CEN. S. COOPER. -r the Thi:-, SOUTHEKN HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. BY EDWARD A. POLLAED, AUTHOR OF "FIRST AND SECOND YEARS OF THE "WAR.' -^ p 7 7 v: / NEW YORK: ' CHARLES B. RICHARDSON, 441 BEOADWAY. 1866. Entered according to Act of Consress, in the year 1S64 By CHARLES B. RICHARDSON, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. INTRODUCTION. The author has composed this work under many and severe difficulties. The materials were collected in Richmond, while the author was burdened with the heavy duties of public journalism. After this explanation, and in the third volume of his work, it is, perhaps, unnecessary for the author to repeat that he has not sought literary ornament, or attempted a high standard of historical composition. He has only designed to make a faithful compendium of events, which will illustrate, for the present, what is most interesting in the American War, and serve as a foundation for future and more enlarged inquiries. It may be that these, his unambitious labors, will be appro- priated by others, who will rear upon them a superstructure of their own ; but he cherishes the hope that he is not destined to lose to others the benefit of his early records, and that he may, at some future time, be able to compose a work on the American War, worthy of its importance, and its relations to the interests and philosophy of the present generation. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Review of the Battle of Chaucellorsville.-Two Defects in the Victory of the Con- federates.-" The Finest Army on the Planet."-Analysis of the Victory.-General- ship of Lee.-Services and Character of the great Confederate Leader.-His Com- monphaces and his Virtues.-The Situation in Virginia.-Lee's Preparations for tlie Summer Carapaign.-Hooker to be Maneuvered out of Virginia-Reorganization ot Lee's Army.-Tlie Attair of Brandy Station.-TaE Capture of ^\ inchester.-TIic Affair of Aldie's Station.-Lee's Army Crossing the Potomac -Invasion of Pennsyl- Tania.-Alarm in the North.-Hooker Out-Generalled and Removed.-The Mild Warfare of the Confederate Invaders.-Southern "Chivalry."-General Lee s Error. -His Splendid March from Culpepper Court House to Gettysburg.-Feverish Anti- cipations in Richmond.-THE Battle of GETTTSBUuo.-First Day's Engagement.- A Regiment of Corpses.-Charge of Gordon's Brigade.-The Nine Mississippi Heroes.-The Yankees Driven through Gettysburg.-A Fatal Mistake of the Con- federates. -General Lee's Embarrassments.-THE Second Day. -Cemetery HiU.- Early's Attack Almost a Success.-Adventure of Wright's Bngade.-TnE rniRU DAT.-Sublime Terrors of the ArtiUery.-Heroic and Ever-Memorable Charge ot Pickett's Division on the Heights.-Half a Mile of Shot and Sliell.-Pickett s Sup- ports Fail.-The Recoil.-Generai Lee's Behavior.-His Greatness m Disaster -Im- mense Carnage.-Death of General Barksdale, " the Haughty Rebel."-General Lee s Retreat.-The Affair of Williamsport.-Lee Recrosses the Potomac-Success ot his Retreat.-Yankee Misrepresentation. -Review of the Pennsylvania Campaign.-Halt of Lee's Plans Disconcerted at Richmond.-Results of the Battle of Gettysburg Ne- gative.-Lee's Retreat Across the Potomac an Inconsequence-Disappointment in Kiclimond.-The Budget of a Single Day in the Confederate Capital Page 1- CHAPTER H. Vicksburg, "the Heroic City."-Its Value to the Confederacy.-An Opportunity Lost by Butler. -Lieutenant-general Pemberton.-A Favorite of President Da- vis—The President's Obstinacy.— Blindness of Pemberton to the Enemy s De- Bi.^n*.-His Telegram to Johnston.-Plan of U. S. Grant.-Its Daring.-TnE Battle OF Port GiBsoN.-Exposure of General Bowen by Pemberton.-The First Mistake.- Pemberton's Disregard of Johnston's Orders.-Grant's advance against Jackson — Johnston's Evacuation of Jackson.-His Appreciation of the Situation.-Urgent Or- ders to Pemberton.-A Brilliant Opportunity.— Pemberton's Contumacy and btnpul- ity.-His Irretrievable Error. -Yankee Outrages in Jackson.-THE Battle of Baker s Creek, &c.-Stevenson's Heroic Fight.-Alleged Dereliction of General Loring.- His Division Cat Off in the Retreat.-Demoralizatiou of Pemberton's Troops.-T.ie Enemy's Assault on the Big Black.-Shameful Behavior of the Confederates.-A 6 CONTKNTS. Georgia Hero. — Pcmberton and the Fnofitives. — Ilis Return to Vicksburg. — Eecrim- inations as to the Disaster of the Big Bhick. — How Pemberton Was in the Wrong. — Johnston Orders the Evacuation of Vicksburg. — Peniberton's Determination to Hold It I'age 41 CHAPTER III. The Defences of Vicksburg.— Pemberton's Force.— His Troops Reinspirited.— A Memorable Appeal.— Grant's Assault on the Works. — Confidence of the Yankees. — Their Repulse and Losses. — Commencement of Siege Operations. — Confidence in Richmond.— Johnston's Secret Anticipation of the Fall of Vicksburg. — His Alleged Inability to Avert it.— Critical Condition of the Confederate Armies in Numbers. — Secret Correspondence of Richmond Officials.— Mr. Seddon's Bait of Flattery.— Suf- ferings of the Garrison of Vicksburg. — Johnston's Attempt to E.xtricate them. — Pro- posed Diversion in the Trans-Mississippi. — Its Failure. — A Message from Pemberton. A Gleam of Hope.— An Important Despatch Miscarries.— The Garrison Unable to Fight Their Way Out.- But Their Condition not Extreme.— Pemberton's Surrender on the Fourth of July.— Surprise in Richmond— Mendacity of the Telegraph.— The Story of the Rats and Mules.— Pemberton's Statement as to his Supplies. — His Ex- planation as to the Day of Surrender.— The last Incident of Humiliation.— Behavior of the Vicksburg Population.— A Rival of "The Beast."— Appearance and Manners of the City under Yankee Rule.— Consequences of the Fall of Vicksburg.— The Yan- kee Reoccupation of Jackson.— Johnston's Second Evacuation. — The Enemy's Rav- ages in Mississippi.— How they Compared with Lee's Civilities in Pennsylvania. — The Fall of Port Hudson, &c. — Enemy's Capture of Yazoo City. — The Battle OK Helena.— The Trans-Mississippi. — Repulse of the Confederates.— Abandonment of Little Rock.— Tlie Trials and Sufferings of the Trans-Mississippi Department.— Hindman's Memorable Rule.— Military Autocracy.— The Generous and Heroic Spirit of the Trans-Mississippi Page 59 CHAPTER lY. Elasticity of the Spirit of the Confederacy.— What it Taught.— Decay of Confi- dence in President Davis's Administration.— His Affection for Pemberton.— A Season of Eneouraffing Events. — The Campaign in Lower Louisiana.— Capture of Brashear City.— The Affair of Donaldson.- The Siege of Charleston.— Operations of the Enemy on Folly Island.— General Beauregard's Embarrassments.— Assault of the -Enemy of Fort Wagner.— His Foothold on Morris Island.— Beauregard's Designs.— Bombardment of Fort Wagner.— Second Repulse of the Enemy's Assault.— Gilmore'a Insolent Denuind.— His Attempt to Fire Charleston.— A Noble Reply from Beaure- gard.— Bombardment of Fort Sumler.— The Fort in Ruins.— Evacuation of Morris Island by the Confederates.— The Yankee Congratulations.- Devilish Penalti^^ for " the SecessiGn City."— Dahlgren's Part of the Programme.— His Night Attack on Sumter.— His Failure.- Safety of Charleston.— Bitterness of Yankee Disappointment. —Morgan's Expedition into Indiana and Ohio. — His Capture of Lebanon. — An ^ Unnatural Encounter.— Murder of Captain Magennis.— The Incursion Through Indi- ana.— The Yankee Pursuit.— A Chaplain's Trick.— Operations in Ohio.— The Affair of BuflBngton Island.— Morgan's Attempt to Escape.— His Capture and Imprison- ment.— Results of his Expedition, Strategic and Material.— The Value of Military Adventure Page 81 CONTENTS. CHAPTER Y. Contrast between our Military Fortunes in the East and in the West. — Some Reasons for our Success iu Virginia. — Her Hearty Co-operation with the Confederate Autliorities. — Her Contributions to the War. — General Bragg's Situation in Tennes- see. — Confederate criticisms on General Kosecrans. — Opinion of the " Chattanooga Rebel." — An Extensive Movement Contemplated by Eosecrans. — Bragg's Eetreat to Chattanooga. — The Yankees on a Double Line of Operations. — Buckner's Evacuation of Knoxvilie. The Sukrendek of Cumberland Gap. — President Davis's Comment on the Surrender. — The Battles of Chi-ckamauga. — Braggs' Evacuation of Chatta- nooga. — Topography of the Battle.-.field. — Thomas's Column of Yankees in McLemore's Cove. — Disobedience of Orders by Lieutenant-general Hi^l of the Confederates. — Bragg's Orders to Lieutenant-general Polk. — Two Opportunities Lost. Note: Bragg's Secret and Official Eeport of the Miscarriage of His Plans. — The First Day's Engagement on the Chickamauga. — Second Day. — General Polk's Fight on our Eight. — Longstreet's Successful Attack on the Left. — The Grand Charge. — Eout of the Enemy. — Longstreet's Message to Bragg. — Forrest Up a Tree. — Bragg Declines to Pursue. — His Hesitation and Error. — His Movement upon Chattanooga. — Boast of Eosecrans. — An Empty Victory for the Confederates. — Bragg's Awkward Pause. — Discussions of the Campaign. — His Supposed Investment of Chattanooga. — Two Blunders of the Confederate Commander. — Chickamauga a Second Edition of Bull Eun. Note ; Observations of a General Officer of the Confederate States Army on the Campaign in the West Page 106 CHAPTER 71. Political Movements in the Fall of 1863.— The "Peace Party" in the North.— The Yankee Fall Elections. — The War Democrats in the North.— The South's Worst Enemies. — Yankee Self-Glorification. — Farragut's Dinner-Party. — The Eussian Ban- quet. — Eussia and Y'ankeedom. — The Poles and the Confederates. — The Political Troubles in Kentucky. — Bramlette and Wickclift'e. — The Democratic Platform in Kentucky. — Political Ambidexterity. — Burnside's Despotic Orders. — The Kentucky " Board of Trade." — An Election by Bayonets. — The Fate of Kentucky Sealed. — Our European Eelations. — Dismissal of the Foreign Consuls in the Confederacy. — Seizure of the Confederate " Earns" in England. — The Confederate Privateers. — Their Achievements. — British Interests in Privateering. — The Profits of So-called "Neutrality." — Naval Affairs of the Confederacy. — Embarrassments of Our Naval Enterprise. — The Naval Structures of the Confederates. — Lee's Flank Move- ment in Virginia. — Affair of Bristoe Station.— Failure of Lee's Plans. — Meade's Escape to Centreville. — linboden's Operations in the Valley. — Capture of Charlestown. — Operations at Eappahannock Bridge.— Kelley's Ford. — Surprise and Capture of Hayes' and Hoke's Brigades. — Gallantry of Colonel Godwin. — Lee's Army on the Eapidan. — The Affair of Germania Ford. — Meade Foiled. — The " On-to-Eich- mond" Delayed Page 134 CHAPTER YH. The Chattanooga Lines.— Grant's Command. — The Military Division of the Missis- sippi. — Scarcity of Supplies in Chattanooga. — Wheeler's Eaid. — Grant's Plans. — He Opens the Communications of Chattanooga. — The Affair of Lookout Valley. — Eelief of Chattanooga. — The Battlk of Missionary Ridge. — Bragg's Unfortunate 8 CONTENTS. Detachment of Longstreet's Force. — His Evacuation of Lookout Mountain. — The Attack on Missionary Ridge. — Hardee's Gallant Resistance. — Eout and Panic of the Confederates. — President Davis's First Reproof of the Confederate Troops. — Bragg's Eetreat to Dalton. — Cleburne's Gallant Affair. — Longstreet's Expedition Against Knoxville. — More of Bragg's Mismanagement. — Insufficiency of Longstreet's Force. — Difficulty in Obtaining Supplies. — His Investment of Knoxville. — An Incident of Personal Gallantry. — Daring of an English Volunteer.^Longstreet's Plans Discon- certed. — The Assault on Fort Sanders. — Devotion of Longstreet's Veterans.— The Yankee " Wire-net." — The Fatal Ditch. — Longstreet's Masterly Eetreat. — His Posi- tion in Northeastern Tennessee. — He Winters his Army there. — The Affair of Sabine Pass, Texas. — The Trans-Mississippi. — Franklin's E.xpeditiou Defeated. — The Upper Portions of the Trans-Mississippi. — The Missouri " Guerillas." — Quan- trell. — Romantic Incidents. — The Virginia- Tennessee Frontier. — Operations of General Sam Jones. — Au Engagement near Warm Springs. — The Affair of Eogers- ville. — Battle of Droop Mountain. — The Enemy Baffled. — Averill's Great Decem- ber Eaid. — The Pursuit. — The North Carolina Swamps. — The Negro Banditti in the Swamps. — Wild, Butler's "Jackal." — His Murder of Daniel Bright. — Confederate Women in Irons. — Cowardice and Ferocity of the Yiinkees Page 153 CHAPTER YIII. The President's Declaration to the Confederate Congress of 1863-64.—" Want of Capacity" in the Confederate Authorities. — Character of Jefferson Davis. — Official Shiftlessness at Richmond. — Early Prognostications of the War. — The " Statesman- ship" of the Confederates. — Ludicrous Errors of Confederate Leaders. — What " King Cotton" might have done. — ^^Gross Mismanagement of the Confederate Finances. — Mr. Memminger's Maladministration. — The Moral Evils of an Expanded Currency. — The Military Situation in December. — Secretary Seddon's S4iameful Confession. — " De- magogism" in the Confederate War Department. — Seddon's Propositions. — Military " Substitutes." — An Act of Perfidy. — Bullying in Congress. — Spirit of the Confederate Soldiery. — Lincoln's " Peace Proclamation." — Its Stupidity, Insolence, and Out- rage. — How the Confederates Replied to it. — A New Appeal Against " Eecon- Btruction." — The Slavery Question in the War. — A French Opinion. ^The Abolitionists Unmasked. — Decay of European Sympathy with Them. — Review of Lincoln's " Emancipation" Policy. — The Arming of the Blacks. — The Negro Coloni- zation Schemes. — Experiments of New England " Civilization" in Louisiana. — Frightful Mortality of " Freedmen." — The Appalling Statistics of Emancipation. — The Contraband Camps in the Mississippi Valley. — Pictures of Yankee Philanthropy. —"Slavery" Tested by the War. — The Confederates the True Friends of the African Laborer. — The System of Negro Servitude in the Confederacy. — The " War-to-the- Knife" Party in the North. — History of the " Eetaliation" Policy. — The Outrages of Yankee Warfiire. — President Davis's Sentimentalism. — The Eecord of his Unpar- donable and Unparalleled Weakness. — A Peep into Yankee Prisons. — The Torture- Houses of the North. — Captain Morgan's Experience Among "the Convict-Drivers." — President Davis's Bluster. — His Two Faces. — Moral Effects of Submission to Yankee Outrage. — The Eival Administrations in December 1863. — Richmond and Washing- ton. — Mr. Lincoln's Gaiety. — New Issues for the Confederacy Page 174 CHAPTER IX. . The Importance of the Winter Campaigns of the War. — A Series of Remarkable Events. — Encouragement of the Confederacy. — Eosser's Raid. — A Magnificent Prize. — Pickett's Expedition against Newbekn. — The Fight on Bachelor's Creek. — CONTENTS. *' Destruction of the Yankee Gunboat "Underwriter."— The Brilliant Exploit of Com- mander Wood.— Results of the Expedition.— The Affair ok John's Island.— Gencntl Wise's Fight.— The Battlk of Oce.\n Pond— Hi.story of the Yankee Expeditions into Florida.— Lincoln's Designs upon Florida.— Their Utter Defeat.— Political Jugglery of Seymour's Expedition.— Price of "Three Electoral Votes."— Sherman's Expedi- tion IN THE Southwest.— What it Contemplated.— Grant's Extensive Designs.— Th« Strategic Triangle.- Grant's Proposed Removal of the Mississippi River.— i'oWi.' 9. Ke- treat into Alabama.— Forrest's Heroic Enterprise.— His Defeat of Smith's and Grier- Bou's Columns.— Sherman's Retreat to Vicksburg.— His Disgraceful Failure.— The Yankee Campaign in the West Disconcerted.— The Lines in North Georgia.— Repulse of the Yankees Page 210 CHAPTEK X. Auspicious Signs of the Spring of 1SG4.— Military Successes of the Confederates.— Improvements in the Internal Polity of the Confederacy— Two Important Measures of Legislation.— Revolution of our Finances.— Enlargement of the ConscriptiDn.— Theory of the New Military Law.— A Blot on the Political Record of the Confeder- acy.— Qualified Suspension of the Habeas Corpus.— An Infamous Edict, but a " Dead- letter."— An Official Libel upon the Confederacy.— The Real Condition of Civil Liberty in tlie South.— The Conscription not projjcrly a Measure of Force.— Im- pressments but a System of Patriotic Contribution.— Development of the Yankee Government into Despotism.— An Explanation of this.— The Essence of Despotism in One Yankee Statute.— Military Resources of the Confederacy.— Its Military System, the Best and Most Elastic in the World.— The War Conducted on A Volun- tary ^(z.sm.— Supplies.— Scarcity of Meat.— The Grain Product.— Two Centres of Sup- plies.— A Dream of Yankee Hate.— Great Natural Resources of the North.— Summary of the Yankee Military Drafts.— Tonnage of the Yankee Navy.— The Yankee War Debt.— Economic Effects of the War.— Its Etfects on European Industry.- Yankee Conquest of the South an Impossibility.— A Remarkable Incident of the War.— Dahlgkkn's Raid around Richmond.— Kilpatrick's and Custar's Parts of the Expe- dition.— Dahlgren and his Negro Guide.— His " Braves" Whipped by the Richmond Clerks and Artisans.— Deatii of the Marauder.— Revelation of his Infamous Designs. —Copy and History of " the Dahlgren Papers."— A Characteristic Yankee Apothe- osis.— Ridiculous and Infamous Behavior of the Confederate Authorities.— A Bru- tal and Savage Threat, — President Davis in Melodrama Page 228 CHAPTER XL The Current of Confederate Victories.— The Red River Expedition.— Banks' Am- bitious Designs.— Condition of the Conferlerates West of the Mississippi.— Banks' Extensive Preparations.— A Gala Day at Vicksburg.— Yankee Capture of Fort De Knssy.— Occupation of Alexandria.— Porter's Warfare and Pillage.— Banks' Con- tinued Advance.- Shreveport, the Grand Objective Point.— Kirby Smith's Designs.— General Green's Cavalry Fight.— Battle of Mansfield.— Success of the Confeder- ates.— Battle OF Pleasant Hill.— The Heroic and Devoted Charge of the Confeder- ates.— The Scene on the Hill.— Banks Fatally Defeated.— Price's Capture of Yankee Trains.— Grand Results of Kirby Sniitli's Campaign.- Banks in Disgrace.— Yankee Tenure of Louisiana.— Forrest's Expedition into Kentucky.— His Gallant Assault on Fort Pillow.— The Yankee Story of " Massacre."- Capture of Union City.— Con- federate Occupation of Paducah.— Chastisement of the Yankees on their own Theatre 10 CONTENTS. of Outrages— Capture of Plymouth, N. C. — General Hoke's Expedition. — Capture of" Fort Wessel." — Exploit of the " Albemarle." — The Assaults upon the Town. — Fruits of its Capture. — Tlie Yankees in North Carolina Page 246 CHAPTEK XII. Close of tlie Third Year of the War. — Sketch of the SuDseqnent Operations in Vir- ginia and Georgia. — Grant's " On-to-Richmond." — The Combination Against the Confci-lerate Capital. — The Battles of the Wilderness. — A Thrilling Crisis. — Grant on the Verge of Rout. — His First Design Balfleil. — The Battles of Spottsylvania CouRT-HousK. — Death of General Sedgwick. — The Carnage of May the 12th. — Five Battles in Si.K Days. — Grant's Obstinacy.— " Tlie Butclier." — Sheridan's Expedition. — Death of General " Jeb" Stuart. — Butler's Operations on the South Side of the James. — " The Beast" at the Baek-Door of Richmond. — He is Driven to Beririuda Hundred by Beauregard. — Defeat of Sigel in the Valley. — Grant's Movement Down the Valley of the Rappahannock. — His Passage of the Pamnnkey. — Re-organization of General Lee's Lines. — Grant's Favorite Tactics. — Yankee Exultation at his Approach to Richmond — Caricatures of the Confederacy. — A Hasty Apotheosis. — A True The- ory of Grant's " Flank Movements." — ELis Occupation of McClellan's Old iines. — The Battle of the Chickahominy or Cold Harbor. — A Confederate Victory in Ten Minutes. — What Had Become of Yankee Exultation. — Review of the Rival Routes to Richmond. — Grant Crosses the James River. — His Second Grand Combination Against Richmond. — Hunter's Capture of Staunton. — The Battles of Petersburg. — General Wise's Heroic Address. — Engagement of 16th June. — Grand Assault of 18lh June. — on " the Cockade City." — A Decisive defeat of the Yankees. — Engagement at Port Walthal Junction — Sheridan's Defeat Near Gordonsville. — Hunter's Repulse at Lynchburg. — Two Aft'airs on the Weldon Railroad.— Grant's Second Combination a Complete Failure. — Discouragement of the North. — The Gold Barometer. — Secretary Chase's Declaration. — Sherman's " On-to-Atlanta." — His Flanking Movement. — Engagement in Resaca Valley. — Johnston's Retreat.— Engagement at New Hope. — Johnston's Telegram to RicliTnond. — Defeat of Sturgis's Expedition in Mississippi. — Battle of Kenesaw Mountain. — Sherman's Successful Strategy. — The Confederates Fall Back to Atlanta. — The Battles of Atlanta. — Hood's Gallant Defence. — .... The Military Situation in July, 1864. — Grant's F'ailure. — His Consumption of Troops. — Review of Yankee Atrocities in the Summer Campaign of 1S64. — Sherman's Char acter.— His Letter on " Wild Beasts."— His War on Factory Girls.— Sufferings of Confederate Women and Children. — Ravages in Georgia.— Hunter's Vandalism in Virginia. — " The Avengers of Fort Pillow." — Sturgis and his Demons.— The Spirit of the Confederates.— . . . Some Words on " Peace Negotiations." — A Piratical Prop- osition and an Infamous Bribe. — The Heroic Choice of the Confederates Page 261 CHAPTER XIII. AMERICAN IDEAS : A REVIEW OF THE WAR. Sentimental Regrets concerning American History.— The European Opinion of "State" Institutions.— Calhoun, tlie Great Political Scholar of America.— His Doc- trines. — Conservatism oi "Nullification." — Its " Union" Sentiment. — Brilliant Vision of the South Carolina Statesman.— Webster, the Representative of the Imperfect and Insolent " Education" of New England.— Y'ankee Libels in the shape of Party Nomenclature.— Influence of State Institutions.— How they were Auxiliary to the CONTENTS. 11 Utiion.— r/(e Moral Veneration of the Union. Peculiarly a Sentiment of the South.— What the South had done for the Union.— Senutor H;iinmoud's Speech.— The States not Schools of Provinciiilism and Estrangement.- The Development of America, a North and South, not Hostile States.- Peculiar Ideas of Yankee Civilization.-Ide'as Nursed in "Free Schools."— Yankee Materialism.— How it has Developed in the War.— Yankee Falsehoods and Yankee Cruelties.— His Commercial Politics.- Price of las Liberties.— Ideas of the Confederates in the War.-How the Washingtoa Eoutine was introduced. — The Kiehtnond Government, Weak and Negativ^e — No Political Novelty in the Confederacy.— The Future of Confederate Ideas.— Intellectual Barrenness of the War.— Material of the Confederate Army -The Birtli of Great Ideas.-The Old Political Idolators.-The Kecompense of Suf- fering V, -vn^ " Paoe 287 The Battle of The Wilderness.— Correspondence of the London Herald . . Page 303 APPENDIX. JAIL JOURNAL IN FORT WARREN, ETC. CHAPTER I. EuNNiNG THE BLoczADE.-The " Greyhound."-Passing the Blockade Lines.-The Capture.—! aukee Courtesy.— Off Fortress Monroe Page 323 CHAPTER 11. Curiosities of the Yankee BLocxADE.-Correspondence with Lord Lyons, Page 330 CHAPTER HI. T,^o w'J 'T ^''^•?';;-^"t'-^d"^tion to the U. S. Marshal.-In the Streets of Boston : Two Spectacle3.-A Circle of Secessionists.-The "Hub of the Universe.". Page 840 CHAPTER nr. CoM^TMEr^T TO Fort WARREN.-Horrors of the Yankee Bastile.-Torture of " A Brutal Villain. ''-A Letter to Secretary Welles ^aL 3^ CHAPTER y. kef'T^Ne^"'? 7 ^^l^'^'-^'f^'T '^"^"^^^ of Sympathy.-Portrait of the Yan- Fort'^arfen!. . ^'^«P'^«'-mmander was simply nothing. He was entirely the creature of the private and personal prejudices of President Davis. Never was an appointment of this president more self- willed in its temper and more unfortunate in its consequences. It might have been supposed that the fact that Pemberton did not command the confidence of his troops or of any considera- ble portion of the public would, of itself, have suggested to the President the prudence of a change of commanders, and dis- suaded him from his obstinate preference of a favorite. But it had none of this efl^'ect. The Legislature of Mississippi solicited the removal of Pemberton. Private delegations from THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 43 Congress entreated the President to forego Ins personal preju- dices and defer to the public wish. But Mr. Davis h:ul that conceit of opinion which opposition readily contirnis ; and the effect of these remonstrances was only to increase his obstinacy and intensify his fondness for his favorite. To some of them he replied that Pemberton was '• a great military genins," not appreciated by the public, and destined on proper occasion to astonish it. CJeneral Pemberton took command amid the suppressed murmurs of a people to whom he was singularly unwelcome. The first evidence of liis want of comprehension was his ignor- ance and bewiklerment as to the enemy's designs. AVe have referred to the failure of the canal projects. The enemy, after long-continued and streneous efforts to reach tlie right flank of Yicksburg, by forcing a passage through the upper Yazoo river, finally relinquished his design, and on the nights of the 4th and 5th of April, re-embarked his troops, and before day- light was in rapid retreat. About the same time a heavy force of the enemy, which had been collected at Baton Pouge, was mostly withdrawn and transferred to western Louisiana, leav- ing but one division to occupy that place. So blind was Pemberton to the designs of the enemy, that for m-any weeks he continued to believe that the object of the movements of Ulysses S. Grant — the last commander sent from/ "Washington to contest the prize of the Mississippi — was not/ Yicksburg, but Bragg's army in Tennessee. In this delusion, and the self-complacent humor it inspired, he telegraphed to General Johnston, on the 13th of April: "I am satisfied that Eosecrans will be reinforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to Tullahoma?" The aberration was soon dis- pelled. A few days after this despatch, information obtained from Memphis indicated that Grant's retrogade movement was a ruse ; and thus suddenly Pemberton was called upon to prepare for one of the most extraordinary and audacious games that the enemy had yet attempted in this war. "We know that it is customary to depreciate an adversary in war, by naming his enterprise as desperation, and entitling his success as luck. "We shall not treat with such injustice the enemy's campaign in Mississippi. In daring, in celeiity of movement, and in the vigor and decision of its steps it was the 44 THE THIRD TEAK OF THE WAR. most remarkable of the war. The phin of Grant was, in brief, . nothing else than to gain firm ground on one of the Confederate flanks, which, to be done, involved a march of about one hun- dred and fifty miles, through a hostile country, and in which communication with the base of supplies was liable at any moment to be permanently interrupted. In addition, a resist- ance to his advance could be anticipated, of whose magnitude nothing was certainly known, and which, for aught he knew, might at any time prove great enough to annihilate his entire army. The plan involved the enterprise of running a fleet of trans- ports past the batteries, crossing the troops from the Louisiana shore, below Yicksburg, to Mississippi, and then marching the army, by the way of Jackson, through the heart of the Con- federacy, so to speak, to the rear of Vicksburg. On the night of the 22d of April, the first demonstration was made, in ac- cordance with the newly-formed plan, by the running past our batteries of three gunboats and seven transports. Grand Gulf is situated on the east bank of the Mississippi river, immediately below the rnouth of the Big Black river. It was not selected as a position for land-defence, but for the protection of the mouth of the Big Black, and also as a pre- cautionary measure against the passage of transports, should the canal before referred to prove a success, which then seemed highly probable. The necessary works were constructed under the direction of Brigadier-general Bowen, to defend the bat- teries against an assault from the river front, and against a di- rect attack from or across Big Black. THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON. The enemy having succeeded in getting his transports past Yicksburg, an attack on Grand Gulf was anticipated. Twelve miles below this, at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, is Brains- barg, and at this point the enemy landed in heavy force, on the 30th of April, and prepared for an advance movement. As soon as General Bowen received information of the land- ing of the enemy, he crossed Bayou Pierre, and advanced towards Port Gibson, situated several miles south-east of Grand THE THIED TEAE OF THE WAR. 45 Gulf. In tlie vicinity of this place General Bowen met the enemy advancing in full force, and immediately prepared for battle, having previously telegraphed to Yicksburg for rein- forcements. He was left with a few thousand men to confront an overwhelming force of the enemy, as Pemberton had in- sisted upon putting the Big Black between the enemy and the bulk of his own forces, which he declared were necessary to cover Yicksburg. Early on the morning of the 1st of May, General Green, who had been sent out on the Brainsburg road with about a thou- sand men, encountered the enemy. He was joined by General Tracy, with not more than fifteen hundred men. The enemy's attack was sustained with great bravery until between nine and ten o'clock, when, overwhelmed by numbers and flanked on the right and left. General Green had to fall back. Courier after courier had been sent for General Baldwin, who was on the way with some reinforcements, but his troops were so ut- terly exhausted that he could not get up in time to prevent this. Just as the retreat was taking place General Baldwin arrived, and was ordered to form a new line about one mile in rear of General Green's first position. General Baldwin had no artillery, and that ordered up from Grand Gulf had not arrived. Colonel Cockrell, with three Missouri regiments came up soon after. General Bowen now had all the force at his command on the field, excepting three regiments and two battalions, which occupied positions which he could not re- move them from until the last moment. He ordered them up about one o'clock, but only one of them arrived in time to cover the retreat and burn the bridges. Between twelve and one o'clock General Bowen attempted, with two of Colonel Cockrell's regiments, to turn the enemy's right flank, and nearly succeeded. The enemy formed three brigades in front of a battery, to receive our charge. The first was routed, the second wavered, but the third stood firm, and after a long and desperate contest, our troops had to give up the attempt. It is probable, however, that this attack saved the right from being overwhelmed, and kept the enemy back until nearly sunset. All day long the fight raged fiercely, our men everywhere maintaining their ground. Just before sunset a desperate at- tack was made by the enemy, they having again received fresh 46 ' THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. troops. Our right was forced to give ground, and General Bowen was reluctantly compelled to fall back. The order was given and executed without confusion. The enemj attempted no pursuit. Though unsuccessful, the bloody encounter in front of Port Gibson nobly illustrated the valor and constancy of our troops, and shed additional lustre upon the Confederate arms. In his official report, General Bowen declared that the enemy's force engaged exceeded twenty thousand, while his own did not number over fifty-five hundred. It was the first mistake with which Pemberton had opened his chapter of disasters. On the 28th of April he ascertained that the enemy was landing troops at Hard Times, on the west bank of the river ; he became satisfied that neither the front nor right (north) of Vicksburg would be attacked, and he turned his attention to the left (south) of Yicksburg ; but un- fortunately he did not concentrate "aZZ" his troops on that side of Yicksburg. On the 29th of April he telegraphed Gen- eral Johnston that the enemy were at Plard Times, and " can cross to Brainsburg ;" and on the 1st of May that " a furious battle has been going on all day below Port Gibson," On the 2d of May General Johnston replied : " If General Grant crosses unite all your troops to beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it." Unfortunately it was not done. His explanation why it was not done, was, that to have marched an army across Big Black of sufficient strength to warrant a reasonable hope of successfully encountering his very superior forces, would have stripped Vicksburg and its essen- tially flank defences of their garrisons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy. His apprehensions for the safety of Yicksburg were morbid. While he was gazing at Yicksburg, Grant was turning towards Jackson. The battle of Port Gibson won. Grant pushed his columns directly towards Jackson. Pemberton's want of cavalry did not permit the interruption of Grant's communications, and he moved forward unmolested to Clinton. General Pember- ton anticipated " a raid on Jackson," and ordered the re^noval of " the staff department and all valuable stores to the east ;" but he regarded Edwards' Depot and the Big Black Bridge as the objects of Grant's movement to the eastward. THE THIRD TKAR OF THE WAR. 47 The movement of the enemy was one of extreme peril. On one flank was General Joseph E. Johnston with a force whose strengtli was nnknown to General Grant ; and on the other was Lieutenant-general Pemberton. To have remained at Grand Gulf would have ruined the Federal army, and, with this know- ledge, Grant determined to make certain movements on the west bank of the Big Black, while he marched rapidly on Jack- son, Mississippi, with his main force. The object of the Yankee commander was to make sure of no enemy being in his rear when he marched on Yicksbui-g. By glancing at a map it will be seen that the country in- cluded between Grand Gulf, Jackson and Big Black river, at the railroad crossing, forms a triangle. In moving forward, Grant's forces kept upon the line which leads from Grand Gulf to Jackson ; but, instead of all going to Jackson, as might have been expected, the advance only continued toward that point, while the remainder of the army turned off to the left, at in- tervals, and proceeded along lines which converged until they nret in the angle of the triangle located at the Big Black rail- road crossing. Many persons have doubtless been astonished at the ease with which Grant's forces advanced upon and took possession of Jackson. Its importance as a railroad centre and a depot for Confederate supplies warranted the anticipation that the place would be vigorously defended and only surrendered in the last extremity. Unfortunately such a resistance could not be made. General Johnston had arrived too late to prepare a defence of the capital of Mississippi. On reaching Jackson, on the night of the 13th of May, he found there but two brigades numbering not more than six thousand men ; and, with the utmost that could be relied upon from the reinforcements on the way, he could not expect to confront the enemy with more than eleven thousand men. But he comprehended the situation with instant and decisive sagacity. He ascertained that General Pemberton's forces, except the garrison of Port Hudson (five thousand) and of Yicksburg, were at Edwards' Depot — the general's head- quarter's at Bovina ; and that four divisions of the enemy, under Sherman, occupied Clinton, ten miles west of Jackson, between Edwards' Depot and ourselves. 4S THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAE. Not a moment was to be lost. A despatch was hurried to Pemberton on tlie same night (13th), informing him of John- ston's arrival, and of the occupation of Clinton by a portion of Grant's armj, urging the imp(.)rtance of re-establishing com- munications, and ordering him to come up, if practicable, on Sherman's rear at once, and adding, " to beat such a detach- ment would be of immense value." " The troops here," wrote Johnston, " could co-operate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important." It appears from General Pemberton's official report that he had preconceived a plan of battle ; that he expected to fight at Edwards' Depot; and that he was unwilling to separate him- self further from Yicksburg, which he regarded as his base. He had the choice of disobeying Johnston's orders, and falling back upon his own matured plan, or of obeying them, and taking the brilliant hazard of crushing an important detach- ment of the enemy. He did neither. He attempted a middle course — a compromise between his superior's orders and his ,own plans, the weak shift and fatal expedient of military in- competency. He telegraphed to Johnston, "I comply at once with your order." Yet he did not move for twenty-eight hours. A council of war had been called, and a majority of officers approved the movement indicated by General Johnston, Pem- berton opposed it ; but he says, " I did not, however, see fit to put my own judgment and opinion so far in opposition as to prevent a movement altogether." So he determined upon an advance, not to risk an attack on Sherman, but, as he says, to cut the enemy's communications. He abandoned his own former plans ; he disobeyed Johnston's order, and invented a compro- mise equally reprehensible for the vacillation of his purpose and the equivocation of his despatch. He moved, not on Sher- man's rear at Clinton, but in another direction toward Ray- mond. The purpose of General Johnston's order was to unite the two armies and attack a detachment of the enemy. The result of General Pemberton's movement towards Raymond was to prevent this union, and to widen the distance between the two armies. In a moral view, it is difficult to find any term but that of the harshest censure for this trifling compromise of General Pemberton between the orders of his superior and the prefer- THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 49 ences of liis own mind. In a military view it was equally re- prehensible. When the several corps of the enemy were separated into two or more distinct columns, separated by twelve or iSfteen miles, it would be naturally supposed that the true opportunity of Pembertou would have been to strike at one separately, rather than to wait until all the enemy's forces concentrated, and attacked him on his uncertain march. The error was irretrievable. While General Pemberton was in " council of war," on the 14th, the enemy, from Clinton and Raymond, marched on Jackson and compelled its evacuation. Had General Pemberton promptly obeyed General Johnston's order, and boldly marched on Clinton, the enemy could not have marched to Jackson, as that would have been to facilitate the union of Johnston and Pemberton and to have encountered their concentrated armies. The audacity of Johnsl^on's order, if executed, might have reversed the fate of Vicksburg. The vacillation of General Pemberton, and his loss of a day and a half, caused the evacuation of Jackson, and opened the way to Yicksburg. The occupation of Jackson was the occasion of the usual scenes of Yankee outrage. The watchword of McPherson's corps, which first entered it, was plunder. The negroes were invited to assist and share in the pillage. Supposing that the year of jubilee had finally come, the blacks determined to en- joy it, and, with this end in view, they stole everything they could carry oflf. "Nothing," says a Yankee spectator, " came amiss to these rejoicing Africans ; they went around the streets displaying aggregate miles of double-rowed ivory, and bend- ing under a monstrous load of French mirrors, boots, shoes, pieces of calico, wash-stands and towels, hoop-skirts, bags of tobacco, parasols, umbrellas, and fifty other articles equally incongruous." McPherson left Jackson on the afternoon of the 15th, and, in the morning of the next day, Sherman's corps took up its line — the whole moving westward along the south side of the railroad to Vicksburg. As the enemy left Jackson it resem- bled more the infernal regions than the abode of civilization. Vast volumes of smoke lay over it, through which, here and there, rolled fiercely up great mountains of flame, that made infernal music over their work of destruction. The Confederate 4 50 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. State-house — a large new wooden building — the Penitentiary, several private house and several government buildings were all in flames. It was the first step of that catalogue of horrors of invasion in which Mississippi was to rival Virginia, and the Big Black was to be associated with the Potomac in the ghastly romances of ruin and desolation. We return to Pemberton and his ill-starred march. On the 15th, at the head of a column of seventeen thousand men, he had taken the direction of Raymond. On the morning of the 16th, at about six and a half o'clock, he ascertained that his pickets were skirmishing with the enemy on the Raymond road, some distance in his front. At the same moment a cour- rier arrived and handed him a despatch from General Johnston announcing the evacuation of Jackson, and indicating that the only mear|,s by which a union could now be effected between the two forces was that Pemberton should move directly to Clinton, whither Johnston was retiring. The order of counter- march was given by Pemberton. It was too late. Just as this reverse movement commenced, the enemy drove in his cavalry pickets, and opened with artillery, at long range, on the head of his column on the Raymond road. The demon- strations of the enemy soon becoming more serious, orders were sent by General Pemberton to the division commanders to form in line of battle on the cross-road from the Clinton to the Raj'^mond road — Loring on the right, Bowen in the centre, and Stevenson on the left. The enemy had forced the Con- federates to give battle on the ground of his own selection, under the disadvantages of inferior numbers and in circum- stances which had all the moral effect of a surprise. THE BATTLE OF BAKER S CREEK, ETC. But the ground itself was not unfavorable to our troops. The line of battle was quickly formed, in a bend of what is known as Baker's creek, without any interference on the part of the enemy ; the position selected was naturally a strong one, and all approaches from the front well covered. The enemy made his first demonstration on our right, but, after a lively artillery duel for an hour or more, this attack was relinquished THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAK. 61 and a large force was thrown against our left, where elcirmish- ing became heavy about ten o'clock, and the battle began in earnest along Stevenson's entire front about noon. At this time Major-general Loring was ordered to move for- ward, and crush the enemy in his front, and General Bowen was directed to co-operate with him in the movement. The movement was not made by Loring. He replied that the enemy was too strongly posted to be attacked, but that he would avail himself of the first opportunity of successful as- sault. The opportunity never came to him. Stevenson's troops sustained the heavy and repeated attacks of the enemy. Six thousand, five hundred men held in check four divisions of the enemy, numbering, from his own state- ment, twenty-five thousand men. Such endurance has its limits. The only reinforcements that came to the relief of these devoted men were two brigades of Bowen, among them Cockrell's gallant Missourians. This was about half-past two o'clock. The combined charge of these forces for a moment turned the tide of battle. But the enemy still continued to move troops from his left to his right, thus increasing his vastly superior forces against Stevenson's and Bowen's divis- ions. Again orders were despatched to General Loring to move to the left as rapidly as possible leaving force enough only to cover the bridge and ford at Baker's Creek. He did not come. He seems still to have been engaged with the movements of the enemy in his front, and to have supposed that they were endeavoring to flank him. In the mean time the contest raged along Stevenson's lines, the enemy continuing his line movement to our left. Here were displays of gallantry, which, unable to retrieve the disas- ter, adorned it with devotion. Here fell the gallant Captain Ridley, commanding a battery, refusing to leave his guns, single-handed and alone fighting until he fell, pierced with six shots, receiving, even from his enemies, the highest tribute of admiration. ^Nothing could protect the artillery horses from the deadly fire of the enemy ; almost all were killed, and along the whole line, the pieces, though fought with despera- tion, on the part of both ofl[icers and men, almost all fell into the hands of the enemy. In this manner the guns of Corput's and Johnston's batteries, and Waddell's section, were lost. ,*)2 THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. Double shotted, they were tired until, in many instances, swarms of the enemy were in amongst them. Officers and men stood by them to the very latest moment that they could be served. About 5 o'clock p. m., a portion of Stevenson's division broke and fell back in disorder. General Pemberton rode up to Stevenson and told him that he had repeatedly ordered two brigades of Loring to his assistance. The brave commander, who had fought tlie enemy since morning, replied that the re- lief would be too late and that he could no longer hold the field. " Finding," says General Pemberton, " that the enemy's vastly superior numbers were pressing all my forces engaged steadily back into old fields, where all advantages of position would be in his favor, I felt it too late to save the day even should Brigadier-general Featherstone's brigade of General Loring's division come up immediately. I could, however, learn nothing of General Loring's whereabouts ; several of my stafi" officers were in search of him, but it was not until after General Bowen had personally informed me that he could not hold his position, and. not until I had ordered the retreat, that General Loring, with Featherstone's brigade, moving, as I sub- sequently learned, by a country road, which was considerably longer than the direct route, reached the position on the left, known as Champion's Hill, where he was forming line of bat- tle when he received my order to cover the retreat. Had the movement in support of the left been promptly made, when first ordered, it is not improbable that I might have main- tained my position, and it is possible the enemy might have been driven back, though his vastly superior and constantly increasing numbers would have rendered it necessary to with- draw during the night to save my communications with Yicks- burg."* * In a correspondence wliicli ensued between the Richmond authorities and General Pemberton as to the cause of the defeat, the Secretary of War wrote, in a letter dated October 1st, 18G3 : " I should be pleased to know if General Loring had been ordered to attack before General Cummings' brigade gave way ; and whether, in your opinion, had Stevenson's division been promptly sustained, the troops with him would have fought with so little tenacity and resolution as a portion of them exhibited ? Have you had any explanation of the extraordinary failure of General Loring to comply with your reiterated or- ders to attack ? And do you feel assured your orders were received by him ? THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 53 But the disaster of the day was not yet complete. The re- treat of the Confederates was by the ford and bridge of Baker's Creek. Bowen's division was directed to take position on the left bank, and to hold the crossing until Loring's division, which was directed to bring up the rear, had effected the pas- sage. The intelligence of the approach of Loring was awaited in vain. Probably another unfortunate misapprehension had occurred. He had covered the retreat with great spirit. It was in this part of the contest that Brigadier-general Lloyd Tilghman, one of the bravest officers in the Confederate army, fell, pierced through his manly breast with a fragment of a shell. He was serving with his own hands a twelve-pound howitzer, trying to dislodge a piece which was annoying the retreat. It is said that General Loring was under the impres- sion that a force of the enemy had got in the rear of the bridge, and that Stevenson had been compelled to continue his retreat in the direction of Edwards' Depot. " At any rate, he resolved to make his retreat through the east, turn Jackson, and effect a junction with the forces of General Johnston, then supposed to be near Canton. He succeeded, but with the loss of his artillery. Pemberton had retired from the battle-field with a demoral- ized army. It had lost nearly all of its artillery ; it was weak- ened by the absence of General Loring's division ; it had already shown the fatal sign of straggling ; and, worse than all, it had conceived a distrust of its commander, who had car- ried his troops by a vague and wandering march on the very front of the concentrated forces of the enemy. On Sunday morning, the 17th of May, the enemy advanced in force against the works erected on the Big Black. The river, where it is crossed by the railroad bridge, makes a bend somewhat in the shape of a horse-shoe. Across this horse-shoe, His conduct, unless explained by some misapprehension, is incomprehensible to me." To this General Pemberton replied, on the 10th of November: "General Loring had been ordered to attack before General Cummings' brigade gave way, and the order had been again and again repeated ; and, in my opinion, ' had Stevenson's division been promptly sustained,' his troops would have deported themselves gallantly and creditably. I have received no explanation of ' the extraordinary failure of General Loring to comply with my reiterated orders to attaok ;' and I do feel ' assured that my orders were received by him. ' " 54 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. at its narrowest part, a line of rifle-pits had been constructed, making an excellent cover for infantry, and, at proper inter- vals, dispositions were made for Held artillery. The line of pits ran nearly north and south, and was about a mile in length. !North of, and for a considerable distance south of the railroad, and of a dirt-road to Edwards' Depot, nearly parallel with it extended a bayou, which, in itself, opposed a serious obstacle to an assault upon the pits. This line abutted north on the river, and south upon a cypress brake, which spread jtself nearly to the bank of the river. In addition to the railroad bridge, which had been floored for the passage over of artillery and wagons, a steamer, from which the machinery had been taken, was converted into a bridge, by placing her fore-and- aft across the river. Between the works and the bridge, about three-quarters of a mile, the country was open, being either clear or cultivated fields, aflording no cover should the troops be drawn from the trenches. East and north of the railroad, the country over which the enemy must necessarily pass was similar to those above described ; but north of the' railroad, and about three hundred yards in front of the rifle-pits, a copse of wood extended from the road to the river. Our line was manned on the right by the gallant Cockrell's Missouri brigade, the extreme left by Brigadier- general Green's Missouri and Arkansas men, both of Bowen's division, and the centre by Brigadier-general Yaughan's brigade of east Tennesseeans, in all about four thousand men, as many as could be advan- tageously employed in defending the line with about twenty pieces of field artillery. • The position was one of extraordinary strength, yet tliis position was abandoned by our troops, almost without a strug- gle, and with the loss of nearly all that remained of our artil- lery. It would be well if this page could be omitted from our mar- tial records, and its dishonor spared. But it is easily told, and the charitable reader is already prepared for it. Early in the morning the enemy opened his artillery at long range, and very soon pressed forward, with infantry, into the copse oi wood north of the railroad ; about the same time he opened on Colonel Cockrell's position with two batteries, and advanced a line of skirmishers, throwing forward a column of infantry, THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 55 which was quickly driven back by our batteries. Pretty heavy skirmishing was, for awhile, kept up along our whole line, but presently the enemy, who had massed a large force in the woods immediately north of the railroad, advanced at a run with loud cheers. Our troops in their front did not remain to receive them, but broke and fled precipitately. The retreat was disgraceful. It soon became a matter of sauve qui pent. A strong position, with an ample force of infantry and artillery to hold it, was shamefully abandoned, almost. without resistance. Between the troops occupying the centre and the enemy there was an almost impassable bayou. They fled before the enemy had reached that obstacle. In this precipitate retreat but little order was observed, the object with all being to reach the bridge as rapidly as possible. Many were unable to do so, but efiected their escape by swim- ming the river ; some were drowned in the attempt. A con- siderable number, unable to swim, and others too timid to expose themselves to the Are of the enemy by an effort to escape, remained in the trenches, and were made prisoners. A captain, who disgraced the Confederate uniform, laid down in the rifle-pits, and was captured by the enemy. Another behaved more bravely. Captain Osborne, of the Thirty-sixth Georgia, took his place just behind his line, and, with drawn revolver, swore he would shoot the first uuwounded man who turned his back. The consequence was that his company, and the fragment of another, were soon left alone in the field where the steady line of the enemy were advancing under the smoke of their own murderous fire. Completely flanked, and in peril of capture, he gave the order to " march a retreat," but still with revolver and voice checking any unwise or unbecoming haste. When satisfied with his distance, he halted his com- pany, and dressed the line ; just then General Gumming rode up, and, taking off his hat, said : " Captain, I compliment you upon having the only organized body of men on the field." Lieutenant-general Pemberton rode up and down the lines trying to rally the men ; but his courage was not well re- warded. One of his staff threatened to shoot a runaway with his pistol. " Bigger guns than that, back there," said the sol- dier, and went on. 56 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE "WAR. General .?eraberton told a fellow to stop and to go back, and, to give force to the order, said : "I am Lieutenant-general Pemberton, commanding this department." The fellow looked up and said, " You are !" — and proceeded the same way. Who could have recognized in the flying mob the same men whose heroic defence of Yicksburg had attracted the attention and won the applause of the world ! About ten o'clock, Sunday night, the main body of Pem- berton's army entered Yicksburg, A scene of terror ensued. Many planters living near the city with their families, aban- doned their homes and entered our lines with the Confederate forces. The stillness of the Sabbath night was broken iii upon, and an uproar in which the blasphemous oath of the soldier and the cry of the child mingled, heightened the effect of a scene which the pen cannot depict. There were many gentle women and tender children, torn from their homes by the ad- vance of a ruthless foe and compelled to fly to our lines for protection ; and mixed up with them, in one vast crowd, were the gallant men who had left Yicksburg three short weeks befoie in all the pride and confidence of a just cause, and return- ing to it under the shame of a defeat, and with the panic of a mob. It is not necessary to enter at length into the recrimination which ensued between Pemberton and Johnston, as to the memorable disaster of the Big Black. It was argued on Pem- berton's side that had it not been for Johnston's order to move on the enemy at Canton, he never would have advanced in any direction beyond the Big Black. To this the reply of General Johnston was neat and conclusive. "It was," he said, " a new military principle that when an oflScer disobeys a positive order of his superior, that superior becomes respon- sible for any measure his subordinate may choose to substitute for that ordered." Pemberton had neither obeyed the order referred to, nor fallen back upon his original plan ; he had supplanted both by a new movement which concluded in one of the worst disas- ters of the war. The order of the 13th directed truly a " haz- ardous movement," but it was nevertheless a great conception — it was one of those bold and audacious moves that charac- terize military genius, and is a practical illustration of Napo- THE THIRD YEAJS OF THE WAK. 57 leon's maxim, that " a great captain supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet the attack." It was a wise order, for it tended to concentration and the union of both detachments of his army ; and, if promptly and boldly executed, might have resulted in» saving Vicksburg. For if Sherman had been defeated between Clinton and Jackson, Grant could not have invested Vicksburg. As it was, the fall of Vicksburg had become but a question of time. General Johnston was convinced of the iinpossibility of collecting a sufficient force to break the investment of the city, should it be completed. He appreciated the difficulty of extricating the garrison. It was with this foresight that, on learning that Pemberton had been driven from the Big Black, he ordered the evacuation of Vlchshurg. He wrote: "If Ilaynes' Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast." It was a grave order. It commanded the surrender of valua- ble stores and munitions of war ; the surrender of the Mississippi river ; and the severance of the Confederacy. But Johnston had presented to his mind a given alternative: that of the loss of Vicksburg, and that of the loss of Vicksburg and an army of twenty-five thousand men, and he had the nerve to accept with promptness the lesser of two evils. It required the great- est moral courage to come to such a conclusion ; for so de- luded were the Confederate people as to the safety of Vicks- burg, and so firmly persuaded were they that Grant was a desperate fool " who would butt his brains out against the stockades of Vicksburg," that had this order of Johnston been known at the time it would have produced from one end of the Confederacy to the other an outbreak of indignation, and have probably made him the victim of an incorrigible popular passion and ignorance. Pemberton received the order with dismay ; he called a coun- cil of war. It was unanimous for its rejection ; but the reas- on given was peculiar and but little creditable. It was de- cided that it was impossible to withdraw the army with such 58 THE THIED YEAR OF THE WAB. morale and material as to be of future service to the Confeder- acy ; and this, although there were eight thousand fresh troops in Vieksburg. Pemberton replied : " I have decided to hold Yicksburg as long as possible, with the firm hope that the Government may yet be able to assist me in keeping this ob- struction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi river. I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy." While the council of war was assembled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 69 CHAPTER III. The Defences of Vicksburg.— Pemberton's Force.— His Troops Eeinspirited. — A Memorable Appeal. — Grant's Assault on the Works. — Confidence of the Yankees. — Their Kepulse and Losses. — Commencement of Siege Operations. — Confidence in Richmond. — Johnston's Secret Anticipation of the Fall of Vicksburg. — His Alleged Inability to Avert it. — Critical Condition of the Confederate Annies in Numbers. — Secret Correspondence of Eichmond Officials. — Mr. Seddon's Bait of Flattery. — Suf- ferings of the Garrison of Vicksburg. — Johnston's Attempt to Extricate them. — Pro- posed Diversion in the Trans-Mississippi. — Its Failure. — A Message from Pemberton. A Gleam of Hope. — An Important Dispatch Miscarries. — The Garrison Unable to Fight Their Way Out. — But Their Condition not Extreme. — Pemberton's Surrender ou the Fourth of July.— Surprise in Eichmond — Mendacity of the Telegraph. — The Story of the Kats and Mules. — Pemberton's Statement as to his Supplies. — His Ex- planation as to the Day of Surrender. — The last Incident of Humiliation. — Behavior of the Vicksburg Population. — A Rival of "The Beast." — Appearance and Manners of the City under Yankee Rule. — Consequences of the Fall of Vicksburg. — The Yan- kee- Eeocoupation OF Jackson. — Johnston's Second Evacuation. — The Enemy's Eav- ages in Mississippi. — How they Compared with Lee's Civilities in Pennsylvania. — The Fall of Port Hudson, &c. — Enemy's Capture of Yazoo City. — The Battle OF Helena. — The Tkans-Mississippi. — Eepulse of the Confederates. — Abandonment of Little Rock. — The Trials and Sufferings of the Trans-Mississippi Department. — Hindman's Memorable Rule. — Military Autocracy. — The Generous and Heroic Spirit of the Trans-Mississippi. The line of defence around the city of Yicksburg consisted of a system of detached works (redans, lunettes, and redoubts) on the prominent and commanding points, with the usual pro- file of raised field works, connected, in most cases, by rifle-pits. The strength of the city towards the land was equally as strong as on the river side. The country was broken, to a degree afibrding excellent defensive positions. In addition to this, the ravines intervening the ridges and knolls, which the Con- federates had fortified, were covered with a tangled growth of cane, wild grape, &c., making it impossible for the enemy to move his troops in well-dressed lines. To man the entire line of fortifications, General Pemberton was able to bring into the trenches about eighteen thousand five hundred muskets ; but it was absolutely necessary to keep a reserve always ready to reinforce any point heavily threat- ened. It became indispensable, therefore, to reduce the num- ber in the trenches to the minimum capable of holding them 60 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. until a reserve could come to their aid. It was also necessary that tlie reserve should be composed of troops among the best and most reliable. Accordingly, Boweu's division (about tAventy-four hundred) and some otlier forces were designated for that purpose, reducing the forces in the trenches to little over fifteen thousand five hundred men. Fortunately, the army of Vicksburg had speedily recovered from its demoralization, reassured, as the troops were, of a prospect of Johnston's co-operation, and inspired by a remark- able appeal from Pemberton. Tliis unfortunate commander appeased the clamor against himself by an apparently noble candor and memorable words of heroism. He said that it had been declared that he would sell Yicksburg, and exhorted his soldiers to witness the price at which he would sell it, for it would not be less than his own life, and that of every man in his command. Those words deserve to be commemorated in relation to the sequel. The stirring words of Pemberton were circulated through the Confederacy, and satisfied the public that either Yicksburg was safe, or that the catastrophe would be glorious. They called to mind Le3^den and Genoa, Londonderry and Saragossa, and the people of the Confederacy expected that a name not less glorious would be added to the list of cities made immortal by heroism, endurance, suffering, and, as they hoped, triumph. Much of this elation, it is true, was from ignorance of the true situation ; but even the intelligent refused to entertain a sequel so humiliating and disastrous to the South as that which was to ensue. The troops of Grant were flushed Avith victory, and had pro- posed to finish their work by a single assault. The events of the 19th, 20th, and 21st of May, wearied those who imagined that they saw in their grasp the palm of the Mississippi. So fully assured were they of victory, that they postponed it from day to day. To storm the works was to take Vicksburg, in their opinion, and when it was known on the morning of the 21st, that at ten o'clock next morning the whole line of Con- federate works would be assaulted, the credulous and vain enemy accounted success so certain, that it was already given to the wings of the telegraph. On the 22d, the fire from tlie enemy's artillery and sharp- THE THIKD YEAK OF THE WAE. 61 shooters in the rear was heavy and incessant until noon, when his gunboats opened upon the city, while a determined assault was made along Moore's, Hebert's, and Lee's lines. At about cue o'clock p. M., a heavy force moved out to the assault on the lines of General Lee, making a gallant charge. They were allowed to approach unmolested to within good musket range, when every available gun was opened upon them with grape and canister, and the men, rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley after volley, with so deadly an eifect that, leaving the ground literally covered in some places with their dead and wounded, they precipitately retreated. The angle of one of our redoubts having been breached by their artillery previous to the assault, when the repulse occurred, a party of about sixty of the enemy, under the command of a Lieutenant- colonel, made a rush, succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the ditch at the foot of the redoubt, and planted two colors on the parapet. It was of vital importance to drive them out, and, upon a call for volunteers for that purpose, two companies of Waul's Texas legion, commanded respectively by Captain Bradley and Lieutenant Ilogue, accompanied by the gallant and chivalrous Colonel E, W. Pettus, of the Twentieth Ala- bama regiment, musket in hand, promptly ])resented them- selves for the hazardous service. The preparations were quiet- ly and quickly made, but the enemy seemed at once to divine the purpose, and opened upon the angle a terrific fire of shot, shell, and musketry. Undamited, this little band, its chival- rous commander at its head, rushed upon the work, and, in less time than it requires to describe it, it and the flags were in our possession. Preparations were then quickly made for the use of our hand-grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of the purpose, immediately surrendered. On other parts of our lines the enemy was repulsed, although he succeeded in getting a few men into our exterior ditches at each point of attack, from which they were, however, driven before night. Our entire loss in this successful day was com- paratively very small, and might be counted in a few hundreds. So accustomed had the population of Yicksburg become to the fire and rage of battle, that the circumstance is no less true than curious that throughout the day stores in the city were open, and M^omen and children walked the streets, as if no missiles 62 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. of death were filling the air and bursting and scattering the fragments around. There is no reliable account of the enemy's loss this day ; but, in killed and wounded, it was several thou- sands. Two thousand had fallen in front of General Forney's lines alone,- according to the report of that commander. The dead lay before our works, while thousands of wounded men were carried off as soon as they fell. The result of this engagement was a lesson to the temerity of the enemy. After this decided repulse, the enemy seemed to have abandoned the idea of taking Vicksburg by assault, and went vigorously at work to thoroughly invest and attack by regular approaches. The weakness of our garrison pre- vented anything like a system of sallies, but, from time to time, as opportunities offered, and the enemy effected lodg- ments too close to our works, they were made with spirit and success. But these were unimportant incidents. The patience of Southern soldiers — a virtue for which they are not remark- able — was now to be tried by the experiences of a siege: exhausting labors, scant rations, a melancholy isolation, and the distress of being entirely cut off from their homes and friends. The siege was established by the enemy under circumstances of peculiar and extraordinary advantage. Although Grant's attack was made from Grand Gulf, that place was not long his base; and, when he gained Haines' Bluff and the Yazoo, all communication with it was abandoned. He was enabled to rely on Memphis and the river above Vicksburg for food and reinforcements ; his communications were open with the entire West ; and the Northern newspapers urgently demanded that the utmost support should be given to a favorite general, and that the Trans-Mississippi should be stripped of troops to supply him with reinforcements. But the South still entertained hopes of the safety of Vicks- burg. It was stated in Richmond, by those who should have been well informed, that the garrison numbered considerably more than twenty thousand men, and was provisioned for a siege of six months. Nearly every day the telegraph had some extravagance to tell concerning the supreme safety of Vicks- burg and the confidence of the garrison. The heroic promise of Pemberton, that the city should not fall until the last man THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 63 had fallen in the last ditch, was called to the popular remem- brance. The confidence of the South was swollen even to in- solence by these causes ; and, although a few of the intelligent doubted tlie extravagant assurances of the safety of Yicksburg, the people at large received them with an unhesitating and exultant faith. The prospect of Johnston's relief to Yicksburg was a delu- sion of its unhappy garrison and of an ignorant public. In- deed, on learning of the Baker creek disaster, Johnston had given up Yicksburg for lost, and considered that Pemberton had made a fatal mistake in determining to be besieged in Yicksburg, rather than maneuvering, in the first instance, to prevent a siege. The fact is, that at no time after the disaster referred to did General Johnston have at his disposal half the troops necessary to risk an assault on Grant. After the evac- uation of Jackson he had retired to Canton, and the force he had collected there, including reinforcements to the amount of eight thousand men from Bragg's army in Tennessee, and above six thousand from Charleston, scarcely exceeded twenty- four thousand men. Grant's army was 'estimated at sixty thousand or eighty thousand men, and drawn, as they were, principally from the Northwestern States, they were of the best material. His great excess of force was being daily en- larged by reinforcements, while the Richmond authorities re- fused to give or to promise more troops to Johnston. On the 5th of June, Mr. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, telegraphed to Johnston : " You must rely on what you have, and the irregular forces Mississippi can afford." The fact is, that the resources of the Confederacy were at this time in the most critical condition. In Yirginia we were outnumbered by the enemy more than two to one ; and with reference to Bragg's condition in Tennessee, General Johnston did not hesitate to declare that, to take from him a force suffi- cient to oppose Grant, would involve the yielding of that State. He advised the Richmond authorities that it was for them to decide between Mississippi and Tennessee. He informed Pemberton that it was impossible for him (Johnston) with the force at his command to raise the siege of Yicksburg, and all that he could attempt was to extricate the garrison by a simul- taneous attack on some part of the enemy's lines. 64 THE THIKD TEAR OF THE WAR. On the 15tli of June, General Jolmston communicated to the government liis opinion that, without some great bhinder of the enemy, we could not hold both Mississippi and Tennes- see, and that he considered saving Yicksburg hopeless. In- deed such an attempt had now become utterly desperate. Grant had entrenched his position, and protected it by power- ful artillery. His rcintbrccments alone equalled Johnston's whole force. The Big Black covered him from attack, and would cut off our retreat, if Johnston had been defeated in his mad enterprise of attack. And now ensued a series of extraordinary communications from Kichmond, remarkable even among the curiosities of the secret correspondence of officials, A favorite of the Richmond Administration had entangled himself in a hopeless siege, and the proposition was to be recklessly made to General Johnston to effect the relief of the favorite, or to cover his disaster by an attempt, which he (General Johnston) had declared would be tantamount to the sacritice of himself and army, and which all the circumstances of the situation plainly denounced as hopeless. The authorities essayed the dictatorial style, and de- clared that the aim justified " any risk and all probable con- sequences." General Johnston could not be convinced. They attempted the j^crsuasions of flattery : " The eyes and the hopes of the whole Confederacy are upon you," wrote IMr. Sed- don to Johnston, " with the full confidence that you will act." General Johnston could not be cajoled. The Richmond au- thorities were left to await the development of that for which they themselves were most responsible. The situation revealed in this correspondence was a close secret to the public. It was known to Pemberton, but most studiously kept from his troops, who, whenever a courier reached Vicksburg, imagined certain tidings of Johnston's approach. At times, the unhappy men listened for the sound of his guns. The hardships of the siege were telling upon tbem. The enemy were mining at different points, and it re- quired the active and constant attention of our engineers to repair at night the damage inflicted upon our works during the day, and to meet his diflerent mines by countermining. The same men were constantly in the trenches. The enemy bombarded day and night from seven mortars on the opposite THE TIIIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. 65 side of the peninsula, lie also kept up a constant iire on our lines by artillery and sharpshooters. Many officers and men were lost by this fire. Among the first, was the brave Briga- dier-general Green, of Missouri, who was shot in the neck by a minie ball. Ilis wish was gratified — "he lived not to see Vicksburg fall." But although General Johnston despaired of the ability of liis army to save Yicksbnrg, he was busy with eftbrts to extri- cate the garrison or to cut the enemy's communications, hop- ing, from day to day, there might possibly be some new de- velopment of the situation. On arriving in Mississippi he had informed General Kirby Smith, commanding the forces west of the Mississippi river, of the condition of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and requested his aid and co-operation. Gen- eral Smith did send troops to give all possible aid to Vicks- burg. General Taylor was sent with eight thousand men to co-operate from the west bank of the Mississippi, to throw in supplies and to cross with his force if expedient and practi- cable. On the 27th of June- General Johnston telegraphed Pemberton that these troops " had been mismanaged, and had fallen back to Delhi." All prospect of relief from this quarter was thus terminated. A few days before this disappointment Pemberton had com- municated to Johnston the suggestion, that lie (Johnston) should make to Grant propositions to pass the army of Vicks- burg out with all its arms and equipages. He renewed the hope, however, of his being able, by force of arms, to act with Johnston, and expressed the opinion that he could hold out for fifteen days longer. Johnston was reassured by this spirit of determination. He still had some hopes of the co-operation of Kirby Smith. He replied to Pemberton, that something mig/d yet he done to save Vickslurg, and to postpone the modes suggested of merely extricating the garrison. This despatch never reached Vicksburg. " Had I received," said General Pemberton, " General Johnston's despatch of the 27th of June, in which he encouraged the hope that both Vicksburg and .the garrison might be saved, I would have lived upon an ounce a day, and have continued to meet the assaults of all Grant's army, rather than have surrendered the city until General Johnston had realized or relinquished 5 G6 THE TillED YEAR OF THE AVAR. that liope ; but I did not receive his despatch until the 20th day of August, in Gainesville, Alabama, nor had I the most remote idea that such an opinion was entertained by General Johnston ; he had for some weeks ignored its possi- bility." Whatever may be the merit of this declaration, Johnston's reassurance was too late. The very day it was penned, Pem- berton had proposed a capitulation. Forty-five days of incessant duty, with short rations, had had a marked effect upon the troops of Vicksburg. The trials of the siege were extraordinary. The men had been exposed to burn- ing suns, drenching rains, damp fogs, and heavy dews, and had never had, by day or by night, the slightest relief. The extent of onr works reqnired every available man in the trenches, and even then they were, in many places, insufficiently manned. It was not possible to relieve any portion of the line for a sin- gle hour. Confined to the narrow limits of a trencli, with their limbs cramped and swollen, without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous storm of shot and shell, while the enemy's unerring sharpshooters stood ready to pick off every man visible above the parapet, the troops had suffered many combinations of hardship which had told upon their health and spirits. It is nndoubtedly true, that in the condition in which the troops were, they would not have been able to cut their way through the enemy's lines, without the abandonment of a large number of sick, and the loss of, probably, half their ef- fective strength, Such an enterprise was discouraged by all the division commanders. But however unequal the condition of the troops to an enterprise of such vigor and hardihood, it is certain tliat it was yet equal to sustain for many days longer tlie fatigues and hardships of a siege. The condition of the garrison was certainly not as extreme as that which Pemberton had heroically prefigured as the alternative of surrender ; and it must be said, in the severe interest of truth, that it holds no honorable comparison with the amount of privation and sulfer- ing borne in other sieges recorded in history. On the 3d of July, Pemberton proposed terms of capitula- tion for the morrow, to " save the further effusion of blood," " feeling himself fully able to maintain his position for a yet indefinite period.*' There was but little dispute about terms : THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. C7 the parole of tlie garrison, Grant's persistent refusal to make any stipulation with regard to the treatment of citizens, and the surrender of this latter point bj Pemberton. On the morning of Saturday, the Fourth of July, the anni- versary of American Independence, the troops of Vicksbui-g marched from the lines of entrenchments they had defended and held for nearly two months, and, after stacking their arms and lowering their standards which had proudly floated upon many a battle-field, returned inside of the works, prisoners of war to a detested and exultant foe. At the hour of noon the Yankee flao; was raised over the Court-house amid the shouts and cheers of Grant's troops. Demoralized as was Pember- ton's army, there were yet those whose hearts throbbed or eyes filled with tears as they saw the hated ensign floating over a city which the Confederacy had boasted to be impregnable, and which had at last been surrenderred to signalize an Amer- ican holiday. The public confidence of the South with regard to the safety of Yicksburg had been abused by the silly mendacities of the telegraph, which, to the last, reported the garrison in supreme spirits and the enemy in woful plight. Under these circum- stances the surprise and consternation of the people of the South may be imagined, when, without the least premonition, the announcement came that the select anniversary of the Fourth of July had been signalized by the capitulation of Yicksburg, without a fight : tiie surrender of twenty odd thousand troops as prisoners; and the abandonment to tlie Yankees of one of the greatest prizes of artillery that had yet been made in the war. The news fell upon Richmond like a thunder-clap from clear skies. It was at first denounced as an invention of speculators in sugar. The people were unwilling to reconcile themselves to a misfortune so unexpected in its announcement, and so monstrous in its particulars. The authorities of Richmond maintained a sullen silence. But the truth, at last, came out stark and unwelcome. We had surrendered to the enemy a force of more than twenty- three thousand men, with three major-generals, and nine brigadiers ; upwards of ninety pieces of artillery, and about forty thousand small arms, large numbers of the latter having been taken from the enemy during the siege. GS THE TIIlllD YEAIJ OK THE WAU. The statement that the garrison of Yicksbnrg was surren- dered on aecount of an inexorable distress, in whicli the sol- diers had to feed on mules, with the occasional luxury of rats, is either to be taken as a designing falsehood, or as the crudi- ties of that foolish newspaper romance so common in the war. In neither case does it merit refutation. A citizen of Yicks- bui-g declares that the only foundation for the rat story is that a }>ie spiced with this vermin was served up in some of the otiiccrs' messes as a practical joke, and that for days after the surrender he himself had dined on excellent bacon from Pem- berton's stores. In his official report Pemberton declares that he had at the time of the surrender of Yicksbnrg about 40,000 pounds of pork and bacon, which had been reserved for the snbsistance of his troops in the event of attempting to cut his way out of the city. Also 51,2'11 pounds of rice, 5,000 bushels of peas, 112,23-1 pounds of sugar, 8^240 pounds of soap, 527 pounds of tallow candles, 27 pounds of star candles, and 428,000 pounds of salt.* Tliere appears, then, to have been no immediate general oc- casion for the surrender of Yicksbnrg other than Pemberton's desire " to save the further cfl'usion of blood." The exi)lana- tion of his motives for selecting the Fourth of July as the day of surrender implies a singular humiliation of the Confederacy ; as he Avas willing to give this dramatic gratification to the vanity of the enemy in the hope of thus conciliating the ambi- tion of Grant, and soliciting the generosity of the Yankees. lie says : " If it should be asked why the Fourth of July was * But it must be stated that Pemberton's sui)plics of Vicksburg, whicli he had a your to provide, were criiniually scant; and that as the faihire of sup- plies would in all probability have decided the fate of Vicksburg, had he not anticipated it by a surrender, ho cannot be acijuitted of blame in this particu- lar. He declined to provision Vicksburg in prospect of a siege. When one of the Confederate generals, from Mississippi, pointed out to him vast supplies in certain counties of tlui State accessible to his garrison, he dismissed the advice Avith a haughtiness that almost amounted to ])ersonal insult. As ])root of the abundance of the country around Vicksburg, we have Grant's official report of his Mississippi campaign, in which he states that, with a view of rapid movement and surprise, having calculated that twenty days would place him before Vicksburg, he permitted his troops to take only four days' provisions, trusting to the country for the other sixteen days' supply, and, in fact, supplied his army (50,000 men), from the country lying about the line ol his march. THE THIUD TKAR OF THE WAR, . GO selected as the day for the surrender, the answer is obvious ; 1 believed that, upon that da}^ I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the Fourth of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their na- tional vanity, they would yield then what could not be ex- torted from them at any other time." Such an incident of humiliation was alone wanting to complete the disaster and shame of Vicksburir. Wliat the Confederacy had proudly entitled its "heroic city," was now destined to the experience of Yankee despot- ism, and, what was worse, to the shame of those exhibitions of cowardly submission which suited the interests of those who were left to herd with their country's destroyers. The citizens of Vicksburghad suffered little more than mere inconvenience from the siege. There had been but little loss of life among them in the bombardment. The city was filled with gruu]is of caves on every hill-side. In these caves the women and children were sheltered during the nights, and occasionally in the daytime when the firing was very severe. The excava- tions branched out in various directions after passing the en- trance. They were not very desirable bed-chambers, but they seemed to have answered a very good purpose. In one or two instances shells entered them, and two women and a number of children were thus killed durina' the sicfje. On the same day the Yankees centered Vicksburg, several places of business were opened. Signs were hoisted on express ottices, book and fruit stores, informing the new customers that the proprietors were in and ready to serve them. A well- known citizen of Vicksburg took the oath of allegiance and accommodated General Grant with headquarters at his resi- dence. The Jewish portion of the population, composed princi- pally of Germans, with but one honorable exception, went for- ward and took the oath of allegiance to the United States. These tokens of submission were rewarded in the enemy's usual way. At first the citizens were placed under very little restraint. They were permitted to come in and go out of the lines almost at pleasure. In a few days, however, the reins were tightened. Vicksburg found a second edition of Ueast Butler in General Osterhaus, a tawny Dutchman, who pereiup- TO • THE THIRD YEAR OF THE "WAR. torilj stopped the ingress and egress of tlie people; forbid citizens from purchasing provisions without first registering their names; re-enacted much of tlie ingenious despotism of New Orleans; and declared that the height of his ambition was to get our people to hate and abhor him. A Mississippi paper declared that it had no word of excuse or charitj^ for the men who had remained in Yicksburg under the enemy's flag. To quote from their own slang dialect, '* the Confederacy was about gone up, and there was no use in fol- lowing its fortunes any further." But it repeated the charac- teristic story of the conquered cities of the South. The spirit of the women of Yicksburg was unbroken ; and amid all its shameful spectacles of subserviency, female courage alone re- deemed the sad story of a conquered and emasculated city. There was but a single exception to the compliment ; and she a Northern school-teacher who was first to sing " the Bonnie Blue Flag" in Yicksburg, at the commencement of the war, to raise the means to clothe our soldiers. She forgot the "hope- crowned past," and attended a social gathering at MacPher- son's headquarters, where during the evening a sword was presented "in honor of the surrender of Yicksburg." The city had been accounted one of the most beautiful of the South, of commanding situation, and adorned with a profusion of shrubbery ; but the rain of shot and shell had sadly marred its beauty. But few buildings were entirely demolished ; yet there was scarcely a house in Yicksburg that remained unscath- ed ; in all of them were frightful looking holes in the walls and floors. The streets had been ploughed up by shells. In walk- ing along the pavement one had to exercise care not to tumble into a pit dug by a projectile from a thirteen-inch mortar, or from a Parrott gun. The yards, gardens, and open lots were cut up with shot holes. Nearly every gate in the city was crowned with unexploded thirteen-inch shells placed a-top of each post, and the porches and piazzas were adorned with curious collec- tions of shot and shell that had fallen within the inclosures. Everywhere were to be found evidences of the fiery ordeal through which the city had passed. It is impossible to recount with precision the various inter- ests involved in the fate of Yicksburg. It compelled, as its necessary consequence, the surrender of other posts on the TFIE THIRD TEAR OF THE "WAR. 71 Mississippi, and cut the Confederacy in twain. It neutralized successes in Lower Louisiana, to which we shall presentl}' re- fer. Its defence had involved exposure and weakness in other quarters. It had about stripped Charleston of troops ; it had taken many thousand men from Bragg's array ; and it had made such requisitions on his force for tlie newly organized lines in Mississippi, that that general was compelled or in- duced, wisely or unwisely, to fall back from Tullahoma, to give up the country on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and practically to abandon the defence of Middle Tennessee. The fall of Yicksburg was followed by the enemy's re-occupa- tion of Jackson, the capitulation of Port Hudson, the evacua- tion of Yazoo city, and important events in Arkansas, which resulted in the retreat of our army from Little Rock and the surrender to the enemy of the important valley in which it is situated. To these events we must now direct the attention of the reader. THE YANKEE KE-OCCUPATIOJf OF JACKSON. General Grant advanced his forces on Jackson, to which point Johnston retreated so soon as he learned the Vicksburg disaster. His policy was to march rapidly to the capture or discomfiture of General Johnston's army. On the evening of the 9th of July, his advance drove in our outer line of pickets. The troops employed in this expedition were Sherman's army corps, the Fifteenth, commanded by General Steele ; the Thir- teenth arm}"" corps, General Ord, commanding, with Lauman's division of Sixteenth army corps attached, a portion of the Sixteenth and Ninth army corps, commanded by General Par- ker, and McArthur's division of General McPherson's corps — in all about four army corps. The works thrown up for the defence of Jackson consisted of a line of rifle-pits, prepared at intervals for artillery. These extended from a point north of the town, a little east of the Canton road, to a point south of the town, within a short dis- tance of Pearl river, and covered most of the approaches west of the river; but were badly located and constructed, pre- senting but a slight obstacle to a vigorous assault. The troops promptly took their assigned positions in the 72 TUK THIRD YEAR OF TIIK WAR. intrencliments on the appearance of the enemy, in expectation of immediate assault: Major-general Loring occupying the riglit; Major-general Walker the right of the centre; Major- general French the left of the centre, and Major-general Breck- inridge the left. The cavalry, under Brigadier-general Jackson, was ordered to observe and guard the fords of Pearl river, above and below the town. But the enemy, ins.tead of attacking, as soon as he ar- rived, commenced intrenching atid constructing batteries. On the 10th, there was spirited skirmishing with slight cannonad- ing, continuing throughout the day. This was kept up with varying intensity, llills commanding and encircling the town, within easy cannon range, offered favorable sites for batteries. A cross-fire of shot and shell reached all parts of the town, showing the position to be entirely untenable against a powerful artillery. On the 12th, besides the usual skirmishing, there was a heavy cannonade from the batteries near the Canton and south of the Clinton roads. The missiles reached all parts of the town. An assault, though not a vigorous one, was also made on Major-general Breckinridge's line. It was quickly repelled, however, principally by the direct fire of Cobb's and Slocumb's batteries, and a flank attack of the skirmishers of the First, Third and Fourth Florida and Forty-seventh Georgia regiments. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and prison- ers, was at least five hundred.'^" On the 10th, General Johnston obtained information that a large train from A^icksburg, loaded with ammunition, was near the enemy's camp. This, and the condition of the enemy's batteries, made it probable that Sherman would the next day concentrate upon Jackson the fire of near two hundred guns. * During the heavy bombardment Colonel Withers was killed by the ex- plosion of a shell near his own residence. Ho had j ust returned from the front when he was killed. lie was buried at night by his failhftil slave, who was fired uix)n by the enemy during the interment. This boy's conduct to his de- ceased master was a rebuke to the enemy. In the face of the enemy's position, at night, within easy range of the enemy's sharpshooters, he, with the assist- ance of two Confederate ollicers, and by the flickering light of a lam{) — which was shot out of his hand while ho was performing his sacred duty — carried the body of his dead master and interred it with as much affection and tender care as if it were his own child. THK THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. i6 The evacuation of Jackson was determined on and effected on the night of the 16th. The evacuation was not discovered by tlie enenij until the next day ; and Johnston retired by easy march- es to Morton, distant about thirty-five miles from Jackson. When Sherman's troops entered Jackson, exasperated by the losses which their ranks had sustained, they commenced a de- struction of the houses by fire, which was kept up until there was but little left of the town but ashes. Jackson has been an ill-fated place. When it was captured before there was a great destruction. Now, where was but lately a thriving and pretentious town of between four and five thousand inhabitants, with a State-house, lunatic asylum, and many other public buildings, there was a heap of ruins. The country between Vicksburg and Jackson was com- pletely devastated. A letter from our lines in Mississij)pi thus described the outrages there : " I thought the condition of northern Mississippi and the country around my own home in Memphis deplorable. There robberies were committed, houses were burned, and occasion- ally a helpless man or woman was murdered ; but here, around Jackson and Vicksburg, there are no terms used in all the calendar of crimes which could convey any adequate con- ception of the revolting enormities perpetrated by our foes. Women have been robbed of their jewelry and wearing apparel — stripped almost to nakedness in the presence of jeer- ing Dutch ; ear-rings have been torn from their ears, and rings from bleeding fingers. Every house has been pillaged, and thousands burned. The whole country between the Big Black and the Mississi})pi, and all that district through which Grant's army passed, is one endless scene. of desolation. This is not the worst ; robbery and murder are surely bad enougii, but worse than all this, women have been subjected to enormities worse than death. " Negroes, men and women, who can leave their homes, are forced or enticed away. The children alone are left. Barns and all descriptions of farm-houses have been burned. All supplies, bacon and flour, are seized for the use of the invad- ing army, and the wretched inhabitants left to starve. Tlie roads, along which Grant's army has moved, are strewn with all descriptions of furniture, wearing apparel, and private 74: THE THIRD YKAR OK TIIK WAR. property. In many instances Imsbands liave been arrested, and tlireatenod with instant death by the hangman's rope, in. order to make their wives reveal the phice of eoneealment of their vahiable eftects. The poor women are made to ransom their sons, dangliters, and h\isbands. The worst shwes are selected to insult, taunt, and revile their masters, and the wives and daughters of their masters.;" "We must remember that these enormities w^ero contemporary with Lee's civilities in Pennsylvania. It was bad enough for that commander to make such return for what he had experi- enced in Virginia ; but the enemy's warfare in distajit and remote parts of the Confederacy exceeded in atrocity what had been known on the lines of the Potomac. It appears to have been aggravated in proportion to its distance from the centres of intelligence. In the Southwest it was not denied that the policy of the enemy was the destruction of all resources of live- lihood, but on the border (in Missouri, for instance), the enemy was bold enough to announce the policy of the extermination of the inhabitants.* But to this subject we shall have occa- sion to refer again. THE FALL OF TORT HUDSON, ETC. The fate of Port Hudson was necessarily involved in that of Yicksbui-g. But it did not fall until after a prolonged and gallant resistance, the facts of which may be brielly commemo- rated. On the morning of the 22d of May, the enemy, under * For instance, a Missouri paper, speaking of tho iwlicy of General Ewing (tlio Ynukeo general in command of that depai-tment), towards the secession- ists of that country, says : '• General Ewing's policy towanls these wretches from tho very start has been simply extermination — nothing less. His orders have been to take no prisoners from them, and the orders fiair been strietly obeyed.^' Again, the St. Louis Demoerat, an abolition sheet, says, in referring to the troubles on the Missouri border : "The Seventh Missouri State militia are burning all the houses of rebel sympathizers all along the bonier. A fearful state of things exists in all the border counties, and general devastntion is observable." One of these rutlians, a Yankee colonel, tleclared that he would hang every man without " protection papers." He said that " the whole duty" of his regi- ment (.the Fifteenth) wouUl be " to kill rebels " and closed with the following atrocious boast : '• Wo carry the flag ; kill with the sabre ; and hang with the gailoAVB." TIIK THIRD TKAR OF THE WAR. 75 command of General Banks, pushed his infantry forward within a mile of our breastworks. Ilavini^ taken his position for the investment of our works, lie advanced with liis whole force against the breastworks, directing his main attack against the lefr, commanded by Colonel Steadman. Vigorous assaults wore also made against the extreme left of Colonel Miles and GeiKMul r>oale, the former of whom commanded on the centre, the latter on the right. On the left tlie attack was made by a brigade of negroes, composing about three regiments, together with the same force of white Yankees, across a bridge which had been built over Sandy creek. About five hundred negroes in front advanced at double-quick within one hundred and lifty yards of the works, when the artillery on the river blutf, and two light pieces on our left, opened upon them, and at the same time they were received with volleys of musketry. The negroes fled every way in perfect confusion, and, according to the enemy's report, six hundred of them perished. Tlie repulse on Miles' left was decisive. On the 13th of June a communication was received from General Banks, demanding the unconditional surrender of the post. He complimented the garrison in high terms for their endurance, lie stated that his artillery was equal to any in extent and efliciency ; that his men outnumbered ours five to one; and that he demanded the surrender in the name of humanity, to prevent a useless sacrifice of life. General Gard- ner replied that his duty required him to defend the post, and he must refuse to entertain any such proposition. On the morning of the 14th, just before day, the fleet and all the land batteries, which the enemy had succeeded in erecting at one hundred to three hundred yards from our breastworks, opened fire at the same time. About daylight, under cover of the smoke, the enemy advanced along the whole line, and in many places approached within ten feet of our works. Our brave soldiers were wide-awake, and, opening upon them, drove them back in confusion, a great number of them being left dead in the ditches. One entire division and a brigade were ordered to charge the position of the First Mis- sissippi and the !Ninth Alabama, and by the mere physical pressure of numbers some of them got within the works, but all these were immediately killed.. After a sharp contest of two 76 tup: third year ok tiik wak. hours, the enemy were everjM-here rei)ulsed, and withdrawn to their oki h'nes. During tlie remainder of the month of June tliere was iieavj skirmishing daily, with constant firing night and day from the gun and mortar boats. During tlie siege of six weeks, from May 27th to July 7th, inclusive, the enemy must have fired from fifty to seventy-five thousand shot and shell, yet not more than twenty -five men were killed by these projectiles. They had worse dangers than these to contend against. About the 29th or 30th of June, the garrison's supply of meat gave out, when General Gardner ordered the mules to be butchered after ascertaining that the men were willing to eat them. At the same time the supply of ammunition Avas becoming ex- hausted, and at the time of the surrender there were only twenty rounds of cartridges left, with a small supply for artillery. On Tuesday, July 7th, salutes were fired from the enemy's batteries and gunboats, and loud cheering was heard along the entire line, and Yankees, who were in conversing distance of our men, told them that Vicksburg had fallen. That night about ten o'clock, General Gardner summoned a council of war, who, without exception, decided that it was impossible to hold out longer, considering that the provisions of the garrison were exhausted, the ammunition almost expended, and a large proportion of the men sick or so exhausted as to be unfit for duty. The surrender was accomplished on the morning of the 9th. The number of the garrison M'hich surrendered, was be- tween five and six thousand, of whom not more than half were efi'ective men for duty. A few days later, and another disaster is io be noticed in Mississippi : the enemy's capture of Yazoo city. lie advanced against Yazoo city, both by land and water, on the 13th of July. The attack of the gunboats was handsomely repulsed by our heavy battery, under the command of Commander Isaac N. Brown of the navy. The De Kalb, the flag-ship of the liostile squadron, an iron-clad, mounting thirteen guns, was sunk by a torpedo. To the force advancing by land no resistance was made by the garrison, commanded by Colonel Oreasman, of the 29th North Carolina regiment. The greatest misfortune of this event was our loss in boats THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 77 and material of a cliaracter much needed. Some twenty vessels were scuttled and destroyed ; and of the fine fleet of hoats that had souglit refuge in the Yazoo river, not more tlian four or five were saved, which were up the Tallahatchie and Yello- busha. THE BATTLE OF HELENA. — THE TRANB-MISSISSIPPI. The Vicksburg disaster was attended with a grave mis- fortune on the other side of the Mississippi : the repulse of the Confederates at Helena. Our army arrived within five miles of Helena on the evening of tlie 3d of July, when General Holmes assumed immediate command, detached Marmaduke's division and left Price but two brigades — Mcllae's Arkansians and Parsons' Missourians — with which he was ordered to as- sume position, assault and take what was known as the Grave-' yard Hill the next morning. The route lay for the greater part of the way across abrupt hills and deep ravines, over which it was utterly impossible to move artillery during the darkness. General Price ordered his artillery to be left behind until daybreak, and moved for- ward with details from each battery accompanying the in- fantry, in order to command the guns which he expected to capture. Within half a mile of the enemy's works. Price's troops were formed into two columns of divisions, Parsons' brigade occupying the right, moving in front. Both brigades moved forward rapidly, steadily, unflinching, and in perfect order under a storm of grape, canister, and minie balls, which were poured upon them not only from the Graveyard Hill in their front, but from the fortified hills upon the right and left, both of which were in easy range. The enemy gave way before the impetuous assault of the attacking columns, which entering the works almost simultaneously, planted the Confederate flag on the summit of the Graveyard Hill. In the meantime, however, the attack of the enemy's works on Price's left, which was to have been made by General Fagan, had been repeatedly repulsed ; although the men fought gallantry, and more than once drove the enemy from his rifle pits, under a heavy enfilading fire from one of the 78 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. enemy's strongest forts and a gunboat in front of the town. General Price had ordered McRae's brigade to reinforce Fa- gan ; but it soon became obvious tliat it had been so much weakened by losses, and by the straggling of men overcome by thirst and the intense heat of the day, or disheartened by the failure of the other assaulting column, that it could not be detached without too greatly endangering General Price's own position. Under these circumstances, an order came from General Holmes to Price to withdraw his division. The at- tack was abandoned after a loss to the Confederates of about five or six hundred killed and wounded, and probably twice that number of prisoners. But the result was important in other respects than that of the casualties of the fight. It, in connection with the fall of Vicksburg, terminated all hope of the connection of the Trans- Mississippi with the eastern portions of the Confederacy, and was the first step of the retreat which, at last abandoning Little Rock, was to surrender into the hands of the enemy the most valuable portion of Arkansas. It was supposed that the worst consequences of these events would be to estrange the Trans-Mississippi, and easily subject it to the arms or to the persuasions of the enemy. Never were fears of Confederate statesmen so little realized. They found in this distant section of the Confederacy a virtue which had been maintained under all disasters, and which should be com- memorated here in a brief review of the history of this section. The spirit of the Trans-Mississippi was most conspicuous and noble in view of the peculiar sufierings it had endured. It had made a proud record of patriotic integrity. In another volume we have seen how the Confederate forces, in anticipa- tion of a grand contest near Corinth, were moved east of the Mississippi by order of General Albert Sidney Johnson, then commanding the "Western Department. "We may look back to that dark period. The Confederates took with them from Arkansas all material of war and public property, of every description. Immediately afterwards. Brigadier-general Pike retreated sonthward, to the vicinity of Red river. Thus Mis- souri was left hopeless of early succor, Arkansas without a soldier, and the Indian country undefended, except by its own inhabitants. A Federal force, five thousand strong, was organ- THE TIlIKr> YEAR OF THE WAK. 79 ized nt Fort Scott, under tlie iianio of tlie " Indian expedition," and with the avowed intention to invade the Indian conntrj and wrest it from our control. Hostile Indians began (-(dlect- ing on the border, and Federal emissaries were busy among the Cherokees and Creeks, inciting disatiection. Detachments of Federal cavalry penetrated, at M'ill, into various parts of the upper half of Arkansas, plundering and burning houses, steal- ing horses and slaves, destroying farming utensils, murdering loyal men or carrying them into captivity, forcing the oath of allegiance on the timid, and disseminating disloyal sentiments among the ignorant. Tory bands were organized in many counties, not only in the upper, but in the lower half of the State likewise, and depredations and outrages upon loyal citi- zens were of constant occurrence. Straggling soldiers, belong- ing to distant commands, traversed the country, armed and lawless, robbing the people of their property, under the ]>re- tence of "impressing'' it for the Confederate service. The governor and other executive officers fled from the capital, taking the archives with them. The courts M-ere susjiended, and civil magistrates almost universally ceased to exercise their fnnetions. Confederate money was openly refused, or so depreciated as to be nearly M'orthless. This, with the short crop of the preceding year, and the failure, on all the uplands, of the one then growing, gave rise to the crudest extortion in the necessaries of life, and menaced the poor with actual starvation. But it was not only the omissions of the Richmond Admin- istration of which the Trans-Mississippi had to comjdain. There were perpetrated upon it such positive outrages of the Confederate authority as had never been ventured or imagined in other portions of the country. The excesses of Major-gen- eral Ilindman, who assumed, by a certain color of authority from Richmond, to be commanding-general of the Trans-Mis- sissippi, had been severely censured by members of the Con- . federate Congress, and were the subject of an investigation in that body. They were such as might have moved any people from their allegiance, whose patriotism was not paramount to all other considerations. He suspended the civil authority, and instituteil what he called " a government ad uiterim.''' In the summer of 1863. he had proclaimed martial law. To make so THE TIIIUi:» YKAE OF THE WAR. this declaration effective, a provost martial was appointed in each county, and all the independent companies therein were placed under his control. Over these were appointed provost marshals of districts which included several counties. The provost marslial general, at General Ilindman's headquarters, had comnnmd over all. Whatever may have been the good intentions or the pallia- tive circumstances of this singular usurpation, it certainly could not be agreeable to a people accustomed to civil liberty ; and it was an excrescence of the war, after the fashion of Yan- kee " vigor," which did serious dishonor to the Confederacy. AVe have referred to it here to illustrate the virtues of a people, whose steadfast patriotism could survive such trials. As we have elsewhere seen, General Holmes assumed com- mand of the Trans-Mississipin Department in the latter part of 18(52. Ills operations had been feeble and unsuccessful. The fall of Yicksburg and the defeat at Helena, were irrepara- ble disastei'«. Communication was interrupted between the two sections of the Confederacy, and each thrown on its own resources. It was supposed that this division of the efforts of the Confederacy would tend to weakness and jealousies. But these fears were dismissed, when it was known that the gov- ernors of the States of the Trans Mississippi had made the recent disasters an occasion of official conference, in which they had taken the noble resolution to do their respective parts in the war, and to take care that the common cause of our independence should not suffer by a division of the efforts to obtain it. They declared that, instead of such division of effort being occasion of jealousy, it should be that of noble and patriotic rivalry. It is not to be denied that it was unfortunate that the East- ern States and those of the Trans-Mississippi had been con- strained to separate efforts in the war. But it was an especial subject of congratulation and pride that the spirit and unaTi- imity of the South were unaffected by such an event, and that the most distant people of the Confederacy, not only faithfully kept, but fondly cherished their attachment to the vital prin- ciple of our struggle and the common cause of our arms. THE THIED YEAR OF THE WAR. 81 CHAPTER lY. Elasticity of tho Spirit of the Confederacy. — What it Taiifrht. — Decay of Confi- dence in President Davis's Adtninistration. — llis Affoction for Penibcrton. — A Season of Enconragiiip Events. — Tun Campaign in Loweh Louisiana. — Capture of Brasliear Oity. — Tlio Affair of Donaldson. — The Siege of Chaulkston. — Operations of tho Enemy on Folly Island. — General Beauregard's Embarrassments. — Assault of the Enemy of Fort Wagner. — His Foothold on Morris Island. — Beauregard's Dcsigni?. — Bombardment of Fort Wagner. — Second Repulse of the Enemy's Assault. — Gilmore's Insolont Demand. — His Attempt to Fire Charleston. — A Noble Keply from Beaure- gard. — Bombardment of Fort Sumter. — The Fort in Ruins.— Evacuation of Morris Island by the ('onfederatcs. — Tho Yankee Congratulations. — Devilisli Penalties for " the Secession t'ity." — Daiilgren's Part of the Programme. — His Night Attack on Sumter. — His Failure. — Safety of Charleston. — Bitterness of Yankee Disappointment. — Morgan's E-xrEoirioN into Indiana and Ohio. — Ilis Capture of Lebanon. — An Unnatural Encounter. — Murder of Captain Magennis. — The Incursion Through Indi- ana. — Tlic Yankee Pursuit. — A Chaplain's Trick. — Ojterations in Ohio. — Tiie Affair of Buffington Island. — Morgan's Attempt to Escape. — Ilis Capture and Imprison- ment. — Results of his Expedition, Strategic and Material. — The Value of Military Adventure. The most remarkable quality displayed by the Southern mind in this war has been its elasticity under reverse, its quick recovery from every impression of misfortune. This, more than any thing else, has attested the strength of our res- olution to be free, and shown the utter insignificance of any " peace party," or element of submission or compromise in the Confederacy. Great as were the disasters of Vicksburg and Gettysburg they were the occasions of no permanent depres- sion of the public mind ; and as the force of misfortune could scarcely, at any one time, be expected to exceed these events, it may be said they taught the lesson that the spirit of the Confederacy could not be conquered unless by some extremity close to annihilation. A few days after the events referred to President Davis took occasion, in a proclamation of pardon to deserters, to declare that a victorious peace, with proper exer- tions, was yet immediately within our grasp. Nor was he ex- travagant in this. The loss of territory which we had sustained, unaccompanied as it was by any considerable adhesion of its population to the enemy, though deplorable indeed, was not a ' 6 82 THIi TIlIKn YKAK OF TIIK WAR. vital incident of the war : it had reduced the resources of sub- sistence, but it had multiplied the spirit of resistance, and it was yet very far from the centre of our defence. "While Mr. Seward was making to Europe material calculations of Yan- kee success in the square miles of military occupation and in the comparative arithmetic of the military power of the bellig- erents, the Confedera{!y had merely postponed its prospect of a victorious peace, and was even more seriously confident of the ultimate issue than when it first declared its independence. But it must not be disguised that one, and perhaps the most imi>ortant of the disasters referred to — the fall of Vicksburg — while no occasion of despair to the Confederacy, was yet that of another great decline of popular confidence in the Adminis- tration of President Davis, llajipily, every page of the his- tory of this war attests that the dissatisfaction of the (,\>nfed- crate peo])le with the Kichmond Administration was compa- tible with steady attachment to that cause for which they fought and which was impersonal and sublime. It is the fact of these two existing conditions in the Confederacy, a ])uzzle to niany, that gives the sublimest quality to this war, and con- tains its most valuable lesson. Never had the obstinate adhesion of President Davis to his favorites been more forcibly illustrated than in the case of Pembcrton. The criticism of the public had no charity for this commander, and his recent campaign, culminating in the surrender of Vicksburg, was denounced by the intelligent as a series of blunders, and by others less just and more passionate as the device of treason. President Davis had retained him in command in spite of the most powerful remonstrance ever made by a people against the gratification of a personal con- ceit in their ruler. Indeed, the President went further than mere opposition to the public sentiment. lie defied and al- most insulted it ; for after the disaster of Vicksburg, Pember- ton, with the public reproaches clinging to him, and jniblic sentiment clamoring in vain for an inquiry into his conduct, was ostentatiously entertained as the President's guest in Rich- mond, and given the distinction of one of his suite in the sub- sequent official visit of the President to our armies in the West ! It was said by Mr. Foote, in public session of Con- gress, that when the President, with a peculiar hardihood, cs- TlIK Tinun YIOAll OF TlIK WAR. 83 saycd to rule down tlie lines of our troops, witli PeinbertoTi at his side, angry exclamations assailed them, and passed from lip to lip of the soldiers. There were certain events which aided in relieving; the im- pression of the Vicksburg disaster, or, at least, served to divert the public mind. Of these were the operations of the Con- federate general, Taylor, in Lower Louisiana, some of which had })receded the fall of Vicksburg, and, at one time, had kin- dled in the South the hope of the reca})ture of New Orleans. HEK CAMPAIGN IN LOWKR LOUISIANA. Information received from Southwest Louisiana had deter- mined General Taylor to organize an attack upon r>rashear City and its forts. Colonel Majors, who commanded a brigade of cavalry on the Atchafalaya, was to push boldly through the Grosse Tete, Marangoin and Lafourche country, to Doiuildson- ville, thence to Thibodeaux, cut off the railroad and telegraph communication, then ]iush ra])idly to Bceuf river, in the rear of J>rashear City, while a force under Generals Mouton and Gri'cn was to cooi)erate in front of the enemy's position, on Berwick's l>ay. On the 22d of June General Mouton had succeeded in col- lecting some thirty-seven skiffs and other row-boats, near the mouth of the Toche, with a view to co-operate, from the west side of the Atchafalaya, with Colonel Majors' command, then on the Lafourche. An expedition, numbering three hundred and twenty-five gallant volunteers, under Major Sherod Hun- ter, started at 6 o'clock p. m., to turn the enemy's stronghold at Brashear City. It was a hazardous mission to cross the lake (twelve miles) in these frail barks, to land at midnight on the enemy's side, in an almost impenetrable swamp, and await the dawn of day, to make the desperate attempt which would in- sure victory or a soldier's death. The boat-expedition having got oflf, General Thomas Green, with the Fifth Texas mounted volunteers, the Second Louisi- ana cavalry, Waller's Texas battalion, and the Valverde and NichoUs' batteries, advanced, under cover of night, to o])posito the enemy's camp. The Seventh and Fourth Texas regiments 84 THE THIKD YKAK OF THE WAK. were thrown across the Atchafalaya, to Gibbons' Island, during the night. General Green was to attract the enemy's atten- tion and fire, while the troops on Gibbons' Island were to be thrown across to the support of Major Hunter, as soon as the boats returned from the latter's landing-point, in rear of the enemy's position. Immediately after daylight, General Green fired the first gun from the Valverde battery, at a gunboat of the enemy, which was steaming up the bay in the direction of the upper fort (Buchanan). Instantly the whole bay was in a blaze, our guns playing upon the long lines of the enemy's tents. The Yankees were completely surprised. Their heavy guns, from three forts, opened on Green. There was a keen anxiety on our side for the sound of Colonel Majors' guns, for it only re- mained for him to occupy the Boeuf crossing, to cut off com- pletely the enemy's communication. At last the long-distant sound of artillery told that Majors was there; and at the same moment the storming party of Major Hunter made its appear- ance on the edge of a piece of woods. With a real Texas yell the latter dashed at once, with bayonets fixed and pistols drawn, full at the threatening walls of the proud fort — in twenty minutes they had climbed its walls, dispersed its gar- rison, torn down the stars and stripes, and hoisted the Con- federate flag over its ramparts. This heroic charge was made at the point of the bayonet, with unloaded muskets. In half an hour Generals Taylor, Mouton, and Green, with their re- spective staffs, had their headquarters in the city of Brasliear. The immediate fruits of the capture were one thousand prisoners, ten heavy guns, and a large amount of stores of all descriptions. The position obtained by General Taylor, with that of Thibodeaux, gave him command of the Mississippi river above 'New Orleans ; enabled him, in a great measure, to cut oft' Banks' supplies, and, it was hoi)ed, might eventually force Banks to the choice of losing New Orleans or abandon- ing his operations against Port Hudson. But the plan which General Taylor had arranged for an at- tack on New Orleans unfortunately fell through, in conse- quence of his disappointment of reinforcements. His active force, not including the garrison at Berwick's Bay, was less than four thousand. He had obtained from New Orleans in- THE THIRD TEAE OF THE WAR. 85 telligence of the fall of Vicksburg, and this, with the conse- quent fate of Port Hudson, rendered his position in the La- fourche extremely hazardous, and not to be justified on military grounds. On the 28th of June General Green had been repulsed in an attack on Donaldsonville, after a desperate struggle, with two hundred and sixty casualties. On the 12th of July, after the fall of Port Hudson, the enemy, over four thousand strong, advanced six miles from Donaldsonville, where he was met by General Green, with his own and a part of Majors' brigade (in all twelve hundred men), and driven from the field, with a loss of about five hundred in killed and wounded, some three hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, many small arms, and the flag of a New York regiment. The gallant Green dismounted from his horse, placed himself at the head of his old regiment, captured the enemy's guns, and drove his forces into the fort, and under the guns of the fleet. These operations in Lower Louisiana were not followed by the important consequences which were at one time anticipa- ted : for, as we have seen, Taylor's force was not competent to hold the Lafourche country against the overwhelming forces of the enemy released from the siege of Port Hudson. Yet the events we have briefly narrated, had afforded a certain en- couragement to the South ; for they were, at least, some relief from the unwelcome news we had hitherto had from an ill- starred portion of the Confederacy. But one must look in another direction for the first impor- tant wave of the returning tide of victory that was to cover the popular recollection of Yicksburg, and again exalt the hopes and confidence of the Confederacy. THE SIEGE OF CHAKLESTON. The enemy had prepared to follow up the achievements of the summer campaign, by a vigorous attempt upon Charleston. It had been determined by General Gilmore, in command of the Yankee forces, to take Folly Island, as the base of siege operations against Charleston, and to possess, if possible, Mor- ris Island, under the belief that it was the key to Charleston. 86 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAE. This latter island is an outer strip of land, lying directly on the ocean. It is some three and a half miles in length, and tlie northern end, crowned hy Cummings' Point Battery, was the goal aimed at by the enemy, as it bore directly on Fort Sum- ter and the channel leading by it to the city. At the southern extremity of the island was another battery, pointing out towards the north end of Folly Island, where the Yankees had been encamped for many months, and constructing heavy works. It was known and reported to the Confederate gov- ernment, that Folly Island was occupied in force since the 7th of April, and, as a consequence, that Morris Island was threat- ened. The changes of land and naval commanders of the en- emy were reported as presages of impending hostilities. But in vain. All ideas of attack were scouted at Richmond, as late even as the first week in July. General Beauregard's force at Charleston had been greatly reduced by tlie authorities, under the persistent belief that the city and adjoining coast were safe from any serious military operations of the enemy. He was left to provide against at- tacks upon Charleston in no less than five different directions. There is no doubt that he had been seriously embarrassed in his attempts to put Morris Island in condition to meet the at- tack of the enemy, by the want of labor to carry out the plans for its defence ; want of armament for the works necessary to that end ; and last, but not least, want of men to hold and fight any works which might have been thrown up at the south end of Morris Island, without stripping other important po- sitions of the feeble supports left them. But although General Beauregard must have had a general expectation of attack in this direction, it is not to be disguised, that he was surprised in the time and manner of its develop- ment. It is said, that he had not force enough left to venture upon a thorough reconnoissance of the enemy's outposts on Folly Island. For a number of weeks the enemy had been busily engaged on this point of land, in building sand batteries and mounting heavy guns within eight hundred yards of our works on Morris Island. The work was all performed under cover of the night. Screened from observation by the nature of the ground, hundreds of men were engaged night after night, silently and industriously throwing up earthworks, and THE THIPwD YEAK OF THE WAK. 87 mounting heavy guns so near to the Confederates that a loud word might have revealed the work. Shortly before daylight brush would be so disposed as to conceal the work of tlie pre- vious night, without exciting the suspicions of the Confederates. The morning light would dawn upon a quiet and deserted scene — not a soul to be seen — not a sound to be heard — not a thing to indicate offensive operations that the night had con- cealed. In this manner batteries were thrown up, and guns and mortars put in position. On the evening of the 9th, a division of the enemy was sent up Stono river to effect a landing on James Island, near a place called Stevens' Point. This movement was partially intended to occupy the attention of our forces, and conceal from them the real object of the large fleet of vessels hovering about Stono Inlet, and movements of the enemy on Folly Island, At nightfall small boats, loaded with armed men, began to dash out from either shore. These men were to make their way up the narrow creek, which makes into Morria Island, and. there wait till morning, when on a given signal they would assault the battery. This force was under General Strung. At daybreak on the following morning, the brush and boughs, which had served to conceal the battery on Folly Island from observation, were hastily removed, and the guns exposed to the Confederates. At Ave o'clock the first gun was heard from the enemy's battery. The battery was some- what screened from view by a grove of trees, but the incessant cannonade, and the dense white smoke, which rose above the tall pines, told how fearfully the contest raged. In the meantime the assaulting column of the enemy, con- sisting of three regiments, moved on slowly and silently up the beach, until they arrived within two hundred yards of Fort Wagner, when the Confederate pickets were encountered. The order to charge was given. The fort opened with tliree eight-inch howitzers, heavily charged with grape and canister. The Seventh Connecticut, which was in the advance, pressed through the fort, but the Pennsylvania and ]^ew York regi- ments, which were to support them, staggered back and lost their distance, when all three regiments broke into a shameful run, scattering down the beach. 88 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. The assault of the enemy was a shameful failure. The loss of life was inconsiderable, as two of the regiments kept out of the fire, and we may imagine how many were " missing" when the casualties in the storming party were ofhcially enumerated by the enemy as three hundred and thirty-four. But as our lower battery had been abandoned, the Yankees had succeeded in getting possession of the lower end of the island. They had gained a foothold, and were now to direct all their energies to get possession of Fort Wagner. This strong earthwork was near midway of the island, and had to be reduced before the enemy could reach Cummings' Point, and operate from there on Fort Sumter. The enemy having once obtained a foothold on Morris Island, it might have been easily foreseen that he would eventually compel an evacuation by the operations of siege, and the impossibility of defending forever a small island cut off from communication by an enormous fleet. But it was not to be given up without a brilliant incident of arms ; for Gen- eral Beauregard had determined to hold it, while works were elsewhere erected, and until the door of honorable retreat w^as open. In about a week the Yankees had occupied Black Island — a small spot between James and Morris Islands — and thrown up a battery ; they had erected two or three additional batteries on Morris Island, about one and three-quarter miles from Fort Wagner, and they had concentrated their fleet, consisting of four monitors, the Ironsides, a frigate, and four gunboats, some of which threw shell from mortars. Altogether, the circle of fire embraced not far from seventy guns. At day- light, of the 18th August, these opened, first deliberately ; but as the morning wore on the fire increased. Two monitors, two mortar boats, and the Ironsides, had by ten o'clock formed a line nearly in front of Battery Wagner, and about noon these were joined by two additional monitors. Until six o'clock in the evening the firing was incessant. There was scarcely an interval that did not contain a reverberation of the heavy guns, and the shock of the rapid discharges trembling through the city called hundreds of citizens to the battery, wharves, steeples, and various look-outs, where, with an interest never felt before, they looked on a contest that might decide the fate THE THIED YEAR OF THE WAR. 89 of their fair city. Above Battery "Wagner, bursting high in air, striking the sides of the work or phinging into the beach, and throwing up pillars of earth, were to be seen the quickly succeeding shells and round shot of the enemy'B guns. Bat- tery Gregg at Cummings' Point and Fort Sumter took part in the thundering chorus. As the shades of evening fell upon the scene the entire horizon appeared to be lighted up with the fitful flashings of the lurid flames that shot out from mon- ster guns on land and sea. • As night began to fall the bombardment relaxed. But it w^as known to our officers commanding that such a demon- stration on the part of the enemy was not without its object; and every man was ordered, by General Taliaferro, who com- manded our side, to the parapet to prepare for the expected assault of the enemy. At dusk two brigades of the enemy were formed in line on the beach. The regiments were disposed in columns, except a Massachusetts regiment of blacks, which, for peculiar reasons, was given the post of extreme honor and extreme danger in the advance, and was drawn up in line of battle, exposing its full front to our fire. The enemy moved forward at quick time and in deep silence. As they reached the vicinity of our rifle-pits, our batteries opened, and grape and canister was thrown into their ranks with fearful precision and execution. Checked for an instant only, they closed up the ragged gaps in their lines and moved steadily on until within less than eighty yards. Barely waiting for the Yankees to get within a destructive range our infantry opened their fusilade, and from a fringe of fire that lined the parapet leaped forth a thousand messengers of death. Staggering under the shock, the first line seemed for a moment checked, but, pushed on by those in the rear, the whole now commenced a charge at a " double-quick." Our men could not charge back ; but they gave a Southern yell in response to the Yankee cheer, and awaited the attack. On they came over the sand-hills, tripping and stumbling in the huge pits their own shells had dug, until they reached the ditch of the battery; then it was but a moment's work for those who survived our terrible fire of musketry to clamber up the sloping sides of the fortification and attempt to eftect a 90 THE TIIIED YKAK OF THE WAR. lodgment. But the men who met them on the parapet were as desperate as themselves, and the contest that ensued was brief and bloody. The untagonisls were breast to breast, and South- ern rifles and Southern bayonets made short work of human life. We could stop to take no prisoners then. The pai-apet was lined with dead bodies, wliite and bhxck, and every second. was adding to the number. It was one of those rencounters in which one side or the other must quickly yield or fly. The enemy took their choice. In less than five minutes probably, the first line had been shot, bayoneted, or were in full retreat — rolling into the ditch or dragging their bloody bodies through the sand-hills on their hands and knees. But another line came, and another and another, each reinforcing its predecessor, until the battle waxed hot, fierce, and bloody. . Finally, however, the whole were driven back, either into the broad trench at the base of the battery, out of reach of our guns, or scampering out of view in the darkness of the night. There was now a comparative lull in the firing, but in fifteen or twenty minutes a second column of Yankees filed down on the beach towards the left of the fort in much the same manner as that pursued by the first. These repeated the experiment that had just before terminated so disastrously to their com- panions, and, with a bravery that was worthy of a better cause, dashed upon the work. The first assault failed utterly, but with the reinforcements that joined the defeated party, they came again with such strength and impetuosity that between the extreme darkness of the night, which had now enveloped the entire scene, the difticulty of distinguishing friend and foe, and the confusion incident to such an occasion, some two or three hundred, as is estimated, effected a lodg- ment in the vicinity of the chambers occupied by two of our guns. Most of these were taken prisoners. About midnight the enemy gave the order to retire. His repulse had been terribly disastrous in loss of life. Ilis killed and wounded, according to his own accounts, was fifteen hundred and fifty ; and the next day we buried six hundred of his dead left on the field. Our own loss was comparatively light, not more than one hundred in killed and wounded. While the enemy was constrained to fall back upon siege THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR 91 operations against Fort Wagner, it was determined by Gilmore to employ his batteries in the reduction of Fort Sumter, over the heads of both "Wagner and Gregg. But there was an episode, which was an introduction to these operations against Sumter, and which must not be omitted here. On the 21st of August, Gihnore addressed to General Beauregard a demand, which was curiously without signature, for the evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter ; stating that Sumter was already doomed to swift and complete demolition, and that, if the Confederate commander did not comply with his demand within four hours^ a fire would be opened on the city of Charleston from batteries already estab- lished within easy and effective reach of the heart of the city. In the foUowinor night and without further notice fire was opened on the city from Morris Island batteries. Twelve eiglit-inch shells fell in the city ; several flew in the direction of St. Michael's steeple; but fortunately no one was injured. Of this atrocious and cowardly episode General Beauregard said in a letter addressed to Gilmore : " It would appear, Sir, that, despairing of reducing these works, you now resort to the novel means of turning your guns against the old men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city ; an act of inexcusable barbarity from your own confessed point of sight, inasmuch as you allege that the complete demolition of Fort Sumter within a few hours by your guns seems to you a matter of certainty ; and your omission to attach your signature to such a grave paper must show the recklessness of the course upon which you have adventured, while the fact that you knowingly fixed a limit for receiving an answer to your de- mand, which made it almost beyond the possibility of receiving any reply within that time, and that you actually did open fire and threw a number of the most destructive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares, and filled with sleeping women and children, will give you a bad eminence in history — even in the history of this war." The same day that Gilmore made his feeble attempt to execute the threat he had so fiercely and confidently breathed against Charleston, he opened heavily against the east face of Fort Sumter from his land batteries enfilading it. The can- nonade was continued throughout the day, nine hundred and 92 TnE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. forty-three shots being fired. The effect was to batter the eastern face heavily, doing considerable damage, and to disable one ten-inch gun and a rifled forty-two pounder. On the 22d the enemy threw six hundred and four shots at the fort, dis- abling some of the barbette guns, demolishing the arches of the north-west face, and scaling the eastern face severely. The next day the fire from the enemy's land batteries was kept up on Sumter, disabling the only ten-inch columbiad that remained, and the three rifled forty-two-pounders in the northern salient of the second tier. The eastern face was badly scaled, and the parapet seriously injured. The flag-stafi" was twice shot away, but the flag each time immediately replaced. On the 24th of August General Gilmore announced in des- patches to Washington that " Fort Sumter was a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins." His chief of artillery reported its destruction so far complete that it was no longer of any avail in the defence of Charleston. But in this there was some mistake. Fort Sumter was in one respect stronger than ever; for the battering down of the upper walls had rendered the casemated base impregnable, and the immense volume of stone and debris which protected it was not at all affected by the enemy's artillery. It had been held through the siege and cannonade by the First South Carolina artillery, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, until its armament had been disabled ; and the services of the artillerymen being elsewhere required, General Beauregard determined that it should be held by infantry. On the night of the 4th of September, the Charleston battalion, under ]\Iajor Blake, relieved the garrison ; Major Stephen Elliot relieving Colonel Rhett in command of the post. In the mean time the enemy's operations on Morris Island had fearfully progressed. His sappers had advanced up to the very moat of Wagner. On the night of the 4th September the enemy kept up a continual fire, and on the morning of the 5tli the Ironsides combined her fire with the enemy's land bat- teries, all concentrated on Wagner. The eff'ect was to severely injure the traverses and communications, and to disable the guns and equipments still more effijctually. But Wagner was not the only object of this bombardment. During the night of the 6th the enemy displayed from the deck of a monitor off Morris Island an immense calcium light, and several monitors THE TIUliD YKAR OF THE WAR. 93 soon after moved up and opened on battery Gregg. Moultrie and Gregg replied with spirit. At a quarter to two a rocket was thrown up, and ere many minutes elapsed, the enemj were discerned approaching Morris Island at a point between Gregg and Wagner. They had come down in barges through a creek west of Morris Island, obviously with the design of as- saulting Gregg in the rear. Advancing in line of battle they were permitted to come very near, when a nine inch Dahlgren opened upon them at short range, with double canister. Our howitzers then commenced a fire of shrapnel and canister, while our infantry, admirably posted, poured into them a fire of musketry. This the Yankees could not withstand, and though for a very short while they maintained a fire of mus- ketry and grape shot from their bai'ges, they were soon forced to withdraw. For three days and nights battery Wagner had been sub- jected to the most terrific fire that any earthwork had under- gone in all the annals of warfare. In these nights the whole of Charleston harbor had been lighted up in a scene of terrible beauty. From Moultrie almost to Secessionville a whole semi- circle of the horizon was lit up by incessant flashes from cannon and shell. As peal on peal of artillery rolled across the Avaters, one could scarcely resist the belief that not less than a thousand great guns were in action. All this went on beneath a waning September moon, which, with its warm Southern light, mellowed by a somewhat misty atmosphere, brought out softly, yet distinctly, the most distant outlines of the harbor. The efiect of the fire on Wagner had been terrible. The immense descending force of the enormous Parrott and mortar shells of the enemy had nearly laid the wood work of the bombproofs entirely bare, and had displaced the sand to so great a degree that the sally-ports were almost entirely blocked up. Wagner and battery Gregg had now been held under a con- tinued and furious cannonade, by land and sea, for fifty-seven days ; two assaults had been signally and gloriously repulsed ; the enemy had been forced to expend time, men and material, most lavishly in approaching the first ; but at this time he was within a few yards of the salient ; most of the guns of the fort were injured, transportation and supply had become most 94: THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. difficult with the inefficient means at our disposal, the possi- bility of throwing heavy reinforcenicnts in time to resist an assault by the enemy's overwhelming forces, issuing from his trenches only a few yards distant, out of the question, and the practicability of keeping a sufficient force on tlie island for the purpose, under the furious cannonade from land and sea, with- out protecting shelter, scarcely less so. This matter had been some time under consideration by General Beauregard, and after receiving reports concerning the state of the works, and our capabilities for reinforcing the garrison, it was determined not to subject those brave men, the flower of our force, to the desperate chances of assault. Orders were accordingly given, on the morning of the 6tli, to prepare for evacuation. It commenced about 9 r, m., and was concluded at about twelve. The guns of the batteries were spiked and implements generally destroyed. Matches were fixed to explode the maga- zines, bnt, from some unfortunate cause, botii those at Wagner and Gregg failed to explode. The enenjy threw his calcium light on Wagner during the whole night, and one of the most fnrious bombardments on record, even during this war, was continuously kept up while the movements were progressing; but he did not ascertain- the evacuation until the last of the boats were leaving. Then his guard-boats discovered the movement of our boats engaged in the embarkation, and creeping up upon the rear succeeded in cutting oft' and cap- turing three barges. Thus ended the defence of Morris Island — one relieved by much of glory to Confederate arms, and its conclusion, as we shall soon see, an empty advantage to the enemy. The de- fence had been prolonged far beyond what was deemed possi- ble at first, and the brave garrisons who had held it deserved the admiration of their countrymen. The aggregate of casual- ties in the struggle for the Island have been on our side about SQven hundred — killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy's loss was estimated at several thousand. The occupation of Morris Island was the signal to the enemy of great but temporary exultation. The Yankee newspapers flattered their readers that it was the key of Charleston. But the fact was that no one point in its fortification could be so called. In the system of Yaughan there was always such a THE THIRD YP:AR OF THE WAR, 95 point; — once taken, it cotnmandccl tlie rest. But the excel- lence of the new system of defence, illustrated at Comorn and Sebastopol, and repeated at Charleston, was the necessity of a siege for every battery, in which the besiegers were always exposed to the fire of others. It was easily seen by the Con- federates that such a defence, if conducted with courage, by an army which could not be surrounded and starved, might be easily rendered interminable. But such was not the opinion of Gilmorc. On his occupa- tion of the island he announced to the exultant authorities at "Washington: "The city and harbor of Charleston are now completely covered by my guns." Now was the time, de- clared the newspapers, for the famons Greek fire to pour de- struction npon "the secession city." "General Gilmore," said the Baltimore American., " may be expected to roll his fire-shells through the streets of Charleston." That com- mander had already been experimenting in liquid fire, and in a new style of bombs filled with fuses. During the bombard- ment of Sumter, in one of his ofilcial despatches he had de- clared with devilish complacency : " the projectiles from my batteries entered the city of Charleston, and General Beaure- gard himself designates them as the most destructive missiles used in war." But the enemy's fleet was now to appear upon the scene to accomplish the reduction of Charleston. General Gilmore had proposed — firstly, the occupation of the southern portion of Morris Island ; secondly, the capture of Wagner and Gregg ; thirdly, the reduction of Sumter. At that point Admiral Dahlgren was to take up the work, for it was calculated that if Gilmore succeeded in his designs, the navy would find it a comparatively easy task to ascend the harbor of Charleston. But had the condition as to Sumter been fulfilled? On the 7th of September Admiral Dahlgren sent in a flag of truce de- manding a surrender of the fort. General Beauregard tele- graphed to Major Elliot to reply that the Yankees could have Fort Sumter when they took it and held it, and that, in the mean time, such demands were puerile and unbecoming. Dahlgren was left to complete the programme in Charleston Harbor, and the North waited to hear that the possession of " the shapeless mass of ruins" that had once been Fort Sum- 96 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. ter was readily accomplished, and that Charleston, the cyno- sure of Yankee hatred, was at last the prize of the costly and protracted operations. It remained for the Yankee admiral to accept the invitation to assault Sumter, and he proposed to do so by an elaborate surprise. A special force of picked men from all the fleet was organized for a night attack. It was midnight of the 8th of September, when the expedi- tion, consisting of over twenty boats, and with tliirty-four officers and four hundred and thirteen men, of which one hundred and twenty were marines, all under the command of Commander Stevens, pulled its way silently and cautiously towards Fort Sumter. The plan was to assail the fort on three sides — one party landing on the gorge-wall, and attempting to ascend the debris and gain the parapet ; a second was to at- tempt to gain entrance through the lower embrasures, and a third was to act as a reserve. At half-past one in the morning the first line of boats was close upon the fort. The enemy had suj)posed it to be feebly garrisoned, and had hoped to find an unguarded moment. The garrison consisted of the Charleston Battalion, command- by Major Stephen Elliot. They were not asleep. As the Yankee boats crept up to the huge and shapeless mass of shivered walls, all was dark and still ; the great black rifted mound seemed some long-deserted ruin, where the lizards had crept into their holes for the night, and the very bats and owls had gone to bed. They approached with beating hearts. It appeared, indeed, that the hour of doom for Sumter and for Charleston was come. Suddenly a "fire of hell" streamed from out of the night. The stilly ruin becomes as a throat of the bottomless pit ; the bay is lighted with signals ; and on the instant, from Fort Moultrie and from a gunboat in the harbor, hail of shot and shell comes crashing around the barges. Major Elliot- had caused his fire to be reserved until the enemy was within a few yards of the southern and eastern faces upon which the landing was attempted. A close fire of musketry devoured those who had landed ; while three of the boats were torn to pieces by hand grenades or shells from the distant batteries. The garrison lined the walls of Sumter, and as the Yankees landed on the rocks, received them with sharp THE THIED YEAR OF THE WAK. 97 volleys of muslvetiy, which added confusion to their already bewildered movements. A strong party of the enemy now hastily gathered and made an attempt to climb over the ruins of the sally-port, which had been torn down by the tremen- dous fire of their land batteries. Our men received them breast to breast, pelting them with brickbats and pouring in a spattering shower of balls. Some bolder than the others, dashed forward, and seizing Yankees, one in each hand, dragged them by main force inside. Thus the fight raged for twenty or thirty minutes, when the Yankees, finding themselves over- powered, and likely to be cut to pieces, threw down their arms, retreated to the shelter of the walls and surrendered. Those who remained in the boats, not already landed, made their escape under the cover of the night, followed, however, by the spiteful balls of the batteries of Moultrie and of the gunboat Chicora. I^ot a life was lost on our side. Major Elliot succeeded in securing five boats, five stand of colors, twelve officers, and one hundred and nine men, including two officers and seven- teen men wounded. Amongst the captured colors was a worn and torn garrison-flag, reported by some of the prisoners as being that which Major Anderson was permitted to take from the fort, on the occasion of his being compelled to surrender, in April, 1861. This had been brought to hoist on the fort,' and to be made the subject of boast and Yankee "sensation " had the assault succeeded. " It was," says a Charleston paper, " the identical ' gridiron ' carried from Fort Sumter in 1861 ; exhibited to a monster mass meeting in JS'ew York shortly after ; talked, cheered, and prayed over until almost sanctified • wrapped around the gouty limbs of General Scott, and finally brought back under oath* that it should be victoriously replanted on the walls where it was first lowered in recoo-ui- tion of the Southern Confederacy." ^ This unsuccessful attempt to' open the way to Charleston, leaves but little to record of the operations of the enemy against this famous city. Those operations were to be nomi- nally continued for many long and weary months ; there were daily bulletins of bombardments; but the more intelligent persons of the North were not to be deceived by the noisylnd expensive display, and readily came to the conclusion that the 7 98 THE THIRD YEAR OF THR WAIJ. siege of Charleston was a failure, and that, despite Dahlgren's noisy protest, it was virtually abandoned. Months were to pass, and the Yankee admiral was to make no attempt to ■move up the harbor and complete not only the remaining part of the expedition, but that which he had promised to do when he assumed command of the fleet. It is unnecessary to pursue here the desultory record of a fruitless bombardment. The Yankee public had had such a series of emotions, surprises, and disappointments about Charleston, that it sickened of the name, and seemed to be fast progressing to the opinion that the monitors were a fail- ure, that their Parrott guns and monster artillery had been greatly overrated, and that sand-bank fortifications were sub- stantially impregnable to their vaunted artillery. " How many times," asked an indignant Philadelphia paper, " has Fort Sumter been taken ? How many times has Charleston been burned ? How often have the people been on the eve of starvation and surrender ? How many times has the famous Greek fire poured the rain of Sodom and the flames of hell upon the secession city ? We cannot keep the count — though those can who rang the bells and put out the flags, and invoked the imprecations, and rejoiced at the story of confla- gration and ruin." We must leave here the story of Charleston : the city safe beneath the pale autumn sky, with the waters of its beautiful bay un vexed by the busy keel of commerce, yet sleeping quietly ; while across them might be seen the Yankee flag floating from the parapet of Wagner, then the enemy's bat- teries, still beyond these the white' tents of the enemy, and further yet, over the woods of James Island, the masts of the fleet. A large besieging force w^s in sight of the spires of Charleston, and yet the city was safe, and proclaimed to the Confederacy new lessons of brilliant courage and hope. We have referred to the period which this chapter traverses as one of encouraging events for the South. The reader's attention must be turned back from the coast to the fields of the West, for another in the list of successes which made this period fortunate. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 99 morgan's expedition into INDIANA AND OHIO. The command of General Morgan, consisting of detachments from two brigades, numbering two thousand and twenty-eight effective men, witli four pieces of artillery — two Parrotts and two howitzers — left Sparta, Tennessee, on the 27th of June, and crossed the Cumberland near Burkesville on the 2d July. On the 4th of July, the expedition took up the line of march for Green river bridge. An attack was here made upon the enemy, who were found to be posted in a strong position, pro- tected by well constructed stockades. On account of the superior strength of the works our forces failed to carry the position. From Green river bridge Mor-^an next directed his atten- tion to the town of Lebanon. He encamped within five miles of the place on the night of the 4th. He at once demanded the surrender of the place, which was refused by the Yankee officer in command of the post. A heav}'- engagement ensued next day, which lasted, with considerable spirit, for some hours, the Yankees stubbornly resisting, firing from the houses. Finally a charge was ordered, and the town was captured, together with the whole Yankee force, consisting of about six hundred eflfective men, together with a large amount of stores, arms, &c. In the charge was killed Lieutenant Thos. Morgan, a brother of the general, who was shot through the heart. He fell at the very first volley. His only words were, " Brother Cally, they have killed me." The commandant of the post was Colonel Hanson, a brother of General Hanson, who had fallen on our side at Murfrces- boro'. He had behaved with extraordinary gallantry. When a surrender was demanded by Morgan, at his first approach. Colonel Hanson quietly remarked, " If it was any other day he might consider the demand, but the 4th of July was a bad day to talk about surrender, and he must, therefore, decline." His command had been raised in the heart of the Blue Grass region, and among them were brothers and other near relatives of Morgan's own men. This unnatural encounter between men of the same blood and same family — a painful incident of all the Kentucky campaigns — was heightened in its horri- 100 THK THIRD YKAK OF TIIK WAR. blc ferocity by the death of (Jenernl Morgan's brother, a favor- ite of his comrades, who undertook to revenge his death, and who were witli ditticulty restrained by tlieir otKcers from the indiscrimiinitc sjanghter of tlie enemy and ])illage of the town. It is to be rennirived that, in all his expeditions, General Morgan restrained his men from all outrages, and was very severe u[)on those had nuMi inseparable from adventures of his sort, and who accompanied them simi>ly for })lnnder. But the day before the Lebanon iight, a terrible incident had occurred in his little army. An ollicerof the expedition, whose journal lies before us, writes of this occurrence : " About three o'clock, as I rode on abt)ut forty yards in advance, 1 heard the general exclaim something in a very excited tone which I couKl not understand ; ami heard at the same time the rc})ort of a pistol. 1 turned, and. great (u>d ! ^o my horror, I saw (captain ]\la- gonnis falling t'rom his horse, with the blood rushing out of his iuouth and breast. I Fis oidy remark was, 'Let me down easy.' Li anotlier moment his s))irit had lied, lie was killed by Captain Murphy, because Magcnnis, by the direction of (ien- eral IMorgan, had ordered Murphy to restore a watch taken from a prisoner." Leaving Lebanon, Morgan i)roceeded to Bardstown, where he captured some cavalry, advanced then upon the Louisville and Nashville railrood, and next reached Garncttsville, when a feint was nuide upon the city of Louisville, whilst prepara- tions were on foot to elVect a crossing of the Ohio river. A scouting party was sent to the river at JJrandensburg, at which point two steamers were captured. Here the command effected a crossing of the river, after a severe iight with the enemy. They captured about one hundred Home Guards, one rilled twelve-pounder piece, and successfully repulsed two gunboats. On the 8th of July, Morgan's little connnand stood on the Boil of Indiana. He immediately took up the line of march for the town of Corydon, where he captured about 000 militia and some few regular soldiers. Salem was the next point which invited his attention, where an immense amount of damage was iuliicted upon the enemy by the destruction of railroad property, bridges, depots, stores, &c. The expedition from this point visited the interior of the State, and wiis enabled to tind any i|uantity of work to per- TIIIC TIIIKI) YKAK OK 'I 1 110 WAK. 101 form, which cmbracccl tlio dcsti-iiction of vast unionntsof i)ub- lic property, sucli an niilroadw, bridges, depots, and govern- ment stores generally. At Salens Morgan first learned from the telegraph wires of the tremendous exeitement hh unexampled invasion had created, and the station and numbers of the enemy around Ibr the hunt. He discovered that Indiaua,polis was running over with them— that New Albany eontaiiied 1 (>,()(>(»— that :{,0()() l)ad just arrived at Mitchell— and, in fact, 25,()()(> men were armed and ready to meet ihe "bloody invader." Morgan moved rapidly forward to Lexington, thence to Ver- non, and iVom Vernon to Versailles, scattering destruction and dismay along the route. Near the latter phace, an amusing and characteristic incident occurred. A Presbyterian chap- lain, in Morgan's command, captured an entire comi)any of militia. He was inoving ahead, when he found that he had llaidvcd the advance, and run upon a full con)pany of State militia. Imitating his commander's demeanor, he boldly rode up to the company and inquired for the captain. Jieing in- formed that there was a dispute as to who should lead them, he volunteered his services, ex])atiating largely upon the ])art he had played as an Jndiami cai)tain at Shiloh, and was soon elected to lead the valiant lloosiers against "the invading rebs." Twenty minutes spent in drilling, inspinid complete coniidence; and when the advance guard of Morgan's com- mand had passed without Captain P. permitting the lloosiers to lire, he ordered them into the road, and surrendered them to our command. CrcHt-fallen, indeed, were the Yaid^ees; but General Morgan treated them kindly, and, returning to them their guns, advised them to go home and not come hunting such game again, as they had every thing to lose and nothing to gain by it. Leaving the State of Indiana, Cieneral Morgan struck the Ohio line at a jjlace called Harrison. Here he comi)letely destroyed a very long bridge of great strength and value. A feint was here made uj)on Cincinmiti. The whole Ohio coun- try, in this direction, is che([uered over with railroads, and the Attention of the expedition was particularly directed to these. Immense damage was thus inllicted upon the enem3^ The Mississippi and Ohio railroad was greatly injured- Tiie com- 102 THE THIRD TKAR OF THK "WAR. mjiiul approached within eight miles of the city of Cincinnati, and it is saitl that Bonic of Morgan's sconts were within the snbnrbs of the city. On the march, the command bore to tlie left of the city, striking the little Miami railroad, captnring a valuable train of cars soon after reaching the road, together with about 200 Federal soldiers. The train was, of course, destroyed, which was the usual disposition made of such captures. After passing Cincinnati, Morgan next went in the direc- tion of Camp Denison, upon which ])oint he made another feint for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, who were at this time harassing him as he proceeded. Leaving the neighbor- hood of Camp Denison, he proceeded through the interior of the State, o})eratiiig upon an extensive scale, in destroying the railroails in which that section abounds. li.pon arriving near the town x:)f Pomeroy, another feint was hero resorted to. The numerous roads in this section were generally very eifectively blockaded, and much difficulty was experienced in overcoming these obstacles. Near Pomeroy General Morgan encountered a force of the enemy of several thousand men, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Whilst the skirmishers were engaged at this point, the main body of the comnuuid moved around the town to the left, with the view of reaching the river, which they accomplished about daylight on the morning of the 18th of July, at Buffington Island. Here the enemy came up with them, with a strong force, assisted by gunboats in the river, which prevented a crossing at this point. The rear guard of the expedition held the enemy in check, whilst the main body was enabled to move oti' from the river, to a point further up, called Belleville. Here another effort was nu\de to cross. About two hundred of the command had succeeded in crossing the river when the gunboats again mado their a})pearance, and also a force of cavalry and infantry, evidently' the same which had opposed them at Buffington. Only two men were drowned of the number which attcmjited to cross the river. j\[org:in being thus })revented from crossing his whole command, those who effected a crossing succeeded in keeping the gunboats at bay until he could remove his force to a point higher up the river. The enemy claimed to have JUK THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. 103 taken seventeen liuiidred prisoners in tlie running figlit. At any rate, tlie lew hundred wIjo liad crossed the Ohio, tlius cut off from the main body, l»ad no other alternative left tiiem but to make their way as they best could to the Confederate lines, which they succeeded in doing — passing through tiie mountains of West Virginia to Lewisburg, near which place they encamped. Morgan and about two hundred of his men had broken through the enemy's lines, on the north side of tlie Ohio. JIo had by some means got into a carriage. A Yankee major saw him, and, galloping up, reached for him. Morgan jumped out at the other side of the carriage, leaped over a fence, seized a horse, and galloped off as fast as horse-flesh conld carry him. < The fugitive commander, with the remainder of his scat- tered forces, pressed three citizens of Salineville into their Bcrvice as guides, and continued tlieir flight on the New J^isbon road. One of the impressed guides made his escape and rode back, conveying intelligence of the route taken, whicli it was believed was with the nltimate design of reaching the Ohio river higher uj). Forces were immediately despatched from Wellesville to head liim off, whilst another force followed hotly in his rear, and a strong militia force from New Lisbon came down to meet him. About two o'clock, in the afternoon, these various detach- ments closed in around Morgan in the vicinity of West Point, about midway between New Lisbon a>id Wellesville. The Confederates were driven to a bluff from which there was no esca))e, except by fighting their way through or leaping from a lolty and almost ])er})en(licidar ])reeipice. Finding them- selves thus cooped, Morgan surrendered himself and the rem- nant of his command. We shall have occasion elsewhere to refer to the enemy's treatment of this distinguished captive. It is sufficient to con- elude for the presentour narrative of this remarkable expedition to say, that its brave and generous leader and his officers were confined in felons' cells in the Ohio Penitentiary ; were sub- jected to cruelties at which the blood runs cold ; and that on the 20th day of November, Morgan and six of his officers escaped from the confinement and torture of their infamous 104 Tii!<: 'rii:ui) vicak oi^' tiik wak. })rison. The}' had dug out of their cells with small knives, al'tor weeks of coiiHtaut toil. Morgan lel't behind to his enemy an account of his toil and escape, "with two small knives," with this legend: " La patience c'ext aimre^ 'nials son fruit es 'loaxy '' 1 'alienee is bitter, but its fruit is sweet." So far from Morgan's exj)edition being accounted a failure, on account of its terminalit)n in a surremler, it is to be taken as one of the most IVuitful and brilliant of Confederate suc- cesses. There were persons who accused him of rashness in crossing the Ohio. Hut those who prefei-red this flippant acc'usation j)robaijlj did not know that although the passage of the Ohio was not, at the outset, a part of General Morgan's ])n)gi-ammo, it created an important diversion of Burnsido's anil)', large detachments ol" which were drawn after Morgan into and through Kentucky ; })revented the Yankee general froiii marchiii'r on Knowille and trettiny; in rear of Ih-aiJCii's army, then nuMiaced in front by Kosecrans, at Shelby ville; thus disi'onci'rted the ^'ankc^e cami)aign in the West, and de- hiyed its oj)erations for many valuable weeks. It is true that Morgan lost about two" thousand jirisoiiers. r.ul, for this number addcnl to the Yankee exchange list, lie had exacted an immense and brilliant compensation. With twenty- five hundred men he traversed two enormous States from end to end — occupied their towns almost at }>leasurt — cut their i)rinci])al arteries of communication, burnt depots, de- stroyed engines, sunk steamboats imiumerable. He threw several millions of people into frantic consternation for the safety of their ]>roperty, turned entire populations into fugi- tives, and comp.elled several thousand men to leave their occu- pations for weeks and go under arms— only as an equivalent to him and his twenty-live hundred troops, lie paroled near six thousand Yankees, they obligating themselves not to take \\\> arms during the war. He destroyed thirty-four imj^ortant bridges, destroying the track in sixty jibu^es. His loss was by no means sliglit: twenty-eight commissioned olHcers killed, thirty -five wounded, and two hundred and fifty men killed and M'oundetl. Wy the Yankee accounts he killed more than two hundred, wounded at least three hundred and fifty, and (cap- tured, as before stated, near six thousand. The damage to railroads, steamboats, and bridges, added to the destruction THE THIRD YKAK OF THK WAR. V'o of public stores and depots, was not less tlian ten millions of dollars. This brilliant expedition taught Confederates the value of ad- venture. "Want of enterprise had been tlie curse of the South in war as in peace; and the counsels of the war in the Confed- eracy had been too much to the effect that it must do nothin"" but parry — that it must never presume to thrust. However unwelcome the ultimate misfortune of GeneraVf Morgan, it did not rob his expedition of its glory, or its profit to the Confederacy. 106 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. CllArTER V. ' Contrnst betw6on onr Military Fortuiios in tlio East and in tho West. — Some Roasons for our Success in Virsj;iirui. — Hor Hearty Oo-openvtioii with tiio Confederate Autliorities. — Her Contributions to the War. — Uencral ]iravenieiil Contemplated by Koseorana. — Braf^tr's Ketreat to Cbattanoof^a. — Tlie Yankees on a l>ouble l^ine of Operatious. — Huekncr's ICvacualion of Knoxviile. Tnic SuititicNnKu oi<" CuMisKiti.ANn (!ai'. — I'resident Davis' Comment on the Surrender. — Tnic Hattlks or Ciuckamauoa. — Brag}j;s' Evacuation of Ciiatta- iioo^a. — Topofifraphy of the Katllo-tield. — Tlionuis's Column of Yankees in McLemore's Covo. — Disobodienco of Orders by l^ieutenant-fieneral Hill of the Confederates. — Brajjj^'a Orders to Lieutcnantjreneral I'olk. — Two Opportunities Lost. Note: Kra,irf,''s Secret and Ollicial lvei>ort of tlie Miscarriaf,'o of His Plans.— The First Day's Engaffcment on tho Chickamaufiu. — Second Day.— General I'olk'a Fif;fht on our liijjht. — Longstroot's Successful Attack on tlie Left. — Tho Grand Char<;o. — Rout of the Enemy. — IjOn^strool's Mcssafje to Hraijj?. — Forrest Up a Tree.— Bragg Declines to rursue. — His Hesitation and Error. — His Movement upon Chattanooga. — Boast of Kosecrans. — An Empty Victory for tho Confcdcratois. — Bragg's A\vk\vard I'auso. — Discussions of tho Campaign. — His Supposeil Investment of Chattanooga. — Two Blunders of tho Confederate Commander. — Chickamauga a Second Edition of Bull Kun. Note : Observations of a (icneral Oliicer of the Confederate States Army ou the Campaign in tlio West. Tknnksssek was a conspicuous theatre of the war, but one of strange misfortune to the Confederates. We have in preceding volumes of this work, ami at diiVoront periods in the history of the war, referred to the marked and striking contrast between our military fortunes in the East and in the West. True, the picture was not entirely free from lights and shadows on either Bide. Koanoke Island somewhat mai-red the one, M'hile the tirst day of Shiloh, the brilliant forays of Morgan, Wheeler, and Forrest, and the unexpected success with which, for more than a year, Yicksburg delied three successive expeditions, until an evil star shed its malignant intluence over her, lighted up tlie sombre tints of the other. The steady tendency and actual re- sult on each side was, however, clear and unmistakable. Two years ago our army was encamped at Bowling Green, and our batteries, on the beetling cliti' of Columbus, scowled defiance to Cairo. From the time General Johnston fell back from THE 'IIIIRD YEAR OF TIIK WAR. 107 Bowling Green, a dark and bloody struggle ensued, which cnl- minatcd in the disasters of ]*ragg's Kentucky campaign. The battle of" MurtVeesboro', in which we won a brilliant victory, on the 31 St of December, 1862, afterwai-ds proved .but a drawn battle, and on the night of the 2(1 of .lanuary following, the Oonl'cderates had retreated to Tullahoina. The remarkable and persistent contrast between our military affairs in the West and those east of the Alleghanies, especially on the grand theatre of Virginia, aftbrds a curious study for the future and elaborate historian of the war. But some par- tial explanation of it is to be found in obvious circumstances. The army of Virginia was undoubtedly superior in com])osition to that of the AVest. The Virginia troo])s — it may be said with- out invidiousness, where there is so much of common glory for every member of the Confederate army — were especially com- plimented by General Lee for a remarkable union of s})irit and traetal/dity, whicli made them the best soldiery in the world. And it may be said emphatically, that no other State, whose soil was the theatre of war, had exhibited such haj)py accord, and such thorough and generous co-oj)eration with the (Confed- erate authoi'ity as had Virginia. It is in the cii-cumstance of this zealous and devoted co-oj)eratiori of Virginia with ihe Con- federate authority — in contrast with the conduct of certain other States, in whose borders was pitched the theatre of war — that we shall especially find an explanation for those triumphs of the common arms of the South, which so frequently and so uniformly graced her soil. No embarrassments of party politics, no indecent bickerings of demagogues, chilled the zeal of Virginia, or divided her ef- forts in the war. From the beginning of the contest she had poured out a lavish stream of contributions to every necessity of the general government. In the fall of 18G3, it was othcially reported in her legislature, that she had already furnished. 102,915* soldiers to the Confederate service, and that, in ad- dition, thirty thousand conscripts had just passed through the camp of instruction, and that she had issued in this time, 103,840 muskets, 399 pieces of cannon, and other arms in pro- portion. * Statement of the Number of Troops Furnished the Confederate States by the 108 THE THIK1> YKAK OV TlIK WAR. In julvortiiii;- to tlu> t'orlunos in\H)lved by the fall of Viclcs- l>ur^li, wo luive ahviuly said, that (nMUM-al Brao-i^'s army in 3\muu'!?soc had boon oonsidorably woakonod by drafts npon it to reinforce the linos in tho Southwest. lie was in a critical condition at Tnllahoma. Ivosocraiis had nearly double his nuni- bors in his lV(Uit, and l>urnsido, who ct)nunandod what tho Tankoos called the Army of the Cumberland, M-asin a position, by an advance towards Knoxville, to threaten his rear. Kosocrans, whoso name is coupled with so much of tho mil- itary history o\' the AVest, enjoyed a divided reputation in tho Confederacy, boiiiij; esteemed by many as tlio most skilful and formida|)le of Yankee ii,onorals, and by others, as a lucky mil- itary adventurer, who would soon run his career o[' i^ood fortune. In the early sta«^es of the war, ho liad made i^reat reputation by his successes over Leo in Western Vir^-inia, tho latter boin^ taken quite out of his element, in a contracted mountain warfare, and beiu'jj easily bewildered by a nnin who, as an itinerary sjH'culatiu-, a poildlor in "oil si)rings," had nuido liimsoU' minutely familiar with those mountains, lie was now at the head of the I'lass in President Lincoln's academy, for tho irraduation of youuii- and sudden lield-nuirshals. In the Do- partment of Tonnossoo his star had been in the asconilant ; ho luid yet to sustain a defeat ; but such fortune, said those who disputed his generalship, was simply that likely to attend tho march of a much superior army i>f well-disciplined western troops, against a snudl yrmy of brave and j^ationt, but badly handled Confederates. The Chattanooga Jitbel quoted against Siatf of Virffiuia, an takrn from th<- first lidh> on file in the Adjutant and Insptctor-geinral' s Ojficc. Sixty-four rogimoiits infantry 53,49(5 Twenty rogimonts nival ry 14,175 Two roginionts nrtilkMT 1,771) Twonty-ciglitlmttalions, cavnlry, infantryand artillory. . 11,717 , Nine battnlious artillery. Army NortluMU Virjiiuia 4,500 Two huuiirt'il and fourttvn unattaolu'il oounMUiies, artil- liTy. infantry and cavalry 18,348 Total numbor of mon 102,JH5 Tho alnno st«t(Mnont doos not onibraco tlio ivcruits or conscripts furnishoO by the !St«to of Virginia. October, \i'C>S. TIIK TllIKI) YKAK OK TIIK WAK. 109 him a vul;j;;u-, Liit trito uxiotn, uiiiong tlic 1)U(;l hy one of tlio most extensive movements in the West: the 0(;eu})ation of East Tennessee, and a movement IIkmicc; into the heart of the cotton States. This military llei-eules, said a Northiirn pajx-r, liad, of all otliers, been seleeted to "drive a wedge into the centi'c! of iJic! (>onfederaey." Since his retreat to Tnllahoma (J(!neral Th'M^-g liad advanced to ^V'artracc! and Shelby vili(^, and was appariiiitiy ready to *;ive tlu! enemy battle, A j)orti()n of his lorces liavin*^ becui witli- drawn to Mississippi, he considered that he was Icjft as a nH;i'e army of observation. The enemy at hist sn(;ceede(l in sni'j>rislng our forces at liberty and Hoover's (laps by a llank movinnent, and Genei'al r>ra<>'urnside moving on iuioxviile. Tt was thought to be necessary that the exposed left ilaid< of Rosecrans' army should be covered wliile he made a right swinging movement on Chattanooga, and this a]>j)ear(!(l to be the whole ])urpose of the co-operation of Ihirnside's column. The possession of Knoxville, under the (;ircumstances, was not supposed to he of vital moment, for, (Chattanooga in the enemy '3 i)osse8si()n, Knoxville and the whole line was turned and fell of its weight. On the 20th of August, it Avas ascHirtained certainly that Hosecrans had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and Jiridixc;- port. His force of eifective infantry and ai'tillery amounted to fully 70,0(M), divided into four (!()ri)S. About the sanm time (Jeneral l>urnside advanced from Kentucky towards Knoxville, East. Tennessee, with a force estimated by the (Jenei-al com- manding that dej)artmt!nt at over i{.^),0()0. In view of the great supc;ri(n-ity of numbers brought jigainst him, Cenciral Ihickner concluded to evacuate Knoxville, and with a force of about 5000 infantry and artillery, and his cavalry, took })osition in the vicinity of Jjoudon, Two ])rigades of liis command, Krazier's at Cundjerland Cap and Jackson's in ^Northeast Tennessee, 110 THE TIIIK'D YKAR OF THE WAR. were thus severed from us. The enemy having already ob- tained a lodgment in East Tennessee by another route, the continued occupation of Cumberland Gaj) became very hazard- ous to the garrison and comparatively unimportant to us. Its evacuation was accordingly ordered, but on the appeal of its commander, stating his resources and ability for defence, favor- ably endorsed by Major-General Buckner, the orders were suspended on the 31st of August. The main body of our army was encamped near Chattanooga, whilst the cavalry force, much reduced and enfeebled by long service ou short rations, was recruiting in the vicinity of Rome, Georgia. THE SURRENDER OF CUMBERLAND GAP. We may anticipate our narrative to say here that Cumber- land Gap was surrendered on the 9th of September by General Frazier ; a garrison, consistin-g of four regiments, about two thousand men, and fourteen pieces of artillery being uncon- ditionally surrendered to the enemy without firing a gun. The first demand for a surrender was made on the 5th by the Yankee General Shackelford ; and Colonel De Courcy having come up with a brigade on the Kentucky side, renewed the demand on the evening of the 9th September. General Frazier replied under flag of truce, asking De Courcy the number of forces to which he was ordered to surrender. De Courcy replied nearly twelve o'clock at night, refusing to give the number of forces under his command, stating that it was from motives entirely disconnected with the attack upon the gap that he did so. General Frazier then refused to surrender, and it was understood that the fight would open at twelve o'clock the next day. A council of the commanding officers of regiments was called, which resulted in the refusal of all to be surrendered. A majority preferred the risk of cutting their way through the Yankee lines to being surrendered on any terms. A fight was therefore confidently expected. Near twelve o'clock on "Wednesday, the 9th, when all was in anxious expectation for the fight to open. General Frazier received from Burnside, under flag of truce, a demand for the unconditional surrender of himself and his command. Very soon after its THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. ' 111 reception, one of General Frazier's aid-de-camps came in great haste down the mountain and ordered the battle-flag down, and a white one to be hoisted in its stead.* This surrender was declared bj the Richmond Dujpatch to be " one of the most disgraceful occurrences of the war," In a message to Congress President Davis said of it : " The coun- try was painfully surprised by the intelligence that the officer in command of Cumberland Gap had surrendered that import- ant and easily defensible pass without firing a shot, upon the summons of a force still believed to have been inadequate to its reduction, and when reinforcements were within supporting distance, and had been ordered to his aid. The entire garri- son, including the commander, being still held prisoners by the enemy, I am unable to suggest any explanation of this disas- ter, which laid open eastern Tennessee and south-western Vir- ginia to hostile operations, and broke the line of communica- tion between the seat of government and middle Tennes- see." * The following communication with respect to this surrender was published in the Richmond newspapers from Major McDowell, one of the officers of the garrison. " Various statements have been made in regard to the conduct of the troops composing the command at Cumberland Gap. I assert most positively that I have yet to see troops in finer spirits, or more determined to hold their ground than the troops in the gap. I have learned that an attempt is being made to justify the surrender of the gap upon the ground that the troops in the gap would not fight, and that some of them shouted when the flag was ordered down. The last charge was made against the Sixty-second North Carolina regi- ment. The first is false, and the second not only false, but is a base and cowardly eflTort to protect those that may be guilty at the expense of the innocent, brave, patriotic and true. We were surrendered, then, to General Burnside on Wednesday, the 9th, at 4 o'clock p. m. Many made their escape after the surrender. We had when we were surrendered provisions upon which we could have subsisted thirty days. We had all the ammunition on hand that we had when the gap was first invested. My regiment had 150 rounds to the man, and I presume other regiments had the same. K the surrender was a matter of necessity, it was from causes other than a want of provisions, ammunition, or a willingness on the part of the men to do their duty." 112 TIIK TIllUO YKAU OF THK WAR. TIIIO BATTLK8 OF CIIIOKAMAUGA. Before proeeedini>" to discuss those movements, by which the forces of Rosecrans and of Bragg at last joined in decisive bat- tle, a topographical coup d'ceil is necessary. The Cumberhind range is a h^ft}' mass of rocks, separating the M'aters which lh)w into the Cumberhmd from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Ken- tu(dre8sed on his columns to interee})t us, and thus exposed himself in detail. A splendid o])portunity was now presented to Bragg. The detached force in McLemore's cove was Thomas's corps. Be- ing immediately ojjposite Lafayette, at and near which General Ih-agg had all hie forces concentrated, it was comi)letely at the mercy of the latter. It was only necessary that General Bragg should fall u])on it with such a mass as would have crushed it ; then turned down Chattanooga Valley, thrown himself in be- tween the town and Crittenden, and crushed him ; then passed back between Lookout Mountain and the Tennessee river into Wills' Valley, and cut oil' McCook's retreat to Bridgeport; thence moved along the CHimberland range into the rear of Burnside, and disposed of him. No time was to be lost in taking advantage of a blunder of the eneni}^, into which he had fallen in his stupid conceit that the Confederates were retreating. Instant orders were given to Major-general Illndman to ])rej)are his division to move against Thomas, and he was informed that another division THE TIIIKl) VKAli OK TlIK WAR. 115 from Lioutoiuinf--em!nil I). [I. lUWs comtniind, at Lafayette, would iiiovo ii|) to liiiri and co-oporato in the attack. Ooiioral Hill rcccivod UIh orders on the night of the 0th. He replied that he cnld not nndertako the movement; that the oi-ders were impracticable ; that Clehnrne, who commanded one of his divisions, was sick ; and that both the gai)8, i)ng and Catlett's, through which he was required to move, were mipassable, having been blocked by fc^lled timbcir. Early the next jnorning, [lindman was i)romptly in position to execute his part of the critical movement. T)isai)pointed at IldPs refusal to move, General Bragg, with diisperate haste, despatched an order to Major-geru^rai liuckner to move froni his present i)ositIon at Anderson, and execute, without delay, the orders issu(;d to Hill. ^ It was not until the aftcrrKH»n of the 10th, that JJuckner joined irindtuiui, the two commands being united near Davis's Ci-oss-roads in the cove. The enemy was still in flagrant error moving his three columns, with an ai)parent disporitiou to form a junction at or near Lafayette. To strike in detail these isolated commands, and to fall upon Thomas, who had got the enemy's centre into McLemore's Cove, such rapidity M-as Tiecessary as to surj.rise the enemy before he discovered his mistake. Lieutenant-general Polk was ordered to Anderson's, to cover Jlmdman's rear, who, at midnight of the 10th of September again received orders, at all hazards to crush the enemy's centre, and cut his way through to Lafayette. The indomita- ble Cleburne, despite the obstructions in the road, had moved ui> to Dug (hip ; was in position at daylight ; and only waited the sound of Ilindman's guns to move on the enemy's flank and rear. Courier after courier sped from Dug Gap to urge Ilindman on yjut 'it was too late. The enemy had discovered the mis- take that had well-nigh proved his ruin. He had taken advan- tage of our delay, retreated to the mountain passes; and so the movement upon Thomas, which promised such brilliant results, was lost by an anachronism by which the best laid military Bcliemes are so frequently defeated. . But it was not easy for liosecrans to repair his error wholly, and extricate himself from the meshes of a bad military move- 116 TUIC TIIIIID YKAK OF THE WAK. iiuMit. The luovctnent upon Tliomus in McLemore'a Cove hav- inj^ failed, lie having cllVcted his escape uj) the inountain, Ivosecraiis, who, by this time, had discovered Bragiij'a where- abouts, recalled McCook into AVills' Valley, and ordered him to follow Thomas, wlio was ai>ain ])ut in motion over the moun- tain into the cove. But the third corps, under Crittenden, moving from the direction of Chattanooga, was yet in position to be attacked ; and dispositions were rapidly made by Gen- eral Bragg to fall u{)on it, and thus retrieve in some measure the miscarriage of his other plans. Crittenden had move'd on towards Kinggold, with the hope of cutting ofi' Buckner. On reaching the point on the Georgia railroad at which Buckner crossed, he discovered he was too late, aiul turned towards Lafayette to follow him. He moved wp the Chickamauga, on its east side, in the direction of La- fiiyette, and was confronted by the cavalry nnder Generals Pegram and Armstrong. After skirmishes with them, in which there were some brilliant dashes on the part of our cavalry,, the latter retired slowly before the enemy, falling back towards Lafayette. To meet this movement. General Bragg ord-ered a force of two divisions, under Lieutenant-gen- eral Bolk, to move to the front. These divisions, Cheatham's and AValker's, were put in motion, and were in line of battle before daylight, covering the three roads on which the enemy's three divisions were marching. Ilindman came \i\) after day- light, and Bncknei' Avas thrown forward as a supporting force to ijuard Polk's left amiinst Thomas and McCook in the cove, Crittenden, iinding himself confronted, declined battle, and re- tired during the night, falling back on the Chickamauga, which he crossed at Lee and Gordon's Mills. This placed the whole of Ivosecrans' three corps on the east side of the Chickamauga, and in easy supporting distance. Thus had failed the preliminary plans to take the enemy in a flagrant error of generalship, and at vital disadvantage; and nothing renuiined but to light out the issue against his concen- trated forces on the banks of the Chickamauga.* * To avoid recriminations, which resulted in Generals Hill and Polk being deprived of their comnuiiuls in Hragg's army, we annex here what has never Leon jmblished in the Coul'oderucy : General Bragg's official letters and orders TIIIC Tllllin YEAK OK TflK WAK. 117 On Saturday, tlie 19th Sopteinber, General Brae^g had m(»vecl his army by dlv-isions and crossed it at several fords of the Chiekairiauira and bridijces north of Ix'-e and Gordon's MiUs. Reinforcements had reached him. Johnston had arrived with with respect to the alleged dereliction of these officers. General Polk was also blamed in subsequent operations, as we shall see. Major-general Ilindinan r(!ceived verbal instructions on the 9tli to pn^paro Ilia division to move against tliis force [TlioTiias's corps], and was informed tliat another division from Lieutenant-genin-al Hill's command, at Lafayette, would join liim. That evening, the following written oi'dcrs were issued to Generals Ilindman and Hill : Hkadquautehs Army Tennessek, ) Lee and Gordon's Mills, 11 J i'. m., Sept. !)tli, 18(i;}. j Ounkual: — You will move your division immediately to Davis's X roads on th(! road from Lafayette to Stevens' Gap. At this point you will put your- self in communicatiim wiMi the column of General Hill, ordered to move to the same point, and takecommiind of the joint forccis, or re|K)rt to tho oflicc^r com- manding ilill's column, according to rank. If in command you will move upon tlie enemy, rei)ort(;d to bo 4,000 or 5,000 strong, encamped at the foot of Ix>okout Mountain, at Stevens' Gap. Another column of the enemy is rei)ortexi to be at Cooper's Gaj), numl)er not known. 1 am, (General, &c., Signed, KiNLocK Falconer, A. A. General ToMAJOK-GENERAI. IllNOMAN, Commanding Division. ITHAnQTTAKTERS ArJIT TENNESSEE, ) Leo and Gordon's Mills, llj p. m., Sept. Sith, 18G;i f Genrrai,: — I enclose orders given to (^leneral Ilindman. General Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgmt^nt dictat<;s, Chtburnu's division to uuiU'. with General llindimin at Davi.s's X roads to-morrow morning. Hind- man starts at 12 o'clock to-night and ho has thirtcu-n miles to nuiko. The commander of the column thus unittMl will move u]ion the enemy encamped at the foot of Stevens' (lap, said to bo 4,000 or 5,000. If unforeset^n circumstances should i)revent your movement, notify Ilindman. A cavalry force should ac- (•()mi)aiiy your column. Ilindman has none. Open communications with llindnuin with your cavalry, iu advance of the junction. He marches on tho road I'rom Dr. Anderson's to Davis's X roads. I am. General, &c., &c., KiNLocK Falconer, A. A. General. Lieutenant-general Hill, Commanding. On the receipt of his order, during the night, General Hill replied that tlie movement recpiired I)y him was impracticable, as (Jeneral ('h^burne was sick, and both the gaps — Dug and Catlett's — had Ix^n blocked by felling timber, which would nupiire tw(mty-four hours lor its removal. Not to lose; this favor- able o2)i)ortunity, Ilindman, by prompt movement, being ready in jjosilion, the lis THK THIRD YKAK OK TIIK WAK two brigades from Mississippi, find reinforcements from Gen- eral Lee's linos in Virt;-iiiiji wore luirryiMiij up to what was to be the scene of one i>f the most eritical and magniticont actions of the war. The hitter reinforcements consisted of live brijr- i'ollowing ortlors were issued at 8 o'clock, A. M., on the 10th, for Major-general l>iukui'r ti) move with his two divisions, and roport to Ilindmaii. llK.vniiirAiiTKus Army Tennkssre, ) Lee and Gordon's Mills, 8 o'clock a. m., Sept. 10th, 1803. \ Ornrual : — I enclose orders issued last night to Clenerals Hill and Ilind- num. Ueneral Hill has found it impossible to carry out the part assigned to Cleburne's division. The general coniniauding desires that you will I'xecuto without delay the order issued to (Jeneral Hill. You can move to Pavis's X roads by the direct road from your present position at Anderson's, along which General llindnum has passed. I am, UiMieral, &c., &c.. Signed, Uko. W. BiU'iNT, A. A. General. Major-gkneral Bucknkk, Anderson's. And both Hindman and Hill were notified. Ilindman had halted his divis- ion at Morgan's, some three or ft)ur miles frojii Davis's X roads, in the cove, and at this jioint Buckner joined him daring the afternoon of the 10th. Ee- ports fully conlirniing previous information in regard to the ])osition of the enemy's forces, were received during the 10th. and it became certain that he was moving his three columns to form a junction ui>on us at or near liafayette. The cor|is near Colonel Winston's moved on the mountain towards Alpine, a point twi'uty miles south of us. The one opposite the cove continued its move- nu'ut and threw forward its ailvance to Davis's X roads, and Crittenden moved IVom ChattaniH)ga on the roads to Kinggold and Lee and (Gordon's Mill. To striki' these isolated commands in succession was our obvious policy. To se- cure more prompt ami decidi'd action in the movement ordered against the eiuMuy's centre, my lleiidquarters were removed to Lafayette, where I arrived alHMit 114 *>" the 10th, — and IJeutenant-general Polk was ordered forward with his remaining division to Anderson's, so as to cover Hindnuvn's rear dur- ing the operations in the cove. At Lnfayettt> I met Major Nocquet, engineer ollicer on (u'ni>ral Buckner's staft", sent by (h'ueral Hinihuan after a junction of their commands, to wnfer with me anil sviggest a change in the plan of opera- tions. After hearing the ivi>ort of this otlicer, and obtaining from the active and energetic CAvalry connnander in front of our position. Brigadier general Martin, the latest information of the enemy's movenumts and ixisition, 1 ver- bally dirwted the nuijor to u>turn to General Hindman, and say that my plans coidd not bo changed, and that he would airry out his orders. At the same time the following written orders wore sent to tlie general by a courier : IlKArtQTJARTKKS ArMY TENNKSSKK, ^ Lafayette, Ga., \'i P.M.. Sept. 10th, 1803 ) General : — Headquarters are here and the following is the information : Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force fiom the South has advanced to within seven miles of this point. Polk is left at THE THIRD YKAR OF THK WAU. 119 adcs of Lontrstreet's corps ; and those were without artilkny and tnuiKpoi-tutioji. Thc^ Vir3. ) Grxerai, : — I enclose you a despatch marked "A" and I now give you tho orders of the commanding general, viz. : to attack at day -dawn to-morrow the infantry column reported in said despatch at J of a mile beyond Pea-vine church, on the road to Qraysvillo from Lafayette. Signed, Geo. W. Brent, A. A. General. LlEUTENANT-GENERAIi POLK, Commanding Corps Headquarters Arsit Tennessee, ) Lafayette, Georgia, Sept. 12th, 18ii3. ) General : — Tho enemy is approaching from the South, and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be qviick and decided. Let no time be lost. I nm, General, &c.. Signed, Geo. W. Brent, A. A. General, Lieutenant-general Poi-k, Commanding Corps. At 11 p. 51. a despatdi was received from tho general stating that he had taken a strong position for defence, and requesting that he should be heavily reinforced. He was promptly ordered not to defer his attack, his force being already superior to the enemy, and was reminded that his success depended ujion the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further in- formed that Buckner's coriw would be moved within supporting distance the next morning. Early on the loth 1 proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner's command , to find that no advance liad been made on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a junction and rccrossed the Chickamauga. Braxton Bragg, General. To Generate S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, "^^a. THE THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. 121 mile befow Lee and Gordon's Mills. On his ri.^ht came Wood with his own and Joiinstoii's divisions, with Walker on the extreme right,— Cheatham's division being in reserve. General Walker found a largely superior force of the enemy opposed to him. He drove them liandsomely, however, and captured several batteries of artillery in most gallant charges. Before Cheatliam's division, ordered to his support, could reach him, he had been pressed back to his first position by tJie extended lines of the enemy assailing him on both flanks. The two commands united were soon enabled to force the enemy back again, and recover our advantage, though we ■were yet greatly outnumbei-ed. These movements on our right were in a direction to leave an opening in our line between Cheatham and Hood. Stew- art's division forming Buckner's second line was thrown to the right to fill this, and it soon became hotly engaged, as did Hood's whole front. The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's Mills when our movement commenced, had rapidly transferred forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and seemed dis- posed to dispute with all his ability our effort to gain the maiii road to Chattanooga in his rear. Lieutenant-general Polk was ordered to move his remaining division across at the nearest ford and to assume the command in pci-son on our right. HilFs corps was also ordered to cross below Lee and Gordon's Mills and join the line on the right. Whilst these movements were being made our ri^dit and cen- tre were heavily and almost constantly engaged. Stewart by a vigorous assault broke the enemy's centre and penetrated far into his lines, but was obliged to retire for ^ want of sufiicient force to meet the heavy enfilade fire which he encountered from the right. ^ Hood, later engaged, advanced from the first fire and con- tinued to drive the force in his front until night. ^ Cleburne's division of Hill's corps, which first reached the right, was ordered to attack immediately in conjunction with the force already engaged. This veteran command, under its gallant chief, moved to its work after sunset, taking the enemy completely by surprise, driving him in great disorder for nearlj 122 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. a mile, and inflicting a very lieavy loss. ]S^ight founS us mas- ters of the ground, after a series of very obstinate contests with lai'gely superior numbers. For the grand and decisive work of the next day, the forces of Bragg's army were divided into two wings. The riglit wing M-as placed under Lieutenant-general Polk, and the left under Lieutenant-general Longstreet. The former was composed of Lieutenant-general Hill's corps, of two divis- ions, Major-general Cleburne's and Major-general Breckin- ridge's; of the division of Major-general Cheatham, of Lieu- tenant-general Polk's corps, and the division of Major-general W. II. T. Walker. The left was composed of the divisions of Major-general Stewart, and Brigadier-general Preston and Bushrod Johnson, of Major-general Buckner's corps; Major-general Ilindman, of Lieutenant-general Polk's corps, and Bcnning's, Lane's and Robertson's brigades, of Hood's division, and Kershaw's and Ilumphrie's brigades, of McLaw's division, of his own (Lieu- tenant-general Longstreet's) corps. The front line of the right wing consisted of three divisions — Breckinridge and Cleburne, of Hill's corps, and Cheatham, of Polk's corps — which were posted from right to left in the order named. Major-general "Walker was held in re- serve. The left wing was composed of Major-general Stewart's di- vision on the right with Hood's on the left. On Hood's left was Hindman's division of Lieutenant-general Polk's corps, with Preston's division of Buckner's corps on the extreme left. Orders were given to Lieutenant-general Polk to commence the attack at daylight. The left wing was to await the attack by the right, take it up promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent. " Before the dawn of day," writes General Bragg in his offi- cial report, " myself and staff were ready for the saddle, occu- pying a position immediately in rear of and accessible to all parts of the line. With increasing anxiety and disappoint- ment I waited until after sunrise without hearing a gun ; and at length despatched a staff officer to Lieutenant-general Polk THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 123 to ascertain the cause of the delay, and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. This officer not finding tlie general with liis troops, and learning where ho had spent the night, proceeded across Alexander's Bridge, to the east side of the Chickainauga, and there delivered my message. Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found the troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers were immediately despatched for Lieutenant-general Polk, and he shortly after joined me. J\[y ordei's were I'enewed and the general was urged to their prompt execution, the more important as the ear was saluted throughout the night with the sounds of the axe and falling timber as the enemy industriously labored to strengthen his position by hastily constructed barricades and breastworks. A reconnoissance made in the front of our extreme right dur- ing this delay crossed the main road to Chattanooga, and proved the important fact that this greatly desired position was open to our possession. The reasons assigned for this un- fortunate delay by the wing commander, appear in part in the reports of his suboi^iinates. It is sufficient to say they are entirely unsatisfactory." But it was said, on the other side of the story, that Polk's delay was due to circumstances beyond his control ; that, prior to giving the order to move forward to the attack. General Polk discovered that owing to the want of precaution on the jjart of the proper authority in the formation of the general line of battle, a portion of the line of the left wing had been formed in front of his line — a portion amounting to a whole division — and that had the order to make the attack at daylight been obeyed, this division, from its position, must inevitably have been slaughtered. It was saved by an order to halt Cheatham's division, and by orders to the left of Cleburne ad- vising it of its whereabouts. The action was opened upon the right of the Confederates about ten o'clock in the morning by a forward movement of Breckinridge, followed and accompanied by Cleburne. The enemy had during the night thrown up breastworks of heavy timber, cut down from the forest, behind which he had en- trenched himself. These lay chiefly in Cleburne's front. He moved direct upon them, while Breckim-idge swung round to flank them. The assault was a desperate one. General Polk 124: THE TIirKl) YKAU OF THK WAR. being- iiifonned b}' Gcricriil Hill thtit tlic oiieiny was tliroaten- iiiij; his right flank, Polk orcU'rcd Wulktir inuni'diaicly to move to the right and t'onn an ecludon upon Hrcckinridge, over- lapping his right. It was tiieii ascertained that no enemy was tliere. But the forward moveuu'nt of the front line had residted in a severe eonfliet, des))ei'ately contested, which drove the eneni}' around on the extreme left a mile or more across tlio Chatlanooga road. For two hours tlie tight raged with sid)lime fury. Again and again, as we struck the enemy, did hie stately lines of soldiers crumble into masses of terror-stricken fugitives. Thomas commanded the Yaidvce's left. Heavy reinforcements being sent from the enemy's right to him, he was enabled to regain a portion of the groinid he had lost, Never did Yankees fight better than just here. They drove back (Meburne's magni- ficent division, and it a])peared at one time as if our right and centre were giving way before Thomas's extraordinary attack. But while such were the operations on our right wing, the tide of battle running: from ri«2;ht to left had reached Lonji;- street's extreme left about eleven o'clock. Hood and others ■were ordered to make a vigorous assault in front ; Huckner was made to execute a successful Hank movement ; aiul under the vigor of the combined attack llosecrans found his lines steadily giving way, ami McOook and (Crittenden forced far to the right. He had moved most of his strength to the left where Thomas had fought so brilliantly, but with the advantage of superior numbers. Negley, hard pressed on the left, rej^orted to Kosecrans. "Tell General Negley I can't help him," was the reply. The Yankees in Longstreet's front had sought a position on a high ridge. From this position they Avere driven, with heavy- loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, artillery, small-arms and colors, after a desperate struggle, by the brigades of Kt^rshaw and Humphries, under the (tommand of Ih-igadier-general Kershaw, in the absence of Major-general McLaws, reinforced by Gracise's, Kelley's, and Trigg's brigades, of Major-general Freston's division, ]\rajor-general Hind man completing the general work of the line to the left by driving the enemy on his i'ront bcrorc him along M'ith those driven from the ridge by THE TUIKI) YICAll OF THE WAR. 125 Preston and Kersliaw. Kosecrans, perceiving wlmt was taking place on his riglit, ordered U]) reinforcernentH from his left to Bnpl)ort Ilia i-etiring or j-atlier iViglitened battalioiiH, which, finding a good ])o8ition, awaited their arrival, turning upon their j)ursuer8 with the lierceness of a temporary and des|)erato energy. JJrigadier-general Law, commanding II(jod\s division, perceiving this movement, ordered a battery of ten guiiH to a position from which he could enfilade the reinforcing column as it advanced. The battery opened just as it was about wheeling into ])08ition, and, at the same time, Stewart's divi- Bion, i»o.sted on the extreme right, was thrown forward on its flaid<. The shock was terrible. The enemy halted, staggered backwards, and i'ell into conl'usion. It was late in the evening when the whole Confederate lino was revised and jiosted, and a forward movement in all its length ordered. The right swung round with an exteiuled sweep, with its iirm sujJiJortH, and the left rallied once more to the charge of the works, before which it had suffered so seveiH'.ly in the morning. Never did tro()j)rt iriove up to their work with more resolution; the daring 15reckiiii-i(lge with his Kentuckians and Louisianians, and (yieburne with his Arkan- sians and Alabamians, and Walker with his South Carolinians, MiH8issi])pianH, and (ieorgians, and (Jh(!alhani with Ids Tennes- seeans — all moved forward in one mighty tide amidst the thunders of some twenty batte)'i(;s, and the roar of thousands of nniskets and rilies. Tiie scene was one of surpassing sublim- ity and grandeur. Sweeping forward as the flood of a mighty river, it carried every thing before it, nothing being able to stand in the resistless line of its path. The enemy's works, which oj)posed such a stubljorn resistance in the morning, suc- cundjed before tlie torrent, and the brave men of Cleburne's division, which had been repulsed in the morning, had, by their extraordinary gallantry in the evening, the opj)ortunity of avenging the experiences of the earlier part of the day. The "whole field was carried triumphantly, and the enemy driven as chaff belbre the wind. U^ withstood as long as hunum ])owers of ejujuiunce could bear uj) against such a pi-essure, then yielded, and i'ell back partly upon aiul into the hands of the right wing, where several hundred were captured, the residue crossing the Chattanooga road and retreating in the dij'cction 126 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. of Missionary Kidge. Night interposed, and thongli it brought with it a magnificent moon, no orders were received to pursue, and the troops were lialted, giving expression to their sense of the glorious victory won, and unconquerable desire to pursue it to an absolute success in the enemy's utter annihilation, in Buch long, loud and triumphant cheering, as would almost seem to reiid the heavens. Never was a more disorderly retreat of an enemy. Long- street, who had contributed so much to the fortunes of the day, now saw that by a forward movement of the whole army, JRosecrans' whole force might be captured in twenty-four hours, and that no obstacle was between us and the Ohio, and perhaps peace. He sent word to Wheeler, who was on his left, to dash forward between Chattanooga and the enemy and cut him to pieces; but just as Wheeler was about to execute this movement, he received an order from Bragg directing him to pick up arms and stragglers. It was said that Longstreet had not heard from Bragg but once during the day, and then it was to say that he was beaten on the right. He now sent to beg him to advance ; but the General-in-chief declined to do so. General Forrest had climbed a tree and from his lofty perch watched the retreating enemy. He saw the blue uniforms swarming over the fields, and the disorganized masses of the enemy choked with flight, 'and struggling in mortal panic as sounds of feeble pursuit followed on their heels. He shouted to a staff officer : " Tell General Bragg to advance the whole army ; the enemy is ours." Bragg did not catch the inspiration. He tells us in his official report : " The darkness of the night and the density of the forest rendered further movements uncertain and dangerous, and the army bivouacked on the ground it had so gallantly won." But granting that reasons, substantive reasons, existed for not pursuing on Sunday night, what hindered General Bragg from pursuing on Monday morning at daylight ? Chattanooga was only ten miles from the battle-field, and unfortified ; our pursu- ing cavalry could see their head of column, and urged General Bragg by repeated messages to pursue, that every hour's delay would be equal to the loss of a thousand men. Citizens along THE TRIED YEAR OF THE WAR. 127 the road reported that many of the Yankee commands passed their dwellings in tiie utmost disorder, without arms or accoutre- ments, and many without hats, as a confused and routed mob, not as troops in column, everything in Chattanooga and on the road inviting rather than forbidding attack. Even if they had had good defensive works, with the condition as reported above, by a prompt pursuit our army would have gone into Chattanooga with theii's, and thus broken the efi'ect of their fire ; and if such could have been the result with good defen- sive works, what might not the result have been without them, and the enemy panic-stricken because of the knowledge that none such existed ? What hindered General Bragg from pur- suing is not known, but it is known that, while pursuit seems to have been invited, he did not pursue. He simply sent out detachments to the battle-field to gather up the fruits of vic- tory, in arms large and small, to be secured and sent to the rear, and caused the captured banners to be collected to be sent to Richmond, and prisoners to be counted and sent to the rear. The enemy's immediate losses in the battle of Chickamauga were immense. It was officially stated that we captured over eight thousand prisoners, fifty-one pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and quantities of anmmnition, vi^ith wagons, ambulances, teams, medicines, hospital stores, &c., in large quantities. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded have been by many thousands greater than ours ; and General Bragg, in his official report, makes the appalling confession that, on this " River of Death," he lost " txm-fifths " of his troops. Our loss in general officers was conspicuous. Brigadier-general B. H. Helm,* Preston Smith, and James Deshler, had died on the field. The * Brigadier-general Helm was a grandson of Ben Hardin, well known to the oldest inhabitants of Kentucky, as a leading public-spirited gentleman of high moral worth in the earlier days of the Warrior State. General Helm was born in Hardin County, Kentucky, in 1831— graduated at West Point, and afterwards retired from the army of the United States to take up the study of law. He entered the Southern army without a commission, but from the rank of private he was soon made colonel, and coranuinded the first Kentucky cavalry in the Confederate service. He was made brigadier-gcineral in March, 1862, The Kentucky brigafle, which he commanded in the battle of Chicka- 12S THE THIRD YEAU OF THE WAR. lion-lieartedjlood, the luminaiy of Texas chivalry and courage, was so severely wounded that he had to suffer amputation of the thigh. The notice of his extraordinary gallantry by Long- street, who with generous ardor comnuiiiicated it in a special letter to his government, obtained for him the commission of a Lieutenant general, and ranged him with the popular heroes of the war. The day following this terrible conflict, General Bragg ordered the troops under arms, and marched them down the Chattanooga i-oad until they came near to Rossville, where Forest and Pegram were thundering away with their batteries at the retreating enemy, there had them tiled to the right, and thrown down the Chickamauga creek, that they might rest from their fatigues and be in a good position to move upon Burn- side or flank Rosecrans, as future contingences might dictate. On Wednesday, the 23d of September, an order was issued for the whole army to move upon Chattanooga. It moved up to and over Missionary Kidge, where it was halted. And there it was to remain halted for many long weeks. Chickamauga had conferred a brilliant glory upon our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held the prize of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee. Two-thirds of our nitre beds were in that region, and a large proportion of the coal which supplied our foundries. It abounded in the necessaries of life. It was one of the strongest countries in the world, so full of lofty mountains, that it had been called, not unaptly, the Switzerland of America. As the possession of Switzerland opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave easy access to Vii-ginia, North Carolina, Georgia and Alabama. matiga, went into the fight with seventeen hundred and sixty-three men, and came out with only four hundred and tliirty-two. General Helm's wife was a half-sister of Mrs. Lincoln. Immediately after the fall of Fort Sumter, in 1861, President Lincoln sent him a commission as major in the regular army of the United States ; and apprehending that he might not be willing to be employed to murder his own people, the Yankee Secretary of War proposed, as a salve for any scruples, to send him as pay- master to New Mexico. The gallant Kentuckian spurned the bribe, gave his services, and at last his life, to the Confederacy, and fell in the numerous throng of brave defenders of truth, justice and liberty. His wife lives, known as one of the most enthusiastic and devoted patriot women of the South. ■ '''K^^^^./f'i^' CFN BHAXTON BRAGG. rFmgrgyed for the Third Year of -fhe "//'or THE THIUD TEAR OF THE WAR. , 129 Rosecrans found occasion after the battle to congratulate his armj on their retention of Chattanooga. lie said, " You have accomplished the great work of the campaign ; you hold the key of East Tennessee, of Northern Georgia, and of the enemy's mines of coal and nitre." He claimed that he held in his hands the substantial fruits of victory, and sought to per- suade his government that the battle of Chickamauga was merely an incident to the concentration of his forces and his cover of Chattanooga. lie lost no time in reorganizing his army at Chattanooga. He assumed a fortified line about a mile and a half in length, covering the pontoons, stores and hospitals, and commanding all the south east and eastern ap- proaches to the place, leaving Bragg no chance to dislodge him by direct attack, only by long and toilsome maneuvers and marches threatening his communications. Bragg's awkward pause before Chattanooga was the occa- sion of new propositions of the campaign on our side. Of one of these General Bragg communicated as follows to the War Department at Richmond. " The suggestion of a movement by our right immediately after the battle, to the north of the Tennessee, and thence upon Nashville, requires notice only because it will find a place in the files of the Department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reinforcements just before the battle, without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges too had been destroyed to a point soutli of Ringgold, and on all the roads from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river, except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery, and the well known danger of sudden rises by which all communication would be cut, a con- tingency which did actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was proposed. Bnt the most serious objec- tion to the proposition was its entire want of military propri- ety. It abandoned to the enemy our entii-e line of communi- cation, and laid open to him our (^Dots of supplies, while it placed us with a greatly inferior fo^Pljcyond a diSicult, and at times impassable river, in a country affording no sub&ist- 9 loO THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. ence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only ten miles, our battle-field, with thousands of our wounded, and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked and given up, for what? to gain the enemy's rear and cut him oft* from his depot of supplies, by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route half the length, on the south side of the river. " It is hardly necessary to say the proposition was not even entertained, whatever may have been the inferences drawn from subsequent movements." The plan preferred by General Bragg was to invest Chatta- nooga, and starve the enemy out. Rosecrans' shortest and most important road to his depot at Bridgeport lay along the south bank of the Tennessee ; and, as Bragg held this, the enemy was forced to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation, upon which long and difficult route our cavalry might operate with advantage. Looking to a speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for want of wood and forage, General Bragg declared that he " held the enemy at his mercy, and that his destruction was only a ques- tion of time." Alas, we shall see hereafter how vain were the sanguine expectations and the swollen boast of this ill-starred and unfortunate commander ! General Bragg has burdened the story of Chickamauga with recriminations of his officers: a resource to which he showed, on all occasions, a characteristic and ungenerous tendency. His course, in this respect, invites and justifies severe criticism of himself. Whatever may have been the faults of his subor- dinate officers in the action of Chickamauga, it is certain that the military o])inion of the Confederac}' indicated two import- ant errors of his own in the conduct of this famous battle. 1. That he failed to cut off" the enemy's exit to Chattanooga, which it is considered he might have done, if he had marched his army by the right flank, and crossed lower down on the Chickamauga ; at such point throwing his army across the creek and valley, formiiiar it at right angles to the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, aflpo covering the exit from the yalley in the direction of Chattanooga. As it was, he crossed his THE THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. 131 army north of Lee and Gordon's Mills, ordered a 'demonstra- tion there, which miglit have been well used as a cover for the proper movement, and utterly failed, as his critics say, to grasp the situation. 2. That he failed to pursue a routed and disorganized enemy, threw away the opportunity of completing his victory, realized no substantial fruit from it, and, after one of the most splendid successes in the record of Confederate arms, left his enemy in statu quo, reorganizing at leisure. In this latter respect, Chickamauga must indeed be con- fessed to be a second and enlarged edition of the famous Bull Run. It will stand conspicuous among the various fruitless victories gained by the Confederates— among the least pardon- able blunders and shortcomings of history.* * We may place here, in conjunction with Chickamauga, some interesting passages from a private letter of a distinguished general officer in the West reviewing the campaign there, and criticising with great intelligence, the gen- eral military policy of the Confederacy : . . It would be a laborious task to review the campaigns even of the Army of Tennessee. Yet what profound lessons do they teach ? What errors have been committed? What opportunities have been lost? The man who does not see these and who has not learned from them powerful lessons for the future, is totally unfit for any responsible military position in the pregnant future, on which the destiny of untold mOlions now trembles We lost Donelson, and as a consequence Middle Tennessee, from the want of rapid combination and concentration. We lost Shiloh first by delay then bv want of persistence in the first day's fight, then lor the want of the p;oper dis- tribution of troops at the close of that day. We threw away the golden mo- ments at MumfordsviUe, in Kentucky, and further neglected to make security doubly sure by concentrating the two armies. Smith's and Bragg's • and vet again these two armies, for the want of proper generalship and energy'together precipitately and ingloriously abandoned the broad territory between the Ohio and the Cumberland rivers. It is remarkable, that this campaign in Kentucky presented more glorious opportunities for great results, than any other in this or, perhaps, any other war, and all was lost for the want of the simplest com- binations. Again, Nashville, garrisoned by a few thousand Federals, was not taken, simply because the attack was prohibited. God knows how often this city might have been taken before the battle of Murfreesboro', while the two armies were lying idle or being slowly moved, without any decided plan or purpose. How often before and subsequent to the battle of Murfreesboro' did the dispersed condition of the Yankee forces offer the opportunity for a good general to make a vigorous and rapid movement, such as would have destroyed Its fragments in detail ? Murfreesboro' wa^t by want, first, of proper com- bmation on the field, and then by want of pWitence in the fight, especially on the left. In six weeks after the battle of Murfreesboro', our army in Tennessee 132 THE TIITRn YKAK OF THE WAK. was as strong ifs wlun it f()uj;ht tliat battlo, ami could have driven Ilosccrana liDin Tt'iiiicbsee witli ordinary fjencralshii). From March till June, in 1863, Ave renuvined idly stretching from Sli(>lbyville to the right, while the Yankees, holding a line from Franklin to Woodbury, again and again afforded us an op- ixntiuiity to fall, by rapid combinations, nj)on detach(>d masses, and thus de- stroy their army. In July we occupied a strong ridge, stretching from Bell- IJuckle towards Hradyville, very strong by nature on the right, and made strong by fortifications on the left, in front of Shelbyville. An injudicious disposition of forces left 11(X)V»t'8 Uap undefended by our army. Ilosecrans advanced uiH)n Hoover's (hip. Three brigailes of Confederates moved rajjidly up and held them in the gap for over forty hours. A rai)id concentration of our forces at Hoover's (lap, or one half of them, by moving oi\ the enemy's flank and rear, to a commanding position, which lay invitingly before us, would have routed the enemy, and i>lanted us still mow iirmly in Tennessee. But we were or- dered to retreat, and we retiretl before the scattered forces of the enemy, when a rajiid combination and a vigorous attack, with a sudden change from a retro- grade to an advance mcn'enuMit on some one of the enemy's masses in motion, might luive insured victcu-y. In that retrograde movement we also abandoned some remarkal)ly strong positions without taking advantage of them, or making tax etJ'ort to repulse the enemy, even wlu'u we could have done so without dan- ger to our army. At Chickanuvuga, the world knows, we lost the fruits of the victory for want of vigorous i)ursuit. On the night of the 20th of Septemb(>r there -should liave been no sleep and no repose. A vigorous, persistent, onward iuovenu>nt would have dcstroyeil Uosecrans' army. How de])loral)le has been the consequences of our want of energy, want of activity, and want of persistence ! Tlu^ army of Ttumessee bt>ing tied to no spi>cial line of o]ierations, and embarrassed by no important point, such as Richmond, retjuiring to be defended, lutd greatly the advantage over the army of Virginia, yet the former has constantly yielded up tt>rritory to a conquering foe, and the latter has overthrown every ai-my that came against it. I have meant merely to allude to the erroi-s on our line of operations. There are greater i>rrors than these, greater becavise tlu'y pertain to the management of all the ConfiHlerute forces. They are errors in what is usually denomiuated grand strategy. We now hav»>, 1 may say, numerous independent armies in the field, each acting almost without reference to all the others, and mrely co-operating with any other army. The Allied Armies, in 1814, entered France with 400,000 men, and had a numerous force hovering on the borders of that cmjiire. Napoleon had but I'JO.OOO in tlie field, exclusive of the forces shut up in fortifications and ope- rating beyond the boundaries of France. We know how nearly he came to vanquishing the Allied Powers, and even his enemies have demonstrated how he could have completely overthi'own the armies against which he contended. A rapid concentration of forces ujion detached armies, is a well-established means by which inferior forces must conq\u'r superior numbers. Superior mo- bility in strategy, and the concentrated, swift, lightning stroke in the liour of battle, must comiH>nsato for ii^fl||rity of nmnbers. Napoleon, Frederick the Ureat, anil (^harles the Xll., halBniustrated these facts, and they have become tlie most familiar lessons of the soldier. But, with proper strategy, in my TUT? THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 133 opinion, we need seldom fight superior forces. Look at the position of all oiir armies now. We are remaining listlessly waiting for the en(!my to mass his forces and men upon us. Can any one contemplate this attitude of our armies, and not feel uttiirly astonished at our policy, and the repose into which we have sunk on every hand? Where is that activity which should belong to inf<>rior forces V It is rather to be found among our enemies, whose superior numbers would entitle them to the repose which we have quietly assumed. 134 THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAB. CHAPTER VI. Political Movements in the Fall of 1863.— The " Peace Party" in the North.— The Yankee Fall Elections. — The War Democrats in the North. — The South's Worst Enemies. — Yankee Self-Glorification. — Farragut's Dinner-Party. — The Eussian Ban- quet. — Kiissia and Yankeedom. — The Poles and the Confederates. — The Political Tbotjbles in Kentucky. — Bramlette and Wickcliffe. — The Democratic Platform in Kentucky. — Political Amlndexterity. — Burnside's Despotic Orders. — The Kentucky "Board of Trade." — An Election by Bayonets. — The Fate of Kentucky Sealed. — Our European Kelations. — Dismissal of the Foreign Consuls in the Confederacy. — Seizure of the Confederate " Kams" in England. — The Confederate Privateers. — Their Achievements. — British Interests in Privateering. — The Profits of So-called "Neutrality." — Naval Affairs of the Confederacy. — Embarrassments of Our Naval Enterprise.— The Naval Structures of the Confederates. — Lee's Flank Move- ment IN Virginia. — Affair of Bristoe Station. — Failure of Lee's Plans. — Meade's Escape to Centreville. — Imboden's Operations in the Valley. — Capture of Charlestown. ^Operations at Kappahannock Bridge. — Kelley's Ford. — Surprise and Capture of Hayes' and Hoke's Brigades. — Gallantry of Colonel Godwin, — Lee's Army on the Eapidan.— The Affair of Germania Ford. — Meade Foiled.— The "On-to-Rich- mond" Delayed. "We must take the reader's attention from military campaigns to certain political movements, which, in the fall of 1863, ap- parently involved more or less distinctly the fortunes of the war. The long-continued delusion, indulged by Southern men, of " a peace party" in the North, which would eventually compel peace on the terms of the Confederacy, is to be compared *to that similar delusion of Northern politicians, which insisted that " a Union party" existed in the South, and that it was only temporarily suppressed by a faction. There was not the least foundation in fact for either of these opinions ; and the agreeable confidence of the South, in its supposed friends in the North, was to be rudelj'^ dispelled by events that admitted of but one construction. The South had mistaken for substantial tokens of public sentiment the clamors and exaggerations of party elections. The Democratic party in the North went into the fall elections of 1863, on the issue of a general opposition to the Lincoln Administration ; at the same time, promising a vigorous " constitutional" prosecution of the war, while their THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. 135 vagne allusions to an impossible peace and platitudes of fra- ternal sentiment were merely intended to catch favor in the South, and really meant nothing. Even Mr. Seymour, of New York, managed, while cozening the South, to maintain, on the other hand, a cordial understanding with the authorities at Washington ; and he found it necessary to conclude one of his finest speeches by saying, " never have I embarrassed the Ad- ministration, and I never will." But even on its moderate issues, with reference to the war, which, as we have seen, proposed only certain constitutional limitations, the Democratic party in the North was badl}^ beaten in the fall elections. From Minnesota to Maine, the Democrats were defeated. In the latter, which was supposed to be the least fanatical of the New England States, the Republicans carried the election by an overwhelming majority. In Ohio, Vallandigham was defeated. He was still in exile. Voorhies, who had proclaimed doctrines somewhat similar to his, in a neighboring State, narrowly escaped being lynched by the soldiers. The elections were followed by a remarkable period of political quiet in the North. Those who had the courage to confront the administration of Lincoln, had either been sup- pressed by the strong hand of lawless power, or had supinely sought safety in silence. The overthrow of free government in the North was complete. The South was not easily imposed upon by that organized hypocrisy, the War Democracy of the North. While it pro- fessed constitutional moderation in the conduct of the war, it aimed at the reconstruction of the Union, which was only a different phrase for the military conquest of the South. It must be observed that so far as questions of the constitutional conduct of the authorities at Washington were made in the North, they were questions entirely between their domestic parties, which did not properly interest the people of the Con- federacy, inasmuch as their demand for independence, simple and absolute, had 'nothing to do with the modifications of the different parties which opposed it. Indeed, with regard to this demand, the War Democrat at the North was a far more dangerous enemy to the Confederacy than the open and avowed Abolitionist. The former was more plausible; his programme of reconstruction carried an appearance of possibility to entice 136 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. the popular fuith wliich that of naked conquest did not possess. But botli programmes — that of the War Democrat and that of tJie Abolitionist — were equally fatal to the Confederacy : as it mattered not what was the formula of subjugation, if the peu})le of the South once placed themselves within the power of their treacherous enemies, and submitted to any form of their authority. The North had yet shown no real disposition to abandon the war. The Yankees were still busy with the game of self-glori- fication. Their conceit, their love of display, their sensations amused the world. Their favorite generals were all Napoleons; in the cities mobs of admirers chased them from hotel to hotel ; in the New England towns deputations of school-girls kissed them in public. Farragut, their successful admiral, was enter- tained in New York with feasts, where a plaster of ice-cream represented the American Eagle, and miniature ships, built of sticks of candy, loaded the table. These childish displays and vain glory had culminated in an immense banquet given to a Russian fleet in the harbor of New York, at which distinguished Yankee orators declared that the time had come when Russia and the United States were to be taken as twins in civilization and power, to hold in subjection all others of Christendom, and to accomplish the "destiny" of the nineteenth century. And really this festive fervor but gave insolent expression to an idea that had long occupied thoughtful minds in distant quarters of the world. Christendom was called upon to wit- ness two political murders. "While twenty millions of Yankees sought to strangle the Southern Confederacy, fifty millions of Muscovites combined to keep ten or twelve millions of Poles under a detested yoke. In their infamous attempt upon Poland, Russians tried to pass themselves oli' as the defenders of liberal ideas against Polish aristocracy ; and it was declared that the Polish nobility was in rebellion in order not to be forced to emancipate the serfs. " Russia and the United States," said a French writer of the time, " proclaim the liberty of the serf and the emancipation of the slave, but in return both seek to reduce to slavery all who defend liberty and independence." Liberty of the press, of speech, of public meetings, even the venerable privilege of habeas corpus^ inherited from England, had already been put under the feet of Abraham Lincoln. THE THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. 137 While the Democratic party was timidly protesting in the Northern States, Mr. Lincoln had prefaced the fai-ce of the fall elections in the North by an oitrage upon the ballot in Kentucky, which Yankee Democrats were too weak or too dis- honest to resent. A history of the Kentucky troubles, in some details, is the best commentary we can choose from events, upon the condi- tion to which the wlK>le system of political liberty had fallen in the North. THE POLITICAL TROUBLES IN KENTUCKY. In the last days of August, 1862, the Hon. Beriah Magoffin resigned his office as Governor of the State of Kentucky. From causes into which it is not necessary now to enter, he had in- curi-ed the suspicion of a great nuijority of the Union jjarty, and through the Legislature they had succeeded in divesting him of all real power in the government. The executive con- trol of the State had rapidly fallen into the hands of the mili- tary officers of the United States, and for months the people had been subject to martial law in all its oppressiveness, with- out its declaration in form. Under these circnmstances, and for the purpose of relieving the people, and especially that por- tion of them known as "Southern-rights Men," who had been the peculiar objects of persecution, Mr. Magoffin, in a pub- lished letter, declared his willingness to resign whenever he could be assured of the election of a successor of conservative views, who, commanding the coniidence at the same time of the Administration at Washington and of the people of Ken- tuck}', would be able and willing to secure every j)eaceful citizen in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws. James F. Robinson, then a member of the .Senate, was indicated to him, and he consented to resign in his favor. For the August election of 1863, Thomas E. Bramlette was offered as a candidate for governor. Mr. Bramlette main- tained generally the rightfulness of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus^ and the extension of martial law over States where war did not exist, and gave in a quasi adhesion to Mr. Lincoln's policy. 138 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE "WAR. A number of Kentucky Democrats presented a ticket in opposition, headed by C A. Wickcliffe for governor, and pub- lished the following expressions of their views, as comprising the issues of the approaching election. " We cannot consent to the doctrine that the Constitution and laws are inadequate to the i)rcsent emergency ; that the constitutional guarantees of liberty and property can be suspended by war. " Our fathers certainly did not intend that our Constitution should be a fair- weather document, to be laid away in a storm, or a fancy garment to be worn only in dry weather. On tlie contrary, it is in times like the present that con- stitutional restraints on the power of those in authority are needed. " We hold the Federal government to be one of limited powers, that cannot be enlarged by the existence of civil C(mamotion. " We hold the rights reserved to the States t>qually sacred with those granted to the United States. Tho government has no more right to disregard the Constitution and laws of the States than the States have to disregard the Con- stitution and laws of the United States. " We hold that tho Administration has committed grave errors in confisca- tion bills, lawless proclamations, and military orders setting aside constitutions and laws, and making arrests outside of military lines where there is no pub- lic danger to excuse it. " It is now obvious that the fixed purpose of the Administration is to arm the negroids of the South to make war upon the whites, and we hold it to be the duty of the poojile of Kentucky to enter against such a jwlicy a solemn and most em})hatic protest. " We hold as sacred and inalienable the right of free speech and a free press — that the government belongs to the people and not the people to the government. "We hold this rebellion Titterly unjustifiable in its inception, and a dissolu- tion of the Union the greatest of calamities. We would use all just and con- stitutional means adapted to the suppression of the one and the restoration of the other." Notwithstanding these resolutions, which so carefully sound- ed in " loyalty," and exhibited the usual ambidexterity of the "War Democracy, it soon became evident that the authorities at Washington wore determined to interfere in the Kentucky election, and force it exactly to their purpose. Messrs. "Wolfe and Trimble, candidates for Congress in the First and Fifth districts, and Mr. Martin, candidate for the Legislature in Lyon and Livingston counties, were arrested by the provost-mar- shals. On the 31st of July, Biirnside declared martial law in Ken- tucky. The following is a summary of the most outrageous of the despotic orders which followed in quick succession the dec- laration of martial law. THE TIIIKD YEAR OF THE WAE. 139 1. By way of precaution, the people are informed that when- ever any property is needed for the use of the United States army, it will be taken from rebel sympathisers^ and receipts given for the same marked " disloyal," and to be paid at the end of the war, on proof that the holder is a loyal man. 2. Rebel sympathizers are defined to be not only those who are in favor of secession, but also those who are not in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and of furnishing men and money unconditionally for that purpose. " Loyalty" is to be proved by the vote given at the election. 3. County judges are required to appoint none but "loyal" men as judges of election, notwithstanding tlie provisions of our laws, which require the officers of election to be taken equally from each political party. 4. Persons oflfering to vote, whose votes may be rejected by the judges, are notified that they will be immediately arrested by the military. 5. The judges of election are notified that they will be ar rested and held responsible by the military, should they permit any disloyal men to vote. In addition to all this there was at work beneath the surface a potent machinery, whose labors could be traced only by results, for the work was done in darkness and in secret. In every city, town, and considerable village in the common- wealth, there had long been organized, under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, a body of men known as a "Board of Trade," an innocent title, little expressive of their true functions. Under the same regulations of the Secretary, no shipments of goods to the interior of the State could be made without the jpermit of the United States custom-house officers at Cincinnati or Louisville. In order to obtain such a permit, the individual applying must have procured the recom- mendation of the " Board of Trade" located nearest to his place of business, and the recommendation was given to none but " loyal" men, each Board establishing its own test of " loyalty." Without such recommendation no merchant could hope to add to his stock by importation — no mechanic to replenish the ma- terials necessary in his calling. These inquisitorial bodies, therefore, held in their hands the absolute fate of every trades- man and mechanic in the State. The prosperous merchant 140 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. and needy shopkeeper were alike at tlieir mercy. The trades- man and mechanic were thus left to choose between a vote for Bramlette and the utter ruin of their business. Such were the circumstances under which the election of August 3d was begun. In twelve counties not a single vote was permitted to be cast for Wicklitfe. In eight others he re- ceived less than ten votes to the county. In fifteen others he received less than fifty votes to the county. In sixteen others he received less than one hundred votes to the county. These fifty-one counties embraced many of the strongest Democratic counties in the State. In only twenty-eight counties of the State did Bramlette receive a majority of the population en- titled to vote. Less than two-fifths of the population entitled to vote made him Governor of Kentucky. Thus was the fate of Kentucky sealed, and, on the 1st of September, Bramlette entered upon the duties of the office into which he had been foisted by bayonets. We have briefly seen what little comfort there was for the Confederates in the fall elections of 1863, and the contemporary political movements in the North. We naturally glance from this part of the situation, external to the military campaigns, to the European relations of the Confederacy. Here there was quite as little encouragement for the South as in that other alternative of hope outside the war — Yankee politics. OUR EUROPEAN RELATIONS. Some feeble attempt was made by the Confederacy in the fall of 1863 to reassert its dignity by the dismissal of the foreign consuls, who had been, oddly enough, allowed for nearly three years to reside in the Confederate States, and exer- cise super-consular powers under authority granted by the government with which we were at war. The force of this pro- ceeding was, however, much impaired by the fact that it was attributed to certain objectionable action of the British consuls in the Confederacy, and not based, as it should have been, upon the conduct and bearing. towards us of the British Government itself. Put upon that ground, the dismissal would have marked distinctly our sense of British injustice. We have referred in former pages to the prejudicial effect THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAB. 141 of so-called British "neutrality" with respect to the Confede- rate States. Another instance was now to be afforded of its unequal and unjust disposition in the seizure by the British Government of two two-thousand-ton iron-clads, combining the ram and monitor principles, which were being built for the Confederacy by the Messrs. Laird, at Birkenhead. The seizure was made without any evidence to justify it. The Messrs. Laird were forbidden to allow these vessels to leave their yard " without an ample explanation of their destination and a sus- tainable reference to the owner or owners for whom they are constructed." It was curiously held by Lord Russell that " Messrs. Laird were bound to declare — and sustain on unim- peachable testimony such declaration — the government for whom the steam rams have been built." In other words, with- out an affidavit or other legal foundation for proceedings against them, these gentlemen were required to come forward and prove their innocence. The animus displayed in this proceeding was in keeping with the whole conduct of the British ministry towards this country. They suspended, to our great detriment, the law of nations which allowed captures at sea to be taken into neutral ports for condemnation. They ignored and violated their own solemn engageuient in the Treaty of Paris, requiring that a blockade, to be acknowledged and binding, should be such as actually to exclude ships from ingress or egress. They allowed their Foreign Enlistment Act to be inoperative against our enemy, permitting them not only to supply themselves with vast quan- tities of arms and ammunition, but even to recruit their armies from British dominions. But they had revived against us a law practically obsolete, and, in order to give it force and make it applicable, they had reversed a principle of law to bo found in the codes of all free countries. But, notwithstanding the invidiousness of foreign powers, especially against the naval efforts of the Confederacy, it was a matter of surprise how much we had accomplished upon the sea against an enemy whose navy was his particular boast. A few solitary ships, hunted by vast navies, had maintained in foreign seas a warfare that required not only the loftiest cour- age, but the most consummate skill, the most sleepless vigilance, and the most perfect self-reliance. 142 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. Two years had passed since Semmes commenced his cruise in the Sumter, since which time about one hundred and lifty Yankee vessels, vahied, witli their cargoes, at ten million dollars, had been captured by vessels under the Confederate flag. From the first appearance of the little schooner, Jeff Diwl% the Confederate navy had been the terror of the entire Yankee mercantile marine * The effect of our privateering on Yankee commerce and ton- nage was already immense. Since the commencement of the war, three hundred and eighty-five vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of more than one hundred and sixty-six thousand tons, had been transferred to foreigners at the port of New York alone, most of which were sailiiiij: nnder the flas: of Great Britain, the most prominent commercial rival of the Yankee. At other ports the same practice had prevailed, and it would be fair to estimate the loss of Yankee tonnage under it, durine: the past two years, at three hundred thousand tons. This loss to the North, as a matter of course, involved a consequent in- crease of the tonnage and power of its rivals. In the first six months of the year 1860 the number of ves- sels cleared at New York for foreign ports was seventeen hun- dred and ninety-five, of which eleven hundred and thirty-three were Americati and six hundred and sixty-two foreign — a dif- ference of nearly one hundred per cent, in favor of American vessels; while, during the" same period of the present year, there had been twenty-one hundred and ninety-seven clear- ances, of which fourteen hundred and fifty were foreign and only seven hundred and forty-seven American — showing an increase in the number of foreign vessels, and a difference in their favor, as compared with the first named period, of about two hundred per cent. The Yankees had a navy which was daily increasing, and one which, in war-making power, already exceeded vastly any navy in the, world. Yet it was impotent against a few Con- * A roport was made to the Yankee Congress of captures by Confederate cruisers up to the 30tli of January, 1864. The list, wliich was not complete, foots up li);{, with a tonnage of 89,704. At fifty dollars a ton, the vessels are valued at $4,485,200 ; the cargoes, at one hundred dollars a ton, are estimated at $8,1)70,400. Total value, $13,455,500. Sixty-two were captured by the Ala- bama, twenty-six by the Sumter, and twenty-two by the Florida. THE TllTRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 143 federate cruisers which defied its power, and burnt Yankee vessels even within siijht of their conitnerciid marts. NAVAL AFFAIRS OF THE CONFEDKRAOT. We take occasion liere to make a brief summary of wliat had been accomplished in the naval affairs of the Confederacy since the commencement of the war. At that time, but seven steam war vessels had been built in the States now forming the Confederacy since the war of 1812, and the engines of oidy two of these had been contracted for in these States. All the labor or materials requisite to complete and ecpiip a war vessel could not bo commanded at any one point of the Con- federacy. To these disadvantages was to be added the notorious incom- petency of the Confederate Secretary of the Navy. His con- tracts were injudicious; and there was traced more or less dir<*ctly to his mismanagement, the destruction of the Vir- ginia-Merrimac, the Louisiana, the Mississippi, the vessels in Lake Ponchartrain, bayou St. John, the Yazoo and Mississippi rivers, and elsewhere. Yet the department, with all its drawbacks, could now exhibit results of no mean order. It liad erected a powder- mill, which supplied all the powder required by our navy ; two engine-boilers and machine-shops, and live ordnance work- shops. It had established eighteen yards for building war vessels, and a rope-walk, making all cordage, from a rope-yarn to a nine-inch cable, and capable of turning out eight thousand, per month. Of vessels not iron-clad, the department had purchased and otherwise acquired and converted to war vessels, forty-four. Had built and completed as war vessels, twelve. Had partially constructed and destroyed to save from the enemy, ten. And had now nnder construction, nine. Of iron-clad vessels, it had completed and had now in com- mission, fourteen. Uad completed and destroyed, or lost by capture, four. 144 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. Had in progress of construction and in various stages of for- wardness, twenty. It had, also, one iron-clad floating battery, presented to the Confederate States by the ladies of Georgia ; and one iron-clad ram partially completed and turned over to the Confederacy by the State of Alabama. • Taking into consideration the poverty of our means, and the formidable naval power and boundless resources of our enemy, at the beginning of this war, our people had no sufficient cause for shame or discouragement in the operations of our navy. LEE'S FLANK MOVEMENT IN VIRGINIA. We must return from the discussion of these general subjects to the military campaign of the later months of 1863, and take up the long-suspended story of Lee's army in Yirginia. Since its campaign into Pennsylvania, it had rested on the Rapiilan. In October General Lee was prepared to put into execution a campaign which promised the most brilliant re- sults, as its ultimate object appears to have been to get between Meade and AVashington. With the design of bringing on an engagement with the Yankee army, which was encamped around Culpepper Court- house, and extending thence to the Rapidan, Lee's army crossed that river on the 9th instant, and advanced by way of Madison Court-house. Our progress was necessarily slow, as the march was by circuitous and concealed roads, in order to avoid tlie observation of the enemy. General Fitz Lee, with his cavalry division and a detachment of infantry, remained to hold our lines south of the Rapidan ; General Stuart, with Hampton's division, moved on the right of the column. With a portion of his command he attacked the advance of the enemy near James City, on the 10th, and drove them back towards Culpepper. Our main body arrived near that place on the 11th instant, and discovered that the enemy had retreated towards the Rappahannock, removing or destroying his stores. We were compelled to halt during the rest of the day to provision the troops, but the cavalry, under TilE TUIUD YEAK OF THE WAK. 145 General Stuart, continued to press tlie enemy's rear guard towards the Happaluinnock. A lar<>;e force of Federal cavalry, in the mean time, had crossed the llapidan, after our move- ment begun, but vi'as repu4sed by General Fitz Lee, and pur- sued towards Brandy Station. Near that place the commands of Stuart and Lee imited, on the afternoon of the 11th, and, after a severe engagement, drove the enemy's cavalry across the Rappahannock, with heavy loss. On the morning of the 12th, the army marched in two columns, with the design of reaching the Orange and Alexan- dria raih'oad, north of the river, and interrupting the retreat of the enemy. After a skirmish with some of the Federal cavalry at Jefi'er- sonton, we reached the llappahannock at Warrenton Springs, in the afternoon, where the passage of the river was disputed by cavahy and artillery. The enemy was quickly driven oif by a detachment of our cavalry, aided by a small force of in- fantry and a battery. Early next morning, 13th, the march was resumed, and the two colunms united at Warrenton in the afternoon^ when another halt was made to supply the troops with provisions. The enemy fell back rapidly along the line of the railroad, and early on the 14tli the pursuit was con- tinued, a portion of the army moving by way of Kew Balti- more towards Bristoe Station, and the rest, accompanied by the main body of the cavalry, proceeded to the same point by Auburn Mills and Greenwich. Near the former place a skirmish took place between General Ewell's advance and the rear guard of the enemy, which was forced back and rapidly pursued. The retreat of the enemy was conducted by several direct parallel roads, while our troops were compelled to march by difficult and circuitous routes. We were consequently unable to intercept him. General Hill arrived iirst at Bristoe Station, where iiis advance, consisting of two brigades, became engaged with a force largely superior in numbers, posted behind the railroad embankment. The action of Bristoe Station was a disastrous affair for the Confederates. Hill's brigades were repulsed with considerable loss in killed and wounded, and the loss of live pieces of 10 146 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. artillery. The Yankees reported their loss at fifty-one killed and three hundred twenty-nine wounded, and claimed to have ca})tiired four hundred and fifty prisoners. The repulse at Bristoe proved *the end of General Lee's plans, so far as they embraced the view of getting on Meade's coHimunications, or reaching Centreville before him. Before the rest of the troops could be brought up to Hill's assistance and the position of the enemy ascertained, Meade retreated across Broad Run. Tiie next morning he was reported to be fortifying beyond Bull Run, extending his line towards the Little River Turnpike. The vicinity of tlie entrenchments around Washington and Alexandria rendered it useless to turn his new position, as it was apparent that he could readily retire to them, and would decline an engagement unless attacked in his fortifications. A further advance was therefore deemed unnecessary, and after destroying the railroad from Cub Run southwardly to the Rappahannock, the army returned on the 18th to the line of that river, leaving the cavalry in the enemy's front. The fall campaign in Virginia must be confessed a failure. It was an attempt by Lee to flank Meade and get between him and "Washington. Unfortunately the enemy appears to have become cognizant of the plan at the moment of its execution, and to have retreated with sujSicient deliberation to destroy all their stores that they did not carry off to the fortifications of Centreville. It was impossible to follow them, for the country was a desert in which our army could not live, while the enemy would be at the door of the magazines in Washington. But while General Lee's flank movement had thus terminated in disappointment, a contemporary and accompanying opera- tion in the Valley district had been most fortunate. When the movement of the army from the Rapidan commenced, General Imboden Avas instructed to advance down the Valley and guard the gaps of the mountains on General Lee's left. This duty was well performed by that ofticer, and on the 18th October he marched upon Charlestown, and succeeded by a well-concerted plan in surrounding the place. Imboden found the enemy occupying the court-house, jail, and some con- tiguous buildings, in the heart of the town, all loop-holed for muskeiry, and the court-house yard enclosed by a lieavj'^ wall THE THIRD TEAR OF TIJE WAR. 147 of oak timber. To his demand for a surrender, Colonel Simp- son, the Yankee commander, requested an hour for consider- ation. Imboden offered him five minutes, to which he replied, "Take me, if you can." Iinl)odcn immediately opened on tlie building with artilieiy at less than two hundred yards, and with half a dozen shells drove out the enemy into the streets, where he formed and fled towards Harper's Ferry. At the edge of the town he was met by the Eighteenth cavalry and Gilmore's battalions. One volley was exchanged, when the enemy threw down his arms and surrendered unconditionally. The Colonel, Lieuten- ant-colonel, and five others who were mounted, fled at the first fire, and ran the gauntlet, and escaped towards Harper's Ferry, The force captured was the Ninth Maryland regiment and three companies of cavalry, numbering between four and five hundred, men and officers. As was expected, the Harper's Ferry forces, infantry, artil- lery, and cavalry, appeared at Charlestown in a few hours after Imboden had fired the first gun. The brave Confederate retired, fighting back this largely superior force, bringing off his prisoners and captured proj)crty, and inflicting considerable damage upon the pursuing column. In the course of these operations in Virginia, in the month of October, two thousand four hundred and thirty-six prisoners were captured, including forty-one commissioned officers; of the above number, four hundred and thirty-four were taken by General Imboden. OPERATIONS AT RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE. After the return of General Lee's army to the Rappahan- nock, it was disposed on both sides of the Orange and Alexan- di'ia railroad, General Ewell's corps on the right and General Hill's on the left, with the cavalry on each flank. To hold the line of the Rappahannotik at this part of its course, it was deemed advantageous to maintain our communication witli the north bank, to threaten any flank movement the enemy might make above or below, and thus compel him to divide his forces, when it was hoped that an opj)ortunity would be pre- 148 THE THIKD YEAR OF THE "WAR. sented to concentrate on one or the other part. For this 7 purpose a point was selected a short distance above tlie site of the raih-oad bridge, where the hills on each side of the river aftbrded protection to our pontoon bridge and increased the means of defence. The hill on the north side was converted into a tete-dc-pont^ and a line of rilie trenches extended along the crest on the right and left, to the river bank. The works on the south side were remodelled, and sunken batteries for additional guns constructed on an adjacent hill to the left. Higher up, on the same side and east of the railroad, near the river bank, sunken batteries for two guns, and riile-pits, were arranged to command the railroad embankment, under cover of which the enemy might advance. Four pieces of artillery were placed in the tete-de-pont, and eight others in the works opposite. The defence of this position was intrusted to Lieutenant- general Ewell's corps, and the troops of Johnson's and Early's divisions guarded them alternately, Rodes' division being stationed near Kelley's ford. The enemy began to rebuild the railroad as soon as we with- drew from Bristoe's Station, his army advancing as the work progressed. His movements were regularly reported by our scouts, and it was known that he had advanced from Warren- ton Junction a few days before the attack. His approach towards theHappahannock was announced on the Gth of JSTovember, and about noon next day his infantry was discovered advancing to the bridge, while a large force moved in the direction of Kelley's ford, where the first attack was made. General Rodes had the Second and Thirtieth North Carolina regiments, of Ramseur's brigade, on outpost duty at the river. As soon as he perceived that the enemy was in force, he ordered his division to take position in rear of the ford. While it was getting into line, the enemy's artillery opened upon the Second North Carolina, and soon drove it to shelter. The Thirtieth North Carolina was advanced to the assistance of the Second, but in moving across the open ground, was broken by the con- centrated fire of the enemy's artillery, and took refuge behind some buildings, at the river. The enemy, being unopposed, except by the party in the rifle-pits, crossed at the rapids, THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. 149 above the ford, and captured the troops defending it, together with a large number of the Thirtieth North Carolina, who re- fused to leave the shelter of the houses. It was not intended by General Lee to attack the enemy un- til he should have advanced from the river, where it was hoped, that by holding in check the force at the bridge, we would be able to concentrate upon the other. With this view. General Johnson's division was ordered to reinforce General Rodes. In the mean time a large force was displayed in our front, at the bridge, upon receiving information of which, General A. F. Hill was ordered to get his corps in readiness, and Ander- son's division was advanced to the river, on the left of the rail- road. The artillery was also ordered to move to the front. General Early put his division in motion towards the bridge, and hastened thither in person. The enemy's skirmishers ad- vanced in strong force, witii heavy supports, and ours were slowly withdrawn into the trenches. Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, under Colonel Godwin (General Hoke being absent with one regiment on detached service), reinforced General Hayes, whose brigade occupied the noi'th bank. No other troops were sent over, the two brigades mentioned being considered sufficient to man tlie works, and though inferior to the enemy in numbers, the luiture of the po- sition was such, that he could not attack with a front more ex- tended than our own. It was not known whether the demonstration of the enemy was intended as a serious attacl^, or only to cover the move- ment of the force that had crossed at Kelley's ford, but the late- ness of the hour and the increasing darkness induced the belief that nothing would be attempted until morning. It was be- lieved that our troops on the north side would be able to main- tain their position if attacked, and that, in any case, they could withdraw under cover of the guns on the north, the location of the pontoon bridge being beyond the reach of a direct fire from any position occupied by the enemy. As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his movements, the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers against our rifle-trenches. It was a simultaneous advance, un- der cover of the darkness, of the entire force of the enemy. The first line of the enemy was broken and shattered by our 150 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. fire, but tlie second and third lines continued to advance at a double-quick, arms at a trail, and a column formed by compa- panies, moving down the railroad, was hurled upon our right, which, after a severe struggle, was forced back, leaving the battery in the hands of the enemy. General Hayes ordered a charge of the Ninth Louisiana regiment, for the purpose of re- taking the guns ; but his centre having been broken, and the two forces opposed to his right and centre having joined, ren- dered the execution of his purpose impracticable. Forming a new line after this junction, facing up the river, the enemy ad- vanced, moving behind our works, towards our left, while a line which he had formed in a ravine, above our extreme left, moved down the stream, thus enclosing Hoke's brigade, and the Seventh and Fifth Louisiana regiments, in a manner that rendered escape impossible. Nothing remained but surrender. Many of our men effected their escape in the confusion — some by swimming the river, and others by making their way to the bridge, amidst the enemy, and passing over under a shower of balls. General Hayes owed his escape to the fact, that after he was completely surrounded, and M'as a prisoner, his horse took fright and ran off, and as the enemy commenced firing on him, he concluded to make the effort to escape across the bridge, and was successful. Unfortunately no information of this attack was received on the south side of the river until too late for the artillery, there stationed, to aid in repelling it. Indeed, the darkness of the night, and the fear of injuring our own men who had surren- dered, prevented General Early from using artillery. Colonel Godwin's efforts to extricate his command, were made with a gallant desperation, that has adorned with glory this disaster. He continued to struggle, forming successive lines as he was pushed back, and did not for a moment dream of surrendering ; but, on the contrary, when his men had dwindled to sixty or seventy, the rest having been captured, killed, wounded, or lost in the darkness, and he was completely surrounded by the enemy, who were, in fact, mixed up witli his men, some one cried out that Colonel Godwin's order was for them to surrender. He immediately called for the man who made the declaration, and threatened to blow his brains out if he could find him, declaring his purpose to fight to the THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. 151 last moment, and calling upon liis men to stand by him. lie was literall}'- overpowered, by mere force of numbers, and was taken with his arms in his hands. Of this unfortunate surprise, which cost us the greater por- tion of two brigades, there is to be found some excuse in the circumstances that the enemy was aided by a valley in our front in concealing his advance from view, and that a very high wind effectually prevented his movements from being heard. General Lee declared, with characteristic generosity, that " the courage and good conduct of the troops engaged had been too often tried to admit of question." Our loss in pri- soners was very considerable. General Rodes reported three hundred of his men missing. General Early's loss in prisoners was sixteen hundred and twenty-nine. The loss of the position at Kappahannock Bridge made it necessary for General Lee to abandon the design of attacking the force that had crossed at Kelley's ford ; and his army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between Culpep- per Court-house and the Kappahannock, where it remained during the succeeding day. The position not being regarded as favorable, it returned the night following to the south side of the Rapidan. THE AFFAIR OF GERMANIA FORD. We shall complete here the record of General Lee's army for 1863 with a brief account of another affair which occurred at Germania ford, on the Rapidan, on the 27th of N^ovember. This affair appears to have been an attempt by Meade of a flank movement on General Lee's position, his immediate ob- ject being to get in the rear of Major-general Johnson's divi- sion. This division was composed of the Stonewall brigade, under Brigadier-general J. A. Walker, and Stuart's, J. M. Jones's, and Stafford's brigades, with four pieces of Anderson's artillery. These were the only troops engaged in the affair on our side. Opposed to them were Major-general French's corps (the Third), and one division of the Fifth corps. The enemy were in position, and opened the attack before our forces knew of their presence. Their object was to make a sudden attack from their concealed position upon our flank, disperse the 152 THE TIIIKD TEAR OF THE WAR. troops and capture our wagon train. They not only failed of their object, but were driven from the field with considerable slaughter. Our loss in killed and wounded was about four hundred and fifty ; that of the enemy was certainly double. If Meade had designed a general battle — and the fact that, before this movement, his army had supplied itself with eight days' rations argues such design — this repulse and the heavy rains appear to have damped his ardor ; and the " on-to- Kichmond " was reserved for another year. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 153 CHAPTER YIL The Chattanooga Lines. — Grant's Command. — The Military Division of the Missis- sippi. — Scarcity of Supplies in Chattanooga. — Wliecler's Kaid. — Grant's Plans. — He Ojtens the Communications of Chattanooga. — The Affaih of Lookout Valley. — Eelicf of Chattanooga. — The Battle of Missionary Ridge.— Bragg's Unfortunate Detachment of Longstreet's Force. — His Evacuation of Lookout Mountain. — The Attack on Missionary Ridge.— Hardee's Gallant Resistance. — Rout and Panic of the Confederates. — President Davis's First Reproof of the Confederate Troops. — Bragg's Retreat to Dalton. — Cleburne's Gallant Aftair. — Lonostreet's Expeoition Against Knoxville. — More of Bragg's Mismanagement. — Insufficiency of Longstreet's Force. — Difficulty in Obtaining Supplies. — His Investment of Knoxville. — An Incident of Personal Gallantry.— Daring of an English Volunteer. — Longstreet's Plans Discon- certed. — The Assault on Fort Sanders. — Devotion of Longstreet's Veterans.— The Yankee " Wire-net." — The Fatal Ditch. — Longstreet's Masterly Retreat. — His Posi- tion in Northeastern Tennessee. — He Winters his Army there. — The Affair of Sabine Pass, Texas.— 'The Trans-Mississippi. — Franklin's Expedition Defeated.— The Upper Portions of the Trans-Mississippi. — The Mis.souri " Guerillas."-j-Quan- trell. — Romantic Incidents. — The Virginia- Tennessee Frontier. — Operations of General Sam Jones. — An Engagement near Warm Springs. — The Affair of Roo-crs- ville. — Battle of Droop Mountain. — Tlie Enemy Baffled. — Averill's Great Decem- ber Raid.— The Pursuit. — The North Carolina Swamps. — The Negro Banditti in the Swamps.— Wild, Butler's " Jackal."— His Murder of Daniel Bright.— Confederate Women in Irons. — Cowardice and Ferocity of the Yankees. is We left Eosecrans in Chattanooga and General Brag^ hopefully essaying the investment of that place. The defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga had, despite all his attempts to qualify it, cost him his command, and added him to the long list of the victims of popular disappointment.* * In an oflScial statement on the Tennessee campaign, the Yankee commander- in-chief, General Ilalleck, attributed the defeat of Chickamauga to a disobedience of his orders. He stated that Barnside was ordered to connect his right with Rosecrans' left, and, if possible, to occupy Dalton and the passes into Georgia and North Carolina, so that the two armies might act as one body, and sup- port each other. Rosecrans was not to advance into Georgia or Alabama at that time, but to fortify his position and connect with Burnside. If his weak point — his right and the communications with Nashville — were threatened, he was to hand over Chattanooga to Barnside, and swing round to cover that flank. At the same time forces were ordered up from Memphis and other quar- ters to guard that side, as well as his long line of communications. General Burnside, as alleged by Halleck, entirely disobeyed or neglected his orders, and did not connect with the Army of the Cumberland, leaving a great gap be- 154 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. On the 18tli of October General Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, compris- ing the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. He was invested with plenary powers, and a mil- itary autocracy that extended from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi. Thomas was j^laced in command of the Cumber- land, and Burnside commanded at Knoxville. Grant proceeded directly to Chattanooga. lie had tele- graphed Thomas to hold the place to the last extremity, and the latter had replied, somewhat ominously, that he sliould do so until his army " starved." The fact was, the Yankee forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, tlie Confederate lines extending from tlie Tennessee river above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point at Lookout Mountain, below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the riv^er picketed to near Bridgeport, our main force being fortified in Chattanooga Yalley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Yalley. The enemy's artiltery horses and mules had become reduced by starvation. It was estimated that ten thousand animals perished in supply- ing half-rations to the Yankee troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. "While Bragg thus held the Yankees in Chattanooga at the point of starvation, his cavalry had not been idle in their rear. General Wheeler had crossed the river in the face of a division of the enemy at Cotton Port Ford, and proceeded in the direc- tion of McMinneville, when after a sharp fight he cajDtured a large train and seven hundred prisoners. The train was loaded with ammunition and other stores, and supposed to consist of seven hundred wagons, all which were burned. He then at- tacked McMinneville, capturing five hundred and thirty pris- oners, and another large train, destroyed several bridges, an engine and a train of cars. He then moved to Shelbyville, where he captured a large amount of stores and burned them. The amount of property destroyed by him was almost without precedent in the annals of raiding. tween the two armies. It was claimed by Qeiieral Halleck that had the in- structions of the department been strictly followed, the disaster of Chickamauga would not have occurred. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 155 On arriving at Chattanooga, General Grant seems to have at once appreciated tlie situation. It was decided that Hook- er's command at Bridgeport should be concentrated ; the plan agreed upon being for it to cross to the soutli side of the river, and to move on the wagon road, by the way of Whitesides, to "Wauhatchie in Lookout Yallej. On the 28th of October Hooker emerged into Lookout Yalley at Wauhatchie, with the Eleventh army corps under Major-general Howard, and Geary's division of the Twelfth army corps. In the mean time Grant had planned an expedition to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Yalley, which easily succeeded. Hooker proceeded to take up positions for the de- fence of the road from Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry; and Major-general Palmer, who had moved up to Whitesides, also took position to hold the road passed over by Hooker. By these movements Grant calculated to secure two good lines for supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport ; that at Whitesides and Wauhatchie, and that by Kelly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry. THE AFFAIR OF LOOKOUT VALLEY. The Confederates were not idle observers of these move- ments. On the night of the 29th October, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces, with the hope of opening the way to the possession of the lines which had been lost to us by surprise, and with tlie immediate object of cap- turing Hooker's wagon-train. The expedition unexpectedly found itself fighting a whole Yankee corps, the Twelfth, under command of Slocum. Our force consisted of but six regi- ments. By the vigor of our attack the enemy's lines were broken. At one time the Yankees had fallen back in front, and on the right and left flanks, until wagon-trains and prison- ers were captured in the rear. But the pressure of the Yan- kee columns from Brown's Ferry, where it M-as known there were at least two corps, threatened the integrity of our posi- tion. It had become critical in the extreme ; and an order was given to retire. In this action Jenkins's brigade sutFered 156 TIIK THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. severely ; its loss in killed and wounded was said to be three liinulred and sixty-one. Grant's possession of the lines of communication south of the Tcimessee river was no longer disputed. By the use of two steamboats he was enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning, llis relief of Chattanooga was to be taken as an accomplished fact. THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. President Davis had visited General Bragg's lines, and on his return therefrom made, in public, certain mysterious allu- sions to a campaign that was to retrieve our fortunes in the West. The country was shortly afterwards surprised to learn that Bragg had detached Longstreet from his front, and moved him in the direction of Knoxville, to attack Burnside. Of this event, so untoward for the Confederates, Grant says, in his official report : " Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was despatching Longstreet from the front, and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tennessee, evi- dently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity for some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions M^ere given for a movement against IMissionar}' Ridge, with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's communication with Long- street, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th November.''' Lookout Mountain was evacuated by the Confederates, on the 24th of November, being no longer important to us after the loss of Lookout or Wills' Yalley, and no longer tenable against such an overwhelming force as General Grant had con- centrated around Chattanooga. General Bragg abandoned also the whole of Chattanooga Valley, and the trenches and breastworks runninc; alone; the foot of Missionarv Ridge and across the valley to the base of Lookout, and moved his troops up to the top of the ridge. It Avas found necessary to extend his right well up towards the Chickamauga, near its mouth, in consequence of the heavy forces which the enemy had thrown up the river in that direction. The ridge varies in height from 'rillfi TllIKI) YICAK OF THE WAU. 157 fonr to six hundred feet, and is crossed by several roads lead- ing out from Chattanooga. The western side next to tlie enemy- was steep and rugged, and in some phiees ahuost bare, the timber having been cut away for Hrewood. Our pickets occu- pied the brcastwoi-ks below, while the infantry and artillery were distributed along the crest of the ridge from McFarlan's Gap almost to the mouth of the Chickamaiiga, a distance of six miles or moi-e. In addition to the natural strength of tlie position we had thrown up breastworks along the ridge wher- ever the ascent was easy. Determined to make his attack upon Bragg's reduced num- bers as foimidable as possible, Grant waited for Sherman to come up : Sherman, strengthened by a division from Thomas's command, to cross the Tennessee river below the mouth of Chickamauga, to form a junction with Thomas, and advance towards the northern end of Missionary liidge. On the night of the 23d November, Shernuin, with four divisions, com- menced crossing the river. I3y daylight of the 24th, eight thou- sand Yankees were on the south side of the Tennessee, and fortified in rifle-trenches. By noon tlie remainder of Sherman's force was over, and before night the whole of the northern ex- tremity of Missionary Ividge was in his possession. In the mean time, Hooker scaled the western slope of Lookout Moun- tain. On the night of the 2'ith, the Yankee forces maintained an unbroken line, with open communications, from the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Cheat Valley, to the north end of Missionary llidge. On the 25tli of November, the enemy ])reparcd for liis grand assault. The Yankee army was marshalled under Grant, Thomas, Hooker, and Sherman, and did not number less than eighty-five thousand veteran troo[)s. The Confederate army, under Bragg, Hardee and Breckinridge, did not number half 60 many. Longstreet's Virginia divisions and other troops had been sent to East Tennessee. Had these been ])resent, with their steady leader at the head of them, we might have won a victory. As it was, we ought to have won the day ; especially considering the advantages of our position, by which the ranks of the enemy were exposed to an artillery fire while in the plain, and to the infantry fire when they attemj^ted the ascent of the hill or mountain. 158 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. Grant deplo^'ed his immense masses in two heavy lines of battle, and sometimes in three, supported by large reserve forces. The spectacle was magnificent as viewed from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He advanced first against our right wing, about ten o'clock, where he encountered Hardee, who commanded on the right, while Bi-eckinridge commanded on the left. Hardee's command embraced Cleburne's, Walker's (commanded by General Gist, General Walker being absent), Cheatham's and Stevenson's divisions. Breckinridge's em- , braced his old division, commanded by Brigadier-general Lewis, Stewart's, part of Buckner's, and Hindman's com- manded by Patton Anderson. Tlie enemy's first assault upon Hardee was repulsed with great slaughter, as was his second, though made with double lines, supported with heavy reserves. The attack on the left wing was not made until about noon. Here, as on the right, the enemy was repulsed ; but he was obstinate, and fought with great ardor and confidence, return- ing to the charge again and again in the handsomest style, until one of our brigades in the centre gave way, and the Yankee flag was planted on Missionary liidge. The enemy was not slow in availing himself of the great advantages of his new position. In a few minutes he turned upon our flanks and poured into them a terrible enfilading fire, which soon threw the Confederates on his right and left into confusion. Under this confusion, the gap in our lines grew wider and wider, and the wider it grew the faster the multitudinous foe rushed into the yawning chasm. A disgraceful panic ensued. The whole left wing of the Confederates became involved, gave way, and scattered in unmitigated rout. The day was lost, and shamefully lost. Hardee still maintained his ground ; but no success of the right wing could restore the left to its original position. With cheers answering cheers the Yankees swarmed upwards. Color after color was planted on the summit, while muskets and cannon poured their deadl}^ thunder upon the fly- ing Confederates. Grant was surj^rised at the ease with which he had won a victory such as he had never before obtained, and attributed it to the dismay of the Confederates at his " audacit}'," and the " purposeless aiming " of our artillery from the crest of the ridge. Our casualties were shamefully small. Granted stated his « THE THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. 159 own loss as about five thousand in killed and wounded. He claimed to have taken over six thousand prisoners, forty pieces of artillery, and seven thousand stand of small arms. The disaster of Missionary Ridge was not only a great mis- fortune, but a grievous disgrace. Of the unhappy event, Pre- sident Davis said : " After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted on the enemy, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great srt-ength, and, by a disorderly retreat, compelled the commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally to retire with his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had fought with the valor which they had displayed on previous occasions, and which was manifested iu this battle on the other parts of the line, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the mortification of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by the troops." On the night of the 25th of ISTovember, Bragg was in full retreat ; and all of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley and Missionary Eidge were in the hands of the enemy. His army was put in motion on the road to Ringgold, and thence to Dalton. The disgrace of this retreat was somewhat relieved by the spirit of the brave and undaunted Cleburne. He had been left to bring up the rear. The Yankee pursuing column, num- bering, it is estimated, about ten thousand men of all arms, as- saulted him before he reached Tunnel Hill. This column con- sisted of picked troops, who moved rapidly and fought gal- lantly ; but Cleburne succeeded in restraining them whenever he encountered them. After some desultory fighting, he suc- ceeded in ambuscading Thomas's advance at Taylor's Ridge, He managed to conceal his forces, including his artillery, until the enemy got within a few paces of his guns, when they poured grape and canister into them with the most destructive efi'ect. The road was filled with their dead and wounded. Our infan- try then sprang forward from their covert on either side of the road, and literally mowed them down by their well-directed shot. The enemy fled in confusion, leaving two hundred and fifty prisoners and three flags (the latter taken by the artille- 160 THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. rists) in our hands, and from one thousand to fifteen liundrcd killed and wounded in the road. Grant desisted from pursuit, convinced by Cleburne's lesson, that the Confederates were not demoralized, and impressed with the necessity of despatching reinforcements to aid Euruside, at Knoxville. L0NG8TREETS EXPEDITION AGAINST KNOX.VILLE. We must turn, to follow the fortunes of Longstreet's ill-ad- vised and worse-furnished expedition against Knoxville. It is an indisputable fact that, when Longstreet was sent from General Bragg's lines, he was furnished with no subsistence whatever ; and in way of transportation, was provided only M'ith some refuse teams by Bragg's quartermaster. Despite these difficulties, he succeeded in subsisting his army, and in capturing an aggregate amount of stores from the enemy, which alone was a valuable result of the campaign. At Lenoir Station he captured a train of eighty-five wagons, many of them loaded with valuable medical stores. At J>ean Station he captured thirty wagons, a quantity of forage, and some horses. In the Clinch Yalley he captured forty other wagons — a particular!}'- rich spoil, as they were mostly laden witli sugar and coffee. He had been disappointed in the force which was placed at his command. When he started on his expedition, Steven- son's division was then at Loudon, some thirty miles from Knoxville. Stevenson was hastily recalled to Chattanooga by Bragg, who was suddenly awakened to the danger of an attack on his front ; and the first train which carried Longstreet's troops through to Loudon, returned with those of Stevenson. It appears that Longstreet's movement was thus uncovered, and that he was left with only eleven thousand infantry to conduct the campaign, arduous in all respects, against an enemy twice his numbers. On the 18th of Kovember, Longstreet drove the enemy from his advance lines, in front of Knoxville, close under liis works. This sortie was the occasion of one of those dashing feats of in- dividual gallantry which demands a passing notice. A breast- work was charged by our infantry. They winced under the galling fire of the enemy, and wavered, when Captain Stephen THE TIIIKD YKAR OF THK WAR. 161 Northrop, an Englishman, formerly Captain of ITcr Britannic Majesty's 22d foot, who had joined our ranks, and was on duty in Alexander's artillery battalion, stationed several hundred yards from the scene of conflict, mounted his horse, and dash- ing across the plain — the only horseman in the melee — rode in advance of the wavering line, up to the very works of the en- emy; a hundred rifles were lowered upon him, but he moved on, and rallied the wavering line ; the work was carried, and Northrop borne away, with a minie ball through his shoulder, his sword-scabbard broken by another, and the point of his sword cut off by yet another. liis escape was miracuh)UH. Longstreet's investment of Knoxville was nearly complete. The enemy'could only procure supplies from one side of the river, and the Yankees were ali'eady restricted in their rations. But in the mean time news had come of Bragg's disaster, and nothing remained for Longstreet but to trust to the vigor of a decisive assault. It is not improbable that a few days more might have starved the Yankees into a surrender ; but we could not wait for the event. The enemy's cavalry were al- ready on the line of the railroad between Knoxville and Chick- amauga. Communication with General Bragg had been sev- ei"ed, and Loudon was threatened. Knoxville was well fortified. College Hill was fortified with a heavy fort, carrying a siege-piece of artillery. Another fort was thrown up on the hills, near the Summit House. The hill on the right of the street leading from the public square to the depot, had a strong fort. Near the ITumphrey's was another. The hill known as Temperance Hill, had two heavy forts. Another rise had two batteries. The heights south of Knox- ville were also fortified, and connected with these immense for- tifications was one continuous line of rifle-pits and breastworks, from the extreme east of Knoxville, on the river, to the west, on the river. The point of attack was a strong work on the north-west angle of the enemy's line (the salient angle north- west the immediate point to be assailed). The fort was on a hill of considerable eminence, near the Kingston road, known as Fort Sanders. The force which was to attempt an enterprise which ranks with the most famous charges in military history, should bo mentioned in detail. It consisted of, three brigades of McLuws U 162 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. division : that of General Wolt'ord, the Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Tvvent^'-fourth Georgia regiments, and Cobb's and Phillips's Georgia legions ; that of General Humphrey, the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-iirst, IVenty-second and Twenty-third Mississippi regiments, and a brigade composed of General An- derson's and Bryant's brigades, embracing, among others, the Palmetto State Guard, tlie Fifteenth South Carolina regiment, and the Fifty-first, Fifty-third and Fifty-ninth Georgia regi- ments. The signal gun broke the silence of the early dawn of the 29th of November. The assaulting column of the Confederates moved up to the attack over the sIo]>e, in front of the fort, in a direction oblique to the Loudon road. A heavy artiller}^- iire was opened upon them at the first advance. Despite the storm of canister which howled around them, on came the de- voted men, with brigade fiont, slowly ])ouring over the rail- road cut, and anon quickening in motion as the ground pre- sented less obstruction, until at last, emerging from the nearest timber, they broke into the charge. Across the open space which intervened between the timber and the fort, and which was crossed with logs and the stumps of felled trees, the Confederates came at impetuous speed. But the enemy had prepared for them a device quite worthy of Yankee ingenuitj'. Among the stumps which covered the slope, the Yaidvees had woven a netivorh of wire. Lines of telegraph wire had been stretched through the low brush, and coiled from stump to stump, out of ordinary view. The fore- most of the assaulting column stumbled, one falling over an- other, and were thrown into some confusion, until the cause of the obstruction was discovered. The enemy took advantage of the momentary halt and confusion to pour a devouring fire upon the broken lines. The embrasures of the fort, and the whole line of the parapet blazed at once with discharges. But still the gallant Confederates pressed on, their battle-flags of red, with cross of blue, floating triumphantly above their heads. Rallying over the temporary obstruction, leaping the stumps and logs, and pushing through the brush, they were soon within pistol shot of the fort. The enemy reserved his tire. He had treble-shotted some of his guns, and others were loaded with terrible canister. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 163 Suddenly all the enemy's guns launched forth their missiles of death. Our lines were shattered ; but with a terrible cour- age, some of the Confederates sprang into the ditch, clambered up the glacis, and almost side by side with the Yankee flag planted their own. But the rear of the assaulting column had given way. Others remained with their officers, who valiantly kept the lead to the very fort itself, and in the attempt to scale the glacis. There was a spatter of blood and brains as each head appeared above the parapet. A Confederate captain, with an oath, demanded the surrender of the garrison, as he pushed his body through one of the embrasures, and faced the very muzzle of the cannon. The answer to him was the dis- charge of the piece, when, rent from limb to limb, his mangled corpse, or what was left of it, was hurled outward into the air. His comrades, yet essaying to get within the work, were now subjected to the lire of hand grenades, extemporized by cutting short the fuses, and the shells being then tossed over the edge of the parapet. Baffled at every point, and unsuppoi'ted by the rest of the charging column, these brave men surrendered, and were hauled within the fort; but not until the trench was filled with the dead and dying. In this terrible ditch the dead were piled eight or ten feet deep. In comparatively an instant of time, we lost seven hun- dred men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Colonel McEl- roy of the Thirteenth Mississippi and Colonel Thomas of the Sixteenth Georgia, had both fallen mortally wounded in the dirch. The Yankees lost in the action not more than twenty men killed and wounded. Never — excepting Gettysburg — was there in the history of the war a disaster adorned with the glory of such devoted courage as Longstreet's repulse at Knoxville. It left him, considering the consequences of Bragg's defeat at Missionary Riclge, with no other alternative than to raise the siege and occupy a new line of operations. A retreat to Bragg's line was not contemplated, and he decided to transfer his base to a point where he could threaten Knoxville from the opposite side of the town, and establish communications with Bristol, Lynchburg, and Richmond. These intentions, it is said, were known to President Davis in advance, who, it is further said, advised with General Longstreet on the subject, and left 164: TIIK THIRD YEAR OF TUE WAR. to his discretion the phin of campaign to be pursued in tlio future. It was in llic exercise of an independant judgment, tliat Lonirstrcot made his retreat to Rnssellvillc. It was one of the most fortunate retrea-ts of the war. It was made without the slightest loss. It evaded a large column of the enemy at Lou- don. Its immediate c»l)ject was Ilogersville, where Longstreet expected to get 8Uj)p]ies and milling fur his army. Our forces, however, being pressed by the enemy, who followed them to Bean Station, on the Cumberland Gap road, turned upon the Yankees, inilicted upon them a severe defeat, and drove them twelve lines before Ilussellville. P)y an admirable movement, Longstreet selected a position in Northeastern Tennessee, where he could hold communica- tion with his superiors in llichmond, and intrenching himself against all possibility of sur])rise, he proceeded to carry out what rcnuiined of his military plans. The Army of the Ohio ■was weak, and he knew it. It was strong enough to hold Knoxville, as he had, learned by sad experience. The rein- forcements which were sent from Chattanooga, were with- drawn. He, therefore, organized his forces for conquest, not necessarily of territory, but of material for the subsistence of his troops. In this way he mamvged to overran the entire sec- tion of the State east of a line drawn from Cumberland Gap to Cleveland ; to gather within his lines all that was valuable in supplies of food ; and to make his army quite self-subsisting in a tract of country where it was thought it was impossible for him to remain without external aid. While events of dominant importance were taking place on the lines of Generals Lee and Bragg, there wxre distant and minor theatres of the contest, which, at various times in the fall of 1863, exhibited some remarkable episodes in the war. AVe shall make a rapid resume of these minor events, takilig the reader's attention from the Gulf Coast to the distant regions of the Trans-Mississippi, and thence to the frontiers of some of the eastern States of the Confederacy. THE AITAIR AT 8A1JINE PASS, TEXAS. — TUE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. An engagement with the Yankee navy had occurred at Sa- THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. 165 bine Pass, the dividing line between Louisiana and Texas, on the 8th of September. A brilliant victory was won by the little Confederate garrison of Sabine Pass against the fleet of the enemy. Attacked by five gunboats, the fort, mounting but three guns of small calibre, and manned by the Davis Guards, Lieutenant R. M. Dowliiig, assisted by Lieutenant Smith, of the engineers, supported by about two hundred men, the whole under command of Captain F. A. Odium, steadily resisted their fire, and at last forced the surrender of the two gunboats Clifton and Sachem, badly crippling another, which with the others escaped over the bar. The result of this gal- lant achievement was the capture of two fine gunboats, fifteen heavy guns, over two hundred prisoners (among them the commodore "of the fleet), and over fifty of the enemy killed and Avounded, while not a man was lost on our side, or a gun injured. This demonstration of the Yankees, under command of Gen- eral Franklin, was part of an expedition from General Banks' lines against Texas. A column under Washburne had moved by railroad to J>rashearand 13ayou Boeuf; and another Yankee column had been taken by steamboats to the mouth of Red Hiver to go to Simmsport. But Franklin's disaster at Sabine Pass caused him to abandon his part of the movement; and on this account, and also, it is said, the low state of water, an expedition elaborately and ambitiously planned by Banks was wholly abandoned. In the upper portions of the Trans-Mississippi, Confederate operations had assumed an irregular character. The States beyond the great river possessed many advantages for the maintenance of their defence. In provisions they abounded beyond any other part of the Confederacy. In the various requisites for establishing and supplying an army they were by no means destitute. Through Mexico they had been en- abled to make good their deficiencies, to some extent, by importation. (Treat activity seemed to pervade the Trans-Mississippi, and brilliant actions performed by small bodies of men charac- terized it, instead of sanguinary and resultless battles. The nature of the country and the requirements of the situations had no doubt wrought a considerable change in the character 166 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. of the warfare carried oa in that region ; but altliongli no signal indications of strategic skill might be traceable, marks of dash and daring were plainly discernible. • But while Texas and Arkansas still maintained formidable military organizations, in unhappy Missouri the Confederates were well nigh driven to the wall. Quantrell, the famous partisan chief, was compelled, in the fall of 18G3, to make his exodus from Missouri. Towards the middle of September the guerillas reunited at Blackwater, and were ready in a few hours to leave their ren- dezvous for their march South, Cold nights and occasional frost had warned them to leave Missouri, and like poor house- less birds of passage, beaten by the pitiless storm, they sought a more genial clime, where the grass was green and Yankees less numerous. Missouri would aftbrd no shelter of safety after win- ter had set in ; the bare and leafless forests no hiding places, and the pure driven snow would aft'ord to the enemy the best means of tracking the hunted and hungry guerillas whenever they should leave their holes in search of food. Outlawed by an order of Ceneral Blount, proscribed by every Yankee offi- cial, the citizens warned against furnishing food or shelter under the crudest and severest penalties, the very earth almost denying them a resting-place, the gallant three hundred broke up their rendezvous and left for the plains of Texas. The romantic adventures of these men in the Indian coun- try were of thrilling interest. At one time, they came upon a party of Yankees near Fort Smith, who mistook them for comrades. The little Confederate command was drawn up in line of battle, motionless as statues, with Quantrell at their head on his war-horse, looking grimly at a brilliant cavalcade of horsemen forming beautifully about three hundred yards in front. The whisper ran through the line, "It is old Blount, and he thinks we are Yankees coming out to give him a recep- tion !" It was true. There rode General Blount and stall', glittering in blue cloth and gold lace, and about two hundred of his body guard ; just then the cavalcade moved, .and the band commenced playing Yankee Doodle. Quantrell moved also ; but the quick eye of Blount discovered something wrong and called a halt. But the guerillas by this time were under full gallop, and down they swept upon the brilliant cortege THK TIIIKD YKAlt OF TIIK WAR. 167 like an avalanche and hurled them to the earth. The struggle was sliort and fierce ; the sliock terrlHc, as guerilhi rode over Loth horse and his rider, and dashed out the brains of the lat- ter as he passed. Again and again they turned and fired, charged and recharged, until the ground was strewn with the dead, ambulances overturned, and horses flying madly in every direction.* THE VIKOINIA-TRNNHSSEE FKONTIEE. The frontier in which we include the vast body of land laying generally between General Lee's lines in Virginia and East Tennessee, was one of the most important of the minor theatres of tlie war. What was known as the Department of West Virginia and East Tennessee, was under the command of Major-general Sam * A stirring episode of this engagement is told by one who participated in it. We give it, in his words, as a characteristic incident of the romance of jmrti- san warfare : " Lieiit(!nant-c()lonel Curtis, adjutant-goneral on GciKiral Blount's staff, rode a magnificent horse, riclily caparisoned, and was himself dressed in the richest uniform of his rank. He was a n^marlcably handsome num, fair, and rosy, eyes blue as tliose of the fairest blonde of his own clime ; palcf, fair, tall, slender figure — with features as beautiful as those of a woman. He was well arm(;d with pistol and sabre, and used them gallantly. He sees that his forci; is de- feated, and determines to escape. But as ho turns his liorse's head hv encoun- ters the fierce ey<^ of a young guerilla as handsome, as brave and as well mounted as himself, bearing right down upon him. He observes the adjutant- general endeavoring to escape; calls to him to stop and fight. He does turn to meet the guerilla now swooping down upon liim like an eagle on its prey. The Yankee fires a long-range gun, but misses his aim ; he draws his six-shooter and rai)idly, nervously discharges the contents at his advcsrsary, who all this time is gaining on him and dashing straight at him. " As an eagle swoops down on his j)rey, gracefully and grandly ferocious, beautiful evi^n in th(^ act of destruction, bo does Peyton Long, the young hero, gallantly bear down on the " cute" Yankee ; he reserves every shot, while Curtis is wasting his ; he dashes upon him — both pause for an instant as if in mutual admiration — but only for a moment. Peyton Long watches his antag- onist, and sways his body to the left to escape the sabre cut of tlu; Yaidicn; ; the next instant the inevitable six-shooter of the guerilla is pointed at the head of the splendid-looking fellow ; it is the work of an instant ; Peyton strikes like an eagle, and all is over! A shout of triumph rose from the throng of guerillas, who had ceased the fight to watch the encounter between this well- matched couple." 1G8 THE THEBD YEAR OF THE WAK. Jones, one of tlic most active of Confederate commanders. Of events in his department we must make a rapid summary, •which, however, will admit some detail of his most interesting operations. For many montlis operations had been active in this De- partment to cope with raids under the energetic direction of the somewhat famous Yankee commander General Averill. ()n the 2C)th of August a portit>n of General Jones's forces en- countered the enemy alxtut a mile and a half from Dublin, on the road leading to the Warm Sj)rings. Every attack made by the enemy was repulsed. At night each side occupied the same position they had in the morning. The next morning the enemy made two other attacks, which were handsomely re- ])ulsed, when he abandoned his position and retreated towards "Warm Springs, pursued by cavalry and artillery. The troops engaged were the first brigade of Jones's army. Colonel George S. l*atton connnanding. The enemy were about three thousand strong, with six pieces of artillery, under Brigadier-general Averill. Our loss was about two hundred killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was not known. We took about one hundred and fifty prisoners and a piece of artillery. On the Cth November occurred an affair at Rogersville, East Tennessee, which was a considerable success for the Con- federates. Information of a reliable character was received by General Hansom of the exact position, numbers and condition of the Yankees at Big Creek, four miles east of Eogersville. The nearest supporting force being at Greenville, he conceived the idea of cutting them off by a rapid night march of cavalry upon their front and rear. The attack was successful. Among the fruits of the expedition were eight hundred and fifty pri- soners, four pieces of artillery, sixty wagons, and several hun- dred animals. BATTLE OF DROOP MOUNTAIN. On the same day (6tli November) occurred an important action between another portion of General Jones's forces, and the redoubtable Averill. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 6th of November THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 169 Ecliols' brigade, consisting of a regiment and battalion of infantry, and six pieces of artillery, came up to the support of Colonel Wm. L. Jackson, commanding Confederate forces in the Northwest (who was closely pushed by General Avei'ill), on Droop Mountain, in the county of Pocahontas, twenty-eight miles north-east of Lewisburg. The entire forces of the two commands thus united, amounted to about fifteen hundred infantry and dismounted cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery. The position of our men, naturally a very strong one, was selected with groat judgment by Colonel Jackson, on the western extremity of Droop Mountain. At ten o'clock, the enemy, who had remained in the front of Colonel Jackson since daybreak, with a force amounting to seven thousand five liundred mounted infantry and cavalry, and eight ])ieces of artillery, commenced his advance upon us, by posting his long- range guns on an eminence to our right, and by advancing his line of skirmishers upon our right and left ; and brisk skirmish- ing then ensued, which continued from time to time until the light became general between our infantry and dismounted cavalry and those of the enemy. The monstrously unequal combat was kept up for several liours. Our men fought with the utmost gallantry and deter- mination, and stubbornly maintained their position against an enemy five times their number until they were well nigh sur- rounded. Human endurance could hold out no longer ; the troops on the right gave away before overwhelming numbers, while the enemy were ra})idly flanking those on the left. Just at this stage of proceedings, General Echols, seeing that if he remained longer his retreat would be cut off, withdrew the troops from the field and ordered a retreat in the direction of Lewisburg. Our loss in killed and wounded was about three liundred. Although the action terminated in the retreat of the Confederates, yet they had given an exhibition of spirit among the proudest in the war. Our little army had wrestled in deadly conflict with an enemy five times its strength for seven long hours; and when they did retreat, succeeded in bringing off all of our quartermaster and commissary stores, together with our trains and artillery, leaving to the enemy no trophies over which to exult, save the bodies of our gallant dead. 170 THE THIRD tp:ar of the war. So far as the beneficial results of tlie expedition to the enemy could be estimated they amounted to nothing. They camd with two large forces, amounting, in the aggregate, to nearly ten thousand men, with the expectation of capturing the command of Colonel Jackson and General Echols' brigade, and of moving then upon our interior lines of railroad. By fighting, however, so far from the interior, and by being so checked and damaged and baffled as they were, they failed in the one object and abandoned the other. But the o-reat raid of Averill seems to liave been reserved for December. He came from New Creek, a depot on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, in the county of Hardy, along the western base of the Shenandoah mountains, through Covington to Salem, burning and destroying what he could in his path. His command consisted of four regiments of mounted infantry, a battalion of cavalry, and a battery. On the 16tli of December he cut the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at Salem. Here three depots were destroyed, the contents of which were officially stated by Averill to have been 2,000 barrels of flour, 10,000 bushels of wheat, 100,000 bushels of shelled corn, 50,000 bushels of oats, 2,000 barrels of meat, several cords of leather, and 1,000 sacks of salt. On his retreat, the adventurous Yankee had to run the gauntlet of difi'erent Confederate commands, arranged in a line extending from Staunton to Newport upon all the avail- able roads to prevent his return. Having captured a despatch from General Jones to General Early, Averill deflected from the line of his retreat and instead of passing through Buchanan, moved towards Covington. Colonel AVilliam L. Jackson moved his command down to Jackson's river depot, and directed the bridge to be burned as soon as it was ascertained that the enemy were advancing to- wards it. Jackson then took a strong position near the Jackson's river depot, at the point where the Bich Patch road connects the Covington turnpike. He then directed his mounted men, under Cajjtain Sprague, to' move on the Bich Patch road until they met the enemy's advance, and to attack them desperately, and cut the column in two, if possible. At four o'clock on Saturday evening, the 19th December, a courier from Captain Sprague announced the approach of the enemy by that road, THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 171 and that lie had commenced a skirmish with Averlll's advanced forces. Jackson immediately ordered an advance of the Twen- tieth Virt^inia lii^giment by a blind road, so as to attack the enemy obliquely. lie also ordered the Nineteenth Virginia Tiegiment to advance on the Covington tni'npike road, and to attack the enemy directly. At that ])oint Jackson conceived the idea of taking a detachment of about fifty men, and move forward with them for the purpose of striking the enemy vigo- rously, and cutting his colunm in two. In this he succeeded perfectly. One half of the Yankees were thus separated from the other half, which was under the immediate command of Averill, and who ra})idly passed forward towards the Island Ford bridge. Persons entrusted with the burning of the Island Ford bj'idge failed to do so, however, owing to the rapid ad- vance of the enemy upon that point. The advance, under Averill in person, thus managed to make their escape across the bridge. There remained in Jackson's hand about two hundred pri- soners, Averill continued his retreat to Pocahontas county. On the 22d December he wrote to the War Department at "Washington : "My command has marched, climbed, slid and swam three hundred and fifty miles since the 8th instant." THE NORTH CAROLINA SWAMPS. We have referred in this chapter to the occult romances of warfare in the Trans-Mississippi. Put there was a district much nearer the capital of the Confederacy, to which all eyes were turned to witness certain thrilling scenes, a drama of cruelty such as the world had seldom seen, even in the wars and outrages of barbarians. We refer to the north-eastern parts of North Carolina. In Camden and Currituck counties, and in the country lying generally between Franklin on the Plackwater and the Roan- oke river, a series of atrocities was committed by the enemy at which the blood runs cold. It is difficult to find words of de- scription for the pictures of the wild and terrible consequences of the negro raids in this obscuie theatre of the war. The country was traversed by negro banditti ; they burned houses ; they entered the parlors of their masters ; they compelled ladies 172 THE THIRD YICAR OF THE WAE. •to entertain them on the piano, cursed and abused them, stripped them of tlieir jewehy and clothing, and offered them indignities which it would offend delicacy to describe. The fiat seemed to have gone forth for stern and terrible work on the North Carolina frontier, in thi^ dark and melan- choly country of swamps, overrun with negro banditti, and now the especial theatre of the war's vengeance. The country was a rich one, comparing favorably with the Mississippi bot- toms, and one of th# most important sources of meat supplies which was at this time accessible to our armies. To protect this country as far as possible, forces were raised, under autho- rity of the Government of North Carolina, for local defence and to repel invasion ; they were duly organized, and their officers were commissioned by the governor, and for a year or more had been in the regular service of the State. The Yankees found it convenient to designate these forces as "guerillas," in order to justify the fiendish warfare of negro partisans and white banditti, who were invited to prey upon the population. In December, a force of negroes, under the command of Brigadier-general Wild, who emulated the brutal disposition and ferocious cowardice of his master, " Beast " Butler, invaded the north-eastern parts of North Carolina. In the county of Pasquotank, forty miles from Norfolk, he hung Daniel Bright at his own house. lie seized more than one hundred thousand dollars' worth of personal property in the adjoining counties; stripped the farmers of every living thing, and brought it all away, leaving hundreds of inhabitants without a pound of meat or a peck of meal. Daniel Bright was a member of the Sixty-second Georgia regiment, under command of Colonel J. R. Grifiin, and had received authority from the Governor of North Carolina to raise a company in the county for local defence. Failing in the effort, he had retired to his farm, and was there seized, car- ried off and executed. lie was hung on the side of the public road, and a placard fiistened upon his back. But the most brutal of all the outrages of Wild was the seiz- ure, as " hostages " for two of his negroes who had been cap- tured, of two most respectable married ladies, Mrs. Phoebe Munden, wife of Lieutenant W. J. Munden, and Mrs. Eliztibetli THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. 173 Weeks, wife of Private Fender "Weeks, of Captain John T. Elliot's company. The first was arrested at her own house, in the presence only of her three children, of whom the oldest was ten years of age, conveyed a few miles to Elizabeth City, con- lined in a room Avithout tire, bed or bedding, with several male prisoners, and tied by the feet and hands. A negro guard was placed in charge of the prisoners. The succeeding day, the other lady, Mrs, Weeks, was placed in the same room. They were constantly guarded, and neither was allowed to leave the room for the most necessary duty, but in conjpany with an armed negro soldier. Mrs. Munden was in delicate health, and foi'ced from a home immediately laid in ashes, with all it con- tained, without other apparel than she wore upon her person, and passed several nights in the cheerless and cold apartment to which she was confined at that inclement season, before the humanity of her captors was so far softened as to permit blankets to be furnished for her use. They were kept some days and then removed to Norfolk. When Mrs. Mnnden was carried off, her wrists were bleeding with the stricture of the cord with which she was bound, and it is said that a negro was allowed by Wild to hold the cord that bound her, and thus drive her into Norfolk. Such were the scenes which illustrated the Yankee idea of prosecuting the war with " vigor," and gratified the vile and cowardly revenge of those who, in luxurious cities and com- fortable homes, clamored for the blood of " rebels," and even claimed women and children as their victims. 174 THE THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. CHAPTER YIII. The Trosident's Dcclimition to tlic Confederate Congress of 1803-64.— "Want of Capacity" in the Confederate Authorities.— Character of Jetferaon Davis.— Official Sliiftlessnesa at Richmond.— Early Prognostications of the War. — The " Statesuian- ship" of the Confederates. — Ludicrous Errors of Confederate Leaders. — What "King Cotton" inigiit luive done. — Gross Mismanagement of tiie Confederate Finances. — Mr. Mciiiniiiiger's Mahulministration. — The Moral Evils of an P>.\panded Currency. — The Military Situation in December. — Secretary Seddon's Shameful Confession. — "De- inagogueism" in the Confederate War Depiirtmont.— Seddon's Propositions. — Military " Substitutes." — An Act of Perfidy. — Bullying in Congress. — Spirit of the Confederate Sohlierv. — Lincoln's " Pkaok Puoclamation." — Its Stupidity, Insolence, and Out- rage. — How tlie Confederates Keplied to it. — A New Appeal Against " Kecou- struction.'' — The Slavekv Qukstion in the- Wak. — A French Opinion. — The Abolitionists Unmasked. — Decay of European Syinpathy with Them. — Review of Lincoln's " Enunicipation" Policy. — The Arming of the Blacks. — The Negro Coloni- zation Schemes. — Experiments of New England "Civilization" in Louisiana. — Frightful Mortality of " Freedtncii." — The Appalling Statistics of Emancipation. — The Contraband Camps in the Mississijipi Valley. — Pictures of Yankee Philanthropy. — "Slavery" Tested by the War. — The Confederates the True Friends of the Africiiu Laborer. — The System of Negro ^'ervilinie in the Confederacy. — The " War-to-the- Knife" Party in the North. — IIistokv of the "Retaliation" Policy. — The Outrages of Yankee Warfare. — President Davis's Sentimentalism. — Tlie Record of his Unpar- donable and Unparalleled Weaki\css. — A Peep into Yankee Prisons. — The Torture- Houses of the North. — Captain Morgan's Experience Among "the Convict-Drivers." • — President Davis's Bluster. — His Two Faces. — Moral Effects of Submission to Yankee Outrage. — The Rival Administrations in December 1SG3. — Richmond and Washing- ton. — Mr. Lincoln's Gaiety. — Now Issues for the Confederacy. At tlie meeting of the Confederate Congress, in December, 1863, President Davis said: "We now know that the only reliable hope for peace is in the vigor of our resistance, while the cessation of their [the enemy'sj hostility is only to be ex- pected from the pressure of their necessities." The Confederate Administration had at last arrived at the correct comprehension of the war. But it had reached this conclusion only after a period of nearly three years of ignorance, short-sighted conceit and perversity. The careful and candid reader of the pages of two volumes of the history of the war, by this writer, will bear him witness that at no time has he reflected upon the patriotism or the public integrity of President Davis. The accusation, which THE TIlIRn YEAR OF THE WAK. 175 « lias run tlirougli these volumes, is simply this : want of capacity ill the administration of public ati'airs. It is not possible that any historian of this war can overlook certain admirable qualities of the President of the Confederacy : his literary abilities, his spruce English, his ascetic morals, the purity of his private life, and the extraordinary facility of his manners. But he was not a statesman ; he had no administra- tive capacities; he lacked that indispensable and practical element of success in all political administrations — knowledge of the true value of men ; and he was — probably, unconscious- ly througli his vanity — accessible to favorites. In the old gov- ernment, Mr. Davis had never been accounted as a statesman, but was quite as obtuse as most of the public men of that day. He it was, of Southern politicians, who declared in a public letter, in 1858, that the "Kansas Conference bill" was "the triumph of all for which we contended." He had failed to sec the origin and occasion of the revolution which he assumed to conduct. His choice of favorites in the Held had been as unapt as his selection of political advisers in the Cabinet. This President, who depreciated Price as a militiaman, and held (or i)robal)ly ati'ected) a light opinion of I'eauregard, was convinced that Peniberton was a genius who should be raised by a single stroke of patronage I'roni the obscurity of a major to the posi- tion of a Lieutenant-general ; recognized Hetli as a young Napoleon; selected Lovell as the natural guardian of the Mississippi ; declared that Holmes, M'ho had let the enemy slip out of his lingers at llichmond, was the appointed deliverer of Missouri and Arkansas, and competent to take charge of the destinies of an empire ; and prophesied with peculiar emphasis of mystery, but a few weeks before the session of Congress, in a public speech in a Southern city, that Bragg by that time would be in the heart of Tennessee, and on the pinnacles of victory ! The civil administration of Mr. Davis had fallen to a low ebb. There are certain minds which cannot see how want of capacity in our government, official shiftlessne&s and the mis- management of public aifairs yet consist with the undeniable facts of the successes of our arms and the great achievements of the Confederacy. But it is possible that these two conditions 176 THE TIIIKD YEAK OF THE WAR. may consist — that, in a revolution, the valor and deterniinatioii of a i)e()2)lc may make considerable amends for the faults of its governors. If the history of this war lias proved one proposi- tion clearly it is this: that in all its subjects of congratulation, the "statesmanship'' of llichmond has little part or lot. Let those who deny the justice of this historical judgment, which refuses to attribute to the official authorities of this government such success as we have had in this war, say what they have contributed to it. The evidences of the " statesmanship'' of Eichmond were not to be found in our foreign relations : these were absurdities. They were not to be found in our provisions for the war : these were make-shifts from month to month. They were not to be found in our financial calculations : these had proved the most ridiculous failures in the monetary annals of the world. We owe this melancholy confession to history, that we do not know of any real and substantial particuhirs in which the administration of Mr. Davis has contributed to this war. The reverse of the proposition need not be repeated here. It is mortifying, indeed, to look back upon the currents of our history, to observe the blindness and littleness of mind, the conceit, the perversity, the short-sighted management on all which Ave have drifted into this present vastness of war and depths of distress. In Montgomery, at the period of the pro- visional inauguration of the Confederacy, any one who had the hardihood to insist upon the probability of a war, became a butt of raillery or the object of suspicion. The war once be- gun, the next idea in the minds of the Confederate leaders was, that it was to be despatched in a few months by mere make- shifts of armies and money, and with the scant su2)ply of munitions already on hand. Months intervened between Lin- coln's declaration of war and the actual establishment of the blockade. But no jise was made of this golden opportunity, and our importations of army supplies from Europe during all these months, actually may be counted in a few thousand stand of small arms. Secretary Mallory laughed off contractors in New Orleans, who offered to sell to the government a largo amount of navy supplies. Judah P. Benjamin, at the head of the War Department, wrote to a friend in the first winter of the war, that within sixty days the country would be at peace. THE THIRD YEAU OF THE WAR. 177 Later still, in the winter of 18G2, President Davis, in a speech before the Lcgishitnre of Missi8sip]>i, had pronounced the solemn opinion that the war would soon come to an end. Yet we find the same eminent personage now declaring to the Congress of 1803, his belief in an indefinite prolongation of the war, and his des])air of his many brilliant former prospects of peace, through instrumentalities other than that of our arms. Able and candid journals of the North, have repeatedly con- fessed that they were puzzled by the extraordinary want of foresight and judgment displayed by the Confederate leaders, in their calculation at different periods of the war of the course likely to be pursued by Europe and the North. These errors might have been expected from men of little education, to whom selfinterest in its lowest sense was the key to all politi- cal problems, but by no means from persons who had studied politics in books. "The notion," said the New York Timas^ " that the North, being a commercial community, devoted to the pursuit of gain, was, for that reason, sure not to fight, was rather the conclusion of a backwoodsman tlian of a student. The lesson of history is that commercial communities arc among the most pugnacious and ambitious and most obstinate of belligerents : witness Carthage, Yenice, Genoa, Holland, and England." The utter failure of the calculations of the Confederate Ad- ministration, regarding France and England, had exhibited a liasty and i)assionate reasoning, of which Mr. Davis and his associates might well be ashamed. The idea is ludicrous now that at the very beginning of the American revolution, France and England, with their centuries of vast and varied experi- ence, in peace and war, would fling themselves into a convul- sion which their great politicians easily saw was the most tremendous one of modern times. Yet this idea was enter- tained by President Davis ; and as proof of it, the Confederate commissioners were instructed to apply to Earl Eussell for recognition in England after the first battle of Manassas ! At the commencement of the war, cotton was pronounced " King ;" and the absurd and ])uerile idea was put forward by the politicians of the Davis school, that the great and illustri- ous power of England would submit to the ineflable humilia- tion of acknowledging its dependency on the infant Confed- 13 178 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAK. eracy of the Soutli, and the subserviency of its empire, its political interests, and its pride, to a single article of trade that was grown in America ! And what indeed is the sum of advantages which the Confederacy drew from the royal re- sources of cotton ? It is true that these resources could not compel the political interests and pride of England. But, properly used, they might have accomplished much for the interests of the Confederacy. In point of fact the}'^ accom- plished nothing. For one year after the war commenced, the blockade was so slight that the whole of the cotton might have been shipped to Europe, and there sold at two shillings ster- ling a pound, giving the government, purchasing at twenty cents, a clear profit of six hundred millions of dollars ! We may even suppose one-fifth of this captured by the enemy, and we would still have had a balance in our favor, which would have enabled us to have drained every bank in Europe of its specie ! Or if we had drawn for this sum as we needed it, our treasury notes would have been equal to gold, and confidence in our currency would have been unshaken and universal. The Confederacy had thus the element at ready hand for the structure of one of the most successful schemes of finance in the world. But the government was too grossly ignorant to see it. The purchase of the cotton to the government was decried by Mr. Memminger, as a scheme of " soup-house legis- lation ;" and the new government was started without a basis of credit ; without a system of revenue ; on the monstrous de- lusion that money might be manufactured at will out of paper, and that a naked " promise to pay," was all sufficient for the wants of the war! It is to be frankly admitted that the South commenced the war \v\\\\ financial advantages which the Korth did not have — ■ that is, without reference to commercial incidents of the block- ade, but with respect to the sustention of its credit at home. The South had the cotton and the tobacco. It had the un- bounded sympathies of its people. It had larger taxable values per capita than any other country in the world. It is not pos- sible that with these advantages it could have wrecked its credit with its own people, unless through a great want of capacity in the administration of the government. It is not possible, that, with these advantages, its currency should have THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 179 declined with its own people ten times faster than that of the North with its people, unless through a gross mismanagement of public affairs. These are logical conclusions which are not to be disputed. At the organization of the permanent government of the Confederacy, in February, 1862, President Davis had made the most extravagant congratulations to the country, on our financial condition in comparison with that of the North. In less than eighteen months thereafter, when gold was quoted in New York at twenty-five per cent, premium, it was selling in Richmond at nine hundred per cent, premium ; and by the time that the Confederate Congress met, in December, 1863, gold in Richmond was worth about two thousand per cent, premium, and was publicly sold, one for twenty in Confeder- ate notes ! Such had been the results of the financial wisdom of the Confederacy. It had been dictated by the President, who advised Congress (as late as August, 1862) to authorize illimitable issues of treasury notes, without fear of their depre- ciation, and aggravated, no doubt, by the ignorance of his secretary, who invented the legerdemain of "funding," that had given the last stab to the currency, and who opened the doors of the treasury to brokers, blockade-runners, and the vast tribes of those who lived on the depreciation of the public credit.* * The experiments of Mr. Memminger on the currency was the signal of multiplied and rapid depreciation. While the eccentric and pious Secretary %vas figuring out impossible schemes of making money, or ransacking the book- stores for works on religious controversy, unprincipled brokers in the Confed- eracy were undermining the currency with a zeal for the destruction of their country not less than that of the Yankees. The assertion admits of some quali- fication. Sweeping remarks in history are generally unjust. Among those engaged in the business of banking and exchange in the South, there were undoubtedly some enlightened and public-spirited men who had been seduced by the example or constrained by the competition of meaner and more avari- cious men of the same profession, to array themselves against the currency, and to commit offences from which they would have shrunk in horror, had they not been disguised by the casuistry of commerce and gain. It was generally thought in the South reprehensible to refuse the national currency in the payment of debts. Yet the broker, who demanded eighteen or twenty dollars in this currency for one in gold, really was guilty of so many times refusing the Confederate money. It was accounted shocking for citizens in the South to speculate in soldiers' clothing and bread. Yet the broker, who 180 TIIK THIRD YKAR OF TIIK WAR. Of Sill tlic features of niuladniinistration in the Confederacy, |. Avliich we liave unwilliuii^ly traced, that of the currency was, certainly, the most marked, and, perhaps, the most vital. Nothing could bo more absurd than the faith of Mr. Davis and Ml". Moinininger in the virtues of paper money, and no cm})iricisin more ignorant and destructive than that which made the mere emission of paper issues a system of revenue. In the old government, we had had many emphatic lessons on the subject of pa})er money. Indeed, it is a curious and inter- esting fact, that in sixty years of our past history, the banking demanded twenty prices for gold, the representative of all values, speculated alike in every necessary in the country. Nor was this the greatest of their oflences. With unsurpassed shamolessncss, brokers in the Confederacy ex- pensed the currency of the North for snle, and demanded for it ten hundred per cent, premium over that of the Confederacy 1 This act of benefit to the Yan- kees was openly allowtxl by the government. A bill liad been introduced in Congress to prohibit tliis traffic and to extirpate this infamous anomaly in our history ; but it failed of enactment, and its failure can only be attributed to the grossest stupidity, or to sinister influences of the most dislionorable kind. The traflic was immensely profitable. State bonds and bank bills to the amovmt of many millions wivre sent North by the brokers, and the rates of discount were readily sulnnitttHl to when the returns were made in Yankee jiaper money, ■which, in Kichmond shops, was worth in Confedcn-ate notes ten dollars for one. One — but only one — cause of tho depreciation of the Confed(>rate currency •was illicit trade. It had d(Uie more to demoralize the Ciuif'ederacy than any thing else. The inception of this trade was easily winked at by the Confed- erate authorities; it commenced with i)altry importations across tho Potomac; it was said the country wanted nuvlieines, surgical instruments, and a number of trifles, and that trade Avith the Yankees in these could result in no serious harm. But by tlu^ enlarged license of the government it soon became an infa- my and a curse to tlit> (^mfederacy. Wluit was a petty traffic in its commence- ment soon expanded into a shauK^less trade, which corrupti-d the patriotis-m of the coimtry, constituted an anomaly in the history of belligt>rents, and reflected lasting disgrace upon the honesty and good st>nse of our government. Tho country had taken a solemn resolution to burn the cotton in advance of tho enemy ; but the conflagration of this staple soon came to be a rare event ; instead of being committed to the flames it was spirited to Yankee markets. Nor were these operations always disguised. Some commercial houses in the Confederacy counted their gains by millions of dollars since the war, througli tho favor of the government in allowing them to exixnrt cotton at pleasure. The beneficiaries of this trade contributed freely to public cliarities, and did certain fiivors to the government ; but their gifts were but the parings of im- mense gains ; and often those who were named by weak and cr(>dulous people or by interested flatterers as public-spirited citizens and patriotic donors, were, in fact, the mo.st' unmitigated extortioners and the vilest leeches on the bodj politic. — " TliC Second Year of the ]Yar," — pp. 304, 805. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 181 institutions of America had been, more or less, in a state of suspension for one-third of the time. But despite the protest of liistorical facts, against all sys- tems of i)uper expansion, Mr. Memminger had succeeded by the time of the meeting of Congress, in putting afloat some seven hundred millions of currency ; although at another time, he himself had declared that the business of the country could not conveniently absorb more than one hundred and lifty mil- lions.* And even that estimate of absorption was ridiculously excessive. It was so for this particular reason : that in tlio state of war, with its commerce cut off by the blockade, with no merchant ships, with few manui'uctures, with few enter- prises open to capital, the South afforded but little scope for the profitable employment of its currency. The difficulty was that of stagnant capital, as well us that of an expanded cur- rency. At least one reason for the comparative financial prosperity of ihc North, during the war, was its capacity of absorbing large amounts of curieney in the various functions of its active commercial life : in its trade open with all the world ; in its Bhijt[)ing whitening every sea; in its immense internal trade, borne over immense lines of railroad and navigable waters ; in its manufactures, enjoying the monopoly given them by a tariff, which shut out foreign competition ; in its stocks, which made fortunes by the million in Wall street. f * Befor(5 tlie war the i)apc;r money of tlic wliole country, North and Houtli, was two hundred and twelve uuUionH ; the gold and silver, nay one hundred and fifty niiliionK — total circulation, tliree hundnd and aixty-two millions. f The hey-day of " Wall street" is thus dcRcribed in a New York paper (August, 180:3) : " Stocks have advanced on an average fully three hnndred per c(int. For example, tluj Erie formerly sold for five ; it is now one liundred and twenty. The Galena and otlier roads of the same kind, which w<;re down to thirty and forty, are now up to one lumdred and thirty and one hundred and forty. The Ilarlem railroad, that nobody would take at six, has risen to one liundred and seventy. Formerly the average rec(>ipts of the Erie railroad were five millions ; now they are eleven millions. The receipts of the New York Central formerly averaged scvcin millions ; now they average eleven and a half millions. Formerly the Hudson River never could pay its dc^bts ; this y<-ar it is making thirty p(!r cent. The Fort Wayne road formerly received two and a half iriillions annually ; its receipts this year are five millions. The Central Illinois increased its receijits last week, by fifty tliousand dollars, and it will earn this mouth four hundred thousand dollars." 182 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAK. But tlie agricultural South was inundated with a currency for which there was no outlet except in that pernicious and un- productive speculation whose sphere of trade is within itself, and whose operations can be only those of engrossing and ex- tortion. The evils of the expanded currency of the Confede- racy, were not only financial ; they were also moral. The su- perabundance of paper money was the occasion of a wild speculation, which corrupted the patriotism of the country ; in- troduced extravagance and licentiousness into private life; be- stowed fortune upon the most undeserving ; and above all, bred the most grave and dangerous discontents in the army. As long as there was a spirit of mutual sacrifice and mutual ac- commodation in the war, our soldiers were content and cheer- ful. But when they had to compare their condition — the hard- ships of the camp ; the pittance of eleven dollars a month, that could scarcely buy a pair of socks ; the poverty of the dear home left behind them — with the easy and riotous wealth of those who had kept out of the army merely to wring money out of the necessity and distress of the country ; who, in snug shops in Bichmond, made thousands of dollars a day, or, by a single stroke of speculation, became rich for life ; it is not to be wondered, that bitter conclusions should have been drawn from the contrast, and that the soldier should have given his bosom to the bullets with less alacrity and zeal, when he re- flected that his martyrdom was to protect a large class of men grown rich on his necessities, and that too, with the compliance and countenance of the Government he defended ! At the period of the assembling of Congress, the military situation in the Confederacy, which in the early part of 1S63 had encouraged, not without apparent reasons, hopes of an early and honorable peace, had become overshadowed, critical, and, to some extent, truly alarming. At the time of the fall of Yicksburg, the enemy had also obtained an important and per- manent success in Arkansas. The greater portion of the South- west he had now overrun. Missouri^ Kentucky and North- western Yii-giuia, were exclusively occupied by the forces of the enemy. North Carolina, South Carolina and Alabama, were partially invaded by him. He had passed the barrier of the Cumberland mountains, established his dominion in East Tennessee, and from his lines in the central West, now THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 183 hoped to inundate South Carolina, Georgia, and South Al- abama, 111 the face of this critical military situation, came the as- tounding disck>sure from the Confederate Secretary of War, Mr. James Seddon, that the efiective force of the army was " not mure than a half, never two-thirds of the soldiers in the ranks/' In stating this deplorable fact, the Secretary avoided attrib- uting it to its paramount causes — the fault of his own ad- ministration ; the remissness of discipline ; the weak shunning of the death-penalty in our armies, and that paltry quackery which proposed to treat the great evil of desertion with " proclamations" and patriotic appeals. He did what was worse than this insincerity ; for he proposed to repair that evil of absenteeism, which the government itself had occa- sioned, by new and violent measures to replenish the army. These were an extension of the conscription, which endangered the exhaustion of the military reserves of the country ; the ex jpost facto annulment of all contracts for substitution, which was to the scandal of the moral world, and to the lively dis- satisfaction of more than seventy thousand persons, many of whom were indispensable in civil employments and by their wealth and social position, commanded an influence which the government could not afford to despise ;— and, to crown all, the supersedure of all exemptions by a system of details in the War Department, which would have transferred the question of all relief with respect to the burdens of the war, from the proper constitutional jurisdiction and collective wisdom of Congress, to the exclusive discretion, caprice or malice of a single official.* * There is u, little piece of official history which may be properly given here. On the 8th of January, 18154, Mr. Dargan, of Alabama, referred in the House of Representatives to " ads of merciless crudty" on the part of the authorities, with reference to exemptions, which it was then proposed, by a certain dema- gogical bill in the House, to entrust exclusively and omnijiotently to the Ex- ecutive. He illustrated the epithets applied by an instance where a man liad been mercilessly put in the military service, who had never walked and never been able to walk a quarter of a mile in any one day in his life,, and all the ef- forts made by Mr. Dargan with the Secretary of War to procure his release had so far been unavailing. Yet it appears, from a certain record, that the sajne official who had been so 184 THE TIIIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. Sncli measures were finished pieces of demagoguism. The various propositions made to Congress for further military- drafts, at the exj^ense of the public faith and the gravest in- terests of the citizen and producer, were calculated to find favor, of course, in the army, which, as designing politicians knew, contained the great body of voters in the country, and was destined to hold the balance of political power in the Con- federacy. The vice of our public men Avas an inordinate passion for an ephemeral and worthless popularity. The entire legislation of the country, Confederate and State, was demoralized by a pe- culiar demagoguism. All the legislative bodies of the coun- try were filled with schemes of agrarianism for the benefit of the soldier, and assaults on the most important civil rights exacting to the cripple, and who solicited from Congress plenary powers on the subject of exemptions, had given, over his own name, a special, secret exemp- tion to a man who professed to him that he was writing a history of the war ; in which it was, of course, expected that Sir. James Seddon would be one of the figure-heads in the gallery of cc^lebrities. This little piece of nefarious traffic in an official's vanity is of record : else it might be doubted whether, even in our Democratic system, a man occupying Mr. ISeddon's position could be so easily and shamefully used. We copy the extraordinary paper below, omitting the name of its beneficiary, because it is not necessary to history, and because we are anxious to spare all private feelings which are not materially involved in a public issue : Confederate States op America,] War Department, EiciiMOND, October 20, 1863. Mr. , not being a native or naturalized citizen of the Confederacy, AND MOREOVER, being engaged in compiling a icurk of interest to our people, and ad- vantageous to our cause, is exempt until further orders from conscription. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War. Of this curious paper two remarks are to be made : 1. If Mr. had relied for exenii)tion upon his alienage (a plea we must suppose him unwilling to admit, after his literary exploits for the Confederacy), then it was quite unnecessary for the Secretary to assign " moreover" his lite- rary adventure as a c^vuse of exemption. 2. If Mr. had relied for exemption upon his alienage, it was not for the Secretary of War, but for the consular authority of the courts, to give hin> the benefit of that plea. This record may appear to be a small matter for history. It is not : it is one evidence, selected because it is indisputable, of the spirit that is fast reducing the administration of the Confederate affairs to schools of demagoguism and paltry inventions of personal vanity. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 186 and interests at the instance of the blind passions of the army. The annulment, by the Confederate Congress, of contracts heretofore concluded for military substitutes, was an act of un- paralleled infamy. In nuiking the assertion, that the substitu- tion was not a contract, but a privilege accorded by the au- thorities, the government adoj)ted the argument of the despot : to this elfect, that the rights of the people is the jjleasure of the sovereign, to be enjoyed with becoming humility. In assum- ing to break the contract as to the principal, and, at the same time, maintain it in force against the substitute, the govern- ment stultified itself, and violated the plainest and justest of legal maxims, that a contract broken on one side, is broken on all sides. In atteinjiting this violence in the face of the admit- ted fact, that nearly half of the army were out of the ranks, the government avoided the plain duty of replenishing the army with these absentees ; proi)Osed to replace seasoned vete- rans by raw malcontents ; and, for a nominal accession to its military forces, to sacrifice recorded i)ledges ; to wound the confidence and affections of the people ; and to perpetrate a great moral evil, for which the compensation in any practical benefit was utterly disproportionate. If such an act of ])erfidy had been accomplished by the Lin- coln govenmient, the Southern newspapers would have ex- claimed against it as an unecpudled example of despotism. But when it was perpetrated by their own governmen't, South- ern journals, with few honorable exceptions, were base enough to sustain or disguise it; and one Southern Senator, at least — a man of the name of Brown — was ready in his ofiicial seat, and in the security of his own exemption from military ser- vice, to bully the people with an insufi'erable insolence, and to flourish from the shelter of his parliamentary position, the vul- gar and detestable threat of "military power." But it is not necessary to pursue here the legislation of the Confederate Congress on military subjects. We have forborne to say here that the condition of our arms was desperate : it was critical, but there was no real occasion for despair, or for that violent anxiety which approaches it. There was yet much room for hope. We have stated that the amount of absentee- ism in the army was, at least in great part, the fault of the au- 186 TIIIC TIIIKD YEAU OF TIIIC WAR. tliorities, and it is therefurc not to be taken as the indication of decay in the spirit of our soldiery. That spirit was yet brave and resolute. The displacement of Bragg from his conmiand, which was at last unwillingly made by the President, had com- posed a dangerous discontent in the armies of the West, and was the occasion of the re-organization of our forces there, and a reassurance of the spirits of the troops. In Virginia, Lee still held the enemy at bay, and possessed the unanimous and enthusiastic confidence of the country and the army. At Charleston, Beauregard had checked the enemy, broken the line of his successes on the coast, and was advanced even iu liis former reputation as a skilful commander. If the prospect was chequered in the AVest, it was without a serious shadow in the East; and, although a large portion of the Confederacy liad passed into the possession of the enemy, the general condition, at least, externally, was not so serious as when, in 1862, Richmond was threatened, and there were two hund- red and ten thousand Federal soldiers in Virginia alone. LINCOLN S " PEACE PKOCLAMATION. In the mean time there came a new and powerful appeal to the patriotism and resolution of the Confederacy. The Yan- kee Congress had assembled simultaneously with that of the Cont'ederacy, and, for the first time in the war, the conditions upon which })eace would be made with the South were olfici- ally ai\nounced. They were contained in the message and proclamation of Abraham Lincoln.* They were briefly these: * The following are the material portions of this remarkable proclamation : Whereas, In and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that the President shall have power to {:;ive reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment, and Whereas, a rebelUon now exists whereby the loyal State Governments of several States have for a lonj:: time been subverted, and many i)ersons have conmiitted, and are now j;uilty, of treason against tlie United States, and Wliereas, with reference to said rebellion and treason, law^s have boon en- acted by Congress declaring forfeitures and confiscations of property and lib- eration of shives, all upon terms and conditions therein stated; and also declar- ing that the President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proc- Tlllfi THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. 187 the forcible emancipation of the slaves; the perpetuity of con- fiscations ; pardon on condition of an oath of allegiance to the government, to the Union, and to the Abolition party of the North; the excei)tion from this pardon of all important ranks in the army, and conditions in political life; and finally, the monstrous republican anomaly that one-tenth of the voters in any of the Confederate States, declaring for these terms, "should be recognized as the true government of the State." In pro- lamation, to extend to persons who may liave participated in tlio existing rebel- lion in any State, or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions, and at sucli times, and on such conditions as bo may deem expedient for the public well'aro, and Wliereas, the Congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon accords witli the well-established judicial exposition of the pardoning power, and Whereas, with reference to the said rebellion the President of the United States has issued several proclamations and provisions in regard to the libera- tion of slaves, and Whereas, it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said re- Ixsllion, to assume their allegiance to the United States, and to reinaugurato loyal State Governments within and for their resi)ective States ; Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known to all persons who have directly or by implication particii)ated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with rest(jr- ation of all rights of property except as to slaves, and in proj)erty cases where the rl(//it.H of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the con- dition that ev(^ry such person shaU take and subscribe an oath, and tlicnce- forward keep and maintain such oath inviolate, and which oath shall bo reg- istered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect follow- ing, to wit : " I, , do solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully sujjijort, ])rotect, and dt^fend the Constitution of the Uni- ted States and the Union of the States thereunder, and that I will in like man- ner abide by u.nd faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the ex- isting rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modi- fied, or held void by Congress or by decision of the Supremo Court, and that I will, in like mann(!r, abide and faithfully support all })roclamation3 of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so ftir as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God." The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all who are or shall have been civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government ; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid in the rebellion ; all who are or shall have been military or naval otlicers of said so-called Confederate Government above the rank of Colonel in 188 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. posing these utterly infamous terms, this Yankee monster of inhumanity and falsehood had the audacity to declare, that in some of the Confederate States the elements of reconstruction, were ready for action ; that those who controlled them differ- ed, however, as to the plan of action ; and that, " by the pro- clamation, a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as a rally 171 g jpoint, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here." This insulting and brutal proposition of the Yankee govern- ment was the apt response to those few cowardly factions which in I^ortli Carolina, and in some parts of Georgia and Alabama, hinted at " reconstruction." It was as the sound of a trumpet to every brave man in the South to meet and to contest a question of life and death. Appeals had formerly been made in the Confederacy against "reconstruction," on such arguments as the conduct of the enemy in the war; his political prostitution; his vandalism; and sentimental motives of vengeance. There were truth and eloquence in those ap- peals. But now there was another added to them which the army, of Lieutenant in the navy ; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion : All who resigned commissions in the army or navy of the United States, and afterwards aided the rebellion, and all who have engaged in any way in treat- ing colored persons or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, who have been found in the United States service as sol diers, seamen, or in any other capacity. And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known, that wheneA'er, in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Ala- bama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such States, at the Presidential election of the year of our Lord, 1860, each having taken the oath aforesaid, and not having since violated it, and \)eing a qualified voter by the election law of the State existing immediately before the so- called act of secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State Government, which shall be republican, and in no wise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true Government of the State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefit of the Constitutional provision which declares that " The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republi- can form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, when the Legislatm'e can- not be convened, against domestic violence." THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 189 addressed ns not onlj in our passions, bnt in every fibre of our selfishness, and in every ramification of our interests. It was the authoritative exposition to the South of the consequences of its submission. These could no longer be misconstrued : they were gibbets, proscription, universal poverty, the sub- version of our social system, a feudal allegiance to the Aboli- tionists and the depths of dishonor. THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE WAR. The proclamation of President Lincoln was made under cer- tain aft'ectations of benevolent zeal for the negro. He declared that his former " emancipation" proclamation had " much im- proved the tone of public sentiment in foreign countries," and he insisted that to abandon it would be to the negro " a cruel and astounding breach of faith." In view of these pretensions, it is not out of place here to make a brief summary of the true questions of the war, and its real relations to negro slavery in the South. A French pamj^hlet on the American war, published at Paris, holds the following language: "The pride of the North will never stoop to admit the superiority of Southern men ; and yet it is from these that the Union drew its best statesmen and a majority of its presidents. The pride of the North will bend only to necessity, because it has not kept pace with the progress of the age. To-day the Americans of the North are as completely foreign to the family of nations as they were twenty years ago. They understand nothing but the narrowest and most mechanical mercantilism, the art of purchase and sale ; and they long to annihilate the Confederate States in order that the South, by its intelligence, its enterprise, and the talent of its statesmen, may not throw down the rampart it has built up against Europeanism The Federals are so well aware of this that the war which they are waging is really and mainly a war of interest. The pro- ducing, agricultural South was the commercial vassal of the North, which insists upon keeping its best customer : emanci- pation is merely a skilful device for entrapping the sympathies of European liberalism The Northern idea of the 190 THE TlllUn YKAR OF THE WAR. abolition of slavery by making the negro food for powder, or l)y exiling him from liis home to die of hunger, is now thoroughly understood in Europe. Our notions of philanthropy and our moral sense alike revolt from these ferocious exagger- ations of the love of liberty." The above is an admirable summary of the questions of the war — especially of the '"slavery question.'''' There is no doubt that the Anti-Slavery party in the North had, through the violence of its measures, and the exposure of its hollow pretensions for the negro, lost much of that sympathy in Europe which it had formerly obtained ; while the war had also given occasion to intelligent persons in all parts of the world for a more thorough, a more interested, and a more practical study of slavery in the South, The old stories which the newspapers of the enemy revived of fiendish masters in the South, and pandemoniums on the cotton plan- tations, had now come to be objects of scepticism or derision in Europe. In connection with the subject of the relations of slavery to the war, it becomes interesting to inquire what real benefits to the negro were accomplished by the political measures of the Lincoln government. The famous " emancipation" proclama- tion extended "freedom" to the negro merely to subjectt him to a worse fate, and to transfer him from the peaceful service of the plantation to that of the military camp. It was followed by various acts of Congress to enlist the negro in the military service. It was stated by Mr. Seward, in a diplomatic circu- lar, dated August the 12th, 1863, that nearly seventy thousand negroes were at that time employed in the Yankee armies, of whom twenty-two thousand were actually bearing arms in the field ; and at a later date (that of the meeting of the Yankee Congress in December), the whole number of these African allies of the North was said to exceed one hundred thousand. The employment, as soldiers, against the Confederacy, of this immense number of blacks, was a brutality and crime in sight of the world ; it was the ignoring of civilization in warfare; it was a savage atrocity inflicted on the South ; — but it, cer- tainly, was no benefit to the negro. It could be no benefit to him that he should be exposed to the fury of the war, and translated from a peaceful and domestic sphere of labor THE THIRD YICAR OF THE WAR. 191 to the hardsliips of the camp and tlic mortal perils of tlio battle-field. The scheme of the colonization of the negro in the invaded districts of the South was alike destitute of benefit to him, and destructive of the white "civilization" under whose auspicics it was conducted. Wherever this new system of labor was intro- duced, the negro suffered, the plantation relapsed into weeds, the garden disappeared, and desolation and ruin took up their abodes. It had converted the rice coasts of South Carolina into barrens. It had been instituted on a grand scale in Louisi- ana. The result was, to use the language of a Yankee writer, this beautiful State was fast becoming "an alligator pleasure- ground." AVhere formerly had flourished rich and teeming l)lantations, were to be seen here and there some show of cultivation, some acres of corn and cane; but these were "government" jdantations ; the able-bodied negroes had been forced into the Yankee military service, and a few aged and shiftless negroes, who poked lazily through the weed-growth, were the only signs of labor in the vast districts occupied by the enemy. In Louisiana, where the Yardcees had indulged Buch hopes of " infusing new life" by free labor and the scien- tific farming of Massachusetts, the development of the country, its return in crops, in wealth, amounted to little more than nothing. The negro had merely exchanged his Southern master for a Massachusetts shoe-maker, who was anxious to become a Louisiana sugar-maker. His condition was not im- proved, his comforts were decreased ; and the country itself, redeemed by the most tedious labors from the waters of the Mississippi, and brought to a point of fertility unexampled in Anu'riean soils, was fast reverting to the original swamp. Louisiana had taken more than fifty years to raise the banks of the Mississippi, to drain and redeem the swamp lands, and to make herself a great producing State. But, said the New York World, "it has required only a few months for the Administration at Washington to prepare the State for its return to its original worthlessness ; to 'restore' it to barbar- ism ; to re-people it, in spots, with half bred bastards; to drive out every vestige of civilization, and to make the paradise of the South a rank, rotten, miasmatic, alligator and moccasin swamp-ground again." 192 THE THIRD TEAK OF THE WAR. The fact is indisputable, that in all the localities of the Con- federacy where the enemy had obtained a foothold, the negroes had been reduced by mortality during the war to not more than one-half their previous number. To this statement, the deliberate assertion of President Davis to the Confederate Congress, we may make an official addition of the most melancholy interest. In the winter of 1863-64, the Governor of Louisiana, in his official message, published to the world the appalling fact, that more negroes had ^perished in Louisiana from the cruelty and hrutality of the jouhlic enemy than the combined number of white men, in both armies, from the casualties of war. In illustration he stated, that when the Confederate forces surprised and cap- tured Berwick's Bay, last summer, they found about two thousand negroes there in a state of the most utter destitution — many of them so emaciated and sick that they died before the tender humanity of the Confederates could be applied to their rescue from death. The fate of these poor wretches was to be attributed to sheer inhumanity. The Yankees had abundant supplies of food, medicines and clothing at hand, but they did not apply them to the comfort of the negro, who, once entitled to the farce of "freedom," was of no more consequence to them than any other beast with a certain amount of useful labor in his anatom3\ The practice of the enemy in the parts of the Confederacy he had invaded, was to separate the families of the blacks without notice. Governor Moore officially testified to this practice in Louisiana. The men were driven off like so many cattle to a Yankee camp, and were enlisted in the Yankee army. The women and children were likewise driven off in droves, and ■ put upon what are called " Government planta- tions" — that is, plantations from which the lawful owners had been forced to fly, and which the Yankees in Louisiana were cultivating. The condition of the negroes at the various contraband camps in the Mississippi valley furnishes a terrible volume of human misery, which may some day be written in the fright- ful characters of truth. Congregated at these depots, without employment, deprived of the food to which they had been ac- THE TIIIKD YEAR OF THE WAK. 193 custoined, and often witliont shelter or medical care, these helpless creatures perished, swept off by pestilence or the cruel- ties of the Yankees. We may take from Northern sources some accounts of these contraband camps, to give the reader a passing picture of what the unhappy negroes had gained by what the Yankees called their " freedom." A letter to a Massachusetts paper said : — •" There are, be- tween Memphis and Natchez, not less than fifty thousand blacks, from among whom have been culled all the able-bodied men for the military service. Thirty-five thousand of these, viz., those in camps between Helena and l^atchez, are furnished the shelter of old tents and subsistence of cheap rations by the Government, but are in all other things in extreme destitution. Their clothing, in perhaps the case of a fourth of this number, is but one single worn and scanty garment. Many children are wrapped night and day in tattered blankets as their sole apparel. But few of all these jDcople have had any change of raiment since, in midsummer or earlier, they came from the abandoned plantations of their masters. Multitudes of them have no beds or bedding — the clayey earth the resting place of women and babes through these stormy winter months. They live of necessity in extreme filthiness, and are afflicted with all fatal diseases. Medical attendance and su})plies are very inadequate. They cannot, during the winter, be disposed to labor and self-support, and compensated labor cannot be procured for them in the camps. They cannot, in their present condition, survive the winter. It is my conviction that, unre- lieved, the half of them will perish before the spring. Last winter, during the months of February, March and April, I buried, at Memphis alone, out of an average of about four thou- sand, twelve hundred of these people, or twelve a day." Another Yankee correspondent wrote as follows respecting the negroes who had come into Vicksburg after the surrender of General Pemberton : — " About the 1st of August the military authorities became alarmed lest a pestilence should break out among them and extend to the army. Peremptory orders were issued to at once remove across the river all negroes, of every age and sex, whether sick or well, who were not in some employment. 13 194 THE TIIIKD YEAR OF TIIK WAK. " One inorniiipj I went out to inform a certain Lieutenant W , wlio, with an inadequate force, was executing tlio order, that one of them in the Baptist church was dead, and that another, a woman, was lying behind a fence, dying. He tokl me tliat lie had detailed, for the purpose of removing the negroes, 20 army wagons ; that he had hauled them, well, sick and dead, with all their traps, to the river, where he had a steamer to convey them across to a point o]>posite the lower part of the city ; that he had one wagon to haul the dead, and that soine days he found as many as twenty ; that in one house he found six dead bodies, with living ones sitting and lying around them, apparently unconscious of their situation. Holes were dug on the river's bank and the dead buried. The search- ing out and removal of these negroes consumed about fifteen or twenty daya. About three hundred were thus removed to the low grounds opposite Vicksburg, and there left in the weeds without a;ny shelter, under the care of a man who was appointed to organize them into a camp, and separate small- pox cases from the rest. " The chaplain told me that these negroes had suffered and were still suffering untold want and wretchedness; that nearly four hundred had died since he had taken charge of them ; that from sixteen to twenty died daily. Sometimes they would crawl off into the w^oods and die, where their bodies would be found only by the stench which arose from their decay. That there was no white man with them but a nephew of his ; that rations were furnished them by the Government, but sometimes he had difficulty in getting them over the river ; that once they were five days without receiving any food, and the negroes in their despair threatened to kill him, thinking the fault was his. lie also stated that they had no tents or shelter except brush to shield them from the sun, or storm, or dews of night. Captain A stated to me that there were in his camp two thousand ; at Young's Point, eight thousand five hundred and fifty-one ; on Papaw Island, where he purposed gathering most of them, two thousand eight hundred ; and on Black's planta- tion, on the Yazoo, two thousand four hundred — in all over sixteen thousand. One morning I went among the wretched masses where they were hauled to the bank of the river, pre- paratory to being sent across. I tried in vain to find some TIIF. rmUT) YKAII OF TIIK WAU. 1 D.') women who wore ahlc to work, ii8 wc wisliod tliolr IhIk*!- :it our liouso. All woro iMtlior Hick or tukinp; cjirc of the nictk. [ 8:iw ii(»lliiii<^ but Olio Hjid nceiio of misery." 'riu! \v:ir had tested Blavery in the Sontli witli resnltH thiit eould iu>t eseupe tlic intelligent attention of the world. While it had exhihited the horrors of "emancipation" on the ono side, it had shown, eople ; for it implied a certain guilt, a certain moral inferiority in the South, of which the enemy had the right to take advantage. It converted the relations be- tween us and our foes to those of the malefactor and the con- stable ; it depressed our sense of right; and it gave to the sol- dier the bitter reflection that his government cared but little for him, in that martyrdom on the gallows or cajitivity in dun- geons with the terrors of which the eneni}' assailed him. Finally, there is this to be said of the rival admim'strations of llichmond and Washington : that if in the former there were to be found many evidences of weakness, these, at least, were not crimes, while if in the latter there were to be seen vigor and decision, they were associated with the insolence of the reprobate and the inhumanity of the savage. If the his- tory of the retaliation policy and other questions which wc have traced, exhibits imbecility on the part of the Confederate authorities, it has this compensation: that it has inseparably connected with it a fearful record of the inhumanity and crime of the enemy. In this conflict, Avhich, as to goverments, was that between the weakly good and the resolutely evil, the people of the Con- federacy had but little to expect from their political authori- ties ; but it was precisely the condition in which they had much to expect from the resources of their own righteous and aroused passions. In connection with his "peace" proclamation, the Yankee President pointed with an air of triumph to the great resources of the North for the prosecution of the war. There was an actual surplus in its treasury. While the Confederacy had 20S THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. t collected only one hundred millions from its tax and revenue system, the receipts of the Yankee treasury were nine hundred millions. The Yankee army was increased. The Yankee navy now numbered nearly six hundred vessels, and seventy- five of them were iron-clads or armored steamers. The Yan- kee political parties had accommodated their diiferences and no lorf^er embarrassed the authorities at Washington. "The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past," said Mr. Lincoln. The Washington government had now a united people, an unexhausted treasury, enlarged military resources, and a con- fidence more insolent than ever. Richmond, in December, 1863, was a sombre city. An air of gloom pervaded the public offices. In Congress, Mr. Foote told his endless story of official corruption and imbecility, and had his savage jokes on "the pepper-doctor from North Caro- lina," who governed the commissariat of the Confederacy. There w^ere no social gaieties, although disreputable balls and gambling "hells" still amused those immoral mobs, at all times inseparable from a metropolis. In the streets there was the perpetual juggle of bargain and sale, apparently uncon- scious of the war, simply because engrossed in individual ava- rice ; the clatter of the auction sales ; the levity of the tho- roughfare. But there was the seriousness of anxiety, if not the gloom of despair, in the home, in the private sanctuary, in the public office — in every place where thoughtful minds contem- plated the future, and looked beyond the circle of the twenty- four hours. Washington was gay, in the mean time, not with thought- Jessness, but with exultations over the prospects of the war, and the promises of its government. Balls, "diamond" wed- dings, presidential levees, social parties, with splendid arrays of silks and jewels, with all the fantasy of %vealth, the inso- lence of licentiousness, and the fashionable commerce of lust, amused the hours. Mr. Lincoln was jocose again. He snapped his fingers at " the rebellion." He attended the theatre night- ly. This piece of human jacquerie chattered incessantly over the success of his schemes. The Northern newspapers indulged the almost immediate prospect of a peace, which was to irra- diate the Yankee arras, humiliate the South, and open the door THE TIIIKD YEAK OF THE WAR. 209 to the prosperity of the conquerors in an indiscriminate plun- der, and the lasting vassalage of the vanquished. The New York Herald declared, that even if this event did not happen in the festivities of the Christmas season of 1863, it would cer- i tainly be celebrated in the early part of the ensuing year. Intelligent men of tlie South, understood the ap- proaching issues. The war w;is to be prosecuted by the Korth with certain important accessions to its former advantages ; and, on the side of the South, there was a demand for a new measure of that devotion in the minds of the people, which wins success on unequal terms — and without which all expe- dients of States, all violence of legislation, and all commands of authority are utterly in vain. 14 210 THE TIIIKD YEAK OF THE WAR. CHAPTEE IX. The Importance of the Winter Campaigns of the "War. — A Scries of KumarkaMe Events. — Eiiconralaced in a flat, and firing up hill, the recoil came almost directly against the axle, and it broke. Still it continued to fire, carrying dismay among the wagoners and the enemy's line. The action lasted about twenty minutes. The squadron on the left charged a Yankee squadron up hill, some on foot lead- ing their horses, and as each one reached the plateau mounted and spurred after the frightened enemy, who fled without making but a feeble resistance. Meanwhile the party behind the fence were routed and fled ; but being too swift for boots and spurs, the cavalry on the pike charged upon them. The immense train, now in a mass of confusion, so blocked the pike as to prevent overtaking the fugitives. The whole train was now in our hands.* * The prize is thus described by a correspondent who participated in the affair : " There stood ninety-three six-nmlo wagons, loaded to the very sheet with commissary stores, new gear, new wagons, new eveiything. Contents, TIIK THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 213 After securing liis prize, Ilosser moved rapidly on to co- operate with Early in the capture of Petersburg. But infor- mation of the advance had been received, and the garrison evacuated the ])lace during the night. They liad powerful works and six pieces of cannon, and, if they had been less cowardly, might have given us a terrible reception. Ilosser, when he had discovered the escape of the Yankees, wheeled and moved n])on the railroad, destroying two bridges — one over Patterson creek, the other the North Branch of the Potomac. The expedition got back safely into the valley. Posser brought off two hundred and seventy prisoners, fifty wagons and teams, twelve hundred cattle and five hundred sheep. PICKETT 8 EXPEDITIO^f AGAINST NEWBERN. The town of Newbern, situated at the junction of the Trent and Neuse, was a place of some note in North Carolina. Soon after the fall of lioanoke Island, on the 14th day of February, 1862, it fell into the hands of the Yankees, since which time it had been in their possession, and had been the seat of some of their most important military operations. Immediately after occupation, extensive fortifications were erected, and the lines extended over some twenty miles of surrounding country. The regiments stationed here had been composed principally of men from Massachusetts and New' York, the blackest of Abolitionists, full of schemes and plans for negro emancijjation, equalization and education. Negro regiments had been organ- ized ; companies of disloyal Carolinians put in service against us; the most tyrannical rule established; and both men and cfiicers had been guilty of the grossest outrages and atrocities. For many months they had occupied the town securely, retain- ing undisturbed possession, scarcely dreaming of the possibility of an attack. In the river some two or three gunboats were ' in part,' corn, oats, flour, bacon, ad infinitum ; coffee, two thousand pounds nicely roasted ; candles (adamantine), fifty boxes ; sugar, by the barrel ; fresh oysters, one thousand cans ; brandy peaches, five hundred cans ; cheese, hats, &c., &c., ' too numerous to mention.' One bushel of pocket-knives." 211 THE THIRD YEAR OF TIIK WAR. generally lyinf^, either ancliored off the town or cruising np or down the Neuse or Trent, to the great terror of the inhabitants living near their banks. General Pickett's demonstration upon Newbern, M^hich sur- prised the Yankees, on the 1st of Februarj', appears to have followed just in the retiring footsteps of a Yankee raiding party which had been sent out from the town. He had with him two brigades only — Clingman's and Hoke's — while Gene- ral Barton had been sent up the Trent to fall upon the town simultaneously with those in front. An expedition of boats, under command of Commander Wood, of the Confederate Nav}'', was to make a demonstration upon the enemy's gun- boats, and to essay, if possible, their capture or destruction. Early on the morning of 1st February, tlie Yankee outposts at Bachelor's creek were attacked by the Confederates. The force of the enemy here occupied a strong line of fortifications along the edge of the creek, on both flanks of a powerful blockhouse, which commanded the approach to the bridge. While a furious shower of shot and shell was kept up near the bridge, the right of our line succeeded in pushing through the marsh and effected a crossing, flanking the enemy. A vigorous attack was made by the Confederates, and the Yan- kees were driven out, and began falling back. Those of our men on the other side of the creek rushed upon the bridge^ laid the pontoon planks, crossed, and joined the fight. Charg- ing with a yell, they broke the line of the enemy, and pursued them to the cover of the fortifications of Newbern. The night passed without a general attack ; but not without a bold achievement by the Confederates. The Yankee gunboat. Underwriter, had passed up the ISTeuso river near Fort Stephenson, throwing out her anchors and placing all her guns, to be in readiness for any service in case of an attack on the town. About one o'clock at night, the sen- tinel saw some boats approaching, and, hailing them, received no reply. They were Wood's boats. As they came up the Yankees greeted them with a volley of musketry, which flashed in the very faces of the daring Confederates, the balls ' whistling unpleasantly into the boats or into the water beyond. But the boats were soon at the side of the steamer, the grap- neks thrown on, and a hand-to-hand combat joined between TIIR THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 215 the boarding-partj and tlic crew. But the Yankees soon cried for quarter, and the steamer was ours. The Confederate engi- neer Gill was lying in the gangway, shot in four places and mortally wounded, and nndshipinan Saunders, cut down in a hand-to-hand tigHt, was breathing his last upon the decks. The Underwriter was moored, head and stern, to the shore, under three of the largest batteries, and hardly a stone's throw from the wharf. The flash of the guns and the report of musketry had aroused the soldiers on shore, and they were now witnesses of the scene, but determined not to be inactive ones; for, regardless of their oM'n prisoners on board, they fired a shell into the steamer, which, striking the upper ma- (thinery and ex})loding on the deck, produced a terrible shock. To spare the prisoners and wounded, Captain Wood ordered, them to be put into the boats and the ship made ready for fir- ing. As the steam was down, it was found it would be impos- sible to take time to get it up under the heavy fire of batteries not one hundred yards away ; and so, the wounded and pris- oners being put into the boats, the vessel was fired. In a few minutes the Underwriter was one mass of flame, burning up the dead bodies of the Yankees killed in action. General Pickett having ascertained the strength of the for- tifications of Newbern, concluded that it would be useless to risk an assault upon them, and appears to have been satisfied with the results his expedition had already accomplished. In- deed, he represented to the War Department that he had at- tempted nothing more than a " reconnoissance in force." But the results of the recoimoissance was not a mean victory. Pickett had met the enemy in force at Bachelor's creek, killed and wounded about one hundred in all, captured thirteen otfi- cers and two hundred and eighty prisoners, fourteen negroes, two rifled pieces and caissons, three hundred stand of small arms, four ambulances, three wagons, fifty-five animals, a quantity of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and two flags. Tlie destruction of the Underwriter was an important part of the success. She was the largest and best of the Yan- kee gunboats in the sounds; had engines of eight hundred horse power, the largest the Yankees had taken across Hatteras swash ; mounted four guns — two large eight-inch shell guns, one twelve-pound rifle, and one twelve-pound howitzer. 216 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. TUK AFFAIR OF JOHn's ISLAND. An incident " wortliy of note" was at last to occur in what for months had been the dull vicinity of famous Charleston. On the 9th of February the enemy came over in force from Folly to Kiawali Island, and thence crossed over at a place called the Ilaulover, to John's Island, killing, wounding, and capturing some nine men of Major Jenkins's command. With about one hundred and fifty men only, he fought them until night, when Colonel Tabb reinforced him, and tlie Colonel im- mediately attacked the enemy at night, with but a battalion, and staggered them so that they paused and did not advance again until Colonel Pago reinforced them with another battal- ion of the 26tli Yirginia, the next morning. General Wise sent forward more troops, and went in person on the 10th, and got there just as five hundred and fifty in- fantry, with one battery and two hundred cavalry were drawn up in line under the fire of two thousand, at least, of the enemy. Seeing they were about to turn our left flank. Gen- eral Wise ordered our forces to fall back to a point called the " Cocked Hat." There we took a position and awaited rein- forcements. They came up in time to increase our numbers to about one thousand infantry, and two batteries of artillery. The enemy did not advance until the 11th. By 3 p. m. they came up to our front. Just at this moment General Colquitt reinforced us with nine hundred men. At 3.25 p. m. we opened upon the enemy with six pieces, the Marion battery, and one section of Charles's, at about three-quarters of a mile distance. The enemy replied with three pieces — Parrott's and Blakely's. They ceased firing at forty minutes past 5 p. m., and retreated rapidly, leaving some of their dead. Four bod- ies were found on the ground. General Wise's men were too much broken and fatigued to follow them. The enemy retired in confusion to Ilaulover, burnt the Seabrook houses there, and before day crossed back to Kiawah, burning the bridge behind them. THE TUIKD YEAR OF THE WAK. 217 THE BATPLE OF OCEAN POND. But the montli of February was to be distinguished by an important battle, and that in a part of the Confederacy which had yet attracted but little notice in the war. The Yankees hud invaded Florida in the spring of 1862, when they occupied Jacksonville. They then said they came to protect the city against the reprehensible incendiarism of some of our own people ; and, after this ])rofession of j)rotec- tion, and making great promises of an intention to hold the place forever, thus duping a good many disaffected citizens to take sides with them in some sort of a State government which they proposed, and finding much less of Union sentiment than they expected, but more of a military demonstration in their front than they looked for, they departed, after a three weeks' stay in the " water-oak city." They came again in October, 1862. But this expedition turned out to be a very heavy negro trade ; and General Brannon, who commanded it, after collecting a large number of " contrabands," took his departure. Again, in March, 1863, the Yankees invaded Florida, to try the experiment there of recruiting blacks. They were only partially successful ; and the third experiment of invasion ended, leaving its malignant track in the burning of two churches, and laying waste a number of squares of private re- sidences in the beautiful little city of Jacksonville. The fourth invasion was designed at Washington, and con- templated nothing less than the taking and holding of the whole State of Florida, reincor])orating it into the Union, and erecting a State government there under the auspices of Mr. Lincoln's private secretary, who was sent to Florida to engineer the political part of the movement. The times were thought to be ripe for so extensive a design upon Florida. The opera- tions against Charleston were virtually abandoned ; surplus troops were on hand ; and deserters and fugitives had per- suaded the Yankees that the pathway was oi:)en, and that all there was to resist them was a local force of not more than a dozen companies scattered broadcast over the State. It was Boon known that a force of six or seven thousand Yankee 218 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. troops, under command of Major-general Seymour, had left Cliaileston harbor in eighteen transports for what was supposed to be the easy conquest* of Florida. The State was in General Beauregard's military department, and that alert comnumder had hastened General Colquitt down to meet the movement of the enemy. General Finnegan was in command of a small force at Camp Finnegan, where the enemy had expected to surprise him. He eluded him b^'- with- drawing his forces through the woods. The enemy advanced twenty miles on the railroad, and took the junction of the other railroad crossing it, the place or village known as Baldwin. Our rail lines in their hands, our case seemed desperate. The enemy advanced still westward towards Lake City, which had long been tlie head-quarters of the Eastern Department. His advance cavalry had come within three miles of Lake City, But troops were pouring in to Finnegan. General Colquitt and his brigade were en route. The celebrated Chatham artil- lery of Savannah, which stood the brunt of Fort Wagner for long weeks, arrived. Tiiey were hurried down. Body after body of troops arrived. Clinch's cavalry were expected to enter the State in the rear of the enemy, and thus cut off their retreat while the main body of the troops pushed them back. Our forces concentrated and fortified at Oulustre, a spot pre- serving its Indian name. It was the headwaters of a creek of that name, being a continuous swamp on the right of the rail- road, inclining southward. Ocean Pond, or one of the inland lakes of Florida, lying not far north, thus forming a good de- fensible position. Our forces there concentrated about five thousand men. Our rifle-pits and redoubts connected with the swamp on the south, and Ocean Pond on the north. On the morning of the 20th February, General Finnegan was notified that the enemy was approaching. About 12 M., they were reported as distant four miles. The command was tiicn moved out to meet them. When we had marched three miles from camp, our cavalry was discovered falling back rapidly. Our line of battle was formed at once, but so rapidly did the enemy advance that a furious fire commenced before the line was completed. The fire soon became general. The battle opened at 2 o'clock p. m. For two hours the enemy was steadily pushed back, though THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 219 they resisted most obstinately. "We had captured in this time five pieces of artillerj', and the enemy were at their last line. Just then our ammunition became exhausted. It was a trying time to all our troops. Their conduct, however, was above praise. They remained steadfast in line under a heavy fire, to ■which thei'e was scarcely any reply. But as soon as cartridges were distributed, the men moved forward, and drove them again. Just at sunset, the Twenty-seventh Georgia, commanded by Colonel Zachry, made a furious attack upon the centre. This movement was seconded by a flank attack of the Sixth Georgia, Colonel Lofton, upon the enemy's right. They now broke and fled in great confusion. We pursued until dark. The Yankees did not halt until they had placed the St. Mary's river in their rear, twenty miles from the battle-field. The fruits of the vic- tory were five pieces of artillery, two stands of colors, two thousand small arms, and five hundred prisoners. The enemy left upon the field three hundred and fifty dead. They also abandoned the severely wounded. Our loss amounted to eighty killed and six hundred and fifty- wounded. The fight was in the open pine M^oods peculiar to Florida. This accounts for the large number wounded in pro- portion to the killed. The enemy could not have lost less than two thousand killed and wounded. General Finnegan reported that the roads for three miles were strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded. More than one half of the two negro regiments that Seymour had placed in front were said to have been killed and wounded. The enemy fell back to Jacksonville, forty-five miles from where they fought the battle. Our forces followed them along the road, and stragglers and wounded were picked up as they went. A lady reported that General Seymour passed along, look- ing haggard and pale, saying he had lost half of his troops. The victory was a subject of extraordinary congratulation. Had the enemy been successful at Ocean Pond, there were not five hundred men between them and the capital, and, with the capture of our rolling stock at Lake City, they would soon have reached Tallahassee- and fallen back on St. Mark's as a base, and by water held their communications perfectly. Viewed in this respect, it was one of the decisive battles of the war, and had preserved the State of Florida to the Confederacy. 220 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. The Yankee journals (probably for political reasons) were •more candid in their admissions of defeat at Ocean Pond than on any other occasion of disaster to them in the war. An in- vestigation was ordered in the Yankee Congress. The New York Herald declared that the whole movement grew out of the political jugglery for the next Presidency, and the whole thing was a trick to secure the electoral vote of Florida. It said that " a thousand lives were lost in the attempt to get three electoral votes." SHERMAN 8 EXPEDITION IN THE SOUTHWEST. In the winter of 1864, the enemy had planned a grand mili- tary combination in the Southwest, whicli, properly viewed, was one of the greatest projects of the war. It was imperfect- ly known by the Confederates at the time, who, for many weeks vainly imagined the object of Sherman's movement into Mississippi at the head of an infantry column of thirty-five thousand men. Events developed the scheme, and indicated Grant, the Yan- kees' present military idol, as its originator. It was the con- ceit of this General that the " rebellion " presented its most formidable front in N^orth Georgia and that he was so circum- stanced as to render it extremely difficult to turn his advant- age, in the possession of Chattanooga, to account. His disad- vantages were the enormous prolongation of the line connect- ing the front of operations with the base of supplies, the im- perfect character of the communications, and the difficulty of accumulating sufficient supplies for along and severe campaign in the Gulf States. A New York paper declared that it had been recognized as a necessary condition to any advance from Chattanooga, look- ing to great and decisive results, that a water base be opened up, whence a powerful column should march to connect with, and support, the Union army advancing from Chattanooga. A possible point from which a water base could be opened up was Mobile. It was known by the beginning of February that three dis- tinct Yankee columns, from as many different points, were now THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAK. 221 under way in the Southwest. A very powerful cavalry col- umn, under command of Generals Smith and Grierson, had started from Corinth and Holly Springs. An infantry column, composed of the two corps of Hurlbut and McPherson, under command of General Sherman, was under way from Vicksburg. A combined land and naval expedition was moving from New Orleans. While Mobile was the plain objective point at which the latter force aimed, it is probable that Sherman did not design to make an overland march from Vicksburg to Mobile — about three hundred miles. There is reason to believe that he ex- pected, when he marched out of Vicksburg, to reach Selma, in Alabama. The heavy column of cavalry that started from Memphis, and constituted an important part of his forces, was to move rapidly across Mississippi and Alabama, cut the in- terior railway lines, destroy the bridges and Government work- shops, lay waste the country, and gain the rear of General Polk, harass and delay his retreat, and, if possible, force him down towards Mobile, while Sherman rushed upon him in front. Had General Polk retreated upon Mobile, the attack upon which by the Federal fleets was calculated if not design- ed to draw him in that direction, Sherman would have occu- pied Meridian, Demopolis, and Selma, and thus have rendered his escape impossible, and the fall of Mobile, from lack of pro- visions and without a blow, a matter of absolute certainty. The possession of Mobile and Selma would have given the Federal commander two important water bases, the one on the Mississippi, at Vicksburg, the other at Mobile, on the Gulf, two navigable rivers communicating with the latter — the Ala- bama and Tombigbee — and two railways ready to hand, viz.: the Mobile and Ohio, and the Vicksburg and Jackson roads. Once in possession of these important points and his army firm- ly established in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tom- bigbee rivers, and the railroad leading from Selma to Demop- olis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we had been to drive the enemy from the Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. It must be cpnfessed that there were in these combinations the marks of a bold, brilliant, original conception. General Gr.ant had contemplated, so to speak, the removal of the Mis- 222 THE TIIIKD YEAK OF THE WAR. sissippi river from Yicksburg and New Orleans to Montgom- ery and Mobile ; while at the same time the organization of this line would have operated as a flank movement upon Gen- eral Johnston's army, and might have resulted in the fall of Atlanta, and the occupation by the legions of the enemy of the northern half of the great State of Georgia. He proposed thus to get possession of the only remaining line of defence which it was possible for the Confederates to take up when he should advance from Chattanooga. Military men of the Korth had recognized that, if the Confederates were once turned at Atlan- ta, the line of the Tombigbee was the only available position left them. The other line led directly into a cul-de-sac, end- ing in Florida. If, therefore, the present movements were suc- cessful, it would clutch this single position at which the Con- federates could have hoped to make any protracted stand. But Grant — and it will be found to be his characteristic fault — had overtasked himself. His formidable combination was to fail because too much was attempted, and because it was to be met by the Confederates with consummate skill and courage. The co-operating columns were too widely separated, were exposed to too many chances of failure, and were entrusted to too many different heads. The expedition so largely planned was inaugurated by the moving of the first two columns. Sherman left Vicksburg the 1st of February, at the head of thirty-five thousand infantry, two or three thousand cavalry, and from sixty to eighty pieces of artillery. Almost simultaneously Grierson or Smith began their march through !North Mississippi with about ten thou- sand cavalry and mounted infantry. Mobile, at the same time, was threatened by water with the enemy's fleet of gunboats, and by land from Pensacola and Pascagoula. General Polk had recently been placed by the Confederate authorities in command of the Department of the Southwest. He assumed command late in December, and scarcely had more than familiarized himself with the command, and had but little time to organize his troops and collect together all the energies of his department. General Polk took the field. Forrest was still detached from the main army, and remained so as to watch the move- ments of Grierson and his command. Sherman with his thirty- THE THIKD YEAli OF THK WAR. 223 five thousand men could only be opj^osed by Loring, French, and Lee. From Yicksburg the enemy moved very rapidly and vigor- ously on to Jackson, and from that point they threatened Me- ridian, the railroad centre of the Southvrestern Department. At this time General Polk borrowed from the Mobile garrison two or three brigades to retard the enemy in order to enable him to save his supplies, which had accumulated at different points of ihe railroads for the past two years. It would have been the height of folly to have given the enemy battle under the circumstances. Our force, when strengthened by the rein- forcements from Mobile, did not reach over half that of t^ie enemy, inclusive of our cavalry. With the additional force from Mobile the enemy was checked, enabling General Polk to save his accumulated stores and protect his supplies. The little army fell back from Brandon in per- fect order — slowly and successfully. The enemy moved his bodies of infantry, artillery and cavalry, with caution and prudence. Lee hung upon his flanks and compelled him to move in compact column, giving him but little time to forage or to depredate upon the country. In the mean time General Polk, with all his acknowledged energy, was moving all his stores from points of the different railroads likely to fall into the enemy's hands. On Sunday, the 14th, Lieutenant-general Polk evacuated Meridian, with his little army, heavily pressed by an enemy thirty-five thousand strong. Before the evacuation, however, every article belonging to the different departments of the Gov- ernment had been moved. The rolling stock of four important railroads had been saved — not a car was left, and scarcely a wheel left. The locomotives and cars belonging to the Mobile and Ohio road were safely housed in Mobile. Tiiose of the other roads were brought to the Tombigbee and safely placed upon the other side of the river. It was a literal and positive evac- uation of this great railroad centre. The little town of Merid- ian stood lonely amid the silence of pine barrens, without a noise to disturb its solitude or to arouse its inhabitants. The garrison belonging to Mobile had been safely returned to their duties there, and Mobile was as safe as the department at Kichmond intended it to be. General Polk retired to Pe- 224 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. mopolis, Alabama, and prepared for the gathering emer- gency. The enemy's cavalry column under Smith and Grierson was to pass through one of the richest districts of the Confederacy to the assistance of Sherman. From Pontotoc, Mississippi, to the southern boundary line of Noxubee county, a distance of eighty or ninety miles from forty to fifty in width, there was an area of country rich as the Delta of the Nile. Magnificent plantations were spread on. either side of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, level as the sea, and dotted with abodes of wealth and intelligence. Pontotoc, Aberdeen, Columbus, and Macon, were the centres of local trade for all this region. These towns had an aggregate pop- ulation of perhaps thirty thousand, and the narrow territorial limits of their trade illustrated the fact that this district was the richest granary of the South. Owing to the exhaustion of his horses, the want of arms and munitions, and other causes, Forrest could array a force of only two thousand four hundred men to confront Smith and Grierson's column of seven thousand of the best equipped cav- alry the Yankees had ever put in the field. Forrest's men, too, were mostly new and untried, especially in the cavalry service. He had recently recruited them in "West Tennessee. It seemed the extreme of rashness and recklessness, to attempt with such a force to arrest the march of a column of seven thousand splendidly mounted and equipped men, led by expe- rienced officers, whose march thus far had been uninterrupted, who were buoyant and confident, and were charged with such an important mission. The junction of this cavalry force with Sherman at Meridian, was the key of the Yankee plan for the occupation and subjugation of the Southwest. If successful, Sherman would have been in a condition to advance upon Deraopolis and Selma, and these important points, as well as the rich countries adjacent, would have been at the mercy of the enemy. General Polk, with his scant infantry force, quickly per- ceived the momentous issue which depended upon the result of the cavalry movement from Memphis, and after securing his small army on the east side of the Tombigbee, and remov- ing all his supplies and munitions and returning to Mobile the THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 225 troops lie liad borrowed from General Maurj, sent imperative orders to Lee and Forrest to unite their forces, and at every cost to crush and drive back Smith and Grierson's cav-' alrj. Lee did not receive these orders in time to reach Forrest with his force, which was already greatly exhausted by the continual skirmishing with Sherman's column. Forrest, there- fore, was left alone with his two thousand four hundred men to perform this immense undertaking. Confronting the enemy on the broad prairies near West Point, on the Tibbee river, he prepared for action. The enemy formed in a long and most imposing line, outflanking Forrest and threatening the instant demolition of his small and imperfectly organized force. The charge was given, and the Yankees advanced with great boldness and an air of certain victory. Great was their surprise when, as they approached Forrest's line, they observed his men slip from their horses, converting themselves into infantry, each man taking the most favorable position, availing themselves of every advantage the ground afforded, and await- ing with the utmost coolness tiie impetuous charge of the Yankee chivalry. On came the splendidly mounted dragoons, under those far-famed Yankee chiefs. Smith and Grierson, with such fierce displays of valor and determination as augured badly for Forrest's infantry scouts, scattered through the buslies and over the prairie in rather an irregular and unmilitary style. But these valorous horsemen did not advance far before the balls of two thousand riflemen began to rattle through their ranks with fearful eff'ect. Scores of men and horses fell at the first fire, and their onward movement was checked, and before they could recover and reform the volley was repeated — again and again — until dismay and terror began to prevail in their ranks, and they soon broke into confusion and fled. Having discovered the small force of Forrest, several at- tempts were made by Smith and Grierson to rally their men and resume the offensive. Their eff'orts were successful on the hills, just beyond Okalona, when the last grand charge was made by them on the 21st of February. The fight commenced late in the evening, and was obstinate, as the enemy were forced to make repeated stands to hold us in check, and to save their pack mules, &c., from a stampede. It closed with a 15 226 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. grand cavalry charge of the enemy's whole force. "We re- pulsed them with heavy loss, and completely routed them. - General Forrest's command was too tired to continue the pursuit. General Gholson, with six or seven hundred State troops, arrived and went in pursuit. The enemy never halted for a moment in his retreat, and M'hen last heard from, the renmant of this splendid force was hastening fast to Memphis, in far different ])light from that in which it had so recently emerged from its fortifications. The disastrous retreat of Grierson and Smith npon Memphis was decisive of the campaign. Their retreat naturally inter- rupted Sherman's communications all along the line of the Mo- bile and Ohio Railroad, and deprived his army of an important source of supply, without which he was incapable of maintain- ing his fi^round. Worse still, the fallinc: back of these two of- ficers took away from him the cavalry force upon which he re- lied to prosecute his operations. He was left to retrace his steps in disappointment and disgrace, and to retire to Yicks- burg. Back there he dragged his weary, broken-down column, in a demoralized state ; having accomplished not a single mil- itary resnlt in his campaign, and having achieved no other glory than that of warfare upon private property and inoifen- Bive people, a cheap triumph of the ruffian and the plunderer. In a congratulatory order to his army. General Polk said : " The concentration of our cavalry on the enemy's column of cavalry from West Tennessee formed the turning point of the campaign. That concentration broke down his only means of subsisting his infantry. His column was defeated and routed, and his whole force compelled to make a hasty retreat. Never did a grand campaign, inangurated with such pretension, ter- minate more ingloriously. With a force three times that which was opposed to its advance, they have been defeated and forced to leave the field with a loss of men, small arms and ar- tillery." Tlie Yankees made an absurd attempt to cover up Sherman's defeat Avith the stereotyped lie, that the expedition had ''ac- complished all that was intended." It could hardly be possible that the object of an expedition of such magnitude as that con- ducted by Sherman through Mississippi was sinjply to march over a sterile country one hundred and fifty miles, take posses- THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 227 sion of a comparatively insignificant point, and then march back again. The truth was, Grant's grand combination in the West had completely broken down ; and Sherman's defeat had given the Confederacy two months more time to prepare for the great campaign of 1864. While the events we have been narrating M^ere transpiring in the Southwest, as part of the grand plan, there had been a movement on the lines in North Georgia. Thomas, in imme- diate command of the Yankee forces there, had attempted an advance on the 25th of February. For a whole day he at- tempted to penetrate our lines, but was compelled suddenly to fall back upon his base at Chickamauga. The " On-to-Atlanta" was a programme all parts of which had been disconcerted, and to amend which the campaign in the West had to be put over until the fighting month of May. 228 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. CHAPTER X. • Auspicious Signs of tlie Spring of 1804.— Military Successes of the Confederates. — Improvements in the Internal Polity of tlie Confederacy — Two Important Measures of Legislation. — Revolution of our Finances. — Enlargement of the Conscription. — Theory of the New Military Law. — A Blot on the Political Kecord of the Confeder- acy. — Qualified Suspension of the Habeas Corpus. — An Infamous Edict, but a " Dead- letter." — An Oificial Libel upon the Confederacy. — The Real Condition of Civil Liberty in the South. — The Conscription not properly a Measure of Force. — Im- pressments but a System of Patriotic Contribution. — Development of the Yankee Government into Despotism. — An Explanation of this. — The Essence of Despotism in One Yankee Statnte. — Military Kesouuces of the Confederacy. — Its Military System, the Best and Most Elastic in the World. — The War Conducted on A Vulan- tary i?as«s.— Supplies.— Scarcity of Meat. — The Grain Product. — Two Centres of Sup- plies. — A Dream of Yankee Hate. — Great Natural Resources of the North. — Summary of the Yankee Military Drafts. — Tonnage of the Yankee Navy. — The Yankee War Debt. — Economic Ett'eets of the War. — Its Effects on European Industry. — Yankee Conquest of the South an Impossibility. — A Remarkable Incident of the War. — Dahlgren's Raid around Richmond. — Kilpatrick's and Cnstar's Parts of the E.vpe- dition. — Dahlgren and his Negro Guide. — His " Braves" Whipped by the Richmond Clerks and Artisans. — Death of the Marauder. — Revelation of his Infamous Designs. — Copy and History of •' the Dahlgren Papers." — A Characteristic Yankee Apothe- osis. — Ridiculous and Infamous Behavior of the Confederate Authorities. — A Bru- tal and Savage Threat. — President Davis in Melodrama. The auspicious sio^ns of the spring of 1864 was the theme everywhere of the Confederate press. "We have seen how a current of success had set in for the South. Mr. Lincohi's shocking experiment in Fk)rida ; Thomas's disastrous repulse in North Georgia ; Slierman's magnificent failure, were glad auguries for the Confederate arms in the coming campaigns. The situation was being rapidly improved. Not to speak just yet of our achievements in Texas, in Western Louisiana, and along the banks of the Mississippi, we could refer with satisfac- tion to Longstreet's exploits in East Tennessee, subsequent to the raising of the siege of Knoxville, and fancied permanent occupation of East Tennessee by the enemy. The siege ot Charleston had proven only a running sore, where the strength and wealth of the enemy were wasted without the slightest prospect of advancing one step beyond the landward beach of Morris Island. Florida had afforded nothing but disaster to tliem and glory to us. The rainy season would soon render it THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 229 as uninhabitable to a Northern army as it has hitherto been nnconquerable. "Dixie," said the Yankee papers, was "in fine feather." This period of military success was coincident, too, with cer- tain important improvements in the internal polity of the Con- federacy. The Confederate Congress of 1803-64:, had accom- plished two important measures of legislation. It had revolu- tionized the Confederate finances by a law which required the currency to be funded, under the penalty, within certain dates, of thirty-three and a third per cent., stopped further issues of paper money, and provided for the public revenues by heavy taxation, and the sale of five hundred millions of six per cent, bonds. It had enlarged the conscription and qualified it by a system of details, the administration of which, though it prop- erly resided in Congress, and should not have been delegated to the Executive branch of the Confederacy, which was noto- riously corrupted by favoritism, was especially designed to compose and protect the vexed industry and resources of the country. The new military law was designed to devote to the army, directly or indirectly, the whole physical power and energy of the country. Providing, first, recruits for the ranks by an ex: tended conscription, it then organized the remaining labor of the country, for the sole use and benefit of the army and the country's cause. The great pervading principle of this mili- tary bill was that every man owed to his country the duty of defending it, either in or out of the ranks, and the law provided for the discharge of this paramount duty by putting in the ranks all men capable of bearing arms, except certain persons who could be of more service to the cause out of, than in the army. Exemptions and details were to be permitted upon the great and important principle of promoting the public service. Recognizing the absolute dependence of the country's cause upon the great agricultural interest, the Confederate Congress, while protecting this great interest, had made it contribute to ' the support of the army, for the privilege of its exemption — thus protecting the production of the country, without depriv- ing the army of the recruits necessary to its reinforcement. It is, however, to be confessed, with pain, that the Confed- erate Congress of 1803-64, marred the work of this legislative 230 THE THIRD YEAK OF THE WAR. year by a base imitation of tlie Washington despotism in a sus- pension of the hahean corpus. It was an act of criminal stu- pidity, the fruit of an inferiority of mind in our legislators that aped the precedents of the Yankee. It is true that the law authorizing the suspension of the great writ of liberty was qualified by a stringent bill of particulars.* But what can be * The following Ib a copy of this unfortunate law : A Ull to suspend the privilege oftlie writ 0/ habeas corpus in certain cases. Wlicrcas, the Constitution of the Confederate States of America ]irovides, in article 1, section 9, paraj^raph 8, that " the privilej^e of the writ of habeas corpus eliall not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, tln^ public safety may require it;" and, wliereas thci power of suspending th(> privilege of Baid writ, as recognized in said article 1, is vested solely in the Congress, which is the exclusive judge of the necessity of such suspension ; and, whereas, in tho opinion of the Congress, the public safety requires the suspension of said writ in the existing case of tlie invasion of these States by tlu; armies of the United States ; and, whereas the President has asked for tlie 8US])ension of the writ of habeas corpus, and informed Congress of conditions of public danger which ren- der the susi)ension of the writ a measure proper for the public defence against invasion and insurrection ; now, therefore : 1. That during the present invasion of the Confederate States, the privilege of the writ oi habeas corpus be, and the same is hereby, suspended; but such suspension shall apply only to the cases of persons arrested or detained by order of the President, Secretary of War, or the general officer commanding the Trans-Mississippi INIilitary Department, by the authority and under the control of the President. It is hercljy declared that the purposes of Congress in the passage of this act is to provide more effectually for the public safety by sus- pending the writ oi habeas corpus in the following cases, and no other: I. Of treason or treasonable efforts or combinations to subvert the Govern- ment of the Confederate States. II. Of conspiracies to overthrow the Government, or conspiracies to resist the lawful authority of the Confederate States. III. Of combining to assist tlie enemy or of communicating intelligence to the enemy, or giving him aid and comfort. IV. Of conspiracies, preparations and attempts to incite servile insurrection. V. Of desertions or encouraging desertions, of harboring deserters, and of attempts to avoid military service; Provided, that in cases of palpable wrong and opjiression by any subordinate officer, upon any jmrty who does not legally owe military service, his superior officer shall grant prompt relief to the op- pressed party, and the subordinate shall be dismissed from office. VI. Of spies and other emissaries of the enemy. VII. Of holding correspondence or intercourse with the enemy, without ne- cessity, and without the i)eriiiission of the Confederate States. VIII. Of unlawful trading with the enemy and other offences against tho laws of the Confederate States, enacted to promote their success in the war. IX. Of conspiracies, or attempts to liberate prisoners of war held by the Con- federate States. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 231 most said, to wipe from the record of the Confederacy the stain of tliis infamous edict, is, that it was never put into practice. It was not put into practice fur tlie siinple reason that tliere was no occasion for it ; no one doubted the integrity and patriotism of our judiciary ; that brancli of the government was practically permitted to continue its dispensations of law and justice; and the worst that can be said of the law suspending the habeas corpus was, that it was a stain upon our political history. It was an uncalled for libel upon the Confederacy ; but although it might blacken our reputation, yet it is a satisfaction to know that it did not practically affect our system of liberties. In contrasting the political systems of the North and South in this war, we find an invariable superiority in the latter with respect to all questions of civil liberty. This, indeed, is to be taken as the most striking and significant moral phenomenon of the war. Despite the conscription and other harsh necessities of legis- lation, the principles of liberty were yet substantially secure in the Confederacy. The S])irit of the devotion of the peo|)le was, in most instances, in advance of the demands of the gov- X. Of conspiracies, or attempts or preparations to aid the enemy. Xr. Of persons aiding or inciting others to ahandon the Confederate cause, or to resist tlie Confederate States, or to adhere to the enemy. XII. Of unlawfully burning, destroying, or injuring, or attempting to burn, destroy, or injure any bridge or railroad, or telegraph line of communication, or other property v/ith the intent of aiding the enemy. XIII. Of treasonable designs to impair the military power of the Govern- ment by destroying or attempting to destroy the vessels, or arms, or munitions of war, or arsenals, foundries, workshops, or other jjroperty of the Confederate States. Sec. 2. The President shall cause proper officers to investigate the cases of all persons so arrested or detained, in order that they may be discharged if improperly detained, unless they can be speedily tried in the due course of law. Sec. 8. That during the suspension aforesaid, no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ of Jinherts corpus, to appear in person, or to return the body of any person detained by him by the authority of the President, Secretary of War, or the general officer commanding tlie Trans- Mississippi Department ; but upon the certificate, under oath, of the otBcer having charge of any one so detained that such person is detained by liim as a prisoner under the authority aforesaid, further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus, shall immediately cease and remain suspended so long as this act shall continue in force. Sec. 4. This act shall continue in force for ninety days after the next meeting of Congress, and no longer. 232 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. eminent. The people of the Confederacy were more heartily willing than the Yankees to contribute of their substance and convenience to the war, but much less willing than they to sacrifice their civil liberties to its fancied necessities. In the Confederacy the impressments of property were, in fact, in the majority of instances, voluntary contributions. In the Con- federacy, tlie conscription was not, in effect, a measure of force, but was rather to be regarded as a measure to organize the proffer of patriotic devotion, and to equalize its service. It was the purer spirit and superior motives of the Confederacy in the war that made its administration so superior to that of the enemy, with regard to the constitutional standards of liberty, and the well recognized principles of conservatism. The North presented a different picture. Tlie process by which the Yankee Government had developed itself into one of the vilest despotisms on the earth is one of the most inter- esting problems of the history of the war. In an address of the Confederate Congress, which met in the spring of 1864, a reference was made to Yankee despotism as " engendered in a desperate warfare upon the liberties of another and kindred people." The language of this reference contains the key of the problem. The unholy passions of this war, its hate, its greed, its dire revenge, its desperation, induced the people of the North to compromise their constitutional rights. They were willing to purchase the gratification of their passions at the expense of their liberty, and those who gainsayed the price were denounced as disloyal persons, and threatened as traitors. Personal liberty was no longer a thing of any account in the eyes of " the best government the world ever saw." There was a law on the statute-book of the Government at Washing- ton, which not only undertook to deprive the judicial tribunals of the States of all cognizance, civil and criminal, over pro- ceedings instituted against persons who had done any act injurious to a citizen, by order of President Lincoln, but which also made the order of the President, or of any one acting under his authority, a full and ■perfect defence^ in all courts, in any civil or any criminal proceeding in which the act was drawn in question. This law annihilated the liberties of the citizen ; perfected the despotism at "Washington j and gave TlIK THIKD YEAK OF TBE WAE. 233 Abraham Lincoln a power above all judicial redress in tlie country, and as irresponsible as any autocracy on earth. MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE CONFEDERACY. The military system of the South was, perhaps, the most admirable and elastic in the world. The conscription, which, as we have seen, was not regarded in the Confederacy as an edict of violence, but was in fact merely an organized form of public spirit, was constantly and harmoniously in operation ; and it had the especial merit of avoiding that agitation and public demoralization inseparable from a system of periodical drafts. It provided a class of reserves, from sixteen to eighteen years of age, which was constantly passing within the limits of the active military age. The army was thus steadily replen- ished. It was qualified by a system of details, the administra- tion of which was to be constantly concerned in adjusting the demands of the military service to precise necessities, and accommodating the conscription, either enlarging or contract- ing it, to the state of the country. The military system of the Confederacy had thus an elasticity which was indeed its most valuable quality. Ignorant minds appear to have been much impressed with theldea that the Confederacy would break down for the want of men. There had been yearly repetitions of this idea since the commencement of the war ; and yet, strange to say, for all this time the Confederate armies had not declined in numbers. Fighting on the defensive, their losses were much less than those of the Yankees ; occupying interior and shorter lines, and commanded by generals who carefully economized human life, they did not require the same numbers as the enemy ; and, even if they were decreasing, there was this compensa- tion : that while they declined in numbers, the Yankee army was declining, at a much more rapid rate, in a jperson7ieI, which ' had come to be mostly composed of negroes and foreigners, and in those measures of courage and devotion which best insure victory. The advantage which the Confederacy had in the conduct of the war was that every thing was, really and substantially, 234 TIIK TIIIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. on the voluntary hash. The impressment law, though violent in foi-m, like the conscription, was, in fact, the conduit of patri- otic contrihntions. Every thing that was asked for the war was generally given with cheerful consent ; and supplies poured in upon the Government, from private sources, much faster than the transportation of rail-cars, boats, and wagons could dispose of them. The scarcity of meat was a difficulty which could be ,com- paratively endured. There was an impression, long prevalent with us, that the South was dependent upon the North for a large portion of the meat we consumed. We actually reared and slaughtered more animals in proportion to population than the North, and it was simply owing to the fact of our almost wasteful use of meat, in which they economized, that we became annual purchasers of this article to so great an extent. ThroM'n upon our own resources, diverting our agriculture from the production of our great commercial staples to that of breadstuffs, and, along with it, to raising animals, hogs especi- ally, since the war began, in sections undisturbed by the march of armies, or not affected by epidemics among our stock, tlie supplies of meat were far more bountiful than ever before. But although it must be confessed that our meat supplies, which would otherwise have been superabundant, had been sadly diminished by the enemy's occupation of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the isolation of the Trans-Mississippi, yet none but the most ignorant could doubt our sufficiency of other sub- sistence in a country where the cereals might be produced on every acre of arable land. The difficulty was in tlie ready equalization of supplies by ti'ansportation, not in the want of them. There were two centres of supplies in the Confederacy, inaccessible to the enemy, either of which was sufficient to sub- sist our entire army and people ; one whose lines radiated through north-western Carolina and the southern tier of coun- ties in Virginia, and the other in the unequalled grain disti'icts of south-western Georgia and Alabama. To "starve" the South was the atrocious dream of Northern hate, scarcely the calculation of Yankee shrewdness and intelligence. The North had great material resources, but it was wasting them in a war the advance of which was more than doubtful, THE TIIIED YEAK OF THE WAK. 235 and the object of wliicli morally unattainable. It had put two millions of soldiers in the field * The tonnage of its navy was but little short of half a million. Bat while Yankee pride took delight in the exhibits, they were not merely displays of power, they were also evidences of debt. The expenditures of the Yankee Government during the war had constantly exceeded the official estimates, while the receipts had fallen off. Mr. Chase estimated the expenses for 1864 at $750,815,088 ; Congress had already appropriated $l,104,000,000/(?r the War Department alone! The rate at which the debt had accumu- lated, and the amount of claims yet to be adjusted, made it certain that the public debt was not far from $3,000,000,000.t * The following is a list, compiled from official sources, of Mr. Lincoln's enormous calls for troops : April 16,1861 75^000 May 4, 1861 64,748 From July to December, 1861 500,000 July 1. 1862 800,000 Augus-t 4, 1863 300,000 Draft, summer of 1863 300,000 February 1, 1864 500,000 Total 2,039,748 f The following figures, which we find compiled to our hand, show the various loans and liabilities of the Yankee Government thus far authorized by various acts of Congress : Loan of 1842 $242,621 Loan of 1847 9,415,250 Loan of 1848 8,908,341 Texas indemnity loan of 1850 3,461,000 Loan of 1858 2oioOo!oOO Loan of 1860 7,622,000 Loanof 1861 18,415,000 Treasury notes, March 1861 512,910 Oregon war loan, 1861 1,016,000 Another loan of 1861 50,000,000 Three years treasury notes 139,679,000 Loan of August, 1861 320,000 Five-twenty loan 400.000,000 Temporary loans 104,933,103 Certificates of indebtedness 156,918,437 * Unclaimed dividends 114,115 Carried over 921,557,777 236 TIIK THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. Mr. Chase's statement of his administration exhibited the fol- lowing interesting tigures: Government expenses, 72 years, 1789 to 1861, $1,458,790,786 Government expenses, 4 years, 1861 to 1865, 2,692,086,941 Excess in four years .... $1,238,294,155 So we find that, accepting the figures and estimates of the Yankee Secretary of the Treasury, the expenditures of the Government during the administration of Abraham Lincoln would nearly double those of the wliole period from the estab- lishment of the government to the inauguration of the " age of purity." It is impossible, with the imperfect materials at present at hand, to make a pecuniary estimate of the losses due to the shock and derangement of the war. These losses were not only shared by the ISTorth and South ; tlie whole commercial world was involved in the misfortunes of the war, and dragged into its vortex. The South, with a population of ten millions, of whom four millions were slaves, with about one million of these engaged in the production of our great commercial staples, with but little artificial labor, but with only tlie simplest implements of husbandry, her peculiar social institution and her climate, had yet furnished all the vitality, had actually created and brought into existence the greater part of all the great wealth-pro- ducing artificial labor in other nations. Her productions, which could be supplied or substituted from no other avenue without enormous additional expense, were indispensable to the capital invested and the labor developed. English factories had al- ready many of them suspended, or were reduced greatly in their operations. Northern newspapers informed ns that not a Brought over 921,557,777 Demand treasury notes 500,000 Legal tenders, 18(J3 397,767,114 Legal tenders, 1803 104,969,937 Postal and fractional currency 50,000,000 Old treasury notes outstanding 118,000 Ten-forty bonds 900,000,000 Literest-bearing treasury notes 500,000,000 Total $2,774,913,838 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 237 spindle at Lowell was in operation. The manufacturers of France were already clamorous. The only wonder was, that civilized nations could so long remain unmoved by such catas- trophes — so long remain disinterested spectators of a war upon the South for the destruction of our system of natural labor, whether for a mere sentiment or for any other cause, that of necessity involved the loss to them of an immense invested capital, and was destructive of artificial labor equivalent, in operatives, to many hundred-fold the number of our slaves. And what of the results of conquest? what of the indica- tions of final success ? what of the signs of conclusion had the war accomplished ? Eight hundred thousand square miles was too large an area for decisive war. When we imagine the toil- some marches, the mighty mountains, the dense and unhealthy swamps, the innumerable and impassable rivers and inlets, when we see a resolute people enduring outrage and destitu- tion, ever ready to sting the heel of the invader, it is obvious that no human force can traverse those distances, subdue that people, and establish any other government than what such a people shall approve. A territory so extensive could not be held by the policy of plunder and extermination. The miser- able gains of the thief, the marauder, the ruffian, and the plun- derer — the achievements of banditti, might discourage any government and dissatisfy any soldiery.* * A curious attempt was that of the Yankees to represent to the world the extent and permanency of tlieir conquests by bogus State organizations ; alto- g(!ther, one of the vilest cheats of the war. Arkansas, Louisiana, and other States, were made to play false parts upon paper, and were claimed as acquisi- tions for " the Union," when a Yankee dared not show his face in his new do- minions outside of his picket lines. It was by the management of bayonets that bogus delegates met at Little Rock, and concocted a paper which they termed a "Constitution," declaring that slavery should not exist in the State of Arkansas, and sent men to Washington to ask to be received back into the Union. In Louisiana the fiirce of a State election had just been completed. How far such an election represented the franchise or free will of the people we may infer from the following extract from General Order No. 23, issued by General Banks, and paraded in every Government paper the morning of the election : " Open hostility cannot be permitted. Indifference will be treated as a crime, and faction as treason. Men who refuse to defend their country with the ballot-box have no just claim to the benefits of liberty regulated by law. 238 THE THIRD YEAE OF THE WAR. We leave these discussions to follow the current of military events. DAHLGREN 8 RAID AROUND RICHMOND. In the month of March, 1864, was to occur one of the most remarkable incidents of the war ; inasmuch as it was the oc- casion of certain documentary evidence of the savage and atrocious spirit of our enemies, which lieretofore, though it had been the constant assertion of the Confederates, had been per- sistently denied in Yankee prints, and concealed from the world by brazen lies, audacious recrimination, and the stereo- types of Yankee hypocrisy. On the 28th of February, a raid was undertaken towards Richmond by the Yankee cavalry under General Kilpatrick. Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, a son of the Yankee admiral of Charleston " sensation," was second in command. After reaching Beaver Dam and destroying the water station and tearing up a few hundred yards of the track at that point, the force divided, Kilpatrick with his command passing through the upper part of Hanover into Louisa, where he took the mountain road, which he followed until he struck the Brook turnpike, which led into Riclimond. After the force was divided,* Dahlgren's command proceeded to Frederick Ilall, in Louisa county, where they captured sev- (M*al of onr officers who were holding a court-martial at tlie time. Among tliese officers was Captain Dement, of a Balti- more battery, who was compelled to follow the expedition. After tearing up the railroad for some distance, Dahlgren pro- ceeded rapidly towards tlie James River Canal, which he struck in Goochland county. He burnt a grist-mill here, some barns, injured some of the locks on the canal, and did other Whoever ia indifferent or hostile, must choose between the liberty wliicli foreign lands afford, the poverty of the rebel States, and the innumerable and inappreciable blessings which our Government confers upon its people." Thirty-five thousand liOuisianians had already gone to partake of the " pov- erty of the rebel States," and about eleven thousand played the farce of voting to continue " the blessings which the Yankee Government confers upon its people." THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 239 trifling damage. His men were allowed to amuse tliemselves for some hours at the farm-liouses, in hacking up furniture and stealing silver sj^oons. Ills purpose was to cross the James I'iver liere, get into Richmond by a surprise on the south side, and do his peculiar work in that city of the Confederacy. He had employed a negro to guide him to a ford of the river. He had paid him for the proposed service with what appeared to be a five-dollar bill, but was in fact a barber's " token," in the shape of a bank note, after the ingenious fashion of Yan- kee advertisements. The negro conducted him to a ford, but finding the water too high to cross, and imagining that he had. been duped, Dahlgren turned upon the helpless black, had him instantly hanged, and to expedite the horrible deed, furnished a rein from his own bridle to strangle his victim. Finding that he could not cross the river, Dahlgren direct- ed his movements to make a junction with Kilpatrick. But in the mean time all the other parts of the expedition had failed. One part had been to distract attention by a movement of General Custer, with cavalry and artillery, in the direction of Charlottesville. It had come to grief. It had reached the vicinity of Rio Mills, where Stuart's horse artillery, under Major Beckham, was stationed. As soon as the enemy crossed the Rivanna river, the artillery, supported by some furlough- ed and dismounted men, opened on the advancing column. This seemed entirely unexpected, some of the Yankees exclaim- ing, " By , the Secesh have been reinforced ; let's go back," which they did at a double-quick ; nor did they halt to camp until they reached their infantry supports at Madison Court-house. Kilpatrick's part of the expedition had manifested a similar ludicrous cowardice. He had reached the outer line of the Richmond fortifications at a little past ten on the morning of the 1st of March. A desultory fire was kept up for some hours, in which the Yankees who had proposed a desperate in- road into Richmond never once got within range of our artil- lery, and, satisfied to boast that they had been within sight of the city, withdrew, and took up their line of march down the Peninsula. Unapprised of these dastardly events, Dahlgren, on the 2-iO THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. night of the 1st of March, pursued his way towards Eichmond, following the "Westhara plank-road, with some seven or eight hundred horsemen. An exhibition of cowardice was reserved for him, unequalled even by that of Custer, or Kilpatrick. All that stood in the darkness of that night between Dahl- gren and Richmond, between the ferocious Yankee and the revenge he had plotted to pour in blood and fire upon the de- voted capital of the Confederacy, was a force of local soldiery, composed of artisans from the Kichmond Armory, and clerks, many of them young boys, from the departments of the gov- ernment. Such was the force that was to give to Dahlgren's " braves" a lesson for their temerity. The Armory battalion was on the enemy's flank, and ap- pears to have been surprised. But when the enemy came in contact with Henly's battalion (the clerks), the valorous cav- alry broke at the first fire. The first volley of musketry seems to have done all the disaster that occurred, and to have finished the business. Eleven of Dahlgren's Yankees were killed and thirty or forty wounded, while the rest scattered in shameful flight. After this disgraceful afi'air, Dahlgren seemed to be anxious only for his retreat. He divided his forces so as to increase the chances of escape. The force under his immediate com- mand moved down the South bank of the Pamunkey, and crossed the river at Dabney's Ferry. From the ferry they pro- ceeded by the most direct route to Ayletts on the Mattapony, watched closely at every step b}'^ scouts detached from Lieu- tenant James Pollard's company of Lee's Rangers, then on picket duty and recruiting service in King William County, the residence of most of it members. Pollard, himself, while passing through the streets of Richmond, had chanced to see at a newspaper office a bulletin giving some account of the retreat of Dahlgren's party, and declaring that he would make them "pay toll" on their route, had posted to intercept the fugitives. The ferry-boat on the Mattapony having been previously re- moved, and Pollard's arrangements for disputing the passage of the Yankees when they reached the King and Queen side being suspected, they dashed across the river as precip- itately as possible under the tire of a small squad of rangers. THE TIIIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. 241 The Yimlcees had no sooner readied King and Queen County than they were harassed, both front and rear, by the Rangers, showing fight as tliey advanced, until Pollard was reinforced by Captain Fox of the Fifth Virginia Cavalry and some of his men then on furlough in the county, some mem- bers of Lieutenant-colonel Robins' cavalry, and a few home guards. While Dahlgren, M'ith liis party of fugitives constantly slip- ping from him by straggling, and with sinking spirits, pursued the road to Walkerton, the improvised force of Confederates kept pressing him, while a detachment, making a rapid circuit, got ahead of him, and awaited his approach in the darkness of the night. Seeing some figures ahead on the road, Dahl- gi en. rode towards them, requiring for his protection that Captain Dement, the prisoner he had taken at Frederick Hall, should ride by his side. " Surrender," he shouted, to what he supposed was a few skulkers, who would instantly accede to the command. " Fire," was the reply. " Give 'em hell, boys," yelled Pollard ; and the woods were lighted up with a volley from Confederate muskets. It was enough. Dahlgren fell dead from his horse, two bullets in the head, two in the body, and one in the hand. Captain Dement's horse was shot under him. The woods were filled with fugitive Yankees, who had fled at the first volley, and who might be heard in the dark- ness of the night imploring the Confederates to have the kind- ness to come up and accept their surrender. The remnant of Dahlgren's party captured here in the night was one hundred and forty negroes and Yankees. On the body of their leader were found the remarkable doc- uments to which we have referred : papers showing the fiend- ish purpose of his expectation, and revealing to the startled sensibilities of the people of Richmond, the horrors which tliey luid narrowly escaped. The following address to the officers and men of the com- mand was written on a sheet of paper having in printed letters on the upper corner, " Headquarters Third Division, Cavalry Corps, , 1864 :" Officers and Men : You have been selected from brigades and regiments as a picked command to attempt a desperate undertaking — an undertaking which, if successful, will 16 242 Till'; TlllKl) YKAR OF TIIK WAR. •write your names on the hearts of your countrymen in letters that can never bo erased, and which will cause the prayers of our fellow soldiers now confined in loatlisome prisons to follow you and yours wherever you may go. We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Island first, and liaving seen them fairly started we will cross the James river into Richmond, destroying the bridges after us, and exhorting the released prisoners to destroy and hum the hateful city, and do not allow the rebel leader Dams, and his traitorous r.reio to escape. The prisoners must render great assistance, as you cannot leave your ranks too far, or become too much scattc^red, or you will be lost. Do not allow any personal gain to lead you off, which would only bring you to an ignominious death at tin- hands of citizens. Keep well together and obey orders strictly, and all will be well, but on no account scatter too far ; for in union there is strength. With strict obedience to orders, and fearlessness in the execution, you will bo Bure to succeed. We will join the main force on the other side of the city, or perhaps meet them inside. Many of you may fall ; but if there is any man here not willing to sacrifice his life in such a great and glorious undertaking, or who does not feel capable of meeting the enemy in such a desperate fight as will follow, let him step out, and he may go hence to the arms of his sweetheart, and read of the braves who swept through the city of Richmond. We want no man who cannot feel sure of success in such a holy cause. We will have a desperate fight ; but stand up to it when it does come, and all will be well. Ask the blessing of the Almighty, and do not fear the enemy. U. Dahlgken, Colonel Commanding. The following special orders were written on a similar sheet of paper, and on detached slips, the whole disclosing the dia- bolical plans of the leaders of the expedition : " Guides— Pioneers (with oakum, turpentine, and torpedoes) — Signal Officer — Quartermaster — Commissary : " Scouts and pickets — men in rebel uniform : " These will remain on the north bank and move down with the for«e on the south bank, not getting ahead of them ; and if the communication can be kept up without giving alarm, it must bo done ; but everything depends upon a surprise, and no one must be allowed to pass ahead of the column. Informa- tion must be gathered in regard to the crossings of the river, so that should .ve be repulsed on the south side we will know where to recross at the nearest point. All vdlls must be burned, and the canal destroyed; and also every thing which can b(^ used by the rebels must be destroyed, including the boats on the river. Should a ferry-boat be seized, and can be worked, have it moved down. Keep the force on the south side posted of any important movement of the enemy, and, in case of danger, some of the scouts must swim the river and bring us information. As we approach the city, the party must take great care that they do not get ahead of the other party on the south side, and must con- ceal themselves and watch our movements. We will try and secure the bridge Tin; Tiiiun ykar or the war. 243 to the city (one mile below Belle Isle), and release the prisoners at the same time. If we do not succeed, they must then dash down, and wc will try and carry the bridge from each side. " When necessary, the men must be filed through the woods and along the river bank. The bridges once secured, and the prisoners loose and over the river, the bridges will be secured and the city destroyed. The men must keep together and well in hand, and once in the city, it must be destroyed, and Je^lt' Diivis and Cabinet killed. " Pioneers will go along with combustible material. The ofiBcer must use his discretion about the time of assisting us. Horses and cattle, which we do not neiul immediately, must be shot rather than left. Every thing on the canal and elscnvhere, of service to the rebels, must be destroyed. As General ('uster may follow me, be careful not to give a false alarm. " The signal-otficer must bo prepared to communicate at night by rockets, and in other things pertaining to his dei)artment. " The Quart(!rmaster8 and Commissaries must be on the lookout for their de- partm(;nts, and see tliat there are no delays on their account. " The engineer officer will follow to survey the road as we pass over it, &c. " The pioneers must be prepared to construct a bridge or destroy one. They must have plenty of oakum and turpentine for burning, which will be rolled in soaked bulls and giv('n to the men to burn when we get in the city. Torpe- does will only be used by the pioneers for destroying the main bridges, &c. They must be prepared to destroy railroads. Men vdll branch off to the right with a few pioneers and destroy the bridges and railroads south of Richmond, and then join us at the city. They must be well i)repared with torpedoes, &c. The line of Falling Creek is probably the best to work along, or, as th«?y ai> proach the city, Goode's Creek ; so that no reinforcements can come uj) on any cars. No one must be allowed to pass ahead, for fear of communicating news. Rejoin the command with all haste, and, if cut ofl", cross the river above Rich- mond and rtyoin us. Men will stop at Bellona Arsenal and totally destroy it, and anything else but ho8i)ital8 ; then follow on and rejoin the command at Richmond with all haste, and, if cut off, cross the river and rejoin us. As General Custer may follow me, be careful and not give a false alarm." The exhibition of these papers, disclosing a Yankee plot of incendiarism and murder that challenged comparison with the atrocities of the darkest ages, produced a profound sensation in Richmond. Our people, although already familiar with out- rages of the enemy, were scarcely prepared to imagine such extremity of excess ; while these bloody papers were to the world an important evidence of the spirit of Yankee warfare.* * Yankee newspapers, with persistent hardihood, disputed the authenticity of these papers. The writer, whose; relative was engaged in the affair, and who himself was familiar with all the incidi^nts relating to these papers, may assert most positively that there is not a shadow of ground to question their autheii ticity. He saw the originals. In half an hour after they were fuimd on Dahl 214 THE TIIIED YEAR OF THE WAR. It is partly amusing to notice that flimsy and flippant hypo- crisy which, in Yankee newspapers, declared that Dahlgren, who had come on such an errand, when killed in a fight with our troops was " assassinated," or which, through the oflices of an alliterative strong-minded woman, the peculiar creature of Yankeedom — one " Grace Greenwood" — apotheosized, through public lectures to Y^ankee soldiers, one of the worst of their kind, and proclaimed him as " the young hero of the North." The dramatic account of the stripping of the body of the marauder, and the cutting off" the joint of a finger to get from it a diamond ring, is, however revolting to a tender humanity, nothing but an ordinary circumstance in a war where both sides have admitted what is indeed a deplorable practice — that oi '■'' peeling''^ on the battle-field. But there were some acts of the Confederate authorities in. relation to the Dahlgren afifair, which deserved a severe cen- sure, and which were wholly indefensible. Many persons in the Confederacy very justly thought that Dahlgren's raiders were not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but should be turned over to the State authorities as thieves, incen- diaries, and felons in all respects. The Confederate authorities, from motives which could only have been fear of the enemy's displeasure, declined to accede to this demand. But popular clamor was to be appeased ; and to do so the old game of " retaliation" was to be played, and its plain demands put oflT by melodramatic expedients honorable to tell, but in reality amounting to nothing. gren's body they were placed in the hands of General FitzHugh Lee ; and the soiled folds of the paper were then plainly visible. The words referring to the murder of the President and his cabinet were not interlined, but were in the regular context of the manuscript. The proof of the authenticity of the papers is clinched by the circumstance that there was also found on Dahlgren's body a private note-book, whii-h contained a rough draft of the address to his soldiers, and repetitions of some of the memoranda copied above. The writer has care- fully examined thi^s notebook — a common memorandum pocket-book, such as might be bought in New York for fifty cents — in which arc various notes, some in ink and some in pencil ; the sketch of the address is in pencil, very im- perfect, written as one who labored in composition, crossed and recrossed. It does not ditter mati'i-ially in context or language from the more precise com- po.sition, excei)t that the injunction to murder the Confederate leaders is in the rough draft made with this additional emphasis, " killed on the tipot." THE THIRD YEAE OF TUE WAR. 24:5 Dalilgren's body was buried out of sight, with the puerile mystery of a concealed grave. The Libby Prison was under- mined, several tons of powder put under it, and the threat made that if any demonstration on Richmond, such as Dahl- gren's, was ever again to occur, the awful crime, the appaling barbarity would be committed of blowing into eternity the hundreds of helpless men confined in a Confederate prison. No one can believe that such an atrocity was ever intended, under any circumstances, to be executed by the Confederacy, or that it was any thing more than the melodrama by which our weak authorities had been accustomed to avoid the real and substantial issues of " retaliation." This was not the first instance in which the Confederacy had needlessly blackened its reputation by exaggerated pretences of retaliation, which it was thought necessary to make very ferocious in their con- ception, in proportion as they were to be failures in execution. 246 THE TIIIKD YEAK OF THE WAK. CHAPTER XI. The Current of Confederate Victories. — The Red River Expedition. — Banks' Am- bitious Designs. — Condition of tlie Confederates \\^est of the Mississippi. — Banks' Extensive Preparations. — A Gala Day at Vicksburg. — Yankee Capture of Fort De Kus.=!y. — Occupation of Alexandria. — Porter's Warfare and Pillage. — Banks' Con- tinued Advance.— Shreveport, the Grand Objective Point. — Kirby Smith's Designs. — General Green's Cavalry Fight. — Battle of Mansfield. — Success of the Confeder- ates.— Battle OF Pleasant Hill. — The Heroic and Devoted Charge of the Confeder- ates. — The Scene on the Hill.— Banks Fatally Defeated. — Price's Capture of Yankee Trains. — Grand Results of Kirby Smith's Campaign. — Banks in Disgrace. — Yankee Tenure of Louisiana. — Forrest's Expedition into Kentucky. — His Gallant Assault on Fort Pillow. — Tiie Yankee Story of " Massacre." — Capture of Union City. — Con- federate Occupation of Paducah. — Chastisement of the Yankees on their own Theatre of Outrages — Capture of Plymouth, N. C. — General Hoke's Expedition. — Capture of "Fort Wessel." — Exploit of the " Albemarle." — The Assaults upon the Town. — Fruits of its Capture. — The Y'ankees in North Carolina. The current of victory for the Confederacy was still to en- large. The spring campaign of General Kirby Smith in the Trans-Mississippi was to terminate for us in one of the most decisive and fruitful successes of the war. On account of the remoteness of the theatre of action and its very imperfect com- munications with Richmond, we have now at hand but scant ma- terials for composing the history of these events, which termi- nated in the overwhelming defeat of Banks, and the complete demolition of his extensive schemes in Western Louisiana and Texas. THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION. To understand the importance of Banks' great expedition np the Red River, it is necessary to review the military situa- tion in the beginning of March. Sherman had returned to Vicksburg from his grand but disappointed expedition into Mississippi, and instead of directing his forces towards Mobile, the point of the greatest concern to the Confederates, he THE THIRD YEAE OF THE WAR. 217 detached a portion of them to General Banks' assistance, wlio, it appears, had predetermined on scattering or demolishing the Confederate force in West Louisiana, operating against Texas, and opening to Yankee spoliation and theft one of the richest cotton regions of the South. A very general impression, existed in the North that the Confederate cause west of the Mississippi was particularly liopeless. General Steele had cap- tured Little Kock, and was thought to have control of almost the entire country north of the Ked river. General Banks had captured Brownsville, and occupied several points on the Texas coast, with Yankee forces. The discouragement of the Confederate leaders was said to be so complete that the story found believers among the Yankees that Kirby Smith had determined to pay off his army, furlough his men for an indefi- nite period, and then retire with his principal officers into Mexico. The preparations of Banks, however, showed that he either contemplated a much greater resistance than what vulgar opinion in the North anticipated, or that he wals determined to insure success by that exaggeration of means which timidity always suggests. Tlie expedition had been the occasion of a complete change in his plan of military operations in the Department of the Gulf. Altogether, it was the most import- ant military enterprise ever attempted west of the Mississippi, and the largest army ever assembled in that section (amount- ing, besides the fleet, to at least forty thousand men), was entrusted with its execution. About the 1st of March the columns under General Franklin proceeded from New Orleans to Brashear City, and thence took up the line of march along the Bayou Teche. The forces nnder General A. J. Smith, from tlie Department of Tennessee, comprising the brigades under Generals F. S. Smith, Thomas, and Ellet, embarked at Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and proceeded down to the mouth of Red river, where they found a fleet of twenty gunboats ready for the ascent. The twenty transports, preceded by the twenty gunboats, started from the Mississippi on the 10th. As for the naval force of the expedition, a Northern paper stated that a more formida- ble fleet was never under a single command than that now on the western rivers under Admiral Porter. -48 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. Tlie davof the embarkation at Yieksburo; was a srala one for the Yankees. " The scene on the Mississippi river, oppo- site Yieksburg," says a Yankee correspondent, " was sublime. From the deck of tliis steamer, the flagship of the expedition, went up the long, shrill whistle, the signal for our departure, which was instantly answered by the immense fleet, each steamer's whistle screaming a reply, 'AH ready,' in notes ranging from C sharp to B flat. In Ave minutes the gigantic flotilla was in motion, the variegated lights swinging to and fro from the mastheads, while the crowded decks glistened with loyal bayonets, and the cabin windows reflected a brilliant light upon the rushing waters. Add to this picture the lively music of several brass bands, the cheering of the soldiers, eager for the approaching conflict, and their simple shelter-tents spread in miniature encampments on the upper decks of the steamers, while from the monster black chimneys the sparks fell in golden showers over the whole scene, and perhaps a slight idea will be conveyed of the romantic beauty of this rare war spectacle." The imposing expedition proceeded up the Red river Muth- out serious opposition ; and its first achievement was the cap- ture, on the 14th of March, of Fort De Russy. The fort was easily taken b}' General Smith's advance, as it was garrisoned by only two or three companies of Confederates. Had it been fully manned it would have been a difficult point to capture. The fort was intended for a large force. It consisted of a verj' strong water-battery, mounting four guns, and a bomb-proof battery of three guns, only two of which were really mounted. Both these batteries fully commanded the approaches, and were connected with a strong fort, about a quarter of a mile to the rear, by a causeway, protected by high breastworks, thus enabling the men to pass from the battery to the fort in action with comparative safety. The bomb-proof was covered with two feet of solid timber and two layers of railroad iron of the T style, fitted into each other. Porter's gunboats were not engaged ; and the garrison of the fort missed the coveted opportunity of testing the power of their superb water-battery. The Yankees took here two hun- dred and eighty-three prisoners and several heavy guns. Among the prisoners taken was Lieutenant-colonel Byrd, for- THE THIIiD YEAR OF THE WAR. 2 i9 mei-ly in command of the fort. lie was put in double-irons, and sent to the penitentiary at Baton Kouge ! Fort De Eussy having fallen, Porter had no difficulty in steaming up to Alexandria, a place of about fifteen hundred inhabitants, and the county-seat of Rapides parish. It was sit- uated on the Red river, about one hundred and fifty miles above its confluence with the Mississippi. The advance of General A. J. Smith's forces in transports, and Admiral Porter's fleet of iron-clad gunboats, anchored before the red- clay bluff's of Alexandria on the evening of the 16th March. The Yankees had now penetrated the famous cotton district of the Red river ; and Porter, who had already obtained in the South the nnen viable title of " the Tliief of the Missis- sippi," took the initiative in a system of pillage that might iiave disgraced the most ruthless and ferocious banditti. Many of the planters applied the torch to their cotton rather than it should fall into the hands of the rapacious enemy. Porter reported to his Government that upwards of four thou- sand bales of cotton had been confiscated and rescued by his gunboats : a boastful estimate, much above the truth. If cotton could not be found, the Yankees had no liesitation in making prizes of other property ; and when disappointed of plunder, they could at least give vent to their feelings in a spirit of destruction and wanton ferocity, Alexandria was occupied without resistance; and from that point Smith continued his advance towards Shreveport, one hundred and leventy miles higher up Red river. In the meantime, Franklin was making his way with all haste across the country via Franklin, New Iberia, and Opelousas, with the intention of joining Smith at Alexandria ; but he arrived at that place too late for the purpose. Smith's forces had already gone up the river, and, therefore, in order to consum- mate the junction, it was necessary for Franklin to move towards Shreveport over land. The Yankee army, now under command of General Banks, passed Grand Ecore, sixty miles from Alexandria, the fleet having, meanwhile, got within one hundred miles of Shreveport. This latter place, on the Louisiana boundary, appears to have been the grand objective point of Banks' campaign. The Trans-Mississippi district might be considered as having its 250 THE THIED TEAR OF THE WAR. centre of supplies and resources at Shreveport, and it was an obvious base of operations against Texas. Appreciating its importance, and Avitli a view of sustaining and uniting with Price, who was falling back in Arkansas, General Kirby Smith, in command of the Confederates, in giving up Fort De Eussj and the adjoining country had resolved to make a stand to cover Shreveport, and had merelj'^ designed to draw Banks to a decisive point of the campaign. On the 7th of April, Banks encountered a body of Confed- erate cavalry, under General Green, about two miles beyond Pleasant Hill. A desultory fight ensued, in which Green's cavalry, lighting in the strips of woods along the road, severely harassed the Yankees. The appearance of this force had probably taken Banks by surprise. He despatched a conrier to Franklin urging him to " hasten up," and announcing that he was " surrounded by rebel cavalry." BATTLE OF MANSFIELD. Four miles from the town of Mansfield, on the 8th of April, General Banks found himself encountered by a considerable Confederate army, composed of forces under Kirby Smith, Dick Taylor, Mouton, Green, and some of Price's men. The Yankee cavalry were cautiously advancing, when the Confed- erates suddenly assailed the enemy's front ki strong force. The contest continued fiercely for several Iwurs, wJien the Yankees were driven back with great loss, and both wings of Banks' army flanked. A retreat appeared to be inevitable, should the Confederates continue to assault the enemy's front. The Yankee artillery played furiously upon the Confederate lines. But they continued to advance boldly, onr devoted men evincing a desperate determination to conquer or perish in the attempt. An order of retreat was at last given by Banks. But the retreating force found the road blocked up by their trains, which had got into confusion. The retreat soon became a route and a panic ensued. The Confederates pushed on in pursuit, capturing eighteen guns, all of General Lee's wagon trains, and driving the panic-stricken mass of fuiritive Yankees for ten miles to Pleasant Hill. Here LT. GEN. KIRBY SMITH. SigrapTBcL for "tke ThircLYeaT of the War. THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. 251 Franklin, who had at last come up, opened his line of battle and allowed the latter to pass. The Yankees reported their loss about fifteen hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Ainong the Confederates, General Mouton had fallen in the action, his body pierced by four balls. BATTLE OF PLEASANT HILL. The next day Banks had his forces well in hand ; during the night General A. J. Smith having arrived with fresh troops. The place he had selected for a decisive battle was a large open field, once cultivated, but now overgrown with trees and bushes. In the centre of the field was a slight elevation, from which the name. Pleasant Hill, was taken ; and a semicircular belt of timber ran around the field on the Shreveport side. The engagement of the two armies was scarcely more than skirmishing until about five o'clock in the afternoon. One of the most thrilling scenes of mortal contest was now to take place. The Confederates reached the open ground and moved on to the attack in three lines of battle. The Yankee batteries and infantry opened with terrible efifect, making great slaugh- ter with grape and canister, while the Confederate artillery, being in the woods and in bad position, did scarcel}'' any dam- age. The fighting was terrific. The Confederates pressed furiously on. The Yankees were pushed back, Taylor's bat- tery taken, and the enemy's line pushed up the hill. As the second line of Confederates appeared on the crest of the hill, the death-signal was sounded, and from the long line of can- non and crouching forms of men there leaped a terrible and destroying fire. Thousands of rifles blazed away, and cannon loaded nearly to the muzzles belched forth destruction. Find- ing it impossible to force the enemy further, the Confederates fought their way slowly and steadily back to their original line. The enemy could not be rallied after such proof of valor. In vain General Smith ordered a charge. Night was near at hand, and the engagement dwindled into desultory skirmishing. The loss of the enemy in this engagement is not exactly known, though probably much greater than he reported — ^two 252 THE THIRD YEAR OF TH^ WAE. thousand. After the battle Banks fell back to the hne of the JRed River, and took position at Grand Ecore, near Nachitoches, Thus ended the fearful and bloody struggle for the control of Western Louisiana, and the important destinies it involved. Some days later there was an exchange of fire between Porter's gunboats and a force of Confederate mounted infantry about twenty-five miles above Grand Ecore, in which, un- happily, the brave General Green was killed by the fragment of a shell. The Yankees made various pretences to conceal the extent of their disaster. It was declared that the redoubtable Banks had only fallen back for " rest and rations," and that Steele was pushing forward from Arkansas with fifteen thousand men. The fact was that the latter commander had left Little Rock with twelve thousand infantry, and three thousand cav- alry; but Price, whom he imagined he was driving helplessly before him, had turned at Camden, and captured all his trains. The Yankee version of this event was that Steele had hroken through Price's lines and got back to Little Rock to save it from Marmaduke who was advancing upon it. The results of the campaign of Kirby Smith were for us the most substantial ever achieved in the Trans-Mississippi. The expedition of Banks had proved a failure, and nothing was left for him but to retreat to Alexandria, after losing several thou- sand prisoners, and thirty-five pieces of artillery. The expedi- tion of Steele into Western Arkansas had, as we have seen, ended in a complete disaster. The immediate points of our victories, as summed up in the ofiicial report of General Kirby Smith, were eight thousand killed and wounded, six thousand prisoners, thirty-five pieces of artillery, twelve hundred wagons, one gunboat, and three transports. These wagons comprised the whole of Steele's train, which had been captured in Arkan- sas. It was supposed, at one time, that the portion of Por- ter's fleet, above the falls at Alexandria, would have to be abandoned ; but they were released from their unpleasant position by building a tree-dam of six hundred feet across the river at the lower falls, which enabled all the vessels to pass — the back-water of the Mississippi reaching Alexandria, and enabled the vessels to pass over all the shoals and the obstruc- tions planted by the Confederates, to a point of safety. THE THIRD YEAR OF TriE WAR. 253 It was late in tlie month of May, when Banks arrived at New Orleans, Avith the remnants of his army. In moving across the country, during his retreat from Alexandria, he left the Red River at Fort De Rnssy, and struck for Semmesport, where he crossed the Atchafalaya, and then marched to Mor- ganza, on the Mississippi. The complete failure of the expe- dition was beyond disguise, and was the topic of severe criti- cism in the North. Althongh Banks was still permitted to remain in command of his department, as were Rosecrans and Steele, he was placed under the order of General Can by, whose first business was to resupply the troops brought back by Gen- eral Steele and General Banks from the disastrous campaign of the Red River, and to reorganize from these disjected mate- rials the army of the Trans-Mississippi. Banks' splendid empire west of the Mississippi was now practically reduced to the tenure of New Orleans, the banks of the river, and a strip of coast. " If," said a " loyal" observer, at New Orleans, "onr friends at the North choose to amuse themselves with the idea that Louisiana is reclaimed, and again loyal, we ought not to complain of so cheap an entertainment. In truth, under the mild sway of Governor Hahn, M'ho was elected by several thousand majority, there is just so mnch of Lonisiana in the Union as is covered by our pickets. Outside of New Orleans, no Union officer or citizen can ride alone in safety two miles from the Mississippi, except where our organ- ized soldiery move." Banks had stripped the coast and frontier for his expedition towards Shreveport. He had played a heavy stake in his campaign, and he had plainly and irrevocably lost it. FORKEST S EXPEDITION INTO KENTUCKY. On the other side of the Mississippi we left Forrest, the fa- mous cavalry chief of the West, driving back the Yankee cavalry that had threatened to descend tlirough Northern Mis- sissippi with fire and sword. The unwearied Confederate was on the war path again. By long and rapid inarches, Forrest and his men frigadier-gencral Wessell, of the old United States army. On the 17th of April, our forces were within two miles of THE THIRD TEAR OF THE "WAR. 257 Plymouth, having marched through swamps and across swollen creeks a distance of seventy-five miles without the knowledge of the enemy. Kemper's brigade, with a battery of twelve- pounder Napoleons and three twentj'^-pounder Parrotts, was de- tached to attack Warren Neck, a strong position on the river a mile above the town, which the enemy thought, and we feared, would effectually stop the passage of our " ram " — the Albemarle — and so deprive us of her valuable aid. About sunset, Bearing and Peid, with their rifle artillery, opened a brisk fire upon Fort Warren, at fifteen hundred yards, with marked effect, soon cutting down the garrison flag- staff'. The gunboats steamed up to the assistance of the fort. One was speedily sunk and another seriously damaged. Early the next morning, our artillery under Colonel Branch opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's works, which they vigor- ously responded to. That afternoon General Hoke determined to carry " Fort Wessell " with his and Kemper's brigades, and one battery under Major Peid ; he ordered Ransom, with his brigade, and Branch, witli fourteen pieces of artillery, to make a heavy demonstration simultaneously with his attack. Pansom's brigade, with the 8th North Carolina, was drawn up in the woods, facing the works on the Washington, Lee's Mill, and Bath roads. A heavy line of skirmishers was thrown out, and advancing rapidly with the peculiar gait of the sharp- shooters, and the yell with which Confederate troojDS go to the charge, drove the enemy back into his works, and approached within two hundred and fifty yards of the fort, earnestly de- manding to be led into the place. Meanwhile, Pegram's bat- tery dashed forward at a run, supported by the infantry, and unlimbering, delivered a furious fire upon the devoted place. Three times the infantry advanced, each time nearer, until within good charging distance ; but the artillery had it all to themselves. The movement was merely a demonstration to call off the enemy's attention from Hoke's attack upon Fort Wessel. The enemy being now fully engaged on the right. General Hoke made a vigorous attack upon Fort AVessell with artillery and infantry — the enemy opposing a spirited resistance. Our infantry again and again charged the fort, the enemy hurling at. them hand-grenades ; but the strong stockade, deep ditch, 17 2.jS the third year of the war. and liigli parapet prevented our men from scaling it. During one of tliese charges, the intrepid Colonel Mercer, command- ing Ilokc's brigade, fell mortally wounded at the head of his command. Finally, onr infantry snrrounded the fort, tlie ar- tillery advanced to within two hundred yards of it, and Colo- nel Dearing, in behalf of General Hoke, demanded a surrend- er of the phice, which was immediately complied with, and fifty-two prisoners marched to the rear. About two o'clock the next morning, onr iron-clad, the Al- bemarle, mounting two l^ruoke rifled guns, and commanded by Captain Cooke, ])assed easily over the obstructions from the liigli water, passed Fort Warren without eliciting a shot, our sharpshooters so closely investing the fort that the coward- ly cann(jniers would not man their guns. Steamingjust below Plymouth, she met the Miami, commanded by Flusser, and the Southfield, under French. They were side by side of each other, and connected by heavy iron cables, with the hope of entan- gling the Albemarle and running her ashore, or breaking her propeller, and then boarding her. Each of these boats candied eight guns of very heavy calibre, and were regarded equal to any in the waters of EasteiMi Carolina. The gallant Cooke headed directly for the Southfield, gave her the contents of his bow gun, and striking her forward with his prow, she imme- diately began to sink, and with such rapidity, that before the Albemarle could disengage herself she was well nigh carried down, water running in at her ports. This occasioning some delay, the Miami fled, but not until she was severely punished, her commander, Flusser, and many of her crew be- ing killed. Having obtained possession of Fort Wessell, General Hoke arranged his forces for an assault upon the town, sending Han- som on the right to make a demonstration or attack as he thought best, while Hoke, with his and Kemper's brigades, would attack on the left. At early dawn on the morning of the 28th, our infantry moved forward, and our artillery, consisting of Blount's, Mar- bhaH's, and Lee's batteries, under Colonel Branch, dashed for- ward at a full gallop into position, and opened immediately upon the town and forts at about twelve hundred yards. The enemy by this time had concentrated a most terrific fire from THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 259 tlieir siege and field guns. Just at tliis time General Iloke opened, with his artillery, a very rapid and tremendous fire, and his infantry sent up yell after yell as if charging. Ransom caught the sound, and rising in his stirrups, from the head and right of the line, in a clear and ringing voice gave the com- mand, " Charge, boys, and the place is yours." In ten minutes the two outer forts, with eight guns, were captured, our infantry scaling their parapets, and the artillery within one hundred and fifty yards of the forts, horses and limbers blown up and cannoniers shot down, and yet those re- maining stood to their guns, without shelter, confident of vic- tory and to avenge their dead. The whole command, ofiicers and men, infantry and artillery, seemed enthused with the in- spiration of certain victory. Several hundred prisoners were * captured in these forts, which were immediately sent to the rear, and now began the contest for the town, more than half a mile in. length, the enemy's infantry slowly retiring, and stubbornly resisting our advance; Fort Williams dealing out grape and spherical case ; their field-pieces, at the further ex- tremities of the broad, straight streets, raking them with a murderous fire ; their infantry, in the houses and cellars, and behind fences, delivering galling charges of minies ; but all of no avail ; our men were aroused, confident, and irresistible. They pressed on steadily, without halt or hesitation, tearing down fences, hedges, and every obstacle that they met, cap- turing the enemy at every step. The town was ours. But still "Wessell, shut up in his strong- hold, Fort Williams, refused to yield. A heavy cannonade was opened upon the fort, and the garrison was galled by our sharpshooters. At last some of the Confederates, creeping for- ward through the intrenchments, got an enfilading fire upon them, wiiich soon brought them to terms, and hundreds of them rushed out of the " fort without arms and surrendered. Just at this time a shell burst directly on the magazine, and when the smoke cleared away, the hated fl^ag was fluttering rapidly down to the ground. The fruits of this capture were sixteen hundred prisoners, twenty-five pieces of artillery, vast quantities of commissary and quartermaster supplies, and immense ordnance stores. Our loss in killed and wounded was about three hundred. We ^60 THE THIED YEAE OF THE WAE. had also destroyed two gunboats, and with all, had obtained the strong position of Plymouth, which protected the whole Hoanoke valley. The Yankees now held but two places on the North Carolina coast, AVashington, at the mouth of Tar river, and Newbern, at the mouth of the ISTeuse. The latter was strongly gar- / risoncd, but the larger part of the forces at Washington had y'^^'^ been moved up to Plymout hT", It was supposed that General Hoke would prosecute his campaign against Newbern ; but his forces were suddenly to be recalled to more imposing scenes, and to a participation in the great crisis of 1864 in Virginia. 2fil THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAB. *^* CHAPTEK XIL Close of the Third Year of the War.-Sketch of the Subsequent Operations in Vir- ginia and Georgia.-GuANT's " ON-To-R.cHMoxD."-The Comb.nat.on Aga.ust the Confederate Capital.-THK Battlks of thk Wildehness.-A Thnlhng Cr.MS.-Grant on the Verge of Rout.-Hi. First Design Baffled.-TnE Battles of Spottsylvania CouRT-HocsK.-Death of General Sedgwiek.-THE Carnage of May the ISTH.-tive Battles in Six Davs.-Grant's Obstinacy.-" The Bateher."-Shendan . ixped.Uon. -Death of General "Jeb" Sti.art.-Butler's Operations on the South Side of the James -" The Beast" at the Back-Door of Richmond.-He is Driven to Bermuda Hundred by Beauregard.-Defeat of Sigel in the Valley.-Grant's Movement Down the Valley of the Rappahannock. -His Passage of the ?amunkey.-Re-organ.zation of General Lee's Lines.-Granl's Favorite Tactics.-Yankee Exultation at h.s Approach to Richmond-Caricatures of the Confederacy.-A Hasty Apotheosis -A True The- ory of Grant's " Flank Movement8."-His Occupation of McClellan's Old L.nes.-rHE Battle of the Chickahominy or Cold Harbor.-A Confederate Victory m Ten Minutes -What Had Become of Yankee Exultation.-Review of the Rival Routes to Richmond -Grant Crosses the James River.-His Second Grand Combination Against Richmond.-Hunter's Capture of Staunton.-THE Battles of PETERSRCRO.-General Wise's Heroic Address.-Engagement of 16th June.-Grand Assault of 18lh June.~ on " the Cockade City/'-ADecisive defeat of the Yankees.-Engagement at Port Walthal Junction-Sheridan's Defeat Near Gordonsville.- Hunter s Repulse at Lynchburg -Two Affairs on the Weldon Railroad.-Grant's Second Combination a Complete Failure.-Discouragement of the North.-The Gold Barometer.-Secretary Chase's Deelaration.-SHivBMAN's " 0.N--T0-ATLANTA."-Hi3 Flanking Movement.- En-agement in Resaca Valley.-Johnston's Retreat -Engagement at New Hope.- Johnston's Telegram to Richmond.-Defeat of Sturgis's Expedition in Mmsissippi - Battle of Kenesaw MouNTAiN.-Sherman's Successful Strategy.-The Confederates Fall Back to Atlanta.-THE Battles OF ATLANTA.-Hood's Gallant Defence.- . . . , The Military Situation in July, 1864.-Grant's Failure.-His Consumption of Troops. -Review of Yankee Atrocities in the Summer Campaign of 1864.-Sherman » Char- acter.-His Letter on " Wild Beasts."-His War on Factory Girl.s.-buflermgs of Confederate Women and Children.-Ravages in ^eorgia.-Hunter 8 Vandalism m Virginia.-" The Avengers of Fort Pillow."-Sturgis and his Demons.-The Spirit of the Confederates.- . . . Some Words on » Peace Negotiations.''-A Piratical Prop- osition and an Infamous Bribe.-The Heroic Choice of the Confederates. The third year of the war closes properly at the month of May, according to our arrangement of dates in preceding vol- umes. But on account of the magnitude of what is closely subsequent, it is thought advisable to give a summary and very general sketch of the material events of the enemy's two grand campaigns of the summer of 1S64:— the parallel operations of Grant and Sherman in Virginia and in Georgia ;— at least, so 262 TIIK THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. far as to bring the reader to a stand-point of intelligent obser- vation, with reference to questions of peace and negotiation wliicli were agitating the ])ublic mind at the time tliese pages were committed to the press. We sliall follow their campaigns only to what appear to be their decisive stages in June and July. The period we shall thus rapidly traverse we hope to go over in another volume with a more perspicuous narrative, and certainly with much more abundant detail. GRANT 8 *' ON-TO-RICHMOND. General Ulysses S. Grant was now to answer tlie eager ex- pectation of the public by a campaign of unrivalled importance in Virginia. lie had hitherto been known in the North as the great (icneral of the West, and the Yankee newspapers had entitled him the hero of Fort Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicks- burg. His elevation had been rapid. Four years ago the man who coinmanded all the armies of the North had been a tanner, and at the beginning of the war had been accidentally selected to lead a regiment of I'aw recruits. From the moment of receiving his commission as Lieutenant- General, Grant had transferred his personal presence to the Army of the Potomac, leaving Sherman as his vicegerent to carry out the Western campaign. Warren, Sedgwick, and Hancock, were made the corps commanders of this army, and Uurnsidc was given a separate army corps. Butler at Fortress Monroe was reinforced by the Tenth corps from Charleston under Gilmore, and the Eighteenth from the West, under " Baldy" Smith. To the infamous hero of New Orleans was allotted the task of cutting off the city of Richmond from its southern lines of communication ; while Sigel operating in the Shenandoah Valley was to cut the railroad which by way oi Gordonsville connected Lee's army with his principal base of supplies at Lynchburg. Thus were the preparations completed for the most momen- tous campaign in American history. On Wednesday, May 4, jiiHt eight weeks from the day Grant received his commis- sion, his two grand columns were ready to move — the one THE tiiihd tkar of the war. 263 well in lumd on tlio north bank of the Rapidan, seventy miles north of liichmond, and the other at Fortress Monroe, one day's sail from Richmond on the James. THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. At dawn on tiie 5th of May, the Army of the Potomac, closely succeeded by that of Burnside, had crossed the Ilapi- dan river ; the Second corps at Ely's, the Fifth and Sixth corps at Germania ford. Having crossed the river, the first demon- stration of the enemy was an attempt to turn the right flank of Lee's army, between the Orange Court-house pike and the river. The assault was sustained by Iletii and Wilcox's di- visions of the Confederate Army, during the entire day ; and that it was successfully sustained even the Northern accounts do not hesitate to admit. "No cheer of victory," says a Nor- thern correspondent," swelled through the Wilderness that night." During the day Hancock, Second corps, had come up, and the FederaJ forces were concentrated. On the morning of the 6th their lines were consolidated and freshly p'ostcd ; the three corps sustaining their respective positions — Warren in the centre, Sedgwick on the right, and Hancock on the left. The attack was made by the Confederates; Hill and Long- street's corps attacking both of Hancock's flanks with such fury, that the whole line of command thus assaulted is broken in several places. The effort, however, of the Confederates to pierce the enemy's centre is stayed, the Yankees having secured their line of battle beiiind their entrenchments. But with the expiration of the day was to occur a thrilling and critical conjuncture. Just at dusk (the Confederates' fa- vorite hour of battle) a column of Lee's army attacked the enemy's left, captured Seymour and a large jjortion of his bri- gade, and excited a panic which put Grant's whole army on the verge of irretrievable rout. Unfortunately, the Confed- erates had no idea of the extent of their success, and could not imagine how fraiight with vital issue were those few moments of encounter. The Yankee supply trains were thought to be immediately threatened, and artillery was posted to bear upon 264 THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. the Confederate advance in that direction. But the Confed- erates did not press tlieir advantage. As it was, Generals Shaler and Seymour, with the greater pairt of their commands, were taken prisoners. Such had been the two days' battle of the Wilderness : a marked success for the Confederates, disputed by the Northern newspapers,' of course, but manifest in the face of the facts. The enemy confessed to a loss of twelve thousand. The im- mediate consequence of these engagements was, that Grant being clearly outgeneralled in his first design of reaching Lee's rear and compelling him to fight a battle with his communica- tions cut off, which would be decisive of the campaign, was forced to change his plans, and with it his position ; falling back to his entrenched line, between the Wilderness and Trigg's Mill, nearly coincident with the Brock road, leading from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania Court-house. On the 7th, with some desultory fighting, Grant continued his movement towards Fredericksburg, M'ith the evident view of attempting the Fredericksburg road to Richmond. It was in consequence of this change of front that General Lee took up a new line on the Po. It will amuse the candid reader to find how this movement w^as interpreted by the mendacious press of the North ; for, in the newspapers of New York and Boston it was entitled, in flaming capitals, " A Waterloo De- feat of the Confederates," " The Retreat of Lee to Richmond," &c. For a few days the North was vocal with exultation, and for the hundredth time it had the Rebellion " in a corner," to be conveniently strangled. But this imagination of easy conquest was to be dissipated as the many that had pre- ceded it. THE BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE. On the 8th of May two engagements were fought at Spott- sylvania Court-house, between Longstreet's corps, under An- derson (General Longstreet having been wounded in the battle of the 6th) and the Fifth corps, under Warren, supported by cavalry. The enemy was repulsed, with heavy loss, in both instances. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 265 On the 9th, which was marked by some skirmishing, Gen- eral John Sedgwick, one of the most valuable corps command- ers in the Yankee army, was killed, probably by a stray bullet. He had just been bantering his men about dodging and duck- ing their heads at the whistle of Confederate bullets in the dis- tance. " Why," said he, " they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." The next moment a ball entered his face, just below the left eye, and pierced his brain, causing instant death. On Thursday, the 12th of May, occurred what may be entitled as the great battle of Spottsylvania Court-house. The enemy had planned an attack on what was supposed to be a vital section of the Confederates, a salient angle of earth- works held by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps. The storm- ing column advanced silently, and without firing a shot, up to the angles of the breastworks, over which they rushed, taking the forces within in flank, surrounding them, capturing nearly the entire division of Johnson's, with its commander, and also a brigade or two of other troops. Brigadier-general George H. Stuart in command. But the surprise was only momentary. For long hours a battle raged over those intrenchments, the intense fury, hero- ism, and horror of which it is impossible to describe. From dawn to dusk the roar of guns was ceaseless ; a tempest of shell shrieked through the forest and ploughed the field. Ewell's corps held the critical angle with a courage that noth- ing could subdue. General Hill moved down from the right, joined Ewell, and threw his divisions into the struggle. Long- street came on from the extreme left of the Confederate line. Column after column of the enemy was hewn down, or repulsed and sent back like a broken wave. At all points the enemy was repulsed with enormous loss. The ground in front of the Confederate lines was piled with his slain. The sixth day of heavy fighting had been ended. "It would," says an intelligent critic of this period, " not be im- possible to match the results of any one day's battle with stories from the wirs of the old world ; but never, we should think, in the history of man were five such battles as these compressed into six days." Grant had been foiled ; but his obstinacy was apparently untouched, and the fierce and brutal 2G6 THE THIRD YEAE OF THE WAK. * consumption of human life, anotlier element of his generalship, and wliich had already obtained for him with his soldiers the soubriquet of " the butcher," was still to continue. lie tele- graphed to "Washington : " I propose to light it out on this line, if it takes' all sunnner." But we must turn for a few moments from this dominant field of action and interest to notice other movements, which were parts of Grant's combination, and of the great military drama in Virginia. While Grant was engaged on the Hapidan, a cavalry expe- dition of tiie enemy, commanded by General Sheridan, moved around Lee's right flank to the North Anna river; committed some damage at Beaver Dam ; moved thence to the South Anna and Ashland station, where the railroad was destroyed ; and finally found its way to the James at Turkey Island, where it joined the forces of Butler. The damage inflicted by this raid was not very considerable ; but it was the occasion of a severe fight, on the 10th May, at Yellow Tavern, on the road to Tlichmond, where Sheridan encountered a Confederate cav- alry force, in which engagement was lost the valuable life of General J. E. B. Stuart, the brilliant cavalry commander, who had so long made Virginia the theatre of his daring and chiv- alric exploits. The column of Butler, the important correspondent to Grant's movement, intended to operate against Bichmond on the south side, had raised the hopes of the North merely to dash them by a failure decisive in its character, and ridiculous in all its circumstances. On the 5tli of May, Butler proceeded with his fleet of gunboats and transports, and the Tenth and Eighteenth army corps, up the James river, landing at Wil- son's Wharf a regiment of Wild's negro troops, and two brigades of the same color at Fort Powhatan ; thence up to City Point, where Ilinks' division was landed ; and at Ber- muda Hundred, just below the mouth of the Appomattox, the entire army was disembarked. On the 7th, five brigades, under General Brooks, struck for the Petersburg and Bichmond Railroad, and succeeded in destroying a bridge seven miles north of Petersburg. In the mem time, Butler, after intrenching himself, closed about the defences of Drury's Bhiff. The Yankee general seemed confi- TIIK THIRD TKAR OF THE WAK. 267 dent that he could, by a little fighting, in conjunction with the powerful flotilla upon the James, easily overconie the main barrier to his approach to the rear of the Confederate capital, presented in the defences of Drury's Bluff. It was already announced to the credulous public of the North that Butler had cut Beauregard's army in twain ; that he had carried two lines of the defences of Drury's Blufi"; and that he held the keys to the back-door of Richmond. On Monday, the 16th of May, General Beauregard fell upon the insolent enemy in a fog, drove Butler from his advanced positions back to his original earthworks, and inflicted upon liim a loss of five thousand men in killed, M^ounded, and captured. lie had fallen upon the right of the Yankee line of battle with the force of an avalanche, completely crushing it backward and turning Butler's flank. The action was decisive. The day's operations resultf^l in Butler's entire army being ordered to return from its advanced position, within ten miles of Iiich- mond, to the line of defence known as Bermuda Hundred, be- tween the James and Appomattox rivers. While Butler had thus come to grief, the failure of Sigel, who threatened the valley of Virginia, was no less complete. On the 15th his column was encountered near Newmarket by General Breckinridge, who drove it across the Shenandoah, captured six pieces of artillery and nearly one thousand stand of small arms, and inflicted upon it a heavy loss; Sigel aban- doning his hospitals and destroying the larger portion of his train. We left Grant defeated in the action of the 12th in front of Spottsylvania Court-house. On the 14th, he moved his lines by his left flank, taking position nearer the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad. On the 18th he attempted an assault on Ewell's line, which was easily repulsed. It was admitted by the enemy that the object of this attack was to turn Lee's left flank, and that their line got no further than the abattis, when it Avas ''''ordered'''' back to its original position. A new movement was now undertaken by Grant : to pass his army from the line of the Po, down the valley of the Rap- pahannock. It thus became necessary for General Lee to evac- uate his strong position on the line of the Po ; and by an ad- mirable movement he had taken a new position between the 268 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. North and South Anna, before Grant's army had arrived at the former stream. Having cut loose from Fredericksburg as a base (and established depots on the Lower Rappahannock), on the 21st Grant's forces occupied Milford Station and Bowling Green, and were moving on the well known high roads to Richmond. But they were again intercepted ; for Lee had planted himself between Grant and Richmond, near Hanover Junction. On the 23d, and on the 25th, Grant made attempts on the Confederate lines, which were repulsed, and left him to the last alternative. Another flanking operation remained for him, by which he swung his army from the North Anna around and across the Pamunkey. On the 27th, Hanovertown was reported to be occupied by the Yankee advance under General Sheridan ; and on the 28th Grant's entire army was across the Pamunkey. In the mean time. General Lee also reformed his line of bat- tle, north and south, directly in front of the Virginia Central railroad, and extending from Atlee's Station, south, to Shady Grove, ten miles north of Richmond. In this position he cov- ered both the Yirginia Central and the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroads, as well as all the roads leading to Rich- mond, west of, and including the Mechanicsville pike. The favorite tactics of Grant appear to have been to devel- ope the left flank ; and by this characteristic maneuver, he moved down the Hanover Court-house road, and on the first day of June took a position near Cold Harbor. Grant was now within a few miles of Richmond. The vul- gar mind of the North readily seized upon the cheap circum- stance of his proximity in miles to the Confederate capital, and exclaimed its triumph. The capture of Richmond was discounted as an event of the next week. The Yankee periodi- cals were adorned with all those illustrations which brutal triumph could suggest; Grant drubbing Lee across his knee ; the genius of Yankee liberty holding aloft an impersonation of the Southern Confederacy by the seat of the breeches, marked " Richmond ;" Jefferson Davis playing his last card, ornament- ed with a crown of death's heads, and with his legs well girt with snakes ; and a hundred other caricatures alike character- istic of the vulgar thought and fiendish temper of the Yankee. THE THIKD YEAR OF THE WAR. 269 To such foolish extremity did this premature celebration go, that a meeting was called in New York to render the thanks of the nation to Grant, and twenty-five thousand persons com- pleted the hasty apotheosis. But for the candid and intelligent, the situation of Grant was one of sinister import to him, implied much of disaster, and was actually a consequence of his repeated disappointments. The true theory of it was defeat, not victory. He did nothing more than hold the same ground as that occupied by General McClellan in his first peninsular campaign. This position, had he come by that point, a day's sail from Washington, he could have occupied without the loss of a single man. But he had occupied it by a devious route ; with a loss variously estimated at from sixty to ninety thousand men ; witli the consumption of most of his veteran troops, whom he had put in front; with the disconcert and failure of those parts of the drama which Butler and Sigel were to enact ; and with that demoralization which must unavoidably obtain in an army put to the test of repeated defeats and forced marches. What was represented by the enemy as the retreat of Gen- eral Lee's army to Richmond, was simply its movement from a position which its adversary had abandoned, to place itself full before him across the new road on which he had deter- mined to travel. In this sense, it was Grant who was pursued, 'lie had set out to accomplish Mr. Lincoln's plan of an overland march upon Richmond. Mr. Lincoln's scheme as detailed by himself, in his famous letter to General McClellan, was to march by the way of the Manassas railroad. The first move- ment of General Grant was to give up that route, and fall back upon the line by which Generals Burnside and Hooker at- tempted to reach the Confederate capital — that is, the Freder- icksburg and Richmond line. But, repulsed at Spottsylvania, this route proved untenable, and General Grant was forced east and south, and adopted a new base at Port Royal and Tappahannock, on the Rappahannock river, which conformed in a measure to General McClellan's first plan of a march upon Richmond by way of Urbana. Tl^ next change Grant was compelled to make was, after finding how strong the Confed- erates were, as posted on the South Anna, to cross the Pamun- key and make his base at the White House, bearing thereafter 270 THE THIED YEAK OF THE WAE- Btill fiirUier east and fcoutli to the precise ground of McClcllan's operations. The siirnificance of all these movennents was, that Grant had utterly fuilcd in his donign of defeating: Lee's army far from its base, and pubhing the fragments before him down to Rich- mond, and had been forced to cover np his failure by adopting the derided scheme of McClellan. The event of the 12th of May at Spottsylvania Court-house, had settled the question whetlier he could beat Lee in the field and put him in a dis- astrous retreat. Unable to remove the obstacle on the thresh- old of his projjosed campaign, nothing was left but to abandon it. Grant makes his way down the valley of the Ilapjjahan- nock ; turns aside to Hanover Junction, to find a repetition of Spotts^'lvania Court-house ; deflects to the headwaters of the York ; and at last, by a monstrous circuit, reaches a point where he might have landed on the 1st of May, without loss or opposition. We may appreciate the amount of gaseous non- sense and truculent blackguardism of Yankee journals, when we find them declaring tliat these movements wei'e a footrace for Ilichmond, that Grant was across the last ditch, and that the end of the rebellion was immediately at hand. THE BATTLE OF THE CniCKAHOMINY, OK COLD HAEBOR. But we must return to the events on the Ilichmond lines. The position occupied by Grant on AVednesday, Ist of June, had been obtained after some fighting, and by the enemy's own admission had cost him two thousand men in killed and wounded. An imjjoi-tant and criticnl struggle was now to ensue. Grant hud secured a position, theimj^ortance of which was that it was the point of convergence of all the roads, radi- ating whether to Ilichmond — his objective point, or to White House — his base of suj)plie8. Ua was now to essay the pas- sage of the Chickahominy, and we were to have another deci- sive battle of Cold Harbor. ITiere is good evidence tliat Grant's intention was to make it the decisive battle of the campaign. The movements of the preceding days, culminating in the possession of Cold Harbor — an important strategic point — had drawn the enemy's lines THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 271 close in front of the Cliickahominy, and reduced the military problem to tlic forcing of the passage of that river — a pruhlem "which, if Solved in Grant's favor, would decide whether Itich- mond could be carried by a coup de main, if a decisive victory ehould attend his arms, or, whether he should betake himself to siege operations or some other recourse. Early on the morning of Friday, June 3d, the assault was made, Hancock commanding the left of the Yankee line of battle, and leading the attack. The first Confederate line was held by Breckinridge's troops, and was carried. TWe reverse was but momentary, for the troops of Millegan's brigade and the Maryland battalion, soon dashed forward, to retrieve the honors wiiich the Yankees had snatched. On every part of the line the enemy was repulsed by the quick and decisive blows of the Confederates. Hancock's corps, the only portion of the Yankee army that hud come in contact witii the Confederate works, had been hurled back in a storm of fire ; the Sixth corps had not been able to get up further than within two hundred and fifty yards of the main works; while Warren and i>urnside, on the enemy's right and right centre, were staggered on the lines of our rifle pits. The decisive work of the day was done in ten rrduuies. Kever were there such signal strokes of valor ; such despatch of vic- tory. It was stated in the accounts of the Confederates that fourteen distinct assaults of the enemy were repulsed, and that his loss was from six to seven thousand. No wonder that the insolent assurance of the capture of Richmond was displaced, in the Yankee newspapers by the ominous calculation that Grant could not afford many such experiments on the en- trenched line of the Cliickahominy, and would have to make some other resort to victory. The battle of Cold Harbor was sufficient to dispel the delu- sion of weakness and demoralization in Lee's arniy ; for this derided army, almost in the tiuie it takes to tell the story, had repulsed at every point the most determined assault of tlie enemy, and in the few brief mometits of a single morning had achieved an unbroken circuit of victories. Grant and his friends were alike dismayed. The latter insisted that he siiould have half a million more of men to accomplish his work. " We should," said a Boston paper, " have a vigorous and 272 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. overwhelming war, or else peace without further effusion of blood." A certain portion of the Yankee press maintained the unbroken lie, and told the story of an uninterrupted series of victories. An object of most curious and constant interest in the war was the rivalry of the different routes to Richmond. Mc- Clellan had chosen the peninsular approach, while Mr. Lin- coln dissented in favor of an advance from the Lower Rappa- liannock, Burnside had chosen Fredericksburg as his base ; Hooker had acted on the same choice. Meade had selected the Rapidan, as Pope had done before him. Grant came to his command, unembarrassed and untrammeled by the prece- dents and comments of others. He had hunted up the roads to Richmond, through the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court- house, and avowed his unchangeable purpose to adhere to that as his true line. He had now wandered around to McClellan's old base. But the battle of July 3d, decided that Richmond could no longer be approached with advantage from the North, and the disconcerted, shifting commander, with his stock of expedients well-nigh exhausted, found nothing now left for him but to transfer his entire army to the south side of the James river. On the 5th of June Hunter had obtained a success at Pied- mont, in Western Virginia, and had effected the capture of Staunton ; the saddest circumstance of which affair was the loss of General W. E. Jones, one of the most distinguished cavalry commanders of the Confederacy. After occupying Staunton, Hunter had formed a junction Teith the combined forces of Crook and Averill, and on the 13th of June was reported to be moving with his whole com- mand against Lynchburg. On the 7th, Sheridan had crossed the Pamunkey, and was moving eastward in the direction of the Gordonsville railroad. The main movement of the new combination — that of Grant across the James — commenced Sunday night the 12th of June. The first plan of the enemy had comprehended the advance of Sigel down the Shenandoah, and the capture of Petersburg, if nothing more, by Butler, while General Grant engaged Lee's army between the Rapidan and Richmond. Tliat plan having signally failed, the second comprised the capture of THE THIRD YKAU OF THE WAH. "Z t -J Lynclibnrg by Hunter, of Gordonsville and Cliarlottcsvillo by Sheridan, and of Petersburg by Meade. It was thus hoped to isolate the Confederate capital by catting off its communica- tions on every side. It was, perhaps, not Grant's design to cross the river until he had made some attempt on the Central and New Market roads leading into Richmond from the direction of Malvern Hill. On the 13th June, he caused a reconnoissance in force to be made from the Long Bridge toward the Quaker road, and in an affair near the intersection of this road with the Charles City road was repulsed, and drew off his forces, well satisfied that tlie Confederates held with heavy forces all the roads by which Richmond could be reached from the south- east. The Eighteenth Yankee corps had proceeded by water to Bermuda Hundred. The remaining corps had crossed the Chickahorainy at James Bridge and Long Bridge ; and after tlie reconnoissance of the 13th, proceeded down the James, and crossed in the neighborhood of City Point. THE BATTLES OF PET'EESBUEG. Petersburg had already sustained a considerable attack of the enemy. An expedition from Butler's lines had essayed its capture on the 9th of June. • Ajjproaching with nine regiments of infantry and cavalry, and at least four pieces of artillery, the enemy searched our lines, a distance of nearly six miles. Hood's and Batles' bat- talions, the Forty-sixth Virginia, one company of the Twenty- third South Carolina, with Sturdevant's battery, and a few guns in position, and Talliaferro's cavalry, kept them at bay. The Yankees were twice repulsed, but succeeded at last in penetrating a gap in our line ; when reinforcements coming up drove back the insolent foe from approaches which tlieir foot- steps for the first time polhited. The fortunate issue of this first attack on Petersburg encour- aged the raw troops and militia who had been put under arms for the defence of " the Cockade City." General Wise ad- dressed the tro4)p8 of his command in a memorable and thrill- 18 274 THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. ing order ; " Petersburg," said he, " is to be, and shall be, defended on her outer walls, on her inner lines, at her corpora- tion bounds, in every street, and around every temple of God, and altar of man," The resolution of the gallant city — with its defences rein- forced by the fortunate Beauregard — was now to be put to a much more severe test, for it was to encounter the shock of the bulk of Grant's army. Smith's corps having disembarked at Bermuda Hundred on the 14th, moved rapidly upon Petersburg, and made an assault on the batteries covering the approaches to the city on the north-east. Having got possession of this line of works, held principally by Confederate militia, Smith waited the coming up of the Second corps. On the evening of the 16th, an attack was ordered on the Confederate line of works in front of Petersburg, Smith's corps being on the right, on the Petersburg and Cit}'' Point road, west of the railroad, the Second corps in the centre, and Burn- side on the left, reaching the Prince George Court-house road. The assault was not only repulsed at every point, but our troops, assuming the aggressive, drove the Yankees from their breastworks, at Howlett's House, captured some of their guns, and opened upon them an enfilading lire, under which they fled precipitately. The most furious assault of the enemy had been made on General Hoke's front, whose division occupied a position facing batteries from Nine to Twelve inclusive. Tiiree differ- ent charges were repulsed by these heroic troops. In the final repulse of the enemy, a large portion of a Yankee brigade, being exposed to an enfilading artillery fire from our guns, sought shelter in a ravine, and surrendered to the Sixty-fourth Georgia regiment. On Friday, 17th June, fighting was renewed without result. The next day, it was resolved by the enemy to make an assault along the whole line for the purpose of carrying the town. It was thus that the action of the 18th was designed to be deci- sive of operations on the present position. Three different assaults were made by the enemy during the day — at four in the morning, at noon, and at four in the after- noon. Each one was repulsed. Hancock and -Burnside in the THE THraD TKAR OF THE WAR. 275 centre suffered severely. After severe losses on the part of all the Yankee corps, night found the Confederates still in possession of their works covering Petersburg. The disaster of this day left Grant without hope of making any impression on the works in his front, and placed him under the necessity of yet another change of operations. The series of engagements before Petersburg had cost him at least ten thousand men in killed and wounded, and had culminated in another decisive defeat. The misfortune of the enemy appeared, indeed, to be over- whelming. Pickett's division had given him another lesson at Port Walthal Junction. It was here the heroes of Gettys- burg repulsed a force under Gilmore engaged in destroying the railroad, took two lines of his breastworks and put him to disastrous flight. Kor was there any compensation to be found in the auxil- iary parts of Grant's second grand combination. Sheridan had failed to perform his part. He was intercepted by Hamp- ton's cavalry at Trevillian station on the Gordonsville road, defeated in an engagement on the 10th, and compelled to with- draw his command across the North Anna. Hunter had come to similar grief, and his repulse at Lynchburg involved conse- quences of the gravest disaster to the enemy. On the 18th of June, Hunter made an attack upon Lynch- burg from the south side which was repulsed by troops that had arrived from General Lee's lines. The next day, more re- inforcements having come up, preparations were made to attack the enemj^, when he retreated in confusion. We took thirteen of his guns, pursued him to Salem, and forced him to a line of retreat into the mountains of Western Virginia. The attempt of the Yankees to whitewash the infamous and cow- ardly denouement was more than usually refreshing. Hunter officially announced that his expedition had been " extremely successful ;" that he had left Lynchburg because " his ammu- nition was running short ;" and that as to the singular line he had taken up, he was now "ready for a move in any di- rection." But the measure of misfortune in Grant's distracted cam- paign appeared to be not yet full On the 22d he made a movement on his left to get possession of the Weldon railroad, 276 THE TIIIKI) YEAR OF THE WAR. but found the Confederates had extended theh' right to meet him. While the Second and the Sixth corps of Grant's army were attempting to communicate in this movement, the Con- federates, under General Anderson, pierced the centre, cap- tured a battery of four guns and took prisoners one entire brigade, General Pearce's, and part of another. Another attempt or raid on the railroad, by Wilson's and Ivautz's divisions of cavalry was terminated in disaster. In the neighborhood of Spottswood river, twenty-five miles south of Petersburg, on the 28th, the expedition was attacked, cut in two, the greater part of its artillery abandoned and its wagon trains left in the hands of the Confederates. The enemy had been encountered by Hampton's cavalry, and Finnegan's and JVIahone's infantry brigades; and the results of the various conflicts were enumerated as one thousand prisoners, thirteen pieces of artillery, thirty wagons and ambulances, and many small arms. It was evident that the spirit of the North had commenced to stagger under this accumulation of disaster. Gold had already nearly touched three hundred. The uneasy whispers in Wash- ington of another draft gave new suggestions to popular discon- tent. The Confederate Congress had adjourned after the publi- cation of an address referring to recent military events and the confirmed resolution of the South, and deprecating the contin- uance of the war. These declarations were eagerly seized upon by Northern journals, who insisted that no time should be lost in determining whether they might not possibly signify a willingness on the part of the South to make peace on the basis of new constitutional guaranties. The finances at Wash- ington were becoming desperate. Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, had peremptorily resigned. His last words of otficial counsel were, that nothing could save the finances but a series of military successes of undoubted magnitude. SHERMAN 8 " ON-TO-ATLANTA. Simultaneously with Grant's advance on Kichmond, Sher- man moved on Dalton in three columns : Thomas in front, Schofield from Cleveland on the north-east, while McPherson THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAR. 277 threw himself on the line of communication south-west at Ke- saca, fifteen miles south of Dalton. On the 7th of June, Thomas occupied Tunnel Hill, ten miles north-west of Dalton,, and took up a strong position at Buzzard's Roost. By the flank movement on Resaca, Johnston was forced to evacuate Dalton. On the 14th the first important battle of the campaign was fought in Resaca valley. Two efforts were made to carry the breastworks of the Confederates, without success, when John- ston in the afternoon assumed the offensive and drove the en- emy some distance, with a loss which his own bulletins stated to be two thousand. On the loth, there was desultory fighting, and on the 16th General Johnston took up at leisure his line of retrograde movement, in the direction of the Etowah river, passing through Kingston and Cassville. At both places the enemy was held in check. From Cassville, Sherman, having sent the right of his army by way of Rome, moved his centre and left across the Etowah west of the railroad, and then marched towards Dallas. On the 28th, General Cleburne's division of Johnston's army engaged the advance corps of the enemy under General Mc- Pherson at New Hope, and signally repulsed him, with heavy loss. So far, the retrograde movement of Johnston was, in some respects, a success ; it had been attended with at least two considerable victories ; it had been executed deliberately, being scarcely ever under the immediate pressure of the ene- my's advance ; and it had now nearly approached the decisive line of the Chattahoochee or whatever other line he, who was supposed to be the great strategist of the Confederacy, should se- lect for the cover of Atlanta. The events of the campaign, so far, were recounted with characteristic modesty by General John- ston. On the 1st of June, he telegraphed to Richmond of his army : " In partial engagements it has had great advantages, and the sum of all the combats amounts to a battle." In the mean time, the two armies continued to maneuver for position. Sherman held both Altoona and Ackworth with- out a battle, the latter about twelve miles from Marietta. It was said that these positions would enable him to maintain his lines of communications with Chattanooga by railway intact, 278 * THE THIKD TEAR OF THE WAR. and clear his rear of Confederates ; but he found Johnston opposing him with a strong rear-guard, and drawn close to his supplies in Atlanta and Augusta. While these events were transpiring in Georgia, an imj^ort- ant event had taken place in the South"\^est : the defeat of the Yankee expedition under Sturgis on its way from Mem- phis to operate in Slierman'srear, In this action, at Guntown, Mississippi, Sturgis lost most of his infantry and all of his ar- tillery and trains, and the Confederates, under Forrest, achiev- ed a victory that had an important influence on the campaign in Georgia. Forrest took two thousand prisoners, and killed and wounded an equal number. BATTLE OF KENES AW MOUNTAIN. On the 27th of June, General Sherman directed an attack on Johnston's position at Keiiesaw Mountain. This mountain was the apex of Johnston's lines. " Both armies were in strong works, the opposite salients being so near in some places that skirmishers could not be thrown out. The assault of the enemy was made in three columns, about eight o'clock in the morn- ing. It was repulsed on every part of the Confederate line. The loss of the enemy was considerable, even as stated in his own offieial reports. General McPherson reported his loss about five hundred, and Thomas, his, about two thou- sand. In consequence, however, of a flanking movement of the enemy on the right, Johnston on the 3d of July abandoned the mountain defence and retired toward Atlanta. It is true that Johnston's retreat to the immediate lines of Atlanta, was consummated without any considerable military disaster. But it was a sore disappointment to the public ; for it had given up to the Yankees half of Georgia, abandoned one of the finest wheat districts of the Confederacy, almost ripe for harvest, and at Rome and on the Etowah river, had surrendered to the enemy iron-rolling mills, and government works of great value. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 279 THE BATTLES OF ATLANTA. But a lesson \va^ reserved for Sherman on the Atlanta lines by the gallant and impulsive Lieutenant-general Hood, who liad taken command of the army that Johnston had, by a long and negative campaign, brought back to Atlanta. We shall not attempt here the details of the great battles of Atlanta. On the 20th of Jul}^, Hood attacked the enemy's riglit on Peach-tree creek, near the Chattahoochee, driving him from his works, and caj^turiug colors and prisoners. On tlie 22d of July, Hood's army shifted its position front- ing on Peach-tree creek, and Stewart's and Cheatham's corps formed line of battle around the city. Hardee's corps made a night march and attacked the enemy's extreme left at one o'clock, on the 22d, and drove him from his works, capturing sixteen pieces of artillery and five stands of colors. Cheatham attacked the enemy at four o'clock in the afternoon, with a portion of his command, and drove the enemy, capturing six pieces of artillery. During the engagement we captured about two thousand prisoners. After the battle of the 22d, Sherman's army was transferred from its position on the east side of Atlanta to the extreme right of Hood's army, on the west side, threatening the Macon road. Lieutenant-generals Stewart and Lee were directed by Hood to hold the Lickskillet road for the day with their com- mands. On the 28th, a sharp engagement ensued, witii no advantage to either side ; the Confederate loss fifteen hundred killed and wounded. The results of these battles were, on the whole, a most encouraging success for the Confederates ; revived their liopes on what had been considered a doubtful theatre of action ; and left Sherman, although still holding his lines of investment, in a most critical condition, with an army, several hundred miles in its country, having its rear exposed, and depending upon a single line of railroad for its communications. "VVe may take leave here of the military situation ; satisfied 280 TIIK TiriUD YEAR OF THE WAR. that a pause liad now been given to the parallel operations of the enemy in Virf^jnia and (icorgia : aimed, the one at Rich- mond, wliicli tlic V iuikecs entitled the heart and brains of the Confederacy ; and the other at Atlanta, the centre of import- ant manufacturing enterprises, and the door to the great granary of the Gulf States. Both movements were now unmistakably in check ; and the interlude of indecision afford- ed a curious commentary on the boastful confidence that had recorded the fall of Ilichmond and the capture of Atlanta as the expectations of each twenty-four hours. There was reason, indeed, for the North to be depressed. Tlie disappointment of the Yankees was with particular refer- ence to the cam|)aign of Grant in Virginia. The advance from the Kapidan, which we have followed to its recoil before Petersburg, had been made under conditions of success which had attended no other movement of the enemy. It was made after cigiit months' deliberate i)rcparation. In the Congress at Washington it was stated that, in these eight months, the Government had actually raised seven hundred thousand men — an extent of preparation which indicated an intention to overwhelm and crush the Confederacy by a resistless com- bined attack. Nor was this all. One hundred tliousand three-months' men were accepted from Ohio and other States, for defensive service, in order that General Grant might avail himself of the whole force of trained soldiers. The result of the campaign, so far, did not justify the expectations on which it had been planned. The Yankee Government which, since tlie commencement of the war, had called for a grand total of twenty-three hundred thousand men, and had actually raised eighteen hundred thousand men, of an average term of service of three yeai's, to crush the Confederacy, saw in the fourth year of the war the Confederacy erect and defiant, and Rich- mond shielded by an army which had so far set at nought the largest pre[)aration8 and niobt tremendous exertions of the North. "We cannot close this brief sketch of important parts of the summer campaign of 180-1, in Virginia and in the West, with- out adverting to the barbarities of the enemy, which especially marked it, and which, indeed, by regular augmentation be<;ame more atrocious as the war progressed. In this year THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 2Sl they exceeded all that was already known of the brutality of our enraged enemy. General Sliertnan illustrated the campaign in the West, by a niemoralWe barbarity, in a letter of instructions to General Eurbridge, commanding in the Department of Ken- tucky, charging him to treat all partisans of the Confederates in tliat State as " vnld hearts. ^'' It was the invariable and con- venient practice of the Yankees to designate as " guei'illas,"' whatever troops of the Confederates were particularly trouble- some to them ; and the opprobrious term was made, by Gen- eral k^hernian, to include the regularly commissioned soldiers of General Morgan's command, and whatever bodies of Con- federate cavalry chose to roam over territory which the enemy disputed.* Some expressions, in the orders referred to, were character- istic of the Yankee, and indicated those notions of constitu- tional law which had rapidly demoi'alized the North. General Sherman declared that he had already recommended to Gov- ernor Bramlette of Kentucky, " at one dash to arrest every man in the country who was dangerous to it." " The fact is," said this military Solomon, " in our country personal liberty has been so well secured that public safety is lost sight of in our laws and institutions ; and the fact is we are thrown back one hundred years in civilization, laws, and every thing else, * Bi'rbridge was not slow to carry out the suggestions or instructions of his masters. The following is a copy of a 8eyond the limits of the Unitehai." 284- THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. initted, while the 'Avengers of Fort PiHow' overran and deso- lated the country. Ilude unlettered nieu, who had fought at Shiloh, and in many subsequent battles, wept like children, when they heard of the enormities to which their mothers, sis- ters, and wives liad been subjected by tlie negro mercenaries of Sturgis." Such enormities were monstrous enough; they shocked the moral sentiment of the age; yet they did not affright the soul of the South. The outrages practised upon helpless women, more helpless old age, and lK»peless poverty, assured the people of the Confederacy of the character of their enemies, and the designs of the war, and awakened resolution to oppose to the last extremity the mob of murderers and lawless miscreants who deseci'ated their soil and invaded their homes. Tiie war had obtained this singular hold on the minds of the Confed- erates ; that every man considered that he had in it the prac- tical, individual stake of his personal fortunes. When such a sentiment pervades a nation in war, who can say when or how it may be conquered ! At the time these pages are given to the press, it appears that the great disappointment of the North in the re- sults of the summer campaign of 18G4, has given rise to a cer- tain desire to end the war by negotiations, and that this desire has found some response in the South. The undignified and somewhat ridiculous overtures for peace made in this summer by parties, who, on each side, anxiously disclaimed that they had any authority from their governments, but, on each side, by a further curious coincidence, represeuted that they were acquainted with the wishes and views of their governments, cannot be altogether a story of egotistical adventures. They betray the incipiency, tliough an obscure one, of negotiations^ and the times are rapidly making developments of the tendency of an appeal to compose the war. We cannot anticipate what bribes may be offered the South to confederate again with the North. But one has been already suggested in the North : it is, to find an atrocious compensation for the war in a combined crusade against foreign nations. The New York Herald declares: "With a restored Union, prosperity would once more bless the land. If any bad blood remained on either side, it would soon disappear, or be jjurged THE THIRD YKAR OF THK WAR. 285 by a foreign war. "With a combined veteran army of over a million of men, and a fleet more powerful than that of any European power, we could order France from Mexico, England from Canada, and Spain from Cuba, and enforce our orders if they were not oV>eyed. The American continent would then belong to Americans. The President at Washington would govern the Xew World, and the glorious dreams and prophe- cies of our forefathers would at length be realized." To a proposition of such infamy of infamies, the attention of the civilized world should be called. What a commentary upon that European policy which has lavished so much of sympathy and material comfort upon the North, and, on the other hand, has rejected the cause of a people, who as they are resolute in maintaining their own rights, are as equally, indeed expressly and emi>haticnlly, innocent of any designs on the right and welfare of otheis ! The suggestion is, that of a huge and horrible Democracy, eager to prey upon the rights of others, and to repair by plunder and outrage the cost of its feuds and the waste of its vices. The people of the Confederacy do not easily listen to sug- gestions of dishonor. Yet none are more open to the cunning persuasion which wears the disguise of virtuous remonstrance and friendly interest. It is here where the Yankee peacemaker is to be resisted and unmasked. It will be for the Conl'ederacy to stand firm in every political conjuncture, and to fortify itself against the blandishments and arts of a disconcerted and designing enemy. It will remember that enemy's warfare. It will remember that an army, whose jpersonnel has been drawn from oil parties in the North, has carried the war of the savage into their homes. It will re- member how Yankees have smacked their lips over their car- nage and the sufferings of their women and little ones. It will remember how New England clergymen have advised that " rebels," men, women and children, should be sunk beneath the Southern sod, and the soil " salted with Puritanical blood, to raise a new crop of men." To hate let us not reply with hate. We reply with the superiority of contempt, the resolu- tion of pride, the scorn of defiance. Surely, rather than re- unite with such a people; rather than cheat the war of "inde- pendence," and make its prize that cheap thing in American 286 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. history — a paper guarantee ; rather than cheat our dead of that for which they died ; rather than entitle ourselves to the con- tempt of the world, the agonies of self-accusation, the reproof of the grave, the curses of posterity, the displeasure of the mer- ciful God who has so long signified His providence in our en- deavors, we are prepared to choose more suffering, more trials, even utter poverty and chains, and exile and death. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE "WAR. 287 CHAPTER XIII. AMERICAN IDEAS : A RKVIEW OF THE WAR. Sentimental Regrets concerning American History. — The European Opinion of 'State" Institutions. — Caliioun, the Great Political Scholar of America. — His Doc- trines. — Conservatism oi "Nullification." — Its " Union" Sentiment. — Brilliant Vision of the South Carolina Statesman. — Webster, the Representative of the Imperfect and Insolent " Education" of New Entrland. — Yankee Libel.s in the shape of Party Nomenclature. — Influence of State Institutions. — How they were Auxiliary to the Union. — The Moral Veneration of the Union Peculiarly a Sentiment of the South. — What the South had done for the Union. — Senator Hammond's Speech. — Tlte States, not Schools of Provincialism and Estrangement. — The Development of America, a North and South, not Hostile States. — Peculiar Ideas of Yankee (Jivilization. — Ideas Nursed in "Free Schools." — Yankee Materialism. — How it has Developed in the War. — Yankee Falsehoods and Yankee Cruelties. — His Commercial Politics. — Price of his Liberties. — Ideas of the Confederates in the War. — How the Washington Routine was introduced. — The Richmond Government, Weak and Negative.- — No Political Novelty in the Confederacy. — The Future of Confederate Ideas. — Intellectual Barrenness of the War. — Material of the Confederate Army.— The Birth of Great Idea.s. — The Old Political Idolaters. — The Recompense of Suf- fering. It has been a sentimental regret with certain European stu- dents of American History that tlie colonies of America, after acquiring their independence, did not establish a single and coinpact nationality. The philosophy of these optiniista is that the State institutions were perpetual schools of provincialism, selfishness, and discontent, and that they were constantly edu- cating the people for the disruption of that Union which was only a partial and incomplete expression of the nationality of America. These men indulge the idea that America, as a na- tion, would have been colossal ; that its wonderful mountains and rivers, its vast stretch of territory, its teeming wealth, and the almost boundless military resources, which the present war has developed and proved, would then have deen united in one picture of grandeur, and in a single movement of sublime, ir- resistible progress. These are pretty dreams of ignorance. Those who ascribe to tlie State institutions of America our present distractions, 233 THE TIIIUD TKAR OF THE WAR. and discover in them the nurseries of the existins: war, are essentially ignorant of our political liistory. They are stran- gers to the doctrines of Calhoun of South Carolina — the first name in the political literature of our old government — the first man who raised the party controversies of America to the dignity of a political philosophy and illuminated them with the lights of the patient and accomplished scholar. The great political discovery of Mr. Calhoun was this : that the rights of the States were the only solid foundation of the Union ; and that, so far from being antagonistic to it, they con- stituted its security, realized its perfection, and gave to it all the moral beauty with which it a^jpcaled to the affections of the people. It was in this sense that the great South Carolina statesman, so frequently calumniated as "nullifier," agitator, &c , was indeed the real and devoted friend of the American Union. He maintained the rights of the States — the sacred distribution of powers between therti and the general govern- ment — as the life of the Union, and its bond of attachment in the hearts of the people. And in this he was right. The State institutions of America, properly regarded, were not discord- ant ; nor were they unfortunate elements in our political life. They gave certain occasions to the divisions of industry ; they were instruments of material prosperity ; they were schools of pride and emulation ; above all, they were the true guardians of the Union, keeping it from degenerating into that vile and short-lived government in which power is consolidated in a mere numerical majority. Mr, Calhoun's so-called doctrine of Nullification is one of the highest proofs ever given by any American statesman of attachment to the Union. The assertion is not made for para- doxical eft'ect. It is clear enough in history, read in the severe type of facts, withf)ut the falsehoods and epithets of that Yan- kee literature which has so long defamed us, distorted our public men, and misrepresented us, even to ourselves. The so-called and miscalled doctrine of Nullification marked one of the most critical periods in the controversies of* Amer- ica, and constitutes one of the most curious studies for its philosophic historian. Mr. Calhoun was unwilling to offend the i^oj^ular idolatry of the Union ; he sought a remedy for existing evils short of disunion, and the consequence was what THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 289 was called, by an ingenious slander, or a contemptible stu- pidity, Nullification. His doctrine was, in fact, an accommo- dation of two sentiments: that of Yankee injustice and that of reverence of the Union. He proposed to save the Union bj the simple and august means of an appeal to the sovereign States tliat composed it. He proposed that should the general government and a state come into conflict, the power should be invoked that called the general government into existence, and gave it all of its authority. In such a case, said Mr. Cal- houn, "the States themselves may be appealed to, three- fourths of which, in fact, form a power whose decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a State acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitu- tional compact, may compel the government created by that compact to submit a question toucliing its infraction to the parties who created it." He proposed a peculiar, conserva- tive, and noble tribunal for the controversies that agitated the country and threatened the Union, lie was not willing that vital controversies between the sovereign States and the gen- eral government should be submitted to the Supreme Court, which properly excluded political questions, and comprehend- ed those only where there were parties amenable to the pro- cess of the court. This was the length and breadth of Nullifi- cation. It was intended to reconcile impatience of Yankee injustice, and that sentimental attachment to the Union which colors so much of American politics ; it resisted the suggestion of revolution ; it clung to the idolatry of the Union, and marked that passage in American history in M'hich there was a combat between reason and that idolatry, and in which that idolatry made a showy, but ephemeral conquest. The doctrine, then, of Mr. Calhoun was this : he proposed only to constitute a conservative and constitutional barrier to Yankee aggression ; and, so far from destroying the Union, proposed to erect over it the permanent and august guard of a tribunal of those sovereign powers which had created it. It was this splendid, but hopeless vision of the South Carolina statesman, which the North slandered with the catch-word of Nullification ; which Northern orators made the text of indig- nation ; on which Mr. Webster piped his schoolboy rhetoric ; 19 290 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. and on wliicli tlie more modern scliools of ISTew England have exhausted the lettered resources of their learned blacksmiths and Senatorial shoemakers. Mr. Webster, the representative of that imperfect and insolent education peculiar to New Eng- land, appears never to have known that Mr. Calhoun's doc- trine was not of his own origination ; tliat its suggestion, at least, came from one of the founders of the republic. We re- fer to that name which is apostolic in the earliest party divis- ions of America, and the enduring ornament of Virginia — Thomas Jefferson, the Sage of Monticello. At a late period of his life, Mr. Jefferson said : " With respect to our State and Federal governments, I do not think their relations are cor- rectly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former subordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co- ordinate departments of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask if the two departments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to decide between them ? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground ; but, if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a Convention of the States must be called to ascribe the doubt- ful power to tliat department which tbey may think best." Here was the first suggestion of tlie real safety of the Union ; and it was this suggestion, reproduced by Calhoun, which the North slandered as Nullification, insulted as heresy, and branded as treason. It is a remarkable circumstance that the South should have tamely allowed the Yankees to impose upon her ])olitical lit- erature certain injurious terms, and should have adopted tliem to her own prejudice and shame. The world takes its impres- sion from names ; and the false party nomenclature which the North so easily fastened upon us, and which survives even in this war, has had a most important influence in obscuring our history, and especially in soliciting the prejudices of 'Europe. The proposition of Mr. Calhoun to protect the Union by a certain constitutional and conservative barrier, the North des- ignated Nullification, and the South adopted a name which was both a falsehood and a slander. The well-guarded and moderate system of negro servitude in the South, the North called Slavery ; and this false and accursed name has been THE THIRD YEAE OF THE WAR. 291 permitted to pass current in European literature, associating and carrying with it the horrors of barbarism, and defiling us in the eyes of the world. The Democratic party in the South, which claimed equality under the Constitution, as a principle, and not merely as a selfish interest, was branded by the North as a pro-slavery party, and the South submitted to the desig- nation. How little that great party deserved this title was well illus- trated in the famous Kansas controversy; for the history of that controversy was simply this : the South struggled for the principle of equality in the Territories, without reference to the selfish interests of so-called Slavery, and even with the admis- sion of the hopelessness of those interests in Kansas ; while the North contended for the narrow, selfish, practical consequence of making Kansas a part of her Free-soil possessions. The proofs of this may be made in two brief extracts from these celebrated debates. These are so full of historical instruction that they supply a place here much better than any narrative or comment could do : Mr. English, of Indiana. — I think I may safely say that there is not a Southern man within the sound of my voice who will not vote for tlie admis- sion of Kansas as a Free state, if she brings liere a Constitution to that effect. Is there a Soutliern man here who will vot«j against the admission of Kansas as a Free State, if it be the undoubted will of the people of that Territory that it shall be a Free State ? Many Membekb. — Not one. At another stage of the Kansas debate occurs the following: Mr. Barksdale, of Mississippi. — I ask you, gentlemen, on the other side of the House, of the Black Republican party, would you vote for the admission of Kansas into the Union, with a Constitution tolerating Slavery, if a hundred thou-sand people there wishe^l it '/ Mr. GiDDiNCSs, of Ohio. — I answer the gentleman that I will never associate, politically, with men of that character, if I can help it. I will never vote to compel Ohio to associate with another Slave State, if I can prevent it. Mr. Stanton. — I will say, if the gentleman will allow me, that the Repub- lican members of this House, so far as I know, will never vote for the admis- sion of any Slave State north of 36° 30'. "We return to the influence of State institutions on America. We contend that they were not hostile to the Union, or 292 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. malignant in their character; that, on the contrary, they were auxiliary to the Union ; that they stimulated the national progress ; that, in fact, they interpreted the true glory of America ; and that it was especially these modifications of our national life which gave to the Union that certain moral sublimity so long the theme of American politicians. From these propositions we advance to a singular conclusion. It is that the moral veneration of the Union, which gives the key to so much of American history, was peculiarly a sentiment of the South ; while in the North it was nothing more than a mere affectation. This may sound strange to those who have read American history in the smooth surface of Yankee books ; who remember Webster's apostrophes to the glorious Union, and Everett's silken rhetoric ; whose political education has been manu- factured to hand by the newspapers, and clap-traps of Yankee literature about " nullification" and treason. But it is easy of comprehension. The political ideas of the North excluded that of any peculiar moral character about the Union ; the doctrine of State Rights was rejected by them for the prevalent notion that America was a single democracy ; thus, the Union to them* was nothing more than a geographical name, entitled to no peculiar claims upon the afiections of the people. It was different with the South. The doctrine of State Rights gave to the Union its moral dignity ; this doctrine was the only real possible source of sentimental attachment to the Union ; and this doctrine was the received opinion of the Southern jjeople, and the most marked peculiarity of tlieir politics. The South did not worship the Union in the base spirit of commercial idolatry, as a painted machinery to secure tariffs and bounties, and to aggrandize a section. She venerated the Union because she discovered in it a sublime moral principle; because she re- garded it as a peculiar association in which sovereign States were held by high considerations of good faith ; by the ex- changes of equity and comity ; by the noble attractions of social order ; by the enthused sympathies of a common destiny of power, honor, and renown. It was this galaxy which the South wore upon her heart, and before the clustered fires of whose glory she worshipped with an adoration almost Oriental. That Union is now dissolved ; that splendid galaxy of stars is THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 293 1)0 more in the heavens; and wliere once it shone, the fierce comet of war has burst, and writes a red history on the azure page. But let this be said by the historian of this war : that the South loved the Union ; dissolved it unwillingly; and, though she had had the political administration of it in her hands during most of its existence, surrendered it without a blot on its fame. "Do not forget," said a Southern Senator, when Mr. Seward boasted in the United States Senate that the North was about to take control at Washington, " it can never be forgot- ten — it is written on the brightest page of human history — that we, the slaveholders of the South, took our country in her infancy, and, after ruling her for sixty out of the seventy years of her existence, we shall surrender her to you without a stain upon her honor, boundless in prosperity, incalculable in her strength, the wonder and the admiration of the world. Time will show what you will make of her; but no time can ever diminish our glory or your responsibility." But there is one conclusive argument which we may apply to the common European opinion, and the half-educated notion of this country that the State institutions of America were schools of provincialism and estrangement. If such had been the case, the dissolution of the Union would have found the States that composed it a number of petty principalities op- posed to each other, or, at least, diverse and heterogeneous. But this war has found no such thing. It has found the people of Virginia and Tennessee, the people of Missouri and South Carolina, entertaining the same political ideas, pursuing a single, common object in the war, and baptizing it in a com- mon bloodshed on its fields of contest and carnage. The States of the Southern Confederacy ofier to the world the example of its inhabitants as one people, homogeneous in their social systems, alike in their ideas, and unanimous in their resolves; and the States of the Korth afibrd similar illustrations of national unity. The war has found not discordant States, but two distinct nations, in the attitude of belligerents, difi'ering in blood, in race, in social institutions, in systems of popular in- struction, in political education and theories, in ideas, in man- ners ; and the whole sharpened by a long and fierce political controversy, that has arrayed them at last as belligerents, 294 THE THIED YEAE OF THE WAE. and interposed the gage of armed and bloody contest. The development of America has been a North and a South ; not discordant States, but hostile nations. The present war is not for paltry theories of political parties, or for domestic institutions, or for rival administrations, but for the vital ideas of each belligerent, and the great stakes of national existence. What have been the ideas wdiich the North has developed or illustrated in this war? We will answer briefly. The North presents to the world the example of a people corrupted by a gross material prosperity ; their ideas of gov- ernment, a low and selfish utilitarianism ; their conceptions of civilization, prosperous railroads, penny newspapers, showy churches. Tlieir own estimates of their civilization never pene- trated beyond the mere surface and convenience of society ; never took into account its unseen elements; the public virtue, the public spirit, the conservative principle, the love of order, the reverence of the past, all which go to make up the grand idea of human civilization. It is amusing to the student of history to hear Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts, asserting, with scholarly flourishes, that the South is barbarous, because she has no free schools : the sources of that half education in the North, which have been nurseries of insolence, irreverence of the past, infidelity in religion, and an itch for every new idea in the mad calendar of social re- forms. It is yet more amusing to hear his Senatorial peer — " the Natick cobbler." When, on the eve of the downiall of the government at Washington, a Southern Senator depicted the wealth that the South had poured into the lap of the Union, the elements it had contributed to its civilization, and the virtues it had brought to its adornment, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, had this reply : " Massachusetts has more re- ligious newspapers than all the slaveholding States of the Union." The people of the North have never studied politics as a moral science. They have no idea of government as an inde- pendent principle of truth, virtue and honor ; to them it is merely an engine of material prosperity — a niere auxiliary ap]>endage to a noisy, clattering world of trade, and steam, and telegraphs. It is this low commercial sense of government THE THIKD YEAB OF THE WAE. 295 which developed all the old Yankee theories of tariffs, and bounties, and free farms. Indeed, the most fruitful study in American politics is tlie peculiar materialistic idea of the Yankee. Its developments are various, but all held together by the same leading idea: superficial notions of civilization; agrarian theories; the sub- ordination of the principles of government to trade ; mercantile "statesmanship;" the exclusion of moral ideas from politics; the reduction of the whole theory of society to the base measure of commercial interests. Such are some of the developments of the materialistic idea: the last and fullest is the present war. This war, on the part of the Yankee, is essentially a war of interest: hence its negation, on his part, of all principles and morals ; hence its adoption of that coarse maxim of commercial casuistry, ''Hhe end justifies the laemts j^"* hence its treachery, its arts of bad faith, its " cuteness" on all belligerent questions ; hence its atrocities which have debased the rules of civilized warfare to a code of assassins and brigands. It is true that the Korth has affected in this war such sentin)ents as love of the Union, reverence of the American nationality, a romantic attachment to the old flag. But we repeat that the proof that the Korth has fought for coarse, material interests in this war is the conduct of the war itself. War is horrible ; but it has its laws of order and amelioration. Civilization has kindled the dark cloud of horrors with the vestal observances of honor ; and the undying lights of human- ity have irradiated its aspects — softened the countenance of the Giant who " On the mountain stands, His blood-red tresses deepening in tlie sua, With death-shot glowing in his fiery hands." But where, in this war of the Yankee, shall we find exhibi- tions of the chivalry and amenity of modern belligerents. A ghostly echo comes shrieking from fields blackened by fire^ and scarred and tormented by the endless scourge of the tyrant. The characteristics of the Yankee war are precisely those which arise out of the materialistic idea : treachery dignified as genius, and cruelty set up to gaze as the grandeur of power.. 206 TFJE TrilRD YKAR OF THE WAR. Tho crooked • woof of treachery — the scarlet thread of the lie — have been woven by the Yankee into every part of this war.* It is not necessary to unravel here the whole story of Yankee falsehood. One instance will sufhcc. The government which, at the comniencernent of hostilities, played at the game of con- ciliation by affecting to arrest on the streets of its capital, Washington, fugitive slaves, and to return them to their mas- ters ; wliich, in the first months of the war, declared that it " repudiated all designs whatever, and wherever imputed to it, of disturbing the system of slavery;" that any such effort would be " unconstitutional ; " and that " all acts of the Tres- ident in that direction would be prevented by the judicial au- thority, even though they were assented to by Congress and the people " — for such was the solemn assurance of Mr. Sew- * It Ih a curiouH fact, in tin; indisputable records of American Ilifitory, that tlu) Keparation of tlie Houtlicrn BtaUss from tlie Union, is defenHible, in all res- pcx'.tH ; that in, as an afiH('rtif)n of f^tnte rif/ht/i, and, again, as an assertion of the Htill higher prJncii)le of H('-ifgovernm(;nt — on grounds taken by our enemies, whiito it HuiUid tlicrn to take Ikone grouiidH. With reference to the ground of Stat(! Rights : At tho tliird seHsion of tlie Eleventh ('ongress, in 1811, the dissolution of tho Union was spoken of for tlu; first time, by a member from th(; Btate of Massa- chusetts. 'I'ho bill to form a Constitution and State Oovernment for tlie Terri- tory of Orleans, and the admission of such State, under the name of Louisiana, into the Union, was undt^r consideration. " Mr. Quincy, of MaKBaclmscttH, in opposition to the bill, said : ' I am crjm- jxilled t« declari! it as my delibiirate opinifm, that if tliis bill passes, the bonds of this Union are virtually dissolved ; that the Statf;s which compose it are free from tluur obligations, and that, as it will bo the right of all, m> it will be tho duty of some, to priiitare definitely for a separation — amicably, if they can ; violently, if th(!y must.' " Mr. Quincy was here called to order by Mr. Poindexter. "Mr. Quincy repeated and justified the remark he had made, which, to savo all miHappreh(!nsion, lie coiuniitled to writing in the following words : 'If this bill [jasses, it is my delilxirate ojiinion that it is virtually a dissolution of this Union ; tliat it will fn« the States from their moral obligations, and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be i\w duty of some, d(;finitely to prepare for a sepp.ration — amicably, if they can ; violently, if tlnjy must.' " In 1844, the JiCgislature of Massachusetts resfdved that the annexation of Texas would be cause of dissolutiwer, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing Government, and form a new one that suits them better. Nor is this right confined to cases where the jjcople of an existing Oovernment THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. 297 ard's diplomatic circular of 1861 ; which promised the South " the Constitution as it was," and recited poetry in Congress entreating South Carolina to return to the bosom of the Union is to-day found making the boast — rather, we may say, indulg ing the fiendish exultation — that it has Abolitionizcd every district it has invaded ; that it has forced into military service one hundred thousand blacks, stolen from their masters; that it has forcil)ly consigned them from peaceful occupations to the perils of the battle-field ; and that it has whetted their ig- norant and savage natures with an appetite for the blood of the white man of the Confederacy. And this stupendous lie is called the genius of Yankee statesmanship, and the world is asked to applaud it. But it is in the atrocious warfare of the enemy that we find the most striking instances of his exclusion of that noble spirituality common to the great conflicts of civilized nations, and the most characteristic evidence of the brutal selfishness of his hostilities. The Yankee has never shown mercy in this war, and not one touch of refinement from his hand lias re- lieved its horrors. The track of his armies has been marked by the devouring flame, or by the insatiate plunder and horrid orgies of a savage and cowardly foe. The weed-growth of Louisiana, where once flourished tlie richest plantations of the South ; the desert that stretches from the Big Black to the may choose to exercise it. Any p<->rtion of such people that can, may revoln- tionizf;, putting down a minority intermingled with or near about them, w}io may oppone them." In 1800, the New York Tribune, declared: "Whenever a portion of this Union large enougli to form an independent, w;lf-8ustaining nation Bhall see fit to Bay autlientically to tlie rr-sidue, ' We want to get away from you,' we sliall say — and we trust selfrespect, if not regar^ for the principle of s<;]f-govem- ment, will cfmstrain the rmdue of the American people to say — Go! " At the beginning of the sect^ssion movements, Becretary Seward used the following language to Mr. Adams, the United States Minister at Ijondon : " For tlx-sti reasons he would not be disp<^>sed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs (the Secessionists), namely, that the Federal Government could not ro duce the sewding States to oljedience by c^jnquest, even although he W(;re dis- pose^l to question that propr>sition. But in fact the Prc-sident willingly a/wpts it a« true. Only an imperial or despotic government could subjugate; thorough- ly disaffected and insurrectionary meml>ers of the State. This Federal Repub- lican system of ours is, of all forms of government, the very one most unfitted for Buch a labor." 298 THK THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. Missiseippi, once a beautiful expanse of happy homes ; tlio black, mangled belt of territory that, commencing at Harper's Ferr}', extends to Fortress Monroe, bound like a ghastly pall with the silver fringe of the Potomac ; these are the hideous monuments of partial conquest which the Yankee lias com- mitted to the memory of tlie world and to tlie inscriptions of histoi-y. What has been safe in this war from tlie grasp of his plunder or the touch of his desecration ? In the districts of the Confederacy where his soldiers liave penetrated they have ap- propriated or destroyed private property ; they liave stolen even works of art and ornament ; they have plundered churches ; they have desecrated the grave and despoiled the emblems which love has consecrated to honor. And all this has been done according to a peculiar theory of hostilities which makes of war a sensual selfishness, and contemplates its objects as a savage gain of blood and ])lunder. This is the true and char- acteristic conception of the Yankee, lie is taught by his po- litical education, by liis long training in the crooked paths of thrift, that all the j^rinciples of civilized usage are to be set at nougiit, wlien convenience and present policy interfere with their fulfilment. It is in this sense of narrow, materialistic expediency that the Yankee has surrendered his liberties in this war, and pro- claimed the enormous doctrine, that the Constitution under which he lives, and all his other monuments of liberty, are sus})ended by the paramount necessity of conquering and de- spoiling the South. lie has carried his commercial politics into the war, and trades his own liberties for the material rewards of an otherwise vain and fruitless conquest. But we leave the subject of the'Yankee to turn to the other side of the question, and inquire what new political ideas the South has developed in tins war. Here is an extraordinary blank. In the new government of the Confederacy we do not discover any statesmanshi]), any financial genius, any ideas be- yond what are copied from the old effete systems that, it was thought, the revolution re])laced. There must be some expla- nation of this absence of new ideas, this barren negation in our revolution. By a misfortune, not easily avoided, the new government of the Confederacy fell into the hands of certain prominent partisans, but THE THIED TEAR OF THE WAE. 290 mediocre politicians, wlio made a servile copy of the old Yankee Constitution ; wlio had no ideas of political administration liiglier than the Washington routine ; and who, by their igno- rance and conceit, have blindfolded and staggered the revolu- tion from its commencement. This observation gives the key to the political history of the Confederacy in this war. A ser- vile copy of old ])olitical ideas, an ape of the AVashington ad- ministration, without genius, without originality, rejecting the counsels of the intelligent, and living in its own little circle of conceit, the Confederate government has fallen immeasurably below the occasion of this revolution, and misrepresents alike its spirit and its object. But this weak, negative government of the Confederacy is but the early accident of this revolution ; and the people en- dure the accident of their present rulers merely from yjatriotic scruples which contemplate immediate exigencies. We stand but on the threshold of this revolution, and the curtain falls over a grand future of new ideas. Those who expect that it will terminate with the mere forniality of a treaty with the public enemy, and that we shall then have a plodding future of peace, a repetition of old political ideas and manners, have got their pleasant j)hilosophy from newspaper articles and street talk; they have never read the exalted and invariable lesson of history, that, on commotions as immense as this war — no matter what its particular occasion — there are reared those ])ew political structures which mark the ages of public prrigress. If it was true that this war, with its immense expenditures of blood and treasure, was merely to determine the status of negroes in the South — merely to settle the so-called Slavery quefetion — there is not an intelligent man in the Confederacy but would spit upon the sacrifice. If it was true that this ter- jible war was merely to decide between two political adminis- trations of the same model, then the people of the Confederacy would do right to abandon it. Political novelty will come soon enough: it is the inevitable offspring of such commotions as this war. We repeat, that the Confederacy is now barren of political ideas, because those who are accidentally its rulers are, without originality or force, copyists of old rotten systems, and the apes of routine ; and because the public mind of the South ie now too forcibly en- 300 THE THIRD YEAE OF THE WAE. grossed with the publie enemy, either to replace their authority or to cliastise their excesses. It is under these peculiar re- straints that the Confederacy has produced such little political novelty in this war. But the revolution is not yet past. Those exalted historical inspirations, which, with rapt souls and kindled blood, we read in the printed pages of the past, are this day, with trumpet sound, at our doors. We live in great times; we are in the presence of great events; we stand in the august theatre of a national tragedy. This struggle cannot pass away, until the great ideas, which the public danger alone holds in abeyance, have found a full development and a complete realization ; until the South vindicates her reputation for political science and eliminates from this war a system of government more ingenious than a Chinese copy of Washington. But while we thus reflect upon the intellectual barrenness of this war, we must not forget that, while the Confederacy in this time has produced but few new ideas, it has brought out troops of virtues. In this respect, the moral interest of the war is an endless theme for the historian ; and we may be pardoned for leaving our immediate subject to say a few words of those fields of grandeur in which the Confederacy has found com- pensation for all other short-comings, and stands most conspic- uous before the world. We have put into the field soldiers such as the -world has seldom seen — men who, half-clothed and half-fed, have, against superior numbers, won two-thirds of the battles of this war. The material of the Confederate army, in social worth, is sim- ply superior to all that is related in the military annals of man- kind. Men of wealth, men accustomed to the fashions of polite Bociet}', men who had devoted their lives to learned professions and polished studies, have not hesitated to shoulder their mus- kets and fight as privates in the ranks with the hard-fisted and uncouth laborer, no less a patriot than themselves. Our army presents to the world, perliaps, the only example of theoretical socialism reduced to practice it has ever seen, and realizes, at least in respect of defensive arras, the philosopher's dream of fraternal and sympathetic equality. The hero of this war is the private soldier : not the officer whose dress is embroidered with lace, and whose name gar- THE TIIIUD YKAR OF THE WAR. 801 nishes the gazette, but the humble and lionest patriot of the South in liis dirt-stained and sweat-stained clothes, who toils through pain and hunger and peril ; who has no reward but in the satisfaction of good deeds ; who throws his poor, unknown life awaj at the cannon's mouth, and dies in that single flash of glorj. IIow many of these heroes have been laid in un- marked ground — the nameless graves of self-devotion. But the ground where they rest is in the sight of Heaven, Noth- ing kisses their graves but the sunlight; nothing mourns for them but the sobbing wind ; nothing adorns their dust but the wild flowers that have grown on the bloody crust of the battle- field. But not a Southern soldier has fallen in this war with- out the account of Heaven, and Death makes its registry of the pure and the brave on the silver pages of immortal life. It is said that some of our people in this war have cringed beneath disaster, and compromised with misfortune. These are exceptions : they may be sorrowful ones. But in this war the people of the Confederacy, in the mass, have shown a for- titude, an elasticity under reverse, a temperance in victory, a self-negation in misfortune, a heroic, hopeful, patient, enduring, working resolution, which challenge the admiration of the world. It is not only material evils which have been thus endured : the scourge of tyranny, the bitterness of exile, the dregs of poverty. But the most beautiful circumstance of all is the strange resignation of our people in that worst trial and worst agony of war — the consignment of the living objects of their love to the bloody altars of sacrifice. These are the real horrors of war, and patriotism has no higher tribute to pay than the brave and uncomplaining endurance of such agony. How have we been resigned in this war to the loss of our loved ones ! How many noble sorrows are in our hearts ! How many skeletons are in our closets ! War may ruin and rifle the homestead ; may scatter as chaff" in the wind the prop erty of years ; may pronounce the doom of exile — but all these are paltry afflictions in comparison with the bereavement of kindred, whose blood has been left on the furze of the field and the leaves of the forest, and whose uncoffined bones are scat- tered to the elements. The virtues and passions of the South in this war are not idle sentimentalisms. They are the precursors of new and illus- 302 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAE. trioiis ideas — the sure indications of a new political growth. In tlie warmth of such passions are born noble and robust ideas. Thus we await the development of tliis war in ideas, in politi- cal structures, in laws, which will honor it, and for which we shall not unduly pay the dreadful price of blood. It is impossible that a nation should have suffered as the South has in this struggle ; should have adorned itself with such sacrifices ; should have illustrated such virtues, to relapse, at the end, into the old routine of its political existence. "We have not poured ont our tears — we have not made a monu- ment of broken hearts — we have not kneaded the ground with human flesh, merely for the poor negative of a peace, with nought higher or better than things of the past. Not so does nature recompense the martyrdom of individuals or of nations : it pronounces the triumph of resurrection. We believe that a new name is to be inscribed in the Pan- theon of history ; not that of an old idolatry. All now is ruin and confusion, but from the scattered elements will arise a new spirit of beauty and order. All now is dark, but the cloud will break, and in its purple gates will stand the risen Sun. THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAE. 303 '■} BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS* Field op the Batte of the Ny, May 18, 1864. The works occupied by Lee's army on the Rapidan extend- ed on the right three miles below Raccoon ford. Ewell's corps and Hill's lay behind those defences, and stretched out on each side of Orange Court-house, along a line of twenty miles. Longstreet, having returned from Eastern Tennessee, occupied the country around Gordonsville, thirteen miles southwest of the position on the Rapidan. Such had been the disposition of the army of Northern Yirginia during the latter part of April. Grant, having declined to assail Lee's front, determined to turn it by a movement on that officer's right. He marched eastwardly from his cantonments in the country of Culpepper ; and, having reached that river seven miles lower down, at Germania ford, and also seven miles still lower down, at Ely's ford, crossed the Rapidan. The campaign in ^Northern Virginia, fraught, as it was, with the fate of the Confederate States and the United States, took thus its initial form on the 3d of May. From Orange Court-house two roads — the turnpike and the plank road — run on a line somewhat north of east to Freder- icksburg. Those two routes are in general parallel. The plank road consists of one track of worn planking, and another of earth ; its course, very irregular, vibrates in and out on the south side of the generally straight line, known as the turn- pike. A plank way runs from Culpepper Court-house to Ger- mania ford. Extending south-easterly, it crosses the turnpike; and after a route of four or live miles beyond that, terminates on the Orange and Fredericksburg plank-road. Beside these main lines several others traverse the country around the * We insert here the London Herald correspondent's account of the Battle of the Wilderness. 304 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR. battlc-flcld of the Wilderness — some pursuing a course par- allel with these, some crossing them more or less transverely. Grant's columns advanced from the Ivapidan on the 3d of May. That which marched from Ely's ford followed an earthen way, leading to the junction of the Orange and Fred- ericksburg plank-road with the plank-road extending from Culpej)pcr Court-house, by way of Germania ford ; while the other column moved down the latter route to the same point. That junction once gained, not only had the position of Lee on the Ka[)idan been turned, but several roads to Richmond would have been laid open. Ewell's corps having been encamped on Lee's right, moved castwardly on the -itli. A few of his brigades remained be- hind for a day guarding some of the fords across the Rapidan. Johnson's division, having the advance, followed the turnpike, and encamped for tlie night within three miles of a stream flowing northwardly — Wilderness Run; Rodes, next in the order of march, lay in his rear along the same route; and Early, who had moved from Ewell's left at Sumerville ford, encamped for the night a little behind Locust Grove. The Second corps had thus reached, on the night of the 4th, a po- sition from which it stood ready to strike on the following morning the flank of Grant's column of advance. Johnson moved with his division at the head of Ewell's corps on the 5th. Having thrown skirmishers out into the woods on either side of the turnpike he discovered those of the enemy at about six o'clock in the morning. The musketry on each side deepening, he pressed forward with General J. M. Jones's brigade to gain a hill in his front ; and having, after a brief struggle, driven back a heavy line of sharpshooters from that position, j^roceeded to form his troops in line of battle. The thicket on all sides of the two armies excluded the use of artillery, save only for the width of the turnpike. Jones's brigade had been formed but a moment across that road when the enemy advanced in what of order is practicable in a tangled forest. He approached with a heavy line of skir- mishers, followed by a solid column extending across the whole of Lee's front, four lines deep. Stewart's and Stafibrd's brigades proceeded to form rapidly on Jones's left. To guard TIIK TIIIKD YKAR OF THE WAR. 305 against the danger of an overlapping breadth of attack, tho brigade of General Walker, whieh, having nursed the geniua of Jiickson, is known as the "Stonewall," formed at some dis- tance from Stafford's left flank, covering it by a front at right angles to that officer's line. In this position the division of General Edward Johnson, of Ewell's corps, stood on the morning of the Stii to receive the enemy's onslaught. Johnson's skirmishers were driven in. Those of the enemy took position in the advancing column. The Fifth corps of the Federal army, accompanied by two pieces of artillery, that came thundering along the turnpike, assailed the Confederate line at the intersection of that road. Ileceiving, as it ad- vanced, a terrible fusilade without any sign of wavering, tho rear ranks pressing forward those of the front, the attacking masses delivered from a forest of rifles a fast and furious fire upon Johnson's line. Closing in upon it with great Bi)irit in front, and threatening to envelop it on its right, they suc- ceeded, after a brief struggle, in forcing back part of the bri- gade that had been formed across the turnpike — that of Gen- eral J. M. Jones. Two of his regiments — the Twenty-first Virginia, commanded by Colonel Witcher, and the Twenty- fifth by Colonel lligginbotham — holding tlieir ground reso- lutely. Jones strove in desperutiun to rally his broken troops. Threatening, entreating, shaming, were of no avail in arresting their disordered flight ; and as he saw his men rushing from the field in hopeless confusion he fell from his saddle a bleed- ing corpse. Captain Early, of his staft*, unwilling to desert him, had but a few moments previously wheeled his Iku-so from its retreat ; but only to share with his gallant chief, while in the act, the same red burial. Stewart moved from his position in the line of battle to close the gap left in it by the brigade of Jones. As the Federal masses poured through, his men rushed forward with a cheer; and, driving them back by the impetus of his charge, cap- tured their guns. Alniost simultaneous with the first signs of weakness in Jones's line, Daniel's brigade of North Carolinians, and (ior- don's brigade of Georgians, both of Rodes' division, were placed rapidly in line upon the right. Ordered immediately afterward by General Ewell to charge, Gordon, holding coni- 20 306 THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAK. mand of the movement, crushed through the enemy's first lines and captured as he went forward a whole regiment, men, officers, and colors. Driving onward furiously he struck back the Federal front in confusion upon its supports; and scatter- ine: both like leaves before a storm, forced them off the field in utter route for a mile and a half. His front thus cleared, Gordon found the enemy's lines firm on both of his wings. Dividing his men into two bodies he formed them at right an- gles to the lines of his original advance, and sending them both forward back to back, took the masses on his right and on his left in flank. Pressing on them so energetically as to have prevented their formation across either of his lines of movement, he swept them in disorder from the Confederate front for a width of a mile. At the moment of Gordon's brilliant charge the enemy at- tacked the brigade of General Stafford. A deadly conflict on that part of tlie field raged for some time doubtfully. The marksmanship of Stafford's Louisianians, however, shot truly to the buckles of the Federal belts, and strewed the field with death and agony. Reeling under its deliberate fire, the enemy finally fled, marking his route with his killed and wounded, and adding to his other disasters the loss of six hundred pris- oners. In this repulse, however, the Confederates have to mourn the loss of Brigadier-general Stafford. He fell mortally wounded. He had been a planter of Louisiana ; but having gone through most of the battles in Northern Virginia, had be- come an excellent officer, and was not more beloved by his men for his gentleness than he was admired by them for his daring. Soon after the onslauglit upon the Confederate front the Sixth corps of the Federal army advanced upon its left flank. Coming up at right angles to the line of movement of the Fifth corps, its skirmishers were encountered by those thrown out in anticipation of attack in that direction, from the Stone- wall brigade. Sedgwick, commanding this movement on Johnson's flank, soon afterward threw the whole weight of his dense column upon those stout souls ; but, though threatening to envelop it on the left, failed to force back the men who had learned heroic constancy from Jackson. Sorely pressed, how- ever, Pegram's Yirginians and Hays' Louisianians deployed rapidly on their left. Charging immediately upon the Federal THE TITIED YEAR OF THE WAK. 307 right, those fresh troops drove it back. The furious onslaught of Ilays' men did not expend itself until they had forced the enemy to retreat in confusion for nearly a mile. In advance of all others on that face of the attack, these splendid troops, having left nearly one- third of their number on the field, fell back with Pegram's gallant men to the general line of battle. The enemy routed with great slaughter from all points of his advance, Ewell proceeded to select ground for the mor- row's battle. Assisted by General Smith, of the engineers, he reviewed his position, and proceeded at once to cover his front with a line of fieldworks and an abattis of felled trees. Skir- mishing continued murderously outside the lines. Immediately , before the close of the evening, the skirmishers of General Pegram, on Johnson's left, came running in, and soon after- wards his sharpshooters sprang back from their rifle-pits in his immediate front. A column, three Hues deep, moved upon him from the depths of the forest, and, firing heavily as they came on, pressed towards his works furiously. Ilis staunch Yirginians, however, met the attack resolutely, and, covered partially by their works, hurled volley after volley in withering blasts, breast high, into its serried ranks. The Moloch of the North had, iiowever, not yet been sated. In five lines a column renewed the attack after nightfall ; but did BO without other result than to increase terribly the hun- dreds of men that, dead or dying outside the Confederate works^, lay weltering in their gore. Pegram fell in this last attack severely wounded. The repulse which he guided as he fell, closed the work of war for the day on tiie left, and wit- nessed the Confederates still in possession of their improved position and advanced lines. Hill was ordered to march, on the 4th, from Lee's left. Anderson's division remained behind for the time to guard some fords in its front ; Iletli, followed by Wilcox, moved eastwardly, through Orange Court-house, along the Fredericks- burg plank-road. Tiie divisions of these two officers bivou- acked for the night near Verdicrsville. lieth in advance, they resumed their march on the following day, still pursuing the line of the plank-road. The ring of small arms on the right announced, in the course 308 THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. of the morning of the 5th, a small cavalry aifair near the route of Hill's column. The march still, however, continued, until it encountered some dismounted cavalry ; but after a moment's pause, brushing those from its way, still went forward. At one o'clock musketry was again heard in front; and, though at first thought to indicate the presence of merely a party of cav- alry, proved, after some skii-mishing, to have come from a largo body of infantry. Kirtland's brigade, of Ileth's division, de- ployed immediately on both sides of the plank-road ; and the whole colunm proceeded to form in line of battle on its flanks; while the sharpshooters of both armies kept up in front a de- sultory and somewhat languid fire. Hill's advance followed, on the plank-road, while Ewell'a pursued the turnpike. Parallel lines in their general direction, these movements stood at the time of the deployment of Mirt- land's brigade, from three to four miles apart. The country intervening, and round about for several miles, is knoM-n as the " Wilderness," and having very few " clearings," consists almost Avholly of a forest of dense undergrowth. The enemy, apparently bewildered by the cliaracter of the site of the ap- proaching conflict, sent out scouts and skirmishers in every direction from his front. Eight or ten of these having strayed in between the column of Hill and that of Ewell, came into an open field in which they might have shot, as he sat with Gen- eral Hill and other ofticers on the ground, that idol of the army. General Lee. Those adventurous blue-coats, finding themselves in front of two brigades of "Wilcox's division, made a rapid retreat, ignorant, most happily, that a very precious life lay for a moment at the mercy of their rifles. The interpolation of those skirmishers between his two coif umns, suggested to General Lee the necessity of opening com- munications with Ewell. Captain Hotchkiss of the engineers of the Second corps, having come up immediately afterwards, indicated the route for that purpose ; and Wilcox's division moving accordingly to the left — having captured two hundred of the enemy on the way — eftected, after a march of a mile and a quarter, a junction with Gordon's brigade, on Ewell's extreme right. The line of battle, thus completed, extended from the right of the plank-road through a succession of open fields and dense forest to the left of the turnpike. It presented THE THIRD TEAR OF THE WAR. 309 a front of six miles ; and, with Flat creek in its rear, occupied a very irregular plane along the broken slopes of a broad ridgo that rises from the stream known as Wilderness run. The thicket that lay along the whole face of the Confederate array is so impenetrable as to have excluded the use of artillery by the enemy, save only for the breadth of those openings where it is penetrated on the left by the old turnpike, and on the right by the plank-road. The attack on Ewell having been repulsed, musketry began at half-past two to deepen in volume in front of Hill. Large columns of the enemy, enveloped in clouds of dust, were seen at that time moving up from the rear in the direction of the deafening fire. Possession of the intersection of the plank- road from Germania ford, with that from Orange Court-house, opening, as it would, a favorable line for Federal advance southwardly, was shown, by the enemy's movements, to be about to become the sui)ject of a bloody encounter. Ileth's skirmishers were driven in about three o'clock. They were followed closely by a heavy column that appeared to move forward spiritedly. Firing with great rapidity as it advanced, its musketrj^, in the ears of a man approaching the field of battle, rolled through the depths of the forest like the roar of mighty waters. Ilesolute defence on the one hand, and on the other the attack that sought to force its way rather by constant pressure than by dashing enterprise, the struggle in Hill's front continued for two or three hours, unbroken in its terrible monotony by even any disturbance of the rapid regu- larity with which it added to its masses of grim death or mor- tal agony. Ileth's division bore, at first, the whole brunt of the Federal onslaught. The heavy columns pressing so obstinately upon its front failed to break its heroic constancy. Thick and fast its men crept to the rear, bleeding, or dropping in the ranks, dead — but still it gave no sign of yielding. One-half of its number of the morning had been placed hovs du comhat. The weight of the immsense masses hurled against it having excited in Lieutenant-general Hill some fears for its solidity, orders were sent to Wilcox to come up with his division from Ewell's right, at the double-quick. That gallant officer arrived at four o'clock, while the roar of the rifles in front, accompaiued by 310 TTIB TiriRD YKAR OF THE WAR. the thunder of four or five guns on the plank-road, declared ,. the combat to bo one of extraordinary fierceness. Wilcox, guided by the heaviness of the fire, placed his lead- ing brigade in rear of lleth's centre, and deployed it to the right and to the left of the plank-road. The conflict soon afterwards deepening in that direction, he next formed his second brigade, as it arrived upon the field, on the left flank ; but had no sooner drawn it up in line of battle than it became exposed to musketry so completely in reverse as to have •wounded some of his men in the back. Changing front instantly to the rear, and swinging round his left, he found himself confronted by a Federal line of battle. Reasoning from the crushing weight of the musketry in lleth's front, Wilcox drew up another of his brigades in that oflicer's rear, on the right of the plank-road. The hoarse roll of the fire extending subsequently in that direction, he placed his last brigade for the protection of that flank, in extension of lleth's array on the extreme right. Two of Wilcox's brigades lay there in reserve, in rear of the centre, while another occu- pied each of the two flanks of the line of battle. The terrible- ness of the Federal musketry at this moment was such that, having torn a section of the trunk utterly to shreds, it actually cut down a white oak-tree having a diameter of eighteen inches. The losses in lleth's division had become so heavy that Wilcox's brigades in reserve were moved at about half-past five to the front. McGowan's South Carolinians thus brought into action, their gallant chief, im})atient of delay, leaped his horse over a rank that had lain down to let his men pass. Spurring forward, waving his sword as he went, he was fol- lowed by his brigade with a clieer ; and plunging immediately into the depths of the conflict, drove back the enemy by his impetuous dash for several hundred yards. Wilcox, seeing the Federal lines on each side of the breadth of that charge of the fiery South Carolinians stand firm, became apprehensive for their safety, and, ordering them at once to fall back, placed them in the position assigned them in the array of bat- tle. The murderous conflict raged in fierce monotony until night closed over the Confederate line in the position it had originally taken. The prisoners captured included men from THE THIRD YKAR OF THE WAE. 311 the Sixth, the Second, and tlic Fil'lh corps; and tliia fact points to tlic sui)positi()ii that the o-uliant divisions of Iletli and Wilcox actually held at bay, from three o'clock until half-past seven, three corps of the Federal army. Heth's division was ordered durin^j the ni