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ADVANCE/RETREAT 
 
 PERSONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
 United States:^Confederate States 
 
 ARMIES. 
 
 ]. B, HOOD, 
 
 Lieutenant- General in the Confederate Army, 
 
 PUBLISHED FOR THE 
 
 HOOD ORPHAN MEMORIAL FUND. 
 
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, 
 
 NEW ORLEANS, LA 
 1880. 
 
 (i JSo, IS fl I A 
 
COPYRIGHT SECURED. 
 
 aO 
 
 PRESS OF 
 
 BORK t m'feTRIDGE, 
 
 304 CHESTNUT ST. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER. PAGB. 
 
 I, — United States Army — California and Texas — Con- 
 federate States Army — Virginia — Yorktown — 
 Eltham's Landing — Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, 5 
 
 II. — Confederate States Army — Virginia — Gaines's Mills, 
 or First Cold Harbor — Malvern Hill — Second 
 Manassas — Boonsboro' Gap — And Sharpsburg, or 
 Antietam, 24 
 
 III. — Confederate States Army — Virginia — Fredericks- 
 burg — Suffolk — Gettysburg — And Chickamauga, 48 
 
 IV. — Reply to General Johnston — Effective Strength 
 AND Losses — Army of Tennessee — Dalton to At- 
 lanta, 69 
 
 V. — Reply to General Johnston — Transfer from the 
 Virginia to the Western Army — Dalton — Re- 
 SACA — Adairsville — And Cassville, . . .89 
 
 VI. — Reply to General Johnston — Cassville, . . .110 
 
 VII. — Reply to General Johnston— New Hope Church — 
 Kennesaw Mountain— Retreat across the Chat- 
 tahoochee — Johnston Relieved from Command, 117 
 
 VIII. — Reply to General Johnston — Handling of Troops — 
 Lee and Jackson School versus The Johnston 
 School— Johnston's Plan to hold Atlanta " for- 
 ever," '-9 
 
 (3) 
 
4 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER. PAGB 
 
 IX. — Reply to General Johnston — His Intention to Aban- 
 don Atlanta — Evacuation of Richmond Contem- 
 plated IN 1862 — Attempt to Court Martial, . 150 
 
 X. — Siege of Atlanta — Difficulties of the Situation — 
 
 Battle of the 2oth of July, 161 
 
 XI. — Siege of Atlanta — Battle 22D of July — Hardee — 
 
 General Frank Blair's Letter, . . . .173 
 
 XII. — Siege of Atlanta— Engagement of the 28th of July — 
 Wheeler, I verson and Jackson — Battle of Jones- 
 BORo' — Evacuation of Atlanta, . . . .193 
 
 Xlli. — Atlanta Untenable — Losses during the Siege com- 
 pared with those of Sherman, and with those 
 of Johnston from Dalton to Atlanta, . .211 
 
 XIV. — Correspondence with Sherman — Citations on the 
 
 Rules of War, 229 
 
 XV. — Campaign TO the Alabama Line — Preparations — Presi- 
 dent Davis Visits the Army — Hardee relieved 
 — Allatoona — Resaca — Dalton — Lafayette — 
 Sudden Determination to Enter Tennessee — 
 Gadsden — Beauregard, 243 
 
 XVI. — Tennessee Campaign — Forrest — Wheeler — Deflec- 
 tion TO Florence — Detention — President Davis 
 — Beauregard — Columbia — Spring Hill, . . 270 
 
 XVII. — Tennessee Campaign — Franklin — Nashville — Re- 
 treat — Tupelo — Return to Richmond — Surren- 
 der AT Natchez, Mississippi, 292 
 
 XVIII. — Rashness — ^Johnston — Fabius — SciPio, . . . .312 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Official Reports — Letter to Honorable J, A. Seddon, Sec- 
 retary OF War, 317 
 
ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 UNITED STATES ARMY CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS CONFEDERATE 
 
 STATES ARMY VIRGINIA, YORKTOWN, ELTHAM's LANDING, 
 
 SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS. 
 
 I RECEIVED at the age of seventeen an appointment as Cadet 
 at West Point through my maternal uncle, Judge French, who 
 was then in Congress. I fancied a miHtary hfe, although it 
 was not my father's choice. He occupied a high position in 
 the medical world, and preferred I should adopt his profession; 
 he offered me every inducement — even the privilege of com- 
 pleting my studies in Europe, I, nevertheless, adhered to my 
 decision. Doubtless I had inherited this predilection from 
 my grandfathers, who were soldiers under Washington. They 
 were of English origin ; had settled at an early period in Vir- 
 ginia, and after taking an active part in the War of Indepen- 
 dence, emigrated to Kentucky, " the dark and bloody ground," 
 where they lived in constant warfare with the Indians. One 
 of them was married in the Fort of Boonsboro',the first forti- 
 fication constructed in that State, the land of my nativity. 
 
 I entered the Military Academy in 1849, ^^^ graduated in 
 the Class of Sheridan, McPherson and Schofield, in 1853, when 
 I was appointed Brevet Second Lieutenant in the Fourth 
 
 (5) 
 
6 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Infantry. I sailed from New York in November of that year 
 to join my regiment in California, via Panama. On my 
 arrival at San Francisco — at that time a small city built upon 
 sandhills and flats, and distinguished for its foggy atmosphere — 
 I, together with one of my classmates, deemed it but proper 
 that officers of the United States Army should go to the hotel 
 in a carriage ; but to our astonishment, on hailing a driver, we 
 found the charge to be twenty dollars in gold. This aspect 
 of affairs — our pay being only about sixty dollars a month — 
 compelled us to hold consultation with our brother officers 
 and to adopt the only alternativ^e : to proceed on foot to what- 
 ever quarters we desired to occupy. 
 
 After having been stationed a short period at Benicia Bar- 
 racks, I was directed to report for duty to Captain Judah at 
 Fort Jones, Scott's Valley, in the northern portion of California. 
 Colonel Buchanan was in command of my regiment, with Cap- 
 tain U. S. Grant as Quarter Master. It was at this post I 
 formed a warm attachment to Lieutenant George Crook, now 
 Brigadier General in the Army, and who has so signally dis- 
 tinguished himself as an Indian fighter. Although he com- 
 pleted his course at West Point a year before I graduated, his 
 purse was not much longer than my own ; it became therefore 
 necessary for us to devise some plan to get along in this 
 country of gold and extravagance. We concluded to asso- 
 ciate ourselves with Doctor Sorrell and Lieutenant Bonny- 
 castle in the organization of a mess, and, as we were fond of 
 hunting and game was plentiful, to supply our own table with 
 every variety thereof and to send the surplus to market for 
 sale. This financial policy worked admirably, and since I had 
 at the age of fifteen, during the absence of my father in Phila- 
 delphia, taken charge of his farm for one year with consider- 
 able success, Crook and I were led to secure land and sow a 
 large crop of wheat. Just before the harvest, however, I was 
 ordered in command of a detachment of Dragoons to serve as 
 escort to Lieutenant Williamson of the Topographical Engi- 
 neers, upon a surveying expedition in the direction of Salt 
 
UNITED STATES ARMY— CALIFORNIA. 7 
 
 Lake. My duties were soon brought to a close by the receipt 
 of an appointment as Second Lieutenant in the Second Cavalry, 
 a new regiment organized in accord with an Act of Congress, 
 in 1855, and commanded by Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, 
 with R. E. Lee as Lieutenant Colonel, George H. Thomas and 
 W. J. Hardee as Majors. Lieutenant Philip Sheridan relieved 
 me, and I returned to San Francisco en route to Jefferson Bar- 
 racks, Missouri, the rendezvous of the regiment. At the 
 former place I met, for the first time, in his bank, W. T. Sher- 
 man, who possessed as at present the same piercing eye and 
 nervous impulsive temperament. Little indeed did I anticipate 
 at that period the great theatre of life upon which I was destined 
 so soon to be thrown as an humble actor with him and others 
 just mentioned, and who have since become so distinguished 
 and prominent as American soldiers. 
 
 In the early Autumn of 1855 I sailed from San Francisco for 
 New York, via Panama, and reported for duty at Jefferson 
 Barracks, Missouri. Soon thereafter, if my memory betray me 
 not, I received a draft for about one thousand dollars in gold, 
 as my share of the profit in the wheat crop cared for by Lieu- 
 tenant Crook and myself In November I marched with my 
 regiment to Fort Belknap, Texas, which place we reached 
 about the middle of December. Shortly afterward. Camp 
 Cooper was established on the Clear Fork of the Brazos. 
 Major George H. Thomas was placed in command till the 
 arrival of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Lee, to whom I had become 
 very much attached at West Point where he was Superinten- 
 dent whilst I was a Cadet. My relations and duties were there- 
 fore most pleasant during my service at Camp Cooper. The 
 Government had under advisement, at this period, the con- 
 struction of a fort in that vicinity; it was Colonel Lee's custom 
 to often ride over the country in search of a suitable location, 
 and to request each day one or more of his officers to accom- 
 pany him, in order to avail himself of their views in regard to 
 the best point at which to establish this military post. Whilst 
 riding with him upon one of these excursions, and enjoying 
 
8 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 the scenery and balmy air as we passed over the high and 
 undulating prairies of that beautiful region, the conversation 
 turned upon matrimony, when he said to me with all the 
 earnestness of a parent : *' Never marry unless you can do 
 so into a family which will enable your children to feel 
 proud of both sides of the house." He perhaps thought 
 I might form an attachment for some of the country lasses, 
 and therefore imparted to me his correct and at the same time 
 aristocratic views in regard to this very important step in life. 
 His uniform kindness to me whilst I was a Cadet, inclined me 
 the more willingly to receive and remember this fatherly 
 advice ; and from these early relations first sprang my aftec- 
 tion and veneration which grew in strength to the end of his 
 eventful career. 
 
 The latter part of that same \ear I was ordered to Fort 
 Mason, situated near the Llano river, about forty miles distant 
 from Fredericksburg. Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston was 
 chief in command until sent to Utah. Although stationed 
 with him but a short time, I became deeply impressed by the 
 exalted character of this extraordinary man. Major George 
 H. Thomas succeeded in authority ; it was during my service 
 as his Acting Adjutant that he specially won my high regard 
 by his manliness and dignity. 
 
 After the lapse of several months, and having grown weary of 
 the routine duties of camp hfe, I determined to change the scene 
 and start on a scouting expedition in search of the red men of 
 the forests. Preparations were accordingly made, and I left Fort 
 Mason on the morning of the 5th of July, 1S57, in command 
 of twent\--five men of Company *' G " Second Cavalrj', with an 
 Indian guide, compass in hand and supplies for thirty days. 
 I passed out upon the plains by the head of the Llano river, 
 and marched thence to the country' bordering on the Concha 
 rivers. After an absence of ten days and an exploration of 
 these different streams. I discovered aii Indian trail, apparently 
 about two or three days old, and indications warranting the 
 belief that fifteen or twentj' ponies belonged to the party 
 
UNITED STATES ARMY— TEXAS. 9 
 
 which was moving' in the direction of Mexico, via the head 
 waters of Devil's river. I was young and buoyant in spirit; 
 my men were well mounted and all eager for a chase as well 
 as a fray. It was soon apparent that we would be forced to 
 pass over a portion of the staked plains or desert lying between 
 the Concha rivers and Mexico; that in order to overtake the 
 Indians we would most likely have great fatigue and privation 
 to endure, as we could expect to find but little water 
 during the pursuit. However, in the conviction that 
 we could live for a short time wherever Indians could 
 subsist, we began the chase on the morning of the 17th 
 of July, marched about forty miles, and camped that night 
 upon the dry plains without water or the sight of game, so 
 frequently in view the previous day, and without even the 
 chirp of a bird to cheer us on our journey, we knew not 
 exactly whither. At early dawn the following morning the 
 march was resumed ; we passed during the day a water-hole 
 utterly unfit for use, and went into bivouac that night with 
 the same surroundings, fully fifty miles further out in the 
 desert. Our canteens were now empty, and the outlook was 
 somewhat dismal. At daybreak on the 19th, "to horse" was 
 sounded and the journey continued. About noon a deer was 
 seen bounding over the prairie, and with the sight went forth 
 a shout of joy from the men, who then felt confident that 
 fresh water was not very far distant. The trail had moreover 
 become much more distinct ; this encouragement, together with 
 the hope of quenching their thirst, reinspirited the soldiers. 
 A few hours later another pool was reached, but not of that 
 purity which was desirable. The odor of the water was such 
 as to oblige one to hold his breath whilst he partook of the 
 distasteful but refreshing draught. The canteens were, not- 
 withstanding, again filled, as well as the sleeves of all the water- 
 proof coats we possessed. The pursuit was continued, and at 
 dark we bivouacked after a forced march of probably sixty 
 miles. Several of the horses began to show, by this time, 
 great fatigue and leg-weariness. The following morning the 
 
10 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 lofty peaks of the mountains near Devil's river could be seen 
 afar off, and all possible speed was made as we recognized that 
 the line between the United States and Mexico was not far 
 distant. About noon we reached another stagnant water-hole 
 near the foot of a range of hills in proximity to the rugged and 
 mountainous country about the head waters of Devil's river, 
 along the banks of which stream passes the stage road from 
 San Antonio to El Paso. Here we discovered that another 
 party of Indians had joined that of which we were in pursuit 
 The deserted camp indicated that there were not less than fifty 
 warriors in number. They had eaten one of their mules 
 or horses, and this sign, together with others about their 
 bivouac, bore clear evidence that the party had become for- 
 midable. The trail from this point was not only much larger, 
 but presented a fresher appearance. The arms of the men 
 were therefore carefully inspected, every preparation made for 
 action, and the chase quickly resumed. The horses were much 
 fatigued, and some of them were scarcely able to keep their 
 places in the line of march ; consequently the pursuit was not as 
 rapid as it had been the three days previous. The march over 
 the hills and up the mountains increased moreover their leg- 
 weariness to such extent that about 3 p. m. I abandoned all 
 hope of overtaking the Indians before they crossed the Rio 
 Grande, which river was then not far distant. This condition 
 of the horses and the thirst of the soldiers led me to the 
 determination to quit the trail and go immediately in search 
 of fresh water. We were at this time well up on the high and 
 rough range of mountains bordering on Devil's river, and after 
 leaving the trail a distance of nigh one mile, I perceived on a 
 parallel range about two miles off a few Indians waving a large 
 white flag apparently hoisted from a mound. Orders from 
 Washington had been issued before I left Fort Mason, notify- 
 ing all United States troops that a party of Tonkaways were 
 expected at the reservation, near Camp Cooper, and that they 
 would, in the ev^ent of meeting a body of our soldiers upon the 
 frontier, raise a white flag, upon which signal they were to be 
 
UNITED STATES ARMY— TEXAS. U 
 
 allowed to pass unmolested. I therefore became convinced 
 that these Indians were either the Tonkaways or a hostile 
 body endeavoring by an infamous ruse to throw me off my 
 guard, to entrap and massacre my entire party. 
 
 Notwithstanding the condition of the men and the horses, 
 I determined to pass over upon the ridge occupied by the red 
 men, move toward them, and ascertain the meaning of this 
 demonstration. I had at this time but seventeen men for 
 action, the remainder having halted in rear, owing to the ina- 
 bility of their horses to advance further without rest. I moved 
 across to the opposite ridge and, as a precautionary measure, 
 formed line and marched forward in readiness to talk or fight. 
 Every man was armed with an Army rifle and a six-shooter; 
 a few of us had sabres and two revolvers, whilst I was armed 
 with a double barrel shot-gun loaded with buck shot, and two 
 Navy six-shooters. As we passed over a mound about one 
 hundred and fifty or two hundred yards distant from the one 
 occupied by friend or foe — we knew not which — the flag, 
 seemingly a sheet, was still waving aloft and a few Indians 
 were lounging about with every appearance of a party desirous 
 of peace. 
 
 The ground in that vicinity was rough and partially cov- 
 ered with a growth of Spanish bayonets which afforded a 
 secure place of concealment. Feeling that in the event of an 
 attack I had better chances of success mounted than dismounted, 
 for the reason that my fighting force in the latter instance would 
 have been lessened by the number of men required to hold 
 and guard the horses in rear, and sharing the belief which 
 generally prevailed in my regiment that twenty well-armed 
 soldiers should be able to successfully engage four times their 
 number of Indians, I continued to move forward slowly upon 
 the immediate right of my line. When we were within about 
 twenty or thirty paces of the mound occupied by the Indians, 
 four or five of them advanced towards us with the flag ; sud- 
 denly they threw it to the ground and fired upon us. Simul- 
 taneously from a large heap of dry grass, weeds and leaves, 
 
12 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 burst forth, in our immediate front, a blaze of fire some thirty- 
 feet in height, and, with a furious yell, the warriors instantly 
 rose up round about us, whilst others charged down the slope 
 in our midst, even seizing some of our horses by the bridle 
 reins. At the same moment a mounted party attacked the left 
 of our line with lances. Thus began a most desperate strug- 
 gle. The warriors were all painted, stripped to the waist, with 
 either horns or wreaths of feathers upon their heads; they 
 bore shields for defence, and were armed with rifles, bows and 
 arrows. The quick and sharp report of our rifles, the smoke 
 and cracking noise of the fire, together with the great odds 
 against us, the shouts of the soldiers and the yells of the 
 Indians, betokened the deadly peril from which seemingly 
 naught but a miracle could effect our deliverance. Each 
 man, after discharging his rifle, drew his revolver and used it 
 with terrible effect as the warriors, in many instances, were 
 within a few feet of the muzzle of our arms. Stubbornly did 
 my brave men hold their ground ; again and again they drove 
 the enemy back to the edge and in rear of the burning mass 
 of weeds in our front, when finally the Indians charged des- 
 perately and forced our line back a few paces in the centre. 
 Having discharged my shot-gun, I rode at once with revolver 
 in hand to that point, rallied the soldiers, who again drove them 
 back, whilst our horses, in some instances, were beaten over 
 the head with shields. The contest was at such close quarters 
 that a warrior bore off a rifle which had been used and hunsf 
 by one of the men upon his saddle. Meantime the Indians as 
 quickly as they discharged their arms, handed them to their 
 squaws, who ran to the rear, reloaded and returned them. At 
 this juncture I was pierced in the left hand with an arrow 
 which passed through the reins and the fourth finger, pinning 
 my hand to the bridle. I instantly broke the spear head and 
 threw it aside. Unmindful of the fact that the feathers could 
 not pass through the wound, I pulled the arrow in the direction 
 in which it had been shot, and was compelled finally in order to 
 free myself of it to seize the feathered in lieu of the barbed end. 
 
UNITED STATES ARMY— TEXAS. 13 
 
 Thus raged this hand to hand conflict until all our shots 
 were expended, and it was found that owing to the restiveness 
 of the horses we could not reload while mounted. We then 
 fell back about fifty yards and dismounted for that purpose. 
 Soon afterward arose from beyond the burning heap one con- 
 tinuous mourning howl, such as can alone come forth from the 
 heart of the red man in deep distress. These sounds of sorrow 
 revealed to me that we were in little danger of a renewal of 
 the assault, and I was, I may in truth say, most thankful for 
 the truce thus proclaimed. Two of our men had been killed 
 and four, besides myself, severely wounded; we had also one 
 horse killed and several disabled. Had the combat been 
 renewed I would have had, after leaving a guard with the 
 horses, but five or six men to fight on foot. 
 
 Nightfall was approaching; the Indians gathered up their 
 dead and wounded, and moved off toward the Rio Grande. 
 Our thirst, which was great at the beginning of the combat, 
 had now become intense from excitement and loss of blood. 
 I therefore moved at once to Devil's river, where we bivou- 
 acked about lo p. m., and sent a messenger to Camp Hudson 
 for supplies and medical aid. 
 
 Thus closed this terrible scene, and often since have I felt 
 most grateful that our horses were so broken down, as but for 
 their condition they would, doubtless, when beaten over the 
 head with shields, have become totally unmanageable, and 
 have caused the massacre of my entire command. I attribute 
 also our escape to the fact that the Indians did not have the 
 self-possession to cut our bridle reins, which act would have 
 proved fatal to us. We were nigh meeting a similar fate to 
 that of the gallant Custer and his noble band. 
 
 I learned after the fight, through other Indians as well as 
 through my guide, that the party which attacked us were 
 Comanches and Lipans. The exact number of their killed 
 we were unable to ascertain, owing chiefly to the cover afforded 
 by the Spanish bayonets, but we were confident at the hour 
 
14 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 that it amounted to not less than nine or ten ; we were equally- 
 certain that four to one were engaged against us. 
 
 Lieutenant Fink came up the following day with a detach- 
 ment of Infantry. Our troops returned to the scene of action 
 and buried the dead, as I had neither pick nor shovel at the 
 time of the encounter. Moreover I could not have delayed 
 thereafter for any purpose, on account of the extreme suffering 
 of the men for want of water. 
 
 After a respite of a few days I marched to Fort Clark and 
 there made a brief report of the affair, which is now, I presume, 
 on file in Washington. General David E. Twiggs, command- 
 ing the Department, shortly afterwards published the following 
 order : 
 
 " Headquarters, Department of Texas. | 
 
 " SAti ANTOtiio, A u_^ies^j//i, i8s7. } 
 
 " Sir : — Lieutenant Hood's report was transmitted last mail ; from sub- 
 sequent information, not official, I think Lieutenant Hood's estimate of 
 the Indian party was much too small. The same party, it appears, 
 attacked the California mail guard five days after, and near the place 
 where Lieutenant Hood had the fight, and they estimated the Indians to 
 be over one hundred. These affairs were in the vicinity of Camp Hud- 
 son where Lieutenant Fink of the Eighth Infantry is stationed with a 
 Company of Infantry. If this company had have been furnished with 
 some fifteen or twenty horses, the second attack would not probably have 
 been made. Lieutenant Hood's affair was a most gallant one, and much 
 credit is due to both the officer and men. 
 
 " I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "(Signed) D. E. TWIGGS, 
 
 " Brevet Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Department, 
 
 " To Lieutenant Colonel L. Thomas, 
 
 " Assistant Adjutant General, 
 " Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York." 
 
 I also afterwards learned through the Indian Agent that the 
 Indians at the Reservation stated my command had killed 
 nineteen warriors during the fight, and that General Twiggs's 
 estimate Avas about correct in regard to numbers. The com- 
 paratively small loss we sustained is strong evidence that our 
 shots proved most destructive, and that the Indians labored 
 
UNITED STATES ARMY— TEXAS. 15 
 
 under an intense excitement which caused them generally to 
 miss their mark. The fact that we were mounted and above 
 their level seems to have rendered their aim very imperfect, 
 as shown by the circumstance that one of my wounded men 
 whose horse had been killed, was pierced in the back with 
 three additional arrows (one of which passed through his lung), 
 as he was making his way to the rear of the line. 
 
 Early in August I returned *:o Fort Mason, where not long 
 afterwards I was promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant, 
 assigned to Company " K," and placed on duty at Camp Colo- 
 rado, on the upper waters of the river of that name. In 1858 
 I re-established Camp Wood, on the Nueces river, about forty 
 miles distant from its source, and at this post my company 
 continued in the performance of the ordinary duties of soldiers 
 upon the frontier till the declaration of war in 1861. 
 
 In November, i860, I was granted a leave of absence for 
 six months, and on my arrival at Indianola I received an order 
 directing me to report for duty as Chief of Cavalry at West 
 Point. I immediately proceeded to Washington, and made 
 application in person to Colonel S. Cooper, Adjutant General, 
 to be relieved from the order and allowed to avail myself of 
 the leave of absence already granted. I shall ever remember 
 the astonishment of this old and most worthy soldier at my 
 unwillingness to go to West Point. He turned quickly in 
 his chair, saying : "Lieutenant, you surprise me; this is a 
 post and position sought by almost every soldier." I replied 
 it was true, but I feared war would soon be declared between 
 the States, in which event I preferred to be in a situation to 
 act with entire freedom. He acceded to my request; before 
 the .expiration of my leave of absence hostilities were 
 inaugurated, and my resignation was tendered to the United 
 States Government. 
 
 Shortly before the secession of the Southern States I re- 
 turned to Camp Wood, and, although still on leave, accom- 
 panied my regiment to Indianola, where I bid my comrades a 
 reluctant farewell. Kentucky being the land of my nativity, I 
 
16 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 deemed it right I should first tender my services for her de- 
 fence. Accordingly I went to Louisville in the early Spring 
 of 1 86 1, and subsequently to Frankfort. I met the Governor, 
 Mr. Breckinridge and other prominent men of that Common- 
 wealth; but after long debate and considerable delay, I 
 became convinced that no decided action would be taken. I 
 repaired at the latter part of April to Montgomery, Alabama, 
 offered my services to the Confederate Government, was 
 appointed First Lieutenant in the Army and ordered to Rich- 
 mond to report to Colonel R. E. Lee, who had very recently 
 assumed command of all the troops in Virginia by authority 
 of the Governor of that State. 
 
 During my long service in Texas I had had occasion to 
 visit almost ever portion of that extensive and beautiful terri- 
 tory, and was able to form an idea of the future prosperity of 
 that State. So deeply impressed had I become with its vast 
 and undeveloped resources that I had, just prior to the war, 
 determined to resign and make it my home for life. There- 
 fore when Kentucky failed to act, I entered the Confederate 
 service from the State of Texas, which thenceforth became my 
 adopted land. I arrived in Richmond about the 5th of May, 
 sent my luggage to the hotel, and proceeded without delay to 
 the office of Colonel Lee who had, I was informed, been recently 
 promoted to the rank of Major General. He extended me a 
 most cordial greeting, and, taking me by the hand, said : " I 
 am glad to see you. I want you to help me." I replied that 
 I came to Richmond with that object, and inquired what 
 duties he desired me to perform. He answered : " I wish you 
 to go to Yorktown and report to Colonel Magruder." I 
 naturally asked at what time he desired me to leave. He 
 turned his head, looked at the clock, and, with a smile, said he 
 would like me to go before I dined. It was then about 1 1 
 a. m., and I well knew he meant early dinner. 
 
 I went immediately to the Ballard House, ordered my trunk 
 to the station, and left for Yorktown. On the train I could 
 but contrast the surroundings of General Lee, as I had just 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 17 
 
 beheld him, with the quiet and peaceful scenes we had passed 
 through together but a year or two before upon the frontier of 
 Texas. His office was in the third or fourth story of, I think, 
 the Mechanics' Institute; and he had around him, it seemed 
 to me, every cobbler in Richmond, giving them instructions 
 as to the manner of making cartridge boxes, haversacks, 
 bayonet scabbards, &c. He was studiously applying his great 
 mind to this apparently trivial but most important work. The 
 Confederacy was destitute of such equipments at that hour, 
 and it may be safely asserted that his labor in this regard and 
 in the organization of our troops was the source, in a great 
 measure, of the success of our arms in the engagements which 
 soon followed. 
 
 I arrived at Yorktown that afternoon about an hour before 
 sunset, and reported to Colonel Magruder, whom, if I remem- 
 ber correctly, I found out upon the line of works around the 
 town. He forthwith placed me in command of several bat- 
 teries then in position. Upon my right and left, almost as far 
 as the eye could extend, were infantry regiments in line of 
 battle, and, in their front, officers delivering stirring and war- 
 like appeals to the men. As no tent or quarters had been 
 assigned me, I sent for my trunk and sat upon it in the sand 
 a greater portion of the night, gazing intently every few min- 
 utes in the direction of Fortress Monroe, in the expectation 
 momentarily of beholding the enemy. The following morning it 
 was ascertained that the Federals were not within thirty miles 
 of this line bristling with bayonets. The excitement therefore 
 soon subsided, and the soldiers returned to their respective 
 bivouacs. Such was my first night of service in the Confed- 
 erate Army. 
 
 Colonel Magruder assigned me to the command of the 
 cavalry companies then at Yorktown, and directed me to drill 
 and discipline them, and at the same time picket his front. 
 These troops were from Virginia and as fine a body of men 
 as that State sent to the war. I was only a First Lieutenant, 
 and the companies were of course under the direction of 
 2 
 
18 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 captains ; a question eventually arose in respect to rank, and 
 Magruder, unwilling to await action at Richmond, declared 
 me Captain by his own order. Subsequently discussion arose 
 touching the date of commissions of the Captains, and he at 
 once, by the same process, declared me. Major. This settled all 
 matters pertaining to authority, and I continued on outpost 
 service, covering the front of Magruder's forces. 
 
 Soon after the affair at Big Bethel, it became the custom of 
 the enemy to send out every few days scouting parties of 
 infantry in the direction of our position at Yorktown. I 
 determined to go at night into the swamp lying between the 
 James and York River roads, remain quietly under cover, 
 and, upon the advance of such a party, to move out upon its 
 rear, and capture it if possible. In accordance with this plan, 
 I concealed my troops in the swamp several nights, when 
 finally a battalion of infantry came forth upon the James River 
 road. I moved out in the rear of the Federals, overtook and 
 attacked them upon the same spot where Colonel Dreux, of 
 Louisiana, had been killed. Our assault in rear produced 
 great consternation, and the enemy ran in all directions through 
 the woods. However, we killed several of their number, and 
 captured some ten or fifteen prisoners whom we sent to York- 
 town, where the infantry climbed to the house and tree tops to 
 see the first "boys in blue" I presume many of them had ever 
 beheld. 
 
 Through orders from Richmond, these cavalry companies 
 were then organized into a regiment. Colonel Robert Johnson 
 was placed in command, and I was promoted to the rank of 
 Lieutenant Colonel. In this position I served until, I think, 
 in July, when I was summoned to Richmond, appointed 
 Colonel, and directed to organize the Fourth Texas Lifantry 
 Regiment from the detached companies which had recently 
 arrived from that State, and were at the time in camp near that 
 city. I remained there drilling this splendid body of young 
 men and educating them in the duties of soldiers till Sep- 
 tember, when we were ordered to join the right of General 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA, 19 
 
 Joseph E. Johnston's Army at Dumfries. Honorable L. I. 
 Wigfall had been appointed Brigadier General and assigned 
 to the command of the Texas brigade. 
 
 Quarters were constructed by placing the tents on pickets 
 with a chimney attached, which provision made the men com- 
 paratively comfortable for the Winter. I remained on the 
 Lower Occoquan during the Winter of 1861-62, engaged in 
 the instruction of my regiment in all its essential duties. I 
 lost no opportunity whenever the officers or men came to my 
 quarters, or whenever I chanced to be in conversation with 
 them, to arouse their pride, to impress upon them that no 
 regiment in that Army should ever be allowed to go forth 
 upon the battle-field and return with more trophies of war 
 than the Fourth Texas ; — that the number of colors and guns 
 captured, and prisoners taken, constituted the true test of the 
 work done by any command in an engagement. Moreover, 
 their conduct in camp should be such as not to require pun- 
 ishment, and, when thrown near or within towns, should one 
 of their comrades be led to commit some breach of military 
 discipline, they should, themselves, take him in charge, and not 
 allow his misconduct to bring discredit upon the regiment ; 
 proper deportment was obligatory upon them at home, and, 
 consequently, I should exact the same of them whilst in the 
 Army. By perseverance in this system I experienced no 
 difficulty in their management. One of the main obstacles 
 to the attainment of strict discipline, in the training of volun- 
 teers, is the issuance of orders without satisfactory explanation 
 as to their object. For example, the usual and important 
 regulation, prohibiting lights or noise in quarters after ten 
 o'clock at night, would be regarded by young recruits as un- 
 necessary, and even arbitrary, unless the officer in command 
 illustrated to them the necessity thereof, and made them 
 understand that an Army in time of active operations must 
 have sleep at night, in order to march and fight the following 
 day; and that for this reason no soldier should be allowed to 
 keep awake, say, six of his comrades in the same tent, nor be 
 
20 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 permitted to create a disturbance, which would deprive his 
 neighbors of rest, and render them unfit for duty the ensuing 
 morning. 
 
 On the 7th of March, 1862, I followed up the movement 
 with my regiment back in the direction of Fredericksburg; 
 en route, and, greatly to my surprise, I received information of 
 my appointment as Brigadier General, and of my assignment 
 to the command of the Texas brigade. General Wigfall, if 
 I remember correctly, had been elected to the Senate, and 
 regarded his services more important in that chamber than 
 upon the field. This promotion occasioned me some annoy- 
 ance, as Colonel Archer, who commanded the Fifth Texas, and 
 to whom I was warmly attached, ranked me by seniority. 
 He, however, came to my tent, spontaneously congratulated 
 me upon my advancement, and expressed his entire willingness 
 to serve under me. He gave proof of the sincerity of his 
 professions by a subsequent application to be transferred to 
 my division, after I was appointed Major General, and he was 
 promoted to the rank of Brigadier. Moreover, some years 
 later, when I assumed thedirection-of the Army of Tennessee, 
 he applied for orders to report to me for duty. He was not 
 only a fine soldier, but a man of sterling qualities, and whose 
 nobility of character was unsurpassed. 
 
 I had been stationed a few weeks in the vicinity of Freder- 
 icksburg, when orders were received to march to Yorktown, 
 at v/hich place we arrived a few days prior to the 17th of April, 
 the date of General Johnston's assumption of the command of 
 all the forces on the Peninsula. I was here placed in reserve 
 with my brigade, which consisted of the First, Fourth, Fifth 
 Texas, and Eighteenth Georgia Regiments, and continued the 
 system of instruction and training already indicated. I had so 
 effectually aroused the pride of this splendid body of men, as 
 to entertain little fear in regard to their action on the field of 
 battle. 
 
 The 3d of May, " on information that the Federal batteries 
 would be ready for service in a day or two," the Commanding 
 General ordered the Army to retreat. Accordingly, I marched 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 21 
 
 with my brigade, which formed part of Major General G. W. 
 Smith's Division, upon the Yorktown road, in the direction of 
 Wilhamsburg. At daybreak of the 5th the retreat was con- 
 tinued from Wilhamsburg towards Richmond, through deep 
 mud, and in a heavy rain. Whilst in bivouac opposite West 
 Point, General Whiting informed me that a large body of the 
 enemy had disembarked at Eltham's Landing ; that our cavalry 
 was on picket upon the high ground overlooking the valley 
 of York river, and instructed me to move my brigade in that 
 direction, and drive the enemy back if he attempted to advance 
 from under cover of his gunboats. Pursuant to imperative 
 orders, the men had not been allowed to march with loaded 
 arms during the retreat. On the 7th, at the head of my com- 
 mand, I proceeded in the direction of Eltham's, with the inten- 
 tion to halt and load the muskets upon our arrival at the 
 cavalry outpost. I soon reached the rear of a small cabin 
 upon the crest of the hill, where I found one of our cavalry- 
 men half asleep. The head of the column, marching by the 
 right flank, with the Fourth Texas in the front, was not more 
 than twenty or thirty paces in my rear, when, simultaneously 
 with my arrival at the station of this cavalry picket, a skirmish 
 line, supported by a large body of the enemy, met me face to 
 face. The slope from the cabin toward the York river was 
 abrupt, and, consequently, I did not discover the Federals till 
 we were almost close enough to shake hands. I leaped from 
 my horse, ran to the head of my column, then about fifteen 
 paces in rear, gave the command, forward into line, and ordered 
 the men to load. The Federals immediately opened fire, but 
 halted as they perceived our long line in rear. Meanwhile, a 
 corporal of the enemy drew down his musket upon me as I 
 stood in front of my line. John Deal, a private in Company 
 "A," Fourth Texas Regiment, and who now resides in Gon- 
 zales, Texas, had fortunately, in this instance, but contrary to 
 orders, charged his rifle before leaving camp ; he instantly 
 killed the corporal, who fell within a few feet of me. At the 
 time I ordered the leading regiment to change front forward 
 on the first company, I also sent directions to the troops in 
 
22 ADVANCE AND RETREAT, 
 
 rear to follow up the movement and load their arms, which 
 was promptly executed. The brigade then gallantly advanced, 
 and drove the Federals, within the space of about two hours, a 
 distance of one mile and a half to the cover of their gunboats. 
 When we struck their main line quite a spirited engagement 
 took place, which, however, proved to be only a temporary 
 stand before attaining the immediate shelter of their vessels of 
 war. Hampton's brigade, near the close of the action, came 
 to our support, and performed efficient service on the right. 
 
 Our loss was slight, whereas that of the enemy was quite 
 severe. General Johnston states in his Narrative that if North- 
 ern publications of that period are to be relied upon, it was ten 
 times greater than our own. The Commanding General of the 
 Army, though correct in his assertion that the security of his 
 march required the dislodgement of the enemy from its position 
 south of Eltham's Landing, is in error in regard to the troops 
 who bore the brunt of the combat, as will be seen by the fol- 
 lowing extracl from the official report of Major General G. W. 
 Smith, who at that time commanded the division : 
 
 " Referring to the reports of the several commanders for details, it ir 
 only necessary for me to state that the Texas brigade, under command o» 
 Brigadier General John B. Hood, supported on the right by the Hampton 
 Legion and the Nineteenth Georgia Regiment, of Colonel Hampton's 
 brigade, were selected, and ordered forward by General Whiting, to drive 
 the enemy from the woods then occupied in front of their landing. Late 
 in the day the Tennessee brigade, commanded by Brigadier General 
 Anderson, was placed in position to support and cover the left flank of 
 the Texans. All the troops engaged showed the finest spirit, were under 
 perfect control, and behaved admirably. The brunt of the contest was 
 borne by the Texans, and to them is due the largest share of the honors 
 of the day at Eltham. The Texas brigade lost eight killed and twenty- 
 eight wounded ; in the other portions of the command there were twelve 
 wounded and none killed." 
 
 This affair, which brought the brigade so suddenly and 
 unexpectedly under fire for the first time, served as a happy 
 introduction to the enemy. 
 
 The ensuing day the march was resumed to the rear and 
 continued till we reached the Baltimore Cross-roads, in which 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 23 
 
 vicinity we bivouacked about five days ; thence we retreated 
 to a point near Richmond. About this juncture it was 
 rumored that the Commanding General contemplated the 
 abandonment of the Capital of the Confederacy. General 
 McClellan, however, soon threw across the Chickahominy, to 
 the south bank, about one-fourth of his forces, and the Con- 
 federate Army was ordered to make ready to assail this 
 detachment. Major General G. W. Smith massed his division 
 on the Nine Miles road the morning of the 31st of May. 
 Longstreet and Hill assembled on the right, lower down on 
 the Chickahominy; they attacked and were driving the enemy 
 handsomely, when about 3 p. m. General Smith ordered 
 General Whiting to advance through the swamp. The object 
 was to assault, on his right flank, the enemy engaged against 
 Longstreet. Law's brigade came in contact with the Federals, 
 as my troops would soon have done, had not General Johnston, 
 in person, unfortunately changed my direction by ordering me 
 to move off by the right flank, and join Longstreet's left. 
 Shortly after I passed the railroad, a battery, to my surprise, 
 fired upon us from the rear, I nevertheless continued to 
 march by the flank ; a few moments later, I heard roar upon 
 roar of musketry in the direction of the ground I had just left, 
 and naturally supposed our troops were firing into each other, 
 by mistake. The undergrowth in the swamp through which 
 we were passing was very dense, and the water waist deep in 
 some places ; consequently, our progress was not as rapid as 
 I desired. Soon after this heavy firing in rear, Major S. D. 
 Lee came to me in great haste with instructions to return 
 forthwith, as our troops on the left required support, and, at 
 the same time, informed me that General Johnston had been 
 wounded. I immediately started back, but nightfall approached 
 before I was enabled to rejoin Major General Smith, and render 
 him the assistance I would have gladly afforded. The follow- 
 ing day rny brigade remained in line of battle without encoun- 
 tering the enemy ; with this marching and counter-marching 
 ended the part taken by my troops in the battle of Seven 
 Pines or Fair Oaks. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY, VIRGINIA GAINES'S MILLS OR FIRST 
 
 COLD HARBOR, MALVERN HILL, SECOND MANASSAS, BOONSBORO, 
 GAP, AND SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 
 
 After the battle of Seven Pines, General R. E. Lee was 
 assigned to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 He immediately commenced to form plans by which to free 
 the Confederate Capital from the proximity of the enemy. 
 His first move was to send General Whiting's Division to 
 Staunton, as a ruse, to join General Jackson; to order the 
 latter then to march toward Richmond, or down the north 
 side of the Chickahominy, upon the right flank of McClellan ; 
 and, when Jackson was sufficiently near the enemy, to throw 
 across this stream the main body of the Confederate Army at, 
 and in the vicinity of Meadow bridge, and, finally, with his 
 united forces to make a general assault upon the Federals. I 
 happened to have been made cognizant of the foregoing plan 
 through General Whiting, just prior to or during the march to 
 Staunton. I mention the source from which I obtained this 
 information, as it might seem strange that a Brigadier General 
 should have knowledge of the secret purposes of such a move- 
 ment, in operations of so great importance. 
 
 My brigade having been reinforced by Hampton's Legion, 
 under the command of Colonel Geary, moved by railway about 
 the middle of June, via Lynchburg, to Charlottesville, and 
 thence marched to Staunton. Upon our arrival at this place. 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 25 
 
 we received orders to retrace our steps, return to Charlottes- 
 ville, and there take the train to Hanover Junction. On the 
 25th I conducted my command, which now formed a part of 
 Jackson's Army, to Ashland. At this point rations and 
 ammunition were issued to the troops, and, the morning of the 
 26th, I marched with my brigade in a southeasterly direction 
 towards Cold Harbor, as the advanced guard of Jackson's 
 forces. We soon came in contact with the Federal outposts, 
 whom we drove rapidly to and across Tottapotamoi creek, a 
 sluggish stream, with banks steep and densely wooded on 
 either side. Here I discovered "the bridge on fire, and the 
 enemy busily engaged felling trees to check our advance 
 beyond ; thereupon, Reiley's battery was placed in position, 
 and opened fire, whilst we continued to push forward our 
 skirmish line. The Federals finally retreated in such haste 
 that they left their axes in the trees. The bridge was promptly 
 repaired, and we continued skirmishing with their rear guard 
 till we reached Handley's Corner, where we halted, and bivou- 
 acked for the night. 
 
 We had heard during the day, in the direction of Mechanics- 
 ville, the guns of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, which indicated 
 that the issue of the great battle, then in progress, would soon 
 be decided. At early dawn of the 27th the march was 
 resumed ; Ewell's Division bore off in the direction of our 
 left during the day, and Whiting's to the right. The latter 
 received instructions, in the afternoon, to repair to the support 
 of Longstreet, then assaulting the Federal left at Cold Harbor. 
 I moved on with all possible speed, through field and forest, 
 in the direction of the firing, and arrived, about 4.30 p. m., at 
 a point, on the telegraph road, I should think not far distant 
 from the centre of our attacking force. Here I found General 
 Lee, seated upon his horse. He rode forward to meet me, 
 and, extending his usual greeting, announced to me that our 
 troops had been fighting gallantly, but had not succeeded in 
 dislodging the enemy; he added, "This must be done. Can 
 you break his line?" I replied that I would try. I immedi- 
 
26 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 ately formed my brigade in line of battle with Hampton's 
 Legion on the left. In front was a dense woods and ugly 
 marsh, which totally concealed the enemy from us ; but the 
 terrible roar of artillery and musketry plainly revealed, how- 
 ev^er, that thousands and thousands of living souls were strug- 
 gling in most deadly conflict for the mastery of that field, and 
 I might say, almost under the shadow of the Capitol of the 
 infant Confederacy. My line was established, and moved for- 
 ward, regiment by regiment, when I discovered, as the dis- 
 position of the Eighteenth Georgia was completed, an open field 
 a little to its right. Holding in reserve the Fourth Texas, I 
 ordered the advance, and galloped into the open field or pas- 
 ture, from which point I could see, at a distance of about 
 eight hundred yards, the position of the Federals. They were 
 heavily entrenched upon the side of an elevated ridge running 
 a little west and south, and extending to the vicinity of the 
 Chickahominy. At the foot of the slope ran Powhite creek, 
 which stream, together with the abatis in front of their works, 
 constituted a formidable obstruction to our approach, whilst 
 batteries, supported by masses of infantry, crowned the crest 
 of the hill in rear, and long range guns were posted upon the 
 south side of the Chickahominy, in readiness to enfilade our 
 advancing columns. The ground from which I made these 
 observations was, however, open the entire distance to their 
 entrenchments. In a moment I determined to advance from 
 that point, to make a strenuous effort to pierce the enemy's 
 fortifications, and, if possible, put him to flight. I therefore 
 marched the Fourth Texas by the right flank into this open 
 field, halted and dressed the line whilst under fire of the long- 
 range guns, and gave positive instructions that no man should 
 fire until I gave the order; for I knew full well that if the men 
 were allowed to fire, they would halt to load, break the allign- 
 ment, and, very likely, never reach the breastworks. I more- 
 over ordered them not only to keep together, but also in line, 
 and announced to them that I would lead them in the charge. 
 Forward march was sounded, and we moved at a rapid, 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 27 
 
 but not at a double-quick pace. Meantime, my regiments on 
 the left had advanced some distance to the front through the 
 wood and swamp. 
 
 Onward we marched under a constantly increasing shower 
 of shot and shell, whilst to our right could be seen some of 
 our troops making their way to the rear, and others lying 
 down beneath a galling fire. Our ranks were thinned at 
 almost every step forward, and proportionately to the growing 
 fury of the storm of projectiles. Soon we attained the crest 
 of the bald ridge within about one hundred and fifty yards of 
 the breastworks. Here was concentrated upon us, from bat- 
 teries in front and flank, a fire of shell and canister, which 
 ploughed through our ranks with deadly effect. Already the 
 gallant Colonel Marshall, together with many other brave men, 
 had fallen victims in this bloody onset. At a quickened pace 
 we continued to advance, without firing a shot, down the 
 slope, over a body of our soldiers lying on the ground, to and 
 across Powhite creek, when, amid the fearful roar of musk- 
 etry and artillery, I gave the order to fix bayonets and charge. 
 With a ringing shout we dashed up the steep hill, through the 
 abatis, and over the breastworks, upon the very heads of the 
 enemy. The Federals, panic-stricken, rushed precipitately to 
 the rear upon the infantry in support of the artillery; sud- 
 denly the whole joined in the flight toward the valley beyond. 
 At this juncture some twenty guns, stationed in rear of the 
 Federal line on a hill to my left, opened fire upon the Fourth 
 Texas, which changed front, and charged in their direction. 
 I halted in an orchard beyond the works, and despatched 
 every officer of my staff to the main portion of the brigade in 
 the wood on the left, instructing them to bear the glad tidings 
 that the Fourth Texas had pierced the enemy's line, and were 
 moving in his rear, and to deliver orders to push forward with 
 utmost haste. At the same moment I discovered a Federal 
 brigade marching up the slope from the valley beyond, evi- 
 dently with the purpose to re-establish the line. I ran back 
 to the entrenchments, appealed to some of our troops, who, by 
 
28 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 this time, had advanced to the breastworks, to come forward 
 and drive off this small body of Federals, They remained, 
 however, motionless. Jenkins's command, if I mistake not, 
 which was further to our right, boldly advanced and put this 
 brigade to rout. Meantime, the long line of blue and steel to 
 the right and left wavered, and, finally, gave way, as the Eigh- 
 teenth Georgia, the First and Fifth Texas, and Hampton's 
 Legion gallantly moved forward from right to left, thus com- 
 pleting a grand left wheel of the brigade into the very heart 
 of the enemy. Simultaneously with this movement burst 
 forth a tumultuous shout of victory, which was taken up 
 along the whole Confederate line. 
 
 I mounted my horse, rode forward, and found the Fourth 
 Texas and Eighteenth Georgia had captured fourteen pieces 
 of artillery, whilst the Fifth Texas had charge of a Federal 
 regiment which had surrendered to it. Many were the deeds 
 of valor upon that memorable field. 
 
 General Jackson, in reference to this onset, says in his offi- 
 cial report: 
 
 " In this charge in which upwards of a thousand men fell, killed and 
 wounded, before the fire of the enemy, and in which fourteen pieces of 
 artillery and nearly a regiment were captured, the Fourth Texas, under 
 the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strongholds and 
 seize the guns. Although swept from their defences by this rapid and 
 almost matchless display of daring and desperate valor, the well dis- 
 ciplined Federals continued in retreat to fight with stubborn resistance." 
 
 On the following day, as he surveyed the ground over 
 which my brave men charged, he rendered them a just tribute 
 when he exclaimed : " The men who carried this position 
 were soldiers indeed !" 
 
 Major Warwick, of the Fourth Texas, a brave and efficient 
 officer, fell mortally wounded near the works,. whilst urging 
 his men forward to the charge; over one-half of this regiment 
 lay dead or wounded along a distance of one mile. Major 
 Haskell, son-in-law of General Hampton, won my admiration 
 by his indomitable courage : just after my troops had broken 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 29 
 
 the adv^ersary's line, and I was sorely in need of staff officers, 
 he reported to me for duty, sword in hand, notwithstanding 
 one of his arms had by a shot been completely severed from 
 his body. I naturally instructed him to go in search of a 
 surgeon. 
 
 After the capture of the artillery posted on the hill in rear 
 of the Federal line, a strange and interesting incident occurred. 
 The Second Cavalry, my regiment in the United States service 
 prior to the war, gallantly charged the Fourth Texas, the regi- 
 ment I had organized and commanded in the Confederate 
 Army. Major Whiting, who was captain of my company on the 
 frontier of Texas, commanded the former in this bold attack 
 to recapture these guns ; his horse was killed under him, and 
 he fell stunned, though unharmed, at the feet of my men, and 
 was taken prisoner. 
 
 When the battle had ceased, I gave my attention at once 
 and during the night — to the care of the wounded, as doctors, 
 litter-bearers and ambulance drivers were without much expe- 
 rience at that early period of hostilities. As I rode over the 
 field, about 2 o'clock in the morning, amid the wounded whose 
 touching appeals for water resounded on every side, a voice in 
 the distance arose, calling me by my surname in tones of deep 
 distress. Shortly after one of my soldiers came and reported 
 to me that Captain Chambliss, an old friend, and a member of 
 the Second Cavalry, United States Army, was lying upon thehill, 
 desperately wounded. I ordered him to return immediately, 
 to render every assistance in his power, and to assure Chambliss 
 that I would soon be with him, as I was then completing the 
 necessary arrangements for the care of the wounded. About 
 daybreak I reached the spot where my friend lay, and we met 
 with the same warmth of feeling which had characterized our 
 intercourse previous to the Avar. I issued instructions to have 
 him transported to the hospital, and accorded the same atten- 
 tion given to my own wounded officers. Although I feared 
 at the time his wounds would prove mortal, he, I am glad to 
 state,' finally recovered. 
 
30 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Subsequent to the battles around Richmond, I, in company 
 with Colonel Fitzhugh Lee,also formerly of the Second Cavahy, 
 United States Army, visited the Capital, and, at the Libby 
 prison, called upon Whiting and Chambliss, with whom we 
 renewed the cordial relations we had enjoyed upon the 
 frontier. 
 
 The dead were buried on the field of Cold Harbor or 
 Gaines's Mills on the 28th, and, the afternoon of the 29th, my 
 brigade began the pursuit of the enemy along with Jackson's 
 forces. We crossed the Chickahominy at Grapevine bridge, 
 near the railroad ; arrived at Savage's Station the morning of 
 the 30th, and pushed on to White Oak Swamp, where we 
 found the enemy in position on the opposite side of the stream, 
 in our immediate front, behind the bridge, which they had 
 destroyed on the retreat. General Jackson ordered forward a 
 few batteries, opened fire, and, at the same time, sent detach- 
 ments to the right and left to effect a crossing and assail our 
 adversary upon both flanks. Whilst this artillery duel in our 
 front was progressing, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were heavily 
 engaged lower down at Frayser's Farm. At a very early hour 
 on the morning of July istwe forced the passage cf White 
 Oak Swamp, moved rapidly forward, and, before long, reached 
 the field which Hill and Longstreet had compelled the enemy 
 to abandon. From this point Jackson's Corps led the adv^ance 
 of Lee's Army upon the Willis Church road; my brigade, 
 under an annoying fire from the Federal rear guard, soon 
 arrived in an open field in front of and commanded by Mah^ern 
 Hill. The latter was not only a position of immense natural 
 strength, but was, moreover, crowned with artillery which was 
 supported by McClellan's entire Army, 
 
 General Whiting's Division, in this meadow, constituted the 
 left of the Confederate line; and, although the position occu- 
 pied by the enemy in our immediate front was seemingly 
 impregnable, the country on their right appeared to be open, 
 and to afford an easy approach. I therefore dispatched some 
 of my Texas scouts to reconnoitre in that direction. The 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 31 
 
 report, shortly received, was of a favorable character, and 
 General Hampton and I requested of General Whiting per- 
 mission to turn and assail this exposed flank. Our a])plica- 
 tion was not granted, however, and we remained during the 
 day under a murderous fire of artillery, whilst our forces on 
 the right were driven back in every attempt made to gain pos- 
 session of Malvern Hill. The ensuing night the Federals 
 retreated to Harrison's Landing, on the James river, and thus 
 put an end to this bloody and fruitless contest. 
 
 General Jackson marched, after this engagement, in the 
 direction of Culpep^r Court House, leaving my brigade with 
 Longstreet. The battle at Cedar Run soon followed, and 
 resulted in a brilliant victory for Jackson over Pope, whilst 
 Longstreet remained with his corps in observation of McClel- 
 lan's shattered forces at Harrison's Landing. A fleet of vessels, 
 however, appeared on the James river to transport the Federals 
 to another field of operations, and orders were issued to march 
 to the Rapidan in the vicinity of Gordonsville, which point we 
 reached about the 15th of August. 
 
 My command had been increased by the addition of two or 
 more batteries and a splendid brigade, under Colonel E. M. 
 Law, an able and efficient officer. General Evans was shortly 
 afterwards given, besides his own troops, command of the two 
 brigades under my direction. 
 
 On the 20th of August my division, acting as an advanced 
 guard of Longstreet's Corps, moved against General Pope's 
 Army, then lying a short distance south of the Rappahannock, 
 crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, and marched in the 
 wake of Jackson's Corps, Avhich was pushing forward rapidly 
 with the design to secure a position on the flank or in rear of 
 the Federals. This manoeuvre resulted in one of those bold 
 and dazzling achievements which not only won my unbounded 
 admiration, but deservedly earned for Jackson the highest 
 appreciation and encomiums of the civilized world. Whilst 
 he was hastening forward with a determination to allow no 
 obstacle to hinder the accomplishment of his object, his train 
 
32 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 was attacked by the enemy near Welford's Ford, on Hazel 
 river; nevertheless, true to the inspiration of his genius, he 
 pushed onward, leaving Trimble's brigade to protect his bag- 
 gage against this assault. General Trimble gallantly repulsed 
 the Federals, as my division moved forward to his support. 
 
 Longstreet's Corps continued to threaten the enemy, while 
 Jackson turned his right flank and cut his communications 
 with Washington. He finally stood at bay near Manassas, 
 whilst Longstreet, by a forced march from the Rappahannock, 
 pushed forward, and reached about mid-day, on the 2Sth, 
 Thoroughfare Gap, which was guarded by a strong force of 
 the enemy. 
 
 My command had marched nearly the whole previous night. 
 About 2 a. m., after passing through a valley amid darkness 
 which was greatly increased by a dense wood, the troops were 
 allowed to file off, stack arms, and bivouac on a slope, and 
 around a knoll upon which some of our cavalrymen had been 
 stationed on picket duty. The fatigue of the men was so 
 excessive that they dropped down in line, and fell asleep 
 almost the instant they touched the ground. Amid the still- 
 ness and darkness which reigned in the encampment, some of 
 the officers, who had dismounted- upon the summit of the 
 hillock, kicked over an empty barrel which had been used by 
 the cavalrymen as a receptacle for forage, and it came rolling 
 and bounding down the slope over the bushes, toward the 
 Texans who were then in a sound sleep. Just at this moment 
 a favorite animal of one of the regiments, "the old grey mare," 
 loaded with kettles, tin cups and frying pans, dashed up the 
 hill from the forest below with a rattling noise. Some one 
 gave the alarm, crying with a loud voice, " Look out !" and the 
 brave men who had fought so nobly at Cold Harbor sprang 
 to their feet, deserted their colors and guns, and ran down the 
 slope over a well-constructed fence, which was soon levelled 
 to the ground, and had continued their flight several hundred 
 yards before they awoke sufficiently to recover their wits, and 
 boldly march back, convulsed with laughter. This incident is 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 33 
 
 the origin of the brigade song, the burden of which ran, 
 " The old Grey Mare came tearing out o' the Wilderness." 
 The truth is, in time of war, a cap explodes much louder at 
 night than in the day. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of the 28th my division was instructed 
 to unite with General D. R. Jones's Division and gain possession 
 of Thoroughfare Gap, a narrow mountain defile, protected, as 
 it were, by a wall of stone on either side. At the same time 
 General Lee sent a force to the left to threaten the Federals in 
 rear, whilst a portion of my command passed through the Gap 
 under a heavy fire of artillery, and my main force crossed over 
 the ridge upon the immediate left of the Gap. The enemy was 
 thus forced to retire, and my division bivouacked for the night 
 beyond this stronghold. At early dawn on the morning of the 
 29th I put my troops in motion, and, in accordance with 
 instructions from General Longstreet, formed his advanced 
 guard in the direction of Manassas. I placed Lieutenant 
 Colonel Upton, of the Fifth Texas, in command of about one 
 hundred and fifty picked men, from the Texas brigade, to act 
 as skirmishers, and instructed him to rapidly push the Federals 
 in his front. I impressed upon him the importance of hasten- 
 ing to the support of General Jackson, and assured him I 
 would keep the division in readiness to render him prompt 
 assistance, if requisite. Here was achieved by this advanced 
 guard of the advanced guard one of those military feats which 
 is entitled to the admiration of every soldier. Although the 
 Federals opposed us with the different arms of the service, 
 Colonel Upton drove them before him with such rapidity that 
 General Longstreet sent me orders, two or three times, to halt, 
 since the Army was unable to keep within supporting distance 
 of my forces. The gallant Upton was, indeed, pre-eminent in 
 his sphere as an outpost officer. 
 
 I joined General Jackson on the Groveton pike, upon the 
 
 field of Manassas, about 10.30 a. m., when he rode forward 
 
 and extended me a hearty welcome. He was then keeping at 
 
 bay the entire Federal Army, commanded by Major General 
 
 3 
 
34 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Pope. My division was formed without delay across the pike ; 
 the Texas brigade was posted on the right, and that of Law 
 on the left. Between my left and Jackson's right, which rested 
 about one mile south of Groveton, a gap of a few hundred yards 
 existed ; it was afterwards filled by artillery, under the direc- 
 tion of Colonel Walton. Longstreet's Corps, as it arrived upon 
 the field, formed on my right, thus constituting my division 
 the centre of the Confederate Army. I was instructed to 
 obey the orders of either Lee, Jackson, or Longstreet. We 
 remained, till a late hour in the afternoon, spectators of the 
 heavy engagement of Jackson's troops with the enemy, who 
 was thwarted in his attempt to turn our left flank. Major B. 
 W. Frobel, whom I had previously assigned to the command 
 of my artillery, was sent to our right with his battalion to 
 oppose a column of the enemy, advancing to attack Longstreet 
 whilst he was establishing his line. He speedily repulsed the 
 Federals, and returned to his former position.* 
 
 In the meantime our opponents had been massing their 
 forces in our front. Just before sunset I received orders from 
 General Longstreet to advance, and scarcely had I given the 
 word of command, when the enemy moved forward and began 
 a general attack along my line. Law's brigade of Alabamians, 
 Mississippians and Carolinians dashed forward with theTexans, 
 Georgians and Geary's Legion, upon their immediate right; 
 each seemed to vie with the other in efforts to plunge the 
 deeper into the ranks of the enemy. Onward they charged, 
 driving the foe through field and forest, from position after 
 position, till long after darkness had closed in upon the scene 
 of conflict. Law had captured one piece of artillery, f and I 
 beheld with pride the work done by my men, who had forced 
 back the Federals a distance of over one mile. 
 
 I now discovered that my line was in the midst of the enemy; 
 the obscurity of the night, which was deepened by a thick 
 wood, made it almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe, 
 
 * See Frobel's Report, 
 f See Law's Report. 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 85 
 
 and for the same reason I was unable to select a position and 
 form upon it for action next morning. The Confederates and 
 Federals were so intermingled that commanders of both armies 
 gave orders for allignment, in some instances, to the troops of 
 their opponents. Colonel Work, of the First Texas, was struck 
 in the head with an inverted musket in the hands of a Federal, 
 and several stands of colors were snatched from their bearers 
 by my troops, and borne off as mementos of this night encounter 
 of clubs and fists. 
 
 In view of this condition of affairs I determined to ride to 
 the rear, inform Generals Lee and Longstreet of the facts, and 
 to recommend that I retire and resume the line from which I 
 had advanced just before sunset. I found them about two 
 miles off, in an open field, and, after a brief interview, we 
 received orders to act in accordance with my suggestion. The 
 troops were therefore withdrawn from the immediate presence 
 of the enemy, back to their original position across the Grove- 
 ton pike, about 2 a. m. on the 30th of August. As I was 
 prepared to lie down and rest for the few remaining hours 
 before dawn, one of my officers informed me that General 
 Richard Anderson's Division was bivouacked in mass just in 
 my front. Knowing that some thirty or forty pieces of artil- 
 lery bore directly upon his troops, I mounted my horse, rode 
 off in search of his quarters, and urged him to hasten his with- 
 drawal, as the Federal artillery would assuredly, at daylight, 
 open upon his men thus massed, and greatly cripple his division. 
 Anderson had been marching all day, in order to join General 
 Lee, and did not halt until he found himself in the midst of 
 Federal and Confederate wounded. Upon my warning, he 
 promptly aroused his men and, just after daybreak, marched 
 to the rear of my line of battle. The pike was dry, and his 
 division, as it moved back, left a cloud of dust in its wake, 
 which circumstance, I have always thought, induced General 
 Pope to send his celebrated despatch to Washington to the 
 effect that General Lee was in full retreat 
 
36 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 My troops remained stationary a greater part of the 30th, 
 quietly awaiting orders to again advance. About 3.30 p. m. 
 a furious assault was made upon Jackson, within full view of 
 my position. Line after line was hurled against his brave 
 men, posted in a railroad cut, from which they stubbornly 
 resisted every attack. I sent for a battery (Reiley's, if I mistake 
 not), and ordered it to open upon the flank of the enemy's 
 attacking column, whilst Colonel S. D. Lee's artillery, together 
 with the remainder of Major Frobel's batteries, ploughed deep 
 furrows through the Federal masses, as they advanced to and 
 recoiled before the " Stonewall" upon my left. So desperate 
 was the assault of Pope, and so fixed the determination of this 
 commander, or some of his officers, to force the troops to fight 
 that a line was, apparently, stationed in rear to fire upon those 
 who, impelled by fear or despair, sought refuge from the battle- 
 field. 
 
 Thus raged this fierce contest, when about 4 p. m. I received 
 an order, through one of Longstreet's staff officers, to advance. 
 A few minutes after my division moved forward, a messenger 
 from Longstreet summoned me, and, at the full speed of my 
 horse, I joined him from a quarter to a half of a mile in rear. 
 He instructed me not to allow my division to move so far 
 forward as to throw itself beyond the prompt support of the 
 troops he had ordered to the front. Notwithstanding I rode 
 at as rapid a course as my favorite horse could bear me to 
 rejoin my two brigades, I did not overtake them till I had 
 crossed the creek, about four hundred yards south of the 
 Chinn House, and the Texas brigade had captured a battery, 
 routed the Federal Zouaves — literally strewing the ground 
 with their dead and wounded — and Law, upon the left, had 
 accomplished equally important results in his front. The field, 
 where lay the dead and dying zouaves in their gay uniforms, 
 amid the tall green grass, presented indeed a singular appear- 
 ance, as I passed down the slope and across the creek. I here 
 sent orders to my troops to halt and adjust their allignment, 
 and discovered, at the same time, upon a ridge a short distance 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 37 
 
 beyond, another battery together with large masses of Federal 
 infantry in the vicinity of the Chinn House. Soon, Colonel 
 Means, mounted and in command of General Evans's brigade, 
 reported to me for directions. I instructed him to take the 
 battery which was then within sixty yards of us. His men 
 boldly dashed forward, and he, a few moments later, fell dead 
 to the ground pierced by a ball. 
 
 I moved a little to the right, and about this juncture D. 
 R. Jones's Division arrived upon the scene of action; it was 
 soon followed by the remainder of Longstreet's Corps. Gen- 
 eral Jones rode up to me, and desired to know at which point 
 he could most effectually strike the enemy. I recommended 
 that he at once assail the heavy lines in rear of the Chinn 
 House. He promptly accepted the suggestion, in concert with 
 several other commanders, and they moved to the attack, as 
 did the whole line from right to left. Thus the splendid corps 
 of Longstreet moved forward in a grand charge out upon the 
 high and open ground in that vicinity. Onward it swept 
 toward Bull Run, driving the enemy at a rapid pace before it, 
 and presenting to the view the most beautiful battle scene I 
 have ever beheld. I was in conference, near the Chinn House, 
 with General Jones and other commanders, as they arrived 
 upon the field, when the Fifth Texas — after Colonel Robertson 
 had been wounded in the faithful discharge of his duty, and 
 the gallant, noble Upton had been killed — slipped the bridle 
 and rushed forward, breaking loose from its brigade. When 
 night approached, and the battle was over, I found it far to the 
 front, in the vicinity of the Sudley Ford road. 
 
 Whilst I lost many valuable officers and men, as shown by 
 the official reports, my two brigades, true to their teaching, 
 captured five guns in addition to fourteen stands of colors, 
 which they bore off as trophies of war and proof of the noble 
 work they had accomplished. During this engagement Major 
 W. H. Sellers, my Adjutant General, led the Texas brigade. 
 I had ordered him to assume direction when General Long- 
 street sent for me at the beginning of the movement forward. 
 
38 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 This distinguished soldier not only deserves great credit for 
 his conduct in this battle, but proved himself, as I expressed 
 my conviction in my official report, competent to command a 
 brigade at that early period of the war. Toward the close of 
 the battle I pushed forward some of my reliable Texas scouts, 
 and captured a number of new Federal ambulances, with a 
 view to better the outfit of my troops. After nightfall I reas- 
 sembled my division, and rode back to the headquarters of 
 General Lee. 
 
 I found him in an open field, near a camp-fire of boards 
 kindled for the purpose of reading despatches; he was in high 
 spirits, doubtless on account of the brilliant and complete vic- 
 toryjust achieved by his Army. He met me in his usual man- 
 ner, and asked what had become of the enemy. I replied 
 that our forces had driven him almost at a double-quick, to 
 and across Bull Run, and that it was a beautiful sight to see 
 our little battle-flags dancing after the Federals, as they ran in 
 full retreat. He instantly exclaimed, "God forbid I should 
 ever live to see our colors moving in the opposite direction!" 
 
 The ambulances I had captured were destined to cause me 
 somewhat of annoyance, which I had nowise anticipated at 
 the time I assigned them to my troops for the use of their 
 sick and wounded. After the burial of the dead on the fol- 
 lowing day, and the march had been resumed, with orders to 
 follow Jackson's Corps in the direction of Maryland, I was 
 instructed by Major General Evans to turn over these ambu- 
 lances to his Carolina troops. Whereas I would cheerfully 
 have obeyed directions to deliver them to General Lee's Quar- 
 ter Master for the use of the Army, I did not consider it just 
 that I should be required to yield them to another brigade of 
 the division, which was in no manner entitled to them. I 
 regarded the command, which had captured them, as the right- 
 ful owners in this instance, and therefore refused to obey the 
 order. I was, in consequence, placed in arrest, and, on the 
 march to Frederick, Maryland, was ordered by General Long- 
 street to proceed to the rear to Culpepjs^^er Court House, if I 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 39 
 
 remember correctly, and there await the assembly of a Court 
 Martial for my trial. General Lee, however, became apprised 
 of the matter, and at once sent instructions that I should 
 remain with my command, though he did not release me from 
 arrest. Longstreet's Corps was finally massed near Hagers- 
 town, and by this time my division had become restive and 
 somewhat inclined to insubordination on account of my sus- 
 pension. I repressed all demonstrations of feeling by assur- 
 ances to the officers that the affair would soon be settled, and 
 I shortly restored to command. 
 
 On the 13th of September intelligence was received of 
 McClellan's advance from the direction of Federal City toward 
 South Mountain, and on the morning of the 14th I marched 
 with Longstreet's Corps to Boonsboro' Gap, a narrow and 
 winding pass, through which runs the turnpike from Hagers- 
 town to Federal City. I was still under arrest, with orders to 
 move in rear of my two brigades. The division reached the 
 foot of South Mountain about 3.30 p. m., from which point 
 could be seen the shells of the enemy, as they passed over 
 the rugged peaks in front, and burst upon the slope in our 
 proximity. I could hear the men, as they filed up the ascent, 
 cry out along the line, " Give us Hood!" but did not compre- 
 hend the meaning of this appeal till I arrived with the rear 
 of the column at the base of the ridge, where I found General 
 Lee standing by the fence, very near the pike, in company with 
 his chief of staff, Colonel Chilton. The latter accosted me, 
 bearing a message from the General, that he desired to speak 
 to me. I dismounted, and soon stood in his presence, when 
 he said: "General, here I am just upon the eve of entering 
 into battle, and with one of my best officers under arrest. If 
 you will merely say that you regret this occurrence, I will 
 release you and restore you to the command of your division." 
 I replied, " I am unable to do so, since I cannot admit or see 
 the justness of General Evans's demand for the ambulances my 
 men have captured. Had I been ordered to turn them over 
 for the general use of the Army, I would cheerfully have acqui- 
 
40. ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 esced." He again urged me to make some declaration expres- 
 sive of regret. I answered that I could not consistently do 
 so. Then, in a voice betraying the feeling which warmed the 
 heart of this noble and great warrior, he said, "Well, I will 
 suspend your arrest till the impending battle is decided." 
 
 I quickly remounted, galloped to the front of my column, 
 and, with a kind welcome from my troops, reported for duty 
 to General Longstreet, who by this time had reached the sum- 
 mit of the mountain. He immediately instructed me to file to 
 the left, in the wake of Evans's brigade, and to take position 
 with my right near the pike. The advance of McClellan's long 
 lines could be seen moving up the slope in our front, evidently 
 with the purpose to dislodge our forces posted upon the sharp 
 ridge overlooking the valley below. Before long Major Fairfax, 
 of Longstreet's staff, came to me in haste with orders to move 
 to the right of the pike, as our troops on that part of the field 
 had been driven back. He accompanied me to the pike, and 
 here turned his horse to leave, when I naturally asked if he 
 would not guide me. He replied, " No, I can only say, go to 
 the right." Meantime Major Frobel's batteries had come for- 
 ward into position on top of the ridge ; they opened fire, and 
 performed excellent service in checking the enemy. The wood 
 and undergrowth were dense, and nothing but a pig path 
 seemed to lead in the direction in which I was ordered. 
 Nevertheless, I conducted my troops obliquely by the right 
 flank, and while I advanced I could hear the shouts of the 
 Federals, as they swept down the mountain upon our side. I 
 then bore still more obliquely to the right, with a view to get 
 as far as possible towards the left flank of the enemy before we 
 came in contact. We marched on through the wood as 
 rapidly as the obstacles in our passage would admit. Each 
 step forward brought nearer and nearer to us the heavy Federal 
 lines, as they advanced, cheering over their success and the 
 possession of our dead and wounded. Finally, I gave instruc- 
 tions to General Law and Colonel Wofford, directing the two 
 brigades, to order their men to fix bayonets ; and, when the 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 41 
 
 enemy came within seventy-five or a hundred yards, I ordered 
 the men to front and charge. They obeyed promptly, with a 
 genuine Confederate yell, and the Federals were driven back 
 pell mell, over and beyond the mountain, at a much quicker 
 pace than they had descended. Night closed in with not only 
 our dead and wounded, together with those of our adversary 
 in our possession, but with the mountain, on the right, within 
 our lines. 
 
 After the correction of my allignment I rode, at about lO 
 p- m., back to the Gap, where I found General D. H. Hill and 
 other officers on the gallery of a tavern, near the pike, 
 evidently discussing the outlook. As I approached, I inquired, 
 in an ordinary tone of voice, as to the condition of affairs on 
 our left, and to my surprise was met with a mysterious 
 " Pshe — Pshe " — ; a voice added in an audible whisper, " The 
 enemy is just there in the corn field; he has forced us back." 
 I thereupon suggested that we repair without delay to General 
 Lee's headquarters, and report the situation. Accordingly, 
 we rode down to the foot of the mountain, where we found 
 General Lee in council with General Longstreet. After a long 
 debate, it was decided to retire and fall back towards Sharps- 
 burg. 
 
 The morning of the 15th our forces were again in motion 
 in the direction of the Antietam ; the cavalry and my two 
 brigades, in addition to Major Frobel's artillery, formed the 
 rear guard to hold our opponents in check, whilst the Army 
 marched quietly to its destination. My troops, at this period, 
 were sorely in need of shoes, clothing and food. We had had 
 issued to us no meat for several days, and little or no bread ; 
 the men had been forced to subsist principally on green corn 
 and green apples. Nevertheless, they were in high spirits 
 and defiant, as we contended with the advanced guard of 
 McClellan the 15th and forenoon of the i6th. During the 
 afternoon of this day I was ordered, after great fatigue and 
 hunger endured by my soldiers, to take position near the 
 
42 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Hagerstovvn pike, in an open field in front of * Dunkard Church. 
 General Hooker's Corps ciT)sscd the Antietam, swung round 
 with its right on the pike, and, about an hour before sunset, 
 encountered my division. I had stationed one or two batteries 
 upon a hillock, in a meadow, near the edge of a corn field and 
 just by the pike. The Texas brigade had been disposed on 
 the left, and that of Law on the right. We opened fire, and a 
 spirited action ensued, which lasted till a late hour in the 
 night. When the firing had in a great measure ceased, we 
 were so close to the enemy that we could distinctly hear him 
 massing his heavy bodies in our immediate front. 
 
 The extreme suffering of my troops for want of food 
 induced me to ride back to General Lee, and request him to 
 send two or more brigades to our relief, at least for the night, 
 in order that the soldiers might have a chance to cook their 
 meagre rations. He said that he w^ould cheerfully do so, but 
 he knew of no command which could be spared for the 
 purpose; he, however, suggested I should see General Jackson 
 and endeavor to obtain assistance from him. After riding a 
 long time in search of the latter, I finally discovered him alone, 
 lying upon the ground, asleep by the root of a tree. I 
 aroused him and made known the half-starved condition of 
 my troops; he immediately ordered Lawton's, Trimble's and 
 Hays's brigades to our relief He exacted of me, however, a 
 promise that I would come to the support of these forces the 
 moment I was called upon. I quickly rode off in search of 
 my wagons, that the men might prepare and cook their flour, 
 as we were still without meat; unfortunately the night was 
 then far advanced, and, although every effort was made amid 
 the darkness to get the wagons forward, dawn of the morning 
 of the 17th broke upon us before many of the men had had 
 time to do more than prepare the dough. Soon thereafter an 
 officer of Lawton's staff dashed up to me, saying, " General 
 Lawton sends his compliments with the request that you come 
 
 * In my official report erroneously called St. Muniina Clnirch. 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 43 
 
 at once to his support." " To arms " was instantly sounded, 
 and quite a large number of my brave soldiers were again 
 obliged to march to the front, leaving their uncooked rations 
 in camp. 
 
 Still, indomitable amid every trial, they moved off by the 
 right flank to occupy the same position we had left the night 
 previous. As we passed, about sunrise, across the pike and 
 through the gap in the fence just in front of Dunkard Church, 
 General Lawton, who had been wounded, was borne to the 
 rear upon a litter, and the only Confederate troops, left on that 
 part of the field, were some forty men who had rallied round 
 the gallant Harry Hays. I rode up to the latter, and, finding 
 that his soldiers had expended all their ammunition, I 
 suggested to him to retire, to replenish his cartridge boxes, 
 and reassemble his command. 
 
 The following extract from the official report of General 
 Jackson will convey an idea of the bloody conflict in which 
 my two little brigades were about to engage: 
 
 " General Lawton, commanding division, and Colonel Walker, com- 
 manding brigade, were severely wounded. More than half of the 
 brigades of Lawton and Hays were either killed or wounded, and more 
 than a third of Trimble's, and all the regimental commanders in those 
 brigades, except two, were killed or wounded. Thinned in their ranks, 
 and exhausted of their ammunition, Jackson's Division and the brigades 
 of Lawton, Trimble and Hays retired to the rear, and Hood, of Long- 
 street's command, again took the position from which he had been 
 before relieved." 
 
 Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, 
 heavy columns of Federal infantry; not less than two corps 
 were in sight to oppose my small command, numbering, 
 approximately, two thousand effectives. However, with the 
 trusty Law on my right, in the edge of the wood, and the 
 gallant Colonel WofTord in command of the Texas brigade on 
 the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the assault. Not- 
 withstanding the overwhelming odds of over ten to one 
 against us, we drove the enemy from the wood and corn field 
 
44 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 back upon his reserves, and forced him to abandon his guns 
 on our left. This most deadly combat raged till our last 
 round of ammunition was expended. The First Texas Regi- 
 ment had lost, in the corn field, fully two-thirds of its number ; 
 and whole ranks of brave men, whose deeds were unrecorded 
 save in the hearts of loved ones at home, were mowed down 
 in heaps to the right and left. Never before was I so con- 
 tinuously troubled with fear that my horse would further injure 
 some wounded fellow soldier, lying helpless upon the ground. 
 Our right flank, during this short, but seemingly long, space 
 of time, was toward the main line of the Federals, and, after 
 several ineffectual efforts to procure reinforcements and our 
 last shot had been fired, I ordered my troops back to Dunkard 
 Church, for the same reason which had previously compelled 
 Lawton, Hays and Trimble to retire. 
 
 My command remained near the church, with empty cartridge 
 boxes, holding aloft their colors whilst Frobel's batteries 
 rendered most effective service in position further to the right, 
 where nearly all the guns of the battalion were disabled. 
 Upon the arrival of McLaws's Division, we marched to the 
 rear, renewed our supply of ammunition, and returned to our 
 position in the wood, near the church, which ground we held 
 till a late hour in the afternoon, when we moved somewhat 
 further to the right and bivouacked for the night. With the 
 close of this bloody day ceased the hardest fought battle of 
 the war. 
 
 In the Military Biography of Stonewall Jackson, edited by 
 Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D., occur the following passages (pp. 
 330-31) in reference to this engagement: 
 
 "Seeing Hood in their path the enemy paused, and a Northern 
 correspondent writes : ' While our advance rather faltered, the rebels, 
 greatly reinforced, made a sudden and impetuous onset,* and drove our 
 gallant fellows back over a portion of the hard won field. What we had 
 
 * The above mentioned large reinforcements were my two small brigades. 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 45 
 
 won, however, was not relinquished without a desperate struggle, and 
 here, up the hills and down, through the woods and the standing corn, 
 over the ploughed land and clover, the hne of fire swept to and fro as 
 one side or the other gained a temporary advantage.' 
 
 " Hood was now fighting with his right toward the main line of the 
 enemy, for General Hooker had swept round so far, that, as we have 
 said, his line was almost at right angles with its original position. Hood 
 threw himself into the action with great gallantry, and says in his report : 
 ' Here I witnessed the most terrible clash of arms by far that has 
 occurred during the war. The two little giant brigades of my command 
 wrestled with the mighty force, and although they lost hundreds of their 
 officers and men, they drove them from their position, and forced them 
 to abandon their guns on our left.' ' One of these brigades numbered 
 only eight hundred and fifty-four {854) men.' " 
 
 The following morning I arose before dawn and rode to the 
 front where, just after daybreak, General Jackson came pacing 
 up on his horse, and instantly asked, " Hood, have they gone?" 
 When I answered in the negative, he replied " I hoped they 
 had," and then passed on to look after his brave but greatly 
 exhausted command. 
 
 The subjoined letter, I have no doubt, obtained my promo- 
 tion about this period. I had no knowledge of its existence 
 until after the close of the war, when it was handed to me in 
 New York by Mr. Meyer, to whom I am indebted for the 
 favor. He was at the time of the surrender a clerk in the 
 War Office, at Richmond, and, in consideration of the unsettled 
 condition of affairs, placed it am.ong his papers for preservation: 
 
 " Headquarters, V. Dist., ) 
 " Sept. 27th, 1862. ] 
 
 "General: — I respectfully recommend that Brig. Genl. J. B. Hood 
 be promoted to the rank of a Major General. He was under my 
 command during the engagements along the Chickahominy, com- 
 mencing on the 27th of June last, when he rendered distinguished 
 service. Though not of my command in the recently hard fought battle 
 near Sharpsburg, Maryland, yet for a portion of the day I had occasion 
 to give directions respecting his operations, and it gives me pleasure to 
 say that his duties were discharged with such ability and zeal, as to 
 
46 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 command my admiration. I regard him as one of the most promising 
 officers of the army. 
 
 " I am, General, your obedient servant, 
 " (Signed) T. J. JACKSON, 
 
 " Major General." 
 
 '' General S. Cooper, 
 
 " Adjutant and Inspector General, C. S. A. 
 
 " Endorsed, New York, November 9th, 1866." 
 
 " The enclosed letter from General Jackson to General Cooper was 
 handed to General Hood by Mr. Meyer (a former clerk in the War 
 Department at Richmond), at the Southern Hotel in this city. The letter 
 is the original, and preserved by Mr. Meyer. 
 
 " (Signed) F. S. STOCKDALE." 
 
 The foregoing letter is doubly kind in its tenor, inasmuch 
 as I was not serving in General Jackson's Corps at the time. 
 
 During the i8th the Confederate Army remained in pos- 
 session of the field, buried the dead, and that night crossed 
 near Shepherdstown to the south side of the Potomac. Soon 
 thereafter my division marched to a point north of Winchester, 
 and passed a pleasant month in the beautiful Valley of the 
 Shenandoah. My arrest, which General Lee, just prior to the 
 battle of Boonsboro' Gap, had • been gracious enough to 
 suspend, was never reconsidered ; the temporary release 
 became permanent, and, in lieu of being summoned to a 
 Court Martial, I was shortly afterwards promoted to the rank 
 of Major General with the command of two additional brigades. 
 
 The accession of Benning's and Anderson's brigades, which 
 had already taken part in a number of battles, composed a 
 division which any general might justly have felt honored to 
 command. The former brigade had been gallantly led by 
 General Toombs at Sharpsburg. I experienced much interest 
 in training these troops, as I endeavored to excite emulation 
 among them and thoroughly arouse their pride, in accordance 
 with the system of education I had pursued with the Fourth 
 Texas Regiment, Law's, and my original brigade. Under the 
 unfortunate organization of brigades by States, I lost the 
 Eighteenth Georgia Regiment and Hampton's Legion, to both 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 47 
 
 of which commands, I, as well as my Texas troops, had 
 become warmly attached. The former had served with me 
 longer than the latter, and in every emergency had proved 
 itself bold and trusty ; it styled itself, from a feeling of brother- 
 hood, the Third Texas. 
 
 Whilst I lost these two excellent bodies of men, I gained 
 the Third Arkansas, a large regiment, commanded by Colonel 
 Van Manning, a brave and accomplished soldier, who served 
 with distinction, and, in truth, merited higher rank and a 
 larger command. I also lost the Sixth North Carolina, Ninth 
 and Eleventh Mississippi Regiments, which, after long and 
 gallant service in Law's brigade, were also transferred to other 
 commands ; thus, unfortunately, were severed relations which 
 had been engendered and strengthened by common trials and 
 dangers. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY VIRGINIA FREDERICKSBURG, SUF- 
 FOLK, GETTYSBURG, AND CHICKAMAUGA, 
 
 The latter part of October McClellan's movements deter- 
 mined General Lee to withdraw from the Valley of the Shen- 
 andoah, leaving his cavalry in rear, and to return to the Valley 
 of the Rappahannock. Accordingly, my division took its 
 place, about the 26th, in the marching columns of Longstreet's 
 Corps, which moved in the direction of the latter point. Dur- 
 ing the previous month of quiet and rest, the troops had 
 received a supply of shoes and clothing, and had improved in 
 drill and discipline. This splendid corps, therefore, exhibited 
 a very different appearance from that which it presented in its 
 ragged and bare-footed condition, a short period before in 
 Maryland. 
 
 We halted in the vicinity of Culpepper Court House, where 
 shortly afterwards intelligence was received that McClellan 
 had been superseded by the appointment of Burnside. This 
 General promptly made a demonstration on the Upper Rappa- 
 hannock, as he moved towards Fredericksburg. General Lee 
 crossed to the south side of the Rapidan, and, by the latter 
 part of November, the Federal and Confederate Armies again 
 confronted one another at Fredericksburg, where we quietly 
 awaited the development of events. 
 
 (48) 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 49 
 
 On the nth of January, 1863, General Burnside having 
 completed all necessary preparation, began to lay pontoons 
 above and below the railroad bridge which had been destroyed. 
 That entire day and night he consumed in crossing his forces 
 to the southern bank of the river, under cover of, at least, one 
 hundred pieces of artillery. During the 12th he formed his 
 line below and above Deep Run, whilst upon the range of 
 hills overlooking the valley, Lee's forces lay in readiness to 
 receive the attack. General Jackson had, meantime, moved 
 up to form line on our right, and that day, if I remember cor- 
 rectly, as we were riding together in direction of General 
 Lee's headquarters, the conversation turned upon the future, 
 and he asked me if I expected to live to see the end of the 
 war. I replied that I did not know, but was inclined to think 
 I would survive ; at the same time, I considered it most likely 
 I would be badly shattered before the termination of the strug- 
 gle. I naturally addressed him the same question, and, with- 
 out hesitation, he answered that he did not expect to live 
 through to the close of the contest. Moreover, that he could 
 not say that he desired to do so. With this sad turn in the 
 conversation, the subject dropped. Often since have I thought 
 upon these words, spoken casually by each of us, and which 
 seem to have contained the prophecy of his untimely death and 
 of my own fate. 
 
 My division was again the centre of the Confederate Army, 
 as it rested in line of battle opposite Deep Run, full of spirit 
 and impatient for action. The following morning, after the 
 fog had disappeared, and at about lO o'clock, the heavy lines 
 of the enemy advanced upon our right and against Jackson's 
 forces, but were driven back beneath the fire of our guns 
 posted on that part of the line. Again, at about I p. m., the 
 attack was renewed, and the Federals penetrated into a gap 
 left in Jackson's front line. They were, however, speedily 
 repulsed by his brigades held in reserve. My troops repelled 
 with ease thje feeble attack made on their immediate front, whilst 
 4 
 
50 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Longstreet's remaining forces on the left drove the enemy back 
 repeatedly with great slaughter near Marye's Hill. 
 
 I was directed in this battle, as at Second Manassas, to obey 
 the orders either of Generals Lee, Jackson, or Longstreet. 
 About sunset, after the musketry fire had nigh ceased, I 
 received instructions through an officer of Jackson's staff to 
 join in a movement on my right as soon as A. P. Hill's division 
 advanced. The order was accompanied with a message from 
 General Jackson that he intended to drive the enemy into the 
 river. I responded that I was in readiness to act, but, for some 
 reason unknown to me, these orders were countermanded. 
 
 About lo o'clock that night I rode back to my encampment 
 to procure a cup of coffee, and, General Lee's quarters being 
 within a few hundred yards, I walked up the ridge and pre- 
 sented myself at his tent. He immediately asked me what 
 I thought of the attack by the enemy during the day. I 
 expressed my opinion that Burnside was whipped ; that no 
 good general would ever make an assault similar to that upon 
 my right and left, without intending it as his main effort, and 
 that the heavy roll of musketry I had heard clearly convinced 
 me that the hardest part of the battle had been fought. He 
 then remarked that he did not think Burnside had made his 
 principal attempt, but would attack again the next day, and 
 that we would drive him back and follow him up to the river. 
 After conversing a few moments longer, during which time he 
 was in the highest spirits, I returned to my line, where I con- 
 tinued the remainder of the night. 
 
 The morning of the 14th both Armies still lay face to face, 
 no aggressive movement having been initiated by either side, 
 when about noon Generals Lee and Jackson rode by my 
 position, and invited me to accompany them on a reconnois- 
 sance towards our right. We soon reached an eminence, not 
 far distant from Hamilton's Crossing on the railroad, and upon 
 which some of our batteries were posted. From this point 
 we had a magnificent view of the Federal lines on their left, 
 some seven in number, and each, seemingly, a mile in length. 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 51 
 
 General Jackson here turned to me, and asked my estimate of 
 the strength of the enemy then in sight and in our immediate 
 front. I answered fifty thousand, and he remarked that he 
 had estimated their numbers at fifty-five thousand. 
 
 Strange to say, amid this immense assemblage of Federal 
 troops not a standard was to be seen ; the colors were all low- 
 ered, which circumstance induced me to abide by the opinion 
 I had expressed to General Lee the night previous. The 
 two Armies stood still during this entire day, and the follow- 
 ing morning we awoke to find the enemy on the north side of 
 the Rappahannock. 
 
 In this vicinity my division was quartered for the Winter, 
 and my tent remained near that of General Lee. • It was my 
 privilege to often visit him during his leisure hours, and con- 
 verse with the freedom of yore upon the frontier. In one of 
 our agreeable chats, in company wnth General Chilton, his 
 chief of staff, he complained of his Army for burning fence rails, 
 killing pigs, and committing sundry delinquencies of this 
 character. I spoke up warmly in defence of my division, 
 declaring that it was not guilty of these misdemeanors, and 
 desired him to send Chilton to inspect the fences in the neigh- 
 borhood of my troops. General Lee, who was walking up 
 and down near his camp fire, turned toward me and laughingly 
 said, " Ah, General Hood, when you Texans come about the 
 chickens have to roost mighty high." His raillery excited 
 great merriment, and I felt I was somewhat at a stand ; never- 
 theless, I urged that General Chilton be sent at least to inspect 
 the fences. 
 
 Time passed pleasantly till the early Spring, when General 
 Longstreet marched back to Petersburg, and thence towards 
 Suffolk — a movement I never could satisfactorily account for, 
 and which proved unfortunate, since it allowed General Hooker, 
 who had superseded Burnside the latter part of April, to cross 
 the Rappahannock and attack General Lee in the absence of 
 one-half of his Army. The transcendent genius of " Stone- 
 wall," by which he executed one of his most brilliant moves 
 
52 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to the rear of the assailants, once more thwarted the Federal 
 Commander, who was hurled back beyond the Rappahannock 
 to seek refuge upon Stafford Heights, But alas ! at a terrible 
 sacrifice, an irreparable loss to the Confederacy : the immortal 
 Jackson. 
 
 I had received information of Hooker's anticipated advance, 
 and was most anxious to rejoin my old chief, General Lee. 
 Never did I so long to be with him as in this instance, and I 
 even proceeded so far as to apply for permission to move with 
 my division to his support. The request, however, was not 
 granted. 
 
 Longstreet, after receiving the order to join General Lee, 
 made every effort to accomplish this great end, but his wagons 
 were, unfortunately, out in search of forage, and the march 
 was consequently delayed ; for which reason we failed to reach 
 Chancellorsville in time to participate in the battle. 
 
 Nothing was achieved against the enemy on the expedition 
 to Suffolk, at which point he possessed a safe place of refuge 
 within his strong fortifications, protected by an impenetrable 
 abatis. During our sojourn in this vicinity, quite a spirited 
 affair occurred between our troops and the Federal gunboats^ 
 on the Nansemond river, and in which I suffered a grave mis- 
 fortune in the loss of Captain Turner, of the Fifth Texas. As 
 an outpost ofificer, he was gifted with the same pre-eminent 
 qualities which distinguished the gallant Upton. 
 
 On the march from Suffolk to Chancellorsville, intelligence 
 reached us of the Confederate victory and of the death of 
 Jackson. This latter event occasioned me deep distress. I 
 was hereupon prompted to write to General Lee, giving expres- 
 sion to my sorrow, and, at the same time, to my regret at our 
 failure to join him before the great battle he had just fought 
 and won. In reply to my brief note, he addressed me as 
 follows : 
 
 " Camp Freds, 21st May, jS6j. 
 " My Dear General : — Upon my return from Richmond, I found 
 your letter of the 13th awaiting me. Although separated from me^ I 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 53 
 
 have always had you in my eye and thoughts. I wished for you much 
 in the last battle, and believe had I had the whole Army with me, Gen- 
 eral Hooker would have been demolished. But God ordered othenvise. 
 "I grieve much over the death of General Jackson — for our sakes, not 
 for his. He is happy and at peace. But his spirit lives with us, and I 
 hope it will raise up many Jacksons in our ranks. We must all do more 
 than formerly. We must endeavor to follow the unselfish, devoted, 
 intrepid course he pursued, and we shall be strengthened rather than 
 weakened by his loss. I rely much upon you. You must so inspire and 
 lead your brave division, as that it may accomplish the work of a corps. 
 I agree with you as to the size of the corps of this Army. They are too 
 large for the country we have to operate in for one man to handle. I 
 saw it all last campaign. I have endeavored to remedy it — this in a 
 measure at least — but do not know whether I shall succeed. I am much 
 obliged to you always for your opinion. I know you give it from pure 
 motives. If I am not always convinced, you must bear with me. I 
 agree with you also in believing that our Army would be invincible if it 
 could be properly organized and officered. There never were such men 
 in an Army before. They will go anywhere and do anything if prop- 
 erly led. But there is the difficulty — proper commanders — where can 
 they be obtained ? But they are improving — constantly improving. 
 Rome was not built in a day, nor can we expect miracles in our favor. 
 
 " Wishing you every health and happiness, and committing you to the 
 care of a kind Providence, 
 
 " I am now and always your friend, 
 "(Signed) R. E. LEE. 
 
 " General J. B. HooD, 
 
 " Commanding Division." 
 
 Again early in May we were in bivouac in the Rapidan, and 
 preparations were initiated for another campaign. The artillery 
 and transportation were carefully inspected, and whatever was 
 found unserviceable was sent to the rear. At this period my 
 division was in splendid condition, its four brigades being 
 under the direction of Law, Benning, Anderson and Robert- 
 son. Past service had created with each command a feeling 
 of perfect confidence in its associate whenever brought under 
 fire. The artillery had again been increased by the addition 
 of a number of pieces, as will be seen by the following report 
 of Colonel Owen: 
 
54 
 
 ADVAiNCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 "Headquarters Battalion Washington Artillery, ) 
 " New Orleans, February Jjlh, iSyg. \ 
 
 '^ Copy of Report of Major Henry's Battalion of Artillery, July igth, 
 i86j, attached to Hood's Divisiojt, First {Longs tree t's) Corps, Arfny 
 of Northern Virginia : 
 
 battery commanders. 
 
 c 
 
 o 
 
 2 
 
 rt 
 
 II 
 
 Captain Buckman, 
 
 Captain Garden, 
 
 Captain Reiley, 
 
 Captain Latham, 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 
 II 
 
 6 
 
 I 
 
 "Official copy from original return, i8. 
 
 " (Signed) W. M. 
 
 OWEN. 
 
 
 " Late Adjutant to Chief Artillery First Corps." 
 
 This battalion completed the organization of as brave and 
 heroic a division, numbering, approximately, eight thousand 
 effectives, as was ever made ready for active service. So high- 
 wrought was the pride and self-reliance of the troops that they 
 believed they could carve their way through almost any 
 number of the enemy's lines, formed in the open field in their 
 front. 
 
 Soon after the ist of June the Confederate forces crossed 
 the Rapidan, and .advanced again in the direction of Maryland. 
 About the middle of the month we forded the Potomac, which 
 was so swollen by recent rain that the men were forced to 
 uplift their cartridge boxes, in order to keep dry their ammu- 
 nition. Nevertheless, they marched in regular order to the 
 northern bank of that beautiful stream, and, as they moved 
 through the deep water the inspiriting strains of " Dixie " 
 burst forth from bands of music. Never before, nor since, 
 have I witnessed such intense enthusiasm as that which pre- 
 vailed throughout the entire Confederate Army. 
 
 Shortly afterwards we crossed into Pennsylvania, amid 
 extravagant cheers which re-echoed all along the line. Our 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 55 
 
 forces marched undisturbed, and were massed in the vicinity 
 of Chambersburg, where intelhgence was received of General 
 Meade's assignment to the command of the Federal Army. 
 
 My headquarters were again in close proximity to those of 
 General Lee, and, after a few days devoted to rest and quiet, I, 
 as usual, rode to pay him my respects. I found him in the 
 same buoyant spirits which pervaded his magnificent army. 
 After the ordinary salutation, he exclaimed, " Ah ! General, the 
 enemy is a long time finding us ; if he does not succeed soon, 
 we must go in search of him." I assured him I was never so 
 well prepared or more willing. 
 
 A few days thereafter, we were ordered to Gettysburg, and 
 to march with all possible speed. 
 
 The following letter, which I addressed General Longstreet 
 in 1875, gives, up to the hour I was wounded and borne from 
 the field, an account of the part taken by my command in the 
 great battle which ensued : 
 
 " New Orleans, La., June 28th, iSj^. 
 
 " General James Longstreet : — General, I have not responded 
 earlier to your letter of April 5th, by reason of pressure of business, 
 which rendered it difficult for me to give due attention to the subject in 
 regard to which you have desired information. 
 
 "You are correct in your assumption that I failed to make a report of 
 the operations of my division around Suffolk, Va., and of its action in 
 the battle of Gettysburg, in consequence of a wound which I received in 
 this engagement. In justice to the brave troops under my command at 
 this period, I should here mention another cause for this apparent neg- 
 lect of duty on my part. Before I had recovered from the severe wound 
 received at Gettysburg, your corps (excepting Pickett's Division) was 
 ordered to join General Bragg, in the West, for battle against Rosecranz ; 
 my old troops — with whom I had served so long — were thus to be sent 
 forth to another Army — quasi, I may say, among strangers — to take part 
 in a great struggle ; and upon an appeal from a number of the brigade 
 and regimental officers of my division, I consented to accompany them, 
 although I had but the use of one arm. This movement to the West soon 
 resulted in the battle of Chickamauga, where I was again so seriously 
 wounded as to cause the loss of a limb. These severe wounds in close 
 succession, in addition to the all-absorbing duties and anxieties attending 
 the last year of the war, prevented me from submitting subsequently a 
 
56 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 repprt, as likewise one after the battle of Chickamauga, in which 
 engagement — whilst you led the left wing — I had the honor of command- 
 ing your corps together with three divisions of the Army of Tennessee, 
 respectively under A. P. Stewart, Bushrod Johnson and Hindman. Thus, 
 the gallantry of these troops, as well as the admirable conduct of my 
 division at Gettysburg, I have left unrecorded. 
 
 " With this apology for seeming neglect, I will proceed to give a brief 
 sketch, from memory, of the events forming the subject of your letter: 
 
 "My recollection of the circumstances connected with the attempt, 
 whilst we were lying in front of Suffolk, to reach General Lee in time to 
 participate in the battle of Chancellorsville, is very clear. The order 
 directing your corps to move to the support of General Lee, was received 
 about the time Hooker crossed the Rappahannock. Unfortunately we 
 had been compelled by scarcity of forage to send off our wagons into 
 North Carolina to gather a supply from that State. A short delay 
 necessarily ensued, as couriers had to be dispatched for requisite trans- 
 portation before the troops could move. Every effort, however, was 
 made to get to Lee at the earliest moment. If my memory betrays me 
 not, you repaired in advance of your corps to Petersburg or Richmond, 
 having issued orders for us to march with all possible speed to Lee, on 
 the Rappahannock. I was most anxious to get to the support of my old 
 chief, and made strenuous efforts to do so ; but, whilst on a forced march 
 to accomplish this object, I received intelligence of our victory at Chan- 
 cellorsville, and of Jackson's mortal wound. We, nevertheless, continued 
 our march, and eventually went into bivouac upon the Rapidan, near 
 Gordonsville. 
 
 " After the batde of Chancellorsville, preparations were made for an 
 offensive campaign. 
 
 "Accordingly, my troops moved out of camp, crossed the Rapidan 
 about the 5th June, 1863, and joined in the general move in the direction 
 of the Potomac. We crossed the river about the middle of the same 
 month, and marched into Pennsylvania. Hill's and Ewell's Corps were 
 in advance, and were reported to be in the vicinity of Carlisle. Whilst 
 lying in camp, not far distant from Chambersburg, information was 
 received that Ewell and Hill were about to come in contact with the 
 enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws's Division, 
 were put in modon upon the most direct road to that point, which, after 
 a hard march, we reached before or at sunrise on the 2d of July. So 
 imperative had been the orders to hasten forward with all possible speed, 
 that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about 
 two hours, during the night from the ist to the 2d of July. 
 
 " I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly 
 after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 57 
 
 July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, 
 where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. 
 A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of 
 that same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals 
 Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General 
 Lee — with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-belt buckled round the 
 waist, and field glasses pending at his side — walked up and down in the 
 shade of the large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the 
 enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet, at times, buried in deep thought. 
 Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree 
 not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the 
 Federal Army. 
 
 "General Lee was, seemingly, anxious you should attack that morning. 
 He remarked to me, ' The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, 
 he will whip us.' You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's 
 Division — at that tirne still in the rear — in order to make the attack ; and 
 you said to me, subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the 
 trunk of a tree : ' The General is a little nervous this morning ; he 
 wishes me to attack ; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never 
 like to go into battle with one boot off.' 
 
 " Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day, when in the after- 
 noon — about 3 o'clock — it was decided to no longer await Pickett's 
 Division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmets- 
 burg road. McLaws moved off, and I followed with my division. In a 
 short time I was ordered to quicken the march of my troops, and to pass 
 to the front of McLaws. 
 
 "This movement was accomplished by throwing out an advanced 
 force to tear down fences and clear the way. The instructions I received 
 were to place my division across the Emmetsburg road, form line of 
 battle, and attack. Before reaching this road, however, I had sent 
 forward some of my picked Texas scouts to ascertain the position of the 
 enemy's extreme left flank. They soon reported to me that it rested 
 upon Round Top Mountain ; that the country was open, and that I 
 could march through an open woodland pasture around Round Top, and 
 assault the enemy in flank and rear; that their wagon trains were 
 packed in rear of their line, and were badly exposed to our attack 
 in that direction. As soon as I arrived upon the Emmetsburg road, I 
 placed one or two batteries in position and opened fire. A reply from 
 the enemy's guns soon developed his lines. His left rested on or near 
 Round Top, with line bending back and again forward, forming, as it 
 were, a concave line, as approached by the Emmetsburg road. A con- 
 siderable body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between 
 
58 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 the Emmetsburg road and Round Top Mountain. This force was in 
 line of battle upon an eminence near a peach orchard. 
 
 " I found that in making the attack according to orders, viz. : up the 
 Emmetsburg road, I should have first to encounter and drive off this 
 advanced line of battle ; secondly, at the base and along the slope of the 
 miountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so massed together as 
 to form narrow openings, which would break our ranks and cause the 
 men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky precipice. I found, more- 
 over, that my division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main 
 line of the enemy in position on the crest of the high range, of which 
 Round Top was the extreme left, and, by reason of the concavity of the 
 enemy's main line, that we would be subject to a destructive fire in flank 
 and rear, as well as in front ; and deemed it almost an impossibility to 
 clamber along the boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, 
 under this number of cross fires, put the enemy to flight. I knew that 
 if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as 
 brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle. 
 
 " The reconnoissanceof my Texas scouts and the development of the 
 Federal lines were effected in a very short space of time ; in truth, shorter 
 than I have taken to recall and jot down these facts, although the scenes 
 and events of that day are as clear to my mind as if the great battle had 
 been fought yesterday. I was in possession of these important facts so 
 shortly after reaching the Emmetsburg road, that I considered it my duty 
 to report to you, at once, my opinion that it was unwise to attack up the 
 Emmetsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me to turn 
 Round Top, and attack the enemy in flank and rear. Accordingly, I 
 despatched a staff officer, bearing to you my request to be allowed to 
 make the proposed movement on account of the above stated reasons. 
 Your reply was quickly received, ' General Lee's orders are to attack up 
 the Emmetsburg road.' I sent another officer to say that I feared nothing 
 could be accomplished by such an attack, and renewed my request to 
 turn Round Top. Again your answer was, ' General Lee's orders are to 
 attack up the Emmetsburg road." During this interim I had continued 
 the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become more and more 
 convinced that the Federal line extended to Round Top, and that I could 
 not reasonably hope to accomplish much by the attack as ordered. In 
 fact, it seemed to me the enemy occupied a position by nature so strong 
 — I may say impregnable — that, independently of their flank fire, they 
 could easily repel our attack by merely throwing and rolling stones down 
 the mountain side, as we approached. 
 
 " A third time I despatched one of my staff to explain fully in regard 
 to the situation, and suggest that you had better come and look for your- 
 self. I selected, in this instance, my adjutant-general, Colonel Harry 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 59 
 
 Sellers, whom you know to be not only an officer of great courage, but 
 also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers returned with the same message, 
 'General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.' Almost 
 simultaneously. Colonel Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the 
 above orders. 
 
 " After this urgent protest against entering the battle at Gettysburg, 
 according to instructions — which protest is the first and only one I ever 
 made during my entire military career — I ordered my line to advance 
 and make the assault. 
 
 " As my troops were moving forward, you rode up in person ; a brief 
 conversation passed between us, during which I again expressed the 
 fears above mentioned, and regret at not being allowed to attack in flank 
 around Round Top. You answered to this effect, ' We must obey the 
 orders of General Lee.' I then rode forward with my line under a 
 heavy fire. In about twenty minutes, after reaching the peach orcliard, 
 I was severely wounded in the arm, and borne from the field. 
 
 "With this wound terminated my participation in this great battle. As 
 I was borne off on a litter to the rear, I could but experience deep dis- 
 tress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave 
 fellow-soldiers, who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world- 
 renowned army ; and I shall ever believe that had I been permitted to 
 turn Round Top Mountain, we would not only have gained that position, 
 but have been able finally to rout the enemy. 
 
 " I am, respectfully, yours, 
 
 "J. B. HOOD." 
 
 Notwithstanding the seemingly impregnable character of 
 the enemy's position upon Round Top Mountain, Benning's 
 brigade, in concert with the First Texas Regiment, succeeded 
 in gaining temporary possession of the Federal line; they 
 captured three guns, and sent them to the rear. Unfortunately, 
 the other commands, whose advance up a steep ascent, was 
 impeded by immense boulders and sharp ledges of rock, were 
 unable to keep pace up the mountain side in their front, and 
 render the necessary support. Never did a grander, more 
 heroic division enter into battle ; nor did ever troops fight 
 more desperately to overcome the insurmountable difficulties 
 against which they had to contend, as Law, Benning, Ander- 
 son and Robertson nobly led their brave men to this unsuc- 
 cessful assault. General Law, after I was wounded, assumed 
 
60 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 command of the division, and proved himself, by his courage 
 and abihty, fully equal to the responsibilities of the position. 
 
 The losses were very heavy, as shown by the reports, and 
 have often caused me the more bitterly to regret that I was 
 not permitted to turn Round Top Mountain. 
 
 The following officers of my staff, most of whom served with 
 me throughout the war, rendered gallant and efficient service, 
 not only in this great battle, but upon many fields where we 
 were thrown together in the heat of action : Colonel W. H. 
 Sellers, Assistant Adjutant General; Colonel E. H. Cunning- 
 ham, Inspector General; Major B. H. Blanton, Captain John 
 Smith, Captain James Hamilton, Lieutenant E, B. Wade, 
 Aides-de-Camp; Major N. B. George, Quarter Master; Major 
 Jonas, Commissary; and Captain D. L. Sublett, Ordnance 
 Officer, faultlessly discharged their duties in their respective 
 departments. Dr. John T. Darby, Chief Surgeon, distinguished 
 himself by his untiring energy in caring for the wounded ; the 
 eminent talent which he displayed in his province, during our 
 struggle, has since deservedly won for him a high position in 
 the medical world. 
 
 My official reports bear testimony to the valuable services 
 of other gentlemen temporarily attached to my headquarters. 
 In truth, I can say with pride that no General was ever more 
 ably supported by staff officers than myself, during the war. 
 
 When the Confederate Army fell back from Gettysburg, I 
 followed our marching column in an ambulance, suffering very 
 much from the wound received in my arm. In the same vehicle 
 lay General Hampton, so badly wounded that he was unable 
 to sit up, whereas I could not lie down. We journeyed 
 together in this manner to Staunton, a distance of some two 
 hundred miles. Along the pike were seen our wounded, 
 making their way to the rear, and the noble women of Vir- 
 ginia, standing by the wayside to supply them with food, and 
 otherwise administer to their wants. 
 
 I remained for a period of one month under medical treat- 
 ment, first at Staunton and then at Charlottesville, whence I 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— IN THE WEST. 61 
 
 proceeded to Richmond. About the 14th of September my 
 division passed through the Capital, under orders to join 
 General Bragg in the West for the purpose of taking part in 
 battle against Rosecranz. Although I had but partially 
 recovered, I determined, for reasons already stated in my letter 
 to General Longstreet, to place my horse upon the train, and 
 follow in their wake. 
 
 I arrived at Ringgold, Georgia, on the afternoon of the i8th, 
 and there received an order from General Bragg to proceed on 
 the road to Reid's bridge, and assume command of the column 
 then advancing on the Federals. I had my horse to leap from 
 the train, mounted with one arm in a sling, and, about 3 p. m., 
 joined our forces, then under the direction of General Bushrod 
 Johnson and in line of battle. A small body of Federal 
 cavalry was posted upon an eminence a short distance beyond. 
 On my arrival upon the field I met for the first time after the 
 charge at Gettysburg a portion of my old troops, who received 
 me with a touching welcome. After a few words of greeting 
 exchanged with General Johnson, I assumed command in 
 accordance with the instructions I had received, ordered the 
 line to be broken by filing into the road, sent a few picked 
 men to the front in support of Forrest's Cavalry, and began 
 to drive the enemy at a rapid pace. In a short time we 
 arrived at Reid's bridge across the Chickamauga, and dis- 
 covered the Federals drawn up in battle array beyond the 
 bridge, which they had partially destroyed. I ordered forward 
 some pieces of artillery, opened fire, and, at the same time, 
 threw out flankers to effect a crossing above and below and 
 join in the attack. Our opponents quickly retreated. We 
 repaired the bridge, and continued to advance till darkness 
 closed in upon us, when we bivouacked in line, near a beau- 
 tiful residence which had been fired by the enemy, and was 
 then almost burned to the ground. We had driven the 
 Federals back a distance of six or seven miles. Meantime, 
 the main body of the Army crossed the Chickamauga at 
 
62 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 different points, and concentrated that night in the vicinity of 
 my command. 
 
 General Bragg having formed his plan of attack the follow- 
 ing morning, I was given, in addition to my own division, 
 the direction of Kershaw's and Johnson's Divisions, with orders 
 to continue the advance. We soon encountered the enemy in 
 strong force, and a heavy engagement ensued. All that day 
 we fought, slowly but steadily gaining ground. Fierce and 
 desperate grew the conflict, as the foe stubbornly yielded 
 before our repeated assaults ; we drove him, step by step, 
 a distance of fully one mile, when nightfall brought about a 
 cessation of hostilities, and the men slept upon their arms. 
 
 In the evening, according to my custom in Virginia under 
 General Lee, I rode back to Army headquarters to report to 
 the Commander-in-Chief the result of the day upon my part 
 of the line. I there met for the first time several of the prin- 
 cipal officers of the Army of Tennessee, and, to my surprise, 
 not one spoke in a sanguine tone regarding the result of the 
 battle in which we were then engaged. I found the gallant 
 Breckinridge, whom I had known from early youth, seated by 
 the root of a tree, with a heavy slouch hat upon his head. 
 When, in the course of brief conversation, I stated that we 
 would rout the enemy the following day, he sprang to his feet, 
 exclaiming, " My dear Hood, I am delighted to hear you say 
 so. You give me renewed hope ; God grant it may be so." 
 
 After receiving orders from General Bragg to advance the 
 next morning as soon as the troops on my right moved to the 
 attack, I returned to the position occupied by my forces, and 
 camped the remainder of the night with General Buckner, as 
 I had nothing with me save that which I had brought from 
 the train upon my horse. Nor did my men have a single 
 wagon, or even ambulance in which to convey the wounded. 
 They were destitute of almost eveiything, I might say, except 
 pride, spirit, and forty rounds of ammunition to the man. 
 
 During that night, after a hard day's fight by his old and 
 trusty troops, General Longstreet joined the Army. He 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— IN THE WEST. 63 
 
 reported to General Bragg after I had left Army headquarters, 
 and, the next morning, when I had arranged my columns for 
 the attack and was awaiting the signal on the right to adv^ance, 
 he rode up, and joined me. He inquired concerning the for- 
 mation of my lines, the spirit of our troops, and the effect 
 produced upon the enemy by our assault. I informed him 
 that the feeling of officers and men was never better, that we 
 had driven the enemy fully one mile the day before, and that 
 we would rout him before sunset. This distinguished general 
 instantly responded with that confidence which had so often 
 contributed to his extraordinary success, that we would of 
 course whip and drive him from the field. I could but exclaim 
 that I was rejoiced to hear him so express himself, as he was 
 the first general I had met since my arrival who talked of 
 victory. 
 
 He was assigned to the direction of the left wing, and placed 
 me in command of five divisions : Kershaw's, A. P. Stewart's, 
 Bushrod Johnson's, and Hindman's, together with my own. 
 The latter formed the centre of my line, with Hindman upon 
 my left, Johnson and Stewart on the right, and Kershaw in 
 reserve. About 9 a. m. the firing on the right commenced; 
 we immediately advanced and engaged the enemy, when 
 followed a terrible roar of musketry from right to left. Onward 
 we moved, nerved with a determination to become masters of 
 that hotly contested field. We wrestled with the resolute foe 
 till about 2.30 p. m., when, from a skirt of timber to our left, 
 a body of Federals rushed down upon the immediate flank 
 and rear of the Texas brigade, which was forced to suddenly 
 change front. Some confusion necessarily arose. I was at 
 the time on my horse, upon a slight ridge about three hundred 
 yards distant, and galloped down the slope, in the midst of the 
 men, who speedily corrected their allignment. At this 
 moment Kershaw's splendid division, led by its gallant com- 
 mander, came forward, as Hindman advanced to the attack a 
 little further to the left. Kershaw's line formed, as it were, an 
 angle with that of the Federal line, then in full view in an open 
 
64 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 space near the wood. I rode rapidly to his command, ordered 
 a change of front forward on his right, which was promptly- 
 executed under a gallmg fire. With a shout along my entire 
 front, the Confederates rushed forward, penetrated into the 
 wood, over and beyond the enemy's breastworks, and thus 
 achieved another glorious victory for our arms. About this 
 time I was pierced with a Minie ball in the upper third of the 
 right leg; I turned from my horse upon the side of the 
 crushed limb and fell — strange to say, since I was com- 
 manding five divisions — into the arms of some of the troops 
 of my old brigade, which I had directed so long a period, and 
 upon so many fields of battle. 
 
 Long and constant service with this noble brigade must 
 prove a sufficient apology for a brief reference, at this juncture, 
 to its extraordinary military record from the hour of its first 
 encounter with the enemy at Eltham's Landing, on York 
 river, in 1862, to the surrender at Appomattox Court House. 
 In almost every battle in Virginia it bore a conspicuous part. 
 It acted as the advanced guard of Jackson when he moved 
 upon McClellan, around Richmond ; and, almost without an 
 exceptional instance, it was among the foremost of Long- 
 street's Corps in an attack or pur-suit of the enemy. It was 
 also, as a rule, with the rear guard of the rear guard of this 
 corps, whenever falling back- before the adversary. If a ditch 
 was to be leaped, or fortified position to be carried. General 
 Lee knew no better troops upon which to rely. In truth, its 
 signal achievements in the war of secession have never been 
 surpassed in the history of nations. 
 
 The members of this heroic band were possessed of a streak 
 of superstition, as in fact I believe all men to be ; and it may 
 here prove of interest to cite an instance thereof I had a 
 favorite roan horse, named by them " Jeff Davis ; " whenever 
 he was in condition I rode him in battle, and, remarkable as 
 it may seem, he generally received the bullets and bore me 
 unscathed. In this battle he was severely wounded on Satur- 
 day ; the following day, I was forced to resort to a valuable 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— IN THE WEST. 65 
 
 mare in my possession, and late in the afternoon was shot 
 from the saddle. At Gettysburg I had been unable to mount 
 him on the field, in consequence of lameness ; in this engage- 
 ment I had also been shot from the saddle. Thus the belief 
 among the men became nigh general that, when mounted on 
 old Jeff, the bullets could not find me. This spirited and fear- 
 less animal performed his duty throughout the war, and after 
 which he received tender care from General Jefferson and 
 family of Seguin, Texas, until death, when he was buried with 
 appropriate honors. 
 
 When wounded I was borne to the hospital of my old 
 division, where a most difficult operation was performed by 
 Dr. T. G. Richardson, of New Orleans. He was at the time 
 Chief Medical Officer of the Army of Tennessee, and is now* 
 the President of the Medical Association of the United States. 
 
 The day after the battle I was carried upon a litter some 
 fifteen miles to the residence of Mr. Little, in Armuchee 
 Valley. I remained there about one month under the attentive 
 care of Mr. and Mrs. Little, the parents of the gallant Colonel 
 Little, of my division, and under the able medical attendance 
 of Dr. John T. Darby. 
 
 I then received intelligence from General Bragg that the 
 enemy was contemplating a raid to capture me. I at once 
 moved to Atlanta, and thence to Richmond. 
 
 General Longstreet, has since the war, informed me that he 
 telegraphed the authorities of the Confederate Government 
 from the battle field, on the day I was wounded, urging my 
 promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, and was kind 
 enough about the same time to send the following letter : 
 
 " Headquarters, Chattanooga, ) 
 " September 24th, 1863. \ 
 
 "General: — I respectfully recommend Major General J. B. Hood 
 for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, for distinguished 
 conduct and abiUty in the battle of the 20th inst. General Hood 
 
 5 * 1878-79. 
 
66 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 handled his troops with the coolness and ability that I have rarely known 
 by any officer, on any field, and had the misfortune, after winning the 
 battle, to lose one of his hmbs. 
 
 " I remain, sir, very respectfully, 
 
 " Your obedient servant, 
 " (Signed) J, LONGSTREET, 
 
 " Lieutenant General." 
 
 " General S. Cooper, 
 
 " Adjutant and Inspector General. 
 
 " Endorsed : 
 
 " Headquarters, near Chattanooga, September 24th, 1863." 
 
 "W. D. 1988. 
 " J. Longstreet, Lieutenant General, recommends Major General J. B. 
 Hood for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General for distinguished 
 services in the battle of the 20th inst." 
 
 " I cordially unite in this just tribute, 
 
 "BRAXTON BRAGG, 
 
 "General." 
 
 " Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War. 
 
 " By order ED. A. PALFREY, 
 
 " Lieutenant Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General, 
 
 " Respectfully submitted to the President." 
 
 " I cannot too warmly express my appreciation of the character and 
 services of this distinguished officer, and cordially concur in recommend- 
 ing his promotion, if only as an appropriate testimonial of the gratitude 
 of the Confederacy. 
 
 "J. A. SEDDON, 
 
 " Secretary of War. 
 
 "3d October, 1863." 
 
 " The services of Major General Hood, and his character as a soldier 
 and patriot, are equal to any reward, and justify the highest trust. The 
 recommendation to confer additional rank, as a testimonial, must have 
 been hastily made. The law prescribes the conditions on which Lieu- 
 tenant Generals may be appointed. Please refer to act. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 "October 3d, 1863." 
 
 The subjoined extract from a letter of the Hon. Mr. Seddon, 
 Secretary of War, addressed to Senator Wigfall will explain 
 the endorsement of President Davis : 
 
CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY— VIRGINIA. 67 
 
 " Richmond, Va. | 
 " October I4tk, 1863. j 
 
 * * * * <<j have felt the deepest interest for your friend, and I 
 trust I may say mine, the gallant Hood. He is a true hero, and was the 
 Paladin of the fight. I need not say how willingly I would have mani- 
 fested my appreciation of his great services and heroic devotion by 
 immediate promotion, and but for some rigid notions the President had 
 of his powers (you know how inflexible he is on such points), he, too, 
 would have been pleased to confer the merited honor." * * * 
 
 I remained in Richmond, and, having been blessed, with a 
 good constitution, rapidly recovered from my wound. By the 
 middle of January, 1864, I was again able to mount my horse 
 and enjoy exercise. My restoration was so complete that I 
 was enabled to keep in the saddle when on active duty, and, 
 during the remainder of the war, never to require an ambu- 
 lance either day or night. Often President Davis was kind 
 enough to invite me to accompany him in his rides around 
 Richmond, and it was thus I was for the first time afforded an 
 opportunity to become well acquainted with this extraordinary 
 man, and illustrious patriot and statesman of the South. His 
 wonderful nerve and ability, displayed at a most trying epoch 
 of our history, commanded my admiration ; he was not only 
 battling with enemies abroad, but with a turbulent Congress 
 at home. 
 
 It was during our pleasant excursions round Richmond 
 that he imparted to me his purpose to largely re-enforce Gen- 
 eral J. E. Johnston's Army at Dalton, for the object of moving 
 in the early Spring to the rear of the Federal Army, then 
 concentrating at Chattanooga. He also expressed a desire 
 to send me to command a corps under General Johnston. I 
 was deeply impressed with the importance of this movement, 
 and cheerfully acquiesced in the proposition of the President, 
 but with the understanding that an aggressive campaign would 
 be initiated. I was loth, indeed, to leave General Lee and the 
 troops with whom I had served for so long a period. 
 
 I was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, left 
 Richmond about the 1st of February, arrived at Dalton, 
 
68 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Georgia, on the 4th, and reported for duty to General J. E. 
 Johnston. 
 
 A short time before leaving the Capital General Breckin- 
 ridge, whilst we were together in my room at the Spotswood 
 Hotel, approached the seat I was occupying, and placed his 
 hands upon my head, saying, " My dear Hood, here you are 
 beloved by your fellow-soldiers, and, although badly shattered, 
 with the comfort of having done noble service, and without 
 trouble or difficulty with any man." In truth, the course of 
 my official duties up to this hour had not, I might say, been 
 ruffled in any degree. My relations with my superiors, as 
 well as with officers of lesser rank, had been of a most friendly 
 character. But alas, after a journey over a smooth sea for 
 many days — aye three years — a storm suddenly arose which 
 lasted not only to the close of the war, but a long period 
 thereafter. 
 
 The foregoing chapters, Avhich contain a brief record of my 
 experiences up to the day I reported for duty in the Army of 
 Tennessee, were written after the body of this work was pre- 
 pared for publication. As the Dalton-Atlanta campaign pre- 
 sents no action which rises to the dignity of a general battle, 
 and since the strictures of General Johnston demand my 
 earnest attention, I shall here discontinue the relation of events 
 in the order which I have thus far observed, and resume the 
 narrative at the period I assumed command of the Army 
 around Atlanta. I shall substitute a reply to the erroneous 
 and injurious statements in my regard, brought forward by 
 General Johnston, and which will sufficiently record the part 
 I bore in the campaign of that Spring and early Summer. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON EFFECTIVE STRENGTH AND 
 
 LOSSES, ARMY OF TENNESSEE DALTON TO ATLANTA. 
 
 I VERY much regret I should find it incumbent upon me to 
 discuss, at this hour, certain operations in the West; but most 
 unjust strictures, passed upon me by General Johnston, and 
 which are derogatory to my character, alike as a man and a 
 soldier, compel me to speak in self-defence, or otherwise admit 
 by silence the charges brought forth. 
 
 Although I feel by reason of injustice done me in the past 
 that I have good cause to demand of our people the privilege 
 of a hearing upon certain matters little understood by them, 
 I would, nevertheless, have left the work of vindication to the 
 unbiassed historian of the future, had not my words and 
 actions been so strangely misrepresented. 
 
 Before and just after the close of the war, our people, in the 
 despair of defeat, were in no state of mind to listen to truth 
 which ran counter to their prejudices. Blind passion, how- 
 ever, has now subsided, and reason, it is hoped, has returned. 
 I therefore solicit a hearing upon the subject of some of the 
 most important historical events recounted by General John- 
 ston, and in which I was a prominent actor. 
 
 (69) 
 
70 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 In his Narrative General Johnston speaks as follows, pages 
 353-54: 
 
 " General Hood in his report of his own disastrous operations accused 
 me of gross official mis-statements of the strength of the Army and of 
 its losses — asserting that I had ' at and near Dalton ' an available force 
 of seventy-live thousand (75,000) men, and that twenty-two thousand 
 five hundred (22,500) of them were lost in the campaign, including 
 seven thousand (7000) prisoners. He recklessly appealed for the truth 
 of these a:ssertions to Major Kinloch Falconer, Assistant Adjutant Gen- 
 eral, by whom the returns of the Army were made, which were my 
 authority for the statement attacked by General Hood. At my request, 
 made in consequence of this attack. Major Falconer made another state- 
 ment from the data in his possession, which contradicts the appellant. 
 By that statement the effective strength of the Army ' at and near Dal- 
 ton ' was forty thousand four hundred and eighty-four (40,484) infantry 
 and artillery, and twenty -three hundred and ninety (2390) cavalry." 
 
 Furthermore, page 356, he says: 
 
 " The loss of the Confederate Army in this campaign, while under my 
 command, was nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-two (9972) 
 killed and wounded. About a third of it occurred near Dalton and 
 Resaca." 
 
 The point in controversy, and which I shall consider at 
 present, is this statement made in my official report : 
 
 " On the 6th of May, 1864, the Army lay at and near Dalton, awaiting 
 the advance of the enemy. Never had so large a Confederate Army 
 been assembled in the West. Seventy thousand (70,000) effective men 
 were in the easy direction of a single commander, whose good fortune 
 it was to be able to give successful battle, and redeem the losses of the 
 past. * * The Army of Tennessee lost twenty-two thousand seven 
 hundred and fifty (22,750) men, nearly one-third of its strength." 
 
 I shall now demonstrate the actual loss during General 
 Johnston's campaign. In order to do this, it is necessary to 
 prove what was the force " at and near Dalton," or as I 
 expressed it in my official report, " In the easy direction of a 
 single commander," May 6th, 1864. It must be admitted that 
 in order to estimate the loss of an Army during any campaign, 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 71 
 
 siege, or battle, it is necessary first to ascertain the total effect- 
 ive force at the beginning of hostilities, and when the battle is 
 over, or the siege, or campaign ended, again to find out the 
 effective total, which, subtracted from the number at the outset, 
 will unquestionably give the loss. This is the only means by 
 which it can be fairly indicated. The losses of an Army are 
 greater or less according to the manner in which the troops 
 are handled; /. r., an Army standing its ground and fighting, 
 or advancing and driving the enemy, as was the case in Vir- 
 ginia, under General Lee, will count but few stragglers and 
 deserters ; the actual loss is not great, from the fact that the 
 wounded men go to their homes proud of their wounds, and 
 the majority of them are soon found again in the ranks. 
 
 On the other hand, an Army fighting and retreating at the 
 same time, taking up positions, day after day, to be given up 
 only under cover of darkness, suffers great loss. During such 
 a campaign, the orders necessary to be issued in withdrawing 
 from the immediate presence of the enemy, are depressing, 
 such as directing that dead silence be observed, wheels muffled, 
 etc., for fear of discovery and being fired upon. Let this 
 policy be continued for a distance of one hundred miles, as it 
 was from Dalton to Atlanta, and the " pride, pomp and circum- 
 stance of glorious war " are lost in a somewhat funereal pro- 
 cession. 
 
 The wounded cannot return home buoyant and hopeful, as 
 they are forced to bear with them the chilling intelligence that 
 the Army is falling back ; in all such instances they tarry with 
 their friends, and many fail to report again for duty. How- 
 ever, the loss from this source is but small in comparison to 
 that which accrues from the number of stragglers picked up 
 by the enemy, and of deserters who, beholding their homes 
 abandoned to the foe, become disheartened, and return to 
 their families within the lines of the enemy, as was the case in 
 North Georgia and West Alabama during General Johnston's 
 continued retreat. 
 
72 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 The statement derived from Doctor Foard's* return of the 
 killed and wounded, is doubtless correct ; but General John- 
 ston's intention cannot, assuredly, be to affirm that this 
 number, nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-two (9972), 
 constitutes his entire loss during his campaign. According to 
 the return of Major Falconer, his own Adjutant General, f and 
 to which he refers, the effective strength of the Army on the 
 loth of June, near Kennesaw Mountain, when about eighty 
 miles from Dalton, and within about twenty miles of Atlanta, 
 was fifty-nine thousand two hundred and forty-eight (59,248) ; 
 whilst the return of the loth of July shows, just after crossing 
 the Chattahoochee river on the night of the 9th, an effective 
 total of only fifty thousand six hundred and twenty-seven 
 (50,627), which, subtracted from the number we had when 
 near Kennesaw Mountain the loth of June, demonstrates a 
 loss of eight thousand six hundred and twenty-one (8621), less 
 six hundred (600) of J. K. Jackson's command, sent to Savan- 
 nah. Therefore, it seems impossible that this General should 
 wish to create the impression that nine thousand nine hundred 
 and seventy-two (9972) was his entire loss from all causes, 
 when, within the last twenty miles of his retreat, he lost eight 
 tiiousand and twenty-one (8021) effective men. 
 
 A vacancy in the ranks, brought about by desertion, is as 
 actual and effective as if the soldier had been killed in battle. 
 It is worse in its results, as the deserter generally takes with 
 him his arms, and demoralizes the comrades he has forsaken. 
 
 I shall now pass to New Hope Church, a little higher up 
 the country, and ascertain his effective force, to which must 
 be added three thousand three hundred and eighty-eight 
 (3388)1 killed and wounded prior to his arrival at that point, 
 or to "the passage of the Etowah," since they were effective 
 soldiers at Dalton ; in this manner I shall gradually trace the 
 number of available troops, from which deduct the effective 
 
 Johnston's Narrative, page 576. f Johnston's Narrative, page 574. 
 
 J Johnston's Narrative, page 325. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 73 
 
 total turned over to me by General Johnston on the i8tli 
 July, and I shall finally arrive at his entire loss during the 
 campaign. 
 
 The Army reached New Hope Church on the 25 th and 26th 
 of May, and remained in that vicinity about ten days previous 
 to the retreat upon Pine and Kennesaw Mountains, near 
 Marietta. It was here visited by General L. T. Wigfall, a 
 man of talent, and, at that time, in the Confederate States 
 Senate, but who, owing to his intense enmity to President 
 Davis, allowed himself to be governed by undue influences. 
 General Wigfall was virtually the political chief of staff of 
 General Johnston, and considering the close relations of these 
 gentlemen, a statement from him relative to the strength of 
 the Army at that period may safely be regarded as good 
 authority. This Senator, in a speech directed against Presi- 
 dent Davis and myself, in the Confederate States Senate, 
 asserted that, "at New Hope Church, he (Johnston) had of all 
 arms* sixty-four thousand (64,000) ; of these eight thousand 
 (8000) were cavalry, supposing it not to have increased by 
 recruiting up to that time; that gives him fifty-six thousand 
 (56,000) infantry and artillery. 
 
 Thus he allowed fifty-six thousand (56,000) infantry and 
 artillery on the 26th May, after being out thirteen days from 
 Dalton ; but admitted only eight thousand (8000) cavalry. 
 There must be a mistake in respect to this arm of the service. 
 It should be borne in mind that General Johnston reports, in 
 accordance with Major Falconer's statement, on the ist of 
 May, and previous to General Sherman's advance, only two 
 thousand three hundred and ninety-two (2392) cavalry, and that 
 no other return was made up until the loth June, when the 
 Army was near Kennesaw Mountain — forty days in the interim 
 having elapsed. Field-returns are made up from the returns of 
 corps commanders, and may be called for every ten days, or 
 every month or two, as the Commanding General may deem 
 
 ♦Johnston's Narrative, page 591. 
 
71 ADVANCE Ax\D RETREAT. 
 
 proper. It does not follow, however, that commanders of 
 corps, divisions, briijades, and regiments, neglect to make up 
 their returns every few days. In fact, it is well known that 
 this duty is neglected by no discreet officer, even during an 
 active campaign; otherwise there would be no means of ascer- 
 taining the number of men engaged in any one battle. The 
 return of Major Falconer, I presume, is correct so far as it 
 gives the etVective strength of the cavalry directly at Dalton 
 on the 1st of May; but it does not include brigades "near 
 Dalton," " within the easy direction" of General Johnston, as 
 shown by the following extract from the official return now 
 in the possession of Major General Wheeler, a copy of which 
 this officer furnished me on the 2d May. 1874: 
 
 " M.iyoih, 1S04. v.'icncr.ii ricid and statV and company officers prosonr, 
 five hundred and twenty-five (5-5); total effective fighting force, four 
 thousand two hundred and ninety-nine (4399) ; aggregate officers and 
 men eifective for battle, four thousand eight hundred and twenty-four 
 (4S24). Dibbrell and Harrison joined from East Tennessee with four- 
 teen hundred and fifteen (1415) effective men just after this report was 
 made. Dibbrell and Harrison reached Resaca about May ist. I went 
 down and inspected the command." 
 
 This aggregate gives a total effective of six thousand two 
 hundred and thirty-nine (6239^ and it is evident that General 
 Johnston's chief of ca\Axlry. Mvijor General Wheeler, had in 
 his command this number, " at and near Dalton," not only on 
 tlie 6th, but on the ist of May. 
 
 General Johnston himself furnishes proof of the correctness 
 of Maior General Wheeler's report of the 6th. by his acknow- 
 ledgment of the presence of Dibbrell's brigade on the 9th of 
 May. in these words :* 
 
 " On the same day. Major GenenU Wheeler, with Dibbrell's 
 and Allen's brigades, encountered a large body of Federal 
 cavalrv- ne.ir Varnell's Station." He admits also General 
 
 Johnston's Narrative, page 307. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTOxV. 75 
 
 Martin's division of cavalry to have been at Cartcrsvillc a short 
 distance south of Rcsaca on the ist of May, and Major Kin- 
 loch Falconer states in his official report:* "The cavalry of 
 the Mississippi Army which joined near Adairsville was esti- 
 mated at three thousand nine hundred (3900) effective men, 
 and Martin's cavalry division, which joined near Resaca, at 
 three thousand fiv-e hundred (3500)." Let us, therefore, con- 
 tinue the search for cavalry, before returning to New Hope 
 Church to make the first estimate of the effective stren^rth of 
 this Army. General Johnston, in his Narrative, alludes to the 
 following- accessions (p. 353): "Jackson's three thousand nine 
 hundred (3900) met us at Adairsville on the 17th." This 
 number, added to Wheeler's and Martin's forces of six thou- 
 sand two hundred and thirty-nine (6239), gives of this arm of 
 the service an effective total of ten thousand one hundred and 
 thirty-nine (10,139); which number, in lieu of eight thousand 
 (8000) reported at New Hope Church, added to fifty-six thou- 
 sand (56,000) infantry and artillery, gives sixty-six thousand 
 one hundred and thirty-nine (66,139), instead of sixty-four 
 thousand (64,000), of all arms, as stated by General Wig- 
 fall. 
 
 The following letter, from Major General Wheeler affords 
 additional evidence of the correctness of the foregoing estimate 
 of cavalry : 
 
 " New Orleans, La., Jttne ist, 1866. 
 " Dear General : — In reply to your inquiry as to the aggregate number 
 of officers and enlisted men, mounted and dismounted, I could have 
 thrown into action at any time prior to the siege of Atlanta, had I been 
 notified that a battle was to be fought, and time given to bring up men 
 detailed at the rear, I will state that the records in my possession show 
 that upon the loth day of July, 1864, the figures referred to were eight 
 thousand four hundred and ten (8410) ; of these, six thousand two hun- 
 dred and seventy-nine (6279) were fighting, enlisted men already on duty, 
 mounted on serviceable horses. General Jackson had three brigades 
 which are not included in the above. 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 574. 
 
76 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 *' I cannot give his exact force, but when he first joined the Army 
 near Adairsville I was informed he had about forty-five hundred (4500) 
 men. 
 
 " I remain, General, with great respect, 
 
 " Your obedient servant, 
 "(Signed) JOSEPH WHEELER. 
 
 " To General John B. Hood, 
 
 " Late Commanding Army of Tennessee." 
 
 Thus, the first summary shows an effective total of sixty-six 
 thousand one hundred and thirty-nine (66,139) nien, thirteen 
 days out from Dalton ; to which force should be added three 
 thousand three hundred and eighty-eight (3388) killed and 
 wounded, a loss which General Johnston acknowledges to 
 have sustained prior to the passage of the Etowah, and the 
 result shows a grand Army of sixty-nine thousand five hun- 
 dred and twenty-seven (69,527) effectives " at and near Dal- 
 ton," exclusive of deserters, stragglers, and the prisoners cap- 
 tured from the commencement of the campaign to the arrival 
 of the Army at New Hope Church. Therefore it requires an 
 allowance of but four hundred and seventy -three (473) men, 
 lost as stragglers and deserters during the thirteen days of 
 retreat, in order to sum up the seventy thousand (70,000) effec- 
 tives alluded to in my official report. 
 
 I shall now ascertain the strength of the Army at Adairs- 
 ville, on the 17th May, after four days' retreat, and again 
 estimate the effective strength " at or near Dalton." 
 
 Shortly after the fall of Atlanta, and whilst we were lying 
 in bivouac at Lovejoy Station, I sent for Major Kinloch Fal- 
 coner, who was at that time one of my Assistant Adjutant 
 Generals, and called his attention to the outcry against me, 
 through the medium of the press, which charged that I had 
 lost many more men during the siege of Atlanta than had 
 General Johnston during his campaign ; and, inasmuch as he 
 was the Adjutant General of my predecessor, I desired to know 
 from him the entire loss, from all causes, during the retreat 
 from Dalton to Atlanta. He at once replied that he could not 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 77 
 
 give me the exact figures, for the reason that General Johnston 
 had taken with him all the books and records of the Army to 
 Macon, but that we had lost, in round numbers, twenty -five 
 thousand (25,000) men. Moreover, that we had, at Adairs- 
 ville, fifty-three thousand (53,000) infantry. Two of my staff 
 officers, Captain John Smith and Lieutenant E. B. Wade, 
 happened to be present at the time, and gave me, whilst these 
 facts were fresh in their memory, the following affidavits : 
 
 "Houston, Texas, June 21st, 186^. 
 "I certify that on or about the loth September, 1864, Major Kinloch 
 Falconer, Assistant Adjutant General, Army of Tennessee, reported 
 officially in the presence of Lieutenant E. B. Wade, Aide-de-Camp, Mr. 
 James H. Haggerty, and myself, to General J. B. Hood, at Lovejoy's 
 Station, Ga., that the loss of that Army, from all causes during the cam- 
 paign from Dalton to Atlanta, Ga., between the 7th of May and i8th of 
 July, 1864, was twenty-five thousand (25,000) effective men. He also 
 stated that the Army, when at Adairsville, Ga., numbered fifty-three thou- 
 sand (53,000) effective infantry, after the losses sustained at Rocky Face 
 Mountain and Resaca, Ga. 
 
 "(Signed) JOHN SMITH, 
 
 ' ' Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 " Sworn to and subscribed before me this 22d June, A. D. 1865. 
 " (Signed) William Andrews, 
 
 " Mayor of Houston." 
 
 "I certify that on or about the loth day of September, 1864, Major 
 Kinloch Falconer, late Assistant Adjutant General, Army of Tennessee, 
 C. S. A., reported officially in the presence of Captain John S. Smith, 
 Aide-de-Camp, Mr. Haggerty, and myself, to General J. B. Hood, com- 
 manding Army at Lovejoy Station, Ga., that the loss of that Army, from 
 all causes, during the campaign from Dalton to Atlanta, Ga., between 
 the 7th day of May and the i8th day of July, 1864, was twenty-five thou- 
 sand (25,000) effective men. He (Major Kinloch Falconer) also stated 
 that the Army when at Adairsville, Ga., numbered fifty-three thousand 
 (53,000) effective infantry, after the losses sustained at Rocky Face 
 Mountain and Resaca, Ga. 
 
 " (Signed) E. B. WADE, 
 
 "Aide-de-Camp. 
 
78 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 " State of Tennessee, ) 
 "Rutherford County.) 
 
 " This day came before me, J. N. Clark, J. P. for said county, E. B. 
 Wade, and made eath that the facts stated in tlie within certificate are 
 true to the best of his knowledge and belief, this ist day of June, 1866. 
 
 " E. B. WADE. 
 
 " Sworn and subscribed before me the date above. 
 
 " (Signed) J. N. Clark, J. P. 
 
 " For said County." 
 
 The statement of Major Falconer relative to the strength of 
 the infantry at Adairsville tallies very well with that of 
 General Wigfall, as to this arm of the service at New Hope 
 Church, and I have no doubt of the correctness of Major Fal- 
 coner's assertion to me. 
 
 Allowing three thousand eight hundred (3800) artillery, 
 acknowledged by Major Falconer on the loth of June, the 
 Army at Adairsville exhibits, with the addition often thousand 
 one hundred and thirty-nine (10,139) cavalry, an effective 
 total of sixty-six thousand nine hundred and thirty-nine 
 (66,939), to which should be added three thousand three hun- 
 dred and eighty-eight (3388) killed and wounded " near Dal- 
 ton and Resaca," and this second summary shows an effective 
 total of seventy thousand three hundred and twenty-seven 
 (70,327), exclusive of stragglers, deserters, and prisoners cap- 
 tured from Dalton to Adairsville. 
 
 The foregoing summary fully tallies with the first, and we 
 find, when only four days out from Dalton, over seventy 
 thousand effectives, exclusive of deserters, stragglers, and 
 prisoners captured. 
 
 It cannot be asserted with any degree of reason that it was 
 not feasible to have remained longer at Dalton, inasmuch as 
 General Johnston had only to fortify Mill Creek and Snake 
 Creek Gaps to insure his safety, and sufficient time to receive 
 all the reinforcements th^n en route to Dalton. 
 
 As further evidence of the correctness of my assertion, this 
 General states in his Narrative, page 352 : 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTOxN. 79 
 
 " The troops received by the Army of Tennessee during the campaign 
 were those sent and brought to it by Lieutenant General Polk, and 
 formed the corps of the Army which he commanded. Of these, Canty's 
 Division of about three thousand (3000) effectives reached Resaca on 
 the 9th of May. Loring's of five thousand (5000) on the nth ; French's 
 of four thousand (4000) joined us at Cassville on the i8th ; and Quarles's 
 brigade of twenty-two hundred (2200) at New Hope Church on the 26th." 
 
 Our Army retreated from Dalton on the night of the 12th 
 and the morning of the 13th of May, and, as just cited, 
 Gantry's Division of three thousand (3000; was at Resaca on 
 the 9th, and Loring's of five thousand (5000) on the nth. 
 
 Thus, we discover fourteen thousand two hundred (14,200) 
 infantry, and thirty-nine hundred (3900) cavalry under General 
 Jackson, moving en route to Dalton, prior to the 9th of May; 
 and that the head of Polk's column, which was Canty's Divi- 
 sion, joined General Johnston's left, at Resaca, on that date, 
 which facts seemingly indicate that there were at least some 
 troops " within easy direction " of this General on the 6th of 
 May. Let us, however, for the present, adhere to the question 
 of the strength and losses of his Army. 
 
 Since the cavalry increased so greatly in number after the 
 1st May, it is reasonable to suppose that the infantry and 
 artillery likewise augmented after that date, and before we left 
 Dalton. 
 
 It was telegraphed over the country that General Sherman 
 was about to advance. This information induced quite a large 
 number of absentees to return ; as General Hardee and myself 
 had noticed this increase a short time before the retreat began, 
 the subject was mentioned betv/een us when discussing the 
 approaching campaign, and we found by comparison that we 
 had as many as forty-two thousand five hundred (42,500) effec- 
 tive infantry and artillery in our two corps, exclusive of not 
 less than six hundred (600) effectives in the reserve artillery. 
 If a return had been made up on the loth or 12th of May, the 
 number I have stated would have appeared upon it. 
 
 The following extract from a letter of Colonel W. H. Sellers, 
 
80 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General of Hood's Corps, Army of Tennes- 
 see, dated October 20th, 1872, Galveston, Texas, furnishes 
 evidence of the correctness of my statement in this regard : 
 
 " I cannot be as positive regarding the strength of your command 
 during the operations at and from Dalton to Atlanta as I could wish. 
 My recollection, however, is that you mustered twenty-one to twenty-two 
 thousand (21,000 to 22,000) effectives at Dalton and Resaca, at which 
 latter point some diminution occurred in casualties, and in desertions on 
 the night of our retreat on Cassville. 
 
 Hardee's Corps was the largest in the Army, and numbered 
 about two thousand (2000) more than my corps. 
 
 As previously stated, the assertions of General Wigfall as to 
 Johnston's strength and losses may safely be regarded as correct; 
 and General Johnston furnishes evidence of his satisfaction 
 therewith by inserting in his Narrative the speech delivered by 
 Wigfall in the Senate Chamber of the Confederate States. 
 This Senator, in his estimate of the strength of Polk's Corps,* 
 says " it amounted to less than nineteen thousand (19,000) 
 men." 
 
 Colonel Douglas West, of New Orleans, La., who was at 
 that time Assistant Adjutant General of Polk's Corps, says on 
 November 13th, 1869, in answer to a letter from me in regard 
 to the strength of that corps when it joined General Johnston, 
 " We bore on the rolls an aggregate of about twenty-four 
 thousand (24,000) present." General Johnston acknowledges 
 to have received eighteen thousand one hundred (18,100) from 
 that source. 
 
 We now have forty-two thousand five hundred (42,500) in 
 Hood's and Hardee's Corps at Dalton, exclusive of six hundred 
 reserve artillery; and about nineteen thousand (19,000) in 
 Polk's Corps, which was marching rapidly to that point, 
 together with eight thousand four hundred and ten (8410) of 
 Wheeler's Cavalry, exclusive of Jackson's. 
 
 *Johnston's Narrative, page 59 1. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 81 
 
 We find, by this summary, seventy thousand five hundred 
 (70,500) effectives — a number in excess of that which is stated 
 in my official report. This number of troops, however, did not, 
 at that time, embrace all the available forces which were subject 
 to the order of General Johnston. 
 
 The following extract from Major General G. W. Smith's 
 official report attests the presence of over three thousand 
 (3000) Georgia State troops, which could have been, in May, 
 1864, assembled at Dalton, in the event the Commanding 
 General of our Army had desired to offer battle, when in pos- 
 session of Rocky-faced Ridge : 
 
 " Headquarters, Georgia Militia, \ 
 "Macon, Ga.. September i^th, 1864.) 
 "General J. B. Hood, 
 
 " Commanding Army of Tennessee, near Lovejoy Station : 
 
 "General: — My appointment was dated rst June. I took command 
 a few days thereafter, relieving General Wayne, who returned to the 
 duties of his office as Adjutant and Inspector General of the State. The 
 force then in the field was composed entirely of State officers, civil and 
 military. They had been formed into two brigades of three regiments 
 each, and one battalion of artillery, making in all a little over three 
 thousand (3000). The command had reported for duty to General J. E. 
 Johnston, and had been ordered to guard the crossings of the Chatta- 
 hoochee river from Boswell Bridge to West Point." 
 
 These troops were far superior to those usually found in 
 the ranks of the militia, as they were composed of the civil 
 and military officers of the State, and were possessed of more 
 pride and intelligence. They could have performed noble 
 service in well-constructed redoubts in Mill Creek and Snake 
 Creek Gaps ; would have proved the equal of regulars in those 
 positions, and have allowed General Johnston the grand oppor- 
 tunity to attack Sherman with his main Army, by passmg 
 over the northern slope of Rocky-faced Ridge. 
 
 We find, as above stated, forty-two thousand five hundred 
 (42,500) in Hardee's and Hood's Corps ; nineteen thousand 
 (19,000) in Polk's Corps; eight thousand four hundred and 
 6 
 
82 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 ten (8410) in Wheeler's immediate command, and three thou- 
 sand (3000) Georgia State troops under General Wayne; 
 thus forming a grand total of seventy-three thousand five 
 hundred and ten (73,510) effectives "at and near Dalton," 
 either marching to or in readiness, to be promptly massed at 
 that point. 
 
 It will be observed that I have estimated the total effective 
 cavalry at ten thousand one hundred and thirty-nine (10,139), 
 whereas, Major Falconer, in his return of the loth of June 
 (page 574, Johnston's Narrative), acknowledges ten thousand 
 five hundred and sixteen (10,516); also, that I have made no 
 allowance for the return to duty of some of the wounded, 
 prior to the passage of the Etowah, nor for the killed and 
 wounded of the cavalry, prisoners, stragglers, and deserters 
 in the two estimates at New Hope Church and Adairsville. 
 
 I have been compelled to make these various estimates in 
 order to demonstrate the actual strength of General Johnston's 
 Army, since he furnished the War Office with no returns after 
 the 1st of May until June loth, and since he, as stated by his 
 own Adjutant General, took with him all the books and records 
 of the Army when he relinquished the command. Major Fal- 
 coner is sustained in his statement in regard to the removal of 
 the records to Macon, by the following declaration, which 
 prefaces the diary of Brigadier General Shoupe : 
 
 •' Memoranda of daily movements and events in the Army of Tennessee, 
 kept by Brigadier General F. A. Shoupe, assigned to duty as Chief 
 of Staff by orders from General HoOD , dated July 24th, 1864: 
 
 " No records were turned over by former chief of staff; therefore, the 
 records of the office embrace only the administration of General 
 Shoupe." 
 
 Major Falconer, in referring to General Johnston's last 
 return of the loth of July, says : " The report was made under 
 General Johnston, and signed by General Hood. On the i8th 
 of July the command was turned over to General Hood." 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 83 
 
 He estimates the force turned over to me on the i8th of 
 July, eight days after this return, at fifty thousand six hundred 
 and twenty-seven (50,627) effectives, assuming that no losses 
 occurred from the loth to the l8th of July. The last eight 
 days General Johnston commanded the Army. This suppo- 
 sition is not reasonable, since eight thousand and twenty- 
 one (8021) were lost the thi'-ty days previous to the loth. 
 Owing to the change of commanders under such extraordinary 
 circumstances, surely from two to three thousand deserted 
 during the interval. Therefore, I estimated the number of the 
 Army of Tennessee turned over to me on the i8th of July at 
 forty-eight thousand seven hundred and fifty (48,750), which 
 estimate I arrived at through my chief of staff, Brigadier 
 General Shoupe, who was with me at the time I made my 
 official report. I also placed his losses at twenty -two thousand 
 seven hundred and fifty (22,750), and his strength at seventy 
 thousand (70,000) effectives, when I knew them to have been 
 in excess thereof My desire, however, was not to over- 
 estimate either. 
 
 My attention having been called to the exaggerated state- 
 ments of Federal officers in regard to my losses around 
 Atlanta, it will be seen that I telegraphed the War Department 
 on the 1 8th of August that General Johnston turned over to 
 me forty-nine thousand and twelve (49,012) effectives. This 
 must have been the assumed estimate of Major Falconer at 
 the time, as no return was made up on the i8th of July. 
 
 Having established the strength of the Army to have been 
 over seventy thousand (70,000) effectives after General Polk's 
 Corps joined, it only remains to be shown that these rein- 
 forcements -Cvere " available." 
 
 General Johnston asserts in his Narrative, page 304, " On 
 the 5th the Confederate troops were formed to receive the 
 enemy." On the next page, referring to the same date (May 
 5th), he states, " In the evening a telegram from Lieutenant 
 General Polk informed me that he had been ordered to join 
 the Army of Tennessee with all his infantry"; also, "At day- 
 
84 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 break on the 7th the Federal Army moved forward; * * * 
 in the afternoon the Federal Army placed itself in the front 
 of the Confederate line, its right a little south of Mill Creek 
 Gap, and its left near the Cleveland road." 
 
 General Wigfall furnishes the following information obtained 
 from the War Office : * 
 
 " It was not till the 4th of May that General Polk was ordered to move 
 with Loring's Division and other available force at your command to 
 Rome, Georgia, and thence unite with General Johnston." On the same 
 page he states that on the 6th of May the following dispatch was sent 
 to General Cooper, at Richmond, by General Polk from Demopolis, 
 Alabama, " My troops are concentrating and moving as directed." 
 
 It will be seen that on the 4th of May, Polk's Army had 
 been ordered to join the Army of Tennessee; was concentrat- 
 ing and moving forward rapidly by rail from Demopolis on 
 the 6th, havang but a short distance to march ; and that 
 General Sherman did not take up his position in front of 
 Rocky-faced Ridge until the afternoon of the 7th of May. 
 
 Between the two Armies arose, I might say, a high wall of 
 stone, as the name Rocky-faced Ridge indicates. The Con- 
 federate position was one of the strongest to be desired ; it 
 was necessary to hold but two gaps in the mountains ; Mill 
 Creek and Snake Creek. The approach of the Federal Army 
 down the railroad from Chattanooga, in lieu of down the road 
 from Cleveland, rendered the position the more secure, inas- 
 much as General Johnston would not have had a stone wall 
 between him and his adversary, had General Sherman advanced 
 by the latter route, w^here the country is open towards Cleve- 
 land. I have always thought General Sherman did not wish 
 to accept a pitched battle, or he would have moved upon 
 Dalton from that direction. His advance by the Chattanooga 
 road, and, subsequently, in front of Rocky Face, convinces me 
 that his intention was to initiate the policy of wasting our 
 strength, which he so effectually carried out in the campaign 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 590. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 85 
 
 from Dalton to Atlanta. He came to the position of all others 
 most favorable, if our commander could have been induced to 
 hold his ground, viz : in front of Rocky-faced Ridge. 
 
 General Polk was not far distant from Dalton, when it is 
 considered that eight thousand (8000) of his troops were at 
 Rcsaca on the 9th and nth, and that he in person was in 
 Dalton on the 12th. General Johnston could well have 
 awaited the arrival of the whole of this Army, since it required 
 so small a force to hold Mill Creek and Snake Creek Gaps, as 
 previously stated, and practically demonstrated by General 
 Sherman's use of them, after these mountain defiles fell into 
 his possession. 
 
 When en route to Tennessee, during the campaign in the 
 Fall of 1864, the Confederate Army, after having captured the 
 troops stationed at Dalton, attempted to march through Mill 
 Creek Gap ; it was prevented from so doing by a squad of men 
 posted within a little fort, covered with railroad iron, and 
 which had been constructed of logs of large size, around which 
 was thrown up an embankment of earth to protect the troops 
 against field artillery; port holes had been cut so as to allow 
 the men to fire in all directions, and especially upon the line 
 of the railroad. It was reported to me that field artillery had 
 little or no effect upon this impromptu fortification, and that 
 when the men charged up to it they could not find an 
 entrance ; therefore, it could not be taken without much loss 
 of time, and considerable cost. Major Kinloch Falconer was 
 severely wounded while experimenting with this little fortress, 
 which occasioned the Army to march several miles around it. 
 At a later hour, however, after the order to move forward had 
 been issued, this block-house was sui'rendered to a detachment 
 of our troops. 
 
 It is not often the case that all the troops to be brought into 
 action are assembled beforehand at the precise point where 
 a great battle is imminent. On the contrary, when two armies 
 are approaching each other, each commander manoeuvres, 
 and, generally, one is forced to keep his adversary in check 
 
162 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 day, issued his farewell order that memorable night. In 
 despite of my repeated and urgent appeals to him to pocket 
 all despatches from Richmond, to leave me in command of 
 my own corps, and to fight the battle for Atlanta, he deserted 
 me the ensuing afternoon. He deserted me in violation of his 
 promise to remain and afford me the advantage of his counsel, 
 whilst I shouldered all responsibility of the contest. 
 
 I reiterate that it is difficult to imagine a commander placed 
 at the head of an Army under more embarrassing circum- 
 stances than those against which I was left to contend on the 
 evening of the i8th of July, 1864. I was, comparatively, a 
 stranger to the Army of Tennessee. Moreover General 
 Johnston's mode of warfare formed so strong a contrast to 
 the tactics and strategy which were practiced in Virginia, 
 where far more satisfactory results were obtained than in the 
 West, that I have becom^e a still more ardent advocate of the 
 Lee and Jackson school. The troops of the Army of 
 Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected to the 
 ruinous policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta that they were 
 unfitted for united action in pitched battle. They had, in 
 other words, been so long habituated to security behind breast- 
 works that they had become wedded to the " timid defensive" 
 policy, and naturally regarded with distrust a commander 
 likely to initiate offensive operations. 
 
 The senior Corps Commander considered he had been 
 supplanted through my promotion, and thereupon determined 
 to resign, in consequence, I have no doubt, of my application 
 to President Davis to postpone the order transferring to me 
 the command of the Army; he however, altered his decision, 
 and concluded to remain with his corps. 
 
 The evening of the i8th of July found General Johnston 
 comfortably quartered at Macon, whilst McPherson's and 
 Schofield's Corps were tearing up the Georgia Railroad, 
 between Stone Mountain and Decatur; Thomas's Army was 
 hastening preparations to cross Peach Tree creek, within about 
 six miles of Atlanta ; and I was busily engaged in hunting up 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 163 
 
 the positions of, and establishing communication with Stewart's 
 and Hardee's Corps, since I did not know where they were 
 posted, when General Johnston disappeared so unexpectedly 
 and left me in this critical position. 
 
 Not till I read Sherman's Memoirs, was I aware of McPher- 
 son's so close proximity to Atlanta at an early hour on the 
 1 8th of July. In truth, a few enterprising scouts thrown out 
 that afternoon from his columns, in the direction of the Macon 
 Railroad might have captured my predecessor on his retreat to 
 Macon. 
 
 Sherman says (vol. II, pages 71, 72) : 
 
 "On the 1 8th all the Armies moved on a general right wheel, Thomas 
 to Buckhead, forming line of battle facing Peach Tree creek ; Schofield 
 was on his left, and McPherson well on towards the railroad between 
 Stone Mountain and Decatur, which he reached at 2 p. m. of that day, 
 about four miles from Stone Mountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, 
 and there he turned toward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he 
 progressed, his advance guard reaching Decatur about night, where he 
 came into communication •'ith Schofield's troops, which had also 
 reached Decatur." 
 
 It thus appears that on the afternoon of the i8th the enemy 
 was in Decatur, almost at the gates of Atlanta. This intelli- 
 gence must have been communicated to General Johnston by 
 the cavalry, after he left me to ride into the city with the 
 promise to return toward evening, as he was virtually Com- 
 mander-in-Chief up to the moment of his sudden departure. I 
 had consumed a great portion of that day in vain endeavors to 
 adjust the difficulties in the way of his retention in command, 
 by earnest representations to him, on one hand, and, on the 
 other, by telegraphing to Richmond in the hope of accomplish- 
 ing this object. Although he had published his farewell 
 order the night previous, I had not, owing to the foregoing 
 reasons, assumed command. He had agreed to issue orders 
 in my name, and, in reality, I did not become Commander-in- 
 Chief until about night of that day, when I received informa- 
 tion of his departure. 
 
88 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 the 6th, the date mentioned in my official report, since our Army- 
 was still at Dalton: on the I2th, when nearly one-half of Polk's 
 Corps had already joined Johnston's left at Resaca on the 9th 
 and nth of May. Therefore, the trivial point raised by these 
 two gentlemen is of little or no consequence. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON TRANSFER FROM THE VIRGINIA 
 
 TO THE WESTERN ARMY DALTON, RESACA, ADAIRSVILLE, 
 
 AND CASSVILLE. 
 
 Before I relate the embarrassing circumstances under which 
 I assumed command of the Army of Tennessee, I shall state 
 certain facts connected with my transfer from the Virginia to 
 the Western Army early in February, 1864, and reply to state- 
 ments of General Johnston, in reference to operations near 
 Resaca, Cassville, and New Hope Church. 
 
 The War Department had been anxious that an offensive 
 campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky be initiated in the 
 early Spring of 1864, and made a proposition to General 
 Johnston to reinforce him with Polk's troops, then in Missis- 
 sippi, and Longstreet's Corps, in East Tennessee. Johnston, 
 at the appointed time, was expected to move forward and 
 form a junction with these troops. The President and Gen- 
 eral Bragg, and also General Lee, were desirous that the offen- 
 sive be assumed, and an attempt be made to drive the Federals 
 to the Ohio river, before a large Army could be concentrated 
 to move against us. The following* extract from a letter of 
 General Bragg to General Johnston, dated March 12th, 1864, 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 292. 
 
 (89) 
 
90 
 
 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 will show the number of men proffered the latter, if he would 
 carry out the expressed wishes of the authorities at Richmond; 
 
 " It is needless, General, for me to impress upon you the great import- 
 ance, not to say necessity, of reclaiming the provision country of Ten- 
 nessee and Kentucky ; and from my knowledge of the country and 
 people, I believe that other great advantages may accrue especially in 
 obtaining men to fill your ranks. 
 
 " The following forces, it is believed, will be available, if nothing 
 should occur to divert them, viz. : 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Your own cominand 
 
 33,000 
 
 3,000 
 
 5,000 
 3,000 
 
 41,000 
 
 3,000 
 
 5,000 
 
 10,000 
 
 General Martin's cavalry now en- 
 
 From Lieutenant General Polk . . 
 From General Beauregard 
 
 5,000 
 10,000 
 
 12,000 
 
 
 
 
 From General Longstreet's com- 
 mand • •• 
 
 2,000 
 
 2,000 
 
 16,000 
 
 
 
 
 60,000 
 
 5.000 
 
 10,000 
 
 75,000 
 
 "It is proposed to hold the reinforcements ready, and to put them in 
 motion just as soon as you may be able to use them. To throw them to 
 the front now, would only impede the accumulation of supplies neces- 
 sary for your march." 
 
 I here give the subjoined extract from a letter of General 
 Bragg, addressed to me at the close of the war : 
 
 '.Alabama, \ 
 r, i86j. I 
 
 " Near Lowndesboro' 
 " i/i/t December, 
 
 " My Dear General : — In addition to the Army of Tennessee, then 
 at DaUon, the General commanding there Avas offered, for an offensive 
 campaign, Polk's Corps from Mississippi and Alabama, Longstreet's 
 Corps from East Tennessee, and a sufficient number from Beauregard's 
 command in South Carolina and Georgia, to make up seventy-five thou- 
 sand (75,000) effective infantry. The cavalry with these commands would 
 have numbered at least ten thousand (10,000), and the artillery six thou- 
 sand (6000) — Total, ninety-one thousand (91,000). Besides the effective, 
 so reported, there were not less than fifteen thousand (15,000) able- 
 bodied men bearing arms, but reported on extra duty, such as clerks, 
 cooks, mechanics, laborers, teamsters, etc., — one-half of whom, at least, 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 91 
 
 could at any time be placed in battle without impairing the efficiency of 
 the Army. * * To furnish the means, all other Armies were, for the 
 time being, to be subordinated to the Army of Tennessee. Even Gen- 
 eral Lee, with the Army of Virginia, was to give up Longstreet's Corps, 
 and remain on the defensive, 
 
 " Yours truly, 
 
 "BRAXTON BRAGG." 
 
 The President had thus agreed to afford General Johnston 
 every facihty in his power for the execution of the proposed 
 plan of operations; and it was with the understanding we 
 were to enter upon an active campaign that I consented to 
 leave the Army of Northern Virginia, w^ith which I had served 
 since the outbreak of the war. 
 
 On the evening of my arrival at Dalton, on or about the 4th 
 of February, I repaired to General Johnston's headquarters, 
 and reported to him for duty. During our interview, in his 
 room alone, he informed me that General Thomas was moving 
 forward, and he thought it might be best for us to fall back 
 and take up some position in rear of Dalton. I at once told 
 him that I knew nothing of the situation or of the object of 
 General Thomas's move from Ringgold, but that we could, 
 at least, hold our position a sufficient length of time to com- 
 pel the enemy to develop his plan. The Federals, in a few 
 days, fell back to Ringgold, having merely made a feint, in order 
 to cover some movement then being made in Mississippi. 
 
 This was my introduction to the Army of Tennessee ; albeit 
 not calculated to inspire or encourage military ardor, — since 
 it was proposed to retreat even before the enemy became in 
 earnest — I nevertheless laid before General Johnston the plan 
 to join Polk's Army and Longstreet's Corps on the march into 
 Tennessee, gave him assurance that the authorities in Rich- 
 mond would afford him every assistance, and informed him, 
 moreover, that General Lee favored the projected campaign. 
 
 General Johnston immediately took the ground that he did 
 not very well know the country through which it was pro- 
 posed to pass to the rear of the enemy ; that there were diffi- 
 culties to be encountered, etc., etc. ; he desired Polk's and 
 
92 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Longstreet's forces to join him at Dalton, "where, this large 
 Army being concentrated, he considered he should be left to 
 decide and act for the best ; in other words, be left to move 
 forward, stand his ground or retreat, as might seem most 
 expedient. 
 
 To this demand. General Lee was unwilling to accede ; he 
 was reluctant to give up Longstreet's Corps, unless for the 
 purpose of active work and dealing hard blows, in the perform- 
 ance of which task it had already so often distinguished itself 
 The War Department objected to the withdrawal of Polk's 
 Army from Mississippi, until active operations were to com- 
 mence, as by such a movement one of the best regions of 
 country for supplies would be abandoned to the enemy. Thus 
 matters stood until the 7th of March, when, still anxious for 
 the offensive, I wrote to President Davis, suggesting that Polk 
 join us at Dalton, and we move forward to make a junction 
 with Longstreet. 
 
 I will here incidentally remark that the following is the 
 only correspondence I remember ever to have had with the 
 authorities at Richmond, while occupying a subordinate posi- 
 tion, and its object was the furtherance of General Johnston's 
 wishes : 
 
 " Dalton, Georgia, March yth, 1864. 
 " To His Excellency, President Jefferson Davis. 
 
 " I have delayed writing to you so as to allow myself time to see the 
 condition of this Army. On my arrival, I found the enemy threatening 
 our position. I was, however, delighted to find our troops anxious for 
 battle. He, the enemy, withdrew after taking a look, and is now resting 
 with his advance at Ringgold. 
 
 "I am exceedingly anxious, as I expressed to you before leaving 
 Richmond, to have this Army strengthened, so as to enable us to move 
 to the rear of the enemy and with a certainty of success. An addition of 
 ten or fifteen thousand (10,000 or 15,000) men will allow us to advance. 
 We can do so anyhow by uniting with Longstreet. 
 
 " But so much depends upon the success of our arms on this line, that 
 I thoroughly appreciate the importance of collecting together all the 
 forces we possibly can, in order to destroy the Army under General 
 Grant. We should march to the front as soon as possible, so as not to 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 93 
 
 allow the enemy to concentrate, and advance upon us. The addition of 
 a few horses for our artillery will place this Army in fine condition. It 
 is well clothed, well fed, the transportation is excellent and in the 
 greatest possible quantity required. 
 
 "I feel that a move from this position, in sufficient force, will relieve 
 our entire country. The troops under Generals Polk and Loring having 
 united with the forces here, and a junction being made with General 
 Longstreet, will give us an Army of sixty or seventy thousand (60,000 or 
 70,000) men, which I think should be sufficient to defeat and destroy all 
 the Federals on this side of the Ohio river. 
 
 " I sincerely hope and trust that this opportunity may be given to 
 drive the enemy beyond the limits of the Confederacy. I never before 
 felt that we had it so thoroughly within our power. He, the enemy, is 
 at present weak, and we are strong. His Armies are far within our 
 country, and the roads open to his rear, where we have a vast quantity 
 of supplies. 
 
 "Our position in Virginia can be securely held by our brave troops 
 under General Lee, which will allow us to maixh in force from our 
 centre, the vital point of every nation. 
 
 " You find, Mr. President, that I speak with my whole heart, as I do 
 upon all things in which 1 am so deeply interested. God knows I have 
 the interest of my country at heart, and I feel in speaking to you that I 
 am so doing to one who thoroughly appreciates and understands my 
 feeling. 
 
 " I am eager for us to take the initiative, but fear we will not be able 
 to do so unless our Army is increased. 
 
 " Believe me, with great respect, your friend and obedient servant, 
 y "J. B. HOOD." 
 
 The same difficulty here arose as before mentioned : un- 
 willingness upon the part of the authorities at Richmond to 
 order Polk from Mississippi, and reluctance on the part of 
 General Lee to give up Longstreet, before it was positively 
 ascertained that active operations were to commence. As to 
 the tim.e of such active operations. General Johnston would 
 not specify. So stood this important matter in abeyance, until 
 the 13th of April when I addressed General Bragg the 
 foUowino- letter : 
 
M ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 [Private.] 
 
 " Dalton, Georgia, April ijth, 1864. 
 " My Dear General. 
 
 " I received your letter, and am sorry to inform you that I have done 
 all in my power to induce General Johnston to accept the proposition 
 you made to move forward. He will not consent, as he desires the 
 troops to be sent here, and it be left to him as to what use should be made 
 of them. I regret this exceedingly, as my heart was fixed upon going to 
 the front, and regaining Tennessee and Kentucky, I have also had a 
 long talk with General Hardee. Whilst he finds many difficulties in the 
 way of our advancing, he is at the same time ready and willing to do 
 anything that is thought best for our general good. He has written a 
 long letter to the President, which will explain his views. 
 
 " When we are to be in better condition to drive the enemy from our 
 country, I am not able to comprehend. To regain Tennessee would be 
 of more value to us than half a dozen victories in Virginia. 
 
 " I received a letter from General R. E. Lee yesterday, and he says, 
 ' you can assist me by giving me more troops or driving the enemy in 
 your front to the Ohio river. If the latter is to be done, it should be exe- 
 cuted at once.' * * * 
 
 " Since McPherson's Corps has moved up from the lower Mississippii 
 to join the Army of the Potomac or that of the Cumberland, would it not 
 be well for General Polk's troops to unite with this Army, as we should 
 then be in a condition to reinforce General Lee, in case it should be 
 necessary ? 
 
 " Yours truly, 
 
 " J. B. HOOD. 
 " To General Braxton Bragg." 
 
 It will be seen that I was still urgent for an offensive cam- 
 paign, and even counselled that Polk be ordered to Dalton, in 
 the hope that we would finally advance, and join Longstreet 
 in Tennessee. At the same time, I was not unmindful of the 
 great danger of leaving Mississippi open to the enemy, 
 before being able, by unmistakable preparations for a forward 
 move, to attract the undivided attention of the Federals in the 
 West. Unfortunately, however, assumed difficulties set forth 
 by General Johnston prevented the execution of, in my opinion, 
 one of the most important campaigns projected during the 
 war ; and one fact is certain, whatever may be said contrari- 
 wise. President Davis offered every possible inducement 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 95 
 
 towards its execution, and had, in regard to the wisdom of the 
 proposed operations, the support of General Robt. E. Lee. 
 
 I cannot name one of Lee's Lieutenant Generals who would 
 not have met this proposition from the War Department with 
 that spirit of co-operation which is so essential in time of war. 
 Moreover, any officer possessed of even a part of that heroic 
 self-reliance so characteristic of Lee and Jackson, would not 
 only have gladly accepted the ninety-one thousand (91,000) 
 men, but, having secured a competent Quarter Master, would 
 soon have found the necessary transportation ; would have 
 sent a dispatch to Richmond that he was moving forward, and, 
 God willing, would take from the enemy all else needed to 
 equip the army. Such might have been the result, instead of 
 unremitting demands, upon the part of General Johnston, for 
 an outfit equal to that of United States troops, visions of 
 insuperable difficulties, and vacillations unending. 
 
 I am now convinced that even the concentration of Polk's 
 Army and Longstreet's Corps, at Dalton, would in no manner 
 have altered the ensuing campaign. If I had had a concep- 
 tion of the operations from Dalton to Atlanta, naught but the 
 most peremptory orders could have induced me to have left 
 General Lee. 
 
 General Johnston, in reference to the operations around 
 Resaca, makes the following remarks: * 
 
 " Major General Stevenson had early in the day, and with Lieutenant 
 General Hood's approval, assumed the position from which he had been 
 recalled the night before. Here he was directed by the Lieutenant 
 General to place a field battery in a position some eighty yards in 
 front of his Hne of infantry. Before the necessary arrangements begun 
 for its protection were completed, he was directed by General Hood to 
 open its fire. This was no sooner done, than so impetuous an attack 
 was made upon it that the guns could not be drawn back to the main 
 line of the division. After a very sharp contest, the enemy was driven 
 beyond the battery by the well directed fire of Brown's and Reynolds's 
 brigades, but found shelter in a ravine not far frorn it. From this posi- 
 tion their musketry commanded the position of the battery equally as well 
 
 *Johnston's Narrative, page 313. 
 
96 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 as that of the Confederate infantry, so that neither could remove the 
 guns, and they were left between the two armies until night." 
 
 He asserts,* " no material was lost by us in this campaign but the four 
 field pieces exposed and abandoned at Resaca by General Hood." 
 
 I was anxious to occupy a commanding position in my 
 front before the enemy obtained possession thereof. Steven- 
 son's Division, of my corps, as well as the Federals, were 
 moving rapidly towards this point. A battery was placed in 
 position in order to check the enemy, and allow my troops 
 time to reach the ground, the object of contention. Whilst 
 these four guns accomplished the desired aim, the concentrated 
 fire of a number of Federal batteries forced the gunners to 
 withdraw, and leave them between the lines of the two armies, 
 which were very close together at that point. They were 
 finally abandoned on the night of our retreat from Resaca, 
 simply from the fact that I found upon consultation with 
 Colonel Beckham, my chief of artillery, and Major General 
 Stevenson, one of my division commanders, that I had more 
 guns than were required for the number of men in my com- 
 mand ; and, as the order to retreat had been given, it was 
 deemed better to yield them to the enemy than to sacrifice 
 one or two hundred men in reclaiming them. I think my 
 action, in this instance, will meet not only the approval of the 
 military, but also of the civilized world. 
 
 The whole matter was laid before General Johnston, and 
 the guns were abandoned with his concurrence ; at least such 
 is my recollection. Moreover, I am informed by Captain 
 Sweat that these guns belonged to his command, and that they 
 were four old iron pieces, not worth the sacrifice of the life of 
 even one man. 
 
 The following letter from General Johnston's chief of 
 ordnance, Colonel Oladowski, is at variance with the statement 
 that " no material was lost by us in the campaign but the four 
 field pieces, exposed and abandoned at Resaca by General 
 Hood:" 
 
 *Johnston's Narrative, page 351. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 97 
 
 " Mobile, 2gth May, 1874. 
 "General B. Bragg. 
 
 " General : — I answered your telegram day before yesterday ; hasten 
 to-day to answer your letter, received this morning. I read attentively 
 General Johnston's Narrative, and it seems to me he tried to vindicate 
 himself at the cost of others. His statement of losses is based upon 
 report of his Medical Director. I wonder how a doctor could know 
 about deserters, stragglers, prisoners, etc. I am extremely disappointed. 
 " I cannot positively state the reduction of his Army from Dalton to 
 Atlanta, but I believe it was about nineteen thousand (19,000) muskets. 
 * * * * As to t}^g deficiency of ammunition, it is a romance. I left 
 full supplies on hand at the time General Hood took command. * * * 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " H. OLADOWSKI." 
 
 The above is in answer to a letter written at my request by 
 General Bragg. It is impossible that we should have lost 
 twenty-five thousand (25,000) men from Dalton to Atlanta, 
 and, at the same time, no material save four field pieces. After 
 the muskets of the killed and wounded were gathered and 
 turned into the Ordnance Department, ^ nineteen thousand 
 (19,000) is about the proportion that might be expected to 
 have been lost through stragglers, deserters, and prisoners, 
 during such a campaign. 
 
 Colonel Oladowski will be remembered by many soldiers of 
 the Army of Tennessee, not only as a gentleman of high 
 character, but also as an officer who was faithful and exact in 
 the performance of his duty. 
 
 I regret to find it necessary to notice this small affair, upon 
 which General Johnston seems to lay so great stress, whereas 
 he might, in his Narrative, have furnished the future historian 
 with important matter, had he given an account of the miracu- 
 lous escape of his Army at Resaca, when, under cover of 
 darkness, we marched over bridges commanded by the enemy's 
 guns, and were thus extricated from the pocket, or, I may say, 
 cul de sac, in which he had placed us, with two deep and ugly 
 streams, the Connasauga and Oostenaula, in our immediate 
 rear. 
 
 7 
 
98 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Of this historical fact there is no mention whatever in 
 Greneral Johnston's book ; and I shall always believe the attack 
 of Stevenson's and Stewart's Divisions, therein described 
 (page 311), together with our return to our original position 
 on the following day, saved us from utter destruction by 
 creating the impression upon the Federals that the contest was 
 to be renewed the next morning. They were thus lulled into 
 quiet during that eventful night of our deliverance. It was 
 upon this occasion General Polk remarked to an officer of 
 high rank, now residing in New Orleans, that our escape 
 seemed almost a miracle. 
 
 In regard to operations around Cassville, General Johnston 
 states :* 
 
 "Next morning (19th of May), when Brigadier General Jackson's 
 report showed that the head of the Federal column following the railroad 
 was near Kingston, Lieutenant General Hood was directed to move with 
 his corps to a country road about a mile to the east of that from Adairs- 
 ville, and parallel to it, and to march northward on that road, right in 
 front. Polk's Corps, as then formed, was to advance to meet and engage 
 the enemy approaching from Adairsville, and it was expected that Hood's 
 would be in position to fall upon the left flank of these troops as soon as 
 Polk attacked them in front. An order was read to each regiment, 
 announcing that we were about to give battle to the enemy. 
 
 " When General Hood's column had moved two or three miles, that 
 officer received a report from a member of his staff, to the effect that the 
 enemy was approaching on the Canton road, and in rear of the right of 
 the position from which he had just marched. Instead of transmitting 
 his report to me, and moving on in obedience to his orders, he fell back 
 to that road and formed his corps across it, facing to our right and rear, 
 towards Canton, without informing me of this strange departure from 
 the instructions he had received. 
 
 " I heard of this erratic movement after it had caused such a loss of 
 time as to make the attack intended impracticable ; for its success 
 depended on accuracy in timing it. The intention was therefore aban- 
 doned." 
 
 This is, indeed, a grave charge on which I am arraigned, 
 and, if sustainable, I should have been deprived of my com- 
 
 *Johnston's Narrative, page 321. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 99 
 
 mand at the time. An officer of high grade who would prove 
 so incompetent as to fail to initiate a battle ordered and planned 
 by his Commander-in-Chief, is worthy of the severest censure. 
 I will, however, give a simple statement of the facts. 
 
 The three Corps Commanders, especially General Polk and 
 myself, urged General Johnston, soon after our arrival at Cass- 
 ville, to turn back and attack Sherman at Adairsville, as we 
 had information of a portion of his Army having been sent to 
 cross the Etowah, in order to threaten our communications 
 south of that river. The opportunity was the more favorable, 
 because of an open country and good roads, which would 
 have enabled the Army to move rapidly and force the Federals, 
 whilst divided in their forces, to accept a pitched battle, with 
 rivers in their rear. This he declined to do, as stated in my 
 official report ; in no part of his Narrative, however, can be 
 found the slightest allusion to this matter. 
 
 On the following day, Howard's Corps having been reported 
 on the Ironton road (the country road referred to), I asked his 
 authorization to march my command across an open field, and 
 attack this detachment of the enemy, in case the report was 
 correct. He consented. 
 
 I received no orders for battle as related by General John- 
 ston, nor were the Corps Commanders brought together and 
 given explicit instructions, verbal or written, as is usual and 
 necessary upon the eve of a general engagement, although he 
 had published, soon after our arrival at Cassville, a general 
 order to the effect that he intended to fight. I was merely 
 granted the privilege of doing what I had requested ; the asser- 
 tion, therefore, of General Johnston, that I had been ordered 
 to move to the country road and be in readiness to attack in 
 flank when Polk engaged the enemy in front, is as erroneous 
 as it is inexplicable. 
 
 In accordance with his authorization, I put my troops in 
 motion. After riding some distance in advance, I found the 
 country road in possession of our own dismounted cavalry, 
 and turned to meet the head of my column, then pushing 
 
100 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 forward, when, suddenly, in an open space adjoining the Can- 
 ton road, appeared a hne of the enemy advancing upon our 
 flank, and in rear of the position we had just left. This line 
 opened both an artillery and musketry fire upon my troops, 
 who were marching by flank across the same open range. 
 General Hindman was ordered to throw out from his division a 
 line of skirmishers to develop the enemy approaching from 
 this so unexpected direction, and suffered a loss of several 
 men killed and wounded. 
 
 About this juncture General Mackall, Chief of General 
 Johnston's staff, rode up in great haste, and said in a most 
 excited manner that General Johnston desired I should not 
 separate myself too far from General Polk. I called his atten- 
 tion to the enemy, in sight, advancing in the open field, and 
 told him I had been in person to the Ironton road; had found 
 it in possession of our cavalry, and could, therefore, at any 
 moment, easily form on the right of Polk. His reply was 
 " Very well," or words to that effect. 
 
 Polk had not moved from the position in which I had left 
 him, as I had his right in full view; and, surely, if General 
 Johnston had intended that I should have been in position to 
 attack in flank when Polk engaged the enemy in front, Polk 
 would already have been moving forward, or I would have 
 been ordered by Mackall to remain on the country road till he 
 (Polk) advanced and engaged the enemy. I was within two 
 hundred yards of the Ironton, or country road, when General 
 Mackall overtook me. 
 
 In an appended note,* General Johnston affirms, in regr.rd 
 to the appearance of the enemy on the Canton road, "the 
 report upon which General Hood acted was manifestly untrue." 
 
 If General Johnston be right, I am not only to blame for 
 not fighting in accordance to instructions (which were never 
 given), but also for allowing myself to be deceived by an 
 imaginary line of the enemy advancing from an unexpected 
 direction, m an open field, and firing upon my troops about 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 321. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 101 
 
 four or five hundred yards distant. On the other hand, if my 
 report be true, it was my duty, upon the appearance of the 
 enemy in hne of battle, accompanied by artillery, and moving 
 upon our flank and rear, not only to report the same to my 
 commander, but to halt, and force the enemy to develop his 
 strength and object, even if I had been given orders by General 
 Johnston to deliver battle, which orders, I reiterate, were never 
 issued to me, for, be it remembered, I had merely been author- 
 ized to carry out my own suggestion. 
 
 The following letters from Major J, E. Austin, one of the 
 most gallant and efficient officers of the Army of Tennessee, 
 and from the Honorable Taylor Beattie, of the State of Louis- 
 iana, both gentlemen of honor and prominent position, show 
 whether or not the report I made to General Johnston was 
 "manifestly untrue." 
 
 " New Orleans, May 26th, 1874. 
 
 " My Dear General: — In the disposition of the Army under General 
 Joseph E. Johnston, at Cassville, Georgia, as he states, for attack, I com- 
 manded the extreme right of the skirmish line in front of your corps. 
 In your movement to the north, across the open field, on that day, I 
 covered your front and right, and my command was left to observe the 
 enemy when a part of your corps was thrown across the Canton road. 
 The enemy were in force in my front, with artillery and infantry, and 
 developing toward our right. About an hour and a half before nightfall 
 the enemy broke through the skirmish line of an Alabama brigade posted 
 to my left, and moved rapidly in rear of my main line, which was threat- 
 ened in front. My reserve was, consequently, disposed to meet this 
 movement in the rear, and encountered and repulsed the enemy in a 
 short and severe engagement on and near the Canton road ; but gather- 
 ing reinforcements, he moved further to the rear, until I was completely 
 isolated and cut off from your corps. 
 
 " To extricate my command, I had to move to the right, fighting all 
 the while in front and rear, until darkness put an end to hostilities. By 
 making a detour of eight or nine miles in the night over a country devoid 
 of road, 1 was enabled to rejoin your corps, massed in column about two 
 o'clock in the night, and just in time for my wearied men to participate 
 in the retreat across the Etowah, which was shortly after begun. 
 
 " From my observations, I am forced to believe that General Johnston 
 makes an error in his book in discrediting the presence of the enemy on 
 
102 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 your right, while you were moving to the north, across the large open 
 field, to get in position. If my memory serves me, your extreme right 
 flank was not covered by cavalry at all, as is not only usual but most 
 essential in a movement such as you were making, and you must have 
 had to rely for information of the enemy in that quarter from your staff 
 and escort. 
 
 " I am. General, very truly yours, 
 
 "J. E. AUSTIN, 
 
 " Major commanding Austin's Battalion Sharp Shooters." 
 
 " Parish of Assumption, March 2gth, 1874. 
 " General J. B. Hood. 
 
 " Dear Sir : I remember very well the occurrences at Cass Station, or 
 Cassville, during the campaign of 1864. During that campaign I kept 
 a diary, which I have just examined to refresh my memory. At the risk 
 of being somewhat tedious, I will state all I know of that affair. Your 
 corps being in the rear of the Army, entered Cassville about 12 m., on 
 the 1 8th of May, 1864. Yourself and staff (on which I was active as 
 volunteer aid) came in last and found the Army massed by brigades in 
 front of Cassville, — that is, between that town and the approaching enemy. 
 So we remained all night. Next morning I first heard of the celebrated 
 battle order of General Johnston. I refer to that order in which it was 
 announced that our retreat was ended, and that, if the enemy continued 
 his advance, battle would then and there be given him. I thought it 
 strange, if such were the determination, that the Army had not been 
 placed in line of battle the evening before, when they would, at least, 
 have been more comfortable. After our breakfast we rode to General 
 Johnston's headquarters, where you remained some half hour or more. 
 We then rode to General Hindman's Division, which was immediately 
 placed in motion to take up its position in line of battle, as I supposed. 
 
 "As we marched across an open valley towards the range of hills 
 which I understood to be the line to be occupied by our forces, you 
 being in front with General Hindman and I just behind, one of the sol- 
 diers called my attention to a dark line off to our right, saying they were 
 Yankees. I called your attention to the fact, but you said it could not 
 be so, but must be our cavalry, if it was a body of men. Falling back, the 
 same soldier (to whom I had said I thought the dark line was a fence or 
 hedge), said that they were throwing out skirmishers in our direction, and 
 I at once called your attention to that fact. You halted the division, 
 and ordered General Hindman to send out a body of skirmishers to find 
 out who they were. In a few minutes a sharp skirmish was in progress, 
 and several of our men were wounded and killed in your immediate 
 proximity. I recollect very distinctly that five men were hit at one time 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 103 
 
 by the fragments of a shell, which exploded not more than twenty-five 
 yards from where you were sitting on horseback. 
 
 "About this time General Mackall, chief of staff to General Johnston, 
 rode up, apparently much excited, and spoke with you. Of course, I 
 cannot say what took place, but soon after, — indeed, at once, and in his 
 presence, — our direction was changed, and we proceeded to take up a 
 line of battle on the range of hills immediately in rear of Cassville. 
 
 " There we remained all day, the enemy erecting batteries in front and 
 in flank of us, and enfilading our line. This fire of the enemy's artillery 
 was harassing in the extreme, as it seemed to come from all directions 
 except our immediate rear, and we made little or no reply. Late that 
 evening you took us (your staff) from the left of your corps to the extreme 
 right (which was also the right of the Army) and back. I shall long 
 remember that ride as one of the most disagreeable it has ever been my 
 fortune to take, being, as we were, continually under a heavy cross-fire 
 of artillery. As soon as the ride was over, you proceeded to head- 
 quarters of the Army, and on your return you notified us that we would 
 retreat at midnight across the Etowah, and gave us the necessary orders. 
 
 " It was afterwards said in the Army, indeed, I am not certain that a 
 report by General Johnston was not published to that effect, that the 
 retreat was ordered because you and General Polk had declined to fight 
 — or rather had given an opinion adverse to battle. I can say, after four 
 years' experience of war, that I am satisfied that no soldiers in the world 
 could have held the line then occupied by your corps during the next 
 day, unless the enemy had been very remiss in taking advantage of his 
 position. 
 
 " I have heard that General Johnston, in his history of the war, says 
 you were mistaken about the enemy being immediately on your flank 
 on May 19th, 1864. He was misinformed by whomsoever gave him this 
 idea, for, as I have said, several of our men were killed and wounded 
 by this raking fire in your immediate proximity, and before our Army 
 was in line of battle. 
 
 " Very truly yours, 
 
 "TAYLOR BEATTIE, 
 
 " Late Colonel C. S. A." 
 
 The foregoing statements prove the report characterized by- 
 General Johnston as " manifestly untrue," to be manifestly 
 true. Five thousand witnesses, moreover, could be produced 
 to testify to the truth of my assertion. It would, indeed, seem 
 strange that, after battling three long years with the same 
 enemy, wearing the same uniform, and bearing the same 
 
104 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 colors, I should be so grossly deceived as to make a false 
 report, especially when I had a full view of this same enemy 
 in an open field, within a distance of four to five hundred 
 yards.* 
 
 I did not fall back, and form across the Canton road, as 
 General Johnston states ; his chief of staff overtook me too 
 soon to allow this movement ; in accord with General Mackall's 
 instructions, I marched back to join Polk's right, which had 
 remained in the same position I had left it. Whilst Major 
 Austin was still engaged with this same enemy on the Canton 
 road, and my corps was nearing the line occupied by General 
 Polk on the ridge in front of Cassville, orders were issued for 
 the Army to fall back to the ridge in rear of the town. 
 
 This position was commanded by the ridge we were about 
 to abandon, and a greater portion thereof was exposed to an 
 enfilade fire of the enemy's artillery. General F. A. Shoupe, 
 General Johnston's chief of artillery, advised the Confederate 
 commander of this fact before the Army was ordered to occupy 
 that line, as I stated in my official report. General Johnston 
 does not, if I remember correctly, refer to General Shoupe's 
 monition in his own official report, which he has failed to pub- 
 lish in his Narrative, although the latter purports to be his 
 contribution for the use of the future historian ; this report 
 should be one of the most important records of his military 
 career, for the omission of which, however, he apologizes by 
 stating that it had been published by the Confederate Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 In reference to the position established on the ridge in rear 
 of the town, this General writes :t 
 
 "The Federal artillery commenced firing upon Hood's and Polk's 
 troops soon after they were formed, and continued to cannonade until 
 
 * Since the foregoing was penned. General Carson, of the Federal Army, who 
 is now engaged in writing an. account of General Hooker's operations, informs me 
 that it was a portion of General Butterfield's command which appeared on the 
 Canton road, and fired into my column. 
 
 ■j- Johnston's Narrative, page 323. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 105 
 
 night. Brigadier General Shoupe, chief of artillery, had pointed out 
 to me what he thought a weak point near General Polk's right, a 
 space of a hundred and fifty or two hundred yards, which, in his 
 opinion, might be enfiladed by artillery placed on a hill more than a 
 mile off, beyond the front of our right — so far, it seemed to me, as to 
 make the danger trifling. Still, he was requested to instruct the officer 
 commanding there to guard against such a chance by the construction 
 of traverses, and to impress upon him that no attack of infantry could 
 be combined with a fire of distant artillery, and that his infantry might 
 safely occupy some ravine in rear of this position during any such fire of 
 artillery." 
 
 It will be seen that the artillery of the enemy opened upon 
 Polk's and my troops soon after they were formed ; that accord- 
 ing to the above statement, General Shoupe pointed out only 
 a small portion of our line which might be enfiladed by artil- 
 lery; also that General Shoupe was requested to instruct the 
 officer there commanding to guard against this evil by the con- 
 struction of traverses. The truth is, General Shoupe reported 
 to General Johnston that a large portion of the ridge he pro- 
 posed to occupy in rear of Cassville, would be enfiladed by 
 the Federal artillery ; in other words, that the position of the 
 line subsequently occupied by Polk and myself would be so 
 enfiladed. This is in substance what I stated in my official 
 report; and this statement was written by General Shoupe 
 himself, at present the Reverend Dr. Shoupe, of Sewanee, 
 Tennessee. The subjoined letter is confirmatory of my asser- 
 tion: 
 
 "Sewanee, Tennessee, June jd, 1874. 
 
 "Dear General: — With regard to the point you mention, I have a 
 very distinct recollection. I pointed out the fact to General Johnston 
 that his line would be enfiladed before the troops were posted, and sug- 
 gested a change of position to obviate the trouble. 
 
 "The General replied that the troops could not hope to be always 
 sheltered from fire, and that they must make the best of it by traversing. 
 
 " As soon as the enemy got into position, my fears were fully verified. 
 The line, at that point, fell back from the crest of the ridge, but was 
 poorly sheltered even upon the slope. I should say that there was as 
 much as a quarter of a mile badly exposed to the enemy's fire. 
 
 "General Polk was present at the time the conversation between 
 
106 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 General Johnston and myself took place, and strongly supported my 
 objections. 
 
 " I am indeed sorry to have my name mixed up in the difference 
 between General Johnston and yourself, but I do not see that I can 
 decline to reply to such questions as you please to ask. 
 
 " With high regard, I am, &c., 
 
 "F. A. SHOUPE." 
 
 The memory of General Johnston must assuredly have 
 become very treacherous to have forgotten, not only the 
 remonstrances of General Shoupe, but the earnest opposition 
 of General Polk ; and, moreover, to have reduced the distance 
 of a quarter of a mile to one hundred and fifty or two hundred 
 yards. (See Map.) 
 
 General Johnston must have placed but little reliance upon 
 traverses in this position, since, if I am not mistaken, he made 
 no mention of them in his official report. 
 
 At all events, traverses could not, in this instance, have 
 proved a sufficient protection to the troops. 
 
 After our lines had been enfiladed for one or two hours 
 before sunset, as General Shoupe had pre-admonished General 
 Johnston, Polk and I decided, upon consultation, to see the 
 Commanding General and apprise him of our real condition ; 
 to state also that, whilst our position was as good as we could 
 desire to move forward from and engage the enemy in pitched 
 battle, the line we held was unsuited for defence ; and if he 
 did not intend to assume the offensive the next morning, we 
 would advise him to change his position. This is the sum 
 and substance of our suggestion, or recommendation, to the 
 Commander of that Army, viz. : that if he did not intend to 
 fight a pitched battle, we would advise him to change our 
 position for one better suited for defence. 
 
 This suggestion would seem to be in unison with the spirit 
 of our urgent recommendation only the day previous to turn 
 upon Sherman, and give him general battle at Adairsville, and 
 but poorly harmonizes with the following :* 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, pages 323, 324. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. \ 107 
 
 " On reaching my tent soon after dark, I found an invitation to meet 
 the Lieutenant Generals at General Polk's quarters. General Hood was 
 with him, but not General Hardee. The two officers, General Hood 
 taking the lead, expressed the opinion very positively that neither of their 
 corps would be able to hold its position next day ; because, they said, a 
 part of each was enfiladed by Federal artillery. The part of General 
 Polk's Corps referred to was that of which I had conversed with Briga- 
 dier General Shoupe. On that account they urged me to abandon the 
 ground immediately, and cross the Etowah." 
 
 I have already stated that the corps commanders, especially 
 Polk and myself, urged Johnston only the day previous to 
 march back and attack Sherman at Adairsville; that his own 
 chief of artillery reported the position Polk and I occupied as 
 unsuited for a defence, before our retreat from the ridge in front 
 of the town ; I have proved that the enemy appeared on the 
 Canton road, according to my report — which report General 
 Johnston declared to be " manifestly untrue." Now since 
 Polk and I most earnestly urged Johnston, only the day 
 previous, to move forward and attack Sherman, does it not 
 seem strange that we should be insisting on retreat the follow- 
 ing night? Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, 
 that Johnston intended to fight when in position on the unten- 
 able ridge in rear of Cassville, this intention could only have 
 been based upon the vain hope that Sherman would march 
 across the valley, and through the town to attack his entrench- 
 ments. The Federals would never have made an assault from 
 this direction, as the country toward Canton was open, and 
 favorable to an attack upon our right flank. Humanity itself 
 should have prompted this way of approach, in order to spare 
 the women and children of the town. Again, even in the 
 event Polk and I had consented to subject our troops to a 
 heavy enfilading fire of artillery, may I not ask — especially as 
 a part of Sherman's Army, I think Schofield's Corps, was then 
 reported to be moving across the Etowah to threaten our 
 communications south of this stream, and a similar movement 
 had dislodged us already from Dalton and Resaca, and in fact 
 dislodged us from every position between Dalton and Atlanta — 
 
108 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 how long is it supposed we would have remained at Cassville? 
 I leave the answer to every fair minded man. 
 
 This is the history of the much talked of affair at Cassville, 
 in connection with which it is afiirmed that Johnston wished 
 to fight, but Polk and I were not inclined to do so.* 
 
 General Johnston, as evidence that without any proviso 
 we advised him to retreat, quotes a statement to that effect 
 of General Hardee and his chief of staff, neither of whom 
 were present during our long discussion. If I did remark 
 after the interview had closed, and Johnston had decided to 
 cross the Etowah, that, if attacked, Polk would not be able to 
 hold his line three-quarters of an hour, nor I mine two hours, 
 the remark could have had but a distant bearing upon the 
 question. A single observation could not have unfolded all 
 which occurred during this prolonged meeting. 
 
 If General Polk were to rise up from his grave, he would be 
 astounded at the suppression of the most important part of the 
 testimony in relation to these facts, by which, during a period 
 of ten years, the impression has been sustained that we are 
 both to blame for not permitting General Johnston to fight, 
 when he was so desirous to deliver battle. With the fore- 
 going statement, I do at this day and hour, in the name of 
 
 * The following letter from Dr. A. M. Polk, son of General Polk, at that time 
 aide-de-camp to his father, sustains the truthfulness of this representation of facts : 
 
 " New York, June lyth, 1874. 
 
 " Dear General: — I have just read your correction of General Johnston's 
 statements in regard to my father's connection with the ' Cassville affair.' 
 
 " Pray accept our sincere thanks, not only for the correction, but also for the 
 manner in which it is expressed. He was killed so soon after, he left no 
 written statement of the matter; but from conversations I held with him I know 
 his position to have been just as you state it : not willing to stand there and wait 
 for the enemy to attack us, but more than willing to take the initiative in bringing 
 on a general engagement. 
 
 " With much respect, 
 
 " I am most truly yours, 
 
 "A, M. POLK." 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 109 
 
 truth, honor and justice, in the name of the departed soul of 
 the Christian and noble Polk, and in the presence of my 
 Creator, most solemnly deny that General Polk or I recom- 
 mended General Johnston, at Cassville, to retreat when he 
 intended to give battle ; and affirm that the recommendation 
 made by us to change his position, was throughout the 
 discussion coupled with the proviso : If he did not intend to 
 force a pitched battle. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON — CASSVILLE, 
 
 When the preceding chapter was written, setting forth my 
 most positive denial of General Johnston's statements in regard 
 to that which he avers to have been said by General Polk and 
 myself, at Polk's headquarters, during this important council ; 
 and when I charged General Johnston with the suppression of 
 the most important part of the recommendations made to him 
 by each of us, I was under the impression that only Johnston, 
 Polk and I were present in the room during the discussion. 
 Fortunately, however, the complete vindication of my asser- 
 tion has arisen from a source I little expected. In addition to 
 the strong evidence adduced by the letters of General Shoupe 
 and Doctor Polk, I am favored with the subjoined full and 
 explanatory letter from a gentleman of no less position than 
 that of chief engineer of a corps d'armee, and who was present, 
 in the room, during the council of war held by Johnston, Polk, 
 and myself, with map and measurement of angles of the 
 position in question: 
 
 "New York, June 25th, 1874. 
 " Dr. W. M. Polk, 288 Fifth Avenue, New York. 
 
 " Dear Sir : — In reply to your note of the 20th inst., asking me to give 
 you my recollection of the circumstances in regard to the retreat of the 
 
 (no) 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. Ill 
 
 Confederate Armies from Cassville, Georgia, to the south side of the 
 Etowah river, I will state the facts as connected with myself, as follows : 
 
 "At the time when the Confederate Armies of Tennessee and Missis- 
 sippi, under the command of General J. E. Johnston, and the Federal 
 Army under General Sherman, were manoeuvring in the neighborhood of 
 Cassville, I had nearly completed my journey from Demopolis, Alabama, 
 to that town to join Lieutenant General Polk, commanding the Army of 
 Mississippi, who was with General Johnston in that vicinity. I had 
 crossed the country in company with a part of that command. I arrived 
 at Cassville railway station about half-past three or four o'clock in the 
 afternoon of the 19th of May, 1864, and met Colonel Gale, of our staff, 
 who informed me that the Lieutenant General desired to see me as soon 
 as I arrived. I passed on without delay to his headquarters, about half 
 a mile east of the railway station, and met General Polk at the door of 
 the cabin used for headquarter purposes. I entered immediately, and 
 he placed a skeleton map before me, giving the surrounding country, 
 and pointed out the positions of the Confederate forces, and the known 
 and supposed locations of the Federals, giving such additional informa- 
 tion as to enable me to fully understand the actual condition of affairs. 
 This was done rapidly. He then requested me to go at once and 
 examine the extreme right of his line, as he considered it untenable for 
 defence. 
 
 " 1st. He desired me to form an opinion if, by constructing a rifle pit, 
 his line could be held against such an attack as might be reasonably 
 expected in the morning. 
 
 " 2d. To carefully examine that part of the line enfiladed, to see if it 
 was possible to construct traverses to enable him to hold the position on 
 the defensive. 
 
 " 3d. To examine the ground immediately in his front in reference to 
 advancing, and to note in reference the positions then occupied by the 
 Federal batteries in front and to the right of Lieutenant General Hood's 
 line. 
 
 " 4th. If those batteries to the front and right of Hood's line could be 
 taken by a special movement. These explanations, noting them down, 
 and getting a tracing of the skeleton map, required about thirty minutes, 
 and I started for that part of the line in question ; General Polk impres- 
 sing upon me the necessity of reaching that part of the hne as soon as 
 possible, as I would only have about two hours of daylight to make the 
 examinations. Furnishing me with a fresh horse, one of his own, and 
 the necessary guides from his escort, I reached the ground in fifteen 
 minutes. I was instructed to return as soon after dark as possible, for, 
 
112 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 if necessary, an invitation would be sent to General Johnston to come to 
 his (Lieutenant General Polk's) headquarters. Lieutenant General 
 Hood, I think, was with General Polk when I left. Arriving upon the 
 line of battle, I found Major General French's Division, Army of Missis- 
 sippi, located on the extreme right of that Army, and occupying the 
 part of the line in question. To his right was the line of Lieutenant 
 General Hood's Corps, Army of Tennessee, forming the extreme right 
 of the Confederate infantry forces. The crest of the ridge occupied by 
 French's Division was about one hundred and forty feet above the plain, 
 or valley, in which the town of Cassville is located. This ridge is cut 
 across by a ravine of about fifty feet deep, its sides rising from its bottom, 
 on either side, at about 30 degrees. The location of this ravine on 
 French's line was five or six hundred feet to the left of his extreme right. 
 To the left of this ravine, for twelve or fifteen hundred feet, the crest of 
 the ridge was entirely open, as was to the rear for eight hundred or one 
 thousand feet. There were a few scattered trees of stunted growth in 
 and about the ravine. The remaining portion of General French's line 
 to the left and to the rear was timbered, as also to the front for seven or 
 eight hundred feet, increasing in depth towards the left. The ground to 
 the front of the left half of his line descended about one hundred and 
 forty feet for half a mile, continuing on to Cassville about one and a 
 quarter miles to the northwest of his left. The ground in front of the 
 right half of his line descended about a hundred feet on the left, 
 and eighty feet on the right for a distance of half a mile on the left, 
 and a quarter of a mile on the extreme right. Then ascending to eighty 
 feet on the left, and a hundred on the right to a ridge opposite, and 
 due north. 
 
 " This opposing ridge passed on a line about 23 degrees south of 
 west, forming an angle ,with General Polk's line of defence of about 
 25 degrees, and forming something less of an angle with Lieutenant 
 General Hood's line. This opposite ridge was occupied by the enemy, 
 their left resting on a point about a mile and a quarter northeast on a 
 prolongation of General Polk's hne, and from half a mile to three- 
 quarters of a mile in front of Lieutenant General Hood's, and passing 
 on to the westward at a distance of about half a mile to one and a 
 quarter miles north of General Polk, and in front of his extreme right. 
 The line occupied by the enemy on the opposite ridge was from twenty to 
 forty feet higher than the position of General Hood's line, and from forty 
 to sixty feet higher than General Polk's. The batteries of the enemy 
 were posted on- the most prominent and available points along their 
 ridge, extending for a mile from their extreme left towards their right, 
 reaching a point to the north and front of General Polk's extreme right. 
 
Siiowing einepositioTis of llie 
 
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 May lOl'-'iaGl., 
 
 imcltn- ConmuuicL of G<»TieiviL 
 .J. J'] . .1 Ol IK S T C»^. 
 
 ^iny Ttnm -. (nml Jcitirist(ni 
 .. MLss: I A Go 
 
 TJu' Topo(,rn,jl,.y. „n<l poslHon,, oftl.r h-oops ^urtrd ,m X 
 TIK dayot tlir (nujageincnt Mi;/ fffH^ f<- yjKlf IHH^h 8c % 
 
 ap madv hy 
 
 , .f'^f,'. ', r'-^/ J''n;/ii,j',', ■ Co rps. 
 
 K/i'Tij'rf >o-in 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 113 
 
 and directly in front of the ravine and open part of French's line. The 
 batteries enfiladed and cross fired upon the entire open crest from 45 
 degrees to 60 degrees, and with a plunging fire of from twenty to sixty 
 feet and sweeping through the ravine, and across the rear of the ridge to 
 a distance of about a thousand feet. This rear fire being still more 
 plunging than that on the crest. 
 
 "There was no cover for the men within a reasonable distance to the 
 crest, for from the extreme positions of the left batteries of the enemy, 
 it would not be necessary for them to cease firing during the attack until 
 their infantry had reached a line very close to the crest of the ridge 
 occupied by General Polk's command. 
 
 "The extreme left, or eastern batteries of the enemy, necessarily enfi- 
 laded a considerable portion of General Hood's line. 
 
 " Having made these examinations and noted them down, I formed the 
 following opinions : 
 
 " 1st. That the right of the line occupied by Lieutenant General Polk's 
 command could not be held, as it then was, nor could it be held by con- 
 structing a rifle pit along the crest. 
 
 " 2d. That traverses would be of no avail either for the rifle pits upon 
 the crest or as a covered way to the rear, as such traverses would cover 
 nearly the entire surface. 
 
 " 3d. That it was extremely hazardous for Lieutenant General Polk to 
 advance his line to make an attack upon the enemy while their batteries 
 held the positions they then occupied. ' 
 
 " 4th. As to forming any opinion as to the taking of these left batteries 
 of the enemy by a special flank movement, this I could not do, as I was 
 unable to examine to the right of Lieutenant General Hood's line, as it 
 had grown dark. But judging from the stream, as located on the skele- 
 ton map, there must have been a very narrow ridge to approach the 
 enemy upon their left. 
 
 " At the time I arrived about the centre of General Polk's right where 
 the open crest of the ridge commenced, I found a very heavy enfilading 
 and cross fire going on from the enemy's batteries. There were but a 
 few sentinels remaining upon the crest, the main body of men, intended 
 to occupy this part of the line, were compelled to withdraw to the right 
 and left at the foot of the ridge, out of sight, but not out of range of the 
 enemy's batteries. 
 
 " I found that Major General French had one or two batteries in posi- 
 tion upon the part the line near the ravine, and while they were coming 
 into their positions, and before the guns could be unlimbered, from one 
 
114 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to two horses from each piece were killed. On my return over this part 
 of the line, about dark, the fire from the enemy had nearly ceased. 
 
 " Having completed the reconnoissance, I returned to Lieutenant Gen- 
 eral Polk's headquarters, just after dark. 
 
 "I placed before him my sketches and notes, and explained to him 
 substantially these facts. General Polk sent at once to ask General 
 Johnston to come to his headquarters. Lieutenant General Hood was 
 already with General Polk. General Johnston arrived about 9 o'clock. 
 I remained in the cabin during the conversation as to holding the position 
 then occupied or advancing or retiring the Armies to the south of the 
 Etowah river, about seven or eight miles to our rear. 
 
 " Lieutenant General Polk expressed himself convinced that he could 
 not hold his line against attack, and that Major General French, who 
 occupied that part of his line in question, was of the same opinion as 
 was his (General Polk's) engineer officer (myself), who had examined 
 the position and reported that traverses would be of no avail. Lieutenant 
 General Hood stated that he was also convinced that neither he nor 
 General Polk could hold their lines for an hour against such an attack as 
 they might certainly expect in the morning — these Generals both advo- 
 cating to the Commanding General to take the offensive and advance on 
 the enemy from these lines. In reference to this proposed forward 
 movement, General Johnston's attention was pardcularly called to the 
 advantages of taking possession of the positions occupied by the batteries 
 of the enemy on their extreme left, either by a special flank movement 
 or by prompt action at the time when the Confederate lines would be 
 advanced. Lieutenant General Polk expressed himself entirely willing 
 and ready to co-operate with General Hood to accomplish this object. 
 After some moments of silence. General Johnston decided to withdraw 
 the Armies to the south of the Etowah. Soon after this, Lieutenant 
 General Hardee arrived. General Johnston informed him of this deci- 
 sion to cross the river, stating that Generals Polk and Hood had informed 
 him that they could not hold their lines. Lieutenant General Hood then 
 re-stated the reasons, and said that General Polk could not hold his line 
 an hour. Nor could he. Hood, hold his two hours if attacked in the 
 morning. Lieutenant General Polk again explained the facts as existed 
 in reference to his line, and stated his willingness to assume the offensive 
 at any time, then or in the morning, rather than to await the attack of 
 the enemy in his (Polk's) present position. Upon these points Lieu- 
 tenant Generals Polk and Hood entirely agreed, urging the offensive 
 rather than await the enemy. 
 
 " Lieutenant General Hardee made but few, if any, remarks that I 
 heard. After a few moments General Johnstort gave the orders for the 
 armies to move to the south side of the Etowah. Lieutenant General 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 115 
 
 Polk called to his A. A. General to issue orders to his Division Com- 
 manders. This was about 10.30 or 11 o'clock. 
 
 " The orders to Major General Loring, Army of Mississippi, were given 
 me to deliver ; also one to him to order to report to me an officer with 
 three hundred (300) men to occupy the exposed part of Major General 
 French's line, as soon as his command was withdrawn. 
 
 " I was instructed by General Polk to place this detail along that part 
 of the line, and keep up such fires as would indicate the presence of the 
 withdrawn command, and to cut timber and drive stakes to indicate that 
 works were being thrown up, and to remain there until daylight and 
 observe the movements of the enemy before leaving. I went at once to 
 General Loring's headquarters on the left of the Cassville road, saw that 
 General, and delivered the orders ; obtained the officer and detail, and 
 arrived at General French's line about half-past eleven o'clock, and 
 found that command ready to move ; by twelve o'clock (midnight), they 
 had withdrawn and the detail was posted with a few men out in front. 
 It was a calm, clear starlight night, and the position of the enemy upon 
 the opposite ridge was clearly seen, without their fires which could be 
 traced along their line, and the cutting of timber could be distinctly 
 heard and located. In addition to the enemy's location upon the crest 
 of the ridge, and passing there or just in front of the town of Cassville 
 and on to the southwest, there were also strong indications of an advance 
 line upon the plane nearer to the foot of the ridge occupied by us, and 
 their chopping and driving rails was very distinct, and their voices occa- 
 sionally could be heard. 
 
 " The work of the detail was kept up through the night. At daylight I 
 instructed the officer to assemble his men to the rear. During this time 
 of preparing to leave the line, I closely observed the enemy and his 
 positions through a very strong field glass. I found that many of their 
 batteries along the ridge had been advanced, and their principal and 
 somewhat entrenched line appeared to leave the ridge at a point about a 
 mile east of Cassville, and passing to the southwest fully a half-a-mile in 
 front of their lines of the previous afternoon. It appeared that the 
 enemy had been aware of the movement of the Confederate Armies, 
 and their line advanced during the night, was now vacated and there 
 were trains and artillery moving to the west upon the Kmgston road, 
 and solid bodies of infantry were moving in the same direction. 
 • " The detail having been assembled, I placed them upon a by-road to 
 Cassville Station on the main road to Cartersville. I instructed the 
 officer to proceed to the south side of the Etowah river by way of the 
 Cartersville bridge, and to report back to his Division Commander. I 
 passed on to cross the river at the same point, arriving there about half- 
 
116 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 past ten o'clock, and found the Army of the Mississippi nearly over to 
 the south side, which was completed by noon. 
 " Very truly yours, 
 
 "WALTER J. MORRIS, 
 
 "Late Captain Engineer Corps, C. S. A 
 "Chief Engineer, Army of Mississippi 
 
 " N. B. — Enclosed herewith you will find a map made by me from my 
 notes taken at the time of reconnoissance.* 
 
 " Yours, etc., 
 
 "W. J. M." 
 
 * Map of Cassville, page 113. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON NEW HOPE CHURCH KENNESAW 
 
 MOUNTAIN RETREAT ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE — JOHN- 
 STON RELIEVED FROM COMMAND. 
 
 General Johnston, touching the operations of his Army- 
 near New Hope Church says :* 
 
 " We found, next morning, that the Federal line extended much 
 further to our right than it had done the day before. Polk's Corps 
 was transferred to the right of Hood's. * * * The Federal troops 
 extended their entrenched lines so rapidly to their left, that it was found 
 necessary in the morning of the 27th to transfer Cleburne's Division of 
 Hardee's Corps to our right, where it was formed on the prolongation 
 of Polk's line. Kelly's Cavalry, composed of Allen's and Hannon's 
 Alabama brigades, together less than a thousand (1000) men, occupied 
 the interval, of half-a-mile, between Cleburne's right and Little Pumpkin- 
 vine creek. * * * * Between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, 
 Kelly's skirmishers were driven in by a body of Federal cavalry, whose 
 advance was supported by the Fourth Corps. * * * * As soon as 
 the noise of this contest revealed to Major General Cleburne the 
 manoeuvre to turn his right, he brought the right brigade of his second 
 line, Cranberry's, to Kelly's support, by forming it on the right of his 
 first line. * * * The Fourth Corps came on in deep order, and 
 assailed the Texans with great vigor, receiving their close and accurate 
 fire with the fortitude always exhibited by General Sherman's troops in 
 the actions of this campaign. * * * The contest of the main body 
 
 *Johnston's Narrative, pages 328, 329, 330. 
 
 (117) 
 
118 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 of the Fourth Corps with Cranberry's brigade was a very fierce one. * 
 * * They (the enemy) left hundreds of corpses within twenty paces of 
 the Confederate hnes." 
 
 It is strange the author of this Narrative should offer the 
 above, and, in fact, nearly all he has written on pages 328-29- 
 30-31 as a contribution to the historian, when he commits the 
 unpardonable error of placing Polk's Corps during the whole 
 of this " affair near New Hope Church " in the identical posi- 
 tion occupied by my corps. 
 
 I was not only on the right, where he places Polk, but sent 
 to him for a good division, with the message that Howard's 
 Corps was moving rapidly to turn my right flank, which was 
 the right of the infantry of our Army ; that I had extended 
 my lines as far as possible. He sent Cleburne's Division to 
 report to me. General Cleburne was given by me most 
 explicit instructions in regard to the formation of his forces on 
 the right of my corps. He was directed to place his troops 
 in a column of brigades, in the rear of my immediate right, 
 which was the right of Hindman's Division, with Cranberry's 
 brigade in rear of the column, so as to bring it on our extreme 
 right when deployed into line ; he was also instructed to allow 
 the Federal cavalry to reconnoitre and find our right. Simi- 
 lar orders were given to our own cavalry. As Howard's 
 Corps advanced, Cleburne was directed to deploy quickly into 
 line ; the Federals thus came in contact with a solid line of 
 infantry, in lieu of finding the open space on our flank, which 
 existed at the time of the reconnoissance of the Federal 
 cavalry. 
 
 I shall ever remember the enthusiasm and transport of the 
 gallant Cleburne at the time of this though small engagement, 
 yet most brilliant affair of the whole campaign. 
 
 The proof of the correctness of my statement respecting 
 the above operations will be found in the following extract 
 from a short report, written at my dictation by a young officer 
 of my staff, and which, as it conflicts with General Johnston's 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 119 
 
 own Narrative, is unaccountably inserted by him on pages 
 585 and 586: 
 
 " On the morning of the 26th, the enemy found to be extending their 
 left. Hindman's Division was withdrawn from my left, and placed 
 in position on my right, the enemy continuing to extend his left. Major 
 General Cleburne, with his division, was ordered to report to me, 
 and v/as massed on Hindman's right. On the morning of the 27th, the 
 enemy known to be extending rapidly to the left, attempting to turn my 
 right as they extended. Cleburne was deployed to meet them, and, at 
 half-past 5. p. m., a very stubborn attack was made on his division, 
 extending to the right, where Major General Wheeler, with his cavalry, 
 dismounted, was engaging them. The assault was continued with great 
 determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler until after night, but 
 every attempt to break their lines was gallantly repulsed. About 10 
 o'clock at night. Brigadier General Cranberry, with his brigade of Texans 
 made a dashing charge on the enemy, driving them from the field, their 
 killed and wounded being left in our hands. During this engagement, 
 two or three hundred prisoners were captured, all belonging to Howard's 
 Corps." 
 
 At the end of this hastily written field report I add, " I 
 enclose Major General Cleburne's report, and will forward 
 others as soon as received." Every soldier of and above 
 the rank of captain knows that no officer sends forward his 
 reports of battle, save through his commanding officer at the 
 time of the engagement. Therefore General Cleburne brought 
 his report of this "affair" to me, who commanded him at the 
 time, in lieu of forwarding it through Lieutenant General Har- 
 dee to whose corps he was attached. 
 
 Again, in reference to operations near New Hope Church, 
 the author of this remarkable Narrative writes as follows, 
 page 333 : 
 
 "When the three Lieutenant Generals were together in my quarters 
 that day (the 28th), as usual. Lieutenant General Hood suggested that 
 we should make an attack upon the Federal Army, to commence on its 
 left flank. The suggestion was accepted, and the three officers were 
 desired to be ready for battle next morning. Lieutenant General Hood 
 was instructed to draw his corps out of the line to the rear, and to march 
 during the night around our right, and form it facing the enemy's left 
 
120 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 flank, somewhat obliquely to his line, and to assail that flank at dawn 
 next day. Polk and Hardee were instructed to join in the battle suc- 
 cessively, obliquely to the present formation, when the progress made on 
 the right of each should enable him to do so. 
 
 " We waited next morning for the signal agreed upon — the mus- 
 ketry of Hood's Corps — from the appointed time until about lo a. m., 
 when a message from the Lieutenant General was delivered to me by 
 one of his aides-de-camp, to the effect that he had found Johnston's Divi- 
 sion, on the Federal left, thrown back almost at right angles to the gen- 
 eral line, and entrenching ; that, under such circumstances, he had 
 thought it inexpedient to attack, and asked for instructions. I supposed, 
 from the terms of this message, that Hood's Corps was in the presence 
 of the enemy, and that, his movement and position being known to them, 
 they would be prepared to repel his assault as soon as he could make it, 
 after his aide-de-camp's return. If the attack had been expedient when 
 Lieutenant General Hood's message was dispatched, the resulting delay, 
 by enabling the enemy to reinforce the threatened point and complete 
 the entrenchments began, made it no longer so. He was therefore 
 recalled." 
 
 Before I withdrew from the right of the Army which rested 
 on Little Pumpkin-vine creek, with Cleburne's Division still 
 on my extreme right and under my orders — i. e., before I 
 withdrew on the night of the 28th of May from the position 
 General Johnston erroneously assigns General Polk during 
 the 26th, 27th and 28th, I received information from General 
 Wheeler's cavalry stationed on Cleburne's right, just across 
 Little Pumpkin-vine creek, that the enemy had its left flank 
 beyond this stream, in a position which was exposed by reason 
 of the difficulty of passage back to the main body of their 
 Army; and that if I could withdraw that night, the 28th, and 
 get in position by early morning, I might attack this corps or 
 division thus exposed, and destroy it before it could recross 
 Little Pumpkin-vine creek or receive reinforcements. This 
 information reached me on the morning of the 28th, after 
 Cleburne's repulse of the enemy on the afternoon and night of 
 the 27th, as before mentioned. 
 
 Encouraged by this favorable opportunity of dealing the 
 enemy a hard blow, I instantly repaired to General Johnston's 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 121 
 
 headquarters and asked his permission to withdraw my corps 
 at dark from our extreme right, and attack this exposed flank 
 next morning. He answered that it might result in a general 
 engagement; to which I repHed that, if I were able to destroy 
 one portion of the enemy before it could be reinforced, it would 
 give us greatly the advantage if a general battle ensued ; that 
 Hardee and Polk could be in readiness to come to my assist- 
 ance, if necessary. 
 
 Having obtained his consent, couriers were dispatched for 
 the two remaining corps commanders, Hardee and Polk, who 
 shortly joined us. They were instructed to hold their corps 
 in readiness for action the next day, as I was going to march 
 that night, upon the above report from Wheeler's cavalry, and 
 attack the left flank of the enemy, — provided I found it as 
 reported ; in other words, the whole of the proposed move- 
 ment was to depend upon the enemy's left flank remaining as 
 represented. 
 
 Polk was then, for the first time, ordered to my position — 
 the right of the Army — and, accordingly, I withdrew after 
 night and took up my line of march with guides from 
 Wheeler's cavalry. Just about dawn, as we were approaching 
 the place where the enemy was reported to be in an exposed 
 position, I received from the same cavalry a message to the 
 effect that I need proceed no further, as the Federals had 
 during the night, drawn back their left flank, recrossed Little 
 Pumpkin-vine creek, and were entrenched. From a feeling 
 of insecurity, they had recrossed to the side of the creek I 
 had left the evening previous, thereby placing between the 
 opposing forces a swamp and difficult stream to cross, in addi- 
 tion to entrenchments on the opposite bank. An attack upon 
 the enemy after he had recrossed to the side of the creek I 
 had left the night before, would have been extreme rashness, 
 especially, since I had had an opportunity during one or two 
 days previous to my move from the position I occupied at the 
 time Cleburne was on my right, to make a similar assault 
 without having to encounter the obstacles of a swamp and a 
 
122 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 creek. Our cavalry had evidently seen the folly of attacking 
 the Federals across this creek, and, therefore, advised me to 
 proceed no further. I reported these facts to General John- 
 ston, and was ordered to return. 
 
 The following extract from a letter dated May 22d, 1874, 
 received from General Wheeler, General Johnston's Chief of 
 Cavalry, will show that the enemy was heavily entrenching 
 the night of my march around our right flank : 
 
 ****<< J recall the movement to attack the enemy's left flank 
 with your corps and my cavalry, which, I think, was on the night of the 
 28th. I remember you sending for me on the morning of the 29th, and 
 telling me why you did not attack, which was owing to a change in 
 position of the enemy and their invariable custom of entrenchment. I 
 remember that the enemy were cutting down trees during the night, 
 which was one of their favorite plans of strengthening and even building 
 works, especially in so densely wooded a country. I cannot recall what 
 officer was in charge of the scouts or in command of the brigade imme- 
 diately in front of the enemy's left flank." 
 
 I have a strong impression that the officer to whom General 
 Wheeler refers was the gallant General Kelly, who was after- 
 wards killed in battle. 
 
 It might be supposed, upon reading General Johnston's 
 recital of this his second attempt to fight, that I was ordered 
 to assault the enemy under any circumstances, and that I was 
 again the cause of battle not having been delivered. Never 
 within my history have I been ordered to fight and have failed 
 to obey instructions. I have never experienced pleasure in 
 being shot at, but I have always endeavored to do my whole 
 duty; and, although I have been charged with recklessness in 
 regard to the lives of my men, I had sufficient caution to 
 know that some positions should not be attacked, such as the 
 one occupied by the enemy after recrossing Little Pumpkin- 
 vine creek. However, had General Johnston given me orders 
 to attack at all hazard, I would have done so. It is true I 
 went into battle under protest at Gettysburg, because I desired 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 123 
 
 to turn Round Top Mountain ; but, notwithstanding, I v/as 
 true in every sense of the word to the orders of my commander 
 till, wounded, I was borne from the field. 
 
 During three years'service, under Generals Lee, Jackson, and 
 Longstreet, I was never charged with being too late in any of 
 the many battles in which I was engaged, before reporting for 
 duty with the Army of the West. 
 
 When General Johnston said "as usual," I suggested that 
 we attack the left flank of the enemy. I presume he had in 
 remembrance Lieutenant General Polk's and my urgent recom- 
 mendation that he turn upon and attack Sherman at Adairs- 
 ville, just before he placed his Army upon the untenable ridge 
 in rear of Cassville, with women and children of the town 
 between the two armies, and of which recommendation he is 
 so careful to make no mention. 
 
 When I retrace these facts and circumstances, I cannot 
 think General Johnston in earnest when he states that he 
 intended, or desired to fight at the different points mentioned; 
 moreover, it must seem strange to my comrades of the Vir- 
 ginia Army that I, who had always been ready and wilhng to 
 do my duty, should have undergone so complete a change 
 under General Johnston, during the last year of the war. In 
 truth, I had nowise altered in my nature ; and I will add that 
 no General ever received more thorough co-operation of his 
 corps commanders than did General Johnston during his 
 campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. He was on cordial terms 
 with each of us, and it should be borne in mind that the 
 animus displayed towards General Polk and myself, never 
 became apparent till after I was assigned to the command of 
 the Army of Tennessee, and the noble Polk had been laid in 
 his grave nigh two months. General Johnston was then 
 residing in Macon, Georgia, where he wrote his official report, 
 in which were brought forward, for the first time, these unjust 
 and false accusations. 
 
 If I was so little to be relied upon, and had given cause for 
 complaint successively at Resaca and Cassville, why did he 
 
124 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 entrust to me the important operations at New Hope Church, 
 from which it was supposed a general engagement might 
 ensue. The truth is, he possessed no real cause of complaint, 
 and, I reiterate, he had the full co-operation of his Lieutenants. 
 No matter what were the views held by them touching his 
 mode of handling an army, they were all sufficiently good 
 soldiers to forego, in the presence of even one of their own 
 staff officers, any remark which might tend to destroy confi- 
 dence in their leader. 
 
 I will cite a historical fact illustrative of this spirit of dis- 
 cretion and forbearance, which will be peculiarly interesting as 
 it has never, to my knowledge, been made public. 
 
 Just before leaving New Hope Church, his three corps 
 commanders were assembled alone, at night, in his quarters — 
 then a little cabin near the church — when General Johnston 
 suggested Macon as being the place to fall back upon. If I 
 remember rightly, this suggestion was received in silence, for 
 I cannot recall the reply of one of us at the moment. I well 
 remember, however, after we had left the presence of General 
 Johnston, and were riding through the darkness of the night 
 to our respective headquarters, that the unanimous sentiment 
 expressed on this occasion was to this effect: "In the name of 
 Heaven, what is to become of us? Here we are with the 
 depots for recruits drained, from Mobile to Richmond, all the 
 troops having been sent either to us or to General Lee, in Vir- 
 ginia ; our Army fifty or sixty miles from Dalton, no general 
 battle fought, and our Commander talking of Macon, one 
 hundred miles beyond Atlanta, as being the place to fall back 
 upon !" 
 
 This gloomy outlook brought about the comparison touch- 
 ing our losses up to that period, and to which I have previously 
 referred. We finally separated; each rode off to his own tent; 
 and, howsoever, dispirited, I am confident not one of us so far 
 lost sight of that co-operation so essential in time of war, as to 
 speak one word which would convey a suspicion of General 
 Johnston's contemplated retreat to Macon. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 125 
 
 Shortly after this occurrence, the Army occupied the hne at 
 Kennesaw Mountain, the last stronghold of the many sharp 
 ridges passed over during our retreat. It was to the left of 
 this point, on Pine Mountain, that we lost the brave and mag- 
 nanimous Polk, and with him much of the history of this re- 
 markable campaign. 
 
 The Confederate Army had remained on the defensive about 
 thirty days at Kennesaw Mountain, when Sherman resorted 
 to a ruse he had learned from experience would prove effective : 
 he sent a few troops to make a rumbling sound in our rear, 
 and we folded up our tents, as usual, under strict orders to 
 make no noise, and, under cover of darkness, marched to and 
 across the Chattahoochee, upon the flat plains of Georgia. 
 
 After our passage of this river, on the night of the 9th of 
 July, Sherman moved rapidly to the eastward and across the 
 Chattahoochee, some distance above Peach Tree creek. He 
 formed a line parallel to this creek, with his right on the river, 
 and approached Atlanta from the north, whilst Schofield and 
 McPherson, on the left, marched rapidly in the direction of 
 Decatur to destroy the railroad to Augusta. 
 
 General Johnston thus relates the sequel :* 
 
 "On the 17th, Major General Wheeler reported that the whole Federal 
 Army had crossed the Chattahoochee. * * * The following telegram 
 was received from General Cooper, dated July 17th : ' Lieutenant General 
 J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of General, 
 under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War 
 to inform you that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy 
 to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no 
 confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved 
 from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which 
 you will immediately turn over to General Hood.' * * * General 
 Hood came to my quarters early in the morning of the i8th, and remained 
 there during the day. Intelligence soon came from Major General 
 Wheeler, that the Federal Army was marching toward Atlanta, and, at 
 General Hood's earnest request, I continued to give orders through 
 Brigadier General Mackall, Chief of Staff, until sunset." 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, pages 348, 349, 350. 
 
126 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 About II o'clock, on the night of the i/th, I received a 
 telegram from the War Office, directing me to assume 
 command of the Army. This totally unexpected order so 
 astounded me, and overwhelmed me with sense of the responsi- 
 bility thereto attached, that I remained in deep thought 
 throughout the night. Before daybreak I started for General 
 Johnston's headquarters, a short distance from which I met 
 Lieutenant General A. P. Stewart, one of my division com- 
 manders, who had been recommended by me, and recently pro- 
 moted to the rank of corps commander to replace General 
 Polk. 
 
 We rode on together to General Johnston's quarters, which 
 we reached shortly after dawn. I at once sought the Com- 
 manding General, and inquired into the cause of this order. 
 He replied he did not know; the President had seen fit to 
 relieve him. I then insisted he should pocket that dispatch, 
 leave me in command of my corps, and fight the battle for 
 Atlanta; at the same time I directed his attention to the 
 approach of General Sherman, and alleged that the enemy, 
 unless checked, would in a few days capture the city. 
 
 To this appeal, he replied that the President had seen fit to 
 relieve him, and it would have so to be, unless the order was 
 countermanded. Lieutenant Generals Hardee and Stewart 
 then joined me in a telegram to the President, requesting that 
 the order for his removal be postponed, at least till the fate of 
 Atlanta was decided. 
 
 The following extract from a letter of Lieutenant General 
 A. P. Stewart will show that I was desirous General Johnston 
 should remain in command: 
 
 " St. Louis, August yth, 1872. 
 " General J. B. Hood. 
 
 "My Dear General ; — Your letter of the 25th ultimo was received 
 some days since, and I avail myself of the first opportunity to answer it. 
 
 " You ask me to send you ' a statement setting forth the facts as you 
 (I) understand them, of the circ-umstances attending the removal of 
 General J. E. Johnston from the command of our Army in Georgia, in 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 127 
 
 1864, and my appointment to succeed him.' It gives me pleasure to 
 comply with your request. * * * Monday morning, (July i8th,)you 
 will remember we met about sunrise in the road near Johnston's head- 
 quarters ; and I then informed you of the object of seeking an interview, 
 and that was that we should all three unite in an effort to prevail on 
 General Johnston to withhold the order, and retain command of the 
 Army until the impending battle should have been fought. I can bear 
 witness to the readiness with which you concurred. We went together 
 to Johnston's quarters, and you and he had a long conversation with 
 each other, which I did not hear. At the close of it, however, you and 
 General Hardee and I went into the Adjutant General's office, and 
 together prepared a telegram to the President, stating that, in our judg- 
 ment, it was dangerous to change commanders at that juncture, and 
 requesting him to recall the order removing Johnston, at least until the 
 fate of Atlanta should be decided. That was the substance ; 1 cannot 
 remember the language. An answer was received that afternoon from 
 the President, declining to comply with our request or suggestion, on the 
 ground that the order having been issued, it would do more harm than 
 good to recall or suspend it. * * * 
 
 " Very sincerely yours, 
 
 "ALEX. P. STEWART, 
 
 "Late Lieutenant General C. S. Army." 
 
 The President's answer to our telegram was as follows : 
 
 " Richmond, July i8ih, 1864. 
 " To Generals Hood, Hardee and Stewart. 
 
 " Your telegram of this date received. A change of commanders, under 
 existing circumstances, was regarded as so objectionable that 1 only 
 accepted it as the alternative of continuing a policy which has proven 
 disastrous. Reluctance to make the change induced me to send a tele- 
 gram of inquiry to the Commanding General on the i6th inst. His reply 
 but confirmed previous apprehensions. There can be but one question 
 which you and I can entertain, that is, what will best promote the public 
 good ; and to each of you I confidently look for the sacrifice of every 
 personal consideration in conflict with that object. The order has been 
 executed, and I cannot suspend it without making the case worse than 
 it was before the order was issued. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 
 
 After the receipt of the above telegram, I returned to 
 General Johnston's room, alone, and urged him, for the good 
 of the country, to pocket the correspondence, remain in 
 
128 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 command, and fight for Atlanta, as Sherman was at the very- 
 gates of the city. To this my second appeal he made about 
 the same reply as in the first instance. I then referred to the 
 great embarrassment of the position in which I had been 
 placed ; asserting, moreover, I did not even know the position 
 of the two remaining corps of the Army. With all the earnest- 
 ness of which man is capable, I besought him, if he would, 
 under no circumstances retain command and fight the battle 
 for Atlanta, to at least remain with me and give me the benefit 
 of his counsel whilst I determined the issue. My earnest 
 manner must have impressed him, since, with tears of emotion 
 gathering in his eyes, he finally made me the promise that, 
 after riding into Atlanta, he would return that same evening. 
 Although our relations were, as they had been throughout the 
 campaign, friendly and cordial, he not only failed to comply 
 with his promise, but, without a word of explanation or 
 apology, left that evening for Macon, Georgia. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON HANDLING OF TROOPS LEE AND 
 
 JACKSON SCHOOL VerSUS THE JOHNSTON SCHOOL-r-JOHN- 
 STON's PLAN TO HOLD ATLANTA " FOREVER." 
 
 General Johnston makes the following arraignment :* 
 
 "General Hood asserts in his published report, that the Army had 
 become demoralized when he was appointed to command it, and ascribes 
 his invariable defeats partly to that cause. The allegation is disproved 
 by the record of the admirable conduct of those troops on every occasion 
 in which that General sent them to battle — and inevitable disaster. 
 Their courage and discipline were unsubdued by the slaughter to which 
 they v/ere recklessly offered in the four attacks on the Federal Army 
 near Atlanta, as they proved in the useless butchery at Franklin. He 
 also states, f It is a calumny to say that the Army of Tennessee was 
 dispirited or broken down.' It had never before been in finer condi- 
 tion — the men in a high state of discipline and full of confidence from 
 uniform success in their engagements with the enemy." 
 
 At the date of my transfer to the West, I, still under the 
 influence of the teaching of Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, 
 could not but recognize a marked difference, after the crossing 
 of the Chattahoochee river, between the troops of the Army 
 of Tennessee and those of Virginia. My long experience and 
 service with the latter, who formed, their limited numbers not- 
 withstanding, one of the most powerful as well as renowned 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 365. f Johnston's Narrative, page 349. 
 
 9 (129) 
 
130 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Armies the world has produced, enabled me also to discover 
 a marked difference in the spirit and morale of General 
 Johnston's Army when south of the Chattahoochee, and when 
 lying at Dalton, full of hope and anxious for battle. The 
 cause of this difference is simple, and easily understood by 
 those who have had a practical demonstration of the superiority 
 of the Lee and Jackson manner of handling troops over the 
 Joe Johnston mode of warfare. The one school elevates and 
 inspirits, whilst the other depresses, paralyzes, aiid, in time, 
 brings destruction. The effect of these respective schools is 
 alike upon almost all men; otherwise some ground might 
 exist for the assertion that the men of Lee's Army were of a 
 superior class to those under Johnston. Not so, indeed. The 
 personnel of the two Armies was originally of the same 
 element, and there is no reason why our Army at Dalton, 
 handled according to the Lee and Jackson school, should not 
 have been made to equal its counterpart in Virginia. 
 Although it may be argued that the Army of Tennessee 
 had been dispirited, or demoralized, previous to its reorganiza- 
 tion by General Johnston in the Spring of '64, it is neverthe- 
 less certain that, at the time of the first appearance of the 
 Federals in its front at Dalton, it possessed the capability to 
 be rendered the equal of the best troops in the Confederacy. 
 Li this assertion, I am confident I shall be upheld by the 
 intelligent of^cers and men of that Army. 
 
 I regret to find it necessary to discuss this purely military 
 question, since I have as warm personal friends in the Western 
 as in the Virginia Army, and would be pained to know that 
 aught from my pen had given umbrage to any Confederate, 
 who performed his duty faithfully unto the end. I reiterate 
 that t\\Q personnel oi the two Armies was originally the same; 
 that the troops at Dalton were capable of having been made 
 the equal of those in Virginia. Therefore, I see not that two 
 brothers — one having served in Lee's, and the other in John- 
 ston's Army — have cause of jealousy, if one has accomplished 
 somewhat more than the other; whereas had the two been 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 131 
 
 under the same commander, they would have proved soldiers 
 of equal merit. With these premises, I shall proceed to show 
 in brief the cause of difference between these brother-soldiers 
 of opposite schools. 
 
 General Lee never made use of entrenchments, except for 
 the purpose of holding a part of his line with a small force, 
 whilst he assailed the enemy with the main body of his Army — 
 as, for instance, around Richmond at the time of the battle of 
 Gaines's Mills — and save eii daniicr resort, as at Spottsylvania, 
 to and around Petersburg, toward the close of the war. He 
 well knew that the constant use of breastworks would teach 
 his soldiers to look and depend upon such protection as an 
 indispensable source of strength; would imperil that spirit of 
 devil-me-care independence and self-reliance which was one 
 of their secret sources of power, arid would, finally, impair the 
 morale of his Army. A soldier cannot fight for a period of 
 one or two months constantly behind breastworks, with the 
 training that he is equal to four or five of the enemy by reason 
 of the security of his position, and then be expected to engage 
 in pitched battle and prove as intrepid and impetuous as his 
 brother who has been taught to rely solely upon his own 
 valor. The latter, when ordered to charge and drive the 
 enemy, will — or endeavor to — run over any obstacle he may 
 encounter in his front; the former, on account of his undue 
 appreciation of breastworks and distinct remembrance of the 
 inculcations of his commanding officer, will be constantly on 
 the look-out for such defences. His imagination will grow 
 vivid under bullets and bombshells, and a brush-heap will so 
 magnify itself in dimension as to induce him to believe that he 
 is stopped by a wall ten feet high and a mile in length. The 
 consequence of his troubled imagination is that, if too proud 
 to run, he will lie down, incur almost equal disgrace, and 
 prove himself nigh worthless in a pitched battle. 
 
 A somewhat similar result is to be observed in engagements, 
 in the open field, with the red men of the forest. Those who 
 are familiar with their mode of warfare well know that, when- 
 
132 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 ever they are attacked away from such shelter as trees and 
 boulders, they at once become confused, and scatter in all 
 directions. I concede that five hundred, in the open field, 
 would overpower one hundred men, howsoever well trained; 
 but two hundred and fifty properly trained soldiers should 
 always prove the equal of five hundred Indians, mainly because 
 of the difference in the manner of handling forces, practiced 
 by the respective combatants. On the one hand, shelter is 
 invariably sought in time of battle ; on the other, reliance is 
 placed upon boldness and valor. 
 
 In accordance with the same principle, a cavalryman proper 
 cannot be trained to fight, one day, mounted, the next, dis- 
 mounted, and then be expected to charge with the impetuosity 
 of one who has been educated in the belief that it is an easy 
 matter to ride over infantry and artillery, and drive them from 
 the field. He who fights alternately mounted and dismounted, 
 can never become an excellent soldier of either infantry or 
 cavalry proper. Moreover, the highest perfection in the educa- 
 tion of troops, well drilled and disciplined, can only be 
 attained through continued appeals to their pride, and through 
 incitement to make known their prowess by the substantial 
 test of guns and colors, captured upon the field of battle. 
 Soldiers thus educated will ever prove a terror to the foe. 
 The continued use of breastworks during a campaign, renders 
 troops timid in pitched battle ; and the employment of such 
 defences is judicious and profitable alone when resorted to at 
 the proper time. They should be used not unto excess, and 
 only in such instances as I have already mentioned, and in 
 such as I shall hereafter specify. The result of training 
 soldiers to rely upon their own courage, we behold in the 
 achievements of Lee's troops. Long will live the memory of 
 their heroic attempt to scale the rugged heights of Gettysburg ; 
 of their gallant charge over the breastworks at Gaines's Mills, 
 and again over the abatis and strong entrenchments at Chan- 
 cellorsville; of the many deeds of equal daring, which history 
 will immortalize. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 133 
 
 I shall consider, for a moment, the manner in which General 
 Lee handled his troops. After the battle of Sharpsburg, or 
 Antietam, McClellan followed him south of the Potomac; 
 instead of forming line of battle, and throwing up entrench- 
 ments upon every suitable hill he could find, from Maryland 
 to the Rapidan, for the purpose of skirmishing, and delaying 
 the enemy — which work he properly left to the cavalry — he 
 threw his colors to the breeze, and, with martial music, marched 
 to the line of Gordonsville and Fredericksburg. A few 
 months later, when the Federals appeared in his front, he 
 marshaled his forces, which, refreshed by their long rest, v\^ere 
 anxious for battle ; he at once attacked, defeated the enemy, 
 and pursued him to the Potomac. He thus drove back, suc- 
 cessively. Pope, Burnside, and Hooker. 
 
 After the battle of Gettysburg, Meade likewise followed Lee 
 south of the Potomac. Again, he marched to the line of the 
 Rapidan, as in the first instance, leaving his cavalry to observe 
 and check the advance of the enemy. General Grant subse- 
 quently appeared in his front, with a large and well-equipped 
 Army. Although our great chieftain had only about forty-five 
 thousand (45,000) effective men wherewith to oppose him, he, 
 true to his past history, attacked instantly — having cut roads 
 through the Wilderness, in order to get at the enemy — and 
 so fierce was his assault that it almost made the very stones 
 of the earth cry out. History will relate how nigh he was, in 
 this instance, unto theachievement of victory ; so nigh, indeed, 
 that Mr. Lincoln, if I remember correctly, remarked in a speech 
 in the course of which he referred to this desperate onslaught, 
 that Grant had been jostled, not driven back ; and that any one 
 of the men he had sent previously to the command of the 
 Army of the Potomac, would have been back on the north 
 side of the Rappahannock. 
 
 Thus it will be seen that General Lee made use of entrench- 
 ments only en dernier resort, as around Petersburg, or in order 
 to hold one portion of his line with a small force whilst he 
 attacked with the main body; also that when he found it 
 
134 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 necessary to retreat, or fall back from an advanced position, 
 he marched his Army to the line he intended to defend, instead 
 of constantly fighting, skirmishing, avoiding a general engage- 
 ment, and taking up position, day after day, to be abandoned 
 under cover of darkness. General Johnston not only made 
 uniform use of entrenchments, but retreated and fought at the 
 same time — an error which Lee carefully eschewed, and one 
 which should always be avoided, since the long continuance 
 of such policy will prove the inevitable ruin of any army. 
 Napier, one of the highest authorities on war, says : " It is 
 unquestionable that a rcti'catiiig army should fight as little as 
 possible." Such was, however, the mistake committed by 
 General Johnston. If he did not intend to risk a battle in the 
 mountain fastnesses between Dalton and the Chattahoochee, 
 but preferred to decide the fate of Georgia, the centre of the 
 Confederacy, upon the flat plains around Atlanta, he should 
 have left the cavalry in his rear to check the advance of the 
 enemy ; have marched his Army direct to the latter point, 
 without firing a musket ; and there have awaited Sherman's 
 advance, when he should have made his attack. By the pur- 
 suance of this policy, he would have been able to engage 
 Sherman with over seventy thousand (70,000) effective men, 
 instead of fifty thousand (50,000) he claims to have had after 
 crossing the Chattahoochee river. In lieu thereof, a course 
 was pursued which entailed a loss of twenty-five thousand 
 (25,000) men, without a single general battle having been 
 fought, and which seriously demoralized the next to the largest 
 and proudest Army assembled in the South. 
 
 When I state the Army was demoralized, I desire, at the 
 same time, to except not only men who performed individual 
 acts of remarkable devotion and courage, but also brigades 
 and divisions, which, in prowess and discipline, would com- 
 pare with the best troops in any army; unfortunately, how- 
 ever, the efforts of one such brigade or division were paralyzed 
 by others so thoroughly effected by their training in the 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 135 
 
 Johnston school as to render them of but little service in a 
 pitched battle. 
 
 A policy similar to that of my predecessor can be persisted 
 in till desertions will take place by the thousands. The longer 
 an army retreats, entrenches, and fights at the same time, the 
 more numerous the desertions, and the more thorough the 
 demoralization. As I have already mentioned, Lee handled 
 his troops upon a directly opposite basis. They were always 
 taught to work out the best means to get at the enemy, in 
 order to cripple or destroy him, in lieu of ever seeking the best 
 means to get away from him. Therefore the Lee and Jackson 
 school is the opposite of the Joe Johnston school, and one will 
 always elevate and inspirit, whilst the other will depress and 
 paralyze. 
 
 The statement of Lieutenant Generals Hardee and Stewart, 
 to the effect that the Confederate Army, after crossing the 
 Chattahoochee, had as much spirit and confidence as it pos- 
 sessed at Dalton, is erroneous. Whilst I have a proper regard 
 for the opinions of these officers who spoke, I believe, in all 
 sincerity, I cannot but consider that their impressions were 
 formed from their own standpoint, without having actual 
 knowledge of the high state of perfection obtained by the 
 troops in the Virginia Army, under the training and mode 
 of handling of General Lee. In the course of daily life our 
 thoughts and convictions generally receive their impress from 
 our surroundings ; and, if we confine our experiences to any 
 one sphere of life, without contact with the various spheres 
 around us, we lose that power of comparison by which we are 
 enabled to form correct judgments of things and men. These 
 officers formed their decision from but one standpoint, which 
 was the Army of Tennessee, and they comprehended not fully 
 the spirit of heroism which pervaded the Army led by our 
 great chieftain to victory after victory. Therefore they were 
 partial judges when came into question the comparative spirit- 
 lessness of the Western Army, as it slowly retreated a distance 
 
136 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 of one hundred miles, without a single glorious victory to 
 inscribe upon its banners. 
 
 If requisite, I could bring forth abundant evidence from 
 officers of that Army that the continuous retreat from Dalton 
 to the plains of Georgia, produced a demoralizing effect. 
 General Frank Blair, whose corps was engaged in the battle 
 around Atlanta on the 22d of July, 1864, when my friend and 
 classmate, General McPhcrson, was killed, states in a letter to 
 a prominent officer of the Army of Tennessee, that the Con- 
 federate troops, on that day, did not fight with the spirit they 
 should have displayed. It was, nevertheless, reported to me, 
 at the time of this engagement, that they had fought with gal- 
 lantry, and I so telegraphed to the authorities at Richmond. 
 The truth is, no troops handled as these had been from Dalton 
 to Atlanta could have attacked with extraordinary vigor, and 
 I do assert that fifty thousand men of the Lee and Jackson 
 school will always prove equal to eighty thousand (80,000) of 
 the Johnston school ; moreover, that the small Army I com- 
 manded at Franklin was equal to that which was turned over 
 to me at Atlanta, although it numbered only about one-half in 
 effective strength, for the simple reason that a forward march 
 of about one hundred and eighty miles, together with a differ- 
 ent mode of handling it, had contributed to the improvement 
 of its morale and the restoration of its pristine spirit. These 
 conclusions I have reached after a long and careful considera- 
 tion of the subject. It has been my fortune to serve, during 
 the war, in every grade from that of First Lieutenant to that 
 of Commander-in-Chief Having, therefore, been under fire 
 with both small and large bodies of men, and having carefully 
 observed the effect of such fire upon troops with and without 
 breastworks, the principles which I have endeavored to eluci- 
 date will, in my opinion, stand the test of time. 
 
 In January, 1874, I addressed the following communication 
 to Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee, who served a long 
 period in Virginia, and subsequently in the Army of Ten- 
 nessee : 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 137 
 
 " New Orleans, January lyth, 1874. 
 
 "General: — Your position during the late war, and experience 
 throughout different campaigns in Virginia, doubtless enabled you to 
 observe, and form an opinion of the general effect of entrenchments upon 
 an army. Since the close of the revolution I have conversed with many 
 officers of the Army of Northern Virginia upon this subject, and have 
 been informed that when General Lee was forced, as a dernier resort, to 
 use breastworks around Petersburg, it had a depressing effect even upon 
 the stern veterans who made up that grand old Army ; that it could easily 
 be discerned when the troops were called upon to leave the trenches, 
 and again give battle in the open field. During three years' service in 
 the Virginia Army, as regimental, brigade, and division commander, 
 under the orders of Generals Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, I was never 
 required to throw up even temporary breastworks for the protection of my 
 troops. The battles of Gaines's Mills, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, 
 Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, were all fought by the 
 Confederates without the aid of such defences. The officers and soldiers, 
 who served in the Virginia Army, know of the great self-reliance and 
 spirit of invincibility which pervaded its ranks, and how correct the 
 appreciation of General Lee, when he said, 'There were never such 
 men in an army before ; they will go anywhere, and do anything if 
 properly led.' Those who come after us will seek the cause of the extra- 
 ordinary results accomplished by the Army of Northern Virginia in 
 comparison with other Armies of the South. The personnel of all the 
 Confederate Armies being about the same, the question must arise, and 
 will be discussed, as to whether there was not something in the handling 
 of the troops or in the strategy and tactics, adopted and carried out by 
 the distinguished leaders of Virginia, which produced soldiers equal to 
 twice the number of the enemy. 
 
 " I of course admit the necessity of fortifications for the protection of 
 certain harbors, depots, and important centres, which should, however, 
 never be allowed to become pitfalls for large bodies, but be well provi- 
 sioned, and garrisoned only by a sufficient number of men to stand a 
 siege, if requisite ; and whilst I also admit the necessity of entrenchments 
 under such circumstances of constraint as those which induced General 
 Lee finally to resort to them, my own experience has taught me that the 
 continued use thereof, by an army has a demoralizing influence. 
 
 "An army cannot at one time fight behind breastworks, with the practi- 
 cal demonstration that its position renders it equal to three times the 
 strength of the foe, and, at another time, when occurs a favorable oppor- 
 tunity of attack, forget its own experience in the use of entrenchments, 
 and charge the enemy's works, and force him to fly from the field, as 
 was so often the case in Virginia. 
 
 " Hoping soon to have your valued opinion upon this subject, 
 
 " I am truly yours, J. B. HOOD." 
 
138 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 I received the subjoined in reply: 
 
 " Brookeville, Mississippi, January 26th, 18^4. 
 " To General J. B. Hood. 
 
 "General: — In your favor of the 17th inst., you ask my opinion of 
 the 'general effect of entrenchments upon an Army.' My experience 
 during the recent war was nearly equally divided in serving with and 
 without entrenchments. 
 
 " My service with the Army of North Virginia ended after the battle 
 of Sharpsburg — then in the campaigns in Mississippi, involving the fall 
 of Vicksburg — again in the campaign in Georgia, involving the fall of 
 Atlanta, and also the last campaign into Tennessee. Entrenchments 
 were generally used in my service in the West. They were not used in 
 Virginia up to the time I was transferred West. I am free to say that I 
 consider it a great misfortune to any army to have to resort to entrench- 
 ments ; its morale is necessarily impaired from their constant use. 
 
 "Troops once sheltered from fire behind works, never feel comfortable 
 unless in them. The security of entrenchments is a constant subject of 
 discussion by troops who use them. It is a matter of education. They 
 are taught that one man equals five or six of the enemy. This they 
 remember when called upon to attack entrenchments of the enemy, 
 about which they are necessarily timid. Troops in works, engaged the 
 first time, are always bolder than afterwards — stand erect and deliver 
 their fire with precision as they were used to in the open field; after a 
 few engagements, the thought of constant security is always with them, 
 and their object is to be always covered by the works, while under fire. 
 
 "An army, accustomed to entrenchments, has its -efficiency impaired 
 as a whole, from the fact that in nearly every division one or two brigades 
 consider it hazardous in the extreme to attack entrenchments ; hen«ig,''in 
 the attack hesitate, and hesitancy in attacking works is certain defeat. 
 A bold and defiant attack on works, though attended with great loss when 
 successful, generally drives troops from the works before reaching them — 
 which shows that boldness in attack and nearness make a sudden change 
 in the ideas of the troops behind the works, they being discouraged, and 
 disappointed in not seeing the enemy easily and certainly driven back. 
 
 "A general who resorts to entrenchments, when there is any chance of 
 success in engaging in the open field, commits a great error. Entrench- 
 ments are sometimes necessary for the safety of an army, encountering 
 greatly superior numbers to gain time, or to save an army defeated by 
 superior numbers. When these occasions are plainly visible to the army, 
 I do not see that its efficiency is necessarily impaired, when encountering 
 the enemy again in the open field ; but the habitual use of entrenchment 
 ' certainly impairs the boldness of attack in any army. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 139 
 
 "To attack entrenchments, give me troops who have never served 
 behind them. Good troops, in line of battle, before using entrenchments, 
 feel as secure without works as with them. As an instance, recall your 
 division, at Sharpsburg, when attacked by more than five times its 
 number in an open field, or again your brigade at Gaines's Mills, when it 
 carried the works of the enemy, 
 
 " I would not be understood as arguing against the use of entrench- 
 ments when the occasion is plain for their use ; but certainly against an 
 army habitually using them ; for the latter use of them destroys a plan 
 of campaign, and there is no campaign ; and the generals are besieging, 
 or resisting a siege in fact, and with casualties from day to day soon 
 equivalent to the loss in a general engagement. 
 
 "I am yours, truly, 
 
 "STEPHEN D. LEE.'^ 
 
 This officer enjoyed a fair opportunity to note the effect of 
 long continued use of entrenchments upon an army. He 
 served with distinction until the close of the war, and dis- 
 played superior ability as a corps commander whilst in the 
 Army of Tennessee. 
 
 A forcible example of the difference in the mode of hand- 
 ling- troops — as illustrated by General Lee, and those generals 
 who constantly resort to the use of fortifications — is afforded 
 in the recent war between France and Prussia, and also in that 
 between Turkey and Russia. One hundred and fifty thousand 
 of Louis Napoleon's Army, under Bazaine, shut themselves 
 up in the stronghold of Metz ; allowed a much larger number 
 of Germans to surround them ; to construct works almost as 
 formidable as their own, and quietly await their surrender for 
 want of provisions. 
 
 The Turks committed a similar blunder at Plevna, in allow- 
 ing a fine army to be entrapped and the remainder of their 
 forces to become demoralized by the natural effect of this 
 gross error, in lieu of holding their troops well in hand, 
 taking some general line upon which to retard and cripple the 
 enemy as much as possible, and, finally, beat him, if not in a 
 general pitched battle, in detail ; the only chance of success 
 for the weaker power grappling with its strong enemy. Had 
 
140 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 General Lee pursued the plan of the French or of the Turks, 
 he would have entrenched himself at an early day of the war 
 — say at Winchester ; have allowed the Federals to surround 
 him with five times his numbers ; to construct breastworks, 
 finally, to compel him to surrender, and thus bring demoraliza- 
 tion to his countrymen, in addition to the loss of their cause. 
 
 The " reckless " attacks around Atlanta — so designated by 
 General Johnston — enabled us to hold that city forty-six days, 
 whereas, he abandoned in sixty-six days one hundred miles of 
 territory, and demoralized the Army. 
 
 It is a significant fact that General Sherman dedicates only 
 thirty-eight pages to an account of the rapidity with which he 
 dislodged Johnston from one position after another in the 
 mountains from Dalton to Atlanta, and devotes that number to 
 an explanation of the necessary operations of his Army, in 
 order to force me to abandon the one untenable position of 
 Atlanta. 
 
 General Johnston says : * 
 
 " General Hartsuff, General Schofield's Inspector General, told me, in 
 the succeeding Spring, that the valor and discipline of our troops at 
 Franklin, won the highest admiration in the Federal Army." 
 
 The valor displayed at Franklin, and which deservedly won 
 the admiration of the Federals, was caused by the handling of 
 the troops in a directly opposite manner to that of General 
 Johnston, together with the advance movement previously 
 inaugurated, and the mortification experienced after the unfor- 
 tunate failure the day before at Spring Hill. Inasmuch as 
 General Johnston never inaugurated a forward movement, nor 
 sought out the enemy, but invariably retreated in their front, 
 he is not able to comprehend the origin of the gallantry so 
 conspicuous on that field. He, therefore, errs as egregiously 
 in the supposition that his continued retreat from Dalton to 
 Atlanta and incessant entrenching gave rise to the courage 
 displayed, at Franklin, as in his endeavor to find a parallel to 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 365. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 141 
 
 his campaign in that of Lee against Grant, from the Rappa- 
 hannock to Petersburg : they in truth are the opposite of one 
 another. 
 
 General Johnston states,* " In transferring the command to 
 General Hood I explained my plans to him." He may have 
 said somewhat to me in regard to his plans — if, indeed, he had 
 at any time resolved upon the defence of Atlanta — but I have 
 no recollection thereof; possibly, from the fact that I was thor- 
 oughly engrossed by the grave responsibilities unexpectedly 
 thrust upon me at that critical moment. At all events, we are 
 now informed, through his Narrative, that he had two plans, 
 and that, if the first had failed, the second would, at least, have 
 secured to the Confederacy Atlanta " forever.' 
 
 Thus would have been wrought our independence, and the 
 Southern people have been spared the sorrow and degradation 
 to which they were so long subjected. If General Johnston 
 be correct in his assertion that no reason exists why Atlanta 
 should not have been held " forever," a heavy responsibility 
 rests upon the Confederate authorities who relieved him of 
 the command of the Army of Tennessee. 
 
 Heavier still is the responsibility assumed by them, when 
 they refused to dismiss General Lee from the command of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, and to re-assign General John- 
 ston to that position, after his recovery from a wound received 
 at the battle of Se\'en Pines. 
 
 He states, in addition, f that his "Army had a place of 
 refuge in Atlanta, too strong to be taken by assault, and too 
 extensive to be invested." According to his theory, Rich- 
 mond, which was larger than Atlanta, should also have been 
 too extensive to be invested ; and its defences, which I am 
 certain any council of competent officers would pronounce 
 more tenable than those of its sister city, should also have 
 been too strong to be carried by assault. It follows, there- 
 fore, that if General Johnston could have held Atlanta " for- 
 
 ■^ Johnston's Narrative, page 350. f Johnston's Narrative, page 358. 
 
142 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 ever," most assuredly would he have held Richmond " forever," 
 and have given us that freedom for which the great Lee 
 struggled so gloriously, but in vain. Again, if this General 
 felt it within his power to hold Atlanta " forever," unpardon- 
 able is the offence he committed, in refusing to answer 
 definitely, when interrogated by the President who was anxious 
 to ascertain whether or not he intended to defend Atlanta, 
 In view of the abandonment of one hundred miles of terri- 
 tory into the very heart of the country, it was but natural 
 the Government should have made such inquiry ; and who, 
 with any degree of justice, can question the right of the 
 authorities, at Richmond, to have sought, nay demanded, a 
 positive answer from one of their subordinate officers? Had 
 General Lee been placed in the same position, how long would 
 he have hesitated to answer most fully and satisfactorily the 
 President's inquiry on the i6th of July? 
 
 If General Johnston had, at that time, informed President 
 Davis that he could see no reason why Atlanta should not be 
 held " forever," he would have been retained in command. I 
 know this to be true ; moreover, the correspondence I have 
 already published, clearly indicates this fact. Lastly, if his 
 declaration in regard to the tenability of Atlanta be grounded 
 upon sound principles, who of my countrymen will forgive 
 him for having deserted me under the peculiar trials of the 
 hour, instead of aiding me by his counsels to accomplish the 
 great end, at the sacrifice of every personal consideration, and 
 in the spirit of a true patriot. 
 
 These are, indeed, grave questions, and afford matter for 
 serious reflection to every Southerner, especially since Gen- 
 eral Johnston claims, by asserting his ability to have held 
 Atlanta " forever," the power to have saved the Confederacy 
 from the disaster and ruin which followed. As already stated, 
 the order relieving him from the command of the Army was 
 received upon the 17th of July, at 11 p. m., he, unwilling to 
 await the dawn of day, promulgated the order that night to 
 the troops, and by dark, the next evening, he was journeying 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 143 
 
 towards Macon with all speed possible. Had he remained 
 with the Army, at my urgent solicitation, he would undoubt- 
 edly, have gained the credit of saving Atlanta, in the event of 
 success; in case of failure, his friends could, as they have 
 already done, have taken measures to protect his reputation by 
 asserting that I had not altogether followed his counsels. The 
 responsibility of non-success would have rested upon me, 
 whilst he had nothing to lose, and all to gain. He was, how- 
 ever, in so great haste to leave the scene of action that I have 
 almost been inclined to think he was rejoiced at having been 
 relieved from the duty of holding Atlanta " forever," and thus 
 insuring the independence of his people. 
 
 It now devolves upon me, in order to vindicate myself, as 
 well as the Confederate Government, and to exonerate my 
 predecessor from the charge of apparent insensibility to the 
 fate of Atlanta and his country, to show that some doubt 
 actually exists of his ability to have held Atlanta " forever," 
 
 First, I will consider the evidence to be presented against 
 his intention, at any time, to fight for this city, and then demon- 
 strate the insufficiency of his power to make good an assertion 
 which, after an interim of nigh ten years, is, for the first time, 
 published to the world. 
 
 It was generally believed, before the Army abandoned Dal- 
 ton, that General Johnston would make a stand at that point; 
 throughout his correspondence with the Government, during 
 the Winter and Spring of 1864, and in which he urges all 
 available troops to be sent immediately to his command, one 
 is led to suppose that he actually intended to fight at that 
 stronghold. In his letter to President Davis, dated January 
 2d, 1864, he speaks thus :* " I can see no other mode of taking 
 the offensive here than to beat the enemy when he advances, 
 and then move forward." In response to General Bragg's 
 letter of March 12th, proffering fully eighty thousand (80,000) 
 men, as an inducement to assume the offensive, and to which 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 275, 
 
144 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 letter I have already referred, General Johnston dispatched the 
 following telegram : * 
 
 " Your letter by Colonel Sale received. Grant is at Nashville. Where 
 Grant is we must expect the great Federal effort. We ought, therefore, 
 to be prepared to beat him here" — at Dalton. In his written reply to 
 the same, he says : f "We cannot estimate the time he (the enemy) will 
 require for preparation, and should, consequently, put ourselves in 
 condition for successful resistance as soon as possible by assembling 
 here the troops you enumerate." Again, % "I would have the troops 
 assemble here without delay, to repel Grant's attack and then make our 
 own." 
 
 It is hereby evident that as long as General Johnston 
 endeavored to obtain the transfer, to his own command, of 
 Longstreet's Corps in Virginia, and of Polk's Army in Mis- 
 sissippi, he spoke continually of fighting at Dalton; when, 
 however, Sherman appeared at Tunnel Hill, in front of Rocky- 
 faced Ridge, and he was given an Army of over seventy thousand 
 (70,000) available troops — as I have demonstrated — he decided 
 to retreat. What followed at Rcsaca ? Retreat. New Hope 
 Church ? Retreat. Cassville ? Retreat. Kennesaw Moun- 
 tain ? Retreat. Would we have fought at Atlanta after our 
 inglorious campaign, the abandonment of the mountain fast- 
 nesses, and the foreshadowed intention of our commander to 
 fall back to Macon? 
 
 I shall now glance at his two plans for the defence of Atlanta, 
 one of which was to insure the security of that city " forev^er." 
 By his first plan, he hoped to attack the enemy as they crossed 
 Peach Tree creek. Within thirty-six hours, almost before he 
 had time to select quarters in Macon after his departure on the 
 evening of the 1 8th of July, General Thomas was crossing 
 Peach Tree creek, whilst McPherson and Schofield were 
 moving to destroy the railroad to Augusta. General Johnston 
 evidently had little faith in this plan, since he was unwilling to 
 await thirty-six hours to test its feasibility. 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, page 294. f Johnston's Narrative, page 295. 
 
 J Johnston's Narrative, page 296. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 145 
 
 By his second, and, "far more promising plan," as he desig- 
 nates it, he intended to man the works of Atlanta, on the side 
 towards Peach Tree creek, with the Georgia State troops; and, 
 upon the approach of the enemy, to attack with the three corps 
 of the Army in conjunction with the cavalry. 
 
 When the advance sheets of Johnston's Narrative appeared 
 before the public, I read with amazement the account of this 
 extraordinary project, and, forthwith, addressed the following 
 letter to Major General Gustavus W. Smith, who commanded 
 the Georgia State troops previous to General Johnston's 
 removal, and during the siege of Atlanta: 
 
 " New Orleans, January lyih, 1874. 
 " General G. W. Smith, Frankfort, Ky. 
 
 "General: — Having occasion to refer to your official report of the 
 operations of the Georgia Mihtia around Atlanta, I find you were 
 assigned the command of these troops the ist of June, 1864; that you 
 relieved General Wayne, who had been placed under, and subject to, 
 the orders of General Johnston ; that you had, at the time you crossed 
 the Chattahoochee and marched to the support of General Johnston, 
 about three thousand (3000) effective men; that when you recrossed the 
 river and reported to me for duty in the trenches around Atlanta, you 
 had about two thousand (2000) effective muskets. You also state that 
 Governor Brown called out the reserves ; that the largest number of 
 effective men in your command, at any one time during the siege, did 
 not exceed five thousand (5000); that they were poorly equipped, more 
 than two-thirds of them having no cartridge boxes ; that most of the 
 reserves had never been drilled and the others but a few days, etc., etc. 
 
 "Your relations with the Governor of Georgia, at this time, were such 
 as to enable you to form a correct opinion as to whether or not Governor 
 Brown furnished me, for the defence of Atlanta, as many State troops as 
 he could or would have furnished General Johnston, had the latter 
 remained in command. The Governor gave me to understand that he 
 had sent forward all the militia he could enroll, and I have no reason to 
 doubt his assertion. 
 
 " Your large experience as a soldier, moreover, enables you to form 
 an estimate as to the ability of five thousand (5000) militia to have 
 occupied the trenches in front of the enemy, and have held Atlanta 
 against General Sherman's Army of over one hundred thousand (100,000) 
 effective men, and thereby to have rendered free the three corps, which 
 constituted the whole Army of Tennessee, and have allowed them to 
 
 10 
 
146 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 operate on the outside against either flank of the enemy. My reason 
 for requesting your mihtary opinion upon this subject is that in General 
 Jos. E. Johnston's forthcoming book appears the following statement : * 
 
 " ' In transferring the command to General Hood I explained my 
 plans to him. First, I expected an opportunity to engage the enemy on 
 terms of advantage while they were divided in crossing Peach Tree 
 creek, trusting to General Wheeler's vigilance for the necessary informa- 
 tion. If successful, the great divergence of the Federal line of retreat 
 from the direct route available to us would enable us to secure decisive 
 results ; if unsuccessful, we had a safe place of refuge in our entrenched 
 lines close at hand. Holding it, we could certainly keep back the enemy, 
 as at New Hope Church and in front of Marietta, until the State troops 
 promised by Governor Brown were assembled. Then, 1 intended to man 
 the works of Atlanta on the side toward Peach Tree creek with those 
 troops, and leisurely fall back with the Confederate troops into the town, 
 and, when the Federal Army approached, march out with the three 
 corps against one of its flanks. If we were successful, the enemy would 
 be driven against the Chattahoochee where there are no fords, or to the 
 east, away from their communications, as the attack might fall on their 
 right or left. If unsuccessful, the Confederate Army had a near and 
 secure place of refuge in Atlanta, which it could hold forever, and so 
 win the campaign, of which that place was the object. The passage of 
 Peach Tree creek may not have given an opportunity to attack ; but 
 there is no reason to think that the second and far most promising plan 
 might not have been executed.' 
 
 " Whilst I acknowledge with pleasure the gallant conduct and efficient 
 service of the Georgia State troops in the defence of Atlanta, I cannot 
 conceive how they could have been expected to accomplish all that 
 General Johnston seems to have anticipated, /. e., man so long a line of 
 breastworks as that on the side of Peach Tree creek, which embraced 
 the front of General Sherman's entire Army; and when, as you will 
 remember, within three days after General Johnston relinquished the 
 command, the enemy's left was across the Augusta Railroad, southeast 
 of the town, and moving rapidly southwest to destroy the railroad to 
 Macon. 
 
 " Your views upon this important subject, I should be pleased to have 
 at your earliest convenience. 
 
 " Yours truly, 
 
 "J. B. HOOD." 
 
 * Johnston's Narrative, pages 350, 351. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 147 
 
 " Frankfort, Kentucky, ] 
 " Jattuary 2jd, 1824. \ 
 
 "General John B. Hood, New Orleans, La. 
 
 "General: — Your letter of the 17th inst. is received. In answer to 
 your first inquiry I have to say that, in my opinion, you were furnished 
 with all the State forces that the Governor of Georgia, could by the use 
 of extraordinary powers bring to assist in the defence of Atlanta. 
 
 "Your second question calls for my opinion ' as to the ability of five 
 thousand (5000) militia to have occupied the trenches in front of the 
 enemy and have held Atlanta against General Sherman's Army of over 
 one hundred thousand (100,000) effective men, and thereby to have 
 rendered free the three corps, which constituted the whole Army of Ten- 
 nessee, and have allowed them to operate on the outside against either 
 flank of the enemy.' 
 
 " Atlanta would, in all probability, have been taken by the enemy 
 within twenty-four hours after its defence was entrusted to the Georgia 
 militia, because in number this force was entirely inadequate, under the 
 circumstances. 
 
 " Very truly yours, 
 
 "GUSTAVUS W.SMITH." 
 
 I was unwilling to harbor a suspicion that Governor Brown 
 would have furnished for the defence of the State, and of our 
 common cause, a larger number of troops to General Johnston 
 than to myself; neither could I perceive in what manner the 
 impossibilities, suggested by this General, were to be accom- 
 plished by the Georgia militia. General Gustavus W. Smith is 
 a soldier, as well as an engineer, of eminent ability, and his 
 opinion is entitled to much weight in a discussion of this 
 character. 
 
 The side towards Peach Tree creek embraced about the 
 entire front of General Sherman's Army. I, therefore, found 
 it necessary to place not only the Georgia State troops on that 
 side, but also two corps of the Army, whilst I made the attack 
 of the 22d of July with a single corps and the cavalry. I very 
 much regret General Johnston's inability to have remained, 
 and enlightened me in regard to the means to hold Sherman's 
 one hundred and six thousand (106,000) at bay with five 
 
148 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 thousand (5000) militia, whilst I attacked one of the enemy's 
 flanks with the entire Army of Tennessee. If this feat could 
 have been achieved, great results might hav^e ensued. In view 
 of General Johnston's now avowed intention to have made a 
 stand at Atlanta, it would certainly have been more judicious 
 to have marched direct to the line he had resolved to defend — 
 as General Lee marched out of Maryland and Pennsylvania to 
 the Rapidan ; to have thus reserved the twenty-five thousand 
 (25,000) effective men andnineteen thousand (19,000) muskets, 
 lost on our retreat through Georgia, and have used these 
 trained soldiers and good muskets on the side towards Peach 
 Tree creek, instead of General Gustavus W. Smith's five thou- 
 sand militia, many of whom were armed with flint lock muskets, 
 and were devoid even of cartridge boxes. Surely this plan 
 would seem to have been more feasible, and certainly more 
 promising. 
 
 If Sherman had not a sufficient force to form a cordon of 
 troops round the city, he was able to accomplish his object by 
 equally effective means. The size of Atlanta in no manner 
 hindered the destruction of our railway line of communications 
 which, in the exhausted condition of our resources the last 
 year of the war, we were no wise competent to re-establish 
 when great damage had been committed. We had neither the 
 material nor the force to repair them. 
 
 If General Johnston considered Atlanta so especially adapted 
 to his purposes, inasmuch as it was too extensive to be 
 invested and too strong to be carried by assault, I am at a 
 loss to divine the reason why he did not take a radius equal 
 to that of Atlanta, and describe a circle from a given centre, 
 within the mountains of Georgia ; throw up entrenchments, 
 and declare to the world the impregnability of his position and 
 his intention to hold it "forever." Trees of the forest would 
 certainly have been of as much or more service to him than 
 buildings proved to me in Atlanta, or to General Lee in Peters- 
 burg, and Richmond. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 149 
 
 No more decided advantage was to be derived from the 
 junction of railways, at Atlanta, than was afforded at Kingston, 
 or any other point on the railway line below Dalton, because 
 of our poverty in resources towards the close of hostilities 
 and consequent inability to reconstruct at the same time two 
 or three roads when seriously damaged. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON — HIS INTENTION TO ABANDON 
 
 ATLANTA EVACUATION OF RICHMOND CONTEMPLATED IN 
 
 1862 ATTEMPT TO COURT MARTIAL. 
 
 After General Johnston's abandonment of the mountains 
 of Georgia, his inconsistency in maintaining that Atlanta was 
 a position " too strong to be carried by assault," must indeed 
 strike with surprise not only military men, but civilians of 
 intelligence. From the earliest periods of history mountain 
 fastnesses have proved, by actual test, the most secure strong- 
 holds to every people determined upon obstinate resistance. 
 General Lee asserted shortly before the close of the war that 
 he could continue the struggle twenty years longer, if hos- 
 tilities were transferred to the mountain regions of the Con- 
 federacy. Numerous instances are adducible to attest the fact 
 that prolongation of war is ofttimes to be attributed to such 
 protection from Nature. To cite an example from a neigh- 
 boring island, how long, I venture to inquire, would the 
 Cubans have held out against the Spanish Government, if their 
 territory had been devoid of mountains, and had stretched 
 forth to the sea in one vast plain like the country from 
 Atlanta ? 
 
 But when the Confederate commander, with seventy thou- 
 sand available men, surrendered the Thermopylae of the South 
 
 (150) 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 151 
 
 without risking a general battle, it is hardly reasonable to sup- 
 pose that he would have made a final stand upon the plains of 
 Georgia. 
 
 According to the following extract from an official telegram, 
 even General Sherman w^as in doubt as to whether or not 
 Johnston would fight for Atlanta: * 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, | 
 " In the Field, at San House, Peach Tree Road, V 
 " Five Miles N. E. of Buckhead, Ga., July i8, 1864. ) 
 
 » * * " It is hard to realize that Johnston will give up Atlanta 
 without a fight, but it may be so. Let us develop the truth. 
 
 "W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 " Major General Commanding." 
 
 My predecessor had evidently another scheme in reserve. 
 General Forrest was required, with five thousand (5000) cav- 
 alry in Tennessee, to destroy Sherman's communications with 
 Nashville, — at least, in so far as to hinder Sherman from 
 receiving sufficient supplies for the maintenance of his Army. 
 General Wheeler's cavalry force numbered over ten thousand 
 (10,000), and was composed of as brave men as those under 
 the command of Forrest. If this force, with the exception of 
 a small detachment to protect the flanks of the Army, was 
 unable to break the Federal line of communications, I cannot 
 conceive in what manner General Forrest was expected to 
 accomplish this object with only five thousand (5000) men — 
 especially, when Sherman had a large force of cavalry attached 
 to his own Army, as well as another large body of this arm 
 in Tennessee; had erected block houses at every important 
 bridge and culvert, and had stationed infantry at fixed points 
 along the entire line between Nashville and Atlanta, forming, 
 it might be said, a chain of sentinels. The Federals had at 
 their disposal locomotives of great power, and a sufficient 
 number of cars to move, within a few hours, a corps of infantry 
 to any one threatened point. Their vast resources enabled 
 
 * Van Home, 11 Army C, vol. II, page 121. 
 
152 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 them also to rebuild the railroad almost as fast as Forrest 
 could have destroyed it. General Johnston, therefore, errs 
 in the supposition that five thousand cavalry, under these cir- 
 cumstances, could have so effectually destroyed Sherman's 
 communications as to compel him to retreat. The impossi- 
 bility of the success of this plan, however, will be clearly 
 established when I give an account of the inability, during the 
 siege of Atlanta, of Forrest's cavalry together with about five 
 thousand under Wheeler to accomplish this important object. 
 
 I am, therefore, reluctant to believe that General Johnston 
 possessed any more definite idea of defending Atlanta than he 
 had of defending Dalton, or any other position from that point 
 to Atlanta. He brings forward the presence of his family in 
 this city, as evidence of his intention to make a stand ; and 
 affirms that the entrenchments thrown up, together with the 
 moving forward of heavy artillery, support his testimony. 
 Unfortunately, in view of his history in the past, the evidence 
 is not conclusive. He threw up various lines of works during 
 his campaign, and, successively, abandoned them ; moreover, 
 whatever heavy artillery had been ordered to the front could, 
 if the necessity had arisen, have been placed upon cars, and 
 been removed to the rear. In regard to the first plea, I am 
 unable to discover why his family could not retreat as well as 
 the Army. 
 
 A General who, at New Hope Church, informed his corps 
 commanders that he considered Macon, one hundred miles 
 beyond Atlanta, the point to fall back upon, would hardly 
 have resisted the temptation to carry out his suggestion, when 
 to retreat was, with him, if not a fixed principle, certainly an 
 inveterate habit. 
 
 Aside from any other evidence, the following extract from a 
 letter received from General M. C. Butler, * now United States 
 Senator, is sufficient to prove that General Johnston had no 
 hope or idea of holding Atlanta. 
 
 * 1879. 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 153 
 
 " Edgefield, S. C, July iStJi, 1E74. 
 ******<< J yyas with General Johnston when he arranged 
 the terms of surrender with Sherman. Generals Hampton and Wheeler 
 being away at the time, I commanded the cavalry of Johnston's Army 
 and accompanied him with an escort to the last interview with Sherman, 
 and on our return to camp he told me that he had had no confidence in 
 the success of our cause for two years." * * * * 
 
 As stated, if this General could have held Atlanta " forever," 
 he likewise would have held Richmond " forever." 
 
 In this connection I will, — in defence of General Lee, make 
 known an historical fact of singular interest, and of which I 
 have but recently been apprised ; it is true the matter was 
 hinted about at the date of the occurrence, but I now, for the 
 first time, receive the information from the highest authority. 
 
 About the 26th of April, 1874, I met, in Mobile, the Hon- 
 orable C. M. Conrad, of Louisiana. We were each en route 
 to New Orleans, and in the freedom of friendly conversation, 
 we discussed without restraint the subject of the late war. 
 General Johnston's book was referred to, when Mr. Conrad 
 remarked that Mr. McFarland, of Richmond, Virginia, a vol- 
 unteer aid on the staff of General Johnston at the time of his 
 retreat from Yorktown — had informed him, during the war, 
 that General Johnston said to him (Mr. McFarland), on the 
 retreat from Yorktown, that he (Johnston) expected or intended 
 to give up Richmond. Mr, McFarland expostulated and pro- 
 tested; finally expressed to the Commanding General the hope 
 that he would change his mind. I at once observed to Mr. 
 Conrad that this fact was truly an important link in the history 
 of that period, and, if no objection existed upon his part, I 
 might on some occasion refer to the incident. He replied, 
 "Well, it is a matter of history," or words to that effect. 
 
 The above is almost verbatim the statement of Mr. Conrad 
 to me, in Mobile. When we remember the high character of 
 the late Mr. McFarland, a banker of Richmond, a citizen who 
 was not only beloved and respected in Virginia, but well known 
 to all the prominent men of the South as a gentleman of honor 
 
154 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 and unimpeachable integrity, and when we consider the name, 
 the position, and the career of the Honorable C. M. Conrad, 
 the testimony becomes irrefutable. 
 
 Richmond would have been abandoned by General John- 
 ston at the outset of the struggle, had he been afforded the 
 opportunity ; in other words, had he not, in consequence of 
 his disability, been replaced by General Lee, who retained, to 
 the end, command of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 Shortly after my return to New Orleans I resolved to obtain 
 from Mr. Conrad a written statement of this important fact. 
 He had, however, left for Washington. Thereupon I addressed 
 him the following letter : 
 
 " New Orleans, May igth, 1874. 
 " Honorable C. M. Conrad, Washing-ion, D. C. 
 
 "My Dear Sir :— I called at your office this morning to ask that you 
 give me a memorandum of the statement of Mr. McFarland to you, in 
 regard to General Johnston's giving up the city of Richmond at the time 
 of his retreat from Yorktown. Since Mr. McFarland was, at this time, 
 a volunteer aid of General Johnston, and was so well and so favorably 
 known throughout Virginia, and by our prominent men of the South, any 
 statement of his to one of your prominence in the public affairs of this 
 country, makes a very important link in history — in fact becomes of great 
 historical value. If no objection on your part, I would be much pleased 
 to have you give me, in brief, what you stated to me on this subject, in 
 Mobile, about the 26th ultimo. 
 
 " Respectfully and truly yours, 
 
 "J. B. HOOD." 
 
 I received in answer the following : 
 
 •• Washington, D. C, yune 13th, 1S74. 
 
 " Dear General : — On my return a few days ago from a visit to West 
 Virginia, I found your letter and telegram. Upon reflection, 1 have 
 determined that I cannot with propriety comply with your request. 
 
 " In the first place, although the conversation between Mr. McFarland 
 and myself, of which you ask me to give you a statement, was not pro- 
 fessedly confidential, it might, from its nature, be considered impliedly 
 so, as it related to a communication which was confidentially made by 
 General Johnston to him, and which he would, probably, not have 
 divulged to any one but an intimate friend. It was perhaps indiscreet 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 155 
 
 in me to have repeated the remark at all ; but to give publicity to it, and 
 that for a purpose unfriendly to General Johnston, would, in my view, be 
 unjust both to General Johnston and to Mr. McFarland, as the latter is 
 no longer alive to explain it, if necessary to maintain his statement. 
 
 " I will add that I have long known and esteemed General Johnston 
 and his family. In his quarrel with Mr. Davis (which you are aware 
 commenced long before the events which gave rise to the controversy 
 between him and yourself), he had my sympathy and support. Under 
 these circumstances for me to volunteer a statement not for the purpose 
 of vindicating your military reputation, but for the purpose of assailing 
 him in a matter with which you were in no manner concerned, would, I 
 think, give just cause of complaint to him and his friends. 1 am sure 
 that on considering the matter you will come to the same conclusion. 
 
 " Very truly yours, 
 
 " C. M. CONRAD." 
 
 I subjoin my reply: 
 
 " Niagara, Ontario, July jsf, 1874, 
 " Honorable C. M. Conrad, New Orleans, La. 
 
 "Dear Sir: — I received a few days ago your letter of the 13th ult., 
 which was forwarded from New Orleans. Its consequent delay in reach- 
 ing me will in part account for my tardiness in replying. 
 
 " Whilst I fully appreciate your unwillingness to comply with my 
 request, I cannot agree in forming with you the conclusion that I should 
 remain silent upon this important matter of history. I have, with your 
 consent granted at the time of our conversation in Mobile, already men- 
 tioned to a number of our common friends, the fact of General Johnston's 
 intention to abandon Richmond, after his retreat from Yorktown, as 
 expressed to Mr. McFarland ; and one of our friends, after listening with 
 great interest to my assertion, and being informed that I had requested 
 of you a written statement of the fact, remarked : ' If Charles M. Conrad 
 told you this, he will give it to you in writing.' 
 
 " Moreover, I am not only indirectly but, I may say, directly con- 
 cerned in this matter, from the fact that I have publicly stated that Gen- 
 eral Johnston foreshadowed to his corps commanders at New Hope 
 Church, his intention to retreat to Macon, Georgia, during his campaign 
 of '64 from Dalton. I am the only living witness of this historic truth ; 
 therefore, Mr. McFarland's testimony, through one of your prominence 
 and character, becomes of great relative value to me. 
 
 "When I again have the leisure to continue my reply to the many 
 unwarranted statements contained in General Johnston's book, I may 
 find it necessary to bring forth also this important truth. 
 
 " I am yours truly, 
 
 "J. B. HOOD." 
 
156 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 When I recall the different events with which the military 
 career of General Johnston is connected, it is difficult to believe 
 that he ever had any other fixed plan than that of retreat. 
 Possibly the following paragraph in reference to a light engage- 
 ment of General Hardee, on the 15th of March, 1865, near 
 Averysboro', North Carolina, may indicate the nature of his 
 expectations, after a surrender of Richmond, Atlanta, etc., etc., 
 and a final retreat to the seashore, the last point of resistance : 
 " That report, if correct, proves that the soldiers of General 
 Sherman's Army had been demoralized by their course of life 
 on the Southern plantations. Those soldiers, when fighting 
 between Dalton and Atlanta, could not have been driven back 
 repeatedly by a fourth of their number, with a loss so utterly 
 insignificant." Was it General Johnston's policy to retreat till 
 he had demoralized the enemy, and demoralized them by their 
 course of life on Southern plantations? An easy victory even 
 at such cost would, indeed, have been dearly bought. 
 
 I do not wish to be understood as, in any manner, ques- 
 tioning the courage of this General. He would have led 
 men into action as gallantly as any soldier. But leading men 
 into action is one thing, and ordering an Army into battle is 
 another. To issue an order of great moment and simply to 
 obey instructions, involve such different measures of responsi- 
 bility that a distinct degree of moral courage is requisite to 
 fulfil either duty. General Johnston has defended himself by 
 charging me with recklessness, and exposure of my troops to 
 " useless butchery." I may, therefore, be pardoned if I point 
 out what I consider his main defects — the reason, in fact, why 
 his name is not coupled with a single glorious victory in the 
 annals of our four years' struggle, since it is, most assuredly, 
 not because of lack of personal courage. It becomes necessary 
 to express myself somewhat explicitly, in order that no mis- 
 apprehension be engendered. 
 
 Caution and boldness are the two predominant qualities 
 which characterize all soldiers of merit — I mean the caution 
 and boldness tempered by wisdom, which such men as Napo- 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 157 
 
 leon L, Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Von Moltke, and Sir Garnet 
 Wolseley have exhibited in so high a degree. These soldiers 
 have shown themselves gifted with that intuition of the true 
 warrior which rendered them bold in strategy, rapid in move- 
 ment, and determined in battle. Observation has taught me 
 that a commander may acquire sufficient caution by receiving 
 hard blows, but he cannot acquire boldness. It is a gift from 
 Heaven. A soldier whose quality of caution far exceeds 
 that of boldness, can never be eminent in war. He cannot 
 overcome nature, and experience that self-confidence requisite 
 to order an Army into battle. If from pride or wounded vanity 
 he make the venture, after long awaiting a more and more 
 favorable opportunity, he will, as a rule, strike at the most 
 unpropitious moment. Herein lies the deficiency of General 
 Johnston. He is a man of courage and ability, and a fine 
 organizer of an Army for the field ; but he lacks the bold 
 genius of Lee, and, consequently, will rarely, if ever, see suffi- 
 cient chances in his favor — especially at the right time — to 
 induce him to risk battle. Seven Pines is, I think, the only 
 battle he attempted to inaugurate during the war, although it 
 may be said that he commanded more men than any other 
 Confederate officer. In this instance he had received informa- 
 tion that a small body of the enemy had crossed the Chicka- 
 hominy ; he attempted to crush it with his entire force, and, 
 even then, failed. He invariably throws up entrenchments, 
 fortifies his line, and there remains in deliberation upon the 
 best means to defeat the enemy without risking a general 
 engagement, when, suddenly, he finds himself outflanked, and 
 issues the usual order for retreat. 
 
 The same defect — want of decision and self-reliance — 
 exhibits itself eminently in the lower grades of rank in an 
 army. Among ten brave division commanders who, under 
 orders, would lead their troops anywhere and everywhere, 
 seldom will be found one who, in a position to act upon his own 
 responsibility, will attack at a favorable moment, especially 
 when detached and ordered to the rear of the enemy. If the 
 
158 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 inquiry be made of any enterprising, self-reliant division com- 
 mander who has participated in many engagements, as to how 
 often his request has been granted when, heavily engaged with 
 superior numbers, he has called upon his neighboring division 
 commander (whose troops were lying inactive) to furnish him 
 the assistance of a brigade, he will reply that rarely has succor 
 been afforded, even in the most critical moment of battle. 
 His neighbor, albeit a man who knows not fear, was generally 
 unwilling to act and give the necessary support without orders 
 from his superior officer, because of his over-development of 
 caution and his deficiency in boldness — the counterbalancing 
 quality. 
 
 Again, few men are endowed with the capacity to execute 
 such moves as those of Stonewall Jackson, at Second Manassas, 
 and at Chancellorsville, for the reason that, whilst en route to 
 the rear of the enemy, the appearance of a light squad of their 
 cavalry will cause a majority of officers to halt, form line, 
 reconnoitre, and thus lose time and the opportunity. Jackson's 
 wagon train was attacked by Federal cavalry whilst he was 
 marching to the rear and flank of Hooker, at Chancellorsville; 
 he wisely paid little attention thereto, and moved boldly on 
 towards the main object, and achieved a signal victory. 
 
 I shall allow to pass unnoticed, in this reply several state- 
 ments of General Johnston which, although equally erroneous 
 and illiberal in spirit, are too trivial to demand my attention. 
 I shall, therefore, end this unpleasant discussion with a brief 
 reference to his unpardonable conduct towards me, after 
 he again assumed command in North Carolina. He was not 
 unmindful that he had again been restored to power. This 
 new acquisition of authority, he determined should be felt by 
 those who had ventured to oppose his policy, and contradict 
 his statements. Accordingly, as I was en route for the Trans- 
 Mississippi Department, under orders to bring to the support 
 of General Lee all the troops that would follow me, I received, 
 at Chester, South Carolina, the following telegram : 
 
REPLY TO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 159 
 
 " Smithfield, ApnV ^f/i,i86j. 
 " Lieutenant General J. B. Hood. 
 
 "After reading your report, as submitted, I informed General Cooper, 
 by telegraph, that I should prefer charges against you as soon as 1 have 
 leisure to do so, and desired him to give you the information. 
 
 "J. E.JOHNSTON." 
 
 I replied as follows : 
 
 " Chester, South Carolina, April 4th, iS6j. 
 " General J. E. Johnston, S7?iithfield, N. C. 
 
 " Your telegram of this date received, informing me that you intended, 
 as soon as you had leisure, to prefer charges against me. I am under 
 orders for the Trans-Mississippi Department. 1 shall inquire of General 
 Cooper whether I am to await my trial or proceed as ordered. 1 will be 
 ready to meet any charges you may prefer. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD." 
 
 On the following day I applied to the War Department for 
 a Court of Inquiry. 
 
 " Chester, South Carolina, April ^th, 186^. 
 " General S. Cooper. 
 
 " I have the honor to request that a Court of Inquiry be assembled at 
 the earliest practicable moment to investigate and report upon the facts 
 and statements contained in my official report of the operations of the 
 Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, 
 
 "Lieutenant General." 
 
 I received the following in reply : 
 
 " Danville, April ^th, 1863. 
 " Lieutenant General J. B. Hood. 
 
 " Proceed to Texas as heretofore ordered. 
 
 "S.COOPER, A. LG." 
 
 " Danville, April -jth, 186^. 
 " Lieutenant General J. B. Hood. 
 
 " A Court of Inquiry cannot be convened in your case at present. 
 You will proceed to Texas as heretofore ordered. 
 
 "S. COOPER, A. I. G," 
 
160 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Had I been granted a Court of Inquiry at that date, I would 
 have produced stronger testimony than I have given, even at 
 this late period, in relation to the points in controversy between 
 General Johnston and myself. 
 
 This attempt to summons me before a Court Martial was his 
 final effort, during the war, to asperse the character of a 
 brother officer who had always been true to duty, but whose 
 unpardonable crime was having been appointed to supersede 
 him in the command of the Army of Tennessee. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 SIEGE OF ATLANTA DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION — BATTLE 
 
 OF THE 20TH OF JULY. 
 
 Notwithstanding the manifold difficulties and trials which 
 beset me at the period I was ordered to relieve General John- 
 ston, and which, because of unbroken silence on my part, have 
 been the occasion of much injustice manifested in my regard, 
 I formed no intention, till the appearance of General Sher- 
 man's Memoirs, to enter fully into the details of the siege of 
 Atlanta, the campaign to the Alabama line, and that which 
 followed into Tennessee. 
 
 A feeling of reluctance to cause heart-burnings within the 
 breast of any Confederate, who fulfilled his duty to the best 
 of his ability, has, hitherto, deterred me from speaking forth 
 the truth. Since, however, military movements with which 
 my name is closely connected, have been freely and publicly 
 discussed by different authors, whose representations have not 
 always been accurate, I feel compelled to give an account of 
 the operations of the Army of Tennessee, whilst under my 
 direction. 
 
 As already mentioned, the order, assigning me to the com- 
 mand of that Army, was received about II p. m., on the 17th 
 of July, My predecessor, unwilling to await even the dawn of 
 11 (161) 
 
162 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 day, issued his farewell order that memorable night. In 
 despite of my repeated and urgent appeals to him to pocket 
 all despatches from Richmond, to leave me in command of 
 my own corps, and to fight the battle for Atlanta, he deserted 
 me the ensuing afternoon. He deserted mc in violation of his 
 promise to remain and afford me the advantage of his counsel, 
 whilst I shouldered all responsibility of the contest. 
 
 I reiterate that it is difficult to imagine a commander placed 
 at the head of an Army under more embarrassing circum- 
 stances than those against which I was left to contend on the 
 evening of the i8th of July, 1864. I was, comparatively, a 
 stranger to the Army of Tennessee. Moreover General 
 Johnston's mode of warfare formed so strong a contrast to 
 the tactics and strategy which were practiced in Virginia, 
 where far more satisfactory results were obtained than in the 
 West, that I have become a still more ardent advocate of the 
 Lee and Jackson school. The troops of the Army of 
 Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected to the 
 ruinous policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta that they were 
 unfitted for united action in pitched battle. They had, in 
 other words, been so long habituated to security behind breast- 
 works that they had become wedded to the " timid defensive" 
 policy, and naturally regarded with distrust a commander 
 likely to initiate offensive operations. 
 
 The senior Corps Commander considered he had been 
 supplanted through my promotion, and thereupon determined 
 to resign, in consequence, I have no doubt, of my application 
 to President Davis to postpone the order transferring to me 
 the command of the Army ; he however, altered his decision, 
 and concluded to remain with his corps. 
 
 The evening of the 18th of July found General Johnston 
 comfortably quartered at Macon, whilst McPherson's and 
 Schofield's Corps were tearing up the Georgia Railroad, 
 between Stone Mountain and Decatur ; Thomas's Army was 
 hastening preparations to cross Peach Tree creek, within about 
 six miles of Atlanta ; and I was busily engaged in hunting up 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 163 
 
 the positions of, and establishing communication with Stewart's 
 and Hardee's Corps, since I did not know where they were 
 posted, when General Johnston disappeared so unexpectedly 
 and left me in this critical position. 
 
 Not till I read Sherman's Memoirs, was I aware of McPher- 
 son's so close proximity to Atlanta at an early hour on the 
 1 8th of July. In truth, a few enterprising scouts thrown out 
 that afternoon from his columns, in the direction of the Macon 
 Railroad might have captured my predecessor on his retreat to 
 Macon. 
 
 Sherman says (vol. II, pages 71, 72) : 
 
 "On the 1 8th all the Armies moved on a general right wheel, Thomas 
 to Buckhead, forming line of battle facing Peach Tree creek ; Schofield 
 was on his left, and McPherson well on towards the railroad between 
 Stone Mountain and Decatur, which he reached at 2 p. m. of that day, 
 about four miles from Stone Mountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, 
 and there he turned toward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he 
 progressed, his advance guard reaching Decatur about night, where he 
 came into communication "/ith Schofield's troops, which had also 
 reached Decatur." 
 
 It thus appears that on the afternoon of the i8th the enemy 
 was in Decatur, almost at the gates of Atlanta. This intelli- 
 gence must have been communicated to General Johnston by 
 the cavalry, after he left me to ride into the city with the 
 promise to return toward evening, as he was virtually Com- 
 mander-in-Chief up to the moment of his sudden departure. I 
 had consumed a great portion of that day in vain endeavors to 
 adjust the difficulties in the way of his retention in command, 
 by earnest representations to him, on one hand, and, on the 
 other, by telegraphing to Richmond in the hope of accomplish- 
 ing this object. Although he had published his farewell 
 order the night previous, I had not, owing to the foregoing 
 reasons, assumed command. He had agreed to issue orders 
 in my name, and, in reality, I did not become Commander-in- 
 Chief until about night of that day, when I received informa- 
 tion of his departure. 
 
164 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Much confusion necessarily arose during this interval ; and 
 this condition of affairs accounts for the circumstance, which 
 must seem strange to military men, that at this late date I am 
 apprised for the first time, and through Sherman's Memoirs, 
 of the presence of the enemy's left wing, at 2 p. m. on the 
 l8th of July, upon the railroad leading to Augusta. It must 
 seem equally strange that, if I was regarded as chief in 
 command, this important movement was not made known to 
 me at headquarters by our cavalry, which was, generally, very 
 prompt in reporting all such information. I cannot but think, 
 therefore, that General Johnston was cognizant before 4 
 o'clock that day, and before his departure for Macon, of the 
 enemy's presence on the Augusta Railroad, within six or eight 
 miles of Atlanta. If such is not the case, our cavalry, 
 stationed upon the right, neglected most unpardonably its 
 duty — which supposition I am not inclined to admit. 
 
 The statement in my official report* that McPherson was at 
 Decatur on the morning of the 19th, is proof of my ignorance 
 of the circumstance on the i8th. 
 
 These facts give evidence of the trying position in which I 
 was placed at this juncture, and this last move of the enemy 
 may somewhat account for the inexplicable conduct and dis- 
 appearance of General Johnston who, at this critical moment, 
 was unwilling to share with me the responsibility of the issue. 
 
 I will now turn from the many unpleasant occurrences 
 interwoven in the history of that day, and endeavor to show 
 in what manner General Sherman exposed, on his approach to 
 Atlanta, the Federal Army to successful attack by our troops; 
 and, at the same time, state why, in my opinion, after our dis- 
 covery of his blunders, the Confederate Army did not succeed 
 in defeating and routing his forces. 
 
 These premises may seem bold, especially since defeat was 
 our fortune, and victory the boast of our adversary. 
 
 After having established communication with the corps and 
 
 * Appendix, p. 320. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 165 
 
 the cavalry of the Army during the forepart of the night, I 
 found myself, upon the morning of the 19th, in readiness to 
 fulfil these grave duties devolving upon me. 
 
 Our troops had awakened in me heartfelt sympathy, as I 
 had followed their military career with deep interest from early 
 in May of that year. I had witnessed their splendid condition 
 at that period ; had welcomed with pride the fine body of 
 reinforcements under General Polk ; but, with disappointment, 
 I had seen them, day after day, turn their back upon the 
 enemy, and lastly cross the Chattahoochee river on the night 
 of the 9th of July with one-third of their number lost — the 
 men downcast, dispirited, and demoralized. Stragglers and 
 deserters, the captured and the killed, could not now, however, 
 be replaced by recruits, because all the recruiting depots had 
 been drained to reinforce either Lee or Johnston. I could, 
 therefore, but make the best dispositions in my power with 
 the reduced numbers of the Army, which opposed a force of 
 one huYidred and six thousand (106,000) Federals, buoyant 
 with success and hope, and who were fully equal to one hun- 
 dred and forty thousand (140,000) such troops as confronted 
 Johnston at Dalton, by reason of their victorious march of a 
 hundred miles into the heart of the Confederacy. 
 
 Accordingly, on the night of the i8th and morning of the 
 19th, I formed line of battle facing Peach Tree creek; the left 
 rested near Pace's Ferry road, and the right covered Atlanta. 
 I was informed on the 19th that Thomas was building bridges 
 across Peach Tree creek ; that McPherson and Schofield were 
 well over toward, and even on, the Georgia Railroad, near 
 Decatur. I perceived at once that the Federal commander 
 had committed a serious blunder in separating his corps, or 
 Armies by such distance as to allow me to concentrate the 
 main body of our Army upon his right wing, whilst his left 
 was so far removed as to be incapable of rendering timely 
 assistance. General Sherman's violation of the established 
 maxim that an Army should always be held well within hand, 
 or its detachments within easy supporting distance, afforded 
 
166 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 one of the most favorable occasions for complete victory which 
 could have been offered ; especially as it presented an oppor- 
 tunity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force 
 upon his left. In fact, such a blunder affords a small Army 
 the best, if not the sole, chance of success when contending 
 with a vastly superior force. 
 
 Line of battle having been formed, Stewart's Corps was in 
 position on the left, Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's 
 on the right. Orders were given to Generals Hardee and 
 Stewart to observe closely and report promptly the progress 
 of Thomas in the construction of bridges across Peach Tree 
 creek and the passage of troops. General Cheatham was 
 directed to reconnoitre in front of his left; to erect, upon that 
 part of his line, batteries so disposed as to command the entire 
 space betv/een his left and Peach Tree creek, in order to com- 
 pletely isolate McPherson and Schofield's forces from those of 
 Thomas ; and, finally, to thoroughly entrench his line. This 
 object accomplished, and Thomas having partially crossed the 
 creek and made a lodgment on the east side within the pocket 
 formed by Peach Tree creek and the Chattahoochee river, I 
 determined to attack him with two corps — Hardee's and Stew- 
 art's, which constituted the main body of the Confederate 
 Army — and thus, if possible, crush Sherman's right wing, as 
 we drove it into the narrow space between the creek and the 
 river. 
 
 Major General G. W. Smith's Georgia State troops were 
 posted on the right of Cheatham, and it was impossible for 
 Schofield or McPherson to assist Thomas without recrossing 
 Peach Tree creek in the vicinity of Decatur, and making on 
 the west side a detour which necessitated a march of not less 
 than ten or twelve miles, in order to reach Thomas's bridges 
 across this creek. I immediately assembled the three corps 
 commanders, Hardee, Stewart, and Cheatham, together with 
 Major General G. W, Smith, commanding Georgia State troops, 
 for the purpose of giving orders for battle on the following 
 day, the 20th of July. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 167 
 
 I here quote from my official report written soon after these 
 events : 
 
 " On the morning of the 19th, the dispositions of tlie enemy were sub- 
 stantially as follows : ' The Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas, 
 was in the act of crossing Peach Tree creek. This creek, forming a 
 considerable obstacle to the passage of an army, runs in a northeasterly 
 direction, emptying into the Chattahoochee river near the railroad cross- 
 ing. The Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, was also about to cross 
 east of the Buckhead road. The Army of the Tennessee, under 
 McPherson, v/as moving on the Georgia Railroad at Decatur. Finding 
 it impossible to hold Atlanta without giving battle, I determined to strike 
 the enemy while attempting to cross this stream. My troops were 
 disposed as follows: Stewart's Corps on the left, Hardee's in the centre, 
 and Cheatham's on the right entrenched. My object was to crush 
 Thomas's Army before he could fortify himself, and then turn upon 
 Schofield and McPherson. To do this, Cheatham was ordered to hold 
 his left on the creek, in order to separate Thomas's Army from the 
 forces on his (Thomas's) left. Thus I should be able to throw two 
 corps, Stewart's and Hardee's, against Thomas. Specific orders were 
 carefully given these Generals, in the presence of each other, as follows : 
 The attack was to begin at i p. m. ; the movement to be by division, 
 en echelon from the right, at a distance of about one hundred and fifty 
 yards ; the effort to be to drive the enemy back to the creek, and 
 then towards the river, into the narrow space formed by the river and 
 creek ; everything on our side of the creek to be taken at all hazards, 
 and to follow up as our success might peirmit. Each of these Generals 
 was to hold a division in reserve. Owing to the demonstrations of the 
 enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division 
 front to the right. To do this, Hardee and Stewart were each ordered 
 to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that 
 some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General 
 Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left 
 to see that the left did not take more than a-half division front. This, 
 unfortunately, was not attended to, and the line closed to the right, 
 causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In 
 consequence of this, the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p. m.'" 
 
 The three corps commanders, together with General G. W. 
 Smith, were assembled not only for the purpose of issuing to 
 them orders for battle, but with the special design to deliver 
 most explicit instructions in regard to their respective duties. 
 
168 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 I sought to " make assurance doubly sure" by direct inter- 
 rogatory ; each was asked whether or not he understood his 
 orders. All replied in the affirmative. I was very careful in 
 this respect, inasmuch as I had learned from long experience 
 that no measure is more important, upon the eve of battle, than 
 to make certain, in the presence of the commanders, that each 
 thoroughly comprehends his orders. The usual discretion 
 allowed these officers in no manner diminishes the importance 
 of this precaution. 
 
 I also deemed it of equal moment that each should fully 
 appreciate the imperativeness of the orders then issued, by 
 reason of the certainty that our troops would encounter hastily 
 constructed works thrown up by the Federal troops, which 
 had been foremost to cross Peach Tree creek. Although a 
 portion of the enemy would undoubtedly be found under cover 
 of temporary breastworks, it was equally certain a larger por- 
 tion would be caught in the act of throwing up such works, 
 and just in that state of confusion to enable our forces to rout 
 them by a bold and persistent attack. With these convictions 
 I timed the assault at i p. m., so as to surprise the enemy in 
 their unsettled condition. 
 
 As stated in my official report, the charge was unfortunately 
 not made till about 4 o'clock p. m., on account of General 
 Hardee's failure to obey my specific instructions in regard to 
 the extension of the one-half division front to the right, in 
 order to afford General Cheatham an advantageous position 
 to hold in check McPherson and Schofield. The result was 
 not, however, materially affected by this delay, since the 
 Federals were completely taken by surprise. 
 
 General Stewart carried out his instructions to the letter ; 
 he moreover appealed in person to his troops before going 
 into action, and informed them that orders were imperative 
 they should carry everything, at all hazards, on their side of 
 Peach Tree creek ; he impressed upon them that they should 
 not halt before temporary breastworks, but charge gallantly 
 over every obstacle and rout the enemy. It was evident that 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 169 
 
 after long-continued use of entrenchments, General Stewart 
 deemed a personal appeal to his soldiers expedient. An 
 address from a corps commander to his troops, upon the eve 
 of battle, is always productive either of great good or evil, 
 according to the spirit in which it is spoken. For this reason, 
 commanders of large bodies should exercise extreme caution 
 in the expression of their sentiments, even in the presence of 
 staff officers. Every word, portending probable results, passes 
 like an electric spark through the entire command. It is, 
 therefore, in the power of an officer to inspirit his men, and 
 incite them to deeds of valor in the hour of battle, as well as 
 to depress and demoralize them by an expression of despond- 
 ency, one word foreshadowing the possibility of defeat. 
 
 General Stewart and his troops nobly performed their duty 
 in the engagement of the 20th. At the time of the attack, his 
 corps moved boldly forward, drove the enemy from his works, 
 and held possession of them until driven out by an enfilade 
 fire of batteries placed in position by General Thomas. 
 
 The following extracts from the reports of Generals Stewart 
 and Featherston, touching the battle of the 20th, will be read 
 with interest: 
 
 " The plan was for the divisions (commencing on Hardee's right) to 
 move forward, successively, en echelon, at intervals of some two hun- 
 dred yards, to attack the enemy, drive him back to the creek, and 
 then press down the creek to the left. Should the enemy be found 
 entrenched, his works were to be carried; everything on our side of the 
 creek was to be taken, and our crossing to the other side of the creek 
 was to depend on our success. Such were the instructions of the Gene- 
 ral Commanding to General Hardee and myself. I was to hold a division 
 in reserve. It seems a division had been withdrawn from the lines on 
 the right of Hardee's Corps. His corps and mine were to close to the 
 right far enough to cover the space vacated by this division— ih^ space 
 to be divided between the two corps. This would have shifted my line 
 a-half division front to the right — perhaps at most — half-a-mile. At 
 I o'clock I found the left of Hardee's Corps just beginning to shift to the 
 right. Feeling that this change was not important, and that not a 
 moment was to be lost in making the attack contemplated, a staff cfficer 
 was despatched to the Commanding General to inform him of the fact, 
 
170 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 and requesting an order to stop the movement to the right and commence 
 the forward movement. The result was, however, that to keep up con- 
 nection with the other corps, my line was moved a mile and a-half or 
 two miles to the right. * * * My instructions to division commanders, 
 and through them to brigade and regimental commanders, were to move 
 forward and attack the enemy ; if found entrenched, to fix bayonets and 
 carry his works , to drive him back to the creek, and then press down 
 the creek ; that we were to carry everything in our front on our side 
 of the creek. * * * These commanders, their officers and men, 
 behaved entirely to my satisfaction, and I cannot but think, had the 
 plan of the battle, as I understood it, been carried out fully, we would 
 have achieved a great success." 
 
 General Featherston in his official report writes : 
 
 "The plan of the battle, as explained to me, was as follows: The 
 attack was to begin on the extreme right of the Army. General Hood's 
 old corps and General Hardee's were both on my right. The troops 
 were to advance en echelon by divisions, beginning on the extreme right; 
 the first division advancing some three hundred yards to the front 
 before the second moved. The same order was to be observed down 
 the entire line from right to left, extending through all three of the army 
 corps. Each division when it reached Peach Tree creek was to oblique 
 to the left, and sweep down the creek, and thereby make the attack 
 upon the enemy, one upon his front and left flank at the same time. 
 My orders were to fix bayonets and charge their works when we reached 
 them, to stop for no obstacle, however formidable, but to make the 
 attack a desperate one. I was informed that the same orders had been 
 delivered by the Commander-in-Chief, General Hood, to each and every 
 army corps. I thought the battle had been well planned, and heard it 
 spoken of by my associates in arms in terms of commendation. The 
 whole corps, so far as I heard an expression of their opinions, anticipated 
 a brilliant victory. 
 
 " I was struck with surprise, at the time we moved to the front, that no 
 guns, either artillery or small arms, were heard on our right, save a 
 feeble skirmish. I supposed from hearing no firing on our right, and 
 knowing that many divisions had had time to reach the creek, that they 
 had found no enemy in their front. Had the attack been vigorously 
 made by all the troops on our right, and the plan of the battle been 
 strictly carried out, I then believe, and still believe, the victory would 
 have been a brilliant one, and the Federal forces on the south side of 
 Peach Tree cseek would have been all either killed, wounded or captured. 
 The orders seem to have been misunderstood by the troops on our 
 right, or for some cause not fully carried out." 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 171 
 
 .Unfortunately, the corps on Stewart's right, although com- 
 posed of the best troops in the Army, virtually accomplished 
 nothing. In lieu of moving the half division front promptly 
 to the right, attacking as ordered, and supporting Stewart's 
 gallant assault, the troops of Hardee — as their losses on that 
 day indicate — did nothing more than skirmish with the enemy. 
 Instead of charging down upon the foe as Sherman represents 
 Stewart's men to have done, many of the troops, when they 
 discovered that they had come into contact with breastworks, 
 lay down and, consequently, this attempt at pitched battle 
 proved abortive. 
 
 I was at the time unable to discover a satisfactory reason 
 for which an united attack by two corps d'armee, at even 4 
 o'clock in the day, should have failed to destroy Thomas's 
 Army, which was protected by only slight entrenchments and 
 was situated within a pocket formed by two streams difficult 
 of passage. I was deeply concerned and perplexed, as I 
 sought to divine the cause of misfortune — especially of failure 
 on the part of Hardee's Corps to attack according to explicit 
 instructions. 
 
 General Sherman writes as follows, in regard to this engage- 
 ment :* 
 
 " On the 19th the three Armies were converging towards Atlanta, meet- 
 ing such feeble resistance that I really thought the enemy intended to 
 evacuate the place. McPherson was moving astride of the railroad, near 
 Decatur; Schofield along a road leading toward Atlanta, by Colonel 
 Howard's house and the distillery ; and Thomas was crossing ' Peach 
 Tree ' in line of battle, building bridges for nearly every division as 
 deployed. There was quite a gap between Thomas and Schofield, ivhick 
 I endeavored to close by drawing two of Howard' s Divisions nearer Scho- 
 field. On the 20th I was with General Schofield near the centre, and 
 soon after noon heard heavy firing in front of Thomas's right, which 
 lasted an hour or so, and then ceased. I soon learned that the enemy 
 had made a furious sally, the blow falling on Hooker's Corps (the 
 Twentieth), and partially on Johnston's Division of the Fourteenth, and 
 Newton's of the Fourth. The troops had crossed Peach Tree creek, 
 
 ♦Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, pages 72, 73. 
 
172 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 were deployed, but at the time were resting for noon, when, without 
 notice, the enemy came pouring out of their trenches down upon them, 
 they became commingled, and fought in many places hand to hand. 
 General Thomas happened to be near the rear of Newton's Division, and 
 got some field batteries in good position, on the north side of Peach Tree 
 creek, from which he directed a furious fire upon a mass of the enemy, 
 which was passing round Newton's left and exposed flank. After a 
 couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy retired slowly 
 within his trenches, leaving his dead and many wounded on the field." 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 SIEGE OF ATLANTA BATTLE 22D OF JULY HARDEE GENERAL 
 
 FRANK BLAIr's LETTER. 
 
 The failure on the 20th, rendered urgent the most active 
 measures, in order to save Atlanta even for a short period. 
 Through the vigilance of General Wheeler, I received infor- 
 mation, during the night of the 20th, of the exposed position 
 of McPherson's left flank ; it was standing out in air, near the 
 Georgia Railroad between Decatur and Atlanta, and a large 
 number of the enemy's wagons had been parked in and around 
 Decatur. The roads were in good condition, and ran in the 
 direction to enable a large body of our Army to march, under 
 cover of darkness, around this exposed flank, and attack in 
 rear. 
 
 I determined to make all necessary preparations for a 
 renewed assault; to attack the extreme left of the Federals in 
 rear and flank, and endeavor to bring the entire Confederate 
 Army into united action. 
 
 Accordingly, Hardee's and Stewart's Corps resumed their 
 former positions. Colonel Prestman, chief engineer, was 
 instructed to examine at once the partially completed line of 
 works toward Peach Tree creek, which General Johnston had 
 ordered to be constructed for the defence of Atlanta, and to 
 report, at the earliest moment, in regard to their fitness to be 
 
 (173) 
 
174 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 occupied by Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps, together with 
 the Georgia State troops, under General G. W. Smith. The 
 report was received early on the morning of the 2ist, to the 
 effect that the line established by Johnston, was not only too 
 close to the city and located upon too low ground, but was 
 totally inadequate for the purpose designed ; that Sherman's 
 line, which extended from the vicinity of Decatur almost to 
 the Dalton Railroad, north of Atlanta, rendered necessary the 
 construction of an entirely new line, and upon more elevated 
 ground. 
 
 The chief engineer was thereupon directed to prepare and 
 stake off a new line, and to employ his entire force, in order 
 that the troops might occupy the works soon after dark on 
 the night of the 2ist, and have time to aid in strengthening 
 their position before dawn of next morning. This task was 
 soon executed through the skill and energy of Colonel 
 Prestman and his assistants. Generals Stewart, Cheatham, 
 and G. W. Smith, were instructed to order their division and 
 brigade commanders to examine before dark the ground to be 
 occupied by their respective troops, so as to avoid confusion, 
 or delay, at the time of the movement. 
 
 General Hardee, who commanded the largest corps, and 
 whose troops were comparatively fresh, as they had taken 
 but little part in the attack of the previous day, was ordered to 
 hold his forces in readiness to move promptly at dark that 
 night — the 2ist. I selected Hardee for this duty, because 
 Cheatham had, at that time, but little experience as a corps 
 commander, and Stewart had been heavily engaged the day 
 previous. 
 
 The position of the enemy during the 2ist remained, I may 
 say, unchanged, with the exception that Schofield and 
 McPherson had advanced slightly toward Atlanta. To 
 transfer after dark our entire line from the immediate presence 
 of the enemy to another line around Atlanta, and to throw 
 Hardee, the same night, entirely to the rear and flank of 
 McPherson — as Jackson was thrown, in a similar movement, 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 175 
 
 at Chancellorsville and Second Manassas — and to initiate the 
 offensive at daylight, required no small effort upon the part of 
 the men and officers. I hoped, however, that the assault 
 would result not only in a general battle, but in a signal 
 victory to our arms. 
 
 It was absolutely necessary these operations should be 
 executed that same night, since a delay of even twenty-four 
 hours would allow the enemy time to further entrench, and 
 afford Sherman a chance to rectify, in a measure, his strange 
 blunder in separating Thomas so far from Schofield and 
 McPherson. Sherman evidently perceived his error, as the 
 following extract from his Memoirs denotes : * 
 
 "There was quite a gap between Thomas and Schofield, which 1 
 endeavored to close by drawing two of Howard's Divisions near Scho- 
 field." 
 
 I well knew he would seek to retrieve his oversight at the 
 earliest possible moment ; therefore, I determined to forestall 
 his attempt, and to make another effort to defeat the Federal 
 Army. No time was to be lost in taking advantage of this 
 second unexpected opportunity to achieve victory and relieve 
 Atlanta. 
 
 I was convinced that McPherson and Schofield intended to 
 destroy -not only the Georgia Railroad, but likewise our main 
 line of communication, the railroad to Macon. It is now evi- 
 dent the blow on the 20th checked the reckless manner of 
 moving, which had so long been practiced by the enemy, with- 
 out fear of molestation, during the Dalton-Atlanta campaign. 
 The rap of warning received by Thomas, on Peach Tree creek, 
 must have induced the Federal commander to alter his plan. 
 He says in relation thereto : f 
 
 " During the night (21st), I had full reports from all parts of our line, 
 most of which was partially entrenched as against a sally, and finding 
 that McPherson was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote 
 him a note early in the morning not to extend so much by his left ; for 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol, II, page 72. 
 I Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 74. 
 
176 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 we Ihad not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended 
 to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, 
 then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right." 
 
 Thus was situated the Federal Army at the close of night, 
 on the 2 1st: it was but partially entrenched ; Schofield and 
 McPherson were still separated from Thomas, and at such dis- 
 tance as to compel them to make a detour of about twelve 
 miles, in order to reach the latter in time of need. 
 
 The Confederate Army occupied the same position, at dark, 
 as prior to the attack of the 20th. The new line around the 
 city, however, had been chosen ; each corps commander fully 
 advised of the ground assigned to him, and the special duty 
 devolving upon him ; working parties had been detailed in 
 advance from the corps of Stewart and Cheatham, and from 
 the Georgia State troops; rations and ammunition had been 
 issued, and Hardee's Corps instructed to be in readiness to 
 move at a moment's warning. 
 
 The demonstrations of the enemy upon our right, and which 
 threatened to destroy the Macon Railroad — our main line for 
 receiving supplies — rendered it imperative that I should check, 
 immediately, his operations in that direction; otherwise Atlanta 
 was doomed to fall at a very early day. Although the attack 
 of the 20th had caused Sherman to pause and reflect, I do not 
 think he would have desisted extending his left toward our 
 main line of communication, had not the events occurred 
 which I am about to narrate. 
 
 As already stated, every preparation had been carefully 
 made during the day of the 2 1st. I had summoned, moreover, 
 to my headquarters the three corps commanders, Hardee, 
 Stewart, and Cheatham, together with Major General Wheeler, 
 commanding cavalry corps, and Major General G. W. Smith, 
 commanding Georgia State troops. The following minute 
 instructions were given in the presence of all assembled, in 
 order that each might understand not only his own duty, 
 but likewise that of his brother corps commanders ; by this 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 177 
 
 means I hoped each officer would know what support to 
 expect from his neighbor, in the hour of battle. 
 
 Stewart, Cheatham, and G. W. Smith, were ordered to 
 occupy soon after dark the positions assigned them in the 
 new hne round the city, and to entrench as thoroughly as pos- 
 sible. General Shoupe, chief of artillery, was ordered to 
 mass artillery on our right. General Hardee was directed to 
 put his corps in motion soon after dusk ; to move south on 
 the McDonough road, across Entrenchment creek at Cobb's 
 Mills, and to completely turn the left of McPherson's Army 
 and attack at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. He 
 was furnished guides from Wheeler's cavalry, who were familiar 
 with the various roads in that direction ; was given clear and 
 positive orders to detach his corps, to swing away from the 
 main body of the Army, and to march entirely around and to 
 the rear of McPherson's left flank, even if he was forced to 
 go to or beyond Decatur, which is only about six miles from 
 Atlanta.* 
 
 Major General Wheeler was ordered to move on Hardee's 
 right with all the cavalry at his disposal, and to attack with 
 Hardee at daylight. General Cheatham, who was in line of 
 battle on the right and around the city, was instructed to take 
 up the movement from his right as soon as Hardee succeeded 
 in forcing back, or throwing into confusion, the Federal left, 
 and to assist in driving the enemy down and back upon Peach 
 Tree creek, from right to left. General G. W. Smith would, 
 thereupon, join in the attack. General Stewart, posted on the 
 left, was instructed not only to occupy and keep a strict watch 
 upon Thomas, in order to prevent him from giving aid to 
 Schofield and McPherson, butto engage the enemy the instant 
 the movement became general, i. e., as soon as Hardee and 
 Cheatham succeeded in driving the Federals down Peach Tree 
 creek and near his right. Though the movement assigned 
 General Hardee, on this occasion, was a very simple one, it is, 
 
 * Hood's Official Report, Appendix p. 321. 
 
 12 
 
178 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 as I have remarked in my reply to General Johnston, rare to 
 find one out often brave division commanders, who is capable 
 of swinging away from the main army and attacking in rear 
 as Jackson did at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. 
 The march, however, in this instance, was so short — Decatur 
 being only six miles from Atlanta, and our cavalry had so 
 often passed back and forth over the roads, day and night, in 
 bringing dispatches from Wheeler to Army headquarters, and 
 consequently were so thoroughly familiar with the different 
 routes, that I considered Hardee's move one merely within 
 the lines of our cavalry; that no special quality, such as Jackson 
 possessed, was required; that he had simply to follow the 
 guides furnished him to Decatur, and attack as ordered. 
 
 Thus orders were given to attack from right to left, and to 
 press the Federal Army down and against the deep and muddy 
 stream in their rear. These orders were carefully explained 
 again and again, till each officer present gave assurance that he 
 fully comprehended his duties. The following extract will 
 disclose the situation and surmises of the enemy on the morn- 
 ing of the battle:* 
 
 "In the morning (22d) we found the strong line of parapet, 'Peach 
 Tree hne,' to the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our 
 lines were advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I 
 supposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horse- 
 back at the head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of 
 the Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly 
 see the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up 
 from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saphngs for abatis. 
 Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could 
 see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in position at inter- 
 vals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear Thomas 
 further to the right engaged, when General McPherson and his staff rode 
 up. We went back to the Howard House, a double frame building with 
 a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of 
 Hood's general character. McPherson had also been of the same class 
 at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, pages 74, 75. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 179 
 
 ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and 
 for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, 
 or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and 
 rash man ; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued 
 the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but 
 prudent conduct of General Joe Johnston." 
 
 At dawn on the morning of the 22d Cheatham, Stewart, and 
 G. W. Smith, had, by alternating working parties during the 
 night previous, not only strongly fortified their respective posi- 
 tions, but had kept their men comparatively fresh for action, 
 and were in readiness to act as soon as the battle was initiated 
 by Hardee who was supposed to be at that moment in rear of 
 the adversary's flank. 
 
 I took my position at daybreak near Cheatham's right, 
 whence I could observe the left of the enemy's entrenchments 
 which seemed to be thrown back a short distance on their 
 extreme left. After awaiting nearly the entire morning, I 
 heard, about ten or eleven o'clock, skirmishing going on 
 directly opposite the left of the enemy, which was in front of 
 Cheatham's right and Shoupe's artillery. A considerable time 
 had elapsed when I discovered, with astonishment and bitter 
 disappointment, a line of battle composed of one of Hardee's 
 divisions advancing directly against the entrenched flank of 
 the enemy. I at once perceived that Hardee had not only 
 failed to turn McPherson's left, according to positive orders, 
 but had thrown his men against the enemy's breastworks, 
 thereby occasioning unnecessary loss to us, and rendering 
 doubtful the great result desired. In lieu of completely turn- 
 ing the Federal left and taking the entrenched line of the 
 enemy in reverse, he attacked the retired wing of their flank, 
 having his own left almost within gunshot of our main line 
 around the city. I then began to fear that his disregard of the 
 fixed rule in war that one danger in rear is more to be feared 
 than ten in front — in other WKsrds, that one thousand men in 
 rear are equal to ten thousand in front — would cause us much 
 embarrassment, and place his corps at great disadvantage, not- 
 
180 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 withstanding he had held success within easy grasp. It had 
 rested in his power to rout McPherson's Army by simply 
 movinof a little further to the ricrht, and attacking in rear and 
 flank instead of assaulting an entrenched flank. I hoped, 
 nevertheless, this blunder would be remedied, at least, in part, 
 by the extreme right of his line lapping round, during the 
 attack, to the rear of McPherson. 
 
 I anxiously awaited tidings from the scene of action while 
 listening attentively to what seemed a spirited engagement 
 upon that part of the field. The following extract testifies to 
 the uneasiness which Sherman experienced at the possibility 
 of an attack upon his rear and flank :* 
 
 " Although the sound of musketry grew in volume, I was not so much 
 disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward Decatur." 
 
 This alarming sound proceeded from the guns of the gallant 
 Wheeler, in the direction of Decatur, whence I hoped, 
 momentarily, to hear a continuous roar of musketry, accom- 
 panied by the genuine Confederate shout frorA Hardee's entire 
 Corps, as it advanced and drove the enemy down Peach Tree 
 creek between our general line of battle and that formidable 
 stream. Although the troops of Hardee fought, seemingly, 
 with determination and spirit, there were indications that the 
 desired end was not being accomplished. The roar of mus- 
 ketry occurring only at intervals strengthened this impression, 
 and a staff officer was dispatched to General Hardee to know 
 the actual result. 
 
 During the early afternoon I received information that the 
 attack had been, in part, successful, but had been checked in 
 consequence of our troops coming in contact with different 
 lines of entrenchments, several of which they had carried and 
 held. Fearing a concentration of the enemy upon Hardee, I 
 commanded General Cheatham, about 3 p. m., to move for- 
 ward with his corps, and attack the position in his front, so as 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 76. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 181 
 
 to, at least, create a division. The order was promptly and 
 well executed, and our troops succeeded in taking possession 
 of the enemy's defences in that part of the field. A heavy 
 enfilade fire, however, forced Cheatham to abandon the works 
 he had captured. 
 
 Major General G. W. Smith, perceiving that Cheatham had 
 moved out on his left, and having thoroughly comprehended 
 all the orders relative to the battle, moved gallantly forward 
 with his State troops in support of Cheatham's attack, but was 
 eventually forced to retire on account of superiority of numbers 
 in his front. The militia, under his leadership, acted with 
 distinction on this occasion, and Georgia has reason to con- 
 gratulate herself that her troops were under the command of a 
 soldier of the ability and skill of General G. W. Smith. 
 
 Hardee bore off as trophies eight guns and thirteen stands 
 of colors, and, having rectified his line, remained in the pres- 
 ence of the enemy. Cheatham captured five guns and five or 
 six stands of colors. 
 
 Notwithstanding the non-fulfilment of the brilliant result 
 anticipated, the partial success of that day was productive of 
 much benefit to the Army. It greatly improved the morale 
 of the troops, infused new life and fresh hopes, arrested deser- 
 tions, which had hitherto been numerous, defeated the move- 
 ment of McPherson and Schofield upon our communications, 
 in that direction, and demonstrated to the foe our determina- 
 tion to abandon no more territory without, at least, a manful 
 effort to retain it. 
 
 I cannot refrain from mentioning the noble and gallant old 
 hero, Major General W. H. S. Walker, who fell at the head of 
 his division whilst bravely leading it into battle on the 22d of 
 July. He was an officer of the old Army, had served with 
 great distinction in the Mexican war, and was generally 
 beloved by officers and men. On the night of the 2 1 st, shortly 
 before joining in Hardee's line of march with his troops, he 
 rode by my headquarters, called me aside, and, with charac- 
 teristic frankness, expressed his appreciation of the grave 
 
182 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 responsibilities attached to the position in which I had been 
 placed ; assured me that he full well understood the condition 
 of the Army, after our protracted retreat from Dalton, and 
 wished me to know, before he entered into battle, that he was 
 with me in heart and purpose, and intended to abide by me 
 through all emergencies. During the early afternoon of the 
 ensuing day, I received the painful intelligence of his death ; 
 and I am certain that those officers and men who came within 
 tlie sphere of his genial presence, will unite in the verdict that 
 no truer or braver man ever fell upon the field of battle. 
 
 In connection with this sad event, I will record also the 
 death of my classmate and friend in boyhood. General 
 McPherson, which occurred the same day, and the announce- 
 ment of which caused me sincere sorrow. Although in the 
 same class, I was several years his junior, and, unlike him, 
 was more wedded to boyish sports than to books. Often, 
 when we were cadets, have I left barracks at night to partici- 
 pate in some merry-making, and early the following morning 
 have had recourse to him to help me over the difficult portions 
 of my studies for the day. Since we had graduated in June, 
 1853, and had each been ordered off on duty in different 
 directions, it had not been our fortune to meet. Neither the 
 lapse of years, nor the difference of sentiment which led us 
 to range ourselves on opposite sides in the late war, had 
 lessened my friendship; indeed the attachment, formed in 
 early youth, was strengthened by my admiration and gratitude 
 for his conduct toward our people in the vicinity of Vicksburg. 
 His considerate and kind treatment of them stood in bright 
 contrast to the course pursued by many Federal officers ; and 
 his acts were ever characterized by those gentlemanly qualities 
 which distinguished him as a boy. No soldier fell in the 
 enemy's ranks, whose loss caused me equal regret. 
 
 It became apparent almost immediately after the battle of 
 the 22d that Sherman would make an attack upon our left, in 
 order to destroy the Macon Railroad ; and, from that moment, 
 I may say, began the siege of Atlanta. The battles of the 
 
( 
 
 SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 183 
 
 20th and 22d checked the enemy's reckless manner of moving, 
 and illustrated effectually to Sherman the danger of stretching 
 out his line in such a manner as to form extensive gaps 
 between his Corps, or Armies, as he admits he did at Rocky- 
 face Ridge and New Hope Church, and, as I have no doubt, 
 lie did many times with impunity, when driving us before him 
 through the mountain fastnesses of Georgia, 
 
 My failure on the 20th, and 22d, to bring about a general 
 pitched battle arose from the unfortunate policy pursued from 
 Dalton to Atlanta, and which had wrought such demoraliza- 
 tion amid rank and file as to render the men unreliable in battle. 
 I cannot give a more forcible, though homely, exemplification 
 of the morale of the troops, at that period, than by comparing 
 the Army to a team which has been allowed to balk at every 
 hill : one portion will make strenuous efforts to advance, 
 whilst the other will refuse to move and thus paralyze the 
 exertions of the first. Moreover, it will work faultlessly one 
 day, and stall the next. No reliance can be placed upon it at 
 any stated time. Thus it was with the Army when ordered into 
 a general engagement ; one corps struggled nobly, whilst the 
 neighboring corps frustrated its efforts by simple inactivity ; 
 and whilst the entire Army might fight desperately one day, 
 it would fail in action the following day. Stewart's gallant 
 attack on .the 20th was neutralized by Hardee's inertness on 
 the right ; and the failure in the battle of the 22d is to be 
 attributed also to the effect of the "timid defensive" policy 
 upon this officer, who, although a brave and gallant soldier, 
 neglected to obey orders, and swing away, totally independent 
 of the main body of the Army. 
 
 General Sherman acknowledges the correctness of my posi- 
 tion in regard to constant retreat and use of breastworks. He 
 remarks, in reference to the battle of Shiloh : * 
 
 "We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no 
 orders to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw 
 men timid." 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 229. 
 
184 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 When at Kennesaw Mountain, he ordered General Howard 
 to use freely his artillery, saying : * 
 
 " I explained to him that we must keep up the morale of a bold offen- 
 sive, that he must use his artillery, force the enemy to remain on the 
 timid defensive." 
 
 Again, whilst still at Kennesaw, he says : f 
 
 "On the 19th June the rebel Army again fell back on its flanks, to 
 such extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to the Chattahoo- 
 chee river. * * * These successive contractions of the enemy's line 
 encouraged us and discouraged him." 
 
 Sherman possessed sufficient judgment and soldiership to 
 discern that the causes which improved his Army, impaired 
 that of his antagonist; and his ground regarding the bold 
 offensive policy in opposition to the "timid defensive," together 
 with his acknowledgment of the effect of breastworks upon 
 raw troops, clearly proves that he did not favor the handling 
 of troops according to the Joe Johnston school. 
 
 Lieutenant General S. D. Lee, who served a long period 
 under General Lee, in Virginia, and who was assigned to the 
 command of a corps around Atlanta shortly after I assumed 
 the direction of the Army, remarks in his official report of the 
 offensive operations commencing at Palmetto, Georgia, Sep- 
 tember 29th, 1864, with reference to the morale of the troops 
 during the operations around Atlanta : 
 
 " It was my observation and behef that the majority of the officers 
 and men were so impressed with the idea of their inability to carry even 
 temporary breastworks that, when orders were given to attack and there 
 was a probability of encountering works, they regarded it as reckless in 
 the extreme. Being impressed with these convictions, they did not gen- 
 erally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always ensures 
 success. Whenever the enemy changed his position, temporary works 
 could be improvised in less than two hours, and he could never be 
 caught without them. 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 53. 
 
 f Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 56, italicised by the author. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 185 
 
 " In making these observations, it is due to many gallant officers and 
 commands to state that there were noticeable exceptions ; but the feeling 
 was so general that anything like a general attack was paralyzed by it. 
 The Army having constantly yielded to the flank movements of the 
 enemy, which he could make with but little difficulty, by reason of his 
 vastly superior numbers, and having failed in the offensive movements 
 prior to the fall of Atlanta, its efficiency for further retarding the progress 
 of the enemy was much impaired ; and, besides, the advantages in the 
 topography of the country, south of Atlanta, were much more favorable 
 to the enemy for the movements of his superior numbers than the rough 
 and mountainous country already yielded to him." 
 
 Lieutenant General Lee's large experience in Virginia quali- 
 fied him to form a correct opinion upon this subject; it should 
 also be borne in mind that he assumed command of his Corps 
 around Atlanta, on the 25th of July, immediately after the 
 battles of the 20th and 22d, which had already, in a degree, 
 improved the morale of the Army, and which had the subse- 
 quent effect of arresting desertions almost entirely throughout 
 the siege. 
 
 Notwithstanding my endeavors to explain satisfactorily to 
 myself my inability to procure co-operative action upon the 
 20th, and 2 2d, I remained somewhat perplexed upon the sub- 
 ject — especially in regard to the failure, on the 20th, of the 
 best troops of the Army, Hardee's Corps. Shortly after the 
 beginning of the siege. Major General Cleburne, commanding 
 a division in that corps, called at my headquarters. The 
 occurrences of the hour were discussed, and, finally, the two 
 late battles in which he had been a participant. Much was 
 said pro and con, relative to the condition of the Army and 
 the causes of failure in the above referred to engagements. I 
 then unfolded to him the plans of action, together with the 
 peremptory orders to halt at nothing on our side of Peach 
 Tree creek. 
 
 Cleburne seemed surprised, and thereupon informed me that 
 as his Division was about to move forward to the attack, on the 
 20th, General Hardee rode along the line, and, in the presence 
 
]86 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 of those around him, cautioned him to be on the lookout for 
 breastworks. 
 
 I can recall no reply on my part at the time, save, perhaps, 
 some expression of astonishment. I could say nothing, even 
 to so worthy a subordinate. He left me to infer, however, 
 from subsequent remarks, that his Division would have taken 
 quite a different action on the 20th, had it not been for the 
 forewarning of his corps commander. 
 
 I give the above narrative of facts with a full knowledge of 
 my accountableness to the same Ruler before whom those two 
 gallant soldiers have been summoned; and, as I avowed at 
 the beginning of my task, would not have undertaken to write 
 of these unpleasant subjects, were it not for the seeming per- 
 petuation of injustice and misrepresentation in the guise of 
 truth and histoiy. 
 
 It is but reasonable to deduce from this unfortunate obser- 
 vation to Cleburne that General Hardee gave a similar warning 
 to other officers. At all events, those who are able to realize 
 the baneful effect of such a remark from the commander of a 
 corps d'armee, upon the eve of conflict, know that his words 
 were almost equivalent to an order to take no active part in 
 the battle. 
 
 From the hour one of the main sources of our trouble was 
 thus accidentally made known to me, I recognized that my 
 power, upon any occasion, to deal quick and heavy blows to 
 the enemy, would be greatly hampered, unless I could procure 
 the relief of this officer and the appointment of one better 
 qualified for the actual emergencies. Whilst General Hardee 
 had, perhaps, no superior as a corps commander during retreat 
 in presence of an enemy, or in defensive operations, he was 
 wanting in that boldness requisite for offensive warfare. This 
 his defect, which may be found in officers of undoubted courage 
 and of every rank, was aggravated by the protracted " timid 
 defensive " policy under my predecessor, and to this misfortune 
 I attributed his non-observance of orders. Long and gallant 
 service had, however, endeared him to his troops, and, because 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 187 
 
 of further demoralization which I feared might ensue in the 
 event of his removal, I decided to retain him in command. 
 Moreover, President Davis held in high appreciation his ability 
 as a corps commander. Lee, Stewart, and G. W. Smith were 
 very open in the expression of their opinion, in regard to his 
 conduct which they imported to a less charitable notice than I 
 was willing to concede. Their opinion of the consequences 
 of his non-fulfilment of orders is recorded in the following 
 extract from the official report of Major General G. W. Smith: 
 
 " If they (the corps commanders) are not unanimous, there is but one, 
 if any, who dissents from the opinion expressed above, viz : Sherman 
 would have been beaten had your orders been obeyed on the 2oth of 
 July, 22d of July, and 31st of August."* 
 
 About the Autumn of 1874, I met in St. Louis General 
 Frank Blair, with whom I conversed at length upon military 
 events of the past; and, reverting to the battle of the 22d, I 
 informed him that my instructions to Hardee had been to 
 completely turn McPherson's left, even if he was forced to 
 march to Decatur. He at once remarked that if the move 
 had been accomplished, it would have resulted in the rout of 
 that portion of Sherman's Army; even under the circum- 
 stances, the attack nigh proved fatal to the Federal arms. 
 
 The following extract from a letter of General Blair to Major 
 J. E. Austin, of New Orleans, who served with great distinc- 
 tion in the Tennessee Army from the beginning to the close 
 of the war, will be read with interest, as the writer commanded 
 a corps in McPherson's Army, during the battle of the 22d of 
 July. This letter was in response to one from Major Austin 
 in relation to different events connected with the Georgia cam- 
 paign, and touching the two battles under discussion : 
 
 " Clifton Springs, Fcbrttary, iS'j^. 
 * * * "Of the affair at Peach Tree creek I know very little, and 
 that only from the report of the officers engaged in it. Our troops there 
 were under the command of General Thomas, who had about fifty thou- 
 
 * See Report in Appendix, page 354. 
 
188 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 sand (50,000) men. Our losses were very severe, and the fighting was 
 very heavy. 
 
 " On the 22d of July, my Corps held the extreme left of our Army. We 
 were well entrenched along the McDonough road, running about north 
 and south. 
 
 "The reports which we got from the front, early in the morning, indi- 
 cated some movement of the enemy, and General McPherson, under 
 whom I served, with several other officers and myself rode out to the 
 front to observe what was going on, and, if possible, to make up our 
 minds as to the nature of the movement which was being made. We 
 approached the city near enough to see plainly that a large body of 
 troops were moving out of the city towards the south, and great numbers 
 of the citizens, including some of the ladies, were on the tops of the 
 houses as if they were expecting some movement to take place which 
 they were desirous of seeing ; yet the Confederate entrenchments, imme- 
 diately in front of us were full of men, who, however, did not fire upon 
 us although we were very near them, and in plain view, McPherson 
 said that he believed that the enemy were abandoning the city and were 
 in full retreat, and that the citizens were on the tops of the houses expect- 
 ing to see our Army enter the city. As we rode back to our lines. 
 General McPherson repeatedly expressed his opinion that the Confederates 
 were retreating, and would abandon the city to us. I rode with him to 
 his headquarters, and, after I had been there some half hour, we heard 
 skirmishing in our rear, immediately in the direction of Decatur. General 
 McPherson ordered me to send back to the rear two regiments to protect 
 our hospitals. I executed this order, and, as these regiments were 
 moving to the rear, one division of the Sixteenth Corps, which had been 
 ordered by General McPherson to take position on my extreme left, 
 made its appearance in rear of my position, on a road known as the 
 Clay road, and at right angles with the McDonough road, along which 
 my Corps was entrenched. 
 
 "Just as this division halted, about five hundred yards in rear of my 
 line, heavy skirmishing commenced on the extreme left of my line. I 
 hastened toward the front of the line, and as 1 reached a skirt of timber 
 which intervened between me and the line, I saw General McPherson, 
 accompanied by one orderly, enter this piece of timber in front of me. 
 In a few minutes I heard a heavy discharge of musketry, and McPher- 
 son's horse came out of the timber riderless. 
 
 " The division of the Sixteenth Corps, to which I have alluded, in a very 
 few moments became heavily engaged, and I became aware of the fact 
 that my whole position had been turned, and that the enemy were pressing 
 with full force upon the rear and flank of my position. General McPher- 
 son had been killed in attempting to reach my line, on a road over 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 189 
 
 which we had ridden away from that hne a short time before, in the full 
 belief that the enemy were in retreat. 
 
 " I was only able to reach the line by making a detour to the right, and 
 reached it at a point where it joined the Fifteenth Corps, to find the 
 whole of my line fighting from the reverse of my entrenchments. 
 
 " The Confederates were very much scattered, and, I dare say, fatigued 
 by their long and swift march, and did not make a very vigorous attack. 
 The diversion created by the division of the Sixteenth Corps was also a 
 very great assistance to us. We had hardly got rid of the attack in our 
 rear before we were assailed from the direction of Atlanta, but this attack 
 was easily repulsed in my front, although it was more successful on the 
 front of the Fifteenth Corps which was broken, and driven from its 
 entrenchments by a large body of Confederates who had collected in the 
 rear of a large fine house, which had been allowed to stand, a short 
 distance in front of our line. It stood on the main road from Decatur to 
 Atlanta, and for some reason, had not been destroyed as it should have 
 been. A large body of men had collected in the rear of this house, and, 
 when this attack was made, they precipitated themselves on the line of 
 the Fifteenth Corps, driving them from their entrenchments. 
 
 " When I saw that the Fifteenth Corps had been driven from their 
 entrenchments, knowing that the position of my Corps had been com- 
 pletely turned, I was convinced that I should not be able to maintain my 
 position ; but the Fifteenth Corps rallied gallantly, and recovered their 
 lost ground. 
 
 " Although the attack upon us was renewed again and again, both 
 from the front and rear, we were still able to maintain our position. 
 Late in the day, I drew out my forces from the line which they had 
 occupied, and took up a new position, extending from the hill where my 
 right had formerly rested, and extending toward the position in which I 
 have described the Sixteenth Corps to have occupied in my rear. This 
 new position prevented the enemy from taking me in the rear. 
 
 "We had barely time to throw up a very tight rifle pit, before the 
 enemy attacked us with great vigor in our new position, and, when night 
 closed in upon us, the fighting still continued; and the lines were so 
 close that it was impossible for a person looking on to tell one line from 
 the other, except for the direction of the fire from the muzzles of their 
 guns. 
 
 " On the next morning at lo o'clock, we had a truce for burying the 
 dead. As we had given up the greater part of the ground over which 
 the battle had been fought the day before, most of our dead were within 
 their lines. We had suffered very severely : we had lost many valuable 
 officers, including General McPherson, but, as we had fought from 
 behind entrenchments all the time, the Confederate loss had necessarily 
 
190 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 been much greater than ours ; and as the dead were separated into dif- 
 ferent piles by the working parties who were sent out from each Army, the 
 difference was very striking and must have been observed by every 
 one. 
 
 " The movement of General Hood was a very bold and a very bril- 
 liant one, and was very near being successful. 
 
 " The position taken up accidentally by the Sixteenth Corps prevented 
 the full force of the blow from falling where it was intended to fall. If 
 my command had been driven from its position at the time that the 
 Fifteenth Corps was forced back from its entrenchments, there must have 
 been a general rout of all the troops of the Army of the Tennessee, com- 
 manded by General McPherson, and, possibly, the panic might have 
 been communicated to the balance of the Army. This, however, is not 
 likely, as Thomas's command and Schofield's together, made a much 
 larger force than the whole Army of Hood, and they were not easily put 
 into panic. As it was, we congratulated ourselves on being able to hold 
 our position, and we felt satisfied that Hood's Army could not stand 
 much longer the terrible losses it was suffering from these brilliant but 
 disastrous movements. The opinion in our Army was that the result 
 would have been the same if Joe Johnston had continued in command, 
 but that the denouement was hastened and expedited by the change 
 of tactics adopted by General Hood. This I think, and indeed am sure, 
 was General Sherman's opinion before and after Hood's tactics were put 
 in practice. 
 
 " I remember to have got a newspaper from a farm house, in which 
 the change of commanders was announced. I got it on the very morning 
 it was printed, and sent it immediately to General Sherman by one of 
 my couriers. He wrote me back that it was very good news, but to look 
 out for an attack ; that Hood would make it very lively for us, and that it 
 was necessary to be exceedingly cautious. 
 
 " I don't know of anything that I have in my power to say now, which 
 will throw any light on the subject of your inquiry, but, in reply to your 
 second question, I would say that I do not believe our Army ever under- 
 took, or attempted, any flanking or turning operations without using 
 entrenchments ; at least I have no recollection of their ever doing so. 
 
 " In conclusion, I cannot help expressing regret that any misunder- 
 standing should have occurred between two such gallant officers as 
 General Hood and General Johnston,- and their friends. Both of them 
 were most meritorious officers and commanded the respect and admira- 
 tion of their enemies. The great fault of both was that they did not 
 have men enough to contend with Sherman's Army. It was natural 
 enough that after the failure of General Johnston to check our advance, 
 other tactics should be employed ; and no man could have been found 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 191 
 
 who could have executed this policy with greater skill, ability and vigor 
 than General Hood. 
 
 " With many thanks for your kind expressions towards me personally, 
 
 " I remain, your friend, 
 
 " FRANK P. BLAIR. 
 
 " To Colonel J. E. Austin, New Orleans.''' 
 
 General Blair was mistaken in pronouncing the attack dis- 
 astrojis, since, as I have stated, it greatly improved the Diorale 
 of the Army, and arrested desertion. In connection with the 
 battle of the 20th, it also enabled us to hold possession of 
 Atlanta a prolonged period. He erred likewise in attributing 
 the lack of spirit in Hardee's troops to fatigue from the march 
 of the night previous. Decatur is but six miles from Atlanta, 
 and the detour required to be made was but slight. Beside, 
 those troops had been allowed almost absolute rest the entire 
 day of the 2 1st. 
 
 Stonewall Jackson made a hard march, in order to turn 
 Pope at Second Manassas, and again to come up in time at 
 Antietam, or Sharpsburg ; as also at Chancellorsville, in order 
 to fall upon Hooker's flank and rear. Longstreet likewise 
 made hard marches, prior to the battles of Second Manassas 
 and Gettysburg. The men were often required, under Lee, to 
 perform this kind of service an entire day and night, with only 
 a halt of two hours for sleep, in addition to the ordinary rests 
 allowed on a march ; and were then expected to fight two or 
 three consecutive days. Indeed, in movements of this char- 
 acter, it is rare that a decided advantage is gained over an 
 enemy, without the endurance of great fatigue and privation 
 on the part of the troops. Neither Johnston's nor Sherman's 
 Armies ever experienced the weariness and hardship to which 
 Lee and Jackson frequently subjected their troops — the fruits 
 of which, brought to perfection by their transcendent genius, 
 won for them a fulness of glory and renown, shared by no 
 other soldier of the war. 
 
192 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 I am as thoroughly convinced at present as at the hour 
 these events transpired, that had these same forces, at my dis- 
 posal in these battles, been previously handled according to 
 the Lee and Jackson school, they would have routed the 
 Federal Army, and, in all probability have so profited by Sher- 
 man's blunders as to have altered signally the issue of these 
 operations. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 SIEGE OF ATLANTA ENGAGEMENT OF THE 28tH OF JULY^ 
 
 WHEELER, IVERSON AND JACKSON BATTLE OF JONESBORO' — 
 
 EVACUATION OF ATLANTA. 
 
 In accordance with the valuable diary of Brigadier General 
 Shoupe, I find naught to record after the battle of the 22d 
 beyond the usual shelling by the enemy, till the 26th of July 
 when the Federals were reported to be moving to our left. 
 This movement continued during the 27th, when I received 
 the additional information that their cavalry was turning our 
 right, in the direction of Flat-rock, with the intention, as I sup- 
 posed, of interrupting our main line of communication, the 
 Macon Railroad. We had lost the road to Augusta previous 
 to the departure of General Johnston on the i8th, and, by the 
 22d, thirty miles or more thereof had been utterly destroyed. 
 
 The Federal commander continued to move by his right 
 flank to our left, his evident intention being to destroy the 
 only line by which we were still able to receive supplies. The 
 railroad to West Point, because of its proximity to the Chatta- 
 hoochee river, was within easy reach of the enemy whenever 
 he moved far enough to the right to place his left flank upon 
 the river. Therefore, after the destruction of the Augusta 
 road, the holding of Atlanta — unless some favorable opportu- 
 13 (193) 
 
194 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 nity offered itself to defeat the Federals in battle — depended 
 upon our ability to hold intact the road to Macon. 
 Sherman thus refers to the importance of this line:* 
 
 " I always expected to have a desperate fight to get possession of the 
 Macon road, which was then the vital objective of the campaign." 
 
 General Wheeler started on the 27th of July in pursuit of 
 the Federal cavalry which had moved around our right ; and 
 General Jackson, with the brigades of Harrison and Ross, was 
 ordered, the following day, to push vigorously another body 
 of the enemy's cavalry which was reported to have crossed 
 the river, at Campbellton, and to be moving, via Fairburn, in 
 the direction of the Macon road. On the 28th it was apparent 
 that Sherman was also moving in the same direction with his 
 main body. Lieutenant General Lee was instructed to move 
 out with his Corps upon the Lick-Skillet road, and to take the 
 position most advantageous to prevent or delay the extension 
 of the enemy's right flank. This officer promptly obeyed 
 orders, and came, unexpectedly, in the afternoon, in contact 
 with the Federals in the vicinity of Ezra Church, where a 
 spirited engagement ensued. The enemy was already in pos- 
 session of a portion of the ground Lee desired to occupy, and 
 the struggle grew to such dimensions that I sent Lieutenant 
 General Stewart to his support. The contest lasted till near 
 sunset without any material advantage having been gained by 
 either opponent. Our troops failed to dislodge the enemy 
 from their position, and the Federals likewise to capture the 
 position occupied by the Confederates. Although the actual 
 loss was small in proportion to the numbers engaged, Generals 
 Stewart, Brown, Loring, and Johnson, were slightly wounded. 
 I desired of Lieutenant General Lee an opinion as to the 
 manner in which our troops had conducted themselves upon 
 the field. In answer to my request, he replied that he could 
 not succeed in bringing about united action; whilst one 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 99. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 195 
 
 brigade fought gallantly, another failed to do its duty. I 
 learned afterwards that such indeed was the case, notwith- 
 standing he had led one or more to the attack, and had even 
 offered to lead others. Although this affair occurred subse- 
 quent to the improvement of the morale of the Army and the 
 check to desertions, which had resulted from the battles of the 
 2ist and 22d, the lack of spirit manifested in this instance will 
 convey a just idea of the state of the Army at this period. 
 
 In reference to the non-capture of the position held by the 
 enemy, he says in his official report: 
 
 " I am convinced that if all the troops had displayed equal spirit, we 
 would have been successful, as the enemy's works were slight, and, 
 besides, they had scarcely gotten into position when we made the 
 attack." 
 
 Whilst these operations were in progress, Wheeler and 
 Jackson were in hot pursuit of the Federal cavalry — General 
 Lewis's infantry brigade having been sent to Jonesboro', the 
 point about which I supposed the raiders would strike our 
 communications. 
 
 At an early hour on the 29th, dispatches were received from 
 various points upon the Macon road to the effect that General 
 Wheeler had successfully checked the enemy at Latimer's, 
 and was quietly awaiting developments. On our left, the 
 Federals succeeded in eluding our cavalry, for a time, by 
 skirmishing with our main body, whilst their main force 
 moved round to the rear, and cut the telegraph lines at Fair- 
 burn and Palmetto. General Jackson, however, soon discov- 
 ered the ruse, and marched rapidly toward Fayetteville and 
 Jonesboro', the direction in which the Federals had moved. 
 The enemy succeeded in destroying a wagon train at the 
 former place; in capturing one or two quarter masters who 
 afterwards made their escape, and in striking the Macon road 
 about four miles below Jonesboro', when the work of destruc- 
 tion was began in earnest. 
 
 General Lewis, within three hours after receiving the order, 
 
196 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 had placed his men on the cars and was in Jonesboro' with his 
 brigade, ready for action. Meantime Jackson was coming up 
 with his cavalry, when the Federals became alarmed, and 
 abandoned their work ; but not without having destroyed about 
 a mile and a-half of the road, which was promptly repaired. 
 
 While Jackson followed in pursuit, and Lewis returned to 
 Atlanta, Wheeler moved across from Latimer's, with a portion 
 of his command, in rear of this body of the enemy — leaving 
 General Iverson to pursue General Stoneman who, after some- 
 what further damaging the Augusta road, and burning the 
 bridges across Walnut creek and the Oconee river, had moved 
 against Macon. 
 
 These operations had been ordered by General Sherman 
 upon a grand scale ; picked men and horses had been placed 
 under the command of Generals McCook and Stoneman, 
 with the purpose to destroy our sole line of communication, 
 and to release, at Andersonville, thirty-four thousand (34,000) 
 Federal prisoners to ravage and pillage the country. 
 
 These raiders, under McCook, came in contact with Greneral 
 Roddy's cavalry at Newnan, and were there held in check till 
 Wheeler's and Jackson's troops came up; whereupon the 
 combined forces, directed by General Wheeler, attacked the 
 enemy with vigor and determination, and finally routed them. 
 Whilst these operations were progressing in the vicinity of 
 Newnan, General Cobb was gallantly repelling the assault of 
 Stoneman at Macon, when Iverson came up, and engaged the 
 enemy with equal spirit and success. 
 
 The following dispatches were received from Generals 
 Wheeler and Iverson. Wheeler says : 
 
 "We have just completed the killing, capturing, and breaking up of 
 the entire raiding party under General McCook — some nine hundred and 
 fifty (950) prisoners — two pieces of artillery, and twelve hundred horses 
 and equipments captured." 
 
 Iverson, the same date : 
 
 "General Stoneman, after having his force routed yesterday, surren 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 197 
 
 dered with five hundred (500) men ; the rest of his command are scat- 
 tered and flying toward Eatonton. Many have been already killed and 
 captured." 
 
 General Shoupe, in recording these two telegrams in his 
 diary, states that Iverson also captured two pieces of artil- 
 lery, and remarks that "the ist day of August deserves to be 
 marked with a white stone." He, doubtless in common with 
 every Southerner, experienced deep concern in regard to the 
 Federal prisoners at Andersonville, as it was reported that 
 Sherman had arms in readiness for their use. Fearful indeed 
 would have been the consequences, had they been turned 
 loose upon the country in its unprotected condition. 
 
 Had the authorities at Richmond believed that General 
 Johnston would have abandoned the strongholds of the moun- 
 tains, they would assuredly have removed these prisoners 
 before the Federals crossed the Chattahoochee. 
 
 General Sherman, in reference to his plan of operations at 
 this time, writes : * 
 
 " My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee to the 
 right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below Atlanta, and at the 
 same time to send all the cavalry round by the right and left to make a 
 lodgment on the Macon road about Jonesboro'." 
 
 The flanks of the Federal Army were at this juncture so well 
 protected by the Chattahoochee and the deep ravines which 
 run down into the river, that my antagonist was enabled to 
 throw his entire force of cavalry against the Macon road ; and 
 but for the superiority of the Confederate cavalry, he might 
 have succeeded to such extent as to cause us great annoyance, 
 and subject our troops to short rations for a time. 
 
 After the utter failure of this experiment. General Sherman 
 perceived that his mounted force, about twelve thousand in 
 number, in concert with a corps of infantry as support, could 
 not so effectually destroy our main line of communication as 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 87. 
 
198 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to compel us to evacuate Atlanta, as the subjoined extract 
 will indicate : * 
 
 " I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a 
 sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing would 
 suffice but for us to reach it with the main Army." 
 
 Wheeler and Iverson having thus thoroughly crippled the 
 Federal cavalry, I determined to detach all the troops of that 
 arm I could possibly spare, and expedite them, under the 
 command of Wheeler, against Sherman's railroad to Nashville ; 
 at the same time, to request of the proper authorities that 
 General Maury, commanding at Mobile, be instructed to strike 
 with small bodies the line at different points, in the vicinity of 
 the Tennessee river, and also that General Forrest be ordered 
 with the whole of his available force into Tennessee for the 
 same object. I intended General Wheeler should operate, in 
 the first instance, south of Chattanooga. 
 
 I was hopeful that this combined movement would compel 
 Sherman to retreat for want of supplies, and thus allow me an 
 opportunity to fall upon his rear with our main body. I 
 expressed this hope in a dispatch of August 2d, to President 
 Davis. In reply thereto, and I presume also to a letter 
 indited the ensuing day, but of which I possess no copy, he 
 sent the following telegram : 
 
 "Richmond, August ^th, 1864. 
 " General J. B. Hood. 
 
 "Yours of August 3d received. I concur in your plan, and hope your 
 cavalry will be able to destroy the railroad bridges and depots of the 
 enemy on the line to Bridgeport, so as to compel the enemy to attack 
 you in position or to retreat. The loss consequent upon attacking him 
 in his entrenchments requires you to avoid that if practicable. The 
 enemy have now reached a country where supplies can be gathered by 
 foraging expeditions, and a part of your cavalry will be required to pre- 
 vent that. If he can be forced to retreat for want of supplies, he will be 
 in the worst condition to escape or resist your pursuing Army. General 
 Hardee's minute knowledge of the country and his extensive acquaint- 
 
 * Sherman'.s Memoirs,, vol. II, page 98. 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 199 
 
 ance with the officers and men of the command, must render his large 
 
 professional knowledge and experience peculiarly valuable in such a 
 
 campaign as I hope is before you. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 
 
 The foregoing dispatch is the only communication offering 
 a suggestion, which I remember to have received during the 
 siege of Atlanta from the President ; it therefore stands out 
 in bold contradiction to the general assertion that I was ordered 
 by him to assume the offensive, or to make certain campaigns. 
 The President did not, at any time, order what I should or 
 should not do ; and although I had solicited counsel, he gave 
 none, save the above caution in regard to breastworks, and, at 
 a later period, his expressed disapproval of the contemplated 
 campaign into Tennessee. 
 
 In accordance with my determination to attempt, with 
 cavalry, the destruction of Sherman's road, I ordered General 
 Wheeler with four thousand five hundred (4500) men to begin 
 operations at once. He succeeded in burning the bridge over 
 the Etowah ; recaptured Dalton and Resaca ; destroyed about 
 thirty-five miles of railroad in the vicinity, and captured 
 about three hundred mules and one thousand horses ; he 
 destroyed, in addition, about fifty miles of railroad in Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 General Forrest, with his usual energy, struck shortly after- 
 wards the Federal line of supplies in this State, and, as will 
 hereafter be shown, inflicted great damage upon the enemy. 
 Of his exploits on this expedition I have no official report, as 
 he was not directly under my command. 
 
 Forrest and Wheeler accomplished all but the impossible 
 with their restricted number of cavalry, and the former, finally, 
 was driven out of Tennessee by superior forces. General 
 Sherman, in relation to this movement, says : * 
 
 " The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee, threaten- 
 ing our railroads, and rumors came that Forrest was on his way from 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 130. 
 
200 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Mississippi to the same theatre, for the avowed purpose of breaking up 
 our railroads and compeUing us to fall back from our conquest. To 
 prepare for this, or any other emergency, I ordered Newton's Division of 
 the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and Corse's Division of the 
 Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed General Rosseau at Nash- 
 ville, Granger at Decatur, and Stedman at Chattanooga, to adopt the 
 most active measures to protect and insure the safety of our roads." 
 
 So vast were the facilities of the Federal commander to 
 reinforce his line of skirmishers, extending from Nashville to 
 Atlanta, that we could not bring together a sufficient force 
 of cavalry to accomplish the desired object. I thereupon 
 became convinced, and expressed the opinion in my official 
 report, that no sufficiently effective number of cavalry could 
 be assembled in the Confederacy to interrupt the enemy's line 
 of supplies to an extent to compel him to retreat. 
 
 From the 5th to the 19th of August no event of special 
 importance occurred. I find naught recorded save the con- 
 stant demonstrations of the enemy in front, whilst completing 
 his movement to our left. A heavy demonstration was made 
 on the 6th against Bates's Division which was twice assaulted; 
 twice the foe were driven back in great confusion with a loss 
 of two stands of colors, eight hundred killed and wounded, 
 some small arms and entrenching tools. 
 
 On the 7th General Cleburne's Division was transferred to 
 our extreme left, and the 9th was made memorable by the most 
 furious cannonade which the city sustained during the siege. 
 Women and children fled into cellars, and were there forced 
 to seek shelter a greater length of time than at any period 
 of the bombardment. 
 
 The 19th, nigh two weeks after Wheeler's departure with 
 about one-half of our cavalry force. General Sherman took 
 advantageof the absence of these troops, and again attempted a 
 lodgment on the Macon road with cavalry. At 3.30 a. m.. 
 General Kilpatrick was reported to be moving, via Fairburn, 
 in the direction of Jonesboro'. General Jackson quickly 
 divined his object, moved rapidly in pursuit, overtook him at 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 201 
 
 an early hour, attacked and forced him to retreat after sustain- 
 ing considerable loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. The 
 Federals had previously succeeded, however, in destroying a 
 mile and a-half of the Macon road ; had cut the wires, and 
 burned the depot at Jonesboro'. 
 
 General Sherman, touching this his second strenuous effort 
 to render the evacuation of Atlanta a matter of compulsion by 
 throwing cavalry to our rear, says : * 
 
 "He (Kilpatrick) reported that he had destroyed three miles of the 
 railroad about Jonesboro', which he reckoned would take ten days to 
 repair ; that he had encountered a division of infantry and a brigade of 
 cavalry (Ross's) ; that he had captured a battery and destroyed three of 
 its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and he also brought in three battle- 
 flags and seventy prisoners. On the 23d, however, we saw trains 
 coming into Atlanta from the South, when I became more than ever 
 convinced that cavalry could not or would not work hard enough to 
 disable a railroad properly, and therefore resolved at once to proceed 
 to the execution of my original plan." 
 
 Our cavalry also drove a brigade of the enemy from the 
 Augusta road on the 22d, which affair, together with the 
 happy results obtained in the engagement with Kilpatrick, 
 demonstrated conclusively that the absence of one-half of our 
 mounted force notwithstanding, we had still a sufficient 
 number, with Jackson, to protect not only the flanks of the 
 Army, but likewise our communications against similar raids, 
 and, moreover, to defend our people against pillaging expedi- 
 tions. At this period, I was charged by the Johnston-Wig- 
 fall party, through the press, with having committed a serious 
 blunder by sending off the cavalry, and with having exposed 
 our people to robbery and maltreatment by raiders through 
 the country. 
 
 The severe handling by Wheeler and Iverson of the troops 
 under Stoneman and McCook, together with Jackson's success, 
 induced me not to recall Wheeler's four thousand five hundred 
 (4500) men who were r.till operating against the railroad to 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol, II, page 104. 
 
202 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Nashville. I had, moreover, become convinced that our 
 cavalry was able to successfully compete with double their 
 number. Fortunately, they had not become demoralized 
 upon the retreat, in consequence of their habit of dismounting 
 and fighting at one point to-day, then remounting and hastening 
 in another direction to encounter the enemy on the morrow. 
 As before stated, our cavalry were not cavalrymen proper^ but 
 were mounted riflemen, trained to dismount and hold in check 
 or delay the advance of the main body of the enemy, and who 
 had learned by experience that they could without much 
 difficulty defeat the Federal cavalry. This teaching, combined 
 with the fact that small bodies can fall back in front of large 
 armies without material discouragement to the men, warded 
 off the baneful influences which worked upon the infantry, and 
 accounts for the non-demoralization of the cavalry. 
 
 In this connection, it becomes my duty, as well as pleasure, 
 to make acknowledgments of the valuable services of 
 the cavalry of the Army of Tennessee, during my opera- 
 tions in Georgia, and North Alabama. I have not forgotten 
 the outcry against Wheeler's cavalry just prior to and after 
 the close of the war ; it was brought about in great measure, 
 doubtless, by renegades from our Armies, who committed 
 outrages which were charged by the people to the account of 
 the cavalry. I am confident that when the history of our 
 struggle is written, Major General Wheeler and his command 
 will occupy a high position, as the Confederacy possessed, in 
 my opinion, no body of cavalry superior to that which I found 
 guarding the flanks of the Army of Tennessee at the time I 
 assumed its direction. 
 
 The bombardment of the city continued till the 25 th of 
 August; it was painful, yet strange, to mark how expert 
 grew the old men, women and children, in building their little 
 underground forts, in which to fly for safety during the storm 
 of shell and shot. Often 'mid the darkness of night were 
 they constrained to seek refuge in these dungeons beneath the 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 203 
 
 earth ; albeit, I cannot recall one word from their lips, expres- 
 sive of dissatisfaction or willingness to surrender. 
 
 Sherman had now been over one month continuously moving 
 toward our left and thoroughly fortifying, step by step, as he 
 advanced in the direction of the Macon Railroad. On the ni<jht 
 of the 25th, he withdrew from our immediate front; his 
 works, which at an early hour the following morning we dis- 
 covered to be abandoned, were occupied at a later hour by the 
 corps of Generals Stewart and Lee. 
 
 This movement of the Federals gave rise to many idle 
 rumors in relation to its object. I felt confident that their 
 plan would soon be developed; accordingly, orders were 
 issued to corps commanders to send out scouts in their front, 
 and to keep Army headquarters fully advised of the slightest 
 change in the enemy's position ; to issue three days' rations, 
 and to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning. 
 Instructions were likewise sent to General Armstrong, com- 
 manding the cavalry in the vicinity of the West Point Rail- 
 road, to be most active in securing all possible information in 
 regard to the operations of the enemy. 
 
 On the 27th, Major General G. W. Smith's Division was 
 ordered to the left to occupy the position of Stevenson's 
 Division which, together with General Maury's command, was 
 held in reserve. Early the following morning, the enemy 
 were reported by General Armstrong in large force at Fair- 
 burn, on the West Point road. It became at once evident that 
 General Sherman was moving with his main body to destroy 
 the Macon road, and that the fate of Atlanta depended upon 
 our ability to defeat this movement. 
 
 Reynolds's and Lewis's brigades v/ere dispatched to Jones- 
 boro' to co-operate with Armstrong. General Adams, at Ope- 
 lika, was directed to guard the defences of that place with 
 renewed vigilance, while General Maury was requested to 
 render him assistance, if necessary. The chief quarter master, 
 ordnance officer, and commissary, were given most explicit 
 instructions in regard to the disposition of their respective 
 
20i ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 stores. All surplus property, supplies, etc., were ordered to 
 the rear, or to be placed on cars in readiness to move at 
 any moment the railroad became seriously threatened. Gen- 
 eral Armstrong was instructed to establish a line of couriers 
 to my headquarters, in order to report every hour, if requisite, 
 the movements of the enemy. In fact, every precaution was 
 taken not only to hold our sole line of communication unto 
 the last extremity, but also, in case of failure, to avoid loss or 
 destruction of stores and material. 
 
 On the 29th, the Federals marched slowly in the direction 
 of Rough and Ready, and Jonesboro'. A portion of Brown's 
 Division was directed to take position at the former place and 
 fortify thoroughly, in order to afford protection to the road at 
 that point. General Hardee, who was at this juncture in the 
 vicinity of East Point, was instructed to make such disposition 
 of his troops as he considered most favorable for defence ; and, 
 in addition, to hold his Corps in readiness to march at the 
 word of command. Generals Jackson and Armstrong received 
 orders to report the different positions of the corps of the 
 enemy at dark every night. 
 
 Had Sherman not been doubly protected by the Chatta- 
 hoochee, deep intervening creeks and ravines extending to the 
 river, beside the wall of parapets behind which he had thus 
 far manoeuvred, I would have moved out from East Point with 
 our main body, and have attacked his Army whilst effecting 
 these changes of position. This move not being practicable by 
 reason of these obstructions, I was forced to await further 
 developments. 
 
 The morning of the 30th found our general line extended 
 further to the left — Hardee being in the vicinity of Rough 
 and Ready with Lee's Corps on his right, near East Point. 
 Information from our cavalry clearly indicated that the enemy 
 would strike our road at Jonesboro' ; after consultation with 
 the corps commanders, I determined upon the following opera- 
 tions, as the last hope of holding on to Atlanta. 
 
 As General Armstrong had already foreseen, a Federal corps 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 205 
 
 crossed Flint river at about 6 p. m., near Jonesboro', and made 
 an attack upon Lewis's brigade, which was gallantly repulsed. 
 This action became the signal for battle. General Hardee was 
 instructed to move rapidly with his troops to Jonesboro', 
 whither Lieutenant General Lee, with his Corps, was ordered 
 to follow during the night. Hardee was to attack with the 
 entire force early on the morning of the 31st, and drive the 
 enemy, at all hazards, into the river in their rear. In the event 
 of success, Lee and his command were to be withdrawn that 
 night back to Rough and Ready; Stewart's Corps, together 
 with Major General G. W. Smith's State troops were to form 
 line of battle on Lee's right, near East Point, and the whole 
 force move forward the following morning, attack the enemy 
 in flank, and drive him down Flint river and the West Point 
 Railroad. In the meantime, the cavalry was to hold in check 
 the corps of the enemy, stationed at the railroad bridge across 
 the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Peach Tree creek, whilst 
 Hardee advanced from his position near Jonesboro*, or directly 
 on Lee's left. 
 
 Such were the explicit instructions delivered. I impressed 
 upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta rested upon his 
 ability, with the aid of two corps, to drive the Federals across 
 Flint river, at Jonesboro'. I also instructed him, in the event 
 of failure — which would necessitate the evacuation of the city — 
 to send Lee's Corps, at dark, back to or near Rough and 
 Ready, in order to protect our retreat to Lovejoy Station. 
 
 I remained in Atlanta with Stewart and G. W. Smith, anxi- 
 ously awaiting tidings from Jonesboro'. At an early hour the 
 following morning, no information having been received and 
 the wires having been cut by the enemy, I despatched a courier 
 with orders that Lee's Corps, in any event, march back and 
 take position in the vicinity of Rough and Ready. The 
 arrival of no messenger from Hardee caused me to fear that 
 the attack had not been made at an early hour, according to 
 instructions ; this apprehension proved, unfortunately, but too 
 well grounded. 
 
206 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 The attack was not made till about 2 p. m., and then resulted 
 in our inability to dislodge the enemy. The Federals had 
 been allowed time, by the delay, to strongly entrench ; whereas 
 had the assault been made at an early hour in the morning, 
 the enemy would have been found but partially protected by 
 works. Lieutenant General S. D. Lee expressed the opinion, 
 at the time, that the enemy could have been driven across the 
 river, if the attack had been made at an early hour, or soon 
 after his Corps arrived at Jonesboro'. General Hardee trans- 
 mitted to me no official report at that period, nor subsequently, 
 of his operations whilst under my command. I find, however, 
 from the diary in my possession that his Corps succeeded in 
 gaining a portion of the Federal works ; the general attack, 
 notwithstanding, must have been rather feeble, as the loss 
 incurred was only about fourteen hundred (1400) in killed and 
 wounded — a small number in comparison to the forces engaged. 
 Among the wounded were Major General Patton Anderson 
 and Brigadier General Cummings, who were disabled whilst 
 gallantly leading their troops into action. 
 
 This failure gave to the Federal Army the control of the 
 Macon road, and thus necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta 
 at the earliest hour possible. 
 
 I was not so much pained by the fall of Atlanta as by the 
 recurrence of retreat, which I full well knew would further 
 demoralize the Army and renew desertions. The 1-oss of over 
 four thousand (4000), sustained from this same cause during 
 the change from Kennesaw Mountain to and across the Chatta- 
 hoochee, augmented my great reluctance to order the Army 
 to again turn its back to the foe. Howbeit, as stated in my 
 official report, the presence of thirty-four thousand (34.000) 
 Federal prisoners at Andersonville, rendered it absolutely 
 incumbent to place the Army between Sherman and that point, 
 in order to prevent the Federal commander from turning loose 
 this large body, ready to wreak its ill-will upon our people. 
 Thus the proximity of these prisoners to Sherman's Army not 
 only forced me to remain in a position to guard the country 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 207 
 
 against the fearful calamity aforementioned, but also thwarted 
 my design to move north, across Peach Tree creek and the 
 Chattahoochee, back to Marietta, where I would have destroyed 
 the enemy's communications and supplies, and then have 
 taken position near the Alabama line, with the Blue Mountain 
 Railroad in rear, by which means the Confederate Army could, 
 with ease, have been provisioned. * Notwithstanding the 
 presence of one of Sherman's Corps at the railway bridge over 
 the Chattahoochee, I would have made this move. I would 
 have thrown upon our left flank a sufficient force to occupy 
 the Federals, at the bridge, whilst we laid pontoons and passed 
 round to their rear, as we subsequently did in the presence of 
 Schofield, at Columbia, Tennessee. Had I been enabled to 
 carry into effect this plan, Hardee and Lee would not have 
 been sent to Jonesboro', as the cavalry would have been 
 instructed to retard, to the utmost, the advance of the enemy, 
 whilst Major General Cobb made demonstrations from the 
 direction of Macon. Thus, while Sherman was destroying the 
 road to Macon, I would have been upon his communications 
 with Nashville, and the desertions, together with the demorali- 
 zation which followed the evacuation of Atlanta, would have 
 been avoided. 
 
 In lieu of the foregoing operations, the battle of Jonesboro' 
 was fought, and on the following day, September 1st, at 2 a.m., 
 Lieutenant General Lee, with his Corps, marched from Jones- 
 boro' to the vicinity of Rough and Ready; and so posted his 
 troops as to protect our flank, whilst we marched out of 
 Atlanta at 5 p. m. the same day, on the McDonough road, in 
 the direction of Lovejoy Station. Generals Morgan and Scott, 
 stationed at East Point, received similar orders to protect our 
 flank during the retreat. 
 
 Upon our uninterrupted march, information reached me that 
 Hardee's Corps was engaged with a large force of the enemy. 
 His position upon a ridge with an open country in rear relieved 
 
 * See Official Report, Appendix page 324. 
 
208 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 me from special anxiety in regard to the safety of himself and 
 command. Lieutenant General Stewart, nevertheless, was 
 instructed to hasten forward to his support, and General Lee 
 to follow promptly with his Corps. When these reinforce- 
 ments reached the scene of action, the contest had ceased. 
 Hardee's troops had been attacked by a considerable force; 
 but, in consequence of the protection afforded by their breast- 
 works, their loss in killed and wounded was small in compari- 
 son to that of the enemy. The Federals, who largely 
 exceeded them in numbers, forced them back a short distance 
 from the position they primarily occupied, and necessitated 
 the abandonment of two four gun batteries. This engagement 
 was the only event of importance which occurred during our 
 continuous march from Atlanta to Lovejoy Station. I have 
 often thought it strange Sherman should have occupied him- 
 self with attacking Hardee's entrenched position, instead of 
 falling upon our main body on the march round to his rear. 
 
 Notwithstanding full and positive instructions, delivered 
 prior to the evacuation of the city, and ample time and 
 facilities afforded to move all stores, cars and engines, the 
 chief quarter master grossly neglected to send off a train of 
 ordnance stores, and five engines, although they were on the 
 track and in readiness to move. This negligence entailed 
 the unnecessary loss of these stores, engines, and about eighty 
 cars. Shortly afterwards, a Court of Inquiry was assembled 
 to examine into and report upon the cause of this unwar- 
 ranted loss. A copy of the findings of the Court was forwarded 
 to Richmond, and is at present, I presume, among the cap- 
 tured Confederate records in Washington. I regret I possess 
 no copy for reference ; my memory, however, is quite clear as 
 to the result of the inquiry, which was, in substance, that the 
 commanding general had issued all necessary orders, and was 
 in no manner to blame ; that ample time had been allowed, 
 and the road left open long enough to have transferred all 
 stores, etc., to a place of safety in rear; and that the loss was 
 to be attributed to the neglect of the chief quarter master. The 
 
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 209 
 
 stores which had been abandoned were blown up at about 2 
 o'clock on the morning of the 2d September, and the rear 
 guard soon thereafter marched out of Atlanta. That night 
 and the morning of the 3d, our troops filed into position in 
 Sherman's front, which was then near Jonesboro'. By the 4th, 
 our entire Army was assembled at this point, on the Macon 
 road. 
 
 Major General Gustavus W. Smith, commanding Georgia 
 State troops, was directed to proceed to Griffin and protect 
 our communications in that vicinity; General Jackson was 
 ordered to keep active scouts in the direction of Greenville; 
 General Morgan to report to Jackson for duty ; Lewis's Ken- 
 tucky brigade to be mounted, and to use blankets in default 
 of saddles. 
 
 On the 5th, General Morgan was ordered back to assume 
 command of the cavalry on the right; the corps commanders 
 were instructed to use every effort to gather up absentees ; 
 the chief commissary was directed to keep on hand five days' 
 rations of hard bread; Major Beecher, quarter master, to 
 confer with Major Hallett, superintendent of the railroad, in 
 regard to means to facilitate the transportation of supplies, and 
 to issue shoes and clothing forthwith upon their receipt. 
 
 On the 6th, the Federals withdrew from our immediate 
 front, and moved off in the direction of Atlanta. General 
 Sherman published orders stating that his Army would retire 
 to East Point, Decatur, and Atlanta, and repose after the 
 fatigue of the campaign through which it had passed. We 
 were apprised of these instructions soon after their issuance — 
 as well as of nigh every important movement of the enemy 
 through the vigilance of our cavalry, spies, and scouts, and 
 from information received through Federal prisoners. Upon 
 this date it may be justly considered that the operations round 
 Atlanta ceased. We had maintained a defence, during forty- 
 six days, of an untenable position, and had battled almost 
 incessantly, day and night, with a force of about forty-five 
 thousand (45,000) against an Army of one hundred and six 
 14 
 
210 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 thousand (io6,OOo) effectives, flushed with victory upon victory 
 from Dalton to Atlanta. When we recall the extent of the 
 demoralization of the troops at the commencement of the 
 siege, we cannot but recognize that the Army of Ten- 
 nessee was composed of splendid material, and that its condi- 
 tion at Dalton justifies the assertion of its capability, by proper 
 handling, of having been made the equal of its counterpart in 
 Virginia. The non-fulfilment of its brilliant promise is nowise 
 attributable to the officers and men. The fault lies at the 
 door of the teacher in whose school they had been trained ; 
 therefore, none of my countrymen can hesitate to accord them 
 the highest praise for the patriotic and noble work performed 
 by them during the siege of Atlanta. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ATLANTA UNTENABLE LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE COMPARED 
 
 WITH THOSE OF SHERMAN, AND WITH THOSE OF JOHNSTON 
 FROM DALTON TO ATLANTA. 
 
 Having stated that our position at Atlanta was untenable, I 
 shall now undertake to give proof of the correctness of my 
 opinion, by demonstratinc^ in what manner Sherman might 
 have captured the city in less than one-third of the time he 
 actually devoted to that end, notwithstanding the idle asser- 
 tion of General Johnston that he could have held Atlanta "for- 
 ever"; also to demonstrate that had I ventured to remain 
 longer than fifteen days within the trenches around the city, 
 Sherman could have finally forced me to surrender, or have 
 put my Army to rout in its attem.pt to escape; and, lastly, 
 that he could have attained his object with one-fourth the loss 
 he sustained during a siege of forty-six days, provided he 
 had availed himself of the natural advantages afforded him. 
 
 In order to render these operations clear to the mind of 
 the reader, I invite his attention to a map, page 167. 
 
 The Federal commander chose well his crossing of the 
 Chattahoochee, as he approached Atlanta, and the move of 
 McPherson and Schofield upon the Augusta road was ably 
 conceived and executed. Thomas, however, should not have 
 formed line of battle along the lower part of Peach Tree creek 
 
212 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 with a view to cross the creek, as he endangered the safety of 
 his Corps when he placed it in the angle, formed by this stream 
 and the Chattahoochee, and thus isolated himself from Scho- 
 field and McPherson. His right should have rested in the 
 vicinity of, and have covered, the ford nearest the mouth of 
 Peach Tree creek, with a line of skirmishers extending to the 
 Chattahoochee, and batteries in position at proper intervals in 
 rear of this line, and likewise on the north side of the river, 
 so as to thoroughly command the approaches to the railway 
 bridge. His right being established at this ford, his left 
 should have been thrown back north of Decatur, and his entire 
 line strongly entrenched. From this position of perfect safety, 
 he could have made constant demonstrations against the city, 
 whilst McPherson and Schofield destroyed the road to Augusta. 
 At the same time, by use of the batteries near the mouth of 
 Peach Tree creek, and of those on the north bank of the river, 
 near the railway bridge, he could have easily thrown a division 
 across the creek, and have established a strong tttc-de-pont on 
 the south bank of the river. I would thus have been forced 
 to form line of battle facing Peach Tree, with no possible 
 chance of successfully assaulting the enemy at any point. His 
 right and rear would have been covered by a deep and muddy 
 stream ; his front protected not only by breastworks, but also 
 by one^ of the branches of Peach Tree creek. I could not 
 have attacked either his left or McPherson and Schofield, with- 
 out marching out of Atlanta, and exposing our left flank to 
 Thomas. I would have been compelled to abide quietly the 
 destruction of one of our principal roads, without the ability 
 to strike a blow in its defence. 
 
 After my loss of the Augusta road, McPherson and Scho- 
 field should have marched by the right flank down Peach Tree, 
 in rear of Thomas's line, until their right rested on the Chat- 
 tahoochee, and then have halted. General Sherman having 
 his Army thus massed, and well in hand, in rear of Peach Tree 
 creek, should have thrown across the Chattahoochee a suflfi- 
 cient number of pontoon bridges to allow the easy and rapid 
 
ATLANTA UNTENABLE. 213 
 
 passage of his troops; have sent two corps of Thomas's Army 
 across and down the Chattahoochee, on the northwest side, to 
 a favorable crossing just below Camp creek or one of the deep 
 ravines or creeks, heading in the direction of East Point, and 
 running toward the river upon the southwest side; have laid 
 pontoons, crossed over, and strongly entrenched. Whilst this 
 move was in progress, the main body should have made heavy 
 demonstrations along the line of Peach Tree to the Augusta 
 road, which diversion would have held my Army in position 
 on the north side of Atlanta. 
 
 The two corps below Camp creek having their line and out- 
 posts established sufficiently in advance to allow full space for 
 the massing of the Army, Thomas should have left the 
 division in the tete-de-pont protected by ditch and abatis, 
 whilst another division, with dismounted cavalry, occupied his 
 position on Peach Tree creek with cavalry on their left, and a 
 few batteries to support their line ; then have marched, at dusk, 
 with the remainder of his Army to join the two corps below 
 Camp creek, followed by Schoficld and McPherson, 
 
 The transportation of the Federal Army having been pre- 
 viously parked on the north side of the Chattahoochee, General 
 Sherman could with entire safety have massed his Army in the 
 space of one night on the southeast side of the river, below 
 this creek, as the two divisions left on Peach Tree had a secure 
 place of refuge in the tete-de-poiit in the event I had moved 
 out in that direction. 
 
 These preparations completed, he should on the morning of 
 the morrow have ordered the divisions and cavalry, along this 
 stream, to make demonstrations against the city whilst Thomas 
 pushed forward in the direction of East Point — changing front 
 forward on his left — and formed line of battle with his left 
 flank resting as high up on Camp creek* as it would afford 
 protection against its being turned, and his right extending to 
 or across the West Point Railway ; have instructed Schofield 
 
 * See Federals massed just below Camp creek, map, page 167. 
 
214 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 and McPherson to move rapidly, as they had done upon 
 Decatur and the Augusta road, to deploy on Thomas's right 
 along the south bank of South river and cast side of Shoal ' 
 creek, with their right thrown back southeast of Decatur,* 
 and to entrench the whole line. 
 
 Such would have been the position of the Federal Army 
 within twenty-four hours after it left Peach Tree creek, and 
 within ten days after its first crossing of the Chattahoochee, 
 subsequent to the operations about Kennesaw Mountain, 
 provided it had moved with the rapidity usual with the Con- 
 federate Armies, Even had forty-eight hours been required 
 to perfect this movement, Sherman could have so manoeuvred 
 as to have held the main body of my troops on Peach Tree 
 until he was willing I should become apprised of his real 
 purpose. In other words, he could without difficulty have 
 entrenched south of Atlanta, before I could have received 
 the necessary information to warrant a change of position from 
 the north to the south side of the city. Moreover, had I 
 divined at an early instant his contemplated move, his position 
 in rear of Peach Tree, and that of the two corps on Camp 
 creek would — by demonstrations on the north and south sides 
 of the city, with an Army double our own — have rendered it 
 an easy matter to him to gain possession of Atlanta, in spite 
 of every effort on my part. 
 
 General Sherman knew as well as I did, that every available 
 man in the Confederacy had been sent either to General Lee, 
 in Virginia, or to General Johnston, in the mountains ; that, 
 consequently, he had nothing to fear from the direction of 
 Macon, and that one division would have sufficed to protect 
 his rear, south of the city. When Grant marched round 
 Pemberton at Vicksburg, and placed his rear in front of Gene- 
 ral Johnston, commanding an Army of twenty-five or thirty 
 thousand men at Jackson, Mississippi, he executed successfully 
 not only one of the boldest, but one of the grandest movements 
 
 * See line deployed from near East Point, map, page 167. 
 
ATLANTA UNTENABLE. 215 
 
 of the war. It will rank with one of the many similar moves 
 of the immortal Jackson, and receive the tribute due to the 
 talent and boldness which planned and achieved it. It was, 
 however, fortunate for General Grant that a " Stonewall" was 
 not at Jackson, Mississippi. No especial daring on the part 
 of General Sherman would have been required to carry out 
 the operations I have designated, since he had no enemy to 
 fear in his rear. General Grant was reported, at this period, 
 to have said that the Confederacy was but a shell. 
 
 As I have just remarked, I could not have received in time 
 sufficiently reliable information to justify a change from the 
 north to the south side of Atlanta, and to attack the Federals 
 before they had thoroughly entrenched; it would have been 
 equally impossible to assault later, with hope of success, his 
 line, protected in front by works and abatis, on the left by 
 Camp creek, and on the right by being thrown back and 
 entrenched southeast of Decatur. 
 
 This position of the enemy would have necessitated the 
 immediate abandonment of Atlanta or have shut up our Army 
 in the pocket, or ciiL de sac, formed by the Chattahoochee 
 river and Peach Tree creek, and finally have forced us to sur- 
 render. Had I attempted to extricate the Army, it would have 
 been almost impossible to have pierced the enemy's works 
 south, and utterly impossible, by reason of the proximity of 
 the Federals, to have laid pontoons and crossed Peach Tree 
 creek — as I would have done when Sherman was at the dis- 
 tance of Jonesboro', but from which I was hindered by the 
 presence of the prisoners at Andersonville. 
 
 By reference to the map (page 167) it will be perceived that 
 Sherman had simply to advance his right flank, in order to 
 form a junction with the troops, near Decatur, and thus com- 
 pletely hem in our Army. This plan for the speedy capture 
 of Atlanta could have been executed with an insignificant loss, 
 as it would have been achieved mainly by manoeuvre. In 
 view of the impaired morale of the Army at the close of the 
 Dalton-Atlanta campaign; the numerical inferiority of our 
 
216 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 forces ; the fact, previously mentioned, that all available troops 
 in the Confederacy, east of the Mississippi, had been sent 
 either to the Army of Northern Virginia or to the Army of 
 Tennessee, with the exception of small forces guarding the 
 seaboard; in view of the proximity of the Chattahoochee 
 river, which flows v/ithin five miles of Atlanta, along the foot 
 of the general slope from the mountains of Georgia to the 
 plains, forming with Peach Tree creek a complete ciil de sac, 
 in which Atlanta is situated ; the advantages to be derived 
 from Camp or any other creek in that vicinity, or from the 
 deep ravines running to the river from the southwest side, 
 behind which the Federal Army could have been rapidly 
 deployed forward into line, with no enemy to fear from the 
 rear ; m which position Sherman could have readily supplied 
 his Army from the nearest point on the railway north of the 
 river, and have quietly awaited my surrender; in view, then, 
 of the above enumerated sources of weakness and danger, I 
 do not hesitate to challenge the militaiy world to refute my 
 assertions, not only as to the feasibility of the plan I have 
 demonstrated, but also as to the untenability of Atlanta. 
 
 How long, I venture to inquire, is it probable that Sherman, 
 after the capture of Jonesboro', would have tarried before 
 occupying the identical position I have designated? The 
 extraordinary haste I made to evacuate Atlanta, after the Fed- 
 erals gained possession of Jonesboro', on the Macon road, 
 fifteen miles below the line from Camp creek to and along 
 South river and Shoal creek, is proof of the great dread I 
 entertained of a speedy occupation of this line. In lieu thereof, 
 Sherman, during or immediately after the destruction of the 
 Augusta road, threw Thomas across Peach Tree creek, into the 
 ad de sac aforementioned, separated him from McPherson and 
 Schofield, and subjected him to an assault by the main body 
 of our Army, which should have resulted in the roilt and cap- 
 ture of the greater portion of his Army. This move was, 
 moreover, unnecessary, as it was impossible for him to invest 
 Atlanta, approaching it from the north. He therefore con- 
 
ATLANTA UNTENABLE. 217 
 
 sumed forty-six days in the achievement of results which might 
 have been accomplished within a fortnight. 
 
 I have, from Dr. A. J. Foard, medical director of the Army, 
 a statement of the total number of killed and wounded from 
 July 1 8th to September ist; in other words, from the day I 
 assumed command to the evacuation of Atlanta. As I have 
 already asserted, the number of men wounded in an Army 
 which is standing its ground, and fighting, or is advancing, 
 and driving the enemy, should not constitute an actual loss, 
 and should only in part be comprised in the sum total of losses, 
 since almost all the slightly wounded, proud of their scars, 
 soon return to ranks. Therefore the only correct method of 
 ascertaining the entire loss, during a siege or a campaign, is to 
 deduct the number of effectives at the close of the siege, or 
 campaign, from the number of effectives at the beginning of 
 operations, after adding to the total strength the number of 
 reinforcements, and deducting therefrom the number of troops 
 permanently detached. This calculation should embrace the 
 sick, and those who die from natural causes ; losses under this 
 head are, however, rarely of consequence during active opera- 
 tions. It is, as a generality, only when troops are lying in 
 bivouac, or in quarters, that the ravages of disease are to be 
 feared. Therefore, the fairness of this method can in no degree 
 be affected by this minor fact. 
 
 Upon this broad and equitable basis, I herewith submit the 
 official return of Colonel A. P. Mason, assistant adjutant 
 general of the Army of Tennessee, showing its strength at 
 different periods whilst under my command. As I desire to 
 compare my strength and losses with Sherman's and John- 
 ston's, I present, at the same time. Dr. Foard's official report 
 of the killed and wounded; General Sherman's returns, show- 
 ing his effective strength and estimate of losses ; and the official 
 statement of General Johnston's adjutant general, exhibiting 
 the strength of the Army of Tennessee at different periods, 
 during the campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. 
 
218 
 
 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 "Strength of the Army of Tennessee, 07i the 31 st of fuly, 1S64; 20th 
 September, 1864; 6th November, 1864; and loth December, 1864. 
 
 fu/y jist, 1864. 
 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 
 Effective. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 1 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalr\' 
 
 30,451 
 10,269 
 
 3.775 
 
 39.414 
 
 15.904 
 
 4,610 
 
 43.448 
 
 17,313 
 4,840 
 
 93.759 
 
 26,354 
 
 6,317 
 
 IOI.715 
 
 28,363 
 
 6,6g6 
 
 Artillery 
 
 
 
 Total Army 
 
 44.495 
 
 59.928 
 
 65,601 
 
 126,430 
 
 136,684 
 
 
 September 20th, 1S64. 
 
 
 
 PRESENT 
 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 
 Effective. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 27.094 
 
 10,543 
 2,766 
 
 36,301 
 
 15.978 
 
 3.408 
 
 39.962 
 
 17,416 
 
 3,570 
 
 81,824 
 
 27,005 
 
 4,628 
 
 89,030 
 29,215 
 
 4.845 
 
 Artillery 
 
 
 Total Army 
 
 40,403 
 
 55.687 
 
 60,948 
 
 113-457 
 
 123,090 
 
 November 6 th, 1864. 
 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 
 Effective. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 25,889 
 2,306 
 2,405 
 
 34.559 
 3.258 
 2.913 
 
 38,119 
 3.532 
 3,068 
 
 79.997 
 4,778 
 4,018 
 
 87,016 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 5,148 
 
 Artillery 
 
 4,203 
 
 
 
 Total Army 
 
 30,600 
 
 40,730 
 
 44,719 
 
 88,793 
 
 96,367 
 
 
COMPARISON OF LOSSES. 
 
 219 
 
 Decetnber loth, 1S64. 
 
 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 
 Effective. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Total. 1 Aggregate. 
 
 I n fantry 
 
 18,342 
 2,306 
 2,405 
 
 27,222 
 3.258 
 2,913 
 
 29,826 
 
 3.532 
 3.068 
 
 71,329 
 4.778 
 4,018 
 
 77.631 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 5,148 
 
 Artillery 
 
 4.203 
 
 
 
 *Total Army 
 
 23.053 
 
 33.393 
 
 36,426 
 
 80,125 
 
 86,982 
 
 
 
 "Re 
 
 jspectfull) 
 
 ^ submitted, 
 "A. R MASON, 
 
 " Lieutenant Colonel, 
 
 '^. A. G." 
 
 " Columbus, Georgia, April jd, 1S66. 
 " Consolidated summaries in the Armies of Tennessee and Mississippi 
 during the campaign commencing May 7th, 1864, at Dalton, Georgia, 
 and ending after the engagement with the enemy at Jonesboro' and the 
 evacuation of Atlanta, furnished for the information of General J. E. 
 Johnston. 
 
 " CoJisolidated stanmary of casualties of the Armies of Tettfiessee and 
 Mississippi in the series of engagements around and from Dalton, 
 Georgia, to the Etowah river, for the period coinmencing May the 
 yth, and ending May 20th, 1864 : 
 
 Corps. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 119 
 
 283 
 42 
 
 859 
 
 1,564 
 405 
 
 978 
 
 Hood's 
 
 1,847 
 
 Polk's Army, Mississippi 
 
 447 
 
 
 444 
 
 2,828 
 
 3.372 
 
 * It should be remembered that, in all estimates of the strength of Armies, 
 the number oi effectives is alone to be considered; therefore, the first column, in 
 the foregoing return, is that to which reference should be made. Also, that of 
 the forty thousand four hundred and three (40,403) effectives reported present for 
 duty on the 20th September, forty-five hundred (4500) cavaliy were absent with 
 Wheeler, in Tennessee. This latter circumstance accounts for my statement, 
 subsequendy, that we had thirty-five thousand (35,000) effectives during the 
 
220 
 
 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 " Consolidated suvwiary of casualties of the Armies of Tennessee and 
 Mississippi in the series of engagements around New Hope Church, 
 near Marietta, Georgia : 
 
 Corps. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Hardee's 
 
 173 
 103 
 
 33 
 
 1,048 
 679 
 194 
 
 1,221 
 
 Hood's 
 
 782 
 227 
 
 Polk's Army Mississippi 
 
 
 
 309 
 
 1,921 
 
 2,230 
 
 " Consolidated summary of casualties of the Armies of Tennessee aftd 
 Mississippi in the series of engagements around Marietta, Georgia, 
 from June 4th to futy 4th, 1864: 
 
 Corps. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Tot.il. 
 
 Hardee's 
 
 200 
 140 
 
 128 
 
 1.433 
 
 1,121 
 
 926 
 
 1.633 
 
 I '>6i 
 
 Hood's 
 
 Polk's Army Mississippi 
 
 1.054 
 
 
 
 468 
 
 3.480 
 
 3.948 
 
 " Consolidation of the above three Reports is as follows . 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Dalton to Etowah river 
 
 444 
 309 
 468 
 
 2,828 
 
 1. 92 1 
 3,480 
 
 3.272 
 2,230 
 3.948 
 
 New Hope Church 
 
 Around Alarietta 
 
 
 
 1,221 
 
 8,229 
 
 9.450 
 
 campaign to the Alabama line. It should, in addition, be observed that 
 Wheeler's cavalry, ten thousand five hundred and forty-three (10,543) in number, 
 as borne upon Colonel Mason's return, on the 20th September, was left in Georgia 
 when we crossed the Tennessee, and was replaced by Forrest's cavalry, numbering 
 altogether two thousand three hundred and six (2306) effectives. This large 
 detachment will account for the reduction in the strength of our Army, at 
 Palmetto and Florence, as will be seen later in my narrative of the campaign to 
 the Alabama line, and thereafter into Tennessee. 
 
COMPARISON OF LOSSES. 
 
 221 
 
 " Consolidated summary of casualties of the Arjny of Tennessee {Army of 
 Mississippi being merged into it) in the series of engagements around 
 Ailafita, Georgia, commencing July 4th, and ending July jist, 1S64 : 
 
 Corps. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Hardee's 
 
 523 
 
 351 
 
 436 
 
 29 
 
 2 
 
 2.774 
 
 2,408 
 
 2,141 
 
 156 
 
 21 
 
 3.297 
 
 2.759 
 
 2,577 
 
 185 
 
 23 
 
 Lee's 
 
 Stewart's 
 
 Wheeler's Cavalry 
 
 Engineers 
 
 
 
 1. 341 
 
 7,500 
 
 8,841 
 
 " Consolidated summary of casualties in Army of Totncssee in engage- 
 ments around Atlanta and Jonesboro' , from A-ngust ist to September 
 1st, 1864 : 
 
 COKPS. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Hardee's 
 
 141 
 
 248 
 93 
 
 482 
 
 1,018 
 1,631 
 
 574 
 3.223 
 
 J. 159 
 
 1,879 
 
 667 
 
 Lee's 
 
 Stewart's 
 
 
 
 3.705 
 
 " Co7isolidation of which two Reports is as follows . 
 
 Around Atlanta, July 4th to July 31st, 1864... 
 
 Atlanta and Jonesboro', Aug. ist to Sept. 
 
 1st, 1864 
 
 Killed. 
 
 1,341 
 482 
 
 1,823 
 
 Wounded. I Total. 
 
 7,500 
 3.223 
 
 10,723 
 
 8.841 
 
 3.705 
 12,546 
 
 " I certify that the above reports are from the returns made to my 
 office, and are in my opinion correct. 
 
 "(Signed) A. J. FOARD." 
 
 " Medical Director, late Army of Tennessee." 
 
 " Note. — The Atlanta-Dalton campaign began on May 7th, and ended 
 on the ist of September, 1864, and the above reports are exact copies of 
 those made to the Commanding General during its progress, and in the 
 order in which they here appear. 
 
222 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 " General Johnston commanded from the commencement of the cam- 
 paign until the i8th of July, when he was relieved from duty, and Gene- 
 ral Hood assigned to the command of the Army. Hence the casualties 
 of battle which occurred in the Army between the 4th and the i8th of 
 July belong to the period of General Johnston's command, and are as 
 follows: Killed, sixty-seven (67); wounded, four hundred and fifty-five 
 (455) ; total, five hundred and twenty-two (522). These figures, added 
 to the total of casualties as reported up to July 4th, viz., killed, twelve 
 hundred and twenty-one (1221), wounded, eight thousand two hundred 
 and twenty-nine (8229). total, nine thousand four hundred and fifty 
 (9450), gives the entire losses (killed and wounded) in battle for the 
 whole Army, while under the command of General Johnston, as follows, 
 viz: killed, twelve hundred and eighty-eight (1288); wounded, eight 
 thousand six hundred and eighty-four (8684) ; total, nine thousand nine 
 hundred and seventy-two (9972). A deduction of the same, viz., killed, 
 sixty-seven (67), wounded, four hundred and fifty -five (455), total, five 
 hundred and twenty-two (522), from the total of casualties reported from 
 July 4th to September ist, viz., killed, eighteen hundred and twenty- 
 three (1823), wounded, ten thousand seven hundred and twenty-three 
 (10,723), tota], twelve thousand five hundred and forty-six (12,546), gives 
 of killed seventeen hundred and fifty-six (1756), wounded, ten thousand 
 two hundred and sixty-seven (10,267) \ total, twelve thousand and twenty- 
 three (12,023), as the entire losses in killed and wounded during that 
 period of the campaign when the Army was commanded by General 
 Hood, viz., from July the i8th to September ist, 1864, when it ended, 
 and the Army was then prepared for the campaign into Tennessee. 
 
 "(Signed) A. J. FOARD, 
 
 " "Medical Director late Army of Tennessee." 
 
 " On recapitidatbtg the entire losses of each Ariny during the cttiire cam- 
 paign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, in the Union 
 Army, as per table appended : * 
 
 Killed 4.423 
 
 Wounded 22,822 
 
 Missing 4,442 
 
 Aggregate loss 31,687." 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, page 132, vol. It. 
 
COMPARISON OF LOSSES. 
 
 223 
 
 "Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
 " In the Field, Atlanta, Georgia, September i^th, 1864. 
 
 'Prisoners and deserters taken by 'Army in the Field,' Jifi/itary Division 
 of the Mississippi, during May, June, July, and August, 1864:'^' 
 
 commands. 
 
 prisoners. 
 
 deserters. 
 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Officers. Men. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Army of the Cumberland, 
 Tennessee . . 
 Ohio 
 
 121 
 16 
 
 3,838 
 
 2,591 
 
 781 
 
 21 
 
 5 
 
 I 
 
 1.543 
 576 
 292 
 
 5.523 
 3.305 
 1,090 
 
 Total 
 
 270 
 
 7,210 
 
 27 
 
 2,411 
 
 9.918 
 
 
 "Sherman's Forces.! 
 " Recapitulation — Atlanta Campaign. 
 
 Arm. 
 
 June I. 
 
 July I. 
 
 August I. 
 
 Sept I. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 94.310 
 
 12,908 
 
 5.601 
 
 88,066 
 
 12,039 
 
 5.945 
 
 75.659 
 10,517 
 
 5.499 
 
 67.674 
 9.394 
 4,690 
 
 Cavalry » 
 
 Artillery 
 
 
 Aggregate 
 
 112,819 
 
 106,050 
 
 91.675 
 
 81,758 
 
 "Near Greensboro," North Carolina, ) 
 " May I, 1863. \ 
 
 "I. The effective strength' of the Army of Tennessee, as shown by 
 the tri-mo7ithly return of the jst of May, 1864, was :% 
 
 Infantry 37,652 j g 
 
 Artillery 2,812 J 40.404 
 
 Cavalry 2,392 
 
 " This was the entire strength of the Army ' at and near Dalton ' at 
 that date. 
 
 "2. The movement from Dalton began on the 12th May. On that 
 day Loring's Division, Army of Mississippi, and Gantry's Division, 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 134. 
 •j- Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 1 36. 
 J Johnston's Narrative, pages 574, 575. 
 
224 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 joined at Resaca, with about eight thousand (8000) effectives. French's 
 Division, same Army, joined near Kingston several days later (about 
 four thousand (4000) effectives). Ouarles's brigade from Mobile (about 
 twenty-two hundred (2200) effectives) joined at New Hope Church on the 
 26th. The cavalry of the Mississippi Army, which joined near Adairs- 
 ville, was estimated at three thousand nine hundred (3900) effectives ; 
 and Martin's Cavalry Division, which joined near Resaca, at three 
 thousand five hundred (3500). These were the only reinforcements 
 received while General Johnston had command of the Army. 
 
 "3. There was no return (filed) of the Army made after May 1st, 
 until June loth. The return of June loth gave, as effectives : 
 
 Infantry 44,860 ] „ 
 
 Artillery _ . 3,872 j ''"^'"S^ 
 
 Cavalry 10,516 
 
 "4. The next return was made on the ist of July. 
 
 Effectives : Infantry 39.197 | .^ f^ 
 
 Artillery 3,469 j 42.ot>& 
 
 Cavalry 10,023 
 
 " On the 3d of July, at Vining's Station, the Fifth and Forty-seventh 
 Georgia Regiments (about six hundred (600) effectives) left the Army for 
 Savannah, under Brigadier General J. K. Jackson. 
 
 " 5. The next and last return made under General Johnston was on 
 the loth of July. 
 
 Effectives: Infantry 36,001] , ^^^ 
 
 Artillery 3,755|4°'656 
 
 Cavalry 9.971 (Exclusive of 
 
 escorts serving with infantry.) 
 
 "This was the estimated force turned over by General Johnston to 
 General Hood. 
 
 "6. The report was made under General Johnston, and signed by 
 General Hood. On the 18th of July the command was turned over to 
 General Hood. The first return thereafter was that of August ist, after 
 the engagements of Peach Tree creek, on the 21st, and around Atlanta, 
 on the 22d and 28th July. 
 
 " 7. The foregoing figures are taken from the official records kept by me 
 as assistant adjutant general of the Army. 
 
 "(Signed) KINLOCH FALCONER, 
 
 "Assistant Adjutant General." 
 
COMPARISON OF LOSSES. 225 
 
 I here reiterate that it is impossible General Johnston 
 should have turned over to me fifty thousand six hundred and 
 twenty-seven (50,627) effectives on the i8th of July (as shown 
 in Colonel Falconer's report), for the reason that he had this 
 number in full on the loth of that month. When, according 
 to this same report, we suffered a loss, over and above the 
 killed and wounded, of four thousand and seventy-three (4073) 
 men who abandoned their colors, and went either to their 
 homes or to the enemy just prior to the retreat across the 
 Chattahoochee river, it is not reasonable to assume that no 
 desertions occurred from the loth of July — the date of his 
 last return — to the i8th, when a change of commanders took 
 place in the face of the enemy, and under extraordinary cir- 
 cumstances. The supposition that many deserted during this 
 interval is but just and natural. I am, therefore, confident 
 that I am over-liberal in the estimate given — forty-eight thou- 
 sand seven hundred and fifty (48,750) effectives — in my offi- 
 cial report of the effective strength of the Army of Ten- 
 nessee, when I assumed command. However, I will, in this 
 instance grant, for the sake of argument, that my force on the 
 1 8th of July was fifty thousand six hundred and twenty-seven 
 (50,627) effectives. 
 
 On the 20th of September, when stragglers had been gath- 
 ered up, the effective strength of the Confederate Army, 
 according to Colonel Mason's report, was forty thousand four 
 hundred and three (40,403). This number, subtracted from 
 fifty thousand six hundred and twenty-seven (50,627) — less 
 thirty-one hundred (3100) permanently detached to Macon 
 and Mobile, about the beginning of the siege — shows a loss of 
 seven thousand one hundred and twenty-four (7124), to which 
 should be added two thousand prisoners returned to the ranks 
 by exchange, soon after the fall of Atlanta, and before Colonel 
 Mason made up his return on the 20th of September. These 
 prisoners were overlooked by myself and my chief of staff 
 at the time I made my official report, and increase the total 
 15 
 
226 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 loss, from all causes, to nine thousand one hundred and twenty- 
 four (9124). 
 
 Whilst Dr. Foard's report of the killed and wounded is cor- 
 rect, the above estimate is beyond doubt equally accurate, 
 since I received no reinforcements, during the siege, which 
 were not sent back soon after their arrival, with the exception 
 of about two hundred and fifty men of Gholsen's brigade 
 (which small force I have not taken into account), as the fol- 
 lowing letter from General Shoupe will indicate: 
 
 " Richmond, March joth, 1863. 
 " General Hood : — You ask to what extent your Army was strength- 
 ened at Atlanta by the return of detailed men, and by dismounted 
 cavalry ordered to you by General Bragg. I have the honor to state 
 that so far as the detailed men are concerned, it was found necessary to 
 return them to the arsenals and shops in rear, and that they were, as I 
 believe, all so returned before the evacuation of Atlanta. Roddy's 
 cavalry, upon the very day it reached Atlanta, was ordered back to 
 Alabama. Gholsen's brigade remained at Atlanta until its evacuation. 
 It was, however, very small — not numbering more than two hundred and 
 fifty (250) men, and was in most miserable condition. So that the rein- 
 forcements, in truth, amounted to nothing. 
 
 " I have the honor to be very respectfully, etc., 
 
 "F. A. SHOUPE, 
 
 " Brigadier General and Chief of Staff at Atlanta." 
 
 Although the number of killed and wounded in the Army 
 of Tennessee proper, during the siege, amounted to twelve 
 thousand and twenty-three (12,023), the actual loss was nine 
 thousand one hundred and twenty-four (9124); thus proving 
 that near three thousand wounded returned to the ranks. 
 
 I shall now sum up the loss of the enemy during that same 
 period. 
 
 * General Sherman reports his loss in killed, wounded, and 
 missing, around Atlanta during Jul}% August and September, 
 to have been fifteen thousand and thirty -three (15,033). His 
 actual loss during the siege must assuredly have been in 
 excess of this number. In accordance with his recapitulation,-j- 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 133. 
 f Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 136. 
 
COMPARISON OF LOSSES. 227 
 
 he had on the ist of July an Army of one hundred and six 
 thousand and seventy (106,070); on the ist of August, ninety- 
 one thousand six hundred and seventy-fiv^e (91,675); and on 
 the 1st of September, eighty-one thousand seven hundred and 
 fifty-eight (81,758), demonstrating an actual loss of twenty-four 
 thousand three hundred and twelve (24,312) men within two 
 months. This number, less the troops discharged or perma- 
 nently detached, must be the real loss he sustained. I have 
 not been able to glean from his statements the decrease of his 
 Army from this latter source. I find, however, the following 
 recorded in Shoupe's Diary on the 17th of August: 
 
 " Enemy's pickets called to ours, and stated that a Kentucky Division, 
 twenty-two hundred (2200) strong, was going out of service, and that 
 neither Old Abe nor Uncle Jeff would get them in service again." 
 
 Taking his own statements as a basis of calculation, and 
 assuming the correctness of the report by the picket relative 
 to the discharge of twenty-two hundred (2200) Kentuckians 
 thirteen days prior to the fall of Atlanta, his actual losses 
 (provided he did not during the siege receive reinforcements, 
 of which I can find no mention in his Memoirs), prove to have 
 been twenty-four thousand three hundred and twelve (24,312), 
 plus nineteen hundred and two (1902) killed and wqiinded 
 early in September, minus twenty-two hundred (2200) dis- 
 charged ; showing an actual loss of twenty-four thousand and 
 fourteert (24,014) effectives against my loss of nine thousand 
 one hundred and twenty-four (9 1 24), although every aggressive 
 movement of importance was initiated by the Confederates. 
 
 On the other hand, and according to my opponent's state- 
 ment,* General Sherman had, after Blair's Corps joined him 
 near Rome, a force of one hundred and twelve thousand eight 
 hundred and nineteen (i 12,819) eftectives ^'^ oppose General 
 Johnston ; and at the close of his victorious march from 
 Dalton to Atlanta, one hundred and six thousand and seventy 
 (106,070) effectives, which subtracted from the total number 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 136. 
 
228 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 one hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred and nineteen 
 (112,819) in the field, at the beginning of the campaign, 
 demonstrates an actual loss of only six thousand seven hun- 
 dred and forty-nine (6749) against General Johnston's loss of 
 twenty-five thousand (25,000) men. 
 
 This comparison of losses under opposite modes of hand- 
 ling troops, evinces the truth of the principle for which I con- 
 tend : that losses are always comparatively small in an Army 
 which drives before it the enemy day after day, as in the 
 instance of the Federal Army during the Dalton-Atlanta 
 campaign; or in an Army which holds its ground, as in the 
 instance of the siege of Atlanta when the Federal loss was 
 greatly in excess of our own, by reason of the enthusiasm and 
 self-reliance of the Northern troops having, in the sudden check 
 given to their sweeping career of victory, been somewhat 
 counteracted by depression, consequent desertion, and the 
 tardy return of absentees. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE WITH SHERMAN CITATIONS ON THE RULES 
 
 OF WAR. 
 
 About the time I exchanged with General Sherman the two 
 thousand (2000) prisoners above mentioned, the following 
 correspondence passed between us, in relation to his treatment 
 of the non-combatants of Atlanta : 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ] 
 " In the Field, Atlanta, Georgia, September jth, 1864. 1 
 
 " General Hood, Comtnafiding Confederate Army. 
 
 "General : — I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that 
 the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who prefer it 
 to go South, and the rest North. For the latter I can provide food and 
 transportation to points of their election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or 
 further North. For the former I can provide transportation by cars as 
 far as Rough and Ready, and also wagons ; but, that their removal may 
 be made with as little discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you 
 to help the families from Rough and Ready to the cars at Lovejoy's. If 
 you consent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta who 
 prefer to go South to Rough and Ready, with all their moveable effects, 
 viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding, etc., with their ser- 
 vants, white and black, with the proviso that no force shall be used 
 toward the blacks, one way or another. If they want to go with their 
 masters or mistresses, they may do so ; otherwise they will' be sent away 
 unless they be men, when they may be employed by our quarter-master. 
 
 (229) 
 
230 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Atlanta is no place for families or non-combatants, and I have no desire 
 to send them North if you will assist in conveying them South. If this 
 proposition meets your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighbor- 
 hood of Rough and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, 
 or persons sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner 
 be harmed or molested ; you in your turn agreeing that any cars, wagons, 
 or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point, shall not be 
 interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of, say one hundred 
 (loo) men, to maintain order; and limit the truce to, say, two days after 
 a certain time appointed. 
 
 " I have authorized the Mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you 
 this letter, with such documents as the Mayor may forward in explanation 
 and shall await your reply. 
 
 " I have the honor to be your obedient servant, 
 
 "W. T. SHERMAN. 
 
 " Major General Commanding." 
 
 " Headquarters Army of Tennessee, "I 
 " Office Chief of Staff, September gth, 1864. \ 
 
 " Major General W. T. Sherman, Conmaiiding United States Forces 
 
 in Georgia. 
 
 " General : — Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball 
 and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received. You say therein, ' I 
 deem it to be to the interest of the United States that the citizens now 
 residing in Atlanta should remove,' etc. . 
 
 " I do not consider that I have any alternative in this matter. I there- 
 fore accept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or such time 
 as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and shall 
 render all assistance in my power to expedite the transportation of citi- 
 zens in this direction. I suggest that a staff officer be appointed by you 
 to superintend the removal from the city to Rough and Ready, while I 
 appoint a like officer to control their removal further South ; that a guard 
 of one hundred men be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain 
 order at the place, and that the removal begin on Monday next. 
 
 "And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you 
 propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before 
 brought to my attention in the dark history of war. 
 
 " In the name of God and humanity. I protest, believing that you will 
 find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and 
 children of a brave people. 
 
 " I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General" 
 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SHERMAN. 231 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
 
 " In the Field, Atlanta, Georgia, Scptanbcr loih, 1864. J 
 
 "General J. B. Hood, Comniatiding Arjny of Tennessee, Confederate 
 Army. 
 "General: — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to 
 the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal South of the 
 people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. I enclose you a 
 copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose 
 perfectly. 
 
 " You style the measures proposed ' unprecedented,' and appeal to the 
 dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of ' studied and ingenious 
 cruelty.' It is not unprecedented ; for General Johnston himself veiy 
 wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, 
 and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it neces- 
 sary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern 
 examples are so handy. You yourself burned dwelling houses along your 
 parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered 
 uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men. 
 You defended Atlanta on a line so close to town that every cannon shot 
 and many musket shots from our line of investment, that overshot their 
 mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General 
 Hardee did the same at Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same, 
 last summer, at Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heart- 
 less cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, 
 and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any 
 fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a 
 'brave people.' 
 
 " I say it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, 
 at once, from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, 
 and the ' brave people ' should scorn to commit their wives and children 
 to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as 
 illustrated in the pages of its dark history. 
 
 " In the name of common sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God 
 in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace and 
 prosperity, have plunged a nation into war — dark and cruel war — who 
 dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals 
 and forts that were left in the honorable custody of peaceful ordnance 
 sergeants, seized and made 'prisoners of war' the very garrisons sent 
 to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any 
 overt act was committed by the (to you) hated Lincoln Government ; 
 tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion, spite of themselves ; 
 falsified the vote of Louisiana; turned loose your privateers to plunder 
 
232 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 unarmed ships ; expelled Union families by the thousands, burned their 
 houses, and declared, by an act of your Cong^ress, the confiscation of all 
 debts due Northern men for goods had and received ! Talk thus to the 
 marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this 
 day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the 
 best born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be 
 men, and fight it out as we propose to do and not deal in such hypo- 
 critical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, 
 and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town 
 full of women and the families of a brave people at our back, or to 
 remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and 
 people. 
 
 " I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 " W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 " Major General Commanding." 
 
 " Headquarters Army of Tennessee, ] 
 
 " September 1 2th, i86^. j 
 
 " Major General W. T. Sherman, Coinma7iding Military Division 
 of the Mississippi. 
 
 " General : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 letter of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women, chil- 
 dren, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel from their 
 homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let the matter 
 rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close this corres- 
 pondence, and, without your expressing it in words, would have been 
 willing to believe that, while ' the interests of the United States,' in your 
 opinion, compelled you to an act of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the 
 necessity, and we would have dropped the subject; but you have chosen 
 to indulge in statements which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far 
 as to signify my dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be 
 construed as acquiescence. 
 
 " I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify 
 the language of condemnation with which I characterized your order. 
 It but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands ' pre-eminent in the 
 dark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty.' Your original 
 order was stripped of all pretences ; you announced the edict for the sole 
 reason that it was to ' the interest of the United States.' This alone you 
 offered to us and the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disre- 
 garding the laws of God and man. ' You say that General Johnston 
 himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from 
 Dalton down.* It is due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say 
 that no act of his distinguished career gives the least color to your 
 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SHERMAN. 233 
 
 unfounded aspersions upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, 
 nor towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile- He offered and extended 
 friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens who desired to flee from 
 your fraternal embraces. You are equally unfortunate in your attempt 
 to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in the defence of 
 Jonesboro', by General Hardee, or of Atlanta, by myself. General 
 Hardee defended his position in front of Jonesboro' at the expense of 
 injury to the houses; an ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. 
 I defended Atlanta at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in 
 either case, it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case 
 of Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war 
 among civilized nations. No inhabitant was expelled from his home 
 and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and therefore 
 your recent order can find no support from the conduct of either of us. 
 I feel no other emotion other than pain in reading that portion of your 
 letter which attempts to justify your shelling Atlanta, without notice, 
 under pretence that I defended Atlanta upon a line so close to town 
 that every cannon shot, and many musket balls from your line of 
 investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women 
 and children. I made no complaint of your firing into Atlanta in any 
 way you thought proper. I make none now, but there are a hundred 
 thousand witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women and 
 children for weeks, firing far above and miles beyond my line of defence. 
 I have too good an opinion, founded both upon observation and expe- 
 rience, of the skill of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they 
 for several weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field- 
 works, and slaughtered women and children by accident and want of 
 skill. 
 
 " The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a wide field 
 for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are committed to me. 
 I am only a General of one of the Armies of the Confederate States, 
 charged with military operations in the field, under the direction of my 
 superior officers, and I am not called upon to discuss with you the causes 
 of the present war, or the political questions which led to or resulted 
 from it. These grave and important questions have been committed to 
 far abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to 
 repel any unjust conclusion which might be drawn from my silence. 
 You charge my country with ' daring and badgering you to battle.' The 
 truth is, we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful 
 separation, before the first gun was fired on either side. You say we 
 insulted your flag. The truth is, we fired upon it, and those who fought 
 under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission of subjugation. 
 You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and made prisoners of 
 
234 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 the garrisons sent to protect us against Indians and negroes. The truth 
 is, we, by force of arms, drove out insolent intruders and took possession 
 of our own forts and arsenals, to resist your claims to do minion over 
 masters, slaves, and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a una- 
 nimity unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your 
 attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to force Ken- 
 tucky and Missouri into rebellion in spite of themselves. The truth is, 
 my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour, has 
 again and again offered, before the whole world, to leave it to the 
 unbiassed will of these States, and all others, to determine for themselves 
 whether they will cast their destiny with your Government cr ours ; and 
 your Government has resisted this fundamental principle of free institu- 
 tions with the bayonet, and labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its 
 hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say 
 we falsified the vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only 
 separated herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of 
 her people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from Gettys- 
 burg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to her decision, 
 which challenges the admiration and respect of every man capable of 
 feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for heroic valor. You 
 say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your unarmed ships. The 
 truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the Navy, we built and bought 
 a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our country, and swept the seas, in defi- 
 ance of your Navy, around the whole circumference of the globe. You 
 say we have expelled Union families by thousands. The truth is, not a 
 single family has been expelled from the Confederate States, that I am 
 aware of; but, on the contrary, the moderation of our Government 
 towards traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies 
 and well meaning friends of our cause. You say my Government, by 
 acts of Congress, has confiscated ' all debts due Northern men for goods 
 sold and delivered.' The truth is, our Congress gave due and ample 
 time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with their 
 ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property of our ene- 
 mies in retaliation for their acts — declaring us traitors, and confiscating 
 our property wherever their power extended, either in their country or our 
 own. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts known of all 
 men to be true. 
 
 " You order into exile the whole population of a city ; drive men, 
 women, and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet, under 
 the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and on the claim 
 that it is an act of ' kindness to these families of Atlanta.' Butler only 
 banished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, 
 and acknowledged that he did it as a punishment. You issue a sweeping 
 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SHERMAN. 235 
 
 edict, covering all the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury 
 heaped upon the defenceless by assuming that you have done them a 
 kindness. This you follow by the assertion that you ' will make as much 
 sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best born Southerner.' 
 And, because I characterize what you call a kindness as being real 
 cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God ; and 
 you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save our 
 women and children from what you call kindness, is a 'sacrilegious, 
 hypocritical appeal.' 
 
 "You came into our country with your Army, avowedly for the purpose 
 of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not only intend 
 to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and desire to place 
 over us an inferior race, which we have raised from barbarism to its 
 present position, which is the highest ever attained by that race, in any 
 country, in all time. I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements 
 in reference to your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your 
 willingness to sacrifice everything for the peace and honor of the South, 
 and refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between 
 myself, my country, and my God. 
 
 "You say, 'let us fight it out like men.' To this my reply is — for 
 myself, and I believe for all the true men, ay, and women and children, 
 in my country — we will fight you to the death ! Better die a thousand 
 deaths than submit to live under you or your Government and your 
 negro allies ! 
 
 " Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9th 
 of September, I close this correspondence with you ; and, notwith- 
 standing your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of humanity, 
 I again humbly and reverently invoke his Almighty aid in defence of 
 justice and right. 
 
 " Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General:' 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, | 
 " Atlanta, Ga., September, 14th, 1864. j 
 
 " General J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of Tennessee. 
 
 " General : — Yours of September 12th is received, and has been care- 
 fully perused. I agree with you that this discussion by two soldiers is 
 out of place, and profitless ; but you must admit that you began the con- 
 troversy by characterizing an official act of mine in unfair and improper 
 terms. I reiterate my former answer, and to the only new matter 
 contained in your rejoinder add: We have no 'negro allies' in this 
 Army; not a single negro soldier left Chattanooga with this Army, or is 
 
236 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 with it now. There are a few guarding Chattanooga, which General 
 Stedman sent at one time to drive Wheeler out of Dalton. 
 
 " I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling of 
 Atlanta, a ' fortified town, with magazines, arsenals, foundries, and 
 public stores ;' you were bound to take notice. See the books. 
 
 " This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not begin, 
 and terminate with satisfaction. 
 
 " I am, with respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 "W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 " Major General Commanding." 
 
 I preferred here to close the discussion, and, therefore, made 
 no reply to his last communication inviting me to " see the 
 books." 
 
 I will at present, however, consider this subject, and cite a 
 few authorities upon the above disputed points, in order to 
 show that General Sherman's conduct, in this instance, was in 
 violation of the laws which should govern nations in time of 
 war, 
 
 Atlanta could not properly be designated a regularly forti- 
 fied city. It was simply protected by temporary breastworks, 
 of the same character as those used by Johnston and Sherman, 
 during the preceding campaign. The fortifications consisted 
 of a ditch, with a log to act as protection to the heads of the 
 men whilst firing, and of brushwood, when it could be 
 obtained, thrown out in front as an obstruction to a rapid 
 advance of the enemy. A large portion of the line, which 
 passed through open fields, was devoid of this latter safeguard. 
 Moreover, only a few of the heavy guns and batteries were 
 covered by embankments with embrasures. 
 
 Fortifications, it is well known, are divided into two classes: 
 temporary, and permanent. Those I have described, around 
 Atlanta, come under the head of the first class. The latter 
 are constructed of the best material, iron, and stone, with 
 parapet, deep and wide ditch and glacis, similar to the fortifi- 
 cations on Governor's Island, and those of Fortress Monroe. 
 In the construction of permanent works, every exertion is 
 made to render them as strong and durable as possible. 
 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SHERMAN. 237 
 
 It might be supposed, from General Sherman's Memoirs, 
 that Atlanta was not only a thoroughly fortified town, but was 
 provisioned to endure a siege of a year or more, after all com- 
 munication was cut off; that it possessed arsenals and machine 
 shops as extensive as those in Richmond and Macon — an illu- 
 sion created, probably, by a dilapidated foundry, near the 
 Augusta road, which had been in use prior to the war. Gen- 
 eral Sherman, therefore, cannot assert, in order to justify certain 
 acts, that Atlanta was a regularly fortified town. And whereas 
 I marched out at night, allowing him the following day to 
 enter the city, unopposed, as he himself acknowledges, and 
 whereas no provocation was given by the authorities, civil or 
 military, he can in no manner claim that extreme war meas- 
 ures were a necessity. 
 
 It has been argued that Wellington sanctioned extt-eme 
 measures against the Basques, at the tim.e he was opposed to 
 Marshal Soult, at Bayonne, in 1814. Wellington perceived 
 that, by pillage and cruel treatment, his Spanish allies, under 
 Mina and Morilla, were arousing the Basques to arms, and at 
 once ordered the Spanish troops to abstain from such odious 
 conduct. He was, unfortunately, too late in his discovery; 
 the appetite for plunder had become so inordinate that his 
 proclamation was disregarded by his allies, and he was subse- 
 quently forced to threaten extreme measures, in order to check 
 the partisan warfare which initiated the cruelties and horrors 
 he deplored. This is the unquestionable interpretation of the 
 subjoined passage: "A sullen obedience followed, but the 
 plundering system was soon renewed, and this, with the mis- 
 chief already done, was enough to arouse the inhabitants of 
 Bedary, as well as those of the Val-de-Baigorre, into action. 
 They commenced and continued a partisan warfare until Lord 
 Wellington, incensed by their activity, issued a proclamation 
 calling upon them to take arms openly, and join Soult, or stay 
 peaceably at home, declaring that he would otherwise burn 
 their villages and hang all the inhabitants." * 
 
 * Peninsular War, B. XXIII, chap. 3. 
 
238 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 The inhabitants of Atlanta gave no such cause for action on 
 the part of General Sherman, nor was the safety of the Federal 
 Army in any manner involved. Nevertheless he ordered 
 women and children, the infirm and the sick, in fact the entire 
 population to go cither North or South. 
 
 The subjoined appeal of the Mayor and Councilmen of 
 Atlanta was powerless to alter the determination of the Federal 
 commander ; 
 
 "Atlanta, Georgia, September nth, 1S64. 
 "Major General W. T. Sherman. 
 
 "Sir: — ^\Vo, the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the 
 city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of 
 the said city, to express their want3 and wishes, ask leave most earnestly 
 but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to 
 leave Atlanta. 
 
 "At first view, it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary 
 hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, 
 so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of the people, 
 and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering 
 attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the 
 aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending. 
 
 " Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now 
 having young children, and whose husbands, for the greater part, are 
 either in the Army, prisoners, or dead. 
 
 " Some say : ' I have such a one sick at my house ; who will wait on 
 them when I am gone ? ' Others say : ' What are we to do ? We have 
 no house to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any ; no parents, 
 relatives, or friends to go to.* Another says : ' I will try and take this or 
 that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, 
 though I need them much.' We reply to them : ' General Sherman will 
 carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General Hood will take it 
 thence on.' And they will reply to that : 'But I want to leave the rail- 
 road at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from there on.' 
 
 " We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this measure 
 will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of this fell 
 back, and before your arrival here, a large portion of the people had 
 retired South ; so that the country south of this is already crowded, and 
 without houses enough to accommodate the people, and we are informed 
 that many are now staying in churches and other out-buildings. 
 
CITATIONS ON THE RULES OF WAR. 239 
 
 "Tliis being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly 
 women and children) to find any shelter? And how can they live 
 through the Winter in the woods — no shelter or subsistence, in ^he midst 
 of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them 
 much, if they were willing to do so. 
 
 "This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. 
 You know the woe, the horrors, and the sufferings cannot be described 
 by words ; imagination can only conceive it, and we ask you to take 
 these things into consideration. 
 
 "We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the 
 duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your atten- 
 tion to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not con- 
 sidered this subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on more 
 reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to all 
 mankind ; for we know of no such instance ever having occurred — surely 
 never in the United Stales — and what has this helpless people done, that 
 they should be driven from their homes, to wander strangers, and out- 
 casts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity ? 
 
 " We do not know as yet the number of people still here ; of those 
 who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain 
 at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a 
 respectable number for a much longer time, and who might not need 
 assistance at any time. 
 
 "In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to recon- 
 sider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain 
 at home, and enjoy what little means they have. 
 
 "Respectfully submitted, 
 
 "JAMES M. CALHOUN, yJ/a/^r. 
 "E. E. RAWSON, Coimcibnatt. 
 "S. C. WELLS, Council'/iian." 
 
 I shiU now cite a few authorities upon the rights of war, to 
 ascertain in how far the course pursued toward the inhabi- 
 tants of Atlanta is in accordance with those laws which are 
 now universally recognized. 
 
 Halleck, Vattel, and Grotius establish the following rules:* 
 
 " * * * It is a just remark made by some theologians, that all Christian 
 princes and rulers who wish to be found such in the sight of God, as 
 well as that of men, will deem it a duty to interpose their authority to 
 
 * Grotius, B. Ill, chap. 12, sec. 8. (The italics are the author's.) 
 
240 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 prevent or suppress all unnecessary violence in the taking of terms, 
 for acts of rigor can never be carried to an extreme without involving 
 great numbers of the innocent in ruin; and practices of that kind, 
 beside being no way conducive to the termination of war, are totally 
 repugnant to every principle of Christianity and justice." 
 
 "Women, children, feeble old men, and sick persons, come under the 
 description of enemies; and we have certain rights over them, inasmuch 
 as they belong to the nation with whom we are at war, and as, between 
 nation and nation, all rights and pretensions affect the body of society, 
 together with all its members. But these are enemies who make no 
 resistance ; and consequently we have no right to maltreat their persons, 
 or use any violence against them. * * * This is so plain a maxim of 
 justice and humanity that at present every nation, in the least degree 
 civilized, acquiesces in it."* * * * 
 
 " Since women and children are subjects of the State, and members 
 of the Nation, they are to be ranked in the class of enemies. But it does 
 not thence follow that we are justifiable in treating them like men who 
 bear arms, or are capable of bearing them." f 
 
 "At present war is carried on by regular troops ; the people, the peas- 
 ants, the citizens, take no part in it, and generally have nothing to fear 
 from the sword of the enemy. Provided the inhabitants submit to him 
 who is master of the country, pay the contributions imposed, and refrain 
 from all hostilities, they live in as perfect safety as if they were friends ; 
 they continue in possession of what belongs to them ; the country people 
 come freely to the camp to sell their provisions, and are protected as far 
 as possible from the calamities of war." % 
 
 " Since the object of a just war is to repress injustice and violence, 
 and forcibly to compel him who is deaf to the voice of justice, we have a 
 right to put in practice, against the enemy, every measure that is necessary 
 in order to weaken him and disable him from resisting us and supporting 
 his injustice ; and we may choose such methods as are the most effica- 
 cious and best calculated to attain the end in view, provided they be not 
 of an odious kind, nor unjustifiable in themselves, and prohibited by the 
 laws of nature." § 
 
 " The lawfulness of the end does not give a real right to anything 
 further than barely the means necessary to the attainment of that end. 
 
 * Vattel, B. Ill, chap. 8, sec. 145. 
 f Vattel, B. Ill, chap. 5, sec. 72. 
 
 X Vattel, B. Ill, chap. 8, sec. 147. Incorporated by Halleck, Law of War, 
 chap. 18, sec. 3. 
 
 ^ .Vattel, B. Ill, chap 8, sec. 138. 
 
CITATIONS ON THE RULES OF WAR. 241 
 
 Whatever we do beyond that is reprobated by the law of nature, is faulty 
 and condemnable at the tribunal of conscience. Hence it is that the 
 right to such, or such acts of hostility, varies according to circumstances. 
 What is just and perfectly innocent in war in one particular situation, is 
 not always so on other occasions. Right goes hand-in-hand with neces- 
 sity and the exigencies of the case, but never exceeds them." * 
 
 "All these classes (old men, women and children, the clergy, macris- 
 trates, and other civil officers), which, by general usage or the municipal 
 laws of the belligerent State, are exempt from military duty, are not 
 subject to the general rights of a beUigerent over the enemy's person. 
 To these are added, by modern usage, all persons who are not organized 
 or called into military service, though capable of its duties, but who are 
 left to pursue their usual pacific avocations. All these are regarded as 
 non-combatants. ' 'f 
 
 General Sherman admits, in his Memoirs, that he burned 
 stores and dwellings ; that " the heart of the city was in flames 
 all night ; " that he telegraphed to Grant he had " made a 
 wreck of Atlanta," J which he afterwards termed "the ruined 
 city." The following quotations will show whether or not 
 he was justified in this destruction of property : 
 
 "And with respect to things, the case is the same as with respect to 
 persons — things belonging to the enemy, continue such wherever they 
 are. But we are not hence to conclude, any more than in the case of 
 persons, that we everywhere possess a right to treat these things as 
 things belonging to the enemy." § 
 
 " The wanton destruction of public monuments, temples, tombs, 
 statues, paintings, etc., is absolutely condemned, even by the voluntary 
 law of nations, as never being conducive to the lawful object of war. 
 The pillage and destruction of towns, the devastation of the open 
 country, ravaging, setting fire to houses, are measures no less odious 
 and detestable on every occasion where they are evidently put in practice 
 without absolute necessity or, at least, very cogent reasons. But as the 
 perpetrators of such outrageous deeds might attempt to palliate them, 
 under pretext of deservedly punishing the enemy, be it here observed 
 that the natural and voluntary law of nations does not allow us to inflict 
 
 * Vattel, B, III, chap. 8, sec. 137, 
 f Halleck, Laws of War, chap. 16, sec. 2. 
 J Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 154. 
 I Vattel, B. Ill, chap. 5, sec. 74. 
 
 16 
 
242 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 such punishments, except for enormous offences against the law of 
 nations."* 
 
 When General Lee entered Pennsylvania with his Army, he 
 gave strict orders to destroy no property, and to pay for all 
 provisions obtained from the enemy. Marshal Soult was like- 
 wise magnanimous in his conduct, after he had been not only 
 compelled to storm the defences of Oporto, but to fight from 
 street to street, in order to finally force a surrender. Napier 
 states that the French found some of their comrades who had 
 been taken prisoners, " fastened upright and living, but with 
 their eyes burst, their tongues torn out, and their other members 
 mutilated and gashed." This ghastly sight notwithstanding, 
 many of the French soldiers and officers endeavored, at the 
 risk of their lives, to check the vengeance of their comrades, 
 Soult did not, even after this fearful resistance and these 
 examples of barbarous cruelty, send off the women and chil- 
 dren, the infirm and the sick, and then burn their homes; on 
 the contrary,t " Recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, 
 he caused the inhabitants remaining in town to be treated 
 with respect ; he invited, by proclamation, all those who had 
 fled to return, and he demanded no contribution ; but restrain- 
 ing with a firm hand the violence of his men, he contrived, from 
 the captured public property, to support the Army and even 
 to succor the poorest and most distressed of the population." 
 
 Although it is customary, previous to a general assault of a 
 fortified town of which the demand for surrender has been 
 rejected, that the commanding officer give warning (on account 
 of the extraordinary sacrifice of life, to which his troops must 
 necessarily be subjected) that he will not be responsible for 
 the lives of the captured, as did Lieutenant General Lee in my 
 name at Resaca. No officer should allow his soldiers to burn 
 and pillage after victory has been secured. 
 
 * Vattel, B. Ill, chap. 9, sec. 173. Incorporated by Halleck. Laws of 
 War, chap. 19, sec. 24. 
 
 f Napier, Peninsular War, B. VI, chaps. 4 and 7. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE PREPARATIONS PRESIDENT 
 
 DAVIS VISITS THE ARMY HARDEE RELIEVED ^ALLATOONA 
 
 RESACA DALTON LAFAYETTE SUDDEN DETERMINA- 
 TION TO ENTER TENNESSEE GADSDEN BEAUREGARD, 
 
 After the fall of Atlanta, this most serious question pre- 
 sented itself for solution : in what manner, and accompanied 
 with the least detriment, to effect the riddance of a victorious 
 foe, who had gained possession of the mountains in our front, 
 and planted his standard in the heart of the Confederacy. In 
 order to compass this end, either the Federals should be forced 
 back by manceuvres into the mountains, there defeated in 
 battle, and finally driven northward ; or an attempt be made 
 to defeat them upon their march forward, after Sherman had 
 been allowed full time to rest his troops, make preparations, 
 and receive reinforcements, for, in the meantime, it would have 
 been rashness and folly, in view of our inferior numbers, to 
 have attacked the enemy whilst under the protection of the 
 breastworks of Atlanta. This grave and momentous question 
 presented the same difficulties which had risen before General 
 T.ee.when Grant crossed the Rappahannock, and the battles of 
 the Wilderness, Spottsylvania Court House, and, finally, the 
 surrender at Appomattox followed. Our great chieftain well 
 
 (243) 
 
244 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 knew that he would be forced to abandon Richmond or sur- 
 render his Army, unless he beat his enemy in battle, and 
 drove him back, as he had done in previous instances. So 
 paramount did he consider this necessity that he cut roads 
 through the Wilderness, in order to get at the Federals while 
 his own Army was in best condition for battle. He possessed, 
 for the execution of his purpose, a body of troops which had 
 been trained and handled in such a manner as to render it 
 impossible to find its superior in the history of nations. 
 Moreover, he was not confronted by a victorious Army, but 
 by one he had driven back more than once from the same line 
 then occupied by Grant. 
 
 The difficulties which surrounded me even at the outset, 
 when I assumed command of the Army of Tennessee, and 
 after the fall of Atlanta, when a recurrence of retreat was 
 brought about with its train of former evils, were more per- 
 plexing than those which beset General Lee at the juncture 
 above referred to. The problem was the more difficult to 
 solve, by reason of the impaired condition of the Army. 
 
 The same question had arisen for consideration when 
 Sherman moved from Chattanooga, and formed line of battle 
 in front of Rocky-faced Ridge. My predecessor did not per- 
 ceive the necessity of defeating the enemy at that period — a 
 necessity as urgent as that which impelled General Lee to use 
 extraordinary means to reach his enemy in the Wilderness. 
 
 Unless the Army could be heavily reinforced, there was, in 
 the present emergency, but one plan to be adopted: by 
 manoeuvres to draw Sherman back into the mountains, then 
 beat him in battle, and at least regain our lost territory. 
 Therefore, after anxious reflection, and consultation with the 
 corps commanders, I determined to communicate with the 
 President, and ascertain whether or not reinforcements could 
 be obtained from any quarter. In accordance with this 
 decision, I telegraphed to General Bragg as follows : 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 245 
 
 [No. I.] 
 
 "LovEjoY Station, September jd, 1.45 p. m. 
 " For the offensive my troops, at present, are not more than equal to 
 their own numbers. To prevent this country from being overrun, rein- 
 forcements are absolutely necessary. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 At 6.10 p. m., the same day ; 
 
 [No. 2.] 
 
 " My telegram in cipher this morning is based upon the supposition 
 that the enemy will not content himself with Atlanta, but will continue 
 offensive movements. All the Lieutenant Generals agree with me. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, GejieraL" 
 
 In consideration of the high regard President Davis enter- 
 tained for General Hardee, I suggested to the latter to tele- 
 graph to the President in relation to our condition. I find in 
 my dispatch book a copy of his telegram: 
 
 " September 4th, 11.30 a. m. 
 
 "Unless this Army is speedily and heavily reinforced, Georgia and 
 Alabama will be overrun. I see no other means to arrest this calamity. 
 Never, in my opinion, were our liberties in such danger. What can you 
 do for us ? 
 
 " (Signed) W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant General." 
 
 The following reply from His Excellency conveyed no hope 
 of assistance : 
 
 " Richmond, September ^th, 1864. 
 " General J. B. Hood : — Your dispatches of yesterday received. The 
 necessity for reinforcements was realized, and every effort made to bring 
 forward reserves, militia, and detailed men for the purpose. Polk, 
 Maury, S. D. Lee, and Jones have been drawn on to fullest extent. 
 E. K. Smith has been called on. No other resource remains. It is now 
 requisite that absentees be brought back, the addition required from the 
 surrounding country be promptly made available, and that the means in 
 hand be used with energy proportionate to the country's need. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 
 
 I hereupon decided to operate at the earliest moment possi- 
 ble in the rear of Sherman, as I became more and more con- 
 vinced of our inability to successfully resist an advance of the 
 
246 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 Federal Army. I had thought immediately after my arrival 
 at Lovejoy Station that our troops were not disheartened, and 
 telegraphed to Richmond to that effect; but I discovered my 
 error before long, and concluded to resume active operations, 
 move upon Sherman's communications, and avert, if possible, 
 impending disaster from the Confederacy. 
 
 Before entering into the details of the plan of the contem- 
 plated campaign, I will, in brief, consider the indubitable 
 results had I remained in front of Sherman, till he made ready 
 and moved forward. In lieu of dividing his forces, as he did 
 when I eventually marched to his rear, he would either have 
 increased the strength of his Army to the fullest extent possi- 
 ble, previous to his forward movement, in order not only to 
 brush away more easily the cobweb of an Army in his front, 
 but also to overawe and discourage our people by the presence 
 of an Army strong and powerful ; or he would have ordered 
 Thomas into Tennessee, with instructions to muster all avail- 
 able forces and march into Alabama with a second Army, 
 whilst he moved through Georgia. In the event of the adop- 
 tion of the first plan, he could, after assembling all the troops 
 at his disposal between Nashville and Atlanta, have advanced 
 with an Army of not less than one hundred and twenty-five 
 thousand (125,000). According to his own statement, Thomas 
 had under his command, at the time I accepted battle at Nash- 
 ville, over seventy thousand (70,000) effectives, irrespective of 
 troops at other points in Tennessee and Kentucky. 
 
 Had he chosen the second plan, he would soon have moved 
 with a concentrated Army of not less than seventy-five thou- 
 sand (75,000), whilst Thomas overran Alabama with at least 
 fifty thousand (50,000) men. This is in no degree an exag- 
 gerated estimate, since forces could have been withdrawn from 
 Tennessee and Kentucky, where no necessity for troops would 
 have existed during these operations. The enthusiasm 
 throughout the North, succeeding the capture of Atlanta, 
 would also have swollen the Federal ranks by the return of 
 absentees in large numbers. This plan would have brought 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 247 
 
 into the field two powerful Armies to move simultaneously 
 through Georgia and Alabama. 
 
 On the other hand, our Army of forty thousand four hun- 
 dred and three (40,403) would have gradually decreased 
 through desertions, with no prospect of obtaining another man 
 east of the Mississippi river, and with the information in 
 my possession from Richmond, that no troops were shortly 
 expected from the Trans-Mississippi Department, although 
 every effort had been made by the Government to get rein- 
 forcements from that quarter. 
 
 Thus the outcome of this stand-still policy, which would 
 have enabled Sherman to advance with all due preparations 
 and have forced us to retreat in his front day after day, would 
 have been the final dispersion of the Army ; a greater portion 
 would have returned to their homes, leaving behind a noble 
 band of patriots too proud to desert, yet too w^eak and dis- 
 heartened to be of material service. I would have been able 
 to offer just about sufficient resistance to harass and embitter 
 the enemy ; to instigate him to perpetrate greater outrages, 
 and commit ten-fold the havoc he actually made in traversing 
 Georgia ; and, in lieu of contenting himself with simply cut- 
 ting the communications of the Army of Northern Virginiav 
 with its largest fields for supplies, Sherman would have tarried 
 long enough upon his march to effect irreparable damage. 
 
 I shall now recite the preliminaries to the campaign in rear 
 of Sherman, and give an account of operations, results accom- 
 plished, together with those events which led me to conceive 
 the idea of the campaign into Tennessee. 
 
 I foreshadowed my intention of moving upon Sherman's 
 communications in the following telegram to the President, 
 dated September 6th : 
 
 [No. 10.] 
 
 " I shall make dispositions to prevent the enemy, as far as possible, 
 from foraging south of Atlanta, and at the same time endeavor to prevent 
 his massing supplies at that place. 1 deem it important that the 
 prisoners at Andersonville should be so disposed of, as not to prevent 
 
248 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 this Army from moving in any direction it may be thought best. Accord- 
 ing to all human calculations, we should have saved Atlanta had the 
 officers and men of the Army done what was expected of them. It has 
 been God's will for it to be otherwise. I am of good heart, and feel that 
 we shall yet succeed. The Army is much in need of a little rest. After 
 removing the prisoners from Andersonville, I think we should, as soon 
 as practicable, place our Army upon the communications of the enemy, 
 drawing our supplies from the West Point and Montgomery Railroad. 
 Looking to this, I shall at once proceed to strongly fortify Macon. 
 Please do not fail to give me advice at all times. It is my desire to do 
 the best for you and my country. May God be with you and us. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 Having requested and obtained authority from the War 
 Department to propose an exchange of prisoners, captured 
 during the siege, I made on the 8th of September, by flag of 
 truce, a proposition to the enemy to that effect. An exchange 
 of two thousand (2000) was agreed upon. Some delay, how- 
 ever, resulted from a refusal upon the part of General Sher- 
 man to excnange Confederates for Federal prisoners whose 
 term of service had ceased or was about to expire. 
 
 Upon the 9th was initiated the correspondence between 
 General Sherman and myself, in regard to the treatment of the 
 inhabitants of Atlanta, and which I embodied in the narrative 
 of the siege of that city. On the 1 2th I sent every wagon, 
 which could be spared in the Army, to Rough and Ready, and 
 performed the sad duty of transferring within our lines the 
 women and children, the sick and the infirm. 
 
 In the meantime, intelligence had been received from General 
 Wheeler, announcing that he had destroyed several bridges 
 and about fifty miles of railroad in Tennessee, and that he had 
 thus far been successful in every engagement with the enemy. 
 
 During the progress of the exchange of prisoners, the 
 transportation of the Army was carefully inspected and 
 repaired ; pontoon trains made ready for active operation, 
 and every exertion made to inaugurate a forward movement at 
 the earliest hour possible. At this period I deemed it to the 
 interest of the Confederacy, because of General Hardee's failure 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 249 
 
 to obey instructions on the 20th, and 22d of July, and 31st of 
 August, to request that this officer be relieved from duty with 
 his Corps, and that another be assigned to its command. I 
 dispatched to General Bragg as follows : 
 
 [No. 14.] 
 
 " September 8th, 2.J0 p. m. 
 " I suggest that all the reserves of Georgia, under General Cobb, 
 be ordered to this Army, since the prisoners have been removed ; and 
 that Lieutenant General Taylor be ordered to relieve General Hardee, 
 bringing with him all the troops he can. 
 
 " J. B. HOOD, General:' 
 
 The unfortunate events connected with General Hardee's 
 service during the siege of Atlanta, rendered obligatory this 
 unpleasant duty on my part. I have already stated the opin- 
 ions, at the time, of Lieutenant Generals Lee and Stewart, and 
 of Major General G. W. Smith, in regard to this painful sub- 
 ject. So decided were these officers in their convictions that 
 I determined to inform the President of my own loss of con- 
 fidence, and to invite him to visit the Army, and confer with 
 the corps commanders in relation to the operations around 
 Atlanta. Accordingly, I sent the following telegram to His 
 Excellency : 
 
 [No. 24.] 
 
 " September ijih. 
 
 " In the battle of July 20th, we failed on account of General Hardee. 
 
 Our success on the 22d July was not what it should have been, owing to 
 
 this officer. Our failure on the 31st of August, I am convinced, was 
 
 greatly owing to him. Please confer with Lieutenant Generals Stewart 
 
 and S. D. Lee, as to operations around Atlanta. It is of the utmost 
 
 importance that Hardee should be relieved at once. He commands the 
 
 best troops of this Army. I must have another commander. Taylor or 
 
 Cheatham will answer. Hardee handed in his resignation a few days 
 
 since, but withdrew it. Can General Cobb give me all the reserve 
 
 regiments he has ? 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 Major General Gustavus W. Smith, in his official report of 
 the operations of the Georgia State troops, dated 15 th of 
 
250 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 September, 1864, shortly after these occurrences, says in this 
 regard : 
 
 " Commanding a peculiar organization, the ranking officer of the forces 
 of the State in which you were operating, I was invited to and partici- 
 pated in your councils, I had every opportunity of knowing what was 
 going on. Your plans were fully explained to your Lieutenant Generals, 
 your chief of artillery, chief engineer, and myself. Opinions and views 
 were called for, and then specific orders were given. I have never known 
 one of them to dissent to any plan of yours, a doubt expressed as to the 
 meaning, or intent, of your orders, nor a suggestion made by them of a 
 plan they supposed would be better than that you ordered. If they are 
 not now unanimous, there is but one, if any, who dissents from the 
 opinion expressed above, viz ; Sherman would have been beaten, had 
 your orders been obeyed on the 20th July, 22d July, and 31st August." 
 
 General A. P. Stewart, in his official report of the operations 
 around Atlanta, states in regard to the battle of the 20th July :* 
 
 " I cannot but think had the plan of the battle, as I understood it, been 
 carried out fully, we would have achieved a great success." 
 
 Lieutenant General Lee expressed to me the opinion that 
 but for the delay before the attack on the 31st August, the 
 result might have been different. This officer, Lieutenant 
 General A. P. Stewart, and Major General G. W. Smith were, 
 at the time, unanimous in the conviction that had General 
 Hardee faithfully and earnestly carried out my instructions on 
 the 20th, and 22d July, we would have been victorious in the 
 two battles, i. e., had he attacked at I o'clock in lieu of 4 p. m., 
 on the 20th ; had he appealed to his troops in a manner to 
 arouse their pride, patriotism and valor, instead of giving 
 utterance to expressions of caution against breastworks ; had 
 he, on the 22d, marched entirely round and in rear of McPher- 
 son's left flank, as ordered, and attacked at daylight or early 
 morning, we would have gained signal victories. 
 
 It may very properly be asked why, after failure on two 
 consecutive occasions, was Hardee placed in command at 
 
 * Appendix, page 350. 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 251 
 
 Jonesboro' ; why I did not relieve him previously from duty 
 with the Army, and thus avoid further cause of complaint. 
 
 The battles of the 20th, and 2 2d of July, were fought in 
 rapid succession, and immediately after my appointment to the 
 command of the Army. I knew not then the original cause 
 of trouble, nor was I enlightened upon this matter till General 
 Cleburne visited my headquarters about two weeks after these 
 engagements. The President had confidence in General Har- 
 dee, and believed he could be of great service on account of 
 his thorough knowledge of the country, and his long con- 
 nection with the Army of Tennessee. In this opinion I 
 naturally acquiesced, since I could not imagine that a soldier, 
 wittingly and willingly, would disregard orders in operations 
 of so much importance. Moreover, the position of his line of 
 battle, together with that of General Lee, rendered it necessary 
 to send their two corps to Jonesboro', and Hardee, the supe- 
 rior officer in rank, of course assumed command. 
 
 I was slow and reluctant to adopt the conclusion finally 
 expressed in my dispatch to the President. I refused to attri- 
 bute Hardee's non-fulfilment of orders to a fixed purpose on 
 his part to thwart my operations as Commander-in-Chief, and 
 imputed his misfortune mainly to the influence of the school 
 in contact with which he had been thrown for a considerable 
 period. 
 
 It is true I had been promoted and placed over him who 
 was my senior in rank, and equally true that, under similar 
 circumstances, not many men will co-operate as heartily as 
 duty dictates, in the furtherance of the projects of their com- 
 manding officer. His brother corps commanders were of the 
 opinion that in this grievance lay the source of trouble, and 
 that he, if not consenting to a frustration of my plans, was at 
 least willing I should not achieve signal success. If these 
 impressions be correct, his want of confidence, or rather fear 
 of rashness on my part, was not lessened ; and feelings were 
 doubtless engendered that created the lukewarmness which 
 
252 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 characterized the conduct of his mihtary operations at that 
 juncture. 
 
 I have been forced to recur to these facts, in consequence 
 of their intimate connection with the important events of that 
 period, and do so with the more sincere regret that General 
 Hardee is no longer able to speak in his own defence. 
 
 After the removal of the prisoners at Andersonville — hitherto 
 the principal obstacle to a movement in rear of Sherman — 
 I deemed it advisable, and, therefore ordered that the rail- 
 road iron for some distance on the three roads leading into 
 Atlanta, be removed and stored for future use. Major General 
 M. L. Smith, chief engineer, was instructed to not only fortify 
 Macon, but likewise Augusta and Columbus ; the chief 
 commissary was directed to remove the depot of supplies to 
 the West Point Railroad, as I desired, preparatory to crossing 
 the Chattahoochee, to place our left flank on that river, with 
 headquarters at Palmetto. 
 
 I recalled General WheelerfromTennesseetojoinimmediately 
 the left of the Army, whilst Colonel Prestman, of the engineer 
 corps, made ready to move with the pontoon train and a suffi- 
 cient number of boats to meet any emergency. These various 
 preparations somewhat revived the spirit of the officers and 
 men ; I was hereby induced to believe that the Army, in its 
 next effort at battle, would fight with more determination than 
 had been exhibited since our retreat from Resaca, and so tele- 
 graphed General Bragg on the 15 th of September. 
 
 Upon the morning of the i8th, the Army began to move in 
 the direction of the West Point Railroad, which the advance 
 reached on the 19th. Upon the 20th, line of battle was formed, 
 with the right east of the railroad, and the left resting near the 
 river, with Army headquarters at Palmetto. 
 
 I sent the following dispatch to General Bragg the succeed- 
 ing day : 
 
 [No. 30.] 
 
 " September 21st. 
 
 " I shall — unless Sherman moves south — as soon as I can collect sup- 
 plies, cross the Chattahoochee river, and form line of battle near Powder 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 253 
 
 Springs. This will prevent him from using the Dalton Railroad, and 
 force him to drive me off or move south, when I shall follow upon his 
 rear. I make this move as Sherman is weaker now than he will be in 
 future, and I as strong as I can expect to be. Would it not be well to 
 move a part of the important machinery at Macon to the east of the 
 Oconee river, and do the same at Augusta to the east side of the Savan- 
 nah river ? If done, it will be important to make the transfer so as not 
 to interfere with the supplies for the Armies. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 On this date expired the truce of ten days which had been 
 agreed upon for the exchange of prisoners, and Major Clare, 
 of my staff, returned with his escort from Rough and Ready. 
 The same day I received information that the President, in 
 response to my invitation, had decided to visit the Army 
 forthwith. 
 
 On the 25th, at 3.30 p. m., President Davis, accompanied 
 by two staff officers, arrived at Pahiietto, with a view to ascer- 
 tain in person the condition of the Army; to confer, as 
 requested, with the corps commanders in regard to the opera- 
 tions around Atlanta, and to obtain the particulars of the 
 proposed campaign in the rear of Sherman. 
 
 On the ensuing morning, we rode forth together to the front, 
 with the object of making an informal review of the troops. 
 Some brigades received the President with enthusiasm; others 
 were seemingly dissatisfied, and inclined to cry out, " give us 
 General Johnston." I regretted I should have been the cause 
 of this uncourteous reception to His Excellency; at the same 
 time, I could recall no offence save that of having insisted that 
 they should fight for and hold Atlanta forty-six days, whereas 
 they had previously retreated one hundred miles within sixty- 
 six days. 
 
 During the evening the President was serenaded by the 
 Twentieth Louisiana band, accompanied by quite a large number 
 of soldiers. He made upon the occasion a short but spirited 
 speech, which was received with long and continued cheers. 
 General Howell Cobb, and Governor Harris, of Tennessee, 
 also delivered brief and eloquent addresses. 
 
254 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 The President held a long conference the next day with 
 Lieutenant Generals Lee and Stewart, in a house not far from 
 my tent. H - conferred also separately with General Hardee. 
 I had, at a previous interview, fully expressed to him my 
 views in relation to the condition of the Army, and maintained 
 that our only hope to checkmate Sherman was to assume the 
 offensive, cut the enemy's communications, select a position on 
 or near the Alabama line in proximity to the Blue Mountain 
 Railroad, and there give him battle. Should the enemy move 
 south, I could as easily from that point as from Palmetto, 
 follow upon his rear, if that policy should be deemed prefer- 
 able. On the other hand, if my position on or near the 
 Alabama line should force Sherman to move out of Atlanta — 
 as I believed it would do — and divide his Army by sending 
 off a portion to Tennessee, which he would consider immedi- 
 ately threatened, I might be able to defeat the wing of the 
 Federal Army, remaining in Georgia, drive it from the country, 
 regain our lost territory, reinspirit the troops, and bring hope 
 again to the hearts of our people. I stated also that I thought 
 an offensive move would improve the morale of the Army to a 
 degree which would render it equal to giving battle to the 
 enemy ; that at the moment it was totally unfit for pitched 
 battle, and the above plan offered the sole chance to avert 
 disaster. 
 
 Prior to his departure, I recalled to him the fact that I had 
 accepted with reluctance the position to which I had been 
 assigned ; that I had never sought preferment from him either 
 directly or indirectly, and assured him I cherished but one 
 desire, which was to do my whole duty to my country. I 
 told him I was aware of the outcry against me, through the 
 press, since the removal of Johnston, and, if he adjudged 
 a change of commanders expedient, not to hesitate to relieve 
 me entirely from duty with the Army of Tennessee or to give 
 me a corps or division, under a more competent leader than 
 myself. 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 255 
 
 After final counsel with the Lieutenant Generals, he left for 
 Montgomery, at 6 p. m., on the 27th of September. 
 
 The main part of the above conversation was repeated after 
 he had mounted his horse, and was in readiness to leave ; he 
 replied that he might find it necessary to assign another to the 
 command of the Army, but I should continue to pursue my 
 proposed plan, at least till a decision was reached in the 
 matter. 
 
 On the 28th, an order from the President was received, and 
 read to the troops, relieving Lieutenant General Hardee from 
 duty with the Army of Tennessee, and assigning him to the 
 command of the Department of South Carolina and Florida, 
 
 The same day, I issued instructions to commence the move- 
 ment across the Chattahoochee at Pumpkin Town and Phillips's 
 Ferry, and, on the following morning, I directed that our sup- 
 plies from Newnan cross the river at Moore's Ferry. At noon, 
 I rode over the pontoon bridge in advance of the infantry, and 
 established my headquarters that night at Pray's Church, along 
 with General Jackson, commanding the cavalry ; and on the 
 next day I received the subjoined communication from the 
 President : 
 
 [Private.l 
 
 " Opelika, Alabama, September 28th, 1864. 
 " General John B. Hood, Headquarters Army of Tennessee. 
 
 " General : — I have anxiously reflected upon the subject of our closing 
 conversation and the proposition confidentially mentioned. It seems 
 to me best that I should confer with General Beauregard, and, if quite 
 acceptable to him, place him in command of the department embracing 
 your Army and that of General R. Taylor, so as to secure the fullest 
 co-operation of the troops, without relieving either of you of the respon- 
 sibilities and powers of your special commands, except in so far as 
 would be due to the superior rank and the above assignment of General 
 Beauregard. He would necessarily, if present with either Army, com- 
 mand in person. Before final action, there will be time for you to com- 
 municate with me, and I shall be glad to have your views. In the mean- 
 time you will of course proceed as though no modification of existing 
 organization was contemplated. 
 
 "Very respectfully and truly yours, 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 
 
256 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 The morning of the ist of October, Brigadier General Jack- 
 son advanced with the cavalry, sending a detachment at the 
 same time to operate against the railroad between the Chatta- 
 hoochee and Marietta. That night the Army went into 
 bivouac eight miles north of Fray's Church, after having 
 effected an undisturbed and safe passage of the Chattahoochee. 
 Information was here received that Kilpatrick's cavalry was 
 north of the river, and that Girard'y cavalry had moved in the 
 direction of Rome. 
 
 The next morning, I telegraphed to General Bragg as 
 follows : 
 
 [No. 33] 
 
 "October 2d. 
 "To-night my right will be at Powder Springs, with my left on Lost 
 Mountain. This will, I think, force Sherman to move on us or to move 
 south. Should he move towards Augusta, all available troops should be 
 sent there with an able officer of high rank to command. Could General 
 Lee spare a division for that place in such an event ? 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, Generair 
 
 The night of the 2d, the Army rested near Flint Hill 
 Church. On the morning of the 3d, Lieutenant General 
 Stewart was instructed to move with his Corps, and take 
 possession of Big Shanty ; to send, if practicable, a detach- 
 ment for the same purpose to Ackworth, and to destroy as 
 great a portion of the railroad in the vicinity as possible ; also 
 to send a division to Allatoona to capture that place, if, in the 
 judgment of the commanding officer, the achievement was 
 feasible.* The main body of the Army in the meantime 
 moved forward, and bivouacked near Carley's house, within 
 four miles of Lost Mountain. 
 
 On the 4th, General Stewart captured, after a slight resist- 
 ance, about one hundred and seventy prisoners, at Big Shanty, 
 and, at 9.30 a. m., the garrison at Ackworth, numbering two 
 hundred and fifty men, surrendered to General Loring. The 
 forces under these officers joined the main body near Lost 
 
 * See Official Report, Appendix, page 326. 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 257 
 
 Mountain on the morning- of the 5th, having, in addition, 
 destroyed about ten or fifteen miles of the railroad. 
 
 I had received information — and Gensral Shoupe records 
 the same in his diary — that the enemy had in store, at Alla- 
 toona, large supplies which were guarded by two or three 
 regiments. As one of the main objects of the campaign was 
 to deprive the enemy of provisions, Major General French 
 was ordered to move with his Division, capture the garrison, if 
 practicable, and gain possession of the supplies. Accordingly, 
 on the 5th, at 10 a. m., after a refusal to surrender,, he 
 attacked the Federal forces at Allatoona, and succeeded in 
 capturing a portion of the works; at that juncture, he received 
 intelligence that large reinforcements were advancing in 
 support of the enemy, and, fearing he would be cut off from 
 the main body of the Army, he retired and abandoned the 
 attempt. Major L. Perot, adjutant of Ector's brigade, has 
 informed me by letter that our troops were in possession of 
 these stores during several hours, and could easily have 
 destroyed them. If this assertion be correct, I presume Major 
 General French forbade their destruction, in the conviction of 
 his ability to successfully remove them for the use of the 
 Confederate Army. 
 
 Our soldiers fought with great courage ; during the engage- 
 ment Brigadier General Young, a brave and efficient officer, 
 was wounded, and captured by the enemy. 
 
 General Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance, 
 and not without reason the Federal commander complimented 
 this officer, through a general order, for his handsome conduct 
 in the defence of Allatoona. 
 
 Our presence upon his communications compelled Sherman 
 to leave Atlanta in haste, and cross the Chattahoochee on the 
 3d and 4th of October with, according to our estimate at that 
 time, about sixty-five thousand (65,000) infantry and artillery, 
 and two divisions of cavalry. He left one corps to guard the 
 city and the railroad bridge across the river, and telegraphed 
 to Grant he would attack me if I struck his road south of the 
 Etowah. 
 
 17 
 
258 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 I received at this juncture a copy of the following order 
 from President Davis : 
 
 "Augusta, Georgia, October sd, 1864. 
 "General G. T. Beauregard, Augusta, Georgia. 
 
 " General : — I desire that, with as httle delay as practicable, you will 
 assume command of the military departments now commanded respect- 
 ively by General Hood, and Lieutenant General Taylor. 
 
 " You will establish the headquarters of the department under your 
 command at such point within its territorial limits as you may consider 
 most advantageous to the public service. 
 
 "Your personal presence is expected wherever in your judgment the 
 interests of your command render it expedient, and whenever present 
 with an Army in the field, you will exercise immediate command of the 
 troops. 
 
 "The adjutant and inspector general will be directed to communicate 
 
 to you without delay the orders defining the geographical limits of your 
 
 department, and such letters of general instruction as may have been 
 
 sent to your predecessors, and as it may be important for you to possess. 
 
 " Very respectfully and truly yours, 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 " (For General Hood)."* 
 
 This order was most satisfactory, inasmuch as it afforded 
 me at least an opportunity to confer with an officer of distinc- 
 tion, in regard to future operations. 
 
 The attack upon his communications, in the vicinity of the 
 Etowah river and near the Alabama line, had forced Sherman 
 to hasten from Atlanta. In truth, the effect of our operations 
 so far surpassed my expectations that I was induced to some- 
 what change my original plan to draw Sherman to the Alabama 
 line and then give battle. I accordingly decided to move 
 further north and again strike his railroad between Resacaand 
 Tunnel Hill, thoroughly destroy it, and then move in the 
 direction of the Tennessee, via Lafayette and Gadsden, with 
 no intent, however, to cross the river. This move, I consid- 
 ered, would so seriously threaten the road at Stevenson, and 
 the bridge across the Tennessee river, at Bridgeport, that 
 Sherman would be compelled still further to detach and divide 
 his forces, whilst at the same time he continued his march 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 259 
 
 northward. I intended then to entice him as near the Ten- 
 nessee line as possible, before offering battle. To accomplish 
 this end, I thought it might be expedient to march to a point 
 in the vicinity of the Tennessee, and even to order the cavalry 
 to advance as far as the river, before I turned upon the enemy. 
 
 It was my fixed purpose to attack Sherman as soon as I 
 succeeded in these manoeuvres. The plan of the original 
 campaign was, therefore, only more fully developed by this 
 strategy, which, in truth, I adopted as an afterthought. 
 
 On the 6th, the Army reached Dallas ; our right rested at 
 New Hope Church, where intelligence was received that the 
 enemy was advancing from Lost Mountain. From Dallas we 
 marched to Coosaville, ten miles southwest of Rome, via Van 
 Wert, Cedartown, and Cave Spring. At the latter place Major 
 General Wheeler, with a portion of his command, joined me 
 from. Tennessee. We arrived at Coosaville on the loth, and the 
 day previous, when near Van Wert, I sent the following dis- 
 patch to General Bragg: 
 
 [No. 34.] 
 
 " Near Van Wert, Georgia, ) 
 " October gth, 1864. j 
 " General B. Bragg and Honorable J. A. Seddon, Richmond. 
 
 " When Sherman found this Army on his communications, he left 
 Atlanta hurriedly with his main body, and formed line of battle near 
 Kennesaw Mountain. I at once moved to this point, and, marching 
 to-morrow, shall cross the Coosa river about ten miles below Rome ; and 
 moving up the west bank of the Oostenaula, hope to destroy his com- 
 munications from Kingston to Tunnel Hill, forcing him to fall back or 
 move south. If the latter, I shall move on his rear. If the former, I 
 shall move to the Tennessee river, via Lafayette and Gadsden. I leave 
 near Jacksonville all surplus baggage, artillery, and wagons, and move 
 prepared for battle. If I move to the Tennessee, my trains will meet me 
 at Gadsden. Please have the Memphis and Charleston Railroad repaired 
 at once to Decatur, if possible. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, Genera/." 
 
 This last precautionary measure I deemed advisable, as I 
 sought to forestall every possible contingency. If our arms 
 
2G0 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 met with only partial success in battle — that is, if Sher- 
 man was not routed, but merely badly worsted — I had deter- 
 mined to send the wounded to the rear by the Blue Mountain 
 Railroad; by rapid marches to cross the Tennessee river at 
 Gunter's Landing, and again destroy the enemy's communica- 
 tions at Stevenson, and Bridgeport. I felt confident that Sher- 
 man, after being disabled in battle, would follow in my rear, 
 and I hoped that the near approach of cold weather would 
 favor my attempt to at least recover our lost territory, and allow 
 our Army to winter again in the vicinity of Dalton. In anticipa- 
 tion of this probable event, I requested the authorities to have 
 the Memphis and Charleston Railroad repaired to or near De- 
 catur, Alabama, in order to establish another line for supplies 
 and retreat, in case of either success or disaster in Tennessee. 
 In a dispatch to General Taylor I requested that Forrest 
 be ordered to operate at once in Tennessee : 
 
 [No. 499.] , 
 
 "Van Wert, October y/h. 
 " Lieutenant General Taylor, 
 
 " Cotmnandmg Departmettt, Gainesville yunction. 
 " Your dispatch of the 6th received. This Army being in motion, it is 
 of vital importance that Forrest should move without delay, and operate 
 on the enemy's railroad. If he cannot break the Chattanooga and Nash- 
 ville Railroad, he can occupy their forces there, and prevent damage 
 being repaired on the other road. He should lose no time in moving. 
 I am very thankful for the assistance already afforded this Army. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General:' 
 
 The improvement in the morale of the troops was already 
 apparent, and desertions, so frequent at Palmetto, had alto- 
 gether ceased. I, therefore, indulged a not unreasonable hope 
 very soon to deal the enemy a hard and staggering blow. In 
 order to convey his appreciation of the importance attached 
 to our movement upon his line of communication, I will quote 
 General Sherman's own words : * 
 
 "In person I reached Allatoona on the 9th of October, still in doubt 
 as to Hood's immediate intentions." 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 152. 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 261 
 
 In a dispatch of the same date to Thomas, at Nashville : 
 
 " I came up here to relieve our road. The Twentieth Corps remains 
 at Atlanta. Hood reached the road, and broke it up between Big Shanty 
 and Ackworth. He attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed. We have 
 plenty of bread and meat, but forage is scarce. I want to destroy all 
 the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the 
 sea coast. We cannot defend this long line of road." 
 
 On the same day he sent the following dispatch to Grant, 
 at City Point : 
 
 " It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads now that Hood, 
 Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without 
 home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to 
 the end of the Selma and Talladega road, at Blue Mountain, about sixty 
 miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridge- 
 port, Decatur, Alabama." * * * * 
 
 On the loth of October, Brigadier General Jackson, com- 
 manding the cavalry, was instructed by Colonel Mason, as 
 follows : 
 
 [No 438.] 
 
 "Cave Spring, October loth, 8 a. m. 
 " General Hood desires me to inform you that the pontoon at Quinn's 
 Ferry, on the Coosa river, will be taken up this evening, and you must 
 put on a line of couriers to that place to connect with a line to the other 
 side. They will meet at the ferry, and you must continue to keep some 
 there, or near there, to take dispatches over the line. Day after to-mor- 
 row (i2th), unless you are otherwise engaged, General Hood desires you 
 will mqve on Rome, and make a considerable demonstration from your 
 side of the river ; but be careful not to fire into the town. Communicate 
 fully and frequently about all movements of the enemy." 
 
 On the I ith, the Army crossed the Coosa river, marched in 
 the direction of Resacaand Dalton, and bivouacked that night 
 fourteen miles above Coosaville, and ten miles northwest of 
 Rome. That same day Major General Arnold Elzey, chief of 
 artillery, was directed to move to Jacksonville with the reserve 
 artillery and all surplus wagons, and General Jackson was 
 instructed to retard the enemy as much as possible, in the 
 event of his advance from Rome. 
 
 Having thus relieved the Army of all incumbrance, and 
 
262 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 made ready for battle, we marched rapidly to Resaca, and 
 thence to Dalton, via Sugar Valley Post Office. Lieutenant 
 General Lee moved upon Resaca, with instructions to display 
 his forces and demand the surrender of the garrison, but not 
 to attack, unless, in his judgment, the capture could be effected 
 with small loss of life. He decided not to assault the Federal 
 works, and commenced at once the destruction of the railroad. 
 
 On the 13th, I demanded the surrender of Dalton, which, in 
 the first instance, was refused, but was finally acceded to at 4 
 p. m.^ The garrison consisted of about one thousand (looo) 
 men. ATBie road between Resaca and Tunnel Hill had been 
 effectually destroyed, the Army was put in motion the next 
 morning in the direction of Gadsden, and camped that night 
 neai* Villanon. 
 
 Whilst in front of Dalton, quite a spirited affair occurred at 
 Mill Creek Gap, where a detachment of our troops attacked 
 and gained possession of a block house. Major Kinloch Fal- 
 coner, of my staff, was during this assault seriously wounded. 
 
 On the morning of the 15 th, I sent from Van Wert the follow- 
 ing dispatch to the Honorable J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War, 
 Generals Bragg and Beauregard: 
 
 [No. 500.]- 
 
 "Van Wert, October isth. • 
 " This Army struck the communications of the enemy about a mile 
 above Resaca (the 12th), completely destroying the railroad, including 
 block houses from that point to within a short distance of Tunnel Hill ; 
 and about four miles of the Cleveland Railroad, capturing Dalton and 
 all intermediate garrisons, with their stores, arms and equipments — 
 taking about one thousand (1000) prisoners. The main body of Sher- 
 man's Army seem to be moving towards Dalton. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, Generair 
 
 From Villanon, the Army passed through the gaps in the 
 mountains, and halted during the 15th and i6th at Cross 
 Roads, in a beautiful valley about nine miles south of Lafay- 
 ette. At this time I received intelligence that Sherman had, 
 on the 1 3th, reached Snake Creek Gap, where the right of his 
 line had rested in the early Spring of this year; also that he 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 263 
 
 was marching in our pursuit, whilst General Wheeler was 
 endeavoring to retard his advance as much as possible. I here 
 determined to advance no further towards the Tennessee river, 
 but to select a position and deliver battle, since Sherman had, 
 at an earlier date than anticipated, moved as far north as I had 
 hoped to allure him ; moreover I was again in the vicinity of 
 the Alabama line, with the Blue Mountain Railroad in my 
 rear, and I thought I had discovered thgt improvement in the 
 morale of the troops, which would justify me in delivering 
 battle. In accordance with information received from our 
 cavalry, Sherman had, however, made no further division of his 
 forces after leaving Atlanta. I estimated, therefore, his strength 
 to be about sixty-five thousand (65,000) effectives. 
 
 Upon the eve of action, I considered it important to ascertain 
 by personal inquiry and through the aid of officers of my staff, 
 not alone from corps commanders, but from officers of less 
 rank, whether or not my impressions after the capture of 
 Dalton were correct, and I could rely upon the troops enter- 
 ing into battle at least hopeful of victoiy. I took measures to 
 obtain likewise the views of Lieutenant General Lee who, at 
 this juncture, was with his Corps in rear, at or near Ship's Gap. 
 He agreed with all the officers consulted ; the opinion was 
 unanimous that although the Army had much improved in 
 spirit, it was not in condition to risk battle against the numbers 
 reported by General Wheeler. 
 
 The renouncement of the object for which I had so earnestly 
 striven, brought with it genuine disappointment; I had 
 expected that a forward movement of one hundred miles 
 would re-inspirit the officers and men in a degree to impart to 
 them confidence, enthusiasm, and hope of victory, if not strong 
 faith in its achievement. 
 
 I remained two days at Cross Roads in serious thought and 
 perplexity. I could not offer battle while the officers were 
 unanimous in their opposition. Neither could I take an 
 entrenched position with likelihood of advantageous results, 
 since Sherman could do the same, repair the railroad, amass a 
 
264 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 large Army, place Thomas in my front in command of the 
 forces he afterwards assembled at Nashville, and then, himself, 
 move southward ; or, as previously suggested, he could send 
 Thomas into Alabama, whilst he marched through Georgia, 
 and left me to follow in his rear. This last movement upon 
 our part, would be construed by the troops into a retreat, and 
 could but result in disaster. 
 
 In this dilemma, I conceiv^ed the plan of marching into 
 Tennessee with a hope to establish our line eventually in 
 Kentucky, and determined to make the campaign which 
 followed, unless withheld by General Beauregard or the 
 authorities at Richmond. General Beauregard at this time 
 was journe)'ing in my direction. I proposed, therefore, when 
 he joined me, to lay fully before him my plan of operations. 
 
 Before entering into an account thereof, I will for a moment 
 advert to the evidences of the solicitude occasioned the enemy 
 by our movement to the Alabama line. 
 
 On the loth of October, General Sherman telegraphed to 
 Generals Thomas and Cox, as follows : * 
 
 " I will be at Kingston to-morrow. I think Rome is strong enough to 
 resist any attack, and the rivers are all high. If he (Hood) turns up by 
 Summerville, I will get behind him." 
 
 On the 1 6th, when in pursuit of our Army from Resaca in 
 the direction of Ship's Gap and Lafayette, he again telegraphs 
 to Thomas, at Nashville : f 
 
 " Send me Morgan's and Newton's old Divisions. Re-establish the 
 road, and I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move 
 to Blue Mountain. We can maintain our men and animals on the 
 country." 
 
 On the 17th, he writes Schofield, at Chattanooga: J 
 
 «. * * * \Yg must follow Hood till he is beyond the reach of mischief, 
 and then resume the offensive." 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 153. 
 f Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 1 56. 
 j Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 157. 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 265 
 
 Ten days after this declaration, he was still undecided as to 
 the plan he should adopt. In truth, it seemed difficult to 
 divine when our little Army would be far enough away to be 
 "beyond the reach of mischief" On the 26th, he telegraphed 
 to General Thomas : * "A reconnoissance, pushed down to 
 Gadsden to-day, reveals the fact that the rebel Army is not 
 there, and the chances are it has moved west. If it turns up 
 at Guntersville, I will be after it." He writes in his Memoirs if 
 "There is no doubt that the month of October closed to us look- 
 ing decidedly squally, but, somehow, I was sustained in the 
 belief that in a very few days the tide would turn." Upon the 
 same page I find the following telegram from General Grant : 
 
 "City Point, November ist, 1864, 6 p. in. 
 "Major General Sherman. 
 
 " Do you not think it advisable, now Hood has gone so far north, to 
 entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign ? With 
 Hood's Army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I 
 believed and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in 
 the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. 
 Now that he is far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and 
 he will go on in one direction while you are pushing in another. If you 
 can see a chance of destroying Hood's Army, attend to that first, and 
 make your other move secondary." 
 
 General Sherman replied, as follows : J 
 
 "Rome, Georgia, November 2d, 1864. 
 " Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, City Point, Virginia. 
 
 " Your dispatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hoed, I 
 would turn against him with my whole force ; then he would retreat to 
 the southwest, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which is his 
 chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee river, I may venture 
 in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on- his line of retreat ; 
 but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee river. General 
 Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any 
 country in which we have an interest ; and he has orders, if Hood turns 
 
 * Van Home's History of the Army of the Cumberland, vol. II, page 1,8 1, 
 f Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 164. 
 J Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 165. 
 
266 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama. No single Army can catch 
 Hood, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating 
 Jeff. Davis's cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by manoeuvring. 
 Thus far I have confmed my efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced 
 baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction ; but I regard 
 the pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle 
 Tennessee, 1 will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direc- 
 tion ; but, unless I let go Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his, 
 
 " W. T. SHERMAN, Major Generair 
 
 Before my attention was arrested by the above dispatches, 
 I had vvTitten those hnes which record my surmises in regard 
 to Sherman's and Thomas's movements, during our campaign 
 to the Alabama hne. I did not, however, believe that Sher- 
 man would follow me to Guntersville, unless I had been 
 able to worst him in battle. No better proof can be adduced 
 of the wisdom of this campaign than the foregoing dispatches, 
 together with our success in drawing Sherman back, within 
 ten days, to Snake Creek Gap, the identical position he occu- 
 pied in May, 1864. Had the Army been in the fighting con- 
 dition in which it was at Dalton, or at Franklin, I feel confident 
 of our ability to have at least so crippled the enemy in pitched 
 battle as to have retained possession of the mountains of 
 Georfria. When I consider also the effect of this movement 
 upon the Federal commanders, I cannot but become impressed 
 with the facility with which the Confederate Army would have 
 taken possession of the country as far north as the Ohio, if it 
 had marched in the early Spring of '64, to the rear of the 
 Federals (who were at Chattanooga assembling their forces) ; 
 and when, in addition to the troops at Dalton, Polk's Army, 
 Longstreet's Ccrps, and ten thousand men from Beauregard, 
 were proffered for the purpose. 
 
 After halting two days at Cross Roads, I decided to make 
 provision for twenty days' supply of rations in the haversacks 
 and wagons ; to order a heavy reserve of artillery to accom- 
 pany the Army, in order to overcome any serious opposition 
 l)y the Federal gunboats ; to cross the Tennessee at or near 
 Guntersville, and again destroy Sherman's communications, at 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 267 
 
 Stevenson and Bridgeport ; to move upon Thomas and Scho- 
 field, and attempt to rout and capture their Army before it 
 could reach Nashville. I intended then to march upon that 
 city where I would supply the Army and reinforce it, if pos- 
 sible, by accessions from Tennessee. I was imbued with the 
 belief that I could accomplish this feat, afterward march 
 northeast, pass the Cumberland river at some crossing where 
 the gunboats, if too formidable at other points, were unable to 
 interfere ; then move into Kentucky, and take position with 
 our left at or near Richmond, and our right extending toward 
 Hazelgreen, with Pound and Stoney Gaps, in the Cumberland 
 Mountains, at our rear. 
 
 In this position I could threaten Cincinnati, and recruit the 
 Army from Kentucky and Tennessee; the former State was 
 reported, at this juncture, to be more aroused and embittered 
 against the Federals than at any period of the war. While 
 Sherman was debating between the alternative of following 
 our Army or marching through Georgia, I hoped, by rapid 
 movements, to achieve these results. 
 
 If Sherman cut loose and moved south — as I then believed 
 he would do after I left his front without previously ivorsting 
 hint in battle — I would occupy at Richmond, Kentucky, a posi- 
 tion of superior advantage, as Sherman, upon his arrival at the 
 sea coast, would be forced to go on board ship, and, after a 
 long detour by water and land, repair to the defence of Ken- 
 tucky and Ohio or march direct to the support of Grant. If 
 he returned to confront my forces, or followed me directly 
 from Georgia into Tennessee and Kentucky, I hoped then to 
 be in condition to offer battle ; and, if blessed with victory, to 
 send reinforcements to General Lee, in Virginia, or to march 
 through the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains, and attack 
 Grant in rear. This latter course I would pursue in the event 
 of defeat or of inability to offer battle to Sherman. If on the 
 other hand he marched to join Grant, I could pass through 
 the Cumberland gaps to Petersburg, and attack Grant in rear, 
 at least two weeks before he, Sherman, could render him 
 
268 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 assistance. This move, I believed, would defeat Grant, and 
 allow General Lee, in command of our combined Armies, to 
 march upon Washington or turn upon and annihilate Sherman. 
 
 Such is the plan which during the 15th and i6th, as we lay 
 in bivouac near Lafayette, I maturely considered, and deter- 
 mined to endeavor to carry out. In accordance therewith, I 
 decided to move to Gadsden, where, if I met General Beaure- 
 gard, I intended to submit to him the foregoing plan of opera- 
 tions, expressing at the same time my conviction that therein 
 lay the only hope to bring victory to the Confederate arms. 
 
 On the 17th, the Army resumed its line of march, and that 
 night camped three miles from the forks of the Alpine, Gales- 
 ville, and Summerville roads; thence proceeded towards 
 Gadsden. 
 
 On the 19th, I sent the following dispatches: 
 
 [No. 35 1 
 
 " October igth. 
 " General Bragg and Hon. J. A. Seddon. 
 
 " Headquarters will be to-morrow at Gadsden, where I hope not to be 
 delayed more than forty-eight hours, when I shall move for the Tennes- 
 see river. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, Genera/." 
 
 [No. 36.} 
 
 " October 20th. 
 " Lieutenant General Taylor, Mobile. 
 
 " I will move to-morrow for Guntersville on the Tennessee. Please 
 place all the garrison you can at Corinth, and have the railroad iron 
 from there to Memphis taken up as close as possible to Memphis. Have 
 not yet seen General Beauregard. Give me all the assistance you can 
 
 to get my supplies to Tuscumbia. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, G"^;/^'ra/." 
 
 I proposed to move directly on to Guntersville, as indicated 
 to General Taylor, and to take into Tennessee about one-half 
 of Wheeler's cavalry (leaving the remainder to look after 
 Sherman) and to have a depot of supplies at Tuscumbia, in 
 the event I met with defeat in Tennessee. 
 
 Shortly after my arrival at Gadsden, General Beauregard 
 reached the same point ; I at once unfolded to him my plan. 
 
CAMPAIGN TO THE ALABAMA LINE. 269 
 
 and requested that he confer apart with the corps commanders, 
 Lieutenant Generals Lee and Stewart, and Major General 
 Cheatham. If after calm deliberation, he deemed it expedient 
 we should remain upon the Alabama line and attack Sherman^ 
 or take position, entrench, and finally follow on his rear when 
 he moved south, I would of course acquiesce, albeit with 
 reluctance. If, contrariwise, he should agree to my proposed 
 plan to cross into Tennessee, I would move immediately to 
 Guntersville, thence to Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Nashville. 
 
 This important question at issue was discussed during the 
 greater part of one night, with maps before us. General Beau- 
 regard at length took the ground that if I engaged in the 
 projected campaign, it would be necessary to leave in Georgia 
 all the cavalry at present with the Army, in order to watch 
 and harass Sherman in case he moved south, and to instruct 
 Forrest to join me as soon as I crossed the Tennessee river. 
 To this proposition I acceded. After he had held a separate 
 conference with the corps commanders, we again debated 
 several hours over the course of action to be pursued ; and, 
 during the interview, I discovered that he had gone to work in 
 earnest to ascertain, in person, the true condition of the Army ; 
 that he had sought information not only from the corps com- 
 manders, but from a number of officers, and had reached the 
 same conclusion I had formed at Lafayette : we were not com- 
 petent to offer pitched battle to Sherman, nor could we follow 
 him south without causing our retrograde movement to be 
 construed by the troops into a recurrence of retreat, which 
 would entail desertions, and render the Army of little or no 
 use in its opposition to the enemy's march through Georgia. 
 After two days' deliberation. General Beauregard authorized 
 me, on the evening of the 21st of October, to proceed to the 
 execution of my plan of operations into Tennessee. 
 
 At this point, it may be considered, closed the campaign to 
 the Alabama line. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN FORREST WHEELER DEFLECTION TO 
 
 FLORENCE DETENTION PRESIDENT DAVIS BEAUREGARD 
 
 COLUMBIA SPRING HILL. 
 
 General Beauregard's approval of a forward movement 
 into Tennessee was soon m^de known to the Army. The 
 prospect of again entering that State created great enthusiasm, 
 and from the different encampments arose at intervals that 
 genuine Confederate shout so familiar to every Southern 
 soldier, and which then betokened an improved state of feeling 
 among the troops. 
 
 With twenty days' rations in the haversacks and wagons, 
 we marched, on the 22d of October, upon all the roads leading 
 from Gadsden in the direction of Guntersville, on the Tennessee 
 river, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity of Bennetsville. 
 
 I here received information that General Forrest was near 
 Jackson, Tennessee, and could not reach the middle portion 
 of this State, as the river was too high. It would, therefore, 
 be impossible for him to join me, if I crossed at Guntersville; 
 as it was regarded as essential that the whole of Wheeler's 
 cavalry remain in Georgia, I decided to deflect westward, effect 
 a junction with Forrest, and then cross the river at Florence. 
 General Beauregard sent orders to him to join me without 
 delay; also dispatched a messenger to hasten forward supplies 
 
 to Tuscumbia. 
 
 (270) 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 271 
 
 The succeeding day, th(? movement was continued toward 
 Florence, in lieu of Guntersville as I had expected. Lieutenant 
 General Lee's Corps reached the Tennessee, near Florence, on 
 the 30th ; Johnson's Division crossed the river, and took pos- 
 session of that town. My headquarters were during the 27th 
 and 28th at the house of General Garth, near Decatur, where 
 also stopped General Beauregard. While the Army turned 
 Decatur, I ordered a slight demonstration to be made against 
 the town till our forces passed safely beyond, when I moved 
 toward Tuscumbia, at which place I arrived on the 31st of 
 October. Johnson's Division, which held possession of 
 Florence, was reinforced the same day by Clayton's Division. 
 
 Thus the Confederate Army rested upon the banks of the 
 Tennessee one month after its departure from Palmetto. It 
 had been almost continuously in motion during this interim; 
 it had by rapid moves and manoeuvres, and with only a small 
 loss, drawn Sherman as far ndrth as he stood in the early 
 Spring. The killed and wounded at Allatoona had been 
 replaced by absentees who returned to ranks, and, as usual in 
 such operations, the number of desertions became of no conse- 
 quence. In addition to the official returns, my authority for the 
 last assertion is Judge Cofer, of Kentucky, who was provost 
 marshal of the Army at this period, and is at present one of 
 the district judges of his State. About two years ago, in 
 Louisville, he informed me that he had been impressed by 
 the small number of desertions reported to him during the 
 campaigns to the rear of Sherman, and into Tennessee. 
 
 Notwithstanding my request as early as the 9th of October 
 that the railroad to Decatur be repaired, nothing had been 
 done on the ist of November towards the accomplishment of 
 this important object, as the following dispatch from the super- 
 intendent of the road will show : 
 
 " Corinth, Mississippi, November ist, 1864. 
 " General G. T. Beauregard. 
 
 " I fear you have greatly over-estimated the capacity and condition of 
 this railroad to transport the supplies for General Hood's Army. 
 
272 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 " Most of the bridges between here and Okolona were destroyed and 
 recently only patched up to pass a few trains of supplies for General 
 Forrest, and are liable to be swept away by freshets which we may soon 
 expect. The cross-ties are so much decayed that three trains ran off 
 yesterday, and the track will be still worse in rainy weather. 
 
 " I have called upon General Taylor for additional labor, and will use 
 every effort to forward the supplies, but deem it due to you to advise you 
 of the true condition of the road. 
 
 "(Signed) L. J. FLEMING, 
 
 " Chief Engineer and General Superintendent ^I. & O. R. R." 
 
 I had expected upon my arrival at Tuscumbia to find addi- 
 tional supplies, and to cross the river at once. Unfortunately, 
 I was constrained to await repairs upon the railroad before a 
 sufificient amount of supplies could be received to sustain the 
 Army till it was able to reach Middle Tennessee. 
 
 General Beauregard remained two weeks at Tuscumbia and 
 in its vicinity, during which interval the inaugurated campaign 
 was discussed anew at great length. General Sherman was 
 still in the neighborhood of Rome, and the question arose as 
 to whether we should take trains and return to Georgia to 
 oppose his movements south or endeavor to execute the pro- 
 jected operations into Tennessee and Kentucky. I adhered 
 to the conviction I had held at Lafayette and Gadsden, and 
 a second time desired General Beauregard to consult the corps 
 commanders, together with other officers, in regard to the 
 effect a return to Georgia would produce upon the Army. I 
 also urged the consideration that Thomas would immediately 
 overrun Alabama, if we marched to confront Sherman. I had 
 fixedly determined, unless withheld by Beauregard or the 
 authorities at Richmond, to proceed, as soon as supplies were 
 received, to the execution of the plan submitted at Gadsden. 
 
 On the 6th of November, I sent the following dispatch to 
 the President: 
 
 [No. 37.] 
 
 " Headquarters Tuscumbia, 1 
 " November 6th, J 
 
 " His Excellency, President Davis, Richmond. 
 
 " General Wheeler reports from Blue Mountain that Sherman is mov- 
 ing one corps to Tennessee, and three to- Marietta. I hope to march for 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 273 
 
 Middle Tennessee by the eighth or ninth (8th or 9th) inst. Should he 
 move two or three corps south from Atlanta, I think it would be the best 
 thing that could happen for our general good. General Beauregard 
 agrees with me as to my plan of operation. Would like to be informed 
 if any forces are sent from Grant or Sheridan, to Nashville. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General:' 
 
 At this juncture, I was advised of the President's opposition 
 to the campaign into Tennessee previous to a defeat of Sher- 
 man in battle, as is clearly indicated by his reply : 
 
 "Richmond, November -/ih, 1864. 
 " General J. B. Hood. " via Meridian. 
 
 " No troops can have been sent by Grant or Sheridan to Nashville. 
 The latter has attempted to reinforce the former, but Early's movements 
 prevented it. That fact will assure you as to their condition and pur- 
 poses. The policy of taking advantage of the reported division of his 
 forces, where he cannot re-unite his Army, is too obvious to have been 
 overlooked by you. I therefore take it for granted that you have not 
 been able to avail yourself of that advantage, during his march north- 
 ward from Atlanta. Hope the opportunity will be offered before he is 
 extensively recruited. If you keep his communications destroyed, he 
 will most probably seek to concentrate for an attack on you. But if, as 
 reported to you, he has sent a large part of his force southward, you may 
 first beat him in detail, and, subsequently, without serious obstruction or 
 danger to the country in your rear, advance to the Ohio river. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 
 
 The President, as indicated, was evidently under the impres- 
 sion that the Army should have been equal to battle by the 
 time it had reached the Alabama line, and was averse to my 
 going into Tennessee.* He was not, as General Beauregard 
 and myself, acquainted with its true condition. Therefore, a 
 high regard for his views notwithstanding, I continued firm in 
 the belief that the only means to checkmate Sherman, and 
 co-operate with General Lee to save the Confederacy, lay in 
 speedy success in Tennessee and Kentucky, and in my ability 
 finally to attack Grant in rear with my entire force. 
 
 * Almost every writer upon the subject of my campaign into Tennessee, has 
 fallen into the popular error that the President ordered me into that State; and, 
 strange to say, General Taylor, brother-in-law of Mr, Davis, has also grossly erred 
 in this regard, when he could have addressed a note to the Chief Executive of the 
 Confederacy and have ascertained the truth. 
 
 18 
 
274 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 On the 9th, I telegraphed to the Secretary of War : 
 
 [No. 38.] 
 
 " Headquarters Tuscumbia, ] 
 *' November <jth. j 
 
 " Hon. J. A. Seddon, Richmond, Va. 
 
 " Information received places Sherman's Army as follows : One corps at 
 Atlanta, two corps at or near Marietta; and three at or north of Chatta- 
 nooga. Heavy rains will delay the operations of this Army a few days. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 Although every possible effort was made to expedite the 
 repairs upon the railroad, the work progressed slowly. Heavy 
 rains in that section of the country also interfered with the 
 completion of the road. 
 
 I informed General Beauregard of the President's oppo- 
 sition to my plan, and, on the 12th, replied to His Excellency, 
 as follows : 
 
 [No. 39.] 
 
 " Headquarters near Florence, Alabama, | 
 " November 12th, 1864. \ 
 "His Excellency, the President, Richmond, Virginia. 
 
 " Your telegram of the 7th received to-day. When I moved out from 
 Atlanta, he (Sherman) came with five corps, and kept them united until 
 I moved from Gadsden to this point, entrenching himself wherever he 
 halted. It was only after I reached this point that he divided his force. 
 After my descent upon the railroad and upon Dalton, I did not regard 
 this Army in proper condition for a pitched battle. It is now in excellent 
 spirits, and confident. Before leaving Gadsden, I urged on General 
 Beauregard to send General Forrest across the Tennessee river. This 
 he ordered ; and I intended, when leaving Gadsden, to cross the river at 
 or near Gunter's Landing. Finding, however, when I reached that 
 vicinity, that Forrest had not crossed, I could not, without his co-opera- 
 tion, pass the river there, as I required Wheeler to look after my right 
 flank. Forrest has not yet crossed over, but is moving upon this side of 
 the river, and will join me here. 
 
 " This circumstance, high water, and the fact that I had to draw supplies 
 
 from and through a department not under my command — involving delay 
 
 in their reaching me — have retarded my operations. As soon as Forrest 
 
 joins me, which will be in a few days, I shall be able to move forward. 
 
 Without the assistance of Forrest, I cannot secure my wagon trains when 
 
 across the river. You may rely upon my striking the enemy whenever 
 
 a suitable opportunity presents itself, and that I will spare no effort to 
 
 make that opportunity. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN 275 
 
 On the 13th, I established my headquarters in Florence, 
 upon the north branch of the Tennessee, and the following 
 day General Forrest, with his command, reported for duty. 
 On the 15th, the remainder of Lee's Corps crossed the river, 
 and bivouacked in advance of Florence. Stewart's and Cheat- 
 ham's Corps were instructed also to cross the same day. 
 
 Upon this date, I received the following from General Beau- 
 regard : 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the West, ) 
 " TuscuMiUA, Alabama, November 13th, 1864. j 
 
 " General : — As you seemed on yesterday to have misunderstood my 
 verbal communication of the 13th inst., through my chief of staff, I 
 deem it of sufificient importance to communicate in writing, what I had 
 instructed him to say relative to the movement of the Army of Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 " I instructed him to tell you that in consequence of the information 
 received the night previous, to- wit, the apparent confirmation of the 
 concentration of the bulk of Sherman's Army in Middle Tennessee (at 
 Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur), the arrival of Canty and part of his 
 forces at Memphis, and the condition of Cobb's and Smith's forces at 
 Lovejoy's Station, I desired to confer further with you before you com- 
 menced the projected movement into Middle Tennessee, now partly in 
 process of execution ; that is, Lee's Corps already in advance of Florence, 
 and Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps under orders to cross the river. 
 
 " My purpose was to call again your attention as I did yesterday : 
 
 " 1st. To the necessity of guarding well your left flank, and rear, in 
 advancing towards Lawrenceburgand Pulaski, against a sudden offensive 
 movement of the enemy from Huntsville or Athens, across the Elk river. 
 
 " 2d. To securing against the passage of the enemy's gunboats 
 another point (about Savannah or Clifton) besides Florence for the Army 
 to recross the Tennessee, in the event of disaster. 
 
 " 3d. To giving still greater protection to Corinth, and the M. and O. 
 R. R. to that point. 
 
 " I was aware that these points had already been discussed between 
 us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command, 
 made it incumbent on me to call again your attention to these important 
 matters. 
 
 " I wish also to inform you that the third point mentioned may require 
 greater time than was at first supposed necessary. All orders for com- 
 pleting the defences of Corinth, repairing and prosecuting vigorously 
 the work on the M. and C. R. R. to this place, and for repairing the 
 
276 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 M. and O. R. R. from Okolona to Bethel, have been g'ven, and are being 
 carried out as rapidly as the limited means of the engineer and 
 quarter master's departments will permit. It is at present reported that 
 the railroads referred to will be completed in from fifteen to twenty days ; 
 but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the prevailing unfavorable 
 weather will delay the work one or two weeks longer. 
 
 " General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your 
 present campaign, with all the means at our control ; but, these being 
 limited, ample previous notice of what may be required, should be given 
 to enable us to make all necessary preparations. 
 
 " It will also give me pleasure to confer on you such powers as you 
 may deem necessary to secure your communications, repair roads, and 
 hasten supplies to your Army, whilst operating in the department of 
 General Taylor. 
 
 " Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 •• G. T. BEAUREGARD, General:' 
 
 About the time all necessary preparations verged to a com- 
 pletion, and I anticipated to move forward once more, heavy 
 rains again delayed our supplies, as will be shown by the sub- 
 joined communication from Colonel Brent: 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the West, 1 
 " TuscuMBiA, Alabama, November iph, 1864. j 
 
 " General : — General Beauregard instructs me to say that a bridge 
 about three miles from Tuscumbia on road to Cherokee, is now being 
 constructed, and that, for want of workmen, it cannot be completed in 
 less than five or six days, and at this point the road is almost impassable. 
 There are also other points on the road which will become impassable, 
 should the rain continue. He thinks it important that a proper force 
 should be sent to complete the improvements as early as possible. 
 " Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " GEORGE W. BRENT, 
 
 " Colonel and A. A. G." 
 
 In compliance with this request, working parties were at 
 once detailed, and sent to different points on the railroad ; 
 wagons were also dispatched to aid in the transportation of 
 supplies. The officer in charge was instructed to require the 
 men to labor unceasingly toward the accomplishment of this 
 important object. 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 277 
 
 On the 17th, General Beauregard issued the following order 
 previous to his departure for Montgomery, Alabama: 
 
 " Headquarters Military Division of the West, ) 
 " TuscuMBiA, Alabama, November lyth, 1864. j 
 
 "General: — General Beauregard desires me to say that he desires 
 you will take the offensive at the earliest practicable moment, striking the 
 enemy whilst thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's 
 advance into Georgia. 
 
 " To relieve you from any embarrassment whilst operating in North 
 Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such 
 orders, in General Taylor's Department, you may deem necessary to 
 secure the efficient and successful administration and operation of your 
 Army — sending General Taylor copies of all orders. 
 
 " He wishes you to send forthwith to Major General Wheeler one 
 brigade of cavalry of Jackson's Division, and the balance of that Division 
 as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia ; and 
 also to advise General Wheeler that in such case Clanton's brigade is 
 subject to his orders. 
 
 "The headquarters of this military division will be removed, in the 
 morning, from this place to Montgomery, Alabama. 
 
 "I am. General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "GEORGE W. BRENT, 
 
 " Colonel and A. A. G. 
 
 "General J. B. Hood, 
 
 " Commanding Army of Tennessee." 
 
 The ensuing day, I replied : 
 
 [No. 537.] 
 
 " Florence, Alabama, November i8th, 1864. 
 " I will send two batteries from the Army to Corinth. General Forrest 
 thinks his force of cavalry entirely insufficient without Jackson's Division. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, Generair 
 
 The working parties on the railroad having succeeded in 
 pushing forward the supplies, I also telegraphed to him, on 
 the 19th, that I would resume the line of march at the earliest 
 practicable moment. 
 
 Information had, in the meantime, reached me that Sherman 
 was advancing south, from Atlanta. He marched out of that 
 fated city on the i6th, and thus describes his going forth : * 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 178. 
 
278 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 "About 7 a. m., of November i6th, we rode out of Atlanta by the 
 Decatur road, filled by the marching troops and wagons of the Fourteenth 
 Corps; and reaching the hill, just outside of the old rebel works, we 
 naturally paused to look back upon the scenes of our past battles. We 
 stood upon the very ground whereon was fought the bloody battle of 
 July 22d, and could see the copse of wood where McPherson fell. 
 Behind us lay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke rising 
 high in air, and hanging like a pall over the ruined city." 
 
 Thus were two opposing Armies destined to move in oppo- 
 site directions, each hoping to achieve glorious results. 
 
 I well knew the delay at Tuscumbia would accrue to the 
 advantage of Sherman, as he would thereby be allowed time 
 to repair his railroad, and at least start to the rear all surplus 
 material. I believed, however, I could still get between 
 Thomas's forces and Nashville, and rout them ; furthermore, 
 effect such manoeuvres as to insure to our troops an easy 
 victory. These convictions counterbalanced my regret that 
 Sherman was permitted to traverse Georgia " unopposed," as he 
 himself admits. 
 
 General Beauregard had moved in the direction of Georgia 
 to assemble all available forces to oppose Sherman's advance. 
 At the time I made my official report, I was furnished a copy 
 of his letter to President Davis, stating in full the reasons 
 which had induced him to approve my campaign, and enu- 
 merating the difficulties, at this crisis, to be encountered in a 
 movement southward to Georgia. This letter is dated the 
 6th of December, but I insert it at this point, since it treats of 
 events under consideration, and which occurred just prior to 
 the advance into Tennessee ; 
 
 " Augusta, Georgia, December 6th, 1864. 
 "To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States. 
 
 " Sir: — Your letter of the 30th ult., acknowledging the receipt of my 
 telegram of the 24th November, was received by me on the road from 
 Macon to this place. 
 
 " With the limited reliable means at our command, I believe that all 
 that could be, has been done, under existing circumstances to oppose 
 the advance of Sherman's forces towards the Atlantic coast. That we 
 have not thus far been more successful, none can regret more than 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 279 
 
 myself; but he will doubtless be prevented from capturing Augusta, 
 Charleston, and Savannah, and he may yet be made lo experience 
 serious loss before reaching the coast. 
 
 " On the i6th of November, when about leaving Tuscumbia, Alabama, 
 on a tour of inspection to Corinth, Mississippi, I was informed by General 
 Hood of the report just received by him, that Sherman would probably 
 move from Atlanta into Georgia. I instructed him at once to repeat his 
 orders to General Wheeler to v/atch closely Sherman's movements, and, 
 should he move as reported, to attack and harass him at all favorable points. 
 
 " I telegraphed to Lieutenant General Taylor at Selma, Alabama, to 
 call on Governor Watts, of Alabama, and Governor Clarke, of Missis- 
 sippi, for all the State troops that they could furnish ; and with all the 
 available moveable forces of his department, to keep himself in readi- 
 ness to move at a moment's notice, to the assistance of Major General 
 Howell Cobb and Major General G. W. Smith, who were then at or 
 about Griffin, Georgia, threatening Atlanta. 
 
 " I also telegraphed to General Cobb to call upon Governor Brown, of 
 Georgia, and Governor Bonham, of South Carolina, for all the State troops 
 that could be collected. 
 
 " I made all necessary preparations to repair forthwith to Georgia, in 
 the event of Sherman's executing his reported movement. 
 
 "On my arrival at Corinth, on the i8th of November, having been 
 informed that Sherman had commenced his movement, I issued all 
 necessary orders to meet the emergency, including an order to General 
 Hood to send one division of cavalry (Jackson's) to reinforce Wheeler ; 
 but this order was suspended by him, his objection being that his cavalry 
 could not be reduced without endangering the success of his campaign in 
 Tennessee, and that General Wheeler had already thirteen brigades 
 under his command. I finally instructed him to send only one brigade, 
 if he contemplated taking the offensive at once, as had already been 
 decided upon. I then left Corinth for Macon, where I arrived on the 
 24th of November. 
 
 " I did not countermand the campaign in Tennessee to pursue Sherman 
 with Hood's Army for the following reasons : 
 
 "ist. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa river 
 across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy 
 rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and wagon trains. 
 
 " 2d. General Sherman, with an Army better appointed, had already 
 the start about two hundred and seventy-five miles on comparatively 
 good roads. The transfer of Hood's Army into Georgia could not h^ 
 been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the^ 
 country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the 
 condition of the railroads. 
 
280 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 " 3d. To pursue Sherman, the passage of the Army of Tennessee 
 would, necessarily, have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, 
 and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage ; 
 and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part 
 would seriously deplete the Army by desertions. 
 
 " 4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee 
 in pursuit of Sherman, would have opened to Thomas's force the richest 
 portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain 
 the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the 
 defeat of Sherman. 
 
 " 5th. In October last, when passing through Georgia to assume 
 command of the Military Division of the West, I was informed by 
 Governor Brown that he could probably raise, in case of necessity, about 
 six thousand (6cxx)) men, which I supposed might be doubled in a levy 
 'en masse.' 
 
 "General Cobb informed me, at the same time, that at Augusta, Macon, 
 and Columbus, he had about six thousand five hundred (6500) local 
 troops, and that he hoped shortly to have collected at his reserve and 
 convalescent camps, near Macon, twenty-five hundred (2500) men. Of 
 these nine thousand (9000) men, he supposed about one-half, or five thou- 
 sand ( 5000) , could be made available as moveable troops for an emergency. 
 
 "To oppose the advance of the enemy from Atlanta, the State of 
 Georgia would thus have probably nineteen thousand (19,000) men, to 
 which number must be added the thirteen brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, 
 amounting to about seven thousand (7000) men. The troops which would 
 have been collected from Savannah, South Carolina, and North Carolina, 
 before Sherman's forces could reach the. Atlantic coast, would have 
 amounted, it was supposed, to about five thousand (5000) men. 
 
 " Thus it was a reasonable supposition that about twenty-nine or thirty 
 thousand (29,000 or 30,000) men could be collected in time to defend the 
 State of Georgia, and insure the destruction of Sherman's Army, esti- 
 mated by me at about thirty -six thousand (36,000) effectives of all arms — 
 their cavalry, about four thousand (4000), being included in the estimate. 
 
 " Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I 
 concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennes- 
 see and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas's Army and such 
 other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel 
 Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to 
 repair at once to the defence of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio, and thus 
 prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent 
 to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georg:a 
 from the present constant drain upon its limited resources. 
 
 " I remain very respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 "G. T. BEAUREGARD, General 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 281 
 
 The writer of the above letter greatly over-estimated the 
 number of troops which he hoped to collect for the defence of 
 Georgia. He published a stirring appeal to the people of the 
 State to rally and drive back the enemy, but he was not suc- 
 cessful in obtaining even one-half the number of men he antici- 
 pated, and a great portion of those who responded to his 
 call were irregular troops. The Honorable B. H. Hill, in an 
 eloquent address, also urged the people to action, but, as I 
 have already stated, the country at this period was well nigh 
 drained of all its resources. 
 
 General Beauregard, as previously mentioned, left me on the 
 17th of November. On the 19th, the preliminaries to the 
 campaign being completed, the cavalry was ordered to move 
 forward. The succeeding day, Lee's Corps marched to the 
 front a distance of about ten miles on the Chisholm road, 
 between the Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro' roads. 
 
 The same day, I received the following dispatch from 
 General Beauregard: 
 
 " West Point, 2oih, 10 a. m. 
 " General J. B. Hood. 
 
 " Push on active offensive immediately. Colonel Brent informs me first 
 order for movement of one of Jackson's brigades to Wheeler has been 
 suspended by you. It is indispensable it should be sent by best and 
 quickest route to Newnan to cut off communications of enemy with 
 Kingston, and to protect (here in cipher, of which I have not the key). 
 I have appealed to the people of Georgia to defend their homes. 
 
 " G. T. BEAUREGARD, General:' 
 
 On the 20th of November, Stewart's Corps having crossed 
 the Tennessee and bivouacked several miles beyond on the 
 Lawrenceburg road, orders were issued that the entire Army 
 move at an early hour the next morning. Lee's and Stewart's 
 Corps marched upon the Chisholm and the Lawrenceburg 
 roads, and Cheatham's Corps upon the Waynesboro' road. 
 
 Early dawn of the 21st found the Army in motion. I hoped 
 by a rapid march to get in rear of Schofield's forces, then at 
 Pulaski, before they were able to reach Duck river. That 
 
282 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 night headquarters were established at Rawhide, twelve miles 
 north of Florence, on the Waynesboro' road. 
 
 The march was resumed on the 22d, and continued till the 
 27th, upon which date the troops, having taken advantage of 
 every available road, reached Columbia, via Mount Pleasant. 
 Forrest operated in our front against the enemy's cavalry which 
 he easily drove from one position to another. 
 
 The Federals at Pulaski became alarmed, and, by forced 
 marches day and night, reached Columbia, upon Duck river, 
 just in time to prevent our troops from cutting them off. 
 Van Home, in his History of the Army of the Cumberland, 
 thus mentions their narrow escape : * 
 
 " General Hood's rapid advance had been made with the hope of 
 cutting off General Schofield from Columbia, and barely failed in this 
 object, as the National troops gained the place by a night march." 
 
 The enemy having formed line of battle around Columbia, 
 Lee's Corps filed into position with its right upon the Mount 
 Pleasant pike ; Stewart's formed on Lee's right, his own right 
 flank extending to the Pulaski pike ; and Cheatham established 
 his left on the latter pike, with his right resting on Duck river. 
 Army headquarters were established at the residence of Mrs. 
 Warfield, about three miles south of Columbia. 
 
 The two Armies lay opposite each other during the 27th. 
 The Federals being entrenched, I determined not to attack 
 them in their breastworks, if I could possibly avoid it, but to 
 permit them to cross undisturbed to the north bank of Duck 
 river that night, as I supposed they would do ; to hasten 
 preparations, and endeavor to place the main body of the Con- 
 federate Army at Spring Hill, twelve miles directly in the 
 enemy's rear, and about mid-way upon the only pike leading 
 to Franklin; to attack as the Federals retreated, and put to 
 rout and capture, if possible, their Army which was the sole 
 obstacle between our forces and Nashville — in truth, the only 
 barrier to the success of the campaign. 
 
 *Van Home's Army of the Cumberland, vol. II, page il 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 283 
 
 I was confident that after Schofield had crossed the river 
 and placed that obstruction between our respective Armies, he 
 would feel in security, and would remain in his position at least a 
 sufficient length of time to allov/ me to throw pontoons across 
 the river about three miles above his left flank, and, by a bold 
 and rapid march together with heavy demonstrations in his 
 front, gain his rear before he was fully apprised of my object. 
 
 The situation presented an occasion for one of those inter- 
 esting and beautiful moves upon the chess-board of war, to 
 perform which I had often desired an opportunity. As stated 
 in a letter to General Longstreet, I urgently appealed for 
 authority to turn the Federal left at Round Top Mountain. 
 I had beheld with admiration the noble deeds and grand 
 results achieved by the immortal Jackson in similar manoeu- 
 vres ; I had seen his Corps made equal to ten times its number 
 by a sudden attack on the enemy's rear, and I hoped in this 
 instance to be able to profit by the teaching of my illustrious 
 countryman. As I apprehended unnecessary and fatal delay 
 might be occasioned by the appearance of the enemy on the 
 line of march to the rear, I decided to bridge the river that 
 night, and move at dawn the next morning with Cheatham's 
 Corps — whose right was then resting near the point selected 
 for a crossing — together with Stewart's Corps and Johnston's 
 Division, of Lee's Corps, and to leave Lieutenant General 
 Lee with Stevenson's and Clayton's Divisions and the bulk of 
 the artillery, to demonstrate heavily against Schofield, and 
 follow him if he retired. 
 
 Since I had attempted this same movement on the 22d of 
 July, and had been unable to secure its success, I resolved to 
 go in person at the head of the advance brigade, and lead the 
 Army to Spring Hill. 
 
 Colonel Prestman and his assistants laid the pontoons during 
 the night of the 28th, about three miles above Columbia; 
 orders to move at dawn the following day having been issued 
 to the two corps and the division above mentioned, I rode 
 with my staff to Cheatham's right, passed over the bridge soon 
 
284 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 after daybreak, and moved forward at the head of Cranberry's 
 Texas brigade, of Cleburne's Division, with instructions that 
 the remaining corps and divisions follow, and at the same time 
 keep well closed up during the march. 
 
 General Forrest had crossed the evening previous and 
 moved to the front and right. I threw forward a few skir- 
 mishers who advanced at as rapid a pace as I supposed the 
 troops could possibly proceed. 
 
 During the march, the Federal cavalry appeared on the 
 hills to our left ; not a moment, however, was lost on that 
 account, as the Army was marching by the right flank and 
 was prepared to face at any instant in their direction. No 
 attention, therefore, was paid to the enemy, save to throw out 
 a few sharp-shooters in his front. I well knew that to stop 
 and lose time in reconnoitering would defeat my object, which 
 was to reach the enemy's rear and cut him off from Nashville. 
 
 I also knew that Schofield was occupied in his front, since 
 I could distinctly hear the roar of Lee's artillery at Columbia, 
 whilst a feint was made to cross the river. 
 
 Thus I led the main body of the Army to within about two 
 miles and in full view of the pike from Columbia to Spring 
 Hill and Franklin. I here halted about 3 p. m.,and requested 
 General Cheatham, commanding the leading corps, and Major 
 General Cleburne to advance to the spot where, sitting upon 
 my horse, I had in sight the enemy's wagons and men passing 
 at double-quick along the Franklin pike. As these officers 
 approached, I spoke to Cheatham in the following words which 
 I quote almost verbatim, as they have remained indelibly 
 engraved upon my memory ever since that fatal day : " General, 
 do you see the enemy there, retreating rapidly to escape us?" 
 He answered in the affirmative. " Go," I continued, " with your 
 Corps, take possession of and hold that pike at or near Spring 
 Hill. Accept whatever comes, and turn all those wagons 
 over to our side of the house." Then addressing Cleburne, I 
 said, " General, you have heard the orders just given. You 
 have one of my best divisions. Go with General Cheatham, 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 285 
 
 assist him in every way you can, and do as he directs." 
 Again, as a parting injunction to them, I added, "Go and do 
 this at once. Stewart is near at hand, and I will have him 
 double-quick his men to the front." 
 
 They immediately sent staff officers to hurry the men for- 
 ward, and moved off with their troops at a quick pace in the 
 direction of the enemy. I dispatched several of my staff to 
 the rear, with orders to Stewart and Johnson to make all 
 possible haste. Meantime I rode to one side, and looked on 
 at Cleburne's Division, followed by the remainder of Cheat- 
 ham's Corps, as it marched by seemingly ready for battle. 
 
 Within about one-half hour from the time Cheatham left 
 me, skirmishing began with the enemy, when I rode forward 
 to a point nearer the pike, and again sent a staff officer to 
 Stewart and Johnson to push forward. At the same time, I 
 dispatched a messenger to General Cheatham to lose no time 
 in gaining possession of the pike at Spring Hill. It was 
 reported back that he was about to do so. 
 
 Listening attentively to the fire of the skirmishers in that 
 direction, I discovered there was no continued roar of mus- 
 ketry, and being aware of the quick approach of darkness, 
 after four o'clock at that season of the year, I became some- 
 what uneasy, and again ordered an officer to go to General 
 Cheatham, inform him that his supports were very near at 
 hand, that he must attack at once, if he had not already so 
 done, and take and hold possession of the pike. Shortly 
 afterwards, I entrusted another officer with the same message, 
 and, if my memory is not treacherous, finally requested the 
 Governor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris, to hasten forward 
 and impress upon Cheatham the importance of action without 
 delay. I knew no large force of the enemy could be at 
 Spring Hill, as couriers reported Schofield's main body still 
 in front of Lee, at Columbia, up to a late hour in the day. I 
 thought it probable that Cheatham had taken possession of 
 Spring Hill without encountering material opposition, or had 
 formed line across the pike, north of the town, and entrenched 
 
286 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 without coming in serious contact with the enemy, v/hich would 
 account for the little musketry heard in his direction. How- 
 ever, to ascertain the truth, I sent an officer to ask Cheatham 
 if he held the pike, and to inform him of the arrival of Stewart, 
 whose Corps I intended to throw on his left, in order to assail 
 the Federals in flank that evening or the next morning, as 
 they approached and formed to attack Cheatham. At this 
 juncture, the last messenger returned with the report that the 
 road had not been taken possession of General Stewart was 
 then ordered to proceed to the right of Cheatham and place 
 his Corps across the pike, north of Spring Hill. 
 
 By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when General 
 Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to 
 halt, and, turning to Cheatham, I exclaimed with deep emo- 
 tion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, 
 " General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the 
 enemy, and taken possession of that pike ?" He replied that 
 the line looked a little too long for him, and that Stewart 
 should first form on his right. I could hardly believe it pos- 
 sible that this brave old soldier, who had given proof of such 
 courage and ability upon so many hard-fought fields, would 
 even make such a report. After leading him within full view 
 of the enemy, and pointing out to him the Federals, retreating 
 in great haste and confusion, along the pike, and then giving 
 explicit orders to attack, I would as soon have expected mid- 
 day to turn into darkness as for him to have disobeyed my 
 orders. I then asked General Cheatham whether or not 
 Stewart's Corps, if formed on the right, would extend across 
 the pike. He answered in the affirmative. Guides were at once 
 furnished to point out Cheatham's right to General Stewart, 
 who was ordered to form thereon, with his right extending 
 across the pike. Darkness, however, which was increased by 
 large shade trees in that vicinity, soon closed upon us, and 
 Stewart's Corps, after much annoyance, went into bivouac for 
 the night, near but not across the pike, at about eleven or 
 twelve o'clock. 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 287 
 
 It was reported to me after this hour that the enemy was 
 marching- along the road, almost under the hght of the camp- 
 fires of the main body of the Army. I sent anew to General 
 Cheatham to know if at least a line of skirmishers could not 
 be advanced, in order to throw the Federals in confusion, to 
 delay their march, and allow us a chance to attack in the 
 morning. Nothing was done. The Federals, with immense 
 wagon trains, were permitted to march by us the remainder of 
 the night, within gunshot of our lines. I could not succeed 
 in arousing the troops to action, when one good division 
 would have sufficed to do the work. One good division, I 
 re-assert, could have routed that portion of the enemy which 
 was at Spring Hill; have taken possession of and formed line 
 across the road ; and thus have made it an easy matter to 
 Stewart's Corps, Johnston's Division, and Lee's two Divisions 
 from Columbia, to have enveloped, routed, and captured Scho- 
 field's Army that afternoon and the ensuing day. General 
 Forrest gallantly opposed the enemy further down to our right 
 to the full extent of his power; beyond this effort, nothing 
 whatever was done, although never was a grander opportunity 
 offered to utterly rout and destroy the Federal Army, 
 
 Had I dreamed one moment that Cheatham would have 
 failed to give battle, or at least to take position across the pike 
 and force the enemy to assault him, I would have ridden, 
 myself, to the front, and led the troops into action. Although 
 it is right and proper that a Commander-in-Chief, in the event 
 of disaster to a portion of his line during an engagement, should 
 endeavor in person to rally the troops, it is not expected nor 
 considered expedient that he should inaugurate a battle by 
 leading a division or brigade. Had I done so, my opponents 
 would have just cause for the charge of recklessness. I would, 
 nevertheless, have risked my life in this instance, had I con- 
 ceived the possibility of the disregard of my orders, on the 
 part of this officer. General Lee was in a measure thwarted - 
 by the same want of prompt action, at Gettysburg. Whilst I 
 failed utterly to bring on battle at Spring Hill, he was unable 
 
288 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to get the corps of his Army to attack and co-operate, as 
 desired. He was thus checkmated for two days, and finally 
 lost the battle. Had our immortal Chieftain foreseen the result 
 of this inactivity, he would, doubtless, have ordered and acted 
 differently. 
 
 Before proceeding further, I will produce additional evidence 
 from Federal sources, in order to make still more manifest the 
 opportunity which was lost to the Confederate arms on the 
 29th of November, at Spring Hill. 
 
 Shortly after the war, I met in New Orleans Colonel Fuller- 
 ton, of the United States Army ; he was Schofield's adjutant 
 general at the time of these events, in connection with which 
 he wrote me the following : 
 
 "New Orleans, La., October 20th, 1863. 
 " To General Hood. 
 
 " General : — The only body of United States troops on the battle- 
 field of Spring Hill, Tennessee, on the 29th of November, 1864, was 
 the Second Division of the Fourth Army Corps. I think the division 
 was less than four thousand (4000) strong. There were no other United 
 States troops in or about Spring Hill on that day but one or two hundred 
 cavalrymen and perhaps fifty or sixty infantrymen (post troops). The 
 rest of General Schofield's Army was in the vicinity of Columbia, on 
 the north side of Duck river, and none of these troops began to arrive 
 at Spring Hill until after 9 p. m. I arrived in Spring Hill with the Second 
 Division of the Fourth Corps, and remained there till nearly daylight 
 when I went to Franklin with the rear of the Army. I was at the time lieu- 
 tenant colonel and assistant adjutant general of the Fourth Army Corps. 
 
 " J. S. FULLERTON, 
 
 "Brevet Brigadier General, United States Volunteers.'' 
 
 Van Horne, in his History of the Army of the Cumberland, 
 informs us that at 3 p. m., when the Confederate Army was 
 already at Spring Hill, the Federal commander became 
 apprised of our move in his rear, and thus describes his 
 retreat : * 
 
 " His (Lee's) repeated attacks were all repulsed by General Cox, and 
 at 3 p. m., General Schofield became satisfied that the enemy would not 
 attack on Duck river, but was moving two corps directly on Spring Hill. 
 He then gave orders for the withdrawal. * * * 
 
 * Vol. II, page 194. 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 289 
 
 " There was some delay at Rutherford's creek, as the bridge was 
 inadequate for the emergency, but nevertheless the divisions, one after 
 another, arrived at Spring Hill — the foremost of the three at up. m. 
 The enemy's pickets fired into the column frequently, but as they did 
 not come upon the road, the National troops gave no response. The 
 enemy were so close to the road, that when a column was not moving 
 upon it, it was difficult for a single horseman to pass," * 
 
 " There was momentary expectation that this great Army would take a 
 step forward, and press troops, artillery, and trains from the road in con- 
 fusion and rout ; but still the movement went on without interruption by 
 the enemy. "t 
 
 " Rarely has an Army escaped so easily from a peril so threatening."! 
 
 In connection with this grave misfortune, I must here record 
 an act of candor and nobihty upon the part of General Cheat- 
 ham, which proves him to be equally generous-hearted and 
 brave. I was, necessarily, much pained by the disappointment 
 suffered, and, a few days later, telegraphed to Richmond, to 
 withdraw my previous recommendation for his promotion, 
 and to request that another be assigned to the command of 
 his Corps. Before the receipt of a reply, this officer called at 
 my headquarters — then at the residence of Mr. Overton, six 
 miles from Nashville — and, standing in my presence, spoke an 
 honest avowal of his error, in the acknowledgment that he 
 felt we had lost a brilliant opportunity at Spring Hill to deal 
 the enemy a crushing blow, and that he was greatly to blame. 
 I telegraphed and wrote to the War Department to withdraw 
 my application for his removal, in the belief that, inspired with 
 an ambition to retrieve his short-coming, he would prove in 
 the future doubly zealous in the service of his country. 
 
 The following are the dispatches above referred to : 
 
 " Headquarters, Six Miles from Nashville, ) 
 " On Franklin Pike, December 7th, 1864. \ 
 " Honorable J. A. Seddon. 
 
 " I withdraw my recommendation^ in favor of the proinotion of Major 
 General Cheatham for reasons which I will write more fully. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 *Vol. II, page 195. I Vol. II, pages 194, 195. 
 
 J Van Home's A. C, vol. II, page 196. 
 g The words in italics were in cypher. 
 
 19 
 
290 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 " Headquarters, Six Miles from Nashville, \ 
 "On Franklin Pike, Decejitbcr 8th, 1S64. ) 
 
 " Honorable J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War. 
 
 " General G. T. Beauregard, Macon, Ga. 
 
 "A o-ood Lieutenant General shonld be sent here at once to conimaiid 
 
 the corps new commanded by Major General Cheatham. I have no one 
 
 to recommend for the position. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General." 
 
 " Headquarters, Six Miles from Nashville, ] 
 " On Franklin Pike, December 8th, 1864.. \ 
 
 " Honorable J. A. Seddon. 
 
 "Major General Cheatham made a failure on the 30th of November, 
 
 which will be a lesson to him. I think it best he should remain in his 
 
 position for the present. I withdraw my telegrams of yesterday and 
 
 to-day on this subject. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General:' 
 
 On the I ith of December I wrote the Hon. Mr. Seddon: * 
 
 ****<< Major General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great 
 error of which he was guilty, and attaches much blame to himself. 
 While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe lesson 
 to him, by which he will profit in the future. In consideration of this, 
 and of his previous conduct, I think that it is best that he should retain, 
 for the present, the command he now holds." ******** 
 
 The best move in my career as a soldier, I was thus destined 
 to behold come to naught. The discovery that the Army, 
 after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles, was 
 still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the 
 protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave 
 concern. In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I 
 would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. It seemed to me 
 I had exhausted every means in the power of one man to 
 remove this stumbling block to the Army of Tennessee. And 
 I will here inquire, in vindication of its fair name, if any intel- 
 Hgcnt man of that Army supposes one moment that these 
 same troops, one year previous, would, even without orders to 
 
 *See letter and telegram to Secretary of War, Appendix, page 356. 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 291 
 
 attack, have allowed the enemy to pass them at Rocky-faced 
 Ridge, as he did at Spring Hill. 
 
 Lieutenant General Lee performed his duty, at Columbia, 
 with great skill and fidelity which were crowned with entire 
 success : he attained the object of the demonstration, which 
 was to keep the Federals in ignorance of our movements till 
 sufficient time had been allowed the Army to reach the desired 
 point. Colonel Beckham, chief of artillery in Lee's Corps, and 
 one of the most promising officers of his rank, was unfor- 
 tunately killed on the 29th, during the heavy cannonade in 
 front of that town. On the morning of the 30th of November, 
 Lee was on the march up the Franklin pike, when the main 
 body of the Army, at Spring Hill, awoke to find the Federals 
 had disappeared. 
 
 I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to 
 reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon 
 another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive 
 him in the Big Harpeth river at Franklin, since I could no 
 longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of 
 the short distance from Franklin to that city, and the advan- 
 tage which the Federals enjoyed in the possession of the 
 direct road. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN FRANKLIN NASHVILLE RETREAT 
 
 TUPELO RETURN TO RICHMOND SURRENDER AT NATCHEZ, 
 
 MISSISSIPPI. 
 
 At early dawn the troops were put in motion in the 
 direction of FrankHn, marching as rapidly as possible to over- 
 take the enemy before he crossed the Big Harpeth, eighteen 
 miles from Spring Hill. Lieutenant General Lee had crossed 
 Duck river after dark the night previous, and, in order to reach 
 Franklin, was obliged to march a distance of thirty miles. 
 The head of his column arrived at Spring Hill at 9 a. m. on 
 the 30th, and, after a short rest, followed in the wake of the 
 main body. 
 
 A sudden change in sentiment here took place among 
 officers and men : the Army became metamorphosed, as it 
 were, in one night. A general feeling of mortification and 
 disappointment pervaded its ranks. The troops appeared to 
 recognize that a rare opportunity had been totally disregarded, 
 and manifested, seemingly, a determination to retrieve, if pos- 
 sible, the fearful blunder of the previous afternoon and night. 
 The feeling existed which sometimes induces men who have 
 long been wedded to but one policy to look beyond the sphere 
 of their own convictions, and, at least, be willing to make 
 trial of another course of action. 
 
 Stewart's Corps was first in order of march ; Cheatham 
 followed immediately, and Lieutenant General Lee in rear. 
 
 {292) 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 293 
 
 Within about three miles of Frankhn, the enemy was dis- 
 covered on the ridge over which passes the turnpike. As 
 soon as the Confederate troops began to deploy, and skir- 
 mishers were thrown forward, the Federals withdrew slowly 
 to the environs of the town. 
 
 It was about 3 p. m. when Lieutenant General Stewart 
 moved to the right of the pike and began to establish his 
 position in front of the enemy. Major General Cheatham's 
 Corps, as it arrived in turn, filed off to the left of the road, 
 and was also disposed in line of battle. The artillery was 
 instructed to take no part in the engagement, on account of 
 the danger to which women and children in the village would 
 be exposed. General Forrest was ordered to post cavalry on 
 both flanks, and, if the assault proved successful, to complete 
 the ruin of the enemy by capturing those who attempted to 
 escape in the direction of Nashville. Lee's Corps, as it arrived, 
 was held in reserve, owing to the lateness of the hour and my 
 inability, consequently, to post it on the extreme left. Scho- 
 field's position was rendered favorable for defence by open 
 ground in front, and temporary entrenchments which the Fed- 
 erals had had time to throw up, notwithstanding the Confed- 
 erate forces had marched in pursuit with all possible speed. 
 At one or two points, along a short space, a slight abatis had 
 been hastily constructed, by felling some small locust saplings 
 in the vicinity. 
 
 Soon after Cheatham's Corps was massed on the left, Major 
 General Cleburne came to me where I was seated on my horse 
 in rear of the line, and asked permission to form his Division 
 in two, or, if I remember correctly, three lines for the assault. 
 I at once granted his request, stating that I desired the Fed- 
 erals to be driven into the river in their immediate rear and 
 directing him to advise me as soon as he had completed the 
 new disposition of his troops. Shortly afterward, Cheatham 
 and Stewart reported all in readiness for action, and received 
 orders to drive the enemy from his position into the river 
 at all Jiazards. About that time Cleburne returned, and, 
 
294 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 expressing himself with an enthusiasm which he had never 
 before betrayed in our intercourse, said, " General, I am ready, 
 and have more hope in the final success of our cause than I 
 have had at any time since the first gun was fired." I replied, 
 " God grant it !" He turned and moved at once toward the 
 head of his Division ; a few moments thereafter, he was lost to 
 my sight in the tumult of battle. These last words, spoken 
 to me by this brave and distinguished soldier, I have often 
 recalled; they can never leave my memory, as within forty 
 minutes after he had uttered them, he lay lifeless upon or near 
 the breastworks of the foe. 
 
 The two corps advanced in battle array at about 4 p. m., and 
 soon swept away the first line of the Federals, who were 
 driven back upon the main line. At this moment, resounded 
 a concentrated roar of musketry, which recalled to me some 
 of the deadliest struggles in Virginia, and which now pro- 
 claimed that the possession of Nashville was once more 
 dependent upon the fortunes of war. The conflict continued 
 to rage with intense fury ; our troops succeeded in breaking 
 the main line at one or more points, capturing and turning 
 some of the guns on their opponents. 
 
 Just at this critical moment of the battle, a brigade of the 
 enemy, reported to have been Stanley's, gallantly charged, and 
 restored the Federal line, capturing at the same time about 
 one thousand of our troops within the entrenchments. Still 
 the ground was obstinately contested, and, at several points 
 upon the immediate sides of the breastworks, the combatants 
 endeavored to use the musket upon one another, by inverting 
 and raising it perpendicularly, in order to fire ; neither antago- 
 nist, at this juncture, was able to retreat without almost a 
 certainty of death. It was reported that soldiers were even 
 dragged from one side of the "breastworks to the other by men 
 reaching over hurriedly and seizing their enemy by the hair 
 or the collar. 
 
 Just before dark Johnston's Division, of Lee's Corps, moved 
 gallantly to the support of Cheatham; although it made a 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 295 
 
 desperate charge and succeeded in capturing three stands of 
 colors, it did not effect a permanent breach in the hne of the 
 enemy. The two remaining divisions could not unfortunately 
 become engaged owing to the obscurity of night.* The 
 struggle continued with more or less violence until 9 p. m., 
 when followed skirmishing and much desultory firing until 
 about 3 a. m. the ensuing morning. The enemy then with- 
 drew, leaving his dead and wounded upon the field. Thus 
 terminated one of the fiercest conflicts of the war. 
 
 Nightfall w^hich closed in upon us so soon after the inaugura- 
 tion of the battle prevented the formation and participation of 
 Lee's entire Corps on the extreme left. This, it may safely be 
 asserted, saved Schofield's Army from destruction. I might, 
 with equal assurance, assert that had Lieutenant General Lee 
 been in advance at Spring Hill the previous afternoon, Scho- 
 field's Army never would have passed that point. 
 
 Shortly afterward I sent the following dispatch to the Secre- 
 tary of War and to General Beauregard : 
 
 [No. 541.] 
 
 " Headquarters, Six Miles to Nashville, \ 
 
 " December jd. ) 
 
 "About 4 p. m., November 30th, we attacked the enemy at Franklin, 
 
 and drove him from his outer line of temporary works into his interior 
 
 line which he abandoned during the night, leaving his dead and wounded 
 
 in our possession, and rapidly retreated to Nashville, closely pursued by 
 
 our cavalry. We captured several stands of colors and about one thousand 
 
 (looo) prisoners. Our troops fought with great gallantry. We have to 
 
 lament the loss of many gallant officers and brave men. Major General 
 
 Cleburne, Brigadier Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Cranberry, 
 
 were killed ; Major General Brown, Brigadier Generals Carter, Manigault, 
 
 Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott, were wounded, and Brigadier General 
 
 Gordon, captured. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General" 
 
 I rode over the scene of action the next morning, and could 
 but indulge in sad and painful thought, as I beheld so many 
 
 * In an address delivered at Charleston, S. C, I estimated our strength, at 
 Franklin, at twenty-eight thousand (28,000), having overlooked the fact that two 
 of Lee's Divisions could not become engaged. 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 297 
 
 battle of the 20th. He knew also in what manner my orders 
 at Spring Hill had been totally disregarded. After cur last 
 brief interview which was followed so quickly by his death, I 
 sought to account for his sudden revolution of feeling and his 
 hopefulness, since he had been regarded as not over sanguine 
 of the final triumph of our cause. I formed the conviction 
 that he became satisfied on the morning of the 30th of 
 November, after having reviewed the occurrences of the 
 previous afternoon and night, and those of the 20th and 226. 
 of July, that I was not the reckless, indiscreet commander the 
 Johnston-Wigfall party represented me; that I had been 
 harshly judged, and feebly sustained by the officers and men; 
 that I was dealing blows and making moves which had at 
 least the promise of happy results, and that we should have 
 achieved decided success on two occasions around Atlanta as 
 well as at Spring Hill. He therefore made a sudden and firm 
 resolution to support me in all my operations, believing that 
 my movements and manner of handling troops were based upon 
 correct principles. It has been said he stated, upon the 
 morning after the affair of Spring Hill, that he would never 
 again allow one of my orders for battle to be disobeyed, if he 
 could prevent it. For these reasons his loss became doubly 
 great to me. The heroic career and death of this distinguished 
 soldier must ever endear the memory of his last words to his 
 commander, and should entitle his name to be inscribed in 
 immortal characters in the annals of our history. 
 
 A similar revolution in feeling took place to a great extent 
 among both officers and men, the morning of the day upon 
 which was fought the battle of Franklin ; this change — and in 
 a measure the improved morale of the Army, which had 
 resulted from a forward movement of one hundred and eighty 
 miles — occasioned the extraordinary gallantry and desperate 
 fighting witnessed on that field. 
 
 The subjoined extract from Van Home's History of the 
 Army of the Cumberland, will confirm my assertion in regard 
 
293 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to our nearly-won victory. Referring to the main breach in 
 the Federal works, the author says : * 
 
 " Toward the breach, the enemy's heavy central hnes began to press, 
 and to his lateral lines were turned, in seemingly overwhelming conver- 
 gence. To General Hood, the advantage so easily gained, premised 
 the capture or destruction of the National Army, and he and his Army 
 were inspired to quickest action to maintain and utilize it for this grand 
 achievement. And he certainly could have maintained his hold of the 
 National line, and used for extreme success, had time been given him to 
 thrust into the breach his rapidly advancing and massive rear lines ; and 
 as it was, he began to gain ground, right and left, from the Columbia 
 road." 
 
 As shown by Colonel Mason's official report, made on the 
 1 0th of December, ten days after the battle, our effective 
 strength was: Infantry, eighteen thousand three hundred 
 and forty-two (18,342); artillery, two thousand four hundred 
 and fiv^e (2405); cavalry, two thousand three hundred and six 
 (2306); total, twenty-three thousand and fifty-three (23,053). 
 This last number, subtracted from thirty thousand six hundred 
 (30,600), the strength of the Army at Florence, shows a total 
 loss from all causes of seven thousand five hundred and forty- 
 seven (7547), from the 6th of November to the loth of Decem- 
 ber, which period includes the engagements at Columbia, 
 FrankUn, and of Forrest's cavalry. 
 
 The enemy's estimate of our losses as well as of the number 
 of Confederate colors captured is erroneous, as will be seen by 
 the following telegram : 
 
 [No. 560.] 
 
 " Headquarters near Nashville, on Franklin Pike, ) 
 
 " December i^th, 1864. J 
 
 " Honorable J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War, Richmond. 
 
 " The enemy claim that we lost thirty colors in the fight at Franklin. 
 We lost thirteen, capturing nearly the same number. The men who 
 bore ours were killed on or within the enemy's interior line of works. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD, General:' 
 
 The estimate of the actual loss at Franklin, given in my 
 *Van Home's History, vol. II, pages 199, 200, 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 299 
 
 official report, was made with the assistance of General Shoupc, 
 my chief of staff, and is, I consider, correct. However, I 
 will estimate later the total loss from all causes, in order to 
 avoid possible error. 
 
 After the failure of my cherished plan to crush Schofield's 
 Army before it reached its strongly fortified position around 
 Nashville, I remained with an effective force of only twenty- 
 three thousand and fifty-three. I was therefore well aware of 
 our inability to attack the Federals in their new stronghold 
 Avith any hope of success, although Schofield's troops had 
 abandoned the field at Franklin, leaving their dead and wounded 
 in our possession, and had hastened with considerable alarm 
 into their fortifications — which latter information, in regard to 
 their condition after the battle, I obtained through spies. I 
 knew equally well that in the absence of the prestige of com- 
 plete victory, I could not venture with my small force to cross 
 the Cumberland river into Kentucky, without first receiving 
 reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi Department. I 
 felt convinced that the Tennesseans and Kentuckians would 
 not join our forces, since we had failed in the first instance to 
 defeat the Federal Army and capture Nashville. The Presi- 
 dent was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transfer- 
 rence of troops to the Army of Tennessee from Texas, and I 
 daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage 
 across the Mississippi river. 
 
 Thus, unless strengthened by these long-looked for rein- 
 forcements, the only remaining chance of success in the 
 campaign, at this juncture, was to take position, entrench 
 around Nashville, and await Thomas's attack which, if hand- 
 somely repulsed, might afford us an opportunity to follow up 
 our advantage on the spot, and enter the city on the heels of 
 the enemy. 
 
 I could not afford to turn southward, unless for the special 
 purpose of forming a junction with the expected reinforce- 
 ments from Texas, and with the avowed intention to march 
 back again upon Nashville. In truth, our Army was in that 
 
300 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 condition which rendered it more judicious the men should 
 face a decisive issue rather than retreat — in other words, rather 
 than renounce the honor of their cause, without havincr made 
 a last and manful effort to lift up the sinking fortunes of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 I therefore determined to move upon Nashville, to entrench, 
 to accept the chances of reinforcements from Texas, and, even 
 at the risk of an attack in the meantime by overwhelming 
 numbers, to adopt the only feasible means of defeating the 
 enemy with my reduced numbers, viz., to await his attack, 
 and, if favored by success, to follow him into his works. I 
 was apprised of each accession to Thomas's Army, but was 
 still unwilling to abandon the ground as long as I saw a 
 shadow of probability of assistance from the Trans-Mississippi 
 Department, or of victory in battle; and, as I have just 
 remarked, the troops would, I believed, return better satisfied 
 even after defeat if, in grasping at the last straw, they felt that 
 a brave and vigorous effort had been made to save the country 
 from disaster. Such, at the time, was my opinion, which I 
 have since had no reason to alter. 
 
 In accordance with these convictions, I ordered the Army 
 to move forward on the ist'of December in the direction of 
 Nashville ; Lee's Corps marched in advance, followed by 
 Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps, and the troops bivouacked 
 that night in the vicinity of Brentwood. On the morning of 
 the 2d, the march was resumed, and line of battle formed in 
 front of Nashville. Lee's Corps was placed in the centre and 
 across the Franklin pike; Stewart occupied the left, and 
 Cheatham the right — their flanks extending as near the Cum- 
 berland as possible, whilst Forrest's cavalry filled the gap 
 between them and the river. 
 
 General Rousseau occupied Murfreesboro', in rear of our 
 right, with about eight thousand men heavily entrenched. 
 General Bates's Division, Sears's and Brown's brigades, were 
 ordered, on the 5th, to report at that point to General Forrest, 
 who was instructed to watch closely that detachment of the 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 301 
 
 enemy. The same day, information was received of the cap- 
 ture of one hundred prisoners, two pieces of artillery, twenty 
 wagons and teams by Forrest's cavalry, at Lavergne ; of the 
 capture and destruction of three block houses on the Chat- 
 tanooga Railroad, by Bates's Division ; and of the seizure the 
 day previous, by General Chalmers, of two transports on the 
 Cumberland river, with three hundred mules on board. 
 
 We had in our possession two engines and several cars, 
 which ran as far south as Pulaski. Dispatches were sent to 
 Generals Beauregard and Maury to repair the railroad from 
 Corinth to Decatur, as our trains would be running in a day 
 or two to the latter point. This means of transportation was 
 of great service in furnishing supplies to the Army. Our 
 troops had, when we reached Middle Tennessee, an abundance 
 of provisions, although sorely in need of shoes and clothing. 
 
 At this time, I telegraphed the War Department to request 
 that General Breckinridge's command, in West Virginia, be 
 sent to me or ordered into Kentucky to create a diversion 
 and lessen the concentration of the Federal Army in my front. 
 General R. E. Lee's necessities were, however, more urgent 
 tlian my own. The application was, therefore, not granted. 
 
 On the 7th, intelligence was received, and telegraphed to 
 General Beauregard, that General Steele, with fifteen thousand 
 (15,000) troops, had passed Memphis in the direction of 
 Cairo ; also, that Rousseau had made a sally, and driven back 
 our forces at Murfreesboro'. The following day General 
 Forrest was instructed to leave the roads open to Lebanon, in 
 the hope of enticing Rousseau out of his stronghold ; pre- 
 parations were at the same time made to capture his detach- 
 ment of eight thousand, should he venture to reinforce Thomas 
 at Nashville. He remained, however, behind his entrench- 
 ments. 
 
 General Bates's Division was ordered to return to the 
 Army ; Forrest was instructed to direct Palmer's and Mercer's 
 infantry brigades to thoroughly entrench on Stewart's creek, 
 or at Lavergne, according as he might deem more judicious; 
 
302 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 to constitute, with these troops and his cavalry, a force in 
 observation of the enemy at Murfreesboro', and, lastly, to send 
 a brigade of cavalry to picket the river at Lebanon. 
 
 The Federals having been reported to be massing cavalry 
 at Edgefield, Forrest was instructed to meet and drive them 
 back, if they attempted to cross the Cumberland. The same 
 day, the loth of December, Generals Stewart and Cheatham 
 were directed to construct detached works in rear of their 
 flanks, which rested near the river, in order to protect these 
 flanks against an effort by the Federals to turn them. Although 
 every possible exertion was made by these officers, the works 
 were not completed when, on the 15th, the Federal Army 
 moved out, and attacked both flanks, whilst the main assault 
 was directed against our left. It was my intention to have 
 made these defences self-sustaining, but time was not allowed, 
 as the enemy attacked on the morning of the 15th. Through- 
 out that day, they were repulsed at all points of the general 
 line with heavy loss, and only succeeded towards evening 
 in capturing the infantry outposts on our left, and with them 
 the small force together with the artillery posted in these 
 unfinished works. 
 
 Finding that the main movement of the Federals was 
 directed against our left, the chief engineer was instructed to 
 carefully select a line in prolongation of the left flank; 
 Cheatham's Corps was withdrawn from the right during the 
 night of the 15th, and posted on the left of Stewart — Cheat- 
 ham's left flank resting near the Brentwood Hills. In this 
 position, the men were ordered to construct breastworks 
 during that same night. 
 
 The morning of the 1 6th found us with Lee's right on 
 Overton Hill. At an early hour the enemy made a general 
 attack along our front, and were again and again repulsed at 
 all points with heavy loss, especially in Lee's front. About 
 3.30 p. m. the Federals concentrated a number of guns against 
 a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left 
 of our centre, and which had been occupied during the night. 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 303 
 
 This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault 
 under cover of artillery. Accordingly the enemy availed 
 himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men — 
 apparently one division — at the base of this mound, and, 
 under the fire of artillery, which prevented our men from 
 raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and 
 gallant charge up to and over 'Our entrenchments. Our line, 
 thus pierced, gave way ; soon thereafter it broke at all points, 
 and I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate Army 
 abandon the field in confusion. 
 
 Major General Bates, in his official report, refers to an angle 
 having been formed upon the mound where the line first 
 gave way. If such be the case, the officers in command of 
 the troops at that point were doubtless at fault, as Colonel 
 Prestman, chief engineer, and his assistants, had staked off 
 the line with great care, and I am confident were not guilty of 
 this grave neglect. I was seated upon my horse not far in 
 rear when the breach was effected, and soon discovered that 
 all hope to rally the troops was vain. 
 
 I did not, I might say, anticipate a break at that time, as 
 our forces up to that moment had repulsed the Federals at 
 every point, and were waving their colors in defiance, crying 
 out to the enemy, " Come on, come on." Just previous to 
 this fatal occurrence, I had matured the movement for the 
 next morning. The enemy's right flank, by this hour, stood 
 in air some six miles from Nashville, and I had determined 
 to withdraw my entire force during the night, and attack this 
 exposed flank in rear. I could safely have done so, as I still 
 had open a line of retreat. 
 
 The day before the rout, the artiller}^ posted in the detached 
 works had been captured ; a number of guns in the main line 
 were abandoned at the time of the disaster, for the reason that 
 the horses could not be brought forward in time to remove 
 them. Thus the total number of guns captured amounted to 
 fifty-four. 
 
 We had fortunately still remaining a sufficient number of 
 
S04 ADVANCE AND RETREAT, 
 
 pieces of artillery for the equipment of the Army, since, it 
 will be remembered, I had taken with me at the outset of the 
 campaign a large reserve of artillery to use against gunboats. 
 Our losses in killed and wounded in this engagement were 
 comparatively small, as the troops were protected by breast- 
 works. 
 
 An incident at the time of the rout was reported to me 
 which I deem worthy of mention. When our troops were in 
 the greatest confusion, a young lady of Tennessee, Miss Mary 
 Bradford, rushed in their midst regardless of the storm of 
 bullets, and, in the name of God and of our country, implored 
 them to re-form and face the enemy. Her name deserves to be 
 enrolled among the heroes of the war, and it is with pride that 
 I bear testimony to her bravery and patriotism. 
 
 Order among the troops was in a measure restored at Brent- 
 wood, a few miles in rear of the scene of disaster, through the 
 promptness and gallantry of Clayton's Division, which speedily 
 formed and confronted the enemy, with Gibson's brigade and 
 McKenzie's battery, of Fenner's battalion, acting as rearguard 
 of the rear guard. General Clayton displayed admirable cool- 
 ness and courage that afternoon and the next morning in 
 the discharge of his duties. General Gibson, who evinced 
 conspicuous gallantry and ability in the handling of his troops, 
 succeeded, in concert with Clayton, in checking and staying 
 the first and most dangerous shock which always follows 
 immediately after a rout. The result was that even after the 
 Army passed the Big Harpeth, at Franklin, the brigades and 
 divisions were marching in regular order. Captain Cooper, 
 of my staff, had been sent to Murfreesboro' to inform General 
 Forrest of our misfortune, and to order him to make the 
 necessary dispositions of his cavalry to cover our retreat. 
 
 Although the campaign proved disastrous by reason of the 
 unfortunate affair at Spring Hill, the short duration of daylight 
 at Franklin, and, finally, because of the non-arrival of the 
 expected reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi Depart- 
 ment, it will nevertheless be of interest to note how deeply 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 805 
 
 concerned General Grant became for fear we should finally 
 reach Kentucky. He ordered General Thomas to attack on 
 the 6th of December, and evidently became much worried 
 about our presence in front of Nashville, as he telegraphed to 
 the War Department at Washington, on the 9th, to relieve 
 Thomas on account of his delay in assaulting according to 
 instructions. This order was .issued on that date, but was 
 afterwards suspended by Grant. On the nth, at 4 p. m., he 
 again telegraphed General Thomas.* 
 
 " If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be wit- 
 nessed of a rebel Army moving for the Ohio, and you will be forced to 
 act, accepting such weather as you find. * * * *" 
 
 The following dispatch from General Grant to Thomas gives 
 strong evidence that in this campaign we had thrust at the 
 vitals of the enemy : f 
 
 "Washington, December ijth, 1864, 11.30 p. m: 
 " I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from 
 Van Duzen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no 
 further. * * * 
 
 " U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General." 
 
 He could not well afford to allow us to reach Kentucky, and 
 finally assail him in rear at Petersburg. Therefore he left his 
 own Army in front of the illustrious Lee to proceed to Nash- 
 ville and assume direction in person.. 
 
 At this eventful period General Thomas stood with eighty- 
 two thousand (82,000) effectives % to oppose our small Army, 
 which numbered less than twenty thousand (20,000) after 
 deducting the force under Forrest at Murfreesboro'. 
 
 I had had reason to hope that we would have received large 
 accessions to our ranks in Tennessee. The following letter 
 from Governor Isham G. Harris, written during the retreat 
 and at the time the Army was approaching the Tennessee river, 
 
 * Van Home's History Army of the Cumberland, vol. II, page 257. 
 ■}• Van Home's History, vol. II, page 259. 
 J Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, pages 162, 163. 
 
 20 
 
306 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 will indicate to what extent our ranks would have been recruited, 
 had the campaign proved successful : 
 
 "TuscuMBiA, Alabama, December 23th, 1864. 
 " His Excellency, Jefferson Davis. 
 
 " Sir: — I arrived here last night, leaving the Army some fifteen miles 
 beyond the Tennessee river, on the Bainbridge route. 
 
 " Our stay in Tennessee was so short, and engagements so constant 
 and pressing that we did not recruit to any considerable extent. If we 
 could have remained there a few weeks longer, we could and would have 
 recruited to a great extent. The men are there, and thousands were 
 making their arrangements to join the Army, but the unfortunate result 
 of the battle of Nashville, and immediate retreat of the Army was very 
 discouraging to our people. I hope, however, to be able to get a great 
 many of these men out, notwithstanding we have left the State. 
 
 " I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this campaign, 
 and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able to see anything 
 that General Hood has done that he should not, or neglected anything 
 that he should have done which it was possible to do. Indeed, the more 
 that I have seen and known of him and his policy, the more I have been 
 pleased with him and regret to say that if a// had performed their parts 
 as well as he, the results would have been very different. 
 
 "But I will not detain Colonel Johnson, except to say or rather to 
 suggest that if General Hood is to command this Army, he should by all 
 means be permitted to organize the Army according to his own views of 
 the necessities of the case. 
 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 "ISHAM G. HARRIS." 
 
 Lieutenant General Lee displayed his usual energy and 
 skill in handling his troops on the 17th, whilst protecting the 
 rear of our Army. Unfortunately, in the afternoon he was 
 wounded and forced to leave the field. Major General Carter 
 L. Stevenson then assumed comm-and of Lee's Corps, and 
 ably discharged his duties during the continuance of the retreat 
 to and across the Tennessee river. 
 / Major General Walthall, one of the most able division com- 
 manders in the South, was here ordered to form a rear guard 
 with eight picked brigades together with Forrest's cavalry ; the 
 march was then resumed in the direction of Columbia, Stewart's 
 Corps moving in front, followed by those of Cheatham and 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 307 
 
 Stevenson. The Army bivouacked in line of battle near Duck 
 river, on the night of the i8th. 
 
 The following day, we crossed the river and proceeded on 
 different roads leading towards Bainbridge on the Tennessee. 
 I entertained but little concern in regard to being further 
 harassed by the enemy. I felt confident that Walthall, sup- 
 ported on his flanks by the gallant Forrest, would prove equal 
 to any emergency which might arise. I therefore continued, 
 although within sound of the guns of the rear guard, to march 
 leisurely, and arrived at Bainbridge, on the 25th of December. 
 A pontoon bridge was constructed as rapidly as the boats 
 arrived, the corps were placed in position covering the roads 
 to the north, and during the 26th and 27th the Army crossed 
 the river. The following day, the march was continued in the 
 direction of Tupelo, at which place Cheatham's Corps, the 
 last in the line of march, went into camp on the loth of Jan- 
 uary, 1865. 
 
 I had telegraphed General Beauregard from Bainbridge to 
 meet me, and, in compliance with my request, he arrived at 
 Army headquarters on the night of the 14th. The day 
 previous, I had sent the following dispatch to the Secretary 
 of War: 
 
 " Headquarters, Tupelo, Mississippi, [ 
 "January ij/h, iSdj. | 
 
 " Honorable J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War, Richmond, 
 " I request to be relieved from the command of this Army. 
 
 "J. B. HOOD. General' 
 
 On the 15th, after consultation with General Beauregard, a 
 system of furloughing the troops was agreed upon. In refer- 
 ence thereto, I find the following memorandum in General 
 Shoupe's diary: 
 
 " A system of furloughing the troops established. See General Order 
 No. I, 1865, and circular letter to corps commanders, field dispatches, 
 No. 542." 
 
 In a dispatch of January 3d to President Davis, I asked for 
 authority to grant a leave of absence to the Trans-Mississippi 
 
308 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 troops ; and, as the men from Tennessee had stood by their 
 colors notwithstanding the Army had been forced to abandon 
 their State, I deemed it wise, in consideration of their faithful 
 services, to at least grant them a short leave of absence, as 
 well as to others who might be able to go home and return 
 within ten or fifteen days. General Beauregard concurred 
 with me, and the general order above referred to was issued, 
 as the ensuing circular will indicate : 
 
 [No. 542.] 
 
 " Headquarters, Tupelo, Mississippi, ) 
 " Jafiuary i6th, i86j, j 
 
 " Lieutenant General Stewart, Major General Stevenson, Major 
 General Cheatham. 
 
 (Copy sent to Colonel Harvie.) 
 "If you have any troops in your command who live sufficiently near 
 the present position of the Army to justify, in your judgment, the 
 granting them ten days' furlough, the same will be done on proper appli- 
 cation made at once, provided the men go by organizations under officers, 
 and pledge themselves to return at the expiration of the time. All 
 obtaining such furloughs will be debarred the benefit of General Order 
 No, I from Army headquarters. 
 
 " By command of General Hood, 
 
 "A. P. MASON, 
 
 "Lieutenant Colonel, A. A. G." 
 
 I regret that I have not this general order in my possession. 
 My recollection is quite clear, however, that it referred in a 
 great measure to the furloughing of the Tennessee troops — 
 about two thousand in number — and of those who lived in the 
 vicinity. It is a source of equal regret to me that I have not 
 the field return of the Army, which was being made upon 
 the 23d of January, the day I left Tupelo for Richmond. The 
 following letter from Colonel A. P. Mason, assistant adju- 
 tant general, written soon thereafter, will establish the approxi- 
 mate strength of the Army after its arrival at Tupelo, on the 
 1 0th of January : 
 
 [Private.] 
 
 " Richmond, March loih, 186^. 
 "General: — In compliance with your request made a few days since 
 in reference to the strength of the Army of Tennessee at the time you left 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 309 
 
 Tupelo, Mississippi, I respectfully submit that, according to my recollec- 
 tion of a ' Field Return ' of the Army, which was being made at that time 
 and finished a day or two after your departure, the ' effective total ' of 
 the infantry and artillery was about fifteen thousand (15,000) — perhaps 
 a few hundred less. This return was made after the West Tennessee 
 regiments of Major General Cheatham's Corps had been furloughed, 
 as well as some men furloughed under an order published at Tupelo, 
 and some small organizations also furloughed at Tupelo. I cannot form 
 any estimate of the number of men thus furloughed, because you will 
 remember that all the organization furloughs were given by the corps 
 commanders (your sanction having been previously obtained) ; conse- 
 quently the strength of such organizations, at the time they were fur- 
 loughed, was not furnished the assistant adjutant general's office at 
 Army headquarters. 
 
 " The ' Field Return ' above referred to was sent to Colonel Brent, and 
 was in his office in Augusta when I passed there a few weeks since. ^ 
 " Most respectfully your obedient servant, 
 "A. P. MASON, 
 
 " Lieutenant Colonel, A. A. G." 
 
 Under the foregoing order not less than three thousand five^ 
 hundred (3500) men were furloughed prior to the date upon 
 which the return was made up. Now since Colonel Mason 
 was the adjutant general under whose direction it was made, 
 there can hardly be any question but that the Army, after its 
 arrival at Tupelo, numbered from eighteen thousand (18,000) 
 to nineteen thousand (19,000) effective troops of the infantry 
 and artillery. General D. H. Maury, commanding at that 
 period in Mobile, informs me by letter that about four thou- 
 sand (4000) of these forces joined him from Tupelo, armed 
 and equipped. General Johnston states in his Narrative that 
 only about five thousand (5000) reached him in North 
 Carolina, and, adducing the oral statement of two officers, 
 endeavors to create the impression that their arms had been 
 lost, and that this remnant constituted the Army of Tennessee 
 at the time I relinquished its command. Whereas — notwith- 
 standing the outcry against me, and the general declaration 
 through the press that, if Johnston were restored to command, 
 absentees and deserters would return by the thousand and our 
 independence be secured, and although it was understood, 
 
310 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 before my departure from Tupelo, that he would be reinstated 
 — nine thousand out of fourteen thousand, who left Tupelo to 
 repair to his standard in North Carolina, deserted, and either 
 went to the woods or to their homes. This affords positive 
 proof that General Beauregard and I judged aright at Gadsden 
 and also at Florence, Alabama, in regard to the Army, when 
 we decided that to turn and follow Sherman would cause such 
 numbers to desert, as to render those who were too proud to 
 quit their colors almost useless. 
 
 In accordance with Colonel Mason's letter of March the 
 lOth, there were, including the furloughed men, about eighteen 
 thousand five hundred (18,500) effectives of the infantry and 
 artillery at Tupelo, after my retreat from Nashville ; and it 
 will be seen in his return of November 6th, which date was 
 near the time of our advance into Tennessee, that the effective 
 strength of the Army at that period was thirty thousand six 
 hundred (30,600), inclusive of the cavalry. 
 
 Thus we find at Tupelo eighteen thousand five hundred 
 (18,500) infantry and artillery, and twenty-three hundred and 
 six (2306) of Forrest's cavalry; to which add ten thousand 
 lost from all causes, and the sum total amounts to thirty 
 thousand eight hundred and six (30,806) effectives, which 
 proves my loss during the Tennessee campaign to have been 
 not in excess of ten thousand (10,000), as I announced in my 
 official report. As previously mentioned, Wheeler's cavalry, 
 reported at ten thousand (10,000), was left in Georgia when I 
 marched into Tennessee, and was replaced by Forrest's cavalry, 
 which accompanied the Army. 
 
 Upon General Beauregard's arrival at Tupelo, on the 14th 
 of January, I informed him of my application to be relieved 
 from the command of the Army. As the opposition of our 
 people, excited by the Johnston-Wigfall party, seemingly 
 increased in bitterness, I felt that my services could no longer 
 be of benefit to that Army; having no other aspiration than 
 to promote the interests of my country, I again telegraphed 
 the authorities in Richmond, stating that the campaigns to the 
 Alabama line and into Tennessee were my own conception; 
 
TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 311 
 
 that I alone was responsible; that I had striven hard to 
 execute them in such manner as to bring victory to our 
 people, and, at the same time, repeated my desire to be 
 relieved. The President finally complied with my request, and 
 I bid farewell to the Army of Tennessee on the 23d of 
 January, 1865, after having served with it somewhat in excess 
 of eleven months, and having performed my duties to the 
 utmost of my ability. 
 
 At the time I assumed command around Atlanta, a number 
 of General Johnston's staff officers remained with me, among 
 whom were Colonels Mason, Falconer and Harvie, Majors 
 Henry and Clare, who, notwithstanding the extraordinary 
 circumstances under which I had superseded their old com- 
 manding officer, ably discharged their various duties with 
 zeal and strict fidelity. 
 
 After leaving Tupelo, I returned to Virginia and found 
 President Davis still most anxious to procure reinforcements 
 from the Trans-Mississippi Department. He consulted fully 
 with General Lee in regard to this important matter, and, 
 after a sojourn of several weeks in Richmond, during which 
 interval I prepared my official report, I was ordered to Texas 
 with instructions to gather together all the troops willing to 
 follow me from that State, and move at once to the support 
 of General Lee. Soon after my arrival at Sumpter, South 
 Carolina, I received the painful intelligence of Lee's surrender. 
 Nevertheless, I continued my journey, and about the last of 
 April reached the Mississippi, in the vicinity of Natchez, 
 Here I remained with my staff and escort, using vain endeavors 
 to cross this mighty river, until after the receipt of positive 
 information of General E. Kirby Smith's surrender. During 
 this interim we were several times hotly chased by Federal 
 cavalry through the wood and canebrake. Finally, on the 
 31st of May, 1865, 1 rode into Natchez and proffered my sword 
 to Major General Davidson, of the United States Army. He 
 courteously bade me retain it, paroled the officers and men in 
 company with me, and allowed us to proceed without delay 
 to Texas, via New Orleans. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 RASHNESS ^JOHNSTON FABIUS SCIPIO. 
 
 Before closing these pages, I request the privilege of 
 correcting a false impression which has gained ground in my 
 regard, and which is, I may say, the outcome of inimical 
 statements of certain writers who have followed in the wake 
 of Pollard and Johnston. 
 
 General Sherman gives color to their charge of rashness as 
 a commander, in the following passage : 
 
 " I did not suppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to 
 attack fortified places like AUatoona, Resaca, Decatur and Nashville ; 
 but he did so, and in so doing, played into our hands perfectly."* 
 
 And yet from other portions of his Memoirs it will be seen 
 that I did not attack either Resaca, Decatur, or Nashville. 
 My official report will also show that Major General French 
 assaulted AUatoona, whilst under discretionary orders. Thus, 
 in none of these instances is General Sherman correct. 
 
 Touching this same accusation of rashness, put forth by my 
 opponents, I shall merely state that the confidence reposed in 
 me upon so many occasions, and during a service of three 
 years, by Generals Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, in addition 
 to the letters of these distinguished commanders, expressive 
 
 * Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 167. 
 
 {312) 
 
RASHNESS— JOHNSTON— FABIUS—SCIPIO. 313 
 
 of satisfaction with my course, is a sufficient refutation of the 
 charge. 
 
 The above allegation is not more erroneous than the follow- 
 ing inference is illogical. Van Home, in his History of the 
 Army of the Cumberland, speaks in commendation of my 
 movement to the rear of Sherman, after the fall of Atlanta, but 
 regards the circumstance as unfortunate for the Confederacy 
 that Johnston was not summoned to Palmetto at the beginning 
 of the new campaign, in order to insure its successful issue. 
 The writer must assuredly have been ignorant of the antece- 
 dents of this General when he formed this conclusion ; it 
 seems, indeed, preposterous to suppose that General Johnston 
 would have inaugurated a similar movement with thirty-five 
 thousand (35,000) men, when he had just retreated from the 
 same territory with an Army of seventy thousand (70,000) 
 and when he had declined to make, with an effective force 
 of over eighty thousand (80,000), the same campaign from 
 Dalton the preceding Spring. 
 
 Now, since I have been charged with rashness, and even 
 recklessness, by General Johnston and his adherents, I may 
 be allowed, in addition to answering this severe arraignment, 
 to at least question his right to be considered one of our lead' 
 ing Generals. 
 
 It has been asserted that he pursued the Fabian policy in 
 his campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. It is, indeed, to be 
 regretted that he did not follow in the footsteps of the renowned 
 Roman by holding on to the mountains of Georgia. In the 
 long course of years, during which Fabius Maximus com- 
 manded at intervals the Roman Legions, he could never be 
 induced to quit the mountainous regions, and accept the gage 
 of battle with Hannibal upon the plains. Neither the taunts 
 nor stratagems of his enemy, nor the contempt and ridicule 
 of his own people, could make him depart from his resolution, 
 and abandon the heights. The people finally grew so dissat- 
 isfied under his policy that he was required to share the com- 
 mand of the Army with Minucius. During the long and 
 
314 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 eventful period embraced in the second Punic war, which lasted 
 eighteen years, different commanders salhed forth and dehvered 
 battle ; but Fabius continued to adhere strictly to his plan of 
 warfare, and stubbornly refused to encounter his antagonist in 
 the plains. His colleague, Minucius, an imprudent and even 
 rash General, dashed down from the heights with one-half of 
 the Army, engaged Hannibal, and was only spared utter 
 destruction by the timely aid of Fabius. Varro marched out, 
 fought the Carthagenians near Cannse, was defeated, and left 
 forty thousand Romans upon the field. Marcellus, a more 
 fortunate General, gained important advantages over the 
 enemy; but,' as history tells us, Fabius permitted no allure- 
 ment of his foe, nor outcry of his countrymen, to induce him 
 to descend from the mountains. 
 
 His policy was, seemingly, as fixed and unchangeable as 
 the sun in the eternal heavens. Plutarch relates that in order 
 " to secure himself against the enemy's horse, he took care to 
 encamp above them on high and mountainous places. When 
 they sat still, he did the same; when they were in motion, he 
 showed himself upon the heights, at such a distance as not to 
 be obliged to fight against his inclination, and yet near enough 
 to keep them in perpetual alarm, as if, amidst his arts to gain 
 time, he intended every moment to give them battle. These 
 dilatory proceedings exposed him to contempt among the 
 Romans in general, and even in his own Army. * * * Thus 
 the soldiers were brought to despise Fabius, and by way of 
 derision to call him the pedagogue of Hannibal, while they 
 extolled Minucius as a great man and one that acted up to 
 the dignity of Rome. This led Minucius to give a freer scope 
 to his arrogance and pride, and to ridicule the Dictator for 
 encamping constantly upon the mountains ' as if he did it on 
 purpose that his men might more clearly behold Italy laid 
 waste with fire and sword.' And he asked the friends of 
 Fabius ' whether he intended to take his Army up into 
 heaven, as if he had bid adieu to the world below, or whether 
 he would screen himself from the enemy with clouds and fogs?' 
 
RASHNESS— JOHNSTON— FABIUS—SCIPIO. 315 
 
 When the Dictator's friends brought him an account of these 
 aspersions, and exhorted him to wipe them off by risking a 
 battle: 'In that case,' said he, 'I should be of a more das- 
 tardly spirit than they represent me, if through fear of insults 
 and reproaches, I should depart from my own resolution.' " 
 
 Therefore when General Johnston retreated from the moun- 
 tain-fastnesses, crossed the Chattahoochee river, and moved 
 out upon the plains of Georgia, he bid adieu forever to even a 
 shadow of right to the claim of having pursued the policy so 
 persistently carried out by Fabius Maximus. Had he clung 
 to the mountains and refused to surrender them to General 
 Sherman, vast indeed might have been the results achieved, 
 and far greater his title to distinction. Although Fabius suc- 
 ceeded in wasting in a great measure the strength of his 
 adversary, it however required the boldness and the genius of 
 Scipio to finally defeat Hannibal, and place Carthage beneath 
 the heel of the proud Roman. 
 
 General Johnston not only signally failed in the Fabian 
 policy, but, unfortunately, declined to act the part of Scipio 
 Africanus, at Dalton, in the early Spring of 1864. 
 
 History records the deeds of this famed warrior who, whilst 
 the Carthagenians w^ere still warring in Italy, aroused the 
 Roman pride, gathered together his legions, moved to the rear 
 of the enemy, transferred the war into Africa, forced the recall 
 of Hannibal, routed his Army in battle, placed Carthage at his 
 feet, and brought security and prosperity to his countrymen. 
 Arnold, in his History of Rome, gives a lengthy and interest- 
 ing description of this bold and brilliant move, and of the 
 victories which followed. Plutarch condenses the whole into 
 these few words : "After Scipio was gone over into Africa, an 
 account was soon brought to Rome of his glorious and won- 
 derful achievements. This account was followed by rich 
 spoils which confirmed it. A Numidian king was taken pris- 
 oner; two camps were burned and destroyed, and in them a 
 vast number of men, arms and horses ; and the Carthagenians 
 sent orders to Hannibal to quit his fruitless hopes in Italy, and 
 
316 ADVANCE AND RETREAT. 
 
 return home to defend his own country. * * Soon after, 
 Scipio defeated Hannibal in a pitched battle, pulled down the 
 pride of Carthage, and trod it under foot. This afforded the 
 Romans a pleasure beyond all their hopes, and restored a 
 firmness to their empire, which had been shaken by so many 
 tempests." 
 
 Since General Johnston failed to practice the art of war in 
 accordance with the principles either of Fabius Maximus or 
 of Scipio Africanus, and since he fought not a single general 
 battle during the entire war of Secession, what just claim has 
 he to generalship ? A man may be learned in anatomy, and 
 perfect in the theory of surgery; he may be able to thor- 
 oughly describe the manner in which the most difficult opera- 
 tion should be performed, but may never have possessed 
 sufficient nerve to undertake even one operation in which 
 serious risk was involved, and thus give life to his theories by 
 practical work. Who would employ a surgeon who had never 
 used the knife? Furthermore, who could, under the circum- 
 stances, declare him with reason an eminent man in his pro- 
 fession? Ruskin can, probably, better describe a painting 
 than any artist of ancient or modern times. His gorgeous 
 descriptions attracted the attention of the world to the won- 
 derful genius of Turner ; but who would venture to assert 
 that he himself was a great painter, when he has perhaps never 
 used the brush? Thus it is as it should be: no man is 
 justly entitled to be considered a great General, unless he has 
 won his spurs. Had General Johnston possessed the requisite 
 spirit and boldness to seize the various chances for victory, 
 which were offered him, he never would have allowed General 
 Sherman to push him back one hundred miles in sixty-six 
 days, from one mountain stronghold to another, down into the 
 very heart of the Confederacy. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 General Hood's Report. 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE. 
 
 Richmond, Va., Feb. ijth, 1863. 
 
 General S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va. 
 
 General: — I have the hc"--"- to submit the following Report of the 
 operations of the Army of Tennessee, while commanded by me, from 
 July i8th, 1864, to January 23d, 1865. 
 
 The results of a campaign do not always show how the General in 
 command has discharged his duty. Their enquiry should be not what 
 he has done, but what he should have accomplished with the means under 
 his control. To appreciate the operations of the Army of Tennessee, it 
 IS necessary to look at its history during the three months which preceded 
 the day on which I was ordered to its command. To do this, it is neces- 
 sary either to state in this report all the facts which illustrate the entire 
 operations of the Army of Tennessee in the recent campaign, or to write 
 a supplemental or accompanying report. I deem the former more appro- 
 priate, and will therefore submit in a single paper all the information 
 which seems to me should be communicated to the Government. 
 
 (317) 
 
818 APPENDIX. 
 
 On the 6th of May, 1864, the Army lay at and near Dalton awaiting 
 the advance of the enemy. 
 
 Never had so large a Confederate Army assembled in the West. 
 Seventy thousand (70,000) effective men were in the easy direction of a 
 single commander, whose good fortune it was to be able to give suc- 
 cessful battle, and redeem the losses of the past. Extraordinary efforts 
 had been used to secure easy victory. The South had been denuded of 
 troops to fill the strength of the Army of Tennessee. Mississippi and 
 Alabama were without military support, and looked for protection in 
 decisive battle in the mountains of Georgia. The vast forces of the 
 enemy were accumulating in the East, and to retard their advance or 
 confuse their plans, much was expected by a counter movement by us 
 in the West. The desires of the Government expressed to the Confed- 
 erate commander in the West were to assume the offensive. Nearly all 
 the men and resources of the West and South were placed at his disposal 
 for the purpose. The men amounted to the number already stated, and 
 the resources for their support were equal to the demand. The reinforce- 
 ments were within supporting distance. The troops felt strong in their 
 increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements to move forward, and 
 recover, not abandon our own territory, and believed that victory might be 
 achieved. In such condition was that splendid Army when the active 
 campaign fairly opened. The enemy but little superior in numbers, 
 none in organization and discipline, inferior in spirit and confidence, 
 commenced his advance. The Confederate forces, whose faces and hopes 
 were to the North, almost simultaneously commenced to retreat. They 
 soon reached positions favorable for resistance. Great ranges of moun- 
 tains running across the line of march, and deep rivers, are stands from 
 which a well-directed Army is not easily driven or turned. At each 
 advance of the enemy the Confederate Army, without serious resistance, 
 fell back to the next range or river in the rear. This habit to retreat 
 soon became a routine of the Army, and was substituted for the hope 
 and confidence with which the campaign opened. The enemy soon 
 perceived this. With perfect security he divided his forces, using one 
 column to menace in front, and one to threaten in rear. The usual order 
 to retreat, not strike in detail, was issued and obeyed. These retreats 
 were always at night, — the day was consumed in hard labor. Daily 
 temporary works were thrown up, behind which it was never intended to 
 fight. The men became travellers by night, and laborers by day. They 
 were cea=ing to be soldiers by the disuse of military duty. Thus for 
 seventy-four days and nights that noble Army, if ordered to resist, 
 no force that the enemy could assemble could dislodge from a battle 
 field, continued to abandon their country, to see their strength departing, 
 and their flag waving only in retreat, or in partial engagements. At the 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 319 
 
 end of that time after descending from the mountains when the last 
 advantage of position was abandoned, and camping, without fortifications 
 on the open plains of Georgia, the Army had lost twenty-two thousand 
 seven hundred and fifty (22,750) of its best soldiers. Nearly one-third 
 was gone, no general battle fought, much of our State abandoned, two 
 others uncovered, and the organization and efficiency of every command 
 by loss of officers, men, and tone, seriously diminished. These things 
 were the inevitable result of the strategy adopted. It is impossible for a 
 large Army to retreat in the face of a pursuing enemy without such a 
 fate. In a retreat the losses are constant and permanent. Stra^^o^lers 
 are overtaken ; the fatigued fall by the wayside, and are gathered by the 
 advancing enemy. Every position by the rear guard, if taken, yields its 
 wounded to the victors. The soldiers always awaken from rest at night 
 to continue the retreat, leave many of their comrades asleep in trenches. 
 The losses of a single day are not large. Those of seventy-four 
 days will embrace the strength of an Army. If a battle be fought, and 
 the field held at the close, however great the slaughter, the loss will be 
 less than to retreat in the face of an enemy. There will be no stragglers. 
 Desertions are in retreat, rarely, if ever, on the field of battle. The 
 wounded are gathered to the rear, and soon recover, and in a few weeks 
 the entire loss consists only of the killed and permanently disabled, 
 which is not one-fifth of the apparent loss on the night of the battle. 
 The enemy is checked, his plans deranged, territory saved, the campaign 
 suspended or won. If a retreat still be necessary, it can then be done 
 with no enemy pressing, and no loss following. The advancing party 
 loses nothing but its killed and permanently disabled. Neither straggler 
 nor deserter thin ifs ranks. It reaches the end of its march stronger for 
 battle than when it started. The Army commanded by General Sher- 
 man, and that commanded by General Johnston, not greatly unequal at 
 the commencement of the campaign, illustrate what I have written. 
 General Sherman, in his official report, states that his forces when they 
 entered Atlanta were nearly the same in number as when they left Dalton. 
 The Army of Tennessee lost twenty-two thousand seven hundred and 
 fifty (22,750) men, nearly one-third of its strength; I have nothing to say 
 of the statement of losses made by General Johnston in his official report, 
 except to state that by his own figures he understates his loss some thou- 
 sands, that he excludes the idea of any prisoners, although his previous 
 official returns show more than seven thousand (7000) under the head, 
 "absent without leave," and that the returns of the Army while he was 
 in command, corrected and increased by the records of the Army which 
 has not been fully reported to the Government, and the return signed by 
 me, but made up under him as soon as I assumed command, show the 
 losses of the Army of Tennessee to be what I have stated, and a careful 
 
820 APPENDIX. 
 
 examination of the returns with the Army will show the losses to be more 
 than stated. 
 
 This statement of the previous conduct of the campaign is necessary, 
 so as to show what means I had to retrieve the disasters of the past. And 
 if the results are not such as to bring joy to the country, it is not the first 
 time that the most faithful efforts of duty were unable to repair the injury 
 done by others. If, as is untruly charged, the Army of Tennessee ceased 
 to exist under my command, it is also true that it received its mortal 
 wound when it turned its back in retreat in the mountains of Georgia ; 
 and under different management it lingered much longer than it would 
 have done with the same daily loss occurring, when it was placed under 
 my direction. 
 
 The Army was turned over to me by order of the President at Atlanta 
 on the 1 8th July, 1864. Its effective strength was : Infantry, thirty-three 
 thousand seven hundred and fifty (33,750) ; artillery, three thousand five 
 hundred (3500) ; cavalry, ten thousand (10,000), with one thousand five 
 hundred Georgia militia, commanded by Major General G. W. Smith, 
 making a total effective of forty-eight thousand seven hundred and fifty 
 (48,750) men. The Army was in bivouac south of the Chattahoochee 
 river, between Atlanta and that river, and was advancing — the right near 
 Pace's Ferry and the left near Roswell. On the evening ot the i8th 
 our cavalry was principally driven across Peach Tree creek. I caused 
 line of battle to be formed, the left resting near the Pace's Ferry road, 
 and the right covering Atlanta. On the morning of the 19th the dispo- 
 sitions of the enemy were substantially as follows : The " Army of the 
 Cumberland," under Thomas, was in the act of crossing Peach Tree 
 creek. This creek forming a considerable obstacle to the passage of 
 an Army, runs in a northeasterly direction, emptying into the Chatta- 
 hoochee river near the railroad crossing. The " Army of the Ohio," 
 under Schofield, was also about to cross east of the Buckhead road. 
 The " Army of the Tennessee," under McPherson, was moving on the 
 Georgia Railroad at Decatur. Feeling it impossible to hold Atlanta 
 without giving battle, I determined to strike the enemy while attempting 
 to cross this stream. My troops were disposed as follows : Stewart's 
 Corps on the left; Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's on the 
 right, entrenched. My object was to crush Thomas's Army before he 
 could fortify himself, and then turn upon Schofield and McPherson. To 
 do this, Cheatham was ordered to hold his left on the creek in order to 
 separate Thomas's Army from the forces on his (Thomas's) left. Thus I 
 should be able to throw two corps, Stewart's and Hardee's, against 
 Thomas. Specific orders were carefully given these Generals, in the pres- 
 ence of each other, as follows : The attack was to begin at i p. m. ; the 
 movement to be by division in en echelon from the right, at the distance 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 321 
 
 of about one hundred and fifty yards ; the effort to be to drive the 
 enemy back to the creek, and then towards the river, into the narrow 
 space formed by the river and creek, everything on our side of the creek 
 to be taken at all hazards, and to follow up as our success might permit. 
 Each of these Generals was to hold a division in reserve. Owing to the 
 demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend 
 Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this, Hardee and Stewart 
 were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. 
 Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to 
 call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff 
 officer on his left, to see that the left did not take more than half a divi- 
 sion front. This unfortunately was not attended to, and the line closed 
 to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper dis- 
 tance. In consequence of this, the attack was delayed until nearly 4 
 p. m. At this hour the attack began as ordered. Stewart's Corps carry- 
 ing the temporary works in his front ; Hardee's failed to push the attack 
 as ordered, and thus the enemy remaining in possession of his works orr 
 Stewart's right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the 
 position he had carried. I have every reason to believe that our attack 
 would have been successful had my order been executed. I am strength- 
 ened in this opinion by information since obtained through Brigadier 
 General Govan, some time a prisoner in the enemy's hands, touching 
 the condition of the enemy at the time. The delay from one to four 
 o'clock, p. m., was unfortunate, but would have not proved irretrievable 
 had the attack been vigorously made. Ascertaining that the attack had 
 failed, I caused the troops to retire to their former positions. 
 
 The position and demonstration of McPherson's Army on the right 
 threatening my communications, made it necessary to abandon Atlanta 
 or check his movements. Unwilling to abandon, the following instruc- 
 tions were given on the morning of the 21st: The chief engineer was 
 instructed to select a line of defence immediately about Atlanta, the 
 works already constructed for the defence of the place being wholly use- 
 less from their position ; Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps to take position 
 and construct works to defend the city — the former on the left, the latter 
 on the right. The artillery, under the command of l^rigadier General 
 Shoupe, was massed on the extreme right. Hardee was ordered to move 
 with his corps, during the night of the 21st, south on the McDonough 
 road, crossing Entrenchment creek at Cobb's Mills, and to completely 
 turn the left of McPherson's Army. This he was to do even should it be 
 necessary to go to or beyond Decatur. Wheeler, with his cavalry, was 
 ordered to move on Hardee's right, both to attack at daylight, or as soon 
 thereafter as possible. As soon as Hardee succeeded in forcing hark the 
 enemy's left, Cheatham was to take up the movement from his right, and 
 21 
 
322 APPENDIX. 
 
 continue to force the whole from right to left, down Peach Tree creek, 
 Stewart in like manner to engage the enemy as soon as the movement 
 became general. Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's left, as 
 directed, took position, and attacked his flank. His troops fought with 
 great spirit and determination, carrying several lines of entrenchments, 
 Wheeler attacking on the right. Fmding Hardee so hotly engaged, and 
 fearing the enemy might concentrate upon him, I ordered Cheatham for- 
 ward to create a diversion. Hardee held the ground he gained. Cheat- 
 ham carried the enemy's entrenchments in his front, but had to abandon 
 them in consequence of the enfilade fire brought to bear upon him. 
 Cheatham captured five guns and five or six stands of colors, and Hardee 
 eicrht guns and thirteen stands of colors. While the grand results desired 
 were not accomplished, the movements of McPherson upon my commu- 
 nications were entirely defeated, and no further effort was made in that 
 direction at any time. This engagement greatly inspired the troops and 
 revived their confidence. Here, I regret to say, the brave and gallant 
 Major General W. H. T. Walker was killed. The enemy withdrew his 
 left to the Georgia Railroad, and strongly entrenched himself, and hei-e 
 properly began the siege of Atlanta. It became apparent almost imme- 
 diately that he would attempt our left. He began to mass his forces in 
 that quarter. On the 28th it became manifest that the enemy desired to 
 place his left on Utoy creek. 1 desired to hold the Lick-Skillet road, and 
 accordingly ordered Lieutenant General Lee, who on the 25th had 
 relieved Major General Cheatham from the command of the corps for- 
 merly commanded by myself, to move his forces so as to prevent the 
 enemy from gaining that road. He was or-dered to hold the enemy in 
 check on a line nearly parallel with the Lick-Skillet road, running 
 through to Ezra Church. General Lee, finding that the enemy had 
 already gained that position, engaged him with the intention to recover 
 that line This brought on the engagement of the 28th. General Stew- 
 art was ordered to support General Lee. The engagement contmued 
 until dark, the road remaining in our possession. 
 
 On the 27th July I received information that the enemy's cavalry was 
 moving round our right with the design of interrupting our communica- 
 tion with Macon. The next day a large cavalry force also crossed the 
 Chattahoochee river at Campbellton, moving round our left. Major 
 General Wheeler was ordered to move upon the force on the right, while 
 Brigadier General Jackson, with Hawson's and Ross's brigades, was sent 
 to look after those moving on the left. I also dispatched Lewis's brigade 
 of infantry down the Macon Railroad to a point about where they would 
 probably strike the road. The force on the left succeeded in reaching 
 the road, tearing up an inconsiderable part of the track. It was the 
 design of the enemy to unite his forces at the railroad, but in this he was 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 323 
 
 defeated. The movement was undertaken by the enemy on a grand 
 scale, having carefully picked his men and horses. A Federal force, 
 under General Stoneman, moved further south against Macon. He was 
 defeated by our forces under Brigadier General Iverson. General 
 Wheeler, leaving General Kelly to hold the force on the right, moved 
 against that already at the railroad. He succeeded in forcing them to 
 give battle near Newnan on the, 30th, and routed and captured or 
 destroyed the whole force. Too much credit cannot be given General 
 Wheeler for the energy and skill displayed. He captured two pieces 
 of artillery, nine hundred and fifty (950) prisoners, and many horses, 
 equipments, &c. Brigadier General Iverson captured two pieces of 
 artillery and five hundred (500) prisoners. Believing the enemy's cav- 
 alry well broken, and feeling myself safe from any further serious opera- 
 tions of a like nature, I determined to dispatch a force of cavalry to the 
 enemy's rear, with the hope of destroying his communications. I accord- 
 ingly ordered Major General Wheeler, with four thousand five hundred 
 (4500) cavalry, to effect this object. He succeeded in partially inter- 
 rupting the enemy's communications by railroad. This still left suffi- 
 cient cavalry to meet the necessities of the Army. This is sufficiently 
 shown by the fact that several determined cavalry movements were sub- 
 sequently attempted, and successfully met by our cavalry. 
 
 From this time till the 26th of August there is nothing of any particular 
 moment to mention. The enemy gradually extended his right, and I 
 was compelled to follow his movement ; our entire front was covered with 
 a most excellent abatis and other obstructions. Too much credit 
 cannot be given the troops generally for the industry and endurance 
 they displayed under the constant fire of the enemy. 
 
 On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the 
 extreme right, and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works 
 on the Dalton Railroad, and extending to the railroad crossing the river. 
 Again he withdrew on the night of the 27th across Utoy creek, throwing 
 one corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the inter- 
 mediate points. His left then rested on the Chattahoochee river 
 strongly fortified and extending across the West Point Railroad. The 
 corps defending the crossing of the Chattahoochee, his works on this side 
 of the river, and the obstacle formed by the Utoy and Camp creek 
 rendered it impossible for me to attack him with any possibility of 
 success, between the river and railroad. 
 
 On the 30th it became known that the enemy was moving on Jones- 
 boro' with two corps. I determined, upon consulting with the corps 
 commanders, to move two corps to Jonesboro' during the night, and to 
 attack and drive the enemy at that place across Flint river. This I hoped 
 would draw the attention of the enemy in that direction and that he 
 
324 APPENDIX. 
 
 would abandon his works on the left, so that I could attack him in flank. 
 I remained in person with Stewart's Corps and the militia in Atlanta. 
 Hardee's and Lee's Corps moved accordingly, Hardee in command. It 
 was impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta depended 
 upon his success. Six hours before 1 had any information of the result 
 of his attack, I ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta, to be 
 ready to commence the movement indicated in the event of success, and, 
 if unsuccessful, to cover the evacuation of Atlanta which would thus be 
 compelled. As it turned out unsuccessful, it allowed the enemy the 
 opportunity either to strike us as we marched out of Atlanta, or to con- 
 centrate on Hardee. Lee's Corps constituted a guard against the former, 
 and I did not fear the destruction of Hardee before Stewart and Lee 
 could join him, as his position on a ridge between two rivers I thought 
 strong in front, and want of time would prevent the enemy from attacking 
 him in flank. The small loss in Hardee's Corps, and the much greater 
 loss of the enemy, show my views to have been correct. The attack 
 at Jonesboro' failed, though the number of men on our side considerably 
 exceeded that of the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some 
 sort imagined, when only fourteen hundred (1400) were killed and 
 wounded out of the two corps engaged. The failure necessitated the 
 evacuation of Atlanta. Thirty-four thousand (34,000) prisoners at 
 Andersonville, Georgia, in my rear compelled me to place the Army 
 between them and the enemy, thus preventing me at that time from 
 moving on his communications and destroying his depots of supplies at 
 Marietta. A raid of cavalry could easily have released those prisoners, 
 and the Federal commander was prepared to furnish them arms ; such 
 a body of men, an Army of itself, could have overrun and devastated the 
 country from West Georgia to Savannah. The subsequent removal of 
 the prisoners, at my request, enabled me to make the movement on the 
 enemy's communications at a later period. 
 
 On the night of the ist of September we withdrew from Atlanta. A 
 train of ordnance stores and some railroad stock had to be destroyed, in 
 consequence of the gross neglect of the chief quarter master to obey the 
 specific instructions given him touching their removal. He had ample 
 time and means, and nothing whatever ought to have been lost. 
 
 On the 1st of September Hardee's Corps was attacked in position at 
 Jonesboro.' The result was the loss of eight guns and some prisoners. 
 Hardee then retired to Lovejoy's Station, where he was joined by Stewart's 
 and Lee's Corps. The militia numbering about three thousand (3000), 
 under Major General G. W. Smith, was ordered to Griffin. It is proper 
 to remark here that this force rendered excellent and gallant service 
 during the siege of Atlanta. The enemy followed and took position in 
 our front. On the 6th of September, however, he abandoned his works 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 325 
 
 and returned to Adanta. Here properly ended the operations about 
 Atlanta. Of the forces turned over to me nearly two months before, and 
 since that day, daily engaged in battle and skirmishes, with a greatly supe- 
 rior enemy, there were remaining effective, as shown by the return of 20th 
 September, infantry, twenty-seven thousand and ninety-four (27,094); 
 cavalry, ten thousand five hundred and forty-three (10,543) ; artillerj^ two 
 thousand seven hundred and sixty-six (2766). There had been sent to 
 Mobile one brigade of infantry eight hundred (800) strong, and to Macon 
 three battalions of artillery, eight hundred (800) strong. The militia had 
 increased as stated, but counting it at the same as originally turned over, 
 we have, against the aggregate turned over, forty-eight thousand seven 
 hundred and fifty (48,75°) present, forty thousand four hundred and 
 three, sent off three thousand and one hundred (3100), making an aggre- 
 gate of forty-three thousand five hundred and three (43,503,) thus giving 
 a total loss of all arms of five thousand two hundred and forty-seven 
 (5247) men. 
 
 A serious question was now presented to me. The enemy would not 
 certainly long remain idle. He had it in his power to continue his 
 march to the south, and force me to fall back on Alabama, for subsistence. 
 I could not hope to hold my position. The country being a plain had not 
 natural strength, nor was there any advantageous position upon which I 
 could retire. Besides the morale of the Army, greatly improved during 
 the operations around Atlanta, had again become impaired in conse- 
 quence of the recurrence of retreat, and the Army itself decreasing in 
 strength day by day. Something was absolutely demanded, and I rightly 
 judged that an advance, at all promising success, would go far to restore 
 its fighting spirit. Thus I determined on consultation with the corps 
 commanders to turn the enemy's right flank and attempt to destroy his 
 communications and force him to retire from Atlanta. The operations 
 of the cavalry under Wheeler, in Georgia, and under Forrest, in Ten- 
 nessee, proved to me conclusively and beyond a doubt that all the 
 cavalry in the service could not permanently interrupt the railroad com- 
 munications in the enemy's rear sufficiently to cause him to abandon his 
 position. To accomplish anything, therefore, it became necessary for 
 me to move with my whole force. Causing the iron to be removed from 
 the several railroads out of Atlanta for distances of forty miles, and 
 directing railroad stock to be restored to the West Point Railroad, the 
 movement to the left toward that road began on the 18th of September. 
 Arriving at that road the Army took position, with the left touching the 
 Chattahoochee river, and covering that road where it remained several 
 days to allow the accumulation of supplies at Blue Mountain and a suffi- 
 ciency with which to continue the movement. On the 29th of Septem- 
 ber it left its bivouac near Palmetto, Georgia, with Jackson's cavalry in 
 
326 APPENDIX. 
 
 front, Brigadier General Iverson Nvith his command being left in obser- 
 vation of the enemy in and around Atlanta, and moving first on the pro- 
 longation of its left flank to the westward it crossed the Chattahoochee 
 river the same day on a pontoon bridge at Pumpkin Town and Phillips's 
 Ferry, while our supplies which we brought by wagon from Newnan, 
 Georgia, crossed at Moore's Ferry, where we had constructed a temporary 
 trestle bridge. As soon as we crossed the river the Army moved at once 
 to the immediate vicinity of Lost Mountain, reaching there on the 3d of 
 October, our cavalry during the march watching the enemy on our front 
 and right flank, and occasionally skirmishing with his cavalry along the 
 banks of South Water creek. On the 4th of October Lieutenant General 
 Stewart's Corps, in obedience to my orders, struck the enemy's railroad 
 at Ackworth and Big Shanty, captured the garrisons at both places, con- 
 sisting of some four hundred (400) prisoners, with some animals and 
 stores. 
 
 Hearing that the enemy had a quantity of stores at Allatoona, I deter- 
 mined, if possible, to destroy the bridge over the Etowah river, and 
 directed Lieutenant General Stewart to send a division also to Allatoona, 
 instructing the officer in command to destroy the railroad there and take 
 possession of the place, if, in his judgment, when he reached there, he 
 deemed it practicable. Accordingly, Major General French was sent, 
 who attacked the place early on the morning of the 6th of October, and 
 quickly carried the enemy's outer line of works, drawing him into a 
 redoubt, and with that exception carried the place. Just at this critical 
 juncture he (General French) received information which he considered 
 correct, but which subsequently proved false, that a large body of the 
 enemy were moving to cut him off from the remainder of the Army, and 
 he immediately withdrew his command from the place without having 
 accomplished the desired object. 
 
 Lieutenant General Stewart's command succeeded in destroying 
 completely some ten miles of the railroad. These operations caused 
 the enemy to move his Army, except one corps, from Atlanta to 
 Marietta, threatening an advance in the direction of our position at Lost 
 Mountain ; but not deeming our Army in condition for a general engage- 
 ment I withdrew it, on the 6th of October, to the westward, continuing to 
 march daily, and crossed the Coosa river near Coosaville, and moved up 
 the west bank of Oostenaula, and striking the railroad again between 
 Resaca and Mill Creek Gap, just above Dalton, on the 13th of October, 
 destroying the railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill, capturing the enemy's 
 posts at Tilton, Dalton, and Mill Creek Gap, with about one thousand 
 (1000) prisoners and some stores. I again withdrew the Army from the 
 railroad, moving from the southwest towards Gadsden, Alabama, the 
 enemy following and skirmishing constantly with our cavalry, then under 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 327 
 
 the command of Major General Wheeler, who had joined the Army on 
 the march just before it crossed the Coosa river. 
 
 The Army reached Gadsden, Alabama, on the 20th of October, at 
 which point General G. T. Beauregard, commanding the Military Divi- 
 sion of the West, joined us. It had been my hope that my movements 
 would have caused the enemy to divide his forces and that I micrht o-ain 
 an opportunity to strike him in detail. This, however, he did not do. 
 He held his entire force together rn his pursuit, with the exception of the 
 corps which he had left to garrison Atlanta, The inorale of the Army 
 had already improved, but upon consultation with my corps commanders, 
 it was not thought to be yet in condition to hazard a general engagement 
 while the enemy remained intact. I met at this place a thorough supply 
 of shoes and other stores. 1 determined to cross the Tennessee river at 
 or near Gunter's Landing, and strike the enemy's communications again 
 near Bridgeport, force him to cross the river, also to obtain supplies and 
 thus we should at least recover our lost territory. Orders had been sent 
 by General Beauregard to General Forrest to move with his cavalry into 
 Tennessee. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, these orders did not reach him in time. As 
 I had not a sufficient cavalry force without his to protect my trains in 
 Tennessee, I was compelled to delay the crossing and move further down 
 the river to meet him. The Army arrived at Florence on the 31st of 
 October. This unfortunate delay allowed the enemy time to repair the 
 damage to his railroad and to accumulate at Atlanta sufficient supplies, 
 to enable him to return the greater part of his Army to that place and 
 move with it through to the Atlantic coast. The remainder he threw 
 across the Tennessee under Thomas. When our Army arrived at Flor- 
 ence it had entirely recovered from the depression that frequent retreats 
 had created. The enemy having for the first time divided his forces, I 
 had to determine which of the two parts to direct my operations against. 
 To follow the forces about, to move through Georgia under Sherman, 
 would be to again abandon the regained territory to the forces under 
 Thomas, with little hope of being able to reach the enemy in time to 
 defeat his movement, and also to cause desertion and greatly impair the 
 morale or fighting spirit of the Army by what would be considered a 
 compulsory retreat. 
 
 I thought the alternative clear that I should move upon Thomas. If 
 I succeeded in beating him, the effect of Sherman's movement would 
 not be great, and 1 should gain in men sufficiently to compensate for the 
 damages he might inflict. If beaten, I should leave the Army in better 
 condition than it would be if I attempted a retrograde movement against 
 Sherman. 
 
328 APPENDIX. 
 
 Upon all these questions I had a full and free conference with General 
 Beauregard at Tuscumbia. General Beauregard left it optional with me 
 either to divide the Army, sending a part after Sherman, and to push on 
 with the remainder, or to move forward at once against Thomas with the 
 entire force. The Army I thought too small to divide. I so informed 
 him, when he directed me by telegraph, to push forward at once. For- 
 rest's cavalry joined me on the 21st of November, and the movement 
 began. Major General Cheatham's Corps taking the road towards 
 Waynesboro', and the other two corps moving on roads somewhat 
 parallel with this, but more to the eastward with the cavalry under Gen- 
 eral Forrest, in the advance and upon their right flank. The enemy's 
 forces at this time were concentrated at Pulaski, with some force also at 
 Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place the Army between these 
 forces of the enemy and Nashville, but he evacuated Pulaski upon the 
 23d, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having furiously driven off 
 their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by the turnpike and 
 railroad to Columbia. 
 
 The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through 
 which the Army marched, prevented our overtaking the enemy before 
 he reached Columbia, but, on the evening of the 27th of November, our 
 Army was placed in position in front of his works at that place. During 
 the night, however, he evacuated the town, taking position on the oppo- 
 site side of the river about a mile and a-half from the town, which was 
 considered quite strong in front. Late in the evening of the 28th of 
 November General Forrest with most of his command crossed Duck 
 river a few miles above Columbia, and I followed, early in the morning 
 of the 29th, with Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps, and Johnston's Divi- 
 sion of Lee's Corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's Corps in the 
 enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order 
 with only a battery to the corps, my object being to turn the enemy's 
 flank by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Frank- 
 lin pike at or near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy 
 at or near Columbia. When I had gotten well on his flank the enemy 
 discovered my intention, and began to retreat on the pike towards Spring 
 Hill. The cavalry became engaged near that place about mid-day, but 
 his trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break 
 through them. About 4 p. m. our infantry forces — Major General 
 Cheatham in the advance — commenced to come in contact with the 
 enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which place the 
 Columbia and Franklin pike runs. The enemy was at this time moving 
 rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops formed on the flank of his 
 column to protect it. Major General Cheatham was ordered to attack 
 the enemy at once vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 329 
 
 although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made 
 but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had 
 my instructions been carried out, there is no doubt that we should have 
 possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's Corps and Johnston's Divi- 
 sion were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the 
 golden opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon 
 the hope of dealing the eneniy a heavy blow. Accordingly, Lieutenant 
 General Stewart was furnished a guide and ordered to move his corps 
 beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. 
 Shortly after this General Cheatham came to my headquarters, and 
 when I informed him of Stewart's movement, he said that Stewart ought 
 to form on his right. I asked if that would throw Stewart across the 
 pike. He replied that it would and a mile beyond. Accordingly, one 
 of Cheatham's staff officers was sent to show Stewart where his (Cheat- 
 ham's) right rested. In the dark and confusion he did not succeed in 
 getting the position desired, but about ii p. m. went into bivouac. 
 
 About 12 p. m., ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great con- 
 fusion, artillery wagons and troops intermixed, I sent instructions to 
 General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him 
 and still further impede and confuse his march. This was not accom- 
 plished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and 
 confusion within hearing nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great 
 opportunity of striking the enemy for which we had labored so long, the 
 greatest this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the 
 war. Lieutenant General Lee, left in front of the enemy at Columbia, 
 was instructed to press the enemy the moment he abandoned his position 
 at that point. The enemy did not abandon his works at that place till 
 dark, showing that his trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles 
 during the day and a great part of the night. At daylight we followed 
 as fast as possible towards Franklin ; Lieutenant General Stewart in the 
 advance. Major General Cheatham following, and General Lee, with the 
 trains moving from Columbia on the same road. We pursued the enemy 
 rapidly and compelled him to burn a number of his wagons. He made 
 a feint as if to give battle on the hills about four miles south of Franklin, 
 but, as soon as our forces began to deploy for the attack, and to flank 
 him on his left, he retired slowly to Franklin. 
 
 I learned from dispatches captured at Spring Hill from Thomas to 
 Schofield, that the latter was instructed to hold that place till the position 
 at Franklin could be made secure, indicating the intention of Thomas to 
 hold Franklin and his strong works at Murfreesboro'. Thus I knew that 
 it was all important to attack Schofield before he could make himself 
 strong, and if he should escape at Franklin, he would gain his works 
 about Nashville. The nature of the position was such as to render it inex- 
 
530 APPENDIX. 
 
 pedient to attempt any further flank movement, and I, therefore, deter- 
 mined to attack him in front and without delay. On the 30th of Novem- 
 ber Stewart's Corps was placed in position on the right, Cheatham's on 
 the left, and the cavalry on either flank, the main body of the cavalry 
 on the right under Forrest. Johnston's Division of Lee's Corps also 
 became engaged on the left during the engagement. The line advanced 
 at 4 p. m., with orders to drive the enemy into or across the Big Harpeth 
 river, while General Forrest, if successful, was to cross the river and 
 attack and destroy his trains and broken columns. The troops moved 
 forward most gallantly to the attack. We carried the enemy's first line 
 of hastily constructed works handsomely. We then advanced against 
 his interior line, and succeeded in carrying it also in some places. Here 
 the engagement was of the fiercest possible character. Our men possessed 
 themselves of the exterior of the works, while the enemy held the inte- 
 rior. Many of our men were killed endrely inside the works. The 
 brave men captured were taken inside his works in the edge of the town. 
 The struggle lasted till near midnight, when the enemy abandoned his 
 works and crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded in our pos- 
 session. Never did troops fight more gallantly. The works of the 
 enemy were so hastily constructed that, while he had a slight abatis in 
 front of a part of his line, there was none on his extreme right. During 
 the day I was restrained from using my artillery on account of the 
 women and children remaining in the town. At night it was massed 
 ready to continue the action in the morning, but the enemy retired. We 
 captured about a thousand prisoners and several stands of colors. Our 
 loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was four thousand five hundred 
 (4500). Among the killed was Major General P. R. Cleburne, Brigadier 
 Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Cranberry. Major General 
 Brown, Brigadier Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and 
 Scott were wounded, and Brigadier General Gordon captured. The 
 number of dead left by the enemy on the field indicated that his loss was 
 equal or near our own. The next morning at daylight, the wounded 
 being cared for and the dead buried, we moved forward towards Nash- 
 ville, Forrest with his cavalry pursuing the enemy vigorously. 
 
 On the 2d of December the Army took position in front of Nashville, 
 about two miles from the city. Lieutenant General Lee's Corps consti- 
 tuted our centre, resting upon the Franklin pike, with Cheatham's Corps 
 upon the right, and Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank 
 extending to the river. I was causing strong detached works to be built 
 to cover our flanks, intending to make them enclosed works, so as to 
 defeat any attempt of the enemy should he undertake offensive move- 
 ments against our flank and rear. The enemy still held Murfreesboro* 
 with about six thousand (6000) men strongly fortified. He also held 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 331 
 
 small forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville. It was apparent that he 
 would soon have to take the offensive to relieve his garrisons at those 
 points or cause them to be evacuated, in which case I hoped to capture 
 the forces at Murfreesboro', and should then be able to open communi- 
 cation with Georgia and Virginia. Should he attack me in position, I 
 felt that I could defeat him, and thus gain possession of Nashville with 
 abundant supplies for the Army. This would give me possession of 
 Tennessee. Necessary steps were taken to furnish the Army with sup- 
 plies, which the people were ready and willing to furnish. Shoe shops 
 were in operation in each brigade. We had captured sufficient railroad 
 stock to use the road to Pulaski, and it was already in successful opera- 
 tion. Having possession of the State, we should have gained largely in 
 recruits, and could at an early day have moved forward to the Ohio, 
 which would have frustrated the plans of the enemy as developed in his 
 campaign towards the Atlantic coast. 
 
 I had sent Major General Forrest, with the greatest part of his Cavalry 
 and Bates's Division of infantry to Murfreesboro', to ascertain if it was 
 possible to take the place. After a careful examination and reconnois- 
 sance in force, in which I am sorry to say the infantry behaved badly, it 
 was determined that nothing could be accomplished by assault. Bates's 
 Division was then withdrawn, leaving Forrest with Jackson's and 
 Buford's Divisions of cavalry in observation. Mercer and Palmer's 
 brigades of infantry were sent to replace Bates's Division. Shortly after- 
 wards Buford's Division was withdrawn and ordered to the right of the 
 Army on the Cumberland river. 
 
 Nothing of importance occurred until the morning of the 15th of 
 Deceinber, when the enemy, having received heavy reinforcements, 
 attacked simultaneously both our flanks. On our right he was hand- 
 somely repulsed with heavy loss, but on our left, towards evening, he 
 carried some partially completed redoubts of those before mentioned. 
 
 During the night of the 15th our whole line was shortened and 
 strengthened ; our left was also thrown back ; dispositions were made to 
 meet any renewed attack. The corps of Major General Cheatham was 
 transferred from our right to our left, leaving Lieutenant General Lee 
 on our right, who had been previously in the centre, and placing 
 Lieutenant General Stewart's Corps in the centre, which had been pre- 
 viously the left. Early on the i6th of December the enemy made a 
 general attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of artillery. 
 All his assaults were repulsed with heavy loss till 3.30 p. m., when a 
 portion of our line to the left of the centre occupied by Bates's Division 
 suddenly gave way. Up to this time no battle ever progressed more 
 favorably ; the troops in excellent spirits, waving their colors and bidding 
 defiance to the enemy. The position gained by the enemy being 
 
332 APPENDIX. 
 
 such as to enfilade our line caused in a few moments our entire line to give 
 way, and our troops to retreat rapidly down the pike in the direction of 
 Franklin, most of them, I regret to say, in great confusion, all efforts to 
 re-form them being fruitless. Our loss in artillery was heavy — fifty-four 
 guns. Thinking it impossible for the enemy to break our line, the 
 horses were sent to the rear for safety, and the giving way of the line 
 was so sudden that it was not possible to bring forward the horses to 
 move the guns which had been placed in position. Our loss in killed 
 and wounded was small. 
 
 At Brentwood, some four miles from our line of battle, the troops were 
 somewhat collected, and Lieutenant General Lee took command of the 
 rear guard, camping for the night in the vicinity. On leaving the field, 
 I sent a staff officer to inform General Forrest of our defeat, and to 
 direct him to rejoin the Army with as little delay as possible, to protect 
 its rear, but owing to the swollen condition of the creeks, caused by the 
 heavy rain then falling, he was unable to join us until we reached 
 Columbia, with the exception of a portion of his command, which reached 
 us while the enemy was moving from Franklin to Spring Hill. On the 
 17th we continued the retreat towards Columbia, camping for the night 
 at Spring Hill. During this day's march the enemy's cavalry pressed 
 with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry repeatedly with 
 the sabre, and at times penetrating our lines. The country being open 
 was favorable to their operations. I regret to say that also on this day 
 Lieutenant General Lee, commanding the covering force, was severely 
 wounded in the foot. We continued our retreat across Duck river to 
 Columbia, the corps alternating as rear guards to the Army. Lieutenant 
 General Lee and the corps commanded by him deserves great credit. 
 
 After the fight at Nashville I at first hoped to be able to remain in 
 Tennessee, on the line of Duck river, but after arriving at Columbia I 
 became convinced that the condition of the Army made it necessary to 
 recross the Tennessee without delay, and on the 21st the Army resumed 
 its march for Pulaski, leaving Major General Walthall with Ector's, 
 Strahl's, Maney's, Cranberry's and Palmer's infantry brigades at Colum- 
 bia as a rear guard under General Forrest. From Pulaski I moved by the 
 most direct road to the Bainbridge crossing on the Tennessee river, 
 which was reached on the 25th, where the Army crossed without inter- 
 ruption, completing the crossing on the 27th, including our rear guard, 
 which the enemy followed with all his cavalry and three corps of infantry 
 to Pulaski, and with cavalry between Pulaski and the Tennessee river. 
 After crossing the river the Army moved by easy marches to Tupelo, 
 Mississippi. Our pontoon and supply trains were ordered at once to 
 the vicinity of Columbus, Mississippi, by the most direct route, that the 
 animals might be more easily foraged, and while on the march there 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 333 
 
 were pursued by a small body of the enemy's cavalry, and owing to the 
 neglect of Brigadier General Roddy's cavalry were overtaken, and the 
 pontoon train and a sinall portion of the supply train destroyed. 
 
 Here finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country, as 
 in my judgment to greatly impair, if not destroy, m.y usefulness and 
 counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country, I 
 asked to be relieved, with the hope that another might be assigned to 
 the command, who might do more than I could hope to accomplish. 
 Accordingly, I was so relieved on the 23d of January by authority of the 
 President. 
 
 And now, lest an opportunity should not be again presented, I trust I 
 may be pardoned for noticing in self-defence one or two statements in 
 General Johnston's report of the previous operations of this Army, which 
 has just been given to the public, in which the action of Lieutenant 
 General Polk and myself has been impugned. I thoroughly understand 
 that it is not the part of an officer to state what may have occurred from 
 time to time in council, but a charge publicly made ought certainly to be 
 publicly met. 
 
 In General Johnston's report he says: "On the morning of the 19th 
 (May), when half of the Federal Army was near Kingston, the two corps 
 at Cassville were ordered to advance against the troops that had followed 
 them from Adairsville, Hood leading on the right. When the corps had 
 advanced some two miles, one of his staff officers reported to Lieutenant 
 General Hood that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road, in 
 rear of the right of our original position. He drew back his troops and 
 formed them across that road. When it was discovered that the officer 
 was mistaken, the opportunity had passed by the near approach of the 
 Federal Army. Expecting to be attacked, I drew up my troops in what 
 seemed to me an excellent position — a bold ridge immediately in rear of 
 Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery 
 commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. 
 Soon after dark Lieutenant Generals Polk and Hood expressed to me 
 decidedly the opinion formed upon the observation of the afternoon that 
 the Federal Artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, 
 and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. 
 Lieutenant General Hardee, whose position I thought weakest, was con- 
 fident he could hold it. The other two officers, however, were so earnest 
 and so unwilling to depend upon the ability of their corps to defend the 
 ground that I yielded, and the Army crossed the Etowah on the 28th, a 
 step which I have regretted ever since." For myself and the good and 
 great man now deceased, with whom I am associated in this stricture, I 
 offer a statement of the facts in reply : After the Army had arrived at 
 Cassville, I proposed to General Johnston, in the presence of Generals 
 
334 APPENDIX. 
 
 Hardee and Polk, to move back upon the enemy and attack him at or 
 near Adairsville, urging as a reason that our three corps could move 
 back, each upon a separate road, while the enemy had but one main road 
 upon which he could approach that place. No conclusion was obtained. 
 While Generals Polk and Hardee and myself were riding from General 
 Johnston's headquarters the matter was further discussed ; General Polk 
 enthusiastically advocated, and General Hardee also favoring the pro- 
 position. It was then suggested that we should return and still further 
 urge the matter on General Johnston. We, however, concluded to delay 
 till the morning. The next morning, while we were assembled at General 
 Johnston's headquarters, it was reported that the enemy was driving in 
 the cavalry on the Adairsville road, in front of Polk's position. Polk's 
 Corps was in line of battle, and my corps was in bivouac on his right. 
 We all rode to the right of Polk's line, in front of my bivouac. Hardee 
 soon left and went to his position, which was on the left, there being 
 some report of the enemy in that direction. General Johnston said to 
 me, "You can, if you desire, move your corps to the Ironton road, and 
 if Howard's Corps is there, you can attack it." My troops were put in 
 motion ; at the head of the colunin I moved over to this road, and found 
 it in possession of our own dismounted cavalry, and no enemy there. 
 While in motion, a body of the enemy, which I supposed to be cavalry, 
 made its appearance on the Canton road in rear of the right of my 
 original position. Major General Hindman was then in that direction 
 with his division, to ascertain what force it was keeping the other two 
 divisions in the vicinity of the Ironton road. // was not a mistake, as 
 General Johnston states, that the force appeared, as is shown from the 
 fact that Major General Hindman had men wounded from the small arms 
 and artillery fired from this body. Major James Hamilton, of my staff, 
 was sent to report to General Johnston the fact that the enemy had 
 appeared on the Canton road. During Major Hamilton's absence Briga- 
 dier General Mackall, chief of staff, rode up in great haste and said that 
 General Johnston directed that I should not separate myself so far from 
 General Polk. I called his attention to where General Polk's right was 
 resting, and informed him that I could easily form upon it, and orders 
 were given to that effect, throwing back my right to look after this body, 
 which turned out to be the enemy's cavalry. Feeling that I had done all 
 which General Johnston had given me liberty to do, I then rode to his 
 headquarters, where General Johnston decided to take up his line on the 
 ridge in rear of the one occupied by General Polk, a line which was 
 enfiladed by heights of which the enemy would at once possess himself, 
 as was pointed out to General Johnston by Brigadier General Shoupe, 
 commanding the artillery. In a very short time thereafter the enemy 
 placed his artillery on these heights, and began to enfilade General Polk's 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 335 
 
 line. Observing the effect upon the troops of this fire, I was convinced 
 that the position was unsuited for defence. Accordingly General Polk 
 and myself said to General Johnston that our positions would prove 
 untenable for defence, but that we were in as good position to advance 
 upon the enemy as could be desired. We told him that if he did not 
 intend to take the offensive he had better change our position. He 
 accordingly ordered the Army across the Etowah. It will thus be seen 
 that I received no order to give battle, and I believe that had General 
 Polk received such an order he would have mentioned it to me. Were 
 General Polk now alive, he would be astounded at the accusation made 
 against him. Again, General Johnston says, "that the usual skirmishing 
 was kept up on the 28th (May) ; Lieutenant General Hood was instructed 
 to put his corps in position during the night to attack the enemy's left 
 flank at dawn the next morning, the rest of the Army to join in the attack 
 successively from right to left. On the 29th (May), Lieutenant General 
 Hood, finding the Federal left covered by a division which had entrenched 
 itself in the night, thought it inexpedient to attack ; so reported and asked 
 for instructions. As the resulting delay made the attack inexpedient, 
 even had it not been so before by preventing surprise upon which success 
 in a great measure depended, he was recalled." 
 
 The enemy, on the 28th, had extended his left flank across AUatoona 
 creek and along the Ackworth road. At my own suggestion General 
 Johnston directed me to move my corps and strike the enemy's left. 
 Upon arriving the next morning and while moving to accomplish this, I 
 found that the enemy had retired his flank a mile and strongly fortified 
 it. The opportunity having thus passed by the act of the enemy and not 
 by my delay, I reported the fact to General Johnston, deeming it best 
 that the attack should not be made, and the instructions to me were 
 countermanded. 
 
 My operations are now fully stated. It may not be improper to close 
 with a general resiimi of the salient points presented. I was placed in 
 command under the most trying circumstances which can surround an 
 officer when assigned to a new and most important command. The 
 Army was enfeebled in number and in spirit by long retreat and by severe 
 and apparently fruitless losses. The Army of Tennessee between the 
 13th and 20th May, two months before, numbered seventy thousand 
 (70,000) effective arms-bearing men, as the official reports show. It was 
 at that time in most excellent condition and in full hope. It had 
 dwindled day by day in partial engagements and skirmishes without an 
 action that could properly be called a battle, to forty-seven thousand two 
 hundred and fifty (47,250), exclusive of one thousand five hundred militia 
 which joined in the interim. What with this constant digging and 
 retreating from Dalton to Atlanta, the spirit of the Army was greatly 
 
336 APPENDIX. 
 
 impaired and hope had almost left it. With this Army I immediately 
 engaged the enemy, and the tone constantly improved and hope returned. 
 I defended Atlanta, a place without natural advantages, or rather with 
 all the advantages in favor of the enemy, for forty-three days. No 
 point, of all passed over from Dalton down, was less susceptible of 
 defence by nature. Every preparation was made for retreat. The Army 
 lay in bivouac a short distance from the town, without attempting to con- 
 struct works of defence in front of the camps, ready to resume the Hne 
 of march as soon as the enemy pressed forward. I venture the state- 
 ment that there was neither soldier nor officer in that Army who believed 
 that in the open plain between Atlanta and the river a battle would be 
 offered, which had so often been refused in strong positions on the 
 mountains. 
 
 My first care was to make an entrenched line, and the enemy despair- 
 ing of success in front threw his Army to the left and rear, a thing that 
 he never could have done had it not been for the immense advantage 
 the Chattahoochee river gave him. I arrived at Lovejoy's Station, having 
 fought four battles, and the official reports of the Army on the 20th of 
 September show an effective total of forty thousand four hundred and 
 three (40,403) present, giving a total loss in all this time of five thousand 
 two hundred and forty-seven (5247) men. 
 
 My reasons for undertaking the movement into Tennessee have, I 
 think, been sufficiently stated already. Had I not made the movement, 
 I am fully persuaded that Sherman would have been upon General Lee's 
 communications in October, instead of at this time. 
 
 From Palmetto to Spring Hill the campaign was all that I could have 
 desired. The fruits ought to have been gathered at that point. At 
 Nashville, had it not have been for an unfortunate event, which could 
 not justly have been anticipated, I think we would have gained a com- 
 plete victory. 
 
 At any time it was in the power of the Army to retire from Tennessee 
 in the event of failure, as is established by the leisurely retreat which 
 was made under the most difficult and embarrassing circumstances. 
 
 It is my firm conviction that, notwithstanding that disaster, I left the 
 Army in better spirits and with more confidence in itself, than it had at 
 the opening of the campaign. The official records will show that my 
 losses, including prisoners, during the entire campaign do not exceed ten 
 thousand (10,000) men. Were I again placed in such circumstances, I 
 should make the same marches and fight the same battles, trusting that 
 the same unforeseen and unavoidable accident would not again occur to 
 change into disaster a victory which had been already won. 
 
 In support of the statement touching the strength and losses of the 
 Army, I respectfully tender the official recqrds of the assistant adjutant 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 337 
 
 general (Major Kinloch Falconer) alike on duty with General Johnston 
 and myself. 
 
 Those who have seen much service in the field during this war will at 
 once understand why it was that desertion, which had been so frequent 
 on the retreat from Dalton to Atlanta, almost entirely ceased as soon as 
 the Army assumed the offensive and took a step forward. I did not 
 know of a desertion on the march from Palmetto to Dalton, or from 
 Dalton to Florence. I am informed that the provost marshal general 
 of the Army of Tennessee reports less than three hundred (300) deser- 
 tions during the whole Tennessee campaign. The Tennessee troops 
 entered the State with high hopes as they approached their homes. 
 When the fortunes of war were against us, the same faithful soldiers 
 remained true to their flag, and with rare exceptions followed it in retreat 
 as they had borne it in advance. 
 
 But few of the subordinate reports have reached me. I am conse- 
 quently unable, without risk of injustice, to describe the instances of indi- 
 vidual skill and gallantry. 
 
 I invite special attention to the report of Major General G. W. Smith 
 of the operations of the Georgia militia in the vicinity of Atlanta, the 
 reports of Lieutenant General Stewart and his subordinate officers, here- 
 with submitted. Maps of the campaign accompany this report. 
 Respectfully your obedient servant, 
 
 (Signed) J. B. HOOD, General. 
 
 22 
 
338 APPENDIX. 
 
 OFFICIAL REPORT LIEUTENANT GENERAL 
 S. D. LEE. 
 
 Columbus, Miss., January 30th, 1864. 
 
 Colonel : — Owing to my temporary absence from the Army, and to 
 the movements of the troops, it will be impracticable to procure detailed 
 reports from my subordinate officers, and I cannot, therefore, make a 
 full report of the operations of my command during the recent campaign, 
 but deem it proper to offer this until one more complete may be substi- 
 tuted. 
 
 I assumed command of " Wood's old Corps," consisting of Steven- 
 son's, Clayton's, and Hindman's Divisions, the latter commanded by 
 Brio-adier General John C. Brown, on July 27th, 1864. The Army was 
 then in position and entrenched around Atlanta, daily shifting its position 
 to meet the flank movements of the enemy. On the 27th, Hindman's 
 and Clayton's Divisions were withdrawn from the trenches and massed 
 on the Lick-Skillet road. On the 28th, about 1 1 a. m., I received orders 
 to move out on the Lick-Skillet road and check the enemy, who was then 
 moving to our left, as it was desirable to hold that road, to be used for a 
 contemplated movement. I soon found that the enemy had gained the 
 road, and was gradually driving back our cavalry. Brown's Division 
 was formed at once on the left of, and obhquely to the road, and Clay- 
 ton's Division on the right, connecting by a line of skirmishers, with the 
 main works around the city. As soon as Brown was formed he moved 
 forward handsomely, drawing the enemy across the road, and to a 
 distance one-half mile beyond, where he encountered temporary 
 breastworks, from which he was driven back with considerable loss. 
 Clayton's Division moved forward as soon as formed, about ten min- 
 utes after Brown's advance, and met with similar results. I found it 
 difficult to rally Brown's Division, and move it against the enemy a 
 second time. The consequence was, that one or two brigades of this 
 division, as also of Clayton's Division, sustained heavy losses, because 
 of the failure in the attack of portions of their lines. Walthall's Division, 
 of Stewart's Corps, had moved out on the Lick-Skillet road, while Brown's 
 and Clayton's Divisions were engaging the enemy. At my suggestion 
 this division was thrown against the enemy when Brown had attacked. 
 The enemy was still within easy range of the Lick-Skillet road, and I 
 believed that he would yield before a vigorous attack. The effect, how- 
 ever, was a failure, and the troops were formed on the road, and during 
 the night were withdrawn, by order of the Commanding General, to a 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 339 
 
 more suitable position, connecting with the works immediately around 
 Atlanta. The enemy had two corps engaged in this affair ; still I am 
 convinced that if all the troops had displayed equal spirit, we would 
 have been successful, as the enemy's works were slight, and besides 
 they had scarcely gotten into position when we made the attack. From 
 the 28th July to the 5th of August the enemy cautiously pushed forward 
 his lines towards ours, erecting, new lines of works as he advanced. 
 Several severe attacks were made upon the works of my skirmish line, 
 but no assault was made on the main entrenched line. The enemy, in 
 almost every instance, was severely repulsed. 
 
 On the 6th Major General Bates's Division of Hardee's Corps, which 
 had reported to me temporarily in place of Stevenson's Division, which 
 had been detached from my corps and placed in the works immediately 
 in front of Atlanta, took position on my left, almost perpendicularly to 
 our main line, and along the Sandtown road. This division constructed 
 in one night a very strong skirmish line, and with such little display that 
 the enemy, on the 6th, finding, as he supposed, only a slight impediment 
 to the extension of his lines, at once moved a corps to the attack, which 
 was signally and handsomely repulsed. Much credit is due General 
 Bates and his division for their conduct. The enemy was exceedingly 
 cautious in his movements after this affair. His extension to our left was 
 gradual, and he seemed determined to push his lines more closely to 
 ours, in my front, with a view of making an assault. The skirmishing 
 along Patton Anderson's — formerly Hindman's — and Clayton's Divisions, 
 amounted to almost an engagement for a week. Hardee's Corps had 
 been placed on my left to check the enemy, who continued extending to 
 the left. The enemy, about the 26th, retired his right flank from my 
 front, making quite a detour to the left of my corps, which extended to 
 the West Point and Atlanta Railroad, three-quarters of a mile beyond 
 East Point. Stevenson's Division reported to me by 11 a.m. on the 30th 
 of August. Hardee's Corps was on my left, and was gradually relieved 
 by my corps, in order that it might extend further to our left. About 4 
 p. m. on the 30th I was notified that General Hardee would probably 
 move to Jonesboro', and that it was desired that my corps should 
 follow and support him. At Army headquarters, in Atlanta, about 9 p. 
 m., it was decided that the column of the enemy, which was marching 
 on Jonesboro' from the direction of the Atlanta and West Point Rail- 
 road, should be attacked early on the morning of the 31st, and crushed, 
 if practicable, and that Lieutenant General Hardee, with his corps and 
 my own, should be charged with the expedition. According to my recol- 
 lection, the column of the enemy marching on Jonesboro' was the 
 only body well defined and in motion, and that it consisted of about three 
 Army Corps. I accordingly reporJ:ed to General Hardee at General 
 
340 APPENDIX. 
 
 Hood's headquarters ; was advised that General Hardee's Corps, the left 
 of which rested at Rough and Ready, four miles below East Point, 
 on the Macon Railroad, commenced moving about 4 p. m. Orders were 
 extended for my corps to move immediately after General Hardee's. 
 The rear of Hardee's Corps was in motron about ii>^ p. m. My corps 
 was well closed up to it, and immediately following. Our progress was 
 very slow, and the head of my column did not reach Rough and Ready 
 till daylight. I ascertained that the delay was caused by a part of Har- 
 dee's Corps encountering the enemy about 12 p. m., August 30th, on the 
 road on which they were moving, which made it necessary for the hne 
 of march to be changed to a neighborhood road. In consequence of this 
 delay my corps did not arrive at Jonesboro' till near 10 a. m. on the 
 31st, but it reached there immediately in rear of General Hardee's last 
 division. The last three brigades of my corps, in consequence of the 
 distance they had marched, and having been on picket, arrived about 
 1.30 p. m. 
 
 The enemy had during the previous evening and night, effected a 
 crossing of the Flint river, and made a lodgement on the east bank. 
 The preliminaries for the attack were arranged. My corps was formed 
 almost parallel to the railroad, immediately to the right of Jonesboro', 
 connecting with Hardee's right, his line extending towards Flint river, 
 and making almost a right angle with the railroad. It was found that 
 Hardee's Corps did not cover as much ground as was expected, and I 
 was instructed to extend my troops so as to fill up the interval ; and my 
 command was moved almost two divisions front to the left. The instruc- 
 tions given me were to attack as soon as Cleburne, who commanded 
 Hardee's Corps, should become hotly engaged, he being ordered to 
 swing to his right, and my corps to advance directly against the enemy, 
 and if possible, swing to the left. The firing to my left on Cleburne's 
 line, did not indicate a serious engagement, until the right division of 
 Hardee's Corps became engaged. Being satisfied that the battle had 
 commenced in earnest, I at once gave orders to my corps to move 
 against the enemy. The attack was not made by the troops with that spirit 
 and inflexible determination that would ensure success. Several brigades 
 behaved with great gallantry, and in each brigade many instances of 
 gallant conduct were exhibited by regiments and individuals, but gener- 
 ally the troops faltered in the charge, when they were much exposed 
 and within easy range of the enemy's musketry, and when they could 
 do but little damage to the enemy behind his works, instead of moving 
 directly and promptly forward against the temporary and informidable 
 works in their front. The attack was a feeble one, and a failure, with a 
 loss to my corps of about thirteen hundred (1300) men in killed and 
 wounded. The enemy being behind works, and apparently no impression 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 341 
 
 having been made upon him by the attack on my left, where his hne 
 was supposed to be weakest, and Brigadier General Ross commanding a 
 cavalry brigade on my immediate right, having reported the enemy 
 movmg to my right, I was induced not to renew the attack. During the 
 night of the 31st, about i p. m., I received an order from Lieutenant 
 General Hardee to march at once to Atlanta. My corps was immediately 
 put in motion, and was halted by Major General M. S. Smith chief 
 engineer of the Army, about six miles from Atlanta, and there put 
 in position to cover the evacuation of the city. On the morning of Sep- 
 tember I St, I was ordered to move my command towards Lovejoy's 
 Station, which place I reached on the 3d. The Army remained at Love- 
 joy till September i8th, when it commenced moving to Palmetto Station, 
 on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, where it arrived on the 19th. 
 
 Not having received the reports of my division commanders, it is 
 impossible to notice those officers and commands deserving especial 
 mention. It is my purpose to refer to their gallant deeds in a subsequent 
 and more detailed report. I received at all times the cordial support of 
 my division commanders— Major Generals Stevenson, Clayton and 
 Brown, and afterwards Patton Anderson, commanding Hindman's old 
 division, they always displayed great gallantry and zeal in time of 
 battle.* I take pleasure in making a special mention of the gallantry of 
 Brigadier General (now Major General) John C. Brown, during the 
 engagement of the 28th on the Lick-Skillet road, and of Major General 
 Stevenson and Clayton during the battle of Jonesboro' on August 
 31st. The officers of my personal staff, as also of the corps staff, 
 behaved at all times with gallantry, and were energetic in the discharge 
 of their duties. 
 
 I have the honor to be, yours respectfully, 
 
 S. D. LEE, Lieutenant General. 
 
 Columbus, Miss., January 30th, 1864. 
 Colonel :— I have the honor to offer the following as my official report 
 of the operations of my corps, during the offensive movements com- 
 mencing at Palmetto Station, Georgia, September 29th, 1864. It is 
 impracticable, now in consequence of the movement of troops and my 
 temporary absence from the Army, to obtain detailed reports from my 
 division commanders. 
 
 * I reejret to state that Major General Patton Anderson and Brigadier General 
 Cummings were severely wounded in the action of the .31st, while nobly leading 
 their troops against the enemy's works, and their services were lost to us during 
 the remainder of the campaign. 
 
342 APPENDIX. 
 
 As a corps commander, I regarded the morale of the Army greatly 
 impaired after the fall of Atlanta, and in fact before its fall, the troops 
 were not by any means in good spirits. It was my observation and 
 belief that the majority of the officers and men were so impressed with 
 the idea of their inability to carry even temporary breastworks, that 
 when orders were given for attack, and there was a probability of 
 encountering works, they regarded it as recklessness in the extreme. 
 Being impressed with these convictions, they did not generally move to 
 the attack with that spirit which nearly always ensures success. When- 
 ever the enemy changed his position temporary works could be impro- 
 vised in less than two hours, and he could never be caught without them. 
 In making these observations, it is due to many gallant officers and 
 commands to state that there were noticeable exceptions ; but the feel- 
 ing was so general that anything like a general attack was paralyzed by 
 it. The Army having constantly yielded to the flank movements of the 
 enemy, which he could make with but little difficulty by reason of his 
 vastly superior numbers, and having failed in the offensive movements 
 prior to the fall of Atlanta, its efficiency for further retarding the progress 
 of the enemy was much impaired, and besides the advantages in the 
 topography of the country south of Atlanta were much more favorable to 
 the enemy for the movements of his superior numbers than the rough 
 and mountainous country already yielded to him. In view of these facts, 
 it was my opinion that the Army should take up the offensive, with the 
 hope that favorable opportunities would be offered for striking the enemy 
 successfully, thus ensuring the efficiency of the Army for future opera- 
 tions. These opinions were freely expressed to the Commanding 
 General. 
 
 My corps crossed the Chattahoochee river on September 29th, and on 
 October 3d, 1864, took position near Lost Mountain to cover the move- 
 ments of Stewart's Corps on the railroad at Big Shanty and Allatoona. 
 On October 6th I left my position near Lost Mountain, marching via 
 Dallas and Cedar Town, crossing the Coosa river at Coosaville, October 
 loth, and moved on Resaca, partially investing the place by 4 p. m., on 
 October 12th. The surrender of the place was demanded in a written 
 communication, which was in my possession, signed by General Hood. 
 The commanding officer refused to surrender, as he could have easily 
 escaped from the forts with his forces, and crossed the Oostenaula river ; 
 I did not deem it prudent to assault the works, which were strong and well 
 manned, believing that our loss would have been severe. The main 
 object of appearing before Resaca being accomplished, and finding that 
 Sherman's main Army was moving from the direction of Rome and 
 Adairsville towards Resaca, I withdrew from before the place to Snake 
 Creek Gap about mid-day on the 13th. The enemy made his appearance 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 343 
 
 at the Gap on the 14th in large force, and on the 15th it was evident that 
 his force amounted to several corps. Several severe skirmishes took 
 place on the 15th, in which Deas's and Bradley's brigades of Johnson's 
 Division were principally engaged. 
 
 This Gap was held by my command until the balance of the Army had 
 passed through Mattox's Gap, when I followed with the corps through the 
 latter. The Army moved to Gadsden, where my corps arrived on October 
 2 1 St. At this point clothing was issued to the troops, and the Army 
 commenced its march towards the Tennessee. My corps reached the 
 vicinity of Leighton, in the Tennessee Valley, October 29th. Stewart's 
 and Cheatham's Corps were then in front of Decatur. On the night of 
 the 29th I received orders to cross the Tennessee river at Florence, Ala- 
 bama. By means of the pontoon boats, two brigades of Johnson's 
 Division were thrown across the river two and one-half miles above 
 South Florence, and Gibson's brigade of Clayton's Division was crossed 
 at South Florence. The enemy occupied Florence with about one thou- 
 sand (1000) cavalry, and had a strong picket at the railroad bridge. 
 The crossing at this point was handsomely executed, and with much 
 spirit by Gibson, under the direction of General Clayton, under cover of 
 several batteries of artillery. The distance across the river was about 
 one thousand yards. The troops landed, and after forming, charged the 
 enemy, and drove him from Florence. The crossing was spirited, and 
 reflected much credit on all engaged in it. Major General Ed. Johnson 
 experienced considerable trouble in crossing his two brigades because of 
 the extreme difficulty of managing the boats in the shoals. He moved 
 from the north bank of the river late in the evening with one brigade, 
 Sharpe's Mississippi, and encountered the enemy on the Florence and 
 Huntsville road about dark. A spirited affair took place, in which the 
 enemy were defeated, with a loss of about forty (40) killed, wounded, 
 and prisoners. The enemy retreated during the night to Shoal creek, 
 about nine miles distant. The remainder of Johnson's and Clayton's 
 Divisions were crossed on the night of the 30th, and on the morning of 
 the 31st. Stevenson's Division was crossed on November 2d. My 
 corps remained at Florence till November 20th, when the Army com- 
 menced moving for Tennessee, my command leading the advance, and 
 marching in the direction of Columbia via Henryville and Mount Pleas- 
 ant. I arrived in front of Columbia on the 26th, relieving Forrest's 
 cavalry then in position there, which had followed the enemy from 
 Pulaski. The force of the enemy occupying Columbia was two corps. 
 They confined themselves to the main works around the city and their 
 outDosts, and skirmishers were readilv driven in. On the night of the 
 27th the enemy evacuated Columbia, and crossed Duck river; Ste- 
 venson's Division of my corps entered the town before daylight. After 
 
344 APPENDIX. 
 
 crossing, the enemy took a strong position on the opposite side of the 
 river, and entrenched, his skirmishers occupying rifle pits, two hundred 
 and fifty yards from the river. There was considerable skirmishing 
 across the river during the day, and some artillery firing, resulting in 
 nothing of importance. On the morning of the 29th Johnson's Division 
 of my corps was detached and ordered to report to the General Com- 
 manding. I was directed to engage and occupy the enemy near Columbia, 
 while the other two corps and Johnson's Division would be crossed 
 above, and moved to the rear of the enemy in the direction of Spring 
 Hill. The entire force of the enemy was in front of Columbia till about 
 mid-day on the 29th, when one corps commenced moving off, the other 
 remaining in position as long as they could be seen by us, or even till 
 dark. I had several batteries of artillery put in position to drive the 
 skirmishers of the enemy from the vicinity of the river bank, and made 
 a display of pontoons, running several of them down to the river under 
 heavy artillery and musketry fire. Having succeeded in putting a boat 
 in the river, Pettus's brigade of Stevenson's Division was thrown across, 
 under the immediate direction of Major General Stevenson, and made 
 a most gallant charge on the rifle pits of the enemy, driving a much 
 superior force, and capturing the pits. The bridge was at once laid 
 down, and the crossing commenced. The enemy left my front about 
 T-Yz a. m., on the morning of the 30th, and pursuit was made as rapidly 
 as was prudent in the night time. The advance of Clayton's Divi- 
 sion arrived at Spring Hill about 9 a. m., when it was discovered that the 
 enemy had made his escape, passing around that portion of rhe Army in 
 that vicinity. My corps, including Johnson's Division, 'followed imme- 
 diately after Cheatham's Corps towards Franklin. I arrived near 
 Franklin about 4 p. m. 
 
 The Commanding General was just about attacking the enemy with 
 Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps, and he directed me to place Johnson's 
 Division, and afterwards Clayton's, in position to support the attack. 
 Johnson moved in rear of Cheatham's Corps, and finding that the battle 
 was stubborn, General Hood instructed me to move forward in person ; to 
 communicate with General Cheatham, and if necessary, to put Johnson's 
 Division in the fight. I met General Cheatham about dark, and was 
 informed by him that assistance was needed at once. Johnson was 
 iltfmediately moved forward to the attack, but owing to the darkness and 
 •want of information as to the locality his attack was not felt by the 
 enemy till about one hour after dark. This division moved against the 
 enemy's breastworks under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, gal- 
 lantly driving the enemy from portions of his line. The brigades of 
 Sharpe and Bradley (Mississippians), and of Deas (Alabamians), par- 
 ticularly distinguished themselves. Their dead were mostly in the 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 345 
 
 trenches ana on the works of the enemy, where they nobly fell in a des- 
 perate hand-to-hand conflict. Sharpe captured three stands of colors- 
 Bradley was exposed to a severe enfilade fire, yet these noble brigades 
 never faltered in the terrible night struggle. I have never seen greater 
 evidences of gallantry than was displayed by this division, under 
 command of that admirable and gallant soldier, Major General Edward 
 Johnson. The enemy fought gallantly and obstinately at Franklin, and 
 the position he held was, for infantry defence, one of the best I have 
 ever seen. The enemy evacuated Franklin hastily during the night of 
 the 30th. My corps commenced the pursuit about i p. m., on December 
 1st, and arrived near Nashville, about 2 p. m., on the 2d. 
 
 The enemy had then occupied the works around the city. My 
 command was the centre of the Army in front of Nashville; Cheatham's 
 Corps being on my right, and Stewart's on my left. Nothing of import- 
 ance occurred until the 15th. The enemy was engaged in entrenching 
 and strengthening its position. On the 15th the enemy moved out on 
 our left, and a severe engagement was soon commenced. In my imme- 
 diate front the enemy still kept up his skirmish line, though it was 
 evident that his main force had been moved. My line was much 
 extended, the greater part of my command being in single rank. About 
 12 m. I was instructed to assist Lieutenant General Stewart, and I 
 commenced withdrawing troops from my line to send to his support. I 
 sent him Johnson's entire division, each brigade starting as it was dis- 
 engaged from the works. A short time before sunset the enemy 
 succeeded in turning General Stewart's position, and a part of my line 
 was necessarily changed to conform to his new line. During the night, 
 Cheatham's Corps was withdrawn from my right and moved to the 
 extreme left of the Army The Army then took position about one mile 
 in rear of its original line, my corps being on the extreme right. I was 
 instructed by the Commanding General to cover and hold the Franklin 
 pike. Clayton's Division occupied my right, Stevenson's my centre, 
 and Johnson's my left. It was evident, soon after daylight, that a large 
 force of the enemy was being concentrated in my front on the Franklin 
 pike. About 9 o'clock a. m., on the i6th, the enemy having placed a 
 large number of guns in position opened a terrible artillery fire on my 
 line, principally on the Franklin pike. This lasted about two hours, 
 when the enemy moved to the assault. They came up in several lines 
 of battle. My men reserved their fire till they were within easy range, 
 and then delivered it with terrible effect. The assault was easily 
 repulsed. It was renewed, however, several times, with spirit, but only 
 to meet each time with a like result. They approached to within thirty 
 yards of our line and their loss was very severe. Their last assault was 
 made about 3^ p. m., when they were driven back in great disorder. 
 
346 APPENDIX. 
 
 The assaults were made principally in front of Holtzclaus' (Alabama) 
 Gibson's (Louisiana), and Stovall's (Georgia) brigades, of Clayton's 
 Division, and Pettus's Alabama brigade of Stevenson's Division, and too 
 much credit cannot be awarded Major General Clayton and these gallant 
 troops for their conspicuous and soldierly conduct. The enemy made a 
 considerable display of force on my extreme right during the day, evi- 
 dently with the intention of attempting to turn our right flank. He made, 
 however, but one feeble effort to use this force, when it was readily 
 repulsed by Stovall's Georgia, and Bradley's Mississippi brigades, which 
 latter had been moved to the right. Smith's Division, of Cheatham's 
 Corps, reported to me about 2 p. m., to meet any attempt of the enemy to 
 turn our right flank. It was put in position, but was not needed, and by 
 order of the Commanding General it started to Brentwood, about 2>}z P- m. 
 
 The artillery fire of the enemy during the entire day was very heavy^ 
 and right nobly did the artillery of my corps, under Lieutenant General 
 Hoxton, perform their duty. Courtney's battalion, under Captain 
 Douglass, was in Johnson's front ; Johnson's battalion was in Steven, 
 son's front, and Eldrige's battalion, under Captain Fenner, was in 
 Clayton's front. The officers and men of the artillery behaved admira- 
 bly, and too much praise cannot be bestowed upon this efficient arm of 
 the service in the Army of Tennessee. The troops of my entire line 
 were in fine spirits and confident of success (so much so that the men 
 could scarcely be prevented from leaving their trenches to follow the 
 enemy on and near the Franklin pike). But suddenly all eyes were 
 turned to the centre of our line of battle, near the Granny White pike, 
 where it was evident the enemy had rnade an entrance, although but 
 little firing had been heard in that direction. Our men were flying to 
 the rear in the wildest confusion, and the enemy following with enthu- 
 siastic cheers. The enemy at once closed towards the gap in our line 
 and commenced charging on the left division — Johnson's — of my corps ; 
 but were handsomely driven back. The enemy soon gained our rear, 
 and were moving on my left flank, when our line gradually gave way. 
 My troops left their lines in some disorder, but were soon rallied and 
 presented a good front to the enemy. It was a fortunate circumstance 
 that the enemy was too much crippled to pursue us on the Franklin pike. 
 The only pursuit made at that time was by a small force coming from 
 the Granny White pike. 
 
 Having been informed by an aid of the General Commanding that the 
 enemy was near Brentwood, and that it was necessary to get beyond that 
 point at once, everything was hastened to the rear. When Brentwood was 
 passed, the enemy was only one-half mile from the Franklin pike, when 
 Chalmer's Cavalry was fighting them. Being charged with covering the 
 retreat of the Army I remained in rear with Clayton's and part of Steven- 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 347 
 
 son's Division, and halted the rear guard about seven miles north of 
 Franklin, about lo p. m., on the i6th. Early on the morning of the 17th 
 our cavalry was driven in— in confusion — by the enemy ; who at once 
 commenced a most vigorous pursuit, his cavalry charging at every 
 opportunity and in the most daring manner. It was apparent that they 
 were determined to make the retreat a rout, if possible. Their boldness 
 was soon checked by many of them being killed and captured by Pettus's 
 Alabama, and Stovall's Georgia, brigades, with Bledsoe's battery, 
 under Major General Clayton. Several guidons were captured in one of 
 their charges. I was soon compelled to withdraw rapidly towards 
 Franklin, as the enemy was throwing a force in my rear from both the 
 right and left of the pike, on roads coming into the pike near Franklin, 
 and five miles in my rear. This force was checked by Brigadier General 
 Gibson, with his brigade, and a regiment of Buford's cavalry, under 
 Colonel Shacklet. 
 
 The resistance which the enemy had met with early in the morning, 
 and which materially checked his movements, enabled us to reach 
 Franklin with but little difficulty. There the enemy appeared in consid- 
 erable force and exhibited great boldness ; but he was repulsed, and the 
 crossing of the Harpeth river effected. I found that there was in the 
 town of Franklin a large number of our own and of the enemy's 
 wounded, and not wishing to subject them and the town to the fire of the 
 enemy's artillery, the place was yielded with but little resistance. Some 
 four or five hours were gained by checking the enemy about one and 
 one-half miles south of Franklin, and by the destruction of the trestle 
 bridge over the Harpeth, which was effected by Captain Coleman, the engi- 
 neer officer on my staff, and a party of pioneers, under a heavy fire of the 
 enemy's sharpshooters. About 4 p. m. the enemy, having crossed a con- 
 siderable force, commenced a bold and vigorous attack, charging with his 
 cavalry on our flanks and pushing forward his lines in our front. A more 
 persistent effort was never made to rout the rear guard of a retiring column. 
 This desperate attack was kept up till long after dark, but gallantly did 
 the rear guard, consisting of Pettus's Alabama and Cummings's Georgia 
 brigades, the latter commanded by General Watkins, of Stevenson's 
 Division, and under that gallant and meritorious officer. Major General 
 C. L. Stevenson, repulse every attack. Brigadier General Chalmers with 
 his division of cavalry covered our flanks. The cavalry of the enemy 
 succeeded in getting in Stevenson's rear, and attacked Major General 
 Clayton's Division about dark ; but they were handsomely repulsed, Gib- 
 son and Stovall's brigades being principally engaged. Some four or five 
 guidons were captured from the enemy during the evening. 
 
 About I p. m. I was wounded while with the rear guard, but did not 
 relinquish command of my corps till dark. Most of the details in 
 
548 APPENDIX. 
 
 conducting the returns from that time were arranged and executed by 
 Major General C. L. Stevenson, to whom the Army is much indebted for 
 his skill and gallant conduct during the day. I cannot close this report 
 without alluding particularly to the conduct of the artillery of my corps on 
 the i6th. Sixteen guns were lost on the lines. The greater portion of them 
 were without horses, they having been disabled during the day. Many 
 of the carriages were disabled also. The noble gunners, reluctant to 
 leave their guns, fought the enemy, in many instances, till they were 
 almost within reach of the guns. Major General Ed. Johnson was cap- 
 tured on the 1 6th. Being on foot he was unable to make his escape from 
 the enemy in consequence of an old wound. He held his line as long as it 
 was practicable to do so. The Army of Tennessee has sustained no 
 greater loss than that of this gallant and accomplished soldier. To my 
 division commanders — Stevenson, Johnson and Clayton — I am indebted 
 for the most valuable services. They were always zealous in discharge 
 of their duties. Although it is my desire to do so, I cannot now allude 
 to the many conspicuous acts of gallantry exhibited by general, field, and 
 company officers, and by the different commands. It is my intention to 
 do so in future, when detailed reports are received. To the officers of 
 my personal staff", and also of the corps staff, I am indebted for valuable 
 services. They were always at their posts and ready to respond to the 
 call of duty. 
 
 I have the honor to be yours, respectfully, 
 
 S. D. LEE, Lieutenant General. 
 
 Notes. — Brigadier General Manigault, commanding a brigade of Alabamians 
 and South Carolinians, was severely wounded in the engagement while gallantly 
 leading his troops to the fight, and his two successors in command — Colonel 
 Shaw was killed, and Colonel Davis wounded. During the affair around 
 Columbia, the gallant and accomplished soldier, Colonel R. F. Beckham, com- 
 manding the artillery regiment of my corps, was mortally wounded, while indus- 
 triously and fearlessly directing the artillery firing against the enemy. He was of 
 the truest and best officers in the service. 
 
 S. D. LEE, Lieutenant General. 
 
 Columbus, Miss., January 30th, 1864. 
 
 Report of the operations of Lee's Corps from the commencement of offensive 
 operations at Palmetto, Georgia. 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 349 
 
 OFFICIAL REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 
 
 STEWART, OF OPERATIONS UNDER 
 
 GENERAL HOOD. 
 
 Headquarters, Stewart's Corps, A. of T. ) 
 Near Tupelo, Miss., January 12th, i86^.\ 
 
 Col. a. p. Mason, A. A. Cejieral. 
 
 Sir: — In compliance with the wishes of the Commanding General, I 
 submit the following brief report of the operations of this corps from July 
 1 8th, 1864, the day on which General Hood took command of the Army 
 of Tennessee, to September 29th, 1864, the day on which we re-crossed 
 the Chattahoochee. On the i8th of July we lay in bivouac on the south 
 side of Peach Tree creek, between the Marietta and Pace's Ferry road. 
 On that or the following day we commenced entrenching, the enemy 
 having crossed the Chattahoochee, and advanced, on Sunday, the 17th, 
 to the vicinity of Peach Tree creek. This corps was on the left, Hardee's 
 in the centre, Cheatham's, formerly Hood's, on the right of the Army. 
 On the morning of the 20th it was decided at Army headquarters that at 
 I o'clock, p. m. that day an attack should be made on the enemy by 
 this corps and Hardee's. The plan was for the divisions (commencing on 
 Hardee's right) to move forward successively ett echelon, at intervals of 
 some two hundred yards, to attack the enemy, drive him back to the 
 creek, and then pass down the creek to the left. Should the enemy be 
 found entrenched, his works Avere to be carried, every thing on our side 
 of the creek was to be taken, and our crossing to the other side of the 
 creek was to depend on our success. Such were the instructions of the 
 Commanding General to General Hardee and myself. I was to hold a 
 division in reserve. It seems that a division had been withdrawn from 
 the lines on the right of Hardee's Corps. His corps and mine were to 
 close to the right far enough to cover the space vacated by this division 
 — the space to be divided between the two corps. This would have 
 shifted my line a half division front to right, perhaps at most half a 
 mile. 
 
 The division and brigade commanders were notified of the work to be 
 done, and directed to reconnoitre the ground in front of their lines as far 
 as practicable. 
 
 At I o'clock I found the left of Hardee's Corps just beginning to 
 shift to the right. Feeling that this change was not important, and that 
 not a moment was to be lost in making the attack contemplated, a staff 
 officer was dispatched to the Commanding General to inform him of the 
 fact, and requesting an order to stop the movement to the right and 
 commence a forward movement. The result was, however, that to keep 
 
350 APPENDIX. 
 
 up connection with the other corps my line was moved a mile and a- 
 half or two miles to the right, and my right division (Loring's) did not 
 move forward — following the one on its right in the prescribed order, 
 until nearly 4 o'clock. My instructions to division commanders, and 
 through them to brigade and regimental commanders, were to move 
 forward and attack the enemy ; if found entrenched, to fix bayonets and 
 carry his works ; to drive him back to the creek, and then press down 
 the creek ; that we were to carry everything in our front on our side of 
 the creek. Loring's Division was on the right, Walthall's in the centre, 
 and French's, the reserve division, on the left. 
 
 The instructions given were obeyed promptly and with alacrity. 
 Loring's Division moved forward and carried the works in their front, 
 but were compelled to fall back by an enfilade fire from the right, 
 because the left division of the other corps had not moved up to the 
 attack. Walthall's Division also engaged the enemy with great spirit, 
 while French was moved so as to cover the left, and be in supporting 
 distance. Learning the cause of the check to Loring's and Walthall's 
 Divisions, an officer was dispatched to request General Hardee to allow 
 his left division to co-operate with Loring's in carrying the line in its 
 front. Before an answer was received, a staff officer brought me an 
 order from the Commanding General to retire to the entrenched Hne 
 from which we had advanced, and the conflict terminated. The loss in 
 Loring's and Walthall's Divisions, especially the former, was heavy. 
 These commanders, their officers and men, behaved entirely to my 
 satisfaction, and I cannot but think had the plan of the battle, as I 
 understood it, been carried out fully, we would have achieved a great 
 success. I beg leave to refer to subordinate reports, for the names of 
 those who distinguished themselves by special gallantry, and of the 
 brave officers and men whose blood was so freely, and it would seem so 
 uselessly, shed on this occasion, as well as for those details it is impos- 
 sible to embrace in this sketch. 
 
 Thursday night, July 21st, the Army fell back to the line around 
 Atlanta, this corps occupying the space from Peach Tree creek to a 
 redoubt on a hill to the left of the Turner's Ferry road, being still the 
 left of the Army. 
 
 On the 22d we were again ordered to be in readiness to attack the 
 enemy, following the corps on our right, but for reasons unknown to me 
 the battle did not become general on that day. On the 28th the enemy, 
 by extending to his right, had nearly gained the Lick-Skillet road, 
 Loring's and Walthall's Divisions had been relieved at the trenches, and 
 it was expected that French's would be that night. As I understood the 
 instructions, General Lee, commanding corps, was to move out on the 
 Lick-Skillet road, attack the enemy's right flank, and drive him from 
 that road and the one leading from it by Mount Ezra Church. My own 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 351 
 
 orders were to move with the divisions named to the point where our 
 own line of works crossed the Lick-Skillet road. French's Division, 
 when relieved, and one from some other corps, were to rejoin us, and 
 at an early hour ne.xt morning we were to move out upon that road, turn 
 to the right, pass in rear of the enemy, and attack. On reaching the 
 point indicated Lee's Corps was found to be engaged, and in need of 
 assistance. Accordingly Walthall's Division was moved out (Loring's 
 following as support), and formed on Lee's left. It attacked the enemy, 
 strongly posted on a hill, and failing after a desperate fight and heavy 
 loss to dislodge him, Loring's Division was placed in position along the 
 Lick-Skillet road, and Walthall directed to withdraw his in rear of 
 Loring's. A short time previous to this General Loring was wounded, 
 leaving his division under the command of Brigadier General Feather- 
 ston. While his division was taking its position I was myself disabled, 
 and did not return to duty till the 1 5th of August. At this time the corps 
 occupied the line from the Marietta road to a short distance west of the 
 Lick-Skillet road. Nothing of special interest occurred beyond the con- 
 stant skirmishing along the picket lines, until the end of August, when 
 the enemy moved from our front, and moved upon Jonesboro'. This 
 corps remained in position around Atlanta until it became necessary to 
 evacuate the place, retiring towards McDonough, and finally to Lovejoy's 
 Station, where it remained until September i8th. On that day we 
 marched for Palmetto, on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, and on 
 the 20th took position on the left of the Army, between the railroad and 
 the Chattahoochee, where we remained undisturbed until the 29th, when 
 we crossed the river at Pumpkin Town, near Cross Anchor. 
 
 It is due them to express my high appreciation of the conduct and 
 services of the several members of my staff, namely, Lieutenant Colonel 
 F. F. Sevier, assistant inspector general, and his assistants. Lieutenants 
 Cohal and Hopkins, and private Williams, of the New Orleans Light 
 Horse; Major Douglas West and Captain W. D. Gale, of adjutant 
 general's department; Major Foster, Captain Porter, Lieutenant De 
 SauUet and McFall, of the engineers; Lieutenants Ridley and 
 Stewart, aids; Captain Vanderford, ordnance officer; Major Mason, 
 quarter master, and Major Murphy, chief of staff. To Captain Green- 
 leaf and his company, the Orleans Light Horse, I acknowledge my 
 obligations for valuable services. 
 
 Very respectfully, Colonel, your obedient servant, 
 (Signed,) ALEXANDER P. STEWART, Lieutenant General 
 
 Reports from Loring's Division and from Major General French of 
 action, July 20th, forwarded with this. Others will be forwarded when 
 received. Respectfully, 
 
 (Signed,) ^^ p 5, 
 
352 APPENDIX. 
 
 OFFICIAL REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL G. W. 
 
 SMITH, COMMANDING GEORGIA MILITIA, 
 
 AT AND NEAR ATLANTA. 
 
 Headquarters Georgia Militia, ) 
 Macon, Georgia, September i^th, 1864. \ 
 
 General J. B. Hood, Commanding At-my of Tennessee, near Lovejoy 
 Station. 
 General : — I have the honor to make the following report of the part 
 taken by the Georgia militia, under my command, during the operations 
 at or near Atlanta. My appointment was dated the ist of June. I took 
 command a few days thereafter, relieving General Wagner, who returned 
 to the duties of his office as adjutant and inspector general of the State. 
 The force then in the field was composed entirely of State officers — civil 
 and military. They had been formed into two brigades, of three regi- 
 ments each, and one battalion of artillery, making in all a little over three 
 thousand (3000) men. The officers of the militia not needed for these 
 regiments took their places in the ranks as privates with the civil 
 officers. The command had reported to General J. E. Johnston for 
 duty, and had been ordered to guard the crossings of the Chattahoochee 
 river from Roswell Bridge to West Point, which duty they continued to 
 perform until ordered by General Johnston to cross the Chattahoochee 
 and support the cavalry on the left wing of his Army, the right wing 
 being at Kennesaw Mountain. In the execution of these orders the 
 militia were twice brought in conflict with largely superior forces of the 
 enemy's infantry. They behaved well, thoroughly executed the part 
 assigned to them, and when the Army fell back to the Chattahoochee 
 they were the last infantry withdrawn to the fortified position. General 
 Johnston, in a letter to Governor Brown, paid a handsome, and, I think, 
 a well deserved compliment to them for their conduct beyond the river, 
 and their services in beating back the enemy in their attempts upon the 
 various crossings. The day we marched to the Chattahoochee, we were 
 assigned to your corps of the Army. You soon placed us in reserve, 
 which, it was thought, would give some opportunity for drilling. and 
 disciplining the command, no opportunity having offered for this pre- 
 viously. In the meantime the reserve militia of Georgia was ordered 
 out by Governor Brown, and I was ordered to Poplar Spring, near the 
 Atlanta and West Point Railroad, for the purpose of reorganizing, arming 
 the reserves, etc., etc. We had not been there three days before you 
 found it necessary to order us into the trenches on the east side of 
 
OFFICIAL REPORTS. 353 
 
 Atlanta. You had in the meanwhile been assigned to the command of 
 the Army, and instructed me to report to you direct, instead of through 
 a corps commander. There were at this time about two thousand (2000) 
 effective muskets in the command. We guarded some two miles of the 
 line, having in them, however, about eight pieces of Confederate artillery. 
 On the 22d of July, while Hardee was attacking the enemy on our extreme 
 right in the direction of Decatur, when you ordered the troops on my left 
 to advance, without waiting for orders, I closed the intervals in my line, 
 formed line of battle in the trenches, and moved the militia forward 
 over the parapets more than a mile against the enemy's strong works in 
 our front. They were directed upon a battery which had annoyed us 
 very much. Captain Anderson, who had served with my command 
 beyond the Chattahoochee, volunteered to move his battery with us. 
 He took position in clear open ground within about four hundred yards- 
 of the embrasure battery of the enemy, supported by the militia upon, 
 his right and left. Within two minutes the effective fire of the enemy 
 was silenced in our front, and after this they only occasionally ventured 
 to show themselves at the embrasures, or put their heads above the para- 
 pets. My troops were eager to be allowed to charge the battery, but the 
 brigade upon my left had given way, and the falling back was extending 
 still further to the left. Hardee's fire on my right had ceased just after 
 we moved out of the trenches. I considered it useless to make an iso- 
 lated attack, and, therefore, held the position and awaited further devel- 
 opment. In about two hours 1 received orders from you, directing me 
 to withdraw to the trenches. We lost only about fifty men killed and 
 wounded. The officers and men behaved admirably. Every movement 
 was promptly and accurately made ; there was not a single straggler. 
 A few days after this affair of the 22d of July I was ordered again to 
 Poplar Spring, but was scarcely established in camp before we had again 
 to be placed in the trenches on the left of the Marietta road, and from 
 this time until the end of the siege continued under close fire, night and 
 day. We had to move from one portion of the line to another, and had 
 our full share of all the hardest places, extending from the left of the 
 Marietta road across the Peach Tree road to our extreme right. 
 
 The militia, although poorly armed, very few having proper equip- 
 ments, more than two-thirds of them without cartridge boxes, almost 
 without ambulances or other transportation, most of the reserves never 
 having been drilled at all, and the others but a few days, all performed 
 well every service required of them during an arduous and dangerous 
 campaign. They have been in service about one hundred days, during 
 at least fifty of which they have been under close fire of the enemy 
 mostly night and day. They have always shown awilling spirit, whether 
 in camp, on the march, working on the fortifications, guarding trenches, 
 
 23 
 
354 APPENDIX. 
 
 or upon the open battle field They have done good and substantial 
 service in the cause of their country, and have established the fact that 
 Georgia is willing and able to do something effective in her own name, 
 besides furnishing more than her quota to the Confederate Armies 
 proper. The greatest number of effective muskets in the trenches at any 
 one time was about five thousand. When Atlanta was evacuated the 
 reserve artillery of the Army passed out through my lines, and my men 
 were formed as a rear guard. The whole was safely brought to Griffin 
 under your orders. The march from Atlanta to Griffin satisfied me that 
 men over fifty are not, as a class, fitted for military duty. I have, there- 
 fore, strongly advised the Governor to withdraw them from continuous 
 service. 
 
 There being a lull in active operations, the Governor has, with my 
 recommendation and your concurrence, withdrawn the Georgia militia 
 from Confederate service, and furloughed them for thirty days. This 
 report is hastily written, without access to the records and papers of my 
 adjutant general's office, but all omissions can be readily supplied by 
 the returns, etc., already forwarded to your office. Before closing, I 
 cannot refrain from alluding to a subject which, under ordinary circum- 
 stances, forms no part of the reports of subordinates to their command- 
 ers. I allude to the outcry of the press and people against yourself 
 because of the evacuation of Atlanta. 
 
 Unsolicited by me, without my consent or knowledge, the civil and 
 military officers of the State of Georgia, when called upon to take up 
 arms in defence of their homes, almost unanimously elected me their 
 leader, and as their leader I wish, in this report, to say to you and place 
 officially on record this opinion, viz : Had your orders been properly 
 executed, either upon the 20th of July, at Peach Tree creek, the 22d of 
 July, on our right, or on the 30th of August, at Jonesboro', Sherman 
 could have been foiled and Atlanta saved at least for some time to come, 
 and I am not alone in this opinion. 
 
 Commanding a peculiar organization, the ranking officer of the forces 
 of the State in which you were operating, I was invited to and partici- 
 pated in your councils. I had every opportunity of knowing what was 
 going on. Your plans were fully explained to your lieutenant generals 
 and your chief of artillery, chief engineer, and myself. Opinions and 
 views were called for, and then specific orders were given. I have never 
 known one of them to dissent to any plan of yours that was attempted to 
 be executed, never a doubt expressed as to the meaning and intent of 
 your orders, nor a suggestion made by them of a plan they supposed 
 would be better than that you ordered. If they are not now unanimous, 
 there is but one, if any, who dissents from the opinion expressed above, 
 
LETTER TO HONORABLE MR. SEDDON. 355 
 
 viz : Sherman would have been beaten had your orders been obeyed 
 on the 20th of July, 22d of July, and 30th of August. 
 
 Whatever the press or people may say, the militia of Georgia are 
 now more than satisfied with you as their Confederate General, and 
 when they again enter that service in defence of their homes will be 
 glad to hail you as their Confederate Chief. 
 
 (Signed) G. W. SMITH. 
 
 Major General. 
 
 LETTER TO HONORABLE MR. SEDDON. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of Tennessee, ) 
 Near Nashville, Dec. nth, JS64. ) 
 Hon. Jas. A. Seddon, 
 
 Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. 
 
 Sir: — On the 21st of November, after a delay of three weeks, caused 
 by the bad condition of the railroad from Okolona to Cherokee, and of 
 the dirt road from the latter point to Florence, and also by the absence 
 of Major General Forrest's command, this Army moved forward from 
 Florence — Major General Cheatham's Corps taking the road leading 
 towards Waynesboro', and the other two corps moving on roads some- 
 what parallel to this, but more to the eastward, with the cavalry under 
 General Forrest in their advance, and upon their right flank. 
 
 The enemy's forces at this time were concentrated at Pulaski, with 
 some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place our 
 Army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville, but he evacuated 
 Pulaski upon the 23d, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having pre- 
 viously driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by 
 the turnpike and railroad to Columbia. 
 
 The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through 
 which the Army marched, prevented our coming up with the enemy 
 before they reached Columbia, but on the evening of the 21th of Novem- 
 ber our Army was placed in position in front of the enemy's works at 
 Columbia. During the night, however, they evacuated the town, taking 
 position on the opposite side of the river, about a mile and a-half from 
 the town, which was considered quite strong in front. Therefore, late 
 in the evening of the 28th of November, General Forrest, with most of 
 his command, crossed Duck river a few miles above Columbia, and I 
 followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and Cheatham's 
 
356 APPENDIX. 
 
 Corps, and Johnson's Division of Lee's Corps, leaving the other Divi- 
 sions of Lee's Corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops 
 moved in light marching order, with only one battery to the corps. My 
 object being to make a rapid march on roads parallel to the Columbia 
 and Franklin pikes, and by placing the troops across the pike at or near 
 Spring Hill, to cutoff that portion of the enemy between Spring Hill and 
 Columbia. The cavalry engaged the enemy near Spring Hill about mid- 
 day, but their trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to 
 break through them. About 4 p. m. our infantry forces. Major General 
 Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy 
 about two miles from Spring Hill, through which the Columbia and 
 Franklin pike passes. The enemy were, at this time, moving along the 
 pike, with some of their troops formed on the flank of their column to 
 protect it ; Major General Cheatham was ordered at once to attack the 
 enemy vigorously, and get possession of this pike ; and although these 
 orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and 
 partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. 
 
 Darkness soon came on, and to our mortification the enemy continued 
 moving along this road almost in ear-shot, in hurry and confusion, nearly 
 all the night. Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for 
 which we had labored so long, the best which this campaign has offered, 
 and one of the best offered us during the war. General Cheatham has 
 frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches 
 much blame to himself. While his error lost so much to the country, it 
 has been a severe lesson to him by which he will profit in the future. In 
 consideration of this, and of his previous conduct, I think that it is best 
 that he should retain for the present the command he now holds. 
 
 Before daylight, next morning (30th November), the entire column of 
 the enemy had passed us, retreating rapidly towards Franklin, burning 
 many of their wagons. We followed as fast as possible, moving by the 
 Columbia and Franklin pike. Lieutenant General Lee, with his two 
 divisions, and trains and artillery moving from Columbia by the same 
 road. The enemy made a feint of making a stand in the hills, about 
 four miles from Franklin, in the direction of Spring Hill, but as soon as 
 our forces commenced deploying to attack them, and extending to out- 
 flank them on their left, they retired slowly to Franklin. This created a 
 delay of some hours. We, however, commenced advancing on Franklin, 
 and attacked the place about 4 p. m.,with the corps of Generals Stewart 
 and Cheatham— Johnson's Division of Lee's Corps becoming engaged 
 later. We carried the enemy's outer line of temporary works, but failed 
 to carry the interior line. During the night I had our artillery brought 
 forward, and placed in position to open upon them in the morning when 
 the attack should be renewed, but the enemy retreated rapidly during 
 
LETTER TO HONORABLE MR. SEDDON. 357 
 
 the night on Nashville, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands. 
 We captured one thousand prisoners, and several stands of colors. Our 
 loss in officers was severe. The names of the general officers I have 
 already given by telegraph ; * our entire loss was about forty-five 
 hundred. 
 
 We continued our march towards Nashville, and on the 2d of Decem- 
 ber our Army took its present position in front and about two miles from 
 the city. 
 
 Lieutenant General Lee's Corps, which constitutes our centre, rests 
 upon the Franklin pike, with General Cheatham upon his right and 
 General Stewart upon his left. Our hne is strongly entrenched, and all 
 the available positions upon our flanks and in rear of them are now being 
 fortified with strong self-supporting detached works, so that they may 
 easily be defended should the enemy move out upon us. 
 
 The enemy still have some six thousand troops strongly entrenched at 
 Murfreesboro' ; this force is entirely isolated, and I now have the larger 
 part of the cavalry under General Forrest, with two brigades of infantry, 
 in observation of these forces, and to prevent their foraging on the 
 country. Should this force attempt to leave Murfreesboro', or should the 
 enemy attempt to reinforce it, I hope to be able to defeat them. 
 
 I think the position of this Army is now such as to force the enemy to 
 take the initiative. Middle Tennessee, although much injured by the 
 enemy, will furnish an abundance of commissary stores, but ordnance 
 and certain quarter master stores will have to come from the rear, and, 
 therefore, it is very important that the railroad should be repaired at once 
 from Cherokee to Decatur ; the cars can run now from here to Pulaski on 
 
 ♦Headquarters, Army of Tennessee, 
 Six Miles South of Nashville 
 December Sd, I864. 
 
 EE, 1 
 
 • I 
 
 Hon. J. A. Seddon, 
 
 Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. 
 Sir: — About 4 o'clock, p. m. we attacked the enemy at Franklin, and drove 
 him from his outer line of temporary works into his interior lines, which he 
 abandoned during the night, leaving his dead and wounded in our possession, and 
 retreated rapidly to Nashville, closely pursued by our cavalry. We captured 
 several stands of colors, and about one thousand prisoners. Our troops fought 
 with great gallantry. We have to lament the loss of many gallant officers and 
 brave men. Major General Cleburne, Brigadier Generals Gist, John Adams, 
 Strahl, and Granberry were killed ; Major General Brown, Brigadier Generals 
 Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott were wounded, and Brigadier 
 General Gordon captured. 
 
 (Signed) J. B. HOOD, General. 
 
358 APPENDIX. 
 
 the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad. We have sufficient rolling stock 
 captured from the enemy to answer our purposes. I will endeavor to 
 put this road in order from Pulaski to Decatur as soon as possible. 
 
 As yet I have not had time to adopt any general system of conscription, 
 but hope soon to do so, and to bring into the Army all men liable to mili- 
 tary duty. 
 
 Some fifteen thousand of the enemy's Trans-Mississippi troops are 
 reported to be moving to reinforce the enemy here. I hope this will 
 enable us to obtain some of our troops from that side in time for the 
 Spring campaign, if not sooner. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. B. HOOD, General. 
 
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