L m ■ja '-I73 '2 38Tn Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. "ession. f I 473 ■ .U6 ^-S- ^-^^^A^ ' "^^^^^^^r?:^. .H^^ Copy 1 GENERAL G. W. MORGAN'S REPORT. ( Ex. Doc. \ No. 94. L E T TE E THE SECRETARY OF ¥AR IN ANSWER TO A resolution of the House of Representatives, transmitting Major General G. W. Morgan's report of' the occupation of Cumberland gap. May 27, 1864. — Read and ordered to be printed. "War Dfpartment, Washington City, May 27, 1864. Sir : In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, I have the honor to transmit, herewith, a copy of Brigadier General G. W. Morgan's report of the occupation of Cumberland gap by the forces under his command, in April, 1862. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Hon. Schuyler Colfax, SpeaTcer of the House of Representatives, Washington. Headquarters 7th Division of the Army of the Ohio, Cumberland Gap, June 22, 1862. Colonel: On the 28th of March last I was assigned by Major General Buel to the command of this division, and directed to concentrate my force at Cumberland ford, and to take Cumberland gap. At that time the roads, leading from Crab Orchard and Mount Vernon to Cumberland ford, were almost impassable, and from three to four miles a day was the ordinary distance made by small trains of twelve wagons. On my way up I came from Lexington in an open buggy, in order to move forward as rapidly as possible. At many places the narrow roads, walled in by the mountains, had become torrents, and sometimes the horses were obliged to swim. It was the rainy season, and these facts are only mentioned to convey some idea of the difficulties this command had to overcome. >0 j^ 2 REPORT OF GENERAL G. W. MORGAN. ^ ^^ ^ On arriving in the Cumberland valley, I found the country entirely exhausted by the occupation of Carter's brigade, and by the ravages committed by the enemy. It was necessary to haul forage for thirty, forty, and fifty miles, and at last from a distance of eighty and ninety miles. It was under such circumstances that I concentrated and organized the 7th division. I found six guns, and increased the number to. twenty-two — four of which are Parrott siege guns. A floating bridge was built upon the Cumber- land river by Lieutenant Edge, of the 16th Ohio, under the supervision of Colonel De Courcy, and means were adopted to supply the troops with fresh meat, which some of them had not tasted for several months, and they were thi-eatcned with scurvy. Regiments were armed with guns of various calibres, and there was a scarcity of ammunition even for them. A new distribution of arms was made, worthless ones were replaced by effective weapons, and a supply of ammunition was obtained. I reached Cumberland ford on the II th of April, and made a reconnoissance of the enemy's position at Cumberland gap. It was evident that the enemy had grouped too many works on their left, and depended too much on the natural strength of their right. Six hundred yards to the right of Fort Pitts I observed a knob Avbich commanded that fort and Fort i\Iallory, and I was satisfied that that hill once in our possession and occupied by siege guns, the gap was ours. I made a requisition for, and obtained, two 20 -pounder and two 30-pounder Parrott guns, but before their arrival I ordered an armed recon- noissance to be made by the brigades of Carter and De Courcy, with directions to avoid an exchange of shots if possible. However, the enemy attacked the reconnoitring party, and a skirmish ensued, in which we lost one man mor- tally, and several slightly wounded. The loss of the enemy was seven killed and eight wounded. The rebel papers announced that our loss was 150 killed and 300 wounded, and that their loss was 30. This statement was untrue, both as to th'feir loss and our own. Before the arrival of our siege guns. Engineer Lee, of the rebel forces, con- structed a strong work, protected by rifle-pits, upon the summit to the right of Fort Pitts; and, convinced that the position could only be carried by immense loss of life, with keen regret I abandoned all idea of attacking the place from the front, and resolved to execute a flank movement and force the enemy to abandon his position — the strongest I have ever seen, except Gibraltar — or fight us in the field. Such a movement was full of difliculties. It was universally believed that the route through Cumberland gap was the only one practicable, within a range of eighty miles, for the march of an army with cannon ; and as it was, our horses were frequently without forage, and the troops on half rations. To have three days' rations ahead was a subject of rejoicing. On the east of Cumberland gap the mountains rise up like a gigantic wall, on one side nearly perpendicular; while on the west were Baptist, Rogers's, and Big Creek gaps, through which small wagons, lightly lad an, had been known to pass, but they were generally used as bridle paths, and were now strongly blockaded. In order, at the same time, to threaten Clinton, one of the enemy's depots of •bsistence, and to divert his attention from my real plan, I established Briga- dier General Spears, with three regiments of his command, at the commence- ment of the eighteen miles of blockade, at the foot of the Pine mountain, and on the route to Big Creek gap, and thirty-five miles west of Cumberland gap As I had anticipated, the enemy immediately occupied the front of Big Creek gap with two strong brigades of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. I now determined to cross the Pine mountains, and pass the Cumberland chain at Rogers's gap, (which is twenty miles Avest of Cumberland gap, fifteen miles east of Big Creek gap, and thirty-nine miles southwest of Cumberland REPORT OF GENERAL G. W. MORGAN. 6 ford, and debMiiclies into Po\veirs valley, immediately opposite to the moutli of the road leading to Knoxville ; this position once occupied, Avonld threaten Knoxville, Cumberland gap, and Clinton, or three important points, in three different directions,) with the brigades of De Courcyand Coburn, (now Baird's,) and to leave the brigade of General Carter to guard Cumberland ford. It was my determination to attack the enemy in front, while Spears, with his brigade, would pass through Elk gap and take him in the rear. The advanced guard had crossed the Cumberland river to execute this manoeuvre, when one of my scouts came in and announced that Barton's com- mand had withdrawn from Big creek, and was then encamped near Cumberland gap. For the moment the execution of my plan was postponed, but not aban- doned. I now determined to withdraw my entire force from Cumberland ford, and to cause the sides of the Pine mountain to be mined, so that an hundred thousand tons of rocks and trees could be hurled into the valley, should the enemy at- tempt to strike at our line of supplies. The mines were constructed by Captain S. S. Lyon, but they Avere never sprung. On the 6th instant the march was again resumed. Munday's cavalry and Garrard's 3d Kentucky infantry constituted the advance guard, followed by the sieg(^ guns, Foster's battery, and De Courcy's brigade ; next the brigade of Baird, with Wetmore's battery; Carter's brigade and Lanphere's battery brought up the rear. Heavy fatigue parties were constantly employed in front, in making and re- pairing roads, which were again blockaded by Captain Lyon after the rear guard had passed. It was amusing to witness the astonishment of the people at the passage of enormous cannon over roads regarded by them as difficult and dangerous for lightly laden wagons. Old men, women, and children flocked to the roadside, and everywhere we were welcomed witli smiles and tears of joy. Too much praise cannot be awarded to Captain Jacob T. Foster, 1st Wis- consin battery, chief of artillery. As an artillerist of energy and skill, he will not unfavorably compare with any officer in the service. The corps under his command is also deserving of the highest commendation. Nor can I pass unnoticed the heroic toil and hardy endurance of the parties de- tailed from the infantry to aid Captain Foster in advancing his guns along the cliffs of the Pine and Cumberland mountains, for without their assistance at the block and tackle and the drag-ropes, the march could not have been continued. The duties devolving upon Carter were both difficult and dangerous, and were executed with skill and energy. The narrow mountain roads were cut into gullies by the brigades, which had already gone forward, and there might have been a descent from Cumberland gap. On the 10th instant the brigades of De Courcy and, Baird encamped on the north side of the Cumberland mountains, and on the following day, after well- conducted marches, they descended into Powell's valley, and bivouacked in a dense forest, which entirely masked their position. Colonel De Courcy, whose brigade led the advance, displayed throughout the entire march skill and ability of a high order, and removed blockades and made roads for the passage of the other troops. On the 9th instant I directed General Spears to clear the blockade from the Big Creek gap, and to advance by the Valley road to join me at Rogers's gap. On the 10th instant I instructed him to send a party of two hundred men, under a cool-headed and daring officer, to burn the railroad bridges over the Tennessee at London. The expedition was undertaken, but was not successful, as London was occupied by two regiments of the enemy ; however, the party fell back without loss. On the 9th instant I received at Lambdin's a telegram from Major General Buel, informing me that Negley was fully employed in Middle Tennessee, and 4 REPORT OF GENERAL G. W. MORGAN. could give me no assistance ; that he was opposite Chattanooga, but that his stay could not be depended upon ; and that the force now in Tennessee was so small that no offensive operations against East Tennessee could be attempted, and there! ore that I must depend mainly on my own resources. I replied that it was too late to change my plans ; that my advance guard Avas already at the foot of the Cumberland mountains, and that a bold and determined policy on my part was the only prudent one. On the 11th instant I descended the south side of the Cumberland mountains with De Courcy's advanced guard. The entire day and the following day were occupied in making the passage of the mountain bridge — miscalled a "gap" — and at dark on the night of the 12th instant some of the cannon had not reached the summit of the mountain. On that night, while in the act of giving directions as to the destruction of the railroad bridges at Strawberry plains and Mossy creek, I received the second telegram of General Buel, dated on the 9th instant, as also that of the date of the 10th instant. It had been my intention to have advanced against Cumberland gap on the following day with the brigades of Spears, Baird, and De Courcy, but I no longer felt at liberty to do so, and ordered a countermarch upon Williamsburg. I despatched three couriers to General Spears, one of whom reached him, ordering to fall back. On the morning of the 13th I was again at Lambdin's, to which point I hastened to meet Carter's column. Soon after my arrival I received a note from Colonel De Courcy, whose brigade had not yet been able to leave Powell's valley in consequence of the narrow road being blocked up by the 30 pounders, which had not yet descended the mountain, saying that there was a rumor that the enemy was evacuating Cumberland gap. I also received a telegram from Major General Bucl, dated on the 11th instant at his headquarters beyond Corinth, stating that Mitchell was instructed, as far as possible, to threaten Chattanooga ; but that I Avould " have to depend mainly upon my own ability to beat the force opposed to me." Acting upon this information,' and the telegram last mentioned, which I con- strued into a permission to act on my own discretion, I determined to resume the offensive. Carter was still at Lambdin's, but the head of his column was twelve miles in advance. I instructed him to proceed to join me at Rogers's gap by way of Big Creek gap, and directed General Spears to await his arrival and then march up the valley to join me. Baird's brigade, which had returned to Lambdin's, was ordered to again breast the mountain, and, inspired by the admirable ex- ample of their commander, and roused at the prospect of going to the front, they cheerfully obeyed the order. Early on the morning of the 14th I was again in Powell's valley, and Baird's brigade arrived there on the 15th, and marched down the mountain to the air of "Dixie," played by the band of Coburn's 33d Indiana. I here received a despatch from Spears, enclosing a letter from Colonel Carter, of the rebel cavalry, dated Cumberland gap, June 11, 1862, and addressed to Major Bean, as follows : "Major Bean: Maintain your position, if you possibly can, until to-morrow. The general intends sending a force of artillery and infantry down the valley, early in the morning, to attack the enemy. General Barton's force is on its way back into the valley. Despatch to Colonel Allston, immediately, the intention of the general to move a force down the valley in the morning, and tell him that General Stevenson wishes him (Colonel Allston) to despatch to General Barton the same thing immediately. The despatch should go by way of Clinton if possible, as General Barton will soon move by that route. This post will not be evacuated — at least not now. ""By command of Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Carter. "J. D. CARTER, Adjutant." REPORT OF GENERAL G. W. MORGAN. 5 The enemy was sorely in doubt as to what course to pursue, and evidently greatly exaggerated ray strength, which is reported in the rebel papers at 50,000 men. I had now at the foot of Rogers's gap the brigades of Baird and De Courcy, and as the valley was occupied by the enemy's cavalry, I ore* red the supply trains to the rear, and was compelled to subsist upon the foe. I felt all the responsibility of my position, for I had adopted my plan of operations contrary to the opinions of three of my brigade commanders, all of whom I hold in high esteem. I had not the opportunity to consult General Spears, who was at the foot of Pine mountain, when I determined upon the line of operations I had re- solved to pursue. Hence 1 was anxious for the arrival of Spears and Carter, the head of whose columns were soon seen to approach from the direction of Fincastle. Spears marched without wagons and without tents, and it would be doing injustice, alike to him and to myself, not to express my high appreciation of the prompt and soldierly energy he has always displayed in aiding me to execute my plans. His brigade has acted an important part in the strategic game which has been played along these mountains during the past six weeks. Immediately upon the arrival of Carter and Spears, 1 wished to advance upon the enemy, understood to be in position at Thomas's farm, eight or nine miles on the valley road towards the gap, but Carter had performed a most trying and difficult march of seventy-five miles, and Spears had cleared the blockade at Big Creek gap immediately before marching. One day wat^, therefore, devoted to rest and preparations for the struggle expected to take place on the following day. Herewith I have the honor to enclose my order of march and plan of attack, and also the reports of brigade commanders and separate corps. I determined to advance upon two parallel roads, the old and the new Valley roads, the latter of Avhich starts from the Knoxville road, nearly opposite Rogers's gap, and intersects the old Valley road at Thomas's, as indicated in the accompanying map embracing the square of my operations. The hour designated for the march was one o'clock on the morning of the 18th, and by three o'clock in the morning the rear guards of the two columns were on the march. I feel that I have a right to be proud of the admirable order and promptness Avith Avhich the noble troops of my division marched out to meet a foe they had good reason to believe was much stronger numerically than themselves. And so I believed myself, but I felt the assurance of victory, though I did not underrate either the gallantry or skill of the enemy. Had Kirby Smith been personally in command, we should have had a battle, but it was evident to me that the actual general in command felt vi\icertain of the ground upon which he stood. Rains, a gallant and dashing officer, was in our immediate front, and Barton was a few miles from our right flank, while Stevenson was in supporting distance. But on arriving at Thomas's we found that the enemy had retreated in hot haste, and, after a short halt, the march was resumed, and the advanced brigade, under De Courcy, took possession of the gap at about 2 o'clock p. m. — the rear guard of the enemy having evacuated the fortress at 10 a. m. The same after- noon the national colors were unfurled, and a national salute was fired from the summit of the gap by De Courcy's brigade, and by a general order each brigade was authorized to unfurl its colors, amid the roar of cannon, upon the pinnacle of the mountain, for the honor belongs equally to all. Well, the gap is ours, and without the loss of a single life. I have since care- full}' examined the works, and I believe that the place could have been taken in a few days' struggle from the froiit ; but to have done so, I should have left the bones of two-thirds of my gallant comrades to bleach upon the mountain side. And after all, this fastness, all stained with heroic blood, would only have been, 6 REPORT OF GENERAL G. W. MORGAN. what it now is,