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DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 OR 
 
 A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS 
 
 IN 
 
 FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE 
 
 OF A 
 
 SUPREME BEING. 
 
 
 BY ISAAC HARRINGTON. 
 
 HARTFORD: 
 
 PRESS OF CASE, LOCKWOOD AND COMPANY 
 
 1860. 
 
 IV 3 
 
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 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by 
 
 ISAAC HARRINGTON, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
 Southern District of New York. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In the physical sciences much accuracy has been attained. 
 Mathematics have acquired the appellation of Exact Sciences, 
 and all departments of science deduced from external Nature, 
 have commended themselves to the respect of the world. Not 
 so with the intellectual and moral. No reliableness has yet 
 been attained in them. Every thing is yet in doubt and 
 dispute. Not one fact has been fully settled. The world is 
 divided and distracted on every point in religion and morality. 
 Should it be affirmed that a God exists, very great authority 
 can be adduced to contradict the assertion. Let the opposite 
 be affirmed, and the authority is still more ponderable. 
 
 Should it be alleged that the world was created, very 
 respectable authority can be arrayed against it. On the con- 
 trary, let it be asserted that the world was not created, but 
 always existed as at present, and the opposition is still 
 stronger. 
 
 The greater portion of mankind never entertained a doubt 
 that some acts are morally right, and others morally wrong ; 
 but respectable authority is not wanting to dispute the prop- 
 osition. It has been both learnedly and ingeniously con- 
 tended, that man necessarily follows the stronger motives ; 
 that for those motives he is not responsible, and has no control 
 over them ; that his character is formed by circumstances — is 
 
lr INTRODUCTION. 
 
 formed for him, not by him ; that " God foreordains whatever 
 comes to pass," without the agency of man. All these issues 
 are yet open, and have not been placed beyond the sphere of 
 logical disputation. 
 
 Should it be affirmed that man will exist beyond the grave, 
 the answer is returned, that death is an eternal sleep, and that 
 future existence can not be proved. Affirm that there is such 
 a place or state as heaven, and it is denied ; affirm the con- 
 trary, and it is also denied. Affirm that there is a hell, a 
 devil, or a state of future misery, and the proposition is largely 
 admitted and largely denied. That the consequences of any 
 acts committed here can reach beyond the grave, is matter for 
 animated and bitter dispute. Should it be contended that the 
 marriage institution is proper, it can be disputed on learned 
 authority. So of every proposition that can be started in the 
 whole range of religious or moral disquisition. 
 
 Now why is this so ? Is it because every moral or religious 
 principle is equally true or false ? Are moral acts both right 
 and wrong ? and either equally indifferent ? Are they equally 
 true and equally false ; equally right and equally wrong ; 
 equally useful and equally hurtful? This is impossible. Then 
 why is so much confusion permitted to distract and bewilder 
 the human intellect ? What has occasioned this dreadful per- 
 plexity ? Is it true that not one fact is yet settled beyond dis- 
 pute in the whole range of morals ? Yes, it is really so ; and it 
 is equally true of every idea that the human intellect has ever 
 conceived. What has logic settled ? What has it really 
 demonstrated beyond the power of. disputation ? Has it 
 demonstrated that any thing can be proved ? Has it demon- 
 strated that demonstration is possible — that any one exists to 
 demonstrate — that any one exists to whom a demonstration 
 could be made ; or that any thing exists to form a subject of 
 demonstration ? Can logic prove that logic exists ? No ; all 
 
INTRODUCTION. V 
 
 these things are acknowledged to be hopeless. Is there no 
 remedy ? Is this uncertainty always to continue ? If so, where 
 is human progress ? Where the fondly anticipated and fondly 
 hoped-for day of deliverance ? How were these difficulties 
 surmounted in the physical sciences ? How did mathematical 
 truths arise to the reputation of " Exact Sciences ?" Simply 
 by adopting a set of " axioms." But for these axioms, 
 mathematical demonstrations would be as unreliable as meta- 
 physical ; and it becomes of the gravest importance to inquire 
 if mathematical axioms are any more reliable than meta- 
 physical. Can we not form a set of metaphysical axioms, that 
 will inspire the same confidence, and lead to as reliable results, 
 as the mathematical truths which lead to exact science ? If 
 so, the demonstrable principle may be applied to metaphysics 
 with reliable results, and dispel. much of the darkness and 
 gloom which now rest on all moral subjects. 
 
 One of the mathematical axioms is the following : 
 
 Part of a thing is less than the whole. 
 
 But this is true only by virtue of the antecedent axiom, 
 
 that SOMETHING EXISTS. 
 
 If this axiom is not true, mathematics falls to the ground. 
 Neither the part nor the whole of a thing exists, and all science 
 is false. 
 
 What gives the mathematician confidence that when he has 
 made a demonstration, and brought out a result, that the 
 same process will again produce the same result ? Simply his 
 confidence in the fidelity of cause and effect. Take away the 
 immutable relation between causes and effects, and all confi- 
 dence must cease in any of the operations of Nature. The 
 physical sciences would be destroyed, and all philosojfcy must 
 cease; mathematics would be untrue, and all that is now 
 received as truth would be destroyed. Then, on the authority 
 of mathematics, we have the axiom that, 
 
VI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 There is such a relation as cause and effect. 
 
 Why does the mathematician accept the proposition, that the 
 three angles of a triangle equal two right angles ? and reject 
 the proposition that all the angles of a triangle equal four 
 right angles ? Simply his confidence in the principle of right 
 and wrong. What object would any one have in attempting 
 to prove that there is no such thing as right and wrong ? 
 Simply to show that he was right and his fellow wrong. Then, 
 on the authority of mathematics, we have the antecedent axiom, 
 that there is such a thing as " right and wrong." 
 
 Has not a mathematician as clear evidence that he can 
 divide a thing into parts, as he has that si the sum of the parts 
 equals the whole ?" Can he have any more confidence that 
 " if equals be added to equals the wholes will be equal," than 
 he has in the freedom of his own acts ? Is not the freedom of 
 his own will as clear to him as any axiom that he is capable of 
 knowing ? If the freedom of the will is rejected from the list 
 of axioms, there is no axiom that may not be rejected on the 
 same account. 
 
 If a mathematician can know that the less can not contain 
 the greater, does he not know also that the less can not pro- 
 duce the greater ; the less can not exceed the greater ; the 
 less can not control the greater ; the less can not destroy the 
 greater. No laws of existence ; no properties of bodies ; no 
 relations of things can be more clearly addressed to the human 
 comprehension, than the fact that — . _ 
 
 The producer is greater than the thing produced. That also 
 which destroys is greater than that whioh is destroyed. Thus 
 the list of moral axioms may be extended to thousands. 
 
 Intuij^on is the great source of knowledge. Without it, 
 ecience can never get a basis. With it, ail is clear and definite. 
 It is certainly as true in moral and intellectual, as it is in 
 mathematical science. 
 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 Consciousness is that by which we know. 
 
 Should any one ask what evidence we have that 
 we exist, the answer must be that we know it. 
 Should we be asked how we know that, or any other 
 fact, all we can say, is that we are simply conscious 
 of it. 
 
 Should we be asked how we know that the sun 
 shines, we must say, that we are conscious that we 
 have seen it. Should we be asked how we know 
 that Columbus discovered America, our reply must 
 be, that we are conscious that we have been told 
 so. The only evidence we have of the fact, that 
 two sides of a triangle are greater than the third 
 side, is that we are conscious of the fact, that we 
 have passed through a process which shows that it 
 is so. 
 
 Thus it is evident, that consciousness is the only 
 means of knowing even mathematical truths. The 
 
8 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 exact sciences prove nothing till we admit the 
 truthfulness of consciousness. A mathematical 
 demonstration proves nothing, till we are conscious 
 of the fact that we exist ; that our proposition ex- 
 ists ; that we have reasoned ; and have passed through 
 a process of thought, conducted according to cer- 
 tain laws ; that we have remembered the whole pro- 
 cess ; and that we have regularly drawn our con- 
 clusion from the premises, according to the laws of 
 mathematics. Until all this is admitted, on the 
 simple dictates of consciousness, mathematics prove 
 nothing, and cannot be considered truthful. 
 
 A popular opinion prevails, to a very mischievous 
 extent, that reasoning is the only means of know- 
 ing. All science is imbued with this spirit, and 
 though it is not directly affirmed in science, yet it 
 is uniformly implied, and made the basis of all 
 philosophizing. Even those who have admitted the 
 reliableness of consciousness, have still made rea- 
 soning the test of consciousness ; thus implying 
 the false axiom, that reasoning is the most reliable 
 source of knowledge. 
 
 Reasoning proves nothing, till we are conscious 
 that we exist, that we can think, that we can com- 
 pare things by means of known laws, and draw 
 correct conclusions from premises known to be true 
 without reasoning. Consciousness is the final court 
 of appeal. Suppose a man chooses to doubt his 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. \j 
 
 own existence, and to plant himself on the propo- 
 sition, that every thing requires proof. Let him 
 try to prove his own existence. He must do it by 
 reasoning ; but he cannot reason till he first exists. 
 Therefore he must admit the existence, before he 
 begins the reasoning. This fact is indispensible to 
 the validity of the proof. Take this away, and the 
 proof means nothing ; or let this be in doubt, and 
 the whole proof is without foundation, and void. 
 Therefore a man in trying to prove his own exist- 
 ence, assumes it in the premises, and cannot prove 
 it in the conclusion. He cannot make it any part 
 of the conclusion, because the conclusion must not 
 be involved in the premises. 
 
 Suppose a man wishes to prove the fact of his 
 thinking. How will he do it % He must do it by 
 reasoning. But he cannot reason without thinking, 
 and thinking is the thing to be proved. Therefore 
 the fact of thinking must be admitted, before the 
 proof can begin ; and the conclusion must be as- 
 sumed in the premises ; and therefore it cannot 
 be made the conclusion. It is hopeless therefore 
 to attempt to prove it. 
 
 Should a man attempt to prove the fact of his 
 own memory, he must not assume the point in dis- 
 pute ; and therefore he must not use his memory 
 till he has proved its existence. How will he prove 
 it I If he does not use his memory he can have 
 
10 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but one object in his mind at once. Let that object 
 be memory, the thing to be proved. Then he can 
 have nothing in the mind, at the same time, to prove 
 it with. On the contrary, if he has any thing in 
 his mind to prove it with, he cannot have memory 
 in his mind, at the same time, to be proved. 
 
 Consequently, as soon as he has something in his 
 mind to be proved, he can have nothing in his mind 
 to prove it with ; and as soon as he has something 
 to prove it with, he has nothing to be proved. 
 Therefore the existence of the human memory, must 
 rest on the evidences of consciousness, without any 
 hope of proof. 
 
 If we attempt to prove the freedom of the will, 
 we must lay the will aside till we make the proof. 
 But we cannot make the proof without reasoning, 
 and we cannot reason, till we will to reason ; there- 
 fore the proof is forever beyond our reach. We 
 cannot reason at all, till we admit the declarations 
 of our consciousness that the will is free. 
 
 We assume the freedom of the will, the moment 
 we begin to reason ; and therefore it cannot be 
 proved. Neither can it be disproved for the same 
 reason. We cannot disprove it till we will to do 
 so ; therefore we must assume the freedom of the 
 will, before we can deny, or attempt to disprove the 
 fact. 
 
 The existence of such a thing as a law, defies all 
 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 11 
 
 human proof. We cannot reason without laws. 
 Our only means of proving is to appeal to some law 
 of science or of thought. Before we begin to reason, 
 we must admit the reliableness of the laws employ- 
 ed in the process ; and therefore the point to be 
 proved must be known and admitted before reason- 
 ing is of any value. Consciousness alone can 
 inform us that there is such an entity as law. 
 
 We shall find ourselves in the same difficulty, if 
 we attempt to prove the existence of such a thing 
 as cause and effect. To prove a thing is to produce 
 an effect. Therefore we cannot attempt to reason 
 without attempting to produce an effect ; and there- 
 fore we cannot prove, that there is any such thing 
 as cause and effect ; because we must assume that 
 relation of things, before we begin the proof. 
 
 We cannot prove that there is any such thing as 
 truth or falsehood, because we must know that 
 there is such a relation of things, before our proof 
 amounts to any thing. All proof is derived from 
 fixed laws, which must be known to be true, or we 
 could not know whether a point were proved or 
 not. The very fact of proof presupposes a knowl- 
 edge of the laws on which the proof is based. 
 
 No man can prove that he derives any happiness 
 from the exercise of benevolence. He feels the 
 sweet emotions running through his soul, and there 
 the matter ends. 
 
12 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We cannot prove that sweet melodies of music 
 awaken emotions of delight. We feel it, and those 
 who have also felt it, may know how to sympathize 
 with us ; but to those whose souls do not respond 
 to music, we can impart no proof by logic. 
 
 The Christian cannot prove that he feels a joy 
 which surpasses all that philosophy can explain, or 
 that the imagination can paint, or eloquence unfold. 
 He feels the sweet consciousness of it, raising him 
 higher in the scale of happiness, and extending his 
 perceptions into regions of 
 
 < ' Permanent delight — 
 Full above measure." 
 
 But those who have not felt it, must forever re- 
 main ignorant of its happifying power. 
 
 The principal sources of human happiness are 
 those which consciousness alone reveals to us, in- 
 dependently of the powers of logical demonstra- 
 tion. 
 
 The extreme absurdity of attempting to verify 
 consciousness by reasoning, will be apparent if we 
 make the attempt. 
 
 In the first place, we must lay aside all the ob- 
 jects of consciousness. We must not use them in 
 our proof; because their reliableness is the point 
 in dispute ; and if we use them, we cannot tell 
 whether our proof is correct or not. We must 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 13 
 
 not use doubtful facts in our proof, or the proof 
 itself must be doubtful. 
 
 We must lay aside every thing that rests on our 
 consciousness. We must reject our own existence, 
 the evidence of our senses, the freedom of the will, 
 the exercise of reason, thought, memory, and all 
 the first truths in reasoning. We must reject the 
 relation of cause and effect, and right and wrong. 
 We -must not be conscious of any thing. We must 
 suspend all that we know, and then attempt to 
 construct an argument. What can we do? Of 
 course nothing. We could no more test the truth- 
 fulness of any thing than a tree or a rock. 
 
 And yet philosophers will tell us that we are 
 bound to prove our own existence, the existence of 
 such a thing as cause and effect, of right and 
 wrong, the existence of the external world, etc. 
 The wisdom and learning of the world have been 
 expended on the freedom of the will, which is af- 
 firmed by simple consciousness ; and, therefore, all 
 that can be written to try to verify it, must proceed 
 in a circle. 
 
 Every man is conscious of existence. Now, 
 suppose we appeal to reasoning to know whether 
 this declaration of consciousness is correct. Let 
 our reasoning bring us to the conclusion that Ave do 
 not exist. Would any man accept and act upon 
 this deduction of reasoning ? No ; every one 
 2 
 
14 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 would still be conscious of existence, -would act 
 accordingly, and would refuse to act on any other 
 supposition. The business of life would still go 
 on, and no one would perceive that the world had 
 lost a particle of confidence in the declarations 
 of consciousness. It is evident, therefore, that 
 men confide in the teachings of consciousness more 
 strongly than they do in the deductions of their 
 ow T n reasoning. 
 
 Consciousness is a necessary prerequisite, or an- 
 tecedent to reasoning. We cannot reason till we 
 are conscious that we exist, that we think, that we 
 have facts to reason with, and subjects to reason 
 upon. All these things must be antecedent to 
 reasoning ; and from them, reasoning derives all its 
 authority. Take them away, and reasoning would 
 prove nothing. But if we attempt to prove the 
 reliableness of consciousness by reasoning, we must 
 take these away, till we can prove them by reason- 
 ing; otherwise we shall assume the point to be 
 proved. 
 
 Now reason is in an awkward predicament. She 
 cannot begin to reason without consciousness, and 
 she cannot have consciousness, till she can begin 
 to reason, and prove consciousness and its truth- 
 fulness. What will she do? Can she ever sur- 
 mount this difficulty ? She cannot. She is eter- 
 nally at rest, till she will proceed on the authority 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 15 
 
 of consciousness, and cavil no more. She must 
 make an entire surrender, and be content with the 
 conditions. Should she, like a fickle child, grow 
 petulant and troublesome again, she will be at once 
 arrested in the midst of her most daring enter- 
 prises, and held in bonds till she learns her weak- 
 ness. 
 
 Therefore reasoning is forever arrested in her 
 progress, till she confides in the superior authority 
 of consciousness. 
 
 Now, since reasoning depends on consciousness, 
 it cannot be applied as a test to consciousness ; be- 
 cause that would be making consciousness depend 
 on reasoning, instead of reasoning on conscious- 
 ness ; and, since reasoning derives its authority from 
 consciousness, it cannot be applied as a test to 
 consciousness ; because that would make conscious- 
 ness a test of itself, which is absurd. 
 
 To make reasoning prove or disprove conscious- 
 ness, would be to make consciousness prove or dis- 
 prove itself. Consciousness would become the 
 prover, the proof, and the thing to be proved ; be- 
 cause all would depend upon it as a foundation. 
 Now r if reasoning could disprove the existence of 
 consciousness, and consciousness could be taken 
 away, or be out of existence, as the thing dis- 
 proved, it would still exist as the prover and the 
 proof, and would be out of existence in one form, 
 
16 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and would still be in existence in two forms, which 
 is ridiculous and absurd. 
 
 It is evident that the teachings of consciousness 
 must be confided in before reasoning can begin; 
 therefore they cannot be established by reasoning ; 
 and if they could be established by reasoning with- 
 out the aid of consciousness, we could not know it ; 
 and therefore we should be obliged to prove that 
 we had reasoned ; we should be obliged to prove 
 our proof, and prove that we had proved the point 
 in dispute ; all of which would be impossible with- 
 out the sanction of consciousness. It is therefore 
 impossible to apply reasoning as a test to con- 
 sciousness, until we can reason independently of 
 consciousness ; and therefore reason without being 
 conscious that we exist, or that any thing else 
 exists ; that we reason, or that any one else rea- 
 sons. 
 
 In order to prove or disprove the authority of 
 consciousness, we must be unconscious at the time, 
 and must not let consciousness be in any way ne- 
 cessary to the proof ; but in order to know that we 
 had proved any thing, we must be conscious of 
 what we had done. 
 
 Therefore we can neither prove nor disprove the 
 authority of consciousness, till we can be uncon- 
 scious of existence, and yet conscious of it ; un- 
 conscious of the teachings of consciousness, and 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 17 
 
 yet conscious of them ; unconscious of the proof 
 of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of conscious- 
 ness, and yet conscious of it, which is absurd. 
 
 Therefore it is impossible for reasoning to be 
 employed as a test of consciousness. But con- 
 sciousness is the only test of reasoning; because 
 we cannot judge whether an argument is correctly 
 conducted or not, nor whether the conclusion is 
 correctly drawn from the promises or not, without 
 our consciousness. Now, since consciousness is 
 the test of reasoning, it follows that reasoning can- 
 not be the test of consciousness. 
 
 We have also seen, that should reasoning lead 
 to the conclusion that we do not exist, and that 
 consciousness is fallacious, no one would believe the 
 deductions of his ow T n reasoning. The conscious- 
 ness of his own existence could not be overruled. 
 The active currents of life would still flow on. 
 The lamp of life would still burn. The ocean of 
 thought would heave with restless commotion. 
 Consciousness would whisper into the ear of being, 
 and the devotee at the shrine of reasoning, after 
 he had confessed his nonentity, would rise up and 
 affirm — " I still exist." 
 
 Hence, in every aspect of the case, it is impos- 
 sible to make reasoning a test of consciousness. 
 The almost universal practice, therefore, of making 
 reason the test of every thing, is evidently absurd. 
 
18 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hence the vast amount of ingenious effort that 
 has been expended in trying to verify the teachings 
 of consciousness, has been worse than lost. It has 
 unsettled every fact known to man. There is not 
 one fact in literature, art, or science that has yet 
 been settled by reasoning. Every thing is open 
 for discussion. Philosophers have taught us to 
 demand proof of our own existence, of the exist- 
 ence of the external universe, of the existence of 
 such a thing as cause and effect, of right and 
 wrong, and all the truths on which human knowl- 
 edge depends. 
 
 Philosophers have entirely overlooked the fact, 
 that it is beyond the power of reason ever to settle 
 one fact. We have shown that reasoning cannot 
 confirm the truthfulness of consciousness, and of 
 course, it cannot confirm any thing else ; because 
 every thing else depends on consciousness. Hith- 
 erto we have found ourselves wandering amazed in 
 a universe of unknown, disputed, and disputable 
 things, either real or imaginary, and unable to find 
 a solid and settled point on which to erect a stand- 
 ard by which to test any thing. By reasoning 
 alone, the human family have never had one thing 
 in common, except the uncertainty of every thing. 
 
 Now, why is it so ? Is it because the universe 
 is an ignis fatuus, and reason a bright luminary. 
 
 " Which leads to bewilder, and dazzles to blind ?" 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 19 
 
 No ; it is because reason has been wrested from 
 its true office, and been amused, like the infant 
 and unpracticed spectator, on first looking up to 
 the brilliant host of worlds on high. It holds up 
 its little hands to catch the stars, thinking them 
 quite within its reach. 
 
 For the ten thousandth time, consciousness has 
 been arraigned at the bar of reasoning, and requir- 
 ed to give an account of the rectitude of her doings. 
 She has been obliged to face the most powerful ar- 
 ray of counsel, headed by Des Cartes, and backed 
 up by the most profound learning, and the most in- 
 genious logic that the world could furnish ; but she 
 has found herself quite equal to the occasion. She 
 has never yet been compelled to lower her dignity, 
 by acknowledging accountability at the bar of 
 reasoning. She is the rightful sovereign of the 
 realm of thought, seated on an eminence too high 
 for genius to ascend, and too firm for logic to dis- 
 turb. 
 
 With what success her authority has been dis- 
 puted, we shall see. Among the first and foremost 
 of her opponents, we may mention Des Cartes. 
 Being disgusted with the looseness of the philoso- 
 phy of his times, he took the opposite extreme, 
 and resolved to discredit his own existence, till he 
 could confirm it by reasoning. He was unwilling 
 to trust his consciousness, and therefore resolved to 
 
£0 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 establish bis existence by the force of logic. In 
 searching for proof he found nothing which ap- 
 peared to him entirely free from doubt, except the 
 fact that HE THOUGHT. 
 
 Delighted with the idea that he had found a re- 
 liable foundation on which to build, he constructed 
 the argument, " Cogito ergo sum." "I think, 
 therefore, I am." He thought he had proved 
 his own existence, from the fact that he thought ; 
 and he made this the foundation of his philosophy. 
 It is a little surprising, however, that he did not 
 discover, that the conclusion of his argument was 
 assumed in the premises. When he had said, 
 " I think," he had presupposed the proposition, 
 " / am." If I affirm that I think, I do not prove 
 that I am, as a necessary consequent ; but I as- 
 sume or presuppose that I am, as a necessary 
 antecedent, without which the proposition, " I 
 think," cannot be true. If he had said, J do not 
 think, he would have assumed the proposition, I 
 am, as the only condition on which he could say, I 
 do not think. The act of speaking or acting at all, 
 presupposes the existence of the person who speaks 
 or acts. The argument of Des Cartes amounts to 
 this, " I am, therefore I am," which is ridic- 
 ulous and absurd. 
 
 But how did he know that he thought? Simply 
 by his consciousness. Then he assumed the teach- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 21 
 
 ings of consciousness to be reliable, and made that 
 fact the foundation of his proof. But that was 
 the point he set out to prove. Therefore he as- 
 sumed the point to be proved, and made that as- 
 sumption the foundation of his philosophy. 
 
 Lest we should be thought to draw our conclu- 
 sions unfairly, we beg that the reader may notice, 
 that the proposition, I think , is without meaning, 
 unless the subject I represents some person who 
 thinks, and the predicate think is affirmed of some 
 person who thinks. The existence of this person 
 must be known before the affirmation can be made, 
 that he thinks. Des Cartes, therefore, could not 
 have truthfully affirmed, a I think, " unless he pre- 
 viously knew his own existence. When he said, 
 " I think, therefore I am" he ended exactly 
 where he began. He began and ended with the 
 fact of his own existence, and this he received on 
 the authority of consciousness, which is the thing 
 he resolved not to do. 
 
 He therefore made consciousness the foundation 
 of his philosophy, while he professed to build upon 
 proof. 
 
 Why did that deep and acute philosopher fall 
 into such a mistake ? It was the unavoidable re- 
 sult of the false axiom on which he attempted to 
 build, that nothing must be received without 
 proof It was an unavoidable result ; because 
 
22 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the moment he attempted to prove his own exist- 
 ence, he assumed it ; and he finally built on con- 
 sciousness, because that is the only foundation on 
 which he could build. He who attempts to avoid 
 it, will find himself planted upon it, the moment he 
 begins to think, speak, or act. The teachings of 
 consciousness are the only reliable things known to 
 man — the only foundation on which we can build, 
 even if we attempt to reject it. It is, indeed, the 
 
 only FOUNDATION. 
 
 If any differ from us in adopting this foundation, 
 we ask him to take any other, and risk the conse- 
 quences. What will he do ? 
 
 He cannot think a thought, speak a word, per- 
 form an act, nor recognize his own existence, nor 
 that of any person or any thing else. He cannot 
 eat nor drink, can neither affirm a thing nor deny 
 it, admit, assume, nor attempt to prove. He must 
 consent to be a nonentity — must not be at all. 
 His very existence will be a standing refutation of 
 his theory. 
 
 He cannot be allowed to assume his conscious- 
 ness, and to act upon it ; and make that the only 
 means of doubting it, as has universally been the 
 case with those who have distrusted their conscious- 
 ness. But the doubter may say, as objectors are 
 fond of saying, that he is on the negative, and it 
 devolves on the affirmative to make the proof. But 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 23 
 
 he must recollect, that in the absence of conscious- 
 ness, there is neither affirmative nor negative. If 
 there is such a relation of things, and if it is a 
 settled rule of logic, that the affirmative is bound 
 to make the proof, it follows that the point in dis- 
 pute is admitted; because these distinctions can 
 exist only among conscious beings, who have a very 
 considerable knowledge of men and things, and of 
 the rules of logic, and the settled principles of 
 science ; all of which must be kept out of sight, till 
 the truthfulness of consciousness is settled. 
 
 He cannot throw the burden of proof on his 
 opponent, because neither he nor his opponent yet 
 exists, as far as the argument is concerned. Their 
 very existence is involved in the question, and must 
 not be assumed. Let no one flatter himself that 
 we are anxious to persuade him to adopt the plat- 
 form which we have laid down. We ask him, 
 rather, to reject it if he can. We cannot conceive 
 how an objector can exist ; because the moment 
 the reliableness of consciousness is denied, it is ad- 
 mitted ; and therefore the objector is instantly con- 
 verted into a defender of our platform. Therefore 
 an opponent can never be found. Professed oppo- 
 nents are the best defenders of what we contend for. 
 
 It is sufficiently demonstrated that the veracitj 
 of consciousness is a truth which cannot be proved, 
 denied, nor questioned. 
 
24 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is an astonishing fact, that in any conceivable 
 mode of proof, the conclusion would be assumed 
 in the premises. 
 
 No one can reason on the subject without admit- 
 ting to himself the proposition, I reason. But 
 we cannot reason without thinking ; therefore the 
 admission, I reason, is an admission of the propo- 
 sition, I think, which is the elementary proposition 
 of Des Cartes. 
 
 His argument is, therefore, the only one that 
 could have been adopted, since every other is but a 
 different form of his, and may be reduced to it. 
 Hence we cannot reason at all on the truthfulness 
 of consciousness, without beginning with the pro- 
 position, I think. But we have seen that the pro- 
 position, I think, assumes the proposition, I am, 
 which is the point in dispute. Therefore any pos- 
 sible mode of inquiry into the truthfulness of con- 
 sciousness must assume the conclusion in the prem- 
 ises. 
 
 It is one of the greatest evidences of the agency 
 of a great intelligence in the orderly structure of 
 the universe, that the foundations of human knowl- 
 edge, deep laid in our consciousness, are so wisely 
 presented to the understanding, and are so effect- 
 ually guarded against unbelief, that we cannot 
 openly deny, nor silently disbelieve, nor secretly 
 doubt the teachings of consciousness, without as- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 25 
 
 saining the point that our foolish pride of intellect 
 would call in question. 
 
 If any man denies, he admits the proposition, 
 " / deny." If he disbelieves, he admits the pro- 
 position, " I disbelieve ." If he doubts, he admits 
 the proposition, " I doubt." But in all these 
 propositions the subject I assumes the existence of 
 some person who denies, disbelieves, or doubts. 
 Therefore we cannot deny, disbelieve, nor doubt 
 the verity of consciousness, without assuming the 
 point in debate. 
 
 We have now seen that the teachings of con- 
 sciousness can neither be proved nor disproved, 
 affirmed nor denied, doubted nor believed, admit- 
 ted nor rejected. 
 
 We cannot prove them, without a conscious and 
 antecedent agent to prove them. We cannot dis- 
 prove them, without a conscious and antecedent 
 agent to disprove them. And could that agent 
 disprove them, and show that they do not exist, 
 or that no reliance can be placed upon them ; this 
 conscious being must rely on his consciousness for 
 the reliableness of his reasoning, and must therefore 
 rely on what he had disproved. 
 
 After consciousness and its teachings had been 
 
 reasoned out of existence, the being that performed 
 
 the wonderful feat would still exist, and would 
 
 possess and trust his consciousness ; and therefore 
 
 3 
 
26 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 consciousness must exist, and not exist at the same 
 time, which is absurd. 
 
 Who would not laugh at the folly of a mad man 
 who should light a lamp, and, with the lamp in 
 hand, should search for the non-existence of the 
 lamp ; and after he had found that the lamp did 
 not exist, should confirm the non-existence of the 
 lamp, by the light of the lamp. But is not this 
 precisely the case with the philosopher, who, by 
 the light of consciousness, attempts to discredit 
 the teachings of consciousness % The point can 
 neither be proved nor disproved, affirmed nor de- 
 nied, admitted nor rejected, believed nor doubted, 
 without first assuming a conscious being, who shall 
 take the light of consciousness into his hand, be- 
 fore he can perform any act whatever. 
 
 The final sum is this : any proposition whicn 
 can possibly be formed must assume the truthful- 
 ness of consciousness in the subject ; therefore it 
 cannot become the predicate ; consequently all rea- 
 soning on the subject must proceed in a circle. 
 
 The premises of an argument or proposition 
 necessarily include the teachings of consciousness 
 as the conditions on which they are correct ; and 
 therefore to try to bring them into the conclusion 
 or predicate, is an absurdity which would require 
 but little notice, had it not become so common. . 
 
 The teachings of consciousness can be neither 
 
THE SENSES. 27 
 
 proved nor disproved, affirmed nor denied, doubted 
 nor believed, admitted nor rejected. 
 
 They must be let alone, and simply obeyed. Its 
 voice is our law. It stands forth an immutable, 
 incomprehensible, eternal source of truth, -which 
 we can never fathom. 
 
 THE SENSES. 
 
 The senses are the instruments by which we per^ 
 ceive external objects. 
 
 By the senses, we mean Seeing, Hearing, Tast- 
 ing, Smelling and Feeling. 
 
 The existence of our senses cannot be proved. 
 We have no means of conveying ideas but by lan- 
 guage ; and language is wholly derived from objects 
 of sense. Therefore the objects of sense are neces- 
 sarily involved in the premises of every argument ; 
 and cannot belong to the conclusion. We cannot 
 construct a sentence in any language, without ad- 
 mitting the objects of sense. But in recognizing 
 the objects of sense, we recognize the senses them- 
 selves. Therefore the existence of the senses, is 
 an element in the premises of every argument ; and 
 cannot be made the conclusion. Hence the exist 
 
28 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ence of the senses cannot be proved without assum- 
 ing it in the proof. 
 
 But the existence of the senses is a fact which 
 does not need proof; because, 
 
 1. We are conscious of their existence, and 
 consciousness is more reliable than proof. There- 
 fore the existence of the senses is more reliable than 
 it would be if we could merely prove it. 
 
 2. The fact is necessarily admitted by all men ; 
 therefore proof would be gratuitous and super- 
 fluous. 
 
 RELIABLENESS OF THE SENSES. 
 
 All philosophers admit the existence of the senses, 
 and also the reliableness of their teachings, so 
 far as ideas are concerned. No one denies that we 
 have the idea of external objects ; but that any 
 thing more than the idea exists, is a fact which, 
 in the opinion of modern philosophers, requires 
 proof. Hence much ingenious effort has been 
 expended in trying to demonstrate this difficult 
 problem. 
 
 If the existence of external objects requires proof, 
 they must not be used, until the proof is made ; 
 otherwise the point in dispute will be assumed. If 
 philosophers attempt to prove that the earth exists ; 
 they must not have it to stand upon till they prove 
 
THE SENSES. 29 
 
 its existence. They must not have the air to 
 breathe, food to eat, nor water to drink ; otherwise 
 they will assume the point in dispute, which is not 
 allowable. 
 
 Yet all these things are necessarily recognized, 
 before any process of proof can begin. Their exist- 
 ence is a necessary element in the subject of every 
 proposition that can be formed in any language ; 
 and therefore cannot be the predicate. It is there- 
 fore absurd to try to prove this proposition ; because 
 the point to be proved, is necessarily assumed in 
 the premises. 
 
 Philosaphers seem to think, that if they can 
 puke and drule for a time in the nursery — be fed 
 and clothed — protected from danger — and be fur- 
 nished with every thing needful in the defenseless 
 hours of infancy : if they can be sent to the pri- 
 mary school, and taught in the elements of learn- 
 ing — be sent to a grammar school, and be patiently 
 taught in their academical studies— can be sent to 
 a university and supported there, till they acquaint 
 themselves with science, literature, and arts : if 
 they can assume all these, as antecedents ; they 
 can then sit down and coolly demand proof, that 
 any such things ever existed. 
 
 Greater folly and absurdity could not be in- 
 dulged. 
 
 How can a philosopher respect the command- 
 
30 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 ment — " Honor thy father and thy mother ;" if 
 he demands proof that they ever existed ? 
 
 It may be said perhaps, that philosophers may 
 assume and employ the idea of external objects, 
 without assuming the objects themselves. But 
 they are not at liberty to use even the idea of these 
 things. While making the proof, they are bound 
 to have the idea of not having, and using external 
 objects. 
 
 They must have the idea of not having had 
 father nor mother nor home — of not having been fed 
 and clothed — of not having been taught and guided 
 through childhood and youth. They are bound to 
 have the idea, that external objects have not been 
 used, while they were proving their existence. 
 
 It is obvious that the reliableness of the senses, 
 cannot be proved ; because the objects of sensation 
 must be employed in making the proof. Therefore 
 the point to be proved, would necessarily be as- 
 sumed in the subject or premises ; and could not 
 be made the predicate of a proposition. 
 
 But the existence of external objects is a pro- 
 position which does not demand proof, because, 
 
 1. It is a fact that all men admit. They 
 cannot live a single hour, or minute, without ad- 
 mitting it ; and therefore to attempt to prove it, 
 would be gratuitous. 
 
 2. The existence of things cannot be denied; 
 
THE SENSES. 31 
 
 because the very proposition which denied it would 
 admit it. 
 
 We have now shown that the existence of ex- 
 ternal objects is necessarily admitted in the prem- 
 ises of every argument. 
 
 The words of all languages are the representa- 
 tives of external objects ; 
 
 Therefore a proposition which denied the exist- 
 ence of external objects, would admit the thing 
 denied. 
 
 We have now seen, that the existence of the 
 external universe, cannot be proved ; because it is 
 always admitted, even when denied. We cannot 
 formally admit the fact, without involving a double 
 admission ; because the admission would be involved 
 in both the premises and the conclusion. 
 
 It is therefore a proposition which cannot be 
 proved nor disproved ; admitted nor denied ; re- 
 ceived nor rejected. 
 
 It must be let alone as a truth antecedent to, 
 and independent of reasoning. 
 
 It is a truth forever secure against the attacks 
 of skepticism. It cannot be denied nor doubted 
 without recognizing words ; and consequently ex- 
 ternal objects. The objector cannot demand proof 
 of any one else, because any one else would be an 
 external object, the existence of which is the point 
 to be proved. 
 
32 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 There is no reason why this perplexing proposi- 
 tion should be any longer considered an open ques- 
 tion. Any one who denies it, or demands proof of 
 it, can instantly be convicted of inconsistency, by 
 showing that he admits it. 
 
 If he demands proof of it, he admits it in two 
 ways : 
 
 1. By using words derived from external objects. 
 
 2. By admitting the existence of a person exter- 
 nal to himself to whom he is speaking. 
 
 The existence of the external world is a neces- 
 sary antecedent to all reasoning. Without it, 
 reasoning cannot begin. 
 
 Therefore the existence of the senses, and the 
 reliableness of their teaching are : 
 
 1. Antecedent to reasoning. 
 
 2. Are necessarily admitted in all processes of 
 reasoning. 
 
 3. Reasoning is void without them. 
 
 4. Men confide in them even though their rea- 
 soning should reject them. 
 
 5. They cannot be proved nor disproved ; affirm- 
 ed nor denied ; doubted nor believed ; admitted nor 
 rejected by any form of logical reasoning, without 
 assuming the point in dispute ; 
 
 6. Therefore the senses are more reliable than 
 any thing that depends on proof. 
 
REASONING. 83 
 
 REASONING. 
 
 Having shown that consciousness is antecedent 
 to reasoning, and that reasoning cannot begin till 
 the verity of consciousness is admitted ; we now 
 proceed to notice the nature and extent of rea- 
 soning. 
 
 The foundations of reasoning have ever been in- 
 volved in vagueness and doubt. Philosophers have 
 been aware that the starting points of their reason- 
 ing, eluded the powers of logic; and baffled all 
 attempts at demonstration. Writers of every 
 school have felt this difficulty, and have long been 
 striving to surmount it. Some, on finding that 
 they could not demonstrate their first truths, have 
 hesitated whether to 
 
 " Trust in every thing or doubt of all." 
 
 Others have attempted to prove them, and after 
 committing themselves to the necessity of proving 
 them, have failed, and then assumed them in viola- 
 tion of their own admission. 
 
 The attempt has been made to shun the diffi- 
 culty by rejecting substantial forms, and denying 
 the existence of every thing except ideas ; but this 
 
84 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 does not remove the obstacles from our path. 
 There is quite as much difficulty in proving the ex- 
 istence of immaterial things, as material things. 
 We can no more prove the existence of ideas, than 
 we can the existence of material forms. Therefore 
 we cannot reject the one, without rejecting the 
 other. 
 
 Reid has endeavored to surmount the obstacle 
 by insisting on his rule of common sense ; but he 
 has asserted and denounced, where he should have 
 reasoned. An opponent is entitled to a reason, 
 rather than an odious epithet. He argues very 
 properly, that first truths do not require proof; 
 but he asserts this fact without proving it. If we 
 cannot prove them ; we can prove that they can- 
 not and need not be proved. 
 
 Reid denounces as mad men, those who deny the 
 evidence of their consciousness and sensation ; and 
 says they are fit subjects for an insane hospital. 
 But most philosophers have tried to prove their 
 first truths ; and this fact implies the right to deny, 
 till the proof is made. If it is a mark of lunacy to 
 deny, it is as much so to attempt to prove ; and 
 Reid's list of mad men becomes so large, that we 
 should not find a hospital large enough to hold 
 them. There are thousands of little neighborhood 
 philosophers, who would think it an honor to be 
 called even mad men, in the same category with 
 
REASONING. 35 
 
 John Locke, Des Cartes, and numerous others of 
 like celebrity. May it not be better to try, by 
 some skillful treatment, to restore these men to 
 their reason again, by giving them a good reason for 
 what we assert, rather than leave them in their 
 insanity ? 
 
 It is not sufficient for us to say that we cannot 
 prove our first truths, and that we are not bound to 
 do so. What we cannot do, perhaps some one 
 else can ; unless it is shown that these truths lie 
 beyond the reach of human reasoning ; and cannot 
 be proved by any means. But Reid falls so far 
 short of this, that he leaves them nearly as open as 
 before. He says, " Such common principles seldom 
 admit of direct proof. 5 ' Now what are we to under- 
 stand by the assertion, that they seldom admit of 
 direct proof. Does he mean to say, that sometimes 
 they do admit of direct proof; and at other times 
 they do not % And when he says, they seldom 
 admit of direct proof, does he mean to imply that 
 they frequently admit of indirect proof? This 
 leaves them in confusion and doubt. Is it true 
 that these truths can be proved in any manner; 
 directly or indirectly ; seldom or frequently 1 They 
 cannot. 
 
 And if we allow that these are facts so clearly 
 self-evident as not to require proof ; how are we 
 to determine what kind of facts come within the 
 
36 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 meaning of elementary truths, and how manyl 
 We need some rule to determine, otherwise we may 
 plead exemption when we should prove. 
 
 The youthful inquirer has had no standard by 
 which to judge, and he has been led to believe that 
 he is bound to prove every thing. 
 
 The foundations of reasoning have not yet been 
 fortified against the attacks of ingenious sophistry. 
 Philosophers must hold themselves bound by more 
 exact methods of investigation, or science can never 
 inspire implicit confidence. Every fact known to 
 man, may now be disputed on the authority of science. 
 
 If we allege that we exist, we have the authority 
 of great names to contend with. We can be re- 
 minded that Des Cartes has given his sanction to 
 She necessity of proving the fact of personal exist- 
 ence ; and his opinion may be fortified by hundreds 
 of illustrious names. If we assert the existence 
 of the external world, we must confront the powers 
 of Berkley, Locke, Hume, and a most proud array 
 of learning and talent, allowing that this is a pro- 
 position which should be proved. 
 
 If we claim that some acts are morally right, and 
 others wrong ; we are told by a large and somewhat 
 celebrated school of moralists, that all things are 
 right, that all things are governed by the fixed and 
 invariable laws of nature, and must be right and 
 pure. 
 
REASONING. 37 
 
 If we raise our voice against the appalling effects 
 of vice, and urge the moral causes appropriate to 
 destroy the effects of wrong doing ; we may be told 
 upon the very gravest authority, that it has not yet 
 been shown, that there is any such relation among 
 things, as cause and effect. 
 
 If we contend that " All men are created free 
 and equal," we &re told that "There is no institu- 
 tion more pleasing in the sight of Heaven than do 
 mestic slavery." 
 
 When we urge the exalted precepts of Jesus 
 Christ as a rule of action, we are informed that 
 it is not certain that any such being ever ex 
 isted. 
 
 So we may pass through the whole range of lit- 
 erature, art, science, and* indeed every fact yet 
 known to man ; and every particle may be disputed 
 on the authority of science. 
 
 By science alone, man has never yet settled one 
 fact. There is not yet one demonstrated truth on 
 which any man can build a system of logic. Sci- 
 ence has been erected without a foundation, and 
 when held responsible by its own inductions, its 
 deductions are unsound. 
 
 But is science necessarily so unreliable ? Why 
 
 has logic proved so inefficient? The difficulty 
 
 seems to have arisen from a misconception of the 
 
 true nature of reasoning. Philosophers have over- 
 
 4 
 
88 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 looked the fact, that something must be known 
 
 BEFORE ANY THING CAN BE PROVED. 
 
 They have supposed that they could make logical 
 proof more satisfactory than the facts from which 
 their conclusions must be drawn. 
 
 Philosophy has been greatly misled by the false 
 opinion, that nothing is to be admitted without 
 proof. 
 
 This sounds well in theory, and coincides with 
 the popular, and even the learned idea of the true 
 system of philosophy. It may seem absurd to al 
 lege, that there are things more reliable, than any 
 thing that depends on proof; but however startling 
 it may be, we venture the assertion, that proof is en- 
 tirely subordinate to that from which it is derived 
 
 This will be apparent when we consider, that 
 reasoning is to philosophy, what chemistry is to 
 solids. It is a method of decomposition, by which 
 things are reduced to their elements. 
 
 Reasoning is a species of intellectual chemistry. 
 The art of decomposing thoughts, and reducing 
 them to their elements, so as to ascertain the laws 
 of their composition. Thoughts, like sensible 
 bodies, have certain elements to which they may 
 be reduced ; and beyond which the process of anal- 
 ysis cannot go. An element cannot be analyzed. 
 We can no more analyze an element in metaphys- 
 ics, than in physics. 
 
REASONING. -89 
 
 Simples must first exist, or compounds cannot 
 exist. Therefore simples are necessary antece- 
 dents to compounds ; and compounds cannot be 
 antecedent to simples. The compounds must de- 
 pend on the simples ; and therefore the simple3 
 cannot depend on the compounds. 
 
 The compounds can have no properties not con- 
 tained in the simples. 
 
 Since the simples exist antecedent to, and inde- 
 pendent of compounds ; and since the compounds 
 depend on the simples, it follows that the com- 
 pounds cannot be admitted to exist ; nor be in any 
 way used without presupposing the simples. 
 
 Ail reasoning, therefore, presupposes the exist- 
 ence of those elementary principles from which 
 reasoning is derived ; and therefore reasoning can- 
 not prove these elements. If they are not pre- 
 supposed, the reasoning is void, and does not prove 
 any thing ; and if they are presupposed as a neces- 
 sary antecedent to the reasoning, they cannot be 
 proved by that reasoning. 
 
 If A is before B, then B cannot, at the same 
 time, be before A. 
 
 If A supports B, then B cannot, at the same 
 time, support A. 
 
 If A depends on B, then B cannot, at the same 
 time, depend on A. 
 
40 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If A proves the existence of B, then B cannot, at 
 the same time, prove the existence of A. 
 
 If B cannot be proved without A, then A must 
 be known, before B can be proved. 
 
 If A must b§ known before B can be proved, 
 then B cannot be employed in the proof of A. 
 
 These axioms show that those elementary ideas 
 which are antecedent to, and which support reason- 
 ing, cannot be sustained, or demonstrated by rea- 
 soning. 
 
 We can prove a thing only by reducing it to, or 
 comparing it with something that is known. 
 
 Therefore, before the first thing can be proved, 
 something must be known; or nothing could be 
 thus reduced or compared. 
 
 Proof is something more simple than the thing 
 proved. Therefore there must be something more 
 simple than any thing that can be proved. Hence 
 the thing proved cannot be the plainest thing 
 known ; nor the first thing known. 
 
 We cannot reason without something from which 
 to reason. A carpenter cannot build a house with- 
 out principles to work from ; tools to work with, 
 and materials to work upon. Neither can a man 
 reason without principles from which to reason ; 
 subjects on which to reason ; and known facts with 
 jwhieh to reason. Therefore known facts must be 
 antecedent to reasoning , must sustain all rea- 
 
REASONING. 41 
 
 soning; and therefore cannot be proved by rea- 
 
 soning, 
 
 These facts must be sufficiently ample, to con- 
 tain the elements of all that is afterward to be 
 proved ; because every thing subsequently proved, 
 must be regularly deduced from these as ante- 
 cedents.; 
 
 These antecedents must not be based on specu- 
 lation ; or all that flows from them will rest on 
 speculation. 
 
 They must not depend on probability, or all that 
 is drawn from them can be merely probable, and 
 no fact could ever rise higher than probability. 
 
 They must be known, or nothing drawn from 
 them could ever be known ; and no fact could arise 
 to the standard of actual knowledge. 
 
 We have here laid down a basis for reasoning ; 
 and consequences so momentous depend on the ele- 
 mentary principles on which we build our super- 
 structure ; that every particle of the foundations 
 should be rigidly inspected. 
 
 Should this basis be received, it must forever 
 settle all the controversies about first truths. 
 
 If our main proposition is not true ; that some- 
 thing MUST BE KNOWN BEFORE ANY THING CAN 
 
 be proved ; then let the opposite be true ; that 
 something must be proved, before any thing can be 
 known. Let us ascend the stream of time to its 
 
42 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 source ; and take our stand at that period, when 
 the intellectual domain was as uncultivated as an 
 unbroken forest — when no fact had been proved, 
 and nothing of course w T as known. When man had 
 not a single idea ; or, if he had any at all, they 
 were unknown, and therefore untrue. 
 
 At this point, let us begin to reason. Having 
 no known facts to begin with, we must begin with 
 unknown facts ; and w T e must put unknown facts 
 enough together, to make know^n facts. 
 
 Now the question naturally suggests itself ; how 
 many unknown facts, will make one known thing ? 
 Probably about as many as it would take ciphers 
 to make a unit. The thing is impossible. 
 
 Should we pass through a train of reasoning, 
 using all the time unknown facts, and bring out a 
 conclusion ; that conclusion would be unknown. 
 It is a rule in logic, that no part of the argument 
 must be assumed ; but in this case every part 
 would be assumed, and therefore, the proof would 
 be worthless. Therefore it is obvious that nothing 
 can be proved, till we have known facts with which 
 to make our first proof. 
 
 We may be asked if we do not assume some- 
 thing, in saying that something must be known, 
 before any thing can be proved. 
 
 But, it must be recollected, that something must 
 
REASONING, 43 
 
 not only be assumed, but it must be known ; or 
 nothing can ever be # found out by reasoning. 
 
 It must not only be considered probable, but it 
 must be known, beyond all doubt, probability, or 
 assumption. 
 
 Now one known thing is no more assumed than 
 another. If my consciousness tells me one thing, 
 and my reasoning another thing, the one is no 
 more assumed than the other ; because both de- 
 pend on the affirmations of consciousness. 
 
 Therefore it follows that all first or elementary 
 ideas are known truths. 
 
 It now becomes important to know what is prop- 
 erly a first or elementary truth, and to this subject 
 we now invite special attention. 
 
 FIRST TRUTHS. 
 
 A first truth is one that cannot be proved nor 
 disproved on any other evidence than the simple 
 affirmations of consciousness.* A first truth may 
 be known by the following characteristics : 
 
 1. In any attempt to prove a first truth; the 
 conclusion will be assumed in the premises. 
 
 * Although sensation conveys ideas to our consciousness , 
 we cannot say that sensation reveals to us a first truth. Until 
 the consciousness makes the affirmation, no idea is conceived 
 by the mind. Consciousness is the only means of knowing. 
 
44 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 2. In any attempt to disprove a first truth ; its 
 truthfulness becomes essential to the validity of 
 the proof. 
 
 The difficulty of either proving or disproving a 
 first truth, arises from the fact, that man is finite. 
 He cannot comprehend the whole chain of being ; 
 there must, somewhere, be a limit to his intelli- 
 gence. It matters not, how far back he may go ; 
 after he has traced the chain of cause and effect 
 back to the last link within his comprehension; the 
 next link farther back must be out of sight. The 
 last link which he can comprehend, is a first truth ; 
 and the only reason why he cannot prove its truth- 
 fulness, is that the proof requires a knowledge of 
 the link on which it depends ; and that is out of 
 sight. An impenetrable vail hides the immediate 
 antecedents and causes from our view ; and igno- 
 rance alone can prompt us to attempt impossibil- 
 ities. 
 
 Were it possible for man to transcend his present 
 limits, and explain the causes of what are at pres- 
 ent first truths ; he would still find himself in the 
 same difficulties. 
 
 Wherever he stopped, his last truths would de- 
 pend on something still farther back, and would be 
 inexplicable. The last link would be incompre- 
 hensible. Its bare existence would be all that he 
 could know about it. He could not explain the 
 
REASONING. 45 
 
 immediate causality of that existence ; and he 
 would still be perplexed and confounded with a set 
 of first truths. 
 
 He would have only exchanged one set of diffi- 
 culties for another, by resolving one set of first 
 truths into another. 
 
 Therefore it is a philosophical necessity in the 
 case ; and it follows that all finite beings must 
 have a set of first truths which must ever triumph 
 over all attempts to solve them. 
 
 Could we go back myriads of times farther than 
 we can at present ; the last facts would depend on 
 something still farther back; and forever cut off 
 from our inspection ; lying within the incompre- 
 hensible. 
 
 Therefore the doctrine of first truths is so far 
 from being even doubtful, that there is a necessity 
 in the case, that there should be such a class of 
 ideas. 
 
 He who has not reasoned back to a set of first 
 truths, has not found a solid point on which he can 
 rest the lever of intellectual power. He has not 
 yet begun the business of reasoning ; and he who 
 has reasoned back so far, and still doubts, or de- 
 mands proof of his first truths, has reasoned to no 
 end. 
 
 His reasoning is without foundation, and his su- 
 perstructure is a baseless edifice which stands in 
 
46 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tliin air, without substance enough even to deter 
 mine its own fall. 
 
 Man is truly and emphatically a 
 
 " Distinguished link in being's endless chain, 
 Midway from nothing to the Deity." 
 
 We can neither go backward nor foward to the 
 end. 
 
 If we go forward, we soon find ourselves involved 
 in the same difficulties. The last link within our 
 comprehension is the support of something still 
 farther on, which we cannot explain ; and we have 
 a set of last truths as difficult to be comprehended 
 as our first truths. 
 
 Now it is just as reasonable to doubt our last as 
 our first truths. 
 
 We have just as much reason to doubt all we 
 know, because we cannot trace the chain of causa- 
 tion forward to all eternity, as we have to doubt 
 because we cannot go back to the immediate causes 
 of our first truths. Yet men never doubt what 
 they know because they cannot go farther forward. 
 
 They believe as far as they can go, and are con- 
 tent to stop there. Why not then, go back as far 
 as we can, and be content to stop there % 
 
 EXTENT OF FIRST TRUTHS. 
 
 The greatest evils have resulted from the supre- 
 
REASONING. 47 
 
 macy that has been given to intellect over the innate 
 and subjective principles of our nature. There is 
 something in man superior to mere intellect. Man 
 has been mostly taught by intuition, and sensation ; 
 and not by logic. It is not the result of logic, that 
 we know that we love, or fear, or hate. How do 
 we derive the idea of any pure enjoyment ? Cer- 
 tainly not by reasoning, but by the spontaneous 
 emotions of the soul. 
 
 He who stands upon the shore of the majestic 
 ocean and listens to its deep-toned thunders ; or to 
 the more subdued voice of its thousand-tongued 
 minstrelsy ; explores a world of thought and feel- 
 ing variegated with sublimer scenery and sweeter 
 prospects than logic ever dreamed of. 
 
 He who listens to the sweet strains of eloquence, 
 or like a reed bending before the blast; stands 
 yielding to the overpowering strokes of native 
 oratory plred by the strong arm of genius ; finds 
 emotions spontaneously awakening within him, 
 revealing a world unexplored by the votaries of 
 logic. 
 
 Let the poet attempt to warm his genius into fer- 
 tility at the fires of logic, and he will soon find the 
 deep fountains, the gentle rills, and the flowery 
 vales of his soul chilled to barrenness and decay. 
 His Italy will be transported to Iceland. His 
 A rides will become only a shapeless eminence three 
 
48 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 miles high ; without form and void. Niagara Falls 
 will be a convenient place for washing sheep ; and 
 the Alps a serious inconvenience in the way to 
 Italy. 
 
 Should the painter draw his masterly creations 
 from the simple power of logic, all their richness 
 and beauty would be lost. Reasoning might con- 
 struct a systematic and mechanical exterior ; but 
 the deep, native resources of the incomprehensible 
 principle which resides where the footsteps of logic 
 never reached, must breathe into the lifeless body 
 the breath of life. Life must be breathed in ? not 
 reasoned in. 
 
 We might pursue this branch of our subject to 
 any extent. It is a region full of instruction ; and 
 as far as philosophy is concerned its rich mines are 
 yet undiscovered. Indeed, it has been supposed 
 that they must not be admitted into the founda- 
 tions of philosophy. 
 
 We shall probably be told that poets, painters, 
 and musicians are poor logicians ; and cannot be 
 relied on for exact science. The converse is equally 
 true that logicians are miserable poets, painters, 
 and musicians. , The fault lies between them. 
 Neither must be taken without the other. We 
 should employ all the powers that God has given 
 us ; and when the poet, the painter, and the mas- 
 ter of song learn to think more; and the logician 
 
REASONING. 49 
 
 learns to feel more ; the world will be much, the 
 better for the blending of the two. 
 
 UNWRITTEN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Every man feels within him, what he cannot ex- 
 press. The soul sickens at the pitiable attempts 
 of language, to map out the exalted imager} 7 that 
 spreads out to the view of the interior existence. 
 In ranging over the sterile and desolate regions of 
 metaphysics, ask any man if his soul is pictured 
 there. If the metaphysician has entered into the 
 region where he lives. He will tell you, that he would 
 be ashamed of himself ; life would be irksome and 
 forbidding, if he had nothing within him, more rich 
 and beautiful ; more elevated and pure ; more 
 sweet and enchanting ; more refined and heavenly, 
 than mental science has ever hinted at. There is 
 not an untaught savage, who has not more knowl- 
 edge of the real elements of the soul, than philos 
 ophy can ever explain. To attempt to get a knowl- 
 edge of man, by any other means, than the action 
 of the soul, is as hopeless, as to go to the sepulcher 
 and inspect the dust, and the fragments of his 
 being slumbering there. 
 
 Physiology and anatomy may furnish a wide field 
 for curious inquiry, and awaken our curiosity and 
 admiration of the supreme wisdom which made us 
 5 
 
50 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 so wonderfully and fearfully ; but the anatomy of 
 the soul — the physiology of the spiritual essence 
 within, is far more wonderful. 
 
 Phrenology with its glow-worm lamp, may point 
 out some of the exponents of the vast powers with- 
 in ; as the structure of a house may give some hint 
 as to the purpose for which it is intended. 
 
 The size of a river may afford some probabilities, 
 but it does not indicate the depth of the stream, 
 the rapidity of the current, nor the quality of the 
 water. It is no index to the extent and depth of 
 the ocean into which it pours its waters ; nor the 
 resources of the country through which it passes ; 
 nor the capacities of the hidden streams that pen- 
 etrate deep into the interior regions. 
 
 The size of a river tells us nothing of the in- 
 herent principles of causation. 
 
 The study of phrenology is entitled to the same 
 attention that other natural sciences are ; but the 
 foolish practice of giving it a prerogative above tho 
 inherent powers of the soul, reflects severely on 
 the judgment and good sense of those who thus 
 pervert it. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 51 
 
 METHODS OF PROVING THE EXIST- 
 ENCE OF A GOD. 
 
 FIRST METHOD. 
 
 Proposition I. — Something Exists. 
 
 This proposition is necessarily true, or all hu- 
 man reasoning is false. There can be no such 
 thing as reasoning, unless something exists. 
 Therefore he that attempts to reason, or to even 
 think, or to affirm any thing, acknowledges this 
 proposition to be true. 
 
 No man can deny it, or even doubt it, without 
 admitting it to be true ; because, if it is not true 
 no man exists, and nothing can be either doubted 
 or denied ; and nothing exists to be either doubted 
 or denied ; and therefore this proposition does not 
 exist. All things exist only in imagination ; and 
 yet the imagination does not exist. We are there- 
 fore perpetually deceived ; and yet w T e do not exist 
 to be deceived ; and therefore we are perpetually 
 deceived while it is impossible for us to be deceived. 
 As far as philosophizing is concerned, this proposi- 
 tion must be considered true. He that does not 
 allow it to be true, cannot attempt to reason ; and 
 therefore he is out of the way, and there is no op- 
 
52 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 position to the proposition. The moment he raises 
 opposition ; he admits its truth by admitting his 
 own existence, and the existence of the proposition. 
 
 The existence of something is the elementary 
 proposition of all reasoning. We cannot even 
 affirm nonentity, but by virtue of entity. There- 
 fore he that affirms nonentity admits entity. 
 
 The proposition is therefore sustained ; and we 
 have one fixed point from which reasoning cannot 
 drive us. 
 
 The reliableness of this deduction arises from 
 the following facts : 
 
 1. It is affirmed by consciousness, which is the 
 highest source of evidence. 
 
 2. From the direct admissions of all men. 
 
 3. From the fact that he who denies it, admits 
 it as effectually as he who admits it. 
 
 The fact that it can be denied, shows : 
 
 1. That there is some one to deny ; and, 
 
 2. That there is something to be denied. 
 
 Proposition II. — Something always did exist. 
 
 If something does exist, it necessarily follows, 
 that something always did exist ; because : 
 
 1. Something could not be made by nothing. 
 That which is made, presupposes an antecedent ; 
 therefore something must have existed before the 
 first thing was made. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 53 
 
 2. A thing could not come into existence spon- 
 taneously ; because no effect could be produced 
 without a cause. If there ever was a time wdien 
 no cause existed, no effect could have followed. 
 
 3. A thing could not make itself; because it 
 must first exist before it could act; and it must 
 act before it could make itself. Therefore it must 
 exist before it could exist, and must perform f the 
 act of making itself before it came into existence. 
 If it made itself it was the cause of its own exist- 
 ence ; and if it was made by itself it was the effect 
 of that cause. Therefore it stood in the relation 
 of both cause and effect. It was both antecedent 
 and consequent, and was both older and younger 
 than itself. It was, before it was produced ; and 
 was not, till after it was produced ; and therefore 
 was and was not at the same time, which is prepos- 
 terously absurd and entirely impossible. 
 
 Nothing could come into existence without some- 
 thing to make it come into existence ; because no 
 event can take place without some producing cause. 
 Therefore if there ever was a time when nothing 
 existed ; that time must always have continued. 
 It therefore necessarily follows, that something 
 always existed. 
 
 Proposition III. — Something always will exist. 
 Nothing can be destroyed, without something to 
 
54 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 destroy it ; therefore if every thing in the universe 
 could be destroyed except one, that one could 
 never be destroyed, because there would be nothing 
 to destroy it ; therefore one thing, at least, must 
 exist forever. 
 
 The question may arise : could not a thing de- 
 stroy itself ? This however would be impossible for 
 thai following reasons : 
 
 1. An agent must exist till its work is fully 
 done ; therefore if a thing could destroy itself, it 
 must exist till it was fully destroyed ; and the mo- 
 ment the object was fully ^accomplished, it must be 
 wholly in existence and wholly out of existence, at 
 the same time, which is impossible. 
 
 2. A thing could not destroy itself; because 
 that which destroys, is greater than that which 
 is destroyed. The less can never destroy the 
 greater. Therefore if a thing could destroy itself, 
 it must be greater than itself. 
 
 3. A thing could not be destroyed by itself; 
 because that which is destroyed is less than that 
 which destroys it. Therefore a thing could not 
 destroy itself, without being less than itself, which 
 is absurd. Consequently, if a thing could destroy 
 itself; it must be both greater and less than itself, 
 at the same time, which is impossible. 
 
 4. A thing could not produce effects enough to 
 destroy it ; because that which produces, is greater 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 55 
 
 than that which it produces ; therefore a thing is 
 greater than all the things which it produces ; and 
 since the less cannot destroy the greater ; a thing 
 cannot produce effects enough to destroy itself. 
 
 It is sometimes asked if a serpent cannot kill a 
 man ; disproving the axiom, that the less cannot 
 destroy the greater. To this we reply : 
 
 1. That the serpent does not destroy the man. 
 The man still exists. Neither does the serpent kill 
 the man. He is killed by a fluid which the serpent 
 had no agency in bringing into existence. All that 
 the serpent did was to bite the man ; which is the 
 lowest exercise of the animal functions. A flea or 
 a gnat might do the same. All that can be said 
 about the fact of the man's being killed, is that 
 there are certain fluids which have so strong a de- 
 composing tendency, as to overcome the synthetic 
 power of the fluids in the human body. But noth- 
 ing is lost, nor destroyed by the process. A change 
 of form is all that takes place. 
 
 It is strictly true, that the less cannot destroy 
 the greater ; neither can either of two equals de- 
 stroy the other. Nothing can be destroyed but by 
 something superior to itself. 
 
 In arguing the eternal existence of God, writers 
 have conceded too much in saying that God has 
 no sufficient motive to destroy Himself. They 
 should have said rather that He could not do it. 
 
56 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 He could no more destroy Himself, than He could do 
 any other wrong act. He cannot do what is not in 
 His nature to do. 
 
 A fig tree cannot produce grapes, simply because 
 it has no function for that purpose ; neither can God 
 do a bad act. He has no attribute by which He 
 can do wrong ; and to destroy Himself would be the 
 most hurtful of all acts ; because it would result in 
 the destruction of every thing else. 
 
 He not only has no sufficient motive, but He has 
 not the power. It would involve a solecism. It 
 would be the application of an infinite power to the 
 removal of an infinite resistance. An infinite power 
 cannot be resisted ; and an infinite resistance can- 
 not be overcome. A resistless power applied to an 
 immovable obstacle, is a complete contradiction in 
 terms ; because if there is an infinite power there 
 is no such thing as an immovable impediment ; 
 and if there is an immovable impediment there can 
 be no such thing as an infinite power. But God 
 being infinite in all His attributes^ He can exert all 
 power and resist all power ; therefore He is above 
 all powers or attributes of being destroyed. 
 
 Again, in order to destroy Himself., He must be 
 both an active agent and a passive substance ; be- 
 cause that which destroys is active ; and that w T hich 
 is destroyed is passive ; therefore he must be both 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 57 
 
 active and passive, at the same time, which is 
 absurd and impossible. 
 
 Again, He must be both superior and inferior. 
 That which destroys, is superior to that which is 
 d&stroyed ; and that which is destroyed, is inferior 
 to that which destroys. God, in order to destroy 
 Himself, must stand in both of these relations, at the 
 same time, which is absurd. 
 
 It has been remarked, that there are but three 
 ways in which a thing can be destroyed; viz., by 
 decay, by self-destruction, and by a superior force. 
 But all of these are identical. If a thing should 
 decay, it must be by the action of superior elements ; 
 and could a thing destroy itself, it must be greater 
 than itself ; consequently there is no way in which 
 a thing can be destroyed, but by a superior agency. 
 Therefore the greatest thing of all can never be 
 destroyed ; because there is nothing greater than 
 itself to destroy it. 
 
 It is now demonstrated beyond all power of con- 
 tradiction, that — something does exist, something 
 always did exist, and something always will exist ; 
 or in other words, we have demonstrated the 
 eternal existence of something. 
 
 Now this Eternal Existence must have been 
 a cause, and not an effect. 
 
 An effect necessarily presupposes a cause ; and 
 
58 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 consequently, an effect could not have existed for- 
 ever. 
 
 Therefore an effect could not have been the first 
 thing that existed ; and therefore that something 
 which always existed, must have been a cause. 
 
 We now have an eternal uncaused cause ; which 
 is, and teas, and will be without beginning — with- 
 out end. Something which was not caused by it- 
 self, nor by any other agency ; which cannot decay 
 of itself, nor by any other agency ; cannot be de- 
 stroyed by itself, nor by any other agency. 
 
 This cause must have been the cause of all 
 things else. Nothing could begin without a cause, 
 and every cause must have had a beginning, except 
 that cause which had no beginning. Therefore 
 every thing that has had a beginning, must have 
 resulted from something which had no beginning. 
 
 Nothing can strictly be said to result from a 
 cause which had a beginning ; because that which 
 had a beginning, had a cause. If A was caused 
 by B, and B by C ; then A was caused by C. If C 
 was caused by B, and B by A ; then B and C are 
 both effects caused by A. 
 
 Therefore nothing can strictly be caused but by an 
 uncaused cause. A caused cause is but an effect ; 
 therefore an uncaused cause is the only cause that 
 can strictly be said to exist. 
 
 Hence every thing that has had a beginning, 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 59 
 
 must have had a cause ; and every real cause must 
 have been uncaused. Therefore every thing that 
 has had a beginning must have come from an un- 
 caused cause. 
 
 This uncaused cause must have possessed intel- 
 ligence, or it could not have produced the intelli- 
 gent results which we notice in nature. 
 
 It must have possessed infinite intelligence or 
 omniscience, to have conceived the great mechanism 
 of the universe. A finite mind could not compre- 
 hend, much less originate such a plan. 
 
 It must have possessed infinite power or omnip- 
 otence, to execute such a plan. 
 
 It must have been omnipresent, to be in all parts 
 of the universe at the same time, superintending 
 the operations of nature. 
 
 It must have been all-seeing, to be able to see 
 on all sides of a sphere, and especially of all 
 spheres, at the same time, and be able to notice the 
 progress of every leaf and every plant ; the pulsa- 
 tions of every insect, and the wants of every living 
 thing ; not only on the earth, but on the infinite as- 
 semblage of worlds throughout the vast empire of 
 the universe. 
 
 Now if we put these attributes together, we have 
 the exact idea of a God. ^ 
 
 If we have made no mistake, we have now proved 
 the existence of a God who existed from eternity, 
 
80 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and will continue to exist to eternity; without 
 cause, without beginning, without change, without 
 decay, without end. 
 
 SECOND METHOD. 
 
 Proposition I. — Mind is not matter. 
 
 In determining whether mind is, or is not mat- 
 ter ; we must proceed as a naturalist would, in 
 classifying any other natural objects. 
 
 We know nothing of either mind or matter s but 
 by its properties and effects. Matter has certain 
 essential properties, all of which must be present 
 at the same time, or matter cannot exist. If mind 
 is matter, all these properties must be common to 
 both mind and matter, at the same time, or mind 
 cannot exist. The essential properties of matter 
 are, impenetrability , extension, figure, divisibil- 
 ity, inertia and attraction. 
 
 Now if our proposition is not true, let the oppo- 
 site be true, that mind is matter, and let us iden- 
 tify it as such, by the presence of these essential 
 properties of matter. Let us compare it with mat- 
 ter on the score of impenetrability. By impenetra- 
 bility we mean, that two bodies cannot occupy the 
 same space, at the same time. How is it with 
 mind ? Can two minds occupy the same space, at 
 the same time % From the known properties and 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 61 
 
 effects of mind, we have no evidence that it re- 
 gards space, as such, at all. We have no evidence 
 that space is a term which can, in any respect, be 
 applied to mind ; and if it can be restricted to any 
 given space, that shall mark its limit of extension ; 
 we have no evidence that it could exclude all other 
 minds from the space which it occupies. It is as 
 reasonable to suppose that a thousand minds can 
 occupy the same space, as that one mind can be 
 restricted to any given space ; hence our experiment 
 has wholly failed to show the presence of impene- 
 trability in mind ; and we have not obtained a par- 
 ticle of evidence that mind is matter. 
 
 Let us compare mind and matter with reference 
 to extension. Matter, under all circumstances, 
 must have length, breadth, and thickness. Is this 
 also a property of mind ? Has mind length, 
 breadth, and thickness? If so, who will tell what 
 is the length, breadth, and thickness of any mind ? 
 Are all minds equally long or broad, or do some 
 minds exceed others by a certain number of feet, 
 inches, or barley-corns? Is the mind longer or 
 shorter than the body, or does it fill some certain 
 cavity in some part of the body ? If the known 
 properties and effects of mind enable us to deter- 
 mine any thing in relation to it, it serves to prove 
 to us the entire absurdity of these questions, when 
 applied to mind. That no such property can 
 6 
 
62 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 belong to mind, is an axiom which coincides with 
 all our knowledge respecting it; therefore our 
 second experiment has also failed to afford any evi- 
 dence that mind is matter. 
 
 Let us compare mind and matter with reference 
 to figure or form. Matter, under all circumstan- 
 ces, must have some kind of form. We say of 
 bodies, that they are globular, cylindrical, or cubi- 
 cal, etc. Some are in the form of a pyramid or 
 cone, others irregular. How is it with mind ? Is 
 it in the form of a globe, or a pyramid, a cylinder, 
 a cone, a prism, or a cube ? If human wisdom or 
 experience can furnish any answer to these ques- 
 tions, it is, that they are ridiculous when applied 
 to mind ; and our third experiment has also failed 
 to discover any analogy between mind and matter. 
 
 Compare mind and matter with reference to 
 divisibility. All forms of matter may be separated 
 into parts ; and those parts into other parts, and 
 so on, indefinitely. It is doubtful if it is in the 
 power of man to separate matter into particles so 
 minute, as to be susceptible of no further division ; 
 and yet every particle will be perfect matter still. 
 Now can you divide mind in this way ? Can it be 
 pulverized, until its particles are infinitely minute ; 
 and yet have every particle perfect mind still? 
 Matter may be resolved into its original or simple 
 elements ; but can mind be so resolved ? We have 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 63 
 
 no evidence that mind is composed of parts, or that 
 it is capable of existing in any other form than that 
 of unity. We do not know that mind can be re- 
 solved into its original elements ; because we do 
 not know that it is compounded of elements, or that 
 it can exist in any simpler form; therefore this ex- 
 periment has also failed to show any resemblance 
 between mind and matter. 
 
 Compare mind and matter with reference to 
 inertia. By inertia we mean that matter has no 
 control over its own actions. When put in motion 
 it has no power to bring itself to rest ; or when at 
 rest it has no power to put itself in motion. If a 
 rock be placed in a certain position, it will remain 
 in that position, until removed by some other 
 agency. If a body near the surface of the earth be 
 put in motion, it will soon be brought to rest, by 
 virtue of several forces which it has no power to 
 resist, or modify. Could a body be put in motion 
 in the absence of all external force, it is acknowl- 
 edged by all philosophers, that it would never come 
 to rest ; but would move with uniform motion for- 
 ever. The matter of which the human body is 
 composed, has no power to move of itself. The 
 arm cannot rise, unless the mind direct it to rise ; 
 the foot cannot move, unless the mind command it 
 to move ; the body cannot rise up or lie down at 
 pleasure, without the agency of the mind. How is 
 
64 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it with mind in these respects ? Has it any con- 
 trol over its own , actions 1 Can it direct its own 
 movements ? Yes, it forms the business of human 
 life, for mind to direct its own movements. It can 
 summon its energies, and direct them to a given 
 object for a given time ; it can then arrest them 
 and direct them to any other object. In this re- 
 spect, it possesses properties which do not belong 
 to matter ; and therefore it is not matter. 
 
 But mind can control not only its own motions, 
 but it can control matter also. It can pass matter 
 through an infinite variety of compositions, and de- 
 compositions, and recompositions. 
 
 And since mind controls matter, it follows that 
 it is greater than matter ; because that which con- 
 trols is greater than that which is controlled. 
 Therefore mind is not matter. 
 
 Proposition II. — Mind did not arise from the 
 organization of matter. 
 
 If mind is not matter, it follows of course that 
 mind did not arise from the organization of matter. 
 This is quite obvious. Since mind is not matter, 
 it is impossible to put matter together in such a 
 manner as to make something which is not matter. 
 Matter will be matter still 3 however changed or 
 modified. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 65 
 
 Simples cannot be put together, so as to make 
 any thing not contained in the simples. 
 
 It is allowed by philosophers, that in all the pro- 
 cesses of nature since the creation of the world, 
 nothing has added, and nothing lost. 
 
 The following anecdotes will illustrate the ab- 
 surdity of supposing, that the proposition is not 
 true, that mind did not arise from the organization 
 of matter. 
 
 During a public lecture, which the author gave 
 on this subject ; a young man arose in the audience, 
 and asked if the galvanic battery was not an excep- 
 tion to the proposition. The young man was asked 
 if he could make any new thing, by means of the 
 galvanic battery? He thought he could. The 
 speaker then turned to the audience, and remarked, 
 " You have a very remarkable young man in your 
 midst. He can take his galvanic battery, and 
 actually exert creative power. He can make what 
 did not exist before. Now if he can make one thing, 
 he can make ten ; and if he can make ten, he can 
 make a hundred ; and if a hundred, he can a thou- 
 sand, etc. You may therefore see your neighbor- 
 hood teeming with new and unheard-of forms. " 
 
 During a public debate on the subject, an antag- 
 onist brought in a flint and steel, and produced 
 sparks in copious abundance ; but he was reminded 
 that he did not perform the act of creation. He 
 
66 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 produced no new thing ; but merely developed what 
 already existed. 
 
 These illustrations will sufficiently show, that 
 mind did not arise from the organization of matter. 
 There is a philosophical impossibility in the case. 
 Materialism must give up this point till it can dis- 
 prove these propositions. 
 
 Proposition III. — Mind, or the intelligent 
 principle, existed before the organization of 
 matter. 
 
 Every process of nature evinces the presence of 
 an intelligent and designing cause ; nature never 
 takes an unintelligent step ; that nature is guided 
 by intelligence in all her works, no intelligent phi- 
 losopher will venture to deny ; and yet should the 
 fact be denied there are few propositions so clearly 
 susceptible of proof. The difficulties experienced 
 in proving the proposition do not arise from the 
 want of evidence, but from the great amount of 
 evidence from which we are obliged to choose. 
 Fully to argue the proposition, would require far 
 more time than can be devoted to this whole argu- 
 ment. Therefore we shall consider it briefly. 
 Should we travel into a far country, uninhabited by 
 man ; and should we find a human footstep petri- 
 fied in a rock ; we would necessarily infer : 
 
 1. That a human being had been there. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 67 
 
 2. That that human being existed before the im- 
 pression was made ; because the footprint could 
 not have been made until there was a foot to make 
 it. Now when we inspect the organization of mat- 
 ter, we every where discover the footsteps of intel- 
 ligence, and we necessarily infer : 
 
 1. That intelligence had been there, and, 
 U. That intelligence existed before the impres- 
 sions were made. Because intelligence could not 
 make impressions, until it first existed ; conse- 
 quently if intelligence was employed in the organi- 
 zation of matter ; that intelligence existed before 
 that organization. If this conclusion be not true, 
 let the opposite be true ; that intelligence was em- 
 ployed in the organization of matter, but did not 
 exist before that organization. Then it follows, 
 that intelligence was employed before it existed ; 
 or that it existed before it did exist ; that it acted 
 before it did act ; and that it was an active, de- 
 signing cause, controlling all the infinite processes of 
 nature, comprehending the whole mechanism of the 
 material universe, before it was itself brought into 
 existence. Now let it be still further true, as the 
 naturalist alleges, that mind arose from the organ- 
 ization of matter ; now since intelligence was em- 
 ployed in the organization of matter, and arose from 
 that organization ; it follows that intelligence was 
 employed in making itself. Let us suppose a par- 
 
68 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 allel case ; that when our Pilgrim fathers landed 
 upon Plymouth rock, they had the misfortune to 
 lose their ship. Now they could not return to 
 Europe without a ship, and they could not build a 
 ship until they could go to Europe for materials. 
 They were now in a dilemma. Materialism would 
 furnish an easy solution of this difficulty. They 
 might first take the ship, and go to Europe ; and 
 get the materials; and then return and build 
 the ship ; or they might employ tho ship to build 
 itself. It will be seen that there is nothing absurd 
 in this, when we consider, that the time was when 
 intelligence was needed to organize matter, but in- 
 telligence could not be obtained, until matter was 
 first organized — now here was a dilemma. Matter 
 could not be organized until intelligence existed ; 
 and intelligence could not exist until matter was 
 organized. How was this difficulty surmounted? 
 Simply by employing intelligence to organize mat- 
 ter, so that, during the process it might make itself. 
 From this process of reasoning, it is obvious that 
 if intelligence was employed in the organization of 
 matter, it necessarily existed before that organiza- 
 tion ; hence our proposition is proved; that in- 
 telligence existed before the organization of matter. 
 
 Proposition IV.— Mind, or the intelligent 
 principle, existed before matter itself. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 69 
 
 It has been shown, that mind existed before the 
 organization of matter ; and if it did not exist be- 
 fore matter itself, it must have come into existence 
 during an interval between the existence, and the 
 organization of matter. But according to the show- 
 ing of materialism, matter was organized by virtue 
 of principles inherent in itself ; and it follows, that 
 the process of organization must have commenced 
 as soon as matter existed. We cannot conceive, 
 that there ever was a time, when matter did not 
 possess the same properties that it does at present ; 
 because if we deprive it of any of its essential prop- 
 erties, it would cease to be matter. Therefore on 
 this hypothesis, there could not have been an in- 
 terval between the existence and the organization of 
 matter. Therefore if mind existed before the or- 
 ganization, it existed before the existence of matter. 
 
 As far as materialism is concerned, our proposi- 
 tion is now proved : " That mind existed before 
 matter. 55 Now it remains to be considered, whether 
 on any other hypothesis, this conclusion could be 
 unsettled. 
 
 If mind did not exist before matter, let the op- 
 posite be true, that matter existed .before mind. It 
 then follows that matter is that something which 
 always existed. (First Method, Prop. III.) That 
 it was the cause of all other things, and that mind 
 was produced by matter. 
 
70 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 And since the cause is greater than all the effects 
 ■which it produces, matter is, on this supposition, 
 greater than all other things put together. There- 
 fore on this hypothesis, we have matter greater than 
 mind. But it is evident, that mind controls mat- 
 ter ; and that which controls is greater than that 
 which is controlled ; therefore mind must be greater 
 than matter ; and we have mind both greater and 
 less than matter, which is absurd ; and that rea- 
 soning which leads to absurdity is false. Hence 
 matter could not have existed before mind. 
 
 On another hypothesis, let us assume, that both 
 mind and matter always existed. Now we have 
 two things which existed without a cause. But 
 subsequently mind organized matter ; and therefore 
 controlled matter ; and therefore it was greater 
 than matter. Now we have a subordinate existence, 
 which is controlled by a superior existence, and yet 
 which existed independently of that superior exist- 
 ence, and therefore we have a subordinate which is 
 controlled, and not controlled, at the same time, 
 which is absurd ; for it would be but partially con- 
 trolled if its existence were not controlled. 
 
 The greater can always control the less. But 
 that antecedent cause, which controls all things 
 else, must necessarily control the very existence of 
 all things else ; otherwise it would not have 
 supreme control. Therefore the great controlling 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 71 
 
 principle of all things, must have power to destroy 
 all things except itself. Now suppose matter and 
 mind always existed ; then it will still follow, from 
 what we have just seen, that there never was an 
 instance in which mind had not the power to con- 
 trol the existence of matter, and therefore there 
 never w T as a time in which mind had not the power 
 to prevent the existence of matter, or to destroy it ; 
 hence if matter always existed, it must have been 
 with the consent of mind, which amounts so nearly 
 to the act of creating matter that there is nothing 
 left worth contending for. But there are still 
 other reasons, which lead us to the conclusion, that 
 mind existed before matter. 
 
 That amazing intelligence, which organized the 
 physical universe, with all its grandeur and sub- 
 limity, must have comprehended the whole chain 
 of cause and effect, before the first process was put 
 in operation ; but it could not have executed its 
 plans, without materials adapted to its use ; no 
 more than a watchmaker could make a gold w T atch, 
 if he had nothing more than silver from which to 
 make it. If the designing cause of all this beau- 
 tiful organization, had no control over the adapted- 
 ness of the materials ; they might or might not 
 have been suited to the purposes intended. The 
 wonderful evidences of design, which w r e every 
 where recognize in the works of nature, arise as 
 
72 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 much from the properties of matter, as from its 
 organization ; and even more, because the or- 
 ganization takes place by the intelligent adapt- 
 edness of the constituent properties of matter 
 to the uses intended. The most obvious evi- 
 dences of intelligence are found in those prop- 
 erties or tendencies of matter, by which their 
 mutual affinities produce spontaneous organiza- 
 tion. 
 
 Now if mind or. intelligence was employed in 
 the organization of matter, much more was it 
 employed in the production of matter, and the 
 determining of its peculiar properties with ref- 
 erence to future plans. It is therefore evident 
 that mind, or the intelligent principle, existed 
 before matter existed — was the agent by which it 
 was organized, and also by which it was pro- 
 duced or created. Every evidence, both proba- 
 ble and possible, denies the supposition that mat- 
 ter existed antecedent to intelligence, or inde- 
 pendent of it. 
 
 We have now traced intelligence back of matter, 
 and as mind and matter compose the universe, 
 mind must be the antecedent cause of all things. 
 And as the first cause could not have been 
 caused, mind was not caused, and could have 
 had no beginning. We now have mind as 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD, 73 
 
 a cause which was not caused, the original, antece- 
 dent, efficient cause of all other things, a cause 
 which had no beginning, and which can have no end. 
 
 We may now dismiss matter from the inquiry ; 
 and go on with intelligence alone. We can judge of 
 the character of this intelligence from the nature 
 of its works. From all that we know, and all that 
 we can infer, the universe on which we live is infi- 
 nite in extent. If it can have any possible limit, 
 it must lie far beyond the reach of human investi- 
 gation, or human imagination ; if indeed it has any 
 prescribed limit, it rests upon so vague a supposi- 
 tion, that no intelligent philosopher will ever make 
 it the basis of an argument ; indeed, its infinite ex- 
 tension is admitted by every intelligent philosopher. 
 And if it is infinite in extent, that mind which com- 
 prehended it, is omnicient ; and that power which 
 organized it, is omnipotent ; and that presence 
 which watches over and guides all its movements, 
 is omnipresent. Now putting all these attributes 
 together, we have an Omnicient, an Omnipotent, 
 and aji Omnipresent Intelligence, which was, and 
 is, and will be without beginning, and without end ; 
 which answers precisely to the idea that is excited 
 in our minds, when we speak of a God who created 
 and sustains all things. 
 
 The objector sometimes asks, How God could 
 create something from nothing 1 
 1 
 
74 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 To this question we may reply, 
 
 1. The question overlooks the real issue. The 
 question is not, how or when or where He did it, 
 but, did He do it 1 
 
 2. That something was produced where nothing 
 existed before has been shown. Unless every thing 
 existed from eternity ; something must have had a 
 beginning, and must have been created ; and if 
 created, it must have been by making something 
 exist, when nothing existed before. The act of 
 creation implies the act of bringing something into 
 existence. But if a thing were made from some- 
 thing that already existed, no act of creation 
 would be performed. 
 
 3. Those who reject the idea of creation, and ac- 
 count for the existence of things without the act of 
 creation ; are unavoidably thrown upon the very 
 difficulties that they would avoid. 
 
 In rejecting the idea of creation, they are com- 
 pelled to adopt the theory of infinite progression, 
 w r hich proceeds on the basis of making the greater 
 come from the less. A monkey becomes a man, etc. 
 
 If a thing can be increased without adding any 
 thing to it ; the act amounts to that of creation. 
 If a quantity equal to four can be made equal to 
 eight, without adding any thing to it ; then a quan- 
 tity equal to four has been created from nothing. 
 Materialism denies the act of creation, and yet holds 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 75 
 
 that mind arose from the organization of matter. 
 Now mind controls matter, and is therefore greater 
 than matter ; and if it came from matter, the 
 greater came from the less ; which involves all the 
 absurdity which the objector professes to see in the 
 act of creation. 
 
 4. The question is also answered by saying, that 
 we have proved the existence of an infinite power, 
 which existed before matter existed ; and was the 
 original uncaused cause of all things ; and an infi- 
 nite power is sufficient to account for any thing else 
 that may follow. 
 
 Should an objection still be raised, on the ground 
 that the universe may not be infinite ; and there- 
 fore that which made it may not be infinite ; we 
 reply, that an intelligence which knows all things 
 past, present, and future, must be an all-knowing 
 or omnicient intelligence. That which can see all 
 things past, present, and future, must be an all- 
 seeing intelligence. That which can control the 
 whole chain of cause and effect, and can act in the 
 future as well as the present, so as to determine all 
 possible events, and work independently of time, 
 distance, or casualty, must be omnipotent. That 
 which can be present, at the same time, in all the 
 opposite parts of the universe, so as to superintend 
 all nature's works — attend to the wants of every 
 little plant ; hear the cry of every little insect ; reg- 
 
76 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ulate the motions of all systems and spheres — in fine, 
 that which is everywhere, at the same time, must be 
 omnipresent ; and these attributes combined make 
 up the idea of a God. 
 
 THIRD METHOD. 
 
 All organized forms are composed of elements. 
 Compounds cannot exist, till the elements first 
 exist ; therefore, matter must once have existed 
 in an elementary or uncombined state. 
 
 As matter was susceptible of being changed into 
 an infinite variety of forms, it could not take any- 
 one of those forms in preference to another, without 
 something to determine its choice ; and matter must 
 have remained eternally at rest, in the absence of 
 any thing to direct or control it ; therefore, some- 
 thing controlled the action of matter, to cause it to 
 take particular forms. 
 
 Now since that which controls is greater than 
 that which is controlled ; it follows that that which 
 controlled the action of matter, was greater than 
 matter. 
 
 But the greater cannot come from the less ; there- 
 fore, that which was greater than matter did not 
 come from matter. 
 
 It could not have been matter ; because that 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 77 
 
 would make matter greater than itself, which is im- 
 possible. 
 
 It could not have been a property of matter ; 
 because that would make a property of a thing 
 greater than the thing itself, or a part greater than 
 the whole, which is impossible. 
 
 It could not have been caused by matter, because 
 the effect cannot be greater than the cause. 
 
 It must have possessed intelligence ; or it could 
 not have produced an intelligent result. This in- 
 telligence could not have arisen from the organiza- 
 tion of matter ; because the organization was pro- 
 duced by this intelligence. 
 
 It must have possessed infinite intelligence ; for it 
 knew the future as well as the present and the past. 
 It must have seen the whole chain of cause and 
 effect involved in the plan of the universe ; and 
 this could be the case only with an unlimited in- 
 telligence ; therefore it must have been omnis- 
 cient. 
 
 It must have had power to control all the opera- 
 tions of nature ; therefore it must have been om- 
 nipotent. 
 
 It must have been present, at the same time, in 
 all parts of the universe ; or it could not have con- 
 trolled all the remote and infinitely distant parts, 
 at the same time, and especially it could not have 
 been on all sides of a globe, and certainly not of all 
 
78 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 globes at the same time ; therefore, it must have 
 been omnipresent. 
 
 It must have been an all-seeing intelligence ; or 
 it could not have seen in all parts of the universe, 
 at the same time. 
 
 These attributes make up the idea of a God ; 
 therefore, a God existed antecedent to, and inde- 
 pendent of, the organization of the universe. 
 
 But being omnipotent, He must have controlled 
 the properties of the particles or elements of mat- 
 ter. This could be done only by the exercise of 
 this power before the properties of matter were es- 
 tablished or created. The determining power 
 must therefore have existed before the particles 
 of matter existed ; and therefore must have been 
 eternal or uncaused. 
 
 Now we have an uncaused, infinite, omniscient, 
 omnipotent, omnipresent, all-seeing intelligence, 
 which is the exact idea of a God, " Whose center 
 is everywhere, and whose circumference is no 
 where." 
 
 FOURTH METHOD. 
 
 From Cause and Effect. 
 
 Men are naturally prompted to act for the ac- 
 complishment of some end. They are conscious 
 that they can produce effects ; and they cannot be 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 79 
 
 made to act on the assumption that no consequences 
 are involved in the nature of their actions. 
 
 Effort is the motto of the busy world. New en- 
 terprises, new hopes, and higher degrees of develop- 
 ment perpetually stimulate to new efforts. 
 
 But all these result from the antecedent axiom, 
 that there is such a relation among things as cause 
 and effect. 
 
 No man can deny the truthfulness of this axiom, 
 but by virtue of its own authority. Should a man 
 deny that there is any such thing as cause and ef- 
 fect, the object of doing so would be to produce an 
 effect. Therefore the denial of cause and effect is 
 the admission of it. 
 
 Should any man reason to the conclusion, that 
 there is no such thing as cause and effect, he would 
 still believe and act upon the consciousness of 
 the fallacy of his own reasoning. He would not 
 then be willing to drink deadly poison, expose 
 himself to the loaded cannon, or in any way neg- 
 lect the observance of the great laws of personal 
 safety. 
 
 Could any one really disbelieve that there is any 
 such thing as cause and effect, he would never try 
 to do any thing. He would never attempt to shun 
 danger, or to seek safety, and would not attempt to 
 accomplish his designs. 
 
 But all men do exert themselves to accomplish 
 
80 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 certain objects ; therefoie all men act on the rela- 
 tion of cause and effect ; and admit the existence 
 of such a relation of things. 
 
 Should any one admit the relation of cause and 
 effect, the admission would be an attempt to pro- 
 duce an effect. 
 
 Should any one attempt to prove the existence 
 of such a thing as cause, and effect, his object in 
 doing so would be to produce an effect ; therefore 
 the very attempt to prove would antecedently as- 
 sume the relation. It must, therefore, be admitted 
 in the premises of the argument, and could not be 
 brought into the conclusion. 
 
 Should any one attempt to disprove it, the at- 
 tempt to disprove would be an attempt to produce 
 an effect ; therefore the act of attempting to dis- 
 prove it, admits it. 
 
 Should any one deny it, the act of denying would 
 be an attempt to produce an effect ; and would be 
 an admission of the fact. 
 
 Every attempt to reason on any subject is an at- 
 tempt to prove or discover something ; but an at- 
 tempt to prove or discover something is an attempt 
 to adapt means to ends; or to employ causes to 
 produce effects. Hence cause and effect is a neces- 
 sary element in all reasoning. 
 
 Reasoning derives all its authority from cause and 
 effect i which is firmly seated in our consciousness. 
 
DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 81 
 
 It is an element in, is antecedent to, and inde- 
 pendent of, reasoning. 
 
 Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Cause and 
 
 Effect. 
 
 Men pursue agriculture, manufactures, and com- 
 merce, in full assurance of physical cause and ef- 
 fect. 
 
 Discreet parents teach their children to read and 
 Write — acquaint them with history to store their 
 minds with facts ; teach them mathematics to 
 strengthen their reasoning powers, and philoso- 
 phy to teach them the reason of things. But all 
 this is done by virtue of intellectual cause and 
 effect. 
 
 All good persons teach their children in the rules 
 of uprightness and truth, in full assurance that 
 there is such a thing as moral cause and effect. 
 
 We now perceive that, 
 
 1. All men are naturally prompted to act on the 
 relation of cause and effect, and can not act on any 
 other. 
 
 2. No man can deny the relation of cause and 
 effect, without first admitting it. 
 
 3. Should any one reason to the conclusion that 
 there is no such thing as cause and effect, he would 
 still believe and assume it. 
 
82 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 4. No man can disbelieve, that there is such a 
 thing as cause and effect ; because he cannot dis- 
 believe contrary to his consciousness, which per- 
 petually prompts him to act on the assumption of 
 cause and effect. 
 
 5. No one can prove the existence of any such 
 thing as cause and effect, without first admitting 
 the point in dispute ; and making that admission the 
 foundation of the proof. 
 
 6. No person can admit the fact ; because the 
 admission would be intended to produce an effect ; 
 and it would presuppose the existence of such a re- 
 lation of things as cause and effect ; therefore the 
 fact cannot even be admitted without a double ad- 
 mission. 
 
 7. Every attempt to reason on any subject, is an 
 admission that there is such a thing as cause and 
 effect. 
 
 8. It is an element in all reasoning ; is antece- 
 dent to all reasoning ; gives effect to reasoning ; is 
 therefore independent of reasoning ; and can be 
 neither admitted nor denied, proved nor disproved, 
 by any logical process. 
 
 Therefore there is such a relation among things 
 as cause and effect. 
 
 But there being such a thing as cause and effect; 
 there must be an uncaused cause. 
 
 Every effect presupposes a cause. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 83 
 
 A cause wliich was caused is but an effect ; and 
 must have had a cause ; therefore every effect pre- 
 supposes an uncaused cause, 
 
 A caused cause, or a secondary cause, was 
 caused by something which existed before this 
 caused cause. Therefore a caused cause is not the 
 real cause ; and we find no cause at all, till we find 
 a cause which was not caused. 
 
 Those who admit the relation of cause and effect, 
 and yet deny an uncaused cause ; would make up 
 the universe out of effects alone without cause, and 
 would have uncaused effects ; which is absurd and 
 ridiculous. 
 
 If A is caused by B, and B by C, then A and B 
 are effects, and C is the cause of both A and B. 
 Now if C was not caused, it is an uncaused cause ; 
 but if it was caused, then it is an effect also, and 
 we have not yet found any cause at all ; and we 
 can never find a cause until we find an uncaused 
 cause. 
 
 We must admit an uncaused cause ; or deny the 
 relation of cause and effect. 
 
 But to deny the relation of cause and effect, is to 
 produce an effect ; which is the thing we wish to 
 deny ; therefore we cannot deny cause and effect 
 without admitting it. 
 
 What object can a man have in denying cause 
 and effect, if it be not to produce an effect. If he 
 
* 
 
 84 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hopes to effect nothing by it, he will not make the 
 attempt. Therefore he who denies cause and effect, 
 admits it ; and he who admits cause and effect, 
 admits an uncaused cause. Consequently the very 
 denial of cause and effect, admits an uncaused cause. 
 
 An uncaused cause therefore is an antecedent 
 idea, which cannot be denied without admitting it. 
 
 Indeed every act of our lives is an admission of 
 an uncaused cause. 
 
 The argument may be resolved into the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 1. Every act of our lives is designed to pro- 
 duce an effect ; and is therefore an acknowledg- 
 ment of the existence of cause and effect. 
 
 2. Every effect must have a cause. 
 
 3. A cause which had a cause, is only an effect. 
 
 4. Therefore an effect implies an uncaused cause. 
 
 5. And since every act acknowledges cause and 
 effect ; every act acknowledges an uncaused cause. 
 
 6. The denial of cause and effect, is an act; 
 which is intended to produce an effect ; and there- 
 fore acknowledges cause and effect. Hence, 
 
 7. The denial of cause and effect, is an acknowl- 
 edgment of an uncaused cause. 
 
 This uncaused cause must have been the cause 
 of all things else ; and must have been greater than 
 all things else. It must have possessed intelligence, 
 in order to produce intelligent results. 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 85 
 
 It must have possessed omniscience, to conceive 
 the plan of the universe. 
 
 It must have possessed omnipotence, to execute 
 such a plan. 
 
 It must have been all-seeing, to see in every part 
 of the universe at the same time. 
 
 Indeed it must have been exactly what we mean 
 wiien we speak of a God. 
 
 It could not have been matter, because matter 
 includes the relation of cause and effect. And this 
 uncaused cause could not have been thus composed. 
 It could not have been either wholly or in part 
 composed of effects. Matter also seems to be the 
 passive object on which causation is exerted ; there- 
 fore it cannot be the active agent which exerts that 
 causation. 
 
 It cannot be both active and passive, w T ith regard 
 to the same action. 
 
 This antecedent cause must have caused matter, 
 or matter could not have been so admirably adapted 
 to the purposes of a great intelligent cause. 
 
 Therefore this uncaused cause was an all-power- 
 ful, all-wise, omnipresent intelligence ; or an all- 
 wise and omnipotent God ; who is, and was, and 
 will be, without beginning, without cause, without 
 change, without decay, without end. 
 8 
 
86 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 IFTH METHOD. 
 
 From the Freedom of the Will. 
 
 Every man acknowledges that he has some agency 
 in the guidance of his acts. When approaching a 
 precipice, he does not say that he is under the guid- 
 ance of the unerring laws of the universe, and there- 
 fore has no power to turn aside. If struck by an 
 assassin, he does not tamely say it is the work of 
 regular laws, over which he nor the assassin has any 
 power. 
 
 No one has sufficient confidence in the fixidness of 
 natural laws, to dismiss all fear and apprehension ; 
 and trust the interests of himself and family to the 
 mercy of the elements, and the harmonious workings 
 of natural phenomena. Whatever may be a man's 
 theory, he will make some effort to avoid drinking 
 poison, falling down a precipice, or running into 
 any extreme danger. 
 
 We find also that this does not indicate a diseased 
 state of the intellect ; but, on the contrary, it is the 
 regular and uniform result of the unperverted 
 mind. 
 
 We notice also that when the formula of logical 
 inductions have brought out the conclusion that all 
 things are governed by fixed and undeviating laws ; 
 and man has no agency in any thing that transpires, 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 87 
 
 the mind still recognizes its ability to seek its own 
 good, and supervise the exigencies of life. 
 
 Logic cannot allay its fears, nor satisfy its de- 
 sires. It still feels the strivings of a principle too 
 active in its energies, too enterprising in its aims, 
 to haughty in its aspirations, to be thus reduced to 
 the level of a stone, or a clod of the valley. 
 
 Nor is this a partial result. All men — all phil- 
 osophers — even thd most confirmed skeptics follow 
 the same law. 
 
 They may amuse themselves with the eccentric 
 achievements of mental gymnastics ; by which it 
 may be shown that two opposites may be true ; or 
 that a man cannot move from one place to another ; 
 but when danger assails, or w T ant inspires, the 
 powers of philosophy give place to the teachings of 
 consciousness. No man trusts his own philosophy 
 when that philosophy contradicts the simple affirm- 
 ations of his intuition. The fatalist has never yet 
 evinced the least faith in his own theory, by adopt- 
 ing it in the practical affairs of business. He has 
 never yet been known to risk a single farthing upon 
 the verity of his philosophy. His speculations lead 
 where his courage refuses to follow. 
 
 From what we have seen it is apparent, 
 
 1. That all men believe that the human will is 
 free in its volitions. 
 
 2. That it is so obvious, that all minds are nat- 
 
88 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 urally led to this conclusion ; and cannot be made 
 to trust the opposite. 
 
 3. That even when the mind is led to the oppo- 
 site conclusion., it rebels against it, and will not re- 
 ceive it. 
 
 4. That this is not a result produced on diseased 
 minds alone. It is the conclusion to which all 
 minds arrive in the most healthy and unperverted 
 state. 
 
 But it is a well settled principle in natural sci- 
 ence, that the regular and unperverted impulses of 
 nature, lead to the correct use of every function. 
 Nature prompts all men to walk on their feet, and 
 not on their hands ; to see with their eyes, to hear 
 with their ears, and to work with their hands. 
 Nor are these partial results. They are the uni- 
 form promptings of all minds alike. 
 
 Should any one be led to the conclusion that they 
 are false, he would not adopt the results of his own 
 reasoning. He would still walk on his feet, and 
 hear with his ears, and see with his eyes ; and be 
 convinced that these organs were legitimately em- 
 ployed. 
 
 But these dictates of nature are no more uniform 
 and convincing, than the conviction that the will is 
 free from arbitrary control — that man ip free in the 
 choice of his actions — that he is responsible for the 
 results ; and that duty and interest alike demand 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 89 
 
 of liim a prudent exercise of the liberty which he 
 possesses. 
 
 Man has as clear evidence that he wills, as that 
 he sees or hears. 
 
 The freedom of the will is a fact which stands 
 above the reach of sophistry. It is so firmly forti- 
 fied against all opposition, that any logical formula 
 which can be made to deny it, will at the same 
 time admit it. 
 
 A man cannot deny the freedom of the will, till 
 he wills to deny it ; and he cannot will to deny it, 
 till he has power to control his will. 
 
 Therefore the moment any one admits that he 
 performs an act of any kind, he admits that he 
 wills, and therefore that he has power to will. 
 Hence, he cannot construct a sentence of any kind 
 without admitting the freedom of the will. There- 
 fore the same proposition which denies the freedom 
 of the will admits it. 
 
 The freedom of the will is a necessary element 
 in the subject of a proposition, and can neither be 
 admitted nor denied in the predicate. It belongs to 
 the premises of an argument, and is a necessary 
 element which cannot be separated from the prem- 
 ises ; and cannot be brought into the conclusion. 
 
 It cannot be proved because it becomes a part 
 of the proof, and therefore it cannot be established 
 by the proof. We cannot prove a thing till we 
 
90 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 will to do so ; and we cannot will to do so unless 
 we have power to use the will. Therefore the 
 attempt to prove is an acknowledgement of the 
 freedom of the will. 
 
 We cannot even admit the freedom of the will, 
 because we cannot admit it till we will to admit it, 
 and we cannot will to admit it till we have the 
 ability to use the will. Therefore the act of ad- 
 mitting the freedom of the will presupposes it, and 
 the thing is admitted both in the subject and in the 
 predicate ; and it amounts to an admission before 
 it can be admitted. 
 
 The freedom of the will is affirmed by our intui- 
 tions ; and that is the highest source of authority. 
 What our consciousness declares our logic can- 
 not dispute. Therefore the freedom of the will 
 stands above the province of logic, and can be 
 neither proved nor disproved, admitted nor denied, 
 received nor rejected. It must be let alone, as 
 one of those things which are known without rea- 
 soning, and from which reasoning is derived. 
 
 It is common with logicians to admit the free- 
 dom of the will, and then by an ingenious process 
 to effectually deny it. 
 
 This feat is performed by the following affirma- 
 tion : " Man has the freedom to choose what he 
 does choose, but he has not the freedom to choose 
 the opposite." 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 91 
 
 According to this philosophy, Brutus had the 
 liberty to choose to stab Caesar ; but he had not 
 the liberty to choose the opposite ; therefore he 
 had not the ability to choose not to stab Caesar, 
 and consequently he could not have avoided the act 
 of stabbing Caesar ; or in other words, Brutus was 
 compelled to stab Caesar ; and this admitted free- 
 dom of the will amounts to the most absolute fate, 
 or irresistible and absolute control. 
 
 This gives to man precisely the same kind of 
 liberty that it does to a stone. A stone possesses 
 the liberty to fall to the ground ; but it has not the 
 liberty to do the opposite, and therefore it has not 
 the freedom to rise ; consequently, it is compelled 
 to fall. 
 
 To say that the will is free, and that man has 
 the liberty to choose to do a thing, and has no power 
 to choose the opposite, involves a direct solecism. 
 
 It is a form of words without meaning ; unless 
 it means that man has the liberty to be controlled ; 
 or has the liberty to do what he cannot avoid doing, 
 just as the oyster has the liberty to lie still, and 
 has not the liberty to fly. 
 
 To say that an apple has the liberty to be pro- 
 duced on an apple-tree, or that the blackbird has 
 the liberty to be black, may be a convenient way 
 of amusing one's self; but to call it reasoning is a 
 liberty which we deny. 
 
92 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Even that however may be justifiable, as a boy 
 may make himself a clown or a king for want of 
 some better employment. 
 
 As an attempt at perverting the province of rea- 
 soning, it holds a respectable rank among feats of 
 sophistry ; but among candid men, reasoning on an 
 important subject, such perversions of the import 
 of language are quite reprehensible. 
 
 If man has no other freedom than that of doing 
 as he is compelled ; or if he has no liberty but the 
 liberty of necessity ; he has nothing that comes 
 within the meaning of liberty ; and to call it liberty, 
 or freedom of choice, is a direct absurdity and con- 
 tradiction. 
 
 Man either has or has not a certain amount of 
 freedom. He either is a machine, or is not. Let 
 the issue be fairly met. We cannot allow to any 
 one the liberty of arguing on one side, while he 
 seems to be on the other. This pretended liberty 
 of choice, is necessity, fatalism, and must not be 
 allowed the garb of freedom. It is a perversion 
 and prostitution of the word freedom, that cannot 
 be shielded from censure. 
 
 We have now seen, 
 
 1. That all men believe in the freedom of the 
 will. 
 
 2. That they believe it even when they think 
 their reasoning has disproved ; therefore, 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 93 
 
 3. They believe it more firmly than they do any 
 thing that depends on reasoning. 
 
 4. That it is not the result of disease ; but of 
 the healthy and regular operations of mind. 
 
 5. That a man cannot deny it without admitting 
 it, in the same proposition. 
 
 6. That it cannot be proved nor disproved ; ad- 
 mitted nor denied ; received nor rejected ; without 
 assuming the point in dispute. 
 
 7. That it is a part of the premises of every 
 argument, and cannot be brought into the con- 
 clusion. 
 
 8. That it is affirmed by our consciousness ; and 
 therefore is more obvious than any thing that can 
 be proved by reasoning. 
 
 9. Therefore it is a first truth which is known 
 without reasoning ; is antecedent to reasoning ; is 
 an element in all reasoning ; and therefore cannot 
 be affirmed nor denied by reasoning; and is of 
 higher authority than any thing that depends on 
 reasoning. 
 
 We have now seen that the freedom of the will 
 is placed beyond the power of logic. 
 
 But freedom of any kind implies the existence of 
 a God. 
 
 If there is no God, the governing principle must 
 reside in the fixed laws of nature ; and freedom 
 cannot exist. Natural laws are devoid of freedom. 
 
94 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If there is any such thing as freedom in the uni- 
 verse, it must reside in something above the fixed 
 order of nature. 
 
 Either freedom or necessity must lie at the 
 foundation of things. But freedom must be at the 
 foundation or it cannot exist. It cannot arise out 
 of necessity, because it is not contained in neces- 
 sity. Unless necessity includes the elements of 
 liberty, it cannot become the source of liberty. 
 Therefore if liberty exists at all, it is the founda- 
 tion of all things. 
 
 But liberty does exist as a first truth, which 
 logic cannot dispute. It is above the province of 
 logical proof ; and must be admitted in all processes 
 of reasoning. 
 
 Liberty is therefore the governing principle of 
 the universe. 
 
 But liberty or freedom cannot exist in the ab- 
 sence of a God who is free ; therefore a God exists. 
 
 We may further observe, that liberty is an at- 
 tribute. Freedom implies something that is free. 
 Freedom also implies choice. Nothing can be said 
 to be free, unless it has the power of choosing 
 between two objects, or modes of action. Choice 
 implies intelligence. No choice can be made with- 
 out the exercise of thought in comparing the ob- 
 jects to be chosen. 
 
 Now since intelligence is involved in choice, and 
 
EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 95 
 
 choice in freedom, and freedom is an attribute of 
 some being possessing freedom ; it follows that 
 choice and intelligence are attributes of the same 
 being. 
 
 We have seen that liberty is the principle which 
 governs the foundations of things ; and as liberty 
 is an attribute of some being, that being must be 
 the governor of all things. Therefore liberty im- 
 plies a great thinking, choosing, acting being ; who 
 governs all things ; or liberty implies a God as the 
 governor of all things. 
 
 We have now seen that the idea of liberty im- 
 plies the existence of a God ; and therefore to deny 
 the existence of a God, is to deny liberty or^free- 
 dom. But it has been shown that we cannot deny 
 freedom without, at the same time, admitting it. 
 
 Now we cannot deny the existence of a God, 
 without denying freedom ; and we cannot deny 
 freedom without admitting it ; therefore we cannot 
 deny the existence of a God, without admitting it. 
 
 The existence of a God is therefore involved in 
 the nature of first truths, and cannot be denied 
 without, at the same time, admitting the point in 
 dispute. 
 
TESTIMONIALS. 
 
 The following testimonials were received several years 
 ago, but they have strict reference to this work. 
 
 From Rev. Dr. Skinner. 
 
 Mr. Harrington's mode of argumentation is very thorough 
 and exact ; his style is uncommonly lucid and simple ; and 
 there are no subjects of greater importance than those to 
 which he applies his powerful and demonstrative logic. I 
 earnestly desire that his lectures may be examined by 
 good judges of doctrine and reasoning. I think they will 
 abide the severest test of criticism. 
 
 THOMAS H. SKINNER. 
 
 New York, October 1st, 1849. 
 
 From Dr. Asa D. Smith. 
 From what attention I have been able to give to Mr. 
 Harrington's Lectures, I concur most fully with the Rev. 
 Dr. Skinner in his estimate of them. It strikes me that 
 his views on some important subjects, would, if made pub- 
 lic, not in lectures merely, but in some more permanent 
 form, be generally regarded as a valuable contribution to 
 theological science. ASA D. SMITH. 
 
 New York, October 2d, 1849. 
 I have examined the plan of the Rev. Mr. Harrington's 
 Lectures, and somewhat in detail, the powerful and con- 
 clusive reasoning of one of the lectures ; and most cheer- 
 fully concur in the high opinion expressed of their value 
 by the Rev. Dr. Skinner. J. DOWLING. 
 
 From the Rev. Dr. Dowling. 
 I have had the pleasure of listening to the lecture of 
 my friend, the Rev. Isaac Harrington, upon Materialism, 
 which is the first of a course of lectures on Infidelity, 
 prepared by him. The lecture was delivered to a large 
 and intelligent congregation in my church, last Lord's day 
 evening, and was listened to with evident pleasure and 
 interest. The lecture, though terse, rigid in argument, 
 
and a chain of connected thought from beginning to end, 
 is yet well adapted to instruct and to interest an intelligent 
 popular audience. I have no hesitation in saying that the 
 lecture was one of the best that I have ever heard or read 
 on the subject ; and if the first is a fair specimen of the 
 rest, I should think the course would be highly valuable 
 and instructive, whether presented from the pulpit or the 
 press. J. DOWLING, 
 
 Pastor of Bedford St. Baptist Church. 
 New York City, October 8th, 1849. 
 
 To the Friends of the Saviour : 
 
 It gives me great pleasure to introduce to your fraternal 
 notice and affection, the bearer, Mr. Isaac Harrington, a 
 member of my church, and a Licentiate of the Presbytery 
 of the North River. Pie is a devoted christian, and an 
 able defender of the word of God. His lectures on Infi- 
 delity are the very best I have ever heard. I hope he 
 may have frequent opportunities to deliver them. 
 
 H. G. LUDLOW. 
 
 Poughkeepsie, October 10th, 1849. 
 I have listened to Mr. Harrington's lecture upon Mate- 
 rialism, as well as to his arguments on several other 
 important points connected with the truths which he pro- 
 poses to establish ; and have received from him a state- 
 ment of the general plan of a work which he is preparing. 
 The method proposed by Mr. H. seems to me to be good ; 
 and the arguments perfectly clear and conclusive. I think 
 there is a demand for just such a work as he purposes to 
 publish, and that its publication at this time, would be 
 productive of great good to the cause of Christianity. 
 From an acquaintance of several years with Mr. Harring- 
 ton, and with his logical mind, I have the fullest confi- 
 dence in his ability to render it an interesting and valuable 
 work. L. F. WALDO, 
 
 Pastor of First Cong. Church, Poughkeepsie, N. Y. 
 
 I have listened with great interest to Mr. Harrington's 
 reasonings upon the Moral Axioms, and upon the reliable- 
 
3 
 
 ness of the teachings of consciousness, as the foundation 
 of all reasoning processes, and of all knowledge. His 
 demonstrations appear to me to be entirely clear and con- 
 clusive ; and will, I think, be of great service, not only to 
 the cause of Christianity, but of Mental Science, in set- 
 tling the long contested questions respecting First Truths. 
 
 L. F. WALDO. 
 Poughkeepsie, March 6th, 1850. 
 
 From the JRev. J. Hyatt Smith. 
 
 Poughkeepsie, September 11th, 1849. 
 The bearer of this letter, Isaac Harrington, a Minister 
 of the Gospel, in the Presbyterian Church, is a much 
 esteemed brother in Christ. I am told that during his 
 temporary absence from our village, he intends delivering 
 his course of lectures on Infidelity. I believe him to be 
 truly able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince 
 the gainsayers — confident that he is a workman appointed 
 unto God, that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly divid- 
 ing the word of truth. Identified with him in heart, and 
 . in feeling, any kindness rendered him would be a favor 
 conferred upon his friend and brother in Christ. 
 
 J. HYATT SMITH. 
 
 The bearer of this letter, Mr. Isaac Harrington, is a 
 Licensed Preacher of the Gospel in the Presbyterian 
 Church in this village. I have had the pleasure of asso- 
 ciating with Mr. Harrington for some time past, and also 
 of hearing a part of his lectures on Infidelity ; and cheer- 
 fully commend him to the favorable regard of my brethren 
 in the ministry. GEORGE F. KETTELL, 
 
 Pastor of Second Methodist Episcopal Church. 
 
 Poughkeepsie, September 16th, 1849. 
 
 Poughkeepsie, December 14th, 1849. 
 I have listened to the reading of some portions of Mr. 
 Harrington's work on Infidelity, and cheerfully commend 
 it as a work of great merit and importance. Mr. Harring- 
 ton's arguments are forcible and conclusive, and in my 
 opinion overthrow entirely the strongest positions of the 
 
Infidel. As a text-book for the young I think it eminently 
 adapted to subserve the interests of Christianity. 
 GEORGE F. KETTELL, 
 Pastor of Second Methodist Episcopal Church. 
 
 From Prof. Samuel F. B. Morse. 
 I have listened to the reading of a portion of Rev. Mr. 
 Harrington's arguments, and cordially agree with the dis- 
 tinguished gentlemen who have expressed their opinions, 
 that they are logical in an eminent degree, and calculated 
 to be useful, so far as reasoning is concerned, in breaking 
 down the infidelity of the natural heart. 
 
 SAMUEL F. B. MORSE. 
 Locust Grove, January 3d, 1850. 
 
 From the New York Tribune. 
 Lectures on Infidelity. — An able and argumentative 
 lecture, preparatory to a more extensive course on the 
 subject, was delivered last night, by Rev. Mr. Harrington, 
 at the Baptist Church corner Sixteenth Street and Eighth 
 Avenue, (Rev. Mr. Taggart's,) to a deeply interested audi- 
 ence. The lecturer considered the subject, in reference to 
 the Atheism which is founded on a materialistic philoso- 
 phy, and by a very ingenious and lucid analysis, demol- 
 ished the first principles of the system. He commenced 
 his argument with showing the necessity of an eternal 
 existence from the fact of an actual existence ; he then 
 demonstrated the impossibility of destroying this exist- 
 ence ; and finally proved, by an acute and logical compar- 
 ison of the qualities of mind and matter, that the First 
 Cause must be intelligent and spiritual. The lecture was 
 distinguished by the closeness of its reasoning, the vigor 
 and originality of its illustrations, and the happy adapta- 
 tion of rigid and connected argument to a popular audience. 
 It was also remarkable for its freedom from vituperative 
 epithets toward the persons whose opinions it so earnestly 
 combated, and its reliance on the force of evidence rather 
 than the severity of invective. We trust that the inter- 
 esting course, of which this lecture forms a part, will be 
 delivered where all will have an opportunity of listening 
 to the powerful statements of the interesting speaker. 
 
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