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 Uan Dcmer's Briaade at €bickamauda 
 
 BY GEN. J. W. BISHOP 
 
 THEN LieUT. COL. SECOND REGIMENT MINN. INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS 
 
 PAPER Read before Minnesota Commandery 
 OF Loyal Legion u. S., May 12, 1903 
 
 WITH COMPLIMENTS^OF THE WRITER 
 
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VAN DERVEER'S BRIGADE AT CHICKAMAUGA 
 
 By general J. W. BISHOP, 
 (Then Lieut. Col. Second Regiment Minnesota Infantry Volunteers.) 
 
 Paper Read before Minnesota Commandery 
 OF Loyal Legion V. S., May 12, 1903. 
 
 During the period covered by this narrative, the follow- 
 ing infantry regiments, viz., the 9th Ohio, (Col. Gustave 
 Kammeriing), the 35th Ohio, (Lt. Col. H. V. Boynton). 
 the 87th Indiana, (Col. Newell Gleason), and the 2nd Min- 
 nesota, (Col. James George), and Battery "I," 4th U. 
 S. Artillery, commanded by Lt. Frank G. Smith, constituted 
 (the Third Brigade of Third Division, 14th Army Corps, 
 Army of the Cumberland. 
 
 The Army was commanded by Major General W. S. 
 Rosecrans, the Corps by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, the 
 Division by Brig. Gen. J. M. Brannan, and the Brigade 
 by Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer, of the 35th Ohio, and 
 was called and known as "Van Derveer's Brigade." 
 
 On the 1 6th day of August, 1863, the Army of the 
 Cumberland, at and near Tullahoma, Tennessee, commenced 
 the campaign for the capture and possession of Chattanooga, 
 involving the expulsion therefrom, and the defeat in battle, 
 if possible, of the Confederate Army under Gen. Bragg, 
 then occupying that city and the country about it. 
 
 We cannot even briefly describe in this paper, the mas- 
 terly strategy of the ensuing thirty days, by which our 
 
 
army was taken over the Cumberland , Range, across the 
 Tennessee River, over the Sand Moimtain Range into the 
 Lookout Valley, and then over the Lookout Mountain 
 Range, in eager pursuit of our old enemy. 
 
 On the 8th of September, finding us pervading the coun- 
 try and threatening his communications South of Chatta- 
 nooga, he had evacuated that place, and, with his whole 
 army, retired some thirty or forty miles Southward, to- 
 wards Rome. 
 
 A few days later, as our army descended the Eastern slope 
 of the Lookout Range, by the several narrow and difficult 
 passes, from twenty-five to forty miles South of Chatta- 
 nooga, we found the situation had suddenly and com- 
 pletely changed. Bragg, being reinforced by Longstreet's 
 Corps from Virginia, by Buckner's from East Tennessee, 
 
 and by a detachment from Johnston's Army in Mississippi, 
 was concentrated at and near Lafayette, and with largely 
 superior numbers was now intent upon attacking us as we 
 emerged in detachments from the mountain passes. Twice 
 he attempted such attacks, only to have his plans fail, as he 
 claimed, for want of co-operation by his corps comman- 
 ders. 
 
 Rosecrans, appreciating the new situation, by energetic 
 maneuvering, was withdrawing his army fronn pursuit and 
 cO'llecting it for battle; and so we found, on the i8th of 
 September, both Armies concentrated and confronting each 
 other in the Chickamauga Valley, at and extending South- 
 ward from the vicinity of Lee & Gordon's Mill ; the Chicka- 
 mauga Creek flowing Northward between them, in a tor- 
 tuous course, and with a deep and silent channel down the 
 center of the valley. 
 
 At this mill, the Lafayette-Chattanooga Road crosses 
 from the east to the west side of the creek, and then runs 
 northerly parallel with it about five miles, to the Cloud 
 
Church, so-called, thence northwesterly about three miles 
 to and through the Rossville Gap in Mission Ridge, to the 
 Chattanooga Valley, and thence northerly about four miles 
 to Chattanooga. This road, for the first five miles north- 
 ward from Lee & Gordon's mill, was, so to speak, the axis 
 of the coming battle, and its possession was the immediate 
 object oi the contest. It lay about midway between the 
 Chickamauga Creek to the eastward, and Mission Ridge 
 to the westward, at an average distance of about two miles 
 from each; so the battle field may be said to be contained 
 in the rectangle five miles north and south by four miles 
 east and west, though not all that ground was actually 
 fought over. 
 
 As we faced northward toward Chattanooga, the Mission 
 Ridge on our left afforded twO' practicable passes to the 
 Chattanooga Valley lying west of it, the one known as 
 "McFarland's Gap," or the "Dry Valley Road," seven miles 
 south of Chattanooga, and the other and better one, through 
 which led the main Lafayette-Chattanooga Road, was the 
 "Rossville Gap" already mentioned. The battle field was 
 mostly covered with timber, much of it with a dense growth 
 of underbrush, though there were several farms with open 
 fields and log buildings, with narrow local roads or trails, 
 (not shown on the map) leading in various directions from 
 one farm; to another, and to the several fords and bridges 
 crossing the creek about half a mile apart. Nowhere was 
 any extended or comprehensive view of the field possible, 
 even by daylight ; and as both armies came ontoi the field dur- 
 ing the night time, neither could have any definite knowledge 
 or understanding next morning, of the presence or posi- 
 tion of the other, until they actually came into collision from 
 time to time. 
 
 On the 17th Van Derveer's Brigade had bivouacked — 
 "(encamping had long been obsolete with us as a word or 
 
a practice) — near the west bank of the creek, some six or 
 seven miles above (south of) Lee & Gordon's; — a brigade 
 of the enemy iwas in the woods just across the creek, and, 
 as has been said, the two armies were looking, as it were, 
 defiantly into each other's faces. All that night and the 
 next day they were moving by brigades and divisions, clos- 
 ing up from the south and stretching out to the north, we 
 moving by the left flank and the enemy by the right. 
 
 Bragg had given up his plan of attacking Rosecrans in 
 the upper valley, and on the i8th ordered a general move- 
 ment, the scheme of which was, to extend his right beyond 
 our left, cross the creek during the night, at the various 
 fords and bridges, place his army across the Chattanooga 
 road ahead of us, and on the morning of the 19th to attack 
 the Union Army on its left, double it up and drive it back 
 up the valley. This plan was so far worked out as to place 
 his whole army (except three divisions) in the woods on our 
 side of the creek, before sunrise of the 19th. 
 
 Meantime Rosecrans had also moved to his left, on the 
 Crawfish Springs and parallel roads, and at sunrise that 
 morning was again facing the enemy, with a line of battle 
 hastily and irregularly formed in the darkness and in the 
 woods, but between the enemy and the main Lafayette- 
 Chattanooga road. 
 
 Returning to Van Derveer's Brigade in bivouac away up 
 the valley. There we spent the day, (the i8th) Hstening to 
 the racket of moving artillery and trains, and watching the 
 long clouds of dust before and behind us, until, at four 
 o'clock, we were called to take our place in the procession. 
 The roads were choked with troops, with artillery and 
 wagons, alternately moving and standing, never halting 
 long enough to stack arms and rest, and never moving more 
 than a few rods at a time. We spent the next fifteen hours 
 in marching probably some seven or eight miles, in the 
 
blinding, suffocating dust, unable during the niglit to see, 
 and too tired and exasperated to guess what was going on. 
 At daybreak we passed General Rosecrans' Headquarters 
 at the Widow Glenn's Log House on the battle field, and we 
 now began to observe the regiments and batteries ahead of 
 us, moving off into the woods to the right of the road, and 
 presently we seemed to have got through the army to and 
 beyond its left flank, and had a clear road ahead of us as 
 far ?iS we could see. We could now understand what a slow 
 and tedious process had been the formation of the army into 
 line of battle during the night, and that others, perhaps even 
 the enemy, were as weary and hungry as we were. 
 
 An open field lay to the left of the road, and our brigade 
 was marched into^ it, and arms were stacked on information 
 that we were to have "twenty minutes for breakfast." We 
 need not in this presence describe the eager haste with 
 which the little fires were lighted, and the coffee and bacon 
 and hard-tack were made ready; but before we had tasted 
 a morsel an order came to take arms and march immedi- 
 ately. Some desperate emergency was of course to be pre- 
 sumed, but to meet it with empty bellies at that moment, 
 was a severe trial of our patriotism. We had no time, how- 
 ever, to argue or to think about it. Arms were taken and we 
 filed out into the dusty road again and started northward, 
 every man carrying as best he could his little can of boiling 
 coffee, nibbling at his hardtack, and relieving his indignant 
 soul, at every step, of thoughts not to be quoted here, but 
 at the time better uttered perhaps than suppressed. 
 
 One of these men said to me some thirty years after- 
 wards : "Colonel, d'ye mind that breakfast we didn't ate at 
 Chickamauga? — be Jazis Oi can taste it yet." 
 
BATTLE OF JAY's MILL. 
 
 Meantime in explanation of the situation, and of our 
 orders, I quote from Gen. Rosecrans' Report — (Vol. 50, 
 p. 56, Official Records). Speaking of the morning of the 
 19th he says: "At this point Colonel McCook of Gen. 
 Granger's Command, who had made a reconnaisance to the 
 Chickamauga the evening before, and had burned Reed's 
 Bridge, met General Thomas and reported that an isolated 
 brigade of the enemy was on this side of the Chickamauga, 
 and the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that 
 direction might result in the capture of the force thus iso- 
 laited." So we were expected to find that lonesome brigade 
 and bring it in before breakfast. 
 
 Marching down the main Chattanooga Road we soon 
 passed beyond the left of our general line of battle, (then 
 forming in the woods to the east of and out of sight from 
 the road,) and arriving at McDonald's house we turned 
 squarely to the east on the cross road leading to- Reed's 
 Bridge about two miles distant. Jay's Mill, near where 
 the coming engagement took place, is about forty rods south 
 of this road and 160 rods west of Reed's Bridge. Our way 
 lay along a ridge of low elevation, with easy slopes to either 
 side; the land, so far as we could see, being covered with 
 trees mostly oi small size, and without underbrush, giving 
 an open view of perhaps forty rods or more in every direc- 
 tion. As we advanced the brigade was deployed — the 
 2nd Minnesota to the left of the road, the 35th Ohio to the 
 right, with the battery in the road between the regiments, 
 and a line of skirmishers in advance. The 87th Indiana 
 was placed behind the 35th Ohio, the 9th Ohio being absent 
 in charge of our Division wagon train. 
 
 We had thus proceeded about a mile and a half toward 
 the creek, when a spluttering skirmish fire broke out away 
 to our right and front, and changing direction to face it 
 
 6 
 
the regiments moved off the road to the right ahout a hund- 
 red yards, where we halted as the enemy came in view, and 
 the battle was promptly opened by both opposing lines — ^oiir 
 battery remaining in the road and firing over our heads 
 and through the interval between our regiments. 
 
 In a few minutes the enemy's fire began to weaken, and 
 presently their line broke and went to the rear out of our 
 sight They soon came back with a fresh attack more ener- 
 getic and persistent than the first, intending apparently to 
 sweep us out of the way, without spending much more valu- 
 able time on the job. As we read the reports now, we 
 know how impatient the Confederate Commanders must 
 have been to find their supposed open way around Rosecrans' 
 left, thus obstructed so early in the day ; but this second at- 
 tack was also promptly repulsed, and the enemy, (Ector's 
 Brigade of Walker's Division) soon disappeared. 
 
 Now the 87th Indiana replaced the 35th Ohio on our 
 right, and our bandmen commenced to gather up our 
 wounded men, carrying them back across the road to the 
 northern slope, where the surgeons gave them such atten- 
 tion as the time and place permitted — and the 2nd Regiment 
 was moved a little to the left to give the battery a wider 
 interval. 
 
 Then the firing broke out again in the same direction; 
 first the scattering fire of skirmishers — then the terrific file 
 firing of regiments, then the artillery, then the "rebel yell," 
 and the firing gradually approached us. We stood attentive 
 and expectant for a few minutes, then a straggling line of 
 men in blue appeared coming toward us in wild retreat, 
 their speed accelerated by the firing and yelling of the exult- 
 ant Confederates who were close behind them. I do not 
 remember any more appalling spectacle than this was for 
 a few minutes ; but our men took it with grim composure, 
 lying down until the stampeded brigade had passed over our 
 
 7 
 
line, then rising and blazing a volley into the enemy's faces, 
 which abruptly ended the yelling and the charge. They 
 had not expected such a reception, and all efforts of their 
 officers to get or hold their men in line for a fight, were in 
 vain. They promptly retreated in their turn until out of 
 range and out of sight. This was Walthall's Confederate 
 Brigade of Liddell's Division. They had successfully as- 
 saulted the left brigade of Baird's Division on Rosecrans' 
 left, breaking and driving it out of line and capturing its 
 guns, — Guenther's Battery "H." U. S. 4th Artillery. 
 
 Now came up the 9th Ohio. They had he?-rd the firing. 
 and following Van Derveer's trail arrived just as the last 
 fight was finished, as above described. This was a German 
 regiment, using only German language and German tactics, 
 and was originally commanded by Coh Bob McCook. 
 They had been in the Mill Springs battle, in line with the 
 2nd Minnesota, and they were furious now to find that, as 
 they supposed, the fighting was all over before their arrival. 
 Col. Kammerling soon learned what direction the retiring 
 enemy had taken, and shouting in German to his men they 
 passed our lines to the front and disappeared among the 
 trees. Van Derveer sent an aid after them, with peremp- 
 tory orders to return, but before his arrival they had re- 
 captured Guenther's Battery after a sharp fight in vhich 
 they lost a good many men, and were then obliged to leave 
 it for want of horses to bring it away. 
 
 Meantime it soon became apparent that the enemy had 
 not given up their scheme of enveloping Rosecrans' left. 
 We could presently see Confederate troops moving north- 
 ward across the road to our left, and an attack was made on 
 us from; that direction. The 2nd Minnesota anticipated 
 and met it alone by facing left and filing left, and so form- 
 ing across the road north and south, facing east, thus plac- 
 ing its right where its left had been. This attack was easily 
 
 8 
 
repulsed — it was probably intended only to cover the move- 
 ment oif troops around us, yet more to the left. 
 
 As this movement became apparent the 2nd Minnesota 
 again changed position by facing left and filing left, thus 
 getting into line just north of and parallel to the road with 
 its left next the battery, which had, without leaving its 
 first position, "about faced" so to speak, so as to fire in the 
 opposite direction or northward. The other regiments of 
 our brigade took places to the left of the battery, and a 
 part of Connell's Brigade of Brannan's Division arrived 
 and were placed to extend our line, still farther to the left 
 or westward. 
 
 In this position our regiment found our wounded men 
 on the ground in front of us, but there was no time to make 
 any changes. The enemy were approaching in orderly array 
 — ranks behind ranks — no skirmishers or preliminary fir- 
 ing, but with the evident intention of forcing an actual col- 
 lision, in which they should have a large majority. We 
 opened on them at about 200 yards, with carefully directed 
 file firing, while the battery treated them with canister in 
 double doses. They made no reply, but with splendid cour- 
 age continued their steady advance. Their ranks were soon 
 so depleted, however, as to- make it plain that they could not 
 make a successful rush — at fifty yards they began to "wab- 
 ble" and commenced firing wildly, and presently they started 
 back in wild disorder, retiring out of sight. Thus ended 
 the fighting of Van Derveer's Brigade for the day, of which 
 Gen, Ro'Secrans says : "This vigorous movement discon- 
 certed the plans of the enemy on our left and opened the 
 battle of the 19th September/' Vol. 50, O. R. P. 56. 
 
 During the day thereafter divisions and brigades came 
 into collision as they found each other out, and plans had 
 to be improvised and lines readjusted from hour to hour. 
 We heard the roar of the battle as it extended southward. 
 
involving most of the divisions in both armies, but in our 
 vicinity no further attack was made. 
 
 The troops whose attack was last repulsed as above, were, 
 as we now know, Davidson's and Dibrell's Brigades of 
 Forest's Division of Cavalry dismounted, comprising nine 
 regiments and five battalions or squardons. The 2nd Min- 
 nesota commenced the day with 384 officers and men, and 
 lost here, 8 men killed and 41 wounded. The brigade, out 
 of 1,788 men lost 42 killed and 236 wounded — total 278, 
 or 15^ per cent of the force engaged. 
 
 After collecting and caring for our dead and wounded, 
 and replenishing our cartridge boxes, our brigade was 
 ordered to a position in reserve, and at sunset was bivou- 
 acked for the night, without fires. Of course we knew that 
 the battle was to be renewed next morning, and that before 
 it was over many more of us would doubtless join our dead 
 and wounded comrades who lay in thousands all over the 
 field that cold September night. Yet, with sorrow for the 
 dead, and pity for the wounded, and with thoughts of loved 
 ones at home, we sought rest as best we could on the hard, 
 gravelly hillside under the sentinel stars. 
 
 BATTLE OF KELLY S FIELD. 
 
 On Sunday morning, September 20th, the sun rose clear 
 and soon dissipated the hazy mist that had settled over the 
 field during the night. 
 
 Bragg's Army was now all in the woods on the west 
 side of the creek, extending in irregular line from the 
 Reed's Bridge Road near Jay's Mill, southwestwardly about 
 three miles to a point southeast of the Viniard house. 
 
 Rosecrans' army was in line east of and nearly parallel 
 to the main Chattanooga Road, and between it and the 
 
enemy, except that his right had been swung back and 
 rested between the Viniard house and Widow Glenn's. 
 
 The official records now show that Bragg had given 
 to General Polk the command of the Confederate right wing, 
 and to General Longstreet that of the left wing, with posi- 
 tive orders to Polk to commence a vigorous attack at day- 
 break, by his right division, to be promptly taken up by all 
 the Confederate Divisions from right to left. Also, that 
 when Bragg, at his headquarters, had waited with furious 
 impatience until 8 130 for the attack to begin, he sent an aid, 
 who found Polk at a comfortable farm house, eating a 
 leisurely breakfast; and, it is said, that on learning this, 
 Bragg dispatched his whole staff up and down the line, 
 with orders to every captain to put his men into the fight at 
 once. So it was that up tO' so late an hour the solemn 
 quiet of that Sabbath morning was unbroken. 
 
 Van Derveer, at 8 o'clock, was placed in reserve in an 
 open field, on west side of the road, about 80 rods south of 
 the Kelly House and in rear of our general line of battle, 
 which, being in the woods, was invisible to us. The Con- 
 federate attack was commenced on our left about 9 130 
 o'clock, and, in a few minutes, had extended to involve 
 nearly all of both armies. To us, idle in the open field, the 
 roar of musketry and artillery was appalling. The enemy's 
 bullets and shells came through the trees to and among us 
 in a very disquieting manner, and presently a horde of strag- 
 glers in blue, came back out of the w^oods, and passed on 
 tO' the rear, singly at first, then in squads, until it seemed 
 that our line in front must be breaking up, and we were 
 expecting to be ordered in to replace or support it, when an 
 order came for us to go immediately to Kelly's Field. 
 
 Bragg had renewed his scheme for enveloping our left, 
 and while the battle was raging along the line of both arm- 
 ies, with terrific slaughter and varying success, Breckin- 
 
ridge's Division, which overlapped our left, was ordered to 
 swing around it to the south and attack our flank in the 
 rear. He had three brigades in line from left to right, 
 Helm's, Stovall's and Adams'. Helm's Brigade struck the 
 left brigade of Baird's Division, and was wrecked right there 
 and then — Helm and two of his colonels being killed. But 
 Stovall and Adams found no opposition, being beyond our 
 left, and soon reached the main road near McDonald's, 
 where they turned south and were coming gayly on — Stovall 
 on the east of the road, Adams on the west, and a battery 
 trailing down the road between and behind them. 
 
 Of all this we were ignorant, Breckinridge's operations be- 
 ing screened from our view by the woods about and north 
 of Kelly's Field; so our brigade moved by the left flank 
 northward until opposite Kelly's Field, and then facing 
 eastward, marched through a strip of thick woods and 
 undefbrush to the main road, and crossing it, intO' the field. 
 Here we stood for a moment, the brigade in two lines in 
 rear of and facing east towards, our main line of battle, 
 which, in the woods, was not to be seen from our position. 
 The 2nd Minnesota was on the right in the front line — the 
 87th Indiana on its left — the 9th Ohioi a few paces in rear of 
 the 2nd Minnesota, and the 35th Ohio in rear of the 87th 
 Indiana. (Smith's Battery had been taken away from us 
 in the morning.) 
 
 Along the north end of the field, and perhaps 50 yards 
 from the left of our left regiments was a thick woods with 
 underbrush, into which nothing could be seen from our 
 position. We had hardly halted, when, with a crash of 
 musketry and a cloud of gray smoke from the edge of the 
 woods on our left, the air was filled with bullets, and our 
 men began to fall. A change of front to face this attack was 
 instantly commenced, and was executed on the run; but 
 before it brought us face to face with our enemy a good 
 
 12 
 
many of our men, and nearly all of the horses in the brigade, 
 were killed or wounded. 
 
 As our men came into line the 2nd Minnesota and 87th 
 Indiana rushed down to the edge of the woods, and for a few 
 minutes the opposing lines fired into each others faces, at less 
 than thirty yards distance. But we were at a disadvantage, 
 standing in the open field, while the enemy were protected in 
 the 'woods, and moreover, the two regiments behind us were 
 fully exposed to the enemy's fire, and unable to return it — 
 so the second line, (with guns all loaded,) was ordered to 
 pass the first, and then both lines joined in the charge into 
 the woods. The enemy promptly gave up their position 
 at the edge of the field and retired back among the trees and 
 brush, where, for a time, they stubbornly resisted our furth- 
 er advance; but after a hot contest of perhaps fifteen or 
 twenty minutes, they withdrew altogether. 
 
 It will appear from what has been said, that Stovall's 
 Confederate brigade was in this affair opposed to ours. 
 Adams, (on Stovall's right,) was opposed by other Union 
 troops which we could not see during the action, and only 
 know from the reports to have been parts of Stanley's, Beat- 
 ty's and Willich's Brigades. Adams, the Confederate brigade 
 commander, was badly wotmded, and was captured (ac- 
 cording to the official records) by at least seven different 
 regiments. Stovall describes this collision as follcw's : 
 (Vol. 51, p. 231, O. R.) Here (near McDonald's) the brig- 
 ade was halted, and by a flank movement formed nearly 
 perpendicular to its former position. Thus re-formed, I 
 moved forward, and had not gone far before I encountered 
 the enemy in heavy forces and strongly entrenched. Here 
 the battle raged fiercely; a concentrated fire of grape and 
 canister, shot and shell of every conceivable character, was 
 poured into us from the front, while my left suffered no 
 less from an enfilading fire, equally galling and severe." 
 
 13 
 
Now we comirienced collecting our dead for burial, and 
 bringing our wounded back to vicinity of Kelly's house, 
 where the surgeons could care for them. About 2 o'clock, 
 and before this duty was completed, the battle away to our 
 right seemed to open again with increased fury, and to be 
 trending around to our rear; and presently orders came to 
 go to Gen. Thomas, who was then collecting all available 
 troops at 
 
 SNODGRASS RIDGE, 
 
 We arrived there about 2 130, and were placed in a single 
 line, the 35th Ohio on the right, then the 2nd Minnesota, 
 the 87th Indiana and the 9th Ohio. On our left were parts 
 of Stanley's, Croxton's and Connell's Brigades, and Smith's 
 Battery, all, as we were, under comoiand of Gen. Brannan ; 
 also, on his left were parts of Hazen's & Marker's Brigades ; 
 on our right there were then no Union troops. 
 
 Snodgrass Ridge was a spur extending out from Mission 
 Ridge to the eastward, about 80 or 90 feet higher than the 
 plain into which it descended, and terminated about 80 
 rods west of the Lafayette Road. The Snodgrass log 
 buildings were located on the northern slope and about 30 
 or 40 yards back from the crest. The ridge was covered, 
 (except the Snodgrass field east and north of the buildings,) 
 with timber, and on the southern slope was a growth of 
 underbrush, when the battle here commenced. This was 
 mostly shot away before 4 o'clock, so that we had thereafter 
 had a clear view down the easy slope up which the advances 
 of the enemy were made. 
 
 In view of serious misfortunes which had befallen several 
 divisions of our right wing, compelling them to vacate that 
 part of the field south of Snodgrass, the possession of this 
 ridge had become of the greatest importance to each army. 
 
 Longstreet, commanding the Confederate left wing, had 
 swung his lines around to the west and north and now they 
 
lay south of and parallel to the ridge. He says in his official 
 report, (Vol. 51, p. 289) — "It was evident that with this 
 position gained I should be master of the field;" and with 
 soldierly appreciation of the situation he prepared to take 
 it, probably not anticipating much resistance. But Gen. 
 Thomas was there before him, and with more than equal 
 energy and determination was gathering and posting for 
 its defense, all the troops, organized, and fragmentary, that 
 could be found, not engaged elsewhere. The Union Army 
 Commander, two of the three Corps Co'mmanders, four 
 of the ten Division Commanders, and broken brigades, regi- 
 ments, stragglers and skulkers unnumbered, with artillery, 
 ammunition wagons and ambulances, had drifted or been 
 swept from the field, passing through McFarland's Gap, and 
 behind Mission Ridge, were making their way tO' Rossville. 
 An orderly withdrawal for Thomas, and that part of the 
 army that remained with him, was now only possible by 
 keeping Longstreet and his army south of Snodgrass Ridge 
 until night. As our 2nd Minnesota Regiment moved up 
 to the crest of the ridge we found there the 21st Ohio, a 
 fine, large regiment, armed with six chambered revolving 
 rifles. Upon our appearance they immediately asked tO' be 
 relieved, claiming to be out of ammunition. We had been 
 unable to replenish at or after Kelley's Field, and had only 
 fifteen or twenty rounds in our cartridge boxes, but we took 
 their place, and they retired down the slope to the rear. 
 An hour later we heard that they had got ammunition from 
 Granger, and, with the 89th Ohio and the 22nd Michigan, 
 attached temporarily to Whitaker, had taken places on the 
 right of our brigade. 
 
 Longstreet had vainly assaulted the ridge before our 
 arrival, and within thirty minutes thereafter he made two 
 more unsuccessful attacks with the troops he had nearest 
 at hand. Meantime, Gen. Granger had arrived with two 
 
 15 
 
fresh Union brigades under Whitaker and Mitchell, Gen. 
 J. B, Steedman commanding the division. 
 
 They had come from McAfee's church 2 m.iles east from 
 Rossville, and for a mile or more had marched through a 
 cloud of Confederate skirmishers, straight to the sound of 
 our guns. Granger had orders to aid Thomas, and seemed 
 to know where and how to find him. Never were reinforce- 
 ments more welcome. Thomas immediately ordered them 
 to the crest of the ridge on our right, which the enemy had 
 found to be vacant, and had in fact just occupied ; so that, 
 Steedman's brigades had to assault and drive the enemy off, 
 thus accomplishing with desperate fighting and heavy loss, 
 just what the enemy had attempted and failed to do in our 
 immediate front. 
 
 The firing was terrific while this was being done, and we 
 were much relieved when we heard that Steedman had 
 gained the ridge. He had brought some ammunition with 
 his column, and we got a few rounds of which we were in 
 desperate need, from his wagons. 
 
 In the intervals between the enemy's assaults, we had 
 robbed the boxes of the dead and wounded — Union and 
 Confederate alike — and had carefully avoided waste, but we 
 were nearly destitute when Granger's wagons arrived. 
 
 It had become plain to both commanders that here was to 
 be the supreme contest for the field, and Longstreet now 
 marshalled the Veteran Divisions of Kershaw, Hindman and 
 Johnson, and sent them in to take the ridge. Each of their 
 successive and repeated assaults were repulsed with heavy 
 loss; finally, at 4:30, Preston's Division, which had not 
 been previously engaged at all on either day, was lined up 
 at the foot of the southern slope, and with courage and 
 enthusiasm, stimtil^-ted to the utmost, advanced to their fate 
 — Grade's brigade in front of Van Derveer's and Trigg and 
 Kelly against the troops on our right. 
 
 16 
 
The slope in our front was now well cleared of under- 
 brush, and we could see the gray legs of the front line, as, 
 in regular step, they crossed the road at the foot and com- 
 menced the ascent, a second line following, each containing 
 more men than were in the thin, single line of defenders. 
 "Don't waste any cartidges now, boys," was the only in- 
 struction given, (and this was quite unnecessary) as our line 
 commenced firing — and the men in gray commenced fall- 
 ing ; but they seemed to bow their heads to the storm of bul- 
 lets, and picking their way among and over their fallen 
 comrades who already encumbered the slope by hundreds, 
 they came bravely and steadily on; as however they ap- 
 proached nearer, and the firing in their faces grew hotter 
 and more deadly, they seemed to lose the assuring touch 
 of elbows, and as the vacancies rapidly increased, they be- 
 gan to hesitate— "Now we've got 'em, see 'em wabble" were 
 the first words that passed in our lines since the firing had 
 begun — then they halted and commenced firing wildly into 
 the tree tops, then turned and rushed madly down the slope, 
 carrying the second line with them. 
 
 (This was substantially the story of the preceding as- 
 saults which, at intervals of twenty or thirty minutes, had 
 been met and repulsed during the past two hours. Each 
 assaulting brigade had made two, and some of them three, 
 such attempts.) 
 
 Grade's brigade was promptly re-formed and advanced 
 again, this time getting so near to us that some of their men 
 came in and surrendered rather than to be shot in the back, 
 as were many of those trying to run. A third attack was 
 made by this brigade as soon as it could be re-formed, only 
 to result in further sacrifice of its men and a third and final 
 repulse. 
 
 It was now sundown, and we felt that the contest was 
 over; but our satisfaction was tempered by the reflection 
 
 17 
 
that "they may come again," and we had now in our regi- 
 ment, less than lOO cartridges for 250 guns. Meantime 
 Trigg and Kelly had been more successful. Steedman's 
 troops had been withdrawn, leaving the three orphan regi- 
 ments only on our right. These had exhausted their am- 
 munition, but had been ordered tO' fix bayonets and hold 
 their lines. 
 
 Trigg and Kelly, finding Steedman's lines vacant, and 
 getting no more bullets from the detached regiments, soon 
 enveloped them with loaded guns against fixed bayonets, 
 and called on them to surrender or be shot down where they 
 stood; and they surrendered and were started for Ander- 
 sonville — a most pitiful ending of two days of gallant ser- 
 vice in battle. 
 
 Being engaged with Gracie in our front, we were ignorant 
 of all this for a time, but when, elated with their success, 
 the enemy next came sneaking around the right of our bri- 
 gade, they were discovered by Lt. Col. Boynton of the 35th 
 Ohio, who promptly swung his regiment back and con- 
 fronted them, and fired the last volley of the day, and the 
 last cartridges he had, into their faces. It was now getting 
 dark among the trees, and uncertain O'f the situation, the 
 enemy withdrew and the battle of Chickamauga was over. 
 
 Meantime, about 5 o'clock, Thomas had ordered the with- 
 drawal by divisions, of all his troops except those who' were 
 holding the ridge to cover the movement. Reynolds, Pal- 
 mer, Johnson and Baird were holding their lines in that 
 part of the field north of Snodgrass, in a semi-circle north, 
 east and south of the Kelly House, the enemy closely watch- 
 ing their front — ^both sides much depleted in numbers, and 
 well nigh exhausted by the two days fighting. 
 
 Longstreet, (Vol. 51, p. 289,) says: "At 3 o'clock in 
 the afternoon. I asked the Commanding General for some of 
 the troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that 
 
 18 
 
they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no 
 service to me." When the movement began, the enemy, in 
 a weary fashion, attacked each division in turn, but the with- 
 drawal was accomplished without serious hindrance or dis- 
 order about 6 130 o'clock. Probably Polk was more than 
 willing- that Thomas should withdraw at that time if he 
 wanted to. and, not to be outdone in courtesy, Thomas wait- 
 ed an hour later for Longstreet to retire first. 
 
 When all was over some of us walked down the slope in 
 our front, in the darkening twilight — the dry leaves and 
 twigs had taken fire and little serpents of flame were creep- 
 ing around and among the Confederate dead and wounded, 
 who now thickly covered the ground. We carried back 
 our own wounded men and left them near the Snodgrass 
 buildings — nothing more could be done for them; and at 
 7 130 the field having been quiet for an hour or more, the men 
 with Brannan on the ridge, filed down the Northern slope, 
 and, unmolested, took the road to and through McFarland's 
 Gap to Rossville, all on our left having previously gone ; Van 
 Derveer's Brigade being the last to leave the field, followed 
 only by the 68th and loist Indiana as rear guard, which 
 as Brannan explained, "were the only regiments that had 
 any ammunition whatever." (Vol. 50, O. R. P. 393.) 
 
 Some of the wounded were able, with more or less aid, to 
 accompany the troops in the retirement, but more than 
 twenty thousand of them, and four thousand dead and dying, 
 were left on the field, abandoned for the night by both 
 armies. So cruel is War. 
 
 On the Ridge, as the day wore on from 2 130 to 6 :30. the 
 situation had at times seemed absolutely desperate. We had 
 no relief or reserve whatever, every man being in the single 
 firing line, which, excluding Steedman's troops, could not 
 have extended more than 160 rods, with our right flank 
 wholly vacant, and on our left an interval of perhaps 80 
 
rods, protected only by the six guns of Smith's Battery, 
 Willich's Brigade being beyond the interval. 
 
 Brannan says (Vol. 50^ P. 403, O. R.) that "his entire 
 force during the day and afternoon on this ridge could not 
 have been over 2,500 men, including the stragglers of vari- 
 ous regiments and divisions, besides my own immediate 
 command." Longstreet's four divisions which assaulted the 
 Ridge after 3 o'clock, lost, in killed and wounded, 5,589 
 men, most of them in front of the Ridge, and that is more 
 than one-third of the total Confederate loss (15,801 — K. 
 & W.) in the two days' fighting, and more than three times 
 the total loss of the United States army in the Spanish- 
 American War of 1898 (K. 280 W. 1577 — 1857). In our 
 front it seemed as if the whole Confederate army were 
 against us, and every available brigade was there in fact. 
 But our chief worry was the ammunition question.. We 
 knew that Thomas' trains had been piloted ofif the field to 
 Rossville, and but for Granger's arrival we would have been 
 absolutely destitute by 4 o'clock. To "fix bayonets (without 
 cartridges) and hold the line" against loaded guns in the 
 hands of twice as many equally brave men. is an order 
 which should not be given unless it has become necessary 
 to sacrifice the men to whom it is given. 
 
 The royal presence of General Thomas there was an in- 
 spiration to us all, who knew and loved and trusted him, and 
 there were no stragglers or skulkers or cowards there — nor 
 was there any dramatic enthusiasm or excitement. This 
 was the afternoon of the second day of baittle — our work and 
 duty were plan and simple, and by every man they were well 
 understood and well done. 
 
 It is interesting now to read over the reports (in Vol. 51, 
 O. R.) of the Confederate commanders who participated at 
 Snodgrass, and so get the story from their point of view. 
 Only a few paragraphs can be given here, but speaking gen- 
 
erally, those officers credit us with having repulsed their 
 first, second, and some of them, a third assault, describe 
 our firing as terrific and wholly unbearable, our intrench- 
 ments (of which we had none whatever) as formidable, 
 and our numbers are greatly exaggerated in their imagin- 
 atioin. 
 
 Hindman says (P. 305, O. R.) : "I hoped to secure the 
 capture or destruction of the enemy by driving him in con- 
 fusion upon the right wing of our army." He says also, 
 after mentioning arrival of Preston's Division about 4:30: 
 "From this time we gained ground, but though now com- 
 manding nine brigades, with Kershaw co-operating, and all 
 in action, I found the gain both slow and costly. The 
 enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly re- 
 pulsed us, but only to be again assaulted. I have never 
 known Federal troops to fight as well ; it is just to say also 
 that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better." 
 
 Preston's Division lost after 4:30 o'clock, 1,336 in killed 
 and wounded, and Preston says of Gracie, whose brigade 
 made the last attack on Van Derveer (P. 416) : "This 
 brigade carried into action 2,003 officers and men, and in 
 the space of an hour lost 698 men killed and wounded. The 
 Second Alabama Battalion, out of 237 lost 169 killed and 
 wounded in the action — its color was pierced in 83 places." 
 
 Capt. Toulmin, commanding the 22nd Alabama (P. 357), 
 says: "Twice did it (the regiment) rally and attempt to re- 
 cover its ground and lost colors (which had been literally 
 riddled with bullets), but the storm of grape and canister 
 was so terrific and destructive that every effort proved un- 
 availing. Having fallen back a third time in some disorder, 
 the regiment retired to the foot of the hill and re-formed 
 there." 
 
 Gen. D. H. Hill says in his Century Paper on Chick- 
 amauga: "There was no more splendid fighting in '61, 
 
 21 
 
when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, 
 than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63 — 
 but it seems to me the elan of the Southern soldier was 
 never seen after Chiclcamauga — that brilHant dash which 
 had distinguished him was gone forever," 
 
 Chaplain Van Home, the official historian of the Army 
 of the Cumberland, says of the Snodgrass Ridge contest 
 (Vol. I, P. 350), that it, "for the vigor and frequency of 
 charge and counter-charge, and successful resistance to 
 vastly superior numbers, is perhaps without parallel in the 
 war," 
 
 Brannan says in his official report, of Van Derveer's 
 Brigade: "This gallant brigade was one of the few who 
 maintained their organization perfect through the hard 
 fought passes of that portion of the field." 
 
 The State of Minnesota has erected on the Chickamauga 
 battle field, now a beautiful National Military Park, three 
 monuments, to commemorate the services of its only regi- 
 ment engaged in the battles there, one at Jay's Mill, one in 
 Kelly's Field, and one where the colors of the regiment stood 
 all that memorable Sunday afternoon on Snodgrass Ridge. 
 The last one is conceded to be the finest and most appro- 
 priate monument of the hundreds now there. It represents, 
 by three bronze figures, the color guard in action, and bears 
 the following inscription, duly verified as historically cor- 
 rect, by the Park Commissioners and by the Secretary of 
 War: 
 
 "The Second Regiment, Minnesota Veteran Volunteer 
 Infantry, occupied this position Sunday, September 20th, 
 1863, from 2:30 p. m. to 7:30 p. m., successfully maintain- 
 ing it against repeated assaults by the enemy, and with- 
 drawing only after the attempt to take it had been aban- 
 doned. 
 
 "This regiment was engaged September 19th on the 
 
 22 
 
Reed's Bridge road, and in the forenoon of September 20th 
 at Kelly's Field ; in every contest repulsing the enemy oppos- 
 ing it. Having 384 men engaged, its loss was 34 killed, 
 114 * wounded, and 14 men (detailed for care of wounded) 
 were captured; total loss, 42 per cent." 
 
 "It is a notable fact that the Second Minnesota had not a 
 single man among the missing or a straggler during the 
 two days' engagement." (Quoting the) Official report of 
 Col. Ferd'd Van Derveer, Commanding Brigade." 
 
 Our march through the gap and thence to Rossville, was 
 uninterrupted, and about 11 o'clock our brigade had lined 
 up across the road, again facing the Confederacy, stacked 
 arms, re-filled our cartridge boxes, and sent out a few 
 pickets to the front. Then we laid ourselves down in the 
 dusty grass and weeds along the line of stacks, glad to 
 know that the battle was over, and that we were still alive 
 and between the enemy and Chattanooga. 
 
 At daybreak next morning a careful inspection and roll 
 call verified the presence of every man of the Second Min- 
 nesota Regiment, not killed, seriously wounded or captured. 
 
 During the operations of the 20th our Second Minnesota 
 Regiment lost 26 men killed and ^2) "^^"^ wounded. Of the 
 wounded, 1 1 died on the field where they fell ; so that the 
 figures then reported should riave been 37 killed and 62 
 wounded. It will at once occur to old soldiers that when 
 three men are killed out of every eight men hit, the fighting 
 must have been desperate and at close quarters, which was 
 the case at Kelly's Field, where most of the casualties oc- 
 curred. At Snodgrass we ourselves did most of the killing 
 and wounding, and while we had some casualties there, they 
 cannot be stated separately. 
 
 At Kelly's Field our Assistant Surgeon, Dr. Otis Ayer, 
 
 * 1 1 mortally wounded. 
 
 23 
 
the hospital steward and twelve men detailed to gather up 
 and care for the wounded, were left there, to join us as soon 
 as their work should be done. The enemy's skirmishers 
 and stragglers soon swairmed over the field, however, and 
 our men left there were captured — they were the only men 
 not wounded that we lost from capture during the two 
 days. So our total loss at Chickamauga foots up 45 killed, 
 103 wounded, and 14 captured, in all 162, or 42 per cent of 
 the 384 men engaged — 38^^ per cent of killed and wound- 
 ed. (Our total Union loss — 11,413, K. & W.). 
 
 Van Derveer's Brigade commenced the battle with 1,788 
 men and lost 748, or 42 per cent killed and wounded, the 
 heaviest loss in proportion to the men engaged, of any of 
 the thirty-six brigades in the Union Army. As has been 
 recited it had three separate engagements with the enemy, 
 either of which considered apart from Chickamauga, would 
 be regarded as a battle of some importance. In two of 
 these — at Jay's Mill and at Kelly's Field — the brigade was 
 isolated, receiving orders only from its own commander. 
 It was, however, our good fortune that this brigade was not 
 forced to, and did not, at any time yield any position in pres- 
 ence of the enemy. Its gallant commander and three of its 
 four regimental commanders, have passed to the Great Be- 
 yond, as have also the division, corps and army commanders. 
 Some of the veterans, however, still survive, and will meet 
 next September to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Chick- 
 amauga, and may they yet "live long and prosper." 
 
 24 
 
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