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ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; 
 
 OB, 
 
 OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF 
 
 DR. FRANCIS THEREMIN, 
 
 M 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD. 
 
 AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 REVISED EDITION. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 DRAPER AND HALLIDAY. 
 
 90S. 68 AND 60 COBNHILL. 
 
 1867. 
 

 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, 
 BY W. F. DRAPER, 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 
 
 «3Wt 
 Bertram Smith 
 
 ELECTROTYPED AND PRIX TED 
 JY W. F. DRAPER, ANDOVER, MASS. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 'TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 The edition of this work published in 1850 has become exhausted, 
 and the existing demand for it is such as to warrant its republication. 
 The translator undertook the work primarily to supply a need which 
 he felt for a text-book adapted to the more advanced class of students, 
 and he has been encouraged to learn that other teachers have found 
 the same adaptedness in it. The opportunity, afforded by a reprint, 
 has been embraced, to attempt to explain and illustrate the leading 
 position of the treatise, in an Introductory Essay, as well as to throw 
 some more light upon the general subject of Rhetoric and Eloquence. 
 The series of Questions, which has also been appended to this edition, 
 will serve, it is hoped, to generalize the contents for the student, and 
 thereby to assist him in getting possession of them. The work is again 
 committed to the public, with the confident belief that its influence, 
 wherever felt, will be truthful and salutary. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 * PAGE 
 
 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, ........ 9 
 
 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY THE TRANSLATOR, .... 17 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 ON INVENTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 DESIGN AND USE OF THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION, ... 61 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS NOT AN INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN POETRY AND 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, 57 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS NEITHER POETRY NOR PHILOSOPHY, ... 60 
 
 1* 
 
VI ■ CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS A VIRTUE, . . . . . . . . . .61 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 IDEAS, 72 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FORM OF PRACTICAL IDEAS, . 76 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ELOQUENCE, . ... . .81 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 VIRTUE IS ALSO GOOD SENSE, 86 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SUBORDINATE IDEAS, OR CATEGORIES, . . . . . 91 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE CATEGORY, TRUTH, ... .93 
 
 CHAPTER XI. , 
 
 THE RHETORICAL DEMONSTRATION OF TRUTH, 95 
 
CONTENTS. VII 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE CATEGORIES, POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY, . . . . 105 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE PLAN AND DIVISION OF AN ORATION, . . . . . .109 
 
 CHAPTER XI Y. 
 
 FIRST FEATURES TOWARDS A SKETCH OF THE ORATOR, . . 121 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 ON ELOCUTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 AFFECTION AND PASSION, . .127 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE DUTY OF THE ORATOR TO SPEAK WITH AFFECTION, AND 
 
 TO AWAKEN AFFECTION, . 135 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AFFECTION, 141 
 
 APPENDIX- WIT, V . . •" , " '"'- Ü7 
 
VIII CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE MEANS OF EXCITING AFFECTION; OK, THE RHETORI- 
 CAL PRESENTATION OF THOUGHT, . . . . . . .151 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE LAW OF ADAPTATION, 156 
 
 APPENDIX — TASTE, 176 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE LAW OF CONSTANT PROGRESS, . .179 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE LAW OF VIVACITY, 191 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROSE, . 200 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CONCLUSION, ............. 206 
 
 SUPPLEMENT, . . . . . . . 207 
 
 QUESTIONS, . . 215 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 It is believed that this little treatise upon Rhetoric possesses 
 some characteristics which render it worthy of a place among the 
 current English treatises on this subject. Perhaps no one will be 
 ready to assent to all the positions laid down in it, and many may 
 think that in its method and spirit it is altogether too foreign to our 
 own modes of thought and expression, to be of any worth to the 
 English student. Still, if used in the right way, it is thought 
 that it may be made to contribute to a broad and thorough disci- 
 pline in this department of culture. For no production, espe- 
 cially of a foreign mind, should be servilely received by the 
 student, or allowed to exert an arbitrary and violent influence 
 upon him. He should retain his own individuality and nation- 
 ality in their most independent and determined forms, while, at 
 the same time, he opens his mind and heart to all that is true and 
 genial in a foreign literature. Non-intercourse is as impolitic 
 and injurious in the world of contemplation, as it is in the world 
 of action. 
 
 Moreover, the present state of Rhetoric, considered as one of 
 the coordinate branches of discipline, to which the mind of the 
 student is subjected in the course of liberal education, seems to 
 call for the infusion of an element which may be found in this 
 treatise of Theremin. Rhetoric, in its best estate, is but the 
 science of Form, or to use Milton's phrase, an " organic," t. e. 9 
 instrumental, Art. It does not propose to furnish the material 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 of knowledge, but only to put the material, when furnished, into 
 as fine and perfect forms as possible. Owing partly to this in- 
 trinsic nature of Rhetoric as an art, and partly perhaps to the 
 excessively popular character which science and scientific state- 
 ments have assumed in the present age, Rhetoric has become ex- 
 tremely superficial in its character and influence, so that the 
 term " rhetorical " has become the synonyme of shallow and 
 showy. Dissevered from Logic, or the necessary laws of 
 thought, it has become dissevered from the seat of life, and has 
 degenerated into a mere collection of rules respecting the struc- 
 ture of sentences and the garnish of expression.* 
 
 Any treatise, therefore, of which the tendency is to restore 
 the connection between thought and its expression, cannot but 
 be beneficial in its influence upon both the theory and practice 
 of Eloquence. Even if it were constructed upon a false fun- 
 damental principle, and as a systematic whole were incorrect, 
 still the mere effort to systematize the subject, the striving to 
 ground it in something deeper and more solid than its own hollow 
 forms, would not be without its salutary influence upon the art itself 
 and the student. It would, at least, direct attention to the fact, 
 that an art like Rhetoric should be based upon some science, and 
 that its rules and maxims, in order to be efficient and influential, 
 must be the off-shoots of principles lying deeper than themselves. 
 It would point to the adaptation that really exists in the nature 
 of things, and that ought actually to exist in practice, between an 
 
 * Lord Bacon remarks that it was an error in the educational course of 
 his time, "that scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to 
 logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and novices : for 
 these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the art of arts ; 
 the one for judgment, the other for ornament : and they be the rules and 
 directions how to set forth and dispose matter, and therefore for minds 
 empty and unfraught with matter, and which have not gathered that which 
 Cicero calleth ' sylva ' and ' supellex,' stuff and variety, to begin with those 
 arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind,) 
 doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and 
 universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerated into childish 
 sophistry and ridiculous affectation." — Advancement of Learning, Book f. 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 instrument employed by the human mind, and addressing itself 
 to it, and the human mind itself. 
 
 The work of Theremin, whether it be true or false in sub- 
 stance, is, what it purports to be, a systematic Rhetoric. It does 
 not begin with rules, and it does not, in starting, deal in minute 
 observations upon minutiae ; but it begins with the Ideas which 
 are conceived to underlie the whole subject, and to constitute the 
 ground and soil from which the whole after-development and 
 detail will naturally spring. It begins at the ; beginning, goes 
 through the middle, and so arrives at the end. 
 
 Now there is power in such a method, apart from its contents. 
 The course and movement of the system is according to nature. 
 Commencing with the Matter, it proceeds to the Form, which is 
 to take shape and character, and all" its qualities, from that primi- 
 tive material for whose sake alone it has any existence at all. 
 
 " Well may men knowen, but it be a fool, 
 That every part deriveth from his hool. 
 For Nature hath not taken his beginning 
 Of no partie ne cantel of a thing, 
 But of a thing that parfit is and stable 
 Descending so, til it be corrumpable." * 
 
 The whole tendency of such a theory of Rhetoric is to pro- 
 duce, in practice, masculine and thoughtful discourse. The 
 student, if we may use the term, is headed right by it, and is 
 taught to apply his best power to the evolution of truth and the 
 production of thought in his own mind, not surely to the neglect 
 of the Form in which it is to be expressed, but in order to the 
 highest and most perfect elaboration of the Form. He is taught 
 to be severe with himself, to forget himself in the theme, that he 
 may exhibit it with that boldness and freedom of manner, that 
 daring strength and grandeur of treatment, which is absolutely 
 beyond the reach of him who is anxious respecting the impres- 
 sion he may make ; who, in short, is tormented by too much 
 
 * Chaucer, Knightes Tale. 
 
XII PREFACE. 
 
 consciousness of self, at a time when he should be absorbingly 
 conscious of the theme. 
 
 According to the theory here presented, the Oration, — mean- 
 ing by this, every rounded and complete discourse, — is the evo- 
 lution of an Idea, which is the germ and principle of the whole 
 composition. Hence it is simple in its structure, and homogen- 
 eous in its character ; fitted to enlist the whole attention of the 
 hearer, and to produce one distinct total impression. 
 
 Nothing can be of greater benefit to the student, than, in the 
 very beginning of his intellectual life, to be habituated to com- 
 pose in the light, and by the guidance, and under the impulse, of 
 Ideas ; than to be enabled to discover those germinal truths which 
 are pregnant with life, and which, when embodied with freedom 
 and power in a discourse, constitute the ground-work of the finest 
 creations of the human mind. And apart from the benefit which 
 is to be derived from this habit and ability, for the practical pur- 
 poses of Rhetoric, what a benefit is derived from it in respect to 
 the private contemplations and enjoyment of the scholar ! Sup- 
 posing he does not need this ability, because he is never called 
 upon to speak or write to his fellow-men, (a supposition that is 
 hardly to the credit of an educated man in this peculiar age, *) 
 does he not need it, in order that his own mind may reach essen- 
 tial truth, and may, in its own reflections, follow the method and 
 order of Reason ? Jn what a serene and constant illumination 
 does that mind dwell, which is able in its meditaiions to find the 
 fontal truth as it were by instinct, and to unfold it by its own 
 light, and in accordance with its own structure ! 
 
 By such a theory the student is introduced into the world of 
 Ideas, Laws and Principles, and is taught to begin with these, 
 and from them to work out towards detail, elaboration and. orna- 
 ment. It is a mysterious world, it is true, and it must be, from 
 the very fact that it is the source and origin. But it is the very 
 
 * " Ob eamque causam eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est, quam 
 vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare : quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, 
 eloquentia complectitur eos, quibus cum communitate juncti sumus." — 
 Cicero, De Officiis, Lib* I. cap. 44. 
 
PREFACE. XIII 
 
 office-work of thinking to convert these Ideas into clear concep- 
 tions ; to put these vast unlimited truths into definite and intelli- 
 gible discourse ; in fine, in the strict meaning of the term, to 
 develop truth. 
 
 He is the mystical and obscure discourser who leaves truth as 
 he finds it; who does not, by the aid of close thinking and a 
 rigorous remorseless logic, compel the dark truthful Idea to yield 
 up its secret ; who does not force the contents out of the all- 
 comprehending law or principle. And he is the clear and in- 
 telligible discourser, in the only high sense of the term, — clear 
 while solid, intelligible while weighty, — who, not starting in light- 
 to make things light, starts in darkness and works his way out 
 into high noon. In both the Pagan and Christian cosmogonies, 
 creation emerged from old night. 
 
 But if we are not mistaken, the theory presented in this work 
 is true in its substance. It teaches that Eloquence is moral in 
 essence ; that it has a moral origin, moral means and movement, 
 and a moral end. It teaches, with what may seem pertinacity 
 to some, that in its substance and its accidents, its primary laws 
 and secondary rules, Eloquence is ethical. 
 
 This is not a new theory. As the author remarks, it was dis- 
 tinctly announced by the elder Cato, and mentioned with appro- 
 bation by Quintilian, a critic whose exquisite taste often brought 
 him to an indistinct intimation of truths, which a more profound 
 genius would have brought out into distinct intuition. It has, 
 moreover, been the tacitly-received theory of all the great minds, 
 the really eloquent of the race. We have it on the authority 
 of Cicero, * that " Socrates dicere solebat, omnes, in eo, quod 
 scirent, satis esse eloquentes." By this he could only mean, that the 
 moral feeling and interest generated by clear knoiuledge of truth, 
 is the ground of that methodical, earnest, and animating mental 
 action which we denominate Eloquence, — ,a truth which may be 
 found substantially, if not formally, falling from the lips of 
 Socrates in the Gorgias. Add to this the decisive statement of 
 
 * De Oratore, L, 14. 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 Buffon, " Le style — c'est 1 'homme," which meets with an equally 
 decisive response within us, together with the views of Elo- 
 quence left us in the remarkable fragments of Pascal, and we 
 find that the theory in question is no newly broached one, but 
 one that is unconsciously formed by the thoughtful and eloquent 
 mind everywhere. 
 
 Most certainly the tendency and influence of such a theory of 
 Eloquence must be good and elevating. Setting aside the fact, 
 that if it be the true theory, it is the only one by the aid of 
 which Eloquence can come into existence, it is the only working 
 theory, it is most certainly a great point gained, if an art, 
 so often supposed to be at furthest remove from earnestness, 
 and seriousness, which is regarded too commonly as the art by 
 which the ornaments are furnished when the solid and real work 
 has been done, is shown to have its native seat and source in 
 Ethics. The expression of thought by this theory becomes a 
 sincere process, and the mind, while giving utterance to its re- 
 flections, is really contributing to the moral culture and develop- 
 ment of the man. The productions of such a Rhetoric are marked 
 by that grave and conscientious character which is the natural 
 fruit of simplicity and sincerity in the mental processes. The 
 influence of the theory is felt even in the language employed. 
 It is no longer stiff, stilted, and aloof from the thought, but pliant, 
 vital, and consubstantial with it. 
 
 Finally, it is believed that the theory of Eloquence here set 
 forth harmonizes with the true theory of Art. Perhaps the 
 greatest defect in many of the current treatises upon Rhetoric is 
 the absence of correct views of the principles of Art. Oratory 
 is claimed, (though not by Theremin,) to be one of the Fine 
 Arts ; and how, then, can a clue to its mystery and power be 
 obtained without a philosophic knowledge of those laws and 
 principles by which embodiment, whether in Nature or Art, is 
 regulated and impelled ? 
 
 We say embodiment whether in Nature or Art, because the 
 method of each is essentially the same. In both, a creative Idea 
 is the starting point and the guiding principle, and the movement 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 in both is free and original. A genuine work of Art is no more 
 a copy or a mechanical production, than a work in Nature is. It 
 is not the product of ingenuity improved by practice and experi- 
 ence, but of impulsive genius, and the same characteristics are 
 found in it, according to the degree of its perfection as a work of 
 Art, that are found in Nature. Indeed, we demand that a work 
 of Art have Nature in it, i. e., be original, fresh, living, glowing, 
 breathing ; a demand that would be unreasonable if there were 
 no likeness at bottom between Art and Nature. As Nature, ac- 
 cording to Sir Thomas Brown, is the Art of God, so Art is man's 
 Nature, and sustains the same relation to the Finite mind that 
 creation does to the Infinite. 
 
 By this is not meant, of course, that it sustains the same rela- 
 tion materially, but only formally. The work of Art is the crea- 
 tion of the finite imagination, in the sense that it is the em- 
 bodiment and result of an Idea, a productive thought, which 
 sprang from the innermost recesses of this human faculty. As 
 Nature is the result and embodiment of divine .Ideas, so Art is 
 the result and embodiment of human Ideas. The two differ 
 from each other as the Infinite differs from the Finite, but they 
 are alike, as reason in man is the same in kind with reason in 
 God. We say, then, that the work of Art is formally — L e. ? in 
 respect to its origin from a productive Idea, and in respect to the 
 plastic method of its construction, : — like the work of Nature ; 
 that man, the Artist, works creatively, not in the absolute and 
 highest sense of creating something out of nothing, in which 
 sense God is the only creator, but in the secondary yet significant 
 sense of embodying Ideas, of producing works to which the 
 terms applied to the works of Nature find a patural and spon- 
 taneous application, the world over. 
 
 Now, it is evident that Rhetoric, whose office it is to guide the 
 student into the right method of embodying his thought, and which 
 is the very science of Form, should itself be formative, con- 
 structive, plastic. But how is such a Rhetoric possible, if the 
 theory that is formed is not pnly not conformed to, but positively 
 contradicts, the laws and principles pf what, after the remarks 
 
XVI PREFACE 
 
 above made upon Nature and Art, may be denominated Univer- 
 sal Art ? Plainly, then, it is only by a deep and true insight 
 into the nature of Art, in its widest sense, that a system of 
 Rhetoric can arise that will lead to the production of works ap- 
 pealing with power to the imagination as well as the intellect. 
 
 This treatise of Theremin, while it strictly distinguishes Elo- 
 quence, by virtue of its moral character and its external aim and 
 end, from a merely artistic process, at the same time sufficiently 
 recognizes the aesthetic element in it, and while, by some, the 
 author might be thought to have carried out his theory too rig- 
 orously, and have shown too much fear lest the high ethical 
 character of Eloquence should be suffered to lose itself in the 
 lower sphere of mere Art, he has by this very thing imparted to 
 Eloquence a still higher character and a still more energetic 
 power. For by thus insisting that, while the means employed by 
 Eloquence may be aesthetic, and the form in which it appears 
 artistic, the great end constantly aimed at must be moral, and 
 only moral, the author has furnished a Rhetoric that is not 
 only formative and plastic, but organißc, and has thus superin- 
 duced life upon the lifeless. Art in this case passes over into 
 the production of living realities ; the old fable of Pygmalion 
 becomes actuality ; the oration is not only a beautiful and fault- 
 less form, it is also a living soul. 
 
 The work has been translated mainly for the purpose of fur- 
 nishing a text-book, to be used in a free reproductive manner in 
 giving instruction in the department of Rhetoric. It is believed, 
 however, that any one who shall make use of it, by entering into 
 its spirit and method in a free and independent manner, will find 
 more or less in it promotive of a sound way of thought, and a 
 serious, deep-toned Eloquence. 
 
 The Translator. 
 
 University of Vermont, Nov. 24, 18^9, 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, 
 
 BY THE TRANSLATOR. 
 
 The proper product of Rhetoric is Eloquence, and the purpose 
 of a rhetorical education is to produce an eloquent thinker, and 
 an eloquent writer or speaker. So far as it comes short of this, 
 therefore, Rhetoric comes short of its true end. 
 
 Hence it becomes important to inquire, first of all, into the 
 essential nature of Eloquence itself; and, particularly, to define 
 it in such a manner as to detect all false products, and preclude 
 all specious methods and models. For nothing exerts a more 
 injurious influence upon the taste, the studies, and the mental 
 habits of an educated man than a false idea of Eloquence. All 
 educated men desire to be eloquent, and at times make greater 
 or less effort to be so. An eloquent man is, universally, an ob- 
 ject of admiration and of imitation. The idea of Eloquence is 
 consequently one that exerts a highly formative and modifying 
 influence upon both individual and national culture. When 
 an educated man has been seized by this idea, when he has be- 
 come possessed with the desire and the aim to influence public 
 opinion by free and fluent speech, how wonderfully are all his 
 thoughts, and feelings, and acquirements, pressed into the service 
 of it. If he has the true idea, he almost invariably becomes elo- 
 quent ; if he has the false idea, he invariably becomes over-orna- 
 mented, and glittering, and degenerates into inflation, and bom- 
 bast, — so energetic and influential is the idea itself, whether 
 truly or falsely apprehended. It enters the mind with an inter- 
 est and influence peculiar to itself, and works there with all the 
 potency of a plastic principle. The thought of becoming a phi- 
 
 r 
 
18 'INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 losopher, or a poet, or an artist, or a man of science, when once 
 formed, indeed exerts a controlling influence upon the whole in- 
 tellectual life ; but the thought of becoming an eloquent man, a 
 man who " wields at will the fierce democracie and shakes the 
 arsenal," exerts an overmastering influence, so that the mind 
 either becomes the most passionate of the passionate, or else the 
 feeblest of the feeble, according to the truth or falsity of its idea 
 of Eloquence, and its ideal of an Orator. 
 
 I. In proceeding to discuss the true nature and essential prop- 
 erties of Eloquence, it is deserving of notice, that nearly as many 
 definitions have been given of Eloquence, as of Poetry, and so far 
 as a perfectly exhaustive definition is concerned, with about the 
 same success. Perhaps no one definition that shall include all 
 the essential qualities of what are strictly vital products of the 
 human mind can be given. We must be content to reach the 
 inward nature of Poetry, of Art, and of Eloquence, by approxi- 
 mations ; by several definitions, each of which contemplates some 
 particular aspect of the subject, and specifies some peculiar 
 characteristic omitted by the others. The more mechanical and 
 common products of the human understanding may often be 
 clearly comprehended in a single conception, and fully defined in 
 one statement ; but its rarer, richer, and more living productions, 
 such as Poetry and Eloquence, being more mysterious in their 
 origin, are more difficult of comprehension, and consequently of 
 definition. We may lay it down as a general rule, that in pro- 
 portion as a product takes its origin in the more spontaneous, im- 
 pulsive, and original agencies of the mind ; in proportion as it is 
 less the work of mere experience, and trial, like a product of use- 
 ful art, or of mere memory and classification, like a manual of 
 science ; in proportion as its nature is living, and its origin is 
 fresh, will it be more difficult to bring it within the limits of a 
 concise and full definition. Like the definition of Life itself, the 
 definition of Poetry, and Art, and Eloquence, must be an approx- 
 imation only. 
 
 Socrates, according to Cicero,* was wont to say that all men 
 
 * De Oratore, I. 14. 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 19 
 
 speak eloquently when they have a thorough knowledge of their 
 subject, and Cicero coincided with him in the affirmation. The 
 duty and office of Rhetoric, and hence of Eloquence, according to 
 Bacon,* is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving 
 of the will. Style, says Buffon, — by which he means the style 
 of Eloquence, — is the man himself; a definition corresponding 
 with the remark of Pascal, that a simple and natural style, the 
 eloquence of nature, enchants us with reason ; for while we are 
 looking out for an author we find a man. Eloquence, says 
 D'Alembert,! is the ability to cause a sentiment, with which the 
 mind is deeply penetrated, to pass with rapidity into the souls of 
 others, and imprint itself there with force and energy. Elo- 
 quence, says Campbell,! adopting the definition of Quintilian, is 
 that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end, 
 and the end of discourse is to move the will 
 
 If we examine these definitions we shall find that they all pre- 
 suppose a common nature and properties in Eloquence, and are, 
 all of them, approximate definitions of it. Neither of them is 
 sufficient of itself to exhaust the subject, — perhaps all of them 
 together are insufficient, — but they all look one way, and give 
 the mind of the inquirer one general direction. They all teach 
 or imply, that truth is the substance, and principle, of all true 
 Eloquence, — truth clearly perceived, deeply felt, and distinctly 
 expressed. Men are eloquent in proportion as they thoroughly 
 know their subject, say Socrates and Cicero. Eloquence is truth 
 all aglow and practically effective in a human soul, it is reason 
 in the forms of the imagination in order to influence the will, says 
 Bacon. It is the cooperation of the understanding with the im- 
 agination and the passions, in order to carry the will, say Quin- 
 tilian and Campbell. Eloquence is truth felt and transferred to 
 others, it is the transfer of the orator's consciousness into the 
 auditor's consciousness, says D'Alembert. 
 
 All these definitions teach that plain verity is the substance of 
 
 * Advancement of Learning, Book II. 
 
 t Keflections sur Telocution oratoire. Oeuvres, IV. 275. • 
 
 t Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book I. Chap. I. 
 
20 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 Eloquence, and that through the transformation which it under- 
 goes by passing through an earnest and eloquent mind, its final 
 effect is to carry the whole man, head, heart and will, along with 
 it. This carriage of men's minds, this mental movement in 
 speaker and hearers, this streaming flow of thought and feeling 
 to an outward end, seems to be inseparably connected, in all these 
 definitions, with Eloquence as different from other forms of dis- 
 course. While in the essay, the historical narrative, or the phi- 
 losophical disquisition, the thought more or less moves in a circle, 
 returning back upon itself, and thus forming a wider expanse, in 
 the oration, the thought is ever rushing onward in a deep nar- 
 row channel, like a river to the main. We are speaking, of 
 course, of an ideal or perfect oration ; and bearing this in mind, 
 we may say that in proportion as the mind of the orator is impro- 
 gressive in its action, it ceases to be eloquent in its action and in- 
 fluence. A mind that is continually eddying ; that is inclined to 
 dwell long, either upon a particular thought, or upon the expres- 
 sion of it, either upon a bright idea, or a beautiful figure ; must 
 break up this habit, and overcome this disposition, before it can 
 create that strong rushing current, that overwhelming, overbearing 
 torrent in a discourse, which under the name of Scivottjs the 
 Greeks regarded as the height of Eloquence. By this term, which 
 was applied particularly to the eloquence of Demosthenes, the 
 Greeks intended to denote that overpowering vehemence, in the 
 exercise of the mental powers, which results from a clear con- 
 sciousness of the truth and the right, united with a glowing fiery 
 interest for it. This vehemence of soul, this onward sweeping 
 rush in a channel which the mind has worn into a subject, and 
 which it is continually wearing deeper, is preclusive of all retro- 
 grade movements, and of all stationary attitudes. Even if the 
 subject calls in a great amount of argumentative or explanatory 
 matter, this current draws it all into its own volume, so that it 
 accelerates rather than impedes its mighty flow. " In his oration 
 for the crown," remarks one,* " Demosthenes must have had as 
 
 * Marsh's Remains ; Tract on Eloquence. 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 21 
 
 cumbrous a satchel, as any bearer of the green bag in our courts 
 of law. He brings forward a great mass of testimonies, written 
 and oral laws of Athens, decrees of foreign towns and of the 
 Amphictyonic council, and records of history, all exhibited and 
 discussed with the utmost force and clearness. But through the 
 whole process, there is an under-current and moving power of 
 passion and eloquence that carries us forward to a final and una- 
 voidable result. It is as though we were embarked upon a 
 mighty river. All is animation and energy around, and we gaze 
 with a momentary reverie upon the deep and transparent waters 
 beneath. But even while we admire, the current grows deeper 
 and deeper, and we are unconsciously hurried onward with in- 
 creasing and irresistible power." 
 
 An eloquent mind, then, is a mind under motion. It is a mind 
 moving forward, under the influence of clear knowledge and 
 deep feeling, with constantly accelerated motion, and constantly 
 increasing momentum, to a final end, which is always a practical 
 one. Eloquence itself, then, is thought with an impulse in it, 
 thought with a drift and rush in it. Eloquence is, as we instinct- 
 ively denominate it, a ßood. * 
 
 Without dwelling longer upon these definitions, and others that 
 have been given of Eloquence, we proceed now to a considera- 
 tion of that particular one, upon which Theremin founds his 
 rhetorical system. Eloquence, says Theremin, is a Virtue. 
 This definition differs from the others that have been quoted, 
 
 * " Hazlitt, " says De Quincy, " was not eloquent, because he was discon- 
 tinuous. No man can be eloquent whose thoughts are abrupt, insulated, and 
 (to borrow an impressive word from Coleridge) non-sequacious. Eloquence 
 resides not in separate or fractional ideas, but in the relation of manifold 
 idti:s, and in the mode of their evolution from each other. It is not indeed 
 enough that the ideas should be many, and their relations coherent j the 
 main condition lies in the key of the evolution, in the law of the succession. 
 The elements are nothing without the atmosphere that moulds and the dy- 
 namic forces that combine. Now, Hazlitt 's brilliancy is seen chiefly in 
 separate splinterings of phrase or image which throw upon the eye a vitreous 
 scintillation for a moment, but spread no deep suffusions of color, and distri- 
 bute no masses of mighty shadow. A flash, a solitary flash, and all is gone." 
 
22 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 more in appearance than in reality. It does not, as its author 
 remarks, differ essentially from the definition given by the elder 
 Cato, and handed down to us with approbation by Quintilian ; and 
 it coincides with the general doctrine taught by the more pro- 
 found writers upon Eloquence, in all ages, — all of whom have 
 recognized the moral element as the essential one in this species 
 of intellectual productions. Stated, however, in this brief and 
 striking form, Eloquence seems to become identical with Morality, 
 and the author in one place actually speaks of Rhetoric as a 
 part of Morals. * By this, however, it is conceived he did not 
 mean to imply that Eloquence is merely and simply a moral vir- 
 tue, and is therefore sufficiently defined when it is put into the 
 list of virtues, along with temperance, or honesty, or veracity. 
 Perhaps the real meaning of the author would be more precisely 
 expressed, by saying that Eloquence is an intellectual Virtue. 
 It has a common origin with the moral virtues, in the resolute 
 action of the moral force or character of the man, and, so far as 
 the point of ultimate origin is concerned, may therefore be de- 
 nominated virtuous, or of the nature of virtue. The theory of 
 Theremin is, that all true Eloquence springs ultimately from in- 
 tegrity and strength of character; that the principle and the 
 power by which the several faculties of the mind concerned in 
 the production of Eloquence are actuated and guided is a volun- 
 tary principle and power, and hence that the product, in its ulti- 
 mate and essential nature, must be moral. Let us explain in de- 
 tail, that the theory may be understood. In the production of 
 an eloquent oration, the understanding, the imagination, and the 
 feelings, are employed. By the first mentioned faculty, truth 
 simple and abstract is presented to the understanding of the 
 hearer. By the second, this same truth is taken out of this ab- 
 stract and intellectual form, and put into an imaginative form for 
 the imagination of the hearer. And by the feelings, it is again 
 transmuted in order to awaken and stir emotion in the hearts of 
 others. Now, it is plain that the excellence of the oration de- 
 
 * Book I., Chap, xiv. ... . 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 23 
 
 pends upon the presence in it, of some power or principle that 
 shall swallow up into the unity of its own life all these processes 
 of the understanding, imagination, and feelings, and thereby be- 
 come that vehement and terrible energy, which we have seen, 
 according to the Greek definition, is the reality and vitality of 
 Eloquence. The unity of the oration, moreover, depends upon 
 the proportionate and harmonious exercise of these several facul- 
 ties. Any excess in the functions of the understanding, e. g., 
 will be to the injury of those of the imagination and the feelings. 
 The oration, in this case, must either lose its unity, or else give 
 up its oratorical character and pretensions, and be converted into a 
 philosophic essay. And the same may be said [mutatis mu- 
 tandis) , in case of an excessive action of either of the remaining 
 two faculties concerned in the production of Eloquence. 
 
 Now, that power by which each of these faculties is to be 
 guided and governed, so that there shall be a just proportion and 
 true harmony in their co- working, is the will of the orator. He 
 is to repress an undue tendency to ratiocination, by moral deter- 
 mination. He is to repress an undue poetic tendency, by moral 
 determination. He is to repress an undue pathetic tendency, by 
 moral determination. And let it not be thought that only a slight 
 and feeble exercise of the self-controlling power is needed in the 
 origination of this so-styled Virtue of Eloquence ; that but little 
 moral energy and stern force of character is required in order to 
 the highest eloquence. How often does it happen that the Ora- 
 tion degenerates (for in this reference it is degeneration) into the 
 abstract Essay, or the over-ornamented Prose-Poem, solely be- 
 cause there was not enough of moral strength, not enough of 
 will, in the orator, to compel all his acquisitions, and all his ten- 
 dencies, into subservience of that practical end, the actuation of 
 his hearers, which is the ultimate end of Eloquence. Often, as 
 much self-control is needed to mortify a strong logical propensity, 
 in order that it may not damage or destroy a rhetorical pro- 
 cess, as is needed in order to mortify a lust of the flesh. And still 
 more often, as much force of character is needed to restrain a lux- 
 uriant imagination, in order that it may not clog and stop the on- 
 
24 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 ward movement of the oration by excessive illustration and orna- 
 ment, as is needed in order to restrain an animal passion. In 
 short, that vanity, that self-feeling, which would draw off the ora- 
 tor from the practical end of his discourse to the undue display 
 of his logic, if his mind is predominantly philosophic, or to an 
 undue employment of the poetic element, if his nature is pre- 
 dominantly imaginative, requires for its conquest and extirpation, 
 precisely the same kind of moral force, force of will, that is 
 needed in the suppression of vice, or in the formation of any of 
 the strictly so-called virtues. 
 
 Now, it is in this reference that Eloquence is styled a Virtue. 
 So far as the principle from which it proceeds, and the impulse 
 by which it is impelled, are concerned, Eloquence is Ethical, 
 rather than Philosophic, or Aesthetic. It is the position of 
 Theremin, that Eloquence is more strictly of the nature of Virtue, 
 than of the nature of Science, or of the nature of Fine Art Its 
 essential quality and properties, he contends, are more properly 
 ethical than scientific or artistic. Neither a scientific nor an artis- 
 tic talent can become the living fountain of Eloquence. Only a 
 moral force can. Although both a philosophic and an artistic pro- 
 cess properly and necessarily enter into that complex mental ac- 
 tion of which Eloquence is the product, yet neither of them is the 
 fundamental process. We must look for this in the moral process 
 which springs out of the character of the orator ; which involves 
 his earnestness, his sincerity, his honesty of conviction, his con- 
 sciousness of the truth, and his love for it. These moral elements 
 must first exist, or there can be no Eloquence. In the same 
 sense, then, that the orator, according to Cato and Quintilian, is 
 a good man, is Eloquence a Virtue. Not that every good man 
 is eloquent, or that every virtue is ipso facto Eloquence (though 
 we often say of the Virtues, as they shine out in human 
 character, that they are eloquent) ; but no man is eloquent who 
 is destitute of moral force of character, and no discourse is 
 eloquent that is not pervaded with a moral earnestness that is 
 higher than any mere scientific talent or aesthetic feeling. 
 
 The truth which there is in Theremin's definition may be 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 25 
 
 seen, again, by considering the difference between an Oration 
 and a product of Fine Art. According to the theory of Theremin 
 Eloquence is not strictly a Fine Art. It is no more one of the Fine 
 Arts because it contains an aesthetic element, than it is one of the 
 Sciences because it contains a philosophic element. It is taken* 
 out of the department of mere and pure Art, by the practical 
 and outward end which it has in view. For if there is any- 
 thing settled in the theory of Art, it is, that an aesthetic product 
 has no practical end out of itself. Art, as such, has no utility, 
 nor morality. Its productions exist for themselves, and not for 
 any object other than themselves. We must not go beyond 
 them, and look for a practical or beneficial influence exerted by 
 them upon the minds of men, in order to decide whether they 
 are excellent in their kind or not. Hence Art cannot become 
 Religion, or even Morality. If a painting or a sculpture is 
 beautiful, we cannot deny it artistic excellence. Whether it is 
 useful, or whether it is moral, are questions for Philosophy and 
 Religion, but not for Art. The Artist, unlike the Philanthropist, 
 or the Orator, works for his own gratification solely. His work 
 has no end but the embodiment of a beautiful idea. As an 
 Artist merely, he is indifferent to the practical effects that may 
 result. The work of Art is addressed solely to the aesthetic 
 sense. If it were addressed to the cognitive powers, solely, it 
 would be a scientific work. If it were addressed to the' moral 
 or religious nature, solely, it would be a religious work. 
 
 It is true, indeed, that a production of Fine Art may make 
 a moral impression, and as matter of fact the highest works in 
 this department invariably do. It is true that the Apollo may 
 elevate the soul of the beholder, and the Madonna may soften 
 and humanize it, but neither of them, as works of Art, owed 
 their origin to any such practical and moral aim. Fine Art is its 
 own end. It is self-sufficing, self-included, and irreferent. If it 
 has ever contributed to the intellectual or moral improvement 
 of man, this was a happy accident, and not a predetermined and 
 foreseen result. 
 
 But that Morality, which thus stands in no inward and neces- 
 
 3 
 
26 
 
 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 sary connection with Art, constitutes the very essential principle 
 of Eloquence. The Oration, unlike a painting or a statue, aims 
 to exert a moral influence upon a moral agent. It seeks to 
 work a change, more or less deep and extensive, in the state of 
 man's active powers, employing his cognitive and imaginative 
 faculties as mere means and media. The Orator cannot, like 
 the Artist, isolate himself from all outward circumstances, and 
 find the goal of his efforts in the serene and complacent embodi- 
 ment of his idea in a form of Beauty, without troubling himself 
 in the least about the influence he may exert. The Orator is a 
 man of moral influence, and of moral impression, upon moral 
 agents, or he is nothing. If, then, the term Virtue denotes, 
 generally, a product of the will, and not of the intellect merely, 
 or the imagination merely, — is not Eloquence a Virtue ? If that 
 agency of the soul be virtuous, or of the nature of Virtue, which 
 has an outward aim, — the aim, \dz., to exert a legitimate influ- 
 ence upon the character and actions of men, — is not Eloquence 
 a Virtue ? Is not this earnest, moral, and practical product of 
 the human mind much more properly denominated a Virtue 
 than an Art? 
 
 To place the definition given by Theremin in another aspect, 
 we may say that Eloquence is an intellectual Virtue. It is the 
 action of the understanding and imagination, when these are 
 under the sway of the moral will. When the understanding 
 merely follows its own structure and laws ; when its action is 
 unmodified by any reference to an auditor, or to an outward 
 impression upon other minds ; the product is Logic, and this 
 action of the understanding is scientific. When the imagination 
 merely follows its own nature and law, the product is Poetry, 
 or some other work of Fine Art, and this action of the mind 
 is aesthetic. In both of these instances the mental faculty is left 
 to its own guidance and impulse. The will exercises no modify- 
 ing influence in either case, and consequently there is no moral 
 element, nothing virtuous or of the nature of Virtue, in these 
 species of intellectual activity. It is true that the subject matter 
 of both Philosophy and Art may be moral, but the mental 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 27 
 
 process itself cannot be so characterized. It is a purely spon- 
 taneous process, not deriving its quality in the least from the 
 voluntary power, from the character of the individual, or even 
 being in the least modified by it. The process in the one 
 ease is purely logical or scientific, and in the other purely 
 artistic. 
 
 But Eloquence has a different origin from either Science or 
 Art. It results, not from the isolated action of a particular faculty, 
 like the understanding, or the imagination, but from the interpen- 
 etration and cooperation of all the mental powers, under the sway 
 and actuation of the voluntary force. The degree in which each 
 faculty shall work, as we have already remarked, is fixed by the 
 determination of the orator, and the acme of Eloquence is seen 
 in the rush, in one resistless volume, of all the cognitive, imagin- 
 ative, and pathetic powers in the unity of the moral will. The 
 combined action of these powers, in this instance, unlike their 
 isolated action in the production of the philosophic Essay, or the 
 Poem, is moral, and therefore of the nature of virtue. The will 
 interpenetrates the logical and imaginative processes in the mind 
 of the orator, and thus renders them ethical. Eloquence in this 
 aspect, is seen to be the virtuous action of the human intellect, as 
 distinguished from that virtuous action of the isolated human 
 will, to which the term " virtue " is more strictly and commonly 
 applied. There is voluntary action in both cases, and hence the 
 epithet " virtuous " belongs to both ; but in the case of a virtue, 
 commonly so called, the action is confined to the will itself, while 
 in the case of Eloquence it is action of the will in and by the 
 powers of understanding, imagination, and feeling. The virtue 
 of patience, e. g., is the product of the isolated action of the will, 
 lust as logic is the product of the isolated action of the understanding. 
 Patience is the product of the will operating upon itself, subdu- 
 ing its own restiveness, and therefore is simply a particular habit 
 jf the will. But the virtue of Eloquence is the product of the 
 will as it operates upon, and in, other mental faculties, for the 
 purpose of exerting an influence upon the will of others. Elo- 
 quence is reason and imagination and feeling wrought into a 
 
28 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 living synthesis by the vitality of a will, — by the force of a 
 strong, deep, and earnest character. 
 
 There is less difficulty, therefore, in understanding this defini- 
 tion of Theremin, and in adopting it, if we do not take the term 
 " virtue " in its more limited and common signification, but in 
 its widest sense, as denoting a product into which the moral 
 strength of the individual, his force of character, enters as the 
 fundamental quality. And such we suppose to be the essential 
 nature of Eloquence. If we are required to locate it, we think 
 there are fewer objections to placing it within the province 
 of practical Ethics, than in that of abstract Science, or in that 
 of aesthetic Art. As Theremin affirms, that theory will be 
 most successful, will explain most phenomena and exert the most 
 beneficial influence upon the student, which assumes that the 
 practical and moral element in Eloquence is the fundamental 
 and denominating one, and that the philosophic and aesthetic 
 elements are subsidiary to this. We know that the Ancients, 
 from whom it is not generally safe to differ upon subjects like 
 the one which we are considering, regarded Eloquence as one 
 of the Fine Arts, and assigned it a place in the list along with 
 Poetry, and Painting, and Sculpture ; and the Modern world 
 has generally acquiesced in their classification. And yet the 
 rhetorical treatises of Aristotle, of Longinus, of Cicero, and of 
 Quintilian, contain much that is irreconcilable with this theory. 
 Unconsciously, the doctrine that Eloquence is at bottom neither 
 speculatively philosophic, nor imaginatively aesthetic, but prac- 
 tically moral, creeps into these treatises, and exerts a modifying 
 influence throughout. And it is the merit of Theremin, as it 
 seems to us, that he has systematized this ethical view of Elo- 
 quence, — that he has organized these materials scattered here 
 and there through all the best treatises on the subject, and 
 wrought them into the unity of a consistent theory. Instead of 
 defining Eloquence to be a Fine Art, and then, under the instinct 
 and impulse of good sense and sound feeling, beating off and 
 away from the definition, until it is perfectly apparent that there 
 has been a mistake in the outset, and that Eloquence has received 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 29 
 
 a wrong location, this author affirms distinctly that it is not a 
 Fine Art, but that it is (for want of a better term) a Virtue. 
 Starting with this position as the basis of his theory, he is not 
 troubled, as were the ancient Rhetoricians, by a conflict between 
 his theory and its detailed unfolding and application. He is not 
 compelled to those statements respecting the necessity of charac- 
 ter, of integrity and sincerity and earnestness, in the orator, 
 the necessity of subjecting everything in the oration to a practi- 
 cal outward end, and of subordinating Philosophy and Art them- 
 selves to the moral purposes of Eloquence, which are irreconcil- 
 able with the definition that makes Eloquence a Fine Art. On 
 the contrary, these statements which suggest themselves so 
 unconsciously, and spontaneously, as actually to override the false 
 theory that has been assumed by the Rhetorician, are merely 
 corroborations of the ethical theory of Eloquence. As they 
 grow out of it, so they return back into it ; like vigorous shoots, 
 which by inarching are made to contribute to the vigor and 
 strength of the parent stock. 
 
 The truthfulness of the ethical theory of Eloquence is still far- 
 ther evinced, and illustrated, by a consideration of its influence 
 upon the Orator. Here its excellence and value appear in plain 
 view. Here is the place of its triumph. For even if an oppo- 
 nent should be able to make a stand, while discussing the nature 
 of the theory itself, and to raise objections that are forcible, and 
 difficult to remove, yet when its practical application, and practi- 
 cal influence, comes into consideration, the defender of the theory 
 may speak with boldness and confidence. He really has the en- 
 tire history of the department in his favor. All those forcible 
 and impressive statements, in Ancient and Modern treatises upon 
 Rhetoric, which lay emphasis upon the moral elements in Elo- 
 quence, and in the Orator himself, — statements which fall glow- 
 ing from the mind of the theorist, when, having for a moment 
 left his speculative theory behind him, he speaks more from the 
 common feeling, and the common sentiment, of mankind at large 
 upon this subject, — all such statements, we say, come thronging in 
 upon the mind, when it is considering the practical influence of 
 
 3* 
 
30 
 
 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 the theory in question. The advocate of the ethical theory 
 feels that all these statements legitimately belong to Mm, and to 
 him alone ; that they are but the practical and informal enuncia- 
 tion of his own speculative and formal theory. When he hears 
 Quintilian define the Orator to be fi an upright man who under- 
 stands speaking," he thinks he hears a concrete annunciation of the 
 abstract position that " Eloquence is a Virtue," and believes that, 
 in the establishment of his theory, he has only applied an affirma- 
 tion to Oratory itself, which long ago was applied to the Orator. 
 Supported thus, as he is, by the spontaneous and unbiassed opin- 
 ions of theorizers themselves, he is the more confident in his 
 belief that the actual application of the ethical theory of Elo- 
 quence will only serve to verify it, and its practical influence to 
 recommend it, in the very highest degree. 
 
 is The influence of the ethical theory of Eloquence is most 
 excellent, in the first place, upon the studies of the Orator. 
 
 It is the natural tendency of that theory of Eloquence which 
 defines it to be a Fine Art strictly, to isolate Oratory from the real 
 sciences, and the solid acquirements of the orator. The eye is too 
 intently fixed upon Form, and the secondary properties of dis- 
 course, because it is assumed that the ultimate end of Eloquence, 
 like that of any other Fine Art, is Beauty. The studies of the 
 Orator, consequently, will take their main direction from this 
 theory, and he will bestow undue attention upon those depart- 
 ments of human knowledge, and those species of literature, 
 which have more affinity with the idea of the Beautiful, than 
 with the ideas of the True and the Good. These higher ideas 
 will be made to take a secondary place in his mind, and his cul- 
 ture will be characterized more and more by superficiality, and 
 lack of vigorous strength. He will become more and more in- 
 terested in works of Art, and the lighter forms of Literature, and 
 less and less interested in Science, Philosophy, and Theology. 
 
 But the natural tendency of that theory of Eloquence which 
 regards it as essentially moral rather than aesthetic, which sets 
 up for it an outward and practical end, and does not for an instant 
 allow it an artistic indifference in respect to an outward and prac- 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 31 
 
 tical impression, which connects Eloquence far more with the 
 ideas of the True and the Good than with the idea of the Beauti- 
 ful, — the natural tendency, and strong direct influence, of such a 
 theory of Eloquence is to promote the graver and higher studies 
 in the Orator. The more profound and central powers of the 
 mind will be continually exercised, and thus the foundation for a 
 powerful and impressive mental activity will be laid. Such an 
 Orator, like Pericles of old, will study and meditate upon the 
 dark problems of philosophy and religion, and while, like the 
 patron of Phidias and the decorator of Athens, he will not by 
 any means be indifferent to Beauty and to Art in their proper 
 place, he will yet derive that commanding and overwhelming 
 eloquence, that Olympian power attributed to the great Grecian, 
 from these loftier themes, these more profound departments of 
 human inquiry and effort. * 
 
 2. Again, the influence of that theory of Eloquence which re- 
 gards it as ethical, rather than either scientific or aesthetic, is most 
 excellent, in respect to the models of the Orator. 
 
 The general influence of the ethical theory of Eloquence upon 
 the taste is to render it strict and pure. The Orator whose mind 
 has been moulded by it, naturally selects models from the very 
 highest range of Oratory, and thereby feels the very choicest in- 
 fluence of the department. His models, consequently, are few 
 in number, but they are such as can never be outgrown and left 
 behind in his onward progress. A single model like Demosthenes 
 contains, for the mind that is prepared for it by a strict and high 
 theory of Eloquence, more educational power than myriads of 
 inferior models. Such a model is a standard and permanent one. 
 
 ^ Soc. Kivdvvevet, do apicrre, clkotoos 6 H€piKX?]S ttoVtcoj/ reXecoraros els tt\v 
 pt)TopLK7]u yeveabai. Phaed. Ti 5?j ; Soc. riacrcu ocrai fieydXai t&v t^x^oou, 
 irpo(T^€OVT(xt aSoXecrx'ias koI fxercoopoXoylas <pv(Tecos ir4pi. t6 yap vipTjXoyovif 
 tovto Kal to irdi/rrj TtXecnovpyiKOv eoiKeu ivrev&tv iroxtev tUn&vwe o /col 
 Tl€piK\7]S rrpbs rqi €V(pv s i]S elvai eKTTjCraro. irpocnreaoov ydp, olfxai, toiovto) us/tl 
 'Ai/afayopa, jxereoipoXoyias e^TrXria-^els, kcX iit\ (pvaiv vov T6 kou avoias &<pt/c- 
 6/j.evos (3)V 5-J7 Trepi toV ttoXvv Xoyov €ttol€7to 3 Az/a|ayopas ) evrevSev eiXKV&ey 
 ivl t^j/twv X6y<av rex^W T( $ Trp6<y<popov avrij. — Phaedrus, 270. 
 
32 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 But in order that the first-class models may be apprehended and 
 appreciated, a severe taste must have been engendered in the stu- 
 dent. He must have been so disciplined by a high theory that 
 he has acquired an indifference towards second-rate productions, 
 and a positive disrelish for those more glaring and showy quali- 
 ties which are found in works that are for a day only, and not for 
 all time. He must have attained such an intellectual temper, 
 such a style and tone of literary culture, as can find pleasure 
 only in those calmer, grander, and loftier efforts which do not so 
 much strike and startle by their brilliancy, as develop and stir 
 the human soul by their depth, fervor, and power. 
 
 Now, the theory in question tends directly to the production of 
 such an intellectual taste in the Orator. It is a high and austere 
 theory. It is a theory which checks extravagance, and prunes 
 luxuriance, by subjecting the whole oratorical process to the re- 
 straints of ethics. It subordinates the beauty of poetry, and 
 even the truth of philosophy, to the practical ends of morality. 
 If there is any danger in the theory, it is in the direction of se- 
 verity and intense truthfulness. If there is any error in the 
 theory, it is upon the safe side. It cannot be denied that the 
 entire influence of it is to induce such mental habits, such mental 
 tastes, and such a mental tone, as both prepare the student for a 
 genial appreciation of the highest models, and a free and original 
 reproduction of them. The mind which has been developed and 
 trained by the ethical theory of Eloquence will prefer Demosthenes 
 to Aeschines, Cicero to Hortensius, Massillon to Bossuet, Mirabeau 
 to Lamartine, Burke and Fox to Sheridan and Phillips. 
 
 But the excellence of the influence exerted by the theory in 
 question, in rendering the taste pure and strict, is seen more par- 
 ticularly in reference to current productions, and current styles 
 and schools. The principal danger to which the Rhetorician or 
 the Orator is exposed, arises from the influence of contemporaneous 
 Rhetoric and contemporeous Eloquence. Dazzling and brilliant, 
 but superficial and transitory, products, always have their day; 
 and during their day, minds that have not been highly trained 
 are taken captive by them. Such minds become copyists and 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 33 
 
 mannerists ; and copyists and mannerists never are, and never 
 can be, eloquent. But a pure taste, and a genuine relish for the 
 excellences of those great masters and models which like the sun 
 are always the same in all ages, is an infallible preservative 
 against this pernicious influence of contemporaries. There is a 
 strength and reserve in that intellectual character which has been 
 formed by high theories, by the contemplation of grand ideals, 
 which no storm of popular applause, no fury of fashion, can 
 overcome or exhaust. Such a mind is self-possessed, and self- 
 reliant. Such a mind is eagle-eyed, and critical. Such a mind 
 calmly stands the glare of false Rhetoric and false Eloquence, 
 while the weak, unarmed eye of the half-educated is dazzled and 
 blinks. This austere judgment, this clear calm criticism, looks 
 by and beyond all the showy and gaudy products that are tem- 
 porarily bewitching the popular taste, to those serene, grand, and 
 absolutely beautiful Forms, the DU majorum gentium, in all the 
 great literatures of the Past and the Present, and in them alone 
 finds its models, and upon them alone expends its enthusiasm. 
 
 II. Having thus discussed the nature of Eloquence, we pro- 
 ceed, in the remainder of this Essay, to consider the general nature 
 of Rhetoric, and particularly its position and influence in the 
 system of liberal education. 
 
 In passing to the consideration of that branch of discipline 
 whose object it is to produce and promote Eloquence, we are 
 struck in the outset with the fact that it has ever been regarded 
 an essential part of a symmetrical system of education. If we 
 look into the ancient world, all culture seems to have culminated 
 in Rhetoric and Oratory. The whole end and aim of study, 
 even in other and higher departments, appears to have been to 
 make the educated man a Rhetorician, — using the term in its best 
 and technical signification. The goal had in the eye, during the 
 whole of his education, by the young Athenian, or the young 
 Roman, was the bema or the rostrum. It was thought that unless 
 culture enabled the mind to give expression to itself, to reveal 
 and embody its knowledge in a form that would impress and influ- 
 ence other minds, it was worthless. Hence even philosophy was 
 
34 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 made subservient to oratory, as in the example of Pericles, who 
 studied under Anaxagoras, one of the most subtle of the Greek 
 philosophers, in order to prepare himself for the practical life of 
 a statesman and orator. The walks of the Academy and Lyceum 
 led directly to the Agora and the Forum. 
 
 In Grecian and Roman education, consequently, Rhetoric oc- 
 cupied a high position. It was not only a distinct department, 
 but one of great influence. Genuine rhetorical power, the abil- 
 ity to express and impress, was regarded as the last and highest 
 accomplishment of the educated citizen. And the same holds 
 true, to a considerable extent, of the system of education in 
 vogue in the modern world. If Rhetoric, within the last hun- 
 dred years, has somewhat sunk down from its former " pride of 
 place," it is mainly because of the false view that has been taken 
 of its essential nature, and the false method iu which it has been 
 taught. During the two centuries that succeeded the revival of 
 learning, however, its claims were never higher, or more wil- 
 lingly allowed. The minuteness of detail, and, we may add, the 
 comprehensiveness on the whole of outline, exhibited by the 
 rhetorical treatises composed two hundred years ago, are ample 
 evidence that then, at least, there was no disposition to under- 
 value this branch of discipline. Indeed the over-estimate which 
 came to be put upon it, together with the dry and mechanical 
 method into which the somewhat formal, and yet substantially 
 sound, rhetoric of Aristotle had degenerated, contributed to that 
 reaction which followed, and which for the last hundred years has 
 led to an under-estimate of the whole department. Yet Rhetoric 
 is still honored in that system of instruction by which the 
 modern mind is being educated. Rhetoric is still one branch of 
 human learning, one department of instruction ; and whenever 
 it is pursued in the spirit, and by the method, which its own real 
 nature and distinguishing characteristics prescribe, it is still found 
 to minister to the sound and vigorous development of the 
 mind. 
 
 In discriminating the distinctive nature of Rhetoric, and in 
 assigning it its position in the curriculum of discipline, it is 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, 35 
 
 necessary in the first place to direct attention to that generic 
 classification of the sciences which so greatly assists the inves- 
 gator in locating any particular one of thera. 
 
 Human knowledge may be divided into two grand divisions, 
 which very exactly and conveniently distinguish the immense 
 variety that enters into this great sum-total. Knowledge is either 
 material or formal.* A material department of knowledge is one 
 in which the matter is primary, and the form is secondary. A 
 formal department is one in which the form is primary, and the 
 matter secondary. The material sciences have also been termed 
 real sciences, to denote that in them the reality or substance of 
 human knowledge is to be found. For the forma 1 sciences are 
 not independent, and self-sufficient. They have no positive char- 
 acter, no substantial contents of their own, such as the material 
 or real sciences have. They derive all the interest and worth 
 they possess from their connection with these latter. They 
 exist onlv for these latter ; because the form exists onlv for the 
 substance, the manner for the matter. 
 
 Take those portions of the general department of Philosophy 
 which go under the names of Physics and Ethics, as examples 
 of branches of mate rial or reed knowledge, and consider what 
 they contain. Here we have no hollow and empty divisions 
 which must be filled up from other divisions in order that they may 
 have solidity; no mere firm of knowledge, to be filled up with 
 knowledge itself. Natural and Moral Philosophy have each sub- 
 dud contents of their own. The nature and operations of the 
 
 * "All rational knowledge is either material, and contemplates some one 
 object, or formal, and is occupied merely with the forms of the understand- 
 ing, and of the reason itself. — with the universal laws of thinking generally 
 without regard to the objects of thought Formal philosophy is denom- 
 inated Logic ; but material philosophy, which has to do with determinate 
 objects, and the laws and principles to which they are subjected, is twofold. 
 For these laws are either laws of Natmre or of Spirit. The science of the 
 - is denominated Physics i that of the latter is Ethics : the former is also 
 the latter the doctrine of Morals, " — Kants 
 Practical Reason ( Vorrede. . 
 
36 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 human mind, and of the Divine Mind, so far as it is cognizable 
 by man, and the laws and principles of the material word, — - these 
 and such like are the subject matter of these two subdivisions of 
 real science. In whatever direction the moral or natural philoso- 
 pher advances, he meets with real entities and essences ; he is occu- 
 pied with substantial verities. Truth itself, fact itself, and thought 
 itself, is the staple and substance of his investigations. The form 
 is for him an altogether secondary thing ; the matter is everything. 
 He does not ask, " how is it ? " but " tokat is it ? " 
 
 But take again the department of Logic, and we have a branch 
 of formal knowledge. The logician establishes no one particu- 
 lar truth, but merely shows how any truth may be established. 
 He does not exhibit the actual contents of the human mind, its 
 ideas, sentiments, and beliefs, but only those laws of mental acti- 
 vity in accordance with which these contents are formed. It is 
 not the province of Logic to exhibit thought itself, but only the 
 process of thinking. Logic generates no fountain of living 
 waters ; it merely indicates the channel in which they must flow, 
 if they flow at all. In investigating such departments as Physics 
 and Psychology, we are occupied with the Real, — with truths 
 that are matters of actual consciousness, or actual intuition; 
 with the contents of our own minds. But in studying such a 
 subject as Logic, we are occupied with the Formal — with the 
 mere abstract notions and forms of the understanding ; with the 
 ways in which, rather than the things which, it perceives. 
 
 To see the distinction in question still more clearly, compare 
 an entire department like Fine Art with an entire department 
 like Science or -Religion. The end and aim of Art is to embody 
 some Idea in a Form suited to express it. With the nature and 
 origin of this Idea it does not concern itself. It takes it as it finds 
 it, and leaves the analysis and investigation of its interior structure 
 to the philosopher or the theologian. The artist may, it is true, 
 contemplate this subject matter of his Art philosophically, or 
 theologically, but only in subordination to the purposes of his 
 profession ; only in order to be able to clothe the Idea in a more 
 beautiful Form. He does not, like the votary of the real 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 37 
 
 sciences, rest in the subject matter, being satisfied with having 
 unfolded and developed the truth in his own mind ; he cannot 
 rest until he has given expression to it in an outward embodi- 
 ment. Hence we say that Fine Art is formal in its nature and 
 character. It subordinates everything to this its ultimate and 
 constituent end. For it, the material is secondary. 
 
 In reference then to this general division of the various de- 
 partments of human knowledge and inquiry, Rhetoric is a for- 
 mal department. It is the science of Form, so far as human 
 discourse is concerned. It is an " organic " art, as Milton terms 
 it ;* an art which furnishes the organ or instrument for commu- 
 nicating thought most effectively to other minds. Rhetoric, 
 strictly speaking, is not to supply the matter, the thought itself, but 
 is to put the material when supplied into as appropriate and fine 
 forms as possible. The thought itself of the Rhetorician must 
 be drawn from deeper fountains than those of Rhetoric. If by 
 thorough collegiate and professional training he has not first filled 
 his mind with the materials for discourse, rhetorical training and 
 preparation will only disclose his emptiness. From the material 
 departments of human knowledge, from the real sciences, h/3 
 must have first acquired a profound and comprehensive culture, 
 before he is qualified to become a Rhetorician. 
 
 Rhetorical discipline being thus formal in its nature presup-^ 
 poses on the part of the student a preparation for it. It postu- 
 lates a full mind and a full heart. It takes the individual at that 
 point in his course of education when the materials have been 
 originated by other methods of discipline, when they are in a stir 
 and fermentation, struggling for utterance and demanding an out- 
 flow, and teaches him delivery, — teaches him the method of em- 
 bodying these conscious and living contents of his mind, in 
 rounded and symmetrical forms. If, therefore, Plato had reason 
 for writing over the door of his Academy, " let no one who is 
 not a geometrician enter here," the Rhetorician has equal reason 
 
 * Tract on Education. 
 
 4 
 
38 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 for inscribing upon the rostrum, "let no one ascend here, who is 
 not a scholar and a thinker." * 
 
 It is of great importance here to observe the fact, that al- 
 though Rhetoric is a formal department of knowledge, it must 
 not be isolated from the real sciences, either in theory or practice. 
 This has been the error in this department for the last century. 
 That part of Rhetoric which is termed Invention, — that part 
 which treats of the supply of thought, - — has been greatly 
 neglected in many modern treatises, so that the whole art has 
 degenerated into a collection of rules relating to expression, or 
 Elocution, merely. The Rhetorician has been too exclusively 
 occupied with the externals of his subject. No grand and vital 
 Eloquence can originate on a theory which in this manner separates 
 the form from the matter, the style from the thought. As in 
 the natural world there is no growth and no fruit except as the 
 living principle and the outward form constitute a -unity, an iden- 
 tity of existence, so in the intellectual world the idea and the 
 form in which it is manifested must inhere in each other, and in- 
 terpenetrate each other, in order to real excellence of any sort. 
 The student cannot therefore cultivate thinking by itself, isolated 
 from the expression of his thoughts ; neither can he cultivate 
 the expression of thought isolated from the process of thinking. 
 Both processes, the philosophical and the rhetorical, must proceed 
 pari yyassu, and simultaneously, and the result be a unity that is 
 neither wholly formal nor wholly material in its nature. An ora- 
 tion considered as a rhetorical product does not consist of thought 
 alone, any more than of expression alone. It is thought and 
 expression, matter and form, in one common identity. Pure 
 thought, alone and by itself, exists only in the conscious mind. 
 Pure form, alone and by itself, exists no where. It is a mere 
 notion or abstraction of the understanding, to which there is no 
 objective correspondent. A mere form is a ghost, and a ghost 
 possesses neither being nor reality. 
 
 Now, by virtue of this intercommunication of Rhetoric with 
 all the solid material branches of knowledge, it stands mid- 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 39 
 
 way between the pure sciences and the practical arts. It is neither 
 wholly speculative, nor wholly practical. It is a most intimate 
 and thorough mingling of these two qualities. Rhetoric serves, 
 therefore, as a bond of connection between the more abstract 
 branches, and the plain practical knowledge of common life. It 
 is the mediator between the recondite theories of the philosopher, 
 and the simple, spontaneous thinking of the uneducated man. 
 What indeed is the orator, or the discourser generally, but a man 
 who stands midway between the schools and the market place, 
 and interprets the one to the other ; a man whose function it is to 
 give such an expression to the lore of the learned world, as will 
 impress and influence the unlearned world ? The orator, the dis- 
 courser generally, is a middle-man, who brings these two great 
 halves, the lettered and the unlettered, together, and thus contri- 
 butes to that collision of mind wjth mind, which is the life and 
 soul of human literature, and of human history. For it is this 
 communication of thought, which is ever going on, that keeps 
 the world alive and stirring. Mere pure thinking, that never 
 found an utterance of* itself, by tongue or pen, even if such a 
 thing could be, would leave the world as dull and motionless as it 
 found it. It is the expressed thought, the written or the vocalized 
 idea, that stirs and impels the general mind. 
 
 Having, in this brief manner, directed attention to the distinc- 
 tion between the formal and real sciences, and having assigned 
 to Rhetoric its place among the former, at the same time also 
 observing its vital connection with the latter, we proceed in the 
 remainder of this Essay to specify some of the advantages of 
 this method of contemplating the general subject. / 
 
 1 . In the first place, upon this method, the department obtains 
 an accurate definition, and is confined to its own just limits. 
 
 There was once a time when Rhetoric was made to include 
 vastly more than properly belongs to it ; when indeed it was 
 more like an encyclopaedia of all arts and sciences, than a lim- 
 ited and specific branch of knowledge. Rhetoric, at one time 5 
 was almost as comprehensive a term as Philosophy is at the 
 present day. The effect of this was to distract the mind by a 
 
40 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 multiplicity of topics, and to preclude that singleness of aim, and 
 unity of pursuit, which is the foundation of all good discourse. 
 Such a variety and complexity as is exhibited by some of the 
 mediaeval treatises upon Rhetoric, is destructive of all distinct- 
 ness, neatness, and elegance of form. A style formed by such 
 an instrument must be in the highest degree loose, rambling, and 
 unrhetorical. As matter of fact, the composition which was the 
 fruit of such rhetorical training is generally devoid, not merely 
 of true grace and ornament but, of the more necessary qualities 
 of good writing, perspicuity and vivacity. Sentences are con- 
 structed in the most clumsy manner ; involved, parenthetic, and 
 incomplete to the last degree ; while the general style of the 
 whole is heavy, dragging, and dull. 
 
 The defect in these treatises is the lack of a close and clear 
 definition in the outset, of the nature of the Art itself. It was 
 really regarded as a material branch of knowledge ; and hence 
 it was the duty of the Rhetorician to give positive instruction 
 upon nearly all subjects. Inasmuch as the Orator needs all the 
 knowledge he can possibly obtain ; inasmuch as Eloquence can 
 successfully employ a greater amount of information than any 
 other department, not excepting even that of History ; it was 
 supposed to be the business of Rhetoric, and of the Rhetorician, 
 to furnish it all. Hence the department, as we have remarked, 
 become virtually an encyclopaedia ; not merely a material 
 science, but all material science in one mass ; the omne scibile 
 itself. But such, we have seen, is not its nature. It is strictly, 
 and really, a formal science. Its final end is simply to express, 
 to communicate, to embody ; and the more rigorously this is 
 held to be the essential character of Rhetoric, the finer will 
 be the forms and styles of composition that come into existence. 
 No sharply-drawn outlines, no distinct definitions, no clean 
 and clear developments, no round and full statements, can orig- 
 inate from a Rhetoric that is unlimited and undefined in its own 
 nature. If Rhetoric includes everything, and is to furnish 
 everything, then discourse will contain everything, and be full of 
 everything. If, on the other hand, the term is strictly defined, 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 41 
 
 and the eye of the student is kept steadily directed to the produc- 
 tion of a pure and noble form, for the materials with which hi3 
 mind has been stored by other sciences, and other disciplines, 
 then there will arise " a form and combination indeed/' a style 
 and manner fit to be a model. 
 
 2. In the second place, this view of the nature and relative 
 position of the department of Rhetoric protects it from a lifeless 
 formality. 
 
 No branch of human knowledge is so liable to a dead formal- 
 ism as Rhetoric. By its very definition, it is obliged to make the 
 form, in distinction from the substance, the appropriate and final 
 end of its investigations and instructions. It is not surprising, 
 consequently, that this formal and formalizing tendency should 
 become too strong in the course of time, and that Rhetoric should 
 become a feeble and artificial department, instead of a vigorous 
 and creative one. Human nature is hypocritical. Its tendency 
 is to the form rather than to the substance ; to the show rather 
 than to the reality. This characteristic is not confined to the 
 moral side of man's nature. It enters very largely into his intel- 
 lectual being. Indeed, the effects of the apostasy are as plainly 
 to be seen in the human intellect, as in the human heart. 
 What is this formality, this lack of sincerity and genuineness, in 
 our mental processes, but the effect of a corruption that has 
 vitiated the mind, as well as the heart ? If we closely examine 
 ourselves, we shall find an absence of veracity, of integrity, of 
 godly simplicity and sincerity, to be as marked and evident in our 
 intellectual, as in our moral condrtion. The whole head is sick. 
 
 Now, when a department of human knowledge, by its very 
 metaphysical nature, and vocation, falls in with this corrupt tend- 
 ency of man's nature, it is no wonder that its history should be 
 marked by degeneracy ; that it should constantly grow more and 
 more formal, and ungenuine, in its own nature and influence. 
 When the theoretic definition harmonizes with the practical bent, 
 when high abstract science is in unison with an actual tendency 
 of man's nature, it is not surprising that the development, 
 unchecked and unmodified by other agencies, should be in the 
 
 4* 
 
42 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY." 
 
 6 
 
 highest degree false and fatal. If the blind lead the blind, both 
 fall into the ditch. 
 
 The history of Rhetoric, and we may add of the whole 
 department of Fine Art, proves and illustrates the truth 
 of this remark. We find in every nation which had an Elo- 
 quence, and an Art, one period of fresh powerful talent and 
 activity in these departments, and then long periods of feeble, 
 formal, and lifeless efforts. The form constantly encroached 
 upon the idea, until it crowded it out. The distinction between 
 formal and real science become a division, and a separation, so 
 that each was pursued alone by itself, to the great injury of the 
 former, and to the death and destruction of the latter. Compare, 
 ♦e. g., the eloquence of Demosthenes with the oratory of the 
 Sophists. The former proceeds from thought, from truth, as the 
 principle of all Eloquence, form and style being moulded and 
 determined by it. The latter starts from form and style itself, 
 which is continually subjected to a repetition of touches and re- 
 touches, without any inward moulding, any living formation ; 
 
 " Like shadows on a stream, the forms of Art 
 Impress their character on the smooth surface, 
 
 but no soul 
 
 Warmeth the inner frame." * • 
 
 But the view which has been presented of the nature of Rhetoric, 
 and of its relation to the whole field of human knowledge and 
 inquiry, is preclusive of this besetting bad tendency in the de- 
 partment. While recognizing the essentially formal character of 
 Rhetoric, and thus giving it a distinct place in the circle of the 
 sciences, and thereby confining it within its own limits, it, at the 
 same time, directs attention to the deeper soil into which its roots 
 must strike, and from which it must derive its nourishment and 
 vigor. The Rhetorical training of the student, on this method, 
 is concurrent with all his other training, and becomes the medium 
 of its communication to other minds. His general culture is 
 benefited by his discipline in this direction, for the whole body 
 
 * Schiller altered. 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 43 
 
 of it is set into motion, and action, by every effort to give form 
 and expression to it. 
 
 3. It is obvious in the third place, that the view under consid- 
 eration imparts an interest to the department of Rhetoric which 
 it is entirely destitute of, upon any other theory. 
 
 For, as we have already remarked, no strictly formal depart- 
 ment of knowledge is independent and self-subsistent. If we 
 confine ourselves to a mere art, without respect to the more pro- 
 found principles that lie under it, our minds soon become weary 
 and spiritless. Such is the affinity between the human intellect 
 and fundamental truth, such is the hungering after substantial 
 knowledge and real science, that it cannot be permanently inter- 
 ested in any branch of inquiry, or of activity, that does not ulti- 
 mately lead it down into these depths. Essential truth is the 
 element, and the aliment, of a rational mind, and nothing short 
 of this form of truth can long satisfy its wants. Unless, there- 
 fore, Rhetorical discipline conducts the mind ultimately to these 
 perennial fountains of stimulation and nourishment, it will soon 
 become irksome in its nature, and wearisome in its influence. All 
 this training in the art of composition will only serve to drink 
 up the vigorous juices, and kill out the life of the mind. 
 
 If, on the contrary, Rhetorical study and practice be grafted 
 into the vigorous stock of a preexisting culture, if the stu- 
 dent come to it with a well-trained and fully informed mind, the 
 result of industry and fidelity in the academical, collegiate, and 
 professional courses of instruction through which he has passed ; 
 then this part of his labor as an educated man will be the most 
 interesting and congenial of all We have, perhaps, experienced 
 the exquisite pleasure which the intellect feels in the hour of 
 vigorous creative production ; the high swelling enthusiasm of the 
 mind, as it careers over a field of noble and lofty thought. We 
 have, perhaps, experienced that enlargement and elevation of soul, 
 which accompanies the distinct intuition of principles, and a 
 firm masterly grasp of them. " The highest joy," says Schiller, 
 " is the freedom of the mind, in the living play of all its powers ;" 
 and there is no sphere in which this play of the intellect is so 
 
44 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 full and so free, as that of authorship, as that of composition. 
 None of the other processes in the course of education can com- 
 pare with it, for depth and heartiness of interest. The processes 
 of memorizing, of comparing, of judging, of analyzing, of com- 
 bining, and of close attention, — the processes that occur in the 
 classical, mathematical, historical, and philosophical disciplines, — 
 are each and all of them inferior in fresh living interest for the 
 mind, to the process of original production. In these former in- 
 stances, the mind is more passive than active, and but a portion 
 of its power is in exercise. But in the act and process of orig- 
 inal authorship, the mind becomes a unit and unity, all its pow- 
 ers are concentrated into one, and the productive process is a 
 most original and vital union of all the knowing, all the feeling, 
 all the imagination, and all the moral force of the man. The 
 historian Niebuhr, speaking of the historian's vocation, remarks 
 that he who calls past ages into being enjoys a bliss analogous 
 to that of creating.* With still more truth, may we say of that 
 mind which is able, in the conscious awakening of all its pow- 
 ers, to give full and satisfactory utterance to its thick coming 
 thoughts, that it enjoys the joy of a creator. If there is one 
 bright particular hour in the life of the educated man, in the career 
 of the scholar, it is that hour for which all other hours of student 
 
 * " J have found," he says in one of his letters, " my former experience 
 irresistibly confirmed, that with me the body depends entirely on the mind, 
 and that my indisposition almost always arises from some impediment to the 
 free action of my mind, which seems to introduce disorder into all the func- 
 tions of the bodily machine. When my mind is exerting itself freely and 
 energetically upon a great subject, and I advance successfully from one 
 point to another, displaying their mutual connection as I proceed, I either 
 feel no physical inconveniences, or if they show themselves, they disappear 
 again very quickly. No man can have a more vivid perception, that crea- 
 ting [i. e., authorship] is the true essence of life, than I have derived from my 
 internal experience. But if I am altogether restricted to a passive state of 
 mind, the whole machine comes to a stop, and my inward discomfort brings 
 on an unhealthy condition of body, of which I have an unmistakable out- 
 ward sign, in the contrast between the free and strong circulation of the blood 
 in the former state, and its irregularity in the latter." — Life and Letters^ 
 p. 179. 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 45 
 
 life were made, — that hour in which he gives original and full 
 expression to what has slowly been gendering within him. Now, 
 what this bright hour is to the general life of the educated man, 
 Rhetorical discipline and practice is to the sum-total of education. 
 If pursued in the right method, and after the proper preparatory 
 work has been done, it imparts an interest to general study and 
 general culture, such as cannot exist without it. How dull and 
 stupid is the life of a book -worm; of a mind which passes 
 through all the stages of education, except that last and crowning 
 one, by means of which it is put into communication with the 
 great world of scholars and letters. Such a mind is always des- 
 titute of that most interesting and infallible sign of genuine cul- 
 ture, enthusiasm. It has done nothing for long years but absorb* 
 Knowledge has had the same effect upon its inner fabric and 
 structure, which the sweet rains of heaven have upon the rootless 
 fallen pine. The noble shaft becomes struck with the sap-rot. 
 
 The history of literature furnishes many examples of men 
 whose knowledge only increased their sorrow, because it never 
 found an efflux from their own minds into the world. Knowledge 
 uncommunicated is something like remorse unconfessed. The 
 mind not being allowed to go out of itself, and to direct its ener- 
 gies towards an object and end greater and worthier than itself, 
 turns back upon itself, and becomes morbidly self -reflecting and 
 self-conscious. A studious and reflecting man of this class is 
 characterized by an excessive fastidiousness, which makes him 
 dissatisfied with all that he does himself, or sees done by others ; 
 which represses, and finally suppresses, all the buoyant and spir- 
 ited activity of the intellect, leaving it sluggish as " the dull weed 
 that rots by Lethe's wharf." The poet Gray is an example in 
 point. In the instance of this in many respects highly inter- 
 esting literary man, the acquisition of culture far outran the ex- 
 pression and communication of it. The scholar overlaid the 
 author. Even the comparatively few attempts which this mind 
 made to embody its thoughts were hampered by its excessive 
 introspection. Had Gray thrown himself out with freedom and 
 boldness upon the stream of original production, which might 
 
46 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 have been made to flow ifrom his richly-endowed and richly in 
 formed mind, he would have been stronger, greater, and happier 
 as a literary man. Neither would his productions have lost that 
 perfection of symmetry, and elaborate hard finish which they ex- 
 hibit ; while at the same time they would have had breathed 
 into them tfiat warm breath of life, which they do not now pos- 
 sess, and for the lack of which no mere art can ever compensate. 
 Certain it is that a closer, warmer contact with the mind of his 
 age, through a more daring and exuberant authorship on his part, 
 would have imparted a spring and buoyancy to the literary char- 
 acter of Gray, which would have rendered it a far more influen- 
 tial and interesting one than it now is. 
 
 As an example of the freshening and invigorating influence of 
 the constant and free communication of thought upon the intel- 
 lect, take the late Sir Walter Scott. His mind was one of the 
 healthiest, and most robust, that we meet with in the history of 
 literature. It was also one of the happiest, the most free from 
 morbid exercises and activities. Something was undoubtedly due 
 to its native structure, but very much was owing to those habits 
 of authorship which it early acquired, and long kept up. 
 Suppose that Scott had immured himself in his library, had 
 given free play to his acquisitive and antiquarian tendencies, 
 without developing and using his originating and productive tal- 
 ent, can we suppose that his intellect would have been that 
 warm, breezy, sunny spot that it always was ? It is true that he 
 finally broke his powers down, by attempting the Herculean task 
 of rescuing the great publishing house with which he had become 
 connected from bankruptcy ; but this dead lift of the mental 
 powers is not what we are speaking of. It is the moderate, and 
 uniform, yet free and bold expression of the thoughts of an 
 educated mind, in distinction from the dull, lethargic, uniform 
 suppression of them, of which we are speaking, and for which 
 we are pleading. 
 
 In this way, the ethical theory of Rhetoric, while resulting in 
 a practical and energetic Eloquence, exerts a vivifying influence 
 upon the entire culture of the student. It gives employment to 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 47 
 
 the sum total of his acquisitions, instead of permitting it to re- 
 main idle in his mind. It elaborates and uses, for the purposes of 
 popular instruction and impression, all the material with which 
 the mind is filled, instead of allowing it to remain a lifeless mass, 
 a caput mortuum, by itself. Mathematical, classical, historical, 
 philosophical, and theological knowledge, instead of being held in 
 the memory from a mere feeling of vanity, is set to work from a 
 sense of duty. The Rhetoric of the man has affinities with the 
 scholarship of the man. It is homogeneous with it. It moulds 
 it, and embodies it. For the Rhetorician, upon this theory, and 
 under this training, is not one in whom two distinct disciplines 
 exist side by side, with no interpenetration. He is not at one 
 time a dull sluggish recipient of knowledge, and at another a 
 dull formal communicator of knowledge ; discharging two func- 
 tions which in him have no connection with each other. He is 
 at all times a genial and vital receiver, and a genial vital com- 
 municator. It was once said of a famous jurist, that his know- 
 ledge had passed out of his memory into his judgment. We 
 may say of the genuine Rhetorician, that his knowledge is con- 
 tinually passing out of his passive into his active nature. It 
 enters into the circulation of the soul, and becomes vitalized by its 
 living currents. The Scholar and the Orator are not separated 
 from each other, but constitute one living personality. 
 
 But what an energy is imparted to culture, by a training that 
 thus tasks to the utmost for acquisitions, and then vivifies those ac- 
 quisitions to the utmost in order to popular oratorical impression ! 
 It is safe to say that the literature of a nation is vigorous and alive, 
 only in proportion as it has oratorical elements in it ; and that the 
 very height of its living energy appears in its Eloquence and 
 Oratory. What other portion of Greek literature throbs with 
 such intense life as the speeches of Demosthenes ? If there be 
 any of the vis viuida vitae in Roman literature, that literature 
 which, unlike all others, was born old, and never exhibits any of 
 the morn and liquid dew of youth, — if there be any fresh vital 
 force in Roman letters, is it not to be found in the orations of 
 Cicero ? And where, in the modern world, do the most vehement 
 
48 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 
 
 and passionate energies of the human intellect expatiate and 
 career, if not in the vastly widened arena of political and sacred 
 Eloquence, — if not on that theatre where the active, practical 
 interests of man for time and for eternity come up for discussion 
 and decision ? 
 
 The importance of a high and philosophic theory of Eloquence 
 and Oratory, when considered in its bearings upon the education 
 of the American mind, is plain and great. The American is 
 sensitive to Eloquence, and is inclined to be influenced by the 
 Rhetorician and Orator more than by the Poet or the Philoso- 
 pher. We are in our youth as a nation; in that forming period 
 which in Grecian, in Roman, and in English history, is marked 
 by the ballad and romance literature. Unlike our predecessors 
 we have not been much influenced by these lighter and im- 
 aginative species, but even in our infancy have sought a" manlier 
 diet. " We affect Eloquence and Oratory, rather than the Bal- 
 lad and the Romance. If we compare the literature of America 
 with that of Europe, for the last seventy-five years, we find 
 that our success has been altogether greatest in this department. 
 During this period we have produced no Poetry equal to that 
 of England, no Philosophy equal to that of Germany, and 
 no Science equal to that of France. But the most unwilling 
 admirer must acknowledge that we have produced a body of 
 Eloquence and Oratory which, taken as a whole, is superior to 
 anything in contemporaneous English or Continental Eloquence. 
 The eloquence called out in the debates upon the adoption of the 
 Constitution, and all along down from that time to the present, in 
 expounding and defending it ; the panegyrical eloquence of the 
 country elicited by the commemoration of great events, or of 
 patriotic men; nay even the ruder and less elaborate efforts- in- 
 cident to the political contests that occur so often : all these 
 have called out, within the period of the last seventy -five years, 
 in the republican States of America, a body of oratorical litera- 
 ture with which nothing could so successfully compare, as that 
 which was called forth, (but which has not been handed down), 
 in the Democracies of Greece, from the time when the Olympian 
 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 49 
 
 Pericles thundered in the Agora, to the time when Demosthenes 
 sucked the poisoned quill. 
 
 The American mind ought therefore to be under the influence 
 of a high theory, and a strict taste, in order that this tendency 
 may receive its very best education ; and in order that American 
 Eloquence may continue to be characterized, as it has been, by 
 solid and sterling qualities. The national mind, thus far, has been 
 too seriously occupied with great interests, to become meretricious 
 in its Rhetoric and Eloquence. The Revolution that established 
 liberty and the government, was no time for an inflated and bom- 
 bastic display. Energy and thoughtfulness characterize our fa- 
 vorite and model orators. But peace, and prosperity, and perfect 
 security, relax the mind and its theories There is some danger 
 that the form outrun the substance; that congressional debates, 
 that judicial, panegyrical, and sacred Eloquence, all of them 
 become less truthful and forceful in their character, while they 
 become more florid and dazzling. 
 
 What better corrective, then, can there be, than a good educa- 
 tional theory, upon the whole subject, in both the individual and 
 the public mind ; in both the auditor and the orator ? If audi- 
 ences are intolerant of a Rhetoric that separates the form from 
 the material, the style from the thought, the public speaker will 
 know it, and act accordingly. If the auditor insists that Elo- 
 quence have a soul of truth, and of thought, within it, the orator 
 will yield, and become a more thoughtful man, that he may min- 
 ister to the public want. The result will be a Rhetoric and an 
 Oratory that first patiently accumulates knowledge, and then thor- 
 oughly elaborates it, for the purposes of popular instruction and 
 impression, — an Eloquence 
 
 "not like those rills from a height 
 Which sparkle and foam, and in vapor are o'er ; 
 But a current that works out its way into light 
 Through the filtering recesses of thought and of lore/' 
 
ELOQUENCE A VIBTUE. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 ON INVENTION. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DESIGN AND USE OF THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION. 
 
 It has often surprised me that, while in modern times 
 the theory of the Fine Arts, and especially of Poetry, 
 has reached so high a degree of clearness and complete- 
 ness, Rhetoric still consists of unconnected principles, 
 and is not competent either to guide the practice of Elo- 
 quence by sure rules, or to give satisfactory information 
 with respect to the nature and qualities of the subject of 
 which it treats, — of Eloquence itself. Hence it has 
 seemed to me not to be a superfluous attempt to endeavor 
 to represent the gift of Eloquence as one of the funda- 
 mental powers of man, and to derive its laws from one 
 of the higher philosophical sciences, so that everything 
 uncertain and mutable may disappear from the theory as 
 well as the practice of it.* 
 
 I must, indeed, fear that such an undertaking will ap- 
 pear useless to many, and that I shall be asked, " What 
 
52 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 is gained by theories generally ? Has all the philoso- 
 phizing upon Art, in modern times, produced a more 
 beautiful bloom of Poetry ? Did not Eloquence attain 
 its highest perfection among the ancients, although proba- 
 bly among them, as among us, its highest principle either 
 remained unknown, or, at least, never distinctly presented 
 itself to the orator ? Only by means of rules which were 
 drawn from experience, and which had respect to indi- 
 vidual particulars in the formation of the oration, only 
 by means of a constant practice which began in earliest 
 youth and never ceased, and not by means of general 
 theories, did Demosthenes and Cicero form themselves ; 
 only by means of a similar discipline, and not by means 
 of text-books, can Eloquence, which has sunk so very 
 low among us, be raised up, if indeed it is to be raised 
 up at all." 
 
 These objections would be perfectly well founded, if 
 Eloquence, since the establishment of the Christian 
 Church, had not appeared in a form entirely unknown to 
 the ancients, and one to which we are obliged to have 
 special reference. The political and civil relations amidst 
 which, exclusively and alone, Eloquence appeared among 
 the ancients, were sufficient of themselves to secure it 
 from deviations from the true course, and to render more 
 precise theories unnecessary. For him who spoke be- 
 fore the court, or in the popular assembly, upon a matter 
 which would be decided immediately upon the close of 
 his oration, the effect was the surest proof whether he 
 had spoken well or not ; and when the highest personal 
 interests were at stake, it was very natural that the 
 orator should call forth all his powers in order to succeed, 
 and that he would learn to understand and avoid those 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 53 
 
 faults which might draw after them the loss of wealth, 
 influence, life, and freedom. The sacred orator, on the 
 contrary, stands in a relation to his hearer, and treats of a 
 subject, which does not allow of such decisive proof. 
 Whether he has instructed, edified, improved, or has 
 merely superficially pleased and moved his hearer, the 
 effect of his sermons can very seldom inform him, since 
 this, from its very nature, remains concealed in the mind, 
 and almost never comes into sight. Since, therefore, he 
 is not, like the orator before the court and in the popular 
 assembly, impelled towards the prescribed end by a press- 
 ing danger ; since he is not shut up within such narrow 
 limits which render deviation to the right or left almost 
 impossible, he runs the greatest risk of error, if without 
 settled theory and principles. He must be able to give 
 the most accurate account, to his own mind, of all that 
 he does, and that deeper insight into the principles of 
 Eloquence, w T hich the ancient orator did not need, is in- 
 dispensable to him. 
 
 Moreover, many are of opinion that Eloquence, which 
 in Greece and Rome reached so high a degree of perfec- 
 tion, disappeared from the earth with the destruction of 
 ancient freedom, and never again found its home upon 
 it. According to this opinion, Eloquence is therefore less 
 an original impulse in man, than Poetry ; it is a creature 
 of circumstances, by which it is not only more or less 
 favored, but is produced and destroyed; the republican 
 constitutions of antiquity were necessary to its develop- 
 ment; and now, when social life, the spirit of the age, 
 and the form of government, are so entirely different, 
 that which we call Eloquence is either utterly unworthy 
 of this name, or is only the mere shadow of that ancient 
 
 5* 
 
54 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 powerful faculty. * Whether this opinion is well found- 
 ed or not, can be known only after such an investigation 
 as we are intending to institute. If we do not succeed 
 in showing that Eloquence is one of the fundamental 
 powers in man, this opinion will stand unassailed, and 
 whoever in modern times thinks himself to be an orator 
 must simply give up his pretensions. But if we do suc- 
 ceed, and do actually point out a particular original 
 power, whose development in a certain direction neces- 
 sarily produces Eloquence, then Eloquence is no longer 
 the ephemeral bloom of a particular age ; and although 
 it may conceal itself, and sometimes may appear under 
 another name, it nevertheless lives a life just as real and 
 forceful, in modern, as in ancient times. 
 
 Finally, there are men — and men, too, highly distin- 
 guished for learning and science — who set a very low 
 estimate upon Eloquence, and would have nothing to do 
 with it. For, in their opinion, it is perfectly clear that its 
 purpose is to excite the feelings, which is always useless, 
 and sometimes even injurious ; nay, Eloquence com- 
 monly carries its pretensions still further, and, in the best 
 orators, it is the design plainly prominent, and even ac- 
 knowledged by themselves, to master the heart, to rule 
 the will, and turn it whithersoever they wish. But this, 
 from its very nature, whatever be the manner in 
 which it is done, is not at all compatible with the rela- 
 tions in which man stands to his fellow-man, and is there- 
 fore, strictly considered, contrary to morality ; and the 
 more so, from the fact, that commonly the orator makes 
 use of cunning and deceptive tricks of art, rather 
 
 * Magna ista et notabilis eloquentia . . . quae in bene constitutes 
 civitatibus non oritur. — De Caus. Corr. Efoq., c. 40. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 55 
 
 than honorable weapons. In their opinion, we should 
 address the understanding alone, and satisfy it by means 
 of stringent arguments ; all excitement of the feelings, and 
 influencing of the will, were better omitted. This class 
 of opponents, as has been remarked, is a very important 
 one ; at its head stand names of distinction, — Aristotle* 
 among the ancients, Kantf among the moderns ; their 
 objections have the very strongest appearance of truth, 
 and as yet have not been answered in a satisfactory man- 
 ner by any of the modern advocates of Eloquence, who 
 have made far too little of them. But this question also, 
 whether there is anything contrary to morality in the at- 
 tempt to acquire mastery over the minds of others, can 
 be decided only by means of such an investigation as we 
 contemplate. For, should it actually turn out to be im- 
 possible to derive each and all of the rules of Eloquence 
 from one and the same fundamental principle ; if the 
 
 * 'AAA.' '6\7]5 ov(T7)S irpSs So^av rrjs irpayfiareias rrjs Trepl r)]v pTjropiK^y, 
 ovx &s op&ws exovros, aAA.' ws avajKaiov t^v iTrt/jLeAeiav iroirjTeov. 
 
 Metor., Lib. IIL t c. 1. 
 
 t I must confess that, while a beautiful poem always gives me pure plea- 
 sure, the perusal of the best orations of the popular orators of Kome, or 
 the parliamentary or pulpit orators of the present time, is always accompa- 
 nied with the disagreeable feeling of disapprobation towards a cunning art 
 which understands how to move men like machines, to a judgment which, 
 upon calm after-thought, must lose all its worth with them. Oratory, con- 
 sidered as the art of making use of the weaknesses of men, for its own pur- 
 poses, (be these never so well meant, or be they actually good, as they are 
 always intended to be, ) is worthy of no respect at all. — Kritik der Unheils- 
 kraft, p. 202. Rosenkranz' s Ed. 
 
 It is also said of Eloquence, in the "Dialogue Be Cans. Corr. Eloq., c. 40, that 
 A is M alumna licentise, quam stulti libertatem vocabant, comes seditionum, ef- 
 frenati populi incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine Servitute, contumax, temera- 
 ria, adrogans." 
 
56 
 
 OR, 
 
 theory of Eloquence should be found to consist only of 
 some maxims derived from experience and observation, 
 which can be brought together under no unity, this would 
 certainly be a very strong presumption against it. The 
 impossibility of constructing its fundamental principles 
 philosophically, would greatly lower it, and would throw 
 it into the same class with other abilities of an ambigu- 
 ous nature, in relation to which this same thing occurs, — 
 with Prudence, Skill, Hypocrisy, or, in the phrase of Pla- 
 to,* with the art of Cookery. If, however, we succeed 
 in laying down an all-comprehending principle as the 
 ground of Eloquence, it will then appear of itself, wheth- 
 er this is good or bad ; although Eloquence would be 
 acquitted of all charges on the score of being contrary to 
 morality, from the mere philosophical form of its theory, 
 since that which depends upon a fundamental power of 
 man cannot possibly contradict his moral sense. 
 
 * Platonis Gorgias ed. Heindorf, p. 53. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 57 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS NOT AN INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN POETRY 
 AND PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Three different characteristics of Eloquence attract no- 
 tice immediately upon the first examination. First, it is 
 evident that Eloquence seeks to separate the true from 
 the false, and to satisfy the understanding by argument. 
 The powerful enthymemes of Demosthenes, the assertion 
 of Aristotle that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and 
 Cicero's affirmation that he had made himself an orator, 
 not in the schools of the Rhetoricians, but in the walks 
 of the Academy,* testify plainly enough to the affinity of 
 Eloquence with Philosophy. Secondly, Eloquence ap- 
 proximates to Poetry alsq, through the liveliness of its 
 representations, and the use of turns and figures which 
 are similar to those of Poetry. But, thirdly, Eloquence 
 is distinguished from Philosophy as well as Poetry by 
 the outward end after which it strives, — by that mastery, 
 over minds, which it does not quietly wait for, but ob- 
 tains by a struggle, and by the innumerable references 
 which must be regarded in such a striving, and which are 
 entirely foreign to Philosophy as well as Poetry. 
 
 Characteristic marks of three kinds, therefore, are tobe 
 found in Eloquence: 1. An affinity with Philosophy; 
 
 * Fatepr me oratorem non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex academiae spatiis 
 extitisse.— Orator, c. 3. 
 
58 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ) OR, 
 
 2. An affinity with Poetry ; 3. A striving after an out- 
 ward end. In order to find a fundamental principle of 
 Eloquence, one of these three characteristics must be 
 made predominant; for they cannot exist beside each 
 other in equal dignity. Should it be affirmed that the 
 Beautiful and the True, which in Poetry and Philosophy 
 are principal, in Eloquence appear as adjuncts and sub- 
 servient to outward ends, the difficulty is not yet remov- 
 ed ; for the question ever returns, — What is the law ac- 
 cording to which the True and the Beautiful may be used 
 for the attainment of outward ends ? So long as this is 
 not given, Eloquence has not found its highest funda- 
 mental principle. 
 
 If we take our stand upon that point of view, where 
 Eloquence appears as something fluctuating between 
 Philosophy, Poetry, and mere Skill, the theory projected 
 in accordance with this view cannot satisfy the philoso- 
 pher ; and just as little will it be a sure guide for the pu- 
 pil in oratory. 
 
 First, the teacher says to him, " You must select a sub- 
 ject, and must endeavor to treat it fundamentally." This 
 he does in all faithfulness, and thus, imperceptibly, there 
 arises under his hands a philosophic essay. " This is 
 good for nothing," says the teacher; " where is the rising 
 sweep, the life, the poetic ornament, by which these truths 
 are to make an entrance ? " This censure seems just to 
 him, and he now throws himself into the other extreme, 
 and that which he produces is the most disagreeable of 
 all caricatures, — poetic prose. Having once more failed, 
 it is now said to him, " You discourse as if you were alone 
 by yourself, with no hearers before you, into whose cir- 
 cumstances, into whose way of thinking, you must en- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 59 
 
 ter ! " Who will find fault with the pupil, if at this point 
 he falls into a sort of desperation, and addresses his 
 instructor somewhat after this manner : " In Heaven's 
 name ! what is it that you require of me ? Am I to 
 unite, in one, three things entirely different from each 
 other : philosophic profundity, poetic ornament, and ref- 
 erence to an outward end ? Tell me, first, if this union 
 is possible ; and, if it is, then give me the higher princi- 
 ple under which three so different requisitions can be 
 brought into one; show me the rule which determines 
 how much I may concede to the subject-matter, how 
 much to beauty of form, how much to the hearer, in or- 
 der that each may coexist with all, and that an unlucky 
 preponderance may not oscillate from one side to another. 
 For I can now no longer cast my work in an old form, 
 without troubling myself about the wherefore, without 
 asking myself why that which I produce must look pre- 
 cisely thus, and whether it might not look entirely differ- 
 ent ; I wish in my oration, from beginning to end, to see 
 the necessity of every single part." So then show me the 
 principle which groups all others under itself, and from 
 which all rules readily derive themselves." 
 
60 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS NEITHER POETRY NOR PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If, therefore, one of the three characteristic marks of El- 
 oquence is to be made the fundamental one, it might be 
 supposed that its affinity with Poetry is the one, and that 
 the same fundamental principle which reigns in the rep- 
 resentations of Poetry, must also guide in the practice 
 of Oratory. But this would pre-suppose that Eloquence 
 give up its striving after an outward end, as something 
 incompatible with Poetry, which it cannot do without 
 renouncing its own nature and peculiarity ; or else that 
 Poetry adapt itself to this striving, and to all the refer- 
 ences connected with it, which is equally impossible. 
 
 When Poetry clothes its ideas in forms, it can demand 
 nothing more than the perception and acknowledgment 
 that the idea is perfectly suited to the form, and the form 
 to the idea ; its design can never be to implant the ideas, 
 which it has wrought out with such pleasure to itself, in 
 another mind ; the one process would injure the other ; 
 in the two-fold effort to exhibit his own mind and to 
 work upon the mind of another, the Poet would succeed 
 in neither. Indeed, nothing is so very much suited to 
 produce the feeling of displeasure and disgust as an ora- 
 tion overloaded with poetical ornament ; we pky the ig- 
 norance which selects means so unsuitable for its ends ; 
 we are indignant at the profanation which would force 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 61 
 
 Poetry to subserve such outward ends. Eloquence, there- 
 fore, cannot be regarded as a part of Poetry. 
 
 But, secondly, is it not possible to make the Philosoph- 
 ic element in it the fundamental principle of Eloquence ? 
 Since in Eloquence, as in Philosophy, ideas are presented 
 in a certain sequence and in a certain connection, its co- 
 incidence with the art of Philosophizing might be so 
 great as that it. should fall into this and constitute only a 
 part of it. But here the very obstacle which rendered 
 the union of Eloquence with Poetry impossible, shows 
 itself again, — that striving, namely, after an outward 
 end, which is just as essential to Eloquence as it is for- 
 eign to Philosophy. Philosophy can recognize no other 
 law by which its representations are to be guided, than 
 that which lies in the ideas themselves ; these ideas them- 
 selves are simply to come forth in their greatest possible 
 clearness, and in their greatest possible compass. The 
 problem of Eloquence, on the contrary, is to gain over to 
 its ideas a mind thus or thus disposed. The laws which 
 Philosophy follows in its representations cannot therefore 
 be the highest and sole rules of Eloquence, since, besides 
 these, it has still others to obey which are imposed upon 
 it by the outward end after which it strives. 
 
 This truth is of the greatest importance for the success 
 of our investigation, and I must call attention to it the 
 more, since from the great tendency of the Germans to 
 Philosophizing, it is certainly to be feared that it will 
 meet with opposition from many of my readers. " Is 
 not," it maybe objected, "this profound and powerful 
 development of ideas, which is the essential element in 
 the Philosophic representation, itself also the most infal- 
 lible means of making an entrance for these ideas into 
 
 6 
 
62 
 
 the minds of others, and thus of fulfilling all the requisi- 
 tions of Eloquence ?" Let one make this attempt, but 
 let him make it with thoroughness, without suffering 
 himself to be diverted by circumstances from the purpose 
 once fixed upon. Let one lose himself entirely in the 
 idea ; let him develop it in its whole compass ; let him 
 not omit even the least of all that can serve to exhibit it 
 still more clearly ; let him forget, as is fitting, the place 
 where he stands ; let him confine himself to no definite 
 time, but speak until his subject is exhausted ; let him 
 not trouble himself about his hearers, about the degree 
 of their culture, about their capacities, qualities, prejudi- 
 ces, and inclinations ; in a word, let him seek only to ex- 
 press his own mind, — will such a discourse be adapted 
 to gain over an opposing mind and to transfer the senti- 
 ments of the orator into his hearers ? I think not. 
 Hence no one who refers the Rhetorical manner and 
 method to the Philosophical, is able in his practice to re- 
 main true to his theory. Imperceptibly he concedes 
 something to time, to place, to the occasion, to the hear- 
 ers ; and thus there arises a product which is neither Phil- 
 osophical nor Rhetorical, and which can satisfy no one 
 who is accustomed to judge of things with strictness. 
 
 If I understand it rightly, Aristotle makes this attempt, 
 which must ever be a failure, to connect Eloquence with 
 the art of Philosophizing, in order to obtain a simple, 
 firm, constituent principle for it. In the very beginning 
 of his work he lays down the position that Eloquence is 
 akin to Dialectics, and it seems as if all is to be derived 
 from this, and that Rhetoric is in this way to acquire a 
 scientific unity. But this first assertion compels him to 
 a second, by which Eloquence becomes strangely limited 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 63 
 
 in its sphere. " In Eloquence," he says, " which depends 
 upon Dialectics, the arguments are the only thing per- 
 taining to the art, and it should, properly, confine itself 
 simply to showing whether a thing has or has not hap- 
 pened. It is owing to the imperfection of governments 
 alone, that Eloquence has introduced the ideas of Jus- 
 tice and Injustice into its sphere, and assumes to excite 
 the feelings." Now, it would be interesting to see what 
 sort of a Rhetoric would have arisen, if Aristotle had 
 strictly maintained and carried out this principle ; but 
 whether it was because an Eloquence so narrowly limited 
 did not satisfy him, or because he felt himself obliged to 
 take Eloquence as he found it in actual existence, he lets 
 the principle drop again immediately. Hence we are not 
 a little surprised to see how soon he is no longer content 
 with the purely dialectic arguments, but, besides these, 
 calls in those means of persuasion also which lie in the 
 moral state of the orator and in the inward condition in- 
 to which the hearer has been brought. But, in order to 
 the apprehension of these, Dialectics no longer suffices ; 
 the knowledge of the virtues and the affections is requi- 
 site for this, and Aristotle finds himself compelled to the 
 acknowledgment that Eloquence is no longer akin to 
 Dialectics alone, but also to the Ethical science called 
 Politics. Thus he gets a fundamental principle having 
 a two-fold nature, and destructive of all scientific uni- 
 ty, — a quality, moreover, that is not to be met with again 
 in the whole work. 
 
64 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS A VIRTUE. 
 
 Since, therefore, Rhetoric cannot acquire a scientific 
 form, if Eloquence is to be regarded as a fluctuating in- 
 termediate between Poetry and Philosophy ; and since, 
 furthermore, it cannot be subordinated either to Poetry 
 or Philosophy, there is only one way left to find its high- 
 est fundamental principle, if it has one, namely, to 
 examine the third of the characteristic qualities noticed 
 in it, the striving after an outward end, and to see if it 
 will not lead to a firm fundamental principle. 
 
 Production in Poetry and Philosophy is a species of 
 activity which may be denominated the isolated, or that 
 which retreats into itself again. For it simply unfolds 
 an idea, and in the process has no other end but this idea 
 and its unfolding. That which has been formed in this 
 way can, indeed, like all that exists, exert an outward in- 
 fluence ; yet it never owes its origin to the design of 
 exerting such an influence. 
 
 There is another species of activity, which always aims 
 at an outward change, either in the sentiments and con- 
 duct of individual men, or in the social and family rela- 
 tions, or in the civil and ecclesiastical. Now, to this 
 species of practical activity — the sum-total of which 
 constitutes social life — Eloquence also belongs ; and it 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 65 
 
 is so entirely implicated in the circumstances existing at 
 the particular time, that even in thought it cannot be 
 separated from them. For although it is easy enough in 
 the case of a tragedy of Sophocles, to contemplate it as 
 something existing for itself, and to think of it as sepa- 
 rated from all the social and civil relations of the poet, 
 such a separation in the case of an oration of Demos- 
 thenes cannot be so effected in the least degree. Nothing 
 in it is an isolated piece of art ; nothing can be torn out 
 from the web of circumstances in which it was spoken ; 
 only in connection with these does it constitute a unity, 
 which again was nothing but an act, a point in the po- 
 litical career of the orator. "When the ancient orators 
 appeared, their discourse was an action* in the strictest 
 
 * " True Eloquence, indeed," says Webster, " does not consist in speech. 
 Patriotism is eloquent ; self-devotion is eloquent. The clear conception 
 outrunning the deductions of logic, the high purpose, the firm resolve, 
 the dauntless * spirit, speaking on the tongue, beaming from the eye, inform- 
 ing every feature, and urging the whole man onward, right onward, to his 
 object, — this is eloquence ; or rather it is something greater and higher than 
 all eloquence, — 'it is action, noble, sublime, godlike action" 
 
 Bolingbroke has noticed this implication of Eloquence, with the active and 
 practical circumstances in the midst of which it takes its rise, in a passage 
 which is worthy of being quoted, not less because he had no theory to sup- 
 port, than because of its masculine vigor and force. " Eloquence," he re- 
 marks, " has charms to lead mankind, and gives a nobler superiority than 
 power, that every dunce may use, or fraud, that every knave may employ. 
 But eloquence must flow like a stream that is fed by an abundant spring, 
 and not spout forth like a frothy water on some gaudy day, and remain dry 
 the rest of the year. The famous orators of Greece and Rome were the 
 statesmen and ministers of those commonwealths. The nature of their gov- 
 ernments, and the humor of those ages, made elaborate orations necessary. 
 They harangued oftener than they debated ; and the ars dicendi required 
 more study and more exercise of mind, and of body, too, among them, than 
 are necessary among us. But, as much pains as they took in learning how 
 to conduct the stream of eloquence, they took more to enlarge the fountain 
 from which it flowed. Hear Demosthenes, hear Cicero, thunder against 
 
 6* 
 
66 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 and most common signification of the word ; an action 
 that was none the less worthy of the name, and none the 
 less powerful, because they made use of speech instead 
 
 Philip, Catiline, and Antony. I choose the example of the first, rather than 
 that of Pericles, whom he imitated, or of Phocion, whom he opposed, or of 
 any other considerable personage in Greece; and the example of Cicero 
 rather than that of Crassus, or of Hortensius, or of any other of the great 
 men of Rome ; because the eloquence of these two has been so celebrated, 
 that we are accustomed to look upon them almost as mere orators. They 
 were orators indeed, and no man who has a soul can read their orations, after 
 the revolution of so many ages, aafter the extinction of the governments and 
 of the people for whom they were composed, without feeling, at this hour, 
 the passions they were designed to move, and the spirit they were designed 
 to raise. But if we look into the history of these two men, and con- 
 sider the parts they acted, we shall see them in another light, and admire 
 them in a higher sphere of action. Demosthenes had been neglected, 
 in his education, by the same tutors who cheated him of his inheritance. 
 Cicero was bred with greater advantage, and Plutarch, I think, says, that 
 when he first appeared, the people used to call him, by way of derision, the 
 Greek, and the scholar. But whatever advantage of this kind the latter 
 might have over the former, and to which of them soever you ascribe the 
 superior genius, the progress which both of them made in every part of po- 
 litical knowledge, by their industry and application, was marvellous. 
 Cicero might be a better philosopher, but Demosthenes was no less a 
 statesman : and both of them performed actions, and acquired fame, above 
 the reach of eloquence alone. Demosthenes used to compare eloquence to 
 a weapon, aptly enough; for eloquence, like every other weapon, is of 
 little use to the owner, unless he have the power and the skill to use it. 
 This force and skill Demosthenes had in an eminent degree. Observe them 
 in one instance among many. It was of mighty importance to Philip, to 
 prevent the accession of Thebes to the grand alliance that Demosthenes, at 
 the head of the Athenian commonwealth, formed against the growing power 
 of the Macedonians. Philip had his emissaries and ambassadors on the 
 spot, to oppose to those of Athens, and we may be assured that he neglected 
 none of those arts upon that occasion, that he employed so successfully on 
 others. The struggle was great, but Demosthenes prevailed, and the 
 Thebans engaged in the war against Philip. Was it by his eloquence alone 
 that he prevailed in a divided State, over all the subtilty of intrigue, all the 
 dexterity of negotiation, all the seduction, all the corruption, and all the 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 67 
 
 of limbs, weapons, or other instruments. Nay, even 
 in our unrhetorical times, if -one were to regard the 
 discourses of a sacred orator as a series of little separate 
 
 terrors, that the ablest and most powerful prince could employ 1 Was De- 
 mosthenes wholly taken up with composing orations, and haranguing the 
 people in this remarkable crisis ? He harangued them, no doubt, at Thebes, 
 as well as at Athens, and in the rest of Greece, where all the great resolu- 
 tions of making alliances, waging war, or concluding peace, were determined 
 in democratical assemblies. But yet haranguing was, no doubt, the least 
 part of his business, and eloquence was neither the sole nor the principal 
 talent, as the style of writers would lead us to believe, on which his success 
 depended. He must have been master of other arts, subserviently to which 
 his eloquence was employed ; and must have had a thorough knowledge of 
 his own State and of the other States of Greece, of their dispositions, and of 
 their interests relatively to one another, and relatively to their neighbors, 
 to the Persians particularly, with whom he held a correspondence, not 
 much to his honor in appearance, whatever he might intend by it : I say he 
 must have been master of many other arts, and possessed an immense 
 fund of knowledge, to make his eloquence in every case successful, and 
 even pertinent or seasonable in some, as well as to direct it, and to furnish 
 with matter whenever he thought proper to employ this weapon. 
 
 Let us consider Tully on the greatest theatre of the known world, and in 
 the most difficult circumstances. We are better acquainted with him than 
 we are with Demosthenes ; for we see him nearer, as it were, and in more dif- 
 ferent lights. How perfect a knowledge had he acquired of the Roman con- 
 stitution of government, ecclesiastical and civil ; of the origin and progress, 
 of the general reasons and particular occasions of the laws and customs of 
 his country ; of the great rules of equity, and the low practice of courts ; 
 of the duty of every magistracy and office in the State, from the dictator 
 down to the lictor ; and of all the steps by which Rome had risen from her 
 infancy, to liberty, to power, and grandeur, and dominion, as well as of all 
 those by which she began to decline, a little before his age, to that servitude 
 which he died for opposing, but lived to see established, and in which 
 not her liberty alone, but her power, and grandeur, and dominion were lost ! 
 How well was he acquainted with the Roman colonies and provinces, with 
 the allies and enemies of the empire, with the rights and privileges of the 
 former, the dispositions and conditions of the latter, with the interests of them 
 all relatively to Rome, and of the interests of Rome relatively to them ! 
 How present to his mind were the anecdotes of former times concerning 
 the Roman and other States, and how curious was he to observe the minut- 
 
68 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 pieces of art, delivered every Sunday, everybody certainly 
 would protest against such a view, and demand that his 
 orations be regarded as individual attempts to influence 
 
 est circumstances that passed in bis own ! His works will answer suf- 
 ficiently the questions I ask, and establish in the mind of every man who 
 reads them the idea I would give of his capacity and knowledge, as well as 
 that which is so universally taken of his eloquence. To a man fraught with 
 all this stock of knowledge, and industrious to improve it daily, nothing 
 could happen that was entirely new ; nothing for which he was quite unpre- 
 pared ; scarce any effect whereof he had not considered the cause ; scarce 
 any cause wherein his sagacity could not discern the latent effect. His elo- 
 quence in private causes gave him first credit at Rome ; but it was this 
 knowledge, this experience, and the continued habits of business, that sup- 
 ported his reputation, enabled him to do much service to his country, and 
 gave force and authority to his eloquence. To little purpose would he have 
 attacked Catiline with all the vehemence that indignation, and even fear, 
 added to eloquence, if he had trusted to this weapon alone. This weapon 
 alone would have secured neither him nor the senate from the poniard 
 of that assassin. He would have had no occasion to boast, that he had 
 driven this infamous citizen out of the walls of Rome, abiit, excessit, evasit, 
 erupit, if he had not made it, beforehand, impossible for him to continue any 
 longer in them. As little occasion would he have had to assume the 
 honor of defeating, without any tumult, or any disorder, the designs of 
 those who conspired to murder the Roman people, to destroy the Roman 
 empire, and to extinguish the Roman name ; if he had not united, by skill 
 and management, in the common cause of their country, orders of men the 
 most averse to each other ; if he had not watched all the machinations of 
 the conspirators in silence, and prepared a strength sufficient to resist them 
 at Rome, and in the provinces, before he opened this scene of villany to the 
 senate and the people : in a word, if he had not made much more 
 use of political prudence, that is, of the knowledge of mankind, and of the 
 arts of government, which study and experience give, than of all the powers 
 of his eloquence. 
 
 Such was Demosthenes, such was Cicero, such were all the great men 
 whose memories are preserved in history, and such must every man be, or 
 endeavor to be, if he has either sense or sentiment, who presumes to 
 meddle in affairs of government, — of a free government, I mean, — 
 and hopes to maintain a distinguished character in popular assemblies, what- 
 ever part he takes, whether that of supporting, or that of opposing." — On 
 the Spirit of Patriotism. Bolingbroke's Works t IV., pp. 214-219. — Tr. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 69 
 
 his hearers, as individual acts in the discharge of his 
 calling; whereby they would become lost in the sum- 
 total of his social influence. But since all the activity 
 of man in his various relations is, or should be, under 
 the guidance of the moral law, the practice of Elo- 
 quence, if Eloquence is, in reality, an activity of this 
 sort, can be subjected to no other than Ethical laws. 
 Eloquence seeks to produce a change in the sentiments 
 and conduct of other men. The inquiry after its fun- 
 damental principles, therefore, becomes changed quite 
 naturally into this : What are the laws according to 
 which a free being may exert influence upon other free 
 beings ? And the answer to this question can be derived 
 only from Ethics. 
 
 We will attempt to answer it. And if it shall turn 
 out that all the rules of Eloquence, which have been 
 truly and correctly acknowledged as such, but which have 
 been placed beside each other in no inward connection, 
 can be derived from the laws according to which a free 
 being may exert influence upon other free beings, there 
 will be no doubt that Rhetoric, considered as the theory 
 of Eloquence, is a part of Ethics, and that Eloquence 
 itself is an ability to exert influence according to ethical 
 laws, — that is to say, is a Virtue. 
 
 In this way, moreover, the perplexity will be removed 
 in which theorizers find themselves when they would de- 
 termine whether Eloquence is an Art or not, and, gener- 
 ally, what it is in reality. They cannot declare it to be an 
 Art, since it is plain that it aims at the attainment of an 
 outward end, and not at a free and uninterested represen- 
 tation of the Beautiful. To the level of a Trade, how- 
 ever, it cannot be degraded ; hence a distinction is made 
 
70 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 between fine and non-fine, aesthetic and non-aesthetic, 
 Arts; strange expressions, and difficult to be understood !* 
 Into this latter class Eloquence is thrown, with the addi- 
 tional remark, that it merits the name of an Art, in so 
 far as we connect with this term the conception of a 
 practised and cultivated capacity and ability to produce 
 works whose individual parts in their closest connection 
 unite for one and the same end. Under this conception, 
 however, belongs also every talent of a mechanical kind, 
 and hence nothing is added to the dignity of Eloquence 
 by such a distinction. But if the view of Eloquence 
 brought forward by us can be maintained, not only a 
 much more settled and definite place would be secured 
 to it, but also a place in the highest degree honorable. It 
 would belong to that which is highest among men, to 
 Virtue ; and could be called an Art only in so far as the 
 name of Art could be given to Virtue itself. 
 
 But in saying that Eloquence is a Virtue, it is by no 
 means meant that a certain degree of moral excellence 
 is enough in order to Eloquence, and all that is usually 
 derived from art, learning, and science, can be dispensed 
 with. It is only meant that the arrangement and defini- 
 tion of that which Eloquence derives to itself from these 
 different departments, belongs peculiarly to ethical laws ; 
 but this is the very thing that is demanded of a highest 
 fundamental principle. Who, for example, would deny 
 that the imagination is the highest lawgiver for the 
 painter ? And yet no painting can be completed by the 
 
 * Schott' s Theory of Eloquence, 1807, p. 17. Fundamental Principles of 
 Rhetoric and Homiletics, by the same, 1815, p. 420. — A condensed 
 summary of the first mentioned work of Schott, by Prof. Park, may 
 be found in the Bibliotheca Sacra. — Tr. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 71 
 
 imagination alone. There is needed, besides, mechani- 
 cal skill, knowledge of colors, of perspective, of anatomy, 
 of history ; the imagination, as the highest fundamental 
 principle, merely determines how each of these knowl- 
 edges and abilities shall be applied. In like manner, 
 means of various kinds are necessary to the orator, ac- 
 cording to the different relations which he sustains, and 
 according to the different ends which he proposes to 
 himself, which are to be obtained only by study and 
 practice ; but that which determines where, how, and in 
 what degree, each of the existing means shall be applied, 
 is the ethical law, to which belongs every judgment re- 
 garding our relations^, our ends, and our social influence. 
 So that here the moral law does not merely point out the 
 time for the action, leaving the guidance of the action to 
 another principle, as would be the case in the practice of 
 any particular art; but Eloquence, in all its various 
 forms, is nothing but the development of the Ethical 
 impulse itself. 
 
72 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 IDEAS. 
 
 But what is the tenor of this highest law of Eloquence, 
 which, according to what has been said, must necessarily 
 be an ethical one ? It does not seem to us to be neces- 
 sary here to unfold from the bottom a new and peculiar 
 system of morals ; it will be sufficient to consider closely 
 the relation which the orator sustains to the hearer. The 
 few positions which we shall lay down, will, it is hoped, 
 meet with a confirmatory response in the moral feeling 
 of every cultivated man. 
 
 The orator has plans and designs which he would 
 realize, and to this end he must first overcome the slug- 
 gishness of indifferent minds, and give them an impulse 
 to action ; and secondly, he mifst overcome those who 
 openly oppose, and carry them along with him. But he 
 has no compulsory authority at all over the minds of 
 others ; he is not a law-giver, who ordains the relations 
 of men, and thus gives them direction in a mediate, yet 
 sure and irresistible manner ; he is not a ruler, who leads 
 a whole people hither and thither, because he has control 
 over the possessions, life, and standing of every indi- 
 vidual. He stands upon a perfect equality with those 
 upon whom he would exert an influence ; and since his 
 relation to them ensures him no open authority over 
 their freedom, he may not surreptitiously obtain it in 
 any secret manner; he must respect their freedom, and 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 73 
 
 neither by exciting their emotions, nor deluding their 
 understandings, deprive them of this prerogative. The 
 hearer who is carried away, must, at the same time, act 
 independently also ; and while he follows the will of the 
 orator, he must not merely believe that he is following 
 his own will, but must actually follow it. But how is 
 the solution of such a difficult, and, as it would seem, 
 insoluble problem, rendered possible ? From the fact 
 that there is something altogether universal and neces- 
 sary which all men will, something which they must will, 
 from their moral nature ; from the fact that the true free- 
 dom of man is constantly striving after the realization 
 of certain Ideas, which can be enumerated and distinctly 
 pointed out. The orator, therefore, has satisfied all the 
 requisitions of morality, as soon as he has carried back 
 his present design to one of those Ideas which every in- 
 dividual of his hearers wishes to realize. For, in this 
 way, the freedom of one man is not destroyed by the in- 
 fluence of another upon him ; he only fulfils, from an 
 impulse from without, what he is constantly seeking to 
 fulfil from an inward impulse. The highest law of Elo- 
 quence, therefore, is this : the particular Idea which the 
 orator wishes to realize, is to be carried back to the neces- 
 sary Ideas of the hearer. 
 
 Of these necessary Ideas we must now obtain a more 
 distinct apprehension. Ideas, generally, are productive 
 thoughts, which impel to production and action, and are 
 themselves the germ of that which is to be produced, as 
 well as the rule by which its form is to be constructed. 
 As there are plastic,* musical, poetic Ideas, from which 
 
 * Plastic is here used in its strict signification, to denote that which per- 
 tains to sculpture, including works both in stone and bronze. — Tr. 
 
 7 
 
74 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 the creations in each of these spheres of art originate ; 
 so there are also ethical Ideas, which are destined to be 
 embodied in life, which lie in the reason, must be pre- 
 supposed to be in every man considered as a being 
 endowed with reason, and are, moreover, actually in- 
 dwelling in every one, though not in equal clearness and 
 liveliness. For the mind in action, these Ideas flow to- 
 gether into one, and form a whole, which flames before 
 it as the one Ideal Perfection, after which it strives, and 
 which is capable of an outward realization in its action. 
 But in reflection, and in verbal statement, the Perfect di- 
 vides into three different Ideas, according as reference is 
 had to the circumstances under which action occurs, or 
 to the character of the person who acts, or to the neces- 
 sary inward and outward consequences of the action. 
 Every man wills the Perfect, in so far as it is specifically 
 determined arid conditioned by his peculiar relations ; 
 this is the Idea of Duty. Every man wills to be in- 
 clined and able to realize the Perfect at all times, and 
 everywhere ; this is the Idea of Virtue. Every man 
 wills that each and every one of his actions result in a 
 series of internal and external consequences that will 
 render the realization of the perfect Ideal easier for him 
 in future ; this is the Idea of Happiness. In a word, 
 every man wills to fulfil his duty, wills to form himself 
 to virtue, wills to promote his own happiness.* These 
 
 * The author here means to say that man wills to fulfil his duty, to form 
 himself to virtue, and to promote his own real happiness, ideally, not actu- 
 ally. By virtue of his moral constitution, he wills and must will this, 
 though by reason of sin he actually does not. But the orator must address 
 man as he came from his Creator, and not as he has made himself; he must 
 appeal to that which is highest in him, even although it does not find a 
 realization in his actual life. Only in this way can he profoundly move or 
 elevate his hearer. — Tr. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 75 
 
 are the necessary practical Ideas which are to be met 
 with in every man, and freedom consists* only in follow- 
 ing these Ideas unconditionally. 
 
 It is plain now, in what consists the first duty of the 
 orator. The hearer, while he is borne along, is, never- 
 theless, to remain free, and through the whole of his ora- 
 tion the orator is to carry back the particular Idea every- 
 where present in it, to these necessary Ideas of the hearer. 
 He in this way shows them how, in order to fulfil their 
 duty, in order to elevate themselves to virtue, in order to 
 promote their happiness, they must also realize his pro- 
 positions ; how the Ideas of Duty, of Virtue, of Happi- 
 ness, of themselves necessarily produce this very disposi- 
 tion, necessarily impel them . to the very conduct to 
 which he would urge them. In this way, the drator not 
 only respects the freedom of the hearer, but while he 
 seems to overpower and utterly subject him, raises 
 him, through the enlivenment of his Ideas, to the very 
 highest grade of an independent self-consciousness. It 
 is for this reason, also, that men who abhor all compul- 
 sion, and are ready to resist all compulsory violence, 
 love the orator, and follow him gladly, because he gives 
 them a direction, by means of Ideas, the most powerful 
 and certain, yet, at the same time, most innocent force 
 by which men are controlled. H Whoever feels himself 
 to be compelled," says Xenophon, " hates, as if he were 
 deprived of some good ; whoever is persuaded, loves, as 
 if he had received a benefit." * 
 
 * Memor. I. 2, 10. 
 
76 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE I OR 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FORM OF PRACTICAL IDEAS. 
 
 But only in the most general relations, — relations in 
 which men meet each other as free beings merely, and 
 before any relation of a more limited sort has developed 
 itself from this original relation, — do the regulating Ideas 
 of the Will appear as Duty, Virtue, and Happiness. 
 Through every closer connection among men, by which 
 that original relation is further developed and unfolded, 
 these Ideas a-lso obtain a stricter determination, a wider 
 unfolding, and, consequently, another name. There are, 
 however, two relations among men which have the com- 
 mon aim to render easy the realization of these practical 
 Ideas, and which have both been established by God, 
 the one in a supernatural manner, the other by a neces- 
 sity of nature. The first is the Church; the second is 
 the State. 
 
 We will, in the first place, consider what form the 
 ethical Ideas assume in this latter relation. Since in 
 the State the universal ethical law, in its application to 
 particuar cases, becomes more closely determined by 
 positive laws and ordinances, Civil Law, or the Legally 
 Right, here comes in, in the place of Duty. Since, fur- 
 thermore, in the State, the happiness of every individual 
 consists in his activity as a citizen being unrestricted, 
 and since this cannot be unless there is a flourishing 
 condition of the commonwealth, the ethical Idea of Hap- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 77 
 
 piness becomes changed into the striving after the Com- 
 mon Weal. Lastly, Virtue here comes into notice only 
 in so far as the realization of Ideal Perfection, to which 
 it is inclined and suited, promotes the well-being of the 
 commonwealth, and in this reference Virtue is called 
 Merit. Civil Law, the Common Weal, and Merit, are 
 consequently, the necessary Ideas, by which every mem- 
 ber of State, as such, is guided in his conduct ; and the 
 first duty of the orator, if he is dealing with his hearers 
 as members of a State, consists in showing them how, 
 through the execution of that which he proposes, Civil 
 Law will be obeyed, the Common Weal will be pro- 
 moted, and Civic Merit will be acquired. 
 
 But these Ideas attain a perfect unfolding, neither in 
 the general ethical relations, nor in the particular politi- 
 cal, since in these they remain shut up within the sphere 
 of the earthly, which can never satisfy man, from his 
 very nature. They acquire* their highest dignity only 
 through religion, and through their reference to the Deity, 
 who imparts this reference to them. Hence they appear 
 in the Church, where the Christian, as such, exercises an 
 influence upon the Christian, regards his own activity as 
 an efflux from the Deity, or as a striving to return back 
 into Him, and thereby imparts to these ideas an actu- 
 ating power, both for himself and others, of which they 
 are always destitute when man does not rise above and 
 beyond his own individuality. 
 
 In the Church, however, a divine institution, and under 
 divine guidance, the human reason cannot be regarded 
 as the highest law-giver ; God alone is the supreme law- 
 giver who speaks to us through his natural word in the 
 conscience, and his revealed word in the gospel^ and 
 
 gives us a rule of conduct; what, therefore, this com- 
 
 7 * 
 
78 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 mands in a particular instance, is not merely Duty (an 
 idea that carries man back no further than to himself 
 merely), but the Will of God. Furthermore, when the 
 Christian contemplates that disposition of the soul which 
 is constantly applying itself to good works, and is able 
 to perform them, he cannot possibly stop at mere Vir- 
 tue ; for this denotes that degree of moral perfection to 
 which man can raise himself, which he can attain by a 
 constant struggle with sin. But the Christian knows of 
 something higher; he beholds moral perfection as it 
 reigns, without struggle, and without conflict, in the 
 divine Being; and hence this perfect condition of the 
 soul can for him consist only in resemblance to God, or, 
 since the invisible God has become man, and has lived 
 and acted in 'human relationships, in resemblance to 
 Christ. Happiness, again, he cannot possibly seek in a 
 series of states and conditions, each one of which renders 
 the production of the highe*st good easier in the next 
 following ; instead of this, his eye, pressing forward into 
 eternity, beholds the final goal to which this series con- 
 ducts, namely, intimate union with God, or Blessedness ; 
 he, therefore, as his guiding Idea, chooses this alone as 
 the ultimate goal, and not Happiness, which, conceived 
 of in its highest ethical purity, can constitute only the 
 way to this goal. 
 
 Hence, when an orator contemplates himself and his 
 hearers as members of the Church, his first duty con- 
 sists in bringing the Idea which he would impart to them, 
 into connection with the Ideas which he must necessa- 
 rily presuppose ill them ; and these, according to the 
 foregoing, are the Divine Witt, Godlikeness, and Bless- 
 edness. If no one of these is prominent in a sermon, as 
 the point from which everything is viewed, so much is 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 79 
 
 certain at least, the sermon does not belong to the sphere 
 of Eloquence. But the sacred orator should not deem 
 it unworthy of his office to be at home in this sphere, 
 since, according to what has been said before, Eloquence 
 is not only the most innocent of all influences, but is 
 Virtue itself. It has shown itself to be such thus far ? 
 and, it is hoped, will prove itself to be such, still more, 
 in what is to follow. 
 
 I must here beg my readers to carefully note a result 
 which flows with the greatest certainty from the investi- 
 gation thus far, the truth of which, however, has never 
 been strictly proved, nay, has been doubted by most, — 
 namely, that ecclesiastical Eloquence is entirely one and 
 the same with political, as to its Ideas ; that is, as to its 
 nature. 
 
 In saying this, however, we do not deny that they 
 differ from one another in their outward form, in an 
 important degree ; for Church and State are very differ- 
 ent relationships, and relationships always exert a mate- 
 rial influence upon every species of moral activity.* 
 
 It is apparent furthermore, that even if it be granted 
 that the political and judicial Eloquence of the Ancients 
 has perished, still only one form of the thing, and not 
 the very thing itself, has perished; for this has risen 
 again in ecclesiastical Eloquence with a still higher 
 splendor; the Ideas upon which Eloquence is based 
 have been made more splendid by passing through the 
 
 * Herder says, in his letters upon the study of Theology, (letter 40, ) 
 " Whoever takes the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Cicero as an 
 absolute model for his sermons, has no true conception either of a sermon 
 or of a judicial oration ; he does not understand the true end of either/' 
 True, if he makes them an absolute model. But as I have presented the 
 matter, this objection would not, it is hoped, apply to my view. 
 
80 
 
 medium of Religion, and whatever deficiency modern 
 Eloquence may have in perfection of form, when com- 
 pared with ancient, it is compensated for by the superi- 
 ority of its subject-matter, while, at the same time, it is 
 to be # remembered that perfection in the outward form 
 is far more easily attained when the subject is of a less 
 elevated nature, than when it is of the absolutely highest. 
 Finally, it is apparent, that even if it be granted that 
 ecclesiastical Eloquence itself has disappeared, as is 
 actually asserted by some, still Eloquence itself is not 
 destroyed, but must be sought for in the intercourse of 
 men, in their daily society In a word, Eloquence is 
 eternal, for it rests upon that which is eternal in man, 
 upon his ethical Ideas.* 
 
 * 1/ eloquence peut se trouver dans les entretiens et dans tout genre 
 d' ecrire. Elle est rarement, ou.on la cherche, et eile est quelquefois ou on 
 ne la cherche point. — La Bruyere 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 81 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ELOQUENCE. 
 
 Although all three of these Ideas may be employed 
 very properly on one and the same occasion, as motive 
 grounds, yet most commonly, the aim of the orator has 
 a more easy reference to one of them, which is then 
 predominant, and to which the others, when they are 
 employed, are subordinated. This circumstance led the 
 Ancients to assume three species of orations, of which 
 one has Legality and Illegality, another, Public Advan- 
 tage and Public Detriment, and the third, Civic Merit 
 and Civic Demerit, for its subject-matter. The first is 
 the oration before the court of justice ; the second, the 
 deliberative or political oration ; the third, the panegyri- 
 cal or demonstrative oration. Correct as this division 
 is, the Ancients have nevertheless, so far as I am aware, 
 given no satisfactory ground for it, as indeed they were 
 in general well fitted for comprehending and analyzing, 
 but were less successful in referring to higher principles. 
 For that which Aristotle, from whom the later rhetori- 
 cians derive this division,* offers in its justification,! has 
 in truth more resemblance to a jest, however earnest he 
 may have been in it. There are, says he, as many 
 species of orations as there are species of hearers ; but 
 
 * Qulntil. III. 4. 
 
 t Rheto. I. 3. Cicero derives this division in the same way. — De Parti- 
 tion«, III. 
 
82 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 the hearer is either a spectator or a judge, and this latter 
 again, in respect to the future, or in respect to the past; 
 hence there arise the demonstrative, the deliberative, and 
 the judicial orations. This supposition, of a hearer who 
 is merely a spectator, is most remarkable. The demon- 
 strative orations of the Sophists, (that is, discourses hav- 
 ing no other aim but to strike by the jingle of words,) 
 were indeed listened to with applause in the time of 
 Aristotle ; but this must be regarded only as a piece of 
 bad taste, and not as a natural impulse in man, upon 
 which to build philosophically. Furthermore, although 
 the relations in which the hearers usually stood to the 
 orator in the ancient republics, are imperfectly indeed 
 denoted by this passing of judgment on the past or the 
 future, yet it is by no means shown thereby, that there 
 were only so many and could be no more of such rela- 
 tions.* 
 
 On the contrary, if these three species of orations are 
 placed beside the three Ideas above-mentioned, it is 
 apparent that these are the only ground upon which the 
 division in question rests. For since among the An- 
 cients, only the political relation reached any good degree 
 of perfection, these Ideas could be actualized among 
 them only under the form of the Legal and the Illegal, 
 the Weal and the Detriment of the State, Civic Merit 
 and its contrary, and this very relation is also assigned 
 as the subject-matter of the three species. 
 
 If divisions are to be made at all in Eloquence, the 
 different species cannot be determined by a reference to 
 the Form and Matter, and to the manner in which both 
 
 * That also does not seem to be satisfactory which occurs to Quintilian, 
 cuncta rimanti III. 4. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 83 
 
 interpenetrate each other. In Poetry this can be done; 
 in Eloquence it cannot be,* for the reason, that the Form 
 and the Matter vary with the relations which the orator 
 and the hearer sustain, and these relations are too 
 numerous to be specified. The leading Ideas are the 
 permanent in Eloquence, the only thing which does not 
 change ; and on this account, they of themselves alone 
 furnish a ground of division. 
 
 If these three species constitute a valid division in 
 political Eloquence, they must be found in sacred Elo- 
 quence also, since the fundamental Ideas are the same 
 in both. To counsel for the well-being of the State, and 
 to point out the way to eternal well-being, is a moral 
 activity of one and the same kind ; as also there is no 
 practical difference between accusing a criminal and 
 inveighing against a vice, between praising a meritori- 
 ous man and recommending a virtue. It is only to be 
 regretted that the names by which the Ancients desig- 
 nated these species are suited to political Eloquence 
 alone ; and it could be wished, that appellations of an 
 entirely general character might be introduced, which 
 could be applied indiscriminately to both political and 
 sacred Eloquence. 
 
 That species of oration which is based upon the Idea 
 of Virtue was developed latest ; it first received its com- 
 plete unfolding through the Church, to which the State 
 was always unfavorable. For this reason, also, this 
 species was never known among the Ancients in its 
 purity. Aristotle apprehends it merely on the side of 
 the praise and blame which it dispenses, and makes 
 
 ■ * Oratorum genera esse dicuntnr tamquam poetarum. Id secus est. — 
 Cicero De optimo genere oratorum, I. 
 
* 
 
 84 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 it a demonstrative oration without any practical aim. 
 Cicero, who adheres closely to this same view, doubts 
 whether it can be regarded as a species at all, and 
 whether it is necessary to give rules concerning it 
 And contemplated from this point of view, it certainly 
 does not belong to Eloquence. If a writer praises and 
 censures with no other purpose but to praise and cen- 
 sure, productions of two kinds can arise ; a lyrical poem, 
 if the writer surrenders himself to his feelings ; or an 
 historical representation, if he follows the thread of a 
 narrative. It will be an oration only in case the pur- 
 pose to awaken a certain disposition in the hearer, to 
 determine him to a certain course of conduct, is con- 
 nected with the praise and the censure. The Idea of 
 Virtue is employed in this way certainly by the An- 
 cients ; yet it is seldom predominant, and commonly is 
 subordinate merely, as when Demosthenes places before 
 the Athenians the example of their forefathers as an 
 incitement to great deeds, or pictures the worthlessness 
 of an opponent in order to give greater weight to his 
 defence or accusation. 
 
 A particular species of oration, based upon the Idea 
 of Virtue, was first formed in the Christian Church ; 
 here the moral perfection, which is conceived of as being 
 in God-, which was manifested in Christ, and after which 
 whole companies of saints strove, was exhibited to be- 
 lievers for imitation. With the panegyrical oration in 
 praise of the saints, was soon conjoined the funeral ora- 
 tion, which is also constructed upon the Idea of Virtue, 
 land which deserves the name of an oration only when, 
 
 * De Oratore, II. p. 1J. "All panegyrics/' says Swift, "are mingled 
 w th an infusion of poppy." — Tr. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 85 
 
 through commendation of the deceased, it seeks to impel 
 the hearer to good inclinations and resolutions. Every 
 department of literature, nevertheless, has its limits, 
 where it borders upon some other ; thus this species of 
 oration, based upon the Idea of Virtue, forms the transi- 
 tion from Eloquence to the Lyrical Poem, on the one 
 hand, and to Historical Representation on the other. 
 For this reason, the greatest care is requisite in the 
 orator at this point, in order not to lose himself in one 
 or the other. It would be forgetfulness of the relations 
 in which he stands to his hearers, and, consequently, 
 contrary to morality, if, without thinking of their benefit, 
 he should give himself up entirely to his feelings, or 
 should follow out a Historical Representation ; either of 
 which may be done only so far as it contributes to the 
 attainment of an ethical end. It is difficult, I acknowl- 
 edge, for the orator to describe his hero with some good 
 degree of completeness, and still bring all under such a 
 practical point of view as that he can be sure of exert- 
 ing an influence upon the hearer. Yet the solution of 
 this problem is not impossible, as the great models 
 show. 
 
 8 
 
86 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE \ OR, 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 VIRTUE IS ALSO GOOD SENSE. 
 
 In case the orator satisfies the requisitions of duty, by 
 referring the end he has in view to the ethical Ideas of 
 the hearer, the question arises, whether this course is 
 also in accordance with good sense, or whether there 
 are not other and far more effectual means of gaining 
 entrance to men's minds, and of giving them a direction. 
 Should this be found to be the case ; should it be found 
 that the orator in reality has only to choose between 
 acting contrary to good sense, by following out moral 
 principles, or acting contrary to good morals, by follow- 
 ing out the rules of good sense ; we must then give up 
 the design of giving a systematic form to the theory of 
 Eloquence, since nothing is capable of a systematic 
 form which is either essentially incomplete in itself, or 
 stands in open contradiction to one of the fundamental 
 impulses in man, namely, the moral. But, furthermore, 
 this question itself could not even arise, if the science of 
 morals were only a little more developed than, strange 
 to say, it actually is, although man has been employed 
 in its unfolding for so many centuries. We should, in 
 that case, see that Ethics, since it includes the whole 
 conduct of man, must also furnish the means requisite to 
 attain rational ends ; that it cannot exist at all as a 
 science ; that there can be, absolutely, no conduct in 
 conformity with principles, if the same laws which pre- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEArATIjC RHETORIC. 87 
 
 scribe our actions do not, at the same time, also point 
 out the way and means whereby they will best succeed. 
 In accordance, however, with views now prevailing, we 
 hear much of good sense, as an attribute which often 
 leads aside from the path of morals', and which, in its 
 resources, shrewdly derived from experience and per- 
 sonal observation, furnishes us the surest means of 
 attaining our ends. "Whether this is so or not, I leave 
 undecided ; but that for the orator the moral action is 
 also good sense, that is, is the true way of attaining his 
 ends, is already apparent, from the investigation thus 
 far. For we have found this to be a law, namely, that 
 the orator must make his design subserve the moral 
 Ideas of his hearers, otherwise he must not attempt to 
 give them a direction. But so very much is Virtue one 
 with good sense, that this very reference to the moral 
 Ideas of the hearer is the only infallible means of giving 
 him a direction. "Will one here say, i; No ! the orator 
 must address himself to the passions of men ; he must 
 make use of them where he finds them excited ; he 
 must arouse them where he cannot pre-suppose their 
 existence, for only in this way are minds and hearts 
 swayed. Who will deny that they are not very often 
 swayed in this way, and that a practised orator, who 
 understands how to inflame. the passions, is able to get 
 the victory over a less practised orator, who aims only 
 to awaken moral Ideas?" The case, however, must 
 not be stated in this way, but we must imagine two 
 men of equal talents, one of whom takes hold of the 
 hearer in the way prescribed by us, on the side of his 
 moral Ideas, that is, on his stronger side, and the other 
 of whom endeavors to seize him on his weak side, to 
 
88 
 
 corrupt, to blind, to deceive him ; the first, I affirm, will 
 always succeed, the second will always fail. 
 
 And, indeed, for the following reasons. First, because 
 by virtue of his human nature, moral Ideas are indwell- 
 ing in every individual hearer; while, on the contrary, 
 the possession of a human nature does not imply that 
 man is controlled at all times by passion, or even that 
 he is peculiarly liable to be. Consequently, if the orator 
 presupposes the presence of passion, it is very possible 
 for him to be mistaken ; and if the orator endeavors to 
 excite passion, such an undertaking is always very 
 doubtful, since a firm point to which he can fasten is 
 wanting. This point, on the contrary, is always found, 
 and the orator is always sure to awaken interest, as 
 soon as he claims to have morality on his side. 
 
 Secondly, even supposing that the passions exist as 
 universally in the hearer as the moral Ideas, yet these 
 latter possess this advantage over the former, that they 
 are the same in all, while the passions, on the contrary, 
 are different in each individual. But the orator cannot 
 address himself to each particular individual ; one and 
 the same effect is to be produced in the most diverse 
 minds by one and the same oration. Now, how want- 
 ing in good sense would the orator be, if he should 
 neglect the universal interest grounded in human nature, 
 in order to speak of the particular interest grounded in a 
 passion which could affect only some particular mind, 
 and with respect to which the most would be cold and 
 indifferent! 
 
 In the third place, in addition to this, a very true re- 
 mark, and one that is very much to the honor of man, 
 applies here; namely, that taken singly, men may, 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 89 
 
 indeed, be full of little passions, but so soon as they are 
 collected in great masses, each one seems to give up the 
 base portion of his individuality, in order to preserve the 
 purely human in it, which is always good. When man 
 loses himself in a multitude, he is no longer the narrow- 
 hearted creature governed by desire and self-seeking; 
 but his interests melt in with those of all the others, 
 and, consequently, cannot be other than pure and noble. 
 The greater, therefore, the assemblage is, the more large- 
 minded must the orator be, or it is all over with him. 
 
 Nay, even the deception which is so often employed 
 by popular orators, proves that a direction can be im- 
 parted to men only by means of moral Ideas ; for how 
 does the orator succeed even in this case? By no 
 means by appealing to Avarice or Revenge, directly, 
 and endeavoring to inflame these passions ; for no one 
 has ever been able to carry away a great multitude by 
 this means. On the contrary, the art of the deceiver of 
 the people has ever consisted in clothing the desires 
 growing out of their particular passions in the garb of 
 requirements based upon the universal moral Ideas. 
 Thus the demagogues in the French Revolution were 
 able to bring about their great results only by concealing 
 their selfish designs under the Ideas of Justice, the Com- 
 mon Weal, that is, under moral Ideas ; and they could 
 not but succeed, for owing to the misfortune of the 
 times, there were none who were able to exhibit these 
 Ideas in their pure form with equal force. But that the 
 pure moral Ideas, when they are presented with power, 
 gain the victory, (even in the most frivolous and corrupt 
 minds,) over that false play with Ideas, the case of 
 Demosthenes proves, who beat down his opponent, not 
 
 8* 
 
90 
 
 merely by means of his massive style and his perfect 
 declamation, but mainly by means of the purity of his 
 Will, and the power of his moral Ideas. 
 
 Fourthly, it is to be remembered that every hearer is 
 by nature suspicious, particularly when he perceives 
 that the right to influence his mind is claimed, and 
 when he reflects that he should yield himself up only 
 to one who appears to him to be an honest man. It is 
 for this reason, also, that teachers of Rhetoric attach so 
 much importance to the way in which the speaker ap- 
 pears to the hearer, and to the first impression which 
 the hearer receives from the orator. But nothing is so 
 difficult as to play the honest man, and one is far more 
 readily taken for an honest man, if he really is one. 
 For the consciousness of being in the right imparts a 
 coloring to the style, and an emphasis to the tone, which 
 an evil conscience can imitate only in part, never per- 
 fectly ; and the morally bad which peers through, will 
 always induce a suspiciousness in the hearer, which 
 renders him less susceptible to influence. Hence, when 
 Rousseau advised a young and afterwards very dis- 
 tinguished French advocate, Loiseau de Mauleon, to 
 ■undertake the defence of only such causes as he was con- 
 vinced were just, this was a Rhetorical rule, for the very 
 reason that it was an Ethical rule, and adapted to pro- 
 mote, in the same degree, both integrity and eloquence.* 
 
 * " We ought to be able to persuade on opposite sides of a question ; as 
 also we ought in the case of arguing by syllogism ; not that we should 
 practise both, for it is not right to persuade to what is wrong ; but in order 
 that the bearing of the case may not escape us, and that when another 
 makes an unfair use of these reasonings we may be able to solve them. 
 The true and better side of the question is always naturally of a more easy 
 inference and has, generally speaking, a greater tendency to persuade." — 
 Aristotle's Rhetoric, B. I. c. 1. — Tr. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 91 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 OR CATEGORIES. 
 
 The orator, in this moral striving to connect his partic- 
 ular Idea with the universal and necessary Ideas of his 
 hearers, is liable to meet with obstacles of three different 
 kinds. First, there are the obscure and undeveloped 
 conceptions which the hearer forms of the nature of 
 things, whereby he may be prevented from recognizing 
 something which the orator holds out (as e. g. Duty, 
 Virtue, or Happiness,) as really being such, and so from 
 taking it up into his own Ideas. Secondly, the hearer, 
 from a defective knowledge of existing relations, and of 
 the present state of things, may be in doubt whether an 
 Idea, from which in other respects he does not dissent, 
 is practicable. Lastly, the hearer may form a different 
 opinion with respect to the actual reality of a matter to 
 which the orator would apply one of the higher Ideas, 
 or, to speak generally, may not be convinced of its real 
 historical existence. Hence arises the necessity for the 
 orator, first, to instruct the hearer in the true nature and 
 quality of things ; secondly, to make clear to him the 
 practicability of the proposed undertaking; thirdly, to 
 show him that the matter in question has been actually 
 realized, or to convince him of its historical certainty. 
 Hence arise, for the theory of Eloquence, three subordi- 
 nate Ideas, or Categories, as I would rather call them: 
 Truth, Possibility, Actuality. And here it is evident that 
 
92 > ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 moral attributes alone do not suffice for the manage- 
 ment of these Categories, but that philosophic culture, 
 and a great compass of solid knowledge, is requisite. If 
 it is asked by what right, then, we bring these Catego- 
 ries into a theory of Eloquence grounded upon ethical 
 principles, I would reply: Because the moral maxim, 
 that the orator should refer his particular Idea to the 
 universal Ideas of the hearer, can be followed out, only 
 in case the doubts, or false views of the hearer, in rela- 
 tion to the Categories, Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, 
 are removed; and this work, since it is under the guid- 
 ance of a moral principle, must also be regarded as 
 moral in its nature. And secondly, because the orator, 
 in case he did not possess the scientific culture and the 
 substantial knowledge which are requisite, would be 
 morally obliged to attain them, since they are the neces- 
 sary means, in order to the execution of a moral under- 
 taking. The orator, even if he acquires philosophic 
 culture and historical knowledge, to the full extent per- 
 mitted and required by the highest" ethi co-rhetorical prin- 
 ciples, does not thereby become a philosopher or a histo- 
 rian, but must ever be regarded as one whose sphere is 
 action, and who seeks to exert an influence externally. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 93 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE CATEGORY, TRUTH. 
 
 If we should make Truth, i. e., the exhibition of the es- 
 sential nature of a thing, the ultimate end in Eloquence, 
 Eloquence would thereby become entirely identical with 
 Philosophy. But we regard it only as a subordinate 
 Category, to which the higher moral Ideas lead. In 
 this way Eloquence maintains its ethical character, and 
 at the same time its affinity with Philosophy is ex- 
 plained. 
 
 It is therefore allowable, and oftentimes necessary, 
 for the orator to philosophize, whether the need of the 
 Truth, as such, becomes apparent only after the conflict 
 between the practical Ideas of the orator and the hearer 
 has begun, — in which case, Truth merely furnishes the 
 intermediate positions by which the former are the more 
 easily made to harmonize with the latter; or whether 
 the orator begins with the exhibition of the Truth, — -a 
 thing that may be done if it accords with the aim and 
 the circumstances of the orator, and if the moral im- 
 pulse from which it originates and the moral design for 
 which it is done, are plainly to be seen. Then this 
 impulse itself and this design will set the bounds within 
 which the Rhetorical presentation of Truth must be 
 kept, and by which it is distinguished from the Philo- 
 sophical, which aims at the mere development of Ideas 
 without reference to anything farther. 
 
94 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 The exhibition of Truth is an object of prime impor- 
 tance in sacred Eloquence, and is one of the characteris- 
 tics by which it is specially distinguished from secular 
 Eloquence. In secular Eloquence, only one deed, one 
 single resolve, is sought to be produced by the orator. 
 This determines, and of necessity limits very narrowly, 
 all that belongs to the mere development of a subject, 
 and the mere informing of the mind. The problem of the 
 sacred orator, on the contrary, is to conduct man to eter- 
 nal life through the knowledge of God and of His Son, 
 and to mould his spirit in such a way that not merely 
 one good deed, but a complete change of the inner man, 
 and a whole series of good deeds, may be the result. 
 Reflections upon human nature and its relation to God, 
 so far as they are referred back to Happiness, Virtue, 
 and Duty, are therefore perfectly in place in the sacred 
 oration. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Rhetorical presentation of Truth is 
 entirely different from the Philosophical ; for, in Philoso- 
 phy, Truth is moulded wholly, and on all sides, in a 
 statuesque manner so to speak, so that as in the case of 
 a statue, there is no particular point of view, no per- 
 spective, for it, but it . presents a perfect form to the be- 
 holder wherever he stands. In Eloquence, on the con- 
 trary, Truth appears only in a picturesque manner, and 
 in profile, so to speak, for the orator presents only so^ 
 much of it to the hearer, as is necessary to convince 
 him, and as the theme requires. While, therefore, Duty 
 commands the orator to strive after scientific culture, it 
 also bids him to forget and sacrifice all the sensible, pro- 
 found, and excellent thought he may have upon a topic, 
 if it is not indispensably necessary to the attainment of 
 his end. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIG RHETORIC. 95 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 THE RHETORICAL DEMONSTRATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 Two points, therefore, have been fixed with respect to 
 Philosophizing in Eloquence : first, that some exhibition 
 of political, ethical, and religious Truth is necessary in 
 Eloquence ; second, that this exhibition cannot be made 
 with the completeness of Philosophy. From this it fol- 
 lows, further, that the strict demonstration of a proposi- 
 tion, — L e., its derivation from the one highest principle 
 of all knowledge, — is not allowable in an oration ;* since 
 by a method of this sort, the practical aim of the oration 
 would either be destroyed entirely, or at best would only 
 faintly glimmer through. Here, therefore, arises the dif- 
 ficult question : How is Truth to be established in Elo- 
 quence, if it is not allowable to demonstrate it Philoso- 
 phically ? 
 
 In answer, it is to be noted in the first place, that 
 there are many truths which do not need such a demon- 
 stration, and to which the orator can gain the assent of 
 all hearers by a plain explication, by a happy illustra- 
 tion, by a fitting application to a circumstance in plain 
 view. 
 
 If this is not possible, then doubt respecting any par- 
 ticular truth, since it cannot be removed by means of a 
 demonstration, must be removed by means of Authority ; 
 that is, the Authority of the hearer himself or the Au- 
 
 * " To demand demonstrations from an orator, would be very much like 
 allowing a mathematician to employ persuasion." Aristotle's Ethics, Book 
 I. c. 3.— Tr. 
 
96 
 
 thority of another. And this latter, again, is either 
 human or divine. 
 
 The orator cites the Authority of the hearer himself, 
 when he shows him that, in rejecting a certain truth, he 
 stands in contradiction to himself, and to convictions to 
 which he has given expression upon other occasions. 
 This species of argument, which, from its brevity and 
 convincing power, has such a great advantage over phi- 
 losophical demonstrations, is to be strongly recommended 
 to the orator, and in order to be able to apply it with 
 success, he must have the views and opinions of the 
 general mass constantly in view, and as much as possi- 
 ble must enter into them. Herein, I believe, partly con- 
 sists the popularizing power so highly praised, and 
 always required, in the orator. I am not afraid that the 
 orator, in thus constantly referring to the innate convic- 
 tions of his hearers, will find that which is false and 
 degrading. It would indeed be degrading to proceed 
 from an Ideal which the orator himself regards as ab- 
 surd, for the sake of pleasing the hearer ; but why are 
 the opinions diffused among the mass of men to be 
 regarded as false and absurd, as a matter of course ? 
 On the contrary, is it not an essential characteristic of 
 the human understanding that the truth can never utterly 
 die out of it, but that a portion of it is ever preserved 
 pure and genuine ? And why should not the orator 
 present what he has to say, in this form, rather than in 
 a systematic argument? Since, morever, the freedom 
 of the hearer must be respected, it will be respected far 
 more if I mould him, so to speak, from within outward, 
 and by means of the development which I impart to his 
 own Ideas, than if I lace him up in a system foreign to 
 him. And I shall have less reason for attempting this 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 97 
 
 last, because, by joining on upon his own inward con- 
 viction, I can with less difficulty gain him over to a salu- 
 tary truth ; and because, on the contrary, the finest 
 philosophical explication would perhaps only weary him 
 and render him indifferent to his own true well-being, 
 and the practical aim of my oration. Hence, if an 
 orator in the expression of his Ideas, seeks to please 
 himself simply, and for this reason forgets his hearers 
 and the end which he has or should have in view, I 
 affirm that this is not only contrary to good sense, since 
 he can never in this way attain his end, but it is also 
 contrary to morality ; it is reprehensible self-seeking. 
 And the evidence that it is contrary to morality, is found 
 in the very fact, that it defeats his undertaking. For 
 the orator, with all his powers, is now in the Ethical 
 domain, and consequently, that which aids these powers 
 must be morally good, and that which thwarts them 
 must be morally bad. The distinctive character there- 
 fore, of oratorical discourse, is Popularity^ using the term 
 in its highest sense ; and the orator is to join on upon 
 the truth as it exists among the mass of the people, and 
 to esteem the general form in which he finds it here, 
 more highly than that particular form which he has 
 given to it in his philosophical system. 
 
 If, however, there should be no one among the Ideas 
 of the hearer which the orator can employ as the basis 
 of his argumentation, then, since a scientific investiga- 
 tion is entirely forbidden him, he must betake himself to 
 human or divine Authority. And, indeed, nothing is 
 more frequent than the employment of the former of 
 these in speeches upon legal cases and affairs of state. 
 If the orator thinks that the enlivenment of the ethical 
 Ideas of the judge is not sufficient in order to obtain 
 
98 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 from him the desired decision, he cites the Authority of 
 the law; and if an opinion which is being maintained 
 is not in accordance with the conceptions of a political 
 assemblage, it must then be shown that, in a similar 
 case, a statesman of acknowledged wisdom thought or 
 spoke in the very same way. 
 
 To sacred Eloquence, in particular, Authority, and 
 indeed a divine Authority, is so necessary, that this 
 species of Eloquence would not have arisen, and, even 
 now, cannot exist, without it. The highest of all truths, 
 those pertaining to the relation of God to man, are here 
 presented to view, in order to serve as a guide to man 
 in his striving after happiness, and as motives to sancti- 
 fication. Even granting, what, however, is not to be 
 granted, that these truths can be reached by philosophic 
 deduction alone, yet this method is not to be followed 
 by the orator ; for, although knowledge, indeed, might 
 be imparted in this way, yet all the practical benefits of 
 knowledge would be lost, or, at best, would be but scan- 
 tily reaped. Furthermore, neither the Authority of the 
 hearer, nor that of any man whatever, is a sufficient 
 foundation upon which to base truths of such impor- 
 tance, and which lie entirely beyond the ordinary field 
 of view. They need, therefore, a divine Authority, when 
 they are employed in public discourse, to promote the 
 sanctification and blessedness of men. It was for this 
 reason that, among the Ancients, who were destitute of 
 a positive Revelation, not even a purely moral Elo- 
 quence could be developed along with political Elo- 
 quence, notwithstanding the high degree of excellence 
 which characterizes their ethical systems, and that a re- 
 ligio-moral Eloquence did not appear until Christianity 
 appeared. This species of Eloquence rises and sets 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 99 
 
 according as faith in a divine Revelation grows stronger 
 or weaker ; and, from "the very nature of the case, in 
 proportion as the sacred orator loses the conviction of 
 the divine Authority of the Bible, his Eloquence, also, 
 must lose in power and dignity. Let one imagine to 
 himself a pulpit orator endowed with the finest talents, 
 but who places his own individual reason not beneath, 
 but above Revelation, and who, consequently, in deter- 
 mining the relations which God sustains to man, and 
 which men should sustain to each other, can appeal to 
 no higher divine Authority. If the predominant bent of 
 his mind is philosophic, he will make it his principal 
 business to exhibit, to explain, and, as far as possible, to 
 demonstrate, the principles of his religious and ethical 
 systems. Now, passing over the objection to such an 
 undertaking, that it is ordinarily not suited to the aver- 
 age degree of culture in a promiscuous assembly, I ask 
 what, at most, can be the result, even supposing that 
 the hearer rightly apprehends all the views of the 
 speaker ? Scientific culture, indeed ; but the improve- 
 ment of the heart and life of the hearer, and not scien- 
 tific culture, was the design of the orator, and he must 
 miss of this, since his whole time has been taken up in 
 the endeavor to establish certain truths, and none is left, 
 to connect them with the higher practical Ideas of the 
 hearer. He will, perhaps, attempt to do this in the con- 
 clusion ; but if the whole of the oration, up to the 
 conclusion, has not been planned with the design to 
 awaken moral interest, the orator will in vain labor after 
 this in the application of his discourse. 
 
 Furthermore, it seems to me that one can never have 
 so firm and unshaken confidence in the religious and 
 practical views which he derives from a human system, 
 
100 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 be it his own or another's, as in those truths which, 
 having acknowledged a Revelation, he receives on its 
 Authority. Hence, there will always be in the minds of 
 pulpit orators who are sceptical respecting a Revelatiotij 
 a certain embarrassment, scarcely perceived by them- 
 selves, which will betray itself in their presentation of 
 truth, now by a cold, indifferent tone, now by unnatural 
 effort and distorted zeal ; and thus the truths presented 
 by them, however excellent they may be, will never 
 acquire the influence over the feelings and the will which 
 a calmer, more powerful emphasis would have imparted. 
 But what carries this embarrassment to the highest 
 pitch, and must, in the utmost degree, weaken the 
 Rhetorical power of a pulpit orator in the exhibition of 
 truth, is the obscure feeling which will certainly press 
 upon him, that, considering the relation which he sus- 
 tains to his hearer, there is something contrary to up- 
 rightness in such a way of thinking ; and this not 
 merely because he is acting contrary to the designs of 
 the State and the Church, who have appointed him to 
 proclaim, not his own individual and human opinions, 
 but divine truth, — although this seems to me to be a 
 very well-founded scruple, — but principally because his 
 office invests him with a dignity and respect which 
 must appear as unwarrantable assumption in the case 
 of every one who does not found his teaching on divine 
 Authority. It is true, indeed, that when a man appears 
 before other men, in order to prosecute the guilty, or 
 defend the innocent, or to propose measures for the 
 common weal, he needs no impulse from above, and no 
 divine Authority, in order to do this. But it is difficult 
 to understand how a man, with no basis but his own 
 strength alone and not regarding himself as the ambas- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 101 
 
 sador of a higher being, can dare to point out to his 
 fellow-men, this, as the road to salvation, and that, as 
 the road to perdition, and now, to urge them on by the 
 prospect of the punishment and retributions of a future 
 world, and now, to hold them back. He can acquire 
 the right to do this only through a wisdom and virtue 
 higher than human ; and who will venture to ascribe 
 these perfections to himself? The higher the degree in 
 which he does really possess them, the greater, it seems 
 to me, must be his dread of being made vain, even in 
 his feelings, by appearing in public. Moreover, he sees 
 among his hearers persons who are his equals in moral 
 and scientific culture, or, it may be, his superiors. Feel- 
 ing as if, in this case, it would be unbecoming to seize 
 with a strong grasp upon their minds, he seeks to say to 
 his little public only what is pathetic, agreeable and 
 entertaining ; and if he describes a vice, he gives them 
 to understand that he does not suspect any one of his 
 hearers, but has in his eye certain other persons who are 
 out of their circle. Emotion is everything for him, and 
 the awakening of feeling that comes to nothing ; he 
 seeks to be brilliant by means of external attractions and 
 an ornamental style ;* and thus his discourses are de- 
 prived of power and usefulness by his scepticism. 
 
 Let one, on the contrary, imagine to himself a sacred 
 orator of less talent, but who, to a sincere will to do 
 good, joins an unshaken belief in the truths of the 
 Christian religion ; and let him see what a higher eleva- 
 tion and sweep his discourses will receive from this 
 single circumstance. While he derives the sublimest 
 truths from the Holy Scriptures, where they are given to 
 
 * Un clerc mondain on irreligieux, s'il monte en chaire, est declamateur. — 
 La Bruydre. 
 
 9* 
 
102 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 him in the clearest, most popular form, he is, at the same 
 time, through the divine Authority of the Bible, raised 
 above all prolix developments and arguments, and with- 
 out troubling himself about them, can apply his whole 
 power to directly impressing the minds of his hearers. 
 The truths exhibited by him will be the more readily 
 believed, since he himself speaks only because he be- 
 lieves, and since his firm inward conviction gives an 
 equally calm and moving emphasis to his tone, before 
 which all doubt must disappear. With all the humility 
 produced by a sense of the weakness of the human 
 reason, as well as of his own moral deficiencies, he yet 
 feels that, without assumption, he may address instruc- 
 tion, rebuke, and exhortation to his equals, nay, to those 
 better and wiser than himself, since he speaks to them, 
 not in his own, but in God's name ; and since as an 
 ambassador of the Highest, he is raised above every one, 
 be he who he may. Since, therefore, the design of the 
 sacred orator to lead to Virtue and Happiness through 
 the knowledge of the truth, is to be attained only through 
 his belief in Revelation ; and since without this, the 
 relation which he sustains to his hearers has not even a 
 moral validity, it is plain that belief in Revelation in his 
 case must not only be regarded as a religious character- 
 istic, but as a moral excellence also, and should be 
 strictly required in him. It is in this connection the 
 more mournful to notice, that so many, from a ground- 
 less fear of giving displeasure by recognizing a divine 
 Authority, either conceal their belief in it altogether, or 
 else give only timid utterance to it, and thereby deprive 
 their discourses of power, dignity, usefulness, and conse- 
 quently in the end of the approbation of the public also. 
 To him who is animated by the lofty desire of rival- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC 103 
 
 ling the political Eloquence of the Greeks, and of speak- 
 ing from the pulpit with Demosthenean power, I would 
 say " Science, Learning, Style, Delivery, these all ren- 
 der easier the practice of Eloquence, but do not make 
 the orator. Demosthenes became an orator through the 
 greatness and solidity of his character, and these quali- 
 ties are indispensable to you, too, in order to the attain- 
 ment of your aim ; but they are not all you need. 
 Though the greatest perfection attainable here were 
 yours, yet you are not free from human weakness, and 
 who gives you the right to proclaim salvation or dam- 
 nation to your brethren, who are not worse than your- 
 self? This difficulty you will feel; you will not ven- 
 ture to speak to them with power; you will be com- 
 pelled to content yourself with exciting their emotions, 
 or enriching their stores of information with new views ; 
 you will perhaps, for a time, be listened to with applause 
 by a mixed assembly ; but the abiding, eternal renown, 
 the salutary, ever-onward-rolling influence of your efforts, 
 is gone. You are weak and fearful so long as you 
 would rest upon yourself; dare to regard yourself as the 
 organ of a higher Being, and you are all power and all 
 courage. Faith plants you firm and sure ; your teach- 
 ing is no longer that of the Pharisees, unmeaning sound, 
 and useless hair-splitting ; you teach with power, like 
 Jesus himself, for he spake the words of His Father, and 
 you speak His. Appropriate each and every one of His 
 words, as well as those which His Spirit gave to Hi's 
 Apostles; but take them in the very sense in which 
 they take them. You do not believe it now, but your 
 own experience will soon teach you, that in the doc- 
 trines of our religion lies hidden all the power of sacred 
 Eloquence." 
 
104 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 Would that many might understand me, and through 
 Eloquence be led to Christianity ! A great honor for 
 Eloquence, and a glorious gain for Christianity! For 
 were it not as well and fitting to attain to Christian 
 faith through Eloquence, as by the ordinary way of 
 adversity and suffering ? 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 105 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 m 
 THE CATEGORIES, POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY. 
 
 As the higher Rhetorical Ideas lead the orator to the 
 Category Truth, u e., to the exhibition of the nature 
 of a thing, they also frequently demand the proof of 
 the possibility and actual existence of a thing. And 
 hence, in addition to Truth, Possibility and Actuality 
 come into view as subordinate Rhetorical Ideas, or 
 Categories. 
 
 The Idea of Possibility is employed in a special man- 
 ner in the oration before deliberative bodies. In this 
 case, however apparent the benefits are that accrue from 
 the execution of the proposed undertaking, yet the cour- 
 age of the hearer often falls on reflecting how difficult 
 the undertaking is, and his indolence intrenches itself, so 
 to speak, behind the objection that it is impossible. 
 This objection must be removed, and the orator must 
 show clearly the practicability of his proposition. As 
 the hindrances which seem to stand in his way disappear, 
 one after another, the ethical Idea in the hearer acquires 
 vitality and force, and begins to impel him to action. 
 Demosthenes would have employed all ethical motives 
 in vain, in order to incite the Athenians to resist Philip, 
 if he had not also, at the same time, made clear to them 
 the practicability of his proposition, and the Possibility 
 of success. We see what an amount of solid knowl- 
 edge is requisite in the orator, how he must have 
 
106 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 thoroughly examined all the relations of the State, and 
 have calculated all its resources, in order to acquit him- 
 self well in respect to this point. It does not belong to 
 my plan to mention all the cases which the Idea of Pos- 
 sibility includes ; and I content myself with remarking, 
 in accordance with my main design, that this Idea, how- 
 ever weighty and important it may be, is yet subordinate 
 to the ethical Idea of State Weal. For only through 
 this is the orator led to the consideration of the Possi- 
 bility of a thing; and he can have no finer impelling 
 motive to attain all the knowledge requisite for this, 
 than that love of country by which he is inspired. 
 
 Moreover, this Idea is found in sacred Eloquence, also. 
 Those acquainted with the human heart know how often 
 we endeavor to quiet our conscience, when it brings to 
 our notice our neglected duties, by the excuse that it 
 was impossible for us to perform them. Hence, it is not 
 enough for the orator to recommend a particular action 
 as belonging to an ethically perfect course of conduct ; 
 he must so understand mankind generally, and the con- 
 dition of society around him, as to be able to enter into 
 an examination of all their relations, and to show that 
 that which he advocates, is, in the highest degree, 
 adapted to their relations. In this way, the high relig- 
 ious Ideas are taken out of their abstract and universal 
 forms, and put into the concrete and definite forms of 
 human life ; and nothing imparts a more active life to 
 the Ideas of the hearer, than this full unfolding of them, 
 and nothing seizes more powerfully upon his mind. 
 But a strong will is needed on the part, of the orator, in 
 order to compel the very same spirit which has soared 
 up to the highest objects of thought, to descend suddenly 
 to the minutest detail of human life, without thereby 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 107 
 
 losing its fire and elasticity. Few are able to do this, and 
 hence, since it is easier, the orator often deems it more 
 befitting to roam about among abstract and formless 
 Ideas. 
 
 The category of Actuality is of peculiar importance in- 
 the judicial oration ; for although the sentence of the law 
 respecting a particular act, that of murder, e. g\, is not a 
 matter of doubt in the least, yet the act itself sometimes 
 is, and its actuality can be affirmed or denied. Here the 
 wide field of narrative-proof and statement opens to the 
 orator, — a part of Rhetoric upon which the issue of a 
 cause depends and which the Ancients consequently cul- 
 tivated with great care. Yet, however important it may 
 be, the ethical Idea of Civil Law presides over it; without 
 this Idea, the question respecting the actuality of a thing, 
 would not arise in Eloquence, and it must ever be kept 
 in view as the last goal to which the narrative-statement 
 tends. Hence no objection against the ethical principle 
 laid down by us as the foundation of Eloquence, can b.e 
 brought from the fact that the historical element pre- 
 dominates in this species of oration ; for the oration, be- 
 fore the court, still remains a moral procedure, in accord- 
 ance with the Idea of positive Law, although this latter 
 leads directly to the notion and exhibition of the Actu- 
 ality of a thing. 
 
 This subordinate Idea is also found in sacred as well 
 as in political Eloquence. In this department it exists in 
 very close connection with the category Truth, the latter 
 category very commonly leading to the former. For it is 
 a peculiarity of Christianity that it establishes the truth, 
 not by means of demonstration, but by means of facts; 
 as, e. g\, the love of God, by the sacrifice of His Son, 
 immortality, by the resurrection of Christ. If these facta 
 
108 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 are doubted, they must be shown to be actual by means 
 of a historical examination of witnesses. Such investi- 
 gations are of the greatest interest, because the Truth 
 established thereby stands in such close connection with 
 the highest practical Ideas; with Duty, Happiness and 
 Virtue. Furthermore, to this category belong those pas- 
 sages, whether in political or sacred oratory, in which the 
 quality of a person, or a thing, is described, in order to 
 apply to it one of the higher Ideas. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 109 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE PLAN AND DIVISION OF AN ORATION. 
 
 By laying down the Rhetorical Ideas and Categories, 
 we have, as it were, measured off the domain of Elo- 
 quence, and found the materiel on which it labors. By 
 contemplating, therefore, these Ideas in their first move- 
 ment, we also become acquainted with the Form, in its 
 most general features, which the Rhetorical matSriel as- 
 sumes. This is the doctrine of the Plan and Division of 
 an oration, respecting which, ordinarily, very good and 
 correct, but for the most part merely logical, rules are 
 given, which, consequently, relate only to the Form; 
 teaching, it is true, how to distinguish the good from the 
 bad in the Form, but not pointing out the way to find the 
 former, and avoid the latter. We wish here to unite both, 
 and to investigate this materiel, not only in a formal, but 
 also in a real manner. We must needs succeed, since we 
 conceive of Eloquence as a procedure according to Ideas, 
 in which Ideas the Matter as well as the Form of that 
 which is to be produced, is contained ; and since, conse- 
 quently, we never separate the Form from the Matter, and 
 are, therefore, enabled to determine on this theory, not 
 only how the division is to be made, but also, tuhat is to 
 be divided. 
 
 Let us, therefore, imagine to ourselves a man who pos- 
 sesses the ability to bring out ethical Ideas into his con- 
 sciousness, in great power and vitality, and who is ani- 
 mated with the desire to represent these Ideas in actual 
 life, or rather to mould the Actual into conformity with 
 
 10 
 
110 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 these Ideas. Such an one can employ, for this purpose, 
 no other means than the Ideas themselves, and their ex- 
 pression in language ; and he knows that his undertaking 
 will succeed only in case he is not subservient to the 
 passions of his hearer, but rather subjects himself to the 
 Ideas of the hearer, — to that which is Highest and Best 
 in him. He, therefore, brings his hearer before his mind, 
 at first with merely the main features of his ethical na- 
 ture, and with those requisitions which every man imposes 
 upon himself, — viz., to fulfil his Duty, to form himself to 
 Virtue, to lay a foundation for Happiness. When he 
 addresses members of the State or Church, he conceives 
 these Ideas in the particular form given to them by each 
 of these relations. Every citizen, the political orator pre- 
 supposes, desires to have Law and Justice administered, 
 the Common Weal promoted, and to acquire personal 
 Merit; every Christian, the sacred orator presupposes, 
 desires to fulfil the Law of God, to raise himself to Like- 
 ness with Him, and to become capable of Eternal Bless- 
 edness. That these Ideas are leading Ideas in each and 
 every hearer, the orator presupposes ; but even if he is 
 mistaken, even if no one of them, in any one of the above 
 specified forms, exists in the hearers, — a thing which we 
 affirm to be impossible, — still this confident presupposi- 
 tion would be the best means by which to generate them ; 
 for in proportion as men are assumed to be better than 
 they are, and are so treated, do they become better than 
 they are. 
 
 When the orator has thus brought the hearer before 
 him, he will find it adapted to his purpose, either to refer 
 the particular Idea of his oration to one only of the 
 above-mentioned Ideas, be it one of the higher or subordi- 
 nate, or else to connect it with several of them. The 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. Ill 
 
 orations constructed in the former way, I would denomi- 
 ., nate simple ; those in the latter, complex. In the simple 
 oration, Happiness, or Virtue, or Duty, is the predominat- 
 ing Idea ; or else Truth, or Possibility, or Actuality, 
 shaped and moulded by one of these former. In the com- 
 plex oration, Truth, e.g., takes the lead, and Virtue and 
 Happiness follow ; or whatever may be the order found 
 best adapted to the particular Idea of the oration, and to 
 the relations peculiar to it. 
 
 And now the orator makes a perfectly simple and natu- 
 ral beginning, by specifying his general design, and des- 
 ignating the Ideas or Categories, whether one or more, 
 to' which he intends to refer. This, and nothing more 
 than this, is the Exordium. Its distinguishing character- 
 istics are clearness and plainness. The orator announces 
 the contest to the hearer, and tells him at what point he 
 intends to attack him ; and the hearer can well engage in 
 it, because the fight is with honorable weapons, and the 
 advantage is always on the side of the vanquished. 
 
 Since, among the Ancients, the subject upon which the 
 orator wished to speak was usually known to the hearers, 
 the Exordium, so far as it contained an announcement of 
 the subject, must naturally be very brief; and it became 
 more extended only when the orator wished to present 
 himself in a more advantageous light in the existing cir- 
 cumstances, or to remove certain prejudices respecting 
 himself personally, which might hinder his success. This 
 advantage, arising from the hearer's being acquainted 
 with the subject, and from a set occasion, is afforded to 
 the sacred orator by the Festival days in the Christian 
 Church, and also, to some extent, at least, by the Scrip- 
 ture text. For this, provided it is rightly selected, already 
 contains the particular Idea of the orator, which needs 
 
112 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 only a slight explanation, in order to spring forth from it 
 into plain view. Moreover, the text is often interwoven 
 with the circumstances and relations to which it was ap- 
 plied at the time of its first utterance, and the orator 
 needs only to realize them to himself, in order to discover 
 the same or similar relations in the present time, upon 
 which it shall exert its influence. Since, therefore, the 
 text specifics not only the Idea, but also the environment 
 in which it is to unfold itself, this important advantage 
 enables the sacred orator to abridge his exordium, es- 
 pecially as he does not need, like the political orator, to 
 fill it out with assurances that his purposes are pure. For, 
 in the first place, the whole drift and connection of his 
 sermon, and still more of his life, is the best evidence of 
 this ; and, in the second place, since he ever appears as 
 the ambassador of a higher Being, and never in his own 
 name, it is not befitting in him to be anxiously careful 
 about himself. That which so often lengthens out the 
 Exordium is the undue employment of the subordinate 
 Categories ; the exhibition of the Truth or the Actuality 
 of a thing, e. g\, — the orator, with the design of interest- 
 ing, addressing himself to man's mere desire for knowl- 
 edge, without regard to the demands of his moral nature. 
 I cannot favor this method, and believe that it may be 
 followed only in rare instances. For, in the first place, 
 time is in this way spent in merely paving the way for the 
 Idea, which might be better employed in the development 
 of the Idea itself. In the second place, the preliminary 
 statements by which the orator would prepare the way for 
 the theme, are often as remote from the minds of the 
 hearers as the theme itself, so that he might just as well 
 employ this as to introduce the former. Finally, in the 
 third place, since the mere desire for knowledge is, or 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 113 
 
 should be, subordinate to the moral interest, the orator 
 can hardly fail to interest the hearer in his main Idea, if 
 he connects it immediately with one of the higher moral 
 Ideas, — a thing that can be done without a long circum- 
 locution. 
 
 At the end of the Introduction, the orator may an- 
 nounce the two or three parts which contain the develop- 
 ment proper ; for why should he not carefully employ this, 
 as well as every other opportunity, to aid the hearer's at- 
 tention, and io facilitate his comprehension of the whole ? 
 If the hearer is compelled to stretch his power of atten- 
 tion too much, he either slackens it altogether, or else the 
 effect of the oration is exerted on the cognitive powers 
 alone, and not on the will, which, for the orator's pur- 
 poses, is tantamount to no effect at all. 
 
 If we do not find this practice observed in the orations 
 of the Ancients, or any announcement of the Plan and 
 Division, this may proceed from two reasons. First, the 
 method to which they were obliged to accommodate 
 themselves, was prescribed to them by the occasion on 
 which they spoke, far more than is the case with the sacred 
 orator, and since this method, especially in the instance 
 of the orator before a court, was almost always one and 
 the same, it seemed unnecessary to announce it formally. 
 Secondly, — and this appears to me to be the chief rea- 
 son, — such a formal statement of the Plan would have 
 been evidence of study and previous preparation, the ap- 
 pearance of which they avoided as carefully as they 
 sought to maintain that of extemporizing. For they had 
 to deal with a suspicious audience who would have at- 
 tributed such previous preparation only to the design to 
 deceive. But the case is different with the sacred orator, 
 who may allow the diligence which he has bestowed with 
 
 10* 
 
114 
 
 OR, 
 
 an honest intention to continually appear in his oration, 
 since he will thereby excite in the hearer only the expec- 
 tation of a mass of information all the more fundamental 
 for this. If, however, the sacred orator would, for any 
 reason, omit the formal mention of the grounds of his 
 oration, of the plan which he has sketched for himself, he 
 is free to do so ; for though, indeed, it is absolutely nec- 
 essary that he endeavor to arrange his thoughts in the 
 clearest and best manner, it is not absolutely necessary 
 that he specify beforehand how he has arranged them. 
 
 But what is the principle upon which the Division of 
 an oration should proceed? Beginning with the simple 
 oration, this contains as many heads as there are princi- 
 pal positions, by which the leading design of the orator 
 is connected with one of the higher, or one of the subor- 
 dinate Ideas, as the case may be. In the sermon of 
 Reinhardt, e. g\, entitled, " The worthy celebration of the 
 Sacrament is a source of the noblest enjoyment," the 
 leading design of the orator is referred solely to the Idea 
 of Happiness, and is connected with it by the following 
 positions : The worthy celebration of the Holy Sacra- 
 ment affords us a view of our Redeemer in the most af- 
 fecting greatness of his character; it wakens us to the 
 consciousness of the highest of vocations ; it fills us with 
 the feeling of the highest of fellowships ; it makes us alive 
 to the most blessed of all hopes. If Duty is the single 
 predominant Idea, the oration divides into as many heads 
 as there are principal positions employed by the orator, 
 to make it apparent that the state of mind, or course of 
 conduct, recommended by him, is a Duty. If Virtue is 
 the predominant Idea, the oration may be divided accord- 
 ing to the different motives existing for the practice of a 
 particular Virtue, or according to the different character- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 115 
 
 istic marks by which the particular Virtue is made to 
 melt in, and become one, with the universal Idea of 
 Virtue. 
 
 But the simple oration may also be constructed accord- 
 ing to one of the subordinate Ideas, — Truth, Possibility, 
 Actuality, — provided only its connection with the higher 
 Ideas is, from the very beginning, clearly and definitely 
 established. To illustrate : the false notions which Chris- 
 tians form of Divine Providence, or of the efficacy of 
 Prayer, stand in the way of their religious and moral de- 
 velopment; from this point of view, instruction respect- 
 ing Providence and the efficacy of Prayer, acccording to 
 the Idea or Category of Truth, may be the only object 
 of the oration. Yet, such instruction should not degen- 
 erate into a complete treatise on these subjects, but the 
 orator should bring forward, in his refutation or indoc- 
 trination, that only which is specially important in prac- 
 tical respects. 
 
 In a political oration, the whole may be referred to the 
 Idea of Possibility, in order to show that the proposition 
 in question, which confessedly promotes the Common- 
 Weal, is also practicable. The same may be done in 
 sacred oratory, in order to weaken the force of excuses for 
 commiting a fault, derived from the impossibility of 
 avoiding it ; or for neglecting a virtue from the impossibil- 
 ity of practising it. It is evident, moreover, that in this 
 case the orator should combat those objections only, 
 which the hearer actually makes, or, at least, may easily 
 make. The positive reasons, on the other hand, for the 
 practice of the Virtue then divide off into main masses 
 by themselves which form the parts of the oration. 
 
 In like manner, also, the Idea of Actuality, referred to 
 one of the higher Ideas, may be the predominant Idea in 
 
116 
 
 OR, 
 
 an oration, as is most commonly the case before a court 
 of justice. Here, the different proofs that a thing has or 
 has not happened, fall into several classes, and these are 
 the parts of the oration. The old Rhetoricians, however, 
 give us information on this, with a minuteness of detail 
 which leaves nothing to be desired. In the sacred ora- 
 tion, also, Actuality may be the sole predominant Idea ; 
 first, when the orator wishes to prove a disputed fact be- 
 longing to sacred history ; and, secondly, when he would 
 sketch a picture of an important personage or fact, that 
 shall be fruitful in practical application. In the first in- 
 stance, he will maintain such a particular fact, not against 
 skepticism in general, but against the doubts of his con- 
 temporaries only ; he will not therefore take into view the 
 objections of former times, but those only that are peculiar 
 to their time ; he will make a selection, accordingly, from 
 the mass of proofs which are at his command, and these 
 are easily divided, according to their intrinsic character, 
 into certain classes and divisions. In the second instance, 
 the orator brings into notice those qualities and charac- 
 teristics of a person or a thing which are most congruous 
 with the practical Idea, which guides the whole oration. 
 Thus, Actuality is the single predominant Idea in the 
 sermon of Reinhardt upon " The characteristics of the 
 Church of Christ as seen in its origin ;" and he describes 
 this origin as pure in its sources, miraculous in its circum- 
 stances, noble in its aim, benificent in its consequences. 
 
 A peculiarity not so much in the manner of the division 
 itself, as in the way of announcing it, is found in the 
 French orators, especially in Massillon. When, namely, it 
 is their principal business to combat the erroneous notions 
 of their hearers, — and any one of the above-mentioned 
 predominant Ideas may lead to this, although the three 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. lit 
 
 higher less often than the three subordinate ; in such cases, 
 I say, they are wont to announce, not those correct views 
 which they wish to unfold, but the erroneous ones which 
 they wish to combat. It is apparent that it amounts to 
 the same thing in the end ; for the employment of this 
 mode presupposes that the orator has divided the errors 
 and their contrary truths into equal and correlative masses, 
 and hence it makes no difference which of the two he an- 
 nounces specifically. There is always, however, some- 
 thing hazardous in this mode of proceeding, since it is 
 easier to bring truths of which the speaker is himself 
 thoroughly convinced, into a sure and certain connection, 
 than the errors and doubts current among the multitude; 
 and if the orator has not so arranged these as that the 
 threads of a full development of the truth can be wound 
 upon them, he will not combat them with success. The 
 want of connection, and the breaks, so frequently to be 
 noticed in Massillon's sermons, are perhaps to be attrib- 
 uted to this manner of arranging the parts of an oration, 
 which became an almost uniform habit with him ; hence 
 only the practised and skilful orator, and he only rarely, 
 should make use of this manner. It is always safest for 
 the orator to present in the very outset his own conviction, 
 having some reference however to prevalent errors, and 
 to combat these only when they come up of themselves 
 in the development of his own thoughts. 
 
 But the complex oration, in which several Ideas are 
 placed beside each other in equal importance, is of more 
 frequent occurrence than the simple oration, of the divis- 
 ion of which we have been speaking. It is apparent, at 
 the first. glance, that this species of oration conducts, with 
 much more force and certainty, to the end in view, than 
 the other. For, if the orator brings his leading Idea int^ 
 
118 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 connection with those of the hearer, only on one side, it 
 is very possible for him to fail in the attempt to show its 
 identity with them. In order to win over the hearer com- 
 pletely, the orator must lead him continually to one and 
 the same goal from several points; the orator's Idea, if I 
 may be allowed the expression, must continue to wind 
 around the Idea of the hearer until it has become com- 
 pletely incorporated with it. 
 
 It is evident, now, that the complex oration has as 
 many parts as there are predominant Ideas in it ; and each 
 one of these parts, again, may be regarded as a simple 
 oration, and be divided according to the same rules, so 
 that that which forms a main division in the simple ora- 
 tion, becomes a subdivision in the complex. A common 
 method, here, is to begin with the Category of Truth or 
 Actuality, in order to throw due light over the subject of 
 which the orator would treat, and then, in order to waken 
 a higher interest, to follow up with the Idea of Virtue, 
 Happiness, or Duty. This is the almost too uniform 
 mode of division, when the orator speaks, first, of the na- 
 ture, and, secondly, of the effects. But unless the Cate- 
 gories Truth and Actuality are handled by a very skil- 
 ful master, discourse based upon them often becomes 
 somewhat cold and tedious, and the hearer remains indif- 
 ferent towards a subject of which the orator indeed gives 
 right conceptions, but the relation of which to the higher 
 demands of his moral nature he does not make plain to 
 him. Or else the orator, conscious himself of this cold- 
 ness and dryness, allows himself to be led into the error 
 of interweaving into this part of his oration those higher 
 means of moving his hearers which should not be em- 
 ployed until later ; and in this way he oversteps the limits 
 which he has prescribed for himself, and anticipates the 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 119 
 
 contents of the divisions which are to follow, which he is 
 now unable to fill out. Instead, therefore, of placing Truth 
 and Actuality in an equal rank with the higher ethical 
 Ideas, it may often be more suitable to subordinate them 
 to these ; to make Happiness, Duty, or Virtue, principal 
 parts, and to insert the representation of Truth and Ac- 
 tuality only when the need of it becomes plainly apparent 
 in the course of the development of those higher Ideas. 
 But, again, there are some subjects in which the Idea of 
 Truth or Actuality has such a decided preponderance, 
 that the orator must make it predominant throughout his 
 oration, and must interweave what he has to say respect- 
 ing Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, in the individual devel- 
 opments of the True or the Actual. 
 
 In this way, the six Rhetorical Ideas are associated 
 with each other in an order and interchange the most 
 manifold. The counter-action which the orator expects 
 from the hearer, determines him to begin now with this 
 and now with that Idea, and to follow up with the others, 
 thus or so ; and hence no universal rule can be laid down 
 regarding a Plan of this sort, since existing circumstances 
 and relations have so great influence upon it. The Plan 
 is, in fact, a resolution which the moral powers form, and 
 which is shaped by the peculiar occasions and induce- 
 ments which lead to it. 
 
 The course and movement of Ideas in a great orator 
 animates to a similar pregnant and powerful movement 
 in the auditor, in the same way that the example of the 
 hero animates to virtue. Demosthenes, e. g\, in the first 
 oration against Philip, begins with the Category of Pos- 
 sibility; he shows how a more fortunate issue may be 
 expected in the case of further expeditions ; and as he pro- 
 ceeds, the doubts of his hearers vanish, their breasts swell, 
 
120 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 and fill with heart and hope. But the orator does not 
 stop with considerations of a general nature; he goes into 
 detail, and lays before the people a circumstantial plan of 
 all that is to be done. In this way he satisfies the under- 
 standings of his hearers, elevates their minds, and renders 
 them open to the higher Ideas of State-weal, and of Civic 
 Merit, by which they are now carried captive at the will 
 of the orator. But there is no course and movement of 
 Ideas of such irresistible power as the one in the oration 
 for Ctesiphon,in which, in accordance with the Category 
 of Possibility, it is first shown that the speaker could not 
 by any possibility have foreseen the issue of the battle at 
 Chseronea, and then the Idea of Virtue follows w T ith a 
 startling rapidity, — the orator affirming that, even if he 
 had foreseen all, he should nevertheless have given no dif- 
 ferent counsel. The well-known division of Cicero's ora- 
 tion for Milo, according to the Ideas of Actuality and 
 Legality, has some resemblance to the wonderful method 
 of this oration of Demosthenes. 
 
 In the oration of Demosthenes upon the affairs of the 
 Chersonesus, the Idea of Public Advantage is not con- 
 nected, but entangled, with that of Civil Law, in a highly 
 singular manner. For, while according to the former 
 he shows that the army which Diopeithes commanded in 
 that country, should not be disbanded, he, at the same 
 time, according to the latter, exculpates their general 
 with respect to the acts of violence with which he was 
 charged, — a procedure to which he was probably com- 
 pelled "by the circumstances of the case, and which he 
 carries through with extraordinary self-confidence, but 
 which I would recommend no one to imitate, since, of 
 Ideas thus entangled, the one commonly would be prej- 
 udicial to the other. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 121 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 FIRST FEATURES TOWARDS A SKETCH OF THE ORATOR. 
 
 It has been remarked, respecting the science of Mor- 
 als, that there are three points from which it may be 
 contemplated, and that a complete philosophic presenta- 
 tion of it is rendered possible only by connecting these 
 different views. Morals, in the first place, may be re- 
 garded as the enumeration of all those commandments 
 derived from the one highest law, by which the will 
 ought to be directed, and of the duties imposed by them. 
 Secondly, the question may arise with respect to that 
 character in the agent, which inclines or enables him to 
 fulfil all these duties ; and developed in this direction, 
 the science of Morals becomes a presentation of ideal 
 virtue, or of ideal virtues. In the third place, again, the 
 product may be contemplated, which perfect virtue pro- 
 duces by the fulfilment of all its duties, and this becomes 
 the chief object in view, under the names of prosperity, 
 happiness, the highest good. But, instead of connect- 
 ing in one, these three different views, writers upon Mor- 
 als commonly make but one of them prominent in their 
 theories, which, consequently, must be one-sided and 
 unsatisfactory. For does not the sum-total of all the 
 different and scattered virtues presuppose an active agent, 
 in whom they can concentrate and come into actual 
 practice ; and when this agent is seen acting, what is 
 more natural than the inquiry after the product of his 
 activity ? 
 
 11 
 
122 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 We make these well-known statements, in the first 
 place, in order, by placing the three different forms of 
 the system of Morals beside the three highest Rhetorical 
 Ideas mentioned by us, to justify our having assumed 
 these latter as fundamental Ideas ; and in the second 
 place, still more, for the reason that these fundamental 
 Ideas furnish rules for the treatment of Rhetoric as a 
 system. If Rhetoric, as we affirm, is only a more gen- 
 eral unfolding of Morals, the selection of one particular 
 point of view, alone, would be a fault in Rhetoric, as 
 well as in Morals, and the combination of all the points 
 of view becomes as necessary in the former as it is in 
 the latter. We have thus far developed that part of 
 Morals which is called Rhetoric, from the Idea of Duty, 
 as a point of view. For we began with laying down a 
 law, of which we have pointed out the application, and 
 from which we have derived several individual rules ; 
 and we have believed it necessary to take this method, 
 for the sake of greater intelligibleness. Cicero and 
 Quintilian, — to compare those Philosophers who have 
 developed Morals from the Idea of Virtue, as a point of 
 departure, — it seems to us, have chiefly in view the 
 representation of the model orator, whom Quintilian 
 describes even from the time of his first instruction in 
 school. But their representations are somewhat ambigu- 
 ous, since, although in this way of treating the subject, 
 we are, indeed, made sufficiently acquainted with the 
 character and qualities of the orator, we can yet form 
 no definite conception of his activity, because the rule 
 by which it is to be judged of remains unknown. If, 
 now, as we have said above, we have sought to avoid 
 this fault by laying down firm fundamental principles, 
 we must also guard against falling into the opposite 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 123 
 
 error of forgetting the character and qualities of the 
 orator. The representation of these is the more impor- 
 tant, since it might seem as if the mere knowledge and 
 skilful application of the rules laid down by us were 
 sufficient for the orator, and as if his moral character 
 and qualities were to receive no farther notice ; which, 
 if it were actually the case, would frustrate our endeavor 
 to construct Rhetoric as a part of Morals. But such is 
 not the case ; and furthermore, it is impossible to follow 
 all these rules, unless there be moral strength of charac- 
 ter, unless there be virtue, and, in the case of the sacred 
 orator, unless there be the inner life of faith. 
 
 For the distinctive agency of the orator consists in 
 giving a powerful impulse and direction to the minds of 
 others, and he is not equal to this unless the goal to 
 which he would direct them is plainly in his eye, and 
 unless he earnestly desires to reach it himself. In a 
 word, he must possess, so to speak, the faculty of moral 
 Ideas, and these belong to character. The imagination, 
 it is true, generates those Ideas from which the creations 
 in the sphere of Art proceed ; although, even in the case 
 of Art, as it seems to me, the products are always some- 
 what lacking in body and firmness, unless they are set 
 up by character. But, inasmuch, as the Will is the 
 object which Eloquence seeks to influence, Eloquence 
 must originate in the Will, in the moral state of the 
 orator. Take the sacred orator, for instance : where 
 will he find matter for his discourses, if his own sanctifi- 
 cation, if the moral and religious condition, of men 
 does not lie near his heart, if he does not earnestly desire 
 to improve human character ? In him alone who is 
 animated by these motives, who labors upon himself, 
 and contemplates men around him with the design of 
 
124 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 elevating them to a higher degree of perfection, only in 
 such an one will Ideas that may be referred and applied 
 easily to the highest aim and end of the human Will, 
 be generated in their constant and abounding fulness ; 
 and such Ideas are, beyond question, motive-powers 
 moral and Christian in their nature. Nay, they presup- 
 pose a higher grade of morality, one that is raised far 
 above that which is commonly called virtue, — the mere 
 abstaining, namely, from vice, and an irreproachable life. 
 For if it is morally beautiful to will, at all times, that 
 which is Highest and Worthiest, for its own sake, it is 
 still more beautiful by far, to desire at the same time, in 
 connection with this, that which is Highest and Worthi- 
 est for all mankind. This desire may be wanting in a 
 man, and he not be morally bad in his life; but a far 
 higher degree of moral perfection must be ascribed to 
 him of whom it is the sole and actuating principle. 
 Hence it is certainly no envious complaint, when a 
 sacred oration is charged with being wanting in such 
 moral Ideas as alone can beget a disposition of soul 
 that is constantly employed in promoting the well-being 
 of humanity. To give expression to one's self merely, 
 to depict certain favorite views with self-complacency, 
 cannot be represented as a vice exactly; but it is cer- 
 tainly proof of an imperfect nature, which is not able to 
 forget itself, and to live only in the well-being of others ; 
 it indicates a want of that higher character by which 
 the orator produces the stuff and material employed by 
 him, and which, since the creative power in man is 
 designated generally by the term genius, we would style 
 moral genius. In vain, therefore, is the command : 
 ^ Refer your Ideas to the highest human Ideas," ad- 
 dressed to him who, absorbed in his own emotions, 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 125 
 
 fancies and notions, does not feel the heroic impulse to 
 seize upon the hearts of men, and to mould them into a 
 nobler state ; for he is lacking in the first and most 
 necessary things, — in Ideas, — and instead of these, he 
 will play with figures, dissolve in soft emotion, or bring 
 forward information, which is quite entertaining, it may 
 be, but which produces no effect upon the Will. 
 
 That which is true of the sacred orator, is true also of 
 the civil orator. If he does not clins: with disinterested 
 love to his father-land, and is not impelled by this love 
 to study closely the internal relations of his country, and 
 to mark attentively the changes in its foreign relations, 
 how is he, in important and difficult emergencies, to 
 acquire correct views and to form salutary plans, with- 
 out delay ? He will be dumb, as was the case with 
 the Athenian orators, on hearing that Philip had taken 
 Elataea. "For," as Demosthenes said, "that day and 
 that occasion demanded a man who had traced events 
 from the beginning, and had formed a correct conclusion 
 for what reason and for what end Philip had done that." 
 And how had-Demosthenes, the only one who spoke on 
 this day, obtained this keener insight, except through his 
 love of country, in which respect he was in advance of 
 all his fellow-citizens ? It may indeed be said, that in 
 the absence of love of country, self-interest, hatred and 
 friendship, preconceived opinions, political systems, will 
 not leave the orator destitute of ideas and plans. Per- 
 haps not ; but here the great difficulty presents itself, 
 that these very designs are to be subjected to the highest 
 ends of the State, and not of the individual will; and 
 this must be uncommonly difficult to accomplish, if they 
 did not spring up in dependence upon and subjection to, 
 the Common Weal, but were suggested by other and 
 
 11* 
 
126 
 
 less noble motives. In order that his selfish plans may 
 succeed, the orator, as has been remarked, must bring 
 them into connection with the highest moral Ideas ; and 
 if this connection is not a natural, but a forced one, 
 talent of the first order will often fail in the endeavor to 
 carry through the deception,* and the web of its argu- 
 ment will be torn into shreds by another orator, who 
 perhaps speaks with less power, but whose Ideas have 
 grown up out of the ground and soil of patriotism. A 
 fine instance of this is afforded in the two orations, 
 which, according to Sallust, were delivered by Caesar 
 and Cato in the Roman Senate, respecting the punish- 
 ment of the fellow-conspirators of Catiline. What can 
 be finer than the arrangement of Caesar's oration ; how 
 cunningly does he understand how to render the Ideas 
 of magnanimity, positive law, and public advantage, 
 available in a case in which it was his sole aim to sup- 
 port the mere instruments of his own ambitious plans ! 
 With less art, but with greater power, the honest Cato 
 forces his way through, and the whole Senate sides with 
 him. And thus, finally, by our own examination and 
 by the example of the younger Cato, that definition of 
 the orator is justified, which, according to Q,uintilian,f 
 originated with the elder Cato, and which is indisputa- 
 bly the best that has come down to us from antiquity, 
 viz. : The orator is an upright man ivho understands 
 speaking. 
 
 * A wrong design is betrayed by the contradictions in the course and 
 connection of thought. ^ireiBdv tis, o7jxai, Kanovpytav iirl fi^j irpoa-riKovTa 
 irpdyßara robs \6yovs fjLeracpeprjy Bvcrx^p^s a.v6,yKf\ Qaivetrfrai* — Demosth. ad' 
 versus Leptinem, p. 100, ed. Wolf, 
 
 t Instit. XII. 1. 
 
BOOK IL 
 
 ON ELOCUTION 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 AFFECTION AND PASSION. 
 
 Before we proceed further, let us cast a glance over 
 the path which we have opened. 
 
 It was our design to seek for a fundamental principle, 
 that should bring unity and connection into the frag- 
 mentary and disconnected theory of Eloquence. In order 
 to this, we made one of the characteristics of Elo- 
 quence, the striving to produce an influence outwardly, 
 its essential characteristic, and in this way found that it 
 stands upon an ethical basis and ground, and is an 
 active process ; that, as it proceeds only from Ideas, it 
 can address itself only to Ideas. The development of 
 this single thought has already led us to important 
 results, and has combined into a systematic unity many 
 assertions which in the common theories of Eloquence 
 are laid down without proof; and we have also been 
 enabled by it to correct many errors in the prevailing 
 views on this subject. We have seen that there is but 
 one Eloquence, and that civil Eloquence is connected 
 with sacred by the unity of its constituent principle, 
 
128 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 although each is differently modified by the particular 
 relation in which it moves ; that the Ancients, in con- 
 formity with a feeling in the highest degree correct, have 
 assumed three species of Eloquence, corresponding to the 
 three highest Ideas ; by laying down Truth as a subordi- 
 nate Rhetorical Idea, we have found again one of the 
 characteristics of Eloquence, its inclination to Philoso- 
 phy, but, at the same time, as we flatter ourselves, have 
 thrown some light upon the difficult question respecting 
 the dividing line between Philosophy and Eloquence; 
 we have given rules respecting the plan and division of 
 an oration which proceed according to Ideas, and, there- 
 fore, are preferable to the common method of division, 
 which proceeds merely according to fragmentary concep- 
 tions ; and, finally, in order to justify our ethical view, 
 we have in different places made it apparent that the 
 orator is capacitated for the performance of his proper 
 business only by means of a truly moral state of heart. 
 And thus, as we believe, has our ethical principle 
 maintained itself, so far as that part of Rhetoric is con- 
 cerned which embraces the doctrine of Invention and 
 Arrangement ; for all the rules which can properly -be 
 given respecting these subjects flow directly from the 
 fundamental law laid down by us, which, in its develop- 
 ment, has shown not only how each and everything in 
 this part of Eloquence should be, but also why it should 
 be so, and not otherwise. To maintain this principle 
 with respect to that part of Rhetoric which is now to 
 follow,— with respect to Elocution, so called, — seems a 
 work of greater difficulty. For since the excitement of 
 the Affections, or at least of the Passions, is that with 
 which we have to do here, how, it may be asked, is this 
 to take its origin from an ethical principle, nay, even to 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 129 
 
 be justified before it ? Furthermore, we are here, and 
 rightly too, to expect the outlines at least, of a theory of 
 Prose; and it would seem that an ethical principle could 
 in no way lead to it. It does, indeed, seem so; but it is 
 seeming merely ; for, in fact, this part of Rhetoric con- 
 stitutes the very triumph of the ethical view, since prob- 
 lems are solved fry it which can be solved by no other 
 view. 
 
 But we must, in the first place, express our regret at 
 the errors by which this part of the subject has been dis- 
 figured, and for which the Ancients, properly, are respon- 
 sible, who, since they are now universally lauded, must 
 here, at least, take home a merited blame. This blame 
 falls, first, upon the Rhetoricians, who again can throw 
 the accusation back upon the orators themselves, or 
 rather, upon the circumstances amidst which they spoke. 
 Ancient Eloquence owed its power and definiteness 
 principally to the rapidity with which the effect followed 
 immediately after the oration was ended ; but in this 
 very circumstance lay also a source of degeneration. 
 For, since the orator contended for honor, property, and 
 life, and since the possession or loss of these depended 
 upon the effect of the oration, he would, in this his strait, 
 find every means good, of whatever sort, provided it only 
 led to the end in view ; and he who could get hold of no 
 noble means, must often content himself with bad ones, 
 satisfied, if he only attained his end, and not considering 
 that he would have attained it with much more cer- 
 tainty had he employed worthier means. Hence the 
 orators allowed themselves in artifices of many sorts, in 
 order to deceive the judges and the people, to dazzle 
 them and excite their passions. This practice, which of 
 necessity, must often succeed, passed over into the 
 
130 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 theory of Eloquence, which, in this instance, as generally, 
 was not able to rise above the existing practice. The 
 artifices for stimulating the minds of the hearers were 
 collected together and arranged in a connected series; 
 and rhetoricians, who held the excitement of the passions 
 to be necessary in their art, taught for this end, not 
 the training of the mind, to use Plato's phrase,* but the 
 actual deceiving of the mind. Aristotle does this in the 
 section of his Rhetoric where he treats of the Passions ; 
 and Cicero speaks of the means which he employs* for 
 exciting them with a frankness at which we cannot but 
 be surprised.! 
 
 But it is, perhaps, equally surprising that these writers, 
 and those who have harmonized with them in sentiment, 
 should have been implicitly believed, and that these arti- 
 fices should have been held necessary and indispensable 
 in secular Eloquence at least. The example of Demos- 
 thenes alone, it seems to me, could not but have led to 
 the thought that they might be dispensed with, and that 
 other means might be employed in their stead, which 
 are not only much nobler but also much more reliable. 
 If this orator had written a Rhetoric, it would certainly 
 have been different from Cicero's rhetorical writings, and 
 have been not unworthy of his instructor Plato, who, in 
 the Gorgias, lays down such a strict view of Eloquence. 
 But the Eloquence of Demosthenes, like his character, 
 possesses an elevation, which, of necessity, must fail of 
 being apprehended ; and owing to their inability to 
 rightly estimate the rhetorical means which he employs, 
 
 * Ifvxaryeoyia. — Phcedrus, p. 331 ed. Heindorf. 
 
 t Qua (miseratione) nos ita dolenter usi sumus, ut puerum infantem in 
 manibus, perorantes tenuerimus ; ut alia in causa, excitato reo nobili, sublato 
 etiam filio parvo, plangore et lamentatione complerimus forum. Orator c. 38. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 131 
 
 the Ancients, and we after them, have believed to have 
 detected the very same artifices in him, which are plainly 
 apparent in other orators. 
 
 In order to prepare the way for this part of Rhetoric, 
 it is necessary to enter upon a psychological investi- 
 gation, and to establish a distinction between two things, 
 which, though very different from each other, are yet 
 commonly confounded with each other, — namely, be- 
 tween Affection and Passion. The movements in our 
 minds differ very much in their nature, their duration, 
 and their importance, according as they are produced by 
 external objects, or are generated from within outwards. 
 An external object, or the representation of it, excites, if 
 we desire or loathe it, a movement within us which is 
 rightly called Passion, since we are passive in the matter, 
 and yield ourselves up to an influence which operates 
 upon us from without. This condition of the soul can- 
 not, in strictness, be justified, since it supposes the inac- 
 tivity of the Reason, a power which, indeed, cannot 
 always prevent the reception of impressions from without, 
 but which should, nevertheless, limit, elevate, and, if 
 they are injurious, suppress them. Moreover, this inward 
 condition is, in its nature, unquiet, perplexed, and pain- 
 ful to the mind, which is always troubled by the feeling 
 of dependence upon external objects, and in its duration 
 it is transient, since it is produced by a transitory object. 
 Entirely different from this, is that excitement of the 
 mind which owes its origin to an Idea; I call it Affec- 
 tion, (Affekt,) and not Passion, since the mind in this 
 case affects itself through its own reflex activity, instead 
 of passively receiving an impression from without, as in 
 the other case. Yet this term Affection, which renders 
 me iiable to misapprehension, and is not, by any means, 
 
132 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 
 
 adequate, I employ only because I know of no better 
 one. What, however, I mean by it, will be clear from 
 what follows. A mind in which an Idea has become 
 living consciousness, cannot possibly retain that coldness 
 which accompanies mere abstract representations or 
 conceptions; for since the Idea contains within itself the 
 notion of an activity of some sort, and the impulse to it, 
 it must necessarily appropriate to itself all the powers of 
 the soul, and set them in motion in one definite direc- 
 tion; and from this united working of all the faculties, 
 from the exertion accompanying it, an inward state 
 must arise, distinguished by a higher degree of warmth 
 and life. In case a creation in the domain of Art results 
 from the Idea, this inward state is denominated poetic or 
 artistic inspiration, and is universally recognized and 
 esteemed as fine and beautiful in its nature. But the 
 same warmth and glow attends upon all ethical Ideas 
 which strive to break forth into activity; nothing but the 
 mere negative refraining from evil can have coldness 
 of soul as its attendant ; he who strives to produce 
 something great and good, will never be without ardor, 
 without affection. Yet we should never apply the name 
 Passion to this fine mental manifestation ; this term in- 
 dicates the inactivity of the higher spiritual powers, 
 while, on the contrary, Affection as distinguished from 
 Passion, supposes the highest activity of the Reason, 
 which is the parent of Ideas. Furthermore, the warmth 
 pf Passion is obscure and vague, — to use a comparison, 
 is like a dimly burning fire; Affection, on the contrary, 
 constantly conscious, constantly attentive to the slightest 
 hint of Reason, capable of checking itself in the midst of 
 the most rapid course, is to be compared to the sun-light, 
 which brings even more clearness than warmth with it. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 133 
 
 For this reason, and also because Affection does not, 
 like Passion, divide the mind into two contending parties, 
 but unites all the powers of the soul, and all the emo- 
 tions of the heart, in finest harmony with the" Reason, it 
 is the happiest state by far to which man can raise him- 
 self. That it is also a perfectly moral state, it seems 
 unnecessary to add. It is, especially when generated by 
 ethical Ideas, man's moral nature itself, and that, too, in 
 its finest splendor, its highest dignity, and elevated far 
 above that coldness of soul which is sometimes denomi- 
 nated rational, although with great injustice, since a 
 powerful activity of the Reason must necessarily banish 
 all coldness. Finally, Affection is distinguished from 
 Passion, by the fact that the former is as permanent as 
 the latter is transient. For since the Idea which gener- 
 ates it can never be exhausted by a single exhibition, but 
 only by a continued series of exhibitions, and, therefore, 
 has a long-continued existence, nay, if it is a moral Idea, 
 an eternal existence, for the contemplating mind, it im- 
 parts this attribute and duration to the mental affection 
 which accompanies it. 
 
 Instead, however, of duly distinguishing between two 
 mental manifestations so diverse as those above de- 
 scribed, it is too common to denominate everything as 
 Passionate, that is attended with any degree of fire and 
 life ; and it often happens that that which is beautiful 
 and excellent in the highest degree, is degraded by the 
 debasing conception which is connected with this word. 
 We should, therefore, never ascribe to one who is given 
 up to an art, or a science, as soon as he is capable of 
 producing something within its sphere, by his own inde- 
 pendent power, a Passion for this art or science ; his love 
 is an Affection which is generated by Ideas; and he, 
 
 12 
 
134 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OK 
 
 alone, has a Passion for an art who merely desires to 
 contemplate its creations for the sake of the pleasure 
 they produce, without being excited to any. activity of 
 spirit by them. In the social relations of men, also, not 
 all love is Passion. Love is Passion, or Lust, only when 
 it strives after the possession of the loved object, as after 
 the possession of a piece of property which it wishes to 
 obtain and hold ; it is something far higher, it is Affec- 
 tion, so soon as the Idea of a perpetual connection comes 
 to lie at the bottom of it ; an Idea which is neither dis- 
 turbed by separating circumstances, nor grows cold from 
 the earthly possession of the object. Speaking gener- 
 ally, the action of man should never be Passionate, but 
 always Affectionate ; it should never betray the fire which 
 an external object has kindled, but should be constantly 
 animated by that mild and clear warmth which accom- 
 panies all that springs from the inward depths of the 
 spirit. And thus let us, in Eloquence also, distinguish 
 the discourse of a man who is filled with an Idea, which 
 he would impart to others in an equal degree of clearness 
 and warmth, from the effort, ever to be condemned, to 
 awaken their Passions. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 135 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE DUTY OF THE ORATOR TO SPEAK WITH AFFECTION 
 AND TO AWAKEN AFFECTION. 
 
 Having, in the foregoing, shown that true Affection as 
 distinguished from Passion, is never morally wrong, but 
 is always to be regarded as intrinsically beautiful and 
 excellent, we now go still farther, and affirm, that it is 
 absolutely necessary that the orator speak with Affection. 
 For he goes before an assembly only in order to impart 
 to it the Idea by which he is himself pervaded ; and this 
 Idea, if it actually be an Idea, must be accompanied 
 with Affection. If we find the orator wanting in this, 
 we are justified in assuming that he is not animated by 
 an Idea ; that he seems to purpose and undertake some- 
 thing, but in reality has no definite purpose, and, there- 
 fore, is in contradiction with himself; that he pursues 
 his business from necessity merely, like a day-laborer, 
 or from by-ends like a demagogue, or from cold and 
 chilling vanity, like a mere fine speaker ; and any one of 
 these assumptions, if just and warranted, will prevent 
 the hearer from respecting the man or opening his heart 
 to him. What we have said, moreover, respecting the 
 difference between Affection and Passion, will, it is 
 hoped, protect us from the charge of demanding in the 
 orator, feverish heat, sickly emotion, or strained anima- 
 tion ; we demand warmth with thoughtfulness, feeling 
 with reason, emphasis without distortion, light and fire 
 without vapor, — fine qualities, which even the common 
 
136 ELOQUENCE A 
 
 OR, 
 
 hearer knows how to estimate, and readily distinguishes 
 from the extravagant and artificial. 
 
 Every one who has ^ever come before the people, filled 
 with a great Idea, has spoken with Affection ; but with 
 the greatest Affection by far, He who gave utterance to 
 the greatest Ideas, namely, Christ. This Light of the 
 World reveals eternal truth with an abiding inspiration, 
 which is at one time mild and gentle, at another with 
 thunder and crash; a great example for every sacred 
 orator, and one that warrants him in dispensing with all 
 so called philosophical calmness, and obligates him to 
 speak with similar Affection. 
 
 Supposing, now, that there are means whereby Affec- 
 tion can be communicated to others, it is plain that the 
 use of these means can never be injurious, but always 
 and only beneficial. For they never rouse up mere blind 
 feeling to a life and energy that renders Reason inactive; 
 on the contrary, mere blind feeling is held in subordina- 
 tion, since the orator compels it to cooperate towards 
 his ends, and in this way, there arises inward harmony, 
 which is man's most perfect condition. The fear, also, 
 that the orator may go too far in exciting Affection, 
 seems to me to be entirely unfounded; for Affection is 
 generated by a stronger activity of the Reason, in which 
 there can be no excess, and the calm thought must 
 at every moment lead back within its proper limits the 
 discursive feeling. Passion most certainly may become 
 too strong, or rather, it should never become so ; but how 
 the Ideas of the moral Reason can be accompanied with 
 too lively Affection, or how it is possible for these same 
 Ideas, sanctified by religion, to seize upon the mind with 
 too great power, I, at least, cannot imagine. The orator, 
 therefore, if he is able to excite Affection, need prescribe 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 137 
 
 no limits to himself while making the attempt; owing 
 to human weakness, instead of going too far, he will 
 ordinarily have to blame himself for having done too 
 little. And if it is objected that Affection, like every 
 lively frame of the soul, is transitory, I ask whether it is 
 for this reason, merely, to be deemed worthless, and 
 whether every single hour which is spent in the feeling 
 of enthusiasm for the Highest and Best is not a positive 
 gain, and a beautiful reward for the soul that is the sub- 
 ject of it ? But this objection is without foundation ; 
 for Affection owes its existence to the heightened activity 
 of Reason alone ; and Reason, by means of the fuller 
 development it has received in the process, is always of 
 itself, independently, able to reproduce Affection. 
 
 Invariably excluding everything Passionate, and as- 
 suming that Affection can be imparted to the hearer, we 
 can now, without any opposition whatever, we hope, lay 
 down the assertion, that it is the duty of the orator to 
 awaken Affection. In case, either from principle or from 
 inability, he disclaims this obligation, his activity must 
 be limited to that of which we have treated in the First 
 Book ; namely, to proving that the particular Idea of his 
 oration is contained in the general Idea of the hearer, 
 and that the hearer, if he wills Duty, or Virtue, or Happi- 
 ness, must also will this or that procedure to which 
 these Ideas lead. But what is accomplished by this? 
 As good as nothing. This might indeed do, if in man, 
 knowing, willing, and doing, were one and the same act. 
 In this case, he would only need to know that he ought 
 to will, in order to will, and would only need to will, in 
 order to do. But such is not the case. There is a cold 
 abstract knowing which generates no willing; there is a 
 feeble willing which never passes over into doing. But 
 
 12* 
 
138 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE* OR, 
 
 to what does this cold knowing and this feeble willing 
 lead, and how can the orator be satisfied with producing 
 it? For the very reason, that something is to be accom- 
 plished which is not yet accomplished; for the very 
 reason that he finds the State and the Church in a cor- 
 rupt, or at least an imperfect condition, and would have 
 it changed for the better ; for this, and no other reason, 
 does he come forward as an orator ; this is the end 
 towards which he must labor, if he would not be in con- 
 tradiction with himself; and if he does not attain it, he 
 has spoken in vain. But in order to attain it, it is neces- 
 sary, that the Idea of the hearer be raised to such a 
 grade of vitality as that it can immediately pass over 
 into act; for that blazing up of all the inward powers 
 which we denominate Affection, indicates the moment 
 when the Idea is breaking through and coming forth 
 into Actuality. If the capacity of being conscious of 
 ethical Ideas must be predicated of every man, and yet 
 very few act in accordance with Ideas, this is only 
 because Affection is wanting in them, the very link itself, 
 which, in the chain of human activity, connects willing 
 with doing. The sentiment which the orator labors to 
 produce in his hearers, and the resolution which he seeks 
 to have them take, are to be brought about immediately, 
 not only when he speaks before the judge or before his 
 fellow-citizens, but also when he speaks before a Chris- 
 tian assembly. For if it is not brought about immedi- 
 ately, when will it be? At another time? But why 
 defer that which is in itself good ? Or would the orator 
 merely enlighten and cultivate the Reason under the con- 
 viction that well regulated action will then be developed 
 of itself, from it ? But experience proves the contrary ; 
 it shows us men of very cultivated Reason who either do 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 139 
 
 not act at all, or act wrongly. And, moreover, how is 
 this gradual cultivation possible in the case of the orator, 
 to whom, at this one particular moment, a mind is sur- 
 rendering itself, which perhaps will never again fall with- 
 in the sphere of his influence ? Is nothing at all to be 
 done for such an one, and how long is the orator to 
 wait for something to be developed of itself, from the 
 audience before him ? Their ethical Ideas they bring 
 with them ; they are therefore, at this moment, just as 
 susceptible to every good influence, as they will be 
 years hence; for it is the individual who changes, the 
 mass, on the whole, is ever the same. The objection in 
 question proceeds from the false supposition that it is 
 necessary for the orator to laboriously impart to men 
 that intelligence which lies at the bottom of action ; but 
 he is spared this labor, since every man by nature 
 possesses the ethical Ideas. Perhaps there is sometimes 
 in the orator, as in the hearer, an aversion towards 
 the exhibition of Affection, which conceals itself behind 
 these objections, but which, after what has been said, 
 can hardly pass as praiseworthy. 
 
 If now it be asked, in what does the business of the 
 orator properly consist, — in conviction or persuasion, — 
 I confess that I can declare decidedly neither for the 
 one nor for the other, and that it seems to me the ques- 
 tion ought not to be asked, since it is based upon a false 
 view of Eloquence. So far as conviction is concerned, 
 this is by no means sufficient to constitute the substance 
 of Eloquence, if by it is understood the proof that the 
 particular Idea of the orator is contained in the general 
 Idea of the hearer. But this is hardly the meaning 
 given to the word ; it is generally taken to denote a 
 demonstration, by means of which the whole philosophic 
 
140 
 
 connection of thought in the orator is impressed on 
 the hearer, in order that he may be excited to one 
 particular act. Conviction of this sort seems to me to 
 be an impossibility, and I believe that the best dialec- 
 tician has not yet succeeded in entirely bringing over 
 his opponent to his own standing-point. But even if it 
 were a possibility, I should deem it useless for the orator 
 to start from the highest principles of all knowledge and 
 action, when he might directly, and with entire certainty 
 of success, fasten on upon the ethical Ideas. It were 
 also sad, in the highest degree, to be compelled to go 
 through with a course in Philosophy with a man in order 
 to move him to the performance of a good action. But 
 this part of the subject, as I believe, has been sufficiently 
 explained in the First Book. I can as little approve of 
 persuasion, if by it is understood the distortion or dark- 
 ening of representations, in order to excite the Passions ; 
 no able orator will betake himself to this means, and 
 we have shown that he has no need to do so. If, how- 
 ever, conviction may be taken to denote the production 
 of the Idea in consciousness, and persuasion its eleva- 
 tion and transformation into Affection, — which, how- 
 ever, as I believe, the common use of language does not 
 permit, — I would answer the question above by saying, 
 that the business of the orator consists neither in convic- 
 tion nor persuasion alone; but that his conviction should 
 be persuasive, and his persuasion convincing. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 141 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AFFECTION. 
 
 Before we proceed to treat of the means of exciting 
 the Affections, we must first become acquainted with 
 the different kinds of Affections. Affection is not always 
 one and the same ; for, in the first place, the Ideas upon 
 which it attends, although all of them of an ethical 
 nature, may be very different from each other. In the 
 second place, the character and qualities, as well of the 
 subject or agent in whom the Idea is generated as of the 
 object to which it is referred, vary. For example, the 
 Idea of Duty may be generated in a guilty or in an inno- 
 cent mind, may be applied to a guilty or an innocent 
 man ; and in relations so dissimilar, the Affection aris- 
 ing from the enlivenment of this Idea must asume 
 different hues. Finally, in the third place, several Affec- 
 tions, in themselves different, may flow together, and by 
 their union, form a third. The knowledge of these dif- 
 ferent kinds of Affections seems to us to be necessary, 
 since, without it, it will be impossible to determine 
 whether the means of exciting the Affections which we 
 shall present, are sufficient or not. This knowledge will 
 also enable us the better to distinguish the Affections 
 from the Passions, — a distinction upon which I lay the 
 greatest stress, since only through its observance can 
 Eloquence be restored again to its proper rank. Indeed, 
 it does not escape me, that I am here entering upon the 
 dangerous ground of Psychology, so called, from which 
 perhaps the fragments of so many unsuccessful under- 
 
142 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 takings in the department of Rhetoric ought to deter 
 me ; yet the safe clue with which I venture into this 
 domain, will perhaps preserve me from a similar failure. 
 It is true, that nothing can be done in Psychology, if that 
 observation of self and of others, from which it draws 
 its truths, is pursued at hap-hazard, and without leading 
 principles. But here we have something firm, universal, 
 and sure, in the ethical Ideas, which we bring down into 
 the lower region (so to speak) of the mind, only in order 
 to observe what will result from their contact with the 
 natural feelings and the different inward states of men. 
 In this, or in a similar way, it may perhaps not be im- 
 possible to distinguish and to designate satisfactorily all 
 the different movements in the mind which so interpen- 
 etrate and run through each other, and which no so- 
 called empirical Psychology has as yet systematized. 
 Yet, what we shall be able to do here can be regarded 
 as only a slight contribution towards such an undertak- 
 ing. 
 
 With regard now to the Idea of Duty, it is apparent 
 that the inward state of a man who is warmed and 
 enlivened by it, and who strives with all his powers to 
 realize it in conduct, must be remarked as a peculiar Af- 
 fection. It is denominated Zeal, and it is naturally the 
 strongest in him who regards the law which he obeys 
 from love, as a truly divine law ; it is weaker in degree, 
 yet not essentially different, in the mind of him who 
 receives the law by which he regulates his conduct, from 
 the State solely, or who believes that he imposes it upon 
 himself. If, however, man does not strive after the 
 realization of an Idea, but after the possession of an 
 outward good, his Zeal, which at first was an Affection, 
 degenerates into Passion. If the Idea of Duty has been 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 143 
 
 suppressed for a long time in a man's mind, and again 
 acquires dominion within it, it begets, with reference to 
 his past faulty state Shame and Repentance, the liveliness 
 of which, like that of Zeal, is in proportion to the 
 seriousness of the sphere in which the Duty is conceived 
 to be obligatory, and which, like the Affection of Zeal, 
 would cease to be pure Affections, if the individual, 
 instead of charging himself with the positive neglect of 
 duty, should charge upon himself merely the neglect to 
 make use of a favorable opportunity to promote some 
 earthly advantage. The perception, in the case of 
 another, of the difference between what he actually does 
 and what he ought to do, excites in different degrees the 
 Affection of Anger, which, in order to remain a pure 
 Affection, must never go farther than to the bad action 
 itself, and which becomes a Passion so soon as it is 
 directed against the person of the agent. 
 
 The Idea of Virtue, whether its perfection in God, in 
 Christ, or the approximation to its perfection in a good 
 man, be considered, through the Affection accompanying 
 it becomes Love, Friendship, Esteem, Benevolence, Emu- 
 lation, Admiration. These are pure expressions, from 
 which the common use of language has already banished 
 every notion of passionateness, with the exception only, 
 that by Love is not always meant an Affection generated 
 by the Idea of Virtue, for an object in which this Idea is 
 perfectly or in part realized, but often, also, a passionate 
 desire for that which stimulates unnaturally. Love, as 
 an Affection, has the Godhead for its highest object, with 
 which it strives to unite and become one, and can pass 
 over to a human being only in case the human being 
 manifests something divine. Accordingly, it is more 
 perfect in its nature than Friendship, since it reveringly 
 
144 ♦ ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 
 
 recognizes the whole individuality of the loved object, 
 while Friendship, on the contrary, is generated by esteem 
 for only certain particular, mainly moral, qualities. Yet, 
 as Love strives after an abiding union with its object, so 
 there is also in Friendship, the desire for community of 
 feeling and action ; if this fails, Esteem remains, which is 
 denominated Benevolence, when it is accompanied with 
 the impulse to manifest itself in procuring some earthly 
 advantage for the object of its regard. Emulation is 
 inseparable from Love and Friendship, and in general, 
 arises in a mind that is pervaded by the Idea of Virtue, 
 on seeing its Ideal of excellence more perfectly realized 
 in another being than itself. Admiration is the loving 
 recognition of another's excellence, when it is unattain- 
 able by us, or, at least, when it seems so far removed 
 from our own Ideal, that we cannot strive after it with- 
 out renouncing our own Ideal, and ourselves, as it were. 
 Thus the hero admires the poet, and the poet the hero, 
 while each follows after a restricted Ideal, and one that 
 is and must be foreign to the other. But no one ad- 
 mires either the invisible Godhead, or the Godhead 
 as revealed in Christ, for the very reason that its perfec- 
 tion is without limits or restrictions, and consequently, 
 may be taken as an Ideal by every man. The Idea of 
 Virtue produces the Affection of Contempt and Disesteem 
 towards those who seem to be destitute of the Idea of 
 Virtue; though Disesteem more properly has reference 
 to the absence of Civic Merit, or desert in relation to the 
 State. Contempt is a very harsh, and, therefore, an im- 
 perfect Affection ; he alone feels it who stands upon a 
 low point of view, and who believes himself to be the 
 creator of the virtue he possesses. He who is convinced 
 ihat he has received it from God, without any merit 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 145 
 
 of his own, will be more inclined to Pity than Contempt 
 in relation to the sinner. 
 
 Finally, in the third place, the following Affections 
 are associated with the Idea of Happiness : — Longing 
 after the highest Good, Hope to obtain it, Gratitude to- 
 wards him who has rendered aid in obtaining it, Pity 
 for the erring who does not strive after it at all, or in a 
 false way, Fear of all that might deprive us of it, and 
 Abhorrence of evil within ourselves, as the worst enemy 
 of our true happiness. Yet, in order to preserve these 
 affections pure, the Idea of Happiness must be conceived 
 in its greatest purity ; and it is for the very reason that 
 this is seldom done, that the Affections at this point bor- 
 der so closely upon the Passions. He who stands upon 
 the position of the mere moralist, and seeks his happi- 
 ness in an unhindered activity, will detect in himself a 
 displeasure, not altogether pure and unselfish, towards 
 all who oppose him in any way. But these Affections 
 most easily degenerate into Passions, when the Idea of 
 Happiness is applied to political relations, and the indi- 
 vidual animated by it is striving after the welfare of the 
 State. So long as Enthusiasm only, is felt in relation to 
 those who promote the welfare of the State, and Dis- 
 pleasure only, in relation to those who disturb it, these 
 are beautiful Affections, and worthy of esteem ; but, in- 
 stead of Enthusiasm, there very easily arises blind Ado~ 
 ration, and instead of Displeasure, raging Hatred; and 
 these political Passions, which presuppose a great ob- 
 scuration of the rational Idea of Happiness, are the 
 more frightful, because it is easy for every man to justify 
 to himself, and to others, his own selfish efforts, under 
 the appearance of a patriotic disposition. In like man- 
 ner, Enmity against him who has done us some injury, 
 
 13 
 
146 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 is never an Affection, but always a Passion. The same 
 is true of Envy, in which the Begrudging another of his 
 Happiness is connected with Hatred towards him for 
 having it. Even Pity has something of Passion in it, if 
 we deplore the case of an unhappy person, not for his 
 own sake, but from a lurking, unconscious intimation, 
 that possibly we may soon find ourselves in his condi- 
 tion. It is a true Affection only when, as has been said 
 before, it springs from the pure Idea of Happiness dwel- 
 ling in us, and in some degree realized in our own case, 
 but which we miss in the striving of another ; or when 
 our feeling for the miserable is elevated and ennobled by 
 the additional influence of the Ideas of Justice and of 
 Virtue, as is the case on seeing an innocent man stricken 
 with disease, or a man who, considering his high quali- 
 ties, merited a better fate. As the sight of an innocent 
 man, stricken with disease, calls forth an elevated Pity 
 that is full of Affection, so the sight of prosperous Vice 
 begets Moral Indignation* which, like Compassion, is a 
 mixed Affection, and springs from the connection of the 
 Idea of Justice with the Idea of Happiness. 
 
 Aristotle, who, in the beginning of his Rhetoric, con- 
 demns the excitement of the Passions, but who after- 
 wards, unable to carry out his theory independently, 
 adapts himself to the necessities of the casej treats of 
 the subject-matter of this chapter with evident interest, 
 and with the precision in the specification of particulars 
 peculiar to him. He assumes eleven Passions : — An- 
 ger, Placability, Love, Hatred, Fear, Shame, Benevolence, 
 Moral Indignation, Pity, Envy, Emulation. It is easy to 
 see how, in this enumeration, things the most diverse are 
 brought together, — e. g., the mean vice of Envy, with 
 
 * Nemesis. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 147 
 
 the noble striving of Emulation, and, consequently, how 
 necessary it is to distinguish between Affection and Pas- 
 sion. Let it also be noticed that this list of Aristotle is 
 not more copious than our own, and, consequently, that 
 we have not been compelled, in order to systematically 
 arrange the actual phenomena of consciousness, to muti- 
 late them in the least. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 WIT. 
 
 If we, of right, require in the orator the ability to 
 awaken Affection, we should also, perhaps, require that 
 he have Wit. Wit is the destruction of Affection ; it is 
 the bent of a mind, which, instead of being carried away 
 by the Holy and the Great, makes it an object of its 
 scrutiny, and entertains itself with the apparent contra- 
 dictions and contrasts which are contained in it. The 
 play of such a mind is much more sure and safe when 
 it is directed against a Passion, which continually pre- 
 sents a great number of weak points, and which is al- 
 ways checked and abated whenever Wit gets the upper 
 hand. It might, therefore, seem as if the weapon of 
 Wit were necessary to the orator, not indeed for attack, 
 but for defence against a Passion or an Affection awak- 
 ened by his opponent, that is working against him. This 
 is the only one, among the many shallow reasons men- 
 tioned by Cicero, for the employment of Wit in Elo- 
 
148- ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 quence, that is not utterly to be rejected.* And, indeed, 
 it cannot be denied that a well-applied sally of wit is of 
 great effect when the orator needs merely to free himself 
 from some entanglement, to help himself quickly out of 
 a momentary embarrassment, and by a brief word to get 
 rid of a matter, especially if it does not pertain to the 
 higher relations of human existence, and is of no special 
 importance to any one. Yet, when the orator has in 
 view the excitement of a great and powerfully moving 
 Affection, Wit, however skilfully applied, can produce 
 only an injurious effect. It may indeed deprive the rea- 
 soning of an opponent of its force, and extinguish the 
 fire which he has kindled ; but the hearer is thereby put 
 into an indifferent mental state that is destitute of 
 Affection, and one in which he is more inclined to reflec- 
 tion than to action. But the orator should never let it 
 come to this ; for while in this way he destroys the Affec- 
 tion or Passion which his opponent has called forth, he 
 at the same time destroys that which has been produced 
 by himself, and must, after an interruption so disturbing 
 in its effects, begin his whole work over again. The inter- 
 mingling of Wit in an oration, is therefore unworthy of 
 a true orator; and it seems to me the orator is upon true 
 and high ground only when, without utterly annihilating 
 the particular Affection which has been called forth in 
 opposition, he throws it back with redoubled force upon 
 his opponent. In this way, without any cold and indif- 
 ferent state intervening, Affection follows upon Affec- 
 tion, and that awakened last is strengthened by the con- 
 trast with the preceding. It will not be more- difficult, it 
 
 * Quod fran git adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, 
 quod refutat. — De Orator e, II. 58. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 149 
 
 will rather be more easy, for him who speaks with the 
 consciousness of the goodness of his cause, and can ap- 
 ply the whole power of the moral Ideas to his own pur- 
 poses, to suddenly reverse a false feeling in the mind of 
 the hearer, which is unfavorable to himself, than first to 
 kill all feeling in him, and then reanimate him for his 
 own purposes. 
 
 In order to clearly perceive how foreign Wit is from 
 Eloquence, let one consider the nature of sacred Elo- 
 quence, and ask himself, What would be the effect of a 
 witty sally, against an opposer of religion, for example, 
 • in the midst of a serious discourse ? Would it not, of 
 necessity, so destroy the whole impression of the dis- 
 course as that it would be impossible to think, even, of 
 renewing it again ? Of similar effect, also, is Wit in 
 political Eloquence, although less hazardous, because the 
 contrast with the main character of the discourse is not 
 so sharp and striking. Upholding, to speak generally, 
 is the proper function of the orator; he can therefore 
 have to do with destroying, only in passing and briefly. 
 
 The tendency to Wit and the capability of employing 
 it, were very slight, in the serious mind of Demosthenes, 
 in which great affections were constantly dominant, 
 while they were prominent qualities in Cicero. The 
 latter took great pleasure in practising this talent, which 
 flattered his vanity, while in the orations of Demosthenes 
 no traces of it are to be met with, although he was often 
 the subject of the witty sallies of his contemporaries. 
 Quintilian, who in general is more prejudiced in favor of 
 # his countryman than he should be, in reference to this 
 quality places him above Demosthenes ; a totally false 
 judgment, since he praises him on account of a quality 
 which rather merits condemnation. Cicero is very en- 
 
 13* 
 
150 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 tertaining, perhaps, to the modern reader, in those pas- 
 sages in which he covers his opponent with wit and 
 ridicule, but let one only observe how Demosthenes re- 
 futes his adversary with earnest vehemence, with what 
 masterly ability he converts defence into an attack, and 
 hurls back as an accusation the annihilated charge of his 
 opponent, and then ask himself which method is most 
 conformed to the end of the orator, most elevated and 
 noble, most virtuous ? * 
 
 * Wit, in a deep and vehement nature, assumes the form of sarcasm, and 
 moral scorn. When there is a perfectly clear perception of the thorough 
 falsity of an opinion perversely defended by an opponent, it is accompanied 
 in the earnest and truth-loving mind with an ethical indignation, which is 
 too intense and strong for any merely light play like that of ridicule, and 
 gives itself vent in that bolt-like denunciation of sarcasm which at once 
 smites and withers. Wit is never found in the Scriptures ; but irony and 
 sarcasm sometimes appear in their most incisive and awful force, as in the 
 advice of Elijah to the priests of Baal (1 Kings xviii. 27 sq.), and in the 
 description of idol-manufacturing by Isaiah (Isaiah xl. 19, 20; xli. 6, 7). 
 — Tr. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 151 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE MEANS OF EXCITING AFFECTION J OR THE RHETORI- 
 CAL PRESENTATION OF THOUGHT. 
 
 The way for the investigation of the important in- 
 quiry, by what means Affection can be excited, seems to 
 have been sufficiently prepared, by what has been said 
 in proof of the moral dignity and worth of this mental 
 state, and of the duty of the orator to call it into exist- 
 ence. We do not treat of the excitement of the Pas- 
 sions, because it is a subject which can find a place only 
 in a Rhetoric constructed according to entirely false, or, 
 at least, imperfect principles. Aristotle, upon this sub- 
 ject, imparts an amount of instruction which, in com- 
 pleteness and fulness of rich and fine remark, can hardly 
 be surpassed. Yet it all amounts simply to this, that 
 each Passion has its particular object by which it can be 
 excited, if it be depicted in lively colors, and placed 
 vividly before the view. A little imagination and so- 
 called knowledge of human nature, accompanied with a 
 versatile character, or an evil will, is often sufficient in 
 order to succeed in this. It is not even necessary that 
 the orator himself feel the Passion which he would en- 
 kindle ; nay, this might rather be a hindrance to him, 
 since it would destroy his coolness and self-possession. 
 We acknowledge, moreover, that in many circumstances, 
 and having to do with certain characters, it may be much 
 easier to allow a Passion to blaze forth, than to produce 
 an Affection; nay, that the former, in comparison with 
 
152 
 
 OR, 
 
 the latter, is mere child's play. But besides that such a 
 procedure is not moral in its nature, it is also a highly- 
 uncertain and deceptive means in order to attain a rhe- 
 torical end, as we have already shown ; so that good 
 sense, which goes hand-in-hand with duty, limits the. ac- 
 tivity of the orator to the educing of Ideas, and their 
 enlivenment into Affections. 
 
 "While now a Passion may be made to blaze forth, by 
 one who is destitute of Passion himself, he alone, on the 
 other hand, is able to awaken an Affection, who is him- 
 self enlivened and pervaded by it. For the aim, in this 
 case, is not to render the mind of the hearer susceptible 
 to the stimulus of an external object, — in order to which, 
 it is not indispensably necessary that the orator himself 
 be strongly affected by it, — but to transfer something 
 that has been generated in the depths of the soul, into 
 another person, which can be done only in proportion as 
 the orator himself possesses that which is to be produced. 
 Furthermore, it has been shown, that in the mind of the 
 orator, the Affection is most intimately connected with 
 the Idea, and that it arises only as an effect of the Idea, 
 and in proportion to the degree in which the Idea is un- 
 folded and developed. In like manner, it can never be 
 produced in the mind of the hearer by means which lie 
 without the Idea, but only by means of the Idea itself, 
 and its presentation. Only when the orator succeeds in 
 imparting the Idea, which is living and creative in his 
 own mind, to the hearer, in an equal degree of force and 
 clearness, will the Idea break forth into activity in both 
 speaker and hearer with equal power, i. e., be accompanied 
 with the same Affection in each. If, therefore, we can 
 discover a particular and peculiar manner of presenta- 
 tion, by which an ethical Idea may be gradually carried 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 153 
 
 up to its highest completeness in the mind of another, 
 we shall have discovered the true means of awakening 
 Affection. I say a particular and peculiar manner of 
 presentation, for at this point especially, it must be evi- 
 dent that it can be neither a Philosophical nor a Poetical 
 manner. For although Philosophy exhibits Ideas in 
 themselves, and Poetry, an Idea in a sensuous dress, yet 
 neither strives to excite an Affection from which a sud- 
 den revolution, either in the inward state of a man, or in 
 the outward condition of human society, may proceed ; 
 and even if anything similar to this results from the 
 Philosophical or Poetical manner of presenting Ideas, 
 yet the design to attain it, forms no part of this manner 
 of presentation, and exerts no influence upon it, when 
 it is pure and perfect in its character and execution. 
 But the Rhetorical manner of presenting Ideas has the 
 excitement of Affection for its peculair aim and end ; and 
 I affirm that this is the only point of view from which 
 we can proceed, if we would consecutively and systemat- 
 ically derive its rules and laws. After having treated, 
 in the First Book, of the Plan and Division, we shall 
 therefore now endeavor to penetrate more deeply into 
 the secret of Rhetorical Composition. 
 
 The success of our attempt to refer the theory of Elo- 
 quence to ethical principles, would be very doubtful, if 
 we should now find ourselves compelled to leave the 
 path which we have hitherto trodden, and to deduce the 
 laws of the Rhetorical presentation of thought, which 
 have for their aim the awakening of Affection, from 
 some other domain than that of Ethics ; perhaps from a 
 newly-invented theory of the Beautiful and Sublime, 
 which we had connected as a little addendum with the 
 main system, or perhaps from the theory of the Emo- 
 
154 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE I OR 
 
 tions, and some shrewd empirical rules for exerting an 
 influence upon the human mind. But we find ourselves 
 in no such desperate position, but take up our investi- 
 gation again, precisely at the same point where w r e 
 dropped it in order to explain some subjects which pre- 
 sented themselves, by the aid of the principles which had 
 been established, and proceed in the deduction of the 
 laws, according to which a free being may exert influence 
 upon other free beings. The first was : the orator must 
 subordinate his particular Idea to the universal and neces- 
 sary Ideas of his hearers; and upon this was based all that 
 we have thus far developed. It is now incumbent upon 
 us to lay down the remaining laws which are to be ob- 
 served in this case, and to show how they, and they only, 
 are the best and sole means of attaining the end which 
 the orator must of necessity prescribe to himself, viz., 
 the production of Affection. 
 
 He, therefore, who, as a free being, would work upon 
 other free beings, and has already brought his particular 
 Idea into harmony with their innate and necessary Ideas, 
 must, in the first place, closely adapt his method of treat- 
 ing the subject to existing circumstances and relations. 
 He must, in the second place, with all this reference to 
 the position in which he finds himself, with all the resist- 
 ance or avoidance of the obstacles which he meets in his 
 path, at the same time be shut up and continue in one 
 constant, unceasing, progressive process. But since, in 
 the third place, through this advancing movement, the 
 entire relation of the orator is every moment changing, 
 assuming another form and shape, every element of his 
 activity must likewise be distinguished by a particular 
 form and shape; and as his method, as a whole, was 
 adapted to the relations which he found already existing, 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 155 
 
 so each of the steps in it must be in harmony with these 
 changes brought about by himself. 
 
 These three laws, — the first of which we denominate 
 the law of Adaptation, the second the law of Constant 
 Progress, the third the law of Vivacity, — we shall now 
 examine, and endeavor to apply to Eloquence, as the 
 means of exciting Affection. 
 
156 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE I OR, 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE LAW OF ADAPTATION. 
 
 It is not merely a maxim of good sense, it is an ethical 
 law, that our influence upon others should be adapted to 
 the circumstances under which it is attempted to be 
 exercised. These circumstances are no other than our 
 relations to our fellow-men, which again are determined 
 by their particular individuality, and by all that is con- 
 nected with this. But every man demands that his indi- 
 viduality be respected, and although he acknowledges 
 that it can and must undergo modifications, he never- 
 theless demands that these consist not in the suppres- 
 sion, but in the cultivation and elevation of what is 
 already existing within him. Since this is a demand 
 which every man makes, and since it is a moral law, that 
 we so harmonize our claims with those of others, that 
 they can coexist with each other, this same law imposes 
 upon us the obligation to respect their individuality,^ e., 
 in our method of procedure to adapt ourselves to exist- 
 ing relations and circumstances. For in endeavoring to 
 realize an Idea, we assert and maintain our own individ- 
 uality ; but in order that this may not be done at the 
 expense, or by the suppression, of the individuality of 
 others, the preponderance which we are endeavoring to 
 acquire must be made easy and compensated for, by the 
 closest possible insinuation of our own individuality into 
 that of our hearers. Hence arose the first duty to fuse 
 our Ideas with theirs ; hence arises, now, the second duty 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 157 
 
 of recognizing their individuality while asserting our 
 own, and of employing the greatest carefulness while 
 penetrating into anything that can possibly be regarded 
 as belonging to it. But since, according to what we 
 have before affirmed, the highest virtue is also the high- 
 est good sense, the employment of this moral adaptation, 
 while we are endeavoring to exert an influence upon 
 others, will be the surest means, and the necessary con- 
 dition, of securing a successful result. It is this by 
 which the practical man, in the higher and better sense 
 of the word, is distinguished ; and if his method is uni- 
 formly characterized by this quality, and for this reason 
 is never fruitless, we should, while ascribing good sense 
 to him, at the same time not overlook the moral ground 
 and source of this quality. There are men who at first 
 sight inspire confidence, because they assert a distinctive 
 and superior individuality with dignity, and set it forth 
 with modesty, while at the same time they concede its 
 full rights to the individuality of every other man. Hardly 
 have they commenced the management of a difficult case, 
 when all obstacles and opposition vanish, because every 
 hearer, on seeing them proceed, is soon convinced that 
 their influence upon him can result only in his own 
 benefit. These are the men who control and give direc- 
 tion to social life, and to such examples must we look if 
 we would obtain a true and lively notion of the dis- 
 tinctive peculiarity of the orator. On the contrary? there 
 are persons who are ever ready and desirous to exert 
 a good influence upon others, but who, because they 
 always bring forward their propositions at the wrong 
 time, and are not able to adapt them to the individual 
 peculiarities of those with whom they have to do, inva- 
 riably fail in their plans and enterprises ; good men, per- 
 
 14 
 
158 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 haps, and yet, without doubt, men who need a higher 
 moral cultivation. They are the genuinely unrhetorical 
 natures, exactly adapted to place clearly and plainly be- 
 fore the eye, what the orator should not be. 
 
 Now the law of Adaptation is as valid in relation to a 
 rhetorical, as it is in relation to a moral procedure, and 
 imparts to it, if it is formed after it, certain qualities 
 which are of an ethical origin, and which, at the same 
 time, may be regarded as the best means of exciting 
 Affection. 
 
 In the first place, an oration adapted to existing rela- 
 tions, will be so suited to the hearer's power of compre- 
 hension, as that it will neither strain it to over-exertion, 
 nor leave it unemployed. For the power of comprehen- 
 sion depends upon the learning and intellectual culti- 
 vation of the hearer, along with which it forms a part, 
 and indeed a very essential part, of his individuality, 
 which is to be respected by the orator, and which he 
 would offend against in an inexcusable manner, if he 
 should fatigue it by too great obscurity, or too great 
 plainness, in his discourse. And since, in order to avoid 
 both these faults, a very accurate acquaintance with the 
 Public whom he addresses is necessary, and one which 
 he cannot obtain without a diligent study of it, he is 
 obligated to engage in this study ; otherwise, he would 
 incur the very same blame which he does, who under- 
 takes a particular business, and neglects to acquire the 
 knowledge necessary to its prosecution. It is indeed 
 true, that, even among the same class of hearers, the 
 degree of cultivation in each one is different ; yet, it is 
 easy to strike a mean, and from this to form the image, 
 if I may so say, of a universal or model hearer ; and this 
 image, if the orator keep it constantly before him, and 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 159 
 
 address all he has to say to it, will keep him from the 
 two extremes above mentioned. 
 
 If an orator is not able to form a correct judgment 
 respecting the Public which he is to address, or to occupy 
 their attention in a manner adapted to their power 
 of attention, this cannot be regarded as a natural and 
 unavoidable defect, and so be merely matter of regret, 
 but must be considered as a moral defect ; for his inade- 
 quateness ought not to have escaped his notice, and he 
 should have given up a profession to which he had not 
 become equal, especially since, in the majority of cases, 
 he might have made up for what was wanting in natural 
 talent, by persevering diligence. Nay, even if the orator 
 possesses the greatest natural talents, it will be impos- 
 sible for him to form a correct judgment respecting the 
 intellectual state of cultivated hearers, and to adapt his 
 conceptions to theirs, unless he possesses scientific and 
 learned culture ; this, therefore, he should acquire ; ig- 
 norance in him is to be regarded as weakness of moral 
 character, and as such, is to incur moral condemnation. 
 Here, again, we see how, in the case of the orator, the 
 activity of all his powers is, or should be, under the 
 guidance of a moral principle. 
 
 In the acquisition of learned and scientific culture, he 
 is to set no limits to himself; let him go as far as he may 
 and can ; let him keep even step with his age, or let him 
 press on before it ; only let him never forget that learn- 
 ing and science, for him as an orator, are only means, 
 and not ends, and that he may not put the exhibition of 
 what he has made his own in these departments, in the 
 place of the moral Ideas which he is to set before the 
 popular mind. This would be a vanity intrinsically 
 contrary to morality ; it would cause him to lose sight 
 
160 
 
 entirely of the hearer's power of comprehension, and 
 oftentimes to present things that would weary the atten- 
 tion of his audience to no purpose, or only awaken ob- 
 scure images, instead of distinct conceptions ; and this 
 is the second, and, as it appears from investigation, very 
 culpable error, which the law of Adaptation forbids, in 
 respect to the hearer's power of comprehension. 
 
 In this adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power 
 of comprehension, which, as we have seen, is of an 
 ethical origin, we find the first means of exciting Affec- 
 tion. In order that the hearer may be induced to take 
 part in a series of conceptions, it is absolutely necessary 
 that the activity which is required of him be not fatiguing 
 in its nature ; in case it were fatiguing, it would soon 
 become irksome to him, and he would surrender himself 
 to an inactivity that would render all further efforts of 
 the orator fruitless. And even if the hearer should be 
 willing to exert himself, to attentively follow a discourse 
 which taxed his powers to the utmost by its obscurity, yet 
 the too great stretch of the power of comprehension 
 would exert a deadening influence upon feeling and 
 imagination, and would render it impossible to excite 
 them. But the power of attention is weakened by the 
 too great plainness, as well as the too great obscurity, of 
 that which is presented to it, and the gentler stirrings of 
 Affection will ever disdain to wake at the bidding of an 
 orator who cannot even satisfy the understanding. 
 
 Here, I fear, I shall be met with the objection, that he 
 who has good sense enough to see the correctness of the 
 remarks just made, will need nothing more than this 
 good sense itself, in order to direct himself accordingly, 
 and to impart to his oration the right relation to the 
 hearer's powers of comprehension, so that the moral qual- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 161 
 
 ities and character of the orator need not come into 
 account at all. This may have actually been the case 
 in Athens, and in Rome, with many a demagogue ; yet, 
 such an example would prove nothing here; for he who 
 in Athens, or Rome, should have set forth something 
 utterly unintelligible, would have been immediately 
 driven off* from the bema by the scorn and laughter of 
 his impatient hearers. Under these circumstances, there- 
 fore, where the necessity of following the rules above 
 mentioned was so clear and pressing, the moral character 
 and qualities requisite in other circumstances, might, 
 perhaps, have been dispensed with in the orator; but 
 from the fact, that a bad man may be compelled, by cir- 
 cumstances of a highly pressing nature, to a certain 
 method of procedure, it cannot be inferred that this 
 method of procedure is not of an ethical nature, and 
 that, other things being equal, the bad man can succeed 
 in it as well as the good. For only contemplate, for a 
 moment, the sacred orator of our own times, whose re- 
 lation to his hearers is far more unhampered than that 
 of the ancient orator, since they cannot react upon him 
 in a manner so totally destructive of success, as in the 
 case above mentioned, and how difficult, nay, how impos- 
 sible, it often seems, even for men of the shrewdest good 
 sense, men whom no one can deny to be capable of 
 forming a correct estimate of the capacity of their 
 audience, to keep themselves in their discourse upon 
 the right level, and neither too high nor too low. Car- 
 ried away by complacency in something which they 
 have learned or originated, they at one time require im- 
 possibilities of the hearer's power of comprehension; at 
 another, from mere habit, sticking to common-places, 
 they set forth that which is perfectly well known to their 
 
 14* 
 
162 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 audience, m a prolix and wearisome manner. Does not 
 the former testify of too great vanity and self-compla- 
 cency, which are certainly faults of a moral nature ; and 
 does not the latter, as does all supine yielding to mere 
 habit, presuppose a lack of strength and elasticity in the 
 character ? 
 
 Thus it is apparent that even this excellence in an 
 oration — viz., that it is adapted to the hearer's power 
 of comprehension — although it is only a very subor- 
 dinate excellence, cannot be reached without qualities in 
 the orator that are morally good. If I have succeeded 
 in demonstrating the truth of this assertion, I believe 
 I have thereby done those young men no little service, 
 who are devoting themselves to Eloquence. Science 
 and learning prepare them beforehand for an office in 
 which science and learning can no longer be the prin- 
 cipal object of their endeavors, but must be subordinated 
 to the higher aim, to the attainment of which they are 
 subservient. That this higher aim is actually a higher, 
 it will be very difficult for them to understand, especially 
 since the instruction at the common and higher schools, 
 as these have hitherto been constituted, exhibits learning 
 and science to them as the highest of all things, to which 
 nothing, religion and morality not excepted, should be 
 preferred. In vain, therefore, are they now urged to 
 banish everything purely scientific, both in Matter and 
 Form, from their discourses ; they despise this rule, 
 which appears to them only as timid concession, and 
 which, it cannot be denied, is commonly represented to 
 them as such, by their teachers ; in default of the Pro- 
 fessor's chair, they would employ the Pulpit instead of 
 it, and would make the bold attempt to raise the people 
 to the heights where they themselves are soaring. If 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 163 
 
 they finally come back from their error, yet the loss of 
 heart and inspiration often causes them to sink down 
 into superficiality and common-place. If, on the con- 
 trary, this accommodation of discourse to the hearer's 
 power of comprehension is not a mere shrewd and skil- 
 ful concession, but a perfectly moral procedure, if the 
 opposite to it is contrary to duty, and if it is exhibited 
 from this point of view, a young and noble mind will 
 readily follow a rule, the observance of which it believes 
 does not degrade, but, on the contrary, elevates and 
 ennobles. 
 
 Yet the law of Adaptation requires not only that the 
 oration be adapted to the capacity of the hearer, but 
 also that the orator have reference to his whole individ- 
 uality, to his position, his relations, to the occurrences 
 which enter deeply into, and determine, his fortune and 
 fate. And this kind of adaptation is far more difficult to 
 attain than the first. In order to this, it is necessary 
 that the orator know, and have before his eye, the innu- 
 merable elements which enter into the civil, moral, 
 and religious condition of man ; namely, the circle of 
 his ideas and experiences, the thoughts that are com- 
 mon or foreign to him, the images with which his imagi- 
 nation is commonly employed, the more or less perfect 
 Ideal of happiness, of civil, moral, religious perfection, 
 which floats before him, his virtues and vices, his wishes 
 and desires, together with all the more intimate modifica- 
 tions imparted to his individuality by standing in society, 
 by wealth, by political events, by the condition of the 
 Church and State to which he belongs. 
 
 This Adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power 
 of comprehension, the best teachers of Rhetoric seem to 
 have recognized as a means of exciting the Affections 
 
I 
 
 164 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 (in their sense indeed, according to which they were 
 merely Passions) ; at least, I know no other reason why 
 Aristotle in his Rhetoric, immediately after presenting 
 the theory of the Passions, follows with a description of 
 the manners of men, according to their age, rank, and 
 wealth,* although he does not explain what use the 
 orator is to make of this latter knowledge. 
 
 Cicero, also, would have the orator be a shrewd and 
 subtle man, who has thoroughly scrutinized the character 
 and mode of thought of his hearers, according to their 
 age and standing in society,! an d he only errs in ex- 
 pecting of shrewdness and subtlety what may be best 
 accomplished by morality. A crafty man may indeed 
 succeed in detecting this or that weak side of a character, 
 in order to attach to it the threads by which he would 
 lead it ; but in order to so enter into, and feel, the views, 
 the sentiments, and the position of a man, as to be able 
 to address his whole individuality in a manner to benefit 
 and elevate, something more than craftiness is needed; 
 shrewd good sense is indeed needed, but such as is under 
 the guidance of moral feeling, and that disinterested 
 benevolence which readily surrenders itself up to sym- 
 pathy with men, and to the contemplation of the objects 
 in which they are interested. 
 
 Furthermore, the knowledge of the hearer's capacity 
 thus obtained, should not be used to favor his errors and 
 to flatter his passions, but it should be employed to 
 
 * Rhet. Lib. IT. c. xii. — xvii. 
 
 t Acuto homine nobis opus est, et natura usuque callido, qui sagaciter 
 pervestiget, quid sui cives, iique homines quibus aliquid dicendo persuadere 
 velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, expectent. Teneat oportet venas cu- 
 jusque generis, aetatis, ordinis, et eorum apud quos aliquid aget aut erit ac- 
 turus, mentes sensusque degustet. — De Orat. I. 51 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 165 
 
 excite the Affections in a negative way at first, — L e., to 
 avoid all that might displease, and so injure the hearer 
 as such, or that might render things in themselves indif- 
 ferent to him matters of offence. Without this care 
 beforehand, the excitement of Affection is not to be 
 thought of. In vain does the orator speak with fire and ! 
 emphasis ; in vain is the hearer inclined to suffer himself 
 to be warmed and animated by the Idea which the 
 orator imparts to him, if the orator detains or wearies 
 him, in the way to the goal in view, by a thousand minor 
 matters irksome in their nature. And this is no undue 
 or sickly sensibility on the part of the hearer, for the 
 claim itself, which I as an orator make upon him, to en- 
 tirely surrender himself in one respect to me, imposes 
 the duty upon me to spare him as much as possible in 
 all other respects. Hence, the orator also, if he is en- 
 dowed with true moral wisdom, must know how to go 
 around all the difficulties which he cannot at the mo- 
 ment overcome ; this is at once duty and good sense. 
 Thus, the Apostle Paul, in order the better to reach his 
 great aim, spared the prejudices of his contemporaries, 
 and became all things to all men, if by any means he might 
 save some. 
 
 The orators of antiquity, Demosthenes perhaps alone 
 excepted, because they did not apprehend the true ground 
 of this Adaptation in the oration, sometimes practised a 
 species of artifice and trickery as unworthy of a high- 
 minded man, as it was useless towards the attainment 
 of their aim. When Cicero pretended that he could not 
 call to mind the name of Polycletus, and it was men- 
 tioned to him aloud by one of the bystanders,* he, with- 
 
 * Verrina, IV. 3. — Wolf ad Leptineam, p. 300. 
 
166 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 out doubt, intended by this seeming ignorance of the 
 history of Grecian Art, to fall in with the notion of his 
 fellow-citizens, that to employ one's self with such ob- 
 jects as those of Art was unworthy of a statesman. 
 For my part, I can see in this only an excess of Rhetor- 
 ical Adaptation, and, consequently, something contrary 
 to morality. Moreover, I do not understand of what 
 use this little piece of trickery could be to a man who 
 knew how to set such mighty springs in motion. But it 
 is the fate of all one-sided endeavors, to soon degenerate 
 into the production of mere form without substance. 
 This was very soon the case with ancient Eloquence, 
 because the Ancients misapprehended the moral* nature 
 of Eloquence, and regarded it only as an instrument for 
 the attainment of ambitious designs.* 
 
 * An artifice similar to this of Cicero's, only still more shrewd and cun- 
 ning, is attributed to Demosthenes, in order to explain the following passage 
 in the oration for Ctesiphon : " For I fthus he addresses -/Eschines), and 
 all these with me, call you a hireling, first of Philip and now of Alexander ! 
 If you doubt, ask these present ; but I will rather do it for you. Does it 
 seem to you, Athenians, that JEschines is a hireling or a guest of Alexander ? 
 Do you hear what they say? " — Von Returner's Translation, p. 122. — Here, 
 say the Scholiasts, Demosthenes purposely pronounced the word ^KT^(ar6s, 
 with an incorrect accent, and represented the exclamation of the hearers, 
 who repeated the word in order to correct the pronunciation, as an answer 
 to his question, and as a declaration on their part that they regarded ^Es- 
 el lines as an hireling. This explanation is given upon the authority of the 
 Scholiasts, and, so far as I know, is accepted by many, because the reader 
 is particularly delighted with discovering such artifices in orators ; but that 
 it is tfie correct one, I doubt. Certainly such a misplacing of the accent 
 would have offended the ears of the Athenians extremely, and might have 
 occasioned an exclamatory correction on their part ; but could this same ex- 
 citable public have thus coolly entered into the deception, and pretended to 
 pronounce a judgment respecting JEschines, when they only corrected De- 
 mosthenes % It seems to me, that Demosthenes, by this artifice, in reality so 
 impertinent to the occasion, would not have won over the minds of his hear- 
 ers, but would have only exasperated them. But besides this, while exam- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 167 
 
 If such an extreme Adaptation on the part of the 
 orator is to be condemned, the opposite fault, namely, 
 striking violently against existing and unalterable rela- 
 tions, is likewise to be regarded as contrary to morality, 
 and contrary to good sense. A shock of this kind anni- 
 hilates immediately the effect of the most powerful ora-( 
 tion, and we need only to examine the sort of displeasure 
 which is excited by it, in order to see that the orator who 
 has committed the fault in question, is chargeable, not 
 with a defect in good sense, or in productive genius, but, 
 what is far worse, in moral feeling. If an audience should 
 be so obtuse as not to be offended by mistakes of this 
 kind, — and this is oftener the case than one would think, 
 — this indeed renders the labor of the orator easier on 
 the one side, but it renders it more difficult on the other; 
 for, as the audience does not perceive the want of Adap- 
 tation, neither will it perceive the presence of Adaptation 
 in an oration. The orator, therefore, should congratulate 
 himself only in an audience that is cultivated enough to 
 be displeased with the slightest unbefitting expression ; 
 if he does not find his audience to be of such a character, 
 he must seek to elevate it to this height, while he shows 
 it a respect which it will certainly learn more and more 
 to estimate and understand. 
 
 inihg the orations of Demosthenes, we should at least consider what is due 
 to his character, the dignity of which, even though but half recognized, must 
 protect him from the suspicion of having meddled with such miserable con- 
 ceits ; we should consider that in this most tragic hour of his life, his strongly 
 exercised soul could only hurl bolt-like ideas and not play with accents. 
 Moreover, what is more natural than to suppose, as an explanation of- this 
 passage, that he could from the first reckon upon a strong party among the 
 audience, and might anticipate that they would answer the question accord- 
 ing to his wishes ? This much more befitting explanation is also found in 
 the Scholiasts, who ascribe this answer to a friend of the orator, the comic 
 poet Menander. 
 
168 
 
 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 But with respect to what he may venture upon, and 
 what he may not venture upon, let the orator decide, not 
 according to the conjectures of worldly shrewdness and 
 sense, but according to moral principles; the hardest 
 and strongest statements, provided only they are adapted 
 and suitable, provided only the orator is called upon by 
 virtue of his office and his calling to make them, will 
 never do injury ; they will never weaken, but will always 
 strengthen the effect of his oration, and the Affection 
 which he would produce. How cultivated was the feel- 
 ing for the Becoming and the Adapted, in the Athenians 
 in the time of Demosthenes, and yet this orator never 
 feared to charge home upon them, with the greatest force 
 and impressiveness, their degeneracy, their failures and 
 weaknesses ; and I am not aware that he ever injured 
 the effect of his orations by the freedom which was so 
 unmistakably connected with his love for his country 
 and the existing constitution. Still less should the 
 sacred orator fear to depict moral and religious corrup- 
 tion, according to its true reality, and to terrify the im- 
 penitent sinner by the retributions of the future life. He 
 who omits to do this from fear of estranging his audience 
 from himself, does not consider that the hearer altogether 
 involuntarily judges of the orator according to moral 
 rules, and allows him to venture upon all that he may 
 rightfully venture upon ; that the most vehement charges 
 do not exasperate him, provided only he sees that the 
 orator, by virtue of the relation in which he stands to 
 himself, is justified therein ; nay, that there is a propen- 
 sity in the moral and religious nature of man, which is 
 closely akin to the propensity for the Terrible and Sub- 
 lime, by virtue of which he is better pleased with a 
 merited humiliation, that may lead to better senti- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 169 
 
 ments, than with that superficial emotion which is gen- 
 erated by flattering and specious discourse. Thus the 
 renowned orators who spoke before Louis XIV. and his 
 court, — an auditory who surely would never have par- 
 doned the slightest impropriety in them, — often em- 
 ployed and applied all the terrors of religion, and all the 
 censorial power of their office, and always with the 
 greatest effect. 
 
 While, on the one hand, Adaptation in the oration pre- 
 vents every offence that might suppress Affection in the 
 hearer, on the other it contributes directly to the awaken- 
 ing of Affection. If, namely, the orator moves in a cir- 
 cle of such thoughts, images, and allusions, as recall into 
 memory the experiences of the hearer himself, and the 
 scenes of which he was himself a witness, the oration 
 must influence with double power. For in this w T ay the 
 Idea is not merely made clear and distinct to his mind, 
 but since the orator associates it with all that the hearer 
 has himself thought and felt, the whole inner being of 
 the hearer is taken possession of, and that inward fer- 
 mentation, which we denominate Affection, is awakened. 
 There may be many forms of expression suitable to the 
 thought, and intelligible to the hearer ; but there is per- 
 haps still another in particular, by which a region of his 
 mind enveloped in darkness may be suddenly filled with 
 light, and which at least strikes some of the manifold 
 threads of which the web of his feelings consist; this 
 latter form the orator should know how to find, and he 
 will be enabled to find it by means of that study of his 
 hearers which is grounded in an interest for their well- 
 being. If he should prefer another mode of presenta- 
 tion, to this form of clothing his thought, this would be 
 an egotistic procedure that would punish itself bv the 
 
 15 
 
170 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 inefficiency of the oration. But the occasional oration 
 shows how strong the impression is, which can be pro- 
 duced by the wise use of feelings already existing in its 
 hearers. If the preacher speaks on the occasion of the 
 opening of a campaign, or of a festival in commemo- 
 ration of a victory or a peace, he may, in this instance, 
 presuppose the existence in the hearers of certain pre- 
 vailing views and opinions, certain hopes and fears, cer- 
 tain feelings of joy and thankfulness, with greater cer- 
 tainty than in the case of ordinary discourses, when the 
 relations that exist are not so determinate and precise ; 
 and if he understands, with only moderate wisdom, how 
 to converge all these different rays into the focus of his 
 leading Idea, he will be able to raise his Idea to a very 
 high grade of Affection in the mind of the auditor. 
 This is the reason why the effect of sermons on festival 
 occasions is always greater than that of ordinary dis- 
 courses on the Sabbath. In the former case, the hearer, 
 however unfavorable his mental state may be for the 
 purposes of the orator, nevertheless, always brings with 
 him some sentiments of a religious character, upon 
 which the orator can very easily fasten. 
 
 It also belongs to this Adaptation in the oration, that 
 the orator never rise into expressions, phrases, and images 
 that are above the language of cultivated society, even 
 before an auditory that would be able to follow a higher 
 style of thought, and to understand more exquisite modes 
 of speech. I mention this for the sake of those who 
 think they impart a peculiar dignity and force to their 
 discourse, by the use of poetic ornament, by employing 
 words which they bring forth from the dust of past cen- 
 turies, and by constructions which are foreign to pure 
 prose. But this is always only a cold show without 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 171 
 
 power, — if power, as I affirm, can mean nothing else 
 than the efficiency of the oration in exciting Affection. 
 In the throng of active life, amidst heart-rending mis- 
 fortunes, during the silent hours of contemplation, does 
 the hearer make known his thoughts and feelings to 
 himself and to others, in a highly flowery style, and in 
 strange, unusual phraseology ? Certainly not. The 
 style of expression which spontaneously associates itself 
 w T ith the silent emotions of our heart, when they come 
 forth into consciousness, is always as noble as it is sim- 
 ple; if, therefore, the orator would penetrate into our 
 inner life, and renew again the traces of forgotten 
 thoughts and feelings, if he would actually address us, 
 he must employ the very same well-known and cus- 
 tomary language in which we are wont to commune 
 with ourselves. Every strange expression, nay, every 
 unusual phrase, tears us away from ourselves, instead of 
 leading us back into ourselves ; and the stream of in- 
 ward harmonies, which perhaps was on the point of 
 flowing forth, suddenly breaks upon such unexpected 
 obstacles, and is dissipated. Moreover, with the dis- 
 turbance of this flow is connected displeasure towards a 
 man who decks himself out in a showy costume of 
 sounding phrases, which, after all, are not so very diffi- 
 cult to collect together, instead of employing my com- 
 mon, every-day language along with me, to his own true 
 advantage, as well as mine. Those very rare instances 
 when the speaker selects an unusual expression for an 
 unusual thought, are of course excepted here; but to 
 allow one's self in even the slightest departure from 
 ordinary language, unless there is some particular reason 
 to justify it, seems to me to be unadapted to the oration, 
 and contrary to its aim, and is therefore, according to 
 
172 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 the theory of Eloquence here laid down, morally blame- 
 worthy. 
 
 It will of course be understood in this connection, that 
 I do not intend to disapprove of the use of Bible lan- 
 guage ; on the contrary, I would recommend to all 
 sacred orators the frequent employment of the expres- 
 sions and images of the sacred Scriptures, as a highly 
 adapted and effectual means of exciting Affection, pro- 
 vided only they be not brought in merely to fill up empty 
 space, but are fused into the discourse, retaining their 
 whole dignity and force. They are highly adapted ; for 
 the language of the Bible can never become antiquated, 
 because it affords so many highly significant expressions 
 for the manifold conditions of human life and states of 
 the human heart, many of which appear as proverbial 
 phrases in the language of common intercourse ; and 
 however much religious education, and the reading of 
 the Bible, may have been neglected, the orator may yet, 
 in the case of the generality of hearers, reckon with cer- 
 tainty upon a thought being understood sooner in a 
 Biblical than in a Philosophical dress. But the great 
 power of Bible language, in awakening Affection, con- 
 sists principally in this : that, in it, the expression for the 
 understanding, and the expression for the feelings, are 
 not different, as in merely human representations, but 
 are always one and the same. The figures, so frequent 
 in the Bible, while they have all the precision of an ab- 
 stract terminology, at the same time transfer the idea 
 into the web of human relationships, and clothe it with 
 all that can exert influence upon the mind ; they are a 
 ray which unites in one, both light and heat, and passes 
 over from the mind into the heart, thus kindling the 
 whole man. If now, as is often the case, a sentence 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 173 
 
 from the Bible, on our first meeting with it, or upon 
 after-occasions, has awakened a whole series of pious 
 emotions, the orator, by citing it as he passes on, can 
 evoke anew the Affection which has already become con- 
 nected with it, and can apply it to the purposes of his 
 oration. On account of this great advantage, I would 
 advise the employment of the language of the Bible, 
 even though the orator cannot presuppose that the 
 hearer is acquainted with it, or that it has ever con- 
 tributed to awaken his inward life ; for by this frequent 
 employment of it, this closer acquaintance, and this in- 
 influence upon the mind, will be brought about by 
 degrees. 
 
 But that which prevents the orator from entering into 
 the conceptions of his hearers, speaking to them in their 
 own language, and exciting Affection by the Adaptation 
 of his discourse to the individuality, is, in the last an- 
 alysis of it, nothing but a moral defect. In the main, it 
 is that self-complacent vanity which only desires the 
 pleasure of expressing itself strikingly and agreeably, 
 and which shrinks from the difficult and oftentimes 
 violent effort which is requisite in order to go out from 
 self, and into another individuality. From this weakness 
 arise, in sacred Eloquence, the loosely constructed, flow- 
 ery orations, which, indeed, since they are adapted to 
 excite the fancy of the hearer, often meet w r ith enthusi- 
 astic applause (inasmuch as men generally, blinded by 
 their own vanity, seldom set such an estimate upon the 
 vanity of others, and chastise it, as it deserves), yet 
 whose idle play of thoughts and images can never pro- 
 duce a noble Affection urging on to great resolves. Sec- 
 ondly, there is also a certain aversion to the process in 
 question, which may be found even in noble and tender 
 
 15* 
 
174 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 minds, and which prevents them from entering into the 
 relations of their hearers, seizing their hearts with a 
 strong grasp, and thus giving to their discourse that 
 Adaptation which awakens Affection. If an orator ab- 
 sorbs himself entirely in the Idea, and develops it with 
 great carefulness, but touches only superficially and 
 generally upon the relations in which it is to be realized, 
 in order not to strike against any obstacle, or to give 
 offence to any one, we may presuppose with certainty 
 the existence of the very aversion above mentioned. 
 Thirdly, too great yielding on the part of the orator in 
 sacrificing his Idea and his individuality, and in employ- 
 ing himself solely with the relations and inclinations of 
 his hearers, in order to say something agreeable and 
 pleasing to them, deserves the very same, if not greater, 
 moral condemnation, with the faults already mentioned, 
 and exerts the same debilitating influence upon the dis- 
 course. An orator who is thus moved, often lets his 
 hearers melt away in powerless emotion ; but he will 
 never kindle in them a true Affection, since the clear ray 
 of his Idea, by which alone this is to be accomplished, 
 never breaks through the veil which surrounds it. Thus 
 we have specified three errors : absorption in self, ab- 
 sorption in the Idea of the oration, absorption in the 
 relations of the hearers. If a Rhetorical presentation 
 of thought has a decided preponderance to one of these 
 three sides, it lacks Adaptation, and is so far powerless. 
 In order, therefore, to speak with perfect Adaptation, the 
 orator must so bring together, unite, and reconcile these 
 three different claims, which his own individuality, the 
 Idea of his oration, and the relations of his hearers, 
 make upon him, as that each one of them be satisfied 
 without any disparagement to the others : and in order 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 175 
 
 to do this, nothing more is necessary, than is required in 
 order to any truly moral action, — namely, a constantly 
 clear consciousness of our own individuality, of the Idea 
 according to which, and of the relations in which, we act. 
 But in order to the solution of this problem, extremely 
 great strength of character in rhetorical as well as in 
 moral respects, is necessary ; and how very much both 
 are one and the same in essence is seen in the fact, that 
 orations, which are excellent both as rhetorical and moral 
 processes, are not distinguished by any outward brilli- 
 ancy and splendor ; for when the three different elements 
 above mentioned are fused together, their colors flow into 
 each other, while, on the contrary, imperfect orations, for 
 the very reason that some one of these elements appears 
 separated from the others, provided they are elaborated 
 with any tolerable degree of ability, readily acquire a 
 brilliancy which astonishes the ignorant hearer, but 
 which truly enlivens neither him nor any one else. 
 
 In this respect Demosthenes deserves the very highest 
 praise, since no orator has ever united with such a dig- 
 nified presentation of his own individuality, and such a 
 transparent development of his Idea, such an all-com- 
 prehending reference to existing relations ; and from the 
 constant fusion of these three constituents originates his 
 forcible simplicity, which would have been totally de- 
 stroyed, if, in his orations, the lyrical and the phil- 
 osophical elements had ever been separated from the 
 real and practical. On the other hand, Cicero, is far 
 less deserving of being set up as a model of Adaptation 
 in the oration ; not that he ever rises above his hearer's 
 power of comprehension, or brings forward anything 
 unbefitting and offensive, but at one time his own indi- 
 viduality, at another, his Idea, at another, the existing 
 circumstances, are too prominent ; and that one of these 
 
176 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 three elements which is predominant at any time, throws 
 the other two into the shade. But on account of this 
 very fault, his coloring is more brilliant than that of 
 Demosthenes, and he can, in general, be understood w T ith 
 less laborious study into the relations of the age in 
 which he appeared.* 
 
 Without wishing in the least to compare Massillon 
 with Demosthenes, or Bossuet with Cicero, they never- 
 theless have this similarity : that Massillon, like the Gre- 
 cian orator, without giving up himself and his Idea, 
 realizes to himself, in the most accurate manner, the life 
 of his hearers ; on the contrary, Bossuet, and indeed, as 
 I conjecture, on account of a less pure character, almost 
 entirely neglects this latter reference. For this reason, 
 Massillon inspires us, and we forget to admire him, — 
 the highest praise that can be given to the orator ; on 
 the contrary, Bossuet excites, even by his most sublime 
 religious elevation, nothing but cold admiration, or, at 
 most, an inflammation of the fancy that is morally useless. 
 If, moreover, the French themselves almost always place 
 Bossuet before Massillon, this only proves, like many 
 other judgments of their critics, how little they know 
 how to recognize and estimate that which is truly excel- 
 lent in their own literature. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 TASTE. 
 
 What Taste properly is, is as much a matter of dis- 
 pute, as is the place which it should hold in a theory of 
 Art, and the influence which should be conceded to it in 
 the production and criticism of works of Art. Indeed, 
 
 * See Note I., page 207. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 177 
 
 the attempt has been made in modern times to bring it 
 into utter condemnation, and to strip it of all influence, 
 as a perverted principle which we have derived from the 
 French; yet since the Public, however much it may 
 have been enjoined upon it not to exercise Taste in its 
 judgments, does not, nevertheless, cease to regard its re- 
 quisitions as valid, and since, moreover, Taste sometimes 
 unconsciously influences the judgments of those who 
 despise it, it would seem that it only needs to be seen in 
 the right light, and to be placed in the right position, in 
 order to be universally recognized. It can, indeed, find 
 no place in such theories as recognize no other rules for 
 Art but those which the imagination imposes upon itself; 
 for Taste will never have any connection with the imagi- 
 nation, so long as the imagination works separate from 
 the other faculties of the soul. But in this very separa- 
 tion lies the fault ; for how is it possible that Art, which, 
 from its nature, is to seize upon the whole man, should 
 excite into action the imagination alone, and not the 
 other powers also ? And even if this should be the case, 
 still the ethical power, although it will not indeed pre- 
 dominate in Art as it does in Rhetoric, will certainly not 
 be without influence upon the impulse of the imagina- 
 tion predominant in it. 
 
 In the ability, then, of working according to ethical 
 Ideas, I would seek the source of Taste, and affirm that 
 Taste is nothing but the selection of the Becoming and 
 Adapted (to irpeirov), guided by ethical Ideas. Its proper 
 home, therefore, is within the sphere of Eloquence ; or 
 rather, its sphere should be extended over the whole 
 practical life of the orator, since regard for the individual 
 peculiarities of his fellow-men, and for the relations in 
 which he finds himself to them, should accompany him 
 
178 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J ORj 
 
 at all times. But if Taste has become a moral habit in 
 him, I do not see how he can suddenly drop it, when he 
 turns back from the circle of his outward activity into 
 himself, in order to unfold the Ideas of his imagination, 
 and how he can here speak with himself in a language, 
 and make use of a manner of representation, which he 
 would never allow himself in, in his relations to his 
 fellow-men. Taste, in the above-given sense, should 
 therefore extend itself over all Poetry ; the Ideas of the 
 imagination must be made to pass through this medium ; 
 and if this is done, they will themselves gain in liveli- 
 ness, and their embodiment in power and perfection. 
 For in order to make his work a living whole, in order 
 to give it individuality, the artist must impart to it 
 characteristics of the most precise stamp ; and some 
 of them will always be failures, unless, besides the 
 other relations in which the work originated, the moral 
 relations also are to be recognized in it by the regard 
 paid to them. But Eloquence, in respect to Taste, must 
 always differ from Poetry, in that, in the case of Elo- 
 quence, the selection of the Becoming and Adapted is 
 accompanied with the design of exciting Affection, while 
 Taste in the poet, on the contrary, is a quality that 
 works without any design in view, except the mere pro- 
 duction of Beauty. Moreover, the term Taste, so offen- 
 sive to many, would not be so unsuitable to denote such 
 a separating, selecting principle as has been spoken of; 
 while, at the same time, it would occur to us, that as the 
 sensuous Taste manifests itself differently in different 
 persons, so also the moral Taste does not pass the same 
 judgments in Eloquence and Poetry, in different ages 
 and relations; for although the rule remains ever the 
 same, it is modified by circumstances in the most mani- 
 fold way. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 179 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE LAW OF CONSTANT PROGRESS. 
 
 After having previously become acquainted with the 
 main parts into which the oration divides, we have now 
 also seen what should be the nature of the subordinate 
 representations by which the Ideas are developed. But 
 the question now arises, as well in respect to those main 
 parts, as to these subordinate representations : By what 
 law are their order and succession determined? We 
 set forth here the law of constant Progress, and have, in 
 the first place, to show that this is an ethical principle. 
 
 Not only should the inward moral development of 
 man, considered as a striving after perfection never to 
 be absolutely reached, be a constant progress, but also 
 when in active life he attempts the actualization of an 
 ethical Idea, he should seek to approach continually, and 
 without intermission, the prescribed goal. If the diffi- 
 culties that stand iri the way, determine him to entirely 
 give up his plan, or if, occupying himself with secondary 
 things, he suffers himself to be turned aside from the 
 path upon which he has entered, so that he returns back 
 into it late, and with spent energies, we justly charge 
 him with being wanting in that heart, that constancy, 
 that force of character which is an essential constituent 
 of virtue. He cannot, it is true, approach his goal 
 always in a straight line, so to speak, and with even pace ;- 
 he will sometimes advance slower, because he must re- 
 move the obstructions which oppose him, out of his way, 
 
180 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 or because he must slowly prepare the way for a work 
 which cannot succeed at once. But even while making 
 these elaborate preparations, the eye should never lose 
 sight of the goal, and the striving to reach it must be 
 plainly apparent even in the greatest digressions. But 
 this progress itself receives its perfection from the steady 
 constancy prevailing in it, — i. e., from the easy connec- 
 tion and fusion of the parts of the process, so that each 
 particular part, as it was occasioned and prepared for, 
 by what preceded, so in its turn serves as the occasion 
 and preparation for what follows. If this essential 
 requisite be wanting, and the movement of the discourse 
 is only by leaps and impulses, individual brilliant frag- 
 ments may, indeed, be the result, but no continuous 
 ethical life. 
 
 From Ethics, therefore, we derive the law of constant 
 Progress (for it is contained necessarily and essentially 
 in Ethics), and not from the mode of representation 
 employed in Philosophy or Poetry, in which it is to be 
 met with only under many limitations, nay, is often 
 forced out by the opposite principle. For the activity 
 of the poet, like that of the philosopher, returns back 
 into itself, because of the effort to impart roundness and 
 finish to its creations, and is accompanied w T ith a rest 
 and satisfaction which is grounded in the consciousness 
 of the possibility of perfectly representing its Idea. The 
 ethical striving, on the contrary, in the consciousness 
 that it can never reach its Ideal of perfection, nay, can 
 never exhibit even a single Idea perfectly realized in 
 actual existence, is never to give itself up to rest and 
 self-satisfaction, but with abiding zeal, though with re- 
 flection, is to hasten on immediately from each step in 
 the process that lias been taken to a new one. And if 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 181 
 
 the law of constant Progress is found in certain species 
 of Poetry, as for example, the Drama, it must not be 
 supposed that Rhetoric borrowed it from them ; on the 
 contrary, it imparted it to them, since the Drama is the 
 representation of the ethical activity of men, and must 
 therefore retain something of the ethical element in it. 
 
 As, therefore, the individual actions in a complete 
 moral process join on upon one another, so also in the 
 oration should the ethical Ideas and the adapted repre- 
 sentations which serve to develop them, be methodically 
 arranged. So unceasing and vehement is the progress 
 of the genuine orator, that he detests every thought, 
 every word, that does not bring him nearer the goal, as 
 a weakness, a fault, nay, as a sin, and casts it from him. 
 If it is necessary to instruct the hearer in things of sec- 
 ondary importance, that might have influence upon his 
 decision, to moderate his excited feelings, to obviate an 
 objection, he checks for a moment the rapidity of his 
 course, yet only in order to be able to advance with so 
 much the greater speed ; nay, it may sometimes seem, 
 as if he were deviating entirely from his path, yet, even 
 in his deviation, the movement towards the goal is con- 
 stantly apparent, and it is soon seen that he turned aside 
 into the by-bath, only in order to reach the goal the 
 sooner. And in this movement, sometimes vehement, 
 sometimes gentle, thought without effort joins on upon 
 thought, so that, from the first to the last, there is an 
 unbroken chain, in which not the least break, either for 
 the understanding or for the feelings, is discoverable. 
 
 Furthermore, it is plain, that by the application of 
 this ethical principle to the Rhetorical presentation of 
 thought, its chief aim, the production of Affection, is 
 reached. If nien find in themselves no enthusiasm for 
 
 . 16 
 
182 ELOQUExNCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 a really great and beautiful Idea, the reason must be, 
 either that they do not contemplate it in all its relations 
 to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, or that they allow them- 
 selves to be too greatly dampened by the individual 
 difficulties in the way of its realization. But if all the 
 individual elements and relations of the Idea are made 
 to pass before their minds, one after another, in rapid 
 progression, so that they can take in at a glance all that 
 is great, sublime, and rich in blessing, flowing from it, it 
 is impossible that they should not warm towards it; 
 every new representation on the part of the orator, is a 
 new spur which urges them on to the realization of the 
 Idea. At the same time, the mind depressed and bowed 
 down by the presentation of difficulties and hindrances, 
 is, as it were, freed from a burden, by the removal of its 
 doubts, so that it no longer anxiously holds itself in 
 reserve, but can freely and readily yield itself up to the 
 influence which is exerted upon it. But in order that 
 this warmth with which the mind begins to glow, may 
 not grow cold, but may increase and constantly diffuse 
 itself, it is necessary that this progress of the orator be 
 also constant. If the thoughts are not closely linked 
 together, so that the understanding perceives a defect 
 in their connection; if it is difficult for the mind to 
 change from one feeling already awakened, to another, 
 or to pass from a feeling to thoughts not specially con- 
 nected with it, there arises reflection in the hearer's mind, 
 not upon the Idea, but upon the orator; and the effect 
 of this reflection is so chilling, that all the warmth which 
 had already been produced, perhaps, at once vanishes, 
 and the orator must begin his work over again from the 
 beginning. In the 4 case of a constant Progress, on the 
 contrary, the effect of what follows is strengthened and 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 183 
 
 favored by what precedes, and the effect of what pre- 
 cedes by the effect of what follows.* 
 
 Thus have we shown, as we flatter ourselves, that 
 through this law of constant Progress, which is ethical 
 in its origin, the chief aim of the Rhetorical presentation 
 of thought, the excitement of Affection, is also reached. 
 But in order to obtain a more thorough insight into the 
 scope and application of the law, we subjoin in addition 
 the following particulars. 
 
 In the first place, so far as respects this necessary pro- 
 gress in the oration, it is to be noticed that, though it 
 admits of narration, it entirely excludes description. In 
 narration, the different constituent parts of a subject 
 follow one upon another, and the progress of the oration 
 is not checked by it ; but in description, on the contrary, 
 these constituent parts stand beside each other, and form 
 a quiet picture, whereby the swift, strong movement of 
 the oration is stopped. Hence the orator, if called upon, 
 as is very often the case, to describe the character of a 
 person, or a particular posture of things in actual life, 
 should never in his narration exhibit the different quali- 
 ties of a person, or the different characteristics of things, 
 beside each other, but he should find a historical thread, 
 by means of which his representation may run off like a 
 gradually developing history. It is exceedingly difficult 
 to do this, since, in order to it, the orator is often obliged 
 to do violence to the representation as it exists in his own 
 mind, and to take objects which he has apprehended and 
 contemplated as a quiet whole, out of this form, and put 
 them into another. Yet this is absolutely necessary; 
 
 * Cicero seems to mean the same thing, when he says : Deinde inventa, 
 non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque judicio dispensare 
 atque componere. — De Orat., I. 31. 
 
184 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 unless it be done, the orator falls away from the Rhe- 
 torical into the Poetical representation, and allows him- 
 self and his hearers a rest that is destructive of all 
 Affection. The descriptions in the orations of the An- 
 cients are wrought entirely according to this principle ; 
 they are always narrative, never descriptive ; in modern 
 Rhetoric, the contrary is almost always the case, and 
 hence the heavy dragging movement found in it. 
 
 The law of Progress also determines the extent of the 
 development of each individual thought that appears in 
 the rhetorical series. For the orator must not allow one 
 thought to so expand and become prominent at the 
 expense of another, as to produce a pause in the move- 
 ment of the oration. The recondite nature of many 
 thoughts, which require unfolding, explanations, argu- 
 ments, may often lead to this fault. Hence the genuine 
 orator will rather make up his discourse out of thoughts 
 that need only to be enounced, not explained and proved. 
 Strictly speaking, it is a fault to express the same thought 
 in different language, the first time obscurely, the second 
 time by explanation and circumlocution ; for the law of 
 Progress, strictly observed, requires that the development 
 of the thought progress with every new sentence ; the 
 orator, therefore, must know how to find immediately, 
 the plainest, most forcible expression, and to be satisfied 
 with it once for all. 
 
 With respect to the arguments often necessary in Elo- 
 quence, it might seem as if they must stop the swift 
 current of the oration, and impart to it that slow move- 
 ment, returning into itself, which is peculiar to Philos- 
 ophy. Yet this will not be the case, provided these 
 arguments are brought forward according to the general 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 185 
 
 principles laid down in the First Book* Would the 
 orator show the possibility of a thing, he does it by pro- 
 posing a plan, by citing an example, showing that in 
 similar circumstances the like has already been done; 
 would he prove the actuality of a fact, he cites testimony, 
 and establishes its validity. In this way everything is 
 made out by the exhibition of the real, of the plainly 
 apparent, and there is no need of a slow tedious chain 
 of abstract propositions. This is not necessary even 
 when the truth of a thing is to be demonstrated ; in this 
 case, the orator refers to a universally recognized author- 
 ity, the weight of which immediately decides the ques- 
 tion ; or he makes use of public opinion, which has 
 already, on another occasion, decided according to truth, 
 and shows his hearer, by means of a brief and readily 
 apprehended enthymeme, that he cannot possibly judge 
 differently, or decide differently, in the present case, from 
 what he did in the former, without falling into self- 
 contradiction. In this way Demosthenes constructs his 
 formidable enthymematic trains of reasoning, which, so 
 far from hindering the progress of the orator, are rather 
 to be compared to the lightning, in force and rapidity.f 
 
 It often happens that a thought, in a position from 
 which the logical arrangement would not displace it, 
 exerts a retarding influence, and interrupts the con- 
 tinuity of the Rhetorical series, because it seems neither 
 to have been sufficiently prepared for by what precedes, 
 nor to sufficiently prepare for what follows. To avoid 
 this case, and so to present every single thought as that 
 it shall not only not retard, but accelerate the sweep of 
 the oration, is one of the most difficult problems in Elo- 
 
 * Chapter XL t Note II., p. 213. 
 
 16* 
 
186 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 quence ; yet it may be solved, as it seems to us, by the 
 aid of the principles which we have laid down. In 
 order to this, we must recognize a gradation in the 
 relative rank of the Rhetorical Ideas. Though Duty, Vir- 
 tue, and Happiness, are equal in importance, yet the 
 three forms under which they present themselves are 
 not. The first of these forms is the Religious, then 
 follows the Ethical, and lastly the Political. Under 
 these, again, stand the categories Truth, Possibility, and 
 Actuality,* in the order in which they are here men- 
 tioned. Now, in every separate development of a sub- 
 ordinate Idea, if all that pertains to it is not fused 
 with a higher Idea, and interwoven at all points with 
 the development of it, the steady flow of the oration is 
 retarded and checked. Suppose that a sacred orator is 
 discoursing with reference to the categories Truth and 
 Actuality, — e. g., that he wishes to present the events 
 of his time from a religious point of view. Beginning 
 with the development of Truth, he may, provided he has 
 reached a proper place for it, cast a passing glance at 
 Actuality; for description based upon this latter sub- 
 ordinate Idea, if he should begin with it, or should give it 
 a development independent of that of Truth, would be a 
 dead stop, and not progress, and could not well be con- 
 nected either with what followed or with what preceded. 
 An orator before the court, or before the people, com- 
 mits the same error, if, when he might make the higher 
 Idea of Duty or of Virtue predominant, he neglects it, 
 and allows himself in a development, entirely uncon- 
 nected with it, of the Idea of Civil or Positive Law, 
 which he ought to have employed only as a corollary 
 and confirmation of the former. "With all the modesty 
 
 * Book L, Chapters X., XII. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 187 
 
 that becomes us Moderns in criticizing the great modeh 
 of Antiquity, I venture to charge ^Eschines with com- 
 mitting this latter error in his oration against Ctesiphon, 
 Inasmuch as his attack upon Demosthenes was in 
 strictness based upon the Idea of Virtue, and inasmuch 
 as he wished to represent his life and character as un- 
 worthy and detestable, it w r as a mistake to dwell so long, 
 as he does, in the very beginning, upon the positive 
 statutes that might take from his opponent the crown 
 which had been decreed to him. We feel, in the perusal, 
 how weak this whole first part of his oration is, and how 
 little it prepares for the succeeding part, in which he ex- 
 amines the life of Demosthenes ; nay, between these two 
 parts there is a chasm over which he could not possibly 
 carry his hearers without their minds becoming entirely 
 cold and emotionless. That Demosthenes perceived this 
 mistake, it seems to me is evident, from the circumstance 
 that he protests in the very beginning of his oration, 
 against the demand of his opponent, that he shall in the. 
 defence follow the same plan which he did in the attack ; 
 far from doing this, he rather sets forth the Idea of Vir- 
 tue as the Idea upon which he shall found his oration, 
 and not until after he has refuted a great portion of the 
 objections brought against him, by a history of his past 
 life, does he occupy himself with the examination of 
 the positive laws which seem to be adverse to the pro- 
 position of Ctesiphon. Hence, from the beginning of 
 this oration to the end, there is no pause to be perceived, 
 but the mind is kept continually on the stretch, and 
 borne along unceasingly from one important point to 
 another. 
 
 To impart this constant flow to an oration, is perhaps 
 the most difficult among the many difficult things in 
 
188 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 Eloquence. A poem, like the poet himself, is born ; in 
 some fine moment of inspiration it stands out before 
 him an articulated whole, and, so far as the plan at 
 least is concerned, is completed without further effort. 
 But as virtue is born with no man, but is acquired only 
 through a long series of efforts, so likewise the oration, 
 considered as a moral product, is never complete in its 
 first origin, but becomes so only by means of labor and 
 pains perse veringly applied to it. Nay, inasmuch as the 
 activity even of the - most virtuous man can never be 
 wholly perfect, i. e., can never be wholly conformed to 
 the law and at the same time to existing relations, the 
 question may arise, whether the oration, which, according 
 to my assertion at least, is a moral act and process, can 
 be perfect, — a question which I should answer in the 
 negative. The Adaptation which has been spoken of 
 in a former chapter, can itself be reached only approxi- 
 mately ; for, in order to be perfect, an absolutely divine 
 knowledge of all characters and relations would be 
 requisite. The second law also, laid down by us, that 
 of constant Progress, in its perfection can belong only 
 to the action of God in the government of the world, 
 but never to human action, which is ever imperfect. 
 But be this as it may, so much is certain — and with 
 respect to it every man will agree with me, and the more 
 readily the better orator he is — that, in the plan of the 
 oration as it is first presented to the mind, the thoughts 
 are never found already arranged in this constant pro- 
 gressive flow, but must be afterwards wrought into it. 
 As they first present themselves, they are hard, brittle, 
 and separate particles; the mind must seize them, and, 
 by grinding them incessantly upon each other, crush 
 them, until the friction kindles the mass, and it runs like 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 189 
 
 molten ore. The higher Ideas, thrown, as it were, into 
 this solution, take up the thoughts which belong to 
 them, and which, now that they are fluid, obey the 
 mystic power that attracts like to like, so that they form 
 themselves into a firm chain. 
 
 Here the truth of our assertion becomes very apparent 
 again, that it is the Character which makes the orator. 
 Could the most brilliant Imagination, and the most pro- 
 found and penetrating Reason, succeed in so elaborating 
 the thoughts, if they were not guided and supported by 
 the power of the moral Will ? Both Imagination and 
 Reason, taken by themselves alone, lead the orator away 
 from the sharply-drawn line along which he should move, 
 and seduce him into a useless pause, and an idle, undue 
 unfolding of his thoughts. They can find no interest at 
 all in the elaboration of the unpretending, highly simple 
 conceptions borrowed from common life;* at the same 
 time, they grow weary, and, finally, try to exchange an 
 irksome business for one more agreeable, unless they are 
 actuated and urged on by another power. And this 
 power is not the mere empty rage for shining before an 
 assembly ; for vanity is not capable of such a tension of 
 mind ; nay, vanity does not even feel itself to be called 
 upon to make an effort, since it is satisfied with a loosely- 
 constructed oration garnished with some showy pas- 
 sages. For the hearer is capable of criticizing such an 
 oration, and of admiring it; but let him be ever so culti- 
 vated, he can never do full justice to an excellence lying 
 so deep as the steady, unceasing sweep of thought. He 
 only feels its effects upon him, like the breathing of the 
 living Spirit, without knowing the cause ; and for the 
 very reason that so much that is Beautiful and Excellent 
 arises in his own mind, he forgets that the orator has 
 
190 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE , OR, 
 
 spoken excellently. That Dernosthenean determination, 
 that iron diligence, which is requisite in order to the 
 formation of the rhetorical, constantly progressive, train 
 of thought, can spring only out of the endeavor to fill 
 the minds of others with those great Ideas in which the 
 orator has lost himself; the endeavor to satisfy his own 
 conscience, and to employ only that which can rightfully 
 contribute towards his success. And what is such an 
 endeavor but the moral power of Character in its finest 
 development and highest dignity ? 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORJC. 191 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE LAW OF VIVACITY. 
 
 In the beginning of this treatise, we attempted to 
 seize the active process of the orator in its origin, as it 
 unfolds itself under the guidance of certain definite 
 moral Ideas. In this second part of the work, we have 
 sought to become acquainted with the nature of the 
 representations with which the leading Idea of the orator 
 becomes encompassed, as well as w T ith the rules in ac- 
 cordance with which these representations are linked 
 together. We have now to conceive of the active pro- 
 cess of the orator, as it comes forth into language from 
 his inward being, and here we find that his progress in 
 the development of his Idea, and the effect produced by 
 it upon the hearers, cause his own relation to them, 
 though remaining the same in substance, to change every 
 moment in respect to individual circumstances ; and we 
 demand that this active process of his, without wavering 
 in its essential character and purpose, do, nevertheless, 
 through a constant variation in the form, keep company 
 with all these different variations in his relations. This 
 is the third and last law of the Rhetorical presentation of 
 thought. We denominate it the law of Vivacity* Like 
 the former laws that have been mentioned, this law also 
 
 * The term in the original is Lebendigkeit, and is intended to denote a 
 vital flexibility in thought and diction. The word Vivacity is an inadequate 
 one. — Tr. 
 
192 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 is of Ethical origin, and wholly foreign to the Philo- 
 sophical, as well as the Poetical, presentation of thought. 
 In both of these latter the mind isolates itself, and since 
 it is not its design to exert an influence upon the circum- 
 stances which surround it, so neither does it allow cir- 
 cumstances to exert an influence upon itself. Hence the 
 unvarying uniformity of the state and condition in which 
 it remains from the beginning to the end of its work, 
 allows the mind, in these latter cases, to give to its pro- 
 ducts a fixed, unchangeable form. Moral activity, on 
 the contrary, would entirely preclude such an isolation ; 
 it is itself a constant reception of outward influences, 
 and an equally constant reaction upon them ; and since 
 all that is outward is never still, but fluctuates restlessly 
 hither and thither, man, when in action, must change 
 his position in respect to the outward every moment. 
 This is not bending the Will to the force of circum- 
 stances, but is in reality the only means of obtaining 
 dominion over them ; their constantly varying pressure 
 w r ould utterly overwhelm, if the manner of meeting them 
 did not vary with equal rapidity. True virtue, on the 
 side of law, is indeed unalterably the same, but on the 
 side of life, is constantly changing and new. It would 
 betray a want of elasticity in the character, if one should 
 continue the same way of action in entirely different 
 circumstances. 
 
 This change in the position and movements of the 
 agent, peculiar to moral activity of all sorts, can be per- 
 ceived in the case of the activity of the orator, only in 
 the thoughts and the words, and in their constantly 
 varying turns, since the orator makes use of thoughts 
 and words only, in order to the realization of his Idea. 
 These turns are the so-called rhetorical figures : an ex- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 193 
 
 pression which must not be taken to denote mere orna- 
 ments coldly and artificially contrived to set off the dis- 
 course (to which the expression might indeed lead), but 
 turns and lively movements in thought and language, 
 prompted by the imagination under the guidance of 
 rhetorical Affection in conflict with the opposing senti- 
 ments of the hearers ; for which reason, perhaps, these 
 latter expressions are preferable, because they are liable 
 to no such misunderstanding. Similar turns arise easily 
 and naturally in the social intercourse of cultivated and 
 lively minds. For since social life of the higher order 
 involves the mutual cultivation of minds through the 
 interchange of views, each man alternately playing 
 the part of the orator and the hearer, it is evident that 
 although from the language of such social life nothing 
 indeed is to be learned in relation to the rhetorical series 
 of representations, because it is, of necessity, fragmen- 
 tary in its matter, yet much is to be learned from it in 
 relation to the turns of thoughts and words, which be- 
 come more lively and forcible on account of the closer 
 action and reaction within this sphere. The so-called 
 figures which are employed by orators, and which are 
 specifically enumerated by Rhetoricians, are in reality 
 only such turns of thought and expression as arise in the 
 active intercourse of men, elevated and polished in order 
 to adapt them to a higher connection. Hence, if the 
 orator would employ figures rightly, he should not bor- 
 row them from manuals of Rhetoric, or even from the 
 most perfect works in Eloquence, but should go back to 
 the language of common intercourse, and appropriate to 
 his own purposes all those living movements and turns 
 in thought and expression, the influence of which he has 
 felt upon himself, and has also imparted to others. Or 
 
 17 
 
194: ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 rather, the orator must realize the hearer to himself with 
 definite features, with all his opposing views and inclina- 
 tions, and represent the whole oratorical process to him- 
 self, not monologically, but dialogically ; then he will 
 know instinctively the proper time* to waken attention, 
 to instruct, to exhort, to show the connection or the oppo- 
 sition of several thoughts, to meet an objection, to hurl 
 it back again, to place a truth in clear light by an unex- 
 pected surprising turn, to pass from one truth to another, 
 to restrain his feelings, to give them full play, etc. Having 
 such a lively sense of his position and relations, and of 
 the changes which he is producing in them by the prog- 
 ress which he is constantly making, his thoughts, and 
 consequently their expression, will take on a different 
 form at every step. 
 
 But if this alternation of forms in the rhetorical pres- 
 entation of thought, is of ethical origin, as we have 
 endeavored to show, it is also the most powerful and 
 effectual means of all in exciting Affection.f For Affec- 
 tion in the hearer is kindled by Affection in the orator; 
 and how can the orator show more plainly that he is 
 wholly animated by an Idea, and by the striving to im- 
 part it to others, than by exhausting all the most lively 
 forms of presentation ? Adaptation, in the discourse, 
 taken by itself alone, would not produce such an im- 
 pression ; even the firmest and most labored chain of 
 thought, unless each link in it were distinguished by a 
 peculiar structure, would, in the end, only weary by a 
 fixed uniformity. But by means of the peculiar, and 
 often surprising turn, in which each new representation 
 is announced, it is made to pierce more deeply into the 
 
 * Cicero, Orator, 39 et 40. 
 
 t Jam vero ad affectus nil magis ducit. — Quint. IX. 1. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 195 
 
 mind, which, incessantly stimulated on so many sides, 
 is compelled, in the end, to yield itself up without resist- 
 ance to the exercise of Affection. 
 
 This influence upon the Affections is the distinguishing 
 mark by which we can recognize Rhetorical figures, and 
 can separate them from Poetical. The latter are created 
 by the Imagination for the Imagination ; they are a 
 painting, a picturing, a representing. The Rhetorical 
 figures are produced by the Mind, using this term to 
 denote the whole inner being of man so far as it is under 
 the guidance of the Will, for the. Mind ; they should 
 seize, enchain, move, carry away. Poetical figures are 
 brilliant and adorned, and poetic art delights in their 
 splendor ; Rhetorical figures are a -naked power, which 
 avoids all pomp, because its influence is liable to be 
 hindered thereby, or to be directed to the Imagination 
 instead of the Affections.* If the orator would acquire 
 a quick feeling and an unerring sense for Rhetorical 
 figures, let him read Demosthenes ; for in respect to him, 
 the Ancients boast that he never brought forward a 
 thought without expressing it in some peculiar figure.f 
 In reading Demosthenes, we shall also perceive most 
 clearly, how great is the difference between Rhetorical 
 and Poetical figures ; for no style can be freer from all 
 
 * Aristotle (Rhetoric III. 4) remarks that the simile is more suitable in 
 poetry, and that the metaphor is the only ornament in which the orator may 
 indulge. — The reason of this highly truthful and important remark lies in 
 the fact, that the simile is too detailed for the rapid and practical movement 
 of oratory. Eloquence requires that nil illustrative matter be swift and glanc- 
 ing ; simply flashing light, without impeding the progress. The metaphor 
 is the condensed simile, and the simile is the expanded metaphor. Hence 
 the former is the orator's figure, and the latter the poet's. — Tr\ 
 
 t Cicero Orator, c. 39. — Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam con- 
 formatione sentential dicitur. 
 
196 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 that we denominate poetry of expression, than that of 
 Demosthenes. In saying this, however, we would by no 
 means assert, that none of those figures which are com- 
 monly termed Poetical, are to be permitted in an ora- 
 tion. Everything depends upon the application, upon 
 relative position and influence; and it is very possible 
 indeed, that in a different use and connection the figure 
 would at one time depict to the Imagination, at another 
 awaken Affection. 
 
 There being this difference between Poetical and Rhe- 
 torical figures, the specific enumeration of the former is 
 as proper, as that of the latter is improper. Since the 
 Imagination renders itself independent of the external 
 world, and allows it no influence upon its creations, its 
 forms are by no means innumerable in their manifold- 
 ness ; for their source is in the Imagination alone, which, 
 notwithstanding all its opulence, is, like every human 
 faculty, limited by certain definable laws. Hence, in the 
 enumeration of the different species of poetry, as well 
 as in the specification of Poetical figures, complete- 
 ness is attainable. But since the moral activity of 
 man, on the contrary, is constantly conditioned by his 
 relations to the external world, all the changes of 
 which can never be computed, it is impossible to enu- 
 merate with satisfactory completeness the forms under 
 which this activity appears. For this reason, we may 
 not in Eloquence, as in Poetry, assume certain species 
 distinguished by Form and Matter; and hence it was 
 an absurd undertaking to attempt to bring under certain 
 fixed rubrics the turns which the thoughts of the orator 
 receive, under the influence of the constantly varying 
 circumstances amidst which his activity is put forth. 
 This mistake would never have been made if the ethical 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 197 
 
 character of Eloquence had been recognized, and if 
 Eloquence had been properly distinguished from Poetry. 
 That the undertaking was a failure is perfectly evident. 
 There are fine and noble turns of thought in Demos- 
 thenes, which no Rhetorician has yet put on his list; and 
 many have also been invented by orators of the Church, 
 that were entirely unknown to the Ancients. 
 
 Owing to this confounding of Poetical and Rhetorical 
 figures, there arose among the Ancients an entirely false 
 view of the use and influence of the latter. Cicero and 
 Quintilian agree in this, that they may, in part at least, 
 be employed as adornment merely, of the oration, and 
 to please the hearer.* But this should never be the 
 purpose for which they are employed, if, as we affirm, 
 they are not productions of the Imagination for the 
 Imagination, but of the Mind for the Mind. Quintilian 
 gives another excellent rule, but one that by no means 
 harmonizes with his other statement just cited, when he 
 says, that all that does not promote the design of the 
 orator, hinders it ; f and certainly, nothing so little pro- 
 motes, and consequently so greatly hinders, the awaken- 
 ing of a strong Affection that seizes upon the whole 
 mind, and breaks forth into acts, as that light play of 
 the Imagination which leaps from figure to figure. 
 Hence, we assert that no figure should be allowed in 
 an oration, unless each and every word in it, according 
 to the expression of Quintilian, J awaken an Affection 
 of some sort. Any other use of figures on the part of 
 
 * Ex collocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina, magnum affe- 
 runt ornatum orationi. — Cicero, Orator, c. 39. — Major pars barum figura- 
 rum posita est in delectatione. — Quintilian, IX. 3. 
 
 t Obstat enim quidquid non adjuvat. — ■ Quintilian, VIII. 6. 
 
 X Quot verba, totidem affectus. — Quint. IX. 3. 
 
 17* 
 
198 
 
 the orator would betray a departure frorti his purpose, 
 i. e. } a moral weakness, and instead of contributing to 
 his design, would only stand in its way, i. e., would leave 
 the mind cold, instead of warming it. 
 
 Furthermore, figures, which consist in peculiar turns 
 of thought, are likewise subject to those laws of Adap- 
 tation and constant Progress, which we have laid down 
 for the guidance of Rhetorical discourse generally. If 
 the orator wastes the most impressive and powerful of 
 these figures upon trivial occasions, or employs them 
 imprudently at a time when the mind is not prepared for 
 so violent an impression,. this unsuitable application of 
 them will hinder and destroy their influence. And since, 
 in order to prevent Affection from becoming chilled, the 
 thoughts themselves must run on in a continual series, 
 it is also necessary, in order to the same end, that the 
 turn which one thought has taken, easily and naturally 
 lose itself in that which the following thought will 
 assume. In this connection, it is also to be remarked, 
 that the most perfect concatenation of figures loses its 
 effect if it is repeated successively, after short intervals; 
 for the mind once impressed, is immediately rid of the 
 impression, by the repetition of that which produced it, 
 and is led away to an idle contemplation of the mere 
 Form, irrespective of the Matter; the constant recurrence 
 of which would, in this case, produce only a poetico- 
 musical enjoyment. 
 
 And as we have seen that every offence against the 
 Rhetorical laws is to be regarded as a moral defect, so 
 also the wrong use of figures is not to be ascribed to a 
 want of genius, but only to a weakness of character. It 
 is vanity, if the orator is profuse in figures for the sake 
 of show and ornament ; it is obtuseuiess of moral feeling, 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 199 
 
 if the orator employs them unsuitably; it is sluggishness, 
 incapacity of enthusiasm in respect to lofty Ideas, if the 
 orator does not understand how to give to a thought 
 those forcible turns by which alone he can produce the 
 designed impression. Hence, not by means of the mere 
 knowledge of this or of other rules, but only by means 
 of those moral excellences which are opposed to the 
 faults above mentioned, will the orator be enabled to 
 employ figures rightly and with effect. In order to this, 
 a mind is needed which can warm towards moral Ideas; 
 which, along with all its inspiration and enthusiasm, can 
 keep up a calm, accurate survey of circumstances, and 
 which is far more interested in the true advantage of 
 the hearer, .in his improvement and elevation, than in his 
 applause. 
 
200 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ] OR, 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROSE. 
 
 In the beginning of this Second Book, we promised to 
 sketch the main features of a theory of Prose, and to 
 derive them from the ethical principle which we have 
 sought to establish as the foundation of Rhetoric. We 
 now attempt to fulfil this promise. 
 
 We shall first set forth the distinguishing marks of 
 Prose, while at the same time, for the sake of greater 
 distinctness, we shall compare them with the peculiar 
 characteristics of Poetic discourse. 
 
 The first difference between Poetry and Prose lies in 
 the period. Not that the period is peculiar to Prose 
 alone, and might be dispensed with in finished Poetry ; 
 but in Poetry it appears only as a necessary form in the 
 connection of thoughts, upon which no special emphasis 
 is laid. In Prose, on the contrary, while it retains this 
 first original characteristic, it acquires a still higher sig- 
 nificance, and seems to serve particular purposes. Hence 
 we require in Prose, that each period be marked by 
 something peculiar to itself, and be distinguished from 
 what precedes and follows it, by its form, while in Poetry, 
 we do not regard it as a fault, and hardly notice it, if 
 several sentences exceedingly simple, and entirely similar 
 in their structure, follow one another. 
 
 The second difference lies in the words used. In 
 Poetry, every word has worth, not only by virtue of its 
 sense, but also by virtue of its sound and its mere ex- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 201 
 
 istence ; the most important and the most unimportant 
 words, in respect to sense, as integral parts of the same 
 whole, have equal rank, like citizens of a free State. In 
 Prose, on the contrary, the worth of words differs accord- 
 ing to their sense ; in every sentence there are one or 
 more words which, by their peculiar position, are ele- 
 vated and placed in the light, so that the others are sub- 
 ordinate to them, and seem to be designed only to 
 elevate and minister to them. 
 
 The third difference lies in the relation between long 
 and short syllables, which, in Poetry, is termed metre; 
 in Prose is termed number. The difference between the 
 two may, perhaps, be best exhibited under the following 
 general characteristics. Metre, though adapted to the 
 Idea, yet appears as something independent in itself, 
 and seeks to attract attention to itself, aside from the 
 thoughts and feelings expressed through it. Hence it 
 not merely determines, with the greatest exactness, the 
 number and succession of long and short syllables ; it 
 also separates them into individual metrical members, 
 the frequent repetition of which, impresses their peculiar 
 form so much the more, upon the ear and the mind. If 
 the difference between long and short syllables is not 
 duly marked in a sentence, Poetry makes up for what its 
 form would lose thereby in peculiarity and independence 
 of character, by counting and limiting the number of the 
 syllables which compose the individual line, and by the 
 regular recurrence of the same sound at the end of the 
 verse. Number, on the contrary, far from separating 
 itself from the thought, remains constantly subordinate 
 to it, and it would be regarded as one of the greatest 
 faults of a Prose period, if one of its parts, by a succes- 
 sion of tones too striking and too agreeable to the ear, 
 
202 
 
 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 should attract attention from the Matter to the Form. 
 Number, therefore, arranges the succession and number 
 of long and short syllables, only so far as is necessary in 
 order that the impression of the discourse upon the sen- 
 suous organs may be adapted to the impression which 
 is to be produced upon the mind, so that the mind may 
 not feel less, because the ear has either experienced no 
 agreeable sensation at all, or has been offended.* And 
 that number may not usurp an independence that does 
 not belong to it, it is necessary, and is also universally 
 required, that it be adjusted most accurately to the Mat- 
 ter, as well as the Form ; that it vary with every new 
 thought, nay, every new period, and thus flow forth in 
 constant manifoldness. 
 
 If, as I believe, the peculiar characteristics of Prose 
 have been sufficiently exhibited in what has been said, the 
 question now arises: From what principles can we de- 
 duce such a form of discourse, and show that it must be 
 constituted so, and not otherwise ? This problem seems 
 never to have been proposed even, while yet a similar 
 one respecting the forms of Poetry has employed many 
 theorizers, and has been successfully solved by them. 
 Why, then, is there Prose at all? What right has it to 
 exist by the side of Poetry ? Should men, generally, 
 speak only in verse, and is it owing merely to con- 
 venience or inability, that they do not ? We feel that 
 this cannot possibly be, for there are modes of presenting 
 thought in which poetical forms cannot be employed at 
 all. And this does not arise from their intrinsic difficulty, 
 for finished Prose has its peculiar excellences, and, con- 
 sequently, its difficulties also, which are not easier to 
 master than those of versification. If, now, Prose is to 
 
 * See Gibbon's Miscellaneous Works, p. 455. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 203 
 
 maintain itself as a peculiar form of presenting thought, 
 the rightfulness of its claims must be demonstrable from 
 rational grounds. Or shall we, after having deduced the 
 necessity of the forms of Poetry, represent Prose as a 
 thorough and complete opposite to them, and consider 
 the matter as settled in this way, because there can be 
 nothing which has not its opposite ? But, not to men- 
 tion that this principle is not justifiable in itself, it could 
 not, even if it were correct, find its application here, be- 
 cause although Prose and Verse indeed differ from each 
 other, they by no means constitute a proper antithesis, 
 the members of which run parallelto each other, and 
 have purely opposite and mutually correspondent marks. 
 
 The right of Prose to assert its place beside Poetry, 
 and the necessity of the characteristic marks perceived 
 in it, can be satisfactorily shown, only in case it is con- 
 strued from ethical principles. In deriving the rules to 
 which the moral activity of man, so far as it makes use 
 of discourse for its purposes, is subjected, we had arrived 
 at the law of Vivacity; while we further develop it,^ 
 we shall see Prose with all that is peculiar and distinctive 
 in it, originating from it. 
 
 For, in the first place, since according to the law of Vi- 
 vacity, each thought should appear with a peculiar turn 
 and movement, it must naturally impart a peculiar form 
 and structure to the period also, in which it is presented. 
 On this ethical ground, therefore, the carefulness with 
 which the period is formed in Prose, is explained and 
 justified; while, on the contrary, a similar carefulness in 
 Poetry, would not only be unnecessary, but a fault also. 
 For the change in the form of the period is expressive 
 pf a change in the mental state, — a change which is 
 required in the prator, but not allowable in the poet, since 
 
204 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 he purposes to exhibit only one and the same tone of 
 mind. With the same right that figures hi the thought 
 are assumed in Rhetoric, we believe we may assume 
 figures in the period, which are to be distinguished still 
 further from figures in the language. Moreover, much 
 that is cited by Rhetoricians under this latter name, is a 
 peculiarity in the structure of the period, rather than in 
 the position of the words, — e. g\, the climax, the an- 
 tithesis, the isocolon, the prosapodosis, and the coinotes 
 arising from the connection of the epibole and epiphora. 
 But not only does the law of Vivacity exert its influ- 
 ence upon the structure of the period ; it also exerts it, 
 secondly, upon the position of the words. For since the 
 greatest care must be taken that the thoughts do not 
 flow into euch other, so as to form one uniform mass, 
 it is evident that those particular words which express 
 each particular thought most plainly should be made 
 prominent, and.be distinguished from the others. From 
 this ethical view of Prose, not only is the peculiar em- 
 phasis laid upon the most important words, — such 
 as the substantive, adjective, verb, — explained, but also 
 the origin of the more exquisite figures of speech, — 
 such as paranomasia, paradiastole, antanaclasis, epa- 
 node, diaphora, homceoptoton, etc. The use of these 
 figures in Poetry, is condemned of right, because in 
 Poetry the essential thing is not the distinguishing of 
 one thing above another, but the connecting of one 
 thing with another. And if Poetry has appropriated 
 one or another of these figures,: — as e. g\, the homceop- 
 toton, from which rhyme seems to have arisen, — it has 
 yet entirely altered it; for in Prose, a proposition is indi- 
 vidualized by the homceoptoton ; in Poetry, the metrical 
 lines are linked and united together by rhyme. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 205 
 
 Finally, in the third place, the law of Vivacity per- 
 mits neither metre, nor rhyme, nor the numeration of 
 syllables ; for through these, the outward form of pre- 
 sentation acquires a repose and an evenness of pro- 
 portion, it expresses a complacency, which, indeed, be- 
 longs necessarily to the finished unfolding of poetical 
 ideas, but which must ever be foreign to the active pro- 
 cess of the orator, which is full of Affection in itself, and 
 seeks to awaken Affection in the hearer. Nevertheless, 
 since that which is peculiar in the Rhetorical thought 
 seeks to express itself, not only in the structure of the 
 period, and the position of the words, but also in the 
 relation of the long and short syllables ; since, in order 
 to the more distinct separation of the thoughts, there 
 must be the slower pace of some, and the more rapid 
 flight of others, and this difference must be made per- 
 ceptible to the mind through the ear, the law of Viva- 
 city requires a mingling of syllables, in respect to their 
 quantity, suited to the existing thought, but going no 
 further than to vary with each period, and never occu- 
 pying the mind at the expense of the thought. For if 
 this were the case, the orator would betray a compla- 
 cency which is proper in the Poet, but which is forbidden 
 to him by the law of Vivacity ; and, moreover, he would 
 fail to reach the end at which he aims, the production of 
 Affection in the hearer, if the hearer should come to be 
 as much delighted by the musical enjoyment of the 
 melody, as impressed by the force of the thought. 
 
 18 
 
206 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 We have thus far endeavored to unfold and perfect 
 our theory of the ethical nature of Eloquence, in three 
 different ways. By showing, first, that all of its essential 
 laws are of moral origin ; secondly, that a morally good 
 character, alone, imparts the inclination and the ability 
 to follow these laws ; thirdly, that the orator is sure of 
 success, only in proportion as he strictly obeys these 
 moral laws, and puts away all references of a less pure 
 nature. 
 
 And as, in running out these laws, we have arrived at 
 the construction of Prose as a necessary form of pre- 
 senting thought, we believe we may here lay down our 
 pen, inasmuch as what has been said will be sufficient 
 to enable him who has followed thus far, to form a judg- 
 ment respecting the correctness of our hypothesis; and 
 it will not be difficult for him who falls in with it, to 
 apply the principles we have laid down, to the subject 
 of Declamation, and other secondary subjects connected 
 with Eloquence, of which we have not treated. 
 
SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 Note I. Pase 176. 
 
 The frequent allusions by Theremin to Demosthenes will receive 
 additional illustration from the following sketch of " The Rhetorical 
 Character of Demosthenes," which we translate from another work of 
 his, published under the title of Demosthenes und Massillon. A con- 
 densed summary of this work, which the author intended should be the 
 concrete statement of his systematic theory, as seen realized in the 
 two masters of Grecian and French Eloquence, may be found in the 
 Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. VI. pp, 1 — 26. — Tr. 
 
 " From the foregoing representation, it follows that even if his char- 
 acter cannot be cleared of all stain, yet the praise of energy, decision, 
 perseverance, and self-denial for his country, is due in the highest 
 degree to Demosthenes ; that he succeeded in impressing the stamp of 
 these virtues upon his Eloquence, anö! that to them it owes its high and 
 wonderful excellence. He himself seems to have regarded the moral 
 state of the orator as his most important qualification. This is evident 
 from a remark, made under very grave circumstances, and one that 
 puts the necessary qualification upon that famous dictum of his respect- 
 ing " delivery," which we have already cited. " It is not the words 
 of the orator that are most worthy of admiration," — he says in the Ora- 
 tion for the Crown, — " nor the tones of his voice, but it is the fact 
 that he has the same aims with the people, and the same objects of 
 hatred and love with his father-land." 
 
 We shall now endeavor to group the principal features of the Elo- 
 quence of Demosthenes in a brief sketch. In no one of these can the 
 moral origin be mistaken ; and as we proceed with the delineation, it 
 will seem as if we were describing the inmost and essential nature of 
 Eloquence, and not the peculiarity of an orator. 
 
 The first characteristic in the Eloquence of Demosthenes, — which 
 might also be the first in the ideal of Eloquence, — is that his own 
 
208 
 
 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 personality and all regard to the applause of the auditor, are wholly 
 sacrificed to the matter in hand, to the aim and object of the discourse. 
 No orator of ancient or modern times has practised this austere self- 
 denial in an equal degree. But this is confessedly a moral quality, 
 and in most men finds an insuperable hindrance in self-love and 
 vanity. 
 
 Ordinarily the orator, while he moves forward to the goal, will not 
 neglect to pluck many a flower on the way, and by port and gesture 
 exhibit himself most advantageously to his hearers. If Cicero is in- 
 ferior to Demosthenes, it is principally owing to a vanity that protrudes 
 his personality with a prominence disproportioned to the subject matter. 
 Not so Demosthenes. He would not shine, but reach his aim ; he 
 would not win, but carry away the hearer ; he does not seek the hearer's 
 applause, but his assent. All merely outward embellishments, with 
 which even christian orators overload and deck their discourse, often 
 in an offensive degree, are ever contemned in the most decided man- 
 ner by this heathen orator. In this his greatness mainly lies. But it 
 is precisely this greatness which is the cause that we do not fully appre- 
 ciate him, and that he does not come up to our expectations. We 
 demand of the orator, that he exhibit his subject to us by means of 
 ornaments that do not belong to it ; we demand of him paint, false 
 curls, and a drapery rich in folds. Where we see nothing but muscles, 
 sinews, and naked limbs, we complain of dryness. That the Athe- 
 nians not merely endured Demosthenes but declared him to be the 
 first of orators, shows that, even in the time of their decline, they were 
 superior to the cultivated nations of the present day in the right esti- 
 mation of things. 
 
 Perhaps no one has so correctly apprehended, and so well des- 
 cribed, the characteristic of the eloquence of Demosthenes just men- 
 tioned, as Fenelon, who, in his " Dialogues of the Dead," makes De- 
 mosthenes speak to Cicero as follows : " You turned the attention of 
 the hearers to your own person ; I turned it solely to the subject upon 
 which I spoke. You were admired by them ; they forgot me while 
 they thought only of the resolution to which I would determine them. 
 You furnished them an intellectual entertainment ; I smote, I hurled 
 down, I dashed in pieces like a thunderbolt. When they had heard 
 you they exclaimed : ' How finely he has spoken ! ' When they had 
 heard me they cried : ' Up ! war against Philip ! ' You they praised ; 
 when I had spoken they were so carried away that they did not think 
 of praising me. You adorned your orations ; in mine they discovered 
 
SUPPLEMENT. 209 
 
 no ornament ; they found in them only definite, forcible, distinct argu- 
 ments, and then applications of them like lightning, which they could 
 not resist." 
 
 If Demosthenes confines himself closely to his subject, he has never- 
 theless completely investigated it ; he has contemplated it upon all sides, 
 and in all relations ; he has searched it through in all directions, and has 
 penetrated into all its recesses. All the grounds and reasons that 
 make for his purpose, and which are discoverable, he has discovered, 
 and explored carefully ; of all that can be used and applied for his 
 advantage, not the least thing has escaped him. The treasures which 
 he has gained by this labor, which he has dug up and brought to the light, 
 out of the subject itself, put him in a condition to despise all that is 
 foreign to the thing in hand. We caimot but be astonished at the 
 richness of the materials which stand at his command. When we 
 have read half through one of his longer orations, — that against 
 Leptines, that against Midias, the one for the Crown, — we think that 
 now, certainly, the subject is completely exhausted. But we are mis- 
 taken ; the most forcible reasons, the most stunning thunder-claps 
 have not yet come, and we are still to be astounded by them. He has 
 such a superabundance of arguments that he sometimes wastes a very 
 effective one in order to fill up a pause caused by the clerk, when he 
 cannot immediately lay his hand upon a law-paper which must be 
 read before proceeding further. Still greater and more glorious trea- 
 sures than Demosthenes found in the subjects handled by him, are to 
 be found in those which belong to the sphere of Sacred Eloquence ; 
 but just as great singleness of eifort, in searching, and toiling, is 
 needed in order to bring them out of the depths where they lie* 
 
 But such richness of thought must be elaborated. And here, it is 
 not enough to distribute the thoughts under certain heads, and to avoid 
 all infringements of logical rules. On the contrary, every thought 
 must have that place to which it is carried by what precedes, and 
 where it carries what follows ; where it does not stop but propagates 
 the previous movement ; where it is not only immediately understood 
 by the hearer, but also strengthens his convictions, and heightens his 
 emotions. The thoughts of the orator must be waves, of which one 
 urges on another. But this is possible, only when, according to psy- 
 chological laws, their series corresponds to the series of thoughts and 
 feelings they are to evoke in the hearer. This disposition and arrange- 
 ment of thought demands as great effort, and labor, as was necessary 
 in order to its production. In this excellence also, which indeed 
 
 18* 
 
210 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 lies very deep, and can be known only by a fundamental study of 
 his works, Demosthenes surpasses all other orators. His thoughts 
 form a concluded series, no member of .which could change its place 
 without injury to the whole ; and as they follow one another consecu- 
 tively, so the thoughts and feelings which are to be excited by them in 
 the hearer, follow one another, and develop themselves, in the most 
 natural manner. The hearer is in the very beginning seized upon by 
 a wholesome and salutary power, to which the best faculties of his 
 being yield themselves without resistance ; and since he is led along 
 on a path where there is neither hindrance nor interruption, he follows 
 on, step by step, to the end, not only because he must follow, but also 
 because he follows willingly and gladly. 
 
 This firmly linked chain of thought, is, in Demosthenes, made red- 
 hot with the most live fire of emotion. That the Ancients knew how 
 to estimate this excellence in his eloquence, is clear from the above- 
 cited passage of Dionysius, who confesses that he was transported into 
 a Corybantic inspiration, by him. In modern times, we are inclined 
 to deny him this excellence. We seem to take him for a cold and 
 arid man, who, according to the favorite phrase, addresses himself only 
 to the understanding, and not to the heart, and with whom the whole 
 problem is, upon grounds of reason, to convince of the justice of his 
 cause, and the utility of his propositions. Were this so, he had lacked 
 the most essential characteristic of the orator, and we should not have 
 had cause to wonder at his torrent-like power ; for we are not carried 
 away by mere conviction but by impassioned conviction. Now it is 
 indeed true, that he always satisfies the requisitions of the under- 
 standing, — nay, that he usually puts his thoughts into the enthyme- 
 matic form. But is it a fact that thought is incompatible with feeling ? 
 Rather, is not the connection of ideas a thread by which the fire of 
 emotion runs down so much the easier ? Is not feeling the nobler, and 
 therefore the mightier also, in noble natures, the more it is borne up 
 by thought ? Is it not a modern judgment, that feeling necessarily 
 presupposes confusion of thought ? One may not indeed seek the 
 softer and tenderer feelings in Demosthenes, — the struggle against 
 Philip afforded him little opportunity for their unfolding. But if one 
 seeks the strong, masculine feelings, — love for native country, enthu- 
 siasm for the glory of noble deeds, hatred against all that is wrong, 
 indignation against selfishness and perfidy, — the words of Demos- 
 thenes, more than any other human words, are pervaded by the fire of 
 those affections; and it still glows on in them, notwithstanding the 
 lapse of so many centuries, enough to fire every noble heart. 
 
SUPPLEMENT. 211 
 
 To this perfection of Matter, in Demosthenes, perfection of Form is 
 correspondent. The highest praise, in this respect, is ascribed to him 
 by the critics of antiquity, especially by Dionysius. His style, says 
 this critic, is not the rough and hard style of Thucydides, nor the soft 
 and polished style of Isocrates, but he struck a happy mean between 
 both. In this he is to be compared with Sophocles, who stands in a 
 similar relation to Aeschylus on the one hand, and Euripides on the 
 other. In fact, confinement to one of either of these two extremes 
 would have been a onesidedness highly prejudicial to an orator who 
 was to call up, and delineate the most diverse emotions. This freedom 
 which Demosthenes aims at, and reaches, is nevertheless not licen- 
 tiousness. On the contrary, his prose is, in its kind, as perfect and 
 finished as metrical composition. For example, the greatest attention 
 is bestowed by Demosthenes upon the sequence of long and short syl- 
 lables ; not in order to produce a regularly recurring metre, but in 
 order to express the most diverse emotions of the mind by a suitable 
 and ever varying rythm. It may be remarked in general, that by the 
 study of Demosthenes and the ancient critics, w T e are introduced to 
 marvels of prose style at which we cannot but be astonished. The ex- 
 hibition of them would be impossible without the aid of the Greek 
 originals, and would exceed our design in this sketch. As, in Demos- 
 thenes, the prose rythm never passes over into a poetical metre, so 
 also his language, as to its elements, never loses itself in the sphere of 
 poetry, but remains, as the language of rhetorical discourse ever 
 should, that of common life and cultivated society ; and the uncommon 
 charm of this rhetorical prose lies precisely in the fact, that these sim- 
 ple elements of speech are treated with the same care which, usually, 
 only the poet is wont to devote to diction. Demosthenes himself was 
 well aware of this study which he bestowed upon his style, and he 
 required it of the orator. It is not enough, said he, that the orator 
 in order to prepare for delivery in public, write down his thoughts ; 
 he must as'it were, have sculptured them in brass.* The comparison 
 of prose composition with sculpture appears to have been a favorite 
 one with the ancient critics generally, as Dionysius also remarks of 
 Demosthenes, Plato, and Isocrates, " their productions were not so 
 much works of writing, as of carving and embossing." f The modern 
 
 * Dicet scripta quam res patietur plurima, et, ut Demosthenes ait, si con- 
 tinget, et sculpta. — Quintilian, XII. 9, 16. 
 
 t*AAA«s T€ Kcd ruv t6tc avSp&Troou ob ypairroTs, aWa yAvirTo?s Kat ropevroTs 
 *o{k6tols iK(pep6vTuv \6yovs. Dionysius, De compositione verborum XXV. 
 
212 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 world takes a totally different view of this subject. It is of opinion 
 that he who is entirely filled with his idea cannot possibly expend so 
 great care upon the Form ; and, in the instance of the orator parti- 
 cularly, any art shown in style is a sign that he is less anxious for the 
 profit of his hearers, than for their applause. But, on the contrary, 
 one might ask whether such care expended upon the Form is not 
 necessary for the very sake of the Matter, — necessary in order to 
 present it to the view of the hearer in untroubled purity and clear- 
 ness ? We seem to assume, that in such sedulousness, Form and Mat- 
 ter must necessarily separate from each other, and the Form become 
 a thing for and by itself, which we seek to adorn, without regard to 
 the Matter. But that this is by no means necessary, the example of 
 Demosthenes proves, against whom, most certainly, this objection can- 
 not be brought. On the contrary, the fault, which the Moderns too 
 frequently commit, of giving the Form an ornament independent of 
 the Matter, is not to be imputed to art, but to the want of art ; for in 
 the estimation of true art, the most perfect Form is nothing but the 
 clearest and boldest translucence of the Material itself." 
 
 Lord Brougham also notices this attention to diction by the great or- 
 ators of antiquity, in his " Dissertation upon the Eloquence of the An- 
 cients. 9 * " We perceive," he remarks, " the exquisite care taken by the 
 ancient orators to strike and to please their audience, in the attention 
 paid by them to the rythm or numbers of their periods. In the an- 
 cient institutes of Rhetoric, that subject forms a separate and impor- 
 tant head, which, or even the mention of which, would scarcely be 
 borne among us. It must at the same time be observed, that although 
 we are so suspicious of whatever would give an appearance of theat- 
 rical display to the business of debate, our greatest orators, neverthe- 
 less, have excelled by a careful attention to rythm, and some of the 
 finest passages of modern eloquence owe their unparalleled success 
 undeniably to the adoption of those Iambic measures which thrilled 
 and delighted the Roman Forum, and the Dactylus and Paeonicus, 
 which were the luxury of the Attic Ecclesia. Witness the former in 
 Mr. Erskines celebrated passage respecting the Indian chief, and the 
 latter in Mr. Grattan's peroration to his speech on Irish independence." 
 
SUPPLEMENT. 213 
 
 Note IL Page 185. 
 
 " It is a common thing," says Lord Brougham, " with those who, 
 because Cicero is % more ornate, suffers the artifice of his composition to 
 appear more plainly, and indulges more in amplification, imagine that 
 he is less argumentative than the Greek orators, to represent the 
 latter, and especially Demosthenes, as distinguished by great closeness 
 of reasoning. If by this is only meant that he never wanders from 
 the subject, that each remark tells upon the matter in hand, that all 
 his illustrations are brought to bear upon the point, and that he is 
 never found making any step, in any direction, which does not advance 
 his main object, and lead towards the conclusion to which he is striv- 
 ing to bring his hearers, the observation is perfectly just ; for this 
 is a distinguishing feature in the character of his eloquence. It is not, 
 indeed, his grand excellence, because everything depends upon the 
 manner in which he pursues this course, the course itself being one 
 quite as open to the humblest mediocrity as to the highest genius. 
 But if it is meant to be said that those Attic orators, and especially 
 their great chief, made speeches in which long chains of elaborate rea- 
 soning are to be found, nothing can be less like the truth. A variety 
 of topics are handled in succession, all calculated to strike the audience. 
 Passions which predominated in their minds are appealed to, feelings 
 easily excited among them are aroused by skilful allusions, glaring 
 inconsistencies are shown in the advice given by others, sometimes by 
 exhibiting the repugnance of those councils among themselves, some- 
 times contrasting them with other counsels proceeding from the same 
 quarters. The pernicious tendency of certain measures is displayed 
 by referring, sometimes to the general principles of human action, and 
 the course which human affairs usually take ; more frequently, by a 
 reference to the history of past, and generally of very recent events. 
 Much invective is mixed with these topics, and both the enemy without, 
 and the evil counsellor within the walls, are unsparingly dealt with. 
 The orator was addressing hearers who were for the most part as in- 
 timately acquainted as himself with all the facts of the case, and these 
 lay within a sufficiently narrow compass, being the actual state of 
 public affairs, and the victories or the defeats which had, within the 
 memory of all, attended their arms, or the transactions which had 
 taken place among them in very recent times. No detailed statements 
 
214 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 were therefore wanted for their information. He was really speaking 
 to them respecting their own affairs, or rather respecting what they 
 had just been doing or witnessing themselves. Hence a very short 
 allusion alone was generally required to raise the idea which he de- 
 sired to present before his audience. Sometimes a word was enough 
 for his purpose : the naming oi a man or a town : the calling to their 
 recollection what had been done by the one. or had happened to the 
 other. The effect produced by such a rapid interchange of ideas and 
 impressions, must have struck every one who has been preser.' 
 public meetings. He will have remarked that some such apt allusion 
 has a power, produces an electrical effect, not to be reached by any 
 chain of reasoning, however close, and that even the most highly 
 wrought passages, and the most exquisite composition, fall far short of 
 it in rousing or controlling the minds of a large assembly. Chains 
 of reasoning, examples of fine argumentation, are calculated to pro- 
 duce their effect upon a far nicer, a more confined, and a more select 
 audience. But such apposite allusions, such appropriate topics, such 
 happy hits, (to use a homely but expressive phrase), have a sure, an 
 irresistible, a magical effect upon a popular assembly. — Dissertation 
 on the Eloquence of the And: Us. 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
 Mention the primary characteristics of Eloquence. Which one is to be 
 selected as furnishing its fundamental and constituent principle ? Practical 
 effect of selecting either of its other affinities as its fundamental principle 1 
 Distinctive difference between a product within the provinces of philosophy 
 and poetry, and one within that of practical life ? Proof from the examples 
 of Sophocles and Demosthenes, that the productive agency of the orator lies 
 in the sphere of active life % Inference from this with regard to the essen- 
 tial nature of Eloquence ? 
 
 What is meant by saying that Eloquence is a Virtue ? Relation of 
 knowledge, culture, and special training, to Eloquence ? Illustrate by refer- 
 ence to the art of painting. Explain the relation of the orator to the hearer, 
 and the consequent nature of the influence he is to exert upon him. State 
 the highest and most general law of Eloquence. Mention the general Ideas 
 to be assumed by the orator as necessarily existing in every hearer. Parti- 
 cular modifications which they undergo in the spheres of Church and State ? 
 
 Mention the three species of orations assumed by the Ancient Rheto- 
 ricians. Coincidence of this division with the theory of the Author ? Con- 
 nection between the Ethical theory of Eloquence, and the success of the 
 Orator ? Reasons why an appeal to the Passions is not so likely to succeed, 
 as an address to the Moral Ideas ? Mention the subordinate Ideas or Cate- 
 gories. Explain the manner in which they enter into the structure of an 
 oration. The particular species of oration in which each is prominent % 
 Effect of making either one of them predominant in an oration ? 
 
 Distinction between the Rhetorical and the Philosophical presentation of 
 truth ? Does the oration admit of a strictly philosophical demonstration of 
 truth 1 How is truth to be established in Rhetorical discourse ? Define the 
 term popularity, in relation to the orator. Connection of morality, or 
 strength of character, in the orator, with the existence of this quality in the 
 oration ? Relation of the above-mentioned Ideas and Categories to the Plan 
 and Division of an oration 1 Advantage of this method of constructing 
 the doctrine of the Plan % Define the simple oration ; the complex. Define 
 the Exordium. Its distinguishing characteristics ? What tends to lengthen 
 the Exordium 1 Is practice to be uniform with regard to the preännounce- 
 ment of the parts of the development in an oration ? Did the Ancients 
 observe this practice 1 Why ? Principle upon which the division of the 
 simple oration should proceed ? Illustrate by a sermon of Reinhardt, 
 What peculiarity in the manner of announcing the division, in the French 
 
216 QUESTIONS. 
 
 preachers? Effect liable to result from this? How many parts has the 4 
 complex oration ? Relation of the Will and Character to Eloquence ? 
 Illustrate by the examples of Demosthenes, and the younger Cato. Defini- 
 tion of the Orator by the elder Cato, according to Quintilian ? 
 
 Define Elocution or Style, in distinction from Invention. Eaults in the 
 treatment of this part of Rhetoric, by the Ancients ? Peculiarity in the cir- 
 cumstances of the Ancient Orator, contributing to this ? Example of De- 
 mosthenes, in regard to the employment of artifices in Elocution ? Distinc- 
 tion between Affection and Passion ? To what must the orator confine 
 himself, in case he does not awaken and address the Affections of his hearers ? 
 Consequences of this ? Connection between Affection and Action in the 
 hearer ? By what Idea are the affections of Zeal, Shame, Penitence, and 
 Anger generated 1 How may they degenerate into Passions ? Defect in 
 Aristotle's treatment of this part of the subject ? Define Wit in relation to 
 Affection and Enthusiasm. What consequently is its general relation to Elo- 
 quence ? The most valid reason for employing it, mentioned by Cicero ? 
 Confirmation of this view of Wit, derived from a comparison of Demos- 
 thenes with Cicero ? 
 
 Why may not the Philosophical, or the Poetical, presentation of thought, 
 be employed by the orator, in order to produce Affection in the hearer ? 
 Mention the three Laws which impel and regulate the Rhetorical presenta- 
 tion of thought. Define the law of Adaptation. Essential nature of this 
 law, and its connection with Affection in the hearer ? What does this law 
 prescribe with respect to the hearer's power of comprehension ? With re- 
 spect to language ? With respect to phrases and images ? Importance of 
 knowledge and culture in this respect ? Mention the chief causes which pre- 
 vent the orator from adapting his oration to the individuality of the hearer. 
 How far may the orator venture, in dealing with the faults of his auditors ? 
 Illustrate by Demosthenes, and the French preachers of the age of Louis 
 XIV. Are brilliancy and high coloring characteristic of the highest style of 
 Eloquence ? What examples in Ancient and Modern Oratory prove this ? 
 Define the law of Constant Progress. Its essential nature ? Effect of a stop 
 in the progress of an oration ? The surest means of securing constant pro- 
 gress ? Maxim in relation to the employment of Narration and Description ? 
 Ground of the maxim ? What does the law of Constant Progress prescribe 
 respecting the development of individual thoughts in an oration ? Manage- 
 ment of arguments according to this law ? Relation of strength of Charac- 
 ter, in the orator, to progress in the oration ? Define the law of Vivacity. 
 Its essential nature ? The true source whence figures should be derived ? 
 Distinctive difference between Poetical and Rhetorical tropes ? To what 
 law is the employment of figures to be subjected ? Example of Demos- 
 thenes? Distinctive difference between Prose and Poetry-? Between 
 Number and Metre? Explain the origin and construction of Prose on 
 ethical principles. 
 
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