NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 1917-1919 Classin g .3. hdklAlt ightN^_T3-. COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 1917-1919 MAJOK-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 1917-1919 A HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION U.S.A. BY EMERSON GIFFORD TAYLOR MAJOR, INFANTRY, 26TH DI\^SION U. S. A. ACTING ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF With Maps and Illustrations BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 1920 ^. COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY EMERSON GIFFORD TAYLOR ALL RIGHTS RESERVED vi> ^ NOV -I 1920 ©CI,A601256 TO AMAURY DU BOISROUVRAY AND THE OFFICERS OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION CONTENTS I. Origins ^ 11. Organizing the Division 12 III. Overseas ^^ IV. Settling Down in France 34 V. The Chemin des Dames 63 VI. On the March 86 VII. The La Reine (Boucq) Sector 96 VIII. The Fights at Bois Brul6 and Seicheprey UO IX. Day by Day in the La Reine Sector 134 X. The Affairs of May and June 144 XI. To THE Champagne-Marne Defensive 158 XII. The Aisne-Marne Offensive — First Phase 168 XIII. The Aisne-Marne Offensive — Epieds and Trugny 1^ XIV. The Aisne-Marne Offensive — Afterwards 203 XV. The Saint-Mihiel Offensive 213 XVI. In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive — Marche- VILLE / 232 XVII. In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive — Verdun 242 XVIII. Before the Armistice and After 264 XIX. Reconstruction — The Montigny-le-Roi Area 280 XX. Homeward — The Last Days 292 Index 307 ILLUSTRATIONS Major-General Clarence R. Edwards Frontispiece Remieres Trench and Remieres Wood 124 Photograph by U.S. Air Service, Photographic Section Vaux 164 Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. Photograph taken at 4.30 a.m., July 18, 1918, showing MEMBERS of THE 103d InFANTRY JUMPING OFF 176 Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. Pill-Box, Saint-Remy Wood 220 Photograph by U.S. Air Service, Photographic Section No Man's Land over which the Twenty-Sixth Division advanced near Les Eparges 224 Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. Hill south of Ormont Wood 252 Photograph by U.S. Air Service, Photographic Section Major-General Harry C. Hale 282 Photograph taken in France by Mr. Frank P. Sibley MAPS Neufchateau Area 34 Chemin des Dames Sector 66 La Reine (Boucq) Sector 106 Advance of 26th Division, Aisnb-Marne Offensive 168 Saint-Mihiel Offensive 216 Meuse-Argonne Offensive 246 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 1917-1919 CHAPTER I ORIGINS ANY account of an American combat division partici- pating in the late European war, written while the color of its life under fire is yet undimmed, inevitably must incur the danger of lapsing into mere reminiscence. One who has shared the life of a body of fighting troops in the field is like to record concerning it matters which are less the facts of history than the bases of the writer's own enthusiasm or prejudice. But there is vitality in a tale of events, the echoes of which are still sounding. There exists a certain value, for the historian of a later generation, in the fresh recollections and impressions of the men who played an active part in those events. And so, if only for these reasons, it may not be amiss to set down, at this time, the annals of such a division of the American Expeditionary Force as the Twenty-Sixth, which fought in France throughout the entire period of American participation in the World War, in 1918. For the record of the Twenty-Sixth is particularly in- teresting. The circumstances of its organization, its per- sonnel, its record as a fighting unit, are all singularly rich as reflecting not only national and sectional character- istics, but also the typical traits of American fighting troops in the field, on the march, in billets, or in the heat of battle. The story of the Twenty-Sixth is of American citizens, non-professional soldiery, who volunteered to 2 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE take up arms in defense of their country's cause, and of the manner in which American citizens do bear themselves in action. And it is in this light, possibly, that the following pages may be read with clearest understanding. To one unacquainted with military matters, it appears perhaps unnecessary, oftentimes, to take such careful ac- count, as must the military historian, of elements in an organization which appear not directly related to its char- acter as a body of troops equipped and trained for giving battle. Numerical strength, the commander and his staff, proficiency, fighting spirit, physical condition, equipment and supplies, are, like the weather and the state of the roads, obviously important to consider in reviewing the work of any unit in action. But almost equally important, it may be said, for 'a clear understanding of an armed force's operations in the field, are such matters as its or- igin, character and identity of its personnel, and the cir- cumstances of its creation. To understand the nature of the French defense of Verdun in 1916, or that of the British retreat from Mons prior to the Battle of the Marne in 1914, one must accurately appraise the character of the forces engaged. Similarly, one cannot get a true approx- imation of the work of the subject of this history, w^ith- out showing what kind of men were brought together to form the Twenty-Sixth Division, from what environment they sprang, and under what circumstances tliey were organized. In accordance with plans for the organization of the national defense perfected after the entry of the United States into the war, April 6, 1917, the Twenty-Sixth Di- vision of the United States Army was created by a con- solidation and reorganization of the state troops of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.* A territorial scheme for the organization * Numerical designations of divisions in the land forces of the United States, created for participation in the European War in 1917, were assigned according ORIGINS 3 of divisions of the new army already projected was being put into operation quite generally. Admirable in its con- ception, it was valuable as contributing to establish an esprit de corps among the troops to a degree perhaps not always appreciated in the earlier days of the Expeditionary Force's activities in France. Under its provisions, New England men brought into service under the selective draft were grouped together in the Seventy-Sixth Division; in the State of New York were raised the Twenty-Seventh (National Guard) and Seventy-Seventh (National Army) Divisions; and elsewhere, throughout the country, the effort was made to combine in divisions, with local terri- torial affiliations, state troops or the drafted men of the several States or neighboring localities. A notable excep- tion to this rule was the creation of the Forty-Second Di- vision out of National Guard troops from all sections of the country, for the purpose of emphasizing at the outset the national character of the new American armies. The New England National Guard of 1917 meant, as a fighting force, much or little according to the angle from which it was considered. A system by which troops re- cruited, organized, oflBcered, and maintained under the authority of the State, were at the same time equipped and trained under the supervision and direction of the War Department, which were partly dependent on the financial support of the State and partly on that of the federal authorities, was not calculated to produce uniformly good results as to discipline and proficiency. The danger of a to the following plan : To divisions of the Regular Army were given the numbers One to Twenty-Five inclusive; to divisions formed from the National Guard (state troops in federal service), the numbers Twenty-Six to Seventy-Five in- clusive; to divisions of the National Army (composed of men inducted into the army under the Selective Service Act), the numbers Seventy-Six to One Hun- dred inclusive. Numerical designations of infantry, artillery, and engineer units with the National Guard and National Army divisions commenced, by an exten- sion of this system, with 101 to 104 for infantry regiments in the Twenty-Sixth Division, 101 to 103 for artillery regiments, 101 for the engineer regiment. Simi- larly, the infantry regiments of the Seventy-Sixth Division, for example, were numbered 301 to 304 inclusive. 4 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE clash between the controlling authorities was always present. On the one side, the War Department, properly intent on exercising such close control as it deemed vitally important in order to train and equip the state troops as effective fighting units of a national army, tended con- stantly to extend and impose its own regulations; on the other side, the States, appropriating large sums annually for the maintenance of the state forces, and jealous of federal control even while acknowledging its necessity, inclined inevitably to interpret the requirements of the War Department in accordance with local conditions or local military traditions. That the system did not break down is largely due to recognition by state authorities of the practical advantages to be derived from strict con- formity with federal requirements regarding drill, dis- cipline, and instruction if the troops were to be properly trained for active service. It became a point of pride in all the state military organizations to pass creditably the periodical inspections of the federal oflScers; hard and conscientious work was done at the prescribed drills, at the summer camps of instruction, and in the schools for officers and non-commissioned officers. In general, good care was taken that the arms and equipment issued by the War Department were maintained in serviceable condi- tion. Standards varied, even in companies of the same regiment, but a great amount of military knowledge was taught and learned. Good was accomplished furthermore by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Reg- ular Army who were detailed to the several States for duty as Inspector-Instructors. They brought to the state troops the best ideals of the "old army" respecting discipline, training, care of property, and efficiency in the field; they were able to transmit to the federal authorities through the Militia Bureau, along with their routine reports, an accurate and intelligent interpretation of the spirit, quali- fications of officers, and the general attitude of both officers ORIGINS 5 and men constituting the state units, which was of im- mense value. The work of these inspectors, extending through a period of years preceding the call of the state troops into federal service, was further of very great im- portance as interpreting the Regular Army and the New England National Guard to one another. But the conscientious work of those responsible for the efficiency of the local military units could not accomplish more than an approximation of the ideal of perfection. The too brief weekly drill periods, the annual field instruc- tion of but six days' duration, the impossibility of enforc- ing a uniform standard of discipline and proficiency for officers, were only a few of the difficulties against which headway had to be made under the existing system. Wrong in principle (in the light of present-day require- ments), exposed to all the dangers of a dual and divided control, admittedly faulty by many in the National Guard service itself, regarded as a most unsatisfactory makeshift by all those forces intent on building up, under federal control, a strong reserve for the Regular Army, it is sur- prising that the system did not break down altogether. To its opponents, it appeared incredible that the system was able to produce troops who, in the spring of 1917, were even approximately fit for consideration as the basis of a field force for active operations against the enemy. For other elements than the inherent defects of the National Guard system had tended for months to reduce the effectiveness of the New England troops. The period following their hard field service and training on the Mexi- can Bord'^T- in 1916 was one of disintegration. Scores of officers resigned their commissions in the autumn of that year; hundreds of enlisted men, as their terms expired, left the service at once. New enlistments were very rare. Throughout the winter of 1916-17 the effective force of units was reduced to a minimum; military interest was at a low ebb. The prospect, furthermore, of securing com- 6 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE missions in the OjQScers' Reserve Corps by a three months' course of intensive study and work at Plattsburg or another of the newly established War Department training-camps, attracted away from the Guard organizations a large number of valuable junior company oflScers and sergeants. The determined drive made at this time to replace the existing system of national defense, such as it was, by another soundly based on the principle of universal serv- ice, militated strongly against the efficiency of the state troops. The federal inspections of the Guard, held in the late winter months, were far from being universally satis- factory. Judged by ordinary standards, viewed from the angle by which a fighting force is ordinarily estimated as effi- cient or the reverse in proportion as it can show numbers, discipline, long training, and high morale, the New Eng- land National Guard, in the spring of 1917, could not have presented a very reassuring sight to those who were anx- iously weighing the potential fighting value of each organ- ized unit of the meager national establishment. But ele- ments not appearing on the surface, qualities which only intimate knowledge of the state troops could discern, were present to lend strength, solidarity, a spirit of patriotism, and a foundation on which to build a division of fighting men, which are worth study. What was there, latent, in the ranks of the little companies and batteries, what in the headquarters of the regiments and brigades, which, under the red sun of war, came into bloom like unsuspected flowers.'^ In the first place, the men who were to compose the Twenty-Sixth Division, as they assembled in their camps for mobilization, were all volunteers, from highest ranking officer to lowliest raw recruit. They wanted to fight. Not a man who enlisted after January, 1917, but felt, clearly enough, the imminence of the call to active service, with all that service in the war then raging must mean. Hun- ORIGINS 7 dreds joined the New England troops that spring because they felt, quite simply, that to enhst was their duty as good citizens; hundreds were touched by the spirit of the Great Adventure; other hundreds desired ardently to re- join the colors, now that real action was in sight instead of a round of armory drills. The rumor that the National Guard would be first overseas after the Regulars was the spur that pricked forward an ardent thousand; the fact that one's friends were going in the home-town company, proud of their new distinction, brought forward a thou- sand more. Young men of foreign blood enlisted for the sake of aiding their brothers already in the fight on the Allied side. Whatever the spring that gave the impetus, the young fellows who filled the ranks of the old regiments during the late spring and summer enlisted because they wished to be counted with the foremost. And that spirit — the spirit of the patriotic volunteer — was as gold in the crucible. It was the element which gave a precious value to the whole alloy. Another important contribution to the strength of the Guard regiments was the local affection and support which they all commanded. Units of the New England militia had had a long history. Many of them dated their organiza- tion back to the days of the Revolution or even earlier; they were lineal descendants of Colonial train-bands or of Washington's brigades. Many had played a gallant part in previous wars of the Nation. The fathers and grand- fathers of not a few company officers had been captains or lieutenants in the same company a generation or two before. For years the whole military spirit of a town had been expressed in the local company, troop, or battalion. A score of cities and towns, all over the area, had, each in its warm heart's care, the well-being and creditable record of a group of its own "boys." It is quite true that there had come periods when this community interest was lukewarm. Only a few short months before the declaration 8 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE of war, as has been said, this interest was languid to the point of inanition. But once the imagination was touched, once active service was imminent, the heart of the com- munity overflowed in affection and practical assistance. Even obscurely, it was felt that the soldier could only be helped by knowing that his town was backing him. And what enormous value to morale this feeling was proved to possess, those can bear witness who knew, from inti- mate association, what the New England soldier was like in the field. Volunteers for war service, who feel them- selves sure of the support and love of their fellow towns- men, who feel responsible for the good name of their home- grown regiment, make good fighting material. A further asset on the side of esprit de corps was that the troops of every New England State were employed in making up the new organization. Not only was there a healthy rivalry between local units; but further, it soon became evident that the New Englanders, as a group, felt placed on their mettle to outshine the divisions from other parts of the country. From the very outset, a soh- darity was present, in the germ. It was a spirit which was of the greatest value when, in the active competition of the training areas in France and in the days of field serv- ice, the Twenty-Sixth found itself being judged by the same standards as the best divisions in the army, old and new. It will be asked: "What military knowledge and experi- ence did these troops possess.'* This varied greatly. The flood of recruits poured in larger measure into some regi- ments than others; the discharge of old men who had de- pendent relatives, or were of alien enemy parentage or birth, took from some a large proportion, while other units suffered only a little in this respect. The changing policy of the War Department in the spring of 1917, by which recruiting for the National Guard was ordered, then stopped, then ordered to be resumed with new energy. ORIGINS 9 had the general effect of chilling enthusiasm in all quar- ters for that branch of the service. Drill and instruction were taken up with intelligent energy, however, from the moment the Guard units were called into federal service (at various dates following March 20). At once scattered as a protection against enemy sabotage on lines of com- munication and transportation, at centers of the produc- tion of munitions and supplies, and around public util- ities, the new men all obtained experience in guard duty, close-order drill, military courtesy, sanitation, care of government property, and a taste of life under conditions of active service. It was a duty of value in developing non-commissioned officers; it taught battalion and com- pany officers a great deal regarding the handling and supply of an organization the units of which are widely scattered. Of the older men the great majority had had months of field service in 1916 on the Border. The Guard included also an exceptionally large number of officers, both staff and line, who had been in the military service for years, for sheer love of it. Many of these had been in the Spanish War; they included scores of well-qualified rifle and pistol instructors; there were many experienced adjutants, ordnance officers, and quartermasters; the med- ical personnel was very strong. The officers knew the book, and they knew the men under their command. This last is worth emphasizing. Not only had the company, battal- ion, and regimental leaders successfully passed all the War Department efficiency tests; but also they were intimately acquainted with the characters, worth, and personality of the individuals over whom they had control. They came from the same town as their men; they often had brothers in the ranks. Now this may be objected to in a military organization. Indeed, it had been a favorite charge against the National Guard system that company officers were usually elected by the enlisted personnel. Higher authority might appoint them; but the designation to lead came 10 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE from below, in most cases. It was argued that an officer so selected was hampered in his application of discipline, was apt to play favorites, could secure his start by meth- ods of the small politician. Troops should obey the orders of any officer. All this can hardly be denied ; but the fluent criticism failed oftentimes to take into account the many checks and balances which federal and state regulations placed about the elective system. And it was a fact that, even when a man had started on his commissioned career by methods not of the best, he was like to develop, under the pressure of new responsibi ities, quite beyond expec- tation. It is also true that, in the vast majority of cases, the National Guard officers in the Twenty-Sixth Division were such as any authority would have been glad to com- mission. It was one of the many paradoxes of the system — the thing worked, in spite of the many obvious reasons why it should not. A point, moreover, most important to observe, is that these National Guard officers appear to have done admirably in laboring to insure the comfort and well-being of the enlisted men. In procuring food, shelter, and clothing for their troops they were assiduous and effi- cient; they defended the rights and privileges of their fellows most tenaciously. If there was any danger to dis- ciphne, in that officers of such habits should get into the way of babying their men, or of seeking popularity by a cheap and easy means — which was a charge easier to draw than to prove — it is sure that this danger, if it ex- isted, was more than balanced by an increased devotion and a closer bond of mutual understanding. Such, then, were the men who made up the Yankee Division as first constituted. Excellent material physically; with a large proportion of men who had been in mili- tary service more than a year; with thousands of recruits who were still to learn the feel of a rifle against the shoulder; with remarkable solidarity and high morale ; representing every class of the New England social order; every man ORIGINS 11 a volunteer; every unit backed solidly by the personal interest of its community; with a very large number of skilled mechanics and oflBce men in the ranks, it is not too much to say that the force in being, whatever its limi- tations of training, was one which afforded great promise of development into a representative combat unit of the highest type. CHAPTER II ORGANIZING THE DIVISION LET us trace the successive steps of the process by which these soldiers were brought together into an organization. Weeks were to pass before they were fused and welded and shaped into a finished machine; months were required to effect the magical change from a machine to a living organism with a soul and a character all its own. For the moment, during the anxious days of the summer, the men and oflScers were assembled, counted, and tested, as if they were so many elements intended for the melting furnace and the mould. Toward the end of July, withdrawn from guard duty, the troops were concentrated in the state camps of mobili- zation and training, or in other camps erected for the pur- pose.^ Intensive battle training commenced at once. Pa- rades and reviews fostered soldierly pride and smartness; incessant drill was held in close and extended order, with detailed instruction in camp and personal hygiene, first- aid methods, and care of equipment, together with con- siderable target practice for the riflemen. There were applied to all ranks a series of most searching tests, with purpose to insure a force as physically fit as possible. Other boards of medical oflScers examined for weaknesses of heart and lungs; venereal inspections were made weekly; slight physical deficiencies, which were no bar to service - Units were assembled as follows: In Boston, Massachusetts, Headquarters Twenty-Sixth Division, Headquarters Troop, 101st Engineers, 101st Field Sig- nal Battalion, at Framingham, Massachusetts, Headquarters 51st Infantry Brigade, 101st Infantry, 102d Machine-Gun Battalion; at Boxford, Massachu- setts, Headquarters 51st Field Artillery Brigade, 51st Field Artillery Brigade complete; at ^Vestfield, Massachusetts, Headquarters 52d Infantry Brigade, 52d Infantry Brigade complete; 101st Ammunition Train; at New Haven, Connecti- cut, 102d Infantry; at Niantic, Connecticut, 101st Machine-Gun Battalion; at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, 103d Machine-Gun Battalion. ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 13 on a peace-time basis, now sufficed to discharge or trans- fer a man immediately. Severe, too, were the examina- tions of all officers' capacity. The whole efiFort was in the direction of weeding out the incompetent, the dead wood, the man who did not appear capable of pulling his weight. Unfair rejections were made; but they were in- evitable under the conditions. And the net result was to include in the new Division only those who were unques- tionably able to endure the strain of field service, judged from the angle of physical condition. Those officers and men of the New England National Guard who were not included in the Division at the time of its organization, or were subsequently transferred from it, were grouped together in a Depot Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General E. L. Sweetser, of Massa- chusetts.^ To the skeleton regiments of this organization were sent many whom it was desired to retain in the serv- ice, even though tliey could not be numbered with the Twenty-Sixth. Reorganized later, after concentration in southern camps, into corps and army troops, a large pro- portion of these units found their way overseas as pioneer regiments and special service units; their original disap- pointment was largely compensated by the fine service they rendered to the common cause in other ways. It was a period of the greatest nervous tension. Just what was in store, even a day ahead, nobody knew. When would the state troops be finally organized into a division? WTien would the command of the new units be announced? Who would be left behind? Would proper equipment be 1 Under G.O. No. 3, Headquarters Twenty-Sixth Division, August 30, 1917, the Depot Brigade was created and the following units assigned to it: 1st N.H. Infantry (35 officers, 596 men); 1st Vt. Infantry (29 officers, 284 men); 5th Mass. Infantry (37 officers, 503 men); 6th Mass. Infantry (18 officers, 360 men); 8th Mass. Infantry (28 officers, 406 men) ; 1st Conn. Infantry (20 officers, 365 men); 1st Maine Heavy Artillery (40 officers, 776 men); Co. B, N.H. F.S. Troops (3 officers, 62 men); Co. A, Conn. F.S. Troops (3 officers, 64 men); 1st Separate Co., Conn. Infantry (1 officer, 109 men); 1st Separate Co., Mass. Infantry (3 officers, 149 men). 14 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE forthcoming? That comprised one set of thoughts; and the other could be summed up in the question cried by every unit of the American Expeditionary Force when compelled to remain more than forty-eight hours in one place: "When do we go?" On August 5 the troops were drafted into the service of the United States. Already they had been mustered into it as organizations, immediately upon response to the call of the President on and after March 20. But the drafting process changed the soldier's status considerably. He was now individually in the United States Army, instead of being a member of a state organization temporarily in fed- eral service. His allegiance was pledged to the Nation; his pay, subsistence, and control were now regulated wholly by the War Department. His collar ornament was a bronze "U.S." in place of the familiar abbreviation of his State's name. The "U.S." of the officers was surcharged with the initials "N.G." (National Guard), for the purpose of dif- ferentiating, in outward signs at least, the non-profes- sional soldier from his Regular brother. Later, a single device was prescribed for all officers, whatever their military antecedents; but numbers of old National Guard officers had come by that time to feel a quaint pride in re- taining the badges which proclaimed their non-professional origin. The exact strength in men, animals, and material of a combat division was still a matter w^hich the authorities were working out in detail. They had enjoyed the advan- tage of the advice of French and British experts, and the opinions of the staff officers sent overseas as observers earlier in the year; but, even so, there were many difficul- ties to be settled before a scheme could be elaborated for an American divisional organization suitable for trench warfare (the war of position), yet easily adaptable for the needs of the warfare of movement. The secret Tables of Organization of August, 1917, were marked "Provisional." ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 15 Radical indeed were the changes. One saw, for instance, the infantry regiment expanded from a war strength of 2061 to about 3600 all ranks; its machine-gun equipment was increased from four guns to sixteen; its traditional rifle was supplemented by light mortars, rifle and hand grenades, one-pounder field pieces (37-millimeter quick- firers), and automatic rifles. The supply, ammunition, and engineer trains were to operate a veritable fleet of trucks. The machine-gun strength of the division, excluding that of the infantry regiments, now included ten companies, each of 175 men and 16 guns, grouped into three battal- ions. Changes in the artillery were also far-reaching, due to the abandonment of the American guns, light or heavy, and the adoption of the French (the 75-millimeter field piece for two regiments, the 155-millimeter howitzer for one re- giment). A battery of trench mortars was another novel divisional unit. More than one old-timer, after he had read down the page, breathed a sigh of relief on discovering that the authorities had found no substitute for the escort wagon and the army mule, without which, he beheved, no truly American fighting force could legally be substituted. Into this force were to be consolidated the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and machine-gun units of the state troops. The task would appear to have been difficult. For not only was the numerical strength of each unit a factor in the problem, but its record of eflSciency, geographical location, and kind of training, had also to be considered in determining which regiments should constitute basic units, intact, and which should be broken up to complete the new organizations. But actually the tentative plans drawn by the Militia Bureau were found easy of applica- tion; and, with only such slight modifications as the con- ditions of the moment necessitated, they were immedi- ately put in execution. Telegraphic instructions of the War Department, dated August 13, gave the necessary authority and impetus, and organization of the Twenty- 16 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE Sixth Division "from units of the New England National Guard" proceeded forthwith. As leader of what was soon to be called the "Yankee Division," there was designated Major-General Clarence R. Edwards, at the time Com- manding General of the Northeastern Department.^ On August 22, by General Orders Numbers One and Two, under which the newly appointed leader assumed com- mand and announced his Staff, ^ together with the com- position of the new units, there was inaugurated that re- lationship between the General and his troops which, from the very beginning, was destined, as time went on, to take on a character far wider and deeper than the merely offi- cial. The make-up of the individual organizations of the Division is shown by the accompanying table: Unit and Commander Composition Headquarters Troop Troop B. Mass. Cavalry. Captain Oliver Wolcott 51st Infantry Brigade Hdqrs. Brig. -Gen. Peter E. Traub 101st Infantry Dth Mass. Infantry; 1400 en- Colonel Edward L. Logan listed men, 5th Mass. Infantry; 175 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- fantry. 102d Infantry" 2d Conn. Infantry; 35 oflBcers, Colonel Ernest L. Isbell 1582 enlisted men, 1st Conn. In- fantry; 100 enlisted men, 6th Mass. Infantry; 50 enlisted men, 1st Vt. Infantry. 1 Assigned by G.O. 38, W.D., April 2, 1917. 2 The staff included the following oflScers at first: Aide-de-camp — Captain John W. Hyatt, Infantry; Aide-de-camp — Lieutenant N. S. Simpkins, 101st Field Artillery; Chief of Staff — Lieutenant-Colonel George H. Shelton, General Staff; Assistant Chief of Staff — Major A. A. Maybach, General Staff; Adjutant — Lieutenant-Colonel George S. Simonds, Infantrj', National Army; Inspector — Lieutenant-Colonel Horace P. Hobbs, Infantry, National Army; Quarter- master — Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Beacham, Jr., Infantry, National Army; Surgeon — Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Bevans, Medical Corps; Judge Advocate — Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Dowell; Ordnance OflScer — Major E. E. Phillips; Signal Officer — Major H. G. Chase, Signal Corps (Massachusetts); Chief of Artillery — Brigadier-General W. Lassiter, Field Artillery, National Army; Chief of Engineers — Colonel George \Y. Bunnell, Engineering Corps (Massachusetts). ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 17 Unit and Commander 52d Infantry Brigade Hdqrs. Brig.-Gen. Charles H. Cole 103d Infantry Colonel Frank M. Hume 104tli Infantry Colonel WiUiam C. Hayes 51st F.A. Brigade Hdqrs. Brig.-Gen. W. Lassiter 101st Field Artillery Colonel John H. Sherburne 102d Field Artillery Colonel Morris E. Locke 103d Field Artillery Colonel Emery T. Smith 101st Maehine-Gun Battalion Major James L. Howard 102d Machine-Gun Battalion Major John Perrins, Jr. 103d Machine-Gun Battalion Major W. G. Gatchell . 101st Trench Mortar Battery Captain Roger A. Greene 101st Engineers Colonel George W. Bunnell 101st Field Signal Battalion Major Harry G. Chase 101st Train Headquarters and Mil- itary Police Colonel Warren M. Sweetser Composition 2d Maine Infantry; 1630 en- listed men, 1st N.H. Infantry; detachments from Cos. F, H, K, M, 8th Mass. Infantry. 2d Mass. Infantry; 12 officers, 800 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- fantry; 12 officers, 800 enlisted men, 8th Mass. Infantry; detach- ments Cos. F, H, K, M, 8th Mass. Infantry. 1st Mass. Field Artillery; 180 en- listed men. New England Coast Artillery. 2d Mass. Field Artillery; 150 en- listed men, New England Coast Artillery. Battery A, N.H. Field Artillery; 3 Batteries R.I. Field Artillery; 2 Batteries Conn. Field Artillery; Troop M, R.I. Cavalry; detach- ment New England Coast Artil- lery. Squadron Conn. Cavalry; 196 enlisted men, 1st Vt. Infantry. Squadron Mass. Cavalry, less Troop B; 3 officers, 213 enlisted men, 1st Vt. Infantry. Squadron R.I. Cavalry, less Troops B and M; N.H. Machine- Gun Troop; detachment 1st Vt. Infantry. Detachment 1st Maine Heavy Field Artillery. 1st Mass. Engineers; 100 en- listed men, 1st Maine Heavy Field Artillery; 479 enlisted men. New England Coast Artillery. 1st Mass. Field Signal Battalion. 826 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- iautiy. 18 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE Unit and Commander 101st i\mmunition Train Lieut.-Col. William J. Keville 101st Supply Train Captain Davis G. Arnold 101st Engineer Train 1st Lieut. S. R. Waller 101st Sanitary Train Lt.-Col. J. L. Bevans, M.C Composition 13 officers, 700 enlisted men, 1st Vt. Infantry; 6 officers, 234 en- listed men, Mass. Coast Artillery. Troop B, R.I. Cavalry; 5 officers, 359 enlisted men, 8th Mass. In- fantry; 62 enlisted men, Co. M. 6tli Mass. Infantry. 82 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- fantry. 1st, 2d Mass. Ambulance Cos. 1st, 2d Mass. Field Hospitals; 1st Conn. Ambulance Co.; 1st Conn. Field Hospital; 1st R.I. Ambulance Co.; 1st N.H. Field Hospital. Minor changes in some of the transfers took place — indeed, they were still in progress while the units were under orders to proceed to the embarkation port; addi- tions both of officers and men were made as needed; but deviations from the above table were inconsiderable. The composite nature of the divisional units is interesting. Every State in New England was represented; many of the units included troops from localities widely separated. Sorrow there was in the state regiments which were broken up to fill in the numerical strength of the fortunate ones which had been retained intact; there was required both tact and generosity on the part of all groups thus thrown together before the first jealousies and inevitable heart- burnings were quenched in a new spirit of service. But it is a fact well worth recording that, in a time far shorter than was expected, the old resentments, the ancient local rivalries, began to be forgotten; the new division went overseas not as a loose aggregation, but a closely welded whole. What of the men who had been chosen by higher author- ity to lead the Twenty-Sixth in battle? So much of the history of any organization is intimately bound up with the personality of its leaders, so curiously close, in the case ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 19 of the Twenty-Sixth Division, was the connection between the character of any single unit and that of its commander, that no record of the Division's origins and organization would be complete that omitted a somewhat detailed refer- ence to the principal officers of the staff and the hne. The assignment of Major-General Edwards to command insured that the new organization would benefit by the leadership of a Regular officer of long and varied experi- ence, both in administrative, staff, and line branches. Born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1860, he was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1883. With his pro- motion to a captaincy in the Regular service in 1898, large responsibilities and rapid advancement fell to his lot. As Major (Assistant Adjutant-General) and Lieu- tenant-Colonel of Volunteers (47th Infantry), from 1899 to 1901, he performed duty as Adjutant-General to General Lawton in active field service in the Philippine Islands, whither, in 1905, he accompanied Secretary of War Wil- liam H. Taft on the occasion of the latter's famous journey. Appointed Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in 1902. he was promoted to the grade of Brigadier-General in 1906; he was transferred to the line in 1912, and com- manded brigades on the Mexican Border (6th Brigade, Second Division) and in Hawaii (1st Hawaiian Brigade), until sent to the command of American troops in the Pan- ama Canal Zone in 1915. From this duty he was transferred (on April 2, 1917) to the command of the newly created Northeastern Department, with Headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts, in April, 1917, and attained the rank of Major-General in August of the same year. Thirty-four years of active and varied service, in all grades, meant that the new division commander was intimately ac- quainted with army men and methods, had been trained in accordance with army traditions, and shared the honor- able ideals of duty with which the Regular establishment has always been credited. Beyond the lot of the vast ma- 20 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE jority of army officers, however, General Edwards had been fortunate in possessing a wide knowledge of men and events outside the army horizon; the bars which his life and duty, under our system, erect inevitably between the average Regular OflBcer and other classes in the American democracy, sharply limiting his experience and tending unhappily to segregate him from contact with the thought of his generation, were, in the case of General Edwards, early broken down. He enjoyed personal contact with men of many classes; from his varied activities he had become one of the most prominent figures of the army then in the public eye. From the day of his assumption of the duties of Department Commander, in Boston, his immediate hold on the imagination and esteem of the people at large was as marked as was the energy of his administration. His choice, as leader of the New England Division, was felicitous indeed, considering the excellent effect the selec- tion would have on the public from whose sons the Twenty)/ Sixth was recruited. ^ As Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier- General) George H. Shelton brought to his duties twenty years of experience as an infantry officer of the Regular Army, the advantage of Connecticut birth and parentage, and the prestige of his position as a member for two years (1906-08) of the General Staff of the Army. In military circles he had won a wide reputation for fearless expres- sion of opinion and progressiveness through his editorship of the "Infantry Journal," perhaps the most influential of the various service magazines. Throughout the whole course of the Division's history, in which he served in va- rious capacities, no officer carried away a more perfect record for steely efficiency, broad human-kindness, and those qualities of humor, sympathy, and force (combined so rarely) which go to make up an ideal leader of troops in the field. The military record of the infantry brigade commanders, ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 21 Brigadier-Generals Peter E. Traub (51st Infantry Bri- gade) and Charles H. Cole (52d Infantry Brigade), pre- sented a most interesting contrast. On the one side, Gen- eral Traub was a Regular of the Regulars, in education, experience, and point of view. Graduated from West Point in 1886 into the cavalry arm, he became a Major in 1911, and in 1914 Assistant Chief of Philippine Constabulary with rank of Colonel. A colonelcy in the Regular Army came in 1916; on August 5, 1917, he became a Brigadier in the National Army. For several years following 1904, he was professor of languages at West Point and in the Army Signal School ; his duty with troops as a young offi- cer of cavalry had gained him experience in Indian fight- ing. A man of indomitable energy and a keen student of warfare. General Traub proved a great strength to the Division through the early period of training in France, gaining the confidence of all those under his command. Similar natural qualities of leadership — such as en- ergy, inspiration, devotion to duty, and resourcefulness — were possessed by General Cole; but his military training had been received wholly in the service of his State (Massa- chusetts). An enlisted man and officer of the First Corps Cadets between 1890 and 1910 (Major of the battalion in the latter year), he was appointed Adjutant-General of the State of Massachusetts in 1914, retiring as Briga- dier-General in 1916; he served for several years, also, as a member of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. All precedents to the contrary, General Cole vividly exemplified the fact that it is possible for an active politician to be a good soldier. He brought to his new duties in the Division a long experience in handling men, and the utmost energy in the performance of his work, coupled with a patriotism as ardent as it was sus- tained. At the time of the entry of the United States into the war, he was out of the service; but he promptly en- listed as a private in Headquarters Company, 9th Massa- 22 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE chusetts Infantry, and presently, because of long previous service, knowledge of conditiorfs, and established reputa- tion as an organizer and administrator, he was rapidly ad- vanced to the rank of Brigadier-General in the state forces, with command of a brigade. Considered invaluable in any National Guard organization, as representing its best traditions, he was retained in his high rank by the War Department and given the command of a brigade of in- fantry in the new division. This, be it said, was contrary to the prevailing custom of the War Department, which relegated most of the state general officers to command of units not taken overseas, their place being taken by officers of the Regular establishment.^ The command of the 51st Field Artillery Brigade went to Brigadier-General William Lassiter, an acknowledged artillery expert of distinction, who brought to his branch of the Division's forces the very highest professional stand- ards, and who remained long enough with the brigade to impress it with abiding ideals of efficiency. At the time of his assignment to the Division, General Lassiter w^as per- forming duty as military attache at the United States Embassy in London.- Of the nine regimental commanders (four of infantry; three of artillery; one of engineers; one of the trains and military police), the majority were officers of the Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut National Guard. Colonel George W. Bunnell, 101st Engineers, had had the benefit of a West Point education ; others had been long identified with state troops and with their own units, serving in all ^ Another case of an officer's resigning high command in his state troops, merely for the sake of taking an active part in service overseas, was that of Brigadier-General Albert Greenlaw, of Maine. At the very outset, when the Maine troops were called into service, he resigned as Adjutant-General, to accept appointment as Captain and Supply Officer of a Maine infantry regiment (later 103d Infantry), going abroad in that capacity, and later being promoted to the Division Staff (General Staff Section, G-1). 2 Colonel M. E. Locke was in command of 51st F.A. Brigade for some time after arrival in France. General Lassiter joined at Coetquidan, upon terminating his duty as military attache. ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 23 grades. Chosen from all the regimental commanders in the New England Guard, they represented, in the judgment of the War Department, the best material available for the positions they occupied. For, apart from their military experience, there existed another set of considerations re- specting the fitness of these regimental commanders to take their men overseas, which not only possessed con- siderable interest, from various points of view, at the time of their selection, but was also to play a part, later, in de- termining the value of certain regiments as fighting units. In a peculiar sense the regimental commanders were looked upon by the thousands of good men and women whose boys were with the troops as the guardians and friends of those lads as well as their leaders in battle. In every case they were daily subjected to a very heavy and continual pressure, in the form of direct personal appeals, from their own intimate friends, from men of high position and in- fluence, as well as from pathetic hundreds of anxious, proud fathers and mothers, "to look out for my boy," "to bring Joe home safe," "to see that he behaves him- self," "to give Bill a chance," and so on. Whether they so willed or not, these colonels of local, territorial regiments were made to occupy a place in which they were compelled to carry the weight of a feeling of personal responsibility, not only for the military training, good discipline, physical condition, and fighting edge of their regiments, but also for the happiness and safety of hundreds of the individuals composing them. They were forced, moreover, by conditions to assume a position of responsibility to the community which was the home of their respective regiments, for their commands' creditable behavior and honorable achievement. A colonel was told, directly and emphatically, that he was expected to bring glory and renown to his home town ; he was reminded of the competition he would meet; he was showered with gifts to be held by him in trust for "the boys" — gifts in the shape of funds presented by veteran 24 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE members of the organization or other groups of friends, reaching to very large amounts; he was importuned by rehef and patriotic societies, chambers of commerce, and scores of individuals, to express a wish for any conceivable article for the men's comfort or happiness, so that it might be provided at once. Encouraged, flattered, strengthened, heartened by the most prodigal expressions of devotion, actively supported in his work by the confidence of thou- sands of people in his own home town, the regimental com- mander was made to feel, at the same time, that he could not afford to let matters go wrong with his organization, if he cared for his future; that he had a very real duty to- ward the parents and friends of the lads over whom he ex- ercised control. On the face of it, the colonelcy of these community regiments afforded a great temptation in the direction of business, social, or political preferment. It is reasonable to suppose that a certain pressure was ex- ercised to award these colonelcies to officers of the Regular Army, who, because of their training and purely profes- sional attitude, would not be, people assumed, influenced by conditions tending to impair the value of the National Guard commanders. But as the debate proceeded, the question was decided in favor of the officers already in charge. The appointments were made; the Division was committed at the start to a character bearing birthmarks of its strictly community origin. For better, for worse, it was to be a militia organization. And such, through all the vicissitudes of its history, it remained; as such it must be always judged, with what verdict it will be interesting to discover. F CHAPTER III OVERSEAS EVERISHLY active were the times to follow. The new Division Staff was hard-pressed.^ The question of enlisted or commissioned strength would be paramount one day, only to be jostled aside by demands for equip- ment and clothing. Now field inspections must be held; transfers and discharges must be expedited ; training sched- ules must be prepared. The desire animated all ranks to be first overseas. There was eager speculation as to the progress in preparation for service of the Forty-Second ("Rainbow") Division, then mobihzing on Long Island, New York, and quite publicly heralded as destined to be the first division of the citizen-army to go abroad. To ob- tain equipment and clothing, every agency was called on, from state authorities to private individuals, from gov- ernment arsenals to manufacturers' stocks — the work proceeding on the basis that all artillery, machine-gun, and other ordnance material of special application, to- * At various dates subsequent to the organization of the Division and prior to departure overseas, the following officers were added to the Staff in special or- ders: Assistants to Division Surgeon, Captain J. Glass, M.C., Captain K. B. Bailey, M.C., Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Williams, M.C.; Assistants to Division Quartermaster, Major G. E. Cole, Captain C. E. Scorer, Captain O. G. Lager- quist, Captain E. H. Tandy, Captain H. H. Wheelock; Assistant to Division In- spector, Major R. P. Harbold; Assistants to Division Adjutant, Major L. W. Cass, Major C. A. Stevens; Division Ordnance Officer, Major E. T. Weisel; Assistant Ordnance Officer, Captain Aiken Simons; Aide-de-camp, Captain A. L. Pendleton, Jr.; Interpreter, Lieutenant J. P. King. Of these officers a large majority remained with the Division throughout its period of service abroad, a fact which contributed vastly to the smooth running of the staff machinery. Friendship and mutual understanding, together with devotion to the common cause of serving the troops, accomplished more than any set of staff regulations. While frequent changes in the personnel of the General Staff sections sometimes affected temporarily their effectiveness, the Quartermaster, Adjutant's, Ordnance, and Medical Staffs made continuous and notable records for helpful service of the Division, from beginning to end. 26 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE gether with motor transport, animals, and mucli of the required quartermaster property, would be issued on ar- rival in France. In the matter of numerical strength, when it was found that discharges and transfers to the Depot Brigade were going to reduce it, for certain units, below what was prescribed, recourse was had to such other troops as were available in New England. From the New England Coast Artillery (National Guard in federal service), some hundreds were transferred into places where they were most needed; ^ of the newly drafted men of the Seventy- 1 The following telegram from the Adjutant-General and the reply of the Di- vision Commander illustrate the necessarily summary methods employed, and the local conditions contended against, in the organization of the Division: (a) "Washington, D.C., Aug. 30. Maj.-Gen. C. R. Edwards, U.S. Army, Bos- ton, Mass. Secretary of War directs that neither Regular Coast Artillery nor Coast Artillery of the National Guard in service of United States shall, without special permission from the War Department in each case, be considered as available for use in organization of new mobile army units of National Guard and National Army for service abroad. McCain." (6) "Aug. 31, 1917. Adjutant- General, Washington, D.C. Number 115. Reference your telegram August 30th directing that no Coast Artillery be considered available for use in reorganization of National Guard without special permission of W^ar Department. I report that in the reorganization of the 26th Division I transferred from the National Guard Coast Artillery of this Department the following personnel: To the 51st Field Artillery Brigade, 9 officers and 846 enlisted men; to the 101st Engineers, 3 oflB- cers and 379 men; to the 101st Ammunition Train, 7 officers and 234 men, in all a total of 19 officers and 1459 enlisted men. This personnel has been absorbed into the new organizations and equipped, and the organizations are ready for service. Under my orders for the reorganization of the 26th Division . . . the necessity of hastening the reorganization and utilizing everything of the National Guard available here for the purpose appeared paramount and authorized. It was im- possible to complete the organization of the units named above from the person- nel available in this Division without using some of the Coast Artillery. I used no more than was absolutely necessary and used these only after consultation with the District Artillery commanders who stated that these troops could be spared and that those selected desired the transfer. . . . Furthermore, as precedents for my action, the use of Coast Artillery in the organization of the trench mortar battery was in the plan of reorganization suggested to me by the Militia Bureau and handed to Colonel Shelton before he left Washington; and my earlier in- structions, when it was contemplated to use New England units in the organiza- tion of the composite 42d Division, directed me to furnish the Headquarters Train and Military Police for that Division from the New England Coast Artil- lery. I request, therefore, that my action in this respect be approved To transfer these men back now to the Coast Artillery would interfere seriously with the organization and efficiency of my command, and create dissatisfaction among all concerned. Notwithstanding the few popular and political protests that have been made against the reorganization effected by me, I have been able to pre- OVERSEAS 27 Sixth Division, then assembling at Camp Devens, Massa- chusetts, somewhat less than 1000 enlisted men were util- ized, at the last moment, as replacements in the infantry. From the OflScers' Reserve Corps were drawn about 179 lieutenants, who were distributed to units of all arms. It was commonly rumored that, following the Division Commander's notification that organization had been ef- fected, the Division would be sent to Camp Greene, North Carolina, for training. Indeed, the arrangements for that movement progressed so far that a detail of enlisted men was sent to Camp Greene to prepare a Division Head- quarters; and up to the very last this impression was al- lowed to prevail. Over the preparations for actual departure overseas was hung a thick curtain of mystery. Such secrets as possible sailing dates, destinations, or possible routes, precious for the enemy to ascertain, were carefully guarded. The cen- sorship regarding news of war preparations, self-imposed by the New England press, was honorably observed; the news which every village in the region was most anxious to hear was never published. The departure of a unit, when it did occur, was unheralded and unattended. A battalion would be at drill of an afternoon; the next morning would find its camp empty and the troops vanished, nobody of the general public knew whither, and of those in the secret nobody would tell. But one by one the regiments and trains began to disappear, early in September. Their animal transport was packed off, under cover of darkness, to New- port News. Their equipment and baggage were slightly different from those to which they had been used, for the wall and pyramidal tents, the mosquito bars, and the cot- ton uniforms, long familiar to veterans of American camps serve generally an excellent spirit, and to develop, both within and without the Division, a willingness to make the sacriBce of pride and tradition involved by the reorganization. The use of some Coast Artillery has helped largely to obtain this result. To change the accomplished fact now would, I fear, react upon us and arouse new opposition to the reorganization. Edwabds." 28 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE and campaigns, were left behind. Artillery and machine- gun material had long before been turned in. There was a great shortage of rifles, packs, carriers, pistols, and mess equipment, but such an abundance of articles provided by the relief agencies, from safety razors to knitted helmets, that not till months later was the balance between field kit and comfort kit contemplated by regulations even par- tially restored. The movement of the troops to the ports of embarka- tion at Hoboken and Montreal was regulated by a two- fold consideration — available tonnage and readiness of the units. From the moment of organization it had been the naturally ardent desire that the Twenty-Sixth should be the first complete American Division overseas. The prospect of having to undergo a long wait at a southern camp was not alluring; it made a far less insistent call on patriotism than did immediate service abroad. Local pride was touched to the quick by reports of the readiness of the Forty-Second Division; it spurred to the very greatest efforts all persons, military and civihan, on whom fell the duties of organizing and equipping the various units. As a result of ceaseless labor this task was accomplished by the first of September; but the successful issue of the enter- prise — the actual embarkation of the troops — was only accomplished after the expenditure of an equal amount of effort and ingenuity. While the initiative of the Di- vision Commander accomplished much, credit for the Division's winning the final lap of the race with its gen- erous rival and friend the Forty-Second, was largely due to Captain A. L. Pendleton, of the Division Commander's personal staff. Assigned to the task of securing the first available transportation for the Division, this oflBcer never rested till he accomplished his difficult mission. LTpon in- formation on a certain date that four ships would be avail- able within the next four days, and that the units for whom they were destined were not ready, it was less than an hour OVERSEAS 29 after Captain Pendleton wired the news to Division Head- quarters before the Chief of Staff replied with the list of assignments, and the start was made. Because of priority schedules, however, which exactly prescribed the order in which all the American troops were to be embarked, there was a reluctance on the part of the shipping officers to allot to the Twenty-Sixth all the tonnage as it became available; but nothing was left undone to insure that the Division should have every chance. Again a list of ships available in the near future, with their passenger and cargo space, came into the hands of the indefatigable Pen- dleton, who promptly prepared complete embarkation assignments of troop units from the Division, showing how they could be shipped with most economy and least delay. This he placed in the hands of the embarkation author- ities with such good results that, when this next convoy was assembled, and the units officially scheduled to take it were again reported as not ready to go abroad, the units of the Twenty-Sixth once more received the preference, both at the port of Hoboken, New Jersey, and at Mon- treal, from which latter port, by arrangement with the Canadian Government, American troops also sailed. In convoys (usually collected at Halifax), or by single steam- ers, in ships of all sorts from first-class Atlantic liners like the Adriatic, Celtic, or Saxonia, down to hastily impressed coastwise fruit boats, the troops made the journey. Civil- ian passengers, in many cases, were on the same ship with the troops; the service of transport, afterwards so per- fected through experience, was still in embrj^'o. But what- ever the minor discomforts or occasional hardships of the voyage, happiness reigned in every heart, for at length the Division was on its way to the Great Adventure. And com- placency was added when presently it became known that of all the combat forces in the United States, Regulars, National Guard, or National Army, the Twenty-Sixth Division was the first to be organized, fitted out, and sent so NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE abroad as a division. It is true that the splendid First Di- vision had preceded it by some weeks, but this was lacking in many of its prescribed units, and it went in detachments. Other troops also, such as some Marine, engineer, or quar- termaster detachments, and the 14th Railway Engineers, were also on the other side by September 1, engaged in organizing, policing, and construction work around the base ports, travel routes, and principal headquarters.^ But of the citizen-army's combat divisions, the Twenty-Sixth had unquestionably the good fortune to be the first ready and the first across the water. It even preceded all combat troops of the Regular Army, but the units named above. ^ ^ The first American unit landed in France on June 25, 1917. 2 The sailing and arrival list is here appended: An advance party of 17 officers sailed from New York August 25, and arrived at Liverpool September 15: Unit Departed from U.S. Arrived 1. 51st Inf. Brig. Hdqrs September 7, 1917 September 21, 1917 2. 101st Infantry September 7 September 21 3. 101st Ambulance Co September 7 September 20 4. 101st Field Hospital September 7 September 20 5. 101st Field Artillery September 9 September 23 6. 103d Ambulance Co September 16 October 2 7. 103d Field Hospital September 16 October 2 8. 102d Infantry September 19 October 9 9. 104th Field Hospital September 22 October 7 10. 51st F. A. Brig. Hdqrs September 23 October 5 11. lO^d Field Artillery September 23 October 5 12. 101st Signal Battalion September 23 October 5 13. 102d Machine-Gun Btn September 23 October 5 14. 103d Infantry September 25 October 17 15. 101st Supply Train September 25 October 9 16. 101st Engineers September 26 October 9 17. 102d Ambulance Co September 26 October 17 18. 104th Ambulance Co September 26 October 17 19. 52d Inf. Brig. Hdqrs September 27 October 17 20. 104th Infantry September 27 October 10 21. 101st Ammunition Train October 3 October 17 22. 103d Machine-Gun Btn October 3 October 17 23. 102d Field Hospital October 4 October 17 24. Division Headquarters October 9 October 23 25. Headquarters Troop October 9 October 23 26. 101st Machine-Gun Btn October 9 October 23 27. 101st Tn. Hq. and Military Police October 9 October 24 28. 103d Field Artillery October 9 October 23 29. 101st Trench Mortar October 9 October 23 y OVERSEAS SI The only untoward incident of the movement of the Division overseas was that occurring on the voyage of the 2d Battahon, 102d Infantry. And this is worth recording only as illustrating the remarkable good fortune attending the convoys, at a time when German submarine activity was very marked and provisions for the protection of troops on Atlantic passages not yet perfected. Embarked September 23 on S.S. Lenape, the troops had accompHshed some three hundred miles of the voyage, when the break- ing of a piston pinion, during rough weather, compelled the return of the ship to New York for repairs. Until October 27, the battahon encamped at Fort Totten, New York, on which date it sailed on S.S. Adriatic, in convoy, arriving at Liverpool November 9. From the incidents of the voyages of the several regi- ments, battahons, and other units, of their arrival on for- eign soil, and of their transportation to ultimate desti- nations, one impression was outstanding in the minds of officers and men alike. Plain to see it was, that any division was no more than a cog in the huge war-machine. A week before embarkation an infantry regiment had seemed an enormous body of troops; to visualize a new division of 27,000 all ranks was difficult even for the active imagina- tion; a division commander appeared as remote and all- powerful as a demigod. But the jaws of the great troop- movement machinery closed on the Twenty-Sixth, and the Division wilted. Strange British and French staff officers, who represented hitherto unheard-of powers, with an efficiency all their own, and irritating because its meth- ods were not at first understood, laid firm hands on stoutly protesting colonels and the puzzled, weary httle staffs of the brigade and division commanders, directing this and that, insisting on the other, in a manner which made all ranks aware that their beloved organization was no more than a trifling pawn on a gigantic chessboard. For a while the Division did not function as such at all. Battahons 32 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE moved separately, oftentimes; a regimental commander was at no time sure of the location of his units. The ex- perience of one Regimental Headquarters, which crossed the ocean with one battalion of the regiment, the supply company, a strange company of army bakers, Canadian aviators, and civilians, nurses and little children, may be taken as fairly typical. From Montreal the troops pro- ceeded to Halifax, where the ship lay at anchor for a week awaiting the rest of the convoy. The third battalion and the machine-gun company, be it said, had preceded Head- quarters into the unknown by about a week; the second battalion was left behind in camp, to follow nobody knew when. At Liverpool, the ship was boarded by American staff officers, who informed the Colonel that they knew nothing, and had no authority beyond collecting the per- sonnel records and passenger lists. Everything governing debarkation and transportation was in the hands of the British. The latter soon appeared, with explicit orders that the troops should entrain at once, without rations, without field ranges, without baggage of any description save what was in the men's packs. To leave his rations and baggage was something unheard of by the American Colonel; it promised infinity of discomfort for his men; there seemed only the most dubious guarantees that either would ever be forwarded or recovered. He made emphatic representa- tions; but all to no purpose. Bewildered, deeply solicitous both for his men and for his own good impression on the British authorities, he felt swept along on an irresistible current. Unknown forces took him to Southampton; some remote power sent him and his men to a filthy camp of flimsy tentage and black, sticky mud, where the rain (for which the new arrivals were inclined to blame the British Staff) was endless for five days; nobody apparently had the authority to make the men comfortable; "it was always done that way, and quite all right." Here a pause was made while all-powerful, unseen hands prepared a ship to ferry OVERSEAS 33 the troops to La Havre across the Channel. One must wait; one must keep the men strictly in hand ; one must not seek diligently to improve living conditions. It was hard for commanding officers in those bleak, first days. They laid down the strictest orders to check any tendency to stray away sight-seeing; they were desper- ately anxious for their draggled men to be at all times smart, prompt, soldierly, creditable to their country; they were sick at heart over the wretched condition of the sod- den, stinking camp; they were worried by the lads who overstayed their three-hour leaves, while sympathizing with the spirit of adventure and curiosity which led the youthful feet into byways of exploration. Cut off from all connection with home, perfectly ignorant of the where- abouts of other parts of the Division, not knowing a half- day ahead what was in store, they were truly unhappy. Whether at the Southampton camp, or the Oxney camp near Borden, in Saint-Nazaire, the La Havre rest camp, or marooned in the slums of Liverpool seeking baggage and equipage, the story was quite the same. But it was good medicine — that first bitter, salutary taste of inferiority and powerlessness. It gave our officers a great lesson in the direction of subordination to authority, in patience; they were taught to have confidence in those impersonal, higher powers, unseen and unknown, which, from an un- guessed place at the end of a telegraph wire, were directing the destiny of the new arrivals behind the firing-line. CHAPTER IV SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE AFTER a very brief delay, in view of the depleted con- dition of the French railway rolling stock, the vari- ous units of the Division were moved to the two areas as- signed for their training. That occupied by all elements except the artillery and ammunition train lay adjacent to the market town of Neufchateau, along steep, wooded slopes and broad valleys, dotted with gray, stone villages.^ It was in Lorraine. It was in the heart of ancient France. It was the stark, austere region which had cradled Joan of Arc — a land of meager, stony soil, under a sky of dull- est gray. One wonders how many of the new arrivals — vigorous, active lads — were touched at all by the spell of the quaint old country. Surely to some of them — per- ^ Division Headquarters opened in Neufchateau October 31. Units of the Division, less artillery and ammunition train, were billeted in the following villages: 51st Infantry Brig. Headquarters Rebeuville 101st Infantry lOid Infantry 102d Machine-Gun Battalion 52(1 Infantry Brig. Headquarters 103(1 Infantry 10-lth Infantry 103d Machine-Gun Battalion 101st Engineers Headquarters Trains and M.P. 101st Field Signal Battalion 101st Machine-Gun Battalion 101st Supply Train 101st Sanitary Train Railhead Neufchateau — Rouceux — Circourt — Villars — Brechaiucourt — Rebeuville Landaville — Certilleux — Rouvres-le- Chetive Rebeuville — Brechaincourt — Rouvres- le-Chetive Liffol-le-Grand Liffol-le-Grand — Villouxel Harreville — Pompierre — Sartes — Cha- tenois — Giroucourt Liffol-le-Grand — Sartes — Villouxel Rolampont — Bazoilles — Mont-les- Neufchateau Neufchateau Noncourt Neufchateau — Certilleux Neufchateau — Harreville Neufchateau — Bazoilles — Liffol-le- Grand Certilleux Vav