fc^rM^V ^Hty; ^ «#&§>>: - «8'u? H/% v v*** «r ■'■A^r^ (lass 7\Khb~J Hnnk - ^ ■■•;•' J? THE DANGERS OF THE COUNTRY. IS BT THE AUTHOR OF WAR IN DISGUISE, — O miseri, qua tanta insania, cive s ? Creditis avectcw hostes ? ■ ■ ViRO, Neque Per nostrum patimur scelu9 Iracunda Jovera ponere fulmina. LONDON: MINTED FOR J. BUTTERWORTH, FLEET-STREET J AND J. HATCHARD, PICCADUJX 1807* i *f >.■'*#!! / •oefi Fruited by G. Woodlall, Paternoster-raw* ADVERTISEMENT. The first part of this Pamphlet was written, and partly sent to press, soon after the ruin of the Prussian army was certainly known in England ; and when we supposed ourselves to be again left alone in the war ; a conjuncture, at which the fe lings of the Public, as to the perils of our situation, were probably much more in unison than now, with those of the Author. At present, perhaps, a proposition which he lias assumed, viz. that the danger of an invasion, though very indistinctly and inadequately conceived, is uni- versally admitted to exist, may be far from the truth. But he deems it, on this account, onjy the more necessary, to raise his feeble voice against the indifference and supineness which prevail in regard to our public defence ; since the apprehension of immediate danger no longer tends to correct these faults, and they may, by a false sense of security, be fatally confirmed. IV May the next news from the seat of conti- nental war, be of a kind to diminish further the apparent importance of his labours ! But, in his estimate, our danger from the power of France was never more serious and imminent than at the present moment. January, 21, 1807. THE DANGERS OF THE COUNTRY r Sect. i. We may be conquered by France. IN the revolutions which overthrow the power and the independency of nations, there is nothing more asto- nishing than the extreme improvidence which some* times prepares their fall. Let us mark in the page of history the periods which immediately preceded the subjugation of Greece, by Philip and Alexander, the dreadful overthrow of Carthage, by Rome, and of Rome herself by the Barbarians, and we shall perceive that their fate was long very visibly approaching, that it might probably have been averted by vigour and prudence, but that the devoted nations strangely ne- glected the obvious means of self-preservation, till the opportunity of using them was lost. Hpw deplorably does the age we live in abound with similar cases ! B Nations, however, like individuals, seem rarely if ever, to take warning from the fatal errors of each other. Such wisdom is indeed cheaply bought, but not so cheaply reduced into practice; for the measures of pre- ventive prudence generally demand some renunciation of present ease, or apparent advantage. It is easy to see what timely sacrifices others should have made to avoid impending ruin. It is not so easy to make those necessary sacrifices ourselves. Besides, there seems to be an unaccountable preju- dice, a sense of inextinguishable vitality, in the body politic as well as natural, which cheats us into a per- suasion, that whatever may have befallen others in similar circumstances, our own existence is secure. '•' All men think all men mortal but themselves." The same may be said of nations; and the delusion pei haps is still stronger with them, than with indi- viduals. It seems impossible upon any other principles than these, to account for the apathy of the British public at the present most tremendous crisis. The torrent of French ambition, has now washed away every mound that opposed it on the Continent. We stand as on a little spot of elevated ground, surrounded with inunda- tions ; and while the waters are still rising on every side, and rapidly undermining our base, we look on with stupid indifference, or torpid inactivity, heedless of the means by which safety might be still attained. These strictures I hope are not now applicable to those with whom the Government of the Country is- intrusted.— Measures are probably preparing in the Cabinet such as our perilous situation demands : but 6 the people at large are not sufficiently awake to the tremendous evils which menace them, and the duties to which they are called. A sufficient proof of this might be found in the spirit of personal and party rivalship, which has abounded in our late Parliamentary elections, and that exclusive attention which they excited throughout the Country at large. Never in the present reign did the choice of a new Parliament produce a greater number of obstinate con- tests, and never were important national questions less generally involved in the rivalship of contending can- didates; yet when has the public mind been more closely intent on the concerns of a general election? It must have been obvious to every calm observer, that the combats of the hustings had more interest than the battles in Saxony, that the state of the poll was the subject of more anxiety than the advance of the Rus- sians, and the subversions of thrones, events of less concern than the rejection of a favourite candidate. Could this disposition be resolved into a magnani- mous contempt of danger, it might perhaps be deemed a feature of national character by no means of evil omen. The Spartans, on the eve of the battle of Ther- mopylae, were seen combing their long hair, and indulg- ing in their usual amusements. But this construction of the public feelings, though complimentary, would not be just. The dangers of the Country I fear have not been so much despised, as forgotten ; and the pa- triotic emotions which the conjuncture ought to in- spire, have been superseded by the nearer interest of Borough or Provincial politics, B 2 4 This, however, is by no means the only indication of popular insensibility to the present dangers of the Country. Have pride, dissipation, or luxury, contracted in any degree their accustomed range, or are their votaries less intent than before on their favourite pleasures? Has the civil war of parties been suspended ; or have we in earnest begun t© make our peace with a chastising Providence, by religious and moral reformation ? The Nations, of antiquity, while they possessed their freedom, that true source of patriotic feeling, were neither too gay to mourn, too luxurious to retrench, too factious to unite, nor too proud to repent and pray, in seasons of public danger. A situation like our own, at Sparta, at Athens, or at Rome, in their best days, would have been marked by gravity and mourning, by a suspension of civil feuds, by an emulation in every species of private sacrifice to the public service, and by such propitiations as their religion taught them to offer, to their offended Gods. The most distant danger from a foreign enemy, united every Roman in a gene- rous self devotion to the State. The rich remitted their exactions, the poor renounced their complaints; the Patrician forgot his pride, the Plebeian his factions discontent, the Tribune his mob-importance, the Sena- tors their mutual discord. If the assault or defiance of an enemy found them in the heat of civil commo- tions, it in a moment put an end to the strife : If the people were drawn up by their demagogues on the Mons sacer, their citadel of sedition, they descended without delay to the Campus Alar this, and crowded to be enrolled for the military service of their Country. 7 We admire this spirit ; we perceive in it one great cause of the long conservation of Roman freedom, and an essential basis of Roman greatness. — Yet what have Romans, Grecians, or any other people ancient or modern, had to attach them to their Coun- try, compared with the social blessings of these much favoured Islands ? The Sun, in six thousand years, has beheld no human beings so happy in their civil con- dition as ourselves ; has enlightened no land which its inhabitants had so vast an interest in defending as Great Britain. Whence then that indifference, that strange defect at least of patriotic zeal and exertion, which marks this arduous crisis ? It cannot be the effect of a rational confidence in our security, for who is there now that does not admit the Country to be in danger ? The absurd opinion that England cannot be invadeS while we have an invincible fleet, is now rejected by every intelligent man, as it always was by men of nautical knowledge; and the Government itself has long since practically admitted, by various costly pre- parations for our interior defence, that a powerful descent on our shores is no impossible event. Those who formerly thought such an enterprize im- practicable, must have rested their opinion on the extreme depression of the French Marine, But from this state it has already begun to recover, and there can be no doubt that unless the enemy should be rash enough to expose himself to new Trafalgars, his navy will rapidly encrease. When we consider the large acquisitions of ships of all kinds, oi naval maga- zines, of forests ripe for the axe, of excellent docks, and harbours, and even of able seamen, which France has unhappily made by conquest during the two last campaigns j and when we regard her as mistress of all the coasts of continental Europe, from the bottom of the Adriatic Gulph to the straights of Gibraltar, and from Cape Finisterre to the Baltic, it would be idle indeed to suppose that the disparity of her naval power to that of the British islands, will long continue to be great. But even a very inferior fleet to our own, might as I shall hereafter shew, give her ample means of in- vasion. That an invading army would infallibly be repelled by the force we at present possess on shore, is a per- suasion that may still be too general, yet can hardly now maintain its ground in well informed and consi- derate minds — It must at least be greatly weakened, if not removed, by the late tremendous events on the Continent. Are we proudly confident in our military prowess? So were the renowned battalions of Frederick the Great. — The Prussians marched from Berlin as to a certain triumph. Intelligent English gentlemen who were there at the moment, declare that the general con- fidence was extreme ; that it was impossible to make the most rational Prussians with whom they conversed, admit a doubt of the victorious armies of France being defeated by the Prussian tactics ; and that to suggest any uneasiness on the subject, was regarded as prepos- terous at least, if not insulting. Yet where is now that mighty army that was drawn up by the veteran Generals of Prussia in the plain of Auerstadt ? Dispersed, as with the impetuous breath of a whirlwind, or rather the blast of an explosion, its scattered fragments were soon to he found only on the shores of the Baltic ; and even there were gathered up by its enemies. The mendacious vanity of the victors here found no place Tor exaggeration. — It was strict truth to say that a late mighty Monarch, flying from the throne of his ancestors across the Oder and the Vistula, carried with him only a handful of Guards from the great army which he lately commanded, and that with this exception, not a man of that vast host, escaped. Neither the defeat of Darius at Arbela, or any other victory by which Empires have been overthrown, was in this respect half so disastrous. Where has since been found the proper reserve of re- gulars, or of Citizens in arms to repair this misfortune? Like the masses of Bohemia and Hungary after the de- feats at Uhnand Austerlitz, such forces have not been ready to take the field in time, either to stem the tide of conquest, or make a new stand for their Country? Prussia, like Austria, neglected, alas! to call forth the spirit, and prepare the defensive energies of the people till the important opportunity was lost. If examples like these cannot open the eyes and ex- cite the apprehensions of England ; if she can still repose on an army, hardly recruited so fast as it is ex- hausted by Colonial service, and upon volunteers, which from existing defects in their constitution are declining in numbers and discipline every hour, it rqust be from an infatuation against which it would be idle to reason. But the truth is, that the national slumber proceeds less from a rash confidence, than from inattention to the terrible nature of the events, with which we are visibly threatened. There are objects of apprehension so dreadful in their general aspect, that we rarely give ourselves the pain to examine them steadily enough to contemplate their particular features. Much less do we anticipate with a distinct foresight, the consequences which they are known to involve. Of this kind, is the approaching death of a beloved wife or husband. The heart recoils at the idea of such an event in the abstract, and we shut our eyes to all its concomitant horrors. The sight of long protracted agonies, in a frame endeared to us by a thousand tender recollections, the plaintive eye imploring from us un- availing pity, the tears of children surrounding the bed of pain and death, the last fond and sad adieu to them and to ourselves, the ghastly lineaments of death on a face which had long used to beam upon us with intelligence, sensibility, and love ; these, and many other sad accompaniments of the loss, are unimagined till they are felt; nor are the cheerless hours of widow- hood that succeed, the gloom that long broods over the once cheerful family table, and winter fireside, the gall that now mingles with all the wonted sweets of pa- rental affection, the black cloud with which recollec- tion suddenly and cruelly darkens' the brief occasional sunshine of the mind, subjects of anticipated pain. The same, I conceive, is the case in the public mind at this juncture, in respect of those possible and dreadful events, our being invaded and conquered by France. Strangers to the yoke of a foreign master, strangers even to the ordinary miseries which belong to a state of war in countries which are the theatres of its horrors, we have indeed some dread of those events, but it is a vague and indefinite apprehension. We do not distinguish the many specific evils which would make up the aggregate disaster of such a conquest ; much less do we look forward to the miseries that would unquestionably follow. I would endeavour therefore to supply in some mea- sure the defects of these loose conceptions, to analyze the tremendous mischief which is possibly impending over us, to exhibit some of its calamitous elements, and point out the exquisite wretchedness which it would entail upon my country. We must unavoid- ably be soon called upon for very great and very pain- ful sacrifices, in order to avert the national ruin with which we are menaced by the power of France. Let us fairly examine then the impending evil, that we may be reconciled to the unpleasant means by which alone it can be averted. Sect. 2. The effects of such a Conquest Usurpation or destruction of the Throne. It is needless to insist much on that ordinary, and most prominent feature, in the revolutions of kingdoms by conquest, the transfer of the royal power, from a native to a foreign monarch. It is an evil which the loyalty of my countrymen, and their affection to the best of sovereigns, will sufficiently appreciate. If the ruthless Napoleon has ever spared for a while, a prince whom he had power to depose, it has. been from motives of policy which would fkid no place 10 ■in England. He may safely trust a legitimate monarch' to wield for a while a feeble and tarnished sceptre on the Continent, while his dominions, reduced in extent, stripped of their best interior resources, and deprived of every outwork that can guard them from invasion, are in no condition to oppose his ulterior. projects. It may even serve his purposes, to make these degraded sovereigns instruments of his rapacity, in exacting for his use contributions from their wretched subjects.; as well as involuntary ministers to his ambition, in the further extension of his conquests. When rendered by such means, hateful to their subjects, and to their neighbours, they may be more safely commanded to descend from their thrones, and make room for some upstart successor. He seems even to have a cruel plea- sure in this course of proceeding; as the tiger plays with its wounded victim, and apparently enjoys its dreadful suspense, prior to its final destruction. But should this subverter of empires ever become master of England, the illustrious House of Hanover will have no such protracted torments, nor any equi- vocal fate. Our island is not capable of a secure or con- venient partition among his satellites. There are no conquests beyond us, to which England, like Holland or Saxony, may furnish, under a nominal independency, a safe and convenient scaffold. And, what is more de- cisive, the natural bulwarks of England cannot be re- moved. The straights of Dover, cannot, like the fortresses on the Rhine, or the passes of the Tyrol, be annexed to a hostile state, and the popularity of our beloved sovereign, would still more effectually secure 11 Ills fill ; for he has a throne in the hearts of his subjects that a conqueror could not subvert. Perhaps in consideration of our maritime fame, we might be honoured with the gift of the Imperial Admiral' Jerome Bonaparte, as our new Sovereign Lord ; and he might even deign to accept the hand of some female descendant of the Princess Sophia, in order to plant a new dynasty, on something like hereditary right. Nor is it impossible that the male branches of that illustrious House, might soon be so disposed of, as to leave none who could dispute the legality of the mar- riage, or of any title founded upon it England has no Salic Law 5 the Usurper is not scrupulous in his means, and he has shewn that he knows the value of that here- ditary right upon which he has so violently trampled. I must admit, however, that it is more probable we should not be trusted with any shew of national inde- pendence ; but be either reduced avowedly into the form of a province, or honoured with the name of a depart- ment. If the choice of the French people had any weight, such would of course be our destiny ; since our insular situation and maritime character, might soon convert a nominal, into a real independence. — Rome did not think herself safe, while Carthage had walls or foundations. I leave these prospects without remark to a spirited and loyal people, True loyalty, like love, is too deli- cate to admit of excitement or expostulation, unless from the object of its attachment. Sect. 3. Overthrow of the Constitution. What shall I say of the subversion of that glorious fabric the British Constitution ! We have been lately m exercising the elective franchise, and if the spirit of our contests for representatives in Parliament, at this arduous crisis, has in some instances deserved reproof, at least we must admire that perfect freedom of choice, which so many have been able to exercise. Whether more of that freedom is safely attainable than the pre- sent scheme of representation afToids, is a question which it would be impertinent to discuss in these sheets, nor is this a proper season for such discussions. It is not when the ship labours in the tempest, and when breakers are under her lee, that you would set about an alteration in her cabin, or even think of repairing her helm. It is easy to find faults in every thing human ; but when in danger of losing what we love, we think not of its faults, but of its value. He that really loves British liberty, therefore will now be disposed to forget for a while what he may deem imperfect in it, and reflect with fond anxiety on its inestimable worth. What nobler civil exhibition did earth ever afford than the election of a British House of Commons ! A whole people, not in a rude state, or while few in num- ber, but when forming a mighty nation, great in arms, great in civilization, commerce, and wealth, treely as- semble in their various districts to choose their own legislators, the organs of their will, the delegates of their authority, the guardians of their rights. If in- fluence be used by the existing Administration, what is the Administration but a power, which the attach- ment of former representatives of the pec pie, as much perhaps as the choice of the Sovereign, has created or upheld? Influence too is used in an opposite direc- tion, not perhaps with less zeal or effect. Man is not - 13 made universally to act in society from purely sponta- neous motives. But force, brute force, that engine of usurped authority, that instrument of almost every other human government, however legitimate, in mat- ters that concern the State, is driven from the hallowed precincts of our elective freedom, like a demon from consecrated ground. The ordinary instruments of monarchical power, the military, though here never employed but in subservience to, and at the requisition of the laws, are forbidden to approach the place where these high fianchises are exercised, lest even the shadow of constraint should seem to diminish their lustre. Would French conquest leave us such liberties to boast ? Let us look to Switzerland, to Holland, to France herself, for an answer to that question. The freedom of our constitution, mortifying and opprobrious in its example to Frenchmen, is the last of our blessings that the usurper would consent to spare. To subvert this freedom, by the inviting image of which his throne is perpetually endangered, is more than ambition, more than revenge, or the thirst of glory, the true object of his arms, He would rather by far, leave us our political independency, and our commerce, than our civil institutions. I dare not venture however to affirm, that we should have no more parliaments. It is his policy, to retain, the name of every sacred establishment, the spirit and use of which he takes away : and we should probably, therefore, in losing the substance of Parliamentary re- presentation, be insulted with its empty form. I am not sure even that we should not have mock contested elections : the mummery of Garret Green, n might be transferred to Covent Garden or Guildhall. But woe to those electors, or to that populace* which should be simple enough to suppose that the return of members was indeed submitted to their choice. A vote against the nominee of the court, or a hiss at the Frenchified hireling, would fatally. mark the disaffection of its author* and ere long he would have leisure in a dungeon to bewail his temerity and folly. Sect. 4. Subversion of our Liberty and Laws. Our freedom of choice, however, and our elective franchises in general, are rather buttresses of civil liberty, than the happy edifice itself. That inestimable blessing, chiefly consists, in the supremacy of known and equal laws, in their upright administration, and in the secu- rity of the individual, against the oppression of the civil magistrate, or the state. And here, what people ever had so much to lose, as the inhabitants of this favoured land ! When I enter that venerable hall which for many centuries has been the seat of our superior tribunals, and contemplate the character of the courts which are busily exercising their several jurisdictions around it, I am almost tempted to forget the frailty of man, and the imperfection of his noblest works. There, justice supported by liberty and honour, sits enthroned as in her temple, elevated far above the region of all ignoble passions. There, j udicial character is so strong- ly guarded by ages of fair example, by public confi- dence* by conscious independence* and dignity of station, that it is scarcely a virtue to be just. There, the human intellect nourished by the morning dew of industry, and warmed by manly emulation, puts forth IS its most vigorous shoots, and consecrates them to the noblest of all sublunary ends. If the rude emblems of heavenly intelligence with which our pious ancestors have adorned that majestic roof, were really what they were meant to represent, they might announce to us that they had looked down upon an administration of justice, advancing progres- sively, from the days of our Henries, at least, in correct- ness, liberality, purity, and independence, till it has' arrived at a degree of perfection, never before witnessed upon earth, and such as the children of Adam are not likely ever to surpass. This blessing, the fairest offspring of freedom, or rather its purest essence^may like all other advantages, be undervalued by those who have always enjoyed it, and know only by report the evils of a different lot. But those Englishmen who have travelled far enough, to see ignorance, prejudice, servility, and oppression, in the seat of justice, know how to appreciate and admire the tribunals of their native land. Nor is the protecting power of our superior courts, less distinguished than their purity. In what other realm can an independent judge, deliver him whom the government has consigned to the darkness of a dungeon? Where else is the sword of the state chained to its scabbard, t^ll drawn by the sentence of the law ? And who but an Englishman, can defy, while judges are incorrupt, the proudest minister, or most insidious minion of a court 1 . The unique and inestimable institution of trial by jury, is an item only, though a proud and precious one, of this glorious account. The Englishman's life, his 16 honour, and, with some reasonable exceptions, his property too, are placed not only under the protection of the laws, but under the further safeguard of his neighbours and equals in private life, without whose sanction, solemnly given upon oath, he cannot be con- demned. Such, my countrymen, are some of the blessings of our freeborn jurisprudence; and these, I need not tell you, would all cease to exist, if we fell under the dominion of France. None of you can be so ignorant as to suppose, that Buonaparte would allow a Habeas Corpus, a jury, or a gaol-delivery, to the victims of his state-craft or revenge. He has replaced by a hundred bastilles, the one which he has assisted to destroy. A thousand miserable prisoners groan in his dungeons for one that met that fate under the unfortunate Bourbons. He has found the secret also, of obtaining, from .civil as well as military tribunals, a blind obedience to his will. It cannot be supposed that he will submit to the restraint of laws in a province, while he rejects it in imperial France. We must bid farewell therefore, should he become our master, to protecting laws, to independent and upright judges, to trial by jury, and to all those privileges which now constitute our-security from civil or military oppression. The innocent will no longer be able to lie down in peace, secure that they shall not be torn from their families ere morning, to be examined by tortures, or perish in the gloom of a dungeon* From that time, integrity will retire from the seat 17 of justice, and corruption take its place. Judge- ments, in civil cases, will be sold ; in criminal, will be dictated by the luthless voice of oppression. Fraud and violence will every where prevail, and cunning servi- lity be the only path to safety. If any of our laws remain unaltered, they will be such only as may serve, when no longer guarded by the checks of a free consti- tution, to multiply the modes, and aggravate the weight of despotism. Let us look next to the infallible and total suppres- sion of the liberty of our press. While any portion of this privilege remains in any country, there is, if not a hope of deliverance, at least some consolation for the oppressed. The minions of power may be kept in check, by the publicity of transactions which, though not directly arraigned, would speak their own condemnation. But if not, the victim of despotism will at least know that he is pitied, perhaps admired and applauded, by his vir- tuous fellow citizens ; and that reflection will make his chains sit lighter. But no such consolation remains where the power of Buonaparte prevails. He has made a league with dark- ness. He has declared war against the mutual intel- ligence and sympathy, as well as the happiness of mankind. He has not indeed destroyed the organs of public information; but he has done infinitely worsq: he has appropriated them all to his own tyrannic use, compelled them to utter all his falsehoods and calum- nies, and forbad them to speak or whisper with any breath but his own. The government of the press by the French Bour- C IS bofts, or even by the Spanish Inquisition, was wholly of a negative kind. Roberspierre, his associates, and successors, imposed no restraints on the press, un- less through the unavoidable terror of their power ; and we learned, even from the Parisian journals, the. worst crimes of those sanguinary rulers. But Buonaparte, more crafty, though not less cruel, than his predecessors, suppresses every act of Govern- ment that he wishes to conceal, as well as every adverse remark on his conduct; while he obliges every vehicle of public intelligence to circulate, as on its own autho- rity, whatever impostures or forgeries he chuses to propagate. The victims of his tyranny, if not plunged in oblivion, are defamed in their characters, and misrepresented in their conduct ; yet find no possible means of reply. They are not only deprived of liberty and life, but defrauded of the sympathy of their friends, of their families, and mankind. Fancy not then, Englishmen, that under the op- pression of this unparalleled tyrant, you would have the consolation of knowing that your most cruel wrongs, or the honourable fortitude with which you might sustain them, were known and pitied by your Country. You might be tortured to death, like Pichegru, and accused of suicide; you might be murdered, like D'Enghien, and represented as convicted assassins. You might be buried in a dungeon, like Toussaint, and libelled as perfidious traitors. Nay you might, like his unfortunate family, be hidden for ever from the world, or secretly destroyed in prison, without a Voice that could convey to the public, or even to your 39 anxiously inquiring friends, the cause or nature of your fate. It would be endless to enumerate the various and pcciiliar miseries which the sudden subversion of our liberties would produce, among a generous and high spirited people. When Buonaparte bade Frenchmen resume their chains, it was little more than a change from one form of slavery to another. Even in their short-lived zeal for liberty and equality, they never for a moment tasted the rich fruit of genuine freedom. But Englishmen have enjoyed for ages that inestimable blessing; and how shall we be able to bear its sad reverse ? How shall we endure the contemptuous despotism of office, the exactions of rapacious commissaries, and the harsh controul of a military police ? We must lay aside, my countrymen, that indigna- tion at injustice in the exercise of power, which is so natural to the free born mind, when stung by the sense of oppression. We must also suppress that generous sympathy for the wrongs of others, which is so easily excited in the breasts of an English populace. That amiable feeling, now too often abused with tales of imaginary oppression, must then be suppressed, even on the most real and extreme provocation. Fatal would it then be to murmur, when we saw our innocent countrymen, our friends, or dearest connections, dragged away by the rude hand of power, at the man- date of some angry despot, to imprisonment or death. The foulest corruption, the basest perfidy, the most savage cruelty, when clothed with the authority of our new masters, must pass without reprehension, or audi- C a 20 bie complaint ; nay must be treated by us with lowly submission and respect. We must lay aside also that proud sense of personal inviolability, which we now cherish so fondly ; and what is justly prized still more, the civil sanctity of our homes. The Englishman's house must be his castle no more. Instead of our humble watchmen to wish us respect- fully good night when returning to our abodes in the evening, we shall be challenged at every turning by military patroles; and shall be fortunate, if we meet no pert boy in commission, or ill natured trooper, to re- buke us with the back of his sword, or with a lodging in the guard-house, for a heedless or tardy reply. Per- haps after all, when we arrive at our homes,, instead of that quiet fire-side at which we expected to sit in do- mestic privacy with our wives and children, and relieve- our burthened hearts by sighing with them over the sorrows of our Country, we shall find some ruffian familiars of the police on a domiciliary visit ; or some insolent young officers, who have stepped in unasked to relieve their tedium while on guard,, by the conversa- tion of our wives and daughters. It would be danger- pus, however, to offend such unwelcome guests; or even not to treat them with "all the respect due to brave warriors who have served under Napoleon the Great. - B&t should we escape such intruders for the evening,, still we must lie down uncertain whether our dwellings will. be. left unviolated till the morning. A tremendous noise will often at midnight rouse the father of a family from his sleep, and he will hear a harsh voice command- 5 ing to open the gate, through which its hapless master will soon pass to return no more. These are but a small part of those intolerable re- verses in point of civil government to which English- men would be doomed to submit. I will however pursue no further their odious detail ; but proceed to another consequence of the supposed conquest — the transition from opulence to ruin. Sect. 5. Destruction of the Funds, and ruin of property in general. It cannot be necessary to prove, that the rapid de- cline, if not the immediate ruin, of our manufactures and commerce, would be a certain effect of subjection to a foreign power. These envied possessions of England, would be the favourite spoils of the conqueror ; and though he might not find it easy to remove, it would be perfectly so to destroy them. Indeed his utmost efforts to preserve them to us, could we expect such a benevolent at- tempt, would certainly be fruitless. They are the creatures of general confidence and credit, of legal security, and of the peculiar excitements which have been held forth to commercial industry and enterprise, by the genius of our happy constitution. Still more do they owe their extent and prosperity to that maritime greatness, which they reciprocally nourish and sustain. They depend much also, on what would of course im- mediately vanish, the confidence and respect of foreign nations, and those treaties which give us a preference in their markets. Need I add, that another of their grand supports, the commerce of the East, would no 22 longer be ours ; nor those Colonies which we value too much. But it is idle to dwell on such remarks. As well might we expect the tree to flourish after its roots are cut off, as our commerce or manufactures to survive the loss of our power, independency, and freedom. A still more awful view of the effects of conquest, will be found in the contemplation of our public funds. Is any man absurd enough to expect, that the annui- ties or the Stock-holders, will be paid under the go- vernment of Buonaparte ? I fear there are at least many who have not thought seriously upon the question, or reflected on the certainty of the opposite event, and its truly dreadful consequences : for otherwise we should certainly never hear of the weight of taxes, or of financial dangers from the war, when the security of the Country is at stake. The speedy wreck of the funds is demonstrated, the moment it is ascertained that commerce and manufac- tures must be ruined : for the whole current of the revenue has now barely force enough to keep the immense wheels of our finances in motion, and carry them smoothly through their annual revolutions. The loss of commerce and manufactures, let it be re- membered, is not merely the loss of an equal portion of duties in the customs and excise; though that alone would be fatal. It involves also the decline of various collateral branches of revenue ; of the duties on income, of assessed taxes, and all the various direct and indirect contributions, of the Merchant, the Manufacturer, their families and dependents, It leads also to a more than 23 proportionate increase of parochial contributions, those great drawbacks on the national resources. But if our funds could possibly survive the loss of commerce and manufactures, their vitality would cer- tainly not be proof against the grasp of a rapacious Government Buonaparte would assuredly find other uses for our remaining revenue, than that of paying dividends at the Bank, to the public creditors ofEngland. I know not how many tens or hundreds of thousands of French Soldiers, it might be thought necessary to station here, for the support of the new Government : but beyond doubt we should, like Holland, and the conquered Countries on the Rhine, be honoured with the presence of a strong army of the best troops of the Great Nation, who would invite us to practise in a very liberal way towards them, the virtues of hos- pitality. We should also have to provide for the splendour of a Royal or Proconsular Court, which would ill second the views of the magnificent Napoleon, if it did not compensate for the want of native dignity, by a luxury and extravagance far surpassing inexpence the charges of a legitimate government. Supposing however, that our revenue should exceed the immense demands of our new civil and military establishments, still who can doubt that the surplus would be drawn away into the Treasury of the Great Nation, or the Privy Coffers of its Imperial Master? Unhappy creditors, to whom above twenty-two Millions a year are now issued in public annuities, your rights would be a weak obstacle to the avarice of your Conqueror, even though his ap- petite for plunder were not sharpened by necessity, The Conquest of Europe, let it be considered, is a costly thing ■ and so must long be the maintenance of those prodigious armies, and the enriching of those numberless needy instruments, military and civil, by which the conquest must be maintained. But the Con- tinent is already impoverished. Even France herself has been lately obliged to pay her contributions in kind. If all the millions, therefore, which this country must raise in order to be solvent, could be still raised when our freedom is no more, not one of them, we may be sure, would be spared in compassion to the British Stock- holder When solvency should become plainly hope- less, and a small composition be all that justice itself could offer, our new Government would not foolishly embarrass itself with the trouble of apportioning such a pittance among the hungry multitude, but take the short and simple course of shutting up the books at once. Without therefore stopping to enquire, whether Bank Paper would retain its value after the supposed conquest, or whether any other medium of payment could be found, I may safely assume, that with the independency of our country, the dividends at the Bank would cease. It is not even too much to assert, that a stockholder, be' ore in the receipt of thousands per annum, might be unable to pay for his dinner. That this sudden annihilation of our funds, would be a certa n effect of the conquest, will probably, not be disputed by any reasoning mind. Let us pause then awhile, and contemplate that dreadful event. Men are very apt to deceive themselves on this subject, by false analogies in the history of other countries* 25 H America became a bankrupt to her own Citizens; so did the French Republic ; and the consequences, no doubt, were dreadful ; but they were endured— they were even exceeded by other calamities of the same un- fortunate periods." ] But have we considered the essential and fearful dif- ferences, between our own public debt, and that of America or France ? First, as to its amount. — The sums for which those countries failed, bore no proportion to the mass of their general property. The people collectively, lost not a hundredth part, perhaps, of their possessions. But Great Britain owes, and chiefly to her own subjects, above six hundred millions sterling, bearing an interest of above twenty-two millionsyearly; and the whole rental of our lands, estimated even at the rate to which the arti- ficial effects of this very debt has raised it, does not ex- ceed twenty-five millions.* If the rental be taken at the value, to which the fall of our funds would rapidly reduce it, the loss of the public creditors collectively, would greatly exceed the whole remaining income of the country, except that which is produced by com- merce, manufactures, and other modes of active in- dustry. The amount of income that might be derived from such sources, after the national ruin here sup- posed, cannot easily be estimated ; but it would un- questionably become inadequate to the support of the millions who now depend upon it, and would by its sud- den fall, prodigiously augment the mass of the general dis- * This was Mr. fitfs estimate for the purpose of the Inccms Tax. £6 tress more directly occasioned by the wreck of the funds. It would probably, on the whole, be no extravagant con- jecture, that by the mediate and immediate, direct and collateral, effects of this great calamity, one half of all the income of the kingdom derived from actual pro* perty, would be suddenly annihilated. Happy, however, comparatively would the case be, if the consequence only were, that each individual pos- sessed of property lost a half part of his income ; or if the loss were to be in any degree equally divided. On the contrary, to a very great proportion of our stockholders, the sudden effect would be the loss of all that they possess ; an instant reduction from opu- lence or competency, to total and absolute ruin. Dreadfully in other respects, would such a case be distinguished from those of other Nations, in which public insolvency has occurred. Never elsewhere was public credit so well established on the basis of long experienced security, and so upheld by the firm pillars of public principle, and constitutional controuls, that men have been confident enough to trust their all, to the integrity and prudence of the Government. Nor ever elsewhere was property so widely diffused, that multitudes of all classes, from the Peer to the Peasant, had a pledge of this nature to confide. In other in- stances of National Bankruptcy therefore, it has been the calamity, not of the many, but the few; and even to these, has been but a partial loss. Nay, it has prin- cipally fallen upon those to whom it was rather an ordi- nary casualty of commercial adventure, than an unfore- seen and total privation of actual property, supposed to have been realized, and placed beyond the reach of 27 hazard. Foreign Stock, like the share of a new loan, or canal subscription, has been rather a subject of gain- ful speculation, than a depository for quiescent capital, invested with a view to fixed and permanent income. From the same causes another distinction, still more deplorable, has arisen. There are periods in the life of almost every man who possesses property, in which its security is far more important to him than its increase, and when this creature of society, acquires in his eyes its highest interest and value. Such is the case with the Father and the Husband, when, in the contempla- tion of death, he sits down to exercise the power and the duty of making his last will, and providing for the well being of those who are dearest to him, after his de- cease. In such cases, what Testator but an English- man has generally thought of committing the whole subsistence of his widow and infant children, to the security of the public funds ? But here, that has not only been the frequent, it has been the favourite and ordinary course, even with the most prudent parents and husbands, who have had personal property to invest. The funds having long been deemed equally secure with real estate, have been esteemed the most convenient depositary for the property of those who, in respect of their years or sex, are unable to improve or manage it for themselves. Our courts of Equity, too, in the exercise of their controul over Executors and Trustees, and in their protection of the estates of married women and infants, have followed the same course. The most conserva* tory and beneficial application of personal estate, under the direction of those Courts, has been thought to be an investment in the purchase of Bank Annuities ; and a great multitude oi widows and orphans, are at this hour receiving their daily bread from the interest of monies so invested, not through the providence of their deceased relations alone, but by the decrees of our civil tribunals. The certainty of punctual half yearly payments, and the convenience with which they are receiv- ed, have also induced persons advanced in years, or retiring from business, to invest their capitals in the public funds, preferably to all other .securities ; and it is probable, that among twenty such persons living in retirement on their incomes, Landholders excepted, scarcely more~ than one could be found, that does not chiefly or wholly depend on his half yearly dividends at the Bank, for his -subsistence. There is besides, a virtual and indirect dependency of capital and income on the national funds, which is scarcely less comprehensive than that which is direct and immediate-; and which also involves alarge propor- tion of theaged and helpless. The creditors orannuitants of public companies, the bond creditors of private merchants, nay even in great measure the mortgagees of real estate, would find the wreck of the public funds a source of general ruin. The mortgagee indeed might be safe, when his loan, and ail prior incumbrances taken together, bear but a small proportion to the value of the estate ; but in that case only : because it is demonstrable that as the value of land has risen progressively with the growth of our funds, the annihilation of the latter would reduce that walue almost to its ancient level 5 while the enormous increase of poor rates, the effect of general ruin* would sink the landholders net revenue, out of which the interest of incumbrances must be paid, still more per- haps than the value of his capital. And here we may perceive a new range of -calamity* within which the families even of our most opulent landholders would fall. Fortunate is that real estate, which is not heavily charged with jointures, and por- tions for younger children, and with mortgages, and other incumbrances besides, which are often prior in polnft of charge to those family burthens. The interest of the proprietor therefore might hz wholly sunk in the general wreck, should it materially lower his rental; and so might the whole incomes of all his nearest relations. It is highly probable however, that the Estates of the great landed proprietors would soon be -confiscated, and given to the officers of ths army appointed to keep us in subjection. The policy of William the Norman would furnish, an inviting precedent to our new Conqueror, and would perhaps be the best mean of finally breaking down the British spirit of the County In short all who have property of any species, would share soon or late in the common disaster, while a verrr great majority of them would be instantly deprived by it of their whole subsistence. Nor would this calamity be limited to the loss cf actual possessions. How many parents and husbands are there now in this Kingdom, whose sole hope that a helpless family will not want bread after their de- cease, is built upon life insurances I To susiaim this hope, multitudes have long been paying pre- 3v miums which they could ill afford, and renouncing perhaps, in these costly times, long 7 accustomed gratifi- cations, that they might avoid the intolerable dread, of leaving a beloved wife and children in absolute indi- gence and want. But what will become of the security of life insu- rances, when the national funds are no more ? Ask the Directors of those great public Companies whose credit is the most undoubted, and they will tell you that their whole capital consists of Stock, or other public securities ; and that when the State shall become insolvent, their policies maybe thrown into the fire. Where then, in this dreadful case, will the unfortu- nate, though not improvident man, who had relied upon such insurances, find any refuge from his cares ? He had not property to lose, but he has lost much more. He is bereft of the chief human consolation, from which he used to derive comfort in the prospect of approaching dissolution. Perhaps he has already entered upon the confines of the grave > a broken constitution, or the debility of age, preclude the hope of his seeing another summer, and still more of his saving, by future industry, a provision for his family. A faithful wife therefore who is beginning to feel the infirmities of declining years, and beloved daughters who have no means of providing for their own sup- port, must soon be left exposed to all the horrors' of want. Who can conceive the sharpness of parental and conjugal misery, in situations like these 1 Without attempting to pursue further the dreadful effects of National Bankruptcy into their numberless ra- mifkations i I would ask the considerate reader, what pro- i portion would subsist between such a case as this, and any revolution of property that the world has yet seen? The funding system, which alone could produce such terrible consequences., is of very modern growth, and from its worst casualties experienced in other countries, a National Bankruptcy in England would differ as widely, as an earthquake in a crowded city, differs from a shipwreck on the ocean. Ruin, though it may elsewhere have invaded the helpless, has not made them its peculiar prey; but here, its most numerous victims would be found among the feeble, the aged, the widow, and the orphan ; among those who are the least able to struggle against the waves of adversity, and who on the loss of their property, would be destitue of every resource. Tens, or even hundreds of thousands, of hapless Englishmen, would in one day, be reduced from ease and affluence, to extreme and remediless distress. Elegance, would be exchanged for rags, luxury, for hunger and cold, comfort and security, for misery and despair. I know not even whether the benign institution of our poor laws, and our many charitable foundations for the relief of the aged and destitute, would not ag- gravate the general distress. Most of the latter, would be entirely deprived of the funds provided for their support; and the multitudes of poor to be sustained by parochial rates, would becomea burthen scarcely support, able by the impoverished contributors, reduced as they would greatly be in number, as well as in fortune. Persons in the upper and middle ranks of society, would be consequently the less able to assist each other in 32 the dreadful event supposed. The hand of friend-* ship or benevolence, would be arrested by the grasp of the tax-gatherer. Most persons have friends in whose affectionate sym- pathy they think a resource would be found, under the greatest malice of fortune ; but in this tremendous case, whole circles of the dearest connections, or most fa- miliar acquaintances, would all find themselves under the sad necessity of soliciting, instead of being able to impart, relief. Their fortunes being all sunk in the same enormous vortex, they would be in no more capacity to assist each other, than passengers in the same ship* when she goes to pieces on the rocks, or hungry manners on the same desolate island. Or could a wretched family invoke the aid of some acquaintance or friend, who had still some landed income, or other means of support* they would find him pre-occupied by nearer claims -, or so surrounded with supplicants, the objects of equal ' sympathy, as to have but a mere useless pittance to afford. The best hope of the miserable many, there- fore, would be to partake of such parochial relief, as 1 ruined country might still be able to give, to the com- mon mass of its paupers. How terrible would it be for an accomplished and virtuous female-, who till now had been accustomed to all the comforts, and elegant enjoyments, of an easy fortune, to become, with her lovely children, an in- mate of a parish workhouse ! Yet those receptacles of coarse and unsightly indigence, from which even the more decent of our poor, now turn with disgust, would then become an asylum, to which the most refined and delicate might be driven to resort. They might wish, m perhaps, that the humanity of their country had pro- vided no such sad alternative to famine ; but the im- perious requisitions of hunger, or a conscience revolt* ing at suicide, would compel the starving individual, and much more the wretched family, to protract a painful existence even on those loathsome terms. The prospect of such calamities is enough to make an Englishman view with anxiety and alarm* those appearances of general opulence, in which we are too apt to exult. When we walk in the neighbourhood of this grand metropolis, through any of those pleasant villages with which it is surrounded, we see the wealth and prosperity of the nation, in their most pleasing and captivating dress. The road is bordered on each side, and the green or common surrounded, with country retreats of all di- mensions, from the stately villa, down to the little painted box, which mocks the tax-gatherer with its single window : and through the whole range of the scale, all is neatness and comfort. Almost every mansion, however small, is provided with its par- terre in front, and its garden behind; unless fortu- nate enough to possess a more extensive allotment of land, in the centre of which, surrounded with or- namental shrubs and flower-plots, it exhibits a still more inviting shew of retirement and independence. Yet these are the abodes of men engaged in the busy occupations of commerce ; and a great many of them too, in subordinate stations; men, who in any other country, and forty years ago in our own, would have been shut up in the smoaky town, ujader the same roof with their counting houses or shops. D 34 If we pass in the morning, the masters of these happy retreats are seen issuing with cheerfulness, refreshed by the pure breezes of the country, to repair on horseback or in carriages, to their daily business in London. In the afternoon, we see them returning in the same easy and commodious way, to enjoy their family comforts ; or already sat down to the social meal, which waited their arrival. In the interior of these rural mansions, all is answerable to their outward appearance. The smallest of them can boast, if aot elegance, at least, neatness, cleanness, and convenience in its furniture, and plenty, if not luxury, on its table, greater than are always seen in other countries, even in the man- sions of the great. This wide extent of domestic enjoyments, exhibits more clearly, as well as more pleasingly, the general affluence pi the country, than even the profusion of private carriages, and the many splendid equipages, which crov/d the roads to a great distance from the metropolis. Often in the contemplation of such scenes, have I shuddered at the thought of that sad reverse which may be near at hand. How possible is it that in a. lew years, aye, in a few months, all this unexampled comfort and happiness, may vanish, like the painted, clouds in a western sky, before an evening tempest ! These enjoyments ot the merchants, and other busy actors in the various industry of London, may be com-* pared to the tulips and hyacinths which we sometimes see blowing in flower-glasses in their parlour windows. The numberless fibres from which they derive their nu- triment, are not inserted in the solid earth of real pro- 35 perty, but float in the loose element of public credit ; and the wreck of the funds would be as fatal to them, as the fall of the glass cylinder to the flower. Our Merchants would have again to return to the parsimonious habits, and rigid industry of their fore- fathers. Instead of being able to unite as now, the profits of the town, with the health and pleasures of the Country, at the charge of two residences, and the expensive means of communication between them, singularly fortunate would be that individual, who could find, by immuring himself and his family in the heart of the Metropolis, and by using every resource that painful industry and parsimony could there ex- plore, the means of escaping want. Those numberless costly villas, therefore, which now arrest the eye in every direction, those interminable ranges of less conspicuous, but not less happy dwellings, which form the suburbian villages, would soon be de- serted ; and would fall to the ground almost as rapidly as they rose from it. In a few yeais, a walk six miles from London, instead of exciting, as now, lively emo- tions of patriotic joy and admiration, would be like an evening visit- to a Church yard ; presenting nothing but the shadows of impotent ambition, and the moul- dering records of departed happiness. The wretched survivor of the freedom of his country, would be happy to escape from that wide circle that now com- prises the most interesting displays of our commercial- affluence, to leave Hampstead, or Woodford, Cfapham, or Norwood, behind him, in order to find a country less incumbered with ruins, and deliver himself awhile from the tqrments of visual recollection. D z 36 Sect. 6. Dreadful extent and effects of the contribti* dons that would be exacted. In this sad foresight of the desolation of my Country, I have passed over unnoticed some of the earlier and more terrible effects of conquest. On the probable carnage in the field, it would be uncandid to lay any stress. England I trust would not be lost without a struggle worthy of such a stake; and though the astonishing celerity of our enemy's operations, might defraud a large proportion of our military defenders of the chance of dying for their Country, yet there probably would be some actions fertile enough in slaughter. But it would be unfair to reckon this among the aggravations of our fate ; for scenes would soon ensue, which would make the living envy the dead their peace, as well as their glory. Let us rather look therefore, to some of the manifold and endless oppressions which would await the hapless survivors. I have generally and faintly sketched some parts of the wretchedness of losing property ; but a worse mischief will be the false repute of possessing it. Here again we are in danger of misapplying, by false analogies, the lessons of experience. In other Countries which have been conquered by France, their impo- verished and exhausted state has been generally known to the victors. They have been either the seats of war, and drained by previous contributions \ or like Holland r conquered under circumstances which made it pru- dent to practise forbearance, till time had gradually revealed the real indigence of the people. In other cases too, a native government has been made the s? instrument of exactions ; and its representations, the sincerity of which there has been little room to doubt, have sometimes induced the Conquerors to moderate their extreme requisitions. At worst, such a Government has been permitted to regulate, equalize, and soften, the actual collection. The fate of these Countries has nevertheless been severe enough ; and much more so than they have dared to reveal, through any public channels of complaint. But if England be conquered, it will be under cir- cumstances which will leave France nothing to fear from the odium which she may contract by the utmost rapa- city of conduct; and to a native British Government, we shall unquestionably not be intrusted. What is a still more fearful distinction, our Enemies have the most extravagant ideas of our public and in- dividual wealth. Far from understanding the great financial difficulties under which we actually labour, they suppose us to have gold enough yet in reserve to subsidise the whole continent forages; and that instead of being impoverished, we have been greatly enriched by the war. I ask then, what eloquence, or what attainable proofs, would serve to convince these rapacious masters, that the largest contribution, or the greatest number of heavy contributions, which they might successively impose upon us, were too much for our purses to yield ? Sums would soon be required, which the subordinate Admini- strators of finance for the Country at large, would find, it impossible to raise. Our Tyrants would then perhaps apportion the charge, upon counties, cities, towns* and even parishes. But the inefficacy of this, and every 38 other resort, would infallibly sooner or later bring the levy home to our houses, by the mode of individual assessments ; and a system of inquisitorial exaction and oppression would ensue, more cruel than ever before existed upon earth. Let the owner of an elegant villa, or sumptuous town mansion, consider how he would be able to satisfy a mili- tary commissary of his poverty, when called upon for a thousand guineas ; or let the master of a handsome house either in town or country, reflect how he could prove his inability to pay a hundred ? Each indeed might truly allege, that he had not one guinea in his possession or power, that his wealth had been annihilated by the pub- lic bankruptcy, and that his daily subsistence now de- pended upon the credit which he still found, for a while, with his tradesmen, or upon the compassionate assistance of friends. But all this would be regarded as common and stale pretence, which every man might set up, which could never be clearly in vestigated,and which must there- fore be generally disallowed. The unhappy man perhaps might truly add, that his plate had already been seized, his cabinets rifled, and his most valuable moveables sold, to satisfy former requisitions. But this would be considered only as evidence of former contumacy, and systematic deception. The splendid or genteel manner, in which he would be known recently to have lived, would be deemed a presumption against him paramount to every proof that could be offered of present poverty or distress. In truth, nothing would be more natural than the surmise, that poverty was a pretence to elude the de- mands of the state. With many, their pleas of 59 Inability, if not wholly groundless, would at least be -exaggerated statements ; and the detection of falsehood in some cases, would seera to justify incredulity in all. Besides, after every allowance made for the long use of our paper representatives for money, it would be very difficult for a foreigner to believe that so small a quantity of specie remained in the country, as would be actually found. Some few persons too might be detected in having buried or concealed it ; which when discovered, would perhaps be almost as fatal to their countrymen, as the expedient of some unhappy Jews, who on the capture of Jerusalem by Titus swallowed their gold, was to their wretched fellow sufferers, Perhaps some of my readers may suppose, that the worst consequence of suspicion, or of an imputation : of contumacy, would be the having French soldiers quartered in their houses, in order to inforce discovery or compliance : a consequence certainly dreadful enough, especially to those who have wives or daughters: but unless we are treated better than Frenchmen are in like cases, torture or death may be probably superadded to that odious mode of exaction. The report that Toussaint was tortured to death, with a view to extort a discovery of the treasures which he was supposed to have hid in St. Domingo, and that his hapless wife shared the same fate, seems not to be improbable. By recent accounts from that island, it appears, that the suspicion of his having buiied wealth to a large amount, in a spot known only to himself, or to those in his most secret confidence, certainly did prevail with the French party. But if this crime be 40 doubtful, not so the murder, upon the same sordid principle, of M. Fedon, a white man, as well as a. Frenchman, whose case may be worth attention. General RochamDeau, finding that one of his last requisitions of money from the inhabitants of Cape Francois collectively, was not sufficiently productive, proceeded to assess individual merchants, at the sums of which he thought them to be still possessed ; and M. Fedon, being a merchant of the first eminence of that place, was required to pay down immediately as his quota, 5,000 dollars in specie. He truly pleaded inabi- lity to comply j and gave a reason somewhat similar to that which an unfortunate Englishman might allege, in the case which I wish to illustrate.— His whole funds, the goods in his warehouses excepted, had been invested in bills drawn upon the French government, for public services in that colony, under the authority of the general himself, or his predecessor; which bills had been returned protested. The same had been the fate of like paper to a large amount, in the hands of other merchants of the town ; by which means general distress from the want of a circulating medium, had been produced at that calamitous junc- ture. But though the general fact was indisputable, the particular excuse was not accepted. M. Fedon was put under arrest ; and with preremptory orders to the officer who took charge of him, to shoot him at three o'clock the same day, unless the money should be previously paid. It was in vain, that the unhappy merchant offer- ed his keys, to ascertain that he had no money in his coffers, and in vain that he offered to redeem bis 41 life with goods, or government bills, to any amount. Neither his offers nor complaints were regarded ; and the money not being brought forward by the appointed hour, he was led forth and actually shot on the public parade, pursuant to the General's order. His count- ing-house and warehouses were then taken possession of by the same tyrannic government, and, on a strict search, the cash found there amounted to about five dollars. This transaction, which through the loud complaints of a brother of the deceased, and of his mercantile friends, is quite notorious in the West Indies, and America, and which if I mistake not, was either men- tioned, or referred to, in the official dispatches of our naval officers, employed in the reduction of the Cape, has never been disavowed by Rochambeau ; and his impatience to go from this country to France on his parol, is a proof that he apprehended no punishment for so foul a murder, though the complaints of JVL Fedon the brother are known to have made their way to the Thuilleries. In fact, he threatened all the mer- chants at the Cape, French or American, with similar treatment, and would no doubt have followed up the dreadful precedent, but fortunately, the only subsequent assessment which he had time to make before his ex- pulsion from the island, did not exceed a sum, which, by making a common stock of all their resources , the merchants were able to pay. Were it not for the rigorous and unprecedented restraints imposed upon the press, in every country un- der Buonaparte's power or influence, there would proba- bly be no difficulty in citing many instances of similar oppression in Europe ; and even in France itself: but 42 the crimes of his interior government, are always per- petrated in silence, except when it becomes necessary to divulge them for some political purpose; and even then, care is taken to put every gloss upon them that state-craft can devise. Torture and death may very probably have been the secret fate of hundreds, who have been made the victims of this frightful des- potism, whether upon motives of policy, avarice, or revenge. Here, the rapacious spirit of the victors, excited by the expectation of inexhaustible spoil, and abetted by a long cherished lust of vengeance, would take its most direful range; and horrors would ensue,atthe report of which our fellow vassals on the continent might stand aghast, for- getting their own sufferings, in their pity of miserable England — Alas, those unhappy nations now bitterly repent their own supiiie&ess and folly, and regard us with envy, because we have still the power of escap- ing the torments, to which they are irretrievably doom- ed. How would they rejoice to be again as we now are, in a capacity to defend their liberties, though at the cost of every painful sacrifice, and every arduous effort of patriotism, which they fatally shrunk from before. Quam vellent aethere in ako, Nunc et pauperiem, et ciuros perferre laborer !" Let us cease in time to follow their example, that we may not be partakers of their plagues. Sect, j. Rigorous and merciless government that would certainly ensue. In England, various motives -would stimulate our new masters to more than their usual excesses. 43 Could we be fortunate enough, ^ven in tlie total surrender of public and individual property, to satisfy our spoilers that no more remained behind, still rage and revenge would claim their promised prey. Has not Napoleon solemnly declared, that the last of his combined enemies, shall expiate the offence of them all, and feel the full weight of his vengeance ? Has he not repeatedly held out allurements to the army des- tined to invade us, such as plainly imply engagements to give us up to the rapine and violence of his soldiers ? When was he known to be less cruel in act than in promise, and what ground has England to expect that his barbarous nature will relent in her case alone ? It is a peculiar characteristic of this inso'ent Con- queror, to treat every opposition to his purposes by foreign patriots, whether Sovereigns, Ministers, Ge- nerals, or private persons, as a reproach and a crimer Does an illustrious veteran retire mortally wounded from the field, with the wreck of an army which he had gallantly commanded, his loyalty and courage are made reasons for spoiling his domains, and excluding him from the tomb of his Ances- tors. Does a gallant youth of high birth and early reputation, nobly perish in battle, a martyr to the cause of his Country, Napoleon is too crafty to deny some praise to the Soldier, but the memory of the Pa- triot, is treated with the most vindictive censures, and insolent derision. His ebullitions of rage against that gallant officer Sir Sidney Smith, and his less impotent malice toward our unfortunate countryman Captain Wright, are specimens of the same spirit. 44 But wliy do I dwell on inferior instances, when de- posed Monarchs, nay their unhappy Queens, though the graces of beauty in distress, might aid the sympathy due to fallen royalty, are grossly insulted by this unfeel- ing man, for having dared to resist his arms. He, who punishes with death the publication of strictures on his own unworthy conduct, by men who owed him no allegiance, fills every newspaper with his coarse abuse of Sovereigns, who ought to be sufficiently protected by the respect due to long hereditary majesty, and to the grandeur of those thrones in which they lately sat ; but who would find with every liberal mind a still more secure protection, in pity for their unparalleled misfortunes, and their extreme distress. It would seem as if this auda* clous man arrogated to himself a natural right to be Lord of the human species ; regarding his usurpations only as the uniting possession to a title which belonged to him before, and which it was always treason to oppose. Certain it is, that patriotism, loyal- ty, and courage, which other conquerors have re- spected in their foes, are with him unpardonable crimes. What then, has England to expect from this inexorable victor? No nation that he has yet sub- dued, has opposed him so obstinately and so long; and I trust the measure of our offences in this respect, is yet very far from being full. Here, too, that species of hostility which he most dreads and hates, though he employs it without scruple against his enemies, has been peculiarly copious and galling. Instead of one Palm, he will here find a thousand, who have attempted 45 while there was yet time, to awaken their Country to a due sense of his crimes, and of our danger from his pestilent ambition. But it is needless perhaps to prove what he so freely and frequently avows. If there be any sincerity in his language, when there is no use in dissimulation, if either his Proclamations, his Bulletins, his Gazettes, his avowed, or unavowed, his deliberate, or hasty lan- guage, may be trusted, a deadly, acrimonious hatred to this Country, is the most settled and ardent feeling of his soul. He hates us as a people ; and would conquer us less even from ambition, than from anger and revenge. It is to be feared, besides, that partly from his unwea- ried misrepresentations, and partly perhaps from certain errors in our own conduct, he has made this sentiment very popular in France; and that the severest treatment which, as a conquered people, we could possibly receive, would expose him to no censure at home, much less be unacceptable to the enraged " Army of England/' It would not, after all, perhaps, be possible for Fo- reigners to govern us v/ithout a rod of iron, while the memory of our beloved liberties was recent, and custom had not ytt taught us to carry our chains with patience, A free people when conquered, and placed under an arbitrary government, must be kept in awe by a dis- cipline peculiarly strict and severe, till their high spirit shall be subdued ; like the wild native of the forest, which must be domesticated and tamed, by a severity of treatment, such as the spaniel never requires. . Above all, every open act of sedition or insubordi- AS nation among such a people, must be terribly chastised. An illustration of this may be found in our own treat- ment of the Koromantyn negroes, or natives of the Gold Coast ; as explained by Mr. Bryan Edwards, in his History of the West Indies. Among all the dif- ferent nations, and tribes of Africans, whom we reduce to a slavery unknown in their native land, by making them work for life under the whips of our drivers, the Koromantyns, from their martial spirit, and perhaps from a peculiar degree of civil liberty possessed by them in their native country, are found, by far, the hardest to break in, or to season, as it is called, to the duties of West India bondage. Other negroes quietly submit, though they die by great numbers in the process; but the Koromantyns, as we learn from Mr. Edwards, are so intolerant of the yoke, as often to escape Irom it by self-murder. They are naturally, therefore, very apt to resist the master's sovereign authority ; and sometimes form bold, though impotent conspiracies, or desperate re- volts ; and the consequence is, that the people of Ja* maica and other islands, have thought it right to make, in such case?, the most dreadful examples, roasting the insurgents to death by slow fires, or hanging them up alive in irons, to perish on a gibbet.* * Edwards's History of the West Indies, Vol. 2, Book 4. Chap. 3. The following is an account of one case of this kind, of which he was an eye witness. " Of those who were clearly proved to- *' have been concerned in the murders committed at Ballard's *' Valley, one was condemned to be bu r nt > a&d the other two to «'* be hanged up alive in irons, and Left to perish in that dreadful " situation. . 7 47 That Frenchmen would follow precedents so hor-. rible as these, in punishing English insurgents, is per- haps more than we have reason to apprehend ; but the example proves, that dreadful severities would be used ; for we should certainly be, in comparison with other subjected nations, what the Koromantyns are, in comparison with other Africans, when carried into slavery by our merchants. The plea of necessity will be found here, as well as in Jamaica; for when a whole people is reduced to slavery, the more abhorrent to na- ture that condition is, the more fatal would be the effects of unsubdued resistance. " The wretch that was burnt, was made to sit on the ground, " and his body being chained to an iron stake, the fire was ap- " plied to his feet. Fie uttered not a groan, and baw his legs re- <( duced to ashes with the utmost firmness and composure. After f< which, one of his arms by some means getting loose, he snatch- tf ed a brand from the fire that was consuming him, and flung it in " the face of the executioner. " The two that were hung up alive, were indulged, at their " own request, with a hearty meal before they were suspended on " the gibbet, which was erected in the parade of the town of " Kingston. From that time until they expired, they never ut- " tered the least complaint, except only of cold in the night ; but " diverted themselves all day long in discourse with their country- " men, who were permitted, very improperly, to surround the " gibbet. On the seventh day, a notion prevailed among the " spectators, that one of them wished to communicate an important " secret to his master my near relation * who being in St. Mary's " parish, the commanding officer sent for me. I endeavoured by *' means of an interpreter to let him know that I was present, but 11 I cculd net understand what he said in return. I remember ft that both he and his fellow-sufferer laughed immoderately at " something that occurred : I know not what. The next morning " one of them silently expiied, as did the other on the morning of" " the ninth day." (History of. West Indies, Vol. 2, Book 4. Chap. 3.) 48 A French government too. would naturally form ex- aggerated notions of the danger arising from any effer- vescence of popular discontent. Under the old regime in Paris, mobs were some- times raised in the Fauxbourgs, during a scarcity of bread ; when, instead of turning out the constables, reading a riot act, or even giving warning to disperse on the arrival of a military force, a troop of horse coolly rode in among them, and used the sabre, till the streets were cleared, at the expence of many lives. Since that period, the Parisian mobs have furnished some apology for their having been formerly controuled by such sanguinary means; and so far is Bonaparte from being disposed to brook the smallest demonstration of popular discontent, that he lately told the citizens of Berlin, their Sovereign had deserved to be dethroned, because he had not taken vengeance of them for break- ing the windows of an obnoxious minister. The British multitude would have a new lesson to learn therefore, or would be fatally misunderstood by their new masters. They would have to renounce, their hisses, their cat-calls, their Green men, and broad- faced orators, and must be careful how they even huz- zaed too loudly, should they still find any subject of applause. A tenth part of the tumult of the late Westminster election, would be enough to cover our pavements with the dead or wounded, and tinge our sewers with blood. The clubs, and numerous associations which now abound among our middle and lower classes, would also be liable to dangerous misconstructions. They would, no longer, indeed, have any of those 5 49 interesting objects of union, the forming funds for mutual support in sickness, old age, or temporary loss of employment, the securing reversionary interests to surviving relatives, or any of the Various other useful purposes* to which our national taste for clubs has been made subservient. The wreck of our funds, would have ruined all these humble but beneficent establish- ments ; and the prudence of the Poor, disappointed in its present confidence, would no more be listen to the advice of the benevolent, so as to provide, by timely sacrifices, against the ordinary evils of their situation. But convivial, and other private motives, of union* might still draw men together in numbers alarming to the jealousy of a foreign Government ; the ignorance or malevolence of a spy might misrepresent their inten- tions ; and Englishmen, might soon find it dangerous to assemble beyond the limits of a family circle, though they should abstain from the consolation of lamenting together over their wrongs, and the sorrows of their Country. Our appetite for public news, and our propensity to political discussion, would give further occasion of fre- quent offence to the ruling powers, and often provoke the scourge of a rigid police, till we had learnt the hard lesson to forget the liberty of speech, as well as the freedom of the press. But it would be endless to anticipate all the instances, in which our present civil happiness^ would then be- come a source of pre-eminent misery. Every distin* guihing feature of our national character, would be offensive, or alarming to our new masters. An entire revolution in our manners, our feelings, and opinions* E 50 must be effected, before we could have such rest as the prostration of habitual servitude affords. Meantime if France has chastised other nations with whips, she would punish us with scorpions. Among the direct and comprehensive modes of oppression, to which rich and poor would be equally subjected, military conscriptions are of course to be reckoned. It cannot be imagined, that our Conqueror would treat us in this respect better than his other pro- vinces : and as compulsory service in foreign Countries, has been hitherto unknown to us, we should feel this s pecies of tyranny also, more keenly than our neighbours. The flower of the British youth, of all ranks, would soon be compelled to take up the musket, and to bleed and die, in distant climates, for the glory of the Great Nation. But this is a subject which I shall have occa- sion to reconsider, in one of its most striking relations ; I will not therefore enlarge upon it now. Sec. 9 Subversion of our religious liberties. Servants of God, sincere professors of the religion of Jesus, suppose not that in this rapid and imperfect sketch of the calamities with which French conquest would overwhelm our Country, I have forgotten, or mean to pass unnoticed, the grand interests of piety and virtue. On these, however, I need not much insist; for men who know how to value them, are not among the listless or careless observers of the scourge that is im- pending over us. Neither need they in general to be taught, how closely the cause of religion is associated with the liberty and independency of our country. The church of Christ, indeed, is " built upon a rock* 61 and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," The word of omnipotence is pledged for its security ; and it may therefore defy the floods of civil revolution, and the conflagrations of conquest. But it pleases divine providence, to accomplish its purposes in human affairs., chiefly by human hands; and though true, religion has never been propagated by arms, yet the-. defensive courage of nations, has sometimes been em- ployed as the instrument of its protection. Witness the glorious reign of our own Elizabeth, and the co- temporary triumphs of religious liberty in Holland. We are not now menaced by a Philip the second ; but have a far more dangerous enemy ; and if any man suppose that he would long spare our religious, after trampling on our civil freedom, he must have examined very carelessly the character, and the policy of Buona- parte. That this man of blood, this open apostate from Christianity, is not what he has the impious grimace to affect to be, a truly penitent son of the Roman church, and zealous for her superstitions, I fully admit. Be- yond doubt he still is, what he was by education, a despiser of revealed religion in all its forms; and pro- bably, as such men commonly are, profoundly ignorant of its nature. But that as an engine of state, he sets a high value upon the Romish faith, has been evident from his conduct, ever since he first seized upon the sovereign power in France. He perceived that the influence of the Priesthood, and the authority of an infallible Church, might be made useful supporters of iiis throng ; since by their aid, he might remove from E 2 02 the minds of the pious, the horror they felt at lig usurpation ; and even transfer to himself, the benefit of those religious sanctions, which bound them to their lawful Sovereign. But though he could entirely govern the Pontiff, a$ well as the Bishops and Clergy ^ there was one great drawback on the immediate effect of this policy, in the general infidelity and ignorance of the people; for while Popery and Christianity had been subverted together, in the minds of multitudes who were once believers in the Gospel, few among that great part of the nation, which had been born or educated since the Revolution, had been at all instructed in religion of any kind. He had in great measure, therefore, to rebuild that engine of popish superstition, with which he was desirous to work. To this end he has long assiduously laboured ; and, among other means, has lately procured a new cate- chism to be drawn up, and established by the papal authority, for the use of the French church, in which all the old errors and superstitions of popery are strongly inculcated, and maintained, by such miserable sophistry, as is commonly used in their support. In this respect it is well adapted to the capacities of boys, and of adults in the lower ranks of society 3* and on * I have not room for any long specimen of its stile ; but the following extracts, of some of the propositions of faith, may suffice to prove that Napoleon's popery, has not at all degenerated from the standard of Leo the 10th. Q^ What is the sacrament of the Eucharist ? A. The Eucharist is a sacrament which contains, really and substantially, the body, blood, soul, and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, under the forms or appearance of bread and wine* the whole, a more ingenious composition for his purpose could not have been framed. With the solemn sane- Q. Why after having spoken to God, do you address the holy virgin ? A. That she may offer our prayers to God ; and that she may assist us by interceding with him for us, Q^ Is it good and useful to pray to the saints f A. It is very good, and very useful, to pray to them. Q^ Why do you add the satisfaction of the saints, to that of Jesus Christ ? A. Because of the goodness of God, who is willing, on the behalf of his most pious servants, to forgive the other. 0. Why besides ? A. Because the satisfaction of the saints are united to that of Jesus Christ, whence they derive all their value. Q^ When did Jesus Christ, give the priests the power of remitting sin? A. When he said to them in the person of the Apostles, "receive the Holy Ghost ;" sins shall be forgiven to those to whom you shall remit them, and they shall be retained to those, to whom you retain them. Q. Do you believe only what is written ? A. I believe also what the Apostles have taught by word of mouth, and which has always been believed in the Catholic Church. Q. How do you call this doctrine ? A. I call it the unwritten word of God, or tradition. Q^ Why is the Catholic Church called Roman ? A. Because the Church established at Rome is the head, and the mother of all other Churches. Q^ Why do you ascribe this honour to it ? A. Because at Rome the chair of St. Peter was established, and of the Popes his successors. Q. What do you understand by the words, " I believe the Church ?" A. That the Church may always continue ; that all it teaches must be believed, and that to obtain eternal life, one must live and 4ie in its bosom, M tion of the Pope's Bull, an archiepiscopal mandate, and an Imperial decree, in its front it is now carefully cir- culated, and assiduously taught, in every parish of the empire. If it were possible, on a contemplation of Buonaparte's general conduct and character, to question whether superstition, or policy, had kindled his zeal for restor- ing the faith, he has, by the spirit of this curious in- strument, removed all doubt on the subject. A gentle- man who has just published an English translation of it, justly remarks, that * the moral duties which it " specifies, are all on one side ; that what inferiors pretty plainly intimated, in the solemn instruments prefixed to his new catechism. But let the reader judge for himself. €t The constant prayer of the Church, dearly beloved no pledge or security whatever against his pursuing the most hostile and treacherous conduct. We have heard much lately of the uti possidetis^ but this basis, from the offer of which the enemy rece- ded in respect of the shore, he cannot be expected to extend to the sea. If he would apply it to the relative situations of the British and French navies, allowing us to keep the exclusive possession of the ocean, and en-, gaging neither to increase his marine, nor send his fleets out of port, nor prepare seamen to man them hereafter* the true spirit of the utl possidetis might apply to the present new and extraordinary case ; in which, as Napo- leon himself admits, the dominion of the sea is in our possession ; and is an advantage which forms our only counterpoise to his tremendous continental power. But since this application of the principle cannot be hoped for or proposed, the specious basis for which wer so eagerly contended, would in truth be fallacious and unequal. It would leave to France all her present means of annoyance ; and soon deprive us of that ex- treme ascendancy at sea, which is our chief mean of defence. It is like the equality of proposing to a man that has a shorter sword than his enemy, that each shall keep his pistols, provided he will come out of the house in which he has taken shelter, or let the door be open to both. Napoleon, however, thought even this bad bargain too good for us, when he found us ready to accept it i or rather, as we were disposed to leave him possessed of every usurpation in Europe, he postponed the agree- ment, till he should have usurped a still larger share ©f the Continent ; and thrown down every remaining outwork by which we might hope to be in any degree covered, when no longer irresistible on the ocean,, 1 doubt not, that when his continental enemies shall have been brought to acquiescence in a new manufac- tory of kingdoms, out of the ruins of their power, he- will again offer to us the uii possidetis* In yielding to us the sovereignty of new colonies and settlements beyond the Atlantic, or in the extre- mity of Africa, he well knows that he shall give us no 6 73 means of future security against his arms ; but on the contrary, increase those fatal drains which exhaust our defensive energies. What can a man who wishes to conquer England, desire better, than to give her new colonies to garrison, in the sickly swamps of Guiana ; and new civil and military establishments to maintain, at the Cape of Good Hope? He professes indeed to place a great value on colonies ; and perhaps, consider- ing the situation of France, might reasonably do so, but new distant territory to Great Britain, is like new projections from the upper floors of a building which already overhangs its base. If, however, Buonaparte were short sighted enough not to perceive that we should be enfeebled by such acquisitions, he knows at least that the free use of the sea, is worth to him a hundred such colonial cessions, as the uti possidetis would give us. We should in effect pay him a large compensation for the spoils of his allies in the colonies ; while he would retain the enormous spoils of our allies in Europe, without pay- ing for them anv compensation at all. I cannot think, therefore that he has receded from this offered basis, exceot for a short interval, and with a view to finish his usurpations on the continent, before he accepts our comprehensive sanction of them in a new treaty of peace. Supposing this basis unsafe for us, what other it may be asked, would be less so ? I answer, what in the existing posture of affairs is. diametrically opposite, the stales quo ante helium, for ourselves and our allies. But this, it may be exclaimed, it would be prepos- terous to expect at present from France. I admit it 4 7 79 and therefore it would be preposterous to expect at present a peace safe for Great Britain The impossibi- lity consists in this, that France will not relinquish her new possessions on the continent ; and that there- fore Great Britain cannot safely relinquish her undivided possession of the sea. We cannot do so, not only be- cause we should, by opening the sea to our enemy, enable him soon to become a formidable maritime pow- er, but because his usurped Empire on shore, would become far more terrible and irresistible than it is, were its commercial communications restored. We dare not give him back his navigation, and let him keep all his new territory too. These principles, in any day but the present, would have needed no demonstration. If we can safely make peace with France in her present most alarming atti- tude, we have been fighting since J 792, and even in all our wars since the treaty of Ryswick, not only with- out necessity, but upon the most irrational and ex- travagant views that ever governed the policy of a nation. To the argument : " How can we now hope to redeem " the continent by war ?" — I answer, its redemption by peace, is at least equally hopeless. Let us therefore, if the continent be indeed irrecoverably lost, look well to what remains, — to the last hope of Europe, as well as our own nearest interest, the safety of the British Islands. There was a time perhaps, when it might have been more prudent to open the sea to France, leaving her in a state of great continental aggrandizement, than to. risque her pushing her conquests still further, if that, could have been prevented by any pacific conventions that we had power to make* for ourselves and oilt allies ; but if there was ever a proper season for such policy, it plainly exists no longer ; and this, not only because our enemy has shewn that no confidence can be placed in any treaty which opposes his thirst of univer- sal empire ; but because it may now fairly be doubted, whether any further increase of his dominions, would really add to his power. For my. own part, however singular the opinion may seem, I should have less apprehension of dinger from the arms of Napoleon, if the. remaining territories of Prussia, and Austria, and even the immense domains of Russia, and Turkey, were added to his conquests, than I feel at the present moment. At sea, the acquisition of every bottom still friendly to this country, would not now enable him to cope with us ; and on shore, he has power enough already for our destruction, when it can be brought into action against us. The mo- mentum of the vast machine, on its present scale, is more than we can hope finally to resist : but every enlargement of its dimensions, and multiplier* tion of its intricate movements, increases its tenden* cies to interior derangement ;" and therefore, without adding to our immediate peril, improves our chance of escape. Buonaparte has hitherto been so astonishingly prudent, or fortunate, that we naturally begin to doubt whether there be any thing too difficult for him to ac* cornplish i but his power is already composed of so many discordant elements, that their cohesion is truly wonderful : and as be proceeds, he is gaming at double or quits. Even the large armies, which he has to sta- 81 tion in so many conquered countries, will soon be very difficult to govern : They, or their generals, will proba - bly recollect, that the Roman legions bestowed the pur- ple, as well as kept the provinces in subjection ; and revolutions in this extraordinary age, move with a ce- lerity of which history has no example. But if it be still thought that we have cause to dread the further extension of French Empire on the Continent, it is a danger against which Peace can furnish no degree of security. Napoleon will not treat our mediation or remonstrances now, with more deference than he did after the treaty of Amiens. I conclude, therefore, that in relaxing by a Peace, that naval and commercial embargo to which the enemy is now subjected by our fleets, and enabling him there- by to replenish his treasury, and restore his marine, we should incur very formidable new dangers, without at all diminishing the old. We should not check, but accelerate, the growth of his tremendous power on the Continent ; while we should give him the opportunity of building that bridge for it to the British Islands, which is now happily wanting. If Peace would not diminish the power of Napoleon to prepare means for the conquest of England, still less would it remove his present hostility to our indepen- dence and freedom. In truth, it is impossible, that he should ever cease to regard our subjugation as the first and most necessary object of his policy. His throne cannot be stable, while civil liberty remains unsubverted in any part of Europe ; and though freedom is every where the object of his hatred and dread, yet it is particularly terrible to him G 8% Here. With such a neighbour as the British Constiti^ tion, he knows that his military despotism can never cea c :e to be invidious and odious in France. Equally impossible is it, that new subjects of conten- tion, should not soon and often arise. Already he justly foresees one of them, which he is by no means prepared to tolerate, in the freedom of our press; and therefore has modestly proposed its abolition by Act of Parlia- ment, as essential even to that temporary peace, which he is willing, for his own purposes, to accord to us. If be did not press that demand as an indispensible condi- tion of the Treaty lately projected, it only proves the more clearly, that he either was in sincere in negoci- ating for a Peace, or meant to make use of it as a mere stratagem the better to insure our destruction. But supposing that he really means to live in peace with a country, whose news-writefs shall dare to di- vulge and arraign his crimes, it is an intention to which he would be incapable of adhering. He is not less proud or irascible now, than before he had assumed the title of Emperor, or won the battle of Austerlitz; and yet during the last peace, he resented with great indigna- tion the censures of our press. What then is to be done ? He disdained in fche case of M. Peltier the satisfaction of a prosecution at law^ nor would he consent to distinguish between strictures- such as our courts might deem libellous, and' those remarks upon his public conduct, which might be with- in the strictest limits of allowable public discussion^ We know his system of government for the press, and t\)Q policy on which it is founded. Nothing, accord- ing to his maximsj, ought to be published, wheFeby a m tyrant may be rendered deservedly odious at home, o a conqueror be obstructed in his schemes against the in* dependency of foreign nations. Even political rumours in conversation, are with him capital crimes. When it ^vas lately reported in Hanover, that a Russian army was marchings for that country, the French Governor publicly announced that such rumours were by the law of France, punished with death* We know too, by Mr. Palm's case, with what ven- geance Napoleon pursues the offences of a foreign press, when he has the power to punish. To proclaim in a neutral country, the dangers with which Europe is menaced by his ambition, is with him an atrocious crime ; and intitles him to trample on the rights of nations, as well as of individuals, in order to avenge it. Are we prepared then to prohibit our press from di- vulging even such enormities of this man's conduct, as it may most behove the people of England to know ? If not, what hope of abiding peace with Buonaparte ? I will not insist on the danger of quarrels on account of his future outrages against other nations, and his usurpations of new kingdoms and colonies in time of peace ; for to all this we must of course be prepared to submit. It would be grossly inconsistent to go to War again for such causes, if we make peace at the- present juncture ; nor would the people of England be easily brought to engage again in a foreign quarrel, when persuaded that the most enormous aggrandise- ment of France is compatible with their own peace and security. Buonaparte, therefore, must be left to act as he did after the treaty of Amiens \ and to take if he G 2 84 pleases the rest of the world, as the price of abstaining awhile from war against the British dominions. But our commerce, and our navigation, would be- come sure subjects of early dispute, unless we were willing tamely to submit, to injuries fatal to our trade, to our revenue, and maritime power. It is impossible, when we consider Napoleon's maxims of commercial policy, to doubt that he will avail him- self, as soon as the sea is open, of all his enormous power and influence, to exclude us by means of treaties, and of municipal laws, not only from France, but from every other country in Europe, to the Govern- ment of which he can dictate. With a sincerity un- usual to him, he has already pretty plainly intimated that such will be his pacific system, by protesting, in limine, when he began to negociate, against every stipulation in favour of our commerce. He would have no commercial treaties with us whatever. And here I must own myself quite at a loss to com- prehend the views of those, who regard the interests of our commerce and manufactures, as considerations on the side of peace. That such is not the opinion of our merchants in general, is well known ; and yet they judge perhaps only from the necessary effects of a free peace competition against them, under the present great disadvantages of the country, without taking into the account the unfair preferences and exclusions, to be systematically opposed to them in foreign Coun- tries. Who that attentively considers the spirit of Napo-- leon's late decree against our commerce, can be insen- sible to the danger of his acting on the same principle m m time of peace? He might then perhaps find means td carry into effect, what he now impotently threatens. The necessities of his subjects, and of the subjects of his allies and dependents, will secure to us their custom during war, in spite of his prohibitions ; for it cannot be supposed that our Government will omit to employ the obvious means of counteracting them. I hope rather that we shall embrace the fair opportunity which it affords of asserting more firmly our maritime rights, r.nd thereby giving new vigour to British commerce. But when we shall have no longer the power of opposing to regulations on shore, the pressure of our hostilities by sea; when the ships of France, Spain, Holland, Genoa, and Venice, and all the other maritime Countries now hostile to us, shall be able to navigate without interruption, on every voyage, and with every species of merchandize ; the same interdict on our trade, in the inoffensive form of municipal laws, may produce the desired effect, and gradually exclude us from almost all the ports of Europe. Commerce, it is true, will force its way in spite of prohibitions, where the demand and the profits suffici- ently excite the enterprise of the merchant; but it is difficult to believe that the manufactures and trade of this country, under the extreme pressure of our public burthens, will long retain inherent energy enough in the comparative cheapness and skill with which they are conducted, to supplant other maritime nations, ia their own, or neighbouring markets ; and if by a hostile system which we cannot retaliate, they shall be further encumbered with all the disadvantages and risques of a contraband carriage, while our' rivals can trade safely. 86 and with every encouragement that commercial lav\s cm afford, I see not how we can hope long to main- tain the unequal contest. In this view, the compari- son between peace and war is plain and simple. Na- poleon is fully resolved to deprive us of the commerce of the continent ; but in war, he has the inclination without the power; in peace he will have both. He holds the continental gates of the market ; but in war we command all the roads that lead to it, and can therefore'starve him into the admission of our trade : — in peace, the roads will be free to him, and he will still command the gates. Let me not be understood to propose commercial advantages as motives of war; but when the ques- tion is of abandoning a contest, on a firm perseve- rance in which our liberty and national existence may depend, from the dread of ruin to our manufactures and trade; it is right to consider how these would be affected by peace. Let it be shewn therefore what reason we have to hope, that Buonaparte would be disposed to spare them. He must willingly abstain in this respect from lawful means of depressing a rival, or we should probably soon have to choose between the ruin of our commerce, and the recommencement of war. The last, and most decisive objection to Peace, is that Napoleon clearly cannot be trusted ; and has now so con>pletely broken down the balance of Europe, that he nas no guarantee to offer to us for his observance of any treaty that he may make. That he is faithless, is sufficiently notorious ; and what is worse, he feels no restraint from a regard to character, but is on the contrary, vain of his fraudful m policy. This. trait in the character of that, extraordi- nary man, has not, in my apprehension, excited all the attention that it deserves ; for it is in a high degree curious and important. Other conquerors have been perfidious ; but I can recollect no instance of any other sovereign, who was proud and ostentatious of his contempt for truth and justice, both in the cabinet and in the field. To the intelligent reader, instances of this peculiarity in Napoleon, may perhaps readily occur. The Egyptian expedition, a creature of his own, abounded, from first to last, with proofs of it. His dispatches, under a thin veil of expression, too flimsy even to de- ceive the lowest of the vulgar, and used only to make his address conspicuous, informed France and Europe of that foul perfidy, with which nations at peace with the Republic, Turks, Mamelukes, and Arabs, were alter* nately cajoled and deceived. The sanguinary means of conquest, were also coolly narrated ; and Denon, in his account of the expedition to Upper Egypt, publish- ed at Paris under the auspices of Buonaparte himself, needlessly enlarges upon the barbarities committed by the French army in the villages of the miserable Cophts, as if they added to the honours of his patron. He took care also that his impious hypocrisy in that country, should be perfectly understood in France^ His open disavowal of Christ, in his proclamations to a Mahometan people, and his assumption of the name of Ali, to countenance the pretence of his being a con- vert to their faith, appeared, if I remember right, in his official dispatches* as well as in his Egyptian state papers; and it is probable, that the desire of being ad- 8S mired for his address at home, more than the hope of any direct benefit from the cheat among the Mussul- mans, was the motive of that vile expedient. His late elaborate though contemptuous answer to the Prussian manifesto, is evidently an instance of simi- lar conduct. The absurd policy into which he had long betrayed the unfortunate monarch, is artfully pointed out to the notice of every observant reader; and those measures which were the result of a fatal complaisance for, and confidence in the Usurper himself, are held up as having exposed their credulous and simple author to the distrust and hatred of Austria, and thereby prepared his fall. In publishing Sebastiani's report, he gave, according to Mr. Pitt's observation, a greater cause of war than even the insidious mission of that agent ; and yet i twas evidently published, not for the sake of insulting the Powers with which he was then at peace, but for the sake of exhibiting his state-craft, and contempt for the obligation of treaties. Other instances, not less striking, might be found in his European policy ; and if so strange a singularity of character were still doubtful, we might borrow a stiij stronger illustration of it from a case well known in the West Indies ; and which, though little noticed in this country, was recorded in the Paris Gazettes. I mean not the well-known treachery towards Toussaint, but the treatment of Pelage, the chief leader in Guada- loupe, and the black army under his command. The negroes in that Island, remained perfectly quiet and obedient to their masters, through the most trying revolutionary times, till Victor Hugues, and his bra- tlier commissioners, arrived with a decree for their en- franchisement, in the summer of 1794; and by their help, reconquered the Island from the British army, to which it had surrendered. From that time to the Peace of Amiens, the new citizens not only defended the Island for France, when she had no other posses- sion left in the Antilles, but enabled her to do infinite mischief to the neighbouring British colonies ; and powerfully diverted our arms and treasure from the European contest, at the most critical period of the war. Interior subordination and good conduct, accompa- nied these important services ; and Buonaparte himself on the restitution of peace, publicly praised these black patriots, whose freedom was then anew most solemnly guaranteed by the state, and by himself, for having maintained the Island in a state of great agricultural value. He added, by way of apology to the planters, that " it would cost humanity too much to attempt a there, a new revolution.'* At the same moment, however, he sent a new Governor, La Crosse, with an army, to restore slavery and the cartwhip ; and that officer was proceeding to execute his instructions, when the negroes, under Pelage their chief leader, resisted, and drove him from the island. They acted, nevertheless, with the utmost huma- nity and moderation ; and sent a very loyal address to the Chief Consul, humbly justifying their conduct, , imputing the strange attempt of La Crosse to a breach of his orders, and offering to receive dutifully any other Governor whom the Republic might chuse to send. Napoleon took them at their word ; and Richepanse, 90 whom he sent out with new and most solemn declara- tions that liberty should be inviolably maintained, was i^ceived by Pelage and the chief part of his black army, with all the honours due to the representative of the republic. A part however of the negro arfay, being less credulous after what they had recently wit- nessed, refused to obey his orders ; upon which Pelage marched his loyal troops against them, and after several bloody conflicts, completely suppressed all resistance to the authority of the new governor. The last body of the disaffected negro soldiery that held out, consisting of some hundreds, took shelter in a fort, and when they found it no longer tenable against their numerous and brave assailants, followed a memorable example of ancient resolution in the cause of liberty, by setting fire to their magazine. The ex- plosion, not only saved every one of these intrepid men from the whips of the drivers, but was fatal to many of their brave deluded brethren, who were approaching to storm the walls. Buonaparte, in his Gazette account, paid a very high tribute of praise to the astonishing gallantry of Pelage and his black battalions, by whom such determined enemies had been subdued. But what was their imrne- diatereward? To be treacherously divided, seized at their different posts by surprize, sent on board transports, and,as was supposed in the neighbouring Islan-ds,drown- ed atsea. The only reason for imagining that the report of their being destroyed in that mode, may not have been universally true 3 is that at the commencement of the present war, an article appeared in some French news- 91 papers, importing that Pelage was set at liberty from a prison in France ; but it was probably only designed to inspire a fear into our Government, that this brave leader might again be employed to annoy us in the Antilles : for neither he, nor his exiled followers, have since been heard of I do not cite this case for the very needless purpose of shewing that Buonaparte is perfidious in the highest degree, but to prove that he is proud of that quality ; for this unparalleled instance of fraud and ingratitude, though notorious in the West Indies, would pro- bably never have been fully known in Europe, if he had chosen to conceal it; and he had actually con- cealed the cause of the expulsion of La. Crosse, toge- ther with the loyal address of Pelage and his country- men, for the sake of suppressing the disgraceful result of his first attempt on negro liberty in Guadaloupe, till he received accounts of the success of his second perfidious stratagem. But as soon as he learnt from Richepanse, that all the military negroes were destroy- ed, and their unarmed cultivators in his power, he fill- ed the columns of the Moniteur with their address, though then several months old ; and a few days after, announced all the events that followed ; relating coolly the arrest and deportation of Pelage and his troops, without even accusing them of a fault, or suggesting any other excuse, for that unexampled perfidy of which they were the victims. Such is the man, whose good faith must now be our only security for his maintaining the duties of peace, or observing the conditions of Treaties. Were he, while bound by pacific conventions to us, sudden- fy to land an army in Ireland or Great Britain, h£ would rather boast of, than blush for, the stratagem. Much less would he be ashamed of insidiously stirring t>p against us new and dangerous wars in India, for which he would immediately prepare, when the sea should be no longer impervious to his emissaries and his droops. The difficulties of making peace with enemies of a faithless character, have heretofore been commonly ob- viated or lessened, by the mediation and guarantee of powerful neutral states ; cr where these have not thought fit directly to interfere, a treaty has still been held the less insecure, because other nations likely to censure, perhaps to assist in avenging, any flagrant act of perfidy, were privy to the compact. But France, having left in the civilized world no independent Power but England at all capable of annoying her, has no longer any thing to fear, nor have we any thing to hope, from the interference of other States. Is there any reason then to expect that the sense of self interest, or the political maxims of Napoleon, will lead him to adhere to his pacific engagements? On the contrary, were his revenge and hatred towards us, and even his dread of the example of our civil liberty, removed, still he would feel it necessary to crush a power which so obstinately opposes the march of his ambition. It is a common error, of which we find many fatal examples in history, to suppose that a mind inflamed with the lust of conquest and dominion, has set certain bounds to its desires ; and that by allowing it the quiet possession of present usurpations, it will be sated and - 9$ - become quiescent. As well might we expect the flames to subside, because the conflagration is already enor- mous, while there is fresh fuel within reach of their spires. The prodigious ascent of Buonaparte, is alone a sure earnest, that he will never rest, while it is possible to mount any higher. — A mighty monarch, who inherited his throne from his ancestors, may greatly aggrandize himself by conquest perhaps, without giving decisive proof of an ambition absolutely boundless : but what I can be capable of satisfying the man, who when sud- denly elevated from a private station, to the throne of the Bourbons, and possessed of a dominion greater by far than the Bourbons ever possessed, could not for a moment be content ? It is not enough for him, that his own brows are bound with an Imperial diadem. — He must set crowns also on the heads of all his near relations and connections. Nay his friends and follow- ers, must be raised to the rank of Princes, and placed on a level with the most illustrious houses of Europe, Is it in nature that ambition like this, will ever re- spect any limits over which it is possible to vault ? What human passion was ever diminished by excessive indulgence, while the power of its more extensive grati- fication remained ? Let it be recollected that the appetite of a con- queror is, not to enjoy dominion, but to acquire and extend it ; or rather, to find in that favou- rite work, new sources of military fame. He values a kingdom after it is subdued, no more than the sports- man a fox or hare, after it is run down . the pleasure is in the pursuit. Alexander understood this, though bis friend Parmenio did not, when Darius offered 94 half his dominions to save the rest, together with his daughter in marriage. " I would accept the proposal/* said the friend, " were I Alexander," — cc so would I 9 9 * replied the conqueror, " were I Parmenio." In a word, when we consider attentively the peculiar force of this destructive passion, in the breast of Buona^ parte, and the abstinence from its gratification which must be the price of a durable peace with England, his personal feelings, still more than his interest or his policy, render his adherence to a pacific system utterly hopeless. For these reasons, as well as others, the policy of treating with France at the present conjuncture* is by no means like that which prevailed at the close of the last war. The treaty of Amiens, was, I then thought* and still think, a wise and laudable measure. Buonaparte had not then given unequivocal proof that he was actua- ted by views incompatible with a true or lasting peace. On the contrary, there was reason to hope that he desired to build his future fame, and his domestic autho- rity, on that popular foundation. Besides, he had not then abolished the republican government, and estab- lished his power upon the basis of an absolute monarchy,, The popular voice in France therefore was likely to be respected, and it was decidedly in favour of peace. At the same time it seemed highly probable, that the strength of the republic, if not her warlike disposition* would decline, when the pressure of foreign hostilities should be removed* -and her discordant interior ele- ments be left to their natural motion. These are times When no man need be ashamed of erroneous calculations on such subjects 3 for the extrardinary "ctjurse of events has placed the most heedless 'rashness* 95 and most cautious circumspection, iri political judg- ment, nearly on a level. Now however, the character and system of Buonaparte are become matters not of speculation but experience, while, his power seems to be irreversibly established : consequently the hopes which justified the treaty of Amiens, could not now be rationally admitted, even if the state of Europe were equally favourable to peace. But the most important distinction between that case and the present, is to be found in the much altered, and now deplorable state of the Continent The great military powers, our natural allies, were then left in a condition to keep in check the ambition of France, by a timely union ; and in this we had some apparent security for her future moderation, which is now entirely lost. In this respect, the case is most decisively altered for the worse, even since the late negociationat Paris* Neither the example therefore of the administration which treated at Amiens, nor that of the present cabinet and Mr. Fox, would afford any sanction for a new experiment upon the good faith and moderation of France, after the battle of Auerstadt, and the total ruin of Prussia. Surely the ungrateful treatment, of that power, will convince us of the extreme folly of hoping to conciliate Napoleon by a timid pacific system. If not, we shall give a more striking instance than has yet been exhibit- ed of that infatuation which prepares for him his victims ; since England has at present a security in war, that neither Prussia nor Austria possessed. Such are my. reasons for thinking that a peace witk 96 Buonaparte, would not lessen, but aggravate our dan- gers. — Those who maintain the contrary, are prudent- ly sparing of explanations. They hold it enough to spread before our eyes the dangers and inconveniences of war, without shewing how they are to be diminished by peace j or what possible hope we have, that any peace we can make will be lasting. In a view to finances indeed, they say, how are we long to carry on the war ? — I admit the difficulty, but retort the question, how are we to carry on the peace ? Dares any Minister promise us a peace which will 50 far deliver us from the necessity of defensive pre- cautions, as greatly to diminish our expences ? — But to justify a negotiation in this view, its advocates should go much farther, and shew, that contrary to the calculations of our merchants, peace will make no shrink in our commercial revenue ; otherwise the diminution of import and export duties, may be more than equal to any possible saving of expenditure. Some Statesmen are said to assert, that we may by persevering in the system of finance, established by Mr. Pitt, soon find resources for prosecuting the war without any addi- tional taxes; but nobody I believe will maintain, that a peace destructive of our commerce would be consistent with any such hope. If our finances were likely to be improved in peace, it would be a new and decisive reason with Buonaparte for the speedy renewal of war. But without taking any such motive into the account, it must be, and is admitted., even by the most sanguine advocates for a Peace, that its duration would be in tjje highest degree i \ 97 precarious. We must therefore set against the very slen- der chance of financial savings by a pacific system, the probable and vast expence of renewing, at an early pe- riod, our war establishments, after they may have been broken up or reduced. When these considerations are fairly weighed, it will appear very doubtful whether a steady prosecution of the war be not the most economical, as well as the safest course, we can at present pursue. That would at least, I dare affirm, be the case, supposing the war to be conducted upon right principles, and such as the duty of self-preservation, at this awful crisis, demands. If we are still to persevere in military expeditions, to distant countries, those sure sources of enormous pecu- lation and waste, the war indeed may be costly enough j but if we wisely keep at home the army which maybe essential to cur domestic safety, act only on the defensive on shore, and assert firmly our belligerent rights on the ocean, we shall find it more frugal by far to continue at open war, than to suspend hostilities again for a year or two, by an anxious and dangerous peace. Such a use of our maritime power as the state of Europe, and of the world, would abundantly justify, and as the late conduct of the enemy invites, would give us means of maintaining the contest for fifty years if necessary, without an additional tax, except such as France, her Allies, and the States under her influence, would pay. The only additional argument for sheathing the sword that is commonly urged, appears to me perfect* ly frivolous, "If we continue the war, it is said, from a dread of making peace with France in her present state H 98 of aggrandisement, we may continue it for ever; for we cannot deprive her of her conquests." Permanent war, no doubt is a dreadful idea ; but let it be contrasted, as to meet fairly the present arguments for war, it ought, with permanent servitude to France, and perhaps its hor- rors will vanish. The objection however supposes, that because we cannot dislodge the enemy from his present possessions, they must of course be perpetual; and that all the other dangers which forbid a pacific system at the present alarming juncture, are also interminable. But if the ter- ritorial aggrandisement of France, and what is not less dangerous, the talents, strength, and ambition of her present government, are to last for ever, so much the less can we afford to divide with her the possession of the sea. If in that case, the naval power of the enemy is to vegetate long and freely upon the enormous fields of dominion now plowed up for its culture, farewell to every hope of our permanent safety : but we may now cut off from it by war, that maritime carriage and trade, which are essential to its nutrition and growth. For my part, I regard neither Buonaparte, nor his conquests, nor his ambitious system, as immortal ; though all may live long enough for the ruin of England, if we give him a peace at this juncture. Judging from historical examples, and natural pro- bability, which notwithstanding the strange occurrences of the age, we must still do, if we would anticipate future events, I cannot believe that the new erected empire of France will long survive the builder. It has been put together too hastily, and with too many un- seasoned materials, to be durable* It may even fait 99 by the rupture of that military scaffolding by which it was raided. The deposed Sovereigns may probably not be restored, nor the conquered nations delivered from a foreign master ; but it seems probable that the Captains of this second Alexander, will at his decease at least, if not during his life, carve out for themselves their respective kingdoms, without much respect for the claims of the Corsican family. He has already shewn them the way to take up crowns with the sword, and has whetted their appetite for Sovereign power, by the elevation of their comrades. France, therefore, may like Macedon, be soon glad to maintain her ancient borders against those who conquered in her name; and new political combinations, may produce a new balance of powers in Europe. The conqueror himself even, may possibly meet the fate of his brother Emperors, Csesar, and Dessalines ; and if we must at last fall, it will be something at least, to have escaped by a protracted war, the yoke of Buonaparte. We should dread subjection to this man, beyond all other foreign masters ; not only because he personally hates us, and all that is most noble among us ; but because, of all those scourges of mankind called con- querors, there has been none more truly odious. And here let me deprecate with just alarm, let me re- probate with honest indignation,the groveling sentiments that would ascribe to this phenomenon and reproach of our age, the character of a hero, or the appellation of Great. Should we unhappily fall under his yoke, we shall be compelled like Frenchmen to praise him -, but let us not prematurely teach our children to admire, or even to view him without abhorrence. It is of some Ha 100 importance to the cause of morals, and more to the temporal destiny of mankind, that the standard of heroism should not be reduced to the low level of Buonaparte. There has always been in the world a fatal propensity to admire those pests of our species, called conquerors, and to pay them in fame the wages for which they labour in the fields of blood. But this error has in general one excuse. We commonly observe in this mischievous race, as in the lion, a savage dignity at least, if not a generosity of character. Even in their crimes there is a sublimity, which inspires terror indeed, and perhaps indignation, but not disgust or contempt. How different the man, who after the battle of Auerstadt, could send forth those pitiful bulletins against an unhappy woman, and a Queen, which have appeared in the French Gazettes $ who has repeatedly indulged the same paltry spite against the unfortunate Queen of Naples, and the brave Englishman that foiled him in Syria; who refused to allow the body of the gallant old Duke of Brunswick to be laid in the tomb of his ancestors ; and who in the case of Trafalgar, and many other instances, has not scrupled to disgrace himself in the eyes of all Europe, by the grossest forgeries and falsehoods. I fear that the detestation due to this last mean part of Buonaparte's character, begins to wear out, from the frequency of its exhibition. Let us recollect then if we can, any other man in ancient or rnodern story, known by the appellation of Great, who ever stooped to the pitiful tricks of systematic falsehood, in their public relations of facts. To the dignity of ancient heroism the vice was utterly unknown i and though 101 in our modern wars with the Kings of France, accounts of battles are said to have been unfair, at least on the side of our enemies, the misrepresentations have been such as might, in good measure, be ascribed to the de- ceptious reports of subordinate commanders, or to the sincere partiality of self-love. The misrepresentations of the Brussels Gazettes became in the last reign pro- verbial ; yet the French King was probably more the dupe of flattery, than the author of wilful falsehood. Widely different however, were the glosses and strongest distortions of facts used in those days, from the shame- less effrontery which could represent our glorious vic- tory at Trafalgar as a battle in which we had lost fifteen or sixteen ships of the line, and forge letters from Gibraltar to confirm the vile imposture. There is even a generical difference between this mean habit of Napoleon, and the falsehoods ever before used by any Monarch who has stooped to this gro- velling vice. Deceits have been practised privately in the cabinet ; but they have been regarded, at least by those misjudging minds which used them, as the lawful circumvention of an enemy or a rival \ and such violations of truth, have commonly been perpetrated in the hope of escaping detection. But the mendacious Gazettes of Buonaparte, differ from such secret and particular crimes, as open prostitution, differs from a private intrigue. He publishes without a blush, relations the gross falsehood of which he knows to be notorious at the moment to every man in Europe, except those who are prevented from reading any newspapers but his own ; and which must soon lose their credit even with his own deluded subjects, 102 For a temporary domestic purpose, this mighty Mo- narch is content to incur an infamy from which eveiy gentleman shrinks with abhorrence, and the proper epithet for which is too low to sully these sheets. If any man can regard a contemptible trait of charac- ter like this, as compatible with true greatness, let him look to another criterion. There is a comity in heroism, and a sympathy between great minds, which have secured to illustrious characters when fallen, respect and kindness from their conquerors. Antiquity abounds with examples of such magnanimity, which we admire, though we feel, at the same time, that they could hardly be of difficult practice. But the pseudo- heroism of Buonaparte, has no such amiable feature. I will not stop to illustrate his odious want of sensi- bility in such cases, by instances to which Europe has been sufficiently awake ; but refer to one that appears to me the most remarkable and shameful. He had once an illustrious opponent, who attracted much attention in the present day, and will probably be still more admired in the calm view of future ages ; I mean that extraordinary African Toussaint. Napo- leon himself pronounced his eulogy in these terms, u Called by his talents to the chief command in St #< Domingo, he preserved the Island to France during " a long and arduous foreign war, in which she could u do nothing to support him. He destroyed civil II war, put an end to the persecutions of ferocious ft en, u and restored to honour the religion and worship ot u God, from whom all things come"* The praise • Speech of July or August, i8az, in the London Newspapers of August 9th. 5 103 when bestowed, was by no means excessive, or even adequate ; and yet Toussaint's subsequent conduct, added greatly to his former glory. Incorruptible, dis- interested, intrepid, and humane, he performed, in his last contest for freedom, actions that would bear com- parison with the most brilliant traits of ancient heroism and virtue ; and they were crowned by a triumph over the conquerors of Europe. We know too well the rest. Circumvented by the foulest fraud, he fell into the power of his unprincipled enemy. Here, however it might have been supposed, hostilit y would have ended, and generosity begun to act. Deliver- ed from the opposition of his arms, the usurper might have been expected to honour this extraordinary cha- racter, and take pride in rewarding his merit. The interesting singularity of his fortunes and extraction, as well as his worth, would have led a mind of any liberality to treat him with tenderness and respect. Though depressed in early life below the level of man- hood, he had risen to the rank of heroes. Before he mounted into the region of illustrious deeds, he had to cleanse his wings from the filth of a brutalizing bond- age : Yet he became a victorious general, a wise le- gislator, an enlightened statesman, and the chief of a people, formed by his own genius, from slaves and barbarians, into citizens and soldiers. He was never conquered $ and what is far higher praise, never faith- less, cruel, or unjust. In all the relations of private life, he was truly amiable s and to crown all, a pious Christian. Who, that ever pretended to the appellation of Great, except the vile Buonaparte, could have torn such a cap- 104 tlve from his beloved family, and thrown him into a dungeon to perish !! A Cassar or Alexander, would have honoured* a Timur or an Attila, would have spared, him ; but it was his hard lot to fall into the hands of an enemy, who adds to the ferocity of a savage, the apathy of a sceptic, and the baseness of a sham during the two last campaigns 5 for these, give him not oniy new ships, but the means of diverting the navy of England by a much wider extent than before, in ne- cessary foreign service.— -Unhappily, our own distant conquests, of which at this conjuncture^ we are unac- 1 115 coiintably fond, by no means lessen, but oil the contra- ry, encrease this advantage. It would be easy to enlarge on this subject, and to demonstrate clearly the facility of open invasion, by the sudden concentration of an inferior, during the disper- sion of a superior navy. But having many new topics yet to touch upon, I will rely upon what has already been offered, or rather on the plain nature of the case, in proof that we may probably be invaded by a very powerful army, notwithstanding our maritime power. On what human foundation then can we repose a tranquil confidence in the present state of the Country ? We have no inexpugnable fortresses, like Austria and Prussia ; no Alpine mountains, like Switzerland ; no dykes and means of inundation, like Holland ; no sandy deserts, like Egypt. All those impediments have been surmounted by our formidable enemy ; but he would find none such to oppose his progress in England. The torrent must be stemmed, if at all, by the force of our arms in the field. What then is this last retrenchment of the inesti- mable liberties of England ? What is this ulterior de- fence, against the most deplorable revolution that con- quest ever made j against miseries more dreadful, those of the devoted Jews excepted, than any people ever endured ? We have a regular arm)', which I will suppose to be in point of quality throughout, such as specimens of it have gloriously proved to be upon trial, both in Italy and Egypt, But it is widely dispersed, by a policy which at this arduous conjuncture I am quite at a loss to comprehend, upon foreign and distant services. I m Not less than five different British armies are said to- be at this moment employed in, or destined to, five- different regions of the globe : and I am really afraid to state the small amount to which some credible report^ now reduce the regular infantry actually within the realm. But it is not neccessary to my argument to ascer- tain such alarming facts : for were our whole army within? the island, it would still be very unequal, in point of numbers* to our defence, supposing an invasion to take place; on a sgale suitable to the magnitude of the object, and to the ordinary maxims of our enemy; Could our regular troops be collected at once from every part of the island^ they might find themselves greatly outnumbered But we should, through the great quickness of the ensmy's motions, be obliged to fight him previous to any general union of our forces* or give him possession of the Capital. A country so exposed by the extent of its assailable coast,' and by its defenceless interior situation as Eng- land, would perhaps hardly be safe from conquest, much less from ruin, when invaded* if it contained in it's whole extent, three soldiers for every enemy that should land on its shores-. Whereas France, if she in- vade us at all, will probably send^ a force exceeding that of our regulars and militia united. I suppose, it is trua, in this estimate, an equality of military charac- ter ; but I calculate also on* that new system of tactics- which is so formidable in offensive war, in which our enemies so fatally excel, and for which England presents to them a most favourable field. That daring confidence which never measures* Us difficulties in advancing, which reckons too surely on Victory, to make any provision for retreat, has been known ever since the days of Agathocles, to be most propitious to invaders \ and it has probably been partly owing to a more cautious character of war in modern ages, that the subversion of thrones by conquest, has been a very rare event in Europe, till the present disastrous times. But to this audacious spirit, our enemies have added an astonishing celerity of move- ments, which is perhaps still more peculiarly characteris- tic of their military system, and a greater cause of their success. The invaded country has no time to collect its proper domestic resources, much less receive succour from its allies $ it must submit to the ravages of a conqueror, or with such a force as it can bring in a moment into the field, stake its fate upon the issue of a battle. If a defeat be the event, the victors ad- vance with a rapidity that destroys every ulterior hope. It is the speed, not of an army, but a post. They bring the first news of their own victory to the dis- mayed capital ; and the flying divisions of the routed army, instead of meeting friendly battalions advancing to their support, find enemies in their front, as well as in their rear. Their utmost speed is arrested by their impetuous pursuers, and the passes by which they hoped to escape, are seized by hostile corps, who arrive at the defiles before them. It is then too late to call out an irre- gular defensive force; or even to collect the regular troops ffomdistant positions, and the garrisonsof interior towns* The invaders have seized upon the central points of union, have occupied every pass, and cut orTevery source of communication or concert, between the different dis* \% 116 tricts. The vital organs of the state too, are in theif hands, and they can controul all its functions. The disconnected efforts of patriotism and courage that may still be made in different places, are like the con- vulsive motions of members just severed from the body ; a mere semblance of life, momentary and useless. When I reflect upon the terrible effects of this impetuous warfare, by which Europe has been re- peatedly dismembered ; when I behold the last ex- ample of its force, in the yet rolling fragments of a mighty monarchy, which it has recently burst asunder; I am amazed and confounded, at the strange presump- tion of those who rely on our present means of inte- rior defence, while they admit the probability of invasion. It has been said I know, that though London were lost, the Country would still be safe. Were our proper defensive preparations fully made, it would be right to cherish that opinion. But it cannot be supposed that the metropolis would be given up without a battle ; and should we lose a battle first, and London after- wards, our fitial security must depend upon exertions equally difficult and precarious. I am at a loss, to comprehend the practical views upon which an opposite opinion can be founded. That the loss of the metropolis, would immediately follow the loss of a battle, unless we had a second army at hand to retrieve the miscarriage of the first, is evi- dent. What then would be our military reserve, supposing a regular army large enough to make a stand against the invaders, should be defeated ? "Our 117 volunteers, a hundred tongues will be ready to reply, are that grand ulterior resource; nay many of them, would be in the advanced guard of their Country. " The volunteers, I most cordially admit, will do all that their numbers, their degree of discipline, and their physical powers, animated by an ardent love of their country, and a high sense of honour, will enable them to perform. But of our volunteers, how small a part are really effective, in the proper sense of that term ; and how many are from age, bodily constitu- tion, and fixed habits of life, utterly unfit for the du- ties of the field. Far indeed is it from my intention, to detract from the merits of these corps, or to deny their high utilityand im- portance. I would most anxiously maintain, were it ne- cessary, that they are essential means for the perma- nent safety of the country; and, without believing that any member of the present cabinet ever entertained, or meant to express, a contemptuous estimate of their value, I lament that such an idea has unfortunately gone abroad. But it is one thing to applaud an institution in the abstract, and another to say that it has attained to practical perfection ; or that it is equal to the import- ant purposes for which it was designed. They who regard the volunteer corps, as radically unfit for the defence of their conntry, aYe, I am per- suaded, greatly mistaken : but on the other hand, they who suppose this defensive force to be, in its pre- sent state, sufficient to insure our safety, are in a far more dangerous error. Various objections have been made to these esta- J3 118 blishrpents on the score of discipline, which no candid friend to them will affirm to be wholly unfounded. A still more serious objection, however, is that both their discipline and their effective force, is very generally and rapidly declining. But what has always appeared to me the chief defect in these corps, and the natural source of their decay, is a vice in their original con- stitution i I mean the indiscriminate mixture of men of widely different ages, and bodily habits, of which they are composed. Of all qualities in a soldier, his physical powers are of the greatest importance; but more especially, when his services are likely to be of a severe and laborious kind ; and still more, when he is suddenly to be called from the habits of civil life, into actual service. I would by no means undervalue the effects of pa- triotic and military ardour, with which our volunteers, if opposed to an invading enemy, would, I doubt not be generally inspired. But though the body in suchj cases, may be powerfully sustained by the mind, there are limits to the possible effect of such an influence ; and the qualities of the inferior part of our natures will unavoidably determine, in a great degree, our powers of military exertion. It is not in the love of country, long to sustain under the sense of cold, hunger, and fatigue, a man of tender habits, who has passed the prime of his life without any acquaintance with such hardships. That our volunteers must unavoidably be in such respects inferior to regular troops, is evident. They are not inured, by long and constant practice, to the duties of a* military life : they are, for the most part* :mtn unaccustomed' even to those laborious branches of civil industry, which are the best nurseries for the army ; and a great majority of them, are inhabitants of cities and large towns; men of domestic and seden- tary habits, to whom, even exposure to the inclemency of the weather, is a novelty, and a hardship. But though some of these disadvantages are inhe- rent in the very nature of the institution in question, they certainly now exist in a much greater degree than was necessary. We have more townsmen, and fewer vil- lagers, among our volunteers, than we might and should have had, but for causes to be presently noticed. We have also more men of the middle and upper ranks of society, in proportion to the hardy poor, than would have been inrolled, if those accidental causes had #o.t existed. The most unfortunate defect of all, however, an$ which greatly aggravates the effects of all the rest, is one which might most the easily have been prevented, and which still admits of a remedy. I mean the num* ;ber of volunteers to be found in* every ,corj&, who have passed the meridian of life, or at least the age ofju- venile activity and vigour; and yet are jndiscrimi" nately mixed in the ranks, with much younger and abler associates. There is a seasonof life, when our ductile natures may be most easily bent to new habits j and when the elas- ticity of our muscles and animal spirits, is proof against the severest pressure. The same is the season, when brisk and vigorous action is luxury,, rather than fa- tigue; and what we are prone to, by the impulse of nature, even when duty points t© repose* The ima- h 120 gination also, is then powerfully impressed by the charms of novelty, in every employment ; and sym- pathies of all kinds, but especially in bold and ardent pursuits, have an irresistible influence. If man at such a season of life, has peculiar animal qualifications for a soldier, much more for a volunteer. If he be fit for gradual and permanent, much more for sud- den and unaccustomed, service in war; and especially if that service be of a brisk, active, and laborious kind. This season is early manhood. It may vary greatly as to age, in different constitutions ; but its limits, I con- ceive, are in general those of the French conscription ; namely, from eighteen to twenty-five. Some of these qualities, indeed, belong also toourboyhood, and some of them maybe unimpaired at thirty; but I speak of a time when the body has nearly, or fully acquired its ma- turity of strength, without any diminution of juvenile spirits, And here, though it may lead me to digress a little, and upon a subject with which I have no professional acquaintance, I will not suppress an opinion, that Frqnce owes her military success, in great measure > to the youth of her soldiers. It is a common remark, among those who have had the misfortune to see much of the French armies, that they are almost entirely composed of striplings, or very young men. And indeed how can the case be otherwise ? The slaughter of the sanguinary wars that have raged since 1792, must have left few veterans now remain- ing, who had served under their lawful sovereign ; and the requisitions, now called conscriptions, by which such immense armies have since been annually raised, kave not yet comprised a gingle man above the age of 1*1 twenty-five. Reckoning, therefore, from 1792, when that system began, the oldest soldier produced by it has not yet attained forty ; while an equal number at least, even of the earliest requisition, must be seven years younger. But supposing equal numbers to have been raised by it in each year, and to have comprised an equal proportion of men of every age, from eighteen to twenty-five, it would follow, that a majority of the whole, if living, would now be under twenty-nine. v The classes, however, who have served the greatest number of years, must, cceteris paribus, have been the most reduced by losses in action, and other casualties of war. Supposing, therefore, that in respect of natural causes of mortality, the chance of a youth of eighteen, to be found alive at the distance of fourteen years, only equals that of a man of twenty-five, it is plain that the surviving conscripts, of a later, must be far more numer- ous than those of an earlier requisition. Soldiers thus raised, have a right to be discharged, as I apprehend, when they have passed their twenty-fifth year j but since it is probably a right not much respected in time of war, I will take credit for little or no diminu- tion in the relative numbers of old and new conscripts on this account. But there remains another consideration of great im- portance; for it is evident, that each successive ccn^ scription, if impartially made, must include a larger proportion than the preceding one, of men in the earliest stage of the limited time of life. Supposing the last year's levy, for instance, to have been universal, there could be no. conscripts of the present year, returned emi- grants excepted, but such as have attained the age of ■ics eighteen, since the conscription of 1805* a nd con- sequently, whatever portion of the people may be ac- tually conscribed, unless there be a partial ex* emption of the younger classes, which we have no reason whatever to suppose, each successive levy under this system, while it is annually used, must produce a much greater proportion of soldiers of eighteen, than «*f any other age. But eighteen is probably found an age too early, in many -constitutions, for maturity of growth and strength ; and therefore I presume it is* that in the last conscription of 80,000 men, for service in the present year, Napoleon has required that they shall all be of the age of twenty, and no more. On the whole, it seems not too much to conclude, that while the French army comprises very few soldiers who have attained forty, agreat majority of the 600,000 men* of which it is said to consist, are under twenty-five. Unless this extraordinary circumstance in the con- stitution of the armies of France, can be regarded as of a neutral or indifferent kind in war, it must be ad- mitted to have favoured thc-ir success ; for we hav« wonders enough to account for in their atchievements, without supposing that so striking a physical peculia- rity, was a disadvantage to be overcome. In this respect, the composition of every army which they have conquered, has been very different. The Austrian and Prussian battalions, which they have so strangely overwhelmed, the latter especially, contained a large proportion of old or middle aged soldiers. Per- haps, with equal numbers to the French, they could have counted twice as many years. The same, I appre- 123 bend, has been the case with such Russian armies, as have been chiefly engaged in these disastrous wars. The British army, from its fatal employment in the West Indies, has, alas ! not much longevity. A great part of it, has been formed during the last and present war, by very young recruits; and this circumstance also seems, when we regard the success of our arms, rather to support, than oppose, the conclusion to which I reason. I am far from ascribing indeed, to the youth of our soldiery alone, the failure of the enemy's fortune in the field, when opposed to British battalions. The gallantry of our officers and troops, and their hereditary sense of superiority to our insolent neighbours, might sufficiently account for it. But the army of Egypt, I apprehend, had but a small proportion of veterans in the ranks ; and the brave corps which so well sustained the military fame of their country at Maida, were chiefly composed of very young men. I am aware that it has the air of heresy in the science of war, to regard men who have but just emerged from boyhood, as an overmatch for veterans in the field. But if there be any truth in the preceding observations, this is not merely an opinion; it is a fact; and the busi- ness is, not to prove, but explain it. The young sol- diery of France, have in fact, triumphed over the veteran troops of their continental enemies. Innumerable attempts have been made at different times, and in reference to the various disasters of our Allies^ to account for this uniform success of the enemy, by the treason of generals, the disaffection of troops, and by accidents of various kinds ; but the solutions- are all eithejr inadequate^ or highly incredible; as well 124 as inconsistent with each other. Let tis try then whe- ther this very disparity of age between the soldiers of the contending armies, may not, in spite of old re- ceived notions, go far to explain the whole. Buonaparte, and other French generals, have re- peatedly spoken of the old tactics with contempt ; and it is at length become fashionable, with those who have, as well as with those who have not, some little knowledge of the subject, to cry down the old art of war. We begin to look back on Marlborough and Turenne as drivellers, who did nothing great in com- parison with what they might have effected ; but spent half an age, in slowly attaining, what ought to have been the work of a month. If, however, Marlborough or Turenne had commanded the youthful revolutionary armies of France, I cannot help thinking that they would have discovered the same new methods of war- fare, which so many French generals have practised, and used. them with equal success: for great comman- ders in all ages, seem to have been men of strong natu- ral parts, who triumphed, not by a pedantic adhe- rence to established rules ; but by the application of plain common sense, to the circumstances in which they were placed. It was, I conceive, not difficult to discover that the cautious and dilatory system formerly in vogue, was not fit for those inexhaustible mul- titudes of ardent young soldiers, whom France in the delirium of her enthusiasm for liberty, poured forth upon her enemies. The situation of the Republic, at the first, prescribed impetuous and decisive operations; and what was per- haps then but a daring and necessary effort, became 5 1U afterwards from its signal success, an established new system of war. Without depreciating the value of the discovery, it may with probability be supposed to have been, like many others of great importance, the result of accident, rather than design. Buonaparte's genius may possibly be as great as his fortune; but the new tactics, were Moreau's before they were Buonaparte's, and Pichegru's before they were Moreau's. All I wish to establish however is, that the success of this new system, has been promoted by the peculiar and advantageous circumstance in question, the youth of the French soldiers. A Frenchman, from the viva- city of his nature, has a juvenile impetuosity even in sober manhood. How much more when sent into the field between 18 and 25. With such a soldiery it might have been difficult to sit down to sieges and blockades; or cautiously to watch the movements of an enemy, as on a chess board, through a tedious cam- paign : but it was easy to overwhelm him at once, by a rapid march, and an impetuous attack. One of the greatest advantages of this grand physical distinction, is the capacity which young men have of sus- taining for a long time, with far less inconvenience than their seniors, an excess of violent exercise; and of this Buonaparte has availed himself beyond any of his pre- decessors. It is perhaps the chief source of his supe- riority to them in brilliant atchievements. His asto- nishing march over Mount Cenis into the plains of Italy ; his still more rapid advance from Boulogne to Bavaria and Ulm ; what were they, but wonders per- formed by youthful alacrity and vigour. His enemies were taken by surprise, and ruined, because they thought 12ff such marches impossible ; and so they would really have been, to elderly or middle aged soldiers. By the same means, he has been able to make the fruits of a victory decisive, and the rout of an enemy irretrievable, beyond ail former example. Not to men- tion the celerity of his movements after the capitula- tion of Ulm, the late unprecedented fate of the Prus- sian army, subsequent to the battle of Auerstadt, affords too strong an instance of it. I have already touched on that painful subject; and if more need be offered to illustrate, the physical dispa- rity between the pursuers and the pursued, let General Blucher's narrative be read. He does not indeed re- mark, that his veteran soldiers were opposed to much younger men ; but the remark is needless. We find, that though traversing a friendly country, his soldier s were fainting with fatigue and hunger, and dropping, by fifties at a time, on the road ; so that at last he brought but a remnant of his original force in miserable plight to Lubeck ; while his more vigorous pursuers, followed close at his heels, passed as enemies through the same country which he had previously exhausted, arrived in full force, almost at the same moment with him on the coast of the Baltic, and in such unimpaired spirits, as to storm his batteries before they halted. The contradictions pub- licly given to this narrative by the enemy, certainly de^ serve little confidence ; otherwise they would greatly strengthen these remarks. But thus much cannot be denied — that the French had marched as many miles as the Prussians — that they must have set off with as little food, or else have been more encumbered on their way * and that a friendly territory, in which General Blucher, U7 by spreading his* army over a circumference of thirty miles, could hardly obtain refreshment, could not a few hours after, have yielded greater relief to his enemies. At the same time the brave old General speaks, in the highest terms, of the resolution and patience of his troops. They did therefore all that they could. Something, I admit, should be allowed in this case, for the difference between the elation of victory, and She dejection of defeat ; but no man of 50, or even 40, who remembers his own bodily powers and spirits at z$, will be at a loss for a more adequate cause of this disparity, between the conscripts of Buonaparte, and the veterans of Frederick the Great. How different was the case with Moreau ; in his famous retreat before the Archduke Charles, in the campaign of 1796 ? He had to make his way through a hostile country, from the Danube to the Rhine, by a most difficult route of three hundred miles in length ; and yet effected it with so little loss, that the retreat was held to be more glorious than a conquest. Yet nothing is recorded of that exploit, that may not be fully explained by the same bodily superiority of his troops. He made forced marches of such length, and with such extreme perseverance, as baffled all the ef- forts of his enemies. Whether, therefore, in advancing or retreating, our enemies triumph by the juvenility of their soldiers. Their innovations on the old system of war, are calcu- lated to make the most of this advantage. They have wisely turned war, from a minuet into a race ; for they are sure that their veteran enemies, will first be out of |reath, 3 Nor is the same superiority unfelt in the field of battle. No man has as much active or animal courage at 45, as he had at 21. The passive courage of the veteran, it is true, may be increased, rather than diminished by experience ; that is, he may stand longer motionless under a cannonade, or the fire of musquetry $ and be more coolly obedient to orders, and observant of discipline. Hence also the old tactics suited him perhaps better than the new. But now, the steadiness ot troops alone will not suffice ; their strength, and spirits* are tried to the uttermost, by brisk, persevering, and reiterated attacks ; new troops are brought up from distant quarters, with such rapidity, that they arrive before they were known to be on the march ; and the bayonet, is employed with a frequency former- ly unknown. Sometimes, it is brought into action late in a hard fought day •> and when a line of steady veterans are already fatigued, and nearly exhausted, by a long continued engagement, they are suddenly assailed with that formidable weapon. At the battle of Marengo, victory long hovered in suspence ; and the Austrians, after many hours of brave and arduous conflict, were about, perhaps, to reap the fruits of their persever- ance, when the same young soldiers, who had lately rushed from Dijon across the Alps, charged them vigorously with the bayonet, and the fate of Europe was decided. To what extent these reflections are liable to contro- versy, I know not. They seem to me, to rest upon plain reason, and acknowledged fact. — But, if any maa doubt, whether the youth of a soldier be a great advantage under the new system of war ? when he is I2Q opposed to a well disciplined veteran ; at least it wil be universally admitted, that the young are fair better qualified to form new habits, and sustain unaccustom- td hardships, than the old. There is in this view, if in no other, an undeniable importance in the age of our volunteers. A man who has been in the army thirty years, may be as hardy, though not so a. ile or vigor- ous, as his younger comrade ; but if two men, of dif- ferent ages are to be taken at once from the tender habits of domestic life, and exposed to the toils of a campaign, who can hesitate to say, that the younger, is likely best to sustain the trying effects of the tran- sition. Let it be fairly considered, how extreme the contrast would be, between the duties to which a volunteer, in the event of invasion, would be summoned ; and the ordinary habits, of a man who has always resided in the bosom of his family, in a commercial Town, or City. Even to young men, if used to the com- forts commonly enjoyed by the middle ranks of Englishmen, the change would be painful enough ; but to sustain, for a few days or weeks, hardships before unknown, would be to them, if not an easy, at least a practicable task. Not so to a man who has passed his prime, without having ever learned to bear the inconveniences of wet clothes, bad lodgings, watching, fatigue, and the other sufferings incident to a military life. The sense of honour, or fear $f shame, might indeed goad him on, to endure them for a while : but be would soon be reduced to an ab- solute incapacity pf further perseverance. He might continue his march, of stand underarms a second day, K ISO' ©r a third perhaps ; but at length would be obliged!; however reluctantly, to ask leave to retire, or sink under the weight of his sufferings. Nor would the loss of service of such feeble soldiers,, be the only ill consequence of their involuntary failure. The years, and the situations in life, which unfit them for active service, naturally give them more influence in the corps to which they belong, than younger mem- bers y and' an example, the necessity of which might however painfully felt by themselves, be equivocal in- the eyes of others, would have a contagious effect. They would at first retard the corps by their langour, and afterwards dishearten it by their defection; On the whole therefore, I conclude, that those truly patriotic and valuable establishments, cur Volunteer corps, are as now constituted, from the ages and confirmed habits of many of their members, as well as from some existing defects of a remediable kind, which have been noticed by others, a species of force not well qualified to repel, by laborious and persevering efforts, the impetuous armies of France- After all, have v/e effective soldiers, regular or irregu- lar, sufficient in point of numbers, to make the country perfectly safe against a powerful invasion ? The volunteers? much more than the regulars, are dispersed in every part of the island; and no great pro* portion of them could be convened at any given pointy soon enough to stop the progress of an enemy, who^ might land on our eastern or southern coast* before he could become master of London. Besides,} the defects which I have just been stating, would be* found peculiarly fatal, if such troops were to be marchecL 131 from distant parts of the island, immediately prior to their being brought into action. Of the volunteers now enrolled throughout the kingdom, a great many are certainly, in point of discipline as well as bodily qualifications, unfit for actual service; and a large proportion even of those who are returned as effective, will not be found so upon trial ? — It is too common, I fear, to keep every member on the effective list, who has once exercised with the corps in battalion upon an inspection or general muster; though perhaps, he never was perfect even in his manual exercise, and has forgot the little he once learned of it. These un- diciplined effectives too, are, it is probable, increasing very rapidly, in almost every corps not receiving pay, though their nominal force remains undiminished. Without enlarging on this subject, I will hazard an opinion that there are not 50,000 volunteers in the whole island, now ready to take the field, and fit to act against an enemy; yet were there six times as many, it might be difficult to draw together two armies of that amount, in time to make a first, and second stand^ for the existence of their Country. Supposing a battle to be lost, and London in the hands of the invaders, the subsequent junction of volunteers who are scattered* over the whole face of the island, would be no easy work* With a most active and energetic enemy in the centre, the communications between the east and the west, the north and the south, of the island, would not be long open. The hope therefore of further resistance, would depend, not merely on our having enough of effective volunteers, to form a powerful reserve, but on their being sufficiently numerous, to make head in K z 132 different parts of the country at the same moment, and fight their way in large bodies to a general rendez- vous, though opposed by powerful detachments. If it be objected, that these calculations are founded on an assumption that we should betaken by surprise ; I answer, that our notice of an approaching invasion would probably be extremely short, and quite insuffi- cient for the purpose of embodying our volunteers throughout the island, prior to the actual descent. The means of suddenly embarking a large army at Boulogne, are continually at the enemy's command. The only requisite for invasion therefore, which, unless he trusts to the flotilla alone, he must provide by new expedients, is a convoying fleet : and, this, as has been already shewn, he may very possibly obtain by a pre- concerted junction of different squadrons off that or some neighbouring port. But the only probable means of so obtaining a temporary superiority in the channel are so far from being inconsistent with secrecy, tha, they necessarily imply that quality ; nor would the -'Opportunity when found, admit of any delay. It seems not unlikely therefore, that the same day would bring us advice that the blockade of Boulogne was raised by a strong hostile fleet, and that the troops were beginning to embark : nor is it impossible, that the ilotiila might be already on our coast, before the danger could be announced by government, at any great distance from London. What then is to be done in order to prepare effectually against the danger of such a surprise, with our present means of interior defence ? Arc the volunteers to be call- ed from their homes, and marched into distant parts of 133 the kingdom, there to be formed into armies, on every- alarm ? The repetition of such costly and vexatious means of preparation, would soon exhaust both the purse and the patience of the country. Besides, as the danger must always be imminent as long as a large army is encamped within sight of our coasts, and the most specious indications of an imme- diate intention to embark, could be easily made, th e enemy, if he found he could reduce us to such costly defensive expedients, would take care we should have alarms enough to harrass our volunteers prior to an ac- tual attempt. It is plain then, that forces which are to be assembled from many different districts of the kingdom, at the expence of every branch of civil industry, as well as of domestic comfort, must probably be, for the most part, unembodied when the enemy is on his way to our shores. What is the practical conclusion from these remarks ? That the volunteers ought to be disbanded, or discou- raged ? — far from it — that their numbers ought to be very greatly increased, and their discipline improved. But that if this cannot be effected, some other means must be found, to cover the country more abundantly with armed citizens, fully prepared for its defence. The danger of a surprise will obviously be less formi- dable, the mischief of losing a battle less irreparable, the power of assembling new armies even after the loss of the capital, less difficult, in proportion as our vo- lunteers, or other defensive forces, become more abun- dant. But there is another consideration of great weight, which we need not disdain to learn from Buonaparte. In a late decree or proclamation for mul- 194 tiplying still further his forces by new conscription*, he observes, that while the objects of the war are better secured by increasing the amount of the forces em- ployed in it, war itself becomes less sanguinary, to the party who has a great superiority in numbers ; resist- ance being speedily subdued, and the horrors of a long protracted contest avoided. The justice of the doctrine, as applied to his own enterprizes, may indeed well be doubted ; because he extends his operations, and his ambitious designs, in proportion to the mag- nitude of the force which he progressively acquires. But if applied to a war, the field and object of which are limited, and especially to a war of interior defence, the remark is self-evidently true. The greater there- fore the amount of our defensive force, regular or irre- gular, the less of British blood will be shed in the event of an invasion, while the dreadful issue of a foreign yoke will be the more certainly averted. Besides, a feeble, and barely adequate preparation, though it might serve to repel, would not prevent inva- sion ; and our country would be redeemed at a painful cost, though far inferior to the unspeakable value of the pledge, if we had to combat a powerful French ^my on British ground, with the arms of our volun- eers. But if the people were generally armed in de- fence of the country, few or none might have to bleed for it. The enemy, in all probability, would not dare to assail, on their own soil, a whole nation of soldiers. But if he should act with such temerity, he would be repulsed with an overwhelming energy, that would for ever preclude a renewal of the mischievous attempt. War too itself might be shortened by such decisive 135 preparations. The enemy seeing that we are not to be •conquered, might be glad to give us peace': not such a peace as would make him speedily master of our fate; not a peace by which he would add the sea to the shores of his tremendous dominion in the old world, by ceding to us another colony or two in the new; but a peace of real security., and genuine honour : a peace by which, in some degree at least, the sad destiny of our allies might be repaired, and the bulwarks of Europe restored. At present, if we are not strong- enough at home for a war, much less so for a peace, with Buonaparte. If our interior force gives no ade- quate protection against him during the present de- pression of the French marine, where will be our se- curity on its restitution? and if we are now not suffi- ciently prepared to repel invasion, after three years no- tice of the danger, how much less should we be so on a sudden recommencement of war, of which the ap- pearance of a French fleet on our shores, would, per- haps, give the first intimation., Were there no other argument against making ,peace atthis juncture, a decisive one might be found in the present inadequate and declining state of our domestic defence. To improve it when the dangers of war shall be supposed to have subsided, will neither be so easy in respect of the feelings of the people, nor so conci- liatory in regard to those of a just reconciled enemy, -as to be a work fitter for that period, than the present. If, after all, any reader be sanguine enough to think that we have already enough of military force for our protection, let him compare the fatal consequences of a mistake on that side, with the iaconveniencies of i 136 superfluous preparations. Where the evil to be risqued is infinite, no preventive means can be excessive, which may contribute to lessen the danger. But I am per- suaded, that a great majority of the public will re- quire no arguments to convince them that our in- terior defensive force ought to be improved. They will feel more difficulty perhaps on the subject ta which I next proceed, the means of improving it. ToaJvance the discipline, meliorate the physical cha- racter, and enlarge the number, of our volunteer corps, are beyond doubt, the best defensive expedients we can possibly resort to, if such improvements can be made. That they are in a financial, commercial, and constitu- tional view, more desirable than a large increase of our regular army, can, I presume, be doubted by nohody ; and in a military estimate, they are, I am confident, liable to no sound objections, but such as may be re- moved. To suppose that these patriotic bands are not capable of being made fit for the secure defence of their Country, because they can have no actual employment in war till the event of an invasion, is to adhere to old theories, in contempt of the most decisive experience. The French officers, are said to express astonishment at our having a diftidence in our volunteers on this exploded principle ; and so they reasonably may ; for by whom have the most brilliant exploits of their own cam- paigns been performed, bnt troops that had never seen service ? \Ve ourselves, however, might have learnt to correct the old prejudice earlier, by our experience in America; and what a glorious refutation was lately given, of it by the j§ftb Regiment at Ma id a ? ;' 137 The brave young Scotchmen who composed that corps, were raised in 1805, and sent to the Mediterra- nean in September of that year. Till they landed in the Bay of St. Euphemia from Sicily, on the first of July last, they had never seen a musket-shot fired in actual service ; and yet they confounded by their steadiness, as well as by their intrepidity and ardour, the bravest battalions of France.* * The following is an extract of a letter, from one of the gallant young officers by whom this corps was raised, to his father a respectable gentleman in this country. r< The light infantry battalion, commanded by Lieutenant ,( Colonel Kempt, the 78th, Highlanders, and the 8ist Regiment *' led the attack. We formed line, at about a mile in front of the " enemy, and advanced in ordinary time, keeping an excellent '! line. When arrived within a quarter of a mile of the enemy, ** we perceived them in three large solid columns, with about ** 300 cavalry on their right. They advanced, halted and de- '« ployed into line with much seeming regularity and steadiness. ** After a halt of about five minutes they advanced with drum* u . beating and loud shouting, (the latter is an expedient by which the French attempt to intimidate their enemies, at the* critical moment of an attack, and often with great success,) «« and at ** 200 yards distance, the firing commenced on our right, by the *' light infantry battalion. The 78th at the same time advanced, ". but without firing, until within 100 yards of them ; when we '* commenced and received a heavy fire for a quarter of an hour. ft The enemy then retired : and we charged them four times, ** but they never would look us in the face, — they fled about half a. *' it.ile, and we halted to breathe a little. " By this time, the 78th had advanced considerably beyond the " corps on their right and left. The enemy perceiving our sitita- •* tion, brought forward their cavdry to charge us, but they could '• not make them advance. We were soon supported by the light " infantry battalion, and 81st regiment. At eight o'clock, a large " column of the enemy was perceived on the left fiank of the fir^t 5 138 But the troops who have thus immortalised their first attempts m arms, have not been men who e( line, they having out flanked us by marching along a hollow