Bmffl fliffllfl mu Bni nfuu ilsl 1 Igygamra Hi w& KjmHf}] ^ H *+* ,. -*> • ^ V -^ &. * ^,s~ \ ^ v^ ^ -% ., - ^' - 221 <- c %K : * 00 ** ; -^^ ^ ^ ^fr^ r\0 O o NOTES ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. BY WILLIAM EDWAKD JELF, B.D., LATE STUDENT OE CHRIST CHURCH. OXFORD, AND 377, STRAND, LONDON; JOHN HENRY and JAMES PARKER. M DCCC LVI. PRINTED BT MESSRS. PARKER, CORN-MARKET, OXFORD. REV. ROBERT SCOTT, D.D., MASTER OF BALLIOL AND PREBENDARY OF EXETER, SOMETIME STUDENT OE CHRIST CHURCH, SF&ege STolumeg ARE INSCRIBED, IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE OF AN UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP OF MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. PREFACE. It is not my purpose in this edition to set forth a complete system of moral philosophy, or to compare and reconcile dif- ferent views, but simply to assist the student of the Ethics in understanding Aristotle's meaning, and in following his arguments in the book before us. There is, indeed, scarcely a page of the work which might not have served as a peg on which to hang a dissertation on some point of the theory and practice of morals ; but to do so would have interfered with, rather than furthered, my main aim : and I have therefore ab- stained from general disquisitions, and have neither referred to ancient systems of philosophy, except where Aristotle's meaning would have been obscure without such reference ; nor to modern views, except where they directly illustrate, in more familiar language, and thus enable us more completely to apprehend what Aristotle meant to say. And this was the less necessary, as I believe what I have left undone will be performed by able hands. I wish rather to guide students, as far as I am able, to an understanding of what Aristotle says, before they proceed to compare him with, or judge him by, what has been advanced by those who went before or came after him. I am sure that he who carefully and patiently studies his ethical writings, (in which I would include the Rhetoric,) will gain a knowledge of many of the secrets of man's nature, as it practically exists, and of men as they practically act, which will be found of great service, as well in the abstract study of the subject, as in practical dealing with, or guidance of, men. For Aristotle, looking with a curious and careful eye on the realities of human life, saw the elements of man's nature, the motives and springs of action, b VI PREFACE. and the manner of their working, far more distinctly and accurately than any other philosopher, ancient or modern. He may not have had the brilliant imagination of Plato ; but his wonderful powers of discernment, of analysis, of com- parison, of combination, of distinction, of sifting the wheat from the chaff, enabled him to arrive at conclusions which, as far as they go, are wonderfully in harmony with the fuller and deeper knowledge which is vouchsafed to us. If I were called upon to rest Aristotle's fame on one part of his mani- fold wisdom, it would be on the patient confidence with which he believes that nature has worked, and does work, for the best ; and that true moral philosophy consists, not in dogmatising on what man ought to be, or what he would be, had he been created otherwise than he is, but in seeing what he was intended to be as he is ; on the patient skill with which, in accordance with this principle, taking man as he is, and the world as it is, he has worked out the nature, the functions, the perfection, the true happiness of such a being placed in such a world. If it may with truth be said that Socrates drew morality from heaven, it is not less true to say that Aristotle found it on earth. Aristotle's fame undoubtedly rests rather on his logical and moral writings than on his physical, though it is hardly fair to form an unfavourable judgment of his whole natural phi- losophy from what remains to us. The names of several of his lost works might lead us to suppose that he treated the subject more completely and truly than is sometimes sup- posed ; but without taking this into account, physical science was then undoubtedly in its infancy. Observations and ex- periment could not, in the nature of things, have given the same variety of data as the moderns possess ; and, it may be, our treasury of facts will seem to future enquirers to be but scantily filled. Physical science is always cradled in time, the giant of one generation is but the infant of the next; so that it is no detraction from Aristotle's powers as a philo- sopher, if his physical science seems a dwarf by the side of our own : but in whatever regards that on which time has nothing new to reveal,— the powers and laws of thought and PREFACE. Vll action, — Aristotle's data were as ample as, though not more so than, our own, and therefore his logical, ethical, and poli- tical writings maintain the place which was assigned them two thousand years ago : they have informed and guided the wisest men in succeeding generations ; and especially in our own language, the arms of the truest and deepest phi- losophers bear undoubted marks of the armoury in which they were forged. The keystone of Aristotle's philosophy, which enabled him thus to construct a stable system out of the shifting materials he had, is ov6ev rj fyvais fidrijv iroiel : while in Ethics he was led to truth by taking a true view of man as a compound being, made up of reason and passions, each of which had their function in the formation of his moral character and the development of moral action. This view of man as a compound being is discernible in his Rhetoric as well as his Ethics. The data which Aristotle uses will be found to be either the opinions of men, expressed or implied, or the facts of na- ture, as seen either in the general laws and principles which philosophy had been able to detect, or common sense to re- cognise; or in the facts of daily life, as discernible by our senses or reason. Most philosophers of his age rejected the one, while they asserted the claims of the other. Aristotle uses the one or the other as they come most readily to hand, (see bk. i. notes 58, 61,) and, if possible, both, so as to shew the agreement which ought to exist, and, when both are care- fully examined, does exist, between them. Again, in the examination of philosophic or popular opi- nions, and he does not throw aside a dogma, or even a proverb, without care : he extracts from the very dross whatever gold may be in it ; and pointing out where each has fallen short of, or exceeded the limits of truth, confirms his own opinion by shewing how it agrees with the truth, while he corrects the errors of others. And thus one great lesson to be learnt from the study of Aristotle is, that where contrary opinions are held by honest" men, with a fair show of argument on each side, or have obtained in popular opinion of different ages or Vlll PREFACE. countries, each is true with limitations or additions : where one says "it is wholly this," and another, "it is wholly that," the truth lies hid in the fact that both are partially, neither wholly, right. As for the treatise itself, enough is said from time to time in the notes on the general object and nature of its several parts and of it as a whole, to render it unnecessary to go over the same ground here. I had some thoughts, at one time, of prefixing an Analysis or Conspectus, such as that of Michelet's ; but on consideration, I think there is sufficient help given in the notes to enable the student to do it for himself, with far more benefit than if he had it ready made to his hands ; and I- should be doing more harm than good if I superseded useful labour, instead of merely guiding and as- sisting it. I have directed some blank pages to be left in the beginning of the first volume for this purpose, and I subjoin an analysis of one chapter very much on Michelet's plan, as a specimen of the way in which I should recommend such work to be done. Suffice it to say, that I believe the Ethics to have been written by Aristotle as a scientific proof that moral virtue was the perfection of man, a compound being, placed in the world in which we find him ; and hence that his happiness, the production and preservation of which ought to be the aim of the science of social life, is to be found in the faithful discharge of his duties as a citizen and a man. Of course there is much practical information and explana- tion given throughout, but I do not agree with those who cannot see in the Ethics a distinct point to be proved, and a distinct line of argument to prove it. It is a scientific en- quiry into and proof of the practical nature of human virtue and happiness,— not merely a barren speculation into its ab- stract nature, with no aim or result beyond speculation, but with a view to practice, and the attainment of something beyond itself. (See bk. ii. note 13.) The reading given is almost invariably that of Bekker's; The duodecimo text has been printed in an octavo page, so as to leave room for a running abstract or observations which may strike the student as he reads ; thus giving all the ad- PREFACE. IX vantage of an interleaved book, without being interleaved. And I have not loaded the text or notes with various readings, but have contented myself with merely giving those which seemed to affect the sense. Not that I would be supposed to undervalue various readings ; they afford scope for the ex- ercise and development of a very useful mental faculty ; but I think they belong rather to the poets than to the philo- sophers. In the former the taste is chiefly called into play, and therefore it is right that scope should be found for the oc- casional exercise of the critical faculties side by side with the other, in comparing and judging of authorities and probabili- ties. In the latter there is sufhcient scope for the critical faculty in the subject and the arguments, and the introduc- tion of unimportant and formal points of criticism would rather call off the judgment from its more important sphere in the contents of the book itself. In some, if not many passages, the conciseness of the style, so different from that of Plato, renders the reasoning at first sight obscure and difficult ; but these, even where the ge- neral line and conclusion of the argument are clear enough, may not be neglected or slurred over. It is no fruitless men- tal exercise to follow such a mind as Aristotle's even where the path is rugged, and where we think we see a short cut. Whoever declines this labour will fail to master many forms of thought and argument which would have made his own powers of thought and argument more varied and available. This important result will be obtained, and the treatise more thoroughly mastered, by following out the connection and arguments as closely as possible, — searching into the force of illative conjunctions, (such as v \ex6eio~cov en larr) p,S>v. emo-T^pr) IS here used loosely for systems or arts, such as vavrvrjyiK^, iarpucT), &c. c. ii. 1—2.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. CHAPTEB II. (.1.2.) He here draws his conclusion from the premisses advanced in the last chapter, that the re\os npaKrcbv, whatever it may- be, is the aya66v of man. (13.) 1. The leading notion in Aristotle's mind is that man's own nature, with its tendencies and powers, would lead him to happi- ness ; and this is what he practically states when he says that it is re'Xos irpaKTwv. The irpaKTa of man are really only the de- \ velopment and exhibition of man's nature and tendencies ; and the very presence of these tendencies (fye£ic) implies some Te\os towards which they tend; and the reXos would be that which most fully comprehended and developed that nature and its opegis : hence the leading proposition of his moral system is that the full and complete development of man's nature is his happiness. He believed man not only de- ^J signed by nature to be happy, but contrived for happiness ; and that his own constitution would lead him to it, if he would honestly follow it. " This is what the Schoolmen mean when, in their way of expression, they say, That the will is carried towards happiness not simply as will, out as nature." L eighton's Lectures on Happiness, II. vol. iv. p. 190, ed. 1830. (14.) 1. Ei dq. 617 very frequently marks a conclusion in the Ethics. See Grammar, 721, 1. (15.) 1. 7rp6eitri k.t.X. If the elenchus on which this argument rests be worked out, it will bring us to the key-stone of Aristotle's philosophy : ov&kv 17 vo-is p.art]v ivoiel. It is always worth while to work out compressed arguments of this sort, as well for the mental exercise, as for the sake of the principles up to which they lead us. (16.) 1. Kevrjv, empty in itself; par a lav, without result. (17.) 1. ayaObv k a\ a p i V rj dwd/XCOiV, to what science or system it belongs. eVicTr?^ is here both a science and a scientific art, with a definite subject-matter, such as politics, ethics, &c. ; 8vvap,is, an organic art, such as logic or rhetoric, which supplies formulae, more or less abstract, for any subject-matter. Of course, to whatever system, whether scientific or formal, the good belongs, the know- ledge of that science is necessary to its comprehension, and an enquiry into it is necessary to the completeness of that science. Hence ttoKitikt] includes ethics, and ethics is 7roXi- tikt] ris, a branch of the grand science of politics. (23.) 4. A d £ e i e $', would be held, or allowed, to be. (24.) 4. KvpKOTdrrjs, that to which most authority is given by nature. dpx lTCKroI/tK ^ s > * na ^ which is most practically directive. (25.) 5. (p a I v e t a i, evidently is. (26.) 5. d tarda- ae i andu7ro r a v r r\ v refer to KvpKordrijs : \ P a) " fJL€ VTj S and TT 6 p l€ X<> I O.V TO. T (OV O.W (H V tO dpxiT6KTOVtKrjS. — Cf. Pol. 1. 1. (27.) 7. tovt av eiij rdv pa>7Tiv ov ay ad 6 v. The dyadov of man belongs to the science of politics, inasmuch as the end of this science embraces all other ends under it, and therefore is practically the re\os ra>v npaKT&v. (28.) 8. ei ydp k.t.X. This is one of the instances of omission of the sentence to which ydp refers, which produces so much difficulty in following Aristotle's arguments. The sentence 9. c. iii. 1—2.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 5 must be worked out from the context, and supplied, before the bearing of the reasoning can be perceived. It might have been^, expected that the dvOpdoirivov dyaOov would belong to dvOpa>irivr) emaTTjfxr), and not irokiTiKt) : but this is not so, for in reality dvOpoiTTivq eniaTrjixT) IS the same as noXiTiKr}, and dvOpamivov dyaOov as irokiTiKov dyaOov, being different views of the same thing ; but noXiTiicr) is higher than dv6pa>ivivrj, as the 7rd\i? is higher than the individual, resting on higher grounds and aiming at higher results (cf. Eth., bk. vi. 8. 1) ; and therefore the good may be viewed either as noXiTiKrjs reXos, or npaKTeov reXos. (29.) 9. rovrav, either dvOpamvov dyaOov {==. -n paKrStv rtXos,) and noXiTiKrjs reXos (=7roXm/<6j/ dyaOov), or referring back to section 3, rl 7TOT6 eort, Koi rivos to>v €7n(TTr) peov rj bvvdpeav. Looking to the beginning of chap, iv., it is probably the former of these. (30.) 9. 7roXiTiKr) ris ova- a. Being thus connected with poli- tics, and a necessary branch of that science which aims at the happiness of the state, or, in other words, the dya86v of the individuals composing it, the good of man belongs to the province of politics, and the knowledge of the former is ne- cessary to the completeness of the latter. The Ethics is the accidence of the Politics. CHAPTER III. (31.) Having now laid it down that the dyaOov of man is npaKTav reXos, and that it belongs to the science of politics, he would naturally proceed to the enquiry as to what this irpaKTGiv reXos may be ; but he first guards himself against those who would object to his system that it is not demon- strative, and to those who object that it is above their com- prehension. The one class would be of the philosophic, the other of the self-indulgent, careless sort. (32.) 1. Kara, proportionally to. (33.) 1. drjpiovpyovpevois, works of art. The perfection required differs according to the material, &c. (34.) 2. KaXd na\ Sinai a, the principles of moral and social right. G ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. iii. 2—7, (35.) 2. 8 ia : but that all dUaia were vopa, and none cpvaei. Plato, Legg. 889. As a school, however, they practically get rid of the reality of all natural right and wrong. (37.) 3. Ka\ ra dy ad d, the principles and views of human good. (38.) 4. nepl toiovtuv, on such subject-matter. i< tolov- tcov, from such premisses. naxvX&s, roughly, roiavra, SC. ra cos eVi TO 7ToXl), (39.) 5. aKobexeo-Bai, to listen to the proof: we must, in pro- bable matters, be content with probability. (40.) 5. 7T€7raidevLi€vov. The man of a highly trained mind has the power not only of discerning truth when it is put before him, but of discerning how far truth is attainable : so he only will see that the proofs which Aristotle is about to bring forward give all the proof of which the subject is capable. (41.) 6. uplvei Ka\S>s a yivaxrKei. This faculty answers to o-vveo-is in morals. See bk. vi. c. x. (42.) 6. dnXas. The generic sense of dnXcos is "keeping out of sight the circumstances mentioned in the context j" here it is generally, leaving out rd th e educated. See Lidd. and Scott. (53.) 2. ev £ijv refers to abundance of good things ; ev TvpaxTuv* to success and good fortune. (54.) 2. vnoXapPdvovo-i, conceive of. This is its usual mean- ing in the Ethics. (55.) 3. d7ro$i$6ao-iv, explain it. (50.) 3. Trap a ravra, besides and beyond. The Platonic Idea is here alluded to. (57.) 4. in nro\a£ov acts, most popular. Lidd. and Scott; literally, on the surface. 8 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. iv 5. (58.) 5. n f) \av0avcTco. It is not to be supposed that Aristotle introduces this passage in the middle of his subject to give us a piece of information which belongs rather to logic, or possibly found a place in his Methodica ; but being about to examine human opinions as a possible source of truth, it was necessary to vindicate their right to be thus considered, as Plato and his school would look upon such materials as un- sound foundations, and inadmissible in the endeavour to build up truth. Aristotle therefore lays down the principle of the analytical and synthetical methods, and claims for each its proper position in true philosophy, quoting Plato himself as an evidence of the existence of both methods. The opinions of mankind are among the phenomena of the world, and a system based on them would be analytical, i.e. analyzing a confused (ra o-vyK€xvpeva: see Phys. i. 1. 2.) mass of facts, in order to arrive at the truth implied in them. The words analytical and synthetical are explained by the Schoolmen, and after them by Aldrich, in a different sense. This is only noticed to prevent students from confusing themselves by trying to explain this passage by what Aldrich says. (59.) 5. dp xv in the Ethics signifies a starting-point, whether in reasoning, scientific or moral, — or in action or choice, — or in his treatise. (60.) 5. apKreov ovv=f)dpxr) vi JLlv %&t<*>- He claims the right to proceed from curb t&v yvaplpav, from whatever presents itself as yvwpipov, whether matters of human experience, observa- tion, opinion ; or anXas, abstract principles, prior to and inde- pendent of such experience, &c. ; that is, whether a priori or a posteriori. Eor the difference between yvapifta &it\G>s and yvvpipa rjpTtv, see Phys. i. 1. 2 ; Anal. Post. i. 2. 10. (61.) 5. t (ro)s ovv k.t.X. The more usual, because the most accessible, sources of enquiry will be yv6pip.a rjplv, ra iyyvrepa rrjs alo-Srja-eas. The facts of moral life — whether these be the facts of our constitution, or the facts of life, as discernible in the actions, the opinions, language, habits of men, set forth either by the ol noXkoi, or the cpp6vip,os or o-novdalos, or 770X47-1x0$-, or 7to\itikti — all may be bases of truth, and furnish sound ground for further systems. The characteristic of Aristotle's method is that he claims the right to use both methods, as they may be within his reach. When he draws his arguments C, 7. c. v. 1—5.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 9 from the abstract constitution of nature lie uses the former, but when from opinions of men, the latter; but he usually uses the analytical, because most suited to his subject. It is hardly worth while to enquire at length whether the whole of his treatise is one or the other ; perhaps, as he begins with the abstract principle of nature that the dya66v of every thing is in its epyov, and proceeds to shew that tjOikt} dperr) does perform the epyov, he may be in a certain sense synthetical ; but we may remark that he seldom or never brings forward an abstract principle without confirming it by experience. (62.) 6. 816 Set rols tdcaiv. As facts form the groundwork of moral science, and as moral facts are appreciable only by men of good morals, hence a right moral education is abso- lutely necessary for the profitable study of moral or social subjects, or, to speak generally, of politics. (63.) 7. 6 toiovto s, SC. 6 KaXws rois %6ev\dTTG>v, maintaining a paradox. Top. i. 9. 5, p. 107. (73,) G. iv ToTf cyKvKkiois. In my treatise on general subjects. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. Probably general questions on morals. These were two books of 7rpofi\r)p.aTa iyKvickia, a passage from which is quoted by Aulus Gellius, xx. 4 ; and from the cha- racter of this passage it seems probable that these are the treatises referred to here. See Fabr. Bibl. Grsec. iii. p. 392. (7i.) 7. iv rols ino nevois. The next chapter is devoted to a more particular consideration of the supposed avrb dya66v, which is the aim and result of the /3io? tiecop-qrucos with respect to the supposed science of happiness. These words are com- monly supposed to refer to the discussion in the tenth book ; but first, as the doctrine of the Ibea, which is the principle of speculative philosophy or (3ios OecoprfriKos, is, as a matter of fact, considered in the next chapter, it seems difficult to give any reason why these words should not refer to that chapter. Next, if we take the passages in which the words iv vols iirofie- vois occur, we shall find that they denote a more real and actual connection than between the first and last book of a treatise. Where he refers to some distant part of his book (as in Bhet. i. 10. 5), he generally gives a more distinct descrip- tion of the part referred to. (75.) 8. to, tr pore pov Xe^e^ra, SC. t^cWj) — Tip.r) — dperf}. (76.) 8. kcl'itoi 7to\\o\ \6yoi K.T.X. The other reading is Kal y which would mean that Aristotle had wasted many words on them ; and as this could hardly be said to be true, therefore Kairoi is the better reading. But even these do not appear to be final; and yet much reasoning has been spent with regard to them, i.e. to prove them to be rc'Xiy,— not by himself, but by others. CHAPTER VI. (77.) He now examines the opinions of those who look for the good in the OeaprjTiicbs (Bios, and hold that the only true hap- piness consists in, and is gained by, the mental realisation of the avro dyaOSv, — by the science of the good. It would be beside our purpose to go at length into an account of the c. vi. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 11 Platonic theory of ideas : it is enough to say that the leading feature of it seems to be, that there existed in the Divine mind certain archetypal forms or qualities, which being communicated to, or at least present in, things visible, gave them these qualities, (Phsedo, 100, cf. Arist. Met. xii. 5, pp. 269, 270) ; and that these archetypal ideas being also impressed on the mind of men, were called out by men- tal exercise ; and when they were thus called out, the true ; qualities of visible things were recognised in their several , shapes and forms of existence. Thus a visible thing was good by virtue of the presence in it of the idea of good, and the mind could recognise and enjoy that good only by vir- tue of the mental development and realisation of the cor- responding idea. (78.) 1. KadoXov, sc. the Platonic idea, (Met. vi. 13, p. 155) ; called kcl66\ov, from its being the result of the highest ab- straction. It may be observed that in the Physics, 1. i., Ka66Xov has exactly an opposite meaning, viz. the whole fully exhibited in its details and phsenomena. (79.) 1. ra e'lbrj. Here the Ibiu, or abstract ideas: when op- posed to Idea, as below, section 10, it seems to mean the concrete to which the Idea by its presence gives form and quality. (80.) 1. otxiov 7T porifidv rrjv a\rj8eiav. This passage pro- bably gave rise to the Latinised saying attributed to Aristotle, "Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis arnica Veritas." Whenever Plato is spoken of, even when his theories are opposed, it is always with respect, and almost affection. (81.) 2. There are five ways in which Aristotle meets the doc- trine of the Ideal : — 1. By taking some abstract principles of the speculative school, (2—4). 2. By calling on them to define the difference between the avro exao-Tov and the thing itself, (5 — 7). 3. By shewing that their distinction between good inde- pendent and good dependent does not help them, (8 — 11). 4. By shewing that the common name of " good" does not necessarily imply a common idea, (12). 5. By shewing that it would be of no practical use, (13 — end). 12 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. vi. 2—5. (82.) 12. He takes as a major premiss, one of the Platonic dog- mas, and proves from it that there can be no one abstract idea of good. It would be quite waste of time to enquire either into the meaning of the Platonic dogma, or how far it is true. Aristotle allows, for the purpose of his argument, that it is true, and we may do the same. The argument is a simple negative syllogism in the first figure, and, as well as the other arguments in this chapter, should be worked out in full. (S3.) 2. KoiiLaavres. This may be translated entertaining. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. (84.) 2. X eye rat, is predicated in; that is, may, as a predicate, express substance or quality, &c. (85.) 2. fj ova la. The category of substance. For the other meanings of it, — the essence, the universal, the genus, — see Met. vi. 3, p. 130, where substance is also termed inroKeipeuov : see also Categ. c. 2, and 3, Met. iv. 8, p. 98. — *a0' air 6. The other categories can only exist iv vn-oKetpiva : they have no independent existence ; wherefore ko0' avro is a character- istic of ova la. (86.) 2. 7rapacf)vd8i, offshoot; av ju/3 e /3 rj k 6 r i, property. See Met. iv. 30, p. 119 ; see also iii. 4, p. 70. (87.) 3. laax<*s Xeyerai, sc. it is predicated in all the Cate- gories. A thing may be spoken of as good in respect of its relation to the end, or the time or place when and where it happened, and so on through the rest. Refer to the end of the second chapter of the Categories. (88.) 3. Kaiposj opportunity. This argument is an hypothetical destructive. (89.) 4. rj v a v, sc. if there is an idea of good. (90.) 5. An argument to shew that, waiving the question of there being such a thing as avro €Kaarov, the difference between it and the emarov itself is uureal, a mere play upon words ; that the Platonists themselves cannot define them in different terms. (91.) 5. k a i is emphatic : how they even wish to define, &c. (92.) 5. 6 avros \6yos. avOpanos and avro av$pconos are defined bv the same terms. 6—12.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 13 (93.) 6. This is an answer to the argument drawn from the eternity of the avro emo-rov. The essence of the thing is not altered by its greater or less permanence ; that which is white for an instant is as white as that which is white for a thousand years. It may, however, be answered, that per- manence being itself a good, a thing which is good for an instant is not so good as that which is so for a thousand years. (94.) 7. Snevcwnvos. The nephew and successor of Plato in the Academy, whom Aristotle represents as abandoning, in part at least, the Platonic theory, by making unity an exhibition or phase of good, rather than good a development and phase of unity. See Met. vi. 2, p. 129. (95.) 7. iv Tfj to>v dyadmv oruo-roi^ia. This vvpois, Cat. i. (101.) 15. i it i a- t r] jx a i s, scientific arts ; the arts and sciences, as we see from the word rexvlras below. (102.) 15. to i v 8 e £ s, that which is wanting to tlieir perfection. (103.) 16. r r] v v y i e i a v, health in the abstract. ' CHAPTEE VII. Having thus in vain sought for a correct notion of the ayaQov in the practical and speculative views of men on the subject, he now proceeds to discover it for himself; and his mode of proceeding of course forms tlie characteristic feature of his treatise. Instead of imitating former philosophers, who, forming abstract notions of what happiness was, tried to find out what sort of life afforded tlie widest and surest sphere for it, Aristotle proceeds by stating what will lead to it, viz. that it will be the development of the epyov, i.e. of the best and highest tendency or principle of man's nature. (105.) 2. peraftaivav, changing its ground ; by a different mode of proof . In the first chapter the conclusion that npaKT&v reXos is the rayaQov was arrived at by referring syllogistically to major premisses ; here by induction and analogy. (106.) 3. He now gives some characteristics of the good, whereby evbaipovla is identified with it among the various reXrj in life, as being permanently rekeiov and avrapices, which latter is also a sign of the former ; and the conclusion he comes to is that evdaipovia is perfect, perfectly developed in itself; self-con- tained, requiring nothing external to complete it; and the highest end of human action. (107.) 4. bia rovd' alperov. tovto, SC. to pt]8e7TOT€ 8ia fiWo. There are three divisions : — 1. Things sought for their own sake c. vii. 2—10 ] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 15 alone. 2. Things sought only for the sake of something else. 3. Things sought both for their own sake and for that of something else. (108.) 5. opyava, instrumental goods ; which are valuable only as leading to some end. — v ovv, intellectual power, talent. (108.) G. to avrb o- v fx j3 a l v e i v, the same result, viz. that evdaL- fiovia is reXeiov, and therefore the good. (109.) 0. e n e i 8 t] (jivorei tt o\ ir i k 6 s a v 6 p co it o s. Observe this principle, wliich is the keystone of Aristotle's moral philosophy. (110.) 7. tovtcov 8e \r)7TTe6s opos tis, some bound must be placed to these sympathies. (111.) 7. elaavOis, see ch. 11. (112.) 8. TvdvToav alper (ordrrjv. The highest object of choice, in its own essence, even when in its lowest degree, without any adventitious additions, as compared with anything else ; and yet alpercorepav, in its higher degrees, when increased not in essence or kind, but in degree, by the addition of acknow- ledged blessings, as compared with itself before those addi- tions. The change produced by the addition of external goods is in degree, not in kind. — pf) awapiBpovpevrjv, not reckoned as joined with anything else ; by itself. The word is used again Bhet. i. 7. (113.) 9. Xeyeiv. This word shews that what he has been doing in the preceding sections is to identify that which is called evdaipovia with the ayaQov. (114.) 10. It having been laid down that €vhaip,ovla will be attained by the development of the highest tendency of human nature, it is necessary to discover the epyov of man, as this will be the development of his highest and best tendencies ; and in it, by a general law of nature, the <■$ of man will be found. We here get at one of the major premisses of the! Ethics, — whatever devejopes the epyov, or highest principle or function, of man will be his ayadov. (115.) 10. The terms epyov, reXos, ev, dp errj, jfyaBov, Only present different views of the same state, ep-gov, the proper development of the proper nature; t e"kos,mie same state viewed as in its accomplishment; ev, vievf&dXas a simple r 16 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. vii. 10—13. excellence ; dper rj, with the additional notion of obligation or tlie corresponding one of good desert ; dyaBov, with a farther notion of good or happiness resulting from it. (116.) 10. iv t(5 epya. We have here again Aristotle's recog- nition of the wise benevolence of nature, which has provided that everything and being shall find its dyaBov in the due performance of the function assigned to it by its constitution and position ; and thus human nature, rightly understood, will lead to human happiness. (116.) 11. d p y 6 v SC. depyov, without an epyov. (117.) 11. trorepov ovv r e k t o v o s, argument from analogy. (119.) 11. rj KaBane p, argument a fortiori. If each of the parts has an epyov, much more the w r hole. (120.) 12. (car} is not the same as /3tos, life without, or living, but a principle of life within : so the far] of man is afterwards stated to be yfrvxrjs ivepyeia. It may be translated nature, in the sense of a principle or part of nature ; and of course the epyov of man will arise from his peculiar fri). (121.) 12. Bpe-rrriKri. In bk. vi. c. 12. 6, he calls BpeimKr] the riraprov popiov : the other three being, the intellectual, the moral, and the alaBtjTiKf]. (122.) 13. XetTrerat marks the conclusion of a disjunctive syl- logism, which is implied in what goes before, though not actually stated. (123.) 13. npaKTiKr) Tis tov \6yov €%ovtos, the life of a rational agent. It does not mean here practical, as opposed to intel- lectual, nor a life of moral virtue and activity, as opposed to one of contemplation, for in the subdivision of 7TpaKTiKri £0077 we find the intellectual energies included. It is opposed to BpenTLKr] and alo-Br)TiKr), and not to SiavorjTiKr). It is necessary to observe this, for it was long the fashion to construe this word practical, and to make it the link between rjBucr) apery and €vbaip.ovia. (124.) 13. rov rov be, sc. tov \6yov e^oi/ros. Of the rational agent one part is receptive of reason, the other is the state and energy of it. a> s, as being. (125.) 13. Ka\ Tavrr/s agrees with farjs tov ex OVTOS Ka ' Swvoov- 13—20.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 17 pevov, implied in the context: since the intellect may exist in a passive state (e'xov, e£is), or as an active energy, dtavoov- fievov ; the ivepyeia is preferred to the e£is. (126.) 13. tcvpiarepov. More properly and essentially termed the npaKriKr) far) rov \6yov i'xovTos. The word \eyea-6ai is some- thing more than merely spoken of, — rather predicated as a definition ; and therefore representing more or less accu- rately the essence. (127.) 14. Kara \6yov r) pr) avev \6yov. He does not here choose to define the exact proportion which Xoyos holds in this cvepyeta ^vx^s : it may be the governing and directing principle, or it may be merely an ingredient. Below he adds the words p.era Xoyov. (128.) 15. Kara rr)v oiKeiav dp€Tr)v, in accordance with — according to — the excellence proper to and resulting from its nature. It must be observed that dperr) here does not mean virtue in its technical sense of moral virtue, (for we find it afterwards divided into moral and intellectual,) but excellence, whatever it may be. (129.) 15. n TrXeiovs k.t.X. The great object, then, of his trea- tise is to discover what is the highest (dpia-rrj) and most per- fectly developed (reXetorar/?) dperr) of man. This furnishes us with the major premiss of the syllogism : " Whatever is the TeXeioraTrj dperr) developes the epyov of man." — reXetordrrj, that which most perfectly developes the epyov. See Met. iv. 16, p. 110. (131.) 16. iv j3i'o> Te-A€ia>, implying both sufficiency of time and sufficiency of means, (see below, note 175,) though the pro- verb immediately following applies only to the former. (132.) 17. nepiyey pd(p 6 a>, be sketched, dvaypafyai, fill in. Sd£ete d y av Ttavrbs k.t.X. It would seem to be every one's duty, SfC (133.) 18. He now repeats his caution as to the contingent cha- racter of his subject, and of the sources whence his phe- nomena and principles are drawn. (134.) 19. op6r)v, either yaviav, or ypap,p.r)v. (135.) 20. t6 h' otl 7rpS>Top teal d p xh' I n t ne discussion of first principles the on is sufficient, for this is itself the D i^> KTHIOS.— BOOK I. [c. vii. 21. starting-point, beyond which it is not possible to go, and which it is not possible to demonstrate, or to require an alria for it : it has its own evidence in itself. See book vi. G. - Ttj* (186). 21. r a) v 8' a p x w v k.t.X. Of the various ways in which these generalised facts (on) are apprehended, Aristotle spe- eities three which depend more immediately on our senses. n. a t a 6 r? x i) tg>v tSiW, dXX' orpi08, i. 1 21. IXXai 5' ,|. ; GG, A. (138.) 21. pcrtfvai 8e k.t.X. Observe the practical wisdom of Aristotle, who does not, on abstract grounds, slmt himself out from any sources of truth, but recognises the great principle, that truths are to be sought after according to the nature of their subject-matter. In the Topics, i. 12. 5, p. 110, he gives three heads of Trpordafis : rjdiKai — (pviriKai — XoyiKai. It is clear that the apxai in these three arc not to be sought for in exactly the same way. .Much confusion would have been avoided if writers on philosophy had imbibed from Aristotle a little of his comprehensiveness of mind. (130.) 21. 6p tadcoa-i, be set out clearly,— as well in thought as in terms. CHAPTER VIII. | 1 10.) The notions 0$ ttoaipowia were arrived at in the last chap- ter &0m the Constitutions Of nature, deductively (<< tov reXeto). 4. r]8ovfj naturally arises from this ivepyeia. (141. ) 2. r p i x v> ^at. Legg. 697, B. (142.) 2. Ka\ a>s av Xeyo it o, our definition would hold good. (143.) 3. ovtco yap k.t.X. It would belong to the soul,/or npagis implies both i'pyov (without), and 7rpoaipeo-is (within), — it is not only an act, but an action. (1 44.) 5. eV i£t]T ov peva 7r e p\ rrjv k.t.X. The further questions raised on happiness. The more particular requirements, as dis- tinguished from the more general notions of ra itepX yjsvxrjv, or TO €KTOS. (145.) 5. t<5 \ex0* VT h sc - n i s definition. (146.) 7. ovderepovs k.t.X. The principle here laid down seems to be the true rule in cases where there are two or more dif- ferent views, each supported by more or less of sound reason- ing, — both are true in some points, both wrong in others. It differs from eclecticism, inasmuch as truth is not compro- mised, but only sifted and harmonised. (147.) 8. ravTTjs yap k.t.X. For to this (virtue) belongs the energy according to it. (148.) 9. viv oXap.fi ave iv, to conceive of. (1 49.) 9. igTjpyijKOTi, in a torpid state. (150.) 9. oi n p d t r o p t e s, those who are active, — opposed to those who are egrjpyrjKores. (151.) 10. ra>v ^AvxtKav. Pleasure is an affection of the soul, and will arise on all energies thereof, according to the dis- position of the agent. (151.) 11. ra fjbea p. a x^ r a i, their pleasures are inconsistent. (152.) 11. bia to p.ri k.t.X. Work out the major premiss im- plied here. 12— 1G ; c. ix. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 21 (153). 12. ire pidiTTov tip 6s, as it were an appendage. Lidd. and Scott. (154.) 13. et 8' ovt(o k.t.X. From 7rpbs vols elprjpevois to aXXcou is in a parenthesis, so that ovroi refers to e^ei rjdovrjv ev iavra. (155.) 13. d\\a fir^v k a i, further. — airovhalos: properly a man who is in earnest, — a man who regards life seriously ; hence a good man. (156.) 13. Kpivci a) s eiTropev: SC. that they are dyaOal kcu KdXai. The argument is a simple constructive hypothetical: the hypothetical premiss being, " if the good man judges truly, they are what he judges them;" and the minor de- pending on a reductio ad absurdum, viz., dyadal na\ KaXal, " if he does not judge rightly, who can do so ?" (157.) 14. bia> p lo-rai, are not separated from each other. (158.) 15. cpaiverai, evidently is. He now turns to the opinion of those who hold sktos dyadd to be happiness. (159.) 16. o6cv. From this opinion, that ckt6s dyadd are happi- ness, and that the want of these impair it, some identify it with eiTuxta, while others insist on its being apcrrj, intel- lectual or moral, whereby, as they think, evdaipovia is placed above the accidents of life. CHAPTER IX. (160.) 1. oOev. Erom these two opinions arises a further ques- tion as to its attainment. Those who hold it to be intel- lectual virtue (aocpia), say it is \ia6j]r6v. Those who hold it to be moral virtue, say it is eOio-rov, or do-Krjrov. They who hold it to be etrrvx i'a, say it is Sid dtlav polpav, or rvyr)V- (161.) 1. padrjrov. See Plato, Meno 1. In more than one of his dialogues, such as the Protagoras, Euthydemus, &c, Plato holds this opinion. The conclusion to which he comes in the Meno seems to be meant as a piece of irony against the Sophists. See Stallb. Pref. ad Menon. (162.) 1. napaylvtrai, springs up, as it were spontaneously. 22 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. ix. 4—10. (163.) 4. 7to\vkoivov, open to most; those only excluded who were 7T€7n] papevot. npbs dperrjv. (164.) 5. e'lnep to. Kara cpvorcv. Observe the reverential be- lief in the wisdom and benevolence of nature here laid down. ra Kara (pvo-iv, the productions of nature. ra Kara Texvrjv, those things which are in the province of art, or any other productive or directive cause (irdo-av alriav), are also produced in the best way (6 p.o La> s). (165.) 6. 7r\r) fifieXes, contrary to analogy; out of tune with the rest of the creation. (166.) 7. iK tov \6yov k.t.X. The question raised, i.e. how far happiness is matter of ti>xv, is solved by what has been said ; for it has been stated that in its essence it is a mental energy of a certain sort (n-ot'o ns), according to virtue ; while of external goods, some only exist, as adjuncts, (eWe ir pov and iiaicdpios seems to be, that in the former the mental state of the person spoken of is the leading notion, his being in possession of that which constitutes happiness ; in the latter, it is rather his happiness externally, so to say, in its relation to gods and men, — favoured by the gods, and envied by men. In Ehet. i. 9. 34, p,ctKapio-p6s and elbaipovia-pos are said to be in them- selves the same, but to differ inasmuch as evhaipoviapos im- plies the possession of dperrj, as comprehending enaivos and iyKoipwv : and this seems to lead us to the above distinction between pandpios and evbaipcov, which the words blessed and happy in some degree represent. The distinction, however, naturally enough, is not always observed, and they are often LO, 11 ; c. x. 1—6. ETHICS.— BOOK I. 23 used indifferently, when it is not required to bring out the proper notion of either one or the other. This will obviate some difficulties from the use of this word in the next chapter. (170.) 10. 8 el yap k.t.X. The reason of what has just been said is, that the elements of happiness are its essence, aperf reAfi'a, and its adjuncts /3io? reXeios : for which see the next chapter. (171.) 11. noXXal ydp. It requires filos r eA <• to s, for a man's life may change, and, in the opinion of men, his happiness would, under great calamities, change with it. (172.) 11. evbaipov'i£ei. This introduces the opinions dis- cussed in the next chapter. CHAPTER X. (173.) The common feeling of men, to which Solon gave utter- ance, demands investigation. As the opinions of men were to Aristotle, generally speaking, tests of truth, he had to shew how far, and in what sense, it was true that happiness was not attainable in this life. (174.) 1. The questions or difficulties started are : — 1. Are we unable to say that a man is happy as long as he lives ? 2. If so, is he happy when he is dead ? — anopia ; " Happi- ness is an energy." 3. Or is it only meant that we can safely say that he is happy when he is dead ? 4. But supposing this, are the events which happen after death to have no influence on his happiness? airopla. "But this is contrary to the opinion of men," (boKelyap K.T.X.) 5. But if they have such influence, then the dead man would be at one time adXiov, at another evdaLpeav. (175.) 6. The three first questions practically resolve themselves into another, — how far external reverses destroy happiness ? 24 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. x. 1—5. This may be solved by observing that cvbaipovla consists of its essence (dperf] reXeia), and its adjuncts (/3ioy reXeios). The later means a life which has performed or arrived at the end for which it was given, (Met. iv. 16, p. 110) ; and this evidently is when the energies of happiness are exercised without let or hindrance, (bk. vii. 13. 2, ovbepla yap evepyeia reXeLos epnobiCopevr} k.t.X.) ; and to this end we require both sufficiency of time, (prj, SC. ra £g>vti. (179.) 4. airos, suitably, gracefully. See Lidd. and Scott. (190.) 12. p,aKapia>Tepov tov /3t op, i.e. his external life. (191.) 12. to fiaicdpiov signifies the state as it is viewed by men externally, without any prominent notion of the ivepyeiai dpeTTjs, in which it really consists, though of course it implies these : it is evSat/tcop viewed from another point. See above, note, 169. (192.) 12. to Ka\6v, the instinctive sense of right, — the princi- ple of aperr), and therefore the test of its presence. In the Greek mind, and hence in their language, there was a strong connection between the physically and morally beautiful : so X dpis. (193.) 13. r r) s £a>r} s,— not tov /3/ou, — but the internal life of hap- 26 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. x. 14— 16 j piness. — /xio-t/to, things of bad desert. iEschylus has ex- pressed something of the same sentiment, Eum. 550. (194.) 14. ovbe\s av yevoiro k.t.A. to p.andpiov implies both the essence and the adjuncts, and therefore, of course, ceases when the adjuncts cease. The evbaifxcov continues so long as the essence remains, even though the adjuncts be removed : he will not cease to be evdaipav until the essence is destroyed, i. e. until the balance of mind is disordered by some over- whelming calamity, and the inner man becomes incapacitated for the dpeTtjs ivepyeiai. (195.) 14. reXe/o). fiLos riXeios includes, as stated above, both length of time and sufficiency of means : here it evidently means the former. (196.) 15. r i ovv KcoXvet Xiyeiv. He now turns from the point, how far a man is happy while he is alive, to the ques- tion how far he may be called so. (197.) 16. fiaKapiovs §' dvOpaiiTovs, happy as men; as far as human life admits. CHAPTEK XI. (198.) Having thus settled the first point, by saying that he who has dperrjv reXeLav and (3iov reXeiov may be called happy, (always bearing in mind the uncertainty of human things,) he goes to the second question which arises from this, viz. whether the fortunes of descendants or friends affect this happiness and thus prevent our speaking of a man as happy. (199.) 1. rats Sogais ivavrlov. This explains why he enters upon this seemingly unpractical question. If these 86£ai were right, then happiness would be a shifting unreality, and no man could be secure of attaining to it. (199.) 4. 8ia(pepei. There is much more difference between a calamity happening to a living or to a dead person, than there is on the stage between the actual acting of horrors and the relating them as past. — n p o i) ir d p x c i v, be represented as past. Hor. Ars Poet. 182. c. xi. 1—6; c. xii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 27 (200.) 5. ravTT], i.e. this difference must be concluded upon in this way, and perhaps still more decidedly (fiaXKov 'la-cos) the ques- tion whether the dead are sensible of good or evil, al. ravr^v, which does not make such good sense. — e k tovtov, from what has been said. (201.) 5. d 7r X & ?, in themselves. — ?) i ne ivots, or relatively to the circumstances of the dead person; — a great loss of money- would not be great if a man had died very rich. (202.) 5. 6t de firj: if it is heavy, then, nevertheless, it only touches them (duKveirai, supplied from above,) in such a kind and degree, &c. (203.) 6. firjT a\\o tg>v to io vt co i/, SC. e vn p a£ i a>v rj dvcr- 7r p a £ i co v t co v

a> K.T.X. (206.) 5. Eudoxus (who in Aristotle represents the Epicurean philosophy) argued as follows : — "Whatever, being a good, is not praised, is the highest good. Pleasure, being a good, is not praised : pleasure is the highest good. (207.) 5. crwriyoprja-ai, to act as advocate for; to plead in fa- vour of. (208.) 7. Tols 7T € 7TOVT] fit VO IS 7T € p\ TO. € y K Q> /JL I a, those wllO have laboured on the subject of encomium, neirovrjo-dai: see next chap. sect. 2. (209.) 8. dpxrjv. The final cause is in one sense the starting- point of action. (210.) 8. Tavrrjs yap x<*P lv «t.\. Observe this principle. CHAPTER XIII. (211.) There are not many difficulties which require explanation or remark in this chapter. (212.) 5. Kara ttjv e| dpxrjs irpoalpecnv : our purpose at the begin- ning of our book, which was not merely av&pa>mvov dyadov, but alsO 7T0\lTlKTjS T€\0S. (213.) 9. iv toIs egarepiKols \6yois. Aristotle's treatises in general have been sometimes divided into eo-oTepiKot and egcorepiKoL, and certain subjects placed in the one division, and others in the other ; but the difference lay not so much in the subject-matter, as in the way of treating it. Oi e|orfpi, nominally. (2 15.) 12. ok avBpanlvYj, not peculiar to man, quoad man. (216.) 13. nXrjv si 7J-77 k.t.X. Mark his notion of the origin of dreams, — as if they were the vibrations of our waking feelings. (21 7.) 13. rvxovTiov, ordinary men. (218.) 15. dr e x» a> $ s opeKTiKov: opeKTiKov would include the impulses of the irascible as well as the concupiscible part. (221.) 18. t£>v p,a6r)fxaTiKa>v: aswe apply the terms e'xeiv \6yop to the intellectual energies of a scientific man. This is an argument drawn from language. (222.) 19. kv picas, in a proper sense. (223.) 20. twv egeav ras iiraiverds k.t.X. This is a pro- perty of virtue, and a test of it, — not part of its essence, but joined to it ; and this is a good instance of a definition tov Siopifav, as distinguished from one tov Seacvvvai ova-lav. The standard of obligation — that whereby obligation and actions were to be weighed was in Aristotle's system eVan/oy, — not the mere praise and blame of a fickle multitude, the whim of the moment, the mere passing breath of a mob, but the sen- tence of the collective conscience of mankind ; and as, in Aristotle's system, obligation was owing to man in a social state (ttoXis), so it followed that the collective voice of man should be the standard of obligation ; just as conscience, or the voice of Him to whom our obligation is due, is to us the standard of actions. 30 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. i. 1—6, BOOK II. CHAPTEE I. In this book he discusses the nature of human virtue generally, and, with the exception of the first section, the practical nature of moral virtue; proving it to be a fie a- orris or* fiea-rf e£is, preparatory to shewing that it developes the epyov of man as a social being. (1.) 1. Of neither part of the soul is the perfection given us by nature, but it is the result of our own exertions and training. (2.) 2. e£ e6ovs. An argument from the opinions of men ex- pressed by etymology ; SO also o-axppoavvriv, i. e. crafaaav rf/v (ppovrjo-iv, bk. vi. 5. 5. bUaios, from dlxa, v. 4. 9. (3.) 2. It is worth while to work out these arguments syllogis- tically. The first is in the second figure, with the major premiss supported by some of the particulars of the induc- tion, which it implies, stated as examples. (4.) 3. it a pa v a v r S> v k.t.X., from the same source, (viz. 7rd6ri, &c.,) and by similar means, (viz. actions). An argument consisting of a simple statement of a fact, supported by the analogy of the arts. (8.) 6. (pBeiperai, i.e. nava yiverai KaKta. This word is used be- cause the notion in Aristotle's mind was the destruction of 7, 8 ; c. ii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 31 . This may be laid down for the present as a general (kolvov) definition ; and he will afterwards enquire into it more accu- rately : but it is not sufficiently particular and practical for his present purpose, therefore lie proceeds to investigate its actual phenomena, as seen in action. Another reading, of equal authority, is xmepiceicrOa) : but vnoK^adai is the Aristo- telian word, which he uses to lay down what he means to be a settled fundamental definition or point, or at least one which does not need at present further discussion. (15.) 2. tio-repov, bk. vi. (16.) 3. ovdev ia-rrjKos ^x € h have nothing fixed. He does not mean in themselves, (objectively,) but in our perception and application of them, (subjectively). — r a iv n pdgeo- 1, morals, ra v KaO' eKaa-ra \6yos, the question when it goes into particulars. — ir apayyeXiav, professed system of instruction. The irapayyikiai were the promises held out by professors, and especially the Sophists, to make their pupils (or victims) perfect in such and such a subject. (19.) 4. avrovs, the agents themselves — r a nep\ rbv v d a v S> v, sc. this moral virtue, into the nature of which he is enquiring. 6-9 ; c. iii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 33 This is a simple statement of the principle of argument from analogy. (21.) 6. o-vpneTpa, the exact point or quantity. (22.) 7. v )) it is a, sign of the habit being formed ; and for this reason : pleasure being the result of energising according to our nature, (Kara rrju vndpxova-av cpvo-w, Rhet. i. 10,) and habit being a second nature, it follows that pleasure results from it as a matter of course ; — and again, virtue being the right regulation of our pleasures and pains, and vice the wrong regulation thereof, it follows that in either case pleasure (good or bad) will wait on the actions proceeding from a good or bad habit. (26.) 1. rols epyois, acts, as distinguished from actions (ivpa&is): the latter imply npoalpea-is. (27.) 1. 7T6pi fjbovas Ka\ Xvnag: not merely about pleasure and pain, but the regulation of pleasures and pains, — of the impulses and checks of the compound principle of the higher self-love ; one urging us to, the other keeping us from, cer- tain actions. To each of the naBr), which are the sources of the several dperai, there is an 1760^57 or Xvnrj attached to the p 31 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. in. 1, 2. gratification, and another r}8ovr) or \inrr) arising from the sense of Ka\6v or alo-xpou, which balance one another ; and when these are rightly balanced or regulated, right action follows. (See the particular virtues.) It must be remembered that tjbovr) has a twofold sense : it is either the feeling, tendency, instinct which is the motive cause of action, or the satisfac- tion which is the final cause of action ; or perhaps the two may more properly be said to be the same thing looked at from a different point of view : at all events, they imply each other; but there are some passages where the context requires one notion or the other to be more prominently brought out. Aristotle insists on dperfj being 7rep\ r)8ovas koI \vnas, because Plato would give a different view of moral virtue, which he would make to consist in the subordination of the irascible to the rational, and the total subjection of the concupiscible ; and therefore Aristotle takes pains to prove that the subject-matter, the raw material, as it were, of dperr) is the several f)8ovai and Xinrai attached to our nature. See Plato, Eep. Ml, 442 ; Phgedo, 68, c. (28.) 1. The proofs given are eight : — 1. They are the motive causes of human action. 2. They are the results of human action, in. the regulation of Which aperr] Consists (3). 3. In governments, pleasure and pain, in the shape of re- wards and punishments, are used to counteract vice, and to encourage virtue ; and as all remedies act by contraries, it shews that what punishments are used to counteract is pleasure, what rewards are used to coun- teract is pain : therefore, in the opinion of men, the re- gulation of pleasures and pains produces right action (4.) 4. They are the productive causes of virtue and vice (5). 5. They comprehend all the final causes of human action (6, 7). 6. They are innate principles of our nature (8). 7. They are, more or less, the practical standards and rules of action (9). 8. Virtue is either nepl 6vp,6p, or nepl r)8ovr)v : it is more difficult to grapple with and subdue the latter, and therefore aperr) is ivepi r)bovr)v (10) . (29.) 2. o) s 6 rrXdrcoj/ cferjcrlv. ~L>egg. 653, where he speaks 4—7.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 35 of the aperf of children as consisting in a right perception of ydovrj and Xv-nt] : cppovrjais and d\rj3els d6£ai being the privilege of a more advanced stage of life. In the cultivation of this right aio-drjo-is of pleasure and pain consists naideia. The pas- sage should be referred to. (30.) 4. a I KoXda-eis. Observe this notion of the true nature and object of punishments, as being larpcicu. — 8 t a r£>v ivav- Tiv ovrv rex vS)V k.t.X. This is an example of the modes of refuting an argument from analogy, — either by denying the resemblance of relations on which the argument is founded, or the fact which it is attempted to apply from one side of the analogy to the other : here both are used. It is denied that, in the case of the arts, a mere act makes a man an artist ; and even if it did, the arts and virtue do not stand on the same ground, (en oide 6p.oi6v ea-nv): the productions of art are artistic, whatever may be the mental state of the artist ; while real acts of virtue imply and presuppose a particular mental state and intention, (n u> s ex^v). (44.) 3. nas exovra, of a certain sort. c. iv. 2-6 ; c. v. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 37 (45.) 3. dfxeTaKivfjTois, i. e. whenever occasion- offers ; so, " pray without ceasing." (46.) 3. ras ciXXXas rix vas - This does not mean that the virtues are arts, nor is rex^as used for eget,s ; but ras v,) and produces goodness of operation, ( s, i. e. by repeated action. — rj8r], bk. ii. 4. 3. c. v i. i_o.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 39 (60.) 4. elvai s a K p o v I the notions of imepfioXrj and eXXeiyp-is are excluded from dvdpiia, (for example,) because, though a pecrov, it is also an anpov or aKpor-qs, a fixed point of perfection. A man cannot have too little dvbpela, or too much, and still be dudpelos ; so those states or actions in the other extreme, which are fixed points of badness, are not bad from being in vnepfioXr) or eXAeix/ap, but simply from their own nature. A man is not cLSikos from being too much so, but simply from being so at all. CHAPTER VII. (79.) 1. KcvaiTepoi: another reading is Koiporepoi, which would mean that such arguments have a wider application, and thus have their advantages, but particular arguments are more accurate and true ; while if Kevcorepot be read, there is no opposition between the two clauses : koivos is used in this sense in ch. ii. 2, koivov /cat viroKeio-Oa ; and Michelet quotes De Anima, i. 1. The Paraphrast undoubtedly read kow6~ repot. (80.) 1. t)iaypa6@ovs Ka\ Bdpprj. There seem to be four vices be- longing to this fieo-orris, as also to the Soon? Kal \^is to>v XPV" fidrau, but in reality there are only two ; but these may be looked at from different points of view. There are two in- stincts (v 8e e£«oi/ tcis inaLverds operas KaKovpev as his standard of dperr). — en a iverov, object of good desert ; yp-eKrd, objects of bad desert. (90.) 14. ev to Is ir d 6 e a- 1, in the mere affections, which are not 16; c. viii. 1-8.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 43 exhibited in any definite irpdgis. Thus aldws is an instinct rather than a virtue ; veneris and cmxaipcKctKla are feelings. (91.) 16. a\Xd<9t, sc. Ehet. ii. 9. (92.) 16. oi>x dnXSys Xtyer at, is not spoken of in one sense only. CHAPTEE VIII. (93.) This chapter and the next are rather practical : having shewn his q&fo) aperf to be a pea-oTrjs, he gives us practical directions as to its attainment. (94.) 1. tv a s. o-a>(ppoo~vvr), for instance, is opposed to dicoXao-ia ; dicoXao-la is opposed to dvaiaOrjcria. (95.) 2. air a 6 ovvr a t, push him further from themselves. (96.) 6. npos de to p e a o v k.t.X. Each virtue being the regu- lation of the impulse of fjbovr), by the check of Xi/nr}, or vice versa, the extreme, which is an exaggeration of the regu- lating principle, is less opposed to the mean than the other : thus in dvbpeia, the Xvirrj ((pofios) is regulated by the ydovrj, (dappos, arising from a sense of koXov,) and hence Opao-vrrjs, which is an exaggeration of Bappos, is nearer dvdpela than SeiXta : so in o-s c'lpTjrai. He speaks as if be had sufficiently proved the point that tjOikt) dperr) is a peo-oTrjs : it now remains for him to prove that this fxea-orrjs performs the epyov of man. (102.) 2. inaivcTov refers to the opinion of others; KaXov to our own sense of right. (103.) 3. KaKvyjra). A curious instance of Aristotle's memory fail- ing him : it was Circe who gave the advice which Ulysses refers to in the lines quoted from Od. xii. 219. (104.) 4. Kara top devrepov, cpao-i, ttXovv: a proverb, applied to those who having tried and failed, try again, or, according to Eustath. Odys. p. 1453, ore dirorvx^v tis ovpiov Kotirais irXcji Kara Uavaavlav. See Stall, ad Plat. Phaed. p. 99, D, — as our next best. (105.) 5. els Tovvavriov k.t.X. One would hardly expect to see self-distrust and self-denial so fully and practically recog- nised by a heathen philosopher, at the same time with the distinction between resistance to and total suppression of the passions. But here, as elsewhere, Aristotle's knowledge of human nature and human circumstances, and his sound practical sense, led him right where others went wrong : mark, too, the practical wisdom of making 77801/77 and Xvn-7 the test of our disposition, iavrovs is omitted in some editions : on its use for r^pas avrovs, see Or. Or. 654, 2, b. ( 1 06.) 6. ev wavTi 8e cpvXaKriov r6 778 v. Aristotle, though of course unacquainted with the doctrine of the corruption of man, had too practical an eye to overlook its actual results on men's hearts and actions. (107.) 6. dbeKao-Toi, unbribed. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. §eKa£o). — onep ovv. II. y. 158. — e n 1 X e y e 1 v, to repeat. (108.) 7. ol yap pabiov k.t.X. The whole of this passage is a striking instance of the practical wisdom of Aristotle's views and system. (109.) 8. T<5 X d y o), in a general argument or principle. (110.) 8. ovde yap aXXo ovbev tcov al(rOr)T v does not mean the agent and patient of the same action, but the patient of the /3ia, whether active or passive. — k vpiot ovres, having power over lis. (4.) 4. oo-a be 8 1 a cj> 6 @ o v k.t.X. It has been said that there is a contradiction between what is said here about kcAov and what is said in sect. 1 1 ; but he is talking here of actions in themselves involuntary, which are very different from what he is considering in sect. 1 1 ; and the immediate motives to such actions are either a feeling of fear or a sense of duty : these act one against the other. A man sometimes does something which fear would make him decline, from a sense of duty ; sometimes something to which his sense of duty makes him averse, from fear. (5.) 4. 7r p a £ a v r o s, sc. avrov, supplied from the general context. See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 3. (6.) 6. p.iKTa\ it page is, compound actions. "Where there is a mixture of willingness and unwillingness, though the mere fact of the action being done proves that willingness prevails, (paXkov $' eoucep eKovaiois. Sect. 10,) yet unwillingness exists in the abstract (arrkois, icad' avro) ; but willingness, looking at the circumstances : and acts thus done, are to be judged by the state of the will at the moment of action ; and hence they are voluntary, or at least partly so, as no action can take place without the will, for some cause or other, con- senting (jrpdgeis §' ev rols Ka6' e/cacrra, ravra d' eKovaia. Sect. 10). There are four such npageis here given : two of nega- tive suffering, where cpofios is overruled by kq\6v ; two of posi- tive action, where koXoV is overcome by cpofios. The nature of these pinral irpdgeis, and the view taken of them, vary ac- cording to the thing done and the motive for doing it : where eKovaiov is evidently the strongest element of the com- pound, there enaivos or yjroyos is awarded ; where aKovanov is, from the very nature of the action, very strong, even though overpowered, we grant o-vyyvcopi]. 7_9.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 47 1. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of some great real ko\6v — enaivos. 2. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of no ko\6v at all, or no equivalent ko\6v — \jr6yos. 3. Where v prj peydXau fj KaXfov. (9.) 8. 'AXicfiatai/a. Alcmaeon is made to kill his mother on the plea that his father imprecated curses on himself and his country if he did not do so. (10.) 9. Observe how Aristotle refuses to dogmatise in cases where each action must assume its particular hue from the circumstances. (11.) 9. ok yap k.t.X. The force of the yap is difficult to discover at first, especially in connection with what follows, Sdev k.t.X., but the whole may be paraphrased thus : " It is difficult to abide by one's deliberate determination, (rots yvcao-Oclcriv,) for the struggle is, for the most part, between duty, which for- bids cu which urges to them ; fear makes us give up what had been, from a sense of duty, resolved on : and hence praise and blame arise on such actions, for the struggle thus being, for the most part, between fear of pain, a wish to avoid ra irpoo-hoKa>pcva Xvnrjpd, and a sense of duty, a wish to decline a dvayKa&vrai alaxp a " ("'^XP" ^ s nere used for something "wrong" not merely "shameful;" it is here 48 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. i. 10—14, opposed to \v7rrjp6v, before it was joined with it ;) " and these being balanced one against the other, then if alo~xpdv is pre- ferred, it shews that the will is more disinclined to KaXov, and ylroyos is attached to it ; if Xvmjpov is preferred, it shews that the will is rather inclined to KaXov, and erraivos ensues ; where Xvnrjpov is too great to be borne, then there is o-vy- yvd>p.r), for there is no proof of any lack of inclination to KaXov, as far as is practicable for man ; where there is no real KaXov, as in 2, note 6 above, the very act of enduring Xinr] or alaxpov unnecessarily is wrong, and hence yjfoyos." (12.) 10. a it X S> s, without reference to the puKral npdi-eis. (13.) 10. Ka\ f) dpxy, SC. o)V f) dpxr]' (14.) 1 1 . The argument is an elenchus, which it may be as well to work out, as well as that in the second figure, immediately following. (15.) 11. KaXov p,e6' Tjdovrjs. This is the pleasure which fol- lows on right action, in the shape of self-approbation. (16.) 11. yeXolov 8r). This argument need not be reduced to a strictly logical form, as it is a simple appeal to common sense. Another reading is be, but brj marks a new argument, as well as a conclusion : see Grr. G-r. 721, 1 . He refers to a modified form of the former theory, which makes rjbv alone fiiatov. (17.) 13. to be Si' ayvoiav. Bekker here begins chap, ii., which is perhaps the more natural division ; but for the con- venience of other editions, the sections will be numbered as if in continuation of chap. i. (18.) 14. ere pov be eoiKe k.t.X. The difference between doing an action St' ayvoiav, and ayvo&v, is that in the former the ayvoia is the direct cause of the act, in the latter the ayvoia is not the direct cause of the act, but of the p,oxdr]pia, whence the act proceeds. This is illustrated by bk. v. chap. viii. sect. 12, ocra yap p.r) povov dyvoovvres dXXa rfj rrpoaipeo-ei, ignorance shewn in the act of choice, where, through the bad moral state of the agent, he fails to discern the character of the particular action, but puts sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet ; such as where a man fancies that what is called a white lie is not dishonest. In this case the ayvoia is not the immediate, but the remote, cause of the action ; indeed, it is not properly the cause of the action at all, for this springs directly from the p.oxBrjpia, or wicked tendencies, which partly consist in this absence of moral principles, and, in particular cases, in the want of moral perceptions. Thus, if a man does not think im- purity wrong, this is a result of guilty demoralization, a want of moral principles; or if he does not think obscene language to come under the category of impurity, this want of moral perception does not make the action cLkovo-iov; in either case it is not the cause of his doing something which he does not intend, but it is the a'inov rrjs noxfypias, of his intentionally doing what is wrong, inasmuch as the bad moral habit is caused by his not knowing better the nature of right and wrong ; and thus fioxOrjpla leads him wrong, though it might not have acted had he known the real nature of the matter better. Hence the importance not only of moral principles, but also, and, if possible, still more, of right and clear moral perception in particulars. The case of the ayvo2>v, however, who is ignorant not of the moral character of the particulars, (17 iv rrpoaipeo-ei ayvoia,) but of the particulars themselves, (ayvoia 17 Kad' eKaa-ra,) is very different : here the ayvoia is not the cause of his intentionally doing a wrong action, (rrjs noxOrjpias,) but of his doing some- thing which he does not intend ; as where a man shoots a friend from not being aware that the gun in his hand was loaded. But in both cases the degree of blame or sympathy would vary with the consideration whether the ignorance was such as might or ought to have been avoided, or the strength of the rrdOos which overruled the moral knowledge or perceptions, (see note 18). But on all these points Aristotle refuses to dogmatise. (20.) 14. did ri k.t.X., through the drunkenness or the anger, H 50 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. i. 14—18, or, as others interpret it, through i)8oi^, or some such motive, not through ignorance of right from wrong. These are in- stances of tov dyvoovvTu trpdrrtiv'. but the to dyvodv of the man who is in those states does not relieve him of responsibility, though the moral knowledge which would have restrained him is, by his own fault, suspended. A man indeed, in an angry or drunken fit, might strike his father, not through ignorance of its being wrong to do so, but having mistaken his father for some one else. In such a case there is epov. The political dyadov is viewed as implying that of the individual. (23.) 15. r) lv rfj tt poaipeo-ei a y v o i a, ignorance at the mo- ment of choice of the character of the particular. — ^ ku66- Xov, ignorance of the universal. (24.) 15. ev ofj, the circumstances; nepl a, the particulars. The former would be when a man shot his friend not know- ing he was near ; the nepl a, when he did not know the gun to be loaded. (25.) 16. ov x €l P 0V > it wiM ne as we M' (26.) 17. e Knead v a vtovs, it had escaped them unawares; they had let it fall. — &o-nep rj Mepom] : see Poet. c. 14. Merope is about to kill her son in ignorance, but recog- nises him in time. (27.) 17. Sel£at, to exhibit in any way. — dKpoxeipi£6pevoi } Anglic^, with the gloves. (28.) 18. eu toIs kv p i a rdro is, in the most essential points 20—27 ; c. ii. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 51 of the action, — those that most decide its character. — h oh f} npagis, the circumstances of the action. (29.) 20. This definition of Uova-iov, the result of the foregoing chapter, will now be applied to human action. (30.) 21. ydp refers to an objection against this definition, on the ground that actions from concupiscible or irascible im- pulses, though iv ai>To>, are involuntary. (31.) 22. The argument is an elenchus. (32.) 24. bet S£ s: by an examination into the mo- tive cause of human action he will shew it to be volun- tary. 7i p oal pea- 1 s is the deliberate act of choice; not the general principle which directs the choice, but the choice of some particular, directed well or ill by the reason, as the agent is good or bad. (37.) 1. o I k e 1 6 Tar oi/, most nearly connected. — rS>v Tvpaf-cav: npci^Ls is here used in a loose way for epyov, as, strictly speak- ing, 7Tpa£is includes Trpoalpea-is. (38.) 2. fyaiverai, evidently is. — earl ir\clov: it is a species of ckovo-iov. 52 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. ii. 3, 5, (39.) 3. ol 8e Xeyovres. He proceeds to shew, by an analysis of npoalpeo-is, that it is not a simple mental impulse or act, but a compound motion : it is not an impulse of the irascible or concupiscible parts of our nature, nor is it merely an opinion on moral matters, in any of which cases it might more or less lose the character of ckovo-iov. (40.) 5. This chapter and the following one will be more clearly understood if we trace the course of an action of our concu- piscible part from its first beginnings in the soul of a rational agent up to its completion. e 7r i 6 v fi i a (De Anima, p. 32, — rjbeos opegis), a general latent appetite or propension towards 1781;, resulting either from the Xinrr} of (pvaiKal evdetai {koivclL), or from particular propensions of fjBovfj tfdiai, eVttferoi), existing differently in different individuals, as the several nddr) exist in them in different degrees of strength. aia-Brjo-is, presenting to the iinOvpLa, by means of the (pavraa-ia, (see De Anima, p. 30,) an object suitable to the epBeia or iraOos. iiriOvpia, existing actively, (rovde tov fjbeos opegis,) — a sen- sible propension, — appetite in motion. o p e £ 1 s = iiriOvpia, directed towards some definite object, appetitive ; — Slagis, an appetite, a seeking after ; — ope|ts, a stretching forth after. 86% a, a judgment of the moral reason as to the pursuit or avoidance of the object in question. j3 o v X tj a- 1 s, will, — an act of the will consequent on the decision of the reason that the object is a proper one for pursuit, — a choice of the end, — will of the end : povkrjo-is tov ayaOov. o peg is, again, — confirmed by the assent of the reason, — rational 8ia>|is : bk. vi. 2 ; putting in motion, /3ovXevo-is, a deliberation as to the means proper for the attainment of the object, — will of the means : tov s dya- 6ov kcu rjSeos- It must further be borne in mind that when the character is rightly formed, that is, when the agent is a good man, all the steps previous to povXrjo-is are merged in the impulses towards action ; are rational impulses of the ?}8os towards good, inasmuch as nothing presents itself to the desire as good or pleasant, but what the reason simultaneously ap- proves of as really good and pleasant. Here the opegis and pov\r)v ddvvd- Ttov. that is, imperfect fiovXrjo-is, or wish, as stated above. The consideration of dhvvarov belongs rather to pov\evo-is, but real povXrjo-is, actual will, nevertheless does not exist where dhvvarov is manifest. All these arguments may be resolved into the second figure, though perhaps we con- clude differences between things which have different ob- jects from a process of perception, rather than of actual reasoning. (46.) 10. 8 6 £ a, a mere intellectual act. (47.) 11. 8 6 g y tiv i, an act of the intellect on moral subjects. This 86ga enters into a moral purpose, as shewn above, but it is not the whole of it. (48.) 13. rj r<3 6p0S)s. ff is "or" not "than;' 1 as p,3X\ov pre- ceding might suggest. (49.) 15. See vii. 7. 4 ; and below, 4. 5. (50.) 17. per a \6yov k.t.X. X6yos, properly, reason; 8ia- vo i a, exercise of the reason: see De Anima, p. 69. 56 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. iii. 4—8. CHAPTER III. He now examines one of the elements of npoaipea-is, — the will of the means, fiovkevats. (51.) 4. on do-vpperpoi, that is, that the side and the diago- nal of a square have no common measure. This is a favourite illustration of Aristotle's. It probably was a problem then in vogue in the learned world, like squaring the circle with us. (52.) 4. Bid rtva aWrjv alriav. He here leaves room for the opinion of those who distinctly held a Divine Providence separate from nature. (53.) 7. ravra 8e v(ris and /3ia : but dvdyKrj there is only used popularly to express the plea of involuntariness, which does away with the responsibility of the agent in a trial, which he is laying down in the passage in the Rhetoric : see also An. Post. ii. 10, p. 217. (55.) 7.

v del, — such as fire and heat. 2. (pva-is-, where this connection is perceptible and gene- ral, but not invariable, as clouds and rain. r&p «rt to noXv. Eth. vi. 4. 3- T v X Vi (atria aopiaros,) where this connection is neither invariable nor perceptible, — r£>v ur)re del urjre £>s eVt r6 ■ ttoXv. See Met. p. 228; Top. p. 130 ; Phys. p. 35. (56.) 8. aKptfiels, of which the laws are well ascertained. — a v- rdpKeis, where they do not depend, in part or whole, on some other science or art for their realization : where they do thus depend, there may be deliberation as to what science, or what operations of that science, are necessary to them, as producing or co-operating cause. 9-17.] ETHICS.-BOOK III. 57 (57.) 9. tjttov 8irjKpt/3v. This is rather introduced as an ornamental figure than as any actual proof of what he is saying. Homer (II. E. 53,) has introduced the chiefs de- claring to the people what they had thus decided upon as things to be done. The process was ended when irpoaipeats had taken place in their councils. (69.) Deliberation, then, is a process of enquiry carried on by the reason, with its various powers and functions, set in motion by the presence of some opegis, (approved by reason =Pov\rjcns,) beginning with the end in view, and proceeding, link by link, through the chain of means, till it reaches the point in our own power, and which our judgment approves. When this is reached, povkevo-is ceases, and the act of choice or purpose supervenes. CHAPTEE IV. (70.) He now proceeds to consider the other element of irpo- alpeo-is, the will of the end, or fiovXrjo-is. The first question is whether the will has for its proper object the real good, (rdyadov,) or that which presents itself to US as good, (to (paivopevov dyaOov). (70.) 2. to (SovXrjTOV, the object of pov\r)cuWat) as good, and an object of pursuit, — the dya66v presents itself as r)8v ; while to the bad man the rjbv presents itself as dya06v : the views of the rjdv and the ). The view we take, then, of the several ends we propose to ourselves depending upon our frame of mind, (e£ts,) this is an dpxn ev fjpiv ; and therefore the choice of ends is voluntary. (75.) 5. dia rrjp T]8ovr)v, the propension to pleasure, as plea- sure, which exists in us, as we should say, by nature. Aris- totle would ascribe it rather (though not entirely) to bad education. (76.) -Trpoaipeo-is, then, as described by Aristotle, is an act of deliberate choice, by a moral agent, of a certain end, by cer- tain means : the whole action lies before the mind, and is resolved upon in all its details ; the choice of the end, the selection and adoption of the several means, implies volun- tariness and responsibility on the part of the agent. On this act of deliberate choice follows the carrying it out, of which more will be said in the latter part of bk. vi. It may be added here, that there is no more accurate description of a virtuous moral action than that given in the second collect at Evening Prayer, — holy desires, good counsels, just works. "Why irpoaipevis is generally used for " good counsels," see note 79 : for the effect of character on our moral judgment, see bk. vii. CHAPTEE V. (77.) Having thus shewn that each of the parts of npoaipeo-Ls is iv rjplp, he now uses this to shew that the actions proceeding 60 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. v. 1, 2, from it are voluntary. Plato held the contrary opinion, De Legg. ix. 860, D, oi kukoi names eh ndvra elv ^yelrai ovbeva avOpcoTTcov eKovra igapaprdvetv, ovbe alcrxpd re ml mm eKovra epyd- £e6ev : to this he answers by his proof that vpoaipeo-is in itself and its parts is an dpxf\ iv fjfxiv. 2. Natural desires, corruption of nature : the dpxr) is iv fjplv, and therefore the action voluntary. 3. Acquired habits, — dpxfj iv rjpiv, and therefore voluntary. 4. Wrong impressions from external things, the apxo is egcodev : he answers this by shewing that as this impres- sion ((jyavTaaia) arises from our character and tone of mind, as well as from external things, we are responsible for it, as having formed that character and tone ; and, further, that this v be Kal ■n poaiperav k.t.X. It is to be observed, both here and in some other places, that he confines 7rpoaipeo-is to the choice of means, whereas, in reality, it is a choice both of ends and means. The reason of this is, that where the first stage of the moral character is formed, the right end is chosen instinc- tively, without any effort on the part of the intellect, rdya- 66v presents itself as f)bi>, and then the function of the intel- lect in the choice of the action is confined to the choice of proper means : see bk. vi. chap. 12. (80.) 1. The first argument is in the first figure ; the result of the analysis of irpoaipeo-is, which has occupied the three last chapters. (81.) 2. In the Magna Moralia, i. 9, it is said that Socrates uses 3—17.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 61 this opposition between kukIu and aperf to shew that as Ka/a'a is involuntary, so must apcrf) be. (82.) 3. tovto 8' rjv k.t.X. should be in a parenthesis. This is a formula for the reference to a former admitted definition or position : see bk. v. i. 12, Gr. Grr. 398, 4. — d y a 6 o 7 s : the dative is in attraction to i$> f)plv. (83.) 4. Aristotle here alludes to a proverb, wherein, by a plau- sible antithesis, the truth of the one true clause is made to throw a shadow of truth over the other, and quietly disposes of it by pointing out which is true and which is false. (84.) 5. He then refers to another argument of the fatalists, that a man's actions cannot be said to proceed from him, — that a man is not the source whence his actions flow, — that they proceed from his nature, which he cannot help, — plea of ne- cessity in a man's nature. — r ols vvv elpripevois: what has been said about irpoaipea-is, fiovXcv vis, j3ovXij(riy, and the conclusions drawn therefrom. — d vayayelv, trace. (85.) 6. Tavra. =ra vvv elprj/xeva — v, possessed of a sense of shame. — Xe'yerai k.t-X., SC 6 /lxt) ofie pararov de 6 Odvaros. This notion, that the meeting death with firmness is the final cause of Odppos, and the perfection of dvbpeia, harmonizes with his view of man as a citizen designed for the good of the state. — ire pas yd p. Stress must be laid, in this passage, on the word bond, to mark that it was the common opinion of which Aristotle was speaking, not his own. See De Anima, i. 5. p. 25, 8okc7 yap paXXov f) ■v/^i'X'7 T o a-wpa avue^eiv : i^eXdovo'rjs yov dianvelrai Kal af)7T€Tai. The word dumveirai is taken from the Phsedo, 80, c. (105.) 11. ov priv dXXd k.t.X. The dvdpelos will be dberjs in storm or sickness ; but still his dvbpela will have no sphere for exercise. (106.) 11. oi>x ovtg) de wf BaXdrnoi. The man who is sick and the sailor in a storm look upon death nearly in the same way ; and the latter is used to illustrate the absence of dvhpcia in both cases — ol p.ev, ol 8 e, may be two sorts of OaXdrTiot. That is, in the case of the OaXdmoi, there is either (ol p.ep) utter despair of life and a dislike of a death in which there is no koXov, or (ol &?) there is a hope of escape, arising from their skill or experience : or oi p. e v may be the dvdpeloi, and ol 8e the OaXaTTiot. — o i pkv referring to the dvdpelot, being, with reference to this particular case, ddeels, (though in a different way from the OaXdrnoL,) and not dvhpeioi. The dv- 8pfios is not here dvdpelos because there is no koXop; and though his tone of mind prevents his fearing death, yet he would escape it if he could, whereas the dvbpehs would not. The sailor is dfcfjs, because his experience prevents death from threatening him as it does the landsman. Neither case is that of death being willingly met, when it is possible to avoid it, for the sake of the t6 koXov. In real dvSpeia there must be within reach a means of averting death, (oXkt),) and a counterbalancing motive to meet it. (107.) 12. dvhpl&vTai, act bravely. K ETHICS-BOOK III. [c. vii. 1—6, J CHAPTER VII. (108.) The conditions, then, of true avSpela are: — 1. The pre- sence of the really <£o/3epdV, (i. e. death). 2. cpofios, an impulse (see chap, ix.) arising from it, to avoid it, (Xwrrj). 3. A means of averting it, (olXkt)). 4. tidppos, (f)8ovf),) arising from a sense of KaXoif, — an impulse towards meeting it. 5. irpoaip^is. 6. egis, (see chap. viii. 15,) it must be ready to act on emer- gencies, without reasoning and persuading itself on each par- ticular occasion. The absence of any one of these conditions destroys the character of avbpeia. (109.) 1. In dvdpeia the Xvttt) comes first, and is balanced by r^bovT] ; alo-Brjo-is presents the 6(3os, must not be mere animal courage, nor yet a mere fear of shame, but must be suggested by a sense of KaXdV. The final cause which should set men on right action is the na\6v, to which the sense of good desert is attached, so that it shall be f)8v : see iii. 1. 11, to Se dia. — koKov ped' r}8ovf]s. The koK6v in the Rhetoric is defined as having a twofold source, — either our internal impressions, 6 av ayadov bv, rjdv 17 on ayadov, or the praise of men, o alperov ov, enaiveTov ecm. The notion of icakov embraces both these, — one in its sense of beautiful, the other in its sense of honourable. The *aXdV, as the motive of virtue, must be an internal sense of right and good desert, (see note 101,) not only iiraiverou : see chap. viii. sect. 1. (112.) 5. (tar* a £ I a v. == as 0V1 in section 2, — with the additional notion of " as becomes him. 11 (113.) 6. 7r a o- x * * tai ^parrei, both enduring and doing, — passive as well as active. Leonidas would be an instance 0—12.] ETHICS—BOOK III. 07 of the latter ; a martyr, to whom a pardon is offered on con- dition of apostacy, of the former. (114.) 6. reXos Se k.t.X. The h€o-6tt)s between the two extremes fulfils the conditions of aperf, a Set, &c. He now shews more definitely that it has for its object t6 kcc\6v, because that which is in accordance with the habit (r6 Kara rrjv egtv) is the re'Xo? ; that is, if the egis is koXov, this is its reXos, — if the egis is alaxpop, al(Txpov is its reXos : and dvdpeia is Kakou, therefore the reXos is koXov, for everything takes its character (6pt£crv 8e vn€ pfiaXXovrav. Each of the extremes stands in a double relation,— an excess of one principle, a deficiency of the other ; and hence vireppaXXovrcov is used for both extremes. Even d(pofila (the deficiency of fear) may be viewed as an excess of ddppos, though different from the real excess, (6pav cv€\7rl8a>v: no (pofiepov, — there is however a 8«- j/dz>, which distinguishes these from the next sort. e. e £ dyvoias : no cpofiepov, or rather no beivov. (122.) 1. fj no X it ikx). It is difficult to find any equivalent word for this; "political" does not convey the required meaning; it may be called the courage displayed by citi- zens, as citizens, i. e. which would not influence them if they were removed from social life. — p dXia-ra yap eomev: first TroXirtK^, for this is most like the true. — e k tS>v v6 pav: see Thuc. ii. 39. (123.) 2. IlovXvddpas k.t.X. : see II. xxii. 100. Aiopr}8rjs: H. viii. 148. (124.) 3. bi* dpeTrjv. It arises from a good state of mind, viz. respect for oneself and others, (alSS),) and the desire for KaXov in the shape of honour ; but not like dvbpcia, from that inter- nal koKov which is its own reward. (125.) 4. els tcivto, SC. Tots ttoXitikoIs — ov 8e k.t.X. II. j3. 391 ; and quoted again Pol. iii. 14. — r v n r o v r e s : see Hdt. vii. 223. (126.) 6. 86 ev Ka\ k.t.X. Protagoras, 350 ; Laches, 195. (127.) 6. Kevd, al. Kawd: both have MSS. authority. Michelet quotes from Tacitus, Hist. ii. 69, " inania belli ;" and Cicero c. viii. 1—16.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 09 ad Att. v. 10, " scis enim dici quaedam iravim, dici item ra Kcva tov 7roXf/xou." Koivd, on the other hand, is supported by Thue. iii. 30, r6 naivbv tov noXtpov : so Dion. 40, r 6 Kai- vbv tov noXepov fj pir ao-e : and again, Diod. Sic. xx., dXrjdes etvai oti ttoXXgi to. k. a i v a tov iroXepov. If the former is preferred, we must translate it " vain alarms ;" if the latter, "surprises." Section 15, "iv to Is a<\>vih lots <£d/3oi?" seems to favour naivd. — a v v e co p d k a a i v, take in at a glance. (128.) 7. TToirjo-ai: sc. kcikov, act on the offensive — oirola dv c'itj: the av belongs to the clr), — which may be. Gr. Gr. 832. (129.) 8. I b t a> r a i s, amateurs. (130.) 9. Ta ttoXitikcl, forot 7roXir at, opposed to the merce- naries, o-Tpa.Ti£)Tai — tVl T

t a r o v : see Arist. Nub. 445 : so hai and hapol, Plato. "O prj pos: II. xvi. 529 ; II. v. 510 ; Odyss. xxiv. 317. (132.) 10. 6vp6s is the animal instinct, which, when regulated and elevated into a rational instinct, and directed towards the koKov, may become dvbpela : it is the natural instinct towards doing and suffering. — vo-iKcoTaTi], en- grained in our nature. — f) bid tov 6vp6v, sc. Xeyopevrj dvbpeia. (134.) 12. to bi dXyrj b 6v o s, SC. ret Orjpia. — did t a v r a, for the sake of Xvnrjpov in 6pyf), and rjbv in Tipcopia. (135.) 13. did ra 7rpoeipr)peva, SC. bid to KaXov koi a>s 6 Xoyos. (136.) 15. rfTTov i< irapao-Kevrjs, less a matter of prepara- tion. — rd be e£ai(f)vr)s k.t.X. That is, Xoyiapds is merged in the egis, so that the impulses of passion and the sugges- tions of reason are both lost in the rational instinct. (137.) 16. d^i'w/Lta, no notion of their own powers.— exei i/o i Se, SC. exovai-d^iapa. (138.) 16. oi 'Apyeiot: Xen. Hell. iv. 10. The Spartans, arm- ing themselves with the shields of the vanquished Sicyonians, 70 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. ix. 1—6 ; advanced upon the Argives, who, taking them for Sicyonians, received them with contempt, but when they found out who they really were, fled. CHAPTEE IX. (139.) In this chapter he shews that Xwi/ and rfbovr} are the real springs of dvbpeia, and that it is the regulation of the Ximrj, (v kvkX<*, by circumstances. — e 1 7r e p adpKivov, if they are flesh and blood. — 7r as 6 novos, SC ecrri \vTrrjp6v— TaxiTa : to. iv kvkXoo. (141.) 3. K al Zkopti: see Gr. Gr. 599. 3. (141.) 4. t<5 ToiovTto. Compare this with what Socrates says in the Phsedo, 62. (142.) 5. ov 8f] k.t.X. ov 817, al. olde, not in all: it does in o-axppoo-uin], for instance, in which there is enjoyment in moderate indulgence, besides that arising from the koXov. In dvbpda it arises from the Ka\6v alone. — e^oirrfTai, at- tains to : to evepye7p is the supplied nom. Michelet, — " aliter quam in fine positum est." (143.) 6". Srpanwraj k.t.X. Take these Words, ovbev KeXevei Kpario-Tovs e I v a 1 (rrparicoras, prj tovs toiovtovs, (sC, tovs dpeTrjv e'xovras irdo-au) dXXd k.t.X. " There is no reason why the best soldiers should be, not these above-mentioned but, those who, though having less dvdpeia, have less to lose in dying." CHAPTER X. (144.) cracppoo-vvrj, which, as it is treated of here as one of the virtues, is the regulation of the animal impulses of pleasure, has, both in Aristotle and in strictly classical Greek, especially c. x. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 71 in its adjectival form of aaxppwv, the far wider signification of self-control : so that araxppav is sometimes used almost in the same sense as cppopipos, and it has this signification, — first, in a metaphorical or applied sense, — for as aperf generally is nepl rjdovas koL Xvnas, SO crcocppoo-vvr] is 7rep\ fjdovas Kai \v7ras in their simplest form ; secondly, because the regulation of the animal impulses is so difficult, that he who has really won the mastery over them must have arrived at a considerable degree of moral virtue ; and thirdly, because, since all wrong actions spring from wrong notions and conceptions of fjdovrj and \v7rrj in general, the right regulation of the all-powerful motive seems right action, (£ei ttjv cppovrjaiv : bk. vi. 5. 5). (145.) 1. avr a i, sc. o(Sia. The objects which excite them are presented simply by a'lo-drjo-is, without the intervention of reason (a'Xoya) ; while the impulses of the other virtues, such as ambition, are taken cognizance not by a't(rdr)(ris alone, but by a'tcrBrja-is and reason, (oidev TrdaxovTos tov crcapaTos a\\a pdWov rrjs biavolas). They are votjtlkoX opegeis, which could hardly rise up in an animal who was without some share or shadow of reason or intelligence. (146.) 1. 7rep\ rjbovds. As in dvdpela the Xxnrrj (cpopos) is regu- lated and counteracted by the rjdovrj, (Odppos,) so in o-cocppoavpr} the r]8ovrj is counteracted and regulated by the Xvirrj arising from a sense of the ala-xpdv, which is, so to say, the negative side of the na\6v : (chap. xii. 1, rj peu yap 8i* fjdovrjv, — f) 8e Bid Xvvrjv). Eirst of all a desire arises,— if it be a bad one, there arises almost coincidently a sense of the bad desert which will wait upon it ; and this acts, or ought to act, as a check upon Our passions ; hence it is yjttov ml ovx opoicos nepl Xirrras. (147.) 1 . aKoXao-la. Mark the derivation. The state where no correction can avail, — thorough depravity, — where all sense of alarxpdv is lost. —

$ \eyovcr, 6 KvOrjpios yvgaro rpicov ex* lv Pdpvyya nrjxecov. — avra, al. avra: see Grr. Grr. 656. 1, and obs. (153.) 11. rj £S> a. This gives at once a simple and yet complete definition of the subject-matter of o-cocppocrvvrj. — rpi'^ewy, friction. — e pfiaa-las, warmth, as in a bath. c. xi. 1—5.] ETHICS.-— BOOK III. 73 CHAPTER XL (154.) Having thus discussed o-axppoo-vvr) in its relation to the affections, and explained what sorts of pleasure and pain come properly within the sphere of o-axppoo-vvr), he now goes on to shew how far propensions or desires are regulated by this habit of mind. — iniBvpla, when distinguished from ybovr), differs from it, in that it springs from eVdeta, and therefore is painful : see below, sect. 6. (155.) 1. icoivai, universal, generic. idiat, peculiar and indi- vidual. €7ri6eTol acquired. (156.) 2. Tjfxerepov, to be of our own making; nevertheless, Nature has some hand in it. — I via k.t.A. Every one has particular objects which are to him more pleasant than ge- neral ones. (157.) 3. e(j) ev, in one direction, viz. in quantity ; while in the ifitat emdvfilai, as he tells us below, the vTrepfHokr) is not only in indulging too much, but indulging at wrong times, &c. ; all which shew the passion within us to be stronger and less under control than it ought to be. (158.) 3. avrrjv, SC. yaoripa, Or rr)v (fivoiKrjv imdvpiav. (159.) 4. 7rcpi tcls Id i as t &> v f)bov£>v. 7)dova>v IS used here instead of imOvpiStv, because, in reality, the peculiar pro- pensions are not from the ivoelai of nature, but from parti- cular views of pleasure ; these give rise to emOv/iicu : see chap. i. note 40. In the other sort, emOvpla exists previously to any notions of pleasure whatever. (160.) 4. I) to> [xaWov fj ms oi TroXXot, more than most men do ; x a ^P eiv <» s °' L noXkoi could never, in Aristotle's view, make a man aKoXao-ros. — r) ws: for fj, see Gr. Gr. 779, obs. 2. (161.) 4. p,Krr)r6v is to alcrxpov what iirawerov is to Kakov ; the one referring to the disapprobation of others, the other to that of our consciences. : j (162.) 5. He first takes the two habits of mind in relation to 178014 and then to 6Vi%u'a.— ^ e k t 6 v is evidently a less strong term than /xio-^rdV : it expresses the opinions of men, while L 74 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. xi. 6-8 ; the other expresses their feelings. — 7repi ras Xvnas. aa>- cfipoavvrj is not, like uvbpda, the regulating and counteracting of pain by pleasure, but of pleasure by pain. Pain does not enter into the composition of cruxppoovvr), as presenting objects whence the moral action springs : o-axppoo-vvr) is not resistance to an attack of Xvnr), nor aKoXaaia the yielding to it. As far as Xv-irr] is concerned, the aKoXao-ros feels pain when he fails of his desire ; and to the adxppcov the absence of the object of desire is accompanied by pain. And so far pain is connected with these states of mind ; but rjdovrj is the essence of them. (162.) 6. 6 pev ovv k.t.X. In the matter of imBvpia, again, the aKoXaa-Tos is its slave, and as every ZinOvpia is a painful feeling, the success as well as the failure of the aKokaaros causes him pain ; and hence may be seen the folly and absurdity of such a man, (^citottco Se 'ioiici). (163.) 7. Asceticism was unknown to Aristotle. What would he have said to those who refused the good things of Grod's providing merely because they were good ? (164.) 8. The araxppav has his notions of rjbovrj purified and chastened ; his imdvpiai moderated and directed. (165.) 8. oo-a de ir p 6 s k.t.X., al. a. The final] causes of these bodily appetites are evidently the health and [well-being of the body. Whatever the o-axppcov seeks will either contribute directly to these, or, at the least, not binder them. This rule for cases where positive laws are not laid down, is of uni- versal application, and one much to be remembered as a practical law of action. (166. ) 8. our cd? e^cov, SC. opeyopevos tcdv aXXcov f}bea>v, epnobicav tovtols. — v ir € p t T) v o v cT I a v, beyond his means. CHAPTEEX II. (167.) It might be argued that there was some excuse for aico- Xcio-tos, inasmuch as he was ^hurried away by passion, while the beiXos acted more slowly. In this chapter Aristotle, who always shews a peculiar abhorrence of dKoXaala, proves the contrary. c. xii. 1—9.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 75 (168.) 1. fj /x€v yap k.t.X. dicokao-ia is the excess of the influ- ence of r)8ovf), unmoderated by the Xvnt] of shame ; SeiXla is the influence of \v7rrj, uncontrolled by the i)bovrj of koKov. — a IpcTop: hence aKoXao-la is more voluntary. (169.) 2. dio Kal iiroveibio-Toirtpov Kal yap k.t.X.: being voluntary, it is a reproach to any one who falls into it, for he must do so voluntarily ; and it is easy to habituate one- self against it ; for there are so many f)8ea in life that a man may, without much trouble, exercise himself in temperance : while dvdpeia, from the comparatively rare opportunities for its exercise, w r hich are to most men few, and always attended with pain and risk, is less easily attained. (170.) 3. dogeie re k.t.X. Voluntariness is mostly tested by the to. koB' emo-Ta : and hence, as no one wishes to be SetXo'y, and only is so under pressure from without, it is less volun- tary at the moment of action than aKoXao-la, where the motive cause of the evil is eVitfu/Ata and opegis from within. aKoXao-la, however in the abstract, is as little an object of desire as beiXia, (to 5' oXou tJttov ovdels yap k.t.X.) : in this respect both are equally (if at all) involuntary. — r olj Kaff eKao-Tov: the dative marks the middle term of the argument : Gr. Gr. 609. 5. (171.) 3. avrf], SC a-KoXao-La. (172.) 6. fieTevr)V€x8ai } to be applied. — iv tovtois, SC 7rcu3tot9. (173.) 7. e v 7T€ lS e s, the 110111. IS to aio~xp<*>v opeydjxeuov. — Kal 7rav- raxo ev, from whatever quarter it comes. — t6 avyyeves, that which is kindred to it in the soul, or that whence it springs. — Michelet, " that which is in our nature." (174.) 7. The notion of the struggle between l-mBvpla and Xoyos, so frequently spoken of by Aristotle, the key-stone of his Ethics, as applied to education, would suggest the great problem of all systems of education, — how to subdue the passions to the reason, — the great difficulty of right action, and, even apart from the Scriptures, the best proof for the necessity of divine grace. (175.) 8. avTas, SC. imOvpLOiv evepyeias. (176.) 9. ap.VTa 6 i avra to. xpw aTa * (10.) 18. to vne pfidWe iv. This has no connection with the i>7rep[3o\r), ( going beyond the mean,) but simply to give largely, — more than most people would, or more than what might have been expected of him. (11.) 19. to yap pr) fiXeireiv. Here, again, we have the ab- sence of self as an ingredient of virtue. — o vbiv 8e KT€ poi k.t.X., are, it would seem, more given to liberality. — n apaXafiovTes, inheriting it. (13.) 21. iyKaXeiTai: neuter passive : blame is thrown on. (14.) 23. ao-a>Tos: from a and crw^co. — tv pdvvovs, monarchs. (15.) 24. enopevai, thus connected with each other. ivavTiai, opposed to each other. (16.) 25. Xynrja-eTai. This will shew /xera/xeXeia, and make the action ovk (Kovaiov. (17.) 26. hvvaTai ad i k el a 6 ai, is open to wrong. (18.) 27. Sipcovidr]. He was notorious for his love of money : see Rhet. iii. 2 ; Arist. Pax, 698, Sipcovlo'Tjs ; irm ; 6ti yepwv &v Ka\ o-airpos Kfpbovs ff/cart kciv mti pinos nXeoi. 78 ETHICS.— BOOK IY. [c. i. 29—40, (19.) 29. 7t\t)v earl piKpols, but in small matters, or with petty objects. Liberality is displayed in large gifts as well as small ; but illiberality shews itself in petty gains. Where the wickedness is on a large scale, it is hardly illiberality, but rather nXeovegia: see sect. 44. — rot ttjs do- cot Las, the actions of da cot i a. (20.) 30. en- ci. Michelet rightly observes that «rei does "not always require an apodosis, but can stand independently for moreover, then, thus : see bk. vi. 8. 6. This may be an elliptic construction for "since this is so, then," &c. — ov -ndw v can, in physical truth, discern the true point ; so can the p.€ydXonpeirr)s in his habits of life and expenses. — e fifieXcos, in Jit proportion. (39.) 6. rj e£ts opi^erai rat? ivepyeiais (sc. raj npknovn Iv npenovn npbs avrov.) — r rj v t) an dvq v t SC d£lav eivai. (40.) 10. o to v piyeOos. This is a difficult passage: the best interpretation seems to be to join it with eXevdepiorrjTos : u In these the p,eyd is the characteristic of the p,ey aXon penrj ? ;" as it were an increased degree of liberality, which has the same subject-matter ; or if ravra be read : is on these matters. eXevde- piorrjs, on a large scale ; or it may be : "But in these points the peyd of the fieyaXonpenrjs comes in, as if it were a great- ness of something ; the notion of greatness is^ implied in the 80 ETHICS.— BOOK IV. [c. ii. 10—20 ; very term of magnificent. The peyaXonpeTr-qs has the character- istic of greatness, though iXevdepiorrjs is concerned with the very same actions." (41.) 10. Kal a no r ?j s 10-77? k.t.A. : and not only when the thing done is greater in itself, " but even when the expense and pains are equal, the ixeya\o7rpenf}s will produce something more magnificent." Aspasius, quoted by Michelet, illustrates this by saying that the Olympian Jupiter of Pericles was more magnificent than if, at the same cost, he had made a smaller statue, but more richly adorned : in this case, too, the peyd of the fieya\o7rpe7rr)s exhibits itself. p.eydk<£pa>i/, a man of well-ordered mind ; modest. This word has a generic sense of controlling in some one way or other and restraining our natural tendencies; and the particular sense varies according to the context. (50.) 5. do-re lot, natty, and well made. (51.) 6. 6 8e fxe i (6 v co v rj agios ov nas \avvos. The essence of x a vvos is that he is dvdgios fieydXav : — if a man is agios fxeyd\a>v, and thinks himself agios p.cyiaroav, this is rather a Spurious p.eyaXo^rvxia than x a ^votr)S. (52.) 7. a v 8 6 g e i e v, SC. p.iKp6^rvx os ehat. (53.) 8. ol d e, the others. (54.) 9. 7rept ei>, SC. 6 6eo\s diroveixofi€v = rip.rjv. — r) b* dgia k.t.X. This is put in to confine it to its particular subject-matter, viz. some one of i-a Zktos dyaOd. (55.) 11. avcv \6yov, without argument, — of itself. (56.) 13. ov firjv top yc k.t.X. SC ivpbs top ye k.t.X. (57.) 15. 7ra/3ao-et(raj/Tt, demissis manibus ; wringing his hands. — fte'ya, of consequence. (58.) 16. Koa-fio s, the setting of the virtues. (59.) 17. tg> fir) exciv: dative of cause considered as instru- ment : see Gr. Gr. 607. (60.) 20. a 8' a fi (p (o t SC. fj dperrj Kai rd egtodev dyaOd. (61.) 21. eKeivav pep, others. — a vroi, they themselves do what they fancy ; their life is without rule : hence they are vnc- pOTTTCll. (62.) 24. 6 v u d p g a s, he who first did him a kindness. (03.) 25. ovs av: ovs is in attraction, while Z>v in the next clause depends directly on p,vrjp,opeveiv. 25. Qenv. II. a. 503. — oi AaKwcs. The interchange of the infinitive, (Xe'yeti/,) and finite verb, (eXeyop, implied after AdKoves,) is curious : in the former, the notion in Aristotle's mind was that Homer had not made Thetis Xf yew, &c. ; in M 82 ETHICS.-BOOK IV. [c. iii. 26-37, the other, that ol Adiccoves did not, as a fact, recount, &c. : or it is possible that in the former construction 816 is equi- valent to tovto cutiov eVrt, after which X£ye«> would follow naturally. (64.) 26. ri poyis, or very reluctantly. — ev ineivois, al. eV, but not so well. (65.) 27. a XX' fj, except. (66.) 28. The former reading of several MSS. — Trapprjo-iaa-riKos yap Oia to KaraCppovrjTiKos eivai, kol Trapp-qo-UMTTiubs Be bio KaraCppovrjTiKos Ka\ dXrjdevTinos k.t.X. — is evidently corrupt. The reading in the text is given in one MS., and makes good sense. Perhaps to Kara(ppovr)TiKbs elvai might have been substituted from the majority of MSS. for naracppovelv ; and the following words, which really create the difficulty, may have easily crept in, by some carelessness, from the preceding line. (67.) 28. n\riv oo-a pi), except what ; after the analogy of itXtjv « pr], except — o o~a prj Kai = el prj nva. — e X p ov a, al. el pa- ve lav. He does not think it worth while to say what he really means to the common sort. (68.) 29. 7rp6s a\\ov £r)v: literally, to live looking to another ; to order his life by another. {69.) 31. avBpa>i?6\oyos, he does not talk of men or human life, but of something higher. (70.) 32. o- 77 o v b d £ o v r o s, of one who cares for such things. (71.) 34. Xe£ts orrao-t/xos, and his style stately. — o- vvtopos, eager. (72.) 33. oi8' ovtol: see chap. ii. 22. (73.) 35. duvTjpoi, lazy; not caring to take the trouble to act worthily of themselves; al. poepoi, sharp, i.e. looking too sharply into themselves ; al. v vv po s, an evi- dence of such a character being practically unrecognised. (82.) 5. (paiverai Se k.t.X. "When contrasted with (fiikoTtpla, such a well-regulated desire of honour would seem short of what was proper ; when with d^iXorifiia, it would seem to exceed it ; while contrasted with both at once, it would seem, in some way or other, to combine both : it would seem to be either, according to the light in which it was held. (83.) 6. eoiKe k.t.\. This, it seems, is the case in the other virtues, — the mean is opposed to each and both the extremes, while the extremes are only accidentally opposed to each other, as being each opposed to the mean ; but here the only apparent opposition is between the two extremes, as the mean, though really existing, is not practically recog- nised : hence over-ambition seems to be directly opposed to under-ambition ; but in reality each is opposed to a well-regulated ambition. CHAPTEE Y. (84.) 1. fxea-orrjs irepi opyds. The regulation of those emotions of our irascible nature, (Top. iv. 5, 5. p. 172, r) hi opyrj iv t<3 6vtxoeideL : cf. Top. ii. 7. 4. p. 133,) which are created by the actions of others towards us, and in which 0vp.6s, with r)bovi) attached to it in prospect, (see Ehet. ii. 2. 2,) furnishes the impulse, rather than any pleasurable opegis : it is 6'/>efis pera Xvnrjs, not peff r)bovr)s, (sect. 10, Ttfiwpla rravet rrjs dpyr)s, noiova-a rjbovrjv dvrl Xvntjs). For the meaning and function of Bv/ios, see bk. iii. note 10. (85.) 1 . dvavvfxov ovtos k.t.X. There is some difficulty in treating of this virtue, because it does not seem as if there were three distinct degrees or forms of anger; both opyrj and npaoTrjs which are the only recognised forms in which this nados shews itself, being rather simple affections, than affections controlled or uncontrolled : hence ivpaoTrjs is by some men, and under certain circumstances, looked upon as the right habit of mind, and at other times, 6pyr) : but Aristotle contents himself with shewing that in their praise and blame men do recognise a mean between rage and insensibility*; that this 3-14 ; c. vi. 2, 3.] ETHICS.— BOOK IV. 85 mean or regulation of anger, which he calls 7rpa6n]s, is stamped as the virtue of these instincts of our nature by that appro- bation of men which in the end of the first book he laid down as the standard or sign of virtue, (see sect. 14, infra : to ye roaovrov br/Xov on f) p.ev pear] e£is i-naiveTi]), (86.) 3. |3ov\fToi yap- see bk. iii. note 15. (87.) 6. to 8e npoirrjXaKiCofievov k.t.X. It is scarcely neces- sary to call attention to the contrast between this feature of heathen ethics and Christianity. — nepiopav, sc. 71730707- XaKi£opevovs. (88.) 7. oXoKXrjpov, occupied the whole character ; or was developed in all its points. (89.) 8. avTcnrobiboao-iv, return the injury ; al. airobiboao-w. — 17 (pavepoi e I o- 1, in the way in which their anger is felt, (see Ehet. ii. 2. 1, and 3. 16). Michelet takes it, " so that through their sharpness of mind they discover their anger ;" but it seems better to join 8th ogvTrjTa with avrcmohtboaa-tv, and to take ?; cpavcpoi as above, especially when we refer to the charac- teristic given in the Ehetoric, as to the necessity of their revenge being felt to come from them : they do not wish to do a harm secretly, but openly. (90.) 12. Tjj irpaoTrjTi-. the lack of anger is merely an excess of the controlling principle ; for anger is the instinct which, being properly regulated, becomes irpaoTrjs, — p.b\XXov y [ve- ra t, SC. r) vnepftoXr). (91.) 14. The mean, though dva>vvp.os, is recognised by the praise of men generally as the virtue of this part of our nature. CHAPTEE VI. (92.) We come to the virtues of the social, or what perhaps may be more properly called the sociable, instincts of man. (93.) 2. toIs e'vTvyxavovaiv, in whose society they may be. (94.) 3. oTi f] p.ecrr) e g t s iiraiveTr). The point proved in this chapter likewise is, that the mean is recognised as the virtue of the sociable instincts, considered apart from , to grieve for them. (97.) 6. kg66\ov k.t.X. : speaking of it generally in its abstract character, it is merely habitual propriety in social intercourse ; but when we consider how far it takes cognizance of what is individually or socially right, (dvafopav npbs to ko\6v kcu to crvfxfiepov,) we shall find that it is habitual propriety in regard of the sympathies of social life, and the pleasures and pains attached to them ; that such pain and pleasure is the subject-matter of it, and that the mean consists in the regu- lation of our natural desire to please and sympathize with others, (v has no formulae or system to guide him in the choice and treatment of his subject-matter; but uses whatever comes to hand, just as it may for the time suit his purpose, of making him seem a greater man than he is : what he says is not even always false, but simply so said as to produce false impressions about the greatness of his own merits. Others translate rfj bwdpei by what he can do, by his having the power to do so, — referring to Top. iv. 5. 7, p. 170 ; but the passage seems to refer to something else, — to the cases where the person has been blamed merely because lie has it in him to do wrong, whereas the will (jrpoaipeo-is) is the point in question. — r w toio o~8 e elvai, i. e. by his disposition, (irpoaipeaei). (106.) 12. axrirep Kai yfreva-TTjs, k.t.X. as the liar is SO, i. e. Kara rfjv €%iv Kai ra> roi6o~de dvai ; — one sort lying for the mere sake of lying, the other from his tendency to ambition or covetous- ness, (86%r)s opcyopevos rj Kepbovs) ', or axrtvep Kai ylrevcrrrjs may be in a parenthesis, as the liar proper, and 6 piv and 6 be refer to two sorts of d\d£ove s, and not of -v^eOcrrat. (107). 13. o2 p,ev ovv k.t.X. Supply eariv after icf> ols', after k e p $ o v s, Supply aka^ovevopevoi 7rpo(moiovvTai roiavra %>v Kai k.t.X. — bia\ade\v which may be undetected, if they do not exist: pretensions which cannot be tested; as a false prophet, or a quack, can always give reasons why their predictions or their remedies turn out wrong — pdvnv a-ocpov, al. pdvnv rj v QavKibav o eaTiv eibos vnob^pdrcov 1q)vikv AaKo>va>v ecr6f}s: the ultra-simplicifcy of the Spartan costume is in reality not modesty, but conceit. Cf. Xen. de Rep. &c, ii. 3. 4. (111.) 16. ifi7To8 6v, be/ore one's feet, — obvious. CHAPTEE VIII. (112.) 1. 6 fiiXla e/i/ifXijy, a certain well-timed sociability. Another virtue of social life consists in the proper regu- lation of the instincts towards relaxation and society. (113.) 3. p&fAoXoxoi'- properly, those that waited about the altars to get the refuse of the sacrifices ; a lickspittle, buffoon. (114.) 4. evrpdneXo i, witty. We have a similar metaphor in our welt-turned jest, compliment, &c. — x aptcvres, amusing, pleasing. (115.) 4. €7ri7roXdCovros, being very common. Cf. bk. i. 4. ras fiakiara irnnoXa^ovcras bogas. (116.) 5. e iv 1 b e £ 1 6 t r) s, neatness, tact. (117.) iv ir ai8ias p <•' p e e, jestingly, in sport. (118). 6. vnovoia, the under or hidden sense; wit, jest, play on words. (119). 9. e'Set is /cat a k a> it t e i v, perhaps they ought to have forbidden joking a person. (120.) 10. tjtt(ov eo-Ti k.t.X., is a slave to his jest. CHAPTER IX. (121.) 1. TrdOei. This albas is one of the elements of s) of his doing what was wrong ;" but this is really and practically impossible (ovk. ev ivavriatv : the opposite habit does not belong to opposite results, i.e. an habit which has some other habit opposed to it, cannot produce the results which belong to that opposite. Thus health cannot produce the same result as sickness, but the art of medicine may be used 6—11.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 91 to produce either. Some commentators leave out ov; i. e. "but the contrary habit is of (i. e. has) contrary results." The sense is much the same. (5.) 6. irXeovax&s Xeyrjrai, spoken of in more senses than one. — o> s iv\ to noXv, not in all cases : the Paraphrast in- stances . (6.) 7. a\Xa fiia to o~v v eyyv s k.t.A. For opcovvpla, see Ca- teg. i. 1. Where the identity of name arises from a close similarity between the things, the difference between them is apt to be overlooked. (7.) 8ia(f)opa. ff Kara rrjv I S ea p, the generic difference. (8.) 8. ac a I 6 apco-off, al. Kal tidiKos ; but the former is the better, dividing a8iv p-opioov avTrjs rfj 7rokiTiKrj Koivcovla. — This is 0X77 8iKaio(rvvr), which com- prehends under it the diKcuoavvr) /car' dperrjv, and r) iv p.epei BlKaiOO~VVT). (15.) It may be as well to give at once the scheme of diKmoo-vvij, as it will throw light on what is coming : — a. o\t) biKaioarvvT), (given in ch. i. 13,) the whole system of political arrangement (v6p.ipLov), the dBiKia of which is irapd- vo ov in its widest sense. /3. t) Kara rr)v oXrjv dperrjv, (ch. i. 14 and 19,) ordering and encouraging habits and acts of the several virtues ; the ddinia of which is not avio-ov, but napdvopiov, though this in its wider sense comprehends both divisions. This exists first as an habit energising in the performance of virtues considered as duties towards others ; secondly, as a political system of laws, rewards, punishments, guiding to such an habit. y. t) iv fiepei rrjs oXrjs, (ch. ii.), regulation of political union ; the dbiKLa of which is avio-ov. This exists first as a political regulation of the principles of political union, and of distri- butive, retributive, catallactic arrangements, (napd ttjv aperr]*); secondly, as a habit of mind or disposition towards acting on such principles, {iv p.ipei dper^s,) a regulation of the covetous tendencies with especial view to others : hence it is that this 8iKaioo-vvr) is said at one time to be irapa ttjv dperqv, (ch. ii. 7,) and at another, iv p.ipu dperrjs, (ch. ii. 1). (16.) 13. 7T do- iv, democracy : d piarois, aristocracy ; rj to?s kv p io is, or the governing body. — rj ko.t dWov r tva rpo- 7tov toiovtov t) KaT d p € t rj v, selected for virtue or some other principle, such as wealth, birth, &c. The difference between the apto-roi and the Kvpioi nar dperrjv would be, that in the former the interest of the better sort, whether in office or not, would be consulted ; in the latter, the interest only of those who in consequence of their merit hold office : the latter would be rather oligarchical, fj op.oderr)Tai rrepl rraideiap, ch. ii. 11). (18.) 15. dp err} reXela. Here then is solved the question started at the outset, (bk. i. ch. vii. 16,) and this gives the middle term for the syllogism of the book : — "Whatever is reXetorarjy dperr) performs the epyop of man ; tjOikt] dperr) -rrpos erepop is this (for it = ducaioo-vprj, which is reXeioraTrj dperr)) ; rjducr) dperr) TTpos erepop performs the epyop of man. In the after-part of this book he shews that there is no higher law, or epyop, than diKaioarvpr), as he has before shewn that each particular fieaoTrjs performs the epyop of the passions or tendencies to which it belongs, making the habit of mind good, with relation to oneself and to others. (19.) 15. oi>x affXws, not without some limitation ; not in its most literal sense. — oiiff "Eo-nepos k.t.X. This saying is ascribed to Euripides, Theognes, or Aristotle himself, all equally without authority. (20.) 15. reXela pd\io~ra: because it is social, which is the highest standard we can take for man, as man. r)6iKrj dperr) taken dnXcos could not have been the dperr) of social man, but it becomes so when it is connected with diKaioavprj. (21.) 16. dpxv &vbpa dci£ci: cf. Soph. Ant. 175. (22.) 20, ear i yap r) atrr): in themselves, they are identical ; each being the possession of the same habits and the per- formance of the same duties. — r6 p'l/rot elpai: their essence is different ; they will be differently denned. dperr)= the possession of the habits and performance of the duties with reference to individual or moral perfection, (cm\a>s)', 8i- Kaioo-vprj=t\ie possession of the same habits and performance of the duties with reference to social perfection, (v-pos erepop), to ehai is used in Aristotle in different senses, (7roX\axa>s yap rd ehat Xeyopep, Met. xii. p. 264) : when opposed to \6yos, it signifies the actual objective existence of anything, as opposed to a verbal or merely subjective notional existence, (Met. xii. 2, p. 263) ; in another sense, (as here,) it means the full mental notion or definition of the thing, as opposed to an accidental, incomplete view of it. So De Anima, iii. 2, r) be rod 94 ETHICS— BOOK V. [o. ii. 1—6, al(r8r]TOv ivepyeia Kai rrjs alaOrjaem f) airy pev ian Kai pla — to be ehai ov ravrbv avrais) : accidentally, the reception of the image of the alo-OrjTov and its transmission from the alaOyrov are the same; but in essence they differ, inasmuch as one is an energy of the subject, the other of the object : so the words spoken are the same to the hearer and speaker, but they would be differently denned in relation to each. CHAPTEE II. (23.) 1. There is some difficulty in determining the exact relation in which f] iv pepei biKaioavvr) stands to biKaioavvr) in general, and to r)6iKri apery ; whether the iv pepei refers to its being a subdivision of bi an d thus having a different subject-matter 8-11.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 95 from aperfj. — i v p.* pen as being an habit of mind, or ha- bitual disposition to act fairly in these points, — a regulation of the Tjbourj dno tov Kepbovs- (28.) 8. diapia-rai k.t.X. This may be thus paraphrased : — "SUaiov being divided into napdvopov and ta-ov, there is a dtKaioo-vvrj and ddiKia proper to each, which we must discuss ; and the ddiKia and diKaioavvr) of these two stand to each other in the relation of whole and part." The object is to shew how it is that, though avio-ov and napdvopov are contrasted divisions of abiKov, yet one falls under the other as a subdivision, and of the two sorts of SUaiov corresponding to these, one is con- tained under the other, (ev pepei dperfjs,) just as nXeov and avia-ov, though likewise contrasted divisions of abiKov, stand to each other as part to whole. — j? n pore pov e\pr\p.evr\ dbiKta, SC. that which is opposed to XPW 15 °^V S aperrjs. (29.) 9. ico I to cLSikov kcl\ fj dhiKta k.t.X. The way to con- strue this is: " the abiKov and ddiKia of the irapdvopav and avia-ov (eKcivav referring to the division given above of bUaiov into irapdvopov and avurov,) are different ; the former includes as a whole the latter, just as avia-ov includes as a whole the irktov" Some editions read itapdvopov for 7rXeoi/, which confuses the passage : the MSS. vary ; but the reading in the text is the best. (30.) 9. t^s ev fie pei biKaioavvrjs: see above, note 23. — avTrj rj d 8 i k i a, SC. nepl to aviaov. — oXrjs ddncias: that is, the violation of oXrj aperf. The words " \jseyopev yap" in the first section shew that he is speaking of this particular aSiKia as a part of the violation of 0X77 apery, (Jv p,epei Kauai). (31 .) 10. npaTTOfxeva, al. 7rp oo-rarro/xeya. (32.) 11. airXas, generally, properly speaking; considered as an individual. — vo-Tepov: briefly in the last chapter of the book, but at length in the Politics. — tj ire pas: sc. whether education should be of public or private concern. (33.) 11. ov yap 'la- as k.t.X. There maybe, indeed are, states in which the rewards and punishments of the law do not coincide with the impulses and checks of conscience, nor even with the recognised duties of a moral being. It would be easy to give instances in which this is the case. In the 96 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. ii. 12, 13 ; fiekTio-TT) TroXn-eia, the model state, they would coincide. The matter is discussed in Pol. iii. (34.) 12. The motive powers of the state, answering to rj&ovr) and Xv7ri7 in an individual, are diavofirj and xp eia: > an( ^ Aristotle proceeds to shew that the perfection of the state is arrived at by a mean, and thus to confirm his view, that the perfection of an individual lies in a mean. (35.) 13. Tavyap v k.t.X. The eKovcna belong to catallactic, the a.Kovo-ia to diorthotic or corrective justice, so called from its correcting evils : distributive justice would exist even in the deXrio-TT] iroXireia, as being an adjustment of the common property which must find place in every society ; but the other would cease to exist where diKaioo-vvrj was super- seded by (f>i\ia, in that ideal state to which theorists thought it possible to mould society, and with a view to which they would admit (as Plato in his Republic) such institutions as community of property, wives, children, &c. CHAPTEE III. (36.) 1. eVet k.t.X. Since the aducos is avuros, it is further to be observed that there is a mean (fxearov) implied in the notion of avia-ov, (as containing a nXeov and eXarro*>,) viz. the 'lo-ov ; and the abiKov being aviaov, it follows («| ivavTioiv) that there is an 'Lvov : bUaiov is this 'Lvov, and hence also pio-ov ; it is not only an absolute equality (iW), but also a relative equality (/ieVoi/), as equally removed from nXeov and cXarrov : where the equality is absolute, the bUaiov will be simply 'lo-ov, but being iVoi/, it will also be a [ieo-ov ; where the equality is relative, the diKaiov will be a pea-ov between -nXeov and eXarrov, and hence also 'lo-ov : in both cases it is dlmiov ruriv ; hence the following arrangement holds : — Distrib utive justice. rbUaiov tio~lv = general, soldier. | nev : things in which, looking to the posi- BUaiov is -^ tion of the parties, there is in the Siavofii) neither nXeov nor J iXaTTov, but a /xeVoj/, — relative equality: ^see sect, 12. c.iii. 1— 11.] ETHICS.-BOOK V. 97 Catallactic justice bUaiov tktiv. Xa-ov bvoiv, absolute equality between two things, dUaiou -l without reference to their character, (see ch. iv. sect. 3,) but still, as being 'to-ov, it is a /aeow, (see iv. 6). (37.) 6. orav rj taoi prj to- a k.t.X. Here are given the two faults which prove olicelai cpQopaL to a constitution admitting them; — the French system before the revolution is an in- stance of the former, and the American constitution of the latter. (38.) 7. iXevdepiav, i.e. that every free man is entitled to an equal share. — e iyivciav. This was the principle of the old constitutions of Athens and Rome, in which the belonging to certain tribes or families was the a£ia of the constitution. (39.) 8. fxovadiKov dpiBfiov, number proper, such as 1,5,10, &c, by which we count ; 6Xa>s dptB p,ov t numbers generally, — wherever the notion of quantity exists. (40.) 9. dXXa na\ rj a-wexh^'- this is merely to answer a plausible eWrao-ts against his statement that all analogy has four terms. In arithmetic this continuous proportion may occur, (as 3 : 6 : 1 6 .* 12,) but in geometrical proportion, (eKarepov irpbs eKarepov u>s oXov npbs oXov,) which is the propor- tion of distributive justice, the same term cannot be used twice, and therefore it is not continuous : see sect. 13. Michelet thus illustrates this : — indrepov npbs eicdrepov Achilles Ajax Nummi Achilles Nummi Ajacis 8:4: 6 ; 3 €vaXKd£ Achilles Nummi Achilles : Ajax Nummi Ajacis 8 :: 6 :: 4 3 oXov npos SXoVf onep 17 vopf) iX€TpLK^: G-org. 518, A. (44.) 13. e v dyaOov Xoya y iv er at, is regarded as dyaOov. CHAPTEE IY. (45.) 1. to be XoL-rrov €v: divided into two — corrective and catallactic, — each diopOaTmov as correcting existing inequali- ties. (46.) 2. e I o- e v e x @ * v t a, the terms introduced. (47.) 3. ov8ev yap biacpepei. There may be cases where the character and circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant respectively are taken into consideration in estimating the amount which will make them equal ; that is, the (rjpia suf- fered by one, and the nepdos gained by the other, (ttjv tov fi\d(3ovs diacpopdv) : as, for instance, in an action for libel, a minister of state or a clergyman would, from his position, suffer a greater frpia than another person would from the same act, and therefore the amount of damages would pro- perly be greater ; but supposing the right value to be thus fixed for the C-qpla, then the damages would not be assessed according to the proportion existing between the parties. Thus, supposing a plaintiff in one case to = 4, and the de- . fendant 4, that is, both to be in respect of station, &c. ex- actly equal, the frpla might be represented by 3 ; while in another exactly similar act, where the two parties were un- equal in their position, as plaintiff = 6, the defendant = 2, the (jifiia might be represented as 10; and this would be the damages : whereas, if proportion was introduced, the balance would be struck thus, as 6 .* 2 : 30 ; 10, and the defendant would have to pay, not 10, the actual fr/ua, but a threefold one, — and this is what Aristotle is guarding against here. (48.) 5. Tiaiv, to some cases. — o lov, as if there was icepSos. (49.) 6. dXX' oTav k.t.X. The most proper application of these terms, though even this is improperly used in some cases, is c. iv. 1—13.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 90 of profit to the agent, loss to the patient; but when (d XX' orai/) the nddos has been estimated, that which the agent restores to the patient is called $7/ua, as well as the loss which the patient suffered at first. He seems to be ac- counting for the phrase 777 C^iq lo-dfriv, inasmuch as the term Cw' ia i s properly confined to the injury inflicted on the patient, and not to the restitution made to him. (50.) 12. This may be illustrated by the lines given in the text : — « 7 Then from yyS must be taken -yS, and added to ae, to make it equal to 0/3. The patient's and agent's case is represented by act, yy : 00 is only used to set the inequality clearly before us. — r 6 i(j> & v. This cannot properly be applied to a single line. It seems to have crept in either as part of the formula, or by a clerical error. If it is omitted, then to yd answers to t<3 ae ; and below we have t<5 yd. The passage beginning, ecrrt fie tovto kcu eVt T s, sc. ttoicTlv. (57.) 7. Xapircov lepov, moral beauty expressed in physical beauty. The number of the Graces represents the threefold sense of x<*P ls > — * ne feeling of kindness, the kind action, the kind feeling in return ; while their being interwoven repre- sents the inseparable connection which does, or at least ought to, exist between the three. (58.) 8. rj Kara 8 id /xer pov Tov, at first; at once; that is, if before the exchange takes place, the value of the two things is considered rela- tively to each other and to their producers, and then an exchange is made, (elra to avTiTrenovObs yevrjTai,) that (fair exchange) we speak of (to Xeyopevov) will take place ; — or to \ey6fievov may refer to the proverbial expression mentioned above, to dUaiov to avTineTrovdos dX\a>. — tov eKeivov epyovi partitive genitive ; al. to e, con- ventionally, (71.) oIkIcl icj) fjs, al. ; but the weight of authority is against it. — rj di-ia: the rj refers to to-ov, equal, or of the same value. (72.) 17. ov top avTbv Tpoirov: in its most prominent cha- racter, it is not 7rep\ f)8ovas Koi Xinras, a regulation of pleasures and pains, but irep\ biavoprjv koL xP e ' LCLV i a regulation of the prin- ciples of social life ; secondarily, as a habit of mind, (kv fie pet dp€Trjs,) it is a disposition to act on these principles of fair dis- tribution and exchange, arising from the proper regulation of the rjboprjv dno tov Kepdovs* (73.) 18. f) S' ddiKia, SC. Kad' rjv Aeyerat npaKTiKos tov ddiKOv. — TovvavT Lov, SC. diaveprjTiKos tov dvtaov k.t.X. — r ovto } SC. to abiKOV. (74.) 18. V7T6 pj3o\r)s Ka\ iXXeiyjreSs ecrTiv k.t.X.: because it is of the nature of vnepfioXr) and eXXeiyjns. "With regard to oneself, it is always too much of the good, and too little of the bad ; with regard to others, the d§i/a'a, which is a violation of rjBiKr] dpeTrj, (to pev o\ov,) is always the taking too much good, or not enough evil, — seeking pleasure, or shunning 104 ETHICS.-BOOK V. [ c . vi. 1, 4, pain at another's expense. — 6 polas, sc. to the case of ifi avrov just given. In the distributive injustice (to iraph to avaKoyov) it may be either vnepfiokr) or tWei^ns of good or bad, as the case may be, (SrroTepcos ervxe). It may be giving too much good, Qr too little good, or too much or too little evil, to another. CHAPTER VI. (75.) He now distinguishes briefly between unjust acts and in- justice, and proceeds to shew that the only dUaiov, or law of obligation, really binding upon man as an individual, is that 7to\ltik6v diKaiov which is equivalent to t^Qikyj aperf) ; the other sorts of bUaiov are only so in a secondary and ana- logical sense, and form no element of the dperrj or epyov of man. (76.) 1. 6 7roIa, a!. oiTola. — ovtg>, sc. looking to the acts only. (77.) 4. del 8e fxfj \av6dveiv k.t.X. The following is an analysis of DUaiov, as laid down by Aristotle : — The principles. — Natural justice. Blkcuqv airkSas bimiov. koivoSj aypacpos vopos '. Rhet. i. 10, i. 13, ii. 3. TToklTlKQV dUaiOV. tdios, yeypappevos vop.os : Rhet. i. 10, i. 13. Ii. a. imeiKeia. | /3. virepfioXr) dperrjs. cpvoutov \ vopiKov. | yeypappevos | aypacpos. aypacpos \ yeypappevos : Rhet. i. 13. 11. Common law. Statute law. Rhet. i. 13. 11. 1. dUaiov in the abstract, existing prior to any formal declaration of it by states or individuals. 2. That part of the SUaiop which is adopted by the legis- lator and embodied in the laws and institutions of the state. 3. That part of the dUaiov which the legislator did not or could not transfer to his laws or institutions, consisting — a. of the spirit of the laws, which he could only take im- perfectly, — ine'iKeia. 0. the principles or quasi duties which he did not take, (vTreppoXr] dperris) ; works of imperfect obligation. 4.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 105 4. (ftvariKov, that part of tvoXltikov which is drawn directly and positively from the abstract dltcaiov, (i.) divided into — c. That which is ordained by actual statute, {statute law). d. That which has obtained by consent, (common law). 5. vojxikov, that part of tvoXitikov which is not drawn di- rectly from natural justice, but arises entirely from the wants or whims of men ; care being taken that it is not contrary to natural justice. This, too, is divided into statute and com- mon law. (78.) 4. to £t]Tovixevov, sc. Kvpiws SiKaiov ; that St'/catoz/, the vio- lation of which would make a man uSikos. (79.) 4. tovto Se k.t.X. The only justice or law of obligation really binding upon man is the tvoXuikov ; that which is em- bodied in the laws and regulations of a social state, and w r hich is represented in the individual by qducri aperf ; for real obligation cannot exist except where there are social rela- tions. He proves this by the following argument : — S Ik a toy can exist only where there is v 6 po s, (eem yap dtKciLov oh /cat vopos irpbs avrovs,) vopos where there is dbiKia, {vopos 5' iv ols dbucia,) a 8 t k i a where it is possible to take too much good and too little evil, {tovto S' ia-TL to irXeov avrto vipxiv) ; and this can only be where there are social relations, — common properly and inter- change, (eVt koivcovcov fiiov Tvpbs to elvcu avTapKeiav,) — SO that where these social relations do not exist there can be no real diKaiov, but only icaO* 6 po i ottjt a. (80.) 4. eXevOepcov vipeiv, therefore it is clear that dbiKia, against which we are thus guarding, consists in ttXIov alra vipeiv \ hence we see that it can exist only where this inequality is possible, i. e. in Koivcovla. He seems to be bringing forward men's notion of government as an evidence of his proposition, that true biKaiov exists only where Koivoovia exists. (83.) 5. 6 apx<0V' Some persons make apxx ov iveiea coi^, a result happened which he had not thought of as the end. (104.) 8. oaa re 8ui 6vp6v k.t.X. The passion, which hurries the agent so rapidly away that he has no time to reflect, is the cause of the action, not KaKia. See bk. hi. 1. 21, where he says that desire or anger do not abstractedly destroy Uovaiov. Here he looks at what accidentally and occasionally accom- panies them. (105.) 9. dvayKoia, hunger, thirst, &c. ; s, with a deliberate intent to be unjust, so as to justify the anger of the other party. (108.) 11. fjtjT), sc. where there is irpoa'ipeo-is. (109.) 12. r a> v 8' clkovo- icov. He uses this word in a looser sense than in bk. iii. 1. 2, (where he says, 'lo-as yap ov Ka\a>s Xeyerat dicovo-ia etvai ra dia Bvpbv r) §C e7Ti6vpiav: see note 104,) for any actions done without definite Tvpoalpea-is, even those which arise from ignorance of the general principles under the im- pulse of irdBos ; such as where a starving man, under the pressure of hunger, loses sight of his knowledge of the nature of theft, and his abstract npoalpeais against it ; his act does not arise from a bad irpoalpeais, but from the pres- sure of the hunger, which obscures, for the time, his irpoaL- peais : it is therefore avyyvcopovLnov. Where the ndOos is less urgent it is not so. — hi ayvoiav : see bk. iii. note 19. CHAPTEE IX. (110.) The questions discussed are as follows : — 1. Can a man be injured if he consents to the act ? (npaTov pev — eKovres). 2. Is the recipient of an injury always injured ? (eneL — biKaicm payovvros . ) And this latter one branches off into two other points, (sect. 9). C. IX. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. ill a. Whether he -who receives, by an unjust sentence, more than he ought, is himself unjust ? /3. "Whether a man can injure himself? dr on cos, paradoxically. (111.) 2. cv\oyov avriKclo-Bai ofioicos. The opinion that dbacelaOai is not always the same, either voluntary or in- voluntary, but sometimes one, sometimes the other, accord- ing to circumstances, arises from the consideration that though biKaioirpayfiv is always invariable in respect of volun- tariness, yet biKaioio-6ai does not follow it, but is sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary (frtoi yap biKaiovvrai oi>x €kovt(s); and it might reasonably be expected (cvXoyov) that dbiKelodai would stand in the same relation (avTiKeio-6 r o v = hiKaiov an\(i>s. (119.) 13. 8 i a ravra, SC. X^P LV or Tipcoplav. — e7r' e k e iv a>v, in the case of those who divide the unjust spoil between them. (120.) 14. bovvai k.t.X. This is an act of liberality equally easy with the acts of vice mentioned in the same sentence ; but to do a liberal action, which supposes a certain state of mind, and certain circumstances, is not easy. — ovt eV avrols. Aristotle here recognises the great fact in human nature, — the weakness of the will for good. (121.) 16. Erom supposing that every wrong act is a vicious action, every unjust act an act of injustice, it is said that a just man may act unjustly : but not so ; for though, under certain circumstances, a just man might act in the same way as an unjust man, or a brave man act as a coward might, it would not be an unjust or cowardly action, unless it was done in the frame of mind and purpose which are necessary to in- justice or cowardice. — en Snorepaovv, right or left ; al. onore- pavovv. (122.) ean be k.t.A. Justice and social obligation exist among koivwvoI tcov anXcbs dyad&v. — e x o v a i is dative plural agreeing with tovtols : who are capable of having too much or too little thereof. Justice cannot exist among the gods, for having all things, they cannot be supposed to have too much ; nor among the reprobate, for being incapable of having anything, they cannot be said to have too little : but as men in general occupy a middle position, they are capable of it ; wherefore it exists among men in a social state, and is the epyov of man as a social being. Some editors omit ovk before ia-nv iirep- /3oXj7, understanding Aristotle to say that the gods are above these human dnXas dyadd : the anXas kukoI are below them. c. x.; xi. 1,4.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 1L3 CHAPTEE X. (123.) 1. cn-tctxeia represents the spirit of the natural dUaiop, which the legislator was unable to transfer to his system of polity; and as it provides for those cases in which that system is wanting, it is the enapopBapa or complement of the dUaiou popipop, which here=7roXiTiKoV : see also Ehet. i. 13, 12. — «ri tu aXXu emcpepopcp, we refer in our praise to something besides justice. (124.) 2. dta ravr a, for these reasons,- anavra, all these. — vire- vavrLop, these have nothing contradictory to themselves. — 5 1- icaiov t iv 6 s ov, belonging to a sort of 8 1 k a i o p } sc. natural justice. (125.) 4. cidvs,"from the first." (126.) 5. ape pop e K t 5>p elprjfiepap, first, from what has been said, it is clear that he who commits suicide injures somebody, for he violates the law ; secondly, that it is not himself whom he injures, for he does it willingly, but it is the state. (132.) 4. The question whether a man can injure himself is im- portant ; for it might be urged, that if a man put restraint on himself for the sake of others, he might be unjust to him- self, and then i)6lkt) aperf would be in this view wrong. There is no law of obligation to a man's own self which obliges him to take care of his own interests in preference to those of his Q 114 ETHICS —BOOK V. [c xi. 4—9 ; neighbour. The contradictory notion is embodied in popular expressions, and more or less covertly in several moral sys- tems of ancient and modern times. The only sense in which a man can be said to injure himself, (and then only by a metaphor ;) is when the lower part of his nature governs the higher. (133.) 4. Kaff o. Even under the view that he who commits merely an unjust act is unjust, though not bad in its widest sense, one cannot injure oneself. (134.) 4. rovro yap a\\o ineivov, (I mention this) for this is different from the former case, where injustice is considered as a violation of right generally, — as abiv. — a pa: SO that it is not rrporepov. (137.) 6. Trphs be tovtois k.t.X. : no one acts unjustly with- out committing some particular, definite act of injustice, and this a man cannot do towards himself: a man cannot steal his own property.— o X a> s, generally, as well as by the settled principle ovx eKovra dbiKeio-Oai. (138.) 7. fj iyyvs, or bordering on it—; it is not in every case i reXeia Kaula, for in some cases, though the action is voluntary, it is not complete abulia, as where there is excusable Zyvoia. (139.) 8. oidev /ze'Xei k.t.X., to the act or system. Medicine, as a system, takes no cognizance of the accidental character of the matter in hand. (140.) 9. iv tovtois yap \6yois, on these theories or views. — dieo-Tr] ice, is separate from. — i v r o v t o i s, sc. the two parts of the soul. c. i. ; ii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 115 BOOK VI. CHAPTEE I. (1.) Haying now practically proved that rjdiKfj apery is the tpyov of man, both as being the right operation of our several feelings and instincts, and also as agreeing with that diKatoavvrj be- sides which there is no duty really binding on man, he now proceeds to consider in what kind and in what degree the in- tellectual part of our nature is an ingredient of this fjOiKff dperr). That it is so in some kind and degree was before implied, when 6p66s \6yos was said to be our guide to right action. He now considers what this 6p66s \6yos is, and in what faculties or habits of our reason it consists. (2.) 1. opos rav /if a oTrjTav, the limits or sphere of the mean habits. (3.) 3. tovtcov tLs 6 opos: what is its definition or nature. (4.) 5. vnoKe Lo-600, let it be laid down that there are. (5.) 5. ofjLoioTrjTa, the adaptation of the powers to receive the impressions and conceptions of the several objects of percep- tion and thought. olKeiorrjTa, the affinity between them. This is rather a trenching upon the higher metaphysics, and probably, like some other similar passages, was used by Aristotle as a recognised principle, which would compel the assent of those, who received it, to the point he wished to prove. (6.) 7. f] 8' apcTT): that is the excellence of anything which developes its epyov ; we must therefore discover what is the i'pyov of the two parts of the soul. Cf. bk. ii. 6. 2. CHAPTEE II. j (7.) 1. The end of the logistic part of the soul is right moral action ; we must therefore discover what produces this. | (8.) 1. There are in the soul three powers of moral truth, {irpd- 116 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. ii. 2, 3, £eo>s Kol ak^Belas,) scil. cuo-Brjcns, vovs, ope£is : in one of these three the epyov and the aperrj of the logistic part mnst reside. (9.) 2. TovTcav — (cotVwveiv. Of these, perception need not be considered, as it is no immediate cause of moral action ; it merely conveys to the senses an object which may lead to a moral action, if the recipient be capable thereof; but if not, as in the brute creation, it produces nothing but a mere sensual act. (10.) 2. eo-rt 5' onep k.t.\. The other two powers of moral action, vovs and opegis, are intimately connected. The assent and dissent of the vovs are what pursuit and avoidance are in the opegis, and they mutually imply each other. As, therefore, the 7rpoalpeo-is is made up of opegis and Aoyos, (or vovs,) if it is to be good, the vovs must be a\rj6r]s in decision, and the opegis op6r\ in its pursuit, (ra. avra rbv pev (pdvai ttjv 8e 8ia>Keiv). The opegis cannot be dpdfj unless the vovs be akrjdrjs, nor can the vovs be oXtj6t)s unless the Spegis is 6p6rj : if the vovs assented to a wrong opegts, it would be ^ev^s ; if the opegis accepted a false decision of the reason it would not be 6p6f]. (See bk. iii. note 40) ; hence, as a good irpoaipccns is made up of opegis and X6yos, or vovs, it follows that the dX^eia vov, working with, and implying, a right opegis, is the epyov of the logistic part of the soul, as producing, and securing, (or combining to produce,) right action. (11.) 2. iSo-r inciSf) k.t.X. Since, then, right action implies a good act of choice, and this good act of choice is simply a true decision and a right end, it follows that SXrjdeia tov vov, which, as we have seen, implies both, will produce good moral action : he assumes, as he has a right to assume, that right action, and therefore right irpoaipecns, is the epyov of the logistic part of the soul. (12.) 2. dia ravra, for these reasons, viz. the nature of apery and Trpoaipeo-is, and the connection between the reason and the desire given above. (13.) 2. avTij fxev ovv: this, then, is the moral intellect and moral truth, which performs the epyov of the logistic part. (14.) 3. ttjs 8e BeaprjTiKris: of the pure intellect, truth is the acknowledged epyov : see Met. ii. 1, p. 35. — r ov be tt paten- 4, 5.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 117 kov kci\ b iav ot)t ikov, of the moral intellect, truth corre- sponding to and implying a right b'pegis ; hence truth, moral or intellectual, is the epyov of both parts of the soul. (15.) 4. To shew that ivpoaipco-is is not merely an intellectual act, as some would have it, nor yet a mere orectic appetite or desire, as others hold, but a combination of the two, we may examine the efficient and motive powers of human action. (16.) 4. it page as. The motive cause {66ev rj kIvtjo-is) of right action is npoalpeo-is ; the material cause or constituents of 7Tpoaipe s : this is not the same as ndOos, but it is that right moral state which has the intellect worked into it, and therefore implies the moral truth as one of its elements. (19.) 4. evirpagla ydp k.tX. : for right being and acting, which is the object of irpoalpeo-is, cannot exist without the action of the intellect and that right moral state in which the intellect and ndBr) are combined, (rjdos). (20.) 5. It being thus clear that the bidpoia is an active cause of right action, it now must be proved that it is not the only one, but that op^is must be joined with it. The mere intellect (pidvoia avrrj) is not properly motive cause at all, (ovdev Kivei) ', it is true that the moral intellect is con- cerned in action, (npaKTiicr),) and when it is working towards an end (eW*a roO) is such a motive cause, for it sets in motion (apx«) the contriving faculty ; that is, when the intellect in the shape of (3ov\r)x cnr\a>s,) and only relative (npos ™) and subordinate (nvos) to some further end, but the subject of moral action is the real re'Xos- (dXX' to npaKrov) ; this is cinpa^ia, and this end is supplied by opegis, which is thus shewn to be as necessary an ingredient as the moral intellect itself. — d X X' ov to n paKTov,&\. dXka to irpaKrov, which must be con- strued, but it is not the subject of moral action, for this, Sfc. (21.) 5. bidvoia alrf) ovOkv Kivel. There is a point of view in which this seems to be wrong, viz. where the object of desire is not perceptible by the senses, but by vovs, such as some future good : but this perceptive vovs which performs the functions of alo-drjcris where the thing is invisible, is not really the dpxh of the action ; it is only a channel whereby the fjdv reaches the ndBos. There are two sorts of cpavTao-ia which present the fjbv to the opegis ; one (alo-OrjTLxr)) of visible, the other (votjtikt}) of invisible, objects : see ch. vii. 9, where he Speaks of a sort of a vorjTiKt) aio-drjo-is, ovx fj t5>v iSiW dXX' ota K.r.X. : SO bk. vii. ch. 6. 1, rj be i-mOvpla, iav povov 6177-/7, on rjdv, 6 \6yos rj a'lorBrjo- is: see also Met. vi. 10, p. 148. (22.) 5. Sid k.t.X. : whence npoalpeo-is may be viewed as vovs ac- companied by opegis, or as opegis assented to by vovs, (see bk. iii. note 40) ; at all events, it implies both these as necessary : and this complex principle of action is humanity, (77 Toiav-n} dpxh avOpanos) : whatever habit of mind, then, secures, as far as it is in the province of the intellect to do so, that these two shall be right, secures right irpoaipeais, right moral action, and therefore is the i'pyov of the logistic part of the soul ; and in the beginning of the chapter we have seen that akridsia tov vov does this. (23.) 6. ovk eo-rt k.t.X. upoalpecris has nothing to do with that sort of TrpaKTiicr) Siavoia, the subject of which may be moral action, but which has no end beyond its own exercise, as that which considers past events. c. iii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 119 CHAPTEE III. (24.) 1. Truth, then, in one shape or the other, being the epyop of both parts of the intellectual faculties, we now proceed to investigate what is the state or habit of mind which most perfectly and certainly arrives at truth in each. (25.) Things or notions are said to be true in different rela- tions : — 1. In respect of their corresponding to the designs of nature, things are said to be in a true state : Physic, i. 8. 1, d\ij0 e tap Ka\ rfjp

v 6vts v7ro\d(3r) virdp- \eiv rj prj vndpxeip l ibid., rrjs aTrXcos vnoXrjyjreois d-rr\rj rj dTrdrrj, rijs de dia o-vWoyia-pov nXelovs,) and may be quite false, and yet would be an vnoX^is: so in ch. ix., the distinguishing epithet dXrjdrjs is applied to it. So d6£a is a judgment (cpdo-is) on a 120 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. iii. 2, 3, matter of probable truth, of which though it took a false view, it would still be a 86ga, (Anal. Post. i. 33. p. 199, sq., and ix. 15, 8) : v n 6 X rj yjs i $■ differs from 86ga inasmuch as the latter is a (pdais, and implies a subject, copula, and predicate, while the former conceives of the subject and predicate as a whole, Avithout the intervention of the copula ; 86£a is of two notions separately, vnoXyj^ns is of the two notions com- bined. The mental process may be thus represented : aiadrj- ens, (pavrao-ia, vorjais, efjnrepia, i)7r6Xrj\jns } then doga on contin- gent, cf)p6vr)(ris on moral, eVto-T^/i?; on necessary, matter. The complex idea contained in dpio-pos, the to tL rjv elvai, is an V7rd- Xt)\J/ls : SO Anal. Post. i. 33, V7r6\r)\jfis rrjs dpeaov npoTcio-ews. (28.) 2. emo-Tripr). This word has two senses: — 1. an intellectual state, or habit; 2. a scientific system, or collection of principles and laws of necessary matter. It is, of course, in the former of these two senses that it is used here. — t a I s 6 /i o i d r 77 o- 1. See Anal. Post. i. 2. 1, for spurious sorts of science. (29.) 2. \av6dvei el e a t i fj prf, (cf. Met. vi. 15, p. 158): therefore they are not fit subjects for emarripr} ; and hence the subject-matter of eVio-r?^ is e'£ dvdyKrjs, things necessary and unchangeable. Aristotle recognises in the order of things which he expresses by v del, where the connection is invariable and perceptible ; 2. (pvais in a second sense, (rav as eVi r6 iro\v,) where the con- nection, though perceptible, is variable, (ra iv8exdf*eva aWas exeu>) ; 3. rvxn, where the connection is variable and imper- ceptible : b6£a belongs to the second and third, emorr/pri to the first. 2. a it X 5> s, to speak generally. 3. ra dtdia k.t.X. : we here get his views of the past and future eternity of the universe. (30.) 3. en be StSaKr^ k.t.X. Science falls under teaching, as whatever may be known scientifically may be taught and learnt : as teaching and learning presuppose certain principles from which to start, it follows that science implies having such principles to refer to ; therefore science is a habit, or habitual state of the intellect, which is able to refer what it knows to certain principles or atrial, (egis anodei/cnuf) ;) or rather, speaking more accurately, as a state or habit of mind is only the presence of certain emotions, perceptions, con- 3, 4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 121 ceptions, or principles in the mind, science is the principle or universal conception itself, (ch. vi., 17 Zmo-Tripr) ncp\ t&v Ka66\ov co-tip vTToX^yjns,) it is the certain conscious possession of fixed conceptions or principles (dpxai), and their application to less abstract, and apparently less evident, truths. Thus the cm- o-Trjuav in mathematics would possess the principles of mathe- matical reasoning laid down by others, (\ap(3dva>v &>$• rrapa £wiev- ra>v, Anal. Post. i. 1, p. 145,) and be able to apply them to the various theorems and problems following therefrom, which, not self-evident in themselves, would become certain to him from their resting on principles of fixed truth : of this the instrument is syllogism, referring back these problems or theorems to their principles or alrlai. — iv rots dvaXv- tikoIs: Anal. Post. i. 1. (31.) 3. fj fiev 8rj iirayayr). This passage would be enough to shew Aristotle's view of induction, and its relation to syllo- gism as necessary to it. There are numberless passages of the same sort throughout his writings. Among others, see Anal. Post. i. 18, ii. 15. 7 ; Anal. Prior, ii. 25. 8, p. 139. (32.) 3. hv ovk earn. pel) on the properties and laws of the universe, but not as a mere speculation ending in itself. This knowledge of the properties and laws is not properly its subject-matter, but only accidentally, as being conducive to production. It 2-4.] ETHICS— BOOK VI. 123 is this mental power which is most cultivated and most prized at the present day, and has hence almost appropriated the word "philosophy." We must not, in reading what Aristotle says of rexvr), expect to find his view of it agree with our con- ceptions of it as drawn from what it is now ; for it has made so much progress since that time, and its functions and sphere are so much enlarged, as to make it difficult to understand how it can be said that the universal or general laws of the universe do not fall within its province ; as, though many are excluded, yet others again (such as the production of an electric current) are evidently now matters of art, or the contriving faculty. (37.) 2. e garcpiKols \6yois: see bk. i. note 213. (38.) 3. This is an instance of the universal conclusion, per sim- plicem enumerationem. Architecture, and every other intel- lectual habit of production, is an art. Every art is an intellectual habit of production, conse- quently these two are identical. (39.) ovtc roiavrrj is merely a repetition of the other side of the induction, ezrel be rj olKobopiKr). (40.) 3. Zgis pera \6yov 7toit]tikt]. The word "habit," though it may be conveniently used to express e£is, yet does so very imperfectly, egis noirjTiKq is not so much a habit of produc- tion, as the productive faculty trained and exercised to ha- bitual operation, "E£tr denotes that power of the mind, to which it is applied, as in a particular state of development^ and perfection, and might perhaps be expressed by the word power, as opposed to faculty; and in using the word " habit," we must be careful not to lose sight either of the faculty itself, or of the state of development in which it is. ,(41.) 3. \6yov d\rj6ovs : true, inasmuch as it judges rightly of external things, and their fitness for the particular object of our contrivance. (42.) 4. eo-r! be rex vr l K ' rX - ^ n tne Metaphysics, p. i. 1, he says, ylverai r] rex vr l ° Tav eK 7T0 ^^ V efX7reipias ivvorjpaTcov KaOoKov pia yevrjrai 7rep\ ru>v 6/xoiW vnoXrjylns. Art is the possession and application of the general principles of production : of course things necessary, or out of our power to produce, are excluded. "YVe must be careful (as in the case of eVtor^fy) to 124 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. iv. 4—6 ; distinguish between the word rtx vr i "when used to denote a state or power of the mind concerned in contrivance, and when used to express a system, or collection of rules for the production of any given result. (43.) 4. 7rept yeveo-iv, the production of something as its re'Xo?, and the contriving the means thereto (jexva^eiv), and considering what they are {6ea>pa.v). They seem to be placed in this order because looking at the object of rex^n as com- pleted, and going backwards as it were in process of com- pletion, (yevevis,) comes first, then rexvd^iv, or the active part of rexvt], and then the reflective, deliberative process of 6ea>pe7p, or examining into the nature of the object, and the powers or combinations which will produce it. (44.) 4. r&v i£ av ay Kris k.t.X. In this chapter we have the division given above, (note 29,) of i), whatever that is. (50.) 2. hv prj eVrt rix vr )-> f° r which there are no rules laid down. (51.) 2. cppovifios povXcvTiKos. The most usual notion of (ppovrjais, as an intellectual operation, is the consideration of the means towards a good end, which is presented to us as an object of pursuit by i)6iKr) dperr), in its first stage, (see ch. xiii. 6) ; but cppovrjais has to do, not only with fiovXevais, or the ra irpos reXos, but with the reXos itself. See ch. ix. 7. (52.) 3. naura, SC. TOtavra hv ai dpxai ei/Se^oi/rai a\\a>s c^eii/. (53.) 4. nep\ to. dv0p6>n(p dy a 6 d k.t.X. The connection be- tween these paragraphs is this : — In noirjais we arrange well 126 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. v. 4—6, certain materials with a view to produce some end ; in right 7rpagis we arrange and regulate certain actions, not with a view merely to evnpagia, for such arrangement in itself is evirpagla ; so that the energy and the end are one and the same thing : wherefore 4>p6vrjais has to. dvOpamw dyadd for its subject-matter, though this is at the same time its reXos : if cppoprjo-is were noirjTiKT], it could not be said to be nepl ra dvOpoanois dyaOd, but Trepl rd dvOpdouiva npos rd dvOpanrois dyadd. He seems to be accounting for his making it nepl ra dvOpayrrois dyaOd ; but we must recollect that many of these short arguments in the Ethics, and, indeed, more or less, in all his works, seem ob- scure and needless at first sight. It is not easy to see why they are introduced, but it is probably with reference to some subtle theories or distinctions of one or other of the schools of his day, which he answers thus parenthetically. (54.) 4. 77 o it] 7T(o dyadd, for it secures right notions of pleasure and pain ; and these notions are the causes of human action : wherefore that which o-cocppoo-vvrj preserves is right notions on human action. — to oil eveica ra irpaKTa, the final cause of the action. (58.) 6. ev6vs, ipso facto. The right motive to action, the right view of good and evil, will in action not present itself to one who is thoroughly demoralised by pleasure or pain ; and this is what the contrary habit (o-axppoo-vvr)) preserves and improves ; whence cppSvrjcris preserves a right view of good and evil in action. 6, 7; c. vi. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 127 (59.) 6. ovbe 8elv tovtov e v e k e v. That this right end is the true final cause (tovtov eWxa) and motive (Sm tovto) of moral action and moral choice (ov (paiveru). — cp 6 a prim) d p. XV s: hence (pdciperai is used in bk. ii. for the formation of habits of vice. See note 8, bk. ii. — p era \6yov d A ^ ?} : not merely pera dXrjBovs Aoyou, as Texyrj. (GO.) 7. Tf'x^j dpeTT). There are degrees of development in art, and consequently an excellence of it ; while of eppovrjacs, properly speaking, there are no degrees, — it implies perfection in itself. He who is truly (ppovipos has all the virtues, and if be fails in any one, so that his v §e dpxp>v al p.ev alcrdrjcrei 6ev dpx&v in morals ; the moral intellect ; the perceptive and inductive power, which perceives the moral qualities and works out the moral laws from the moral world in general, on which cppovrjo-is is founded, (tov iaxdrov v irpos to tc\os) become instinctive, so that a man could at a glance see the right means, it would be termed vovs : of course vovs is employed in it as enabling us to see the nature of the means which fiovXevo-is suggests to us as desirable. (64.) 1. [i€Ta \6yov yap: as eVtcTTJ^/xj; USCS \6yos, and Xoyos starts from certain principles, there must be some power to arrive at them. — n e p\ £ v i a> v, sc. t&v TipKOTdToav. (65.) 2. \e17rcTa1, conclusion of disjunctive syllogism. CHAPTEE VII. (66.) 1. In the study and contemplation of things immutable, we have seen that there are two separate habits or powers of mind : the one discerning, tracing, and laying down fixed laws and principles from the shifting particulars in which they operate ; the other discerning the connection between these first principles and results, and what follows or de- pends upon them. The one is the inductive, the other the deductive, or, perhaps, more properly retro due tive power, because it refers back principles and phenomena to the higher and more fixed principles on which they depend. There is, however, another habit or power, in which both the others are combined ; whereby a man becomes thoroughly master of that which is within the compass of human know- ledge, — at one glance seeing the laws, and their results. This man is the o-ov o-iWor^Kev 6 Koapos). In mathematics, for instance, Euclid would be a o-o containing within itself, or the summing up, or the perfection : it may be taken either way.— r 5> v rnxicorarcov. vroXm^ and p6vn™, though the highest ex- cellencies of man's social and moral nature, are nevertheless not the highest attainments man is capable of, inasmuch as man, their subject-matter, is inferior to the immutable and eternal elements and powers of nature. In ancient philosophy, permanence was a main standard of excellence, and the short- lived man, with his shifting and perishing societies and affairs, naturally seemed inferior to the apparently everlasting things of nature, of which no one knew the beginning nor the end, and which had outlived so many ages of humanity. (69.) 4. e I 8 f] k .t.X. If, then, the bodily and moral good of man is variable, and the physical properties, such as whiteness and straightness, always the same, it would be also («iQ allowed that t6 6v, which contemplates the former, is as invariable as its subjects, and that r6 cppdv^ov, which contemplates shift- ing particulars, is variable, and therefore both different from j and inferior to a-ocpia. (70) 4. bib nal k.t.X. That 4> P 6vrj&r>cn yvr)aia>s Kcii iKavcos kcu tovto els tcivtuv crvp,- 7recrr] dvvcifxis ttoXitikt) kcu cpiXocrocpia — ovk eari kokcou navXa rais noXecri k.t.X. (72.) 5. it e p i r t d, superfluous matters. CHAPTEE VIII. (73.) 6. rj de (ppovrjo-ts. It would seem as if cli. viii. ouglit to begin here. He lias finished the examination of a-ocpia, and now proceeds to a further examination of that intellectual virtue which has to do with morals ; but inasmuch as he is contrasting cppovrja-is with o-ocfiia, it may also be viewed as properly belonging to ch. vii. (74.) 7. cppovrjo-Ls is divided into the knowledge of general principles and the knowledge of particulars, and their rela- tion to those general principles ; it is not merely a Ka96Xov v7rdX^^ts, but Trepi ra Kad' eKacrra. (75.) 7. el yap el be It]. If one has the general principle, but is ignorant of the nature of the particular, it is not so prac- tically useful as if one knew the nature of the particular. Therefore cppovrjais is rather nepl to. eKacrra, though both are desirable. (76.) 7. e'er) 8' av k.t.X. It is probable that there will be some governing power or system to direct and inform this par- ticular (ppovrjo-is. The following scheme of the relation be- tween cppovrjcns and 7roXiTiKr) will set this forth clearly : — First/N, we must observe that ttoXitikt) and cppoprjcns are practically identical; the propositions and principles of which they consist are the same in themselves (r) avrr) fxev e£is,) though both these habits themselves, and these principles would be defined differently, (to pivroi etvai ov ravrbv avrais). Thus (ppovrjcns, consisting of a number of general principles on human good, might be defined to be the science of moral good, while tvoXitlkt), consisting of exactly the same principles, might be defined to be the science of social good. Such_aJ principle as " honesty is the best policy," which belongs alike to TToXiriKr) and etcao-Ta : that it is not merely the possession of moral principles, but the acting on them in particulars, is evidenced by the fact that the young can become paOr^parLKoi, but cannot become y, abstract. (87.) 6. rwv be to ri lariv ovk adrjXov. Abstract prin- ciples of mathematics are in their very nature to be received before they are understood, for their nature and meaning is hidden ; but matters of experience must be comprehended to be received, as their nature and meaning is not hidden, but manifest. It is no proof that a person has not abstract principles because he does not understand them; but if a person does not understand matters of experience, he evi- dently has no experience of them. (88.) 7. en k.t.X. This passage seems rather to be connected with what he said above, (sect, iv.) as to the necessity of knowledge of the general principles furnished by olKovopia Or TToXlTlKT). (89.) 8. on S* f) (ppovrjo-is k.t.X. This is a difficult passage, and requires much attention to master it. — t ov io-xarov, i. e. TeXovs: of the particular object of a particular Trpoai- peens, (ov rj cppovqcris dXt]6r]S vTroXrjyf/is eaTiv, ch. IX. fin.). The first function of the moral reason is to direct us in forming a right judgment (86ga) on the true nature of any object of desire, (tov eo-xdrov,) and in deciding whether it is to be sought or declined. "When this function is by practice become habi- tual, it operates instinctively, and is called vovs, as being an immediate perception of a moral fact, of the moral quality of an action or thing, which is one of the functions of vovs. See note 62. 3. (90.) 9. dvTiKeiTai k.t.X. This does not mean that it is op- posed to vovs as a contrary, but that it stands over against vovs, and is analogous to it. (See Metaph., p. 100.) Thus : — Moral action. Intellectual operation. L L . (ppovrjCLS tov TeXovs. vovs tcov opcov. (91.) 9. He is shewing why the term vovs is applied to this moral perception, cppovrjais. (ppovrjo-is stands (aimVeirai) to moral action, 9.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 135 as vovs does to scientific operations, supplying the starting- point to morals, as vovs does to science : vovs, as used here, is reason without reasoning ; so (ppovrjons, when the first stage of the moral character is formed, is moral reason without rea- soning, (rational sense), vovs is used (ch. xi. 2.) to denote this v opcov lav ovk eo~Ti X o y o s. vovs, as we have seen in ch. v., discovers the apxai or principles which are not capable of demonstration, but are perceived by aia- 6t]o~is, Or ediapos, or inayoiyr]. (93.) 9. r) 8e tov €o~xarov: that is, of the particular T eXos, with which i7riaTr}pT] has nothing to do, but which is matter of alo-drjaLs; not the simple aladrjo-is of visible properties, such as whiteness in an object, (ovk % t5>v Idicov,) but that sort whereby we perceive some invisible quality, (uAX' o'la alcrOa- vopeda k.t.X.,) and in which vovs operates instinctively, — as, when seeing a triangle by simple alo-drjo-is we see its visible shape, and also by vorjTiKr) alo-drjo-is, (cf. Anal. Post. i. 31. 8, p. 197 ; also De Anim. iii. 3. 1,) by the power of an habituated vovs, we recognise its invisible quality of being the simplest figure, and capable of no further resolution, (6Vt r6 iv pa6r]p.a- tlkoIs eaxarov rpiyavov) ; for when we have arrived at a triangle we stop, knowing instantaneously and immediately that we cannot go further, (o-Trjo~€Tai yap KaKeT). (94.) 9. a XX' avrrj k.t.X. This latter, the instinctive power of vovs to see the invisible and remote qualities of material ob- jects, is not called cppovyo-is, but alaOrjo-is, for it resembles the perception of visible properties more closely than it does the perception of moral qualities, (paXXov aladrjo-is rj cppovrjo-is,) both being supposed to be instantaneous and immediate ; but the former, cppovrjo-is, (the perception of moral qua- lities,) belongs to a different species of intellectual per- ception from aiadrjo-is, (eKeivrjs 5' tiXXo eldos,) and therefore^ having nothing to do with sensual perception, is not simply called a'Lo-Qrio-is, but vovs. We shall see in ch. xi. that this /3ovXia. Again, boga is the result of an intellectual process. When- ever boga has taken place the matter is settled, (apa be koi copio-Tai fjbr) ndv ov boga ioriv). It is a decision more or less certain on some point, (i) boga ov ^ffnja-is dXXa v '■ see ibid., sect. 20. (113.) 4. Xeyopep ydp k.t.X. That awuvat is to judge of what another person puts before us, and to receive it from him, is clear from its being frequently used as synonymous with \iav6dvew. CHAPTEE XI. (114.) The next habit which is necessary to moral wisdom is, that we should be able to apply rightly to our own particular selves and circumstances those principles which by crvveais we have received from others. This power is yv d>p.rj, discretion, discernment ; as o-vyyvwur) is the fair and right application of general principles to the persons and cases of others, so drop- ping the s,) have a re- lation and bearing towards the same point, that is, any moral action. Their functions are as follows : — vovs, perceiving the character and quality of any reXos which presents itself = cppovrjo-is tov reXovs. See note 91. (ppovrjo-is, choosing the right means towards such an end. a-vveacs, supplying us with principles by enabling us to judge of, and apprehend rightly from others, the principles of right and wrong. yvvprj, enabling us to apply these principles rightly to our needs. On this we must observe : — J . That vovs is substituted for that cppovrjo-is which is dXrjdrjs vTroXrjyj/is tov reXovs, because cppovrjais, being perfected in its first stage as the right choice of the end, becomes a rational instinct, or hvvapus, whereby, without any intellectual pro- 140 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xi. 2, 3, cess, the moral eye of the soul perceives right or wrong in particulars, just as a'ladrjo-is perceives some visible, or vovs some invisible, attribute of an object. In fact, this func- tion of moral perception is exercised directly by vovs morally instructed ; it is a simple energy of the intellectual eye, operating instinctively and immediately. We now see the meaning and bearing of the passage (ch. viii. 9.) beginning " aVTlKeiTCLl TCO vc5." 2. e v /3 o v X [ a is omitted and (pp6vr)i/ icrxdrcov. The rAos is termed eo-x a t o v as being the extreme point of the whole moral action, where it stops and it is also used to denote t6 *a0' exao-Tw, or to irpaia-ov as being the tcXos. 3, 4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VT. 141 (119.) 3. Kal 77 avvfiTis k.t.X. Though avveais is the reception of general principles from others, yet it is of general prin- ciples with reference to particular actions, and hence it is t&v eV^tircoi/ as well as (ppovrjais. (120.) 4. This difficult passage may be mastered with a little at- tention. Noh has to do with extremes in both science and morals : in science it lias to do with first principles, whence scientific reasoning starts, or to which it returns. These cannot be arrived at or proved by reasoning (Xoyo?), but are perceived by vovs. But in morals, vovs (=cpp6vrjo-is rov rekovs) is of the shifting particular rov io-xdrov (eaxarov as being rekos) Kal ivdexofievov, because by it we perceive immediately the good or bad in what presents itself to us as an end, and pursue or avoid it accordingly; and also of the major premiss, (rrjs ircpas irpoTciaeas,) which is applied instinctively in that energy of the moral vovs : for the sources of the ov evekt6v, that is, tovto becomes an ov eW/ca to us. (121.) 4. he pas npoTao-eeos. It is generally assumed that frepa npoTao-ts is the minor premiss. In Anil. Prior, i. 8. 1, it is either one of the premisses. But the fact is, that it is the pre- miss which has not been spoken of before ; so that it is only the minor when the major has been mentioned or implied :. here the eaxaTov koi ivbex°l ievov -> t ne shifting particular, clearly indicates a minor premiss ; so iripa npoTaais is the major. (122.) 4. eft tS>v Kaff tKao-Ta ydp: 1. Anal. Post. i. 31. 5. This yap refers to the ere pa npoTao-is : vovs is of the ere pa irpo- raais as well as of the particular, because this irepa Tvporao-is is formed (Jk t&v Ka6' eKaara) by that intellectual alaBrjais which is Called vovs, — avrr) S' eoTi vovs> 142 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xi. 5, 6 j (123.) 5. Si6 na\ ipvaiKa. As a proof of this, that these powers of moral action do not spring from or belong to aocpia, bnt are of ra Ka(? eKaara, we may remark that they are conceived of as more or less natural gifts, which o-o v, as con- clusions. (126.) 6. &o~T€ S el k.t.A. Since moral reasoning is mostly about the particulars of moral action, the qualities, good or bad, of particular actions, men of experience, or age, or moral excel- lence, are enabled to judge, as it were by sight, of moral actions, and therefore their axioms and opinions, even though not supported by reasons, are to be followed as guides with as much confidence as the conclusions of the moral reason of ourselves or others who are not thus qualified. (127.) 6. U t^s efiTreipias Sp,fia: cf. St. Matt. vi. 22, 23; Heb. v. 14. CHAPTER XII. (128.) The question now arises, what is the use or advantage of these intellectual perfections, scientific or moral? Wisdom, it is urged, has no practical value, for it leads to no action; while moral wisdom, allowing it to lead to action, is not ne- cessary to right action ; for, first, if moral wisdom consists in the knowledge of right and wrong in action, of what advan- c. xii. 1-C] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 143 tage is this knowledge? for the virtues are habits, and when we have them we act from that habit, and not from the knowledge which may be implied therein : so in bodily health, we are not more healthy or strong for knowing medicine or gymnastics scientifically, (sect. 1). Or, secondly, suppose we allow that moral wisdom does not merely consist in the know- ledge of right and wrong, but also plays an important part in the formation of the habits, then it may be asked, of what use is it to those who have the habit ? and even those who have it not can form it under the direction of others, as in matters of health, (sect. 2). And again, it is absurd to suppose that moral wisdom, in- ferior as it is to intellectual perfection, is to govern it, as will be the case if w T e assign to moral wisdom the supreme direc- tion of our lives, (sect. 3). These points Aristotle answers. (129.) 1. tovto fieu, SC. yeveaiv elvai 7rpd£eo;), be is induced to mention parenthetically the fourth principle or part of humanity. The perfection of the aesthetic part is here represented by dperfj, because that stage of the moral character is here supposed to be formed, in which aperr) operates instinctively, as a sort of aladya-Ls, in distin- guishing a good end from a bad one. (133.) 7. 7T€pl Se tov p-qdev k.t.X. He now turns to the other point put by the objectors, viz. that if cppovrjais is useful for the formation of yOucr) apery, it is useless as soon as the habit is formed. He recapitulates (pL cr kott ov 6p66v : see also ch. xiii. sect. 7 : this instinctive choice of the end being the first stage of the moral character, which in the passage before us is viewed as in a further stage of perfection, the (ppovycns of the means being merged in the moral habit as well as that of the end. (134.) 7. cppovrjaiv t a> v Ka\u>v v). (136.) 9. That (ppomjo-is which recognises and selects the right end and means, whether together or separately, springs from vovs in its function of perceiving the moral qualities and uses and tendencies of things or acts ; but there is another function of the intellect, or, it may be said, another function of vovs, which has the distinct name of 8 e i v 6 r -q s, which perceives (not the moral, but) the useful qualities of things ; sees how these necessary means may be carried out and obtained, (wore ra rrpbs rbv o-kottov o-vvreivovra 8v- vaadai ravra n p arr e iv koi riiy^ai/f ty air S>v: cf. Magn. ]VTor. i. 34, p. 48, rrjs be beivorrjros aKt^raaOai i< rivSiV av eieao-rov y e v o i r o ra>v TrpaKTOiV koi ravra npdrreiv',) and from this tivvapis of deivorrjs there springs a second sort of po- vrja-Ls, which is able to devise, carry out, obtain the means predetermined upon towards a good end; for unless the end is good, the habitual and deliberate exercise of this con- triving faculty is not (pp6vr)ai$, but navovpyia. And it is very important to the understanding of this chapter, to keep in mind the different nature and functions of the cppovrjais which springs from vovs, and that which springs from Seivorrjs ; that which chooses the means because they are good and right, and that which carries such good and right means out : hence it is seen how moral wisdom, or cppovrjais, is necessary even after the habit has been perfectly formed, see note 133, — as perfectly as it is possible to conceive it, — more perfectly than it practically can be, — certainly than it ever has been, except in the single case of Him Who had our nature with- out our imperfections. S e i v 6 r r] s. Soph. Ant. 332, noWa. ra 8 e i v a. Kovbkv av9ponTTOv deivorepov 7reXet. Our word cunning represents Seivorrjs more fully than any other, but still it does not give the notion of fear which exists in 8av6s. Cunning is used in old authors both in a good and bad sense, though in later times it is mostly confined to the latter, — a tacit evidence of the way in which the faculty is generally used. — navovp- y o v s : SO we call both cppovipoi and -navovpyoi d € iv o L (137.) 10. eo-ri $' 17 cppovrjo-is k.t.X. cppovrjais, when thus ap- U 146 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xii. 10 ; plied to the carrying out our choice, is not the same as this faculty ; for, first, it implies a greater degree of intellectual exertion, as beivorrjs is rather an instinctive power ; and secondly, cppovrjais implies a good end, while beivorrjs is in- different to the character of the end : but still Seivorrjs is an ingredient of active moral wisdom, for without it we should choose, but not act ; our moral character would remain un- productive, from our inability to carry out our determinations. Practically, we do meet such people not unfrequently, to whom nature seems to have denied beivorrjs, and hence, though they have cppovrjais as moral knowledge and moral perception, their light is hid under a bushel ; indeed, in this world, as it is at present ordered, their very moral excellence often makes them shrink from doing what is necessary to secure their end. It must be remembered, that though the cppovrjais of the end often becomes actually instinctive, and the cppovrjais (choice) of the means can be conceived of as instinctive, the cppovrjais which consists in a rational and right use of deivorr/s cannot, from its nature, ever become an instinct, and therefore remains even when the moral character is looked upon as perfectly formed ; see note 133. (138.) 10. r) de e£is k.t.A. The habit of contriving and carrying out the means to a good end arises to this eye of the soul, when to it is joined aperr) ; for the end must be good, or else it will be navovpyia, and good ends do not present themselves (as good) except to those who have aperr). (139.) 10. op, pan rrjs "^vx^s may either be cppovrjais dnb rrjs deivorrjTos, or deivorrjs : in either case the meaning is the same, viz. that to the exercise of this practical faculty moral ex- cellence is necessary. (140.) 10. ol yap avWoyiapoi. In acts of moral choice there is a reasoning process more or less distinct ; a reference of the particular to some principle, some standard of right, which may be syllogistically stated. This standard of right, this major premiss, by reference to which we draw our con- clusion as to the pursuit or avoidance of the particular ob- ject in question, is not known except to the good man. The man without aperr) has a bad standard by which he measures acts in the moral syllogism, (see bk. iii. 4. 4, 5,) and there- c. xiii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 117 fore his end is wrong, and his tWorq? becomes iravovpyla, and not cppovyais ; therefore without apery we cannot have the (ppovrjais d-rro rrjs deivoryros. (141.) 10. coo-re ahvvarov k.t.X. This seems to be a mere repetition, for the greater part of the book has been occu- pied in shewing the way in which cppovrjais and apery are con- nected : but he is speaking, not of the (ppovyo-is which works in j3ov\r]cris and ftovXevais, but of the (ppovyais dno rrjs heivoryros, and shews that to the development of detvorys into cppovya-is it is necessary that apery should exist, (ppdvya-ts dnb vov re- quires deivorrjs to carry it out, otherwise it would have eyes but not hands ; but in the case supposed above, and con- sidered here, where the r)6iKy apery secures both the right end and right means, the s oiKelov rr/s dperrjs arepyov ro KaXov Ka\ Si/cr^e- palvov to alcrxpov,) — certain shadowy visions of mXov and alaxpov, which, float indefinitely before the mind of every one who possesses human nature, unless, perhaps, we are to ex- cept those savage nations or individuals whose nature has by long corruption and degeneracy fallen below even the original 148 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xiii. 1—3, fall. The shadowy instincts, residing in the imagination rather than the reason, are the guide of the child while yet his reason is dormant: as his powers in course of nature unfold themselves, these shadowy instincts impregnate his reason, and become rational, (p,era \6yov ova-ai,) until, as the child grows into the man, instinct is no longer his guide, but reason; he knows why he avoids the evil and seeks the good, and thus cpvaiKr} dperr], which resides in the irdOrj (espe- cially in alb&s) by the admixture and impregnation of the reason, becomes r)6iKr) ; and this again, as has been before said, the nearer it approaches to perfection, becomes in its opera- tion more instinctive, more a hvvap-is. (143.) 1. dXX' avev vov k.t.X. (pvaiKr) dperr) then IS dperr) mmUS vovs. — ovtco Kal kvravQa. These shadowy feelings some- times lead one wrong. — iav be Xo/3?/ vov v. It is not by the addition of beivorrjs that (pvo-ucr) dperr) becomes Kvpla, but by the addition of that cppovrjo-is which springs from vovs. (144.) 2. r) be eg is Spot a ova- a. Both (pvo~LKr) and Kvpla dperrj consist in avoiding what is wrong and doing what is right ; but the latter energizes thus upon rational grounds. (145.) 2. ware KaQditep k.t.X. As in the moral intellect there are the two powers of beivorrjs and cppovrja-is, which are so connected, (at least as far as cppovrjo-is is considered as an habitual and rational exercise of the contriving and acting power,) that beivorr/s becomes cppovrjo-is by the addition of dperr), so in moral action these states Kvplcos imaTrjpr], Or (ppo- vrjo-is. (Seebk. vii. 3. 33.) irdv Kakbv dicoKrov. Ttdv alcrxpov (pevKrov. 1. Choice of ends. — povXrjo-is, directed by (fipovrjcris. Sense of koXov and alo-- Xpdv gradually superseded by a rational apprehension of them, — 7rd0r) submitting to it. (ppovrjo-is rod reXovs, gra- dually merged in nddrj, choosing right ends in- stinctively, rjOucr) dperr) tov (tkottov = dvvapus of moral vovs* 2. Choice of means. — (BovXevais, directed by cppo- vrjo-is: if by practice merged in rjOos, becoming also a mere bvvayns — character perfectly formed : 7)611$ dperrj tt)v irpoaipeaiv iroiei 8 e i dvr id € pevrj e £ i $• the whole being and nature is above the mere rational per- ception of KaXoV, and exempt from any impulse of rjdv ; while in KaKia the rational perceptions of right and wrong are so distorted, that the ala-xpov presents itself as fjdv : in d k p a- aia the rational perceptions of koXou differ from, and are overcome by, the impulse of rjbv ; in 6rjpiorr)s all rational perceptions of right and wrong are lost, and the desires, in consequence of the obscuration of reason, are so utterly de- praved, that they belong to a nature lower than that of man. (5.) 2. el KaOdnep

s vtto- \ap,pdva>v 6 p 6 p6vr)p6vriv r i s, for he is one who has to do with the particulars, not the principles of action only. If he is "7 icr^t/pai). The ne- gation of the consequent takes away the pr) from lo-xvpal, without touching upon (pavXai at all, — the emphasis of this part of the argument rests w r holly upon do-Bevels ; there- fore they are npaTTeiv. (31.) 10. 8 6 £■ e lev av, may be held to be. (32.) 10. p 77 i tv e tt e 1 a- t o. Most MSS. omit pr\ : " If the dwarfs had done it from a (bad) conviction that he ought to do it, he would have had a chance of altering when his con- viction is changed; but now with a different conviction, viz. that he ought not to do it, he does it." But prj eTreVeio-ro, which seems on the whole preferable, is supported by one or two MSS. : " If he had not had a right conviction" (that he ought not to do it,) " he might have changed when he got that convic- tion, (peraneiadeis) ; but now, though he has that conviction, he does it." In the reading without pr\, Treireio-Oai and eVe- Treio-To mean the false conviction of the d<6\ao-Tos, while 7re7reio-pevos refers to the right conviction, implied in /xera- TreiaBeis. If p.f) is read, TrenelaOai refers to the wrong convic- tion of the aKohao-TOS, and ine-neto-TO and Treneiapevos to the right conviction of the dicpaTrjs. In either case it is awkward to construe the same word differently in the same passage, but it is less so to do this with ireTrelvOai and intTreio-To than with e7T£7reicrro and 7r€7reicrp,€vos : if we take these two last to mean the same, then we must read prj. (33.) 11. The last words of the chapter are worth remark : — f] yap Averts rrjs dnopias evpeo-is eVrti/. CHAPTEE III. (34.) 2. t<» ftip\ a fj t<3 TTois, differ in their subject, or their method of handling the subject. (35.) 3. oh ote t at, SC. belv TTpdrTeiv. (36.) 3. rrepl p.ev oZv k.t.X. : cf. Plat. Eep. 479, E.— n a p %v, contrary to which. '■> c. iii. 2-5.] ETIIICS.-BOOK VII. 1G1 (37.) 4. Sr/XoT 8' 'HpdicXeiTos. See Prcllcr, page 21, Plato, Cratyl. 402, E. Heraclitus professed to have 86£a only; yet his d6ga was practically as strong as Plato's tVim-j^ : it is merely a difference in words. (38.) 5. There are various ways of accounting for a man's acting contrary to his knowledge, founded on the practical dif- ference between active (xp^f l€V0 s ) and inactive (ov xp^' fxevos t fi e n la-TTj ixr}) knowledge : — a. By the difference between the knowledge of the uni- versal principle, and the knowledge of the character of the particular thing which presents itself for the time to the will : a mistake in the latter does not prove the absence of the former. j8. By the varieties of this knowledge of the universal and particular which are concerned in a simple action ; the know- ledge of a general principle as regards such things gene- rally ; the knowledge of a principle as regards men, or some class of men generally : and to each of these belongs a par- ticular ; so that frequently four varieties of knowledge are concerned in a single act, and the absence of any one of these may cause error, though the agent may be in conscious and active possession of the other three. "What Butler, in Sermon X., calls self-partiality, continually operates to pre- vent men applying to themselves principles, which they believe abstractedly. y. By the various temperaments and states which are fa- vourable to the exercise of knowledge, or the contrary. Not only is there abstractedly a great difference between know- ledge when active and when dormant, but practically the knowledge is called into action, or suppressed, by different temperaments, or by those changes of temperament to which human nature is liable ; so sleep, anger, excitement, mental or bodily, suspend the active operation of the knowledge of which, at other times, we may be in conscious possession; — a veil is thrown over the intellect at such times by the gene- ral suspension of our faculties, as in sleep, or by the over- activity of one part of our nature : how this veil is removed, and activity restored to our knowledge, is a question for pathology. Such persons cannot be said to have knowledge, 162 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. iii. 8, 9, and therefore to act contrary to it at the moment of action, though they have it at other times. (39.) 8. avfjLcfjvvai, to be worked into the nature. The whole phenomena of moral action depend on the degree in which knowledge of good and right is worked into the whole system, so as to become part of our self-consciousness, and to operate instinctively, or exists externally, as it were, to ourselves, and operates only with great effort. In aKpaala the (ppcvrjo-is may exist externally ; in iyKpdreia it is partially, in aaxppoarvvrj it is wholly, worked into our being. See below, note 42. (40.) 9. (pvo-accos, psychologically ; according to its nature, and hence here psychologically. — hv a'Lo-O-qvis rjb-q Kvpla, which thenceforward depends on the senses. — fj drj: the function of j? KadoXov 8 6£a has ceased. (41.) orav Se p. I a k.t.X., when these agree. This syllogistic pro- cess of reasoning in moral action seems to be a true account of what goes on, though, as in scientific reasoning, the pro. cess is often instantaneous and imperceptible. He supposes two premisses or principles in the mind, arising, the one from the law of the mind, the other from the law of the members ; the one may be represented by nau y\vKv alperov, the other by nav alo~xp ov cpevKTov (rj KcciXvovcra yeveadai). The mind assents, and the will follows which- ever of these is called most strongly and sensibly into being, by having its particular attached to it. If it is tovto ia-rc yXvKv, then the major premiss, irav y\v , presents itself with more readi- ness and force than the moral one, tovto e o-t i alaxpov. It is true that, except where the mind is quite depraved, the moral major premiss virtually forbids it (J) pev \eyei qbevyeiv tovto) ; but the mind is carried away by the impulsive im- pression of desire (^ einOvpla S' ayei), so that the warning voice is disregarded : thus the man is overcome not wholly 0,10.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 1G3 contrary to knowledge, but yields to a sensual knowledge, and the syllogistic process arising from it, which represents the end as an object of rational desire. Hence it is of the greatest importance to right action that the tone of the mind, according to w r hich we take a sensual or moral view of particulars, should be in a true and healthy state, so that the particular should strike us in its moral rather than its sen- sual view; hence the Apostle's direction for holy living, — " to have our loins girt about with truth," so that it may be always ready for use. (42.) Our actions in matters of sensual pleasure and pain de- pend really on the greater or less degree in which cppourjais is worked into our moral nature. In dKoXao-la the (ppovrjais is totally absent, and a sen- sual wisdom (alaOrjTiKr) e7rikt6v: sometimes, in cases of utter depravity, ala-xpop iari yXvKv obtains. The principle which should coun- terbalance and restrain the passions (jvav alxn depends on orav, which is carried on by Se. — eKaa-rov, the passions and the reason. — vtto \6yov, sc. the reasoning process, nrdv ykvKv r)8v, tovt\ yXvKv, tovti rjdv. — d 6 £r) s } a result of a reasoning process ; sc. tovA ?}5u. 164 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. iii. 10-13, (45.) 10. on ivavrias k.t.X., SC. 6p6& Xoyco. Tllis doga is not essentially opposed to right reason, though it is so accidentally, in consequence of the imOvpia making it a practical guide to an action which 6p66s Xoyos disapproves : there is no struggle between this 8 6% a and 6p66s Xoyos, but between the imdvpia and the 6p66s Xoyns. From ovk havrias to X6ya is in a sort of parenthesis, so that the sentence beginning &are ml dta tovto belongs to the sentence immediately preceding ovk ivav rias k.t.X. (46.) 11. wo-Te ku\ §ta tovto k.t.X. This is brought forward as a proof that aKpao-ia is founded on some sort of reasoning process, on some general principle which, true in itself, is Kara avp^€J3r)K6s t a right guide for practice under certain cir- cumstances ; it is not a mere impulse. Hence animals are not termed tkpareis because they are not capable of these general principles, but act on the impulse of the senses. (47.) 11. cpavTao-la, the impression received from external things, from to, cpaivopeva. (48.) 12. irS>s be \{>€Tai k.t.X. It being thus shewn how the principles of moral wisdom are lost sight of by the active influence of desire, it is no business of ours to enquire how and when they return in power to the mind : that is a ques- tion for pathology. (49.) 13. Eire) Se f) TeXevTaia k.t.X. It is the particular premiss of the moral syllogism, the judgment we form of the object before us (8 6 £ a a I a- 8 r\ r o €), which mainly influences our action {kv pi a t&v tt pdgeav); and he who is under the influence of desire does not take the moral view of the particular object, but only a sensual view. The object sug- gests to him tovtI yXvKv, which calls forth nav yXvKv f/Sv, and not tovtX alcrxpov, which would Call forth nav alarxpov (pevKTov, and prevent the action. And it may be again said, that it i$ of the utmost importance to right action that the tone of the mind should be right, that things should strike us in a moral, and not a sensual, point of view ; — this is the object of right education. (50.) 13. Kal dia to k.t.X. Since a right judgment on par- ticulars is not necessarily implied in the knowledge of the general principle (dia t6 ^ Ka66Xov 8oKe7v etvat), and, being of particulars, is not matter of ima-Typr) (prf i-mo-rnpoviKov 6pola>s) } 14 ; c. iv. 1, 2.] ETIIICS.-BOOK VII. 1G5 the want of right judgment on a particular docs not imply the want of the general principle : if the particular were enta-TriiioviKov opolm, then a wrong view of the particular would imply the entire absence of the general principle. (51.) 14. oi ydp k.t.X. Socrates appears to be right (tome 6 e^r« 2a>KpaTr}s avppaivei v),for aKpaaia does not take place when «nori/fi?7, properly so called, (nvplas en-to-r^iT/, the law of the mind,) is present in power in the mind. This is hindered and obscured, though it exists passively. But there is a sort of inia-TTjixr] present, viz. f] aiV^riKj/, the law of the members, such as irav ykvKv r)Sv ; and this does exist when aKpaaia takes place. aKpaaia is not a mere animal impulse, but, by the aid of a reasoning process, it operates in spite of our better know- ledge, which exists, though not actively, (eVori, not napeari). The natural reference which a reasoning creature would make to reason to approve his actions is supplied by the operation of the sensual syllogism, and thus cppovrjais is suspended as a principle of action. (52.) 14. ovb* avr-q — 77 ados is in a parenthesis, so that rrjs alo-drjTiKris is in the same construction as Kvplas «rt $•, in its proper sense.— & anep avdpunos. As we add an epithet or characteristic to the man who thus differs from other men ; the common term " man" has a slight difference attached to 160 ETHICS.--BOOK VII. [c. iv. 2-5, it to mark the individual : it is a slight difference ; but never- theless, by it he differed from other men, dXX y optis erepos tju. Another interpretation is, that a man named Anthropus won the Olympic prize, and that in order to prevent it being supposed, when the individual Anthropus was spoken of, that the class audpconos was meant, they attached to his name 6 to. 'OXvpTTia veviKrjKus ; SO that the kolvos Xoyos (avdpcojros) Iblov ^AvdpoiTTOs) p'tKpco bucpepev. (56.) 2. e fee iv cp, SC. tco ra 'oXvpma vevtKrjKoTi. — k ara to pe po s, as ciKpaTTjs itotov, dupciTrjs o\jrov k.t.X., which are all varieties of aKpao-ia proper. The argument here is in the second figure. (57.) 3. t co 77 p o a i p el a- 6 a i, modal dative. — o v Kara 7T p 6 a 6e a- 1 v, not with an addition. (58.) 4. paXcucol. This term, which expresses one phase o cLKpaaia proper, is not (like dKparrjs) used metaphorically, and is only applied to bodily pleasures : if dwarfs were properly applied to all the above, then it would be applicable to them in all its shapes and phases ; but it is not so. Another read- ing is aKoXao-Tos, taking the meaning to be, if aKoXao-Tos cannot be properly applied to Spyr] Tiprj, &c, so neither can aKpao-ia ; but the former is best. — ir e p\ t avTas, SC. irep\ as aKparrjs XeyeTai a rr X co s. — e k e t v co v refers to nepl Ta8e, opyrjv, Tiprjv, &C. The argument consists of an affirmative and a negative con- clusion in the third figure. — o vk e Keivcov ovbeva is pa- renthetical, so that 8ta to k.t.X. belongs to the preceding clause : the meaning is, we do not place aKpa-r^s dpyrjs, Tiprp k.t.X. in the same category with aKoXao-Tos, as we do the simple aKpaTrjs. — prj en i6v p.S>v. The aKoXao~Tos is rather bent on indulgence from the tone of his mind and taste (^cW^), than hurried into it by vehement desire. Mark the distinction here drawn between emOvpia and fjdovr]. (59.) 5. tco yevei, generically of the number of things fair and esteemed. The first sentence of the next chapter, however, suggests that tco yevei may mean " to the species man." (60.) 5. tcov yap rjdecov k.t.X. This is a difficult passage, especially when compared with sect. 2 ; but it is solved by taking to. peragv to be the dvayKala of sect. 2 ; standing, that is, between to. cpvaei atperd and to. cpvaei cpevKTa, being neither the one nor the other ; not being alpeTa, matter of choice at all, ; 5, 6.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. . 107 but simply dvaymla, in which wo havo no choice. The division then stands thus : — 1. cpuaei alperd — rtpi] — vikij k.t.X. ev vnepftdXf] yjstyerat cos ep\ de 6v\x6v k.t.A. His endeavour to shew that dicpacria is properly confined to fjBovfj aanariKr) has reference to his opposition to Plato's theory of morals, — that 6vp6s, and not rjbovr], is the real motive cause of human action. CHAPTEE V. (68.) In this chapter he shews that the gross violations of right and decency are not to be classed under dicpao-ia, or from acting contrary to knowledge, but proceed from a perverted nature, where there is a complete confusion, or rather ab- sence, of principles of right and wrong. (69.) 1. rci be ovk e crriv 7 SC. ovk icrriv (fivo-ei qbea, — are not 0&- jects of desire by nature. (70.) 2. rrjv av$ p oa-nov. Lamia, a lady of Pontus : Hor. Ars Poet. 340. — 7repl rbv TLovtov. Arist. Pol. viii. 3, p. 260, and bk. iv. 18, p. 106. — to tt e p\ 3> dXap tv \ey 6 p.ev o v. Phalaris is said to have eaten his son. (71.) 5. ovk f] dirXrj aKpaala. Supply 77 eyicpdreia. — tt e p\ tovs Bvfiovs, angry passions. See Grr. Gr. 355, obs. 1 rov rrd- 6 ov s SC. aKparr] 3vp,ov } not aKparrj drrX&s. CHAPTEE VI. (72.) 1. tjttov alcrxpa, ^ ess ivrong, less a violation of duty. alcrxpdv gives the neuter notion of Kaicia, as ko\6v of aperf. (73.) 1. cpavraaia, the faculty which receives impressions (apev ttjs vXrjs) from external things and acts, following on dlo-Orjo-is, so that below ata-Brjaris is used for it. vppis, properly speaking, is not matter of atvOrjo-is, but of cpavTao-ia ; it is not any thing or act actually seen, but it arises from some such thing or act. (74.) 1. 6 Xo'yos rj fj a 3 io-0r) o-is. The two channels whereby T)t)v presents itself, the one of things absent, the other of things present, are here distinctly recognised. (75.) 2. fj §' €Tri6vfiia ov. He is here speaking of right reason, which puts forth its directions under the form of § e I,. as a matter of duty, which emOvpia does not, as we have seen in 2—6.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 1G9 cli. iii., allow to operate. The sensual Xoyos, alo-6r)riKrj ema-TTjprj, may have operated so far as to shew that this particular thing is i)hv, or that nav r)8v Siuktov, and sp far it operates in aKpaata as to sanction the 6^^117 of cmtivpia, but it does not say 8fT nav r)8v 8id>Keiv : in 6vp6s, a sort of right reason, something which pretends to be so, lends its sanction to the action : 8 e I toiovtco noXcpelv. (76.) 2. k a\ r) ^aXeTTOTT;? k.t.X. Supply tov dvfjLov eVri cpvaiKco- T€pa T1)S TQ)V €7rL0vp.ia>v. (77.) 3. 8o\o7t\6kov. The force of the quotation of course lies in the 86\os of the compound. (78.) 3. ajo-r' etnep k.t.X. The way to construe this is, "If aKpaa-ia proper is more a violation of justice than that of anger, it is also (koi) worse (ato-xtW), and it is most properly termed aKpaaia, and in a certain sense is vice." (79.) 4. This sorites is somewhat difficult, from the short way in which the argument is stated, and from there being a change from the first middle term, — the greater cause for resentment in €7tl6v |ita, and consequently greater injustice — to that which implies this, but does not state it, — the less cause for resentment in 6 py 77, and consequent less injustice : " and aKpao-ia 8\ eW Bvpiav is worse than that from anger, for it is a fitter object for resentment, (dSiKovrepa) ; for 6pyr), being accompanied with Xvnr), can have no v(3pi$, and therefore is a less fit object for resentment, and therefore less unjust." Or it may be stated in another way : — "Whatever has pain has no vfipis : 6pyr) has pain ; opyr) has no v(3pis. Whatever is a more fitting object of resentment than 6pyr) is d8(Kcorepa rrjs 6pyr)s. aKpao-ia 81 imOvplav is more an object of resentment than dpyrj, (for 6pyr) has no vftpLs). Rhet. ii. 2. 5. aKpacrla b\ iniBvplav is dbiKcorepa. (80.) 4. cppx vtt6 \6yov, sc. /xera/3dXXei. — X ap.^dvova-1, receive from external things. (106.) 3. &o-7rep ilrr](pi(rp,aTa. The yj/rjcpiapia does not carry with it any power of effecting what it decrees ; as far as itself goes, it is inoperative & are p,d\\ov k.t.X. : because they are influenced, not by reason, but by pleasure and pain. c. x. 1-4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 175 (107.) 4. d\\a KaXrjv, sc. 8ui koXtjv rjSovfjv. Remark the dis- tinction here drawn between the sorts of r/Soi/17, kuA/;, and mcrjfpa. (10S.) 5. He here shews that eyupdreia is a mean, as well as those properly termed virtues. — § toiovtos: that is, as i';w ;is this point in his character is concerned. This is supported by three MSS. 6 toiovtos ol. is a. mere repetition of the first words of the clause : ear\ must be supplied, 6 toiovtos ovk ippevav earl t&> Aoyco. — 8 la ro pdWdv t i : through his sense of pleasure being too strong ; while the other does not allow himself the indulgences which reason allows, owing to his sense of pleasure being too weak, (St a to tjttov n). (109.) 6. t)ko\ov6t]K€p, is derived from it in the way of analogy* CHAPTER X. (110.) 1. He now shews that wherever aKpao-la takes place, perfect (ppovrjo-is is wanting. It is not that cppovrjcris is not a suf- ficient development of the intellect, but because it is not sufficiently worked into the ndOr). (111.) 2. toi/ 8e Seii/o'i/. As SeivoTrjs does not involve any moral considerations, but is merely a power of carrying out the necessary means to a desired end, the deivos may be dupciTxis, and vice versa, for the d8aip.ovia. (116.) The fact that Aristotle discusses the question again in bk. x., and goes over, in many points, the same ground as here, has led some to suppose that these last chapters have found their way from the Eudemian Ethics (in which they occur verbatim) into this place; but the distinction given in the last note will point out a difference in his way of looking at pleasure and pain in this book and the tenth, while their close connection with aKpaaia will suggest a suf- ficient reason why he should have introduced them here. (117.) 3. eviat fiev elpai, SC. ay ad a i. (118.) 4. He gives the arguments by whicli these three opinions are supported— y eve a- is, transition state — a- vyyevrjs, co- existent with. While the yeveais (olKo86fxr](Tis, for instance) is going on, the reXos thereof (oi/aa) is not in existence ; when the riXos (oIklo) is in existence, the yeveais (olKoSoprjais) has ceased : therefore, if 77801/77 is a yeveo-is, it cannot ever be co- existent with the dya86v, for this is a reXos- CHAPTEE XII. (119.) Aristotle in this chapter is giving the arguments on the other side of the question. We must not suppose that these are held all by the same persoris, but they probably were used by differing schools or individuals, so that we must not expect the same facts to be assumed or the same results deduced in the several positions : — 1. That there is a difference between the airXcos rjdv and the tivX fjbv, so that what may be true of the latter is not true necessarily of the former, (sect. 1). 2. That there is a difference between the ivepyeia of plea- sure and the jfgis of pleasure, (sect. 2). c. xii. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 177 3. That even those pleasures which seem to be yevtcrcis are not so really, but rather eVcpyemt, (sect. 3). Sects. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are evident. (120.) 1. irpSiTov pev k.t.X. The argument here is, that the objections urged above may be true as against f}8ov^j nw, but not rjdovrj dnXcos. (121.) 1. aKoXovOfjcrovcriv. As there is an dyaObv dnXus, and dyaOov TIN, SO there are (pvcreis and e£eis, which are dyadai dnXoos, and others only dyaBai tipi; and further, there are some Kivrjaeis and yeviaeLS dyadai anXctis, and others Only dyaOa'i tivi, — as, for instance, the yivccns, or process of the act of sight, is dyaBrj dnXcos, the yeueais, or process of recovery from sickness, is dyaOr) tcvl. (122.) 1. evia i 8e ov&e T<5Se, SC. del or Kad' citrus. The divisions of rjdovf) in this respect are, — dyaOal dnX a s. dyaO a I r ivi del. dyaBai rivi it ore. (j) a i v u /j, € v a i r}h oval. (123.) 2. en k.t.X. Further, we must distinguish between the dnXcds rjdv and the Kara ). (130.) 3. ku\ re\os k.t.X. The riXos of such pleasures (sight, for instance) is not distinct from the pleasure itself, but only of those which conduce to the supplement of some natural want, (l7roXoi7rov €$€(os, sect. 1). — 816 k.t.X. : see ch. xi. 4. 3—7; c.xiii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK V1J. 179 (131.) 3. evepyeiav ttjs Kara (pvaiv egeus, the operation or energy of a state consonant to nature. This is the definition of anXcos rjSovr) : the others, as we have seen above, are only narh arvp^ej3r)<6s jfielai — a t o 8 r] t tj v y eve a iv, a perceptible state of transition towards something. (132.) 3. do ac el hi k.t.X. It may be said that the very notion of pleasure being a yeveo-is arises from its being in the most proper sense, (fn/ptW) dya$6v ; for as that which is properly dyadov is an evepyeia, and rjbovrj being properly such an evepyeia tov dyadov, people confound it with a yeveo-is, fancying that the two are identical. The way people got at the notion of its being a yeveo-is was — f)8ovr) must be an evepyeia, because it is dya$6v, and an evepyeia must be a yeveo-is. He brings for- ward the source of the error (that f)8ovr) is a yeveo-is) which he has just been confuting, in proof of his position that 3760^17 is in the proper sense an dyadov, (though not rdyaOov). (133.) 4. to at to Kal, the same as if (you were to call) healthy things bad, because, &c. — n p6s xpV f iaT l(T l JL ^ v } money-mak- ing, business. — TavTv. Viewed relatively, both rjbea and vyieiva are sometimes bad ; but this does not prove them abso- lutely bad. (134.) 6. ovde yap a\\r)s k.t.X. An art is that which sets out and regulates the productive powers of a bvvapis : that which sets out and regulates the operation of an evepyeia is a law, not an art. — k a It 01 : " and yet the objection does not seem to be founded in fact, for," &c. (135.) 7. to Sc tov o 3 ipLirohio-TiKr}, is an evil to particular persons, (opposed to dirXcos,) as being in some way an hindrance to them : al. irfj tq3, opposing nrj to dnXcos. (137.) 1. 0)5 yap l.irevo-nviros k.t.X. The method devised to meet the foregoing argument (e£ ivavrlmv) was simply this : as the two extremes are not only opposed to the mean as good, but each to the other as an evil, so the opposition be- tween Xirnr) and t]8ovt) may be of this latter kind, and both be evils. Aristotle answers — if both were evils, both would be alike avoided. Cf. bk. i. 12. 180 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. xiii. 2-7; (138.) 2. tovto, SC. ivepyeia dvepTrobicrTOs. — ovbepia yap k.t.X. The argument is, " ivipyeta TeXeios is 77801/77, (as being dvepno- diaTOs,) evbaipoula implies evepyeia TeXeios, evbaipovia implies 77001/77. (139.) 3. oi be k.t.X. : see bk. i. ch. x. The essence of the evbai- povia would remain, though the adjuncts perished ; the evbai- povia would remain, though the man would not be evbaipav : see bk. i. note 175. — 77 iicovres fj a < owes, whether they really mean it or not, (140.) 5. (pr]pr) S' oi K.r.X., Hes. Opp. 762. — Xaoi, SC. (prjpi&v o-lv, Hesiod. (141.) 6. oi>x V avrr), SC.7racri. (142.) 6. dXXd ttjv avTrjv. In reality, there is a divine instinct within men, which prompts them to desire and seek after true pleasure, though in their views and practices they re- cognise and seek only the lower sort, because these are commonly received as the only pleasures. Reasonable self- love is at bottom a motive cause to every one. — irapa- pdXXeiv is neuter.— 7rai/ra yap k.t.X. These words give an important feature in Aristotle's view of human nature. (143.) 7- fj evepyeia, SC. rrjs qbovrjs. — evb e x eT ai £l v i sc * T0P evbaipova. CHAPTEE XIY. (144.) 2. o v v, if then this is the case. (145.) 2. 77 ovras. This is another opinion, which Aristotle, on the whole, adopts. He frequently introduces such opinions of his own by rj ovtg>s. — r 6 p rj k a k 6 v, sc. the getting rid of the Xv7T77 ttjs emdvpias. — p * XP l fov ay a6 ai'. that is, as long as they are within proper limits. — r s S' e w i Xvnr] s. In the case of rjbovf] a man is bad, not for pursuing pleasure at all, but its excess ; in the case of Xv-rrrj a man is bad, not from avoiding the excess of pain, but pain altogether. — oXcos, SC. 6 (pavXos. (147.) 2. o v ydp e cm. This is an answer to the second ques- c. xiv. 2—4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 181 tion proposed above, (8ia tL ovv k.t.X.) u If some plea- sures are bad, why are the pains opposed to them bad like- wise ?" Having first answered the difficulty, " how far bodily pleasures are good," (/} ovtus ayaOal k.t.X.), he then introduces his answer to the other, as if it were a deduction from it. We must supply the seutence to which yap refers : " So that it is not absurd for one who holds excess of pleasure to be an evil, to say that Xvirr) is an evil also, for \vir-q is not in itself the opposite of the bad sort of pleasure, but only acciden- tally, in the case of him to whom this bad sort of pleasure is good," ((i\X' fj tg> dtuKovri ttjv v7r€p(3o\r)v) . In itself this bad pleasure is an evil, and therefore cannot be opposed to Xvttt), which is an evil also. (148.) 3. to Sia t\ (patvcrai d\r)6esis the nominative case to (pavf/. — eVel 8' ov. The apodosis begins in sect. 4, npwrov pev ovv k.t.X. : when a reasonable cause can be given for the origin of an error, it confirms the truth. Cf. Hooker, Ecc. Pol. I. viii. 3. (149.) 4. u> s ovo-rjs I ar pe ias, SC. rye fjbovrjs — o~(po8pai. These remedies against violent pain are in themselves violent, hence the two are placed in strong contrast. — 8 1 6 ku\ bidxovrai dia to it a pa to evavTiov (by the side of the contrary,) (paiveo-Oai, sc. rjdelai. These false pleasures appear to be pleasures from their contrast to the pain to which they are opposed. — ftia. dvo tclvto. may be either, the two reasons above do not prove these pleasures to be good, for the fol- lowing reasons ; or dvo TavTa may refer to the following rea- sons themselves. — 6 n a I pkv k.t.X. He is giving one reason for the view which some men, looking only at bodily plea- sures, and these in excess, take of rjBovf) as an evil. (150.) 4. at de I ar pelai k.t.X. This is another reason for the same. The full sentence is, at Se larpelai (ov anovbala elvai $0- kovo-i) on evbeovs (elcrl) Ka\ (on) ex* lv ( r /3eXndV eari, rj (tovto) yiveo-Qai : " But the pleasures which are of the nature of reme- dies are held to be bad, because they imply a deficiency, and because it is better to be in possession of any thing, than that this thing should be in course of production," or fycut may be rendered "an e£is, and yevio-6aC^ and yeveo-6ai towards that egis. It is better to be well than to have recourse to remedies for getting well : an larpela implies an evil, rather 182 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. xiv. 4—8, than is itself a good. Such pleasures seem to be of the na- ture of evil, because they are merely remedies for a defect. (151.) 4. at Se crv fx(3a ivo v /x e v o i. Their desires are more active and in- satiable, as drunken men are more thirsty the more they drink. (154.) 7. a I 8' avev \vna>v. such as the pleasures of thought, sight, &c. ; and as these are never lv v7repftoXf}, they are (TTzovhaiat. — r o v viropevovTos k.t.X. Health is restored, not by the action of the medicine, but by the operation of the yet surviving principle of health. All that the antidote does is to check that which would prevent this principle working ; and therefore, though it is for the time an object of desire, it is only accidentally so, as hindering a greater evil. — a it o iel 7r p a £■ iv rrj s r o i a cr 8 e (pv o~ e a> s, which performs the actions suitable to such nature. In the Rhetoric this would be stated — d 7roteI Trpos.a (pikoToiovros, or ra KaTaaravra els ttjv v7rdpxovo~av (pvo~iv. (155.) 8. ovk del k.t.X. St. James i. 8, "A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways." In proportion as the parts of our nature are harmonized so as to work together, our pleasures will be consistent and enduring. — k a 66

kt6v, — without giving time for the moral principle to make itself heard. dupaala 81a o~K- rov, violent impulse to escape pain, — obstinate emOvpla, — moral principle not allowed to speak. dicpacr la hi' daOeveiav: fiovXevadpevoi, taking counsel with right reason, but not having the moral principle in sufficient strength to be effectual ; — given above. aKpao-la 5i" e 6 1 o~ pov : where self-indulgence has given increase to the imBvpla, quickened sensual perception, and strengthened the sensual principle. J: or aapaala dnb rrjs imOvpias, and dupao-la dnb rrjs rj&ovrjs, See note 89. 184 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. i. 1—4, BOOK VIII. CHAPTER I. (1.) Aristotle in this book discusses the social instincts of man apart from any notion of social or political obligation, which he has treated of in the fourth (ch. vi.) and the fifth book. "While going through the principles and the phe- nomena of cpiXia, he shews that r)BiKr) apery secures the most perfect and enduring exercise of the social instincts, as he has shewn in the fifth book that it secures the due per- formance of social obligation. The actual difficulties in this book are fewer than in any of the preceding, but it requires considerable attention and clearness to master and retain the details, and the relation in which the matters treated of stand to each other : such as the conditions of cpikla in general, and of true : II. X. 224. (4.) 4. eoiKe be ras noXeis o-vvex^^v r) ?, in the abstract. CHAPTEE III. (10.) 2. ovx fl ° (piXovfievos icrnv, not in respect of that which the person beloved is in himself; al. i\ias. The other sorts of friendship are merely resemblances and sha- dows of this : al. ravrrj yap opoia, in this they are similar, &c. (13.) 8. rovs Xeyopevovs a\as. Michelet quotes Cic. de Amicitia, c. 19, Verumque Mud est quod dicitur multos modios salis simul dandos esse ut amicitice munere expletum sit. End. Vll. 2 : els 7rapoipiav i\r)\vdev 6 pedipvos t o p, in regard of duration. — r avrd, al. ravra. CHAPTEE IV. (15.) 2. prj § e re p o v, he who is neither really good nor really bad (neither iirieucrjs nor v (piXia : opoioi being used as opoiapa, in sect. 1 : or ravTrj in this respect, sc. xP e ' a or h§ ov fl' CHAPTEE V. (19.) 3. dnoS e xo pevo i, taking to one another. — ol paicdpio i. The word expresses here both virtue and prosperity. (20.) 5. rjbel. The common reading is ei'Sei, but it seems difficult to make any sense of this word ; and the reading in it, vii. 2, 3.] ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. 187 the text (178ft) is not much better. (37cret. I would suggest e/>yw, which is Hot a violent alteration. CHAPTER VI. (21.) 4. fiaWov fouf o v r i, to him as a man. Whatever goods belong to humanity : hence not such as pertain to the gods. CHAPTEE YIII. (29.) 1 . v it e p e x 6 p e v o s, in an inferior condition. — to iovto s elvai, al. Om. eivai. (30.) 4. iv ots tov to yivcTat kclt agtav. He is speaking of the (fiikiai iv virepoxfl- (31.) 5. 6 po LOTTj S (SC. eOTl) CpiXoTTJS € 7T I T p € 7T € I V '. the COUl- mon reading has virrjpeTelv after i-mTpkneiv, but the reading in the text is the better, supplying dpapTaveiv. (32.) 6. sc - ch. i. 4. Some persons have argued from this expression, here and else- where, (bk. viii. and ix.,) that these chapters do not properly belong to the Nicomachean Ethics : but there is no reason ix. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. 189 why eV cipxji here may not mean "the beginning of this part of the subject;" and there are other passages in these books where the words eV apxfii used somewhat differently, imply connection with the earlier parts of the Ethics. — cpiXLa bi: fie is emphatic ; Gr. Gr. 761, 2. (34.) 1. ku6' 00-01/ k.t.A. As biKiuov is the substitute for vr)crai cpiXias : — unless the proper reading be na\ cpiXla dr). Michelet suggests that cpiXias depends on W, supplied from rt binaiov. CHAPTER XII. (50.) 1. irao-a cpiXla. He is here speaking of noXiTiical cptXiai, or cpiXiai Kar d^Lcov. — a cp o p i viKrj, r) Xeyopevrj ttoXltikt). (51.) 2. 6K ct va), al. eKeivoov de o v 8 e v i, sc. to none of these is the possessor an object of interest ; but the new reading is by far the better. (52.) 3. t<5 e£ avTa>v necpvKevaL Cf. 1 Ep. St. John 5. — rail- rbv a I p. a: II. £. 211. pi£av: Eur. Ion. ix. 76. — Kal fv dirjpr)p.evois, in the separate branches. — e I a I, sc. alpa Kal pi£a. 4-7; o. xiii. 2-7.] ETHICS.— BOOK Vlll. 198 (53.) d'. »'/Xl£ V"/ 5 tfXlKU, SC. TtpiTfl. (TVVOIKC t U) V T (II, C//V' connected, (51.) 5. ws 7r/jo? ^eouy. Observe his notion of the care of the Divine Being for man. (55.) G. r; roiavTt] (p iX i a, SO. 17 (rvyycuiKJ). — r co v o Qv e L 10 v, SC. tt/s (fiiXlas. — 6 (3 i s k.t.X., their daily lives have mure in common. — pdXXov iv rois e a-ie t/ce o-t : that is, where there is apery']. — v7rdpxovcri o-repyovres- (Supply etcri before oliceioTepoi ; 111. vrrdpxoPTes arrepyovcri. (56.) 7. oiros ; the avOpumos being formed with a view to the family, the family with a view to the state: in this passage lie is speaking natures operantis, (avOpa-rros, olida, ttoXis,) as in order of development the indi- viduals form themselves into families, and families become states. (57.) 7. 17 tt w $• 8'iKaiov, sc. o-vpfiiwvai. The requirements of (fiikia are the same as those of binaiov, though on different principles : as the relations differ, so will the bUaiov ; and hence also the <£iAia must be different. — r avrov, sc. bUaiov, CHAPTER XIII. (58.) 2. d p v v e t a t, al. dpeifierai. (59.) 6. o-waXXdgao- 1 : neuter. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. (60.) 6. cpiXiKrjv 5e ttjv dvafioXrjv ex el -> but it admits of a friendly delay : c/nX lkov, Bekker ; but friendship admits of delays : cf. Plat. Legg. 915. But the former reading is the better, as the neuter adjective for the abstract noun requires the article to : see Gr. Gr. 436, y. (61.) 7. 6t 18 rjrr o r e ciXXo, for whatever other services he does to the other, are as to a friend: al. aXXa, sc. napex^. This is the old reading, but aXXo has MS. authority, and is better. (62.) 7. bwapevep. If he is able, he must repay the debt. — kcl\ £k6vtl, and with good-will. — anovra ydp k.t.X., ior we must not make a man a friend against his will, as we should be doing if we were to suppose that as friendship is not cVi c c 194 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. xiii. 9—11; pr)Tols, therefore we need not repay it,— that it was no debt. From Jco/itO' ov ovk e'Set. In this interpretation acorn and aKovra refer to different persons, one the agent, the other the recipient of the apodosis ; and kcu €k6vtl has not the emphasis whieh it evidently is meant to have. It is better to take both for the same person, making itcovri to refer to the will of the recipient, as hwapeim does to the power of the agent, and making it depend on airoftovvai in airoboriov, (Gr. Gr. 613, 3,) and not on the passive verbal notion. " A return is to be made to him who did the benefit, if the person benefited is able to do it, and if he is willing to receive it ; for one must not make a man a friend against his will," which would be the case if you were to treat a man as if he had done you a service as a friend, while he declares he did not do it as your friend, that he has no such claim upon you : as where a person had accidentally benefited another, without the least notion of doing him a service, or done it from friend- ship to some one else. In such a case the person benefited ought not to have received the benefit, and all he has to do now is to allow the matter to be settled, (SiaXvreW,) as if it had been hn faroU ; in which case, as no mention of return was made beforehand, no return would be expected afterwards. This gives kcu Ikovti its emphatic force, and gives the two con- ditions of the dvTcm6doo-is, viz. the ability of one party and the willingness of the other ; and moreover describes a case which is perpetually happening in every-day life. A man refuses to accept a return for a benefit conferred, because such accept- ance would imply a friendship which does not exist, and was not implied in the original act. (63.) 9. 6po\oyr) p. o X 6 y r) a- e 6' a v, which would favour the former of the two interpretations, by shewing that the eVi p/roTy refers to the dnodoo-is to which he would have agreed beforehand, and not, as suggested in the second interpretation, to there being no bargain for an dnoboais, and therefore no case for it. (64.) 11. c tv a p k e I, SC. erepos. CHAPTEE XIV. (65.) 3. eis xph\ xaTa k-t.X., by him who is on the debtor side with respect to money or to excellence. — dvrairobih6vra depends on Sei in avranodoTeop =. del avrbv dnoSovvcu. (6Q.) 4. ov8e\s ydp k.t.X. Oi serve here again his notions of the gods. — ocpeiXovra, same construction as dpTanoboTeop above. — v rr e p (3 dWo p t o s, sc viov. — r at be

v, the father cannot hope for any benefit from a very bad son, and men do not usually benefit those for whom they cannot hope for some return. BOOK IX. CHAPTEE I. (1.) Akistotle in this book considers certain questions connected with our social instincts, their development and operation. — Kad art e p e tpijrot, be viii. 14. 4. (2.) 2. 6 epwpevos, SC. eyKakel. — £ n a y y e X X 6 p. e p o s, SC o epao-rfji. (3.) 3. f) ra>p T) 6 a> p } SC. fj r}6iKJ]. (4.) 4. k i 6 a p sc - &>v beopevos Tvyxcivei. — tt po\ afro vt o s, SC. he icho was the first recipient, as irpoex 0VTa below. — UpcoTayopav : Plat. Prot. 328, B. (6.) C. piaOos 5' dvbpl (piXcp elprjpevos iipKios ecrTco, HeS. Opp. 36S. (7.) 7. Si' avr ov s, those ivho benefit their friends for their own sake, i. e. 8i dpeTrjv. (8.) 8. top 7r p oe xovtci, he who first received the benefit. — dvrt- Xa (3 cov, SC. 6 erepos. (9.) 8. e v to 7 s co viols, in shops. The buyer fixes the price he will give according to the benefit or pleasure he thinks the article will give him, and will not give more ; whereas the seller tries to get as much as he can. The need of the buyer gives the article its marketable value ; and the person who has been benefited in the same way ought to fix the value, as it was his need which determined it. (10.) 9. iicovcricov o~vp.(3o\alcovi see V. 2. 13. CHAPTEK II. (11.) He now considers some questions of casuistry. The logical description of casuistry would be, where the particular minor or fact being realized, a deliberation arises as to what major premiss or principle we should refer that known particular. Honest casuistry is where the doubt implied in such delibe- ration is real. Dishonest, or casuistry in its usual accepta- tion, is where the proper major is really known, but it is at- tempted to refer the minor to some more palatable principle, and thus escape from an inconvenient conclusion or dis- agreeable duty. — 6 polcos, SC. TTOTepov. (12.) 5. iavTov, than himself He ought rather to ransom his father, than procure his own liberty. — r rjv tt p ovirap xvv, al. erepov TrpovTrapxqv, al. eTalpov. — r retaining an instinctive consciousness of his former nature and personality, he has desires suitable to it : so that hence we see that a man's notion of his proper good, and his pos- session of it, depends on his proper personality. 2. The Divine Being has some good ; but even this is by virtue of some nature or personality unknown to us, (a> v on 7roT car i,) to which this good is suitable. So that, if in proportion as any one realizes and de- velopes his personality or true nature he wishes the truest good to himself, it follows that a good man, leading a life of reason, (which is the ima-Torr]? of man,) wishes most truly good to himself. (22.) 5. t<5 8rj it p 6 s iavrov — virdp x e i v. Dative of proof: see Gt. Gr. 609, 5. (23.) 5. elvai r i S o k e t, seems to be something real : n is em- phatic. So Plato, Phsedr. 242 E, o-ep,pvverep6v r e, al. r<». — it e p i, in the case of — Kav pLTj&ev ao-i — yevo lvto. The conjunctive points to the present, the opt. to the future. (Cardwell.) (37.) 4. iapev (T ivepyeia. This observation is founded on a profound knowledge of the human mind. It is the prin- ciple which, stirs men up to activity and toil where no de- finite advantage is to be gained by it. (38.) 4. ivepyeia 8 r\ — I a r t it a s, exists as it were in his energy. Michelet takes to epyov as the nominative, and reads io-rl TToas ; and this interpretation is recognised by the Paraphrast. The argument is, that the act of benefiting another is an act of existence, is a realization to us of our existence, and there- fore pleasant ; while the act of being benefited is something passive, and does not realize to us our existence, as we do not co-operate in it, but we are simply recipients of the act of the agent. — b yap e o-r i bwdpei: that which has a virtual, in posse (dwdpei) existence, is set forth actually in esse {Ivepyeia) by its act or result. (39.) 5. x a ' L P €LV €V 4 tovto, so that he to whom this per- tains feels pleasure . — ovbev ica\6 v iv ro3 S p do~ avr i. The words koXov iv ra dpao-avn must be taken together : the feeling of na\ 6 v which exists in the agent. (40.) 6. dvdira\iv. In the benefactor the memory of the koXov is sweet, and he therefore dwells with pleasure on his act and its object. In the person benefited the remem- brance of the avpcpepov is less vivid ; and he rather looks for- ward to some new benefit, than backwards to what he has received. It is in this sense that gratitude has been defined 7 ; viii. 1 — 8.] ETHICS.— BOOK IX. 201 as a lively sense of favours to come. — n otqcrti, a productive act. r co iratrxci-v, a passive act: the former produces feelings of crripyeiv coarnep tc'kpci : c-vepyerelv glVCS a notion of vnepoxrj, — evepyereicrOai a notion of vnepexfcrBai ; hence also the benefactor loves his act for the feeling of superiority which it gives him. (41.) 7. tlov irapaXafiovTcov, than those who inherit it. — p. d X- \ov i era o- <, i. e. more than the children know them as the authors of their being, or than the fathers know the children to he theirs. CHAPTER VIII. (42.) 1. d <£' i avTov, losing sight of himself and his own in- terests. (43.) 2. ois 6 v, SC. eavrov to Kvpicorarov — opeyccrOai, al. op eye a 6a i rj. (48.) 7. an 08 k xovrat, welcome. — Trdvrcov §' dpn.Wcop.iv co v. This brings to mind what Butler says of the tendencies of virtue, part i. ch. 3. The public as well as the individual good would be secured by true cptXavria. (49.) 8. it ds yap vovs- The reason, when not perverted and Dd 202 ETHICS.— BOOK IX. [c. viii. 9; ix. 1-7, overwhelmed by the passions, as in the case of the dicoXao-Tos or 7re7TT]pa)fi€vos, chooses the highest good : perhaps even in these desperate cases the good is occasionally perceived by the reason, though not even in wish acted upon. (oO.) 9. dXrjdes 5c xrept (nrovSaiov, al. to nepi a-irovbaiov, what is said of the good man. — v nepanoOv^a-Kova-i, those who die for their country or friends. — e <£' w XrjyjsovTat. See Grammar, 836, 5, c. CHAPTER IX. (51.) 1. 80 ev to k.t.X.: Eur. Orest. 667. (52.) 2. €vtv xovvtcdv ovs, sc. deojxevav. ovs in attraction to 7roir]o~ovo~iv. (53. ) 4. eneio-aKTov 17 S o v ?) s, adventitious. (54.) 5. Sri yiverai. If the word ivepyeia had not preceded, this passage might have been correctly translated, is an energy {yiverai), and not a state, (yirapxei) : it is an active pro- cess, not a passive state, and therefore requires to be, as it were, in perpetual motion 5 and this is attained, even though we are unable to energize continuously in ourselves, by the cognate energies of our friends, which are, as it were, our own feelings and actions reproduced in others. — eo-n Se to oIkcIov, and that which belongs to ourselves is classed among things pleasant.— iavT ovs, ourselves: Gr. Or. 654, 2, b. (55.) 5. ap,s porjais : i. e. thought consists in the intellectual perception of thought. — to 8e oti alo~ 6 av 6 pe 6 a rj voovpev on icrpev. This perception, (to 8e) on aladavopeOa rj voovfiev, is really a perception on io-piv, and therefore every such consciousness is a consciousness of our being living beings, and therefore brings pleasure. (62.) 10. ms 8 i k.t.\. The rest of the argument is clear enough, that a man receives these impressions of his own existence from seeing them in his friends. CHAPTER X. (63.) 1. firjTe noXvgeivos: Hes. Op. et Dier. 713. (64.) 3. ovre ydp k.t.X. This is a curious dogma, when illus- trated by modern history ; but the real fact is, that except where the representative principle is admitted, which it was not in antiquity, it seems to be true. — r 6 8e novo v. The exact quantity is not one point in all, but varies, according to circumstances, between two given points, which mark the too much or the too little. (65 .) 5. arvfi-ir'nrTeiv, happen coincident!?/. (66.) 6. iv bvarl XeyovTai: Pylades and Orestes, &c. — n \r)v 7To\iTiKG>s. except politically, i. e. as members of the same state, or belonging to the same party. CHAPTEE XI. (67.) 2. to Xex#ej/, SC. Kov(j>i£ovTai ol \v7rovpeuoi. (68.) 3. avTo — to Spav, the very sight of one's friends, %c. (69.) 4. avWviTe'iv, al. o~vKkviviio~6ai. — vnepTeivrj tj} dXviriq. virepTelvrj depends on dvdpca8r]s, implied in dvbpadels : Grr. Gr. 390, 1, b. The meaning of this is, that if he is not excessively callous to painful impressions, he cannot bear the sight of his friends grieving for him. The Paraphrast and Thomas Aqui- nas give another interpretation : " Unless the friend out- xi., xii.; i.] ETHICS— BOOK X. 205 weighs their grief by his own dXvrria, they do not bear to com- municate their grief to him ;" but this is very forced. (70.) 5. a\is f'yw 8vv dyadav, of the number of goods. — n\dr r 6 1 v, the pleasure arising from bad sources is evidently not atperov, but the contrary. — p. r) 8 k n o t e p kXX on v \v7rrj6rjvai, though he were never likely to smart for it. See Bishop Butler, Tendencies of Virtue. (28.) 12. 7rep\ noXXa K.r.X. In some things pleasure is the final cause, while in others it is not ; as the pleasure of see- ing, &c. : hence, too, pleasures differ from each other. CHAPTER IV. (29.) 1. dn dpxvs dv a\a(3 ov a- 1: having considered the com- mon opinions on the subject, and their difficulties and solu- tions, retracing our steps, and beginning the subject afresh. He shews — 1. What it is not : — it is not a klv^ctis. 2. What it is. (30.) 1. reXeia eivai. Take any point in any prolonged energy of sight, the act of sight so taken is perfect in itself, though no other act of sight had preceded it, and none were to follow. — o X o v t i, indivisible. (31.) 2. iv xp" 1 "? y a P 7r«o" a Kivrjo-ts. A Ktvrjais is a pro- gression from one state to another, — from that which is kv hvvapti to that which is in eWeXex^?, (see Phys. iii. 1 ;) and therefore involves not merely a point of time, but a space of time : when that space of time is ended the Kivrjiris ceases, the rkXos towards which it was a kivtjo-ls being arrived at; wherefore kv XP° V( ? 7iw fl nlvr/ais. 212 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. iv. 2, (32.) 2. r) iv airavri tco XP° VC0 *l * v tovtco. This is the major premiss of a disjunctive syllogism, one alternative of which has to be supplied. If a Ktvrjo-is is reXeia, it is so either iv cnravn xp° vc p v * v tovtco, or not at all. The first step is to give the characteristics of Kivr)o~eis iv pipeo-i, viz. that they are ire pat tco ei'Sei and areXeTs. This latter disposes of the claim of the Kivrjaeis iv pepecn to be reAeitu, and he then goes on to enlarge upon the point of their specific difference, with a view to prove that the whole kIv^o-is thus made of specifically different portions is not re\ela. Tou must view kivtjo-is either in its totality, extending from the hvvapis to the ivTe\ix el - a > — an( l then it is iv cmavn tco xpoVo) in its whole duration, — or in any of the various parts of the whole, and then it will be iv tovtco in that particular space of its duration. Michelet reads rj iv airavTi br) tco XP° V(0 tovtco, confining the view of k'iv^o-ls to its whole duration ; but this destroys the argument given above. (33.) 2. Ka\ eT€pai tco etdei k.t.X. As the several Kivrja-eis differ from one another, and from the whole which they together constitute, it is clear that they are several independent Kivrjo-eis rather than one whole : though they result in one end, yet they are not continuations of one another, but are hepai tco ci'Sa ; and therefore the whole Klvrjo-ts cannot be viewed as reXeia, for each of the independent parts has passed away before the whole is complete. That this is what he has in view in shewing the several Kivr)(reis to be irepat tco eiS«, is clear from the end of section 3. (34=) 2. pafiScbo-ecos, fluting : Lidd. and Scott. — < p rj it 7 S o s, base- ment. — TpiyXvqbov, a three- grooved tablet, placed at equal distances along the frieze. Id. (35.) 2. Ka\ ovk i'o-TLv k.t.X. If a KLvrjcns be taken at any point of its duration, it is imperfect, inasmuch as it has re- lation to what has preceded and what is to follow, and with- out these it has no real existence : if perfection can be pre- dicated at all of a KLvrjo-is (dXX' etirep TeXeiav 8et Xeyetv), it nmst be viewed in its whole duration, from the moment when it begins to the moment when it ceases {iv tco clttclvti, sc. xpovcp). This is another way of stating the disjunctive premiss above, (note 32,) one of the alternatives (the iv tovtco xp° vco Kivrjo-ets) having been eliminated. — k a\ Tavrt] s: particular Kivrjo-eis are also specifically different. 3,4] ETHICS—BOOK X. 218 (36.) 3. ov fiovov ydp k.t.X. The act is not merely a motion across a point, bat across a point with the accident of locality attached to it, which is sufficient to make one such act differ from the Other, (ci/ erepoi, SC. two) avrrj (Keivrjs). — Si' a k p i- ^et'as: Phys. iii. 1. (37.) 3. iv anavri xP° V( ?i * n ^ s whole duration. A Kiurjais is not really perfect and complete in its whole duration, for the very same moment that it is completed it ceases to exist as a Kivrjo-is : when viewed as a whole it is merely a succession, or series of imperfect lav^o-eis, specifically differing from each other, (a\X* at noXXal kol dtacpepovaat rco e'iba,) inasmuch as each starts from a specific point, and tends to a specific and special end, (e'ln-ep to nodev 7rot et(Woioi/). We must supply the conclusion of the disjunctive syllogism : " therefore a Kivrjais is not TeXeia. (38.) 4. rrjs fjbovrjs S' iv 6 r a o v v reXeiov to cldos. Each, sort of pleasure, and each several one of a succession of pleasurable emotions, (i. e. of a state of pleasure,) is perfect and complete in itself ; each several emotion is not a step in an imperfect process, as in the case of Ktvrjo-ts, but in itself, and by itself, realizes a definite notion : so that if there was nothing either before or after, yet its notion and definition (ddos) would be complete. — twv 6\cov Ka\ reXeicov, be- longs to the indivisible and perfect. (39.) 4. to yap iv rv pepio-Toiv: such things as are made up of parts imperfect in themselves, none of which has separately an existence independent of the whole of which it is a part. It is true that a state of pleasure may be divided into its suc- cessive pleasing emotions, but each of these is in itself a whole, and capable of existing independently of the whole state of pleasure, just as the portions of a divided crystal are in themselves perfect crystals. 214 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. iv. 4, 5, (-11) 4. ovbe yap opdae&s kt.X. opaais is oXov tl ; for if a being were only to enjoy his sight for a single moment of time, the act of sight would for that moment be as perfect an act of vision as if it were continued for an hundred years : it cannot be divided into energies so minute, but that each is in itself perfect and complete. (42.) 5. alcrOrjo-eois k.t.X. Having now shewn what rjbovrj is not, he now proceeds to say what it is. To every act of the senses, or of the active or contemplative intellect, there is an T)8ovrj attached, (kcitcl ndaav yap aXa-Brjcriv Icttlv fjdovr) — opoicos be Ka\ hiavoiav kch Oecoplav,) arising from and upon the realiza- tion and attainment of the object of sense or intellect ; i. e. pleasure follows on the sensual reception of the ob- ject of sight, or on the intellectual conception of whatever object in the world of thought the intellect is for the time employed. The higher and more perfect the being, and the object on which it is employed, the higher and more per- fect will the energy be, and the higher and better the plea- sure ; and therefore the highest pleasure will result co- incidently on the realization and completion of the highest energy of the highest being. See Butler, Sermon on " Love of our Neighbour." (43.) 5. als Se 7rdat]s k.t.X. Every sense is directed towards some object as its end, in which it rests ; and every act of sense is an energy towards such an object. The most perfect energy is that of the most perfect sense, or of the sense in the most perfect state, working towards the best object which falls under its powers. (44.) 5. avrrjv Se k.t.X. The psychological question whether the sense itself works and energizes towards its object, or the being in whom the sense resides, is foreign to the present question. (45.) 5. avTJ] b' av e'lrj k.t.X. He here anticipates a conclusion which properly can only be drawn after the next clause, (kuto. naaav aladrjalv eWu> 77 rjBovfj,) and lays it down that that energy which is most perfect would also bring with it the highest pleasure, as every act of sense or intellect has its pleasure ; and that pleasure will be the highest which results from the highest and most perfect energy, as before defined ; i. e. the energy which works towards its highest and best object. G, 7.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 215 (46.) 6. TfXeioI fie ivipyciav k.t.X. Pleasure crowns and perfects the energy, not as a producing or instrumental cause, but as a result ; as health is the perfection of, or per- fects, the body, but not in the same way in which the in- strumental causes, such as the physician or medicine, perfect it. The a'ia 6t)tov is an ingredient in the completion of the energy, as being the object on which it works ; the madrjais perfects it as being its instrument ; the fjbovfj per- fects it as being its result, — just as beauty is the perfection of the prime of youth, without being necessary to its ex- istence, or in any way producing it. (47.) 7. , O I V T CO V e o v t co v k.t.X. If the aiadrjais and aladr)- tou are good of their sort (roioi/rcoz/), f)8ovf] will always follow, as being the result of the realized correspondence between the aio-Orjo-is and the a'ladr]Tov : if the energy is incomplete, so that the a'ia8T)x <*> s f^'s k.t.X.j not as an ingredient, but as a result and crown. This is the practical difference between Eudoxus and Aristotle. The former would say happiness is a result of the highest pleasure ; pleasure is an essential ingredient of happiness : Aristotle, that pleasure was the result of happi- ness ; happiness could exist without it. (50.) 8. 6 poL ov yap opt cop. Being similar, and there being the same correspondence and adaptation (irpos aXXrjXa top avTop Tponop exopTcov) between the active energies, (the Kplvop or 6eopovp,) tov noirjTiKov and the qualities of the object thereof, (the potjtop or alo-6r)Tov), tov Tra6r]TiKov, the same result, viz., rjdovrj, foDows, as in the case of the simple aia-6rj s ovp k.t.X., is it that he is weary of it ? (52.) 10. TtXetot is the TeXos of— the perfection — crown ; it is a necessary result. — r ov i p e p y e I v, in which life consists ; and therefore of life itself. c.v.l— 10.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 217 CHAPTER V. (53.) 1. o 8 e v, sc. from its connection with cvtpy€iai : as the hep- yeiat arc different, so must the pleasures which result from and crown them be different. The contradictory opinions about pleasure being or not being a good, arise from there being different sorts of pleasure, and one party looking at one sort, the other at another sort. And again, if there are different sorts of pleasure, true pleasure may arise from the pure intellect, and the moral nature, and even from the mere senses ; each being a true pleasure in its kind and degree. (54j.) 2. iirib t&oatriv, gain ground and are improved. This is one of the final causes of pleasure. (55.) 5. e£aKpi/3oI, perfects. (56.) 6. Kal yap a I in i6v p. [ a i, the desires whicli arise from definite feelings and passions, and whence spring definite emotions of desire, (opegis ; ) while f)8ovf) is the more general, indefinite love of enjoyment, — the general tone of mind, which, up to a certain point, regulates and directs the eVt- Ovpiac. — f) 8 ov a i, the emotions of pleasure which are the re- sult of the evepyeiai, of sense or reason. We must distinguish between -qftovr) as a motive cause preceding, and as a result following 011, the action. — r] yap Kara k.t.X., SC. iariv oliceia. (57.) 6. a l pep yap 8 1 a> p 10* p.e v a i k.t.X. The ope£is may pre- cede the ivepyeia by a long time. It differs from it in its nature as much as the act in posse differs from the act in esse, while the pleasure arising from any energy is so closely con- nected with it as to be almost identical. — o-vveyyvs, co- incident. (58.) 8. f) yap Kara k.t.X., SC. iar\v diKeia. (59.) 10. eivai to OTrouSaia) civai Kvpiccs f]8v. — el 8 e tovto k aX a> s X eye rat. If pleasures then differ in excellence according to the he'pyeiai whence they arise, and the good man is the true standard, then the f)8ovTj of aperf] is the highest fjbovf) of man. — 6 dyad 6 s fj to iovto s, i. e. in respect of his aperr), as far as he has aperf he is the standard of excellence. rf 218 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. v. 11; vi., (GO.) 11. d\\a tovtois, except to individuals.. — eiV ovv p. I a k.t.X, the energy or energies of the man who has arrived at the highest happiness, the greatest perfection of which he is capable, have the highest and most perfect pleasures attached to them. CHAPTER VI. (61.) He now proceeds to sum up his book by stating that to- wards which he has been throughout working, — the nature of human happiness ; — and first, happiness being an energy and rap kcl8' avTa alperwv, what energies apparently of this class are nevertheless not evbaipovia. (62.) 2. ovk itrrlv egis: bk. i. 7. — dvayicaiai, necessary as means. — a vrdpKrjs, self-contained. It needs not pleasure nor anything else to complete or perfect it. It would be what it is if nothing were to be joined with it. Of course, if other good things are added to it, it is increased in degree, just as youth is rendered more desirable by the beauty which accompanies it ; but it is youth still, even though there be no beauty superadded. So pleasure is not essential to it, though necessarily joined to it as a coincident result. It is in its essence always alpeTareTrjv, compared with everything else ; but if it has other goods, as accidents and results, it is alperarepa avrr] eavrrjs. See bk. i. ch. vii. note 112. (63.) 3. evBaipoviCopevcov, of those who are thought happy. (64.) 7. fj$r), ipso facto. (65.) 8. ei p.ri Kal piov, external life; social life :— they have far), but not (Bios. The slave has no existence of his own : his daily life, and all in which it consists, is his master's. CHAPTEE VII. (6Q.) In this chapter he lays down the conclusion of his whole treatise, that evdaipovla is the energy of the highest excellence of man ; that in itself the ivepyeia and apery Kara vovv is the vii. 1—9.] ETHICS.-BOOK X. 219 highest energy, looking upon man merely in respect of his intellect as an intellectual being ; but looking upon man as a compound being, his highest good, being what he is — a moral being, — is a life according to moral virtue. (G7.) 1. Kara ri)v oik e Lav a p e t r\ v, according to its proper per- fection. (68.) 2. kci\ yap 6 uovs (kputkttos) TCOV iv rjpiV, Ka\ T CO v yv CO- OT co v (upio-ra) nep\ a 6 vovs. Of subjects of knowledge, the subjects of vovs are the best. (G9.) 3. evXoyov be rols eiSotri k.t.X. It is reasonable that life should be more agreeable to those who are in possession of knowledge than to those who are only seeking after it. It is assumed that all men are either searching after knowledge or in possession of it. (70.) 6. nap' avrb to it oX it ev e 7reveo-dai,, to play his part as a man. — tovs 6eovs. This is not the language of a man who disbelieved in a Divine Being. — a I S e aoiCppoves, SC. npd&is. el Se o-a>- (ppoves, al. 80.) 8. ov k a.T a crvp.$e$r]K.6s, not in its accidental results. 81.). 9. derjo-ei k.t.X. A being such as man requires external goods for perfect happiness, for even OeatpLa looks for some of these as conditions and pre-requisites. — o v p r) v k.t.X. Here is the same distinction drawn between p.apia to the political happiness of npdgcs. — r 6 avTapKes, the sort and degree of external goods necessary to deoopia. — r) iv pd£is, the action of moral virtue which requires external things as its subject-matter. Hence the real meaning of the passage, " Neither 6eapLa nor r)diicr) dperr) require an excessive amount of external goods." (82.) 12. Ttia-T iv p e v ov v k.t.X. Observe the practical cha- racter of Aristotle's mind. (83.) 13. el ydp tis i n t, p e X e t a k.t.X. Here again is a dis- tinct recognition of Divine Providence. c.ix. 1-17.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 221 CHAPTER IX. (84.) 1. uvk eo-Ttv iv rols npaKTols. Here be is speaking of the result of the whole of the preceding treatise, as to decoprjcrai feat yv&vai. He has been giving, not merely practical directions for virtue, but laying down and proving a theory of virtue and happiness ; not an abstract theory with no further result, (ov Oeopias eW*a, bk. ii. 2,) but a practical theory, with a view to right action, and to the system of politics which has human good for its end. His theory of virtue so far agrees with Plato's, that he holds intellectual energies to be in themselves the highest excellence of a being possessing intellect ; but he has proved that the epyov, and hence the excellence of man as a compound being, is realized by rjdtKf) dperrj. Though his Ethics necessarily have a practical bearing, yet their object is mainly yvaxns t^s operas /cat rod dyaQov ; but the re'Xos of this yvcoats is npdgis. See bk. i., note 46. (85.) 3. Qeoyviu. Theognis, 532. — n otrjo-ai av, might or would make. Gr. Gr. 429, 1. — Kar o ku^i/xov 4 k ttjs dperrjs, possessed, occupied by; al. KaraKODxtpos. II. /3. 669, ecpiXrjdev £k Alos. (86.) 5. KaTei\r]p.p.eva, possessed by ; much the same as k7tlk5>s: Od. ix. 114. (93.) 17. ovriva yap ovv\ quemvis ; any one. — npoTeOevTa, com- mitted to one's care. Some refer it to vdpov. 222 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. ix. 18-23. (94.) 18. nap a r 5> v 7to\itikg>v, i. e. "Is it a matter of 5i- daxij ? " — Swdpeav. properly, organic sciences or art ; here, opposed to e7no-Tr)pai, arts : see bk. i. note 22. — o v no- X i r lkovs TvtiToiriKoTes'. see Plat. Protag. 166, sqq. (95.) 19. ov ijltjv ixmpov ye k.t.X. This formula, ov pfjv ye, refers to the question stated above, — " Is it matter of dtdaxrj ?" (r) irapa twv noXiTiKcov ;) and when this has been discussed by stating and examining the opposite question, {rj ovx Spoiov k.t.X. — (piXraTois,) he resumes the subject by ov prjv ye : " But truly, at all events, (ye, however this may be,) experience seems to contribute not a little, otherwise (ov yap av k.t.X.) men would not have become politicians from political practice." (96.) 20. rr}v avTTjv rfj 'Ptjto pLKfj : see Rhet. i. 2 toarirep o v d e k.t.X. &cnrep = boKovvTes : Grr. Grr. 703. (97.) 21. I a 6 elev, SC. eKao-roi. — e k> ov s. eKao~TOV, Michelet ; SC. OepanevpaTa. (98.) 22. 7rapaXi7r6vT(Dv. This is interpreted to mean that no one had treated of it with sufficient accuracy. — a vtovs, our- selves. (99.) 23. 7rpS>Tov pkv k.t.X. Michelet observes that wpaTov pkv refers to the Politics i. 11 ; efra, to iii. — vi. ; QeaprjOev- tgjv, to vii., viii. (100.) 23. ap^dpevoi: having made this dpxn or introduction. The true view of the Ethics is, that it is the introduction or grammar of the Politics. INDEX TO MATTEES CONTAINED IN THE NOTES. A. Abstract and practical sciences, differ- ence between the acquisition of, vi. 87. ayaOos, force of, ii. 58. Ayvota tuv Ka8 y eKaara, iii. 19. r) ko.66\ov, iii. 19, 23. 4v t?7 Trpoaip4crei, ibid. ayvocou, actions of, iii. 18. ayxivoia, meaning of, vi. 98. adencHTToi, meaning of, ii. 107. aSiKia f) iv fxepei, how far an virepfSoXi} and e\\ei\pts, v. 74. alSus, function of, iv. 123. alodyaLS, apxa'h arrived at by, i. 136. importance of in Aristotle's sys- tem, ii. 111. in moral action, iii. 40. aiadrjoris votjtikt], vi. 93. al(r6i]TiKT] e7rto"nr/yU7j, vii. 51 — 75. alaxpfo, meaning of, ii. 36 ; iii. 6 ; vii. 72. aKoAaaia, meaning and nature of, iii. 147, 168; vii. 42, 86, 100. oK^Aao-Tos, Aristotle's dislike to, iii. 167. anouaios, looser use of, v. 109. aKpaata, general view of, vii. 156 : mean- ing of, vii. 3 : founded on quasi rea- soning, vii. 75. i phaenomena of, explained, vii. 38, 41. nature of, vii. 11 — 86. subject-matter of, vii. 53. why shewn to be Trepl 7]5ovds, vii. 67. d/cpaTTjs may be 5eiv6s, vii. 111. aicpSrris, how virtue is, ii. 71. aAas tovs Asyofx.evovs, viii. 13. Alcibiades, illustration of fi(yaX6^vxos, iv. 33, 3 k aArjOeia rov vov, how it secures right action, vi. 10. avdyxr), meaning of, vi. 29 ; iii. 55 ; di- visions of, iii. 54. avaipei, meaning of, x. 8. Analogy, modes of refuting argument from, ii. 43. ava.iT\T)p<»s, sense of, i. 42. Siicaiov, v. 77. air6dei^is, meaning and nature of, vi. 33. a7ro8e|eTCK, meaning of, iv. 95. a.Troo-Tr)iJ.a.(n, meaning of, i. 179. apery, excellence, not necessarily moral virtue, i. 128. 224 INDEX. apery, how a fKaSrrjs, ii. 66. ■ how an aKp6rr}s, ii. 71. how ircpl ifiovas /cat Xviras,i\. 27. a balance of ySowf} and Autttj, ii. 81. function of in choice of good end, vii. 100. — — reXem, how far indestructible, i. 175. why the perfection of aladyriKr) is so called, vi. 132. effect and test of, ii. 57. Aristotle's moral system, key-stone of, iii. 35 : his data, i. 58, 140. his philosophy inductive, vii. 13. does not dogmatize, iii. 10. his mode of searching after hap- piness, i. 13, 104. practical wisdom of ii. 105. rejects views which are contrary to experience, vii. 16. his ways of searching after truth, i. 138. way of treating responsibility, iii. 97. ■ and Eudoxus, different views of, on pleasure and happiness, x. 49. Art and chance, connection between, vi. 46. apxv, meaning of, i. 59; iii. 67. apxai, ways of arriving at, i. 136. apxh tov rjdovs, x. 2. Asceticism unknown to Aristotle, i. 63. acrQiveia, cause of aKpaaia, vii. 95. ao-retoi, meaning of, iv. 50. aavnnerpos, meaning of, iii. 51. acrwria, nature of, iv. 22. &£a, in moral action, iii. 40. nature of, vi. 27. Dreams, Aristotle's notions on, i. 216. Swd/xei, meaning of, iv. 105. Swd/xeis, how far habits become, vi. 116. Svvafus, meanings of, i. 22, 205. E. iytcpdreia, nature of, vii. 11, 86; vii. 156. 1 how far intellectual firmness, vii. 104. £Qkth6s, source of a/>x°»> i« 136. exaar orris, ix. 21. itcireaeiv avrovs, meaning of, iii. 26. iv apxf), meaning of, viii. :;:>. iv )8ty TeAefy, i. 131, 175. iv fxipei aperris SiKatoavv-q, meaning of, v. 23. iv rfj Suvd/u.ei, meaning of, iv. 1(),>. Enquiry, Aristotle's method of, vii. 13, 33. e|js, meaning of, ii. 55 ; vi. 40. i£ viroOiacujs, meaning of, v. 70. itwTepiKol Koyoi, what, i. 213. iTrayooyi), source of apxal, i. 136. iiraiverdv and Ka\6v, difference between, ii. 102. cTTaivos, how the standard of virtue, i. 223. faret, used independently, iv. 20. imSiSoaaiv, meaning of, x. 5 t. iirlSoais, meaning of, ii. 100. iirie'iKeia, nature of, iii. 102; v. 123. irnQvp-ia, iii. 40. influence of in aKpaaia, vii. 41. and rjSovf), how different, iii. 40, 154; vii. 58—89, 91; x. 56. irricrrarai, meaning of, vi. 34. imaT-qix-q, nature of, ii. 63 ; vi. 28, 30. /cara av/j.fie&r)K6s, vi. 35. iirio-ry/xuv, vi. 30. Equality, how far necessary in daily life, v. 61. icr/xev ivepyela, meaning of, ix. 37. saxarov, meaning of, vi. 118; kcl\ iv- Sexo/xevov, meaning of, vi. 120. kripa irpSracris, what, vi. 121. Ethics, in what sense a practical treatise, i. 46 ; ii. 13. a scientific treatise, ii. 13; x. 81 : introduction to Politics, x. 100. Etymology, arguments from, ii. 2. evSai/xovia, meaning of, i. 51 ; energy of highest excellence, x. 66. evScu/jLOVKTiJLds and fxaKapio-fids, i. 169. Eudoxus, x. 5 ; i. 206. and Aristotle, different views of, on pleasure and happiness, x. 49. ed Zrjv, vi. 49. evOvs, meaning of, vi. 58. 6uotox»o» vi. 97. idpela, iii. 114; of virtue, iii. 113. KaX6v and inaiviT6i/, ii. 102. alrrxptv, shadowy visions of, vi. 138, 142. Kaprepia, vii. 86. Kara, meaning of, ii. 14. Kara Sid^rpov avfcv^is, v. 58. Kara rbv SevTtpov ttXovv, ii. 104. \6yov, vii. 112. KaTonwxW *) meaning of, x. 85. K(i>a rod TroKt'nov, iii. 127. KepSos, meaning of in diorlhotic justice, v. 17. 1!». K€(pa\^}u txoutra, vi. (JS. nivr)(Tis not reAeia, x. 31: parts of, not rekaai, x. 32. Knowledge, actions contrary to, ex- plained, vii. 38. of general and particular, vi. 74, sqq. Kvpios, meaning of, i. 175, 184; ii. 14. Kvp(ws, meaning of, i. 122. iTTi(TTT]fxrt, vii. 51. KvptwTcpov, meaning of, i. 126. X. Xavvos, nature of, iv. 51. A. Aa/j.(idveiv (pp6vt](riv, vi. 111. Law, definition of, x. 91. Keyecrdai, meaning of, i. 126. A.e/7r€T«i, ii. 55. Aeafiia a.KoSo/x(a, v. 129. Liberality, nature of, iv. 19. Living, pleasure in, ix. 57. IxaOrjTov, whether happiness is, i. 161. lioLKapiov, meaning of, i. 191, 194. /AaKapHT/xos and ev5aifxovt(Tp.6s, i. 169. /j.a\aKia, vii. 11, 80. Man, a compound being, iii. 35 ; x. 77. fMavreveadai, meaning of, i. 136; vi. 149. Mean and extremes, how opposed, iv. 83. /xeyaAoirpeTrris, character of, iv. 34, 41. fj.eya\6\pvxos, character of, iv. 75. Medical illustrations, Aristotle's fondness for, ii. 17. fx.€\ayxoXtKoi, why atcpareTs, vii. 95, 1 1 3_ Mental process, vi. 27. Mentiens, fallacy of, vii. 28. /xe/jiCTo, nature of, x. 40. 22S INDEX. fx€aoT7]s how apery is, ii. 66 : not capable of degrees, ii. 78. yueTa opSov \6yov, meaning of, vi. 150. fiiKTal 7rpa|eis, iii. 6. Ixkti]t6v, meaning of, iii. 161 ; vii. 66. Money, use of, v. 64". Moral action, course of, iii. 40 : how far instructive, iii. 40. Moral actions, mental habits concerned in, vi. 115. and states, how they de- pend on (pp6vf). and SiKatocruvT), relations between, viii. 4, 26 : bond of society, viii. 4. cause of different views on, viii. 5. (piXoTijxia, nature of, iv. 82. 7}(ns, function of, vi. 115: subject- matter of, vi. 53 : divisions of, vi. 48, 76 ; connection with vovs — why called vovs, vi. 89, sqq. two sorts of, vi. 136 : airb vov, page 151 : airb tt)s 8etv6rr)Tos, ibid. : requires apery, vi. 141 : connection with 7roAiTt/o7, vi. 76, 84 : viewed in its first stage, vi. 104 : rov reAovs, vi. 48 : rod e, nominally, i. 214. 0. 077ptoT7js, whence arising, vii. 10 : how (poPepcoTaTov, vii. 84. Qvjxos, nature of, iii. 1 32 : distinguished from dpyrj, ii. 9. i\ di:\. 281 T. vwoKonros e£ G ' D - V * s' V 0^ « X ' 8 4 *

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