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67th Congress' 
 1st Session 
 
 SENATE 
 
 /Document 
 \ No. 37 
 
 PANAMA 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE 
 
 OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 IN THE 
 
 UNITED STATES SENATE 
 
 JANUARY 5, 1904 
 
 Zl-iyb 
 
 ^S^ 
 
 PRESENTED BY MR. McCUMBER 
 June 9, 1921. — Ordered to be printed 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1921 
 

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 PANAMA. 
 
 Speech of Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge. 
 
 The Senate having under consideration Senate resolution No. 66, submitted by 
 Mr. Morgan December 18, 1903, that neither the President, nor the President and 
 the Senate, as the treaty-making power of the United States, has the lawful power 
 to wage or declare war against any foreign power without the consent 6f Congress, 
 when such country is at peace with the United States, etc. — 
 
 Mr. Lodge said: 
 
 Mr. President, there is now pending before the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations a treaty with the Repubhc of Panama. I have 
 no intention of discussing that treaty or its terms. It would be 
 manifestly improper for me to do so, because the terms and pro- 
 visions of that treaty must be the subject of discussion in executive 
 session. But the events, sir, which led to the making of that treaty- 
 are entirely public. They have been made the subject of much 
 discussion here already and of much wider discussion in the press 
 of the country. It is in regard to those events I desire to speak this 
 morning. 
 
 I wish first to say something about the general law and the prece- 
 dents affecting the right and-methods of-therecognition of a new state. 
 I feel as if I ought to apologize fo^ entering upon a review of the 
 authorities and the precedents, notmerely because the subject is 
 necessarily a dry one, but because aU those precedents and all that 
 law are or ought to be familiar to every Member of this body. But 
 there have been so many "misstatement's "in re^^ to the law and 
 the precedents affecting the right of recognition by one country 
 of the independence of another, there has been such a cloud of 
 misapprehension resting upon the subject that it has seemed to 
 me impossible to refrain from making some statement in regard to 
 it. I shall try to be extremely brief in what I have to say on that 
 subject; but I wish to bring the authorities together in such a manner 
 that they can be easily examined by anyone who takes sufficient 
 interest in the question to make such examination. 
 
 I think, Mr. President, we may accept it as settled by all the 
 writers on international law, as a general proposition, that a revolted 
 state or colony may under certain circumstances be recognized as 
 sovereign and independent by a neutral nation without thereby 
 necessarily departing from an attitude of strict neutrality or giving 
 just cause of offense to the parent state. The conditions necessary 
 before such a recognition of independence is proper have been clearly 
 defined by competent authorities. 
 
 HaUeck, in his International Law, says: 
 
 When * * * a state changes its government or a province or colony that before 
 had no separate existence is in the possession of the rights of sovereignty, the posses- 
 sion of sovereignty de facto is taken to be possession de jure, and any foreign power 
 is at liberty to recognize such sovereignty by treating with the possessor of it as an 
 independent state. Where sovereignty is necessary to the validity of an act no 
 distinction is or ought to be made between sovereignty founded on a good or bad 
 title. * * * In international transactions poss^sfi a is sufficient. 
 
4 PANAMA. 
 
 In Lawrence's Wheaton's International Law (pt. 1, chap. 2, 
 p. 36) is found the following discussion of what actually constitutes 
 sovereignty in a state : 
 
 Sovereignty is acquired by a state either at the origin of the (•i\'il society of which 
 it is composed or when it separates itself from the community of which it pre^dou^ly 
 formed a part and on which it was dependent. * * * The internal sovereignty 
 of a state does not in any degree depend upon its recognition by other states. * * * 
 The existence of the state de facto is sufficient in this respect to establish its sovereignty 
 de jure. It is a state because it exists. 
 
 Precisely the same definition of a sovereign state is found also 
 in Kluber, Droit des Gens Moderne de I'Europe, section 23. 
 Further, in Lawrence's Wheaton, page 47, is the following: 
 
 Wliere a revolted pro\T.nce or colony has declared and shown its ability to main- 
 tain its independence the recognition of its sovereignty by other foreign states is a 
 question of policy and prudence only. 
 
 And again, on page 48 of the same work, Lawrence's note No. 19, 
 it is said: 
 
 Before a formal recognition by sending ambassadors and entering into treaties by 
 foreign powers, there should be a practical cessation of hostilities on the part of the 
 old state which may long precede the theoretical renunciation of her rights, and 
 there should be a consolidation of the new state so far as to be in a condition of main- 
 taining international relations with other countries, an absolute bona fide possession 
 of independence as a separate kingdom, not the enjoyment of perfect and undisturbed 
 tranquillity — a test too severe for many of the oldest kingdoms — ^but there should be 
 the existence of a government acknowledged by the people over whom it is set, and 
 ready to prove its responsibility for their conduct when they come in contact with 
 foreign nations. 
 
 The same doctrine is declared in Historicus 1, page 9, by Sir 
 William Vernon Harcourt, which was published at the time of our 
 Civil War : 
 
 Recognition of the independence of a revolted state is only lawful when such 
 independence is de facto established. 
 
 W. E. Hall, who, I take it, is the first of the English authorities 
 and one of the most recent on international law, says : 
 
 Assuming that the recognition of the Spanish-American republics by the United 
 States and England may be taken as a typical example of recognition given upon 
 unimpeachable grounds, and bearing in mind the principle that recognition can not 
 be withheld when it has been earned, it may be said generally that — 
 
 (1) Definitive independence can not be held to be established, and recognition 
 is consequently not legitimate, so long as a substantial struggle is being maintained 
 by the formerly sovereign state for the recovery of its authority ; and that 
 
 (2) A mere pretension on the part of the formerly sovereign state or a struggle so 
 inadequate as to offer no reasonable ground for supposing that success may ulti- 
 mately be obtained is not enough to keep alive the rights of the state and so to prevent 
 foreign countries from falling under an obligation to recognize as a state the community 
 claiming to have become one. 
 
 In a note of Dana's to WTieaton's International Law he says that the tests which 
 should determine the recognition of a foreign state are "the necessities of the foreign 
 recognizing state and the truth of the facts implied that the state treated with was at 
 the time in the condition de facto of an independent state." (Extract and note 
 from W. E. Hall's International Law, Part II, Chap. I, p. 93.) 
 
 I will not multiply further citations from writers on international 
 law, for I think it is perfectly clear to anyone who has examined 
 the subject that they all unite in the proposition that the question 
 of the recognition of a new state, whether formed originally or by 
 separation from another state, is a question for the sole determina- 
 
PANAMA. 
 
 tion of the recognizing power, that it is not necessarily in any sense 
 an act of war, and that it "may be done with a strict observance of 
 neutrahty. 
 
 Before coming to the question of recognition, as illustrated by 
 our oAvn law and history and as carried out under our Constitution, 
 I desire to say one single word in regard to a matter which has been 
 'used somewhat to cloud the question, and that is the introduction 
 of the theory that because it is a case of secession the United States 
 having prevented the secession of a portion of the States in a great 
 civil war is thereby in some manner debarred from recognizing the 
 independence of a seceding State elsewhere. 
 
 Of course, Mr. President, to anyone who pauses to reflect upon it 
 it is obvious at once that practically the only manner in which a 
 new State can now be formed is by separation. It always must 
 have been one of the modes in which a new State was formed. 
 Therefore recognition must be given constantly to States which owe 
 their origin to secession from a parent State or from another State. 
 
 An effort has been made to show, as I have said, that there is a 
 glaring inconsistency in our action on Panama. But this view 
 will not bear examination. Although the question of the right of 
 secession under the Constitution was elaborately discussed for 
 many years preceding the war, and although that discussion may 
 have served a useful purpose and was entirely characteristic of a 
 race so fond of law as ourselves, it never to my mind had any very 
 real significance. The right of secession in its essencehas nothing 
 to do with constitutions or law. Secession is revolution, and the 
 right of secession is the right of revolution. It is purely a question 
 of fact. Secession, even if it is from a loosely joined league which 
 authorizes the withdrawal of one of the States forming the league 
 is always destructive. In the case of a league the secession of a 
 member changes its character and may lead to its dissolution. In 
 the case of a government formed under a written constitution like 
 our own, secession is revolution in its broadest sense. If it succeeds, 
 a new nation is brought into being, as was the case with us in 1776. 
 If it fails, it is only an abortive attempt at secession and revolution. 
 
 The fact that "France recognized us when we separated from 
 England did not bind France to submit to the secession of a portion 
 of her own territory. Frenchmen, I think, would have been much 
 surprised if they had been told that because they recognized the 
 United States they were therefore bound not to interfere with 
 Brittanny or La Vendee when those Provinces rose against the 
 government of the revolution. The fact that we recognized Texas 
 when she separated from Mexico had no bearing on our acceding 
 to the secession of the Southern States. We have recognized seceding 
 States in South America, not only in the case of Texas but in other 
 cases. The State which originally comprised Colombia herself, 
 Venezuela and Ecuador, dissolved into three States, and we recog- 
 nized the thi-ee new States. Within a few years some of the Central 
 American States formed a confederation which we recognized, and 
 when, as it happened, it quickly dissolved, we recognized once more 
 the component parts. The right of secession, in short, has no 
 bearing on the question of recognition. I shall have something to 
 say later as to the constitutional position of Panama under the 
 
6 PANAMA. 
 
 several constitutions of Colombia, but that is simply to show the 
 relation of Panama to Colombia, and has no bearings on the question 
 of recoojnition, which is all I desire to deal with at this moment. 
 
 I wish now, Mr. President, to say a word as to the general rule of 
 the United States in regard to recognition, first in principle and 
 then in practice. 
 
 Turning from the general question of international law to the 
 question of the established usage of the United vStates in the recog- 
 nition of foreign governments or nations, it will be found that the 
 United States has always assumed that the government de facto 
 was the government de jure, and that in recognizing such a govern- 
 ment the United States has consulted solely necessary questions of 
 policy and prudence. When the Revolutionary Government of 
 France was established after the overthrow of the monarchy, Gen. 
 Washington had no hesitation in recognizing that Government and 
 receiving its accredited minister. The same promptness of recog- 
 nition was accorded to the - Government of the Directorate, the 
 Consulate, and the Empire, which followed in rapid succession the 
 Government of the first French Republic. In regard to the recog- 
 nition of the South American colonies of Spain after they had re- 
 volted and established their independence, the following letter of 
 Mr. Gallatin, United States minister at Paris, to ]\'Ir. J. Q. Adams, 
 Secretary of State, November 5, 1818, clearly defines the attitude 
 of the United States : 
 
 We had not — 
 
 He writes — 
 
 either directly or indirectly, excited the insurrection. It had been the sjjontaneous 
 act of the inhabitants and the natural effect of causes which neither the United States 
 nor Europe could have controlled. We had lent no assistance to either party; we 
 had preserved a strict neutrality. But no European government could be surprised 
 or displeased that in such a cause our wishes should be in favor of the siiccess of the 
 colonies or that we should treat as independent powers those among them which had 
 in fact estabhshed their independence. 
 
 Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Monroe, President 
 of the United States, of August 24-, 1816 (MSS. Monroe Papers, 
 Dept. of State), defines in the following manner the conditions 
 which would lead the United States to recognize the independence 
 of a foreign government or nation: 
 
 There is a stage in such (revolutionary) contests when the party struggling for 
 independence has, as I conceive, a right to demand its acknowledgment by neutral 
 parties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted without departure from the 
 obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when the independence is established as a 
 matter of fact so as to leave the chance of the opposite party to recover their dominion 
 utterly desperate. The neutral nation must, of course, judge for itself when this 
 period has arrived. 
 
 Practically the same doctrine is found in a note of Mr. Jefferson, 
 Secretary of State, to Mr. Morris, November 7, 1792 (MSS. Inst. 
 
 Mmisters) : 
 
 It accords with our principles, to acknowledge any government to be rightful 
 which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared. 
 
 So, in a note to Mr. Anderson of May 27, 1823 (MvSS. Inst. Minis- 
 ters), Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, restates his position on this 
 question as follows : 
 
PANAMA. 
 
 When a sovereign has a reasonable hope of maintaining his authority over insur- 
 gents the acknowledgment of the independence of such i^P^g^^^^^.J.^^^^^^ll^^ 
 international wrong. It is otherwise when such sovereign is manifestly disabled 
 from maintaining the contest. 
 
 The principle of recognizing a de facto government without re- 
 gard to its nature or the manner in which it is established was 
 tcain affirmed by Mr. Clay in a debate in the House of I^epresenta- 
 tives in March, 1818, on the proposition to appropriate $18,000 to 
 defray the expenses of a minister to Buenos Aires. Mr. Uay said: 
 We had constantly proceeded on the principle that the government de facto wa^ 
 that which we could alone notice, * * * and so far as we are concerned the 
 sovereign de facto is the sovereign de jure. 
 
 Almost the same words were employed by Mr. Van Buren, Sec- 
 retary of State, in a note to Mr. Moore, June 9, 1829 (MSb. Inst. 
 Am. St.): 
 
 So far as we are concerned that which is the govermnent de facto is equally so de jure. 
 Again Mr. Livingstone, Secretary of State, in a note to Sir Charles 
 Vaughan, April 30, 1833 (MSS. Foreign Legation Notes), says: 
 
 It has been the principle and the invariable practice of the United States to recog- 
 nize that as the legal government of another nation which by its establishment m 
 ?he actual exercise of political power might be supposed to have received the express 
 or implied assent of the people. 
 
 The same doctrine was even more forcibly expressed bjr Mr. Clay 
 in a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 
 18, 1836 (S. Doc. 406, 24th Cong., 1st sess.) : 
 
 The policy which has hitherto guided the Government of the United States in 
 respect to new powers has been to act on the fact of their existence without regard to 
 their origin whether that has been by the subversion of a preexisting government or by 
 the violent or voluntary separation of one from another part of a common nation.^ 
 
 Again Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Castillo, 
 the Mexican minister, March 17, 1837 (MSS. Notes Mex.), says: 
 
 The independence of other nations has always been regarded by the United States 
 :as a question of fact merely and that of every people has been ^^^^^''^^}X'l^^^^^^ 
 "by them whenever the actual enjoyment of it was accompanied by satisfactory evi- 
 ■dence of their power and determination permanently and effectually to maintain it. 
 Almost the same language was used by Mr. Buchanan, Secretary 
 of State, to Mr. Rush, United States minister to Pans, on March 31, 
 1848 (MSS. Inst. France). . He says: 
 
 In its intercourse with foreign nations the Government of the United States has 
 irom its origin always recognized de facto governments. * * It is stittcient 
 
 for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself, and then its 
 recognition on our part inevitably follows. 
 
 So Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Donelson, 
 July 8, 1849 (MSS. Inst. Prussia), says: 
 
 We as a nation have ever been ready and willing to recognize any government de 
 facto which appears capable of maintaining its power. 
 
 The question was treated at length by Mr. Webster Secretary of 
 State, in a note to Mr. Hiilsemann, December 21, 1850 MSS. Notes 
 Germ. St.), in regard to the revolution in Hungary, which the United 
 States had held itself in readiness to recognize had it been successlui. 
 He says: 
 
 It is the right of every independent state to enter into friendly relations with every 
 other independent state. Of course, questions of prudence naturally arise m refer- 
 
8 PANAMA. 
 
 ence to new states brought by successful revolutions into the family of nations, but 
 it is not to be required of neutral powers that they should await the recognition of 
 the new government by the parent state. No principle of public law has been more 
 frequently acted upon within the last 30 years by the great powers of the world than 
 this. Within that period eight or ten new states have established independent 
 governments within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain on this continent 
 and in Europe. The same thing has been done by Belgium and Greece. The 
 existence of all these governments was recognized by some of the leading powers of 
 Europe as well as by the United States before it was acknowledged by the 8ta1<?s 
 from which they had separated themselves. 
 
 Again the question of recognizing a foreign state as independent 
 was carefully" discussed by President Jackson in his message to 
 Congress, relating to Texas, of December 21, 1836. He says: 
 
 The acknowledgment of a new state as independent and entitled to a place in the 
 family of nations is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility, but more 
 especially so when such state has forcibly separated itself from another of which it 
 had formed an integral part and which still claims dominion over it. A premature 
 recognition under these circumstances, if not looked upon as justifiable cause of war, 
 is always liable to be regarded as a proof of an unfriendly sjnrit to one of the contend- 
 ing parties. All questions relative to the go^-ernment of foreign nations, whether 
 of the Old or New World, have been treated by the United States as questions of fact 
 only, and our predecessors have cautiously abstained from deciding upon them until 
 the clearest evidence was in their possession to enable them not only to decide cor- 
 rectly, but to shield their decisions from every unworthy imputation. 
 
 Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Culver, November 
 19, 1862 (MSS. Int. Venez.), declared that— 
 
 A revolutionary government is not to be recognized until it is established by the 
 great body of the population of the state it claims to go^^ern. 
 
 The policy of the United States in regard to this matter was again 
 declared by Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Sickles, December 
 16, 1870. (MSS. Int. Spain, Foreign Relations, 1871.) 
 
 It has been — 
 
 He says — 
 
 the policy of the United States to recognize the governments de facto of the countries 
 with which we hold diplomatic relations. Such was oiu- course when the Republic 
 was established in France in 1848 and again in 1870 and in each case accepted by the 
 French people. Such was our course in Mexico when the Republic was maintained 
 by the people of that country in spite of foreign efforts to establish a monarchy by 
 military force. We have always accepted the general acquiescence of the people in 
 the political change of government as a conclusiA-e e^ddence of the will of the nation. 
 
 Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, in a note to Mr. Baker, June 14, 
 1879 (MSS. Inst. Venez.), discusses the question from the point of 
 view of policy. He says: 
 
 The capacity of a state in itself for recognition and the fact of recognition by other 
 states are two different things. Recognition is not an act wholly depending on the 
 constitutionality or completeness of a change of government, but is not infrequently 
 influenced by the needs of the mutual relation between the two countries. * * * 
 In other words, while the United States regard their international compacts and 
 obligations as entered into with nations rather than with political governments, it 
 behooves them to be watchful lest their course toward a government should affect 
 the relations to the nation. Hence it has been the customary policy of the United 
 States to be satisfied on this point, and doing so is in no wise an implication of doubt 
 as to the legitimacy of the internal change which may occur in another state. 
 
 From the extracts I have read I think the following conclusions 
 may be drawn as to the principle adopted by the United States : 
 
 i^irst. It is an absolutely well-established principle of international 
 law that in regard to the recognition of a new state or government 
 
PANAMA. 
 
 a neutral nation has but two questions before it: (a) Whether or 
 not the new state or government is de facto estabhshed sufFiciently 
 to be answerable for its international obligations, and (b) whether 
 or not it accords with the dictates of national prudence and policy 
 to recognize it. If these two questions are answered affirmatively, 
 the neutral nation may recognize without in any way departing from 
 the strict observance of neutrality. The question of right is never 
 considered. 
 
 Second. The United States has tliroughout its history followed the 
 above principles. It has always recognized de facto states and 
 governments without the slightest regard to their origin or right, 
 and the promptness of the recognition it has accorded to such de 
 facto states or governments has been determined solely by questions 
 of its national prudence and policy. Two extreme cases will illustrate 
 this point. In the case of the revolution in Hungary the United 
 States stood in readiness to recognize the revolutionary government 
 before it was really established, and was only prevented from doing 
 so owing to the fact that the revolution failed. Remonstrances were 
 made by the diplomatic representatives of Austria, but there is no 
 doubt that had the government of Kossuth ever been sufficiently 
 successful to be recognized these remonstrances would have been of 
 no avail, for they were powerless to prevent the President from 
 taking all the preliminary steps to recognition. The fact was that 
 the cause of Hungarian independence was extremely popular in the 
 United States, and in addition the United States had nothing either 
 to get or to fear from the Austrian Government. It therefore con- 
 tented itself with remaining merely within the strict limits of neu- 
 trality as defined in international law. 
 
 In the case of the revolted colonies of Spain in South America, on 
 the contrary, the recognition of the United States was delayed long 
 after the time when the colonies were de facto independent and when 
 hostihties had ceased on the part of Spain. The Spanish minister, 
 Mr. De Omis, made constant complaints and protests to the Govern- 
 ment of the United States in regard to supposed acts of assistance 
 given to the revolted colonies by American citizens. All these com- 
 plaints were carefully considered by the Department of State, and 
 the Government preserved an absolutely inactive neutrality despite 
 the sympathies of the people of the United States for the colonies 
 and despite pressure from Congress. The reason of the delay was 
 that, in the opinion of the Executive, it would have been contrary to 
 the dictates of prudence and policy for the United States to have 
 taken any action which might antagonize Spain in the condition of 
 the country and the state of relations between the two nations at 
 that time, for the United States was not then a strong power and the 
 question of the cession of the Floridas was imminent. Therefore the 
 United States construed the obligations of neutrahty far more liberally 
 in this case than in the case of Hungary, and was much slower to 
 decide that the South American colonies were de facto independent. 
 The same principle was maintained in both cases, but owing to ques- 
 tions of policj^ its application was widely different. 
 
 In other words, to repeat the proposition once more, the question 
 of recognition is to be decided solely by the recognizing State on its 
 own interests, wishes, and sympathies. All that is required in the 
 recognized State is a de facto government in possession. 
 
10 PANAMA. 
 
 Such was the nature of the recognition of the United States by 
 France. We had a revolutionary government. We had no con- 
 stitution. The Articles of Confederation passed Congress just on the 
 eve of the treaty of alliance, too late to have affected it in the slightest 
 degree. France recognized the revolted colonies as an independent 
 State when they had no constitutional government whatever, simply 
 a revolutionary Congress sitting at Philadelphia. The attitude then 
 taken b}^ France is that which has been adopted by all nations, and 
 by none more than the United States — that is, that it lies with the 
 recognizing power to determine whether it is for her interest and in 
 conformity to her sympathies and wishes to recognize the revolted 
 State. 
 
 Now, Mr. President, as to the methods and time of recognition. 
 The President has been given by the Constitution the power to 
 receive foreign ministers and ambassadors. By the language of the 
 Constitution that power is given to him alone. I 'think if we consider 
 the nature of that duty we shall see at once that the makers of the 
 Constitution were guided, as they univei'sally were, by common sense 
 and by their knowledge of the practice of nations. It was impossible 
 in dealing with foreign relations, which, in the language of Hamilton 
 in the Federalist, above all others require "secrecy and dispatch," to 
 leave them to the slow and clumsy operation of a legislative body 
 which must be called together perhaps in order to meet the exigency. 
 An emergency in foreign relations may easily arise during a recess of 
 Congress. It may demand the most instant action on the part of the 
 Executive, an action which the entire country would deem of the 
 utmost necessity. Such action would be absolutely impracticable 
 and impossible if the Executive was obliged to wait until Congress 
 could be summoned in extraordinary session in order to take some of 
 the steps which must be taken without delay in the foreign relations 
 of any great country. I conceive that to be the explanation of the 
 very simple clause in the Constitution which gives the President 
 the right to receive foreign ministers. He also has the right to nom- 
 inate and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint am- 
 bassadors, ministers, and consuls. In other words, he has placed in 
 his hands two methods of recognition, and on the principal method 
 of recognition, that of receiving a minister from a State, there is no 
 limitation placed whatever. The language of the Constitution, which" 
 I may properly repeat, is 'Hhe President shall receive ambassadors 
 and other public ministers." 
 
 I wish next to review, historically, the action which has been taken 
 in practice by the United States and the authorities in regard to 
 recognition since the foundation of the Government. Mr. Curtis, in 
 his great work of authority, the Constitutional History of the United 
 States, volume 1, page 580, says: 
 
 As tlie President was to be the organ of communication -with other Govern- 
 ments, etc. — 
 
 thus interpreting this passage of the Constitution to mean that all 
 communications between the Government of the United States and 
 foreign Governments shall be made solely tlu-ough the President. 
 
 In 1793 the question of recognizing the new French Republic, and 
 whether or not the treaties with King Louis XVI were still binding, 
 
PANAMA. 
 
 11 
 
 was discussed in the President's Cabinet, and there decided. A min- 
 ister from the new Republic was accordingly received, and m view o± 
 the war between France and allied Europe a proclamation was issued 
 by President Washington, in which he said: 
 
 I have therefore, thought fit to declare the disposition of the United States to ob- 
 serve the'conduct aforesaid (friendly and impartial) toward those powers, respectively, 
 and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States. 
 
 In other words, our first President, Washington, conceived that he 
 had the right to recognize the new French RepubHc by receiving her 
 minister, despite the division of parties on the question, and despite 
 the fact that we had binding treaties with the France of the old 
 monarchy. He went even further, however, than this when he took 
 the ground that he had the right as the Chief Executive to declare the 
 neutrality of the United States in the situation that had thus arisen. 
 I think, Mr. President, that the action of Washington as interpretmg 
 the constitutional right of the President is one of the most significant 
 that we have, especially as it comes at the very begmnmg of our 
 Government. 
 
 I ought to say that in the citations I am about to make on this 
 point I am very largely indebted to two extremely valuable mem- 
 oranda which were presented in 1898 by the Senator from Maine 
 Mr. Hale]. I have added one or two citations which seem to me 
 of importance, but anyone who desires to see with the utmost r inute- 
 ness what the practice has been in that respect should consult those 
 two memoranda, which were printed as Senate documents. 
 
 The view taken by Washington of the constitutional powers of the 
 Executive was strongly held by Mr. Ellsworth, a leading member of 
 the convention which framed the Constitution, Senator from Con- 
 necticut, and afterwards Chief Justice of the United States, when, m 
 the Senate on January 6, 1796, on the motion of Mr. Tazewell to strike 
 out a complimentary reply to the French Republic, he said that — 
 
 Nothing could be found in the Constitution to authorize either branch of the legis- 
 lature to keep up any kind of a correspondence with a foreign nation. 
 
 Early in the nineteenth century the revolutions in South America 
 made the question of recognition a very immediate and pressing one. 
 Soon after the conclusion of our war mth England in 1815 John 
 Quincy Adams, in his Diary, speaking of the Cabinet, says : 
 
 That at the time the questions were proposed whether the Executive was competent 
 to acknowledge the independence of Buenos Aires, and, if so, whether it was expe- 
 dient; that it had been concluded the Executive was competent, but that it was not 
 expedient to take the step without the certainty of being supported in it by the public 
 opinion, which, if decidedly favorable to the measure, would be manifested by 
 measures of Congress. 
 
 Therefore the Cabinet of President Monroe, after full discussion, 
 John Quincy Adams being Secretary of State, decided that it was 
 competent for them to recognize the independence of a revolted state. 
 
 On the nth of March, 1818, Vincente Pazos, representing himself 
 as the deputed agent of the authorities acting in the name of the 
 Repubhcs of Venezuela, New Granada, and Mexico, presented to the 
 House of Representatives, through the Speaker, a memorial com- 
 plaining of ''the occupation by the United States of Ameha Island." 
 (Annals of Congress, first session, Fifteenth Congress, 1251.) 
 
12 PASAMX. 
 
 An animated discussion immediately ensued. Forsyth said: 
 
 THg question, then, for the House to consider was whether, when tlie Constitution 
 has ))lace(l the conduet of our foroij^n relations with tlie Executive, a foreign aeent 
 shall be permitted to appeal from the Executive to this House. (Ibid. 1262. ) The 
 House by a vote of 127 to 28 refused to receive the memoiial. (Ibid. 1268.) 
 
 At this same period, in the first session of the Fifteenth Congress, 
 Mr. Chiy, then Speaker, proposed to amend the appropriation bill 
 under consideration by a clause appropriating $18,000 to defray the 
 expenses of a minister to be sent to Buenos Aires, the capital of the 
 united provinces of the Rio de la Plata, at the discretion of the Presi- 
 dent. On this proposition there was much discussion in the House 
 of Representatives during the month of March, 1818, and in the course 
 of the debate one of the chief points under consideration was whether 
 or not the House was competent to take any step tending to the 
 recognition of a foreign nation before action had been taken by the 
 Executive in the matter and whether it was justified in urging the 
 Executive by any legislative act to take such action. In the course 
 of discussing this point the following opinions were expressed by 
 various Members of the House at different times. 
 
 IVii'. Cla}^ said that — 
 
 He was perfectly aware that the Constitution of the United States— and he admitted 
 the proposition in its broadest sense — confided to the Executi^ e the reception and the 
 deputation of ministers. But in relation to the latter operation Congress had a con- 
 current will in the power of providing for the payment of their salaries. * * * 
 There was great reason, Mr. Clay contended, from the peculiar character of the Amer- 
 ican Government, in there being a perfect understanding between the legislative and 
 executive branches in relation to the acknowledgment of a new power. * * * if 
 contrary to his opinion, there were even a risk that the acknowledgment of a new 
 State might lead to war, it was advisable that the step should not be taken without a 
 previous knowledge of the will of the war-making branch. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth, opposing the amendment, contended that — 
 
 Heretofore the President and the Senate were left to the exclusive management of 
 the foreign intercourse of the United States. 
 
 Mr. Smith of Maryland said : 
 
 _ The Constitution has given to Congress legislatiAe powers, to the President the direc- 
 tion of our intercourse with foreign nations. 
 
 Mr. A. Smith of Virginia said: 
 
 The Constitution grants to the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, 
 power to appoint ambassadors and public ministers and to make treaties. According 
 to the usage of the Government, it is the President who recei"\ es all foreign mjnisters 
 and determines what foreign ministers shall or shall not be received. It is by the 
 exercise of some one of these powers in neither of which has this House any partici- 
 pation, that a foreign power must be acknowledged. Then the acknowledgment of 
 the independence of a new power is an exercise of ExecutiA-e authority; consequently, 
 for Congress to direct the Executive how he shall exercise this power is an act of usur- 
 pation. 
 
 Mr. Tucker of Virginia, speaking after Mr. Smith, contended that 
 the House had the right to express its opinion on every subject, but 
 admitted by implication that the recognition of a foreign nation was, 
 in effect, a constitutional power of the Executive, which, however, he 
 held should be exercised in conjunction with Congress if such a 
 recognition might lead to war. 
 
 Mr. H. Nelson of Virginia, the next speaker, said: 
 
 When Washington saw cause to recognize the independence of France, did he wait 
 for the sanction of Congress to judge whether or not he ought to recei^ e a minister from 
 
PANAMA. 13 
 
 that Government? He did not. In every view the course proposed was not recon- 
 ciliable with the usages of the country, and because it was not, and, in his opinion, 
 transcending the constitutional powers of Congress, he was unwilling, on great prin- 
 ciples, to adopt this measure. 
 
 Mr. Clay said : 
 
 But the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. I owndes] has told us that the Consti- 
 tution has wisely confided to the executi-', e branch of the GoAernm^ent the adminis- 
 tration of the foreign concerns of the country. Fas the honorable gentleman attempted 
 to show (though his proposition be generally true and will never be controverted by 
 me) that we also ha-ve not our participation in the administration of the foreien in- 
 terests of the country when we are called upon in our legislativ e capacity to defray 
 the expenses of foreign missions or to regulate commerce? * * * There are 
 three modes under our Constitution in which a nation may be recognized — by the 
 Executive receiving a minister; secondly, by its sending one thither; and thirdly, 
 this House unquestionably has the right to recognize in the exercise of the consti- 
 tutional power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce. To receive a minister from 
 a foreign power is an admission that the party sending them is sovereign and inde- 
 pendent. So the sending a minister, as ministers are neA er sent but to soa ereign 
 powers, is a recognition of the independence of the power to whom the minister is 
 sent. 
 
 ]\Ii\ Poindexter, of Mississippi, following Mr. Clay, opposed the 
 measure. He thought that, the matter of recognition being an 
 Executive function, the House should take no action except after a 
 minister to a foreign power was appointed to decide whether or 
 not it would appropriate money for his expenses. 
 
 Mr. Robertson, of Louisiana, said: 
 
 Gen. Washington received a minister from France when a political war was waged 
 against her by all Eui'ope combined. He recognized that Republic * * *. 
 
 Mr. Spencer said : 
 
 I believe most firmly that we have the constitutional power to legislate on this and 
 every other subject connected with our foreign relations or with the regulation of com- 
 merce. I hold it to be a power concurrent with that of the executive branch. 
 
 The amendment, after prolonged discussion, was finally rejected. 
 In February, 1921, Mr. Clay (the Speaker) introduced the fol- 
 lowing resolution in the House of Representatives : 
 
 That the House * * * mil give its constitutional support to the President of 
 the United States whenever he may deem it expedient to recognize the sovereignty 
 and independence of any of the said Provinces (South American colonies of Spain). 
 
 This resolution is, of course, in itself an admission by the House 
 of the President's power to recognize a foreign nation without 
 consultation with Congress. 
 
 Ml'. Clay and others supported the resolution on the ground of 
 general policy, maintaining, also, that ''so far from interfering 
 with the Executive prerogative it was a fair exercise of the un- 
 doubted rights of the House." Other members opposed the reso- 
 lution, maintaining that the matter was one wholly for the Execu- 
 tive to decide, and that the House should not attempt to goad the 
 Executive to action. 
 
 Mr. Mercer, adverting to the supposed power of the President 
 to recognize the independence of a government by receiving a 
 minister, as well as by sendino- one, in which recognition the Sen- 
 ate would have no voice, said that — 
 
 It became this House to share a part of the responsibility which the Executive 
 would incur by such a recognition. He doubted himself whether the President could 
 recognize the inde])endence of a foreign power by receiving a minister without the 
 consent of the House. 
 
14 PANAMA. 
 
 Mr. Baldwin opposed the resolution on the ground that recog- 
 nition of a foreign State should be made by all three branches of 
 the Government and not by the President alone. 
 
 Mr. Brown said — 
 
 He beKeved the executive branch of the Government possessed of the constitutional 
 power of performing those acts which would amount to a recognition. 
 
 Mr. Smith of Maryland opposed on the ground that the resolu- 
 tion ''attributed to the President a power [that of recognition] 
 too important to be exercised by any authority less than the three 
 branches of the Government." 
 
 Mr. Clay, with respect to the mode of recognition of foreign 
 powers, reviewed the various o,pinions which had been expressed 
 at different times as well as to-day on this subject. He concluded 
 that both Congress and the Executive had this power, but that 
 the most regular, ordinary, and usual course was by the Execu- 
 tive, and it was therefore proper to assure him of the support of 
 this House. That was the proposition Mr. Clay was trying to 
 establish, but great as was his influence he failed to carry the 
 House of Representatives with him on that theory at that time. 
 
 On January 2, 1819, the Cabinet of President Monroe considered 
 the question of the power to recognize Buenos Aires. Mr. Cal- 
 houn advised acting in concurrence with Great Britain, which was 
 only possible through Executive action. Mr. Crawford advised 
 sending a minister — 
 
 Because the Senate must then act upon the nomination, which would give their 
 sanction to the measure. Mr. Wirt added that the House of Representatives must 
 also concur by assenting to an act of appropriation. And the President, laughing, 
 said that as those bodies liad the power of impeachment over us, it would be quite 
 convenient to have them thus pledged beforehand. 
 
 Ml". Adams thought that the first minister should come from the 
 country seeking recognition, and said : 
 
 As to impeachment, I was willing to take my share of risk of it for this measure when 
 ever the Executive should deem it proper. And, instead of admitting the Senate or 
 House of Representatives to any share in the act of recognition, I would expressly 
 avoid that form of doing it wMch would require the concurrence of those bodies. It 
 was, I had no doubt, by our Constitution an act of the Executive authority. Gen. 
 Washington had exercised it in recognizing the French Republic by the reception of 
 Mr. Genet. Mr. Madison had exercised it by declining several years to receive, and 
 by finally receiving, Mr. Onis; and in this instance I thought the Executive ought 
 carefully to preserve entire the authority given him by the Constitution and not 
 weaken it by setting the precedent of making either House of Congress a party to an 
 act which it was his exclusive act and duty to perform. 
 
 Mr. Crawford said: 
 
 He did not, however, deny, but admitted, that the recognition was strictly within 
 the powers of the Executive alone. (Diary of J. Q. Adams, vol. 4, pp. 204-206.) 
 
 In 1833 Edward Livingston, a great lawyer and then Secretary of 
 State, sent out a circular letter of instructions to the consular and 
 diplomatic officers of the United States, which is as follows: 
 
 No. 18.] Department op State, 
 
 Washington, March 28, 1833, 
 Henry Wheaton, Esq., 
 
 Charge d' Affaires of the United States to Denmark. 
 Sir: It is observed that special communications from foreign powers intended for 
 the Executive of the United States have been usually addressed to tlie President and 
 Congress of the United States. 
 
PANAMA. 15 
 
 This style was introduced under the old Confederation, and was then perfectly 
 proper, but since the Federal Constitution has been formed its inaccuracy is apparent^ 
 the whole executive poiver, particularly that of foreign intercourse, being vested in the Presi- 
 dent. You will therefore address a note to the minister for foreign affairs, apprising 
 him that all communications made directly to the head of our executive government 
 should be addressed "To the President of the United States of America," ■nithout 
 any other addition. 
 
 You will, of course, observe that this relates solely to those communications of cere- 
 mony which are made from one sovereign to another — for example, notices of birth, 
 deaths, changes in government, etc. — and does not relate to the ordinary diplomatic 
 intercourse, which is to be carried on as usual through this department. 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 Edward Livingston. 
 
 President Jackson, in his message to Congress of December 21^ 
 1836, said: 
 
 Nor has any deliberate inquiry ever been instituted in Congress or in any of our- 
 legislative bodies as to whom belongs the power of originally recognizing a new State; 
 a power the exercise of wMch is equivalent under some cii'cumstances to a declaration 
 of war; a power nowhere especially delegated and only granted in the Constitution,, 
 as it is necessarily involved in some of the great powers given to Congress, in that given 
 to the President and Senate to form treaties with foreign powers and to appoint ambas- 
 sadors and other public ministers, and in that conferred upon the President to receive 
 ministers from foreign nations. 
 
 In the preamble to the resolution of the House of Representatives (the resolution 
 referred to is as follows: "That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged 
 by the United States whenever satisfactory information should be received that it had. 
 in successful operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and ful- 
 filling the obligations of an independent power") it is distinctly intimated that the 
 expediency of recognizing the independence of Texas should be left to the decision of 
 Congress. " In tliis view on the ground of expediency I am disposed to concur, and do 
 not, therefore, consider it necessary to express any opinion as to the strict constitu- 
 tional right of the Executive either apart from or in conjunction with the Senate OA'er 
 the subject. It is to be presumed that on no future occasion will a dispute arise, as- 
 none has heretofore occurred, between the Executive and the Legislature in thet 
 exercise of the power of recognition. It "Rdll always be considered consistent with the 
 spirit of the Constitution and most safe that it should be exercised, when probably 
 leading to war, -with the pre-vious understanding with that body by whom war can. 
 alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be 
 furnished . 
 
 On June 18 of the same year, and referring to the same matter of 
 the independence of Texas, Mr. Clay, in a report from the Senate 
 Committee on Foreign Relations (S. Doc. No. 406, 24th Cong., 1st 
 sess.), said: 
 
 The recognition of * * * an independent power may be made by the United 
 States in various ways. First, by treaty; second, by the passage of a law regulating 
 commercial intercourse between the two powers; third, by sending a diploma.tic 
 agent * * * -with the usual credentials; or, lastly, by the Executive recei\ing 
 and accrediting a diplomatic representative from the power in question, which would 
 be a recognition as far as the Executive, only is competent to make it. In the first 
 and third modes the concurrence of the Senate in its executive capacity would be 
 necessary, and in the second in its legislative character. 
 
 The Senate alone, without the cooperation of some other branch of the Govern- 
 ment, is not competent to recognize the existence of any power. 
 
 ThB President of the United States, by the Constitution, has the charge of their 
 foreign intercourse. Regularly he ought to take the initiative in the acknowledgment 
 of the independence of any new power. But in this case he has not yet done it, 
 for reasons which he, without doubt, deems sufficient. If, in any instance, the 
 President should be tardy, he may be quickened in the exercise of his power by the 
 expression of the opinion, or by other acts, of one or both branches of Congress, as was 
 done in relation to the Republics formed out of Spanish America. 
 
16 PANAMA. 
 
 Together with this report a resolution was submitted to the Senate 
 from the Committee on Foreign Relations that was as follows: 
 
 Resolved, That the independence of Texas oi^ght to be acknowledged by the United 
 States whenever satisfactory information shall be received that it has in successful 
 o])eration a ci\dl government capable of jjerforming the duties and fulfilling the 
 obligations of an independent power. 
 
 On July 1, 1836, this resolution being in debate in the Senate, Mr. 
 Webster said he was willing to go so far as to vote funds to enable 
 the President to send out a proper minister, but against a direct 
 recognition he thought there existed strong objections, because it 
 was the proper function of the President to take the lead in this 
 matter. 
 
 In a debate in the House in the following year John Quincy Adams 
 said (Feb. 27, 1837) he objected to the proposition before the House 
 on the ground that the act of recognition of a foreign power had here- 
 tofore always been an Executive act of this Government. It was 
 the business and duty of the President of the United States, and he 
 (Mr. A.) was not willing to set the example of giving that recognition 
 on the part of the legislative body without recommendation of the 
 Executive. 
 
 In a note from Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Rush, on 
 March 31, 1848 (MSS. Inst. France), we find the following language: 
 
 It was right and proper that the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 
 from the United States should be the first to recognize, so far as his powers extended, 
 the provisional government of the French Republic. 
 
 A passage in President Polk's special message to Congress of April 
 3, 1848, also distinctly implies the power of the President, through 
 his ministers, to recognize the existence of a foreign Government. 
 He says : 
 
 The prompt recognition of the new Government by the representative of the United 
 States at the French Coxu't maets my full and unqualified approbation, and he has 
 been authorized in a suitable manner to make known tliis fact to the constituted 
 authorities of the French Republic. 
 
 President Taylor, in his fbst annual message to Congress of De- 
 cember 4, 1849, says: 
 
 For this purpose I invested an agent then in Europe with the power to declare 
 our willingness promptly to recognize her (Hungary) independence in the event of 
 her ability to sustain it. 
 
 There a President authorized an agent to recognize the inde- 
 pendence of a country contingent on the happening of some future 
 event. 
 
 President Taylor again, in a special message to Congress, March 
 28, 1850, says: 
 
 Mv purpose, as freelv avowed in this correspondence, was to have acknowledged 
 the independence of Hungary had she succeeded in establishing a government de 
 facto on a basis sufficiently permanent in its character to have justified me in doing so. 
 
 Thereby he clearly asserted his right as President of the United 
 States to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary with- 
 out congressional action of any kind. 
 
 In 1864 the House passed a resolution in regard to the attempt of 
 France to set up the empire of Maximilian in Mexico. Mr. Seward 
 writes that the French minister, having asked an explanation of the 
 
PAISTAMA. 17 
 
 resolution, he inclosed it, with the statement that it 'Hruly interprets 
 the uniform sentiment of the people of the United States in regard 
 to Mexico." He says, further: 
 
 It is, however, another and distinct question whether the United States would 
 think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted by the House 
 of Representatives at this time. This is a practical and purely executive question, 
 and a decision of it constitutionally belongs, not to the House of Representatives, 
 nor even Congress, but to the President of the United States. 
 
 Again, Mr. Seward, in a note to Mr. Dayton, of April 7, 1864 
 (MSS. Inst. France), says: 
 
 The question of recognition of foreign revolutionary or reactionary governments is 
 one exclusively for the Executive and can not be determined internationally by 
 congressional action. 
 
 President Grant, in his second annual message, 1870, says: 
 
 As soon as I learned that a Republic had been proclaimed at Paris, and that the 
 people of France had acquiesced in the change, the minister of the United States 
 was directed by telegraph to recognize it and to tender my congratulations and those 
 of the people of the United States. 
 
 Still another precedent for the recognition of a foreign Government 
 by the President or officers appointed by him is found in a note from 
 Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Sickles, December 16, 1870 (MSS. 
 Inst. Spain, Foreign Relations, 1871) : 
 
 Should there be circumstances which lead you to doubt the propriety of recog- 
 nizing the Duke of Aosta as King of Spain, it will be easy to communicate with the 
 department by telegraph and ask instructions. Should there be no such circum- 
 stances, the general policy of the United States, as well as their interests in the present 
 relations with Spain, call for an early and cheerful recognition of the change which 
 the Nation has made. 
 
 In 1876 the Republic of Pretoria sent us certain resolutions of 
 congratulations on our centennial celebration of the Declaration of 
 Independence. Congress passed a resolution of acknowledgment. It 
 went to the President. Nothing could have been more harmless or 
 have met with more uniform agreement. But on January 26, 1877, 
 President Grant vetoed the resolutions on constitutional grounds (p. 
 1112). His veto message was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs and never reported therefrom. The President said : 
 
 Sympathizing as I do in the spirit of courtesy and friendly recognition which has 
 prompted the passage of these resolutions, I can not escape the conviction that their 
 adoption has inadvertently involved the exercise of a power which infringes upon 
 the constitutional rights of the Executive. * * * The Constitution of the United 
 States, following the established usage of nations, has indicated the President as the 
 agent to represent the national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers, and to 
 receive all official communications from them, * * * making him, in the language 
 of one of the most eminent writers on constitutional law, "the constitutional organ 
 of communication with foreign states." If Congress can direct the correspondence 
 of the Secretary of State with foreign governments, a case very different from that 
 now under consideration might arise, when that officer might be directed to present 
 to the same foreign government entirely different and antagonistic views or statements. 
 
 He vetoed, therefore, a mere resolution of acknowledgment, in 
 response to a resolution from the Republic of Pretoria congratu- 
 lating us on our centennial anniversary, and he did so upon the 
 ground that the whole conduct of our foreign relations rested in 
 executive hands and not even so slight an invasion of it as that 
 could be permitted. 
 
 S. Doc. 37, 67-1 2 
 
18 PANAMA. 
 
 In a note to ^Ir. Christiancy, May 9, 1881 (MSS. Inst. Peru, 
 Foreign Relations, 1881), Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, says: 
 
 If the Calderon government is supported by the character and intelligence of Peru 
 * * * you may recognize it as the existing provisional government. 
 
 And in relation to the same matter President Arthur, in his third 
 annual message to Congress, 1883, says: 
 
 When the will of the Peruvian people shall be manifested I shall not hesitate to 
 recognize the government approved by them. 
 
 Also the power of the President or officers appointed by him to 
 recognize a new government is distinctly implied in a note from 
 Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, to Mr. Logan, March 17, 
 1884. (MSS. inst. Chile.) He says: 
 
 The Department of State will not recognize a revolutionary government claiming 
 to represent the people in a South American state until it is established by a free 
 expression of the will of that people. 
 
 Thus, Mr. President, I have reviewed the action and the inter- 
 pretations based upon that clause of the Constitution which au- 
 thorizes the President to receive foreign ministers as a full and 
 exclusive power of recognition by a series of Presidents and Secre- 
 taries of State. I now wish to call attention to the decisions of 
 the Supreme Court and to the opinions of writers upon constitutional 
 law. 
 
 By the act of February 28, 1795 (1 Stats. L. 424), Congress specially 
 delegated to the President the power to decide whether a government 
 organized in a State (of the Union) is the duly constituted government 
 of that State, and this power of the President was reafBrmed by the 
 Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden (7 Howard) , the celebrated case 
 growing out of the trouble in Rhode Island, known as the "Dorr 
 rebellion." In that case, Mr. Webster, who appeared for the defend- 
 ant in error, said : 
 
 How did the President of the United States treat this question? Acting under the 
 Constitution and law of 1795, he decided that the existing government was the one 
 which he was bound to protect. He took his stand accordingly, and we say that this 
 is obligatory upon this court, which always follows an executive recognition of a 
 foreign government. 
 
 Webster made that statement in argument, and in the decision, 
 Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 
 
 In the case of foreign nations the go\ernnient acknowledged by the President is 
 always recognized in the courts of justice. 
 
 Mr. President, it is pretty hard to go beyond that statement as 
 a recognition by the Supreme Court of the power of the President 
 to recognize foreign governments. 
 
 LTnited States v. Hutchings (2 Wheeler's Criminal Cases, 543), 
 in 1817, was a prosecution for piracy. The question arose whether 
 at a certain date the Republic of Buenos Aires was independent. 
 Counsel argued that our independence began with the Declara- 
 tion of Independence in 1776, and therefore that the independence 
 of Buenos Aires ''commenced with their declaration of independ- 
 ence," was a matter of notoriety throughout the world, and was 
 proved by certain correspondence between President Monroe and 
 the Spanish minister. Chief Justice Marshall was of opinion — 
 
 That a nation became independent from its declaration of independence only as 
 respects its own go"\ernment and the various departments thereof. That before it 
 
PANAMA. 19 
 
 coiild be considered independent by the judiciary of foreign nations it was necessary 
 that its independence should be recognized by the executi-\e authority of those 
 nations; that as our Executive had never recognized the independence of Euenos 
 Aires, it was not competent to the court to pronounce its independence. 
 
 Here we have the decision of Marshall to add to that of Taney 
 as well as to the statement of Mr. Webster in argument. 
 
 In United States v. Palmer (3 Wheat., 610, 634), arising two 
 months later, the Chief Justice used language applicable to the 
 legislative as well as to the executive department, and this is the 
 only exception to the general rule above stated in regard to such 
 cases. 
 
 Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company (3 Sumn., 270, 273) in- 
 volved the question whether the fisheries at the Falkland Islands 
 belonged to Buenos Aires. It was decided by Mr. Justice Story, 
 whose remarks are of especial interest because he had discussed 
 this very question in his commentaries on the Constitution, and 
 had, according to the general plan of the commentaries, left it 
 there an open one. He now said: 
 
 It is \ ery clear that it belongs exclusively to the executi- e departn^ent of our G o ern- 
 ment to recognize from time to time any new go"\-ernments which may arise inthe 
 political resolutions of the world; and until such new go', ernments are so recognized 
 they can not be admitted by our courts of justice to ha", e or to exercise the common 
 rights and prerogatives of so"\ ereignty. 
 
 Mr. Justice Story further goes on to say that ''this doctrine was 
 full}^ recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
 Gelston v. Hoyt (3 Wheat., 246, 324)." In that case the opinion 
 had been ^vritten by himself and used simply the word "govern- 
 ment." The learned justice's interpretation of the opinion would 
 indicate that whenever the word ''government" had been used in 
 this connection the executive department has been intended; and 
 it is also noticeable that the case thus referred to was decided at the 
 same term of court with the Palmer case above referred to; so that 
 these remarks of Mr. Justice Story tend to confirm the inference which 
 may be drawn from the Hutchings case, that the reference to the 
 legislative department of the Government in the Palmer case was an 
 inadvertence. We now can add Story to the authority of Marshall 
 and Ta.ney. 
 
 Williams v. Suffolk Insm-ance Company, above quoted, came up 
 for review in the Supreme Court of the United States (13 Pet., 415). 
 Mr. Justice McLean said (p. 420) : 
 
 And there can be no doubt that when the executive branch of the Government, 
 which is charged with our foreign relations, shall in its correspondence vath a foreign 
 nation assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclu- 
 sive on the judicial department. And in this view it is not material to inquire, nor 
 is it the province of the court to determine^ whether the Executive be right or wrong. 
 It is enough to know that in the exercise of his constituJiona! functions he has decided 
 the que.5tion. Having done this under the responsihili'ifs 'vJiich belong to him, it is 
 obligatory on the people and the Government of the Union. 
 
 In Kennett v. Chambers (14 How., 30) the question arose whether 
 Texas was an independent government in September, 1836. Chief 
 Justice Taney said (p. 46) that it "belonged to the Government" 
 to decide when Texas became independent. He then refers to the 
 President's message of December 22, 1S36, as evidence that it had 
 not yet become independent at that time, and says (pp. 50-51) : 
 
 It is a sufficient answer to the argum.ent to say that the question whether Texas 
 had or had not at that time become an independent State was a question for thai 
 
 department of government exclusively v:hich is charged with our foreign relations. 
 
20 PANAMA. 
 
 The department thus referred to is clearly indicated by its fur- 
 ther characterization (p. 51) as "the treaty -making power. " 
 
 The Prize Cases (2 BL, 635) are not strictly in point, because 
 they refer to domestic, not to foreign, difficulties. Mr. Justice 
 Grier (p. 670), however, sajs: 
 
 Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as commander in chief, in suppres" 
 sing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and a ci\'il war of 
 such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of 
 belligerents, is a question to be decided hy him, and this court must be governed 
 by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government, to which 
 this power teas intrusted. 
 
 The italics are the court's own. 
 
 In the recent case of the United States v. Trumbull (48 Fed. Rep., 
 99, 104), referring to the late civil war in Chile, Judge Ross says: 
 
 It i.s beyond question that the status of the people composing the Congressional 
 Party at the time of the commission of the alleged offense is to be regarded by the 
 court as it was then regarded by the political or executive department of the United 
 States. This doctrine is firmly established. 
 
 In the Rata (56 Fed. Rep., 505, 510) the circuit court of appeals 
 for the ninth circuit, speaking through Judge Hawley, said : 
 
 The law is well settled that it is the duty of the courts to regard the status of the 
 Congressional Party in the same light as they were regarded by the executive depart- 
 ment of the United States at the time the alleged offenses were committed. 
 
 The law and practice as to appointing and receiving ministers 
 and consuls has been elaborately set forth and discussed by Caleb 
 Cushing (7 Op. Attys Gen., p. 242), who concludes: 
 
 Further, to show that this act can not be reasonably construed as intending to 
 require the President to do what the Constitution, on considerations of public policy, 
 has intrusted to the sole discretion of the Executive, may be mentioned the clause 
 of the act which says, in words, that the President shall appoint a "consul" at Port- 
 au-Prince. This, if done, would have the effect, according to international usage, 
 of placing the Haytien Empire in diplomatic relation mth the United States. It is 
 not presumed that such was the purpose of the lawmakers; yet such is the necessary 
 effect of the law. if the words ' ' shall appoint "' are mandatory in operation. If they are 
 mandatory in any case, they are in all; if not mandatory in one case, they are so in 
 none. * * * 
 
 The President can, with concurrence of the Senate, appoint consuls at any place 
 whatever, whether they be mentioned in the act or not. 
 
 I will now cite the writers upon our Constitution : 
 In W. Rawle's View of the Constitution of the United States, 
 pages 195 and 196, is found the following in regard to the Pres- 
 ident's power of recognition of a foreign nation : 
 
 The power of receiving foreign ambassadors carries with it, among other things, 
 the right of judging, in the case of a revolution in a foreign country, whether the new 
 rulers ought to be recognized. The Legislature, indeed, possesses a superior power 
 and may declare its dissent from the Executive recognition or refusal; but until that 
 sense is declared the act of the Executive is binding. 
 
 The power of Congress on this subject can not be controlled. They may, if they 
 think proper, acknowledge a small and helpless community, though with the certainty 
 of drawing a war upon our country; but greater circumspection is required fi-om the 
 President, who, not ha^dng the constitutional power to declare war, ought ever to 
 abstain from a measure likely to produce it. 
 
 Judge Story says, in his Commentaries on the Constitution (2 
 Story on the Constitution, sees. 1566 and 1567) : 
 
 But a much more delicate occasion is when a civil war breaks out in a nation, and 
 two nations are formed, or two parties in the same nation, each claiming the sover- 
 eignty of the whole, and the contest remains as yet undecided, flagrante bello. * * * 
 
PANAMA. 21 
 
 The exercise of this prerogative of acknowledging new nations or ministers is, therefore, 
 under such circumstances, an executive function of great delicacy, which requires 
 the ut'nost caution and deliberation. * * * if such recognition is made it is con- 
 elusive upon the nation, unless, indeed, it can be reversed by an act of Congress 
 repudiating it. If, on the other hand, such recognition has been refused by the 
 Executive, it is said that Congress may, notwithstanding, solemnly acknowledge the 
 sovereignty of the nation or party (citing Rawle). These, however, are propositions 
 which have hitherto remained as abstract statements under the Constitution, and 
 therefore can be propounded, not as absoluetly true, but as still open to discussion 
 if they should ever arise in the course of our foreign diplomacy. The Constitution 
 has expressly invested the Executive with power to receive ambassadors and other 
 ministers. It has not expressly invested Congress with the power either to repudiate 
 or acknowledge them. * * * 
 
 That a power so extensive in Us reach over our foreign relations could not 'properly he 
 conferred on any other than the executive department will adrait of little doubt. That it 
 should be exclusivelj'' confided to that department without any participation of the 
 Senate in the functions (that body being conjointly intrusted with the treaty-making 
 power) is not so obvious. Probably the circumstance that in all foreign governments 
 the power was exclusively confided to the executive department, and the utter imprac- 
 ticability of keeping the Senate constantly in session, and the suddenness of the 
 emergencies which might require the action of the Cxovernment, conduced to the 
 establishment of the authority in its present form. It is not, indeed, a power likely 
 to be abused, though it is pregnant with consequences often involving the question 
 of peace or war. And in our short experience the revolutions in France and the 
 revolutions in South America have already placed us in situations to feel its critical 
 character and the necessity of ha^dng at the head of the Government an Executive 
 of sober judgment, enlightened views, and firm and exalted patriotism. 
 
 Clearly only the general plan of not deciding open questions in 
 these commentaries was the learned justice's only reason for not 
 more positively expressing dissent from the propositions of Mr. 
 Rawle; and, as has already been shown, his views upon this point 
 were in accord with those of Chief Justice Marshall as expressed 
 upon the Hutchings trial in 1817. He refers also to the chapter 
 on M, Gen^t and the neutrality proclamation of 1793, in Marshall's 
 Life of Washington, and all through that chapter it is clear that 
 the Chief Justice agrees with Washington and his Cabinet in con- 
 sidering the recognition of a new government to be an Executive 
 function. 
 
 Mr. Pomeroy is much more positive in the statement of his opinion. 
 He says (Pomeroy's Constitutional Lav/, pp. 669, 670, and 672) : 
 
 All foreign relations are thus confided exclusively to the President or to him in 
 connection with the Senate. * * * 
 
 Of the unlimited extent and transcendent importance of this function thus con- 
 fided to the Executive, either alone or in connection with the Senate, there can be 
 no doubt. * * * • _ 
 
 Congress may pass resolves in relation to questions of an international character, 
 but these can only have a certain moral weight; they have no legal effect; they can 
 not bind the Executive. The necessity for this is evident; negotiations generally 
 require a certain degree of secrecy; one mind and will must always be more efficient 
 In such matters than a large deliberative assembly. * * * 
 
 The President can not declare war; Congress alone possesses this attribute. But 
 the President may, without any possibility of hindrance from the legislature, so con- 
 duct the foreign intercourse, the diplomatic negotiations mth other Governments, as 
 to force a war. as to compel another nation to take the initiative; and this step once 
 taken the challenge can not be refused. 
 
 Mr. Wharton expresses his opinion in the following headnote: 
 ''Such recognition determinable by Executive." (Wharton's Inter- 
 national Law Digest, 2d ed., p, 551.) 
 
 The number of instances in which the Execxitive has recognized a new foreign 
 power without consulting Congress (because not anticipating consequences which 
 made such consultation necessary) lias been very great. No objection has been 
 
22 PANAMA. 
 
 made by Congress in any of these instances. The legislative power has thus for 100 I 
 years impliedly confii'med the view that the right to recognize a new foreign Govern- 1 
 ment belonged to the Executive; and if it is correct doctrine that the same power 
 can not be exercised for the same purposes by two different branches of the Govern- 
 ment, this implied approval is conclusive of the whole present controversy. (54th 
 Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 56.) 
 
 I should like next briefly to call attention to what the United 
 States, acting upon the principles just stated, has done in practice 
 as to the time accorded before recognition was given and as to the 
 manner in which recognition was given. 
 
 In the case of the French Republic of 1793, President Washington 
 received Monsieur Genet, and recognized the Republic in that way. 
 
 The President authorized the recognition of the Empire in 1804 
 through sending a new letter of credence to our minister. He 
 recognized the monarchy of 1814 in the same way. When the 
 Republic of 1848 was proclaimed on the morning of February 25, 
 it was recognized by Mr. Rush, the American minister, on the 28th, 
 three days later. That action was executive. It was witliin three 
 days, and it was approved by the President. The second Empire 
 was recognized in the same manner. 
 
 The Republic of 1870 was recognized by the Executive through 
 our minister, Mr. Washburn, after an interval of two days. There 
 was then no constitution established in France; it was a purely 
 revolutionary government, and the Republic was recognized by us 
 with the utmost rapidity. The telegrams are cited in the Senate 
 document presented by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Hale] in the 
 Fifty-fourth Congress. 
 
 When Brazil threw off the imperial rule, the minister telegraphed : 
 
 Legation of the United States, 
 
 Rio de Janeiro, Novemher 17 , 1889. 
 The imperial family sailed to-day. Government de facto, with ministry, estab- 
 lished. Perfect order maintained. Important we acknowledge Republic first. 
 
 Adams. 
 Mr. Blaine telegraphed to Mr. Adams : 
 
 Department of State, 
 Washington, November 19, 1889. 
 You will maintain diplomatic relations with the provisional government of Brazil . 
 
 Blaine. 
 
 Thus we recognized the new Government within two days. 
 
 The Central American Federation was recognized by the President's 
 reception of Mr. Canaz as envoy extraordinary in 1824. The King- 
 dom of Hawaii was recognized in 1826 by Capt. Jones, a naval officer, 
 being sent there by the Executive to negotiate a treaty. The United 
 States recognized the existence of Belgium by the issuance of an 
 exequatur to the Belgian consul at New York — a purely Executive 
 act. The President recognized Texas by sending Mr. La Branche as 
 charge d'affaires. Again, when the independence of Greece was 
 recognized, it was an Executive act through our minister in London. 
 
 In the case of Hungary, to which I have already alluded, President 
 Taylor sent an agent out to recognize Hungary the moment it could 
 be said the revolution was in any degree successful. The recognition 
 of the Republic of Haiti was an Executive act, as were the recogni- 
 tions of the Republic of Liberia, the Dominican Republic, the King- 
 
PANAMA. 23 
 
 dom of Korea, the Empire of Germany, the Orange Free State, the 
 PrincipaUty of Rumania, Serbia, and the Congo Free State. Costa 
 Rica was recognized by the reception of a minister. Guatemala. 
 Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, the Greater Republic of Central 
 America in 1896, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, the Peru- 
 BoHvian Confederation, Uruguay, Venezuela, New Granada, and 
 the Kingdom of Samoa were all recognized by Executive act. In 
 every instance it was a case of purely Executive recognition, almost 
 all by the method of receiving a minister. 
 
 My proposition, therefore, as to the recognition of a State and 
 Government, is that it is primarily and may be, as has always hap- 
 pened, an exclusively Executive function. The precedents are 
 uniform to a most extraordinary degree. The position has been 
 held by every Secretary of State, I think, without exception; it has 
 been held by the Supreme Court in the cases I have read that the 
 Executive recognition is the only recognition admitted by the courts, 
 and I do not tmnk it is possible to go beyond that. 
 
 The other method of recognition in the Constitution is by the 
 clause which gives the President the right to nominate ambassadors, 
 ministers, and consuls. Recognition has almost invariably occurred 
 in what Mr. John Quincy Adams pointed out to be the best and most 
 proper way — -the reception of a minister from the State seeking inde- 
 pendence — ^but the power of the President to nominate a minister 
 where no such office had been created by Congress and which, there- 
 fore, implies his ability to recognize in that way, has been estab- 
 lished beyond a doubt. I have heard the right of the President to 
 nominate a minister to Panama questioned because no such office 
 had been created by Congress, and I thought it would not be amiss 
 to call the attention of the Senate to the practice in that respect. 
 
 On December 22, 1791, President Washington sent a message to 
 the Senate nominating Gouverneur Morris, Thomas Pinckney, and 
 WiUiam Short as ministers to Paris, London, and The Hague, respec- 
 tively. There were no provisions of law for any such officers. Vari- 
 ous motions declaring that there was no need for these missions were 
 debated and were rejected, and the nominations of Morris and 
 Pinckney were confirmed. A similar motion was made that there 
 was no occasion for a minister to The Hague, and that was postponed 
 until the following Monday, when it was taken up and defeated, and 
 immediately after the nomination of a minister to The Hague was 
 confirmed. 
 
 On the 16th of April, 1794, Washington nominated John Jay as 
 envoy extraordinary to Great Britain. Mr. Pinckney was minister 
 plenipotentiary, but he was not envoy extraordinary, which ofiice 
 did not exist. President Washington, therefore, nominated Mr. Jay 
 to aa office which had no existence. He was confirmed by the 
 Senate. 
 
 On the 6th of February, 1799, John Adams nominated Rufus King 
 minister to Russia. No such office existed. He said in the nomi- 
 nating message that it was to open relations with Russia. No 
 action was taken, and the Russian mission was not established until 
 1809, I think, when Mr. John Quincy Adams was sent. 
 
24 PANAMA. 
 
 On the 29th day of May, 1813, Mr. Madison nominated a minister 
 to Sweden to open diplomatic relations with that country. No 
 such office had been created by Congress. 
 
 John Adams sent in the names of Ellsworth and Patrick Henry 
 to be commissioners to France in conjunction with William Vans 
 Murray. No such offices existed. 
 
 On the 11th of January, 1803, Jefferson nominated Livingston 
 to negotiate with France and Charles Pinckney to negotiate with 
 Spain in conjunction with Monroe. No such offices existed. 
 
 Until Mr. Madison's second term appropriations for the Diplo- 
 matic Service were made in a lump sum, and Congress thus left it 
 for many years to the Executive to appoint ministers when he 
 pleased without ever taking any action which could be construed 
 as the creation of any one of these offices. 
 
 Of course, Mr. President, with the extension of our Diplomatic 
 Service cases of nominating to offices for which there is no appro- 
 priation have practically disappeared, but the cases which I have 
 cited — of Washington, John Adams, and Madison — show that the 
 men most familiar with the Constitution in its early days conceived 
 that they had an entire right to nominate a minister to a country 
 where there was no provision for a mission made by Congress, and 
 that the Senate in all instances conffi-med those nominations just as 
 if a specific appropriation had been made, thereby recogni,zing the 
 right of the President. It is a method by which recognition could 
 be extended. It is a method which, in practice, has not lately 
 been used at ail for that purpose, because very naturally the recep- 
 tion of the minister or ambassador of the State seeking recognition 
 has been the obvious way to meet it. 
 
 Mr. President, I have tried to lay down the general international 
 law; I have tried to show the general practice of the Government of 
 the United States and the precedents which we have in regard to it. 
 Having shown, as I believe, that all the authorities hold that recog- 
 nition is an Executive function which can not be invaded or dimin- 
 ished by the legislative body, that whatever dangers it may carry 
 the Constitution has placed it in executive hands, I now come to the 
 exercise of that right in the present case of Panama. The right of 
 the President to recognize being demonstrated by law and precedent, 
 
 1 wish to inquire whether that undoubted right has been properly 
 exercised in this particular case? 
 
 In section 4 of the act approved June 28, 1902, which provided 
 for the construction of the canal, occur these words: 
 
 That should the President be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory 
 title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the neces- 
 sary territory of the Republic of Colombia and the rights mentioned in sections 1 and 
 
 2 of this act, within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the President, 
 ha\T.ng first obtained for the United States perpetual control by treaty of the neces- 
 sary territory from Costa Rica and Nicaragua upon terms which he may consider 
 reasonable, for the construction, perpetual maintenance, operation, and jirotection 
 of a canal connecting the Caribbean Sea with the Pacific Ocean by what is com- 
 monly known as the Nicaragua route, etc. 
 
 In other words, the President was instructed by that act to secure 
 a right of way through a given piece of territory with a view to 
 building a canal. It was entirely secondary and of no vital impor- 
 e to whom that territory belonged. At that time that territory 
 within the boundaries of the Republic of Colombia, and Colom- 
 
PANAMA. 25 
 
 bia sought to make a canal treaty with us. If Senators will turn 
 to page 18 of Senate Document No. 51, Fifty-eighth Congress, they 
 will see there a letter from Mr. Hay to Mr. Beaupre, in which he says : 
 
 The canal negotiations were initiated bj^ Colombia, and were energetically pressed 
 upon this Government for several years. The propositions presented by Colombia, 
 with slight modifications, were finally accepted by us. In ^drtue of this agreement 
 our Congress reversed its previous judgment and decided upon the Panama «route. 
 
 In other words, the treaty was sought by Colombia, had been 
 sought by Colombia for years, and was made with Colombia on the 
 terms she asked, with comparatively slight modifications. The 
 treaty was dated the 22d of January, 1903. As to the character of 
 the treaty, which is fresh in everybody's mind, I need only say that 
 the sole objection that I heard made to it in the Senate — and that 
 sole objection was made at considerable length and during a pretty 
 long period of time — was that we went a great deal too far in what 
 we conceded to Colombia. Therefore Colombia sought the treaty; 
 she got the treaty; she got what she asked, with trifling modifica- 
 tions, and she got concessions which it was very difficult for many 
 of us to accede to, and which only the universal desire for the build- 
 ing of the canal made it possible for us to accept. 
 
 Now, what was the treatment of that treaty by Colombia '? I 
 wish to call attention 
 
 Mr. Daniel. Will the Senator from Massachusetts allow me to 
 interrupt him for a moment ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. Daniel. Before the Senator speaks on that subject, I should 
 be very glad if he would state whether or not the Department of 
 Panama took part in that action of Colombia; and, if so, what part? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I will answer the question in one moment. 
 
 Mr. Daniel. I have seen it stated that one or more of the revo- 
 lutionary consuls of Panama took part in the action of the Colombian 
 Congress, but I have not been able 
 
 Mr. Lodge. The Senator means in the Congress which discussed 
 the treaty? 
 
 Mr. Daniel. Which discussed and rejected the treaty. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I have analyzed that very carefully and will show the 
 Senator from Virginia exactly what the representatives of Panama 
 did. 
 
 Mr. Daniel. I wish the Senator would do so. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. When the treaty reached Bogota, Colombia — as I 
 think I shall be able to show by the extracts I shall read from Mr. 
 Beaupre 's correspondence — from the beginning sought to extort 
 more money from the United States and from the company, and it will 
 appear also that the feelings of Panama found very early expression. 
 Mr. Beaupre, whom I know only from this correspondence which 
 has been sent to the Senate, appears to me to have been a man of 
 great clearness of vision, great firmness, and great tact. I think 
 the correspondence does him the utmost credit, and I think anyone 
 who will read it will agree with me on that point. 
 
 On page 7 of his correspondence, on April 24, 1903 — see how early 
 that was — he says to Mr. Hay: 
 
 1 have the honor to refer to your teiegxam of the 7th instant, confirmed elsewhere, 
 in regard to the negotiations for the cancellation of the present concessions of the 
 Panama canal and railroad companies. 
 
26 PANAMA. 
 
 Now, in the first article of that treaty, as he points out in the letter 
 of April 28— 
 
 The Government of Colombia authorizes the New Panama Canal Co. to sell 
 and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties, and concessions, as 
 well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or parts of shares of said company. 
 
 In other words, the very first thing that Colombia did after the 
 treaty had been ratified by our Senate was to try to destroy and 
 annul the concessions which in that treaty she agreed should be 
 <5on tinned to the Panama Canal Co. It was clearly in violation 
 of the treaty which her own representatives had signed. 
 
 On the 4th. of May Mr. Beaupre writes to Mr. Hay: 
 
 Private discussion, which perhaps more clearly reflects the real situation, is to the 
 effect that the price is inadequate ; that a much greater sum of money can be obtained, 
 and that the United States can be obligated to guarantee the sovereignty of Colombian 
 ports outside the Department of Panama against the invasion or seizure by foreign 
 enemies. The one great determining point, however, is the belief that the price can 
 be greatly augmented. 
 
 That was on May 4. They were trying already to get more money 
 out of it. 
 
 Now, on the 7th of May — and this is the first allusion to what the 
 Senator from Virginia asked me — he says : 
 
 The probabilities are that when the measure is presented to Congress there will be a 
 lengthy debate and an adverse vote. Then the representatives of the coast Depart- 
 ments of the Cauca, Panama, and Bolivar Avill ask for a reconsideration, and urge a 
 ratification of the convention as the only means of preventing the secession of those 
 Departments and the attempt to constitute of their territories an independent republic. 
 
 As early as the 7th of May, therefore, the representatives of Panama 
 were giving it to be understood at Bogota that if the treaty were not 
 ratified it would lead to the secession of the State which they 
 represented. 
 
 On page 22, June 10, Mr. Beaupre says: 
 
 Mr. Mancini, the local agent of the Panama Canal Company, has informed me that 
 ■he had received an official note from the Colombian Government, stating that it did 
 did not think the convention would be ratified because of the opinion that the com- 
 pensation was insufficient, but that if the canal company would pay to Colombia 
 .about $10,000,000 ratification could be secured. Mr. Mancini has notified hia 
 ■company of this note. 
 
 Then they were trying, as was obvious, to squeeze the company. 
 They sent to the agent of the French company and said they wanted 
 ten millions from them. 
 
 On page 26, June 20, at 5 p. m., when the extra session had con- 
 vened, Mr. Beaupre telegraphed: 
 
 Extra session of Congress convened to-day. Joaquin Velez, president of the Senate ; 
 Jose Medina Calder6n, president of the Chamber of Representatives. The President's 
 message deals mth canal convention as follows: "To my Government has been pre- 
 sented this dilemma: either it lets our sovereignty suffer detriment or renounces 
 certain pecuniary advantages, to which, according to the opinion of many, we have 
 a right. In the first case to consent to the sacrifice of our sovereignty and not aspiring 
 to great indemnification, the just wishes of the inhabitants of Panama and other 
 Colombians would be satisfied if the canal were opened, but the Government would 
 be exposed to the charge afterwards that it did not defend our sovereignty and that 
 it did not defend the interests of the nation. 
 
 That is, the President, who had caused the treaty to be made, sends 
 in a message in which he vibrates between the two propositions, that 
 there is doubt about their right to cede territory, and, on the other 
 
PANAMA. 27 
 
 hand; that there are great pecuniary advantages; and he transmits 
 this treaty which he had caused to be made, with that shuffling mes- 
 sage, to the Congress called to consider it. 
 Mr. Beaupre says on June 20 : 
 
 As I have heretofore predicted, there is a full and ample majority of the friends of 
 the Government in both houses of Congress, and such legislation as the Government 
 may seriously desire will be enacted. 
 
 The Government itself, which had made the treaty and had the 
 power then, Mr. Beaupre says, to have passed it, subsequently had 
 excited so much feeling against it and against themselves that all 
 action became hopeless. But at that time they had the power, and 
 the Government that had made the treaty was holding back in the 
 hopes of getting more money out of us or more money out of the canal 
 company. Their constitutional scruples, which now play so large 
 a part, were then only used for purposes of blackmail, and would 
 have disappeared at once before the offer of a few extra millions. It 
 is altogether a pretty picture of a responsible government supposed 
 to be fit to maintain international relations. 
 
 June 27 our minister says again : 
 
 Friends of the Government have control in Congress. I believe any legislation 
 •seriously desired by the Government will pass. 
 
 That was brought to a test. He telegraphed on the 25th: 
 
 Opposition Chamber of Representatives opened canal discussion yesterday, demand- 
 ing documents relating to the treaty. The Government objected because it was not 
 ready to present the treaty. The Government was sustained; vote 38 to 5. 
 
 That shows the control which the Government had at that time. 
 
 Now, again, I come to a passage which will throw light on the 
 question which the Senator from Virginia has asked me. Mr. Beau- 
 pre writes on July 5, and, after acknowledging the receipt of a cipher 
 telegram, says: 
 
 This and the statement of just-arrived members of Congress from Panama that this 
 Department would revolt if the treaty is not ratified caused alarm, and the effect is 
 favorable. 
 
 He means favorable, of course, to the ratification of the treaty. 
 
 Again, he writes on the 9th of July that he has been asked by a 
 gentleman, evidently of importance, whose name is not given, if the 
 payment can not be increased to $15,000,000. He says on July 11: 
 
 The majority in the Senate are opposed to treaty. Apparently the Goverimient — 
 
 The Government that made it — 
 is not defending the treaty, although it may intend to later. 
 
 He further says on July 1 1 : 
 
 Ex-President Caro has been the leader of the opposition in this debate and has 
 made many brilliant speeches. He has charged the Government with lack of good 
 faith and consistency, both to the United States and ColoniJ)ia, in not defending a 
 treaty of its own making and for endeavoring to throw the whole responsibility upon 
 Congress. 
 
 Thus we learn that the opposition had pictured this attitude, this 
 discreditable attitude, of the Government which had made the treaty, 
 which would not take responsibility for it, which would not carry it 
 through, although it had the majority, but was holding back evidently 
 
28 PANAMA. 
 
 with the hope of getting more money out of somebody. That was 
 openly charged in the debate. Our minister says again: 
 
 The Vice President — 
 
 That is, MaiToquin, who was acting as President and who had 
 caused the treaty to be made — 
 
 has positively declined to sign, and if the motion as presented should prevail and he 
 still refuses his signature, the Senate will not consider the treaty at all, and in all 
 probability Congress will be dissolved. 
 
 On the 21st of July he says: 
 
 The Government has continued to triumph on every important question. 
 
 Now I come to a passage to which I ask the careful attention of the 
 Senate, inasmuch as we are considering the good faith of the people 
 with whom we had these dealings and what sort of treatment they 
 are entitled to from us. Mr. Beaupre, July 21, said: 
 
 I have certain, but private, information that Dr. Uricoechea, a member of the 
 special Senate committee heretofore referred to, and who lived a great niany years in 
 Germany, called on Baron Griinau, the German charge d'affaires, to inquire what 
 would be the attitude of the German Government in case of trouble arising out of the 
 matter, and whether it would be willing to imdertake or aid the construction of the 
 canal in case the treaty with the United States .should not be ratified. Baron Griinau 
 replied that he had no instructions bearing upon the subject, but that he was of the 
 positive opinion that, considering how desirous his Government was at the present 
 moment to remain on friendly terms with the United States, it would not take any 
 steps with reference to the construction of the canal or to any controversy gromng out 
 of the present negotiations; that he would, however, submit the matter to his Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 My English colleague, with whom I have the most pleasant personal relations, and 
 whose attitude I know has been one of unswerving friendliness to our interests in this 
 matter, informs me — 
 
 This is direct — 
 
 that one of the deputies of the Chamber of Representatives called on him with an 
 inquiry similar to the one above mentioned. To this he replied that this question 
 was thoroughly considered by His jSIajesty's Government at the time the modifica- 
 tions were made in the Bulwer-Clayton treaty, and that his Government was of the 
 opinion that the safeguards contained in the Hay-Pauncefote arrangement formed a 
 sufficient guaranty for the commerce of the world, and was therefore willing now to 
 leave the United States quite free as regards any further negotiations with reference 
 to the construction of a canal. 
 
 There they were, Mr. President, members of the House and the 
 Senate of Colombia, seeking to make arrangements with Germany or 
 England, trying to discover if Germany or England was ready to 
 make arrangements to build that canal in case they rejected the 
 treaty with us, and these are people whose very existence depends 
 upon the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine which we uphold, who 
 are defended by the shield we throw over them. At that very mo- 
 ment, with our treaty pending, these honest patriots were sneaking 
 up to two of the great powers of Europe, fortunately our friends, 
 fortunately awake to the situation and its conditions, and inviting 
 them to come into the American hemisphere and build the canal. 
 Those are the people who would now ask consideration at our hands. 
 
 Mr. President, I do not know that it is necessary for me to follow 
 out the history of the amendments which were proposed in the 
 Colombian Congress. They all ended practically in a demand by these 
 
PANAMA. 29 
 
 patriots for more money. But on August 12 the Senate rejected the 
 treaty, and Mr. Beaupre says: 
 
 Referring to my telegram of August 12, 7 p. m., I do not believe that rejection of 
 treaty is final , for the following reasons: Yesterday's debate and vote was undoubtedly 
 previously arranged. 
 
 In other words, it was a step — a trick, if you please — to try to ex- 
 tort further concessions from us. 
 
 I come now to another passage which again throws light on the 
 question asked by the Senator from Virginia. Mr. Beaupre says that 
 there is nobody supporting the treaty; that its support has failed; 
 that the Government has retreated from its position and hostility to 
 the Government is growing. Then he adds : 
 
 Even the Panama representatives have lately become so thoroughly imbued with 
 the idea of an independent republic that they have been more or less indifferent to the 
 fate of the treaty. 
 
 On September 5 he wrote that the committee had reported a law 
 by which they authorized the President to open new negotiations, in, 
 which they were to ask for an increase all around of rental and 
 
 0,000,000 from the United States. 
 
 On September 10 he speaks of the appointment of Obaldia as 
 
 governor of Panama, and says: 
 
 Fierce attack to-day in the Senate upon the appointment of Obaldia as governor 
 of Panama. The appointment is regarded as being the forerunner of separation. 
 
 Obaldia was supposed to be very friendly to Panama. 
 
 Of several senators who spoke, only the son of the President defended the action of 
 the Government. 
 
 Resolution passed by almost unanimous vote, whi(^h is equivalent to vote of censure 
 against the Government. 
 
 That censure upon the Government was for appointing a man 
 whom they thought friendly to the separatist movement in Panama. 
 Again he says, on the 11th of September: 
 
 Sir; I have the honor to report that events of interest have taken place in connec- 
 tion with the appointment of Senator Obaldia to the post of governor of the Depart- 
 ment of Panama. 
 
 Senator Obaldia 's separatist tendencies are well known, and he is reported to have 
 said that, should the canal treaty not pass, the Department of Panama would declare 
 its independence, and would be right in doing so. 
 
 That was a senator speaking at Bogota; and yet people hold up 
 their hands and say the revolution in Panama was a surprise. 
 
 At yesterday's session of the Senate the feeling of opposition to Seiior Obaldia 's ap- 
 pointment was given expression by a resolution proposed by Senator Perez y Soto, to 
 
 ''The Senate of the Republic can not see with indifference the appointment which 
 has been made for the post of governor of the Department of Panama, which it regards 
 as a menace to the safety of the Republic. " 
 
 That shows that the matter was thoroughly under discussion at 
 that time. 
 
 On the 30th of September our minister writes : 
 
 It is said, and generally believed in this city, that there is a project on foot among 
 certain senators to annul the arrangement entered into by the Colombian Government 
 and the French Oanal Co. in 1900, extending the franchise and prnaleges of that 
 company. 
 
30 PANAMA. 
 
 Now, Mr. President, I think the extracts which I have read show 
 the manner in which the Congress of Colombia dealt with this treaty, 
 made at their solicitation and carrying not only the concessions they 
 wanted, but also a great sum of money for the benefit of their people. 
 I think it is a pretty sorry picture, this description of the manner in 
 which our treaty was dealt with at Bogota. Their actions resemble 
 those of irrational highwaymen much more than responsible public 
 men of even indifferent honesty. 
 
 It also comes out from this correspondence that back in May, be- 
 fore the Congress met, there was already talk in Bogota of a revolution 
 and of the secession of Panama; that it was openly spoken of by the 
 representatives of Panama when they arrived; and that later they 
 became so imbued with the idea of independence that they were 
 indifferent to the fate of the treaty, because they preferred to seek 
 their own independence. 
 
 All these facts were' matters of notoriety in the Colombian capital. 
 The Colombian President and Congress did not conceal their attempt 
 to extort more money, and they did not hesitate to make approaches 
 to the representatives of European nations to see whether they could 
 make a bargain with them. If those performances, Mr. President, 
 constitute the serious acts of a serious and honorable government, 
 or of a government acting in good faith, then I am very much mis- 
 taken in my judgment of what constitutes honor and good faith in 
 governmental action. 
 
 Mr. President, I desire to call attention now to the feelings and the 
 attitude of Panama. I want to show to the Senate that the revolu- 
 tion, about which Senators speak as if it were the creation of a moment, 
 represents not only the preparations of months, but that it expresses 
 the feelings and the hostilities of years. I am going to read from a 
 speech made by the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Morgan] on the 
 20th of December, 1902. I could not hope myself to put in better or 
 in such eloquent language the feelings of the people of Panama 
 toward the Government of Colombia. The Senator then said: 
 
 They remember what the people of Panama can never forget — that their State,, 
 once sovereign and independent, was the first State of this hemisphere, after the 
 United States of North America, that achieved their independence and sovereignty. 
 
 Neither can they forget that the church party has strijjped that badge of honor- 
 and power from their national flag and has reduced Panama toa department of Colom- 
 bia, ruled by a governor appointed at Bogota. It is as if Ohio should be reduced to 
 the former condition of a part of our Northwestern Territory. Above all, they can not 
 forget the degrading bondage of the concordat that the church party in Colombia 
 has forced upon them in the agreement of 1888 with Po^De Leo XIII. While memory 
 of these events lasts in Panama peace will have only a precarious and temporary 
 residence there. 
 
 These thoughtful men know that agitation in Panama will be incessant to enlarge 
 the canal concession we may obtain from Colombia into a bond of union with the 
 United States, and no occasion that promises success will be overlooked to promote 
 and intensify that feeling; and they know that even the security of the canal property 
 will be made a reason why the United States should accept the annexation of Panama 
 as a measure of necessity. This is not a new thought or an abandoned hope in Panama. 
 I dread the thought of placing such a temptation, so lit up with the hopes of restored 
 liberty, honor, and sovereignty, before those people, unless they could be again 
 realized in their separate independence. 
 
 If Panama could be again restored to her sovereign independence, I would hail 
 the event with joy, but I will not consent to an agreement with Colombia that may 
 drive Panama into our Union to escape her present bondage to Colombia. 
 
 Above all else, we should be careful and entirely frank in our dealings Avith Colombia. 
 The belief or the pledge that we will even aid her actively in fastening upon Panama 
 
PANAMA. 31 
 
 the fetters of the concordat of 1888 or in maintaining her hold on Panama against the 
 will of her people, if they choose to throw it off, will prove to be a mistake that may 
 deceive Colombia, for our people will not sustain us in supporting such a pledge. 
 
 Our people will never aid Colombia in the infliction of wrong and injustice upon 
 the people of Panama at the will and pleasure of that Government, and this appears 
 to be the pledge we are asked to give. They will never extinguish or prevent the 
 rekindling of the light of liberty, independence, and sovereignty in that once bril- 
 liant star that has been stricken from the galaxy of American republics by the frat- 
 ricidal hand of Colombia. A casual concession offers no temptation to the people of 
 the United States for an act that is so unnatural. 
 
 It would be a far better use to make of the $40,000,000 we are asked to pay the Pana- 
 ma Canal Co. for a title that is a mere possession of a property they are anxious to get 
 rid of to pay $30,000,000 of it to Colombia for the restoration of Panama to independence 
 and $10,000,000 to Panama for the concessions claimed by the New Panama Canal 
 Co. The French could then work out their concession, if they wish to do so, and if 
 they can get the money, or, if not, they could forfeit it to the United States. 
 
 ******* 
 
 When the treaty of 1846-1848 was made Panama was a State with so^^ereign powers. 
 Now she is a department of Colombia, and that treaty has made the United States' 
 accessory to her degradation. I can never vote for its renewal. To pledge the pro- 
 tection of Colombia in her sovereignty over one of her departments, without restric- 
 tion as to any abuses of power over those people, is to bind our country to assist Colom- 
 bia in any policy she may choose to adopt toward them. It is not a pledge of pro- 
 tection to Colombia against foreign aggression, but a jaledge of assistance to that Govern- 
 ment against any resistance by the people of Panama to any policy or law Colombia 
 may choose to impose upon a people who are already degraded in their political rights' 
 from the proud position of sovereign statehood to that of a mere department that is 
 governed from Bogota. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Mr. President 
 
 The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massachu- 
 setts yield ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Certainly; wdth pleasure. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. I have no word in that statement to change — no 
 sentiment, no thought, no word. I have not changed it, and I do 
 not propose to change it. 
 
 Now, may I ask the honorable Senator from Massachusetts, did 
 he not vote to put back on Panama those very bonds against which 
 I was declaiming? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I voted for the treaty with Colombia. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Did it not do that very thing ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I did not think so. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Was it not an exact repetition of the treaty of 1846,. 
 word for word, with an addition applying it particularly to certain 
 special localities in Panama? So the Senator reads that for the 
 purpose of reproaching me, I suppose, for a change of opinion — an 
 opinion that I have not changed in the slightest degree. 
 
 I will ask the Senator again, is he now willing to take that $40,000,- 
 000 that these condemned felons in France are to get from us and 
 pay Colombia for Panama ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. No, Mr. President; I am not willing that the United 
 States should break any agreement it has made. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. The United States has no agreement to-day witk 
 the Panama Canal Co., so that we are as free as the wind with 
 respect to an agreement. Now, is the Senator, in the absence of any 
 agreement with Panama, willing to pay Colombia that $40,000,000 
 which we propose to pay to the Panama Canal Co. and buy the 
 peace of Colombia toward the United States and toward Panama ? 
 
32 PANAMA. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I am not willing to take money which I honestly 
 think should be paid to the Panama Canal Co. for its property 
 rights there and give it to anybody else. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. I understand it all now. I am glad I got the reply. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I did not read that quotation for the purpose of 
 charging the Senator either with consistency or with inconsistency. 
 I do not think that matters of consistency or inconsistency— '' the 
 bugbear of weak minds" — are of much importance or consequence. 
 I read it because it was an extremely strong statement of the feel- 
 ings of the people of Panama, showing that those feelings were the 
 growth of years and because it alluded to Panama's constitutional 
 relations with Colombia, which I now wish to touch upon. 
 
 In 1819 Colombia was included under the constitution of Bolivar, 
 and had all the territory now occupied by Colombia, Ecuador, and 
 Venezuela. 
 
 In 1830 Colombia separated into New Granada, Venezuela, and 
 Ecuador, and the constitution of 1832 was formed. That was the 
 constitution of New Granada. 
 
 There was a new constitution of New Granada in 1843. Article 
 232 of that constitution makes secession an act of rebellion, and it 
 was due to the revolt of certain provinces, including Panama, in 
 1840. This was amended by Congress in 1855 by a law making 
 Panama a Federal State, sovereign in itself, and dependent on the 
 Government of New Granada only on certain points. Other States 
 followed, and New Granada became practically a federated republic. 
 This resulted in the constitution of 1858, which recognized the 
 sovereignty of the several States, and the name was changed to the 
 Granadine Confederation. That is the last constitution to which 
 Panama ever gave its assent. 
 
 Then followed a liberal revolution in 1860 against the election laws, 
 which was conducted under Gen. Mosquera and based upon the 
 sovereignty of the States. There was then a pact made at Cartagena 
 to form the United States of Granada, and in 1861 the name was 
 changed to United States of Colombia by the further pact of Bogota. 
 In 1862 the liberal revolution was completely victorious, and in 1863 
 a new constitution was made by the " plenipotentiaries of the States," 
 as they were called. Article 93 of that constitution provided that this 
 constitution should take effect only on unanimous ratification of 
 State deputations, and if any State refused to ratify it should not 
 be binding. The result was an ''organized anarchy," and the 
 constitution which was imposed simply by the party victorious in 
 war and never had any complete assent was followed by constant 
 revolts and insurrections, especially on the Isthmus. 
 
 In 1884 Rafael Nunez seized the Government as a dictator and 
 suspended the constitution of 1863. He had delegates from the 
 nine States called to council, and in 1885 the council passed a resolu- 
 tion for a convention to frame a new constitution subject to the 
 ratification of the people of the State. In 1886 the new constitution 
 was adopted annulling the constitution of 1863. It was the exact 
 reverse of the constitution of 1863 and centralized power entirely. 
 It took away the autonomy of the States, and was never submitted 
 to the popular vote. The constitution of 1886 has been suspended 
 and inoperative since 1900. The last constitution accepted by 
 
PANAMA. 33 
 
 Panama was in 1858. When her constitutional relations are con- 
 sidered, I think it is well to bear that little bit of constitutional 
 history in mind. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Mr. President ■ 
 
 The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massachusetts 
 yield ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. With pleasure. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. If the Senator will allow me a question, does he 
 think that the constitutional duty of Panama is any less toward 
 Colombia than it was when she was a free, sovereign, and inde- 
 pendent State, after she had been denationalized, broken down as a 
 State, and reduced to a department ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. As a matter of constitutional law, I do not think it 
 makes a particle of difference in considering this question, for I 
 consider under any constitution her separation from Colombia as 
 an act of revolution. I merely put that statement in in order to show 
 what her actual constitutional position was, as I understand it. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. That the Senator's remark was a very painful 
 reminder to me of the fact that after the Civil War had closed and 
 politicians got hold of the destinies of the country Alabama was 
 forced, before she could receive any right of representation on this 
 floor, to pass a constitution that renounced her well-cherished and 
 well-established doctrine of the right of secession. We gave it up. 
 Other States in the Union were not required to do that. The State 
 of the Senator from Massachusetts was not required to yield up her 
 sovereign right of secession, which she proposed to exercise in the 
 year 1812. 
 
 Now, I wish to ask this question of the Senator. Suppose that 
 Great Britain, with a view to trying to restore to us in Alabama our 
 ancient rights of sovereignty as they existed before our constitution 
 was changed on the demand of the Republican Party in the United 
 States, should say to Alabama: ''We are willing to recognize your 
 independence; we acknowledge that you have resumed the sover- 
 eignty you had before you passed your act renouncing it," does 
 the Senator think that Great Britain by that act of recognition or 
 that promise would restore Alabama even to her former prestige 
 and right or that she could separate Alabama from the United States 
 as a matter of international law ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Of course, Mr. President, I do not think that the 
 recognition of Great Britain could restore to Alabama or to any 
 other State rights which under the Constitution of the United States, 
 as I understand it, she never had. I do not want to enter into the 
 old discussion of the constitutional right of secession, because to 
 my mind it is simply a question of fact, a question of successful or 
 unsuccessful revolution. What I wanted to call attention to here 
 was merely the fact that, so far as the constitutional question is 
 involved at all the last constitution to which Panama gave her assent 
 was the constitution of 1858, which assured to her and to every 
 State of the Granadine Confederation, as it was then called, the right 
 of withdrawal, and guaranteed their autonomy. 
 
 Now, still further, in regard to the treatment of Panama and the 
 reason why there was revolution there, I have here a letter which 
 
 S. Doc. 37, 67-1 3 
 
34 PANAMA, 
 
 appeared in the New York Evening Post of December 17, dated 
 Panama, December 8. I shall ask to have it all printed with my 
 remarks, because it is extremely interesting, and the New York 
 Evening Post is a newspaper which for many years has been so 
 absolutely crazed with hostility to the Republican Party or to any 
 administration which seemed to be advancing the interests of the 
 United States that I am perfectly certain it can not be supposed to 
 be a biased witness ; and this is an admission against itself. This 
 letter is worth reading, because it shows, I think, on its face why 
 those people were ripe for revolution. 
 The matter referred to, is as follows : 
 
 [Special correspondence of the Evening Post.] 
 
 Panama, Republic of Panama, December 8. 
 
 Next to that of the Negro republics the most exasperating Government is doubtless 
 that which is known as "Latin America." Panama had an experience of it which 
 may well be indicated as an excuse for separation. To get to the point, every member 
 of the present junta was among the company of 23 Conservatives of Panama called 
 together by Gov. Alban a few years ago. 
 
 ■'Gentlemen," he said, when they assembled in the Yellow Room of the Palacio 
 del Gobierno, "the Conservatives need $50,000. I will withdraw while you arrange 
 the matter." 
 
 Retiring, he summoned his soldiers and placed a cordon around the building. 
 Government, for much of the time, being actual martial rule, this meant that anyone 
 who sought to come out without subscribing his due share, according to his riches, 
 would be thrown into prison. Gov. Alban returned to the Yellow Room. He was 
 met with protests. 
 
 "There are soldiers all about this house." he replied. "Before you pass through 
 them you will subscribe |50,000." Again he withdrew, and when he returned the 
 paper had been signed. 
 
 These subscriptions were prettily called "voluntary subscriptions," as recruits for 
 the army were tied with ropes, yet called "volunteers." They were rather worse, 
 as "business," than corporation contributions to Tammany Hall, because there came 
 in return for them no adequate advantages, moral or immoral. Sometimes if one of 
 the eventual contributors was obstinate, he was made to take chili sauce and salt 
 water. The suffering from this is so shocking, one is assured, that "when the man 
 recovered he was fit for treason." At any rate he was in a receptive mood for sugges- 
 tions of secession and only bided his time. 
 
 "voluntary subscriptions." 
 
 Hermadio Arosemena, of the banldng house of that name, suffered frequently from 
 the "voluntary subscription," for all the Arosemenas were known to be Libei'als. 
 One day a notice was posted on his door saying that before a certain hour of a certain 
 day he must pay .125,000. He had it reported that he was out of town — that he had 
 gone to Ecuador. Troops were quartered in his house. "Cable him for the money," 
 the governor recomm.ended to the family. Arosemena was not in Ecuador, but hiding 
 in his own home. But he would not allow the money to be paid. For nine months 
 he was a prisoner there, never stepping beyond his threshold. Besides, the soldiers 
 on guard during that period had to be fed from his own larder. That was the practice. 
 At different times, not reckoning the billeting of troops, the Arosemenas paid within 
 a few years more than $150,000 in "voluntary subscriptions" to Colombian governors. 
 
 Oscar Mtiller, a jeweler, shows receipts for "war loans " of $50 to $100 a month. He 
 was born on the Isthmus. Though of German parents, he had no protection. One 
 day he was asked for a "voluntary subscription'' of $1,250. He removed everything 
 from his safe and refused to pay. A commission came from Gen. Alban to force the 
 safe. Muller gave the combination rather than see the safe blown up. Nothing but 
 old papers were found in it. "Lock his house and let no one in or out," ordered 
 Alban. For 24 hours Miiller's family were thus besieged. Then Muller compromised 
 for $300. He had to pay $1 additional for the man who had come to blow up the safe. 
 The man did not need to do the job, but he had "lost his time." Muller had also to 
 pay $6 for the advertisement of the intended sale of his store. Your correspondent 
 has seen all these receipts and the witnesses. . 
 
PANAMA.. 35 
 
 Carlos Miiller, brother to Oscar, was similarly treated. His haberdashery was 
 ■locked up for four days, till he should subscribe $1,250. Advertisement of a public 
 sale of his goods was made, and then he yielded. At the house of Domingo Diaz the 
 soldiers occupied the bedroom of Senora Diaz, and the women folk had for two nights 
 no place to sleep. They could not leave the house. Merchants were assessed |7.50 
 a day for the colonel's horse when the colonel was on duty in town. The imposition 
 was that several merchants would each be assessed for the same .|7.50. They always 
 paid rather than go to jail. Out at the barracks an Italian egg peddler was asked to 
 leave two additional eggs for two that had been found not good. When he refused, he 
 was taken by soldiers and given 500 lashes on his bare back. 
 
 ASSESSMENTS FOR INDIFFERENCE. 
 
 Federico Boyd was held up for $10,000, but settled for $5,000. Espriella ran away 
 to Costa Rica — he had only just returned-^to avoid a "voluntary subscription," 
 which he heard was to be required of him. Ycaza, before he could escape, was levied 
 upon for $5,000. It did not make any difference, if the governor wanted money, 
 whether a man was of his own party or not. The 23 whom he imprisoned in the 
 Yellow Room were Conservatives, like himself; If a man were neither Liberal nor 
 Conservative, he was still liable to assessment. J. G. Duque, who holds the lottery 
 privilege, had a clerk at Colon, F. Cortez, who was a Colombian, but took no part or 
 interest in politics. He was assessed $S00 for being an indifferente. "The gov- 
 ernor gave me that explanation himself," Mr. Duque says. Soon after the clerk was 
 assessed $400. "I had just lent the Government some money without charging inter- 
 est," Mr. Duque tells me. "I went to Alban and declared that if he did not leave my 
 ■clerk alone I would charge interest. At that he erased the assessment." 
 
 Officers would select saddles and swords and not pay for them. The cost would 
 lie as a charge against some designated citizen or allowed to go to the loss column of 
 the merchant's daybook. If one man loaned money to another, it sometimes happened 
 that the borrower would be sent for and compelled to hand over the borrowed money 
 to the Government. The lender would have to stand the loss, as the papers would be 
 canceled. 
 
 Importers for a while were assessed arbitrary sums instead of an import tax. Banks 
 were forced to make loans. Government, indeed, was a kind of piracy, of buccaneer- 
 ing almost as barbaric as that which Henry Morgan carried on along these coasts, with 
 lieadquarters at Bogota instead of at Porto Bello. Indirectly foreigners were affected 
 by the methods. Mr. Duque, for example, who is a Cuban-American, saw all his 
 cattle at Chiriqui driven away by foragers for a marching army. He could get no one 
 to testify to it (and so could not collect damages), "for witnesses would be flogged if 
 they gave such evidence." Soldiers turned his country house into a barracks, "and 
 I, myself," he relates, " saw them and their women bringing my furniture to town, 
 piece by piece, to sell it at the pawnshops." One hears of several foreigners who lost 
 money because " voluntary subscriptions " left them unable to pay their just debts 
 
 RAISING THE COST OF LIVING. 
 
 Monopolies were granted in ice, tobacco, salt, pearl fishing, lotteries, gambling, 
 butchering. Ice, which is a necessity of life in this climate, was 25 cents a pound. A 
 iarmer could not kill his own cattle for market without paying $10 a head to the con- 
 cessionaire. Swine had to yield $4 a head. Salt the Government bought from the 
 concessionaire at $1.50 a hundredweight and sold it to the people at $4. Nobody 
 could sell tobacco except Isaac Brandon & Bro. Nobodj^ could wholesale cigarettes 
 except Piza Piza. The prices were "all the traffic would bear." If the people were 
 .squeezed too much, they bought less. So it was more profitable not to kite rates too 
 high. The ice monopoly paid the Government $1,000 a month for a while, and the 
 price of ice to the consumer was 10 cents a pound. Then Bogota raised the rental to 
 $2,000 and permitted the concessionaire to charge the consumer 25 cents a pound. On 
 this basis the concessionaire lost money. The sale of ice decreased, and at last he 
 could not pay the rent of his monopoly, and Mr. Duque was appointed to run the 
 business for the Government itself, reducing the price to ' ' what the traffic would bear. ' ' 
 
 GOV. ALBAN. 
 
 Alban seems to have been the most oppressive of the military governors. Yet there 
 was a quality in him which now and then touched the hearts of the people. He was 
 -exceedingly brave, and was killed at last in a naval battle in Panama Bay, and he 
 lies at the bottom with his ship. 
 
36 PANAMA. 
 
 Two sisters came to him to seek the release of their brother from prison. 
 
 "Bring me §400," he answered them, '"and he can go free." 
 
 The girls sold all their jewelry, but could raise only $300. "I must have the fulP 
 $400," he insisted. The girls borrowed the other $100 of a usurer, and returned with, 
 the money. 
 
 ''Ah, I thought you could get it," he remarked. "How did you do it?" 
 
 They showed him the receipts for the jewelry; they showed him the contract with, 
 the usurer. 
 
 "What," he exclaimed, "10 per cent a month?" He sent at once for the usurer. 
 
 "You took the jewels of these girls, giving them only $300, and then you charge' 
 them 10 per cent a month on the other §100? Bring those jewels to m.e. Bring also 
 their contract to pay." When the usmer came back Alban gave the jewels to the sis- 
 ters, tore U15 the i^apers, sent the money lender back to his pawnshop, wrote out a fulL 
 pardon for the brother of the girls, and kept the $400 as punishment to the usurer. 
 
 OTHER ErFORTS AT SEPARATION. 
 
 Natives make out that the revolutionary or separatist spirit has been long years- 
 growing; 70 years ago, when the Isthmus cut loose from Spain it si^ontaneously joined 
 Colombia. 
 
 "That country acquired it free of expense, without the cost of a penny or a life," 
 as one of them puts it, "but she did not properly value it, for only misrule and oppres- 
 sion followed. The Isthmus was used merely as a soiu'ce of revenue. Pondering this^ 
 our people grew resentful. Several attemjDts to separate from Colombia were made. 
 One of Bolivar's soldiers. Gen, Espinar, headed a revolution in 1830, and he set up a. 
 free State, but by reason of sweet words the Isthmus soon went back to Colombia. 
 The sweet words meant nothing. Old practices were reverted to. Remonstrances 
 were of no avail; inland politicians treated us more like serfs than brothers. 
 
 "In 1840 there was a revolution which gave another opportunity of breaking away. 
 Under Col. Herrera independence was once again proclaimed. It was short-lived. 
 
 "In 1855 Panama was permitted to be governed by its own special laws, and there- 
 appeared to be an era of satisfaction ahead, when Gen. Masquerarose up, overthrew 
 the Government at Bogota, became dictator, and sent Murillo Toro to Panama to- 
 attach it to his cause. A fair treaty was entered into with him; but the dictator repu- 
 diated his work and sent down an army to compel adhesion unconditionally. Panama, 
 became as a conquered land and was treated accordingly. Her governor was replaced, 
 by one of the dictator's creatines. 
 
 HIGHER EXPENSES IMPOSED. 
 
 "During the three years' war, which ended one year ago, we were subjected to num>- 
 berless oppressions, heavily taxed, and charged enormously for the necessaries of life. 
 That has taught us several things about Colombia and about ourselves. It taught us, 
 for one thing, the extent of our own resources, and we began to think once more of 
 separation. We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of life or death ta- 
 ns. We wanted that because it meant, with the United States in control of.it, peace 
 and prosperity for us. President Marroquin appointed an isthmian to be governor of. 
 Panama; and we looked upon that as of happy augury. 
 
 "Soon we heard that the canal treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota. 
 Next we heard that our isthmian governor, Obaldia, who had scarcely assumed power,. 
 was to be superseded by a soldier from Bogota. We thought that the days of misrule^ 
 were upon us once more. We decided to strike a blow for freedom. General Huertas,. 
 in command of the troops here, gladly joined us. General Tovar was coming to take 
 his place. General Pompillio was coming to take the place of Obaldia, Tovar was. 
 to receive from Panamans $1,200, whereas Huertas had been getting only $400, Pomr- 
 pillio was to have a salary of $2,000, although Obaldia 's had been only $800, This- 
 was penalty imposed because Bogota had heard that Panama had thoughts of dis- 
 loyalty and independence, 
 
 "Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the way of revenues, she did 
 not bridge for us a single river, nor make a single roadway, nor erect a single college 
 where our children could be educated, nor do anything at all to advance our induS' 
 tries, * * * Well, when the new generals came, we seized them, arrested them,, 
 and the town of Panama was in a joy. Not a protest was made, except the shots- 
 fired from the Colombian gunboat Bogoti., which killed one Chinese lying in Ms bed.. 
 We were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight it out, but the 
 commander of the United States cruiser Nashville forbade Superintendent Shaler to. 
 allow the railway to transport troops for either party. That is our story." 
 
PANAMA, 37 
 
 LITTLE OPPOSITION. 
 
 Panama evades much., gains more, and loses nothing at all in achieving separation 
 ■with American bayonets to maintain it. She will get $10,000,000 for canal rights; 
 will have her two main towns cleaned by the United States, and will derive obvious 
 and tremendous benefits from the incoming of the thousands of canal workmen. 
 
 Her material advantages are so clear that it is natural that opposition to her new 
 direction should be difficult to find. The church, of course, will have to readjust 
 its manner of support, as it did in Cuba and the Philippines; but Saturday's out- 
 break in the barracks was of no account as a sign of opposition. 
 
 If the Spanish method of doing things was not still unconsciously influential with 
 the provisional government, there would have been no deportation of soldiers, for 
 the evidence on which, without a hearing, they were adjudged guilty of conspiring 
 to kill the commanding general, Huertas, was very flimsy and the action somewhat 
 hysterical. 
 
 Two letters were written from Port Limon, one to Huertas telling him he'd better 
 Tead one which was coming to Col. Ferral. He intercepted the one addressed to 
 Col. Ferral. It seemed to hint that an attempt to recapture the garrison for Colombia, 
 'and forthwith he arrested everybody mentioned in the Ferral letter, ran them at point 
 ■of bayonet aboard a train for Colon to be taken out of the country. 
 
 "I shall be landed on the beach at Port Limon, ' ' remarked Col. Lorano, good humor- 
 edly, "with only |2 silver in my pocket. I am sorry now I took the trouble to pay 
 all my bills before leaving Panama. ' ' 
 
 He protests that he would like to stay in the new Republic. "Why should I plot 
 ■against it? I signed allegiance to it with the rest, and thereby sacrificed connection 
 with Colombia. If I should go to Colombia, I'd be shot for treason." F. C. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. That, I think, is pretty good testimony as to the 
 conditions down there in Panama. 
 
 Now I come to the question of the incidents which led up imme- 
 diately to the recognition of Panama by the United States. I will 
 first show how they knew of it in Bogota. Mr. Beaupre, on the 21st 
 of October, wrote: 
 
 Sir: I have the honor to inform you that there is no disguising the alarm existing 
 as to the possible action of the Government of the United States should the feeling of 
 disaffection undoubtedly existing in the Department of Panama find expression in 
 overt acts. This alarm took the form of a heated debate in the Senate yesterday, 
 when the Government was again attacked for the appointment of Senor Obaldia as 
 governor of Panama. 
 
 On October 29 he telegraphed: 
 
 October 29, 1 p. m. Please give instructions to consul general at Panama. Keep 
 me advised by cable matters of consequence. 
 
 At that time it was so well known in Bogota what was impending 
 that he thought it important he should be in immediate communi- 
 cation with the consul general. 
 
 It will be noticed that on October 29 Mr. Beaupre in Bogota 
 thought the revolution was impending and on the 31st he says: 
 
 The people here in great anxiety over conflicting reports of secession movements 
 in the Cauca and Panama. 
 
 In other words, on the 31st of October people in Bogota had 
 reports that revolution had actually broken out, and on November 
 18 he heard from our Government the action that we had taken. 
 
 Now, that is what was known in Colombia. The talk had begun 
 in Bogota as early as May about a probable revolution in Panama. 
 It was the common talk of the city. It was openly spoken of by the 
 representatives of Panama in the Congress. It was openly discussed 
 •everywhere days before it occurred. So expected was it that there 
 were rumors in Bogota that it had occurred before November 3. All 
 .the world knew last summer that there was revolution impending. 
 
38 PANAMA. 
 
 The correspondent of the New York Evening Post for December 8 
 says that they were planning revolution in Panama early in May. I 
 happened to be out of the country, seeing only foreign newspapers 
 in London and elsewhere, but it was a matter of common knowledge 
 both in Europe and in England, that revolution was impending in 
 Panama if the treaty was not agreed to. 
 
 That knowledge, of course, came to the Executive. He had in- 
 formation also from our naval and military officers, which has been 
 cited in his message. It was his business to keep informed, but the 
 fact of information does not imply assurances or connivance, and the 
 insinuations of connivance and incitement have already been denied 
 in a manner which requires neither repetition nor support from me 
 or anyone else. Those insinuations have been spread abroad for 
 political purposes and by persons outside the capital for much more 
 discreditable objects. The President would have been in the highest 
 degree censurable if he had not taken every proper precaution to 
 
 Erepare for the event which the reports of the disturbance on the 
 sthmus suggested. He was bound to carry out the provisions of 
 the treaty of 1846. We have always construed that treaty to mean 
 that we were charged with the responsibility of keeping open the 
 transit across the Isthmus; that we were not charged with the duty 
 of enforcing the power of Colombia if there was a revolt; that we 
 w^ere there to protect it against foreign aggression, but that our 
 primary duty was to keep it open and uninterrupted. 
 
 All this information had come in upon the President, and he had 
 as in duty bound considered it and watched events. Finally there 
 came what constitutes the first act of our Government. News 
 arrived that Colombia was about to land a force of 6,000 men at 
 Colon, and the Acting Secretary of the Navy on November 2 sent 
 this dispatch: 
 
 jMaiiitain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed 
 force; occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing- of any armed force with hostile 
 intent either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point.. 
 Send copy of instructions to the senior officer present at Panama upon arrival of 
 Boston. Have sent copj^ of instructions and have telegraphed Dixie to proceed 
 with all possible dispatch from Kingston to Colon. Government force reported 
 approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing if in your judgment 
 this would precipitate a conflict. Acknowledgment is required. 
 
 That was the first step. The next day, November 3, a press, 
 bulletin having announced an outbreak on the Isthmus, the Acting 
 Secretary of State telegraphed to the consul at Panama: 
 
 Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep department promptly and fully informed. 
 
 The reply came back that there was no uprising; that it was. 
 expected that night. Within a short time, a little more than an 
 hour, came the dispatch: 
 
 Uprising occurred to-night. 6; no bloodshed, etc. 
 
 The rest of the story is fully set forth in the dispatches from thfr 
 State and Navy Departments which the President has transmitted 
 to Congress. 
 
 Mr. President, the preparations that have been very largely 
 talked about, and which I have no doubt were adequately made, 
 really resulted in the presence of one vessel of war at Colon. We 
 landed from that vessel 42 sailors and marines. The landing, party 
 
PANAMA. 39 
 
 was commanded with judgment. The captain of the Nashville 
 showed the utmost discretion and firmness. He prevented with an 
 even hand either party from using the raih'oad. He prevented 
 bloodshed. He kept peace on the Isthmus. Mr. President, the 
 President of the United States has been assailed for landing troops. 
 He has landed no troops. Some sailors and some marines have 
 been landed, and he has been charged with having made war 
 by the act of recognition and b}^ the landing of the forces of the 
 United States. 
 
 It is perfectly certain, Mr. President, that the act of recognition 
 by all the best authorities is held not to be in itself an act of war. 
 As for the landing of those sailors and marines to keep order, we have 
 done it over and over again. We did it in 1900; we did it in 1901; 
 we did it in 1902. The dispatches of 1901 and 1900 v/ere read in 
 the President's message here yesterday. The admiral there at that 
 time telegraphed to the department that he had only allowed the 
 troops to go without their arms and under our naval guard, and that 
 he had allowed the arms to go by freight tra,in — a separate train, 
 also under guard. Colombia has asked us to keep that line of 
 transit open over and over again. She asked us to do it on 
 this very occasion. Under the treaty of 1846 the President had 
 no choice except to maintain order and peace across that line of 
 transit, and yet he is charged with having made war. 
 
 Well, Mr. President, if he did make war by that act he had a 
 good Democratic precedent for an Executive making war. Mr. 
 Webster said in a speech in Faneuil Hall, and I use his words be- 
 cause they are particularly good: 
 
 The Mexican War is universally odious throughout the United States, and we 
 have yet to find any Sempronius who raises his voice for it. 
 
 Some one in the gallery asked who voted for the war, and Mr. 
 Webster replied, ''Nobody at all; the President made it without 
 any vote whatever." 
 
 That is good Democratic precedent if it is held that wai has been 
 made by the Executive authority; but, Mr. President, there is no 
 need of citing President Polk's action or that of anybody else. 
 There has been no war on the Isthmus, and the result of our landing 
 troops is that, instead of that Isthmus being drenched in blood by 
 contending factions, there is absolute peace. There has been no 
 life lost except that of the unfortunate and inevitable Chinaman, 
 who was killed in his bed by a shell from a Colom.bian gunboat. 
 I think it is a good thing to have stopped the fighting there, even 
 if nothing else was effected. 
 
 We have seen, therefore, that the President, in common with all 
 the rest of the world, knew a revolution was im.pending. He had 
 certain duties to perform; he made reasonable preparations, if 
 anything too inadequate, for what he anticipated. When the 
 revolution came he prevented fighting and kept the transit open. 
 I think that was a wise and proper step to take, one which it was 
 his plain duty, even if he had not desired to do so. 
 
 The matter of recognition followed quickly, because it was an 
 occasion in which it was in the interest of the United States as 
 the recognizing Government to act quickly. I think myself, Mr. 
 President, that the President of the United States would have been 
 
40 PANAMA. 
 
 in the highest degree blameworthy if he had not taken precautions 
 and if he had not protected the transit across that Isthmus. Our 
 naval forces there prevented those people from getting at each 
 other's throats. They held back one as much as the other, and the 
 result has been the establishment of that Republic by the people 
 of Panama without any serious opposition to it within its own 
 borders. 
 
 That we are not alone in so judging the event is shown by the 
 list of governments which have recognized the independence of 
 Panama, and which I shall ask to have printed with the dates of 
 recognition. It is worth while to read them over again, for people 
 forget that the world has given full assent to the justice of our action. 
 
 The United States recognized Panama on November 13, then 
 France, China, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Russia, 
 Sweden and Norway, Belgium, Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Great Britain, 
 Italy, Japan, Costa Rica, and Switzerland. 
 
 Those recognitions indicate that the rest of the civilized world do 
 not think it was a very unreasonable thing for us to have recog- 
 nized that new Republic quickl}^.^ 
 
 Among the multiplicity of objections brought forward to our 
 action is tlie objection that Panama ought to pay a part of the 
 debt of Colombia. I should like to know when it became a prin- 
 ciple of international law that a seceding State, if it succeeded in 
 establishing itself as a separate government, ought to pay any part 
 of the debt of the country from which is separated. When we 
 separated from England I do not recollect that we took up any por- 
 tion of the imperial debt for payment, and I never thought any 
 dishonor attached to us because we did not offer to pay our share of 
 that debt. When Cuba was freed by our hands we insisted above 
 all things that she should not be held liable for a single dollar of the 
 Spanish debt, and we would not permit that that separating State 
 should be responsible for any part of the debt of the mother country. 
 
 Mr. Spooner. Will the Senator permit me to make a suggestion on 
 that point? 
 
 The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massa- 
 chusetts yield to the Senator from Wisconsin ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. Spooner. I wish also to allude to the fact that a part of that 
 debt was secured by the hypothecation of Cuban revenue, and still 
 we would not permit Cuba to be held liable for it. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Certainly. As the Senator from Wisconsin has well 
 suggested, though the revenues of Cuba were particularly hypothe- 
 cated for that debt, though it was made a special Cuban debt, we 
 would not permit it to become any part of the obligation of the new 
 State. 
 
 1 List of governments which have recognized the indefendence of Panama, with the dates of recognition. 
 
 United States Nov. 13, 1903 ] Nicaragua Dec. 15, 1903 
 
 France Nov. 16,1903 | Peru Dec. 19,1903 
 
 CMna Nov. 28, 1903 i Cuba Dec. 23, 1903 
 
 A.istria-Hunary Nov. 27, 1903 1 Great Britain Dec. 24, 1903 
 
 Germanv- . . .". Nov. 30, 1903 \ Italy Dec. 24, 1903 
 
 Denmark Dec. 3,1903 | Japan Dec. 28,1903 
 
 Russia Dec. 6,1903 | Costa Rica Dec. 28,1903 
 
 Sweden and Norway Dec. 7,1903 Switzerland Dec. 28,1903 
 
 Belgium Dec. 9,1903 I 
 
PANAMA. 41 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Will the Senator from Massachusetts permit me to 
 .task him a question ? 
 
 The President pro tempore. Does the Senator from Massachusetts 
 yield to the Senator from Alabama ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. The Senator has read a list of governments which 
 have recognized something in Panama. I do not know whether it is 
 a government de facto or a government de jure, or whether the 
 independence or sovereignty of Panama has been recognized by these 
 -countries. Does the Senator know? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I do not understand the Senator's question. 
 
 Mr, Morgan. I say I do not know whether the form of recognition 
 by these various governments as to the Government of Panama was 
 that it was a de facto, a de jure, or a sovereign and independent 
 :government. Does the Senator know ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, it was a recognition of the Government 
 as an independent de facto government with whom they could 
 transact business — the usual recognition. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. That is independence. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I never heard of a recognition with a reservation. 
 .Perhaps the Senator has. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. That is a new phrase to me — "an independent de 
 ■facto government." 
 
 Mr. Lodge. The Government was de facto. They recognized it 
 as an independent government without any qualifications whatso- 
 ever, of course. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Is the Senator sure of that ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I never knew of recognition being accorded with 
 •qualifications or limitations. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. I was merely inquiring as to the fact. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I understand it was a complete recognition in every 
 case — as complete as ours. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. My understanding has been quite the reverse, and 
 therefore I asked the Senator. 
 
 S' Now., may I ask the Senator whether any of those governments, 
 having recognized whatever they have recognized, have not in effect 
 insisted that Panama is obliged under the laws of nations to assume a 
 part of the debt of Colombia? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I do not understand that any government has insisted 
 ■on it. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Or was insisting. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I do not understand that any has insisted. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. Then the newspapers are in error. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I think that highly probable, though I make that 
 statement, of course, with great reservation and great hesitation. 
 Undoubtedly the British bondholders and' other bondholders have 
 been talking about their Colombian bonds, but I do not understand 
 that any government has put any qualification on their recognition 
 of Panama. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. The Senator never knew a Britisher to joke about 
 money, did he ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. As a matter of fact, in the papers sent in yesterday— — 
 
 Mr. Spooner. The Senator will, of course, see that the recognition 
 of the liability of a government and the demand that they agree to 
 
42 PANAMA. 
 
 pay a part of the debt of the government from which they have 
 separated could not be anything else than a recognition of the former's 
 independence. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. And nothing else. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. But, Mr. President, as a matter of fact Panama has 
 made an offer, and authorized it through her minister here, and has 
 announced her intention and her willingness, as appears in the 
 correspondence transmitted yesterday, to assume one-fifteenth of the 
 debt — her population being one-fifteenth of the population of Colom- 
 bia—and she has also proposed that $8,000,000 of the $10,000,000 
 should be held in trust by the United States. Those do not seem 
 unreasonable or unfair propositions. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. May I ask the Senator is there any condition an- 
 nexed to that proposition recjuiring that we are to furnish the money ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. We are to furnish what money? 
 
 Mr. Morgan. To pay the debt she insists she is ready to assume. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Of course we have to pay the $10,000,000 under the 
 treaty. I suppose she means to take part of that $10,000,000 to pay 
 her share of the debt. 
 
 Mr. Morgan. I was only thinking it would be a pretty bad debt if 
 we did not furnish the money. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I think it is undoubtedly a very bad debt now so far 
 as Colombia is concerned, but I think if Panama undertakes to pay 
 it it will be a very good debt. 
 
 Mr. President, this cjuestion is an Am.erican question, and our 
 interests in it are very profound indeed. The portion of the country 
 which I have the honor to represent in part is far removed from the 
 canal, and yet it is of immense interest to the people of New England 
 that there should be that quickened communication to the East. 
 Deep as our interest is far up there on the Atlantic coast, it is nothing 
 to the interest of the people of the Gulf — to the people who are 
 selling their cotton as well as their manufactures in the East. Most 
 important of all, Mr. President, more important than any commercial 
 advantage, is the fact that it makes the coast of the United States 
 practically continuous from the Columbia River to the extremest 
 boundary of Maine. 
 
 Mr. President, the commercial interests, the interests of our self- 
 protection, involved in that canal are of the largest possible kind. 
 It seems to me that it gives us a stake in that Isthmus which can not 
 be overestimated. We also stand before the world as the nation 
 which has taken up this great task of opening communication between 
 the Atlantic and the Pacific. The civilized world has committed 
 that work to us and has done so gladly. We stand in relation to that 
 Isthmus not only for our own interest, but as the trustee of the 
 interests of the whole civilized w^orld. The people who live there, 
 who own it if any people in the world own it absolutely, are anxious 
 that we should go there and build a canal on our own terms. We are 
 not taking it from the people who dwell there. They are only too 
 anxious to have us come. But there are a few people up in the 
 mountains and on the great plateaus in the interior, farther removed 
 from Panama, so far as actual communication goes, then we are in 
 the United States, and they have undertaken to say that Panama 
 shall not have that canal; they propose to take from Panama, if 
 
PANAMA. 43 
 
 they could make a treaty, every dollar that is involved in it— people 
 who do not own the territory and whose interests are trivial compared 
 to the rest of the world. I do not think, Mr. President, that those 
 people have the right to stand across the pathway of the world's 
 commerce and say, "Here it shall not come." I think that it is part 
 of our duty to do just what we have done. I think we should have 
 been false to our duty if we had not done it, and there is nothing 
 whatever in all the action of the Colombians, of whom our treatment 
 has been more than generous, which should make us repent of any 
 act that has there been committed. 
 
 Mr. President, this seems to me — if it can be said truly of any 
 question — to be a question that is not one of party. Certainly it is 
 a question in which the interests and the hopes of all the people of 
 the United States — North and South, Democrat and Republican — 
 are alike bound up. I think it is a great achievement, in which we 
 should all be proud to take a part. I never in my life, I think, 
 questioned the motives of anybody who differed from me, and I do 
 not now; still less should I impugn the patriotism of Senators who 
 hold a different view of this question from my own. I only ask from 
 them the same belief in my sincerity that I accord to theirs ; but I do 
 think that it is fairly open to discuss this question from a political 
 standpoint, and I confess the attitude assumed by some portions, 
 at least, of the Democratic Party is very curious and interesting. 
 
 I know well that there are some members of that party here and 
 large numbers of that party outside of Washington who are as zealous 
 and as eager for the promotion of this canal and the ratification of this 
 treaty as any people can possibly be. I know, too, that there are 
 others — for I have read debates which have occurred elsewhere — who, 
 while they protest their hatred of the sinner, seem perfectly willing 
 to embrace the sin. But, Mr. President, there is still another ele- 
 ment which seems desirous to make this a party question and to 
 extract from it political capital. It seems to me that a stranger 
 idea than that never entered into the head of man. 
 
 I quite agree with the saying of Disraeli that "the business of an 
 opposition is to oppose," but I think that great parliamentary leader, 
 when he uttered that epigran, postulated that the opposition should 
 be intelligent, for he knew perfectly well that the duty of an opposi- 
 tion was to be always ready to take up the government from the 
 hands of those who were then administering it, and that nothing 
 could so soon prevent the rise of an opposition to power as their 
 convincing the electorate that they were not fit to govern. Such 
 unfitness is very easily shown by the attitude of an opposition; and 
 when a party thinks that there is political capital to be gathered in 
 resisting the policy which would begin at once the opening of that 
 great canal, I think, Mr. President, if I may be pardoned for saying 
 so, that it exhibits a misapprehension which it is hard to fathom. 
 I have been reminded by this Democratic opposition on several 
 occasions of Dr. Johnson's remark about Thomas Sheridan, the 
 father of the great dramatist and orator. He said: "Sherry is dull, 
 sir, naturally dull, but he must have taken great pains to arrive at 
 his present position. Such an excess of stupidity is not in nature 
 sir." [Laughter.] 
 
 Mr. President, think of the proposition of making political capital 
 out of a question of this nature. As a Republican I should ask 
 
44 PANAMA. 
 
 nothing better than to have the Panama Canal made the issue in 
 the impending campaign. I think, indeed, that a good deal of 
 valuable material has already been given us in that direction, but 
 I should be very sorry, as an American, to see the work of building 
 the canal delayed, and I believe, Mr. President, that when it is 
 thought over seriously by the Democratic Party they will see that 
 there are more judicious courses than to oppose simply because the 
 other party proposes. There must be grounds of opposition more 
 relative than that if you would satisfy the American people, and I 
 am sure that the Democratic Party will not always be deceived by 
 the solemn face of an apparent wisdom which sometimes proves to 
 be nothing but that ordinary cunning which overreaches itself. 
 
 Mr. President, my own feeling about this policy in regard to 
 Panama I can best express by comparison with the great event 
 which we are about to celebrate at St. Louis. When Mr. Jefferson 
 bought the Louisiana territory in 1803, he met with deep opposition, 
 chiefly from men representing my own part of the country. They 
 were honorable, high-minded men, although they made then a great 
 mistake. But what I wish to call attention to is this: Mr. Jefferson 
 believed that when he made that purchase he was transcending his 
 constitutional powers. I do not think that he was; posterity does 
 not think so ; but he thought so at the time, and even went so far as 
 to suggest the passage of a constitutional amendment. And yet, 
 thinking so, he went boldly on and performed what I regard as the 
 greatest act of his life; did what I consider one of the great acts of 
 American history; certainly reared to himself the most splendid and 
 enduring monument that any man could rear. Mr. President, there 
 has been no occasion here for any man to doubt about constitutional 
 powers. Laws and constitutions are not disregarded by men as 
 familiar with the history of their country as the President and the 
 Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is one of the most ac- 
 complished men who ever held that great place. I doubt if anyone 
 has ever rivaled him in his familiarity with what has gone before and 
 with the acts of all his predecessors. The President and the Secre- 
 tary of State have regarded this question with the deep sense of re- 
 sponsibility which comes upon men who in high executive position 
 are called upon to ta,ke a momentous step. I believe they acted as 
 patriots and as farseeing Americans; and when that canal is com- 
 pleted — and I hope not many years will pass until that happens — I 
 believe that then the voice of the American people will acclaim the 
 action of this administration, which threw open the gateway be- 
 tween the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, even as they acclaim the 
 action of Jefferson when he bought the territory of Louisiana. 
 
 Mr. President, I had meant to stop here, but these are days when 
 new events tread fast upon each other's heels. This morning I had 
 the pleasure of reading the account of a great banquet in New York 
 and I can not properly finish without an allusion to something that 
 was said there. It seemed to me a most interesting occasion. 
 Tammany Hall and the remnants of the Democratic reform admin- 
 istration nestling under the wings of Mr. David B. Hill. I do not 
 know which was the lion and which were the lambs, but they were 
 •certainly all lying down together. [Laughter.] Among others 
 present was a very distinguished citizen of my own State, whom I 
 
PANAMA. 45 
 
 am very proud and happy to call my personal friend. I very rarely 
 agree with him on any political question, but he made a single state- 
 ment last night with which I think I am in more or less agreement. 
 He referred in a picturesque way to the dreadful career that has been 
 run by the Republican Party since it came into power in 1896. He 
 said that we had passed from " a needless war with Spain to a wanton 
 war with Colombia.^' 
 
 "Needless war with Spain." Mr. President, I am inclined to 
 think that the adjective was well chosen. If, when the first stir- 
 rings for independence had come in that island, the administration 
 of Mr. Cleveland had behaved with sense and courage; if they had 
 told Spain that the time had come when the United States could no 
 longer hold back and that Cuba must be free, I have always believed — ■ 
 I believed then, and I believe now — that Cuba would have obtained 
 her independence, perhaps after some protracted negotiations, but 
 without any war by us. I have always thought that if that admin- 
 istration, instead of taking counsel with the minister of Spain and a 
 great sugar planter in Cuba, had been guided by a sound and brave 
 American spirit before Spain had squandered blood and treasure in 
 the island, we might indeed have been saved from the war. 
 
 And, Mr. President, I look forward with great interest and great 
 pleasure to the picture that was there drawn by the ex-SecretarJr 
 of State when he eulogized the last Democratic President. Ap- 
 parently in 20 years he is the only candidate they can produce, and 
 Mr. Olney seems to think he is the only one they can run. Very well, 
 Mr. President, whatever his strength or whatever his weakness, I can 
 not refrain from saying that his nomination would present me at 
 least with one great som^ce of pleasure. His administration has 
 never been discussed. I do not regard the Democratic Party — this, 
 I suppose, is a partisan remark, but I shall make it — I do not, I say, 
 regard the Democratic Party as always abounding in good sense, t>ut 
 they had too much sense to fight the campaign of 1 896 on the per- 
 formances of Mr. Cleveland's administration. They repudiated him 
 and his administration, and we were deprived of the opportunity 
 of discussing it. We may say what we will about the silver issue, 
 but it was a better issue for the Democratic Party to meet the country 
 on than what had gone before; and when I saw the accounts of this 
 delightful banquet in New York and read those inspiriting speeches 
 and observed the Democratic Party once more, through its chosen 
 leaders there present, preparing to stand across the pathway of 
 American progress and proposing to put at their head the man who 
 last held power in their name I confess my spirits rose higher than 
 ever about Republican prospects. I thought of what a pleasure 
 it would be to contrast the policy which tried to set up Liliuokalani 
 in Hawaii with the policy of the Republican Party which has made 
 those islands a part of the United States; to contrast the tariff which 
 they passed, and which their own President called the ''tariff of 
 perfidy and dishonor," with the tariff we passed; to examine the 
 history of the loans which they made in a time of profound peace to 
 the bankers of New York with an interest rate far above what the 
 United States could borrow at even then, and contrast them with 
 the popular loan which we made in time of war; above all I should 
 like to compare that era of panic and depression with the prosperity 
 which followed. The whole field fairly bristles with delightful con- 
 
46 PANAMA. 
 
 trasts. I think, Mr. President, that nothing could be happier for 
 us — and we have had a great deal of good fortune in time past 
 showered on us by our Democratic friends — than to have them 
 nominate the last Democratic reform President, with the agreeable 
 record of his last administration as a theme for debate, on a policy 
 of sustaining Colombia and opposing the United States in digging 
 the canal at Panama. [Manifestations of applause in the galleries.] 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Mr. Lodge. I wish to ask that there may be printed three memo- 
 randa which I have received from the State Department. The}" are 
 copies of memoranda in Jefferson's manuscripts — the memorandum 
 of Mr. Jefferson when Secretary of State, which was made for Presi- 
 dent Washington but not sent to the Senate, in regard to the ap- 
 pointment of the first ministers abroad; the second in regard to the 
 recognition of the French Republic, and the third as to the pro- 
 visional army. 
 
 They are very interesting memoranda from Mr. Jefferson on the 
 point of recognition and executive power, which has been under 
 discussion here. I am sure the first has never been printed. I am 
 not sure about the other two, but they are all very apt. I should 
 like to have them printed as part of my remarks, if there be no 
 objection. They are very brief. 
 
 The President pro tempore. Does the Senator desire to have them 
 printed as part of the remarks which he has just made ? 
 
 Mr. Lodge. Yes; following what I have just said. 
 
 The President pro tempore. Is there objection. The Chair hears 
 none, and that order will be made. 
 
 The memoranda referred to are as follows : 
 
 APPOINTMENT OP FIRST MINISTERS, ETC., ABROAD. 
 
 [Memorandum of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, made in January, 1792, but not sent to the 
 
 Senate.] 
 
 Gentlemen op the Senate: Your House haa been pleased to communicate to me 
 their resolutions, purporting a decision by them that it is expedient to * * * from 
 whence an application arises that in their opiniop. they might have decided that no 
 such appointments were expedient. 
 
 After mature consideration and consultation I am of opinion that the Constitution 
 has made the President the sole competent judge to what places circumstances render 
 it expedient that ambassadors or other public ministers should be sent and of what 
 grade they should be; and that it has ascribed to the Senate no executive act but the 
 single one of giving or withholding their consent to the person nominated. 
 
 I think it my duty, therefore, to protest, and I do protest against the validity of 
 any resolutions of the Senate asserting or implying any right in that House to exercise 
 any executive authority but the single one before mentioned. 
 
 it is scarcely necessary to add that nothing herein is meant to question their right 
 to concur in making treaties, this being considered not as a branch of executive but 
 of legislative powers, placed by the Constitution under peculiar modifications. 
 
 recognition op FRENCH REVOLUTIONISTS. 
 
 [Memorandum of Jefferson, Mar. 12, 1792.] 
 
 The Prasident now sends Lear to me to ask what answer he shall give the com- 
 mittee, and particularly whether he shall add to it that ''in making the communica- 
 tion it was not his expectation that the House should give any answer." I told 
 Mr. Lear that I thought the House had a right independently of legislation to express 
 .sentiments on other subjects. That when these subjects did not belong to any other 
 br'BUch, they would publish them by their own authority; that in the present case, 
 
PAlsTAMA. 47 
 
 wliich respected a foreign nation, the President being the organ of our action with 
 other nations, the House wo-ild satisfy their duty if instead of a'direct communication 
 they should pass their sentiments through the President; that if expressing a senti- 
 ment were really an invasion of executive power, it was so faint a one that it would 
 be difficult to demonstrate it to the public, and to a public partial to the French 
 Revolution and not disposed to consider the approbation of it from any quarter as 
 improper; that the Senate, indeed, had given many indications of their wish to in- 
 vade the executive power; the Representatives had done it in one instance which 
 was indeed mischievoi.;.s and alarming — that of gi\ing orders to the heads of the execu- 
 tive departments without consulting the President — biit that the late vote in direct- 
 ing the Secretary of the Treasrry to report ways and means, thorgh carried, was 
 carried by so small a maiority and by the aid of Members so notoriously under a local 
 influence on that question as to give the hope that the practice would be arrested 
 and the constitutional coiu'se be taken up of asking the President to have information 
 laid before them; but that in the present instance it was so far from being clearly an 
 invasion of the Executive, and would be so little approved hj the general voice, 
 that I could not advise the President to express any dissatisfaction at the vote of the 
 House, and I gave Lear in writing what I thought should be his answer. 
 
 RAISING OF PROVISIONAL ARMY WHEN WAR EXPECTED WITH FRANCE. 
 [Functions of the legislative and executive branches. Memorandum of Jefferson in 1798.] 
 
 The legislature may raise armies, but can not prescribe the purposes for which they 
 shall be used. The army being raised, the Constitution transfers the use of them to 
 the President, which is paramount to anv law limiting the use. 
 
 The legislatrre may erect offices, but thev can not restrain the appointment of the 
 officers to any qualification of persons, for this would be to restrain a power given by 
 the Constitution to the President withou.t restraint. 
 
 The Constitution authorizes the President to appoint foreign ministers. The 
 legislature can not ref^lse gi%dng money for them without breach of a moral obligation. 
 
 If a law raises an army for a long term of years, though the Constitution forbids an 
 ■appropriation for them for more than two years, yet they can not refuse to renew it 
 ■every two years without breach of a moral obligation. 
 
 The Constitution gb-es the President and Senate a power to make treaties. If in 
 these they gi">-e subsidies or money for other purposes, the legislature can not refuse 
 the money without a breach of moral obligation. 
 
 The Constitution leaves the raising of armies to the discretion of Congress. There- 
 fore Congress may leave it to the discretion of the President. (So argued by Ross, 
 Reid, Sedgwick," Stockton, and others in the Senate on the provisional army, and 
 "by Otis, Dana, Sewell, Harper, Rutledge, Craik, and others in the debate oii the 
 same bill Apr. 24, and by Mr. Pinckney in the debate on the bill for the provisional 
 army, May 10, 1798.) 
 
 The Constitution leaves the levjdng of taxes to the discretion of Congress. There- 
 fore Congress may leave it to the "discretion of the President. (Harper, in the same 
 debate.) 
 
 The Constitution leaves the power of legislation to Congress. Therefore Congress 
 may leave it to the President. (Necessary consequence from the premises.) 
 
 If the President informs Congress that in his opinion there is imminent danger of 
 invasion. Congress is bound to act in conformity to it without examining the grounds 
 of the opinion. (Said by Otis; see Gallatin's speech on the provisional army. May 
 10, 1798. See Bayard's speech against juries and the superior advantages of a trial 
 hy the court. Aurora, Aug. 2.) 
 
 STATEMENT OP MR. OLNEY, SECRETARY OP STATE. 
 
 [Washington Evening Star, Dec. 19, 1S96.] 
 
 I have no objection to stating my own ■\TLews of the resolution respecting the inde- 
 pendence of the so-called Republic of Cuba, which, it is reported, is to be laid before 
 the Senate on Monday. Indeed, as there are likely to be serious misapprehensions 
 regarding such a resolution, both in this country and abroad, and as such apprehen- 
 sions may have serious results of a grave character, it is perhaps my duty to point 
 out that the resolution, if passed by the Senate, can probably be regarded only as an 
 expression of opinion by the eminent gentlemen who vote for it in the Senate, a,nd 
 if passed by the House of Representatives can only be regarded as another expression 
 of opinion by the eminent gentlemen who vote for it in the House. The power to 
 recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent State rests exclusively 
 
48 PANAMA. 
 
 with the Executive. A resolution on the subject by the Senate or by the House,, 
 by both bodies or by one, whether concurrent or joint, is inoperative as legislation and 
 is im])ortant only as advice of great weight tendered to the Executive regarding the 
 manner in which he shall exercise his constitutional functions. The operation and 
 effect of the proposed resolution, therefore, even if passed by both Houses of Congress 
 by a two-thirds vote, are perfectly plain. It may inflame popular passion both in 
 this cotmtry and elsewhere; may thus put in peril the Ha es and property of American 
 citizens who are resident and traveling abroad, and will certainly obstruct and 
 perhaps defeat the best efforts of this Government to afford such citizens due protec- 
 tion. Eut, except in these ways and unless advice embodied in the resolution shall 
 lead the ExecutiA e to reA'ise conclusions already reached and officially declared, the- 
 resolution will be without effect and will leave unaltered the attitude of the Govern- 
 ment toward the two contending parties in Cuba. 
 
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