND GERMANY tions which were considered the secret of English greatness. But his acceptance of the German Confederation, by which the Congress of Vienna restored Germany to the tutelage of absolutist and obscurantist Austria, destroyed the hopes of his people, and for the rest of his reign Germany groaned under the oppression of Metternich. The King himself adopted the Austrian system, which reduced Prussia to the rank of a second-rate Power, and thereby earned the ob- loquy of English liberals who conceived their own phi- losophy to be a panacea for all evils existent and potential. For this state of affairs Great Britain was in part respon- sible. 1 She had it in her power to dictate the settlements of the Congress of Vienna. Had she seen fit to demand the creation of a strong and united Germany, which should satisfy the aspirations of the German people, she might well have accomplished it. The Tsar Alexander ardently supported the claims of Prussia to the whole of Saxony, and Prussian statesmen demanded Alsace-Lorraine as well. But Alexander, who was then posing as a liberal, was dis- tasteful to Castlereagh, the British plenipotentiary, and his designs on the Ottoman Empire were suspected; Aus- tria was the traditional ally of Great Britain, except in the Seven Years' War, and was the opponent of Russian de- signs in the Balkans. Castlereagh, therefore, joined with Metternich and Talleyrand, the French representative, to upset the Prusso-Russian schemes, and to force the Con- federation upon Germany. Perhaps German unity was yet only an ideal, but if British statesmen could have looked ahead fifty years and perceived how British policy in the Italian wars of unification would cement an abiding 1 For the German attitude toward English policy up to 1871, see Erich Marcks, England and Germany, 1500-1900 (1900), Richard Graf von Moulin-Eckart, Eng- lands Politik und die Machte (1901), and Heinrich Oberwinder, Die Aufgaben des Deulschen Reiches (1905). Lord Palmerston is severely criticised by Sir Spencer Walpole in his two works, History of England from 1815 and History of Twenty- Five Years. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 121 friendship between England and Italy, they might well have done something for the great nation of central Europe. Intelligible as was Gastlereagh's attitude in the light of narrow " British interests," it is to be regretted that he had no vision of a Europe reconstituted on the basis of liberty and nationality. In the reaction which followed the Congress of Vienna, German liberals looked across the North Sea for light, for with the passing of Castlereagh, in 1822, English policy became distinctly liberalizing, in both foreign and domestic affairs. The Carlsbad Resolutions of 1819 gave the German governments absolute control over the intellectual life and political activities of their peoples; in comparison, England, even before the Reform Act of 1832, was free and enlight- ened. Not even the unconstitutional regime in Hanover, which was still bound to England by a personal union, and until its severance refused to join the Zollverein, could dampen the enthusiasm of German professors for the in- stitutions and liberties of England. In official circles, on the other hand, English policy was not popular, more espe- cially after Palmerston, speaking in the House of Com- mons, advised the German princes to restrain their reac- tionary tendencies. The name of Palmerston hangs like a dead weight over Anglo- German relations till the days of Bismarck. Con- trolling the foreign relations of Great Britain for the greater part of a generation, he certainly achieved some remarkable successes. The independence and neutrality of Belgium, the establishment of British influence in China, and the checking of French and Russian designs in the Near East are not less conspicuous than his benevolent neutrality in Italian politics, without which Italy might never have been made. But with respect to Germany, his attitude was deplorable. He described the country as "a land of damned professors," and quoted with favor 122 ENGLAND AND GERMANY the aphorism of Voltaire, that its people should be content to rule the clouds, while France ruled the land and Britain the seas. While the Frankfort Assembly of 1848 purchased a fleet to protect Schleswig-Holstein from Danish acquisi- tiveness, he airily remarked that the "German" flag was unknown to international law, and that British cruisers might treat the ships of the Confederation as "pirates"! His policy was regarded as meddlesome, high-handed, and treacherous. The famous doggerel, "Hat der Teufel einen Sohn, 1st er sicher Palmerston," reflects accurately German antipathy to the great Eng- lishman. His dismissal from office in 185 1, for a too prompt recognition of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat, was hailed with delight at the German courts, and his diplo- macy was felt to be an important factor in the maintenance of British economic supremacy, which aimed to keep Ger- many divided in the interests of its own monopoly. But his worst offense was to exclude Prussia from the Congress of Paris, which met after the Crimean War, until the terms of peace had been settled, although as a neutral nation Prussia had no legal claim to participate. As Lord Palmerston enjoyed boundless popularity among all classes of Englishmen they accepted his view of a coun- try about which they knew little and cared less. The typ- ical German, as portrayed in literature and on the stage, was "a genial, wool-gathering professor in a formidable pair of spectacles, untidy of habit, and far from athletic in form, the dedicated slave rather than the possessor of several large note-books and a collecting-box." 1 Not even the old universities were free from the prevailing preju- dice, perhaps because they were strongholds of Anglicism and suspected the "undisciplined freethinkers" (Palmer- 1 The Round Table, September, 1Q14, p. 617. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 123 ston) of Germany. 1 Prince Albert was long disliked as a foreigner scarcely worthy to be the consort of an English queen, in spite of the deep regard of Frederick William IV for Queen Victoria 2 and the partiality of Bunsen, his min- ister at the court of St. James, for English institutions. 3 Finally, the international exhibition of 1851, held to de- monstrate the complete superiority of English civilization and the ineffable blessings of peace, was considered a kind of rebuke to Germany for the revolution of 1848 and the backward "Kultur" which produced them. On the other hand, says Sir Harry Johnston, "the mar- riage of Queen Victoria gave a fresh impetus to the Ger- manization of Britain. Notable Germans were more or less directly brought to this country by those far-seeing helpers of England, Leopold and Albert of Saxe-Coburg. They explored unknown lands for the British Empire, founded colleges of music and chemistry, schools and mu- seums of art, studios in philology, ancient and modern, improved both theatre and drama, extended horticulture, 1 See W. Tuckwell, Reminiscences of Oxford, p. 147. 1 In 1848 he addressed to Queen Victoria the following remarkable letter: "Most Gracious Queen and Sister . . . God has permitted events [the Paris revolution of February, 1848] which decisively threaten the peace of Europe. ... If the revolutionary party carries out its programme, 'the sovereignty of the people,' my minor crown will be broken no less certainly than the mighty crowns of your Majesty, and a fearful scourge laid upon the nations: a century of rebellion, lawlessness, and godlessness. . . . God has placed in your Majesty's hands and the hands of the two Emperors, and in those of the German Confederacy and in mine, a power which, if it acts now in union and harmony, with reliance on Heaven, is able, humanly speak- ing, to enforce with certainty the maintenance of the peace of the world. . . . The power I mean is 'the power of united speech.' In the year 1830 the use of this immeasurable power was criminally neglected. ... On both knees I adjure you, use, for the welfare of Europe, ' Engellands England.' With these words I fall at your Majesty's feet." (Letters of Queen Victoria, vol. II, p. 151.) 3 The comment of a Pan-German is worth reading. Bunsen was "the worst choice that could have been made. Instead of being a man of the old Prussian type, he was a weak and fanciful representative, whose Anglomania was accentuated by his English wife." He desired an Anglo-German alliance, "forgetful of what such an alliance had cost Prussia " in the time of Frederick the Great. And "the almost sickening prejudice of Frederick William IV was increased by Bunsen's effusive reports." (Moulin-Eckart, Englands Politik und die Machte, p. 60.) This is practically a paraphrase of Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte, vol. V, pp. 125-6. 124 . ENGLAND AND GERMANY and assisted to make Kew Gardens and the Herbarium what they are and have been to an Empire in which eco- nomic botany is a matter of necessity, not a pretty lux- ury as some of our home-bred statesmen have imagined. Glance through the eminent names which have become famous during the nineteenth century in British colonial and imperial history, in British exploration, biology, metal- lurgy, painting, music, journalism, banking, law making and expounding, soldiering and seamanship, and note how many are of recent or immediate extraction." x There fol- lows a truly astonishing list of notabilities who gave Eng- land their best efforts, and were well rewarded by a grateful country. Between none of the countries now at war did there exist such close and intimate personal relations of long standing as between England and Germany. When the movement for German unification began to take definite shape, Queen Victoria lent her sympathy and her influence to the Prussian cause, 2 but Bismarck's defi- ance of the Prussian Diet aroused much indignation. The foreign office had no definite policy, although it did not stand alone in this respect, for Bismarck's designs were nowhere understood, not even in Germany itself. Palmer- ston had once written (22 November, 1850): "We should have no objection to see Prussia take the first place; on the contrary, a German union, embracing all the smaller states, with Prussia at its head, and in alliance with Austria as a separate Power, would have been a very good European arrangement." 3 With such remarkable prescience did Palmerston envisage the future organization of central Europe, but when the crucial moment came he abandoned this view for a policy of bluster. 1 Views and Reviews, p. 104. 2 Cf. Sir Sidney Lee, Life of Queen Victoria, passim. 8 Ashley, Life of Lord Palmerston, vol. II, p. 171. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 125 The unification of Germany began when Bismarck in- terested himself in the problem of Schleswig-Holstein. That question was one of the most complicated which ever confronted European diplomacy. As Palmerston ex- plained, only three persons had ever understood it: the Danish prime minister, who had lost his mind; the late Prince Albert; and himself, who had forgotten it. 1 It did not occur to him that the Prussian statesman had thor- oughly grasped the possibilities of the situation, and as the status of the duchies rested on an international agree- ment of 1852 Palmerston supposed in 1863, when the attempt Of Denmark to annex them brought both the Ger- man Confederation and Prussia on the scene, that the Con- cert of Europe would settle the matter. Hence his state- ment that, if any violent attempt were made to overthrow the rights or interfere with the independence of Denmark, those who made the attempt would find that they would not have to contend with Denmark alone. A more un- fortunate declaration could not have been made, because England was not prepared to use force on behalf of Den- mark, even if the Prince of Wales had just married a Da- nish princess, and diplomacy was quite unable to prevent Bismarck from taking both Schleswig and Holstein for Prussia. 2 "The war of 1864 was one of the great cross- 1 The problem itself and the insufficiency of British diplomacy is admirably pre- sented in the Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, 1 826-1 876. Sir Robert was one of the few Englishmen who possessed an adequate knowledge of German affairs. He was attached to the Berlin embassy, and had his advice been followed the ques- tion would probably have been peacefully settled ; which doubtless explains Bis- marck's bitter dislike of him and his rejection for the Berlin embassy after the uni- fication of the empire. J "When in the year 1864 the sudden death of the King of Denmark opened up the Schleswig-Holstein question, the British Government proposed to France that they should oppose the advance of Prussia and Austria-Hungary, that is, they should interfere in the internal affairs of Germany, with a view to hindering the advance- ment of German unity." (So Heinrich Oberwinder, Die Wellkrise und die Aufgaben des Deutschen Reiches, p. 37.) This is, of course, a ridiculous overstatement, because the Schleswig-Holstein question had been internationalized by the Treaty of 1852, and no one, not even the Germans themselves, who were far from approving of Bis- marck's policy, anticipated his real intentions. Until after the war with Austria 126 ENGLAND AND GERMANY roads of British history," observes a competent student of naval affairs, and he opines that England "took the wrong turning. The great German chancellor candidly admitted that the possession of Kiel and a strategic canal through Holstein were two of the principal objects which Prussia had when she drew the sword. ... A war which should have left Schleswig-Holstein in the hands of Denmark would have been . . . exceedingly advantageous, eco- nomical, and opportune for Great Britain." 1 But royal interference restrained Palmerston and Russell, and Bis- marck had achieved the first of his great triumphs. Not until the defeat of Austria in the war of 1866 and the establishment of the North German Confederation did England comprehend the progress of events in central Europe. But as the policy of Napoleon III grew more reckless, English sentiment began to see in the new Ger- many an important bulwark for the balance of power. The annexation of Savoy and Nice by the French Em- peror after he had withdrawn from the Italian War of Liberation, had been deeply resented in England, and his negotiations with Bismarck for "compensation" on the morrow of Sadowa branded him as a veritable highway- man. His raising of the Luxemburg question in 1867 ended by involving England in a difficult pledge to pro- tect its neutrality. And as it became evident that the Second Empire was tottering he was expected to stake all on a last desperate throw. For these reasons English opinion, in the early stages of the Franco- German War, was decidedly favorable to Germany. She had been attacked after conceding the essential point in the preliminary diplomacy. On 25 July, 1870, the Times published a draft treaty, in the hand- Bismarck was generally regarded as a traitor to the German cause. Herr Ober- winder's remark admirably illustrates the fashion in which history has been dis- torted to serve modern political ambition. 1 Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, p. 87. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 127 writing of the French ambassador in Berlin, which pro- vided for the annexation of Belgium to France, and to the same newspaper Thomas Carlyle, then at the height of his influence, sent a long letter in praise of Germany. 1 The Queen's sympathy was known to be with the German legions. In short, politicians and publicists were agreed that a strong Germany was essential to Europe and to England ; to quote the Times, a propos of the adhesion of the South German states to the North German Confederation, "in this the policy of past generations of English statesmen will be fulfilled." 2 The first French defeats aroused no sympathy — they were considered a proper punishment for a reckless and uncalled-for declaration of war. But the disinterested spectator could not remain indif- ferent to the fate of France. Bismarck's protest against the sale of coals and ammunition to France by Newcastle and Birmingham, and the refusal of the German military authorities to let an English gunboat ascend the Seine to- remove British subjects from France were not kindly re- ceived, and when, after Sedan and the collapse of the Empire, it was realized that the Germans would make peace only for a heavy price, English opinion began to rally to France. To the feeling that France should not be unduly punished for the mistakes of a government she had repudiated, the desire was added that the city and people of Paris should be spared the horrors of war. Lord Granville therefore endeavored to bring about an armistice before the capital should be bombarded. Bismarck spoke of this proposal as so much "rubbish," pretending to be- lieve that slow starvation and the horrors of a siege were worse than a bombardment; in his Reflections and Remi- niscences he declared that the Commune was directly caused by conditions arising out of the siege. In the same place, and even more in Moritz Busch's Bismarck : Some Secret 1 11 November, 1870. 2 10 December, 1870. 128 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Pages of His History., his irritation against England finds constant expression: now a complaint that the Crown Princess, who was the daughter of Queen Victoria, was influencing the King or her husband; now a lament that the two men were more anxious to be praised in the English press than to further the interests of Germany. Nor was Bismarck pleased when Lord Granville protested vigor- ously against Russia's repudiation of that clause of the Treaty of Paris which restricted her from building war- ships in the Black Sea, for he himself had urged this action upon Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian chancellor; and in the London conference which met to consider the Russian demand, the Prussian representative voted steadily with his Russian colleague. In such an atmosphere the sug- gestion of Queen Victoria that King William should be "magnanimous" in the final terms of peace was ignored; while Gladstone's protest against the annexation of Alsace- Lorraine inspired Bismarck with a permanent dislike for the great Englishman and a contempt often manifested in the title "Professor" Gladstone. 1 British policy, throughout this period of Bismarckian triumphs, was frankly opportunist, and perhaps it was a mistake not to take sides more resolutely. "A great English statesman would either have prevented the uni- 1 Sybel in his Begriindung des Deutsches Reiches, of course, follows the cue of Bis- marck. Oberwinder and Moulin-Eckart, in the works cited, are very bitter because Great Britain did not prevent the war with France, as if Bismarck had not boasted, in the Reflections and Reminiscences, that he had contrived to make the war inevi- table! Professor Marcks writes: "The unity of Germany was accomplished with- out the aid, and somewhat against the wishes, of England. The historian under- stands how the interests of Great Britain caused her indifference and unfriendliness, but he also understands how her course of action affected Germany. The German mind does not understand, and has not yet forgotten, how the land it had hitherto so greatly admired, and which was so closely akin to it, so bitterly disappointed it." (England and Germany, 1500-1900, p. 50.) As a matter of fact, Lord Gran- ville did endeavor to mediate between France and Germany in the two weeks before the war, and his policy as regards the neutrality of Belgium was scrupulously im- partial. Cf. Morley, Life of Gladstone ; Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville ; Lord Augustus Loftus, Diplomatic Reminiscences, second series; Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 129 fication of Germany or have loyally welcomed it as a guar- antee of the peace of Europe." * But British interests were not directly involved; "watchful waiting" and a strict neutrality were seemingly called for in the circum- stances of the moment. Thanks to its ignorance of Ger- man affairs, English opinion had not grasped the necessity of German unity — it could not see that "Germany" de- served its sympathy quite as much as "Italy." English assistance was invaluable to Garibaldi and Cavour ; why should it be denied to Bismarck and Moltke ? The answer, of course, is that Cavour fought for an in- telligible purpose; from the first the unification of Italy was his acknowledged aim, and his policy enjoyed the en- thusiastic support of the Sardinian Parliament and the people of Italy. When Italy was made, parliamentary government became the basis of her national fife, union and liberty went hand in hand. Such a cause appealed strongly to all classes of Englishmen. But they were ut- terly unable to understand the devious ways of Otto von Bismarck. His defiance of the Prussian Diet in the in- terests of the army; his unblushing destruction of the liberties of Schleswig-Holstein to protect which had been the ostensible purpose of his policy; and the annexation of Hanover and other small states after the war of 1866, were disgusting and repugnant to the English mind. Had a liberal Prussia, such as was struggling to be born when Bismarck thrust his sinister personality into the balance, struck for the unity of Germany, had the liberal ideas of some of the lesser princes been more favorably received by the Prussian Government, England would doubtless have rallied to the German national cause with the same en- thusiasm which enabled Palmerston and Russell to support the Italian patriots against a reactionary Austria. But 1 Sidney Whitman, "England and Germany," in Harper's Magazine, April, 1898, P- 783. 130 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Bismarck cared little for German nationality — he thought only of Prussian supremacy, and Englishmen could not respond to the autocratic and military ideals of Prusso- Germany. Even so, the events of 1862-71 received sym- pathetic treatment at the hands of Mr. C. A. Fyfle, whose History of Modern Europe long was, and perhaps still is, the standard account of nineteenth-century history. We shall not be far from the truth if we say that English- men were taken aback by the meteoric rise of Prussia to the headship of a great nation, the more so because her methods were contrary to English traditions, but there was no disposition to ignore the new Power. To contend, as some superpatriotic Germans have done, that Great Britain tried to prevent the unification of the fatherland or to "embitter the proudest moments of our victory by phrases about civilization and humanity," x is absurd, pace Bismarck and Busch. Whatever the unpleasant features of the new Power, they were expected to dis- appear when the Crown Prince should inaugurate a more liberal system upon his accession to the throne. For twenty years after the creation of the German Empire — that is, until the dismissal of Bismarck — the attitude of Great Britain was decidedly friendly, in spite of many dis- agreeable incidents, and the possibility of a fatal quarrel between the two countries was beyond imagination. The unification of Italy and Germany fixed the map of Europe, outside of the Balkans, for forty-three years — from 187 1 to the beginning of the Great War. The new Ger- many was immeasurably stronger than the old Prussia, whose part in international politics since 181 5 had been negligible. South of the Alps an entirely new Power had arisen. The war of 1866 with Prussia and the compro- mise with Hungary in the following year had transformed 1 Moulin-Eckart, Englands Politik und die Machte, p. 76. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 131 Austria into a dual monarchy. The future of France, shorn of two fair provinces and equipped with a genuine constitutional system for the first time in her history, was problematical. Only England and Russia had experienced no organic changes. It was natural, therefore, that for some years interna- tional politics should be in a state of flux. For Bismarck the great problem was: Will defeated France accept the new situation? She could undertake a war of revenge, he saw clearly, only if she were allied with Austria or Russia. So, to keep the new Republic isolated, the chan- cellor in 1872 devised the Three Emperors' League, an elastic agreement between the Tsar, the Austrian ruler, and' the German Emperor, whose nominal purpose was the preservation of monarchical principles in Europe. As room in this combination was left for Italy, and Great Britain was eschewing an active part in Continental politics, Bis- marck's ascendency was complete. France was helpless, and was quite aware of the fact. Then occurred one of those incidents which have done so much to prejudice Germany in the eyes of other nations. In 1874-5 the military party in Berlin professed much alarm at the rapid recovery of France from the effects of the war, and in particular at the reorganization of her army. The Kulturkampf was then at its height, and Bismarck was disposed to relieve the internal pressure by a vigor- ous foreign policy. The international atmosphere suddenly became thick with rumors of a second Franco-German war, nor were they dissipated when the French Government communicated to the Times a report from its ambassador in Berlin on German war preparations. Bismarck always denied that war was in sight at this time ; on the contrary, he asserted that he had restrained the military enthusiasts. But the evidence is against his contention. Queen Vic- toria wrote to Bismarck and Emperor William, and at the 132 ENGLAND AND GERMANY critical moment Gortchakoff descended on Berlin, from which, after an interview with the Emperor and Bismarck, he issued a circular beginning: "Peace is now assured." The peace was not broken, but Europe was stunned to observe that in four years Germany had "learned and exag- gerated the besetting vice of the people she had conquered," with the distinction that while French chauvinism was "spasmodical and undisciplined," hers was "methodical, calculating, cold-blooded, and self-contained." x The repercussions of this war scare were soon felt. Bis- marck was furious with Gortchakoff, whose conduct could be regarded as either an insinuation or an affront; the Three Emperors' League was doomed. As the Turkish crisis of 1875-8 developed and revealed Russia and Austria as rivals in the Balkans, Bismarck drew closer to the latter Power, and at the Congress of Berlin consistently supported the Anglo-Austrian pretensions against Russia. It was also clear that Russia would not permit France to be crushed at the convenience of German militarism, and that Great Britain, under the leadership of Lord Beaconsfield, was conscious of her duty as a European Power. Russian opin- ion deeply resented this ingratitude for Russian neutrality during the wars of unification; it suddenly gave vent to much abuse of Germany, and early in 1879 Russo-German relations became very strained. Under these circumstances Bismarck negotiated an agree- ment with Austria which was expanded into the Triple Alliance by the adhesion of Italy in 1882. So far as is known the purpose of the combination was purely defen- sive. Austria was not pledged to act against France, nor Italy against Russia. In this form the Triple Alliance en- dured for thirty- three years as one of the "hard facts" 1 Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, II, p. 346. The evidence is discussed in J. Holland Rose, The Development of the Modern European Nations, 1905, chap. 12: "The Triple and Dual Alliances." See also Lord Newton, Life of Lord Lyons vol. II, pp. 67-84. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 133 (Prince Biilow) of Continental politics. Thus the three Powers which had been born or reorganized in the third quarter of the century were united to preserve the new settlements; furthermore, they formed a compact block in the centre of Europe, recalling after a fashion the old Holy Roman Empire, and their united military strength was irresistible. Here was a fact of which British statesmen were not slow to take advantage. Since 181 5 British policy had en- deavored to restrain the aggressive tendencies of France, and to check the advance of Russia toward the Mediter- ranean or the frontiers of India. Thanks to German arms, France had ceased to be dangerous; but the revision of the Treaty of Paris in 187 1 and Lord Beaconsfield's diplo- macy in the crisis which culminated in the Congress of Berlin had aggravated Anglo-Russian bickerings almost to the point of war. On the other hand, German assistance had been invaluable in securing the "peace with honor" (Treaty of Berlin), and Bismarck had formally stated that there was no conflict of interests between England and Germany. Lord Salisbury, who held the foreign office from 1878 to 1880, welcomed the news of the Austro- German alliance as "good tidings of great joy." x Accord- ing to one account, Bismarck proposed an Anglo-German alliance to Lord Beaconsfield on the morrow of the Berlin Congress, and the idea was cordially received, but the elec- tion of 1880 drove the Conservative statesmen from office before the negotiations were complete. It is likewise stated that in 1887 Bismarck wrote a personal letter to Lord Salis- bury, to urge that England join the Triple Alliance, but that the latter was then too obsessed by his policy of "splendid isolation." 2 Generally speaking, the British Government co-operated 1 Speech at Manchester, 17 October, 1879. 2 Daily Telegraph, 12 May, 19 12. Special correspondence from Vienna. 134 ENGLAND AND GERMANY with the Powers of the Triple Alliance as long as Bismarck was chancellor of the German Empire. England and Aus- tria equally desired the exclusion of Russia from the Bal- kans; Lord Granville accordingly sought and secured the help of Bismarck in carrying out the treaty of Berlin. England and Italy were at one in opposing the pretensions of France in the Mediterranean, especially after the latter's occupation of Tunis; in 1888 some kind of bargain was made between the first two Powers, and a British squadron appeared in Italian waters when Franco-Italian relations became difficult. "In Egypt," Bismarck declared, "I am English." If the decade from 1880 to 1890 be viewed as a whole, Anglo-German intimacy must be credited with evicting Russia from the control of Bulgaria and prevent- ing General Boulanger from precipitating a war of revenge. Disputes there were between London and Berlin. Bis- marck refused to tolerate the marriage of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the deposed ruler of Bulgaria, with the daughter of the Crown Princess, an arrangement upon which Queen Victoria had set her heart. His treatment of the Crown Princess, amounting almost to persecution, and his conduct toward the Emperor Frederick during his brief reign of three months (March- June, 1888) aroused much resentment in England. He boasted to Busch, his Boswell, that he encouraged the colonial ambitions of France to make bad blood between Paris and London; he frequently complained that Great Britain was endeavor- ing to use Germany as a catspaw in her quarrels with Rus- sia; he often discanted upon that hypocrisy which most Germans believe is the dominant trait of the English char- acter. He raised no objection when Russia provoked the Pendjeh incident on the Afghan frontier shortly after the death of Gordon at Khartoum; and he was not opposed to a Russian occupation of Constantinople provided Austria was given a free rein in the western Balkans. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1S90 135 In the difficult question of colonial expansion, which was now coming to the fore, there was considerable wran- gling between England and Germany; at times the tension was acute, as the Life of Lord Granville clearly reveals. But the statement of Professor Hans Delbriick, that, "im- mediately on taking her first steps to share in the exploita- tion of the earth, Germany encountered the negative of England and, in consequence of the English attitude, ac- quired during a quarter of a century only very few and very unimportant colonies," 1 is an exaggeration. In two instances Great Britain did impose her veto. In 1884 the British flag was hoisted at Santa Lucia Bay, on the east coast of Africa, shortly before a German man-of-war ar- rived for a similar purpose; and the following year Bech- uanaland was occupied, to prevent a junction between the Transvaal and German Southwest Africa. The refusal to surrender Walfisch Bay to the last-named colony may also be considered a legitimate grievance, although the Union Jack was hoisted there before Germany manifested any interest in the region; for that matter, the London authori- ties would probably have surrendered the possession ex- cept for the emphatic protests of Cape Colony. For the rest, Downing Street made a point of admitting the claims of Germany where they did not conflict with a well-recognized and clearly established British interest. In some cases anterior British rights were renounced in order to humor Germany. Lord Granville withdrew the British claims to Angra Pequena (Luderitz Bay), which became the nucleus of German Southwest Africa. He wel- comed the protectorate over Togoland, on the ground that Germany was a more desirable neighbor than France, which would then have surrounded the Gold Coast on three sides; and he made it possible for a German agent to ac- 1 "The Price of a German-English Entente," Contemporary Review, February,. 1911, p. 13. 136 ENGLAND AND GERMANY quire the Cameroons for the fatherland. He yielded to German remonstrances against an Anglo-Portuguese con- vention of 1884 which would have secured the control of the lower Congo region by the signatories. Finally, he restricted the British claims in New Guinea, in order that Germany might have a share of the island, in spite of vigor- ous objections from Australia. The only serious rivalry between England and Germany concerned Zanzibar, where each had strong claims. In the end Lord Salisbury arrived at a complete understanding with Count Caprivi, which was recorded in the conven- tion of 1890. Germany's claims to what is now — or was, before the war — German East Africa were admitted, ex- cept that the island of Zanzibar remained a British pro- tectorate; Great Britain in return secured a free hand in Uganda. But, in the light of later developments, the most important provision was the cession of Heligoland, for which Bismarck had been clamoring since 1884. This must always remain the conclusive proof that Great Britain was not jealous of a legitimate German expansion, for that would have been impossible so long as Heligoland gave the British navy a base of operations on the very coast of Ger- many. If Germany was not satisfied with her acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific, the blame must rest, not upon Great Britain, but with the policy of Bismarck, who delib- erately encouraged France to a programme of colonial adventure in order to divert her thoughts from Alsace- Lorraine and a war of revenge. The truth is, Bismarck never allowed any difference with England to become serious. Mr. Sidney Whitman, who knew the prince better than any Englishman, has said that "he was free from that petty dislike of England so often imputed to him." 1 In his German Memories, the same writer has stated: 1 Conversations with Prince Bismarck, p. 173. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS TO 1890 137 "I know for a fact that Bismarck's final verbal instructions to German officials, such as consuls and diplomatic agents to India and Egypt, invariably culminated in the words: 'Do all you can to obtain the good will of the English. You need never use a cipher in telegraphing, for we have nothing to conceal from them. It would be madness for us to quarrel with England, or she with us.' " l Various statements of Bismarck to the Reichstag might be quoted to show his appreciation of England's position with respect to Germany : it will suffice to recall that upon the conclusion of the convention of 1890, which was not popular in Germany because Zanzibar was conceded to England, although Heligoland was given in exchange, he declared that the good will of England was more important to Germany than the whole of Africa, and he might have added that Germany had secured the colonies she then possessed in Africa through the good will of the British Government. 2 Whatever the mistakes or evil deeds of the Iron Chancellor may have been — and he can be charged with a good many of both; however much he might differ with Great Britain in even important matters, till at times his relations with London were severely strained — he was under no illusions as to the danger which the permanent hostility of the British Empire would be to the splendid edifice of German power he had been at such pains to con- struct. In no phase of his policy did he show more strik- ingly his ability to distinguish between the possible and the impossible. This is not to say that Bismarck would not have broken with England if he had remained in office till his death, but one thing is certain — he would not have risked such a quarrel until he had squared Germany's account with France and have arranged with Russia for a diversion against British interests in Asia. In England there was no disposition to regard Germany as an enemy. Sir Charles Dilke, easily the most acute 1 P. 125. 2 This appears clearly in Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville. 138 ENGLAND AND GERMANY observer of international politics in his day, presented a sympathetic view of Germany in his Present Position of European Politics (1887), and was able to say: " Little harm has been done to English interests by Germany since she became the foremost of Continental Powers, and few occa- sions of serious difficulty between the countries are likely to arise." 1 He thought that the German general staff, underrating the military capacity of England, would attack France through Belgium in case of another war between the two nations, but he credited Germany with a desire to keep the peace, and believed that if Belgium strength- ened her army, so that it might offer effective resistance, war in western Europe might be indefinitely postponed. To-day two kindred nations, who have more in com- mon than any other European nations as regards natural characteristics, and who have through the centuries usu- ally stood shoulder to shoulder in the great movements of European history, whose best interests, separate and re- ciprocal, would have been best served by the permanent enjoyment of peace, are locked in a struggle to the death. Even if a drawn battle is the ultimate result the loss to each country will be enormous, almost irreparable; more likely one will be badly defeated by the other and will sink from the high position it has hitherto enjoyed in the world. Is it possible to determine with any approach to accuracy or fairness where the responsibility for this lamen- table rupture should rest? An overwhelming majority of Americans have close ties with either England or Germany; they would rejoice to see a lasting peace established be- tween the two most progressive countries of the Old World. In the succeeding chapters an effort will be made to discuss these problems as dispassionately as possible, and, if possible, to establish the responsibility for the rupture of 1914. CHAPTER VII THE QUARREL The last decade of the nineteenth century is a very confused period for the student of international politics. It opened with an Anglo-German convention which seemed to dispose of all serious disputes between the two govern- ments; at its close the world had become aware of an Anglo- German rivalry that boded ill for the peace of Europe. In 1890 the Triple Alliance was well-nigh omnipotent in Europe; in 1900 it was confronted by a hostile alliance of France and Russia, with which Powers, however, the German Empire had managed to preserve tolerably cor- dial relations. The position of Great Britain had changed most of all. Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck were in substantial agreement in 1890; in 1900 Anglo-German re- lations were so delicate, thanks to the inflamed state of public opinion on both sides of the North Sea, that the most careful handling of the difficulties arising out of the Boer War was required of the German Government to prevent an open rupture. Four years later, on April 8, 1904, France and England signed a series of agreements, which not only adjusted numerous disputes of long stand- ing, but rescued England from the "splendid isolation" to which the policy of Lord Salisbury condemned her, and effected a diplomatic revolution comparable only to the reversal of alliances on the eve of the Seven Years' War. The essential point lay in the fact that Great Britain passed over to the side of Germany's hereditary enemy, France, and by her action restored a semblance of equilibrium to a Europe long dominated by Germany. 139 140 ENGLAND AND GERMANY The most striking characteristic of these fifteen years is the absence of any guiding hand in the international game, for William II was a poor substitute for the great Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor had insured the predomi- nance of Germany by "keeping the wire open to St. Peters- burg." William II, in 1890, refused to renew the secret "reinsurance" treaty, out of loyalty to Francis Joseph, his formal ally, and Bismarck resigned shortly afterward. His passing removed the last obstacle to that Franco- Russian alliance which he had always feared, and which had been foreshadowed by Russian loans in Paris, not to speak of Russian warnings to Berlin in 1875 and 1887 that the Tsar would not allow France to be crushed. The alli- ance was concluded sometime between 1891, when a French fleet visited Cronstadt, and 1896, when the Tsar came to Paris, probably in 1895. The treaty has never been pub- lished; its purely defensive character and its limitation to European affairs, however, have always been assumed. For some years the French unquestionably cherished the hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine with the help of Russia, and Germans were able to stigmatize the alliance as un- natural, on the ground that a democratic and republican country could have nothing in common with an autocratic empire. But their own policy was primarily to blame for this development, and they must be held in large measure responsible for the enormous armies of recent years. After all, France was merely reviving the policy of her Valois and Bourbon kings, who always maintained an alliance with some state of Eastern Europe against the predominant power in Germany. Whatever the motives of the Repub- lic may have been, Germany was henceforth compelled to reckon with the possibility of a simultaneous attack on both frontiers. William II, therefore, tried to handle the situation by diverting the new alliance to his own purposes. There is some reason for believing that it was directed, THE QUARREL 141 in the first instance, against Great Britain. Here was Germany's opportunity. She was resolved to become a world, as distinct from a European, Power; she believed that England was the chief obstacle to her success in such a policy, and English opinion, it may be admitted, had not taken kindly to her first ventures in this field. Further- more, in the lack of an adequate German fleet, the assist- ance of France and "Russia was essential for any humilia- tion of the island Power. It happened that the French foreign minister from 1894 to 1898, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, was by no means averse to a policy of " pin-pricks" which would cause embarrass- ment to Great Britain in various parts of the world. Since the dismissal of Bismarck William II had in various ways tried to cultivate friendly relations with France. So it was easy for Paris and Berlin to strike up a temporary accord. In 1894 they protested successfully against an Anglo-Congolese treaty which would have given Great Britain a connecting strip of territory between Rhodesia and the Uganda Protectorate. The following year Ger- many supported the Dual Alliance in "advising" Japan to give back Port Arthur, which China had surrendered by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and winked at its subse- quent seizure by Russia, who had made no opposition to the German occupation of Kiao-Chou. Next, Germany was certainly aware of, and may possibly have abetted, the expedition of Major Marchand, which the French Government sent into the Sudan in the hope of blocking the recovery of that region by the Anglo-Egyptian forces under Sir Herbert (now Lord) Kitchener; when the expe- dition was abruptly stopped at Fashoda by Lord Kitch- ener's victory near Khartoum, Germany offered, so Eng- lishmen believe, to make a demonstration in South Africa if France would hold firm. In the same year Prince Miin- ster, the German ambassador in Paris, proposed an alliance 142 ENGLAND AND GERMANY with France in order to nullify the British guarantee of the Portuguese colonies, which was understood to be the price of a free passage for British troops through Delagoa Bay into the Transvaal. As all these overtures required a tacit recognition by France of the Treaty of Frankfort, they led to nothing definite, but generally speaking Germany supported the aggressive policy of both France and Russia, who were still the rivals of Great Britain. If she gained little for herself, the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 for preserving the status quo in the Balkans removed a serious obstacle to her own programme of commercial and railway development in Asia Minor. William II had very early appreciated the importance of the Ottoman Empire in that scheme of expansion which was the great idea of his reign. To win the friendship of the Sultan, the German ruler opposed the British plan for reforming the Ottoman administration, which the Arme- nian massacres had completely discredited, and he dis- creetly refused to join in settling the Cretan problem against the wishes of Abdul Hamid. Finally, in 1898, he visited the Sultan at Constantinople, from which place he proceeded to Jerusalem as the latter's guest. In a famous speech he there declared that Germany was the only true friend of Islam, for she was the only European Power which neither possessed Moslem subjects nor coveted Moslem territory. The rise of German influence at Con- stantinople was detrimental to British interests through- out the Ottoman Empire, and this rivalry between the two Powers, begun at a time when England's attention was being directed more and more to South Africa, was destined to acquire very great importance when England's hands were free again. The year 1898 witnessed the Spanish- American War. There is every reason to believe that a coalition of the European Powers to help Spain against the United States THE QUARREL 143 was proposed by Germany, but was quashed by Lord Salis- bury's intimation that Great Britain would support the United States. Similarly, in the harbor of Manila, when Admiral Dewey had trouble with the commander of the German fleet, the British admiral probably had orders to give our admiral all necessary assistance. All such incidents, however, might be regarded merely as moves on the diplomatic chess-board, although they intimated that the intimacy of Bismarckian days was gone. What first brought home to Englishmen the reality of Ger- man hostility was the Kaiser's telegram to President Kriiger on the morrow of the Jameson raid: "I express to you my sincere congratulations," William II tele- graphed on 3 January, 1896, "that without appealing to the help of friendly Powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression." This message, as we now know, emanated from the Berlin foreign office rather than from the Emperor him- self. 1 There was nothing objectionable in the protest against such an international misdemeanor, and the sen- timent of the civilized world approved the imperial action. But it intimated, and the foreign secretary, Baron von Marschall, formally stated in the Reichstag, that the in- dependence of the Boer republic fell in the scope of Ger- man interests. From that moment till the outbreak of war eighteen years later, Great Britain and Germany were seldom sincerely in accord, though their relations were 1 According to the Paris correspondent of the Times, 29 October, 1908, as soon as the news of the raid reached Berlin, Baron Marschall visited M. Herbette, the French ambassador, to inquire whether France would join Germany with a view to securing the integrity and independence of the Boer states. M. Herbette demanded as a quid pro quo German assistance in the Egyptian question, and the matter got no farther. Prince Biilow admitted in the Reichstag on 12 December, 1901, that the telegram was a ballon d'essai and that he was disappointed by its reception in France. 144 ENGLAND AND GERMANY now and again friendly and usually "correct"; also, there was created between the two peoples a barrier of suspicion, if not of jealousy, which seriously militated against the belated efforts of their governments to arrange an under- standing. The situation, however, was not yet beyond control, as was shown by the events of 1899-1900. 1 The first step toward an Anglo- German detente was an agreement with respect to the Portuguese colonies, which, though never published, was understood to provide for their disposition in case Portugal wished to sell. As Ger- many was well treated in the division, her interest in the Fashoda affair rapidly declined, and Lord Salisbury dic- tated his own terms to France in March, 1899. Cecil Rhodes journeyed to Berlin, where he was cordially re- ceived by the Emperor and, in default of the Cape to Cairo railway, arranged for a telegraph line which should pass through German territory. A most important convention, to which the United States was a party as well as Great Britain, settled the ten-year-old quarrel over Samoa on terms distinctly to Germany's advantage (Prince Billow). 2 In announcing the agreement Lord Salisbury declared that the relations between England and Germany were all that could be desired, and that for years there had been friend- ship and sympathy with Germany as with no other country. Indeed, late in the year 1899 Count Billow (as he then was) called on Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, in 1 "The Jameson raid and the Emperor's telegram did something to inflame the mutual distrust and jealousy already growing between England and Germany. The sentiment was carefully watched by both governments, and was not permitted to produce any adverse effect on their political or diplomatic action. But, though the two foreign offices kept their tempers admirably, a bitter warfare of tongues and pens was raging between England and Germany during the final years of the cen- tury, and was at its height when Queen Victoria's reign came to a close." (Low and Sanders, Political History of England, XII, "The Reign of Queen Victoria, 1837-igoi," p. 437.) 2 Imperial Germany, p. 116. This admission is quite important, for it disposes of the contention often met with in German writings that England in this matter was playing her favorite game of blocking the expansion of Germany. THE- QUARREL 145 London, and three days later (30 November) the latter in a speech at Leicester proclaimed the necessity of an Anglo- German alliance. Unfortunately, the Boer War had already begun. That struggle, which put an end to German aspirations for the incorporation of South Africa in a Greater Germany, was the great landmark in Anglo-German relations. All over the Continent British policy was bitterly criticised, but the German press exceeded all others. It did not stop at vilification, at distortions and falsifications — it demanded action from the government. The caricatures of the aged Queen Victoria were often vulgar, and anything, however unreasonable, was printed and believed. Especially ob- jectionable in German eyes were the concentration camps for Boer non-combatants. Ultimately Mr. Chamberlain reminded the Germans of the conduct of their own troops in the war of 1870; Count Biilow replied that to criticise Germany was like biting granite, and the evangelical clergy of the Rhenish provinces protested against the "wanton audacity" of comparing their fathers and brothers with "the craven bands of mercenaries who placed Boer women and old men in front of their ranks in battle in order to protect themselves against the bullets of the Boers." 1 At this time professorial lucubrations, which ransacked the past for proofs of English hostility to Germany, began to make their appearance. To all this hue and cry the Brit- ish press replied with spirit, and the recollections of those unfortunate days were never eradicated from the minds of either Germans or English. The German attitude was explained by Englishmen as an aftermath of bungling diplomacy. 2 Moderate Ger- 1 For details about this exchange of compliments, see the Annual Register for 1900, 1901, and 1902. 2 "The most intelligible explanation of this state of affairs was not creditable to Great Britain, which was her attitude in the affair of Angra Pequena in 1882, and more recently in 1895 in the Armenian question. In the latter matter Italy, the 146 ENGLAND AND GERMANY mans like Theodor Mommsen, who had formerly admired the free institutions of England and desired their develop- ment in Germany, were revolted by "the repetition of Jameson's raid by the English Government dictated by banking and mining speculators." 1 " When the burghers of the two little Teutonic republics were fighting to resist annexation to the British Empire we had the same feelings as every Englishman would have if the German Government — absit omen — should take the fancy to add to the German Empire the German-speaking Swiss republics." 2 But neither a few moves of British diplomacy nor sym- pathy with a kindred race would scarcely have aroused the German people to a passionate display of hatred for Eng- land. Germans spoke freely, if frankly, because they perceived clearly that the mistress of the seas must be humiliated before their own plans of Empire could be re- alized. In marked contrast to this, the attitude of the German Government would seem, throughout the war, to have been not only studiously "correct" but actually friendly to England. In June, 1899, President Kriiger had been warned to come to terms with England. 3 When the war broke out Prince Muravieff, the Russian foreign secretary, three times endeavored to organize a demonstration against ally of Germany, had been invited to join with Great Britain to force Turkey to more humane treatment of her Armenian subjects. With the consent of Germany, and with the assurance of her support, Signor Crispi had thrown himself heartily into the British policy, only to find himself saddled with the Abyssinian War and the hostility of Russia and France. Lord Salisbury thereupon disinterested him- self altogether in the trouble of which he had been the principal cause. This deser- tion of Italy, behind whom Germany was standing, and ready to support her, im- pressed German statesmen and writers with such a sense of selfishness of British policy that they came to the conclusion that no understanding with England was possible." {Annual Register, 1900, pp. 7-8.) The accuracy of this interpretation may be questioned, for Germany consistently opposed all efforts to reform the ad- ministration of Turkey. 1 North American Review, February, 1900. 2 Independent Review, November, 1903. 3 Annual Register, 1900, p. 313. THE QUARREL 147 England, in which the Kaiser, according to his own state- ment, refused to participate. 1 He seems also to have sent some military advice to the British Government, 2 and he de- clined to receive President Kriiger for a personal interview. Doubtless William II was not playing the part of a disin- terested knight, 3 and he expected due consideration from the British Government for German interests in Africa, 4 but, whatever the motive, his policy allowed Great Britain a free hand in South Africa. Only when some German steamers were seized by British cruisers on the ground that they were carrying contraband to the Boers, was there any friction between the two governments, and this was speedily adjusted by the release of the steamers and the payment of damages. That the Boer War had little bearing upon the official relations of Great Britain and Germany is clearly seen from the convention of October, 1900, by which the two govern- ments agreed to uphold the integrity of China and to ob- serve the principle of the open door in their commercial dealings with that country. In fact, the identical char- acter of British and German interests in the Far East came near culminating in' that Teutonic alliance of which Joseph 1 Interview in Daily Telegraph, 28 October, 1908. 2 In the Daily Telegraph interview, the Emperor said that he had sent a plan of campaign to the war office, "which can be found in the archives of Windsor Castle." Actually, it would seem to have consisted of "some general aphorisms on military tactics" contained in a letter to the Queen, and the British Government denied that it had ever received such a document as the Emperor described. (Perris, Germany and the German Emperor, p. 411.) 3 According to the Paris correspondent of The Times, 29 October, 1908, the pro- posed coalition fell through because France and Russia refused to guarantee the status quo in Europe, i. e., the treaty of Frankfort, apart from the fact that M. Delcasse, the French foreign minister, ardently desired to effect a general settlement with England. On this last matter, see Berard, La France et Guillaume II, p. 23. On 18 October, 1899, one week after war was declared between England and the Boer republics, the German Emperor spoke of " the bitter need of a strong German navy," with which "we should be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests overseas." * Lady Phillips, A Friendly Germany, Why Not ? pp. 63-64, quoting special correspondence of the Daily Telegraph, sometime in 191 2. 148 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Chamberlain had dreamed and spoken. When the Marquis Ito opened those conversations with the British Govern- ment which produced the Anglo- Japanese alliance of 30 January, 1902, "there was a German suggestion of a triple alliance between Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, and for some time Germany was kept au courant with the nego- tiations by Lord Lansdowne." l She "was finally ignored," according to a competent authority, because she demanded "terms which might have involved Great Britain in heavy responsibilities in Europe, Africa, and America, without involving Germany in any corresponding responsibilities in Asia." The German idea was that the Japanese alli- ance would protect British interests in Asia, and "leave us [England and Germany] both free to co-operate in other quarters where our interests might be found to approxi- mate much more closely." But even supposing an Anglo- German agreement, "it is more than doubtful whether, in view of Germany's relations with Russia, Berlin would ever seriously have entertained the idea of Germany's open adherence to the Anglo- Japanese alliance, even if it had commended itself to Japan." 2 About an Anglo- German alliance 'Prince Biilow has written: "Germany might perhaps not have been disinclined to conclude a treaty with England on a basis of absolute equality, and with mutual obligations. German interests would have gained nothing by stipulations which England might disregard in the event of a change of ministry, or the occurrence of any other circumstances over which we had no control, while we continued bound by them. Nor would it have sufficed us that some minister or other was in favor of an Anglo-German treaty. To make a lasting agreement 1 Hayashi revelations, Times (weekly edition), 12 September, 1913. s Sir Valentine Chirol, Times (weekly edition), 19 September, 1013. He has since stated that at the time of the German intervention, after the war with China in 1895, Marquis Ito said emphatically to him that "Japan would never forgive Germany" — and she never did. ("The Origins of the Present War," Quarterly Review, October, 1914.) THE QUARREL 149 the whole cabinet, and above all the prime minister, would have had to support it. Bismarck pointed out how difficult it was to establish firm relations with England; because treaties of long duration were not in accordance with English traditions, and the expression of opinion of English politicians, even those in a promi- nent position, and the transitory moods of the English peers were by no means equivalent to immutable pledges. For many reasons English public opinion is more favorable to France than to us, for England no longer looks upon her as a rival, and certainly not as a serious competitor, at sea; consequently France occupies a different position from ours with regard to England. In consideration of the wide-spread jealousy roused in England by Germany's industrial progress, and especially by the increase of the German navy, it was only on condition of absolute binding pledges on the part of England that we could have set foot on the bridge of an Anglo- German alliance. We could only thus unite ourselves with Eng- land on the assumption that the bridge which was to help us over the real and supposed differences between England and Germany was strong enough to bear our weight. "At the time this question of an alliance was being ventilated the European position differed in many respects from the present one [1913]. Russia had not then been weakened by the Japanese war, but intended to secure and expand her newly won position in the Far East, in particular on the Gulf of Pechili. Owing to the Asiatic questions pending between the two empires, relations be- tween England and Russia were then rather strained. The danger was imminent that if Germany allied herself with England she would have to undertake the role against Russia which Japan assumed later single-handed. But we should have had to play this part under very different conditions from the very favorable ones which Japan found at her disposal in her conflict with Russia. The Japanese war was unpopular in Russia, and it had to be waged at an immense distance, like a colonial war. If we had allowed ourselves to be thrust forward against Russia, we should have found ourselves in a far more difficult position. A war with Ger- many would not, in these circumstances, have been unpopular in Russia, and would on the part of the Russians have been carried on with that national enthusiasm which is peculiar to them when defending their native soil. France would have preferred the ex- cuse of the casus foederis, and would have been able to wage her war of revenge under favorable circumstances. In the event of a general conflict, we Germans would have had to wage strenuous 150 ENGLAND AND GERMANY war on land in two directions, while to England would have fallen the easier task of expanding her colonial Empire without much trouble and the profiting by the general weakening of the Conti- nental Powers. Last, but certainly not least, while military opera- tions were going forward on the Continent and for a long time after, we should have found neither strength nor means nor leisure to proceed with the building of our navy, as we have been able to do. Thus the only course left to us was not to intrench upon Eng- lish interests, and to avoid both a hostile encounter and a docile dependence." * The failure of this project, which, had it been success- ful, would have ranged the greatest naval and the greatest military powers of the world against the Dual Alliance, and profoundly changed the course of European history, may be regarded as the last effort of both Germany and England to find a basis for a common policy. For Great Britain the rise of the German navy and the outburst of Anglophobia during the Boer War were at once disturbing and surprising; Germany in turn was exceedingly disgusted to see the Boer republics incorporated in the British Empire, for ever since the Jameson raid the opinion had been ven- tilated in countless newspapers and pamphlets that only in South Africa could Germany acquire a settlement colony in a temperate climate. Official circles in both countries might argue that conditions had not changed, that an alli- ance was both possible and desirable, or the close relation- ship of the two royal families might be considered a barrier to an irreconcilable quarrel; but after 1900 the two peoples were so mutually suspicious that cordial co-operation be- tween their governments would have been exceedingly difficult. In such circumstances it was doubly unfortunate that a clash of national interests should be suddenly re- vealed by the bad faith of one or the other party. By article 3 of the Anglo- German convention of October, 1900, it was stipulated that, "in case another Power should 1 Imperial Germany, pp. 39-42. THE QUARREL 151 take advantage of complications in China to obtain terri- torial advantages in any form whatsoever, the two con- tracting parties bind themselves to conclude a preliminary agreement with respect to measures eventually to be taken for the protection of their respective interests in China." The very case seemed to have arisen when the Russian con- tingent of the allied army which rescued the legations in Peking from the Boxer warriors, instead of retiring beyond the Amur River, remained in occupation of Manchuria; which permitted the cabinet of St. Petersburg to negotiate with China an arrangement that practically made Man- churia a Russian province. Lord Lansdowne desired the Wilhelmstrasse to join in a formal protest to Russia against these proceedings, but Count Biilow stated in the Reichs- tag (15 March, 1901) that " the agreement had no reference to Manchuria" and that Germany had "no important national interest" there. Between his contention that "during the negotiations we left no doubt that Manchuria was in no way involved " and Lord Lansdowne's reply that "the agreement referred not only to China proper, the Eighteen Provinces, but to Manchuria as well," it is impossible to pass judgment until more information is vouchsafed by one party or the other. 1 But the result of the controversy was quite definite. In British eyes, Ger- many was deliberately encouraging Russia in a line of ac- tion detrimental to British commercial interests, in order that German diplomacy might have a freer hand in the Near East, where British interests were already suffering from German competition; and Germany was once more able to argue that British diplomacy was playing its fa- vorite game of using a Continental Power to exert pressure on Russia. From this malaise there gradually developed an atmos- phere of hostility. When in 1902 Great Britain and Ger- 1 Lemonon, L 'Europe et la Politique brittanique, 1882-1909, p. 225. 152 ENGLAND AND GERMANY many, in co-operation with Italy, interfered in the affairs of Venezuela, "profound and almost universal annoyance" was manifested by Englishmen that "His Majesty's Gov- ernment had gone into the business in alliance with a coun- try which had shown itself during the South African war thoroughly disaffected toward [themselves]"; 1 and the following year, when Great Britain had to decide whether she would participate in the Baghdad railway, public opinion forced the Balfour government to withdraw the support which had practically been promised to Germany. It was further held against Germany that she had abetted Russian designs in the Far East, and that she was the main- stay of the Red Sultan, Abdul-Hamid, whose intolerable misgovernment of Macedonia had produced a general outbreak in that unhappy country. One delicate matter between Great Britain and Ger- many had, indeed, been adjusted, but not without much irritation on both sides. In 1897 the Canadian Govern- ment granted a preferential tariff to British imports. Under the treaty of 1865 between Great Britain and the Zollverein, German products were granted in the British colonies a footing of equality with those of the mother country, and to escape the German demand that the Canadian tariff should be overruled, Her Majesty's Gov- ernment terminated the treaty. Lord Salisbury would negotiate no new treaty which did not recognize the fiscal autonomy of British colonies, and Germany threatened to withdraw the most-favored-nation treatment from Brit- ish trade unless the Canadian preferences were disavowed. In June, 1898, the Bundesrath excepted Canada from the benefit of the most-favored-nation clause, in spite of the British protest that colonies of other Powers which differ- entiated in favor of their metropolitan countries were not so treated. The controversy dragged on for five years. In 1 Annual Register, 1902, p. 240. THE QUARREL 153 April, 1903, the Canadian government imposed a surtax of one-third the general tariff upon German imports, and Lord Lansdowne gave warning that "should the German Government persist in the attitude which they have taken up in this matter, ... a very wide and serious issue must inevitably be raised involving the fiscal relations of this country and the German Empire." The German Govern- ment precipitately retreated, and nothing more was heard of interference with imperial reciprocity, probably because German trade with Canada was of no great volume. But had the Conservative policy of a British imperial customs union reached maturity, a serious issue might have been raised between Great Britain and Germany. 1 Such were the relations between Great Britain and Ger- many when on 8 April, 1904, Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, signed a series of conventions which not only guaranteed the neu- trality of England and France in the Russo-Japanese War, which had begun in February, but also swept the slate clean of a multitude of differences which had in the past often produced great tension between London and Paris. This entente cordiale ushers in a new period in diplomatic history which was to end disastrously in the Great War of 1914. That the British Government should reconcile itself with its enemy of centuries, was explained partly by a genuine desire to adjust its differences with all the world, and no wiser step in the direction of a sound diplomacy had been taken in many years. But England also felt herself face to face with a greater problem — the challenge of a new Power, whose commercial advance, colonial aspira- tions, and naval ambitions seemed to take the whole world for its field of operations, and at certain points to threaten the safety of the British Empire. »The correspondence between the British and German Governments may be conveniently read in Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 148-174 (edition of igi2). 154 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Unfortunately for the world, the Anglo- German quarrel was not restricted to the wranglings of Downing Street and Wilhelmstrasse — it was quickly taken up by the two peoples and by them transformed into a struggle for ascendency between two antagonistic civilizations. And precisely be- cause Englishmen and Germans were closely related, be- cause they had, in fact, long regarded each other as cousins, their animosity was distinguished by that virulence, un- reasonableness, and resentment which usually accompanies a family quarrel. 1 Given the necessary good will, diploma- tists can usually patch up the most threatening dispute, but if the peoples whose interests they represent seem to be spoiling for a fight, their task is well-nigh hopeless. Such was the condition of Anglo- German relations for many years, and the possibility of an understanding was not grasped until too late. For this melancholy state of affairs the press of both countries is very largely to blame. For nearly twenty years publicists and journalists engaged in the pleasing business of dissecting Anglo- German relations from every conceivable point of view, and the more irresponsible of them delighted to exaggerate differences and minimize points of common interest. On both sides facts were gar- bled, motives imputed, official statements belittled, and a most outrageous lack of perspective revealed. There was not enough effort to discover the other nation's point of view, and when once it is assumed that a contradiction of interests exists, an infinite deal of labor is required to prove the contrary. In England it was frequently charged that the campaign in Germany derived inspiration from official sources, for the Bismarckian methods of using the press were well known, and the semiofficial character of many newspapers was notorious. This, however, could scarcely 1 "The existence of race kinship has only added bitterness to the feud." (Sidney Whitman, "England and Germany," Harper's Magazine, April, 1898.) THE QUARREL 155 explain the voluminous output of pamphlet literature, in which German writers excel, and which passed for the work of scholars and responsible thinkers, many of them pro- fessors in the great universities or men high in the business and official world. The English opposition to Germany was voiced primarily in the Conservative journals of London and by a small group of military and naval en- thusiasts. Few Englishmen of standing indulged in abuse of things German, except indeed German policy; rather the tendency was to praise the extraordinary achievements of Germany since 1870, and to argue that the hostility manifested in certain quarters of both countries did not reflect the sentiments of either people. German writers never tired of quoting a famous article in the Saturday Review, which created an extraordinary impression at the time, and which was probably the most provocative diatribe in the annals of newspaper effrontery. After pointing out how the superior British navy could bottle up the German harbors and sweep German mer- chantmen from the seas, the organ of Tory chauvinism argued that "were Germany destroyed to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer," and proceeded to the conclusion expressed in the paraphrase Germania est delenda. 1 However intelligible such an outburst may have been in the light of what the German press had been saying, it must ever be a regret to those who sympathize with Great Britain in the present war that a great journal with an established reputation could descend to such depths of ignorance and folly. For Germans would not and did not understand that this weekly journal represented but a small section of English opinion, that is, the military and upper-class world of London. Certain London newspapers, notably the Daily Mail, 1 11 September, 1897. 156 ENGLAND AND GERMANY and to a lesser degree the Times and the Morning Post, were frankly pessimistic about Anglo- German relations, and often treated their readers to inflammatory articles. But the industrial centres, which are the heart of England and the source of her power, were conscious only of com- mercial rivalry, which they endeavored to meet in good spirit by adopting German science and German methods. 1 The men of Lancashire and Yorkshire were under no illu- sions as to the ruinous cost of even a victorious war. The Liberal press, with the Manchester Guardian (one of the most influential newspapers in England) at its head, and the organs of financial circles, especially the Economist, never ceased to plead for moderation and fairness. No one will deny that there was a strong current of opposition to all things German in twentieth-century England, and that the needs and ambitions of Germany were often mis- understood and misrepresented; but there also existed a powerful party which honestly strove to create a better atmosphere, and which unquestionably gained prestige with the passage of time. The same temper cannot be predicated of modern Ger- many. The perusal of a considerable quantity of the German literature of international politics has convinced the present writer that the animus of Germany toward Great Britain was far more bitter and deep-rooted than the reciprocal feeling among English people, and that the seed of the press polemics was sown in Germany. It is, of course, difficult to estimate accurately to what extent the dislike for one nation penetrated the national life and consciousness of the other. But it may be very safely said that from 1896 to the outbreak of the Balkan wars the tone of public discussion in Germany, as regards relations with England, was consistently bitter; the occa- sional protests of clear-headed patriots against the folly 1 Charles Trevelyan, in England and Germany (191 2), p. 98. THE QUARREL 157 of chauvinism were like voices crying in the wilderness. 1 Men there were who perceived that a permanently hostile England would be the most serious obstacle to Germany's imperial ambitions — the late August Bebel, Karl Lieb- knecht, and Eduard Bernstein. 2 But such critics were not heard, probably because they belonged to the Social Demo- cratic party; the nation preferred the teaching of Hans Delbruck and the Preussische Jahrbiicher, Karl Lamprecht of the University of Leipzig, and Paul Rohrbach, whose travels made him the best equipped of German publicists. These men were not exactly anti-English; indeed, they were anxious for an understanding with England; 3 but the terms of the agreement they conceived were to be dictated by Germany, and they consistently preached the idea that England refused to recognize Germany as an equal. 4 In the hands of lesser men, especially the writers of the Pan- German League, just criticism of English policy degener- ated into malignant abuse and gross misrepresentation. As long ago as 1898, Mr. Sidney Whitman, an Englishman with ardent German sympathies, remarked upon "the intense political distrust and dislike for England in Ger- many," which he ascribed to the Anglophobe historical works of German professors; and as for English jealousy of Germany, it "was resented and paid back in kind . . . 1 "The world power of England does not obstruct the interests of Germany in any particular. I do not know on what grounds Germany could desire the British Empire to go to pieces. . . . Nothing would be more profitable than a permanent alliance between the greatest sea power and the greatest military state. It would be the best guarantee for the free and peaceful development of the world, and far more effective than all the speeches, writings, and congresses of the pacifists." (Rudolf Martin, Deutsckland und England, 1908, pp. 89, 91.) J Cf. Bernstein, Die englische Gefahr und das deutsche Volk, 1911. * Cf. Delbruck, in Preussische Jahrbiicher, March, 1912. 4 Dr. Rohrbach's books afford the best insight into Germany's needs and as- pirations: scholarly, moderate, and written from a historical point of view, they are in striking contrast to the dangerous polemics of most German writers. Die Bagdadbahn, 1902; Deutschland unter den Weltvblkern, 1908, 191 2; Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, 1912 (English translation, German World Policies, 1915); Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik, 1914. 158 ENGLAND AND GERMANY with a large amount of malignant envy added to the score." l Mr. Whitman further points out that the fall of Bismarck was welcomed in England because he was reputed anti- English, and William II was expected to be pliable, even obedient, to the wishes of his grandmother, Queen Victoria. German opinion in the 'nineties was, indeed, thoroughly suspicious of British policy. Lord Salisbury was repre- sented as desiring an Anglo- German alliance in order that Great Britain might have the assistance of a Continental army in her inevitable war with Russia, and Germans were fain to ask how such a campaign would profit themselves. But even if all the counts against England are returned in the court of civilization, the historian is entitled to say that Germany is responsible for the bitterness of feeling and the violence of language which long characterized the discus- sion of Anglo-German relations. The testimony of Ger- many's sanest publicist may be invoked against her. In his Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern Dr. Paul Rohr- bach has written: "It cannot be denied that if the utterances of the German press at the time of the Kriiger telegram are considered, they were excel- lently calculated to convince an Englishman that England was regarded by us with a far more powerful and general aversion than was to be explained by the mere sympathy with that happy stroke by which the Boers resisted the plot against their independence. It must, furthermore, be admitted, from the highly explosive out- bursts of Anglophobia in the whole German press, without regard to party and feeling, that public opinion with us was hostile per se to England, and that it not only did not begrudge the Boers any- thing good, but also wished the English the worst of everything. To make this clear is quite important, for in judging the political relations of England and ourselves, much depends upon what peo- ple on the other side believed they had in general to expect from us. There can be no doubt in the mind of an impartial political observer 1 "England and Germany," Harper's Magazine, April, 1898, p. 779. THE QUARREL 159 that the idea was not first mooted in England that Germany pre- sents a danger to England, and must be struck down before it is too late, but that, on the contrary, Germany was thinking of attack- ing England at a favorable opportunity, and enriching herself at her expense. Accordingly, it is not particularly surprising that in English eyes the German Emperor, the German nation, and the German press were thrown together and taken for one, and even less does it appear wonderful that Germany's economic expansion which was gradually becoming noticeable, and the very disagree- able and surprising experiences with German competition which the English business world was beginning to encounter in all cor- ners and regions overseas, must very soon serve the purpose of pro- viding a basis for the plans ascribed to Germany." ' Doctor Rohrbach explains the attitude of his country- men as "an emotional reaction against the high-and- mighty condescending air with which Englishmen were formerly accustomed to treat us, socially, commercially, and politically as poor relations." But he is bitter against the irresponsibility and bad manners of the German press, which, he says, "have wrought the greatest damage to Anglo-German relations," and when he advises the hack- writers of an unrestrained press not to advocate policies which they could not carry out if intrusted with political power, he puts his finger on the most insidious of the many offenses for which modern journalism is responsible. At this point it is fitting to speak again of Treitschke, whose Deutsche Geschichte int Neunzehnten Jahrhundert is a "great fact" (Richard Meyer) and who "devoted all the resources of a mordant rhetoric, a pitiless invective, and a vitriolic ridicule to making Britain odious and contemptible in the eyes of the generation which heard him with enthu- siasm in the class-room, and read his book as a gospel." 2 The late Professor Cramb wrote of him: 1 Pp- 53 - 55- A similar admission is made by Dr. Theodor Lorenz, Die Eng- lische Presse, in England in deutscher Beleuchtung, 1907, Heft 9, pp. 76, 136. 1 Vigilans sed ^Iquus (W. T. Arnold), German Ambitions as They Affect Britain and the United States, 1903, p. xv. 160 ENGLAND AND GERMANY "More than any other single character in German political life he is responsible for the anti-English sentiment which blazed out during the Boer War, which still reigns in German society and the German press, which in the Reichstag reveals itself in the frigid or ironic applause with which any references to 'our amicable rela- tions with England' are greeted. The foundations of that senti- ment, of course, lie deeper than the creative power of an individual intellect or will. They are . . . beyond the control of any passing generation, rooting themselves in the dark forces which determine the destinies of peoples and of the universe itself. But Treitschke, beyond any other German, stands forth as the interpreter of these forces." 1 It is significant that his famous dictum, "With Austria, with France, with Russia, we have already squared ac- counts; the last settlement — with England — seems likely to be the longest and the hardest," 2 was quoted with equal approval by Pan-German agitators and British jingoes. It is not entirely true that he was unknown in England until his name was found in the writings of Professor Cramb or General von Bernhardi. English publicists who read German discussions of international politics certainly found repeated quotations in castigation of their own country, and some of these were translated for English readers. His Deutsche Geschichte was one of the books recommended by the Oxford faculty of modern history for a study of the nineteenth century. But there was no wide-spread knowl- edge of his teaching, no appreciation of the place he occu- pied in German life; which is the more remarkable because rabidly anti- German organs like the Daily Mail and the National Review were always searching for fresh proofs of German designs upon English liberties, and surely no one ever pursued England with such relentless and bitter hatred as this apostle of Neo- Germanism and Realpolitik. Treitschke did not write directly upon English history, 1 Germany and England, p. 70. (English edition.) 2 Deutsche Kampfe, Neue Folge, p. 34g. THE QUARREL 161 but he frequently diverted from the topic in hand to dis- cuss certain problems of the island state. Thus in the Deutsche Gesehichte the main events of English history up to 1848 are discussed at length, and British foreign policy is the subject of several essays, printed in Deutsche Kampfe. He can be credited with entire sincerity, for he sought to abide by the canons of historical writing; much of what he says is true; he expressed himself with no little eloquence, and, according to all reports, he aroused in his hearers or readers the same passionate desires which he himself felt so deeply. His great purpose was to construct an indict- ment of Great Britain which should make Germans regard her as the inevitable enemy that must be crushed before Prussia could accomplish her divine mission of leading the world into the way of truth and righteousness of life. In his glowing pages, stored with facts and replete with bit- ter invective, three sins of England are constantly held up to the withering scorn of honest and idealistic Ger- many. 1 First, "England is at the present day the unblushing representative of barbarism in international law. It is England who is to blame if naval warfare, to the shame of humanity, still bears the character of privileged rob- bery." 2 Again and again he returns to this congenial theme, that the right of a belligerent to capture enemy ships on the high seas is "an organized form of piracy"; that "it is the common task of all nations to establish on the sea that balance of power which had long existed on land, that healthy equilibrium which should make it im- possible for any state to do just as it pleased and to secure for all alike the protection of a humane system of inter- national law." It was therefore Germany's mission to 1 The translations used in the following quotations are borrowed from H. W. C. Davis, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, 1914, which is the most sympathetic, yet critical, study of Treitschke in English. 1 Deutsche Kampfe, II, p. 362. Quoted hereafter as D. K. 1 62 ENGLAND AND GERMANY "mitigate that oppressive alien despotism" which the British fleet exercised in all the waters of the world. 1 Second, Treitschke is very scornful of English com- mercialism, which he regards as the ordinary motive of British policy. Cobden's "doctrine of a universal free exchange of commodities was based on the tacit assump- tion that England was to control the wholesale industries of the whole world, and that only the primary industries, and a few others, which would be difficult to transplant, should be left to the other nations. Just as Canning and Palmerston had relied on the phrase 'constitutional,' so Cobden relied on the phrase 'free trade' as a profitable article of export, which should make the tour of the globe, and enlist all the nations in the interest of British trade supremacy." 2 " Such a gospel of mammon- worship threat- ened to mutilate the human race"; but it has been the constant inspiration of the British foreign office. Thus Canning, "in the midst of peace, ordered the marauding expedition against Copenhagen because the interests of English trade demanded this act of violence." 3 For the same reason did he break with the Holy Alliance at the Congress of Verona, when it was proposed to intervene in Spain against the revolutionists and help the King to recover his revolted American colonies: "If England were the first to express formally that recognition of the inde- pendence of South America which was, in fact, already partly ratified, the British flag would win the lead in the newly opened market, and might possibly secure in the West another greater Portugal and the commercial and political exploitation of a vast territory." In 1877, when the Russians were nearing Constantinople, Treitschke re- marked that "Great Britain desires at any price to pre- serve the existence of the Ottoman Empire, because the 1 Deutsche Geschichte, V, p. 63. Quoted hereafter as D. G. 2 D. G., V, p. 477- 3 D. G., Ill, p. 263. THE QUARREL 163 ridiculous commercial policy of the Turks has opened a vast hunting-ground to the English trader"; 1 "the eco- nomic helplessness of the slumbering Balkan peoples," he said in another place, " offered such a convenient market to the British merchant." 2 With regard to the repeal of the Corn Laws he wrote: "A commercial spirit pervaded the whole life of the nation. That last indispensable bulwark against the brutalization of society — the duel — went out of fashion; the riding- whip supplanted the sword and the pistol; and this triumph of vulgarity was celebrated as a triumph of enlightenment. . . . The gulf between German and British manners widened more and more. Such traces as remained of the Puritans of Shakespeare's merry England were completely submerged in the prose of commercial life. Therefore the atti- tude adopted by the island kingdom toward the other states of the world was more than ever determined by the calculations of a commercial policy." 3 Third, Treitschke never tired of parading, in order to criticise it, the habit of interfering in Continental politics — what he called " Palmerston's old policy of secretly dis- turbing the peace of the world." 4 This interference was now in the name of liberalism, now to the tune of nation- ality; but its real object was to perpetuate "that condi- tion of veiled dissension which England needed for her plans." "Like Canning, Palmerston wished to preserve the peace of the world, in order not to injure British trade; but, like his master, he desired with equal intensity that the Continent should always be threatened with a simmer- ing danger of war, in order that England might have a free hand for extending her colonial Empire, and for secur- ing the markets of the whole world." Another notion also animated the "paltry statesmanship" of "a policy which, like that of Metternich, merely strives to preserve " D. K., II, p. 396. - D. G., Ill, p. 265. • D. G., V, p. 480. * D. G., V, p. 63. 1 64 ENGLAND AND GERMANY existing conditions because they exist, lives from hand to mouth. ... In their blissful seclusion, the inhabitants of this rich island have preserved an antiquated notion of a European balance of power, and they torment their brains with horrid visions which, since the revolutions in Italy and Germany, have lost any justification." 1 But it is all cant, sheer hypocrisy. England will not recognize the right of other nations to become as rich, as strong, as famous, as herself, and therefore she does not scruple to restrain their development by every means and at every turn. "Overrich and oversatiated, vulnerable at a hun- dred points of their widely scattered dominions, the Brit- ish feel that they have nothing more in the world to wish for, and that to the young and developing forces of the century they need still only oppose the mighty weapon of a vanquished age." 2 Thus, in the name of impartial history, Treitschke drew a picture of England as a great robber state which clamored vainly for peace, although it had waged more wars than any nation in Europe. "England! the successful burglar, who, an immense fortune amassed, has retired from busi- ness, and, having broken every law, human and divine, violated every instinct of honor and fidelity on every sea and every continent, desires now the protection of the police ! " 3 Such unctiousness would have been less dis- tasteful to Treitschke had he not cherished the conviction that modern England was a colossus with feet of clay, a nation decadent in every fibre and utterly unable to ac- complish the mission she proclaimed with intolerable egotism. Professor Cramb, in his Germany and England, has explained Treitschke's feelings in these words: "Britain's world-predominance outrages him as a man almost as much as it outrages him as a German. It outrages him as a 1 D. K., H, p. 464. 2 D. K., II, p. 362. ' Cramb, Germany and England, p. 44. THE QUARREL 165 man because of its immorality, its arrogance, and its pretentious security. It outrages him as a German because he attributes England's success in the war for the world to Germany's preoccu- pation with higher and more spiritual ends. But for her absorp- tion in those ends and the civil strife in which that absorption re- sulted, Germany might, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have made the Danube a German river and established a German predominance from the Bosphorus to the Indus. . . . "His strongest motive is the conviction, which becomes more intense as the years advance, that Britain's world-predominance is out of all proportion to Britain's real strength and to her worth or value, whether that worth be considered in the political, the social, the intellectual, or the moral sphere. It is the detestation of a sham. 'In this universe of ours the thing that is wholly a sham — wholly rotten — may endure for a time, but cannot endure forever.' This is the protest of the stern apostle of reality. He frequently rings the changes on the nation of shopkeepers, point- ing with aptness and justness to the general meanness and gradu- ally increasing sordidness of English political life. That which Treitschke hates in England is what Napoleon hated in England — a pretentiousness, an overweening, middle-class self-satisfaction, which is not really patriotism, nor the high and serious passion of Germany in 1813 and 1870, but an insular, narrow conceit, in fact, the emotion enshrined in that most vulgar of all national hymns, ' Rule Britannia ! ' . . . "For Treitschke it is not genuine, it is not valor, it is not even great policy, as in the case of Venice, which has built up the British Empire; but the hazard of her geographical situation, the supine- ness of other nations, the measureless duplicity of her ministers, and the natural and innate hypocrisy of the nation as a whole. These have let this monstrous Empire grow — a colossus with feet of clay. Along with this he has the conviction that such a power can be overthrown. And with what a stern joy and self-congratu- lation would not the nations acclaim the destruction of the island state ! ' Old England ! ' — old, indeed, and corrupt, rotten through and through !" 1 If the reader doubts that the "conception of England as a colossus with feet of clay was widely cherished in Ger- many, let him read Alexander Tille's Aus Englands Flegel- 1 Pp- 92-94- 1 66 ENGLAND AND GERMANY jahren ("England's Hobbledehoyhood"), published in 1901 by a sometime teacher in Glasgow University who was compelled to give up his post during the Boer War. Every aspect of English life or English policy is held up to scath- ing criticism, and the United Kingdom is pictured as almost on the verge of dissolution. Or there is Mariano Herg- gelet's England's Weak Points and Germany's Position in Europe, published in both countries in 191 2. The author states that "in the whole of England there are about 150,000 really capable men, according to German ideas," x and summarizes the British philosophy of life in these words : "Dream, live in a pleasant mist of unreality, take refuge in de- lightful meditation about money and games, sleep late, live well, do a little work, spend a quarter of an hour daily in abuse of the scandalous behavior of the other side in politics, pay your taxes, be content, believe firmly in the natural superiority of the British race, and, for the sake of appearances, always look pleasant and be pleasant to every one." 2 The complaint that Britain refused to recognize Ger- many as her equal found constant expression. English- men knew nothing of Germans, whom they looked upon as "an inferior race, living on all kinds of impossible things, and satisfied with an economic and political existence which is semislavery." 3 Thus, the Saturday Review printed four columns about "dirty, dusty, nasty, smelling, unromantic Germany." 4 And Mr. Sidney Whitman la- mented that "somehow or other the German race has never succeeded in getting itself accepted by the English as on a parity." 5 To a people who conceived their civil- izing mission in large and vigorous terms, who looked upon *P. 17. 2 P. 15. 8 Fritz Schneider, We Germans and Our British Cousins (igog), p. ig. 4 14 August, i8g7. 5 "England and Germany," Harper's Magazine, April, 1898, p. 779. THE QUARREL 167 themselves as "the salt of the earth," this contemptuous attitude of the island race was exasperating in the extreme, not less so because in the field of social legislation and sci- entific achievement the latter openly copied the methods of Germany! "We want nothing better than to love the English, but they will not let us," Bismarck had once re- marked. Similarly, in the twentieth century many Ger- mans frankly ventilated the opinion that war with England was bound to come, because in no other way could Ger- many secure adequate recognition as the equal of the older European states, who were being organized by England in a coalition to keep Germany in swaddling-clothes. 1 The German view of England has been admirably stated by Mr. Bernard Shaw in The Man of Destiny. When that play was published, in 1898, France was the principal opponent of British policy, and the dramatist used Napoleon for the expression of his caricature. In point of fact, the words put into the Corsican's mouth reflected with substantial truth the opinions of the his- torical Emperor, who, it may be noted, has become almost a hero to Pan- German writers, because he endeavored to destroy the world Empire of Great Britain. In this speech we have the best possible expose of English hypocrisy, about which Germans have written so much. "No Englishman is too low to have scruples; no Englishman is high enough to be free from their tyranny. But every English- man is born with a certain miraculous power that makes him master of the world. When he wants a thing he never tells himself that he wants it. He waits patiently until there comes into his mind, no one knows how, a burning conviction that it is his moral and religious duty to conquer those who have got the thing he wants. 1 "We owe the North German Confederation to the dualism between Austria and Prussia. We owe the German Empire to the jealousy of France. We shall have to thank the dualism between Great Britain and the German Empire for the new Greater Germany." (Rudolf Martin, Kaiser Wilhelm und K'dnig Eduard > 1907, p. 58.) 1 68 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Then he becomes irresistible. Like the aristocrat, he does what pleases him and grabs what he covets; like the shopkeeper, he pur- sues his purpose with the industry and steadfastness that come from strong religious conviction and deep sense of moral responsi- bility. He is never at a loss for an effective moral attitude. As the champion of freedom and national independence, he conquers and annexes half the world, and calls it Colonization. When he wants a new market for his adulterated Manchester goods he sends a missionary to teach the natives the Gospel of Peace. The natives kill the missionary: he flies to arms in defense of Christianity; fights for it; conquers for it; and takes the market as a reward from heaven. In defense of his island shores he puts a chaplain on board his ship; nails a flag with a cross on it to his topgallant mast; and sails to the end of the earth, sinking, burning and de- stroying all who dispute the empire of the seas with him. He boasts that a slave is free from the moment his foot touches British soil: and he sells the children of his poor at six years of age to work under the lash in his factories for sixteen hours a day. He makes two revolutions, and then declares war on our one in the name of law and order. There is nothing so bad or so good that you will not find Englishmen doing it; but you will never find an English- man in the wrong. He does everything on principle. He fights you on patriotic principles; he robs you on business principles; he enslaves you on imperial principles; he bullies you on manly principles; he supports his king on loyal principles and cuts off his king's head on republican principles. His watchword is Duty; and he never forgets that the nation which lets its duty get on the opposite side to its interest is lost." 1 And, as the Round Table admitted, "there is much truth in the general charge that the national characteristic of the Briton is not only to ignore the other man's point of view but to believe that indefeasible right lies behind his own." 2 Englishmen, if they gave any heed to the problem of Anglo-German relations, formed their opinions in three main directions. Those few who possessed any knowledge of German history ascribed to the government of William 1 Plays Pleasant and Unpleasant, II, pp. 200-201. 2 "Britain, France, and Germany," December, 191 1, p. 41- THE QUARREL 169 II the same brutal, unscrupulous, and aggressive aims that characterized the policy of Bismarck from 1862 to 1871; wherefore they concluded that imperial Germany was try- ing to shuffle the cards of diplomacy in such fashion that Great Britain would be left isolated, upon which consum- mation the Kaiser would promptly declare war. Others drew the same inference from the rapid construction of a German navy; when it was large enough, or when the Brit- ish fleet had been lured away from British waters, it would sally forth to challenge the mistress of the seas. Still others harked back to the outbursts of Anglophobia in Germany during the Boer War and afterward; not being aware that England had given offense to Germany, they argued that Germany must be envious of England's wealth and England's colonies. The Emperor, his government, his people were thus credited with the plan of attacking England and destroying her Empire, and that, too, without warning or provocation. To quote Professor Cramb: "There beyond the North Sea is the stern watcher, unsleeping, unresting, bound to her own fate, pursuing her own distant goal undeviatingly, unfalteringly, weighing every action of England, waiting for every sign of England's weakness.". 1 Conscious of their own desire for peace, many Britons believed that Germany desired war, and interpreted the policy of her government since the accession of William II as a Machiavellian plot to usher in the struggle when the circumstances seemed favorable to German success. Four times between the opening of the twentieth century and July, 1914, Europe was faced with the possibility of war. Each crisis was precipitated by Germany or her ally, Austria-Hungary: by Germany in 1905 and 191.1 in Mo- rocco; in 1908 and 191 2 by the Dual Monarchy in the Near East. In each case peace was preserved by British 1 Germany and England, p. 130. 170 ENGLAND AND GERMANY diplomacy, so at least Englishmen believed; except after the Balkan settlement of 1913 Germany vented her in- dignation in press campaigns against England and by add- ing to her navy. Englishmen may have been wrong, they may have misjudged the intentions and ambitions of Ger- many; but they were at least sincere. 1 They looked upon Germany not as a rival but as a probable enemy, and they allowed their government to take all precautions against the arbitrament of war, even though such precautions in- volved a reversal of many sacred traditions of British policy; even though the new policy, by irritating Germany, actu- ally brought nearer the danger it was intended to forestall. And the undoubted fact that Germany resented the policy of England only persuaded Englishmen the more that Ger- many's own policy was directed primarily against them- selves. The British attitude was admirably stated by the Round Table in the following question: "If a nation constantly proclaims that it is the strongest and greatest people on earth, that its destiny is to dominate the world, that it will do so by the use of the mightiest armaments the world has ever seen, and that it will use them instantly and mercilessly against those who thwart its will, what wonder that its neighbors take it at its word, and insure one another's prosperity and safety by ententes and understandings?" 2 The interests of Britain and Germany were not irrecon- cilable. But the essential preliminary to an understand- ing was proof positive that the aims of Germany did not 1 Among anti-German publications in England may be noted: Emil Reich, Germany's Swelled Head, 1907; Rowland Thirlmere, The Clash of Empires, 1907; W. N. Willis, What Germany Wants, 1912; Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, 1912. The Spectator for years maintained the thesis that the danger to England lay in the incalculable ambitions of the bureaucracy which completely controlled the policy of Germany; it freely admitted the right of Germany to build as large a fleet as it could pay for, also the justice of the German desire for more elbow-room in the world. Only, it insisted, Great Britain must be prepared for all eventualities. 2 "Britain, France, and Germany," December, 1911, p. 51- THE QUARREL 171 threaten the interests of the British Empire, or that it was not her policy to squeeze and cajole weaker nations at the risk of plunging the world into war. Not until the Balkan crisis of 191 2-13, however, did the imperial gov- ernment or the German press make a serious effort to disabuse Englishmen of their suspicions, to translate into action their oft-professed desire for an accommodation with Great Britain. If during the ten or fifteen years preceding the rapprochement of 19 13 German policy was sincerely pacific, then its directors committed an irreparable error in not taking note of English susceptibilities; on the other hand, if its intentions were equivocal, as English opinion was not unjustified in believing, the reserve of Sir Edward Grey and the watchfulness of the London press 1 were measures of elementary prudence. A fitting conclusion to this chapter may be found in two quotations. From the Round Table : "Ignorance spells suspicion, and the British and the Germans, being extraordinarily ill-informed about one another's affairs and being fed largely on reports of the extravagances of extremists, came to believe that their rivals were incredibly efficient and far- sighted, were malignantly hostile, and by some miracle were so free from internal difficulties that they were able to pursue their bane- ful designs with relentless labor night and day." 2 In large measure each nation did make identical accusa- tions against the other. 3 Not until too late did either rec- ognize any justice in the position of the other, or perceive 1 Certain English newspapers and writers made a practise of collecting from German newspapers, pamphlets, and books innumerable expressions of hostility to England and the Empire. Such outbursts can scarcely be explained away as the extravagances of extremists, for they represented all shades of opinion; if they were not spontaneous, then the German Government must be held responsible for delib- erately encouraging or restraining, as the political situation demanded, a dangerous and execrable habit. Examples of these pronunciamentos may be found in J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, and A. D. Maclaren, An Australian in Germany (1912). 2 "Britain, France and Germany," December, 1911, p. 40. l Cf. Sigma, "The Tu Quoque Quarrel," Contemporary Review, June, 1907. 172 ENGLAND AND GERMANY that concessions on both sides might open the wide world to the energies of both peoples. Asking "what were the roots of the jealousy that gave such fruits?" Mr. G. H. Perris says, in Germany and the German Emperor: "Fear, of course. Fear, on the part of England, of an unprece- dented competition, both in commerce and armaments. On the part of Germany, fear of a kindred race, an old friend turned enemy, one not content with possessing a quarter of the land surface of the globe, but claiming also to be 'mistress of the seas' and holding the power at any moment to sweep away every German ship and to seize every German colony. The fear of an old state, its nerves shaken by the strain of a petty expedition grown into a first-class war; the fear of a young state, instably constituted, politically ill- equipped, trying its new strength in an unwonted field. A pitiful spectacle history will call it." 1 ip.423 CHAPTER VIII THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC In the preceding chapter we have seen how, within a period of fifteen years, the British Government exchanged its traditional friendliness with the Powers of the Triple Alliance for an unexpected intimacy with the French Re- public, which was a member of the Dual Alliance. The growth of bitter feelings between the peoples of Germany and England was also described at some length. But the primary and most lasting cause of Anglo- German rivalry was not referred to at all: the rise of a German navy, which, in the eyes of Englishmen, was intended to filch from them the supremacy of the seas and thereby endanger the safety of the United Kingdom and the British Empire. In the treatment of that question it will be convenient to set forth chronologically the bald facts concerning the navies of Germany and Great Britain up to the outbreak of war; after which the merits of the controversy can be more easily discussed, and the responsibility for the burden of naval expenditure properly attributed. The German navy has been created in the reign of William II. In 1888, when he ascended the throne, it consisted of "floating forts placed at the estuaries of the rivers on which stood the rising commercial centres," 1 together with an excellent torpedo-fleet; it was adminis- tered by military men who considered it of secondary im- portance to the army, a view inculcated and sustained by the full force of Bismarck's personality. But by this time 1 Hislam, Admiralty of the Atlantic, p. 13. 173 174 ENGLAND AND GERMANY "the national mercantile marine had risen to the third place among the trading Powers, and the Emperor clearly saw the futility of endeavoring to defend it by coast-de- fense gunboats and torpedo-craft." l He therefore created an imperial navy office {Reichsmarineamt) in charge of Admiral Hollman, who induced the Reichstag to provide for five battleships and three small cruisers. The next stage was a campaign to educate public opinion in -naval affairs. Not much success was achieved until the formation of the Navy League (Deutscher Flottenverein) in April, 1898, an organization of which the Krupps have been the chief financial supporters. But the decisive step was the appointment, in 1897, of Admiral Tirpitz as secre- tary of state for the navy. An efficient officer, risen from the ranks, who believed with the Emperor that "Neptune with the trident is a symbol that we have new tasks to per- form . . . and that trident must be in our hands," 2 he has been the chief craftsman of the German fleet and " the most dangerous international mischief-maker of our time." 3 Chancellors and ministers have come and gone, but Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, as he now is, has survived them all, for the fleet has been the Emperor's hobby and Tirpitz an extraordinarily efficient minister. The German navy in 1898 consisted of 9 battleships (excluding coast-defense vessels), 3 large cruisers, 28 small cruisers, and 113 torpedo-boats; there were building 3 battleships, 7 cruisers; the personnel comprised about 25,- 000 men. 4 Concentrated in the Baltic, this fleet was of little concern to the mighty British navy of 54 battle- ships, 14 coast-defense ships, 104 cruisers, and several hun- dred torpedo- vessels. Immediately upon taking office Ad- miral Tirpitz decided to inaugurate a policy which has 1 Ibid., p. 15. 2 Cologne speech, 4 April, 1897. * Collier, Germany and the Germans, p. 529. 4 Parliamentary papers, 1912, cd. 6513. Admiralty Memorandum, sec. 2. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 175 been consistently pursued ever since. Its four elements were: (1) The creation of a high-seas fleet {Hochseeflotte). (2) The establishment by law of a fleet of fixed size and character. (3) The replacement of old ships after a definite interval. (4) Argument with and persuasion of the Reichstag, in place of Admiral Hollman's policy of coercion, and the moulding of public opinion through an elaborate campaign waged in the press and by the Navy League. The first-fruits of the new course were gathered in the Navy Law of 1898, which revealed ambitions far exceeding the modest demands that Admiral Hollman had failed to carry through the Reichstag. The law provided for 19 battleships, 8 coast-defense vessels, 12 large cruisers, and 30 small cruisers. Battleships were to be replaced in twenty-five years, large cruisers in twenty, and small cruisers in fifteen. Although the entire programme was to be completed within six years, it "bore no reasonable relation," says an English writer, "to Germany's growing trade and overseas interests." x But greater things were at hand. The Boer War began on n October, 1899. A week later the Emperor, in an impassioned speech, declared: "We are in bitter need of a strong German navy. If the increases demanded during the first years of my reign had not been continu- ously refused in spite of my warnings and continued entreaties, how differently should we now be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests oversea ! " Though the Emperor declined to take any measures against England during the course of the war, the German people understood his meaning: it was impossible to interfere as long as the British navy controlled the seas. Public opin- 1 Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, p. 118. 176 ENGLAND AND GERMANY ion was further stimulated by the seizure of several German steamers in South African waters. The Navy League in- creased its membership to 200,000, and Admiral von der Goltz issued a statement to the effect that "we are almost defenseless against England at sea." The press fell in line, with what deplorable results upon the future of Anglo- German relations has been noticed in the last chapter. So in 1900, in spite of Admiral Tirpitz's declaration the year before that there was no intention of altering the programme of 1898, a new law was passed, by which in 1920 the German fleet was to consist of 38 battleships, 14 large cruisers, and 38 light cruisers, with the necessary torpedo and auxiliary craft. Two battle squadrons and a flag-ship, 17 battleships in all, were to be kept permanently in commission, and the age of replacement for battleships was fixed at twenty-five years. What gave exceptional interest to this programme, which definitely announced Germany's intention to become a mighty naval Power, was the memorandum annexed to the law. 1 The important passage reads as follows: "To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea power a war against it would involve such dangers as to im- peril his own position in the world. "For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an ade- quate fleet." l The text of all the German navy laws, in English, is given in Appendix I of Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 177 And in an exposition of naval strategy published at the same time by Admiral von der Goltz, a former chief of the admiralty staff, occur these words: "Let us consider the case of a war against England. In spite of what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such a war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country toward England and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the British nation toward all Continental Powers, and in particular against Germany. . . . Our chances of success in a war against England grow more favorable day by day. "The maritime supremacy of Great Britain, now [1900] over- whelming, will certainly remain considerable in the future; but she is compelled to scatter her forces all over the world. In the event of war in home waters, the greater part of her foreign squadrons would, no doubt, be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, and then all stations overseas could not be abandoned. On the other hand, the German fleet, though much smaller, could remain concentrated in European waters. "With the increases about to be made, it will be in a position to measure its strength with the ordinary British naval forces in home waters; but it should not be forgotten that the question of numbers is far less important at sea than on land. Numerical in- feriority can be compensated for by efficiency, by excellence of material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. Careful prep- aration permitting rapid mobilization can insure a momentary superiority." • In this language there is nothing threatening, but much that is illuminating. Whatever Germany might intend to do, she was clearly of the opinion that her fleet would at least be a good match for the British, which appeared to be incapable of defending British interests. It is there- fore necessary to examine the condition of the British navy at the opening of the twentieth century. The British fleet in its modern form dates from the Naval Defense Act of 1889, which provided for the construction of 70 men-of-war, including 10 battleships, within seven 1 Quoted in Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 1 21-123. 178 ENGLAND AND GERMANY years, at a cost of £21,500,000. The avowed object of the measure was to create an " establishment on such a scale that it should be at least equal to the naval strength of any two other nations." 1 Under this two-Power standard 30 more ships of the line were laid down before the end of the century, thanks to which the Boer War had been conducted without interference by any Continental Power. By 1904 10 others were built or building, making a total of 50 battleships not more than fifteen years old. It might seem that only jingoism or jealousy could, under such circumstances, regard the new German navy as a danger to the overwhelming British fleet. As a matter of fact, the royal navy was in a very parlous condition. Except for the desultory operations of the Crimean War and the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, it had lived on its reputation since the Napoleonic struggle that ended in 181 5. How lax discipline had be- come, how inefficient the gunners were, how far a general slackness had permeated the whole naval administration, was known only to the inner circles of the admiralty and a few officers afloat. Moreover, innumerable ships were kept in commission which had long outlived their useful- ness, while more modern vessels were rendered useless from the shortage of crews; eighteen types of ships actu- ally figured in the navy list, and many of them were divided into classes, so that homogeneity, an essential attribute of an efficient battle fleet, was notoriously lacking. But this was not all. The two-Power standard had been devised against the Powers of the Dual Alliance, France and Russia, and the strategic distribution of the British squadrons was determined by the possibility of war with those countries. The most powerful ships were stationed in the Mediter- ranean; the Atlantic fleet was as important as that sta- 1 Lord George Hamilton, first lord of the admiralty, House of Commons, 7 March, 1889. (3 Hansard cccxxxiii, c. 1171.) THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 179 tioned in the Channel. Strong squadrons were maintained in the Far East to watch the designs of Russia, and others in American waters for no particular reason except habit. In the North Sea there were only antiquated or obsolescent ships, which were used chiefly for training purposes. Also it was deemed necessary for political motives to show the White Ensign 1 in all parts of the world, so that cruisers and gunboats had to be kept in service wherever British interests had assumed any importance. In other words, circumstances, tradition, and necessity had combined to leave home waters, in particular the North Sea, practically defenseless. Yet it was from across the North Sea that a direct chal- lenge seemed to have been flung at the heart of the British Empire. To rouse public sentiment in favor of a large fleet, the German press and the Navy League had openly spoken of England as the eventual enemy; the language of the two memoranda quoted above seemed to convey a clear warning; the diplomatic situation did not indicate any slackening of the tension between the two countries. But this was not all. The Russo-Japanese War relieved Germany from any danger on her eastern frontier, and thus upset the balance of power in Europe; while the success of Japan, England's ally since 1902, insured the safety of British interests in Asia. Events in the Balkans demanded the attention of British statesmen. There was also only too much reason to believe that neither the French army nor the French navy, as they had been administered by General Andre and M. Pelletan, were prepared to risk a combat with Germany if the policy of the latter should become aggressive. These circumstances explain the momentous measures taken by the British Government in the year 1904. First 1 The name usually applied to the British naval flag. The red cross of St. George is shown on a white field, with the Union Jack in the upper corner. 180 ENGLAND AND GERMANY of all, the agreement with France, the famous entente cor- diale, and the situation in the Far East permitted a whole- sale redistribution of the British squadrons. Those in the North Pacific and South Atlantic were abolished, and the Mediterranean and China fleets were almost denuded of battleships. The Channel fleet was correspondingly- strengthened. An Atlantic fleet resting on Gibraltar, and a home, fleet stationed in the North Sea, for which public opinion had been clamoring, 1 were also envisaged, and made their appearance in 1906. Thus was begun that concen- tration of British naval strength against Germany, the silent pressure of which has been one of the marvels of the Great War. Of equal, perhaps greater, importance was the appoint- ment of Sir John Fisher as first sea lord at the admiralty, whose one ambition was to put the British fleet in a state of "instant preparedness for war." His first step aroused considerable opposition among, sentimentalists, for he "scrapped" 180 obsolete ships of no fighting value. Not only was the heavy charge for up-keep abolished and the money freed for purposes of new construction; the crews and officers thus released were sent to fighting units hitherto kept in reserve and the first step taken toward simplicity of organization and efficiency in practise. Much more sensational was the introduction of the Dreadnought type of battleship. In the early years of the century the admiralty had materially reduced its pro- gramme of construction, while the German fleet was ad- vancing toward its statutory limits. Under such circum- stances the 4 battleships which the Balfour government proposed to lay down annually would not suffice to maintain the two-Power standard. Moreover, the Russo-Japanese x In February, 1903, a meeting was held in London to discuss the "desirability of creating a North Sea squadron and of establishing a naval base on the east coast." It was voted that the "proposed measures are urgently required in view of the continuous increase of the German navy." (Annual Register, 1903, p. 35.) THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 181 War was held to have demonstrated the comparative in- efficiency of medium armaments, and ships which should carry only guns of heavy caliber had already been fore- shadowed by American and Italian designers. British tendencies were in the same direction. The ships built before 1900 were regularly provided with four 12 -inch and twelve 6-inch rifles; the 8 King Edwards (1 901-1903) were equipped with four 12-inch, four 9.2-inch, and ten 6-inch; the 2 Lord Nelsons (1904) had four 12 -inch and ten 9. 2 -inch guns. The transition to the Dreadnought, therefore, was not so revolutionary as is usually supposed. This famous ship, laid down in October, 1905, and commissioned before the end of 1906, carried ten 12 -inch guns on a displacement of 17,900 tons, which made possible a speed of twenty-one knots, or at least two knots more than had been attained by any battleship heretofore. Three other ships, known as battle-cruisers, with eight 12-inch guns and a speed of twenty-eight knots, were also laid down and completed within two years, which now became the recognized period for construction. Since then practically all capital ships in all navies have been Dreadnoughts. Beyond a doubt the admiralty had achieved a triumph not only of engineering skill but, for the moment, of di- plomacy: from the summer of 1905 to July, 1907, no battle- ship was laid down in Germany. The first 4 German Dreadnoughts were not completed until May and September, 1910, by which date the British navy possessed 10 of these monsters. Furthermore, the cost of construction per ton was smaller than for the old type of ship, and the main- tenance per year less by £50,000. But it is equally clear that, by inaugurating the Dreadnought, the admiralty con- demned the magnificent collection of older ships to an earlier uselessness than would otherwise have been the case. With respect to the new type, Germany was able to start the race on fairly equal terms, and at the beginning 1 82 ENGLAND AND GERMANY of the Great War possessed 17 modern ships of the line to England's 29. In addition, the enthusiasm created in England by the Dreadnought and the battle-cruisers gave a new fillip to the propaganda of Admiral von Tirpitz and the Navy League, who for a campaign cry asked nothing better than an undoubted increase of British superiority. In 1906 a third navy law was passed by the Reichstag. Six large cruisers, which the Reichstag of 1900 had refused to grant, were added to the 14 provided for in the earlier law. Anglo-German naval rivalry now began in earnest. The preceding year had been one of great tension, for Great Britain intervened in the Morocco dispute between France and Germany, and the German Government took advan- tage of the new outburst of Anglophobia to carry through the naval increment. Most unfortunately, it also de- clined to respond to British overtures for a reduction of armaments. When the crisis of 1905 had been adjusted by the Alge- ciras Conference, the Liberal and Radical press in Eng- land, taking up Prince Biilow's statement that Germany thought as little of challenging British maritime supremacy as of building a railway to the moon, 1 began a strenuous campaign for a limitation of armaments. The movement reached its height when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the prime minister, published an article in the first issue of the Nation (London) , 2 a new Radical weekly, in which he in- vited Germany to discuss the whole problem; only to en- counter an obstinate refusal from Prince Biilow. 3 Sir Henry's sincerity, which Germans were not inclined to admit, cannot be doubted. His government had taken office pledged to a vast policy of social reform, which prom- ised to be very costly. So the Cawdor programme had 1 August, 1906, to a correspondent of the Daily Mail; quoted in Bardoux, L'An- gleterre radicale, 1906-1912, p. 340. * 2 March, 1907. s Reichstag, 30 April, 1906. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 183 been abandoned, only 3 ships being laid down in 1906, and again in 1907; this after the German increase of March, 1906. The British Government also earnestly strove to have the limitation of armaments discussed at the second Hague Conference, in 1907. But the German Emperor, who in August, 1906, expressed to Sir Charles Hardinge, then permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs, the opinion that the coming conference was "great nonsense," refused to be represented at it if the question of disarma- ment were to be brought forward. 1 Nevertheless, at the conference the British delegate read a declaration that Great Britain was ready to exchange naval estimates in advance with any other Power in the hope that the exchange might lead to a mutual reduction. In the autumn of 1907 the Emperor William visited England and, in a speech at the Guild Hall, professed em- phatic sentiments of amity toward the country of his grandmother; but during the time of his stay he prob- ably received the impression that the British reductions were dictated by weakness. Otherwise he would hardly have dared write to Lord Tweedmouth, then first lord of the admiralty, a letter reassuring him as to German naval plans and protesting against "this perpetual quoting of the German danger" as "utterly unworthy of the great British nation, with its world-wide Empire and mighty navy." 2 EUs Majesty's belief in British decadence must have been confirmed by Lord Tweedmouth's reply, which communicated the naval estimates for the coming year, 1908-9. Providing for only 2 battleships and reaching the lowest figure for new construction since 1898, they 1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace (1914), p. n. This is a "record of Anglo-German negotiations, 1808-1014, told from authoritative sources," evi- dently the British foreign office. The narrative presented has not been denied, except in one detail, by the German Government or its apologists. The pamphlet is the most valuable contribution to the subject of Anglo-German relations that has appeared since the war began. * First published in the Morning Post, 30 October, 1914. 1 84 ENGLAND AND GERMANY could have only one meaning for the German admiralty. Might not a supreme effort practically destroy the British superiority in modern ships ? So in March, 1908, a fourth navy law was passed, by which the period of replacement was reduced for battle- ships from twenty-five to twenty years, that is, Dread- noughts would take the place of old ships five years earlier than originally planned. To give effect to the new plan, the programme of 2 battleships a year, which had been increased to 3 in 1907, was now increased to 4; so that between 1906 and 1908 9 German Dreadnoughts were actu- ally authorized to England's 8. ^--In the summer of 1908 the British Government once more endeavored to make an arrangement with Germany. King Edward VII, with Sir Charles Hardinge, visited the German Emperor at Cronberg and explained to the latter that "the naval rivalry set on foot by Germany was sure to provoke suspicions as to its ultimate intentions, and thus to embitter relations, then perfectly friendly and natural, between the two countries." 1 William II flatly refused to discuss his naval armaments with a foreign government, and, it is understood, "avowed his intention to go to war rather than submit to such a thing." The German for- eign office repelled the British overtures with equal em- phasis. Proceeding to Ischl, where he met the Emperor Francis Joseph, the King urged the Austrian monarch to exert his influence with the German Emperor, but to no purpose, doubtless because German assistance might be needed in the coming annexation of Bosnia and Herzego- vina. 2 King Edward is believed to have returned to the charge on the occasion of his visit to Berlin in February, 1909. An awakening was now at hand. The continued re- 1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, pp. 13-14. s Maximilian Harden, Monarchs and Men, p. 33. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 185 fusal of the German Government to discuss a limitation of armaments; the interview with the Kaiser published in the Daily Telegraph, in which he stated that the majority of his people were hostile to England; the contention of Lord Cromer that the money intended for old-age pensions should be devoted to battleships; some fiery letters in the Daily Mail by Robert Blatchford, a socialist; the agita- tion carried on by Lord Roberts for national military serv- ice and the sensation produced by the play "An Eng- lishman's Home"; and the crisis in the Balkans from October, 1908, to March, 1909 — all prepared the way for the "panic" of March, 1909. In submitting the naval estimates for 1909-10 Mr. McKenna pointed out that the British navy then possessed 5 Dreadnoughts, which would be increased to 12 in 191 1. In the same year Germany would have 9, according to the announced programme; but in 1908, when only 2 British ships were laid down, the German Government had accelerated the construction of 4 ships, so that there would be 13 German Dreadnoughts in 191 1, as opposed to the 12 British. By the autumn of 191 2 there would be 17, and, if acceleration were again resorted to, by April, 191 2. To meet this emergency the admiralty proposed to build 4 capital ships at once, which would raise the British strength to 16 by November, 191 1; if the German ships of 191 1 were accelerated, 4 more British ships would be laid down, which when completed in March, 191 2, would give Great Britain 20 Dreadnoughts as opposed to the German 17. 1 It was subsequently proved that these figures were based on a mistaken estimate of German capacity. The imperial government declared that it would not possess 11 Dread- noughts till April, 191 2, and that there would be no further 1 House of Commons, 13 March, 1909. (5 Hansard ii, cc. 930 ff.) Mr. Balfour declared that Germany would have at least 21 Dreadnoughts in April, 191 2, and perhaps 25, and that therefore not even a one-Power standard was being main- tained by the mistress of the seas ! 1 86 ENGLAND AND GERMANY acceleration, that is, there would be only 13 ships ready in the autumn of 191 2. 1 But public opinion in England paid no attention to these assurances. Ignoring, wisely, as events have shown, the enormous preponderance of England in older ships, the Conservative newspapers took up the cry, "We want eight and we won't wait"; the op- position in Parliament demanded a clear-cut two-Power standard without exceptions, so as to avoid offense, 2 and the by-elections began to indicate popular uneasiness. On 26 July the government conceded the 4 contingent ships, in spite of the protests of its followers, thus taking the first step toward securing that preponderance in ships of the line which has been of such incalculable importance in the war. Advantage was taken of the delay, it should be noted, to equip 6 of the 8 ships with 13.5-inch rifles, so that they go by the name of super-Dreadnoughts. This episode was not really a "panic." The 4 contin- gent ships merely rilled up the shortage in the Cawdor programme, from which the Liberal government had de- parted for three successive years (8 ships instead of 12, 1906-8). When the Germans did not respond to the British overtures for disarmament, it was inevitable that the old programme should be restored and its deficiencies remedied. There was, to be sure, much unnecessary fire- eating on the part of irresponsible journalists in England, but no corresponding outburst across the North Sea oc- curred. On the contrary, the fatherland was greatly im- pressed by the resolute determination of a Liberal govern- ment to maintain that "unassailable supremacy" (Mr. Asquith) at sea which it had previously seemed to let pass. 1 Admiral von Tirpitz, in the Reichstag, 17 March. Even these forecasts were not realized, for in March, ion, there were only 5 Dreadnoughts in. commission; in March, 1012, only 9. 2 On 12 November, 1908, Mr. Asquith said that the government accepted the two-Power standard as defined by Lord Cawdor, that is, a ten-per-cent margin above the two next strongest Powers. (4 Hansard cxcvi, c. 560.) THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 187 In the budget of 1909 Mr. Lloyd George easily raised the huge sums required for the naval estimates; Prince Biilow was defeated in the Reichstag when he demanded new taxes to pay for the vast armaments authorized during his chancellorship. Perhaps for this reason the Kaiser did not demand a new naval law from the Reichstag in reply to the British programme. Whether Germans realized the fact or not, they had been too clever in 1906-8, for the situation was now less favorable to them than it had been previous to their efforts to catch up with England. 1 In addition, the British Channel fleet was now absorbed in the home fleet, which comprised 16 battleships on a war footing and 16 more in reserve. For the next three years the rivalry went silently on, in spite of British efforts to stop it. In the summer of 1909, after the resignation of Prince Biilow, overtures were made by the new chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann- Hollweg, to secure British neutrality in the event of a Continental war, in return for which Germany was willing to "retard her rate" of construction without abandoning her programme mapped out up to 1918. 2 The offer was naturally refused as inadequate, but new negotiations were opened the following year. After informal views had been exchanged for some months, the chancellor declared that "a frank and sincere interchange of views followed by an understanding as to the economic and political interests of the two Powers offered the surest means of allaying all distrust." 3 He would seem to have been willing not to increase the German programme in return for a general understanding with England, and "the British Govern- 1 The German Government denied that definite proposals had ever been made by Great Britain (Reichstag, 2g March, 1909); this in reply to Mr. Asquith's state- ment (House of Commons, 16 March) that "informal" communications had taken place with regard to a reduction of armaments. 1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 20. * Reichstag, 10 December, 1910. 1 88 ENGLAND AND GERMANY ment were considering their reply when the German Emperor informed the British ambassador that he would on no account ever consent to any agreement binding Germany not to enlarge her naval programme." x The chancellor himself crushed all hopes of an agreement by his speech in the Reichstag on 30 March, 191 1. "I consider," he said, "any control of armaments as absolutely impracticable, and every attempt in that direction would lead to nothing but continual mutual distrust and perpetual friction. Who would be content to weaken his means of defense without the absolute certainty that his neighbor was not secretly exceeding the proportion allowed to him in the disarmament agreement? No, gentlemen, any one who seriously considers the question of universal disarmament must inevitably come to the conclusion that it is insoluble so long as men are men and states are states." Germany meanwhile adhered to her programme of 4 ships each year until 191 2, when she was expected to lay down only 2. But it soon became clear that she intended to build 58 Dreadnoughts, instead of the 38 capital ships authorized by the law of 1900, for the large cruisers would gradually be replaced by battle-cruisers. 2 The British Government was therefore compelled to increase the Cawdor programme, and laid down 5 ships in both 19 10 and 191 1. Even so, at the beginning of 191 2 England possessed but 30 Dreadnoughts, built and building, as op- posed to Germany's 19. Nevertheless, in preparing the estimates of 191 2, the admiralty assumed that Germany would lay down only 2 ships, according to previous an- nouncements and reduced its own programme to 4. Unfortunately, the Agadir crisis of 191 1 had aroused in- tense indignation in Germany. Within two weeks of the announcement of the British plans the German Govern- ment presented a new fleet law for the consideration of 1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 25. 2 So Colonel Gaedke, in Berliner Tageblatt, 23 February, 1910. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 189 the Reichstag. As passed without amendment, it added 3 battleships to the familiar 38, but its main feature was an increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which would be available — immediately available — at all seasons of the year. A third squadron of 8 battleships was created and maintained in full commission as part of the high-seas fleet, which was henceforth to consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armored cruisers, 18 small cruisers, and 99 destroyers; in short, four-fifths of the entire German navy was to be kept constantly and instantly ready for war. Fifteen thousand men were added to the personnel, which in 1920 was to number 107,000 apart from the reserves. 1 When completed, this fleet would be the most powerful aggregation of war-ships the world had ever seen. No wonder an English writer exclaimed: "For the first time in history a Great Power definitely asserted its intention of being supremely powerful both by sea and land." 2 Once more Great Britain endeavored to arrange some agreement to stop the insensate naval rivalry. The Ger- man chancellor had declared that the settlement of the Morocco difficulties had "cleaned the slate" as regards Anglo-German relations, and at the invitation of the Em- peror Lord Haldane went to Berlin to discuss the naval problem, although only two days before his arrival the new navy law had been announced. But the German Govern- ment would not offer more than a temporary retardation of their existing programme, even in return for a political understanding with Great Britain which the latter was quite willing to conclude. Nothing, therefore, came of the negotiations. A month before Sir Edward Grey had indicated the British acceptance of a proposal that the two governments should exchange information on naval 1 Mr. Churchill's summary, House of Commons, 24 July, igi2. (5 Hansard,. xli, cc. 838-840.) 2 A. S. Hurd, The Command of the Sea (1912), p. xvi. 190 ENGLAND AND GERMANY matters; this was left unanswered, and also came to naught. 1 From this time to the outbreak of the Great War no further overtures were formally made to Germany ' by the British Government, so far as is known, for a limi- tation of armaments. But it was barely possible that public opinion would succeed where official negotiations had failed. Under the various navy laws 35 German Dreadnoughts should be in commission in 1920. A two-Power standard for England, without a ten-per-cent margin, would require 70 British ships of the same type. In March, 191 2, 16 of these monsters were completed, 12 were building, and 2 provided for, a total of 30. In the next eight years to build 40 capital ships would be a herculean task, and Mr. Churchill, first lord of the admiralty since October, 1911, recognized the fact. Speaking in the House of Commons on 18 March, 191 2, he discussed the situation with entire frankness, on the ground that plain speaking would be welcomed in both Germany and England. The principle of the two-Power standard was no longer applicable to Europe. In recent years the admiralty had maintained a superiority of sixty per cent in Dreadnoughts over the Ger- man fleet, and would continue that standard for the next four or five years. But England stood on the defensive, so that any reduction in the German programme would be immediately imitated. If the Germans built no ships in a given year, neither would England, and on this basis a limitation of armaments could be effected without formal agreement or any restrictions of national sovereignty. The futility of this appeal was apparent when the German navy law of 191 2 was passed through the Reichstag by an overwhelming national majority. Mr. Churchill's programme, as outlined in July, 191 2, provided for 25 Dreadnoughts, spread over the next six years. 1 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 25. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 191 This would have given 55 to the German 35, which did not represent a superiority of sixty per cent; they would, however, provide a margin of a little more than sixty per cent above the 33 German ships, which could be foreseen in commission in 1920. But to achieve this result in the North Sea, all the Dreadnoughts must be withdrawn from the Mediterranean, where by 191 6 Austria and Italy were due to have 4 and 6 Dreadnoughts respectively. 1 The problem of manning the British fleets was also beginning to attract attention. It was estimated that, instead of the 134,000 enrolled in 191 2, 170,000 would ultimately be re- quired, and while the additional quotas could doubtless be raised they would be very expensive, whereas German ratings were conscripted and therefore cheap. 2 In these circumstances Mr. Churchill's efforts to lessen the naval rivalry were quite intelligible, nor was he dis- couraged by the chilling reception of his first overtures. When Admiral von Tirpitz in February, 19 13, stated that the ratio of sixteen to ten for the construction of battleships was "acceptable" to Germany, he was formally invited by Mr. Churchill to proclaim a "naval holiday." 3 It was at once objected in Germany that the net result would be to increase the superiority of England, for the Canadian Government was then proposing to present 3 capital ships to the mother country; and that Germany could not afford to let her plants and workmen stand idle; moreover, the 1 There was talk of creating a Mediterranean squadron which should be truly imperial in character and intrusted with the defense of the highway of the British Empire: the Australia, presented to the imperial government by the Common- wealth in March, 1909, but stationed in Australian waters; the New Zealand, pre- sented at the same time, and lent for use in the North Sea temporarily; the Malaya, presented by the Federated Malay States; and 3 ships which the Canadian Gov- ernment was then proposing to build. ' As the Canadian ships were not finally au- thorized, the proposal came to nothing. 2 Most German discussion of British naval problems assumed that England could not raise the necessary quotas, but there was no real foundation for this theory, which merely served to stimulate German ambitions. s House of Commons, 26 March, 1913. (5 Hansard 1, c. 1759-) 192 ENGLAND AND GERMANY navy laws stood in the way. But the British statesman was indomitable. On 18 October, 1913, speaking at Man- chester, he renewed his offer, with a detailed proposal. If Germany would put off for twelve months the beginning of her 2 ships of the 1914 programme, Great Britain, "in absolute good faith," would postpone for the same period the laying down of her 4 ships, provided that other Powers fell in line with the idea. This proposal commended itself to neither British nor German public opinion and was quietly dropped. But in one matter Mr. Churchill had succeeded. The British and German Governments agreed to exchange information about naval matters, so that "scares" would be difficult to organize in the future. On the eve of the war recrimination had practically ceased, and many believed that an Anglo-German rapprochement was not impossible. In spite, however, of the more cordial relations reflected in the last paragraph, the concentration of the British fleet in home waters proceeded. In 191 2 Mr. Churchill an- nounced that the navy would be organized in three fleets: the first, of four squadrons of 8 battleships each, in full commission, with a fleet flag-ship; the second, of two squadrons with nucleus crews; 1 the third, of two squadrons, one with nucleus crews, the other of the oldest ships of the line. To complete the active battle fleet of 33 capital ships, it was necessary to recall the Atlantic fleet to the Channel, and the Mediterranean fleet, hitherto resting on Malta, to Gibraltar, besides reducing the strength of the latter from 6 battleships to 4 battle-cruisers. Thus the Mediterranean was practically abandoned, 2 in spite of the 1 Enough men were retained to keep all the machinery of the ships in order — about two-thirds of the full complement. 2 "England has suffered her first defeat, her first moral defeat. She has had to withdraw her fleet from the Mediterranean. That sea was once ours — an English lake. It is no longer ours. { Our power is concentrated, watching our dearest friends, those Germans who have no-intention whatever of coming near England ! " (Cramb, Germany and England, p. 37, note 1.) THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 193 fact that through it came about fifty per cent of the grain consumed in England. But, inasmuch as in March, 1913, there would be 13 German Dreadnoughts in the North Sea, British interests in the Middle Sea had to be left in charge of France, against whom the British fleet had been con- centrated ten years before in the same waters, but whose own fleet was concentrated there in the autumn of 191 2. But the sea is all one, and the principal business of a British fleet in case of war would be to destroy that of the enemy. Sound strategy, therefore, demanded the strong- est possible armament in the North Sea. The situation in 19 14 was as follows: England possessed 29 modern battleships, 1 Germany 17; they were building 15 and n respectively. In older battleships the propor- tion was exactly two to one — 40 British, 20 German. There were 125 British cruisers built and building, as opposed to 55 German. In torpedo-craft the figures stood at 237 for Britain, 154 for Germany; in submarines, 99 British, 45 German. The Berlin correspondent of the Times pre- dicted an increase of the foreign-service cruiser squadron, but he went on to say: "Every effort is being made, and will be made, to sterilize the rivalry with Great Britain and to shift the scene of action, or rather the arguments for eventual expansion, from the North Sea to the Baltic. To all appearances we are going to hear a great deal more about the naval strength of Russia, and to a minor ex- tent of France, than about the naval strength of Great Britain." The ratio of sixteen to ten in the construction of battleships was "still acceptable" to Admiral von Tirpitz, who said: " If it were really desired to come to an armaments agreement, it was only natural that England, as by far the most powerful sea 'Including the New Zealand; the Malaya is included among the ships building. Both ships were gifts to the imperial government. Two others, taken over from Turkey, raised the total to 46. 194 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Power in the world, would have to make the positive proposals. He had no doubt that such proposals would be examined by Ger- many most minutely." He added that "if a general reduction of displacement were to set in he would welcome it"; 1 which was not un- likely, for England and France had agreed that their ships should not exceed 26,000 tons for the future. 2 One cannot say that Anglo-German naval rivalry had subsided when the murder of the Archduke Francis Fer- dinand disturbed the diplomatic situation; but the calm temper in which the first lord of the British admiralty and the German naval secretary now discussed their problems was in marked contrast to the feverish excitement previ- ously attendant upon a striking move by either government. English opinion had somehow got used to the German fleet. Germany, on her side, had taken to heart Lord Haldane's statement: "Whatever efforts Germany may make, she must reckon upon our making efforts which will be still greater, because sea power is our life, and in sea power we intend to remain superior." 3 Furthermore, the predic- tions of economists like Professor von Schulze-Gaevernitz, 4 that English resources would be unequal to the strain of German competition, had been disproved by the enormous expenditure in the five years preceding the war, which, it should be noted, had been met entirely from the increased yields of taxation, whereas the German fleet had been built very largely from the proceeds of loans. Similarly, the idea so prevalent in the early years of the twentieth century, that the British navy was rotten to the core and living on its traditions, 5 had been dissipated by the reforms 1 Times, 6 and 10 February, 1914. 2 New York Times, 15 February, 1914. 3 House of Lords, 23 July, 1912. (5 Hansard xii, c. 668.) 4 "England and Germany — Peace or War?," American Review of Reviews, October, 1909. 5 See Ernst Meyer, Los von England, translated in Contemporary Review, July, 1902. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 195 carried out since 1904. Germans had abundant proof that Great Britain was not a colossus with feet of clay. Prob- ably they had also come to see that their challenge of British naval supremacy was stimulating, as nothing else could do, the organization, perhaps the federation, of the British Empire. But, above all, the policies of the British and the German Governments had been found less antag- onistic than was previously supposed; at least, this was the lesson drawn from their co-operation during the Balkan wars of 1 91 2-13. If a political understanding could be reached between London and Berlin, the naval question would ultimately settle itself, as it was already in a fair way of doing. And the tragedy of the Great War lies in the fact that early in the summer of 1914 a substantial agreement had been reached between Great Britain and Germany on those matters about which they had previously disagreed. From this narrative of events we may now turn to dis- cuss the merits of the Anglo- German naval controversy. The British Government certainly exhausted the resources of diplomacy and persuasion to secure from Germany an agreement to limit the expenditures upon naval armaments. Failing in that policy, it faced with courage and resolution the task of maintaining that supremacy of the sea which has belonged to Great Britain since the Napoleonic wars. Was such an attitude justified, or has she been guilty of a "navalism" comparable to that militarism of Germany which has been counted the chief cause of the Great War ? The case for a German navy was admirably summarized, in its broad outlines, by the great expositor and champion of sea power. "The only shore-line of the German Empire," wrote the late Admiral Mahan, in his Interest of America in International Condi- 196 ' ENGLAND AND GERMANY tions, "is that of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. All the river ways of Germany, so extensively developed and utilized, inter- connected by canals already existing or planned, constituting a huge internal system of water communications, find their outlet in one or other of these two seas through which all sea-borne trade enters or departs. The whole external commerce of Germany, going or coming, focusses there. The North Sea, if it be covered by hostile cruisers, is little over sixty miles long from the Ems to the Elbe. The Baltic seaboard is much more extensive; but all access to it from the Atlantic is through the Skager-Rack, the ex- ternal approach to which is less than a hundred miles wide. . . . Directly across all lines of communication to the Atlantic, and so to every ocean, lie the British Islands. Most of us carry in our mind's eye the width of the English Channel and the Straits of Dover, along the full length of which, moreover, is English land contain- ing two principal naval stations; but the other way round, by the north of Scotland, the North Sea itself is nowhere four hundred miles wide, and in places only three hundred. In case of war be- tween the two countries, no German ship, as international law now stands, can use this stretch of water without liability to capture; while a successful blockade of the German harbors on the two seas puts a stop to all commerce as well by neutrals as by Germans." Even supposing that through the use of the Kiel Canal the ports of the Baltic or the North Sea can be kept open, "the neutral ton- nage would be quite inadequate to the necessary transportation to German ports. . . . Americans who recall what Cuba once meant to our international policy may appreciate what the British Islands by situation mean to German commerce. . . . The su- premacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetual latent control of German commerce." 1 The above quotation represents quite fairly the official view that Germany's growing commerce must be ade- quately protected. Closely connected with this was the complaint that through her occupation of Gibraltar, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and innumerable coaling-stations in all oceans, Great Britain effectively controlled the trade routes of the world; Germany not only possessed no such stations, except some islands in the Pacific, but could not 1 Pp- 53 _ 6i, passim. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 197 secure any, because of British opposition. 1 The idea was also ventilated that the supremacy of the seas on the part of a single Power was an anachronism in an age when the commercial interests of all the Great Powers demanded that the seas be kept open. 2 In the same strain, Germans argued that England refused to treat them as equals in the affairs and politics of the world. Germany would be "most willing," said Prince Bulow, "on the basis of mutual consideration and absolute parity, to live with England in peace, friendship, and harmony." 3 "The English . . . are not willing to admit us to a political and national equality in the world," declared Dr. Paul Rohrbach. 4 As a German admiral put it: "The source of misunderstanding resides in the fact that Eng- land refuses us equal maritime power, and only recognizes us on land, or in the realms of culture and the like." 5 Finally, we may quote Herr Arthur von Gwinner, the manager of the Deutsche Bank: "That sea supremacy is, for Great Britain, a life-and-death question is understood and appreciated in Germany as well as it is in England. Can public opinion on the other side of the North Sea not be convinced likewise that the possession of a strong fleet is for Germany, if not to such a complete extent, still to an im- portant degree, also a question of vital importance?" 6 1 This point is well developed by L. von Amran, Englands Land-und-See Politik und die Mdchte, 1902. The author proposed the neutralization of all straits then under British control, as well as their adjacent territories; if the Ottoman Empire, which he foresaw shorn of its European provinces, were similarly treated, England could surrender her points of vantage with equanimity, and if she refused, the other European Powers were to unite for the purpose of executing the plan. 'Professor von Schulze-Gaevernitz, "England and Germany — Peace or War?" American Review of Reviews, October, 1909. * Reichstag, 16 December, 1900. * Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 196. * England and Germany (1912), p. 156. 1 Ibid., p. 113. 198 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Politically, the case was put by the Emperor when he said: "We need a fleet to protect ourselves from arro- gance." * Or when he remarked: "Every German war-ship launched is one guarantee more for peace on earth, yet it also means that our adversaries will be so much less inclined to pick a quarrel with us, while it renders us by an equal amount more valuable as allies." 2 Professor Hans Delbriick was less cautious, if more frank: "The German navy is not, and never will be, sufficiently strong directly to menace England; yet it is strong enough to necessitate a cautious English policy and to compel England continually to consider her relations with Germany. ... If Germany had been content to maintain her position of thirty years ago as a Continental Power, and had built no war-ships in addition to her few cruisers, England's power on the seas would be boundless." 3 Germany must, he contends, restrict the movements of England to prevent them becoming hostile to herself. Finally, Germans never tired of asserting that their fleet was intended only for defense, that it would never be used offensively against Great Britain; whereas the naval his- tory of England, they contended, was largely one of aggres- sion. When the Dutch in the seventeenth century man- aged to secure the carrying trade of Europe, had not the English used their navy to secure that trade for themselves ? Had not the Earl of Chatham explained the Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth century as a struggle for the mastery of the sea? In 1807 an English squadron had bombarded Copenhagen and brought the Danish fleet to England as a prize of war: this when Great Britain and Denmark were at peace ! Within the present generation Alexandria 1 1 have not been able to discover the time and place of this remark, although it is often ascribed to the Emperor. 2 Bremen, 22 March, igos. 1 "Why Germany Builds War-ships," Contemporary Review, October, 1909. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 199 had experienced the same fate at the orders of a Liberal British government; and during the Boer War German mail steamers had been taken into port by British cruisers. So no nation is safe from the tyranny of the British fleet, which alone is responsible for the continued liability of private property at sea to capture. In short, Nieder mil dem englischen Seeraubertum I x Such is the indictment which for the past fifteen years and more, especially since the Great War began, German officials and German publicists have drawn up against the mistress of the sea. And if the British fleet has been a danger, actual or potential, to Germany, then she was well advised not to accept British overtures for a limita- tion of armaments, but, on the contrary, to strain every nerve in the hope of some day overcoming the British su- premacy. It is therefore necessary to examine the counts of Germany's indictment with an open mind. First, as regards the protection of their commerce, Ger- mans would seem to have been guilty of deliberate mis- representation or much loose thinking, for they often talked as though the British navy was a continual menace to their overseas trade. Of course, this was not true. From the creation of the German Empire to August, 1914, the seven seas were just as free to the ships of Germany as to those of Great Britain and her colonies; and Germans made full use of that freedom to develop a merchant marine second in general importance to that of England. Only during the Boer War were German steamers molested in the slightest degree by British cruisers, and then they were released as soon as complaint was made. The British position was made clear some years ago by an English writer on military problems: "It ought to be made clear to all the world," wrote Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, "that, whatever may be the language used in English 1 Paul Rohrbach, Der Krieg und die deulsche Politik (1914), p. 100. 200 ENGLAND AND GERMANY discussions, Great Britain makes no claim to suzerainty over the sea, or over territories bordering on the sea not forming parts of the British Empire; that, while she is determined to maintain a navy that can, in case of war, secure the 'command' of the sea against her enemies, she regards the sea, in peace, and in war ex- cept against her enemies, as the common property of all nations — the open road forming the highway of mankind." 1 Thus, only if Germany were involved in war with Great Britain would her commerce be in the slightest danger from the British fleet. Was such a contingency probable ? Not if England's wishes were to prevail. In the account of Anglo-German relations up to 1904, it was pointed out that Anglo- German relations were satisfactory enough until William II began to give a distinctly anti-English bent to German policy; and in the following chapters it will be seen that in the decade before the Great War British policy toward Germany was essentially defensive. In other words, an Anglo-German war would result only from German aggression, and Germans denied that they were planning such a war. True, they accused Great Britain of a desire to destroy the German navy; but if such was the main purpose of British policy (which can by no means be admitted), then to increase the German navy so that it might become more distrusted than ever by the British was surely a paradox of reasoning and the ne- gation of statesmanship. The truth is, the British navy could become a danger to Germany only if her own policy was so devised as to endanger the legitimate interests of Great Britain, in which event the main German argument against the British navy falls to the ground. Next, as to the contention that the control of the seas by a single Power could not be tolerated in these days of international commerce, and that Germany must be recog- nized as the equal of Great Britain. "For reasons abso- 1 Britain at Bay (1909), p. 92. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 201 lutely vital," said the late Admiral Mahan, "Great Britain cannot afford to surrender supremacy at sea." x The fron- tiers of Germany are, in the main, land frontiers; in the matter of food she is largely self-supporting or fed over- land. The British Isles, on the other hand, must import most of the food they consume, and such imports must come by sea, for there is no contiguous country through which the necessaries or the luxuries of life may come. The clos- ing of the trade routes would be the prelude to famine, revolution, national collapse. To quote Sir Edward Grey: "There is no comparison between the importance of the Ger- man navy to Germany and the importance of our navy to us. Our navy is to us what their army is to them. To have, a strong navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce; but it is not the matter of life and death to them that it is to us." 2 To Englishmen, devoid as they were (with some excep- tions, to be noted presently) of aggressive intentions toward Germany, the German fleet was bound to appear a "luxury," as Mr. Winston Churchill once called it. 3 Could Great Britain have solved her problem by con- senting to make private property at sea immune from capture in time of war? Theoretically, at least, there could then be no interruption of her food supplies. The traditional British view, however, has been that the ability to destroy an enemy's sea-borne trade is at once the surest means of defeating him in war and of restraining him from making war. It is also urged that as war interrupts all commerce on land between belligerents, a similar interrup- tion must occur on the sea. The analogy, indeed, between 1 Interest of America in International Conditions, p. 61. 'House of Commons, 29 March, 1909. (5 Hansard iii, cc. 60-61.) As long ago as 1862 Francis Urquhart said: "England will be the sea's victim on the day she ceases to be its queen." * Speech at Glasgow, 9 February, 191 2 202 ENGLAND AND GERMANY private property on land and at sea is not complete, for the latter is almost entirely the means or the articles of commerce, not the paraphernalia of every-day life, and a belligerent always restrains the land commerce of his enemy in every way possible. Finally, would the im- munity of British trade be actually respected by a bellig- erent possessed of strong naval power? For these reasons the British Government opposed any change in the existing rule at the second Hague Conference. But Sir Edward Grey "expressly intimated to the German Government his readiness to make the concession, if it were made the basis of an agreement for the restriction of naval armaments," only to meet with an absolute refusal. 1 Hence the statement of Mr. Edwin D. Mead, who has long advocated the change: "One of the ablest statesmen in England declared to me his be- lief, shared, he assured me, by many like himself, that, if England had voted at The Hague for the inviolability of ocean commerce in war, Germany would have been at war with her in less than two years." 2 Nevertheless, in May, 1914, Sir Edward Grey declared that England would not offer "a blank opposition to this ques- tion on the next international occasion," if she could secure the conditions which would make her ocean trade abso- lutely safe. He added this promise: "If it is understood that we must have conditions, I should be quite prepared to take up the attitude that we should not on the next occasion refuse to negotiate, but should come forward our- selves with the actual conditions which we regard as essential and fair in the matter with the possibility of a settlement." 3 1 J. M. Robertson, M.P., who says he had "special means of knowing the facts," New York Times, 3 August, 19 15. '"England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, March, 1908. 3 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 6 May, 1914. (5 Hansard xlii, c. 410.) THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 203 It is plain, therefore, that the British Government was ready to concede the essential point if that were the price of a limitation of naval armaments; while the German Government, although it put forward the necessity of pro- tecting German commerce as the raison d'etre of its fleet, did not respond to any overtures to remove the grievance of which it complained. Quite apart from the duty of keeping the trade routes to England open, another equally important task devolves upon the British navy — the defense of the British Empire. Not one of the numerous colonies or dominions of England would be able, alone, to defend itself against aggression, and the time is far off when the mother country can con- fide to her children the burden of self-defense. It is usually overlooked that until England felt her own situation im- perilled by the rise of the German navy the British fleet was actually employed for the defense of British dominions on the spot. And since more and more ships have been withdrawn to home waters at least two self-governing colonies, Canada and Australia, have felt constrained to begin the construction of their own fleets at their own ex- pense. In the existing organization of the world an enor- mous fleet is needed for the protection of an Empire which comprises a fifth of the land of the globe and contains a quarter of its inhabitants ; whether that fleet is maintained by the Empire as a whole or by the metropolitan nation is entirely a matter of imperial, as opposed to world, poli- tics. So, from whatever angle the question may be viewed, it is evident that Britain is bound to maintain a navy su- perior to that of any other Power. And curiously enough, paradoxically even, Germans on paper conceded this point, which was the fundamental issue in the Anglo- German quarrel ! While he was chan- cellor of the. Empire Prince Btilow repeatedly declared that Germany did not aspire to wrest the control of the 204 ENGLAND AND GERMANY seas from Great Britain, and in his Imperial Germany, written after his retirement, he said: "English policy has remained true to itself up to the present time, because England is still, as she was formerly, the first sea Power." 1 Admiral von Tirpitz was equally positive that Germany had no intention of challenging the supremacy of Great Britain; he renewed the assurance whenever a new navy law added to the strength of the German fleet. Count Reventlow, the well-known naval critic; 2 Herr Ernst Bas- sermann, the leader of the National Liberal party; 3 and several admirals 4 could be quoted as proof that thinking Germans accepted the necessity for England to maintain a predominant navy. Even more interesting was the ad- mission of the Kreuzzeitung, the well-known Conservative paper, the foreign columns of which are edited by Pro- fessor Schiemann, the personal friend of the German Emperor. "England," it wrote on 28 January, ion, "must protect her enormous imports of food against every disturbance, especially in time of war. Therefore the English Government is compelled to maintain a navy strong enough to open all trade routes, and if possible to blockade all hostile squadrons in their ports in order to protect the British Isles against the danger of starvation and a panic affecting the prices of foodstuffs." 5 Yet, in spite of these admissions, both official and private, whenever the British Government proposed a limitation of armaments the German reply invariably was that any agreement would have the effect of making the British supremacy permanent! The conclusion can scarcely be avoided that Germany did aspire to the admiralty of the 1 'p. 33. 1 "Die englische Seemacht," in England in deutscher Beleuchtung, Heft 5, pp. 1-2. 8 England and Germany (igi2), p. 149. 4 E. g., Vice- Admiral Karl Gaster, in England and Germany, p. 143. 6 Quoted by J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany (1912 edition), p. 245. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 205 Atlantic, 1 and that she expected to achieve it. "The main- tenance of Great Britain's naval supremacy has become impossible in the future. . . . That is the great historic process which we are witnessing." 2 With respect to British naval policy in the past, some of the German criticism is justified; but it is scarcely fair to judge the twentieth century by the canons of the seven- teenth and eighteenth. Even so, at the time of the Anglo- Dutch wars "England was not yet a great Power; Holland and England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since renounced as mischievous and futile." 3 The bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 was a great wrong; in extenuation it may be noted that the British Government had learned of the plan of Napoleon and the Tsar to seize the Danish fleet for use against Eng- land. The high-handed impressment of American seamen for the British navy was one cause of the War of 181 2 between England and the United States; but that policy has not been reinvoked in the somewhat similar condi- tions of a hundred years later. Since 18 15 the British navy has been used with great restraint. Apart from the Crimean War, which was not primarily concerned with European politics, Great Britain kept out of the numerous struggles which occupy so large a page in the history of the nineteenth century. Her naval power has not been used to prevent the legitimate devel- opment of any European state, except where British in- terests have been directly threatened; and she has endeav- ored to keep that naval power within bounds. Of course, the wide sweep of British interests throughout the world 1 In August, igo2, at Revel, the German Emperor is said to have signalled to the Tsar: "The admiral of the Atlantic greets the admiral of the Pacific." 2 Deutschland set Wachl (1912), quoted in Fortnightly Review, June, 1012. * Why We Are at War, by members of the Oxford faculty of modern history (1914)1 p. 121. 206 ENGLAND AND GERMANY has involved England in many disputes, some of which were unnecessary or unjustified. But, when all is said, it can be admitted that from 1815 to 1914 the British navy was but twice used for aggressive purposes against a Euro- pean Power: in 1853, when Great Britain declared war on Russia to prevent the destruction of Turkey, and again in 1878, when she threatened war against the same Power for the same purpose. All things considered, England's record for the nineteenth century is better than that of any /Great Power except, perhaps, that of Italy. When the Anglo-German naval rivalry became acute Germans professed to believe that England would one day pounce upon their fleet as she had upon the Danish in 1807. They could point to the famous article in the Saturday Review, to which reference was made in the last chapter. They were told how Mr. Arthur Lee, civil lord of the ad- miralty in the Balfour government (1902-5) had said at a dinner that England might strike the first blow before Germans had read in the newspapers that war had been declared. 1 The Army and Navy Gazette had remarked that "once before we had to snuff out a fleet which we be- lieved might be employed against us," and the Daily Chronicle, a Liberal paper, had written that "if the German fleet were destroyed the peace of Europe would be assured for two generations." After the Morocco crisis of 191 1, Captain Faber, M.P., asserted that on 18 September the British squadrons were ready to attack the German fleet preparatory to landing a British army in France, and the admiralty admitted that precautionary measures had been taken. 2 And unquestionably there was a feeling in cer- 1 This and the next two quotations are borrowed from Paul Rohrbach, Der deut- scke Gedanke in der Welt ; they are reproduced in Prince Billow's Imperial Germany. 2 17 November, 1911, at Andover. In December the Illuslrirte Zeitung (Leipzig) published a series of maps showing the distribution of the British fleet at different times in the summer of 191 1. In none of them is the fleet represented as concen- trated in the North Sea. Vice-Admiral Karl Gaster ridiculed the idea that a surprise attack was being planned. {.England and Germany, p. 145.) THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 207 tain English circles that, "if England were ever going to check the rapidly growing German navy, the sooner she did it the better, before it got any larger; the smashing would be easier now than later." * Germans were, per- haps, the more inclined to ascribe such madness to England because it seemed to them a natural proceeding, thoroughly in keeping with those Bismarckian traditions which domi- nated the policy of their own foreign office. 2 But England wisely refused to listen to its jingoes, who were splendidly described as "false guides, bad strategists, and worse states- men." 3 In August, 1905, Mr. (now Lord) Bryce, after a consultation with the leading men of both political parties, assured Germany that "no English politician of standing, no leader in any department of English thought, had the slightest idea of a war with Germany, or would contem- plate its advocacy by reckless writers with anything but abhorrence and dismay." 4 Such evidence, however, is no more conclusive than similar statements by representative Germans that Eng- 1 Edwin D. Mead, "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, March, 1908. Thus Sir Edmund C. Cox ("England and Germany: How to Meet the Crisis," Nineteenth Century, April, 1010) demanded an ultimatum to Germany that she should stop the construction of her fleet. "Not a shot need be fired. . . . The whole of Europe, with the exception of Austria, would gladly support England in an ultimatum demanding the instant cessation of this universal danger." "An Englishman" (The German Menace and How to Meet It, 1911) proposed "a diplo- matic notification to Germany that her naval programme will be interpreted as in- dicative of intended conflict with this nation and must be arrested. It would be notified to Germany that an agreement must be come to without delay, limiting the strength of her navy: that failing such an agreement the laying down of any batteships after a given date would be regarded by this country as a casus belli. If this notification were disregarded and further Dreadnoughts were laid down after the specified date, war would be declared, and Germany's naval power and mer- cantile marine, as they now exist, would, in six months, become things of the past " (p- 33)- One would have thought that Englishmen were sufficiently aware of Napoleon's failure in restricting the Prussian army after Jena to forego another such experiment. s /Eneas O'Neill, "Six German Opinions on the Naval Situation," Nineteenth Cen- tury, May, 1909; R. C. Long, "Naval Armament Delusions," Fortnightly Review, January, 1910. J Spenser Wilkinson, Britain at Bay, p. 102. * Nation (New York), 17 August, 1905. 208 ENGLAND AND GERMANY land had no reason to fear an attack from Germany. Much more to the point is the policy pursued by the Brit- ish Government. At least twice since the tension with Germany controlled its international relations the United Kingdom could have precipitated a war with Germany had it been so minded: in 1908 over the Bosnian crisis, and again in 191 1 in the last stages of the Morocco dis- pute. Each year that passed decreased the superiority of the British fleet over that of Germany, yet Great Britain did not strike, and, as will be seen in a later chapter, she was ready to pledge herself never to undertake a war of aggression against Germany. And surely, if Great Brit- ain had desired war with Germany, she would not have striven so manfully for peace in the last days of July, 19 14, would not have withheld any promise of assistance to France until the latter had received an ultimatum from Germany. Equally important for the student of history, is the con- sistent refusal of successive British governments to create a military establishment on Continental models. At any time after 1896 war with Germany was a possibility. Now, whenever England has been involved in European wars in the past, the decision has invariably been secured by land warfare. In many cases the pressure of the British fleet has seriously reduced the fighting capacity of the enemy, but it has never won Great Britain's victories. Napoleon was overthrown by the campaign in Spain and the "crown- ing mercy" of Waterloo, and similarly England could not defeat Germany by merely destroying her fleet. Never- theless, the British army for service abroad was not in- creased above 160,000 men — a mere bagatelle compared with' the hosts of Germany. For home defense a territorial army of about 300,000 volunteers, reorganized by Lord Haldane in 1907, was deemed sufficient, and even that force never reached its legal establishment. 1 Yet in spite ^ 1 Duke of Bedford, "The Territorial Force Fiasco," Nineteenth Century, June, 1013. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 209 of the agitation ably conducted by the late Lord Roberts for some kind of universal military service, in spite of the fact that in the fleet manoeuvres of 191 2 the "enemy" succeeded in landing an armed force on the east coast, both the government and public opinion resisted the prop- aganda of the military party, on the grounds that even Great Britain could not maintain both a supreme navy and a conscript army, 1 and that such an army would every- where be regarded as the proof of aggressive intentions and would indeed stimulate British diplomacy to an aggres- sive policy. A nation bent on war would not have neglected its preparations to such an extent that when war did come the conduct of operations would have been seriously ham- pered by the utter lack of supplies and munitions of every kind, such as was actually revealed in the winter of 19 14-15. Lastly, we come to the question whether England should frankly have accepted the frequent German asseverations that their fleet was meant only for defense. In other words, is there any reason for believing that the German navy was a positive danger to England ? Germans often complained that, although until very recently the American navy was stronger than their own, English opinion never used hard words about it, never looked upon it as a menace to their liberties and their happiness. 2 To begin with, Englishmen were profoundly impressed by the achievements of Bis- marckian diplomacy. In their eyes, the great chancellor had isolated diplomatically, then attacked, and finally de- spoiled — for the profit of Prussia — Denmark, Austria, and France, in turn; they were aware that a noisy section of the German people clamored for a repetition in the twen- tieth century of the exploits of 1864-71, and regarded war, 1 Edinburgh Review, April, 1013; "An Islander," The Naval and Military Policy of the British Isles (1913); J. A. Spender, The Foundations of British Policy (1012); J. L. Garvin, in England and Germany, p. 82. 1 This is a favorite idea of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, and finds expression in his various books. 210 ENGLAND AND GERMANY in Mirabeau's phrase, as the "national industry." It was notorious that the Pan-German League represented Eng- land as the great obstacle to the realization of its ambi- tions, and that the Navy League, which was little more than a department of the German Government, 1 openly pointed to the British fleet as the main reason for increas- ing the German navy. There was the widely believed story that in the wardroom messes of the German navy the favorite toast was "To the Day!" that is, the day when the Kaiser's fleet should engage that of his Britannic Majesty for the mastery of the seas. Likewise, the Em- peror's famous dictum, "Our future lies on the water," had for British ears an ominous ring. To some extent Englishmen's nerves were certainly affected, but the cumu- lative effect of innumerable expressions of Anglophobia in Germany, the circumstances in which the German fleet was constructed, and the generally hostile tone of German foreign policy from 1896 to 191 2 were admirably calculated to inspire a strictly commercial people with a genuine dread, not to say positive terror, of the most military and efficient nation in the world. In the second place, many Englishmen believed that Germany actually contemplated an invasion of England. It has been stated that "the British Government, by those means which are always open to the Power ready to pay for information, came into the possession of a matured scheme for the invasion of this country which had not only been submitted to the German Government, but had been adopted as a plan of campaign that could be put into 1 Prominent government officials were responsible for its organization and have always held the chief offices; private patronage is a sure road to official favor; the Reichsmarineamt supplies it with information and the Emperor has more than once interfered in its affairs. Its membership fluctuates around a mil- lion, in striking contrast with the private Navy League of England, which numbers about 20,000. Die Flotte, its monthly journal, is said to have the largest circulation of any paper in Germany. Cf. Hurd and Castle, German Sea Power, pp. 207-213; J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 324-344. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 211 operation at almost any moment with the minimum of ostentation and the maximum probability of success." * At a time when the British fleet was away from the North Sea a military force was to be embarked in the steamers always available in German harbors and convoyed to the Humber. At the same time the high-seas fleet would seize Dover. The landing force would then march across England to Liverpool and by paralyzing the industrial life of Lancashire dictate peace to the British Government. Whether this plan was more than one of the campaigns which the German general staff had worked out for war against any country there is no way of knowing; and as the British military authorities had for some years before the war consulted with those of France and Belgium with reference to joint operations in case of a war with Germany, the mere existence of a German plan of campaign against England cannot be considered proof of hostile intentions. What did make the matter serious was the frequency with which the possibility of invading England was discussed by German military and political writers, and the confidence they expressed that such an undertaking was quite feasible. 2 For many years the question was vigorously debated in the English press, and the Balfour government thought the problem serious enough to have it discussed by the com- mittee of imperial defense. Gradually the view that "a serious invasion of these islands is not a possibility which we need consider" was accepted, 3 although the danger of a "sudden raid" was officially admitted. 4 The relatively long time required by Italy to transport her Tripolitan ex- pedition across the Mediterranean doubtless lulled popular 1 Hislam, Admiralty of the Atlantic, p. 75. 2 Ibid., p. 144; Edelsheim, Operationen iiber See, translated in Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 34s Jf.; Rudolf Martin, Deutschland und England (1908). . 3 Mr. Balfour, House of Commons, 11 May, 1905. (4 H ansard cxlvi, c. 77.) * The secretary of the admiralty, House of Commons, 5 March, 1907. (4 Hansard clxx, c. 662.) 212 ENGLAND AND GERMANY suspicions. 1 In 191 2 the admiralty took the unusual step of publishing, over the initials of the first sea lord, a reasoned argument against the possibility of invasion, on the con- dition, of course, that British naval supremacy was main- tained. 2 But if that supremacy were surrendered, then all was lost, for not even an invasion would be required to humble Britain in the dust; she could be starved into sub- mission. Lastly, when the purely defensive theory of the German navy was examined, it was noted that the German coast was already defended against the landing of an English army. The German fleet could not protect German com- merce on the high seas, because that function appertained to fast cruisers, of which Germany had built few, and because the necessary coaling stations were conspicuously lacking. Germany had no point of contact with Japan or the United States; naval operations against Russia or France would be of little use, and their fleets were far from formidable. Yet a war armada like the German high-seas fleet was not built for nothing: by process of elimination, England must be its objective. 3 It would be too much to say that Englishmen really believed Germany to be medi- tating an unprovoked attack upon their country, although they undoubtedly feared that such might be the case. Their feeling simply was that they must be prepared for the worst, and their political instinct told them that "the moment the German navy became strong enough to con- front that of Great Britain without risk of destruction British influence in Europe would be at an end, and the Continent would have to follow the direction given by 1 Cf. Archibald Hurd, "Italy's Bolt from the Blue," Fortnightly Review, December, IQII. 2 As an appendix to the second edition of Sir Ian Hamilton's Compulsory Service. The first sea lord was Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson. 3 Naval Supremacy: Who? (1908); Edinburgh Review, April, 1012; Captain Hartwig Schubert, Die deutsche Schlachtflotte eine Gefahrfiir Deutschlands Machtstel- lung (1911). THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 213 German policy." l After that Germany could subdue Eng- land at her leisure and convenience. To quote Admiral Mahan: "The British navy is left the sole military force in the world superior to anything that Germany can as yet bring into the field. . . . This removed, neutral, or fallen in power, Germany, under present anticipations, which accord with reasonable probabilities, becomes the dominant naval state of the world, as well as the pre- dominant country of Europe." 2 Here, indeed, is the root of the whole controversy. Britain never aimed at, never acquired, the hegemony of Europe: Germany did dominate the Continent; and whatever her precise ambitions might be, the world would lie at her feet if she secured the control of the seas as well. The British view was well formulated by two eminent statesmen, one an ex-prime minister, the other a leading member of the present government. In a letter written for the German magazine Nord und Siid in May, 191 2, Mr. Balfour said: "If recent years have produced a change in the way in which ordinary Englishmen judge of German policy, it is due to no na- tional prejudice, to no underestimate of German worth, to no want of gratitude for German services in the cause of universal culture. ... If Englishmen were sure that a German fleet were only going to be used for defensive purposes, i. e., against aggres- sion, they would not care how large it was. . . . But does Germany make it easy for Britain to take this view? The external facts of the situation appear to be as follows: the greatest military Power and the second greatest naval Power in the world is adding to both her army and her navy. ... It is conceivable that all this may be only in order to render herself impregnable against attack. But unfortunately no mere analysis of the German preparations for war will show for what purposes they are designed. A tremendous weapon has been forged; every year adds something to its efficiency and power; it is as formidable for purposes of aggression as for 1 Spenser Wilkinson, Britain at Bay, p. g3. * Interest of America in International Conditions, pp. 67, 68. 214 ENGLAND AND GERMANY purposes of defense. But to what end it was originally designed, and in what causes it will ultimately be used, can only be deter- mined, if determined at all, by extraneous considerations. . . . "The danger lies in the coexistence of that marvellous instru- ment of warfare which is the German army and navy, with the assiduous, I had almost said the organized, advocacy of a policy which it seems impossible to reconcile with the peace of the world or the rights of nations. For those who accept this policy German development means German territorial expansion. All countries which hinder, though it be only in self-defense, the realization of this ideal, are regarded as hostile; and war, or the threat of war, is deemed the natural and fitting method by which the ideal itself is to be accomplished." Disclaiming any intention to criticise the theories held and preached by German students, Mr. Balfour went on: "Do not let them ask Englishmen to approve. We have had too bitter an experience of the ills which flow from the endeavor of any single state to dominate Europe; we are too surely convinced of the perils which such a policy, were it successful, would bring upon ourselves as well as upon others, to treat them as negligible." x In a speech to the House of Commons on 27 November, 191 1, Sir Edward Grey remarked: " German strength is by itself a guarantee that no other country will desire or seek a quarrel with Germany. That is one side of the shield of which the Germans may well be proud. But I think it ought to be remembered by German public opinion that there is another side of the shield, and that if a nation has the biggest army in the world, if it has a very big navy and is going on to build a still bigger navy, then it must do all in its power to prevent what would otherwise be natural apprehensions in the minds of others who have no aggressive intentions against that Power, lest that Power with its army and navy should have aggressive intentions toward them." Without positively ascribing such intentions to Germany, Sir Edward added: 1 Reprinted in England and Germany, pp. 1-7. THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 215 "I think it must be realized that other nations would be appre- hensive and sensitive, and, of course, will be on the lookout for any indication of aggressive intentions." * No responsible Englishman denied the right of Ger- many to build as large a fleet as she could man and pay for; what was wanted was an assurance that such a fleet would not be used aggressively against England, for Ger- man policy seemed to point in such a direction. That as- surance Germany would never give, although the British Government was willing to undertake most solemnly never to be a party to aggression upon Germany. It is in the light of this circumstance that we must now consider which of the two rivals — England or Germany — was responsible for the burden of modern naval armaments. The German thesis from the first has been that her navy was being built to further the interests of Germany, with- out regard to the size of other navies — if Great Britain chose to build two battleships for every one laid down in Germany, the fault was hers; if she found the burden in- tolerable, the remedy was to abandon the two-Power standard. Even English radicals and social reformers took much the same ground, 2 and Sir Edward Grey ad- mitted that England built the first Dreadnought. 3 But Germany's case would be infinitely stronger if she had been willing to negotiate upon the matter of disarma- ment. As it was, she invariably took refuge behind her navy laws, which she alleged could not be changed with- out the consent of the Reichstag; as if the British pro- gramme was not subject to the approval of Parliament, and as if the Reichstag was not frequently called upon to 1 s Hansard xxxii, cc. 59-60. As an illustration of Sir Edward Grey's criticism, Germany in 191 1 fixed her army establishment for the next five years, and declared that her navy was satisfactory; the chancellor said that Germany was at peace with all the world, but quite ready for war if it were forced upon her. Yet in 191 2 she increased her army and passed a new navy law. 1 E. g., F. W. Hirst, The Six Panics (1913). 3 Manchester, 3 February, 1914. 2l6 ENGLAND AND GERMANY change the existing laws in an upward direction! As for the two-Power standard, it first appears eo nomine in the Naval Defense Act of 1889; but its principle had been acted upon ever since the Napoleonic wars. Neither France nor Russia, which nations were usually hostile to Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century, had found the British supremacy of the seas injurious to them, primarily because, in spite of innumerable disputes with Great Britain, both perceived that the British navy was the bulwark of the European balance of power. An analysis of the programmes of construction and of the moneys voted for that purpose shows clearly that Brit- ish policy, viewed over a period of twenty years, was re- markably constant, in marked contrast with that of Ger- many: BATTLESHIP CONSTRUCTION Period Great Britain Average Germany Average 1889-1898 30 23 12 3 3 9 15 11 A 2f 1898-1905 1905-1909 Or take the amounts voted for new construction, which is the real key to naval expenditure: Year Great Britain Battleships Germany Battleships 1902-1903 1903-1904 1904-1905 1905-1906 1906-1907 1908-1909 £10,341,780 9,282,217 12,398,133 13,184,419 11,368,744 10,480,397 8,849,589 8,521,930 3 2 5 2 4 3 3 2 £4,653,423 4,662,769 4,388,748 4,275,489 4,720,206 5,167,319 5,910,959 7,795,499 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 Thus Great Britain, up to 1909, took little notice, in con- crete fashion, of the development of the German navy; THE ADMIRALTY OF THE ATLANTIC 217 she built, on the average, approximately the same number of ships annually, before and after 1898, and the expendi- ture for new construction showed a persistent tendency to diminish. For the five years preceding the Great War it is more difficult to form an impartial judgment. The figures are as follows: Year Great Britain Germany Construction Ships Person- nel Construction Ships Person- nel 1909-1910. . 1910-1911. . 1911-1912. . 1912-1913.. 1913-1914. . 1914-1915. . £11,227,194 14,957,430 17,566,877 17,271,317 17,361,850 18,676,080 8 5 5 4 5 4 127,968 130,817 132,792 136,443 142,500 151,000* £10,177,068 11,392,850 11,710,859 ",393,340 10,719,787 19,902,859 4 4 4 4 3 2 53,946 57,373 60,805 66,810 73,176 79,386 The German estimates do not include votes for aeronautics; the British estimates have exceeded the actual payments for construction by amounts ranging from £200,000 to £2,000,000. * Estimated number. The verdict must depend largely upon the point of view. If the German contention be accepted, — that British sea power is simply piracy brought up to date, — then the addi- tion of 31 Dreadnoughts and super-Dreadnoughts to the first dozen was a crime against humanity and an unneces- sary burden upon a country as heavily taxed as modern England. On the other hand, those who believe that the growing German fleet was a positive danger to the United Kingdom and the British Empire — and a large number of Englishmen did so believe — will acquit the British Govern- ment of reckless extravagance, and will argue in good con- science that an abdication of British naval superiority would have been a premium upon stupidity, a confession of cowardice, an act of treason; more especially as the British Government made repeated efforts to keep its naval 218 ENGLAND AND GERMANY expenditure within bounds, but invariably encountered the obstinate refusal of Germany to discuss even the prin- ciple of disarmament. It is not out of place to remember, in conclusion, that nothing succeeds like success. Prince Biilow, iri his Im- perial Germany, argues that the entry of Germany into the world politics of the twentieth century was made possible by the building of her fleet, and that she had gained both profit and glory in the adventure. 1 What are the facts? Between 1884 and 1899, during which period the German fleet was a quantite negligeable, Germany secured all the colonies she possessed at the opening of the Great War, with the exception of what was surrendered by France in 191 1 in return for a protectorate over Morocco. Between 1900 and 1914, while the German fleet was build- ing, England disarmed the French opposition in Egypt; France secured Morocco; Italy seized Tripoli; Austria- Hungary regularized her position in Bosnia; Russia prac- tically annexed northern Manchuria and established a pro- tectorate over Mongolia. Even the little Balkan states despoiled the unspeakable Turk, who was the cherished friend of Germany. Spain received part of Morocco, and Belgium the Congo as the legatee of King Leopold. Ger- many alone got nothing, or next to nothing, for the Congo concessions of 191 1 did not satisfy her appetite. Whether or not the Powers of the Triple Entente were responsible for this starvation of a hungry nation, it is evident that the German fleet produced no adequate return upon the colossal sums borrowed for its construction; nor has it been of appreciable value to Germany in the conduct of the war. Judged by the standard of results, the whole policy asso- ciated with naval expansion has been a lamentable failure, and a blunder for which Germany is paying by the par- ticipation of Great Britain in the Great War. 1 F. 119. CHAPTER IX THE TRIPLE ENTENTE The ten years from 1904 to 19 14 form one of the most stormy periods in the history of European diplomacy. Four times did the spectre of war stalk across the horizon — in the summer of 1905, in the winter of 1908-9, again in the summer of 191 1, and lastly in the winter of 191 2-13. In not all of these crises were the interests of Great Brit- ain directly affected ; yet because indirectly her position in the world and her honor as a Great Power were called in question, she was an active participant on each occasion, and the experience and knowledge she thereby gained of German policy was the secondary cause of her ultimatum to Germany in August, 1914. Three of the four disputes found England and Germany in opposite camps, and as crisis followed crisis, it became increasingly clear that the real issue was a test of strength between the two Powers, however much disguised by the circumstances of the moment. Anglo- German relations became strained in the early years of the twentieth century, or in the last years of the nineteenth if the first symptoms of hostility be considered, because two great questions hitherto distinct were fused into a single issue. Those questions were the balance of power in Europe and the division of certain non-European lands which had thus far escaped effective penetration or absorption by white men. From 1870 Germany domi- nated the Continent of Europe, whereas she took but a limited interest in the problem of expansion; France and Russia, on the other hand, pursued an active colonial policy, which involved many disputes with Great Brit- 219 220 ENGLAND AND GERMANY ain. Hence a policy of splendid isolation commended itself to British statesmen of both political parties. But when with the accession of William II to the throne Ger- many began to manifest an intense interest in the disposi- tion of unappropriated lands, when the increase of her population, the accumulation of wealth, and the heaping up of great military and naval armaments threatened to overturn the balance of power in her favor, and when the direction of her policy became unmistakably anti-British, it was inevitable, first, that England should emerge from the isolation by drawing closer to one or more Continental Powers; and, second, that Germany should encounter the opposition of the island Power on every hand. For the moment the question may be passed whether the British attitude was offensive or defensive : it is sufficient to recog- nize that the ramifications of Anglo- German rivalry were endless and that the peace of the world was bound up with the issue of their antagonism. The real cause of that hostility was, of course, the de- velopment of the German navy. To the pacifist and the advocate of disarmament, the danger to either Power from the navy of the other seemed to belong distinctly to the future, and for that reason he could not or would not admit the reality of the latent conflict. Yet the question has a very practical bearing upon the policy of each coun- try, as Prince Biilow has rather naively confessed. "The fleet was to be built," he writes in his Imperial Germany, "while we maintained our position on the Continent, without our coming into conflict with England, whom we could not as yet oppose at sea, but also while we preserved intact our national honor and dignity." Or again: "Patriotic feeling must not be roused to such an extent as to damage irreparably our relations with England, against whom our sea power would for years still be insufficient." THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 221 And a propos of the Boer War: "Our navy was not strong enough for us forcibly to achieve a sufficient sea power in the teeth of English interests." * Whatever may be thought of British sea power, Great Britain can scarcely be blamed for taking every precaution to meet the challenge of the German navy; for she believed the maintenance of her supremacy to be absolutely vital to her safety. In the chapter on "German Expansion" it was pointed out that German colonial ambitions were to be satisfied, so far as may be guessed, in Morocco and Asia Minor. For reasons that will presently be set forth, a complete suc- cess of the German plans as regards those regions would prejudice England's interests severely, either by cutting into her trade, or by leaving her isolated diplomatically. Germany was fully entitled to carry through her schemes if she could, and the impression one gets from a study of her policy is that she aimed to present England with fails accomplis, which are the strongest arguments in the armory of diplomacy. Unfortunately for Germany, England re- fused to be taken by surprise, and endeavored to block the German designs in one way or another. Some will have it that British policy was dictated by jealousy. In any case, the interests of the two countries were for many years frankly contrary, and for that reason diplomatic tension was inevitable; which fact made difficult, if not impossible, a sincere co-operation in those fields where there was no conflict of interests. Another factor in the situation was the attitude of pub- lic opinion in both countries, which had been lashed to fury by the Boer War and its attendant circumstances. Repeated efforts were made to restore confidence, and no little success had been achieved; so much, indeed, that 1 Imperial Germany, pp. 23, 24, 38. 222 ENGLAND AND GERMANY until the violation of Belgian neutrality English opinion was far from convinced that English intervention in the war was necessary. But up to 191 2 the difficulties of Down- ing Street and Wilhelmstrasse were certainly enhanced by the conviction of many sections of both peoples that war was inevitable. The emergence of Great Britain from her cherished iso- lation was a gradual rather than a sudden development, and was accomplished against her wishes and in spite of repeated attempts to prevent it. A more melancholy fact can hardly be imagined than that the Anglo-French recon- ciliation of 1904, designed to secure a lasting peace between England and France, should prove one of the main causes of war between England and Germany ! The entente between England and France was the work of three men: M. Delcasse, French minister for foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905; Mr. Thomas Barclay, sometime president of the British chamber of commerce in Paris, and the late King Edward VII. Upon taking over the Quai d'Orsay in November, 1898, when the Fashoda inci- dent was still fresh in men's minds, M. Delcasse said to M. Victor Berard, the noted publicist: "I do not intend to leave this office until I have re-established good relations with England." 1 Six years passed before the definitive conventions were signed, but the thoroughly correct atti- tude of the French foreign office during the Boer War, when there were rumors of an anti-English coalition, paved the way. Queen Victoria was decidedly pro- German in her sympathies, and Lord Salisbury entertained a deep distrust of all things French. These obstacles were re- moved by the death of the Queen in 1901 and the retire- ment of Lord Salisbury from the ministry in July, 1902, and in the late summer of 1902 M. Delcasse made over- 1 Victor Berard, La France el Guillaume II (1907), p. 23. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 223 tures to London for a joint settlement of the Egyptian and Moroccan questions. LordLansdowne was sympathetic, but the South African situation and a dispute with Venezuela postponed active negotiations until the summer of 1903. 1 Meanwhile unofficial influences were at work. In the summer of 1899 Mr. (now Sir Thomas) Barclay determined to bring about a reconciliation between England and France. At his suggestion, and with the cordial approval of the French Government, the chambers of commerce of the United Kingdom held their annual meeting in Paris during the exposition of 1900 as guests of the British chamber of commerce, and from that time Englishmen flocked to the exposition in great numbers. Mr. Barclay then began a campaign in favor of an arbitration treaty between England and France, in which he enlisted the enthusiastic support of the chambers of commerce and the trade unions of both countries. It was no small under- taking to break down the prejudices of centuries and the time-honored belief in both countries that their respective interests were conflicting; and not the least obstacle was the attitude of Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambas- sador in Paris, who did not consider a rapprochement pos- sible and possessed a capacity for making tactless speeches. But in the end provincial opinion on both sides of the Channel was converted. Only the two capitals remained suspicious. Finally, in May, 1903, King Edward, who as Prince of Wales had been adored by the Parisian populace and who was an ardent admirer of France, visited Paris and was respectfully received. The return visit of Presi- dent Loubet in July was an even greater success, so that it only remained for the two governments to translate their friendly sentiments into concrete agreements. 2 •William Morton Fullerton, Problems of Power (1013), p. 57- * For the history of the entente cordiale, see Sir Thomas Barclay, Thirty Years' Reminiscences, 1876-1906, especially pp. 175-326. 224 ENGLAND AND GERMANY This was done by the arbitration treaty of 14 October, 1903, and the epoch-making political conventions of 8 April, 1904. The details of these treaties have been given in the chapter on "Modern England," and need not be here recited; nor will their historical importance lie in the fact that the two countries adjusted sundry colonial dis- putes in various parts of the world. A perspective of only ten years was needed to show that the entente cordiale marked a new period in recent history, the chief character- istic of which, internationally considered, was the freedom enjoyed by both France and England in their dealings with Germany. Such freedom was the more desirable be- cause the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, in Feb- ruary, 1904, deprived France of any possible assistance from her ally, and for practical purposes left Germany in absolute control of the Continent. The balance of Europe was restored by the entente, as Prince Billow subsequently admitted, but this was appar- ently the result rather than the cause of the entente. There was nothing in the conventions themselves, which were being negotiated before the war in the Far East, to indicate any arriere-pensee toward Germany, and they were obvi- ously designed simply to end the long strife between France and England. Lord Lansdowne "strongly repudiated the assumption that because there had been an approximation between Britain and two great and friendly Powers, there must necessarily be an estrangement between ourselves and any other Power or Powers." 1 To the German am- bassador in Paris the Anglo-French arrangement seemed "perfectly natural," 2 and his government declared its acceptance of what was regarded as a new pledge and guarantee of the peace of the world. Prince Billow's re- marks in the Reichstag, on 12 April, 1904, are conclusive of Germany's opinion at the time. '6 November, igos; quoted in Annual Register, 1905, p. 228. ' French Yellow Book, Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 122. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 225 "We have no cause," he said, "to apprehend that this agreement was levelled against any individual Power. It seems to be an attempt to eliminate the points of difference between France and Great Britain by means of an amicable understanding. From the point of view of German interests we have nothing to complain of, for we do not wish to see strained relations between Great Britain and France, if only because such a state of affairs would imperil the peace of the world, the maintenance of which we sincerely desire." "There was another reason why Germany would rather welcome than find fault with the agreement. The general impression in Germany throughout 1904 was that the rap- prochement between France and Great Britain tended to weaken the alliance between France and Russia. Any enduring friendship with both, owing to existing political conditions in both the Middle and Far East, seemed im- possible. The public excitement in England caused by the Dogger Bank affair and the exploits of the Russian cruisers Petersburg and Smolensk accentuated, if anything, this impression." l As it turned out, the German assump- tion that England and Russia were of necessity hostile and irreconcilable, an assumption that governed the weekly reviews of foreign politics written by Professor Theodor Schiemann for the Kreuzzeitung, was to prove Germany's undoing, for when England and Russia made up their differences Germany had no policy prepared to meet the new situation, and the ultimate result of that deficiency was the war of 1914. Thus the entente cordiale of 1904 augured well for the peace of the world. Yet it must be recognized that the agreement commended itself to the public opinion of both France and England, and to their respective foreign offices, because at the very least each country would enjoy a free hand against Germany, and might, in certain contingen- cies, count on the diplomatic support of the other. 2 Ger- 1 Barclay, Thirty Years' Reminiscences, p. 261. * This is admitted by Sydney Brooks, "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, May, igio, p. 624. 226 ENGLAND AND GERMANY mans subsequently convinced themselves that M. Delcasse's policy was inspired solely by the desire to secure British support in a war of revenge, and that King Edward VII was at the bottom of a matured scheme to effect the diplo- matic isolation of Germany. 1 Here, then, was a situation full of dangerous possibilities. Would either France or England, or both of them, pursue an aggressive policy toward Germany? or would the latter endeavor to break up the new friendship before it had been consolidated as an effective force against a German hegemony of Europe? In either case the peace of Europe was bound to be seriously threatened; so that the agreement concluded between Great Britain and France for the purpose of avoiding war on account of numerous questions in which they were both interested actually opened up the vista of war between one or both of them and Germany ! As it happened the initiative in testing the new situa- tion came from Germany. Although she had raised no objection to the Anglo-French convention at the time of its publication, even though it had not been formally com- municated to her, 2 the prospect of a permanent reconcilia- tion between the two old enemies was far from pleasing to her; for her colonial policy had hitherto profited from the jealousy of London and Paris, not to mention her ascend- ency in Europe. But when the Russian armies, in Feb- ruary, 1905, met defeat at Mukden, it was obvious that France could expect no assistance from her ally in case of trouble with Germany. The temptation was too strong for the latter. Count von Biilow, the chancellor, stated in the Reichstag that Germany was ignorant of any agree- 1 Inter alia, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkem, pp. 243-247. Innumerable references could be cited. 2 The British Government notified the Powers of its undertakings with respect to Egypt. France unofficially informed Germany of the Moroccan clauses of the agreement, and the latter made no protest at the time. Personal motives seem to have inspired M. Delcasse in neglecting the formal communication to Germany. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 227 ments as to Morocco recently made between France and England, and to reinforce the position Emperor William II appeared at Tangier on 31 March, 1905, where he spoke to this effect: "It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sover- eignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain, open to the peace- ful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, for I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign." This speech produced the most serious diplomatic crisis that Europe had known since thirty years before, when a Franco-German war was threatened by the attitude of the German military party. For Germany now challenged the principle of the Anglo-French convention, that "it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country and to pro- vide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, eco- nomic, financial, and military reforms which it may re- quire." l In brief, Germany demanded that Morocco be placed under international control, while France seemed disposed to insist upon her ascendency in its affairs. As the French policy was peculiarly the work of M. Delcasse, a German ultimatum that France should consent to the meeting of an international conference was tantamount to a demand for the dismissal of the Republic's foreign min- ister, and was so regarded, both then and since. France, unable to face a war with her mighty neighbor, yielded, and Germany seemed to have scored a distinct triumph at the expense of the new entente, for, although the Brit- ish Government was willing to assist France by landing 1 Anglo-French Declaration (public), Art. II. 228 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 100,000 troops in Schleswig-Holstein, the French cabinet declined to support M. Delcasse in a policy of resistance, and he resigned. 1 After long negotiations, extending over the summer of 1905, it was arranged between France and Germany that the conference should meet at Algeciras, opposite Gibraltar on the Spanish mainland, in January, 1906. Inasmuch as the agreement with France only bound the British Government to afford its " diplomatic support" to obtain the execution of the Morocco clauses, it is not sur- prising that Germany considered the offer of military as- sistance an evidence of England's unfriendliness, and that there was a renewed outburst of Anglophobia in the Ger- man press toward the end of 1905. The Morocco question was, indeed, one of the few definite issues between the two countries, although Great Britain was not involved as a principal. It is therefore necessary to explain what the problem was, and, if possible, to express some opinion as to the merits of the controversy. Morocco, or the Shereefian Empire, was the last inde- pendent state of Africa Minor, as the southern littoral of the Mediterranean is sometimes called. In the course of the nineteenth century all the surrounding regions had been appropriated by European Powers, and by 1900 the fron- tier of Morocco marched with that of the French posses- sions, except in the extreme south, where it touched a Spanish colony. The government was no more successful than that of Mohammedan states elsewhere; the country was, in fact, a feudal state of the variety to be found in 1 A special envoy, Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, was sent to Paris by the German Government to warn the prime minister, M. Rouvier, that M. Delcasse" was persona non grata to Germany, and that both the interests of France and the peace of Europe required his dismissal. So the Gaulois (Paris) in June, 1905. M. Delcasse" took his revenge by disclosing in the Matin, in October following, the details of the British offer of assistance. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 229 Europe about the year 1000. Geographical divisions worked against national unity, even if there had not been many strong tribes much addicted to fighting and a tradi- tion of corruption which prevented the working out of an efficient administrative system. Even the strongest sul- tans could maintain some semblance of order only by trav- elling about the Empire and quartering themselves upon powerful tribal chieftains. The last great ruler was Mulai Hassan, who died in 1894, and had prevented excessive European interference by protecting such Europeans as resided in the land for purposes of commerce; his policy, however, was continued by the grand vizier, Ben Hamed, down to 1 90 1, when death removed the one man who understood the situation clearly. The Sultan Abdel Assiz achieved considerable notoriety by his addiction to photography and other refinements of European life. But civilization led to bankruptcy, which could be liquidated only by European assistance; and tribal restlessness, culminating in the revolt of El Rogui in 1903, created a dangerous and difficult position for European resi- dents. As the land had long been the arena of European intrigue without falling a prey to it, the unhappy Sultan was likely to be overwhelmed by applications from Powers anxious to give his country their respective types of colonial organization. Historically Spain enjoyed the greatest interest in Mo- rocco, on account of the long struggle between Christianity and Islam for the control of the Iberian peninsula. But at the opening of the twentieth century her holdings were confined to four presidios on the Mediterranean littoral and a small settlement on the Atlantic coast. Her friend- ship with Great Britain guaranteed that no other Power would be allowed to secure the Mediterranean coast lest it be used as a balance to Gibraltar. Great Britain's interest was entirely commercial, except 230 ENGLAND AND GERMANY that she could not tolerate an occupation by a hostile Power which might control either the Suez or the South African route to India. She had several times tried to secure reforms in the Shereefian Government, but, failing that, was content with some forty per cent of the trade of Morocco. Her diplomatic agents and her merchants en- joyed the confidence of the Sultan, who regarded the Eng- lish friendship as the surest barrier to the introduction of European influences; so that in 1901 a protectorate was practically offered to the British Government. The Power with a vital interest in the future of Morocco was France. Ever since Algeria became a French colony the anarchy which reigned on the Morocco-Algerian fron- tier had been a constant source of trouble; also of profit, for by perpetuating the disorder the French Government provided itself with a convenient excuse for intervening in Morocco should a favorable occasion ever arise. After the occupation of the last Sahara oases in the 'nineties, Morocco came to be regarded as the keystone of the French African Empire, and the colonial party in France openly avowed its desire for a French protectorate, or for an an- nexation, if possible. French commerce stood second to that of Great Britain, being reckoned at about twenty per cent. And some patriots, keenly aware of the ever increasing discrepancy of France and Germany in popula- tion, looked forward to the time when the Republic might use African troops to supply the deficiency of the regular army; for which purpose the fighting tribesmen of Morocco would be of great value. Furthermore, in the event of a European war, the position of France throughout northern Africa might be seriously compromised by the activities of Mohammedan secret societies operating from an inde- pendent Morocco. On the whole, therefore, France's moral claim to the reversion of the Shereefian Empire may be fairly admitted. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 231 There remained Germany, who was not disposed to al- low her western neighbor a free hand in dealing with the decaying Moorish state, partly because of her own definite interests therein, partly because, as the Emperor once re- marked, "without Germany and the German Emperor, no important step in international policy should be taken, even beyond the seas." * Unfortunately, it is well-nigh im- possible to determine whether the German Government ever had a definite policy as regards Morocco itself, for its conduct in the years 1 905-1 1 was curiously inconsistent. Prince Bulow repeatedly stated that the interests of Ger- many were purely economic, and that she would be content if the open door and the sovereignty of the Sultan were adequately maintained. At the end of the last century German commerce with Morocco amounted to only nine per cent of the total trade, but it was displaying the usual German energy and was rapidly increasing. Well aware that the French occupation of Tunis had led to sharp differential treatment in favor of French goods and that in Madagascar practically all non-French goods had been excluded by a high protective tariff, Germany insisted upon equal treatment for all nations in Morocco, and might reasonably expect the support of other governments. Her point was well taken because the Anglo-French agree- ment bound France to maintain the open door for thirty years only and did not in any manner insure the rights of other nations after that period. 2 So long, therefore, as German policy envisaged the maintenance of the inde- pendence and integrity of Morocco, together with a recog- nition of the sovereignty of the Sultan, as a guarantee of the open door, it occupied a strong position. In addition, a convention signed at Madrid in 1880 by all the European Powers and the United States made Morocco a kind of. 1 Kiel, 3 July, igoo. 2 Anglo-French Declaration (public), Art. IV. 232 ENGLAND AND GERMANY international hunting-ground. True, that agreement had reference to the protection of European residents in the Shereefian Empire and was not concerned with trading rights; but Article XVII declared that "the right of most- favored-nation treatment is recognized by Morocco for all the Powers represented at the Conference of Madrid." The most-favored-nation treatment was also promised to Germany in the commercial treaty signed by Germany and Morocco in 1890. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that Germany did not cherish ambitions of another description. Through- out the period during which the Morocco controversy kept Europe on tenter-hooks the agitation for "a place in the sun" was at its height, and Morocco figured prominently in the programmes of the Pan- German League and the Colonial Society. In the propaganda of these associations the Shereefian Empire was described as a veritable Gol- conda; nor was this a distortion of the truth. With an area of 219,000 square miles and a population of only 5,000,000, the land was capable of receiving a large num- ber of European settlers; the climate, more especially in the southwest, was salubrious; the agricultural possibilities were boundless, for the soil was both rich and sparsely cultivated; above all, from a German point of view, the earth was known to be extraordinarily rich in iron and other ores in which Germany was either lacking or increas- ingly dependent upon imports. A further recommenda- tion could be found in the fact that Morocco was practically the last semicivilized region of the globe that was not mortgaged to some European Power or was not entangled in the meshes of Pan-American or Asiatic politics. The acquisition of Morocco would probably have gone far to satisfy German colonial ambitions, and, whether or not the imperial government aimed to secure the whole or a part of the spoils when the Sultan capitulated to European pres- THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 233 sure, public opinion fully expected the fatherland to ob- tain its proper share of the prey. For political reasons as well as economic considerations Germany would find Morocco useful. For some time she •had felt keenly the need of a coaling station somewhere on the route from Europe to her African colonies — Togoland, Cameroons, and Southwest Africa. For that purpose the western coast of Morocco offered many possibilities. Furthermore, a German Morocco would neutralize French Algeria in case of a European war. But most important of all, Germany would become a Mediterranean Power, at least in its western area. Then, if her Baghdad railway could be put through and her hold on Asia Minor estab- lished; if also her ally, Austria-Hungary, were to carry through an ambitious naval programme, then the Germanic Powers might in time acquire a preponderant position in the Middle Sea, that is, across the most important trade route and the strategic centre of the British Empire. It must be frankly admitted that the above interpretation of Germany's Moroccan policy is inferential, for the im- perial government never admitted that it cherished terri- torial aspirations in Morocco. But if Germany were merely championing the open door, it is difficult to under- stand why Great Britain opposed so resolutely every for- ward move of the Berlin foreign office, for her own trade was bound to profit by the success of the German policy. Either Germany did aspire to a part of Morocco — and in the negotiations preceding the Great War, she declined, be it remembered, to guarantee the integrity of the French col- onies, of which Morocco was surely the most desirable; or she was using the Morocco question as a means of test- ing the Anglo-French entente. The one did not exclude the other, for that matter. If Germany avowed her de- signs upon Morocco, the entente would speedily become an alliance; on the other hand, if she could break up the 234 ENGLAND AND GERMANY entente, Morocco would be hers for the asking, as France was in no position to undertake a war single-handed. But from whatever angle the matter is viewed, it is clear that Great Britain, deeply concerned as she was at the growth of the German navy, was bound to resent the establishment of German influence in Morocco, which would prejudice her position in the Mediterranean, or to draw nearer to France if the latter were subjected to any threats at the hands of Germany. If Germany's interests obviously demanded a forward policy in Morocco, British interests equally required that such a policy be blocked; and be- yond that point it is neither useful nor possible to refine the dispute. 1 After the foregoing statement of the attitude of the sev- eral Powers toward the Moroccan question we may nar- rate the course of events in the Shereefian Empire which led up to the Conference of Algeciras. The first step toward securing a hold on Morocco was taken by France in iqoi, when her relations with England were still problematical and when the latter was still engaged in the Boer War. In July of that year, after a French squadron had repaired to Tangier (a French subject had recently been murdered) , a treaty was concluded which prepared the way for that penetration pacifique so dear to modern diplomacy and pledged France to maintain the independence and integrity of the Sultan's dominions. This was followed in April, 1902, by another convention, which regulated the policing of the Morocco-Algerian fron- tier in a manner distinctly favorable to France. Shortly after this M. Delcasse opened negotiations with Germany 1 Gustav Diercks, Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algesiras (1906); Krieg mit Frankreich? Wohin muss die deutsche Marokkopolitik fuhren? (1907); Heinrich Class, West-Marokko deutsch I (191 1), 60,000 copies being sold; Dr. Albrecht Wirth, Die Entscheidung iiber Marokko (191 1); Dr. Wilhelm Arning, Marokko-Kongo (1912). Andre Tardieu, La Conference a" Algesiras (1906) ; Augustin Bernard, Le Maroc (1913). E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy (1912), bitterly critical of British policy, but containing all the essential documents. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 235 to buy off her opposition, and proposed to Spain a parti- tion of what did not yet belong to France. But nothing came of the former, and Great Britain got wind of the Franco-Spanish scheme and blocked it. This check was probably the decisive factor in deciding the Republic to give up its claims in Egypt in return for England's con- sent to its Morocco policy. The agreement with London was then concluded on 8 April, 1904. The published articles of the Anglo-French convention bound the two governments not to "alter the political status" of either Egypt or Morocco, but in secret articles, which were not published until 191 1, they considered "the event of either government finding itself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify the policy in re- spect to Egypt or Morocco," and they promised mutual assistance in securing "reforms" in either country. The published declaration recognized the interests of Spain on the Mediterranean littoral of Morocco, and France was bidden to come to terms with her. On 3 October, 1904, the French and Spanish Governments, in a public declara- tion, stated that they were "firmly attached to the in- tegrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan"; but secretly they arranged a treaty of partition which, according to agreement, was communicated to the British Government and which bound Spain never "to alienate or to cede in any form, even temporarily, the whole or any part of the territories" awarded to her — a precau- tion, perhaps, against a German purchase or lease. 1 ' Thus, while the world was led to believe that Morocco's position would be maintained intact by France, Spain, and Great Britain, those very Powers were privately agreed that the Sultan's dominions should be divided among two of their number, and the third was pledged to give its diplomatic support to the proceedings. 1 Art. VII. 236 ENGLAND AND GERMANY It was not a creditable business for the negotiators. True, the possession of Morocco by France was the logical corollary of the British occupation of Egypt, and a pub- lic announcement might easily have precipitated a war. Probably not otherwise could the Western Powers have scored at the expense of Germany, but their diplomacy was placed in a false light; just as was Germany's by her refusal to pursue a consistent policy fairly and squarely. Whether or when Germany learned of the secret articles, cannot be said; but it has been argued that the sudden change of front made by Germany after the battle of Mukden was dictated by the knowledge that a partition of Morocco was being prepared, 1 and the explanation is not unreasonable, as important secrets have more than once leaked out of the Quai d'Orsay. In any case, the Germans had reason to be alarmed, for in June, 1904, the Maghzen, as the Shereefian Government is called, had raised a loan of 62,500,000 francs in Paris, and the pro- gramme of reforms presented to the Sultan by the French minister in February, 1905, would have made Morocco practically a French protectorate. 2 " The Algeciras Conference had, therefore, to decide whether it would establish an international control over Morocco or recognize the peculiar interests of France and Spain. Germany had a strong case, beyond a doubt, but the strong-handed methods of her diplomacy militated seriously against her. She had raised the question in a brutal fashion, and her representatives at the conference assumed a domineering and hectoring attitude that was most distasteful to the polished agents of the other Powers. 1 So Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, p. 98, who bases bis opinion on tbe text of a Reuter despatch of October, 1904, ! According to the German minister to Morocco, his French colleague pressed the reforms on the Sultan by the argument that he was acting in the name of the Euro- pean concert. M. Saint-Rene Taillandier denied explicitly that he had used such language. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 237 Hence, in the really vital questions, she enjoyed the sup- port only of Austria-Hungary, her ally. Her other ally, Italy, consistently voted against her, and even the neutral American delegates favored the French contentions. To a large extent, the question debated was not so much the future of Morocco as the strength of the several Powers. An unreserved German victory would have consolidated firmly the new position in Europe she had acquired since Russia's defeat in the Far East. The result of the con- ference, accordingly, was a theoretical acceptance of the German doctrine of internationalization, but a practical disavowal of it by the grant of a privileged position to France and Spain. In securing this the assistance of the British Govern- ment was invaluable to France. Sir Edward Grey, who had just taken over the foreign office, said to the French ambassador : "If war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco — a question which had just been made the subject of agreement between this country [England] and France, an agreement extremely- popular on both sides — if out of this agreement war was forced on France at this time, in his view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France." l Sir Edward made no promises, but he conveyed his opinion to the German ambassador as well as to the French; he used no threats, but the German Government knew that it could not break up the entente cordiale by an aggres- sive policy toward France. Without committing the Brit- ish Government, the foreign secretary also authorized the consultation of British and French military experts. Thus German policy had succeeded in cementing the entente into something more than a mere combination for diplo- 1 House of Commons, 3 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxv, c. 1811.) 238 ENGLAND AND GERMANY matic manoeuvres, without, as later events showed, taking the lesson to heart. The Act of Algeciras, in one hundred and twenty-three articles, accepted "the threefold principle of the sover- eignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality." Apart from regulations for the suppres- sion of the traffic in arms and for the better collection of taxes, the essential provisions were those concerning the organization of a police force and a state bank. The former task was intrusted to French and Spanish officers. As regards the bank, its capital was divided into fourteen equal shares, of which one was allotted to each of the twelve signatory Powers, and the other two to the French banks interested in the loan of June, 1904; France and Spain, therefore, secured two-sevenths of the capital. Also, the bank was organized under the laws of France. In theory, France and Spain were to act as agents of the Powers, but in reality they were awarded a privileged position; and it soon became apparent that the authority given them as agents of the Powers was not sufficient to cope with the problems that arose. Prince Billow, in a speech to the Reichstag on 5 April, 1906, sought to justify his policy. The Morocco question, he said, had been "one affecting the prestige of the German Government and the dignity of the German Empire," and he argued that these had been vindicated and safe- guarded by the conference and its decisions. He also insisted that Germany did not begrudge France her friend- ship with England or her reconciliation with Italy. But public opinion in Germany was not so easily satisfied. The press, the pamphleteers, and many parliamentarians felt that in reality little had been gained for so much effort; that the Act of Algeciras would not persuade France to abandon her policy toward Morocco, and that other nations THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 239 were not sympathetic with German ambitions. As one writer remarked: "We are now isolated, unloved, hated, because we have gradually established our right to take part in the settlement of international problems, because we have zealously come forward to support our interests." ' This was in large measure true, and it was much re- marked upon at the time that in his Reichstag speech of 14 November, 1906, Prince Biilow, whose attitude had been rather haughty since the beginning of the Russo- Japanese War, was at some pains to demonstrate the friendliness of Germany with all the Powers of the world. But, he went on to say: "A policy that aims to hem Germany in, to draw around us a circle of Powers for the purpose of isolating us, would be a very dangerous policy for the peace of Europe." Nevertheless, the year 1907 witnessed a series of agree- ments which, avowedly growing out of the Morocco im- broglio, went far toward accomplishing the very result against which Prince Biilow had delivered his warning. On 16 May the French and Spanish Governments, in identical declarations, announced their intention to "main- tain the status quo in the Mediterranean and that part of the Atlantic which washes the coast of Europe and Africa"; in case new circumstances necessitated any change in the status quo they would consult together with a view to common action. Similar declarations were made by Spain and Great Britain, for which the way had been prepared by the marriage of Princess Ena of Battenberg to King Al- fonso the preceding year. 2 Thus Spain, which had long 1 Diercks, Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algesiras, p. 170. 2 About the same time Spain decided to reconstruct her fleet, which had been neglected since the war with the United States, and British capitalists arranged to provide the necessary loans. 240 ENGLAND AND GERMANY been in close relations with the government of Berlin, was, by her interests in Morocco, brought within the orbit of the entente cordiale, to the intense annoyance of her former friend. It should also be noted that the Anglo- Portuguese treaty of alliance, which contained a guarantee of the integrity of the Portuguese colonies, had been re- newed in 1903. From this time an active German policy in the Mediterranean was destined to meet with oppo- sition from the four Western Powers. With these Powers Italy was now, for practical pur- poses, closely associated. From the days of unification Italy had cultivated and enjoyed the close friendship of Great Britain, chiefly as a protection against the hostility of France, and she had persisted in this policy even after her ally, Germany, had fallen out with England, a fact recognized by visits of King Edward to Victor Emmanuel III in 1903 and 1907. More important was the rapproche- ment with France, which became possible after M. Del- casse, in 1901-2, had recognized the "rights" of Italy to Tripoli when a convenient season should come for assert- ing them. As the Anglo-French entente developed, Franco- Italian relations steadily improved, as evidenced by the Italian support of the French claims at the Algeciras Con- ference. No formal convention between the two countries was signed, except an Anglo-French-Italian agreement guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Abyssinia, but their interests were sufficiently identical to insure a harmonious co-operation. Italy, indeed, remained a mem- ber of the Triple Alliance, but she was a silent partner, whose ambitions in the Adriatic were directly opposed to those of her ally, Austria-Hungary. Prince Biilow in- sisted that the Triple Alliance was as efficient as ever, but he did not succeed in convincing his countrymen by his argument. The last straw, from the German point of view, was the THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 241 Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August, 1907. This was perhaps the soundest move of British diplomacy for a hundred years, for it dispelled the long-imagined bogie of a Russian attack on India, whose safety is one of Britain's first considerations. But to Germany it was intolerable — first because Anglo-Russian rivalry had played an impor- tant part in the shaping of her policy; next because it was doubtful if the traditional friendship of the German and Russian Emperors could stand the strain of Anglo-German hostility; and lastly because, as the Russian foreign min- ister said, 1 the agreement made possible the re-entry of Russia into European politics, from which she had stood aloof since the days of Bismarck and her absorption in Far Eastern affairs. To be precise, Russia was hence- forth to take an active interest in the Balkans, to support the policy of reform which Great Britain, to the disgust of both Germany and Austria, was urging for Mace- donia, and in general to oppose the Drang nach Osten of the Germanic Powers. Germans had not believed an Anglo-Russian reconcilia- tion possible, and the renewal of the Anglo- Japanese alli- ance, which was originally directed against Russia, in August, 1905, seemed to confirm their view. But Russia had stood by England and France at Algeciras; on 10 June, 1907, France and Japan adjusted their relations by an agreement to respect the independence and integrity of China and the principle of the open door; on 30 July Russia and Japan drew closer together by a formal recog- nition of their possessions and treaty rights in China and Manchuria. These prehminaries removed the last ob- stacle to the accord between London and St. Petersburg, which was stimulated by the advance of German influence in Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf, to be noticed presently. Their bargain respecting Tibet and Afghanistan was of 1 A. Viallate, La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, 1906-1907, p. 7. 242 ENGLAND AND GERMANY no interest to Germany. But the practical partition of Persia did not augur well for Germany's growing commerce in that country, nor was she pleased to see Russia concede British supremacy in the Persian Gulf. Henceforth Ger- many would not possess a free hand in the Near East, just as her activities in the Mediterranean were restrained by the agreements between the Mediterranean Powers. It must be admitted that the situation was not pleasant for Germany. As late as 1904 her influence in Europe had been scarcely challenged, and the one check upon it, the Dual Alliance, was seriously compromised by Russia's reverses in the Far East. By 1907, in addition to the Franco-Russian alliance, Germany was confronted by a network of agreements involving Great Britain, Spain, Italy, and Japan, of which Powers two were closely con- nected with the Dual Alliance. The Triple Alliance was now opposed by a Triple Entente, which was in a position to restrain the policy of Germany and Austria in the very regions they regarded as the theatres of their political and economic expansion. Indubitably the strength of the new combination lay in the support which British sea power could give to the military pressure exerted by France and Russia. Germans had convinced themselves that Great Britain must desire the destruction of Germany before the latter forged ahead as a commercial and naval Power: they therefore, not unnaturally, argued that the entente had been engineered by Great Britain with the object of isolating Germany diplomatically and with the ultimate purpose of precipitating a war against her. Englishmen, on the other hand, insisted that the agreements with France and Russia were made merely as means of protection against German aggression; they remembered the unscrupulous- ness of Bismarck, they regarded the German navy as a challenge to their traditional maritime ascendency, and they pointed to the recurring diplomatic crises as convinc- THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 243 ing evidence of German forwardness. As long as Europe remained split into two hostile camps, only a miracle could avoid war between them. The time is far off when we can know the truth about the so-called Einkreisungspolitik of England. It became "a matter of faith even among those who were her best friends," x and Germans will probably never be convinced that King Edward VII and Sir Edward Grey were not playing a Machiavellian game. The King rather than the foreign secretary was held primarily responsible, but the latter passed for the arch-type of English hypocrisy, partly, it may be suggested, because he spoke but seldom in Par- liament and took but little interest in the social life of London; his time must, therefore, be consumed in plots and intrigues against Germany. The basis of the charge against King Edward was his extraordinary fondness for travelling. From his coronation to his death not a year passed in which he did not pay a round of visits to his brother monarchs of Europe, and as he was a man of un- common tact and urbanity it was easy to imagine that this activity was closely connected with British foreign policy. But those who ascribed to him the personal direc- tion of that policy overlooked the fact that as a constitu- tional ruler he could not initiate a policy of his own; that on his many journeys he was accompanied by only officials of the foreign office, not by ministers responsible to Parlia- ment, who alone could authorize actions binding the Brit- ish Government. The King was certainly the agent of the foreign office, for he was excellently equipped to ex- plain its intentions to Continental sovereigns who did en- joy control of their national policies; but as his official biographer has said: 1 R. C. Long, "Germany and the Entente," Fortnightly Review, October, 1909, P- 738. 244 ENGLAND AND GERMANY "Foreign statesmen and rulers knew that no subtler aim really underlay his movements than a wish for friendly social intercourse with them and the enjoyment of life under foreign skies quite unencumbered by the burden of diplomatic anxieties." Some "unguarded remarks" in Paris, in the course of 1905, which reached the Emperor William had "an unfriendly sound," but "no deliberate hostility to the German peo- ple can truthfully be put to the King's credit." In short, British foreign policy "was unaffected by the royal prog- resses." l These progresses, it should be noted, were impartially distributed. If he preferred to visit France and the Medi- terranean lands, or sometimes journeyed to Russia and the Scandinavian countries, he did not neglect the Germanic sovereigns. He visited William II in 1904, 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1909, in the last year as an official guest in Ber- lin; Francis Joseph was similarly honored in 1903, 1905, 1907, and 1908. The real purpose of the King's visits was to induce the German Emperor to consider a limita- tion of naval armaments — that is, to prepare the ground for formal negotiations between the British and German foreign offices; and he sought to make use of the tradi- tional friendship of England and Austria as a means of exerting pressure upon the ally of the latter. The verdict of Germany's most fearless publicist, Maximilian Harden, deserves to be quoted: "Edward VII, son of a Coburger, grandson of a Saxon princess, was never an enemy of Germany. As a Briton he knew that Eng- land must not abandon the command of the sea and the predomi- nant position in Islamic countries, if it did not wish to see the roots of its power destroyed. As the patron of Sir John Fisher he knew the opinion of English naval experts: 'Dreadnoughts alone, not the ships of yesterday, will decide any future war, and Germany may soon be devilishly near us in Dreadnought strength.' As a business 1 Sir Sidney Lee, "King Edward VII," Dictionary of National Biography, second supplement, vol. I, pp. 502-596. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 245 man he said to himself that the 63,000,000 of Germans would not quietly submit to the destruction of their fleet and the loss of their colonies, and that Great Britain, the market and clearing-house of the inhabited earth, could not sustain a century of constant menace of war, even after a great victory. He desired, therefore, an under- standing as to extent of naval armaments instead of war." x Harden's was a voice crying in the wilderness, except for the protests of Social Democrats, who were not heeded. The conviction as to British hostility and her policy of is- olation subsisted in German minds. Thus Herr Bassermann, the National Liberal leader, at Essen, in September, 1905: "England works for fresh coalitions against Germany in order to get great forces together for a final reckoning with Germany. . . . Peace with England will be assured when our fleet is so strong that England will not dare fall upon us." Or again at Magdeburg, in April, 1907: "England is everywhere, England's King is everywhere. . . . In every corner of the world England is pursuing a policy which is unfavorable to Germany." 2 In June, 1908, the Emperor himself was full of the idea. In a speech at Doberitz he said: "It seems likely that people wish to isolate and provoke us. We shall be able to put up with it. The Teuton has never fought better than when he has been brought to bay. So let them attack us; we shall be ready!" 3 British statesmen endeavored to dispel the illusion that their policy was one of encirclement. Sir Edward Grey admirably defined his position in a speech made shortly before he took over the foreign office: "Nothing we do in our relations with Germany," he said, "is in any way to impair our existing good relations with France. In 1 Monarchs and Men (1912), p. 28. 'Quoted in Annual Register, 1905, p. 293; 1907, p. 306. * A. Viallate, La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, 1907-1908, p. 162. 246 ENGLAND AND GERMANY other words, it must be, in my opinion, a condition of any improve- ment in the public relations between Germany and ourselves that the relations of Germany with France on all matters which come under the French agreement should be fair and good also." 1 This attitude he consistently maintained to the very out- break of the Great War, and it may be stated that the rela- tions of the British and German Governments, from 1904 to 1914, became strained only when the latter became tru- culent in its relations with France. As regards Russia, Sir Edward was equally explicit. He warmly supported Sir Charles Dilke in deprecating the idea that the Anglo- Russian agreement aimed at the isolation of Germany, and said that he had no objection to any alliances Ger- many might conclude. 2 For this reason, during the Bos- nian crisis of 1908-9, which intimately affected the inter- ests of Russia, "anything more than diplomatic support . . . was never asked from us, more was never given, more was never promised." 3 And after the Morocco cri- sis of 191 1, Sir Edward Grey declared that "one of the es- sential conditions of our friendships with France and with Russia in the last few years has been the certain knowledge that neither they nor we wished to pursue a provocative or aggressive policy." 4 On the other hand, he made it quite clear that Great Britain was willing, even anxious, to enjoy the friendship of Germany, provided such a friendship was not at the expense of Britain's existing friendships with France and Russia; and it will presently be seen that he attempted to give concrete expression to such a policy. The diffi- culty was explained by Sir Frank Lascelles, who was Brit- ish ambassador in Berlin from 1895 to 1908, when he wrote: 1 London, 20 October, 1905. 2 House of Commons, 27 July, 1908. (4 Hansard cxciii, cc. 955, 970.) 3 House of Commons, 3 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxv, c. 1811.) 4 House of Commons, 27 November, 191 1. (5 Hansard xxxii, c. 59.) THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 247 "It became my duty to speak at dinners, and I noticed that whilst the expression of a sincere desire for good relations on the part of England was cordially applauded a coldness seemed to come over my audience when I pointed out that it must be clearly under- stood that friendship with one country did not imply hostility to any other, and although we desired to be friends with Germany we were not prepared to abandon the friendships into which we had entered with other Powers and which certainly did not imply any hostility toward Germany." 1 That England adjusted her difficulties with France and Russia from fear of Germany, and by so doing created the Triple Entente is in large measure true, but no evidence has ever been produced to show that the immediate or ultimate aim of that policy was war with Germany, or that the Entente was ever regarded by England as other than a means of defense against the incalculable policy of Germany, which managed to challenge British interests first in one, then in another, quarter. If Germany has been the victim of a conspiracy hatched by Great Britain, she has published no evidence which can stand in the court of history. Indeed, such facts as are known point to Germany as the aggressive Power, for each of the four European crises preceding the Great War — 1905, 1908-9, 191 1, and 191 2-13 — were precipitated by the action of Germany or her ally Austria-Hungary; and on each occa- sion the crisis was due to the. mailed-fist diplomacy of the Teutonic allies. The relations of the British and German Governments from the Algeciras Conference to the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9 were chiefly concerned with the question of naval armaments, and the result has been noted in the chapter entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic." On the surface the only difficulties were met with in the deli- cate question of Macedonian reforms. But at the second 1 "Thoughts on the Anglo-German Problem," Contemporary Review, January, 1912, p. 7. 248 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Hague Conference (summer of 1907) British and German policies were poles apart. The atmosphere was somewhat cleared by the Emperor's visit to England in the autumn of 1907, despite a savage attack on Prince Biilow in the columns of the Times} The Emperor was well received wherever he went, and he stayed on for some weeks in a private capacity. His speech at the Guild Hall made a profound impression. Referring to a visit to the same place in 1891, he said: "I said then, on this spot, that my aim was, above all, the main- tenance of peace. History, I venture to hope, will do me justice in that I have pursued this aim unswervingly ever since. The main prop and base for the peace of the world is the maintenance of good relations between our two countries, and I will further strengthen them so far as lies in my power. The German nation's wishes coincide with them." In characteristic fashion the Emperor proceeded to undo the effects of these remarks: first, by his letter to Lord Tweedmouth; 2 second, by the navy law of 1908; and, above all, by the interview which he gave to an English diploma- tist and which was published in the Daily Telegraphy on - ; 28 October, 1908: "His Majesty," ran the principal passage of the statement," • which was intended "as a message to the English people," "spoke with impulsive and unusual frankness, saying: 'You English are as mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are completely given over to suspicions that are quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command in my speech at the Guild Hall that my heart was set upon peace and that it was one of my dearest wishes to live on the best terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak 1 10 October, 1007. 2 See Chap. VIII, "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," p. 183. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 249 for themselves, but you will not listen to them, but to those who misinterpret and distort them. '"This is a personal insult which I resent; to be forever mis- judged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scru- tinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press, or at least a considerable section of it, bids the people of England to refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other hand holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?' "Complaining again of the difficulty imposed upon him by Eng- lish distrust, his Majesty said: 'The prevailing sentiment of large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in the minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best element, just as it is in England respecting Germany.' " The rest of the interview presented the imperial view of recent diplomatic events, and need not be quoted here; it ended with the stereotyped justification of the German navy. As a statement of facts, the interview was to some ex- tent justified, for the ill feeling between Germany and England was very strong at the time, and was perhaps stronger in England than in Germany. 1 But it was sin- gularly unsuccessful as a harbinger of better relations, for in both England and Germany there was intense indigna- tion, which was in no wise diminished by the crisis in the Near East and the conflicting policies followed by Great Britain and Germany in that matter. Fortunately the statesmen of both countries kept their heads. Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and Prince Biilow made conciliatory speeches, and the incident was gradually forgotten. In February Edward VII visited Berlin, where he was '"The ill feeling seems to me much commoner and more menacing in England than in Germany." (Edwin D. Mead, "England and Germany," Atlantic Monthly, March, 1908, p. 398.) But he records that the other English papers rebuked the Times for its savage attack on Prince Biilow. 250 ENGLAND AND GERMANY most cordially received, and it was considered a happy augury that during his stay a Franco- German conven- tion was signed which promised to give a definitive solu- tion to the Morocco question. But the royal visit "exer- cised no lasting effect in abating the popular apprehension of German designs." * Indeed, shortly after the King's return, the naval scare of 1909 was sprung, and Germans said that they had been duped. The intervention, there- fore, of the Wilhelmstrasse in the Balkan crisis to support Austria against the demands of the Triple Entente, and the complete rout of the latter were regarded as a fitting reply to British duplicity, even though Europe was left in two sharply drawn diplomatic groups in which Germany was supported only by her ally. No amount of official optimism or of private assurances could conceal the harsh realities of the situation. Sincere efforts were made in both countries. A British Anglo- German Friendship Committee, organized in 1905, soon had its counterpart in Germany. Visits of representa- tive men were arranged on each side. Ministers, journal- ists, public officials, workingmen, and students from each country visited the other, and professed themselves satis- fied that the hostility reflected in the press was artificial and did not represent a real conflict of interests. Many writers in English reviews argued that each people accused the other of the same hostile and diabolical designs, and that only the armament firms profited by the insensate naval rivalry. Englishmen hailed Germany as the land of Goethe, Schiller, and the world's greatest musicians; Germans gave fitting recognition to the genius of Shake- speare, and acknowledged their indebtedness to England in all matters of commerce and industry. But nothing could remove the malaise that oppressed the people of both countries, and it was precisely this feeling that a conflict 1 Annual Register, 1909, p. 8. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 251 was inevitable which enabled both governments to con- struct the huge navies that actually did create an issue and materially increased the chances of a fatal outcome. Years of hard work by enlightened patriots in each coun- try ultimately prepared the way for more cordial relations, more especially after the Morocco question was settled. But the reconciliation had not been effected when the crisis of 1 9 14 arose; the old animosity reappeared, and Sir Ed- ward Grey had behind him a practically unanimous nation when he called upon Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium, while Germans were at once persuaded that the struggle with Great Britain was the real issue of the war. Public opinion must bear with diplomacy its share of the blame for the Great War, and the historian will be reluc- tant to say that in this respect one nation was entirely guilty and the other quite blameless. Domestic politics in both countries reacted unfavorably upon their international relations. The Liberal govern- ment of Great Britain was pledged to a costly policy of social reform, and many of its supporters in the House of Commons were, for various reasons, admirers of Germany, with whom they insistently demanded an understanding. Under such circumstances the money required to keep up the two-Power naval standard was not forthcoming, and the foreign office could not, even if it so desired, make a formal defensive alliance with France and Russia. Brit- ish policy was actually a compromise that was far sounder than most people suspected, but in many quarters it was not understood, and because devised by a Liberal ministry it was supposed to be weak and vacillating. This played directly into the hands of Germany, for the elections of January, 1907, had been fought on the question whether, to quote the North German Gazette, " Germany was at all capable of developing from a European Power into a world Power." The triumphant vindication of the government's 252 ENGLAND AND GERMANY policy and the defeat of the Social Democrats necessitated vigorous action, to which the foreign office was nothing loath, and whether by accident or design such action in- variably involved British interests or British relations with the other Powers of the Triple Entente. Hence Anglo- German relations were at their worst during the five years' life of the Reichstag elected in 1907 ; whereas they improved materially after the elections of 191 2 had gone against the government and revealed the popular disapproval of the Wilhelmstrasse's methods and policy alike. Also, in the course of time the German foreign office learned that Sir Edward Grey was not a man of wax, but was prepared to stand firm when British interests were affected. But again, the realization came too late, or the lesson was not taken to heart, and the Great War was the result. From this analysis of the general situation we may proceed to examine the two great questions with regard to which Great Britain and Germany were ranged on oppo- site sides in the last years of peace: viz., Morocco and the aftermath of Algeciras, and the problem of the Near East, more particularly the question of the Baghdad railway. Chronologically the latter takes precedence and will be discussed first. CHAPTER X THE NEAR EAST "The Near Eastern question may be denned as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe." x Beginning with the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, by which Hungary was restored to the Hapsburgs, the process was not finally completed by the treaty signed in London on 30 May, 1 913, which left to the Sultan eastern Thrace and Constantinople itself. But down to the Crimean War and the treaty of Paris (1853-6), the Turkish posses- sions still extended to the Danube River and the Carpa- thians, and the animosities bred by their partition was one of the main causes of the Great War of 1914. The con- viction that the Turk must depart from Europe gradually spread among all the European peoples, even the English, who fifty years ago believed that the safety of India de- pended upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. But the problem of the Turk was not restricted to Europe. His possession of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, and, until within a generation, of northern Africa as well, determined the policy of more than one Power with re- spect to the situation in the Balkans. The problem is due to the Turks themselves. A nomadic tribe out of the heart of Asia, they conquered their vast dominions by the sword, and by the sword they held them. Of the arts of peace they knew nothing; in the six centuries of their domination they contributed little to the economic, 1 William Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913, p. 1. 253 254 ENGLAND AND GERMANY political, religious, or literary life of their subjects. Worse than that, they did not even govern, except so far as to collect taxes and to raise armies for innumerable wars. Furthermore, the Turks proper, who constituted the bulk of the governing classes, represented only a minority of the total population. In the European provinces the in- habitants were almost entirely of European stock, except in certain small localities where there was some Turkish immigration. In Asia also the bulk of the people was anything but Turkish, being Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, Jewish, or Greek. Only in Asia Minor was a Turkish peas- antry to be found. From time to time clever individuals of each of the subject races rose to high place in the Otto- man Government; but the main features of Ottoman polit- ical life — inefficiency, corruption, inertia, the playing off of one race against another — were not counteracted, rather they were intensified by the purely selfish ambitions of these capable individuals. Of recent years, as the doctrine of nationality has gath- ered force all over the world, the preservation of the Otto- man power has become increasingly difficult. Everywhere the subject races have revolted against oppression and tyranny, and one frontier province after another has es- caped from the control of Constantinople. Indeed, the final crash would have come long since but for the weak- nesses and jealousies of the Sultan's subjects and the ambi- tions of the European nations, and the present war will not have been fought in vain if it provides a lasting solu- tion of the Near Eastern question. But it is necessary to point out that only the Great Powers can furnish an ade- quate solution, for much more is involved than the fate of the various peoples hitherto or still under Ottoman do- minion. The vast extent of her territory and the difficulty of navigating the Baltic during half the year make Russia's THE NEAR EAST 255 natural outlet the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, over which Constantinople stands guard; for the greater part of her grain crop, which is the chief item of her export trade, is raised on the black lands in the southern provinces of her European Empire. The fact that many ships loaded with Russian grain were cooped up in the Black Sea when Italy attacked the Dardanelles in 191 2, amply justifies the national demand for a free passage to the iEgean and the Mediterranean. But long before economic considera- tions had assumed their present importance, historical and political forces were driving the Russians along the chemin de Byzance. They ever regarded themselves as the heirs of the old Greek Empire, from which they took their two- headed eagle. They aspired to plant the Cross once more on the church of Santa Sophia, and they cherished warm sympathies for those Southern Slavs who were cut off from the main Slav stock by a solid barrier of Germans, Mag- yars, and Rumanians, and groaned under the oppression of the Turk. To reach her goal, Russia resorted to endless intrigue, formed diplomatic combinations galore, waged nine wars — without, however, advancing her frontier per- ceptibly beyond the Rumanian barrier. But if the main Russian current made little progress, if Constantinople did not become Tsarigrad, — to the great satisfaction of other Powers, — Russia's wars were primarily responsible for the resurrection of five Christian states which might serve as outposts of Russian influence in the Balkans. Greece received her independence after the war of 1828- 9; but she was far away, and until recently too weak to be of particular service. Rumania secured autonomy as an aftermath of the Crimean War; but when her troops had saved the Russians before Plevna, in the war of 1877, she was "rewarded" by the seizure of Bessarabia, a trans- Danubian province inhabited by Rumanians. Consequent- ly, for more than thirty years she cultivated the close 256 ENGLAND AND GERMANY friendship of Austria-Hungary, even though the Russian victory had secured her independence. The war of 1877 also placed Bulgaria, Serbia, and Mon- tenegro on the map. New states, with slender resources and thoroughly Slav in spirit, they seemed excellently suited to serve Russian designs — that is, as a result of their expansion and development, Russia might hope to secure that access to the sea which had been denied to herself. For twenty years after the Congress of Berlin Russia aimed to control the domestic politics of Bulgaria; later she trans- ferred her attention to Serbia. In each case her policy was selfish, often brutal. Nevertheless the Balkan peoples did not forget that they owed their freedom to Russian arms, and if they resented some features of Russian con- duct they showed no enthusiasm for the expansionist policy of Austria-Hungary, Russia's great rival. Only fair treatment was needed to make the Balkan states devoted adherents of Russia's great ideal. Sharply opposed to this were the interests of Austria- Hungary. Bounded on the north by a nation whose com- mercial progress was the wonder of the world, the Dual Monarchy found the chief outlet for its trade down the Danube and toward the JEgean. Moreover, the tradi- tional policy of the Hapsburgs, as revealed in the annals of four centuries, was one of territorial expansion, and after her expulsion from Italy and Germany fifty years ago, Austria regarded the western Balkans as her theatre of operations, with probably Salonika as the ultimate goal. Accordingly, she was permitted, in 1878, to "occupy and administer" Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they constituted the hinterland to her Dalmatian provinces. But she could not hope to advance farther along the Adriatic coast, be- cause Italy, her ally since 1882, also had designs on Al- bania and would have resisted an Austrian occupation. 1 x The Triple Alliance, as renewed in 1887, is said to have contained a clause imposing mutual forbearance upon the rival Powers as regards Albania, and in 1897 THE NEAR EAST 257 Incidentally Montenegro, whose guns on Mount Lovchen commanded the Austrian harbor of Cattaro, had long been a Russian protectorate. Austria was therefore compelled to regard Serbia, which she surrounded on two sides, as the only region open to her expansion. A hundred years ago, when the Serbians, under Kara George, were seeking to emancipate themselves from Turkish rule, they repeatedly asked to be annexed to the Hapsburg crown. The request was refused, doubt- less to the regret of later Austrian statesmen; but through- out the nineteenth century Austrian influence was domi- nant in Serbia, for the family of Obrenovitch, which usu- ally possessed the throne, needed the assistance of Vienna against its rivals the Karageorgevitches. So it was easy for Austria to secure a favorable tariff for her goods, in return for which Serbia was encouraged to export her live stock to Austrian markets, and the Magyars of Hungary were able to lord it over the unhappy Croatians, who are closely akin to the Serbs, without fear of trouble from Bel- grade. The true character of Austrian friendship was demonstrated to Serbia in 1885, when the union of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria was carried through, contrary to the Berlin treaty. At Austria's instigation the Serbians attacked Bulgaria, only to be badly defeated; the Dual Monarchy then intervened, and prevented the victorious advance of the Bulgarian army. After that the Belgrade politicians were as clay in Austrian hands, and from 1897, when Austria and Russia agreed to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, Serbia seemed to have become the permanent vassal of her great northern neighbor. This situation was upset by the Serbians themselves. In 1903, King Alexander and his consort were murdered in their palace by Serbian officers who resented his sub- a special agreement to maintain the integrity of Albania was concluded. See Spec- tator, 11 October, 1013; also Dr. Hans F. Helmolt, "La Triplice en Orient," Revue Politique Internationale, April, 1914. 258 ENGLAND AND GERMANY servience to Vienna and the scandals of his court. As he was the last of his line, Peter Karageorgevitch, who was Russian in sympathy, was placed upon the throne ; owing to the circumstances of his accession he determined to rule as a constitutional monarch, and, left to their own de- vices, his ministers soon broke with Austria. Meanwhile the Bulgarians had tired of the hectoring Russian protect- orate and were cultivating the friendship of the Haps- burg monarchy. From this time to the outbreak of the present war the rivalry of Austria and Russia was acute, because the protege of one Power blocked the southward expansion of the other. This rivalry would become dangerous, however, only on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and neither Aus- tria nor Russia was prepared to face that eventuality: Austria because of her internal racial problems; Russia because of her approaching struggle with Japan. So in 1903 they produced a scheme, known as the Miirzsteg programme, for reforming the administration of Turkey in Europe, lest the Balkan states should attempt forcibly to relieve the lot of their brethren in Macedonia and thereby forestall both Austrian and Russian ambitions. Such was the Balkan situation when Great Britain and Germany were discovered as rivals in another quarter of the Sultan's Empire, viz., Mesopotamia and Arabia. For a century Great Britain had been the traditional upholder of Turkish independence and power. She had exhausted the resources of diplomacy in impressing upon successive sultans the necessity of setting their house in order. In the Crimean War she was the active ally of Turkey, and in 1878, when the Russian armies were at the gates of Constantinople, she intervened to compel the Tsar to revise that treaty of San Stefano which almost expelled the Turk from Europe. For the rest of the cen- tury British diplomacy, acting upon Lord Beaconsfield's THE NEAR EAST 259 assertion that "Turkey was not a worn-out state," con- tinued to urge reforms as the surest means of blocking the advance of Russia, and after 1903 the foreign office under- took to convert the Miirzsteg programme into a workable plan, under the direction of the Powers. Nevertheless British policy gradually underwent a pro- found change. Its attitude had always been dictated by the necessity of guarding, for both political and commercial reasons, the Mediterranean route to India. Translated into practical politics, this meant that no strong Power should establish itself in the eastern Mediterranean, and that England should block the advance of Russia in the Balkans. But the treaty of Berlin recorded a distinct defeat of Russia's plans, and the difficulties experienced by the Tsar's Government in controlling the young Bul- garian state promised to postpone indefinitely a Russian conquest of Constantinople. Moreover, for her services to Turkey at the Congress oTTJerlih Great Britain had received Cyprus; in 1875 srie had acquired control of the Suez Canal and in 1883 she had occupied Egypt; with Gibraltar and Malta in her hands her position in the Medi- terranean seemed fairly secure. After 1894, when Russia began her aggressive policy in the Far East, British in- terest in Turkish affairs was limited to demanding, in diplomatic terms only, vengeance for the Armenian mas- sacres and to providing a solution of the troublesome Cretan question. But about 1900 it became evident that another Power was assuming the Russian role of adviser- in-ordinary to the Sultan, and was securing for itself eco- nomic and political advantages which would either guar- antee its hold on Turkey when the ultimate collapse came or make Turkey a vassal of itself. That Power was Germany, and the enterprises she was observed to be promoting were considered a direct and serious menace to British interests. Thus there was added to the general 260 ENGLAND AND GERMANY rivalry of the two countries a specific dispute which was typical of the Anglo-German problem as a whole — the challenge of a new Power to a nation long established in a strong position and determined to yield nothing of its just rights or legitimate interests. During the crisis that led up to the Congress of Berlin Bismarck had made his famous remark that the whole Eastern question was "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." But in 1883 General von der Goltz of the Ger- man army was, at the request of the Sultan, despatched to Constantinople to reorganize the Turkish army. ( In 1889, and again in 1898, the Emperor William II visited Constantinople, on the latter occasion proceeding to^Da- mascus, where at the grave of Saladin he declared: "The 300,000,000 Mohammedans that are scattered through the world may rest assured that the German Emperor will eternally be their friend." 1 At the moment this was no idle boast. Christians had recently been massacred by thousands in Armenia, but with the assistance of Germany Abdul Hamid had successfully resisted the British demand for administrative reforms. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 German officers had rendered signal assist- ance to the Ottoman forces. That war had been caused by an insurrection in Crete; Germany declined to join in forcing the Sultan to grant autonomy to the island^ Most important of all, perhaps, was the appointment of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein as German ambas- sador to the Porte. Easily the foremost of the Kaiser's diplomatists, a champion of colonial expansion, an expert in manipulating the press, and a bitter opponent of Great 1 Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, one of the greatest authorities on Islam, has re- cently pointed out that this appeal made little impression on the Mohammedan world, because "in the Mohammedan East Saladin's name has long been forgotten, except by the few students of history and literature." Dr. Hurgronje remarks that German scholars were disturbed by the incident, which well illustrates the dilettanteism of the German Emperor and the unscientific basis of his foreign policy. (The Holy War : "Made in Germany" (1915), pp. 70-71.) THE NEAR EAST 261 Britain, he readily obtained the ear of the Sultan, and was for fifteen years ( 1897-19 12) the guiding spirit of Turkish foreign policy. He seems to have convinced Abdul Hamid, who had maintained his position only by setting the Powers at odds, that Germany was a sincere and the only friend of Turkey; for Germany alone of the Great Powers, it was urged, had no designs upon Turkish territory, and she was willing, even anxious, to promote the economic de- velopment of Asiatic Turkey, in contrast with other Powers, who were always clamoring for reforms. Baron von Mar- schall also encouraged Abdul Hamid in the hope of recov- ering Egypt, and pointed out that with the help of Ger- many he could ignore the inevitable Russian demand for the opening of the Straits to Russian men-of-war. Finally, Germany aided and abetted the Pan-Islamic schemes so dear to Abdul Hamid. That wily monarch was fully aware that his Empire existed on the sufferance of the Great Powers: to their armies and wealth might he not oppose the unity of Islam, of which he was the titular head? The idea was the more attractive because his two greatest enemies (so Germany convinced him) were Russia and Great Britain, both Powers with more Mohammedan subjects than Abdul Hamid himself could boast of. If these millions could be weaned from their allegiance to the Tsar of all the Russias and the Raj of India, those sovereigns would be restrained from pushing on their de- signs of annihilating the Ottoman Empire and its Sultan might become the leading prince of the Mohammedan world. According to the most competent authorities Pan- Islamism was very largely a figment of vivid imaginations. 1 There was, to be sure, an active Mohammedan propaganda in Africa when that continent began to pass under Euro- 1 In addition to the work of Dr. Hurgronje, just cited, reference may be made to a lecture by Professor Edward G. Browne, the distinguished Cambridge scholar, "Pan-Islamism," in Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century, edited by F. A. Kirkpatrick (1902). 262 ENGLAND AND GERMANY pean control, and it met with no little success; also, agents of Abdul Hamid were at work throughout the Moham- medan world preaching disloyalty to the Christian govern- ments. But there was no real danger. The basis of Abdul Hamid's schemes was his possession of the title of Caliph, which was supposed to be a kind of Mohammedan papacy. But the claim of the Ottoman sultans to that dignity was never recognized by the whole Mohammedan world. It had been wrested from the last Abbasid sultan of Egypt when that ruler was defeated by Sultan Selim I in 1517, and compelled to give up Egypt and Arabia, with the holy cities of Medina and Mecca, to the Ottomans. But the sultans of Constantinople were not descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, in whom alone the title of Ca- liph could vest, according to Mohammedan law, and four centuries of de facto possession could not establish their claim de jure — a fact which the non-Turkish Mohammedan world did not forget, in spite of the practical usurpation by the Turkish Sultan. In the second place, the Caliphate does not connote the spiritual headship of Islam. In the days when the title possessed any reality it implied the po- litical overlordship of the Mohammedan world; and even in the period of their greatest power, that is, the six- teenth century, the Turks never controlled all the lands where Islam was the dominant religion, and in the latter half of the nineteenth century their dominion was so se- verely shaken that its complete extinction was seen to be only a matter of time. For such a state to assert its suze- rainty over the Mohammedan peoples was clearly absurd. Finally, the unity of Islam is a myth. Its political unity really ceased within a few years after the death of Mo- hammed and has never been restored. More important is the century-old schism of the Sunnite and Shiite sects. Their theological disputes do not concern us here. But Persia, which is the stronghold of the Shiites, lies wedged THE NEAR EAST 263 between the Ottoman dominions and those Mohammedans of British India and Russian Central Asia whom Abdul Hamid aspired to use for political ends. The Arabs of the desert also, who resent the Ottoman assumption of the Caliphate, would never allow themselves to be reduced to political servitude in the name of Islam by a ruler whose very title they questioned. Thus, however regarded, Pan-Islamism is seen to have been and to be a danger which was not very dangerous. To what extent the governments of Great Britain, Russia, and France (the last has millions of Mohammedan subjects in Africa) considered the matter serious it is impossible to say. They were doubtless well informed of any intrigues which Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks who succeeded him may have carried on; they may have believed that the "talk of an organization of Pan-Islamism . . . was without foundation," and that Turkey "was little quali- fied to lead an international movement"; 1 publicly they took no steps to protect themselves. But the French and English press were persuaded that Pan-Islamism might easily become a grave danger, and soundly berated the Germans for encouraging it. The latter, on their side, were completely fooled. Their eagerness to involve Tur- key in the present struggle, in order that, a jihad, or holy war, might be proclaimed, shows how confident they were that the Pan-Islamic propaganda had undermined the loyalty of the Allies' Mohammedan peoples. In their antebellum discussions of Near Eastern problems German writers frequently emphasized the identity of interest be- tween Pan-Germanism and Pan-Islamism, and there can be no doubt that German diplomacy strove valiantly to forge an instrument which it believed would deal a hard, if not a vital, blow to the probable opponents of German ambitions. Whatever strength Pan-Islamism possessed it 1 Hurgronje, The Holy War, pp. 25, 26. 264 ENGLAND AND GERMANY derived from the support of the German Government, for the Sultan would never have undertaken a campaign against Great Britain, France, and Russia without the assurance of support from another Great Power, and that Power could be only Germany. It is now time to inquire as to what were the motives of German policy in Turkey. For what purpose had she acquired practical control of the Ottoman Government and prevented it from carrying out those reforms which, in the opinion of disinterested observers, could alone save it from utter collapse? Viewed as part of the national Weltanschauung, the object was to provide Germany with a route to the Orient, with its teeming commerce, enor- mous wealth, and boundless possibilities of a political char- acter. The commerce of the Far East has always been one of the great prizes for which the European nations have struggled, and in this blatantly commercial age Ger- many could not afford to be left behind. Great Britain bestrode two routes, the one around the Cape of Good Hope, the other through the Suez Canal; Russia was established in Central Asia at the gates of India; she was pegging out another route by the trans-Siberian railway and her advance in Manchuria. A Germanized Turkey would give the fatherland an outlet on the Persian Gulf, from which steamship lines could carry German influence farther eastward; Persia might be brought under the spell; and even India itself might succumb to Teutonic attraction when the sceptre of England should fall from her nerveless hands and the sun set at last on her colossal Empire. It was a part of this audacious programme, of course, that Austria-Hungary should become the dominant Power in the Balkans; a consummation that, in the late 'nineties, when the German vision began to unfold itself, seemed not unlikely to be realized; for Serbia was still under Obrenovitch rule, Bulgaria was chafing under Rus- THE NEAR EAST 265 sian dictation, Rumania was almost a member of the Triple Alliance, and Russia was busy in the Far East. To overpower the feeble resistance of Great Britain to an energetic Drang nach Osten might well seem like child's play to the vigorous, pushing, well-organized Germanic Powers, who dominated Continental Europe and who had established their ascendency in the councils of the decrepit Ottoman Government. There was nothing objectionable per se in this German Weltpolitik; it was as reasonable as the ambitions of Russian or British imperialism, and its successful applica- tion would mean the introduction, in some measure at least, of European efficiency and order into a region which had been the cradle of civilization but which had for cen- turies suffered from the blight and inertia of oriental des- potisms. England had reformed Egypt amidst the ap- plause of the world : would not a German regeneration of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia be equally worth while? Before suggesting an answer it will be well to examine the German plans in detail. It is most unlikely that Germany contemplated a con- quest of the old-fashioned kind. A few years ago there was considerable talk of German colonization in Asiatic Turkey, but that was soon seen to be impracticable. Asia Minor was already inhabited by Turks — was, indeed, the foyer of the race — and the climate of Mesopotamia was un- suited for Europeans; nor would such immigrants as might be attracted from Germany consent to become Turkish subjects, which was the only condition on which the Otto- man Government would have encouraged such a settle- ment. 1 There is also no reason for believing that Ger- many intended to replace the Ottoman Government by a full-fledged Prussian bureaucracy. What she did desire was a practical protectorate over Turkey and a complete 'Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn (191 1), p. 10. 266 ENGLAND AND GERMANY control of its economic resources. The fiction of sover- eignty would be left, just as in Egypt, which remained in theory a province of Turkey; but the "advice" of German diplomatists and generals would be forced on the officials of the Sultan in the fashion adopted by the British in Egypt. There would, in short, be a German "occupation" of Turkey, but the amour propre of the Powers would be re- spected, and, it was asserted, their commercial interests would be not only considered but stimulated. By such means the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which all the European Powers were pledged to respect, would be main- tained; Germany's expansionist ambitions would be satis- fied; and a fruitful source of international strife would be effectually closed. This programme was to be realized by penetration paci- fique, or commercial exploitation; of which the chief in- strument was the Baghdad railway. 1 As far back as 1888 a German company had received a concession for a rail- way, which had been duly built, from Ismidt, on the Asiatic mainland opposite Constantinople, to Angora, a distance of 301 miles (485 kilometres). By 1896 a branch had been constructed from Eski-Shehir, half-way between Ismidt and Angora, to Konia. After the second visit of the Emperor William to Constantinople (1898), the Ana- tolian Railway Company prepared for greater things — for nothing less than an extension of its line to the Persian Gulf, and in November, 1899, the concession was granted by the Sultan. The final step was not taken till 1903, when a firman was published constituting the Baghdad Railway Company as an Ottoman corporation and author- izing the building of a railway from Konia across the 1 Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn, first published in 1902; Andre Che- radame, Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (1903); Victor Berard, Le Sultan, I' I slam et les Puissances (1907); Rene Pinon, L Europe et V Empire Ottoman (1908), chaps. 7, 8; David Fraser, The Short Cut to India (1909); T. A. O'Connor, "The Baghdad Railway," Fortnightly Review, February, 1914. THE NEAR EAST 267 Taurus range and the Mesopotamian desert to Mossul, thence along the Tigris to Baghdad; from that point the line was to follow the right bank of the Euphrates to Bas- sorah, below the confluence of the two great rivers, and terminate at a point on the Persian Gulf. The original plan had been to prolong the Angora line through Armenia to the upper reaches of the Tigris, but Russia was unwill- ing to allow a railway — which could be used for the trans- port of troops — brought so near her Caucasus frontier, and it was necessary to follow the southern route, which would be more costly to construct and would pass through a much poorer section of country. The estimated length of the line, with various branches, was 2,800 kilometres (about 1,740 miles). For purposes of construction it was divided into sections of 200 kilo- metres, each of which was to be constructed separately and the first within eight years. The capitalized value of each section was fixed at 54,000,000 francs, for which Turkish four-per-cent bonds were to be issued to the company before work was started. The company was to receive an annuity of 1 1 ,000 francs for each kilometre constructed and 4,500 francs additional toward the expenses of opera- tion. At the end of ninety-nine years all rights and prop- erty of the operating company were to revert to the Otto- man Government. No date was fixed for the completion of the line. The first section, reaching to Eregli, near the foot of the Taurus, was promptly built, to the great profit of the promoters, 1 but after 1904 so great were the finan- cial difficulties of Turkey that she could not meet any further kilometric guarantees, and, owing to British and French opposition to the railway itself, it was impossible to raise money in the London and Paris markets. But before recurring to the main topic — Anglo-German 1 Fraser, The Short Cut to India, calculates that the promoters were the richer by £1,243,000, or more than 21,000,000 francs. 268 ENGLAND AND GERMANY rivalry — a word must be said about the general importance of the Baghdad railway. The Germans liked to speak of "our Baghdad" (unser Bagdad) or to talk of the "BBB" — Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad. Now the railways of Tur- key in Europe and the Balkan states were very largely owned by German and Austrian banks. When the Bagh- dad had been built, the Germanic Powers would control the most direct line of communication from Europe to the Far East, and by virtue of this control they might hope to dominate the economic life of the vast region stretch- ing from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf! No wonder that they were determined to carry through their plans at all cost; no wonder that those plans should be closely scrutinized by other nations whose political or commer- cial interests might be seriously prejudiced by a German monopoly. For, however much the Germans might ex- plain their projects, it was clear that they aimed to solve in their exclusive interest a question which had from its very inception been regarded as an international matter, and that their solution would upset, to the detriment of other Powers, the balance of power in Europe," which for a century has rested on the existence of an independent Ottoman Empire. If the history of the Baghdad railway be considered from its inception in 1899 to the outbreak of the European War in 1914, it is evident that the opposition of France, Russia, and Great Britain was due not to the project it- self but to certain features and details, the proof being that in 1910 Russia came to terms, and that on the eve of the war an agreement was initialed by London and Berlin according to which the former withdrew its opposition in return for certain concessions by Berlin. The first British objection was concerned with the financ- ing of the railway. Not even its promoters contended that the line would pay its way until many years after its THE NEAR EAST 269 construction. Ultimately cotton might be grown along the Anatolian sections; northeast of Baghdad there are naphtha wells which can be developed; in the lower Tigris valley, below Baghdad, the irrigation schemes of Sir Wil- liam Willcocks will restore millions of acres to cultivation. But the essential condition of success is a great increase in the population, at present very meagre, and, considering the climate, the only source of immigration is India or China ! The concessionaires of the line, therefore, insisted on the kilometric guarantees and drove a hard bargain. By the terms of the agreement the charge upon Turkish revenues would amount annually to 43,400,000 francs — a sum utterly beyond the paying capacity of Turkey. Some- thing could certainly be raised by increasing the customs; but in this matter Turkey does not enjoy a free hand, for the tariff is fixed by international agreement. Among the nations having commercial relations with Turkey, Great Britain had for a century enjoyed the supremacy, but here as elsewhere considerable German competition was devel- oping. 1 Under such conditions it cannot be seriously argued that the British Government should consent to an increase in the Turkish customs, the object of which was to enable a German company to pocket handsome profits! Moreover, there was no little feeling that any increase in the revenues of Turkey should be devoted, not to the building of. an unprofitable railway, but to the improve- ment of the internal administration of the Empire, es- pecially in Macedonia, in which business Great Britain had come forward as the leader of the Powers and the promoter of a genuine scheme of reform. 1 German imports to Turkey: German exports from Turkey: 1890 34,000,000 marks 9,600,000 marks 1895 39,000,000 " 22,100,000 " 1900 34,200,000 " 30,000,000 " 1905 70,800,000 " 51,500,000 " 1910 104,900,000 " 67,400,000 " 270 ENGLAND AND GERMANY The other recourse for raising money was to the bourses of London and Paris. This solution was boldly put for- ward by Germany, for if the moneyed classes of England and France could be persuaded to invest in the Baghdad railway they would have an interest in its success, and would exert such pressure on their respective governments that the latter would not dare oppose the German plans upon which success depended. In 1903, accordingly, Germany proposed that she, France, and England should each raise thirty per cent of the required funds, the remaining ten per cent being left to Russia, or the smaller states if the latter would not participate. But at the same time the Sultan's firman enabled Germany to appoint six of the eleven directors of the Baghdad company; so that, although France and England were to contribute sixty per cent of the money, they would be effectually debarred from any voice in the management of the line. The bonds to be taken up were Turkish government securities, but the general financial situation of Turkey and the certainty that the railway would not be self-supporting made a de- preciation almost inevitable; the Deutsche Bank, which was the financial backer of the grand project, would then buy in the bonds at a small figure, and Germany would acquire for a song the ownership of a railway which might do infinite damage to the very Powers whose money had been used for building it. Here again it is impossible to take seriously the German contention that France and Great Britain refused their help to a great economic enter- prise out of jealousy and fear; quite apart from the fact that neither government exerted the slightest diplomatic pressure on Turkey to prevent the granting of the Baghdad concession, 1 they were both bound to safeguard the inter- 1 In 1899 British influence would seem to have been exerted at Constantinople in favor of the concession, for this was the period when Joseph Chamberlain was advocating an Anglo-German alliance. Count Billow's visit to London and the grant of the concession synchronized nicely. THE NEAR EAST 271 ests of their investors and if possible to insure Turkey against a financial collapse. Sound business and sound politics alike demanded that London and Paris should decline the German offer. Germany could not build the Baghdad railway herself because she lacked capital; that was her misfortune, but she could not expect other coun- tries to build it for her and at the same time retain all the advantages for herself. In the second place, the British were not unnaturally suspicious of the political aspects of the situation. They understood thoroughly that the Baghdad line would place Turkey under the tutelage of Germany; that they might concede, under certain conditions, but surely they were entitled to protect their own interests. Long before Ger- many had put the issue in the forefront of her policy her diplomacy had opposed that of Great Britain in all quarters of the globe; she had definitely challenged British naval supremacy; and in 1905 she made a demonstration against France, with the double object of breaking up the newly formed entente cordiale and of establishing a hold on Mo- rocco. She was not successful, but she might return to the charge and another time she might gain her point: that is, she would isolate England and she would establish herself in Morocco. In view of this possibility, it was unthinkable that Germany should be allowed a free hand in the Baghdad railway, for she would then become the mistress of the Mediterranean, and she could at her leisure prepare to destroy the lonely British Empire by attacking it in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. It may not, at first sight, be clear how a line across Asia Minor to the gulf could menace Egypt, protected as it would be by the Arabian Desert and the Red Sea. To begin with, a Turkey which was the vassal of Berlin would offer no objections to the use of its Mediterranean ports by German men-of-war. Still, a land attack would be 272 ENGLAND AND GERMANY necessary for the recovery of Egypt. Now, in 1900 Abdul Hamid had determined . to construct a railway from Da- mascus southward to Medina and Mecca. The ostensible object of the line was to facilitate pilgrimages to the holy cities, and the Sultan cleverly appealed to the Moham- medan world for money and materials to build it; with such success, indeed, that in 1908 the rails reached Medina. Yet the real purpose of the line was political. The tribes of the Hedjaz and the Yemen had for years resisted the efforts of the Turkish Government to exercise real author- ity in western Arabia, and in this policy they had unques- tionably been encouraged by the British Government, which feared that the strengthening of Turkish influence in Arabia would react unfavorably upon Egypt. The Hedjaz railway could now be used for transporting troops to the disturbed regions; connected with the Baghdad line, when the latter should reach Aleppo, it would enable the Sultan to concentrate large military forces along the eastern fron- tier of Egypt. And behind the wjiole enterprise England saw the hand of Germany, even though the line had been rather ostentatiously constructed by the Turks without foreign assistance. The German attitude was frankly re- vealed by Dr. Paul Rohrbach in the second edition of his book, Die Bagdadbahn: "England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe in one place only — Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her control of the Suez Canal and / her connections with India and eastern Asia, but probably the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa as well. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power like Turkey would react most dangerously upon England's 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India and would prejudice her position in Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, cannot dream of recovering Egypt until she pos- sesses a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian railway to Baghdad, she can withstand a British attack on Mesopotamia; until her army THE NEAR EAST 273 is increased and improved, and her economic and financial situation advanced." For these reasons, Dr. Rohrbach says, Germany must give Turkey every assistance, and, though he insists that the German policy is defensive, he remarks: "Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would well be worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England." 1 The possibilities of the situation were foreseen in an in- cident of the year 1906. By that time the Hedjaz railway had been built considerably beyond Maan, a point just east of Akaba, which is at the head of the gulf of that name and lies within striking distance of Suez. In Feb- ruary a detachment of Turkish troops suddenly appeared at Akaba, and proceeded to occupy Tabah, on the other side of the gulf, with the object of pushing the Turkish frontier westward to the southern entrance of the canal. Needless to say, the British foreign office lost no time in asserting the rights of Egypt, which rested on the corre- spondence exchanged between Constantinople and Cairo, in 1892, upon the accession of the Khedive Abbas II. The Porte yielded, but not until a British squadron had been despatched to the eastern Mediterranean. "The diplomacy of the Emperor William II was officially disin- terested in the Tabah incident, but the power of insinuation was stronger than the wishes of statesmen: German in- fluence was so preponderant at Constantinople, the advice of the imperial ambassador was so heeded and so complete, so general was the dovetailing of Turkish and German interests, that public opinion in all countries was bound to regard the occupation of Tabah by Ottoman troops as the result of advice or encouragement from Berlin. . . . Great Britain and the whole of Europe were persuaded that behind the Turko-Egyptian dispute there must neces- 1 Pp. 18-19. 274 ENGLAND AND GERMANY sarily be lurking an episode of Anglo-German rivalry, a preliminary skirmish foreshadowing the harsh struggle for influence waged by the two great European empires over the ruins of Turkey." x Passing from surmises to facts, it is sufficient to recall, in justification of British appre- hensions, that in the autumn of 1914 Turkey went to war with England at the behest of Germany, and actually used the Hedjaz railway in preparing for her attack on the Suez Canal. The third and most important aspect of the Baghdad question was concerned with the Persian Gulf. The con- cession of 1903 authorized the building of the railway from Baghdad to Bassorah, and thence to some point on the gulf. Bassorah, the only commercial town south of Bagh- dad, was the logical terminus of the line, but owing to the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab (as the fusion of the Tigris and Euphrates is called) it could be reached only by small ships. A gulf port was therefore desirable, and Koweit was the logical choice. But the Sheikh of Koweit denied that he was a vassal of the Sultan, 2 and when in 1900 the Germans endeavored to buy terminal facilities and lease a large concession he politely refused; for in January, 1899, he had secretly accepted the protection of the British Government in return for a promise not to cede any territory without the consent of Great Britain. For the next few years the Sheikh had to be protected by British cruisers against German intrigues and Turkish at- tempts to use force; but in 1901 an Anglo-Turkish agree- ment practically confirmed his independence and secured for him an increase of territory. The question came to 1 Pinon, L'Europe et VEmpire ottoman, pp. 387, 389. 5 In 1870, in return for his assistance to Midhat Pasha, he was given the title of kaimakam (the head of a sanjak) by the Sultan, but the duties were quite honorary, and no recognition of Turkish suzerainty was ever made by the sheikh, who through- out the nineteenth century was an independent potentate in fact quite as much as in theory. THE NEAR EAST 275 a head with the announcement by Lord Lansdowne, then foreign secretary, in May, 1903, that Great Britain "would regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf as a very grave menace to British in- terests, and would certainly resist it by all means at her disposal." x By what right did Great Britain thus pro- claim a Monroe Doctrine for a body of water which washed the shores of independent countries (Turkey and Persia) ? Did the Baghdad railway threaten the interests of England in the gulf so severely that she was justified in vetoing that section of the line from Baghdad to the gulf? The British flag was first flown in the Persian Gulf in 161 8, the year that saw the opening of the Thirty Years' War in Germany. In 1622 a treaty was concluded with Persia by which the British undertook "to keep two men- of-war constantly to defend the gulf"; 2 the number was subsequently increased to five, and ever since Great Britain has enjoyed paramountcy in those waters. It is not gen- erally realized that the British were in the gulf some two hundred and fifty years before the Turks. The latter ac- quired nominal control of Mesopotamia and Arabia early in the sixteenth century, and their flag was hoisted at Bassorah in 1668; but until Midhat Pasha became governor of Baghdad, in 1869, no effort was made to assert Turkish authority on the western shores of the gulf. Even then Arabia was never reduced, and after Midhat's recall in 1873 Turkish interest again languished until stimulated by German ambitions. During this long period the East India Company, and later the British Government, undertook the work that properly belonged to Turkey and Persia. At a consider- 1 House of Lords, 5 May, 1903. (4 Hansard cxxi, c. 1348.) 'Quoted in The Times History of the War, 1914, vol. Ill, p. 84. The story of British policy in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, and Arabia is well told by Dr. Rouire, La Rivalite anglo-russe au XlXme siecle en Asie (1908), part 1. Only the barest outline has been given in the text. 276 ENGLAND AND GERMANY able expenditure of blood and treasure both piracy and the slave-trade were suppressed and gun-running reduced to a minimum. A hydrographic survey was begun as early as 1785. The lighthouse service was established by the British. Their sanitary measures helped exterminate the plague, which was for long endemic. Finally, the British resident at Bushire, on the Persian side, was the arbiter of local disputes and the guarantor of peace and security, especially during the date and pearling seasons, when local notables were apt to get out of hand. Great Britain may fairly claim to have discharged her duty as policeman with reasonableness and honesty. Such a policy was, of course, dictated by enlightened self-interest, for disorder was prejudicial to British trade, and British trade has enjoyed almost a monopoly in the region, amounting to some £7,000,000 a year. The local products — wool, dates, barley, rice, and pearls— are ex- changed for the cottons of Manchester and the coal of Wales, and English or Indian money is almost the medium of exchange. These goods are carried almost exclusively in British ships. Since 1834 the navigation of the Tigris as far as Baghdad has been controlled by Messrs. Lynch, whose steamers are better, faster, and infinitely more reg- ular in their sailings than any which the Turkish Govern- ment has placed in service. Baghdad is also important as a distributing centre for the trade of Persia, and a Brit- ish consul was appointed in 1798. Germany began to invade this preserve of British, com- merce in the last decade of the nineteenth century. There is no need of repeating the familiar story of her success, which rested upon the cheapness of German goods, the fore- sight of her bankers, and the capacity of her local rep- resentatives. After the Hamburg-America Line estab- lished a monthly service to Bassorah, in September, 1906, German progress was steady and rapid, and, although her THE NEAR EAST 277 trade remained far behind that of Great Britain, the out- look was distinctly favorable when the Great War began. With the coming of the Baghdad railway greater things were hoped for, because the railway was to make Meso- potamia once more a garden of prosperity, and would provide a direct connection with Germany and western Europe. "It may be argued that Germany had an entire right to estab- lish and extend her trade around the shores of this inland sea [the Persian Gulf]. Of course she had. No one has ever dreamed of questioning her right to trade or to build railways. . What was questioned were her motives and some of her acts. It was the com- bination of commercial effort with political action, so lucidly ex- plained by the Berliner Tageblatt, which roused British hostility to the doings of Germany in the Persian Gulf. On innumerable German platforms the ultimate aims of Germany in the Middle East were expounded with arrogance and without reserve. Count- less German books dealt with the same theme. The intention was to supplant and replace British influence in these regions, and not to supplement it. To that great end all the German efforts were in reality directed." * No one ever denied that from the economic point of view the Baghdad railway was a laudable enterprise, although objections were raised to its financial methods. Its com- petition was recognized as desirable, for the freight rates charged by British shipping companies engaged in the gulf trade were outrageously high. It might carry the Indian mails and much of the Indian passenger traffic, especially if the trans-Persian line were built. In short, British trade was bound to benefit by an improvement in local economic conditions, and this fact was fully recog- . l The Times History of the War, 1914, vol. Ill, p. 101. The reference to the Ber- liner Tageblatt is to a statement made in 1907, that "commerce and politics can no longer be divided," and that Germany could attain commercial success only by "energetic political action." 278 ENGLAND AND GERMANY nized in both England and India. British capitalists were quite ready to invest their money in the Baghdad line as soon as their government withdrew its opposition. On account of the danger to India from a hostile naval force in the Persian Gulf, Great Britain has always insisted that no European Power should secure a foothold there. She made no political conquests for herself (except the Bahrein Islands); she enforced the same rule on others. The Germans, however, were fully determined to acquire a port on the gulf, and secured the right in Article XXIII of the convention of 1903. From the Sheikh of Koweit they tried first to secure Koweit itself, and later the is- land of Bubian, which belonged to him. They persuaded Abdul Hamid to grant a pearl monopoly on the island of Halul, which did not belong to him, but which might be- come an oriental Heligoland; but only a sharp word from London was required to quash the scheme. The Germans, who worked through the commercial house of Wonckhaus, in Bahrein, next endeavored to secure the island of Abu Musa, where there were deposits of red oxide. The Sheikh of Shargah, to whom the island belonged, objected to Wonckhaus acquiring the concession, and with the help of a British cruiser removed the invaders; whereupon the German Government formally protested and publicly challenged the position of Great Britain in the gulf. Finally, great pressure was put upon the Sheikh of Moham- merah, who was nominally a vassal of the Shah of Persia but in reality a dependent of Great Britain, to allow his lands to be irrigated by a German company. It cannot be doubted that if these several schemes had matured, Germany would promptly have sent war-ships to the gulf to protect her interests, and that the range of Anglo- German rivalry, already sufficiently large, might have been extended to the Indian Ocean. As soon as the Germans and the Turks renounced any political ambitions in the THE NEAR EAST 279 gulf, Great Britain, as will presently be seen, withdrew her opposition to the Baghdad railway; but to imagine that she would abdicate a position obtained at such great sacrifices merely at the behest of another Power — and this the Germans expected her to do — illustrates admirably the fact already referred to, that the Germans do not under- stand the fine art of politics. 1 In spite, however, of the British opposition, the Bagh- dad company was able to sign a second convention with the Ottoman Government in June, 1908, which provided for the construction of the four sections beyond Eregli and would bring the line within one section of Mossul. The work was actually carried as far as Burgulu, only to be stopped by the Young Turk revolution and financial difficulties. But Anglo- German differences were not al- layed by the suspension of the Baghdad enterprise, and were further envenomed by the Young Turk revolution. On 24 July, 1908, the absolute power of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II was overturned by a revolution engineered by the officers of the army, who saw that the policy of the Sultan was conducting Turkey toward a general collapse 1 Dr. Paul Rohrbach ascribes to British policy the twofold purpose of con- structing a railway from Damascus to Baghdad, and thence to the gulf along the Tigris (the German line was to follow the Euphrates), and of transferring the Cali- phate either to a British puppet ruler of Egypt or to one of the Arabian sheikhs under British influence. The first idea is an old one, having been much ventilated in the middle of the nineteenth century and being in all probability responsible for the acquisition of Cyprus in 1878. Then the matter was dropped until Sir William Willcocks, the famous irrigation expert, began the reclamation of the valley of the Euphrates. In igoo-11 the Horns-Baghdad railway was projected by French and British financiers, with the approval of their governments. They proposed that the Baghdad should be diverted from its original route and follow the Tigris, and that the Anglo-French line should join it at Deir or Anna. Thus the Horns- Baghdad line was to be not the rival but the complement of the Baghdad railway. The Anglo-French promoters, however, could not come to terms with the Ger- mans, and the question never became a matter of practical politics. As to the Cali- phate, Dr. Rohrbach ascribes too much importance to the institution, and ought to know that a caliph under the control or influence of a Christian Power would not be acceptable to the Mohammedan world. 280 ENGLAND AND GERMANY that must end in a partition among the Great Powers. In the march of events Anglo- German rivalry played a part which must now be examined. The intolerable misgovernment of Macedonia at the hands of Abdul Hamid produced a general insurrection in the summer of 1902, and still another in 1903. Austria and Russia, the Powers most directly interested, drew up a programme of reforms which was accepted by the Sul- tan, but which was not applied, for Abdul Hamid was sure of the support of Germany. It became increasingly likely that the Near Eastern question would be reopened forci- bly by the Balkan states, and that a general conflagration might ensue. 1 True, therefore, to the policy adopted after the Boer War, and in strict conformity with her own interests, Great Britain in 1903 came forward as the advocate of an international regime in Macedonia. She desired the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as the surest means of protecting her vital interests in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf; at the same time it was essential that the lot of the subject peoples should be so improved that constant rebellion would not shake and destroy the entire edifice. Her policy, accordingly, was to rehabilitate the European concert and through it to exert a pressure on the Sultan which he could not resist. On paper consider- able success was achieved. Civil, military, and financial agents of the Powers were appointed to assist the Ottoman authorities in Macedonia, and a three-per-cent increase in the Turkish customs was allowed in order that funds might be available for the work of reform. As the next step it was proposed to place the judiciary under international control, and the details of this reform had been prepared 1 On the question of reforms: Victor Berard, La Revolution turque (ioog), parts 3 and 4; Rene Pinon, L' Europe et l' Empire ottoman, chaps. 3-6. The extensive Blue and Yellow Books of the British and French Governments are carefully digested. THE NEAR EAST 281 by the Powers of the Triple Entente when the revolution of July, 1908, occurred. Nevertheless, this sweeping programme had effected little change in the condition of Macedonia, for the agents of the Powers were not possessed of the authority to act — they could merely advise and report. For this half-measure of internationalization Germany must be held responsible. She did not oppose, in principle, the doctrine advocated by the other Powers, but she adopted an attitude essen- tially conservative. In brief, she opposed any diminution of the Sultan's authority in his own dominions, and until his authority could be controlled no reform was possible. Her policy was at least consistent. If she abandoned Adbul Hamid in his time of trouble, she could not hope for a con- tinuance of those economic and political concessions which were rapidly making the Ottoman Empire a preserve of her influence and commerce; in particular, the Baghdad railway depended upon the good will and favor of the Porte, and a real internationalization of Ottoman affairs would introduce other influences which would undermine the prestige that she had acquired by the hard work of many years. Moreover, autonomy, such as England proposed for Macedonia, would be the prelude to independence, if Turkish history furnished any basis for prophecy. Ger- many, with her hard-and-fast ideas of government, could not understand how a loosening of the central power would contribute to the security and strength of the Ottoman Empire; she much preferred the autocratic and central- ized system of Abdul Hamid, which corresponded to her own institutions. Turkey was fast becoming a German protectorate; when that process was completed Germany could then undertake a thorough reorganization of its gov- ernment and finances, and such a reformed Turkey would make Germany the dominant Power in the Near and Middle East. Lastly, the Anglo-Russian convention of 282 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 1907 had an important bearing on the situation. That agreement, by its virtual partition of Persia, dealt German influence a severe blow in the latter country. It also fore- shadowed Anglo-Russian co-operation in the affairs of Turkey, in a sense not palatable to Germany. 1 All the more, therefore, was she constrained to stand by Abdul Hamid in his resistance to the repeated representations of England and Russia, who were regularly accused of plotting his destruction. The Young Turk revolution was undoubtedly precipi- tated by the meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval, in June, 1908. Among the topics discussed was the Anglo-Russian programme of judicial reform in Macedonia, which was, indeed, given its final shape, and the two Powers were expected to exert great pressure in presenting it to the Porte. German writers go so far as to say that the reforms were a blind and were devised to provide an excuse for declaring war on Turkey, whose partition had been carefully arranged by the King and the Tsar. 2 This is most unlikely, and no proof has ever been presented of such a conspiracy; but the Young Turks were alarmed, and believed that the acceptance of the reform programme would put their country in the grip of the Powers. Their prompt action took Europe by surprise and, not least of all, their proclamation of the old constitution of 1876, which, by setting up a full-fledged constitutional system, went much farther in the direction of reform than the Powers had proposed in their most zealous moments. 1 "From the moment England and Russia arrived at an understanding the fate of Turkey in Europe was in jeopardy, and any ambitions which Germany had in Turkey were doomed to sterility." (Sidney Whitman, Turkish Memories, 1014, p. 277.) Mr. Whitman remarks that German influence in Turkey was not popular with the masses, who regarded the concessionaires as usurers and as the harbingers of German political control; nor did the Turkish character respond to the systematic training of the German officers who were sent to reorganize the army. 2 E. g., Dr. Rohrbach, "L'Evolution de l'Allemagne comme puissance mondiale," Revue Politique Internationale, July, 1914, p. 30. THE NEAR EAST 283 The latter, for their part, were so pleased to be quit of the business of reform that they withdrew the agents which they had hitherto maintained in the Balkans for ad- vising the Turkish authorities — with what disastrous re- sults the Balkan wars of 191 2-13 presently revealed. Englishmen hailed the overthrow of Abdul Hamid with enthusiasm, not only because a hateful tyranny was sup- planted by constitutional government, but because German ascendency in Turkish politics was destroyed, at least for the moment. The British ambassador in Constantinople was lionized in the streets; King Edward telegraphed his felicitations to Kiamil Pasha, a life-long Anglophile, who became grand vizier; and for a time it seemed as if Great Britain would resume her ancient position, maintained un- til the days of Abdul Hamid, of chief friend and protector of Turkey. And there can be no doubt that if Turkey had fulfilled the promises of the first glorious days of the revolution, when all races and religions fraternized for joy over the disappearance of the Hamidian despotism ; if the new government had persevered in the policy of equality, toleration, and the rule of law enshrined in the revived constitution; and if international complications had not arisen — then, British influence might have regained a per- manent ascendency and have directed the reforming move- ment to a successful issue. But Germany was not disposed to surrender her posi- tion without a struggle. When Abdul Hamid, in April, 1909, attempted to overthrow the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, it was Germany who urged them to march on Constantinople with the army of Salonika, it was Germany who outlined the plan of campaign and financed the expedition. 1 Abdul Hamid deposed, the mili- tary element of the Committee took charge of the govern- 1 Sir William Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey (igog), pp. 42-44- 284 ENGLAND AND GERMANY ment, and they were mainly men who had received their education in the German army. Determined to reform the Turkish army, they naturally turned to Germany for assistance, which was readily granted in the shape of Baron von der Goltz, who returned to his old functions in Con- stantinople. As soldiers they looked askance upon con- cessions to subject nationalities which might in any way weaken the military resources of the state, and they soon returned to the centralizing system of Abdul Hamid; as financiers they found the bourses of London and Paris closed to them because the reorganized Turkish army was suspected of being at the disposal of Germany in case of a European war. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German ambas- sador to the Porte, also made the most of the international situation. Scarcely was the July revolution over when Austria proceeded to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria proclaimed her independence. These affronts to Turkey came from Germany's ally and her friend, and they were carried through only by the aid of Germany. None the less German diplomacy persuaded the two cul- prits to pay damages to the amount of 179,000,000 francs, which were sorely needed by the Turkish Government; and it helped to prevent the Cretan question from being raised. It was easy for so experienced a diplomatist as Baron von Marschall to point out that Great Britain, the supposed friend of the new regime, had done nothing to help it, in spite of many professions, and that she was the most formidable opponent of Pan-Islamism, with which the Young Turks, largely freethinkers, were already co- quetting. If Turkey wished to avoid future international difficulties, she must reorganize her army and provide railways for its service: in each case German advice and assistance could be had for the asking. So it came about that the influence of England was THE NEAR EAST 285 speedily shattered, and Germany became as ardent a sup- porter of the Young Turks as she had been of the Hamidian system which they had overturned. Henceforth the Com- mittee ignored the criticisms of the British press upon their ruthless policy, and went serenely to their doom, trusting in the diplomacy and strength of Germany — after the man- ner of Abdul Hamid, and with similar results. For just as in 1908 the old Sultan was left to the mercy of the Young Turks, so in 191 2 Germany did not raise her finger to stay the Balkan states from the campaign which cost Turkey her European provinces. Yet, in spite of these bitter ex- periences, the Turks allowed themselves in the autumn of 1 9 14 to be dragged into war with England by the intrigues of Germany ! In the early days of October, 1908, Austria-Hungary announced that she would annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had "occupied and admin- istered" since the Congress of Berlin thirty years before, and Bulgaria proclaimed her independence, thereby repu- diating the suzerainty of Turkey laid upon her by the same Congress. Neither act involved any real change in the Balkan situation, except to dispose of any hopes which the Young Turks might have cherished of recovering the provinces in question; and had the European Powers been consulted, they would doubtless have consented to the procedure of the Dual Monarchy and the principality of Bulgaria. As it was, the Powers were taken by surprise, and were entitled to protest that the treaty of Berlin could not be amended without the consent of the signatory Powers. Out of this situation there arose a crisis which had an important bearing on the relations of England and Germany. . The conversion of the Bosnian occupation into a perma- nent annexation had been a project of Austrian diplomacy for many years, but Count Goluchowski, foreign minister 286 ENGLAND AND GERMANY from 1895 to 1906, was loyal to the Austro-Russian agree- ment of 1897 f° r preserving the status quo in the Balkans. His successor, Baron von Aerenthal, was a man of different caliber. Secretive, ambitious, and nimble-witted, he in- augurated a forward policy which, in the hands of Count Berchtold, culminated in the Great War of 19 14. Aeren- thal resented the role of "brilliant second" 1 to Berlin, which the Ballplatz had played ever since the conclusion of the Austro- German alliance, and planned to score a victory of his own, which could be won only in the Balkans. He regarded the liberalizing and reforming policy of Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey in Macedonia with dis- gust, and affected to believe that British influence in the Near East was negligible. He therefore endeavored to reconstitute the old Three Emperors' League, with the difference that its centre was to be Vienna and not Berlin. Russia was to be bribed by the opening of the Straits, and France also might be bought off by a free hand in Morocco, provided she would consent to finance the Bagh- dad railway. Then the Drang nach Osten could be resumed in earnest. Unfortunately for the Austrian statesman, M. Isvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, had other plans, to wit, a reconciliation with England, and the Anglo-Russian con- vention was signed on 31 August, 1907. Aerenthal now prepared to break with Russia, and did so with character- istic duplicity. In September-October, 1907, he drafted with M. Isvolsky the judicial reform scheme for Mace- donia (an English project, which he detested!), and then, by promising not to support it, secured from the Porte in January, 1908, a concession for a railway through the san- jak of Novi-Bazar and western Macedonia to Salonika. As the proposed line had been condemned by the Austrian x This was the left-handed compliment addressed to Count Goluchowski by the German Emperor in a telegram after the Algeciras Conference. THE NEAR EAST 287 general staff and, being longer than the existing route through Belgrade, was useless from a commercial point of view, it was believed that Aerenthal's purpose was so to discredit his Russian colleague that his resignation would follow, and then the Anglo-Russian entente would collapse. This did not happen: on the contrary, Russia promptly- secured from the Porte the promise of a railway from Nish, Serbia, across Albania to the Adriatic, and M. Isvol- sky and Sir Edward Grey proceeded to draft their own programme of reforms, which, as noted above, was the immediate occasion of the Turkish revolution. Thus Aerenthal's diplomacy had secured no positive advantage; in addition, it merited the censure of Sir Edward Grey, that an international project had been utilized by Austria to further her private interests. 1 It is not surprising, therefore, that in the crisis produced by the annexation of Bosnia, Sir Edward Grey did not see eye to eye with Baron von Aerenthal, and that he was disposed to support the contentions of Russia. The Russian Government had accepted the annexation of Bosnia, in principle, in June, 1908, and again in Sep- tember, after the Turkish revolution made such a trans- formation desirable. 2 But M. Isvolsky had stipulated for advance notice of such action: the matter would have to be approved by a European conference, and Russia could then claim her compensation— the opening of the Straits. Nevertheless Aerenthal contented himself with sending M. Isvolsky a private letter two days before the annexa- tion was proclaimed, and the Russian foreign minister felt that he had been tricked. So did the British Government. 1 House of Commons, 25 February, 1908. (4 Hansard clxxxiv, cc. 1700-01.) 2 An impartial view of the controversy is presented by Rene Pinon, L' Europe el lajeune Turquie (191 1), chaps. 4, 5 ; the Russian and Austrian versions by two articles in the Fortnightly Review, September, November, 1909; the British position in H. W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (1913), chapter on "Foreign Policy." The fullest account of the negotiations is given in A. Viallate, La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, 1908-9, pp. 156-187. 288 ENGLAND AND GERMANY For when King Edward paid his annual visit to the Emperor Francis Joseph in August not a word was said about the contemplated action of Austria-Hungary. This was doubt- less Aerenthal's revenge for the Anglo-Russian agreement of the year before, which he had tried to forestall; but his conduct did not smooth the way. for a prompt recognition of the fait accompli in Bosnia. M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward Grey at once agreed to de- mand the summoning of a European conference, in which they were supported by France. Their position was thor- oughly sound, for to admit the Austrian right to tear up a solemn treaty at her convenience was to consign the public law of Europe to the scrap-basket. They went farther — they claimed compensation for Serbia. For that little state saw its cherished ambitions rudely and decisively crushed by the annexation. As long as the provinces in question were even nominally parts of the Ottoman Empire, there was. the chance that some day, when Francis Joseph should die, they might be incorporated in a Greater Serbia, which was perhaps the only permanent solution of the Southern Slav problem. To this end an extensive propa- ganda had been carried on for years in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with no little success : all such hopes now seemed per- manently extinguished. The Serbian Government, there- fore, formally protested against the annexation, began to mobilize its army, and assumed a warlike attitude. It counted upon the assistance of Russia, both on account of Russia's particular interest in Serbia and because of the enthusiasm aroused in all walks of Russian life by the ap- peal of a Slav nation. M. Isvolsky can scarcely be blamed for accepting the Serbian contention and for trying to extricate Russia from a difficult situation which was not of her choosing. Yet it must be admitted that the Serbian case was open to question. Politically, the situation recalled the Austro- THE NEAR EAST 289 Sardinian complications of fifty years before. Serbia aspired to unite under her rule those Slavs of the Dual Monarchy who were of the Serb race, even though a major- ity of the Serbo-Croatian race already lived in Austria- Hungary. In 1859 the kingdom of Sardinia stood for- ward as the champion of Italian unity against Austrian oppression, and readily conquered the sympathies of Europe and America. In 1908 Serbia could point to the discon- tent of the Southern Slavs of the Dual Monarchy, whose treatment of them had been disgusting, as an adequate reason for refusing to recognize the annexation of Bosnia, which was considered the forerunner of the conquest of Serbia. None the less, the Serbian claim rested on no treaty, no promise, no sanction of international law. True, the Austrian action was a violation of international law; but the pressure of other Powers might persuade her 1 to allow that action to be formally approved by the signa- tories of the Berlin treaty, and thus legalized. But by supporting the Serbian demands for compensa- tion, a purely political consideration, the British Govern- ment weakened its legal right to demand the observance of the violated treaty. Sir Edward Grey might argue that as Austria had broken the law she must be punished, but after all that law prescribed no scale of punishments for its infraction. Doubtless, if Sir Edward had been will- ing to concede the opening of the Straits, which M. Isvol- sky requested and to which Austria was practically pledged, the Serbian controversy would not have arisen, or would have been speedily adjusted, for Russia would have achieved the great goal of her policy. As it was, in default of the greater promise, England made the lesser concession, and with the diplomatic support of England, France, and Russia, the Serbian Government held out against Austria I for six months, to the great derangement of the latter's finances and economic life. 290 ENGLAND AND GERMANY The story of those six months need not be told here. Suffice it to say that in March, 1909, the Russian Govern- ment decided not to go to war, and consented to the an- nexation of the provinces to Austria-Hungary. British support of Serbian claims, promised only "so long as they should be seconded by Russia," was also withdrawn, and Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the British ambassador at Vienna, exerted himself to find a satisfactory formula to which Serbia might subscribe. Inasmuch as her declaration of 31 March, 1909, was the basis of the Austrian ultimatum of 23 July, 1914, it is well to give the full text: "Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with the treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Bowers Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annex- ation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good, neighborly terms with the latter." The humiliation of the little kingdom was complete; but it saved its dignity by presenting the note to the Powers, and not to Austria, a fact which clearly emphasized the international "character of the Balkan problem. In this fashion the peace of Europe was, for the moment, preserved, but in the end at an excessive cost. Austria had indeed scored a distinct diplomatic success. In the fulness of time, however, the wheel came full circle. The defiance of the public law of Europe was profoundly re- sented in Italy, where it was regarded as the first step toward that Austrian advance along the Adriatic which Italy was determined never to permit. 1 Hence the Italian 1 Italy, with Russian help, secured the retrocession to Turkey of the sanjak of Novi-Bazar and the release of Montenegro from those limitations of sovereignty over her territorial waters imposed by Article XXIX of the treaty of Berlin. THE NEAR EAST 291 overtures to Russia, which led to a cordial meeting between the Tsar and Victor Emmanuel III at Racconigi, in Octo- ber, 1909, thus indicating Italy's distrust of the Triple Alliance. And when the opportunity came Italy went to Tripoli, thus shattering the alliance, because her new col- ony was at the mercy of the French and British fleets in the Mediterranean. When the Turkish resistance proved stubborn, she encouraged, if she did not abet, the forma- tion of the Balkan League, which practically extinguished the Turkish power in Europe. Out of that conflagration arose the new Serbia which provoked Austria to bring on the present war. Thus for the sake of an unreal triumph, the Dual Monarchy was compelled, after five years, to stake its very existence in a conflict which must raise for — let us hope — a last settlement those problems which it de- sired to postpone indefinitely. In the second place, Europe was left divided into two diplomatic camps pursuing conflicting policies and deeply suspicious of each other. For this state of affairs Ger- many and England were chiefly responsible, for by inter- vening in disputes not of primary concern to themselves, each gave countenance to the charge of the other that ulterior motives and deep-laid plots had prompted its in- tervention. To Germany Sir Edward Grey's support of Serbia was explicable only on the ground that England was practically an ally of Russia. Germany therefore acted vigorously in support of her ally. But by so doing she bound Austria so closely to herself that the consolida- tion of the Entente, against which Germany was constantly protesting, became more necessary than ever as a protec- tion against the Austro-German combination. Baron von Aerenthal did not take the advice of Berlin upon the annexation of Bosnia; he boldly proclaimed it, and then notified his ally. For the moment the German Government was indignant, because the stroke threatened 292 ENGLAND AND GERMANY to injure German interests in Turkey. But Prince Biilow at once decided to stand by Austria, who would not be able to resist the pressure of Great Britain, France, and Russia on behalf of a conference, and on 13 October notified Sir Edward Grey that "Germany could not, any more than Austria-Hungary, allow the discussion of the annexation by the conference." 1 For the rest, she endeavored to keep out of the discussion, except that she helped effect the Austro-Turkish accord which enabled Aerenthal to maintain his intransigent attitude toward Serbia. Then on 21 February, 1909, when the French and British Gov- ernments proposed that the Powers should take joint action at Vienna and Belgrade — for Austrian and Russian mobilizations had made the situation very tense — Berlin flatly refused and demanded that pressure be exerted at Belgrade to compel an acceptance of Austria's terms. This was rejected by Russia, and the danger of war in- creased. But about 21 March, M. Isvolsky prepared to capitulate. Suddenly, on the 23d, the German ambas- sador in St. Petersburg was instructed to make represen- tations in favor of Austria, who was neither aware of the proceedings nor needed such assistance. The published statement declared that Count Pourtales had merely of- fered some "friendly advice" (avis amical), but in May, 1 9 10, on the occasion of his visit to Vienna, the German Emperor boasted that he had supported his ally "in shin- ing armor," and M. Isvolsky always described the incident, to those entitled to inquire, as une mise-en-demeure peremp- toire, which marks a serious stage in diplomatic negotia- tions. 2 M. Isvolsky may have preferred yielding to Ger- man pressure rather than Austrian stubbornness, but the German action created a profoundly disagreeable impres- sion on Russian public opinion, and in considering the events of July, 1914, when German policy followed the prece- 1 Reichstag, 29 March, 1909. 2 Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 262. THE NEAR EAST 293 dents of 1908-9 with considerable exactness, it is well to remember that the Russian Government could not be ex- pected to undergo such a humiliation a second time. Germany's diplomatic support of Austria-Hungary was, of course, as justifiable as the assistance given Russia by Great Britain. But Prince Billow's explanation of his policy reads as follows: "The German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision, directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indi- rectly for the preservation of European peace, and above all for the sake of German credit and the maintenance of our position in the world. It would now be made manifest whether Germany really had been checkmated by the policy of isolation and whether the Powers that had been drawn into the circle of anti-German policy would find it consistent with their vital interests in Europe to take up a hostile attitude toward the German Empire and its allies. The course of the Bosnian crisis, in point of fact, made an end of the policy of isolation. . . . The policy of isolation, which seemed likely to endanger our safety, was directed against the in- ternational trade and the sea power of Germany. By means of our strength as a Continental Power, we tore the web which en- compassed us." 1 The German sword had been thrown into the scale . . . for the sake of German credit : this does not sound like peace- ful or disinterested diplomacy anxious to resolve a dim- cult question that might unchain a general war. Rather, it is the policy of the mailed fist, which succeeded because no one was prepared to resist it. As to the isolation of which Prince Biilow complains, it is sufficient to quote his own remarks in the Reichstag in December, 1908. Adverting to an interview with M. Isvolsky at the begin- ning of the crisis, he said: "M. Isvolsky and I were agreed that Russian policy could have no point against Germany, and vice versa; in addition, that the 1 Imperial Germany, pp. 62-63, 65. 294 ENGLAND AND GERMANY old friendly relations must be maintained. The Russian minister, on that occasion, renewed the assurance that there existed no un- derstanding between Russia and England, either public or secret, which could be directed against German interests." If, as the prince has argued at length in his Imperial Ger- many, Germany's undertakings in the field of world diplo- macy depended on her position as a Continental Power, and that was secured by "the hard facts of the Triple Alliance," 1 why should Germany protest against an agree- ment of the other three Powers? Great Britain, for her part, never objected to the Triple Alliance, and Sir Edward Grey condemned the allegation that any British differences with Austria had been provoked by hostility to Germany. 2 On the other hand, British policy during the crisis was not very happily inspired. Mr. Asquith declared that its attitude was "entirely disinterested," 3 and, according to Sir Edward Grey, "the knowledge that Italy and Germany were working for peace removed all risk of friction with them." 4 As M. Isvolsky had declared from the first that there would be no war, 5 the danger of an explosion came from the intransigeance of Serbia, and, apparently to fore- stall such a calamity, Sir Edward Grey promised British diplomatic support to the Serbian claims for compensation. That, as has been seen, prolonged the crisis, and almost brought on the war it was intended to avoid. Also, it enabled Germany to put forward her theory of a policy of isolation, because England certainly had no direct in- terest in Serbia. But instead of crediting Sir Edward with a Machiavellian scheme to injure Germany, it is much simpler and more in keeping with his straightforward character to say that he misjudged the situat3oh"and made ■P. 66. 2 House of Commons, 29 March, 1909. (5 Hansard iii, cc. 57-58.) 3 Guild Hall, London, 9 November, 1908. * Coldstream, 22 January, 1909. 5 Interview in the Temps (Paris), 8 October, 1908. THE NEAR EAST 295 a mistake; as, in fact, he practically confessed when he refused to express any opinion on the merits of the Austro- Serbian controversy of July, 19 14, and valiantly endeav- ored to find a solution by means of the European concert. 1 Great Britain subsequently re-established cordial relations with Austria, but Germans clung to the idea that the oppo- sition of views in 1908-9 had been dictated by the considered (or ill-considered) prejudice of the British foreign office against themselves, and the good effects of King Edward's visit to Berlin in February, 1909, before the crisis was ad- justed, were undone by the British naval programme for 1909-10. Thus the Bosnian crisis illustrates admirably the remark of the French writer, quoted on the first page of this book, who described Anglo- German rivalry as "the essential fact which dominates the whole policy of our time, which thrusts itself into all events to embitter and warp them, and which is to be found at the bottom of all the political crises by whose succession Europe is periodically agitated." England and Germany, theoretically, had only a secondary interest in the controversy about two provinces of the Ottoman Empire. A mistake on the part of England en- ables Germany to intervene as a principal; she boasts that she has dealt a death-blow to the policy of the former; England resents the accusation that her policy has been directed against Germany, and strengthens her navy; this Germany regards as sure proof of England's unremitting hostility; and finally each country is convinced that the crisis arose through the machinations of the other, which must be thwarted by more diplomacy or more armaments, either of which is bound to increase the suspicions already cherished on the other side of the North Sea ! In the opinion of the writer, Germany has made out a 1 Cf. Great Britain and the European Crisis (1914), no. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 24 July, 1014. 296 ENGLAND AND GERMANY poor case for her intervention "in shining armor," and Baron von Aerenthal was not grateful for her assistance. Not only did it deprive him of the credit for the annex- ation, to which he was entitled; it showed Germany's un- willingness to let Austrian diplomacy pursue its own course and her determination to assert her own power at all costs. Until the end of his life Aerenthal had to combat the in- trigues of the German ambassador at Vienna, whose in- fluence steadily increased until, with his connivance, if not under his direction, the fatal ultimatum to Serbia was drafted in July, 1914. Not until the archives are opened will the truth be fully known, but it is perfectly clear that the seed of distrust which produced the catastrophe of 1914 was sown in the crisis of 1908-9, and that the policies of the three eastern empires were determined in 19 14 very largely by their recollections of what had happened five years before. For several years after the Bosnian crisis Near Eastern politics reflected the diplomatic schism of Europe. In ap- pearance normal relations were restored by an Austro- Serbian treaty of commerce (31 March, 1909) and a re- sumption of regular intercourse between Austria and Russia (March, 19 10). Actually there was little cordiality. The Powers of the Entente labored to bring about a union of the Balkan states which might raise an effective barrier to Teutonic influence. To offset this, Germany and Austria gave their unreserved support to the Young Turk govern- ment at Constantinople, and in the summer of 1910 there were well-defined rumors of a Turco-Rumanian alliance directed against Bulgaria. About the same time Turkey applied to the French Government for permission to raise a loan of 150,000,000 francs on the Paris bourse; this was refused because the Turks would not give guarantees that the money would not be used against the political interests of France and Russia. For similar reasons the British THE NEAR EAST 297 foreign office persuaded Sir Ernest Cassel, the great Lon- don financier, not to float the loan. German banks then raised the money, but on conditions decidedly more oner- ous than those offered in Paris and London; the money was spent on the Turkish army then being reorganized by a German mission, and this was held to justify the refusal of the Entente to participate in the loan. Germany also succeeded in selling two old battleships to Turkey (August, 1910), a transaction not popular in England because these gaps in the German navy were filled by Dreadnoughts. As it turned out, the Turkish Government subsequently ordered two Dreadnoughts in England, and these were taken over by the British authori- ties at the beginning of the Great War. The incident did not, therefore, affect the superiority of the British navy, although the resentment of the Turks at the seizure of the ships seems to have aided the Young Turks in joining Ger- many against Great Britain. It may also be noted that, as an offset to the German control of the Turkish army, the reorganization of the navy was intrusted to British officers and that the customs were placed under the direction of Sir Richard Crawford, who managed them, to the great profit of the Porte until Turkey joined the European War. This chapter may conclude with ar statement of the progress of the Baghdad railway. The Young Turks, as noted above, very soon discarded all notions of liberty and equality, and embarked upon a policy of centraliza- tion and "Turkification." That brought its reward in the shape of constant rebellions, from Albania to Arabia. So it became imperative to establish railway communication with the disturbed regions, and the Baghdad negotiations were resumed. A series of new conventions was signed in the spring of 191 1, but not before German diplomacy had obtained the support of Russia to the project, which had hitherto been unpopular in St. Petersburg. 298 ENGLAND AND GERMANY The Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August, 1907, practically closed Persia to German influence, except in the central zone that was supposed to be excluded from British or Russian designs. In the face of the virtual Russian protectorate over northern Persia, the German school at Teheran lost its importance, and German bankers could not for the future hope to participate in the frequent loans to the bankrupt Persian Government. Germany at first tried to upset the new arrangements by inciting the Turks to occupy Persian territory in the province of Azer- baijan, to which they had some sort of claim, and by lend- ing some support to the constitutional movement directed against the worthless Shah. But he was amenable to Rus- sian gold, the constitutionalists were incapable, and the British Government raised no objection to a Russian occu- pation of northern Persia, because it was threatening to interfere in the south in the interests of British trade. In other words, the partition of Persia was an accomplished fact, carried out partly from the selfish ambitions of Russia and England, partly as a protection against the Drang nach Osten. In order that the Baghdad railway might not be blocked indefinitely, Germany determined to come to terms with Russia and England, who were not opposed to the line if their own interests were adequately protected. Accordingly, in November, 19 10, the German Emperor received the Tsar at Potsdam, and a bargain was struck. Germany withdrew her opposition to Russian railway schemes in northern Persia, where she recognized the polit- ical, strategic, and economic interests of Russia, and Russia accepted the Baghdad railway, on condition that no branch lines were built into Armenia and Kurdistan — a common- sense agreement, for neither Power could prevent the con- struction of the other's railway. The Russian and German systems were then to be linked up by a spur from Baghdad to Khanikin on the Persian frontier, which would enable THE NEAR EAST 299 Germany to share in the trade of northern Persia, where Russia promised to maintain the open door. At the time, this Russo- German accord created an unfavorable impres- sion. The Turks complained that they had been ignored. France feared that Germany was trying to weaken the Dual Alliance. English publicists alleged that Russia had abandoned the Triple Entente, and that German policy would have a free hand against British interests in the Persian Gulf; some looked askance upon the proposals for a trans-Persian railway which once more began to be mooted in connection with the probable completion of the Baghdad line. The German press, it may be remarked, paid glowing tributes to Russia on account of what was momentarily regarded as a blow to France and England, which countries were then the chief target of German diplomacy. No talk then of "the Slav peril" ! As a matter of fact, none of these apprehensions seem to have been justified. The railway situation in the Near and Middle East had reached an impasse, from which an escape could be found only by mutual concessions. The Potsdam negotiations, which were definitely recorded in a Russo-German convention of 19 August, 191 1, may be regarded as the first step toward an equitable solution of the whole difficulty. They were followed by the agree- ment between the Turkish Government and the Baghdad railway company, the terms of which can now be under- stood. 1 By the first of the three conventions, signed in March, 191 1, the construction of the fine from Halif to Baghdad was provided for, the section over the Taurus being tem- porarily abandoned. The company renounced any claim to share in the increased revenues expected from the raising of 'Victor Berard, "Off res allemandes," "La Choix de Londres," Revue de Paris, 1 and 15 April, 1911; R. Said-Ruete, "Anglo-German Relations in the Near East," England and Germany (1012), pp. 66-71, a pro-English statement by a former officer in the German army. 300 ENGLAND AND GERMANY the customs from eleven to fifteen per cent, and contented itself with the revenues already allocated for the Anatolian section of the line; this was, of course, a distinct conces- sion to the British point of view. The second convention leased to the company the railway already running from Alexandretta, on the Mediterranean, to Osmanye, and per- mitted it to exploit Alexandretta as a commercial port; this gave the company an excellent harbor in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the company surrendered its right to construct the section from Baghdad to Bassorah, for which a new international company, under Turkish con- trol, was to be formed; the Germans retaining only the right to as large a share of the capital as was accorded to any other Power. This, again, was a virtual acceptance of the British contention that British interests were not protected in the original concession. There remained the section from Bassorah to the gulf, which depended upon a satisfactory arrangement with Great Britain as regards the Sheikh of Koweit. Hakki Pasha, a former grand vizier, therefore repaired to London and opened negotia- tions with Sir Edward Grey. The discussions dragged on at inordinate length, and were interrupted by the Agadir crisis of 191 1 and the Balkan Wars of 191 2-13 ; but an agree- ment was finally reached, and was about to be published when the Great War and Turkey's participation therein translated the question from the field of diplomacy to the arbitrament of force. The details of the agreement, so far as they are known, will be more appropriately noticed in the chapter entitled "The Eve of the War." From the above narrative of events the following con- clusions appear to be warranted: (1) The policies pursued, by England and Germany with respect to Turkey were the expression of their national needs and ambitions, and the conflict of these policies gave additional stimulus to THE NEAR EAST 301 the rivalry bred by the race for naval supremacy. (2) The Triple Entente, evolved out of the Dual Alliance by British diplomacy as a protection against Germany, ac- quired real vitality under the pressure exerted by Germany in the interest of her Near Eastern policy, because that policy, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would severely prejudice the position of the several Entente Powers. Thus the Near Eastern question, instead of being dealt with by the European concert as the lessons of history required, became a shuttlecock in the game being played by two rival groups of Powers, whose differences were so great that they neglected the opportunity afforded by the Balkan Wars of 191 2-13 to make a permanent settlement; with the inevita- ble result that the new situation was unsatisfactory to all of them and was the immediate occasion of the Great War. (3) Great Britain did not object to the economic enterprises of Germany in the Ottoman Empire except when they promised to make that Empire a political sat- ellite of Germany,, but she was willing to withdraw her opposition in return for tangible concessions which secured her own interests. (4) Great Britain feared the political designs of Germany in the Near East, partly because they threatened to undermine the position and prestige gained through generations of successful commerce and diplomacy; partly because they seemed intimately connected with other phases of German policy which had to do with the balance of power and the affairs of western Europe. This last consideration brings us to the Morocco crisis of 191 1. CHAPTER XI AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH On i July, 191 1, the German gunboat Panther cast anchor in the harbor of Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. This incident produced the most serious crisis in Anglo- German relations before the actual outbreak of war three years later, and very nearly provoked war at the time. To the world at large, and probably to the Euro- pean governments, the news of the German action came as a bolt from the blue, although such precipitancy was endemic in German diplomacy; but events were to show that if the Wilhelmstrasse reckoned on presenting Europe with a fait accompli, it had, as usual, calculated badly, and that neither France nor England could be cajoled or threatened. In the reaction which followed the peaceful solution of the difficulty, England got the credit for block- ing the designs of Germany, although the real blame be- longed to the stupid procedure of the German foreign office. This in turn led to much searching of heart in England, and for a brief period a reconciliation seemed possible, only to be shattered by the Great War. Hence the importance of the crisis. In the early summer of 191 1 Anglo-German relations, if not cordial, had lost much of the animosity engendered by the Bosnian troubles of 1908 and the naval scare of 1909. The German Emperor had been well received when he at- tended the obsequies of his uncle Edward VII, and again on the occasion of the dedication of the national monument to Queen Victoria in May, 191 1. On 13 March of the same year Sir Edward Grey had remarked upon the friendly 302 AGADIR AND ITS AFTERMATH 303 relations obtaining with all the Powers; 1 on 6 February Mr. Asquith had declared that British friendships were not exclusive, and had no hostile tendency or ramifications. 2 For a year negotiations had been in progress for a limitation of naval armaments, and the British Government had "as- sented to the German view that some wider agreement of a political nature should be a condition precedent to a naval arrangement." 3 In Germany the death of Edward VII, who passed for the inspirer of the Einkreisungspolitik, caused a feeling of relief, for King George was not re- garded as a diplomatist; 4 at any rate, the crop of pamphlets in denunciation of British policy, which had been of large volume from 1904 to 1910, fell off considerably. Above all, perhaps, the struggle over the Parliament Bill, then at its height, seemed to render England a negligible quantity in international affairs. The first of a series of strikes among the transport workers had also begun. In India and Egypt the native unrest was still evident, and Canada was absorbed by the reciprocity treaty with the United States. That Great Britain should intervene decisively in a European quarrel was as surprising to German public opinion and to the German Government as the forcing of that quarrel was to the British public. * The Act of Algeciras, it will be remembered, conferred upon France and Spain the task of organizing an inter- national police force in those ports of Morocco which were open to European commerce. Inaugurated in November, 1906, this reform was distasteful to the Moorish popula- tion, who rightly feared the loss of their national inde- pendence, and numerous outbreaks followed, in which 1 5 Hansard xxii, c. 1983. 2 S Hansard xxi, c. 65. 3 Sir Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, p. 26. 4 "With the death of King Edward VII the English policy of isolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship against Germany, has broken down." (Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, p. 33.) 3 promised the "entire influence" of the Emperor "to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia." 6 It seems probable, therefore, although there is only one despatch in the German White Book (exhibit 14) to corroborate the statement, that for about twenty-four hours after the Austrian declaration of war Berlin did, as the White Book claims, "advise Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the Monarchy." 7 1 British, no. 71. 2 British, no. 75. ' French, no. 92. * French, no. 94. 6 Russian, no. 53. 6 German, no. 20 (1). 7 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 409. ARMAGEDDON 439 In these circumstances the chances for mediation in some form or another seemed decidedly favorable. Nor was there any lack of suggestion. Sir Edward Goschen, M. Jules Cambon, M. Viviani, the French premier, and the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian foreign minister, urged Sir Edward Grey to let Herr von Jagow propose the form which mediation should take, for he had accepted the idea "in principle." 1 So, at four o'clock on the after- noon of 29 July, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Berlin an account of his interview with Prince Lichnowsky: "The German Government had said that they were favorable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference — con- sultation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London — too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or medi- ating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine were not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press the but- ton' in the interests of peace." 2 This despatch is one of the most important in the entire correspondence of the belligerent governments, for it proves conclusively that France, Italy, Great Britain, and Russia (M. Sazonof had appealed for mediation) were willing to give Germany the lead in any move by which the existing difficulties might be resolved. The problem was not more serious than that created by the Balkan revolution eighteen months before; no military operations, as distinct from mili- tary preparations, had been begun; there was needed only good will; but no time could be lost. This telegram was answered by one of even greater im- 1 British, nos. 60, 80; French, nos. 81, 97. 2 British, no. 84; French, no. 98; Russian, no. 54. 440 ENGLAND AND GERMANY portance, in which Sir Edward Goschen described an in- terview with the German chancellor. Under the presi- dency of the Emperor, who had returned to Berlin on 27 July, a council of the highest authorities of the Empire was held at Potsdam on the night of the 29th. It is not known what happened on that fateful occasion, but the events of the next twelve hours suggest that the decision to make war was practically taken. Otherwise the return of the chancellor to Berlin that night, his haste in seeing the British ambassador, and the tenor of his remarks are inexplicable. "He said," reported Sir Edward Goschen, "that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be' given to the British Government that the imperial government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. "I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that re- spect. As regards Holland, however, his excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neu- trality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian in- tegrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." l That Germany should thus cynically avow to Great Britain her resolution to make war, at a moment when other Powers 1 British, no. 85. ARMAGEDDON 441 were straining to secure a peaceful settlement, is not only the crowning proof of the ineptness of her diplomacy, but an adequate commentary on her professions that she strove valiantly for peace to the end of the controversy. From this time on the efforts she made for peace took the form of threats which she can scarcely have expected to be heeded. The explanation of the chancellor's appeal to Sir Edward Goschen is found in the demarche of Count Pourtales at St. Petersburg, which is itself highly significant. On the afternoon of 29 July, or about twenty-four hours after the Russian Government had informed Berlin of its intention to mobilize against Austria, he declared to M. Sazonof that if Russia did not stop her military preparations Ger- many would mobilize her army. If it is recalled that three days before Count Pourtales had announced that "mobili- zation meant war," and also that Herr von Jagow had promised both the British and the French ambassadors that Germany would not respond to a Russian mobiliza- tion against Austria alone, it is clear that Germany was not only breaking faith but threatening Russia with war. The ambassador's communication was practically an ulti- matum without the name, and was so understood by M. Sazonof, who telegraphed as follows to the Russian am- bassadors in the great capitals: "We only began these preparations in consequence of the mobil- ization already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settle- ment of her dispute with Serbia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to assume that war is inevitable." l As a matter of fact, the mobilization against Austria had not yet been ordered at the time of Count Pourtales's inter- view, for the French ambassador informed his government 1 Russian, no. 58 442 ENGLAND AND GERMANY that " the tone in which Count Pourtales delivered his com- munication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilization of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria." 1 The German ambassador may have assumed that the intention to mo- bilize, which the Russian Government did not conceal, was identical with the order to mobilize; but inasmuch as the whole German case against Russia rests upon the Russian mobilization, it was surely his business to ascertain whether mobilization was a fact before making threats which would certainly precipitate mobilization. Of course, it is alleged in the German White Book that while the Russian minister of war had given his "word of honor" that "nowhere had there been a mobilization up to three o'clock in the after- noon" of 29 July, actually extensive measures were under way. 2 Then why did not Count Pourtales complain to M. Sazonof of this "attempt to mislead" Germany? It may therefore be reasonably asserted that the demarche of Count Pourtales was unprovoked and uncalled for; it can be explained only on the assumption that Germany wanted war, for if persisted in it would make the Russian mobilization inevitable and, according to the German con- ception of international relations, that meant war. It is suggestive that no mention of this incident, or of the one immediately following it, occurs in the White Book. Why? Obviously because it is destructive of the German thesis that Russia " spoiled everything " by her premature mobili- zation, for it would have provided Russia with the best of all reasons for mobilizing. As it happened, the German Government decided not to proceed a outrance for the moment. Its attitude re- mained the same, as may be seen from the Emperor's telegram dated 30 July, 1 A. m. 3 But it may have per- 1 French, no. ioo. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 410. 3 German, no. 23. ARMAGEDDON 443 ceived the weakness of the case it was setting up; or it may have had its zeal tempered by the warning conveyed by Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky, that Germany must not count upon England's standing aside in all cir- cumstances. 1 At all events, Count Pourtales visited M. Sazonof again at 2 a. m. on 30 July, and instead of form- ally requiring the cessation of Russian mobilization, which was the logical step after his communication of the after- noon before, asked upon what conditions Russia would consent to demobilize. After the usual statement by Count Pourtales that Austria would not infringe upon the terri- torial integrity of Serbia, and the familiar complaint from M. Sazonof that Germany was refusing to intervene at Vienna in order to gain time for the Austrian advance into Serbia, the Russian foreign minister dictated the following formula to the German ambassador: "If Austria, recognizing that her dispute with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are dam- aging to the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations." 2 According to Sir George Buchanan, Count Pourtales "com- pletely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable," and M. Paleologue, the French ambassador, stated that "Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with his government," although, in point of fact, it involved absolutely no change in the attitude which the Russian Government had consistently upheld from the very begin- ning of the crisis. The sincerity of M. Sazonof in making this proposal is seen from his remark to M. Paleologue, that in the course of the night "the general staff had sus- pended all measures of military precaution, so that there 1 British, nos. 89, 102. 1 Russian, no. 60; British, no. 97; French, no. 103. 444 ENGLAND AND GERMANY should be no misunderstanding," 1 the reference, of course, being to the mobilization against Austria, which had been ordered on the evening of 29 July. The reception of the Russian formula merits the most careful study, because it represented the last effort to preserve peace and for a brief space promised to be successful. Count Berchtold at once showed himself more concilia- tory than at any time since the beginning of the crisis. In an interview with the Russian ambassador he explained that his refusal to allow Count Szapary to continue the conversation was due to a misunderstanding; he did not say that he would allow the ambassador in St. Petersburg to discuss the Austrian ultimatum and the Serbian reply, but he was willing to "discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both empires had equal concern." He also gave positive assur- ances that Austria would not infringe the sovereignty of Serbia, and he did not manifest any alarm over the Russian military measures, to which Austria would have to reply as a measure of precaution. The Entente ambassadors in Vienna were encouraged by the friendly tone of the inter- view, which took place on 30 July. 2 The next day Count Berchtold practically abandoned the position he had hith- erto maintained, for he telegraphed to London that "we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir Ed- ward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia." 3 Even though he posited the conditions that "our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course," and that the Russian mobilization should be brought to a standstill, "in which case we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia," the offer approximated the Russian formula sufficiently to warrant negotiations. 1 French, no. 102. . J Austrian, no. 50; British, no. 96; French, no. 104. 8 Austrian, no. 51. ARMAGEDDON 445 How very different was the attitude of Berlin ! The Russian ambassador was informed by Herr von Jagow that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our pro- posal." l The French ambassador, recalling the promise that "Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilize if Russia mobilized on her German frontiers," was told that "the words . . . did not constitute a firm engagement." 2 Herr von Jagow justified this repudiation on the ground that the heads of the army were clamoring for mobilization, "for every day was a loss to the strength of the German army." As a matter of fact, the military party had got the upper hand at the council on 29 July, as evidenced by the fact that at 1 p. m. on the 30th the Lokal Anzeiger published a special edition announcing the mobilization of the German army. 3 The news turned out to be premature, but the newspaper would not have acted thus without official inspiration. The next day the chan- cellor "was so taken up with the news of the Russian meas- ures along the frontier that he received without comment" Sir Edward Grey's reply to the bid for British neutrality; he also said to Sir Edward Goschen that "it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some serious step." 4 As this conversation occurred before Berlin learned of the Russian general mobilization, it is obvious that Germany was preparing to take the situation into her own hands, in imitation of her procedure of March, 1909. The position of Sir Edward Grey was now difficult in the extreme. The German Government "had not had time to send an answer" to his proposal that it should indicate the form mediation should take, and Herr von Jagow practically evaded it by stating that he would com- municate directly with Austria. 5 The chancellor's bid for 1 Russian, no. 63; French, no. 107. ' French, no. 109. 8 French, no. 105; Russian, nos. 61, 62. 4 British, nos. 108, 109. 'British, no. 107; French, no. 109. 446 ENGLAND AND GERMANY British neutrality and the demarche of Count Pourtales at St. Petersburg evidently convinced Sir Edward that Germany was bent on war. Hence his stinging reply to the chancellor's "infamous proposals" and his negotia- tions with M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London. The reply to the chancellor reveals at once the intense indignation of Sir Edward Grey and his capacity of re- strained expression. "His Majesty's Government," he wrote, "cannot for a moment entertain the chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. "What he asks us, in effect, is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. "From the material point of view such a proposal is unaccept- able, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. "Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace to us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. "The chancellor also, in effect, asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. . . . "We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable de- velopment of the present crisis as the chancellor contemplates." 1 On the same day (30 July) Sir Edward discussed with the French ambassador the question whether the agreement made in November, 191 2, would not now come into op- eration, that is, whether the French and British Govern- ments should not discuss what they would do if the peace of Europe was threatened. The ambassador did not press for a promise that Great Britain would intervene, but for 1 British, no. 101. ARMAGEDDON 447 a statement of intentions under certain circumstances, in this case an aggression by Germany on France. Sir Ed- ward Grey promised to consult the cabinet the next morn- ing and to see the ambassador in the afternoon. 1 In other words, so alarmed were England and France two days be- fore the German declaration of war on Russia that they were making preparations to meet all eventualities. That is one side of the picture. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey did not cease from his endeavors to keep the peace. On 29 July he had suggested to Prince Lichnowsky that Austria might be persuaded to stop her military action with the occupation of Belgrade. 2 The Wilhelmstrasse seemed to approve of the suggestion, and promised to sup- port it at Vienna: Sir Edward accordingly, on 30 July, communicated it to St. Petersburg, with the hope that on this basis "Russia would consent to discussion and suspen- sion of further military preparations, provided other Powers did the same." 3 He also pointed out that "if the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, this is not too great a number against 400,000 Serbians." 4 The German Government was informed of this overture through the regular diplomatic channel, and also by a telegram from King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, which contained the additional information that England was asking France to postpone her military preparations. 5 The length to which Sir Edward Grey was willing to go can be measured from his two memorable offers of 30 and 31 July: "If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrange- ment to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 1 British, no. 105. 2 British, no. 88. 3 British, no. 103. ' British, no. 1 10. 6 Second German While Book (published in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 August, 1914), no. 2, in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 539 448 ENGLAND AND GERMANY assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or sepa- rately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a correspond- ing object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if the present crisis, so much more acute than Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." x This proposal came at the end of Sir Edward Grey's refusal to barter away British neutrality, and it envisaged a Europe organized for peace on the basis of a reduction of armaments by all the Powers. Statesmanship has never risen higher, and this vision of Sir Edward Grey may yet be realized. But in July, 1914, the German chancellor received the proposal "without comment" ! 2 More specific and more practical was the second offer: "I said to the German ambassador this morning (31 July) that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreason- able if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences ; but otherwise, I told [the] German ambas- sador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." 3 Here was the opportunity that Germany had been seeking for many years : to shatter the Entente and lay the founda- tions of an alliance with England. For England to make such an offer was to strain almost to the breaking-point her most cherished friendships and obligations; it was her su- preme effort for peace. Yet there is no record in the diplo- matic correspondence that the German Government gave 1 British, no. 101. 2 British, no. 109. 8 British, no. in. ARMAGEDDON 449 the least consideration to this invitation or hesitated a mo- ment in the course upon which it had embarked: Herr von Jagow said "it was impossible for the imperial government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication" demanding demobili- zation of the Russian army. 1 The mobilization of both the Russian and the Austrian armies was ordered on 31 July. Nevertheless the situa- tion, as between those two countries, seemed to be clearing on that and the following day. Immediately upon re- ceiving Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a discussion on the basis of the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, M. Sazonof combined it with his own suggestion, and produced the following formula: "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she ad- mits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a state and to her independence, Russia agrees to preserve her waiting attitude." 2 Austrian troops had already bombarded Belgrade when this offer was forwarded to Vienna and Berlin. Nevertheless, the Tsar telegraphed to the German Emperor: "It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations be- tween Austria and Serbia [sic] continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." 3 Finally, the Russian ambassador in Vienna declared that "Russia would be satisfied even now with assurance re- specting Serbian integrity and independence," 4 and that "his government would take a much broader view than 1 British, no. tax. J Russian, no. 67; British, no. 120; French, no. 113. * German White Book, p. 411. "Serbia" is obviously a misprint for "Russia," as Austro-Serbian relations were broken off on 25 July. 4 British, no. 141. 450 ENGLAND AND GERMANY was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy." 1 It is surely fair to say that the Russian Government went to the extreme limit of conciliation. Austria, for her part, realizing from the Russian mobili- zation that her policy of bluff had failed, gave every ap- pearance of yielding. She did not airily brush aside M. Sazonof's formula, as she had done his earlier proposals. The ambassador in Paris, Count Scezsen, declared that Austria would respect the integrity and independence of Serbia; that she would not occupy the sanjak of Novi- Bazar; and she would answer Serbia, or any Power speaking in the name of Serbia, any questions as to the conditions of a settlement. 2 In London, "Count Mensdorff begged the Russian ambassador to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the ' door had been banged ' by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations." 3 Finally, "Count Szapary at last con- ceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence." 4 The Russian foreign minister accepted this on condition that Austria refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia, and pro- posed that the mediation should be prepared in London. 5 It would be too much to say that Austria and Russia had come to terms, but they were certainly in a fair way to do so, and neither Power showed the slightest disposition to begin hostilities. Suddenly Germany intervened, just as she had in March, 1909, when the Austro-Russian quarrel over the annexa- tion of Bosnia was approaching a settlement, and, to bor- row Herr von Jagow's complaint about Russian mobiliza- 1 French, no. 104. 2 French, no. 120; Russian, no. 73 3 British, no. 137. 4 British, no. 161 6 Austrian, no. 56; British, nos. 120, 139. ARMAGEDDON 451 tion, "spoiled everything." Her precipitate action was the more remarkable because she was insisting that her media- tion at Vienna was responsible for the altered attitude of Austria. 1 The explanation given in the White Book runs as follows: "During the interval from 29 July to 31 July, whilst these en- deavors of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy, there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Rus- sian west frontier allowed us no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor." 2 Now the curious thing is that not a single despatch cor- roborative of this charge is printed in the White Book, nor is there mention of any remonstrances by either the Ger- man foreign secretary or the German ambassador in St. Petersburg. Not until 2 p. m. on 31 July does the Ger- man Emperor protest to the Tsar against "serious prepa- rations for war going on on my eastern frontier." 3 The White Book produces four telegrams as proof of Russian mobilization before 29 July: why is it silent as regards the next two days ? The Russian mobilization may have been in full swing against Germany before the order for general mobilization (31 July), but the historian cannot accept the fact as conclusive on Germany's ipse dixit. The news of the Russian general mobilization became known in the German capital sometime in the afternoon of 31 July. Kriegsgefahrzustand was at once proclaimed, and 1 German White Book, pp. 410-41 1; despatch of the German chancellor to the German ambassador in Vienna, 30 July, 1014, published in the Westminster Gazette, 1 August; King George to the Emperor Nicholas, 1 August, Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 536; British, nos. 98, 112. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411. 3 German White Book, p. 412. 452 ENGLAND AND GERMANY two ultimatums were launched. The one to Russia, pre- sented in St. Petersburg at midnight, stated that "if within twelve hours — that is by midnight [sic] on Saturday — Rus- sia had not begun to demobilize, not only against Germany but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilization." To M. Sazonof's inquiry whether this meant war, "the ambassador replied in the negative, but added that they were very near it." x For the moment we may postpone the consideration of the equity of this demand and continue the narrative of events. The ultimatum to France, presented at 7 p. m., recited that Germany had taken "no measures toward mobilization," but that she would be forced to do so if Russia did not demobilize within twelve hours. Since "mobilization inevitably implies war," the French Govern- ment was asked to reply in eighteen hours "whether it intended to remain neutral in a Russo- German war." 2 Only a miracle could now avoid war. Yet the Tsar did not expect war: so he stated in his telegram of 1 August to King George. 3 Consequently, although the German ultimatum expired at noon, at 2 p. m. he telegraphed to the German Emperor: "I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guarantee which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts." 4 The French Government, for its part, tactfully kept its troops ten kilometres behind the German frontier, 5 and Sir 1 Russian, no. 70; German, no. 24. The British and French ambassadors com- plained to Herr von Jagow that Germany had made the matter more difficult by requiring to demobilize against Austria as well as herself. (British, no. 121; French, no. 116.) 2 German, no. 25; French, no. 117; British, no. 117. 3 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 4 German While Book, p. 413. 6 British, nos. 134, 136, 140; French, no. 136. ARMAGEDDON 453 Edward Grey informed Berlin that "His Majesty's Gov- ernment are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters." * The British Government may also be credited with the last efforts to preserve peace. Sir Edward Grey advised Berlin that "things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse," and commu- nicated the amended Russian formula. 2 Then, on the basis of a report that the German ambassador had sug- gested that Germany might remain neutral in an Austro- Russian war if Great Britain secured the neutrality of France, Sir Edward made overtures to Prince Lichnowsky toward that end, only to learn that the ambassador's pro- posal was that Great Britain and France should remain neutral while Germany went to war with Russia. 3 Steps were also taken to restrain Russia. King George sent to the Tsar a long statement of the German Govern- ment, to the effect that its mediation had been upset by the Russian mobilization, and that war was imminent. The King made "a personal appeal" to his cousin "to remove the misapprehension which he felt must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace." 4 Sir Edward Grey telegraphed that "if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace." 5 Now, since the Tsar, in his reply to King George's telegram, said that he "would gladly have accepted your proposals had not the German ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my govern- ment declaring war," 6 it seems probable that Russia was quite willing to negotiate for a general demobilization, and 1 British, no. 131. * British, no. 131. ' Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxvi, c. 264.) * Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 536. 6 British, no. 135. • Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 454 ENGLAND AND GERMANY that, as Sir Maurice de Bunsen sorrowfully said, "a few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history," 1 provided, of course, that Germany was not determined at all costs to pick a quarrel. All was in vain. At 12.52 p. m., on Saturday, 1 August, or fifty-two minutes after the expiry of the ultimatum, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed to declare that, as Russia had refused to comply with the German demand for demobilization, "and having shown by this refusal that her action was directed against Ger- many, . . . His Majesty the Emperor, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge and considers him- self in a state of war with Russia." 2 According to Baron Beyens, the Belgian minister in Berlin, Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann, the under-secretary of the foreign office, besought the Emperor to await a reply from Russia, which might have been delayed by the military preparations, and not to order the mobilization of the German army. 3 His Majesty, however, followed up the declaration of war by an imperious telegram, 4 and at 5 p. m. ordered the mobilization of the German army and navy. Count Pourtales presented the declaration of war to M. Sazonof at 7.10 p. m. "However," says the White Book, "before a confirma- tion of the execution of this order had been received, . . . Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory. Thus Russia began the war against us." 5 No proof is adduced, except a statement in the Austrian Red Book that "the Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden." 6 Nor were the Brit- ish and Austrian ambassadors in Berlin informed of this 1 British, no. 161. 2 German, no. 26; Russian, no. 76. 3 "La Semain tragique," Revue des Deux Monies, 1 June, 1915. * German White Book, p. 413. 5 Ibid., p. 413. 6 Austrian, no. 57. ARMAGEDDON 455 breach of international usage until the next day. 1 But granted that the violation of frontier took place: "to put it forward, as does the German and Austrian correspond- ence, as the actual ground for the commencement of hos- tilities is to assume the imposition that the fate of nations is subject to the reported action of a roving patrol." 2 It is now necessary to examine the German contention that because Russia mobilized her army while Germany was mediating between Russia and Austria, the security of Germany was thereby menaced and a declaration of war forced upon the Emperor. On general principles, it is quite impossible to admit such a theory, for every sovereign state has the right to dispose of its armed forces within its own frontiers as it sees fit. If a neighboring state con- ceives itself endangered by military movements over the frontier, it can mobilize its own army, but it cannot make such movements a casus belli without putting itself in the wrong; the obvious action is to make the other side declare war. Unfortunately, German "open mobilization was the last stage. It was not a military preparation; it was in itself an offensive movement. On that order the Ger- man armies did not merely concentrate; they marched." 3 The German thesis is disproved by two circumstances. First, to all the overtures made by the British Government to the German for a limitation of armaments, the reply invariably was that every state must remain master of its military powers. Germany cannot claim such rights for herself and deny them to Russia. She could mobilize her own army; she might refuse to exert pressure on Austria; she could give notice that any attack on Austria would be met by a German declaration of war; but by no criterion of international conduct was she entitled to go beyond that. Second, on the eve of the crisis, the British fleet 'British, no. 144; Austrian, no. 57. 1 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. xi. * Ibid., p. xiv. 456 ENGLAND AND GERMANY was mobilized for manoeuvres, and when the crisis opened was not disbanded. Why did not Germany insist upon its demobilization as a condition precedent to British par- ticipation in the negotiations ? Its own fleet, then in Nor- wegian waters, was surely in as much danger from a Brit- ish attack as was the East Prussian frontier on 31 July- 1 August. Suppose that Great Britain, France, or Russia had made formal complaint to Berlin of the preparatory military measures which they believed Germany to be taking; is it open to doubt what the German answer would have been? The German case against Russia rests partly upon the alleged priority of the Russian mobilization. Now, it is difficult to say "who began it." In the various Books there are some forty despatches relating to mobilization in its various stages. If accepted at their face value, they show that the British, French, German, Austrian, and Rus- sian Governments were taking precautionary measures from the early days of the crisis. Some of the reports may be false, but until the records of the general staffs are avail- able the chaff cannot be separated from the wheat, and meanwhile the student can only speculate upon the psy- chological effects produced upon the several foreign offices as news of military preparations by a probable enemy comes in. If Germany asks us to accept her testimony about Russian secret preparations, she must permit us to note what the French and Russian despatches say about her own activities. In other words, the German charge that Russia "betrayed" Germany by denying the existence of preparations that were in reality being carried on can be met by the counter-charge that Germany "betrayed" France and Russia. The one serious question, therefore, is: Was the Russian mobilization premature ? For it is to be remembered that, although Austria began by denying the legitimacy of Rus- ARMAGEDDON 457 sian intervention, she ended by conceding it, since she agreed to discuss with Russia the substance of her ultimatum to Serbia. Russia mobilized her four southern conscriptions on the morrow of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. Ought she to have waited until the Austrian troops actually invaded Serbia? A negative answer seems justi- fied by the fact that Count Berchtold, after a brief inclina- tion to regard the move as a "threat," soon showed him- self ready, for the first time since the crisis began, to make concessions which would obviate the necessity for an armed intervention by Russia. The general mobilization affords a more difficult problem. The Germans contend that the Russian order could not have been caused by the Austrian mobilization, and that it was given before Austria had replied to the proposal embodied in M. Sazonof's first formula. 1 As to the first, there is the definite statement of the Russian Government in its public announcement and the statement of the Tsar to King George, that the mobilization was induced by Aus- tria's previous mobilization. Is it possible to test the accu- racy of these statements ? The one precise piece of informa- tion is that given by the French ambassador in Vienna, according to whom the Austrian mobilization was declared at 1 a. m. on 31 July, 2 the decree for which was appar- ently prepared as early as 28 July. 3 For the Russian mo- bilization three general statements are available. Count Szapary says that it was ordered "early to-day" — 31 July. 4 What does "early to-day" mean? The German White Book says it occurred "am Vormittag," 5 which would seem to mean in the latter part of the morning. The Emperor, telegraphing to the Tsar at 2 p. m., does not mention it. 6 Finally, in his telegram to King George of 1 Dr. Karl Helflerich, "The Dual Alliance versus the Triple Entente," New York Times, 14 March, 1915. J French, no. 115. 3 Russian, no. 47. * Au strian, no. 52. 5 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 412. 6 German White Book, p. 411. 458 ENGLAND AND GERMANY 31 July, the Emperor says: "I have just heard from the chancellor that intelligence had just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his entire army and fleet." 1 The probability certainly is that the Russian mobilization was ordered after that of Austria. The Russian Orange Book and the Austrian Red Book are both strangely silent upon the subject, so it may be that each government ordered its mobilization independently of any knowledge of the other's intentions; but the pub- lished evidence seems to absolve Russia of having antici- pated the Austrian mobilization. It does appear to be true that Russia ordered her mobiliza- tion before Austria had vouchsafed a reply to either Sir Edward Grey's proposal that she should open a discussion with Russia as soon as she had occupied Belgrade, or to M. Sazonof's own formula. And, inasmuch as Russia was aware, from the communication of Count Pourtales, that Germany would immediately imitate the Russian mobiliza- tion and that mobilization meant war, it is evident that Russia must have counted the consequences when she or- dered the general mobilization. Had she waited another twenty-four hours before mobilizing, an agreement might have been reached with Austria which would have obviated the necessity of mobilization. So far as mobilization was the cause of the war, Russia must bear some share of the responsibility. At the same time, quite apart from the fact that mobiliza- tion does not afford a sufficient ground per se for declaring war, Russia was in a difficult position. She had every reason to believe that Austria would make no concessions. Belgrade had been bombarded on 30 July, and the mobiliza- tion of the whole Austrian army had been ordered, accord- ing to the Russian version of events. M. Sazonof also claimed to have information concerning German prepara- 1 Second German White Book, no. 3. ARMAGEDDON 459 tions against Russia. 1 In these circumstances there is much to be said for the plea made to King George by the Tsar: "That I was justified in ordering a general mobilization is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unex- pected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as media- tion negotiations continued." 2 All things considered, we may admit that it would have been wiser for Russia not to have mobilized when she did; but we must remember that her provocation was very great, that she had throughout the crisis displayed admira- ble restraint, and that it was her complete mobilization which actually forced from Austria the promise to discuss with Russia the substance of her ultimatum. Furthermore, if Russia can be criticised for a premature, if intelligible, mobilization, Austria is open to the same charge. Count Berchtold was fully aware of the demarche of Count Pourtales, and had himself requested Germany to notify Russia that Russian mobilization would call for counter-measures by Germany. 3 Now, it stood on the cards that an Austrian mobilization would immediately be followed by that of Russia; this was, indeed, a com- monplace of diplomacy, and Count Berchtold can scarcely have sanctioned the Austrian mobilization without a full appreciation of its effect upon Russia, upon Germany, and in the end upon Europe. It is this consideration which raises the most serious doubt whether the Austrian conces- sions on 31 July and 1 August were sincere, were not, in fact, intended as plays for time or as manoeuvres to place Russia in the wrong. For, although she agreed to discuss the substance of her ultimatum with Russia, she did not 1 British, no. g7; Russian, no. 68; French, no. 102. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 3 Austrian, nos. 28, 42. 460 ENGLAND AND GERMANY promise to stop her march on Belgrade, and did not stop it. Nevertheless, the situation as between Austria and Russia was not irretrievable until Germany took umbrage at the Russian mobilization and proceeded to force the pace. As a matter of fact, this lengthy analysis of the German case against Russia is scarcely needed to demonstrate its utter hollowness. If Germany had proceeded to invade Russia upon her declaration of war, one could understand the argument of Herr von Jagow that Germany "had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions." 1 But Germany did not attack Russia: she waited for the Russian army to invade East Prussia, and hurled her own legions against France even before she had declared war on the Republic ! One cannot avoid the sus- picion that the German attitude toward Russia was as- sumed with the view to providing an opportunity for an invasion of France, whose conduct throughout the crisis was eminently correct and conciliatory. The German ultimatum to France expired at i p. m. on i August. At n a. m. Herr von Schoen visited the Quai d'Orsay, and was informed that "the French Govern- ment failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of the previous evening." M. Viviani re- ferred to the hopeful prospect of an Austro-Russian agree- ment, and "laid stress on the serious responsibility which the imperial government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, it took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace." 2 At 1.05 p. m. Herr von Schoen telegraphed to Berlin that "upon his repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-Ger- 1 British, no. 138. 2 British, no. 126; French, no. 125. ARMAGEDDON 461 man war, the prime minister declared that France would do what her interests dictated." x At 3.40 the mobilization of the French army and navy was ordered. "On the morning of the next day," says the German White Book, "France opened hostilities." 2 In the Reichs- tag, on 4 August, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that "aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared on the territory of the Empire." The charges are particularized in the French Yellow Book : "Eighty French officers in Prussian uniform attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor-cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern." "Several of the aviators openly violated the neutrality of Bel- gium by flying over the territory of that country; one attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others were seen in the district of the Eifel, one threw bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg." 3 The French premier "formally challenged these inaccurate allegations," 4 and the government stated that it had given explicit orders that its troops should remain ten kilometres behind the frontier. Such denials are scarcely conclusive. But two French professors, MM. Durkheim and Denis, of the University of Paris, had the happy idea to ascertain whether German newspapers had given a detailed account of the alleged occurrences. Their account of their re- searches is as follows: "We consulted five of the principal newspapers (Vorwarts, Ar- beiter Zeitung of Vienna, Frankfurter Zeitung, Kolnischer Zeitung, Miinchner Neuste Nachrichten) from the end of July to 5 August. First of all we noticed that the aviator who is said to have flown over Carlsruhe is not mentioned. As for the others, the account of them is as vague as it is in the official note. These incidents, given as the cause of determining war, take up one line, two or 1 German, no. 27. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 413. 3 French, nos. 146, 147. * French, no. 148. 462 ENGLAND AND GERMANY three at the most. The bombs never left any trace. One of the aeroplanes, that at Wesel, is said to have been brought down; nothing is said of the aviator and what became of him, nor is there anything about the aeroplane itself. In a word, the Germans took care to draw attention to their arrival in Germany and then never spoke of them again. They were never seen to return to their starting-point. "But we have still more convincing evidence. We have been able to procure a Nuremberg newspaper, the Frankischer Kurrier. On 2 August, the day the bombs are supposed to have been thrown, not a word is said about the incident. Nuremberg received the news on the 3d by a telegram from Berlin identical to that published by the other newspapers. Again, the Kolnischer Zeitung of the 3d, in its morning edition, published a telegram from Munich which read as follows: 'The Bavarian minister of war is doubtful as to the exactness of the news announcing that aviators had been seen above the lines Nuremberg-Kitzingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach, and that they had thrown bombs on the railway.' " x More interesting is the fact that although the alleged violations of the frontier occurred on 2 August, the German Government did not declare war on France for thirty-six hours, at 6.45 p. m., on 3 August. 2 On the morning of the 2d the ambassador in London telegraphed that England would not guarantee the neutrality of France. 3 If the French attacks were to be made the official cause of war, why was the declaration delayed so long? The Germans have hardly made out a convincing case. It may also be observed that Germany did not regard the mobilization of the French army as a casus belli, although the danger to Germany was very much greater on this side than on the Russian. And yet the neutrality of Belgium was violated because it was necessary for Germany to prevent the French from getting their attack started first ! In the midst of such inconsistencies one finds additional reason for believing that the German attitude toward the 1 Who Wanted War ? (igis), p. 50, note 1. 2 French, no. 147. * Second German White Book, no. 9. ARMAGEDDON 463 Russian mobilization was only an excuse for launching an attack on France. The French, on their side, alleged that the German troops violated the French frontier at Ciry, Longwy, Delle, Joncherey, and Baron, on 2 August. 1 The chancellor's statement in the Reichstag on 4 August, that only one of these violations, which he did not specify, had been com- mitted, is worth as much or as little as the French premier's similar denial of French aggressions. But it is curious to find, in the German account of the negotiations with Eng- land for the neutrality of France, this statement of the Emperor William to King George, in a telegram of 1 August : "The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier." 2 Evidently it was the German intention to in- vade France on that date, when the German ambassador was still in France and had not asked for his passports. This admission and the detail with which the French sup- ported their charges afford reasonable ground for believing that the Germans were across the French frontier thirty- six hours before the declaration of war, conduct which is quite on a par with the policy that based a declaration of war on the alleged zeal of a few aviators. There is, however, one charge against France made by the Germans which must be examined with great care. In his extremely acute analysis of the Books published by the Entente Powers, Dr. Karl Helfferich, secretary of the German treasury, contends that "the Franco-Russian treaty of alliance did not pledge France to an uncondi- tional accompaniment of Russia in war," and that France, by prematurely promising to stand by Russia, was unable to exert pressure at St. Petersburg in the interests of peace, and strengthened the hand of the Russian war party. 3 1 French, nos. 136, 130. ! Second German White Book, no. 6. * New York Times, 14 March, 1915. 464 ENGLAND AND GERMANY Inasmuch as the German White Book is generally re- garded as perhaps the most damning evidence against its authors, Germany is quite justified in trying to prove the guilt of the Entente Powers by their own documents. Dr. Helfferich first cites the interview on 24 July between M. Sazonof, Sir George Buchanan, and M. Paleologue, at which the French ambassador declared that "France would fulfil all the obligations imposed by her alliance with Rus- sia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations." Sir George Buchanan reported to Sir Edward Grey his opinion that, "even if England declines to join them, France and Russia are de- termined to . make a strong stand," the extent of which might be gauged by the remark of M. Sazonof that "Rus- sian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out." * This declaration of French policy, according to Dr. Helfferich, so tied the hands of Paris that it would not listen to the repeated requests of Herr von Schoen to use its moderating influence at St. Petersburg. The decisive step, however, was not taken until 29 July, when the French premier confirmed to the Russian ambas- sador "the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia," 2 to which M. Sazonof replied that "in the existing circumstances that declaration is specially valuable to us." 3 The following day M. Viviani telegraphed to London and St. Petersburg that "France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance." 4 Finally, French diplomacy exerted itself to the uttermost, and most unscrupulously, 5 to secure a pledge of English 1 British, no. 6. ' Russian, no. 55. 3 Russian, no. 58. * French, no. 101. 6 In the original edition of the British White Paper, no. 105 (3), which purports to be a report from Paris of German military preparations, is dated "31 July," although it is enclosed in a British despatch to Paris of 30 July ! It also contains the words "yesterday, Friday," yet Friday was 31 July. Is the document a forgery, as the Germans contend? No explanation has ever been vouchsafed. In subse- quent editions of the White Paper the date and the words quoted have been omitted, ARMAGEDDON 465 assistance. From 29 July France believed herself sure of English support, and made her promise to Russia. There- fore, argues Dr. Helfferich, the aggression during the crisis came from France and Russia, and it was due to France that Russia embarked on her policy of mobilization, which made war inevitable. "Left to depend upon herself alone, Russia would have risked the war with Austria-Hungary and Germany only in an extreme case in the defense of national vital interests, but never as a result of weighing the probable result. Only the assurance of the active co-operation of other Great Powers made possible the determination of the leading circles of Russia for war." Nevertheless, in spite of the sequence of events as estab- lished by Dr. Helfferich, his conclusions do not neces- sarily follow. First of all, his point about the Franco- Russian alliance does not seem well taken. He assumes that Germany will loyally support her ally Austria, yet questions the justice of France standing by her ally Russia. As to the statement that France was not bound under all circumstances to fight for Russia, by which is meant, pre- sumably, that the alliance was defensive, the same thing may be predicated of Germany. Her alliance with Austria was also defensive: none the less she considered herself bound to declare war on Russia, in defense of her ally, before the latter was herself at war with Russia. It would have been highly desirable if Germany and France could have left the dispute to be settled between the two prin- cipals, but since they did not Germany cannot deny to France the same privilege to support her ally which she claimed for herself. In the second place, there is nothing in the whole corre- spondence to show that the attitude of Russia was stiffened and the French Yellow Book dates a similar document (no. 106) 30 July. British, nos. 99, 117, 119, 124, 134, 136; French, nos. 106, 114, 127, indicate how anxious France was for the promise of English support. 466 ENGLAND AND GERMANY as a result of French policy. The Russian Government took its position at the very outset of the crisis and, as we have already observed, maintained it consistently to the end. Dr. Helfferich would have us believe that the Rus- sian mobilization would not have occurred without the assurance of French assistance. As a matter of fact, the Russian mobilization was determined upon, that is, if it was necessary to enforce Russia's claim to share in the settlement of the Austro-Serbian question, on 25 July, 1 or four days before France promised her assistance. Then, in spite of Dr. Helfferich's argument to the contrary, the actual order for mobilization does seem to have been given as a consequence of the Austrian mobilization. Nor is it fair to say that France did nothing for peace. She did not play a prominent part in the diplomacy of the twelve days — 23 July-4 August — but she supported all the proposals of Sir Edward Grey, which is more than can be said of Germany, and she requested her ally to avoid "every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilization." 2 After all, the Germans them- selves have recognized the perfect propriety of France's conduct. In the German note to the Entente Powers of 24 July we read: "The imperial government desires ur- gently the localization of the conflict, because every inter- ference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences." 3 If Germany had waited for Russia to attack her or Aus- tria, and had then been attacked by France, she could convince the world that she was the victim of unprovoked aggression. But when she declared war on Russia, and then on France, while the latter carefully refrained from coming to the assistance of its ally, it is absurd for Ger- 1 Telegram of the Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William, 30 July, German, no. 23a. 2 French, no. 101 3 German, no. 1; British, no. o; French, no. 28 ARMAGEDDON 467 many to argue that the war would not have come if France had not promised to assist Russia. No amount of special pleading can explain away the fact that negotiations were proceeding between Austria and Russia when Germany in- tervened violently and fatally. Furthermore, if Germany had sincerely desired to keep the peace with France, as Herr von Schoen kept saying at the Quai d'Orsay, she would have concentrated in Alsace-Lorraine — for France had promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium — an army sufficient to beat back a French attack, and have waged her own war immediately against Russia who, it was al- leged, had caused all the trouble by threatening Germany's ally. CHAPTER XV THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE It is at last possible to discuss the reasons why Great Britain declared war on Germany. The various phases of the rivalry between the two nations have been analyzed: the struggle for the control of the seas in time of war; the competition for the markets of the world; problems of colonial expansion; mutual suspicion generated in the po- litical sphere by the reaction of the three factors just mentioned; and the profound differences in the national temperaments, institutions, and ideals. A conflict was, perhaps, inevitable. At the same time, it has been seen that the naval rivalry was in process of adjustment; that Great Britain was not jealous of the commercial progress of Germany; that the colonial ambitions of Germany had been recognized by the Anglo-German agreement arrived at on the very eve of the war. As a result of this general relaxation of tension the relations between the two coun- tries in July, 1 9 14, were more friendly than they had been at any time since the retirement of Bismarck. The Triple Entente still remained as an obstacle to German aggression; but Great Britain had made it very plain, not merely in words but by her action, that she was in no way disposed to support France and Russia in an aggressive policy against Germany, and that if Germany was determined to live in peace on the basis of a fair field and no favors she would find no more earnest coadjutor and friend than England and the British Empire. On both sides there seemed to be developing a willingness to forget the quarrels of the past and to work toward a general understanding which would effectually guarantee the peace of the world. 468 THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 469 When the crisis of 19 14 was sprung, Sir Edward Grey had, therefore, every reason to suppose that any efforts to preserve peace which he might make would receive the cordial approval and support of Germany, more especially as such co-operation had been vouchsafed in the crisis of 1912-13. Instead, he had seen Germany refuse to exert pressure on her ally, decline to join in some form of inter- national action, and declare war on Russia. As many French and English publicists who passed for jingoes had predicted, the Bismarckian spirit, without its cleverness, still guided German diplomacy; the Teutonic legions had been sent forth almost without warning, and the neutrality of Belgium was soon discovered to be a paper guarantee. Sir Edward Grey's correspondence bears many a trace of disappointment that he was unable to secure from Germany a favorable response to his repeated overtures, and he is reported to have said, after his speech to the House of Com- mons on 3 August: "This is the saddest day of my life." But such reflections did not solve the awful problem whether Great Britain should participate in the war. The mere fact that she was not drawn in automatically proves that she was not committed to France and Russia by secret agreements or military conventions and Sir Edward Grey stated to Parliament on 3 August that he "did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance." Clearly, then, the British Government was a free agent in any decision which it might recommend Parliament to take. Four possible policies presented themselves for its choice: First, the British Government might take the position that the war was simply an enlargement of the Austro- Serbian dispute, that "direct British interests in Serbia were nil," and that its "idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question." L And 1 British, nos. 6, 87. 47© ENGLAND AND GERMANY as late as 31 July Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, that "nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved." 1 The adoption of this position would have required England at once to pro- claim her unconditional neutrality. This was a possible policy, but in the light of British history it was not a very probable or promising one. Second, England might have decided to cut the Gordian knot by following up the cue of Anglo-German reconcili- ation made possible by the agreement of 19 14, and, aban- doning her friends of the Entente, have contracted a formal alliance with Germany. The German chancellor had such a development in mind when he made his famous bid for British neutrality; and he must have meant the same thing when he declared in the Reichstag on 2 December, 19 14, that "the cabinet of London could have made the war impossible if it had told St. Petersburg unequivocally that England had no intention of permitting a Continental war of the Great Powers to grow out of the Austro-Serbian conflict." For, of course, the Entente would have been shat- tered by such a policy, and England would have been thrown into the arms of Germany. The very idea of an Anglo- German alliance is hard to grasp, in view of the past rela- tions of the two countries. But Sir Edward Grey must have reckoned with it when he said that "if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to pre- serve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, . . . His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the con- sequences." 2 This offer, more than any other incident of the crisis, must prove the disinterestedness and sincerity of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy, and he is not to blame if 1 British, no. 116. 'British, no. in. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 471 Germany did not seize the opportunity to place Anglo- German relations on a sound basis. Third, Sir Edward Grey might, as he was repeatedly urged by French and Russian statesmen to do, have imme- diately declared the solidarity of Great Britain with France and Russia. This step was advocated on the ground that Germany would not provoke a general war if she were con- vinced that Great Britain would be found in the ranks of her enemies. It may be that such a declaration would have stayed the hand of the German military party, but it is extremely doubtful. Not only were the Germans supremely contemptuous of Britain's fighting capacities, but their government was repeatedly warned, by the remarks of Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky, that if the war be- came general Great Britain would be drawn in. Sir Ed- ward even went so far as to say that "the German Govern- ment do not expect our neutrality." x It should be noted, however, that the Marquis di San Giuliano thought "it would have a great effect" if Germany believed that " Great Britain would act with Russia and France." 2 The Germans have tried to prove that, as a matter of fact, England did practically declare her solidarity with France and Russia, and that this was responsible for the French promise to stand by Russia and the unyielding attitude of M. Sazonof. On 29 July Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky "something that was on his mind." "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European inter- ests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside." 3 1 British, no. 116. 2 British, no. 80. 3 British, no. 89. 472 ENGLAND AND GERMANY The ambassador "took no exception" to this, and Herr von Jagow admitted to Sir Edward Goschen that he had heard it "with regret, but not exactly with surprise." x But Sir Edward Grey had already informed the French ambas- sador that he intended to convey this warning to Prince Lichnowsky. 2 It was this, says Dr. Helfferich, that enabled France to promise her assistance to Russia and thus com- promise the situation. Proof of the altered state of affairs is adduced in the letter from the Belgian charge in St. Petersburg to his government which was intercepted in Germany after the war began. "England," wrote M. de PEscaille on 30 July, "at the start let it be understood that she did not want to be dragged into a con- flict. Sir George Buchanan said so openly. To-day every one in St. Petersburg is convinced — has even the assurance — that England will support France. This encouragement has had a powerful effect, and has contributed not a little to giving the war party the upper hand." 3 It is possible that some comfort was derived in St. Peters- burg from the attitude of Sir Edward Grey, and it is diffi- cult to see why he informed M. Paul Cambon of what he intended to say to the German ambassador; all the more so because his policy was apparently shaped by the feeling that uncertainty as to the intentions of Great Britain was the best guarantee of peace. If the Entente practically be- came an alliance on 29 July, then the German attitude de- serves more sympathy than has hitherto been accorded it. But such does not seem to have been the case, in spite of M. de l'Escaille. If Sir Edward Grey had considered him- self morally bound to stand by France, he would scarcely have made the two memorable offers to Germany of 30 and 31 July, which have already been adverted to several 1 British, no. 98. 2 British, no. 87. 3 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 September, 1014; published in American newspapers, 4 October, 1014. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 473 times. Nor would he have been at such pains to convince M. Paul Cambon that the British attitude would be deter- mined by public opinion, and that public opinion would not necessarily support British intervention. 1 But there is still better proof that England's help was not considered as a matter of course. On 31 July M. Poincare, the Presi- dent of France, addressed an autograph letter to King George, begging the British Government to take some step which would demonstrate the solidarity of the Entente; to which the King replied in a vague and non-committal fashion. 2 On 1 August M. Viviani wrote to London: "I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realize the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power." 3 This is not the language of assurance, but of entreaty. On the same day Sir Edward Grey, while refusing to state to Prince Lichnowsky the terms on which Great Britain would remain neutral, said: "Our hands are still free, and we are considering what our attitude will be." 4 On 2 August the cabinet discussed the terms of neutrality, 5 and the promise of naval assistance which was given to France on 3 August was made conditional on the approval of Parlia- ment. Finally, the Tsar's telegram to King George of 1 August concluded with the hope that "your country will not fail to support France and Russia." 6 On the basis of these facts, as opposed to the opinion of a subordinate diplomatist in St. Petersburg and the somewhat forced ar- 1 British, nos. 87, 105, 116, 119, 148; French, nos. no, 126. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 542-544. 3 French, no. 127. * British, no. 123. 6 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 27 August, 1914. (5 Hansard lxvi, c. 124.) 6 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537. 474 ENGLAND AND GERMANY gument of Dr. HeLfferich, it is reasonable to believe that Great Britain was not committed to France and Russia before the outbreak of war, and that, as Prince Lichnowsky reported Sir Edward Grey to have said on i August, "there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hos- tile manner against Germany" x merely because she was Germany. Suppose Great Britain had declared her solidarity with France and Russia. If Russia were bent on war, the promise of British assistance would make it inevitable. Sir Edward Grey evidently believed Russia to be pacific, but he could take no chances. Next, such a declaration would have infuriated Germany and in all probability have whetted her appetite for war; if, by good fortune, peace had been preserved, the whole movement toward an Anglo- German understanding which had been nursed with such tender care would have come to an untimely end, and Great Britain would have been faced with still another in- crease of the German fleet. In fact, had Sir Edward Grey accepted the argument of solidarity, he would have stulti- fied himself, for his consistent policy had been to resist all temptations toward a formal alliance with France and Russia, however much he might support them in opposing the aggressions of Germany and Austria. In the existing situation, Sir George Buchanan was entirely right when he said that "England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsel of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare her- self Russia's ally at once." 2 Thus the true policy of Great Britain, and the one which she actually pursued, was to co-operate in all measures 1 Telegrams published in N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1914. no. 2 {Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 541). ' British, no. 17. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 475 which might preserve the peace of Europe; to suggest such measures herself; to use her influence with France and Russia in favor of moderation; and to secure the help of Germany in calming the adventuresome spirit of Austria. At the same time, Great Britain had no intention of aban- doning France and Russia if they were the victims of an unprovoked attack, and she therefore repeatedly warned Germany that, while she desired above all things to work with her for peace, yet Great Britain would be drawn in if war came about by the action of Germany. Nevertheless, she kept her hands free and did not make any decision to intervene until 2 August, that is, until Germany had declared war on Russia and had violated the neutrality of Luxemburg as the first step in her invasion of France. It remains to describe the steps by which Great Britain abandoned her waiting attitude and became the ally of France and Russia. On the morning of 30 July it was quite evident, thanks to the German bid for British neutrality and the com- munications of Count Pourtales to the Russian foreign minister, that the storm was about to break, and that its extent would not be limited to eastern Europe. In such circumstances, the neutrality of Belgium assumed a vital importance, not merely because of its bearing on the imme- diate diplomatic situation but on its own merits. A short statement, therefore, seems desirable, in spite of all that has been said and written about the matter since the be- ginning of the war. The neutrality of Belgium was not born of any particular consideration for the people of that country, but was essen- tially a political expedient. From time immemorial the Low Countries had been the cockpit of Europe, the decisive battle-ground of innumerable wars since the sixteenth cen- tury. Furthermore, the possession of this territory, which 476 ENGLAND AND GERMANY gave outlets on both the Channel and the North Sea, was considered the key to European domination, as the careers of Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon showed only too well. The French, in particular, had displayed a relentless cupidity, and when the Revolution declared war on the Old Europe, in 1792, their first step was to occupy the southern provinces and, later on, Holland. When the Congress of Vienna met, after the fall of Napoleon, to find some solution of the problems provoked by his meteoric career, nothing aroused more interest than the necessity of hemming France in on all sides by states strong enough to resist a renewed aggression on her part when she should have recovered from the exhaustion of her struggle with the rest of Europe. At the demand of Great Britain a Kingdom of the Netherlands was created, consisting of the old Dutch Republic and the Netherlands proper, which had hitherto belonged to Spain or Austria. But that union proved utterly unworkable, for the excellent reason that between the Dutch of the north and the Belgians of the south there was not one interest in common. In religion, language, political ideals, economic interests, social organi- zation, and traditions, the two peoples were as distinct as Frenchmen and Germans; so that union was as unreal in the nineteenth century as it was in the sixteenth, when William the Silent vainly tried to organize the seventeen provinces for resistance to Spain. Inasmuch as the con- stitution granted in 18 15 by the Dutch Ring William en- tirely favored his own people, the only recourse of the southerners was to carry through a revolution, which they did in 1830, proclaiming their independence and ap- pealing to the Powers for recognition. Their conduct was a deliberate violation of the settle- ments of 18 1 5, upon which Europe had bestowed so much care. None the less, France and England responded fa- vorably to the Belgian appeal, which was resisted by the THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 477 three eastern monarchies, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. The difficulty was that Belgium would not be strong enough to withstand a French attack, and that the new French King, Louis Philippe, who owed his throne to a revolution, might be tempted to undertake a war for the sake of pres- tige. Prussia did not relish the prospect of an attack on the lower Rhine; England was as unwilling as ever for any part of the Low Countries to pass into the hands of a strong Continental Power. It was therefore agreed that the new European state should be "neutral in perpetuity." 1 The idea of the statesmen who thus divided the Low Countries into two independent states was that, "if it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous." 2 Consecrated by two international treaties (1831, 1839) signed by all the Powers and recognized by two generations of statesmen, the neutrality of Belgium was observed for eighty-three years, during which period only one war har- assed western Europe, in striking contrast to the frequent conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the apt phrase of Sir Edward Grey, Belgian neutrality had become "the main rivet" of the peace of Europe. Conse- quently the argument of Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen that the Germans "had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible," 3 falls little short of the ridiculous: "the neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars." 4 In other words, just as Austria sought to im- pose her particular solution of the international Balkan question, so Germany proposed to ignore the historical 1 Article VII, treaties of 1831 and 1839. 1 Great Britain and the European Crisis, " Narrative," sec. 6, par. 3. 3 British, no. 160. 4 Great Britain and the European Crisis, "Narrative," sec. 6, par. 4. 478 ENGLAND AND GERMANY background of Belgian neutrality, which had been devised in no small degree for the protection of Prussia herself. No time need be wasted over the German arguments that by her acquisition of the Congo or that, by leaving her French frontier poorly defended while she strongly forti- fied her German frontier, Belgium had forfeited her neu- trality. The assurances given by Herr von Bethmann- Hollweg to the Belgian Government in 191 1, the statement of Herr von Jagow to the budget committee of the Reichs- tag in 1913, 1 and, above all, the admission of the German chancellor in the Reichstag on 4 August, 19 14, that the entry of German troops into Belgium was "a breach of international law," "a wrong," dispose once for all of the contention that Germany had in any way repudiated the signature of Prussia to the treaty of 1839. Great Britain was also formally committed to observe her signature to the same treaty. In a despatch of 7 April, 1 913, recording an interview with the Belgian min- ister in London, Sir Edward Grey said that "he was sure that this [the Liberal] government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and he did not believe that any British government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it." So long as it was not violated by any other Power Great Britain would certainly not send troops into Belgian ter- ritory. 2 This last sentence is particularly important, because it refutes the German interpretation of the documents dis- covered in Brussels by the Germans after their capture of the city. 3 In the spring of 1906 General Ducarne, of the Belgian general staff, and Lieutenant- Colonel Barnardis- ton, the British military attacne in Brussels, worked out a 1 Belgian, no. 12. 2 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 350. 3 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 November, 1914; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 354-361. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 479 plan for the co-operation of 100,000 British troops with those of Belgium. The Germans published General Du- carne's report of this plan as evidence that Belgium had sold herself and her neutrality to Great Britain, and that the latter would undertake offensive operations against Germany through Belgium. Unfortunately, the docu- ment bears the following marginal note: "The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the vio- lation of our neutrality by Germany." In 191 2 Lieutenant- Colonel Bridges, in a confidential interview with General Jungbluth, remarked that "the British Government, at the time of the recent events (the Agadir crisis), would have immediately landed troops on Belgian territory, even if Belgium had not asked for help"; to which the general re- plied that "their consent would be necessary for this." From the document itself it is impossible to determine whether the British attache was revealing what had been the secret intentions of his government or was voicing a personal opinion; but the Belgian Government has semi- officially stated that there was only "a private conversa- tion between two officers of high rank, which had no refer- ence to any official mission." * The documents are not conventions formally signed between the British and Bel- gian Governments, but are records of conversations; Sir Edward Grey has stated that he never knew of these con- versations, and that no reports of them are on file at the British war office, which fully demonstrates their unofficial character. Finally, King Albert of Belgium has said: "No one in Belgium ever gave the name of Anglo-Belgian con- ventions to the letter of General Ducarne to the minister of war, detailing the entirely informal conversations with the British mili- tary attache, but I was so desirous of avoiding even the semblance of anything that might be construed as unneutral that I had the matters 1 J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian minister of state, On the Violation of Belgian Neu- trality, in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 364. 480 ENGLAND AND GERMANY of which it is now sought to make so much communicated to the German military attache in Brussels. When the Germans went through our archives, they knew exactly what they would find, and all their present surprise and indignation is assumed." l There is, then, no reason for believing that the conduct of both the British and the Belgian Governments was oth- erwise than correct: the object of the conversations was to guard against the two governments being taken unawares if the neutrality of Belgium was actually violated by Ger- many. Now, "the strategic dispositions of Germany, es- pecially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium." 2 This fear was, indeed, a matter of common discussion. If the reader will consult the Fort- nightly Review for February, 1910, and February, 19 14, he will find two articles describing in great detail the military railways of Germany on the Belgian frontier, and arguing that the purpose of such lines was to make possible a Ger- man advance through Belgium. The New York Times of 23 January, 19 14, contains a Brussels despatch, under date of 9 January, describing the new line just completed which linked up the Belgian town of Stavelot with the German town of Malmedy. The correspondent commented upon probable lack of both passengers and freight for the rail- way, which he described as "another strategic line which, in the case of war between England and Germany, or par- ticularly in the case of an Anglo-French and German war, would be of great strategic value to Germany." He con- tinued: "Germany has thereby accomplished the first and more essential part of her plan for the peaceful penetration of the Ardennes. Eng- land has done nothing to stop it; France has done nothing. With- 1 Interview with H. N. Hall, in American newspapers, 22 March, 1915. 2 "Memorandum" prepared by the British foreign office, in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 365. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 481 out their very energetic intervention Belgium is helpless, and so Germany perfects and prolongs her railway system, like her navy, for 'the day' without stay or interference." In the light of what has been said, the interest of Great Britain in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality is appar- ent, and, considering the German attitude assumed on 29 July, the one hope of preserving peace lay in the chance that Germany might hesitate if she were convinced that Great Britain would resist by force an attempt to invade France through Belgium. Accordingly, on 31 July Sir Edward Grey addressed the following identic communica- tion to the French and German Governments: "I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it." * Informing the Belgian Government of this demarche, Sir Edward said: "I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe." 2 It is impossible to say whether Sir Edward Grey really expected Germany to abide by her treaty obligation, but it was his duty to put this question to her, just as Lord Granville had put it in 1870. The language used by Sir Edward deserves close scrutiny. He asked if the French and the Germans were "prepared to engage to respect the neu- trality of Belgium." If the replies were in the affirmative, his next step would doubtless have been, following the prec- edent of 1870, to submit to France and Germany identic treaties, by which the British Government bound itself, •British, no. 114; Belgian, no. 13; Russian, no. 72. J British, no. 115. 482 ENGLAND AND GERMANY in case one Power violated the neutrality of Belgium, to assist the other Power with all its forces. Of course, it may be argued, and it has been argued, that Sir Edward Grey was, for all practical purposes, well aware of Germany's intention to march across Belgium, and that his question was asked simply to provide him with an excuse for advising Parliament to sanction a British declaration of war against Germany. Is not the question somewhat academic? Those who believe that England was bound, both morally and for her own interests, to support France in a defensive war against Germany will say that Sir Edward Grey was entirely justified in seeking a legal and sound justification for British intervention. If the other theory is held — that Germany was attacked by Russia, and was driven in self- defense to cross Belgium — then British intervention was a gratuitous affront; then the parading of Belgian neutrality was a sham quite worthy of English hypocrisy. As a matter of fact, the following paragraphs will endeavor to show that if Germany had agreed to respect the neutrality of Belgium British participation in the Great War would have been unlikely, as the situation stood on 4 August, 1914. The French Government replied immediately to the British demand, that they were "resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise." 1 From Brussels the news came that "Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power." 2 Sir Edward Goschen, however, telegraphed from Berlin: "I have seen secretary of state, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the chancellor before he could possibly 1 British, no. 125; French, no. 122. 2 British, no. 128; Belgian, no. 11. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 483 reply. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request." J This reply, or rather refusal to reply, by the German Gov- ernment made it certain not only that Germany was in- tending war but that she was preparing to march through Belgium. When military considerations prevent an an- swer to a diplomatic question, there can be only one in- terpretation of the state of affairs, and this must be kept in mind when considering the events of Saturday, 1 August. Even before receiving the German reply Sir Edward Grey knew that the situation was desperate, although he continued his efforts for peace ; for the ambassador in Paris had informed him of the German ultimatums to Russia and France. 2 The French Government inquired what would be the attitude of England. A decision must soon be made. Nevertheless, at the cabinet meeting held Saturday morning no action was taken, 3 no doubt because Sir Edward Grey thought he might be able to restrict the conflict to eastern Europe. It had been reported to him that Prince Lichnowsky had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in an Austro-Russian war if Great Britain remained neutral and secured the neutrality of France, and that in this case Germany would engage not to attack France. 4 , Sir Edward Grey asked Prince Lichnowsky about this over the tele- phone about eleven o'clock Saturday morning. To Sir Edward the essential thing was to secure the neutrality of Germany, as that would insure the immunity of France, but Prince Lichnowsky grasped only the second part of the 1 British, no. 122; French, no. 123; Belgian, no. 14. 2 British, no. 117. 'French, no. 126. * Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 August, 1914. (5 Hansard Ixvi, c. 264.) 484 ENGLAND AND GERMANY idea. So he telegraphed for authority to declare that "in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war, Germany would not attack the French." l The chan- cellor replied to the ambassador, and the German Emperor telegraphed to King George, that Germany was ready to accept the British proposal "in case England guaranteed with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo- German conflict." 2 Sir Edward Grey had to explain that Prince Lichnowsky had misunderstood his proposal, and that the German counter-proposal was, so far as he knew, not compatible with the Franco-Russian alliance; that is, the casus foederis must operate equally with France and Germany. 3 Prince Lichnowsky promised to send a second telegram to Berlin to remove the misunderstanding, but apparently did not do so, 4 except to say that "the sugges- tions of Sir Edward Grey, based on the desire of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without any previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of the [German] mobilization, and have since been given up as quite impracticable." 5 In just what fashion England could have guaranteed the neutrality of France was not explained by the German Government. In- deed, at the very time of making this proposal, Germany was despatching her declaration of war to St. Petersburg (12.52 p. m.). She cannot have seriously imagined that, if she attacked Russia, France would remain neutral, unless she was prepared to repudiate her alliance and place herself at the mercy of a victorious Germany. In view of Prince Lichnowsky's first telegram, the German Government may 1 Second German White Book, no. 5 ; telegrams in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1014, no. 1. {Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 541.) 2 Second German White Book, nos. 6, 7. 3 Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 August, 1014. (5 Hansard Ixvi, c. 265.) 4 The German Government denied that such a telegram was received from Prince Lichnowsky. (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1914-) 5 Second German White Book, no. 9. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 485 be acquitted of bad faith, but it is scarcely fair to charge, as did the N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in publishing the correspondence, that Great Britain rejected a positive opportunity to secure both its own and French neutrality. The German offer was based on a misconception, and was beyond the realm of practical politics. On Saturday afternoon Sir Edward Grey had another interview with Prince Lichnowsky. He read to the am- bassador this declaration of the cabinet: "The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu- trality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Ger- many could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to re- strain public feeling in this country." * The ambassador then asked whether, if Germany promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain would engage to remain neutral. Sir Edward would only say that "our attitude would be determined very largely by public opinion, and the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion." Finally, pressed by the ambassador to formulate the conditions of British neu- trality, including, it was suggested, the integrity of France and her colonies, Sir Edward "felt obliged to refuse defi- nitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms." This incident has been very generally misunderstood. At first sight the British Government seems convicted, on its own evidence, of declining to formulate the conditions in which it would stand aside. Therefore, it is argued, England was committed to France and Russia. Nothing is 1 British, no. 123. 486 ENGLAND AND GERMANY farther from the truth. In the first place, Prince Lich- nowsky credited Sir Edward Grey with saying that "for the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us," and that "it would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so." 1 Next, as Sir Edward later pointed out, the offers of Prince Lichnowsky were entirely unofficial and quite contrary to the terms proposed officially by the German chancellor; also that so far was the German Government from guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium that two days later it was asking Great Britain not to make that neu- trality one of the conditions of her own neutrality. 2 Third, the circumstances of the moment must be fully considered. Sir Edward Grey knew that Germany had required Russia to demobilize within twelve hours and had asked France what her intentions, were; at the same time Austro-Russian conversations were proceeding. The German declaration of war was on its way, but this was not known in London. There was the barest chance that peace might still be kept, but that chance depended upon the uncertainty as to the British attitude. If Great Britain definitely promised to stand aside, the last restraint on Germany would be re- moved. Sir Edward Grey could not regard the overtures of Prince Lichnowsky as other than a bribe, which was unacceptable, no matter what the terms were. The only sound policy for the British Government was to stand firm against all temptations, whether from Germany or France, and to keep its hands free, and this policy it adopted; for, if Sir Edward Grey would not promise British neutrality to Germany, neither would he promise British assistance to France. The wisdom of this decision became apparent when the news arrived that the German authorities at 1 Telegrams in Norddeutscke Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September, 1914, no. 2. (Col- lected Diplomatic Documents, p. 541.) 2 French, no. 144; cf. also the appeal to British public opinion, published by the German embassy on 3 August, 1914, and British, no. 157. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 487 Hamburg were detaining British merchant ships. 1 Such measures certainly cast a doubt upon the sincerity with which the German Government was angling for the neu- trality of England, and more than justified the waiting attitude of Sir Edward Grey. From now on events marched rapidly. "Very early" Sunday morning German troops penetrated into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg by the bridges of Wasser- billig and Remich, in spite of the protests of the Grand Ducal Government. 2 Whether this news turned the scale in the British cabinet — which was still discussing the ques- tion of neutrality — in favor of intervention cannot be ascer- tained. Under the terms of the treaty of 1867, as inter- preted by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon, the British Government was bound to act only if all the guaranteeing Powers agreed to do so. The Times, however, demanded immediate action on the ground that Belgium would be the next victim. At all events, after the cabinet, Sir Ed- ward Grey gave the following memorandum to the French ambassador: "I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hos- tile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all protection in its power. " This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." 3 Sir Edward Grey also informed M. Paul Cambon that the British Government was considering whether it should make the violation of Belgian neutrality a casus belli. 1 British, no. 130. 'British, no. 147; French, no. 131; Belgian, no. 18. 3 British, no. 148; French, no. 137. 488 ENGLAND AND GERMANY The next day, 3 August, the decision was taken to regard the Belgian question in this light, and this, together with the promise of assistance to France, received the support of both Houses of Parliament, after Sir Edward Grey, in a masterly speech, had explained his policy and the obli- gations of the government. 1 The foreign secretary admitted that no legal obligations bound Great Britain to assist France, for the exchange of letters of 22 November, 191 2, left the hands of both govern- ments free to take what decision the circumstances of the moment required. But, since the French Government, re- lying on the friendship of England, had withdrawn its fleet from the Channel and concentrated it in the Mediter- ranean, the British Government was morally bound, urged Sir Edward Grey, to protect the undefended coasts of France. The question, however, was not so much one of sentiment as of British interests, and it was primarily on the ground of British interests that Parliament was asked to approve the promise of naval assistance. The distinc- tion is all-important. If Sir Edward Grey had limited his argument to the moral duty of England to support France, it is problematical whether he would have carried the House of Commons with him. But when he said that Brit- ish interests required a certain policy he aroused the pa- triotism of members and achieved an ovenv-helming victory. Sordid reasoning, perhaps. But does it not show that as the situation stood on 3 August, 19 14, Sir Edward Grey did not consider that British interests demanded the de- spatch of an expeditionary force to the Continent? He did not hint at this in the course of his speech, except in case Great Britain should be called upon to defend the neutrality of Belgium. This is not to say that ultimately a British army might not have been sent to the assistance of France. But it is useless to discuss possibilities. The 1 s Hansard Ixv, cc. 1809-27. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 489 essential fact is that Great Britain, with perfect freedom, did not go beyond the offer of naval assistance in a defined contingency. Now, just before Sir Edward Grey went to the House of Commons he was informed that Germany was prepared to pledge herself not to attack the coasts of France in re- turn for British neutrality. Sir Edward declared that this offer was "far too narrow an engagement," because it did not guarantee the neutrality of Belgium, although Germany was ready to respect its territorial integrity and inde- pendence. 1 If to this offer Germany had been willing to add the neutrality of Belgium, it would have been prac- tically impossible for Great Britain to join France and Russia against Germany. Her own conditions would have been accepted by Germany; she would have had no case before the world; her public opinion would not have sanc- tioned a war in which British interests were not directly involved, even though the balance of power would have been upset by a German victory over France. In their book, Why We Are at War: Great Britain's Case, the members of the Oxford faculty of modern history say: "History will doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany to the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will judge that, had it not been for the gratui- tous attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on 4 August, 1914." 2 With this opinion the present writer is in complete agree- ment. Sir Edward Grey may possibly have desired a gen- eral commitment to France; he did not advocate it to Parliament, and his straightforward character and honesty forbid us to believe that he would have concealed a per- 1 British, no. 157; Herr von Bethmann-Hol'.weg, Reichstag, 4 August, 1914. * P. 90. 490 ENGLAND AND GERMANY sonal opinion of such magnitude. He relied frankly on public sentiment, and it is generally agreed that, until Belgium appealed for British help against Germany, the sentiment of England was averse to intervention in the terrible struggle. Once she decided to make war, England would fight for her own interests as well as those of Bel- gium. But there is nothing in the published evidence to show that her declaration of war was dictated by a consid- ered hostility to Germany, or that she avoided a single ef- fort which would have enabled her honorably and with a rightful concern for her own national interests to remain at peace. The rest of the story can be quite briefly told. As early as 24 July the Belgian Government was considering what action would be required of Belgium "to fulfil the in- ternational obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers." x On 29 July the army was placed on "a strengthened peace foot- ing," 2 and on the 31st mobilization was ordered, before the British minister had communicated the note from Sir Edward Grey asking Belgium "to do her utmost to main- tain her neutrality." 3 On the same day, however, the German minister was informed that Belgium's military preparations in no way implied an attitude of distrust toward her neighbors, 4 but that she must fulfil her obliga- tions. Thus before Sir Edward Grey raised the question of her neutrality Belgium was preparing to resist any attempt to infringe it: she did not resist under British pressure, as has been alleged by Germany. Indeed, on 1 August, as soon as the refusal of Herr von Jagow to answer Sir Edward Grey's question became known in Brussels, the Belgian representatives to the guaranteeing Powers were instructed to inform those Powers that, although Bel- 1 Belgian, no. 2. 2 Belgian, no. 8. 3 Belgian, no. 10. * Belgian, no. 12. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 491 gium confidently expects that her territory "will remain free from attack," nevertheless "all necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have been taken by the government." 1 On Sunday, 2 August, M. Davignon, the Belgian foreign minister, and Herr von Below-Saleske, the German minister, were assuring each other of the "perfect correctness" in the relations of their two countries. 2 At 7 p. m. Herr von Below met M. Davignon again — to present a note proposing friendly neutrality, and allow- ing twelve hours for a reply. "Reliable information has been received by the German Govern- ment," declared the ultimatum, "to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory." Therefore the German Government demanded a free pas- sage for its troops through Belgium, in return for which it guaranteed to maintain the independence of Belgium in full, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace, and to pay an indemnity for any damage caused by the German troops. But, should Belgium oppose the ad- vance of the German troops, she would be treated as an enemy, and "the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms." 3 At 1.30 A. m. on 3 August the German minister came again to the foreign office to say that "French diri- gibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier" into Germany; "these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts contrary to in- ternational law would be committed by France" ! 4 The German ultimatum "made a deep and painful im- 1 Belgian, nos. 16, 2 (enclosure). * Belgian, no. ig. » Belgian, no. 20. 4 Belgian, no. 21. 492 ENGLAND AND GERMANY pression upon the Belgian Government," which replied with a considered refusal, 1 and informed the Powers that "Belgium was firmly resolved to repel any attack by all means in her power." 2 But as no act of hostility was com- mitted by Germany on 3 August, although the ultimatum expired at 7 a. m., the Belgian Government did not ap- peal to the Powers for assistance. It contented itself with the despatch of a telegram from King Albert to King George, making "a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integ- rity of Belgium." 3 At 6 a. m., on 4 August the German minister communicated a second note, announcing the in- tention of his government "to take — if necessary by force of arms — those measures of defense already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France." 4 But still Belgium waited. Both Great Britain and France of- fered their assistance to the harassed little kingdom, 5 but not until the evening of 4 August, until the Belgian frontier had actually been violated at Gemmenich, 6 did the Belgian Government appeal to Great Britain, France, and Russia, "to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defense of her territory." 7 "We see in this narrative how scrupu- lously careful the Belgian Government was to avoid the slightest sign of suspicion, the slightest inclination to one of the guaranteeing Powers rather than the other, the slight- est confession of mistrust — in short, the smallest move- ment in any direction, by word or deed, which could fur- nish the shadow of a pretext for such charges as those which have since actually been made." 8 With regard to the German allegations that France had violated the neutrality of Belgium, it is sufficient to ob- 1 Belgian, no. 22. 2 Belgian, no. 23. 3 Belgian, no. 25. 4 Belgian, no. 27; British, no. 154; French, no. 154. 6 British, nos. 151, 155; French, no. 142; Belgian, nos. 24, 28, 37. e Belgian, no. 30; British, no. 158; French, no. 151. ' Belgian, no. 40; French, no. 152. 8 Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. xvi. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 493 serve: first, that the German ultimatum speaks only of the intentions of France; second, that Herr von Bethmann- Hollweg, in the Reichstag on 4 August, simply said that " France stood ready for an invasion," although he ad- mitted that "the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it"; and third, that the French campaign, so far from being launched through Belgium, was actually directed into Alsace and Lorraine. Subse- quently, the Germans charged that French officers were sent to the Liege forts, and that the British had accumu- lated supplies in Maubeuge, before the outbreak of war. No proof of either charge was ever produced, and both were denied by the interested governments. There seems to be no adequate ground for assertions that either England or France had in any manner trespassed upon Belgian soil before their assistance was formally invited by the Bel- gian Government. With quite exemplary frankness Herr von Jagow brushed aside all such quibbles when Sir Edward Goschen made a final appeal to him "to avoid the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue." "Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had already been violated; Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the imperial government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their preparations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as soon as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier." 1 1 British, no. 160. 494 ENGLAND AND GERMANY When King Albert's telegram to King George had been considered and when Sir Edward Goschen reported that there was "no information available" about the detention of British ships at Hamburg, 1 Sir Edward Grey sent an exceedingly stiff note to Berlin. Quoting the text of the Belgian King's appeal, he said: "His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Bel- gian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of a refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. "We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. "His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply." 2 In the course of the day the British Government learned of the second German note and the violation of Belgian territory by German troops. 3 Herr von Jagow sought to "dispel any mistrust ... by repeating most positively [the] formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretext what- ever, annex Belgian territory," the sincerity of this pledge to be guaranteed by the promise to respect the neutrality of Holland. "It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland." 4 But such a promise, coming as it did from a government which had already broken a much more solemn obligation — a 1 British, no. 150. 2 British, no. 153. 3 British, nos. 154, 158; Belgian, no. 36. 4 British, no. 157. THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 495 formal treaty — was obviously worthless, and did not meet the unassailable objection that the neutrality of Belgium had been devised to prevent, not to encourage, war. So Sir Edward Grey despatched his ultimatum: "We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian min- ister for foreign affairs stating that German Government will be com- pelled to carry out — if necessary by force of arms — the measures considered indispensable. "We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. "In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Ber- lin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satis- factory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves." ' As is well known, Herr von Jagow informed the British ambassador that "to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given earlier in the day." The ambassador then proceeded to visit the chancellor, who said that "just for a word — 'neutrality' — word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kin- dred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." 2 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg subsequently sought to explain away the fatal words. He had meant that Great Britain was availing herself of Belgian neutrality as a pretext to engage in a war to which she was already committed. The argument, however, will not be accepted by those who accept the thesis advanced in previous para- graphs — that Belgian neutrality was the actual and not the 1 British, no. 159; Belgian, no. 39. ' British, no. 160. 496 ENGLAND AND GERMANY assumed cause of the British declaration of war. In any case, the Germans have been too fertile in rinding excuses for their acts after they have been condemned by the conscience of the world. The reflection is inevitably suggested by the German violation of Belgian neutrality that it was designed not merely as a step in the conquest of France, but as an in- centive to involve Great Britain in the war. If the history of England holds one hackneyed fact, it is that the island kingdom has always resisted any attempt upon the liberties of the Low Countries. Germany was as aware of this as any one else, and must have counted the consequences. It is possible that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow hoped to cajole Great Britain into standing aside; but the military party, which was always the centre of the Anglophobe agitation, can have had no illusions. After all, Germany could not achieve her self-imposed destiny until she had destroyed the existing British Empire; so that, if England had bargained away her obligation to defend Belgium, she would one day have had to with- stand unaided the attack of a Germany that had achieved an easy victory over France and Russia. That Germany would have been immeasurably more powerful, more ag- gressive, than the Germany of 1914. Thus England's interest quite as much as England's honor compelled her to take sides in the Great War, and it is no reproach to her that she made the two identical and declared war to preserve both. There may have been another motive for the invasion of Belgium. For years Germany has looked longingly toward the Congo. The chancellor has said that on 4 August he "already had certain indications, but no abso- lute proof upon which to base a public accusation, that Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in its relations with England." This not only confirms the argu- THE ANGLO-GERMAN RUPTURE 497 ment of the last paragraph, but suggests that Germany- knew that Belgium would resist her infringement of neu- trality. But Herr von Jagow assured Sir Edward Grey that Germany would not annex Belgian territory, meaning, according to the context, Belgian territory in Europe. Yet Belgium assuredly would not go unpunished for resistance to German arms. The penalty might be paid in Africa, by the cession of the Congo. This also would have affected British interests under certain conditions, and was per- haps an additional factor in convincing Sir Edward Grey that England must protest to the bitter end against all pressure upon Belgium in whatever guise it might be in- voked. This is the end of our story. It has not been contended in this book that all the right in the Anglo- German con- troversy has been on one side and all the wrong on the other. It has been freely admitted that at times the atti- tude of both the British Government and the British people was not friendly to the aims and aspirations of Germany. But it has been argued that much the greater share of the provocation came from Germany, and that the English position from first to last was essentially defensive. Fur- thermore, in the two years before the war a determined effort was made by England to heed such complaints of Germany as could be met by reasonable concessions, and with such apparent success that an adjustment of all diffi- culties seemed possible. In the negotiations preceding the war, however, these hopeful auguries were not fulfilled, and despite the strenuous efforts of Sir Edward Grey Ger- many allowed the war to come — even precipitated it her- self. Thus Germany must bear almost the entire respon- sibility for the fatal ending of her rivalry with England. This fact is too apt to be overlooked, now that the world is weary of the great struggle and longs passionately for 498 ENGLAND AND GERMANY peace. But for England there can be no bargaining for peace until Belgium is restored to her independence and integrity, until France is secured against future aggression, the rights of small nations vindicated, and the Prussian military machine defeated. It is a formidable programme, and at the moment of writing (September, 191 5) the pros- pect is anything but cheering for the Allies. But to talk of peace now — except in the unimaginable hypothesis that Germany will evacuate Belgium and Poland — is futile, for it would be tantamount to admitting the justice of German aggression. Britain's record in the past is not unstained, and even in this war she has done some things that are not palatable to American tastes. But, compared with the crimson offenses of Germany, her peccadilloes are insignifi- cant. Until Great Britain and Greater Britain are actually beaten to their knees, we shall continue to believe that Germany will be punished for having unchained this ter- rible war; and we take courage from the glorious past. To the lover of liberty and the opponent of forceful domi- nation, the situation need not seem less hopeless than was the state of affairs about 181 1, when the whole of Europe, except England, lay prostrate at the feet of Napoleon. The Napoleonic Empire collapsed with nerve-racking sud- denness. We are permitted to hope that British stub- bornness, British credit, British valor will yet, with the assistance of its allies, prevail against the forces of mili- tarism and absolutism, and that the German debacle, far off as it may be, is as inevitable as the fall of the first French empire. APPENDIX Since this book was written the German Government has published, under the title European Politics in the Decade before the War as Described by Belgian Diplomatists, a series of secret reports made to the Belgian Government in the years 1905-14, by its ministers in London, Paris, and Berlin. Found in Brus- sels when that city was occupied by the German army, the reports are published with the remark that they "provide a running commentary on European history during the past decade, throwing light which, once shed, could by no means ever be spared, on the causes of the cataclysm through which Europe is now passing." The future historian is assured that the documents "will rank high" among the sources to which he will turn in the writing of a definitive narrative: "They are not the words of German apologists. They are the words of disinterested expert observers — the considered words, though set down in the very midst of events as they pass. They register the convictions of five professional students of contem- porary international history, living in the three chief capitals of Europe and possessing unparalleled access to the facts, with the advantage of being detached and unprejudiced with regard to them." The despatches are supposed to prove that England enticed France — and later Russia — to oppose Germany, and engineered a campaign for the diplomatic isolation of the great Empire in central Europe. Much is also made of reports from the lega- tion in Paris respecting the revival in France of the idea of revanche, for which President Poincare chiefly, and to a lesser extent M. Delcasse, are held responsible. Russian diplomatists are criticised by the minister in Berlin for their personal ambi- tions and lack of discipline. In short, it is contended, the docu- ments prove the entire correctness of German policy in the ten years before the war and its eminently peaceful character. 499 500 APPENDIX "A more complete indictment of English statesmanship," con- cludes the introduction, "as the enemy of the peace of the world, a deliberate and persistent conspirator against an unoffending neighbor, could not possibly be framed." As to the renascence of French patriotism, chauvinism if one likes, after the crisis of 191 1, no one ever denied it, but surely the conduct of Germany in that year and the subsequent in- creases of the German army were as much responsible as the fact that M. Poincare came from Lorraine and neglected no opportunity to remind France of the lost province. The "reve- lations" about French policy in Morocco and the willingness of Great Britain to assist France in that matter contain nothing that was not known to students of diplomacy; as a matter of fact, the points made by the Belgian ministers have been dis- cussed in Chapters IX and XI of this book. The criticisms of Russian policy, although they reflect the irritation of the German Government at the Anglo-Russian agreement, which had been considered impossible, refer chiefly to the period of the Balkan Wars. They do not extend beyond the fact that Russia was behind the Balkan League and sup- ported the contentions of Serbia against Austria; but they testify to the pacific intentions of M. Sazonof, and do not men- tion that on the advice of Russia Serbia receded from her posi- tion and acceded to the demands of Austria. The comments of the Belgian minister in Vienna are not published. The minister in London seems to have been genuinely sus- picious of the British attitude toward Germany, but he adduces no new facts. He merely repeats the hackneyed charge that England was jealous of German commercial expansion, laying special emphasis on the activities of the late King Edward VII. But he does not go so far as his colleague in Berlin, who wrote (no. 85) that "everybody in England and France considers the entente cordiale as a defensive and offensive alliance against Germany"; on the contrary, Count de Lalaing in one despatch (no. n) remarked that England was "evidently animated by the desire to avoid a conflict." The criticisms of English policy furnished by the Belgian minister cannot be ignored, but, after APPENDIX 501 all, he was only an observer, and other observers, probably as acute as himself, have formed other opinions. It is pertinent to ask: If the Belgian Government shared his views as to the danger to Belgium from British or French policy, why did it permit the conversations between the British and Belgian mili- tary authorities concerning the defense of Belgian neutrality? Is it not likely that, with all due respect to Count de Lalaing and his colleagues in Paris and Berlin, King Albert's Govern- ment regarded the danger as greater from the German than from the Anglo-French side? It is, indeed, quite impossible to accept the Belgian testimony at the value placed upon it by the German foreign office. There are constantly references, in the despatches from each capital, to reports which are not published. Whether the Ger- mans found these reports in the Brussels archives and sup- pressed them is not known, but the historian will insist on see- ing them before forming a final opinion on the attitude of any Belgian minister. Again, there are no reports from Vienna, Rome, or St. Petersburg, reports which might very well contra- dict the opinions of the ministers in the other three capitals. Thirdly, sixty of the one hundred and nineteen despatches come from the legation in Berlin, forty-nine during the incum- bency of Baron Greindl, who was notoriously anti-English and anti-French in his views and descants at length upon the sup- posed intentions of London and Paris. His successor, Baron Beyens, was more impartial; incidentally, he remarks in one place (no. 113) that his view "may be wrong or influenced by the reading of political writings emanating from German pens." The reports do not cover all the events of the years 1905-14. The Baghdad railway is scarcely mentioned; the Turkish revo- lution not at all. The Austrian railway scheme of 1908 is re- ferred to once casually; the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in two despatches. The Franco-German convention of Feb- ruary, 1909 about Morocco and its subsequent history is ig- nored. The truth is, the reports, as they stand, give a very incomplete view of the multifarious activities of European diplomacy, and with possibly two exceptions bring to light no facts which were not known to students of contemporary history. 502 APPENDIX Finally, the German foreign office is not content to let the documents speak for themselves. Forgetful that its White Book, published at the outbreak of the war, failed to carry con- viction, because it presented a German interpretation of events supported by occasional telegrams, instead of publishing the diplomatic correspondence in extenso, it has prepared an intro- duction to the present collection. By removing selected pas- sages from their context it is possible to make out a brilliant case against the Entente Powers, but sometimes this procedure is dishonest. The introduction prints this question, raised by Baron Beyens on 24 April, 1914: "We have had the proof that a co-operation of the British army and the despatching of an expeditionary corps to the Continent have been considered by the military authorities of the two govern- ments (England and France). "Would it be the same to-day, and should we still have to fear THE ENTRY OF BRITISH SOLDIERS INTO BELGIUM IN ORDER TO HELP US DEFEND OUR NEUTRALITY BY FIRST COMPROMISING IT? " But it does not print Baron Beyens's answer to his own question: "If the question is examined from the German point of view — the only one which I can consider — a negative answer is not doubt- ful" (!) In general, the introduction never refers to certain statements of the ministers in Paris and Berlin, that the people of France were peace-loving, and that the policy of their government was, on the whole, animated by similar motives, even though it was often subjected to pressure from the small but noisy war party. Thus Baron' Guillaume, the minister in Paris, writing on 25 April, 1914, says, a propos of Anglo-French relations: "They have during the^last months given undisputable proofs of their efficacy and they were favorable for the maintenance of general peace, while at the same time they were not in the way of other attempts at rapprochement which equally furthered the European equilibrium." (No. 114.) APPENDIX 503 Nor would the reader of the introduction learn that an Anglo- German detente was being prepared on the eve of the war, although there is some evidence of it in the despatches them- selves. To make matters worse, black letters, and sometimes capitals, are used to emphasize those passages of the documents which are favorable to the German case. It would be idle to ignore these Belgian reports, for they are almost the only documents covering the years 1905-14 that have come to light; but they are incomplete: they may be quoted against France and England, but they do not establish a case that is irrefutable. Another collection of documents has also appeared too late for use in the writing of this book. It is the second Belgian Grey Book. The first Grey Book dealt with the action of the Brussels Government to preserve its neutrality in the struggle which was felt to be impending after the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In this volume we are allowed to see the impressions made upon the Belgian ministers in the several capitals by the diplomacy of the Great Powers in July- August, 1914. And since the German foreign office, in the col- lection of despatches reviewed above, was pleased to insist upon the impartiality of the Belgian diplomatists, it is worth while to notice what these gentlemen say about the course of events immediately preceding the Great War. In general, the ministers in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg testify to the absolute loyalty of the Entente govern- ments in trying to preserve peace, and to an equally determined refusal on the part of Germany and Austria to give heed to warnings or expostulations. Space permits only a few cita- tions from the correspondence. Count Errembault de Dud- zeele at Vienna and Baron Beyens at Berlin agree that Count Berchtold's policy was influenced largely by the desire to re- cover the prestige which had been shattered by his conduct during the Balkan Wars (nos. 3, 6). They also believe that he would not have proceeded so recklessly without inspiration from Berlin (nos. 8, 9). Baron Beyens is inclined to believe that the German foreign office would have liked to see a peace- 504 APPENDIX ful solution of the crisis (nos. 6, 52), but "a superior power in- tervened to precipitate the march of events." The minister in St. Petersburg quotes the French ambassador in that capital to the effect that Count Pourtales worked for peace (no. 17). Baron B evens specifically ascribes the attitude of the German Emperor to " the opinion which prevails in the German general staff that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near — an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share" (no. 8). The Emperor's hatred of regicide also played its part in bringing about his decision. With respect to the Emperor's exchange of telegrams with the Tsar, Baron Beyens writes on 1 August, 1914 (no. 20): "The German Government seems to have arranged this scenario in order to lead up to the war, which it seeks to render inevitable, but the responsibility for which it desires to throw upon Russia." Reference was made on p. 472 to the intercepted despatch of the Belgian charge in St. Petersburg, according to which Russia was sure of British support as early as 29 July. To the reasons there given for rejecting this interpretation may be added the statement of the Belgian minister, who returned to his post on 31 July (no. 17): "I have just had a talk with the British ambassador. He tells me that M. Sazonof had tried from the outset to ascertain the in- tentions of the London Government, but, up till now, in spite of the mobilization of the British fleet, Sir George Buchanan has not yet been instructed to make any communication of this kind to the Pont des Chantres. The instructions of the ambassador are to explain to St. Petersburg that if Russia desires the support of Great Britain, it must carefully avoid even the appearance of any aggressive step in the present crisis." As regards the conduct of Belgium, three despatches may be noted. On 22 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume, the minister in Paris, explained to the French foreign office that "it was the intention of Belgium to possess an army which should be strong enough to be taken seriously, and which would allow her to APPENDIX 505 fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her independence of neutrality" (no. 1). This ought to dispose of the German con- tention that Belgium had sold herself to England by the con- versations of 1906 and 191 2, even if there were not recorded the categorical declaration of Baron Beyens to Herr Zimmermann, of the German foreign office, that "if France had been ready first and had demanded a passage of us on the same con- ditions as Germany, we should have made the same reply to her" (no. 52). Baron Beyens also forced from Herr von Jagow the admission: "Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct." The Ger- man foreign secretary finally said that "as a private individual" he recognized the justice of Belgium's position, and that the violation of her neutrality was "the most painful resolution and the most cruel thing [he had] had to do throughout [his] career" (no. 51). If Germany contends that the Belgian despatches from 1905 to 1914 establish the guilt of the Entente, Powers, she must also admit that the second Grey Book disposes effectually of the thesis that she is not to blame for the outbreak of war on 1 August, 1914. INDEX Abbas II, Khedive of Egypt, 273. Abdel Assiz, Sultan of Morocco, 229, 304- Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, 142, 152, 260, 261, 262-263, 272, 278, 279- 280, 281, 282, 283, 284. Abyssinia, Anglo-French-Italian agree- ment of 1907 in re, 240. Aden, 195. Admiralty Memorandum (1912), 174. Adrianople, 359. Adriatic Sea, 240, 256, 287, 396. Aerenthal, Baron von, Austrian foreign minister, 1906-1912, 286, 287, 291, 296, 402. Af aires du Maroc (French Yellow Books), 224, 310. Afghanistan, 5, 18, 21, 32, 241, 272. Africa, 5, 15, 20-21, 28, 32, 78-79, 84-85, I3S-I37. 141-142, 144, 147, 239. 263, 272, 336, 343. 356, 371-372, 391-392, 497- African Act (1885), 336. Agadir, 302, 309, 312, 314-319, 321, 323, 325-327, 329, 332, 339- Akaba, 272. Albania, 256-257, 297, 362-364, 378, 395, 398. Albert, King of the Belgians, 384-385, 392-393, 479-48o, 492, 494, 501. Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Vic- toria, 123, 125. Aleppo, 272. Alexander, Crown Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia, 412, 418. Alexander, King of Serbia, 257. Alexander, Prince, of Battenberg, 134. Alexander I, of Russia, 120. Alexandretta, 300. Alexandria, 19, 178, 198. Alfonso, King, of Spain, 29, 239. Algeciras, Act of, 303-304, 306-307, 309, 313-314, 3i7, 326, 328, 342. Algeria, 79, 230, 233. Alsace-Lorraine, 46, 48-49, 118, 120, 128, 136, 139, 356, 374, 467, 493, 500. Ameer of Afghanistan, 17, 29. Amran, L. von, Englands Land-und-See Polilik und die Mackte, 197. "An Englishman's Home," 185. Anatolian Railway Company, 266. Andre, General, French war minister, 179. Angell, Norman, 98; The Great Illusion, 63, 76, 355- Anglo-Congolese treaty (1894), 141. Anglo-Dutch wars, 198, 205. Anglo-French arbitration treaty (1903), 25, 224; convention (8 April, 1904), 28, 139, 153, 180, 224, 235, 322, 323, 324, 326, 334, 342. Anglo-German agreement in re Turkey and Africa (1914), 195, 367-377, 47o; alliance, proposed (1899), 148-150; convention in re Africa (1890), 137, 139; convention in re China (October, 1900), 147, 150-151; treaty in re Portuguese colonies (1898), 85, 144, 346, 372. Anglo-German-Japanese alliance, pro- posed (1901), 148. Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902), 26, 28, 29, 148, 179, 243, 348. Anglo-Portuguese alliance, 348, 371; treaty (1884), 136. Anglo-Russian convention (31 August, *9°l)> 3°, 241-242, 281-282, 286, 298, 379- Anglo-Turkish agreement (19 14), 370. Angola, 372. Angora, 266. Angra Pequena, 78, 135, 145. Anna, 279. Annual Register, 145, 180, 224, 245, 250. Arabi Pasha, 19. Arabia, 253, 258, 262, 271, 275, 297. Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna), 461. Arbitration, 25, 413, 428. Armenia, 298; massacres, 259-260; re- forms, 374. Army and Navy Gazette, 206. 507 5 o8 INDEX Army increases of 1913, 58-59, 363, 380. Arning, Dr. Wilhelm, Marokko-Kongo, 234- Arnold, W. T., German Ambitions as They Affect Britain and the United States, 159. Ashley, Evelyn, Life of Lord P 'aimer ston, 124. Asia Minor, 5, 85-87, 253, 254, 265, 269, 365. Asquith, H. H., prime minister of Great Britain, 33, 186, 249, 294, 303, 314, 321, 329, 333-334, 343-344. 350-351, 354- Atlantic Ocean, 178, 179, 180, 192, 205. Australia, 15, 16; navy, 191, 203. Austria-Hungary, Balkan policy, 256- 258, 264, 286-291, 296, 360-363, 365, 378-380, 383, 501; Morocco policy, 237, 286; relations with England, 117, 120, 244, 287-290, 294-295, 362; re- lations with Germany, 130, 286, 291- 292, 296, 356-357; relations with Italy, 290-291, 361, 363-381; rela- tions with Serbia, 257-258, 288-290, 296, 361-364, 383, 395-396, 401-402; relations with Russia, 256-258, 280, 286-290, 296, 360-363, 378-380, 383; Salonika railway, 286, 501; war de- termined on in 1914, 383-384. Austria-Hungary, policy during crisis of 1914: attitude toward Russia, 400-402, 408-409, 410-41 1 ; toward Serbia, 397-401, 403; Belgrade bom- barded, 449, 458; conciliatory atti- tude after 29 July, 444, 450; declares war on Serbia, 425-426, 434; designs in the Balkans, 432; determination to have war, 383-384, 403, 405, 407-410, 417, 427, 437, 459; integrity of Serbia, 432-433, 436, 444; mobilization, 434, 449, 456-460; obscurity of intentions in July, 402-409; refuses to grant ex- tension of time, 416-417; rejects Ser- bian reply, 424-425; reasons therefor, 427-432; rejects conversations with Russia and mediation of four Powers, 425; ultimatum to Serbia, 66, 404, 410-41 1, 415, 426-427, 435. Austrian Red Book (1915), 398, 401-402, 454, 458. Austro-Russian agreement (1897), 142, 257, 286, 402. Avarna, Duke of, Italian ambassador in Vienna, 404, 437. Azerbaijan, 298. Baghdad, 267-269, 274-275, 279, 298- 300, 370. Baghdad railway, 87, 233, 252, 266-272, 281, 286, 297-300, 370-371, 501. Bahrein Islands, 278. Balance of power, 2-3, 164, 179, 213, 216, 219, 224, 242-243, 340-341, 365, 367, 376-377, 390-391, 502. Balfour, A. J., British premier, 23, no, 187, 211, 213-214. Balkan League, the, 291, 296, 358-362, 380. Balkan Wars, 1912-13, 26, 64, 156, 283, 300-301, 357-362, 380, 383, 398, 500, 503- Balkans, the, 21, 30-31, 179, 255-258, 358-363, 365; Austro-Russian rivalry, 256-258, 280, 286-290, 296, 360-363, 378-380, 383, 401-402; agreement of 1897, 142, 257, 286, 402; crisis of 1877, I 3 2 , 253, 401; crisis of 1908, 208, 247, 249, 284-296, 302, 305, 378; crisis of 1912-13, 26, 171, 247, 358-363, 378; London conference of ambassadors, 360-361; Macedonia, reform in, 30, 241, 258, 269, 280-283, 286; Mtirzsteg programme, 258-259; Turco-Ruma- nian alliance, 296. "Balkans for the Balkans, The" (Sa- zonof), 380. Baltic Sea, 174, 193. Barclay, (Sir) Thomas, 222, 223; Thirty Years' Reminiscences, 1876-1906, 21, 223, 225. Bardoux, Jacques, L 'Angleterre radicale, 1906-1912, 182. Barker, J. Ellis, Anglo-German Relations and Sir Edward Grey, 318; Modem Germany, 2, 153, 171, 204, 2 10-2 n. Barnardiston, Lieutenant-Colonel, Brit- ish attache at Brussels, 478. Bassermann, Ernst, 204, 245. Bassorah, 267, 274-276, 300, 370. Bebel, August, 40, 157. Bedford, Duke of, The Territorial Force Fiasco, 208. Beethoven, 37. Belgian Grey Book II (1915), 372, 503- 505- INDEX 509 Belgium, African colonies, see Congo; army, 59; military conversations with Great Britain, 211, 478-480, 501, 505. Belgium, neutrality of, cause of British declaration of war, 98, 390-391, 484- 490; established by treaties of 1831- and 1839, 477; observed in war of 1870, 128,391; policy of Belgian Gov- ernment, 478-480, 482, 490-492, 494, 504-505; policy of British Govern- ment, 481-483, 494-497, 502; reasons for, 475-478; threatened by proposed treaty of 1866, 127; violated by Ger- many in 1914, 138, 222, 251, 482-483, 486, 490-497- Belgrade, 285, 292, 399, 449, 458. Below-Saleske, Herr von, German min- ister in Brussels, 491. Benckendorff, Count, Russian ambas- sador in London, 437, 450. Ben Hamed, grand vizier of Morocco, 229. Berard, Victor, La France et Guillaum II, 147, 222; Off res allemandes, La Choix de Londres, 299; La Revolution turque, 280; Le Sultan, VI slam et les Puissances, 266. Berchtold, Count, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, 286, 358-359, 361, 383; policy during crisis of 1914: absent from Vienna, 416; accepts British mediation with Serbia, 444; alleges he is pacific, 430; appeals for German assistance, 435-436; aware of danger from German mobilization, 459; confidences for Grey, 412; con- siders Serbian reply a hostile act, 425; does not regard Russian mobilization as hostile, 457; efforts to reassure Sazonof, 431-433; prestige at stake, 503; receptive to Russian formula, 444; threatens Austrian mobilization, 437- Berlin, Congress of, 132, 133, 134, 256, 260, 285, 365, 378; treaty of, 18, 259, 290. Berliner Tageblatt, 277, 315, 367, 404. Bernard, Augustin, Le Maroc, 234. Bernhardi, General von, Germany and the Next War, 9, 10, 52, 59-63, 83, 86, 92, 303, 345- Bernstein, Eduard, Die englische Gefahr und das deutsche Volk, 157, 354. Bertie, Sir Francis, British ambassador in Paris, 470, 483. Bethmann-Hollweg, T. von, German chancellor, 94, 187, 313, 338, 341, 344-348, 366, 369, 373. 379. 39o; policy during crisis of 1914, 422, 424, 437. 440, 445. 461, 47°. 478, 482, 484, 489, 493, 495-496. Beyens, Baron, Belgian minister in Ber- lin, 501-505; Le semaine tragique, 454. Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, Ger- man ambassador in Constantinople and London, 143, 260-261, 284, 369. Bismarck, Prince von Otto, 18, 36-38, 45. 47, 55, 59, 61-62, 69, 78-80, 124- 140, 169, 173, 260, 356, 362, 377-379; Reflections and Reminiscences, 61, 62, 127. Boer War, 22-23, J 39, 145-147, 150, 152, 160, 169, 221, 234, 280, 348, 367, 373. Bonga, 336. Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupation, 256, 285, 402; annexation, 184, 218, 284- 296, 402, 501; crisis of 1908-9, 208, 247, 249, 302, 305, 378, 402, 450. Bosporus, 255. Botha, General, 32, 391-392. Boulanger, General, 56, 134. Bourdon, Georges, The German Enigma, 93, 310, 319- Brailsford, H. N., The War of Steel and Gold, 374. Brandenburg, 8, 41, 45, 54. Brazil, 81. Breslau (German cruiser), 387. Briand, Aristide, French prime minister, 309, 3"- Bridges, Lieutenant-Colonel, British attache 1 in Brussels, 479. Bright, John, 7. British and Foreign State Papers, 25. British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, 222. British Empire, origins, 13-14; devel- opment in the nineteenth century, 15; imperial conference of 191 1, 27; growth of an imperial navy, 191, 203; revolt expected by Germany, 391. Broniewsky, M., Russian charge in Ber- lin, 416. Brooks, Sydney, England and Germany, 225. Browne, Edward G., Pan-Islamism, 261. 5i° INDEX Branner, Sir John, 354. Bryce, James (Lord), 207. Bubian, island of, 278. Buchanan, Sir George, British ambas- sador in St. Petersburg, 437, 443, 464, 5°4- Bucharest, treaty of, 361, 364. Buenos Aires, 387. Bulgaria, 134, 256-257, 259, 264, 284, 288, 296, 358, 361-362, 365, 380, 395. Biilow, Prince, German chancellor, 41, 69, 133, 143, 145, 151, 182, 187, 197, 224-227, 231, 238-240, 248-249, 270, 292-294, 369; Imperial Germany, 41, 47-48, 87, 144, 148-150, 203-204, 206, 218, 220-221, 293-294. Bunsen, Baron, Prussian minister in London, 123. Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, British ambas- sador in Vienna, 295, 404, 406, 408, 414, 416, 425, 426, 437, 454. Buol, Count, 429. Burgulu, 279. Burmah, 78. Burns, John, 389. Busch, Dr. Moritz, Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History, 79, 127- 128.. Bushire 276. Bute, Lord, 118. Caillaux, Joseph, French prime minister, 316. Caillaux trial, 388. Caliphate, the, 262-263, 279. Cambon, Jules, French ambassador in Berlin, 300-310, 313-315. 3i8, 320, 334-336, 372, 385, 406, 421, 423, 438, 445- Cambon, Paul, French ambassador in London, 153, 364, 446-447, 462, 472- 473, 487- Cameroons, 78, 136, 233, 314. Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, Brit- ish prime minister, 32, 101, 182. Canada, 15, 16, 303; German protest against tariff, 152-153; naval plans, 191, 203. Canning, George, 162-163. Cap Trafalgar (German liner), 387. Cape Colony, 15, 19, 79, 135. Cape of Good Hope, 264. Cape Juby, 319. Cape to Cairo railway, 144, 372. Cape Town, 386, 391. Caprivi, Count, German chancellor, 136. Carlowitz, treaty of, 253. Carlyle, Thomas, 127. * Carol, Prince, of Rumania, 365. Cartwright, Sir Fairfax, British ambas- sador in Vienna, 290. Casablanca, 304, 309, 312. Cassel, Sir Ernest, 297. Castlereagh, Lord, 120, 121. Cattaro, 257. Causes of the war, 69, 253, 291, 301, 358. Cavour, Count, 129, 429. Cawdor, Lord, 182, 186. Challaye, Felicien, Revue de Paris, 307. Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, 92. Chamberlain, Joseph, 21, 98, 100, 144- 145, 270, 372. Channel, English, 179, 180, 192. Charles I, 15. Charles II, 15. Charles Francis Joseph, Archduke, 397. Cheradame, Andre, Le Chemin de Per de Bagdad, 266. China, 21, 29, 83, 147, 151, 241. Chirol, Sir Valentine, The Origins of the Present War, 148. Chotek, Countess Sophie (Duchess of Hohenberg), 394, 397. Churchill, Winston Spencer, 113, 189, 190, 191, 192, 201, 345, 386. Ciganovitch, Milan, 394, 398, 411, 427, 430. Clarendon, Lord, 487. Class, Heinrich, 318; West-Marokko deutschl, 87, 234, 319. Clausewitz, War, 61. Coaling stations, 196-197, 233. Cobden, Richard, 7. Coldstream, speech of SirE. Grey at, 294. Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, 394, 405, 408, 414, 455, 470-480, 490. Collier, Price, England and the English, in; Germany and the Germans, 10, 62, 174. Cologne Gazette, 59, 379, 380, 461-462. Colonial expansion, 4-5, 20, 78. Colonies, differential tariff in, 76, 152- 153, 231. INDEX 5ii Concert of Europe, 26, 280, 288, 292, 29s. 301, 332, 356, 360. 400, 428, 433- 434- Congo, 20, 78, 84, 136, 218, 320, 372, 478, 496-497- Congo, French, 310-311, 314, 319-320, 322, 335. Congo-Cameroon railway, 314. Congo River, 334, 336. Constantinople, 253-255, 260, 268, 273, 283, 350-360. Convention of London (1884), 19. Convention of Pretoria (1881), 19. Cook, Sir Edward, How Britain Strove for Peace, 183-184, 187-188, 190, 303, 348, 35o. Copenhagen, bombardment of, 162, 198, 205. Cox, Sir Edmund C, England and Ger- many: How to Meet the Crisis, 207. Cramb, J. A., Germany and England, 52, 160, 164-165, 169, 192. Crete, question of, 142, 259, 260, 284. Crimean War, 7, 16, 178, 207, 253, 255, 258, 377- Croiset, Alfred, Bulletin de la Societe autour du Monde, 91. Cromarty Firth, 335. Cromer, Lord, 185. Cronberg, 184. Cronstadt, 140. Crown Prince, German, 315, 338, 385. Cruppi, Jean, French foreign minister, 309, 310, 314. 315- Curzon, Lord, Problems of the Far East, 91. Cyprus, 29, 259, 279. Daily Chronicle, 206. Daily Mail, 155, 160, 182, 185. Daily Telegraph, 133, 147; interview with William II, 185, 248-249. Damascus, 279. Dardanelles, 255. Davignon, Henri, Belgian foreign min- ister, 491. Davis, H. W. C, The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, 51, 89, 161. Dawson, W. H., Evolution of Modern Germany, 76, 90. Deir, 279. Delbriick, Professor Hans, 157, 373, 378; The Price of a German-English Entente, 135; Why Germany Builds War-ships, 198. Delcasse, Theophile, French foreign minister, 1898-1905, 28, 147, 222, 226-228, 234, 240. Denmark, 15, 36, 125, 198, 205. Dennis, Alfred L. P., Tendencies in Brit- ish Foreign Policy since Disraeli, 17. Derby, Lord, 487. Deutsche Bank, 270. Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg, 356-357- Deutschland sei wach I, 205. Dewey, Admiral, 143. Diercks, Gustav, Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algesiras, 234, 239. Dilke, Sir Charles, 246; Present Position of European Politics (1887), 138. Diplomaticus, Sir Edward Grey's Stew- ardship, 341. Disarmament and reduction of arma- ments, 182-184, 186-188, 189-191, 194-195, 203-205, 215-216, 244-248, 347-351- Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beacons- field, 16, 29, 132, 133, 258. Doberitz, 245. Dogger Bank incident, 225. Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel von, 228. Doumergue, Gaston, French foreign minister in 1914, 365- Drang nach Osten, 241-242, 286. Dreadnought type of battleship, 180- 181. Dual Alliance, 20, 139-140, 178, 225, 242, 299, 301, 340-341, 352, 356, 375. 463, 465, 469, 484- Dublin, 389. Ducarne, General, Belgian general, 478- 479- Duck's Beak, 336. Dumaine, Alfred, French ambassador in Vienna, 403-405, 416, 426, 437, 457- Durazzo, 361. Durham, Geoffrey, The Foreign Trade of Great Britain and Germany, 106. Durkheim, E.and Denis E., Who Wanted War ?, 461-462. Eastern Rumelia, 257. Eber (German cruiser), 386. Economist, 156. Edelsheim, Operational ilber See, 211. 512 INDEX Edinburgh Review, 209, 212. Edward III, 116. Edward VII, King, 28, 184, 222-223, 226, 240, 243-245, 249, 282, 283, 288, 295, 302-303, 306. Egypt, 17, 19, 28-29, 32, 78, 134, 196, 218, 223, 226, 259, 261, 262-265, 271- 273, 303. 327, 39i- Einkreisungspolitik, 239, 242-243, 245- 247,^91, 293-295, 303, 324, 338-339, 376-377. El-Kasar, 314, 317. El Rogui, Moorish pretender, 229. Elizabeth, Queen, 116. Empress Frederick, 134. Ena, Princess, of Battenberg, 29, 239. England. See Great Britain. England and Germany (1912), 23, 156, 197, 204, 206, 209, 299, 353, 355. England in deutscher Beleuchlung, 204. "Englishman, An," The German Menace and How to Meet It, 207. Enos, 359. Entente cordiale, 28, 180, 224-225. Eregli, 267. Errembault de Dudzeele, Count, Bel- gian minister in Vienna, 503. Esher, Lord, 63. Eski-Shehir, 266. Euphrates River, 267, 274, 279. European Politics in the Decade before the War as Described by Belgian Diplo- matists, 499-503. Faber, Captain, 206. Far East, Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 26, 28, 29, 148, 179, 243, 348; British in- terests, 179-180; Franco-Japanese convention of 1907, 241; Russian in- terests, 259, 265, 378, 379. Fashoda, 20, 21, 28, 141. Ferdinand I of Austria, 36. Fez, 311-314, 327. Fisher, Sir John (Lord), 180, 244. Fitzmaurice, Lord E., Life of Lord Gran- ville, 128, 135, 137. Flotow, Herr von, German ambassador in Rome, 418. Foreign Legion, 305. Fortnightly Review, 287, 383, 480. France, army, 56-57, 59, 179, 364, 388; colonies, 76, 78, 230, 327; navy, 179, 193, 364; pacific policy, 364, 374 - 375, 502; revanche, 364, 367, 374-375, 379* 499-500. France, policy during crisis of 1914: frontier violated by Germany, 463; keeps troops behind frontier, 452-453; mobilization, 456, 461; promises sup- port to Russia, 463-465, 472; prom- ises to respect neutrality of Belgium, 482; refuses overtures of German am- bassador, 422-423; seeks assistance of Great Britain, 464-465, 473, 483; supports all proposals for peace, 414- 415, 420, 466; ultimatum from Ger- many, and reply thereto, 452, 460- 461, 483, 486; urges moderation on Serbia, 403, 414; violation of Belgian and German frontiers charged by Germany, 461-463, 491-492; war de- clared by Germany, 462. France, relations with Germany: arma- ments competition, 55-59, 193, 363, 380; Casablanca incident, 305-306; convention of 9 February, 1909, and its history, 250, 306-316, 335, 342, 501; conventions of 4 November, 191 1, 84, 336-337. 346, 372; crisis of 1875, 57> 63, 131-132, 227; crisis of 1905, 226-228, 230, 234-239; crisis of 191 1, 188, 206, 208, 247, 300, 302-303, 317, 319-323, 329-331, 357; English at- titude toward, 246, 350, 390; German designs on France, 5, 60, 138, 348, 373, 390; hopes of reconciliation, 355-356, 374 - 37S; negotiations of 1894-8, 140- 142; treaty of Frankfort, 142; war of 1870, 37, 126-130, 377. France, relations with Great Britain. See Great Britain, relations with France. France, relations with Italy, 79, 134, 237-238, 240. France, relations with Japan, 241. France, relations with Morocco, 230, 234-236, 303-316. France, relations with Spain, 235, 365. France, relations with Turkey, 268-270, 296, 374- Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 69, 374, 382-383, 394-398, 402, 404; attitude of Europe toward assassination, 397, 401, 434. Francis Joseph, Emperor, 140, 184, 244, 288, 403, 416. INDEX 513 Franco-German convention (1909), 250, 306-311, 313, 335, 342. Franco-German conventions (4 Novem- ber, 191 1), 84, 336-337, 346, 372, 501. Franco-Moroccan convention of 4 March, 19 10, 304, 307, 3ri. Frankfort, treaty of, 142, 147. Frankfurter Zeitung, 372, 461. Frankischer Kurrier, 462. Fraser, David, The Slwrt Cut to India, 266-267. Frederick the Great, 42, 117, 118. Frederick III, 62, 130, 134. Frederick William, Crown Prince of Germany, 315, 338, 385. Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, 42. Frederick William I of Prussia, 42. Frederick William III, 43, 119. Frederick William IV, 36, 42, 55, 123. "Freedom of the seas," 199-200. French Revolution, 12, 71, 391, 476. French Yellow Book (1914), 57, 64, 336, 384, 392-393, 409. 461, 464- Fullerton, W. M., Problems of Power, 223, 308. Fyffe, C. A., History of Modem Europe, 130. Gabrinovitch, Nedeljko, 394. Gaedke, Colonel, 188. Garvin, J. L., 209. Gaster, Vice-Admiral Karl, 204, 206. Gaulois (Paris), 228. Gemmenich, 492. George I, 117. George III, 118. George V, King, no, 303, 365, 447, 453, 457, 459- 463, 473, 484, 492. George, Prince, of Hesse-Darmstadt, 117. German East Africa, 78, 136, 372. German New Guinea, 78. German Southwest Africa, 78, 135, 233, 372, 391-392. German White Book (i9r4), 69, 394, 405, 408, 420-421, 431-433, 438, 442, 45i, 454, 457, 463, 502. Germanentum v. Slaventum, 379. Germania (Berlin), 404. Germany, attitude toward the Entente, 5, 224-228, 233-234, 236, 238, 299, 308, 316-317, 324, 340-34I, 351-352, 364, 377, 392. Germany, economic conditions: agricul- ture, 7r, 73-74; conditions before 1870, 70-71; financial problems, 112, 114-115, 194; foreign commerce, 74- 78, 99, 102-103, io 8, 231, 269; indus- trial development, 72, 99-100; in- vestments abroad, 74, 105-106; popu- lation, 72-74, 103; shipping, 13, 72, 74, 101, 104-105; wealth, 73. Germany, expansion: colonial ambi- tions, 5, 75-78, 83-89, 135, 143, 218- 220, 231-234, 251, 298, 313, 317, 320, 323, 325, 335, 339-340, 356-357, 37o, 372-373; expansion in Europe, 81-83; Pan-German League, 80-84, 157, 210, 232, 318, 385; policy in the Mediter- ranean, 5, 85-87, 233, 240, 27r, 329; policy in Morocco, 85-87, 231-234, 236, 238, 271, 304, 339-34I- Germany, history: after 1815, no-' 120; confederation of 1815, 35, 37, 55, 120, 125; revolution of 1848, 35- 36, 42, 50; Frankfort Parliament, 36, 50, 122; North German Confedera- tion, 126, 127; war of 1870. Germany, navy: case for, 147, 175-177, 195-196, 206; growth of, 173-177; Navy League, 80, 174, 176, 179, 182, 210; navy laws: 1898, 175; 1900, 176-177; 1906, 182; 1908, 184, 248; 1912, 188-189, 190,349-350; navy in 1914, 193. Germany, policy during crisis of 1914: attitude toward Austro-Serbian dis- pute, 400, 407-408, 415-416; toward Russia, 400-401, 408-409; bids for British neutrality, 440, 445-446, 485- 486,489; British ships detained, 487, 494; charges against Belgium, 478- 480; against France, 461-467, 491— 493; complicity with Austria, 405- 406; determination to have war, 384- 388, 405-410, 440-441, 446; efforts to detach France from Russia, 422-423; equivocal conduct, 420-423, 425; ex- pectation that Great Britain would stand aside, 390-391, 496-497; first ultimatum to Russia, 441-443, 446; frontier violated by France, 461-463; hollowness of case against Russia, 455- 460; intervenes in Austro-Russian 5i4 INDEX negotiations, 451-452; Kriegsgefahr- zustand proclaimed, 451; mobilization, 407, 445, 454. 456, 484; neutrality of Luxemburg violated, 487; neutrality of Belgium violated, 480, 482-483, 489-497; note to the Entente Powers, 407, 415-416; obligation to respect Belgium admitted, 478, 505; pressure on Austria, 438; protests against Rus- sian mobilization, 422, 437, 450-451, 453, 460; refuses to exert pressure on Austria, 415-416, 423; rejects arbi- tration, 413; mediation, 421; threats against Russia, 422, 424, 432-433, 441; ultimatum to Belgium, 491-492; to France and Russia, 452, 483, 486; violation of French frontier, 463 ; war declared on France, 462; on Russia, 454, 484, 486. Germany, political conditions: army and armaments, 56-59, 87-89, 363; bureaucracy, 43-44; constitution, 37-41; divisions, 45-46; South Ger- many, 7-8, 37, 41, 46, 356; militarism, 8-10, 55, 60-66, 132, 363, 384-385, 392-393; national character, 89-94; political parties, 38-43, 46, 80, 88, 283, 354; press, 44-45, 429; Prussianiza- tion, 37, 41, 46-49, 56; social democ- racy, 39-41, 80, 88, 252, 354; theory of the state, 52-54. Germany, relations with France. See France, relations with Germany. Germany, relations with Great Britain. See Great Britain, relations with Ger- many. Germany, relations with Russia, 132, 139-140, 148, 179, 193, 225, 241, 292, 299, 336, 3SO, 356, 363, 377-382, 385, 39°- Germany, relations with Turkey, 84-85, 142, 259-269, 281-285, 292, 297-300, 336, 356-357, 370-371, 374, 378-379- Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 353. Gibraltar, 29, 117, 180, 192, 196, 228, 229, 259. Giesl, Baron von, Austrian minister in Belgrade, 407, 410, 417, 428. Giolitti, Giovanni, speech of, 5 Decem- ber, 1914, 36T, 383. Givet, 491. Gladstone, W. E., 17, 18, 19, 128. Gneisenau, 119. Goeben (German cruiser), 387. Goethe, 37, 250. Gold Coast, 135. Goluchowski, Count, Austrian foreign minister, 285, 286. Gordon, General, 134. Gortchakoff, Prince, Russian chancellor, 61, 128, 132. Goschen, Sir Edward, British ambas- sador in Berlin, n, 64, 322, 369, 408, 421, 438, 440, 445, 454, 472, 477, 482, 493- Gowan, A.L., Selections from Treitschke's Lectures on Politics, 51. Granville, Lord, British foreign secre- tary, 18, 127, 128, 134, 135. Great Britain, economic conditions: commerce, 14, 16, 77, 99, 102-104, 108,269,276-277; commercial policy, 162; Corn Laws, 163; financial strength, 112, 194-195; food supply, 3, 29; industrial revolution, 12; in- vestments abroad, 105; law of 1887, 96; population, 103; shipping, 101, 104-105 ; stagnation of industry, 100, no; tariff reform, 76, 98, 106, 108. Great Britain, foreign policy: Far East, 26, 28-29, 148, 179-180, 243, 348; general principles, 25-31, 205-206; Mediterranean, 15, 259; Morocco, 229-230, 233, 308-309, 314, 3i9-334i 339-341; "splendid isolation," 24, 131, 220, 353, 356-357- Great Britain, navy: case for supremacy, 3-4, 199-206, 212-213, 217; condition before 1904, 174, 194; in 1914, 193; crisis of 1909, 184-187, 250, 295; dis- tribution of squadrons, 178-180, 187, 190-193; mobilization in July, 19 14, 386-387, 455-456; Naval Defense Act of 1889, 177, 216; origins, 15; programmes of ship-building, 180, 182, 183, 188, 190-191; reforms, 178- 179; two-Power standard, 178, 180, 186, 190, 215. Great Britain, policy in crisis of 1914: activity of King George, 447, 453, 457, 459, 463, 473, 484.. 492; avoids acts which might precipitate matters, 453; considers neutrality, 483, 487; efforts for peace, 414-415, 417, 419, 447-449, 453, 481-483, 494-497; keeps hands free till 2 August, 474- INDEX 515 475; mobilization of fleet, 455-456; negotiations for neutrality of France and Germany, 453, 483-485; no de- sire to fight Germany, 474-475, 486; no direct interests in Serbia, 469; policy in re Belgium, 481-483, 404- 497; possible policies, 460-475; promises naval assistance to France, 487; refuses neutrality to Germany, 446, 485-487 ; refuses to declare soli- darity with France and Russia, 471- 474, 504; ships detained in Germany, 487, 494; urges moderation on Serbia, 403. Great Britain, political conditions: army, 59, 208-209, 389; colossus with feet of clay, 164-166, 194-195, 264; imperial policy, 31-33; insu- larity, 166-168; jingoism, 207; Labor party, 353; pacific temper, 22-24, 200-201, 208-209, 246-247, 360, 364; military precautions in 1911, 332-333. 335 _ 336; Parliament Bill, 303; rail- way strike of 1911, 335; signs of vigor- ous life, 111-113, 194-195; troubles in summer of 1914, 389. Great Britain, relations with Austria, 117, 120, 244, 287-290, 294-295, 362. Great Britain, relations with Belgium, 141, 211, 474-480, 504. Great Britain, relations with France: arbitration treaty of 1903, 25, 224; convention of 8 April, 1904, 28, 139, 153. 180, 224, 235, 322-324, 326, 334, 342; diplomatic co-operation, 228, 237-238, 246, 251, 305, 320-334, 336- 341, 346, 364, 377, 500; during war of 1870, 126-127; exchange of notes, 22 November, 191 2, 364, 488; military conversations, 211, 367; naval co- operation, 364, 488; no alliance be- fore war, 343, 350, 367-368, 469, 488; rivalry before 1904, 3, 19-21, 28, 79, 133-135. 141-142, 178-179. 218-219, 226, 234-235, 374, 381. Great Britain, relations with Germany: attitude toward German expansion, 135-137, 343-344. 346, 356, 368-376; Agreements, conventions, etc.: Africa (1800), 137, 139; alliance proposed (1900), 148-150; China (1900), 147, 150-15 1 ; neutrality treaty pro- posed (1912), 187, 346-351; Por- tuguese colonies (1898), 85, 144, 346, 372; Samoa (1899), 144; Turkey and Africa (1914), 195, 367~377. 470. British view of Germany, 31, 150, 154-156, 168-170, 200, 207, 209- 210, 219-222, 242-243, 247-249, 251, 341-344. 353-355. 367. 374- Causes of rivalry, 1-11, 150-153, 173, 208, 219, 241-243, 468. "Cleaning the slate," 189, 345, 374- Commercial rivalry: Anglo-German trade, 108; comparison of British and German industry, 100-101, 104-105; of British and German trade, 99, 102, 107; competition for markets, 3, 96-97; 108-109, 113- 114, 269, 276-277, 500; effects on British industry, 98, 101, 108. Conditions of an understanding, 170- 171, 192, 245-246, 252, 344, 352. Friendliness in England to Germany, 63, 113, 126, 135, 137-138, 156, 207, 246-247, 251, 294, 341-344, 35°, 356, 360, 362, 371-374, 474-475, 486, 500. German policy in South Africa, 135, 141-143, 392. German view of England, 60, 96, 108- iog, 156-158, 182, 197-200, 248- 250, 295, 337-339, 344-345, 355- 357, 372-373. 390-39I- Historical: before Bismarck, n 6-1 24; temp. Bismarck, 128-138; 1890- 1900, 141-145; during Boer War, I45-I53, i99- Interview of William II in Daily Tele- graph, 185, 248-249. Letter of William II to Lord Tweed- mouth, 183, 248. Naval rivalry: affects policy in Mo- rocco, 329, 340-341; in Turkey, 278-279; British supremacy at sea, 186, 194, 200-201, 203-205; Ger- man fleet as a danger to Great Brit- ain, 168-170, 176-177, 180, 200, 209-218, 344; regarded as a "lux- ury," 201, 345; German view of the rivalry, 197-198, 204-207, 212, 220- 221; lessening of rivalry, n, 191- 194, 368; movements of British fleet in 191 1, 206, 332-333. 335-336; naval expenditure, 216-217; reduc- 5i6 INDEX tion of armaments, 18, 182-184, 186-190, 194-195, 203-205, 215- 216, 244-248, 347-35 1 - Neutrality negotiations (1912), 187, 346-351. Opposition in re Bosnian annexation, 291-296. Relations: better (1911), 302-303; "excellent" (1912), 351; "sensibly improved" (1913), 11, 357, 360, 368-369; "very good" (1914). 369, 503- Rivalry: in Morocco, 5, 86, 233-234, 314, 319-334. 339-341, 368; in Tur- key, 5, 86, 261, 264-279, 296-301. Responsibility for final rupture, 497. Work of Germans for the British Em- pire, 117, 123-124. Great Britain, relations with Italy, 129, 134, 240, 365. Great Britain, relations with Portugal, 136.348,371. Great Britain, relations with Russia: convention of 31 August, 1907, 30, 241-242, 281-282, 286, 298, 379; diplomatic co-operation, 246, 251, 287-296, 298; naval convention, 366- 367; rivalry before 1907, 2, 16, 18, 20, 29-30, 120, 128, 133-134, 141-142, 178-179, 206, 219-220, 225, 241, 258- 259. 374. 381. Great Britain, relations with Spain, 29, 229, 235, 239-240. Great Britain, relations with Turkey, 109, 142, 152, 162-163, 206, 258-260, 268-284, 296-297, 30o-3or, 370. Great Britain, relations with United States, 28, 205. Great Britain and the European Crisis (1914), n, 295, 364, 369, 394, 397-398, 400-401, 404-405, 412, 464, 477. Greece, 13, 255, 358, 361. Greindl, Baron, Belgian minister in Berlin, 501. Grenzboten, 318. Grey, Sir Edward, British foreign minister, 29, 237; attitude toward Germany, 113, 171, 214-215, 243, 245-246, 249, 252, 302, 341-344, 390; Balkan crisis of 1912-1913, 26, 360- 362, 364, 392; Bosnian annexation, 288-289, 291-292, 294-295; Morocco, 237,319-337; naval policy, 189, 201- 202; Near East, 286-287, 300, 365- 367; negotiations of 1912, 348-351, 3S4-3S6. Grey, Sir Edward, policy during crisis of 1914: attitude toward assassination of archduke, 397, 405, 409-410, 412; toward ultimatum, 406, 410, 412; asks Germany to propose form of me- diation, 439; bases policy on public opinion, 473, 485, 490; calls on Bel- gium to protect neutrality, 481; on France and Germany to respect that neutrality, 251, 481-483; conversa- tions with Cambon, 446-447; does not know terms of Franco-Russian alliance, 469; offers general peace agreement, 11, 447-448; proposes ac- tion by four Powers, 414-415, 419; refuses to state terms of neutrality to Lichnowsky, 473, 485-487; refuses German bid for neutrality, 446; re- quests extension of time for ultima- tum, 414: resists arguments for soli- darity, 47 1-474; speech in Parliament, 98, 488-489; suggests Austria stop in Belgrade, Russia to stop military prep- arations, 447; supports Serbian reply as basis of negotiation, 417, 419; tries to restrain Austria, 409, 412, 414-415, 447; tries to secure German neutral- ity, 453, 483-485 ; warns Prince Lich- nowsky, 471-472; warns Count Mens- dorff, 409; will abandon France and Russia if unreasonable, 448, 470. Guillaume, Baron, Belgian minister in Paris, 502, 504. Gwinner, Arthur von, 197. Hakki, Pasha, 300. Haldane, Lord, 189, 194, 208, 346, 347, 348, 354- Hale, William Bayard, The World's Work, 1. Halif, 299. Hall, H. N., interview with King Albert of Belgium, 480. Hamburg-America Line, 101, 276. Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 403. Hamilton, Lord George, 178. Hamilton, Sir Ian, Compulsory Service, 212. Hanotaux, Gabriel, French foreign min- ister, 141. INDEX 517 Hanover, 117, 121, 129. Hansard (Parliamentary debates), 178, 185-186, 189, 191, 194, 201-202, 211, 214-215, 237, 246, 275, 287, 303, 322, 333-334, 343-344. 346, 351, 364, 366, 370, 453, 473, 483-484, 488. Hanseatic League, 13, 70, 116. Harden, Maximilian, 44; M anarchs and. Men, 184, 244-245. Hardenberg, 119. Hardinge, Sir Charles, 183, 184. Hasse, Ernest, 80. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 28. Hedjaz railway, 272-273. Helfferich, Dr. Karl, Germany's Eco- nomic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913, 74, 106; The Dual Alli- ance versus the Triple Entente, 457, 463-466, 472-474. Heligoland, 136. Helmolt, Dr. Hans, La Triplice en Orient, 257- Henry VIII, 2. Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 447. Herggelet, Mariano, England's Weak Points and Germany's Position in Europe, 166. Heydebrandt, Herr von, 338. Hirst, F. W., The Six Panics, 215. Hislam, Percival, Admiralty of the At- lantic, 174, 175, 211. Hobbes, Thomas, 68. Holland, 13-15, 27, 81, 84, 94, 116, 198, 205, 494. Hollman, Admiral, 174, 175. Holy War, 33, 263. Homs-Baghdad railway, 279, 314. Hotzendorf, General Conrad von, 384. Hueffer, Ford Madox, When Blood is Their Argument, 115. Humbert, Charles, 388. Hurd, A., and Castle, H., German Sea Power, 101, 105, 126, 175, 176, 210. Hurd, A. S., The Command of the Sea, 189; Italy's Bolt from the Blue, 212. Hurgronje, Dr. C. Snouck, The Holy War: "Made in Germany," 260-261, 263. Illustrirte Zeitung, 206. India, 15-16, 20-21, 29, 32, 78, 241, 259, 261, 263-264, 272, 303, 391. International situation after 1870, 130- 131- International situation in 1904, 179, 225. Invasion of England, 2, 210-212. Ireland, S3, 389- Ischl, 184, 416. Islam, 261-264. "Islander," The Naval and Military Policy of the British Isles, 209. Ismidt, 266. Isvolsky, A. P., Russian foreign min- ister, later ambassador in Paris, 241, 286-288, 292-294, 366, 438, 464. Italy, policy in Adriatic, 240, 256, 290- 291, 361; in Mediterranean, 240; in Morocco, 237; relations with Austria, 290-291, 361, 363, 381; France, 79, 134, 237-238, 240; Great Britain, 129, 134, 240, 365; Russia, 290-291; Tripoli, 84, 211, 218, 291, 336, 363; unification, 126, 129-130, 289, 429. Italy, policy during crisis of 1914: favors mediation by four Powers, 415, 420; invited to exert pressure on Austria, 418; thinks Austria animated by desire to recover prestige, 407; warns Austria against a war of aggres- sion, 418. I to, Marquis, 148. Jagow, Gottlieb von, German foreign minister, 360, 369, 372. Jagow, Gottlieb von, policy during crisis of 1914: accepts mediation "in prin- ciple," 416; admits harsh nature of ultimatum, 426-427; arguments for invasion of Belgium, 477, 493; atti- tude toward Serbian reply, 428; breaks bargain with Cambon, 441, 445; complains of Russian mobiliza- tion, 437, 450-451, 460; favors action by Powers, 438; not privy to ulti- matum, 406; passes on British sug- gestions to Vienna, 416, 417, 421; promise to Grey in re Belgium, 494; recognizes German obligations toward Belgium, 478, 505; refuses to answer British query about Belgium, 482-483 ; rejects Grey's warning, 472; rejects Grey's suggestions, 445, 449; re- jects Russian formula, 445; tries to prevent declaration of war, 454. Janina, 359. 5i8 INDEX James I, 116. Jameson, Dr. L. S., 22, 143. Jaures, Jean, 41. Jena, battle of, 42, 55, 71, 119. Jgazmondo (Budapest), 383. Johnston, Sir H. H., lecture tour in Germany, 355-356; Common Sense in Foreign Policy, 356; Views and Reviews, 123. Jungbluth, General, 479. Kagera River, 372. Kandahar, 18. Kant, 37. Kara, George, 257. Karageorgevitch family, 257-258. Karthaus, 386. Kerr, Alfred, 93. Khanikin, 298. Khartoum, 134, 141. Kiamil Pasha, 283. Kiao-Chou, 78, 141. Kiderlen-Waechter, Alfred von, 64, 313, 315. 318, 320, 328, 331-332, 334. 339. 341, 360. Kiel Canal, 126, 390. Kipling, Rudyard, 22. Kirkpatrick, F. A., Lectures on the His- tory of the Nineteenth Century, 261. Kissingen, 315. Kitchener, Lord, 21, 32, 141. Konia, 266. Konigsberg, 68. Konopischt, 383. Koweit, Sheikh of, 274, 278, 300, 370. Kruger, President, 22, 146-147; tele- gram of William II to, 143. Krupps, 385. Kudachef, Prince, Russian charge in Vienna, 413, 416, 418, 432. Kuhlmann, Baron von, councillor of German embassy in London, 389. Kultur, 6, 85-86, 91-95. Kurdistan, 298. La Fontaine, 25. Lake Chad, 336. Lalaing, Count de, Belgian minister in London, 500-501. Lansdowne, Lord, British foreign secre- tary, 24, 28, 148, 151, 153, 223, 224, 275, 286, 324. Larache, 314, 317. Lascelles, Sir Frank, Thoughts on the Anglo-German Problem, 247. Lasson, Professor Adolf, 93. Lee, Arthur, 206. Lee, Sir Sidney, King Edward VII, 244; Life of Que'en Victoria, 124. Leibnitz, 37. Lemonon, Ernest, L'Europe et la Poli- tique brittanique, 17, 151. Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, Revue des Deux Mondes, 34. L'Escaille, B. de, 472, 504. Letters of Queen Victoria, 123. Liberal, El (Madrid), 387. Liberal Year Book, 105. Lichnowsky, Prince, German ambassa- dor in London, 354, 369, 405, 407, 414, 416-417, 419, 421, 423, 426, 447-448, 453, 471-474, 483-486. Lichtenberger, Henri, Germany and Its Evolution in Modem Times, 74. Liebknecht, Karl, 157. Liege, 493. Lindequist, Herr von, 337. Livingstone, David, 79. Lloyd George, David, 187, 329; speech, 329-332, 337-338- _ Lokal Anzeiger (Berlin), 64, 445. London, treaty of (30 May, 1913), 359- Long, R. C, Germany and the Entente, 243; Naval Armament Delusions, 207. Lorenz, Dr. Theodor, Die englische Presse, 159. Loubet, Emile, 223. Louis XTV, 2, 116, 391, 476. Louis Philippe, 477. Low, Sidney, An Anglo-French Alliance, 34i- Low, S. J., and Sanders, L. C, Political History of England, 144. Luther, 116. Luxemburg, 386. Luxemburg question, treaty of 1867, 126, 487. Maan, 273. McKenna, Reginald, 185. Maclaren, A. D., An Australian in Ger- many, 171. INDEX 519 Macchio, Baron, 399, 416, 418. Macdonald, J. Ramsay, 389. Macedonia, 361, 362. Madagascar, 20, 28. Magellan, Straits of, 6. Magnan, Dr., 386. Magyars, 255, 257, 396, 433. Mahan, Admiral, Interest of America in International Conditions, 195-196, 200-201, 213. Majuba Hill, battle of, 19. Malay States, 191, 193- Malm^dy-Stavelot railway, 480. Malta, 29, 192, 259. Manchester, University of, 353. Manchester Guardian, 156. Manchuria, 21, 151, 218, 241, 264. Manila, 143. Mannesmann Brothers, 309. Marchand, Major, 21, 141. Marcks, Erich, England and Germany, 1500—1900, 120, 128. Maria Theresa, Empress, 117. Maritz, Colonel, 392. Martin, Rudolf, Deutschland und Eng- land, 157, 211; Kdnig Eduard und Kaiser WUhelm, 167. Matin, 228. Maubeuge, 493. Mead, Edwin D., England and Germany, 202, 207, 249. Mecca, 262, 272. Medina, 262, 272. Mediterranean, agreements (1907), 29, 239-240; German ambitions in re the, 233, 240, 271, 329; naval situation in, 180, igi-193, 364, 488. Mensdorff, Count, Austrian ambas- sador in London, 399, 414. 4 X 5> 43°, 450- Mesopotamia, 5, 85, 253, 258, 265, 272, 275. 277- Metternich, 36, 120, 163. Meyer, Ernst, Los von England, 194. Midhat Pasha, 274-275. Midia, 359. Miliiarische Rundschau (Vienna), 403. Miller, William, The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913, 253. Millet, Philippe, The Truth About the Franco-German Crisis of 1911, 312. Mitrofanof, Professor, Preussische Jahr- biicher, 378. Mobilization during crisis of 1914, 407. 422, 434, 441-442, 444-445, 449. 45 1 . 453. 455-46i, 466. Mogador, 315. Mohammerah, sheikh of, 278. Moltke, Count von, 49. Moltke, General von, 392. Mommsen, Theodor, 146. Mongumba, 336. Monis, Antoine, French prime minister, 3°9- Monson, Sir Edmond, British ambassa- dor in Paris, 21, 223. Montenegro, 256-257, 290, 358, 362. Moore, John Bassett, International Arbi- trations of the United States, 25. Morel, E.D.,Morocco inDiplomacy, 234, 236, 310. Morley, Lord, 32, 346, 389; Life of Glad- stone, 128. Morning Post, 156, 183, 35*. 383- Morocco, Algeciras: Act of, 238, 303- 304, 306-307, 309. 3i3-3i4» 3i7. 326, 328, 342; Conference of, 182, 228, 236- 238, 240-241, 286; Casablanca inci- dent, 305-306; convention of 1880, 231; crisis of 1905, 182, 226-228, 247, 271; crisis of 191 1, 188, 206, 208, 247, 300, 302-303, 357; Franco-German convention of 8 February, 1909, 250, 306-311, 313. 335> 342, 501; Franco- German convention of 4 November, 1911, 84, 336-337. 346,372; Franco- Moroccan convention of 4 March, 1910, 304, 307, 311; Franco-Spanish convention of 3 October, 1904, 235; German designs on, 5, 85-87, 231- 234, 313. 317-320, 334, 339-340, 409, 467; negotiations of 1911, 316-337; public works, 300-310; rivalry of European Powers, 228-234. Mossul, 267, 279. Moulin-Eckart, Richard Graf von, Englands Polilik und die Machte, 120, 123, 128, 130. Mozambique, 372. Mukden, battle of, 226. Mulai Hafid, Sultan of Morocco, 304. 305. 306, 307, 312. Mulai Hassan, Sultan of Morocco, 229. Munchner Neuste Nachrichten, 461. Miinster, Prince, German ambassador in Paris, 141. 520 INDEX Muriavef, Prince, Russian foreign secre- tary, 146. Namur, 491. Napoleon, 2, 12, 15, 71, 118, 167, 208, 476, 498. Napoleon III, 48, 122, 126. Narodna Odbrana, 394-395, 409, 427. Natal, 19, 79. Nation (London), 182. Nation (New York), 64, 207, 386, 404. National Review, 160. Naval Supremacy : Who ?, 212. New Caledonia, 20. New Hebrides, 20, 28. New York Times, 194, 202, 369, 371, 383, 387, 389, 480. New Zealand, 15, 16, 191, 193. Newfoundland, 20, 28. Newton, Lord, Life of Lord Lyons, 132. Ngoko-Sangha, 310; consortium, 311. Nicholas II, the Tsar, 282, 291, 298, 352, 365, 377> 413, 4S2-4S3, 457. 459, 473, 504- Niger basin, 20, 28. Nish, 287, 418. Nord und Sild, 213, 355. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, , 251, 347, 364-367, 377, 447, 472, 474, 478, 484-485. North Sea, 179, 180, 186, 191, 193. Novi-Bazar, sanjak of, 286, 290, 432, 45o. Oberwinder, Heinrich, Die Weltkrise und die Aufgaben des deutschen Reickes, 120, 125, 128. Obrenovitch family in Serbia, 257, 264. O'Connor, T. A., The Baghdad Railway, 266. Oldenburg, Herr von, 40. Olga, Grand Duchess of Russia, 365. O'Neill, iEneas, Six German Opinions on the Naval Situation, 207. Oriental railway, 399. Osmanye, 300. Our Foreign Policy and Its Reform, 342. Pacific Ocean, 19-20, 78, 180, 196, 205. Paish, Sir George, 105. Paleologue, M., French ambassador in St. Petersburg, 442-443, 464. Pallavicini, Marquis, 383. Palma (Balearic Isles), 387. Palmerston, Lord, 120-122, 124, 125, 126, 129, 162-163. Pan-German League, 80-84, I S7> 210, 232, 318, 385. Pan-Islamism, 261-264, 284. Panther (German gunboat), 302, 310, 312, 314, 316, 320, 321, 339. Paris, Treaty of (1856), 122, 133, 253. Parliamentary Papers, 25, 98, 174. "Peace of Rome, 1916," 391. Peel, George, The Future of England, 25. Pelletan, Camille, 179. Pendjeh, 18, 134. Penetration pacifique, 234, 266. Perris, G. H., Germany and the German Emperor, 35, 45, 147, 172; Our For- eign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure, 341. Persia, 21, 30, 242, 262, 264, 272, 275, 282, 298-299, 341. Persian Gulf, 21, 30, 241-242, 264, 266, 267, 268, 271, 274-278, 280, 300, 370. Peter the Great, 379. Peter Karageorgevitch, 258. Petit Parisien, 386. Philip II, 2, 476. Phillips, Lady, A Friendly Germany, Why Not?, 97, 117, 147. Pichon, Stephen, French foreign minis- ter, 304, 308-311, 336. Pinon, Rene, L'Europe et VEmpire Ottoman, 1, 266, 273-274, 280; L'Eu- rope et la jeune Turquie, 287. Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 1 18, 198. "Place in the sun," 5, 87, 325, 344. Poincare,Raymond,President of France, 35i, 365, 367, 388, 473, 499-500. Poland, 377, 380. Port Arthur, 21, 141. Port, Baltic, 352. Portugal, 14; African colonies, 78, 85, 144, 346, 371-372. Posen, 46-47, 49. Potsdam, interview at, 298, 342. Pourtales, Count, German ambassador in St. Petersburg, 292, 408, 413, 422, 433, 436-437, 442-443, 451, 454, 459, 475, 504- Poutiloff Arms Factory, in St. Peters- burg, 385. Preussische Jahrbiicher, 157. Princip, Gavril, 394-395- INDEX 521 Private property at sea in time of war, 161, 201-203. Prussia, ascendency in Germany, 7-8, 37-39, 41, 43, 45-49. 56; constitution, 42; franchise, 42-43; history, 8, 41- 42, 71, 118, 124-126; militarism, 8, 36-37, 125, 130. Rabat, 312, 319. Racconigi, 291. Rand mines, 372. Redmond, John, ^$. Reformation, the, 37, 116. Reich, Emil, Germany's Swelled Head, 93, 170. Remich, 487. Renaissance, the, 70. Reval, 205, 282. Reventlow, Count, Die englische See- macht, 204. Rhenisch-W estjdlische Zeitung, 318. Rhine River, 391, 477. Rhodes, Cecil, 144. Rhodesia, 372. Richard of Cornwall, 116. Richard the Lion-Hearted, 116. Riff, the, 314. Rio Grande, 6. Roberts, Lord (Sir Frederick), 18, 185, 209. Robertson, J. M., 202. Rodd, Sir Rennell, British ambassador in Rome, 432. Rohrbach, Dr. Paul, Die Bagdadbahn, 157, 266, 272-273; Der deutsche Ge- danke in der Welt, 6, 10, 157, 197, 206, 279; Deulschland unterden Wellvolkern, 73. 78, 157-159, 226, 279; Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik, 157, 197, 380; L'Evolution de I'Allemagne comme puissance mondiale, 75, 282; Zum Weltvolk hindurch !, 371, 373, 380. Rose, J. Holland, The Development of the Modern European Nations, 132. Rouire, Dr., La Rivalile anglo-russe au XIX"" siecle en Asie, 275. Round Table, 1, 122, 168, 170-171. Rouvier, Maurice, French prime minis- ter, 228. Rumania, 255-256, 265, 296, 361, 365, 380, 383. Rumbold, Sir Horace, British charge in Berlin, 406, 416. Russell, Lord John, 126, 129. Russia, army, 59, 380; Asiatic posses- sions, 76, 78, 263-264; fleet, 193; military party, 381; pacific tend- encies, 381-382; revolution threat- ened in 1914, 388-389. Russia, foreign policy : B aghdad railway, 267-268,298-299, 378; Balkans, 254- 258, 286-293, 296, 360-365, 378-380, 383, 396, 400-402; Far East, 30, 141, 151, 259, 265, 378-379; France, see Dual Alliance; Germany, see Ger- many, relations with Russia; Great Britain, see Great Britain, relations with Russia; Italy, 290-291; Turkey, 120, 128, 134, 241, 254-255, 296, 374, 378-379- Russia, policy during crisis of 1914: announcement that Russia cannot re- main indifferent, 413; appeal to Eng- land for solidarity, 413, 471, 474; con- ciliatory attitude, 449-450; formulas for international action, 443, 449; in- vites mediation by Great Britain, 435, 437. 439. 450; by Italy, 418; mobili- zation, 422, 434-437, 441-442, 444- 445, 449, 451, 453, 466 ; negotiations with Austria, 413, 419, 436, 450; promises Germany not to use army while negotiations proceed, 452; pro- poses arbitration, 413; receives assur- ance of French assistance, 463-466; requests extension of time for Aus- trian ultimatum, 412; ultimatum from Germany, 452, 483, 486; urges mod- eration on Serbia, 403, 412, 418, 420; violation of frontier charged by Ger- many, 454-455 ; war declared by Ger- many, 454, 486; war not expected, 453. 459- Russian Orange Book (1914), 458. Russo-Japanese War, 29, 153, 179, 224, 258, 348, 378. Said-Ruete, R., Anglo-German Relations in the Near East, 299. Saladin, 260. Salandra, Antonio, Italian premier, 418. Salisbury, Lord, British foreign secre- tary, 7, 24, 26, 133, 136, 139, 144, 146, 152, 158, 222, 356. Salonika, 256, 283, 286, 363. Samoa, 144. 522 INDEX San Giuliano, Marquis di, Italian foreign minister, 430, 471. San Stefano, treaty of, 17, 258, 378. Sanders, General Liman von, 379. Santa Lucia Bay, 135. Sarolea, Charles, The Anglo-German Problem, 170. Saturday Review, 155, 166, 206. Sazonof, Sergius, Russian foreign min- ister, 367, 380-381, 500. Sazonof, Sergius, policy during crisis of 1014: appeals for British mediation, 435, 437. 439, 45°,* appeals for British solidarity with Russia, 413, 471, 504; claims to have news of German mili- tary preparations, 458-459; concilia- tory attitude, 413, 419-420, 434; dic- tates formulas for negotiation with Austria, 443, 449-450; explains Rus- sian mobilization, 441; informs Ger- many of mobilization, 435; insists Austro-Serbian dispute is interna- tional, 413, 433-434; suspicious of Austria's intentions, 412-413, 432; of Germany's, 424; thinks ultimatum directed against Russia, 409; thinks war intended by Germany, 452; tries to reassure Germany and Austria, 436; warns Austria, 405; warns Ger- many, 435. Scezsen, Count, Austrian ambassador in Paris, 450. Scharnhorst, 119. Schebeko, M., Russian ambassador in Vienna, 404, 419, 425, 437, 449. Schiemann, Professor Theodor, 225. Schierbrand, Wolf von, Germany, 106. Schiller, 250. Schleswig-Holstein, 46, 122, 125, 129, 228. Schneider, Fritz, We Germans and Our British Cousins, 166. Schoen, Herr von, German ambassador in Paris, 311, 319, 334, 422-423, 433, 438, 460. Schubert, Captain Hartwig, Die deut- sche Schlachtflotte eine Gefakr fur Deutschlands Machtstellung, 212. Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor von, Deutschland und England, 108; Eng- land and Germany — Peace or War ? 194, 197. Schwidden, 454. Scutari, 359, 362. Selim I, 262. Selves, Justin de, French foreign minis- ter, 316, 319, 320. Serajevo, 374, 382, 393. Serbia, 256-258, 288-290, 294, 296, 358, 361-364, 383, 395-396, 401-402; dec- laration of 31 March, 1909, 290, 410, 428. Serbia, policy during crisis of 19 14: ap- peal to Russia, 412, 420; complicity in assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 395, 398-399; policy from assassination to ultimatum of 23 July, 398, 402-403; reply to ultimatum, 417-418, 420, 424, 427-432; war de- clared by Austria, 425-426, 434. Seven Years' War, 20, 139. Shakespeare, 250. Shargah, sheikh of, 278. Shatt-el-Arab, 274. Shaw, George Bernard, The Man of Des- tiny, 167-168. Shawia, 304, 326. Shiites, 262. Shimonoseki, treaty of (1894), 141. Shuster, W. Morgan, 341. Siam, 20, 21, 28. Sieper, Dr. Ernst, Die Kultur modernen Englands, 355. Sigma, The Tu Quoque Quarrel, 171. "Slav peril," 299. Slavs, Southern, 255, 288, 395-397, 401. Sociele marocaine de Travaux publics, 309. Solf, Dr., 346. South Africa, 17, 19, 32, 78, 81, 141, 143, 145, 147, 150, 3Q2-393- Spain, interest in Morocco, 229, 235- 236, 238, 303, 308, 314, 317; relations with France, 235, 365; relations with Great Britain, 29, 229, 235, 239-240. Spanish-American War, 142-143, 239. Spectator, 170, 257, 351, 354. Spender, J. A., The Foundations of Brit- ish Policy, 209, 353. Stanley, H. M., 79. Statesman's Year Book, 99. Statistisches Handbuch des deutschen Reiches, 99. Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das deulsche Reich, 99. Steed, H. W., The Hapsburg Monarchy, 287, 292. INDEX 523 Steelyard, the, 116. Stein, 119. Stein, Dr. Ludwig, 355. Sternberg, Baron Speck von, The Truth about German Expansion, 75. Straits, question of the, 255, 261, 286, 287, 289, 359. Stubbs, William (Bishop), Lectures on Medieval and Modern History, 2. Siidkamerungesellschaft, 310. Suez Canal, 17, 29, 259, 264, 272, 273. Sunnites, 262. Super-Dreadnought, 186. Swerbeiev, M., Russian ambassador in Berlin, 445. Syria, 272. Szapary, Count, Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, 413, 419, 425, 430, 435. 45o, 457- Tabah incident, 273. Taillandier, Saint-Rene, 236. Talleyrand, 120. Tangier, 227, 234. Tankositch, Major Voija, 395, 411, 427. Tardieu, Andre, La Conference d'Alge- siras, 234; Le Mystere d'Agadir, 307, 310, 312; Le Prince de Billow, 308. Taurus Mountains, 267. Teheran, German school at, 298. Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 19. Temps, 294. The Hague, Second Conference at, 183, 248. Thirlmere, Rowland, The Clash of Em- pires, 170. Thirty Years' War, 116, 275. Three Emperors' League, 131-132, 286. Tibet, 21, 32, 241. Tigris River, 267, 274, 279, 370. Tille, Alexander, Aus Englands Flegel- jakren, 165-166. Times, 63, 126-127, 131. 143. 147-148, 156, 193-194. 248-249, 324, 329, 353- 354, 359, 365, 387. 389, 392, 487- Times History of the War, 275, 277. Tirpitz, Admiral von, 11, 113, 174, 176, 182, 186, 191, 193-194, 204, 345, 347. Tisza, Count Stephen, 383, 404. Togoland, 78, 135, 233, 320. Tonkin, 20. Transvaal, 17, 19, 22, 32, 79, 135, 143. Treitschke, Heinrich von, 51, 89, 91, 159-165; Deutsche Geschichte, 123, 159-163; Deutsche Kdmpfe, 160-164. Trevelyan, Charles, 156. Treves, 386. Triple Alliance, 132-133, 139, 237, 240, 242, 256, 265, 286, 294, 341, 348, 356, 363, 366, 381, 386, 465. Triple Entente, 242, 246-247, 250, 252, 281, 288-289, 291, 296-297, 299, 301, 305, 34i, 343. 351-352, 360, 363, 365- 368, 375-376, 392, 428, 468, 470, 472. Tripoli, 84, 2ir, 218, 291, 336, 363. Tschirscky, Herr von, German ambas- sador in Vienna, 406, 408, 417. Tuckwell, W., Reminiscences of Oxford, 123. Tunis, 20, 79, 134, 231. Turgot, 16. Turkey, Committee of Union and Prog- ress, 283, 285; constitution of 1876, 282; customs, 269, 280, 297, 300, 370; Cretan question, 142, 259, 260, 284; finance, 260, 270-271, 284, 296-297; goes to war at behest of Germany, 274, 297, 300; navy, 297; revolution of 1908, 279, 281, 501; Straits, ques- tion of the, 255, 261, 286-287, 289, 359; Turks, the, 253-254; "Turki- fication," 297, 358; war with Greece, 260; Young Turks, 282, 284-285, 296- 297, 358. Turkey, relations with Germany. See Germany, relations with Turkey. Turkey, relations with Great Britain. See Great Britain, relations with Turkey. Tweedmouth, Lord, 183, 248. Two-Power standard for British navy, 178, 180, 186, 190, 215. Ubangi River, 334, 336. Udja, 304, 309. Uganda, 136. Ultimatum of 23 July, 19 14, 66, 404, 410-41 1, 415, 426-427, 435. Union des Mines marocaines, 309. United Kingdom. See Great Britain. United States, 142-143, 231, 239, 303, 336, 428. Urquhart, Francis, 201. Vambery, Dr. Arminius, 21. Van den Heuvel, J., On the Violation of Belgian Neutrality, 479. 5 2 4 INDEX Venezuela affair, 1902, 152, 223. ViaUate, Achille, La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, 241, 245, 287. Victor Emmanuel III, 291. Victoria, Queen, 17, 123-124, 128, 131, 134, 145, 158, 222. Vienna, Congress of, 118, 120, 121, 391, 476. Viviani, Rene, French premier and for- eign minister in 19 14, denies violation of German frontier by France, 461; pledges France to fulfil conditions of alliance, 464; protests against Ger- man ultimatum, 400; seeks assistance of Great Britain, 473; urges Grey to let Jagow propose form of mediation, 438; visits St. Petersburg, 388. Voltaire, 122. Von der Goltz, Admiral, 176. Von der Goltz, General, 260, 284. Vorwdrts, 161. Walfisch Bay, 135. Walpole, Sir Spencer, History of England from 1815; History of Twenty-five Years, 120. Wasserbillig, 487. Waterloo, battle of, 118, 208. Wellington, Duke of, 118. Wells, H. G., Social Forces in England and America, 97. Wemyss, Mrs. Rosslyn, Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, 125, 128, 132. Westminster Gazette, 353, 367, 451. Whelpley, James Davenport, The Trade of the World, 97, 104, 112-113. White Ensign, 179. Whitman, Sidney, Conversations with Prince Bismarck, 136; England and Germany, 131, 154, 157-158, 166; German Memories, 90, 136; Germany's Obsession, 52; Turkish Memories, 282. Why We Are at War, by members of the Oxford faculty of modern history, 59, 205, 489. Wile, F. W., Men Around the Kaiser, 40. Wilkinson, Spenser, Britain at Bay, 200, 207, 213. Willcocks, Sir William, 269, 279. William I, King of the Netherlands, 476. William I of Prussia, 55, 128, 131. William II, German Emperor, character, 38, 67-69, 88, 91, 94, 384-385; Daily Telegraph interview, 147, 185, 248— 249; foreign policy, 140-144, 147, 220, 231,377; interest in Turkey, 142, 260, 266, 273; naval policy, g, 173, 175, 183-184, 187-188, 198; relations with: Edward VII, 244-245; Francis Fer- dinand, 383; Lord Haldane, 347; Tsar Nicholas II, 205, 352, 377; role in crisis of 1 914, 406, 440, 504; "shining armor," 292; speech at Tangier, 227; telegrams: to George V, 457, 463, 484; Goluchowski, 286; Kriiger, 143; Nicholas II, 413, 438, 451, 454, 457, 504; visits to England, 147, 248, 302. William the Silent, 476. Willis, W. N., What Germany Wants,. 170. Wilson, Sir Arthur Knyvet, 212. Wirth, Dr. Albrecht, Die Entscheidung iiber Marokko, 234. Wolff-Metternich, Count, German am- bassador in London, 319-320, 323, 325-328, 331-333. 343. 349-351. 369- Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 19. Wolsey, Cardinal, 2. Wonckhaus (Bahrein), 278. Yangtze Valley, 20. Yemen, 272. Yovanonovitch, Y. M., Serbian minister in Vienna, 397, 399, 403-404, 406. Zabern, 49. Zambesi River, 372. Zanzibar, 136, 137. Zimmermann, Alfred, 318, 454. Zwingli, 116. Aflit Ascension (St-.) P.litie. ttt«t»» Fr»nc»- — • — .-*.— Fro-nec u 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 m Rnlv»\ r 1 Cop* t, £.«£«MBlA. P.C.H S.L.* Sisiin A Lb»n[ V.W.»UK t VicT.ri«. J "!"«».• LclKc Tm (]an A yktt ~o, Ola <=&» l«ii'i>o> ,A '« '' French WesT Africa Tr.f.1?^,^ jj _._ ' Alii v 7 7*!POU ^ 1 ' VJ". -; M -r Egypt fttrn (Br) M. Hi' tt, Ascension (3r.) i Sudan /X* / > ice Kaherun , IS...) W- T J J ABYSSINIA £Rie **m INCH CoNG.0 French boX« tt(J<|hhi B»OTl9N East Africa { ; So*** 1 * CoNCO (8tl,;.n)' C.«v R -V. CeR|v\AN v «^ rTnT *"' " "»»_ /&ZA./XHJAH (Br) I £.*.»T AFRICA ")B.r»3-5.l««m Angola (Port.) SrHtiFtfA. (Br) P.|it;««l Frontiers. rtitti. Fr.ne, _Sp.mil, ParTitUn of M« ceo, ISO*. — .-..-.._ France- Hetwiii i'e«i^, u ii iii i i i iii Railways («nly a. f«w fW«>>). ■ C »P« *"• C.ir. (pr.).cT.i). G»£«mbia. P.C.« Puntuni Kiiinia. 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