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THE 
 
 NORTHERN CONFEDERACY 
 
 ACCORDING TO THE PLANS OF THE 
 "ESSEX JUNTO" 1796-1814 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Presented to the 
 
 Faculty of Princetoin 1\\iversity 
 
 IN Candidacy for the Degree 
 
 OF Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 BY 
 CHARLES RAYMOND BROWN 
 
 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 PRINCETON 
 
 LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
THE ^^'^ 
 
 NORTHERN CONFEDERACY 
 
 ■ ACCORDING TO THE PLANS OF THE 
 "ESSEX JUNTO" 1796-1814 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Presented to the 
 
 Faculty of Princeton University 
 
 IN Candidacy for the Degree 
 
 of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 'BY 
 
 CHARLES RAYMOND BROWN 
 
 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 PRINCETON 
 
 LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 
 OXFORD university PRESS 
 
Published October, 1915 
 
 Accepted by the Department of History and Politics 
 May 1913 
 
 Gift 
 Thft University 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 1. Origin of the "Essex Junto" 7 
 
 2. Opposition to John Adams' Administration and the 
 
 Breaking of the Federalist Party 10 
 
 3. Plans for Secession 1803-1804 25 
 
 4. The Embargo of 1807 and the Junto's Plans for a 
 
 British Alliance 46 
 
 5. Intrigues During the War of 1812 76 
 
 6. The Hartford Convention 102 
 
 Bibliography 118 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The ''Essex Junto" when appHed to a little band of politi- 
 cians in Essex County, Massachusetts, by Governor Hancock 
 in 1778, carried little significance outside of local politics. It 
 very soon grew, however, to have a tremendous influence in 
 national affairs. 
 
 It is the purpose of this work to follow the "Essex Junto," 
 as an active political body, in their endeavors to control Na- 
 tional legislation and, by skillful misrepresentation of the mo- 
 tives of the party in power, to arouse the New England people 
 to the point of dissolving the Union and forming an indepen- 
 dent Confederacy. I have attempted to show the true influence 
 of this movement upon the national history of that period; 
 and have, in some instances, found cause to give a new coloring 
 to familiar historical events on account of the influence of the 
 Junto. 
 
 That there has never been a monograph written upon this 
 subject is due largely to the scarcity of available sources. In 
 many instances the entire correspondence of men intimately 
 connected with the Junto has been purposely or otherwise de- 
 stroyed; and the fact that there was no regular organized 
 movement has forced me to write this monograph almost en- 
 tirely from the letters which have been preserved. There are 
 no secondary sources of any merit upon the subject. The most 
 valuable histories covering the period merely mention the "Es- 
 sex Junto," and are of little value in treating the subject. With 
 letters as my principal documents, and such fragmentary bits 
 of evidence as I have been able to collect, it has been a difficult 
 but an interesting subject. 
 
 Under the guidance and kind assistance of Dr. R. M. Mc- 
 Elroy, this Thesis has been prepared to complete the require- 
 ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Princeton 
 University. 
 
 C. R. B. 
 
 Princeton University, 
 Princeton, N. J. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 Orkun of the "Esskx Junto" 
 
 Almost every historian who has mentioned the 'Essex Junto" 
 at all, has credited John Adams with the distinction of having 
 first applied that name to a radical wing of the Federalist party 
 which centered in Essex County, Massachusetts, and which af- 
 terwards figured so largely in shaping the destiny of the party. 
 This is not true. The name originated a quarter of a century 
 before Adams applied it and under entirely different circum- 
 stances. There was no such thing as party and party organiza- 
 tion, as we understand those terms today, when "Essex Junto" 
 was applied to a number of Essex County politicians. There 
 were Whig views and Tory views but, before the Revolution, 
 American political parties had not taken any definite form. 
 
 About the time of the Declaration of Independence, the 
 formation of a constitution became a matter of much moment 
 in the Colonies which had just become states. In Massachu- 
 setts, in June, 1776, it was proposed in the General Court that 
 a constitution, or some form of government, be prepared and 
 presented to the people.^ It was thought better, however, to 
 refer the matter somewhat more directly to the people; and the 
 House of Representatives recommended that the towns em- 
 power their delegates, at the next election, to form a constitu- 
 tion. Many towns, perhaps most, complied with this request, 
 and early in 1778 a constitution was agreed upon by the Gen- 
 eral Court, and presented to the people. It was rejected by 
 them by a large vote. 
 
 There were several- reasons offered for rejecting the con- 
 stitution but the strongest one was that the proposed constitu- 
 tion had carefully avoided a strong form of government and 
 that the Executive was a mere cipher. The peoj^le were thus 
 divided over the form of government which would be the most 
 satisfactory to Massachusetts ; one class desired a constitution 
 
 ' Parsons' "Chief Justice Parsons," p. 45. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 46. 
 
which would place the governing power largely in the hands 
 of the people; the other class believed that a strong centralized 
 form of government would be most desirable and that the peo- 
 ple should not be the real governing force. To the men of 
 the latter class the proposed Constitution was wholly worthless 
 and they succeeded in defeating it.^ The leaders of the opposi- 
 tion were from Essex County* and believed in a strong central 
 government. Here is the identical line upon which our first 
 two national parties began their struggle. 
 
 A meeting of these men took place in Essex County, in April, 
 1778. By whom it was called, we do not know but it seems to 
 have been attended by twenty-seven delegates.' It originated 
 in Newburyport and there began its work but later adjourned 
 to Ipswich. At the latter place a pamphlet was prepared and 
 ordered published which contained eighteen distinct articles 
 stating the leading objections to the proposed Constitution.'* 
 Its long title is: "The Result of the Convention of Delegates 
 holden at Ipswich, in the County of Essex, who were deputed'^ 
 to take into consideration the Constitution and Form of Gov- 
 ernment proposed by the Convention of States of Massachu- 
 setts Bay." It is most familiar under its short title, "The Essex 
 Result." 
 
 Upon that body of men v/ho prepared this pamphlet and 
 supported a strong central government, John Hancock fastened 
 the title "Essex Junto" in 1778. This, therefore, was the first^ 
 appearance of that name in American politics. 
 
 The following year in September, 1779, a convention^ was 
 called, and met at Cambridge, to frame a constitution. A com- 
 mittee of four, Samuel Adams, John Pickering. Caleb Strong 
 and William Cushing. was directed to draw up a Constitution 
 
 ' Parsons' "Chief Justice Parsons," p. 47. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 47. 
 
 "^ Ibid., p. 49. Documents give number of delegates and say that 
 Parsons called the Essex Convention. 
 
 'Ibid., appendix, p. 359, pamphlet printed in full. 
 
 ^ "Deputed" would lead us to believe that they were officially ap- 
 pointed or elected; they were, however, evidently a self chosen body, 
 representing twelve towns of the County of Essex. 
 
 ' Colonel Pickering quotes Chief Justice Parsons as saying that 
 "Essex Junto" had been applied before the Revolution. There is no 
 evidence that this was true, however. 
 
 •J. S. Barry's "Hist, of Mass.," vol. 3. p. 176. 
 
 8 
 
and Bill of Rights. John Adams was later added to the com- 
 mittee and was the real drafter of the document although he 
 was not from Essex County. The Constitution,"' as presented 
 by this committee, was adopted and it gave more power to the 
 Executive. 
 
 These men of Essex County who later dominated the Fed- 
 eralist party were descendants of those who, in the dark days 
 of 1629, had followed Endicott into the wilderness. They were 
 strong, honest, and in many cases of an almost reckless cour- 
 age. But their intellectual vigor and clear perception were in 
 many instances combined with great mental narrowness and 
 rigidity. When time brought new political forces and expan- 
 sion of ideas the old Puritan stock could not bend to meet the 
 changes. They resisted, therefore, as long as they could and 
 submitted only when resistance was no longer possible.^'^ In 
 1644 the Essex men had turned W'irthrop and Dudley out of 
 office as Federal Commissioners, and replaced them with Haw- 
 thorne and Bradstreet, both of Essex County.^- Palfrey, in his 
 History of New England, says. "A local Caucus (not yet so 
 called) arranged a combination to dictate the proceedings of 
 the government; that those of Essex procured a court made up 
 of Deputies of the several shires and propounded divers things 
 without communicating them to the other shires." "Two hun- 
 dred years ago," says Palfrey "Essex men were thought to be 
 aspiring to rule the colony, as fifty years ago an 'Essex Junto' 
 was cried out against for its alleged combination to rule the 
 Commonwealth."^" 
 
 Of such material was the "Essex Junto" composed w^hich 
 held political sway in Massachusetts and which had to be 
 reckoned with, if not obeyed, for nearly a half century in 
 national affairs.^* 
 
 There have been many attempts to define "Essex Junto" but 
 
 " F. N. Thorpe, "Constitution and Charters," House Documents, vol. 
 3, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1888. 
 
 "H. C. Lodge's "Life of Cabot," p. 18. 
 
 " Palfrey's "Hist, of New England," vol. 2, p. 156. 
 
 "Ibid., p. 157. 
 
 " The men who composed the Junto were Timothy Pickering, Caleb 
 Strong, Jonathan Jackson, Triston Dalton, Theophilus Parsons, George 
 Cabot, Fisher Ames, the Lowells, Benjamin Goodhue, and Stephen 
 Higginson, all from Essex County. To these we will add others who 
 were associated with the Junto. 
 
no one has been very successful. Mr. S. E. Morrison says: "I 
 take it that the Essex Junto, from 1800 to 1815 should be 
 defined as the Massachusetts Federalist leaders who opposed 
 John Adams in 1800, who condoned the Chesapeake outrage 
 and who squinted at secession in 1814."^^ It can best be defined 
 after we have finished our investigation. 
 
 It should be remembered that the influence and activities of 
 the "Essex Junto" were not to be long confined to a single 
 county nor to a single state. The Junto was the dominating 
 force in the Federalist party for many years ; it had followers 
 very early from the other New England states, and later from 
 several states outside of New England. They were not always 
 as ardent and dogmatic as the old members ; nevertheless, they 
 were of the same political faith and must be included under 
 the title "Essex Junto" in our narrative. This monograph will 
 not, therefore, have very great concern with the Junto in local 
 affairs but rather with its influence upon national questions. 
 
 ^'•'Ain. Hist. Rev., July 1912, p. 794. 
 
 10 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Opposition to John Adams' Administration and the 
 Breaking of the Federalist Party 
 
 After the Constitution was adopted and Washington became 
 President, the conflicting tendencies observed in the struggles 
 over the adoption of the Constitution reappeared. The parties 
 under Washington were known as the FederaHst and the Re- 
 publican. It had sometimes been supposed that these parties 
 are identical with the Federalist and the Anti-Federalist of 
 1787-88- This is not true. To be a Federalist in 1787 and 1788 
 was to favor the adoption of the Constitution. To be a states' 
 rights Anti-Federalist was to oppose it. But to be a Federalist 
 in 1791 was to favor the adoption of Hamilton's financial 
 measures and a broad construction of the Constitution. 
 
 The fundamental difference between the parties during the 
 constitutional debate and its adoption was as to where the 
 political power should center. Mr. Hamilton believed a strong 
 central government with the power to govern placed in the 
 hands of the aristocrats to be most satisfactory for any nation ; 
 he had neither sympathy for the states rights doctrine nor faith 
 in the integrity of the masses of the people, and therefore, 
 labored for a form of government bordering strongly on that 
 of a Monarchy. Thus the term "Well born" was a contemptu- 
 ous name given to the Federalists. 
 
 On the other hand were the states' rights Anti-Federalists 
 who dreaded as the greatest of calamities the vesting of large 
 power in a central authority. The Anti-Federalists believed 
 that the central authority should draw its power from the states 
 and from the people. We should notice, then, that these two 
 parties of 1787- 1788, represent merely two tendencies, the cen- 
 trifugal and the centripetal. 
 
 Hamilton's financial policy and the broad construction of the 
 Constitution in 1791, determined Jefi^erson to form a strong 
 party to resist Hamilton's program. Having witnessed the out- 
 break of the French Revolution, Jefferson was eminently quali- 
 fied to become the leader of such an opposition party, and 
 
because of the predilection of its leaders for things French, the 
 new party was called "Democratic-Republican." Thus the two 
 parties, Federalist and Anti-Federalist, took their final form 
 in the "Federalist" and the "Republican" parties. 
 
 The next few years brought vexing questions of foreign 
 relations, which caused the two parties to drift further apart. 
 "Citizen Genet" landed in 1793, the very day on which Wash- 
 ington issued his Neutrality Proclamation, and set to work 
 rather after the fashion of a liberator than of a diplomat.^ In 
 pursuance of secret instructions, he not only presumed upon 
 the force of the existing treaties, but attempted to draw the; 
 United States into the war, so as to make it her common cause. 
 Money, men, and privateers from America, he especially reck- 
 oned upon. The party led by Jefiferson was very enthusiastic 
 over the French cause. It is said that, at a banquet given Genet, 
 they all filed around the table sticking their knives into the head 
 of a roasted pig in celebration of the beheading of Louis XVT. 
 This being their attitude they exerted themselves to enlist 
 French aid against England. 
 
 The Federalists, having less feeling for French Democracy, 
 repudiated this bold and presumptuous attitude. Washington 
 had already issued his Proclamation, and the feeling became 
 intense. Insults were heaped upon the head of the venerable 
 Washington by the followers of Jefferson, and the result was 
 that the Republicans gave their sympathy to the French cause 
 and the Federalists gave theirs to the English. Here, therefore, 
 is the beginning of the "British Faction" and the "French Fac- 
 tion" and also the beginning of that party strife which lasted 
 as long as the Federalist party. From this time the Essex Junto, 
 leading the "British Faction," began its attacks upon the "Ja- 
 cobins" or Jeffersonians. 
 
 In 1793 Great Britain issued two of her Orders in Council,- 
 by virtue of which all vessels loaded with bread stuff, bound 
 for any place occupied by the French armies, were considered 
 good prizes. This was almost an unbearable hardship to Amer- 
 ican shipping. Hamilton, therefore, advised a special mission 
 to Great Britain, and communicated his plan to that portion of 
 the Junto then in the Senate. The Eastern Senators, Cabot, 
 Ellsworth, Strong and King, then held a conference, endorsed 
 
 * Schouler's "Hist, of U. S.," vol. 2, p. 265. 
 " Perkins' "Late War," pp. 12-14. 
 
 12 
 
the mission and appointed Ellsworth to confer with Washing- 
 ton.^ He was instructed to state that Hamilton was the person 
 from whom, in every point of view, a successful issue to this 
 effort was most to be expected.* Ames, although more hostile 
 to the English than his eastern brothers, wrote: "Who but 
 Hamilton would perfectly satisfy all our wishes? He is ipsi 
 agmen."^ This was probably true from a Junto point of view, 
 but not from that of the Republicans. 
 
 Washington avowed his preference for Hamilton, but in- 
 timated doubts arising from the prejudices which had been ex- 
 cited against him.** The same idea was repeated to Goodhue, 
 "You know," said Washington," whom I wish, — but for the 
 clamor they have raised against him."^ Randolph, Secretary of 
 State, urged that such an appointment would be unwise,® and 
 Monroe, even ventured on a letter against the choice of Ham- 
 ilton.^ John Jay was nominated, as a compromise, and nego- 
 tiated a treaty^" which failed to satisfy both parties, although it 
 was ratified by the Senate and signed by the President. It 
 is not necessary for our purpose to discuss this treaty, which 
 failed to adjust many of the points which the United States 
 held as grievances." 
 
 The Junto had failed to obtain the appointment for Hamil- 
 ton but in Congress it had gained adherents and succeeded in 
 ratifying the treaty,^^ although it seems strange that Eastern 
 Senators should have been willing to make Great Britain con- 
 cessions when their commerce was the chief sufferer. Ratifica- 
 tion took place behind closed doors and, when the contents of 
 the treaty were made known, the country was inflamed as by 
 fire. The constituents of this group of Senators held meetings 
 in opposition as did the whole country. Hamilton and the 
 
 'Hamilton's "Hist, of the Republic of the U. S.," vol. 5, p. 532. 
 
 * Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 5, p. 532. 
 ' Ibid., p. 532. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 533. Washington referred to those in the House of Repre- 
 sentatives who were hostile to the Angloman party. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 533. Jefferson, Randolph and Monroe, were responsible 
 for the appointment of Jay. 
 
 * Washington's Writings, vol. 10, appendix, p. 558. 
 
 ''Ibid., appendix, p. 558. Monroe's letter to President Washington. 
 ^°Jay Treaty. Am. State papers, vol. i, p. 520. 
 " Hamilton's Works, vol. 7, p. 723. Hamilton said, "The Treaty 
 upon the whole was satisfactory." Refer to text of Jay's Treaty. 
 " Schoulers' "Hist, of U. S.," vol. 2, p. 309. 
 
 13 
 
Junto were left alone. The Federalist party lost a good deal 
 of local strength, which the Republicans gained ; and Great 
 Britain went on with her tyranny. 
 
 In the year 1796, in dread of the possibility of the election 
 of Jefferson, and the establishment of a Southern and pro- 
 French domination over the United States, an appeal was made 
 to the people of Connecticut, preparing them for and pointing 
 to a dissolution of the Union. "The Northern States," it urged, 
 "can subsist as a Nation, as a Republic without any connection 
 with the Southern."^^ There was a series of articles published 
 in the Hartford Courant, over the signature of Pelham, urging 
 the dissolution of the Union. ^* In letters of Oliver Wolcott, 
 Lieutenant Governor of Connecticut, to his son, then Secretary 
 of the Treasury, the idea was repeatedly advanced. "If," says 
 Wolcott, November 21, 1796, "the French arms continue to 
 preponderate, and a governing influence of this Nation shall 
 continue in the southern and western countries, I am confident, 
 and indeed hope, that a separation will soon take place."^^ 
 "Such an event," he says, November 28, 1796, "will be un- 
 happy for us ; but much less so, than to be under the govern- 
 ment of a French agent. "^''' "I sincerely declare," he added a 
 few days later, "that I wish the Northern States would separate 
 from the Southern, the moment that event (the election of 
 Jefferson) shall take place."^^ 
 
 This plan of disunion, thus rife in Connecticut in 1796, may 
 not improbably be regarded as the germ of that which appeared 
 at Washington, in 1803-04, at Boston in 1808-09, ^'^^1 which 
 showed itself, for the last time, during the War of 1812, being 
 disclosed, in the Hartford Convention of 1814. Whether or not 
 this was the sowing of the seed which sprang up at the above 
 mentioned places we have no evidence. It is true, however, 
 that Connecticut was always represented in the movements of 
 the Junto which had its base in Massachusetts. That is suffi- 
 cient for our purpose. 
 
 After the election of John Adams, the United States was 
 forced to face her former ally, France, in a still more serious 
 
 " Randall's "Jefferson," vol. 3, pp. 634-5. 
 " Randall's "Jefferson." vol. 3, pp. 634-5. 
 
 " Quoted in Plumer's "Life of Plumer," p. 283. Almost all of the 
 Wolcott papers have been destroyed. 
 '" Plumer's "Life of Plumer," p. 283. 
 "Ibid.. 283. 
 
 14 
 
difficulty, known as the X. Y. Z. affair. In this controversy the 
 Federalist party received a blow^ from which it never recovered. 
 France, disgusted and jealous of our recent treaty relations 
 with England, set upon our commerce in retaliation for what 
 she termed injustice, and it became necessary to open treaty 
 negotiations with her. Adams, therefore, sent a commission 
 consisting of Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney, to negotiate with 
 France upon the situation. . . . This was an unfortunate ap- 
 pointment and it gave the members of the Junto an excellent 
 opportunity to ridicule the new President who was as much a 
 Republican as a Federalist. None of these men, except perhaps 
 Gerry, were in sympathy with the French Revolution and, of 
 course, their appointment was not agreeable to the French. 
 
 Hamilton said, "To be useful, it is important that a man 
 agreeable to the French should go. Either Mr. Jefferson or 
 Mr. Madison should be on the committee, but neither should 
 go alone." ^^ In this Hamilton was right and the appointments, 
 being somewhat contrary to the advice and wishes of the lead- 
 ing Federalists, further antagonized them, and led finally to 
 open opposition to the Administration. This is a familiar bit 
 of history and we need only state that the commission was not 
 received, but w^as approached by certain unofficial gentlemen, 
 named in the official despatches merely by the letters X, Y, and 
 Z. The object of these unofficial visits was purely to get money 
 from the United States. Their demands, therefore, were dis- 
 regarded, and yielding nothing. Pinckney and Marshall were 
 soon ordered to leave, while Gerry was invited to remain. That 
 he did so w-as not to his credit. 
 
 When the X. Y. Z. despatches were published, the Junto, 
 especially those members of it who were in the Cabinet, was 
 quick to take advantage of the feeling produced against France 
 and began to work up a war spirit in New England. ^'^ Wolcott, 
 Secretary of the Treasury, wrote Cabot asking him to use his 
 influence with the people of Alassachusetts against France.-" 
 To his request Cabot replied : 'T hope from my very soul that 
 the President will enjoy the immortality which is due the man 
 who dares do right when the whole world does wrong. I 
 
 "Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 214. 
 
 ^' Political Writings in Lodge's "Cabot," pp. 581-600. This will give 
 a partial estimate of the agitation which took place in New England.. 
 ™ Lodge's "Cabot," p. 117. 
 
 IS 
 
readily accept the apostleship and will use your discourse as if 
 it were my own. My zeal has already produced a letter of two 
 sheets which will be transcribed as a circular to a half dozen 
 friends. I will quote no authorities to infidels and the faithful 
 won't need them."-^ Mr. Cabot would have been dangerously 
 near the truth if he had said: "when the whole Junto does 
 wrong." The war spirit in Congress was due largely to the 
 energy of these men, and in 1798, preparations were begun for 
 military defense. Washington was made Commander in Chief 
 and chose his Major Generals as follows: Hamilton first Ma- 
 jor General, Pinckney second, and Knox third.-'- 
 
 President Adams disapproved of Washington's ranking of 
 the Major Generals and attempted to place Knox above Ham- 
 ilton. By this action the President brought the whole Junto 
 forward with remonstrances,-^ and, but for the timely inter- 
 vention of Washington, the party might have been hopelessly 
 split at this juncture. As it was the existing breach between 
 Adams and his party was only broadened. There was really 
 no good reason for the action of President Adams in this mat- 
 ter. Washington had agreed to assume the duties of Com- 
 mander-in-Chief only on condition that he be allowed to choose 
 his staff, and extreme aversion to Hamilton seems to have been 
 the only basis for Adams' conduct. 
 
 The first schism in the Cabinet took place at Trenton, New- 
 Jersey, early in 1799.-'* The trouble arose from the President's 
 desire to, send a second mission to France to attempt further 
 negotiations. The particular expressions which passed on this 
 occasion are not preserved; but, from Mr. Hamilton's Public 
 Letter-^ we are informed of the principal causes. Such an 
 efifort was considered by the Cabinet to be inconsistent with the 
 honor and dignity of the Nation. Pickering, Wolcott and Mc- 
 Henry, remonstrated with Aadms but with little success. Judg- 
 
 ^^ Ibid., p. 120. 
 
 -^ Ibid., p. 177. 
 
 ^Pickering wrote Cabot confidentially saying: "The object of this 
 letter is to engage you in this matter in such a way as you and one 
 or two confidential friends (say Higginson and Ames) shall deem most 
 eligible to prevail on the President to acquiesce in the first arrange- 
 ment." 
 
 "John Woods, "Administration of J. Adams," p. 223. 
 
 ^ A public letter in which he denounces President and which we 
 will examine later. 
 
 16 
 
ing from a letter-" from Pickering to Rufus King, it is clear 
 that the greater part of their strength was thrown into opposi- 
 tion on this measure. He says: "The second mission to France 
 was deprecated by all enlightened Federalists, — especially in 
 New England. I know personally that your friends Cabot, 
 Ames, Higginson, Ellsworth, and Quincy objected to it."-'' 
 
 This opposition determined Adams to make the nominations 
 without further Cabinet consultation. He had no alternative if 
 he wished to send the mission. So on the 26th of February, 
 1799, he nominated Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Patrick 
 Henry of Virginia, and Wm. Vans Alurry of Maryland, Envoys 
 Extraordinary, and drew up his own instructions. Henry de- 
 clined, and Wm. R. Davie of North Carolina, was substituted. 
 
 This friction in the Cabinet put Mr. Adams in a very difficult 
 position. He believed further negotiation to be the safest pol- 
 icy for the country ; but the Junto desired a war with France."* 
 The policy adopted was undoubtedly the wisest but it resulted 
 in the common ruin of President and party, by giving the Junto 
 a broad foundation upon which to attack him. The fact that 
 a portion of the party held erroneous views, and that the 
 President, in opposition to these views, carried through a peace 
 policy, is not a satisfactory explanation of the consequent defeat 
 of the Federalists. 'The causes of defeat in this instance lay 
 deeper, and were inherent not only in the party, but also in the 
 character of the prominent men."-** There were too many lead- 
 ers in the party ; all of them were unbending and all dogmatic 
 to a greater or less degree. This policy of Adams, the wisdom 
 of which cannot be doubted, was held as an absurdity by most 
 of the dominant Federalists. It was unfortunate also that 
 two^" of the most ardent supporters of the war policy held the 
 highest offices in the Administration. 
 
 We cannot doubt that Hamilton and all of the Junto saw 
 
 ^Pickering Mss., November 7, 1799. 
 
 " Combine these with Hamilton and the Cabinet Junto members and 
 we have the leaders of the opposition. 
 
 ^ Adams Works, vol. 9, p. 270. 
 
 '" Lodge's "Cabot," p. 193. 
 
 ^ Pickering and McHenry, Secretaries of State and of War. Wol- 
 cott was Secretary of the Treasury. Pickering was a man as eminent- 
 ly self-centered as Adams and perhaps had a greater imagination, for 
 he truly believed that he was the whole Cabinet. He not only aspired 
 to lead his party but also the President. 
 
 17 
 
clearly that peace and strong neutrality were for the best inter- 
 ests of this country, but they were trying to restrain "Jacobism" 
 and hold the reins of the Government, at the same time ; which 
 policy gradually undermined their strength. "We must all 
 agree," says Pickering to Higginson, "in the one great object 
 of securing Federalists for the two first magistrates of the 
 Union ; that all predilections which might thwart this view must 
 be laid aside. "^^ 
 
 However great may have been Adams' mistakes his position 
 was now almost intolerable for his highest ministers were work- 
 ing against his policies. He was somewhat relieved, therefore. 
 when McHenry asked permission to resign his office as Secre- 
 tary of War.^- His resignation was accepted by the President 
 who immediately requested Pickering to resign his office as 
 Secretary of State. The Secretary refused to resign and was 
 dismissed by the President. Pickering immediately wrote Ham- 
 ilton of his dismissal and added : "I have been contemplating 
 the importance of a bold and frank exposure of Adams ; per- 
 haps I may have it in my pjower to furnish some facts. ""^ 
 
 Adams' greatest mistake in connection with these men was 
 his retaining them in office so long. It was the duty of a 
 President to replace officers who directly oppose his leadership, 
 not because the President may always be sound in his opinions 
 and the offending officers unsound, but because no President 
 can hope to accomplish anything when there is a direct and bitter 
 opposition among his advisers. A "Kitchen Cabinet" working 
 in harmony is to be preferred to one of intellectual giants pull- 
 ing at either end of the string, as subsequent history^ has dis- 
 closed. Adams received a round of biting abuse from the other 
 Junto members who added this to their growing stock of griev- 
 ances. Sedgwick wrote Hamilton in this connection saying: 
 "Every tormenting passion rankles in the bosom of that weak 
 and frantic old man, but I have good reasons to believe that 
 Pickering and McHenry have been sacrificed as a peace offering. 
 But no decided measures should be taken until I see you."^* 
 The cause of the sacrifice of these men upon an altar of peace. 
 
 '' Pickering Mss., December 23, 1799. 
 
 '^ Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 44^. — McHenry to Hamilton : "I re- 
 quested the President's permission to resign the office of Secretary 
 of War May 6, 1800." 
 
 ^' Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 443- 
 
 ^Ibid., p. 442. 
 
 18 - 
 
according to Junto estimates, was the desire of Adams for 
 Southern favor in the approaching election. There may have 
 been an element of truth in this, because the Junto were rapidly 
 ruining his chances at the North. The sacrifice caused much 
 excitement in their ranks and they used it as evidence against 
 him later.^^ 
 
 Adams seems never to have suspected any disloyalty on the 
 part of Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury. He was 
 not nearly so boisterous and disturbing a man as Pickering, 
 yet in a very guarded way he furnished more information than 
 any other man for Hamilton's denunciation of the President. 
 He wrote Hamilton, July 7, 1800, that he would readily furnish 
 any statements desired; that the affairs of the government 
 would not only be ruined but the Federalist party disgraced 
 if it permitted Adams to be re-elected.^*' He admitted in the 
 same letter that many prominent Federalists were being dis- 
 credited, and suggests that an apology must be offered to the 
 public. We shall see later how this apology was presented. 
 
 The lack of system in Adams' Administration can, in a large 
 measure, be traced to these Cabinet officers. They were mem- 
 bers of the Essex Junto and were constantly acting under an 
 influence from without and not in accord with their chief. 
 It should be noticed that nearly, if not all, of their complaints 
 had been addressed to Hamilton. In short, Hamilton dictated 
 to and led the Junto always contrary to Adams' policies. They 
 wrote him regarding every move by the President and sought 
 instructions as to their procedure. 
 
 It was upon this body of men, some of whom were in Con- 
 gress, some in the Cabinet, and others outside, that President 
 Adams fixed the name "Essex Junto,"^' and because of their 
 eagerness for a war with France he called them the "British 
 faction, aided by Alexander Hamilton and his satellites.^" 
 
 ^^ Lodge's "Cabot"; Adams' Works, vol. 9; Schouler's "Am. Hist.," 
 vol. 2. Here we have a party of intriguers tampering with a disease 
 without offering a method of cure. 
 
 Dr. N. Ames says in his Diary, vol. 10, p. 2-]: "Such reiterated in- 
 solence of the British Junto cannot long be borne. Beasts would resist 
 such gibes and goads as the Administration are receiving from the 
 Junto." 
 
 "Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 447. 
 
 "Harper's Encyclopedia, vol. 3, p. 246; Schouler, vol. 2, p. 481. 
 
 ^Adams' Works, vol. 9, p. 281; Lodge's "Cabot," p. 20. Pickering 
 says that Adams attributed his (3 vote) majority over Jefferson in 
 
 19 
 
The Republicans rejoiced at the charge of "British faction," 
 but Hamilton determined to denounce Adams publicly ; a plan 
 which had long been in his mind, and as he had succeeded in 
 getting the necessary information he believed the time ripe 
 for the blow.^" Hamilton had evidently been much concerned 
 as to the most satisfactory way in which to present the denun- 
 ciation. He wrote Wolcott : "If I denounce him publicly mem- 
 bers of the Cabinet will be understood to be the sources of my 
 information. I could predicate it on the fact that I am abused 
 by the friends of Mr. Adams, who ascribe my opposition to 
 pique and disappointment ; and could give it the shape of a 
 defense of myself."*^ It is very clear that Hamilton's con- 
 science was far from being easy, for, if the secret intrigues of 
 the Junto were laid open, he foresaw the sad end of its career. 
 He realized that a bold move must be made at once, or the day 
 would be lost for the Junto and himself. So he again addressed 
 Wolcott as follows: "I wait with impatience for the facts 
 which you promised me." It is plain that, unless we give our 
 reasons in some form or other, Mr. Adams' personal friends, 
 seconded by the Jacobins, will completely run us down in public 
 opinion. Your name, in company with mine, that of T. Picker- 
 ing, etc., is in full circulation, as one of the British faction of 
 which Mr. Adams has talked so much."*- Wolcott was evident- 
 ly slightly dilatory in complying with Hamilton's wishes for a 
 few days later he received another letter from Hamilton, say- 
 ing: "You may depend upon it, a very serious impression has 
 been made dn the public mind, by the partisans of Mr. Adams, 
 to our disadvantage. That the facts hitherto known have very 
 partially impaired the confidence of the Federalists in Mr. 
 Adams, who for want of information,*^ were disposed to regard 
 his opponents as factious men. If this cannot be counteracted, | 
 
 our characters are the sacrifice."** 
 
 1797, to the Essex Junto and named especially Cabot, Parsons and 
 Higginson. 
 
 '* Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 450. 
 
 *• Ibid., p. 450. 
 
 " These are the facts which Wolcott had promised to furnish re- 
 lative to the confidential Cabinet communications. 
 
 ■" Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 449. 
 
 ■"All the information, so far as the Junto was concerned, had been 
 confined to secret correspondence, from one to another. 
 
 ** Gibbs, "Administration of Washington and Adams," vol. 2, p. 422. 
 
 20 
 
Hamilton finally got the desired information from the Cab- 
 inet officials*^ and just before the election in 1800 published his 
 famous pamphlet, entitled: "The Public Conduct and Character 
 of John Adams, Esq-, Presiden of the United States."*'^ This 
 paper was supposed to show why President Adams was unfit 
 for re-election and why certain members of the party were ad- 
 vocating the election of General Pinckney. It degenerated, how- 
 ever, into a most spiteful attack upon the character and 
 administration of Adams. It attempted to cast all public dis- 
 favor upon the President and, at the same time, to place a veil 
 over the foiled intrigues of the Junto. 
 
 Mr. Adams in commenting on Hamilton's bold assertions, 
 contained in the pamphlet, wondered how he (Hamilton) got 
 such minute information. He asked the question, "Had he a 
 spy in the Cabinet, who transmitted from day to day the con- 
 fidential communications between the President and heads of 
 the departments ?"*' Hamilton has told us very clearly whence 
 came his information. In a letter to Wolcott he says : "Some 
 of the most delicate of the facts stated, I hold from the three 
 Ministers, you yourself particularly, and I do not think myself 
 at liberty to take the step without your consent. I never mean 
 to bring proof, but to stand upon the credit of my own 
 veracity." *- 
 
 We need not give much time to a discussion of this publica- 
 tion, for Hamilton has made it clear that it would be a defense 
 of the secret conduct of the Essex Junto.*^ He proceeded to 
 unfold the faults of the President chiefly by dwelling on such 
 peculiarities as temper, egotism, vanity and jealousy. He 
 showed neither corruption, insanity, nor ruinous misbehavior 
 on the part of Adams, as some of his friends had expected him 
 to do"'° ; nor that the President was wrong and the would-be 
 directors were right in the French affair. In fact, Hamilton 
 had undertaken more than even he could do, and a very weak 
 and disgusting document was the result. It was held by many 
 Federalists to be highly impolitic^'^ ; disclosing as it did a deter- 
 
 ^ Pickering, Wolcott, and McHenry. 
 
 *' Hamilton's Works, vol. 7, p. 687 ; the pamphlet is given in full. 
 " Adams Works, vol. 9, p. 303. 
 *^ Gibbs, "Washington and Adams." vol. 2, p. 421. 
 ** Gibbs, "Washington and Adams," vol. 2, p. 422. 
 ^ Schouler's "Am. Hist.," vol. 2, p. 489. 
 " Sullivan's "Public Letters," p. 103. 
 
 21 
 
mined aversion from the continuance of Mr. Adams' official 
 power; it was undoubtedly the strongest instrument that con- 
 tributed to the defeat of Adams at the ensuing election. This 
 publication, whatever may be thought of its motive, time and 
 manner, certainly broke the last thread which held together 
 the Federalist party. The break would have come in time and 
 nothing could have prevented it, because all of the strongest 
 men in the party were leaders, all egotistic and all narrow. 
 Therefore, Hamilton, aided by the able leaders from New Eng- 
 land, whom Adams saw fit to classify as a "Junto" wrecked 
 vengeance upon the party which they had labored to create. 
 
 The truth must be told. There were a few of Hamilton's 
 friends, the Junto, who had expected Adams to make an un- 
 qualified recommendation of a declaration of war against 
 France in his message of 1798. When the President arrived at 
 Philadelphia, he said : "I sent for the heads of departments to 
 consult, in the evening, upon the points to be inserted in the 
 message to Congress, which was soon to meet. The conduct of 
 these gentlemen upon this subject was as I wished it to be, 
 no one giving a decided opinion either for or against a declara- 
 tion of war. That there was disappointment, however, in 
 Hamilton and his friends, is apparent enough from this con- 
 sideration, that, when it was definitely known that a declaration 
 of war was not to be recommended in the President's message, 
 a secret caucus was called of Federal members of Congress, to 
 see if they could not get a vote for a declaration of war, with- 
 out any recommendation from the President, as they had voted 
 the Alien and Sedition law and the Army. All that I shall say 
 is, that Mr. Hamilton and friends could not carry the vote."^- 
 President Adams says he then asked, "What action should be 
 taken in the case we determined against a declaration of war? 
 Instead of silence and reserve which was given my first ques- 
 tion, it was urged that France be allowed to make the first 
 overture. I believe that some of the heads of departments 
 were confident, in their own minds, that France would not send 
 a minister here."^^ 
 
 Mr. Stoddert, in a private letter, declares the belief that the 
 result of this Caucus was decisive in fixing the policy of the 
 country. He says : "A majority of the Caucus, composed en- 
 
 °^ Adams' Works, vol. 9, p. 304. 
 ""Ibid., p. 304-06. 
 
 22 
 
tirely of Federal members of the two Houses, would not agree 
 to a declaration of war ; and the result of the meeting showed 
 too plainly to be mistaken by the President that it was his duty 
 to avail himself of the first fair opportunity that presented 
 itself for seeking reconciliation, without debasement." ■'"* 
 
 Adams, having changed his position somewhat, carefully left 
 an opening for negotiation, should France express a desire to 
 treat with us. In this message of December 8, 1798, he says: 
 "It is peace that we have uniformly and preservingly cultivated, 
 and harmony between us and France may be restored at her 
 option. But to send another Minister there without more de- 
 terminate assurances that he would be received, would be an 
 act of humiliation to which the United States ought not submit. 
 It must, therefore, be left with France, and if she desires ac- 
 commodation we will respect the sacred right of embassy. "^^ 
 
 Therefore, the question, "why did the Junto so ardently 
 desire war with France," naturally presents itself. In one of 
 Mr. Adams' papers printed in the Boston Patriot he makes the 
 following statement: "They could not, or would not, distin- 
 guish between Jacobinism and neutrality. Every thing with 
 them was Jacobinism, except a war with France and an alliance 
 with Great Britain. They all panted for a war between the 
 United States and France as sincerely, though not as ardently, 
 as Alexander Hamilton.'' Mr. Liston^*' repeatedly suggested, 
 according to Adams" that he was ready to discuss that ques- 
 tion. "And there were not wanting insinuations and instiga- 
 tions to me," says Adams, "to confer with Mr. Liston on the 
 subject of an alliance. "^'''^ 
 
 Pickering denied that he ever wished to bring about an alli- 
 ance with Great Britain, but he says, "In 1798, I, in company 
 with others, deemed ?.. rupture with France inevitable and it 
 was certainly natural and proper to ally ourselves with Great 
 Britain."'^ That is, they desired a rupture with France as the 
 only means of justifying the alliance with Great Britain; but 
 
 '' Stoddert to Adams, in Lodge's "Life of Cabot." p. 200; also noted 
 by C. F. Adams, "Life of J. Adams," vol. 9, p. 305- 
 "Adams' Works, vol. 9, p. 128. 
 '"English Minister to the United States. 
 "Adams' Works, vol. 9, p. 286. 
 ■'■' Ibid., p. 286. 
 ^' Pickering, Mss., December 14, 1800. 
 
 23 
 
we must not forget the fact that Mr. Adams is defending him- 
 self and is known to have been egotistic, self-reliant, and un- 
 bending. We must remember also that if there is one 
 characteristic which always marked the lives of John Adams 
 and his son, it was honesty of purpose. By whom, therefore, 
 was shown the greater amount of patriotism, Hamilton and 
 the Junto, or the President who stilled their war cry?"*'*' I 
 would not even suggest that Adams was a faultless man. I 
 would not have any one believe that he did not make his errors, 
 many of which were due to flights of temper, etc., but the fact 
 cannot be denied that Adams' judgment was sound and for the 
 best interests of the Nation. He had the peace and welfare of 
 this country at heart, while the opposition were intriguing to 
 prevent further negotiations and to hurl us into a war with 
 France. For what? Largely because Alexander Hamilton 
 could not see beyond the command of a large army. The Junto 
 seemed to think that anything was honest and honorable so 
 long as it kept the Jacobins out of office. 
 
 Adams, therefore, succeeded in putting down the Junto plots 
 at this period, and thus prevented a war with France; but the 
 price was his defeat and also that of the Federalist party. I 
 think that it would not be unjust to Hamilton and to the Junto 
 to say that they broke up their own party because they could 
 not control and dictate the wb.ole of its policy. Adams seems 
 never to have been as confident of Hamilton's genius and hon- 
 esty as was Washington. Washington brought the best out of 
 the fiery West Indian ; Adams stirred him to do his worst. 
 
 During the last few years of Adams' administration Hamil- 
 ton had the advantage of being the critic, while Adams bore 
 the responsibility. The final collapse found Hamilton and 
 Adams each in command of a fragment of the party, neither 
 having sufficient strength to be efifective. 
 
 ** I say Hamilton and the Junto because he was their faithful guide 
 and spokesman for a number of years. 
 
 24 
 
CHAPTER III 
 Plans for Secession i 803-1804 
 
 For the first and last time in his administration John Adams 
 found himself popular after the publication of the X. Y. Z. 
 despatches. The moderate Republicans in the House were 
 swept away by the current, and thus there was built up a com- 
 pact Federalist majority in both houses. It then proceeded de- 
 liberately to make sure of the destruction of the party. The 
 newspapers had now reached an extraordinary degree of viol- 
 ence ; attacks upon the Federalists, and particularly upon 
 Adams, were numerous, and keenly felt. Many of the journal- 
 ists were foreigners. Englishmen and Frenchmen. To the ex- 
 cited minds of the Federalist leaders, these men seemed leagued 
 with France in an attempt to destroy the liberties of the coun- 
 try; to get rid of the most violent of these writers and at the 
 same time to punish American-born editors who too freely 
 criticised the administration, seemed to them essential. To 
 meet both necessities they passed the Alien, Sedition, and Nat- 
 uralization laws, the first empowering the President to banish 
 from the country, without giving a reason for or a trial to, any 
 alien whom he considered a dangerous or suspicious person ; 
 the second made it a crime to publish any false and malicious 
 writings against the Government, Congress, or the President, 
 with the intent to defame them, to bring them into contempt, or 
 to excite the hatred of the people against them ; the third raised 
 the time of residence for naturalization from five to fourteen 
 years. These laws were intended to silence the Republican 
 journalists and to make permanent the Federalist power but 
 their effect was just the opposite of what was expected and 
 they practically assured the success of the Republicans at the 
 next election. 
 
 In 1 80 1, after it was known that there would be a Republican 
 President, with a majority in both houses of Congress, the 
 Federalists resolved to bolster up their power in the third de- 
 partment of government. A Judiciary Act was therefore 
 
 25 
 
passed, creating new courts, new judges, and new salaried of- 
 ficials. All the resulting appointments were made by Adams 
 and are known as " midnight judges" because of their twelfth 
 hour appointment. 
 
 But the assurances that a Republican had been elected did 
 not end the difficulties for the Jeffersonians. The Constitution 
 had neither specified which candidate should be voted for as 
 the presidential preference nor which should receive the sec- 
 ond honors. The Constitution said: "The person having the 
 greatest number of votes shall be President, if such number be 
 a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and the 
 person receiving the second highest number of votes shall be 
 Vice-President." When returns were in Mr. Jefferson and 
 Mr. Burr were found to have an equal number of votes. The 
 responsibility of electing a President was then thrown upon the 
 House of Representatives. 
 
 It is thought by some that a lack of party organization was 
 responsible for Jefferson not getting a larger electoral vote than 
 Burr.^ But it is also thought by others that Mr. Burr employed 
 secret agents and sent them into some of the states when the 
 Legislatures were appointing the electors to use their influence 
 in his favor.- Mr. Davis, in his Life of Burr, says that Timothy 
 Green of New York vvas sent to South Carolina, and Abraham 
 Bishop of New Haven to Pennsylvania. Both of these men 
 flatly deny any such connection with Burr. Burr also denies 
 the charge.^ Despite these denials there is much evidence to 
 prove that Burr was, in truth, intriguing with disappointed Fed- 
 eralists to obtain the seat intended for Jefferson.* Hamilton 
 wrote Bayard before the election saying, "Burr is intriguing 
 with all his might in New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont 
 with a possibility of success."^ 
 
 The Junto came out openly and declared themselves in favor 
 of Mr. Burr when the vote was known to be equal. Almost 
 all the federal newspapers® advocated the election of Burr. 
 
 ^Powell's "Nullification and Secession," pp. 116-117; Von Hoist, vol. 
 I, p. 168. 
 * M. L. Davis' "Memoirs of A. Burr," vol. 2, pp. 91-98; printed letters. 
 ' Ibid. 
 
 ■* John Wood's "Views of Burr's Political Conduct." 
 '■ Hamilton's "iRepublic," vol. 7, p. 402. 
 "Papers for 1801, Harvard Library. 
 
 26 
 
Different reasons, however, were assigned for this preference. 
 The Connecticut Courant was in favor of him, because he was 
 of Xew England extraction ; the New York Gazette intimated 
 that Burr would give up his bad principles ; and the Boston 
 Ccntinel preferred him because it thought his character some- 
 what like that of Bonaparte, but possessed of none of the cold 
 hearted qualities of the Gallic Consul! Such is the sentiment 
 to be gathered from the leading newspapers on the subject. 
 
 When the balloting began in the House, the Federalists, hav- 
 ing a majority, attempted to elect Burr over Jefferson, or pre- 
 vent an election altogether.' In the last event the President of 
 the Senate would have been made acting President, but in case 
 there had been no President of the Senate, the Speaker of the 
 House would have acted President, pro-tempore, until a new 
 election could be held.^ 
 
 Burr promised to commit himself to the Junto in the event 
 of success through their instrumentality.^ The electors of New 
 Jersey were federal. Dr. Samuel Smith, President of the 
 College of Xew^ Jersey, was an elector. It was boldly charged 
 that Dr. Smith was secretly to have voted for Mr. Burr and 
 thus make him President of the United States.^*' 
 
 Hamilton, who had led the Junto through the Administration 
 of John Adams, broke with them when they proposed to put 
 Burr in the President's chair or to prevent an election al- 
 together. It is evident, however, that he was willing to provoke 
 a quarrel between Jefferson and Burr, for he wrote Wolcott, 
 December i6, 1800: "It may be well enough to throw out a lure 
 for him (Burr), in order to tempt him to start for the plate, 
 and then lay the foundation of dissention between the two 
 chiefs. You may communicate this letter to Marshall" and 
 Sedgwick."^- Perhaps he thought this would cause a rupture 
 in the Republican party and finally reinstate the Federalists ; or, 
 perhaps, he hoped that Burr would challenge Jeft'erson and 
 
 'Von Hoist, vol. I, p. 186; Powell's "Nullification and Secession," 
 p. 116; Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 7, pp. 424-468. 
 
 'Act of March i, 1792, W. W. Willoughby "Constitution," vol. 2, p. 
 1141. 
 
 ' Davis' "Memoirs of A. Burr," vol. 2, p. 89. 
 
 'Vfcid., Dr. Smith denied the charge. 
 
 " Chief Justice. 
 
 "Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 486. 
 
 27 
 
both be killed. It is difficult to say just what Hamilton had in 
 mind at this time. 
 
 Hamilton received letter after letter from members of the 
 Junto giving reasons why Burr should be preferred to JetTer- 
 son.^" Sedgwick wrote that he believed Burr would commit 
 himself to Federalist policy if elevated to the Presidency by 
 them.^* Ames, less confident and with an eye directed to the 
 future, wrote: "I doubt whether Burr will be Federal, if 
 chosen by the Federalists. He would reconcile himself to his 
 old friends as soon as possible. Will Jefferson forget or for- 
 give your efforts to bring in Burr, if they should fail of suc- 
 cess ? Will resentment precipitate him to adopt violent coun- 
 sels, to attack the funds, to restrict British commerce, to hug 
 France closer, etc. ?"^^ 
 
 To these and many similar letters, Mr. Hamilton replied de- 
 nouncing the idea and advising that Federalists support Mr. 
 Jeff"erson. Hamilton and Burr were bitter political rivals in 
 New York and the idea of the latter being elevated to the 
 Presidency provoked many harsh accusations from Hamilton. 
 In regard to their preventing an election he said: "This, if it 
 could succeed, would be, for obvious reasons, a most dangerous 
 and unbecoming policy. But it is well it should be understood 
 that it cannot succeed."^" He wrote Wolcott some days later 
 saying : "The idea that Burr is to be elevated to the Presidency 
 by the Federalists forces causes me pain. Will any reasonable 
 calculation on the part of the Federalists uphold the policy of 
 assuming so great a responsibility in the support of so unprom- 
 ising a character? Adieu to the Federal Troy, if they introduce 
 this Grecian horse into their citadel. "^'^ "If there is one man 
 in this world," Hamilton wrote G. Morris, "I ought to hate, 
 it is Jefferson. ''^'^ Yet when he was fully convinced that the 
 Junto had entered into such a plot, his pen produced letter after 
 letter urging his followers to exert their influence for Mr. Jef- 
 
 ^^ Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 7, pp. 434-465 ; the correspondence in this 
 regard was very extensive. The above will furnish an idea of what 
 actually transpired. 
 
 "Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 511. 
 
 "* Seth Ames, "Fisher Ames," vol. i, p. 291. 
 
 ''Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 508. 
 
 ^'Ibid., pp. 487-489. 
 
 ^^ Ibid., p. 499. 
 
 28 
 
ferson.^" He, therefore, stood out alone opposed to the in- 
 trigues of those whom he had led against John Adams until 
 Jefiferson was elected. 
 
 Burr's refusal to denounce his Republican friends and to 
 commit himself definitely to the Federal yoke was the one great 
 reason why he was not elected President. -° He was perfectly 
 willing, however, to accept anything ofifered to him.-^ But on 
 this, as on all other subjects, he refused to commit himself to 
 the Junto policy. There was no man more thoroughly despised 
 by the Federalists than Aaron Burr. Why then did they wish 
 to throw him upon the country as its chief? "Whatever they 
 may imagine," says Hamilton, "the desire of mortifying the 
 adverse party must be the chief spring of the disposition to 
 prefer Burr."-- 
 
 No one saw more plainly than Alexander Hamilton that the 
 American people, especially the followers of Thomas Jefferson, 
 would not be content with the election of Mr. Burr. The Junto 
 were certainly not ignorant of the fact that Jefiferson was the 
 people's choice and that they were sowing seeds for a revolu- 
 tion ; yet Bayard says, "We had several caucuses in the House. 
 All acknov/ledged that nothing but desperate measures remain- 
 ed, which several were disposed to adopt, and but few willing 
 openly to disapprove."-^^ If Burr had been the people's choice, 
 Jefiferson would doubtless have acquiesced without a murmur, 
 but Burr being a Junto choice. Jefferson's attitude can only be 
 a matter of conjecture. But there was every reason to doubt 
 the sanction of the people, in such an event, and Hamilton 
 clearly understood it. The campaign brought out the fact 
 that Mr. Jefferson was the best loved and most soundly hated 
 man in America. 
 
 Not until the thirty-sixth ballot, did Jefferson get a majority. 
 He was then declared elected. Again the country was rescued 
 from an ugly Junto plot. This time, we must thank Mr. Ham- 
 ilton for deserting the Junto and for his unusual patriotism, 
 
 ^'^ Ibid., see letter to Governor Jay, N. Y., in which Hamilton asks 
 the Legislature be assembled for the purpose of changing in Jefferson's 
 favor, the number of electors. Jenkinson's "Life of Burr," p. 6i. 
 
 "^ Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 487 ; Von Hoist, vol. I, p. 173. 
 
 ^^ Ibid., p. 522. Bayard to Hamilton; "The means existed for electing 
 Burr, but this required his co-operation." 
 
 " Ibid., p. 489. 
 
 " Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 523. 
 
 29 
 
and Mr. Burr for maintaining an ambiguous position. The 
 people undoubtedly voted for and intended that Mr. Jefiferson 
 should be President. If Mr. Burr had been elected we may 
 still wonder wdiat would have been his policies. Unfortunately 
 we can think of nothing but civil strife and discord. 
 
 We have seen how Hamilton had led the Junto against the 
 Administration of John Adams; how he halted and displayed 
 symptoms of patriotism when it was desired to place Burr in 
 the President's chair; and now we are to see him discarded 
 because he would not lead to the desired extremes. 
 
 It is a significant fact that from this time on the Junto began 
 to seek another leader, for Hamilton had proved himself not 
 as radical as themselves when it came to a point of action. 
 The party was in a hopeless condition. Jefit'erson's election had 
 not caused the internal revolution which they had expected. 
 The New England leaders had become desperate. Fisher Ames 
 in a letter to Gore sums up the situation thus : "The Federal- 
 ists are already stigmatized as an oligarchy, as a British fac- 
 tion. Hamilton is obnoxious and persecuted by popular clam- 
 ors, in which Federalists, to their shame, join."-* 
 
 The most important question which Jefferson had to face 
 during his first administration was the right of navigating the 
 Mississippi river. Spain had on the ist of October, 1800, 
 ceded the whole of Louisiana to France. Our depositing sta- 
 tion and the mouth of the Mississippi were temporarily closed. 
 The situation demanded an immediate solution. The real 
 statesmansiiip of Jefferson flashed forth at once showing 
 every one his attitude on such questions, even though it was 
 with France. He wrote Ambassador Livingston in Paris say- 
 ing: "This session completely reverses all the political relations 
 of the United States and will form a new epoch in our political 
 course. There is one spot on the globe, the possessor of which 
 is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through 
 which the produce of three-eights of our territory must pass. 
 France, placing herself in the door, assumes to us the 
 attitude of defiance.'"-^ Negotiations were immediately begun 
 and on the 30th of April, 1803. the treaty ceding the whole of 
 Louisiana to the United States for the sum of $15,000,000 was 
 concluded at Paris. 
 
 " Ames, "Life of Ames," vol. i, p. 289. 
 == Jefferson's Works, vol. 4, pp. 431-432. 
 
 30 
 
Hamilton again manifested true statesmanship by declaring 
 with Jefferson: "I have always held the unity of our empire, 
 and the best interests of our nation that we shall annex to the 
 United States all the territory east of the Mississippi, New Or- 
 leans included. "-'' But not so the Junto! This position placed 
 a greater barrier between Hamilton and the Junto. Xor did 
 the majority of the Federalist party share this broad view, 
 but ridiculed the President for making the purchase. For what 
 reason? Because Xew England believed that this expansion 
 of territory gave the Southern states a preponderance for all 
 time."-' It was the old battle cry, balance of power. One sec- 
 tion must not be allowed more representation than the other. 
 This extension would give the South the advantage. 
 
 It was the purchase of Louisiana, therefore, which gave im- 
 petus to a plan which had been creeping upon Xev/ England, 
 aided and stimulated by the Essex Junto. They agreed that 
 the inevitable consequences of the annexation of this vast terri- 
 tory would be to diminish the relative weight and influence of 
 the Northern section ; that it would aggravate the evils of slave 
 representation and endanger the Union by the enfeebling exten- 
 sion of its line of defense against foreign invasions. But the 
 alternative to annexation was, — Louisiana and the mouth of 
 the ^Mississippi in the possession of France under Napoleon 
 Bonaparte. 
 
 The acquisition of Louisiana, although the immediate cause 
 for this project of disunion, was not its only, nor even its most 
 operative cause. The election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presi- 
 dency had meant to those swayed by sectional feelings the tri- 
 umph of the South over the North, — of the slave representation 
 over the free. On party grounds it was the victory of pro- 
 fessed democracy over Federalism. Louisiana was accepted 
 as the battle ground, however, and from that point the war 
 was waged. 
 
 Mr. Griswold, Representative from Connecticut, said in the 
 House of Representatives. October, 1803: "The vast and un- 
 manageable extent which the accession of Louisiana will give 
 the United States ; the consequent dispersion of our population, 
 and the destruction of that balance of power which is so im- 
 portant to maintain between the Eastern and Western States, 
 
 ** Hamilton's Works, vol. 6, p. 552. 
 "Von Hoist, vol. I, p. 185. 
 
 31 
 
threatens, at no distant day, the subversion of our Union."*^ 
 Plumer of New Hampshire, declared in the Senate: "Admit 
 this Western World into the Union and you destroy, at once 
 the weight and importance of the Eastern States, and compel 
 them to establish a separate and independent empire." -** 
 
 The Junto stoutly maintained, not only on the floor of Con- 
 gress, but also among their constituents, that the balance of 
 power between the North and South was disturbed.^" They be- 
 came active in stirring up the Federal press of New England 
 to clamor for separation, and by all the means in their power 
 encouraged the leaders of their faction in Congress to lay plans 
 for secession.'' Massachusetts was the leading commonwealth 
 in raising the cry of disunion. =*- The Massachusetts Federalists 
 asked for an amendment'^^ to the Constitution which sets forth, 
 at length, the principle that the Union of States could not exist 
 on terms of inequality; that the representation of slaves was a 
 concession of the East to the South, and that the representa- 
 tion was injurious and hurtful from the first.^* The advocates 
 of the proposed amendment stoutly maintained that Massachu- 
 setts was in danger ; that her sovereignty and her independence 
 were swiftly and surely being taken away ; that the power of 
 the South over the North was due to slaves and that a crisis 
 was at hand. Thus the sons of Massachusetts argued 
 that separation was the only means of preserving their 
 independence.^^ 
 
 In view of subsequent history, it is interesting to reflect that 
 the earliest talk of disunion came from those who upheld 
 and profited by the institution of slavery, but from men who 
 
 =* Annals of Congress, No. 13, Eighth Cong., ist Sess., p. 465. 
 
 ^Ibid., Wm. Plumer, at first, was an ardent supporter of the North- 
 ern Confederacy plan, but later changed his position and furnished 
 much valuable information about the Junto. 
 
 '"Ann. Rep't of the Am. Hist. Asso., 1897, p. 152; eleven years later 
 this same question was debated in the Hartford Convention, and an 
 amendment was prepared to so amend the Constitution that New 
 England might hold her power in the National Gov. 
 
 '^ Ibid., p. 152. 
 
 ^7fci(f., p. 152. 
 
 '"^Ibid., p. 153; McMaster, vol. 3, p. 45; known as the "Ely Amend- 
 ment," passed by Mass. Legislature and presented to Congress by T. 
 Pickering but there perished. 
 
 ** Ibid., p. 153- 
 
 "^ Ibid., p. 153- 
 
 32 
 
were descendants of the founder of civil liberty in New 
 England. 
 
 The disunion project was under secret discussion in the 
 eastern quarter of the Union, fermented by those most hostile 
 to the new order of things. It had its origin, as we have seen, 
 in Washington where the New England coterie in Congress 
 comprised ambitious and disappointed men.^" 
 
 The Connecticut Courant comments upon the situation as 
 follows : "Although our National Government must fall a sac- 
 rifice to the folly of Democracy, and to the fraud and violence 
 of Jacobinism, yet if our state governments can be preserved, 
 tranquilty may yet be lengthened out. These observations are 
 made in full view of that most deplorable event, the fall of the 
 National Government. But, I hope that our state governments 
 may yet be preserved from the claws of Jacobinism."" The 
 Eastern Argus, on the other hand, hostile to the Junto move- 
 ment, declares that the time has arrived when the cloven foot 
 of Federalism has made its appearance without a covering. 
 "The plots of these leaders of aristocracy," it says, "have been 
 showing their hideous deformity, at different periods, ever 
 since the establishment of our Government. But that which 
 discloses their ultimate design to overthrow our happy Govern- 
 ment and establish a monarchy, appears in the declaration of 
 Uriah Tracy, Senator from Connecticut.'"^^ The Argus goes 
 on to quote the letter from Mr. Tracy to General Skinner "and 
 others" in which he declared that, "Republican forms of gov- 
 ernment will never answer" — that "our Constitution is good for 
 nothing," — that, "the President and Senators must be heredi- 
 tary," — that, "it must be here as in Great Britain." 
 
 Mr. Jefferson said : "The 'Essex Junto' alone desire separa- 
 tion. The majority of the Federalists do not aim at separation. 
 Monarchy and separation is the policy of the Essex Federalists ; 
 Anglomany alone, that of those who call themselves Federalists. 
 The last are as good Republicans as the brethren whom they 
 oppose and differ only in their devotion to England and hatred 
 of France imbibed from their leaders. "^^ No one has given a 
 better summary of the shattered Federalist desires than this. 
 
 •'"' Schouler's "Am. Hist.," vol. 3, p. 68. 
 " The Conn. Courant, March 8, 1812. 
 ^ The Eastern Argus, February 10, 1804. 
 ^'Jefferson's Works, vol. 9, p. 182. 
 
 Z2 
 
The Junto had been working for some time without any cen- 
 tral head or rallying point. They had no leader since Hamilton 
 forsook them, and this had proved to be a great impediment 
 and, perhaps, a greater blessing to the country. There was no 
 organization working toward a desired end.*'' They were sim- 
 ply trying to get as accurate an idea as possible of the sentiment 
 of the people upon whom they must depend. They maintained 
 the utmost secrecy*^ and went about on their tiptoe lest the 
 awful monster leading the opposing forces be acquainted with 
 their plans. They were sensible of the fact, however, that there 
 must be some central point around which they could cluster, 
 and someone as reckless as themselves to lead. I think we can 
 say that Mr. Pickering, from this time, assumes the position 
 of leader and does more than any other man to effect their 
 schemes. 
 
 In a letter to Mr. Cabot, Pickering gives us a pretty clear 
 idea what the Junto had in mind and what they hoped to ac- 
 complish. To quote him : "The last refuge of Federalism is 
 New England, and immediate exertion, perhaps, its only hope. 
 It must begin in Massachusetts. The proposition would be 
 welcomed in Connecticut; and we doubt of New Hampshire? 
 But New York must be associated ; and how is her concurrence 
 to be obtained? She must be made the center of the confed- 
 eracy}- A'ermont and New Jersey would follow, of course, and 
 Rhode Island of necessity. Who can be consulted, who will 
 take the lead? The Legislatures of Massachusetts and Con- 
 necticut meet in May, and of New Hampshire in June. 
 
 "The subject has engaged the contemplation of many. The 
 gentlemen of Connecticut have seriously meditated on it. We*^ 
 suppose the British provinces in Canada and Nova Scotia, at 
 no remote period, perhaps, without delay, and with the assent 
 of Great Britain, may become members of the Northern Con- 
 federacy. Certainly that Government can only feel disgust at 
 our present rulers. She will be pleased to see them crestfallen. 
 She will not regret the proposed division of the Empire. A 
 liberal treaty of Amity and Commerce will form a bond of 
 
 *" Lodge's "Cabot," p. 19. 
 
 " Henry Adams' "New England Federalism," p. 164. 
 ■•^ Italics my own. 
 
 ** This refers to the Junto members in Congress as mentioned above, 
 from time to time. They discussed it a great deal as we will see later. 
 
 34 
 
union between Great Britain and the Northern Confederacy 
 highly useful to both."" 
 
 Mr. J. Q. Adams, a member of Congress says that during 
 the Spring Session of 1804, the author of the written plan was 
 named to him by Mr. Tracy /^ And that he was a distinguished 
 citizen of Connecticut. "I was told,'' says Adams, "it origin- 
 ated there ; had been communicated to individuals at Boston, 
 at New York, and at Washington."*® The plan, according to 
 Mr. Adams,*' had three alternatives of boundary, "i. If pos- 
 sible, the boundary was to extend to the Potomac, 2. to the 
 Susquehanna, 3. to the Hudson. That is, the Northern Con- 
 federacy was to extend, if it should be found practicable, so 
 as to include Maryland. This was the maximum. The Hud- 
 son, that is, New England and a part of New York, was the 
 minimum. The Susquehanna, or Pennsylvania, was the middle 
 term." The plan, if possible, was evidently destroyed. 
 
 In the life of Mr. Plumer*^ by his son, various extracts are 
 given from his contemporary journals and correspondence, 
 exhibiting special and definite particulars of the plan of dis- 
 union, and of interview in reference to it with its projectors 
 and followers. "I recollect and am certain," says Plumer, 
 "that on returning early one evening from dining with Aaron 
 Burr, Mr. Hillhouse, after saying to me that New England 
 had no infifuence in the Government added that, 'The Eastern 
 States must and will dissolve the Union, and form a separate 
 government, and the sooner the better. But I think the first 
 man who mentioned the subject to me was Samuel Hunt, a 
 Representative from New Hampshire. He conversed often 
 and long upon the subject. He was very eager for the North- 
 ern Confederacy and thought it could be eflfected peaceably and 
 entered into a detailed plan for effecting it. I often talked 
 with Robert Griswold. He was, perhaps, the most eager of 
 all whom I talked with, and was practically of the same opinion 
 as Mr. Hunt. Next to Griswold, Uriah Tracy conversed most 
 
 ** Pickering AIss., January 19, 1804; Adams, "New England Fed- 
 eralism," p. 338; appendix. This indicates that they expected the pro- 
 posed Confederacy to be recognized by Great Britain. A treaty of 
 Amity and Commerce would, otherwise, be impossible. 
 
 '° Undoubtedly Robert Griswold if such a plan was written. 
 
 "Randall's "Jefferson," vol. 3, P- 636, appendix. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 636. 
 
 ** Plumer was yet in Congress and in sympathy with the Junto. 
 
 35 
 
freely and fully regarding the plan. It was he who informed 
 me that Hamilton had consented to attend a meeting of select 
 Federalists at Boston, in the autumn of 1804. Mr. Pickering 
 told me of the plan while we were walking around the north- 
 erly and easterly lines of the city."*'' 
 
 Under date of November 23, 1806, Plumer mentions in his 
 journal, that in the winter of 1804, Pickering, Hillhouse, and 
 himself dined with Aaron Burr ; that Hillhouse, "unequivocally 
 declared that it was his opinion that the United States would 
 soon form two distinct governments"; that "Mr. Burr con- 
 versed very freely on the subject"; "and the impression made 
 on his (Plumer's) mind was, that Burr not only thought a 
 separation would not only take place but that it was necessary." 
 Yet," he says, "on returning to my lodgings and critically ana- 
 lyzing his words, there was nothing in them that committed him 
 in any way."''*" These quotations leave us no longer in doubt as 
 to where the conspiracy began and that there were a great many 
 plans being made. These plans, we regret to say, were hatched 
 in the National Congress and by some of its ablest members. 
 
 The Junto seems not to have overlooked the fact that con- 
 siderable expense would be attached to their plan and Robert 
 Griswold, according to Mr. Pickering,"'^ made a careful examin- 
 ation of the finances. He found that the States above men- 
 tioned, to be embraced by the Northern Confederacy, were then 
 paying as much, or more, of the public revenues as would dis- 
 charge their share of the public debt due those states and 
 abroad, leaving out the millions given for Louisiana. In the 
 same letter he assumes that our mutual wants would render a 
 friendly and commercial intercourse inevitable; that the South- 
 ern States would require naval protection of the Northern 
 Union, and that the products of the former would be important 
 to the navigation and commerce of the latter.''" 
 
 Many of the Junto believed that separation could be brought 
 about peaceably. Indeed, they had a perfect right to think so 
 for the right of secession had not been very seriously question- 
 ed at this time. The Constitution was in its infancy and no 
 
 ■"Plumer's "Life of Plumer," p. 298; Adams' "Federalism," p. 106; 
 Randall's "Jefferson," vol. 3, appendix. 
 ^ Randall's "Jefferson," vol. 3, p. 637, appendix. 
 " Letter to Cabot. Adams' "Federalism," p. 338. 
 '' Ibid., p. 33S. 
 
 36 
 
one seems to have had a very clear idea just what it could be 
 made to cover. Secession, therefore, was not held to be an un- 
 pardonable sin. It was spoken of frequently on the floors of 
 Congress and no one was censured for such utterances. 
 
 But in case forceful means should be necessary they looked 
 to General Hamilton as military leader.'^ We can scarcely be- 
 lieve that Hamilton had consented to this, for he disapproved 
 of the plan. It is very likely, however, that the Junto expected 
 it of him and he may have given his consent. It is interesting 
 to reflect whether or not, in view of his expressed sentiments 
 on the subject of separation, he would have listened to a call 
 to lead forces of a Northern Confederacy against the South 
 and West, if such a crisis had arisen. Would his patriotism 
 have wavered when weighed in the balance against his military 
 ambitions? Eager as he was for military glory, the prospects 
 would not have been sufficiently alluring to satisfy his ambitious 
 desires. He wished to lead a great National army and noth- 
 ing less would have sufficed. 
 
 Therefore, with their plans fairly complete, the Junto began 
 again, without any open organization, to apprise their innocent 
 constituents of these plans and to ascertain, as far as possible, 
 just what percentage could be depended on to follow them into 
 the proposed haven of rest. Their mode of enlightenment was 
 a secret-* correspondence. These letters are full of the vilest 
 denunciations of Jefferson and his policies. Any one who may 
 desire to read them will be convinced that our present-day 
 politicians have tongues and pens unusually discrete when com- 
 pared to this minority wing of that once dominant party. 
 
 The Federal editors, who under the late administration were 
 devoted to the principles of passive obedience and who en- 
 forced the necessity of unqualified submission to the Constituted 
 authorities, were soon imbued with Juntoism. These same edi- 
 tors, therefore, in 1803 were in the true spirit of disorganiza- 
 tion, vilifying the President and administration and further 
 encouraging the people to resist the Constituted authorities."-'^ 
 
 " Adams' "Federalism," p. 147 ; Plumer's "Plumer," p. 303 ; .\dams 
 to Plumer : "Much of my information was collected from Mr. Tracy." 
 
 " Lodge's "Cabot" ; Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 3 : Adams' "Fed- 
 eralism," for much of the correspondence. 
 
 '^^ American Mercury, April 9. 1803; see also. The Pittsficld Sun: The 
 Statesman, The RcpuhUcan Spy, The Boston Gazette, The Democrat, 
 The Essex Register, and many other papers might be cited filled with 
 the bitterest possible articles. 
 
 27 
 
One of their bitterest thrusts was leveled against Jefferson 
 for unseating their "midnight judges." They claimed that he 
 was surely destroying the Constitution with an eye single to his 
 own glory and to that of the common folk.^'' This proved to 
 be always an effective argument, even though called from the 
 past. The Louisiana purchase, of course, was proclaimed to 
 be a destruction of that balance of power, established and 
 ordained, once and forever, by the framers of the Constitution. 
 The new Constitutional Amendment, they purported to believe 
 was solely a party amendment designed to keep Republican in 
 office to the complete exclusion of Federalists. But perhaps 
 the weightiest argument of all was what they termed the "Vir- 
 ginia influence." This influence, they claimed, supported every 
 suggestion of Jefferson's and could only be broken up by a dis- 
 solution of the Union.''" 
 
 The Vermont Centind, November 21, 1804, has the follow- 
 ing to say regarding the popularity of the recent amendment: 
 "The recent excellent amendment to the Constitution proves 
 that Mr. Jeft'erson's Administration has been the most popular 
 that the United States has ever experienced. Fourteen of the 
 seventeen free and independent states adopted the Amendment, 
 some unanimously, too." No possible objection could justly 
 have been found to an amendment simply providing that it be 
 specified which candidate was to be President and which Vice- 
 President. The other points need no comment. 
 
 But, the lack of a regular leader had not been the only 
 obstacle in the way of success for the Junto's plans. There 
 were some of the members who agreed that New England was 
 unprepared and that there must be a more definite and wide- 
 spread complaint before she could act. George Cabot said : "It 
 is not practicable without the intervention of some cause which 
 would be very generally felt and distinctly understood as 
 chargeable to the misconduct of our Southern masters ; such 
 for example, as a war with Great Britain. ^^ manifestly pro- 
 voked by our rulers. "^^ 
 
 '^^ Adams' "Federalism," pp. 331-336. 
 
 " Schouler, vol. 3, pp. 68-71; Von Hoist, vol. i, p. 187; Hamilton's 
 "Republic," vol. 7, p. 772. See particularly Pickering's letter to Lyman ; 
 Adams' "Federalism," p. 343. 
 
 ^* Does this mean that in the event of war New England would cast 
 strength with Great Britain? We will see much more of this in the 
 next chapter. 
 
 '■' Lodge's "Cabot," p. 341 ; Adams' "Federalism," p. 346. 
 
 38 
 
Tapping Reeve"" commented sarcastically upon their "unpre- 
 paredness" as pointed out by Cabot and suggested that, if the 
 members in Congress would come out with glowing comments 
 upon the ruinous tendencies of the measures of the Adminis- 
 tration before the sitting of the Legislatures, that would bring 
 about all the "preparedness" necessary.*'' In the same letter 
 Reeve suggested a very ingenious plan by which a foundation 
 might be laid for separation. "I do not know," he says, "in 
 what manner this separation is to be accomplished unless the 
 Amendment *^- is adopted by three-fourths of the legislatures, 
 and rejected by Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecti- 
 cut upon the last ground taken by Delaware. "^^ In such case, 
 I can see a foundation laid." Presumably he meant by this, 
 that if several of the New England States would reject it as 
 not having been passed by a two-thirds vote of Congress, the 
 people would immediately fall in line and clamor for seperation. 
 The problem confronting the Junto was how to get the people 
 prepared and willing to follow them. However firmly con- 
 vinced that their plan was good, they found many a "doubting 
 Thomas" and this work progressed slowly. 
 
 It has been shown that the Junto believed it to be absolutely 
 necessary that New York be made the central point of the 
 Confederacy. The question, therefore, was how to get control 
 of it. They must capture New York and find some one to lead 
 in the final dash. Pickering, although never wanting in argu- 
 ment, was not the person, they felt, to place at the head of 
 their Confederacy. At length they saw a chance to elect Aaron 
 Burr Governor of New York, and, in this way, establish the 
 man they most despised as leader and ruler of the Northern 
 Union. 
 
 The silent but persistent determination of Jeft'erson's friends 
 to force Burr into retirement produced much bitterness in New 
 York, where the Vice-President had a nest of young followers 
 gaping for office. There was no efifort to re-nominate Burr 
 
 *" A lawyer and judge in Connecticut; a brother-in-law of Burr, and 
 well acquainted with the Junto schemes. 
 
 " Adams' "Federalism," p. 342 : see note added by Pickering. 
 
 *^ Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution. 
 
 ^ That the amendment had not been passed by two-thirds of the en- 
 tire number composing the respective Houses. 
 
 39 
 
for the Vice-Presidency. Governor Clinton, the new nominee 
 for the office, decHned to be re-nominated as New York's Gov- 
 ernor. It became necessary, therefore, to choose a candidate 
 for the Governorship. The regular Republican nomination fell 
 upon Chief Justice Lewis."* The opposing faction of the same 
 party nominated Aaron Burr, with the confident expectation 
 that the Federalists would cast their votes for him. 
 
 It was the work of the Burrites in New York that opened 
 the way for the Junto. Before Congress adjourned, therefore, 
 the Eastern separatists conferred with Burr regarding the sit- 
 uation in New York.**^ They believed that Mr. Burr ought to 
 commit himself definitely to other policies if they should con- 
 sent to throw all of their weight into the contest and elect him. 
 The Junto knew that they could not, even in conjunction with 
 the New York Federalists, elect a Governor because the last 
 election had exhibited so large a Republican majority.'^'' But 
 they saw a chance, in conjunction with the Burrites, to elect 
 Mr. Burr, thereby scoring two points : ( i ) The capture of New- 
 York for the center of their Union; (2) the election of a man 
 whose only virtue, in their opinion, was that he w^as unscrupu- 
 lous enough to do their bidding. 
 
 Mr. Griswold made an engagement to call on Burr in New 
 York after the close of Congress. Griswold wrote Wolcott 
 saying: "Burr has expressed a wish to see me, and to con- 
 verse, but his situation*'^ in this place does not admit of it ; and 
 he begged me to call on him in New York. Indeed, I do not see 
 how he can avoid a free and full explanation with Federal 
 men."*^* According to Hamilton's Republic"'* the interview took 
 place between Griswold and Burr at the home of the latter in 
 New York, on the 4th of April. And with the same cautious 
 non-committal he had shown during the Presidential election, 
 Burr stated that he must go on as a democrat to obtain the 
 Government ; that, if he succeeded, he would administer it in 
 
 ** Mr. Lansing was first nominated but declined, and Judge Lewis 
 was nominated. 
 
 ** Schouler, vol. 3, p. 70. 
 
 ""Adams' "Federalism," p. 354; Griswold to Wolcott. Hammond's 
 "Political Hist, of X. Y.," vol. i, p. 202. 
 
 " He refers to his position as Vice-President. 
 
 ""Adams' "Federalism," p. 354; note the expression "Federal men" 
 not party. 
 
 *" Hamilton's "iRepublic," vol. 7, p. 786. 
 
 40 
 
a manner that would be satisfactory to the Federalists. In 
 respect to the affairs of the Union Burr said: "The Northern 
 States must be governed by Virginia, or govern Virginia, and 
 there is no middle course." 
 
 In the letter, referred to above, Griswold adds : "He (Burr) 
 speaks in the most bitter terms of the Mrginia faction, and of 
 the necessity of a Union at the Northward to resist it ; and it 
 may be presumed that the support given to him by Federal 
 men would tend to reconcile the feeling of those Democrats 
 who are becoming dissatisfied with their Southern masters." 
 Thus they were forced to accept Burr in a "Just as I am'" atti- 
 tude. It w^as too great a chance, however, to be recklessly flung 
 aw^ay. So the Junto aid and the influence were tendered Burr 
 with hope pitted against fate. 
 
 The question then arises, by what great process of juggling 
 patriotism and statesmanship, could a few New England Fed- 
 eralists control an election in New York? By what great 
 stretch of moral principles could they relieve their consciences 
 after thrusting such a character as Aaron Burr upon New 
 York as Governor? We will again quote Robert Griswold for 
 our answer. "Although the people of New England," he says, 
 "have not on ordinary occasions. '° a right to give an opinion 
 in regard to New York, yet upon this occasion we are almost 
 as deeply interested as the people of that state can be. If any 
 other project can be fallen upon which will produce the effect 
 desired of creating a union of Northern States, I should cer- 
 tainly prefer it. ... The election of Colonel Burr is the only 
 hope which, at this time presents itself of rallying in defense of 
 the Northern States." "^ 
 
 Mr. Pickering in his attempt to influence Rufus King'- wrote 
 from Washington, March 4. 1804: "The Federalists here, in 
 general, anxiously desire the election of Mr. Burr to the Chair 
 of New York ; for they despair of a present ascendancy of the 
 Federal party. Mr. Burr alone, we think, can break your Dem- 
 ocratic phalanx ; and we anticipate much good from his success, 
 
 '"This was certainly an extraordinary one. If Burr had been placed 
 over a Northern Confederacy, the sectional questions, would probably 
 have been settled early in our history, and under different circumstances. 
 
 '^Adams' "Federalism," p. 354; Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 7, p. 782. 
 
 "■ King and Hamilton were never persuaded to adopt a secession 
 policy. 
 
 41 
 
Were New York detached (as under his administration it 
 would be) from the Virginia influence, the Union would be 
 benefited. Jefferson would be forced to observe some caution 
 and forbearance in his measures."" Pickering evidently 
 meant that the Northern Union would be much more likely to 
 succeed. 
 
 There is one figure that we must not lose sight of who was 
 able, at any moment, to stay or forward the plot of the Junto. 
 Alexander Hamilton leading a quiet life at his home in New 
 York w^as watching the movement of the New England Fed- 
 eralists with an eagle's eye, ready to swoop down and devour 
 their dearest plans if they did not accord with his ideas. Ham- 
 ilton was the man whose yea or nay, at this critical moment, 
 could decide the destiny of the Union. There is not the 
 slightest doubt that his and only his leadership, could rally 
 the New York people to action. Once he had defeated Aaron 
 Burr and the Junto ; would he do it again ? 
 
 About the time the nominations were being made in New 
 York a few leading Federalists held an informal conference at 
 Albany to consider the expediency of either nominating a Fed- 
 eralist candidate, or if this should not prove expedient, of sup- 
 porting either of their opponents' candidates.'* Hamilton 
 knowing the intention of the Junto, and viewing it as a question 
 far beyond the politics of New York, was present. '^^ To his 
 mind it was a question of the preservation or of the dissolution 
 of the Union. He read, therefore, a paper of very great im- 
 portance before the conference, entitled : "Reasons why it is 
 desirable that Mr. Lansing,"*' rather than Colonel Burr, should 
 succeed.""" The point which Mr. Hamilton made in this paper 
 was that Mr. Burr had always pursued the track of Democratic 
 politics. This, he had done either from principle or from cal- 
 culation. If the former he would not at that time change his 
 plan W'hen the Federalists were prostrate. H the latter, he 
 certainly would not relinquish the ladder of his ambition, and 
 espouse the cause of a weaker party. He went further, hov\'- 
 
 " Pickering Mss., March 4, 1804. 
 
 "■'Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 7, p. 770; Von Hoist, vol. i, p. 198. 
 '''•Ibid. 
 
 '" Lansing had not yet resigned the nomination. 
 
 '' Hamilton's "Republic," vol. 7, p. 770. The paper is here printed in 
 full. 
 
 42 
 
ever, and said that, "It would probably suit Mr. Burr's views to 
 promote this result, to be the chief of the Northern Portion ; 
 and, placed at the head of the State of New York, no man 
 would be more likely to succeed." Hamilton contended that 
 Burr would not be true to his promises, if he had made any 
 to the Federalists, but when they had elevated him to power in 
 New York, he w^ould desert them, and simply use his office to 
 form a greater Democratic wing in the North, in opposition 
 to the Jefferson wing, in the hope of being the next President. 
 
 In spite of Hamilton's protests the Burr press, two days after 
 Burr's nomination as Governor, opened with the following: 
 "Burr is the man who must be supported or the weight of the 
 Northern States in the scale of the Union is irrecoverably lost. 
 If the southern and particularly the Virginia interests, are al- 
 lowed to destroy this man, we may give up all hope of ever 
 furnishing a President to the United States."" 
 
 Jefferson had divined their scheme from the coalition of the 
 Eastern Federalists with the Burrites ; but it gave him no un- 
 easiness. "The object," he said, "of the Federahsts is to divide 
 the Repubhcans, join the majority, and barter with them for 
 the cloak of their name ; ... the price is simple. . . . The 
 idea is clearly to form a basis of a separation of the Union.'"'" 
 
 What a deplorable and dangerous state of affairs ! The 
 Junto supporting Burr as the only hope of carrying through 
 their Northern Confederacy plot ; the New York wing of the 
 Republican party, or the Burrites, supporting him in opposition 
 to Virginia influence, as the only ^hope of ever furnishing a 
 President to the United States. One contemplating a dissolu- 
 tion of the Union with Burr as leader of the northern section ; 
 the other hoping, at some future day, to elect this dangerous 
 man President of the United States. Either scheme, if suc- 
 cessful, would have been disastrous. Colonel Burr's prospects, 
 too, seemed to assume an imposing prospect. His Republican 
 friends in New York, though not numerous, were talented, in- 
 dustrious and indefatigable in their exertions ; and in view of 
 Federal support, his chances were very encouraging. 
 
 The election was carried by the united friends of the admin- 
 
 '"'Thc Morning Chronicle. February 22, 1804; Hamilton's "Republic," 
 vol. 7, p. 777- 
 ''Jefferson's Works, vol. 4, P- 542. 
 
 43 
 
istration, Lewis receiving 35,000 votes, while Burr received 
 28,000.*" Mr. Burr undoubtedly received a very considerable 
 number of Republican votes ; he failed, however, in consequence 
 of the defection of a portion of the Federal party. This ele- 
 ment of the Federal party was controlled and influenced by the 
 paper read at Albany, just before the nomination, by Alexander 
 Hamilton. It was New York's portion of the Federal party 
 which the Junto could not control. Hamilton's prophecy, that 
 no reliance could be placed in Burr, had very great weight with 
 this class of voters. It was that class whom the Federalists 
 claimed should have nothing to do with the Government. 
 
 It was Mr. Hamilton's paper, therefore, coupled with the 
 sound judgment of the New York Federalists, that defeated 
 Aaron Burr. This was the second time that Hamilton had come 
 to the rescue of his country and defeated Aaron Burr ; twice 
 he had defeated the "Essex Junto" ; but it was the last defeat 
 for Burr's bullet was soon to place his most bitter rival beyond 
 the vale of political strife. Hamilton was the barrier over 
 which the dizzy ambitions of the Union breakers could not 
 climb. Burr'r political defeat, followed by Hamilton's tragic 
 death, therefore, checked the Eastern Confederacy plot in its 
 first state of development. This proved to be the greatest blow 
 that had yet befallen the Junto and its members sank into deep 
 despair. Unfortunately, however, there was a later growth 
 from the same root. The plan of separation was not abandon- 
 ed-^ but only allowed to lie dormant for a while. "Not dead 
 but sleepeth." 
 
 The returns of the national election proved beyond question 
 that the Eastern Federalists had no national issue against the 
 administration which had been peaceful, popular, and very suc- 
 cessful. Jefferson and Clinton swept the country with ease in 
 November carrying the greater part of New England, Massa- 
 chusetts unexpectedly included.^- Pinckney and King did not 
 get an electoral vote in their respective states. Connecticut, 
 Delaware, and two votes from Maryland gave them 14 against 
 162 for Jefferson and Clinton.^'' The election proved very clear- 
 
 ** Hammond's "Political Hist, of X. Y.," vol. i, p. 208; Schouler, vol. 
 3, P- 70. 
 
 " Tracy to Plumer, Adams' "Federalism," p. 106. 
 
 *■ Schouler, vol. 3, p. 75. 
 
 ^ Ibid., appendix electoral table. 
 
 44 
 
\y that Mr. Griswold's fears were not without foundation when 
 he said : "Whilst we are waiting for the time to arrive in New 
 England, it is certain that Democracy is making daily inroads 
 upon us, and our means of resistance are becoming less every 
 day."^* The Republicans were daily creeping up to the very 
 doors of the Junto; Vermont and Rhode Island having gone 
 Republican in the State elections, and the National election be- 
 ing so decisive, it showed up the plotters in a light that needs 
 no comment and is severe enough. 
 
 Throughout the period from 1800 to 180S, Massachusetts 
 changed her method of choosing her electors three times. Gov- 
 ernor Strong, in 1800, sanctioned a resolve to have the Legis- 
 lature choose the electors of the President and Vice-President. 
 A republican addressing the electors in 1805, declared that this 
 sanction had been influenced by the Junto for the purpose of 
 excluding a Republican from the Presidency.*^ In 1804, the 
 Junto discovered that electors had best be elected by general 
 ticket in order to preserve the Constitution and the liberty of 
 the people.**^ But again in 1808, the spirit of the Constitution 
 and the rights of the people required that the choice should be 
 transferred from the people to a federal majority in the Legis- 
 lature, which majority being the Essex Junto, could by no 
 means represent the character of the State. ■^' 
 
 The remarkable facility with which the Junto could destroy 
 systems without substituting anything, reminds one of the 
 words of a pious Connecticut priest : "Even hogs," said he, "can 
 root up a garden ; but they can never plant one.'' 
 
 " Adams' "Federalism," p. 345, appendix. 
 
 ^ Political Tracts, 1805-1812. Compiled from original documents. 
 
 *" The Democrat, Boston, June 15, 1808. 
 
 *' Ibid. 
 
 45 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Embargo of 1807 and the Junto's Plans for a 
 British Alliance 
 
 After the overthrow of Aaron Burr in New York and the 
 death of Alexander Hamilton, the plotters were without a lead- 
 er other than Mr. Pickering, whose leadership consisted prin- 
 cipally in the preparation of illogical but optimistic documents. 
 Therefore, we find the Northern Confederacy plan lying dor- 
 mant for quite a long period. In fact, the next secession 
 movement which presents itself is in connection with Jeffer- 
 son's Embargo Act of 1807. 
 
 The Junto, mortified as they had constantly been since 1798 
 in national affairs, though influential on their own grounds, 
 felt the humiliation of being gradually cast aside by an ex- 
 panding democracy. More states were in full attune with the 
 Jefferson administration during this protracted Junto sleep than 
 ever before. Merchants without distinction of party had but 
 of neutral frauds.^ Mr. Pickering, in a letter to Mr. Lowell 
 many years later, says: "Much against his will, and contrary 
 to his own better judgment, Mr. Cabot was placed at the head 
 of a committee which, in 1806, subscribed and sent to Wash- 
 ington the remonstrances drawn by Lloyd - against the British 
 doctrine concerning neutral trade. He signed it simply as a 
 merchant." ^ 
 
 The Junto men decried the Administration for mean temper 
 and a reliance upon moral suasion to protect American com- 
 merce, and yet , strangely inconsistent, they counselled to 
 tamest submission to British search and impressment. When 
 the Chesapeake affront came, like a blow in the face, to peace 
 and neutrality, their first thought was, how to persuade others 
 to bear it meekly. 
 
 Every reader of history is more or less familiar with Jef- 
 
 * Lodge's "Cabot." p. 315. 
 
 'James Lloyd later succeeds J. Q. Adams in U. S. Senate. 
 
 ' Lodge's "Cabot," p. 542. 
 
 46 
 
f erson's embargo ; but, in order to hinge the next secession 
 movement upon it (where it certainly belongs), it will be neces- 
 sary to explain its purpose, as frequent references to it must 
 be made throughout this chapter. Jay's treaty had not re- 
 moved very many of the well grounded grievances of the 
 United States against Great Britain and, by degrees, new ones 
 were added to the old. The prospect of a more friendly un- 
 derstanding seemed to be diminishing as time went on. This 
 was due partly to the fact that Jefferson would have all or 
 nothing and partly because Great Britain, despite occasional 
 advances, grew more overbearing every day. 
 
 Napoleon found herein a convenient pretense to assert 
 "might before right," and ere long both France and England 
 began to disregard the laws of recognized neutrality. There- 
 fore, England's declaration of a blackade of May i6, 1806, and 
 the Order in Council of November 11, 1807,* on the one hand 
 and Napoleon's Berlin decree of November 26. 1806, and his 
 Milan decree of December 17, 1807.'' on the other, made it 
 quite impossible for neutral seafaring nations to sail uninjured. 
 Neither interest nor self respect, therefore, would seem to war- 
 rant the United States quietly acquiescing in this violence. But 
 there were still two very strong parties pulling in opposite 
 directions. The Federalists wished to center our warth upon 
 France and thus induce England to adopt a more favorable 
 policy toward us. The administration party would hear noth- 
 ing of war ; they did not want to fight France and feared war 
 with Great Britain. 
 
 Jefferson and the Congressional majority, therefore, soon 
 came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take a very 
 decided stand. So on the i8th of December the President 
 recommended an embargo." Congress immediately passed 
 such a bill as recommended and it became a law December 21, 
 1807.'^ This measure closed all American ports to all foreign 
 commerce wnth the hope that it would show France, and es- 
 pecially England, that we were really a national power, and 
 
 *Von Hoist's "Constitutional Hist, of U. S.," vol. i, p. 200. 
 
 ' Ibid. 
 
 'Randall's "Jefferson," vol. 3. p. 242. 
 
 ^Von Hoist's "Constitutional Hist, of U. S.," vol. i, p. 202. Moore's 
 "Int. Law Digest," vol. 5, pp. 1445-1454. gives the above mentioned de- 
 crees in full. 
 
 47 
 
force them to recognize and respect our commerce and 
 seamen. 
 
 Lord Eldon, Chancellor of England, said in Parliament: 
 "The Order in Council of November ii, was intended to make 
 America, at least sensible to the policy of joining England 
 against France.^ Although we have no authority except the 
 newspapers of the day, it seems a fair confession of the British 
 Government's views and we have no reason to question its 
 truth since the Chancellor of England is a member of the 
 Privy Council, and called the keeper of the King's conscience. 
 
 But the Administration did not wish to join England against 
 France. It did not wish to join France against England. It 
 only wished to maintain a strict neutrality, aiding neither the 
 one or bowing down to the other. Sir William Scott was presi- 
 dent of the British Prize Court from 1806 to 1807, and moulded 
 their doctrines and decisions in conformity with the view's of 
 his Government. Under the pretence of supporting what were 
 claimed to be British maritime rights, he extinguished many 
 of the just rights and privileges of other nations.^ 
 
 It is not necessary to say that the embargo fell as heavily 
 upon New England as did the Highway robbery of Great 
 Britain. New England certainly was, ov^^ing to her commerce, 
 punished most severely by both England and America. 
 France and England were robbing their ships and impressin^^ 
 their seamen. The United States forbade their ships going 
 to sea and the ships of these nations from landing in their 
 ports, both of which were severe upon the New England com- 
 merce. But her motives were very different, and should have 
 appealed to New England patriotism accordingly. It would 
 have been next to impossible for the United States to have at- 
 tempted any means of redress without striking New England 
 harder than any other portion of the young nation. That does 
 not argue that the embargo was the wisest method of coercion. 
 It does not say that it was a successful measure. It is simply 
 explaining a situation which had to be met. We have seen 
 how the United States Government attempted to meet it, hence 
 it only remains for us to discover how the Embargo was sup- 
 ported by New England and the Junto. 
 
 It is very gratifying to be able to say that while New Eng- 
 
 ' The Essex Register, Aug. 31, 1808. 
 ' Perkin's "Late War," p .21. 
 
 48 
 
land has gasped and struggled against the increasing hardships 
 imposed by France and England, and afterwards, against the 
 constraints of the embargo which pressed heavily upon her, 
 yet most of her sons remained loyal and consonant with the 
 general determination of this country to fight rather than sub- 
 mit to the injustice of Europe. Bound up in commerce, and 
 not being able to divert her capital on such sudden notice, sub- 
 mission to the embargo policy was to her somewhat like suicide 
 to prevent dishonor. But while thus suffering, the thread of her 
 immediate interest was skillfully separated from that of the 
 nation into which it was corded, and the Northern Confederacy 
 remnant began to lead her whither they had sought to lead 
 before. The embargo was like the "bloody shirt" of later times 
 and it was not waived without effect. 
 
 This time the movement was far more secret than before. 
 In fact, it is so secret that very little is known about it. Their 
 plans are distinct, however, and, giving them the advantage of 
 every doubt, there is still sufficient evidence to show that the 
 Northern plotters, in this stage of our narrative, conceived and 
 gave life to a plan by which they could resist the embargo on 
 Constitutional grounds ; withdraw from the Union by refusing 
 all aid and obedience ; peaceably if they could, by means of 
 civil war if they must; and ally themselves with Great Britain. 
 British America was of course to join the confederacy. This, 
 therefore, is the next step toward a Northern Confederacy, 
 beginning soon after the pas\sage of the embargo, living 
 throughout the years 1808 and 1809, and expiring at the pas- 
 sage of the Non-intercourse Act. 
 
 Before taking up the real agitation favoring separation and 
 a British Alliance there is an interesting convention in con- 
 nection with the approaching national election which should 
 not be overlooked. It is interesting and important for two 
 reasons: i. It was the first attempt at a national nominating 
 convention. 2. It was organized and made a reality by a secret 
 movement of the "Essex Junto." A letter appearing in the 
 Boston Gazette, June 2y, 1808, discussing the embargo con- 
 cludes : "All the grandees^" say, we must do something, or 
 our party will be ruined. The Federalists talk of supporting 
 Clinton for President, because he's against the embargo ; and 
 Madison is in favor of it ; but they say we must do something." 
 
 "The reference is to the Junto. 
 
 49 
 
The great question before the FederaHst party was to de- 
 feat Madison. How was this to be done? Some method was 
 necessary which would be binding on the whole party. They 
 had found the caucus ineffective for party harmony in 1800. 
 In 1808, moreover, there were too few Federalists at Wash- 
 ington to make a caucus practicable. A convention of dele- 
 gates seemed to be the only alternative.^^ The Republican 
 nominees were Madison for President, and George Clinton for 
 Vice-President. Indications soon proved that the Clintonians 
 were bidding for Federalist backing. Clinton disapproved of 
 the embargo, or he let it be understood that he did, because he 
 had hoped for the Presidential honors for himself.^- Here 
 was the Federalists' opportunity. Clinton had endorsed their 
 policies ; why not support him instead of going down to defeat 
 with candidates of their own? 
 
 It may be stated that the early state elections had not been 
 wholly without encouragement, although the Republicans had 
 succeeded in electing a Governor in Massachusetts. New 
 York retained a majority of Federalists in her assembly, and 
 Vermont and Connecticut were solid for the Federalists.^^ 
 These results were brought about mainly through the skillful 
 use, by Junto members, of a potent electioneering weapon fur- 
 nished them by Jefferson — the embargo. They were quick to 
 see the possibilities of this weapon for arousing the people 
 and did not fail to use it. "The embargo will touch their bone 
 and their flesh, when they must curse its authors," wrote 
 Pickering." 
 
 With these considerations in their minds, the Junto began 
 in earnest the work of deciding on the moot question of the 
 Presidential nomination. Details of the action of Federalist 
 leaders in Massachusetts, are preserved in two letters from 
 Christopher Gore to Rufus King.^^ The Federalist legislative 
 caucus at Boston appointed a committee of twenty, which in 
 turn appointed a committee to correspond with the Federal- 
 
 ^'■Am. Hist. Rev., No. 4, July, 1912, pp. 744-745. 
 
 "J. D. Hammond's "Political Parties," N. Y., vol. i, p. 269; "Am. 
 Hist. Rev.," No. 4, July 1912, p. 746. 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
 "Adams' "Federalism," Pickering to Rose, p. 366; "Am. Hist. Rev.," 
 No. 4, July 1912, p. 747. 
 
 "These letters of June 8 and 16, are in King's "Rugus King," vol. 5, 
 pp. 100-102. 
 
 SO 
 
ists in other states on the business of the next election of 
 President and Vice-President, and for the purpose of ascer- 
 taining their weight and concerting arrangements for the elec- 
 tion.^" The committee consisted of George Cabot, H. G. Otis.. 
 President of the Senate, Christopher Gore, member of the 
 House, Timothy Bigelow, Speaker of the House and James 
 Lloyd, a Boston merchant who had just been chosen Adams' 
 successor in the United States Senate. ^^ All were Boston men 
 and all of Junto persuasion, recognizing Pickering as their 
 leader. 
 
 The committee held a meeting on June lo, when after a 
 considerable debate, it was deemed advisable to propose a 
 meeting of Federalists, from as many states as could be sea- 
 sonably notified, at New York the last of that or the beginning 
 of the next month. ^^ Here, then, is the original proposition for 
 a would-be national nominating convention. ^^ The idea, in this 
 instance, was revolutionary in party machinery, both from a 
 Federalist and from a national point of view. Nominations 
 by conventions of self-chosen delegates was necessarily revo- 
 lutionary and despotic. The people were bartering away their 
 franchise in promising to support candidates chosen by self- 
 delegated bodies. 
 
 The work of securing a national representation in the con- 
 vention was carried on by personal communications from Bos- 
 ton, New York, and Philadelphia. The Massachusetts 
 committee of correspondence at their meeting on June lO, sent 
 Livermore-° to New Hampshire, Bigelow to Vermont, and Otis 
 to Rhode Island, to arrange for some person, or persons, to 
 represent their states in the New York Convention.-^ The 
 committee, in this manner, sent men into every Federal strong- 
 hold possible. 
 
 On August 15, 1808, and the third Monday, this embryo 
 
 "Gore to King, July 16, King's "King," vol. 5, p. loi. 
 
 " Adams had resigned his seat in Senate on account of friction be- 
 tween Junto members and himself. 
 
 "King's "Rufus King," vol. 5, p. lor. 
 
 " The curious student will search in vain for very much information 
 on this subject. A few letters by the Junto is all the material to be had 
 on this movement. 
 
 ^"Originally a New Hampshire man; member of Congress from the 
 Essex North district, 1807-1811. 
 
 "King's "King," vol. 5, p. loi : Am. Hist. Rez'., July 1912, p. 750. 
 
 51 
 
national convention met in New York.-- Its existence could 
 not even be guessed from the Federalist journals, but the 
 coming together of so many noted Federalists did not escape 
 the eyes of the Republican press. The Boston Independent 
 Chronicle, August 22, says : ''On Friday last a detachment from 
 the Essex Junto passed through Hartford, on their way to 
 New York, there by agreement, to meet the other Choice 
 Spirits, for the purpose of appointing a king to rule over us." 
 Where the session was held can only be a matter of conjecture. 
 We do not know. 
 
 Eight states were represented, says Mr. S. E. Morison, "New 
 York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut. 
 Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina."" The number 
 and personnel of the members is also largely a matter of con- 
 jecture; but it is certain that Massachusetts sent three mem- 
 bers because we have a letter from Cabot to Pickering, August 
 10, 1808, stating: "The gentlemen from this place are Mr. 
 Otis, Mr. Gore, and Mr. Lloyd.""* We do not know the num- 
 ber of representatives. We have no direct evidence as to how 
 the delegates were chosen but there can be little doubt that 
 they were selected by exclusive committees. We have extracts 
 from letters by Hare of Philadelphia and Benson of New York 
 to the Corresponding Committee indicating that such a method 
 was employed.-^ 
 
 Of the proceedings of the 1808 Convention we know no 
 more than the bare results ; but the whole question of whether 
 Clinton should be supported or whether separate nominations 
 should be made, was so thoroughly threshed out in the corres- 
 pondence that we cannot mistake its object, and the trend of 
 the discussion. We know, too, that Charles C. Pinckney was 
 nominated for the office of President and Rufus King for the 
 office of Vice-President. Gore wrote King from Boston, June 
 16. 1808, saying: "Our people are anxious to support a Fed- 
 
 ^ Cabot to Pickering, Aug. 10, says : "On Monday next a conference 
 will be held in New York, for the purpose of settling on a Presidential 
 Candidate." "August 15, was date agreed upon," says Morison; see 
 Am. Hist. ReiK, July 1912, p. 753. 
 
 " Morison quotes this information from the Otis Mss., giving as a 
 quotation the above from the N. Y. Committee to the Charleston Com- 
 mittee, September 1808. See Am. Hist. Rev., July 1912, p. 753. 
 
 " Lodge's "Cabot," p. 397. 
 
 ^ Am. Hist. Rev., July 1912, pp. 748-52. 
 
 52 
 
eral candidate from New York instead of one from South 
 Carolina ; provided there's the possibiHty of success."-'' 
 
 Pinckney's nomination was due largely to the hope of cap- 
 turing his native state and to the wish of avoiding the stigma 
 of sectionalism.-' And the above was about the only opposition 
 to his nomination after Clinton was ruled out. 
 
 The Convention having been summoned and conducted in 
 secret, was to be extremely discreet in announcing its nomin- 
 ations. The original plan for the public announcement, and the 
 reasons for making an eleventh hour change are given in a 
 letter from Thomas Fitzsimon's of Philadelphia to Gore, Otis, 
 and Lloyd, the Massachusetts delegation. "When we separa- 
 ted at New York," it says, "it was understood that the result 
 of our Conference, should not be made public until the event 
 of the election in Pennsylvania-^ should be made known and 
 until the Conferees from that state should deem a publication 
 of it proper. Circumstances have since occurred which, in 
 their opinion, rendered any publication of that kind inexpedi- 
 ent, and led them to conclude that the safer course would be 
 to let our friends in each state announce the candidates to their 
 fellow citizens, at such time, and in such way as they should 
 think best. We were led to this conclusion from having ob- 
 served something like a jealousy in our friends at having 
 a nomination so important decided upon by so small a number 
 as we were, and without any special authority for the purpose. 
 Hence we deem it most prudent that it should appear the result 
 of general sentiment rather than the choice of a few to bind 
 their party. "'-^ 
 
 An article in the Boston Gazette, October 20. entitled, 
 "Grand Federal Nomination." makes the following statement : 
 "We have the satisfaction to learn, from information collected 
 from every part of the Union, that one common sentiment 
 prevails among the Federalists, with regard to candidates for 
 the first offices in the National Government ; that the men se- 
 lected by the approving voice of the whole American party, 
 to preserve the Union, and to prevent a calamitous war, are for 
 President Hon. C. C. Pinckney. for \'ice-President Hon. R. 
 
 -* King's "Rufus King," vol. 5, p. lor. 
 
 "Am. Hist. Rev., July 1912, p. 758. 
 
 ^ State election. 
 
 '' Printed in the Am. Hist. Rev., July 1912. p. 759. 
 
 53 
 
King. In Massachusetts, a formal announcement of the nom- 
 ination of these great parties has been delayed for the sole 
 purpose of collecting the sentiments of the great body of Fed- 
 eralists — the true Americans in other states." In several lines 
 above we notice that, "These men were selected by the approv- 
 ing voice of the whole American party," but, "A formal an- 
 nouncement had been delayed to collect the sentiments of the 
 great body of Federalists." "Consistency, thou art a jewel." 
 There was no formal announcement, therefore, until two or 
 three weeks before the election, although it was pretty general- 
 ly known before that time.^° 
 
 The frankness of the letters quoted and referred to in con- 
 nection with the Convention makes comment almost superflu- 
 ous, but the writer cannot refrain from making a few thrusts 
 at this select body of "well born" and congenial gentlemen who 
 were chosen by their friends to settle, in a quiet and leisurely 
 manner, the great questions which so deeply concerned the 
 party. The body of voters had absolutely no voice in the 
 convention's deliberations. This 1808 conference (or conven- 
 tion) compares favorably with other Federalist machinery of 
 the time. It was based on the old dictum: "We, the 'well 
 born,' must govern without the slightest co-operation by the 
 people. We do not ask their advice but their implicit obedience 
 is required. They are to vote for candidates nominated they 
 know not how, because it was thought best, ordained and es- 
 tablished by the Federal fathers, that we, the choicest spirits, 
 should lead them. This machinery failed for the same reason 
 that the party failed. It ought to suppress and to curb public 
 opinion rather than to guide and lead it. 
 
 The secret convention, representing only the leaders, was 
 again employed in 1812, after which it passes out of existence 
 with the Federalist party. It remained for the Democrats of 
 the thirties to discover that nomination by convention could 
 be made a more satisfactory method. 
 
 ./ The first gun of the Massachusetts, and incidentally, of the 
 presidential campaign, was Pickering's violent attack on the 
 administration policy in his letter to Governor Sullivan, Feb- 
 ruary 16, 1808.^^ In this most extraordinary letter^- by Pick- 
 
 '^ Ibid., many letters and journals are quoted from in this number of 
 the Rcviczv in support of this statement. 
 "Lodge's "Cabot," p. 380, Pickering confidentially to Cabot. Adams' 
 
 54 
 
ering we have a very good duplicate of Hamilton's attack upon 
 the Adams' administration. The burden of Pickering's pen is 
 that Jefferson withheld papers from the Emperor of France 
 which should be made public. That the withholding of such 
 papers was responsible for the passage of the embargo, is the 
 point he makes, or hopes to make. He says : "Had these 
 papers been honorable he would have been anxious to disclose 
 them. That they are of an entirely dift'erent nature, that they 
 are dishonorable, that they are ruinous to our commercial in- 
 terests, and dangerous to our liberty and independence, we are 
 left to infer. Above all, let him unfold our actual situation 
 with France." In short, Mr. Pickering tells his people that 
 Jefferson is pushing them into a war with Great Britain by 
 withholding papers, which if disclosed, would satisfy every 
 one that France is the common enemy. No attack upon Jeffer- 
 son could have been more eff"ective than this, and it was care- 
 fully calculated to stir up resistance in the commercial states. 
 
 It is still more wonderful how the Junto attempted to justify 
 England's impressment policy. To quote again from Picker- 
 ing's letter: "The British ships of war agreeable to a right 
 claimed and exercised for ages, — a right claimed and exercised 
 during the whole of the administrations of W^ashington, 
 Adams, and Jeft'erson, — continue to take some of the British 
 seamen and with them a small number of ours, because of the 
 difficulty to always distinguish an Englishman from an Ameri- 
 can."''^ Of course England would not take Americans but 
 through mistaken identity. 
 
 We cannot but wonder in that written and received authority 
 we would be most likely to find a justification of the rights 
 Pickering claims for Great Britain's conduct? In what usage, 
 except her own will, could it be found? It can imply nothing 
 but the right to search neutral vesesls upon the high seas in 
 time of peace. "We consider a neutral flag,'' says Monroe, 
 January 5, 1804, "on the high seas as a safeguard to those 
 sailing under it." Whether we consult the Law of Nations 
 or the dictates of justice, no pretext can be found for the 
 British impressments from American ships on the high seas. 
 
 "Federalism," p. 193-197: Hildreth's "Hist, of the U. S.," vol. 3, pp. 
 76-77; King's "Rnfus King," vol. 5, p. 87, Gore to King. 
 
 ^^ Original copy in "Political Tracts," 1805-1812; Boston Gazette. July 
 25, 1808. 
 
 ^Niles' Register, vol. 4, p. 23,2, speech of Gov. Strong. 
 
 55 
 
Mr. Pickering waited until it was ascertained that the Rose 
 Mission^* would fail, and then wrote his letter to the Gov- 
 ernor of Massachusetts, denouncing the embargo and calling 
 for joint resistance against it by the Commercial States.^-^ It 
 was both in form and substance an appeal from the Govern- 
 ment of the Union to the Government of the State of Massa- 
 chusetts, with no other purpose than to stimulate the power 
 of the separate state to a resistance of force against a law of 
 the Union; and it contained the first proposal for a concerted 
 move by the commercial states for the same purpose.^'' It was 
 the plan of 1804 reproduced by the same individual who had 
 then appealed to Hamilton to lead the Junto through the "deep 
 waters." As in 1804, also, a few plain spoken letters, for- 
 tunately preserved from the flames, disclose to posterity plots 
 which statesmen of that day denounced without proving. What 
 the English called "Colonel Pickering's Party'"'^ certainly ex- 
 isted at this time and its leader, the ex-Secretary and Massa- 
 chusetts Senator, tunneled like a mole to undermine a mountain. 
 
 The embargo, therefore, was yet only an experiment, and 
 a temporary precaution, so to speak, when Pickering put quill 
 to a lengthy diatribe against the Administration, and hurled a 
 firebrand upon the stage. One copy of this paper was ad- 
 dressed to Cabot to go to the printer in case Governor Sullivan 
 failed to act as his publisher.^* The Governor, be it to his 
 honor, refused on the ground that it was, "A seditious and disor- 
 ganizing production. "^^ More than that, Pickering says : "The 
 letter was rudely returned. ''^"^ Mr. Cabot, in his reply to 
 Pickering's request that he superintend its publication, said : 
 "This day will issue from the press a copy of your letter to. 
 the Governor, which he dared not to communicate. Five thou- 
 sand copies will be struck in pamphlet form and it will be 
 reprinted in the newspapers. Probably, you will receive a 
 pamphlet with this letter. This excellent address is zvell cal- 
 
 *'Mr. Rose, a special Envoy, despatched to the United States, to dis- 
 cuss through the winter the Chesapeake affair with Madison, and then 
 do nothing. 
 
 ''Adams' "Federalism." p. 195. 
 
 '" See above references to letter. 
 
 ^^ Schouler, vol. 2, p. 181. 
 
 ''Lodge's "Cabot," p. 367; Hildreth, vol. 3. P- 77- 
 
 ='» Hildreth, vol. 3, P- 77- 
 
 *" Lodge's "Cabot," p. 380. Pickering to Cabot. 
 
 S6 
 
ciliated to rouse us from our apathy; and, if we are fit for 
 anything but slavery,*^ all New England miyht be brought to 
 act with effect."*- 
 
 The letter was unexampled and in principle unconstitutional. 
 The Senate of the United States is a branch of the legislature ; 
 and each senator is a representative, not of a single state but 
 of the whole Union. His vote is not the vote of his state, but 
 his own individually; and his constituents have not even the 
 power of recalling him, nor of controlling his constitutional 
 action by their instructions. "This was the first instance in 
 the history of the Constitution," says J. Q. Adams, "where 
 a Senator of the United States had made such an appeal to the 
 government of a state by whose legislature he had been chosen. 
 Its principle was itself a dissolution of the Union, — a transfer 
 of the action of the national government to that of the separ- 
 ate state upon objects exclusively delegated to the authority 
 of the Union."*^ 
 
 In 1828, when Adams was President, a body of Massachu- 
 setts Federalists addressed a letter to him demanding proof of 
 such statements as had been given out regarding the Junto 
 twenty years before. Adams replied that he had never doubt- 
 ed that the object of Mr. Pickering was the ultimate substitu- 
 tion of a Northern Confederacy, in alliance with Great Britain 
 for that of the United States ; and that he had good reasons 
 for believing that James Hillhouse,** then Senator from Con- 
 necticut, concurred in these views.*'' Adams was at that time 
 (1808) Senator with Pickering from Massachusetts, but later 
 resigned his position and supported the embargo. 
 
 To his letter, a step, even more reprehensible, succeeded. 
 Pickering, being at Washington during the period of Rose's 
 negotiations, held secret communications with that individual, 
 his object being plainly to stiffen this Chesapeake diplomat, 
 who bore terms disgraceful enough, and through him to as- 
 
 " Slaves to the Republican administration and to the South. Italics 
 my own. 
 
 " Lodge's "Cabot," p. 380. Italics my own. 
 
 ^Adams' "Federalism," p. 195. 
 
 "Pickering admits as much in a letter to Cabot March 11, 1808. See 
 Lodge's "Cabot," p. 380. 
 
 *' Adams' "Federalism," p. 107; His second reply to the Mass. Feds. 
 The first reply begins on p. 46, same work. Correspondence complete, 
 as far as we know. 
 
 57 
 
sure the English ministry that they had only to let us alone in 
 order to find that the embargo would curse its authors.*" "You 
 have only to travel to Boston," he assured him, "to find that 
 our best citizens consider the interests of the United States 
 interwoven with those of Great Britain, and that our safety 
 depends on hers. Men, thus enlightened, could they but con- 
 trol the measures of their own government, would give them 
 a dircctiom uiutually beneficial to the tzvo nations}' And it was 
 for this purpose chiefly that I have more than once expressed 
 to you my hope that you would see them in person, by traveling 
 through the country as far as Boston.** Given up as the people 
 are to strong delusions, to believe lies, it seems impossible that 
 the general deception should continue much longer."^^ In other 
 words, "I am doing everything in my power to poison the 
 minds of the New England people against the Jefl:'erson Ad- 
 ministration, and resorting to this secret and underhand rela- 
 tion with you, in the hope that you will prepare your home 
 government for an alliance in case New England can be per- 
 suaded to revolt." 
 
 Pickering went so far as to hand over to Rose his private 
 letters from Cabot and King for confidential perusal. '° He 
 sent him Sullivan's letter explaining why he (Governor Sulli- 
 van) did not publish Pickering's letter; he sent Boston news- 
 papers and kept Rose informed generally as to public opinion 
 in New England. ^^ He impressed upon Rose the social and the 
 political importance of the Essex Junto, to which he belonged, 
 and tried to show how the brakes could be put on after the 
 close of "Jefferson's reign,"'- even though Mr. Madison should 
 succeed, which was extremely problematical. 
 
 When Rose left the United States, Pickering besought him 
 to keep up a correspondence, designating his own nephew, 
 Samuel Williams, a London merchant, and formerly Consul, 
 as a suitable person through whom their letters could be deliv- 
 
 *° Private correspondence between Pickering and Rose. See Adams' 
 "Federalism," pp. 366-373; Ibid., pp. 46-107; Schouler, 3.1S1.2. 
 " Italics my own. 
 *^ He refers to the Junto. 
 
 ■"* Adams' "Federalism," p. 366. Pickering to Rose. 
 '° Ibid., p. 366. 
 '' Ibid., p. 369. 
 " Ibid., p. 367. 
 
 S8 
 
ered.^^ Rose indulged this request after his return home,^* 
 but whether he imparted ministerial confidence in return, or 
 whether he simply used adroit flattery and encouragement 
 while more subtle agencies were employed, we cannot say. In 
 the light of subsequent events, however, we are safe in assum- 
 ing the latter. 
 
 In order to give some idea as to how Mr. Rose met Picker- 
 ing's advances I will quote from a letter written just after 
 he had received the letter sent him from King: "I avail my- 
 self thankfully of your permission," he says, "to keep that gen- 
 tleman's letter, which I am sure will carry high authority 
 where I can use it confidentially, and whither it is most im- 
 portant that what I conceive to be right impressions should 
 be conve3'ed. It is not to you that I need protest that rancor- 
 ous impressions of jealousy or ill-will have never existed here; 
 but it is to be feared that at some time or another the ex- 
 tremest point of human forbearance may be reached. The 
 night of delusion appears to vanish rapidly ; may no clouds 
 obscure the rising sun. If the day breaks fairly, it will be 
 daylight, not only to yourselves, but to dear and important 
 and universal objects, seem more clearly through the darkness 
 which blinds so many, by none, or more forcibly than by your- 
 self."^^ This quotation needs no comment, for the beauty of 
 its construction and the patriotic impulses which alone could 
 prompt such an utterance are able to stand alone. 
 
 "Rejoice with us," says a Boston correspondent to the St. 
 James Chronicle,^^ "our efforts are at last, I am delighted to 
 believe, about to succeed. By the papers^'*' you will see that 
 Massachusetts has yielded good fruits for our labor and money. 
 We have hard work to do yet. but the prospect of success gives 
 us new vigor. It was a master stroke, your sending Rose here 
 to amuse this Government, to gain time and multiply the means 
 for our last resort — the election. Everywhere things look 
 promising. Your Government has no need to give an inch." 
 
 Another article'"'^ dated London, June 28, 1808, furnishes 
 
 '^Ibid., p. 370. 
 " Schouler, vol. 3, p. 182. 
 
 " Adams' "Federalism," p. 2)^";. Rose to Pickering. 
 °^ The Democrat, Boston, June 18, 1898. The above copied from the 
 St. James Chronicle. 
 
 " Papers sent by the Junto for the English ministry to peruse. 
 "* The Democrat. Boston, June 8, 1808. 
 
 59 
 
us the English view of the situation. It says : "The last files 
 from Boston and other papers from the United States give us 
 most pleasing accounts of Federalism and its growth. That 
 Federalism is gaining ground in \^ermont, New Hampshire, 
 Massachusetts, and New York, in particular, indeed, seems 
 to assure the season close at hand when we shall reap a glori- 
 ous reward for all the labor and expense lavished in that 
 country." 
 
 If we can credit these newspaper articles, and their testi- 
 mony will be well supported later, we must believe that Pick- 
 ering and Rose were not the only interested parties. Indeed, 
 Pickering is only the mouthpiece of the Junto, but that 's 
 giving him the leadership, when we remember that talk, "Yea, 
 much fine talk" was the greater part of their programme. It 
 can only be a matter of conjecture what amount of influence 
 was exerted by Rose. He undoubtedly gave Canning'^ the 
 cue for managing the American situation.'''^ Pickering we may 
 believe used the Rose information'*^ in furthering fomenting 
 discontent in New England against the embargo. The one 
 thing that made the embargo grind so severely upon the sus- 
 ceptibilities of New England was the charge so constantly 
 reiterated and more especially after the failure of the Rose 
 mission, that Jefferson's policy was being constantly dictated 
 by Napoleon, in preparation for a French alliance. 
 
 The question, therefore, naturally arises : Whence this in- 
 jurious calumny? J. Q. Adams insisted that it came from the 
 eastward, though British authorities over the border in cor- 
 respondence with citizens of Massachusetts.**- Mr. Adams says 
 that he told Jefferson in a confidential interview, March, 1808, 
 that he (Adams) had seen a letter from the Governor of Nova 
 Scotia**" which made the charge, obviously intended to propa- 
 gate the calumny that Mr. Jefferson and his Administration 
 were corruptly subservient to the influence of France ; and 
 that this influence was exercised to kindle a war between the 
 United States and Great Britain, and to effect a revolution 
 in the government of the United States, and the conquest by 
 
 ^ British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
 **Schouler, vol. 3, p. 182. 
 
 ^ Some of the letters which passed are missing, hence we do not know 
 very much about the intrigue. 
 °^ Adams' "Federalism," p. 112. 
 "^ Niles' Register, vol. 35, p. 138. 
 
 60 
 
France of the British possessions on this continent.''^ Mr. Jef- 
 ferson stated that the interview took place and repeated the 
 conversation as he remembered it, agreeing with Adams. ^'^ His 
 information is further substantiated by the "Henry Mission'' 
 of which we shall speak later. John Lowell makes an analy- 
 sis"® of the correspondence between the American Administra- 
 tion and that of France and Great Britain, with an attempt to 
 show the real causes of failure on the part of America. In this 
 remarkable analysis the Jacin leaders, Jefferson and Madison, 
 were governed all the time by French instructions. He ac- 
 counts in this way for the great injustice shown Great Britain, 
 and quotes Mr. Jeft'erson as saying to the Emperor: "Repeal 
 so much only of your degrees as relate to us, or give assurances 
 and explanations to the same effect, and we will declare war 
 against your enemy." But to Great Britain he says : Repeal all 
 your orders — repeal them in their entirety and we will restore 
 you to your old place — nothing more." Such volcanic out- 
 bursts from Mr. Lowell were intended to have and could have 
 but one influence, namely, to inflame the people with an intense 
 hatred for the administration. Partiality to France instead of 
 Great Britain was the nearest way to the hearts of many of the 
 New England people. He tells us in No. 7, "That the only 
 cause for the embargo is to be found in the demands and 
 threats of France."®^ It is to be regretted that Mr. Lowell does 
 not give some idea of the nature of these threats which so 
 greatly moulded the Jacobin policies. We know of a French 
 sympathy in America, and have spoken of it. but we must 
 admit that Mr. Lowell's statements, or some of them at least, 
 were made to order. Only a man embarked on a mission of 
 evil could blaspheme his own government and praise that of 
 Great Britain for the purpose of causing a revolt. 
 
 Mr. James Russell, in a series of Articles signed "falkland," 
 and published in the Columbian Centincl, beginning September 
 10, 1808, discusses the subject in a very different manner. 
 These articles are entitled, "A Separation of the States," and 
 attempt to show by statistics that New England's area, popu- 
 lation, and resources are sufficient to enable her to maintain 
 
 "Adams' "Federalism,' pp. 112-113. 
 
 '^ Ibid., p. 136. Jefferson's statement. 
 
 ** "Tracts on American Politics," 1795-1808. Nine documents. 
 
 *" These papers were numbered from i to g. 
 
 61 
 
an independent government. With New York included, as 
 a matter of course, in the Confederacy, a comparison is made 
 between that section and the Southern States, particularly be- 
 tween Massachusetts and Virginia. With the amount, increase, 
 and kind of population ; with the number of acres, population 
 per acre, and value per acre, he gets a ratio of about 2 to i in 
 favor of New England. That is. New England has grown pro- 
 portionately about twice as fast as the South. He concludes, 
 therefore, that with the State of New York added to New 
 England the Confederacy could probably maintain a population 
 equal to that of Great Britain and certainly greater than that 
 of Spain. 
 
 Mr. Russell gives the following reason for his articles : "The 
 policy of Virginia demands nothing less than the sacrifice of 
 greater interests of New England as the only condition on 
 which she will adhere to the Union. She must and will govern 
 us, with a policy that will forever cripple and destroy us, or 
 separate from us and leave us to pursue our own systems, 
 supported by our own resources. These I have attempted to 
 estimate to assist the people of New England in forming their 
 judgment of the consequences of such an event." 
 
 This was the most dignified argument oflrered to the people 
 of New England in regard to a new government ; but perhaps 
 the dignity of it was overbalanced by its narrowness. He 
 either lost sight of, or chose to ignore, the fact that the Great 
 West and Southwest would sooner or later join the southern 
 dynasty if New England should withdraw into a little corner 
 of the Continent. Therefore, he must have made the argument 
 with the belief, at least, that British America would readily 
 join the New England Union, and the Great Britain herself, 
 would immediately join in alliance, otherwise the Confederacy 
 would have been impossible. 
 
 This brings us to the election of 1808 and we w^ill pause 
 long enough to notice its results. We know that Madison re- 
 ceived more than two-thirds of all the electoral votes, 122 out 
 of 176. The Federalists, as we have seen, renominated Pinck- 
 ney and King ; and they carried no electroal college outside of 
 New England, excepting that of Delaware. In New England 
 state elections, however, Federalism met with much greater 
 success because of its opposition to the National policy. Em- 
 bargo candidates were defeated in New Hampshire, Rhode 
 
 62 
 
Island, and \'ermont. In this section, the opposition grew 
 constantly more defiant. Pickering's Public Letter with its bold 
 imputations and base motives made itself felt at this election. 
 
 There were many other ingenious arguments advanced by 
 the Junto to show why Madison ought not to have been elected. 
 Perhaps the most amusing one was that he was ruled by his 
 wife,*^^ and. one this account, was unfit for such high office. 
 To this we can only say that it is a pity that this lady was not 
 taken and kept as a hostage in New England during the good 
 behavior of her husband. He might then have performed the 
 duties of a distinguished statesman, as ably as he had in the 
 Revolution before these alarming petticoats were put on. But, 
 of course, the embargo was the one great argument advanced 
 by Federalist opposition. 
 
 The Boston Gazette of July 25, 1808, says : "The Democrats 
 have brought themselves and the country into this vile scrape, 
 and now they shift the blame to Pickering and his set. They 
 stigmatize the Federalists as traitors for their opposition to 
 the wonder-working embargo ; but all their cunning and all 
 their wisdom consists in hiding their fooHsh and fatal 
 measures." 
 
 It is not just, however, to say that all radical and violent 
 statements were confined to Federalist papers and Federalist 
 writers. Republicans were wholly convinced that the Essex 
 Junto was doing much more harm than the embargo and they 
 did not fail to assert as much. For example, the Baltimore- 
 American, June II, 1808, makes the following comment: 
 "Since by artifice, chicanery, and juggling, the Essex Junto 
 succeeded in throwing the legislative power of Massachusetts 
 into the hands of a faction, disposed to be subservient to a 
 foreign power, their first act of legislation was an anathama 
 against the embargo. They admit it to be the duty of govern- 
 ment to cultivate peace and amity with all nations ; and yet 
 denounce the only measure capable of enforcing its existence. 
 They deny that Congress has the right to pass such a law and 
 yet admit that a temporary' embargo, on some occasions may 
 be necessary. The British Monarch invites our citizens to in- 
 fringe our laws by formal proclamation, and the Legislature 
 of Massachusetts organizes itself in formal opposition to the 
 general government as far as words will go, in order to furnish 
 
 ''^ The Columbian Detector. Boston, Xovember 18, 180S. 
 
 63 
 
our enemies sustenance and comfort while they continue their 
 depredations." 
 
 The opinion spread that the embargo was unconstitutional, 
 and, if so, that it ought to be resisted. This was a Junto doc- 
 trine and the people were beginning to embrace it as though it 
 were true. In town-meeting addresses the language of petition 
 gave place to remonstrance, and that of remonstrance to threat ; 
 "passive obedience and non-resistance," said one of these in 
 November, "can no longer be considered a virtue."®" 
 
 The people were constantly instigated by the Junto'° to for- 
 cible resistance against the embargo, and jury after jury ac- 
 quitted the violators of it, upon the ground that it was un- 
 constitutional, assumed in the face of a solemn decision of the 
 district court of the United States.'^ A separation of the 
 Union was openly advocated in the public prints and a Conven- 
 tion of delegates of the New England States, to meet at New 
 Haven, was intended and proposed. "- 
 
 At the beginning of the final session of Congress, November, 
 1808, Hillhouse of Connecticut, and Lloyd and Pickering, of 
 Massachusetts introduced resolutions for the immediate repeal 
 of the embargo. '3 Added to this was a long exposition of east- 
 ern troubles ; and it became very clear to the supporters of the 
 measure that the Junto was clearly but surely inviting trouble. 
 
 Mr. Giles and several other members of Congress wrote 
 J. Q. Adams (then a private citizen in Boston) informing him 
 of the Junto measures and solicited his advice upon the sub- 
 ject."* Adams replied frankly, and in confidence, as he had 
 been addressed, and had recommended, most earnestly, the 
 substitution of a non-intercourse bill for the embargo. He 
 urged that a continuance of the embargo much longer would 
 certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the Leg- 
 islature, and probably by the judiciary of the state." That to 
 quell that resistance, if force should be resorted to by the 
 government, would produce a civil war ; and in that event, he 
 
 ^ Schouler's "Am. Hist.," vol. 3, pp. 184-185. 
 
 '"Niles Register, vol. 35, 138. 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
 " Schouler's "Am. Hist.," vol. 3. P- 185; Von Hoist, vol. i, p. 226, note. 
 
 "Niles Register, vol. 35, P- 138; Adams' "Federalism," p. 46. 
 
 '"Ibid., also see Von Hoist, vol. i, pp. 222-223, note. 
 
 64 
 
had no doubt the leaders of the party would secure the co- 
 operation with them of Great Britain. That their object was, 
 and has been for several years a dissolution of the Union, and 
 the establishment of a separate confederation. "This," he says, 
 "I know from unequivocal evidence, although not proveable 
 in a court of law ; and that in the case of civil war, the aid of 
 Great Britain to effect the purpose would be as surely resorted 
 to, as it would be indispensably necessary to the design."^" 
 
 In support of Mr. Adams' position let us notice the opinions 
 of some gentlemen who are not so likely to be discredited, 
 owing to Mr. Adams' relations with the Junto. DeWitt Clinton 
 made the following statement, January 31, 1809, in a speech 
 in the Senate of New York : "It is perhaps known to but few, 
 that the project of a dismemberment of this Union is not a 
 novel plan, growing out of the recent measures of the Govern- 
 ment, as has been pretended. It has been cherished by a num- 
 ber of individuals for a series of years. A few months before 
 the death of a distinguished citizen,^' it was proposed to him 
 to enlist his great talents in the promotion of this nefarious 
 scheme."'^ 
 
 In a letter to Joseph White, Jr., dated Washington, January 
 4, 1809, Joseph Story" makes this statement: 'Tf I may judge 
 from the letters I have seen from the various districts of Massa- 
 chusetts, it is a prevalent opinion there — and, in truth many 
 friends from New England States write us, that there is great 
 danger of resistence to the laws, and great probability that the 
 Essex Junto have resolved to attempt a separation of the 
 Eastern States from the Union ; and if the embargo continues, 
 that their plan may receive support from our Yeomanry."^" 
 Again on January 9, 1809, we find Mr. Story writing Samuel 
 Fay in this regard. He says : *Tt seems almost impossible that 
 Massachusetts will ever come to this scheme ; yet, I confess 
 that I have great fears when I perceive that the public prints 
 openly advocate a resort to arms, to sweep away the present 
 embarassment of commerce." ^^ 
 
 '"'Niles' Register, vol. 35, p. 138; Adams Federalism, p. 46; Von Hoist, 
 vol. I, pp. 222-223, note. 
 " Alexander Hamilton. 
 ™ Plumer's "Life of Plumer," p. 302. 
 
 " Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 *" Story's "Life of Story," vol. I, p. 174. 
 ^Ibid., p. 182. 
 
 65 
 
Mr. Adams' statements would seem to be sufficiently sus- 
 tained, by the quotations we have used, but in order to show 
 that Mr. Jefferson himself was alarmed, we will quote a few 
 lines from a letter written to Mr. Randolph January 2, 1809. 
 It reads in part : "The Monarchists of the North have been 
 able to make so successful use of the embargo as to have feder- 
 alized the South Eastern States and endangered New York, 
 and they now mean to organize their opposition by the regular 
 powers of their State Governments. The Massachusetts legis- 
 lature which is to meet the middle of the month, it is believed, 
 will call a convention to consider the question of a separation 
 of the Union, and to propose it to the whole country east of the 
 North River, and they are assured the protection of Great 
 Britain." *^ In the same letter he goes on to say that, "We 
 must save the Union ! But our difficulties do not end here ; for 
 if war takes place with England we have no security that she 
 will not offer neutrality and commerce to New England and 
 that the latter will not accept it." These men saw plainly the 
 situation and knew that something must be done to check the 
 onward march. That is why non-intercourse was urged by the 
 friends of the Administration at this time. 
 
 But, before the discussion of a non-intercourse bill got fairly 
 under way, Congress passed the "Force Bill" January 9, 1809.^'^ 
 This bill is a familiar bit of history and every one knows, per- 
 haps, that it was passed simply to enforce the embargo. The 
 embargo was only in theory a national measure. American 
 commerce was centered in the East. It could be, in reality, 
 therefore, nothing but a sectional measure, and nothing leads 
 to rebellion so surely as sectional discontent. But as we have 
 said any check attempted on Great Britain's impressment policy 
 would have fallen most heavily upon this section. 
 
 The newly enacted Force Bill, therefore, was ushered into 
 the presence of a people whose spirits already boiled with 
 rebellion and discontent. What did it mean? It meant simply 
 this : each Governor was requested and expected to appoint 
 some officer of the militia of known respect for the laws, in 
 or near each port of entry of his State, with orders when ap- 
 plied to by the Collector of the District, to assemble a sufficient 
 force of his militia and to employ them efficaciously to main- 
 
 ^ Mass. Hist. Papers, vol. I, p. 130, seventh series. 
 
 *^ Annals of Cong., loth Cong., 2nd Sess., 1808-1809, p. 1798. 
 
tain the embargo. It was therefore, a radical measure at this 
 time, and it only added fuel to the flame.^* 
 
 The people in the Eastern Section were now stirred, to the 
 satisfaction of the Junta, and memorials were sent to the 
 State Legislature declaring the embargo unconstitutional and 
 the raising of troops to enforce it a menace to civil liberty. 
 Anticipating the Force Act, Otis and Gore wrote Quincy and 
 Pickering, who were in Congress, to ask what to do next.**' In 
 the letter sent by Otis to Quincy we have the first mention of a 
 Hartford Convention. "Will you," he adds, "talk over this 
 subject with Our Little Spartmi Band, and favor me in season 
 with the result of your collected wisdom?"^*' Pickering's reply 
 to Gore is of the most vital interest and in no sense should it 
 be omitted. "Pray look into the Constitution, and particularly 
 into the loth article of the Amendments. How are the powers 
 reserved to the States respectively, or to the people, to be main- 
 tained, hut by the respective states judging for themselves 
 and putting their negative an the usurpations of the general 
 government ?" ®^ 
 
 What was this but Virginia and Kentucky Nullification and 
 by the very men who had then (1796) so bitterly condemned 
 it? Prominent judges and theologians even began, at this 
 time, to foment a New England insurrection.^^ Dr. Dwight, 
 it is said, preached a sermon using the text : "Wherefore, come 
 out from among them, and be separate, saith the Lord." 
 
 The legislatures, particularly of Massachusetts and of Con- 
 necticut, sent remonstrances to the National Congress and in 
 no uncertain terms expressed their opinions of these Acts. The 
 downfall of this forcible embargo must be attributed to the 
 panic which New England produced at Washington. No 
 doubt the careworn JefTerson never forgot how these New 
 England towns pelted and pattered resolutions upon his head. 
 We must also credit this Junto panic with the change of the 
 date for the next Congress from May 22, to March 4. Jeflfer- 
 
 " Schouler, vol. 2, pp. 190-193 ; Sullivan's "Public Men of the Revo- 
 lution"; Adams' "Federalism." 
 *" Adams' "Federalism," pp. Z7Z-27S- 
 ''Adams' "Federalism," p. 375; Otis to Quincy. 
 "''Ibid., p. 27^. The italics are my own. 
 ** Schouler, vol. 2 ; Adams' "Federalism." 
 
 07 
 
son thought*^ that by promising a repeal of the embargo he 
 could keep the East quiet until that time, but his supporters in 
 Congress saw very plainly that the Union would not be pre- 
 served that long. The fourth of March was set, therefore, for 
 the assembling of Congress and the embargo was repealed on 
 the ninth. "The alternative," said Jefferson later, "was repeal 
 or Civil War." 
 
 It is necessary now to consider the "Henry Mission" before 
 attempting any discussion of "What might have been." 
 
 At the beginning of the year 1809 the Governor General of 
 Canada, J. H. Craig, opened communications with one John 
 Henry,^'' then residing at Montreal, asking this gentleman if 
 he would undertake a secret and confidential mission to 
 Boston.^^ Mr. Henry assured the Governor that he would 
 undertake the mission and would be ready to start before his 
 instructions could be made out.^- 
 
 The instructions which Mr. Craig gave Henry, dated Febru- 
 ary 6, 1809, and marked "most secret and confidential," throw a 
 bright and illuminating light upon the British-New England 
 Alliance, which we are trying to reveal. We will, therefore, 
 make some quotations from this document and see if the real 
 object of the mission is not disclosed so that there can be no 
 doubt. 
 
 "The principal object which I commend to your attention," 
 says Mr. Craig in these instructions, is the endeavor to obtain 
 the most accurate information of the true state of affairs in 
 that part of the Union, which, from its wealth, the number of 
 inhabitants, and the known intelligence and ability of several 
 of its leading men, must naturally possess a very considerable 
 influence over, and will indeed, probably lead, the other Eastern 
 States of America, in the part that they may take at this im- 
 portant crisis.^^ The Federalists, as I understand, have, at all 
 
 " See Correspondence, Mass. Hist. Collection, vol. i. p. 135, seventh 
 series. 
 
 ""Very little seems to be known about Mr. Henry. Niles Register, 
 vol. 2, states that he was a Captain in the Provincial Army, of the 
 U. S. 1798. Fisk's speech, p. 28, same reference says: "he was an 
 Englishman but had long resided in this country. He had evidently 
 been in the service of Great Britain, also." 
 
 ** Am. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. 3, p. 546; Niles' Register, vol. 
 2, p. 20. 
 
 ''Ibid. 
 
 "Italics are my own. 
 
 68 
 
times, discovered a leaning to this disposition, and their being 
 under its pecuHar influence at this moment is the more to be 
 expected, from their having ill-founded ground for their hopes 
 of being nearer the attainment of their object than they have 
 been for some years past. It has been supposed that if the 
 Federalists of the Eastern States should be successful in ob- 
 taining that decided influence which may enable them to direct 
 the public opinion, it is not impossible that, rather than submit 
 to a continuance of the difficulties and distress to which they 
 are now subject, they will exert that influence to bring about 
 a separation from the general Union. The earliest informa- 
 tion on this subject, may be of the greatest consequence, to 
 our Government, as it may also be that it should be informed 
 how far, in such an event, they would look up to England for 
 assistance, or be disposed to enter into a connection with us." ^* 
 
 Mr. Craig further instructed Henry to get all the information 
 possible in passing through Vermont. He inclosed credentials 
 which read : "The bearer, Mr. John Henry, is employed by me, 
 and full confidence may be placed in him for any communica- 
 tion which any person may wish to make to me in the business 
 committed to him, etc."®'^ They then agreed upon a cipher 
 for carrying on a secret correspondence, using the letters, A.B. 
 for Henry's signature.^*^ 
 
 When the matter came up before the House three years later 
 Mr. Fisk, in a very pointed speech declared that, "Erskine,^' 
 while here, at that very time, was in the same business that 
 Henry was sent to perform." ^« He goes on to affirm that 
 Erskine wrote a letter, to his knowledge, in which he informed 
 his home government that he (Erskine) "Had endeavored by 
 the most strict and diligent enquiries into the views and 
 strength of the Federal party, to ascertain to what extent they 
 would be willing and able to resist the measures of the party 
 in power, and how far they could carry the opinions of this 
 country with them in their attempt to remove the embargo."^" 
 Mr. Fisk quotes from other letters written by Minister Erskine 
 
 ^Ibid. The etitire correspondence as submitted by Henry is printed 
 in the two references above. 
 ■ ** Am. State Papers, vol. 2, p. 547 ; Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 20. 
 ^ Ibid. 
 
 "British Minister to America. 
 
 "' Niles' 'Register, vol. 2, p. 28. Copy of Fisk's speech printed here. 
 ■" Ibid. 
 
 69 
 
that it would seem without making further quotations, that we 
 are justified in assuming upon the evidence given that Rose, 
 Craig, and Erskine, were all working under instructions from 
 their home Ministry. 
 
 Of course, it is clear that the Junto and British sympathizers 
 were halting upon "unpreparedness" as we used that term in 
 our last chapter. How far would public opinion and the votes 
 of New England support them ? The embargo was being used 
 just as the "bloody shirt" of later times, and to what extent the 
 people were being influenced and were prepared to act it was 
 a part of Mr. Henry's business to find out. His instructions 
 not only covered this point but every other possibility that sug- 
 gested itself. 
 
 Supplied, therefore, with everything but manhood, Henry 
 began his journey to Boston. According to instructions his 
 first stop was Burlington, Vermont, from which place he ad- 
 dressed two letters to Mr. Craig.^°" The impressions and 
 information gained in this State were highly satisfactory to the 
 scheme. He says : ''The people are so disgusted with the 
 embargo and the Administration that if Massachusetts should 
 take a bold step toward resisting the execution of these laws, 
 the people of Vermont would lend their hearty co-operation." 
 
 The next document we have from Henry is dated Amherst, 
 New Hampshire.^*'^ In this State he finds the sentiment pretty 
 much as in Vermont. He adds the bit of information, how- 
 ever, that the United States will not go to war with Great 
 Britain unless they can force His Majesty's Government to 
 commit some act of hostility, thereby placing the responsibility 
 upon Great Britain. This declaration suggests quite a new line 
 of thought. We had not looked upon the acts of the Admin- 
 istration as intended to provoke further hostility from Great 
 Britain, but we are glad to record this as an opinion of Henry's 
 that he found such to be true in New England. He concludes, 
 however, by saying: "It is highly probable that other means 
 will be employed to excite England to such an act." ^''- 
 
 We next follow Henry into Boston where he remains for 
 about three months watching and reporting the trend of affairs 
 to Mr. Craig. In a document of March 7, 1809, he sums up 
 
 ^""Am. State Papers, vol. 3, p. 547- 
 
 "^Am. State Papers, vol. 3, p. 548; Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 22. 
 
 ^''Ibid., p. 549. 
 
 70 
 
the situation, as it is revealed to him there, as follows: "I have 
 now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, the course 
 intended to be pursued by the party in Massachusetts that is 
 opposed to the measures and politics of the administration of 
 the General Government. I have always given an opinion that 
 a declaration of war is not to be expected ; but, contrary to all 
 reasonable calculations, should the Congress possess spirit and 
 independence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by 
 so- strong a measure, the Legislature of Massachusetts will give 
 the tone to the neighboring states, will declare itself permanent 
 until a new election of members, invite a congress, to be com- 
 posed of delegates from the Federal States, and erect a separate 
 government for their common defense and common interests."^ 
 
 The Congress would probably begin by abrogating the of- 
 fensive laws, and adopting a plan for the maintenance of the 
 power and authority thus assumed. By such an act they would 
 be in a position to make or to receive proposals from Great 
 Britain. Scarcely any other aid would be necessary, and per- 
 haps none other required, than a few vessels of war from 
 Halifax station to protect the maritime towns from the little 
 navy which is at the disposal of the National Government. 
 What permanent connection between Great Britain and this 
 section might grow out of the civil commotion, no one is pre- 
 pared to describe ; but it seems that a strict alliance must result 
 of necessity." ^ -* 
 
 The Non-intercourse law of March 9, 1809, raised the em- 
 bargo with all foreign states except France and England. This 
 law quieted the cry for separation and practically crushed the 
 Northern Confederacy plan for the time being. Mr. Henry's 
 mission to Boston loses interest to our narrative, therefore, and 
 we must soon follow him back to Canada. He thought it 
 necessary, however to remain some weeks longer to sketch 
 passing events. He did so and made some ver\^ interesting 
 observations after the above date. 
 
 For instance, on March 13, he writes: 'T lament the repeal 
 of the embargo, because it was calculated to accelerate the 
 progress of these states toward a revolution that would put an 
 
 '<« Niles' Register, vol. 7, P- iSS- See article entitled "New England 
 Convention," and having for its subject the above few lines: "Should 
 the Congress possess the spirit and independence enough," etc. It is 
 article No. i of a series. 
 
 '" Am. State Papers, vol. 3, p. 549- 
 
 71 
 
end to the only Republic that remains to prove that a Govern- 
 ment founded on political equality cannot exist in a season of 
 trial and difficulty, or is calculated to insure either security or 
 happiness to a people."^"' 
 
 Again on April 13, he reports much fear as existing among 
 men of talents and property that an alliance with France and 
 a war with Great Britain is intended by the Administration. "I 
 am convinced," he says, "that in such a measure not one of the 
 new England States would be a party to it." ^^'^ And in a final 
 report given after his return to Montreal he makes this interest- 
 ing observation : "The present hopes of the Federalists are 
 founded on the probability of a war with France ; but, at all 
 events, this party is strong and well organized enough to pre- 
 vent a war with Great Britain." Later in the same report he 
 adds : "It would now be superfluous to trouble Your Excellency 
 with an account of the nature and extent of the arrangements 
 made by the Federalist party to resist any attempt of the Gov- 
 ernment unfavorable to Great Britain}^'' They were such as 
 do great credit to their ability and principles." ^°* 
 
 It is very significant of the Junto's secrecy that Henry in all 
 of his reports to Craig does not mention a single name, and 
 it certainly is unfortunate not to have one item from those who 
 told Henry about the Federal arrangements to resist the Admin- 
 istration. We cannot doubt, if we give any credit to these 
 reports, that Henry was constantly in communication and con- 
 sultation with members of the Junto. It cannot be shown that 
 he ever mentioned a single source of information, and yet we 
 cannot believe that he gathered this information from mere 
 observation. He was evidently in touch with the Junto and 
 must certainly have been warned not to divulge the names of 
 his informants. 
 
 Soon after Henry's return to Canada he naturally opened 
 communications with the Governor General in regard to a just 
 compensation for his services. Mr. Craig, apparently had not 
 considered paying Henry anything for his services while on 
 this mission, although he said in his first letter that, "Such a 
 service would give him a claim, not only upon the Governor 
 
 '"''Ibid., p. 5SO. 
 "^Ibid., p. 551- 
 '" The italics are my own. 
 '"'Ibid., p. 552. 
 
 72 
 
General, but upon his Majesty's Ministry.""'^ A correspond- 
 ence was kept up for some time but to no avail. Henry then 
 went to England to place the matter before the Ministry there. 
 Having arrived he addresed a memorial to Lord Liverpool. ^^'^ 
 In this memorial to Liverpool by Henry we get the clearest 
 statement of the plot which was then much in evidence between 
 the English party in the United States and the British Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 He says : "Soon after the Chesapeake affair, when the Gov- 
 ernor General of British America had reason to believe that the 
 two countries would be involved in war, and had submitted to 
 His Majesty's Ministers the arrangements of the English party 
 in the United States for an effective resistencc to the general 
 Government, zvhich zvould probably terminate in a separation 
 of the Northern States from the gc^ieral Government, he ap- 
 plied to the undersigned to undertake a mission to Boston, 
 where the whole concerns of the opposition were managed. 
 The object of the mission was to promote and encourage the 
 Federal party to resist the measures of the general Government, 
 to offer assurances of aid and support from His Majesty's 
 Government of Canada, and to open communication between 
 the leading men engaged in that opposition and the Governor 
 General, upon such a footing as circumstances might sug- 
 gest ;^'^'^ and, finally, to render the plans then in contemplation 
 subservient to the views of His Majesty's Government." 
 
 Failing in England as in Canada, Henry next turns his face 
 toward America, arriving early in the year 1812. Feeling a 
 just sense of anger toward the English Ministry for its treat- 
 ment of his valuable services he decided to reap a just ven- 
 geance upon the English. He, therefore, addrssed a letter to 
 Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, (Feb. 20, 1812) and disclosed 
 the plot of 1809. He transmitted by the same packet the 
 documents and correspondence relating to this important mis- 
 sion in which he was employed. Henry denounced most 
 bitterly the English Ministry and said he hoped that the wound 
 resulting from his exposure would be felt where it was most 
 justly merited — upon Craig.^^- 
 
 These papers were turned over to President Madison who 
 
 "'Am. State Papers, vol. 3. P- 546. 
 
 """Ibid., p. 533. 
 
 "*The italics are my own. 
 
 "^Am. State Papers, vol. 3, p. 545; Niles' 'Register, vol. 2, p. 20. 
 
 73 
 
sent them to Congress with a message of March 9, 181 2, in 
 which he said: "These documents furnish proof to the plot 
 for resisting the laws, destroying the Union, and forming a 
 political connection between the Eastern States and Great 
 Britain. "2 There was a rumor that Madison had paid Henry 
 $50,000 for the documents which amount was taken out of the 
 Secret Service fund.^^* Nothing can be found in support of 
 this statement, however, and we should not give much credit 
 to it.^^^ 
 
 Congress, with its usual willingness to discuss all things, 
 gave this their attention, and a resolution was pased calling 
 for names. But names could not be obtained because Henry 
 had no attention of going before a committee of investigation 
 for he himself was not wholly free from the plot. The matter 
 was then turned over to the Committee of Foreign Relations 
 which was to establish the authenticity of the papers, after 
 which they were to be printed. ^^"^ They had no difhculty in 
 establishing the authenticity of the documents, the signatures 
 of Lord Liverpool, Mr. Peel, Sir. James Craig, etc., being 
 recognized as genuine. The committee made a formal re- 
 port to the House stating the above and lamenting the fact 
 that they were unable to do more. "From the careful con- 
 cealment, on the part of Henry, of every circumstance which 
 could lead to the punishment of any individuals who were 
 criminally connected with him, your committee cannot go 
 further." 
 
 They examined Count Edward de Crillon, a foreigner, who 
 accompanied Henry to this country and reduced his testimony 
 to writing. It corroborates and gives much more information 
 in support of Henry's statement. ^^" 
 
 However, as an exposure of Eastern Separatists, by one 
 conversant with their counsels, this correspondence fell short 
 of the effect which might have been anticipated. This is 
 largely due to the fact that Henry mentioned no names and 
 that the letters were not published until three years after the 
 events disclosed in them. The leaders of the party disavowed 
 
 '''Ibid. 
 
 '" Sullivan's Public Letters, p. 262. 
 "°Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 31. 
 ''^Ibid., pp. 27-31. 
 
 "'Annals of Congress, No. 24, 12th Cong., Part 2, 1811-1812, pp. 
 1220-1223; Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 31. 
 
 74 
 
all connection with the plot, and permitted friends less 
 suspected to answer for them. However this may have been, 
 the Craig instructions to Henry were undoubtedly genuine and 
 the documents show that Henry's reports had been officially 
 transmitted by way of Canada to the British Government.''^ 
 Would Craig have taken such a step as this without the 
 knowledge or privity of the British Ministry? It would be 
 absurd to entertain such an idea for a moment. The chain of 
 communication from Pickering to Rose, from Rose to Canning, 
 from Canning to Craig, and From Craig back again to the 
 "Pickering Party.'"'^ 
 
 In concluding this chapter it is impossible, by any stretch of 
 the imagination, to find grounds to justify the conduct of the 
 "Essex Junto," or New England, during this trying period. 
 We have acknowledged and tried to show that the embargo 
 measures were radical, and in a large sense sectional, for the 
 obvious reason that commerce was centered in the East. Was 
 it true that they believed these acts unconstitutional? Could 
 we not say that it was only a sham to get from under the Vir- 
 ginia rule, as they called it? They believed that this "rule"' 
 was necessarily bent upon destroying the very sources of their 
 existence. But was this true? Could it have been that the 
 whole South and West were in favor of a destruction of com- 
 merce? We believe that it is in no sense true that the South 
 was hostile to commerce to the extent which these New Eng- 
 land people were taught to believe. The intelligent Southerner 
 was in favor of it in every form. The people of the South 
 had no objection to commerce as such; they had a system of 
 reasoning on the subject which was rather abstract; and their 
 opposition to it resulted less from dislike than from a fear that 
 all other objects would be sacrificed to it. To destroy it would 
 have been to strike at the very, vitals of the nation. The em- 
 bargo was not meant to destroy but to preserve commerce. 
 What would have been the result if war had been declared 
 with the Junto in command in New England, and with their 
 arrangements made for restricting the administration, as 
 Henry tells us? It can only be a matter of conjecture and it 
 is fruitless to attempt a discussion of what might have hap- 
 pened. The next chapted will treat the influence of Junto lead- 
 ership during the War of 1812. 
 
 '''Ibid. 
 
 "* Schouler, vol. 2, p. 348. 
 
 75 
 
CHAPTER V 
 Intrigues During the War of 1812 
 
 We noted in the last chapter that Congress in March 1809 
 raised the embargo as to all other nations except France, Great 
 Britain and their dependencies, and substituted a system of 
 Non-intercourse as to them, which prohibited all voyages to 
 the British or French dominions, and all trade in articles of 
 British or French product or manufacturing; at the same time 
 authorizing the President, in case either of these nations 
 should revoke or modify their edicts and cease to violate our 
 neutral commerce, to restore our trade by Proclamation. This 
 measure was resorted to because, as we have seen, it was feared 
 that the Junto, whose following had become very large, would 
 carry forward their designs at no very distant day. It was, 
 therefore, a question of how to preserve the Union and the 
 Constitution and at the same time maintain our national honor. 
 It was believed to be a question of embargo, internal war, and 
 separation, or some form of legislation which would still the 
 troubled waters at home and merit respect abroad. The pass- 
 age of this bills marks, therefore, the cessation of Junto hostili- 
 ties, and we pass over a period of three years (1809-1812) in 
 which there is comparative quiet in the ranks of the Federalists. 
 Only once in that time is there an outbreak of Juntoism. The 
 occasion was an application for statehood made by Louisiana 
 on January 14, 1811, which will be discussed later. 
 
 This chapter must deal primarily with the attempts of New 
 England leaders to block the National x\dministration during 
 the War of 1812. It is but the carrying forward of their plans, 
 as revealed to us by Henry, in case there should be a war de- 
 clared against Great Britain. 
 
 But before we attempt to hinge the actions of the New Eng- 
 land Federalist upon Junto influences during this important 
 period of history, it will be necessary to make a few general 
 observations concerning the attitude and sentiments of the New 
 England people. 
 
 1(^ 
 
Perhaps every reader of history is acquainted with the half- 
 hearted support accorded the administration during the War of 
 1812 by this particular section of the country. Doubtless many 
 are, and always have been accustomed to attribute this miserly 
 support to the apparent destruction of commerct, forced upon 
 the people by an erring administration. This idea of an erring 
 and malicious government is exactly what was held up before 
 the people of that section, and with a purpose. There are few, 
 we venture to assert, who have ever tried to analyze tlie true 
 feelings of this people ; and fewer still, who have ever thought 
 of the tremendous force and influence which was brought to 
 bear upon New England's inherently honest and loyal sons in 
 an attempt to tear down the government and build one upon 
 "best liberty," principles and "well born" rule. 
 
 When war was declai"ed against Great Britain instead of 
 France, the whole Junto came forward in support of their 
 coveted ally. The Junto was so enraged at this declaration of 
 war that they began immediately to sow seeds of dissension in 
 New England in another vain hope of effecting their design. 
 With the unpopular war as an issue, the Junto was able to ' 
 work up very early a powerful opposition ; and many other 
 active forces were enlisted in supporting the Junto in foment- 
 ing an insurrection. For instance we .have to encounter in this 
 chapter the preaching of the most enlightened ministers who 
 had become convinced that separation was necessary. There 
 are a larger number of newspapers than before supporting the 
 secession doctrine, and some of the most potent workers are at 
 the head of the state governments. 
 
 On the other hand, many prominent men were turning away 
 and denouncing the Junto. We already have noticed the 
 change in Mr. Plumer. And now Samuel Dexter of Boston, 
 formerly a Senator in Congress, and afterwards Secretary of 
 War under John Adams, in a speech at a town meeting in 
 Fanueil Hall, August 6, 181 2, denounced the measures of the 
 Junto^ with great force and earnestness, as leading inevitably 
 to a separation of the states. His convictions had indeed be- 
 come so strong before the end of the war, that, although he 
 had little sympathy with the Republicans, he suffered himself 
 to be run against Strong, the Junto candidate for Governor. 
 "Why," he said, "they make publications and speeches to prove 
 
 ^Plumer's "Life of Plumer," p. 404; Niles' Register, vol. 6, p. 9. 
 
 11 
 
that we are absolved from allegiance to the National Govern- 
 ment and say that a division might be justified. This I cannot 
 reconcile with the duties of American citizenship." 
 
 The first renewal of Federalist discontent was manifested, 
 as has been said, when a bill for the admission of Louisiana 
 as a state, into the Union, was introduced in Congress on Janu- 
 ary 14, 181 1. This bill gave occasion for a strong expression 
 of feeling by the New England members in Congress. Since 
 they were brought now to confront the new and inevitable ex- 
 pansion of the American Union beyond the Mississippi, their 
 pent-up jealousy broke out again into the greatest anger. 
 
 The new census showed a rapid development of population 
 beyond the Alleghanies, where their political camp-fires could 
 never kindle. It seemed to them as if New England's sceptre 
 and commerce were departing together. At this point, there- 
 fore, we are again confronted with the antipathy in the East to 
 the growth of the Southwest, to additional representation from 
 the South and to slavery expansion; the origin of which, so far 
 as concern Pickering and Quincy, and the old faction leaders 
 of that section, must be ascribed more to political than humane 
 convictions, however clear might have been the later objections. 
 
 Quincy's speech in the House against erecting any state be- 
 yond the Mississippi was very violent.^ "If this bill passes," 
 he says, "it is my deliberate opinion, that it is virtually a disso- 
 lution of the Union ; that it will free the states from their moral 
 obligation; and, as it will then be the right of all, so it will 
 be the duty of some to prepare definitely for a separation, — 
 amicably, if they can, violently, if they must." At that point 
 Poindexter* called Mr. Quincy to order and demanded of the 
 Speaker if, "Amicably, if they can, violently, if they must," 
 was consistent with the propriety of debate.^ The Speaker 
 decided that while great latitude was allowed in debate, "Amica- 
 bly, if they can, violently, if they must," was contrary to the 
 order of debate. His opinion was ruled out by a vote of the 
 Hoiise. 
 
 Under the leadership of Hillhouse, Dana and Quincy, pro- 
 digious but vain efiforts were made by the Junto Federalists in 
 
 -Movement to abolish Slavery. 
 
 'Annals of Congress, vol. 22, 3d Sess., p. 526; Plumer's "Plumer," 
 p. 385; "Life and Speeches of J. Quincy." 
 * Delegate in the House from Mississippi Territory. 
 ' Annals of Congress, vol. 22, 3d Sess., pp. 525-526. 
 
 78 
 
Congress to prevent the admission of states erected out of the 
 Louisiana Purchase and without a constitutional amendment."' 
 In regard to the formation of new states, Quincy said: "Sir, 
 the question concerns the proportion of power, reserved by this 
 Constitution, to every state in the Union. Have the three 
 branches of this Government a right at all to weaken and out- 
 weigh the influence, respectively secured, to each state, in this 
 compact, by introducing at pleasure, new partners, situated 
 beyond the old limits of the United States?"" 
 
 Prof. E. S. Corwin said in a recent publication- "The word 
 'Sovereign' was first used by Calhoun as elevating the people 
 of a state to the highest political entity in the United States." 
 
 In Josiah Quincy 's speech of January 14, in, on the ad- 
 mission of Louisiana into the L'nion, was made a most extra- 
 ordinary plea for the political sovereignty of the states.*^ On 
 page 530, he said: "The term new states in this article^° in- 
 tends that New Political Sovereignties be formed within the 
 original limits of the United States ; and does not intend new 
 political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be erect- 
 ed, without the original limits of the United States." Again 
 on page 535, he said: "The proportion of the political weight 
 of each sovereign state, constituting this Union, depends upon 
 the number of states having a voice under the compact. This 
 number the Constitution permits us to multiply at pleasure 
 within the limits of the present United States but not outside. 
 Now^ sir, what is this power that we propose to usurp? Noth- 
 ing less than the power, changing all the proportion of the 
 w^eight and influence, possessed by the potent sovereignties 
 composing this Union. A stranger to be introduced to an equal 
 share, without their consent. The Constitution never meant 
 that we could add foreign partners to this compact at our 
 irresponsible pleasure." 
 
 Mr. Tracy, in the Senate in 1803, gave his reasons why he 
 could not vote for the Louisiana Treaty, and referred to the 
 states as being so many original sovereignties or partners to the 
 compact. ^^ 
 
 "Jefferson's first idea, Randolph's "Jefferson," vol. 3, p. 
 
 ^Annals of Congress, vol. 22, 3d Sess., p. 530. 
 
 ^ Mich. Law of Rev., May 1912, p. 534. 
 
 'Annals of Cong., vol. 22, 3d Sess., pp. 524-542. 
 
 " Article 4, Sec. 3, of the Constitution. 
 
 "Annals of Cong., vol. 13, 8th Cong., ist Sess., p. 55- 
 
 79 
 
As regards State Interposition, Pickering said July 8, 1809: 
 "How are the powers of the respective states to be maintained 
 but by individual states putting their negative on the usurpa- 
 tions of the general government?"^- The newspapers of New 
 England, during the years 1808-1809, and 1811-1814, are full 
 of such sentiments.^^ The Journal of the Hartford Convention 
 in 1814 declares: "That the states not only have the right but 
 it becomes their duty to interpose their authority when infrac- 
 tions of the Constitution endanger their state sovereignty."^'* 
 
 But returning to the discussion in Congress, we find that the 
 Junto objected to Louisiana's being admitted on account of the 
 French influence which might be manifested in that quarter. 
 To this old and well-worn objection, Poindexter of Mississippi 
 made some lively thrusts. He said :^° "1 admit the existence of 
 French influence there, but I cannot make it a basis on which 
 to justify a refusal to emancipate the great body of people from 
 the trammels of territorial vassalage. Is it a good reason, why 
 the people who reside within the circle of the Essex Junto 
 should not enjoy equal rights with the rest of their fellow 
 citizens, because those who compose that association are avow- 
 edly the partisans of England? And I venture to pronounce, 
 sir, that these British attachments, fostered and cherished 
 amidst the wrongs and insults which we have received from 
 that nation, have already produced more mischief to this na- 
 tion, than the miserable French influence existing in New 
 Orleans would produce in a half century." 
 
 In the Senate the aged Pickering, offended those who favor- 
 ed territorial expansion by exposing, in open debate, confidential 
 correspondence relating to West Florida,^" and was therefore 
 censured by that body^^ although this might have been spared 
 him but for his obstinacy. Pickering was trying to prove that 
 the United States had no claim whatever to Florida between 
 the Mississippi and the Perdido rivers.^® In support of this 
 
 ^"^ Pickering Mss., January 8, 1809. 
 
 " See Boston Gazette, the Statesman, the Essex Register, the Pitts- 
 field Sun, and the Boston Centinel. 
 
 "Miles' Register, vol. 7, P- 3o8. 
 
 ^ Annals of Congress, vol. 22, 3d Sess., p. SSS. 
 
 "The papers were letters from Talleyrand to Livingstone, in which 
 the former denied that the United States had acquired, by treaty of 
 1807, any title to Louisiana east of the Mississippi. 
 
 " Annals of Congress, vol. 22, 3d Sess., pp. 65-66. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 65. 
 
 80 
 
argument, he read the documents pubhcly which were intended 
 only for the ears of the members of the Senate. In his last 
 attempt, therefore, he exerted his powers to limit Southern 
 territory and Southern representation. 
 
 As we have seen, the Louisiana debate in 1811 was simply 
 a revival of the debate of 1803, when the purchase was made. 
 The grounds for opposition at both times were, in Junto terms, 
 as follows : "If you extend the Southern territory you destroy 
 that balance of power so necessary to our Union. Therefore, 
 we as a New England Junto, do hereby agree to protest against 
 such extension, on every occasion, in token of deepest respect 
 and gratitude to the Fathers who said: "Lest your numbers, 
 be equally balanced, one with another, at all times, ye cannot 
 hope to endure."' What the Fathers intended has been a never- 
 dying source of debate for scheming politicians throughout all 
 ages. Their efforts availed nothing in this connection, how- 
 ever, and Louisiana became a state April 8, 1812. 
 
 The efforts of the Junto to block the Administration during 
 the War of 1812, being the main topic of this chapter, we re- 
 gret that it is impossible to take up in more detail the causes 
 which led up to the outbreak. They cover almost the entire 
 period from 1793 to the declaration of war in 1812, and, of 
 course, cannot be discussed here. Many of our grievances, 
 however, have been mentioned in connection with the embargo 
 and other measures of retaliation. 
 
 The American nation had despaired of ever being free with- 
 out war from British impressment and the constant inroads 
 upon our commerce. The British refused to raised the long 
 standing Orders in Council, saying that the Non-intercourse 
 ought to be raised and English commerce put on the same basis 
 as that of France. On the ist of June, therefore, Mr. Madi- 
 son transmitted to Congress a correspondence^'' between Mr. 
 Russell, the American Charge d'affaires at London, and the 
 British Ministry on the subject of the Orders in Council, by 
 which it appeared that the latter inflexibly adhered to their 
 system, and that all hopes of accommodation were at an end. 
 At the same time the President sent the correspondence be- 
 tween Mr. Foster and the Secretary of State on tiie same 
 subject. Mr. Foster based all of his excuses on the fact that 
 the French decrees had not been repealed, and in this England 
 
 "Am. State Papers, vol. 3, P- 385- 
 
 81 
 
unfolded her true policy. She declared'-'' that the Orders in 
 Council should not be repealed until France had revoked all of 
 her internal restrictions on British commerce. It was either 
 tamely surrender our affairs or fight. "Forbearance had indeed 
 ceased to be a virtue."-^ 
 
 President Madison's message, which accompanied the docu- 
 ments, referred to above, was referred to the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations. The committee acted promptly and, with 
 an elaborate report of British aggressions upon our neutral 
 commerce, recommended that Great Britain's measures be met 
 by force." On June 5. the House of Representatives passed 
 a bill declaring war against Great Britain and her dependencies. 
 It was debated and passed by the Senate and signed by the 
 President June 18, 1812.-^ 
 
 Many opponents of the Administration contended that Madi- 
 son became a tool in the hands of the war party in Congress. 
 led by Clay. It is urged that this war party conditioned Madi- 
 son's second nomination upon his British policy, and that to get 
 this favor he was forced to recommend a thirty days' embargo 
 followed by a declaration of war. 
 
 There can be no doubt that Clay proposed the embargo which 
 became a ninety days' law instead of a thirty, on April 4, 
 1812-^ ; but whether it was intended as a direct preliminary to 
 war or whether it was a last effort at peaceful negotiation, mat- 
 ters little to us. It is sufficient that war was declared and that 
 the causes justified the measure. Madison says that the em- 
 bargo was a means rather of negotiation than a preliminary to 
 war.-^ 
 
 Immediately after the passage of the bill, the minority party 
 in Congress published an address to their constituents, assign- 
 
 =" Madison Works, vol. 9, p. 272. 
 
 '"■See Am. State Papers, vol. 3, PP- 40S-629, for the diplomatic cor- 
 respondence ; Niles' Register, vol. 2, has many of the important reports, 
 including the report of the committee on foreign affairs which enum- 
 erates British aggressions ; Perkins' "Late War," gives the British and 
 French decrees in their order, pp. 1-48; and the Annals of Congress, 
 vols. 23 and 24, give the entire discussion and the war documents. 
 
 ^Am. State Papers, vol. 3, P- 40S- 
 
 ■■"Annals of Congress, vol. 23, p. 265; Niles' Register, vol. 2, pp. 
 272-273. 
 
 "Annals of Congress, vol. 23, 3d Sess.. p. 187; Monroe's corre- 
 spondence, March 15, 1812. 
 
 ^Madison's writings, vol. 8, April 24, 1812. 
 
 82 
 
ing their reasons for not supporting the measure.-" In their 
 opinion, a war with England would necessarily lead to a con- 
 nection and alliance with France, hazardous to the liberties of 
 the United States. If war, at all, were necessary, it ought to 
 be with France as being first and greater in her aggressions. 
 They would suffer American merchant men to arm in their 
 own defense, and pursue such courses of trade as their judg- 
 ment should direct. They considered the attempt to conquer 
 Canada as unjust and impolitic and promising no good results. 
 The minority protest from Congress served as a platform for 
 a national "Peace Party."-" This party comprised nearly the 
 whole of the Federalists throughout the Union. Upon such a 
 platform the "friends of peace, liberty, and commerce," as they 
 styled themselves, began to organize for the Presdential 
 campaign. 
 
 Meanwhile, the New England coterie set their faces like flint 
 against active preparations. They obstructed the national re- 
 cruitment and subscriptions to the national loan. One after 
 another of the New England State legislatures protested 
 against the war with Great Britain, and called upon the people 
 to vote down the men responsible for it. Quincy presented a 
 protest from Massachusetts ; Chittenden followed with one 
 from Vermont,-^ and Connecticut furnished a proclamation 
 from her Governor Griswold.-'' The Administration could very 
 well evade resolutions so long as they were allowed to remain 
 mere resolutions ; but this could not be for long, because New 
 England's Governors were nearly all members of the Junto* and 
 were not afraid to act.^° The Administration, therefore, was 
 yet to receive its hardest blows. 
 
 Four days after the declaration of war, Governor Strong 
 received a requisition from General Dearborn^^ to order into 
 the services of the United States forty-one companies of militia 
 
 ^® Annals of Congress, vol. 24, part 2, June 1812. Composed largely 
 of New England Congressmen. 
 
 " Schouler, vol. 2, p. 355 ; M. Carey's Olive Branch, p. 225. 
 
 ^ Annals of Congress, vol. 23, 3d Sess., p. 1480. 
 
 ^Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 389. 
 
 ^The recent elections had given as Governors: Strong, to Massa- 
 chusetts; Griswold, to Connecticut; Jones, to Rhode Island; Galushia. 
 to Vermont; and Plumer, a converted Junto member, to New Hamp- 
 shire. Galushia was defeated by Chittenden at the beginning of 1813. 
 
 '^Senior Major-Gen. in Army of U. S. 
 
 83 
 
for the defense of the ports and harbors of Massachusetts and 
 the harbor of Newport, Rhode Island. The Governor, with 
 the advice of the council, refused to comply with this requisi- 
 tion and communicated his views upon the subject to the execu- 
 tives of Connecticut and Rhode Island.''- In support of his 
 opinions the Governor remarked that the President had author- 
 ity to call the militia into actual service, but that there being 
 no immediate danger of invasion either in Massachusetts or 
 Rhode Island, the President was over-stepping his power, that 
 the State Governor should judge for himself when the militia 
 should go out, and that they could not be lawfully commanded 
 by any officer, outside of the militia, except it be the President 
 of the United States. Connecticut and Rhode Island refused 
 their quota of militia on exactly the same ground. 
 
 The Constitution of Massachusetts authorized the executive 
 to require the opinion of the judges of the supreme court upon 
 any important legal or constitutional question. On this occa- 
 sion, therefore. Governor Strong submitted the following ques- 
 tions for judicial decision.''^' Whether the exigencies contempla- 
 ted by the Constitution for placing the militia at the service of 
 the United States were not questions to be decided by the sev- 
 eral states ? 2. Whether, when any of the exigencies occur au- 
 thorizing the employment of the militia in the service of the 
 United States, they can lawfully be commanded by any officer 
 outside of the militia except the President of the United States? 
 In answer to these questions, Judges Parsons, Sewal, and Par- 
 ker, state^* : "After reciting the clause in the Constitution relat- 
 ing to the subject, we find that no power is given either to the 
 President or to Congress to determine that either of the exigen- 
 cies does in fact exist; as this power is not delegated to the 
 United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the states, 
 it is reserved to the states respectively, and must be exercised 
 by those whom the states have intrusted the chief command 
 of the militia." To the second question, they say : "We know 
 of no constitutional provision authorizing any officer of the 
 Army of the United States to command the militia, or any 
 officer of the militia to command the Army of the United States. 
 
 ^=' Niks' Register, vol. 2, p. 388; Perkins' "Late War," p. 63. 
 ^^Ibid., vol. 3, p. 117. Strong's speech to Legislature. 
 "* Decision in full in "Political Tracts," 1805-1812, Harvard Library; 
 Plumer's "Life of Plumer," p. 399; Perkins' "Late War," p. 64. 
 
 84 
 
Congress may provide laws for the government of the miHtia 
 when in the actual service, but to extend this power to the 
 placing them under command of an officer not of the militia, 
 except the President, would render nugatory the provisions of 
 the Constitution, that the militia are to have officers appointed 
 by the states." 
 
 The constitutional questions on the subject of the militia, 
 now brought into view and at issue between the general gov- 
 ernment and the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
 Rhode Island, were of vital importance. Without an efficient 
 army, the safety of the nation rested at this period on the 
 militia. If they were to be considered as eighteen distinct and 
 independent bodies of troops, acting without concert, and sub- 
 ject to being called into service only when the executives of the 
 several states deemed it necssary, and not subject to the direc- 
 tion of any one head, it was evident that they could be of little 
 use in defending the country. Who knew this better than the 
 Junto? What bodies of men ever received a judicial decision 
 more in keeping with its desires than the above ? It is impossi- 
 ble to imagine a decision more nearly in keeping with Juntoism 
 than this, because their purpose was to block the Administration 
 in prosecuting the war. 
 
 "The power,'' says Monroe, "which is given Congress by the 
 people of the United States to provide for the calling forth the 
 militia for the purpose specified in the Constitution, is uncondi- 
 tional. It is a complete power vested in the National Govern- 
 ment, extending to all those purposes. If it were dependent 
 upon the assent of the executives of the individual states, it 
 might be entirely frustrated at any time, and we could not 
 depend upon the militia for public defense." The decision ad- 
 vanced by the three judges of Massachusetts on the other hand, 
 that the regular troops and the militia were to be considered as 
 independent allied bodies, when not directly under the com- 
 mand of the President himself, pushed the doctrine of "States 
 Rights" further than it had ever been carried before. 
 
 The burden of the Junto's petitions to Congress was: "An 
 alliance with England must be our salvation ; war must be our 
 eternal ruin." Madison may have been duped into war, but the 
 provocation was strong, and war or dishonorable submission 
 was the only alternative which England had left us. There is 
 no evidence that Napoleon was in touch with Madison or that 
 
 8S 
 
he influenced the administration in any way. Peace and neutral 
 commerce every one desired, but they could not be had to- 
 gether. Nor could there be a war for maritime and neutral 
 rights without involving, also, offensive warfare. 
 
 The national election of 1812 is of peculiar interest to our 
 narrative, because there was another very decided attempt at 
 a national nominating convention by the Junto, or peace Fed- 
 eralists. They were again face to face with the proposition 
 of defeating Repubhcan candidates. In pursuance of the regu- 
 lar custom, the Republican members of Congress assembled 
 in caucus in the senate chamber and nominated James Madison 
 for the office of President and John Langdon of New Hamp- 
 shire, for the office of Vice-President, May 8, 1812."^ but Mr. 
 Langdon, who was seventy-one years of age, refused the nom- 
 ination.^® Therefore, at a later caucus, Elbridge Gerry of 
 Massachusetts, was regularly nominated for the office of 
 Vice-President.^^ 
 
 Mr. Madison's war policy had made him unpopular with a 
 small portion of the Republican party in New York. This 
 dissenting faction determined to defeat Madison, and to this 
 end nominated through caucus DeWitt Clinton. The Federal- 
 ists hoped that Madison had become sufficiently unpopular by 
 the war measures to lose the nomination ; but, as he had not, 
 they were again at a loss to know what to do. DeWitt Clinton 
 was then a person of some distinction in the State of New 
 York. He had expressed his detestation of mobocracy, and 
 had been reprimanded for it. Although he had been ranked 
 with the Jeffersonian school, yet, as he had indicated dissatis- 
 faction with the policy of Mr. Madison, it was hoped, not only 
 by the nominating faction but by the Federalists, that he might 
 be elected. As a matter of fact, any man that could have been 
 elected would have been preferred to Madison by the Federal- 
 ists, and this party was willing to combine with any portion 
 of the citizens who were willing to withdraw from the support 
 of that gentleman. Measures were taken, therefore, to effect 
 a union of these two dissatisfied forces by calling a conference 
 in New York in the month of September, 1812. 
 
 The Democratic convention which met in Baltimore in 1831 
 
 "Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 192. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 276. 
 =' Ibid. 
 
has always stood as the first National Nominating Convention. 
 Few writers, therefore, have ever mentionel the secret attempt 
 at a National Convention of 1808, and the one of 1812. The 
 latter is simply a duplicate of the 1808 convention which we 
 have already discussed, and will not be treated in detail. Those 
 who have mentioned the Convention of 181 2 at all have called 
 it the first Secret Nominating Convention and not the second. 
 Viewed with relation to practical results, both were of slight 
 consequence, and perhaps for this reason they have been neg- 
 lected ; but as steps in the development of the present method 
 of nominating candidates for the presidency, these Federalist 
 conferences of 1808 and 1812 are of much importance. They 
 are important to this work because both are undoubtedly prod- 
 ucts of Juntoism. So far as is known, no report of the pro- 
 ceedings of the 1812 Convention was ever published, and the 
 newspapers of the period contain very little trustworthy infor- 
 mation regarding it. The conference was conducted as private- 
 ly as possible, so what little information the papers contain is 
 more or less conjectural. We must again, therefore, depend 
 upon a few letters as our sources. 
 
 Mr. Sullivan, one of the delegates, gives the following brief 
 account of its origin"^: "Soon after the war had been declared 
 I chanced to be at Saratoga Springs, where I met with the Hon. 
 Calvin Goddard, of Norwich, Connecticut, and with the Hon. 
 John Dwight of Springfied, Massachusetts, Governor Griswold, 
 of Connecticut, was also at the hoted, but confined to his 
 chamber. It was the habit of these two gentlemen and myself, 
 to pay the Governor a daily visit; and when he announced 
 himself too ill to receive us, we strolled into the neighboring 
 woods to talk over the state of the Union, respecting the wel- 
 fare and durability of which we entertained serious and painful 
 fears." 
 
 "On one of these execursions, it was concluded, that a Con- 
 vention should be convened at New York during the following 
 September, at which as many states should be represented as 
 could be induced to send delegates. The object of the con- 
 vention was to determine upon the expediency of defeating 
 Mr. Madison's re-election, by running DeWitt Clinton as the 
 opposing candidate for the Presidency. Goddard was intrusted 
 
 ^J. T. Sullivan's "Public Men of the Revolution," p. 350; Am. Hist. 
 Rev., vol. I, p. 680. 
 
with the State of Connecticut ; Dwight with New York, and I 
 was to awaken Massachusetts to the importance of this Conven- 
 tion ; while all three were to assist in arousing the States." 
 
 They met privately, and behind closed doors, Sept. 15, 1812, 
 and consumed three days in eager debate.^^ The Convention, 
 during two days, had been unable to come to any determination. 
 Rufus King,^*^ who had been persuaded^^ to attend, eagerly op- 
 posed the adoption of Clinton as their candidate, denouncing 
 him as a mere ambitious demagogue, a second Aaron Burr.*^ 
 King said further : "As evidence of the course he would be 
 likely to follow, we should remember that he disapproved the 
 embargo, then receded from his position, and in a speech made 
 in the Senate of New York, which he published, restored him- 
 self to the confidence of the Democrats by a triade of abuse 
 poured out upon the Federalists. If we succeed in promoting 
 his election we might place in the chair a Caesar Borgia in- 
 stead of a James Madison."*^ These invectives against Clinton 
 threw the Convention into still greater confusion and it was 
 about to be adjourned when H. G. Otis, by a rather clever 
 speech,^* succeeded in restoring order and it was agreed to 
 support DeWitt Clinton for President. Jared IngersoU, of 
 Pennsylvania, was selected for Vice-President. Henry Adams 
 says: "No one knew what pledges had been given by Clinton 
 in the bargain for the electoral votes, but no man of common' 
 sense who wished to preserve the Government and the Union 
 could longer refuse to vote for Madison.'*' 
 
 At the Convention in question eleven states were represented 
 by seventy delegates. Vermont sent two delegates, New Hamp- 
 shire two, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island three, New York 
 eighteen, Connecticut six, New Jersey twelve, Pennsylvania 
 twelve, Delaware two, Maryland three, and South Carolina 
 
 '^Ibid., Hildreth, "U. S. Hist.," vol. 6. p. 3/6. 
 
 *" King always stood with Hamilton against going to the point of 
 secession, and this meeting he considered dangerous. 
 
 " King's "Rufus King," vol. 5, p. 276. Letter from Radcliff to King. 
 
 *^Ibid., King to Gore, p. ^77; Hildreth, vol. 6. p. ^76. 
 
 ^* See King's Papers, in Life and Letters, vol. 5, p. 281 ; see pp. 
 275-284, same reference, for King's account of the resolutions and 
 position taken by the Convention. 
 
 ** Sullivan's "Public Men," p. 351. 
 
 ^ H. Adams' "Hist, of U. S.," vol. 6, p. 410. Mr. Adams characterizes 
 the canvass in New York as being most discreditable. 
 
 88 
 
four. We see that nearly every state in which the Federalists 
 were strong enough to make their vote a counting factor in 
 the election sent delegates, and all were asked to send them. 
 So far as the party was concerned, therefore, we may be safe 
 in saying that they had a national representation. We do not 
 know how the delegates were chosen, because the records are 
 too incomplete to admit of the assertion that they were duly 
 elected. They doubtless used the same method as that employ- 
 ed in 1808. 
 
 The analogy between this Conference and the present na- 
 tional nominating convention is practically complete. Delegates 
 of a distinct political party met for the purpose of nominating 
 a candidate for the Presidency. They nominated such a candi- 
 date; their party conducted a "Campaign" in his behalf and 
 cast their votes for him. The facts in the case, then, would 
 seem to warrant the assertion that the Conventions of 1808 
 and 1812 were near approaches to, if not the strictest sense, 
 National Conventions. The result is well known. Mr, Madi- 
 son was elected and the Junto lost its last chance of capturing 
 the Presidency. , 
 
 It has been shown how upon the first note of war. New Eng- 
 land majorities reverted to the old leaders, under whose in- 
 spiration the legislatures of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
 Rhode Island asserted States Rights, and discountenanced all 
 war measures against Great Britain not purely defensive, while 
 the Governors refused to march the quota of militia to the de- 
 fense of ports or place them under the orders of the War De- 
 partment. We shall now go on to discuss other maeasures of 
 Junto opposition. 
 
 The plan of military operations at the commencement of the 
 war, on the part of the United States, was to garrison and 
 defend the seaboard principally by occasional calls on the 
 neighboring militia, aided by a few regulars, the whole to be 
 under the command of generals from the regular army. With 
 the remaining regular forces, together with such volunteers as 
 could be procured, they were to attack the British posts in 
 Upper Canada, and subdue them. The War Department be- 
 lieved that could be accomplished before England would have 
 time to place an effective army there and it would give the 
 United States a great advantage.*® Here, however, they struck 
 
 *° Writings of James Madison, vol. 8, p. 262. 
 
the full force of Junto opposition because it was offensive war- 
 fare and leveled against their beloved England. They would, 
 in some measure, assist in the defense but used their choicest 
 language against all offensive movements. 
 
 In a document *^ entitled : "The Creed of Federal Editors," 
 one can find such sentiments as these : "We cannot, and we 
 will not rejoice in any event of victory which tends solely 
 to prosper the unjust and wicked views of our Cabinet in pro- 
 ducing an offensive war, at once disgraceful, unnatural, and 
 every way disastrous." 
 
 "It is disgraceful because there is no longer a doubt, since 
 the development of the juggling arts of Bassano and Russell, 
 that it was produced either by wicked intrigues, the baleful in- 
 fluence, or the menaces of the French Tyrant. It is unnatural, 
 because it was declared for the sole purpose of invading the 
 Canadian provinces. It is unnatural, because it has rent asun- 
 der, perhaps forever, nations of the name language, laws and 
 religion ; nations which should be united in a holy league to 
 defend law, liberty, and religion against the most dangerous 
 tyrant who was ever permitted to scourge the earth." 
 
 Routed at the polls in 1812 as a national party, the peace 
 men who had fallen in with the Junto and had supported De- 
 Witt Clinton against Madison, began to disband ; for the elect- 
 oral vote and the Congressional returns showed that the war 
 had been sustained and that it must go on. But the inflexible 
 rulers of the Eastern States were not to be thus turned back. 
 National reverses seem to have bound this type of men more 
 closely to one another. Except for Gore and the over-aggres- 
 sive Pickering who were serving in Congress, all the other 
 great statesmen of the Junto school, Quincy, Lloyd, Otis, 
 Strong, Chittenden, Hillhouse, J. C. Smith, and others, were 
 shedding their combined light upon local politics. Some of these 
 leaders, like Pickering, continued to blaspheme the Adminis- 
 tration : others like Otis were more tolerant ; but all agreed 
 that the New England States, even though left alone, must look 
 to Federalism as their last hope in the approaching shipwreck. 
 Practically all of the other peace states had reallied to the 
 Union cause. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
 Maryland now gave the Administration a firm support. 
 
 In New England, on the other hand, the peace party gained 
 
 *' The Examiner, p. 127. 
 
 90 
 
in strength as the war progressed. In the spring elections of 
 1813, Strong was elected Governor of Massachusetts with a 
 Federal legislature, J. C. Smith became Connecticut's chief ex- 
 ecutive succeeding the late Griswold.^" Chittenden of Vermont, 
 who, in default of a popular choice, was made Governor by a 
 joint ballot of the legislature, defeated Galushia ; and Giliam, 
 of the same Junto School, supplanted Plumer a Governor of 
 New Hampshire, thus delivering into the hands of the Junto 
 leaders the supreme control of the state governments. Gov- 
 ernor Plumer's defeat was a hard blow to the Administration, 
 because he was a firm supporter and the first New England 
 Governor to promptly send militia at the call of the President 
 in 1812.*^ He gives the following account of his defeat: "No 
 part," he says March 9, 181 3, "of my official conduct has been 
 condemned but that of ordering out the detached militia in 
 1812 when requested by the President. The great accusation 
 is, that I support the war and vindicate the National 
 Government."^" 
 
 It is a curious fact, overlooked at the time by both parties to 
 the controversy, that the Legislature of New Hampshire, in 
 June, 1794, by a resolution still in force, had authorized the 
 Governor to call out the militia whenever required by the 
 President. ^^ 
 
 Chittenden, as soon as he took the oath of office, assumed 
 command of the State Militia, and recalled a small Vermont 
 brigade, detailed by his predecessor for garrison duty at Bur- 
 lington, while critical operations were in progress at that point. 
 This action by Chittenden was rebuked by distant states as 
 treasonable, and a war member of the House of Representa- 
 tives at Washington proposed to have him prosecuted." But 
 Otis having laid on the table of the Massachusetts Senate a 
 resolution expressive of the duty and readiness of Massachu- 
 setts to aid. with her whole power, the Governor of Vermont, 
 the matter was dropped. °^ 
 
 *^ Griswold had died in office. 
 
 *' Niles' Register, vol. 2, p. 273 ; speech to Legislature on the declara- 
 tion of war. 
 
 "' Plumer's "Plumer," pp. 40S-414. 
 
 "^Ibid.. p. 389. 
 
 "'Niles' Register, vol. 5, P- 423; Hildreth, vol. 3, p. 465: Schouler, 
 vol. 2, p. 421. 
 
 '' Hildreth, vol. 3, p. 465. 
 
 91 
 
Throughout the year 1813, the success of the American arms 
 lay principally in the daring and splendid work of her small 
 navy which operated in and about the New England harbors. 
 The old British faction, the Essex Junto or the New England 
 peace party, ever watchful of British interests, seems to have 
 grown quite despondent over the defeats of the British navy. 
 They attempted to aid Great Britain, therefore, in destroying 
 American war vessels and won another, and even more odious, 
 title — "Blue light Federalists." 
 
 One incident occurred in New London harbor at the time 
 Hardy's blockading squadron hemmed in the United States 
 frigates. Stephen Decatur commanding the United States 
 squadron addressed the following letter^* to the Secretary of 
 the Navy, December 20, 1812: "Some few nights since, the 
 weather promised an opportunity for this squadron to get to 
 sea, and it was said that on that night we intended to make the 
 attempt. In the course of the evening two blue lights were 
 burnt on both the points at the harbor's mouth as signals to 
 the enemy, and there is not a doubt, but that they have, by 
 signals and otherwise, instantaneous information of our move- 
 ments. Great but unsuccessful exertions have been made to 
 detect those who communicate with the enemy by signal. Not- 
 withstanding, these signals have been repeated, and have been 
 seen by twenty persons, at least, in this squadron. There are 
 men in New London who have the hardihood to affect to dis- 
 believe it, and the affrontery to avow their belief." 
 
 As illustrative of the feeling which the "blue hghts" pro- 
 voked we will quote from several newspapers. The Rhode Is- 
 land American has this to say:^^ "The infamous 'blue light' 
 incident has been lustily denied by many ; for it is feared the 
 honest part of the community may reflect on the circumstance, 
 and in it discover that wicked 'British influence' that prevails 
 in certain parts of the United States."'" The Baltimore Federal 
 Gazette says : "It is astonishing to observe the efforts made to 
 invalidate the truth of the report respecting the 'blue light' ex- 
 hibition on the shores of New London. With impudence un- 
 paralleled the facts are denied in toto, and the thing is twisted 
 
 " Niles' Register, vol. 5, p. 302. 
 "'^ Copied in Niles' 'Register, vol. 5, p. 302. 
 
 °* See also Annals of Cong., No. 25, vol i, House debate on the "Blue 
 Lights" affair. 
 
and turned a thousand ways to weaken its force ; for the people 
 are alarmed and shocked at the vileness, and begin to see the 
 lengths, to which the attachment of some to the enemy, will 
 lead them.'"^' No positive evidence has ever been found con- 
 necting this affair with the British faction. Congress conclud- 
 ed the matter too trivial for investigation ; but public suspicion, 
 long directed against the "peace men" of New England, did 
 them ample mischief in the epithet of "Blue light Federalists." 
 Conclusions may be drawn, however, from what has gone be- 
 fore and from that which is to come. 
 
 We said at the beginning of this chapter that New England's 
 political bosses were responsible for the half hearted support 
 given the Administration during the war. W'e said. Loo, that 
 Juntoism had been breathed into the nostrils of waiters (editors 
 and others, and that even the most learned ministers caught the 
 spirit and showered invectives upon the administration at 
 Washington and plead with their people to, "Come out from 
 among them." During the last year of the W^ar they based 
 their complaints upon three subjects, i. That England has 
 always been willing to make a treaty with us on fair and hon- 
 orable grounds. 2. That the war was offensive and morally 
 wrong. 3. That since our Administration was so obstinately 
 bent on continuing the war no prospect of peace could exist 
 as long as the Government had means of carrying it on. As to 
 the first subject, we cannot say that it was reserved for the 
 last year of the war, in fact none of them were entirely reserved 
 for the second year, but greater eft'ort was manifested at this 
 period to make them felt. The first subject was the text, as 
 we have seen, of Pickering's denunciation of the Administra- 
 tion in 1808. In that letter he went so far as to accuse the 
 President of withholding documents which would have estab- 
 lished the innocency of England to the satisfaction of all.^* It 
 was used by Ouincy and others in Congress to show that war 
 was unnecessary and that if England's advances had been met 
 promptly and fairly, peace could have been assured.'''' The 
 Junto claimed that our Ministers were instructed in such a way 
 that no nation could treat with them. This, of course, refers 
 to our demand for a treaty on the impressment issue. 
 
 "Copied in Niles' Register, vol. 5, p. 31 1- 
 
 ""'Political Tracts," 1908. 
 
 ''Edmund Quincy's "Life and Speeches of Josiah Quinn." 
 
 93 
 
The second subject, which is concerned with the moraHty of 
 the cause, must, in all justice, be entrusted to the New England 
 clerg}'. Governor Plumer, having been defeated in the spring 
 election of 1813, as Governor of New Hampshire, was removed 
 from the scenes of public life. He had been deeply moved by 
 the false and wicked accusations which the sermons of Osgood, 
 Parish, and Gardiner contained. Therefore, he published a 
 series of essays"" during the winter of 1813-14 entitled: "An 
 address to the Clergy of New England on their opposition to 
 the riders of the United States, by a Layman." He quoted the 
 text of Malachi : "Ye have departed out of the way, ye have 
 caused many to stumble ; therefore have I made you con- 
 temptible and base before all the people.'' Plumer's addresses 
 were, in large part, quotations from the sermons and their 
 analysis. Beside the newspaper circulation, about three thou- 
 sand copies of it were circulated in pamphlet form. It proved 
 to be a great and wholesome publication in favor of the Admin- 
 istration in its attempt to counteract the baleful influence. 
 
 A few quotations "^^ will suffice to show how the Clergy took 
 up to old Junto songs at this juncture, and chanted them from 
 the pulpits. Dr. Osgood in a sermon of June, 1812, says : "Our 
 government has the hardihood and afifrontery at which Demons 
 might blush. This war is an outrage against Heaven, against 
 all truth, honesty, justice, goodness, — against all principles of 
 social happiness." In another sermon of a few days later, he 
 says: "Were not the authors of this war in character nearly 
 akin to the Deists and Atheists of France ; were they not men 
 of hardened hearts, sacred consciences, reprobate minds and 
 desperate wickedness ; it seems utterly inconceivable that they 
 should have made a declaration of war." Shortly after this 
 exposition we find him warning his people as follows : "Every 
 man who volunteers his services in such a war against Great 
 Britain or loans his money for its support, or by his conversa- 
 tion, his writings or any other mode of influence, encourages 
 its prosecution, that man is an accomplice in the wickedness ; 
 leads his conscience with the blackest crimes, brings the guilt 
 
 ^The pamphlet containing these addresses can be found in Harvard 
 library. 
 
 •^AU of these quotations are taken from Plumer's addresses. He 
 quotes them directly from the sermons. See Carney's "Olive Branch" 
 for parts of many of these sermons. 
 
 94 
 
of blood upon his soul, and in sight of God and His law is a 
 murderer — and no murderer hath eternal life." How variant 
 are such wanton charges from the spirit of that mild religion, 
 which enjoins on its disciples, to let their moderation to be 
 known to all men, and not to judge others. 
 
 Dr. Parish in a sermon of April 8, 1813, compares the 
 President to the Devil, and says Congress has established 
 iniquity and murder by law. He represents our rulers as the 
 abject slaves of the French Emperor, and all our calamities as 
 rising from the friendship of our government to that haughty 
 master. July 12, 1812, he tells us: "The wicked archives of 
 all the wicked governments from Macedonia's madman to the 
 Swede, furnish no parallel to this profligate measure. The 
 story of Herod destroying all the babes of Bethlehem, will 
 give place to this more enormous iniquity." In a later sermon, 
 he endeavors to excite the people of the Eastern States to 
 rebel, to dissolve the Federal government and dismember the 
 Union. "The general government," he says, "cannot provide 
 any reasonable defense. They cannot raise men ; they cannot 
 borrow money." He tells them further that they have thrown 
 avv-ay a sufficient number of petitions and remonstrances by 
 sending them to the Potomac to form carpets for her palaces. 
 Then followed these questions: "Will you then throw your- 
 selves completely in their power, by suffering this w^arfare to 
 proceed? Will you admit Southern troops into your borders?" 
 This is a fair sample of the Massachusetts pulpit during the 
 war. It is simply Juntoism as it had been proclaimed from 
 the year 1800. J. O. Adams wrote to Mr. Plumer January 10, 
 1813, saying: "The clergy of this country are growing more 
 and more like the clergy of all other countries. Osgood. 
 Parish and Gardiner, are but minatures of Lowth, Sacheverel, 
 Laud and Lorain ; and in that rank I leave them." ''- 
 
 When w^e consider the third subject, "The Government can- 
 not carry on w^ar without money and as long as they have it 
 this blood shedding will never cease," it becomes necessary to 
 uncover one of the darkest and most treasonable of the Junto 
 plats. From the beginning of the war, as we have seen, the 
 Peace Faction, as they called themselves, had exerted every 
 influence and effort to thwart the government in its eft'ort to 
 provide means for maintaining the war against Great Britain. 
 
 ^ Phimer's "Life of Plumer," p. 103. 
 
 95 
 
We have seen how at the beginning they attempted to block 
 the raising of an army; how they refused to send out the State 
 Militia; and how they chose to interpret the Constitution to 
 meet their own wishes and desires. It now remains for us to 
 see how they acted in regard to financing the war. Boston was 
 to be the grand focus of this conspiracy. 
 
 It must be remembered that the embargo had closed all 
 American ports to the legal admission of foreign goods. It 
 must be remembered that the officers were not very zealous 
 in the maintenance of the restrictive laws. Smuggling, there- 
 fore, became almost respectable and. owing to New England's 
 capital, was extensively carried on. This illegal trade was 
 kept up, and during the war many valuable British prizes ^^ 
 were taken into Boston ports. "^^ Boston, therefore, became a 
 distributing center for foreign goods to other cities. For these 
 goods they paid partly in bills of the banks of the Middle and 
 Southern states and partly in their own promissory notes. ^° 
 Boston by this means became a financial autocrat, having in its 
 hands despotic power to control the money aft'airs of the coun- 
 try. This fact suggested to the leaders of the Peace Faction 
 in New England a scheme for blocking the Administration 
 financially and thereby compelling it to abandon with dis- 
 honor "*' the struggle with Great Britain. Nor were they slow to 
 act upon the suggestion and to put the scheme into operation. 
 
 From the beginning of the war the government was com- 
 pelled to ask for loans, and the Peace Faction made such per- 
 sistent opposition for the purpose of embarassing the govern- 
 ment, that in every case a bonus "^ was paid for all sums 
 borrowed.^® In March, 1814, a loan of $25,000,000 was auth- 
 orized. Only $11,400,000 of the proposed loans were raised 
 and that by paying a bonus of $2,852,000."^ It was so dis- 
 
 *^ Carey's "Olive Branch," p. 286. 
 
 ^ Harrison Gray Otis, charged the Administration with the author- 
 ship of this depredation of morals and execrable course of smuggling 
 and fraud. 
 
 '^Lossing's "War 1812," p. 1008. 
 
 "Ibid., Carey's "Olive Branch," p. 286; Schouler, vol. 2, p. 415; 
 Pickering Mss. February 4, 1814, letter to Putnam; Lodge's "Cabot," 
 p. 530. 
 
 *' Niles' Register, vol. 2, pp. 91 and 195. 
 
 •^Lossing's "War," p. 1008. 
 
 *^ Ibid., p. 1009. 
 
 96 
 
astrous that only one more attempt was made after that time to 
 borrow money. This was the darkest period of the war, and 
 then it was that tlie Peace Faction at poHtical meetings, through 
 the press, and from the pulpit, put every obstacle in the way 
 to crush the government. By inflamatory and threatening 
 publications and personal menaces, they intimidated many 
 capitalists."'' 
 
 Of a species of denunciation held out to deter men from sub- 
 scribing, some idea may be formed from the following ref- 
 erences taken from various Boston papers and other publica- 
 tions at this time. Mr. John Lowell '^ in "Road to Ruin" No. 
 5, says: "Will Federalists subscribe to the loan? Will they 
 lend money to our national rulers? It is impossible; first, be- 
 cause of principle; secondly, because of principle and interest. 
 If they lend money now they make themselves parties to the 
 violation of the Constitution, the cruelly oppressive measures 
 in relation to commerce, and to all the crimes which have oc- 
 curred in the field and in the cabinet." ("Road to Ruin" 
 Xo. 5). He continues: "To what purpose have the Federalists 
 exerted themselves to show the wickedness of this war, and 
 to show the authors of it not only to be unworthy of public 
 confidence but highly criminal, and to arouse public sentiment 
 against it, if now they contribute money without which these 
 rulers must be compelled to stop?" (The same reference con- 
 tinued) : "By the magnanimous course pointed out by Governor 
 Strong, that is, by withholding all voluntary aid in prosecuting 
 the war, the manfully expressing our opinions as to its injustice 
 and ruinous tendency, we have arrested its progress ; and driven 
 its authors to abandon their nefarious schemes, and to look 
 anxiously for peace. What then if we lend them money? 
 They will not make peace ; they will hanker after Canada. Pray 
 do not prevent them, the abusers of their trust, from becoming 
 bankrupt ; do not prevent them from becoming odious to the 
 public and replaced by better men. Any Federalist who lends 
 
 '"One of the best examples of New England literature on the subject 
 is the Examiner. It contains fifteen articles entitled, "Road to Ruin," 
 by John Lowell. There are many political essays and official documents 
 which could be cited, but we will quote largely from "Road to Ruin" 
 and indicate by numbers, as the articles are numbered from i to 15. 
 Cary, in his "Olive Branch" quotes correctly from the Examiner and 
 also from newspapers on this phrase of our subject. 
 
 " Both Lowell's were loyal Junto supporters. 
 
 97 
 
money to the government, must go shake hands with James 
 Madison and claim fellowship with Felix Grundy. Let him 
 no more call himself a Federalist and a friend of his country. 
 He will be called by others infamous." "But Federalists will 
 not lend money because they will never get it again. How, 
 where and when will the government get money to pay interest I 
 There are two very strong reasons, therefore, why Federalists 
 will not lend money — first, because it would be a base aban- 
 donment of political and moral principles ; secondly, because it 
 is pretty certain that they will never be paid back the amount." 
 The Boston Centinel, March 24, 1813, says: "The war advo- 
 cates appear very sore and chagrined at the failure of the late 
 loan, and in their ravings ascribe the meager subscriptions to 
 the truths which have appeared in the Federal papers on the 
 subject." In a discourse delivered at Byfield, April 7, 1814, by 
 Elijah Parish, D.D. we find the following: "No peace will 
 ever be made, till the people say that there shall be no war. If 
 the rich men continue to furnish money war will continue until 
 the mountains are melted with blood — till every field in 
 America is white with the bones of her people. "- 
 
 The Junto seems to have extracted promises from many of 
 the wealthier citizens not to lend money to the government ; 
 and the fact that they loaned their money secretly, would sug- 
 gest that they were liable to some sort of disgrace or per- 
 secution. To quote John Lowell again in "Road to Ruin," 
 No. 5 : "Money is such a drug that men against their con- 
 sciences, their honor, their duty, their professions and promises 
 — are willing to lend it secretly to support the very measures 
 intended and calculated to ruin them." What, alas, must be 
 the awful state of society and the tremendous pressure brought 
 to bear, when a free citizen is afraid to lend his money publicly 
 to support the government trying to protect him ! And to be 
 forced to suffer such abuse as the above from Mr. Lowell, when 
 he rallies secretly to its support, certainly signifies the depths 
 to which patriotism can be dragged. 
 
 Records exist to prove these not false accusations. The fol- 
 lowing is taken from the Boston Chronicle, April 14, 1814, and 
 signed by Gilbert and Dean, Brokers. Exchange Coffee 
 House, Boston, April 12" : "From the advice of several friends, 
 we are induced to announce to the public that subscriptions to 
 
 '^ Carey's "Olive Branch," p. 292. 
 
the new loan will be received by us as agents. . . . Applica- 
 tions will be received from any persons who wish to receive 
 their interest in Boston, . . . and the names of all subscribers 
 shall be known only to the undersigned." 
 
 These extracts give but a faint idea of the violence of the 
 publishers, at this time, by the peace faction. We cannot 
 wonder at the people becoming intimidated and hiding their 
 money in stockings beneath hearthstones, and in various other 
 places to prevent its getting into the clutches of Madison and 
 his cohorts. 
 
 Nor was this all. To make the blow still more efifectual the 
 conspirators made arrangements ''* with agents of the govern- 
 ment authorities of Lower Canada whereby a very large 
 amount of British Government bills, drawn on Quebec, were 
 transmitted to New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and 
 offered on such advantageous terms to capitalists as induced 
 them to purchase.'* By this means an immense amount of 
 gold was transmitted to Canada, placed beyond the reach of 
 the Government of the United States, and put into the hands 
 of the enemy, to give succor to the British who were waging 
 war against the independence of the Republic. 
 
 These machinations failed to produce the desired effect. 
 There were loyal men in New England, as we have seen, who 
 still subscribed to the loans. The Middle and Southern State 
 banks, with such outside help, were able to keep the govern- 
 ment going. So these "Wise men from the East" adopted 
 more strenuous measures to drain those banks of their specie, 
 and render them unable to meet their subscriptions to the loan. 
 The Boston banks fell into this scheme ; otherwise it could not 
 have been effected. '= The notes of the banks in New York, 
 and of the banks further south, held by these Boston banks. 
 
 "Lossing's "War," p. loro; Carey's "Olive Branch," p. 301; Schouler, 
 vol. 2, p. 415. 
 
 ''Boston Daily Advcriiscr, Dec. 16, 1814. These transaction were 
 made so boldly that the hills were advertised in the Boston papers. I 
 annex the following : 
 
 "i bill for L. 800 British Government Bills, 
 
 I ditto 250 For sale by 
 
 I ditto 203 Chas. W. Green, 
 
 No. 14 India wharf." 
 
 1.253 
 ''Lossing's "War of 1812," p. 1009; Schouler, vol. 2, pp. 415-416. 
 
 99 
 
were transmitted to them with demands for specie. At the 
 same time drafts were drawn on the New York banks for the 
 balance due the Boston corporations to the amount of about 
 $8,000,000 in the course of a few months. This of course 
 caused the New York banks to draw heavily on those of Phila- 
 delphia and of the South and caused a panic. Statistics show '^^ 
 that the Boston banks which had taken the action had $250 in 
 specie for every $100 of their notes in circulation — "a state of 
 things," says Carey, "probably unparalleled in the history of 
 banking from the days of the Lombards to the present day.'' " 
 The extensive smuggling, the forced sale of British Govern- 
 ment bills,'^^ and the later demands of the New England banks 
 upon the weaker ones caused all of the banks of New York, 
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Mary- 
 land, Virginia, Kentucky and Ohio, to refuse payments in 
 specie.'*' Some of the banks farther south were aided by some 
 prizes and were not forced into such straits.*'^ As direct 
 evidence to this fact we have a report ^^^ addressed and signed 
 by the presidents of the six Banks of Philadelphia which says : 
 "IVe are forced to suspend specie payment on account of the 
 payment in specie for smuggled goods and the trade in British 
 government hills zvhich have caused very great sums to be ex- 
 ported from the United States." As further testimony we 
 have a letter from Mr. Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury say- 
 ing: "Not only did New England lend no aid to the Treasury, 
 but her whole influence was thrown to embarrass it. Of loans 
 to the amount of $41,000,000 paid into the treasury during the 
 war, she contributed less than three millions. This was not 
 all. A large importation of foreign goods into the Eastern 
 States, and an extensive trade in British Government bills of 
 exchange, caused a drain of specie through New England to 
 Great Britain. The specie in the vaults of Massachusetts 
 banks rose from $1,700,000 in June 181 1, to $3,900,000 in June 
 1812, and to $7,300,000 in June 1814, all of which was lost to 
 
 ''Henry Adams' "Life of Albert Gallatin," pp. 473-474; Carey's 
 "Olive Branch," p. 299; Lossing's "War," p. lOio. 
 " Carey's "Olive Branch," p. 300. 
 
 ™Niles' Register, vol. 7, sup. p. 175; Schouler, vol. 2, p. 415. 
 " Niles' Register, vol. 7, sup. p. 175. 
 " Ibid., p. 176. 
 ^^ Ibid., Full report published and signed by the six bank Presidents. 
 
 100 
 
the Government and the Treasury."**- Disaffection, there- 
 fore, withheld a greater part of the capital and so forced the 
 government to negotiate a foreign loan to support a very just 
 war. ^^ 
 
 The facts concerning the attitude of the "Essex Junto," the 
 "British faction," the "Peace Party" or the "Blue-light Fed- 
 eralists," during the War of 1812 seem sufficient to warrant the 
 assumption made at the beginning of this chapter, that this 
 particular coterie of individuals rather than malicious legisla- 
 tion by the administration were responsible for the half-hearted 
 support of New England. We have now only to discuss the 
 crowning conspiracy of the Junto — the Hartford Convention. 
 
 "^H. Adams' "Life of Albert Gallatin," pp. 437-474. 
 *^ Writings of James Madison, vol. 8, p. 278. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 The Hartford Convention 
 
 Before attempting to discuss the Hartford Convention, it is 
 necessary to sketch briefly some of the legislation which helped 
 to precipitate it. In our last chapter we left the Administra- 
 tion, perhaps, in the darkest hour of conflict. It was being 
 forced into the most extreme measures to maintain the war. It 
 refused to make peace on humiliating terms, and it seemed next 
 to impossible to prolong the war without more troops. The 
 proposition, by Monroe, to raise a large force by conscription, 
 therefore, brought matters to a crisis in New England. In 
 some of the other states, the matter of local defense had been 
 left almost wholly to the discretion of the respective governors ; 
 but the President, becoming suspicious of the loyalty of New 
 England because of the injurious action of the Peace Faction, 
 insisted upon the exclusive control of all military movements 
 there. The Massachusetts militia not having been placed un- 
 der General Dearborn's orders, the Secretary of State, in an 
 official letter to Governor Strong, refused to pay the expenses 
 of the State militia defending Massachusetts.^ Similar action 
 for a like cause had occurred in the case of Connecticut, and a 
 clamor was instantly raised that New England was abandoned 
 to the enemy for the action of the National Government. The 
 forces, it is true, had been withdrawn to protect, if possible, 
 the Capital at Washington, but any one has to follow only the 
 conflicts of war to understand why the New England States 
 were thus temporarily unprotected. 
 
 The refusal of the Government to pay the militia defending 
 the coast of Massachusetts ; the proposition to raise a large 
 force by subscription and the temporary withdrawal of troop?, 
 from this section, furnished the Peace Faction new ground 
 upon which they could proceed. A joint committee of the 
 Massachusetts legislature was appointed, having H. G. Otis 
 for its chairman, to make a report on the state of public af- 
 
 ' Niles' Register, vol. ", p. 148. Monroe's letter to Strong. 
 
 IQ2 
 
fairs. This report - contained a convert threat of independent 
 action on the part of that State, recommending "that a number 
 of troops, not exceeding ten thousand, be raised and officered 
 by the Governor for the defense of the state ; that the Gov- 
 ernor be authorized to borrow from time to time a sum not 
 exceeding one milHon dollars to defray local expenses ; that 
 . . . persons be appointed as delegates from this legislature 
 to confer with delegates from the States of New l-i^ngland 
 upon subjects of public grievance, and to take measures for 
 procuring a convention of delegates if they think proper; that 
 a circular letter from this legislature be addressed to the execu- 
 tive government of each of said states explaining the objects 
 of the proposed conference and inviting them to concur in 
 sending delegates thereto ; that on the day of instant, 
 
 the legislature will, by joint ballot, elect persons to meet 
 such delegates as may be appointed by the said states, or either 
 of them, at in the state of 
 
 The Administration minority protested^ against this action, 
 and denounced it as a disguised movement to prepare the way 
 for a dissolution of the Union. The protest was of no avail. 
 The report of the Committee was adopted by a vote of three to 
 one,-* and the Governor addressing a circular letter to the other 
 Governors of the New England States, invited them to appoint 
 delegates, to meet in convention at Hartford, Conecticut, Dec- 
 ember 15, 1814, to deliberate upon the dangers of which the 
 states in the Eastern section of the Union were exposed.'^ The 
 proposition also contained suggestions relative to Constitutional 
 amendments on the subject of slave representation, which 
 might secure to New England equal advantage with the South. 
 
 The convention of both houses of the Massachusetts legis- 
 lature, October 10, proceeded to the choice of twelve delegates, 
 to meet and confer (on the 15th of December next) with such 
 delegates as may be chosen by any or all of the other New 
 England States." 
 
 Late in the same month the legislatures of Connecticut and 
 Rhode Island accepted the invitation from the Governor of 
 
 -■ Niles' Register, vol. 7, P- i50. Report of Committee. 
 
 Ubid., p. 153- 
 
 'Ibid., p. 152. 
 
 ''Ibid., p. 179. The circular letter. 
 
 Ubid., p. 153. Act of Mass. legislature. 
 
 103 
 
Massachusetts, and appointed delegates to the Hartford 
 Convention, Connecticut appointing seven and Rhode Island 
 four/ The legislature of Vermont refused to adopt the Mass- 
 achusets resolutions and unanimously reported against them.* 
 New Hampshire was not represented as a state because a 
 majority of the council who must authorize a call of the legis- 
 lature, to appoint delegates, were Republicans.^ This Council 
 consisted of three Republicans and two Federalists, so the Re- 
 publican majority blocked the appointment of delegates to 
 Hartford. But there followed immediately County Conven- 
 tions in these two States and Vermont was finally represented 
 by one delegate from the County of Windham, and New- 
 Hampshire by two representatives from the counties of Grafton 
 and Cheshire.^" There were, therefore, only three states fully 
 represented at Hartford. 
 
 The Convention met according to programme, on Thursday 
 morning, December 15, 1814. composed of twenty-six del- 
 egates.'^ They organized by the appointment of George Cabot, 
 of Boston, President and Theodore Dwight of Hartford, Sec- 
 retary. The sessions of the Convention continued thorughout 
 three weeks, behind closed doors. The movement had created 
 much alarm at the Seat of government, especially because at 
 about that time the Massachusetts legislature appropriated a 
 million dollars toward the support of ten thousand men to re- 
 lieve the militia in service, and to be exclusively under state 
 control. 
 
 The Hartford Convention has been condemned and defended 
 alike for almost a century without any one writmg a satis- 
 factory account of it. Dwight, Secretary of the Convention, 
 has written a history of it, but it is quite pointless. The treat- 
 
 '' Xiles' iRegister, vol. 7, p. 165 and 180. 
 
 '^ Ibid., p. 167. 
 
 * Ibid., see also Plumer's "Plumer," p. 417. 
 
 '" Ibid., p. 305. 
 
 " The following are the names of the delegates : Geo. Cabot, Xathan 
 Dane, Wm. Prescott, H. G. Otis, Timothy Bigelow, Joshua Thomas, 
 Samuel Summer Wilde, Joseph Lyman, Steven Longfellow, Jr., Daniel 
 Waldo, Hodijah Baylies, and George Bliss, from Massachusetts ; Chaun- 
 cey Goodrich, John Treadwell, James Hillhouse, Zephaniah Swift, 
 Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger M. Sherman, from Con- 
 necticut; Daniel Lyman, Samuel Ward, Edward Monton, and Benjamin 
 Hazard from Rhode Island; Benjamin West, and Mills Olcott from 
 New Hampshire ; and Wm. Hall, Jr., from Vermont. 
 
 104 
 
ment of the Convention in Henry Adams "New England 
 Federalism" is equally unsatisfactory. These are the most 
 voluminous accounts available ; but, as length seems to be their 
 only redeeming feature, we propose to discard both of them 
 and attempt to build our structure upon fragmentary evidence 
 wherever it can be found available. The reason for nothing of 
 value having been written on the Hartford Convention is the 
 fact that it was conducted in secret and that no one has ever 
 been able to collect any considerable amount of information 
 concerning it. Never, certainly, were doors shut more closely 
 upon a delegate, and (professedly a popular) convention, than 
 upon this one ; not even the doorkeepers or messengers gaining 
 access to its discussions.^- Inviolable secrecy was enjoined 
 upon every member and there is no evidence that the injunction 
 was ever removed. 
 
 Four years afterwards, when the Hartford Convention and 
 its projectors bent under the full blast of popular displeasure, 
 Cabot delivered, to his native state, the sealed journal of its 
 proceedings which had remained in his exclusive custody.^^ 
 When this report was opened it was found to be a meager 
 sketch of formal proceedings.^* It makes no record of yeas 
 and nays ; states none of the amendments ofifered to the various 
 reports ; attaches the name of no one to a single proposition ; 
 in short, it carefully suppressed any and all the evidence which 
 could ever be brought against an individual delegate. 
 
 For a convention lasting three weeks to leave only a journal 
 of a few pages does not seem reasonable. That twenty-six men 
 should have consented to leave no ampler means of vindicating 
 their own names to posterity seems equally incredible. That 
 sphinx-like mystery, therefore, which has always hung about 
 the Hartford Convention leaves us in grave doubt as to what 
 really took place behind the doors. The writer of today is 
 little better equipped than the writer of a half century ago. 
 
 "^ Dwight's "Hartford Convention," p. 385, Resolution 3, which says : 
 "The most inviolable secrecy shall be observed by each member of this 
 convention, including the Secretary, as to all propositions, debates, and 
 proceedings thereof, until this injunction shall be suspended or altered." 
 See also, Winsor's "Nar. and Crit. Hist." vol. 7. P- 32i ; Randall's "Jef- 
 ferson," vol. 3, pp. 411-420. 
 
 ^'Winsor's "Nar. and Crit. Hist.," vol. 7, P- 32i ; Schouler, vol. 3. 
 
 P- 473- 
 "Niles' Register, vol. 7, p. 405. Journal of the Convention. 
 
 105 
 
Let us begin our discussion with the assumption that what 
 the most earnest projectors wished for, and really intended, 
 that the Convention should accomplish, was left but half done ; 
 that the most ardent members of the Junto believed that they 
 had promoted a convention which would assemble and im- 
 mediately declare the Union severed and that the Northern 
 Confederacy, toward which they had struggled, would suddenly 
 spring into existence. 
 
 What we propose to do, then, is to show that some of the 
 members of the Junto intended and actually besought many of 
 the members to declare in favor of separation. On the other 
 hand, the delegates, as they assembled, seem to have had in 
 mind a different method of attack, which was not a bold declar- 
 ation of secession, but the withholding of all support and the 
 proposing of such amendments to the Constitution as would 
 make the National Government powerless. They would force 
 amendments to the Constitution by withholding all support 
 from the Administration and in such case the Federalists 
 would again get into power. We must depend upon the Jour- 
 nal of the convention for proof of this last proposition. 
 
 The idea of a New England Convention was not, by any 
 means, a novel one wnth the Junto. The plan was in their minds 
 from 1804 until it actually took place. The first mention of 
 such a convention was, as we have seen, in 1808-9.^^ Otis' ideas 
 were exactly the same as those drafted by the Massachusetts 
 committee, of which he was chairman. The second proposal, 
 if we may believe J. O. Adams and Pickering, was in 1812, 
 immediately after the declaration of war against Great Brit- 
 ain^*' The plan, at this time, was defeated principally by a 
 speech against it in Faneuil Hall, by Samuel Dexter, who for- 
 mally denounced it as a forerunner to the dissolution of the 
 Union. ^^ It remained, therefore, for the third attempt to be 
 successful and that can be said to have been only partially so. 
 
 The stout-hearted Pickering still in Congress, spent much of 
 his time and energy writing letters to urge the Convention on 
 to bolder deeds. "Union," he says, October 21, 1814, "is the 
 talisman of the dominant party ; and many Federalists, en- 
 
 "Quincy's "Life of Quincy," p. 164, Otis to Quincy ; Adams' "New 
 England Federalism," p. 404, Pickering to J. Lowell; Ibid., Adams to 
 Otis, p. 240. 
 
 ^* Adams' "Xew England Federalism," pp. 404-240-262. 
 
 " Plumer's "Plumer," p. 404. 
 
 106 
 
chanted by the magic sound, are alarmed at every appearance* 
 of opposition to the measures of the faction, lest it should en- 
 danger the Union. I have never entertained such fears. On the 
 contrary, in adverting to the ruinous system of our govern- 
 ment for many years past, I have said, let the ship run aground. 
 The shock will throw the present pilots overboard, and then 
 competent navigators will get her afloat and conduct her safely 
 into port."^^ 
 
 Gouverneur Morris seems to have been in some doubt as to 
 what the Convention would do, for we find him writing Picker- 
 ing, November i, 1814, as follows: "Doubts are, I find, enter- 
 tained whether Massachusetts is in earnest, and whether she 
 will be supported by the New England family. But surely 
 these outrageous measures must arovise their patriot sentiment 
 to cast off this horrible load of oppression."^" 
 
 As we have seen all through our narrative, half heartedness 
 on the part of some of New England's leaders, and a lack of the 
 entire confidence of the people, had served to hold in check all 
 but the most radical when it came to a striking point. There 
 was never any want of discussion, but, when it came to point of 
 action, Pickering and the most radical of his Junto were disap- 
 pointed. "I hope in God," he wrote John Lowell, November 
 7, "that the delegates of Massachusetts (a decided majority, at 
 least) may now prove their readiness to act as well as to speak. 
 I consider the destiny of New England, and. in the result, the 
 United States to be placed in the hands of the proposed con- 
 vention. While any symptoms of faint-heartedness will ruin 
 all, the wise sentiments and efficient measures the Convention 
 will be able to express and devise, and the dignified firmness 
 with which they shall be enforced, forbidding every suspicion 
 that they will not be verified in act, will insure the wished for 
 success. The forlorn and destitute condition of the states south 
 of the Potomac, will render your victory easy and complete."'" 
 These two men were perhaps the most active and violent in 
 trying to prepare the minds of the delegates for action. Lowell 
 was one of the most active, influential and radical, writers in 
 New England. His pen was going all the time and scathing 
 indeed were its productions.-^ Lowell was certainly in touch 
 
 '"Lodge's "Cabot," p. 535, Pickering to G. Morris. 
 ""New England Federalism," by Adams, p. 403- 
 "" Ibid., p. 404- 
 ="His "Road to Ruin" is a fair example of this subject. 
 
 107 
 
with the views of the delegates of the Convention. In a letter 
 to Pickering, December 3, 1814, he said: "I am convinced that 
 the Convention will do little ; that they will be ridiculed by one 
 party, and loudly censured by the other. I am convinced that 
 it will not go far enough ; but they ought not to have accepted 
 the position unless they felt, each for himself, that he was 
 ready for great and decided measures. When you ask any of 
 them what the Convention will do you will find that they expect 
 to talk. I say no man should have accepted such an office, if 
 he expected it to end in argument and remonstrance."-- In the 
 last part of this letter Mr. Lowell gives us some idea of the 
 state of mind in which he found many of the delegates. Cabot, 
 the President, first gets his attention in this wise : "Cabot is 
 undoubtedly a wise man but he has no confidence in the possi- 
 bility of awakening the people. He will not, therefore, be in 
 favor of any measures which will disturb our sleep. So at 
 least I fear ; for I cannot find out from him what his opinions 
 are. 
 
 "Otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering — today 
 bold, tomorrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. He is 
 sincere in wishing thorough measures ; but a thousand fears 
 restrain him." 
 
 "Bigelow is bold. He sneers at all threats of vengeance from 
 the other states, and if well supported I have no doubt that 
 measures of dignity and relief would be adopted." 
 
 "Prescott is a firm man, but extremely prudent, and so mod- 
 est that he will yield his opinion to others." 
 
 "Mr. Dane you know. He is a man of great firmness ap- 
 proaching obstinacy, and, of course, it must be uncertain what 
 course he will take." 
 
 "Mr. Wilde is a very able man but I fear his counsels may 
 be influenced by circumstances." 
 
 "These are the men who will have the greatest influence in 
 our delegation. It is to be regretted that we have not chosen 
 two or three such persons as Daniel Sargent, Wm. Sullivan and 
 Colonel Thorndike."-^ 
 
 Ex-Governor Plumer being asked, while the Convention was 
 in session, what in his opinion would be the outcome, gave the 
 
 ^ Adams' "Federalism," p. 410. 
 
 ^ These were men of known radical tendencies and thoroughly con- 
 verted to Juntoism. 
 
 108 
 
following: "You ask what will be the result of the Hartford 
 Convention. I expect no good, but much evil from it. It will 
 embarrass us, aid the enemy, and protect the war. The prime 
 object is to effect a revolution, — a dismemberment of the Union. 
 Some of the members for more than ten years, have considered 
 such a measure necessary. Of this I have conclusive evidence. 
 I think, however, they have too much cunning, mixed with fear, 
 to proceed further, at their first meeting, than to address re- 
 monstrances and resolves to the general government. But the 
 spirit they have excited in the minds of the more violent party 
 will not, I fear, be satisfied with mere words, but will, should 
 the war continue, lead to more violent measures."-* This is an 
 excellent summary, in advance, of the proceedings of the Con- 
 vention. It is by a man who had every opportunity of knowing 
 what he was talking about, having so recently been Governor 
 of New Hampshire. It bears us out in our assumption that the 
 more radical said "separate" while the timid ones said "hesi- 
 tate," but we will not leave it with this. 
 
 Gouverneur Morris has left us many interesting letters upon 
 tihs subject, all of which compare quite favorably with the most 
 violent ones of the time. He says on December 22, that his 
 eyes are fixed on the Star in the East-'^ which he believes to be 
 the day-spring of freedom and glory. "The men assembled 
 will, I believe, if not too tame and timid, be hailed hereafter as 
 the patriots and sages of their day and generation."-*' This gen- 
 tleman was evidently confident that the Convention would not 
 fail to do that which was expected of them. Just before it 
 adjourned we hear him saying: "Yankees like to make what 
 they call fair bargains, and will, I guess, easily take up the 
 notion of bargaining with the National Government, wdiicb, 
 according to my notion, can make no bargain of practical result 
 which will not amount to a severance of the Union."-' 
 
 Nor can it be said that these were the only observers that 
 expected and looked for radical measures from the Convention. 
 The newspapers were just as active and their articles just as 
 vituperative at this time and in this connection as ever before. 
 The Boston Gaaette has the following: "To the cry of dis- 
 
 " Plumer's "Plumer," p. 420. Letter to Jeremiah Mason. 
 
 " Hartford Convention. 
 
 "Sparks "G. Morris," vol. 3, P- 322. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 326. 
 
 109 
 
union, the plain and obvious answer is that the States are 
 already separated ; the bond of union was broken by President 
 Madison. The Convention cannot do a more popular act, not 
 only in New England, but throughout the Atlantic States, than 
 to make a peace for the Government as a whole." The Balti- 
 uiore Federal Republican said, November 17, 1814: "On or be- 
 fore the Fourth of July, if James Madison is not out of office, 
 a new form of government will be in operation in the Eastern 
 section of the Union. Instantly after, the contest will be in 
 many states, whether to join the new government or adhere 
 to the old. . . . Mr. Madison cannot complete his term if the 
 war continues." 
 
 These letters-^ are the only trustworthy sources to show that 
 separation was expected of the convention by the promoters. 
 How many more of the same strain President Cabot may have 
 torn up, one can only conjecture. -° If we keep in mind that the 
 Hartford Convention was as much a product of the conspiracy 
 of 1803-5, ^s it was of the War of 1812, it will be much easier 
 to satisfy our minds as to the real intent of this convention. 
 By looking carefully at the attitude of the Essex Junto, toward 
 all National Republican legislation, throughout this period it 
 is not difficult to see that the Hartford Convention was the 
 culmination of Juntoism, — the crowning act of the conspiracy. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the journal left us 
 by Mr. Cabot, which contains the greater part of the informa- 
 tion that we have of what occurred behind the closed doors at 
 Hartford. And by an analysis of this journal we must support 
 our second thesis, namely that the less radical believed that the 
 administration could be starved and frightened into terms with- 
 out openly declaring for separation. It was, they believed, at 
 any rate, worth trying. 
 
 The views of the most radical first claimed the attention of 
 the convention, and a discussion of the two positions ensued.^" 
 
 '^ Many other letters of the same nature and by many different per- 
 sons can be found in Adams' "New England Federalism," pp. 398-421 ; 
 Sparks "Life of G. Morris," vol. 3, pp. 310-321; and Lodge's "Life of 
 Cabot," pp. 529-550. 
 
 ^ Lodge says in his "Life of Cabot" that he (Cabot) destroyed his 
 correspondence in his last days . 
 
 ^ A complete copy of the journal is printed in Niles' Register, vol. 
 7. P- 305. There are also several copies of it in a single bound volume 
 in Harvard library, entitled, "Hartford Convention of 1814." We will 
 refer to the copy in Niles' Register. 
 
 no 
 
"There are those," it says, "who regard the evils which sur- 
 round them incurable defects of the Constitution. They yield 
 to a persuasion, that no change, at any time, or on any occasion, 
 can aggravate the misery of their country. This opinion may 
 ultimately prove to be correct. But as the evidence on which 
 it rests is not yet conclusive, and as measures adopted upon the 
 assumption of its certainty might be irrevocable, some general 
 considerations are submitted, in the hope of reconciling all to 
 a course of moderation and firmness which may save them from 
 the regret incident to sudden decisions, probably avert the evil, 
 or at least, insure consolation and success in the last resort. "'^^ 
 This is an excellent statement of the two opinions regarding 
 the situation as the Convention assembled ; the more conser- 
 vative offering an apology to the more radical for not quite 
 agreeing with them, and at the same time, setting forth what 
 they regard to be the wisest policy and duty of the Convention, 
 which is virtually our second thesis. 
 
 Following the statement of the two positions, the Conven- 
 tion goes into a discussion of the disgraceful administration. 
 "The fierce passions which have convulsed the Nations of 
 Europe," they said, "have passed the ocean, and finding their 
 way to the bosoms of our citizens, have afforded the adminis- 
 tration the means of preverting public opinion, in respect to 
 our foreign relations, so as to acquire its aid in the indulgence 
 of their adherents.'- They must be made to feel that the 
 Eastern States cannot be made exclusive victims of a capricious 
 and impassioned policy." ^^ But, finally, they agree: "If the 
 Union be destined to dissolution, by reason of the multiplied 
 abuses of a bad administration, it should, if possible, be the 
 work of peaceful times. Events may prove that the causes of 
 our calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found 
 to proceed, not merely from the blindness of prejudice, pride 
 of opinion, violence of party spirit, but they may be traced 
 to combinations of individuals, or of States, to monopolize 
 power and office, and to trample upon the rights and interests 
 of the commercial section of the Union. Then separation will 
 be preferable to an alliance." '"'^ 
 
 ^^Niles' Register, vol. 7, p. 306. 
 
 "^The long nursed cry of French aid and British oppression. 
 
 ^ Xiles' ^Register, vol. 7, 306. 
 
 ''Ibid. 
 
The journal next leads us into a detailed presentation and 
 discussion of their grievances in connection with the war. 
 We cannot take up the discussion upon these various subjects 
 but must content ourselves with the conclusion, which will af- 
 ford a key to the discussion. 
 
 They declared the war measures ^" unconstitutional and 
 absolutely void, which was followed by a bold statement of 
 "State Interposition." We have already noticed the force of 
 this declaration in connection with Louisiana's application for 
 statehood, but we will quote it again as it belongs in this 
 connection, and is the strongest declaration of "State Sov- 
 ereignty" yet made. "In case," it says, "of deliberate, danger- 
 ous and palpable infractions of the Constitution, affecting the 
 sovereignty of a state, and liberties of a people ; it is not only 
 the right but the duty of such state, to interpose its authority 
 for their protection, in a manner best calculated to secure that 
 end. When emergencies occur, which are either beyond the 
 reach of the judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit of 
 the delay incident to their forms, states, which have no com- 
 mon empire must be their own judges, and execute their own 
 decisions. It will thus be proper for the several states to 
 await the ultimate disposal of the obnoxious measures recom- 
 mended by the administration and use their power according 
 to the character these measures shall finally assume, to protect 
 their sovereignty." ^^ The whole journal is nothing but a 
 states rights document, but these few lines must serve as an 
 example of the ideas of the convention upon that doctrine. 
 
 The next step in their discussion is perhaps the most im- 
 portant of all to our narrative, for it furnishes indisputable 
 evidence to almost all of the positions we have taken in re- 
 gard to what New England called ruinous legislation, and to 
 the foundations upon which the Junto has labored. The con- 
 vention furnishes us this valuable evidence by comparing the 
 administration of Washington to that of Jefferson and of 
 Madison.^^ The former administration had been nothing but 
 prosperity at home and respect abroad, while the succeeding 
 administrations by a change of policy simply tore down the 
 wise framework of the Washington Administration. 
 
 ■^Direct taxation; conscription; National control of state militia; re- 
 fusal to pay State militia; offensive warfare, etc. 
 ^ Niles' Register, vol. 7, p. 308. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 310. 
 
 112 
 
The reasons for the absolute failure of the latter two ad- 
 ministrations, as enumerated in the journal of the Hartford 
 Convention, are as follows: "i. A deliberate and extensive 
 system for effecting a combination among certain states so as 
 to secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union the 
 control of public affairs in perpetual succession. 
 
 2. The exclusion from office men of unexceptional merit, 
 for want of adherence to the executive creed. 
 
 3. The infraction of the judiciary authority and rights, by 
 depriving judges of their offices in violation of the Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 4. The influence of patronage in the distribution of offices, 
 which in these states has been among men the least entitled 
 to such distinction. 
 
 5. The admission of new states into the Union, formed at 
 pleasure, in the Western region, has destroyed that balance of 
 power which originally existed between the states, and deeply 
 effected their interests. 
 
 6- The easy admission of naturalized foreigners to places 
 of trust in the government. 
 
 7. Hostility to Great Britain and partiality to the late gov- 
 ernment of France. 
 
 8. A superficial theory in regard to commerce, accompanied 
 by a real hatred to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance 
 in efforts to render it an instrument of coercion and war."^'^ 
 
 Now perhaps we can safely say that the Hartford Conven- 
 tion was simply the crowning act of the Essex Junto whose 
 intrigues began with the Adams Administration. The Con- 
 vention was not a mere product of the war of 1812, because 
 we recognize in these grievances the very earliest, as well as 
 the latest, grounds for Junto conspiracies. Pick them to pieces 
 and what do we find ? The Virginia rule, removal of dissenting^ 
 spirits, fate of the midnight judges. New England Federalists 
 not getting their share of appointments, territorial expansion 
 and a destruction of the balance of power, Alien Law not rigid 
 enough, hostility to Great Britain, and a deliberate destruction 
 of commerce. In all of these we have heard the complaining 
 and threatening voices of the "Essex Junto," and it seems 
 almost superfluous to add that the Hartford Convention was 
 truly an offspring of Juntoism. 
 
 **Niles' Register, vol. 7, p. 310- 
 
 113 
 
Out of the above quoted grievances they proceed to develop 
 the seven famous amendments, which were carefully prepared 
 but destined never to be removed from the journal. We will 
 not quote these amendments because they simply cover the 
 points we have just considered and can be easily found in the 
 above reference to the journal of the Convention. Some of 
 them, however, are very interesting because they are so sweep- 
 ing. The sixth says, for example: "No person who shall 
 hereafter be naturalized shall hold any office under the auth- 
 ority of the United States." They despair, of course, of ever 
 importing another such mind as Hamilton's or Gallatin's. The 
 seventh declares: "No person shall be elected to the presidency 
 of the United States a second time ; nor shall the President be 
 elected from the same state two terms in succession." 
 
 With this much accomplished, there seemed nothing more 
 to be added, except a few well chosen recommendations to 
 their respective states. They are in part :, "We, your delegates 
 assembled, do hereby recommend that you adopt all such meas- 
 ures as may be thought necessary to protect the citizens of said 
 states from the operation and effects of all acts which have 
 been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States ; 
 that a certain proportion of the taxes be collected and placed 
 in the State Treasuries to be used for the support of the 
 militia which shall be under the command of the Governor ; 
 that said troops be armed, equipped, disciplined, and held in 
 readiness for service and upon orders from the Governor shall 
 form a conjunction with the militia of any of the other states 
 to repeal any invasion." ^^ 
 
 But it was further resolved: "That if these resolutions to the 
 National Government ■*" should be unsuccessful, and peace 
 should not be concluded and the defense of these be further 
 neglected, it will, in the opinion of this Convention, be ex- 
 pedient for the legislatures of the several states to appoint 
 delegates to another convention, to meet at Boston in the State 
 of Massachusetts, on the third Thursday of June next, with 
 such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so 
 momentous may require." 
 
 Resolved further, "That the Hon. George Cabot, the Hon. 
 
 ''Niles' Register, vol. 7, p. 312. 
 
 ^''The entire report was to be presented to the authorities at 
 Washington. 
 
 114 
 
Chauncey Goodrich and the Hon. Daniel Lyman, or any two of 
 them, be authorized to call another convention at any time be- 
 fore new delegates shall be chosen, if in their judgment the 
 situation of the country demands it." *^ 
 
 With these expressions of their feelings and desires the 
 Hartford Convention merely adjourned to meet again if the 
 National Government failed favorably to meet their advances. 
 It was not dissolved as a mass meeting with a full report, but 
 an adjournment to a later day for the purpose of ascertaining 
 what action the Government would take concerning their re- 
 port. Do they not leave this impression? If our present 
 report is not effective in relieving the situation, we will meet 
 "on the third Thursday of June next" and follow the wishes 
 of the more radical by voting secession. \\'hat would have 
 been done, however, can only be a matter of conjecture. We 
 regret that the evidence available does not give some idea of 
 the debate which took place in the Convention. There must 
 have been dissenting voices ; there must have been resolutions 
 and amendments ; some must have been more radical than 
 others ; there must have been heated speeches ; but upon these 
 points we must remain ignorant. ]\Ir. Cabot stated over his 
 signature, November i6, 1819, that this was the original and 
 only journal of the proceedings of the Hartford Convention, 
 and we should dislike to be accused of even attempting to 
 impeach the testimony of the President of the Hartford Con- 
 vention. *^ 
 
 The apparent timidity of the Convention provoked some 
 very ironic statements from the Junto members who remained 
 at home. This for example : Gouverneur Morris wrote ^loss 
 Kent, January 10 "The meekness of their doings reminds me 
 of one of La Fontain's fables. A council of rats being con- 
 voked, to devise measures of defense against feline de- 
 predations, a sleek young member was much applauded for 
 proposing to tie a bell around puss's neck, which giving sea- 
 sonable notice of her approach, would enable every one to take 
 care of himself. Before the question w^as put, an old rat 
 (addressing the chair) said, T too. Sir, entirely approve of our 
 young friend's proposal, but wish, before I vote, to know who 
 will tie on the bell." '' 
 
 "Xiles' Register, vol. 7, P- 3^3- 
 "^Dwight's "Hartford Convention," p. 399. 
 ^ Sparks "G. Morris," vol. 3, P- 326. 
 
 115 
 
The legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut** ac- 
 cepted the report of their delegates in January, 1815, and 
 appointed a commission to proceed to Washington to make 
 proposed demands upon the National Government. The mem- 
 bers of this body from Massachusetts were H. G. Otis, Wm. 
 Sullivan and Thomas Perkins ; those from Connecticut, Calvin 
 Goddard and Nathaniel Terry.*' 
 
 While the Hartford Convention was in session deliberating 
 how to create more discontent and strife, there was also a 
 meeting at Ghent whose members were exerting every effort 
 to effect a peace. What a different atmosphere must have en- 
 veloped the two Conventions ! On December 24, 1814 the 
 peace of Ghent was completed. This being the day before 
 Christmas the natives of Ghent entertained their distinguished 
 guests at a public dinner where the band played "God save 
 the King" and "Hail Columbia." Some days later the Hart- 
 ford Convention adjourned, amid shouts and hisses from all 
 loyal citizens. Stigmatized for unpatriotic motives and con- 
 duct, the twenty-six members of the Convention remained 
 condemned to political infamy. 
 
 The tidings from Ghent reached Washington before those 
 from Hartford and the news of the peace of Ghent and the 
 victory of New Orleans successively sped over the land. Here 
 was a sudden turn of affairs! The "Northern Confederacy" 
 bubble burst and the "Essex Junto" and its cohorts dwindled 
 into a handful of malcontents, who could be easily put down 
 by the people of their own states. Derision succeeded indig- 
 nation in the public mind. Henry Wheaton advertised a re- 
 ward in his paper (The Nciv York National Advocate) for 
 the discovery of some unfortunate gentlemen who had started 
 for Washington in the service of the Hartford Convention, 
 but who had missed their way, and it was feared had drowned 
 themselves. 
 
 The committee from Hartford neither displayed their cred- 
 entials to the President nor delivered their ultimatum to the 
 Government, but took an early opportunity to quietly return 
 home. The Hartford Convention remains famous in American 
 History only as a powerful solvent in National politics. 
 
 The War of 1812 marks the end of the "Essex Junto" and 
 
 ** Niles' Register, vol. 7, pp. 372-373- 
 *° Randall's "Jefferson," vol. 3, p. 4i5- 
 
 116 
 
also the Federalist party. The party could not survive the 
 factious opposition to the war. It could not stand the op- 
 probrium of the Hartford Convention. Many of the Fed- 
 eralist leaders had given their support to that most unpopular 
 gathering, while many others, as we have seen, felt that the 
 Hartford assembly should have adopted even more effectual 
 measures of opposition. The party could not remove the 
 public conviction that its little conclave of leaders had been 
 secretly plotting treason and disunion- Only thirty-four Fed- 
 eralist electors voted for Rufus King for President in 1816. 
 It held only Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware, with 
 three Maryland electors who would not vote. The scattered 
 Federalists in Congress did not act as a party, having no issue 
 even as a pretense, and, as a National party, it ceased to exist. 
 State-wise, it controlled Connecticut till after 1820, and Mass- 
 achusetts till 1823, when the Republicans swept even Essex 
 County from the "Junto." It lingered also in Maryland, 
 Delaware, and North Carolina for some time. These were 
 the last surviving remnants of the party of Washington and 
 Hamilton, ?nd the votes were the party's last expiring act. 
 
 The country now enters into the ''Administration of Peace" 
 having realized, with the exception af a few dissenting voices, 
 that, "We are all Federalists, we are all Republicans." 
 
 117 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 A. The Primary Sources consist of letters (public and 
 private), documents written by the Junto members themselves 
 or by others who had fallen under their influence. In this 
 class we must include a great many books valuable only for a 
 few printed letters. 
 
 1. The "Pickering Manuscripts," consisting of about twenty- 
 three volumes and including Pickering's whole correspondence 
 during this period. These papers are in the Boston Historical 
 Society, Boston, Mass., and are indexed and ready for publica- 
 tion. They have been searched by a number of writers wishing 
 to defend their friends and for this reason almost all of the 
 letters if importance to our monograph have been published in 
 one place or another. 
 
 2. Henry Adams, "Documents relating to New England 
 Federalism," in a single volume 1800-1815. This work was 
 prepared largely in defense of the position taken by J. Q- 
 Adams in connection with the Junto. It contains a very large 
 number of letters together with the entire controversy between 
 J. Q. Adams and the New England Federalists of 1828. 
 
 3. H. C. Lodge's "Life and Letters of Geo. Cabot," contains 
 a large number of valuable letters covering the same period 
 and printed to vindicate Cabot in his connection with the 
 Junto. These two volumes contain almost all of the im- 
 portant letters in the Pickering Papers from 1803 to 1809. 
 
 4. Theophilus Parsons, "Memoirs of Chief Justice Par- 
 sons," has the earliest and most valuable account of the Essex 
 Junto." It is valuable only in our introduction as giving 
 documents showing the origin of the name. It has an ex- 
 cellent appendix in which is printed the "Essex Result" which 
 has been referred to as being the basis for the term "Essex 
 Junto." 
 
 5. "The Works of Alexander Hamilton," by John C. Ham- 
 ilton, vols. 6 and 7, furnish much of the correspondence be- 
 tween Hamilton and the Junto members in John Adams' 
 Cabinet, and in vol. 7, is printed Hamilton's "Public Denun- 
 ciation of John Adams." 
 
 As important in this connection, see the "Works of John 
 Adams," by Chas. F. Adams, vol. 9, and the "Memoirs of the 
 Administrations of Washington and John Adams," by Geo. 
 Gibbs, vol. 2. These two volumes throw considerable light 
 
 118 
 
upon the controversy between Adams and the Junto regarding 
 the X. Y. Z. affair. 
 
 6. "History of the Repubhc of the United States," by John 
 C. Hamilton, vols. 5 and 7. \'olume 7 is a very important 
 source especially in connection with the Burr conspiracy of 
 1800-1801. Alany of the letters addressed to Alexander 
 Hamilton are printed in this volume. Volume 5 is important 
 only in regard to the Jay appointment to the court of Great 
 Britain by Washington. 
 
 7- "The Life of \Vm. Plumer," by his son, in a single 
 volume, has a number of letters and quotations from Plumer's 
 diary of great value to this work. 
 
 8. "Life of Thomas Jefferson." by Henry S. Randall, vols. 
 2 and 3. \'olume 3 is of the most importance having an appen- 
 dix of very great value. In this appendix there are copious 
 quotations from Plumer's diary besides other documents. 
 Both of these volumes have valuable footnotes. 
 
 9. "The Life and Writings of Gouverneur Morris," by 
 Jared Sparks, vol. 3 ; "The Life and Correspondence of Rufus 
 King," by C. R. King, vol. 5, 1807-1816; "The Life of Josiah 
 Ouincy," by Edmund Ouincy, in a single volume ; "The Life 
 of Albert Gallatin," by Henry Adams, in a single volume ; and 
 "The Life and Works of Fisher Ames." vol. i, by Seth Ames. 
 aU have a few^ documents of value. "The Lives of King and 
 Morris are of most importance. 
 
 / 10. "The American State Papers, For. Rel," vol. 3." we 
 have all the documents concerning the Henry Mission, and 
 much of the correspondence between England and America 
 prior to the War of 1812. 
 
 11. "Niles' Register," vols. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 35, is our 
 most valuable source in furnishing State documents. It has 
 supplied much of the information regarding the action and 
 attiude of New England during the War of 1812, and the 
 Hartford Convention. Volume 2, contains the documents 
 connected with the Henry Mission agreeing with those in the 
 Am. State Papers, vol. 3. \'olume 7, is of votal importance 
 and contains a copy of the journal of the Hartford Con- 
 vention. 
 
 12. "Annals of Congress," Nos. 13, 22, 23. and 24, cover- 
 ing the years 1803-1804, and 1810-1812 furnish testimony as 
 to the position taken by members of the Junto on such ques- 
 tions as, "The Louisiana Purchase," the admission of Louis- 
 iana to Statehood, and No. 23, part one, 12th, Cong, has the 
 House investigation and report on the Henry Papers. Vol- 
 ume I, No. 25, not included above, contains the House debate 
 on the "Blue Lights" affair- 
 
 To the above sources we w^ould add the following, all of 
 which are in the Harvard Library, Cambridge, Mass.. "The 
 
 119 
 
Crisis, or Origin of our Political Dissensions," a single pam- 
 phlet, by a Vermont Citizen. 
 
 "Pickering's Public Letter to Governor Sullivan and Re- 
 marks," in a single pamphlet, 1808. 
 
 "Memoirs of Aaron Burr," by M. L. Davis, 2 vols., con- 
 taining some important letters. 
 
 "A View of the Political Conduct of Aaron Burr, Esq., Vice 
 President," by John Wood. Perhaps as good a view of 
 Burr's conduct as can be found. 
 
 The Examiner, containing political essays and official doc- 
 uments. Edited by Barent Gardiner. It includes the fifteen 
 articles entitled, "Road to Ruin," by John Lowell. 
 
 "Hartford Convention," a single bound volume containing 
 several copies of the journal of the Convention. 
 
 "Political Tracts on the War of 1812," several volumes, in- 
 cluding many speeches and addresses characteristic of the 
 time and of the Junto. 
 
 "Political Tracts of 1812-1815." 
 
 "Political Pamphlets, 1800-1812." These political pam- 
 phlets and tracts are valuable as giving local coloring and 
 views of the extremists- 
 
 "Political Tracts 1805-1812." In this volume one can find 
 the decision of the several Justices of the Supreme Court of 
 Massachusetts upon the questions submitted by Governor 
 Strong regarding the management of State Militia. 
 
 "Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames," vol. 8-12, in the Mass. 
 Hist. Society, Boston, Mass. Dr. Ames was a Republican 
 in sympathy and a brother of Fisher Ames a Junto member. 
 He makes most biting remarks upon Juntoism. 
 
 B. The Secondary Sources are of little importance to this 
 subject. All that are of any value will be given in the fol- 
 lowing order : 
 
 1. Newspapers. 
 
 2. General Histories of the United States. 
 
 3. Histories on Special Topics- 
 
 4. Miscellaneous. 
 
 I. NEWSPAPERS 
 
 The papers which will be mentioned cover pretty fairly the 
 period from 1800 to 1814. The files are not complete in the 
 case of some of them, nor do they all run through the entire 
 period, but those given below are sufficient to give us the local 
 attitude. Files of all the following papers can be found in the 
 Harvard Library and in The Mass. Hist. Society. 
 
 1. Boston Gazette, 1800-1814. 
 
 2. The Boston Centinel, 1800- 18 14. 
 
3 
 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 II 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 14 
 
 The Democrat, Boston, i8o8. 
 
 The Statesman, Boston, i\ 
 
 The Connecticut Courant, Hartford, 1800-1801. 
 
 The New York Gazette, New York, 1 800-1 801. 
 
 The Columbian Detector, Boston, 1808. 
 
 The Boston Daily Advertiser, 1814. 
 
 The Essex Register, Salem, Mass. 1808. 
 
 The Pittsficld Sun, Pittsfield, Mass. 
 
 The Eastern Argus, Portland, Mass. 1804. 
 
 The Republican Spy, Springfield, Mass. 
 
 The American Mercury, New York, 1803. 
 
 The Morning Chronicle, New York, 1804. 
 
 I have given the year of the particular paper as quoted 
 from. It is not necessary to criticise them individually be- 
 cause they are all very much alike and simply voice the 
 sentiments of the Junto, in regard to our subject. 
 
 2. HISTORIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 1. Schoulers "History of the United States," vols. 2 and 3. 
 is the most valuable general history touching the Essex Junto." 
 The references and statements in this history are accurate and 
 helpful. 
 
 2. Von Hoist's "Constitutional History of the United 
 States," vol- i, has some valuable notes and references, other- 
 wise it is practically of no importance to our narrative. 
 
 3. Hildreth's "History of the United States," vol. 3; Mc- 
 Master's, "History of the people of the United States," vol. i ; 
 and Henry Adams, "History of the United States," vol. 5 and 
 6, treat very sparely the Junto movement and are of little 
 practical value. Pitkin, Bartlett, Spencer, Bryant and Gay, 
 Hart's American Nation Series, etc., merely mention the Es- 
 sex Junto." 
 
 3. HISTORIES ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS 
 
 1. B. J. Lossing's "Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 
 1812," in a single volume, is quite a valuable source for its 
 treatment of the war finances and the Federalist attempts to 
 crush the banks supporting the war. 
 
 2. Samuel Perkins, "History of the Political and Military 
 Events of the Late War," in a single volume, gives an excel- 
 lent review of our grievances with Great Britain at the open- 
 ing of hostilities, and the attitude with which the Federal 
 Peace men met the declaration of war. 
 
 3. J. G. Palfrey's "History of New England." vol. 2, has 
 only a few suggestions for us at the beginning of our work. 
 I have been unable to find any history of New England, or 
 of any one of the New England States, of any value in treat- 
 mg this subject. 
 
 4. J. D. Hammond's "History of Political Parties in the 
 
State of New York/' vol. i, is only valuable as giving results 
 of local elections, etc. 
 
 5. E. P. Powell's "Nullification and Secession in the United 
 States," in a single volume, has a chapter on the "Northern 
 Confederacy Plot 1803-1804." It is of little value in either 
 treating or studying this particular phase because he does not 
 refer to a single source. His chapter is fairly accurate, how- 
 ever, if one cares only for its face value. It has not been 
 used in this work to any speakable extent, only one or two 
 references. 
 
 6. Theodore Dwight's "History of the Hartford Conven- 
 tion ; with a Review of the Policy of the United States Gov- 
 ernment which led to the War of 1812," in a single volume, 
 has rather successfully defeated its purpose; that is to say 
 a defense of the members of the Hartford Convention, based 
 entirely upon Junto grievances will scarcely satisfy us that 
 their conduct was honorable. The journal is the only help 
 it contains- 
 
 4. MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 1. The A]ncrican Hist. Rev., vol. i, October 1895 to July 
 1896, has an article entitled : "The First National Nominating 
 Convention." It treats the secret convention of 181 2, as 
 the first convention of the Federalists, and is the only available 
 treatment of the subject. It is critical and has a number of 
 valuable references. By J. S. Murdock. 
 
 2. The American Hist. Rev., of July 1912, has a similar 
 article by S. E. Morrison, entitled: "The first National 
 Nominating Convention, 1808." This man has a better claim 
 to his position and proves that Mr- J. S. Murdock was exactly 
 four years out of date. This article is of much greater value 
 than the one above for the same reasons. 
 
 3. "Perpetual War, The Policy of Mr. Madison," by a New 
 England farmer. This pamphlet being an examination of 
 his late message to Congress as far as respects the following 
 topics : Conscript militia, pretended negotiations for peace, 
 etc." 
 
 4. "The Olive Branch, or Faults on Both Sides," by M. 
 Carey. This little volume, although very radical, is of great 
 value to our chapter on the war of 1812. It quotes correctly 
 from many sources and is of the greatest importance on the 
 financial side of the War. 
 
 5. "Mass. Hist. Collections," seventh series, vol. i, Jeffer- 
 son papers. 
 
 6. "American Politics." by A. Johnston, single volume. 
 
 7. "Political Parties and Party Problems in the United 
 States," by J. A. Woodburn, single volume. 
 
 8. "Political Men of the Revolution," in a single volume, 
 bv Wm. Sullivan. 
 
9. "Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public 
 Events from the Peace of 1783 to the Peace of 1815," in a 
 single volume, by Wm. Sullivan. 
 
 10. "Ann. Report of the Am. Hist. Asso., 1897." 
 
 11. "Ann. Rept. of the Am. Hist. Asso., 1899," vol. 2. 
 
 J 
 
 123 
 

 
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