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Several items are entirely omitted from the tabulation, because in these items no basis of comparison is given. That is, no figures at all are given for the negroes. Among these items are "the market value of shares in any state or national bank of this state, etc.," and "the market value of cotton, corn, annual crops, provisions, etc." Relative to the first of these items, market value of shares in any state or national bank of this state, the whites of the county are credited with the return of shares to the amount of $834,000. The property of the whites noted in the second of these items is returned at $35,405. These statistics are offered without further comment. Selecting from this detailed array of statistics four items that are probably the most representative, a comparison will be made within this more restricted and more vital range of the relative ownership of property by the two races. In the matter of land, for instance, it will be observed that the whites own 87.14 per cent, while the blacks own 12.86 per cent of the total. This means that the whites own about six and three-quarters acres of land to every acre owned by the negroes. In the value of this land the whites have additional advantage, for the total valuation of the land of the whites is a little more than eight times that of the blacks. If one were, there- fore, to compare the war contribution of the whites with that of the blacks on the sole basis of the valuation of land owned in the county, the ratio would be established. If the aggregate value of the total property of the whites is con- sidered with that of the blacks, the contrast is even more unfavor- able to the negro; for the value of the total property of the whites is somewhat more than seventeen times as much as that of the negroes. This epitome of the most prominent points shown in the preceding tables prepares the way for the consideration of the part the negroes of the county played in the support of the war activity campaigns. Complete responsibility for the raising of all the popular funds connected with war activities — Liberty Loan, Red Cross, War Sav- ings Stamps, United War Work, and all the other related efforts — ■was assumed by the whites. All the organizations for this work were originated by the whites and were placed in operation by them. It was understood that the whites would raise the quota asked for in each instance. If the aid of the negroes could be secured, it was well. If the negroes gave no aid in any particular campaign, the whites thought nothing of it but went ahead and subscribed the entire fund. If any of the white subscribers failed to pay, other white subscribers took up these pledges and paid them. If any CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 11 negro subscribers failed to pay — and they did fail in nearly every instance to pay all they pledged even in the few campaigns in which they took part — the whites also made good these pledges. It was the white man's burden, and the white man bore it in Clarke County cheerfully and most successfully. At the outset one is confronted by the fact that the negroes con- tributed nothing to some of these campaigns. An examination of the list of the fourteen campaigns which will be made the basis of this chapter discloses the fact that there were as many as seven of these, fifty per cent of the total, in which the negroes took no part. In some cases there are extenuating circumstances for this remiss- ness of the blacks; in others there are none. It is true, for instance, that in some of these phases of war activity the negroes were not asked to take part, because some of the campaigns were conducted so rapidly and so successfully that the results aimed at were ob- tained even before more than a very few of the whites had been canvassed, or because a rapid and enthusiastic canvass of the whites insured the success of the given campaign without an appeal being made directly to the negro population. The prosecution of the First Liberty Loan is an example of the former of these two conditions; the Food Conservation Campaign is an example of the latter 1 . But the fact cannot be well escaped that even when vigor- ous canvasses were made of the negroes in the more important cam- paigns that the response received from them was not enthusiastic. No demands were made upon the negroes in some of the later cam- paigns, not because the whites were not anxious for the cooperation and help of the negroes; but because the organizers of these cam- paigns had already learned that much energy was wasted to secure a few pledges among the negroes and that in every campaign the greater part of the pledges made remained unpaid. The response of the negroes as a whole to these concrete demands of patriotism may be characterized as disappointing, not only with reference to the negro subscriptions themselves but also as regards the compre- hension by the negroes of the increased moral and spiritual respon- sibility placed upon them by the war. It has been observed oftener than once by leaders, both white and colored, in the war activity campaign work among the negroes in Clarke County that the zeal and enthusiasm with which the negroes began the consideration of a subscription varied much from the final results that were obtained. The amount of their pledges did not equal the fervor of their emotional enthusiasm. Their interest was apparently easily aroused, but it manifested a tendency to subside just as quickly. This serves to explain in part why even when they finally enlisted in these campaigns their con- tributions were so pathetically insignificant. It doubtless serves also as a partial explanation of why there were so many war activity campaigns in which the negroes did not participate at all. i see Table IX and the explanation following it. 12 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA TABLE IX. Showing Summary of War Activity Campaigns in Which Negroes Did Not Participate Campaign Amt. Subscribed No. Subs. Ave. Sub. First Liberty Loan _ _$357,200.00 (Not available) Second Liberty Loan _ 266,000.00 759 $350.45 First Y. M. C. A. War Work _ _ _ _ 11,860.00 638 18.59 Second Y. M. C. A. War Work _ _ _ _ 32,452.61 (See explanation below) Second Red Cross- _ 33,000.00 2,200 15.00 Armenian and Syrian War Relief _ _ _ _ 6,282.81 862 7.29 Food Conservation — 97 per cent of white people of Athens pledged in one day. Negroes were not solicited. In securing accurate and complete statistics for Tables IX and X much difficulty was experienced. This was due to several causes, two of which should be mentioned. In the first place, it was found that in nearly every instance white and black subscriptions, if kept separate at all, .were often confused in final tabulations made by the leaders of these campaigns. It may, therefore, be that some small subscriptions made by negroes to some one or more of the foregoing campaigns have been overlooked. In the second place, on account of the fact that many of these pledges are paid in instal- ments extending over rather long periods, some of the subscribers fail to complete the payment of their pledges even after having made some of the payments. Consequently the totals are being constantly revised and corrected. In either instance, however, any inaccur- acies that may have occurred would not appreciably change the ulti- mate results. In further explanation of the fact that the negroes did not con- tribute to any of these campaigns it may be said with reference to the First Liberty Loan that this campaign for funds was not only about the first one instituted but also that it was restricted almost entirely to the banks and various corporations of the city of Athens. Most of the subscriptions to each of the Liberty Loans were made in Athens, but the four succeeding loans were better distributed throughout the county than the First. The fact that the bulk of the subscriptions in each of the loans came from the city is natural, because Athens is not only the one city in Clarke County but also represents a great amount of the county's population and wealth. It may be readily seen that in the First Liberty Loan the number of subscribers was small in comparison, for instance, with the Sec- ond Liberty Loan, or with any other loan of the series. It will be observed, however, that the Second Liberty Loan was a more general loan than the First. It came considerably later in point of time, and much greater enthusiasm in the prosecution of the war had been aroused than had characterized the first loan of CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 1 :'. the series. More publicity was given to it, as will be manifest from a glance at that part of the foregoing table which shows the num- ber of subscribers, 759. Yet there is no record of a single negro subscription to this loan. Two of the three large Y. M. C. A. campaigns for funds had been completed before the negroes made any subscription to this worthy cause. The fact that almost as many subscribers participated in the First Y. M. C. A. campaign as in the Second Liberty Loan will serve to show how general was the solicitation made for funds in that campaign. The large number of subscribers who contributed to the Second Y. M. C. A. campaign gives adequate indication of the widespread nature of the appeal in that campaign in Clarke County; for, excluding the War Savings Stamps and the United War Work campaigns, no other organized effort of this nature secured such an individual response. In Table IX the figures given for the amount subscribed for the Second Y. M. C. A. War Work Campaign represent the total for the Athens District, composed of several counties, and not of Clarke County. On account of the fact that Athens oversubscribed so heavily its quota in the First Y. M. C. A. War Work Campaign, no canvass for funds was made in Clarke County at all but the remain- ing counties of the district were left to make up their just subscrip- tions to this fund. The only part of this amount that should be credited to Clarke County is $250 voluntarily sent in to the fund t a large public service corporation of Athens. Consequently no num- ber of subscribers is given with the amount subscribed as listed in the table. In the foregoing table is given a resume of what may be termed the negative phase of the activity of the negroes in Clarke County in the war work campaigns. This is a negative consideration of the matter, because the number of campaigns in which the negroes did not take part made it seem necessary to present this phase of the matter before taking up the positive achievement. Without dwell- ing too much on these negative statistics, a more complete exami- nation will now be made of the positive side. 14 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA TABLE X. Showing Summary of War Activity Campaigns in Which Negroes Participated Campaign Amt. Subscribed No. Subs. Ave. Sub. First Red Cross — White $ 30,117 1,262 $ 23.87 Black _ _ _ _ 1,201. 1,684 .72 Third Liberty Loan — White _ _ _ _ 805,000 1,800 447.22 Black _ _ _ _ 600 12 50.00 Fourth Liberty Loan — White _ _ _ _ 1,151,350 1,782 646.10 Black _ _ _ _ 4,150 34 122.06 F'fth Liberty Loan — ■ White _ _ _ _ 779,100 673 1157.65 Black _ _ _ _ 750 2 325.00 War Savings Stamps — White _ _ - - 274,000 3,700 74.06 Black _ _ _ _ 9,995 379 26.36 United War Work — White 67,175.15 5,077 13.23 Black 1,268.85 '739 1.72 Jewish War Relief — White 14,925 3>50 42.64 Black _ _ _ _ 75 (Not available) There are some interesting conditions presented in this table. With reference to the data for the two Red Cross Campaigns, it will be observed that only one of the two is presented in this tabulation. The statistics for the other one are to be found in the preceding table. The figures for the First Red Cross Campaign show that the whites subscribed twenty-five times as much as the negroes. The comparison of the value of the total property of the two races, it will be recalled, showed that the whites owned seventeen times as much property as the blacks. There were 422 more colored subscribers than white, and the average subscription for the blacks was only one thirty-third of that for the whites. With reference to the Third Liberty Loan, the first loan of the series in which the negroes of Clarke County participated, it will be seen that the whites subscribed 1,342 times as much as the blacks, and that this large white subscription was divided among 1,788 more subscribers than for the negroes. It is only the fact that merely a dozen negroes subscribed to this loan that make the average subscription for the negroes compare with that of the whites as $50 to $447.22. The contrast here is indeed very un- favorable for the negroes, for it shows that only a few of the wealth- iest negroes took part in the campaign. Almost the entire negro population took no part whatever, while the white population as a whole was fairly well represented. In the Fourth Liberty Loan the negroes made the most creditable CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 1 •" showing in the entire series of loans. It appears that the several preceding campaigns were necessary in order to arouse the negroes to sufficient permanent enthusiasm for them to register their patriot- ism in a concrete way in the Liberty Loans. It is also true that, as the Liberty Loans called for sums of not less than fifty dollars t'r individuals, in case of individual subscriptions, they were not suited to the fnancial circumstances of the negroes; but as the loans pro- ceeded it was found that more subscriptions were secured from negro churches, schools and similar organizations. This, together with the fact that the negroes gradually gained more confidence and interest in the loans and were at the same time able to foresee the end of the war, doubtless helps to explain the gradual but percep- tible increase in negro subscriptions. Though the Fourth Liberty Loan called for an increase over the Third Loan of about only a third of the total amount of the latter loan, the negroes increased their share to where it was nearly seven times as large as their contribution to the Third Liberty Loan. There was a gratifying increase also in the number of negro subscribers to this loan, in which the total amount subscribed by the negroes was about one- two hundred and seventy-fifth part of the amount subscribed by the whites. The average negro subscription was about one-fifth that of the white. Without even more than a casual examination of the question at issue one would regard the War Savings Stamps Campaign as the opportunity in this kind of war activity that ought to have proved •by its very nature the most democratic and representative, espe- cially among the negroes. This may have been true, but the sta- tistics do not show it; for it is very likely true in many instances that the subscription, for instance, of a school with several hun- dred pupils was entered and counted as one subscription. Invest- ments in Thrift Stamps, as they were known, could be made in as small sums as twenty-five cents. This ought to have put them in the reach of a majority of people, even among the negroes. It is but natural to conclude, then, that this fund was of all war funds the one most widely distributed among individuals; but there is no way in which this may be definitely established by figures. A further examination of Table X is interesting in this connec- tion. The table shows that there were almost twice as many negro subscriptions to the United War Work Campaigns as to the War Savings Stamps fund, while more than twice as many subscriptions are credited to the First Red Cross Campaign as to the United War Work. In each of these three campaigns subscriptions were made by schools, churches, etc., so that it is very likely that some of these subscriptions that embraced many subscribers were entered as single subscriptions. The fact that the complete amount secured from negro subscriptions in the War Savings Stamps Campaign is about eight times as large as that of the total subscriptions by the negroes 16 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA to either the United War Work or the First Red Cross fund may- he an indication that there were more actual, individual subscribers to this fund than to either of the other two, but this would not necessarily result. The War Savings Stamps Campaign was largely a business matter; but the contributions to the Red Cross and Unit- ed War Work funds were charitable, as no direct returns were ex- pected from these latter contributions. It may have been necessary to secure the total negro subscription to the First Red Cross Cam- paign in very small amounts from the large number of subscribers, 1,684, while, on account of the investment feature, the much larger total negro subscription to the War iSavings Stamps Campaign could have been more easily secured from the 379 subscribers. It seems very likely that this latter condition prevailed and that the War Savings Stamps fund was not the most widely distributed war fund among the blacks, among whom it appears from the property com- parison it should have been far more generally distributed than among the whites, especially since such comparatively small amounts were subscribed by the negroes to the various Liberty Loans. Evidence to some degree corroborative of this may be found in the following table: TABLE XI 1 . Showing Percentage of Negro Population Taking Part in War Sav- ings Stamps Campaign County p u a, O CJ k3 - o 9 a « a O-l -!' Georgia for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1917, p. I. CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 35 ment as a whole I think we should face two broad truths, which I hope I may be pardoned for mentioning, for they are of importance in studying the story of economic and social changes One of the truths to which I allude is that the desire of any people or class of people to improve their condition of living is a natural and healthy desire, and that their effort to gain such improvement is a commendable effort. The migration of negroes from one part of the country to another, Ike all racial and popular migrations in history, expresses such desire and effort. Whether the movement result in the desired advancement is another matter The second broad truth to which I beg to call attention is this: The genuine progress of a country depends upon the spread of good conditions of living and good chances of healthy improvement among all the peo- ple of the country, not only among those of any class, or race, or profession, or occupation, but among all, including especially those who have hitherto had the least chance through power, education, inheritance." 1 Migration of negroes from Clarke County continued almost to the close of the war. This information is vouched for by some of the best informed men in Athens, men who are thoroughly familiar with the negro population here. The migration had very little effect upon the rural districts, but it seems to have been rather marked in Athens. One of the officials of the Local Board for Clarke County is authority for the statement that many negroes left the city after they had registered, their purpose being to go to places where they could enter essential industries. On account of the fact that there are no labor unions among the negroes of Athens, it is impossible to reduce the matter of the negro migration here to a statistical basis of comparison. There are comparatively few labor unions among the negroes. Where such unions are organized they invariably include skilled laborers only. Negro labor unions, therefore, are found only in the larger cities. A large majority of the negroes are unskilled laborers, mainly farmers and workers of similar type. They are consequently not organized into labor unions. There is an indication, however, in the interviews obtained in Clarke County that this class of negro labor is beginning to comprehend the meaning and the use of organ- ization among laborers. One of the employers interviewed seems to think that the negroes are already secretly organizing them- selves into labor unions. It appears that there is no proof or good reasons for believing this; but it is just as certainly apparent that there is coming to be a somewhat more definitely unified spirit among the negroes relative to the disposition of the most important commodity which they possess, labor. They are keeping better in- formed as to prices paid for labor, and are insisting on receiving the highest current wages. The war is probably responsible in the main iDillard. J. H. Introduction to Negro .Migration in 1916-17, bulletin l". s. Department of Labor, p. 9. 36 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA for this in that it has raised wages in so many departments of negro labor to rates previously unheard of in the South and has in this way whetted the naturally keen desire of the negro of today to re- ceive the greatest possible pay for his toil. It is also doubtless true that many negroes in the army have had opportunities of observing the operations of organized labor and upon their return home have told their neighbors of these things and have caused them also to become more keenly interested in labor conditions. It is self-evident that the war caused a great increase in the wages paid for every kind of labor. It will, therefore, not be the purpose of this paper to enter into minute comparisons between pre- war and war-time conditions of labor. Only a few of the more typ- ical and more representative phases of negro labor will be consid- ered. Of these, as has already been indicated, farm labor forms an important part. Unskilled laborers in general form another large element. TABLE XIV. Showing Increase in AVages Paid Farm Laborers Wages per Day Before the War General Laborer _ _ $0.75 to $1.00 Cotton Chopper _ _ 1.00 to 1.25 Cotton Picker_ _ _ .50 to .75 TABLE XV. Showing Increase in Wages Paid Other Unskilled Laborers Average Average Wages per Day Per cent During the War of Inc. $1.50 71.60 2.50 to 3.00 145.54 1.00 to 1.50 1 100.00 Wages per Day Wages per Day Per cent Before the War During the War of Inc. Fertilizer Laborers- $1.25 to $1.50 $3.00 118.11 Ditchers and Other City Laborers- _ 1.25 to 1.50 2.50 83.21 Railroad Laborers- _ .75 to 1.10 2.25 to 2.40 152.17 It may easily be seen from these tables that in general the price of labor has doubled under the influence of war conditions. In some cases it has even increased to three times as much as it was before the war. While the foregoing tables represent the type of laborers who are by far more numerous in Athens and in Clarke County, nevertheless it is true that in every form of unskilled labor in which negroes are employed wages have advanced in proportion. These figures then may be taken as characteristic of the advance in wages of unskilled negro labor. In the field of skilled labor the most numerous employees are the rvants engaged in domestic and hotel service, such as cooks, waiters, butlers, etc. The following table shows the advance in the cost of service of this kind: i These Bprnres apply to the price pnM per ion pounds. * CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 3 7 TABLE XVI. i Showing Increase in Wages Paid Domestic and Hotel Servants Wages per Week Wages per Week Per cent Before the War During the War of Inc. Private Homes Cooks (Women) _ $1.50 to $2.00 $3.00 to $4.00 100 Butlers (Men) _ _ 3.00 to 5.00 5.00 to 10.00 66.67 to 100 Hotels Cooks (Men) _ _ _ 4.00 to 5.00 8.00 to 10.00 100 Waiters (Men) _ _ 8.00 to 10.00 15.00 to 19.00 87.50 to 100 Of this class of laborers even more than of the unskilled type it would be expected that the wages would advance. Even at the higher rates the supply of laborers has not equaled the demand. At the same time the class of service has been very low, character- ized very frequently as both expensive and unreliable. / Tendencies in labor as shown in the foregoing tables are even more vividly and graphically presented in personal interviews with employers. A number of these interviews have been obtained in order to give the individual point of view relative to present labor conditions in the county. From these interviews the scarcity, the high price and the shiftlessness of labor will be understood. Negroes were hard to manage, and they did just as little work as they could to draw their pay. There was a feeling among employers of negro labor that they must endure the unsatisfactory service of the negroes as a matter of necessity. They naturally expected to increase the wages of laborers in keeping with prices of other things, but they felt keenly, and still feel, the failure of labor to return good, steady work for these wages. In the following interviews the employers give directly their opinions concerning labor conditions: Unskilled Labor A. "Dealing with war labor on the farm was about the most un- satisfactory work I have ever done," said a typical farmer in de- scribing his own experiences. "Labor was scare and high. Very little work could be gotten out of negroes, because there were too many people who wanted your laborers. I believe that extra high wages such as we had during the war and still have create idleness. A farmer couldn't afford to get after a negro for loafing on the job. If he did, he might lose what labor he had. So we had to put up with it. Even after the ground was. broken up and ready for crops in the spring it was hard to tell how much to plant, because the supply of laborers was so uncertain. I have seen farmers give even little negro girls $1.50 to $2.00 a day to get cotton chopped out. They were glad to get grown negro men and women to chop cotton at $3.00 a day. When the cotton was made, you had to pay $1.50 a hundred to get it picked, and often you couldn't get pickers at all. There were some farmers who didn't have so much trouble, i statistics in Tables XIV. XV and XVI were seeurefd from employers. 38 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA but every one who depended on negro labor knows how hard it was to hire and work negroes during the war. It seemed that every- thing drew labor away from the farm. The fertilizer and other fac- tories needed help, and the sorriest and most worthless negro could go to the city and make a living. With the factories and the army draining out the labor, the farmers had to suffer." B. From the manager of a large fertilizer plant was secured this interview concerning negro labor in that industry. The manager is a man of mature years and has been in charge of the plant for a long time. Before assuming the management of this plant he had been for many years the supervisor of negro labor on the farm, so that altogether he spoke of the character of negro labor from the observation and experience of practically a life time. The plant itself has the best and most modern equipment, with ample capital back of it, thereby insuring the most desirable working conditions. A year of work in the plant is divided into two seasons. The busier season lasts but three months, February, March, and April. During these months the work consists not only in mixing and manufacturing fertilizers but also in shipping these manufactured products to the various consumers. The remaining nine months of the year constitute the season when the fertilizers are manufac- tured and stored away, except for light shipments made during a part of the autumn. It is during the first of these seasons, there- fore, that the larger number of laborers are required. The pay-roll of the plant includes as many as 155 names during this season, while during the remainder of the year the number of negroes em- ployed fluctuates from 75 to 100, with an average pay-roll of about 90. While a few of these laborers who do the lighter work are not adults, nearly all of them are grown men and receive full pay. This is unskilled labor, most of these negroes being recruited from ad- jacent farms. They are what are termed "field hands," or field laborers, and most of them, when they have completed the work of the busy season at the fertilizer plant, go back to the farm. Before the war it was the custom of the negroes who worked during the busier season at the fertilizer plant to spend much of the remainder of the year in idleness. This they could afford to do, because of the fact that they received such high wages during the busier season at the plant. The manager of the plant even believes that some of them make sufficient money during these three months to support them without work during the next nine months. Notwithstanding the fact that during the summer of 1918 when the demand for labor of every kind was so great and every laborer, both white and colored, throughout the nation was urged by moral suasion and even by legislation to aid in the work of the country in its critical hour of participation in the Great War by keeping constantly em- ployed, these negroes were indifferent as to whether or not they worked all of the time, as they made sufficient money from their brief season of work in the plant to keep them from having to work continually throughout the remainder of the year unless they wished to do so. There are two particularly important points shown in the statement made by the manager. One is that the negroes did not work as well nor were they as easily managed during the war as bhey were before; the other is that even now when the war is over the negroes are not yet rendering as good service as they did before the war. The manager of the plant is convinced that he did not secure as large returns in work from the laborers at $3 a day as he received before the war when their pay was only from $1.25 to $1.50 per day. The same conditions continue to prevail since the war clos- ed, and the negroes have so far failed to re-adjust themselves either CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 39 to the former wage scale or efficiency of service. While it is easier to secure labor today than it was a year ago, it is necessary to pay practically all the labor $3 per day. It is interesting to note the words of the manager in describing labor conditions in the plant during the war: "They (the negro laborers) were absolutely uncontrollable. I had to ask them to do a thing, pay them, and then let them take their own time. I believe, too, that in managing negroes I can get about as much work out of them as anybody. There was only one idea that seemed to be in their minds, 'If I quit, can he get any- body else?' Since the war has closed they are working a little bet- ter, but not as well as they did before the war. Yet they are the best labor we can get. We have never been able to get any laborers more satisfactory for the work of the fertilizer plant, which is dusty, dirty and disagreeable. They are as easy to handle as any other labor, and we can usually get as many of them as we want. They have no unions, and they don't go on strikes. These things are all in their favor. Though the negroes are not organized now, I think it will not be long before they will begin to organize." ('. In the case of the manager of another fertilizer plant who was interviewed, the shortage of labor and the handicap of labor condi- tions both during the war and since its close were likewise affirmed. The manager of this plant was a comparatively young man, prob- ably about thirty-eight years old. He had, however, been manager of fertilizer plants for a period of fifteen years, his first experience in the work having been gained in Florida. Throughout the inter- view he made numerous references to the conditions of labor in the Florida plant, as well as to the conditions in the Clarke County plant during the war and since its close. As he had been manager of the local plant for a comparatively short time, about a year and a half, he was not very familiar with labor conditions as they ex- isted before the war. He drew inferences, however, from the con- dition in which he found labor at the time he assumed his duties here and also from what he had learned from inquiries about former conditions at the plant. From all these sources had come sufficient information to con- ivnce him that the scarcity of labor had materially affeoted the output of the plant during the war and that it was still exerting a similar effect. He could use, he said, as many as 125 negroes at the time he gave the interview, which was near the close of March when the busy season was at its height. He had, however, at that time only 3 5 laborers. At about the same time the year before, which was at a very critical period of the war, he had on his pay- roll about 49 laborers. This practical comparison led him to be- lieve that the scarcity of labor at his plant since the war closed has been even greater than it was during the time when the war was still in progress. In further substantiation of his belief he pointed to the fact that the plant had been known to employ as many as 300 or 400 in the busy season of the year 1913. The average num- ber of men employed then during the year was between 75 and 100. He estimated that the average number of men employed for the year now did not exceed 25. All of these were colored, only two white men besides himself being employed in the entire plant. The pre-war wage scale was about $1.25 per day. During the war the daily pay ranged from $1.75 to $2.25, while since the war it has ranged from $2.75 to $3.25. Notwithstanding the fact that he is offering higher wages now than he did during the war, labor is harder to get and is more unsatisfactory. He believes that negro labor as he knows it is even less trustworthy and effective now 40 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA than it was during the war. He bases his judgment on practically a lifetime acquaintance with negro labor. "Negro laborers that work here are lazy," said he. "They are not insolent or impudent but careless and of no account. They just idle around and fill in a day's time in some way. Though they are no good, we can't run one off. We must have labor of some kind. I can drive them and manage to get a pretty good day's work out of them. The average work expected from a fertilizer laborer is four tons a day. I insist on getting about six tons daily. As sorry as they are, they are easier to manage than dagoes (Italians), for I worked dagoes in Florida. The dagoes are fairly good hands but they are slow. They wouldn't do much even if we could get them into Georgia, so the negro is about as good as we can get. You can drive a negro, but you can't drive a dago. They won't stand for it. It seems now that we can't get any more negro laborers. I believe that they are already secretly organizing into unions. Unless that helps explain the shortage of labor, I don't know what does." />. Of all these labor conditions the ones that most closely affected the home during the war were those of securing and retaining cooks and domestic servants. The experience of a housewife in this particular is given in this interview. During the nineteen months the war lasted this housewife, who is representative of the best home life in the city, had five cooks. It was her opinion that she fared as well in this matter of servants as the average housekeeper who was compelled to retain a cook. She pronounced all of these servants inferior to the ones she had before the war. Two of them were of about average merit, while the others ranged all the way from that degree of merit to utter worthlessness. 'Considering the five in a group, she called them "very poor." Their defects were very easily seen. They were untrained, ignorant, and unsatisfactory generally. She had endeavored to show them and train them in order to keep them interested in the work, but they made a failure in each instance despite her efforts. Practically without exception they began well. They showed interest and enthusiasm in their work at first, but invariably this good beginning came quickly to a poor end. She was very much discouraged by the fact that these negro servants would not re- main with her. She believes this instability of nature is a general characteristic of negro women who are house servants. She could see no improvement in these servants while they were with her, but they actually became less efficient, more careless and indifferent. Very soon they would say that they were tired of the work and that they were compelled to have a rest. This was true of practically every one, the sorry ones and the better ones alike. Whenever they remained with her a fairly good length of time, they showed a tendency at intervals to neglect their work. These "slumps," as the housekeeper called them, the servants would fall into occasion- ally, and their work during these periods was too poor and unsatis- factory for anyone to bear. The only way this housewife has been able to retain a cook lately has been to increase the wages to a little above what is ordinarily being paid for that class of service. She pays her cook about $5.25 per week. /' Conditions with reference to skilled labor in hotels as repre- sented by waiters, rooks, bellbovs and all colored help, were sum- marized by the manager of a large hotel. The manager is a man above middle age and of long experience in the conduct of hotels. M • has deal! with this class of negro labor for manv years, and he emphatically that the conditions during the war were the worst CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 41 he had ever seen. Even before the war began he observed a certain scantiness of labor, though he was usually able before the war to secure at reasonable wages all the colored help he needed. These conditions changed almost at once as soon as the war began, as a decided shortage in help was noted almost immediately. In order to overcome this shortage the manager made a general increase of fifty per cent in wages. The effect of this increase upon the supply of labor, however, was hardly noticeable. The shortage in labor became more and more acute throughout the war. Even at these higher wages the hotel help did no better work, but they became even more lazy and trifling. They took no interest in their work, but they constantly neglected it. They were indifferent as to whether they worked or not, but they seemed to think they could keep their jobs in either case. This, of course, made them harder to manage, for their minds were occupied by the numerous things that at any time tend to demoralize negro workers. A certain amount of indifference is always met with in negro hotel help, and it is naturally expected; but such gross indifference the manager had never encountered before. With reference to post-war conditions he is convinced that the shortage in such negro labor as he employs is constantly growing. He is frank to admit that such conditions are contrary to what he expected. Though he did not believe that labor conditions among his negro help would return to normal immediately upon the close of the war, yet he thought that within a comparatively short time there would be indications of a return to normal conditions. If there are such conditions now, he is unable to discover them. Since these unusual conditions have already persisted longer after the close of the war than he had expected, he is at a loss to know how much longer they will continue. It is to him unthinkable that they will continue indefinitely, though he is of the opinion that negro labor will never get back to the wage scale that was in force before the war. With reference to present tendencies it seems to him that it is not only true that the shortage comes more and more to be felt but also that the inefficiency of hotel labor is increasing. When urged to express an opinion concerning future conditions, he would not even hazard a conjecture. In dismissing the topic under dis- cussion he finally said that it was something about which he did not care to talk , for, as he phrased it, he was "sore about it." Complaints from guests in the hotel concerning the inattention of servants were common, even more common now than during the the war. The only reply he could make to these was to try to show the ones who complained what a problem faces the hotel manager. "I usually tell them," said he, "that by registering complaints they are heaping more burdens upon my shoulders. I can't do anything to stop this indifference, for if I get after the servants who are in- attentive, I may lose all of my help. So there you are!" F. As it has been shown in a former Phelps-Stokes Study that negro women prefer washing to cooking and that a majority of them do washing in order to earn a livelihood, it is interesting to observe the experiences of the head of a family in securing a wash- erwoman during the war. For many years before the war the same negro woman had done the washing for this family. She continued to do the work for some time after the war began, then she asked to be relieved of it. When asked as to why she did not wish to con- tinue the work, she said she wished to rest for a time. An investi- gation showed that she gave up the washing soon after she began to receive an allotment from the government, the allotment having been made by her son in the army. It appears that when she dis- 4 2 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA continued the laundry work for this family she gave up laundering entirely. The head of the family began at once a search for another wash- erwoman. For a time it was impossible to secure one, though a diligent search was made. Inquiry of neighbors disclosed the fact that similar experiences were being undergone by many of them. Another washerwoman was finally secured. She did fairly good work but soon quit. Search was again made for another. Finally another one was secured, but she did such very poor washing that for this reason it was impossible to retain her. In this way the head of the family endeavored during the war period to keep a washer- woman, two of them having been tried during the period of the war whereas before the war the work had been done satisfactorily by one for many years. After the war closed the first washerwoman re- turned and again took up the work, the government allotment hav- ing been discontinued. In this particular family, which consisted of only two members, the price paid for the laundry before the war was $1.10, while war prices ran as high as $2 and more. "Xegro washerwomen during the war were the most independent I have ever seen," said the head of the family. "When negroes draw government money, it is a hard matter to get them to work. Never in my life have I seen such conditions in getting the family wash done. There have been times when we though that prices for washing were a little too high and that good washerwomen were scarce, but it was nothing like the conditions we knew during the war. My own experience was like that of many others, for I know personally of many washerwomen who quit taking in washing at any price during the war. They could do it because they were receiving a government allotment from some relative in the army, or because their husbands were working at high wages for the government operated railroads or for some other firm that paid big wages." . 325. CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 45 ance of such vagrant." Among the classes of vagrants mentioned are people living in idleness, those leading an immoral or prolifli- gate life, those who live by stealing or by trading or bartering stolen goods, professional gamblers, able-bodied beggars, and per- sons who hire out their minor children and who live on the wages of such children. Sixteen years is the lower age limit, but no upper limit is designated. Students are exempted. It is incumbent upon all town, city and state officials to investigate and prosecute all per- sons who violate the law. Any person who violates the law is guilty of a misdemeanor and is to be punished in accordance with that section of the Code which fixes the penalty for a misdemeanor. In contrast with the requirements of the foregoing law the state legislation of 1918, known as the "Work or Fight' 'law, was purely a war measure. The act of 1918 was drafted with the purpose of placing upon the statutes a stringent but impartial supplementary law that would cause all able-bodied persons, within certain lim- its, to work. According to this law, the possession of money, prop- erty or income sufficient for one's support and the support of those dependent upon one was no defence in case of prosecution. Six- teen and fifty-five years were the lower and upper age limits, re- spectively. The work in which one was engaged must be an "essen- tial industry," as this term was defined in the Provost Marshal General's order. Five and one-half days per week, with the num- ber of hours of work customary for the industry concerned, was the amount of work required. Inability to obtain work was no ex- cuse, unless the State Commissioner of Commerce and Labor was unable to secure work for an applicant, it being the duty of said Commissioner to supply work to an applicant under the law. The manner of the enforcement of the law, the penalty attached to violations of it, and the other requirements and conditions were essentially the same as those of the vagrancy laws. The law auto- matically became null and void as soon as the war closed. An examination of the foregoing summary and contrast of these laws of Georgia will show that the "Work or Fight" law differs from the others in that possession of property or income is no de- fence under its terms. It was aimed not only at the idle poor but also at the idle well-to-do. Its fundamental purpose was to exact regular work during the war from every one, both rich and poor, who was able to work. Its aim was impartial, and a reference to the docket of the police court of Athens shows that it was impar- tially enforced. There are comparatively few cases on record of violations during the war of either the "Work or Fight" law or the vagrancy law. The violators of these laws, however, include of- fenders not ®nly of the wealthy but also of the poorer class, both black and white. More than one well-to-do white resident of Ath- ens was forced to enter some essential industry, as the police rec- ord shows. 46 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA While there were several of these violators, both black and white, of the requirements of the "Work or Fight' law, whose cases never came to trial but who yielded promptly to the compulsion of the police official and entered essential industries, yet the heart of the matter is not there but in the consideration of the violations of the vagrancy law as these violations may be traced for several years. A gratifying feature of this record is that there were very few cases of vagrancy against the blacks. This statement is not a contradic- tion of the truth brought out in the first part of this chapter, where it was shown in more than one interview that both skilled and un- skilled negro laborers were hard to manage during the war and that they did as little work as possible. It is merely a statement, the proof of which is to be given more fully, that there were few cases of actual vagrancy, by which is meant vicious idleness and refusal to work at all. There were undoubtedly cases, in some instances probably numerous cases, where negroes violated both the letter and the spirit of the "Work or Fight" law, but the reference now is to vagrancy. TABLE XVII 1 . Showing Annual Decrease in Number of Cases of Negro Vagrancy Year Number of Cases Percentage of Decrease 1916 22 1917 13 40.91 1918 6 53.85 No white cases are included in the above table because during the entire three years noted there is but one case of vagrancy against the whites, according to the police court records, that case being of a woman of ill repute. The foregoing table includes only what are known as "stockade cases," the figures having been secured from the police court docket of the city of Athens. By stockade cases are meant cases of vagrancy in which the persons concerned were arrested, convicted and sentenced, as is usual in sucTi cases, to the city stockade, or workhouse. There were numerous other cases that were entered upon the docket, but the records show that there were no convictions in these cases. The records are, of course, for the city of Athens only. No other part of Clarke County is included, but it is nevertheless true that these statistics are still valid; because by far the larger number of cases of actual vagrancy are found among the negroes in the cities rather than in the rural districts. It will be seen from the table that the decrease in negro vagrancy during the year 1917 amounted to 40.91 per cent, there being but two more than half the number of cases for 1917 as there were for the preceding year. The ratio of decrease is maintained and is even accelerated for the year 1918 during the most critical period •^Statistics in this table were secured from the 1'oiu-e Court Docket of tbe city nf Athens. CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR IT of the war. In that year there were only six cases of negro vagrancy as compared with twelve for the preceding year. This record is indeed an unusual one for a city of 6,316 negro population, and the explanation of it is interesting. It has been the plan of the Athens police force for a number of years to stop crime by prohibiting idleness. It is the belief of the officials on the police force, a belief that is in thorough harmony with well established facts in the study of the negro problem, that idleness is a fruitful source of crime. With this belief in mind, it has been the aim of the police department to prevent vagrancy and even to compel the negroes to notify the department in advance of the time and place of each negro frolic, such as "mullet suppers" and similar functions. In this way much has been accomplished not only in the reduction of vagrancy but also in the decrease of negro crime generally. The statistics given in Table XVII show this con- clusively. In more thoroughly enforcing the conditions of the "Work or Fight" law as it served to make more stringent the provisions of the original vagrancy laws the Athens police department made use of a simple device in the form of a card system. This was used particularly among negroes and those whose employments could not be readily traced by means of their offices, the city directory, or other such devices. The card certificate, with its simple lettering and marginal date arrangement is illustrated below: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 IT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2T 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 IT IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2T 28 29 30 31 Jan. Feb. March April May June 1918 THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT 1920 Is employed by me, and that he was engaged in a USEFUL OCCUPATION on the dates punched in the margin. 1919 1921 July August Sept. Oct. Nov. Deo. 1 o 3 4 5 6 T S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 IT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 T 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 IT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2S. 29 30 31 It is the opinion of a well known police official of Athens, a man who has been connected with the force for a period of fourteen years, that the negroes of Athens, and also of the county generally as far as he had come in contact with them, had realized their re- sponsibility during the war and had proved themselves in the main as law-abiding citizens. He knew of no insolence from negro sol- 48 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA diers, and these soldiers had usually upon their return home from army service gone back to work promptly. He knew personally of one negro who, having arrived one day with his discharge from the army, had gone back to work the following day. He was of the opinion that there were other cases of this kind. What is most notable about the rapidly decreasing number of cases of vagrancy in Athens is that it was brought about as effec- tively before the passage of the "Work or Fight" law as it was afterwards. With the exception of reaching those who have prop- erty or incomes and who for this reason would not work, it appears that the "Work or Fight" law was hardly needed in Clarke County or in Georgia, if the long-existent vagrancy laws ware enforced. Both the Athens police force and the negroes of Athens deserve credit for this commendable state of affairs here. In fact, the very small percentage of vagrancy here during the critical year of the Great War and throughout the course of that memorable struggle is a most creditable showing for the negroes of Clarke County, a manifestation of patriotism and practical helpfulness that is prob- ably not surpassed by that of any county in the state with a negro population of like size. CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 4 9 CHAPTER VI. WHAT BECAME OF THE NEGRO'S WAR PROFITS? Since the preceding part of this study, especially Chapter V, has made clear that the negro has reaped unusual profits from war con- ditions, it is but natural to make the inquiry, "What became of the profits?" It will be the purpose of this concluding chapter to give to this question as definite and as comprehensive an answer as possible. Among other inquiries that suggest themselves as related to the main question as it is presented in the foregoing paragraph are the following ones: "Did the negro invest any of his surplus money wisely?" "If so, how much?" "Did he spend the greater or the lesser part of it with poor judgment?" "In what ways did he find it most agreeable to spend his war profits?" These and similar queries will serve to show the scope of the present chapter of this study. What the average negro family of Athens and Clarke County does with its income in normal times will have much to do in making clear what these negroes did under the stimulus of war-time wages and the reception of allotments that were in most cases like gifts out of the blue sky. It is fortunate that this phase of negro life in Athens, at least, received thorough investigation before the be- ginning of the Great War. Such an investigation formed the basi.; of the Phelps-Stokes Fellowship Studies, No. 1, which was completed about the close of the spring season in 1913, more than a year before the Great War began. In this former study Mr. T. J. Woofter, Jr., made a careful and extended investigation of the expenditures of negro families, the results of which form the matter of an entire chapter in his study. The vital truths revealed by this investiga- tion will first be summarized, and the results of the present investi- gation will be added to them. In his inquiries into the expenditures of 184 negro families Mr. Woofter arrived at, among others, the following conclusions: "The average expenditure for miscellaneous items (items not including food, clothing, lodging, and fuel) is 53 per cent of the total outlay. The percentage of the total income spent for miscellaneous items rises with much more rapidity than the income If this miscellaneous expenditure were saved, or spent for such laudable wants as education, furniture and books, it might be to the negro's advantage that his actual expenditure is only half his income. Such, however, is not the case. Agents, saloons, and instalment dealers cater to negro trade with the view of getting this extra money, and, except in cases of exceptional thrift, they succeed Instead of better furniture, cheap prints, organs, and bric-a-brac are too often purchased; and instead of better clothing a surplus of wages over expenditures goes, too often, for gaudy ornaments. 50 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA "The fact that the negro can live off of the fruits of three days' labor, and, if so minded, can rest the other three days, is empha- sized by the fact that half of the income of the negro goes for inci- dentals, while the items of food, shelter, cleanliness, and self-im- provement receive the slightest possible attention The fallacy that higher wages would make the negro a better workman has been disproved by his tendency to spend for unnecessary articles all over and above a certain percentage of his income." This fallacy, disproved very conclusively by the former investiga- tion, is made even more manifest by the inquiries that have been made recently in order to secure the material used in this study. As the buying of land represents probably the sanest and most per- manently helpful material investment that an agricultural people like the negroes could make with their profits, it will be used as the type of the wise investment. As the automobile probably more than any other one thing symbolizes for the average citizen, particularly so for the negro, unnecessary expenditure and a tendency toward luxurious living, it will be used as the type of the unwise invest- ment. This summarizes the matter in such a way that it may be examined in this introductory analysis in the form of a contrast, the first part of which is the consideration of the changes from year to year in the acreage of land owned by whites and blacks. TABLE XVIII. 1 Showing Ownership of Land by Whites and Blacks, with Increase or Decrease Increase or Decrease White 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1914-1S 60949.25 60889.75 61947 61720.25 61447.50 _L498.25 Increase or Decrease -0.10 _|_1.74 -0.36 -0.44 Black 8537.62 8306.75 8335 8470.37 9024.50 _[_486.88 Increase or Decrease -2.46 _[_0.34 _|_1.62 _|_6.54 Though the specific causes for each change shown in the fore- going table may be hard to find, nevertheless the general principles controlling these changes are fairly manifest. It must be remem- bered that the giving in of land values to the receiver of tax re- turns is a thing that is inevitably more or less irregular, even though land, unlike some other kinds of property, jewelry, for in- stance, cannot be hidden. It is, therefore, necessary to find a very sharp and decisive tendency, either an increase or a decrease in 1 Land acreage Rtntisties In this table were obtained from th<» Clarke County Tax Dlgewl for L918. CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 51 acreage, before one can be sure that any very unusual cause has been operative. The general tendencies in land fluctuations here shown are easily seen. In the case of the whites a gradual but con- tinuous increase is evident. With reference to the negroes a gen- eral increase is almost equally apparent. An examination of these statistics reveals a series of fluctuations in each division of the table, that devoted to the white acreage and that devoted to the black. Sometimes the change is an increase, sometimes it is a decrease. The total increase in acreage for the whites during the five-year period studied is 498.25 acres. The total increase in acreage for the blacks for the same period is 486.88. How nearly identical the increase in acreage is for each race is clearly shown in these figures. The only instances of what may be termed comparatively large increases are, for the whites, in the acreage of 1916, which -shows a gain of 1,057.25 acres, and, for the blacks, in the acreage of 1918, which indicates a gain of 554.12 acres. The acreage for the whites in 1918 shows not an increase but a decrease of 272.75 acres. An increase in negro lands of 554.12 acres for 1918 over 1917, in conjunction with a decrease of 135.37 acres for 1917 in comparison with 1916, has considerable -significance. It means that the negroes spent some part of their war profits for land, but not a very large part. It is a regrettable fact that they did not spend more of their war earnings for permanent economic improvement of this kind. Though most of this acreage is in farm land, yet more than the ordinary proportion of the increase is in city lots, as the sales- records of the Athens real estate dealers show. The increased acreage in negro land, however, is on the economic side one of the most hopeful features of negro life in Clarke County during the Great War. Though the increased acreage in negro lands for 1918 is rather notable, a much sharper contrast is found in the consideration of the tax valuations on the automobile, which is employed here as the type of the unwise expenditure. TABLE XIX. 1 Showing Increase in Tax Valuation of Automobiles, Motorcycles, Etc. 1913 19il4 1915 1916 1917 1918 White _ _ $80,885 $99,955 $118,770 $148,795 $194,690 $257,450 Black _ _ 400 1,300 1,400 3,000 4,990 14,875 TABLE XX. Showing Percentage of Increase Over Previous Year 1913 1914 191'5 1916 1917 1918 White _ _ 23.57 18.82 25.28 30.84 32.24 Black _ _ 225.00 7.69 114.28 66.33 198.09 Although motorcycles and bicycles are included with automobiles in these statistics as they are found on the Tax Digest, nevertheless i Tax Digest, Clarke County, 1918. 52 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA the figures are substantially true for automobiles alone; because the value of these other vehicles as compared with that of automobiles is practically nothing. These tables form a good index to the un- wise investments made by the negroes, for there is a striking con- trast between the war purchases of automobiles by whites and blacks, if the Tax Digest may be considered an accurate index of such conditions. The annual increase in the valuation of auto- mobiles of the whites is very steady and gradual. The increase for the year 1918, being only 1.40 per cent over the increase for the preceding year. On the other hand, the increase in valuation of automobiles owned by negroes is, for the year 1918, 121.76 per cent over that for 1917. In the main year of the war, when Athens automobile dealers and owners reported hardly the usual activity in the sale of cars to whites, more cars were sold to negroes than had ever been known. This means that the negroes of the county in that year found sufficient money available from their war profits to invest approximately $10,000 in automobiles when it was difficult to get them to invest anything in Liberty Loans and other war activities, their total paid subscriptions to all the war activity cam- paigns being less than $5,000. But this is not all. It was only the fact that the negroes could not conveniently get the low-priced automobile they prefer that pre- vented them from buying many more cars. The Athens agent for the most popular car among the negroes said, in speaking of the sale of these cars during the war period, that his firm could not begin to supply the demand for these cars after the factory discon- tinued making them. The negroes who wanted cars, however, were not to be disappointed. They inquired concerning owners of sec- ond-hand cars of this make, and the sale of these second-hand cars here from their owners to negroes was unprecedented. Every sec- ond-hand car of this kind that could be secured was bought by negroes. Many of the negroes who could not secure new cars of the popular make they like strained every point they could, if necessary, and bought higher-priced cars. The sale of these higher-priced cars here to negroes during the war was the largest on record. In view of these facts, it appears plain that the negro eagerly and lavishly spent his war profits for automobiles. So goes the record not only with reference to automobiles but also as regards silverware, jewelry, furniture, food, clothing, fire- arms, and every other kindred phase of expenditure. It is not the mere fact that the negroes spent their war profits for these articles that is being recorded and emphasized here in connection with this study but the far more significant fact that they spent their money with very poor judgment. As a careful and experienced student of the economics of the Georgia negro has observed: "It is painful to have to record the fact that on the whole the negroes seem not to have used their high profits wisely. Never before have merchants CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR 53 sold negroes so many fine clothes, shoes, and firearms; never before have they spent so much money in traveling about aimlessly; never before have they bought such expensive and luxurious articles of food. Many thousands have bought automobiles. High wages on the farm and in the towns have encouraged the negro's natural tendency to idleness." 1 If one wishes to investigate these unwise expenditures of the Clarke County negro, he has but to make a brief tour of the shops of the representative merchants of Athens. The evidence given by these merchants on this point is positive and unanimous. In a few interviews that are given here as personal evidence of this fact it will be seen how the merchants with whom the negroes of the county do their trading regard the expenditures of the negroes for these various articles not only during war-time but also since the war has closed, for invariably these merchants record the fact that the negroes are continuing in time of peace the unusually extrav- agant buying which characterized them in time of war. Dealers in jewelry, firearms, clothing, groceries and furniture were selected for these interviews. In several cases it will be ob- served that the merchant has pointed out the fact that the negro has spent his money, or has shown the desire to do so, for articles much more expensive than would have served his purpose, or even for things that were useless. A. A prominent jeweler, whose white and black customers come to him not only from Athens but also from places within a radius of fifty miles, said that he could easily see during the war the in- crease in negro trade in jewelry and similar wares but that he would not like to attempt to state it in figures. It was "readily perceptible," even "considerable," he said. In this particular he referred definitely to the sale of goods to negro farmers who had sold their cotton and to negro women and other negroes, where he knew from the vouchers presented that the money came from gov- ernment allotments. As there is always a substantial white trade in jewelry in autumn, the unusual sales of such goods to negro farmers and to negroes who were evidently spending money paid them by the government were all the more noticeable. The trade conditions were attributed by the merchant to two main causes: first, the high price of cotton, which sold, during the most lively period of the country trade as high as 35 cents per pound; second, to the presence of ready money in the way of allotments and other funds from soldiers. The first of these causes was, in his opinion, the more powerful of the two, though the latter had a perceptible effect upon the pulse of trade. These causes operated in the very nature of things to increase the trade of both races, though the increased buying noted in the case of the blacks was even more per- ceptible than that of the whites. B. As was true of the most popular kind of automobile, the de- mand for firearms in general was far beyond the supply. This fact is vouched for by an official of one of the largest hardware com- panies in Athens. This dealer says he could have sold firearms of the very best kind in almost unlimited quantities to negroes but 1 Brooks, R. P. Effects of the Great War on Agriculture in Georgia, Pro- ceedings of the Georgia Historical Association, 1919. 54 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA that the factories were so busy with government contracts that fire- arms on other orders could not be secured from them. As it was, the negroes bought all the firearms they could get. V. An example of extravagance in clothing was cited by a large clothing dealer, who said that he had never before sold so large a number of silk shirts to negroes as during the war. White men with -similar incomes would not have thought of buying silk shirts. Many negroes who had formerly bought only cotton shirts bought silk ones instead. Negroes had also bought much more largely than ever the highest-priced suits of clothes, shoes and other furnishings. D. Grocers invariably report unusual sales of the finest groceries and of many foods not usually bought by the negroes. According to one of the proprietors of a large grocery store, whose stock is of the finest and most expensive kind, the increase in grocery expendi- tures among his negro customers, after allowing for the increase in the price of groceries and of the increased cost of living generally, was from 10 to 15 per cent. This is just as true now, five months after the close of the war, as it was during the war. His negro customers now invariably demand only fancy groceries of the very best brands he has. A negro customer who would formerly buy a cheap grade of flour, or haggle very much about paying the differ- ence between the cheaper grade and the better, now asks for the best grade of fancy flour and pays for it without hesitancy. He knows the same thing to be true about not only other groceries but also with reference to meats and similar foods. E. Furniture dealers report not only larger sales but also finer grades of their stock sold to negroes than ever. An increase in the sales of furniture was naturally expected in view of the high price of cotton and other farm products, but the very expensive grades of furniture and kindred articles of bouse furnishings bought by the negroes during the war surprised even the dealers in these goods. So also did the amount of cash the negroes had, many negroes hav- ing often paid cash for their entire large bills of goods. One of the best and largest furniture merchants in Athens estimates that his negro customers as a whole paid four times as much cash on their bills during the war as they ordinarily do. Their instalments, where they bought on the extended payment plan, have been met more regularly than the furniture dealers have ever known. Though in the case of the dealers who sell the higher grades of furniture the number of sales has not largely increased, yet the increase in these sales in dollars and cents is estimated by one dealer conservatively at 200 per cent. For instance, a customer, a negro woman, entered his store and asked to see some chairs. The clerk showed her a set of substantial chairs, with cane bottoms, that retailed at fifty cents apiece. The negro asked to see others and finally bought a set of dainty mahogany chairs at five dollars apiece, paying cash for the entire set. This was cited by the dealer as an example of waste of money, because the mahogany chairs were too frail to stand the service they would be subjected to in the negro's home. Many other instances of this lavish and unwise expenditure of money by the negroes were pointed out, such as the buying by the negro trading public of five times as many talk- ing-machines as ordinarily, these being of an exceptionally expensive type. Negroes who ordinarily pay eight or ten dollars for a trunk did not hesitate to pay twenty to fifty dollars. Those who usually spent ten or fifteen dollars for a bed were not content to buy one for less than twenty to thirty dollars. Similar extravagance was shown with reference to rugs, pictures, china, bric-a-brac, and other articles. PD * 04 CLARKE COUNTY NEGROES DURING GREAT WAR oo It appears that the answer to the question, "What became of the negro's war profits?" has been given rather completely in this chap- ter. It seems very certain from what has been shown that the negro spent the lesser part of these profits for essentials and the larger part for non-essentials, or what the former Phelps-Stokes Study termed "miscellaneous items." During his heyday of pros- perity in the Great War the negro seems to have been attracted, as is usual with him in time of prosperity, more by the superficialities, the tinsel and glitter of life, than by its permanent benefits and durable satisfactions. It is unfortunately true that he used the greater part of his war profits for unworthy ends. 56 UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA BIBLIOGRAPHY Athens City Schools. Report, 1917-18. Brooks, R. P. History of Georgia. New York, Atkinson, Ment- zer & Co., 1913. Effects of the Great War on Agriculture in Georgia. Proceedings of the Georgia Historical Association, 1919. Bruce, Philip A. The Plantation Negro as a Freeman. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889. Code of Georgia Laws, 1910. McCord, Chas. H. The American Negro as a Dependent, Defective and Delinquent. Nashville: Benton Printing Co., 1914. Mecklin, J. M. Democracy and Race Friction. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914. Negro Migration in 1916-17. Division of Negro Economics, United States Department of Labor, Washington, 1919. Odum, H. W. Social and Mental Traits of the Negro. New York: Columbia University Press, 1910. Southern AVorkman, The. Issue for December, 1918. Press of the Hampton, Virginia, Normal and Agricultural Institute, Hamp- ton. Stanley, H. M. Sixth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Com- merce and Labor of the State of Georgia. Atlanta: Index Printing Co. Statute Laws of Georgia, 1918. Woofter, T. J., Jr. The Negroes of Athens, Georgia. Athens: Bul- letin of the University of Georgia, Volume XIV, Number 4, 1913. (Phelps-Stokes Fellowship Studies, No. 1). O °* e/1 «*° ^J> * o „ o ftT ^ 'by' * 4 * o <* t- ^ .0 ^ o « G A <£• ->* "?- V * = « o ° . v v 7 c • , * °^ % c ' V V V ° " ° * **b ^6* 4 o •c- ^ * ^ * A. ^ * ; -F **> .0 ^». O .4 o. o V *o^, V V-* rifiS -^ -P. 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