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 CIVIL GOVERNMENT, 
 
 Hb:,PRl.NTKD FROM TliU 
 
 PRINCETON REVIEW, FOR JANL ARY,, 1851. 
 
 Iprincetou, N. 3 : 
 
 PRINTED BY JOHN T. ROBINSON, 
 
 1851. 
 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 REPRINTED FROM THE 
 
 PRINCETON REVIEW, FOR JANUARY, 1851. 
 
 PRINCETON, N. J. 
 
 1851. : 
 

 JAN 2i 1921 
 
 t 
 
ClYIL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 FROM PKINCETON REVIEW. 
 
 The past year has been one of great anxiety for the 
 peace and union of our country. The danger, though 
 greatly lessened, cannot be considered as entirely passed. 
 There is still great dissatisfaction bath at the north and 
 south with regard to what are called " The compromise 
 measures," adopted by Congress at its late session. We 
 hope and believe that the great body of people in every 
 part of the Union are disposed to acquiesce in those 
 measures, and to carry them faithfully into effect. StiU 
 the a^fitation continues. At the South there is in the 
 minds of many, a sense of injustice and of insecurity; 
 and at the North not a few have conscientious objec- 
 tions to one at least of the peace measures above alluded 
 to. This difficulty is not to be obviated by mutual 
 criminations. The South will not be pacified by calling 
 their demands for what they deem justice, treasonable; 
 nor the North by anouncing their opposition to the 
 fugitive slave bill, as fanaticism. Both parties must be 
 satisfied. The one must be shown that no injustice is 
 i designed or impending; and the other must be convinced 
 i that they can with a good conscience submit to the law 
 for the delivery of fugitive slaves. 
 
 Every candid man must admit that the violent de- 
 
nunciation of slave-holders, in which a certain class of 
 northern writers habitually indulge, it not merely 
 irritating and offensive, but in a high degree unjust and 
 injurious. It is an evil of which the South have a 
 right to complain. But it is to be considered that it is 
 an evil incident to our free institutions, and cannot be 
 prevented without destroying the liberty of speech and 
 of the press. It is an evil for which secession or separa- 
 tion of the Union is no remedy, but would prove a great 
 aggravation. It is moreover not the offence of the 
 North but a small class of northern men. It is no 
 more to be imputed to the whole people, than similar 
 disparaging and injurious representations emanating 
 from southern men against northern institutions, are to 
 be imputed to the Avhole South. Though therefore we 
 admit the injustice of the denunciations in question 
 they are not a grievance which ought to disturb the 
 peace of the country. 
 
 Again, candid men must admit that the South has a 
 right to complain of the facilities afforded for the escape 
 of slaves, and the difficulties thrown in the way of 
 their recapture. But this is an injustice which the 
 North has, by the action of their representatives in 
 congress, shown every disposition to abate. And it 
 is moreover an evil, which as Mr. Clay remarked in 
 his place in the Senate, is almost exclusively confined to 
 the border slaveholding states. 
 
 The great ground of complaint, however, at the 
 South, so far as we can understand, is that the equili- 
 brium between the slaveholding and non-slaveholding 
 states in the Senate, has been destroyed by the admis- 
 sion of California into the Union. A certain class of 
 southern politicians seem to think that justice requires 
 
that there should be perfect equality in the senatorial 
 representation between the two sections of the country ; 
 and consequently that the South should have the half 
 of all new territory acquired, and that whenever a free 
 state is admitted to the Union provision should be made 
 for the admission of a slaveholding state to counter- 
 balance it. This demand we are satisfied cannot 
 appear reasonable to the great majority of the people. 
 It is equivalent to a demand that one-third of the 
 population should have a representation equal to the 
 remaining two-thirds. Justice surely docs not require 
 this in a republic whose fundamental principle is that 
 representation should be in proportion to the population. 
 Nor does the security of the South require this arrange- 
 ment. A retrospect of the history of our congressional 
 proceedings, proves that there is neither the disposition 
 nor the power on the part of the North to interfere 
 with the rights of the South. It is an established law 
 in all free government that a compact minority holds 
 the balance of power, and controls the action of the 
 government. The South has long been in the minority, 
 and yet our histor}' clearly shows that their intiuence 
 has always predominated in our general councils. They 
 have had a majority of the leading offices of the gov- 
 ernment, and of the members of the Supreme Court. 
 They have determined all the great questions of our 
 foreign and domestic policy. This must continue to be 
 the case ; for the causes which have determined this 
 course of action are permanent. In Pennsylvania the 
 Germans, though not one-third of the inhabitants of 
 that state, have for generations had the balance of 
 power in their hands and given character to its politics 
 and policy. We are satisfied that a calm examination 
 
of the past, and a careful consideration of the principles 
 which control the action of the government, and es- 
 pecially the limited nature of its powers, must convince 
 the South that they are in no danger of suffering injus- 
 tice from the North, and that the evils incident to all 
 human institutions, and especially to the confederation of 
 so many states differing so much and so variously from 
 each other, would be aggravated a thousand fold b}^ a 
 dissolution of the Union. Men might as well prescribe 
 decapitation for the head-ache, as the destruction of the 
 confederacy as a cure for the present difficulties. No 
 human mind can estimate and no human tongue express 
 the evils to be anticipated to the prosperity, the morals, 
 the religion of the country, and to the hopes of the world 
 from such a catastrophe as the breaking up of this con- 
 federacy. It is no w^onder then that the remote fear of 
 such an event has roused the whole country, and called 
 forth from the pul23it, the press, and the forum so many 
 addresse.'j' to the wisdom, patriotism, and brotherly-love 
 of the people. 
 
 There is no more obvious duty, at the present time, 
 resting on American Christians, ministers and people, 
 than to endeavour to promote kind feelings between the 
 South and the North. All fierce addresses to the pas- 
 sions, on either side, are fratricidal. It is an offence 
 against the gospel, against our common countrj-, and 
 against God. Every one should endeavour to difiuse 
 right principles, and thus secure right feeling and action, 
 under the blessing of God in every part of the land. 
 
 If the South has no such grounds of complaint as 
 would justify them before God and the human race, 
 whose trustees in one important sense they are, in dis- 
 solving the Union, how is it with the North ? Are they 
 
justifiable in the violent resistance to the fugitive slave 
 bill, which been tlireatened or attempted ? This oppo- 
 sition in a great measure has been confined to the abo- 
 litionists as a party, and as such they are a small minor- 
 ity of the people. They have never included in their 
 ranks either the controlling intellect or moral feeling at 
 the North. Their fundamental principle is anti-scrip- 
 tural and therefore irreligious. They assume that slave- 
 holding is sinful. This doctrine is the life of the sect. 
 It has no power over those who reject that principle, 
 and therefore it has not gained ascendenc}' over those 
 whose faith is governed by the word of God. 
 
 The real strength of the abolitionists as a party may 
 be estimated from its representatives in our national 
 councils. Two or three Senators and a dozen or less 
 members of the House of Representatives are all it can 
 boast of We have ever maintained that the proper 
 method of opposing this part}*, and of counteracting its 
 pernicious influence was to exhibit clearly the falsehood 
 of its one idea, viz : that slaveholding is a sin against 
 God. To this object we have devoted several articles 
 in the preceding numbers of our journal. The discus- 
 sion has now taken a new turn. It is assumed tiiat the 
 law of the last Congress relating to fugitive slaves is un- 
 constitutional, or if not contrary to the constitution, 
 contrary to the law of God. Under this impression 
 mam' who have never been regarded as abolitionists, 
 have entered their protest against the law, and some in 
 their haste have inferred from its supposed unconstitu- 
 tionality or immorality that it ought to be openly re- 
 sisted. It is obvious that the proper method of dealing 
 with the subject in this new aspect, is to demonstrate 
 that the law in question is according to the constitution 
 
8 
 
 of the land ; that it is not inconsistent with the divine 
 law ; or, admitting its unconstitutionality or immorality, 
 that the resistance recommended is none the less a sin 
 against God. We do not propose to discuss either of 
 the two former of these propositions. The constitution- 
 ality of the law may safely be left in the hands of the 
 constituted authorities. It is enough for us that there 
 is no flagrant and manifest inconsistency between the 
 law and the constitution ; that the first legal authorities 
 in the land pronounce them perfectly consistent ; and 
 that there is no difference in principle between the pre- 
 sent law and that of 1793 on the same subject, in which 
 the whole country has acquiesced for more than half a 
 century. We would also say that after having read 
 some of the most laboured disquisitions designed to prove 
 that the fugitive slave bill subverts the fundamental 
 principles of our federal compact, we have been unable 
 to discover the least force in the arguments adduced. 
 
 As to the immorality of the law, so far as we can dis- 
 cover, the whole stress of the argument in the affirma- 
 tive rests on two assumptions. First, that the law of 
 God in Deuteronomy, expressly forbids the restoration 
 of a fugitive slave to his owner; and secondly, that 
 slavery itself being sinful, it must be wrong to enforce 
 the claims of the master to the service of the slave. As 
 to the former of these assumptions, we would simply 
 remark, that the venerable Prof Stuart in his recent 
 work, " Conscience and the Constitution," has clearly 
 proved that the law in Deuteronomy has no a2:)plication 
 to the present case. The thing there forbidden is the 
 restoration of a slave who had fled from a heathen mas- 
 ter and taken refuge among the worshippers of c'le true 
 God. Such a man was not to be forced back iiiLO hea- 
 
thenism. This is the obvious meaning and spirit of the 
 command. That it had no reference to slaves who had 
 escaped from Hebrew masters and fled from oA tribe or 
 city to another, is plain from the simple fact that the 
 Hebrew laws recognised slavery. It would be a perfect 
 contradiction if the law authorized the purchase and 
 holding of slaves, and yet forbid the enforcing the right 
 of possession. There could be no such thing as slavery, 
 in such a land as Palestine, if the slave could recover 
 his liberty by simply moving from one tribe to another 
 over an imaginary line, or even from the house of his 
 master to that of his next neighbour. Besides, how in- 
 consistent is it in the abolitionists in one breath to main- 
 tain that the laws of Moses did not recognise slavery, 
 and in the next, that the laws about the restoration of 
 slaves referred to the slaves of Hebrew masters. Ac- 
 cording to their doctrine, there could be among the Is- 
 raelites no slaves to restore. They must admit either 
 that the law of God allowed the Hebrews to hold slaves, 
 and then tiiere is an end to their arguments against the" 
 sinfulness of slaveholding; or acknowledge that the law 
 respecting the restoration of slaves refer: ed only to fugi- 
 tives from the heathen, and then there is an end to their 
 argument from this enactment against the law under 
 consideration. 
 
 The way in which abolitionists treat the scriptures 
 makes it evident that the command in Deuteronomy is 
 irged not so much out of regard to the authority of the 
 vord of God, as an argumentum ad hominem. W herever 
 the scriptures either in the Old or New Testament 
 recognise the lawfulness of holding slaves, they are tor- 
 tured without mercy to force from them a different re- 
 sponse ; and where, as in this case, they appear to favour 
 
10 
 
 the other side of the question, abolitionists quote them 
 rather to silence those who make them the rule of their 
 faith, than as the ground of their own convictions. Were 
 there no such law as that in Deuteronomy in existence, 
 or were there a plain injunction to restore a fugitive 
 from service to his Hebrew master, it is plain from their 
 principles that they would none the less fiercely con- 
 demn the law under consideration. Their opposition is 
 not founded on the scriptural command. It rests on the 
 assumption that the masters claim is iniquitous and 
 ought n'ot to be enforced.^^' Their objections are not to 
 the mode of delivery, but the delivery itself Why else 
 quote the law in Deuteronomy which apparently forbids 
 such surrender of the fugitive to his master ? It is clear 
 that no effective enactment could be framed on this sub- 
 ject which would not meet with the same opposition. 
 We are convinced, by reading the discussions on this 
 subject, that the immorality attributed to the fugitive 
 
 * In t!ie New York Independent for January 2, 1851, there is a sermon de- 
 livered by Rev. Richard S. Storrs, Jr., of Brooklyn, Dec. 12, 1850, in which his 
 opposition to the fiisitive shivc bill is expressly placed on the injustice of slavery, 
 lie argues the matter almost exclusively on that ground. "To what," he asks, 
 •" am I required to send this man [the slave] back ? To a system which . . . 
 no man can contemplate without shuddering." Again, " Why shall I send the 
 man to this unjust bondage'.' Tlie fact that he has suffered it so long already, 
 
 is a reason why I should xot Why shall I not uklp him, in his struggle 
 
 for the rights which God gave him indelibly, when he made him a man ? There 
 is nothing to prevent, but the simple requirement of my equals in the state ; 
 the parchmotit of the law, which they have written." This is an argument against 
 the constitution and no't against the fugitive slave law. It is an open refusal to 
 comply with one of the stipulations of our national compact. If it has any force, 
 it is in f ivour of the dissolution of the union. Nay, if the argument is sound it 
 makes the dissolution of the union inevitable and obligatory. It should, there- 
 fore, in alt fairness be presented in that light, and not as an argument against 
 the law of Congress. Let it lie understood that the ground now assumed is that 
 the constitution cannot be complied with. Let it be seen that the moralists of 
 our d.iy ii.ivc discovered that the compact framed by our fathers, which all our 
 public mjn in the general and state governments have sworn to support, under 
 which we have lived sixty years, and whose fruits wc have so abundantly enjoyed, 
 is an immjral compact, and must be repudiated from a sense of duty to God. This is 
 the real doctrine constantly presented in the abolition prints ; and if properly 
 understood we should soon see to what extent it commends itself to the judgment 
 and conscience of the people. 
 
11 
 
 slave law resolves itself into the assumed immDrality of 
 slavelioldiii^. No man would object to restoring an 
 apprentice to his master ; and no one would quote scrip- 
 ture or search for arguments to prove it sinful to restore 
 a fugitive slave, if he believed slaveholding to be lawful 
 in the sight of God. This being the case we feel satis- 
 fied that the mass of the people at the north, whose 
 conscience and action are ultimately determined by the 
 teaching of the Bible, will soon settle down into the 
 conviction that the law in question is not in conflict 
 with 'he .law of God. 
 
 But suppose the reverse to be the fact ; suppose it 
 clearly made out that the law passed by Congress in 
 reference to fugitive slaves is contrary to the constitution 
 or to the law of God, what is to be done ? What is the 
 duty of the people under such circumstances? The 
 answers given to this question are different, and some 
 of them so portentous that the pubHc mind hay been 
 aroused and directed to the consideration of the nature 
 of civil government and of the grounds and limits of 
 the obedience due to laws of the land. As this is a 
 subject not merely of general interest at this time, but 
 of permanent importance, we purpose to devote to its 
 discussion the few following pages. 
 
 Our design is to state in a few words in what 
 sense government is a divine institution, and to draw 
 from that doctrine the principles which must determine 
 the nature and limits of the obedience which is due to 
 the laws of the land. 
 
 That the Bible, when it asserts that all power is of 
 God, or that the powers that be are ordained of God, 
 does not teach that any one form of civil government 
 has been divinely appointed as universally obligatory, is 
 
12 
 
 plain because the scriptures contain no such prescription. 
 There are no directions given as to the form which civil 
 governments shall assume. All the divine commands 
 on this subject, are as applicable under one form as an- 
 other. The direction is general : Obey the powers that 
 be. The proposition is unlimited : All power is of God ; 
 i. e. government, whatever its form, is of God. He has 
 ordained it. The most pointed scriptural injunctions 
 on this subject were given during the usurped or tyran- 
 nical reign of military despots. It is plain that the 
 sacred writers did not, in such passages, mean to teach 
 that a military despotism was the form of government 
 which God had ordained as of perpetual and universal 
 obligation. As the Bible enjoins no one for.n, so the 
 people of God in all ages, under the guidance of his 
 Spirit, have lived with a good conscience, under all the 
 diversities of organization of which human government 
 is susceptible. 
 
 Again, as no one form of government is prescribed, so 
 neither has God determined precept! vely who are to ex- 
 ercise civil power. He has not said that such poAver 
 must be hereditary, and descend on the principle of 
 primogeniture. He has not determined Avhether it shall 
 be confined to males to the exclusion of females ; or 
 whether all offices shall be elective. These are not 
 matters of divine aj)pointment, and are not included in 
 the proposition that all power is of God. Neither is it 
 included in this proposition that government is in such 
 a sense ordained of God that the people have no control 
 in the matter. The doctrine of the Bible is not incon- 
 sistent with the right of the people, as we w.ll endea- 
 vour to show in the sequel, to dettrmine their own form 
 of government and to select their own rulers. 
 
13 
 
 When it is said government is of God, we understand 
 the scriptures to mean, first, that it is a divine institu- 
 tution and not a mere social compact. It does not be- 
 long to the category of voluntary associations such as 
 men form for literary, benevolent, or commercial pur- 
 poses. It is not optional with men whether govern- 
 ment shall exist. It is a divine appointment, in the 
 same sense as marriage and the church are divine insti-.- 
 tutions. The former of these is not a mere civil con- 
 tract, nor is the church as a visible spiritual community 
 a mere voluntary society. Men are under obligation to 
 recognise its existence, to join its ranks, and submit to 
 its laws. In like manner it is the will of God that 
 civil government should exist. Men are bound by his 
 authority to have civil rulers for the punishment of 
 evil doers and for the praise of them that do well. This 
 is the scriptural doctrine as opposed to the deistical 
 theory of a social compact as the ultimate ground of all 
 human governments. 
 
 It follows from this view of the subject, that obe- 
 dience to the laws of the land is a religious duty, and 
 disobedience is of the specific nature of sin ; this is 
 a principle of vast importance. It is true that the 
 law of God is so broad that it binds a man to every 
 thing that is right, and forbids every thing that is 
 wrong; and consequently that every violation even of a 
 voluntary engagement is of the nature of an offence 
 against God. Still there is a wide difference between 
 disobedience to an obligation voluntarily assumed, and 
 which has no other sanction than our own engagement, 
 and disregard of an obligation directly imposed of God. 
 St. Peter recognises this distinction when he said to 
 Ananias, Thou hast not lied unto men but unto God. 
 
14 
 
 All lying is sinful, but lying to God is a higher crime 
 than lyiuL: unto men. There is greater irreverence and 
 contempt of the divine presence and authority, and a 
 violation of an obligation of a higher order. Every 
 man feels that the marriage vows have a sacred cha- 
 racter which could not belong to them, if marriage was 
 merely a civil contract. In like manner the divine 
 institution of government elevates it into the sphere of 
 religion, and adds a new and higher sanction to the 
 obligations which it imposes. There is a specific differ- 
 ence, more easily felt than described, between what is 
 relii2;ious and what is merelv moral; between disobe- 
 dience to man and resistance to an ordinance of God. 
 
 A third point included in the scriptural doctrine on 
 this subject, is that the actual existence of any govern- 
 ment creates the obligation of obedience. That is, the 
 obligation does not rest either on the origin or the na- 
 ture of the government, or on the mode in which it is 
 administered. It may be legitimate or revolutionary, 
 despotic or constitutional, just or unjust, so long as it 
 exists it is to be recognsied and obeyed within its pro- 
 per sphere. The powers that be are ordained of God in 
 such sense that the possession of power is to be referred 
 to h's providence. It is not by chance, nor through 
 the uncontrolled agency of men, but by divine ordina- 
 tion that any government exists. The declaration of 
 the apostle just quoted was uttered under the reign of 
 Nero. It is as true of his authority as of that of the 
 Queen of England, or of that of our own President, that 
 it was of God. He made Nero emperor. He required 
 all within the limits of the Roman Empire to recognise 
 and obey him so long as he was allowed to occupy the 
 throne. It was not necessary for the early Christians 
 
15 
 
 to sit in judgm3nt on tho title of every new emperor, 
 whenever the prctarian guards chose to put down one 
 and put up another ; neither are God's people now in 
 various parts of the world called upon to discuss the 
 titles a :d adjudicate the claims of their rulers. The 
 possession of civil power is a providential fact, and is 
 to be regarded as such. This does not imply that God 
 approves of every government which he allows to exist. 
 He permits oppressive rulers to b^ar sway, just as he 
 permits famine and pestilence to execute his vengeance. 
 A good government is a blessing, a b-sd government is a 
 judgment; but the one as much as the other is ordained 
 of God. and is to be obeyed not only for fear but also for 
 conscience sake. 
 
 A fourth principle involved in the proposition that 
 all power is of God, is, that the magistrate is invested 
 with a divine right. He represents God. His autho- 
 rity is derived from Him. There is a sense in which 
 he represents the people and derives from them his 
 power; but in a far higher sense he is the minister of 
 God. To resist him is to resist God, and " they that 
 resist shall receive unto themselves damnation." Thus 
 Baid the scriptures. It need hardly be remarked that 
 this principle relates to the nature, and not to the 
 extent, of the power of the magistrate. It is as true of 
 the lowest as of the highest ; of a justice of the peace as 
 of the President of the United States; of a constitu- 
 tional monarch as of an absolute sovereign. The prin- 
 ciple is that the authority of rulers is divine, and not 
 human, in its origin. They exercise the power which 
 belongs to them of divine right. The reader, we trust, 
 will not confound this doctrine with the old doctrine of 
 " the divine right of kings." The two things are as dif- 
 
16 
 
 ferent as day and night. We are not for reviving a 
 defunct theory of civil government ; a theory wliich 
 perished, at least among Anglo Saxons, at the expulsion 
 of James II. from the throne of Eno'land. That mon- 
 
 O 
 
 arch took it with him into exile, and it lies entombed 
 with the last of the Stuarts. According to that theory 
 God had established the monarchial form of govern- 
 ment as universally obligatory. There could not con- 
 sistently with his law be any other. The people had 
 no more right to renounce that form of government 
 than the children of a family have to resolve themselves 
 into a democracy. In the second place, it assumed that 
 God had determined the law of succession as well as 
 the form of government. The people could not change 
 the one any more than the other ; or any more than 
 children could change their father, or a wife her husband. 
 And thirdly, as a necessary consequence of these prin- 
 ciples, it inculcated in all cases the duty of passive 
 obedience. The king holding his oflice immediately 
 from God, held it entirely independent of the will of the 
 people, and his responsibility was to God alone. He 
 could not forfeit his throne by any injustice however 
 flagrant. The people if in any case they could not 
 obey, were obliged to submit; resistance or revolution 
 was treason against God. We have already remarked 
 that the scriptural doctrine is opposed to every one of 
 these princijDles. The Bible docs not prescribe any 
 one form of government; it does not determine who 
 shall be depositories of civil power ; and it clearly 
 recognises the right of revolution. In asserting, there- 
 fore, the divine right of rulers, we are not asserting any 
 doctrine repudiated by our foreiathers, or inconsistent 
 with civil liberty in its widest rational extent. 
 
17 
 
 Such, as we understand it, is the true nature of civil 
 government. It is a divine institution and not a mere 
 voluntary compact. Obedience to the magistrate and 
 laws is a religious duty; and disobedience is a sin 
 against God. This is true of all forms of government. 
 Men living under the Turkish Sultan are bound to 
 recognise his authority, as much as the subjects of a 
 constitution monarch, or the fellow citizens of an elected 
 president, are bound to recognise their respective rulers. 
 All power is of God, and the powers that be are or- 
 dained of God, in such sense that all magistrates are 
 to be regarded as his ministers, acting in his name and 
 with his authority, each within his legitimate sphere ; 
 beyond which he ceases to be a magistrate. 
 
 That this is the doctrine of the scriptures on this 
 subject can hardly be doubted. The Bible never refers 
 to the consent of the governed, the superiority of the 
 rulers, or to the general principles of expediency, as the 
 ground of our obligation to the higher powers. The 
 obedience which slaves owe their masters, children 
 their parents, wives their husbands, people their rulers, 
 is always made to rest on the divine will as its ultimate 
 foundation. It is part of the service which we owe to 
 God. We are required to act, in all these relations, not 
 as men-pleasers, but as the servants of God. All such 
 obedience terminates on our Master who is in heaven. 
 This gives the sublimity of spiritual freedom even to 
 the service of a slave. It is not in the power of man to 
 reduce to bondage those who serve God, in all the ser- 
 vice they render their fellow-men. The will of God, 
 therefore, is the fountain of our obligation to obey the 
 laws of the land. His will, however, is not an arbi- 
 trary determination; it is the expression of infinite 
 
18 
 
 intelligence and love. There is the most perfect agree- 
 ment between all the precepts of the Bible and the 
 highest dictates of reason. There is no command in the 
 word of God of permanent and universal obligation, 
 which may not be shown to be in accordance with the 
 laws of our own higher nature. This is one of the 
 strongest collateral arguments in favour of the divine 
 origin of the scriptures. In appealing therefore to the 
 Bible in support of the doctrine here advanced, we are 
 not, on the one hand appealing to an arbitrary standard, 
 a mere statute-book, a collection of laws which create 
 the obligations they enforce ; nor, on the other hand, to 
 "the reason and nature of things" in the abstract, which 
 after all is only our own reason; but we are apj^ealing 
 to the infinite intelligence of a personal God, whose wil' 
 because of his infinite excellence, is necessarily the ult 
 mate ground and rule of all moral obligation. Thif 
 however, being the case, whatever the Bible declares t( 
 be right is found to bo in accordance with the constitu- 
 tion of nature and our own reason. All that the scrip- 
 tures, for example, teach of the subordination of chil- 
 dren to their parents, of wives to their husbands, has 
 not its foundation, but its confirmation, in the very 
 nature of the relation of the parties. Any violation of 
 the precepts of iae LUble, on these points, is found to be 
 a violation of the laws of nature, and certainly destruc- 
 tive. In like manner it is clear from the social nature 
 of man, from the dependence of men upon each other, 
 from the impossibility of attaining the end of our being 
 m this world, otherwise than in society and under an 
 ordered government, that it is the will of God that such 
 society should exist. The design of God in this matter 
 is as plain as in the constitution of the universe. We 
 
19 
 
 might as well maintain that the laws of nature are the 
 result of chance, or that marriage and parental autho- 
 rity have no other foundation than human law, as to 
 assert that civil government has no firmer foundation 
 than the will of man or the quicksands of expediency. 
 By creating men social beings, and making it necessary 
 for them to live in society, God has made his will as 
 thus revealed the foundation of all civil government. 
 
 This doctrine is but one aspect of the comprehensive 
 doctrine of Theism, a doctrine which teaches the exist- 
 ence of a personal God, a Spirit infinite, eternal and 
 unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, justice, 
 holiness, goodness and truth; a God who is every- 
 where present upholding and governing all his creatures 
 and all their actions. The universe is not a machine 
 left to go of itself. God did not at first create matter and 
 impress upon it certain laws, and then leave it to their 
 blind operation. He is everywhere present in the ma- 
 terial world, not superseding secondary causes, but so 
 upholding and guiding their operations, that the intelli- 
 gence evinced is the omnipresent intelligence of God, 
 and the power exercised is the potestas ordinata of the 
 Great First Cause. He is no less supreme in his con- 
 trol of intelligent agents. They indeed are free, but 
 not independent. They are governed in a manner consis- 
 tent with their nature; yet God turns them as the 
 rivers of waters are turned. All events depending on 
 human agency are under his control. God is in history. 
 Neither chance nor blind necessity determines the con- 
 catenation or issues of things. Nor is the world in the 
 hands of its inhabitants. God has not launched our 
 globe on the ocean of space, and left its multitudinous 
 crew to direct its course without his interference. He 
 
20 
 
 is at the helm. His breath fills the sails. His wisdom 
 and power are pledged for the prosperity of the voyage. 
 Nothing happens, even to the falling of a sparrow, which 
 is not ordered by him. He works all things after the 
 counsel of his will. It is by him that kings reign and 
 princes decree justice. He puts down one, and raises 
 up another. As he leads out the stars by night, mar- 
 shalling them as a host, calling each one by its name, so 
 does he order all human events. He raises up nations, 
 and appoints the bounds of their habitation. He founds 
 the empires of the earth, and determines their form and 
 t^heir duration. This doctrine of God's universal provi- 
 dence is the foundation of all religion. If this doctrine 
 be not true, we are without God in the world. But if 
 it is true, it involves a vast deal. God is every where 
 in nature and in history. Every thing is a revelation 
 of his presence and power. We are always in contact 
 with him. Everything has a voice, which speaks of his 
 goodness or his wrath. Fruitful seasons proclaim his 
 goodness, famine and pestilence declare his displeasure. 
 Nothing is by chance. The existence of any particular 
 form of government is as much his work, as the rising 
 of the sun or falling of the rain. It is something he has 
 ordained for some wise purpose, and it is to be regarded 
 as his work. If all events are under God's control, if it 
 is by him that kings reign, then the actual possession of 
 power is as much a revelation of his will that it should 
 be obeyed, as the possession of wisdom or goodness is a 
 manifestation of his will that those endowed with those 
 gifts, should be reverenced and loved. It follows, there- 
 fore, from the universal providence of God, that " the 
 powers that be are ordained of God." We have no more 
 right to refuse obedience to an actually existing govern- 
 
21 
 
 rnent because it is not to our taste, or because we do not 
 a^Dprove of its measures, than a child has the right to 
 refuse to recognise a wayward parent ; or a wife a ca- 
 pricious husband. 
 
 The religious character of our civil duties jflows also 
 from the comprehensive doctrine that the will of God is 
 the ground of all moral obligation. To seek that ground 
 either in " the reason and nature of things," or in ex- 
 pediency, is to banish God from the moral world, as 
 effectually as the mechanical theory of the universe 
 banishes him from the physical universe and from his- 
 tory. Our allegiance on that hypothesis is not to God 
 but to reason or to society. This theory of morals there- 
 fore, changes the nature of religion and of moral obli- 
 gation. It modifies and degrades all religious sentiment 
 and exercises ; it changes the very nature of sin, of re- 
 pentance and obedience, and gives us, what is a perfect 
 solecism, a religion without God. According to the 
 Bible, our obligation to obey the laws of the land is not 
 founded on the fact that the good of society requires such 
 obedience or that it is a dictate of reason, but on the 
 authority of God. It is part of the service which we 
 owe to him. This must be so if the doctrine is true 
 that God is our moral governor, to whom we are respon- 
 sible for all our acts, and whose will is both the ground 
 and the rule of all our obligations. 
 
 We need not, however, dwell longer on this subject. 
 Although it has long been common to look upon civil 
 government as a human institution, and to represent 
 the consent of the governed as the only ground of the 
 obligation of obedience, yet this doctrine is so notorious- 
 ly of infidel origin, and so obviously in conflict with the 
 teachings of the Bible, that it can have no hold on the 
 
22 
 
 convictions of a Christian people. It is no more true of 
 the state than it is of the family, or of the church. All 
 are of divine institution. All have their foundation in 
 his will. The duties belonging to each are enjoined by 
 him and are enforced by his authority. Marriage is 
 indeed a voluntary covenant. The parties select each 
 other, and the state may make laws regulating the 
 mode in which the contract shall be ratified; and de- 
 termining its civil effects. It is, however, none the less 
 an ordinance of God. The vows it includes are made 
 to God ; its sanction is found in his law ; and its viola- 
 tion is not a mere breach of contract or disobedience to 
 the civil law, but a sin against God. So with regard 
 to the church, it is in one sense a voluntary society. 
 No man can be forced by other men to join its commu- 
 nion. If done at all it must be done with his own con- 
 sent, yet every man is under the strongest moral obli- 
 gation to enter its fold. And when enrolled in the 
 number of its members his obligation to obedience does 
 not rest on his consent ; it does not cease should that 
 consent be withdrawn. It rests on the authority of the 
 church as a divine institution. This is an authority 
 no man can throw off. It presses him everywhere and 
 at all times with the weight of a moral obligation. In 
 a sense analogous to this the state is a divine institu- 
 tion. Men are bound to organize themselves into a 
 civil government. Their obligation to obey its laws 
 does not rest upon their compact in this case, any more 
 than in the others above referred to. It is enjoined by 
 God. It is a religious duty, and disobedience is a direct 
 offence against him. The people have indeed the right 
 to determine the form of government under which they 
 are to live, and to modify it from time to time to suit 
 
^o 
 
 their changing condition. So, though to a less extent, 
 or within narrower limits, they have a right to modify 
 the form of their ecclesiastical governments, a right 
 which every church has exercised, but the ground and 
 nature of the obligation to obedience remains unchanged. 
 This is not a matter of mere theory. It is of primary 
 practical importance and has an all pervading influence 
 on national character. Everything indeed connected 
 with this subject depends on the answer to the ques- 
 tion, Why are we obliged to obey the laws ? If we 
 answer because we made them ; or because we assent 
 to them, or framed the government which enacts them ; 
 or because the good of society enjoins obedience, or 
 reason dictates it, then the state is a human institution ; 
 it has no religious sanction ; it is founded on the sand ; 
 it ceases to have a hold on the conscience and to com- 
 mend itself as a revelation of God to be reverenced and 
 obeyed as a manifestation of his presence and will. 
 But, on the other hand, if we place the state in the 
 same category with the family and the church, and 
 regard it as an institution of God, then we elevate it 
 into a higher sphere ; we invest it with religious sanc- 
 tions and it becomes pervaded by a divine presence and 
 authorit}^, which immeasurably strengthens, while it 
 elevates its power. Obedience for conscience sake is as 
 different from obedience from fear, or from voluntary 
 consent, or regard to human authority, as the divine 
 from the human. 
 
 Such being, as we conceive, the true doctrine con- 
 cerning the nature of the state, it is well to enquire 
 into the necessary deductions from this doctrine. If 
 government be a divine institution, and obedience to 
 the laws a matter resting on the authority of God, it 
 
24 
 
 might seem to follow that in no case could human laws 
 be disregarded with a good conscience. This, as we 
 have seen, is in fact the conclusion drawn from these 
 premises by the advocates of the doctrine of "passive 
 obedience." The command, however, to be subject to 
 the higher powers is not more unlimited in its state- 
 ment than the command, " children obey your parents 
 in all things." From this latter command no one draws 
 the conclusion that unlimited obedience is due from 
 children to their parents. The true inference doubtless 
 is, in both cases, that obedience is the rule and disobe- 
 dience the exception. If in any instance a child refuse 
 compliance with the requisition of a parent, or a citizen 
 with the law of the land, he must be prepared to justify 
 such disobedience at the bar of God. Even divine law? 
 may in some cases be dispensed with. Those indeed 
 which are founded on the nature of God, such as the 
 command to love Him and our neighbour, are necessa- 
 rily immutable. But those which are founded on the 
 present constitution of things, though permanent as 
 general rules of action, may on adequate grounds, be 
 violated without sin. The commands. Thou shalt not 
 kill, Thou shalt not steal, Remember the sabbath day 
 to keep it holy, are all of permanent authority ; and 
 yet there may be justifiable homicide, and men may pro- 
 fane the sabbath and be blameless. In like manner the 
 command to obey the laws, is a divine injunction, and 
 yet there are cases in which disobedience is a duty. It 
 becomes then of importance to determine what these 
 cases are ; or to ascertain the principles which limit the 
 obedience which we owe to the state. It follows from 
 the divine institution of government that its power is 
 limited by the design of God in its institution, and by 
 
25 
 
 the moral law. The family, the church and the state 
 are all divine institutions, designed for specific purposes. 
 Each has its own sphere, and the authority belonging to 
 each is necessarily confined within its own province. 
 The father appears in his household as its divinely 
 appointed head. By the command of God all the mem- 
 bers of that household are required to yield him rever- 
 ence and obedience. But he cannot carry his parental 
 authority into the church or the state ; nor can he ap- 
 pear in his family as a magistrate or church officer. 
 The obedience due to him is that which belongs to a 
 father, and not to a civil or ecclesiastical officer, and his 
 children are not required to obey him in either of those 
 capacities. In like manner the officers of the church 
 have within their sphere a divine right to rule, but they 
 cannot claim civil authority on the ground of the gen- 
 eral command to the people to obey those who have the 
 care of souls. Heb. xiii. 17. As the church officer 
 loses his power when he enters the forum ; so does the 
 civil magistrate when he enters the church. His right 
 to rule is a right which belongs to him as representing 
 God in the state — he has no commission to represent 
 God either in the family or the church ; and therefore, 
 he is entitled to no obedience if he claims an authority 
 which does not belong to him. This is a very obvious 
 principle, and is of wide application. It not only limit.s 
 the authority of civil officers to civil affairs, but limits 
 the extent due to the obedience to be rendered even in 
 civil matters to the officers of the state. A justice of 
 tlie peace has no claim to the obedience due to a go- 
 vernor of a state ; nor -a governor of a state to that 
 which belongs to the President of the Union ; nor the 
 President of the Union to that which may be rightfully 
 
26 
 
 claimed by an absolute sovereign. A military com- 
 mander has no authority over the community as a civil 
 magistrate, nor can he exercise such authority even 
 over his subordinates. This principle applies in all its 
 force to the law-making power. The legislature cannot 
 exercise any power which does not belong to them. 
 They cannot act as judges or magistrates unless such 
 authority has been actually committed to them. They 
 are to be obeyed as legislators ; and in any other capa- 
 city their decisions or commands do not bind the con- 
 science. And still further, their legislative enactments 
 have authority only when made in the exercise of their 
 legitimate powers. In other words, an unconstitutional 
 law^ is no law. If our Congress, for example, were to 
 pass a bill creating an order of nobility, or an estab- 
 lished church, or to change the religion of the land, or 
 to enforce a sumptuary code, it would have no more 
 virtue and be entitled to no more deference than a sim- 
 ilar enactment intended to bind the whole country 
 passed by a town council. This we presume will not 
 be denied. God has committed unlimited j^ower to no 
 man and to no set of men, and the limitation which he 
 has assigned to the power conferred, is to be found in 
 the design for which it was given. That design is de- 
 termined in the case of the f[imily, the church and the 
 state, by the nature of these institutions, by the general 
 precepts of the Bible, or by the providence of God de- 
 termining the peculiar constitution under which these 
 organizations are called to act. The power of a parent 
 was greater under the old dispensation than it is now; 
 the legitimate authority of the church is greater under 
 some modes of organization than under others ; and the 
 power of the state as represented in its constituted 
 
27 
 
 authorities is far more extensive in some countries than 
 in others. The theory of the British government is 
 that the parliament is the whole state in convention, 
 and therefore it exercises j^owers which do not belong- 
 to our congress, which represents the state only for 
 certain specified purposes. These diversities, however, 
 do not alter tlie general principle, which is that rulers 
 are to be obeyed in the exercise of their legitimate 
 authority; that their commands or requirements be- 
 yond their appropriate spheres are void of all binding 
 force. This is a principle which no one can dispute. 
 
 A second principle is no less plain. No human 
 authority can make it obligatory on us to commit sin. 
 If all power is of God it cannot be legitimately used 
 against God. This is a dictate of natural conscience, 
 and is authenticated by the clearest teachings of the 
 word of God. The apostles when commanded to ab- 
 stain from preaching Christ, refused to obey, and said, 
 " Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken 
 unto you more than unto God, judge ye." No human 
 law could make it binding on the ministers of the gos- 
 pel in our day to withhold the message of salvation 
 from their fellow men. It requires no argument to 
 prove that men cannot make it right to worship idols, 
 to blaspheme God, to deny Christ. It is sheer fanati- 
 cism thus to exalt the power of the government above 
 the authority of God. This would be to bring back 
 upon us some of the worst doctrines of the middle ages 
 as to the power of the pope and of earthly sovereigns. 
 Good men in all ages of the world have always acted 
 on the principle that human laws cannot bind the con- 
 science when they are in conflict wdth the law of God. 
 Daniel openly in the sight even of his enemies, prayed 
 
28 
 
 to the God of heaven in despite of the prohibition of his 
 sovereign. Shadrach, Mesheck and Abednego refused to 
 bow down, at the command of the king, to the golden im- 
 age. The early Christians disregarded all those laws of 
 Pagan Rome, requiring them to do homage to false Gods. 
 Protestants with equal unanimity refused to submit to 
 the laws of their papal sovereigns enjoining the profes- 
 sion of Romish errors. That these men were right no 
 man, with an enlightened conscience, can deny; but 
 they were right only on the principle that the power of 
 the state and of the magistrate is limited by the law of 
 God. It follows then from the divine institution of 
 government that its power to bind the conscience to 
 obedience is limited by the design of its appointment 
 and the moral law. All its power being from God, it 
 must be subordinate to him. This is a doctrine which, 
 however for a time and in words, it may be denied, is 
 too plain and too important not to be generally recog- 
 nised. It is a principle too which should at all times 
 be publicly avowed. The very sanctity of human laws 
 requires it. Their real power and authority lie in their 
 having a divine sanction. To claim for them binding- 
 force when destitute of such sanction, is to set up a 
 mere semblance for a reality, a suit of armour with no 
 living man within. The stability of human govern- 
 ment and the authority of civil laws require that they 
 should be kept within the sphere where they repose on 
 God, and are pervaded by his presence and power. 
 Without him nothing human can stand. All power is 
 of God ; and if of God, divine ; and if divine, in accord- 
 ance with his holy law. 
 
 But who are the judges of the application of these 
 principles ? Who is to determine whether a particular 
 
29 
 
 law, is unconstitutional or immoral? So far as the mere 
 constitutionality of a law is concerned, it may be re- 
 marked, that there is in most states, as in our own, for 
 example, a regular judicial tribunal to which every legis- 
 lative enactment can be submitted, and the question of 
 its conformity to the constitution authoritatively decided. 
 In all ordinary cases, that is, in all cases not involving 
 some great principle or some question of conscience, such 
 decisions must be held to be final, and to bind all con- 
 cerned not only to submission but obedience. A law thus 
 sanctioned becomes instinct with all the power of the 
 State, and further opposition brings the recusants into 
 conflict with the government ; a conflict in which no man 
 for light reasons can with a good conscience engage. 
 Still it cannot be denied, and ought not to be concealed, 
 that the ultimate decision must be referred to every 
 man's own judgment. This is a necessary deduction 
 from the doctrine that obedience to law is a religious 
 duty. It is a primary principle that the right of private 
 judgment extends over all questions of faith and morals. 
 No human power can come between God and the con- 
 science. Every man must answer for his own sins, and 
 therefore every man must have the right to determine 
 for himself what is sin. As he cannot transfer his re- 
 sponsibility, he cannot transfer his right of judgment. 
 This principle has received the sanction of good men in 
 every age of the world. Daniel judged for himself of 
 the binding force of the command not to worship the 
 true God. So did the apostles when they continued to 
 preach Christ, in opposition to all the constituted au- 
 thorities. The laws passed by Pagan Kome requiring 
 the worship of idols had the sanction of all the author- 
 ities of the empire, yet on the ground of their private 
 
30 
 
 judgment the Christians refused to obey them. Protest- 
 ants in like manner refused to obey the laws of Papal 
 Rome, though sustained by all the authority both of the 
 church and state. In all these cases the right of pri- 
 vate judgment cannot be disputed. Even where no 
 question of religion or morality is directly concerned, 
 this right is undeniable. Does any one now condemn 
 Hampden for refusing to pay " ship-money ?" Does any 
 American condemn our ancestors for resisting the stamp- 
 act though the authorities of St. Stephens and West- 
 minster united in pronouncing the imposition unconsti- 
 tutional? However this principle may be regarded 
 when stated in the abstract, every individual instinc- 
 tively acts upon it in his own case. Whenever a com- 
 mand is issued by one in authority over us, we immedi- 
 ately and almost unconsciously determine for ourselves, 
 first, whether he had a right to give the order ; and 
 secondly, whether it can with a good conscience be 
 obeyed. If this decision is clearly in the negative, we 
 at once determine to refuse obedience on our own re- 
 sponsibility. Let any man test this point by an appeal 
 to his own consciousness. Let him suppose the Presi- 
 dent of the United States to order him to turn Eomanist 
 or Pagan ; or Congress to pass a bill requiring him to 
 blaspheme God; or a militarj^ superior to command him 
 to commit treason or murder — does not his conscience 
 tell him he would on the instant refuse ? Would he, or 
 could he wait until the constitutionality of such requi- 
 sition had been submitted to the courts ? or if the courts 
 should decide against him, would that at all alter the 
 case ? Men must be strangely oblivious of the relation 
 of the soul to God, the instinctive sense which we pos- 
 sess of our allegiance to him, and of the self-evidencing 
 
31 
 
 power with which his voice reaches the reason and the 
 conscience, to question the necessity which every man 
 is under to decide all questions touching his duty to God 
 for himself. 
 
 It may indeed be thought that this doctrine is sub- 
 versive of the authority of government. A moment's 
 reflection is sufficient to dispel this apprehension. The 
 power of laws rests on two foundations, fear and con- 
 science. Both are left by this doctrine in their integri- 
 ty. The former, because the man refuses obedience at 
 his peril. His private conviction that the law is un- 
 constitutional or immoral does not abrogate it, or im- 
 pede its operation. If arraigned for its violation, he may 
 plead in his justification his objections to the authority 
 of the law. If these objections are found valid by the 
 competent authorities, he is acquitted ; if otherwise, he 
 suffers the penalty. What more can the State ask ? 
 All the power the State, as such, can give its laws, lies 
 in their penalty. A single decision by the ultimate au- 
 thority in favour of a law, is a revelation to the whole 
 body of the people that it cannot be violated with im- 
 punity. The sv/ord of justice hangs over every trans- 
 gressor. The motive of fear in securing obedience, is 
 therefore, as operative under this view of the subject, 
 as it can be under any other. What, however, is of far 
 more consequence, the power of conscience is left in full 
 force. Obedience to the law is a religious duty, enjoined 
 b}^ the word of God and enforced by conscience. If, in 
 any case, it be withheld, it is under a sense of responsi- 
 bility to God ; and under the conviction that if this con- 
 scientious objection be feigned, it aggravates the guilt of 
 disobedience as a sin against God an hundred fold ; and 
 if it be mistaken, it affords no palliation of the offence. 
 
32 
 
 Paul was guilty in persecuting the church, though he 
 thought he was doing God service. And the man, who 
 by a perverted conscience, is led to refuse obedience to 
 righteous law, stands without excuse at the bar of God. 
 The moral sanction of civil laws, which gives them their 
 chief power and without which they must ultimately 
 become inoperative, cannot possibly extend further than 
 this. For what is that moral sanction ? It is a convic- 
 tion that our duty to God requires our obedience ; but 
 how can we feel that duty to God requires us to do what 
 God forbids ? In other words, a law which we regard 
 as immoral, cannot present itself to the conscience as 
 having divine authority. Conscience, therefore, is on 
 the side of the law wherever and whenever this is possi- 
 ble from the nature of the case. It is a contradiction 
 to say that conscience enforces what conscience con- 
 demns. This then is all the support which laws of the 
 land can possibly derive from our moral convictions. 
 The allegiance of conscience is to God. It enforces obe- 
 dience to all human laws consistent with that allegiance; 
 further than this it cannot by possibility go. And as 
 the decisions of conscience are, by the constitution of 
 our nature, determined by our own apprehensions of the 
 moral law, and not by authority, it follows of necessity 
 that every man must judge for himself, and on his own 
 responsibility, whether any given law of man conflicts 
 with the law of God or not. 
 
 We would further remark on this point that the lives 
 and property of men have no greater protection than 
 that which, on this theory, is secured for the laws of the 
 state. The law of God says : Thou shalt not kill. Yet 
 every man does, and must judge when and how far this 
 law binds his conscience. It is admitted, on all hands, 
 
that there are cases in which its obligation ceases. 
 What those cases are each man determines for himself, 
 but under his two fold responsibility to his country and 
 to God. If through passion or any other cause, he errs 
 as to what constitutes justifiable homicide, he must bear 
 the penalty attached to murder by the law of God and 
 man. It is precisely so in the case before us. God has 
 commanded us to obey the magistrate as his minister 
 and representative. If we err in our judgment as to 
 the cases in which that command ceases to be binding, 
 we fall into the hands of justice both human and di^-ine. 
 Can more than this be necessary ? Can any thing be 
 gained by trying to make God require us to break his 
 own commands ? Can conscience be made to sanction 
 the \dolation of the moral law ? Is not this the way to 
 destroy all moral distinctions, and to prostrate the 
 authority of conscience, and with it the very founda- 
 tion of civil government ? Is not all history full of the 
 dreadful consequences of the doctrine that human laws 
 can make sin obligatory, and that those in authority 
 can judge for the people what is sin? What more 
 than this is needed to justify all the ^persecutions for 
 righteousness sake since the world began ? What hope 
 could there be, on this ground, for the preservation of 
 religion or virtue in any nation on the earth ? If the 
 principle be once established that the people are bound 
 to obey all human laws, or that they are not to judge 
 for themselves when their duty to God requires them to 
 refuse such obedience, then there is not only an end of 
 all ci^il and religious liberty, but the very nature of 
 civil government as a divine institution is destroyed. 
 It becomes first atheistical, and then diabolical. Then 
 
 the massacre of St. Bartholomew's, the decrees of the 
 
 3 
 
34 
 
 French National Assembly, and the laws of Pagan 
 Rome against Christians, and of its Papal successor 
 against Protestants, were entitled to reverent obedience. 
 Then too may any infidel party which gains the ascen^ 
 dency in a state, as has happened of late in Switzerland, 
 render it morally obligatory upon all ministers to close 
 their churches, and on the jDeople to renounce the gospel. 
 This is not an age or state of the world in which to 
 advance such doctrines. There are too many evidences 
 of the gathering powers of evil to render it expedient 
 to exalt the authority of man above that of God, or 
 emancipate men from subjection to their Master in 
 heaven, that they may become more obedient to their 
 masters on earth. We are advocating the cause of 
 civil government, of the stability and authority of 
 human laws, when we make eyery thing rest on the 
 authority of God, and when we limit every human 
 power by subordinating it to him. We hold, therefore, 
 that it is not only one of the plainest principles of 
 morals that no immoral law can bind the conscience, 
 and that every man must judge of its character for him- 
 self and on his own responsibility, but that this doc- 
 trine is essential to all religious liberty and to the reli- 
 gious sanction of civil government. If you deny this 
 principle, you thereby deny that government is a divine 
 institution, and denying that, you deprive it of its vital 
 energy, and send it tottering to a dishonoured grave. 
 
 But here the great practical question arises. What i» 
 to be done when the law of the land comes into conflict 
 with the law of God — or, which is to us the same thing, 
 with our convictions of what that law demands ? In 
 answer to this question we would remark, in the first 
 place, that in most cases the majority of the people 
 
35 
 
 have nothing to do, except peaceably to use their influ- 
 ence to have the law repealed. This mass of the peo- 
 ple have nothing actively to do with the laws. Very 
 few enactments of the government touch one in a thou- 
 sand in the population. We may think a protective 
 tariff not only inexpedient, but unequal and therefore 
 unjust. But we have nothing to do with it. We are 
 not responsible for it, and are not called upon to enforce 
 it. This remark applies even to laws of a higher cha- 
 racter, such, e. g. as a law proclaiming an unjust war; 
 forbidding the introduction of the Bible into public 
 schools; requiring homage or sanction to be given to 
 idolatrous services by public officers, &c., &c. Such laws 
 do not touch the mass of the people. They do not re- 
 quire them either to do, or to abstain from doing, anything 
 which conscience forbids or enjoins ; and therefore their 
 duty in the premises may be limited to the use of legiti- 
 mate means to have laws of which they disapprove 
 repealed. . 
 
 In the second place, those executive officers who are 
 called upon to carry into effect a law which requires 
 Ihem to do what their conscience condemns, must 
 resign their office, if they would do their duty to God. 
 Some years since, General Maitland (if we remember 
 correctly) of the Madras Presidency, in India, resigned 
 a lucrative and honourable post, because he could not 
 conscientiously give the sanction to the Hindu idolatry 
 required by the British authorities. And within the 
 last few months, we have seen hundreds of Hessian 
 officers throw up their commissions rather than trample 
 on the constitution of their country. On the same 
 principle the non-conformists in the time of Charles II. 
 and the ministers of the Free Church of Scotland, in 
 
36 
 
 our day, gave up their stipends and their position, 
 because they could not with a good conscience carry 
 into effect the law of the land. It is not intended that 
 an executive officer should, in all cases, resign his 
 post rather than execute a law which in his private 
 judgment he may regard as unconstitutional or unjust. 
 The responsibility attaches to those who make, and not 
 to those who execute the laws. It is only when the 
 act, which the officer is called upon to perform, involves 
 personal criminality, that he is called upon to decline 
 its execution. Thus in the case of war; a military 
 officer is not the proper judge of its justice. This is 
 not a question between him and the enemy, but between 
 his government and the hostile nation. On the suppo- 
 sition that war itself is not sinful, the act which the 
 military officer is called upon to perform is not criminal, 
 and he may with a good conscience carry out the com- 
 mands of his government, whatever may be his private 
 opinion of the justice of the war. All such cases no 
 doubt ar emore or less complicated, and must be decided 
 each on its own merits. The general principle, how- 
 ever, appears plain, that it is only when the act required 
 of an executive officer involves personal criminality, 
 that he is called upon to resign. This is a case that 
 often occurs. In Romish countries, as Malta, for ex- 
 ample, British officers have been required to do homage 
 to the host, and on their refusal have been cashiered. 
 An instance of this kind occurred a few years ago, and 
 produced a profound sensation in England. This was 
 clearly a case of great injustice. The command was 
 an unrighteous one. The duty of the officer was to 
 resign rather than obey. Had the military authorities 
 taken a fair view of the question, they must have do- 
 
37 
 
 cided that the command to bow to the host, was not 
 obhgatory, because ultra vires. But if such an order 
 was insisted upon, the conscientious Protestant must 
 resign his commission. 
 
 The next question is, What is the duty of private 
 citizens in the case supposed, i. e. when the civil law 
 either forbids them to do what God commands, or com- 
 mands them to do what God forbids? We answer, 
 their duty is not obedience, but submission. These are 
 different things. A law consists of two parts, the pre- 
 cept and the penalty. We obey the one, and submit 
 to the other. When we are required by the law to do 
 what our conscience pronounces to be sinful, we cannot 
 obey the precept, but we are bound to submit without 
 resistance to the penalty. We are not authorised to 
 abrogate the law ; nor forcibly to resist its execution, 
 no matter how great its injustice or cruelty. On this 
 principle holy men have acted in all ages. The apostles 
 did not obey the precept of the Jewish laws forbidding 
 them to preach Christ, but neither did they resist the 
 execution of the penalty attached to the violation of 
 those laws. Thus is was with all the martyrs, they 
 would not offer incense to idols, but refused not to be 
 led to the stake. Had Cranmer, on the ground of the 
 iniquity of the law condemning him to death, killed 
 the officers who came to carry it into effect, he would 
 have been guilty of murder. Here is the great differ- 
 ence which is often overlooked. The right of self- 
 defence is appealed to as justifying resistance even to 
 death against all attempts to deprive us of our liberty. 
 We have this right in reference to unauthorized indi- 
 viduals, but not in reference to the officers of the law. 
 Had men without authority entered Cranmer's house 
 
38 
 
 puB attempted to take his life, his resistance, even if 
 attended with the loss of life, would have been justifia- 
 ble. But no man has the right to resist the execution 
 of the law. What could be more iniquitous than the 
 laws condemning men to death for the worship of God. 
 Yet to these laws Christians and Protestants yielded un- 
 resisting submission. This is an obvious duty flowing 
 from the divine institution of government. There is no 
 power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained 
 of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power 
 resisteth tlie ordinance of God ; and they that resist 
 shall receive to themselves damnation. Thus Paul 
 reasoned. If the power is of God, it cannot be right- 
 fully resisted ; it must be obeyed or submitted to. Are 
 wicked, tyrannical, pagan powers of God ? Certainly 
 they are. Does not he order all things ? Does any 
 man become a king without God's permission granted 
 in mercy or in judgment ? Was not Nero to be recog- 
 nised as emperor ? Would it not be a sin to refuse 
 submission to Nicholas of Russia, or to the Sultan of Tur- 
 key ? Are rulers to be obeyed only for their goodness ? 
 Is it only kind and reasonable masters, parents, or 
 husbands who are to be recognised as such ? It is no 
 doubt true that in no case is unlimited authority grant- 
 ed to men ; and that obedience to the precepts of our 
 superiors is limited by the nature of their office, and 
 by the moral law ; but this leaves their authority un- 
 touched, and the obligation to submission Avhere we 
 cannot obey, unimpaired. 
 
 Have we then got back to the old doctrine of " pas- 
 sive obedience" by another route ? Not at all. The 
 scriptural rule above recited relates to individuals. It 
 prescribes the duty of submission even to unjust and 
 
39 
 
 wicked laws on the part of men in their separate capa- 
 city ; but it does not deny the right of revolution as 
 existing in the community. What the scriptures forbid 
 is that any man should undertake to resist the law. 
 They do not forbid either change in the laws or change 
 in the government. There is an obvious diflerence be- 
 tween these two things, viz. the right of resistance on 
 the part of individuals, and the right of revolution on 
 the part of the people. The latter right we argue from 
 the divine institution of government itself. God has 
 revealed his will that government should exist, but he 
 has not prescribed the form which it shall assume. 
 In other words, he has commanded men to organize 
 such government, but has left the form to be deter- 
 mined by themselves. This is a necessary inference. It 
 follows from the mere silence of scripture and nature 
 on this subject, that it is left free to the determination 
 of those to whom the general command is given. In 
 the next place, this right is to be inferred from the de- 
 sign of civil government. That design is the welfare 
 of the people. It is the promotion of their physical and 
 moral improvement ; the security of life and property ; 
 the punishment of evil doers, and the praise of those 
 who do well. If such is the end which God designs 
 government to answer, it must be his will that it should 
 be made to accomplish that purpose, and consequently 
 that it may be changed from time to time so as to se- 
 cure that end. No one form of government is adapted 
 to all states of society, any more than one suit of clothes 
 is proper to all stages of life. The end for which cloth- 
 ing is designed, supposes the right to adapt it to that 
 end. In like manner the end government is intended 
 to answer, supposes the right to modify it whenever 
 
40 
 
 such modification is necessary. If God commands men 
 to accomplish certain ends, and does not prescribe the 
 means, he does thereby leave the choice of the means 
 to their discretion. And any institution which fails to 
 accomplish the end intended by it, if it has not a divine 
 sanction as to its form, may lawfully be so changed as 
 to suit the purpose for which it was appointed. We 
 hold therefore that the people have by divine right the 
 authority to change, not only their rulers but their form 
 of government, whenever the one or the other, instead 
 of promoting the well-being of the community, is unjust 
 or injurious. This is a right which, like all other pre- 
 rogatives, may be exercised unwisely, capriciously, or 
 even unjustly, but still it is not to be denied. It has 
 been recognised and exercised in all ages of the world, 
 and with the sanction of the best of men. It is as una- 
 voidable and healthful as the changes in the body to 
 adapt it to the increasing vigour of the mind, in its 
 progress from infancy to age. The progress of society 
 depends on the exercise of this right. It is impossible 
 that its powers should be developed, if it were to be 
 forever wrapt up in its swaddling clothes, or coffined as 
 a mummy. The early Christians submitted quietly to 
 the unjust laws of their Pagan oppressors, until the 
 mass of the community become Christians, and then 
 they revolutionized the government. Protestants acted 
 in the same way with their papal rulers. So did our 
 forefathers, and so may any people whose form of go- 
 vernment no longer answers the end for which God has 
 commanded civil government to be instituted. The 
 Quakers are now a minority in all the countries in 
 which they exist, and furnish an edifying example of 
 submission to laws which they cannot conscientiously 
 
 \ 
 
41 
 
 obey. But should they come, in any political society, 
 to be the controlling power, it is plain they would have 
 the right to conduct it on their own principles. 
 
 The right of revolution therefore is really embedded 
 in the right to serve God. A government which inter- 
 feres with that service, which commands what God for- 
 bids, or forbids what he commands, we are bound by 
 our duty to him to change as soon as we have the power. 
 If this is not so, then God has subjected his people to 
 the necessity of always submitting to punishment for 
 obeying his commands, and has cut them off from the 
 only means which can secure their peaceful and secure 
 enjoyment of the liberty to do his will. No one, how- 
 ever, in our land, or of the race to which we belong, 
 will be disposed to question the right of the people io 
 change their form of government. Our history forbids 
 all diversity of sentiment on this subject. We are only 
 concerned to show that the scriptural doctrine of civil 
 government is perfectly consistent with that right ; or 
 rather that the right is one of the logical deductions 
 from that doctrine. 
 
 We have thus endeavoured to prove that government 
 is a divine institution ; that obedience to the laws is a 
 religious duty ; that such obedience is due in all cases 
 in which it can be rendered with a good conscience ; 
 that when obedience cannot be yielded without sinning 
 iigainst God, then our duty as individuals is quietly to 
 submit to the infliction of the penalty attached to diso- 
 bedience ; and that the right of resistance or of revolu- 
 tion rests only in the body of people for whose benefit 
 government is instituted. 
 
 The application of these principles to the case of the 
 fugitive slave law is so obvious, as hardly to justify 
 
42 
 
 remark. The great body of the people regard that law 
 as consistent with the constitution of the country and 
 the law of God. Their duty, therefore, in the j)remises, 
 whether they think it wise or unwise, is perfectly plain. 
 Those who take the opposite view of the law, having in 
 the great majority of cases, nothing to do with enforcing 
 it, are in no measure responsible for it. Their duty is 
 limited to the use of peaceable and constitutional means 
 to get it repealed. A large part of the people of this 
 country thought the acquisition of Louisiana ; the ad- 
 mission of Texas into the union by a simple resolution ; 
 the late Mexican war ; were either unjust or unconsti- 
 tutional, but there was no resistance to these measures. 
 None was made, and none would have been justifiable. 
 So in the present case, as the people generally are not 
 called upon either to do, or to forbear from doing, any- 
 thing their conscience forbids, all resistance to the ope- 
 ration of this law on their part must be without excuse. 
 With regard to the executive officers, whose province 
 it is to carry the law into effect, though some of them 
 may disapprove of it as unwise, harsh or oppressive, 
 still they are bound to execute it, unless they believe 
 the specific act which they are called upon to perform 
 involves personal criminality, and then their duty is the 
 resignation of their office, and not resistance to the law. 
 There is the most obvious difference between an officer 
 being called upon to execute a decision of a court, 
 which in his private opinion he thinks unjust, and his 
 being called upon to blaspheme, or commit murder. 
 The latter involves personal guilt, the former does not. 
 He is not the judge of the equity or propriety of the 
 decision which he is required to carry into effect. It is 
 evident that the wheels of society would be stopt if 
 
43 
 
 every officer of the government, and every minister of 
 justice should feel that he is authorized to sit in judg- 
 ment on the wisdom or righteousness of any law he was 
 called upon to execute. He is responsible for his own 
 acts, and not for the judgments of others, and therefore 
 when the execution of a law or of a command of a su- 
 perior does not require him to sin, he is free to obey. 
 
 Again, in those cases in which we, as private individ- 
 uals, may l^e called upon to assist in carrying the fugi- 
 tive slave law into effect, if we cannot obey, we must 
 do as the Quakers have long done with regard to our 
 military laws, i. e. quietly submit. We have no right 
 to resist, or in any way to impede the operation of the 
 law. Whatever sin there is in it, does not rest on us, 
 any more than the sin of our military system rests on 
 the Quakers.* 
 
 And finally, as regards the fugitives themselves, their 
 obvious duty is submission. To them the law must ap-* 
 pear just as the laws of the Pagans against Christians, 
 or of Romanists against Protestants, appeared to those 
 who suffered from them. And the duty in both cases 
 is the same. Had the martyrs put^o death the officers 
 of the law, they would in the sight of God and man 
 been guilty of murder. And any one who teaches fugi- 
 
 * The doctrine that the executive ofiBcers of a government are not the re- 
 sponsible judges of the justice of its decisions, is perfectly consistent -with the 
 principle udvanced above, viz., that every man has the right to judge for him- 
 self whether any law or command is obligatory. This latter principle relates 
 to acts for which we are personally responsible. If a military oificer is com- 
 manded to commit treason or murder, he is bound to refuse ; because these 
 acts are morally wrong. But if commanded to lead an army against an enemy 
 he is bound to obey, for that is not morally wrong. He is the judge of his own 
 act, but not of the act of the government in declaring tlie war. So a sheriff, 
 if he thinks all capital punishment a violation of God's law, he cannot cany a 
 sentence of death into effect, because the act itself is sinful in his view. But 
 be is not the judge of the justice of any particular sentence he is called on to 
 execute. He may judge of' his own part of the transaction; but he is not re- 
 eponsiblc for the act of the judge and the jury. 
 
44 
 
 tive slaves to resort to violence even to the sacrifice of 
 life, in resisting the law in question, it seems to us, is 
 guilty of exciting men to murder. As before remarked, 
 the principle of self-defence does not apply in this case. 
 Is there no difference between a man who kills an as- 
 sassin who attempts his life on the highway, and the 
 man who, though knowing himself to be innocent of the 
 crime for which he has been condemned to die, should 
 kill the officers of justice? The former is a case of jus- 
 tifiable homicide, the other is a case of murder. The 
 officers of justice are not the offenders. They are not 
 the persons responsible for the law or the decision. 
 That responsibility rests on the government. Private 
 vengeance cannot reach the State. And if it could, such 
 vengeance is not the remedy ordained by God for such 
 evils. They are to be submitted to, until the govern- 
 ment can be changed. How did our Lord act when he 
 was condemned by an oppressive judgment, and with 
 wicked hands crucified and slain ? Did he kill the Ro- 
 man soldiers ? Has he not left us an example that we 
 should follow his steps : who did no sin, neither was 
 guile found in his mouth ; who, when he was reviled, 
 reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not ; 
 but committed himself unto him that judgeth right- 
 eously. On this principle did all his holy martyrs act ; 
 and on this principle are we bound to act in submitting 
 to the laws of the land, even when we deem them op- 
 pressive or unjust. 
 
 The principles advocated in this paper appear to us 
 so elementary, that we feel disposed to apologize for 
 presenting them in such a formal manner. But every 
 generation has to learn the alphabet for itself And 
 the mass of men are so occupied with other matters, 
 
, 45 
 
 that they do not give themselves time to discriminate. 
 Their judgments are dictated, in many cases, by their 
 feehngs, or their circumstances. One man simply 
 looks to the hardship of forcing a slave back to bond- 
 age, and he impulsively counsels resistance unto blood. 
 Another looks to the evils which follow from resistance 
 to law, and he asserts that human laws are in all cases 
 to be obeyed. Both are obviously wrong. Both would 
 overthrow all government. The one by justif^dng every 
 man's taking the law into his own hands ; and the 
 other by destroying the authority of God, which is the 
 only foundation on which human government can rest. 
 It is only by acting on the direction of the Divine Wis- 
 dom incarnate : '• Render unto Cesar the things that 
 are Cesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" 
 that these destructive extremes are to be avoided. Gov- 
 ernment is a divine institution ; obedience to the laws 
 is commanded by God ; and yet like all other divine 
 commands of the same class, there are cases in which 
 it ceases to be obligation. Of these cases every one 
 must judge for himself on his own responsibility to God 
 i and man ; but when he cannot obey, his duty is to 
 i submit. The divinely appointed remedy for unjust or 
 oppressive legislation is not private or tumultuous 
 opposition, but the repeal of unrighteous enactments, or 
 the reorganization of the government. 
 
 What, however, we have had most at heart in the 
 preparation of this article, is the exhibition of the great 
 principle that all authority reposes on God ; that all 
 our obligations terminate on him ; that government is 
 not a mere voluntary oompact, nor obedience to law an 
 obligation which rests on the consent of the governed. 
 We regard this as a matter of primary importance. 
 
46 . 
 
 The character of men and of communities depen^ls, to 
 a great extent on their faith. The theory of morals 
 which they adopt determines their moral character. 
 If they assume that expediency is the rule of duty, that 
 a thing is right because it produces happiness, or 
 wrong because it produces misery, that this tendency is 
 not merely the test between right and wrong, but the 
 o-round of the distinction, then, the specific idea of 
 moral excellence and obligation is lost. All questions 
 of duty are merged into a calculation of profit and loss. 
 There is no sense of God ; reason or society takes his 
 place, and an irreligious, calculating cast of character 
 is the inevitable result. This is counteracted in indi- 
 viduals and the community by various causes, for 
 neither the character of a man nor that of a society i» 
 determined by any one opinion; but its injurious in- 
 fluence may nevertheless be most manifest and deplora- 
 ble. No man can fail to see the deteriorating influence 
 of this theory of morals on public character both in 
 this country and in England. If we would make men 
 religious and moral, instead of merely cute, let us f>lace 
 God before them ; let us teach them that his will is the 
 ^n-ound of their obligations ; that they are responsible 
 to him for all their acts ; that their allegiance as moral 
 ao-ents is not to reason or to society, but to the heart- 
 searching God! that the obligation to obey the laws of 
 the land does not rest on their consent to them, but to 
 the fact that government is of God ; that those who resist 
 the magistrate, resist the ordinance of God, and that 
 they who resist shall receive unto themselves damna- 
 tion. This is the only doctrine which can give stability 
 either to morals or to government. Man's allegiance is 
 not to reason in the abstract, nor to society, but to a 
 
47 
 
 personal God, who has power to destroy both soul and 
 body in hell. This is a law revealed in the constitution 
 of our nature, as well as by the lips of Christ. And 
 to no other sovereign can the soul yield rational obedi- 
 ence. We might as well attempt to substitute some 
 mechanical contrivance of our own, for the law of 
 gravitation, as a means of keeping the planets in their 
 orbits, as to expect to govern men by any thing else 
 than the fear of an Infinite God. 
 
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