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 PORFIRIO DIAZ fo VICTORIANO HUERTA 
 
 ? RAMON PRIDA ^^^^^^ 
 
 19 14 
 
 li i MMi wii ' i i ii nww i — i iM ii 
 
 EL PASO PRINTING COMPANY EL PASO, TEXAS 
 — — — — — — — PRINTERS AND BINPERS —>- : '■ "•" ' " ' 
 
From Despotism 
 to Anarchy 
 
 By 
 JUDGE RAMON PRIDA 
 
 f/6 
 
 Facts and Commentaries about the Mexican Revolutions 
 at the Begmning of the Twentieth Century 
 
 Copyrighted 1914 by Ramon Prida 
 
/' / ^ 
 
 ©CI,A3 74 9 36 
 
 JUL 25 1914 
 
Not 
 
 This is an abridged translation of a complete Spanish edi- 
 tion, several chapters of which have been omitted because the 
 author deems them of no interest to English speaking readers. 
 
 However, by carefully reading the introduction, where the 
 gist of these chapters is clearly outlined, a fair conception of 
 the matter will be formed. The chapters omitted refer exclu- 
 sively to Mexican polities prior to the revolution of 1910. The 
 facts relating to this revolution and to subsequent events, are 
 given in full, exactly as in the Spanish edition. 
 
 The translation has been made under the immediate super- 
 vision of the author, thus assuring a correct version in English 
 of his opinions and statements, — something not always realized 
 in translations of works of this nature. 
 
 New York, March, 1914. 
 
i 
 
 I 
 
Introduction 
 
 'History is not a Flatterer 'but a Witness."— Ch.Sir]es XII. 
 
 General Porfirio Diaz remained in power for so many 
 years, because his government gave to the country that which 
 it craves — PEACE! The moment, therefore, that the govern- 
 ment was unable to quell the incipient revolution incited by 
 Madero, the people for the first time became aware of its weak- 
 ness and its inability to supply their wants — ^peace, order, and 
 the opportunity quietly to earn their daily bread— and at that 
 moment they rose in a body and peremptorily demanded back 
 the rights which they had sacrificed, and summarily overthrew 
 the government which could no longer satisfy these natural 
 cravings. 
 
 At first they turned to General EJeyes, looking again for 
 the energy and strength of the iron hand of a soldier to con- 
 tinue the work whereby General Diaz had formerly compelled 
 the peace they craved. It did not take them long to realize their 
 mistake. With his many ready but empty speeches General 
 Reyes insured his own downfall. T!he nation was soon convinced 
 that the soldier with whom she was coquetting was not the man 
 who could guide her to her goal ; and she scornfully cast him off. 
 
 Then, as in German legends, there appeared at this trying 
 moment a man simple in bearing with the halo of an apostle and 
 the vocation of a martyr; a man who had traveled over most 
 of the country offering life and welfare and preaching demo- 
 cracy and an equality verging on socialism. He was the last 
 hope, the only refuge, the one man to arise from the cringing multi- 
 tude ; so the country resolutely turned to him and delivered itself 
 body and soul to Francisco I. Madero. He was the pamperecl 
 child of fortune. His was the privilege of reaping the accu- 
 mulated fruits of three generations; his the gathering of pro- 
 ducts maturing from labors since the French Intervention and 
 almost ripe at the time he rose to power. Unfortunately, either 
 
4 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 he did not fully appreciate the situation, or appreciating it, he 
 did not know what remedies to apply to our ills. 
 
 What was Madero? An apostle, as his friends called himi 
 A visionary, as some considered him ? A madman, as his enemies 
 declared him? Flattery clothed him in purple of various hues; 
 his deriders made him a ludicrous figure ; his own oratory, which 
 was affluent and of great scope, presents in him contradictory 
 characteristics. But for the cold, dispassionate thinker, he was 
 not an apostle, nor a visionary, nor yet a madman, — he was 
 a symbol. 
 
 When in 1867, after the W^ar of Intervention, the country 
 had secured its independence, it wished to close the door to all 
 ambitions and devote itself to work. It wished to banish the 
 specter of revolt which for half a century had repressed its de- 
 sires for liberty, and stayed its material progress. The wish was 
 disappointed, simply because the soldiers, both victors and van- 
 quished, had to live. For those who for so many years had led 
 a life of hardship and peril, it was necessary that the govern' 
 ment should find employment in time of peace, if peace were to 
 be maintained. This was beyond the power of the government; 
 and strife was inevitable. 
 
 The war of '71 was a national crime, but a necessity to the 
 military element. The rebellion of Ttixtepec in '76 headed like 
 that of '71 by General Porfirio Diaz, was likewise justified be- 
 cause it completed the amalgamation of the soldiery uniting them 
 all under the flag of the Republic. However, in full justice to 
 the rebels of Tuxtepec it must be added that this revolt was also 
 unavoidable because the government of Don Sebastian Lerdo 
 had totally ignored all the essentials on which every government 
 in countries like ours should be based, and the selfish arrogance 
 of Mr. Lerdo himself entirely overshadowed his wonderful in- 
 tellect. 
 
 After the war of '76, every attempted revolution was sub- 
 dued by the iron hand of Diaz; and during his first term of 
 office and the four years of his successor. General Manuel Gon- 
 . zalez, the calm of peace pervaded our social orga^-ism. From 
 the moment of General Diaz' reelection in 1884 when General 
 Manuel Gonzalez peacefully yielded him the reins of government, 
 we Mexicans seem to have resigned ourselves to live undeir the 
 dictatorship of Don Porfirio, exacting from him only peace, 
 tranquility, and the opportunity for work. This explains the 
 
FEIOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 5 
 
 power of General Diaz and the submissiveness of the people. 
 It explains why, when the revolution of 1910 first broke out, it 
 found so slig'ht an echo in the national conscience, which was 
 not dead as many have believed but simply resigned. But the 
 government, inwardly conscious that the nation had just cause 
 for rebellion, became panic stricken at the very first murmurs 
 of it. As a result, the revolution instead of dying out, flickered, 
 suffering blows and defeats, but not entirely extinguished, until, 
 by its very inability to cope with it, the government showed its 
 own weakness and proved conclusively that instead of a real 
 tower of strength and power it was merely a phantom. Then 
 were awakened ambitions dormant through fear; then burst 
 forth energies theretofore restrained by a desire for peace; 
 and then, suddenly and inexplicably to all but the close observers 
 of the phenomenon, the revolution, which had seemed a dying 
 ember, extinguishable by a breath, leaped into flame, became an 
 all -c onsumin g con f 1 agr ation . 
 
 The rebels themselves were dumbfounded at their success 
 and the rebellion thus suddenly triumphant was entirely unpre- 
 pared to receive the government turned over to it by General 
 Diaz. Events followed each other closely; men had to be ob- 
 tained quickly; there was not time to pick and choose; it was 
 necessary to take what first came to hand. .A^ a result, the new 
 administration was not entirely revolutionary, nor was it by any 
 means competent to carry out the work before it. When finally 
 forced to resign. General Diaz, estimating the man at his worth, 
 disdainfully and contemptuously accepted as his successor, Mr. 
 Ftancisco L. de la Barra. Mr. de la Barra, no less surprised at 
 the outcome than the rebels themselves, was equally unprepared 
 to face it ; in fact, he utterly failed to grasp the situation. H'ad 
 he grasped it, the course of his administration would have led 
 through a different channel. TW definite courses lay open be- 
 fore him, either of which would have insured his success: he 
 could either personify and develop the revolutionary principles 
 not held by him, but thrust into his hands by fate, or he could 
 become an independent self-reliant organizer. To follow the 
 first, it ould have been necessary for him to surround himself 
 exclusively by capable men closely identified with the revolu- 
 tion, in order to carry out immediately the great promised re- 
 forms. To follow the second, it would have been necessary for 
 him to direct public sentiment into a common channel by impos- 
 
6 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 ing himself equally on rebel and non-rebel, but bound by neither, 
 being in truth the real head of the nation, controlling with an 
 energetic hand the excesses of both and ignoring the demands 
 and ambitions of all. In other words, he would oblige everyone 
 to maintain order and to obey the law without listening to the 
 honeyed words of flatterers who would attack his vanity, nor to 
 the clamor of the ambitious who would endeavor to intimidate 
 him with their outcries. 
 
 I insist that de la Barra failed utterly to grasp the situation ; 
 for, unconscious of these two courses, he chose rather a via 
 media between the victorious party and the vanquished, attempt- 
 ing at one and the same time to represent a revolution, of whose 
 principles he was ignorant, and to continue the work of the 
 old government which was crumbling through senility. In other 
 words, he tried to please both sides and succeeded in pleasing 
 neither. There we have in a nutshell the whole reason for his 
 failure. The rebellion, as we have said, found itself totally with- 
 out organization when it came into actual power, so naturally, 
 the old system continued to flourish and conditions continued 
 iu the same rut as formerly. Justice, that illusive ideal we always 
 so covet, was ministered under the same system, the same 
 curse, the same anathema, and the only thing worthy of note in 
 this period of transition, is the wonderful vitality of the country, 
 which resisted, as it continues to resist, the blows of those who 
 had joined the revolution from purely mercenary and self-seek- 
 ing motives, the inertia of the government, the appetites of those 
 who were yet insatiable even though for many years they had 
 been glutting themselves at the table of the old regime, and the 
 lust of those who had joined the armed rebellion impelled by 
 their eagerness to satisfy their feverish greed for honor and 
 riches. 
 
 "When Madero, who had been virtually the head of the na- 
 tion, finally reached the presidential chair, he found nothing 
 organized; for— let flatterers say what they will, and de la 
 Barra had more than most men — the provisional government 
 had utterly failed to accomplish, the work of conciliation and pre- 
 paration to which it was pledged, which was its primary duty, 
 the salient feature of its program, and which, if accomplished, 
 would have enabled the new administration to dedicate itself at 
 once to the great reforms which, inscribed on its banner, promised 
 life and prosperity to the nation. 
 
FEjOM despotism to ANARCHtY 7 
 
 Let us suppose that Madero was alive to the task before him, 
 Hjow could he begin? On what resources could he count? The 
 men who were closely identified with the revolution and who 
 had gone through the mill should in all justice have been given 
 precedence in the work of reconstruction. Mladero, fully realiz- 
 ing this, felt it his duty not to break entirely with them, but the 
 fact is they had proved their ineompetency ; — the provisional 
 government had fully tested them and found them wanting, not 
 one of them all deserving the name of statesman. Don Mlanuel 
 Bonilla, though much maligned by the press, was the best one, 
 a good official, honorable, just, and painstaking, but inexper- 
 ienced in politics. Don Ernesto Mjadero, the most promising of 
 them all, was unequal to the task of checking the scandalous 
 w^aste of public funds which characterized the provisional govern- 
 ment as well as that of Madero, and, in the crucial moments of 
 the downfall of the government, showed his entire lack of polit- 
 ical foresight. Could Madero throw himself into the arms of 
 men identified with the old regime f This would have been gross 
 folly as the revolutionists would have considered themselves be- 
 trayed. Where then could he find the men to assist him in a task 
 of such gigantic proportions? For besides the ordinary work of 
 reconstruction resultant from a revolution there would be the 
 control and direction of the strong current of immigration, 
 which, attracted by the wonderful resources so widely advertised 
 by the Centennial Celebration was sure to invade the country, 
 if, at that very moment, it could present a serene and peaceful 
 front and a determination to proceed in the paths of progress. 
 
 H'ow could Madero find men of the necessary calibre when 
 for the last thirty years all activities which came to life any- 
 where had been struck down and smothered and all legitimate 
 ambitions had been considered rebellion ? Could he by his blind 
 faith and love of justice create these statesmen as the Almighty 
 made man by the breath of his msh? Could he give life to 
 the marble images of his illusions and by the strength of his 
 imagination break the heavy clouds which hung over our coun- 
 try ? Impossible ! The task wihich confronted him demanded an 
 exceptional man, and this Mladero was not. To carry out the 
 tremendous work before him, Madero needed not only qualities 
 he did not possess, but a different education, and, above all, a 
 thorough training in statesmanship. Like de la Barra, Madero 
 was headed towards an absolute and complete failure. Though 
 
8 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 a good man at heart and full of the best intentions his weakness 
 of character, his childish caprices, his lack of mental capacity 
 and stamina, were all insurmountable obstacles, but there was 
 an even greater obstacle, which was the regime of the Madero 
 family. 
 
 The Madero family may be properly compared to a Scottish 
 clan whose chief had been Don Evaristo Madero, deceased on 
 the very eve of his grandson's victory. This Don Evaristo was 
 the indisputed head, lord and master of the whole family and 
 as such his word was law. Don Francisco I. Madero as Presi- 
 dent tried to wield the same power over the nation that his 
 grandfather had wielded over the clan ; but at one and at the same 
 time he desired to be a democrat ruler and finally he failed to 
 impose himself even over his own family. F'or, though they had 
 naturally and, one might say, as a matter of course, obeyed Don 
 Evaristo, a man of experience, talent, and dominent personalty, 
 they balked at submitting them'selves to him whom they had been 
 wont to consider the meanest of them all. Unable to dominate his 
 own clan, Mr. Madero was doubly unable to control the nation. 
 Besides, he had one other great fault which lead to his downfall : 
 namely that he was never known to reward services rendered him, 
 a glaring illustration of which we have in his attitude towards 
 General Pascual Orozco, Jr., who, though practically responsible 
 for Madero 's triumph, was by no means adequately rewarded.* 
 
 Such, then, was the man who led the Nation at the outbreak 
 of the revolution of Vera Cruz instigated by Felix Diaz. This 
 uprising in the "Thrice Heroic City" was the first step towards 
 the tragedy which was later to be enacted in the very City of 
 Mexico itself; and it was of so great a magnitude that it could 
 leave no doubt of the subsequent downfall of Madero. Unfortu- 
 nately, it also indicated the beginning of an era of anarchy which 
 should at all costs be avoided. But Mladero and his followers 
 not only failed to realize the dangers which hung like a cloud 
 over them, but failed utterly to grasp the meaning of the move- 
 ment, the consequences of which we are now feeling. The men 
 who overthrew Madero and have taken the power into their 
 hands, have instituted a military despotism, their main weapon 
 being to inspire terror, thinking that in this way they can per- 
 petuate themselves and quell the rebellion headed by Don Venus- 
 
 *The same was done with Maximo Castillo who saved Ma- 
 dero 's life at Casas Grandes. 
 
FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 9 
 
 tiano Carranza. They should arrive if it will be necessary to 
 assure their ambitions, even to provoke a war against the United 
 
 States. 
 
 My object in writing these incidents is to study the crisis 
 through which the country is passing; to clearly establish facts; 
 and to place the responsibility on the shoulders of those upon 
 whom it should be placed, the real actors in the tragedy we are 
 now enacting. I wish to call the attention of my fellow country- 
 men to the great catastrophe which threatens our nation ; and 
 T also wish to tell the world of that which has occurred and is 
 occurring in Mexico. In order to accomplish this purpose, I 
 shall relate facts, all of which have been secured from the best 
 sources of information and I shall relate them not as pictured 
 by the imagination or by political prejudice and passion, but 
 as they really occurred. Throughout, I judge deeds and men 
 with the merciless and impersonal severity of the historian, who, 
 like myself, is under obligation to no man; and putting aside 
 all feelings of friendship and rancor, I tell the truth so that it 
 may be perpetuated in history. I have no intention of teaching 
 anybody nor offering a remedy for anything, for no doubt the 
 book will be issued too late to prevent any of the evils which I 
 foresee. It is merely a crj' from the very depths of my soul as a 
 patriot, a cr}^ that will probably go unheeded by all, but which 
 1 still feel it my duty to give. It will not improve our con- 
 dition but it will, I hope, at least contribute to the study of this 
 period of our history which we have all anxiously witnessed and 
 bewailed; and may it especially serve to teach my children, to 
 whom I dedicate these pages. In them may they learn what 
 human nature really is, to what human ambition can lead, and 
 above all how some people interpret patriotism. May they, my 
 children, in whom I have always endeavored to inculcate the 
 noble spirit of patriotism, they who have shared with me my 
 hopes and fears, they who have closely assisted me in my labors, 
 and have appreciated the fact that I have never been ambitious 
 and have always been willing to sacrifice myself for my country, 
 may they live anew when in future years they read these pages 
 dealing with this sad period in the life of our Nation. To them 
 I dedicate these lines. They, and perhaps they alone, will esti- 
 mate the true idea that inspired them. 
 
 RAMON PRIDA 
 Mexico, November 1913. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 REELECTION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS. 
 
 The life of Porfirio Diaz presents four striking phases. Up 
 to the year 1867 he is a stainless patriot, a soldier of the repub- 
 lic, making all the necessary sacrifices to preserve the integrity 
 of his country and dedicating all his energies to defend and pro- 
 tect its institutions. His enemies, and he has very bitter ones, 
 will cite this or that military event as questionable, but without 
 reason. The military life of General Diaz, is, I repeat, stain- 
 less, and his conduct during the war of the Reform, during the 
 three years war, and during the war against the Intervention and 
 empire, is absolutely above reproach. From 1867 to 1884 he is 
 a revolutionist who has forgotten all affection and duty, who 
 devotes himself solely to securing the power he covets, bribing 
 his employees and perverting his former subalterns ; indifferent 
 to everything but the fixed purpose of climbing to the presi- 
 dency. From 1884 until the centennial celebration in 1910 he 
 is a statesman, empiric but able. Although personal ambition 
 governs all his acts, and although he respects co duty, remembers 
 no service, has no affection, and is hindered by no obstacle which 
 could prevent him from carrying out his main purpose, which 
 is to retain the power in his hands, nevertheless he devotes him- 
 self earnestly to the material progress of the republic under- 
 taking the development of all the branches of the government, 
 except the administration of justice and the action of the courts, 
 in which he never had any faith and which, as a matter of fact, 
 he never for one single moment left free. After the centennial 
 celebration he is a sick man, without will or energy, swayed to 
 and from by reckless and ignorant men, but still clinging to the 
 power, and in his more lucid intervals willing to sacrifice every- 
 thing and everybody rather than give up the presidency, which 
 he feels is fast slipping from his grasp. Finally, he surrenders 
 iu an incomprehensible way leaving behind him his friends and 
 
 (10) 
 
REELECTION WITHOUT RESTKICTIONS 11 
 
 loyal servants seriously compromised and leaving ruin and deso- 
 lation for his country. In these final supreme moments he re- 
 veals himself cold and selfish with no thought for the future, 
 with no solicitude for his country which has been sprinkled with 
 his own blood, and with no anxiety for his good name and his 
 glory which he leaves to be dragged in the dirt and trampled 
 upon by the mob in the streets of Mexico. 
 
 The period of most interest to us and which deserves a 
 brief survey even in this short history is that of his statesmanship. 
 When General Diaz was reelected president in 1884, he was 
 an entirely different man from the one who had been elected in 
 '76. He had acquired a distinguished bearing and an aristocratic 
 air, in fact, his whole physical appearance had changed so radically 
 as to make him look even like a different man. Politically, he 
 was now almost a statesman, as the make up of his cabinet proved. 
 As Secretary of State, he appointed Mr. Ignacio Mariscal, for- 
 merly Secretary in the Juarez Cabinet; as Secretary of the In- 
 terior, Mr. Manuel Romero Rubio ; as Attorney General, he re- 
 tained Mir. Joaquin Baranda, who had held that office under 
 President Manuel Gonzalez; as Secretary of Development, he 
 appointed General Carlos Pacheco, then Governor of Chihuahua ; 
 as Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Manuel Dublan; and as Sec- 
 retaiy of War, General Pedro Hinojosa. His chief task ought 
 to have been to conciliate the various factions, by drawing to- 
 gether the most capable men, irrespective of former enmities. 
 The most able and capable men of the time were at his disposal 
 to help him, in the great task which he had undertaken. His 
 work was highly beneficial, and the material progress and de- 
 velopment of the country, particularly in the first twelve years 
 from 1884 to 1896, were stupendous. We see close to him three 
 men who not long before had figured as his enemies : Mr. Manuel 
 Romero Rubio, head of Mt. Lerdo's last Cabinet; Mr. Joaquin 
 Baranda, a representative under Mir. Lerdo 's administration, and 
 implicated in the revolution so severely suppressed on June 25th, 
 1879 ; and Mr. Manuel Dublan, a man who had served the Empire 
 and who had been sentenced to death as a traitor by General Diaz 
 himself, at that time head of the Army of the East. It is worthy of 
 note too that General Carlos Pacheco was the only member of 
 the Cabinet chosen by Diaz, really representing the revolution 
 of Tuxtepec. General Diaz having acquired by experience a 
 considerable knowledge of statesmanship, knew that men truly 
 
12 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 revolutionary were usually unsuited for government positions; 
 therefore to the subordinates with whom he did not break en- 
 tirely, he gave only second rate positions taking care, however, 
 to enrich them, while the heads of the movement he remembered 
 only to watch them. General Pacheco was there to play an im- 
 portant part in the development of affairs, for he, a pure 
 Tuxtepecan, the sole representative of the revolution in the 
 Cabinet, was destined to be the one to introduce the abolition of 
 the anti-reelection reform that had been the banner of the re- 
 volutions of Noria and Tuxtepec. Had the measure been intro- 
 duced by any other Cabinet officer, all of whom had been reelec- 
 tionists, either under Juarez or under Lerdo, it would not have 
 been so remarkable, but no, the important and almost unbeliev- 
 able fact is that it was introduced by the very member of the 
 Cabinet representing those who, by force of arms, had upheld 
 the anti-reelection principle against Juarez and Lerdo. Thus 
 General Diaz, secure in power, condemned those revolutions 
 instigated by himself as well as all future revolutions, and he 
 was determined to throttle them, no matter by what measures, 
 even by sacrificing his own friends and followers as he did in 
 Vera Cruz on June 25th, 1879. General Dia^ figured that the 
 best plan for him to follow in order to perpetuate himself in the 
 government would be to make the prominent men around him 
 bitterly jealous of each other. Thus , at every subsequent elec- 
 tion, each man rather than see his dearest enemy rise to power, 
 would conclude that the only way to prevent it would be for Gen- 
 eral Diaz himself to be re-elected. Those with whom he did not 
 come into direct contact, he would either keep friendly by en- 
 riching them if necessary, or else would declare them under sus- 
 picion, persecute them, and if they revolted, annihilate them. 
 Such was the unhappy fate of Division General Trinidad Garcia 
 de la Cadena, who had incited the State of Zacatecas in favor 
 of General Diaz in 1871 and in 1876 ; both he and his devoted 
 companion, Colonel Lazalde, meeting their death on the estate 
 of Gruiiidora on October 31st, 1886. To the generals, who, by 
 their renown and popularity in various sections of the country, 
 might instigate new revolutions, he gave large grants of land, 
 making the exploitation as easy as possible. Thus enriching them, 
 he gave them interests which would be of value only in times of 
 peace and which would naturally make them the defenders of 
 the government and the advocates of the indefinite re-election 
 
EEELECTION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS 13 
 
 of the Rebel Chief of Tuxtepec. Immediately upon reaching 
 the presidency in 1884, General Diaz began to put these plans 
 into force; in fact, no sooner had his Cabinet entered upon its 
 duties than a three cornered strife broke out between Mt. Romero 
 Rubio, Mir. Manuel Dublan, and G-eneral Carlos Pacheco, Gen- 
 eral Diaz added fuel to the flame by insinuating to each man the 
 possibility of his succeeding him to the presidency. This jealousy 
 and strife resulted in the increasing of his own power, for each 
 secretary, confidentially informed upon this point by the Presi- 
 dent himself, believed that by increasing the latter 's power, he 
 was gaining prestige with the President and making his own 
 ultimate triumph certain. 
 
 Towards Don Manuel Gonzalez who had loyally given up his 
 power, Diaz ' actions were as follows : At a meeting of the House 
 of Representatives, on the 28th of May 1885, he forced the 
 friends of Mr. Romero Rubio, led by those who had opposed his 
 own election, to question the accounts of the former adminis- 
 tration; and against the expressed stipulation of law, on Octo- 
 ber 30th of the same year, at an ordinary public session, a public 
 impeachment was instituted against Ex-president Don Manuel 
 Gonzalez, by those very persons who had questioned the accounts. 
 The object of this action was to discredit General Gonzalez in 
 the estimation of the people, and at the same time to open a way 
 to his destruction with public approval, should he, while under 
 impeachment by the House, make any attempt at revolt or be- 
 have in a suspicious manner ; for then, on the slightest provoca- 
 tion, he could easily be put out of the way by Diaz himself, who 
 would be applauded by the people as a zealous defender of na- 
 tional justice. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 LOYALTY UNTO DEATH. 
 
 During the convalescence of General Diaz at Cuemavaca, 
 though, his family tried to prevent him from attending to public 
 duties, still the Cabinet members consulted with him personally 
 over the more important affairs of state, one of v^rhich was the 
 nomination for governor of the Federal District. For this they 
 had launched the candidacy of Don Ramon Corral, then in 
 Europe consulting specialists about a throat trouble from which 
 he was suffering. Upon receiving the cable stating that the 
 government needed him, Mr. Corral at once sailed for Mexico, 
 where just a few days after his arrival, he assumed control of 
 the government of the Federal District. His troubles began very 
 shortly, for he at once undertook to reform the various depart- 
 ments which he found entirely disorganized, but on all sides he 
 was hampered by the administration which had for its motto the 
 statu quo. However, by infinite patience, and by surmounting 
 great obstacles, he finally succeeded in instituting several 
 reforms, one of the most important was: the suppression of the 
 gambling houses in the Federal District.* 
 
 When General Mena left the Cabinet, obliged by his phy- 
 sician to go to Europe, General Diaz, with Limantour's approval 
 decided to appoint Mr. Corral to fill the position of Secretary 
 of the Interior, at the same time appointing Mr. Guillermo de 
 Landa y Escandon as Governor of the Federal District. 
 
 The position of Secretary of the Interior presented a much 
 broader field to Mr. Corral, who at once set to work in the De- 
 partment of Public Charities, where he succeeded in complet- 
 ing the General Hospital and the Insane Asylum as well as 
 radically reforming the Juarez Hospital; he also formulated 
 laws for public and private charities. In addition, he organized 
 
 *The gamblers paid $20,000 dollars monthly for the per- 
 mission. 
 
 (14) 
 
LOYlALTY UNTO DEATH 15 
 
 tlie ^iirales, endeavoring to choose the personnel very carefully; 
 be enlarged the penitentiary; and he drew up the plans for the 
 new city jail, which was to do away with the present one, a 
 center of unhealthiness and immorality due to its material con- 
 ditions. On May 22nd, 1904, Lieutenant Colonel Felix Diaz, a 
 nephew and favorite of the President, was appointed Police 
 Commissioner. His work in this capacity was highly detrimental 
 to the government, for he began by delivering himself body 
 and soul to Mr. Celso Acosta, Secretary of Police, who with the 
 cooperation of several subordinates, soon succeeded by means 
 of flattery and adulation towards the Commissioner, in making 
 Police Headquarters a center of political intrigue directed in 
 general against the "cientificos" and in particular against the 
 Secretary of the Interior. 
 
 Shortly after Mr. Corral had been appointed Secretary of 
 the Interior, the constitutional amendment creating the office 
 of Vice-President was passed. General Diaz, now completely un- 
 deceived concerning General Reyes, advocated that the position 
 be filled by a civilian, and named two persons, the only ones 
 who in his opinion could be entrusted with the office: Mr. 
 Olegario Molina and Eamon Corral. These two, he thought, 
 were the only men who could fulfil the duties of Vice-President 
 without making trouble for the administration. Mr. Molina hav- 
 ing been finally eliminated, Mr. Limantour was commissioned 
 to solicit the consent of Mr. Corral ; his candidacy being launched 
 in 1904. 
 
 ' "When the elections were held, the President's candidate 
 as was fully expected, was elected by a large majority, and on 
 December 1st, 1904, General Diaz and Mr. Corral took the oath 
 of office as President and Vice-Presidentl respectively. No 
 change was made in the Cabinet, so everything went on as before. 
 On his part, Mr. Corral refrained entirely from participation in 
 political affairs, but in spite of that, General Diaz would tell 
 any one who would listen, that he had found an ideal vice presi- 
 dent and that it was a pity that so valuable a man should be so 
 unpopular. As a matter of fact Mr. Corral, entering upon his 
 new duties with the determination of giving the office the pres- 
 tige it ought to have, was an ideal vice president. But General 
 Diaz neither understood the part the Vice President should play, 
 nor did he take measures to give Mr. Corral the prestige needed 
 so that in case of necessity, he might assume the position of head 
 
16 FliOM DESPOTISM TO A-NARCH?Y 
 
 of the nation. On the contrary, he, the President, listened 
 willingly to any and every gossip, to the most slanderous tales 
 aimed at the Vice President, and repeated them, always regret- 
 ting that he should be so talked about. 
 
 After the lapse of several years, just following the inter- 
 view given by General Diaz to Mir. Creelman, the American 
 newspaperman*, the question of reelections again arose. As usual, 
 General Diaz made himself out to his friends a victim of duty, a 
 martyr to patriotism. Not a month elapsed after the famous inter- 
 view was published, before General Diaz called together Mr. 
 Limantour, Mr. Corral, and Mr. Olegario Molina, to tell them 
 that every day he received letters urging him to accept reelec- 
 tion, and that before deciding anything he wished to consult 
 Avith his friends. He added that he believed himself too old 
 to begin another presidential term, but that as he was resolved 
 to sacrifice himself for the good of his country, he would accept 
 another term if his friends believed that the nation still needed 
 his services, and that he was not mentally incapacitated to con- 
 tinue at the head of the country From the way he presented 
 the subject, there could be no doubt that what he wanted was 
 not advice but approbation. Mr. Limantour, the first to answer, 
 said that the friends of the administration believed that General 
 Diaz could undertake another term ; that it was known that his 
 intellectual faculties were still intact; that his reelection would 
 be accepted without protest provided, however, that he make 
 a number of radical changes in his platform and, above all, in 
 order to preserve peace, that the make up of the Cabinet be 
 completely changed ; and that he, Limantour, should be the first 
 to leave, as he had been a member for fifteen years. General 
 Diaz agreed to make as many changes as his friends deemed ad- 
 visable except in the Vice Presidency, for Mr. Corral had met 
 all the requirements, and had filled the position with loyalty 
 and honor. 
 
 Mr. Molina agreed mth Mr. Limantour and General Diaz, 
 but added that it was his opinion that the Vice President be 
 given a much more actively political life; especially that he be- 
 come thoroughly acquainted with the military leaders of the 
 country so that in case of necessity they should not be unknown 
 to him, and should during the life of General Diaz become 
 
 *In Pearson's Magazine, MJay 1908 edition. 
 
LOYALTY UNTO DEATH 17 
 
 accustomed to obey him and look on him as the head of the 
 Nation. 
 
 Then, for the first time, Mr. Corral spoke, saying that he 
 believed that although it was possible and even advisable for 
 General Diaz to accept reelection, still it would be an error to 
 retain himself in the vice presidency. After having shown his 
 good will by serving six years, he wished to retire to private life, 
 and he therefore begged General Diaz to name another candi- 
 date. Either Mr. Limantour or Mr. Mlolina could replace him. 
 General Diaz interrupted him to say that on his part he was 
 resolved not to accept reelection unless Mr. Corral should accept 
 it. At the same time Mr. Limantour and Mr. Molina said it 
 would be impossible for them to accept the nomination, the 
 former on account of ineligibility, since his nationality had been 
 passed upon, and the latter, on account of advanced years and 
 illness. Both urged Mr. Corral to accept, but he insisted that 
 either of them or some other friend of the President should be 
 nominated. They, however refused to accept, and the President 
 refused even to consider another man, claiming that the only 
 way the reelection could be justified was if both the officials 
 accepted, since there was no good reason for eliminating Mr. 
 Corral, who had filled the office with so much circumspection. 
 Mr. Corral still refused, until at last General Diaz stated that 
 he solemnly promised that from that day he would decide no 
 matter of importance without consulting the three of them, 
 '^^ unless," he added, "Mr. Corral has some personal grudge 
 against me thiat causes him to take this stand." With that, Mr. 
 Corral was forced to acknowledge himself beaten and agreed 
 to appear on the ticket for reelection. The President repeated 
 that in accordance with Mr. Molina's suggestion, no military ap- 
 pointment would be made without consultation with the vice 
 president, who would become acquainted with all the military 
 leaders and that nothing of any importance would thereafter be 
 resolved without the majority vote of those present at that 
 meeting. 
 
 From that day on, Mjr. Corral had not one moment of rest 
 or peace. The whole pack of hounds at the President's beck 
 and call hurled itself upon him and respected nothing. News- 
 papers, orators, gossips at large, friends, and enemies of the 
 administration, all hurled themselves against the man whose only 
 crime was his loyalty. This infamy reached the lowest depth 
 
18 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHS 
 
 when Mr, Corral, advised by his physician that a change of cli- 
 mate was essential, complying with the Constitutional provision, 
 asked Congress for a leave of absence. At once, a group of 
 the personal friends and relatives of the President opposed the 
 granting of the leave, insisting that it be refused so that he 
 should be forced to resign or die. I will quote the following 
 passage from one of the most striking speeches, that made by 
 ]\Ir. Munoz, a nephew of General Diaz^ "If Mr. Corral is iU, 
 let him try to cure himself, but let him die here where duty calls 
 him, for we shall then mourn a man who has died perserving 
 in his duty as a good patriot, but let us not out of pity, as Wr. 
 Prida says, allow the Nation to suffer irremediable disasters."* 
 
 The leave of absence was finally granted, whereupon Mr. 
 Corral made his preparations for the journey, and on the morn- 
 ing of the 11th, of April, 1911, left with his family for Vera 
 Cruz. Up to the very last minute that he was on Mexican soil, 
 he gave his whole energy and strength to the good of his country, 
 which he was leaving in the midst of great disasters never to see 
 again, for whose future he had fought and suffered, and to 
 which he had sacrificed life itself. In our last interview, when 
 we talked over the situation, his voice was the voice of a Prophet. 
 With what clearness he foresaw events! "With what firmness 
 he suffered disillusionment! The President had been to see 
 him on the eve of his departure, and had timidly broached the 
 subject of his resignation. Mr. Corral had answered him with 
 dignity: ''Yes, sir," he said, "you may count upon it, but it 
 will be submitted with yours. I will accompany you even in 
 this supreme act." 
 
 *As chairman of the House Committee on Interior Affairs, 
 in my speech I had said that Mr. Corral's enemies were merciless 
 in prosecuting him, sick as he was. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE REVOLUTION OF 1910. 
 
 On aceoTint of the personal attacks aimed at him, G-eneral 
 Diaz decided to order Mr. Madero's arrest, and in issuing the 
 order, he took advantage of a speech delivered by the candidate 
 of the anti-reelectionists at the railroad station in San Luis 
 Potosi as he passed through that city on his way to the border. 
 This particular speech was chosen not because it was more impas- 
 sioned or fiery than others made by Madero, but for the signi- 
 ficant reason that it had been heard by Congressman Kr. Juan 
 Ri. Orci. As this gentleman was a particular friend and protege 
 of Vice President Ramon Corral, and widely known to be close- 
 ly identified with him, Diaz felt quite sure that should he be 
 the principal witness against Madero, the whole blame would 
 be placed upon Mir. Corral, who would then naturally bear the 
 brunt of unpopularity resulting from such a measure. As soon 
 as the step was decided upon, orders for the arrest of Madero 
 were i^ued to General Jose M. Mier, Military Chief of the Zone 
 of Nuevo Leon, who succeeded in making the arrest in the city 
 of Monterey just as Madero was about to board a train for the 
 Laguna region, where he was to deliver another speech. By reason 
 of the fact that the judge of the Federal District Court of San 
 Luis Potosi was the judge within whose jurisdiction the offense 
 had been committed, the prisoner was taken to that city and con- 
 fined in the penitentiary, where all his correspondence was 
 opened and examined by the government which was then in a 
 position to prove that he was planning an armed revolution. 
 However, by the time the proofs were collected, he had escaped 
 to the United States, having been released on bail by express 
 orders from General Diaz to the judge of the Federal District 
 Court, Mr. Tomas Ortiz. These orders were issued in compliance 
 with a petition made by Don Ignacio Montes de Oca, Bishop of 
 the diocese of San Luis Potosi, who in order to intercede for the 
 
 (19) 
 
20 , fejom despotism to anarchy 
 
 prisoner had made a special trip to Mexico City where he had 
 succeeded in winning the favor of the President's wife on behalf 
 of the accused, and where he also had the support of Mr. Liman- 
 tour who was a personal friend of the Madero family and, as 
 such, had received various telegrams from (fchem begging him to 
 use his influence with Diaz in favor of the petition which Madero 
 had presented to the Judge of the Federal District Court. The 
 Bishop experienced no difficulty in having his request granted, 
 for in addition to these facts, President Diaz did not think that 
 Francisco Madero could do him any harm, nor did he consider 
 him of very great importance. Upon the receipt of orders from 
 Diaz, the act being according to law, the District Judge placed 
 the bail at $10,000. This sum was at once deposited by M!r. 
 Madero who though released, was expected to remain in the 
 city of San Luis Potosi until the conclusion of the trial which 
 had already begun. 
 
 By this time, which was the beginning of October, the elec- 
 tions had already taken place and the House had made its cus- 
 t-omary declaration concerning them, so with Madero free, every- 
 thing was ripe for a rebellion against Diaz, which was neverthe- 
 less not started until the 20th of November. The delay was 
 due to the fact that the anti-reeleetionists, though resolved to 
 revolt, as they were friends of J\'Iladero, thought it dangerous to 
 start the revolution while he was still in reach of the govern- 
 ment police, so in order to eliminate this difficulty, they planned 
 that he should escape on the train to Laredo. This, Mr. JMladero 
 easily accomplished, for one night, disguised as a mechanic, he 
 walked out of the ciiy to the suburbs where an automobile await- 
 ed him. Along the road which the machine was to take, spies 
 were posted by friends of the cause in order that at the slight- 
 est alarm, or at the first indication of discovery, the fugitive 
 could be hidden in the mountains of Matehuala. However, as 
 the escape went unnoticed by any one, Mr. Madero was able 
 calmly to board the train at a flag station. Still disguised as 
 a mechanic and clean shaven, he managed with the help of the 
 Auditor who was also in the plot, to gain the frontier of the 
 United States. The first news the government had of the flight 
 was from a telegram addressed by Don Andres Garza Galan to 
 the Director of the Reelectionist Club advising him of Madero 's 
 arrival at Laredo, Texas. Several days later, in November, the 
 revolutionary plan signed by ^Miadero in the city of San Luis 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1910 21 
 
 Potosi, was made public. The movement was at once seconded 
 in Chihuahua by Pascual Orozco and Abraham Gonzalez who 
 W€re soon joined by Caraveo, Emilio Campa and others. Gen- 
 eral Manuel Mi. Plata, Chief of the Zone, immediately notified 
 the government of the movement, urgently requesting that 10,- 
 000 men be sent him so that he might suppress the rebellion.* 
 This report was received with derision in government circles 
 where it was deemed so erroneous that the chief was relieved of 
 his command. General Juan Hernandez was appointed as his 
 successor for he had previously engaged in the campaign against 
 the Indians of Chihuahua and was considered capable of mas- 
 tering the situation with the meagre resources at the command 
 of the second military zone. 
 
 In the meantime, General Diaz sent an intimate friend of 
 his, Don Inigo Noriega, to interview the rebels. He was willing 
 to sacrifice everybody in order to give the rebellion its death 
 blow, at the very beginning. General Diaz thought that this plan 
 would have the same success it had at the time of the rebellion 
 of General Neri, but Mr. Vasquez Gomez, who was appointed 
 by the rebels to interview the President's envoy and hear the 
 propositions he had to offer, demanded that Noriega present 
 his credentials in due form; in other words, he demanded that 
 the government should recognize the revolution in its belliger- 
 ent character. As it happened, Mr. Noriega had nothing but 
 the private telegraphic code by which he was to communicate 
 the proposals of the revolutionists to the President. In view of 
 this fact, Mr. Vasquez Gomez very wisely refused to enter into 
 any agreements with him, and the negotiation was a complete 
 failure. By this time, public opinion, greatly excited over the 
 unfruitful results of military affairs, demanded a brief and 
 energetic campaign that should immediately reestablish com- 
 munications and restore to the country the peace which it had 
 lost. Colonel Martin Guzman had been badly defeated at Mai 
 Paso, where he lost many of his soldiers and where he received 
 a wound from which he died a few days after his arrival at 
 Chihuahua. The President's assistants and his son Lieutenant 
 Colonel Porfirio Diaz, made all the arrangements and plans 
 
 *Enrique C. Creel, Secretary of State, questioned by Presi- 
 dent Diaz, on the subject, answered that with the cowboys of 
 the Terrazas' estates only the rebellion would be drowned off in 
 a few days. 
 
22 FKOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHiZ 
 
 for the campaign, as the President was personally incapaci- 
 tated by illness. 
 
 Mr. Madero, when he escaped from San Luis Potosi, went 
 to San Antonio, Texas, where he organized the revolutionary 
 junta. According to an understanding with Don Catarino Bena- 
 vides, he was to go into the interior of. the State of Coahuila, 
 but on the 18th of November, he lost his way and wandered about 
 for two days. Finally, on the 20th he met his partisans 
 in the ranch called "El Indio." Twenty days he waited for 
 those who had promised to join him, but as they did not appear, 
 it was decided that the forces on hand in Coahuila were not 
 enough to head a rebellion and that it would be better for Madero 
 to establish his headquarters in Chihuahua. Therefore, towards 
 the middle of December, assuming a disguise, he again crossed 
 the border. His adherents in San Antonio were anxious that 
 he should go by way of Havana to Yucatan, where it was stated 
 by Mr. Jose Maria Pino Suarez he could count on resources far 
 superior to those on the frontier. They were still doubtful as 
 to the best course of action to follow, when it was learned that 
 through the efforts of the Mexican government an order was to 
 be issued by the United States for the arrest of Don Francisco I. 
 Madero and Abraham G^onzalez, both accused of violating the 
 neutrality laws. 
 
 On February 14, Don Francisco I. IMJadero and his followers 
 re-entered Mexican territory, where they were soon joined by the 
 guerrilla bands marauding in that vicinity; on the 19th, in the 
 Charco de Grado, there began the organization of the revolution- 
 ary forces. Don Eduardo Hiay was given charge of destroying 
 the railroad tracks in order to prevent the mobilization of Fed- 
 eral troops. Ooi' the 22nd, Mir. Madero and his forces entered 
 Villa Ahumada, and on the 28th, they invaded San Lorenzo, 
 encountering absolutely no resistance. On the 1st of M^arch, 
 they Avere joined ia San Buenaventura by 200 men led by Colonel 
 Jose Flo res Alatorre, but on account of the numerous complaints 
 against the man, he was relieved of his command and his soldiers 
 were incorporated into the column commanded by Hay, RIoque 
 Gonzalez Garza, and the Italian Garibaldi. The column marched 
 towards Casas Grandes, arrived there on March 5th, and im- 
 mediately proceded to attack the town. Colonel Garcia Cuellar, 
 leader of the 6th Battalion since the defeat of Colonel Guzman 
 at Mai Paso, who with a section of the artillery under Colonel 
 
THE ElEVOLUTION OF 1910 23 
 
 Eguia Liz had been for some time in the vicinity of the town, 
 immediately came to its defense. The commanders, Jose de la 
 Luz Soto, G^aribaldi, Hay, and G-onzalez Garza, although none 
 of them knew anything about military tactics, refused to take 
 advice from the officers in the column who had technical know- 
 ledge. The federal attack was so fierce, and the surprise of the 
 rebels so great, that Soto's forces were completely demoralized, 
 and this demoralization spread disorder among the rest. Mr. 
 Madero, who was watching the scene from a distance, was ad- 
 vised to take to flight. A carriage and mules were provided, 
 but on hitching, it was found that one of the mules was a pack 
 mule and could not draw the carriage; so Madero was forced to 
 hide in a ditch to escape capture. 
 
 Colonel Garcia Cuellar was badly wounded in the hand but 
 in spite of this, he refused to leave his post. In answering Col- 
 onel Equia Liz' remonstrations and entreaties that he should 
 attend to his wound and leave him in command, enough time 
 was lost to give Madero the necessary opportunity to escape. 
 Don Benito Goribar in his book entitled "El Maderisma en 
 Cueros" says^ "If, Colonel Garcia Cuellar had been a soldier, 
 he would at that very instant have ordered fifty cavalrymen 
 to charge, and there and then would have put an end to Madero 
 and the Maderista revolution of 1910." Mr. Goribar fails to 
 take into consideration the fact that Colonel Garcia Cuellar was 
 wounded, and that therefore the only mistake for which he can 
 be held responsible is for not having resigned his command and 
 for his over anxiety to fulfil his duty. 
 
 In the meantime, the guerilla bands in Chihuahua had suc- 
 ceeded in cutting off Ciudad Juarez, for with the men Pascual 
 Orozco, Caraveo, Salazar, and Campa in Guerrero, Batopilas, 
 the Sierra 'Tarahumara, and the Sierra de las Mestenas, they 
 had advanced on Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga in their efforts 
 to take possession of some border town. The government, ap- 
 parently believing that it was merely a local uprising against 
 the domination of the Terrazas, forced the resignation of the 
 Governor, Mr. Alberto Terrazas, son of General Luis Terrazas, 
 owner of most of the land in the State, and appointed as his 
 successor, Colonel Miguel Ahumada who had just been relieved 
 of the governorship of Jalisco in favor of Don Manuel Cuesta 
 Gallardo, Ahumada had formerly been Governor of Chihuahua 
 and had won the esteem of all the inhabitants. The government 
 
24 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 at tihe same time had ordered General Lauro Villar, chief of the 
 forces in Laredo, to lead the campaign in Chihuahua, but events 
 were hastened when towards the beginning of May, Ciudad 
 Juarez was besieged by a large number of rebels commanded 
 by Pascual Orozco, Jr., as commander-in-chief, with Francisco 
 Villa, Salazar, Caraveo, and Emilio Campa, next in command. 
 Of these, Villa, besides being very well acquainted with that re- 
 gion, was also an excellent marksman ; Salazar was a very intel- 
 ligent and brave young man; Caraveo a daring fellow dearly 
 beloved by his troops and of an unflinching courage ; and Emilio 
 Campa was also a young man of exceptional qualities ; but none 
 of them had had any military schooling whatsoever. These forces 
 had, separately, various encounters with the Federals in 
 Coyame, in Cuchillo, Parade, besides other places, and had never 
 been routed, so now coming together into one group, they formed 
 a nucleus of some importance. 
 
 The forces in Ciudad Juarez were under the command of 
 General Navarro, now an old man, who had always fought with 
 courage, but whose strategic knowledge was almost nil. This, 
 it is true, was offset to some extent by the presence of Colonel 
 Tamborrel who belonged to the corps of engineers and had made 
 scientific preparations for the defense of the town. The Federal 
 columns had up to that time been moved by direct orders from 
 the "War Department, although as a matter of fact. General Diaz 
 himself directed the campaign from his house, assisted by hia 
 aides, particularly by his son, Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz. 
 So long as General Diaz was able personally to issue orders and 
 direct the movements, these movements suffered only because of 
 the fact that the directing power was so far away from the scene 
 of action and was unfamiliar with the country where the forces 
 operated; but as soon as General Diaz was prevented from per- 
 sonally attending to the campaign, which was then carried on 
 chiefly by his son, these movements suffered from the appalling 
 incompetence of the directing power. It was never known at a 
 given time where the columns were, for they were moved about 
 without reason and needlessly exhausted. The Secretary of War, 
 General Gonzalez Cosio, not wishing to displease the President, 
 said nothing, and consequently the results of the campaign be- 
 came worse every day. General Mondragon, an intimate friend 
 of Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz, was also there, but with an 
 eye to business. One proposition which he submitted was an 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1910 25 
 
 offer of a large quantity of anmninition at 70 marks per thous- 
 and, made to the government by a German factory through a Mr. 
 Perez. The President ordered it to be bought, but the Sub-sec- 
 retary of the Treasury, Mr. Nunez, who had a personal aversion 
 to Mondragon, suspecting that there was something crooked in 
 the deal, cabled to Mr. Limantour at Paris. Mr. Limantour 
 answered that the ammunition was in fact German, but that it 
 had been refused by the Chilean government and that it could 
 be bought at about 40 marks per thousand. In view of this reply 
 and in spite of the decisive order from the President, Mr. Nunez re- 
 fused to approve the contract. General Diaz, who, as I have said* 
 was a slave to formalities, canceled the contract that had already 
 been drawn up by the Secretary of War. The army administration 
 was also in frightful disorder. The Sanitary Department was con- 
 tinually complaining of not having the requisite materials because 
 orders for them were not given in due time. The failure of the cam- 
 paign in Chihuahua was due to the weakness of the Secretary of 
 "War who in deference to the President's son, did not himself take 
 actual direction of the Campaign, It has been said that General 
 Gonzalez Cosio was incompetent, but in my opinion such a charge 
 should not be made for he did not actually direct the movements, 
 but simply transmitted the orders he received. Another cause of 
 disaster was the untimely death of Colonel Tamborrel in Ciudad 
 Juarez at the very beginning of the assault, because General 
 Navarro, though a good column commander, was not capable 
 enough to carry out the defense as it had been planned. Thus 
 the fall of Ciudad Juarez, though in itself really an insignifi- 
 cant event, was, as we shall see later, the death blow to General 
 Diaz and his government; with this single battle, and with the 
 capture of this single small town, the revolution begun in Novem- 
 ber 1910, had triumphed. 
 
 *In the complete Spanish edition. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS. 
 
 As a rule, whenever elections were to be held, General Diaz 
 would show Mr. Limantour the list of the Congressmen who were 
 to be elected as soon as made out, and listen to his suggestions 
 and comments, but in 1910, the first glimpse Mr. Limantour had 
 of this list was when he read it in the newspapers. However, 
 in spite of the express agreement made the previous year by 
 Greneral Diaz with him, Corral, and Molina, Mir. Limantour did 
 not complain nor in fact did he in any way show that he was 
 aware that elections would be held in July of that year ; but when 
 the names of the candidates for magistrates of the Supreme 
 Court of Justice of the Nation were published by the newspapers 
 of the different states, and he saw that among them figured a 
 protege of Mr. Dehesa, he could not but remonstrate, though in 
 a respectful and amiable way, stating that the course of action 
 of General Diaz on this occasion was entirely different from his 
 usual attitude towards him, and that, above all, it was absolutely 
 contrary to the express agreement made when Corral Jiad ac- 
 cepted the re-nomiuation. iThe President offered some explana- 
 tions, and the conversation, less cordial than usual, ended by 
 Mr. Limantour asking for a leave of absence to accompany his 
 wife on a trip to Europe for her health. This was immediately 
 granted, though the President requested him to postpone his 
 departure until after the elections. No sooner were the pri- 
 mary elections over than Mr. Limantour left with his family for 
 Europe promising to return in time to assist, on December 1st, 
 in the inauguration of Don Porfirio Diaz and Mr. Ramon Corral, 
 which was to be the beginning of the six year term of office for 
 which they had been elected. 
 
 Mr. Limantour 's friends considered it a mistake on his part 
 to take the trip at this particular time. They showed him clear- 
 ly that it would cause much unfavorable comment, and it would 
 
 (26) 
 
THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS 27 
 
 be open to criticism for tlie Secretary of the Treasury to be ab- 
 sent from the oonntry just at the time of the centennial celebra- 
 tion, a celebration which General Diaz intended should surpass 
 all previous ones in brilliancy and luxury. They also argued 
 that it would be particularly unfortunate for him to be away 
 should the revolution really break out, as there was every indi- 
 cation to believe it would, judging from Madero's actions. But 
 Mr. Limantour, deaf to all arguments, would listen to none of 
 them, and firm in his resolution, left for Europe in July, ap- 
 parently determined to break entirely with Diaz. 
 
 In Europe he was, therefore, when things began to happen 
 in Mexico, and in Europe it was he met General Reyes with 
 whom he became so intimate that hardly a day went by that they 
 were not seen together in the streets of Paris. Both seem to 
 have completely forgotten their former mutual grievances. When 
 events grew worse, and the rebellion finally broke out. General 
 Diaz cabled and wrote to Mr. Limantour urging his return, but 
 Mr. Limantour, offering as an excuse now the illness of his wife, 
 now the illness of his daughter, stayed where he was. The Presi- 
 dent was compelled to demand from his minister an explanation 
 of such conduct, but it was not until February 1911, when events 
 were reaching a crisis, that Mr. Limantour finally decided to 
 come back to the side of Diaz. He returned by way of New York, 
 where he conferred with Messrs. Madero, Vasquez Gomez, and 
 Ambassador de la Barra. What they discussed and what they 
 agreed upon, they have refused to divulge. Mr. Vazquez Gomez 
 alone has thrown out hints about it, but not enough on which 
 to base a statement ; his reticence is even more eloquent, but not 
 even from that can a logical deduction be made. Time alone can 
 throw light on the discussion held in the American metropolis. 
 
 Mr. Limantour was met on the way by his best friends, 
 headed by Mr. Macedo and by Mtr. Nunez. His first words of 
 greeting were that in returning to his country he did not wish 
 to identify himself with any particular political faction, that 
 what he wished was to be entirely independent so as to be able 
 to attract to himself the most able men the nation could supply, 
 regardless of what their ideas or affiliations had heretofore been. 
 Those who up to that time had been Mr. Limantour 's political 
 friends, but had been aware of Mr. Limantour 's intimacy with 
 General Reyes in Paris, immediately understood that what Mr. 
 Limantour wished was to be entirely at liberty to join his old 
 
28 FEIOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 enemies, believing it to be the best way of attaining the power 
 which had slipped through his fingers when he had been faithful 
 to his old friends. Therefore, from that very moment they tacitly 
 agreed to separate, making no comment whatsoever on what 
 had occurred.* 
 
 Limantour, ex-chief of the Cientificos, entered the Capital 
 on March 19th, 1911, after having broken completely with his 
 old friends. On his entry he was accorded an ovation that might 
 almost be called frantic, prepared for him by the Cientificos 
 who naturally had not been able to foretell his change of mind. 
 There were speeches at the railroad station, and acclamations 
 in the streets. It seemed as if the Savior of the country had 
 arrived. The popularity so eagerly sought by Mtr, Limantour 
 for nearly twenty years was his at the most unexpected moment. 
 And this, in spite of the fact that the people did not know that 
 Mr. Limantour was no longer a Cientifico! 
 
 A conference was immediately held between General Diaz 
 and Mr. Limantour at which it was decided to call a special 
 meeting of the Cabinet. At this meeting, he urged the necessity 
 that the Cabinet resign en masse. Mr. Corral, who although se- 
 riously ill attended to his official duties, approved the course 
 suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, but turning to Gen- 
 eral Diaz he openly reminded him of his words at the conference 
 with Limantour, Molina, and himself; he brought before him 
 his failure to keep his promises made at that time as to what he 
 would do, and finally he declared that events had reached such 
 a climax because of the government's weakness, because of the 
 hesitancy of the President in making any changes in the per- 
 sonnel of the Cabinet, and because of the unwillingness of Mr. 
 Limantour to provide the necessary funds when and where 
 needed. 
 
 On March 24th, it was decided that all members of the Cabi- 
 net should resign. The President placed the formation of the 
 new Cabinet in charge of Mr. Limantour who from the nature 
 of things was its head. "When this new Cabinet became known to 
 the general public, it was christened by Mr. Bulnes in one of 
 his brilliant articles ''The Cabinet of High C," for this famous 
 orator argued that it would only last as long as a high C sung 
 by an opera tenor. On the 28th of March the Cabinet was defi- 
 
 *From the next day, 20th of March, 1911, the Cientifico 
 party was no longer in Mexican politics. 
 
THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 29 
 
 nitely appointed as follows: Secretary of State, Francisco de 
 la Barra, Ambassador of Mexico in Washington, to whom Mr. 
 Limantour had offered the portfolio on his way through the 
 United States; Secretary of the Interior, vacant, because the 
 President had suggested as a candidate, Mr. Rafael BeboUar 
 whom Mr. Limantour flatly rejected, because on his side, fol- 
 lowing his new policy of flattering his old enemies, he had pro- 
 posed Mr. Teodoro A. Dehesa, but General Diaz, in spite of the 
 persistence of his own nephew, Congressman Ignacio Mlunoz, 
 refused to countenance the appoinjtment ; Attorney General, 
 Demetrio Sodi, Justice of the National Supreme Cburt, and son 
 of an intimate friend of General Diaz; Secretary of Public Li- 
 struction, Jorge Vera y Estanol, law partner of Mr. Calero, and 
 suggested by this gentleman to the President and Mr. Liman- 
 tour. (It was Mr. Vera Estanol who was given charge of the 
 portfolio of the Interior towards the end of the Diaz regime in 
 order that he might intervene with Madero for the restoration 
 of peace) ; Secretary of Development, Mr. Manuel Marroquin y 
 Rivera, a man in whom Mr. Limantour had absolute confidence ; 
 Secretary of Communications, Mr. Norberto Dominguez; Post 
 Master General, a man in whom General Diaz had full confi- 
 dence, although the public accused him of having given assis- 
 tance to violation of the mails that passed through the post 
 office; the office of Secretary of "War Mr. Limantour had pro- 
 mised to General Reyes, but the President flatly refused to 
 appoint him ; in the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Porf irio Diaz, 
 Jr., a great friend of General Gonzalez Cosio, the incumbent, 
 made the most of the opportunity for supporting the latter, and 
 finally succeeded in convincing his father that it would be a mis- 
 take to remove him ; General Diaz was well enough pleased with 
 General Gonzalez Cosio, not to desire a change, nor did he under 
 any circumstances want General Reyes appointed to the post. 
 Secretary of the Treasury, filled again by Mr. Limantour. 
 
 As soon as the new Cabinet was organized, Mr. Limantour 's 
 first thought was to cable to General Rieyes, who should be placed 
 in charge of the campaign, and whose sword would then come 
 to save the government; but the President strenuously opposed 
 such a course and it took aU the persuasive powers of Mr, Liman- 
 tour finally to secure his consent. General Reyes then imposed 
 conditions, one of which was the elimination from politics of Mr. 
 Limantour 's former friends. General Reyes stated that in the 
 
30 PE'OM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 agreement made in Paris, Mti*. Limantour had pledged his word 
 that Mr. Corral would resign; that all the Cientificos would be 
 eliminated from public posts; that there would be no compro- 
 mise with the revolution; that he, Reyes, would be appointed 
 Secretary of War and would be given all the supplies he might 
 ask for. 
 
 The Cabinet completed by the arrival of Mr, de la Barra, 
 presented itself before Congress on the 1st of April. In his 
 message, the President proposed the constitutional reform that 
 there should be no reelection. This proposal was presented in 
 due form on the following day and its speedy dispatch was re- 
 commended. After a three days discussion, in which individuals 
 rather than political principles were discussed, the proposed re- 
 form was accepted on April 25th. In this way the new govern- 
 ment thought to calm the storm that threatened its deposal; a 
 gross error, for the revolution had already taken such a strong 
 hold on public opinion all over the country that nothing could 
 stop it. Besides, the government had made a change of persons 
 but not of program. Mr. Limantour continued his old method 
 of not spending the national funds; he defended them as though 
 they were his own, and for what? In order that at his downfall 
 he should have a large sum in the treasury for his successor. 
 How much better would it have been had he spent some of the 
 money in preventing the evils caused by the revolution ! Above 
 all, he continued negotiating with the rebels, against whom he 
 defended not the personnel of the government nor its institu- 
 tions, but the funds which the revolutionists demanded of him. 
 
 In defense of this course of action, Mr. Limantour would 
 say that his main object was to prevent American Intervention, 
 a phantom with which Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was al- 
 ways threatening. It is rather peculiar and inexplicable though, 
 that Mr. Limantour who had made his return trip from Europe 
 via the United States, should not have learned there the i-oal 
 attitude of the American government towards the Mexican situa- 
 tion, and should not have come to the conclusion that the threats 
 of invasion came only from Henry Lane AA^ilson himself Rud 
 not direct from the Cabinet nor from the peaceful President. Ml*. 
 Taft, at that time the occupant of the White House. 
 
 Fearing intervention, or pretending to fear it, Mr. Liman- 
 tour ordered Oscar Braniff, who had gone to the United States 
 for the purpose of entering into some agreement with the rebels. 
 
THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 31 
 
 to move to El Paso that he might be nearer to the revolutionists. 
 There, aided by Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, who accompanied 
 him, he began negotiations. In these negotiations, Dr. Vazquez 
 Gromez, who was gifted with much more shrewdness and sagacity 
 than the government envoys and even than the chief of the Cabi- 
 net himself, brought things to such a pass that the government, 
 unconscious of the fact, was made to recognize the revolutionists 
 as belligerents. The way Vazquez Gomez accomplished this was 
 by demanding that the government send a special envoy with 
 credentials so that in case there should be a break, they could 
 extend as an argument to the American government the fact 
 that the Mexican government itself had already recognized them 
 as belligerents, and that therefore a foreign government could 
 not do otherwise. Mr. Limantour, falling nicely into the trap, 
 appointed as a special envoy, Supreme Court Justice Francisco 
 Carvajal to whom were given written instructions and creden- 
 tials that the rebels could not reject. The government was treat- 
 ing with the rebels as equals and therefore the government was 
 lostj^/ln the conferences which took place in Mexican territory 
 near Ciudad Juarez, Vazquez Gromez, acting as spokesman for 
 the revolutionists, was more exacting than ever. He demanded 
 the resignation of General Diaz, although Madero had already 
 relinquished this demand; that all Cientifieos leave the House; 
 that men proposed by the revolutionists be appointed governors 
 for eight or ten states; and that furthermore, a heavy sum of 
 money be paid by the government to defray the expenses of the 
 revolutionists. The government was willing to sacrifice all of 
 Mr. Limantour 's friends, and to change a considerable number 
 of the governors, but it was by no means willing ,to give the 
 money demanded, nor to have General Diaz resign^ The Presi- 
 dent imposed another condition which was accepted by the re- 
 volutionists, namely, not to recognize the military standing of 
 any rebel, as he did not wish to hurt the army that had been 
 faithful to him. This condition then was agreed upon by the 
 revolutionists and as I have said before, Mr. Madero even con- 
 sented to have Diaz remain in power; but the revolutionists, 
 headed by Mr. Vazquez Gomez balked and the negotiations were 
 interrupted. General Diaz then issued to the Nation a procla- 
 mation drawn up by Mr. Rosendo Pineda, one of the former 
 friends of Mtr. Limantour, for, it may be noted, Mir. Limantour 
 is a man of such character, that though he was quite willing, 
 
32 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO AJ^ARCHiY 
 
 ill order to please General Reyes, to have his old friends de- 
 barred from politics and quite willing to have them leave the 
 House of Representatives, where they had loyally defended the 
 government, still he was always ready to use them when occasion 
 demanded and did not hesitate to call upon them and earnestly 
 request work of this kind.* 
 
 As the negotiations were interrupted, the rebels in view of 
 the moral support which the government's attitude had given 
 them, broke the armistice and on May 9th took Ciudad Juarez 
 by assault. Among their prisoners was General Juan J. Navarro, 
 Commander in Chief, whom they intended to execute. Mr. 
 Madero declared this assault an act of disobedience as he had 
 not ordered such a step; the government's envoy entered a vigor- 
 ous protest, in answer to which Mr. Madero complained of his 
 own powerlessness to impose his will. Nevertheless, with great 
 energy he opposed the execution of General Navarro, personally 
 defending him and conducting him to the American side, thus 
 compelling obedience to his desires. Two days later, there was 
 a new disagreement when the military commander of the revolu- 
 tionists, Pascual Orozco, carried matters so far as to arrest 
 Madero in the City Hall. This building had been converted by 
 the revolutionists into their Federal Building. Once more Mr. 
 Madero succeeded in imposing himself, and he regained his liberty, 
 thus asserting the authority with which the rebels had invest- 
 ed him. 
 
 Mr. Limantour did not recall either of the envoys from 
 El Paso; on the contrary, he continued negotiating for peace 
 until finally on the night of the 21st of May, a treaty was signed. 
 On the following day, the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Vera 
 Estanol, appeared before the House and read the following mes- 
 sage from the President, concerning the matter: 
 
 "Gentlemen: You are duly informed by the Secretary of 
 State that the President, always solicitous for the welfare of 
 his country, declared his intention to listen to any peace proposals 
 that might be made to him by the revolutionists then in arms. 
 For this purpose he appointed as his envoy, Mr. Francisco Car- 
 vajal, whom he authorized to negotiate with the envoys that Mr. 
 Francisco I. Madero, publicly considered chief of the revolu- 
 tion, might appoint. The President's desire was to ratify pub- 
 
 *The proclamation can be read in the Spanish edition. 
 
THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS 33 
 
 lie opinion, but he would make only such concessions as would 
 be compatible with the dignity of the government as well as 
 practicable within constitutional limits." 
 
 Official negotiations took place at the beginning of this 
 same month of May, Mr. Francisco I. Madero having appointed 
 as his representatives Messrs. Francisco Madero, Sr., Francisco 
 Vazquez Gomez, and Jose Maria Pino Suarez. Unfortunately, 
 it had been necessary to break off negotiations because the re- 
 volutionists demanded as a necessary condition for declaring their 
 propositions that General Porfirio Diaz should first announce 
 his intention to resign from the Presidency within a specified 
 time. However, it was unofficially known that in order to end 
 the revolution the chiefs intended to propose among other terms, 
 some that it would be impossible to accept without violating the 
 Constitution. 
 
 The Cabinet believed that the sudden announcemenl) of the 
 resignation of the President, without first adjusting the terms 
 under which the revolutionists should lay down their arms, and 
 especially without knowing officially what these terms would be, 
 would have loosened the ties of order and legality withi which 
 the greater part of the country was still bound together, thus 
 bringing about a state of anarchy which was already threaten- 
 ing some parts under the name of a revolutionary agitation. 
 Moreover, the government correctly jiudged that if peace was 
 reestablished by means of unconstitutional arrangements, instead 
 of being permanent it would merely be the beginning of deeper 
 and more lasting national troubles. 
 
 When it was necessary to break negotiations, the President 
 issued his proclamation of the 8th of May, calling upon the 
 nation to support the government and stating that he would 
 withdraw from power when, in his judgment, the country would 
 not run the risk of falling into a state of anarchy at his with- 
 drawal from office. The fall of Ciudad Juarez, in spite of the 
 heroic defense made by our army, furnished resources and gave 
 new strength to the revolution, increasing not only the number 
 of its forces, but also the number of its sympathizers. These 
 two important facts induced the government to facilitate the 
 renewal of negotiations to which, in view of the President's proc- 
 lamation, the leader of the revolution also consented. In the re- 
 newed negotiations, the revolutionary chiefs no longer insisted 
 that the President resign, nor did they insist that he even fix a 
 
34: FKOM DEiSPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 
 
 date for his resignation. They did, however, propose conditions 
 which could not constitutionally he made the terms of an agree- 
 ment, but could only be decided upon if demanded by public 
 opinion through legal and authorized channels. In view of these 
 facts and of the general clamor throughout the country for the 
 reestablishment of peace and security, the government thought 
 it necessary to find a radical solution to the conflict. What was 
 finally determined upon was that General Diaz should publicly 
 announce his intention of withdrawing very shortly from office, 
 at the same time stating that Don Elamon Corral's resignation 
 was also on its way. O'n their side, the revolutionists should 
 pledge themselves to support the provisional government which, 
 as provided by the Constitution, would in that event take office 
 and should aid it to reestablish peace and satisfy public opinion 
 within constitutional bounds. 
 
 Such an act of patriotism by the President of the Republic 
 produced good results, as the revolutionary leader at once con- 
 sented to come to an agreement and in fact did agree with the 
 government's envoy to a general armistice through all parts of 
 the country, an armistice which is to end today. 
 
 Mr. Carvajal, the government's envoy, was immediately 
 given instructions to enter into negotiations with Mjessers. Vaz- 
 quez Gomez, Madero, and Pino Suarez to arrange for a definite 
 cessation of hostilities. The result of these new negotiations 
 was that an agreement subject to ratification already asked for, 
 was agreed upon. This was as follows : 
 
 "At a meeting held in the border Custom House in Ciudad 
 Juarez on the 21st of Miay, 1911 by Mr. Carvajal representing 
 the government of Porf irio Diaz and Messrs. Francisco V. Gomez, 
 Francisco Madero, Sr., and Jose Maria Pino Suarez, represent- 
 ing the revolutionists, to try to readjust matters and put an 
 end to hostilities throughout the country and whereas Porf irio 
 Diaz declared his intention of resigning before the end of the 
 present month; whereas it is gathered from reliable information 
 that Mr. Ramon Corral will also resign within the stated time; 
 whereas as provided by law, the Secretary of State, Francisco de 
 la Barra will become president ad interim and will, according to 
 the constitution, call a general election ; whereas the new govern- 
 ment will carefully study present conditions in order to grant 
 within lawful limits to each state what it may require and will 
 consider payment of indemnities for damages caused directly 
 
THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 35 
 
 by the revolutioD, the contracting parties represented at this 
 conference have agreed upon the following terms: That hos- 
 tilities between the government and the revolutionary forces 
 shall from this day cease; that the revolutionary forces be dis- 
 banded as soon as each state takes steps towards the reestablish- 
 ment and guarantee of peace and public order. TRANSITiOiRiY : 
 that the reconstruction and repairing of telegraphic and rail- 
 road lines at present interrupted shall be taken up immediately. 
 The present agreement shall be signed in duplicate." 
 
 The attitude of the government had naturally caused revo- 
 lutionists to spring up all over the country. On the 20th, Co- 
 lima fell into the hands of the rebels. 0!n the 21st Cuemavaca 
 fell, and on the following day Acapulco and Chilpancingo. On 
 the 22nd it also became known that Tehuacan and Torreon had 
 turned against the government and so on, all over the country, 
 revolutionists whose very existence was unknown sprouted in 
 every place. The ambitious and the hungry, all joined the revo- 
 lution where it was succeeding, in order to share the booty. 
 
 General Diaz though ill and without energy, and though 
 urged by the Secretary of the Treasury and his friends; still 
 resisted. Though the agreement demanding his resignation was 
 already signed, the President still refused to resign. The mobs 
 shouted in the streets and the riots increased so that the troops 
 had to be called out to quell the disturbances; blood flowed 
 through the streets of Mexico City ; the House had been waiting 
 since the 24th for the resignation of the President and the Vice 
 President, but still the President wavered. The scene in the Presi- 
 dent's house on the morning of the 25th of May was really pa- 
 thetic. T!he House of Representatives was about to go into ses- 
 sion and the de facto head of the Cabinet was at the President's 
 side with the written resignation in, his hand. His family begged 
 the President to resign; Mr. Limantour, never before showing 
 so much energy, demanded his resignation, but it was not until 
 half past two o'clock when the representatives were already be- 
 ginning to arrive at the House to approve that humiliation and 
 sacrifice, that General Diaz, in the delirium of fever, almost un- 
 consciously, submitted and signed his resignation. Mr. Corral's 
 resignation had arrived several days before. Mr. Limantour, 
 with a deep sigh of relief, left the President, taking with him 
 both resignations in order that the House might consiunmate 
 
36 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHr^T 
 
 the act. Both documents are worthy of passing into history. 
 That of President Diaz is stated in the following terms : 
 
 Mexico, May 25, 1911. 
 Gentlemen : 
 
 The Mexican people, that people who have so generously 
 overwhelmed me with honors, who proclaimed me their leader 
 in the International War, who have patriotically supported me 
 in all works undertaken for the industrial and commercial im- 
 provement of the country, to establish its credit, to give its name 
 international prestige, and to gain for it a worthy place among 
 friendly nations; that people, gentlemen, have revolted, and in 
 armed bands of thousands, declare that my continuance as chief 
 executive of the country is the cause of the insurrection. I do 
 not know of what I am accused that would give rise to this social 
 phenomenon but granting for the sake of argument that I am 
 unconsciously guilty, this would make me the person least able 
 to reason about and decide my own guilt. Under such circumr 
 stances, respecting as I have always respected the will of the 
 peeople, and in accordance with Article 82 of the National Con- 
 stitution, I appear before the highest representatives of the 
 people to present my resignation as constitutional president 
 with which the national vote has honored me; and I do this all 
 the more because to retain my position, it would be necessary to 
 continue to shed Mexican blood, to destroy the Nation's credit, 
 to squander and drain the fountains of her wealth, and to ex- 
 pose the government to international conflict. 
 
 I hope, gentlemen, that when the passions, always brought 
 out by a revolution, cool down, a deeper and more unbiased 
 study shall form in the public conscience a fair judgment which 
 will permit me to die having in the depth of my soul a recipro- 
 ation of that esteem which all my life I have held and shall con- 
 tinue to bold for my fellow countrymen. 
 
 Respectfully, 
 
 Porfirio Diaz. 
 
 Mir. Corral's resignation reads as follows: 
 
 To the Secretaries of the House of Representatives of the 
 Congress of the Union. 
 G-entlemen : 
 On the two occasions when the National Convention offer- 
 
THE FALL OF THE COLOiSSUS 37 
 
 ed me the candidacy for the Vice Presidency of the Eiepublic 
 on the ticket headed by General Diaz, I informed them I was dis- 
 posed to occupy any position in which my country deemed my 
 services most useful, and that if the public vote placed me in 
 a position so far above my deserts, my aim would be to support 
 at all times the policies of General Dia,z so as to co-operate with 
 him in so far as it lay in my power for the aggrandizement of the 
 nation, which had to such an extraordinary degree been developed 
 under his administration. 
 
 Let those who take an interest in public affirs and have 
 watched their development during the past years judge whether 
 I have achieved my purpose. What I can declare is that I 
 shall at all times endeavor even at the sacrifice of personal con- 
 viction to raise not the slightest obstacle to the policy of the 
 President or to his work of development, not only because such 
 was the basis of my program and demanded of me by my duty 
 and my loyalty, but also because I seek to give prestige to the 
 office of Vice President, so useful in the United States, and 
 so entirely underrated in Latin countries. 
 
 The events which have shaken the country in the past few 
 months have forced the President, out of pure patriotism, to 
 withdraw from the high office given him by the practically unani- 
 mous vote of the MIexican people at the last elections, and at the 
 same time, it seems necessary for the national welfare, that the 
 Vice President act likewise so that with new men and new ener- 
 gies, a stimulus may be added to the national prosperity. There- 
 fore, pursuant to my program of seconding the policy of Gener- 
 al Diaz, I add my resignation to his, and do hereby surrender my 
 office as Vice President, respectfully requesting the House to 
 accept my resignation when it accepts that of the President. 
 
 I beg of you, Messrs. Secretaries, to present this request, 
 which I submit with the assurances of my most distinguished 
 consideration. 
 
 Liberty and Constitution. 
 
 Paris, IVljay 1911. Ramon Corral. 
 
 On the 22nd, Mr. Limantour had accepted the resignation 
 of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Roberto Nunez, 
 and had appointed as his successor Mr. Jaime Gurza. It was 
 to Mr; Gurza that he left the Secretaryship when a few days 
 later he unexpectedly fled from the city, accompanied to the 
 
38 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 station by his successor, and accompanied to the frontier by Mr. 
 Emilio Madero, homage which the triumphant revolution paid 
 to the chief of the fallen government. 
 
 On the night of May 25th, democracy held a veritable orgy, 
 the mobs marching and shouting all over the city. What were 
 they celebrating? What was the cause of that exultation, of 
 that rapture of joy? They themselves did not know! 
 
 General Diaz from his house in Cadena Street could hear 
 the shouting of the frantic mobs as they passed the corner near 
 his residence. Through the street itself they could not go for it 
 was closely guarded by a heavy cordon of troops and was closed 
 at both ends by a compact column of dragoons, behind which, 
 as a reenforcement, stood a double line of infantry. The Presi- 
 dent's house was guarded by one hundred men from the Engi- 
 neers' Battalion and by the whole squadron which composed the 
 President's body guard. On the roofs there were rapid fire guns, 
 and policemen held the points of exit. Faithful friends stood 
 armed at the entrance on the main stairs, and even on the second 
 floor of the ex-president's house. Yain precautions! The peo- 
 ple did not hate Porfirio Diaz, they were merely celebrating their 
 liberty to run through the streets shouting down anybody they 
 pleased. The mob scenes were not the work of the anti-reelec- 
 tionists, nor of the victorious Maderista party; they were pre- 
 pared by old government partisans, men who had fattened their 
 purses from the budget of the Diaz government and who owed 
 Diaz many a good turn. ]\1>. Lalanne incited the mobs, and 
 Mr, Joaquin Baranda McGregor, son of erstwhile cabinet mem- 
 ber of the fallen government, paid the expenses of the demon- 
 stration. The leaders of that demonstration were well known; 
 recalcitrant Reyistas, servants of Mr. Dehesa, and ex-employees 
 of Mr. Felix Diaz. All were united on that occasion to give 
 vent to their feelings by shouting. If at even the most riotous 
 moment of the celebration some practical joker had passed the 
 word that General Diaz was mounted and ready to personally 
 disperse the crowds, there would not have been a single one of 
 those thousands of rioters left in the streets. I myself saw that 
 human wave as it was passing by the House of Representatives; 
 with several gentlemen I was leaving the House on our way home 
 from a meeting which had been called by Mr. Calero. Of our 
 party, Mr. Calero himself, Mr. Sierra M'endez, and M!r. Ricardo 
 Mlolina e:ot into the latter 's automobile which was waiting in 
 
THE FALL OF THDE COLOSSUS 39 
 
 front of the Bouse and were able quickly to leave by way of 
 Canoa Street. I tried to get on a street car which was passing 
 at full speed so as to cross before the mob, but I was prevented 
 from so doing by Don Benito Juarez who jumped on while the 
 car was moving. Others of my companions had gone through 
 the Treasury of the Congress out to Factor Street, whereupon 
 the servants had locked the doors of the House so that I was com- 
 pelled to take refuge in another street car which was held up 
 by the passing mobs. From there, I was able to see everything 
 and to hear the insults that were hurled at all of us. Whether 
 they did not see me, or seeing me did not recognize me, I do 
 not know, but the fact is they did not interfere with me at all. 
 Among that motley mass of humanity that passed so short a 
 distance from me, I saw two women standing in a hired carriage 
 and carrying a tri-color banner and a picture of Madero. One 
 of these women was a teacher in a national school. I saw in 
 other carriages, men who would often address the multitudes or 
 would shout insults in incoherent phrases against the govern- 
 ment, against the congressmen, and, above all, against the Cien- 
 tificos. 
 
 Once in a while, a "Viva Madero!" was shouted, but the 
 ci'> that was most frequently heard, was "Viva el General 
 Reyes!" I knew quite a number of the leaders of these groups. 
 Some of them had been bribed to take part in the celebration 
 of the reelectionists ; others were obstinate Reyistas, and still 
 others in fact the greater part of them, were men who had serv- 
 ed the government up to that very day and would serve the new 
 one. 
 
 Fortunately, a heavy and timely shower put a stop to the 
 orgy, which might otherwise have degenerated into a riot with 
 very serious consequences, for some of the more violent had 
 already begun to propose to set fire to the homes of the re-elec- 
 tionists. The police had remained stock still with arms crossed, 
 probably watching the sight with great complacency. 
 
 The following day at daybreak, without telling anybody, not 
 even his most intimate friends like Don Guillermo de Landa y 
 Escandon, ex-governor of the Federal District, General Diaz 
 left for Vera Cruz escorted by a force composed of Engineers 
 of the 7th Infantry, and a detachment of the President's body- 
 guard, comimanded by General Victoriano Huerta. He was also 
 accompanied by his aides-de-camp, by Mr. Gonzalo Garita. In- 
 
40 FEIOM DiBSPQTISM TO' ANARCHY 
 
 spector General of Police, and two sons of the former President, 
 Manuel Grionzalez. In these supreme moments, these two men 
 in payment of the treachery and disloyalty shown to their father, 
 offered a sublime act of loyalty and self sacrifice. On the arrival 
 of the party at Tepeyahualco, on the border of the States of 
 Puebla and Vera Cruz, a large band of revolutionists, who had 
 been concentrating there with the full knowledge of the Gover- 
 nor of Vera Cruz, had the audacity to attack the train ; somehow 
 or other they knew the time of its departure and the route which 
 it was to take, facts which seemed to be unknown to everybody. 
 The chief of the escort immediately detached three columns 
 under command of the Messrs. Gonzalez and of the Lieutenant 
 Colonel of the Engineers, whereupon the revolutionists instantly 
 fled. General Diaz also got off the traini and once again he 
 was the calm and brave chief of former times. His voice was 
 clear and sonorous, his orders curt and precise. The rebels 
 were commanded by a protege of the ex-president, the son of a 
 man whom Diaz had always served as a friend. 
 
 After the flight of the assailants, the party resumed its 
 journey arriving at Vera Cruz without further mishap. 
 
 Due to the events of 1879*, General Diaz had no sympa- 
 thizers in the city of Vera Cruz, and knowing it, he had al- 
 ways stayed in the city as little as possible. Now in the hour 
 of his misfortune, that magnanimous people treated him with 
 every respect and consideration; and when on board the German 
 steamer Tpiranga he was ready to sail for Europe, the send off 
 they gave him was more than cordial, it was enthusiastic. The 
 crowds acclaimed him. All rancor had vanished, and this was 
 because the athletic figure of General Diaz, as it appeared on 
 deck waving good bye to his country, did not remind the people 
 of the overbearing ruler but rather of the magnificent soldier 
 of the years from '57 to '67. Has countenance did not remind 
 them of the Lord of the Castle of Chapultepec, but rather of the 
 brave soldier of Jalatlaco, Miahuatlan, and Carbonera; and the 
 tears that were running down his cheeks blotted out in the eyes 
 of the people all his past mistakes. People in general are sim- 
 ple and forgiving, but history is cruel and impersonal in such 
 
 *The bloody repression inflicted by Governor Teran on the 
 Lerdo party on the 25th of June, 1879, as related in the com- 
 plete Spanish edition. 
 
THE FALL OF THIE COLOSSUS 41 
 
 moments as these, for it is obliged to ignore tears, to remain un- 
 moved by misfortune, and to look at events and men in their 
 true aspect. 
 
 As General Diaz had twice failed to carry out his promises 
 to Mr. Limantour ; as he had deceived him many times, and had 
 humiliated him even more, Mr. Limantour must have had a 
 feeling of relief as from a distance he watched the Ypiranga carry 
 General Porfirio Diaz away, anid with him all the ambitions of 
 the old executive, and could have said to himself : 
 
 "I am avenged." 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE WHITE PRiESIDENT AND THE BLACK 
 PRESIDENT. 
 
 On the 25th of May Greneral Diaz finally sent in his resig- 
 nation with that of Vice President Corral to the Hlouse of Re- 
 presentatives and it was accepted that very afternoon, where- 
 upon the Secretary of State, Francisco L. de la Barra, who was 
 designed in the treaties of Ciudad Juarez as the man to take 
 charge of the Grovernment until general elections could be held, 
 became President ad interim of the Republic. On the following 
 day, he took the oath of office and at once removed his resi- 
 dence to the Castle of Chapultepec, He then proceeded to name 
 his cabinet, or rather, decreed the appointment of the mem im- 
 posed upon him by the revolution. In this instance, he was guid- 
 ed by history, for in 1876, Jose Maria Yglesias lost the presi- 
 dency by refusing to subordinate his constitutional powers to 
 the terms of a treaty made with the revolutionists. Mindful of 
 this fact, Mk". de la Barra, rather than risk having the same 
 thing happen to him, accepted all the ministers that were im- 
 posed upon him. 
 
 The Cabinet, as finally made up, was as follows: Secre- 
 tary of State, vacant, the President to discharge the duties of 
 this office assisted by the Assistant Secretary Bartolome Carva- 
 jal y Rosas; Secretary of the Interior, Emilio Vazquez Gomez; 
 Attorney General, Rafael L. Hernandez; Secretary of Educa- 
 tion, Francisco Vazquez Gomez; Secretary of Development, 
 Manuel Calero; Secretary of Public Works, Manuel Bonilla; 
 Secretary of the Treasury, Ernesto Madero, suggested by Mr. 
 Jose Ives Limantour; and Secretary of War, General Eugenio 
 Rascon. This last appointment was the only one left entirely 
 to the President's judgment, and it was left to him either be- 
 cause the revolutionary party had no one to suggest for the office 
 
 (42) 
 
THE WHITE AND BLACK PRESIDENT 43 
 
 or because it did not wish to hold up before the soldiers any of 
 its leaders as implicated in the successful revolution. 
 
 It may be noted that Mr. Limantour's work was now com- 
 plete. He had seen to it that two of his friends, Ernesto Madero, 
 and the Assistant Secretary, Jaime Gturza, were left at the 
 head of the Treasury Department, thus preventing any attack 
 that might hurt his good name. In the great disaster which was 
 to bring so many ills to his fatherland, this thought alone filled 
 his mind. He had not lost the hope of attaining the presidency, 
 but though he did not realize it, he was dead politically. 
 
 Owing to the fact that some of the new ministers were in 
 exile, the govemmient was not finally installed until a few days 
 had passed. Mr. Calero, the most intelligent of the new offi- 
 cials not excepting the President, was expected to be the life 
 and soul of the government, and was in fact from the very start 
 its spokesman in Congress. But neither the Secretary of the 
 Interior, nor the Secretary of Education had been bom to obey 
 anybody, nor were they disposed to see another enjoy the bene- 
 fits accruing from the success of the revolution. Consequently, 
 from the beginning, they dispatched thie affairs of their respec- 
 tive departments without taking the trouble of consulting the 
 President nor much less of asking his consent. Emilio Vazquez 
 Gomez at the head of the Department of the Interior, began to 
 squander money in a most outrageous manner. In vain was the 
 atteoition of thie Cabinet called to this state of affairs. The only 
 change that was eventually agreed upon was to the effect that 
 all drafts on the Treasury be countersigned by the Secretary of 
 War, a thoroughly honorable man who would not lend himself 
 to any questionable transaction. But on the day following the 
 agreement, Vazquez Gomez sent to his coUeague in the War De- 
 partment a stack of printed drafts to be signed in blank and 
 returned. General Bascon consulted the President, but the latter, 
 afraid of crossing the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, the intellectual lea- 
 ders of the revolt, ordered that all the requisitions from the Secre- 
 tary of the Interior be honored. Thus did the new plan bring 
 results directly contrary to its purpose, for not only did old 
 abuses continue, but the responsibility for them was removed 
 from the perpetrator. Then there foUowed an unheard of loot- 
 ing. Not only did the Department receive pay rolls of soldiers 
 who had never existed, but it even received notes given in saloons 
 and dives of the capital by the revolutionary leaders whom 
 
44 FROM DESPOTISM TO A2s'ARCHT 
 
 the Cabinet officer was anxious to please. ]\Ioney was given to 
 everybody, even to those who had not even dreamed of joining 
 the rebellion. In less than one month, over one million dollars 
 pa^ed out of the public coffers by order of Emilio Vazquez 
 Gomez. But even this was not the worst. Arms and ammuni- 
 tion were distributed all over the country to people entirely un- 
 worthy of this confidence, under pretext of preparing against 
 a counter revolution which was impossible at the time. In this 
 way, the foundation was effectually laid for the revolution 
 which broke out at the opening of ]Mr. Madero's constitutional 
 term. 
 
 On all sides the friends of ]\Iadero sought to throw obstacles 
 in the way of the government. In Tlaxcala, six hundred !Mader- 
 ists, who formed a body of Rurales paid by the state, revolted 
 against Governor Sanchez and the legislature, with a view to 
 imposing their wishes on their superiors, and it finally became 
 necessary to bring some of the regular troops to quell them. 
 In Toluca, the chief of the Rurales, Joaquin ^Miranda, acting in 
 accord with ]\Iunguia Santoyo, whom ]\Iadero had sent as his 
 political leader in the State, issued an order prohibiting in the 
 name of free suffrage the nomination for governor of anybody 
 connected with the fallen regime. In Xalapa, blood was shed 
 through the imprudence of the ]\laderista leader. In Torreon, 
 the so-called General, Adame jMacias, after the massacre of the 
 Chinese by his troops, jjlotted with the 6th Battalion at the time 
 of the evacuation of the city by General Lojero, finally securing 
 its desertion in a body; and in Chiapas, a conflict in which even 
 the bishop was mixed up, occasioned an encounter in which sev- 
 eral atrocities were com mi tted. 
 
 In Puebla the insolence of the rebels knew no bounds. After 
 the barbarous excesses at Atencingo and Covadonga, Abraham 
 ]\Iartinez calling himself the chief of staff of Zapata, proceeded 
 with the aid of the rurales, and, as he said, by order of the 
 Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Vazquez Gromez, to imprison in 
 the bull ring in the City of Puebla itself, a large number of 
 prominent persons with a view to executing them. Among these 
 was the son of General I\Iucio Martinez, at that time Represen- 
 tative in Congress. The Governor of the State, Mr. Canete, per- 
 sonally went to the rescue of the unfortunate prisoners, but soon 
 found that INIartinez refused point blank to obey him, on the 
 ground that he had direct orders from the Secretary- of the In- 
 
THE WHITE AND BLACK PRESIDENT 45 
 
 terior. The result was tthat the Grovemor was forced to call 
 federal troops under the leadership of Colonel Aureliano 
 Blanquete, who after a bloody conflict, in which over three hun- 
 dred were killed, finally reduced them to submission. 
 
 On the 7th of June, the leader of the revolution', Mir, Fran- 
 cisco I. Miadero, made his triumphal entry into the capital where 
 he was greeted with an indescribable enthusiasm and a formid- 
 able earthquake. The reception accorded to Madero that day 
 can be compared only with the ovation given to Juarez on his 
 entry to the city after his victory over the French intervention 
 and the Empire. All streets through which he passed were in 
 festal array, and not for a single moment did the throngs cease 
 to acclaim him. An attempt was made to unhitch the horses from 
 his coach, so that the people themselves might draw it along. 
 
 Madero standing up in his carriage and smiling to the right 
 and to the left, was really an object of pity. When he arrived 
 at the palace where he was to review the parade, he was ex- 
 hausted; his fatigue was so evident that he looked more like 
 a sick man than a triumphant chief. Mr. de la Barra accompan- 
 ied him to the balcony, flatteritig him and waiting on him, with- 
 out reeeivinig any attention from Madero nor muchi less from 
 his companions, for at that moment, to the revolutionists, the 
 real head of the nation was Madero, and they wished to impress 
 that fact upon the provisional president. 
 
 Madero opened offices in the Paseo de la Eieforma, and, 
 utterly ignoring the President of the Republic, began to handle 
 the more important matters, while his brother, Gustavo, the most 
 energetic member of the family, opened offices in the Avenida 
 Juarez and began to arrange for the elections which were to 
 give legal sanction to the power already held by the revolution- 
 ists, and which were, moreover, destined to be the apple of discord 
 between the various factions, who' fearing the weakness of their 
 common leader, wished at all costs to get hold of the vice presi- 
 dency. 
 
 These offices could not exist simultaneously. It was impos- 
 sible that at one and the same time the Secretary of the Interior, 
 and Mr. Francisco Madero, and his brother Gustavo, should 
 govern the country while the President of the Republic was al- 
 lowed only (to. entertain and draw the applause of the people 
 as he drove through the streets bowing to everybody. 
 
 The Secretary of Education, on his side, paid no attention 
 
46 FEX)M DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 to the provisional president, but occupied himself chiefly with 
 his campaign for election to the vice presidency, which the eant- 
 didacy of de la Barra threatened to deprive him of, for the 
 latter had grouped around him last-minute revolutionists, and 
 especially the catholics organized ostensibly as a political party. 
 In the contest with Vazquez Gomez on one side, incapable 
 of obeying anybody, and on the other with Goistavo Madero, 
 constitutionalist party leader, demanding that he be heard and 
 even obeyed, an absolute break between these men was bound to 
 come, and finally did come. An inevitable and obvious result 
 of the conflict seemed to be the removal of the Messrs. Vazquez 
 Gomez from the Cabinet, but the Secretary of Education, a cun- 
 ning man and more highly versed in political intrigue than his 
 brother, realized that his resignation would raze to the ground 
 all the plans he had built up to attain power; in consequence, 
 he so modified his course of action that both Francisco Madero 
 and the provisional President exerted their influence in his be- 
 half fearing that his removal from the government would alien- 
 ate all those revolutionists who had been flattered and protected 
 by Messrs. Vazquez Gomez. Thus the only one to leave the Cabi- 
 net was Emilio Vazquez Gomez, who up to that time had been 
 the black president, in contradistinction to de la Barra, known 
 as the white President. 
 
CHAPTER yi. 
 
 ZAPATA. 
 
 Wheii the government first assumed control, all the revolu- 
 tionists bowed down to the new order of things, but as Secretary- 
 Vazquez Gromez squandered money, arms and ammunition promis- 
 cously, many of the rebels soon found that it was by far more 
 advantageous to continue in rebellion, surrendering occasionally. 
 By this plan they could live like lords without any great risk 
 and when their prodigal life began to pall on them, they could 
 seek diversion and more riches. In Mbrelos, the revolution had 
 been led by Emiliano Zapata, a former federal soldier. Accord- 
 ing to his own story, he had served in the army only because of 
 an arbitrary act by the Prefect of his counity who without right 
 or reason had drafted him into the ranks. When his term 
 of service was completed, he had returned to his home where he 
 had earned his living as a plowman, or as a herder, or as the 
 head of some small business, or engaging more or less honestly 
 in other affairs. "When the revolution broke out, thinking that 
 the time was propitious for avenging ancient wrongs, he plunged 
 into the struggle having as his primary motive the punishment 
 of the Prefect who had forced him into the army. An absolutely 
 fearless man, with a good knowledge of his section of the coun- 
 try, well known to the people, and with some knowledge of mili- 
 tary discipline gained during his service in the army, Zapata 
 sooni had many followers. By the time the revolution triumphed, 
 his company had increased to a force of eight hundred men 
 which popular imagination further increased to several thous- 
 ands. Among those who came to his side during the revolt 
 was a certain high school teacher, Otilio Montano by name. In 
 the capacity of secretary, he followed the leader around from the 
 very beginning and finally came to be the moving spirit of that 
 revolt. Zapata himself had neither ideals nor program, his only 
 
 (47) 
 
48 FROM DEiSPOTISMi TO ANARCHY 
 
 idea was to try his luck at fighting until the sowing season, al- 
 ways with the hope of getting in the meantime the revenge so 
 dear to him. This man Montano, however, did have both ideals 
 and a program, besides cherishing a desire for vengeance, but 
 a vengeance much broader than Zapata's since it was not against 
 an individual but against the whole of society. For eight years 
 he had studied zealously in the Normal School where he obtain- 
 ed a degree, but he soon found that as a professor the only re- 
 ward for his labors was a position as teacher ini his native vil- 
 lage with a salary insufficient to meet the necessities of life, and 
 with a future which promised, if he were successful after years 
 of toil and privation, only the possibility of obtainiag a slightly 
 better position where his renumeration would be less than that 
 received by men of much inferior education!. Montano felt that 
 something was radically wrong and aimed to set it right. He 
 could, however, not unfurl as a flag for a revolution the in- 
 justice of which he personally felt himself the victim, so he 
 broadened his grievance so that it should attract supporters to 
 his side. What others were there, victims like himself for social 
 injustice? Obviously the "peones" of the ranches whose daily 
 wage was hardly enough to enable them to eke out a bare exis- 
 tence. On these he fixed his attention, and chose to use them as 
 the instrument of his vengeance on society— that society which 
 had made him study, throw away his youth in class rooms, only 
 to find at the end of his career that he was a nobody with barely 
 enough to live on, like the day laborer on the ranch. Therefore, 
 taking as his own the cause of the day laborer, he began at 
 one and the same time to preach a brutal socialism and to carry 
 on with the forces of his chief a war of extermination. 
 
 The Indian of today has only two interests for which he 
 will go to extremes ; his land and his wife. As part of a primi- 
 tive race, he should have one other, his religion, but the uncivil- 
 ized Indian still gropes between the memory of his aboriginal 
 beliefs and the Catholic religion forcibly imposed on him by 
 the conquerors. This causes the Indian 's fanaticism to be localized 
 se that although he would never think of fighting for his religion 
 in the abstract, he is quite capable of suffering the worst torture 
 and making all manner of sacrifice for the saint of his particu- 
 lar parish. Fundamentally, it is his idol— the white conquerors 
 have changed its name and its appearance, but for him the St. 
 Anthony or the St. Joseph, which is venerated in his village 
 
ZAPATA 49 
 
 cihurch is the teotl* which his forefathers worshiped. It is not, 
 therefore, a rare occurrence for priests, especially in remote 
 towns, to find hidden between the fold of the Virgin's mantle, 
 or behind the carvings of the tabernacle, or beneath the pedestal 
 of the monstrance, a little clay figure, which is really what the 
 fanatical element adores when the people flock to church to 
 recite the novena of the Immaculate Conception, or the vespers 
 of St. Joseph. 
 
 In this connection it may be recalled that the original cause 
 of the persecution and subsequent death in 18i71 of Gteneral 
 Felix Diaz, father of the present general of thait name, at the 
 hands of the Indians of the village of Juchitan, was that among 
 the outrages and cruelties which as Grovernor of Oaxaca he had 
 perpetrated he had scourged and then burned in effigy the 
 patron saint of that village. When General Felix Diaz rose 
 against the government of President Juarez, the Secretary of 
 War, Ignacio Mejia, aware of thds grievance and familiar with 
 the traits of the Juchitan Indians, authorized the formation of 
 a guerilla band of natives of that region to go out in search of 
 the fugitive ex-governor. The band led by Apolonio Jimenez, 
 and Mr. Cartas, caught up with Diaz near the city of Pbchutla, 
 and after torturing him horribly, put him to death and tore his 
 body to pieces. Without a doubt, it was a horrible crime, but yet 
 comparable with the many acts committed by Felix Diaz himself 
 during his campaigns and his tenure of office in Oaxaca. Gen- 
 eral Forey, confusing General Porfirio Diaz with his brother 
 Felix, delivered a speech before the French Senate, in which he 
 related heartbreaking atrocities. His mistake lay not in the 
 deeds narrated, for these were on the whole true, but in at- 
 tributinig them to Porfirio Diaz, who was always a humane leader 
 and never committed such horrible acts as those related by the 
 Commander in Chief of the army sent to Mexico by Napoleon. 
 
 To tell an Indian in any part of the country that he has 
 some rights to the property of the neighboring landowner, or 
 that he must fight the neighboring village to take its laoid for 
 himself, or his village, is to sow a seed that instantly bears fruit. 
 There is no village chief or village lawyer who does not know this, 
 and who does not establish his authority or prestige on a lawsuit 
 over the question of lands with the nearby ranch or town. 
 
 *Aztec for God. 
 
60 YROU DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 It is not that the Indian needs that land for his sustenance, 
 for our Indian can live on almost anything, few races being 
 by nature so frugal, and so impervious to privations, nor does 
 his love of land spring from any exact notions of private owner- 
 ship; but he has in the very depth of his soul a profound con- 
 viction that that property has been snatched from him though 
 he knows neither when nor how. The only concrete idea he has 
 on the subject is a determination) to recover it. Hfe has in the 
 fastnesses of the mountain disposable property, which he has 
 obtained from nobody, but which he owns by right of first occu- 
 pancy. Thither he betakes himself when his inborn melancholy 
 impels him to flee from civilized man, and on a piece of ground 
 in the wildest part of the mountain he establishes his temporary 
 abode which he frequently changes according to the necessities 
 of Hf e. 
 
 This idiosyncracy is perfectly well known to all exploiters 
 of the aboriginal race, and Professor MIontano made -ase of it 
 to incite the people of Morelos to rebellion. This was the first 
 seed he sowed and he found fruitful soil, as I shall explain here- 
 after; other factors contributed powerfully to renew a struggle 
 which originated long before the existence of government and 
 which was exactly what caused its establishment. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE REVOLT IN MOEjELOS. 
 
 Exceptional conditions exist in the state of Mbrelos, whicli 
 must be examined in order to understand why the revolutions 
 have been able to thrive there through so long a period. The 
 one million seven hundred and twenty nine thousand acres com- 
 prising the state's arable lands, are under control of exactly 
 thirty-two people, who alone reap the benefit of their cultivation. 
 T3ie result of these holdings has been the building up of im- 
 mensely wealthy plantations equipped with the most costly ma- 
 chinery and with great hydraulic works, facilitating the pro- 
 duction of sugar and spirits which bring to the proprietors fabu- 
 lous profits. The climate of that region (I speak of the agri- 
 cultural region) is very rigorous and can be withstood by few 
 people besides the natives. Foreigners especially suffer a great 
 deal from it, except Spaniards, who get used to it very quickly 
 and resist it with ease. For this reason the majority of superin- 
 tendents and managers of the haciendas are of that nationality. 
 
 The country in Morelos is extremely broken, encouraging the 
 formation of small clans which live comfortably in the moun- 
 tains surrounding the state. These mountains' are of the most 
 rugged type, having as their limit along the Puebla boundary the 
 summit of Popocatepetl; along the side contiguous to the State 
 of Mexico, the peak of Zempoala ; along the Guerrero border the 
 Ocotlan range ; and along the boundary of the Federal District, 
 the Ajusco range, whose spur on joining the Zempoala is called 
 the Tepoxtlan range. 
 
 The Popocatepetl chain divides the districts of Cuautla and 
 Jomacatepec, extending until it meets at right angles the spurs 
 of the Ocotlan range. Those spurs in their turn divide the districts 
 of Jonacatepec and Jojutla. Between Jojutla and Tautepec there 
 extends another range, that of Tlaltizapan, along the foot hills 
 
 (51) 
 
52 FBOM DESPOTISM] TO AiNARCHiY 
 
 ot* whicli runs the Jojutla River, chief tributary of the Amacusac, 
 which divides Morelos from Guerrero. 
 
 The great canyons formed by these ranges are natiural forti- 
 fications which a small band of men can defend successfully; 
 therefore persuit of the rebels is difficult. 
 
 The climate, as I have said above, also materially helps the 
 defense, since those who are not native take sick very easily. 
 Besides, the abundance of vegetation due to the fertility of the 
 region is so great that it can easily furnish sustenance to bands 
 of men hidden even in the most remote parts of the mountains. 
 
 With cheap food, with rich plantations from which money 
 can be obtained by threats of destroying the costly maehiuery, 
 and with the facility to flee at a moment 's notice to places where 
 pursuit is practically impossible, the life of rebel or bandit is 
 extremely pleasant. 
 
 At the close of the war against French intervention and 
 the Empire, the State of Morelos, as at present, was the scene 
 of bloody warfare. So also had it been before 1862, for as a 
 matter of fact, it was the murder of some Spaniards at the San 
 Vicente and Chiconcuac plantations that had served as pretext 
 for the intervention. But at that time there was not even a re- 
 volutionary standard, it was merely a band of marauders who 
 under the name of "The Silver Plated Band" were the terror 
 of that region. 
 
 The government of Juarez in order to handle the situation 
 efficiently, separated what is now the State of Morelos from the 
 State of Mexico and under a purely military regime managed 
 to give security to the people of that neighborhood. But the 
 termination of the war against the "Silver Plated Band" and 
 the complete extermination of these highwaymen was not fi- 
 nally accomplished until five years later, when during the ad- 
 ministration of President Lerdo, General Francisco Leyva, as 
 governor of Morelos succeeded in suppressing brigandage through 
 extraordinary power conferred on him by the government and 
 through his own personal ability. 
 
 The germ was not dead, however, but merely latent, and 
 made its reappearance on several occasions during the adminis- 
 tration of Diaz, only to be put down with pitiless rigor. G^eneral 
 Preciado and Colonel Alarcon were governors who were obeyed 
 because of the terror they inspired ; thus, they were able, thanks 
 to their energy, to preserve peace in the State. 
 
THE REiYOLT IN MORELO'S 53 
 
 At the death, of Colonel Alareon, in the last days of the 
 Diaz administration, the desire to be elected governor seized 
 Don Pablo Escandon, a very worthy and very rich man, proprie- 
 tor of a magnificent plantation in the state and chief aide de 
 camjp of the President of the Republic. 
 
 Conditions throughout the country had changed radically. 
 The preachings of Madero had had their effect and the opposi- 
 tion to General Diaz had gained many converts. Mr. Leyva, son 
 of the military governor whom I have mentioned as successful 
 in reducing to submission the outlaws of the state, also presented 
 his candidacy for governor against Escandon, the man desig- 
 nated for the office by General Diaz. The latter, instead of im- 
 posing his will without allowing any discussion of the question, 
 as had been his custom, authorized appeals to the people to 
 counterbalance those made by Leyva. Accordingly, Jose Maria 
 Lozano, afterwards Cabinet Minister in BDuerta's administra- 
 tion; Diodoro Batalla, and Heriberto Barron, leader of the 
 Reyista party, went to Morelos to promote the candidacy of 
 Escandon by making speeches which stirred up the latent spirit 
 of disorder. 
 
 Naturally, it become necessary to speak of democracy and 
 to promise all manner of freedom and privileges, but the sup- 
 porters of Leyva promised still more. Therefore, in this battle 
 of promises, there was preached a truly socialistic propaganda 
 with the full knowledge and tolerance of the authorities. These 
 authorities, though themselves products of a dictatorship, were 
 utterly at a loss how to proceed in the dilemma when a propagan- 
 da made under the auspices of the government was notoriously 
 opposed to all that the government had theretofore preached. 
 When the period of oratory reached its zenith, stone throwing 
 at public meetings marked the first mjove towards armed re- 
 bellion. The moment that stone throwing began, however, Gen- 
 eral Diaz, judging that law and order might be seriously upset, 
 sent Brigadier General Juvencio Rubles and the 23rd battalion 
 which was under his command, to the city of Cuernavaca, capi- 
 tal of the State of Mlorelos. 
 
 The presence of the Federal troops in the state capital was 
 the deciding argument in the electoral campaign, forcing the 
 partisans of Leyva temJ)orarily to see ' ' the light of reason. ' ' Es- 
 candon was declared the elected Governor of the State and took 
 office shortly afterwards. 
 
54 FRIOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 Thereupon, the supporters of Leyva began to make a pro- 
 paganda which was purely revolutionary and, as was to be ex- 
 pected, they allied themselves with the rebels in the north who 
 were fighting in favor of Francisco I. Madero, The new gov- 
 ernor of the state, a very worthy man, as I have said before, 
 but wholly without political acumen, wished to flatter the people 
 and for this reason abolished the poll tax. But at the same time, 
 since he himself was a large landowner in the state he yielded 
 to the entreaties of his partners and friends appointing to 
 office men who would protect the interests of the landed class. 
 Some of these appointees abused their powers and were prompt- 
 ly removed by Escandon, but at that, the demands of the revo- 
 lutionists only became greater, since they believed that the gov- 
 ernment was entering on a period of vacillation and weakness 
 which it behooved them to take advantage of. Some landowners 
 on the other hand, considering that they could count on the abso- 
 lute backing of the new governor, under titles more or less legiti- 
 mate, began to take away from neighboring villages certain lands 
 which they could develop better than the natives. "With the leaven 
 of revolt already at work, with landowners attempting unreason- 
 able things, with those who had given their aid in the elections 
 making demands, and finally, with the authorities, weak and at 
 a loss as to which way to turn, the result was a condition of dis- 
 order which the triumph of the revolution converted into a verit- 
 able chaos very much like an agrarian revolution. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 THE AGRAEIAN PROBLEM 
 
 Since the beginniiig of the present period of revolution 
 everybody has been speaking of the agrarian problem. Hardly 
 a day goes by that in some newspaper, large or small, there does 
 not appear a sententious article proposing remedies for the na- 
 tion's agrarian problem, all more or less adequate according to 
 the intelligence of the writers themselves. All this, in my opinion, 
 is building castles in the air. 
 
 Our agricultural population is divided into three great 
 classes ; the landowners, the tenants, and the peons. Concerning 
 the first of these, the great majority as a rule would willingly rent 
 half of what they own if they could be assured that the land thus 
 disposed of would be worked, and but one-third of its product given 
 to them in payment of rent. The tenants as a rule do not want 
 land either.* They ask for it, certainly, just as the Indian asks 
 lor it, but whenever they succeed in acquiring a strip, their imme- 
 diate concern is to mortgage and sell it. The tenant is satisfied 
 if he has enough wherewith to live. "When his crop is good, enab- 
 ling him to pay all or part of ihis debts, he does not generally care 
 about anything but the whereabouts of the next county fair where 
 he may spend in cock fights and roulette his year's earnings buy- 
 ing some jewels for his wife, that he could put in pawn on the 
 bad days. Following this, he will once again go to his landlord 
 begging for seed on credit and for loans against his next crop. 
 Concerning the peon, in the majority of cases, if he has enough 
 to enable him to live and drink his gin, he cares little or nothing 
 for anything else. The whole trouble lies in the fact that nearly 
 all lack the spirit of thrift, and that the peon especially lacks 
 necessities. Hie eats little, and requires as clothing merely un- 
 bleached cotton sheeting in winter as weU as in summer. So much 
 for the classes of people. 
 
 *I speak on the majority of cases, and especially, those not in 
 the border states. 
 
 (55) 
 
56 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 Our lands are not worked as they should be because there 
 is no cheap money available to develop their productivity. Until 
 a few years ago, there was hardly a mortgage on rural property 
 at ten per cent, the majority being at twelve per cent and even 
 higher rates of interest. What business of any kind is possible 
 with money ait that rate? Furthermore, for our lands to pro- 
 duce what they should, works of irrigation are indispensable, and 
 these are so costly, that they can be undertaken only when cheap 
 money is available and when a great, productive, easily develop- 
 ed plantation is used as the basis. 
 
 Taking into consideration the characteristics of the people 
 in conjunction with the aforementioned facts, it becomes evi- 
 dent that a universal distribution of property, such as is de- 
 manded by the majority of writers, would be the ruination of 
 the country. 
 
 And yet, it is an undeniable fact that the laborer is exploited. 
 No other term can be used to describe a system in which the la- 
 borer receives only 28 to 40 cenits a day* and then has that 
 pittance further reduced by means of ranch, stores, inventions 
 admirably suited to deprive the laborer of the fruits, in them- 
 selves inadequate, of his toil. 
 
 The ranch store is a highly important factor in the wide- 
 spread discontent of the rural population, for on account of, 
 or rather by means of this institution, the laborers are really 
 held to the plantation, and as a matter of fact, become its slaves. 
 Although the peon 's wages are so scant that he can hardly live on 
 them, still, small as they are, they are seldom given to him in cash. 
 For in spite of the fact that he requires little food and less cloth- 
 ing, as I have already said, they are given to him in the shape 
 of credit to order what he needs at the store, which is kept 
 opposite headquarters by the proprietor of the plantation. The 
 account which the landowner opens with the peon will never 
 be fully paid, as the former well knows, but that is all part of 
 the exploiter's plan. Under these arrangements, the peon can 
 do nothing but buy at the store what is necessary for himself 
 and family, and in so doing run up a debt which his scant wages 
 cannot begin to pay, and which on his death falls to his son as 
 an inheritance. This effectively prevents him from seeking em- 
 ployment at another plantation where wages might be higher, 
 
 *Mexican money whose value is now 0.10 to 0.13 U. S. 
 currency. 
 
THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM 57 
 
 for his original employer would bring Ihim back as a debtor. Tlie 
 law, it is true, does not protect this abuse, but powerless to pre- 
 vent it, tolerates it. On the other hand, it is also true that the 
 peon, whenever he pleases abandons the ranch, and laughs at his 
 creditor if it happens tha* the owner or manager is not in league 
 with the prefect. But if the owner or manager is a friend of 
 the prefect, what happens then?* The laborer is brought back 
 to the plantation by force, or is drafted into the army as a sus- 
 picious character; and so great as well as so justifiable is the 
 terror on the part of our country people of being forced into 
 the ranks, that the mere threat of conscription is enough to pre- 
 vent anybody from having sufficient courage to tempt the wrath 
 of the superintendent, who in most plantations is the only mas- 
 ter the peon knows. 
 
 Conditions are noticeably better in the plantations which 
 are personally directed or at least frequently visited by the 
 owner ; and where no ranch store exists, there is no grievance, no 
 discontent, no agrarian problem; everything goes along smooth- 
 ly and the peon is the first man to defend Ms employer. 
 
 In the towns, there does truly exist the desire to own land, 
 for most of our towns in some states owe their exisifcence to grants 
 of commons by the Spanish government for the use of the en- 
 tire community. Wlhen a boom in the business affairs of the 
 nation brought with it the thirst for land, which in certain busi- 
 ness men amounted to a craze, the encroachments on the village 
 commons began. Using as a pretext that the lands would be 
 much more productive in the hands of large plantation owners, 
 the expropriation of the lands of the towns began in earnestt, the 
 principal victims being those who were the weakest, most de- 
 fenseless, and least able to reach the ear of the men in power. 
 AVhat was done to some frightened all, and there grew up a hatred 
 on the part of the villagers toward their neighboring plantation 
 owner, not for what he did, but for what he might do in the 
 future. 
 
 But the agrarian problem does not consist in reclaiming 
 from the usurping planters the nine square miles of land which 
 
 *The Spanish farm managers are invariably in league with 
 the prefect. 
 
 tThis occurred especially in Morelos and Mexico. 
 
58 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHIY 
 
 is what was generally granted to villages as a eonunons. The 
 problem is a different one and can be stated as follows : 
 
 Is it better to have large plantations or to divide the 
 land up into a large number of small holdings? The latter ap- 
 pears to be preferred by the majority of those who consider the 
 subject, but it seems to me that it would be the country's ruin 
 under the present circumstances. 
 
 The topography of Mexico is such that there is a very un- 
 even distribution of rain throughout the republic, though the 
 rainfall is not as bad as is generally supposed, yet there 
 is need of regulation so as to utilize it, to the best ad- 
 vantage, for much rain is no good if it does not come when 
 it is needed, and in sufficient quantity for all the works of the 
 field. In other words, what is necessary is the regulation of 
 the distribution of waiter. This can be attained only by large 
 works of irrigation, which the small landowner cannot afford, 
 and which in view of the expenditures involved cannot bring 
 adequate returns unless undertaken with a large plantation as 
 a basis. 
 
 Small holdings are useful only when the desired end is in- 
 tensive cultivaltion such as is needed in highly developed coun- 
 tries where land is scarce and labor plentiful, where, conse- 
 quently the industry of man must make up for the niggardli- 
 ness of nature. But even at that, the products of intensive culti- 
 vation cannot compete in price with the products of extensive 
 cultivation carried on with appropriate machinery. 
 
 It requires cheap capital to install great works of irriga- 
 tion, for with money at ten per cent as a minimum, it is impos- 
 sible to obtain desired results, unless the plantation in question 
 happens to be of extraordinary richness, and such plantations 
 are the exception in all parts of the world. 
 
 During the last years of the Diaz administration, when there 
 was a surplus in the Treasury and a credit which made possible 
 loans at low interest, the government might have been able to 
 undertake works of this kind, but Mr. Limantour was never in- 
 terested in the agricultural problem. 
 
 Mf. Olegario Molina, when he was Secretary of Develop- 
 ment, did do something in this regard, ordering surveys in the 
 region of the Nazas River in order to ascertain the character as 
 well as the cost of the works necessary there. This survey was 
 completed but the outbreak of the Madero revolution prevented 
 
THE AGE'AMAN PEOBTJEM 59 
 
 the formulaJtioii of a plan of action based on the information thus 
 gathered. Mr. Rafael L. Hernandez, later Secretary of Develop- 
 ment, finding this iindertakiag already started by his prede- 
 cessor, Mr. Molina, attempted to make a study of the question, 
 but he had neither the required preparation nor the necessary 
 experience to tackle the problem adequately. Besides, the re- 
 volution or rather the state of anarchy of the country, made 
 difficult the consideration of any question not purely political. 
 The study made of conditions at the Nazas is needed for other pro- 
 ductive regions where the land can be apportioned for irrigation as 
 is done in the Nazas district ; but it should be borne in mind that 
 only a comparatively small part of the country is of this char- 
 acter. Miost of thie great ranches and plantations include moun- 
 tainous regions, where the only possible source of income is lum- 
 ber and cattle, and here, obviously, division into small holdings 
 would spell ruin. 
 
 Up to the present, the experiment stations which have been 
 established in the country have yielded no results because they 
 have been placed under the direction of men of theory who have 
 devoted their time to theoretical experiments, whereas what the 
 agriculture of our country needs is practical methods wihich will 
 enable the rude farmer to utilize the teachings of modern science 
 without having to take a formal course of study. For the same 
 reasons our School of Agriculture has been a failure up to the 
 present. Its students have been required to make extended 
 studies in mathematics or military problems and have not been 
 taught what every agriculturist should know — how to increase 
 their produdts and lower the cost of production. 
 
 The agrarian problem, therefore, in my opinion, can be 
 boiled down to the consideration of four measures. First, giving 
 back to the villages the commons taken from them. By the re- 
 moval of this traditional grievance, the dissatisfaction among the 
 rural population in certain quarters could be entirely removed. 
 Second, is the construction of great works of irrigation after a 
 detailed survey of the various parts of the country. Third to 
 enforce thie law ordering that all wages must be paid in cash. 
 Last, but not least, is to seek the means to obtain cheap capital 
 without which development is impossible. The division of the 
 land among many small landowners will follow as an inevitable 
 result of the accomplishment of these measures. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 THE BRAINS OF THE REVOLUTIOQST 
 
 The result of the withdrawal as Secretary of the Interior 
 of Vazquez Gomez on the 2nd of August, was a complete break 
 between the Vazquez Gomez brothers and the Constitutional 
 Progressive Party, or what amounts to the same thing, with 
 Gustavo Madero, the party boss. Don Gustavo Madero, realiz- 
 ing how difficult it would be for his brother to govern if Don 
 Francisco Vazquez Gomez were elected vice president of the Re- 
 public, worked zealously to have the convention nominate some- 
 one else. On their side, Vazquez Gomez and his friends also work- 
 ed strenuously for victory at the convention. This conven- 
 tion was held in the Theatre Hidalgo in the City of Mexico. 
 After a desperate contest, Gtistavo Madero 's candidate, Jose 
 Maria Pino Suarez, was nominated. This nomination, the death 
 blow to all Dr. Vazquez's ambitions, made him break complete- 
 ly with his former friends, because, claiming as he did to be 
 the brains of the revolution, he believed that he and he alone 
 deserved the power*. He probably thought that with the title 
 of vice president he would as a matter of fact govern the country. 
 When he lost the nomination, he correctly judged that his am- 
 bitions had received a fatal blow. From that moment he began 
 to form plots against Mr. Madero and his government even 
 going so far as to reach a temporary understanding with the 
 partisans of Don Felix Diaz and Don Bernardo Reyes, who were 
 also conspiring against Madero and who had been considered 
 bitter enemies by Vazquez Gomez while he was in power. 
 
 Because of gifts he had made while Secretary, Don Emilio 
 Vazquez Gomez had left a very good impression among the re- 
 volutionists and among people not fond of order. As a conse- 
 quence, his brother found little difficulty in gathering around 
 
 *At the convention Mr. Luis Cabrera, speaking in behalf of 
 Vazquez Gomez, called him the "brains of the revolution." 
 
 (60) , 
 
THE BRAINS OF TIHE EEVOLUTION 61 
 
 liim a group of supporters wlio saw in Mm not only tlie brains 
 of the revolution, but also, and principally, the man who could 
 satisfy their craving for money. The provisional government 
 did not cease squandering money with the withdrawal of Vazquez 
 Gomez from the Cabinet, for as it had started, it was very diffi- 
 cult to retrocede. To stop the waste, it would have been 
 necessary for the Secretary of the Interior who received 
 the drafts signed by the Secretary of War, to be not only 
 of strong character, but a man of great intelligence and politi- 
 cal foresight, with a knowledge of men keen enough toi discrim- 
 inate between those really influential and worthy of considera- 
 tion, and those adventurers who should be dismissed without 
 ceremony. Mr. Garcia Granados was a man of character, but 
 ill every other respect he was unqualified for the position and 
 soon proved his incompetence to such a degree that he was 
 obliged to resign from the Cabinet in the same year, 1911, on 
 October 27th. On that day the HDouse of Representatives sum- 
 moned the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior 
 to render an account of conditions in the State of Morelos. In 
 compliance, the President sent Mr, Granados and General Gon- 
 zalez Salas to give the desired information and they both met 
 with a very cold reception. Oti the following day, Mr. Calero, 
 Attorney General, went before the Hjouse to explain matters 
 more fully, but public opinion was against the Cabinet and the 
 ill feeling between the Constitutional Progressive Party and the 
 Cabinet was so great that Messrs. Garcia Granados, Dr. Vazquez 
 Gomez, and General Gonzalez Salas, were forced to resign. 
 Another change had taken place in the Cabinet soon after it 
 had begun operations. This was the exchange of offices on July 
 3rd, 1911, between the Secretary of Development and the Attor- 
 ney General, Mr. Calero assuming the duties of Attorney Gen- 
 eral and Mir. Hernandez those of Secretary of Development. 
 From the moment Mr. Bemandez had been assigned to the De- 
 partment of Justice, there was not much doubt that he would 
 not last long in that capacity because he did not possess the 
 necessary qualifications to fulfill its duties. As a lawyer he 
 had had scant experience in the courts. He knew neither the 
 personnel nor the requirements of the profession. Having but 
 a superficial professional knowledge, he could not even attempt 
 legislative reform, so his work was confined to the appointing of 
 employees and other functionaries. In making these appoint- 
 
62 FKiOM DBSPOiTISM] TO ANARCHY 
 
 ments, he always met with, great obstacles since the President ad 
 interim as well as Mr. Mladero and the Messrs. Yazquez Gomez 
 always had somebody in mind for these positions and naturally 
 it was impossible to please them all. In this respect, the Secre- 
 tary of the Interior had the advantage over his colleagues since 
 he was well acquainted with the personnel of the Department 
 as well as with its procedures. 
 
 On his side, Mr. Calero, the most intelligent of all the Cabi- 
 net members, was not satisfied with his portfolio in the Depart- 
 ment of De^'elopment as he could neither carry out the 
 physically impossible reforms promised by the revolution, 
 nor could he initiate the projects he had in mind because 
 the Provisional President was fearful of any innovation. As 
 both these men were dissatisfied with their respective positions 
 and both were unwilling to withdraw from the Cabinet, it was 
 easy for them to make arrangements for the exchange of offices. 
 
 At the same time, Mr. Calero, with high hopes for the future, 
 was able to devote himself to the task of impressing the future 
 President with the fact that he was the man best fitted to solve 
 the great problems which the new government would necessarily 
 have to face. Thus was he paving the way for his appointment as 
 Secretary of State, which might eventually be the stepping stone to 
 the presidency. For was not de la Barra president simply be- 
 cause he had been Secretary of State during the conflict result- 
 ing in the resignation of Don Porf irio Diaz ? Furthermore, Mr. 
 Calero had a superior intelligence as well as a deeper knowledge 
 of public affairs than the provisional President. Therefore, what 
 had been possible for Mr. de la Barra was not only possible, but 
 even easy for Mr. Calero. At leasti so he thought. 
 
 General Rascon, an honorable man and a conscientious com- 
 mander, as I have said, did not want the officers of the artillery 
 regiment who had conspired against the Diaz government 
 to go unpunished even though they were exempt from punish- 
 ment by the law of amnesty. On moral grounds, he ordered their 
 dismissal as unworthy members of the army. This measure, 
 though worthy of the highest praise did not meet with the ap- 
 proval of Francisco I. Madero or "uith that of the rest of the revo- 
 lutionists, who compelled the provisional President to revoke it. 
 But General Rascon rather than withdraw the order sent in his re- 
 signation on July 19th. General Gonzalez Salas, the subsecre- 
 tary, assumed charge of the department. 
 
THE BRAINS OF THE EEYOLUTION 63 
 
 Mr. Bobles Dominguez had been corrmiissioned to disband 
 a second time the revolutionary troops remaining in the State of 
 Morelos, as the first disbanding when Mr. Vazquez Gomez was sec- 
 retary had failed. The revolutionists once they had received their 
 pay, instead of returning to their homes reorganized, taking 
 back the arms which had been collected from them as a pre- 
 cautionary measure against a new revolt. Zapata, leader of the 
 rebellion in Morelos, protested to Mr. Robles Dominguez, where- 
 upon he was summoned to the Capital. There he was interviewed 
 by Secretary Vazquez Gomez and the provisional President. After 
 the interview, there were rumors that because he had been inso- 
 lent to the head of the nation, the Chief of Rurales, Ambrosio 
 Figueroa, had begged permission to execute him in the public 
 square. This permission had been refused. Zapata and his com- 
 panions had then returned to Morelos in the same automobile 
 which had brought them to the Capital. On his arrival at More- 
 los, he denounced the government and re-started the revolution, 
 forcing the government's representative, Mr. Dominguez, to re- 
 turn quickly to Mexico City. The government sent a division 
 under General Victoriano Huerta to suppress the rebels ; but be- 
 fore he was able to accomplish anything, General Huerta re- 
 ceived orders to suspend action because that Ml*. Francisco 
 Madero urged by Vazquez Gomez and cithers had gone as 
 mediator to Morelos. OIn his reiturn, orders were again given 
 to General Huerta to advance; but this time the "Big Stick 
 Clique," already fully organized, prepared a popular demon- 
 stration and even went to the Castle of Chapultepec to request 
 the recall of General Huerta, or rather, the immunity of 
 Zapata. 
 
 Up to that time Mr. de la Barra had received only the ap- 
 plause of the multitude, but now for the first time, he saw the 
 disagreeable aspects of a position of power; but impotent to 
 assert his authority, he had to resign himself to listen to the 
 discordant yells of the mob headed by Mr. Urueta. As a result 
 of the demjonstration. General Huerta was again ordered to 
 halt, and a few days later he was withdrawn from the command 
 of the division. 
 
 * » * 
 
 General Bernardo Reyes arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana 
 on June 4th, and three days later held a conference with Fran- 
 cisco I. Madero at which it was agreed between them that Reyes 
 
64 FKjOM DEiSPO'TISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 should not present his candidacy for president or vice president, 
 but in exchange, he would be appointed Secretary of War. 
 
 Mr. Madero made this agreement because he dreaded a 
 reaction against himself fearing that the Porfirista fac- 
 tion together with the partisans of General Reyes, which ac- 
 cording to the latter were very numerous, would rob him of the 
 triumph he had gained by the agreement signed at Ciudad Juarez. 
 The anti-Reyista party soon persuaded him that the Reyes fol- 
 lowers were not so numerous as claimed ; that once appointed Sec- 
 retary of War, Reyes would as a matter of fact, be the real master 
 of the situation, and above all, that he, Madero, would lose pres- 
 tige in the eyes of the people for having made such a pact. Ma- 
 dero 's only thought after that was to find a decent way out of 
 the agreement. 
 
 General Reyes on his side, after his interview with Madero, 
 realized that this idol of the nation was losing prestige, and 
 therefore with an impaitiience which was his leading character- 
 istic, he rebelled at biding his time in the position of Secretary 
 of War. Overestimating both his popularity and the influence 
 of his name, he decided to tempt forttane by presenting himself 
 as a candidate for the presidency, ignoring his pact with the 
 leader of the revolution. At the first inkling of General Reyes' 
 intention, Mr. Mladero freed him from all obligations, and the 
 agreement made early in June was by mutual consent declared 
 void, towards the 1st of August to the great relief and satisfac- 
 tion of all concerned.* 
 
 In view of the resignation of General Diaz and Ramon Cor- 
 ral, Congress had ordered the elections for president and vice 
 president. The election of the electors was held on the 1st of 
 October, while the vote of the electoral college took place on the 
 15th of the same month. The triumph of Mr. Madero was over- 
 whelming; he was elected president of the republic almost unani- 
 mously, t Such was not the case with the vice presidential elec- 
 tions which were bitterly contested though they resulted in the 
 absolute majority of votes for Jose Maria Pino Suarez, the candi- 
 date of the Progressive Constitutional Party. 
 
 *The meeting between Madero and Reyes was held at Tehua- 
 can in the State of Puebla. 
 
 tHe obtained 20,000 votes in the electoral college, each of 
 which vote represents about 100 votes in the elections for presi- 
 dential electors. 
 
THE BEGINS OF THE REYOLUTION 65 
 
 The candidacy of General Reyes had received little re- 
 sponse in the country; it had merely caused him to be derided 
 and abused by "The Big Stick Clique" in the streets of the city 
 at a demonstration of his own partisans on the 4th of September. 
 On appearing before the public, Oeneral Reyes was pelted with 
 stones, and he had to take refuge in a photographic gallery in 
 Juarez Avenue opposite the National Theatre.* General Reyes was 
 as a matter of fact the victim of his own methods. What was done 
 to him in Juarez Avenue that day was but a repetition of what 
 he himself had ordered done in San Luis Potosi in 1902 and in 
 Monterey on the 2nd of April 1903. t 
 
 Reyes hoping thaJt in the course of time Mladero's candi- 
 dacy would lose prestige, had tried to induce the House of Re- 
 presentatives to postpone the elections. t Unable to have this 
 granted by a majority of the representatives, he decided to be- 
 gin at once an armed revolt and as a preliminary he tendered his 
 resignation from the army leaving the Capital on the evening of 
 September 27, disguised as an invalid. On the following day he 
 sailed from Vera Cruz for the United States from where as it was 
 planned he should cross the border to lead the revolt. 0!n Nov- 
 ember 2, in accordance with its Constitutional rights, the 
 House of Representatives ratified the election of Madero and 
 Pino Suarez and ordered the inauguration for the 6th. 
 
 As his last official act, the provisional President asked per- 
 mission to submit personally to the House of Representatives a 
 report he had drawn up for the purpose of showing whalt his 
 administration had accomplished. Though the Constitution did 
 not provide for such a contingency, the House out of respect for 
 Mr. de la Barra, granted the permission and appointed the 4th 
 of November for its reading. In this report, Mtr. de la Barra 
 attempted to excuse his deficiences in a great oratorical speech, 
 but the fact of the matter is that the provisional President had 
 been president in name only. His administration, as I have 
 said in the Introduction, was disastrous to the nation because 
 
 *This same gallery was used as a refuge on February 9th, 
 1913, by Madero himself. 
 
 tSee next chapter. 
 
 $This information is first hand as he spoke to me about it 
 wishing to count on the support of myself and friends in the 
 House, which I refused. 
 
66 FROM DEiSPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 ho permitted the scandalous waste of public funds, because he 
 allowed the Cabinet members to usurp rights granted by the 
 Constitution to the President alone, and, above all, because he 
 suffered the dignity of th'e Chief M'agistrate of the Nation to 
 be trampled upon, thereby completely eradicating the prestige 
 gained for the office by G^eneral Diaz. Neither the Cabinet 
 nor the State governors in any way attended to Mr. de la Barra's 
 orders. Congress alone, faithful to its traditions, showed him 
 the deference, which as Chief Executive of the Nation was his 
 due. But when, following the precedent set by Diaz, he tried 
 to impose his candidate as Speaker of the Hlouse, the members 
 totally ignored his recommendation. They chose as their speak- 
 er a Reyista, not because the Reyistas were in the majority in 
 Congress, but just to show the President that they had decided 
 to assert their absolute independence. 
 
 When Porfirio Diaz tendered his resignation as President, 
 all the State governors either resigned or asked for an indefinite 
 leave of absence. These offices were then filled either by men 
 closely identified with the revolution or by men who up to that 
 time had taken no part in the political movement. The pro- 
 visional governors were : Alberto Fuentes, governor of Aguas- 
 calientes; Urbano Espinosa, of Campeche; Venustiano Carranza, 
 of Coahuila; Miguel G^arcia Topete, of Colima; Reynaldo Gor- 
 dillo Leon, of Chiapas; Abraham Gonzalez, of Chihuahua; Luis 
 Alfonso Trejo, of Durango; Juan B. Castelazo, of Guanajuato; 
 Francisco Pigueroa, of Guerrero; Jesus Silva, of HUdalgo; David 
 Gutierrez Allende, of Jalisco; Rafael M. Hidalgo, of Mexico; 
 Dr. Miguel Silva, of Michoacan; Juan M. Carreon, of Morelos; 
 Leobardo Chapa, of Nuevo Leon; Heliodoro Diaz Quintas, of 
 Oaxaca; Riafael P. Caiiete, of Puebla; Jose Antonio Septien, of 
 Queretaro; Dr. Rafael Cepeda, of San Luis Potosi; Celso Ga- 
 xiola Rojo, of Sinaloa; Carlos E. Riandall, of Sonora; Manuel 
 Mestre Ghigliazza, of Tabasco; Lie. Espiridion Lara, of Tamau- 
 lipas; Augustin Sanchez, of Tlaxcala; Leon Aillaud, of Vera 
 Cruz ; Jose M. Pino Suarez, of Yucatan ; and Guadalupe Gonzalez, 
 of Zacatecas. 
 
 The majority of these men were unfit to perform the du- 
 ties devolving upon them. However, with few exceptions, those 
 really revolutionary began immediately to work to be consti- 
 tutionally elected. 
 
 A government with the task of uniting and controlling all 
 
THOE BRAINS OF THE REVOLUTION 67 
 
 the revolutionary movements which had so radically upset the 
 political system of the nation, needed at the front a man of ac- 
 tion, of strong personality, with a keen knowledge of human 
 nature, with a thorough understanding of political conditions 
 throughout the country, and one who could count on the co-opera- 
 tion of men possessed of similar characteristics. It would also 
 require that the head of the Nation and his colleagues be men 
 of great energy, able to prevent the wave of democracy from be- 
 coming a tide of anarchy. 
 
 Mr. de la Barra had been absent from the country for many 
 years. He had never taken part in political affairs, in fact had 
 only served a two year term as representative aJt the beginning 
 of his career. He knew the men by hearsay only. Under the 
 circumstances, his work must inevitably lack thoroughness. Of 
 an easy good nature, weak in character, and well educated, he was 
 totally unqualified to meet a situation which required men of 
 energy like Juarez, Don Justo Benitez, or Don Protasio Tagle. 
 
 When General Diaz assumed control of the government after 
 his triumph in the revolution of Tuxtepec, he gathered around 
 him the most able men of his time, men thoroughly familiar with 
 the political situation, and acquainted with conditions, and men ; 
 and yet, it took all his energy and force of character to check 
 the avalanche which threatened to destroy the work of the re- 
 volution. Mr. de la Barra had no such assistants. Mr. Calero 
 was the only one with sufficient intelligence to really help; but, 
 unfortunately, branded as disloyal, he was looked down upon 
 by everybody. General Diaz had stated that he had used him as 
 a spy in the democratic party, so naturally neither the revolution- 
 ary nor the Pbrfiristas had any faith in him. The other members 
 of the Cabinet were either men of only average qualifications, 
 like Don Rafael Hiernandez, Don Ernesto Madero, Don Manuel 
 Bonilla, or even General Rascon himself, or they were unprinci- 
 pled men whose chief object was to gratify their personal 
 ambitions, utterly ignoring the President. None of them had 
 even been prominent in politics, and their ignorance of human 
 nature, of the necessary steps to be taken, and of the natural 
 course of events, was really astounding. Besides, three elements 
 of disturbance sprang up after the inauguration of the provis- 
 ional government; the Reyismo, the Vazquism.o, and the Big 
 Stick Clique. The Reyismo consisted of the partisans of Reyes 
 who were trying to win over to their side the old Diaz faction; 
 
68 FROM DElSPOTISM> TO ANARCHY 
 
 the Vazquismo consisted of the partisans of Vazquez Gomez and 
 considering him the brains of the revolution, wished him to reap 
 the greatest harvest from the triumph achieved; and the Big 
 Stick Clique consisted of the partisans of Gustavo Madero who 
 claimed the real power, since by the very nature of things Gus- 
 tavo Madero would presumably be successor to Francisco I. 
 Madero at the expiration of his term of office. These were the 
 disturbing elements that did not allow the provisional President 
 a minute's rest. He wished to submit to none of them, and was 
 unwilling to have any of them predominate, and yet he submitted 
 to all of them and allowed them all to dominate. Always vacil- 
 lating, and uncertain, he completely lacked the necessary energy 
 to impose his authority on anybody or at any time. The personal 
 friends of de la Barra also added to the difficulty of the situation 
 because they began to suggest that he should retain the office 
 placed in his hands by chance*. As a result he lost the confi- 
 dence of Francisco Miadero, of Dr. Vazquez Gomez, and of the Big 
 Stick Clique, and his troubles grew to such an extent that it 
 would have been impossible for him to have continued as Presi- 
 dent had his period of office been extended two months longer. 
 
 The consent of Mr. de la Barra to run for vice president 
 had an even more serious result than the mistrust of tibe 
 revolutionary party,' who believed his weakness to be mere- 
 ly a mask to cover his ambition to be president. It fos- 
 tered an opposition to Madero 's government even before Madero 
 began to govern, because de la Barra 's partisans on being de- 
 feated, began to accuse the Big Stick Clique of committing frauds 
 at the polls and to complain that their chance of victory was 
 snatched away from them by illicit methods in conducting the 
 election. That is, they echoed the protests of Vazquez Gomez and 
 his friends, shielding these protests under the prestige of the 
 Chief of the nation. Thus was the revolution germinated even 
 before Madero came into power. 
 
 Politically, Mr. de la Barra was a complete failure. He 
 never had a definite idei of what course to follow. His firmest 
 resolution came to nought at meeting the slightest obstacle or 
 at hearing the faintest applause. He was an abject slave of the 
 press, flattering and fawning to all newspaper men so that they 
 in their turn might praise him before the public. Apparently 
 
 *In fact, Mr. de la Barra never listened to that suggestion. 
 
THE BE^AINS OF TIHE REYOLUTIOiN 69 
 
 this praise was all he craved. Unconscious of the role he was 
 playing, and more desirous of attracting attention than of mak- 
 ing friends, he placed the dignitiy of the head of the nation at 
 the feet of the mob, and allowed himself to be dragged by his 
 flatterers. 
 
 Don Francisco I. Madero was a weak ruler, but even he 
 at times asserted his authority. It may have been whimsical and 
 childish, but at least it was the will of the President of the Re- 
 public. The only energetic act of Mr. de la Barra was to appear 
 before Congress to confess his own weakness. 
 
 On November 6, escorted by Pascual Orozco, Jr., and other re- 
 volutionary leaders, Madero went to the House of Representa- 
 tives to 'take the oath of office as constitutional president of the 
 Republic. On this solemn occasion Mr. Madero 's nerves forsook 
 him completely. He quite ignored the constitutional method 
 for the solemnization of the act. Instead of allowing Mr. Levy, 
 Speaker of the House, to administer the oath as prescribed by 
 law, he took the words out of the Speaker's mouth and himself 
 asked as well as answered the questions formulated by law. He 
 then retired to the National Palace amid the shouts and accla- 
 mations of the populace. Tbese shouts and acclamations, how- 
 ever, were not as enthusiastic nor as spontaneous as those on 
 the Tth of June when Madero entered the capital. 
 
 On November 6, Pascual Orozco, Jr., eclipsed Madero in pop- 
 ularity. 
 
 Mr. de la Barra was awaiting Mr. Madero at the National 
 Palace to turn the reins of government over to him. Cordial 
 phrases were exchanged between them though at heart they were 
 already separated by an abyss. 
 
 Vazquez Giomiez, with an inscrutable smile which might mean 
 either contempt or anger, was taking the measure of both presi- 
 dents. His mind was already nourishing the idea of a trium- 
 phant revolution which would give him the office he thought he de- 
 served, him who both presidents ignored without realizing that he 
 had been the brains of the revolution which was that day conse- 
 crated by the inauguraltion of Francisco I. Madero as constitu- 
 tional President of the Republic. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQUE. 
 
 The place of Vazquez Gomez in the Cabinet was filled by 
 Alberto Garcia Granados, Governor of the Federal District, a 
 man who had been opposed to General Diaz since 1892 when he 
 was put in prison as author of an anti-reelection newspaper 
 known as the "Republic." He was held in esteem by the gen- 
 eral public in spite of rumors that he had been forced to give up the 
 managership of the mine "San Francisco" in Pachuca. Mr. 
 Granados, of morose disposition and scant intelligence, was 
 bound to fall out with the group led by Gustavo Madero 
 who were impulsive and uncompromising men of action. 
 The proclamation for the election of president and vice 
 president had been made, and the Constitutionalist party 
 girded itself for the fight. Even though there was no possible 
 contest over the presidency in spite of the fact that General 
 Bernardo Reyes had appeared as candidate against Madero, the 
 same cannot be said about the vice presidency. 
 
 As I have stated in a previous chapter. General Reyes had 
 been an avowed enemy of Limantour and his adherents, and in 
 consequence of his suspicious conduct had been exiled by Gen- 
 eral Diaz to Europe. There, the startling events in Mexico took 
 him by surprise, and when the Secretary of the Treasury in his 
 trip to Europe in 1910 met him in Paris, forgetting old grudges, 
 they made up their quarrels and promised each other effective 
 co-operation. It was not surprising, therefore, that Limantour, 
 when he took the reins of government in March 1911, should count 
 on the support of Reyes and should cable him to return and give 
 to the government the assistance of his sword. Reyes started 
 immediately for Mexico, resolved as he said, to tear the revolution 
 to shreds, but by the time he arrived at Havana, negotiations 
 with the rebels had reached such a point that they were able to 
 
 (70) 
 
THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQUE 71 
 
 stipulate among other conditions that the ex-governor of Nuevo 
 Leon should not return to the country. In consequence, he was 
 ordered by cable to disembark at Havana and there await fur- 
 ther instructions. 
 
 With the triumph of the revolution, Rodolfo Reyes, son 
 of the General, ingratiated himself with the rebels and offered 
 them his father's aid in pacifying the country, making them be- 
 lieve that he could coun^t on a large following. The result was 
 that they consented to allow General Rieyes to return to the 
 country, and went so far as to offer him the position of Secre- 
 tary of War in the cabinet Madero was to form on taking office. 
 Thus Reyes, with astounding rapidity, had traveled the distance 
 from an uncompromising Porfirista to a triumphant Maderista, 
 and his sword, unsheathed to quell the revolution headed by 
 Madero, had now become one of the supporters of that same 
 Madero 's administration. At that time, the favorite scheme of 
 all who sought public approval was to revile the Cientificos, 
 so General Reyes, always fond of granting interviews and hav- 
 ing the papers make a fuss over him, let loose a tirade against 
 the ancient friends of Limantour, in which he denied even hav- 
 ing allied himself with the former Secretary of the Treasury. 
 Furthermore, he declared Limantour to blame for the fall of 
 the Diaz government.* 
 
 Once in Mexico, the old ambitions returned to Reyes. At 
 first he attempted to gain from the friends of Madero the nomi- 
 nation for vice president, but as the revolutionists refused to 
 accept him among their number, even forming a political party 
 which called itself anti-reyista, he had to desist from his at- 
 tempts at alliance, and gradually drifted away from the Mader- 
 ista group until he finally became its greatest enemy. 
 
 Among the revolutionists there were two groups essentially 
 opposed to Reyes. One was led by Fernando Yglesias Calderon 
 who was bitterly opposed to any compact between Madero and 
 Reyes on the ground that such an alliance would threaten the 
 very principles which the rebellion had proclaimed. This group, 
 composed of people of weight, including among others, Mr* 
 
 *T!he portion included in the asterisks will be found in de- 
 tail in the chapter entitled "General Reyes," in the Spanish 
 edition. 
 
72 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 Jesus Flores Miagon, had not participated actively in the revolu- 
 tion but had sympathized with the rebellion because of their 
 conviction that the government of Diaz was not a constitutional 
 government, as they understood it. They limited themselves to 
 pointing ou't to the public by means of the press, and to Madero 
 confidentially, that Reyes represented dictatorship, which could 
 in no way be amalgamated with the basic principles of the plat- 
 form of the revolt. The Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, seeing in Reyes 
 a probable competitor for the office of vice president which 
 Francisco Vazquez Gomez already deemed his, joined their ef- 
 forts to those of Mr. Calderon's coterie. Tlie other group con- 
 sisted of the fiery younger element, who held a grudge against 
 Reyes for his dissolution by force of their convention in San Luis 
 Potosi, years before, when under tihe title of Liberal Party they 
 had been in fact displaying symptoms of the revolution soon to 
 break out. The leaders of this fiery group were Camilo Arriaga, 
 Juan Sarabia, and Conrado Diaz Soto y Gama, who were also 
 the founders of the aforementioned anti-reyista party, whose 
 main purpose was to prevent the rise of General Reyes. The 
 first group sought to accomplish its end through the future presi- 
 dent, Francisco I, Madero, while the anti-reyista party soon made 
 a quick alliance with Gtustavo Madero 's Progressive Constitution- 
 al Party. As the anti-reyistas had been dissolved by forcible 
 measures at San Luis Potosi, they considered themselves justi- 
 fied now in using the same forcible methods in subduing their 
 enemies. Accordingly, they decided to suppress by force all 
 manifestations which the adherents of Reyes might make in 
 honor of their candidate, just as Reyes with the aid of Heri- 
 berto Barron and Captain Cristo had prevented by force the 
 rally they had organized in San Luis Potosi. 
 
 "When the principle of violence proposed by the anti-reyista 
 followers had been accepted by the Constitutional Progressive 
 Party, there grew up within the party itself a clique to which 
 the press gave the very appropriate name of "Big Stick" in re- 
 membrance of the similar organization formed by Felipe Ducaz- 
 cal in Spain during the political upheaval of 1868-70. The Big 
 Stick was not therefore the handiwork of Gustavo Madero nor 
 of the Progressive Constitutional Party. When they entered 
 politics, the Big Stick already existed. It had arisen under the 
 auspices of General Reyes, Secretary of War, in 1902, in the city 
 of San Luis Potosi. 
 
THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQIUE 73 
 
 Tbe Maderista "Big Stick Clique," like the original Reyes 
 clique, received the abuse of the press and of the public in street 
 rallies. Confident as it was of absolute immtunity and of the 
 help or at least the tolerance of the police, the clique widened its 
 scope until it became truly hated, and its actions became highly 
 subversive to the general welfare. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 MADERO'S ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 Immediately on assuming the presidency, Madero announced 
 the following appointments to his Cabinet: Secretary of State, 
 Manuel Calero ; Abraham Gonzalez, Secretary of the Interior ; 
 Miguel Diaz Lombardo, Secretary of Public Instruction ; Manuel 
 Vasquez Tagle, Attorney General; Manuel Bonilla, Secretary 
 of Public Works; Rafael L. Hernandez (,his own cousin,) Sec- 
 retary of Development; Ernesto Madero (his own uncle,) Sec- 
 retary of the Treasury; Secretary of "War, General Jose Gon- 
 zalez Salas, who had been obliged to resign the post of Assis- 
 tant Secretary in the Cabinet of Mir. de la Barra on account of 
 the opposition which the House of Representatives had shown 
 him. Madero thus began his administration by nlaking the 
 grievous mistake of defying both the House and public opinion. 
 
 The only new Cabinet officers in this list were Abraham 
 Gonzalez, Yasquez Tagle and Diaz Lombardo. All the rest had 
 held positions in the provisional government. The first named 
 of these three had been copartner with Orozco in organizing 
 the revolution in the State of Chihuahua. The other two, al- 
 though long dissatisfied with the government of Diaz had not 
 been actively connected with the revolt. Both were men of high 
 intelligence and of unquestioned professional standing. Much 
 was expected of them, particularly of Vasquez Tagle who was 
 known to possess special qualifications for the post to which he 
 had been appointed and who was looked upon, because of the 
 energy he was supposed to possess, as the one man above all 
 others to correct the evils which had grown up in the Department 
 of Justice. The appointment of both these men was received 
 withi universal approval ; but not so that of Mr. Abraham Gon- 
 zalez. Totally devoid of culture, he might have been fitted to 
 discharge the duties of an officer of Rurales, but as to managing 
 a department of the government, that was totally beyond his 
 
 (74) 
 
MADERO ADMlCNISTRATION 75 
 
 capabilities. Only his fellow revolutionists in diibnahua were 
 pleased with his appointment to so high an office. 
 
 Nevertheless, Madero's administration, as a whole, was very 
 cordially welcomed and with extraordinary unanimity the people 
 patriioitically determined to support [ham,. Few governmentis 
 have begun their administration under such good auspices amd 
 with public opinion so much in their favor. Consequently, 
 when a few days after the inauguration it became known that 
 General Reyes had crossed the border in armed rebellion and had 
 distributed a revolutionary proclamation addressed principally 
 to the army, the whole movement met with universal condem- 
 nation, and the failure of the revolt was considered inevitable. 
 
 General Reyes had left Vera Cruz for Havana in the last 
 days of September. From Havana he went to New Orleans 
 and thence to San Antondo, TIexas, where he organized a force 
 with which he was to join an uprising his partisans had promised 
 to organize in the States of Nuevo Leon and T'amaulipas. De- 
 spite the failure of his candidacy, the General continued to be- 
 lieve that in those states he still had a numerous following. 
 
 The Reyista party had tried to induce the whole country 
 to rise in arms, but had succeeded only in a fevf widely separa- 
 ted localities — in Yucatan, in the Laguna Region, in Ramos 
 Arizpe, and in Michoacan. As the instigators of trouble met 
 with slight response, these movements were all of little impor- 
 tance and finally were disbanded. 
 
 On November 19, General Reyes had been arrested by the 
 United States authorities for his revolutionary operations in the 
 United States and having been set at liberty under bail, there 
 was no other way open to him but to engage in the fight. Oh 
 December 19 he crossed the border into Mexico accompanied by 
 Quiro4;a, owner of the gambling houses in Monterey during 
 General Reyes' administration, David Reyes Retana, a friend 
 and blind partisan of the rebel General, and two servants, and 
 began to look for the troops that were to join him in accordance 
 with the promises of his partisans and especially in accordance 
 with the picturings of his own imagination. 
 
 He crossed the Rio Grande at a ford called "La Vela," 
 near the city of Camargo, in the State of Tamaulipas, and en- 
 tering Nuevo Leon through the first spurs of the Pamorones 
 Mountains, he proceeded in the general direction of the Ga- 
 leana range. 
 
76 FROM DEiSPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 In vain did he seek his supporters; there were none. Of 
 five hundred men whom he expected to meet, waiting only for 
 his arrival to start a triumphant campaign, he met not one. What 
 he did meet was a detachment of federal troops of the 11th cav- 
 alry, which quickly scattered his faithful little band. General 
 Reyes was left alone with his guide, and while in the grip of the 
 terrible and bitter disillusionment which he had suffered, he 
 ordered his companion to lead him at once to the nearest town. 
 This happened to be the city of Linares, Nuevo Leon, where the 
 General arrived on the evening of December 25th and gave him- 
 self up as a prisoner to Corporal of Rurales Placido Rodriguez, 
 who was then on guard. At first, the officer fearing that Reyes 
 had come accompanied by a large force to which he could offer 
 no adequate resistance, was at his wits end what to do, but final- 
 ly he was convinced by the General himself that the man before 
 him was his prisoner. Thereupon be telegraphed the news to 
 General Trevino, Commander in Chief of the Zone, who ordered 
 that the rebel leader be accorded every consideration and pa- 
 roled within the city limits. Hie further ordered Lieutenant 
 Colonel Garcia Lugo, in command of a body of Rurales near 
 Linares, to take charge of the prisoner and conduct him to Mex- 
 ico City vnth every arrangement for his comfort. 
 
 On arriving in Mtexico on December 28, Reyes was placed 
 in Santiago prison* where he remained until the uprising at the 
 Ciudadela in which it was his lot to be one of the first victims. 
 
 Fortune continued to smile on Madero, but unfortunately 
 he refused to heed her smile, and as Fortune is a capricious 
 mistress, she sooner or later was sure to turn against him. 
 
 M'adero and those surrounding him began from the very 
 first to create trouble for their own administration. In Vera 
 Cruz, Governor Dehesa had sent in his resignation, and an elec- 
 tion was ordered by the legislature of the state, t The President 
 at first favored the election of Gabriel Gavira, an honest artisan 
 who knew well his trade of cabinet maker, but who was not in 
 any way fitted to govern that important state. Madero finally 
 decided to support Francisco Lagos Chazaro also an incompe- 
 tent man and in this case mentally unbalanced as well; his 
 
 *As it is named the Military Prison. 
 
 tMr. Leon Aillaud was named provisional governor, but a 
 few days after was removed and Manuel Alegre took the place. 
 
MADERO ADMINISTRATION 77 
 
 absolute lack of character could not but bring on grievous con- 
 flicts during the period of his administration. In Aguascal- 
 ientes and Tlaxcala, Madero insisted on the retention of the ig- 
 norant governors whom the revolution had allowed to rise. One 
 was a former coffin maker and the other, a doorkeeper in a cotton 
 factory. Both were denounced by the intelligent people of the 
 above mentioned states. In Jalisco, the provisional government 
 had appointed as governor pro tem Alberto Robles Gil, a man who 
 managed through his great popularity in the state to assert him- 
 self and maintain perfect order. Madero was determined to 
 have the election take place immediately. The provisional gov- 
 ernor protested on the grounds that so premature an election 
 would lead to serious troubles. At this point the Legislature 
 declared itself in favor of the plan proposed by the Federal gov- 
 ernment, or rather by Madero, and against Robles Gil. The 
 latter finally was forced to submit, and in the ensuing election 
 the victory was gained by the candidate nominated by the Catho- 
 lics, Jose Lopez Portillo y Eojas, a man of tlie scantest ability 
 and whose name had appeared in a notorious fraud case. In 
 Michoacan also, Madero was undecided between two candidates 
 for the governorship ; Miguel Silva, an honorable, liberal, and 
 generally liked man, and Primitivo Ortiz, an old lawyer who had 
 always boasted of being an enthusiastic liberal. Ortiz appeared 
 to be the candidate of the Catholic Party whose displeasure the 
 President was particularly anxious to avoid. Only Gustavo 
 Madero 's vigorous protests prevented him from committing the 
 grave error of deciding against the popular candidate. Serapio 
 Rendon, a man in whom Madero had complete confidence, was 
 sent to Morelia* to settle all controversy, and finally Silva was 
 declared elected by a large majority. In Oaxaea notwithstand- 
 ing the friendship between the Governor, Juarez Mazat and Ma- 
 dero, a conflict had taken place during the last days of the pro- 
 visional government that reached its critical period just after 
 Madero assumed the duties of President, and which had a tragic 
 ending and a disastrous result both for the local and the feder- 
 al governments. 
 
 On the 2nd of September, Juarez Maza had assumed the 
 governorship of the state after defeating Felix Diaz decisively 
 
 *Capital of the State of Michoacan. 
 
 tSon of the great President, Benito Juarez. 
 
78 FEOM DEiSPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 
 
 for that office. Almost his first official act was to remove all 
 the prefects under his jurisdiction, and quite naturally, to sub- 
 stitute in their places personal friends on whose assistance he 
 relied in guaranteeing peace in the state. Among others, was the 
 ill starred appointment for prefect of the District of Juchitan 
 of a gentleman by the name of Enrique Leon. In Juchitan there 
 had grown up, partly because of the Maderista revolution, but 
 principally because of the introduction of true popular elections 
 for the governorship, two distinct local parties, each of which as- 
 pired to conitrol the government of that district. The impor- 
 tance attached to the contest lay in the fact that the district is 
 so far from the state capital that it is considered almost independ- 
 ent of the state authorities. Juchitan is a city of some importance, 
 head of the district that bears its name, and is situated on the 
 isthmus near Tehuantepec. Both districts, Juchitan and T'e- 
 huantepec, abound in wealth and their contribution to the ex- 
 penses of the state form a considerable part of its total revenue. 
 But, as mentioned above, they are so far removed from the state 
 government at Oaxaca that the local authorities of those dis- 
 tricts do not concern themselves with it at all, except to send their 
 quota of taxes at regular intervals. Even, less attention is paid 
 by the inhabitants themselves, since the state government refers 
 all their controversies to the local authorities which in conse- 
 quence are vested with greater power than the officers of simi- 
 lar rank in other districts. 
 
 Taking advantage of this situation, a certain native of 
 Juchitan, Jose Gomez, popularly known as Che Gomez, had 
 formed a party for which Vazquez Gomez procured money, arms, 
 and ammunition, and with these elements at his disposal, he 
 declared himself the cacique of the district, and under the title 
 of Municipal President, claimed to be the governor of that region. 
 
 As Governor of the State, Juarez Maza could not tolerate 
 such presumption on the part of a municipal president, and 
 chiefly for this reason he name Mr. Leon Prefect of Juchitan. 
 This appointment, of course, displeased Che Gomez, and he tried 
 his best to induce the inhabitants of Juchitan to reject the new 
 officer. Ever since the uprising that occurred at the beginning 
 of the Diaz government, the custom had prevailed that when a 
 prefect was to be appointed, the miuiicipal government of Juchi- 
 tan was consulted. The latter always gave its consent, or rather, 
 reported favorably on the candidate proposed by the governor. 
 
MADEiBO ADMINISTRATION 79 
 
 In this instance, the Governor failed to comply with the required 
 formality. This oversig;ht suited Che Giomez' purpose admir- 
 ably. On account of the opposition of the inhabitants of Juchi- 
 tan to the new prefect, Governor Maza asked for federal as- 
 sistance in asserting his authority. Mr. de la Barra sent him 
 federal troops and later a body of Hurales under the command 
 of Gabriel Hernandez*, a ferocious man who in Pachuca had 
 committed innumerable atrocities, and Candido Aguilar, a man. of 
 a more quiet disposition and who, thougih a native of the State 
 of Vera Cruz, knew well the character of the Juchitecos. On 
 the arrival of Hernandez, an encounter took place in the streete 
 of Juchitan, but when Aguilar arrived, negotiations were enter- 
 ed into and an agreement was drawn up in which it was stipu- 
 lated that a new prefect should be appointed with due regard 
 for the local custom of consulting the Board of Aldermen re- 
 garding the proposed candidate. Madero, who had suggested 
 that Aguilar be sent, judged that the affair had received a sat- 
 isfactory solution and telegraphed Juarez Maza recommending 
 Aguilar for the post of prefect. The Governor, however, 
 thought that it would greatly weaken his authority in the State 
 if he should allow the Federal Government to take part in the 
 affair and settle the conflict directly without consulting with 
 the State Government, and in consequence insisted that the pre- 
 fect that had been appointed should take charge, and in return 
 he promised to substitute him later on and declared that he would 
 then submit to the established custom of Juchitan in thie matter 
 of choosing a new prefect. Mr. Madero, angered at the attituJe 
 of the governor, gave orders that the federal troops should take 
 no part in the affair and thus left the governor's appointee en- 
 tirely without support, and as a result, the State Government, 
 without federal backing, became a mere mockery. Che Gomez 
 headed a force too powerful to be attacked by the local mili- 
 tia, which was the only force that Juarez Maza had at his com- 
 man:d. Seeing that the stage was set for a conflict, Governor 
 Juarez Maza immediately set out for the scene of action, judging 
 that by his presence he could impose his authority. When the 
 attitude assumed by the respective State and Federal govern- 
 ments became generally known, and it was seen that the Governor 
 was defending the sovereignty of the State of Oaxaca, the entire 
 
 *Hernandez was murdered in his prison during Huerta's 
 adminstration, by order of the governor of the City of Mexico. 
 
80 FROM DE'SPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 state rose as one man and placed itself side by side with Mm. 
 His arrival at the is'thmus was a veritable triumphant march 
 and the occasion for demonstrations against Madero. Seeing the 
 stand taken by the populace, Che Gomez recognized that his was 
 a lost cause and surrendered, but exacted from the federal govern- 
 ment guarantees for himiself and his followers. Madero who 
 had also suffered a defeat in this conflict, immediately agreed 
 and ordered that a passport and safe conduct be given Gomez. 
 The Governor, however, ordered the arrest of the ringleader 
 in order to submit the case to the State Courts. Che Gomez and 
 Governor Juarez Maza had met in San Geronimo, a railroad 
 junction on the isthmus, and Gomez had sought an interview 
 with the Governor who not only refused to listen to him but even 
 ordered his arrest. The military authorities did not dare to dis- 
 obey the Governor's orders, but satisfied themselves by tele- 
 graphing the fact of the arrest to Mr. Madero. Now, as a favor 
 and not as a command, the President requested Juarez Maza 
 to send Che Gomez to Mexico City. Unfortunately, this tele- 
 gram was received by Juarez Maza too late for him to grant the 
 request. During the night previous to its receipt, some of the 
 residents of Juchitan, adherents of the party opposing Che Gomez 
 had taken him forcibly from jail with his eight companions and 
 had lynched them all near the outskirts of San Geronimo. When 
 the Governor received the President's telegram on the follo^ving 
 day at Juchitan, he already had had a message from the author- 
 ities of San Geronimo advising ihim of the occurrence. 
 
 The officials who took charge of the remains of Che Gomez 
 reported that they had found on his person som^e papers which 
 seriously implicated Don Einilio Vazquez Gomez. Even while 
 Secretary of the Interior, he had been preparing and fomenting 
 a revolt in Juchitan and after his withdrawal from the Depart- 
 ment he had held conferences with the ringleader in which he 
 showed him the possibility of segregating the districts of Juchi- 
 tan and Tehuantepee from the State of Oaxaca, and together 
 with the Cantons of Acayucan and Minatitlan in the State of 
 Vera Cruz, forming a small state or territory on the isthmus 
 which Che Gomez was to receive as feudal land. He, in his turn, 
 Avas to bind himself to aid and abet the Vazquez Giomez brothers 
 in that region. 
 
 The conflict in Oaxaca proved fatal to the Madero govern- 
 ment, chiefly because it was one of the first official acts of his 
 
MADERO ADMINISTRATION 81 
 
 administration and its failure had been complete. He had not 
 even been able to save the life of his protege. Moreover the con- 
 duct of ]\I]r. Juarez Maza without doubt deserved some applause. 
 He had energetically asserted his rights as an executive and 
 had at once proceeded to the scene of the conflict. This act 
 presented even a heroic phase and aroused a general sentiment 
 of independence in the other states v^hich later caused serious and 
 important troubles to the federal government. 
 
 Men guilty of highly reprehensible conduct had been elect- 
 ed governors in jruanajuato, Puebla, and San Luis Potosi ; those 
 of the two latter were not even natives of the states to which they 
 had been elected ; all three were incompetent and had been repu- 
 diated by the thinking class of these respective states. In Guer- 
 rero and Iq other points, differences were constantly arising be- 
 tween the various leaders, each of whom claimed to be lord and 
 master of the whole state ; these differences were becoming more 
 serious because Miadero, well intentioned but utterly impracticable 
 in such matters, did not know his men sufficiently, and con- 
 sequently delayed his decision regarditig which of these aspirants 
 he should support in the scramble for power. 
 
 All of these local strifes could have been easily suppressed 
 if there had been at the head of the Department of the Interior 
 a politician of even mediocre ability, but, thanks to the poor 
 handling of the affair by Mr. Gonzalez, who was even worse than 
 the President himself, they were assuming serious proportions 
 and day by day were weakening the government which had at 
 first had thie united sympathy of the public. Now, after two 
 months, it found itself practically isolated. The President, 
 though upright and tender hearted, was practically nullifying 
 his best intentions through lack of training in public life; he 
 became excited at the least contradiction and although he attempt- 
 ed to hide his displeasure, his treacherous nerves exposed him and 
 transformed him in most instances from a man affable even to 
 familiarity to a man of the most peevish and insolent character. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 THE NEW REYOLUTION. 
 
 The most serious conflicts were those in Chihuahua and in 
 Morelos. The one in Chihuahua was headed by Pascual Orozeo, 
 Jr., who had been a leader in Madero's army. At the time, it 
 was said in Chihuahua that his change of attitude had been 
 caused by the work and influence of Don Gonzalo Enrile who 
 had just arrived with instructions from General Diaz and Mr. 
 Limantour for Mr. Terrazas. This may or may not be true, but 
 one fact is certain, that the Orozquista revolution was supported 
 by funds furnished by members of the Terrazas family. The one 
 in Morelos was led by Zapata who still continued to revolt al- 
 though Mr. Madero was already President and had offered to 
 satisfy all his demands. The uprising of Orozco was due to the 
 lack of tact with which he was treated. For the most part Ma- 
 dero's advisors are responsible for this, although, as a matter 
 of fact, Madero should not have forgotten that Orozco had been 
 the moving spirit of the uprising which had made him trium- 
 phant. Instead of showing Orozco his gratitude and honoring 
 him as he deserved, he treated him harshly, put him aside for 
 men worth much less, and more than that, he even refused to help 
 him secure work to gain a livelihood.* What less could have been 
 requested by him who had been the commander of Mladero's 
 whole army? 
 
 The flatterers supported by the American jingoism were also 
 responsible that Orozco, Jr., and Madero had broken. From the be- 
 ginning of the revolt they lifted up Oi*ozco, praising his work as a 
 wonderful one, and exhibiting him as the real head of the rebell- 
 ion. Orozco during the campaign did not heed these flatteries 
 but when Madero was President and did not reward him, as he 
 expected, through the every day renewed flatteries he lost Ms 
 
 *The same Mr. Madero did with Maximo Castillo. 
 
 (82) 
 
THE NEW EJEVOLUTION 83 
 
 ii(;ad and, believing that he was strong enough to be the leader 
 of a new revolution, revolted.* 
 
 The uprising in Morelos was serious because of its dura- 
 tion and because of its proximity to the Capital of the Republic. 
 General Juvencio Rtobles, a man well acquainted with the state 
 besides being esteemed for his prudence and energy, was sent to 
 take command of the federal troops and to put an end to the 
 disturbance. General Robles immediately began an active cam- 
 paign, guaranteeing security to every one. When Zapata real- 
 ized that the fight was almost lost, he appealed to Madero ask- 
 ing that he be allowed to deal directly with him and asking that 
 all fighting be suspended. This same thing had happened dur- 
 ing the provisional government when General Hluerta had been 
 at the point of killing the leader of the rebels. Now as then, 
 the soft heart of Mladero interposed, causing incalculable dam- 
 age to his administration and to the country at large. General 
 Riobles M^as relieved of the command and was superseded by Gen- 
 eral Felipe Angeles, a very sincere and good hearted man, but 
 entirely theoretical at that moment and totally unadapted 
 for a campaign like that of Morelos. T\vo days later, the hordes 
 of Zapata attacked the passenger train in Ticuman and killed 
 Mr. Herrerrias and Mr. Strauss, both newspaper men. In spite 
 of so many missteps, fortune still smiled upon Madero. The 
 campaign in Chihuahua like that in Mtorelos had been disastrous 
 to the government. General Gonzalez Salas, the Minister of War 
 had been forced to resign and in order that he might have an 
 honorable pretext, he had been appointed to lead this campaign. 
 General Pascual Orozco at the head of his army had taken pos- 
 session of the State Capital on the 3rd of March, forcing Mr. 
 Abraham Gonzalez, the constitutional governor, to flee. When 
 the rebellion broke out in Chihuahua, Mr. Abraham Gonzalez had 
 resigned from the Cabinet and had gone there reassuming 
 the governorship on the 29thi of February. He believed 
 that through his friendship with Orozco he could reestablish 
 peace. He was too late. His tactless efforts alienated 
 even the few friendships he still could claim and caused the loss 
 of the State to the Federal Government. Until then Orozco had 
 wavered, but as soon as he saw Mr. Gbnzalez summoned the rebel 
 leader. Villa, to put him in command of 'the federal troops, he 
 
 *The same is doing now vnih General Villa. 
 
84 FROM DElSPO'TISM TO) ANARCHY 
 
 brake openly with the government, placed himself at the head 
 of the revolution, rapidly organized his forces, and took imme- 
 diate possession of Chihuahua. Within two' weeks he had under 
 him a good army and was making his authority felt throughout 
 the whole sitate. 
 
 Mr. Jesus Flores Magon who though hostile to the govern- 
 ment of General Diaz had not been a revolutionary, succeeded M!r. 
 Abraham Gonzalez as Secretary of the Interior. Under normal 
 conditions, he would have made a good Secretary of the Inter- 
 ior, because though passionate and inexperienced in polities, he 
 had good commion sense. But under the abnormal conditions 
 at the time of his appointment, a far superior man was needed. 
 He had to cope not only with the very delicate affairs of the 
 moment, but also with two other important factors : the Presi- 
 dent, almost childishly capricious at times, and Gustavo Madero 
 and his followers. The first one with aspirations to the office 
 of Secretary of the Interior. This gentleman was day by day 
 becoming more politically influential, backed by the Consti- 
 tutional Progressive Party and especially by the Big Stick 
 Clique with which he dominated the House of Representatives. 
 
 Mr. Flores Magon because of his ignorance of conditions 
 auid not from any personal ill will, was largely responsible for 
 the removal of General Robles from command of the campaign 
 in Morelos. The unfortunate result of this step was that the 
 government failed to put a decisive end to the campaign in More- 
 los although success was then almost assured. 
 
 When General Gonzalez Salas withdrew from the Cabinet, he 
 was appointed to direct the campaign in the north against the 
 forces of Pascual Orozo, Jr., who with a regularly organized army 
 threatened to invade the neighboring states. The two forces met 
 at ReUano, near Jimenez, on the 22nd of March. The resultis 
 were disastrous to the federal troops, in spite of the fact that 
 the rebels through lack of artillery were unable to press their 
 advantage. General Gonzalez Salas, who was entirely unfitted 
 for the work assigned to him, committed a series of blunders 
 which it is unnecessary to enumerate in this book. After his 
 retreat, judging that the defeat had been more ignoble than it 
 really was, and believing that the artillery abandoned by him 
 had been lost, he committed suicide on the train to Torreon. 
 
THE NEW EjEVODUTIOIN 85 
 
 Thus through its own misjiudgment, the government suffered 
 great losses and the President suffered the loss of a friend whom 
 he highly respected and esteemed. 
 
 When the federals retreated, Pascual Orozco thought that 
 General Gonzalez Salas would reorganize his forces and with re- 
 newed strength would reopen the attack. Therefore, as his amanu- 
 nition had run short, he ordered a retreat. When General T'el- 
 lez, commander of the federal artillery, saw himself aban- 
 doned by the Chief of Division, he failed to realize what had 
 happened, but in obedience to the command he had received, broke 
 camp and retreated to Torreon where he took command of the 
 straggling bands that arrived there little by little. Brigadier 
 General Trucy Aubert had by far the worst share in the battle. 
 Pursued by Orozco 's troops, he was compelled to make a long 
 detour in order to rejoin the main army. In this retreat he lost 
 all his ammunition and artillery and nearly all his men, arriv- 
 ing in Torreon with only sixty odd men. The government re- 
 warded the conduct of General Aubert with an immediate pro- 
 motion and with twenty thousand dollars in cash. This last 
 they gave as if it were a tribute from a group of friends of the 
 government. 
 
 General Angel Garcia Peiia, an entirely mathematical man, 
 had succeeded General Gonzalez Salas as Minister of War. He 
 had devoted his whole life to mathematics and had no experi- 
 ence as a commander of troops. His sole comimand had been 
 over the escorts which accompanied him on his scientific ex- 
 peditions. Nevertheless, he was somewhat wise and competent in 
 organizing the material ait his disposal. Unfortunately, he was 
 impulsive and violent to such an extent that one day he actually 
 came to blows with the motorman of a street car. Naturally 
 such a character was not thie best; suited for the position at that 
 time. The Department needed at its head a man of sense and 
 poise who would not foolishly waste the resources of the govern- 
 ment and who would be respected for his dignity and his 
 fairness. 
 
 Mr. Calero was not at ease in the Cabinet because he had been 
 cut off from all interference with the House of Representatives, 
 and because the President did not take his advice as much as he 
 \Aasih'ed. Moreover, he could not agree with the fiery opinions 
 
86 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHIC 
 
 of the niajority of the Cabinet members who were dragging the 
 government to ruin. He, therefore, secured the appointment as 
 ambassador at Washington. Don Gilberto Crespo, Mexican Minis- 
 ter to Austria Hungary, who occupied the position at that time, was 
 ' again sent to Vienna. Mr. Pedro Lascurain was appointed on the 
 9th of April to fill the vacancy left by Mr. Calero. For the fii-st 
 time he took an active part in politics from which he had been 
 excluded because of his religious beliefs, for he was an ardent 
 Catholic, and because of his own character which is little given 
 to seeking strife and trouble. Mr. Lascurain is a man of good 
 intelligence but inexperienced in the affairs entrusted to him. 
 He is calm, affable and upright, but lacking in decisiveness and 
 in initiative. He, as well as Ernesto Miadero, was to be swept 
 away by the strong current of passions let loose by the other Cabi- 
 net members. When at the supreme moment, events placed him 
 in a most precarious situation and gave him executive power, 
 he was merely the plaything of the men who took an active part 
 in this momentous drama. The responsibility he assumed in his- 
 tory when he presented the resignations of Mr. Miadero and Mr. 
 Pino Suarez, contrary to the agreement made with them, can 
 only find an excuse in his absolute good faith or in his absolute 
 lack of political acumen. When Madero fir^t: heard of the step 
 taken by Mr. Lascurain, he believed himself betrayed, but Mr. 
 Pino Suarez exclaimed: "It is not treason, it is stupidity, but 
 iL will cost us our lives. ' ' Mr. Pino Suarez was right. Mr. Las- 
 curian had been deceived like a child; he had been impelled to 
 catastrophe through force of circumstances, and had been un- 
 consciously and against his will forced to contribute to the death 
 of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez.* 
 
 Mr. Diaz Lombardo had been obliged to resign as Secretary 
 of Public Instruction in order that the Vice President, Mr. Pino 
 Suarez, might have a position in the Cabinet. 
 
 Since taking the oath of office as Vice President, j\Ilr. Pino 
 Suarez had presided over the Senate and had even taken an ac- 
 tive part in some matters. A fiery and impulsive young man 
 by nature and a zealous revolutionist, he chafed under the pas- 
 sive duties of the Vice Presidency. He was the tool of Don 
 Gustavo Madero who was constantly recommending him to the 
 President for a more active part in the affairs in order that he 
 might have a voice in all tihe business transacted by the Presi- 
 
 ^See chapter XXIX. 
 
THE NEW DEVOLUTION 87 
 
 dent. Mr. Madero esteemed Mr. Pino Suarez and made him 
 attend the Cabinet meetings, but at these meetings there was no 
 free play for his activity. When Conigress adjourned, the Vice 
 President's life became even more monotonous. For this reason 
 both he and Gustavo Madero wished that he might be a. Cabinet 
 member so that their schemes might become actual facts. 
 
 When the Secretary of the Interior, Mir. Abraham Gonzalez, 
 resigned, Gustavo .Madero concentrated his energies to obtain 
 the portfolio either for himself or for Mr. Pino Suarez. Neither 
 Mr. Ernesto Madero, Secretary of the Treasury, nor Mr. Rafael 
 Hernandez, his companion in politics, wanted the President to 
 be obsessed with the advice of his favorite brother. The family, 
 divided upon, this point, was continually quarreling. 
 
 Mr. Ernesto Madero strenuously opposed the appointment 
 as Secretary of the Interior of either Gustavo Madero or Pino 
 Suarez, because he believed that either appointment would raise 
 a storm of criticism. The President wavered between his per- 
 sonal affection and his duty as president. His affection inclined 
 him towards pleasing his brother, but he fully realized that such 
 an action would create scandal. Weak, he wavered in 
 his decision. Mr. Calero, still Secretary of State, solved the 
 question by suggesting Mr. Pino Suarez for Secretary of Public 
 Instruction and recommending Mr. Jesus Plores M'agon for Sec- 
 retary of the Interior. With no excuse to offer, Mr. Diaz Lom- 
 bardo resigned from this post merely as an act of friendship to- 
 wards Mr. Calero who had originally recommended him for the 
 portfolio. He was then appointed MSnister to France to fill the 
 vacancy created by the resignation of Mr. Sebastian de Mier at 
 the time of the fall of the Diaz government. 
 
 Mr. Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of Development, had at- 
 tempted to secure for the government a majority in the House 
 of Representatives. This was a comparatively easy matter as 
 a large number of the representatives wished to help the new 
 government and had already fulfilled their pledges to ex-Presi- 
 dent Diaz. In order to have greater assurance, Mr. Hernandez had 
 personally offered reelection to the majority of congressmen. 
 IMost of these, however, realizing the weakness of the govern- 
 ment, knew quite well that these were merely empty promises, 
 
88 FRIOM DESPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 
 
 but still, they did their utmost to help the executive power which 
 needed the backing of Congress in order to establish itself firmly. 
 
 =^ ^ # 
 
 Such were the existing conditions at the time for the elec- 
 tion of representatives, senators, and justices of the Supreme 
 Court of Justice of the Nation. These elections had to be carried 
 out in accordance with the new law passed by Congress at its 
 last session. The government and the Constitutional Progressive 
 Party, or, we may say, Gustavo Madero, each made out its slate. 
 The governors, who had no slate of their own, wavered between 
 the two parties, uncertain from which they could gain the great- 
 er advantage. The candidates of these two parties were op- 
 posed by the nominees of the Catholic Party from nearly every 
 district of the Republic, and by the candidates of those who un- 
 der the name of "Independents," were trying to profit by the 
 general confusion. 
 
 The number of excesses committed was astounding. With 
 the exception of the Secretary of State and thie Secretary of 
 War, each Secretary presented his candidates for congressmen or 
 senators, and they were victorious, all more or less legally. The 
 Constitutional Progressive Party adopted all sorts of measures 
 tc' gain victory for its candidates. Though legally defeated for 
 many offices, it found revenge at the time of examination of 
 credentials, since it caused many credentials to be accepted when 
 they were palpable frauds. 
 
 In the State of Vera Cru2, Mr. Tomas Braniff in league 
 with Messrs. Giustavo Madero and Pino Suarez, nominated can- 
 didates against all law and order at the eleventh hour. These 
 candidates were upheld by the governor. In Misantla, the pre- 
 fect even had two men shot; on the eve of the elections and had 
 their bodies paraded through the streets shortly before the vot- 
 ing began. Such an argument was decidedly successful and the 
 prefect was able to forge all papers with impunity in his own 
 office, naming Jose R. Aspe congressman. In Zongolica the 
 ballots arrived on the day following the elections, but they were 
 not for that reason declared illegal. In the State of Mexico the 
 scandal did not reach the point of murder, but there were pre- 
 fects like the one in Ixtlahuaca who brutally enforced the can- 
 didacy of the nominees of the Secretary of the Interior. There 
 was not one state where the law was not trampled upon in a 
 miost shameless way. Under cover of these abuses, there were 
 
THE NEW EiEVOLUTIOiN 89 
 
 districts as for instance Juchitan in Oaxaca, where the prefects 
 paid no attention to the reconimendations of Gnstavo Madero's 
 party nor to the recommendations officially miade, nor even to 
 the protests made by the independent parties and candidates, 
 but they elected their own personal friends or relatives. 
 
 Of the representatives who made up the Twenty-fifth Consti- 
 tutional Congress only twenty-one were elected, among whom 
 were Messrs. Calero and Hernandez. Of these twenty-one, ele- 
 ven were proteges or nominees of the government; or of the Con- 
 stitutional Progressive Party. The rest obtained their election 
 through personal relations. In other words, there were only 
 eight who did not owe their victory to the backing of the govern- 
 ment. These eight men were: From Vera Cruz, General Gre- 
 gorio Riuiz, native of the district of Jalacingo where he had many 
 relatives and friends; from the State of Mexico, M,r. Francisco 
 M. de Olaguibel, a man well known and esteemed in his state; 
 from Hidalgo, M'r, Javier Torres Rivas, a large landowner ; from 
 Jalisco, Mir. Jose Maria Lozano, a native of the district of San 
 Miguel el Alto, where he is well connected; from Nuevo Leon, 
 Mr. Nemesio Garcia Naranjo,* elected for the district of Lam- 
 pazos, where be is well known and esteemed ; from Oaxaca, M'essrs. 
 Jose Maria Garcia, Francisco Modesto Ramirez, and Prisciliano 
 Maldonado, all well known citizens in their towns. There were 
 others who secured backing in their respective districts but their 
 nominaltions did not go through the discussions at the prelimin- 
 ary meetings. The scandals perpetrated at these meetings have 
 no precedent in our constitutional history. There were creden- 
 tials that the committee tried to reject although the members of 
 the committee confessed that they had not even opened the do- 
 cuments relative to the business at hand. Even after this fla- 
 grant confession, thiey still attempted to reject credentials al- 
 leging that they had not been correctly filled out. Mr. Querido 
 Moheno,t a congressman, one day admitted before the House 
 that he had submitted two different opinions concerning the same 
 credentials so that Mir. Giistavo Madero might choose the one he 
 preferred. The credentials of Mr. Francisco Pascual Garcia of 
 Michoacan were approved since the elections in his district were 
 
 *Both Mr. Lozano and Mr. Garcia Naranjo are Cabinet Min- 
 isters in Huerta's administration. 
 
 t Secretary of State in General Huerta's administration 
 
90 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 declared legal; but when the votes were cast, he himself was re- 
 jected without any explanation for the action. 
 
 The debates were endless. In the majority of cases the 
 •Board of Elections did not know how the documents stood, nor 
 did they bother to answer the arguments of those who opposed 
 their actions. They merely imposed their decision by force of a 
 majority vote. These debates lasted so long that the Hiouse had 
 to convene even though all the credentials had not been duly 
 examined. The debates did not come to an end until October, 
 thiat is, until two weeks after the opening of the session of 
 Congress. 
 
 The Catholic Party which had contended in nearly every 
 district, played a most unworthy role in these debates. Fearing 
 that the credentials of their party leaders would be rejected, it 
 supported the Constitutional Progressive Party, voting with it 
 even in the most flagrantly shameless cases. In fact, it did not 
 even protest in favor of some of its coreligionists but rather 
 sacrificed them disgracefully. As a result, it secured only about 
 twenty seats in the Congress. The Constitutional Progressive 
 Party obtained a majority thougih not an overwhelming one. The 
 rest of the Congress was made up of representatives of all varie- 
 ties, lacking discipline as well as definite affiliation. In each 
 question, therefore, a majority had to be formed, a majority that 
 at any moment might become a minority through lack of subor- 
 dination of the elements that composed it. Yet there was al- 
 ways a tendency to group around Gustavo Madero who was the 
 man of power. When the session was opened and the House began 
 its work, it commenced a series of insults against every one, 
 unprecedented in any constitutional body. The House did 
 nothing useful for the country. It seemed as if the representa- 
 tives had convened solely and exclusively to insult each; other 
 or to insult those who could not defend themselves since they 
 were not representatives. The Speakers elected in the months 
 of September, October, November and December, were powerless 
 to bring to order these excited enthusiasts. To make matters 
 worse, the administration in spite of the behavior of the repre- 
 sentatives, had the brilliant idea of calling a special session, 
 which began at thie end of December and lasted until the faU of 
 the Madero administration. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 OROZCO AND VAZQUEZ GOMEZ. 
 
 In the North the revolution began as a Vazquista movement; 
 that is, it took as its leader Mir. Emilio Vazquez Giomez who 
 after his disappearance from Mexico City had appeared in San 
 Antonio, Texas. But it soon deteriorated into nothing but an 
 anti-administration movement.* 
 
 Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez who had remained ia Mexi- 
 co City, was arrested one day as he was about to get into an au- 
 tomobile. He claimed that he was merely leaving the city to 
 visit some property he owned just outside the Federal District. 
 In spite of his remonstrances he was taken to prison, but he soon 
 managed to gain his liberty although the government ac- 
 cused him of complicity with the rebels. It was even said that 
 the telegraph operator of the Treasury Department had inter- 
 cepted a telegram to tlhe Doctor which left no doubt as to his com- 
 plicity with the forces of Zapata. 
 
 To my mind there is absolutely no doubt that Dr. Vazquez 
 Gomez was in close touch with the revolutionists. The rebel lead- 
 ers, Limon, the Samano brothers and others of the State of 
 Mexico in league with Zapata, were constantly receiving instruc- 
 tions as well as pecuniary aid through Representative Pedro 
 
 *The first proclamation issued by Pascual Orozco, Jr., was 
 as usual against the cientificos or rather against the Terrazas co- 
 terie, known in Chihuahua as the cientifico party, claiming that 
 Governor Abraham Gonzalez had been subdued by General Luis 
 Terrazas. The meeting at Enramada with David de la Fuente and 
 other chiefs openly showed that the revolution was a Vasquista 
 one, but some days later Orozco, Jr., changed his mind and pro- 
 claiming that the only purpose of the revolution was the down- 
 fall of the Madero regime, ordered Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez 
 to leave Mexican territory at once, notwithstanding that Colonel 
 Orozco, the leader's father had welcomed Mr. Vazquez Gomez 
 in Ciudad Juarez and honored him as Provisional President of 
 the Republic. 
 
 (91) 
 
92 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECKY 
 
 Galicia Rodriguez from Dr. Vazquez Gtomez or from some com- 
 mittee over which he presided. This I affirm because I myself 
 handled a letter from Limon and other leaders addressed to 
 Mr. Galicia Rodriguez. In this letter they complained that Dr. 
 Vazquez Gromez had not sent money nor ammunition as he had 
 promised to do ; they, moreover, threatened to abandon the 
 Vazquista cause unless the ammunition were sent on the very 
 days promised. Scarcely two months after the receipt of this 
 letter, Limon and the Samano brothers were marauding in the 
 State of Miexieo, not exactly stealing, for they usually paid for 
 what they took, but always parading the fact that they had 
 plenty of ammunition. In fact Limon was in arms up to the very 
 time of the successful revolt of the Ciudadela after which he 
 was executed by the Federals in the State of Mexico. According 
 to the official statement this was done through an error but it 
 is more likely that it was done to wipe out by his death the un- 
 derstanding which the rebel leader had had with those who at 
 that moment were victors. Tlhie best proof of the understand- 
 ing between Dr. Vazquez Gomez and Zapata is the letter which 
 follows, in which Dr. Vazquez Gomez clearly states that the re- 
 volt led by Zapata was a revolution founded on principle, and 
 thiat the Plan of Ayala is the clear and definite echo of an 
 agrarian revolution which will save the country. This letter, 
 published in "El Pais" on the 19th of June 1913, read as follows : 
 
 Washington, June 4th, 1913. 
 To the Editor of El Pais. 
 Dear Sir: 
 
 After much delay, I have at last received copies of news- 
 papers in Spanish from your city and from the southern fron- 
 tier of this country. I have read the articles as well as the news 
 items concerning my jpurney to the northern part of Mexico. 
 Some of these are groundless, others inexact. In order not to 
 make this letter too long, I will just correct the news items, for 
 since the articles are all written anonymously by my political 
 enemies, they do not deserve any comment or notice ; moreover, 
 the very same charges were made from the very same sources in 
 1912, and their falsehood has already been passed upon by those 
 in authority. As for the news items published by the press of 
 that city, I shall correct the most important. It has been stated 
 that the revolution of the North agreed to proclaim me Provis- 
 
OROZCO AND VASQiUEZ GOMEZ ^3 
 
 ional President as soon as the administration of 'this country 
 should recognize the belligerency of the revolutionists. This is 
 absolutely incorrect. In the conference I had in Piedras Negras 
 with Mr. Venustiano C'arranza, this was not even mentioned. 
 Besides, the United States has declared, and rightly, that it 
 will not recognize any government proceeding from violence. 
 Perhaps my approbation will surprise many who only seek that 
 by which they profit for the moment; I, however, seek as usual 
 only that by which our country will really profit. For this 
 reason, I believe that the precedent established by Mr. Wilson 
 is a guarantee for the legal administration of the countries, which 
 like ours, are frequently the scene of political revolutions. I 
 may be wrong, but, be that asi it may, I sincerely believe it. 
 
 It has been stated that I am working among the revolu- 
 tionists in order to be made provisional president when the re- 
 volution triumphs. This is absolutely groundless and false. 
 There is not a single rebel who can bear witness to such an en- 
 deavor. These rumors come from a source that every one knows 
 but which I shall call to mind in a very few words. 
 
 Politically, I figured in a secondary capacity in the revo- 
 lution of 1910. It was due to my efforts, though my enemies 
 deny it even at present, that the revolution did not complete- 
 ly fail. 
 
 At the time of the negotiations at Ciudad Juarez, had it 
 not been for intrigues, well known to all, I w^ould have been elect- 
 ed vice president of the Republic. The complete failure of the 
 revolution of 1910 followed my withdrawal from politics. I 
 do not, however, pretend to believe that this downfall was due 
 to my withdrawal. 
 
 Very well then; these facts as well as others that I do not 
 mention', because I am not trying to write history, are the ori- 
 gin of the good will shown me by the revolutionists of 1910, the 
 greater part of whom have again taken up arms; but between 
 this good will and leadership there is a vast difference. Oiie 
 of the newspapers of your city has said that the work ascribed 
 to me does not agree with my ideas of revolutionary unity ; that 
 lack of agreement would be true if the actions ascribed to me 
 were true, but as they are false, I confirm my ideas, and I still 
 believe that if there had been' unity in the revolution the country 
 would have been saved from anarchy and all its consequences. 
 It is not hard to prove that what I say is right. After the armed 
 
94 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHrF 
 
 moveiaent in the capital w'hich changed the order of things and 
 established a very serious precedent for the country, the revolu- 
 tion is still in full swingi and no one can say how or when it 
 will end. 
 
 But just as I am a friend of revolutionary unity when the 
 revolution is real and not imaginary, I am a decided enemy of 
 revolutions when they have no other aim but to change the per- 
 sonnel of the government. It has been clearly shown in our 
 country that the result of such a change does not compensate 
 for the blood shed. 
 
 Fortunately, the main object of the revolution of 1910 was 
 not to change the personnel of the Government. It tried 'to 
 institute a real reform, to solve the agrarian problem, to better 
 the economic conditions of the country, and to assure the wel- 
 fare and liberty of the people. 
 
 The agrarian revolution only roughly sketched in 1910, and 
 not understood by many has had a clear and well defined echo 
 in the Plan of Ayala;* it is a revolution of principles and not 
 of personal ambition, it originated in support of ideas and not 
 on behalf of men. This fact in itself is an advantage, because 
 when men are the standards, the practically inevitable result 
 is that the victorious leader or chief sets up a personal and tyran- 
 nical dictatorship which renders null and void the sacrifices 
 of the people. Our contemporaneous history is filled with eases 
 that bear out this statement. 
 
 Consequently convinced as I am of the true tendency of the 
 present revolution, my efforts cannot be directed in behalf of 
 one man, even though that man be myself, because principles 
 come before men, and when these principles triumph, men— 
 not one man — will appear to carry them out. 
 
 Begging you, Mr. Editor, to have this letter published in 
 your distinguished paper, and thanking you in advance, I beg 
 to remain, 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 (Signed) Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez. 
 
 In the north the revolution had begun to take a truly vaz- 
 quista character and Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez had even gone 
 
 *Signed by Zapata and written by Doctor Vazquez Gomez 
 himself. 
 
OiROtZCO AND VA'SQiUEZ GOMEZ 95 
 
 to Ciudad Juarez. Pascual Orozco, father of the leader of the 
 revolution in Chihuahua accorded him the honors due to the 
 Presidemt of the Republic. But, when on the following day he 
 received decisive orders to leave Mjexican soil, the revolutionists 
 themselves rescinded the title they had given him, and the re- 
 volution was thus left without an avowed leader. 
 
 Months later, in December, the principal leaders of the re- 
 volt issued a proclamaition in which they all adhered to the plan 
 of September 22, made public by Gieneral Gaudencio de la Llave 
 in the State of Puebla, 
 
 In Sinaloa, the revolution also had at the beginning a vaz- 
 quista tendency, but later, it recognized Paseual Orozco as its 
 head. Then all those who had personal ambitions tried to lure 
 Orozco to submission. Even 'the administration, under the di- 
 rection of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Jesus Flores Magon, 
 sent agents to the rebel leader to see whether his conditions were 
 acceptable to the government. Representative Juan Sarabia was 
 entrusted with this mission, but as hie was unable to come to an 
 agreement, negotiations were broken off. The league for Social 
 Defence headed by Alberto Garcia Granados, ex-Secretary of 
 the Interior, also opened negotiations with Olrozco, but the only 
 result was a friendly intercourse which in no way compromised 
 the leader of the revolution. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 RBLLANOS— CONEJOiS— BACHIMBA. 
 
 After his victory sit Rellanos, Pascual Orozco, Jr., had march- 
 ed southward, taking possession of Escalon, Zavalza, Conejos, 
 etcetera, and was approaching Tbrreon. The government real- 
 izing that he was the nucleus of the revolt, wished at any cost to 
 prevent his advance. It therefore sent a strong force undeir the 
 command of General Victoriano Huerta. General H'uerta was 
 a good soldier, well known throughout the army. H;e had studied 
 his profession scientifically at the Military College from which 
 he had been graduated with the rank of Staff Officer. Besides 
 this theoretic training, he hiad had a vast practical experience 
 for he had escorted General Diaz during his flight to Vera 
 Cruz; he had commanded the column against Zapata during de 
 la Barra's administration; he had been in command of the 3rd 
 Battalion of Infantry during the campaign against the rebels 
 of Guerrero, led by General Neri; he had later been sent to 
 Yucatan as second in command of the forces fighting the Maya 
 Indians in the Territory of Qiuintana Roo; and, lately, he had 
 been Commander in Chief of the campaign in Mbrelos.* There- 
 fore, well versed in military affairs, he calmly made prepara- 
 tions, leaving Mexico City on the 10th of April to assume com- 
 miand of his forces. Hie first went to Monterey where he con- 
 ferred with General Geronimo Ttevino, Chief of the 3rd Mdli- 
 t.iry Zone. General Treviiio was able to put at his command 
 forces organized by him comprising three thousand men 
 accustomed to the climate as well as to the mjethod of warfare 
 in that region. From Monterey, General Huerta went to Tor- 
 reon where he began his plan of attack, reorganizing the forces 
 left by General Gonzalez Salas. Towards the end of April he 
 
 *In all of their commandings. General Huerta was drowned 
 off, accused of misappropriation of funds. 
 
 (96) 
 
REiLLANOS-CONEJOS-BACHIMBA 97 
 
 began, to attack the position iheld by Orozco. He sent a detacliment 
 under Colonel Mercado with a repair train to restore the rail- 
 road towards Bermejillo. These repairs extended from Ber- 
 mejillo to Escalon, a distance of one hundred and twenty-one 
 kilometers, but as thie bridges were burned down and the railroad 
 destroyed, the advance of the main army was made very slow- 
 ly. In the meanwhile, Orozco was advancing towards the south, 
 having established headquarters at Escalon, After several at- 
 tempts to flank General Huerta's forces, among which were the 
 skirmishes at Tlahualilo and Cuatro Cienegas, the main encoun- 
 ter took place on the 11th of Miay, eight kilometers from the 
 station of Conejos. The result of the battle which ended on 
 the 12th, was that Orozco retreated toward the north taking 
 his position between Asunsolo and Corralitos. 
 
 The next battle was on the 22nd and 23rd of May on the 
 Canyon of Riellano. Once again thie artillery played an impor- 
 tant part in the struggle. Orozco 's forces had to retreat hur- 
 riedly toward Jimenez and there again met the federal in Ba- 
 chimba. While Orozco was fighting at Conejos and Rellano, he 
 had ordered his lieutenants to make flank movements in order 
 to cut off the retreat of Ceneral Htierta. In spite of the dis- 
 asters of Tlahualilo and Cuatro Cienegas, he ordered Campa 
 and Argumedo to start for the South with the inltention of tak- 
 ing Torreon just disoccupied by Oeneral Htuerta. The rebel 
 forces met and defeated Colonel Pena, the chief of the federal 
 troops at Velardena, forcing him to retreat to Pedriceiia, to Nazas 
 and to Picardias. There Colonel Pena met General Blanquete 
 who had been hurriedly sent North because of General Htuerta 's 
 reports concerning the movements of Orozco 's lieutenants. Blan- 
 quete had met and had been defeated by the revolutionists at La 
 Loma, a point near Aviles, about twenty-five kilometers from 
 Torreon. He had therefore, been forced to fall back to Picar- 
 dias, from where he sought assistance of the troops in Torreon. 
 Upon receiving reenforeements from Torreon, General Blan- 
 quete reorganized his forces and joined Colonel Pena. He was 
 then able to attack Argumedo, who was now alone. Campa had 
 gone to the assistance of Orozco who had been defeated by Gen- 
 eral Huerta on the very day, May 22nd, that General Blanquete 
 had been defeated by the revolutionists. Since Nazas, Pedri- 
 cena, and Velardena were by that time restored to the Federals, 
 Torreon was free from an attack and the rear of General Suer- 
 
98 FEjOM despotism TO ANAECHiY 
 
 ta's army was protected. He was therefore able to march with 
 entire freedom upon Orozco for the attack at Bachimba. 
 
 Before the beginning of the battle of Bachimba, General 
 Huerta ordered the concentration of all forces in the vicinity. 
 Among these was the division of Francisco Yilla, former highi- 
 wayman, afterwards revolutionist with Orozco, and at that mo- 
 ment Chief of the regiment of Rurales in the service of the 
 government. Villa arrived at the camp of General Huerta from 
 Parral where among other outrages committed by his troops he 
 himself had seized a handsome horse, the property of one of the 
 most prominent men of the place. Tlhie owner of the horse appealed 
 to General Huerta as Comjnander in Chief for the return of 
 his property. Hluerta ordered Villa to return the animal, not 
 to the owner but to headquarters, but Villa unaccustomed to 
 such things, most decidedly refused. General Hxierta was equal- 
 ly decided in his orders and an immediate clash ensued. The 
 result was the imprisonment of Villa and a summary sentence 
 of death on June 4th. Eaoul and Emilio Madero who command- 
 ed bodies of Rurales in the division of General Huerta, inter- 
 ceded in his behalf, and telegraphed to their brother, the Presi- 
 dent, the details of the affair. General Huerta suspended the 
 execution and upon the express command from the President 
 sent Villa as prisoner to Mlexico City.* Saved from death, Villa 
 arrived in Mexico City where he was put in Santiago prison. 
 He was soon allowed to escape and was even provided ^^dth the 
 means to flee to the United States. 
 
 Before General Huerta left Santa Rosalia, he was joined 
 by Mr. Abraham Gonzalez, Governor of Chihuahua. This gentle- 
 man had been obliged to hide when the capital of Chihuahua had 
 declared itself in favor of the revolution. General Huerta also 
 received a visit from a German merchant who as representative 
 of the merchants of Chihuahua, came to seek guarantees for the 
 residents who had contributed voluntarily or by force to the 
 revolution. General Huerta was soon jpined by General Sangines 
 who had marched from Ojinaga to reinforce him, and by Col- 
 onel Ortega who had received orders in Cuchillo Parado to join 
 him. Thus reinforced. General Htierta prepared for the 
 attack. The battle began on July 3rd at nine o'clock 
 
 *Huerta ordered the chiefs in command along Villa's route 
 to Mexico City to shoot him, but not one dared obey. 
 
REiLL'ANOS-CONlEJOS-BACHIMBA 99 
 
 in the morning and lasted until five o 'clock in the afternoon, 
 when the rebels were completely routed. This was not confirm- 
 ed until the following day when, upon the failure to receive an an- 
 swering fire from the rebels a reconnaissance was ordered. It 
 was then learned that the rebels had abandoned the field during 
 the previous night. 
 
 Orozco's forces reorganized at Mapula. However, they did 
 not interrupt their retreat, and instead of entering the City of 
 Chihuahua, kept right on to Mocitezuma. Since the nucleus of 
 Orozco's powerful army was now broken up, guerrilla warfare 
 began, a warfare that was to last until the revolt of the Ciud- 
 adela. Orozoo fell sick not long after and had to hide in order 
 to take care of himself. The real leadership of the rebellion then 
 fell on Jose Inez Salaz^ar. On the other side. General Hhiertia 
 also gave up the command of the division as he was forced to 
 go to Mexico City to be treated for a disease of the eyes that 
 was threatening him with blindness. Upon his arrival in Mex- 
 ico City, he went to the Sanatiorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia* 
 to be operated on by that skillful surgeon a few days later. In 
 the meantime, he was raised to the rank of General of Divis- 
 ion. But he did not again take the field, because the adminis- 
 tration, for some unknown reason, sub-divided his command, 
 placed Gjeneral Antonio RIabago over one part and General Joa- 
 quin Tellez over another. General Sangines who had also had 
 command of some of the troops was recalled to Mexico City as 
 was Colonel Rubio Navarrete, chief of the artillery. General 
 Huerta was greatly displeased at the course of action of the 
 government which kept deceiving him for a long time telling 
 him again and again' that he would shortly receive orders to 
 resume command of his division ; but he says he was mostly dis- 
 pleased because the leaders who had assisted him in his cam- 
 paign were not rewarded as he desired. Brigadier General Blan- 
 quete, who fought ceaselessly and untiringly ever since the fall 
 of General Diaz' administration, who had been wounded at the 
 battle of Rellano under General Gonzalez Salas, who had after- 
 wards so bravely protected the rear of General Huerta 's army, 
 who, recalled to Mexico to fight against Zapata now invad- 
 ing the States surrounding Morelos, biad not been accorded 
 the promotion so well earned. General Huerta himself had not 
 
 * Afterwards Secretary of Interior in Huerta 's adminis- 
 tration. 
 
100 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAKICH^^ 
 
 been promoted until after the battle of Bachimba although 
 Generals Lauro Vlillar, Jose Maria Mier, and Jose Maria Vega 
 had all received promotions the previous December. It is true 
 that some of the promotions, as for example, that of Greneral 
 Villar, were entirely justified, but none of the other generals 
 had fought for the Mladero government as had General Hlierta. 
 
 The very same thing happened with General Juvencio Robles, 
 who had fought for six months in Miorelos and had not yet been 
 rewarded. Had the administration made no promotions at all, 
 none of the generals would have felt slighted, but Mr. Madero 
 raised to Generals of Divisions leaders who had never been in 
 a single battle, and ignored those who had served him efficiently 
 and loyally. 
 
 In Oaxaca, immediately after the death of the Governor, 
 M]r. Juarez Maza, deceased on the 20th of April, there had begun 
 a revolt of the highlanders of the Ixtlan Mbuntains. In order 
 to quell it, the administration sent Brigadier General Manuel 
 Rivera who had been in charge of the 5th Mlilitary Zone, with 
 headquarters in the City of San Luis Potosi. General Rivera, 
 with tact and prudence, was successful in reestablishing peace 
 after severely punishing the leaders of the insurrection. He re- 
 ceived no recognition for his services from the administration 
 which seemed to wish to slight the ablesit leaders of the army 
 who served it best.* 
 
 *Brigadier Rivera was promoted on the last days of Madero 's 
 administration, but the promotion did not reach him until after 
 Madero 's downfall.— See chapter XXV. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE EliECTIONS IN VERA CRUZ. 
 
 The governors wlho had been elected to office at the triumph 
 of the revolution were only completing the unexpired term of 
 their predecessors; for this reason elections were due in Vera 
 Cruz and in Puebla, while in Oaxaca they were necessary be- 
 cause of the death of the constitutional governor. 
 
 Again Mr. Mladero entangled the electoral situation. For- 
 tunately the elections in Puebla were carried on without great 
 difficulty but those in Vera Cruz were the source of great 
 scandals. 
 
 In Vera Cruz many candidates had come to the fore. Among 
 the most important were: Representative Guillermo Pons, a 
 large landowner on ithe coast of Sotavento, very well thought 
 of in his state because he was intelligent, kindly, and well versed 
 in the politics of his country; Adrian Carranza, a merchant of 
 Vera Cruz, prominent in his city but little known throughout 
 the rest of the state ; Antonio Perez Rivera of Xalapa, a man of 
 culture but violent and passionate, little known in the state out- 
 side of Xalapa and the district of Jalacingo where his estates were 
 located ; Mr. Manuel M, Alegre, a newspaper man who had sided 
 with Mladero in his propaganda against General Diaz, and who 
 at the suggestion of Mr. Dehesa was the candidate of the members 
 of the State Legislature ; Ml*. HIilario Rodriguez Malpica, a naval 
 commander, chief aide to the President, known only in his native 
 city of Vera Cruz ; Mr. Tomas Braniff , son of a highly respected 
 American citizen, and although an intelligent man, phlegma- 
 tic alnuost to indolence; but he was a capitalist of Mexico City 
 and as such, able to spend a great deal of money on (his cam- 
 paign. Therefor,e, although completely unknown throughout 
 the state, except in Cordova where his wife is a large landowner, 
 
 (101) 
 
102 FR'O'M DESPOTISM] T0( AH'AKCHiY 
 
 he was neverthieless one of ithe strongest candidates for the rea- 
 son that he was able to make an expensive campaign as well as 
 an extensive one. The other candidates, comparatively unknown 
 citizens, were minor factors of no importance. 
 
 Of all the candidates, Mr. Madero at first favored his chief 
 of staff. This candidate was no* only, as we have said, com- 
 paratively unknown, but moreover, hie had no means at his dis- 
 posal to carry on his campaign. Convinced of these facts, Mir. 
 Madero soon realized that it would be impossible to impose him 
 except by brute force, which the government was in no position 
 to consider, much less to adopt. He then began to vacillate be- 
 tween Mr. Alegre, an old friend and co-religionist; Mr. Tomas 
 Braniff, who was backed by the vice president, Pino Suarez; 
 and Mr. Antonio Perez Rivera, candidate of the Catholic party. 
 Mr. Rivera was a close friend of Don Alfredo Alvarez, an in- 
 triguer whose official position— head of the President's household 
 —gave him daily intercourse with the President. Yacillating be- 
 tween these three candidates, M,adero, who was not bom intri- 
 gant, soon succeeded as usual in entangling himself hopelessly. 
 He broke completely with Mr. Braniff with the result that a 
 controversy was started between the two in which Braniff seem- 
 ed to be trying to force his candidacy by power of money, while 
 Madero, forgetting the dignity of his position, became a dema- 
 gogue, openly reproaching the methods of Braniff. The contro- 
 versy soon degenerated into nothing less than mud slinging, Mr. 
 Braniff going so far as even to give the lie to the President. 
 
 The whole fact of the mat^ter is that from the very begin- 
 ning, Mr. Miadero's one fear was that Mr. Pous might be elect- 
 ed. He was particularly opposed to this man because he had been 
 managing editor of the "El Debate," a newspaper which had 
 hotly campaigned against him in 1910.* 
 
 According to the press, Mr. Francisco Lagos, the governor, 
 was offered a large sum" of money to back the candidacy of Mr. 
 Braniff. The disclosure of this bribery caused such; an uproar, 
 that Madero judged it expedient to interfere; he called the prin- 
 cipal candidates to a meeting at the Castle of Chapultepec at 
 which he ordered the immediate removal from office of Mr. 
 Lagos Chazaro. As his successor he appointed Congressman 
 Manuel Levy to complete the unexpired term, pending the new 
 
 *Details in the complete Spanish edition. 
 
THE ELECTIONS IN VEKA CRiUZ 103 
 
 elections. Such an act was a direct encroachment on the sover- 
 eignity of the State, but it was done openly by Mkdero without 
 any attempt at disguise, and without taking its significance into 
 account. 
 
 Mr. Lagos retired in favor of Mr. Levy as ordered. In pre- 
 paration for the elections, Mr. Levy's first act was to remove 
 many prefects who had had dealings with Mr. Braniff. A ma- 
 jority of the new officials appointed, recommended by the mem- 
 bers of the Legislature, were friends of Mr. Alegre, for the Legis- 
 lature was hand in glove with ex-Governor Dehesa. At the time, 
 however, their only instructions were to accomplish the de- 
 feat of Mr. Pons, since Madero was still obsessed by his 
 animosity towards the former editor of "El Debate." As 
 a matter of fact, Mr. Pous had a state wide popularity 
 and was really the best fitted for the office. Besides, 
 owin,g to the fact that he had guaranteed to maintain peace in 
 Vera Cruz, he was also the candidate most advantageous to the 
 Central Government. Mr. Madero in league with a majority of 
 the State Legislature, openly favored -the candidacy of Mr. 
 Alegre. In the meantime, partisans of Perez Rivera, consist- 
 ing in the main of the Catholic Party which had first nominated 
 him, were successful in winning G^abriel Gavira over to their 
 support. Gavira was a former carpenter who had run against 
 Lagos Chazaro. After his defeat at the elections for governor, 
 he had publicly declared himself against the local government, 
 for which he had been imprisoned in Ulua. With Gavira* on 
 his side, Mr. Perez Rivera was soon able to gain the support of 
 the working class. They had been wavering between all the 
 candidates, though with leanings toward Mir. Pous. But now at 
 the call of a comrade they flocked around Gavira 's ally and be- 
 gan an active campaign for him. The greatest aid lent by 
 Gavira to Perez Rivera was that, through his old friendship with 
 Madero and through his old reputation as a revolutionist, he 
 was able to win over the President who now declared himself 
 in favor of the candidate of the Catholic party. This in turn 
 caused Gustavo Madero and naturally Pino Suarez to desert 
 Braniff and support the candidate favored by the President. 
 
 The elections held on the last Sunday in July showed Mr. 
 Pous victorious with thirty-eight thousand votes against thirty- 
 four thousand for Perez Rivera, fourteen^ thousand for Alegre, ele- 
 
 *S'ee chapter XI. 
 
104 FROM DESPOTISM TO AiNAECHY 
 
 ven thousand for Braniff, and the balance scattered among the 
 remaining candidates. The votes east for Mr. Alegre were gen- 
 erally fraudelent ; those cast for Mr. Braniff were obtained only 
 by the power of his money; thus there were only two real and 
 legitimate contenders and the decision now lay with the Legis- 
 lature. The members whose term was about to expire, refused 
 to render a decision. Therefore, in order to induce them to 
 act on that way, they were led to believe that all the intrigants 
 would be reelected. In fact, Llr. Levy gave credentials to five, 
 credentials which were revoked when the services of the re- 
 presentatives were no longer needed. 
 
 The prefects, realizing that the results of the elections would 
 greatly displease the President of the Repablic, began to with- 
 hold votes east for the popular candidate. The new Legislature 
 was composed entirely of partisans of Braniff and Perez Ri- 
 vera because the credentials of the Dehesistas had been rejected 
 and the votes of the partisans of Pons had been declared null 
 and void by the Board of Elections under pressure of the pre- 
 fects. Nearly twenty thousand votes for Mr. Pons were thrown 
 out, with the result that Mjr. Perez Rivera now showed a major- 
 ity, and was duly declared Governor of the State. 
 
 In this election, frauds more flagrant than those during 
 the elections for congressmen were perpetrated. But the govern- 
 ment was fortunate in that the defeated candidates were serious 
 minded men like Mr. Pons who accepted the decision of the 
 Legislature, and putting politics aside, went about their busi- 
 ness, or like the others, were men of little or no importance. 
 Therefore, no revolution resulted directly from the election, 
 but it left a bad taste and paved the way for a revolutionary 
 movement in the future. 
 
 The question in Vera Cruz had not been quite settled when 
 there was trouble in Tlaxcala. The Governor, Antonio Hidalgo, 
 although his term had expired and it was so declared by the 
 Legislature, refused to turn over the office to his successor. 
 Tlie governor-elect was practically under siege in the Capitol 
 and it was necessary to send regulars to his aid. The situation 
 was further complicated when the commander of the irregular 
 troops, Rafael Tapia, a former revolutionist under Madero, sided 
 Math Mr. Hidalgo. It was then necessary for the government to 
 send troops, and only upon their arrival did the retiring governor 
 surrender his office. 
 
THE ELECTIONS IN VEKiA CRiUZ 105 
 
 In Chiapas, Madero, in order to please his friend, Flavio 
 Guillen, appointed him governor.* First, though, he forced the 
 incumbent, Mr. Reynaldo Gordillo Leon, to resign by appointing 
 him Minister to Guatemala. The appointment of Mr. Guillen, who 
 was very unpopular in the state, caused unrest and dissatisfac- 
 tion. After a short time, Mt. Reynaldo Gordillo Leon resigned as 
 Minister to Guatemala and returned to Mexico to resume his 
 office as governor. Madero unwillingly gave his consent to this 
 procedure, but not until the storm had broken and his overthrow 
 was inevitable. 
 
 *It was thereupon stated in Mexico City that the appointment 
 of Mr. Guillen was made at the urgent request of the President of 
 Guatemala, who offered im exchange, to prevent any revolutions 
 against the ]\Iexican government from being fomented on the 
 Guatemalan frontier. M]r. Guillen was charged to be a former 
 Guatemala spy. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 TH'E FIRST MILITARY REVOLT.— VERA CRUZ. 
 
 The loss of prestige of the governinent was increasing in 
 geometric progression ; a revolution, though not in tangible form, 
 was in the air and everybody felt that it was bound to break 
 out at any moment. Moreover, it was suspected that Brigadier 
 General Felix Diaz was at the head of it. He had asked to be 
 retired from the army and had suddenly left the capital for 
 Vera Cruz where he had taken up his residence. 
 
 Tihe government, unable to shut its eyes to these facts, sent 
 two detectives to shadow him constantly. In addition Secretary 
 Hernandez commissioned Mr. Celso Acosta* to go to Vera Cruz 
 to secure all possible information as to the actions and inten- 
 tions of General Diaz. This was inconceivable stupidity for 
 there was nobody who did not know that Acosta was closely 
 allied with Diaz, and was in fact one of his most ardent suppor- 
 ters and as deep in the conspiracy as the ex-General himself. 
 Their relative position then was that the government was de- 
 luding itself with the idea that it had Diaz under strict surveil- 
 lance, while as a matter of fact Diaz was well posted as to every 
 move of the government. Things kept on in this way until fi- 
 nally one day Diaz disappeared. He left the house of his brother 
 in law, Notary Aleolea, with the avowed intention of going to 
 the Regatta Club, but he failed to return. The fact was known 
 in Mexico City that very afternoon as pre-arranged, and the 
 government, learning of it through rumor, immediately tele- 
 graphed its agents. They reported that Felix Diaz was still in 
 Vera Cruz closely watched by them. Within a few hours they 
 admitted they were unable to see their charge because upon in- 
 quiry at his home they learned that he was ill and unable to 
 receive callers. They still insisted that he had not left the city. 
 
 *Former secretary of Mr. Felix Diaz when he was Police 
 Commissioner. 
 
 (106) 
 
THE FIRStT MILIT'ARiY RCEVOLT 107 
 
 In the meantime, Felix Diaz ihad proceeded from Vera Cruz 
 to Orizaba where Colonel Diaz Ordaz was stationed with most 
 of the 21st Battalion. Diaz had persuaded this Colonel to begin the 
 movement of the revolt against Miadero's government, proclaiming 
 Diaz himself head of the nation. Owing to the fact that the con- 
 spirators took absolutely no precautions, the government knew on 
 the following day where Diaz was hiding ; but still it hesitated 
 to order his arrest, and still Secretary Hiernandez continued to 
 depend on Celso Acosta even going so far as to assign to him the 
 task of confirming the news.* Needless to say, Acosta immedi- 
 ately notified Diaz that his hiding place was discovered and 
 urged him to hurry matters. On the night of October 15th, 
 Colonel Diaz O'rdaz demanded special trains for the purpose of 
 transferring his force from Oirizaba to Vera Cruz where he ar- 
 rived on the morning of the 16th. 
 
 At that time, General Hernandez, head of the Prison of 
 Ulua, was provisional Military Conunander of the city. The 
 rebels of course attempted to win him over to their side by al- 
 luring inducements; but G-eneral Hernandez refused all over- 
 tures and remained a prisoner in Military Headquarters, under 
 guard of the men of the 21st B'attalion, commanded by Colonel 
 Diaz Oirdaz. Nevertheless, Gieneral Hernandez devised the fol- 
 lowing stratagem to obtain his freedom : Be requested permission 
 to go to Ulua for his family. Upon receiving it, he proeeeded 
 thence under escort, or rather in the custody of two officers be- 
 longing to the rebel force. When he arrived at Ulua, where he 
 lie was still the acknowledged head as well as commander of all 
 the troops in that post. General Hjemandez, as he entered the 
 guard house, ordered the arrest of his two guards. Thus he not 
 only regained his freedom but he also placed the prison be- 
 yond the power of the rebels. Commodore Azueta, chief of the 
 Arsenal, had acted in more or less the same way. Hie also had 
 been removed at daybreak from his home and invited to join 
 the rebels. Upon learning what their intentions were, without 
 giving a definite consent, he said he would gO' on board one of 
 the warships to see that there was no disorder. No sooner had 
 he boarded the Morelos, than hei hoisted the ensign of Comman- 
 der in Chief of the fleet. A number of the commanders of the 
 
 *I obtained this information on October 14th, 1912, from 
 Antonio Villaviciencio head of the detective force in charge of the 
 political bureau. 
 
108 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 vessels had gone ashore to receive orders from General Diaz: 
 these he supplanted by the second in command. He thus put 
 the fleet beyond the power of the revolutionists even though the 
 commanders had agreed to assist the rebellion. In the early 
 morning, Colonel Diaz Ordaz marshalled his troops, and at their 
 head, paraded through the streets proclaiming the downfall of 
 the Madero government, and acclaiming Felix Diaz as Provis- 
 ional Head of the Nation, at the same time rendering him all 
 honors due the President. 
 
 The news spread like wildfire throughout the country and 
 the very audacity of the coup delivered at Vera Cruz gained for 
 it sympathizers on all sides even though not a single military 
 chief supported the uprising. As a whole, the army continued 
 loyal to the constitutional government: in spite of the great dis- 
 content evident throughout the country. 
 
 All communication with Vera Cruz was cut off and there- 
 fore the government could learn what was happening there 
 only by cable. Thus it was that for several days the public did 
 not learn the real attitude of the fleet, a very important fact, 
 because had the rebels been able to^ count on its support, they 
 could have takeni possession of the remaining Gulf Ports. The 
 government would then have been in sore straits. It had strong 
 evidence that the fleet commanders were in league with Diaz 
 but at the same time it had the conviction that Azueta had taken 
 command of the squadron and was on board the Morelos. His 
 unwillingness to land left no doubt as to his lack of sympathy 
 with the revolutionary movement. The capture of Vera Cruz 
 M^as of grave importance for several reasons, firstly, because there 
 was a large quantity of munitions of war in the Warehouses of 
 the Custom Houses, which gave the rebel leader means for arm- 
 ing eight thousand men, furnishing them with heavy artillery 
 and machine guns which had just arrived from Europe; secondly, 
 because there were large amounts of available funds, for there 
 were not only those produced by the Customs as well as large 
 amounts in the banks, but there was also the possibility of induc- 
 ing the merchants and brokers of the city to pay their indebted- 
 ness to the Custom House within short terms by offering them dis- 
 counts; and finally, because revolts once started by the soldiery 
 would take root with the result that occurrences like that 
 in Vera Cruz would soon be duplicated at other points. The 
 government, therefore, took immediate steps to smother the move- 
 
THE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT 109 
 
 ment and ordered General Joaquin Beltran, recently appointed 
 Military Commander of the city tibongh not yet in command, 
 to march with all his available forces to recapture the seced- 
 ed city. 
 
 The advance was at once begun by the troops stationed on 
 the Isthmus of Tehuantepec under Brigadier Zozaya, and those 
 in Xalapa under Brigadier Celso Vega. From Mexico City there 
 were sent the 2nd, 11th, and 18th Regiments under their respective 
 heads, Lieutenant Colonel O'caranza, Colonel Jimenez Castro, 
 and Brigadier Agustin Valdez, as well as a body of volunteers 
 from Xico, commanded by Captains Limon and Preciados, and 
 a body of irregular troops under General Tapia, and two bat- 
 teries commanded by Captains Oropeza and Prida. Later or- 
 ders were sent to Colonel Blanquete instructing him to proceed 
 with his regiment, the 29th Infantry, to reenforce the column 
 under General Beltran, while bodies of Rurales stationed at 
 Tehuacan, Perote and Tierra Blanca were mobilized and sent 
 under Brigadiers Davila and Gtistavo Maas to cooperate in the 
 attack on the city. 
 
 Vera Cruz was defended by the 21st regiment brought by 
 Colonel Diaz Ordaz from Orizaba, by a part of the 19th 
 which had been stationed in the city, and by the stationary bat- 
 teries of Vera Cruz consisting of six cannon mounted on one 
 of the forts and a few cannon of little tactical value. 
 
 When he arrived before Vera Cruz, General Beltran began 
 to entrench himself around the city. General Felix Diaz had 
 believed that General Beltran would make common cause with 
 him in view of their friendly relations and comradeship, but 
 the steps taken by the commander of the column admitted no 
 doubt as to his attitude in the matter even though the tone of his 
 messages to Ceneral Diaz declining to join the revolt was quite 
 affectionate. As each detachment of federals arrived before the 
 city, Felix Diaz would send emissaries to the leaders to try tc 
 win them over to his cause; but none of them accepted his over- 
 tures. Some replied that if a general revolt embracing the whole 
 army were intended, they would lend their co-operation, but 
 that in no case would they initiate a revolt nor would they lend 
 themselves to isolated movements. Others, like Colon.el Jimenez 
 Castro, replied that if any person should again come to him with 
 such overtures or missives he would shoot him down on the spot. 
 The inferior officers who were approached, invariably replied 
 
110 FRiOM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 that tbey would only act in conjiinction with their superior 
 officers. These mediations which were carried on by various 
 persons, some passing themselves as members of the Red Cross, 
 and others as newspaper correspondents, lasted up to the very 
 moment of the fall of the city. 
 
 Felix Diaz judg'ed that the underlying note of the replies sent 
 him was really one of adherence, for he believed that the whole 
 army would support him; in fact he was convinced that every 
 division arriving before Vera Cruz would make common cause 
 with him. 
 
 The arrangements he made for defense were without rhyme 
 or reason ; not even what had happened with Commodore Azueta 
 and Brigadier Hernandez caused him to take precautions ; every- 
 thing was in disorder and confusion. From the Coast of Sota- 
 vento he received reports to the effect that there was great en- 
 thusiasm for his cause, that if arms and ammunition were sent, 
 an army of nearly four thousand men could be raised to arrest 
 the advance of General Zozaya and his forces. General Diaz 
 replied by ordering these men to proceed immediately to Vera 
 Cruz, an absurdity of which he soon became convinced since 
 it was ridiculous to suppose that a column of such strength 
 could undertake an advance unarmed as it was, without making 
 it not only possible but easy for General Zozaya to intercept 
 and annihilate it with only five hundred well armed men. Con- 
 vinced of this fact, Diaz ordered that arms be sent by train under 
 a guard commanded by Miajor Zarate and one of his aides. 
 When the train arrived at its destination it was found that only 
 the officers were on board as the arms had been left behind in 
 Vera Cruz. This naturally served to greatly discourage the re- 
 volutionists of Sotavento, and was the cause of desertion of many, 
 who, grasping the situation, realized that with leaders such as 
 those in Vera Cruz, disaster was inevitable. Diaz, in order to 
 obtain funds with which to pay the revolted troops and the peo- 
 ple who had joined him, sent for the Collector of Ctistoms, 
 Mr. Azcarraga, and ordered him to turn over to the paymaster 
 all the funds at hand in his office. Mr. Azcarraga pretended that 
 since all his funds were deposited in the bank it would be neces- 
 sary for him to go to the Custom House to make out the neces- 
 sary cheque. As a matter of fact, he did go to his office to secure 
 the cheque book, but thereupon, accompanied by his Account- 
 ant, he escaped on board the gunboat Morelos which flew the 
 
THlE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT 111 
 
 ensign of the Commander in Chief, Commodore Az-ueta, and 
 thus made a laughing stock of Diaz. 
 
 There remained a few funds in the Treasury of the General 
 Treasurer's Office which General Diaz seized to pay his troops. 
 He even continued to pay the men of the fleet and allowed them 
 to obtain their supplies in the very city itself. In this way in- 
 tercourse was maintained between the land and naval forces to 
 such an extent that not even Vera Cruz, let alone the general 
 public, could determine whether the naval forces favored the 
 rebels or favored the government. 
 
 However, the government itself was fuUy informed of the 
 true state of affairs because Commodore Azueta had communi- 
 cated by cable with the Secretary of War. There was also in- 
 tercourse between the opposing land forces for the messengers 
 of General Diaz had free access to the Federal camp, while at 
 the same time federal spies could enter the city unmolested. 
 Since, as we have stated, overtures were made to superior and 
 inferior officers of the federals up to the very moment of the 
 attack, and since, in spite of the repeated refusals, Diaz never 
 for one instant doubted that the whole army would join him, 
 it is not out of place to ask, why these illusions? "Were they 
 merely deceits practised by the emissaries in order always to ob- 
 tain money, or were they incomprehensible illusions of Diaz? 
 This is a mystery impossible to fathom. But the fact remains that 
 although not one single officer accepted the overtures, there was 
 not one, with the exception of Colonel Jimenez Castro that gave a 
 decisive refusal warranted to convince Diaz that the path he pro- 
 posed to follow was impossible. These symptoms of wavering 
 were fatal to the government, for they clearly showed that the 
 officers of the federal forces were defending the government 
 only half heartedly, merely from a sense of discipline; but this 
 would easily disappear if a daring man in whom all officers 
 had complete confidence should place himself at the head of 
 the rebellion. The government did not notice this fact or if 
 it did, failed to give it the importance it deserved. When the 
 federal forces placed at his command had assembled. General 
 Beltran notified the residents of the city to betake themselves 
 to the neutral zone which had been designated at the request of 
 the foreign consuls, and on the 22nd of October at six A. M. he 
 began the attack. The attacking force was divided into several 
 columns, one under Colonel Jimenez Castro entering' the city 
 
112 FKOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 from the north; another under General Agustin Valdez, advanc- 
 ing from the east through the Parque Ciriaco Vazquez ; a third 
 under Brigadier Celso Vega entering from the southeast; and 
 the fourth under Brigadier Zozaya, approaching the cemetery 
 from the south. The artillery under Brigadier GrUstavo M'aas 
 took up a position on the sand dunes commanding the whole 
 city. A body of irregular troops conunanded by Don Eafael 
 Tapia, formerly a saddle maker, but promoted to general during 
 the revolution, took up a position between the forces of General 
 Valdez and those of General Vega. 
 
 The defenders of the city held positions on high places such as 
 the railroad terminal, the roof of the City Hall, the tower of the 
 Church of the Parroquia, the match factory, as well as on 
 the roofs of the tallest buildings of the principal streets, but 
 they failed to send out scouts and to erect breastworks. In fact, 
 all their actions indicated clearly that they were commanded by 
 a brainless soldier. 
 
 At the first exchange of shots, the federal artillery com- 
 pletely silenced that of the rebels and put it out of commission ; 
 at the second discharge, the roundhouse at the railroad terminal 
 was abandoned by the rebels. It must be noted here that such 
 a blunder was inexcusable. The roundhouse had been occupied 
 by fifty men whose -object no one has ever explained, especially if 
 we take into consideration the fact that just across the way 
 from this building there existed at the time an extensive trench 
 about seven feet wide by four feet deep throughout its length. 
 This trench could have been used as a protection by the sharp- 
 shooters had it been necessary to defend this point. Neverthe- 
 less, instead of taking advantage of this available defence, the 
 soldiers were shut in the roundhouse which had no loopholes 
 and served only to render the force useless. The assaulting 
 party soon learned this fact and ordered their artillery fire to 
 be aimed at the building which could not have withstood a 
 bombardment. This the defending officers realized so well that 
 at the second discharge they abandoned their position. When 
 Colonel Jimenez Castro, who led the attack against that part of 
 the city saw that the soldiers were abandoning the building, he 
 charged them sharply. Thrown into disorder, they retreated 
 headlong towards the center of the city. General Diaz had left 
 his home on horseback at: early dawn to inspect his lines of de- 
 fense, reaching the railroad terminal just when the attack was 
 
THE FIRST MILITARY ElEVOLT 113 
 
 begun. He was still fully under the impression that this was 
 n]ierely a sham and that the attacking party would declare it- 
 self for him. In vain did his companions try to persuade him 
 that this was no sham since the bullets were even now beginning 
 to fall near them. Diaz remained firm in his idea that he would 
 be joined by the opposing force and that the attack was nothing 
 but a farce. As the firing grew hotter, his aides forced him to 
 seek shelter in the city hall where they dismounted and pro- 
 ceeded to the roof.* Meanwhile Colonel Jimenez Castro had 
 pursued the fleeing rebels through Main and 5 de Mayo Streets, 
 passing through the Parque Ciriaco Yazquez where he met Gen- 
 eral Valdez who had advanced tO' this point without meeting with 
 opposition. General Valdez informed Colonel Castro that in his 
 opinion it was not yet time for an advance ; he had not only not 
 encountered the enemy, but had also lost touch with Headquar- 
 ters and therefore was receiving no orders. Colonel Castro re- 
 plied that the time was so ripe that he was even then in pur- 
 suit of General Diaz, apparently whom he had seen through 
 his field glasses retreating from the Terminal making for 
 the barracks of La Merced. Colonel Castro continoied his 
 advance. When he arrived at the corner of Benito Juarez and 
 Main Streets, he divided his forces into two columns. One, un- 
 der Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza, he ordered to proceed along 
 Benito Juarez Street to the Customs Warehouses, thence to the 
 right towards the Municipal Building, which it should enter 
 through the north wing of the Prefecture, The other with him- 
 self at the head, he led along Main Street towards the barracks 
 of La Mierced. As he passed the Portales de Diligencias, he was 
 struck by the fact that he had not been fired on by the troops 
 in the Parroquia nor yet by those on the roof of the Town 
 Hall; but without stopping to investigate the reasons for this, 
 he proceeded at quick step until he arrived at the Cafe 
 Zamora where he encountered an armed detachment of citi- 
 zens advancing from' the opposite direction under command of 
 Major Delgado. This force' did not fire, but the two officers 
 met and there ensued a violent altercation which ended by Major 
 Delgado firing at Colonel Castro and at the same time ordering 
 the troops on the roofs to fire. As Colonel Castro fell wounded 
 
 *I obtained this information from Mr. Enrique Tejedor 
 Pedroza who was with General Felix Diaz that morning and was 
 captured with him. 
 
114 FROM DESPOTISM! TO ANARCHY 
 
 lie fired pointblank at Mlajor Delgado, killing him instantly. He 
 then attempted to rise, but his horse, also wounded, had him 
 pinned down by one leg making it impossible for him to move. 
 His faithful comet then ran to his assistance and by raising the 
 dying horse enabled the Colonel to extricate himself. This 
 deed cost him his life, for his body had served as a shield 
 for his Colonel, against the bullets which were poured on 
 him from the roofs. Colonel Castro dragged himself to the 
 Cafe Zamora, miraculously escaping a certain death. His field 
 glasses and his watch had deflected two bullets which had struck 
 him in the skirmish. When the men of the 11th Regiment saw 
 their Colonel fall, they resolutely charged upon the house from 
 which the volleys had been fired and quickly dislodged the enemy. 
 This was really the only encounter of the assault in which any 
 blood was shed, hence the small number of fatalities. In 
 the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza arrived at the Pre- 
 fecture and ascended to the roof of the building, in which, as we 
 have noted. General Diaz then was. Lieutenant O'caranza met 
 General Diaz on the staircase as the latter was descending from 
 the roof with several citizens and two aides. ' ' You are my pris- 
 oner," exclaimed the federal officer. "How is that?" asked 
 Diaz, "Have you not joined me?" They were in the 
 midst of this dialogue when General Valdez, who had advanced 
 with his forces against the Municipal Hall, entered and com- 
 manded Diaz to surrender his arms. 
 
 Diaz handed General Valdez a Mauser which he carried slung 
 from his shoulder and a revolver from the holster at his hip. 
 Neither of these arms had been discharged even once. His com- 
 panions then surrendered as prisoners of General Valdez. 
 The city had fallen into the hands of the government 
 with no effort at all. Why did Diaz persist in his error up to 
 the last moment? The answer is simple. Negotiations were 
 steadily carried on to win over to his cause not only the com- 
 manding officers but even their staffs. In fact they were car- 
 ried on to such a degree that as a column was entering Miguel 
 Lerdo Street on the point of beginning an assault, the leader, 
 an officer in a battalion of irregular troops, was approached 
 with overtures to join the rebels. While the officer hesitated, 
 women of the town surrounded him and urged him earnestly to 
 jioin the revolt. They tied towels and handkerchiefs around 
 the rifles of the soldiers, all the time hurrahing for Felix Diaz. 
 
THE FIRST MILITAB)Y EIEYQLT 115 
 
 The poor officer, either utterly confused or else convinced that the 
 same thing had happened with the other columns as no firing had 
 been heard, continued his march accompanied by the shouts of the 
 populace, who flocked to the balconies believing as they saw him 
 march by, that the whole force had joined Felix Diaz. The latter 
 from the roof of the Mlunieipal Hall saw the column advancing 
 with what appeared to be white flags and heard his name acclaim- 
 ed ; he therefore, naturally supposed that his victory was an accom- 
 plished fact and gave orders to cease firing. He then descended to 
 receive the federals whom he believed to- have come over to his 
 side. The above column had just reached 'the Plaza de Armas, 
 when, as before stated. Colonel Jimenez Castro with his forces 
 marched past. This explains why he was not greeted with vol- 
 leys from the tower of the Parroquia nor yet from the roofs of 
 the Municipal Building, and why no one seemed to be aware of 
 what was actually happening. However, when Lieutenant Colonel 
 Qicaranza, with part of the 11th Regiment, reached the Pre- 
 fecture and observing the actions of the irregulars, sharply 
 called them to order. These soldiers in reality had no interest 
 either way in the struggle, and mierely followed their officers 
 like sheep. Therefore, as soon as they saw themselves shut in 
 by General Yaldez, they began shouting for Colonel O'caranza 
 and returned to their allegiance to the jgiovemmient, which they 
 had foresworn but a few moments before. This action, though, 
 was due more to the stupidity of their conOmander than to their 
 feelings of sympathy for the revolution. Theses circumstances 
 led to the belief that Ceneral Bieltran had made use of an 
 unsoldiery stratagem to gain possession of the town. It can- 
 not be denied that the irregular soldiers did actually ar- 
 rive at the City Hall flying white flags, for this deed was wit- 
 nessed by many residents of Vlera Cruz, but it can be asserted 
 that neither Colonel Jimenez Castro nor Lieutenant Colonel 
 Ocaranza authorized such a deed nor did they avail themselves 
 of it in the capture of Ceneral Diaz. This can be testified to 
 by all the residents of Vera Cruz who saw the federal regulars 
 participate in the assault and duly engaging in the fighting which 
 took place. Diaz, as may be seen, had some reason for falling 
 into the error. The replies to his overtures were not decisively 
 negative on the part of the federal leaders, but on the contrary, 
 were evasive audi hinted at the possibility of au' understanding 
 with him. If G'eneral Beltran had listened to the overtures and 
 
116 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 had consulted his officers, an agreemjent favorable to the revolt 
 might have been made because the sympathy of the officers 
 with the exception of Colonels Jimenez Castro and Ocaranza, 
 lay with Diaz. As we have said, they were only deterred by their 
 inherent habit of discipline and their honor as soldiers. As 
 a matter of fact, their real feelings were such that if the call 
 had been formally issued by a leader of prestige, or if they could 
 have seen that the revolt was headed by a true soldier, that 
 very day would have witnessed the fall of the government. Ji- 
 menez Castro and Ocaranza would have been powerless to stay 
 the revolt. But General Bteltran did not accede to the offers 
 nor did he waver or if he did waver, he concealed it well, for he 
 made no mention whatever of the affair to his staff. His char- 
 acter, quixotic and formalistic, gave his reply to the proposals 
 of Diaz an under current which might indicate a possibility of 
 concurrence with him although his actual words carried a direct 
 refusal. I repeat, though, that in his own mind, there was no 
 thought that the friendly tone of his reply could be open to double 
 construction or could be interpreted as aceedinigi to the proposals 
 submitted ; neither his words nor his deeds show even the faintest 
 shadow of treason. 
 
 Immediately upon the surrender of General Diaz, all his 
 troops stationed in the Parroquia, in the barracks, and in the 
 match factory, began to disperse and their officers went into 
 hiding to escape the death prescribed by the military code, which 
 they felt sure would be their fate. 
 
 As soon as Brigadier Valdez had captured the city and ar- 
 rested the rebel leader, he notified headquarters, but the 
 Commander in Chief did not march into the city until five 
 o'clock that afternoon. Immediately upon receipt of the news 
 in Mexico City, Captain Gustavo Garmendia,* son-in-law of 
 General Beltran and Military Aide to the President, was sent in 
 a special train with full instructions to convene a drumihead 
 courtmartial at once for the execution of the leaders of the revolt. 
 On the following day, Oetober 23rd, the necessary orders 
 were issued and on the 24th, the special court was convened, com- 
 posed of Generals Maas and Vega, and Colonels Zaldo and Fi- 
 gueroa., and presided over by General Rafael Davila. The deliber- 
 ations of the Court lasted until the 25th at which time sentence of 
 
 *K!illed when assaulting Ctiliacan at the head of a constitu- 
 tional force in October 1913. 
 
THE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT 117 
 
 death was pronounced against Felix Diaz, Colonel Migoni, Major 
 Fiernando Zarate, and Lieutenant Salustio Lima. A sentence 
 of ten years imprisonment was imposed on Captains Manuel 
 Mallen, Hermilo Martinez, and Lieutenant Oscar Camacho. Na- 
 val Lieutenant Vicente Solache and Tejedor Pedroza, a civilian, 
 were acquitted. 
 
 The friends of Felix Diaz had at once actively sought the 
 District Judge to obtain a writ of Habeas Corpus and a sus- 
 pension of the proceeding of the Drumhead Courtmartial, which 
 had convened in strict infraction of the Military Code; but it 
 proved impossible to find the Judge of the District of Vera 
 Cruz. As every minute was precious, they appealed to the First 
 District Judge of the City of Mexico. This official, acting against 
 the law, admitted the appeal and by telegraph requested full in- 
 formation from the drumhead courtmartial, but owing to the 
 fact that the President of that Court had given strict orders 
 that under no circumstances were its proceedings to be interrupt- 
 ed, Gieneral Davila did not receive this telegram until sentence 
 had been pronounced and the Court adjourned sine die. 
 
 Colonel Diaz Ordaz, one of the chief instigators of the revolt 
 and in fact the most seriously implicated of them all, had suc- 
 ceeded in escaping. Protected by some Spanish merchants, he 
 remained concealed in Vera Cruz for a few days. When the 
 police slightly relaxed their vigilance, he left the city disguised 
 as a milkman with a young Spaniard who was willing to under- 
 take the hazardous task of guiding him to Tiixtepec. Unfor- 
 tunately, they stopped for a drink at a wine shop in the out- 
 skirts of the city, where they were recognized by a policeman who 
 immediately notified his superiors. A police officer and a de- 
 tective were sent in pursuit. When Colonel Otdaz arrived at 
 Boca del Rio, a town near Vera Cruz, he again stopped to quench 
 ' his thirst and there he was found by his pursuers and arrested 
 together with his companion without offering the least resis- 
 tance. He was taken to Vera Cruz M^here he was remanded that 
 very day to the custody of the military authorities for trial by 
 courtmartial in its regular sessions. 
 
 Only Captain Ordorica really succeeded in escaping. With 
 one hundred soldiers, he took refuge in the nearby mountains, 
 that is, in the Sierra Negra running from Zongoliea to Misantla 
 and separating the central part of Vera Cruz from the coast 
 of Barlovento. HIere he continued in rebellion until the subse- 
 
118 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 quent revolt in the Ciudadela. A few days after his escape, he 
 was pursued from Vera Cruz by Lieutenant Ocaranza, now a 
 Colonel, commanding the 11th Battalion. Jimenez Castro, former 
 commander of this Battalion, had been sent seriously wounded to 
 the Military Hospital of Mexico City from which he was trans- 
 ferred to the private Sanatorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia. 
 
 An incident worthy of mention occurred during the siege 
 of Vera Cruz. The prison was in charge of a detachment of the 
 21st Infantry, and although the Superintendent of the prison 
 placed no confidence in them, he was in no position to have them 
 relieved. He did, however, take all the precautions in his power 
 but even so, he was unable to prevent a revolt which was 
 started by the reserves stationed daily on the northern break- 
 water connecting the city to the islet. These reserves attempted 
 to incite the whole prison. Captain Avalos, commanding the 
 troops, was the instigator, and was ably seconded by Lieutenant 
 Salustio Lima, commanding the reserves as well as the main 
 guard on the islet itself. The shouts and the cries of the sol- 
 diers brought General Hernandez to the scene. He imposed him- 
 self so forcibly upon them that he prevented an abandonment of 
 the prison, and kept the disturbance from extending to the pris- 
 eners insid'e. He was, however, unable to prevent the escape 
 of Lieutenant Lima and the soldiers under his command. They 
 were fired upon by Conunander Azueta from the gunboat Mbre- 
 los but without success. Lieutenant Lima ran along the break- 
 water carrying his wife in his arms and answering the fire from 
 the fleet and from the fort. He finally reached the city in safety 
 where he received an ovation for the courage and coolness he 
 bad displayed. Captain Avalos disappeared nobody knew when 
 nor how. 
 
 When sentence was pronoimced on the prisoners of war, 
 they were confined in the prison of Ulua where they were 
 well treated and visited daily by their families, friends, and par- 
 tisans. A launch was specially detailed by the Military Comman- 
 der for the use of Mrs. Diaz who was permitted to visit her hus- 
 band every day and at any hour. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION. 
 
 From that time the government was confronted by the 
 very serious problem of what to do with the prisoners. The 
 members of the Cabinet held diverse opinions. Some were in 
 favor of deaJth without pity for the culprits, while others were 
 of the opinion that they should wait for the reports from the 
 Courts before coming to any decision. Even the Madero family 
 disagreed within itself. Gustavo Madero favored quick and ener- 
 getic action, other members held out for clemency. The Presi- 
 dent as usual, wavered, bult decided in favor of reprieve. Don 
 Ricardo del Rio, counsel for the defendants from the very be- 
 ginning, had as his associates, Don Rodolfo Reyes, Fidencio Her- 
 nandez, and Esteban Maqueo Castellanos. Together they began 
 to interpose objections so as to delay proceedings. They obtained 
 the backing of the Slipreme Court of the Nation which granted 
 a stay of execution while the writ of Habeas Corpus was decided. 
 The Military Court rendered even more efficient aid by admit- 
 ting testimony during the review of the proceedings. 
 
 It can safely be said that from the moment the government 
 agreed to abide by the law, the defendants were safe, because the 
 time required for preparation of proofs and briefs was long 
 enough to aUow the cooling of hot blood and consequently to 
 secure a pardon for the culprits. At the same time, the friends 
 and partisans of Diaz began to make demonstrations in his favor. 
 The most important of these was one made by the women at the 
 urgent request of the leading women of Oaxaca, headed by the 
 worthy Mlrs. Castellanos de Maqueo. The ladies sought an in- 
 terview with the President to ask for the pardon of Felix Diaz. 
 During the interview Mladero conducted himself very courteous- 
 ly, but made no promises and committed himself in no way 
 There was, however, a slight altercation between the President 
 
 (119) 
 
120 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 and one of the young ladies of the committee, unpleasant in 
 itself, but of no subsequent importance. 
 
 There was a further demonstration made by the students 
 of the Military Academy when the ladies, on leaving Chapul- 
 tepec, crossed the academy grounds. 
 
 The Big Stick Clique, which could not possibly remain in- 
 active at such a time, organized a demonstration in favor of 
 the immediate execution of the prisoners. The students of the 
 IVIilitary Academy met this demonstration with a hostile demon- 
 stration for which they were severly reprimianded and command- 
 ed not to meddle again in politics. The demonstration of the 
 Big Stick Clique could not have been more iajudicious. In fact, 
 it bordered on cruelty. The public indignantly protested against 
 it, thus gaining for the culprits greater sympathy, although among 
 the educated class the predominant feeling was that the govern- 
 ment should be inexorable if it wished to maintain discipline in 
 the army. But from the moment the abstract thought and feel- 
 ings of all were put into concrete form by the deeds of an un- 
 popular group, it gave the act the appearance of a political re- 
 prisal, killed all sentiments of justice, and gave rise to feelings 
 of clemency which were being; trampled upon by the Porra. 
 
 The leniency of the government, or rather, its desire to 
 conduct itself in strict accordance with the law, lent wings to 
 the conspirators. In fact it can safely be said that from about 
 the middle of November there was not a resident of Mexico 
 City who was not in the conspiracy, with the exception of office 
 holders. 
 
 Secretary Hernandez was still reposefully trustful of Major 
 Celso Acosta Who was thus able to be the link between the con- 
 spirators and the rebels of Viera Cruz. Colonel Giaudencio Gonza- 
 lez de la Llave who early in September had rebelled against the 
 government and had organized his forces in conjunction with 
 General Higinio Aguilar, was now in possession of part of the 
 State of Puebla. He was also in league with the rebels which 
 Tello had raised in Zongolica, and across the mountains with 
 those of Alvarado and Aguirre Perea had under their com- 
 mand at Tiixtepec. When the revolt at Vera Cruz broke out, 
 Gonzalez de la Llave sent his son to confer with Diaz on the 
 proposition that Diaz should leave the city with all the men he 
 could gather, join forces with those now directly and indirectly 
 commanded by de la Llave and thus form an important nucleus 
 
IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTilON 121 
 
 which properly organized, could impose itself on the whole coun- 
 try. De la Llave's plan was to occupy the roads to Vera Cruz 
 with the forces on which he could at present count, threaten 
 Puebla where he had importanti partisans, take this city, and 
 then immediately throw all his forces against the Capital which 
 had few if any defenses. For this plan it was absolutely neces- 
 sary to take advantage of the munitions and arms which had 
 been captured by the rebels in Vera Cruz and which, in his 
 opinion, would be wholly wasted if Diaz shut himself up in 
 Vera Cruz. 
 
 Colonel de la Llave could also count with partisans on the 
 coast of Siotavento because these people were indignant at the 
 treatment which had been accorded the candidate of that section, 
 Don Gf^uillermo Pous, at the popular elections, and were anxious to 
 enter a struggle for the overthrow of the government of Madero. 
 There is no shadow of a doubt that had Diaz accepted the plan pro- 
 posed by de la Llave, a few days would have seen an army of ten 
 thousand men, against which the garrisons of Orizaba, Cordoba, 
 Tehuacan and Puebla would have been totally powerless to offer 
 adequate resistance, and within fifteen days these towns would 
 have fallen into the hands of the rebels. B*ut Diaz was obsessed 
 by the inexplicable idea that under no circumstances should he 
 leave Vera Cruz. He therefore, invariably replied that if he 
 had had the intention to abandon Vera Cruz it would hardly 
 have been worth his while to capture it. He failed to grasp 
 the fact that the fall of Vera Cruz had been rich iq results as 
 it had given to the revolution very necessary resources and that 
 there was no object in shutting himself up in the town and ex- 
 posing it to bombardment or to recapture, as indeed happened, 
 for such d capture only nullified all the sacrifices made and the 
 advantages acquired. When the coup of Vera Cruz was frus- 
 trated through the obtuseness of Diaz, the enemies of the govern- 
 ment sought a different flag around which to rally, but there 
 was none. General Bernardo Reyes was also a prisoner and 
 though his surrender at Linares did not tend to gain him par- 
 tisans, there was still a group of his loyal followers who believed 
 that in him lay the only salvation of the country. Headed by 
 Dr. Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, these men succeeded in 
 forming an alliance with other enemies of Madero. 
 
 The partisans of Diaz who was a prisoner in Vera Cruz, 
 formed the principal nucleus. It was judged dangerous to 
 
122 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 make any move while the heads of both parties, Diaz and Reyes, 
 were imprisoned in separate prisons, since a move in favor of 
 one might prove fatal to the other; they therefore began to set 
 wheels in motion to effect the transfer of Diaz to Mexico City. 
 In this they were so successful that it appeared as if the govern- 
 ment itself and not the partisans of Diaz, was the one who de- 
 sired this transfer. Hbwever, as a precaution, he was lodged 
 in the Penitentiary rather than with Rieyes in the Military Prison 
 of Santiago. The partisans of Diaz submitted themselves to 
 the leadership of General Manuel Mondragon who had boasted 
 of his friendship for Diaz and who, because he had been Chief 
 of the Artillery in the War Department for many years, pos- 
 sessed a great many friends among the officers garrisoned in 
 Mexico City. 
 
 The Reyistas had obtained aid from' G'eneral Gregorio Ruiz, 
 a distinguished cavalry officer, who had been at the head of this 
 branch of the "War Department. Hie was, besides, a member 
 of Congress under protection of Constitutional guarantees, and 
 therefore immune from arrest even if found guilty of conspiracy. 
 Communication, or rather the contract between the two leaders, 
 was arranged through Mrs. Sara Baeza de Miranda who pretend- 
 ing to be a niece of General Reyes had daily access to the prison. 
 She in turn commiunicated daily with General Ruiz through the 
 latter 's two daughters who were daily callers at church and 
 only in pressing cases saw her at her home. 
 
 Besides these two, there were several other conspiracies in 
 Mlexico City at that time, the most important of which was that 
 headed by Alberto Garcia Granados and Carlos G. de Cosio. 
 Both these leaders had an understanding with the rebels in the 
 north and with those headed by IMb:*. Vazquez Gomez, in league 
 with Zapata and the rebels in the State of Mexico. The Felic- 
 istas and the Reyistas were soon able to make an agreement 
 with the group under Garcia Granados but they were unable 
 to come to terms with Vazquez Gomez. Though in sympathy 
 with any movement to overthrow the Madero government, he 
 could not consider any one a better substitute than himself; he, 
 therefore, deliberately prolonged the conferences in no way com- 
 mitting himself. He gave as an excuse for his delay, that it was 
 necessary for him to communicate with his brother at San An- 
 tonio, Texas, in order that the latter might renounce the right he 
 claimed to lead the revolt. 
 
IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION 123 
 
 The army leaders as a whole were thoroujgihly dissatisfied. 
 General Pena, a very brusque and harsh man, entirely devoid 
 of military spirit and training, and quite unfit to be a leader, 
 had been promoted to General of Division over the heads of 
 many generals older in the service. As a consequence, he was 
 very unpopular among the soldiers. The President, quite una- 
 ware of the real situation, still thoug^ht himself the objicct of a 
 popularity which had been sapped on all sides by the greed and 
 passions of all those around him. Gustavo Madero was gradually 
 falling from the good graces of his brother, the President, and 
 he was daily becoming more unpopular mainly because of the 
 implacable war waged on him on one side by people supported 
 or encouraged by the Secretary of Development, and on the other, 
 by the press. 
 
 Gustavo Madero was an intelligent man, but ponderous and 
 slow in thought. He needed time to grasp an argument 
 or to understand a fact, and sometimes it was even necessary 
 tc put details before him in the simplest form possible before 
 he could fully grasp the trend of an argument or circumstances, 
 but once in his grasp, he looked very deeply into current events 
 and into sociological phenomena and was able ahnost infallibly 
 to estimate their importance. He was trustful, but not easily 
 imposed upon ; wilful and imperious, but with a wonderful con- 
 trol over his nerves which rarely failed him; he was affable in 
 manner, but at heart perhaps he was somewhat of an egotist, 
 possessed with a great ambition which he strove at all costs to 
 hide. Hie was, besides, a hardworker, daring and energetic. 
 From thie moment of triumph, he was the target for attack, be- 
 cause, since he was surrounded on all sides by the impulsive, 
 the irreconcilible, and the resolute men, he was thought the 
 author, or rather, the instigator, of all deeds of violence pro- 
 mulgated by the Mladeristas. As a matter of fact, however, he 
 not only took no part in many of these affairs, but he even 
 strongly disapproved the measures. Thus at the mercy of an 
 anti-government press which afraid to attack the President di- 
 rect, vented its spleen on his brother, he little by little gained 
 the reputation of a merciless monster, a reputation which he 
 was far from deserving. "El Pais" in its columns had fiercely 
 attacked him even to the point of personal slander, and a foolish 
 friend sought to avenge the offence by a personal assault on Di- 
 rector Sanchez Santos. This attempt gave rise to new slanders 
 
124 FROM DESPOTISM TO^ ANARCHY 
 
 and attacks not against the assailant but against Giwstavo Ma- 
 dero, though as a matter of fact he had had no foreknowledge 
 of the intended assault. 
 
 In view of the great wave of unpopularity which swept over 
 Gustavo Madero, and in view of the public clamor, even his 
 family became convinced that he was endangering the govern- 
 ment and that it would be best for him to leave the country. 
 To this end he was appointed Ambassador to Japan with the fixed 
 purpose of keeping him out of the country for several years. 
 Gustavo Madero fully resigned and submissive to the wishes of 
 his family, began his preparations for the journey which at one 
 and the same time killed all his political ambitions and sounded 
 the death knell of constitutional government. 
 
 As soon as the intended journey of Gustavo IVlkdero was 
 made public, all fear of the government was lost. It was be- 
 lieved though the belief was perhaps unfounded, that Gustavo 
 Madero was the only man in the government capable of firmly 
 suppressing any attempt at revolt. As soon as it was perceived 
 that there was a break in which the leader of the Constitutional 
 Progressive Party was to be sacrificed, there was no doubt that 
 he would cease to bring further hatred on himself for a govern- 
 ment which was so badly repaying all his sacrifices. Besides, 
 the Big Stick Clique, not bound by any ties, and having no one 
 to suppress its excesses, gave full rein to the passions of those 
 who composed this depraved group. "La Nueva Era," a news- 
 paper founded by Gustavo Miadero to defend the government, 
 had frequently changed directors as none came up to the re- 
 quirements demanded by Gustavo Madero. This also gave loose 
 rein to the intemperate ideas which were the dominating note 
 of those who composed the Constitutional Progressive Party. 
 Up to that time the members themselves had considered Gustavo 
 Madero a weakling because he restrained his friends and ener- 
 getically forced them to keep certain limits in their attacks. On 
 some occasions, with political acumen, he held his partisans in 
 leash, on others, he incited them to make themselves feared by 
 their adversaries; but he always succeeded in controlling the 
 attacks and in restraining the impetuosity of his friends. When 
 this restraint was removed, that paper became an insane in- 
 strument which contributed to a marked degree to the unpopu- 
 larity of the government. And that even before Gustavo Ma- 
 dero had left the country ! 
 
IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION 125 
 
 Thus disgraced before the public, former animosity now 
 became open hatred; there was no crime which was not attri- 
 buted to him, no fraud but he had had a hand in it. Because of 
 this hatred, his reputation for daring was now interpreted as an 
 unscrupulousness in business deals, and his political ambitions 
 as an insatiable desire for power and riches. 
 
 It is probable that in his heart he cherished the ambition of 
 succeeding his brother; but that ambition which he strove at all 
 cost to hide was a very clear one for the public and still more 
 reflected the public opinion, which believed that the whole family 
 was fully resolved not to abandon the power it had obtained by 
 conquest. And since the supposedly dominant thought of the en- 
 tire family could be easily crystallized in Gtistavo Madero, the 
 more resolute partisans grouped themselves around him. For 
 this same reason, public opinion saw in him its greatest peril. 
 
 The hatred for Grustavo Madero was due not to his charac- 
 ter nor to his deeds but to his alleged ambitions for the future ; 
 it was feared that he was to become the second of a series of 
 rulers from his family. 
 
 Although the material progress of the country during the 
 regime of Porfirio Diaz was undeniable, a struggle had been un- 
 dertaken to oust him because he had enthroned himself in pow- 
 er, and it could not therefore be tolerated that such a perpetuity 
 should be the patrimony of a family whose first attempt had re- 
 sulted in national disaster. There we have the reason for the 
 intense hatred which possessed the whole nation against this 
 man who in realty had no power and had filled no position 
 nor did anything which could cause this hatred. The enemies 
 of Gustavo Madero took a new lease of life on learning of the 
 decision to send him out of the country. Their attacks were now 
 directed towards those wiho it was believed had been appointees 
 of the leader of the Constitutional Progressive Party. Pino 
 Suarez was viciously attacked, but as he was an impassioned man, 
 he retaliated. His chief enemy was Mr. Flores M&,gon, Secre- 
 tary of the Interior, with whom he was always at swords points. 
 The fact that their controversy was made public through the news- 
 papers, caused the removal of Magon as Secretary. The tone of 
 Magon's resignation clearly shows the state of mind of those 
 who composed the government. 
 
 Flores Magon was succeeded by Don Rafael L. Hernandez, 
 Secretary of Development, whose portfolio was taken over by Bo- 
 
126 FROM DEiSPOTISM TO ANAE^OHY 
 
 nilla, Secretary of Conununication. To this latter position 
 Don Jaime Griirza, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was 
 appointed. These changes were natural, and it can be said that 
 they were the first logical steps taken by Mr. Madero. As 
 soon as it had been resolved to eliminate Gustavo Madero and 
 his influence in politics, it was natural that the parties who had 
 fought him until they dislodged him should now predominate. 
 Gustavo Madero began preparations for his journey and 
 was in the midst of them when the events which brought about 
 the fall of the government, his own death and that of Francisco 
 Madero and Pino Suarez took place. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 THE SECOND MILITARY RIEVOLT. 
 
 Practically everybody surmised that the revolution would 
 break out within a few days. It was generally known that there 
 was a conspiracy, that the soldiers garrisoning the city had 
 been undermined, and that the overthrow of the government was 
 decreed. The meetings of the conspirators were held almost open- 
 ly at their favorite rendezvous, the candy shop "La Opera." 
 On Saturday, February 8, the artillery officers who had entered 
 most deeply into the plot, had committed the imprudence of bid- 
 ding their families farewell, at the same time advising them of 
 what was to occur; therefore, it is not at all strange that by noon 
 the Secretary of War, General Angel Garcia Pena, was in full 
 possession of the exact details of the conspiracy engineered by 
 the Ex-Generals, Gregorio Ruiz, and Manuel Mondragon. The 
 Assistant Secretary of War, General Manuel M. Plata, was also 
 advised of the plot, but after a conference between himself and 
 the Secretary, the only precaution deemed necessary by them was 
 to lay the facts in their possession before Lauro Yillar, Military 
 Conunander of the City. 
 
 Just about the same time, Don Rafael Hernandez, Secre- 
 tary of the Interior, was informed of the plot by the Comman- 
 der of the Riurales as well as by Don Leopoldo Martinez,* a close 
 friend, who told him what was more or less public knowledge, 
 that on that very night the garrison of the city would revolt 
 with the definite purpose of overthrowing the government and 
 imposing as rulers Generals Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz. 
 Mr. Hernandez claims that he immediately notified Mr. Madero, 
 but the real fact was that Mr. Hernandez rebuked his friend for 
 propagating such sensational stories. Indeed he gave not the 
 slightest importance to a report so minutely detailed as to ren- 
 der it creditible. The truth of the matter is that rumors of plots 
 
 *That was told to me by Mr. Martinez himself. 
 
 (127) 
 
128 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 had spread so many times that M'adero and his advisers thought 
 that this, just like all the rest, would be nothing but a cry of 
 "Wolf." They therefore gave it no importance whatsoever 
 not realizing that this time, and this time alone, the secret ser- 
 vice had furnished tangible and trustworthy proofs. The Presi- 
 dent laughed as usual, and his Secretaries went to their homes as 
 if they knew nothing at all. Only the Vice President, Jose 
 Maria Pino Suarez, was precautious enough not to sleep at 
 home, but spent the night at the house of the mother-in-law of 
 a very intimate friend, Domingo Barrios Gomez. Gustavo Ma- 
 dero received news of the plot while attending a banquet given 
 in honor of Engineer Reynoso, recently appointed Assistant 
 Secretary of the Treasury. It was then about eleven o'clock 
 and he withdrew from the banquet very shortly after to ascertain 
 personally the truth of the rumors in circulation. He hurried 
 away in an automobile to Tacubaya. When he reached the 
 artillery barracks the guard came out to arrest him, but the 
 men were too slow. There was another machine besides his, 
 and in order to surround both, the men forming the guard were 
 obliged to separate into two parties. With the time lost they 
 succeeded only in capturing a plain clothes man whom Gustavo 
 Madero had sent to speak with the officer of the guard. Gus- 
 tavo Madero, quicker witted than usual, realized as soon as he 
 saw the movements of the guard that they wanted to make him 
 prisoner; he therefore speeded up his machine and escaped for 
 the time being the terrible death which was to be his fate. The 
 detective who had been captured by Lieutenant Vazquez.* was 
 led into the guard house where, beset with questions, or rather 
 cowed by the threats of death, he confessed his mission and the 
 purpose of his journey to Tacubaya as well as the names of his 
 companions. 
 
 Immediately upon escaping, Gustavo Madero hurried to 
 Mexico City to tell the Secretary of the Interior and the In- 
 spector General of Police, Don Emiliano Lopez de Figueroa, 
 what was happening. Mr. Figueroa showed his utter incom- 
 petence to grapple with such a situation, for he was content 
 merely to confer over the telephone with the Military Conmian- 
 der and with the Secretary of War at the same time sending 
 new agents to investigate facts which ]\Ir. Madero himself had 
 
 *Lieutenant Vazquez told me these details. 
 
THE SECOND MILITARY REVOLT 129 
 
 already laid before him with perfect clearness. The officer of 
 the guard at Tacubaya* when called to the phone by the Sec- 
 ond in Command of the City, not only made a reassuring report 
 himself, but even forced the captive detective to call up the Inspec- 
 tor General of Police and completely reassure him. In the mean- 
 time, there were serious complications in the artillery barracks. 
 Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon, commander of the 2nd Regiment 
 of Artillery, who was seriously involved in the plot because 
 his regiment, the Military school at Tlalpam, and the 1st Regiment 
 of Cavalry, the life and soul of the revolt, began to waver, 
 He refused to fulfill his promise, hoping to gain time or at least 
 a postponement. This frame of mind was due to the fact that the 
 Military Commander, Lauro Villar, had addressed the officers of 
 several military divisions reminding them of their duties and had 
 ordered them to place their barracks on a war basis. In order to 
 convince him anew it was necessary to send to Dr. Osorio's house 
 in Tacubaya for General Manuel Mondragon who had great 
 influence over the Commander of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery. 
 General Gregorio Ruiz, although warned that an order had 
 been issued for the arrest of anyone involved in the plot, went 
 in person to bring General Mondragon to talk with Aguillon. 
 It was not long before Mondragon was persuaded to leave his 
 hiding place, and with the greatest precaution to betake himself to 
 the barracks of San Diego. Once there, he installed himself 
 in the quarters of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery to await the 
 arrival of Aguillon. In obedience to orders issued by the Mili- 
 tary Commander of the City, Aguillon was sleeping in the 
 barracks. 
 
 In the meantime, it was decided that Lieutenant Francisco 
 Hijar should go to the commander of the detachment at Cua- 
 jimalpa, which was guarding the powder factory of Santa Fe, 
 to order him to join his forces to those of the artillery regiment 
 in Tacubaya. 
 
 After Gustavo Madero had told the Inspector General of 
 Police what was happening he returned to Tacubaya because 
 he wished to ascertain exactly w'hat measures were being taken ; 
 but before reaching the barracks of San Diego, another detec- 
 tive informed him that an automobile filled with artillery offi- 
 cers was proceeding to Cuajimalpa. Instead of continuing on 
 
 * Captain Armino. 
 
130 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 his way, he started in pursuit of this machine driven by Lieut- 
 anant Hijar, hut failed to catch up to it owing to the inexperi- 
 ence of his chauffeur. 
 
 "When the conspirators assembled at the barracks of the 
 2nd Regiment of Artillery in Tacubaya, the place chosen 
 as a rendezvous, it was perceived that many were missing. Among 
 the arrivals was Don Martin Gutierrez, son of the late Gen- 
 eral Alejandro Gutierrez, at one time the terror of the Das Graces 
 Hills, and later com m ander in chief of the auxiliary brigade 
 which patrolled the roads to Ajusco. Gutierrez was accom- 
 panied by a number of trusty men who were entirely familiar 
 with the roads that lead from Santa Fe to the Hills of Ajusco. 
 It was there that the plotters were to escape if their attempt 
 should fall through, a not unlikely event, because, as the plotters 
 well knew, the government had complete details of the conspir- 
 acy. As I have stated above. Captain Armino, commanding 
 the guard in the barracks of Tacubaya, was asked over the 
 telephone by General Villareal, 2nd in Command of the city, 
 what he intended to do with the automobiles which the Inspec- 
 tor General of Police had advised were even then standing in 
 front of the barracks. The officer replied that these machines, 
 filled with fast men and stylish women, were no longer there, 
 for he himself had ordered them to withdraw from the barracks. 
 To make the deceit more complete, the captive detective was 
 forced to call up the Inspector General of Police and give him 
 the same account that Captain Armino had given the 2nd in 
 command of the city. Major Trias, 2nd in command of the 
 artillery at San Lazaro, arrived half an hour later. He ex- 
 plained that when Messrs. Duhart and Ramon Diaz had appear- 
 ed at the barracks with orders for him to join the movement, 
 with his men, they had encountered his chief, Lieutenant Colonel 
 Gamboa, who becoming suspicious, had demanded from him an 
 explanation of his conduct. Trias saved himself by denying 
 that he knew the said gentlemen. Besides he not only volun- 
 teered to arrest the suspects, but even offered to conduct them 
 himself to Military Headquarters. While on their way to Head- 
 quarters, Dulhart and Diaz agreed to remain there as prisoners 
 in order to prevent a discovery of the plot ; but on their arrival, 
 they were informed that General Villar was ill at his home and 
 had given orders that he should not be disturbed. On leaving 
 Headquarters, Trias, Duhart and Diaz, instead of returning to 
 
THE SECOND MILIT'AKY REVOLT 131 
 
 the San Lazaro Barracks proceeded to Taeubaya. Ttias re- 
 mained at San Diego while his companions were sent to watch 
 the house of General Gregorio Ruiz to prevent any surprise. In 
 the meantime, General Mondragon and Colonel Anaya, Comman- 
 der of the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, were arranging the final 
 details. Shortly afterwards. Colonel Anaya proceeded to his 
 barracks. As soon as he arrived there, he gave orders to sound 
 boots and saddles, to have everything in readiness to leave as 
 soon as they were joined by the force due from Santa Fe. Just 
 after Colonel Anaya had left, a message was received from the 
 sentry of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, advising that three police 
 automobiles had just passed him on their way up. General Mon- 
 dragon issued orders that they be detained on their return. For 
 this purpose, officers and men were ambushed among the trees 
 along the street. A few moments later, the first was seen re- 
 turning. As it passed near the ambushed mien. Lieutenant 
 Colonel Aguillon shouted: "Get at them!" His officers, with 
 revolvers cocked, forced the occupants to step down from the 
 machines. One of these men was the Commander of the 2nd 
 Regiment of Mounted Police. After the passengers had been 
 disarmed by Lieutenants Pena, Vazquez, and Castillo, and others, 
 they were imprisoned in the barracks of the 2nd Regiment of 
 Artillery. The police surrendered without offering any resis- 
 tance. About twenty were made prisoners and their arms were 
 distributed among the followers of Don Martin Gutierrez who 
 were unarmed. About 3 A. M. on the morning of Sunday, Feb- 
 ruary 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon ordered the revolt of 
 his regiment as well as of the 5th Artillery which occupied the 
 same barracks. Although the assistance of the respective heads 
 of these regiments was not relied upon, all the other officers, 
 partisans of the rebellion, had given their promise. Lieutenant 
 Colonel Catarino Cruz, commander of the 5th Artillery had 
 flatly refused to second the movement as had also Major Bal- 
 domero Hinojosa in spite of the offers and persuasions of Lieu- 
 tenant Colonel Aguillon and General Mondragon. They did how- 
 ever agree to retire early to their respective quarters and to 
 lend a deaf ear to anything which might occur in the barracks. 
 Colonel Aguillon personally went through the officers quarters 
 of both regiments, awakening the officers and inviting them to join 
 him ; all accepted with pleasure. Shortly afterwards, he ordered 
 out a battery of service guns which he had previously put aside 
 
132 FROM DESPOiTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 for the purpose; distributed anununitioii among the soldiers of 
 the 2nd and 5th regiments, assembled them in the main yard of 
 the barracks and in the presence of General Mondragon and all 
 the officers and civilians, he harangued them, explaining the 
 object of the uprising and the great benefits, which, according 
 to him, would accrue to the country by tihe fall of the government 
 of Madero, which was sowing ruin and desolation. The haran- 
 gue of Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon aroused the soldiers who 
 broke into cheers for the national army and their respective re- 
 giments. These ignorant men were going into danger charmed 
 by the voice of their chief probably unaware of the transcendeni 
 importance of their act and the sacrifices they were about to 
 consummate. 
 
OHIAPT'EK, XIX. 
 
 THE DIE IS CAST.* 
 
 To one of the conspirators, Captain Romero Lopez, was left 
 the task of inciting to revolt his own Machine Gun Regiment. 
 He was to be in readiness to unite it as soon as he received due 
 notice, with the column proceeding from Tacubaya under Gen- 
 erals Ruiz and Mondragon, and together they were to liberate 
 General Reyes from the Military Prison, and Felix Diaz from the 
 Penitentiary. On the eve of the outbreak, however, Captain 
 Lopez was in such a nervous state that he could not wait for 
 the signal, but assembled his regiment in conjunction with his 
 officers at four o'clock in the morning and proceeded to the Li- 
 berty Street Barracks where he found that the other officers had 
 already assembled their men. The commandants of these regi- 
 ments had, without exception, refused to enter into the plot but 
 had agreed to retire to their quarters and turn a deaf ear to 
 the acts of their subalterns. As soon as these two forces had 
 united, they started for the prison of Santiago where General 
 Reyes was confined, taking with them two cannon and fourteen 
 machine guns from the Barracks of San Cosme; at the prison 
 they were joined by Major Zozaya who was leading the horse of 
 General Reyes. 
 
 It had been impossible to count on the support of the Com- 
 mander of the Military Prison, Colonel Miguel Mayol, whose 
 attitude had been such as to force the plotters to desist from 
 further attempts to obtain his co-operation. The under officials 
 of the prison did, however, lend themselves to the plot ; these, to- 
 gether with the Captain of the Guard, were awaiting anxiously the 
 arrival of the conspirators to give the coup d' etat. The first 
 step taken on arriving was to train a cannon on the main gate 
 
 *I obtained the facts related in this chapter from several 
 sources, but chiefly from Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Mr. 
 Mallen and other officers. 
 
 (133) 
 
134 FKiOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 and another on the quarters of Colonel Miayol. Captain Romero 
 Lopez then entered the prison and reappeared shortly accom- 
 panied by General Reyes, already in uniform and enveloped in 
 his military cape. With him were several officers, who had also 
 been prisoners and about two hundred soldiers, besides a large 
 part of the prison guard who from that moment joined 
 the rebels. The forces from Tacubaya entered the square 
 just as General Reyes was leaving the prison.* Before leaving, 
 General Mondragon suggested the advisibility of executing Col- 
 onel Mayol who had already been made prisoner in his quarters 
 by the prison guard itself, but General Reyes opposed such an 
 act, in consequence, the commander was merely detained under 
 guard while the plot was carried to its conclusion. 
 
 The force was further augmented at this point by the timely 
 arrival of a detachment of citizens, some on foot, some on horse- 
 back, and others in automobiles, and organized by Don Samuel 
 Espinosa de los Monteros, by Rodolfo Reyes, Ramon Cosio Gonza- 
 lez, and several others. The whole force with General R^eyes 
 commanding, now set out for the Penitentiary to liberate Gen- 
 eral Diaz and not till day was breaking did they reach their 
 destination. The precaution was again taken of training the 
 guns on the gates, and a delegation was sent to release Diaz. The 
 head of the prison Octaviano Liceaga, had in no way compro- 
 mised himself in the plot, but not so his sons, who had promised 
 to set the prisoner free as soon as the conspirators should reach 
 the Penitentiary. 
 
 Wlien the rebels appeared, one of the sons of Liceaga told 
 Diaz that his friends awaited him outside and that he could 
 now leave his cell. Although aware of the movement on foot, 
 the General had not been told the exact date for his execution, 
 and fearing at that moment a scheme to kill him under the pre- 
 tense of an attempt to escape, he became suspicious and refused 
 to budge unless advised by a mature man rather than a mere 
 boy. The head of the prison saw in this hesitation a means of 
 saving himself from all responsibility in case the plot should fail 
 and immediately began to place difficulties in the way of the re- 
 lease of the prisoner. Hb was unceremoniously pushed aside by 
 Generals Reyes and Mondragon who then entered the prison. The 
 presence of these two leaders at once convinced both the head of 
 the prison and General Diaz who then abandoned his cell and 
 
 *Some hours later the prison caught fire. 
 
THE DIE IS CAST 135 
 
 in civilian dress joined the column. As he came out, a young 
 lady delegated by her friends presented him with a bunch of 
 violets which he placed in his hat. The march was then begun 
 towards the National Palace. Early that morning, the Battalion 
 from the National Training School, together with all the other 
 students, had left Tlalpam under the officers of instruction, Es- 
 coto, Garcia Armino, and Zurita, and had joined the column at 
 Santiago. The infantry of the school made the trip on a train 
 bound for Xochimilco but Which the cadets had seized and com- 
 pelled to take themi to Mexico City, arriving before the National 
 Palace at about 4 a. m. as I shall detail in another chapter. With 
 them were the boys from the Cavalry School. In a wagon seized 
 for the purpose near Tlalpam, two machine guns used in the 
 school for demonstration purposes, had been brought to the city. 
 After the two heads of the revolt had been liberated, and 
 as the column was about to set out from the penitentiary, several 
 of these Training School boys suddenly appeared on the scene to 
 give warning of what had been done at the Palace by General 
 Villar. On receipt of this news, the 1st Riegiment of Cavalry, 
 Colonel Anaya commanding, was sent ahead at the double quick 
 with General Giregorio Ruiz, to prevent if possible the National 
 Palace from remaining in the hands of the government forces. 
 While General Ruiz and Colonel Anaya with the 1st Cavalry, 
 hastened towards the' Palace, General Reyes duly organized the 
 remaining troops into column formation and sounded the march. 
 As they reached the Calle de la Moneda,* they were joined by 
 other students who had fled from the^ Palace when General Vil- 
 lar had taken possession and these confusedly related the oc- 
 currence. General Mondragon was of the opinion that the ad- 
 vance should be halted and a new plan of attack devised, but 
 General Reyes, who was highly excited, would not listen to reason, 
 but judged that with the troops at his command, no serious re- 
 sistence would be offered him. His son, RIodolfo Reyes, attempt- 
 ed to dissuade him but he replied, " If I back down at this time, 
 everybody will call me a coward as happened at Linares. The 
 die is cast." So saying, he spurred his horse, threw aside his 
 cape and resumed the advance, turning the comer of the Calle 
 de la Moneda and making straight for the Palace. When hie ar- 
 rived at the corner, the comet stationed there by General Villar 
 began to sound the salute. General Reyes, firmly believing that 
 
 *At the north side of the National Palace. 
 
136 FROM DE SPOTISM TO A.N ARCHY 
 
 the salute denoted his complete success advanced without sus- 
 picion, accompanied by Don Martin Grutierrez, Dr. Espinosa de 
 Ids Mionteros, Don Emilio Perez de Leon, who was on foot and 
 carried a rifle. Captain Cervantes, and Don Enrique Fernandez 
 Castello. 
 
 Generals MJondragon and Felix Diaz remained in ' ' Licenciado 
 Verdad" Street in command of the reserves. 
 
 Greneral Velazquez who had also joined the revolt, was in- 
 jured by being thrown from his horse which shied at the first 
 discharge. He was assisted into one of the automobiles at hand 
 by Lieutenant Colonel Ottiz Monasterio, and then, accompanied 
 by Rodolfo Reyes, and Cosio Gonzalez, left the scene shortly 
 after the firing had become general. 
 
 When the civilians who had received strict orders from 
 General Reyes to remain at the comer of Moneda Street until he 
 had taken possession of the Palace, saw him passing between the 
 double files, they began to advance little by little but dispersed 
 at the first volley. The advance guard of the column commanded 
 by General Reyes, composed of cavalry of the Training School, 
 reached the southern corner of the Palace without meeting oppos- 
 ition ; to the rear of General Reyes came a detachment of artil- 
 lery with four pieces commanded by Captain Jose Tapia, and 
 to the rear of this came regiments of artillery on foot, but these 
 did not reach the firing zone as they were obstructed by civilians. 
 The latter had thrown the whole column into disorder by enter- 
 ing the double file* and finding themselves unthinkingly brought 
 up against the forces of the 20th Infantry which was drawn up 
 at the north of the Central Gate. The ex-prisoners who had been 
 set free from the Military Prison and the prison guard who had 
 abandoned their post, brought up the rear together with the 
 artillerymen of the M,achine Gun Regiment. 
 
 *At the west side, the 1st Regiment of Cavalry and the loyal 
 troops at the east. 
 
CHjAPTER XX. 
 THE 9TH 0¥ FEBRUAEY.* 
 
 The Military Commander of the City, General Lauro Vil- 
 lar, had received a warning a few days previous to February 
 9th, concerning an attempt to incite the rebellion against the gov- 
 ernment by several officers, especially those of the Artillery Regi- 
 ments and he had transmitted this news to the Secretary of War. 
 At the same time, he had called together the Commandants of 
 the several regiments and had cautioned them to keep a strict 
 watch over their staffs, especially those officers: who were sus- 
 pected of complicity. On the afternoon of Saturday, February 
 8th, the Secretary of War, who as I have said previously, had 
 received notice from General Villar of the proposed plan, sent 
 for the Military Commander and told him that the War De- 
 partment had just received the very warning which he had com- 
 municated to them eight days before, and advised him to take 
 all precautions necessary to prevent possible surprise. 
 
 The Military Commander called the Secretary's attention 
 to the fact that he had warned him of the danger some days pre- 
 vious and had reported at the time that there were insufficient 
 forces in the city to control a military outbreak if any should 
 occur. There were only two bodies in the garrison, the 20th Bat- 
 tation, which he did not trust but which enjoyed the full confi- 
 dence of the President, and the 1st Cavalry, Colonel Anaya com- 
 manding, which was fully trusted by Secretary Garcia Pena. 
 Besides, there were a few detachments from various regiments, 
 composed entirely of recruits tactically useless should a crisis 
 arise. 
 
 On his return to Headquarters, General Villar called Ms 
 regimental leaders, cautioned them to keep strict watch and 
 ordered that all troops be called to quarters and held in readi- 
 ness against any alarm. He further instructed the officers 
 to remain in their respective barracks until further orders. 
 
 *The facts related in this chapter were obtained from the 
 official and from private sources. 
 
 (137) 
 
138 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAHCHY 
 
 General Villar was suffering from an injury to his leg which 
 prevented him from walking and therefore he did not sleep 
 that night at Military BDeadquarters, but ordered his second in 
 ■command, General Villareal, to remain there all nigLl and to 
 advise him by telephone of any new developments. 
 
 At 2 A. M. the Inspector General of Police telephoned Gen- 
 eral Villar to inform him that word had been received to the ef- 
 fect that two suspicious looking automobiles were near the 
 Barracks of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery in Tacubaya. Gen- 
 eral Yillar thereupon telephoned orders to his second in com- 
 mand to find out what was going on at Tacubaya and to report 
 by telephone the results of his investigations. General Villa- 
 real spoke with the Captain of the Guard who informed him that, 
 in fact, several automobiles had gone past the barracks, but that 
 there was nothing new and that things were quiet. 
 
 At 4 A. M., the Inspector General of Police again tele- 
 phoned, this time to notify the Commander that the 2nd and 
 5th Batteries and the 1st Cavalry had left their barracks under 
 the leadership of ex-Generals Gregorio Ruiz and Manuel Mon- 
 dragon. General Villar immediately dressed and literally drag- 
 ging himself, as his left leg was completely paralyzed, sallied 
 out for the Palace. At a short distance from his home he found 
 a carriage and ordered the driver to make all speed for the 
 National Palace, but upon reaching the corner of Flamencos 
 Street, a party of cadets from the Training School, who were 
 convoying two machine guns on a wagon, held up the driver, and 
 taking no notice of his fare commanded him to keep going and 
 not to stop in front of the Palace ' ' because one of his horses might 
 be killed. ' ' General Villar managed to remain unseen and clear- 
 ly perceiving the condition of affairs, ordered his driver to make 
 for the Portal de las Flores. As soon as the Cadets of the 
 Training School were out of hearing, he countermanded these 
 directions with new ones to proceed through the gardens of the 
 Zocalo, and passing in front of the Palace, he perceived that the 
 main entrance was open as was also the Entrance of Honor, 
 and that the guard had been called out. He recognized the 
 uniform as that of the students of the Training School and know- 
 ing of the movement on foot, at once understood that the Palace 
 was already in the hands of the rebels. General Villar there- 
 upon ordered his coachman to convey him to the Barracks of 
 St. Peter and St. Paul, where the 20th Regiment was quartered. 
 
THE 9TH O'F FEBRUARY 139 
 
 Upon arriving near the comer of the barracks, he left the car- 
 riage, moving very slowly, and dragging himself along, assisted 
 by a passing Indian whose aid he had requested, he approached 
 the barracks and announced himself at the door. He ordered 
 the assembly of the troops, that is, of the recruits who were the 
 only men in barracks because the regiment was doing duty in 
 the city. When they assembled he directed Colonel Morelos, 
 commander of this battalion, to proceed with his force to the 
 Palace, to enter through the barracks of the Engineers and at 
 all costs to dislodge the rebels who had taken possession of the 
 residence of the Federal authorities. 
 
 Assisted by two soldiers, he then made his way to the bar- 
 racks of Teresitas, where the main body of the 24th was quar- 
 tered, and he at once ordered it out. Here he found his second 
 in com m and. General Villareal, who upon hearing what had oc- 
 curred, had immediately left the Palace in search of the Mili- 
 tary Commander, and not finding him at his home, was seeking 
 him in the various barracks. General Villar ordered General 
 Villareal to proceed at the double quick to take command at the 
 Ciudadela in order to prevent any surprise by the rebels. He 
 hiniself at the head of the rookies of the 24th,* set out for the 
 barracks of the Emgineers. The brave soldier forgot his physi- 
 cal pain, and did not stop to consider the meagreness of the 
 force at his command nor the strength of the enemy he was attack- 
 ing. His only thought was to do his duty and to retake the 
 Palace before the city was awake. In those moments. General 
 Villar embodied the spirit of the Mexican army, serene, tranquil, 
 immutable, even to the point of heroism, and without fear or 
 hesitation. In the barracks of the Engineers, he found a .^e- 
 tachment of fifteen men who had arrived at the capital that 
 very Saturday, and he ordered them to arm; themselves and 
 follow him. He forced his way into the Palace, battering down 
 the door which led from the barracks. H'ere he divided his force 
 into three detachments; thirty men of the 24th under their 
 Major, were sent to the main entrance ; twenty-two men also 
 of the 24th, under a Captain, were sent to gain possession of the 
 Entrance of Honor; the fifteen cavalrymen under the Aide-de- 
 camp of the M!ilitary commander, Captain Malagamba, who had 
 joined him on the way, brought up the rear as a reserve for 
 
 *General Villar had commanded the 24th for many years 
 and was revered by officers and men. 
 
140 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 both advances. Gleneral Villar himself led the three detachments. 
 In order to avoid the alarm which would be given by rifle shots, 
 all three forces, with fixed bayonets, fell simultaneously upon 
 ■the two guards of the Palace, at the cry of the Military Comman- 
 der ' ' Surrender and silence ! ' ' The guard at the Entrance of 
 Honor, the first to be attacked, as it was the nearest, surrendered 
 at once, as did also the one stationed at the Main Entrance. 
 This was accomplished without a single shot and with no casual- 
 ties of any kind. Officers and men were disarmed, conducted 
 to the stables of the Palace, and with the students of the training 
 School, were held prisoners there under the imm^ediate super- 
 vision of General Felipe Mier who had opportunely arrived at 
 Military Headquarters to offer his services. The fifteen cav- 
 alrymen were placed as a guard over the prisoners, and the re- 
 maining fifty-two were so distributed as to prevent any possible 
 surprise. At that moment Colonel Morelos made his appearance 
 with the rookies of the 20th. As ordered by General Villar, 
 Colonel Morelos had arrived at the Barracks of the Engineers, 
 but aware of the number of the enemy in the Palace, he judged 
 the enterprise foolhardy. He therefore decided to enter the 
 National Palace from the roof of the adjoining building, the 
 War Department Building; he met with no resistance on the 
 roof of the Palace, entered the building with his force and joined 
 General Villar. The latter immediately took the necessary pre 
 cautions to resist the attack which undoubtedly would be made 
 by the forces even then marching upon the Palace under Gen- 
 erals Reyes, Mondragon, and Felix Diaz. After he had taken 
 the Palace, General Villar ran across Gustavo Madero who had 
 been imprisoned in the guard house at the main entrance, and 
 General Angel Garcia Peiia, Secretary of War, who said he also 
 had been made prisoner by the rebels and had even been wounded 
 in the neck at the time of his capture. Gustavo Madero upon 
 returning from Tacubaya, had gone to the Palace, not aware that 
 it was then in the hands of the rebels. When he approached, 
 no one opposed him, but as soon as he passed the sentries, he 
 A\ as surprised and made prisoner by the Training S'chool Cadets, 
 and on account of the suddenness of the attack, he was unable 
 to offer any resistance. The Secretary of War had gone to 
 the Palace when the Inspector General of Police had telephoned 
 the news to him as well as to the Military Commander. On his 
 arrival he met with no opposition but as he was ascending the 
 
THE 9TH O'F FEOBRUAHY 141 
 
 stairs on his way to the office of the Military Commander, he 
 met a group of cadets who were searching for General Yillar. 
 He was immediately recognized and fired upon by one of the 
 boys, but the bullet missed its mark and shattered a window. A 
 piece of flying glass struck the Secretary, cutting his neck and 
 spattering blood all over the front of his shirt. General Peiia 
 retreated quickly and favored by the darkness of the corriders 
 of the Palace, (all lights had been put out) he was able to reach the 
 offices of the War Department where he remained with the Assis- 
 tant Secretary, General ]\I;anuel ML Plata while the events I have 
 related were occurring. "When Colonel Morelos entered through 
 the roof of the War Depar'tment wing, the two secretaries became 
 aware of what had occurred, whereupon General Peiia comman- 
 deered an automobile and went with all speed to Chapultepec to re- 
 port to the President. The Assistant Secretary went to his offices, 
 and Gustavo Madero departed in his automobile. 
 
 General Villar, as soon as he gained complete possession of 
 the National Palace, divided his small force of only one hundred 
 and fifty men into several detachments. General Felipe Mier 
 with thirty men was placed as a guard over the prisoners who 
 had been disarmed and the Training S'chool men who had remain- 
 ed in the Palace after its capture by the rebels; in all, there 
 were nearly three hundred prisoners. To this detachment was 
 given the further duty of guarding the entrance to the Palace 
 from the Barracks of Engineers. The detachment from the 20th 
 Infantry, commanded by Colonel Morelos, was stationed at two 
 meters distance from the sidewalks of the Palace and to the north 
 of the center entrance in double file, the first stretched prone 
 on the ground, and the rear rank crouched on one knee. The 
 fifty-two recruits of the 24th Infantry, commanded by the major 
 of that regiment, took up their station to the south of the cen- 
 ter entrance but on the sidewalk in thie same formation, the first 
 rank prone, the rear kneeling. The Military Commander with 
 his aide. Captain Mlalagamba, placed himself in the center, be- 
 tween the two detachments, with two machine guns. He ordered 
 that not a shot be fired until he himself gave the word. As 
 there were no ai^tillerymen to handle the machine guns, the 
 soldiers who seemed the most capable, were put in charge of them. 
 By this formation, General Villar with the fifty-two men in 
 whom he had entire confidence purposed to defend the position he 
 had so gallantly won, and at the same time to keep an eye on and 
 
142 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 control the detachmeint of the 20th Infantry. Hie feared that the 
 latter would attempt to take sides with their rebel comrades 
 especially if the fortunes of the fray should seem to be against 
 the loyal troops. Shortly after the troops were in position, the 
 advance of the rebels, two squadrons of the 1st Cavalry under 
 the command of General Gregorio Ruiz and Colonel Anaya, ap- 
 peared. The force advanced in columns, rifle in hand, as though 
 executing a manoeuver. As they reached the Palace, General Ruiz 
 halted at twenty paces distance from the loyal troops and gave 
 the order to form into line of battle. The opposing forces were 
 now face to face, but nothwithstanding the fact that the advance 
 guard outnumbered his hiandful by more than two to one, the 
 Military Commander did not for one moment falter. In an 
 imperious tone he commanded the advance to halt. When Gen- 
 eral Ruiz saw the stoicism with which General Villar was await- 
 ing developments, he thought that he mlight be able to win him 
 and the small force at his command to the rebel cause. With 
 this object he advanced as far as the center entrance to confer 
 with him. General Villar advanced a few paces to meet him but 
 did not step beyond his own lines. In the colloquy that ensued, 
 General Ruiz reminded his comrade of the friendship he had al- 
 ways had for him, showed him the absolute futility of the steps 
 he was taking on account of the great strength of the column 
 marching against the Palace, and pointed out to him the damage 
 which the government of Mladero had done to the country. He 
 then proposed that he surrender this position and join the rebels, 
 and made him enticing offers in the name of the leaders of the 
 rebellion. General Villar listened attentively and slowly en- 
 ticed his opponent until they were directly between the detach- 
 ments of the 20th and 24th stationed in front of the Palace. 
 When the General finished speaking, Villar with his left hand 
 grasped the rein of the General's horse and his only reply was 
 "You are my prisoner. A soldier since the French interven- 
 tion, I have never yet been a traitor. I have always served faith- 
 fully and I will not stain my service record for any price nor 
 for any man. It is not for me to count the enemy, my only duty 
 is to defend the post entrusted to my honor, and this I will defend 
 to the death. It is not for us as soldiers to criticize the acts of the 
 government ; our duty is to defend the constituted powers. Dis- 
 mount immediately and do not force me to fire upon you. " Still 
 holding the reins, he ordered that the two machine guns be train- 
 
THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY 143 
 
 ed on the rebel general. G'eneral Ruiz made an attempt to draw 
 the revolver he carried in his saddle holster, but Gleneral Vil- 
 lar in a threatening tone said "'H]ands up and dismiount. As 
 your superior, I command you to get down." Gleneral Ruiz obey- 
 ed, and surrendered. General Villar was here informed that the 
 main body of the troops of the rebels were now in sight. At 
 that m'Oment General Cauz, head of the Cavalry Division of the 
 War Department, arrived at the Palace, and General Villar 
 who had no one else to whom to deliver the prisoner, handed him 
 over to General Cauz, saying "I hold you responsible for this 
 man, General; I entrust him to your honor as a soldier." Hie 
 then returned immediately to the front. General Reyes who was 
 now advancing had as his vanguard a squadron of Training 
 School cadets. Except for two civilians, and a few horsemen 
 immediately behind him, he was, however, practically alone wihen 
 he entered between the double file formed by Villar 's men and the 
 1st Cavalry Regiment. As he advanced, he was joined by man 
 after man and by the time he passed the door of the center entrance 
 to the palace, he was surrounded by a number of armed men some 
 on foot, some mounted. Hb was followed by the 20th Infantry, the 
 1st Cavalry, the 2nd and 5th Batteries, by a part of the regiment of 
 police and by a squadron of mounted police. It was estimated 
 that Reyes, Miondragon and Diaz at that time commanded near- 
 ly three thousand men ; four hundred and fifty of the 1st Cav- 
 alry; two hundred Training School cadets; one hundred and 
 eighty men of the 20th Infantry; and four hundred and fifty 
 men of the Batteries ; eleven hundred made up the machine gun 
 battalion, the battalion of police, and the civilians raised by 
 Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Mr. Martin Gutierrez, Mr. Fiden- 
 cio Diaz Lopez, Mr. Jose Bonales Sandoval, and a Mr. Riamirez, 
 and several others. To oppose this force, well supplied with am- 
 munition, for it had four batteries of guns belonging to the 1st, 
 2nd and 5th Batteries, and all the machine guns belonging to 
 the regiment of that name, the Military Commander could count 
 only on one hundred and twenty men, two machine guns, and 
 sufficient ammunition for ten minutes fighting. General Vil- 
 lar measured the overwhelming magnitude of the undertaking 
 but did not hesitate. Turning tO' the officers near him he said 
 "B'oys, if we are fated to die, let us die defending the honor of 
 our Army." Shortly before the arrival of the main column at 
 the Palace, a body of Training School cadets who, as scouts, 
 
144 FEjOM despotism TO ANAEjOHT 
 
 had advanced between tlie force of General Ruiz and the main 
 body, notified Reyes of the position of the troops in front of the 
 Palace and of what had happened to General Ruiz. This occur- 
 rence was witnessed by all the troops commanded by this hap- 
 less man and by Colonel Anaya. General Reyes gave the mat- 
 ter no importance whatever and to the comment of General 
 Mondragon that he thought the enterprise dangerous owing to 
 the attitude of the Military Commander, Reyes replied ' ' General 
 Villar can not with his limited force resist the column- we our- 
 selves command, and besides there is no doubt that when he sees 
 us he will join us. If he does not, we will wipe him out." Not- 
 withstanding the assurances of General Reyes, neither Mjondrag- 
 on nor Diaz held this view and the column was therefore split. 
 These two leaders remained in Licenciado Primo Verdad Street 
 with the police and a few civilians to await there the result of 
 the venture of General Rieyes. The latter proceeded with his 
 forces down Moneda Street, turned to the left and immediately 
 faced the Palace. Without halting, he advanced between the 
 double file twenty-five paces apart, formed by the loyal troops 
 on one side and on the other by the 1st Cavalry, lined up by 
 General Ruiz. Upom arriving opposite the door that General 
 Villar was guarding, the latter ordered them to halt, but Gen- 
 eral Reyes continued to advance for about fifteen paces to the 
 south of this door. Hiere death overtook him while he was ad- 
 dressing the multitude that was following him and cheering him. 
 Owing to the very limited quantity of ammunition. General Vil- 
 lar had given strict connnand that no one fire until he himself 
 gave the word. His intention evidently was to allow the leaders 
 of the revolt to enter and then if possible to arrest them as he 
 had arrested General Ruiz. As a last resort, he planned to kill 
 the leaders, rightly judging that their death would put an end 
 to the revolt and suffocate it with the minimiun bloodshed. 
 When General Reyes passed through the Center Entrance and 
 did not halt although commanded by General Villar to surrender, 
 the men who followed him, seeing that no resistance was offered, 
 fell upon the soldiers of the 20th stationed as I mentioned above, 
 to the north of the Palace. As the latter were mere recruits 
 under Colonel Morelos, they were easily driven back towards the 
 Palace. Here General Villar, pistol in hand, checked their re- 
 treat, and though the command was not actually given, the loyal 
 troops opened fire in sheer self-defense against the assault. The 
 
THE gTH OF FEBRUARiY 145 
 
 firing immediately became general. The men of the 24th were 
 forced to fall back to the entrance of the Palace where the Mili- 
 tary Commander was personally directing the handling of the 
 two machine guns at his command. At the first volley, General 
 Reyes had fallen shot through the brain and in the legs. The 
 loyal troops reformed at the command of their superior officer 
 and presented such a stubborn resistance that the rebels were 
 forced to retreat shielding themselves behind the columns of 
 the Gates of Las Flores and La Diputacion, and finally were 
 completely dispersed. 
 
 General Villar ordered his troops into the Palace and put 
 General Jose Delgado who had just arrived, in charge of the 
 two machine guns to guard the Center Entrance. With the 
 remaining soldiers who had replenished their ammunition by 
 appropriating that taken from the imprisoned guard and cadets, 
 he at once proceded to the roof of the Palace from where he 
 could better defend his position. He believed that the defeated 
 column would advance against the Palace at once as it was 
 known that his supply of ammunition was practically exhausted. 
 But by the time General Villar reached the roof, the rebels had 
 vanished. He organized sentries to patrol this height and he 
 himself descended to take account of the fatalities resulting 
 from the fray. 
 
 The loyal troops had suffered heavily ; twelve of the recruits 
 of the 20th had been killed and sixteen wounded ; Colonel Mbre- 
 los, Lieutenant Anaya, and three other officers had been killed, 
 and all the surviving officers of the battalion were wounded; 
 five men of the 24th had been wounded and the Military Com- 
 mander himself was suffering from a shattered collar bone. 
 His aide, Captain Malagamba, had received four wounds. The 
 rebels, on the other hand, had lost General Reyes ; and nearly 
 two hundred men, dead or wounded, lay on the sidewalks. Many 
 of these were dressed as civilians and it was therefore impossible 
 to determine whether they were innocent bystanders or mem- 
 bers of the rebel host. The surgeons who had arrived on the 
 scene, attempted to remove General Villar in order to dress his 
 wound properly for he was completely spattered with blood, 
 but the punctilious leader would not, and in fact did not, abandon 
 his post until he was relieved of his charge by order of the 
 President himself. 
 
 When President Madero arrived at the National Palace 
 
146 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO AN^^CHY 
 
 two and one half hours after the battle, GHeneral Villar \vas still 
 standing guard over the main entrance, ready to repel further 
 attacks by the rebels. Here he received the President who 
 greeted him with the words "Whiat a great man you are, Gen- 
 eral." "I have only done my duty," replied Villar. "But 
 you are wounded, ' ' exclaimed Madero. " I . have retaken this 
 place, which is more important," rejoined the Military Com- 
 mander. "Turn over your command to Oeneral Delgado and 
 come mth me," said the President dismounting from his horse. 
 He took General Villar by the arm, led him to the elevator and 
 thence to the reception rooms of the Palace where he submitted 
 to treatment for the first time. 
 
 While he was being prepared for treatment, the Secretary 
 of War said to ihim "Lauro, by order of the President, I have 
 appointed Victoriano Military Conmiander of the City while 
 you are convalescing, ' ' and he pointed to General Htuerta. Gen- 
 eral Villar made an effort to sit up, and turning to General 
 Huerta, said, "Swear on your honor that you will defend the 
 constituted government to the last cartridge." As General 
 Hnerta hesitated and did not give an immediate answer. Gen- 
 eral Villar twice again exhorted him to swear and he finally 
 answered, "Yes, brother, calm yourself, I do so swear." Gen- 
 eral Villar, almost weeping in his excitement, feebly murmured, 
 "to the last cartridge, to the last cartridge," and fell back in a 
 dead faint. 
 
 The surgeons who examined him declared that the wound 
 was dangerous and ordered him to go home immediately as he 
 was unfit for further duty. Mjr. Miadero then formally ordered 
 General Victoriano Hhierta who had arrived at the Palace with 
 him, to take over the post of Military Commander of the City. 
 After being relieved of his command. General Villar requested 
 to be taken to the Military Hospital. "You will be better off 
 in your home," said Miadero. "Yes," replied General Villar, 
 "but I must go where my men go, I was wounded with them 
 and with them I should be cared for." He was taken in an 
 automobile to the Military Hospital. His condition on his arri- 
 val greatly worried his physicians because he was in a state of 
 complete collapse. The stress he had been under had made 
 him forget for the moment the pain in his leg, and the loss of 
 blood he had suffered put him in grave peril of death. 
 
CHAPTER XXI. 
 THE LAST OVATION. 
 
 After General Villar regained the National Palace, General 
 Garcia Pena, as I have said before, took an automobile and has- 
 tened to the Castle of Chapultepec to report to the President. 
 Mr. Madero decided to go to the city at once, escorted by the 
 Cadets of the Military Academy and other forces which had 
 been ordered by telephone to proceed immediately to Chapulte- 
 pec. The Cadets of the Military Academy had not as yet break- 
 fasted and as it was Sunday, they were making arrangements 
 to leave when they received orders to supply themselves with 
 arms and ammunition and assemble by companies on the parade 
 ground of the Academy. As soon as they had assembled, the 
 President informed them that there had been a mutiny in Mex- 
 \eo City, whicih had been suppressed and as the Training School 
 men had unfortunately participated in it, he wished to enter 
 the city surrounded by the Cadets of the Military Academy. 
 Tbat as there was no enemy, their entry would be in fact a 
 triumphal procession, and it was his desire that the Cadets 
 being educated at Chapultepec should take part, for he had en- 
 tire confidence in their loyalty to him. When the Commandant 
 had added a few words of praise and encouragement to the stu- 
 dents, the President mounted his horse and set out from the 
 Castle for the City of Mbxico without giving the students time 
 to breakfast. When they reached the Forest of Chapultepec, 
 a body of firemen waiting there under arms, fell in as an ad- 
 vance guard. The rear was brought up by a detachment of foot 
 and mounted police who had arrived with the Inspector Gieneral 
 of Police. Miajor Emiliano Lopez Figueroa. In the center of 
 the line of march was Madero surrounded by the Cadet Batta- 
 lion led by the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Ker- 
 
 *T!he facts set fort'h in this chapter were related to me by 
 several cadets who were my wards. 
 
 (147) 
 
148 FEjOM despotism TO ANARCOBY 
 
 nandez Covarrubias. The advance was slow, for the line march- 
 ed cautiously along the full length of the Calzada de la Reforma, 
 and as it passed the Cafe Colon, General Huerta joined it. 
 When the line reached the Statute of Charles IV, it turned into 
 the Avenida Juarez to the spot where the National Theatre is 
 in course of construction. Hfere they encountered the fugi- 
 tives routed at the Plaza de Armas who, led by Captain Jose 
 Tapia, in a semblance of order were proceeding to the Ciuda- 
 dela in an attempt to rejoin the main column. As the two for- 
 ces met, shots were exchanged and the forces under T'apia re- 
 treated through the Avenida del Teatro Nacional, thence through 
 the streets of Hombres Ilustres, and came up with the remainder 
 of the rebels in the gardens of San Fernando. In the confusion 
 that followed the encounter, the companions of President Ma- 
 dero, fearing that the affair might assume serious proportions, 
 forced Mjadero to seek shelter in the Daguerre Studios* where 
 he remained under the escort of ten Cadets of the Military Aca- 
 demy commanded by Sergeant Garcia Pena, and of fifteen 
 mounted police, the only ones remaining of the detachment 
 which had left Chapultepec as the President's guard. The 
 rest of the escort was divided into three columns which pro- 
 ceeded respectively through the Street of 5 de Mayo, San Fran- 
 cisco Avenue, and the Avenue 16 de Septiembre, and advanced 
 in battle line upon the Plaza de Armas under the command of 
 General Huerta. 
 
 As the firemen and police arrived at the corner of Profesa 
 Street, they were fired upon from the roofs of the building "La 
 Mexicana" and probably also from the spires of the Cathedral. 
 The Cadets, however, were not fired upon. A\Tien some of the 
 policemen and firemen fell wounded, the rest turned and fled 
 headlong down the Avenida Isabel la Catolica, leaving the Ca- 
 dets without a rear guard. The mounted police had already 
 deserted almost to a man. some at the corner of Resales Street, 
 and others at every cross street on the line of march, so that only 
 fifteen remained when the advance halted at the Avenida del 
 Teatro Nacional. Most of the deserters entered the ranks of the 
 forces under Mondragon and Diaz, which shortly afterwards 
 arrived as above mentioned, at Resales Street. 
 
 *The same place where General Reyes took refuge when 
 threatened by the Big Stick Clique, as related in Chapter X. 
 
TH[B LAST Or^ATION 149 
 
 Generals Mondragon and Diaz were informed in Licenciado 
 Primo Verdad Street of the death of General Reyes and instead 
 of reinforcing the attackers and thus forming a party which 
 the defenders could not have resisted through lack of ammuni- 
 tion, they proceeded at top speed through the streets of Relox 
 and Mina towards the Ciudadela. They reached Resales Street 
 but a few seconds after the President and his escort, who were 
 just at that moment arriving at the high ground where the 
 National Theatre is in the course of construction. 
 
 When the vanguard of the column under Mondragon and 
 Diaz appeared, some sympathizers of the revolt carried the 
 news to Captain of Artillery Jose Tapia, who with his reorgan- 
 ized force of rebels was passing through the Avenida 5 de Mayo 
 on his way to the Ciudadela. Thinking that he would be sup- 
 ported by the rebels in RK)sales Street and thus catch the Presi- 
 dent and his party between two fires, Tapia made an attack on 
 them in the Avenida del T'eatro' Nacional. But either because 
 he perceived that he was receiving no support from the forces 
 in Rosales Street, or possibly because he wished to avoid eon- 
 fronting the Cadets, he withdrew through the Avenida de Hom- 
 bres Ilustres and rejoined the main column. The Cadets of 
 Chapultepec continued their march through the three main 
 streets of the capital until they reached the Plaza de Armas. 
 Pliere again reigned confusion, which might have had very seri- 
 ous results since either the commandant of Cadets as well as 
 thd other officers leading the brigade failed to give correct or- 
 ders, or the orders given T\ere misunderstood. For Avhatever 
 reason it m.ny have been, the ihj-ee columns entered the Plaza 
 de Armas with trumpets sounding the attack. The troops at 
 the National Palace, were momentarily expecting an attack 
 from the rebels under Mondragon and Diaz as soon as the latter 
 should learn from the defeated contingent of the scarcity of 
 ammunition among the defenders, and consequently, when they 
 saw the advanee of the Cadet Battalion, of whose arrival they 
 had not been notified, they prepared to resist. Fortunately, 
 Sergeant Padiiia, a Cadet officer, took the situation in at a 
 giance and ordered the trumpeters to sound "cease firing" and 
 to gi\?e the bugle call of the Military Academy. Those inside 
 the Palace recognized the call and immediately ceased firing, 
 but not before an officer of Cadets had been killed. There 
 were no further fatalities among the cadets for they quickly 
 
150 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARiCHY 
 
 sought shelter behind the pillars of the Portal de Mlercaderes 
 and advanced pillar to pillar, until an officer and three men who 
 issued from the Palace for the purpose of reconnoitering, found 
 that the arriving forces were friends. 
 
 Upon arriving at the Palace, some of the Cadets formed into 
 a cordon surrounding the dead still stretched on the pavement 
 to await the arrival of the Hospital Corps; others were placed 
 as sentries on the side streets leading into the Plaza de Armas, 
 and others were sent to the roofs of the City Hall which could 
 command the square in case of a new attack. After all these 
 precautions had been taken, Mr. Madero was notified, and he 
 immediately proceeded on horseback to the Palace, receiving an 
 ovation all along the line of march. This ovation was to be his 
 last. He entered the Palace on that fateful occasion amid the 
 plaudits of a populace with whom he had always liked to rub 
 elbows, whom he had always liked to flatter, and from whom 
 he had always received proofs of esteem. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, the assembly was sounded. The Ca- 
 dets of the Military Academy were concentrated in the street 
 de la Acequia, and some detachments were stationed inside the 
 Palace to act as sentries where most needed. These latter were 
 shortly relieved by a body of Rurales who had arrived from the 
 Villa de Guadalupe, and by the soldiers of the 20th who had 
 been held as prisoners but who were now put under arms with 
 new officers. Thus scattered at their posts, the Cadets of the 
 Military Academy went without food until six o'clock in the 
 afternoon', without a moment's rest, with no apparent in- 
 terest in their welfare on the part of the Commander who had 
 exposed them to a participation in a fratricidal strife, although 
 his main duty it was to care for these youths, with whose educa- 
 tion he had been entrusted. It is well to recall here that at the 
 time of the revolt of the Ciudadela in the year 1870, General 
 Sostenes Rocha in his official report expressed himself in the 
 following terms : ' ' There was also a noteworthy enthusiasm 
 shown by some of the students of the Military Academy who were 
 on leave and who came to me to ask for arms. But I ordered 
 them to present themselves to you at the Palace because I did 
 not think it right that the blood of this precious youth should 
 be shed so early. ' ' People in the neighborhood of Acequia Street, 
 pitying the situation of the youthful Cadets, began to bring them 
 food, until at ten p. m.. the Military Commander of the City, 
 
THE DAST OVATION 151 
 
 General Victoriano Hluerta, ordered them to the Castle of Cha- 
 pultepec, where they finally remained without further partici- 
 pation, as a body, in suppressing the rebellion. 
 
 As soon as Mr. Miadero arrived at the Palace, he called a 
 meeting of the Cabinet, and it was agreed that the President 
 should leave that very day for Cuernavaca and join the army 
 which, under the command of Gfieneral Felipe Angeles, was mak- 
 ing a campaign against the Zapatistas. 
 
 At four o'clock, the President accompanied by Messrs. Gar- 
 mendia, Montes, and de los Eiios, left in an automobile for the 
 capital of the State of Morelos. Preceding him was another 
 machine carrying ten soldiers armed with Mausers and a Rexer, 
 under command of a 2nd Captain of Artillery. 
 
 That same morning, after Mr. Madero's appearance upon 
 the scene, the Military Commander, General Huerta, had ordered 
 the execution of General Gregorio Ruiz, officer of the 20th, 
 and in command of the Palace guards, and of one of the Tirain- 
 ing School men accused of firing upon Garcia Pena when he had 
 arrived at the Palace at daybreak. The executions took place in 
 the inner courtyard at about twelve^thirty on February 9th. 
 Shortly after one o'clock is was known at the National Palace 
 that the Ciudadela was in the hands of the revolutionists and 
 that the second in command of the city had lost his life in the 
 defense of that point. 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 AT THE CIUDADEEA.* 
 
 As I have already recounted, General Reyes met exactly 
 the death he foreboded. His nerves killed him. With a little 
 prudence, with greater calmness, his triumph would have been 
 assured — the city would have been spared the tragic ten days 
 M^hen so many innocent persons perished, and the country would 
 have been saved from the shame of subsequent events. 
 
 When Messrs. Felix Diaz and Mondragon realized that Reyes 
 had lost his life, they began to march from the streets of Licen- 
 ciado Primo Verdad towards the Ciudadela. When' they arrived 
 at the ancient Boulevard of BUcareli, they began to organize their 
 troops in order to make sure of the actual forces at their command^ 
 but not even on this occasion did they take any of the necessary 
 military precautions. Shortly afterwards, Major Trias and Mr. 
 Enrique Zepeda arrived and they were the ones who put the 
 troops into a semblance of order and directed the attack upon 
 the Ciudadela. A cannon was placed in the School of Commerce, 
 and the forces were arranged to the best advantage, taking the 
 street of Donde as a base of operations. 
 
 By order of the MElitary Commander of the City, issued in 
 the early hours of the morning, Gr'eneral YUllareal had assumed 
 command of the Ciudadela, which had been under Brigadier 
 Davila. 
 
 When Generals Mondragon and Felix Diaz presented them- 
 selves on the Street of Bucareli, they demanded the surrender 
 of the Ciudadela. Both felt certain of an immediate affirma- 
 tive reply, because of an agreement made through Captain 
 Izunza with the forces wfhich were in the Ciudadela and probably 
 because of an agreement with General Davila himself. But the 
 presence of General Villareal completely upset all former agree- 
 
 *This chapter is based on information received verbally 
 from Mr. Zepeda, Mr. Rt)driguez and several officers who were 
 with the rebels. 
 
 (152) 
 
AT THE CIU'DADELA 153 
 
 ments and instead of an immediate surrender as had been agreed 
 upon, the Second in Command of the City, General Villareal, 
 gave orders to his mjen to prepare for a formal defense of the 
 position. 
 
 A few scattered shots were fired when the defenders of the 
 Ciudadela saw that the rebels were mounting a cannon, but a 
 few moments later all firing ceased. General Villareal who was 
 the sole obstacle to a complete surrender, had just been shot 
 dead by an officer in the Ciudadela who was involved in the re- 
 volt. The white flag was raised at once and the surrender imme- 
 diately took place, the former head of the Ciudadela, Brigadier 
 General Rafael Davila, giving himself up as a prisoner with all 
 the men and supplies in the building. 
 
 The revolutionists soon had at their disposal all the reserve 
 ammunition that there was in the City, with the cannon of the 
 1st, 2nd and 5thi Batteries, except on-e that had been left in front 
 of the Palace during the skirmish of the morning, and mth 
 sixty machine guns in perfect condition and most of them 
 brand new. 
 
 The death of General Villareal had rendered void the act 
 of heroism of the ]\i!ilitary Commander, General Lauro Villar 
 and the officers under him. With a little daring on the part 
 of the rebels, the government could have been in their hands 
 that day. But Messrs. Mbndragon and Diaz did not stir, but 
 rather preferred to lock themselves up in a trap and give the 
 government time to assemble a strong force and to provide it- 
 self with the cannon and ammunition that it absolutely lacked 
 at the moment. Only treachery could save them. Fate was pro- 
 pitious and instead of being annihilated, they emerged after ten 
 days of fighting never to be forgotten by the inhabitants of Mex- 
 ico City, apparently triumphant, and full of joy. The Madero 
 administration had indeed fallen, but the Pelicista revolt itself 
 had also fallen through. Its own leaders had smothered it at its 
 birth. They lacked the daring necessary for undertakings of such 
 a character. The momentary popularity that surrounded the 
 seeming victor could not fail to die away completely in a very 
 short time. General H!uerta who had been entrusted by the gov- 
 ernment with the task of putting an end to the revolt, was to fulfil 
 his charge, but he was to destroy the revolt for his own personal 
 gain and to the disgrace of the national army which at that mo- 
 ment he unfortunately represented. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 THE TRAGIC TEiN DAYS. 
 
 The first sensation of the rebels when once in possession of 
 the Ciudadela was one of joyful elation ; but Mr. Trias and Cap 
 tain Romero Lopez soon called them to order, and as a first pre- 
 caution commanded them' to seize the barracks of the Presi- 
 dent's Guard, since these men were not in the plot. The com- 
 mander of this guard, Captain Blazquez, was in Vera Cruz 
 owing to his wife's illness.* Aware of this fact, the rebel leaders 
 attempted to win this regiment over to their cause but the offi- 
 cers refused. They did agree, however, to remain neutral. Oti 
 the following day, General Mondragon annulled this compact 
 and ordered them to incorporate themselves with the rebels; 
 instead of so doing, the officers with the greater part of the 
 guards decamped and went to Chapultepec to place themselves 
 under the orders of the officer there in command. Only a 2nd 
 Lieutenant and fifteen men obeyed Mondragon 's orders. Major 
 Trias after placing his sentinels, secured provisions by raiding 
 all the stores in the neighborhood. Colonel Ig-nacio Munoz who 
 had just arrived, was placed in command of the line to Bucareli. 
 He established headquarters in a house on Tolsa Street. Cap- 
 tain Tapia whose horse had been killed under him during the 
 fight at the Palace, had managed to rejoin Felix Diaz in Resa- 
 les Street and was now ordered to take possession of the Young 
 Men's Christian Association and assume command at that point. 
 Captain Landero, a brave soldier, was chosen to command the 
 outposts stationed in the Calzada de la Piedad. There he met 
 his death, because mistaking daring for valor, he neglected to 
 take the necessary precautions to protect himself. 
 
 Captain Escoto and Lieutenant Vazquez were placed in com- 
 mand of the assault on the prison of Belem which fell into the 
 
 *Capt. Blazquez himself related this to me. 
 
 (154) 
 
THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS 155 
 
 hands of the rebels that same afternoon. On the following day 
 however, Mtr, Oiivera, Superintendent of the Prison, again chang- 
 ed his mind and notified the Military Commander that he would 
 support the government. The rebels gave him a few moments 
 in which to decide definitely one way or the other; at the ex- 
 piration of the allotted time, they opened fire on the prison, de- 
 stroying parts of the walls. The escape of a large number of the 
 prisoners was thus facilitated; two hundred of them were ad- 
 mitted into the Ciudadela where they were set to refill the maga- 
 zines of the machine guns. 
 
 Mir. Pideneio Hiernandez assumed the duties of secretary to 
 General Felix Diaz, who was now installed in apartments on 
 the southeast side of the Ciudadela together with General Mon- 
 dragon and his two sons. 
 
 On the following morning General Diaz left the Ciudadela 
 accompanied by Don Enrique Zepeda and Don Celso Acosta to 
 keep an appointment with an emissary of GJeneral Victoriano 
 Huerta, Military Commander of the City. The conference was 
 to be held at a candy shop, "El Globo" on Providencia Street. 
 The automobile in which Diaz rode was escorted by another in 
 which were Don Ramon R-odriguez Pena and three men. The 
 secret conference at "El Globo" with Colonel Guasque, Hhierta's 
 emissary, was very short ; in fact, after a very few minutes Gen- 
 eral Diaz returned to the Ciudadela. Later in the day he was 
 visited by Lieutenant Colonel Monter, commander of one of the 
 artillery regiments which had that very day deserted his bar- 
 racks and was presenting himself m the rebel camp. 
 
 Confusion reigned supreme in the Ciudadela. If the govern- 
 ment had only made an attack, no matter with how small a force, 
 the Ciudadela would have fallen immediately. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel ]\Ibnter, placed in command of the post, 
 immediately began to bring order out of chaos. He, Mr. Trias, 
 and Captain Romero Lopez, were from that moment the life and 
 soul of the defense. Many false versions have been given of 
 the events of those days — one in praise of the marksmanship of 
 General Mondragon, when, as a matter of fact, General Mon- 
 dragon not only did not fire a single shot, but did not even once 
 appear outside the building. Lieutenant Colonel Monter miount- 
 ed a cannon aJt each corner, and himself appointed the corres- 
 ponding gun crews. Besides, he aimed the cannon stationed 
 on the comer opposite the Prison of Belem and trained on the 
 
156 FKjOM despotism TIO ANARCHY 
 
 National Palace; therefore his shots were those which reached 
 the Mariana emtrance. Hie accompanied the advance of Felix 
 Diaz to the Calles Anchas and duly allotted their positions to 
 the outposts. He attempted to take possession of the 6th Pre- 
 cinct Police Station, but after a fierce engagement it remained 
 in the hands of the federals, under command of General Celso 
 Vega. The Inspector General of Police, Major Emiliano Lopez 
 FigTieroa, presented himself that day at the Ciudadela pretend- 
 ing that he wished to come to some agreement whereby the 
 police should remain neutral, and whereby he could get back 
 those policemen now with the rebels so that he might- give the 
 usual protection as usual to the city. 
 
 Major Figueroa entered the building and went through it 
 all even to the roof, unmolested. Finally, without having once 
 been halted or challenged, he found General Diaz. When he 
 learned the mission of the Inspector General of Police, Diaz 
 peremptorily refused to sanction the withdrawal of the police, 
 saying that since they had already participated in the fight, 
 they could no longer be regarded as neutrals, and that it was up 
 to the government to patrol the city as best it could. Major 
 Figueroa had already been ordered to leave, when one of the 
 bystanders suggested to Mondragon that it would be an act of 
 sheer stupidity to allow him to leave for he had already had 
 an opportunity to take full note of the dispositions made by 
 the rebels. This knowledge would undoubtedly bring about an 
 assault by the government forces with every probability of final 
 success. Acting on this suggestion Felix Diaz immediately or- 
 dered the Inspector General to be placed under arrest. Mon- 
 dragon wanted him shot at once, but the person who had first 
 cautioned against his departure, now opposed the execution, 
 saying that such a step would challenge retaliation from the 
 government, which might even take revenge on the families of 
 the men in the Ciudadela.* Once a prisoner, Major Figueroa 
 was treated so leniently and his guards were so lax, that many 
 people were quite sure that the whole affair was nothing but 
 a farce. 
 
 *I obtained this information from Francisco Moreno, an eye 
 witness. 
 
THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS 157 
 
 That day the government ordered all the lights in the vicin- 
 ity of the Ciudadela to be put out, but the telephones remained 
 iritaet. Thus the rebels were able to keep themselves fully in- 
 formed of the march of events throughout the city.* 
 
 Oin Tuesday, February 11th, the siege of the Ciudadela was 
 begun, following a conference held at the home of Wr. Zepeda in 
 Naples Street between General Tictoriano Htuerta and Felix Diaz, 
 at which in general terms, the overthrow of the Mladero govern- 
 ment was agreed upon. 
 
 General Huerta placed General Jose Delgado, his second 
 in command, over the forces on the Alameda; General Celso 
 Yega over those in the Streets of the Ayuntamiento ; and Gen- 
 eral Felipe Mier over those in the Calazada de la Piedad, w'here he 
 was later superseded by Lieutenant Colonel Catarino Cruz. 
 General Felipe Angeles, who had arrived with his forces from 
 Cuernavaca, was stationed in the Paseo de la Reforma; and 
 General Gustavo Miaas in the streets of San Diego. Chapulte- 
 pec was under command of Eear Admiral Angel Ortiz Monas- 
 terio, but two days later he was superseded by General Joaquin 
 Beltran.t The attack from the Engineers Park was entrusted to 
 Col. Ocaranza who gained possession of it shortly after taking 
 over his command. Colonel Francisco Romero, Speaker of the 
 Bouse, who had brought a regiment mustered in the State of 
 Hidalgo, was given command of the forces on Cinco de Mayo 
 Street directly protecting the National Palace. 
 
 As I have stated before, the government lacked artillery 
 officers for field service, since most of the capable officers 
 were in the Ciudadela. This deficiency was made up by call- 
 ing as volunteers cadets from the Military Academy for field 
 service with the rank of Lieutenant of Artillery. This absence 
 would in no way prevent them from continuing their studies 
 when peace should be reestablished. These volunteers were im- 
 mediately despatched to take charge of the batteries which were 
 
 *Tt is but justice to pay tribute here to the young ladies who 
 acted as telephone operators throughout those days; their con- 
 duct merits warm commendation. 
 
 t After the fall of Vera Cruz, General Bteltran had been re- 
 lieved of his duties as Military Commander of that city. His 
 place had been taken by General Riefugio Velasco, the same who 
 was later defeated by Villa at Torreon. 
 
158 FEjOM despotism TO ANAECHY 
 
 mounted on the plains encompassing the city on the side towards 
 San Antonio Abad. 
 
 This disposition of the forces at hand, reenforced con- 
 stantly by troops arriving' at the city from outside points, since 
 orders had been issued to all garrison Commanders to rush 
 their forces with all speed to the aid of the city, established a 
 siege, which according to all tacticians, should have been brought 
 to a successful close within a few hours. 
 
 The new Military Commander of the city, in order to pre- 
 tend that he would begin the assault on that Ttiesday, gave orders 
 that a body of Riurales, commanded by Colonel Castillo, dis- 
 tinguished for its loyality to M(r. Madero, should advance at 
 the double quick down Balderas Street until they should enter 
 the Ciudadela. 
 
 Colonel Casitillo on receiving these orders thought them so 
 foolish that he sent his aide to interview the Military Comman- 
 der so that the latter should repeat the order to him personally. 
 When the aide returned with the same identical orders. Colonel 
 Castillo formed his men, and placing himself at their head, ad- 
 vanced as he had been commanded, as punctiliously as if he were 
 performing a mere dress parade manoeuver. When they reached 
 the corner of Balderas and Morelos Streets, the machine guns 
 on the roofs of the Ciudadela and in the windows of the Young 
 Men's Christian Association building, under command of Cap- 
 tain Tapia, opened fire on the dragoons, mowing them down by 
 the hundreds and totally annihilating them, the dead reaching 
 even to the gates of the Ciudadela. The horses which were not 
 instantly killed galloped riderless through the streets of the 
 Ayuntamiento as far as San Felipe Neri Street. 
 
 This squadron so gallantly led by its colonel, was wiped 
 out to a man. Colonel Castillo was a victim of military discip- 
 line, a victim of one of the most cowardly and dastardly deeds 
 ^perpetrated in those tragic days. Colonel Castillo knew that 
 he was being sent to his death and consummated the sacrifice with- 
 out a word, without even a murmur of complaint. "Theirs 
 not to reason why, theirs but to do or die." If the author of 
 that deed had a like conscience, he would not have been able to 
 sleep in peace, his remorse for those victims of his incompe- 
 tence or of his infamy would have killed him ere this. 
 
 General Angeles had stationed his battery in the Colonia 
 Station, and when he tried to move it to a more favorable posi- 
 
THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS 159 
 
 tion, he was prevented by the protests of Ambassador Henry 
 Lane Wilson who did not wish to be disturbed by the roar of the 
 guns nor to expose his residence to the fire of the rebels who 
 would no doubt answer that of General Angeles. 
 
 From the Station Colonia, Angeles opened fire on the Ciu- 
 dadela, but as a capable artilleryman, he soon perceived that his 
 guns were doing little if any damage. He therefore personally 
 undertook the aiming of his cannon but with nio better success. 
 It was said that the officers under General Angeles, in league 
 with the rebels, had purposely put tihie sights out of commission 
 and that to this is due the bad marksmanship of Gfeneral An- 
 geles, a very plausible tale, in fact his inefficiency was a surprise 
 to everybody because in France as well as in MexicO' he had a 
 reputation for wonderful accuracy as an artilleryman. Be that 
 as it may, thie truth is that few shots reached the rebel lines and 
 those that did, caused little or no damage. It can be further 
 stated that only the battery of General Angeles and that of 
 General Maas in San Diego did any effective work. This ex- 
 plains the few casualties among the followers of Felix Diaz. 
 On the other hand, the city itself suffered havoc from a con- 
 flict which in reality was but a farce though infamous in itself, 
 for if there was little loss of life among the soldiers, there 
 was a heavy loss among non-combatants, and the material dam- 
 age done was not inconsiderable. 
 
 General Angeles showed great force of character. His 
 were the only forces to really maintain strict siege against the 
 rebels who were receiving outside aid from a large number of 
 persons. Some young men of thie best families who were caught 
 spying for the rebels, were immediately executed by General 
 Angeles, In this way he prevented the rebels from receiving 
 exact details of what) was going on in his camp. 
 
 These actions gave grounds for the court martial of Gen- 
 eral Angeles which ended in his imprisonment after the fall of 
 the Madero Government. However, nothing further was done 
 to him ; he was liberated and immediately sent abroad on a mili- 
 tary mission, but it seems that at the present writing, he has re- 
 signed this commission and has joined the rebel government, 
 which has thus gained a valuable asset. 
 
 From Tuesday, February 11, when General Huerta simu- 
 lated the attack, there was intermittent firing; but a serious 
 assault on the Ciudadela was never undertaken nor even intend- 
 
160 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 ed, because the opposing leaders, the one of the giovernment and 
 the other of the rebel forces, had come to a full understanding on 
 that day, agreeing on the important question, the overthrow of 
 Madero. But the government continued to place full confidence 
 in General Hhierta. He was allowed to continue his prepara- 
 tions so that he could usurp the power, and at one and the same 
 time he was laughing up his sleeve at a government which trust- 
 ed him fully and at the rebels who were also so innocently trust- 
 ful. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 TIHIE ACTION OF THE SENATE.* 
 
 The American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, took the 
 same attitude he had taken towards the end of Don Porfirio 
 Diaz' administration. At that time he had stated on every 
 possible occasion that his government was tired of quietly wit- 
 nessing what was happening in Mexico and had intimated the 
 possibility of an armed intervention. In fact, this was the very 
 weapon which Mr. Limantour hiad wielded over General Diaz 
 to secure his resignation. 
 
 Mr. Lame Wilson now used thesie threats on Mr. Lascurain. 
 The administration feared that the words of Mr. Lane Wilson 
 really voiced the definite opinion of the American government, 
 and therefore, by order of the President, the Secretary of State 
 called a meeting of the Senators at the Hbuse of Representa- 
 tives. At this meeting, held on February 13, there were thirty 
 members of the Senate present. 
 
 In his address to them Mtr. Lascurain, Secretary of State, 
 said that relations between their country and the United States 
 were at that moment very critical, judging from interviews with 
 the American Ambassador; that at any moment the marines 
 from the American men of war in Vera Cruz might land, and 
 that it was therefore the President's wish that the Senate be in- 
 formed of these facts. He then read a telegram and a memo- 
 randum from the American government, neither of which really 
 said anything. The occasion was propitious to those senators 
 who sympathized with the revolution and they made the most 
 of it. 
 
 *The facts in this chapter were related to me by two Senators. 
 
 (161) 
 
162 FKOM D'EiSPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 Senator Gumesindo Enriquez answered on behalf of those 
 present that in view of the report of the Secretary of State, they 
 thought it advisable to have an audienc^ with the President in 
 order to impress upon him the need not v,nly of making any sac- 
 rifice to avoid foreign intervention but, above all, in order to put 
 a stop to the existing impossible state of affairs. The Secre- 
 tary was commissioned to beg for an interview with the Presi- 
 dent. The last action taken before adjourning was to call a 
 meeting for the next day at the residence of Senator Sebastian 
 Camacho. Only the nine followiug Senators kept the appoint- 
 ment: Sebastian Camacho, Grumesindo Enriquez, Guillermo 
 Obregon, Ricardo Guzman, Emilio Rabaza, Enrique Gioroztieta, 
 Rafael Pimentel, Tomas Mancera, and Jose Castellot. At this 
 meeting it was decided that since the interview requested hiad 
 not been granted, they ask M'r. Madero to resign from the Presi- 
 dency and at the same time beg Mr. Felix Diaz to withdraw as 
 a candidate. A provisional president, acceptable to both sides, 
 could then be appointed to call the elections. 
 
 Mr. de la Barra, although not present at the meeting, be- 
 gan on his own initiative, to work for the same end. He wrote 
 a letter to the President offering to speak to Mir. Felix Diaz as 
 agreed by the Senators. 
 
 On the followinig day, Saturday the 15th, the Senators again 
 met at the house of Mr. Camacho. Messrs. Obregon and Pimen- 
 tel who had been appointed to approach Felix Diaz, reported 
 that they had done so, but that the rebel leader absolutely in- 
 sisted upon two things as a working basis for any discussion or 
 provision ; first, the immediate resignation of Mr. Madero ; sec- 
 ond, that no member of his Cabinet should be a nominee for the 
 Provisional Presidency. 
 
 As agreed upon with the Secretary of State, the Senators 
 went to the Palace to give Diaz ' answer to the President, but the 
 latter refused to receive them. By order of the President, they 
 were told by ]M!r. Ernesto Madero and Mr. Btonilla that on no 
 account was Mr. Madero willing to resign. The Senators then 
 decided to go to Military Headquarters to address themselves 
 to General Huerta, head of the government forces. 
 
 When General Huerta was told the purpose of the visit, he 
 begged the Senators that before beginning they allow Mm. to 
 call the Secretary of War as a witness to the conference that was 
 
THE ACTION OF THE SENATE 163 
 
 about to be held. Since the Senators raised no objection to 
 General Htierta's proposition, the Secretary of War joined the 
 meeting shortly after. Hardly was he inside the door than he 
 faced them all and with an angry gesture addressed 'Ss'Lr. Obre- 
 gon, saying that they were the prime corrupters of the army. 
 He was not allowed to finish, for all the Senators sprang to their 
 feet and angrily protested saying that no feeling hostile to the 
 administration had led them there ; that they desired to corrupt 
 no one; that they were moved only by the desire of finding a 
 solution to the strife that was causiag countless misfortunes and 
 w^hose end it was impossible to foresee, since they believed that the 
 administration would gain nothing by fighting the rebels. They 
 added that in view of the attitude assumed by the Secretary of 
 War, they considered their mission at an end, and that the re- 
 sponsibility for the future events would rest with General Gar- 
 cia Pena. He, in turn, somewhalt. subdued, apologized profuse- 
 ly, adding that since he too was seeking a solution to the matter, 
 he would gladly hear the one proposed by them. The Senators 
 then complained of the President's behavior and General Gar- 
 cia Peiia offered to speak to Mr. Mladero in order to obtain an 
 interview for the Senators who were there present. At the end 
 of the meeting. Senator Obregon insinuated to General Garcia 
 Pena that one solution might be the resignation of Mr. Madero 
 and the subsequent appointment of General Garcia Peiia as Pro- 
 visional President. He said that he himself would obtain the 
 consent of Felix Diaz. General Pena answered that not only 
 was it probable that Mr. Diaz would not accept this proposi- 
 tion, but that he did not feel himself sufficiently authorized to 
 propose it to Mr. Mladero. 
 
 On Sunday the 16th, during the armistice, the Senators 
 again met at Mr. Camacho's house, without reaching any agree- 
 ment, for General Garcia Pena did not let them know at what de- 
 cision Mr. Madero had arrived. On Monday morning, the 17th, 
 while at Mtr. Camacho's home, they received word from Genera' 
 Huerta to meet on the following morning at 10 :30 at Military 
 Headquarters. Believing that this appointment was the one 
 with the President, promised them by General Garcia Pena, the 
 Senators met at the stated hour at Military Headquarters on the 
 mezzanine floor of the Palace. On their arrival, and as if in 
 answer to previous conversations, General Huerta told them 
 
164 FEjOM despotism TO ANARlCHJ 
 
 that lie was at their ooininand and would carry out any orders 
 they might see fit to give him.* 
 
 The senators surprised by such an unexpected stand, and 
 unable to grasp the significance of the Military Commander's 
 attitude, kept silence for a few minutes. Finally, Mr. Enri- 
 quez, who had been chosen spokesman for the interview with 
 Mr. Madero, replied that they had nothing to command, but still 
 insisted upon speakioig with the President. "When Mt. Enri- 
 quez finished speaking. General Huerta sent an aid to the Presi- 
 dential apartments. The aide returned almost immediately 
 with the answer that the President would receive the Senators in 
 the Audience Chamber. 
 
 As soon as they joined Mr. Madero, Senator Enriquez began 
 to expound their reasons for soliciting the interview ; but he had 
 no sooner begun to speak than he was interrupted by Senator 
 Guillermo Obregon who began a lengthy and involved speech. 
 In fact, he talked in such a round about way, and expressed him- 
 self in such terms that finally Mladero, losing all patience, said 
 somewhat rudely, ' ' Speak out and say frankly what you want. ' ' 
 He then proceeded to rebuke them all saying that he knew per- 
 fectly well what they were after; they wanted him to resign so 
 as to allow Porfirio Diaz to come back to the Presidency and re- 
 main there until his death, but they could understand once for 
 all that under no circumstances would he resign, that death 
 only could remove him from the National Palace. He admitted 
 that the day wlhen his term expired and he could turn over the 
 office to his successor, would be the happiest day of his life ; but 
 in the meantime, only death could remove him from power. 
 
 Senator Enriquez retorted emphatically that their mission 
 was not one of intervention in favor of General Diaz, but they 
 did believe it their duty to take the necessary steps to prevent 
 greater conflicts ; that was why they had come togiether. Their 
 wislhes which were also those of the country at large, were that 
 the government should come to an agreement with the revolu- 
 tionists so as to put an end to the struggle. That the greatest 
 
 *General Huerta knowing the insinuations made by Sena- 
 tor Obregon to the Secretary of War, hoped that because of the 
 latter 's refusal, these offers might be made to him. Thus in the 
 acts that he had planned for that very day, he would appear to 
 be carrying out the commands of the Senate and so could hope 
 to be free from all blame. 
 
THE ACTION OF THE SENATE 165 
 
 fear of the Senators was that this continued strife would force 
 intervention by foreign powers. Mr. Mladero, quite calm now, 
 answered that tihey oould banish all such fears since he would 
 read to them a telegram jiust received from President Taft, the 
 contents of which were pacific and entirely different from the 
 attitude assumed by Henry Lane Wilson. 
 
 Obregon then took the floor again, becoming so very much 
 excited that Mir. Madero also became excited and the interview 
 came to an end. Each of the Senators present had the firm con- 
 viction that they would all be put under arrest as they lefti the 
 Palace; but Mr. Madero took personal leave of each in such a 
 way that they soon lost all fear. 
 
 On their way to Military Headquarters to take leave of 
 General Huerta, they were met by Lieutenant Colonel Riverol, 
 an intimate friend of one of the Senators, wiho whispered ' ' Three 
 o'clock this afternoon will see the beginning of the end. You 
 just see!" 
 
 Madero, as soon as left alone, summoned General Huerta 
 and asked him when this state of affairs was going to end, in 
 other words, when did he intend to gain possession of the Ciuda- 
 dela. General Huerta told the President that everything would 
 be settled that very afternoon, that at that very moment he was 
 going to give orders for the final assault to begin. He then sa- 
 luted and withdrew. It was true. General Huerta made the 
 assault that very afternoon, but not against the Ciudadela, but 
 against the very President himself; instead of giving a death 
 blow to rebellion, he sounded the knell of constitutional law and 
 order. 
 
 Senators Obregon and Pimentel since the very first inter- 
 view with Felix Diaz, had obtained passes from both the Mili- 
 tary Commander of Mexico City and the leader of the rebels in 
 the Ciudadela. In this way they went back and forth daily and 
 were able to learn that just as the President was fully decided 
 not to resign, Felix Diaz was fully as decided not to cede an inch. 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 AN EVENT IN THE MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY. 
 
 History relates how the Merovingian dynasty was borne 
 down by the weight of the sword of Pepin, Steward of the Palace 
 who usurped the power by abusing the confidence reposed in 
 him by the last Merovingian emperor. General Huerta though 
 not conversant with history, sought to imitate Pepin, and to 
 scale the ladder to power by using the same means employed by 
 the founder of the Carolinian Dynasty. General Huerta, un- 
 fortunately, used this means but he was absolutely incapable to 
 be a ruler such as Pepin, and much less capable to organize a 
 government like that of the ances't'er of Charlemange. 
 
 Resolved to usurp the power, his first effort was to force 
 the Senate to take suchi steps as would give legality to his acts, 
 but the senators were deaf to the insinuations whispered to them 
 and would not do what the Military Commander wished. There- 
 fore, General Huerta was compelled to resort to brute force, and 
 arrest the President and the Vice President in the National Palace 
 itself, and to shoot on the very spot any one offering resistance 
 to the execution of this act. 
 
 For these arrests. General Huerta made use of the services 
 of Brigadier General Blanquete, Commander of the 29th Infantry, 
 in whom he had entire confidence. Blanquete in turn could count 
 on Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez Riverol and Major Izquierdo, 
 his immediate subordinates in the 29th Infantry. 
 
 General Huerta, some of his friends say, feared that he would 
 be arrested and even executed by the government, which sus- 
 pected that he was hand in glove with the revolutionists. Some 
 of Huerta 's intimates even state that General Peila invited the 
 Military Conmiander to visit Chapultepec Military Academy with 
 the idea of placing him under arrest, but on arriving at the Cas- 
 
 (166) 
 
AN EVENT IN THE MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY 167 
 
 tie, he was so heartily dheered by the Cadets that the Secretary 
 of War saw the impossibility of carrying out his plans. He there- 
 fore attempted to induce H'uerta to go with him to the barracks 
 of San Cosme so as to arrest him there. All this however is but 
 imagination. 
 
 General Hiierta ever since the battle of Bachimba had re- 
 ceived whispered suggestions to depose Madero and usurp the 
 power. The enemies of the government believed that a soldier 
 like General Hhierta would alone be able to establish peace, and 
 some of them had looked to him, while others had their eyes on 
 General Geronimo Treviiio. The latter had refused to listen to 
 any proposals, but General Hiuerta not only had lent a willing ear 
 to the suggestions, but even broadhied the subject to some of the 
 most prominent officers, notably to General Blanquete who warm- 
 ly seconded the idea as he believed it to be the sole solution of the 
 problem which was bringing ruin to the whole country.* 
 
 When the revolt broke out and the first conferences were 
 held between Felix Diaz and General Huerta, the latter hesitated 
 at first, but finally accepted the main points. He did, however, 
 impose as a condition that he should act as Provisional Presi- 
 dent and should reserve to himself the right to decide on the pro- 
 pitious moment for the execution of the plot. During the tragic 
 ten days, the whispered insinuations were not hushed for a single 
 moment. A very strong pressure was brought to bear especially 
 on the wife of the Military Commander, to force him to repudiate 
 Mr. Madero. 
 
 General H'uerta could not count on the support of all the 
 troops under his command. In fact, he was certain that some of 
 them, in particular those under General Angeles, would not lend 
 themselves to any action inimical to the government of Madero. 
 He had the idea that perhaps the Senate would facilitate the reali- 
 zation of his object and with that in mind, he had held his inter- 
 views with the group of senators which had met at the house of Mr. 
 Camacho. 
 
 In order to be able to act with safety, he insisted that the 
 29th Infantry, commanded by General Blanquete, be transferred 
 to Mexico City, but General Blanquete who was not as yet in the 
 plot, had delayed the transfer, offering first the excuse that he 
 
 *I myself mentioned all this on Feb. 14th, 1913, to M'r. 
 Madero 's relatives at Monterey. 
 
168 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 was not fully confident of the loyalty of his troops, and later 
 that the bridges across the Lerma had been destroyed. However, 
 when called directly by General Htuerta, he rebuilt the bridges 
 which had been burned down by the 7th Regiment of Rurales 
 under Major Cardenas. He then organised his regiment for the 
 march, arriving in Miexico City on Stinday, and pitched his camp 
 in the Calzada de Tlaxpana. Soon after his arrival, it was agreed 
 that the troops acting as guards in the Palace were to be sup- 
 planted by detachments of the 29th Regiment so that once in pos- 
 session of the Palace, they could arrest Madero and Pino Suarez 
 and force them to resign, that is if the Senate could not be induced 
 to remove them and appoint General Huerta as President pro 
 tern. This point was discussed by General Blanquete and Sena- 
 tor Obregon at the Tlaxpana camp. 
 
 When the plans had been ratified by all concerned, the nec- 
 essary orders were issued. As soon as the 29th had been duly in- 
 stalled in the Palace it was agreed that on Tuesday, the 18th at 
 three o 'clock in the afternoon, while the high officials were lunch- 
 ing, they should all be placed under arrest by Lieutenant Colonel 
 Jimenez Riverol and Major Izquierdo, supported by a detach- 
 ment of the 29th. 
 
 It was decided that Gustavo Madero should be lured from 
 the Palace because it was feared that his natural impulsiveness 
 might cause the sihedding of blood. In order to carry out this 
 scheme, he was invited to a luncheon given by General Delgado 
 at the Restaurant Gambrinus, in honor of Colonel Francisco 
 Romero. The hour of the banquet was set for three o'clock, but 
 in the morning it was learned that General Manuel Rivera, com- 
 mander of the 4th Military Zone, was to arrive that very day 
 from Oaxaca with his brigade. It was therefore thought neces- 
 sary to hasten events before this soldier should enter the city. 
 
 When the brigade arrived at the San Lazaro station, an aid 
 of General Rivera was sent ahead to Military Headquarters, 
 arriving there shortly after noon, to request the necessary per- 
 mission for the brigade to enter the city. He was instructed to 
 await further orders. General Huerta then rushed out, called 
 for Gustavo Madero, took him with the aid of General Delgado, 
 to the Restaurant Gambrinus, and then pretending some pressing 
 business left them and sped in an automobile to the San Lazaro 
 station. On his arrival there he requested General Rivera to ae- 
 
AN EVENT IN THE MERlOVINGIAN DYNASTY 169 
 
 company him in his automobile to Military Headquarters. Once 
 there, General Rivera was placed under arrest and remained in 
 confinement until after the death of Mladero. On his arrival at 
 Military Headquarters, Huerta was informed by General Blan- 
 quete that all the plans had been executed and that Madero and 
 Pino Suarez were under arrest. 
 
CHAPTBK, XXVI. 
 THE THIIRiD MD[LITLA.BY REVOLT. 
 
 In accordance with the orders issued, Lieutenant Colonel 
 Eiverol accompanied by Mjajor Izquierdo, by a Captain of Ar- 
 tillery, and by Don Enrique Zepeda, took thirty men of the Palace 
 Guard and proceeded by way of the main staircase to the Presi- 
 dential apartments. He went through the waiting room and the 
 aides' room to the Cabinet Chamber where he formed his men in 
 line and left them under command of Mr. Zepeda. Then he and 
 Major Izquierdo proceeded to the salon next to the Library where 
 Madero and his Cabinet and a few friends were about to sit down 
 to dinner. Lieutenant Colonel Riverol informed Mr. Madero that 
 General Rivera with his troops, had revolted and was even then 
 within the city, that since there was fear that the garrison might 
 lend him its support, it was deemed of the greatest importance 
 that the President should be taken to a safe place at once and 
 that he had accordingly come to conduct him. Madero was greatly 
 surprised by the news and asked for details ; Eiverol grasped the 
 President's left arm and Major Izquierdo his right and in this 
 way, they attempted to push him into the next room. Madero 
 at once understood what was in the wind and said : "I will not 
 go like this. ' ' As the two officers dragged him towards the room 
 in which the gtuard was stationed, he asked Rliverol who had given 
 such orders. When he saw the guard drawn up in the other 
 room, he understood that he was lost and stopped as he crossed 
 the threshold. Captain Garmendia, aide to the President, drew 
 his revolver, saying : ' ' Ylou shall not lay hands upon the Presi- 
 dent of the Republic, ' ' and fired point blank at Colonel Riverol. 
 Don Marcos Hernandez at the same time fired at Major Izquierdo, 
 both bullets taking deadly effect. Colonel Riverol fell dead across 
 the door leading into the library from the Cabinet Chamber, and 
 Major Izquierdo fell dead in the latter room. About twenty or 
 thirty more shots were fired by the soldiers of the 29th Battalion, 
 
 (170) 
 
THE THIRD MILITARY REVOLT 171 
 
 the aides of the President, and Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Zepeda, who 
 was in command of the detachment of the 29th, was hit in the hand. 
 Zepeda answering the fire, killed Mr. Marcos Hernandez. Captain 
 Montes a member of the Presidents 's personal staff, ordered the 
 troops to about face and leave the room. Since Major Izquierdo 
 had been killed by Captain Garmendia in the library, the men 
 f onnd themselves without an officer in authority ; they therefore 
 obeyed the orders of Captain Montes, the only man in uniform. 
 With him at their head, they left the Pi-esidential suite, and the 
 door was slammed behind them by Mir. Rodriguez Malpica, chief of 
 the President's staff. The President, judging it dangerous to re- 
 main, intending to abandon the National Palace, entered the ele- 
 vator accompanied by Captain Giarmendia and others; but when 
 he issued from the elevator to the eorrider beneath the Hall of 
 Honor, he found General Blanquete there already with reenf orce- 
 ments commanded by Captain HIernandez. 
 
 Hernandez made as if to stop the President, but Garmendia 
 shouted, "Mien, long live the President!" The soldiers at once 
 presented arms in salute to the Head of the Nation. Captain 
 Hernandez, perceivingi that the attitude of his men obviously was 
 favorable to the President, fell back hastily. Madero began to 
 address the soldiers, but in the midst of his speech, was interrupt- 
 ed by General Blanquete, who, ghastly pale, advanced and plac- 
 ing his hand on Madero 's shoulder said : ' ' Come here ' ' and push- 
 ing him into the guard house; when he was into the room he 
 said: "You have just killed a man of great worth, so you are my 
 prisoner, ' ' and grasping him by the arm, pushed him quickly into 
 the rear of the guard house. Madero, highly unstrung, asked 
 repeatedly by whose authority this was done.* 
 
 While this was going on, the Vice President and the Cabi- 
 net members, as well as those who had accompanied Mladero, had 
 escaped, each as best he could. Pino Suarez descended by the stair- 
 way leading to the offices of the Secretary of tihe Treasury, but 
 instead of issuing immediately to the street, went towards the 
 Treasury. On perceiving his error and attempting to leave the 
 building, he was taken captive by an officer from Military Head- 
 
 *Some of the aids of the President tried to impede the arrest 
 and went so far as to aim their revolvers at Gen. Blanquete but 
 they were prevented of their purpose at the instance of one of 
 the Cabinet Members who ordered "Don't fire! Don't fire!" 
 
172 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 quarters who conducted him to where General Blanquete was 
 holding Madero prisoner, 
 
 Mr. Bonilla, a less nervous man, had also descended the stairs 
 to the office of the Secretary of the Treasury and had calmly 
 and quickly quitted the National Palace, accompanied by Cap- 
 tain Blazquez, commander of the President's guard. Both of 
 these officials went first to Mr. Bonilla 's residence, but imme- 
 diately after sought refuge in another house. 
 
 While events were running their course at the National 
 Palace, similar deeds were being enacted at the Restaurant Gam- 
 brinus. Gustavo Madero had been invited to dine with Generals 
 Huerta, Delgado, Yarza, Romero, and Sangines. Shortly after 
 their arrival at the Rjestaurant Gambrinus, two officers, Luis 
 Fuentes and Revilla, entered with twenty men from the forest 
 guard of Chapultepec and ordered those present to put up their 
 hands and surrender. The only one to make the least attempt at 
 resistance was Ghistavo Madero, but Officer Fuentes, placing his 
 cocked revolver at Madero 's head, showed him the futility of such 
 an act. Mladero who was also covered by Revilla 's men, realized 
 how useless resistance would be, and surrendered. Gustavo Ma- 
 dero and Generals Yarza and Delgado were conducted to the coat 
 room of the restaurant and placed under heavy guard strictly ' ' in- 
 comunicado." Messrs. Romero and Sangines disappeared during 
 the confusion without any one knowing how or when they had es- 
 caped, for the attention of the party making the arrest had been 
 concentrated on Gustavo Madero. 
 
 At eleven o'clock that night, the prisoners were transferred 
 to the National Palace and at two, the same night, officer Revilla 
 conducted Gustavo Madero in an automobile to the Ciudadela 
 where he met his death as will be described lalter. 
 
 President Mkdero and Vice President Pino Suarez were eon- 
 ducted that afternoon to the apartments used by the Administra- 
 tive officers of Chapultepec at the National Palace, situated to 
 the south of the Court of Hbnor. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 AN ORGY OF BLOOiD. 
 
 The Secretary of War was arrested in his office from which, 
 at his own request, he was transferred under escort to the guard 
 house where Madero and the other Secretaries were confined. 
 Upon his arrival, the guard turned out to show him the honors as 
 directed by the Militaiy Code. Greneral Garcia Peiia remarked 
 that under the circumstances such honors were superfluous. He 
 had only just greeted the President and his colleagues in the 
 Cabinet, when new orders were received to conduct him to Mili- 
 tary Headquarters. Shortly after, he was given his liberty. 
 
 That afternoon at about five o'clock, Hiuerta arrived at the 
 apartment where Madero was confined. He addressed Kadero 
 as "Mr. President," but Madero interrupted, saying, "Oh, so 
 I am still Presidenit. " Huerta then began again: "Mr. ex- 
 President, I have already notified the Senate and the American 
 Ambassador regarding what I have done, and they both approve 
 my actions. Since I won the battle of Blachimba"— "Even then 
 you were already a traitor," interposed Madero. This inter- 
 ruption caused Hlierta to forget the speech he had been about to 
 make, and after a few words, he took his leave. He shook hands 
 with Mr. Lascurain and Mr. Hernandez, but on reaching Madero, 
 the latter refused to extend his hand. General Huerta then of- 
 fered his hand to Mr. Vazquez Tagle, who said : "I also refuse 
 to shake hands with you. General. ' ' Huerta hesitated, then turn- 
 ed away saying "God be with you."* 
 
 At seven he gave orders that the Cabinet members be set 
 free and be accompanied to their respective homes by aides from 
 Military Headquarters. Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez, 
 who left together, were escorted by Major of Rurales Francisco 
 Cardenas and a Captain, personal aide to General Huerta. On 
 their way back to the Palace, the escort stopped at the home of 
 
 *These facts were related to me by one of the Cabinet Min- 
 isters w^ho was at the side of Mr. Madero at the time. 
 
 (173) 
 
174 FROM DESPOTISM TO AINARCH/Y 
 
 Don Ignacio de la Torre to greet and give him an account of 
 what had happened. Referring to Madero, Cardenas said : ' ' What 
 I do not understand is why that contemptible dwarf is still alive. ' ' 
 One of his hearers made some remark to which Cardenas replied : 
 
 "Just let them give me the order and I'll kill him. That 
 
 has done enough damage already. ' ' That same night Huerta was 
 advised of Cardenas' willingness to be made executioner in the 
 government which was being formed. 
 
 No longer awaiting the appointment by the Senate, H'uerta 
 sent for Mr. Lascurain on the following day, in order to persuade 
 him of the absolute necessity that Madero resign so as to legalize 
 the new government; that this was of urgent importance before 
 the felicistas should recover and desire to take charge of the 
 prisoners, as they had done with Gustavo Madero that morning. 
 He reminded Mr. Lascurain of the tragic end of the President's 
 brother. Finally, he assured Mr. Lascurain that as soon as Ma- 
 dero and Pino Suarez resigned, they would be sent to Vera 
 Cruz. Mr. Lascurain, who had been deeply moved by the tragic 
 death of Gust:avo Madero, went immediately to see Madero. Gen- 
 eral Juvencio Robles had, at the express command of General 
 H'uerta, already taken the matter up with Madero, whose first 
 impulse had been one of violence, and he had decisively refused 
 to resign; but calmed by the remarks of the aged General, he 
 had agreed to talk the matter over with his Cabinet, exacting 
 first and foremost that he should have absolute guarantees that 
 the life of Pino Suarez would be spared as also that of General 
 Felipe Angeles, in Whom he was especially interested. General 
 Robles offered to transmit! these conditions to General Huerta. 
 
 When General Huerta had left the room, in which ]\%dero 
 and his Cabinet were confined, he had gione immediately to the 
 American Embassy where there were awaiting him Felix Diaz 
 and the other persons who participated in the now celebrated 
 compact described in the following chapter. At this moment, 
 the orgy was started at the Ciudadela. 
 
 Those w;ho had shared the danger of the tragic ten days 
 with Felix Diaz, believing themselves triumphant, were celebrat- 
 ing the event by carousing and singing. Some one proposed to 
 finish the work by setting fire to the building of the champion 
 of Maderismo, the newspaper ''La Nueva Era," a building 
 which had been shelled from the Ciudadela during the battle. 
 Soon after this suggestion, a party of men left the Ciudadela, 
 
AN OKGY OF BLOOD 175 
 
 and presently the glare of the flames indicated that it had been. 
 acted upon promptly. The same was done to the other Mladero 
 newspaper. When Felix Diaz returned from the American 
 Embassy after he had signed the famous compact, the orgy was 
 at its height. It was impossible to command respect. The fumes 
 of alcohol, the inebriety of triumph, the excitement caused by 
 the flames, had transformed all these men into veritable beasts. 
 The friends and partisans of F'elix Diaz besieged him and in- 
 sistently demanded that he should force General Hberta to de- 
 liver into their hands both Madero and Pino Suarez, so that 
 they might execute them immediately in the very Ciudadela 
 itself. Without waiting for the decision of General Diaz, Gen- 
 eral Mondragion sent two aides in am automobile with a message 
 to General Huerta, who refused absolutely to surrender his 
 prisoners. They had not yet duly resigned. After the various 
 exchanges of messages, the automobile returned to the Ciudadela 
 with Gustavo Mladero about 2 A. M. 
 
 Gustavo Madero arrived just as Felix Diaz had finisihed re- 
 lating to his friends the happenings at the American Embassy 
 and was about to retire. "General" said Revilla, an aide, who 
 had brought Gustavo Madero, "General Huerta has ordered me 
 to deliver this prisoner to you." "Turn him over to Mon- 
 dragon, " said Diaz, and retired. When G^eneral Mondragon 
 took charge of the prisoner, he turned to Zurita, an officer of 
 the Military Academy who, with Messrs. Remes and Izabal, had 
 just arrived at his quarters, and said to them. "Take this man 
 and do to him what he and his men did to General Ruiz."* 
 
 Zurita took Gustavo Madero by the arm, and ignoring his 
 request to be allowed to speak with Felix Diaz or with General 
 Mondragon, he pushed and pulled him out through the main 
 gate to the small plaza where stands the statue of General Mbre- 
 los. On reaching the threshold of the door, Madero who from 
 the very first knew what to expect, offered a stubborn resis- 
 tance. He talked entreatingly to the youngsters in an attempt 
 to win them over. Grasping the frame of the door, he was able 
 to withstand the pressure exerted against him, while in the mean- 
 time he talked about his hapless children, about his own insig- 
 nificance, claiminig that he had never had any real power. But 
 
 *A11 these facts were related to me by an eye witness, whose 
 name it is not yet advisable to publish. 
 
176 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 it was a mere waste of words and energy, for he was not allowed 
 to continue, a cadet shot him inflicting a wound in the maxillary. 
 An instinct of self preservation forced Madero to break and run, 
 but he could only take a few steps and leaning against one of the 
 wagons standing in the plaza, he let his head fall on his left 
 shoulder. The pain caused by the wound must have been intense. 
 Here he was caught by the men who had pursued him from the 
 Ciudadela; they immediately fired on the hapless man, who, 
 riddled by bullets, fell dead at the feet of his youthful murder- 
 ers. When they saw him fall and ascertained that he was dead, 
 they threw themselves on his inanimate body and stripped it of 
 everything of value; sixty dollars, three letters from his wife, 
 dated at Monterey, and a memorandum book whose last entry 
 was "Everything is lost, the soldiers refuse to fight " 
 
 Drunk with the taste of blood, these men returned to the 
 Ciudadela, to demand that Hberta be forced to deliver in to 
 their hands Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. Felix Diaz had 
 already retired and could not be seen, but an aide again jumped 
 into an automobile and went to the Palace. Huerta agiain re- 
 fused to surrender them and the automobile returned to the 
 Ciudadela. Rodolfo Reyes then said, "He should at least let 
 us have Basso, who killed my father." The automobile again 
 speeded to the Palace returning shortly with Mr. Adolf o Basso, 
 Head of the President's Household, who had been held prisoner 
 in Military Headquarters since the arrest of Madero and his 
 Cabinet. Mr. Basso, an old sailor and retired major of artillery, 
 immediately grasping what was in the air, turned to General 
 Mondragon and said "I do not ask for mercy. I would not 
 have shown mercy to you. ' ' 
 
 General Mondragon, affected by the tragic death of Gustavo 
 Madero, turned to Paulino Ortega, wtho had just arrived with 
 fifty men from the cable office and said "Paulino, detail a firing 
 squad for this man and see to it that the scene just enacted with 
 Gustavo Madero is not repeated with him." 
 
 Paulino Ortega, with his squad conducted Mr. Basso to the 
 spot where Madero had died. When Basso saw the corpse he 
 took of his hat, saying: "Poor man!"— "Hie died like a cow- 
 ard,"* interrupted one of the men. Basso answered, "You 
 
 *This is false. Mr. Gustavo Miadero was not a coward, but 
 his enemies hated him even after death. 
 
AN ORiGY OF BLOlOD 177 
 
 will not say that of me, ' ' and stepping in front of his guard, he 
 added, ' ' Allow me to find the North Star, it has been my guide 
 in many journeys ; I want to see it face to face now that I am 
 making my last jjourney. " When he found the star, he fixed 
 his gaze on it, again took off his hat and cried, "Viva Mexico! 
 Shoot now!" A volley was heard and the body of Mr. Basso 
 fell heavily ito the ground. Dr. Izabal* bent over him and order- 
 ed the coup de grace to be fired, adding "It is useless now, he 
 is dead." 
 
 A few hours later, Mondragon's son arrived at the Ciuda- 
 dela in an automobile with another prisoner, Mr. Oviedo, pre- 
 fect of the neighboring! village of TIacubaya. Gieneral Mondra- 
 gon had given orders that he also should be executed. Be fell 
 shortly after, facing the statue of Morelos, on the very spot 
 where Gustavo M'adero and Adolfo Basso had met their tragic 
 end. All three bodies were interred on the spot. 
 
 Om the morning of the 19th, after reading the newspaper 
 reports, Don Angel Caso, a personal friend of Gustavo Madero, 
 presented himself at the Ciudadela to claim the body of his 
 friend; but there was no one to wihom he could speak; every- 
 body was initoxicated.t Hje was finally able to obtain the desired 
 order from Mir. O'con but no one would obey it. Then he went 
 to Military Headquarters and General Blanquete gave him 
 another very decisive order. But even this was ineffective. 
 As a last resort, he went direct to General Huerta, who sent 
 one of his aides with orders for immediate compliance with the 
 instructions of General Blanquete. 
 
 The disagreeable task of disinterrinig the dead from their 
 sepulchre in the courtyard of the Ciudadela was then under- 
 taken, to see if Madero's body could be found there. Thirty 
 four were exhumed, but his body was not among them. The 
 search was then abandoned. On the 25th, the Board of Health 
 ordered that the bodies in the Ciudadela be exhumed and re- 
 moved to the Dolores Cemetery. Wihen Mr. Caso heard of these 
 orders, he went to the Cemetery to receive the bodies. Among 
 the unsepulchred dead was the corpse of Gustavo Madero. It 
 had been found in the yard, buried in a hole less than three 
 yards deep and so small that it had been necessary to double up 
 
 *Afterwards murdered by order of Huerta. 
 
 tl do not include Felix Diaz, who is no drinker. 
 
178 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 the body so that it would fit in the grave. He, who in life had 
 been the leader of the Progressive Constitutional Party, had 
 been buried ignominiously at the foot of the statue of Mbrelos. 
 Mr. Caso received the body, and escorted by two aides from 
 Military Headquarters, he took it to the French Cemetery where 
 it was laid to rest next to the body of the ex-President. The 
 two brothers now sleep in a small roadway to the left as you enter 
 the Cemetery. Here, loving hands frequently take floral gifts, 
 a mute protest against the brutal deaths of which they were both 
 victims.* 
 
 *"When Gustavo Madero was arrested, knowing that he 
 would be despoiled of everything, he hid a valuable stick pin in 
 the lapel of his coat which he had carried with him during the 
 tragic ten days in case he should suddenly need funds. When the 
 corpse was found, Mr. Caso, aware of this fact, looked for the 
 stick pin but it had disappeared; he was able, however, to obtain 
 the pawn ticket from an employee of the cemetery, who had 
 pawned it for two dollars and a half. This employee saw Mr. 
 Caso looking for the pin and gave him the pawn ticket. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 THE COMPACT AT THE EMBASSY. 
 
 Under such existing conditions, the Diplomatic Corps could 
 not remain idle. In those dark hours, those days of anguish for 
 Mr. Madero, Mr. Pino Suarez, and their respective families, 
 there was one man who played a conspicuous part, the Ambassa- 
 dor of the United States, Mr. Elenry Lane Wilson.* Prom the 
 9th of February, Mr. Lane Wilson had declared that the govern- 
 ment of Mr. Madero no longer existed, and had proposed to the 
 accredited Diplomatic Corps in Mexico the repudiation of the 
 legitimately constituted government, but he was unable to gain 
 the sanction of the Latin American Republics. He had on his 
 side the Belgian Minister openly and the Guatemalan Minister 
 timidly. When he saw that his suggestion was not accepted, 
 the American Ambassador then suggested that Mr. Madero be 
 asked in the name of the Diplomatic Corps to resign. This, 
 he claimed, was the only way by which to reestablish order which 
 had been disturbed by the military outbreak of Tacubaya. 
 Hbwever, owing to the attitude taken by the representatives 
 of Chile and Cuba, he did not dare to make the proposal openly 
 at a meetinig of the Diplomatic Corps, but he chose rather to 
 broach the subject privately to his colleagues. After he had 
 obtained the consent of a number of them, he succeeded in con- 
 vincing M]r. Cologan, the Minister of Spain, that it would be an 
 act of Christian dharity to persuade President Madero that the 
 Diplomatic Corps was of the opinion that he should resign in 
 order to prevent the bloodshed that was imminent. Mr. Colo- 
 
 *Mr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, Cuban Minister in Mexico 
 at the time, has published in the "Heraldo de Cuba" nine articles 
 beginning on March 14th, 1914, relating all the facts as referred 
 to in ithis and succeeding chapters. 
 
 (179) 
 
180 FRiOiMj DESPOTISM. TO AlNARCHY 
 
 gan agreed to approach the President because with this plan, 
 according to Mr. Lane Wilson, it was the desire of the Diplomatic 
 Corps as a whole. He proposed it to Mr. Mladero bnt was flatly 
 refused, though Mr. Madero understood quite well that Mr. 
 Cologan was moved by no unworthy interest. Aside from the 
 humanitarian emotion that had been aroused in his soul by the 
 expressed fears of the American Ambassador, Mjr. Cologan had 
 other reasons for believing himself justified in the step he had 
 taken. Prominent members of the Spanish colony were involved 
 in the movement headed by Mr. Felix Diaz, because they believed 
 that the administration of Mr. Mladero was leading the country 
 to destruction and that his downfall was essential to save the 
 numerous interests in their hands. Some had personal inter- 
 ests, the product of many years of labor; others had interests 
 intrusted to them and dependent upon their wisdom and 
 integrity. 
 
 IVIir. Conzalo Giarita, who was entrusted with the collection 
 of funds for the revolt of the Ciudadela, has made the stiate- 
 ment that of all those wihio pledged themselves only the Span- 
 iards had given the money they promised. This statement is 
 not strictly true because I know that some Mexicans contributed 
 for the support of the rebellion, but it does show the part play- 
 ed by the Spaniards in the downfall of the Madero adminis- 
 tration. Personally, I do not blame them. They were only de- 
 fending their interests, which were gravely threatened; besides, 
 the Spaniard in Mexico does not feel himself in alien land, nor 
 in the majority of oases, does he consider himself a foreigner. 
 According to definite facts obtained by the Spanish legation, 
 there were fourteen Spaniards among the combatants of the 
 Ciudadela. 
 
 During the tragic ten days, Alnbassiador Henry Lane Wilson 
 did not lose a single opportunity for putting obstacles before the 
 government, nor for inciting his colleagues sio that daily diffi- 
 culties arose ; sometimes he complained because bullets fell on 
 the buildings occupied by the Legations, at other times, because 
 troops camped near those buildings, and still at other times, 
 because some of their own countrymen were wounded on the 
 streets. 
 
 The Ambassador did not once leave the Embassy. His 
 house was a nest of conspiracy, but not once did he expose him- 
 
THE COMJPACT AT THE EMBASSY 181 
 
 self to a bullet shot. On the other hand, the Spanish Minister 
 was constantly within the danger zone; his automobile was hit 
 by projectiles on several occasions and pierced in two places 
 by bullets. 
 
 When the Cuban government sent the cruiser "Cuba" to 
 the port of Vera Cruz, the American Ambassador tried in every 
 way to force a landing of the Cuban soldiers on board. His 
 idea was to cause an international conflict, because he would 
 then be able to intervene with the force on board the American 
 ships. President Taft had forbidden the landing of these forces 
 unless the troops of some other nation should land, or unless de- 
 velopment of circumstances should render it absolutely essential. 
 
 A paper to encourage the revolutionists was issued every 
 day. It was printed on a press established for that purpose 
 in the cellar of the very Embassy itself. Mr. Madero was never 
 able to trace the origin or source of this paper. 
 
 After Madero 's fall, the conduct of the Ambassador was 
 even less that of a man of culture and education. On the after- 
 noon of the 18th, a number of foreign ministers who wished to 
 know the truth about what had happened, met at the Embassy. 
 Mr. Henry Lane Wilson was not able to receive them imme- 
 diately because he was busy with other callers. In one of his 
 reception rooms and in his very presence, G<eneral Victoriano 
 Hiuerta and Gemeral Felix D,4az were eonverlsing. Greneral 
 Huerta was accompanied by Mr. Enrique Zepeda and Lieutenant 
 Colonel Joaquin Mlaas. Brigadier Greneral Diaz was accompanied 
 by Messrs. Eodolfo Reyes and Fidencio Hernandez. There was 
 also present at the conference, Senator Guillermo Obregion who 
 had come with M!r. Diaz. The object of the meeting was to discuss 
 and agree upon; terms for the division of power between two con- 
 flicting ambitions. The inevitable result was, as the fable tells 
 us and as always happens in such eases, that the Lion took the 
 Lion's share. Merely as a matter of form. General Huerta dis- 
 cussed the merits of one or two of the Secretaries. For example, 
 the portfolio of the TIreasury was taken from MGr. Carlos G. de 
 Cosio in order to give it toi Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon. This 
 gentleman was not consulted in the least. When the decision 
 was reached, he was ordered to present himself on the follow- 
 ing day at the Department of State to take office. 
 
 When the list of Cabinet officers was complete. Ambassa- 
 dor Henry Lane Wilson took it into the next room where the 
 
182 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 foreign Ministers were awaiting him. "Gentlemen" the Am- 
 bassador said, to them, "the new rulers of Mexico submit to 
 your approval the Cabinet that they are going to name. I would 
 like to hear any objections that you may have in order that I 
 may present them to General Huerta and General Diaz, who are 
 waiting in Ihe next room. By submitting this list to us for our con- 
 sideration, they show their desire to act in harmony with our 
 respective governments. I firmly believe that with such methods, 
 peace in Mexico is assured." Each of the foreign diplomats 
 hastened to copy the list for himself. When they came to the 
 name of Mr. Garza Aldape for Secretary of the Department of 
 Agriculture, which was to be created, one of them objected, say- 
 ing: "That man is a thief." "Mr. Garza Aldape," replied the 
 Ambassador, "is only a prospective secretary." The Cuban 
 Minister then said: "It is my opinion that we should neither 
 disapprove nor approve anything. We should simply take note 
 of all communications sent us and transmit them tO' our govern- 
 ments." Since a majority of those present agreed with the 
 opinion expressed by Mr. M'arquez Sterling, the Ambassador 
 returned to the room where Hlierta and Diaz and their friends 
 were awaiting him. H'e informed them that the Diplomatic 
 Corps had no objection to the Cabinet as proposed. A few 
 minutes later, the diplomats were invited into the presence of 
 Huerta and Diaz. Then, before them aU, Riodolfo Reyes read 
 with great emphasis what the public has called "The compact 
 at the Ciudadela" but whidh in reality should be known by 
 the name I give it, "The Compact at the Embassy." 
 
 When the reading of this document was finished. Ambassa- 
 dor Wilson and the Mlexicans present applauded. Then Huerta, 
 stating that he had urgent business to attend to, took leave of 
 those present. He intentionally left General Diaz for the last; 
 on reaching! him, he hesitated a moment. It seemed as if both 
 hesitated, but at length Hnierta opened his arms, and the two 
 of opposing ambitions embraced, eaoh probably wondering how 
 he oould destroy the other. Then applause broke out again, 
 which as before, was led by his Excellenicy the American Ambas- 
 sador, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson. 
 
 The Ambassador accompanied Huerta to the door. On his 
 return ih© met in the vestibule Felix Diaz whO' with his com- 
 panions had just taken leave of the diplomats. On seeing Diaz, 
 
THE COMPACT AT THE EMBASSY 183 
 
 Wilson cried ' ' Viva General Diaz, savior of Mexico ! ' ' The com- 
 panions of Diaz ansiwered with a cheer; then, accepting an invi- 
 tation from the Ambassador, they entered the dining room to 
 partake with him a glass of champagne. At the time this took 
 place, LHadero was still living and had not as yet signed his 
 resignation !* 
 
 The foreign diplomats heard all that occurred; they heard 
 the clink of glasses, the popping of the corks when' the cham- 
 pagne was opened. Obe of them passed the remark that it 
 was strange that they themselves had not been invited to parti- 
 cipate in the celebration; but the Japanese Charge d 'Affaires 
 replied: '']\Itr. Wilson well knows whom- to invite on such 
 occasions. ' ' 
 
 When Mr. Wilson rejoined his colleagues, they simulta- 
 neously exclaimed: ''Will not these men assassinate the Presi- 
 dent ? " "Oh, no, ' ' rejoined Mr. Wilson, ' ' Madero will be locked 
 up in a lunatic asylumi; as for the other, he is nothing but a 
 scoundrel, so if they kill him it will be no great loss." "We 
 must not allow it," said the Chilean MSnister. " "We must 
 not meddle in the domestic affairs of Mexico," replied the 
 Ambassador. "Let them arrange that themselves." Nobody 
 spoke a word in reply. A few mioments later the diplomats si- 
 lently withdrew from the American Embassy. Omce in the street, 
 after crossing the threshold, one of them said: "This Ambas- 
 sador is a queer man ; he does not refuse to allow a rebel chief 
 under the very roof of his government to plot the downfall 
 of the legitimate government to Vhich he is accredited; he 
 is a willing witness to the compact; he even discusses the 
 persons who will form the new government, without a thought 
 as to whether or not the matter deals purely with the domestic 
 affairs of the country ; but when the question turns to the sav- 
 ing of the lives of two political officials, whom treason and in- 
 famy are even now seeking to murder, then he finds that his 
 position as a representative of a foreign power does not allow 
 him to intervene, but he does criticize bluntly and with extreme 
 
 *But Ambassador Wilson telegraphed to the American Con- 
 suls all over Mexico to use pressure to have Ceneral Huerta re- 
 cognized as President by the local authorities. A fac simile of 
 the telegram was published by the " N. Y. World" verified by 
 Consul Hanna of Monterey. 
 
184 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 indiseretiorL the executives of the government to which he is 
 accredited." "You are right" replied another of the diplo- 
 mats, "Maybe this is a secret cihapter of the IVlbnroe Doctrine 
 of which we are as yet ignorant." "And talking about indis- 
 cretions," he added, "will there be no newspape<r today?" 
 "What for?" replied the other, "the printing plant has prob- 
 ably been transferred today to a more convenient place." 
 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 THE RESIGNATION OF MADERO. 
 
 On the afternoon of February 19ith a meeting of the mem- 
 bers of the Diplomatic Corps was called by the American Am- 
 bassador for the purpose of acquainting them with the communi- 
 cation received from General Huerta announcing the fall of 
 Madero and his administration. The Ambassador read before 
 the meeting not only Htuerta's note, but also thie answer he had 
 drawn up recognizing the new government. The Diplomatic 
 Corps rejected Mir. Wilson's plan. They decided to wait until 
 the following day before making a formal reply because so many 
 rumors were afloat that they did not really know who was to 
 be the head of the new government. 
 
 After his plan was rejected by his oolleagtues, the Ambas- 
 sador concentrated his efforts to force Madero to resign. The 
 parents of the hapless President had addressed that same day in 
 the morning, a note to Mr. Wilson requesting him, as ranking 
 member of the Diplomatic Corps, to intercede on behalf of their 
 sons. When they wrote, they were not; aware as yet that Gustavo 
 Madero had been assassinated at dawn. They begged the Cuban 
 Minister and the Japanese Charge d 'Affaires to personally con- 
 vey their message to the Ambassador and to urge him to call a 
 meeting of his colleagues. Messrs. Miarquez Sterling and Hari- 
 goutchi knew well what to expect for they had been present the 
 evening before at the interview between the American Ambassa- 
 dor and the Chilean Minister. They therefore hastened to the 
 Embassy where in the presence of several of the foreign repre- 
 sentatives, notably Mir. Cologan, Minister from Spain, with due 
 ceremony, they delivered their message. Mr. Wilson after taking 
 note of the context, folded the paper and put it in his pocket, 
 saying that the affair did not concern him at all. The Cuban 
 Minister protested that the letter was not a private communica- 
 
 (185') 
 
186 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 tion to the Ambassador, but an appeal to the Diplomatic Corps 
 as a body, that therefore it was they and not the Ambassador who 
 should decide the matter. The Japanese Charge d 'Affaires se- 
 conded this opinion. Impelled by this opinion, Mt. Wilson hand- 
 ed the letter from Mr. and M]rs. Mladero to the Spanish Minister.* 
 On reading it, Mr. Cologan became highly incensed at Mr. Wil- 
 son's attitude and declared that they should make every possibk 
 effort to save the lives of the imprisoned officials. He further 
 declared that if Mr. Wilson refused to issue a call for a meeting 
 of the Diplomatic Corps, he himself as Dean would issue the 
 necessary call and would lay before the Diplomats the attitude 
 of the representative of the United States. After a very heated 
 discussion, throughout which the Spanish Minister remained firm 
 and unmoved. Ambassador Wilson consented to send a request 
 to the new administration not to impose too severe a punishment 
 on the ex-President. The gentlemen present openly opposed 
 any such action for they rightly judged that such a step would 
 be a tacit admission that Madero should be punished and they 
 realized that by so expressing themselves, they would be over- 
 stepping their functions as foreign representatives in Mexico. 
 They could only interpose in the name of humanity ; above all, 
 because they had been invoked by the parents of one of the vic- 
 tims to save the lives of the prisoners ; but it was not for them to 
 judge the actions of either those on one side or those on the other. 
 It then seemed as if the Ambassador gave in, for he suggest- 
 ed that the Diplomats go to General Siuerta and request him to 
 spare the life of Madero. He urged however, that care should be 
 taken not to call upon the authority of their respective govern- 
 ments, since as a matter of fact, he himself had not received any 
 instructions. H'is argument was that if the petition should be made 
 in the name of the respective governments, the new officials would 
 refuse their request so as not to give the world the idea that they 
 had been coerced. When this proposal was accepted, Mr. Wilson 
 offered to speak personally to Don Felix Diaz about the matter. 
 The Spanish and the Cuban Ministers took charge of the affair 
 and went immediately to the Palace. They were unable to see 
 General Huerta there, but spoke instead to General Blanquete, 
 
 *According to diplomatic usage, the Ambassador presides 
 over the Diplomatic Corps regardless of the date of his appoint- 
 ment ; next to him in rank follows the Dean, who is that Minister 
 whose official reception dates back the farthest. 
 
THE RiESIGNATION OF MADERO 187 
 
 who informed them that nobody had ever thought of killing Ma- 
 dero ; that if he should resign, on that very same day he would 
 be conducted under suitable guard to Vera Cruz where he would 
 be allowed to board the first steamer sailing from that port. 
 The Cuban Minister placed at their disposal the Cuban gunboat 
 anchored at Vera Cruz for the deportation of Mladero and his 
 family. Tlhen they discussed the details of the journey, even go- 
 ing so far as to consider who would be the best person to put 
 in command of the escort of the ex-President. " It is necessary, ' ' 
 said one of those present, "that the leader of this escort should 
 be not an irresponsible subaltern but an officer of rank, who will 
 appreciate the responsibility of his position." "There is no 
 objection to that," said General Blanquete, "in fact, the escort 
 will be commanded by a General designated by Mr. Mladero him- 
 self. ' ' Everything seemed satisfactorily arranged but the Diplo- 
 mats, still desiring to have General H'uerta confirm the words 
 of General Blanquete, went up stairs to the Pl-esident'si suite. 
 Here they met Rodolfo Reyes, who immediately began to ex- 
 press to thiem hisi regrets at the tragic end of Gustavo Madero 
 and Mr. Basso, head of the President's household. The Diplomats 
 remembered Mr. Basso because at a reception given by the Presi- 
 dent on February 1st, they had ^had reason to praise the good taste 
 and tact which Mr. Basso had displayed in his arrangements. 
 Therefore, when they heard he had been killed, they naturally ask- 
 ed the reasons which had led to his assassination. Reyes replied 
 that he did not laiow the reasons but that he regretted the occur- 
 rence ; then covering his face with his hands, as if in deep sorrow, 
 he said : "I suppose my friends killed Basso because it was he who 
 killed my father. ' ' Greatly alarmed at this news, Messrs. Ster- 
 ling and Cologan insistently demanded an interview with Gen- 
 eral Huerta in order to fulfil their mission, but without avail. 
 Nobody seemed to know where General H'uerta was. Unable to 
 see General Huerta, the diplomats went to the apartments where 
 Madero, Pino Suarez and General Felipe Angeles were confined. 
 Mr. Madero, surrounded by a majority of his Cabinet, was g'ently 
 chiding Mr. Vazquez Tagle for having refused to shake hands 
 with Hhierta. As soon as he learned the mission of the diplomats, 
 he agreed to resign, but he stated that he would place the resigna- 
 tion in the hands of the Chilean Minister who would turn it 
 over to the proper authorities only after the prisoners were safe- 
 ly aboard the Cuban cruiser. 
 
188 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAE'CHY 
 
 The resignation was quickly drawn up and signed by Ma- 
 dero and Pino Suarez. Wir. Lascurain took it to slbow to General 
 Hnerta. Everything was now arranged. Madero with his short- 
 sightedness, named General Angeles as commander of the guard 
 which was to escort him to Vera Cruz. It was pointed out to him 
 that this would be impossible since General Angeles himself was 
 a prisoner and that such a choice would awaken the suspicions 
 of his jailors. But argument was useless. The President would 
 not yield the point. Still believing in his power, he thought that 
 by such a course he could save himself as well as the prisoner 
 for whom he had a great affection. He stubbornly clung to his 
 idea and it was impossible to swerve him from his purpose. As 
 usual, Madero through his obsessions was hastening events, ren- 
 dering useless all efforts to save him. General Huerta would 
 undoubtedly suspect that it was a trick. Madero with General 
 Angeles in command of the escort, could frustrate his ambitions 
 and nullify all his efforts, so naturally he would not sanction 
 such a choice. Madero was personally signing his own death 
 sentence. 
 
 It was then and there decided that the prisoners should pro- 
 ceed that very night to Vera Cruz accompanied in their journey 
 by the Cuban Minister and the Japanese Charge d 'Affaires. The 
 hour of departure was set for ten o'clock that nigiht, and Ma- 
 dero requested the Cuban Minister to be at the prison at least 
 two hours earlier. When all these arrangements had been made, 
 without the knowledge or eonsent of General Hiuerta, the di- 
 plomats again sought Huerta, but again without avail. They 
 were unable to find him and were able to see only de la Barra 
 and Vera Estaiiol, who assured them of the safety of the pris- 
 oners. Thiey then returned to their respective homes hardly sat- 
 isfied by the assurances they had received. 
 
 Mr. Lascurain, Don Ernesto Madero, and Don Jaime Gurza 
 had gone with the resignation in their hands to see General Huer- 
 ta. The interview was a lengithy one. General Huerta consider- 
 ed it out of place to allow the Fioreign Diplomats to meddle in 
 the political affairs of the country. He maintained that the re- 
 signation should immediately be placed in the hands of Congress, 
 adding that if this were not done, he refused all responsibility in 
 the matter, The army and the populace were both at a high 
 pitch of excitement ; the followers of Felix Diaz were clamoring 
 for a brutal slaughter; he himself had that very morning been 
 
THE E-ESIGNATION OF MADEBO 189 
 
 seriously compromised by his repeated refusals to deliver the 
 prisoners to the men at the Ciudadela, who, he held, were really 
 the stronger party. He had heard rumors of an assault on^ the 
 Palace with the object of murdering the entire Miadero family. 
 He claimed that he himself could exert no authority until the 
 power was turned over to him ; besides, he greatly feared that if 
 this act were delayed much longer, deplorable events would take 
 place; still, he refused to accept any responsibility whatever be- 
 cause he feared the soldiers would not obey his commands. If 
 the resignation should be withheld, there might be uprisings, for 
 the suppression of whicih he did not have at hand the necessary 
 resources. If uprisings were to break out, a veritable slaughter 
 would result, for the populace was infuriated. Moreover, all 
 the followers of Felix Diaz were hourly adding fuel to the flamies 
 and not one of the family would be saved. The only salvation 
 for all would be to make Ihis power real and effective by turning 
 over to him the presidency. Hie could then assume all responsi- 
 bility and he would then have the right to impose his authority 
 ■Rath the certainty that the army would obey him. 
 
 M]r. Lascurain agreed that the Diplomatic Corps should not 
 be allowed to mix in the affairs, but he hesitated to hand over 
 the resignation. Then, in order that the transference of power 
 should be accomplished in strict accordance with the Constitu- 
 tion, it was agreed that the resignations of Madero and Pino 
 Suarez be formerly accepted. Mr. Lascurain, as Secretary of 
 State, would according to law, assume the presidency ; he would 
 at once appoint General Hluerta, Secretary of the Interior, after 
 which he himself would resign, thus leaving General Huerta 
 Constitutional President. Huerta assured them that in this way 
 everything could be satisfactorily arranged; that he would ans- 
 wer for the lives of all, but only if immediate steps were taken 
 so as to forestall any move on the part of the men in the Ciuda- 
 dela. The picture thus painted before the eyes of Mr. Lascurain 
 and his colleagues in those moments was one to cause real anguish. 
 Mr. Lascurain still wavering, conferred with his companions and 
 with some of the members of the Madero family. They all were 
 of the opinion that necessity forced them to accept the harsh 
 terms imposed by General Huerta in whose hands lay the fate 
 of them all ; but they were also of the opinion that guarantees 
 must be exacted from Huerta. Mr. Lascurain returned to Gen- 
 eral Huerta and requested adequate guarantees for the lives of 
 
190 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAEiCHY 
 
 Madero and Pino Suarez. "All that you like," replied Htierta, 
 "you must either repose full confidence in me or none at all. 
 If you do not give me this confidence, it is useless to continue 
 this interview." He abruptly stopped talking, put his hand 
 inside his shirt and drew out a scapulary, a medal of Our Lady 
 of Ghiadaloupe, and another of the Sacred BDeart, which hung 
 around his neck on a gold chain. ' ' These, ' ' he said, ' ' were placed 
 around my neck by my mother; by her memory, and by these 
 sacred images I swear to you that I will not allow any one to 
 make any attempt against the life of Mir. Madero. ' ' Saying this, 
 he solemnly kissed the sacred medals. Mr. Lascurain, an honor- 
 able man and a devout Catholic, was fully convinced by this act 
 and delivered into his hand the resignation. 
 
 All present at once proceeded to the House of Representa- 
 tives, after having made the necessary preparations for the ap- 
 pointment of General Huerta as Secretary of the Interior, the 
 swearing into office and subsequent resiguiation of Mr. Lascu- 
 rain as Provisional President of the Republic. They found the 
 Representatives already assembled. Roll call was omitted be- 
 cause the affair was pressing, and because it would not be neces- 
 sary to prove that there had been a quorum at this session. 
 Everybody was called and everyone at hand was urged to enter 
 the room. All were excitedly discussing the affair when the 
 Hionse was abruptly called to order and the resignations of Ma- 
 dero and Pino Suarez were read. Only five Congressman voted 
 against the motion to accept these resignations. These five were : 
 Leopoldo Hurtado y Espinosa, Antonio Alarcon, Manuel Men- 
 dez, Francisco Escudero, and Luis Manuel Rojas.* 
 
 Following the acceptance of this motion, the message of Mr. 
 Lascurain, in which he appouited General Huerta as Secretary 
 lof the Interior, was read; then followed the resignation of Mr. 
 Lascurain, which was at once accepted. General Hiuerta and 
 his aides had not for one moment quitted the room in which the 
 session was held. They closely followed each move and probably 
 prepared to take measures, no matter how extreme, to force their 
 plan through. But its accomplishment was assured. The House 
 of Riepresentatives of the 26th Constitutional Congress offered 
 no opposition; it ignored the question of a quorum, and in no 
 
 *Oopy of the minutes of the session will be found in the 
 Diario de los Debates. 
 
THE EiESIGNATION OF MADERO 191 
 
 way did it try to ascertaini whether or not the officials were act- 
 ing with entire freedom in a matter of such great importance, 
 A few of the memlDers of the House privately verified the sig- 
 natures on the resignations as authentic. The Secretary of the 
 Treasury could swear to them, if the honesty of Mr. Laseurain 
 was not sufficient guarantee. The argument of terror was used 
 against Mr. Laseurain. Against the Congressmeni General Buer- 
 ta did not even take that trouhle. The followers of Don Felix 
 Diaz took all the necessary toouble. Huerta dominated with his 
 mere presence. 
 
 The cowardice of the House made matters easy. That night, 
 Huerta officially became Provisional President of Miexico. Im- 
 mediately after taking the oath of office, he retired and no one 
 was able to see him. 
 
 In the meantime, the Madero family had arrived at the 
 apartments of the Palace where Madero was confined. The Presi- 
 dent embraced his mother saying : " I do not know what blind- 
 fold God put over my eyes that did not let me see what Gus- 
 tavo was pointing out to me." "My son," answered his mother, 
 "this is no time for reproaches, we must pray God to save the 
 living and with his divine mercy to pardon the dead." Until 
 that moment Mtr. Madero had been unaware of the death of his 
 brother, for he had not been permitted to read the newspapers 
 containing the accounts of the occurrence nor had any of his 
 visitors daTed tell him about the affair. Shortly thereafter, the 
 family left in order to make preparations of the journey. 
 
 Mr. Pino Suarez had written a long letter to his wife, w^hich 
 he delivered, together with all the money he had at hand, to the 
 Cuban Minister, Mr. Marquez Sterling, who true to his word, 
 had arrived not two but nearly three hours ahead of the appoint- 
 ed time, in order to accompany the prisoners on their contem- 
 plated journey. Eimesto Mladero also came on a visit. The 
 President questioned him closely, but he hesitated to answer and 
 put him' off in every possible way even to leaving the room with 
 the excuse that he had to telephone. Finally, however, he was 
 so pressed by the President's questions that he reluctantly con- 
 fessed that Mr. Madero 's resignation had, in spite of his express 
 orders to the contrary, been presented to General Htierta as the 
 only means of saving the lives of all of them. Mladero then cried : 
 ' ' I have fallen a second time into the trap set by that man ! 
 Run, run," he said to Ernesto Madero, "and tell Laseurain not 
 
192 FROM DESPOTISiM TO ANARCHY 
 
 to resign until we have all arrived at Vera Criiz." Don Er- 
 nesto left at once, but returned shortly, saying, "I arrived too 
 late. Huerta is already President and is even now arriving at 
 the Palace after taking the oath of office before Congress." In 
 fact, the Palace guards had just rendered the honors to the new 
 president. 
 
 "We are lost," said Madero, "no one can save me from two 
 years in the Penitentiary at the very least." Poor Madero! 
 Not for one moment did the possibility of his assassination enter 
 his head. Pino Suarez on the other hand was not at all optimis- 
 tic as to the end. He sat without saying a word, with his elbows 
 on his knees and his head bowed down on his hands. Be was 
 thinking of his family, of his children, all of them very young, 
 who were to be left orphans and even perhaps in dire need. At 
 intervals. Pino Suarez would toss his head as if trying to shake 
 off the thoughts that obstinately occurred, but he would again 
 fall into the silent and deep meditation in which he was wrapt. 
 His wife arrived and they both exchanged a few words. Suarez 
 took the letter and articles which he had turned over to the 
 Cuban Minister and handed them to her. Both fully appreciat- 
 ing the gravity of the position made the interview short. He 
 seemed especially desirous of making it very brief. It may be 
 that he wished to prevent his wife from witnessing the tragedy 
 which he was momentarily expecting, for just as soon as she 
 left the apartments, the Vice President gave a sigh of relief. 
 
 Night fell, it was getting late, but still no preparations for 
 the journey were visible. Ceneral Angeles observed that the 
 sentries were being changed frequently and that the officer of 
 the guard must have received new orders, because his attitude 
 had undergone a change. As soon as this observation had been 
 made, Madero sent messengers to inquire what the trouble was, 
 but none of the messengers returned. They were "incomuni- 
 cados." Gradually one after another of Madero 's visitors left. 
 The Cuban Minister was the only one to remain. He had been 
 requested to do so by Mr. Ernesto Madero who feared lest some- 
 thing would happen to Madero and his fellow prisoners. The 
 diplomat consented to remain, thinking that his presence might 
 prevent the assassination of the prisoners that night. 
 
 After Don Ernesto Madero had withdrawn, Madero re- 
 covered his usual poise. Once convinced that the journey would 
 not be undertaken, he had been unwilling to force the Cuban 
 
THIE DESIGNATION OF MADERlO 193 
 
 Minister to pass an uncomfortable night, but he finally eonsent- 
 ed to allow him to remain, owing to the insistence of Mr. Mar- 
 quez Siterling himself and to that of Don Ernesto Madero, who 
 in order to convince him, suggested the possibility that the jour- 
 ney might perhaps have only been postponed until dawn. He 
 made a couch for Mr. Sterling with three chairs and a blanket 
 and then fixed one in the same way for himself. He persuaded 
 the Minister to lie down, and covered him with another blanket ; 
 then rolling himself in another, he lay down, and very soon fell 
 into a heavy sleep. Mr. Piao Suarez remained all night in the 
 position I have described. 
 
 Mr. Lascurain, after he had relinquished the reins of govern- 
 ment held by him for so short a time, left the House in search 
 of the Cuban Minister. He went to the legation to accompany 
 him to the station; not finding him there, he went directly to 
 the station of Buena Vista, where he found the rest of the Ma- 
 dero family waiting; but no Madero arrived. They telephoned 
 to the Palace but no one seemed to know what the trouble was. 
 At least, after a delay of two hours, they were able to speak to 
 Colonel Maas, nephew of General Hluerta and Chief of Staff. 
 The Colonel informed them that President Huerta had retired 
 and had forgotten to sign the necessary orders. All understood 
 by this that the journey would not be undertaken, and depart- 
 ed. Lascurain first accompanied the members of the Madero 
 family to their temporary residence and then retired to his 
 own home. 
 
 On the following morning, breakfast was served as usual 
 at the Palace, but Pino Suarez with a dread that it might con- 
 tain poison, did not wish to allow the Cuban Minister to taste 
 it. But Mir. Sterling ia order to encourage the prisoners, 
 quickly picked up a glass containing milk and took a sip. This 
 act calmed the fears of Pino Suarez and they at once ate a hearty 
 breakfast. 
 
 That day Mir. Lascurain accompanied by M^. Vazquez Tagle 
 and Mr. Gurza, made many efforts to see General Hluerta, but 
 all were futile. The new President was very busy owing to the 
 fact that he had to assist at the swearing in of his new Cabinet. 
 He had to attend to a great many urgent and important mat- 
 ters and therefore requested Mr. Lascurain and his companions 
 to excuse himi, saying that he would see them later. On the fol- 
 lowing day it was also impossible to obtain an audience with the 
 
194 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAE€H,Y 
 
 Provisional President; he was again too busy. He had to re- 
 ceive the Diplomatic Corps and to attend to pressing affairs. 
 
 Then Mr. Lascurain and his companions attempted to 
 speak with General Blanquete bnt were unable to do even that. 
 They saw Mr. de la Barra and Mr. Vera EstanoL* These two 
 gentlemen assured them that the lives of LDessrs. Madero and 
 Pino Suarez were in no danger, that they would be transferred 
 to the penitentiary. Permission was granted to Lascurain and 
 Vazquez Tagle and Ourza to see Madero. In this interview, 
 Lascurain explained to Madero why his orders in reference to 
 the resignation had not been followed in strict compliance with 
 the ex-President's instructions, whereupon Madero embraced 
 Mr. Lascurain with warm expressions of his gratitude for what 
 had been done. 
 
 After his Cabinet had left, Madero turned to Pino Suarez 
 saying with a smile : ' ' If I ever become head of the government 
 again I will not have as my advisers men whose very courtesy 
 and kindness makes them half men. I will surround myself ex- 
 clusively with men who are really men." 
 
 Mr. Madero did not lose his illusions even in the most tragic 
 moments of his life. At the very instant when he was alluding 
 to the possibility of coming into power, his death had already 
 been decided upon. At the very moment, in fact, his execu- 
 tioners were discussing the way in which he should be assassinated. 
 He was day dreaming while his assassins, always alert, were 
 preparing the scaffold on which he would be consecrated as 
 a martyr! 
 
 *0n his way with Mr. Gurza, they met Alberto Robles Gil, 
 w*ho told them that the new Cabinet were badly disposed against 
 Madero and wished to execute him, that he opposed it and would 
 continue opposing it, but feared he would be overruled. All 
 this was related to me by Mjr. Gurza himself. 
 
CHAPTER XXX. 
 THE DEATH OF MADERO.* 
 
 On February 22nd, 1913, the Cabinet met, as usual, at ele- 
 ven o'clock in the morning. Besides the Cabinet officers, there 
 were present expressly invited for the occasion, General Felix 
 Diaz and General Aureliano Blanquete, Military Commander 
 of the city and a blind instrument of Hnerta. 
 
 Gjeneral Blanquete announced that as he himself did not 
 wish to shoulder the legal responsibilities in a case of such impor- 
 
 *The facts related in this chapter were given to me by a 
 close friend of General Huerta. Later on, after the chapter was 
 written, it was read by ex-Governor Enrique Zepeda who, in the 
 presence of Lie Vicente Sanchez Gutierrez said this description 
 of the facts is a perfect picture of the events. 
 
 While I was in New York, at the snggestion of Mr. Calero, 
 I called on Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon and also on Mr. Jorge 
 Vera y Estanol, both Cabinet M&nisters of General Huerta when 
 Madero was murdered. These gentlemen claimed that the ver- 
 sion was wrong, as they didn't have any thing to do with the 
 death of Madero, and they even denied positively that they knew 
 anything about the events at that time. They were unable to con- 
 vince me that my version is wrong. They contradicted each other 
 and carried no weig'ht as evidence against the facts as related to 
 me by an eye witness. 
 
 Mr. Calero acknowledged that General Hhierta told him that 
 when the facts are cleared up the public will be convinced that 
 he had nothing to do with Madero 's death. The same statement 
 was clearly sustained by Mr. Jose Maria Lozano, Secretary of 
 Public Works, in a speech delivered at Xochimilco and cabled 
 to "Le Matin" a Paris newspaper which published it on the 30th 
 of March, 1914. 
 
 Furthermore, this chapter was published in its full exten- 
 sion by Mr. M. M^rquez Sterling, Cuban Minister in Mexico when 
 Madero was mnrdered, and now chief editor of El Heraldo de 
 Cuba, of Havana, on the 14th of April, 1914 issue of that daily 
 paper. 
 
 (195) 
 
196 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 tance and delicacy, it would be necessary for the Cabinet to de- 
 cide the fate of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. Mjr. Bodolfo 
 Reyes, Attorney General, opened the discussion by stating that 
 in his opinion it was essential that they be executed in order to 
 remove any possibility of a counter revolution, which would nulli- 
 fy the sacrifices already made and the blood already shed. This 
 opinion was very decidedly seconded by General Mlondragon, 
 Secretary of War, but Mr. Alberto Robles Gil, Secretary of 
 Public Works, opposed it although he too believed essential the 
 death of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. He claimed that 
 the psychological moment had passed, and that in politics, such 
 an act committed after the psychological moment becomes a crime 
 which can scarcely be condoned. 
 
 However, the Cabinet as a whole emphatically supported 
 the Attorney General, and the most prominent member argued 
 that without the death of the ex-functionaries a counter revolu- 
 tion would be inevitable; and, as such a revolution could be 
 initiated only in their name, it would be a greater crime for the 
 Cabinet to force the Nation to further bloodshed. The debate was 
 now becoming heated, when General Victoriano Huerta, Presi- 
 dent ad interim, who had hitherto maintained silence, interposed, 
 saying he placed his honor as a soldier above all political expe- 
 diency. He had pledged his word that the lives of Madero and 
 Pino Suarez would be respected, and therefore could counte- 
 nance no form of discussion other than the legal means for bring- 
 ing them to trial, nor could he authorize their death unless le- 
 gally sentenced. In answer to this statement, Mr. Reyes ob- 
 served that such a course would lead to immunity for their 
 crimes ; because, he argued, granted that they were convicted by 
 the Courts, it would be practically impossible to carry out the 
 sentence of death which would surely be imposed, as the Presi- 
 dent ad interim would find it hard to refuse the pardon that 
 would be undoubtedly urged by the rulers of the World Powers 
 and thousands of other people. General Huerta thereupon prom- 
 ised to take no definite action without the consent of the Cabi- 
 net, and closed the discussion by placing the matter in the hands 
 of the Attorney General for his legal decision regarding the 
 Department which should have the custody of the prisoners. 
 Without adjourning the session he immediately retired to anoth- 
 er room accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. 
 Toribio Esquivel Obregon, the only member who had not express- 
 
THE DEATH OF MADERO 197 
 
 ed a single opinion on the matter, and by his private secretary, 
 Mr. Aurelio D. Canale, who had just arrived with a number of 
 urgent telegrams. 
 
 Hardly had General Hhierta left the room, than General 
 Blanquete, Mlilitary Commander of the City, bluntly stated that 
 if the Cabinet deemed important the death of Miadero and Pino 
 Suarez it would be necessary to execute them without the 
 knowledge of the President as his statements left no doubt that 
 he would never give his consent. The discussion was re-opened 
 and at length it was agreed against the opinion of Secretary 
 Robles Gil (*) that the welfare of the nation demanded the 
 sacrifice of those two lives. This decision had no sooner been 
 reached, than the Lliilitary Commander who had opened the dis- 
 cussion and had intimated that he himself would carry out the 
 execution without the President's knowledge, now claimed that 
 as a soldier he could not disobey the orders of the President 
 and could therefore give no orders for the execution. Be pro- 
 ceeded to explain, however, that he could, if so ordered by the 
 Secretary of War, deliver the prisoners to the Secretary of the 
 Interior. Under the latter 's jurisdiction the execution could 
 be placed in the hands of the rurales who are not so directly 
 under the command of the President owing to the fact that the 
 Military Code is not incumbent upon them. His plan, he con- 
 tinued, was to have a sham attempt at rescue in the course of 
 vi'^hich the prisoners should be killed. With this end in view, he 
 already had in mind the officer of Rurales whom he could re- 
 commend as best fitted to carry out the execution and in whom 
 the greatest confidence could be placed. The plan was finally 
 accepted, but not before the Military Commander had twice re- 
 quested Mr. Felix Diaz who up to that time had not uttered a 
 single word, to express his opinion on the subject, insisting 
 pointedly upon a reply, so as to force himi to acknowledge his 
 concurrence with the Cabinet. General Diaz finally admitted 
 that he, like the Secretary of War, considered the death of Ma- 
 dero and Pino Suarez indispensable. No sooner had this ac- 
 knowledgment been made, then General Blanquete proposed that 
 immediate action should be taken. The receipt for the change 
 of custody of the prisoners was then and there drawn up by 
 the Attorney General, Rodolfo Reyes, signed by the Secretary 
 
 "*See note on page 194. 
 
198 FROM DESiPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 of the Interior, Alberto Garcia Oranados, and handed to the 
 Military Commander.* At the urgent request of General Blan- 
 quete, the Secretary of War and General Felix Diaz promised 
 to leave to Mr. Cecilio Ocon the task of assemibling men to make 
 the sham attack on the escort which was to convey the prisoners 
 to the Penitentiary. Mr. Ocon had been paymaster of the forces 
 in the Ciudadela and was therefore in touch with the kind of 
 people demanded for such an occasion. General Blanquete fur- 
 ther agreed to make arrangements at once with the officer of 
 Rurales for the assassination of the doomed man. This officer 
 was Francisco Cardenas, t Major of the 7th Corps, who during the 
 past few months had been stationed in the District of Lerma, 
 State of Mexico, under the direct command of General Blanquete. 
 General Hberta's entry from an adjoining room in response 
 to a summons from the Military Commander, broke up the Cabi- 
 net meeting shortly afterwards, and thereupon Generals Mon- 
 dragon and Blanquete hastened to the office of the War Depart- 
 ment to issue orders for the official delivery of the prisoners, 
 explaining the plan of action agreed upon to M!r. Cecilio Ocon, 
 who held some position in the War Department. General Blan- 
 quete suggested the advisability of having the assaulting party 
 made up of men of the detective force so as to prevent the af- 
 fair from coming to light and to this end Mtr. Oicon was commis- 
 sioned to confer with Mr. Celso Acosta, Inspector General of 
 Police. Upon being approac'hed, Mr. Acosta decided that it 
 would be more advisable to have men from' the police rather than 
 from the detective force, and immediately issued orders that ten 
 armed men of the mounted police in civilian dress place them- 
 selves under Mr. Ocon's orders. 
 
 In the meantime the Military Commander, returning to his 
 office, ordered that the guard in charge of the prisoners be re- 
 lieved by the 7th Corps of Rurales under command of Major 
 Cardenas. He also ordered Colonel Ballesteros, in the name of 
 the President, to take charge of the Penitentiary immediately and 
 come to an understanding with Major Cardenas. But as Mr. 
 Ocon already had had a personal interview with the major and 
 
 *Mr. Blanquete says he is not guilty of 'the murder, because 
 both Mr. Miadero and Mr. Pino Suarez were out of his control, 
 as proved by a document in his possession signed by Secretary of 
 Interior Garcia Granados. 
 
 tSee Chapter XXVTI "An Orgy of Blood." 
 
TIHE DEIATIH OF MADERO 199 
 
 had planned with him all the details, Cardenas told Ballesteros 
 that for the present there was nothing further to be done, so 
 Ballesteros confined himself to the management of the Peni- 
 tentiary, which he held for three days.* 
 
 T!hat night the President and Cabinet Mlinisters attended the 
 reception given by the American Ambassador to celebrate Wash- 
 ington 's birthday. Whilst at the Eimbassy the great American 's 
 birthday was being celebrated, and toasts were being drunk to 
 one people's freedom, another people's freedom was being vio- 
 lated at the National Palace, when, a few minutes before eleven 
 p. m. General Chicarro accompanied by Major Cardenas was 
 entering the room in which Messrs. Mladero and Pino Suarez 
 were sleeping and was informing them of his orders to transfer 
 them immediately to the Penitentiary. In spite of objections by 
 Mr. Pino Suarez, they were obliged to dress quickly and were 
 hustled into two automobiles, Mr. Francisco I. Mladero, Major 
 Cardenas and a Rural entering one, and Mr. Jose Maria Pino 
 Suarez, Officer of Rurales Rafael Pimienta, and another Rural, 
 the other, t They rode through Rielox, Cocheras and Lecumberri 
 Streets to the Penitentiary and upon arriving there, Cardenas 
 left the automobile and exchanged a few words with Colonel 
 Ballesteros. Hie then reentered the automobile and headed to- 
 wards the rear of the Penitentiary where the men sent by Mr. 
 Ocon were waiting. Mr. Madero, rather surprised, asked "Where 
 are we going ? " " We are going in the back way, ' ' answered the 
 Major. "But there is no entrance there," remonstrated Ma- 
 dero, but had time to say no more for at that moment the as- 
 saulting party fired a volley into the air and the machines were 
 brought to a sudden halt. Mlajor Cardenas alighted and turn- 
 ing to Madero he said, "Get down, get down quickly or one of 
 those fellows may kill you." Mladero, always trustful, stepped 
 down without a word, whereupon Major Cardenas fired on him 
 from behind, the bullet entering his head, killing him instantly. 
 Mr. Pino Suarez, who from the moment they had been awakened 
 had suspected what was in the air and had so told Miadero, re- 
 fused to move, but was forced to do' so by blows and pushes from 
 his escort. No sooner was 'he out of the machine than Pimienta 
 
 *Afterwards Mr. Ballesteros was promoted to Brigadier Gen- 
 eral and was put in charge of the Penitentiary in October last. 
 
 tl learned these details from Majior Cardenas himself. 
 
200 FKOM DESPOTISM TO ANAKCHY 
 
 fired on himi, but either through nervousness or poor aim, the 
 bullet did not inflict a mortal wound. He fell, however, but 
 quickly picking himself up dashed away, shouting, "Help ! Mur- 
 der!" Hlearing the cry, Cardenas, from the other automobile 
 darted after him and fired with deadly aim. Pino Suarez fell 
 to the ground mortally wounded, and the police were ordered to 
 finish the work by firing on the prostrate form. Cardenas him- 
 self discharged a final shot, the coup de grace, into the dead 
 man's head. Hb then turned to where the lifeless body of Mr. 
 Madero lay stretched upon the ground, and fired again into the 
 head of the hapless ex-President, although death had been in- 
 stantaneous. The bodies were then taken into the Penitentiary 
 where M!r. Madero 's was wrapped in a red blanket and Mr. 
 Suarez 's in a gray one, and both interred in one of the yards 
 of the building. No sooner was this done than the leaders iu'- 
 formed the Military Commander and the Inspector General of 
 Police by telephone that the escort of Mbssrs. Madero and 
 Suarez had been attacked and the prisoners had been killed in 
 the encounter. General Blanquete, who had slept all night at 
 Mlilitary Hleadquarters at once personally communicated the 
 news to General Huerta who was in the same building because 
 he had moved his private residence ^^o the National Palace. The 
 President had just arrived from the American Embassy where 
 he had spent most of the night in conversation with ]\Ir. Henry 
 Lane Wilson, and on hearing what had happened then and 
 there ordered an immediate special meeting of the Cabinet. One 
 of the official advisers of General Hfuerta carried the farce so 
 far as to ask the Military Commiander over the phone what the 
 trouble was and whether the business in hand was really impor- 
 tant, as he was very tired. Otn being informed by General Blan- 
 quete personally as to what had happened, he replied that he 
 would leave at once for the Capitol. The President also gave 
 orders that an aide be sent to request the immediate presence 
 of t^e American Ambassador at the Palace. AA^en the Cabinet 
 officers had assembled they related to the President what had 
 happened, making it clear that Mtr. Felix Diaz, who was con- 
 sidered as sharing the power with him, had been in full accord 
 with the occurrence, and that measures had been taken to pre- 
 vent the disclosure of the plot at the inquest. Furthermore, 
 they declared, a letter from Mrs. Madero, which could easily be 
 interpreted as a plan of rescue, had been found in the room 
 
THE DEATH OF MADERO 201 
 
 where Madero had been imprisoned, and this could easily be used 
 to place the blame for the entire occurrence on the Madero fam- 
 ily. Besides, the autopsy would disclose that the bullets did not 
 belong to any of the escort.* The President was further ap- 
 praised of the fact that rather than run the risk of having the 
 plans overturned by some unexpected change of judges in the 
 civil courts, it had been deemed advisable to place the case in 
 charge of the Mlilitary Courts, over whom more effective con- 
 trol could be exercised. Illpon learning all that had occurred, 
 the President expressed his chagrin but declared the necessity 
 of submittiQg to the inevitable by accepting accomplished facts. 
 The Military Commander, who had previously ordered the burial 
 of the bodies of Messrs. M'adero and Pino Suarez, now telephoned 
 that they be at once exhumed and washed and that the autopsy 
 be held. For this he detailed an army surgeon in whom he had 
 entire confidence. 
 
 Two courses of action were now open to the President, as he 
 told to his close friends, in the situation officially created by his 
 Cabinet Ministers : Either to break at once with the men of the Ciu- 
 dadela, or to accept the fraudulent story of an assault in the course 
 of which the two former officials met their death. G^eneral Hkierta, 
 on learning the situation from his advisers, lamented the course 
 events had taken. He declared to his friends with the request that 
 they make public his sentiments, that he would never forgive 
 his Cabinet for what they had done, but that at that moment he 
 lacked the necessary strength to oppose the triumphant partisans 
 of Felix Diaz, and in consequence felt obliged to accept the 
 version given him by those in charge of the execution. Thus 
 did Huerta choose the second alternative. Thereupon, it was 
 officially announced that a miob intent on rescuing Messrs. Ma- 
 dero and Pino Suarez had assaulted the autos and that in the 
 ensuing fight the two prisoners had been killed by the mob. The 
 autopsy was held and the bodies were placed in zinc-lined coffins 
 which were tightly sealed and delivered for burial to the re- 
 spective families of the dead officials. The body oi Mr. Madero 
 was placed in the Fi*ench Cemetery where it rests in a grave 
 near the entrance, and that of Mr. Pino Suarez was buried in 
 the Spanish Cemetery. Both rest in foreign soil ! 
 
 *The arms of the Rurales are Mauser 0.0075 and the Mounted 
 Police were armed that night with RIemington 0.44. 
 
202 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 AS soon as the Cabinet meeting adjourned, the President has- 
 tened to Military Headquarters where Ambassador Henry Lane 
 Wilson awaited him.* It was there that the latter gentleman 
 composed the telegram to his government stating what had oc- 
 curred, and rig'ht from Military Headquarters telephoned for 
 an employee of the Embassy to caU for it. The version given to 
 the United States contained the lie that the escort of Madero and 
 Pino Suarez had been attacked and the prisoners killed in the 
 skirmish. 
 
 But the public was not deceived, and to everybody the real 
 instigator of the crime was General Euerta. The Cabinet had 
 fallen into a skillful trap and had assumed the role of instiga- 
 tors of an assassination that the President and his close friends had 
 planned with cunning. 
 
 On the following day Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, upon learning what had happened, ten- 
 dered his resignation, but the President flatly refused to accept 
 it, saying, "No, my friend, it would be very fine for you like 
 Pontius Pilate, to wash your hands, but such things don't go 
 with me. Together we all came into power, and together we'll 
 all go to Hell if necessary, with equal responsibilities; but you 
 cannot palm these two dead men on us." The gesture of Gen- 
 eral Huerta was so forceful that the Minister did not dare to 
 insist upon his resignation. Tihis resignation, however, the Presi- 
 dent was soon to demand, as his remark about hanging together 
 was merely one of the jests characteristic of him; and in fact, 
 he was eventually, half in jicst and half in earnest, to demand 
 the resignation of every single member of that Cabinet. He had 
 appointed them because it had been so exacted of him by Gen- 
 eral Felix Diaz and his friends at the critical time when he was 
 obliged to make it appear that he was coerced by the rebels of 
 the Ciudadela to betray the government of Madero, and he had 
 appointed them particularly because that was the surest way for 
 him to obtain the Presidency which, after all, was really his ulti- 
 
 *When this chapter was published in the "New York Times," 
 Mr. Henry Lane "Wilson in an interview published six days later, 
 claimed that this narrative was of my own malicious fabrication, 
 but he produced no evidence to prove it ; on the other hand the 
 facts were related to me by an eye witness, who was at military 
 headquarters that evening, and said that he had seen Mr. Henry 
 Lane Wilson there, so I cannot change my opinion. 
 
THE DEATH OP MADERjO 203 
 
 mate aim. For, the American Ambassador had given his con- 
 sent and had accepted in the name of the Diplomatic Corps, the 
 proposed Cabinet. In General Hlierta 's opinion at that particular 
 moment, this assured the recognition by all the Powers of the 
 government over which he was about to preside, and as such a 
 recognition was essential to enable him to obtain the loan which 
 ifc was imperative to negotialte, he consented to everything. But, 
 finding himself secure in power after having gained the recog- 
 nition of the Powers and obtained the loan, General Huerta had 
 no further use for these Ministers who had been forced upon him 
 by Felix Diaz at the American Embassy, and therefore would 
 displace them in short order. Such was the intention of the 
 new President when he appointed them, and this intention as 
 we shall see, was carried out within six months. 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 THE MONEY ORGY. 
 
 The felicistas were delighted. Mr. Rodolfo Reyes and the 
 friends of Felix Diaz believed that the so-called compact of the 
 Ciudadela gave them power perhaps for all time. They believed 
 that they had deceived General Huerta, when in fact they them- 
 selves were being deceived by him. As a whole, the Cabinet 
 met with public approval, firstly, because the new incumbents 
 were considered more competent than the men who had been 
 ousted; secondly, because it promised the reestablishment of 
 peace which was craved by all; and thirdly, because it assured 
 the withdrawal of Mladero from the government, which the pub- 
 lic desired being convinced that it was worse than the adminis- 
 tration of General Diaz. Besides, the general impression was 
 that H!uerta was an intelligent man. It was natural therefore 
 that the people, tired of so many revolutions, should be ready 
 and glad to countenance the new government. There were some 
 skeptics among us who believed that the collapse of the govern- 
 ment was a thing of the near future. We were called disaffect- 
 ed and accused of lack of patriotism, but the fact was that aside 
 of its treacherous origin we knew the men identified with the 
 government; we knew the history of each; we knew just what 
 each was worth, and consequently we could well foresee what their 
 real work would be. Unfortunately, we were not mistaken. The 
 public itself soon began to lose all hope in them. The Cabinet, 
 instead of dedicating itself to the task of finding a way to re- 
 conciliation and harmony for the purpose of obliterating the 
 memory of recent events and of joining all Mexicans as one 
 family, chose rather to seek revenge for old wrongs which had 
 absolutely no connection whatever mth the existing situation. 
 Some of the Cabinet members took even a more practical view 
 of affairs and began a veritable despoliation of the national cof- 
 fers. The War Department principally was the scene of the 
 
 (204) 
 
THE MONEY ORGY 205 
 
 most scandalous outrages ever recorded in the history of our 
 country in the frauds perpetrated against the Treasury. I will 
 set forth some examples. 
 
 During Madero's administration the Inspector of the Com- 
 aiissary Department had refused from a i'actory "La Estrella," 
 in which the Miaderos had an interest, a lot of four thousand uni- 
 forms. These uniforms were now accepted at two and one-half 
 dollars more per uniform than allowed by the official schedules. 
 It is needless to state that General Mondragon, Secretary of War, 
 and a son of the President both received very liberal commissions 
 for this act. The samie thing was done in the purchase of two 
 thousand horses to replace the losses suffered by the cavalry. 
 The contractor should have delivered the horses at $65.00 per 
 head, but the government paid for them at the rate of $130.00. 
 For sandals — a special kind in general use among the lower classes 
 in Mlexico — the government was charged one dollar and a half 
 more per dozen than the value; the same thing happened with 
 cartridge boxes, with saddles for the cavalry, and in fact with 
 whatever supplies were needed for the army. All these purchases 
 naturally meant a heavy commission for the Secretary of War, 
 and some of them meant an additional rake off for one or another 
 member of the President's family. General MJondragon made 
 contracts for everything, uniforms, arms, belts, ships, aeroplanes, 
 etc., etc., in such quantities as would obviate further purchases 
 for years to come. 
 
 One of the higher employees made a compilation which show- 
 ed that if all the contracts made by Mondragon during the four 
 months he was in office had been carried out, his commissions 
 would have reached the inconceivable sum of $3,460,000.00. And 
 this in only four months ! 
 
 What was happening in the War Department was also hap- 
 pening in other departments. In the Department of the Interior, 
 the needs of the Rurales and the police were filled for years to 
 come; in the Department of Public Instruction, such supplies, 
 for instance, as paper which was sold to the general public at one 
 dollar ninety cents, was charged up to the government at two 
 dollars and sixty-five cents. In all justice to Mr. Garcia Granados, 
 I must state that all the grafting in his department was done 
 entirely without his knowledge. 
 
 Everybody wanted to make big deals in order to accumu- 
 late a fortune in a few days. It seemed as if the government 
 
206 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 was the only source of riches; and the men, judging that the 
 new government could not exist very long, sought to embrace the 
 opportunity at hand. When it was learned that the government 
 desired to float a loan, hundreds of proposals poured in. All 
 posed as representatives of foreign syndicates, each more power- 
 ful than the other, and all used every influence possible to be the 
 chosen ones. Mondragon, who naturally could not be expected 
 to let such an opportunity slip through his fingers, pretended 
 to represent a group of French capitalists and made every effort 
 to obtain the option. LJ^r. Moheno and several others also used 
 the same plans. Among the most unique and worthy of note 
 was Mr. Jose Hi. Aspe. 
 
 This gentleman had originally been a very vehement Por- 
 firista. In fact he made a very heated speech in the Bouse on 
 the day the resignation of General Diaz was accepted.* After 
 the fall of Porfirio Diaz, he had figured as a firm supporter of 
 Mr. Madero whom he accompanied every day on his morning con- 
 stitutional through the woods of Chapultepec. He had succeed- 
 ed in obtaining an appointment as representative from the dis- 
 trict of Misantla in the State of Vera Cruz, the bloody details 
 of which I have set forth in another chapter, t Later he was 
 appointed Mnister from Mexico to Italy, but his credentials 
 were never issued because Mr. Esteva, who occupied the post 
 for many years, successfully fought against his removal. Af- 
 ter the victorious uprising against Madero, Mr. Aspe suddenly 
 remembered that he had been a classmate of Felix Diaz in the 
 Military Academy and joined the ranks of the Felicista party 
 in support of his old classmate, playing an important role before 
 the House for the acceptance of Mladero's resignation. He then 
 attempted to obtain an option for the loan which was about to be 
 floated in Europe. He made a bid, justifiable in itself, but it hap- 
 pened that the Secretary of the Treasury, at a loss what to do with 
 the many proposals received, and by the many requests for options, 
 finally telegraphed to Paris regarding the responsibility of the 
 firm of which Mir. Aspe posed as agent. The answer he received 
 was that the firm did not exist in Paris and was not even known 
 in the Paris business world, or rather, cables from Paris were 
 being sent with the signature of a man who had not authorized the 
 
 *See Chapter II. 
 
 tin the complete Spanish edition. 
 
THE MONEY OKGiY 207 
 
 use of his name and did not even desire to have any connection 
 whatever with the loan. The letters miade public by the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, Mr. Esquivel Obregon, show clearly the 
 audacity of some persons and at the same time prove the authen- 
 ticity of these statements. The letters were as follows : 
 
 A letter from Representative Aspe and a reply thereto from 
 the Secretary of the Treasury. 
 
 Miexico, June 24th, 1913. 
 To the Editor of the Imparcial, 
 Addressed. 
 
 Dear Sir: I beg to request that if convenient, you will 
 kindly publish in your paper the enclosed letter which is a copy 
 of one I am today addressing to the Secretary of the Treasury 
 and National Credit. 
 
 Thanking you in advance for the courtesy of your columns, 
 I am 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 J. R. Aspe. 
 
 Mexico, June 24th, 1913. 
 
 The Honorable Secretary of the Treasury, 
 
 The Honorable Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon. 
 
 Sir: I have just read in today's paper the reply you 
 make to an open letter addressed to you by Representative Que- 
 rido Moheno, relative to the loan or contemplated loan, in which 
 you make some statements referring to the proposals I had the 
 honor to make you. 
 
 Not desiring to interrupt the progress of the affair, which 
 1 sincerely trust will be successfully consummated, I nevertheless 
 reserve to myself the right of proving minutely and decisively 
 the honesty and advantages of my proposals. At the same time, 
 I wish to take advantage of the time limit you publicly set, 
 the 26th' inst., on which day the truth of the facts can be con- 
 clusively proved. 
 
 However, since the reply to which I refer, is not substantiat- 
 ed by your signature, since some of the statements contained 
 therein may not perhaps be entirely authentic, and since any 
 corrections I might now offer could only serve to complicate the 
 situation, I limit myself to request that you be kind enough to 
 answer the following points: 
 
208 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 1. Do you confirm the statement that you are in receipt of 
 a "cable from the Financial Agent of the Mexican Government 
 irt London advising you in the name of the Syndicate itself 
 (Syndicat des Banquiers de Province) that this syndicate had 
 no interest whatsoever in the affair"? 
 
 2. Do you confirm the statement "That the accredited re- 
 presentative in Mexico of this Syndicate (Syndicat des Ban- 
 quiers de Province) has denied that his firm was interested in 
 the loan"? 
 
 3. Do you confirm the statement that "to a cable sent by 
 the TTeasury Department to Mr. Petit, he cabled in reply deny- 
 ing any participation in the proposal"? 
 
 I remain, 
 
 Yours respectfully, 
 
 Mexico, June 25th, 1913. 
 To the Editor of the Imparcial, 
 Present. 
 
 Dear Sir : You will find herewith enclosed a copy of the 
 letter I am this day sending to Mr. Jose R. Aspe in reply to 
 his letter published today in several newspapers on the subject 
 of the loan, and I request that you kindly have it published in 
 your paper. 
 
 I am, Dear Sir, 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 TO. ESQiUIVEL OBREGON. 
 
 Mexico, June 25th, 1913. 
 Mr. Jose R. Aspe, 
 Addressed. 
 
 Dear Sir: In reply to your communication of yesterday, 
 I beg to state that I sincerely regret the necessity of referring 
 again to the proposal you made me regarding the loan. I have, 
 however, been forced to do so by Representative IMbheno and 
 I repeat, I do so with sincere regret. This feeling I have, not 
 because I think I can injure the good name of one to whom I 
 have always been bound by ties of friendship, one whom I 
 
THE MONEY ORGY 209 
 
 have never believed to have had any ulterior motives in making 
 the proposals, but because the circumstances might hurt his 
 pride, and self respect whicli I would have respected had public 
 interest not forced me to allude once more to your participation 
 in the affair. 
 
 With this explanation I shall now proceed to grant your 
 request. In order to make certain facts concrete, and in order 
 that they may appear not as my personal opinions because I 
 still do not wish you to think I mean you any harm, but that 
 they may appear as undeniable facts, I shall now set forth the 
 telegrams which made me form my judgment. 
 
 I requested you to transmit to Paris the fact as the govern- 
 ment could not consider proposals coming through Peindre, 
 Denois & Roumagnac, the Syndicate of Bankers of Province, 
 should address me direct. You agreed to do this, but in spite 
 of that, on May 21, I received a cable in F'rench which translated 
 freely reads as follows : 
 
 "We repeat our offers made to Legation. We confirm ac- 
 ceptance of imhiediate loan conditions proposed by Rioumagnac 
 intermediary Aspe will sign here with Charge D 'Affaires or 
 await yoar representatives counting first on your support for 
 the Syndicate Bankers Province Peindre. ' ' 
 
 In this cable, the last sentence has the word "pour" which 
 in French has two meanings. It: could either mean "for" in the 
 sense that it was intended to show that Peindre was signing for 
 the syndicate, or it could mean "for" in the sense of only re- 
 questing our support for the firm since there was nO' period and 
 no separate signature. But it is clear that if the cable had been 
 sent in accordance with my demand that the Syndicate itself 
 wire me direct, the apparent intention of this cable was to con- 
 vey the impression that my demand was being complied with 
 while at the same time leaving a loophole of escape should any 
 question arise as to fraudulent use of the signature. The tele- 
 gram as can be clearly seen was not one to inspire confidence, 
 and I therefore insisted that Mr. Pdit, Director of the Bank of 
 Province, should himself communicate with the Department. By 
 this time my suspicions were aroused and I did not wish to rely 
 solely upon a reply which could be sent from Paris by any one 
 whatsoever. For this reason on May 23rd, I cabled direct to 
 Mr. Petit, Directior of the Bank of Province, as follows : 
 
210 FROM DESPOTISM' TO ANARCHY 
 
 ' ' For my information kindly cable confirmation of proposals 
 for loan to M'exican Government of fifteen to twenty million 
 pounds sterling at 87 (eighty-seven) pounds; 5 (five) per cent 
 interest ; fifty years, made in your name by Aspe. ' ' 
 
 That very day I received this reply : 
 
 "We confirm with full guarantees proposals Roumagnac 
 intermediary Aspe. We authorize power of Peindre. Greetings. 
 
 "Petit, Director Syndicate Bankers, Corf. Financial Agent." 
 
 Here though the name of Petit appeared, it was not with 
 the full title of the Syndicate of Banksi of Province, nor that 
 of the Association of Banks of Province, according to the newest 
 firm name of the institution. No, he merely signed himself Di- 
 rector of Syndicate of Bankers, and as there could exist thous- 
 ands of Syndicates of Bankers, the personal identification had 
 been eliminated with a singular lack of cleverness. 
 
 On the following day I received a reply direct from Mr. 
 Petit, which reads : 
 
 "A long time ago we formulated proposals with view to 
 granting loan amounting only to fifty million francs. In view 
 of the greater importance of the contemplated transaction and 
 owing to other obligations, we have not confirmed proposals. 
 
 "Petit Synprobank." 
 
 "Synprobank" is the cable address of the Syndicate of 
 Banks of Province, or rather, Central Association of Banks of 
 Province. 
 
 This same cable was transmitted to the Department by the 
 Financial Agent of the MIexican Government under date of the 
 26th. On the 24th I had received from Vera Cruz another cable 
 herewith quoted : 
 
 "I advise I am in receipt just now message Achille Adam 
 President Societe Central Banques de Province notifying me 
 that said bank has made no bid on the loan of 500 million. Make 
 use of this notice at your convenience and with no reservations 
 whatever. Signed Mkurice Armand Delille. " 
 
 Mr. Delille is authorized agent in Mexico for the Syndicate 
 of Banks of Province. 
 
 Such are the facts of the matter. 
 
 I note, however, a peculiarity, and that is that among the 
 various names given to the group in whose name you make the 
 proposal, is that used in your above mentioned letter ' ' Syndicat 
 des Banquiers de Province, ' ' and it is possible that the Treasury 
 
THE MONEY ORGY 211 
 
 Department committed a grave error in addressing itself to the 
 Syndicat des Banques de Province." 
 
 This deserves an explanation : 
 
 When yon first filed your proposal and I informed you that 
 1 would not entertain it unless submitted by a banking house of 
 high and recognized standing, you mentioned the Syndicate of 
 Banks of Province which is in fact a first class institution. On 
 that basis, which was a condition I exacted from all those who 
 spoke to me about the loani, we were able to enter into negotia- 
 tions. Had I known that we were dealing with a syndicate of 
 bankers of a province in general terms, I would never have con- 
 sented to continue negotiations in spite of the fact that Messrs. 
 Peindre and Roumagnac were members of the syndicate, and 
 that the latter gentleman is well known in Mexico, and Central 
 America. Moreover, it is a very suspicious coincidence that the 
 Director of the Syndicate of Banks of Province should be Petit, 
 likewise that of the Syndicate of Bankers of Province, and that 
 the latter should have accidently signed the cable when I especi- 
 ally demanded his name to appear. 
 
 If you still have any doubts whatsoever as to the cables 
 transcribed herewith, I will show them to you personally or give 
 the necessary orders to the cable office to produce them at your 
 request. I am, 
 
 Yours very truly. 
 
 As I have said, General Mondragon was also posing as the 
 representative of a Mr. M,tercurio, wiho called himself agent of 
 another syndicate of French bankers. General Mondragon went 
 so far as to cause an attack in the House of Representatives to 
 be made against the Secretary of the Treasury for refusing to 
 deal with the mysterious stranger recommended by the Secre- 
 tary of War. This resulted in an unprecedented event in the 
 history of the M'exican Congress and probably of any other par- 
 liament of the world; that the Secretary of the Treasury should 
 question the Secretary of War in an open session of the House. 
 Mr. Mondragon presented himself before the House and after 
 cross examination by Mr. Esquivel Obregon, confessed that the 
 Secretary of the Treasury had acted wisely in the affair and 
 had demanded from those who posed as representatives of foreign 
 
212 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 syndicates proofs as to who they were as well as to their financial 
 responsability. When Mr. Aspe and General Mlondragon both 
 found themselves in a false position, they placated the public 
 and requested that it withhold final judgment for a few days 
 when they could present proofs of their statements. These proofs 
 naturally have never been submitted up to date although ten 
 m-onths have elapsed since these events took place. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIl. 
 
 THE REIGN OF TERROR. 
 
 The entrance of Don Aureliano Urrutia to the Cabinet was 
 not exactly the beginning of the policy of terror, but just at 
 that time measures became so bitter that the public naturally 
 began to associate both facts. The first victim of the reign of 
 terror was Mr. Edmundo Past:elin, alternate congressman for the 
 district of Tuxtepec, State of Oaxaca, a trusted employee of the 
 firm of Samuel Bros, of Mexico City. Mr. Pastelin who was 
 accused of heading a plot against the government of Huerta, 
 was arrested as he reached his home on the evening of June 11th 
 and was executed without trial two days later in the Peni- 
 tentiary.* 
 
 Shortly after, on July 7th, Mr. Pablo Castaiion y Campoverde 
 was arrested at his office and sent to Iguala where he was executed 
 by Colonel Reynaldo Diaz by direct orders from the government. 
 
 On the 14th of the same month, Messrs. Jesus Velazquez 
 and Domingo Juarez, Justices of the Peace in the village of San 
 Pedro Mlartir, were denounced to the government by their per- 
 sonal enemies, the O'znaya brothers, and both were executed. The 
 accusation against tlhem was that in league with Zapata, they 
 were the agents who supplied the rebels of Morelos with ammuni- 
 tion. They denied the charges and were supported in their pro- 
 testations by the villagers, but the government remained inflex- 
 ible; and although the charges were not proved, the men were 
 executed in the vicinity of Ajusco. 
 
 *The government first stated that Pastelin had escaped, 
 then it stated that he had died in an encounter. Both false- 
 hoods, for an eye witness to the execution gave me a detailed 
 account of it. 
 
 (213) 
 
214 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 On the 20th of August it was rumored that Representative 
 Enrique Bordes Mangel had been executed, but this rumor proved 
 false,* 
 
 On the night of August 22nd, as Representative Serapio 
 Rendon was leaving the house of Mrs. Clara Scherer, he was ar- 
 rested by agents of the Department of the Interior, t bound and 
 gagged, and taken in an automobile to the neighboring town of 
 Tlakiepantla, where Commander of Rurales Fortuno Miramon 
 shot and killed him. Several stories regarding the death of this 
 congressman became current, but the facts here narrated were 
 told me by the brother of Mr. Rendon, who in turn obtained 
 them from the Major of the regiment commanded by Fortuiio 
 Miramon. This man was himself killed by Miramon on the ar- 
 rival of the regiment a:t San Luis Potosi while on the way to 
 join the forces attacking Torreon. On the road, Miramon and 
 his second in command began a game of cards, which culminated 
 in a quarrel in which the Major was killed and Miramon serious- 
 ly wounded. 
 
 The facts of Riendon's murder, as related to me, are as fol- 
 lows : Congressman Rendon was taken at night to Tlalnepantla, 
 where he arrived while Fortuiio Miramon was at dinner. When 
 the bonds and gags were removed, Miramon ordered his Major 
 to sitand Rendon up against a wall and shoot him. The Major, 
 however, who knew Rendon and was aware that he was a congress- 
 man, demanded a written order to that effect, since he did not 
 wish to be broug'ht up next day on the charge of having executed 
 a member of Congress without due authority. "This," he said, 
 * ' is a man of importance and I refuse to be a scapegoat. ' ' For- 
 tuno Miramon replied : ' ' Order be d— ; if you do not shoot 
 him, I w^ill." "Do as you like" said the Mlajor, "I won't shoot 
 him." Ml-. Rendon, to whom nothing whatever had been said 
 since his arrest, saw that the affair wasi becoming serious, that 
 he was to be killed without a chance of escape. Desperately he 
 tried to convince Miramon that this would be murder, but could 
 gain no respite other than a few moments to write a farewell 
 to his family. As he was writing to his wife, Fortuiio Miramon 
 
 *0n the 20th of August a well dressed individual was mur- 
 dered in Tlalnepantla. This man was mistaken for Mr. Bordes 
 Mangel. 
 
 tMr. Reudon was arrested as he reached his home situated at 
 No. 35 Industria street, three houses from mine. 
 
THE REIGN OF TERROR 215 
 
 placed his pistol at Rendon's head and fired, killing him in- 
 stantly. A squad was then called into the room and ordered to 
 fire a volley into the dead body of the unfortunate congressman. 
 
 "Your brother," said the Major relating the occurrence to 
 Mr. Rendon's brother, "was the 104th person executed at Tlal- 
 nepantla by order of the Secretary of the Interior." Mr. 
 Urrutia was determined to strengthen General Hjuerta's posi- 
 tion by imbuing terror. In France, during the Reign of Terror, 
 there was a certain^ Fouquier Thionville, as accuser. There was 
 a committee of Public Safety which ordered the accusation, and 
 there was a jury which generally convicted all those accused by 
 Fouquier; but in Mexico, all these processes were brushed aside, 
 an accusation sufficed, and the penalty was left to Mir. Urrutia 's 
 judgment. I have heard the following anecdote which shows how 
 this terror was exerted: 
 
 Four individuals in the custody of several soldiers were 
 marching throug'h the street of Donate Giierra towards the 8th 
 Precinct Police Staitioni, when they met Mr. Rafael Reyes Spin- 
 dola. One of the prisoners shouted to the ex-Editor in Chief of 
 the Imparcial and attracted his attention. "Save me, sir," he 
 cried, "They are going to kill me and I am innocent." The 
 commander of the guard would not let him speak further, but 
 for Mir. Spindola it was sufficient. He hastened immediately 
 to the Department of the Interior and saw Mir. Urrutia. "I 
 know that man," he told Urrutia, "he has been in my employ 
 and would never think of fomenting a revolt. " "You know 
 him?" asked the Secretary, "Do you think him an honest man?" 
 "Yes" replied Spindola, "while in my employ, he always be- 
 haved well." "All right" said Urrutia; wthereupon he gave 
 orders by telephone that the man be set free. The man instead 
 of going to his death, obtained his freedom not because he had 
 been tried nor because he had been acquitted, buti simply be- 
 cause he had accidentally met a man who had befriended him by 
 using his friendship with the Secretary. 
 
 A similar story was related to me how Mir. Emilio Rabasa 
 also saved an unfortunate who was in the same predicament. 
 But Mlariano Salgado, Nestor E. Monroy, Jesus A. Vazquez, and 
 Trinidad Zapa Castillo, not meeting in their paths such propi- 
 tious influences, were shot to death on July 16th. The charge 
 against them was that they had conspired against the government 
 and had attempted to hurl a bomb with intent to kill the Presi- 
 
216 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 dent. Nor did Solon Arguello find any mercy when he was ar- 
 rested in Mexico City because he was suspected of being an agent 
 of the revolution and to have come to the capital with the sinis- 
 ter purpose of assassinating Greneral Huerta. He and three other 
 persons, one of whom was supposed to have been Congressman 
 Bordes Mangel, and another congressman, Luis F. Navarro, were 
 executed on August 29th near the station of Cima between Cuer- 
 navaca and Mexico City. 
 
 From the moment he entered upon his duties as Secretary 
 of the Interior, Dr. Urrutia had proclaimed very peculiar 
 theories. His one object was to set Huerta firmly in power, and 
 any means for accomplishing this purpose seemed to him good 
 and worthy. One of his pet theories, which caused universal 
 amazement, was that men should not be judged by past actions ; 
 acting upon this principle, he emphatically declared that his 
 candidate for the governorship of Morelos was Zapata, against 
 whom the government was at that very moment waging actual 
 warfare. This theory was upheld by Mr. Urrutia in an in- 
 terview granted to a reporter of El Pais, which appeared in 
 that paper on June 19th. The interview, as published, follows : 
 
 ZAPATISMO IN THE GOVEiRNMENT. 
 
 The Attila of the South is Secretary Urrutia 's Candi- 
 date for Grovernor of Morelos. 
 
 Yesterday afternoon. Dr. Urrutia, Secretary of the Interior, 
 made new and important declarations in an interview granted 
 to representatives of the press. 
 
 The Secretary confirmed the statements made at the time 
 he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Interior, relative to 
 the freedom of the press encouraged by the government. ' ' This 
 is a stock in trade phrase of all Secretaries at the beginning of 
 their terms," said Urrutia, "So long as the press sings their 
 praise ' Long Live the Press ! ' But just as soon as it directs one 
 or two attacks on them, then 'DoAvn with the Press!' I assure 
 you that the provisional government really desires freedom of 
 the press, and furthermore, the Department of which I am in 
 charge will gladly welcome any and every suggestion publicly 
 where prudence and social welfare permit, and privately where 
 
THE REIGN OF TERROR 217 
 
 it might be directly barmful to society and indirectly harmful 
 to the government." "Well then, Mr. Secretary," said the re- 
 porter of El Pais, "My paper has published rumors that Dr. 
 Lara Pardo is coming to take over the duties of Assistant Secre- 
 tary in your Department. What truth is there in this?" 
 
 "Dr. Lara Pardo is in my opinion, a very intelligent man, 
 possessed of administrative ability and I think that if he returns 
 to Mexico he will surely be offered an office in the administra- 
 tion. I will also say the same with regard to Mr. Luis Cabrera, 
 another very capable man who in the near future must and will 
 assuredly occupy an important position in shaping the destinies 
 of Mexico in spite of the bad feeling created against him in the 
 past by certain newspapers. 
 
 "As regards the Assisitant Secretary of the Interior, the re- 
 signation of Martinez Carillo has not been accepted. Although I 
 have been in office only a few days, I have formed a very favor- 
 able opinion of him, and consider him an upright man, learned 
 in his profession, and of good sound judgment. All the reports 
 I have received concerning him are corroborated. I believe that 
 the charges made publicly against him about the 'Covadonga' 
 matters are entirely groundless." 
 
 "Mr. Secretary," said another reporter, "The press has 
 made further hints. It has been^ rumored that Orozco is candi- 
 date for Governor of Chihuahua." 
 
 "I know nothing about that" replied Dr. Urrutia, "but I 
 would heartily endorse him just as I would have no objec^tion to 
 aid the gubernatorial candidacy of Zapata in Morelos. Zapata 
 is my candidate. Men," he added, "should not be judged by 
 hearsay. ' ' 
 
 "Wliat are the developments regarding the surrender of 
 this Attila?" 
 
 "I have already stated that there are no such negotiations 
 in progress. The government does not treat with its enemies. 
 The government is strong and is daily becoming stronger. A 
 member of Zapata's family approached me to find out whether 
 there would be any difficulty in granting guarantees of safety 
 to Zapata if he should surrender, and I replied that there would 
 be none. The government can make use of Zapata in Morelos 
 but he must be unarmed. The government will not agree to allow 
 the rebels to retain their arms. The army must be one and must 
 be under one head. We cannot have an army of protection. 
 
218 FROM DESPOTISM TO' ANARCHY 
 
 bodies of irregulars, etc. The army must be oiie and undivided. 
 That is why the government so tenaciously insists on disarma- 
 ment. Those who imported weapons into the country, and armed 
 everybody, are the ones who brought ruin and desolation on the 
 country. Moreover, there is the danger that if the rebels are 
 allowed to remain in arms, they will never understand the mean- 
 ing of force nor cultivate the ideas of discipline. Zapata, weapon- 
 less, can be Governor of Mbrelos. This should not seem strange 
 to you. Gi'overnors are not appointed for life. If they are in- 
 competent, 'they can be removed. ' ' 
 
 But neither the theories nor the actions of Dr. Urrutia 
 could halt the downward march of the government of General 
 Htierta in the estimation of the general public. 
 
 The President feeling the storm that was gathering around 
 the government wished to dispel the clouds by sacrificing his 
 Secretary and friends; therefore, about the middle of Septem- 
 ber, he removed him and placed in his stead Mir. Mlanuel Garza 
 Aldape who was at that moment a great favorite of General 
 Huerta. But arbiti*ary measures did not cease with this change ; 
 on the contrary, it was then that Senator Belisario Dominguez 
 was executed ; and that the Congressmen were imprisoned, some 
 of whom suffered brutal treatment, as for instance, Messrs. Pala- 
 vicini and Rojas. Not even Rodolfo RIeyes and Jorge Vera 
 Estanol* were exempt from such treatment although both had 
 been members of General Huerta 's Cabinet and the first one an 
 intimate friend of Mr. Garza Aldape, Secretary of the Interior. 
 In fact, he owed his present position as adviser to General 
 Huerta entirely to the personal influence of Rodolfo Reyes. 
 J\Iany other persons were imprisoned, such as Mr. Loaiza who 
 was accused of having expressed opinions not flattering to the 
 government. But finally even Garza Aldape fell. His conduct 
 in all the departments in which he had served as Secretary had 
 been disastrous. In the Department of Public Instruction, he 
 misappropriated government funds and committed innumerable 
 
 *0'wing to the fact: that the House of Representatives re- 
 fused permission to one of its members, ]\llr. Tamariz, to become 
 Secretary of Public Instruction, General HYierta ordered the 
 arrest of Representative Jorge Vera Estaiiol, who had been one 
 of his Cabinet Ministers. Huerta had him taken by the police 
 to his own residence at Popotla, and there, in the presence of his 
 aides, insulted him and even threatened to thrash him. 
 
THE REIGN OF TERiROK 219 
 
 injustices against the teaching staff; in the Department of De- 
 velopment, at whose head he served only a few days, he flagrant- 
 ly disobeyed the law ; and in the Department of the Interior, his 
 term of office is marked by the attack on Congress, the imprison- 
 ment of many persons without just cause or reason, and the as- 
 sassination of many Mexicans, like Senator Dominguez, whose 
 only crime was that of telling the truth. 
 
 His work in the State Department was characterized by the 
 remarkable stupidity of his official statement that Mr. John Lind, 
 the Confidential Ajgent of the President of the United States, was 
 "persona non grata," a fact that was absolutely immaterial to 
 both President Wilson and his Agent. 
 
 When G^arza lAldape was forced out of the Cabinet, the fear 
 which he had instilled in others of the arm of the government, 
 suddenly took possession of him. On the night of his dismissal 
 he left Mexico City in a special train, and in the early morning 
 boarded a French steamer. Living on the Nation's money, he 
 serenely views from abroad the results of his work, but his 
 conscience must tirouble him at times and must wake him up 
 often with a start. 
 
 li'e was a traitor to all parties, stupid in all his political 
 deeds and entirely unscrupulous in the handling of public funds. 
 In the orgy which General Hhierta. has been carrying on at the 
 expense of the Nation, Garza Aldape has drunk deep and has 
 been able to fully satisfy his greed. But he has been called be- 
 fore the bar of public opinion. Human justice, always weak, 
 cannot punish him, but the Justice of History will be implacable. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 THE PAELIAMENTARY QUADMLATIERIAL. 
 
 Ever since the discussion regarding credentials of new con- 
 gressmen war had been waged on the governiment of Madero by 
 three members of the old Porfirista Congress, Messrs. Jose Maria 
 Lozano, Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, and Francisco Mi de Olaguibel. 
 They themselves had had their credentials accepted, but! not with- 
 out difficulty, as they were bitterly opposed by the most impor- 
 tant member of the Committee on Credentials, Mx. Querido 
 Moheno. When accepted, they composed the nucleus of the op- 
 position in the House and were called by the press "the Parlia- 
 mentary Triangle." 
 
 Following the acceptance of the credentials, and the open- 
 ing of the regular session of Congress, a difference arose between 
 Mr. Moheno and Gustavo Madero. Mt. Moheno, who is not only 
 daring, but totally devoid of scruples, suddenly declared in open 
 session that he had broken with the government, after which he 
 joined the triangle which now became known as the "Parlia- 
 mentary Qiuadrilateral. ' ' 
 
 From the imauguration of his administration, General Huerta 
 entrusted to this quadrilateral the defense of the program he 
 intended to follow. All four were highly int'elligent men and 
 born orators, their election therefore had been a wise move for 
 there was no one in the House capable of competing with their 
 eloquence or their knowledge of Parliamentary procedure. At 
 the time of Madero 's downfall, Mioheno had intrigued for the 
 appointment of Tomas Braniff as President pro tem by the 
 House;* but as I have remarked, he was intelligent and soon 
 
 *Mr. Braniff and ]\i!r. Moheno had had serious differences 
 on account of the elections for Governor in the State of Yera 
 Cruz and the former had made serious charges against the latter 
 on account of the handling of the campaign funds. 
 
 (220) 
 
THE PARLIAMENT'ARY QUADRILATERAL 221 
 
 perceived the inadvisability of this move, whereupon he turned 
 in favor of Greneral Huerta, whose purposes he served from that 
 moment wisely and actively.* 
 
 General Hiuerta, as I have stated before, had been forced 
 by circumstances to accept as his Cabinie'ti the men proposed by 
 Felix Diaz, but he had done so fully determined tO' displace them 
 as soon as events should permit. The day after he had signed 
 the pact, he began to devise means to break it, for so far as he 
 was concerned, it was not worth the paper it was written on. 
 Shortly before the tragic ten days, Mi-, de la Barra had been 
 elected Governor of the State of MIexico. He took the oath of 
 office on the 4th of March, appointed am acting governor, and 
 retlimed immediately to MIexico City to continue his duties as 
 Secretary of State. Mr. Giarza Aldape, selected for Secretary of 
 Agriculture, an office not existing in the present Cabinet, had 
 arrived in MIexico and was attending Cabinet meetings as if he 
 were really a member, although as a matter of fact, the law 
 creating the new Department had not been passed nor has it 
 been passed to date. 
 
 Huerta was fully resolved not to resign in favor of Felix 
 Diaz or of any one else for that matter. He and his friends 
 were looking for a loophole through which to escape from keep- 
 ing the promises made to Diaz at the American Embassy ; to this 
 end they formulated numerous plans. Finally General Huerta 
 entered into an understanding with the Quadrilateral. He held 
 a meeting at his home at which it wast agreed that on October 
 26th there be an election held for President and Vice President. 
 Congress, agreeing with this plan, issued the necessary procla- 
 mation. The Felicistas who believed absolutely in the sincerity 
 and honesty of General Huerta 's words, began campaigning for 
 their candidate. TIhe Attorney General declared through the 
 press that the call for an election quite carried out the compact 
 made at the Ciudadela, which, as I have said, was really entered 
 into and signed at the American Embassy. De la Barra was 
 nominated for vice president. General Felix Diaz had succeeded 
 in obtaining the appointment of Mr. Celso Acosta as Inspector 
 General of Police. M'r. Acosta, one of his most enthusiastic par- 
 tisans, was intimately associated with him, in fact had been his 
 
 *See note referring to the session of Cbngress on F'ebruary 
 19, which will be found in the Diario de los Debates. 
 
222 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 private secretary when Diaz was Inspector Greneral of Police 
 in Mexico City during the administration of Don Porfirio Diaz. 
 Frankly, however, this appointment was a mistake on the part 
 of the felicis'tas because no politician was safe as long as Celso 
 Acosta held sway at Police Headquarters. This fact was indi- 
 cated to the provisional President who, pretending to satisfy 
 public opinion, at once decided on his removal. The truth of 
 the matter is that the President himself was the one to feel most 
 insecure because Acosta was a tool of Diaz. Huerta saw in 
 public opinion an opportunity to deal a blow to the f elicistas and 
 to free himself from his bonds. Huerta had twice attempted to 
 make this change, but each time had met with opposition from 
 his Cabinet and from Don Felix Diaz who reproached and ac- 
 cused him of unfaithfulness. Huerta did not yet have the neces- 
 sary energy to impose his authority. Finally, one day resolved 
 to make the change, he instructed the Gbvernor of the Federal 
 District, General Samuel Garcia Cuellar, to advise the Secretary 
 lof the Interior that at a certain specified hour, the post should 
 be turned over to the new Inspector, Mjr. Joaquin Pita; after 
 giving this command, he disappeared for the time being. At 
 first, Mr. Alberto Garcia Granados, Secretary of the Interior, 
 gave little importance to the orders, and made no objection to 
 the appointment, but later, when Acosta was informed of the 
 change, Granados complying with suggestions from Diaz, objected 
 and issued orders that nothing definite be done until he could 
 see the President personally. But it was impossible to find Gen- 
 eral Huerta. Therefore in compliance with the President's 
 orders. General Garcia Cuellar, duly installed Mir. Pita as In- 
 spector General of Police in spite of the strenuous objections of 
 the Secretary of the Interior, backed by the Attorney General, 
 Rodolfo Reyes, and Felix Diaz. Following this incident, Mr. 
 Garcia Granados sent in his resignation. Thus was he the first 
 of the Cabinet members chosen at the American Embassy to 
 leave his post. The President insisted that the Parliamentary 
 Quadrilateral had demanded the removal of Acosta, claiming 
 that so long as the police were under the domination of Felix 
 Diaz and his friends, it would be impossible to call an election 
 since the members of Congress could not act with the liberty 
 necessary for the proper performance of their duty. Htierta 
 added that he himself was obliged to fulfil his promises, the 
 first and foremost of which was to hold an election. 
 
THE PARLIAMENTARY QUADRILATERAL 223 
 
 The choice of a successor to Mr. Garcia Grauados gave rise 
 to much intrigue. The President had offered this portfolio to 
 Mir. Lozano, one of the members of the Quadrilateral, but Ro- 
 dolfo Reyes, Attorney General, and Garza Aldape, the portfolio- 
 less Secretary, intimately associated with Reyes for many years, 
 had bitterly opposed this choice. The President had considered 
 Dr. Aureliano Urrutia, who was an eminent surgeon of Mexico 
 City as well as a friend of his, in fact had attended him when 
 he had been forced to give up the campaign in the North because 
 of his eye trouble. Mr. Urrutia was finally appointed. This 
 led to the resignation of Mir. Vera Estanol as Secretary of Ptiblic 
 Instruction ; the vacancy thus formed was filled by Garza Aldape 
 whom Congress had left without a post by refusing to vote 
 for the proposed reform to create a Department of Agriculture. 
 General Huerta had offered the portfolio of Secretary of 
 War to General Blanquete for his yeoman service, but in the 
 early days of the administration he was forced to yield to the 
 demands of Felix Diaz, not because the latter had any real power, 
 but because he wished it to appear that he thought so. For this 
 reason, he acted as he did. Time was passing and General Blan- 
 quete was still waiting for the fulfillment of the promise. For- 
 tunately for the President, the public set up such a clamor at 
 the highhanded and flagrant graft of General Mbndragon as 
 Secretary of War and at the disastrous results of one campaign 
 after another that he could truly say that public opinion de- 
 manded the removal of Mondragon. Rodolfo Rieyes, the life 
 and soul of the felicista party, was commissioned to convince 
 Mondragon that his resignation was an absolute necessity. At 
 a Cabinet meeting, he finally succeeded in extracting the desired 
 resignation, whereupon he himself drew up the letter of resigna- 
 tion which was immediately accepted. That very day, June 13th, 
 General Blanquete was sworn in as Secretary of War, Mr. Urru- 
 tia as Secretary of the Interior, and Garza Aldape as Secre- 
 tary of Public Instruction. 
 
 The disorder and confusion in this last Cabineit were matters of 
 public scandal. When Garza Aldape was transferred to the De- 
 partment of Development and Mir. Jose Maria Lozano was ap- 
 pointed Secretary of Public Instruction in his stead, Mr. Lozano 
 found that in the few days he had held office, the retiring Secre- 
 tary of Public Instruction had almost equalled General Mondra- 
 gon 's record, not in the amount of business transacted, because 
 
224 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 this Department did not lend itself so readily as the War Depart- 
 ment to big deals, but in the quality of business which was 
 equally detrimental to the Treasury. The new head of the ad- 
 ministrative branch, Mr. Antonio Maza, mentioned to me a few 
 outrageous cases, but it would be out of place to mention them 
 here. I will limit myself to stating that here as in the War De- 
 partment, contracts were freely handed out Avhereby the Secre- 
 tary made enormous commissions. 
 
 On July 26th then, Mr. Esquivel resigned from the Cabi- 
 net after several quarrels with the other Cabinet members and 
 with the President relative to the outrageous raids that were 
 made or contemplated on the National Treasury. The main rea- 
 son, however, for his forced resignation was that it had been 
 hinted to President Hluerta that his resignation would serve to 
 put an end to certain difficulties which had arisen with the 
 United States because of the methods he had employed to attain 
 the Presidency, difficulties which seriously compromised the 
 financial efforts of Mr. Esquivel Obregon. 
 
 After an all night banquet. General Huerta commissioned 
 Mr. Garza Aldape to obtain the immediate resignations of Mr. 
 Esquivel Obregon and Mir. Rodolfo Reyes. The latter was able 
 to resist sue ccvss fully, but Mr. Esquivel did not force the Presi- 
 dent to repeat his request, for as a matter of fact, ever since 
 the events of February 22nd, he had wished to resign. 
 
 At first Mr. Garza Aldape was considered as a successor 
 to Mr. Esquivel Obregon, and at the same time Mr. Jesus M. 
 Rabago was chosen to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation 
 of Mir. Robles Gil as Secretary of Development. In fact, this 
 appointment had already been made and he had even presented 
 himself to be sworn in, when owing to circumstances which have 
 not as yet been made public, he was suddenly requested to with- 
 draw from the Capital, and Mr. Garza Aldape was sworn in, 
 in his stead. The portfolio of the Department of the Treasury 
 was offered to Mr. Gorostieta, a lawyer of the State of Nuevo 
 Leon. He was a serious minded and calm man, highly esteemed 
 in his native State, but advanced in years, worn out, and sickly. 
 
 Mr. Rabago was appointed Assistant Secretary of the In- 
 terior. The resignation of Mr. Robles Gil was on the program 
 of President Huerta who only awaited a favorable opportunity 
 for demanding it. This opportunity came when Jesus Flores 
 IMagon attacked the Secretary of Development through the press. 
 
THE PARLIAMENTARY QUADRILATERAL 225 
 
 The charge made against him was that, as executor, he had notor- 
 iously mismanaged an estate, the heirs to which were minors. 
 
 Before Huerta had been in power five months, that is, by 
 the end of July, Rodolfo Reyes and David de la Fuente were the 
 only members left in the Cabinet appointed in accordance with 
 the compact at the American Embassy. These two resigned 
 shortly after, as demanded by the Parliamentary Quadrila- 
 teral; Reyes was named congressman and de la Fuente, who re- 
 presented the Vazquizta faction in the government, was offered 
 the command of a force which was to operate against the rebels 
 in the state of Sinaloa. He was promoted to the rank of G^en- 
 eral of Brigade, but the campaign was never entrusted to him. 
 
 When de la Biarra resigned as Secretary of State, the port- 
 folio was offered to Federioo Giamboa, a well known man of 
 letters who was then Minister from Mexico at Brussels. Until 
 his arrival from Belgium, Glarza Aidape filled the office. It 
 was Mr. Aidape who on the 7th of August made the famous 
 statement that Mr. John Lind,, the confidential agent of Presi- 
 dent Wilson, was "persona non grata" to the Miexican govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Tlhe Cabinet was reorganized when Mr. Lozano accepted the 
 portfolio of Secretary of Public Instruction and Mr. Garza 
 Aidape that of Development. After many futile attempts, Huerta 
 was at length able to force Rodolfo Reyes out of his Cabinet 
 naming Mr, Adolfo de la Lama in his place. 
 
 On September 14lth, it was again necessary to reorganize 
 the Cabinet on account of the retirement of Dr. Urrutia. Mr. 
 Aidape took over the Department of the Interior, and the va- 
 cancy he left was filled by Leopoldo Rebollar who had formerly 
 been Assistant Secretary of Sta'te when Aidape was Secretary, 
 and later had been Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Mr. 
 Lozano succeeded Mr. de la Fuente as Secretary of Communica- 
 tions. Mr. Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, a member of the Quadrila- 
 teral, was made Secretary of Public Instruction. There was yet 
 another change, which was that Mr. Gorostieta and Mr. de la 
 Lama exchanged portfolios, Mr. Gorostieta becoming Attorney 
 General and Mr. de la Lama Secretary of the T'reasury. 
 
 When Mr. Gamboa accepted the nomination tendered him 
 by the Catholic party to head the ticket as candidate for the 
 Presidency, he resigned as Secretary of State, the Assistant 
 Secretary, Mt. Antonio de la Peiia y Reyes acting as Secretary ; 
 
226 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAiRCHY 
 
 8. few days later, by order of the President', Mir. de la Lama, 
 Attorney General, requested the resignation of Mr. de la Pena 
 y Reyes. Mr. Qnerido Moheno, another member of the Quad- 
 rilateral, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State, and when, 
 the Cabitiet was reorganized on September 14th, he was made 
 Seereltary of State. Mr. Francisco M. de Oiaguibel, the only 
 member of the Quadrilateral who did not obtain a Cabinet posi- 
 tion, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State. 
 
 As Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Garza Aldape found him- 
 self obliged to dissolve Congress on October 10th. This dissolu- 
 tion had been desired by both the President and his Cabinet 
 ever since the House had refused to sanction the appointment 
 of Mr. Tamariz as Secretary of Public Instruction, for which 
 position he had been suggested when Mr. Lozano became Secre- 
 tary of Communications. The dissolution of Congress was ef- 
 fected by violence, eighty-three members were arrested that day 
 and warrants were issued for the arrest of ten or twelve others 
 who managed to escape. The dissolution of Congress was due 
 to the attitude assumed by the House a few days after the death 
 of Senator Belisario Dominguez. This gentleman. Senator from 
 the State of Chiapas, had arrived in Mexico City after the events 
 of February, since he had only been appointed Senator to fill 
 out the term of Leopoldo Gout, who had died in Mexico City. 
 Immediately upon learning of past events, IVDr. Dominguez, a 
 man of action, drew an informal accusation against General 
 Huerta which he could not read to the Senate. In it he demanded 
 that the President be duly turned over to the proper branch of 
 the Grand Jury. Although the Vice President of the Senate 
 had very cleverly avoided the issue, the facts became public, and 
 the speech of Mr. Dominguez was circulated widely sub rosa. 
 On October 5th, Mir. Dominguez disappeared; he had been ar- 
 rested by agents of the Department of the Interior as he was 
 about to enter his home. A member of the family of Mr. Vera 
 Estanol related a few days later at the gates of the Penitentiary, 
 that Kr. Dominguez had been stabbed to death by police agents 
 who had arrested him under orders of Isidore Cortes and that 
 his body had been removed to the Cemetery of Coyoacan where 
 it had been cremated. 
 
 Mr. Dominguez had foreseen his tragic end; in fact his 
 speech began by stating this fact to the Senate and saying that 
 
THIE PAEjLIAMENTAKiY QUADRIIiATEilAL 227 
 
 he gladly offered himself as a sacrifice for the salvation of his 
 country, a salvation which in his opinion, could only be obtained 
 by the overthrow of General Huerta. Foreseeing his death, he 
 had made his will and had formulated a request that the colony 
 of Chiapanecans in Mexico City see that his little son who was 
 with him in Mexico City be safely restored to his family. 
 
CKAPTER XXXIV. 
 THE OONSiTITUCIOiNALISTiA KEVO'LUTION. 
 
 Mr. Venustiano C-arranza had been proposed for Governor 
 of the State of Coahuila in the elections of 1910. Hie had been 
 proposed by his friend, General Reyes and accepted by General 
 Diaz who had authorized him to work for the election. 'After 
 the downfall of General Reyes when he was sent to Europe, the 
 agreement with ]\i)r. Carranza did not hold and General Diaz 
 ordered the election of Mr. Jesus del Valle, an honorable lawyer 
 of the State of Coahuila. The result was that Mr. Carranza 
 went to the United States to join the Mladerista revolution in 
 which he had heretofore taken no part. When Madero triumph- 
 ed, Mr. del Valle, like most of the governors, resigned, and the 
 election went in favor of Mr. Venustiano Carranza. He was 
 still in office when the events of February 1913 took place. Ac- 
 cording to the Governor's report to the State Legislature, the 
 first news he received of events in Mexico was a telegram sent 
 him by General Huerta on February 19th, reading as follows : 
 
 "Authorized by the Senate, I have assumed the Executive 
 Power, the President and his Cabinet are under arrest. ' ' 
 
 This telegram was sent before the resignation of Madero had 
 been obtained and when General Huerta was pretending to obey 
 orders from the Senate. On receipt of this telegram. Governor 
 Carranza addressed the State Legislature of Coahuila, inform- 
 ing them of the fact and at the same time intimating that he 
 intended to ignore the new government since he considered it 
 illegal. The Legislature approved of the Governor's conduct, 
 whereupon the Governor issued the following proclamation: 
 
 ' ' The Government under my charge received yesterday from 
 the Capital of the Republic a message from General Victoriano 
 Huerta advising that the Senate had authorized him to take 
 charge of the Executive Power and that the President and his 
 Cabinet are under arrest. This news has been confirmed and I, 
 
 (228) 
 
THE CONiSTITXJCIONALISTA REVOLUTION 229 
 
 in my official capacity, cannot but deem strange the anomalous 
 form of such appointments, because under no circumstances has 
 the Senate the constitutional authority to make such designa- 
 tion; therefore it matters not what the result has been in the 
 City of Mexico of the uprising of Brigadier Felix Diaz, General 
 Mondragon, and General Reyes. Besides, whatever may have 
 been the cause of the apprehension of the President and his 
 Cabinet, it is the Federal Congress that should have held a meet- 
 ing to call immediately an extraordinary election as provided 
 by Article 81 of our Magna Charta. Therefore, in all events, 
 the appointment of General Victoriano BCuerta as President of 
 the Republic by the Senate is an arbitrary and illegal act. It 
 means nothing more or less than the most scandalous overthrow 
 of our Constitution, and a retrogression to our shameful and 
 backward period of mutinies. For it seems as if the Senate had 
 connived and conspired with those unworthy soldiers, enemies 
 of our country and of our liberty, making them turn against 
 the Nation which armed them for the support' and maintenance 
 of order and legal rights. Therefore, the government under my 
 charge, in due respect to the sovereign mandates of our Mexican 
 Constitution, in obedience to our institutions, faithful t'o its 
 duties, and animated by the purest patriotism, is obliged to dis- 
 avow and to resist such a downright transgression against our 
 fundamental law. Our government considers it its duty to 
 declare this before the whole Nation, inviting all governors by 
 this circular, as chiefs of the States to lead in the national sen- 
 timent, justly aroused to indignation, to support legal rights and 
 to uphold the Constitutional Government recently elected in 1910 
 in. accordance with our laws. 
 
 "Saltillo, February 19th, 1913. 
 
 Ylenustiano Carranza. " 
 
 At the same time that Carranza took this stand. General 
 Refugio Velasco, Military Commander of Vera Cruz, acted in 
 much the same way. For in reply to General Huerta announc- 
 ing his rise to power. General Velasco replied that he still recog- 
 nized Francisco I. Madero as President of the Republic and that 
 from him and from him alone, would he obey orders. 
 
 If Madero had not so completely lost prestige in the eyes 
 of the public, he would have been saved in spite of the revolt 
 and of General Hiuerta's conduct; but public opinion did not 
 respond promptly to the call from the Governor of Coahuila, or 
 
230 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 to the worthy Military Commander of Vera Cruz. Huerta on 
 his side realizing that the method he had adopted would not 
 lead to go'od results, began^ to work hard for the resignation of 
 Madero. 
 
 The first person that Huerta sent to persuade Madero to 
 resign was, as I have said before, General Juveneio Riobles. He 
 was sent because General Huerta judged that since he had taken 
 no active part in the mutiny, he was probably on good terms with 
 the President and his associates. 
 
 When the resignation was secured, General Huerta imme- 
 diately telegraphed again to the Governor of Coahuila that he 
 was President. This time he did not say that he had been ap- 
 pointed by the Senate, but that he had attained to it by virtue 
 of an agreement with Mladero and Lascurain which seemed to 
 legalize the act. The telegram was the beginning of negotiations 
 with the Governor of Coahulia to induce him to recognize the 
 Federal Government. General Blazquez, chief of arms in Coah- 
 uila and at that moment a resident of Monterey, was sent to con- 
 fer personally Math the Governor. At the same time, a commis- 
 sion was sent from the City of Mexico to treat with Pascual 
 Orozco, Jr., who was in revolt in Chihuahua, and with the Messrs. 
 Vazquez Gomez, who were in San Antonio, Texas. The com- 
 mission was composed of Messrs. Ricardo Garcia Granados, broth- 
 er of the Secretary of the Interior, Jose Maria Garza Ramos, 
 ex-Senator and personal friend of both Mr. Carranza and the 
 Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, and Mr. Herrejon Lopez, friend and 
 correligionist of the Vazquez Gomez. Besides these, in order that 
 the felicistas might be represented, Mr. Esteban Maqueo Cas- 
 tellanos was appointed. Hie too was an ex-Senator and had al- 
 ways loyally supported Pelix Diaz. 
 
 This commission first went to Laredo where it saw Orozco 's 
 father; thence it went to San Antonio and to El Paso where it 
 held conferences with the Chief of the Chihuahua revolution. 
 This the most important revolutionist at the time, agreed to re- 
 cognize Huerta 's government; but when Governor Carranza 
 heard of Miadero's death, he severed all relations he had thus 
 far had with General Huerta; he armed as many troops as he 
 possibly could, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Garfias, 
 President Madero 's former aide, and he himself left Saltillo, 
 going to Monclova and Cuatro Cienegas where he started the 
 revolt. Some months later, Castillo Brito, Governor of Cam- 
 
THE CONSTITUCIONALISTA REVOLUTION 231 
 
 peche, also refused to recognize General Huerta and proclaimed 
 himself in revolt against the Central Government. Dr. Cepeda, 
 Governor of San L/uis Potosi, and Miguel Silva of Michoacan, 
 tried to do the same thing, but there, as in most of the states, the 
 new government quickly appointed military governors to mas- 
 ter the situation in every locality, suppressing by force if neces- 
 sary any revolt that might be started. Governor Abraham Gon^ 
 zalez, of Chihuahua, obtained Huerta 's assurance through Gen- 
 eral Antonio Rabago, military commander of the federal troops 
 that the State sovereignty should be respected and nobody would 
 interfere with the local government; but some days later Gen- 
 eral Rabago claiming that Governor Gonzalez was planning a 
 revolt against the Federal Government, took him prisoner and 
 sent him back to Mexico City under the custody of Mayor Ben- 
 jamin Camarena, aid and close friend of Huerta. On the way 
 Governor Gonzalez was slain. The only civil governors left were 
 those of Oaxaea, Jalisco, and Vera Cruz.* In Sonora, Governor 
 Pesqueira, provisionally in charge on account of Governor May- 
 torena's leave of absence, also refused to recognize Huerta. 
 In Nuevo Leon General Tteviiio, who had been appointed to 
 substitute the Maderista governor, Mr. Villareal, resigned within 
 fifteen days. Mr. Salome Botello, old reyista and personal 
 friend of General Huerta, was appointed to succeed him. In 
 view of Governor Carranza's attitude, Huerta named Mr. Ignacio 
 Alcocer provisional governor of Coahuila. He remained in 
 power until last October when General Joaquin Maas, Jr., Gen- 
 eral Huerta 's nephew, was assigned to the position. 
 
 The revolution at) once assumed large proportions in C^oah- 
 uila and Sonora. Realizing this, General Huerta started great 
 preparations to fight it out, but the rebels succeeded in rousing 
 the states of T'amaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, and Zaca- 
 tecas and even the mountains that border H'idalgo, Vera Cruz 
 and San Luis Potosi and Queretaro. Congressman Pedro An- 
 tonio Santos, appointed to lead the revolution in San Luis 
 Potosi, met his death as he went into the "huasteca Potosina." 
 he was shot in T'ancanhuitz City by forces under command of 
 
 *Three months later General Eduardo Cauz was sent as 
 Governor of Vera Cruz and when Lopez Portillo was named Sec- 
 retary of Sitate General Jose Mier took the governorship of 
 Jalisco, thus the only state where its constitutional governor re- 
 mained is Oaxaea. 
 
232 FROM! DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 Colonel Vargas Hluerta. Congressman Rodriguez Cabo and Mr. 
 Larraga succeeded him in command in that region and after- 
 wards Pedro Carrera Torres and Colonel Hernandez ; on the north 
 of the State Eulalio Gutierrez ; Orestes Pereyra and Calixto 
 Contreras in Durango and Panfilo Natera in Zacatecas succeed- 
 ed in taking possession of the respective capitals of both states. 
 
 In Taniaulipas Pablo Gonzalez, Lucio Blanco, and Luis 
 Caballero, and in Coahuila Jesus Carranza and Eugenio Aguirre 
 Benavides had raised the banner of the revolution, seconding the 
 Plan of Guadalupe and had encountered many obstacles due 
 to the lack of arms and ammunition but they carried on their 
 military operations with a persistent tenacity of purpose. 
 
 At the same time in the State of Chihuahua RIosalio Her- 
 nandez had defeated the federals at Saucillo and Mlaclovio Her- 
 rera, a very brave and courageous fighter, defeated Colonel 
 Pueblita at Santa Rosalia, and a few days later at the same place 
 administered a riotous defeat to Pascual Otozco, Jr. Manuel 
 Chao at Parral held his own and compelled the federals under 
 General Mercado to retreat to Chihuahua and Chao continued 
 and opened up the lines of Constitutionalist communications 
 to Durango where Don Venustiano Carranza, named First Chief 
 of the Revolution, had established his headquarters after 
 the unsuccessful attack on Torreon by the forces of Contreras 
 during the month of June. 
 
 At Santa Rosalia all the chiefs of the Chihuahua division, and 
 some of the other states, with their respective armies named Fran- 
 cisco ViUa as their chief and placed themselves under his leader- 
 ship. Some of them like Toribio Ortega, Maclovio Herrera and 
 Aguirre Benavides had been in many engagements and had ac- 
 quired military training but they all accepted Villa as their chief 
 because his many victories had shown them clearly that he was a 
 strong military conunander. 
 
 Villa had crossed the American border with only six men 
 during the month of March and despite fierce persecution on 
 the part of the federals and irregulars, known as the Colorados, 
 he was able to organize a strong force with which he took Casas 
 Grandes and achieved a great victory over the Federal General, 
 Felix Terrazas, at San Andres where he captured nine military 
 trains with equipment and war material. He drove out the 
 federal garrison at Bustillos and arrived at Santa Rosalia. He 
 then marched on Torreon and took personal comlmand of the 
 
THE CONSTITUCIONiALISTiA REVOLUTION 233 
 
 Constitutionalisit troops there which were attacking that federal 
 stronghold and after having fought the battle of Aviles where 
 he completely routed the federals and where General Alvirez 
 met his death, he was advancing on Tlorreon when the Federal 
 General Mhinguia evacuated the city and Yilla entered and took 
 possession of same. After establishing civil government there he 
 began his advance on Chihuahua and after feinting an attack 
 on that city by a clever strategic move surprised the Federal 
 General Castro at Juarez capturing the same which was the most 
 important port in Northern Mexico. Castro escaped in disguise 
 to the American side of the Eio Grande where he was interned 
 by the American army. Six days afterwards he fought the cele- 
 brated battle of Tierra Blanca where he gave them a crushing 
 defeat. The news of this defeat at Chihuahua caused General 
 Mercado and his entire division to evacuate Chihuahua and to- 
 gether with the combined forces of Orozco and Salazar they 
 marched to Oljiuaga where they were immediately attacked by 
 Villa and fled across the Rio Grande Rtiver where to the num- 
 ber of four thousand men, General Mercado included, they were 
 captured by the American army and interned. Salazar escaped 
 but was later captured by the American army patrol at Sander- 
 son, Texas. Orozco escaped in disguise and reached New Or- 
 leans where he boarded the Mjexican gunboat Zaragoza which 
 carried him to Vera Cruz. 
 
 Villa hastened to Chihuahua where after establishing a civil 
 government he moved his entire command against Torreon 
 which had been evacuated by the Arrietas and which was then 
 garrisoned by the Federal General Riefugio Velasco. The Tor- 
 reon campaign began with an attack at Bermejillo where the 
 federals were annihilated. Villa then with twenty thousand men 
 attacked Gomez Palacio the federal outposts and after twelve 
 days engagement captured Torreon once more. Villa then made 
 a flying movement to San Pedro where he met the federals under 
 General Miaas, de Mbure, Garcia Hidalgo and Argumedo which 
 were coming to the relief of Torreon. This engagement was a 
 very fierce one but General Villa succeeded in defeating the 
 entire command. Velasco ia the meantime having joined the 
 others from Viesca, arrived only on time to cover the retreat to 
 Saltillo. Villa at once began preparations for a campaign against 
 Saltillo. 
 
234 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 They destroyed any forces tliat opposed them, but in most 
 cases the government forces deserted the towns at the approach 
 of the rebels. General Htierta, as I have said, did his best to 
 suppress the revolution. Hie appointed military governors, he 
 waged merciless war, and ordered a relentless persecution of all 
 those who had refused to recognize his government. By follow- 
 ing such a course, he succeeded in recapturing Campeche and 
 Morelos, the city of Zacatecas, Saltillo and Torreon and finally 
 the mountains of Puebla; but thus far he has been unable to 
 reestablish peace. In fact, he cannot reesitablish it anywhere. 
 The country has never had confidence in him and public opinion 
 is against him. Only fear prevents public demonstrations, but 
 the whole country is anxiously hoping for his downfall. His 
 conduct both public and private does not inspire confidence. 
 
 He expects to remain in power by force, but impossible! 
 The people will reclaim their rights and will as soon as po^ible 
 work his downfall from a position which has been no less a dis- 
 grace to Mexico than an affront to civilization. He has suc- 
 ceeded in inspiring terror, but this will not enable him to con- 
 solidate his gov3nimeut. The dissolution of Congress should 
 have caused his downfall, but the Congress which he dissolved 
 had completely lost prestige with the public. In fact, the coun- 
 try was indifferent to what the President did with a Congress 
 which had never been in its good graces. From the very begin- 
 ning the 26th Congress was unworthy. By exasperating injus- 
 tice, by frauds, and by violence, at the time of the inauguration, 
 it forfeited the good will of the public; but its cowardly atti- 
 tude in the course of subsequent events gained for it the abso- 
 lute contempt of the people. Impassibly it witnessed the death 
 of General Ruiz, a congressman whom the Madero government 
 executed; later it impassibly witnessed the assassination of Mr. 
 Gustavo Madero, a prominent member of the House of Repre- 
 sentatives and one to whom many of its members owed their 
 position. It also had a hand in the downfall of IMIadero's govern- 
 ment since it accepted the resignation of two prisoners whose 
 signature had been obtained by threats of death. Furthermore, 
 it accepted Huerta as President of the Republic, it allowed him 
 to take the oath, and authorized him' to squander the national 
 funds. All these acts were opposed only by an insignificant mi- 
 nority. It did not take the slightest action nor did it offer the 
 slightest protest against the assassination of the President and 
 
HHE C'ONSTITUCIONALISTA RE'VOLUTTON 235 
 
 the Vice President. Besides countenancing all these things, 
 ait the beginning of the first period of the second year of its 
 office, it watched unmoved the murder of Serapio Rendon, at 
 that time a member of Congress. When the assassination of 
 Senator Dominguez took place, Congress made a pathetic at- 
 tempt to take a dignified attitude, but only succeeded in assum- 
 ing a ridiculous and foolish one. To threaten a government like 
 that of Huerta is the height of folly. The motions passed by the 
 House of Representatives on October 9th, showed more than folly, 
 they showed flagrant cowardice, because by them the House 
 proved that it was conscious of its duties but at the same time 
 afraid to accuse those who were in power and to whom it at- 
 tributed all the crimes which it censured. In that frame of mind, 
 it adopted a middle course which placed it in a very absurd 
 position. 
 
 General Huerta soon tired of its impertinences and decid- 
 ed to dissolve a congress which had caused so much scandal and 
 had done so little good to the country.* This is the only one of 
 his crimes which is at all pardonable. It was a terrible dilemma 
 to G^eneral Huerta since he either had to dissolve Congress or 
 allow Congress to do away with him, and with the country also 
 for that matter. It is a fact that the struggles between Huerta 
 and Congress did not do him much harm, but they were sapping 
 the very strength of the country and reducing it to a deplorable 
 condition. For the most part, the House denied Huerta noth- 
 ing ; it pleased him in every thing, but when it finally rose against 
 him, Huerta did what every slave driver does to a slave who 
 mutinies — he punished it. 
 
 The dissolution of Congress caused General Huerta small 
 worry, in fact the very night that the members were carried by 
 the police to the Penitentiary, the President with his Secretaries 
 of the Interior, of Development, of Communications, and of 
 Public Instruction, was calmly dining ait Bach's public restau- 
 rant. General Huerta was certainly daring. The Congressmen 
 attempted to incite the people to revolt, but they had no followers. 
 The same thing has happened on previous occasions, when tiie 
 government followed a similar course, but heretofore such a 
 measure has always in the long run proved fatal to those who 
 have adopted it. On October 31st, 1822, Iturbide dissolved Con- 
 
 *Not a single resolution of the 26th Congress can be con- 
 sidered to the welfare of the Nation. 
 
236 FROM DESPOTISIM TO ANARJCHY 
 
 gress in the same way, and on March 19th of the following year 
 he was forced to abdicate. On November 29th, 1844, Canalize 
 by order of Santana dissolved Congress, and Santana was forced 
 to retire on December 6th of the same year. Mr. Jnan Bautista 
 Ceballos dissolved Congress on January 19th, 1853 and was over- 
 thrown on February 7th. History has repeated itself. The 
 congressmen of those days also called on the people for support, 
 but the people answered with the same scorn as now. The cause 
 of this is that these Congresses have never appealed to the public 
 ideals nor have they ever in reality represented the people. 
 
 Constitutional order in Mexico was upset completely from 
 the very moment that the Military Commander of the City, with- 
 out authority and without legal right, seized the President and 
 Vice President, and usurped power. Unquestionably he had no 
 legal right for such action since Congress had not previously 
 passed judgment convicting Madero and Pino Suarez. Accord- 
 ing to the Mexican Constitution, the farce enacted later can in 
 no way make Hkierta legitimate President or give legality to 
 his acts. 
 
 Covernors Carranza and Pesqueira's attitude ought to have 
 been imitated by the governors of all the states, but, in truth, many 
 of them were unable to follow the same course because they were 
 obliged by force to abandon their offices. There were those, how- 
 ever, who did prefer to keep their places, regardless of the situa- 
 tion in Mexico. 
 
 The revolt took great impetus in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, So- 
 nera, Durango, and Zacatecas, but Mr. Carranza was unable to 
 keep Coahuila because General Huerta reinforced his own forces 
 strongly. The chief of the revolution was obliged to move through 
 Durango to Sonora where the local chief Mr. Alvaro Obregon had 
 succeeded in organizing his forces and kept out H^uerta's troops. 
 In this State Mr. Carranza established the capital of the Republic, 
 proclaiming against General Huerta and his supporters the very 
 decree issued on January 25th, 1862 by Juarez when he was forced 
 to defend the Nation from foreign invasion. In view of the atti- 
 tude assumed by the American government, General Huerta tried 
 to arouse public sentiment by representing himself as the zealous 
 defender of national autonomy. He thought in this way to 
 strengthen his power. When he began to enact this new farce, Car- 
 ranza sent him the following telegram, which, although supposed 
 to be secret, circulated quite freely throughout Mexico. 
 
THE CONSTITUCIOiNALISiTA REVOiLUTTON 237 
 
 "Piedras Negras, Coahuila, July 15(th, 1913. 
 
 "Ex-General Victoriano Huerta, National Palace, Mexico, D. F. 
 
 ' ' I am informed anti-'Aimerican demonstraJtions your own idea 
 as last resort to retain usurped power in the name of the Mexi- 
 can people which in the majority are Constitutionalist, I protesit 
 against your infamous manipulations and those of your fol- 
 lowers, that would throw us into an unlooked for conflict, re- 
 serving for a more opportune moment my rights to fix upon 
 you the responsibility of this new treason. 
 
 "V. Oarranza. " 
 In Sonora, Mr. Carranza has tried to organize a government 
 with the best resources at hand. Revolutionists cannot pick 
 and choose their people. They have to take all classes that are 
 willing to help them; they cannot even do justice to their own 
 war cry,* therefore, their hardest task after triumph, is to purge 
 the triumphant elements so as to keep only the most able and 
 honest men ito aid in the reconstruction of the administrative 
 system. 
 
 Will the Chief be able to control all the elements which are 
 actually helping him to overthrow General Hhierta? Will he be 
 able if he is victorious, to form a government that will inspire 
 confidence, that will permit those who are willing to lend their 
 services towards its consolidation, at the same time that it en- 
 courages the laboring classes to resume their labors, so that to- 
 gether, all may undertake the work of National reconstruction? 
 
 Such are the tremendous questions which come to the mind 
 of those who love their country. All we wish is to see it come 
 back to that life formerly enjoyed. 
 
 *One of the strange features to be noted is that the Consti- 
 tutionalist revolution shouts "Mueran los Cientificos ! " (Death 
 to the Cientificos) and yet among the men of the Ciudadela, who 
 overthrew and killed Madero, there was not a single " Cientif ico. " 
 As a matter of fact, the revolution of February 1913 was the work 
 of the "Reyistas" and " Felicistas, " both the sworn enemies of 
 the ' ' Cientificos. ' ' As regards the Government of General Huer- 
 ta, it has not had the support of any of the prominent men of the 
 "Cientificos" many of whom have had to leave the country to 
 save themselves from assassination. Those who remain in Miexico 
 have stayed only through lack of means to leave the country. 
 The most prominent ministers of Huerta, Mondragon, Reyes, 
 Garza Aldape, Portillo y Rojas, Moheno, have always been the 
 declared enemies of the "Cientificos." 
 
238 FROM DESPCTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 General Huerta's government is condemned by moral senti- 
 ment, by law, and by patriotism. General Huerta is not qualified 
 to be the ruler of a civilized people; to support him now would 
 be a crime. We could have pardoned his treason and his crimes, 
 if their perpetration had brought some benefit to the country; 
 it he had by them concentrated all his energies to direct the 
 country through channels of labor and morality. But his im- 
 moral life, his political ambitions, his actions of an ignorant 
 soldier, his primitive and ferocious passions, do not inspire us 
 with the hope that he will do any good to the country. We must, 
 therefore, give our support to his overthrow; we must, disinter- 
 estedly, aid the government of the triumphant revolution, regard- 
 less of previous convictions and of our former opinions concerning 
 revolutionary methods. To support the Hfuerta government 
 would be a crime, but it would be no less a crime to desert the men 
 who has taken up arms against his despotism. If the new head of 
 the Nation lacks experience and knowledge, let us all join in lend- 
 ing him our experience, and our knowledge, slight as these may 
 be, to aid the work of reconstruction in our countiy. 
 
 Thus when the time comes for separating the wheat from the 
 chaff, it may be that we can form a government just and serene; 
 a government free from rancour or radicalism, which may save 
 the nation in the present terrible crisis. 
 
 If, contrary to expectations, the new government is urged for- 
 ward by the revolutionary current towards an abyss, let us warn 
 him, let us clearly make him see his danger, let us raise our voices 
 and make ourselves heard. Then if we are ultimately vanquished 
 in this awful national catastrophe, Ave shall at least have the con- 
 solation that we have performed our duty. 
 
CHAPTER XXXV. 
 THE KING AMUSES HIMSELF. 
 
 General Huerta, as I have stated throughout this work, ever 
 since the Battle of Bachimba had been seeking a means of as- 
 cending to power, and Madero 's government gave him the oppor- 
 tunity by again putting him in command of the troops, a com- 
 mand that had been taken from him for the very reason that 
 they had no trust in him. From the moment that General Huerta 
 was named Military Connnander of the City to fill General Vil- 
 lar's place, all of us who had followed closely the political events, 
 judged that Huerta would take control of affairs. Only Felix 
 Diaz and his friends could place any faith in the compact of the 
 Embassy and believe that a man lik© HHierta was going to betray 
 the President, carry the stain of traitor, and later that of mur- 
 derer before the whole civilized world, so that Mr. Felix Diaz 
 or any other person, other than himself, should obtain the Presi- 
 dency. When the compact had been entered into at the Ameri- 
 can Embassy, and when public opinion, which condones every- 
 thing but foolishness, had condemned the rebels of the Ciudadela, 
 Mr. Felix Diaz and his friends urged Huerta to hasten the call 
 for the presidential elections. Hherta with the cunning which 
 is his characteristic trait, let affairs drag along, until finally, 
 not wishing further to delay the definite solution of matters, 
 he decided to issue a proclamation for an election. 
 
 Felix Diaz and his friends were meantime seeking a Vice 
 President who by his prestige might help the work which they had 
 begun. They decided on Mr. Francisco de la Barra, who was 
 expected to carry the Catholic party by his personal prestige 
 which they still believed as great as when he had become pro- 
 visional president on the fall of General Porfirio Diaz. M^r. 
 de la Barra accepted at first, but finding that his prestige was 
 not the same, and that the Catholics did not accept him uncon- 
 ditionally, or perhaps guessing General Htuerta's intentions, he 
 
 (239) 
 
240 FROM DESPOTISM TO AINABCHY 
 
 withdrew his name. Again the Felicistas had to seek a candi- 
 date who would help Felix Diaz with the burden he had taken 
 upon himself. Various candidates arose in the Central Com- 
 mittee which was the only one that busied itself with the matter. 
 Among the important ones were the noted lawyer, Senator 
 Gumesindo Enriquez, a dignified man of conunon sense and an 
 experienced politician, and Mr. Jose Luis Requena, a man of 
 great intelligence, a lawyer who has never practised. He had 
 never engaged in active politics, but he was a millionaire who 
 could defray the urgent expenditures that had to be made. The 
 Felicistas decided upon Mir. Requena, and the Diaz-Requena 
 combination was the one favored by the rebels of the Ciudadela. 
 
 General Huerta, who was watching the electoral work in 
 order to see how he could carry out his deliberate plan of not 
 leaving his post, decided that he ought to urge the Catholic party 
 to take an active participation in the campaign and nominate 
 candidates other than those backed by the Felicistas. Thus, 
 he reasoned, by dividing the votes, neither party would obtain a 
 majority and the elections would be declared void. The Catho- 
 lic party which, since its re-entry into the political arena of the 
 country has played a part greatly lacking in dignity, lent itself 
 to everything and nominated the Gamboa-Rascon combination.* 
 
 Mir. Gamboa is a good man and an excellent ^vriter, but he 
 has never taken any part in- political affairs, has no renown in 
 the country, does not know men nor is he himself known, ex- 
 cept as a writer. Hlis position as Secretary of State gave him 
 the opportunity to write his message in answer to the one taken 
 to Mexico by Mr. John Lind, and his decided stand against the 
 demands of the American government gave him a popularity 
 which nevertheless was not solid and could not carry him through 
 a real election. Huerta realized this and it was he himself who 
 told the Catholic party that they ought to nominate Mr. Gamboa. 
 The same was the ease with General Rascon, a worthy soldier, 
 of very little civil ability, and well advanced in years. Neither 
 
 *At the time this book is going to press, I read that Huerta 
 has treated the Catholic party as he did the Felicistas and the 
 House of Representaltives, just as bartenders do with lemons; 
 squeeze them dry and then throw them aside. He has just had 
 the President of the Catholic party imprisoned in the Fortress 
 of Ulua. 
 
THE KINiG AMUSES HIMSELF 241 
 
 of the two candidates could win the election, but General Huerta, 
 to be even more secure, made Mr. Manuel Calero come forward 
 as the candidate of the Liberal Party, fearing then that the 
 Catholic party was going to win the election. Mr. Calero, too, 
 is not popular, in the country at large or among the intellectual 
 element. Hjowever much his talent and political knowledge 
 may be granted, no one has any trust in him and ihe frightens 
 many on account of his boundless ambition. In order to com- 
 plete the list of the Liberal Party, General Huerta himself in- 
 sinuated the advantage of naming Mr. Jesus Flores Miagon whom 
 I have already described elsewhere. Thus the administration 
 counted upon drawing from the resources of Mr. Felix Diaz 
 and making the latter lose the election. In order to encourage 
 the candidates. General Huerta used to send for them to congrat- 
 ulate them on account of the nomination, hinting that the ad- 
 ministration would back them, indirectly, because it had to ap- 
 pear neutral in the struggle. 
 
 He also called for the anti-relectionists to take a part in the 
 farce he was getting ready and had them nominate David de la 
 Fuente and Dr. Vazquez Gomez as Liberal candidates in opposition 
 to Messrs. Calero and Flores Magon, and to Felix Diaz. Thus 
 through the month of O'ctober and part of September did Gen- 
 eral Huerta amuse himself. But at the moment of the elections, 
 fearful that the game might go against his plans, he decided 
 to be more energetic, and the Military Commanders received 
 decided orders to have the election result in favor of General 
 Huerta for President and General Aiureliano Blanquete for Vice 
 President, although neither of the two had presented himself 
 as a candidate, nor had been nominated by any party. However, 
 General Hfuerta continued to protest that he would fulfil his 
 obligations like the good soldier that he was and would respect 
 the popular vote. As an added measure of mockery to the can- 
 didates, he made them meet at the Palace shortly before the 
 election to make them sign a paper to the effect that they would 
 respect the outcome of the election whatever it might be. They 
 were all present at this meeting except M^r. Felix Diaz who was 
 away and who had been the one most flouted in the jest. In 
 fact, shortly after the election had been called, Mr. Felix Diaz 
 had been sent as special envoy to Japan and he had been forced 
 to depart almost without taking leave of any one. Of course, 
 in ihis appointment it was stated that the government hoped he 
 
242 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCHY 
 
 would fulfil his mission before the day of the elections so that he 
 might return to the country in time to carry out his political 
 engagements. Mr. Felix Diaz, who had re-entered the army 
 and had been advanced to the rank of General of Brigade, had 
 to start immediately for Japan with the members of the Embassy 
 but no sooner had he embarked at Salina Cruz than it became 
 known that the Mikado would be unable to see him until the 
 middle of October for the latter was on his summer vacation. 
 "When Mr. Diaz arrived in California, he was tihe target of an 
 inimical demonstration planned by the expatriated Mexicans 
 who lived in that American State. The Miexiean government 
 ordered him to Canada and from Vancouver he was ordered 
 to Europe via the Dominion of Canada. When in Europe, on 
 the eve of the election, he was relieved of his mission and per- 
 mitted to return to Mexico.* Mr. Diaz took the first steamer 
 back to his country. In Havana, he was met by friends who had 
 come as members of the felicista party, and by others sent by 
 General Huerta to intimidate him and keep him from the coun- 
 try. It was considered best to land at Tampico rather than in 
 Vera Cruz, but Mr. Diaz, giving a proof of energy and decision, 
 heeded no one and continued his voyage on the German ship 
 towards Vera Cruz. U^pon their arrival there, the members of 
 the Embassy who had accompanied Diaz, were taken into cus- 
 tody, conducted aboard the gunboat Zaragoza and sent to Ha- 
 vana to resume their journey. It was claimed that they had 
 returned to the country without the permission of the govern- 
 ment, for the telegram to Mr. Diaz authorized the return of the 
 latter only and not that of his friends who accompanied him. 
 When they arrived at Havana, they were all dismissed from 
 office and nearly all returned to Vera Cruz. Upon their sec- 
 ond arrival at this port, those who were army men were taken 
 charge of by the military authorities, and some, like Mr. Fiden- 
 cio Hernandez, were taken into custody under charges of having 
 tried to cause a mutiny among the sailors of the ship that had 
 taken them to Havana. 
 
 *Huerta always distrusted, feared that Mr. Felix Diaz, in 
 spite of the orders of the government, would return to Mexico, 
 and with that audacious step could increase his opportunities; 
 then he preferred to allow him to return at once and watch over 
 him in Mexico. 
 
THE KING AIMUSES HIMSELI^ 243 
 
 General Felix Diaz remained in Vera Cruz, bnt the govern- 
 ment sent Mr. Antonio Villa-vicencio* at the head of a number 
 of detectives to watch him. As there was bitter enmity between 
 General Diaz and Mr. Villa-vicencio, to the degree that when 
 the former (had triumphed at the Ciudadela orders had been 
 given that the latter be shot at sight, General Diaz believed that 
 the object of the police was to shoot him. He prudently moved 
 his quarters to the German Hotel which borders in the rear to 
 the house occupied by the United States Consulate. Villa-vicen- 
 cio ordered his people to surround the block and the whole square 
 was consequently guarded by detectives. In addition to this 
 policing, a rumor was circulated around Vera Cruz to the effect 
 that tlhe Felicistas had prepared a riot in order to attack the 
 crew of the German warship anchored in the bay and thus bring 
 more trouble on the government. These facts served to in- 
 crease General Diaz' suspicions of a possible attempt against 
 his life. 
 
 On the nigiht of Saturday, the 25th, and Sunday the 26th, 
 squads of Rurales patrolled the streets of Vera Cruz, thus show- 
 ing that the government believed there really was a plot afoot. 
 "Whether due to this or to other reasons, the fact is that on the 
 night of Monday the 27th, Diaz passed by way of the roof from 
 the German Hotel to the American Consulate. From there, 
 accompanied by Messrs. Bonales Sandoval and Ocon, and by 
 two American Naval officers, he went hurriedly to the wharf 
 that is in front of the American Consulate and boarded a launch 
 of Rear Admiral Fletcher's fleet that took him to the "Whitley, 
 which was andhored in the Bay. On the following day he was 
 transferred to one of the cruisers that were outside the bay and 
 one of these transferred him at sea to the American steamer Es- 
 peranza when the latter sailed from Progreso on the 2nd of Dec- 
 ember. On the eve of the election. General Diaz had again ob- 
 tained his retirement from the Federal army. Meanwhile, the 
 elections took place. In Vera Cruz, where I was at the time, 
 very few went to the poUs, but a Captain in the army took to one 
 of the booths the ballots corresponding to all the garrison in the 
 city, all of them in favor of General Huerta for President, and 
 General Blanquete for Vice President. One of the Felicistas 
 
 * Chief of the detective force when Felix Diaz was Police 
 Commissioner, 
 
244 FEiOM DESPOTISM TO ANARiCHiY 
 
 wis'lied to protest against this as a flagrant violation: of the law, 
 and had the weird idea of making Mr. Alcolea, brother-in-law of 
 Felix Diaz, the notary to give testimony to the fact. The police 
 arrested the partisan who protested and the Notary before whom 
 he was to swear to the statement, and sent them both to IMlexieo 
 City charged with sedition. 
 
 In Havana, Mr. Felix Diaz met with another misfortune. 
 One night, on the "Malecon," a dispute arose between the group 
 in which he found himself, and another group of expatriated 
 Mexicans, who claimed to be Maderistas or revolutionists. As 
 a result of this dispute, Mr. Pedro Guerrero Mtendez, a young 
 man, native of Michoacan, an ardent partisan of Madero, was 
 wounded by a firearm. When the police examined the parties 
 concerned, no firearms were found upon any of them. Never- 
 theless, a lady who claimed to have seen the whole affair, ac- 
 cused Mr. Felix Diaz as the assailant of Guerrero Miendez, and 
 Mr. Diaz was taken prisoner but released on bail upon the fol- 
 lowing day to await the trial. 
 
 General Htierta, in the meantime, had convened the new 
 Congress, and this had declared the election null and void be- 
 cause it did not conform with the legal requisites, and because 
 the majority of votes had been cast for Hnerta who was not a 
 candidate. This latter point was contrary to the express text 
 of the Constitution, a fact that could not in any way be coun- 
 tenanced by so ardent a champion of the Constitution as Gen- 
 eral Huerta. At the same time the Huertista Congress declared 
 that as the election was null and void, General Hhaerta should 
 continue in office until such a time as a legal election could 
 be held. 
 
CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 AMERICAN POLICY. 
 
 In the whole of our conflict since the revolution began, that 
 is, since the end of 1910, the policy of the United States Grovem- 
 ment has played an important part, but the policy of the govern- 
 ment of the State of Texas has played even a greater part. 
 
 The State of Texas, particularly its cities of San Antonio 
 and El Paso, has been the incubator of the last three Mexican 
 revolutions. I wish to point out this fact and to lay stress on 
 it because since peace in Mexico is of interest to Americans, they 
 should begin by taking measures to prevent further conspiracies 
 at home against the peace of their neighbor. There have been 
 two chief incentives to foment revolutionary movements in Mexi- 
 co. The fever for business, which has no limit with some mer- 
 chants who seek profit wherever it can be secured, regardless of 
 the means employed for obtaining it; and the protection which 
 men of doubtful character find in all movements of disorder. 
 
 For instance, under cover of the revolutionary movements, 
 cattle stealing on a large scale has been frequent. In the majority 
 of cases, the authorities have been powerless to punish the guilty 
 parties. Special legislation on the sale of cattle at the border 
 would probably prevent the repetition of the evil. 
 
 Regarding the second question, the United States Govern- 
 ment is already taking steps to revise the neutrality laws so as 
 to authorize the federal authorities to punish violations more 
 severely, and especially, to empower them to prevent: the execu- 
 tion of acts of rebellion hatched north of the Rio Grande. 
 
 As I have related in different chapters of this book the 
 spectre of intervention, which strikes terror to all Mexican poli- 
 ticians of whatever party, was conjured up by Ambassador Henry 
 Lane Wilson ever since the time of General Diaz, whose downfall 
 it powerfully aided. Later, it was used against Madero with 
 greater force. Huerta is the only one against whom it has not 
 
 (245) 
 
246 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAEOHlY 
 
 been employed, either because Ambassador Wilson was early re- 
 called or because the new American administration soon under- 
 stood that EPuerta wished to be threatened, hoping by that means 
 to consolidate his power.* 
 
 From the beginning of his administration, President Wil- 
 son outlined his policy against usurpation perfectly, and has con- 
 stantly adhered to it. TTie just attitude of the President of the 
 American Union is unassailable both morally and legally. 
 
 President Woodrow Wilson has refused to recognize the 
 government of General Huerta so as not to establish the pre- 
 cedent that governments established by force and through trea- 
 chery, are to be considered legitimate. M]r. Wilson justly denies 
 the theory that he has no right to question the means by which 
 an individual seizes the power. Such theories, as that of the 
 legality of Huerta 's government, are worthy of shysters but 
 not of conscientious people. In refusing to recognize the govern- 
 ment of General Huerta, the President of the United States has 
 made use of an indisputable right of the American nation, for 
 it is inherent to its sovereignty to decide with whom it should 
 have friendly relations without having to declare whether that 
 government is legitimate or not; in other words, whether an 
 official has complied with his particular constitution so as to 
 
 *The propositions presented to the American Government 
 by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson for the pacification of Mexico were 
 published in the New York Herald of November 16th, 1913. It 
 was proposed to authorize American intervention to the 26th 
 parallel of latitude, beginning at Topolobampo, State of Sinaloa, 
 and ending at Mlatamoros, State of T'amaulipas. This would 
 result in the military occupation by the United States of the 
 States of Sonora, Chihuahua, and a large part of Coahuila, Nuevo 
 Leon and Lower California. Besides, Mexico was to relinquish 
 all claims relating to the Chamizal, give up all share in the waters 
 of the Colorado River, pay the claims that might be made against 
 it; and express the wish and possibility of holding regular elec- 
 tions immediately. Did Mr. Wilson submit these propositions in 
 accordance with a previous agreement with Huerta? Tliis is 
 quite probable, because Mr. Wilson has been continuously advo- 
 cating Huerta 's fitness to govern Mexico; besides the latter 's tele- 
 gram to Mr. Henry Lane Wilson thanking him for his work, gives 
 peculiar weight to this assumption. The telegram is dated August 
 5th, that is, inunediately after Mr. Wilson's dismissal on August 
 4th, when President Woodrow Wilson rejected the Ambassador's 
 propositions. 
 
AMEiRICAN POLICY 247 
 
 represent the Nation legitimately. The American Government 
 refuses to enter into friendly relations with the government 
 of General Hnerta for the same reasons that a merchant might 
 refuse to do business with a given house without implying any- 
 thing else than the exercise of an unquestionable right. 
 
 The American Government has been harassed by two par- 
 ties clamoring for directly opposite courses of action in MIexico. 
 On the one hand, it was asked to recognize the H'uerta govern- 
 ment, and on the other, to intervene in the affairs of ]\fexico, 
 manu militari, and to impose peace by force of arms. Either 
 would be a capital mistake. Armed intervention^ is condemned 
 by the policy which the American Government has followed for 
 a century. 
 
 John Adams, on November 18, 1782, maintained that the 
 American people should not intervene in the affairs of others, 
 and therefore, would not concede to anyone the right to intervene 
 in the affairs of the United States. 
 
 Washington maintained the same principles in his procla- 
 mation of April 22, 1793, and particularly recommended them 
 in his "Farewell Address" of September 1796. Jefferson also 
 upheld them on March 12, 1793, and again recommended the 
 same policy on June 30 of the same year. 
 
 MJacon, member of the Senate Committee of Foreign Af- 
 fairs, said on January 16, 1826: "The true interest of the 
 United States was supposed to be promoted by avoiding all en- 
 tangling connections with any other nations whatsoever. ' ' 
 
 Secretary of State Clay said on January 30, 1828: "The 
 government of the United States scrupulously refrains from 
 taking part in the internal dissensions in foreign states whether 
 in the Old World or the New." 
 
 President Van Buren expressed the same views on June 9, 
 1829, and Secretary of State Forsyth on November 11, 1834 
 addressed a note to the American Minister in Mexico on the 
 same subject. Webster, as Secretary of State, on January 29, 
 1842, also referred to this matter in the same terms. President 
 Fillmore on December 2nd, 1851, said : "Let every people choose 
 for itself and make and alter its political institutions to suit its 
 own condition and convenience." 
 
 On December 28, 1855, referring to a controversy with Tur- 
 key about a man who had been condemned to death for changing 
 his religion, Secretary of State Marcy declared that intervention 
 
248 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANARCKY 
 
 could not be justified in spite of the absurdity and inhumanity 
 of such a sentence. 
 
 On account of the occurrences in JVHexico, Secretary of 
 State, General Cass, in a note dated March Tth, 1859, to j\Ir. 
 McLane, the representative of the United States near the go- 
 vernment of Juarez, maintained the policy of non-intervention 
 in spite of the fact that President Buchanan himself desired 
 to intervene having gone so far as to ask authority to do so, 
 which was refused by Congress. Later the United States had 
 their Department of State in charge of that great statesman 
 whose name must always be mentioned with respect, Mir. Seward. 
 I must cite his notes of November 5, 1861 ; June 23 ; November 
 22; and December 14, 1862, and his circular of November 30 of 
 the same year, addressed to the Diplomatic Agents of the Uni- 
 ted States, in which he denies to the European powers any right 
 of intervention ; for at that time, in the name of humanity, they 
 were pretending to meddle with the gigantic struggle of the 
 American people. 
 
 The importunities of the European powers, chiefly France, 
 who wished to re-establish peace in the United States, and to 
 force the government to come to an understanding with the re- 
 bels, obliged the American Congress to pass a joint resolution, 
 which Mi:". Seward published on Miarch 9, 1863 and contains 
 
 the following paragraph: '^....„ In order to remove all chance 
 
 of misunderstanding on the subject and to secure for the United 
 States the full enjoyment of that freedom from foreign inter- 
 ference which is one of the highest rights of independence for 
 Congress to declare its conviction on the subject." 
 
 Finally when things reached a critical point, Mr. Seward 
 made a definite declaration which sums up the policy of the 
 United States without leaving room for the slighest doubt. It 
 is dated June 30, 1864 and in it, Mir. Seward says that "the 
 principles of foreign mediation in our affairs can not be in 
 any form or under any circumstances, admitted." 
 
 Mr. Fish, Secretary of State in the administration of Gen- 
 eral Grant, maintained the same thesis and ratified it on I\Iarch 
 26, 1873. 
 
 On April 15, 1885, Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State in 
 President Cleveland's administration, referring to the protec- 
 tion due to Americans residing in foreign countries, denied the 
 right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of a eoun- 
 
AMERICAN POLICY 249 
 
 try for the purpose of guaranteeing tlie peaceful enjoyment 
 of their property to Americans who found themselves endanger- 
 ed by civil war. Secretary Biayard declared that "generally 
 speaking, persons who quit the shelter of their own flag to take 
 up a voluntary residence in a foreign land do so at their own 
 risk and subject to the vicissitudes of foreign invasion or dom- 
 estic insurrection in the country where they cast their lot in 
 common with the natives thereof." 
 
 Secretary of State Day on September 16, 1898, and Presi- 
 dent McKinley on December 5, 1899, were even more explicit. 
 
 Lastly, on December 6, 1904, the man who has been consid- 
 ered in these times the champion of a strong foreign policy by 
 the United States, the famous originator of the "big stick pol- 
 icy," Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, said: "Ordinarily it is very 
 much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with 
 striving for our moral and material betterment here at home 
 than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of 
 things in other nations. ' ' 
 
 The foregoing citations clearly show that the policy of the 
 United States, inspired by a high sentiment of j;ustice and love 
 of country, has never tolerated the interference of any nation 
 in the interior affairs of the country, and at the same time, 
 applying the rule to other nations, has not interfered in their 
 interior conflicts. 
 
 This has been the policy not only of its statesmen, who 
 have held executive power, but also of the Congress of the Uni- 
 ted States, which has continuously refused to give authority for 
 such interventions. 
 
 After the revolution of Ayutla, when we had the revolt of 
 Tacubaya with the dictatorship of Miramon, President Bucha- 
 nan very insistently asked for authority to intervene in Mexican 
 affairs and expel Miramon from the Capital. President Bucha- 
 nan desired to impress the American Senate with his message of 
 December 19, 1859, but did not succeed. A year later, on 
 account of the assassination of Crabb and his companions in 
 Sonora, and of the murders by Mlarquez in Tacubaya on April 
 11, President Buchanan insisted with the American Congress for 
 authority to intervene in Mtexican affairs. Congress again re- 
 fused; it went even further, it refused to ratify the treaty Mc- 
 Lane-Ocampo, which authorized the American Government to 
 protect traffic in the Isthmus of TIehuantepec with the forces 
 
250 FBOM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 of the United States, and. it refused because "the people of the 
 United States ought not to meddle in the interior conflicts of 
 any nation, ' ' 
 
 This policy was continually maintained by the United States 
 during its own civil war in which some excesses were conunitted, 
 excesses inevitable in fratricidal wars. Then, as now in Mexico, 
 property suffered damages, because Sherman's famous march to 
 the sea, begun November 16th. 1864, was a devastation lasting 
 five weeks. The commander of the Union army, under the exi- 
 gency of war, destroyed everything in his path, without stopping 
 to inquire its value or who were the OT^ners. 
 
 The government of General Huerta has entreatingly com- 
 plained that it has been unable to restore peace, because the 
 American Government has not recognized it. Did General Diaz 
 in 1876 need this recog-nition when he entered the capital of the 
 Eepublic after his victory at the battle of Teeoac? No. The 
 need of it, which General Huerta proclaims, simply shows his 
 own weakness. Strong governments, when supported by the 
 nation thej'- govern, need nobody's recognition. Foreign nations, 
 on seeing them well established, recognize them in their ovm in- 
 terests no matter what grievances they may have had previously. 
 Spain, Catholic Spain, had seen Juarez expel from Mexican ter- 
 ritory the Spanish Ambassador Pacheco, and Clementi, the Nuncio 
 of his Holiness, but all that did not prevent Spain from recog- 
 nizing Juarez when once she saw him solidly established. France, 
 whose soldiers had fought against General Diaz, and Austria. 
 which had seen the brother of its own Emperor shot in Mexico 
 by the party for which Diaz fought, recognized his government 
 and entered into diplomatic relations when they saw that the 
 former republican soldier had constituted a real government. 
 But as regards General Huerta, he does not possess the necessary 
 qualifications to render him capable of establishing a real govern- 
 ment, nor does he enjoy the support of the truly representative 
 and thoughtful men who could guarantee the proper execution 
 of the law and the sway of justice. He has at his side men of 
 undoubted intelligence, but of no weight to the countiy or even 
 to the mind of General Huerta himself, who listens to them 
 only so long as they flatter his passions or do not oppose his 
 wishes. 
 
 The representatives of European nations gave their respec- 
 tive governments favorable reports of General Huerta because 
 
AMERICAN POLICY 251 
 
 they only saw in him a bold soldier, and believed that in reestab- 
 lishing order he would continue to show the same energy that 
 he had used to grasp power. But they failed to apprehend the 
 true character of General II*uerta and to gauge correctly the 
 medium where the events were taking place. 
 
 President Wilson, however, fully realized both, not because 
 his Ambassador faithfully informed him of what occurred, but 
 because the nearness to the theater of events, the large current 
 of communications and the ease of transportation allowed him 
 to receive quickly all the details needed to decide his line of 
 conduct. This has tended to conserve peace between the two 
 nations, which should always be friendly since their political 
 ideals are the same and their mutual interests closely bound. 
 
 Some may complain that we have now been for three years 
 in a state of civil war. This is quite true, but most nations have 
 passed through similar crises before becoming permanently con- 
 stituted. To enjoy the public liberties which so distinguish her, 
 England had to go through the direful period from the end of 
 the 13th centu.ry to the beginning of the 14th; through the civil 
 war of the Koses, and lastly through the period from 1648 to 
 1658 which made Cromwell immortal. Besides, England had 
 as a powerful auxiliary the Oine Hlundred Yiears' War, which, 
 like all foreign wars, served it admirably to consolidate its re- 
 sources. 
 
 To reach the present Riepublie, and not considering the con- 
 tests prior to Louis XI, France had to pass the revolutionary 
 period at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 
 19th, one of the most imposing revolutions registered in history, 
 and it was only after the commotions of 1830 and 1848 and par- 
 ticularly after the great catastrophe of 1870-71 that the country 
 succeeded in reorganizing itself. 
 
 Spain has a revolutionary period which covers nearly all 
 its history, but in its last stage, it took seven years to enable it 
 to constitute a monarchy under the scepter of the present 
 Bourbons. 
 
 The United States have been more fortunate because they 
 came into being differently from other nations. When the Bri- 
 tish Empire was consolidated in America and the Colonies began 
 to be formed m 1664, later to be the nucleus of this great nation, 
 the great English crisis had passed and the head of Charles I 
 had already fallen, carrying with it all future pretensions to 
 
252 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAEjCHY 
 
 tyrannize the English people. With all these lessons in mind 
 the Pilgrims of the Mayflower arrived in America. 
 
 All nations cannot be judged similarly. It is essential to 
 study their history and the elements of which they are formed. 
 Italy has been unified by its defeats. Turkey has been ruined by 
 its victories. How long did that Holy Roman Empire last, 
 which appeared so vigorous at the coronation of Charlemagne 
 by the Pope on Christmas night of the year 800 ? Only the life- 
 time of its founder. 
 
 Why did Austria lose its predominance in Germany? On 
 account of its civil wars, yet if we turn to Japan we find that 
 it has risen to its present high position because of its civil wars. 
 
 It is true we have had three consecutive revolutions. We 
 are now at the crisis. Our enemies say that there is not a single 
 man visible with sufficient authority to control the situation. 
 That is exactly what the allied nations said in 1861 at the dis- 
 cussions of the treaty of London, and yet Juarez demonstrated 
 with facts that he did have the requisite authority to form a 
 government in the country. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 The contemporaneous history of our country reminds us 
 forcibly of another epoch, also disastrous to the life of our nation. 
 Then, as to day, it was necessary to struggle with the natural 
 reaction which, after a military revolt, took possession of power. 
 Then the populace was victorious in the long run, and the mili- 
 tary dictatorship of Santa Ana first, and that of IVTiramon second, 
 both backed by a strong and invincible army, were overthrown, 
 although in their death agony they nearly dragged with them 
 the independence of the Nation. 
 
 The dictatorship of Santa Ana collapsed at the touch of 
 the revolution of Ayutla, for this revolt had inscribed on its 
 banners principles for making normal the political life of the 
 Nation and thus implanting a real democracy. Among these 
 principles, and in fact the main one, was the abolition of special 
 privileges to the army and to the clergy, and the administering 
 of justice equally to all. 
 
 After the triumph of the revolution of Ayutla, Don Juau' 
 Alvarez was made provisional President. His administration 
 was characterized by the fact thait everybody was president ex- 
 cept the President himself. Alvarez was eventually succeeded 
 by General Ignacio Comonfort, the first President elected under 
 the system established by the Constitution of 1857. 
 
 Comonfort, without a doubt was a good man, but indecisive 
 and lacking the necessary capabilities for accomplishing the 
 task at hand. Hie was full of illusions which he had to put 
 aside, and purposes which he could not carry out. Like all weak 
 men, he hesitated, and like all men politically inexperienced, he 
 put himself into the hands of the very men who would ruin him. 
 These men betrayed him, and his downfall was horrible. The 
 military revolt of Tacubaya carried to the Presidency an un- 
 known soldier, Zuloaga by name, a man without education, and 
 even weaker and more indecisive than Comonfort. 
 
 iSoOn after the revolt of Tacubaya, Miramon, who had been 
 its heart and soul, declared the wish of the Nation to be that he 
 
 (253) 
 
254 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAE,CiHY 
 
 occupy the presidency; witih this excuse, he seized the govern- 
 ment and implanted a new dictatorship as bad if not worse than 
 that which the revolution of Ayutla had overthrown. 
 
 Juarez, who had been elected Vice President at the time 
 Comonfort was elected President, now took up the banner which 
 had been dropped by the Constitutional President. He called 
 on the Nation to assist him in a war against pretorian militarism^ 
 whose title to power was treason, and whose only arms were those 
 entrusted to it by the Nation tO' guard its institutions. 
 
 The war lasted three years, but finally, at Calpulalpam, the 
 supremacy of the populace over the pretorian militarists was 
 decided, and right triumphed over the rebellious soldiery. 
 
 Comparing one epoch with the other, we see the similar- 
 ity between them. The dictatorship of General Diaz, like that 
 of Santa Ana, collapsed at the touch of a revolution on whose 
 banners were inscribed principles which would make Mlexico a 
 true democracy. At the elections, the triumphant revolution 
 placed Madero at the head of the government, a good man, but 
 full of illusions, indecisive, and at the critical moment incompetent 
 tC' carry out the promised reforms. Like Comonfort, Mjadero 
 found the ground unfavorable since there had been no work of 
 preparation and education along democratic lines. He, like 
 Comonfort, placed his trust in the very persons who were to be- 
 tray him. 
 
 Two revolts, entirely military in origin, planned at 'Tacu- 
 baya, brought to the Presidency soldiers like Mramon and Santa 
 Ana, who thought to impose their authority by force of arms, 
 believing that with bayonets they could establish peace. 
 
 Guillermo Prieto referring to Santa Ana on page 566 of his 
 book entitled ''Lessons on Our National History for the use of 
 the Cadets of the Military Academy," says: "Needless to say 
 that in the administration all members of the President's family 
 were acting as brokers in all lines of business, thus converting 
 into cash their submission and loyalty to their head. To strength- 
 en such a situation, the army was necessarily increased. Out- 
 casts of all parties flocked to the ranks, shoving aside and heap- 
 ing humiliations upon the men of true merit. As was to be ex- 
 pected, the freedom of the press was withdrawn, spying and tale 
 bearing, and vshady intrigues became the politics of the time * 
 * * * * Santa Ana believed he could do anything and that 
 he knew everything, for such is the invariable result where such 
 
CONCLUSION 255 
 
 petty meannesses and adulations are eombined. This is a symp- 
 tom of the ruin of all brainless rulers. ' ' 
 
 All who are familiar with the crisis through which Mexico 
 is passing at this time, might think on reading the words of 
 Guillermo Prieto about Santa Ana, that they were written about 
 the dictatorship of General Huerta. The reason is that all dic- 
 tatorships are fundamentally alike ; they all carry to power men 
 who as a rule are brutal ; some more intelligent than others, 
 and some more easily adaptable to their new surroundings. Of 
 these, the intelligent men who harmonize their acts, if only in 
 part, are able to make their government tolerable. Such was 
 the case with General Diaz. In fact, when they are sufficiently 
 clever to develop with the times and adapt themselves to the 
 requirements of the people, they end by making themselves loved 
 and are able to perpetuate themselves. Such was the case with 
 Bernardotte in Sweden, and such would have been the case with 
 General Diaz if he had developed politically as he did socially. 
 
 With the fall of the government of Madero, the country has 
 been launched into a new revolution which must necessarily be 
 the last, if we are to maintain our national independence. The 
 present revolution is fully justified because of the unspeakable 
 acts committed by those now in power. Entirely filled with the 
 idea of gaining supremacy, they did not measure the consequences 
 of their conduct, nor have they sought pardon for their deeds. 
 On the contrary, they have all in all given ample cause for an 
 armed rebellion. I repeat that, in my opinion, the present re- 
 volution will be the last ; it therefore behooves us to make up our 
 differences in such a way as to prevent the armed intervention 
 of foreign nations, since it is not impossible that they may be forced 
 to it by the insistent appeals of their citizens who raise before 
 the eyes of the world the host of humanity. Intervention by a 
 foreign power would be disastrous to Mexico, costly if not dis- 
 astrous to the nation attempting it; facts well known to the 
 governments of both continents as well as to ourselves. But 
 public opinion carries such weight in some countries and imposes 
 itself in such a manner that the governments at times, even 
 against their better judgment, are obliged to submit to the man- 
 dates formulated in terms so imperious, that there is not even 
 room for hesitation. 
 
 We should, therefore, not remain complacently tranquil, con- 
 fiding in the personal judgment of this or that ruler, or m his 
 
256 FEOM DESPOTISM TO ANAROHY 
 
 intentions and personal wishes. AA^e must face the question as 
 it stands, measure the conflict in all its phases, and seek a solu- 
 tion without imdue haste or delay which may cause our eventual 
 social death. 
 
 The government of Gteneral Huerta cannot stand, nor can 
 it count on public opinion. It was bom of treason, it lives nursed 
 by the heat of a most frightful disorder, and will die execrated 
 by the whole nation. Those who are not openly its enemies, hide 
 their true feelings through fear, through personal expediency, 
 or through misgivings for the future, seeming to believe that by 
 merely closing their eyes, the yawning chasms will close. In fact, 
 General Hluerta can only count on the bayonet to maintain his 
 position ; and the bayonet as has been said by an expert, is useful 
 for everything except to lean upon. But like Santa Ana, General 
 Huerta will relinquish power only when he is ejected by main 
 force. It may be that he intends, like Santa Ana, to put a figure- 
 head in the chair; then leaving everybody satisfied, to flee to 
 foreign lands to await an opportunity to seize power again, if 
 there should be a new outbreak. But to give up of his o'wn ac- 
 cord, definitely and completely, power gained by the blackest 
 treason ever registered in the annals of our history, will never be 
 done by General Huerta. 
 
 Does the salvation of the country then depend upon the 
 triumph of the revolution headed by Venustiano Carranza? To 
 all appearances; it is the only revolution now existing, and is, 
 I insist, the last one we should have. 
 
 Like all revolutions, the Constitutionalista has not been able 
 to choose its followers, but has been forced to accept all 
 volunteers. For this reason, we cannot condemn it on account 
 of having in its ranks men who may have been formerly evil- 
 doers, nor because it may have resorted to acts unsanctioned by 
 modern warfare. On the contrary, we must close our eyes to 
 both these facts and concentrate our minds, as is meet and just, 
 on the absolute necessity for the overthrow of a regime whose 
 future points to the ruin of the nation ; our eyes should seek to 
 see and our minds to grasp the terrible anguish which possesses 
 all patriots who think only of the welfare of Miexico. Will the 
 government which succeeds that of General Huerta be able to 
 establish itself on such a basis as to give promise of final con- 
 solidation, and prove itself strong, dignified, and worthy of 
 respect ? 
 
CONCLUSION 257 
 
 If tlie men who are leading the present revolution should 
 triumph and attain power, will they be able to establish the peace 
 so eagerly desired by the whole nation? Or will they only give 
 place to a new period of insurrection which the country itself 
 cannot withstand and which foreign powers wiU not tolerate? 
 
 To try to prevent this, I have deemed it my duty to set forth 
 a record of what has happened and call the attention of my coun- 
 trymen to the danger we are in, pointing out at the same time 
 the causes and motives which, in my estimation, have brought 
 us to our present deplorable situation. !S^llch has been the prin- 
 cipal object of this book, since in itls entirety it has been merely 
 a narrative of deeds and a study of the men who have taken 
 part in our national politics within the last few years. To attain 
 my object fully, I must now name the responsible parties, at- 
 tribu'ting to each his responsibility in the deeds set forth in this 
 book. Hjere, as throughout my whole work, I have endeavored 
 to set aside all personal feelings so far as human nature will 
 allow. Therefore, lest I be accused of attempting to shirk re- 
 sponsibility or of being moved by personal animosity, or of nurs- 
 ing some secret ambition, in writing these final pages I have put 
 aside entirely all personal feelings. It has been my endeavor to 
 write as though I had not personally known the men I am judging ; 
 in fact, as if I had never been connected with them. Only with 
 this firm resolution is it possible to write contemporaneous 
 history. 
 
 First of all then, before the tribunal of history, I impeach 
 Don Porfirio Diaz, not of his acts as a revolutionist, which, as 
 I have stated in Chapter II,* do carry with them a certain re- 
 sponsibility, but, first and foremost, I impeach him of his acts 
 as President of the Nation. Hie enjoyed an authority through- 
 out the country never possessed by any other man. Had not 
 ambition killed every other sentiment in his soul, he would have 
 been able to relinquish power at the proper time to younger, more 
 robust, and more energetic hands. At the same time, he could 
 have acted as adviser to his successor, protecting him with the 
 respect and love his conduct would have of itself won. for him 
 in the hearts of the people. He would have been able, in the 
 long years of his rule, to set the Nation on the road to a true de- 
 mocracy. He would have been able to educate a score of m^en 
 
 ^Of the Spanish complete edition. 
 
258 FROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 with a thorough knowledge of public affairs, so that they might 
 properly control the reins of government and conduct the Nation 
 through the paths of peace and order to true liberty. But far 
 from that, he passed his official life distrusting the whole world, 
 and playing those who surrounded him one against the other 
 to their own destruction. He deceived everybody. He used 
 everybody to his own ends and personal purposes. He antago- 
 nized all who could have served him or the country; some of 
 them died, others were totally incapacitated for further work of 
 benefit to the country. His political work was one of destruc- 
 tion, one of extinction. It is true that he developed and encour- 
 aged the material progress of the country, but it is also true that 
 he neglected all the rest. He failed to remember that the ma- 
 terial progress of a people, when not accompanied by their poli- 
 tical education, can only presage ruin and desolation to the 
 country ; for, vast material works, unaccompanied by training in 
 leadership, citizenship, and interest by all in public affairs, can 
 only spell failure. 
 
 Sparta and Athens apparently so strong, so consolidated, 
 one with its great military spirit, the other with its laurels of 
 art and poetry, disappeared from among the nations of the world 
 as soon as they concentrated their activities on material progress 
 and delivered themselves body and soul to the spirit of commer- 
 cialism, going so far even as to hire those satraps who were tyran- 
 nizing the towns bordering on Greece, those peasants crowned 
 with glory at Platea and Marathon. 
 
 The same thing is true of the Persian Empire under the 
 great Syrian, of the Empire of the Pharoahs, and of the Empire 
 of Macedonia which reached the zenith of greatness with the 
 genius of Alexander the Great. 
 
 The Roman Empire, that empire which gave birth to men 
 who still live by the glory of their deeds and who are known to 
 all students throughout the world, also disappeared on the day 
 when its citizens, instead of going to the Forum to discuss the 
 public welfare, went to inspect and admire the great material 
 works which were to perpetuate the glory of the tyrants who were 
 snatching from them one by one all their liberties. 
 
 Social development only is permanent. Greece still lives 
 today because the poetry and art of the Anthenians will live 
 forever. Rome lives because its institutions and laws are an 
 eternal fount of inspiration to the jurist and the lawmaker. 
 
CONCLUSION 259 
 
 Material works fill a momentary need, but in history they 
 only serve to recall the epoch of their construction, they are 
 useful to posterity as sign posts to stimulate the interest in the 
 men who ordered them and in those who constructed them. The 
 monuments left by the Arab conquest of Spain remind us only 
 that the forces of Tarik and Yousuf reached even across the 
 Pyrenees before their progress was stopped by the son of Pepin ; 
 they tell us a story of seven hundred years of hideous crimes and 
 treasons, and seven hundred years of constant blows against 
 liberty. As a whole, those* monuments are testimonials of pain 
 more than of power. The great pyramids of Egypt, and the 
 beautiful ruins of the civilization of the Indians in our own 
 eountry, are altars which grief and shame, exile and slave, have 
 raised to perpetuate throughout the centuries the wickedness of 
 man and the pleasure of tyrants in the grief of a vanquished 
 brother. 
 
 What profit has humanity received from such things as the 
 magnificent baths of Caracullus, of Neztahualcoyotl, or the pyra- 
 mids of Teotihuacan? iThey are only a reminder of the exis- 
 tence of great empires which, like the government of General 
 Diaz, have collapsed. Hjis material works will remind genera- 
 tions to come that Mexico once possessed a man of great power 
 who had vast resources at his command; a man who for many 
 years held a people in absolute subjection, but who lived to see 
 his work perish because although he conquered his country, he 
 was conquered by his own egotism and ambition. Therefore, 
 eventually, instead of peace and prosperity, his work brought 
 ruin and desolation. But the responsibility does not all belong 
 to General Diaz. I now proceed to impeach General Bernardo 
 Reyes. Had not the Rieyista movement been a purely personal 
 one to disturb our spirit, it is possible that we might not have 
 witnessed the events which! fill us with horror and shame, and 
 make us shudder when we contemplate the end they may lead 
 to in the very near future. Under the shadow and immediate 
 supervision of General Reyes, that seed of rebellion and sedition 
 was implanted which was the soul of the disgraceful mutiny of 
 February 18th, 1913. 
 
 The Mladerista revolution, as I have endeavored to show, in 
 the course of this work, found the ground propitious because 
 of the lengthy intrigues carried on for ten years by General 
 Reyes and his subordinates. His. was an undertaking essentially 
 
260 PROM DESPOIISM TO ANAEOHY 
 
 disastrous because it aimed at discrediting resources of value, 
 offering no substitute for them, and above all, because it stood 
 for the supremacy of force as an element of life for the Nation'. 
 
 G^eneral Rieyes created nothing. Hjis work, socially, only 
 engendered a spirit of insubordination, of indecisiveness, of dis- 
 loyalty, which is reflected throughout his entire political career. 
 In fact, he did not even do anything worthy of note for himself 
 though he concentrated his efforts to that end. If he had been 
 upright and decisive, his energy would have served to consoli- 
 date a civil government as well as to restrain General Diaz from 
 those acts which were dragging him down, and the whole natioc 
 with him. General Reyes could have taken advantage of the 
 growing feeling against Porfirio Diaz to place himself at the 
 head of a purely democratic movement. The country would have 
 welcomed him with open arms, for as a matter of fact the people 
 often turned to him and would have delivered themselves to him 
 had he not hesitated. But he was not the man to face such situa- 
 tions. His work was destructive rather than constructive ; it was 
 the forerunner of events which have subsequently taken place. 
 I put him down in history as one of those mainly responsible for 
 the present conditions, and I impeach him as second only to Diaz 
 himself. 
 
 Next, I impeach those officers who have made the army a 
 stepping stone to their ambitions, who have forced the country 
 back to the pretorian epoch of his Serene HUghness, Santa Ana ; 
 an epoch so disastrous to the country. These men have corrupt- 
 ed the army whose mission it is to defend the fatherland and 
 uphold its institutions; they have made of it an instrument to 
 satiate their personal desires; and they have made the present 
 time an epoch which will always be a blot on our national life. 
 These officers are Vlictoriano Htuerta, Felix Diaz, and Manuel 
 Maria Mondragon. 
 
 Next to them, I impeach Mr. Mladero. He is responsible in 
 that he attempted a work far above his capability,— to bring into 
 one channel the conflicting currents reyismo, the democratic 
 party, and the anti-reelectionists, conflicting in everything but 
 the desire to expel Diaz and the men identified with him. He 
 should have understood that it was necessary to curb them so 
 that they should not become anarchical. He should have anal- 
 yzed himself carefully to see whether he really possessed the quali- 
 fications for such a work; but he did not do so. With no realiza- 
 
CONCLUSION 261 
 
 tion of the greatness of the mission he was undertaking, and of 
 the labor and work involved, he plunged straight to a destruc- 
 tion of incalculable consequences to the country. Notwithstand- 
 ing, history undoubtedly will have mercy on him, perhaps forgive 
 all his errors on account of his martyrdom. 
 
 I also impeach the advisers of General Diaz who were in 
 touch with him for many years, who were with him at the crucial 
 moment. Among them, in the first rank, I impeach Jose Ives 
 Limantour. Mr. Limantour for many years enjoyed the friend- 
 ship and affecition of General Diaz and finally his entire confi- 
 dence. Hjis egotism and incompetence at the crucial moment, 
 were revealed to such a degree that many consider him the con- 
 scious author of the fall of General Diaz. Events have not yet 
 clearly established it ; therefore, I myself would not dare to make 
 such a weighty accusation. However, his incompetence in those 
 moments is so plain, his insight into the political situation so 
 slight, his acts so erroneous, that it is hard to believe that a man 
 of his reputed high intelligence could have acted as he did only 
 through error. Like General Diaz, he could have served the 
 country, but either through malice, through ambition, or through 
 incapacity, he hurled it into the abyss. I place him among the 
 most guilty ; in fact, to a degree equal to Bernardo Kieyes. 
 
 I also impeach the American Ambassador, Mr. Henry Lane 
 Wilson, whose work, entirely destructive in character, is inexpli- 
 cable. He worked against the government of General Diaz, forc- 
 ing the collapse of his administration; he was not less hostile to 
 that of Mr. Madero, as he has openly admitted,* and in the 
 tragedy of February 22nd, his sin of omission is absolutely 
 despicable. 
 
 When recalled from office by the Democratic Administra- 
 tion, he upheld in this country the government of General Huer- 
 ta, for the exploitation of his political party ; but while in Mexi- 
 co, his attitude was impertinent. Hfe went so far as to demand 
 in his official capacity as Ambassador of a liberty loving people, 
 the suppression of the Mexican newspaper "El Pais" and the 
 arrest of its editors. t 
 
 *Interview published in the New York Times, Jan. 11th, 1913. 
 
 tLetter from Henry Lane Wilson to President Huerta under 
 date of June 11th. 1913. 
 
262 PROM DESPOTISM TO ANAECHY 
 
 I further impeach the Messrs. Vazquez Glomez and Mt. Fran- 
 cisco de la Barra, who also are, in my opinion, greatly to blame 
 for present conditions in Mexico. The former for their plottings 
 and ambitions ; the latter for his weakness as a ruler. Mr. Lascu- 
 rain is to blame, but only to a very slight degree. Be was un- 
 doubtedly confronted by a situation which he could not possibly 
 have foreseen. It is true he showed lack of energy and foresight, 
 but we must judge him at the moment of action, and above all, 
 we must remember that he was the only one not moved by a per- 
 sonal ambition. Though I do not absolve him entirely, I can 
 only place his responsibility on a par with that of the rest of 
 us, especially of those who have taken part in one way or another 
 in the administration of affairs. I for my part do not shirk this 
 responsibility, and I make my confession to extenuate my blame. 
 
 All of us, by our silence, contributed to the destructive 
 work of General Diaz. All of us believed with a blind faith 
 that we could change a man like Don Porfirio Diaz and induce 
 him to institute a democracy. All of us, fearing a revolution 
 with its appalling consequences, preferred to kill our desire for 
 freedom and allow one man to rule us. We submitted silently 
 without considering that our submission and our silence only 
 served to postpone the conflict. Our conduct only retarded 
 the struggle, but did not prevent it. With history for a teacher, 
 we should have foreseen this. In Riome, after Tiberius came 
 Caligula, then Nero, then the inevitable anarchy and insurrec- 
 tion of the soldiery, which brought into power uneducated, vicious, 
 and incompetent soldiers like Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. 
 
 'T!his is now the peril, and we must prevent it at all hazards. 
 The people are not always fortunate enough to find a Flavins 
 Vespasian, nor is a Domititius often succeeded by a Nervius or 
 a Trojan ; but the duty of a true patriot is to seek them, and to 
 denounce impostors so that lies may not prosper or wickedness 
 flourish. This is the principle purpose of this book. We were 
 blindly obedient for thirty odd years and have fought untiring- 
 ly for more than three years. The moment has now come for 
 us to think, to reflect, and to work conscientiously. Putting 
 aside all personal ambitions, we must think only of our father- 
 land, and duly consider its well being. For this, Ave must forget 
 past strifes, and all purely personal incidents; these must give 
 away to the question of greater interest, the welfare of the na- 
 tion. Let us all unite, and reunited, gather around the govern- 
 
COO^CLUSION 263 
 
 ment which will rise when the present tyranny is overthrown, as I 
 truly believe it will be. When the revolution should triumph, let 
 us place at its command all our energies, all our activities, and all 
 our love of country. Let us consecrate ourselves, not to quarrel 
 over power, but to choose as our only possible course, the path of 
 justice and truth which leads directly to Liberty. 
 
 For my part, I know that by relating events as they have 
 truly happened, and by giving this book to the public, I will 
 increase the number of my enemies; but for all that, I do not 
 hesitate. I gladly place my life and my political honor in their 
 hands. I care not if they revive my past and slander me as 
 much as they please. In offering this book to the public, 
 I have not forgotten the truth of that line of Terence 
 "Veritas odiium parit. " 
 
\ 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Page 
 
 Notice 1 
 
 Preface - 3 
 
 Reelection Witho.jt Eiestrictions, Chapter 1 10 
 
 Loyalty Unto Death, Chapter II 14 
 
 The Revolution in 1910, Chapter III 19 
 
 The Fall of the Colosus, Chapter IV 26 
 
 The White President and the Black President, Chapter V..^ 42 
 
 Zapata, Chapter Yl 47 
 
 The Revolt in Morelos, Chapter VII 51 
 
 The Agrarian Problem, Chapter VIII 55 
 
 The Brains of the Revolt, Chapter IX 60 
 
 The Birth of the "Big Stick" Clique, Chapter X 70 
 
 Madero's Administration, Chapter XI 74 
 
 The New Revolution, Chapter XII 82 
 
 Orozco— Vazquez Gromez, Chapter XIII 91 
 
 Rellano — Conejos — Bachimha, Chapter XIV 96 
 
 The Elections in Vera Cruz, Chapter XV 101 
 
 The First Military Revolt, Chapter XVI 106 
 
 In the Midst of Revolution, Chapter XVII 119 
 
 The Second Military Revolt, Chapter XVIII 127 
 
 The Die is Cast, Chapter XIX 133 
 
 The Ninth of February, Chapter XX 137 
 
 The Last Ovation, Chapter XXI 147 
 
 At the Ciudadela, Chapter XXII 152 
 
 The Tragic Ten Days, Chapter XXIII 154 
 
 The Action of the Senate, Chapter XXIV 161 
 
 An Event of the Merovingian Dynasty, Chapter XXV ;..166 
 
 The Third Mdlitary Revolt, Chapter XXVI 170 
 
 An Orgy of Blood, Chapter XXVII 173 
 
 The Compact at the Embassy, Chapter XXVIII 179 
 
 The Resignation of M^dero, Chapter XXIX 185 
 
 The Death of Madero, Chapter XXX 195 
 
 The Money Orgy, Chapter XXXI , 204 
 
 The Reign of Terror, Chapter XXXII 213 
 
 The Parliamentary Qnadrilateral, Chapter XXXIII - 220 
 
 The Constitueionalista Revolution, ChapterXXXIV 228 
 
 The King Amuses Himself, Chapter XXXV 239 
 
 The American Policy, Chapter XXXVI 245 
 
 Conclusion ( I impeach ) :..^ ...253 
 
WORKS OF THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 General Ulysses S. Grant— Address » . . . 1885 
 
 La Ley del JD^omicilio 
 
 {The Ltnw of the DomiciU) 
 
 1888 
 
 El Arbitrage en America . . . 
 
 (Arbitration in America) 
 
 1902 
 
 * Juarez" como lo describe la Historia y como 
 \o pinta el Dip. Bulnes ... . . . . . 
 
 (Juarez aa he it in History and a* he ia pictured 
 by Congreaaman Bulnea.) 
 
 1904 
 
 La Nueva ley Electoral . . 
 
 (The New Electoral Law.) 
 
 1911 
 
 Forthcoming Book-^ 
 
 "OUR CONFLICT*' 
 

 
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