E 473 .772 .P841 Copy 1 / / li - GEN'L FITZ JOHN PORTER'S REPLY Y "•"^ TO HON. Z. CHANDLER'S SPEECH IN THE U. S. SENATE, FEB. 21, 1870. MORRISTOWN, N. J 1870. ■17 I rFHt MoRRisTOWN, ]Sr. J., March, 1870. Hon. Z. Chandler, U. S. Senate: Sir — You introduced a resolution in the Senate of the United States, on the twenty-first February, " Requesting the Presi. .dent to communicate to the Senate, if not inconsistent with the public interests, any recent correspondence in his possession in relation to the case of Fitz John Porter." On the occasion of oifering the resolution you delivered a speech which has gone into the public debates and been pub- lished, and which will ever remain on the record as the expres- sion of the opinion of a Senator of the United States, not only on the impropriety and injustice of according to me a re-hear- ing — but on the justice of my sentence, even in the light of the new facts Avhich I propose to bring before any tribunal the President may appoint to re-hear the case. Though you withdiow your resolution immediately after making your speech, the latter remains unanswered except by the generous words of the Hon. Henry Wilson, the chairman of the senate committee of military affairs during the whole war and since, who declared that he adhered to his formerly ex- pressed opinion, that my case was, under the new evidence brought to light, a proper one to be re-heard. Indeed the with- drawal of your resolution was more prejudicial to me than the original offering of it ; for if not withdrawn, the correspondence called for would have shown in a great measure the truth, and my title to a re-heai-ing. It is a noble and a senatorial office, " to vindicate the truth of history," and you assured the Senate and the country that that was the object of your speech. May I not ask, that you will read this, my letter to you, which is intended to show that you fell into grave errors in your endeavor to do justice to history. May I not also ask — as your inculpation of me — while I was appealing for a re-hearing of my case on new evidence, w^as presented for the public consid- eration in a speech from your seat in the Senate, and is thus preserved for ever in the printed debates — that you will, by some means familiar to you as a Senator, secure to me, the accused in that speech, the presentation and preservation of my defence and answer, in as advantageous a manner and in as desirable a form. This will vindicate the truth of history in the only way that it can be vindicated with justice to me — the accused. I pray you to do me this justice. In your speech you say that Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Stanton, and Gen. Wadsworth, who knew the facts, are noAV dead. They could not know them. They were not the witnesses. They could only know or believe what was told them. But if you mean that I have waited their death to make my appeal, you are greatly in error. I have made it from tlie first hour of the ver- dict, with constant urgency and all the force I could exert ; and I have the proof that Mr. Lincoln, within a short period of his death, promised to re-open the case if new evidence was pro- duced, and said — what some of the ablest and truest friends of his administration now say, among them some of your brother senators — that, in such case, a rehearing was not only just to me but due to the honor of the army. I have also the further proof that Mr. Lincoln said that he had entertained a very high opinion of my bravery and fidelity, but had been obliged in this particular case, to form his opinion and base his action on the Judge-Advocate General's review, as in the multitude of his cares he had not been able to make a personal investigation. I have also had very gratifying evidence, since the trial, of Gen. Wadsworth's friendship and confidence. You relate the opinion he expressed to you of the great and decisive result of the battle of Malvern. You will pardon me for asking you to remember also in what terms the commanding general assigned to me the chief merit of that great day. I need not go into that half oi your speech which is a com- mendation of General Pope. It would draw me from the proj^er line of my own defence. Much of what you say of him, I am not interested to deny. If he was put at the head of an army to rescue McClellan by the means you suggest — by "fool- ing correspondents," " fooling the country," and " fooling the rebels" vnih stones of his great force, I need not deny that he was the man for that part, although he did not " fool the re- bels" (as he admits), whatever success in that business he had with others ; and I may think it was somewhat in excess of any useful demand the government liad on his peculiar gift, to prac- tice as he did on the good nature of Mr. Lincoln, and attempt to fool hiin with despatches of " great victories," of " driving the enemy from the field," " making great captures," &c., &c. But that is his affair, not mine. I think you are much in error about it. But I prefer to leave it so, and go on to my own business. Stripped of all accessories by which they have been covered I present the charges on wliich I was arraigned, and my claims for a re-hearing. The first accusation against me is that I disobeyed an order of Gen. Pope received at Warrenton Junction about 10 at night August 27, '62, directing me to march my command at 1 o'clock in the morning to Bristoe station, ten miles distant, so as to be there by daylight. You have added to this charge that Hooker was out of ammunition, and might have been destroyed by not getting it from me. The disobedience claimed consists in not marching till 3 o'clock in the morning — a delay of two hours. I shall prove — when I get a re-heai"ing — that I put off start- ing — two hours only of night — by the urgent advice of the generals of division. Their reasons were the following : That my command had reached Warrenton Junction at a late hour, without food, and very much fatigued by a long and difii- cult march, the last of thirteen days and nights of marching and broken rest ; that the night was pitch dark, the road was bad and blocked up with wagon trains in considerable confusion : That the spirit and purpose of the order would be best carried out by delaying the march till dayhreaJc, be- cause the troops would have their night's rest, and would make the march with more rapidity and fewer delays, and reach their destination in condition for immediate action ; and, That as we were informed " the enemy was then retiring" from before Gen. Pope, the necessity was not pressing, and as my command would be required to aid in "driving him from Manassas and clearing the country between that and Gainesville" the troops already worn out and needing rest and sleep, if required to re- new the march at an earlier hour than day-break, would be dis- abled for the service several miles beyond Bristoe. I shall i^rove that, though appreciating the soundness of their reasons, I was decidedly of the opinion that " the order should be obeyed ;" that " he who gave the order knew whether the necessities of the case should warrant the exertions that had to be made to comply with it," and that I yielded to the advice of my Generals only after being assured that the bearer of the order had been delayed by the darkness of the night and the blocked condition of the road. I shall prove that the result showed that literal compliance with the order was impracticable, that no time was lost by the delay, but the march made all the quicker for it; and that I arrived as soon as other troops, commanded by as true soldiers as ever breathed, coming a shorter distance and under as urgent orders. I shall prove that when I did arrive, there Avas and had been nothing for me to do, and that I remained at Bristoe all that day, imder injunctions from Gen. Pope, twice repeated through the day, " to remain at Bristoe, when wanted you will be sent for." I shall prove also, that I knew nothing about Hooker want- ing ammunition, and that he did not want any, and did not take any vhen it reached him. In brief: — I shall prove this charge of Pope's not only false, but frivolous and only suggested as a make weight to the far more serious accusations arising from the transactions of the next day. New proof is ready on all these points. The events of the 2Vth and 28th of August being thus briefly given and my conduct on those days narrated, I am brought to the events of the 29th. On the morning of that day the following order — known as the "joint order" was issued by Gen. Pope. — Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) Centreville, August 29, 1862. ) Generals McDowell and Porter. " You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel and Reno are moving on Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as socm as co'mmunication is established between this force and j-our own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville to night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. " I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide de camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warren- ton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Rickett's position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General Me Dowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts- and instruct him to join the other divisions of his corps as soon as practica- ble. " If atiy considerable advintages are to be gained by departing from this ordtr, it will not be strictly carried ont. One thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. " The indications aie that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to morrow night or the next day. " My own headquarters will for the present be with Ileintzelman's corps, or at this place. " John Pope, Major-General Commanding." The accusation is that I disobeyed this order. You charge " inaction " under it. The record shows it to have been a substitute for a previous order from Gen. Pope to me; that when I received it I was moving along the Manassas road and upon Gainesville, having my own corps (less than 11,000) and King's division of McDowell's corps and that my purpose was to prevent the junction of Longstreet with Jackson — that event having been made im- minent by the withdrawal of the troops of Ricketts and King from the road the enemy would have to traverse. The "joint order" was instigated principally by a note from me to Gen. Pope, asking for written orders to take the place of contradictory verbal orders, which I had received from him, and giving him information I had obtained from various sources. The terms of the "joint order" show that Gen. Pope in- tended to form his army in front of or near Gainesville, in order that he might be prepared to fall back " behind Bull Run that night or next morning"; that McDowell and myself were merely ordered to advance far enough to communicate with the 6 rest of the army and then halt, and on no account to advance so far that we could not fall back to Bull Run by mornmg at least, or as the order says, " the troops must occupy a posi- tion from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morn- ing." It contemplated no offensive combat, beyond that nec- essary to effect the communication with the rest of the army. The record shoAvs that Pope's statement in the "joint order" that the troops under Heintzleman, Sigel and Reno, were " mov- ing on Warrenton turnpike and must now be not far from Gainesville," was wrong. They were all near Groveton, four miles distant from Gainesville, and were arrested by Jackson's troops. About noon Gen. McDowell appeared, and showing me the "joint order," took command. Prior to its receipt, I had been moving toioard Gainesville, and, at the time of its receipt, had come in contact toith the enemy, and vms coming into positioti, when McDowell appeared — the rear of my column being near the junction of the Manassas and Sudley Spring roads. Gen. McDowell testified that "When the 'joint order' reached us we were doing what that joint order directed us to do. That joint order found the troops in the position it di- rected them to be." It seems clear, therefore, that up to noon, 29th, according to Gen. McDowell, both he and I, Avere faith- fully doing as we had been directed, and that our action, (not " m-action") fulfilled Gen. Pope's order to us jointly. I had ample reason to believe, then (noon 29th) that Long- street's forces had formed their Junction with Jackson. I sub- mitted proof upon my trial, to sustain an assertion so vitally important to me. My assertion Avas contradicted, my proof was disbelieved, and the court coinciding Avitli Pope's " assertion," McDowell's " belief," and Judge Advocate Holt's " assump- tion " of Longstreet's force being far distant from me, held me responsible and guilty. When I shall show, by Longstreet's own testimony, how cruel a wrong this mass of bold assertion, Avrong belief, and preju- diced assumption has done me, Avhat just man can gainsay my right to be heard f The record shows that after discussion of the injunctions in the "joint order" and in exercise of the discretion given in it — " that if any considerable advantages are to be gained by de- parting from this order, it will not be strictly carried out "— Gen. McDowell, still in command, decided to withdraw from my column his portion of the troops (over one-half) and gave me a verbal order, about Avhich there is a dispute. He testifies the question was not one of " advance," and that he ordered me " to 2^ost my troops in to the right of the head of the " column of \chere I then was,'''' " to put my troops in there.'''' The record further shows that two officers testify that they heard Gen. McDowell say to me when he first joined me at the head of the column and I had come in contact with the enemy, " Porter you are too far out ; this is no place to fight a battle." I have asserted and ever shall assert, that Gen. McDowell's order to me was " to remain where I then was, while he would " place King's division on my right and form the connection "enjoined in the 'joint order.'" This order to me and state- m.ent of what he himself was about to do, were intended to ac- complish a purpose very much desired by Gen. McDowell. The assignment of King to me annoyed him, and he had previously obtained from me, while at Manassas, a promise that I would place King on my right in the new line about to be formed, so that connecting with Reynolds (then at Groveton) his (McDowell's) troops would be together and at the proper time, he might reclaim King. Gen. McDowell by the above order and statement undertook to discharge me from my promise and to do himself what he desired — have King with him. An immediate examination by us of the country towards Groveton, showed the impracticability of doing directly what he desired, " placing King on my right and thus forming con- nection with the troops near Groveton" — and Gen. McDowell left me without further instruction, but with the understanding that he would, by going (iround behind the woods sej^arating us from Groveton, take King and uniting Ricketts with him, join his command (Reynolds and Sigel) then at Groveton, While returning to my command, seeing the enemy forming in our front, I determined to attack at once with our combined forces and sent my chief of stafi" to King's division to prevent its withdrawal, resuming at the same time the deployment of my troops, arrested by McDowell. 8 My chief of staiF soon returned bringing from Gen. McDowell the message for me " to remain where I was, and if compelled " to fall back to do so on his left." He had found McDowell with King's division. I could then regard this message only as the renewal of McDowell's first injunction, not now, in the face of a superior force, to be disregarded — and at once recalled my troops to the position they held when he left me. From that time till the receipt of an order dated 4:30 P. M., my troops held virtually the same position, changes only having been made to induce attack upon us, or by threatening attack, to keep the enemy from going against Gen. Pope. In this I was successful. As Gen. McDowell's order to me at that time alone prevented an immediate engagement of my troops, and resulted in pro- longing the " inaction " which you condemn in me, I deem it proper to state these facts fully. I was a witness before the court of inquiry relative to Gen. McDowell's conduct, which was in session at the same time and in the same building with my court ; but was prohibited fi-om giving this statement in full and explaining " wherein my state- ment differed from his testimony before inj court." Gen. McDowell was informed by the court that, thougli I could not make this explanation without a change of his question, he should have liberty to change his question to bring out the facts. This he declined to do and my mouth was consequently closed. It is true Gen. McDowell testified to a " want of memory " of any such verbal order sent to me — and had himself endorsed only by the testimony of an oflicer, who was presented to the court as a witness against me, though a member of that name court in which he was sitting judicially ! whose testimony was that he was not present wlien such an order was given. Against Gen. McDowell's want of recollection and the endorsement it had, I produced tlic positive testimony of my chief of stafi', who brought me McDowell's renewed order ; and I am now prepared to verify his testimony by additional and conclusive evidence. I have sliown that my "inaction" up to the afternoon of the 29th was in strict obedience of ord^'s. I now meet your charge of " inaction " up to a later hour on that clay. After Gen. McDowell left me (early afternoon, 29th) and up to the time of Gen. Pope's positive order of 4. 30 P. M. (29th) reaching me, 6:30 P, M., I was certainly as free to exercise my " discretion" under Pope's "joint order" as McDowell Avas. Under the "joint order" he elected to divide our forces and march to another field, where it seems he arrived too late for his troops to be successfully used. Under it I elected to hold my position, neutralize double my force, and, in the enemy's opinion, saved, by my action, both Pope and McDowell from " capture or total route." I submit to you, sir, if I can prove all this, as I can, whether my conduct " within a short distance of the field of battle under the sound of our guns," and iclthout " an order to go into the fight," was not most advantageous to our army and the country. It is now proper to introduce the subject of the new evidence I am ready to produce on these points, and which is indicated in the letters of Generals Longstreet, Wilcox and others. The orders of General Pope on the 29th were based upon the sup- position that the " whole force of the enemy " was still some distance from the field and would not arrive within thirty to fifty hours, i. e. " by to-morrow night or the next day." This basis of the order was, to my knowledge and that of Gen. Mc- Dowell, untrue. I had come in contact with the enemy and was coming into position Avhen the order was received. I knew that Longstreet had arrived, and I was convinced, from in- formation in my possession, that the remainder of the enemy's main forces must be near the field, and observation satisfied me they were arriving. The letters above referred to, state that Longstreet's com- mand commenced arriving on the field at 9 A. M., 29th — about the hour Pope's order was penned — that he was ready to receive any attack after 11, and that he M^as particularly anx- ious to bring on the battle after 1 2 M. This additional evidence also shows, as I claimed at the time, that an attack at any time after 12 M.,by my corps alone, must have resulted disastrously, and that the mere fact of my presence on the Gainesville road kept a largely superior force of • 10 the enemy in my front, and diverted them from supporting Jackson and overwhelming Pope. I am not calling in question the propriety of Gen. McDowell's movements of the 29th. I am merely sustaining my views of the case as claimed at the time, and I ask you, sir, is it not now demonstrated beyond doubt that the very order which McDow- ell could not recollect, " to remain whei-e I was" — was the one of all others for him to give. There can be no dispute among military men on this point. To show that my views are in no wise changed and that I now raise no new issue, I quote from my defence before the court. " I come now to say a few words of the testimony of General McDowell. I "shall sp"iik of liim as a witness with entire calmness and candor, because, " though I speak with regret, I shall speak with no disrespect. His testi- " mony, taken as a whole, has astonished me beyond measure. I feel that it " has done me more harm and more wrong — I cliaritably hoj)e unintentional "wrong — than has been done to me by all the rest of the testimony of the " prosecution put together." "It is well that this alleged order, 'to put my troops in there,' to me l^y " General McDowell does not so appear charged as speciried, for now I will " demonstrate that he did not then give rue, and cannot be believed to have " given me, any such order." * * * " It would have been proclaimed forth- " with at the head quarters of General Pope ; it wotild have been blazoned among " these charges and specitications side by side with the order it.self, and, if true, " it ought to iiave made the words of exculpation which General Pupe uttered to " mo at Fairfax Court House on the 2d September, four days afterwards, choke " him as he spoke. But it is not true tiiat General McDowell then, or at any " time on that day, gave me any such order ' to put my troops in there,' or to " do anj'thing of the kind ; and fortunate is it for General McDowell that it is " not true, for if he had given nic any such mandate to thrust my corps in over " th.'t broken ground between Jackson's right and tlie separate enetny massing " in my front, the danger rnd disaster of such a movement would have been " then and now upon his hands. I am glad that I can say that Gen. McDowell " is utterly in error upon this point, and is no way chargeable with such fatal " military bhinder. It is not alone that I am as clear as I can be as to any " fact in my life that I received at that time no such order from him, but it is "demonstrated in what I have said, as well as in wliat else stands proved in " this record, that no such order to me could have been then by him given. " Unable, as he testifies, by habit of mind accurately to remember the divi- " sions of time, he has plainly confused in his testimonj', * * * " the siluati(jns, the sayings, and the doings of different days. I have said " that I would speak of his testimony with calmness and candor, and without " disrespect. Under strong provocations I have kept my word, but I have " demolished iiis testimony before yim. and with it the whole prosecution falls, «' and the accusHtion is left to the condemnation and derision of all just men." This narrative covers tlie period of time between noon of the 29th and the hour of receipt of Pope's order of 4:30 P. M. You repeat Gen. Pope's main charge : that I failed to make, 11 under his order of 4:30 P. M., August 29, an attack which would have caused " the defeat and capture of JachsorCs army.'''' That order was : — " Headquauters in the Field, "■ Ancimt 29, 1802—4.30 F. M. "Your line of mnrcli brings you in on the enemy's riglit flank. I desire you " to ])usli forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, " on liis rear, keejiing your right in communication with Gen. lleynolds. Tlie " enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon "as you engiige their flank. Keep heavv reserves, and use your batteries, "keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall " back, do so to your riglit and rear, so as to keep in close communication with " the right wing. " JOHN POPE, " Major General Commandhic/." The evidence given on the trial shows very clearly that this order was not delivered to me until about 6:30 P. M., about sunset ; that the orders to carry it into execution were at once given by me and attended to in person ; that the preparations eould not be completed in season to make the attack before dark, and that the nature of the ground was such as to make a night attack impracticable. My witnesses as to the hour of tlie receipt of the order (about 6:30) were Gen. Sykes, Col, Locke, Capt. Montieth and Lieutenants Weld and Ingham, Against these officers, then as now widely known and respected, Gen. Pope was able to introduce only the testimony of his relative who brought the order, and the orderly who came Avith him. On the receipt of this oi'der, I gave, as was my duty, a icritten ackno%ded(jment to the officer bearing it. He verifies this fact, and yet Gen, Pope, wdien called upon in court to produce it and thus establish the vital point of the time of his order reaching me, could not find it. So also of several other letters of im- portance against him and in my favor. When Gen. Pope made this charge, to put on me the blame of his defeat, he little thought I should ever have the proofs I n^w have, and which he and others now labor so hard to ex- clude from the case. He has made many vain boasts; but none more wild and exti^avagant, Avith less of truth and sense than this charge made against me, which he attempts, now as then, to sustain only by such reckless assertions as the following : " I believe, in fact, I am positive, that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the " 29th, Gen. Porter had in his front, no considerable body of the enemy ; 12 " I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him " to have turned the rij^ht flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear; " that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the " army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of " Lojiffstreet; and that the army of Gen. Lee would have been so crippled and " checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in " condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character." On this " emphatic opinion," says Judge Advocate-General Holt, " coincided in by McDowell and Roberts," I was con- demned. McDowell, under the same theory in regard to the com- mander and strength of the enemy fronting me, testifies if I had attacked the right wing of the enemy (Jackson) on the 29th, the result would " have been decisive in our favor." Though I then knew it I had not other witnesses than my- self to prove that it was not Jackson'^ isolated corps alone before us, but Lee's whole army ; and that for me to have at- tacked Jackson's flank was impossible, as Lee's whole army lay between Jackson and me and would probably have led to Pope's capture, not possibly to Jackson's — to our total rout, not to the enemy's defeat. To i^rove this, new testimony is now attainable, and on this I am entitled to a new hearing. My opinions then (29th) were the same as they are now — and I quote once more from my defence pointing to the fact : " If the major general, late commanding the army of Virginia, whose in- " spector general is, at least, my nominal prosecutor here, doubts the truth of " what I now say, let him produce, if he can, as I asked him to produce at the " trial, the note which I sent him by Captain Douglass Pope, at dusk, in reply " to his order of 4. BO P. M , of the 27tli, directing me to attack Jackson's rigtit, " and he will then learn, or at least recollect, what I at that moment judged " concerning both the position of the enemy and my own. Let him publish " that note, since it has not been produced, if he can, even at this late day, find "it, and then all who choose to compare that note with what I have just stated, ' will know that the military theory of the position which I now express with " all confidence has cvlt since that day remained in my mind unchangea." The next day gave sad proof in my justification — though the prosecution managed to exclude the evidence from the trial, and that alone would be ground for a new trial. The facts are these: on that day — the 30th August — Pope withdrew me from before Longstreet, collected all his force on Jackson, attacked, and was defeated. My corps fought well, and suflered gi-eat loss. In Jackson's report to Lee he speaks of our attack ; of the " fierce and sanguinary struggle ;" the " fury of the as- 13 sault ;" the " impetuous and well sustained onsets." But Pope being again defeated, again blames me and my corps. In his report he says : " the attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent ; and his troops soon retired in considerable confu- sion."" The charge sent to the court martial imputes to me, " slowness " — " falling back " — " drawing away " — and " not making the resistance demanded by his position." I was not allowed to acquit myself, and convict him. For lohen the trial came on, the prosecution loithdrew the charge, and prevailed with the court, over my earnest protest, to admit no evidence of the facts on that day, to explain the transactions and prove the situation of the day before. It was a cunning and most un- fair proceeding, and a false technical quibble to shut out my most material proof, and now Pope denies that Jackson's re- port refers to me, and my men. He says, " Porter is deceived." I say I am not deceived ; and that he does not speak the truth. I challenge the proof before any honest tribunal. The situation on both days was simply this. It was now the crisis of the campaign. Pope's " fooling " had all failed. The " stories " he put out — which you think so skillful — had not " fooled " the rebels. They knew the truth — preferring to get it elsewhere — and had come with a superior force to give him battle. The stratagem they practiced had no foolery in it. It was the old maxim of war, " take position when you can, and induce the attack f skilful tactics, which the book of regu- lations for our army thus expounds, in the chapter on battles : " to be safe in making the attack, requires a larger force than " the enemy, or better troops and favorable ground ; " and, " when the ai'tillery can be well posted, and advantage of " ground secured, await the enemy and compel him to attack." Pope's braggart temper and utter want of military penetration let him fall into the trap, and he made the unfortunate attacks the enemy wanted him to make. Here is his own account. On the 30th of August at 5:30 A. M. he telegraphed Halleck of the battle of the 29th, "we have fought a terrific battle; " the enemy was driven from the field ; we have lost " 8,000 men. From the appearance of the field, the en- " emy has lost at least two to one. He stood strictly on "the defensive, and eveiy assault was made by us." Jackson reported that "every advance was most successfully driven 14 " back." Of the next day's battle, Pope says, " I advanced " to the attack as rapidly- as I was able to bring my forces into "action." To his army, he said, '■'■you loill pursue the enemy '■'■in his retreat., and press him vigorously all the dayy Every one knows the deplorable result, and such were the tactics that led to it. But Pope never wants facts and reasons to ex- cuse himself. lie generally has a variet)^ and no two hold together. In this case he has an assortment. /« Aw rg/x>r#, dated January 27, 1863, he says, "atnotinle " could I have fought a successful battle with the immensely su- " perior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was " able, at any time, to outflank me and bear my small army to "the dust." To the court martial he declared that if I had not failed him, he would have " defeated and captured Jackson's army on the 29th, and have beaten and destroyed Longstreet and Lee in detail as tliey came up afterwards." The truth is Lee and Longstreet were with Jackson already, and of this we now have the fullest proof. If this seems to you to be going somewhat into Pope's history I desire you to consider that it adheres strictly to the charge against me, and my proper and true defence to it ; and it has the most direct bearing on the case to add, that if Pope beli(n'ed the charges, if lie had any honest belief or reasonable suspicion of their truth — that " I failed him," and caused his defeat and the escape of liis enemy — it Avas his duty to prefer the charges not that of his Inspector General. In that case I could only be tried by a court detailed by the President. The law says when the general who commands, &c., "shall be the accuser or prose- cutor," the court shall be detailed by the President. Pope was surely the accuser. He brought the accusation in his ofticial report. A military commission was first ordered on his charges. He was the principal witness for the prosecution. He testified to the committee on the conduct of the war, that he "brought me to justice." Then surely a trial, in which his part as accuser was disavowed, and the charges got up were signed by his staff ofBcer Gen. Benjamin S. Roberts, was a fraud on me and on the law,.tainting the proceeding that grew out of it, and whi