V 
 
 
 
 .^^ -^^^ 
 
 ,\^^ "'^^. 
 
 
 
 .•b 
 
 
 .^' 
 
 o 0^ 
 
 
 
 '..s'- ..A 
 
 
 
 
 \' 
 
 
 p^ V' 
 
 
 o 0' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 '^' 
 
 
 .-i\ 
 
 ^, .1^' 
 
 o 
 
 .0 0. 
 
 .S -r 
 
 ,o- 
 
 
',<\^ 
 
 -0- .'^ ' 
 
 \V- -V-L 
 
 r^-C 
 
 
 
 •^ 
 
 
 
 
 ..O'^ 
 
 'O . * ., ., n "5 ^' 
 
 ^^^^ 
 
 ^t^ v^^ 
 
 X^^:. 
 
 
 " '■ « '^^ ■ ' ° ^ A^^\ - ^ " « 
 
 •-^.# 
 
 ^-^^ ^'b'- 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^^. .A^ 
 
 V 
 
 
 .^^' 
 
 o> 
 
 
 
 
 -'^y. v^^ 
 
 K • , '?> 
 
 ^^- A-\^ 
 
 
 .x>' 
 
 
 
 -■^o 
 
 0^- 
 
 C"" 
 
 
 \^'^- 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 ■ '\' 
 
 
 
 
 "V ^ 
 
 y\% 
 
 
 
 
 A^^' ^^- 
 
 
 :,* ,x> '^' 
 
 ,-'^-' 
 
 
 
 
 aV -r- ^ ' » * -?; 
 
 
 >'•' ■'- .r-J 'y 
 
 
 
 ^ .0- 
 
 C-. 
 
 
 •A^" -^z 
 
 
LETTERS 
 
 A 
 
 UNDER THE SIGNATURES OF 
 
 SENEX, 
 
 AND OF 
 
 A FARMER, 
 
 COMPREHENDING AN EXAMINATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 CONDUCT OF OUR EXECUTIVE, 
 
 TOWARDS 
 
 FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN, 
 
 OUT OF WHICH THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS ARISEN, 
 
 ORIGINALLt PUBLISHED IN THE NORTH AMERICAN. 
 
 To whkt end should the conqueror spare us ? Our virtue and undaunt- 
 ed spirit are crimes in his eyes, and will render us more obnoxious. 
 Our remote situation, hitherto the retreat of freedom, and on that 
 account the more suspected, will serve only to inflame the jeaJous/ 
 of our enemies. — Tacitus. 
 
 BALTIMORE: --^ 
 
 PRINTED BY P. K, WAOHEB, CORNER OF GAY AND SECOND STREETS, 
 
 1809. 
 
I 
 
 Great public exi.s:encies, in free governments, 
 have always called forth great virtue and talents. I'lius 
 the passing occurrences of the day prove, that the lapse 
 ©f twenty-five years has not turned our nation aside 
 from that salutary vigilance of their rulers and jealousy 
 of their rights, without which our government could 
 not have been established nor continued. 
 
 Should we survive the fraud, prejudice and power, 
 which have conspired for our ruin, we shall not owe 
 it more to the timely illustrations of the sage, and the 
 heroic devotion of the patriot, than to native good sense 
 and unalterable attachment to liberty in the body of the 
 people. We have here another proof, that the American 
 nation is as conspicuous for its intelligence, as for its 
 civil system, and its unalterable adherence to national 
 freedom. The late attempts upon both, have electrified 
 the whole country. The aged, the n tired, the timid^ 
 the wavering, and the deluded, have all been brought 
 into the ranks of that phalanx, which is determined to 
 save the country. By such exertions, it must be saved ! 
 
 Among the pens which have powerfully contributed 
 to this conservatory alarm, is the able and ingenuous 
 author of the subjoined letters. His fascinating candor 
 and vigorous argument, have chased away the sophistry 
 and premeditated delusions, with which the Hand of 
 Power has covered its sinister purposes and our danger. 
 These explanations of our public affairs, in a conjuncture 
 which has involved the life and death of our enviable 
 political constitution, will be long admired. The crisis 
 which called them forth, is alone more interesting, than 
 the dignity of the writer is venerable, and his capacity 
 exalted. 
 
u^ 
 
SENEX. 
 
 NO. L 
 
 Although long ^ince withdrawn from those ac- 
 tive political scenes, in which I once took an anxious 
 part, I find it impossible to remain an uninterested, 
 ^'though I have been many years a silent spectator of 
 passing events. The transactions of the day involve ob- 
 jects too important to this western vvorid, too vitally 
 essential to the independence of the United States, to 
 leave it possible for any man, who justly appreciates 
 that independence, to view them with unconcern. — 
 However age may have slackened the course of that 
 vital current, which once rushed impetuously through 
 his veins, or retirement have enabled him to contem- 
 plate without emotion, the low intrigues and vile strat- 
 agems of party, the real patriot can never cease to feel 
 for his country; nor can he see her hurried to the brink 
 of that precipice, to dash over which is death, without 
 raising his warning voice to announce her danger. 
 That voice may be disregarded — he may anticipate the 
 neglect it will experience — but he will do what he 
 thinks his duty. 
 
 Never, since the all-subduing legions of ancient Rome 
 carried conquest and chains to the remotest regions of 
 the earth, has human liberty been so nearly banished 
 from the world, has national sovereignty been so nearly 
 swallowed up, by one immense military despotism, as 
 at the present moment. 
 
 In less than ten years, more has been done than is now 
 to be atchieveti.— Since her present emperor seized 
 
 A 
 
 i^ 
 
2 
 
 the reins of the government in France, a much greater 
 mili ciry force has been subjected to his power, than re- 
 main, to be subdued. 
 
 That Europe, if united and directed by one great 
 mind, is able to give laws to the rest of the world has 
 never been doubted. What is now wanted to complete 
 that union ? ! hose vast powers, 'vvhich formerly check-; 
 ed and balanced each other, exist no longer, or exist 
 oniy to employ the remnant of their strength in execu- 
 tii5g the mandates of their conqueror. i-.ven Russia 
 obeys his a^ ill, and at the nod of Napoleon, weakly and 
 wickedly directs her disgraced arms against her most 
 faithful and most honoun;ble friend. A subnussive con- 
 ti'.ent has received his yoke, and is ready to waste its 
 treasures, aixl to pour out its blood in his service.* 
 
 What arrests the application of this immense force to 
 the residue of the world ? What secures a single spot 
 of our earth from those chains, which are prepared for 
 all, and which have been imposed on all, m hom the co- 
 lossal power of France has been able to reach ? What 
 prevents the perfect union of Europe, and the conse- 
 quent subjugation of the rest of the globe ? 
 
 No American is too ignorant to give the true answer 
 to these questions — Destroy the preponderance of the 
 British navy ; place the dominion of the sea in the hands 
 of him who rules the land ; enable Bonaparte to waft 
 his countless legions to whatever shores he may direct 
 them, and the most uninformed of my fellow citizens, 
 the most obsequious and inflituated advocate of that 
 fatal system, which so steadily pursues this object, 
 
 * The present manly exertions of Spain, so honourable to the 
 people of that country, and so disgraceful to their rulers, will, I 
 ftar,give no permanent check to the progress of French domina- 
 tion. It is much to be apprehended, that this late assertion of 
 rational independence, made by a gallant people, who had been 
 betrayed by their government, will terminate in a bloody pros- 
 cription, of which all that is noble and patriotic, will become the 
 victims. Certainly, without the aid of England, not the mpst 
 romantic chivalry could hope for success. 
 
ii>ust feel that the last barrier to the universal empire of 
 one man, is removed. 
 
 I do not think it necessary to prove this proposition. 
 It is one of those self-evident truths, which, like an 
 axiom in mathematics, carries conviction with it. No 
 mind can resist its intrinsic demonstration. 
 
 What then is the course which America ought to pur- 
 sue ? What does her interest dictate ? What v ill rescue 
 her liberty from impending danger ^ What will best se- 
 cure her independence ? 
 
 These are questions most deeply interesting to us 
 all, and on which it Ipehoves us all niost seriously to 
 reflect. 
 
 To those who guide the councils of the nation, it 
 belongs, to mark out the nation's course, and I shall 
 noi presume to say, what that course ought to be. But 
 this I will venture to affirm— the most deadly foe of 
 American independence, the most malignant enemy 
 of human liberty, can devise nothing so certainly fatal 
 to that independence, nothmg so inevitably dt structive 
 of that liberty, as impairing the maritime strength of 
 Britain, and thus transftrring the dominion of the seas, 
 from an island incapable of becoming a great military 
 power, to a sovereign who already wields almost the 
 wnole military force of the Kuropean continent. 
 
 Why then should America throw her weight into the 
 scale already so preponderant ? Why does she endea- 
 vor to augment a power which already threatens to 
 overwhelm the whole human race ? Why should she 
 place additional means in the hands of the greatest sol- 
 dier of the age, who is at the same time the most stern, 
 systematic, cruel and unrelenting tyrant with whom an 
 angry Heaven has ever scourged a sinning world ? 
 Why should she endeavor to put beneath his feet the 
 only obstacle to the full accomplishment of his ambi- 
 tious schemes ? 
 
 I know not why America should pursue these objects. 
 That every motive which ought to influence human con- 
 duct, should impel her in a contrary direction, and in- 
 spire her with different wishes, appears to be so obvi* 
 ous, that I reluctantly credit the clearest evidence which 
 m continually flowing in upon me in support of the fact. 
 
Yet T am comp^eiled to credit it. I am compelled to 
 believe, that those who now administer the government, 
 either feel prejudices in flivour of France, and against 
 England, which have determined them to put in hazard 
 the independence of their country, by becoming the 
 ally of the former in a war, undertaken and carried on 
 for the extermination of the latter ; or they Relieve that 
 England must sink, that the attempt to defend our in- 
 dependence must then inevitably fail, and that it has 
 become the part of wisdom to diminish the severity of 
 slavery, by courting in time the favor of our master. 
 
 If, in these opir<ions, my iellov/ citizens concur 
 with their rulers, desperate indeed is their situation, 
 and vain would be any attempt of mine, to arouse their 
 nobler feelings. But I cannot yet believe, that the spi- 
 rit of '76 is entirely extinguished. J cannot yet believe 
 that America has wrested the right of self-government 
 from a parent state, \yhose laws are the freest and 
 mildest of Europe, from v.hom we derive the wisest 
 and the soundest institutions, as well as the best guards 
 of liberty, in order to surrender that inestimable privi- 
 lege to an unfeeling military despot, in whose handg 
 rewards, bribes, chains, confiscation and death, are in- 
 struments, which, in the execution of his plans, he iis^s 
 with absolute coid-l)looded indiifercnce. 
 
 I shall, therefore, devote a few numbers to the pur- 
 pose of inviting the attention of my countrymen, to 
 some of the most conspicuous of those facts, which ap-;- 
 pear to me to demonstrate the existence of that baneful 
 system, which I have ascribed to those in power, 
 
 SENEX. 
 
NO, IL 
 
 T HAVE said, that those, who rule our councils, 
 have been regularly and systematically urging the na- 
 tiH'i into the arms of France, by plunging us into a war 
 w th Brit in. The mode, by w hich alone this pernicious 
 o jcct can be effected, is too apparent to be mistaken. 
 I'he power of j^eace and war being essentially in the peo- 
 ple, their minds must be prepared for war, before they 
 can be engaged in one. It is not by openly avo^ving 
 the design, that this can be accomplished The people 
 of this country are disinclined to war, and an open di- 
 rect avowal of a wish to involve them in one, might 
 defeat its own purpose. It is by rousing the angry 
 passions ; by exasperating those Iceen rescntntCMts, 
 which have been excited against a foreign nation, that 
 the x^mericans are to be prepared to wage war upon 
 that nation. It is by exaggerating the injuries inflicted 
 by Britain ; by concealing, softening, and even denying 
 those heaped upon us by France ; by misrepresenting 
 the conduct of those powers, and misstating their views, 
 that America is to be induced to focilitate the imposi- 
 tion of manacles on herself, by uniting with the latter 
 to hasten the downfall of the former. 
 
 Who has not perceived the too successful industry 
 with which this baneful system has been pursued ? 
 
 I will not invite my fellow citizens to look back to 
 1793, and to follow the man on whom t.ie people have 
 be stowed their confidence, from that period to the pre- 
 sent. I will not invite them to recollect the ardent and 
 persevering zeal, with which those men continued to 
 defend the \ij;\\t of France to exercise, in this country, 
 the choicest attributes of sovereignty ; nor will I call 
 their attention to the malign antrage with which the 
 best patriots of our country vrere pursued, for defend- 
 ing that sovereignty. But it will be useful to advert 
 to one fact, which appears to have escaped the public 
 attention, and v/hich is of some importance in marking 
 the temper of those who govern public opinion. It is 
 this : In the measures adopted by the belligerent pow- 
 ers, which are deemed irijurious to this country, France 
 has generally taken ihe lead = I or the purpose of ex- 
 
asperation, the past ofiTences of Great Britain are fre- 
 queiitiv rccapiiul.tcd. Among them i-, the order of the 
 9th ofJimc, 1793. Neither the subsequent treaty, nor 
 the ample compensation we have received for captures 
 macle under thai order, can erase it fn^m our catalogue 
 of injuries. Our resentments are still to be excited by 
 it. Yet we are never told, that in the preceding month, 
 a decree still less defensible in principle, stih more in- 
 jurious to our rights, was made by the government of 
 France. We are never told, that for the captures un- 
 der this and other decrees of the same power, which 
 sul^jected to confiscation every vessel sailing under the 
 American flag, no compensation has ever been made. — 
 Degrading to our government and to our nation, as 
 have, and continue to be, the claims and practices of 
 France, we are never reminded of this, or of any other 
 fdct which mighi disclose to us our real situation, 
 \yhilst every measure adopted by a nation struggling 
 for her own liberty, m which ours is involved, is pre- 
 sented to us in the most odious colours, and dilated 
 upon with an assiduity v.hich never relaxes. 
 
 i shLtll not rely on the conduct of those now in power, 
 while they constituted an opposition, but shall pass to 
 those transactions, ^hich manifest the temper with 
 which tiiey have administered our national aflairs 
 
 In the United States, as in all popular governments, 
 public opinion is in a great measure regulated by the 
 Press. It is, of consequence, the vehicle by which the 
 government conveys to the people those sentiments 
 which it w ishes to inculcate. In those presses, there- 
 fore, ^vhich enjoy the sunshine of ministerial favor and 
 patronage, which are professedly devoted to the sup- 
 port of tlic administration, and to the furtheran&e of 
 its designs, we may look with confidence for the cer- 
 tain expression of the ministerial will. All have per- 
 ceived with what unwearied diligence these presses 
 have laboured to diffuse through the mass of the peo- 
 ple, a most rancorou.s and envenomed hate of Lngland, 
 while every fact, ^iiich might open their c}es to the 
 real dangers to be a]:)prehended from France, has been 
 carefully kept out of view. No man, who v/ill look 
 into these papers, and they Have been read ^^•ith par- 
 
tiality by a ^reat majority of the community, can refuse 
 his assent to the truth, that the ruling sentiment which 
 pervades them is hostility to Knt'land, and a conse- 
 quent accordance v.'irh the views of France. 1 will not 
 cite paragraphs to illustrate the truth' of this assertion. 
 I make it fearless of contradiction. ; he columns of 
 the papers alluded to, are replete with evidences of the 
 fact ; and those who are not satisfied of its verity, 
 would require some proof auxiliary to his own splen- 
 dour, that the sun shines at mid-day. No man can in- 
 spect the Aurora, the National Intelligencer, the Enqui- 
 rer, or any other paper enjoying the favour of admin- 
 istration, without perceiving one unvarying effort to lead 
 the American people into a war widi j'^ngLnd. 
 
 1 do not mention this fact as one which has not been 
 observed by others, for there are few who have not felt 
 its influence, but for the purpose of requesting the at- 
 tention of my fellow cidzens to its orighi and intended 
 effect. 
 
 Can it be believed, that papers which are deemed 
 semi-ofiFicial, which are known to devote them.selves to 
 the service of the adminis' ration, and to partake of its 
 bounty, would contintuill} urge a system which that 
 administration disapproved ? It cannof be believed. 
 No man can hesitate to admit, that the press is a pow- 
 erful engine, wielded by the governme .t skiltuiiy, and 
 with immense efl:ect, for the promotion of its favourite 
 object. 
 
 If the means constantly employed have a certain and 
 obvious tendency to produce a particular end, that end 
 must be desired by tho^e v\ ho employ the means. — 
 Who then can resist the conclusion, that a war with 
 Britain is most anxiously desired by that administra- 
 tion, under whose auspices the means calculated to 
 produce it, are so unremitting]}- employed ? 
 
 Let it not be said, that it is unjust to ascribe to the ad- 
 ministration, opinions which may be propagated by the 
 editors of news-papers, or that the fact is in itself too 
 unimportant to form the b.isis of so serious a charge, as 
 a desire to involve the nation in a war, which, without 
 the interposition of Providence, mist terminate in the 
 subjugation of this once free and happy country. The 
 
 ^'■^.T' 
 
iiiivour of p:overnment would be infalliljly withdrawti 
 from papers, which obstinately persisted in opposing 
 its views ; and no man is so ignorant o^" the influence of 
 the press, as to deem it an unimportant instrument in 
 efiecting great political objects. By no men in exist- 
 ence, is its capacity more justly appreciated, than by 
 lliose wh('m it has elevated to almost unlimited power, 
 and who now use it as a mean to excite our hostility 
 as:ainst Eni>:land. 
 
 It is then a most serious and a most infallible proof of 
 the- spirit by which the present administration is actu- 
 ated. It is one wliich demands the solemn considera- 
 tion ol the American people. 
 
 SENEX, 
 
NO. Ill 
 
 From the opinionb incessantly inculcated tliroiioii 
 the prcbb, that powerful engine, by \\'hich governments 
 operate most efficaciousiy on the minds ot the people, 
 I have inferred the spirit of hostility to England and de- 
 votion to France, by which our administration is actu- 
 ated. I am now about to call the attention of my fellow 
 citizens to another circumstance, which, to my mind, 
 is not less conviiicing. 
 
 In the United States there will ahvays be men who le- 
 vote them.ielves to the president. 'J'hey utter opinions 
 which they believe to be his, and maintain those pro- 
 positions which they belit ve him to advocate. Of these 
 some are known to be in his confidence, and to derive 
 immediately from himself the ideas which they com- 
 municate. From these intermediaries, others are con- 
 tent to receive their instructions, and the ass ^^nni' nt 
 of the parts they are respectively to perform. Throu,8:h 
 this medium, not indeed so extensively as through the 
 press, but to a very great extent, does an administra- 
 tion also develope its designs. 
 
 Beyond the range of my own observation I pretend 
 not to speak ; but within that range, t can confidently 
 aver, that among those devoted to the administration, I 
 have scaixely heard an individual, who did not breathe 
 the most envenomed hate to England They appear to 
 think this sentiment the test of patriotism, and an unerr* 
 ing proof of riierit. Their utmost influence is exerted 
 to. render it the common sentiment of the nation. Many, 
 in plain terms, speak of war as proper, and all use that 
 language which leads to war. My fellow citizens will 
 Jiidge from their own observati©n, whether this fact ex- 
 ists in the same degree in other circles, as it does in 
 that in which it has been my lot to move. I believe it 
 does exist in the same, or at least in a very great de- 
 gree. If in this I am correct, docs not the facl: conclu- 
 sively demonstrate the temper of the administration ? 
 Can it be believed, that those who almost idolize our 
 executive, who applaud all his opinions, and all his 
 measures, who dissent in nothing even from his capri- 
 ces, who perceive in him only the purest virtue an^ tlio. 
 
10 
 
 most sublime inlelligence, can all differ essentially from, 
 him on a subject more interesting than any other to 
 this country, his opinions on which have marked his 
 whole political course ? 
 
 Although I should not be pardoned the proKxity of 
 an attempt to enumerate the various circumstances 
 which support this allegation, I may be permitted to 
 .refer, for its more particular illustration, to two papers 
 which have been highly extolled by the friends of the 
 administration, and which may be safely considered as 
 detailing its sentiments. One is the letter of Mr. John. 
 Q. Adams to a senator of Massachusetts — the other ia 
 the letter oi Mr. Wilson C. Nicholas to his constitu* 
 ents. 
 
 To those who are not personally acquainted with 
 these gentlemen, their political characters must be in 
 some measure known. Mr. Adams, the son of the late 
 president, is generally deemed a man of talents, and of 
 extensive information. The foul injustice with which 
 his honourable father has been pursued, even in his re- 
 tirement, and the atrocious calumnies which have been 
 heaped upon that venerable patriot, by those now in 
 power, have not restrained this gentleman from ally- 
 ing himself closely with them, nor hom supporting 
 their political system, wdth a zeal, which not unfre- 
 cjuently outstrips his judgment. Since his conversion, 
 lie is understood to possess a considerable portion of 
 executive confidence, and to be intrusted with at least 
 a general knowledge of its views. Indeed, his talents 
 entitle him to a respectable station in any party, and it 
 is not to be presumed, that he would rush with so 
 much impetuosity into any system, the object of which 
 he did not comprehend. 
 
 Mr. Nicholas is the neighbour of the president, and 
 has been long known to be his intimate and confiden- 
 tial friend. While in the senate of the United States, 
 no man vras supposed to be more certainly in the secrets 
 of the cabinet; and, in the house of representatives, the 
 favour of the executive is not understood to hav^ de* 
 scrtcd him. 
 
 In the deliberate opinions of these gentlemen, given 
 under their own signatures, and prepared for the peo- 
 
11 
 
 pie of the United States, we may look for the senti- 
 ments of that administration, to which the}^ are under- 
 stood to be devoted, and to defend whose system their 
 letters were wTitten. 
 
 It is not my intention to analyze these letters, or to 
 expose to my fellow citizens the falLicies they contain. 
 They are in the possession of all who read, and 1 refer 
 to them, for the sole purpose of marking the inveterate 
 hate of England by which they ^\ ere dictated, the soli- 
 citude which they manifest to hide from die public eye 
 the aggressions of France, and the anxiety they disco- 
 ver to apologize for those aggressions, which cannot be 
 concealed. 
 
 1 appeal to any American who reads those letters, 
 for the truth of the declaration, when I say, that the 
 man who derived his knowledge of facts from them 
 alone, would believe that war with Great Britain iiad 
 become necessary. He would believe that England 
 was the natural and inveterate enemy of this country ; 
 that the destruction of her maritime superiority, v, ould 
 be the epoch from which might be dated the commer- 
 cial liberty and prosperity of these United States ; that 
 in the invasions made by the belligerents on our neu- 
 tral rights, she had uniformly taken the lead ; and that 
 even the Berlin and Milan decrees, even the seizure of 
 our property, and the absolute controul which France 
 claims to exercise over our government, if not render- 
 ed entirely inoffensive, were greatly palliated by the 
 superior atrocities of British insolence and injustice. 
 
 These opinions lead directly to war. They could 
 never be so strenuously inculcated, by men whose ac- 
 tions usually accorded with their opinions, but for the 
 purpose of leading the public mind to war. And on 
 whom is this war to be made ? On the only people of 
 Europe who possess a single remnant of liberty, and on 
 the only nation of the world, which arrests the rapid 
 progreis of Bonaparte to universal dominion. 
 
 §ENMX, 
 
12 
 
 NO. ir. 
 
 ^o openly and so uniformly have those who go- 
 vern tiie United States, manifested their hate of Eni^:- 
 land and their iove of France, so deeply is this senti- 
 men' felt, and so boldly is it expressed, that in show- 
 ing its existe ce, I am only ; roving what is piibiioly 
 avowed. The passion is deemed meritorious, and v e 
 man who would deny it to tlie administration, wou Id 
 probably be pronounced a cahimnlator, from whose 
 imputations it wonkl be rescued bv its friends. Yet I 
 shall mention some other transactions, of a still more 
 serious nature than tliose already stated, \\hich appear 
 to origimte in, and seem designed to promote, that 
 spirit of jTcjudice which leads to war. 
 
 Tlie measure to which I shall first advert, is the act 
 of congress commonly denominated the non -intercourse 
 law. 
 
 'iliis act is a direct attack upon the commerce and 
 manufactures of Great Britain. It cuts off a very im- 
 portant part ol her trade with this country, and prohi- 
 b. s the importation from her dominions of a great num- 
 ber of articles in Iiigh demand, the introduction of 
 which, from her enemies, is allowed. 
 
 It has been said, that this is a commercial regulation, 
 and that we ha\-e a right, as an independent nation, to 
 regulate our own commerce. 
 
 I mean not to deny the right. Neither can it be de- 
 nied, that we have a right to make war. I do not re- 
 fer to this measure, as one in which the government 
 has transcended its power, but as one in which it has 
 exercised its acknowledged rights, in a manner ex- 
 tremely hostile to one of the belligerents, and as favor- 
 able to the views of the other. It is not to be doubted, 
 that commercial regulations may be so framed pending 
 a war, as to deprive the nation framing them, of its 
 neutral character. A nation has certainly a right to 
 refuse all communication with one neighbour, and to 
 preserve a h'Qt trade with another ; but the exercise of 
 this right, especial!} in the midst of a furious extermi- 
 nating war, could scarcely fail to be deemed imact of 
 liostilitv. 
 
13 
 
 In explaining the principle of this measure, I shall 
 not depart from that brevity which i have p. escribed 
 for myself, further than is necessary to be intelligible. 
 
 The states of Europe have concurred in the exclu* 
 sion of all others from participating with the mother 
 country in the trade of her colonies. This commer- 
 cial monopoi}- has become a part of their law of nations. 
 The carriage of colonial produce, like the coasting 
 trade, is confined to the vessels of tie country. With- 
 out examining the abstract justice of this rule, I con- 
 tent myself with observing, that it is a ruie which h.is 
 received the assent of the commercial world. 
 
 During the last and the present war, England has 
 acquired sueh a superiority at sea, as almost to banish 
 the flag of her enemy from the ocean. On the advan- 
 tage resulting from this circumstance, she f unds her 
 principal hope of obtaining a secure peace ; and is, of 
 course, peculiarly alive to any measure which may di- 
 minish the effects of that advantage. 
 
 Disabled by the pressure of a maritime war, from 
 carrying on her accustomed commerce, France has re- 
 laxed those restrictions, which, in common with the 
 other nations of Europe, she had imposed on her colo- 
 nial trade ; and has called in the aid of neutrals, to 
 waft to the mother country that produce, which, in 
 time of peace, had been carried exclusively in her own 
 vessels. 
 
 This state of things produced a contest between 
 Great Britain and the neutral powers. The former 
 contended, that in point of strict right, she might le • 
 gitimatcly prevent the interference of neutrals, to di- 
 minish the effect of her arms. The latter insisted on 
 the right to carry on any commerce, not contraband, to 
 which the government of the nation v.ith which it was 
 carried oii, would admit them. Without receding 
 from these opposite pretensions, the parties seemed, in 
 practice, by a kind of tacit agreement, to meet on mid- 
 dle ground. Great Britain permitted the circuitous 
 and interrupted the direct trade between France and 
 her colonies. 
 
 For a time, landing the goods in the United States, 
 and reshipping them, was considered in the British 
 
u 
 
 courts of admiralty, asevidenceof the circuitous trade, 
 but it was booii discovered or all^dgcd, that under this 
 thin veil, a practice prevailed, which was, in effect, 
 equivalent to the real direct carriage of colonial pro- 
 duce to the mother country. The English govern- 
 ment thereupon declared, that their tribunals should 
 not be precluded, by this cover, from examining into 
 the fact, and deciding according to the truth of the 
 case. This declaration produced much discontent in 
 the United States ; and at the commencement of the 
 discussions to which it gave birth, between the two 
 governments, the non-iniercourse law was passed, 
 avowtdly as a measure of coercion. 
 
 On the policy of this act I shall be silent. I mean 
 ©nly to remark on its hostile aspect towards Britain. 
 
 The two nations differed on a principle on which 
 each claimed to be in the right, and neither could 
 justiliably impeach the sincerity of the other. Under 
 such circumstances, it is usual to resort, in the first 
 instance, to negotiation, and if it be found imprac- 
 ticable to effect an amicable arrangement of the matter 
 in controversy, then, and not till then, is it customary 
 for the aggrieved nation to do justice to itself, and to 
 adopt those measures of reprisal, which, in its own 
 opinion, the exigency may require, A resort to co- 
 ercion in the first instance, unless the offence had 
 been so clear and so serious as not to admit of nego- 
 tiation, or unless it be in the case of some conqueror, 
 who, in the insolence of power, forgets right, was, 
 I believe, without a precedent in the history of ci- 
 vilized I'luropc. Nothing could be more indicative 
 of an indisposition to be on friendly terms with the 
 nation against whom the measure was directed. 
 
 This hasty and violent step on the part of the United 
 S'ates, was the more remarkable, as, in our inter- 
 course with the enemies of Britain, we had not only 
 forJDorne to do justice to ourselves, but had been 
 signally moderate in oar conduct under injuries, 
 which were unquestionable ia th^ir nature, and weigh- 
 ty in their degree. 
 
IS 
 
 This act was denied to be a measure of hostility^ 
 In its character it is completel)^ so. W'hecher vrc 
 consider its motive or its object, it is an act of repri- 
 sals ; and if we reflect on its operatioi , on the nature 
 of existing war, and on the views of the beiiiger nts 
 at the time, it is not only an act of reprisals, ' but is 
 of a nature peculiarly offensive. 
 
 It is obviously the opinion of the enemies of Great 
 Britain, that the resources which enable her to pro- 
 secute that war, which she now wages for her exist- 
 ence, are derived from her extensive commerce. As 
 these resources are impaired, her means of defence 
 are enfeebled, and the probability of her being able 
 to preserve her own liberty, with the loss of which 
 ours must perish, is proportionably diminisiied. — 
 Acting upon this opinion, the t) rant of the continent, 
 b}'^ a course of violence and oppression, to which 
 man in no other period of his history, ever submitted, 
 has endeavoured to annihilate their commerce. In 
 those countries to which his power extends, he has 
 carried this system into execution, with a rigour which 
 has reduced millions to pqverty ; and where his 
 power is not yet felt, his influence has been exerted 
 to produce a co-operation in this favourite plan, the 
 success of which is to confirm him master of the 
 world. 
 
 That the opinion entertained on this subject by the 
 emperor of France, is also entertained by those who 
 rule the United States, has been repeatedly and pub- 
 licly avowed. It has been assigned as an inducement 
 to the measures which have been adopted, and the 
 authors of tliose measures have openly vaunted, that 
 their system would soon bring Great Britain to their 
 feet. 
 
 This act of reprisal then, made, contrary to usage, 
 while a doubtful claim was under discussion, is un-^ 
 derstood by ourselves, and is understood by France,- 
 to be a most vital blow, aimed at the maritime poMer 
 of Great Britain. It is aimed at a time, when she 
 is struggling against the greatest potentate in the 
 
16 
 
 universe for her existence. It is calf^iila'^cd to dis- 
 able ner iVoin pro^ecutiniJ^ a contest, on the event of 
 "whicii depends ihe cjucsiion, whttiier liberty shall be 
 an empty s iind, or a substantial Hood. 
 
 The tendency of such a meiJiure, the hostile spirit 
 in which it orig-iiuited, ana the inliuence under whiclx 
 it \\as adopted, uill be perceived by all who reiiect 
 ©n public tranbactions, 
 
 SLNEX. 
 
17 
 
 KO. V. 
 
 That spirit of enmity towards England, and of 
 devotion to France, which has long animated the ru- 
 lers of the United States, which they have success- 
 fully laboured to transfuse into the bosoms of the peo- 
 pxe, and by which the non- intercourse law was dic- 
 tated, did not exhaust itself in that favourite measure. 
 It continued to manifest itself in our councils, and its 
 influence was consequently felt in the negociations be- 
 tween the two countries. 
 
 The personal attachment of our late minister at Lon- 
 don to the president of the United States, is of public 
 notoriety. It was formed in his youth, and is one of 
 those principles which have steadily guided his politi- 
 caJ course. It is not to be expected that he will dis- 
 close his full knowledge on this delicate subject ; yet 
 his communications evince his opinion, that, had a 
 real spirit of conciliation existed on the part of our ad- 
 ministration, an accommodation of all the differences 
 between the two nations, might certainly have been 
 accomplished, in a manner which ought to be perfectly 
 satisfactory to the American government. Indeed, it 
 is impossible to contemplate the real situation of Great 
 Britain, without feeling the conviction, that to the 
 United States, viewed as a friendly power, nothing 
 Could be refused, which ought to be asked. As a 
 friendly power, wc could not demand a surrender of 
 those principles, on the preservation of which, her 
 maritime ascendency, and consequently her existence, 
 depend. Of this description are believed to be the 
 right of search, and the right of impressment. The 
 right of search at sea, is sanctioned by a long course 
 of general usage, and the right to impress from mer- 
 chantmen her own seamen, seduced from her service, 
 is supported by arguments which have not yet been 
 f efured. The abuse of this right is not defended, and 
 ought to be guarded against ; but its use is of the first 
 importance, unless its rehnquishment could be com- 
 pensated by regulations, which on our part would be 
 
 C 
 
la 
 
 faithfully executed, whicli would secure the restora- 
 tion of deserters, and prevent the employment of her 
 seamen in our merchant service : the exercise of this 
 right is essential to the manning of those fleets which 
 protect Great Britain from a degree of oppression, 
 which might almost efiace from our memor)- the cru- 
 elties, the outrages, and the exactions, of which un- 
 offendmg Portugal is the last wretched victim. We 
 ought not to wish its relinquishment, unaccompanied 
 by such arrangements ; nor ought we to expect, that 
 a satisfactory adjustment of so delicate a subject can be 
 made, without stipulations which shall secure the exe- 
 cution of our part of the contract. 
 
 Yet it is understood to be the silence observed upon 
 these points, and the note of the British ministers rela- 
 tive to the Berlin decree, which are the ostensible mo- 
 tives for rejecting, without even consulting the senate, 
 the treaty lately negotiated with Great Britain. 
 
 The perseverance with which the administration 
 continues to demand, as indispensable to any treaty, 
 the formal surrender of rights essential to the safety of 
 the British nation, is complete evidence of a determi. 
 nation not to conclude a treaty with them, during the 
 present war. This circumstance will make the deep- 
 er impression, if it be recollected, that when the mis- 
 sion of Mr. Jay wsls announced by that great man, who 
 so well understood, and so uniformly pursued the true 
 interests of his country, all negotiation with England 
 was reprobated by the party which now governs the 
 United States, as being justly offensive to France. 
 
 Previous to the sig-nature of this treaty, the Berlin 
 decree was received. It was made after the victory of 
 Jena had fixed the iron yoke of France on Prussia and 
 the German empire. Elated with this immense acces- 
 sion of power, the exulting conqueror proclaimed the 
 British dominions in a state of blockade, subjected to 
 capture and condemnation all anicles of the growth or 
 manufacture of those dominions, although they should 
 be the property, and be in the possession of neutrals, 
 and closed his own ports against every vessel which 
 had visited those of England. 
 
19 
 
 At his order, the vassal monarchs around him, 
 adopted the same measure. A more flagrant viola- 
 tion of his own solemn engagements, or a more in- 
 sulting outrage on the established rights of neutrals, 
 and on the acknowledged law of nations, is not to 
 be conceived. It could only have proceeded from a 
 man, who, feeling his own power, was not only totally 
 regardless of neutrals, but was confident that they 
 dared not assert their rights. It evinces his convic- 
 tion, that the influence he possessed in their cabi- 
 nets, was sufficient to restrain them from resenting an 
 injury, for which no precedent can be found in the 
 annals of modern Europe. 
 
 The result has shown, that he was not mistaken.- — 
 Awed into submission by the terror he inspired, 
 neutrals have crouched beneath his uplifted arm, 
 and have received, without a murmur, the lash of their 
 master. 
 
 The direct object of this atrocious usurpation, was 
 Great Britain. Unable to subdue that last asylum of 
 national independence and of human liberty, in Europe, 
 while defended by her hitherto invincible fleets, he 
 sought to unman them, by drying up the sources of 
 her revenue. One of the most operative means of 
 effecting this end, was the prevention of the use of 
 her manufactures in foreign countries. The violence 
 of the measure, the injury it inflicted on those v. honi 
 he had no pretest for injuring, and no right to 
 <:ontroul, when weighed against the gratification 
 of a vindictive and unlimited ambition, was as dust 
 in the balance. 
 
 From the cabinet of London, the object of this ex- 
 traordinary decree could not be concealed, nor could 
 its consequences be disregarded by them. If permit- 
 ted to go quietly into operation, it would necessarily 
 transfer the \vhole commerce that was carried on in 
 neutral bottoms, from her ports to those of her enemy. 
 Let the voyage to the continent be safe, while that 
 to the British dominions is full of hazard, and the 
 inevitable result must be, either that this whole ti'ade 
 w ill be diverted to the continent, or that the portion 
 of it which still continues in its old channel, v»ill be 
 
so 
 
 burthened with expcnces, which must render it scarcely 
 worth pursuing. 
 
 As this unjustifiable encroachment on the sovereign 
 rights of neutrals, was at the same a palpable invasion 
 of their independence, an essential injury to their 
 prosperity, and a total derangement of individual 
 industry, Britain might reasonably have indulged 
 the hope, that those whose situations placed them 
 beyond the immediate reach of the great enemy of 
 the human race, would not tamely submit to so de- 
 grading a measure. If disappointed in this hope, 
 it was not to be expected, that in a struggle for ex- 
 istence, she vv^ould unresistingly permit to her enemy 
 this illegitimate employment of neutrals, as the effi- 
 cacious, though negative instruments of war, against 
 her. It v/as to be expected, that she would oppose this 
 tyrannical system, by such a counter system as a sound 
 and well considered policy might dictate. 
 
 To those nations with whom Great Britain had 
 existing treaties, it was her duty to announce this 
 necessary determination ; and it would have been 
 correct in them, candidly to avow the course they 
 designed to pursue. With the United States, the 
 articles of a treaty had just been agreed on, and 
 ihc instrument was about to be signed. To affix 
 to it the signature of the commissioners, without a 
 notification of the influence, which this extravagant 
 decree might have on the future conduct of Great 
 Britain, would have been a concealment which might 
 be understood to imply a waver of the right to adopt 
 retaliating measures, and which might, on the adop- 
 tion of those m.easures, subject her to the imputa- 
 tion of insincerity and breach of faith. It was, 
 therefore, the dictate lof candour and of honour, to 
 make a frank dec.aration, previous to the completion 
 of the national compact, then about to be laid before 
 the two p^ovtrnments. 
 
 As this declaration only expressed a confidence, that 
 the Urn..; d States would pursue such a course as was 
 re.'iuired by their own dignity ; and announced no more 
 on .he part of Great Britain, than a determination ts 
 Take thof g measures which the exigency and her own 
 
21 
 
 safety might require, it could Tumish to a friendly and 
 independent power no motive for rejecting the tre?: ; 
 which it accompanied. 
 
 If, as is generally believed, the treaty was rejected by 
 the president on the grounds which have been staied^ 
 it must be considered as strong, if not conclusive evi- 
 dence, not only of those foreign prejudices, of which 
 there are so many other proofs, but of a subserviency 
 to France, for which it is difficult to assij^-n any ade- 
 quate motive, compatible with the independence of the 
 United States. 
 
 How painful must be the feelings of a genuine Ame- 
 rican,, who reflects that to extort from Britain the sur- 
 render of rights essential to her existence, and conse- 
 quently to our liberty, we have co-operated with the 
 tyrant of the earth, in a system of hostility against her 
 commerce ; while the most direct attacks on our un- 
 questionable rights, and the most open invasions of 
 our sovereignty, on the part of that tyrant, so far from 
 exciting in our government an}' sennment of resist- 
 ance, cannot even suspend its efforts to exasperate to 
 a still higher pitch our resentments against a povver, 
 which, by a gillant nation, at length roused by oppres- 
 sion, has been emphatically and justly termed "the 
 shield of oppressed humanity !" — With what indigna- 
 ion must such a man fmd, in the editors of those 
 presses which are the vehicles of executive will, not a 
 mere insensibility to these wrongs^ but abject and 
 servile apologists for them ? 
 
22 
 NO. VL 
 
 The Berlin decree, A\hicli interdicted the lep:iti- 
 snate conuntrce of neutrals, \vith tlie dominions of 
 Great iiritain, and also in articles produced or manu- 
 factured in those dominions, does, in its terms, posi- 
 iively comprehend the United S ates. If, in its ex- 
 pression, instead of the general description which is 
 used, there had been an enumeration of the nations to 
 which it was to apply, and the United States had been 
 inserred in that enumeration, it would not have been 
 more explicit or intelligible. 
 
 No power can safely affix to the language in which 
 the decrees of a foreign sovereign are expressed, espe- 
 cially if that sovereign be an ambitious conqueror, 
 whose lust for dominion no acquisitions can satiate, a 
 meaning in direct opposition to that which the words 
 import, unless authorised to do so by the most unequi- 
 vocal declarations. Indeed, even then, it would be 
 more desirable that the exception should be made a 
 public act. 1 he United States, therefore, could not 
 be justified in supposing themselves exempt from the 
 oy-eration of a decree, the words of which expressly 
 in.( hided them, unless officially assured of such ex- 
 emption. Until such assurance was given, prudence 
 and duty required tliat our rulers should act with cau- 
 tious circumspection, and on the principle that this 
 decree would be construed according to its letter and 
 its spirit. 
 
 Such assurances were never obtained. - An indivi- 
 dual officer of the French government, who professed 
 himself to be uninformed on the subject, and who de- 
 clared liiniself not to be the channel tlirough which 
 communications of that description were to be made, 
 conjectured that this regulation >vould not be applied 
 to the Uniicd States ; and, on this vague conjecture, 
 our rulers have conlideutly reposed. Not only have 
 they omitted to take those measures of precaution, 
 whicli tlie extremity of the outrage, and the imminence 
 of the danger required, but the messap:cs of the su- 
 preme exeGuti^ e to the grand council of the nation, and 
 the debates in that covutcil, have given a publicity and 
 
23 
 
 an official form to this blind and infatuated credulity, at 
 which the cheek of every real American must i3urn 
 with indignant shame. 
 
 The justness of this censure is tacitly acknowledged, 
 by the acquiescence of our rulers in the conduct of 
 Bonaparte. No member of tLie administration, nor 
 any one of its numerous chamDions, has ever once, in 
 public conversation or in the papers, reproaclied his 
 imperial majesty or the French government, with that 
 duplicity or prevarication in this respect, with which 
 he or they would be justly chargeable, had the exposi- 
 tion, given in the first instance to the decree of Berlin, 
 been of a character to entitle itself tOjOur confidence. 
 
 This was the critical point of time, when a firm 
 and upright administration, impartial between the bel- 
 ligerent powers, and only anxious to preserve the ho- 
 nour and the independence of the United States, would 
 have adopted, and ought to have adopted, a system 
 which would have rescued the nation from the disgrace 
 and the calamities which have ensued, and from some 
 of the dangers with which it is now threatened. 
 
 No man is less disposed than myself, wantonly to 
 provoke France — but no man is more perfectly con- 
 vinced, that, with France especially, submission to in- 
 jury invites additional injury. We must discredit all 
 our own experience, as well as that of other nations, ii 
 we doubt this truth. The government of the United 
 States ought, on that occasion, to have assumed a firm 
 and decided, as well as a moderate tone. Represen- 
 tations of our friendly disposition towards trance, 
 ought to have been accompanied with the most unequi" 
 vocal declaration of an unalterable determination, not 
 to submit to the outrageous violation of our acknow- 
 ledged rights, which the execution of the Berlin de-^ 
 eree would consummate. We ought to have required 
 from authority an explicit assurance, that this decree 
 w^as inapplicable to the vessels of the United States ; 
 and, on the failure to obtain such assurance, we ought 
 to have suffered our merchant vessels to arm in their 
 own defence. 
 
 This is not all. We ought to have stated to the bel- 
 ligerent, whom this decree was intended to make us 
 
24 
 
 the instruments of annoying", that the United States 
 ■\vould not submit to its operation, and shouid it be- 
 come necessary, would take measures efFectuiuh to 
 resist it. 
 
 This is the course, which an impartial administra- 
 tion, jciiious of the honour and independence ot tlie 
 nation, would have pursued ; and this course would 
 have liberate d our country from the most afBicting, 
 perhaps from all, the distress that has been since ex. 
 perienced. 
 
 What could have substituted for this manlj system, 
 the pusillaiiimous submissive line of conduct, that we 
 have adopted towards France, and those irritating hos- 
 tile measures touards Britain, which ha\e impelled the 
 ration to tlie point of a war, with the only pow er in the 
 universe which can shield any part of our globe from a 
 despotism, the most ferocious under which oppressed 
 humanity has ever groaned ? What but that temper 
 "vviiich is ascribed to our administration ? 
 
 Among' the various modes by v\'hich we have mani- 
 fested our unfriendly disposition to England, few are 
 calculated to affect her more sensibly, than the encou- 
 ragement given to the desertion of her seamen. It 
 was impossible net to contrast our constant refusal to 
 grant any of those means, by which deserters from her 
 ships of war might be recovered, with the facility 
 which, under similar circumstances, was constantly 
 experienced by the vessels of France. 
 
 But whatever a: ology may be made for refusing our 
 aid to a British officer, wishing to apprehend deserters, 
 none can be given for enlisting those deserters into the 
 American service. It was an open dq^arture from the 
 praciice of nations, and a gross outrage on the received 
 o.;inions of mankind. This inexcusable infraction of 
 C;>mmon usage and of neutral duty, led to an aggres" 
 «.'jn of so serious a nature, as to fill every Americaa 
 bosom widi just indignation. 
 
 'I'he American frigate the Chesapeake, having on 
 board three or four British des'^ertcrs, was foUovv'ed out 
 ofour v/atcrs byan English ship of war, who demand- 
 ed the restoration of certain British seamen who had 
 deserted from their service, v/erc alledged to have wi- 
 
25 
 
 listed in oitrs, and to be on board the Chessprakc. On 
 the refusal oi captain Barron to oomph.- \uth Jils cic- 
 mand, his ship was attacked, and after bring- forced to 
 strike her colours, the deserters found on board -were 
 taken out of her. 
 
 This outrage on a national ship, was universally and 
 highly resented. With one voice, the people of Ame- 
 rica exclaimed, that the wound inflicted on the honour 
 of the United States, -must be healed, L^.nd the act 
 be disavowed, or that the appeal must be snade to the 
 last resort of nati(^^s. 
 
 The cQurse of our administration on this cccasion, 
 merits serious attention. 
 
 A proclamation was issued, inhibiting the use oi 
 our ports, not merely to the offending vessels or offi- 
 cers, but to all ships of war belonging to the nation. 
 
 Although this act of reprisals waa made at a time, 
 when we were not informed that the British admiral 
 acted under the orders of his government, and had no 
 reason to believe that the right to search a national 
 ship, under any pretext whatever, would be asserted, 
 yet its apology will be found in the violence of the ag- 
 gression, and in the extreme irritation of the moment. 
 Its continuance, however, after the motives, which 
 excused it in the first instance, were removed, stands 
 on totally different ground. 
 
 In commenting on the non-intercourse law, I have 
 observed, and I beg leave to repeat the observation, 
 that it is unusual among sovereigns, to take into their 
 own hands, by an act of reprisals, the reparation for 
 an injury sustained, until justice has been demanded 
 from, and refused by the offending nation. This rule 
 is particularly applicable to the cases, in which it is 
 not certain that the offence is to be considered as a na- 
 tional act. It deserves peculiar consideration too, 
 when the reparation selected, is by a neutral against a 
 belligerent power, and is of such a character, as essen- 
 tially to injure the belligerent and serve his enemy in 
 the war. It will be cause for still greater circumspec- 
 tion, if the neutral had before been susv c<ed, not on 
 light grounds, of favour to one of the contending par- 
 
 D 
 
2G 
 
 ties. If, in such a case, the neutral would avoid the 
 inM^iutation of partiality for the kind of reparation he 
 has cliosen to seize, he must entitle himself to exemp- 
 tion from the churge, by discontinuing his reprisals as 
 soon as there is a reasonable ground for the opinion, 
 that the offence is not the act of the nation, and that 
 reparation for the injury will be voluntarily accorded. 
 
 A continuance of reprisals after such a state of things, 
 affords too much ground for the suspicion, that the 
 neutral has caught at the occasion to indulge partiali- 
 ties incompatible with neutrality. ^ 
 
 Let us inquire how these principles apply to the case 
 under consideration — 
 
 On the first notice of the aggression, the British 
 minister officially declared to our reprcsentati\e in 
 London, his regret at the event, and gave assurances 
 that the act of the admiral was net authorized by his 
 go^Trnment. The right "\\ hich had been asserted in 
 committing this outrage, was explicitly disclaimed, 
 and a readiness to make reparation for the injury was 
 voluntarily avowed. All this preceded any communi- 
 cation on the subject from the American government. 
 
 Wlien that communication arrived, it appeared that 
 our administration had placed an insuperable bar in 
 the \vay of reparation, by refusing to receive it, unless 
 accompanied with a surrender of those belligerent 
 rights, of the abuse of which we had complained, and 
 the use of which were deemed by England essential to 
 her safety. 
 
 Under these circumstances, a proclamation was issu-* 
 ed b}' the British crown, forbidding a repetition of the 
 outrage v hich had been committed, and pj*escribing 
 for their ofiicers, in future similar situations, a line of 
 conduct, which would be perfectly unexceptionable. 
 Tn parliament, also, the act of admiral Berkley was dis- 
 claimed ; and the administration fmdino* that our mi- 
 ulster in London was not authorized to separate the 
 affair of the Chesapeake, from the multiplied and com- 
 plex subjects of discussion between the two countries, 
 deputed an envoy extraordinary to the United States, 
 for the ex precis and single purpose of compensating for 
 this particular injury. 
 
27 
 
 Never haS a proud and high-minded nation manifest- 
 ed more solicicude to repair an involuntary wrong ; and 
 never, under similar circumstances, has a reasonable 
 reparation been refused by a nation, whose dispositions 
 were favourable to conciliation. 
 
 In the very threshold of the negociation, the British 
 envoy encountered an obstacle, which arrested his fur- 
 ther progress. To leave it possible for Great Britain, 
 \i»ithout self-abasement, to make further compensation 
 for the injury which had been sustained, he deemed it 
 indispensably necessary, that the United States should 
 forbear further to compensate themselves. For an un- 
 authorised injury, a signal and unequivocal apology 
 had already been made ; and he conceived that repara- 
 tion, in addition to the apology, was, in its nature, the 
 act of a friend, which, without degradation, could oriy 
 be offered to a friend. The continuance of the punish- 
 ment, which had been inflicted in the first moments of 
 resentment, was thought totally incompatible ^vith this 
 idea. Under these impressions, Mr. Rose required, 
 as a preliminary to the compensation he Vv'as instructed 
 to offer, the revocation of the proclamation, which 
 refused the common rights of hospitality to the ships of 
 his government. 
 
 This preliminary was denied ; and on this punctilio 
 was the negociation broken off. For an offence com- 
 mitted on the high seas by a British admiral, which 
 has been disavowed by his government, the repetition 
 of which has been forbidden, to compensate for which, 
 even after we had taken compensation into our own 
 hands, a special envoy has been sent to our country, 
 we still refuse to all the ships of war of the British na- 
 tion an important privilege, which we grant to her ene- 
 my, and which is never refused to a friendly power. 
 
 I mean not to defend, on the part of Britain, the rup- 
 ture of the negociation on this punctilio. The occa- 
 sion was one on which, I conceive, the wise adminis- 
 tration of a powerful empire might, without self-degra- 
 dation, have receded somewhat further than is warrant- 
 ed by rigid practice and principles. But I think it 
 may be safely affirmed, that the conduct of the Ameri- 
 can government is without a precedent, and cpuld only 
 
28 
 
 have been exhibited by a nation, determined not lu 
 adjust tlie difference to which the negociation related. 
 No instance can be adduced in which, for an unautho- 
 rized offence, a nation has undertaken to do itsch 
 justice by making reprisals, and has, after the wish 
 to repair the inju^-y was avowed, and a special en- 
 voy, deputed for that purpose, was received, refused 
 to suspend reprisals, in order to give time for ad- 
 justing the degree of reparation which should be 
 made. No instance of the kind will ever be fur- 
 nished by a nation, not predetermined against an ac- 
 commodation. Had this point been yielded by Eng- 
 land, the negociation would ha\'e broken off on some 
 other. 
 
 In that able and eloquent defence of the course 
 pursued by his government, which the secretary of 
 state has made m his letter to Mr. Rose, he has 
 cited three examples from British history, as being 
 analofrous to this. It required not the penetration of 
 Mr. Madison, to perceive the dissimilitude of those 
 cases, from tluU to which they were applied. In 
 them Great Britain did not pretend, by her own act, 
 to punish the aggres.ion of which she complained. 
 She demanded redress from the offending govern- 
 ment, and received it. In this, we have ourselves 
 puiiished the aggression ; after vhich, although it 
 was not made under the authority of government, 
 reparation is offered, provided we will discontinue 
 the punishment mflicted by ourselves, and thus place 
 ourselves, as nearly as is now in our po\\'er, in the 
 situation in which Britain stood, \vhen she demand- 
 ed and received reparation from Spain. This nc 
 have refused to do. In no point docs a resemblance 
 exist between the cases quoted, and that to which 
 they are applied. 
 
 It is not easy to avoid drawing the contrast, be- 
 tween the conduct of our administration on this oc- 
 casion, and on one of at least as serious a nature, 
 where the aggression proceeded from a different 
 qu.^rter. 
 
 To the preservation of the American Union, no 
 one ubj;:ct IS perhaps iiiorc esseniiai, than the ii'te 
 
59 
 
 «avigaiion of the Mississippi, and the right of deposit 
 at New-Orleans. This right, secured "by a solemn 
 treaty, was violated without a plausible pretext to jus- 
 tify the wrong-. The whole commerce of the west- 
 ern states, down the only channel M'hich conducts it 
 to the ocean, was arbitrarily arrested, not by a mi- 
 litary officer alledging a sudden injury, which he 
 misconceived himself authorised to redress, but by a 
 solemn and deliberate act of the civil government. 
 What, on that qccasion, was the conduct of our ru- 
 lers ? Did they take into their own hands the pun- 
 ishment of the aggression ? Did they refuse to re- 
 ceive reparation for it until their other claims were 
 conceded ? Did thty expect an envoy extraordina- 
 ry to make this reparation ; and after the aggresjiion was 
 disavowed, would they have refused, while adjusting the 
 quantum of reparation, to discontinue the punishment 
 they had infiicted ? No — this was not their con- 
 duct. The aggression proceeded from Spain, then 
 the humble vassal of France, and a very different 
 course was pursued. Our rulers then declared, that 
 reprisals generally led to war, and v/ere never made 
 by a pacific nation, until justice had been demanded 
 and refused. Instead of waiting for a special envoy 
 from Madrid, they dispatched one to Paris ; and, in- 
 stead of receiving an apology and reparation for the 
 aggression, they bought off the injury by paying iif- 
 tesn millions to Bonaparte, who then wanted money 
 to prosecute the war, just commenced against Great 
 Britain. By this contract, we arc promised, indeed, 
 in addition to the island of New-Orleans, the value of 
 which I acknowledge, but to the best use of which we 
 were before entitled, an ideal country west of the 
 Mississippi, the boundaries of vdiieh arc not ascci- 
 tained, and our claim to which is a real misfortune. 
 
 Who can refuse to mark the opposition in the 
 conduct of the same men, in these two cases, or to 
 ascribe that opposition to the strong prejudices 
 X^'hich govern the United States. With what an- 
 guish must the genuine American perceive, that 
 
50 
 
 these prejudices entirely favour a military despqt, 
 WHO is chasing human liberty from tiie iace of ilie 
 earth; and oppose a nation, on whose ability to 
 maintain her present arduous struggle, that best gift 
 of Heaven depends for its existence ! 
 
31 
 NO, VIL 
 
 ON THE EMBARGO. 
 
 1 WILL now solicit the attention of my fellow cit- 
 izens to the embai"go. On the policy of di;s scit-d'^s- 
 troying measure, on the mischief which it scatters 
 through all classes of society, on the ruin it conveys to 
 the inmost recesses pf our count>3^, it is not my pur- 
 pose to remark. My observations will be confined lo 
 the evidence it affords, of that subserviency to France, 
 and hostility to England, which characterises the pre- 
 sent administration. 
 
 It is impossible to advert to this subject, without 
 searching for the m(-tives in which the law originated. 
 In pursuing this inquiry, those aids, which, calculating 
 on the form of our government, we might reasonably 
 expect to derive from official sources, are unattainable. 
 A studied obscurity covers from our view the most es- 
 sential information respecting it. 
 
 As this subject was debated with closed doors, the 
 public is not in possession of those arguments with 
 which the bill was supported by its at vocates. The 
 message of the president, and the documents transmit- 
 ted with it, fumish the only motives which our rulers 
 have avowed for this destructive measure* 
 
 The message refers to the communications accom- 
 panying it, as " showing the great and increasing dan- 
 *' gers with which our vessels, our seamen, and mer- 
 *' chandize, are threatened on the high se«s,^nd eise- 
 ** where, from the belligerent powers of Europe;" 
 and concludes with recommending an embargo, and 
 preparations for any event which might grow out of 
 the crisis. 
 
 The documents, so far as we are acquainted with 
 them, show, that the decree made at Berlin, had always 
 been understood and intended by the emperor of 
 France, to be applicable to the United States, and that 
 the British s-overnment had issued a proclamation re- 
 quirmg then' seamen in foreign parts to return to th6 
 service of their countrv. 
 
52 
 
 It would seem then, that the only danger whicii 
 these com mu 111 cations announced to our commerce, 
 was found in tlie Berlin decree ; and the only increased 
 dcinger, \\ hich threatened ouf seamen, was the procla- 
 mation recalling British subjects to the protection of 
 their native land. 
 
 Let us examine these causes of alarm, and inquire 
 what would probiibiy have been their influence on our 
 administration, had there not been others, which, 
 though unacknowledged, were more operative. 
 
 Was the Berlin decree the real, efficient, moving 
 cause of tlie embargo ? 
 
 There is not, perhaps, a thinking individual in the 
 United States, who would not answer this question m 
 the negative. 
 
 The president had acquiesced in that decree, with- 
 out a serious and adequate remonstrance, too long to 
 warrant a suspicion, that he contemplated resistance to 
 it. When Spain, Avhose monarch was a known auto- 
 maton, moving at the will of Bonaparte, adopted this 
 mcasvire in terms, and applied it to the United States, 
 it was scarcely possible to doubt the intentions of its 
 mastor. Yet no resentments were manifested by our 
 rulers, nor was any disposition shown to counteract 
 this nefarious war on our unoffei ding commerce, though 
 it might have been done, by means far less ruinous to 
 ourselves, thaii those which \\ ere selected. 
 
 If the system recommended by the executive, had 
 really been directed against this decree, there could 
 have been no conceivable motive, for not speaking to 
 congress a plain and decided language, unless it was 
 an unwillingness to prcchum to the legislature and 
 j^eople of America, the grating truth, that the distress- 
 they were about to experience, was to be ascribed ex- 
 clusively to France. 
 
 On tlic contrary, he would, in all probability, have 
 stated the fact in explicit terms. It would have been 
 his duty to have done so, that congress might have ex- 
 ercised some judgment in determining, whether this 
 arbitrary decree could h:ive been resisted more advan- 
 tageously for the United States by an embargo, or by 
 different means. 
 
3S 
 
 Unfortunately, no American, who, has been withift 
 the V. alls of the house of representatiAes, can ascribe 
 to the majority of congress, a very high degree of dis- 
 cernment ; but it is impossible to impute to them such 
 excess of foliy, as to suppose they wouid have selected 
 an unlimited embargo, as the besi means ot defending 
 our commerce against this atrocious attack upon it. 
 Of all that could be chosen, it is the most destructive 
 to ourselves, and the least efficacious. A simple no- 
 tification to our merchants, of the determination an- 
 nounced by the French emperor, unaccompanied by 
 any protecting measure whatever, would have been 
 infinitely more eligible. Allowing to the cruisers of 
 France the utmost success that our fears could antici- 
 pate, and the injuries our merchants could have sus- 
 tained from them. Would have borne no proportion to 
 those inflicted by the embargo. If the fear of giving 
 offence, restrained the president from recommending, 
 and congress from adopting, that obvious and honour- 
 able system of resistance, wliich proved successful in 
 1798, yet the armed ships of France, which escape the 
 active vigilance of the British cruizers, could not an- 
 noy our neglected commerce to an extent, M'hich would 
 bear any comparison with its present suffering, nof 
 even to an extent which might not have been covered 
 by insurance. 
 
 But we deceive ourselves, if we believe, that the 
 embargo, if really intended as a measure of resistance 
 to the Berlin decree, would be less offensive to the 
 haughty master of the European continent, than those 
 which were taken in 1798. Oppo/ition to his will, in 
 a greater or less degree, displayed in one mode or 
 in another, is an unpardonable crime, for which pun- 
 ishment inevitably follows, when the fit occasion for 
 inflicting it shall arrive. \Ve ought to know him bet- 
 ter, than to believe, that he will excuse an embargo, if 
 intended to thwart his designs, sooner than more vi- 
 gorous and more efficacious measures. 
 
 But the most conclusive evidence on this subject, is 
 afforded by the language and conduct of the adminis- 
 tration, and of its confidential adherents. They saf 
 
 E 
 
34 
 
 that the Berlin decree Avas a dead letter, innocent in 
 point of fact, though tremendous inform. It was a 
 mere verbal injur}^ which might indeed insult our so* 
 vereignty, but could not substantially impair our in- 
 terests. 
 
 1 ;.uman folly is not so extravagant, as to guard against 
 «uch an atiack with such an armour. 
 
 Complete refutation of the opinion here controverted, 
 is also to be derived, from the direction which is given 
 to the public sentiment. The people are exhorted to 
 submit with patience to the cahmiities they feel, be- 
 cause this self-annoying system must soon bring Bri- 
 tain to our feet ; they are taught to believe, that its 
 continuance or suspension, deper.ds on the course of 
 the British cabinet ; and that, should A\e engage in a 
 war, it is against Britain we are to wage it. In ma- 
 king military appointments, every principle of propri- 
 ety and decency is disregarded, in ordtr to l^estow 
 commissions on. men, reconmiended only by their uni- 
 fo^-m submission to t|^ w ill of France, and their uni- 
 form exertions to am^ance the power of Bonaparte. 
 
 These circumstances are incompatible with the idea, 
 that it was against the Great Nation, this ruinous 
 measure was intended to operate. 
 
 It is not then in the Berlin decree, that we are to 
 Find the motives for this fatal act. 
 
 The British proclamation was a common and legiti- 
 mate act of sovereignty, at which no nation has a right 
 to be dissatisfied. The recall of their subjects to the 
 defence of their country, affects not us, and can fur- 
 nish no cause for any extraordinary measure on our 
 pint. If it denotes a determination to impress their 
 seamen found in our merchant vessels on the high seas, 
 thcit is no more than the continuance of a practice, 
 which has existed throughout the last and the present 
 Avar, under which our commerce has flourished in an 
 unexampled degree, and our prosperity has been car- 
 ried "to a height, Avhich, until this fatal blow, given to 
 it by ourselves, all other nations might view with 
 envy. It could not, therefore, furnish a motive for 
 annihilating that commerce, and destroying ihai pros- 
 perity. 
 
35 
 
 The Gom muni cations made with the message, then, 
 do not furnish the real motives for the emb. rgo. It 
 cannot be believed, that the American legislature iias 
 passed an act, suspending indefinitely the whole foreign 
 commerce, and nearly all the revenue of the Uniied 
 States, paralising the v.hoie industry of the nation, 
 reducing thousands to sudden beggary, and banishiDg 
 a most useful class of men from their country, upon 
 reasons so totally incapable of proving its necessiiy or 
 utility, to the satisfaction of any reiiecting statebman. 
 
 If we may credit communications made to the pub- 
 lic, by members of congress, the total insuniciency of 
 the reasons assigned in the message, to support the 
 measure recommended, was so obvious, and v\ as urged 
 with such force by its opponents, that its friends were 
 compelled to take refuge under the confidence repos^ed 
 in the president, and the certainty tha he would not 
 have recommended the measure, had he not ^ osses^ed 
 intelligence which proved its propriety. 
 
 How must we be surprised, if in these times any 
 thing could surprise us, to learn that a measure, so 
 deeply interesting to every eiiizen, was passed by the 
 legislature of the Union, because such was the will of 
 the executive. It had been supposed, and the theory 
 of our constitution, as well as the practice of former 
 times, justified the supposition, that en an occa.ion 
 which so vitally affected the whole community, the in- 
 formation and reasons, wh^ch had satisfied the judg- 
 ment of the president, would be truly conveyed to the 
 legislature, that the judgment of that body might be 
 satisfied also. But we are authorised to believe, that ■ 
 the conclusive demonstration of the insufficiency of 
 those reasons, had no tendency to arrest the pernicious 
 Txieasure, which was recommended. It^vasthe will 
 of the president, and he must have sufficient reasons to 
 justify it, although he had not thought proper to trust 
 them to the legislature. 
 
 What, then, were these secret reasons, which were 
 so powerful, ds to produce an unlimited emb.irgo ? 
 
 Are they to be looked for in the orders of the British 
 council ? 
 
36 
 
 This also is impossible. At the passag:e of the act, 
 those orders were unknown in America. That which 
 is unknown, and that which does not exist, are equally 
 incapable of constituting the real motives of human 
 action. 
 
 Those, who are desirous of justifying this ruinous 
 measure, and of ascribing it to the conduct of Britain, 
 have the boldness to say, that private intelligence was 
 received in the United S ates, on which the president 
 and congress acted. This private intelligence, is sta- 
 ted to have been a letter, published in one of our pa- 
 pers, informing a correspondent that some measure, 
 retaliating on France the Berlin decree, was about to 
 be adopted by Kngiand. But is any human •eing, en- 
 do \^ed with ordinary perception, so credulous as to be^ 
 lieve, that the government of the United States ^vouid 
 adopt a measure, so destructive of the national interests, 
 on the fa th of a letter written, they knew not by or to 
 %vhom, inserted m a news-paper, without any veriiica- 
 tion of its authenticity, and stating tliat some regula- 
 tion, the v/riter knew not what, was about to be made 
 by the Britib)h council ? Nations do not adopt a sys- 
 tem so pernicious to themselves, on such vague and 
 uncer ain data. 
 
 Had the British orders of council furnished the in- 
 ducement for the embargo, the presideiit would have 
 transmi ted, with his recommendation of that measure, 
 his reaso:^ for making it. No man can believe ihat 
 orders, which, the instant they were known, were sei- 
 zed widi avidity, and urged in defence of this measure, 
 would not have been assigned at the time as its motive, 
 had their existence then been known, and had those 
 wh , S' nee their discovery, have so eagerly caught at 
 thtm, then in reality acted on them. 
 
 It is not then in the orders of council, that we are to 
 find the motive for imposing upon ourselves this dis- 
 tressing burden. 
 
 If neither the communications referred to in the mes? 
 sage, nortlie orders of council, produced the embargo, ' 
 what, let me ask again, did produce it ? — This severe 
 punisimient cannot have been inflicted on our devoted 
 country, without a grave and serious motive, Wh^ 
 
was that motive ? This is an enquiry which every 
 citizen of the United States ought to join mc in 
 , making. 
 
 Atier the victor)^ of Friedland, and the treaty of Til- 
 sit had extended the influence of Bonaparte over the 
 north of Kurope and of Asia, he seems to have 
 thought it unnecessar}', logger to exhibit the slight- 
 est semblance of respect for the sovereign rights of 
 those nations, u^hich had been theretofore, in some 
 small degree, permitted to enjoy independence. — 
 He seems to have required, that all other states, 
 relinquishing t:e right of self-government, should 
 penorm the part he might assign them, in his fa- 
 vourite svstem, of combining the whole world 
 against England, and cornering her navy, by de- 
 stroying her commerce. In execution of this scheme,, 
 it is knov/n, that he had required Denmark and 
 Portugal to depart from that half-neutrality, which 
 one had purchased, and in Vvhich the other had been 
 indulged : to force Sweden into the same coalition, 
 the arms of Russia and of Denmark, had been turn- 
 ed against that gallant nation. 
 
 There is every reason to believe, that this com- 
 prehensive plan embraced the United Steites, and 
 that it was notified to our government, previous to 
 the recommendation of the embargo. 
 
 It is known, that the arrival of the Revenge, im- 
 mediately preceded that measure ; and it is under- 
 stood, that she brought from our ministers in Eng- 
 land, only duplicates of dispatches, that had before 
 reached the executive. From France, however, very 
 important and interesting communications are un- 
 derstood to have been received : We know with 
 what earnestness, motions, requesting that these 
 communications might be laid before congress, were 
 repeatedly urged, and with what perseverance they 
 were rejected. It is extremely difficult to account 
 for this concealment, unless these communications 
 contained the secret reasons of that embargo, whicli 
 . was recommended immediately after their reception. 
 We know that the private letters, received from 
 
38 
 
 France by the same arri\Ml, concurred in the infor- 
 muiioii, liiat bouaparic, whose voice is pate had 
 
 poaiCively declared, there siiould be no neutrals. 
 
 I lie i^uis .vionix'ur, of the 20th of October, the 
 most othciui paper oi" the French government, which 
 lusiiiuiiitb no po.Kicai idea not sanctioned by the 
 eai^.cror, coniimi.ces a parat^-raph, which seems to 
 aL:5i^naLc me coarse pre.-.crj|jed for us, with these 
 sentences : — " On the 26i:h of October, the co'ig-ress 
 *'oi the Unced Stales opens its sessions at Wash- 
 *' ingcon. No person doubts, that the first opera- 
 " tioii of this assembly, Vvaii be a formal declara- 
 *' tion of war against England. The public mind 
 *' is so vvLirmed on this subject, that any member 
 " of congress, who should dare to vote for pacific 
 *' measures, would run a great risk of being very 
 *' roughly handled by the people." 
 
 We know too, from oificial documents, that 
 France has since manifested some resentment, at 
 our not having actually declartd war; and that she 
 has taken some measures to make us feel that re- 
 seritmen. ; and by acting on our fears, to Ibrce us 
 into the d ciaration. 
 
 It is diiiicuit to compare these circumstances 
 with each other, and with the total imj^ossibility, 
 that the motives publicly assigned for passing the 
 embargo, can really have produced that measure, 
 without feeling a persuasion, that we have drawn 
 tliis ruin on ourselves, in order to deprecate the 
 v.rath of the tyrant of the world, by uniting with 
 him, in his favourite plan, to destroy the commerce 
 of that nation, which presents the only barrier op- 
 posing that universal dominion, to which he as- 
 |)i;es. 
 
 Ihis is the "invisible hand," to which one of the 
 most intelligent and independent members of the 
 house of represen atives alluded ; and the consci- 
 ousness that the allusion was just, accounts lor the 
 vindictive rage v\hich it inspired. 
 
 The apprehension, that even this measure may 
 not he dec mcd sufficient by him, Avhose "in^visible 
 hand" moves neariv all the cabinets of the civili" 
 
39 
 
 zed world ; and tl>:»t nothlnp short of war will <«- 
 tisl) liim, can uionc arrouni lor ilw ui.rriuillinj^ cx- 
 crlioiis ol those uho rule lUc Unirtd Slaies, U» pro- 
 pan he public mind lor ihai mil cunbunimatiou of 
 naiionul dcyfadallon. 
 
4.(3 
 
 NO, VIIL 
 
 Had the motive, for imposing on this country a 
 perpetuai embargo, really been the preservation ot our 
 ships, our merchandize, and our seamen, all of which 
 are in truth destroj^ed by it, this baneful measure would 
 have been limited in its operation to those object^- — 
 There could have been no inducement to render the 
 evil more extensive, by unnecessarily adding to the 
 oppression of the mass of the people. 
 
 Had 11 been true, that the orders of council and the 
 Berlin decree really produced this mischief-be aring act, 
 the legislature would have been content with guarding 
 against those orders and that decree. They would not 
 ■Wantonly have annihilated that great stimulus to indus- 
 try , the market afforded by loreign countries for its 
 produce. 
 
 By applying the embargo to American vessels, and 
 to cargoes belonging to American ciiizens, these ob- 
 jects would be protected, so far as they are now pro- 
 tected. Under the operation of such a law, as well as 
 under the operation of the actual law, American exter- 
 nal commerce, carried on in their own bottoms, wou.d 
 have been cut up by the roots. American vessels 
 would have exchanged the chance of being captured at 
 sea, for the certainty of rotting in our own waters ; and 
 American produce, either in the hands of the mer- 
 chants or of the people, must have found its market at 
 home. 'J he difference consists in this : The home 
 market would be a better market — more buyers would 
 appear in it. We should still supply the foreign de- 
 mand. We should be driven into that policy, which 
 our present rulers have always so much favoured — we 
 should iitive been compelled to withdraw from the 
 ocean, and to confine ourselves to ploughing the land. 
 Yet the produce of our labour would have found its 
 Way to foreign markets, in foreign bottoms ; and, al- 
 though its price would have been diminished, it would 
 not have sunk to its present distressing state of de- 
 pression. 
 
 I do not pretend to say, that the embargo, thus mo- 
 dified, would be a proper measure, far irom it. In 
 
4i 
 
 any form, unless as a mere temxporary expedient, to 
 give time for reflection, and to impress on our mer- 
 chants, the seriousness of the danger, I think it most 
 ill-judged and most ruinous. But I think also, that 
 thus modified, it would be less ili-judged, and less ru- 
 inous, than in its present all-debolating form. Most 
 seriously do I deprecate the idea of relying on foreign 
 bottoms, for the transportation of our surplus produce ; 
 but still more seriously do I deprecate the idea of cut- 
 ting off its transportation entirely, and leaving it to 
 perish on our hands, or to be sacrificed to those, who 
 must be compensated by immense profits, for the risk 
 attending an illicit trade. Deeply should I regret the 
 ruin into which American ship-owners would be plun- 
 ged by this regulation ; but it is no alleviation of that 
 ruin, to find the great body of the American people 
 participating in it. No wise statesman w ill ever re- 
 commend a measure, which shall wound the interests 
 of our merchants ; but if compelled to choose between 
 a measure which is indeed injurious to the commercial 
 interest, and one which is not only in a still higher de- 
 gree injurious to that interest, but which involves the 
 agriculturist also in the same ruin, he cannot hesitate 
 to embrace the latter branch of the alternative. 
 
 Whatever difficulties this alternative might present, 
 to a man who cherished ancient opinions on the sub- 
 ject, it could be expected to present none to those who 
 avow the fantastic notions, which have long been fash" 
 ionable with the ruling party. Men who think com- 
 merce not a real good, but an evil, which the difficulty 
 of breaking ancient habits and prejudices compels 
 them to tolerate ; who think, that by the cultivation of 
 the soil alone, unaided by navigation, the true inte- 
 rests of the country would be best consulted, could 
 not be expected to hesitate betw een a measure, taken 
 in a form to prostrate both commerce and agriculture, 
 and taken imder such a modification, as to preserve 
 agriculture from the ruin, to which commerce is 
 doomed. When wc find ourselves disappointed in 
 this expectation, w^e look to some extrinsic cause, fiir 
 the solution of the difficulty. 
 
42 
 
 Two reasons are publicly assigned. The first is, 
 that a total embargo will force the Ijellif^-erent pow -s 
 to change the system they have adopted — the second, 
 that an embi^rgo on American vessels alone, would 
 have g-iven our whole commerce to England. 
 Let these reasons Ix; examined. 
 
 It has been already shown, that this measure could 
 rsot have been taken with a view to force a repeal of the 
 orders of council ; lor their existence was at the time 
 ^^lknown. It also deserves consideration, that these 
 orders, not having been tiiken as a me.isure of coercion 
 against neutrals, but as a belligerent retaliating mea- 
 sure upon France, it is improbable, that their repeal 
 can precede the repeal of that decree, on which they 
 are professedly founded. This yielding on the part of 
 Kngland would be an acknowledgment of her inabi- 
 Hty to contend with France, in this species of warfare, 
 and would leave the latter power at full liberty to exer- 
 cise h'^r usurped controul over neutral commerce, in 
 such manner, as might most sensibly wound Great 
 Britain, unrestrained by the apprehension, that the 
 isanie weapon might be turned against herself But 
 ho"^vever this argument might be disregarded by our 
 rulers, who, fi*om the year 1796, have been anxious to 
 try their strength in commercial warfare with Eng- 
 hn;', the first is conclusive on the point. The em- 
 bargo could not have been extendf'd, to the total de- 
 privation of all commerce, in order to obtain a repeal 
 of orders, not known at the time to be in existence. 
 It might be so extended, for the purpose of forcing a 
 surrender of other principles, but not of this. 
 
 Neither can its extension be ascribed to a hope, that 
 it Vi'ould compel Bonaparte to rescind theBerlin decree. 
 Our rulers will never attempt to act openly and directly 
 on his fears. Such a system would contradict all their 
 opinions respecting him. But if they had proposed so 
 to act, the modification suggested would have been 
 more operative, than the measure in its present form. 
 He would have perceived in it the counteraction, in- 
 stead of the support, of his favourite system of warfare 
 on British commerccv 
 
40 
 
 Discarding the first reason, then, as having been ob- 
 viously inoperative, let us proceed to the second. It 
 is, that congress was restrained from modifying the 
 embargo, in such a manner as to eRect its avowed ob- 
 ject, without ruining the cultivators of the soil, by the 
 fear that such a modification, while it diminished the; 
 pressure on ourselves, would also benefit England, 
 and consequently be offensive to France. 
 
 Ought our conduct to be so iniiuenced, by such a 
 motive ? 
 
 It will be readily conceded, that the modification 
 |)roposed v/ould have the effect suggested, and th^ir a 
 neutral nation, in the general, cannot safely frame such 
 commercial regulations, as will benefit one of two bel- 
 ligerents, and injure the other. If the regulation be 
 made without a sufficient motive of its ow , and with 
 a view to its effect on the belligerents, it becomes an 
 obvious departure from neutrality, and a measure of 
 hostility. But if the regulation is dictated by plain 
 and important national interests ; if it is framed wish 
 an obvious view to the state of the country, and affects 
 belligerents incidentally and consequently, it ceases to 
 be a departure from neutrality, and to furnish just 
 ^ause of offence. 
 
 Of this latter description, would be the modification 
 in question. If the injustice of belligerent powers, es- 
 pecially of France, with whom the system originates, 
 compels us to relinquish the transportation in our own 
 bottoms, of the produce of our industry, we are oin-i- 
 ously driven to the necessity of selling that produce to 
 those who will come to our own rnarket to purchase it. 
 That the home market is left open to every competitor, 
 is a measure apparently dictated by our substantial in- 
 terests. It is not adopted with a view to its effect upon 
 belligerents, but to its eftect upon ourselves. If one 
 belligerent is in a situation to come to that market, 
 with more facility than the other, this casual advantage 
 arises from causes not produced by us, and gives no 
 right to the party, who finds himself unable to reach 
 our market, to say, that it shall, on that account, be 
 ©losed against all the world. No nation has a rig4it to 
 «ay, that because vshe cannot purchase from us. we 
 
V 4,4, 
 
 shall sell to nobody ; or that to promote her compara- 
 tive interests with a rival, she wishes to destroy, we 
 must sacrifice our own. This is a demand which no 
 nation ought to make, and to which no nation ought 
 to submit. It involves the claim of sovereignty, on 
 the part of the nation making the demand, and betrays 
 the dependence of the nation submitting to it. 
 
 This reason then, which is openly and publicly as- 
 signed by the friends of the administration, f r that 
 .augmentation of distress, which is produced by the 
 extension of the embargo to foreign vessels, is the most 
 conclusive evidence which can be presented to the 
 mind, of our inveterate hate to England, and of our 
 fatal submission to France. Rather than not indulge 
 that hate, we inflict the most serious injuries on our- 
 selves ; and rather than risk giving offence to France, 
 by a measure not offensive in its nature, with which 
 she has not a right to be offended, we submit to the 
 most distressing privvitions, that rank hostility to our 
 J)rosperity could have dictated. 
 
 This pernicious extension too, furnishes additional 
 proof, that the real motives of the embargo have not 
 been publicly assigned. 
 
4S 
 NO, IX. 
 
 The British orders of council are not, in princi- 
 ple, so destructive of our commerce as the Berlin de- 
 cree. The latter, by declaring all the dominions of 
 Great Britain in a state of blockade, subjects to seizure 
 and condemnation, every vessel found trading with 
 those dominions. It consequently prohibits our com- 
 merce with the British West Indies, as well as with 
 her territories in Europe. This is a circumstance of 
 the more consequence, because the facilities for priva- 
 teers, which were furnished by the islands then under 
 the controul of France, enabled them to annoy, to a 
 great extent, all vessels sailing in those seas. 
 
 The former leaves unmolested the whole trade be- 
 tween the colonies and the United Slates. This is a 
 difference of immense consequence. It also exempts 
 from the penalties of the blockade, which is extended 
 to all the European dominions of France, and of her 
 allies in the war, those neutral vessels which will touch 
 at any port in England, and pay a small surn of money 
 as the price of the exemption. 
 
 This relaxation of the riger of the blockade, has giv- 
 en great offence in rhe United States. The irritation 
 it has excited, would certainly have been sufficiently 
 provoked, had this univ^ersal blockade of the European 
 dominions of the enemies of Great Britain, been decla- 
 red by her before those enemies had placed her domi- 
 nions in the same state. Had she commenced this 
 system, we ought to have felt against her the same in- 
 dignation, which the Berlin decree ought to have exci- 
 ted against France ; aiid we ought to have resisted 
 these orders with the same energy, that ought to have 
 been exerted in resisting the Bei-lin decree. But she 
 did not commence it. And if the blockade can be 
 justified, as a measure of retaliation, no relaxation oiF 
 that blockade can add to its offensiveness. 
 
 England then has, in leaving open our trade to the 
 colonies of her enemy, stopped far short of France in 
 the hostile career into which both have entered. 
 
 There is a material difference between the extent of 
 fh^s mc^iU'Cb; Ui HnotiKr respect. The Berlin de- 
 
46 
 
 erce not only cuts off all intercourse betweei'i the UiiU 
 ted Suites and the dominions oi" Great Brit.. in, but ibr- 
 bids all traffic in articles of the growth or manufacture 
 of ihose domiaivms. 
 
 T'nis extravagant prohibition is not retaliated. 
 
 It is then apparent, that the orders of council are, m 
 their letter and spirit, much less comprehensive timn 
 the decree, to retaliate which those orders were made. 
 
 A general blockade, proclaimed by either of those 
 powers, suggests one observation, which can escape 
 no person. That a belligerent has a right ta blockade 
 3i"'y port of his enemy, is admitted. It is onh^ requir- 
 ed, that he should, in flict, invest that port, so as to 
 make the attempt to enter it dangerous. So immense 
 is the naval power of Kngly.nd, that she can, in point 
 of fact, invest at the same time a very great number of 
 the ports of her enemy, while France is absolutely un- 
 able to station a blockading force at any port in the 
 world. She dares not openly trust a fleet mto any sea ; 
 ^nd if lier ships casually steal into the ocean, their 
 saiety depends on returning undiscovered. A block* 
 adi?ig decree, therefore, by France, is an outrage upon 
 neutrals, for which no semblance of apology can be 
 framed. It is an undisguised and shameless licence to 
 her privateers and cruisers, to commit piracy on all 
 neutral vessels. 
 
 Althoug;h hi , imperial majesty commenced this de* 
 predating system, besought not to restrain his rage, at 
 finding that his enemy followed his example, even at a 
 distance. Although that enemy remained flir behind 
 him, he could not tolerate the attempt to retaliate on 
 himseli'any portion of his own injustice. His resent- 
 ments I)rokt out in the Milan and Bayonne decrees, by 
 which his outrages on the United States have been car- 
 ried to extremities, which amount in fact to war. He 
 subjects to capture and condemnation e^■ery American 
 vessel which has ever been visited by an English ship ; 
 he seizes all American vessels in his ports, or which 
 his corsairs can bring in ; and he sequesters all Ameri- 
 can pn^perty Ibund on the water or on land, with the 
 avowed pur}:jose of confiscating it, if the United States 
 do not decliu'e war against ii-^ii^land. 
 
47 
 
 r-an^iap;e eaiinot licigliten thesfc rn6rmitles. The' 
 simj^le narrative can receive no increased colou: ir,g 
 from those epitht tb, which indignalicn woiiid nit* r- 
 weaA^e with it. He must be dead to evC'V /American 
 sentiment, who does not feci for his insihted and dis- 
 graced country. If, uiider those '.hreats, the United 
 States go to war \\ ith England, our independence is 
 ah'eady but an empty name, and not even tliat will be 
 long retained. 
 
 It has been shown, not only that France commenced 
 this system of warfare on neutral rigiits, but that she 
 has greatly outstripped her enemy in the fiacitious 
 course. The time will not be entirely mis\]^plied, 
 which is devoted to a comparison of the ten.per to- 
 wards the United States, w hich these two nations have 
 displayed, in this contest of violence. 
 
 Although the Berlin decree was an open and flagrant 
 violation of the rights which were guaranteed to this 
 country by a solemn treaty, as 'ueli as by the law of 
 nations, yet no previous notification t\ as given to the 
 United States of the intended infraction of those rights ; 
 nor has any subsequent apology, so far as is publicly 
 known, been made. Not only has tlie emperor of 
 France treated us with this insulting neglect, but in the 
 style of a haughty master, ofi'ended that his mandates 
 are not executed the instant they are issued, he adds to 
 the chastisement by fresh injuries, and punishes our 
 disobedience in delaying a declaration of war against 
 Great Britain, by seizing all our property within his 
 grasp ; the confiscation o^ which, he plainly tells us, 
 depends on our entering into the war he dictates. 
 
 What has been the stjie in \\ Inch this contest has 
 been conducted by h ngiand ? 
 
 When the Berlin decree was issued, she expressed, 
 ill decent terms, her confid-nce that the United States 
 Would not submit to this gross infraction of their rights ; 
 and at the same time, g^\VG the notice which the occa- 
 sion required-— that, as Britain was affected essentially 
 by this violence practised on neutral commerce, she 
 Would be com.pelled, in her own defence, to adopt 
 Ttieasures of retaliation against her enemy, "with res- 
 pect to those nations who siwuid unresi^LUigly permit. 
 
48 
 
 this decree to s;o into operation. When afterwards-^ 
 those measures were adopted, they were communicated 
 to the United States in terms of expressive regret, for 
 the necc bsity which caused them, and of the readiness 
 \A ith \vhich they would be discontinued, when that ne- 
 cessity should cease. 
 
 Biitain then, would not have applied her orders to the 
 United Stares, had they taken measures to prevent 
 her enemy from the unlawful use of their commerce, as 
 an instrument of war against her. She would not now 
 so apply them, if they would take such measures. — • 
 And she will revoke them, the instant France shall dis- 
 co'itinue the system commenced by that power. 
 
 But ^\'ill France recall the Berlin decree, should Bri- 
 tain annul the orders of council ? She has never said 
 so — and we knov\^ she will not. The Berlin decree ha- 
 ving preceded the orders of council, was not produced 
 by them, and does not depend on them — Britam then 
 wishes, hut France refuses, to discontinue this system 
 of afjpjesiion. 
 
 Afierthls brief and hasty sketch of the conduct of the 
 two bel'jr-erfnt pc;wers towards the United States, let 
 us for a moment turn our eyes on ourselves, and exa- 
 rninethe impression they have respectively made on us- 
 
 Towards Britain a high degree of resentment has 
 been manifested ; a determination to resist her en- 
 croachments has been avowed ; and war, should she 
 persist in her course, is the language of all the ministe- 
 rial circles. 
 
 Do we exhiliit towards France a similar temper ? — 
 Has the usurpation of Bonaparte of sovereign power 
 over tb.e United States, in directing the course of our 
 whole external commerce, in deciding for us the alU 
 important question of peace and war, in seizing all our 
 property within his grasp, and declaring that its con- 
 fiscation depends on our entering into the war he orders, 
 produced one indignant, one manly sentiment in th& 
 bosoms of our rulers .'' 
 
 Widi inexpressible mortification, must every genu* 
 ine American answer — none. Instead of those feelings, 
 and that energetic system, which the occasion so loud- 
 ly demands, which a really independent nation could 
 
49* 
 
 hot fail to exhibit, we are endeavouring to turn aside 
 the wrath of the conqueror by obedience — We are en*' 
 deavouriiig to prepare the public mind for the War lie 
 directs. , 
 
 . 'J'he genius of America seems to turn pale, and 
 humble itself before that of France. We receive, with 
 humility, and without a murmur, the stripes which 
 his imperial majesty pleases to inflict. We dare not 
 even writhe under the lash. With smiles we kiss the 
 hand that scourges us, and lick the loot that treads 
 upon us. 
 
 At length, in an important part of the Union, the 
 spirit of indepeiidence seems to revive. A light dawns 
 in ;:he East, and gladdens the American bosom with 
 the hope, that the inestimable rights of self-government 
 will not be surrendered without a struggle. The peo- 
 ple of New- ngland are awake—and have in some 
 siigiit degree, shewn at their elections a disposition,- 
 like the pe<'pie of Sjmin, to assert rights, which their 
 gov ernment seems uhwiUing to maintain. 
 
 Should this spirit extend itself, it may avert the dan- 
 gers which threaten us. — France has a minister at 
 Washington, and this portentous change may be com- 
 municated to his imperial majesty, who will be careful, 
 while Britain maintains her ascendancy on the oceaUj 
 not to drive the United States to desperation. 
 
 SMNMX. 
 
50 
 
 NO. X. 
 
 WiT^ a faithful pencil, guided by the hand of 
 truth, I have endeavoured, in the preceding numbers, 
 to sketch, in miniature, the most prominent features 
 which designate the conduct of the American gov- 
 ennnent towards foreign nivcions — A full life portrait 
 has not been attempied. it v.ould require too much 
 canvass, and be a work of too much labour. My 
 object is to induce reflection ; for to mc it seems 
 impossible to rsfiect, without perceiving the dange- 
 rous piecij^ice tovvards which w^e are impelled. — • 
 The partiality which has been displayed ; the efforts 
 wiiich arc incessantly made to keep up the resent- 
 ment of the nation against Kngland ; the extreme 
 solicitude uiiirh has been manifested to conceal the 
 outrages of France ; and the anxiety, \^'ith which 
 apologies have been made for those '.^hich force ' 
 themselves upon our view ; demonstrate but too 
 clearly, .that, if the temper of the people will bear \i 
 it, and France continues to insist on it, the resolution 
 is taken to declare war against Great Britain. 
 
 Strong as are our partialities for France, deep- 
 rooted as is that hate of England, which has long 
 rankled in the bosoms of our rulers, I do not as- 
 cribe to those passions so much influence, as to be- 
 lieve that they could, unaided by other causes, in- 
 duce our administrition to incur the hazards of 
 open war, and risk their popularity by declaring it. 
 They would content themselves with increasing the 
 prejudices, and fomenting the resentments of the 
 people, so as to preserve, in their highest exaspera- 
 tion, the ill dispositions they at present feel towards 
 England, and incline them to carry, still further, that \ 
 system of "war in disguise," into which we have J 
 with so much alacrity, already engaged. If mc are 
 dri\ en beyond this point, it is, I believe by external 
 influence. 
 
 The opinion, that Britain must fall, and that 
 it would be madness in us to draw upon oursehcs 
 tht vengeance of the conqueror, by any opposition to 
 his will, is but ill concealed. A Uttle more of the 
 
51 
 
 curtain is daily raised, and that secret, which was in- 
 deed too thinly veiled to be hidden from us, had we 
 not closed our eyes to the light we possessed, is 
 more exposed to our view. I'he ministerial papers 
 begin to speak still more plainly, and v^ e hear without 
 much surprise, that Bonaparte is the minister of Hea- 
 ven, sent to execute a great work ; sent to fulfil the 
 prophecies, and establish the millenium. Resistance 
 would of course be impious. 
 
 I shall conclude these essays, with a temperate ap- 
 peal, on this subject, to ir.Q reason of my fellow citi- 
 zens. I ask them to examine ail the testimony the}* 
 possess, to consult experience, to think with that se- 
 rious intentness which the crisis so eminently deniartds, 
 and, amidst real diiiiculiics, to decide ibr-themseh es 
 what line of conduct affo.> ds the fairest and most ration- 
 al hope for safety. 
 
 That the independence of the United States cannot, 
 without the interposition of a miracle, survive the fall 
 of the British empire, is, 1 bcLeve, the opinion of eve- 
 ry reflecting man, OF consequence, America can have 
 no motive for endeavouring to precipitate that fall, un- 
 less it be the hope, that her prompt and seemingly 
 chearful obedience may lighten her chains, perhaps 
 may save that poor remnant of self-government, which 
 consists in receiving the orders of the conqueror through 
 a fellow citizen, instead of a Frenchman. — -Bonaparte 
 may give us a Schimmelpenninck, instead of a Louis. 
 
 Let us enquire, whether there is any reasonable 
 foundatio \ for this degrading hope. 
 
 I will nut go through the long list of nations, that 
 hav^e been oulDJugated by France. I will not attempt 
 to shew the fate of those who have resisted, nor to 
 contrast it with what has befallen those, who, endea- 
 vouring to mitigate a fall they thought inevitable, have 
 been swallowed in this all-devouring vortex, without a 
 struggle for their preservation. 1 will select Portugal 
 jnd Spain, the two last cases that have occurred, and 
 isk that they may be considered. 
 
 Portugal is the ancient ally of England. Her situ- 
 ation created a natural connection with that power, on 
 ivhich she neccs$a,rily relied for pvot^ection from Spj^ij^, 
 
52 
 
 B'T*" she is not ?^enerally engaged in the quarrels of the 
 coiitinent ; and, from the commencement of the pre- 
 sent war, she has sought to preserve her neutrality. It 
 js understood, that she had paid France high premiums 
 for being permitted to remain in peace. 
 
 Her complaisance, however, did not avail her. Af- 
 ter the treaty of Tilsit, she was ordered to enter into 
 the continental confederacy ; and, without knowing 
 that these orders would be disobeyed, hrench troops: 
 were marched towards that country, in order to occupy 
 it. Under the pretext of defending them from Kngr 
 land, their government was subverted, and their prince 
 only saved himself by flying to the Brazils. 
 
 A French general took possession of Portugal, pro- 
 claimed tlie friendly views with which he came, dis- 
 armed the people, dried up the sources of their wealth 
 by destroying their commerce, and required from 
 them an enormous sum of money ; not much less in 
 proportion to their population and riches, than one^ 
 hundred millions would be from tlie people of the 
 United States. 
 
 Portugal had giyen no ollence. Her conduct was 
 such, as even to warrant the opinion, that she would; 
 eiiterj though certainly Vvith repugnance, into the views 
 of France. 
 
 But Portugal, it may be said, was, in secret, friend-^ 
 Ky to England. — Let us then turn our eyes to Spain. - 
 
 From a period long anterior to the elevation of Bo-s 
 naparte to the supreme power, Spain has been the obe- 
 dient, the obsequious vassal of France. Without pre- 
 tending to a Vv'ill of her own, she has made peace, and 
 she has made war, as France has directed. She has 
 submitted to the most serious privations, and has pro- 
 fusely lavished her treasure and her blood, not for; 
 Suciiiish, but for French purposes. No partiality for 
 England was imputed to her, nor did the suspicion 
 exist, that she was about to make a single eSbrt to, 
 throw oft'thc galling yoke she had so long v.-orn. ; 
 
 What has S[^ain obtained by all this submission ?j 
 Is her condition better, or h her prospect less gloorny 
 than thttt of other nution.s ? - 
 
Far from it Her armies have marched to the ex- 
 treme points of the continent, under the banners of 
 France ; there they are subdivided into detachments, 
 ivhich render all exertion to return to the defence of 
 their native land impotent ; the passes into their coun- 
 try are occupied by the French, as their friends ; French 
 troops are introduced as friends into their fortified 
 touns ; an immense army takes possession of their ca- 
 pit:'l ; its general is invested, by the vassal monarch, 
 ^vith supreme authority, and thus the whole power of 
 civil g-overnmcnt is, in fact, transferred to him ; the 
 king of Spain is then decoyed into France, and there 
 compelled to abdicate his crown, and transfer his 
 kingdom totlie subtle tyrant, to who!-,e seductive wiles 
 he had f .lien a victim. 
 
 Goaded into fury by this tissue of treachery and of 
 tyranny, by which an ancient and gallant people saw 
 their nation annihilated, and themselves transferred 
 like cattle, to a foreign master, the Spaniards flew to 
 arms. But the time to defend their liberties, to pre- 
 serve their national existence, it is greatly to be ap- 
 prehended, has been permitted to pass away for ever. 
 Torrents of their richest blood, it is feared, will be 
 shed in vain. I 'he pusillanim/ity of the government 
 has betrayed the people, and they awake to a sense of 
 their danger only, when to escape that danger is no 
 longer possible. 
 
 Yet the struggle is glorious. It elevates Spain to 
 the highest point of grandeur, and gives a new lusire 
 to the character of the nation. Every bosom, in w4iich 
 the flame of liberty is not absolutely extinguished, must 
 take a deep interest in her fate. Every generous feel- 
 ing of the human soul must arm in her favour. 
 
 Spain is a beacon, which ought to warn the United 
 States of their danger. If submission could save even 
 nominal self-government from the insatiate ambition of 
 Bonaparte, that poor vestige of former greatness would 
 huve been saved to Spain. If it could preserve to any 
 nation the wretclied consolation of being governed, 
 according to his will, under their ancient forms, S^»ain 
 tvouid have been that nation. 
 
54 
 
 On what foundation then rests the hope of the United 
 States, that t>ubniii>bion can save us ? Is '.■ our dis- 
 tance from France ? We are not nuich further than 
 Si Domingo ; and what is distance to the lord of Eu- 
 rope, and the master of the ocean ? 
 
 Is it, as some infatuated men have said, that we of- 
 fer him no inducenent to enslave us ? Vdin and futile 
 illusion ! Since when has a weak, a rich and a popu- 
 lous country, posse^sii)g the finest rivers in the world, 
 aboundin-.r with ail materials for ship buildini^, capable 
 of \ ieldins^an immense revepue, and of raising consi- 
 dei-abJe armies, ceased lo tempt ambition, or to fur- 
 nish motives to the concjueror ? This rich, and once 
 h.ipp\ country, will afford to the emperor a vast ex- 
 tension of his own power, and an increase of means to 
 gratify his numerous favourites. 
 
 We cannot then indulge the hope, that our insigni- 
 ficance, any more than our submission, will save us. 
 
 By submission^ we, in fact, add to our danger. — 
 Let us only be true to ourselves, and, so long as the 
 maiitime superiority of Britain remains, we are safe. 
 But let us be unfaithful to ourselves, and, yielding to 
 the inflluence of our fears, engage in the wars of Bona- 
 par:e, and we become slaves, though Britain should 
 remain fiec. 
 
 I ask, what ally of France has not l">een compelled to 
 enter into all her views ? Even Rviss'a, who can bring 
 into the field near half a million of excellent troops, has 
 entitled herself to the reproach of posterity, by turning 
 her arms, at the direciion of Bonaparte, against a 
 neighbour and a faithful friend, saved by the Balic 
 from his grasp. Russia, powerful as she still is, gives 
 up her own system, and becomes subservient to his 
 o')jects. But what ally of France, who ceased to be 
 formidable in a military point of view, has not, in form 
 as well as fact, become her slave ? What hope, then, 
 can we entertain of being more fortunate .'' 
 
 If we declare war against England, we must carry it 
 on as our master, under the name of our ally, shall di- 
 rect ; we must receive into our country such auxili- 
 aries as he shall offer ; we must pay, as our just por- 
 tion of the burdens of the war, such sums as he shall 
 
55 
 
 |5rescril)e. And being once in his embrace, when and 
 how shall we escape it ? 
 
 In submission, then, we meet a ruin, alike certain 
 and disgraceful. We have no i^o{K , but in a maniy 
 assertion of our rights, and an unyielding adherence to 
 self-government. 
 
 If, as is most obvious, the independence of the Uni- 
 ted States, in the present condition of the world, rests 
 on the maritime ascendancy of iLngland ; if our dangers 
 are, in every point of view, increased by impairing that 
 ascendancy ; if, by going to war with that power, we 
 incur the double hazard of losing our independence 
 from her destruction, and from the foot hold France 
 will obtain in our coui iry ; ii our rulers openly mani- 
 fested prejudices, and take measures, ^\hich lead to 
 such a war — where shall we look for safety ? 
 
 The/inswer is obvious. We m?ist. look for it to our- 
 selves ; and we must look for it in a charsge of mea- 
 sures, which can oniy be effected by a change of men. 
 If we would not continue, as an instrument of hostility 
 against 'he commerce of i\ngland, an embargo, which 
 is ruinous to ourselves^ until we raise it by an actuai 
 declaration of war, we must confide the c.cvernment of 
 our country to men, who are not devoted to the mise- 
 rable system, under wtiich we now suffer. 
 
 The present is to the United States, a most interest- 
 ing crisis. On the elections about to be made, every 
 thing depends. It is scarcely less essen.:ial to attend to 
 the state legislatures, than to that of the continent. Al- 
 though the per?;ons we are about to choose, will not 
 come immediarely into power, the elections will be a 
 sure test of public sentiment, and \\ill greatly influence 
 the conduct of those, who must rule us yet a short time 
 longer. Every genuine American ought to recollect, 
 that these elections possibly decide the liberty and the 
 independence of his country. 
 
 SENEX. 
 

 NO. I 
 
 Th e spectacle, now exhibited by the United States^ 
 lias undoubted claims to a very distinguished place 
 among those wonderful events, which are crouded into 
 the early part of the present century. Bonaparte is 
 not the first conqueror, to whom a servile world has 
 bowed its neck : but a civilized and intelligent people, 
 active, industrious, agricultural, and commercial, 
 possessing all the means by which those qualities might 
 be advantageously employed, suddenly withdrawing 
 themselves from the ocean, and cutting off their inter- 
 course with the world, presents a phenomenon in po- 
 litical economy, of which the history of the human 
 race furnishes only this solitary example. 
 
 Planted by kind Providence in a bountiful soil, from, 
 which our labour extracts an immense surplus pro- 
 duce, we are commanded by our government to see 
 that surplus perish on our hands ! Having acquired, 
 from a judicious use of the advantages of our situation^ 
 the second commercisil marine in the world ; a marine, 
 which, after the transportation of our own commodi- 
 ties, carries extensively for others, we decree, that our 
 ships shall rot in our harbours ! Possessing a numc 
 tous and skilful body of seamen, we present to thenj 
 
 H 
 
58 
 
 the gloomy alternative of starving at home, or seeking 
 'emj)loymtnt abroad ! While wafted on a full tide of 
 unexampled prosperity, we have oiirselve* turned out 
 of the stream, have locked up our ports, and have de- 
 clared, that the United States shall no longer appear m 
 the society of nations ! We have imposed on our- 
 selves a perpetual embargo, which, pressing like an 
 incubus^ on the bosom of the nation, arrests the course 
 of that vital current, whose healthful motion gave ac- 
 tivity and energy to the whole political body ! ! ! 
 
 Such is the disastrous situation to which we are re- 
 duced, by an administration, to whose misrule this 
 devoted country has, for eight years, been subjected ; 
 by an admin. istration composed of men who, by decep- 
 tive promises of imaginary good, had disgusted us 
 with real happiness, and seduced us from the councils 
 of true wisdom, to confide our destinies to them. 
 
 It would be some alleviation, were this dark pros- 
 pect brightened by the hope df better cimes. Un- 
 fortunately, it is not. The calamities of the moment 
 Ijelong not to the moment only. The burden is not 
 lightened, by the expectation that we may soon be re- 
 lieved from it. We have the melancholy certainty of 
 bearing it until v/e place power in other hands. Those 
 who found us the most flourishing people on earth, 
 who have dictated public measures, and giiidcd at will 
 the councils of the nation, whose system has sunk us 
 to the wretched and hopeless condition in which we 
 now find ourselves, are incapable of being corrected by 
 experience. They are still as loud as ever in their 
 plaudits of that system ; still pronounce it the greatest 
 eiFort of human wisdom ; still obstinately persist, not 
 merely in its support, but in its extension. The em- 
 bargo then, or some measure not less destructive, 
 must be of equal duration with their power. 
 
 So inveterate are the prejudices, \vhich a long course 
 of flagitious calumny has excited against the wise and 
 good of America, that their warning voice, proclaim- 
 ing the ruin into which our rulers were about to 
 plunge us, has been raised in vain. So violent is our 
 antipathy against one foreign nation, so ardent our par- 
 tiality for another j so devoted are wc to those, who, 
 
59 
 
 by aggravating that antipathy and soothing that partial- 
 ity, flatter our most dangerous passions, that the voice 
 of reason and of patriotism, demonstrating the weak- 
 ness of that fatal system which has been adopted, and 
 predicting the miseries which must flow from it, has 
 either not been heard, or has been heard with con- 
 tempt. Yet now, when we feel, that the most gloomy 
 of these predictions ai"e verifying ; when the calamities 
 which were foretold are beginning to press us ; when 
 the intention of persevering in the same destructive 
 system is openly avowed, the hope may be cherished, 
 that passion will yield to sober reflection, and that 
 measures may at length be estimated by their intrinsic 
 value, not by a blind prejudice for or against the men 
 who propose them. 
 
 In this hope, the sufficiency of the motives which 
 are assigned for the great national calamity, which our 
 rulers have drawn upon us, will be briefly examined. 
 
 The decrees of France, not only infracting the most 
 solemn obligations, which can be created by treaty, 
 but exhibiting also, the most inaflfable contempt for the 
 sovereignty of the United States ; and the subsequent 
 orders in council, issued by Britain with the avowed 
 purpose of retaliating on her enemy the injuries sought 
 to be inflicted on herself, are the alleged causes of this 
 self-destroying measure, Although the orders of coun- 
 cil were unknown, when the embargo was enacted, and 
 consequently could not have contributed to produce it, 
 they are now known ; and, if they would have origi- 
 nally justified the measure, they would now justify its 
 ^continuance. I shall not, therefore, at present, avail 
 myself of that circumstance. 
 
 Postponing any comparison of these decrees and or- 
 ders with each other, or any consideration of the oppo- 
 site impressions, which, under the actual circumstances 
 of the world, the conduct of eacn belligerent ought to 
 make on a nation loving liberty, and valuing its inde- 
 pendence, it is my purpose for the present, to solicit 
 my fellow citizens to accompany me in the enquiry, 
 whether this ruinous measure is calculated to effect 
 its object, or to produce a future good, proportioned to 
 those countless ills which are its inseparable attendants^ 
 
€0 
 
 What object, let me first ask, was the embargo in- 
 tended to effect ? In what manner, and on what, was 
 It to operate ? 
 
 To foreign nations, and sometimes to ourselves, it 
 has been represented as a measure of precaution, de- 
 signed only for self- protection. Of this pretext, no fo- 
 reign nation has been the dupe ; nor is it believed that 
 any American is so credulous, as to give it his faith — 
 The safety attending those voyages, which have been 
 permitted by the government, still more th:-\n the pau- 
 city of the captures made on those vessels, vrhich co- 
 vered the ocean when the embargo was imposed, de- 
 monstrate that the danger was not so imminent as to 
 require this desperate expedient. But were the fact 
 otherw ise, to what does the embargo afford protection ? 
 Is our surplus produce protected ? Let this question 
 be answered by the agriculturist or the fisherman, whose 
 market is wrested from him, and Vvho sees that surplus 
 perishing on his hands. Does it save our shipping ? 
 Let this question be answered by the merchant, whose 
 property is rendered useless, and is rotting at our 
 wharves. Does it preserve our seamen r The honest 
 tar, who, with fokled arms and aching heart, contem- 
 plates the ocean, from Viliich he is banished, or bids 
 adieu to his family and home to search for bread in fo- 
 reign service, will tell you it has ruined him. To 
 whom then, of to v/hat, is its protection extended ? 
 Every observing man, not infatuated by the demon of 
 party, will answer— to no person and to nothing. 
 Men are not served by rendering their industry unpro- 
 ductive, nor is property preserved to its owners by be- 
 ing rendered useless to them. It is by permitting la- 
 bour to find employment, and by allowing the produce 
 of labour to find a market, that real protection is afford- 
 ed, and real encouragement given to the one or the 
 other. 
 
 If, in point of fact, the conduct of the belligerents 
 had driven America from the ocean, and compelled - 
 her to seek for safety by retiring within herself, that 
 conduct cannot have compelled her to deny to her cit- 
 izens the scanty privilege of selling the produce of 
 their labour to those foreigners, who v/ill take upon 
 
61 
 
 themselves the risk of tran sport iiig it to its place of 
 consumption. If the danger of searching a foreign 
 market is too great to be encountered by onrselveb ; 
 il the merchants of the United States, incapable of 
 *' managing their own affairs in tlieir own way, without 
 *' too much regulation," have become so incompetent 
 to decide on this danger, that the government must de- 
 cide for them, this can afford no reason for destroying 
 our home market also. Was this the real motive for 
 the embargo, it would be imposed on ourselves alone, 
 and the total loss of our property would be prevented by 
 permi'ting us to sell to others. If motives of policy 
 should induce us to exclude from our ports those who 
 infract our rights, no motives, which can be avowed, 
 would exclude from them those who respect our neu- 
 tral privileges. They would be permitted to purchase 
 and export the surplus produce of our labour. Imbe- 
 cility itself could not devise as a measure of protection, 
 that system of destruction, which our administnition 
 has adopted. 
 
 If we demand other evidence, than is furnished by 
 the measure itself, of the motives to which i^ is to be 
 ascribed, that other evidence is to be found in the lan- 
 guage of government, and in the long settled opinions 
 of the administration. — Any man who reads the de- 
 bates in congress, who hears the sentiments uttered by 
 those who possess the confiden. e of the administration, 
 will perceive that the embargo is a measure, not of 
 self-preservation, but of vengeance ; that it is designed 
 Tiot to protect oursehes, but to coerce a foreign nation ; 
 that it is not a regulation made for internal purposes, 
 but is intended to operate externaily, anci to reduce to 
 our feet and the feet of the merciless tyrant of th'" Eu- 
 ropean continent, who has exacted similar mea^tin-es 
 from all his slaves, a foreign nation, Vv'hose hurniliadon 
 constitutes the first ambition of that tyrant and ofoui* 
 rulers. 
 
 To all who have adverted to the public opinions of 
 public men, it is well known, that the leaders of tiie 
 party now in pouer, have long been solicitous to mea- 
 sure strength with Great Britain, in acomme cia! sivug. 
 ^le. The unprolitabie contest oi trying vikich can do 
 
62 
 
 tlie GtJier the most harm^ is one in which they have long 
 been most anxious to engage. It is the poiiticai hobby- 
 horse which, from the adoption of our present con- 
 stitution, they have been impatient to bestride. In the 
 first congress, this pohcy was advocated with that zeal, 
 vvhich is inspired by strong national prejudice ; and in 
 1794^, the same spirit agitated the whole American peo- 
 ple. The system of rejecting amicable arrangement 
 with Great Britain, and of humbling that hated power 
 by commercial regulations, was then urged with a fer- 
 vor, wliicli was not confined within the Myalls of con- 
 gress. — Jt will be recollected by all, that when the firm 
 virtue and sound judgment of \Vashington checked 
 this ruin-bearing system, by the nomination of Mr. 
 Jay to negociate with England, the respect which had 
 been felt for our patriot chief yielded to the fierce re- 
 sentment of party, and this wise measure was reproba- 
 ted as a sacrifice of national honour, which must infal- 
 libly lead to a sacrifice of national interest also. It was 
 then said, as it is now said, that America possessed the 
 means of dictating to Great Britain the terms of their 
 future intercou se, and that the only desideratum to 
 give these means full effect, was an administration 
 which would employ them. 
 
 Equally well must be recollected, the wild fury 
 vvhich was excited on laying before the public the trea-^ 
 ty, in which those negociations terminated — a treaty, 
 which secured the peace, and promoted the best inte- 
 rests of the United States. On that occasion, as on 
 this, the whole party, with one voice, exclaimed, that 
 the treaty ouglit to be rejected, and commercial re- 
 strictions substituted in its place ; that, had the gov- 
 ernment resorted to this system of coercion, instead of 
 pegoeiatiQn, the most extravagant demands which 
 could \va\i^ been made by America, would have been 
 conceded. 
 
 Had the executive, as well as the legislature, been 
 tlien, as now, in possession of this party, they would 
 ha\e placed their country then, in the situation in which 
 they have now placed it. But fortunately for the United 
 States, the steady hand of Washington guided the 
 helm of our pohtical barque ; and he possessed to» 
 
63 
 
 much penetration, to be deceived by this intemperate 
 clamour, and too anueh virtue to yield to it. He dis- 
 appointed the views of this powerful party ; and a com- 
 parison between our present situation and that in which 
 his measures placed us, will enable us to appreciate the 
 two systems. 
 
 To these evidences of former infatuation, others of 
 a more recent date may be added. The non- importa- 
 tion law is a germ from the same stock. It was the 
 commencement of that plan of giving lav/ to England 
 by shackles on commerce, on which the heated imagi- 
 nations of our rulers have so long d'Aelt. We are now 
 about to witness its completion. Those who have for- 
 gotten the language of the day, and Avho are willing to 
 drink still deeper of the cup of humiliation, are invited 
 to turn to the debates, which that subject produced. 
 It is difficult, for a real American, to feel more disgust 
 or mortification, than must be excited by the swagger- 
 ing, bullying speeches, delivered by men, who derive 
 importance from being clothed with the power of the 
 American people. The language uttered by those 
 who have been emphatically styled "the troops of the 
 palace," on passing the act for suspending this law, is 
 recommended to particular notice. It demonstrates, 
 as clearly as a political truth can be demonstrated, the 
 temper in which this pernicious system originated. 
 i It is then most obvious, that the embargo was in- 
 ! tended as a measure of coercion. It remains to en- 
 quire, whether, if contemplated in this point of view, 
 it promises to be less impotent than when considered 
 as a measure of protection. 
 
 A FARMER, 
 
64 
 
 ,N0. 11. 
 
 Th e e^t'Ct of the embargo as a measure of cocr< 
 elon, is now to be considered. 
 
 However apparent it may be, that this favourite off- 
 spring of our administration was never intended to ope- 
 rate against I'rance, it might be deemed a defect in the 
 argument, not to contemplate the subject, with a view 
 to that pouer, as weh as England. 1 will, tlierefore, 
 bestow a few words on it. 
 
 The most obsequious tool of the Great Nation can 
 no longer deny, that the object of tUeir emperor is tlt^ 
 conquest of the world. No man is so blind, as not to 
 perceive, that to place his own followers and depend- 
 ents on e^'ery throne ; to convert also into monarchies 
 for their use, the few republics he has not yet overturn- 
 ed ; and to reign hinibeif the emperor of emperors, and 
 the king of kings, is a scheme not too extravagant for 
 his gigantic ambition. Even before the publication of 
 the secret treaty of Fontainbleau, in which his imperial 
 majesty engaged to dispose of the United States, no 
 ol)serving man, not blinded by prejudice, could be so 
 infatuated as to believe, that the subjugation of this 
 country formed no part of his plan. 
 
 The only obstacle to the complete execution of this , 
 splendid project^ is England ; and England could no * 
 longer oppose it, were her marine superiority destroy- 
 ed. The main pillar, on which this superiority must 
 rest for its support, is commerce ; and to annihilate 
 commerce, is to break that shield which covers what 
 yet remains of liberty and national sovereignty, from 
 the insatiate devourer of both. Regardless, therefore, 
 of individual suffering, the great enemy of human hap^ 
 piness overlooks the miseries inflicted on his own sub- 
 jects, and sees in the total annihilation of commercCj 
 only its ultimate effect on the British navy, and its con- 
 sequent aggTandisement of himself. He cannot effect 
 his object, without involving the trade of France in that 
 universal destruction, which must be decreed to com- 
 merce generally, in order to reach that of his enemy, 
 and his measures are therefore all taken with this viewc 
 It was impossible not to foresee, that his unparalleic^ 
 
65 
 
 attempt to convert all neutrals into the mere instruments 
 of his hostility against an adversary commanding the 
 ocean, would urge that adversary to measures of reta- 
 liation, which would retort with interest on his own 
 subjects and vassals, the injuries designed for the ene- 
 my. It was impossible not to foresee, that to the war 
 he had commenced on neutral commerce, so much of 
 that commerce as was carried on for France, must be- 
 come the victim. Yet this consideration did not re- 
 strain him. Nay more, as if fearful that the edicts of 
 Britain might not completely exclude neutrals from 
 French ports, he has, by other regulations, aided their 
 efforts. — Had the embargo never been imposed j the 
 lawless seizure and confiscation of all neutral property 
 .within his reach, must eftectualiy have banished from 
 his ports, every American who had not received private 
 assurances of protection, and who was not so blindly 
 devoted to him as to confide in those assurances. The 
 total suspension of all intercourse, betvVeen France and 
 other nations by sea, must then have been contempla- 
 ted by her master, when he commenced this outrage- 
 ous system, and was considered by him as an evil, 
 •which by no means counterbalanced the advantages he 
 expected to derive froni the extinction of commerce. 
 The evil pressed upon the people, the advantage was 
 its tendency to gratify his gigantic ambition. 
 
 The interdiction of commerce therefore by the Uni- 
 ted States, instead of cf)ercing France, is carrying into 
 execution the plan of her emperor. Accordingly, we 
 find him expressing his full approbation of this mea- 
 sure, to us so distressing. 
 
 Although the e.nbargo was not designed to affect 
 France injuriously, the hope was unquestionably che- 
 rished, that the wound it must inflict on Britain, would 
 be mortal. Does any ground remain on which this 
 hope can rest ? 
 
 The medium through which it was to operate vitally 
 on Great Britain, was her commerce. By withholding 
 provisions from her A^^est India Islands, and ravv^ ma- 
 terials from her manufactories, and by refusing to re- 
 ceive her manufactures, we calculated on humblins; 
 
 i 
 
66 
 
 her proud snirit, and reducing her to our feet. This 
 privation, added to that arising from the occlusion of 
 every port in Kurope, while she was engaged in a 
 most distressing war, it was supposed, would reduce 
 her to the last extremity. 
 
 However we might have been beguiled in the first 
 Instance, by a false estimate of our own means, com- 
 pared with those of other nations, experience has cer- 
 tainly detected and exposed the error. We now per- 
 ceive, that substitutes for the food usually supplied by 
 this country can be found ; that every raw material 
 can be obtained elsewhere ; and diat the markets, open 
 for her manufactures, are too ample to warrant the ex- 
 pectation, that the loss of ours, were it even possible 
 to deprive her of it, would bring her to our feet. — 
 'I'hese propositions have been so clearly demonstrated, 
 both in the senate and house of representatives, that no 
 mind, which is not closed against the light of reason, 
 can withhold fn^m them its full assent. To the abl« 
 and conclusiAC arguments that have been urged in both 
 houses of congress, 1 solicit the calm and deliberate 
 attention of every American, who wishes to judge cor- 
 rectly of the present alarming crisis, and to take an ac- 
 curate view of the true interests of his country. He 
 will fmd strong and solid grounds for the opinion, that 
 die evils inflicted on Great Britain by the embargo, 
 are compensated by the advantages she derives from 
 that measure. Were it submitted to her to determine 
 whether it should be continued or removed, the ques- 
 tion, which alternative her immediate interests would 
 incline her to embrace, presents a problem not easy of 
 solution. Most clearly it does not ix)ssess such coer- 
 cive qualities as to iixluce a surrender of those princi- 
 ples on which her maritime superiority depends, or a 
 relinquishment of that retaliating system, which she 
 has on great deliberation adopted. The former would 
 destroy her national grandeur, and with it her national 
 existence ; and the latter, by acknowledging her inabi- 
 lit\ to reto* t upon France the injuries which that nation 
 seeks to inflict, by violating every principle of public 
 lav/, would be to meet naked and unarmed an enemy 
 holding an unlawful weapon, which he had both thft 
 
gkill and disposition to ^vield with infinite force. '• 
 However earnestly our rulers may wish these results, 
 they can no longer be so infatuated as to expect them. 
 Were this experiment on our ability to humble 
 Great Britain as little injurious to ourselves as to her, 
 it might be of equal duration with the enmity of our 
 rulers. However impolitic it might be deemed by 
 those, who entertain just conceptions of the danger to 
 be apprehended from France, they would bear with si- 
 lent resignation an evil, for which there would be no 
 .l^medy. But this measure, so impotent as it respects 
 foreign powers, operates with m( st destructive energy 
 upon ourselves. From a high degree of active anima- 
 tion, in which every mental and corporeal pov\er might 
 be exerteti to great national and individual advantage, 
 it has reduced us, while yet in the vernal season of 
 youth, to a state of death-like torpor, in which the 
 choicest functions of our political being are suspended. 
 The sources both of national and individual Avcalth, 
 which were lately so abundant, if not absolutely dried 
 up, have their streams forced out of those cnannels 
 which mieht fertilize our country. Public and private 
 revenue are equally destroyed. The same blow has 
 annihilated both. Every member of the community 
 who had any thing to lose, perceives and feels the 
 calamity. 
 
 I will not dwell on that distress in which all partici- 
 pate, and of which all are sensible. No representation 
 can equal the reality, nor make any impression which 
 the pressure of the evil has not made. On that sub- 
 ject only one remark will be hazarded. The importation 
 of necessaries has not yet been stopped, and to a con- 
 I siderable extent the embargo has been evaded. To 
 !. these causes are to be ascribed that languid cun'ent, 
 i Ivhich still creeps through our political system. These 
 causes are now to be removed, and their removal will 
 be followed by total stagnation. Hitherto the produce 
 of our labour, though greatly depressed, has sold for 
 something. Let the system be perfected, and it will 
 command no price whatever — circulation must stop. 
 
 Though I mean not to dilate on the evils we feel, I 
 j m\i invite the thinking p^rt of the community to reflect 
 
68 
 
 on those whicli, if less obA'ious, are not, I fear, less 
 certain. 
 
 'I'he most valuable staples of the United States are 
 the growth of other countries, and can be furnished by 
 them in great al^undancc. The commercial state of 
 the M'orld is undergoing a re^•olution, which, notwith- 
 standing our utmost care and circumspection, will pro- 
 bably raise up powerful competitors in those branches 
 of industry, of which we have hitherto possessed al- 
 n;iost the monopoly. By withdrawing our commodi- 
 ties from the market, we surrender it to our rivals, 
 give a forced acceleration to their progress, and put 
 them in immediate possession of a trade they might be 
 a long time in acqui'ing. It is possible, that we mi.y 
 recover it in part, but it is scarcely possible^ that it can 
 ever be completely restored to us. The mischiefs 
 drawn upon us by the blind prejudice of our rulers, 
 will probably be felt fcr ages to come. 
 
 But our self-inflicted injuries are not exclusively of 
 a pecuniary nature. To the view of the statesman, 
 others present themselves, which, though less imme-' 
 diritely felt, are not less to be deprecated. Not only 
 will the moral principle of our merchants be tainted, by 
 inviting them to evasions of tlie law, but the whole 
 mass of the people will be infected by those demorali- 
 zing regulations, which, if not rendered inevitable, 
 w^ill at least find an apology in our situation. To re- 
 lieve the, great body of debtors from that distress which 
 is created by taking from labour its profit, the admi- 
 nistration of justice is, in several states, already divert- 
 ed from its usual course ; and that sense of the obliga- 
 tion of contracts, uhich our constitution has contribu- 
 ted so much to strengthen, and on which national pros- 
 perity so much depends, if not absolutely destroyed, 
 must be grai' ly impaired. Inattention to engagements 
 \y^\\ become habitual ; debt will be augmented by the 
 accumuhtion of interest ; while the means of discharg- 
 ing it will be di.-isip.ited : the hope of being absolved 
 from it other\\ise than by payment, will be created ; 
 and those strugf^lco betu een the debtor and creditor, 
 which are so fata to republics, and which we witness- 
 ed in the interval between the conclusion of the war 
 
69 
 
 for independence and the adoption of our constitution, 
 will l>e revived. 
 
 A precedent for this individual depravity will, it is 
 much to be feared, be found in the example of the go- 
 vernment. The ordinary resources of -revenue being 
 dried up, the fairest claims on the nation 'will be disre- 
 garded, and its most solemn engagements violated. 
 
 It is not amona: the least of the evils which mav rea- 
 sonably be apj)rthended, that the oppressive measures 
 , devised for the execution of this oppressive system, 
 will gradually deaden the sense of real liberty^ and ac- 
 custom the American people to a despotism of the 
 most ferocious kind — the despotism of fliction. The 
 fiercer passions will be kindled mto a flame, will mag- 
 nify petty offences into enormous crimes, and in order 
 to gratify the malignity of party rage, will prostrate all 
 those barriers which defend and preserve freedom. — 
 Nor ought the danger that we are rushing into a war 
 with Britain, to be lightly estimated. The ordinary 
 calamities incident to such a v/ar, form the sn\allest 
 objection to it : It leads infallibly to a still closer con- 
 nection with France, and the independence of no na- 
 tion has survived an alliance with that power. Her 
 friendship is still more formidable than her enmity. 
 
 These are the evils, in which a perseverance in the 
 system commenced by our rulers, must involve the 
 United States. And for what valuable purpose shall 
 we encounter them ? Let it be admitted, that our 
 embargo, in some degree, impairs the resources of 
 Great Britain, and that it is our true interest so to do ; 
 yet the injuries it inflicts on her, can bear no proportion 
 to those it heaps on ourselves. What should we say 
 of the individual who, fmding himself seized by a per- 
 son standing behind him, should pass his sword through 
 his own body, that its point might scratch his ad- 
 versary ? 
 
 That the individuals, whose foreign prejudices and 
 erroneous calculations have drawn upon their country 
 the difficulties and embarrassments we now experience, 
 should desijerately plunge forward into still deeper dif- 
 ficulties and more perplexing embarrassments, may 
 be accounted for from the obstinate and personal pride 
 
70 
 
 of men, who would feel a diminution of importance 
 from the acknowledgment, thut themselves or their 
 idol were fallible. But the mass ot the people feel not 
 the same inducements to persevere in error. How- 
 ever misguidrd they may be, they intend to promote 
 the prosperif) ot their country. However severe ihe 
 pressure, they are taught by those to whom they have 
 given their confidence, to beheve that national honour 
 requires a prolongation of national sufi'ering. In this 
 behef, they bear with patience the worse than useless 
 burden which their rulers have imposed on them. 
 
 The sentiment is too laudible not to be treated with 
 respect. Mistaken as is its application, weak as are 
 the pretensions of the advocates of the present sj'-stem, 
 to be the real guardians of national honour, the subject 
 demands, and shall receive, a dispassionate conside- 
 ration. 
 
 A FARMER. 
 
71 
 
 NO. in. 
 
 The question now to be discussed, is this — Does 
 the honour of the United States demand a persexenaice 
 in that system, which our rulers have adopted, and are 
 still pursuing ? 
 
 A question more important to the American people, 
 one which ought more to engage the attention of the 
 patriot and the statesman, cannot be propoijed. For, 
 in my judgment, national honour and natioriui mterest, 
 can never be in opposition to each other. However 
 the case of the moment may be consulted, a natiori 
 can never promote its real interest, by the abandon- 
 ment of its honour. But it is genuine honour, which 
 maintains this higii rank in the catalogue of national 
 virtues ; not that spurious honour, M'hich with its de- 
 ceptive light beguiles, like an ignis fatuiis, those who 
 trust themselves to its guidance, from the true path 
 leading to happiness, into irremediable perdition. 
 
 In what does this genuine honor consist ? Certainly 
 not in an obstinate adherence to error. If measures 
 have been adopted which disappoint the hopes of their 
 projectors, and instead of producing the advantages at- 
 tached to them by a feverish and sublimated imagina- 
 tion, have a direct tendency to ruin the nation ; ho- 
 nour can never require, that we should bind our desti- 
 nies to ^those measures, and perish rather than change 
 them. If in private life an individual, wearied with 
 the prosperity, which resulted from conducting his af- 
 fairs in the usual Way, should devise some new systemj 
 and stake his reputation on its success, no wise man 
 would think, that honour renuired a pertinacious' per- 
 severance in that s} stem, after experience had demon- 
 strated that, instead of fulfilling his visionary expecta- 
 tions, it was leadinar him to certain destruction. His 
 Ow^n pride might induce him to embrace rum rather 
 than give up his pretensions to infallibility, but every 
 reasonable man would think him a subject more proper 
 for the mad house than for imitation. InfeUibility is 
 the attribute of the Deity, not of man ; and honour can 
 ne^•cr require, that our actions ^should be regulated on 
 
72 
 
 the presumption, that We possess a quality which be- 
 long-s not CO onr nature. 
 
 hince absolute exemption from error is denied 
 to us, true wisdom and true honour are best consulted 
 bv correcting, with the least possible injury, any false 
 step we may have made. If we have lost our way, we 
 cannot too quickly turn back and take the right road. 
 Every sten we take in the wrong one, carries us fur- 
 ther "from our pkice of destination. The guide who 
 has misled us, may stiil insist, that we ought to follow 
 him ; but as travellers, it is our interest to retrace our 
 steps, and to recover the path from which we have 
 wandered. We c-A\ on foreign nations to retrace their 
 steps, and have never supposed that they would de- 
 grade themselves by so doing. Why ihen should 
 America be self-degraded, by changing a rash measure 
 inconsiderately adopted ? Is America the only power 
 on earth whose errors no experience can be permitted 
 to correct, or who would be disgraced by admitting 
 the possibility that our rulers may be fallible ? 
 
 I discard then altogether the position, that national 
 honour requires us to adhere to the system of annihila- 
 ting our commerce, merely br cause we have adopted 
 that system, iis wisdom is still a proper subject for 
 consideration, and we can now consider it with the 
 lights furnished by experience. 
 
 Since the question, what course does national honour 
 require us to pursue, is not closed forever, but may be 
 freely examined, unprejudiced by the experiments 
 which our theorists have made, I intreat my fellow 
 citizens to reflect v. ell on the principle, which ought to 
 guide them in deciding it. 
 
 We may define national honour, in the actual case to 
 which it is now applied, to be a reasonable and firm 
 assertion of oiir independence, and of our unquestion- 
 able rv^hi?,, by a judicious exertion of the best means 
 we have the power to employ. 
 
 In exploring the field opened to us by this definition, 
 it becomes essentially necessary, to take a rapid view 
 of the relative situation and designs of the bellige- 
 rents, of their conduct respectively towards the Uni- 
 ted States, and of their motives for that conduct. 
 
This view will aid us in marking out that course^ 
 which ought to be pursued by ourscives. 
 
 The person executing this task v/ould be unfaithful 
 to his duty, if he sought to coiiioim his statements to 
 pubhc prejudice, rather than to the facf Widi truth 
 for his guide, he must represent things as they are, 
 not as the passions of party have painted tliem. If he^ 
 is ciiarged with want of attachment to his ov\ n country, 
 the charge will be unfounded, for impartiality of state- 
 ment does not imply indifference of feeling. The for- 
 mer is necessary to a clear perception of our real inte- 
 rests ; the latter, were we even in the wrong, would 
 be criminal- 
 France is essentially a military nation. Her genius 
 is tT»ilitary. Her character, therefore, leads to con- 
 quest, and her power is to be extended by the subju- 
 gation dt other nations. Ttie connection she seeks 
 with them, is to be maintained by force, not bj* a re- 
 ciprocity of interests. 
 
 Britain, on the contrary, is a Commercial, and can- 
 not become a military nation. Her territory is immu- 
 taljly limited by the ocean, and she cannot extend it. 
 Commerce, not conquest, is, from necessity, her ob- 
 ject. For this purpose sh<e plants distant colonies, and 
 exercises dominion over remote regions, which may 
 be protected by her fieets,' and in which her power may 
 be maintained without large armies, i er connection 
 with other nations is cemented by mutual interest, and 
 must be dissolved when that mutual interest ceases to 
 preserve it. 
 
 The natural tendency of the French character to con*> 
 quest, is fully developed, and is pushed to its exrreme 
 point, by the consummate soldier, whose chains arc 
 worn throughout the continent of Kuroj:)e. He has 
 exhibited himself also without a mask. The slave of 
 no passion but of his gigantic ambition ; incapabk of 
 behig diverted from his object by any sentiment of ho- 
 nour or feeling of humanity ; patient and impetuous by* 
 turns ; uatchingwith a penetrating eye over all the other 
 powtrs, he discerns and turns to account tiieir vices 
 
 y 
 
74 
 
 or weaknesses, and employs indifferently, force and 
 fraud, terror and seduction, for the accomplishment of 
 his grand scheme of universal dominion. No submis- 
 sion can preserve his friendship, and every ally be- 
 comes his vassal. He acknowledges no other connec- 
 tion than that of master and slave, nor can any thing 
 but open and manly resistance rescue any portion of 
 the earth from his grasp. His promises are cobwebs, 
 "which he breaks at pleasure, and his faith is plighted 
 only for the more sure destruction of those who trust 
 to it. 
 
 The genius, the resources, and the character of the 
 two nations, and of the chief of one of them, have givena 
 character to the war, which they wage agamst each 
 other. On the part of France, it is a war of choice, 
 a war of conquest, a war which has for its object the 
 total extinction of the British power, as a necessary 
 step to the conquest of the world. 
 
 On the part of Great Britain, it is a war of necessity, 
 which she could not avoid, and cannot terminate ; a 
 war for existence ; a war on which depends her own 
 liberty, and that of other nations — Let France succeed, 
 and who is so infatuated as to believe, that there re. 
 mains on earth a power, which can place limits to his 
 ambition ? Let Britain succeed, and she only pre- 
 serves herself and the world. She makes nr- conquests, 
 and can make none. On France she could make na 
 impression. The whole continent of Europe would 
 still be impenetrable by her arms, and every part of it 
 Avould still exhibit a force she could not be frantic 
 enough to encounter. 
 
 The character of the war, the character andthe designs 
 ©f the belligerents, ought to be kept in view during the 
 examination of their conduct towards the United States. 
 This examination will be confined to those measures, 
 w hich have been adopted during the present war, and 
 which affect our sovereignty and our neutral rights— 
 A more extensive range is declined, not because it 
 would produce a different result, but because it would 
 lead to a length of enquiry, transcending the plan of 
 these essays. 
 
75 
 
 , The decree rendered at Berlin by the emperor of 
 jFrancc, in November, 1806, claims our first attention. 
 In violation of the established law of nations and of so- 
 lemn treaties, this decree declares all the dominions of 
 Great Britain in a state of blockade, prohibits all inter- 
 course with those dominions, and all commtrce in ar- 
 ticles of their growth or manufacture. The extrava- 
 gance of this edict is augmented, by the consideration, 
 that the blockaded country was the mistress of the 
 ocean, while the blockading power was unable to sta- 
 tion a squadron before any single port of her enemy.-— 
 The act then is an undisguised attack on the sovereign- 
 ty of neutrals, and an unequivocal invasion of their 
 rights. It is attended by no palliating circumstance, 
 and is alike incapable of being excused or misunder^ 
 stood. It is an authority to French cruisers to com- 
 mit indiscriminate plunder, and the robbery it licences 
 can be justified by no plausible pretext. 
 
 By those who can find nothing to censure in the con- 
 duct of Bonaparte, it is pretended, that Kngia d has 
 been herself the first to avow the principle of proclama- 
 tion blockades, and ^o carry it into practice. 
 
 So far as respects any avowal of the British govern- 
 ment, this assertion is positively untrute. The princi- 
 ple is not, and never has been avowed. No instance 
 exists, in which it has been re ognized, as the rule by 
 which that nation would regulate its conduct, Tlie 
 reverse is the fact, The British doctrine has uniformly 
 been, that a blockade to be lawful, must be eftectiye. 
 
 The practice under the rule, docs not admit of such 
 complete demonstration. From the nature of the thing, 
 the force which shall constiute an effective blockade, 
 is susceptible of no precise definition. It may vary ac- 
 cording to circumstances ; and impartial men may dif- 
 fer with respect to the fact. It is certain, that a very 
 extensive coast has been declared in a state of blockade. 
 The legitimacy of the order, depends on the force em- 
 ployed in its e:j;ecution. What this force was, is a 
 matter of evidence on which few in this country are en- 
 abled to decide. Thus much I think may, without 
 fear of contration, be hazarded. The naval power €>f 
 
76 
 
 Britain is sufficient for snch an effective blockade, of 
 every port from Brest to the mouth of the i^lbe, as to 
 render the attempt to enter any of them manifestly dan^ 
 gerous. No evidence has yet been furnished, tlrit such 
 was not the fact, while that coast was blockaded ; and 
 to pronounce this decision without evidence, is cer- 
 tainly assuming what we have no ni?;ht to assume. 
 
 it is also to be recollected, /that these measures of 
 blockade on the part of ■ na-land, s:rew out of measures 
 previously taken by France, which are not sanctioned 
 by the laws and usages of nations. She undertook to 
 p ohibitthe introdaction of British goods into the con- 
 tinent of Rurope, not only through her own dominions, 
 but throup;h those of other nations, some of vv-hich 
 professed to be neutral. This prohibition extended to 
 iieutral, as well as bel!iL';erent bottoms. In this res- 
 pect, France uufjuestiorably transcended those rights, 
 which war is admitted to give ; and even that part of 
 the prohibition, which may in strictness be deemed le- 
 gitimate, is a very harsh and unusual exercise of belli- 
 gerent privileges. It might be expected to be retort- 
 ed by a hiirsh exercise of belligerent rights on the part 
 of Great Britain. But the enquiry v.ill not be further 
 pursued, because it is manifest, that the contest on 
 this subject can furnish no apology fc/r the Berlin 
 decree. 
 
 This exterminating war then, upon neutral com- 
 merce, under \\'hlch the trade of the United Stctes is 
 doomed to expire, was obviously commenced by 
 France. It will appear the less excusable, and will 
 exhibit in stronger colours the haughty and despotic 
 character of the tyra'it widi whom this system origina- 
 ted, if the advaiUaj^es derived by the beiligerents res- 
 pectively fro n tlie trade which he has annihilated, be 
 tai.Oii into consideration. 
 
 So decided s the superiority of Great Britain on the 
 ocean, *hat her enemies scarcely venture to spread a 
 canvass on th't ele4nent. To neutrals, therefore, al- 
 most exclusively, was France indebted for the expor- 
 tarion of her ^^'ines and brandies, and for the importa- 
 tion of those rich colonial products, which habit has 
 
77 
 
 lendered essential to com'brtable existence. Britain, 
 oii the coiitrary, owes nothing to neutial bottoms. 
 
 ■^Her own conimtrcial n.ar ne is equal to all her purpo- 
 ses, and she asks no aid from foreij^n navigation. Yet 
 France, thus benefitted by neutral commerce, has 
 sough, to exterminate it by an act of violence, which 
 mi gilt be expected to convert every independent neu- 
 tral into a mortiil foe. 
 
 If t lis outrage on public la'v, and on the sovereign- 
 'ty of navions, had spent its force on neutrals', it could 
 have conferred no right on other belligerents to 
 adopt similar measures. But such is not the fact. 
 The object of the Berlin decree was to wound Great 
 
 '• Britain, and its effect, if submitted to, would be not 
 only an iusult to her sovereignty, but a permanent in- 
 jury to her interests also. 
 
 Although France was unable to carry this decree 
 into complete execution, she was able so far to exe- 
 cute it, as to divert into her own ports a considerable 
 portion of that neutral commerce, which was usually 
 destined for England, and to introduce into France 
 those valuable articles which are imported from the 
 Indies, on better terms than they could be introdu- 
 ced into England. No belligerent, especially one 
 warring for existence, can be expected to submit to such 
 a state of things. If she possesses tlie means of re- 
 torting upon her enemy the injuries intended for 
 herself, she will employ them. The suffering neu- 
 tral ought, in justice, to ascribe the calamities re- 
 sulting from such a contest, to the power which 
 commences it. 
 
 But to estimate rightly the relative demerits of 
 France and England in this respect, a more full 
 view ought to be taken of the subject. The inter- 
 diction of neutral navigation by Bonaparte, is not to 
 be contemplated as a single insulated fact. It is part of 
 a system, it is a link of that great chain of violence, by 
 which he hopes so to shackle and confine the commerce 
 of England, as to enfeeble the sinews of her maritime 
 strength, and finally to overturn her maritime powen 
 It is ©bvious, that from her manufactures and com- 
 
78 
 
 merce, Britain derives the means of supporting that im- 
 mense navy, which ejiables her to defend herself, and to 
 place some hmits to the enormous power of France. 
 Deprive her of every market for these manufactures, 
 destroy this commerce, and you dry up the sour- 
 ces, which nourish and recruit her navy, and leave 
 it to perish lor want of support. 
 
 Arduous as this attempt may appear, it was not 
 too dlHicult for Bonaparte. From every power on 
 the continent of l.urope he exacts, as the indispen- 
 sable price of a precarious and temporary existence, 
 implicit obedience to his mandate on this favourite 
 point. I'heir ports must be shut, not only to Bri- 
 tish commerce, but to British manufactures also. — 
 To complete rhis stupendous plan, and close every 
 avenue through which British manufactures might 
 pass into other countries, the Berlin decree was is. 
 sued, by which the British dominions were declared 
 to be in a state of blockade, and all articles of the 
 growth or manufacture of those dominions, found 
 on land or in neutral bottoms, \vere declared to be 
 good prize. This system, if carried into complete 
 execiition, would obviously prostrate his enemy at 
 his feet. For its complete execution, he relied 
 much on his actual power, and much on his influence 
 o/er those states whom his power could not immc» 
 diately reach, but who trembled at its approach. 
 
 Was it to be expected, that Great Britain would 
 become the quiet and unresisting victim of a sys- 
 tem, aimed so directly and so obviously at her 
 safety ? Could she be required not to oppose the 
 whole system by such a counter-system, as, in her 
 judgment, would defeat its object ? If self preserv- 
 ation be the primary law of nature, I know not on 
 what principle those neutrals, who have not resisted 
 with eilect, so far as was in their power, this gross 
 infraction of their rights, this arbitrary assumption 
 of their sovereignty, and attempt to convert them 
 into the mere instruments of hostility against a 
 nation fip^hting for existence, in the cause of hu- 
 intin liberty, can consider that nation as the ag- 
 
79 
 
 gressor, when she cVfends herself by those measures 
 jaf retaliation that are within htr reach. 
 ' ' y.^^' ^f ^^^ attend to the language of our ad- 
 ministration, to the debates in con<.ress, to the 
 Sentiments retailed to the people through the nii- 
 nistericil presses, we should lose sight of France, 
 and consider Great Britain as the original aggres- 
 sor — ^as the principal, if net the sole offender l' 
 
 A FARMER. 
 
80 
 
 NO, ir. 
 
 x\ 
 
 That a neutral tnay permit itself to be used as • 
 an insLiuiiient of hostility by i^ie belligerent a^^ainst 
 anoiher, without fofeiting its neutral chaacter, has not 
 been in terms asserted ; but it is .illeged by those who, 
 overlooking tlie aggressions of France, labour to turn 
 all our resentments against England, that the United , 
 States have never permitted themselves to be so used. 
 In sup,,ort of this assertion, it is contended, that, un!il 
 the condemnation of the Horizon, the United States had 
 a right to consider the Berlin decree as inapplicable to j 
 th'-m, and consequer.tly were not bound to manifest a \ 
 determination to resist ir. The orders of November, ^■ 
 1807, therefore, these politicians say, derive neither 
 justification ixor excuse from the previous measures of 
 France. I 
 
 Let this assertion be candidly investigated, ^ 
 
 That the Berlin decree does, in its terms, as posi- ^ 
 tively include the United States, as if they had been j 
 exiiressly i^.amed, must be acknowledged by all who J 
 have read that docimient. When language is ambi- \ 
 guous, we m.a}' justifiably suspend our opijiions of the j 
 intention of the person u^ing it, until that intention i 
 shall be explainecl ; but when the terms used are un- ^ 
 equivocal ; ^vhcn they can import but one sense ; they ") 
 must be taken in that sense, unless there are well foun- \ 
 ded moii\'es for believing, that they have been employ- a 
 ed inadvertantly ; in whicli case, prudence requires, | 
 that the person or the nation they implicate, should \ 
 take immediate and decisive steps to obtain satisfactory J 
 explanations ; and should, in the mcjU time, prepare I 
 for the event of the resolution being construed accor- .' 
 ding to its expression. \ 
 
 The decree of Berlin, on its face, furnishes no J 
 ground for the hope, that those terms, which compre- 
 hend the Uni'cd States, were inadvertently or unin- 
 tentionally eip.ployed. Let us then enquire, whether 
 there are any extrinsic circumstances to warrant a con- 
 struction in direct opposition to the plain language of J 
 the instrument itself. *- 
 
81 
 
 On the day preceding that, on which the decra& 
 bears date, the report, on which it was founded, was 
 made to the emperor by his minister of exterior rela- 
 tions. This report, after the usual declamation about 
 British tyranny and injustice, recommends that the 
 : British Isles be declared in a state of blockade ; that 
 i every Englishman be made a prisoner of war ; and 
 I that all English property be confiscated. The report 
 jthen proceeds — *' Since England has resolved on anni- 
 *' hilating all industry on the continent, whoever car- 
 " ries on a trade in English merchandize, favours her 
 *' designs to the utmost of his power, and becomes 
 *' her accomplice. Let all trade in English merchan- 
 ** dize be declared illegal." 
 
 The universality of the phrases employed, derives 
 additional force from the object contemplated, and from 
 the particular means relied on to effect that object 
 The avowed object was, the anmihilation of the trade 
 and manufactures of Great Britain ; and a proclama- 
 tion of blockade is intended exclusively for neutrals* 
 How then could the declaration, that all who traded in 
 English merchandize should be considered as the ac- 
 complices of England, and that such trade was illegal, 
 be understood to exclude that neutral, who traded in 
 English merchandize more than any and every other ? 
 In his letter of the 24th November, 1807, to general 
 Armstrong, the minister thus exposes the absurd fal- 
 lacy of such an opinion : — " His majesty regrets, with- 
 *' out doubt, to have been forced to recur to such 
 *' measures. He knows all that the commercial class- 
 *' es may have to suffer in consequence of them, par- 
 *' ticularly those, who, having habitual relations with 
 *' England, using a common language, and often mix- 
 *' ing their interests, might more frequently occasion 
 an apprehension of some commercial connivance 
 with the English, inasmuch as they would have 
 greater facilities in covering it. This circumstance 
 made it necessary to use to\yards them precautions 
 more exact, and an increasing watchfulness, in or- 
 der not to be exposed to abuses, which might resul.t- 
 from a less constant vigilance." 
 
 L 
 
The policy adopted by France, is here acknowled" 
 js-ed to be such, that its appHcation to the United States 
 must be still more rigorous than to other nations. 
 
 The decree itself was framed in the spirit and in the 
 broad terms of the report, and was instantly carried 
 into execution, \mder the immediate inspection of 
 the emperor. English goods imported' into neutral 
 countries, and neutral vessels which had come from 
 England, were seized so soon as those countries were 
 occupied by the French, without excepting those ves- 
 sels and goods which belonged to American citizens 
 from the general calamity. On the 24th of November, 
 three days after the date of the Berlin decree, it was 
 notified to the nominally free city of Hamburgh. 
 From this notification the following extract is tal^en : — 
 *' All English merchandize that may be found in the 
 *' city, in the harbour, or on the territory of Hamburgh, 
 *' no matter to w/iom they may belongs shall be confis- 
 *' cated." — In conformity with this notification, Ame- 
 rican property to a great amount \\'as seized. 
 
 This was a practical and unequivocal application of 
 the decree to the United States. 
 
 This arbitrary edict was announced by order of his 
 imperial majesty, to his vassal kings ; and measures 
 for carrying it into execution were adopted by them. 
 From the decree made on this occasion, by the most 
 degraded of them, (die king of Spain,) the following 
 extract is taken : — " So likewise will be confiscated, 
 *' all merchandize which may be met with, although it 
 " may be met %mth in neutral vessels ^ whenever it is 
 " destined for the ports of England, or her Isles." — 
 It is admitted by our administration, that American 
 vessels were capturtd under this decree. 
 
 The circumstances of the world were opposed to the 
 opinion, that the Berlin decree might be construed, 
 against its letter and spirit, in favour of the United 
 States. 
 
 The then nominally neutral commercial powers of 
 Europe, were Portugal and Denmark. The latter 
 certainly had claims to an exemption from the opera- 
 tion of this measure, which were not infererior to any 
 that could be advanced by this country. Her treaty 
 
83 
 
 was equally violated by It, and her partiality for France 
 Jiad been as undisguised. Yet it has never been sus- 
 pected that Denmark was not included in it. The 
 .merchant vessels of Denmark and Portugal united, did 
 not carry half the British goods that were carried m 
 American vessels. Consequently the motives which 
 induced the decree, urged its application to the United 
 JStates, much more strongly than to any other neutral. 
 . Every probability then was against the opinion, that 
 'a decree, w^hich, in its terms comprehended the Uni- 
 ted States with other neutral powers, would not be ap- 
 plied to them. Every extrinsic circumstance concur- 
 red with the language of the instrument, to prove that 
 it was designed for the United States. 
 
 But it has been alleged, that the answer of the min- 
 ister of marine and colonies, to an application made by 
 general Armstrong, in December, 1806, was suffi- 
 ciently explicit to quiet the United States, and to satis- 
 fy Great Britain. 
 
 It can scarcely be denied, even by the administra- 
 tion, that a decree, so positive and unequivocal as that 
 of Berlin, ought to be satisfactorily explained away 
 only by language equally positive and unequivocal. 
 The United States had a right to demand, and ought 
 to have demanded, an express and public declaration 
 from the proper authority, that this edict was inappli- 
 cable to them ; nor ought they to have been satisfied 
 with any inferior explanation. To have reposed with 
 implicit and unsuspecting confidence, on declarations 
 of a totally different character, is to become the willing 
 dupe of those declarations, and can be justified by no 
 government to the people whom it rules. 
 
 Was the letter of Mr. Decres of this explicit and sa- 
 tisfactory description ? Quite the reverse. It abounds 
 in evasions and subterfuge. 
 
 In his first paragraph he says—" I consider the im- 
 " perial decree of the 21st of November last, as thus 
 ** far, conveying no modification of the regulations at 
 ** present observed in France, with regard to neutral 
 " navigation, nor cc^nsequently of the convention of 
 *« the 30th of September, 1800, with the United States 
 ** ©f America.'* 
 
84 
 
 It ought not to have escaped our administration, nor 
 cbuld it have escaped that of Great Britain, that no dis- 
 tinction is here made between the United States and 
 other neutral powers. The decree is understood to. 
 apply to them in the same manner as to others. The 
 declaration, then, that Great Britain and her dominions 
 were in a state of blockade ; that all trade with them 
 was unlawful ; that every vessel laden with a cargo of 
 the growth or manufacture of her dominions, although 
 a neutral, might be captured, and was, with her cargo, 
 liable to confiscation ; was either inapplicable to any 
 neutral, or was applicable to the United States. If 
 these regulations were inapplicable to neutrals, for 
 whom were they designed ? — certainly not for belligc'- 
 tents. 
 
 It ought to have occurred to all having an interest in 
 the subject, that this absurd construction could not 
 safely be put on the answer of the French minister. 
 That he might explain the whole sentence by declar- 
 ing, that he considered the blockade of England, noti- 
 fied by his imperial master, as a legitimate blockade ; 
 and then, ''without any modification of the regulations 
 ' *' observed in France, with regard to neutral naviga- 
 ** tion," all the penalties imposed by the decree on 
 that "navigation," would necessarily follow. 
 
 Although he deems this a sufficient answer to the 
 questions propounded by Mr. Armstrong, he proceeds 
 afterwards to be more particular, but not to be less 
 evasive. The first article of the decree, he says, fur- 
 nishes "no reason lo^' enquiring what interpretation, or 
 " restriction, or extension may be given to it." 
 
 2d. " Seizures, contrary to the present regulations, 
 " concerning cruising, shall not be allowed to the 
 " captors " 
 
 AVhat \vere the then "present regulations concerning 
 " cruising ?" Did the Berlin decree form a part 
 of them ? At any rate, did they not subject to capture 
 and condemnation every vessel trading to a blockaded 
 port, or in prohibited articles ? But whether these 
 subterfuges were intended or not, this answer insinu- 
 ates no discrimination between American and other 
 neutral bottoms. 
 
85 
 
 3(1. " That an American vessel cannot be taken at 
 '^ sea for the mere reason, that she is g' ing to a port of 
 " England, or returning from one ; because, conform-' 
 " able with the 7th article of the said decree, we are 
 *' limited in France not to admit vessels coming from 
 *' Engl !nd, or the English colonies." 
 
 The style of this observation is not that of a minister, 
 speaking from authority, but that of a man reasoning 
 on an instrument, with no other information than was 
 furnished by the instrument itself; and the reasoning 
 is most obviously false. There is certainly no incom- 
 patibility between two articles in the same decree • 
 the one subjecting a neutral to capture on the high 
 seas, for trading with England ; and the other, subject- 
 ing the same vessel to seizure in the ports of France. 
 
 But it cannot escape observation, that Mr. Decres 
 says only, that a vessel cannot be taken for the mere 
 reason that she is going to, or returning from a port of 
 Englan^l ; he does not add, or for the reason, that her 
 cargo consists of articles of the growth or manufacture 
 of Great Britain. It is also observable, that the reasons 
 he assigns for his opinion, are precisely as applicable to 
 the vessels of other neurals, as to tho-ic of America. — 
 If he did believe the decree' to be inapplicable to the 
 United States, it was because they were neutrals, not 
 because its terms furnished any exception in their 
 favour. 
 
 The fourth and last article of this celebrated letter, 
 relates only to particular articles of the decree, and will 
 be found not to be more satisfactory than tliose which 
 preceded it. Like the third, it is a]:)narentlv tl^e mere 
 reasoning of an individual, l^iavingnoinforn ation from 
 his government, and no authority to declare its in- 
 tentions. 
 
 Never was a more evasive and equivocal answer 
 given on so interesting a subject, nor one which less 
 warranted the opinion which has been avowed, in con- 
 sequence of it. There is certainly no part of it, which 
 insinuates the idea, that any discrimination ^vas intend- 
 ed between the United States and other neutrals. 
 As if some secret respect for character, induced Mr. 
 Decres to secure i\im,self against the future ini[mtation 
 
8^ 
 
 of duplicity, he adds — ''but it would be proper, that 
 " } our excellency should communicate wiJi the min- 
 " ister ot' exterior relations, as to what concerns the 
 *' correspondence oithe citizens of the United States 
 " with Kngland." 
 
 Had the answer been as explicit as it is ambiguous ; 
 had it in piaui terms averred the opinion, that the Ber- 
 lin decree was inapplicable ; this reference was suffi- 
 cient to strip it of all authority, and to make the opinion 
 that of a mere unauthorised individual, not that of his 
 goveniment. Mr. Madison's letter of the 22d of May 
 1807, evinces, that he so understood this reference. 
 
 If this letter justified, in the judgment of the presi- 
 dent, the opinion which he has professed, even in an 
 oHicial message to congress, whence is it, that he has 
 never, even m his letters to general Armstrong, re- 
 j)roac]ied the French government with duplicity ? 
 That the letters of the secretary of state exhibit no such 
 charge, warrants the conclusion, either, that he thinks 
 it could not l)e supported, or that the administration 
 prefers the imputation on itself of excessive credulity, 
 to the odious task of taxing his imperial majesty with 
 deception. 
 
 Is it possible, that our executive can have been satis- 
 fied with this answer ? Can they possibly have believ- 
 ed, that a nation struggling for existence, and having 
 a deep interest in the subject to which it related, 
 \\ ould, or ought, to have been satisfied with it ? 
 
 It must be admitted, that the letter of Mr. Decres, 
 furnished no justifiable (ground for the opinion, that 
 any exception from the Berlin decree, in favour of the 
 United States, was meditated by his master. But it 
 is allcdgcd, that in point of fact, it was never applied 
 to the United States, until late in October, 1807, when 
 tlK Horizon was finally condemned ; and that, till 
 then, there was no reason for believing that it Avould 
 be so applied, 
 
 'i'his extraol ■" lary assertion, has been made for the 
 purpose of supj. 'ng the no less extraordinary decla- 
 ration, tluit the orcLcis of council were issued at a time, 
 wlien it was not known in England that the Berlin de- 
 cree would be applied to the United States. No othr 
 
87 
 
 moa\e can be conjectured for taking the final condem- 
 nation of the Horizon, instead of the declaration of the 
 emperor, made in the preceding September. To an 
 official application on the subject, he answered, that 
 " as he did not think proper to express any exception 
 " in his decree, there is no ground for making any in 
 *' its execution, in relation to whomsoever." — This 
 answer having been as public as it was decisive, must 
 have been immediately known to the British cabinet, 
 and must consequently have removed every doubt, if 
 any before existed, respecting the construction of the 
 decree to which it related. 
 
 But the idea, that a regulation, which in terms com- 
 prehends the United States, may be considered as i;-- 
 applicable to them until executed by a judicial sen- 
 tence, is as novel as it is absurd. Admit this princi- 
 ple, and the orders of council are not yet in force 
 against America. But the principle is intended for 
 French decrees only, and is dropped wlien those of the 
 enemies of his imperial majesty come into view. Un- 
 questionably, the promulgation of such a decree, is its 
 application to the United States, and the first capture 
 of a vessel or seizure of property under it, is its ex- 
 ecution. 
 
 That the property of American citizens was seized 
 under this decree, immediately after its publication, is 
 notorious— and that captures were soon made under 
 it, is admitted. The Horizon herself was captured in 
 May, 1807 ; and the secretary of state, in his letter to 
 Mr. Armstrong, of May, 1807, observes — "there are 
 *' proofs that the West India privateers have, under 
 ** colour of the edict, committed depredations, which 
 " will constitute just claims of redress from their gov- 
 *' ernment."— In his letter of the 6th of January, 1807, 
 to Mr. Erskine, lord viscount Howick, speaking of 
 the Berlin decree, says—" You will state to the Ame- 
 *' rican government, that his majesty relies with confi- 
 " dence on their good sense and firmness, in resisting 
 *' pretensions, which, if suffered to take effect, must 
 ** prove so destructive to the commerce of ail neutral 
 " nations. His majesty has learnt, that the measures 
 " announced in thtdQcrcc have already , in some instan- 
 
88 
 
 *' C€S, been carried into executio?i by the primteers of the 
 " enlniy ; unci there could be no doubt, but his majes- 
 " ty v.ould liave an undisputed right to exercise a just 
 *' retaliation." 
 
 Captures under this decree, . tlien, had been made m 
 the European seas previous to the month of January, 
 1807, and in the West Indian seas previous to the 
 month of May, in the same year. Yet no disposition 
 to resist it was ever manifested. No resentment ap- 
 pears to have been excited by it On the contrary, a 
 treaty ner^otiated with Great Britain was returned with- 
 out being^laid before the senate, and one of the most 
 decisive objections to it, was, that the British minister^ 
 at the time of his signature, addressed a note to the 
 American negoilators, declaring that his government 
 did not mean to rcUnquish its right to retaUate on 
 France this atrocious outra.2;e on neutral rights, if 
 contrary to expectation, the United States should sub- 
 mit to it. 
 
 A belligerent, affected by the aggressions of its ene- 
 my on neutrals, has a right to expect information of 
 the me isurcs those neutrals will take to maintain their 
 neutrality. If then, in point of fact, the application of 
 the Berlin decree to the United States had been doubt* 
 ful, it would have comported Vvith that fairness of con- 
 duct which a neutral, under such circumstances, ought 
 to observe, to give Great Britain express assurances, 
 that the United States would not acquiesce in, but 
 would resist so (laOTunt a violation of their rights. No 
 such assurances appear to have been ever given. On 
 the contrary, our government continued to manifest, 
 both in its language and conduct, the most decided 
 rigour to England, and partiality to France. In the 
 mean time, the Berlin decree was executed abroad, 
 and by openly obtioning certificates of origin from the 
 French consuls, it was practically submitted to at 
 home ; nor did our government in any manner dis- 
 countenance this practice. 
 
 Sucii was the state of facts in November 1807, when 
 tlic British orders of council were issued. 
 
 After they w^re published, but before they wefe 
 know 11 in America, the embargo was imposed. This 
 
89 
 
 measure, therefore, in its origin, had no reference t^ 
 those orders. It was predicatipd on the previous state 
 of things, and would have been adopted had they never 
 existed. 
 
 What secret communications may have been made 
 by any of the belHgerent cabinets to our administra- 
 tion, I pretend not to conjecture ; but the state of 
 things on which this measure was in fact predicated^ 
 was this — 
 
 The emperor of France had openly assumed the de- 
 termination to prohibit all trade w ith the British do- 
 minions, or in articles of the growth or manufacture 
 of those dominions. He had compelled the reluctant 
 and vassal states of h urope, to enter into a league for 
 the execution of this system, so prejudicial to them- 
 selves. He had declared it to be the common interest 
 of the commercial uorld, and that all ought to unite in 
 it. lie had issued an edict, enjoining this course on 
 all neutral powers, and subjecting to confiscation the 
 property of all those who should dare to disobey his 
 mandate. 
 
 Some doubt having been entertained, whether this 
 imperial edict extended to America, his majesty was 
 consulted on the subject, and declared, that it did.— - 
 This communication being received, the embargo was 
 instantly adojjted. 
 
 I will not hazard a conjecture on the motives, which 
 might lead to this measure ; but, without fear of con-- 
 tradiction, I venture to say, that national honour is not 
 to be found among them. 
 
 A FARMER, 
 
 M 
 
NO. V. 
 
 It being; apparent that a sense of national honour 
 contribu^^ed in no cle«free to the adoption of the emb <.r- 
 go, it remains to enquire, whether that noble and ele- 
 vated sentiment demands its continuance. Those who 
 maintain the affirmative of this question, must do so oh 
 one of two grounds. They must either contend, that 
 a system once adopted, can never be reUnnuished with- 
 out disgrace, ho\\^cver certain the ruin it involves ; or, 
 that subsequent events have so changed the original 
 character of the measure, that perseverance in it, to 
 our destruction, is now exacted by national honour. 
 
 To the observations made in a preceding number on 
 the first part of this proposition, 1 will only add, that 
 a nation, which has entered into engcigements with 
 others, for the attainment of a common object, may 
 feel itself bound by tliose engagements, to persevere in 
 measures extremely onerous to itself, so long as that 
 perseverance is required by its ally. But a nation act- 
 ing singly, and unconnected with others, can never 
 feel an honorary obligation to adhere to a system obvi- 
 ously inefficacious, and leading iniallibly to ruin, 
 merely because that system has been adopted. 
 I pass to the second part of the proposition. 
 The events whicli have either come to our kno\A'ledge 
 or have occurred since the imposition of the embargo, 
 and v/hich can influence its continuance, are the orders 
 of tlie British council, the various edicts of the French 
 emperor, the diplomatic communications of this coun- 
 try with the belligerents, and the revolutions in Spain 
 and Portugal. 
 
 The orders of council commence with retaliating 
 strictly on France the principle of the Berlin decree. 
 But from the rigour of this rule thei'e are several ex. 
 ceptions. One of great importance is, that tlic direct 
 trade between the United States and tiic colonies of the 
 enemy is left open. Another, that vessels destined for 
 France, after the knowledge of this blockading decree, 
 ;u-e not to be captured and confiscated, but to be v/arn- 
 cd to sail for a British port. Connected with this latter 
 exception, is another, which, far from beins; considered 
 
SI 
 
 as a mitigation of the rigour of the rule, has been treat- 
 ed as its mo'ot obnoxious fedtLire. Tnis is the admis- 
 sion of the voyage to France after entering a British 
 port, subject to the condition of receiving a licence from 
 the government, which, in some instances, is only- 
 granted on the payment of a transit duly. This has 
 been denominated "tribute," and being artfully consi- 
 dered as an independent measure, has been represented 
 to the American people by their rulers with so much 
 exaggeration, that the encrmities of France arc redu- 
 ced in their estimation to petty indiscretions. 
 
 In noticing this regulation, I do not mean to justify 
 it, as it stands connected with that Vvhich first compels 
 the American vessel to enter a British port. On the 
 contrary, I concur in the policy, making it penal for 
 vessels, under such circumstances, to sail with these 
 licences. Great Britain has certainl} a right to impose 
 what export duty she pleases, but not to compel foreign 
 vessels to enter her ports, and thereby become liable to 
 that duty. Yet this subject, like every olher, ought to 
 be fairly understood by a nation, which is to make it , 
 the foundation of measures extremely interesting to 
 itself. 
 
 If a port be actually blockaded, so as to give a right 
 to prohibit the entry of neutrals, no relaxation of this 
 prohibition would be oflensive. If a vessel should be 
 allowed to enter, on paying all the value of her cargo, 
 her owner might, at his discretion, accept or reject the 
 terms, and his nation would not feel itself concerned in. 
 his making or declining the contract. The only ques- 
 tion in which his government could interfere, would 
 respect the legitimacy of the prohibition. Admit this, 
 and any terms of relaxation would be exclusively for 
 the consideration of the neutral navigator to whom they 
 were proposed. 
 
 So with respect to the orders under consideration. 
 If the principle of retaliation, which Great Britain has 
 assumed, be admissible, a rigorous adherence 'to that 
 principle in its full extent, would leave no other distinc- 
 tion between her and France, than may be drawn from 
 the difference which might exist in the manner and 
 temper with which each applied the principle, and from 
 
92 
 
 the circumstance that the latter has voluntarily origina-^ 
 ted ihe system, while the former has entered into itj 
 long after her adversary, and with professions of muchl 
 reluctance. 
 
 Even under this view of the subject, the quaHficationl 
 of the rule cannot justly render it more offensive. 'lo\ 
 warn a vessel bound for France to enter a British port,,] 
 cannot be more objectionable than to capture or burnfj 
 that vessel ; nor can the ofter of an election to sell the f 
 cargo in Great Britain, or to transmit it under a British 
 licence to France, be more injurious than to conhscatCj 
 that cargo. 
 
 With respect to the duty, it is vrorthy of remark, thati 
 much solicitude was manifested by the British cabinet, 
 to discoxer whether a total prohibition of the importa- , 
 tion iiito France of certain a tides on wJ:iieh it is impo- 
 sed, or their admission burdened with a transit duty, 
 would be least ofFensiA^e to the United States. Our 
 minister having very properly refused to indicate any 
 opinion on the point, it was determined to give the 
 ownt r liis election. This was particularly the case on 
 imposing the duty on cotton. 
 
 \\ ithout hesitating for an instant in concurring with' 
 the government of my country, in the adoption of pro- 
 per measures to prevent the payment ofthisdutyby 
 vessels compelled to enter a British port, truth requires 
 a fair statement of the moti\es which induced the im- 
 positi n of it. 
 
 The deciees of France not only prohibit the intro- 
 duction of this, and of a,i other articles into England, 
 but constitute a complete and u: precedented system of 
 war on all English manufactures. Nothing would give 
 such effect to this system, as the substitution of L'oods 
 made on the con'inent in the iia:e of those heretofore 
 imported from England. In re, eliing this system, 
 therefo e. Great Br. tain may be expected to direct her 
 power, in a })articular manner, to the prevention of the 
 ability to make ihij substitution. Either the principle 
 of retaliation would be entirely abandoned, or would be 
 applied with peculiar watchfullness to those raw mate- 
 rials, wh/ich might nourish rival manufactories. Of 
 these, cotton is among the most essential 
 
93 
 
 The orders of council then, even if unauthorised by 
 the previous conduct of France, are much less injurious 
 to the United States than the Berlin decree. If they 
 are authorised by that conduct, all the evils resulting 
 from them, are to be ascribed exclusively to France. 
 Without determining the question of right,' any mode- 
 rate and reasonable man must admit, that it is at least 
 involved in so much doubt, as not to exclude negoci- 
 ation, but to constitute a fair subject for amicable and 
 honourable compromise. 
 
 Whether they derive extenuation ft'om the circum- 
 stances which gave birth to them, or admit of no palli- 
 ation, they constitute the sum of British offence. 
 
 France has added to her original aggression, the two 
 decrees of Milan and Bayonne. Tiiese subject to cap- 
 ture and condemnation every American vessel which 
 shall even be visited by a British cruiser, although 
 bound for France, and laden with a cargo the produce 
 of the United States. They consequently subject to 
 capture and condemnation, every American vessel 
 which swims the ocean. They also sequester all the 
 property v»hich American citizens have trusted into 
 France under the relations of peace and the faith of 
 treaties. 
 
 In the execution of these decrees, means the most 
 hostile and the most unjustifiable have been emplo} ed, 
 and practices the most ferocious have been indulged 
 with impunity. Their sea-rovers liave been permitted, 
 without censure, to disregard those forms, the observ- 
 ance of which, for the purpose of humanity, the civili- 
 zed world requires from enemies, and to burn those 
 vessels which they meet on the high seas. Our unof- 
 fending citizens too, are treated with a severity, which 
 w^ar itself would scarcely justify. 
 
 These measures are in exact conformity with the de- 
 portment of the French government, in its diplomatic 
 intercourse with that of the United States. His im[)e- 
 rial majesty undertakes to decide on our most momen- 
 tous concerns, and to determine for us the important 
 question of peace and war. Anticipating tlie timevrhen 
 we -shall acknowledge his right to relieve us from the 
 burden of self-gov rnment, he already charges hirriself 
 with the guidance of the nation. 
 
94 
 
 In a letter to general Armstrong, dated the Sitli of 
 November, 1807, Mr. Champagu}^, speaking ot the 
 complaints which had been preferred in consequence of 
 the execution of the Berhn decree, on the prop rty of 
 American citizens, avows in terms, the object of that 
 measure. He says, " All the difficulties which have 
 " given rise to your reclamations, sir, would be remo- 
 *'• ved with ease, if the government of the United States, 
 *' after complaining in vain of the injustice and viola" 
 *' tions of England, iook with tlie whole continent the 
 * ' part of guaranteeing itself therefrom. ' ' 
 
 Thus it is confessed, that to compel the United 
 States to join that coalition against Knglish commerce, 
 which had been forced upon the continent of Europe, 
 was one of the motives for the decree of Berlin. 
 
 In a subsequent letter, Mr. Champagny discloses un- 
 equivocally, the very interesting fact, that the property 
 oi our injured fellow citizens was sequestered in France 
 for the purpose of forcing the United States into a war 
 wirli Great Britain, and that its confiscation or release, 
 depended on the measures they should adopt for ma- 
 king a common cause with the continent of Europe. — 
 The embargo has been considered as a pledge, that we 
 are engaged in that common cause ; yet the sequestra- 
 tion is continued, to secure our future fidelity and obe- 
 dience. 
 
 The resolution of Bonaparte to force us into the war, 
 is unquestionably demonstrated by other testimony, 
 not yet in possession of the public. In a debate op fo- 
 reign relations, Mr. Masters, an independent and in- 
 telligent democratic member, said, "It was the dcter- 
 " mination of the emperor to compel us to take part in the 
 " ix'-r/r, ciilier as friends or allies. If the nation does 
 " not know this, I know it, andyouknowit, Mr. Chairman, 
 ' ' The demands arepositi'De; andhe cause we haije not prompt' 
 " ly obeyed y France has swept, by sequestration and confis- 
 " cation, all the American property from lialy to Antwerp^ 
 " amounting to more than one hundred millions ofUvres.''^ 
 
 I forbear to give vent to the feelings which such in- 
 dignities and injuries must excite in the bosom of every 
 real American. Prudence, perhaps, requires their 
 suppression. 
 
95 
 
 After tills disclosure, a disclosure the truth of which 
 is but too well supported by the testimony in possession 
 of the public, who, without unspeakable niortification, 
 can read that part of the speech of the same gentleman, 
 which developes the motives for continuing the embar- 
 go, and for the last messages to Europe ? 
 
 Th.e measures of France and Great Britain having 
 been reviewed, the propositions we have made to them 
 • will now receive a brief consideration. 
 
 That made to France is not completely understood. 
 The instructions to our minister in Paris are not pui:>- 
 lished ; and their purport is not to be collected from his 
 letters, since he did not dare to address an official note 
 to the French government, on receiving them, propo- 
 sing a repeal of the Berlin decree as a motive for remov- 
 ing the embargo ; and the president is too vague in his 
 message to congress to give any precise id-ea on the sub- 
 ject. If Vv'e may reason from general Armstrong's let- 
 ter of the 6di of August, 1808, we are led irresistibly 
 to the conckision,* [that if France rescinded the Berlin 
 decrees, war would be declared against Great Britain,] 
 should that power not yield every point demanded by 
 the United States, formed a part of the proposition. — - 
 The message of the president at the ommencemeiit of 
 the session, and the debates in congress, countenance 
 this opinion. 
 
 Over the proposition to England, the same veil of 
 mystery is not drawn. To that power nodiing further 
 was ofiered, th n a suspension of the embargo with re- 
 gard to her, provided\she would previously revoke her 
 orders of council. 
 
 It is said that this offer took from Great Britain 
 every pretext for continuing her orders, and that its 
 failure demonstrates the hostile temper of that nation. — - 
 While we acquiesce with respectful silence in an adhe- 
 rence to her system on the part of France, so superci- 
 lious and determined, that our minister could not ven- 
 ture even to make to his imperial majesty the proposi- 
 tion transmitted by our government, the United States 
 resound with preparations for war, because England has 
 not accepted the lerms our president has deigned to 
 offer her. 
 
 J^'ote. — Merc is an hiatus in the original manuscript, supplied 
 by the editw. 
 
96 
 
 Let this subject be seriously ( ximined. 
 
 Tne orders oi' council were iio> occasioned by the ein«= 
 barp-o. I'hcv were not intended as a measure of reta- 
 liation against the United Status, but against France. 
 Their publication was accompanied Vvith the declara- 
 tion, that tliey should be co^existent with the French 
 decrees, and should be revoked the instant those de- 
 crees were revoked. 
 
 Tiiese decrees not having been adopted in conse- 
 quence of the embargo, their dependence on it, or con- 
 nection with it, is not distinctly perceived ; nor does 
 its repeal appear to furnibh a motive for dieir revocation, 
 unless that measure would amount to an eitectual resis- 
 tance to that invasion of neutral rights, which they were 
 intended to retaliate. 
 
 Our rulers have assumed the fact, that the removal of 
 the embargo as respects England, v»4ule it continued 
 with regard to France, would constitute resistance to 
 the edicts of the latter power. 
 
 This conclusion does not appear to be correct. The 
 embargo would neither authorise nor enable a single 
 American vessel on a voyage to or from the dominions 
 of Great br;tain to resist a French cruiser, who should 
 Ciipture her on that account. Our trade with those do- 
 minions would consecpiently remain, as heretofore, sub- 
 ject io the full operation of the French decrees, whie 
 the rev(jcation of the orders of council would leave our 
 trade to France unm( lestcd. 
 
 l>ut a continuance of tlie embargo with respect to 
 France, it is said, would divert our whole trade from 
 that nation still more eficctually than the orders of coun- 
 cil, and would consequently render those orders useless. 
 
 In examining this assertion, i waive ail doubt respect- 
 iiig the good faith with v*'hich any stipulation prohibit- 
 ing trade with France would be executed. 
 
 With whatever suspicions the open partiality of our 
 :idn>ir;istn'.tion for one of the belligerents might justly in- 
 sj^ire the other, i will not presume that the nation would 
 ,i:ct v/iih unfluiness. Yet no delicacy resu'ains me from 
 Sii}ihg, thr.t the prohli)iiion might be easily evaded. — » 
 Vessels clearing out for Spanish or Portuguese ports 
 on ■Jr.- Tjiv of Bisc-iy. or for Enghsh ports on the 
 
^7 
 
 diannel, eould find their way, without much difficulty, 
 into the adjacent ports of France. Should an English 
 cruiser discover them in the fact of entering such port, 
 it would not be lawful to capture them ; for capture in 
 such case, would be equivalent to a reinstatement of the 
 orders of council. And, although we ake no umbrage 
 at supplements being added to our embargo laws by 
 France, for the purpose of condemning vessels not 
 comprehended within them, we should not brook on 
 the part of England, the capture of a vessel taken in the 
 fact of violating both their letter and their spirit. 
 
 That our administration is itself perfctly persuaded 
 of the futility of any attempt, to prevent articles once 
 trusted to the open sea, from reaching a port whe!e 
 they are in great demand, is fairly admitted in the ar- 
 gument for continuing the embargo. The friends of 
 that measure contend, that a permission to export our 
 provisions and raw materials, even to those countries 
 which respect our rights, would destroy its coercive 
 properties, because those articles would inf Uihly be 
 conveyed to Great Britain. No man can doubt the in-* 
 competency of regulations made in the United States, 
 not enforced by a navy, effectually to restrain vessels 
 navigatmg the high seas. Not even the present arbi- 
 trary system of Bonaparte, would amount to a total eX' 
 elusion of American vessels from his ports. Favourites 
 would be licensed, and would prosecute the trade with 
 immense profit. 
 
 The proposition made to Great Britain then, contain- 
 ed nothing like resistance to the French decrees. Nor 
 did it afford any security, that the trade to France would 
 not be prosecuted to as great an extent as the emperur 
 would tolerate ; consequently, it presented a state of 
 things, not essentially variant from that which existed 
 when the retaliating system was adopted. 
 
 This is not all. Nothing more completely assures 
 an amicable adjustment of differences, than an amicable 
 disposition. Terms offered by a government, whose 
 dispositions are really friendly, will be much less rigid- 
 ly scrutinized, than when offered by a power, whose 
 unfriendly temper mingles itself with all its transactions. 
 
 N 
 
98 
 
 1 do not mean to say, that our negotiations with Eng- 
 land, to be successful, ought to man fest for Great Bri- 
 tain that partiality, which characterises ournegociations 
 with France ; but that they ought to be undertaken in 
 the true spirit of conciliation, and conducted in that 
 frank and honourable temper, which distinguished the 
 negotiations of Washington and Adams. So far 
 from this, the proposition did not even exhibit a temper 
 liiendly to accommodation. It manifested no inclina- 
 tion to suspend a coercive course, which America has 
 for some time pursued. The non-intercourse law, 
 that fn-st step in the path marked out by French enmity 
 to British commerce, and the proclamation, by which 
 our ports were closed against British armed ships, while 
 tliey remained open to those of her enemy, were both 
 to continue in foi^cc ; our government did not even in- 
 binuate, that this hostile system might possibly be dis- 
 continued in the event of the removal of the orders of 
 council. 
 
 \\^hat then is the amount of the proposition, the re- 
 jection of which is said to render war inevitable ? It 
 is, that if Great Britain will abandon the principle of 
 retorting on France die injuries which his imperial ma- 
 jesty seeks to inflict, by violating the law of nations on 
 the subject of neutral commerce, we will open our ports 
 and resume our trade, except that no vessel shall clear 
 out for France — that those commercial restrictions, 
 ^\hich were imposed for the purpose of humbling Eng- 
 land, shall still remain ; and that our ports will still ma- 
 nifest our partiality to her enemy. 
 
 Could it have been expected, that such a proposition 
 would be successful ? The English government re- 
 ceives daily proofs of the interminable animosity of our 
 administration. The embargo itself is among the 
 strong evidences of this sentiment. Having been im- 
 posed when the orders of council Mere unknown, it 
 shows what congress would have done, had those orders 
 jiever existed. It shews, diat when commanded by 
 France to suspend our commerce with Britain, and 
 compelled by premature outrages to inten-upt for a time 
 its course with France, we will suspend it with all the 
 \\ orld, to our o^n ruin, rather than allow Britain to 
 participate in its advantages. With the recollection of 
 
99 
 
 this fact, and of others not less decisive, how could 
 such a proposition be understood ? Without insinu^ 
 ating that the suspicion would be correct, I may say, 
 that the British cabinet would not be inexcusable, for 
 suspecting that the proposition was entirely insincere ; 
 that it was made for the purpose of being rejected ; and 
 of being used, as it has been used, as a mean of further 
 exasperating the American people, and of impelling 
 them into that war, which Bonaparte enjoins, and to 
 which their rulers so incessantly urge them. 
 
 The experiment, I fear, will never be made ; but 
 there is every reason to believe, that a temper truly con- 
 ciliatory on our part, would soon terminate honourably 
 and advantageously, the differences between this coun- 
 try and Great Britain. Certainly the reverse of that 
 temper has thus far been uniformly displayed. 
 
 J FARMER. 
 
100 
 
 NO. VL 
 
 The conduct of France and Great Britain towards 
 the United States, has now been examined with candor, 
 and with as much detail as the limits necessarily pre- 
 scribed for news-paper essays will admit. 
 
 The result is this — 
 
 That war upon neutral commerce, which violates too 
 outrageously the sovereignty and rights of neutrals, to 
 find a single open apologist, and to which our rulers 
 ascribe those measures which have occasioned all our 
 embarrassments, originated in the Berlin decree : The 
 terms of that^pdict, unequivocally comprehend the Uni- 
 ted States. It was immediately carried into execution, 
 by seizing the property of their citizens in neutral ports, 
 and hy captures made on the high seas. At the in- 
 stance of her emperor, similar edicts were issued by his 
 dependent governments, under which the vessels of the 
 United States were captured and condemned. No sa- 
 tisfactory explanation of this decree was ever given, 
 and none was received from authority, until near twelve 
 months after its date, when the emperor, returning 
 victorious from the war on the Vistula, declared that, as 
 the decree itself contained no exception in favour of any 
 nation, none could be made in its execution. 
 
 During this time, the United States, far from mani- 
 festing any disposition to resist this flagrant invasion of 
 their rights, gave no evidence of uneasiness at it. — ■ 
 Their resentments were directed exclusively against the 
 nation this measure was intended to crush. 
 ^ The thrust which wounded neutrals, was professedly 
 aimed at Great Britain, and must, if not parried, reach 
 lier through them. Her determination to retaliate it, 
 was immediately declared, and the United States were 
 solicited in friendly and respectful terms, to render this 
 retaliation through them unnecessary, by resisting, 
 thrmselves, this unprecedented attack on their sove- 
 reignty. 'J'hese solicitations being unavailing, orders 
 •were issued soon after the declaration of the emperor, 
 which placed France and her allies in a state of blockade. 
 These orders contain exceptions, which tolerate an ex- 
 
101 
 
 tensive neutral trade, prohibited by the decree they pro- 
 fess to letaliate. 
 
 This measure was the signal for others on the part of 
 France, which, among many atrocities, subject to cap- 
 ture and condemnaton every American vessel that has 
 been visited by a British cruiser. Should the vessel so 
 visited be even laden with American produce, and be 
 bound to a French port, she will derive no protection 
 from those circumstances. 
 
 When it is recollected, that British cruisers cover the 
 ocean, and that the right of a belligerent to visit all mer- 
 chantmen is unquestionable, is one which the mercliant 
 has neither the right nor the power to resist, this is 
 equivalent to an order for the condemnation of every 
 American vessel which navigates the ocean, if found 
 either on the high seas or in a port under the controul 
 of France. 
 
 That France, in the very act of condemning Ameri- 
 can vessels for being visited by British cruisers, exer- 
 cises herself the right inhibited to others, would be 
 worthy of notice, were it not that her whole conduct, 
 with respect to the liberty of the seas, is in such diicct 
 opposition to her professions, exhibits such an uniform 
 course of violence and tyranny, that we are surprised at 
 no contradictipn, however palpable — at no atrocit} , how- 
 ever enormous. 
 
 If an outrage like this, could be aggravated by any 
 circumstances whatever, those circumstances may be 
 found in the manner in which it has been executed, and 
 in the accompanying declarations of the j^overnment, 
 from which it proceeds. Our vessels are burnt upon, 
 the high seas — our sailors imprisoned as enemies — our 
 property, trusted to their country under the faith of 
 treaties, is sequestered to secure our future obedience — ^ 
 our nation is transferred in secret treaty- — and v\ e are 
 ordered to enter into a war, the object of which is, the 
 extermination of liberty ! 
 
 Could the feelings, which these enormities must ex- 
 cite in the bosom of every American patriot, be render- 
 ed still more pungent, that effect would be produced 
 by the reflection, that they proceed from a government, 
 whpse friendship the United States have uniformly 
 
102 
 
 courted, with an assiduity often approaching to mean- 
 ness, and whose forbearance they have long sought to 
 purchase, by sacrifices extremely burdensome and dan- 
 gerous to themselves 
 
 Against which of these powers would national honor 
 direct the energies of the United States ? 
 
 To an American statesman, guiding at this crisis the 
 councils of his country, it cannot be unimportant, that, 
 by co-operating with France, our exertions will be em- 
 ployed in effecting the subjugation of the world, and of 
 ourselves. By pursuing the opposite course, we con- 
 tribute to preserve what yet remains of independence 
 for other nations, and to secure our own. By entering 
 into the views of Bonaparte, Ave are riveting the chains 
 of those whom he has already bound, and preparing 
 fetters for ourselves, as well as for others who yet re- 
 main free. By counteracting those views, we take the 
 last chance for retaining on our earth a single vestige of 
 national or individual liberty. 
 
 But 1 forbear to urge this consideration, because my 
 enquiry is not, what does national safety demand, but 
 w hat does national honour exact ? Ca:n national honor 
 exact a co-operation with that power which has started 
 first, and has so greatly outstripped its adversary in this 
 flagitious course of injustice ? Which, in its diplomatic^ 
 intercourse, adopts the language, not of a sovereigr'^ 
 treating with a sovereign, but of a superior dictating tc 
 an inferior ? Which commands us to make war, anc • 
 seizes our property to enforce obedience ? Whose, 
 known object is the subjugation of the world ? 
 
 To those, who seek to diminish the odium, which, ir 
 the minds of independent and unprejudiced men, mus 
 be attached to our present system, by suggesting that i^ 
 is equal resistance to all the belligerents, the answer i; 
 obvious. The belligerents are not equal offenders 
 The one has voluntarily attacked us ; the other has en 
 tered into the disagreeable contest reluctantly, and ii 
 self defence. The one has carried her outrages to thi 
 utmost of her po^ver ; the other, with much more abilit; 
 for immediate injury, has limited her retaliation to mea 
 surcs much less violent than those adopted by her ad 
 versary. The one declares her determination to adher 
 
103 
 
 to her system until she shall establish principles, which 
 will totally change the law of nations, and commands us 
 to unite with her in establishing those principles by 
 'force ; the other, declares her determination to abandon 
 the system so soon as her enemy shall cease to use it as 
 an instrument of war ; and only asks us to take measures, 
 which shall prevent its operating on ourselves to her 
 prejudice. 
 
 But, above all, it is not equal resistance to both bel- 
 ligerents. 
 
 It has been already said, that the power and resources 
 of Great Britain depend on commerce. To destroy 
 her commerce, although that of P' ranee must be sus- 
 pended by the attempt, is the openly avowed object of 
 the tyrant, at v/hose frown the world trembles. To 
 this object his whole system is directed, and he has 
 compelled all those over whom his power extends, to 
 adopt it. In terms not to be misunderstood, he has 
 commanded the United Sta-es to enter into it ; and, to 
 coerce obedience, has not held the rod suspended over 
 us, he has scourged us with it. The embargo is con- 
 sidered by him as entering into this coalition, and in 
 his expose he ranks us with his vassal neighbours — but 
 the rod is not yet laid aside. Further and more deci- 
 sive measures must be adopted. 
 
 It is then apparent, that this whole work of self-de- 
 struction ; this whole system of annihilating commerce, 
 whether it takes the form of embargo, non- intercourse, 
 or war, is indeed hostility to England, but is co-opera- 
 tion with France. It is a co operation, entered into un- 
 der the influence of menace and of punishment. 
 
 Does national honour demand this ruinous sacrifice ? 
 Nay, more, can national honour endure it ? The train 
 of reasoning which can lead to this opinion, is as diiiicult 
 to conceive, as it is unworthy of refutation. To a really 
 independent American, it must be clear as the sun at 
 mid-day, that no course can be more humiliating, none 
 more degrading to the nation, than that we are pursuing. 
 It is the system which France has prescribed, and our 
 rulers leave no hope of its terminating. On the floor of 
 coi-^ress, the declaration is unreservedly made, that it 
 must be pursued to the extremity of war. War alone 
 
104 
 
 can dci>Tacle us still lower, by carrying our obedience 
 still lurLher than the abandonment of commerce has 
 carried it. 
 
 1 shall not trespass on the patience of the public, by 
 many remarks on the influence, which the revolutions 
 in Spain and Portaj^al ought to have on our conduct. 
 The time has been, when every American bosom would 
 have kindled into a sympathetic flame, in favour of a 
 nalion s ruggling to preserve its freedom against treach- 
 ery and violence ; but that time is past, never I fear to 
 return. That love of liberty, which once glowed in our 
 bosoms, is extinguished by our hate of England, or 
 chilled by the terror, which Bonaparte inspires^ That 
 hate of despotism, for which we were once distinguish- 
 ed, ceases when Bonaparte is the despot. The victo- 
 ries of liberty afflict us, when they are obtained over the 
 m}rmidoms of Bonaparte, or when the cause of free- 
 dom is upheld by Britain or her allies, our character 
 seems radically changed. 
 
 To withliold from Spain and Portugal, struggling 
 against despotism in its most odious form, those im- 
 portant supplies, with which a free commerce would 
 furnish them, is not only unnecessarily injurious to our- 
 selves, but is aiding the cause of tyrants. To divest 
 ourselves of the common right of pursuing our ordinary 
 commercial intercourse with nations under such cir- 
 cumstances, is not only an abandonment of national in- 
 terest, but a dereliction of national character and of 
 national honour. It will long be remembered, by those 
 who feel its hostility and discern its motive, and will, 
 I fear, open to us "an Iliad of woes." — I forbear to 
 press this subject further. 
 
 By those who have plunged their countr}^ into these 
 calamities, and who are burying the recollection of the 
 past under still more afiiicting ruin, it is asked, what 
 other course could have been taken, and what other 
 course can now be taken ? 
 
 We may look back to the past for instruction, how to 
 avoid future errors. The course which ought to have 
 been taken, is that which was prescribed by national 
 honour and by national interest. It is that which was 
 honourably and successfully pursued, under similar cir- 
 
feiiriistanccs, in 1793. Instead cf fomenting clit-ferences 
 \^'ith a power, whose dispositions v. ere friendly, by de- 
 liianding pertinaciously tiie concession of principles? 
 ■whicii that power dares not yield, and of endeavouring 
 to pave the U'ay for hostilities by non-intercourse laws 
 and proclamations, we ought, on the publication of the 
 Berhn decree, to have taken the manly ground of a truly 
 independent nation. We ought instantly to have assert- 
 ed our rights iirmly, and with moderation, by a judi- 
 cious use of the best means w^e had^the povv er to em- 
 ploy. We ought openly to have declared our determi-- 
 nation to resist the execution of that decree, and we 
 ought to have prepared to resist it. Nothing short of an 
 explicit declaration from authority, that its provisions, 
 though so expressed as' to comprehend all neutrals, 
 should not comprehend the United States, ought to 
 have restrained our government from arming, and from 
 authorising our merchant vessels to arm for the protec- 
 tion of commerce. This course was exacted by na- 
 tional honour, and had it been pursued, we should have 
 escaped both disgrace and ruin. We should never 
 have been embarrassed by the retaliating orders of Bri- 
 tain, or by our ouii embargo and non-intercourse ex- 
 periments. The letter of Mr. Decres ought not to have; 
 beguiled us for an instant, from this plain path. That 
 letter could never have deceived a government which 
 did not court deception. The decree itself, and the 
 manner in which it was executed at 1 -amburgh and 
 elsewhere, spoke a language too plain and intelligible^ 
 to have been obscured by the evasive conjectures of 
 Mr. Decres, had we not carefully shunned the light, 
 and anxiously sought a bandage for ourov.n eyes. 
 
 But if our own solicitude to obviate the resentynentr, 
 of Bonaparte, might apc^logize for not making immedi^ 
 ate resistance ; if it might even excuse our tame acqui- 
 escence in his withholding from November 1806 till 
 October 1807, not only that voluntary communication 
 on so interesting a subject, which decent respect ft>r a 
 :aeutral and friendly power required, but any ansMcr to 
 the applications we must have made in the mean time, 
 for a favourable interpretation of his decree, what can 
 be said to palliate thedisG;racerul and ruinoasstcp which 
 we took when his decision reached us ? 
 
10(3 
 
 Oil receiving the oflicial declaration of the emperor, 
 ihat his decree contained no exci.],tion in favour of the 
 United States, and that, consequently, none could be 
 made in its execution, ought a doubt to have remained 
 respecting' the line of conduct, which America was 
 bound by the high obligations oi national honour and 
 national independence to adopt ? Between resistance 
 and submission, the nation had to elect- Our govern- 
 ment chose the latte^. Instead of arming to defend our 
 commerce, our rulers surrendered it. They obe}ed as 
 f;>r as they could obey, the mandate of his imperial ma- 
 jesty. They took the first step tOM ards stopping our 
 trade vv'i^h England. T he suspension of our trade with 
 France also, was inevitab y the eonseqi;ence of arresting 
 our commerce with En gland. It could not have been pro- 
 secuted without great danger, and v. ith the facts then in 
 pcssession of our rulers, such a naked act ol obedience, 
 I ad they even been inciii.ed to it, would hiive been a sur- 
 render of inde]endence too undisguised to be safe. 
 
 Let it be recollected, that, at this time, the retaliating 
 orders of Britain were unknov.nto us, ardj consequent- 
 ly, our conduct v/as the sam.e, and ought to have been 
 the same, as if those orders had never existed. In such 
 a state of things, instead of adopting a system which 
 conformed to the imperious mandate of Napoleon ; which 
 wore the aspect of obedience ; which has bee treated 
 in congress as a measure intended to coerce Great Bri- 
 tair., rather than France ; and which has been considered 
 by the emperor as partially making common cause with 
 the continent of Europe, we ought to have made a firm 
 stand in defence of rights, which we could only sur- 
 render with our independence, and have directed our 
 resistance exclusively against the invader of them. 
 
 Mild we tlien armed for self-protection, how different 
 would have been our present situation. It may be safely 
 afiirmed, that on receiving information of this fact, 
 li>ritain would instantly have revoked her orders of coun- 
 cil. When it is recollected, that she jidopted these or- 
 dri-s simply as a measure of retaliation on France, Vvhich 
 slic justified by otir non-resistance of the Berlin decree, 
 it M il! not b.e denied, that Me might, v ithout Joss of re- 
 putation, have suspended hostilities agiiinst her, until 
 
107 
 
 she could act with a knowledge of our resistance ; or 
 we might have imposed an embargo, to continue until 
 her conduct should deteniiine ours. The most punc- 
 tilious honour M'ould not have felt itself wounded by 
 this procedure, because our measures of resistance to 
 the invasion of our independence by France, having 
 been taken without knowledge of the retaliating orders 
 of England, would have been exempt from the suspi- 
 cion of being influenced by those orders. Nor would 
 there have been any difficulty in reveling any measure 
 of precaution or resistance, which we might have 
 adopted, when the order on Vvhich such measure had 
 been founded was revoked. 
 
 So plain a path could never ha^•e been mistaken, had 
 we not unfortunately selected for our guides the blind- 
 est passions and the most inveterate prejudices. But 
 the important and more intricate question is, v.'hat mea- 
 sures ought now to be adopted ? 
 
 Easy as it Vv-as to escape the distressing embarrass<. 
 ments into v/hich our rulers have plunged the nation, 
 it is not easy to extricate ourselves from them. The 
 course, however, thoogh difficult, is not impracticable. 
 To perceive distinctly the error we have committed, is 
 doing much towards correcting that error. Our first 
 false step, was that long acquiescence in the Berlin de- 
 cree, which preceded the declaration made by the em- 
 peror in the autumn of 1807. A second, and still less 
 excusable error, was, that when we did act, our mea- 
 sures wore the aspect of submission to that decree, 
 rather than of resistance to it. 
 
 It is by the abandonment of error, not b}?- a perseve- 
 rance in it, that its most mischievous consequences are 
 to be obviated. If a conduct, the reverse of that which 
 we have pursued, would have saved us from our present 
 ruinous embarrassments, reversing that conduct even 
 now, affords the fairest prospect of relieving us from the 
 worst consequences of those embarrassments. 
 
 The question whether our acquiescence in the Berlin 
 decree, was such as to justify the retaliating orders of 
 Britain, is one which can never be decided. It is one, 
 on which the two nations can never be expected to con- 
 cur in sentiment. But m this all reasonable men will 
 
108 
 
 concur : Our ^vliolc conduct' was oi' a character to fur- 
 nish the British cabinet \v\lh such grounds for the opi- 
 nion on \\hich they acted ; the motives to which that 
 nation ascribes her conduct are such ; such is the evi- 
 dence which supports those motives ; and such her 
 situation in the war, that, without being over credulous, 
 wc may beUeve that her measures are not dictated by a 
 temper unfriendly tothe United Stdtes, or dangerous to 
 our independence, but b}' that real necessity, which 
 surrounding dangi|i-s and the previous violence of her 
 eneui}' have created. She h 'S not of choice adopted 
 that system, to which we ascribe our abandonment of 
 the ocean. It is the sj^'stem of France, and France ex- 
 acts from us an active observance of it. 
 
 Under these circumstances, our differences with Bri- 
 tain present a case for fair and honourable negotiation. 
 Would our rulers enter into that negotiation in the true 
 spirit of conciliation, it could not fail to prove success- 
 ful. If upon the removal of the orders of council, we 
 would do that Avhich our interests, our honour, our in- 
 dependcnce, imperiously demanded, before these orders 
 were known to us— -resist eirectually the attack on that 
 independence, which Xapoleon has made, no doubt can 
 be entertained, but that these orders would be removed. 
 
 This true spirit of conciliation has never been dis- 
 played in any negotiation between our administration 
 and England. On the contrary, our conduct has uni- 
 Ibrmly manifested oiu- fears, that the restoration of ami- 
 cable intercourse wilh that nation, would be the signal 
 ibr Avar from France. If we continue to act on the 
 same principles, that war which the emperor commands 
 us to wage cannot be remote; and our old men, who 
 \ now ^^ itness our dishonour, may live to see us, in re- 
 
 gular gradation, the allies, the vassals, and the subjects 
 ol 1' ranee — may live to see our liberties extinguisfi- 
 c d , and o ur i n d e r e n d e n c e lost I 
 
 J FARMER, 
 
(' 
 

 ■<:^^^^^^ %'%:;r;^%.o^ 
 
 'O 
 
 
 .^^^'' 
 o 
 
 
 J^> >/. <^ 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 0^ : 
 
 
 ^,.^" 
 
 -^./^ 
 
 \ .<^' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^,# 
 
 ,^% 
 
 
 -v! 
 
 
 
 sO O^ - '- 
 
 
 ^^> ''•^. 
 
 
 '/^ 
 
 
 v^' -/>. 
 
 aV^' -^p- 
 
 .0- , 
 
 '^^J. -^ 
 
 
 ^-^^^ 
 
 
 
 
 %. .^ 
 
 V 
 
 
 
 x°°- V 
 
 
 
 
 •^.j- 'X^ 
 
 
 ^^ - oX 
 
 
 ^ ... •^^•-""-^(^.»-:*;'^ ■ ..-^^ *^ 
 
 ''■\^\ ^/'^ 
 
 ^ ^. ', .^ V - ■ '> 
 
 ^, v^ ?*. ; 'o 0' 
 
 -JV >? 
 
 .5 -^^.^ '. 
 
 ,0 
 
 1 M O Vi ' ' ' ' \ > S '/ '^ -\ 
 
^\\•^■ "^>. 
 
 ■,i>'' ^, 
 
 
 V^^ 
 
 .a\^" 
 
 
 
 vOc 
 
 
 P, ^-\' 
 
 
 xV^^' -^^^ 
 
 
 >-^- 
 
 
 
 ^a 
 
 roo^ 
 
 •^^, ,.\' 
 
 "^.. v^ 
 
 .•-ts- 
 
 
 3o. 
 
 
 ^>^ 
 
 
 
 .0^ 
 
 
 '^A v^ 
 
 .V^ 
 
 •<V. ..\N^ 
 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 II 
 
 011 896 615 6 
 
 11 
 
 Hiiiiiii 
 
 ii 
 
 lll!!!!!ll