LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE. No registration of title of this book as a preliminary to copyright protec- tion has been found. Forwarded to Order Division .^^^^l..'^^^^ ( Apr. 5, 1 901—5,000. ) (^ ^T^^XJ^ Qass__Il^i_ji_ Book CopyrightN^. COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. THE Truth About the War J. Ti^BURNO, ST. PETERSBURG. TRANSLATED BY VICTORIA VON KREUTER. PUBLISHED BY FRANKLIN HUDSON PUBLISHING CO., KANSAS CITY, MO,, U. S. A. lUBBARY of .'^0S^fi3j?ESSJ fwo Oopies rtag«wda OCT § 8905 QounmM fcijirj) GiyiSS Me, ntM COP? B.. Copyright, 1905, bt FRANKLIN HUDSON PUBLISHING CO. Kansas Citt, Mo., U. S. A. CONTENTS. Preface 5 On the Road to Mukden 7 In the Army 9 The Operations at Sandepoo H The Departure of General Grippenberg- 16 Proposed Second Attack of Sandepoo 20 Diary of Events Near Mukden 25 The Panic in the Train 45 The Change of Commander-in-chief , 55 Operations on the Left Flank and in the Center 57 Short Synopsis of the Operations at Mukden 62 The Intendancy g7 The Sanitary Service 71 The Railway and the Evacuation of Mukden 79 The Military Censorship gg The Rear of the Army 94 The Cause of Our Failures 9g The Firing jL19 The Consequences of the Surrender of Port Arthur 123 The Carrying of the Wounded from the Field of Battle 125 The Russian Soldier j27 Table of Russian Weights and Measures I35 Index 1 o*7 TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE, Mr. J. Tabumo, a civil engineer by profession and a special correspondent of the Novoe Vremia^ went abont the middle of December, 1904, to tlie theater of militar\^ operations, for the purpose, as stated in the brief preface of his work, of '^TDeeom- ing acquainted witli the true condition of our troops in Man- churia^, and presenting it in its true light /^ In April, 1905, he placed before the public the results of his observations in a book entitled ^'The Truth About the War," which^ in addition to great literary merit, is invaluable as an accurate, unprejudiced, impar- tial account of the operatioins near Mukden, as a sincere and' con- scientious research into the cause of Russian failure, giving a clear insight into the true condition of affairs. In the RiLSshi Invalid of June 25th, General Parensoff, of the Eussian General Staff, highly commends Mr. Taburno's book^ his opinion being shared by "F. M.," likewise a general of the General Staff, editor of the Eusshi Invalid, and concludes with the words, "This isi a remarkable, an excellent book." His other works, ^TReview of the Financial and EconomjiGal 'Condition of Russia for the Last Twenty Years,-'' a thorough and conscientious research in the domain of political economy, "The Reminiscences of an Insurgent," treating on the Revolution of Poland, and other stories, are likewise of great merit. Mr. Taburno is not an advocate of peace and gives good rea- sons why it should not be concluded.. He says that it is neces- sary to make the Eussian soldiers iiniderstand that victory is indis- pensable and victory will crown their arms. He little knew, when publishing his book in April, that a month later the grant of equal rights to the subjects of all natioia- alities and religions composing the population of Russia, as advo^ cated by him at the close of his book, would be an accomplished fact, thus once more demonstrating that war, this so-called scourget of nations, is an evil which, as shown by the entire history !of the world, brings blessings in its wake; the blessings brought by this bloody and disastrous war to Kussia being incalculable. It is through the courtesy of American military authorities that I had the privilege of reading the book of Mr. Taburno, of having the possibility of translating and publishing it, and I beg them to accept my most sincere thanks for the aid tendered me. 1 beg liJvewise the American Army to accept this humble trans- lation of a remarkable work, while craving indulgence for the imperfections of this translation, as an homage to ^^the honorable calling of the soldier,'^ for which I have all admiration and all esteem. Victoria von" Kreuter. PREFACE. So many confiicting rumors reached us during the last months of the past 5'ear, from the theater of military operations, on the condition of our Army, that it was very difficult to see clearly into them, and still more so to (lud out anything on the true state of affairs. In the middle of December of last year I started for the seat of ^Yar, for the purpose of becoming acquaint- ed with the true position of our troops in Manchuria an'd present- ing everything in its true light. The development of events forced me to remain there much longer than I expected, and to witness many gladdening and positive facts, but, alas ! a great many more negative onesy at the remembra,n(ce of which the heart grows heavy. My moral duty is to lay before the Russian pub- He all I have observed and seen. Tt well might be that, as a civ- ilian, a non-specialist in military matters, I have made mistakes in some of my deductions; but I can say one thing: the facts shall be given such as tliey are, such as I found them. I crave forgiveness in advance that my narrative will not always keep strictly to the chronological order of events. It may be that the data given by me will not be deemed sufficient, but this is because many of them cannot be communi- cated asi yet, as they might be of use to the Japanese. It MAP OF VICINITY OF MUKDEN Where took place the operations during the 211 half of February, 1905 (Ap "Truth About the War.') J. TABURNO The truth about the war. Chapteh 1. ON THE EGAD TO MUKDEN. I met along. the whole road from, Samara to Kharbin eche- lons of troops and military supplies sent toi the theater of war. I cannot say that what 1 saw and heard made a favorable impres- sion on mo. The tales of disorders^ caused on the one or the •other of tlie stations on that long road by detachments of troops, testified to tlie lack of discipline and the defective organization of the transportation of military echelons. The troops sent in entire nnits (by coinpanies, batteries, squadrons) proceeded in order. Such was not the case with the echelons sent to complete detachments already at the seat of war. They created disorders, got drunk, refused to obey their chiefs, etc. In my opinion, this ought not to be wondered at. The men forming these echelons "were taken straight from the plough, uniformed, and sent off un- der command of reserve ofiicers, often only second lieutenants, who lost their heads at the first complication. The further I proceeded, the more vivid grew before me the picture of the imperfection of the measures adopted. The dark coloring to this picture was added by the defective traffic 'and movement of trains, on account of which the echelons were always late in arriving at the etape stations. Eot example, the dinner for a certain unit is prepared for 11 a. m., but, on accounij of the lateness of the arrival of the train, it is served to the men at 10 p. m., or sometimes still later. What kind of ai dinner could it be, and what could be the condition of the food at that time? 8 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. This circumstance had no little effect on the temper of the sol- diers. It is difficult for me to understand why the troops could not proceed with our excellent field kitchens (on my way back I saw that some units had those kitchens in the cars and cooked their meals on them)^ the necessary number of which ought to have been prepared for the troops sent for the filling up of the 'ranks of the units — L e., those that traveled without their house- keeping personnel. The culminating point of disorderly trafhc was to be found on the Trans-Bail^al Eailway line (at the present time it is far' better). I sent a telegram to the Novoc Vremia from the Man- churia station with regard to this condition of afl'airs, but it was unrecognizable when it reached the readers. I was afterwards told that it was impossible to give infor- mation as to our movements of troops^ because news with regard to our means of transportation of troops might reach the enemy, it seems to me, however^ that it is rather naive to suppose that "AV'hat anyone could see, not excluding foreigners (there were two Americans proceeding to some gold mines on the train in which 1 traveled), would be unknown to the enemy once it was of inter- est to him. This is everybody's secret. Kharbin, the principal point in the rear of the Manchurian Army and the center of railway and local administration, makes '.a. vivid impression testifying to the successful colonizing capa- bilities of the Eussians. Some six or seven years ago this local- ity was a desert. At present it is a flourishing city, the center cf commerce, with wide commercial relations, steamer traffic, and a seething commercial life. However gladdening it is to notice here the power of the Iiiissians, an entirely different im- pression is made by Kharbin as the rear of our Army. But this shall be discussed later. ="'A Station on the Trans-Baikal Railway. Chapter II. m THE AEMY. Upon my arrival at Mukden, and the necessary permit hav- ing been obtained, I started to inspect the disposition of our armies. To be just, it must be admitted that excellent care was taken of the soldier., It is not probahle that in any other war such attention had been given to the soldier's life: he ^vas pro- vided with warm clothing, good footwear, warm quarters, plenti- ful and excellent food. It seems to me that the soldiers have never fared so w^ell in time of peace as in the present war : every- where and always did they have hot food, eyen in battle. The Eussian field kitchen is priceless in time of war. The sanitary condition of the x\rmy is such that nothing better could be desired. The number of sick iat very small.. In regard to the esprii and the morale oi the Army, I must say that, although cheerfulness could not be denied the troops, they were not at the height necessary to insure a glorious vic- tory. Quite a large number of oIFicers, of the higher as well as 'of the lower ranks, not counting the civilian employees and sur- geons, the number of which is quite considerable, were not in ■favor of the war; the lack of sympathy of the Russian public with the operations in the I'ar East, the insufticient conscious- Kiess of the necessity of liussian prepouderance in that region, were strongly felt; last of all, the admission that the enemy was right to a certain degree — all this brouglit a passive condition among the intellectual members of the Army, and could not in- spire it with the energy so necessary to victory. It is not to be doubted that the feelings of the intelligent part of the Army had penetrated into the rank and file. It is true that each officer and soldier, brought up in military disci- 10 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. pline, imbued with tlie fouimla of unswerving obedience to the chiefs, were ready to fulfill their duty according to their oath. But the enthusiasm was lacking, and consequently the powerful factor ensuring victory even to the weaker army ; there was a lack of intelligent comprehension of the aim and its attainment, serv- ing as a forceful and conscious motive power, and, according to the characteristics of tlie Japanese General J^odzu — as the prin- ciple of discipline, as stated in one of his orders to his army. My impression, in general, was that the troops would fight well w^henever their leaders would be at the necessary height; but where these would show lack of strength, the troops, having within them the germ of weakened discipline, might easily fall below the standard, since they ha.ve no intelligent understanding as to the aim of their activity. It was already known on January 7th that on the 12th Svould take place the offensive movement of our right flank (Gen- eral Grippenberg's army), and that, in case of success, the entire front would follow. I was advised to go to General Kaulbars' troops, occupying the center. I did so. Unfortunately, I did not witness the events which took place at Sandepoo, so that I report tliem not as an eye-witness, but according to absolutely trust- worthy narratives of others. Sandepoo and Vicinity SEAT OF.OPERATIONS January 12-15, 1905. {Appendix io ■•Truih About the War.") J. TABURNO. 'scale. Chapter III. THE OPEEATIONS AT SAISTDEPOO. On the eve of the operations the condition of affairs on our right flank was as follows: In the nearest villages south and west of Sandepoo were small adA^anced detachments of the enemy •some two to three companies and one to two squadrons strong, while farther away, some 20 to 25 versts distant (at Tiadousian- poo and Siaobiakhe), were large reserves, and some comparatively small units in the other villages along tlie river Taytsekhe. The disposition of the Kussian troops was as follows: the Sth Corps was opposite Sandepoo; to the east of this point was tiie 10th; somewhat to the west, the 1st Siberian Corps: still more west. General Mischenko's army (between Sifontay and the Liaokhe River), the reserves being formed by the mixed Rifles Corps. The total strengtli of the Russians, of which they could 'dispose for the attack, consisted of 84,000 bayonets and sabers.* (See the appended map.) The problem laid before these forces was, in general traits, (the following: The 1st Corps was to turn the left flank of the enemy, taking on its way the villages situated southwest of Sandepoo as far as Soumapoo (see appended map) ; after having taken possession of these villages, one brigade was to be detached and sent in the direction of the village of Dotay — i. e., almost in rear of Sandepoo. One division of the 8th Corps was to attack Sandepoo from the west, and at the same time the above- *The 8th Corps— 22,000 bayonets ; the 1st Siberian— 18,000 ; the mixed Rifles Corps— 16,000 ; General Mischenko's army— about 6,000 bayonets and sabers, and 22,000 bayonets of the 10th Army Corps, although this unit was not to take part with its entire strength, in the attack. , ., 12 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. mentioned brigade, placing itself under the orders of the com- mander of the 8tli Corps, was to attack from the south. The other division of the 8th Corps and the entire 10th Corps were to re- main in their positions and open fire against the enemy, thus attracting the attention of the Japanese by this demonstration and aiding the attacking units; after the taking of Sandepoo, they were to advance. General Mischenko^s troops were to make demonstrations in the rear of the enemy. The principal positions of the Japanese were strongly forti- fied along" the whole front. The advanced positions were masked by false hedges of ghiaolan; wire entanglements and wooden guns were placed at certain points. One division of the 8th Corps (the 14th, I believe), which was to attack Sandepoo, was, on the eve of the impending opera- tions, at Ashitor, where it had been sent for the support of Gen- eral Mischenko, sorely pressed by the Japanese after the unavail- able Inkou raid. The attack was consequently postponed until the arrival of this division. It reached the Eussian troops it« the night of January 12th, and, after a 30-verst march, without .having scarcely rested at all, went into battle early on the 12th, captured a row of settlements on the left bank of the river Khunkhe, some 2 to 3 versts from Sandepoo^. The 1st Siberian Army Corps occupied during the night of January 13th the village of Khongoutay, after which a stubborn fight ensued in the vicinity of Soumapoo, which it did not succeed in taking, in spite of reinforcements sent from the reserves. The occupa- tion of Khongoutay and the battle of Soumapoo cost almost half of this corps: about 10,000 men were put hors de combat. The brigade, which was to march against the village of Dotay and advance from that point with the 14th Division of the 8th Corps against Sandepoo, could not reach its destination, and, imder pressure of the enemy, marched not in the direction desig- nated, but turned to the north at a considerable distance from THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 13 Datay, endeavoring to leave, the rayon in which it could cooperate in the attack of Sandepoo. :N'oticing the movements of this brigade, the commander of the 8th Corps made it turn back and placed it on the line Malandaii-Youoozipow. The bri- gade thus was' several hours late, in consequence of which it was necessary to arrest the advance of the 14:th Division, marching in the direction of Sandepoo according to the disposition. How- ever, coming under a shower of hostile bullets, it could not remain in inactivity under this iire, and alone attacked Sandepoo. Not- withstanding the stubborn defense of the enemy, the division suc- ceeded in capturing tlie suburbs of Sandepoo — Baoteytsze, Siao- sooza, and Lydziavopoo, which, on account of the lack of accurate survey sketches, were taken for Sandepoo itself and which were strongly fortified. This is why the chief of the division reported the taking of Sandepoo while in realiijy this was not so. Evacu- ating the suburbs, the Japanese left infernal preparations behmd tihem in the fanzas: everywhere along the walls, in the Tcanas;'' wherever it was at all possible, they placed and arranged all kinds of explosive material, as grenades, shrapnel, dynamite, etc., and at the last moment set fire to the fanzas, so that when our troops entered the place, all this exploded and we suffered great losses. I was told that on the tables were left small bags, seemingly con- taining money; the soldiers rushed towards tliem, took them up, and at that moment there was an explosion; it was found out that an electric current, causing the explosion, was closed at the time the bag was picked up. Sandepoo was consequently still to be taken. It proved to be strongly fortified by all kinds of means, including stone and beton fortifications. The troops of the 14th Division went into battle in remarkably good order, exactly as they were taught in time of peace. It was their baptism of fire. They were met with a hot rifle and machine-gun fire (the machine guns were first brought into .action during these operations). There was ♦Along the walls a kind of brick settees are disposed at the height of a man's waist. There are conduits for heating running within these settees. j^^ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. found before Sandepoo a lake covered with broken ice, of the size of which nothing was known and which was shown in the :wrong place on the map. In fact, the real plan of Sandepoo arid its vicinity had nothing in common with the plan of which we disposed. The enemy arrested our advance, and the 14th Divi- sion, being unable to maintain any longer the positions occupied by it, decided to retreat at 2 o'clock in the night. On that same day the mixed Eifles Corps, forming the reserve, marched to the rescue, and two of its regiments endeav- ored to attack Sandepoo a second time. This attempt remained without result and cost a great many victims — the Fifth Eegi- ment had only 300 men left in its ranks. During the above-mentioned operations the Japanese suc- ceeded in concentrating large bodies of troops in the center and in the neighborhood of Sandepoo ; counter-attacks were made here and great pressure was brought against the center. It was threat- ened with the breaking through of the lines. The Commander- in-chief then ordered to retreat to the former positions and to begin fortifying them. We lost in these operations about 14,000 men in killed and wounded, and wasted over 67,000 projectiles, IBxhausting almost the entire supply of the Second Army (there remained only 5,000). Thus ended our attempt .to occupy Sandepoo and take here the offensive. At any rate, it could not have ended otherwise: the enemy had concentrated here 100,000 men, who had come [from under Port Arthur. This is when the premature surrender of Port Arthur was felt: should the fortress have held out one 'week or ten days longer, the January operations at Sandepoo would undoubtedly have been crowned with success, and the con- sequences might have proved fatal to the enemy. It may be asked. Why had Kuropatkin not undertaken these operations eome ten days earlier? It was because the mixed Rifles Corps had not yet arrived from Russia, and Grippenberg's forces were insufficient without it. This is, at least,- the answer I received THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 15 to this question; and, moreover, Greneral Kuropatkin did not expect a speedy fall of Port Arthur. During this action General Mischenko was wounded in the knee and General Kondratovich in the chest; two of the gen- erals loving their country and tme Piussian patriots, believing firmly in the strength and power of the Eussian people and the Eussian soldier. Cpiapter IV. THE DEPAETUEE OF GENEEAL GEIPPENBERG. After General Kuropatkin had given tlie order to return to Ithe positions and begin fortifying them, General Grippenberg, unwilling to remain under the command of General Kuropatkin, went back to St. Petersburg. It is difficult to give an explana- tion of such an action on the part of the commander of the Sec- ond Army. It was impossible for him not to know that his departure would have a very unfavorable influence upon the wfir. if General Grippenberg gathered from General Knropatkin's aetions at Sandepoo, as well as from things in general, that he ;was not the man who ought to be at the head of the Manchurian Army, it would have been his duty as a citizen to lay his opinion before the Head of the Empire, even if his suppositions had not been foundj entirely accurate and proven — ^but only in case no personal reasons were involved in such an action. At any rate, he ought to have acted differently, and not have followed the course he chose. He might have sent to the Emperor a trust- worthy man as a messenger with a detailed report, and, without abandoning his post, awaited the imperial decision, sacrificing his personal feeling of amour propre for the time being. It is indubitable that Grippenberg's departure in the way he proceeded about it brought dire results. It is unpardonable for him to have overlooked them, as he could not be sure that the enemy would not take advantage of this incident. Alas! his departure played a poor role in the success of the Mulcden opera- tions. Is it possible that General Grippenberg did not suft'er within his heart jointly with every Eussian and every man lov- ing Eussia, at the news of the Mukden defeat? Is it not pos- sible that truth might be found in the conjectures of those who 16 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE. WAR. 17 believed General Grippenberg was not grieving so much over this painful fact, as ready to take advantage of it to corroborate his , t^pdnion that nothing else could have been expected of Kuropat- kin, and that this would not have taken place had any other man occupied Kuropatkin's post? Coming back, in particular, to the January operations at Sandepoo, I must state first O'f all the opiniou which General Grippenberg disseminated among the public by his interviews with newspaper correspondents, published in several papers. The General said that with the forces at his disposition he could have surrounded the enemy "with an iron ring" and de- stroyed him. I do not wish to call this boasting, or even self- delusion, but will say that it is only the outcome of his ignor- ance of the enemy and the fact of bemg carried away by his sub- ject. Why could not General Grippenberg take Sandepoo, since the Japanese forces 'defending this point were less strong in numbers than his own ? The taking of Sandepoo was the prin- icipal problem laid before him. How could he have carried out this entire operation when the forces of the enemy, occupying, moreover, strongly fortified positions, had increased, while he Vemained without any cover, the bitter frost impeding the troops from digging entrenchments? The statement that he could with an army of 60,000 men surround the Japanese troops, count- ing 100,000 soldiers, seasoned in the fights before Port Arthur, shows that he had not the slightest knowledge as to the enemy. There is no doubt as to the fact that the Japanese would con- tinue to reinforce their troops in the neighborhood of Sandepoo, a thing which could be prevented only in one way — ^by taking the offensive along the entire front. Such an operation was equiva- lent to suicide. General Grippenberg, as the commander of one of the armies, knew the mode and degree of fortification of the [hostile positions, and he must, consequently, have known that to attack these positions by the front was to lay down his troops before them without achieving any results in the same way as he IQ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. wo'uld have laid low his entire army of 60^000 men had he at- tacked behind their fortified positions the troops of the enemy twice as strong numerically as his own. He had already lost 14^000 out of his ranks. Independently of the fact that our (troops could have been destroyed, the enemy might have taken advantage of this victory and have advanced in the tracks of the defeated Second Manchurian Army, bringing about the destruc- tion of the entire Manchurian Army, the results being far more terrible than those which took placQ before Mukden about one month later. Was it possible for the Commander-in-chief to ignore this and to place on one card the outcome of thei entire war, basing his actions on the very dubious deductions of Gen- eral Grippenberg? Only the most critical condition of our Army could have forced the Commander-in-chief to put into execution the plan of General Grippenberg, and at that time the Eussian troops were not in such a situation. Should we even admit that General Ivuropatlvin was wrong throughout, yet in the operations at Sandepoo he acted rightly. Several corps commanders, who have participated in the Sande- poo affair and who do not defend General Kuropatkin, have said to me that we could not do anything else but retreat. Gener- ally speaking, the whole business — the advance against Sandepoo is rather incomprehensible. It is said, however, that it was in- sisted upon by General Grippenberg, who was its initiator. When General Kuropatkin learned of General Grippenberg's intention to leave the Army, he asked him to speak to him by 'telephone; hut Gelneral Grippenberg, alleging siclaiess, refused his request;, proposing to carry on the negotiations by means of the officer of the day. General Kuropatkin asked then that the telephone be carried to the patient^s room, but the latter did not agree to this. After this General Kuropatlcin tried in writ- ing to make him desist from his intention to leave the Army. Eecognizing the usefulness of his service asi coinmander of the Second Army, he addressed himself to his sentiment of duty and THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 1\'AR. IQ love of the Empemr, the Army, and his country, and pointed out to him that his departure might have great, unfavorable conse- quences. Nothing, no persuasions whatever, could induce Gen- eral Grippenberg to change the decision he had taken : self-love triumphed over duty. The excuses proffered by the Commander- in-chief and, maybe, even his humiliation (he wanted to come in person, but knew that he would not be received) could not palliate the offense of the ambitious General. All this is diffi- cult to believe. A man, invested with enormous power — the power of a dictator, the power o£ taking life — is forced to humil- date himself, to entreat his subordinate, though commander of an independent army, to fulfill his duty. Here we find the con- sequences, the worthy fruit, brought about by the bureautic regime. Here do we see clearly corruption and ruin. I have dwelt so long on this incident because the departure of General Grippenberg has been greatly commented upon in Eussia and in the Army among the officers and the soldiers whom news reaches in the most distorted guise. The soldier knew that General Grippenberg had refused to speak to the Commander- in-chief. According to comments, it was believed that General Ivuropatkin not only had no desire to take the defensive, but retreated when our troops could have defeated the enemy, and that this circumstance forced General Grippenberg to leave the Army. Thus we see that these comments destroyed, subordina- tion on the one hand, and on the other disseminated among the troops distrust of the Commander-in-chief — i. e., undermined the two elements which, in the present war, are the only motors of our Army. Chapter V. PKOPOSED SECOND ATTACK OF SANDEPOO. A lull ensued after the unsuccessful attempt to turn the left flank of the enemy. Mukden was again filled with officers, who had left the city for the time of the operations; the life of the rear, seething with gossip, quarrels, and drunkenness, was resumed. At the front the fortification of the positions was ardu- ously pursued. Our attention was principally drawn to our right flank. Our positions were speedily strengthened and large-caliber gun* were placed opposite Sandepoo. The enemy hkewise did not sleep; he also began strengthening his positions, especially those of the center, where they had placed 11-inch guns brought from before Port Arthur, which rendered them almost inacces- sible and allowed them to be idef ended by comparatively small units. Towards the end of January talk was current of a second attack on the Japanese left flank. An uncertain rumor in the beginning, it grew more and more defined until it was laiown in Mukden, and consequently among the Japanese, that the 12th of February was the day designated for the attack. As this date approached the rumors grew, awakening most improbable sup- positions : some asserted that we had resolved to succeed regard- less of cost; others maintained that the attempt would come to nothing and would involve great losses, that we would lay low several tens of thousands of men and win no results. I likewise shared the latter opinion, as it was known that the Japanese had concentrated 110,000 men at this point. The 10th of February set in. Anxiety for the issue of this attack began to take possession of everybody. Mukden was deserted; the officers joined their troops; the 20 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 21 Burgeons^ who were without work, likewise disappeared. The railway depot and the platform of the station^ where until then ilife seethed as in an anthill, were empty. The remaining sick were taken out of the hospitals and placed in cars to be trans- ported to the north, while these establishments were being cleaned and prepared to receive new victims of the war. The railway tracks near the stations were cleared, and the disorder which until now had reigned was superseded by order. Mukden was unrecognizable. The gay, even licentious life was replaced by serious concentration. All faces showed anxiety and pre- occupation. The Chinese were mysteriously silent, and the vari- ous traders, who had come from Eussia, Shanghai, and Chefoo, Caucasians, Greeks, Frenchmen — the inevitable evil following the Army like hungry dogs or ravens — looked careworn and conversed in whispers with each other. The evident coolness of the Eus- sians acted encouragingly upon them, and only the news that a turning movement was being made by the Japanese on Liaokhe, whispered for an instant and discredited by our Staff, darkened the faces. I always believed in the possibility of the success of such a turning movement, as it was known to me that one of out secret service men had sent a Chinaman with the news of the impending turning movement. But General Oukhar-Oronovich, in charge of tlie service of information, drove him out, disbeliev- ing the report, and even desisting from paying him the sum agreed to with the agent. Moreover, a Chinaman spoke to me about this turning movement; all this taking place in the first days of February. In the morning of the 11th I went to the staff of the Sec- ond Army. On the square, along the road to the depot, quiet reigned supreme, and only from time to time somebody would be seen hurrying to the train going south. Upon arriving at the rayon of the Second Army I noticed great activity. The troops were already in their positions. An observation post had been arranged for General Kaulbars, com- 22 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. manding the army. To-inorrow or the day after^ according to order, a fierce battle would begin, carrying off several tens of thousands of the best citizens of two nations. The spirit of the troops was cheerful : all were glad of tak- ing the offensive, all were ready to die so they be allowed to advance and not to retreat. "We have to die anyhow; at least Het us die attacking, and not retreating, as we have done so far, ' were the words heard among the officers and men. The Eussian soldier does not like to retreat. All thirst to rush against the enemy, while what comes next will be as the Lord God wills and the luck of war brings. Here, among these intrepid soldiers, who, without any other thought, are ready to lay down their lives only out of duty and the oath given to the Emperor and their country, the heart grows more peaceful and pusillanimity has no room. A great number of guns was concentrated on our front in the neighborhood of Sandepoo. It was proposed to prepare the attack by artillery fire, a thing we had overlooked in the January opera- tions. The plan of Sandepoo was taken from a balloon. This village proved to be nothing but one mass of fortifications — •stone redoubts, bombproof shelters, wire entanglements, pits, etc. The day of the attack was kept secret; at least, it was thought to be a secret, though many spoke openly of the 12t;h^ of February as being the date designated. After the departure of G-eneral Grippenberg, General Kaulbars was given, on February 3d, the t'ommand of the Second Army. It was reinforced by a mixed brigade, composed of picked men of the 1st Kifles Corps, and was drawn up on the right bank of the river Khunkhe. Before the proposed attack the Second Army, which was to lead this operation, consisted of the 8th Army Corps — 32 bat- talions, 4 sotnias, and 152 guns, in position opposite Sandepoo; the 10th Army Corps — 32 battalions, G sotnias, and 138 guns, in position to the left (somewhat east of the 8th Corps) ; the mixed Rifles Corps — 32 battalions and 114 guns, on the right THE TRUTH ABOUT TH£ WAR. 23 (west of the 8th. Army Corps) ; further the Liaokhe detachment — 12 sotnias and 16 guns; and still more to the west, General Rennenkampf's (formerly General Mischenko's) detachment — 26 sotnias, 32 guns, and the remainder of the Orenburg Division of General Tolmachoff — about 31/2 sotnias. The\ reserve was formed by the 1st Siberian Army Corps, already under General Gern- gross — 30 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 6-1 guns. The total nu- merical streng-th of the Second Army amounted to 115,000 bay- onets and sabers and 516 guns. In addition to this, the Second Army could count upon tlie support of the general strategic re- serves of the Commander-in-chief, consisting of from 15,000 to 20,000 bayonets and 50 guns. Consequently the strength could be increased to 130,000 bayonets and sabers and 570 guns — quite a formidable force. xiccording to the disposition, drawn up on the 9th or 10th of February, the 8th Army Corps was to take possession of San- ■depoo after the artillery preparation; the 10th Corps was to capture several villages situated east of Sandepoo and await the results of the operations of the 8th Army Corps, while support- ing the latter; the mixed liifies Corps was to secure/ the occu- pation of Sandepoo; the duties of the cavalry lay in the observa- tion and security service on the right flank. Such, in general traits, was the problem laid before the Second Army. The above- mentioned disposition was not made known to the army before- hand, but was to be delivered at the last moment, together with the order designating the day of the attack. But it was found out towards the evening of February 11th: (1) that the Japanese were cognizant of our disposition, includ- ing the minutest details; (2) that the enemy had concentrated over 120,000 men against our Second Army; (3) that the Jap- lanese were advancing against the 10th Army Corps and likewise east of this unit; and (4) that large hostile bodies of troops 'attacked and pressed upon our left flank. It was decided to u THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. desist from a second operation against Sandepoo. The 1st Siberian Army Corps and General Eennenkampf received orders to march to the left flank of the First Army (General Eennen- kampf started immediately^ while the 1st Corps came afterwards). It was evident that a serions affair was close at hand. But w^here ? Therein lay the entire question. Chapter Yl. DIAEY OF EVENTS NEAK MUDKEjST. The further course of events in the vicinity of Mukden I 'will give in the shape of a diary, such as I wrote them down on the spot. February IS. — The weather was dreadful; a snowstorm was raging. It was proposed that the troops of the Third Army should take the bridge on the Shakhe Eiver while the other units were making demonstrations. The bridge was taken, but on tlie following day it was retaken by the enemy. During the night of the 13th and 14th. of February the troops of the Second Army attacked and occupied BaotayHze, but could not keep this point. The ohhotniks harassed, the enemy. The Liaokhe detachment, in observation at Liaokhe, has been re- formed. It is incomprehensible. It is said that, on acccount of General Rennenkampf s detail to the left wing and the illness of General Mischenko, tliere is nobody to whom the command of this unit could be entrusted. This is very difficult to believe. February IJfth and 15th. — The Japanese attack along the entire front. The turning column has been clearly defined. Gen- eral Biirger, commanding one brigade of infantry, artillery, prob- ably three batteries, and cavalry, started on a forced march to Sinmintin for the purpose of occupying this point. He was too late — it was occupied by the Japanese before the arrival 'of the- Russian detachment, and Burger was forced to go back. By this time the Japanese had already occupied the road from Sinmintin to Mukden ; it was necessary to divide the troops into two detach- ments: the one arrived at the Imperial Tombs, the other to the Youshitay station, and the artillery lost its train. February 16th. — The mixed Rifles Corps on the right flank 25 26 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. was to take the positions of the 8th Army C'orps^ while this unit was to march to the north in the vicinity of Mukden. But the ^nixed Rifles Corps proved incapable of solving this problem, and, pressed by the enemy, retreated partly to the left bank of the Khunkhe and partly to Peytkhoza, Shuango, and Maturan. A cannonade started at 6 :30 a. m. and lasted until nightfall. The enemy attacked several times our positions in front of Bey- taydze, but uiisuccessfully. Preparations for retreat began to be made at 3 :30 p. m. The artillery materiel was being taken of! from the positions and sent away on February 17th. February 17th. — The 8th Army Corps occupied the rear positions and it fell to tlie share of these troops to cover the re- treat instead o^f the mixed Rifles Corps. It was found out at 7 a. m. that Siaolapooza was occupied by hostile troops consist- ing of the three arms. At the same time the Japanese made energetic attacks against the 8th Army Corps from the south and gradually likewise from the right bank of the Khunkhe, where the 9th Division O'f General Nogi^s army was operating with four batteries which opened a hot fire. It was difficult for the 8th Corps to withstand a simultaneous attack almost from three sides: from the south, the west, and partly from the rear. The commander of the corps rode to Maturan to the commander of the Second Army, in order to report in person on the condi- tion of affairs. Just at that time General Kaulbars was seeing ofl; the 1st Siberian Army Corps, which was to advance at a forced march to our left flank to join General Linevich^s troops. One brigade of the 72d Division was likewise sent there. Gen- eral Kaulbars sent out of his strategic reserve two batteries and two infantry regiments as reinforcements to the 8th Corps; they were to take up positions in the river bend opposite Petkhoza (shown on the map), so as to attack the Japanese in the flank. 'Their operations assisted the 8th Corps, and the Japanese were forced to retreat from the positions occupied by them. After their defeat at this point, the Japanese marched towards the north THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 27 and occupied the village of Seritkliayza. A mixed division was formed towards the evening, which, under command of General Golembatrovski, crossed the river at Shuango in order to attack the enemy at Sentkhayza. The Japanese were driven out of this point, where they left even several machine guns behind. This fcuccessful attack arrested tlie advance of the Japanese on the left bank of the Khunkhe, but could not impede the enemy from marching towards the north. General Kaulbars left for Mukden, General Launitz taking temporarily the command of the Second Army, who also directed the retreat. On that day the enemy occupied the village of Salin- poo, situated 16 versts west of the Mukden station. The 25th' Division was! sent here, and at 3 p. m. it was met by the enemy with a hot fire. Our attacks were repulsed, and the enemy made several counter-attacks, which we succeeded in repulsing, causing great losses to the hostile troops. On both sides they were large : ours amounted to 2,000, while those of the Japanese were still greater. The fight lasted well into the night. A new disposition was drawn up on accouni^ of the retreat of the mixed Eifies Corps, according to which the retreat of the Second Army was to be made in the following order: the 10th CorjDs was to march on the village of Touelpoo; the 8th Corps (the 14th Division on Tatay and the 15th Division marching in the rear guard along the left bank of the IQiunkhe) was to cover the general retreat of the Second Army; the column of Gen- eral Tolmachoff was to protect the right tlank, and the column of Golembatovski had to march along the right bank of the Khunkhe, moving on a line with the 15th Division. This col- umn,, forming part of the rear guard, was, for some reason or other, not subordinate to the chief of the rear guard, but some other who was not operating here. February 18th. — At 2 a. m. the Second Army received orders to begin immediately the retreat. When General Ivanoff, chief of the 15th Division, approached Davanganpoo, it was found 28 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. that the opposite bank of the Khunkhe (tlie village of Shuango) was occupied by the Japanese, and Golembatovski was no^^^ere to be found, as he had marched to Mukden in obedience to orders received from someone. This, naturally, brought disorder into the plan of the retreat. General Ivanoif, having remained at that point for some time and allowed his troops to rest, began to retreat on Tsantap'oo; but, not finding here the troops of the 10th Corps, which were to await his arrival at this point, and attacked by the enemy in the hank, he retreated to the village of Tatay, where the troops of the Third Army had arrived by that time. As the enemy was concentrating large forces in the Salin- poo rayon, the Second Army was ordered to assemble on the right bank of the Khunkhe, while the Third was tO' occupy posi- tions between the Khunkhe and the bridge over the Shakhe (Soukhoudiapoo-Laiishanpooi-Linshinpoo'-Sakhepoo) . The troops of the Second Army moved towards the Khunkhe in two col- umns, the one formed of the infantry and the other of the artil- lery and the train. Some way or other, both columns reached one point of crossing. On account of this, and alsO' because Gen- eral Churin's brigade was drawn up at the crossing on the oppo- site banlv, thus impeding the movement, confusion arose and some disorder ensued. It was difficult to cross over on the ice; it broke under the artillery and heavy wagons, and the crossing Was effected with great difficulty, the infantry remaining un- der arms throughout the entire night. Part of the wounded remained in Davanganpoo. General Myloff ordered the sanitary transports to go at a trot to Davangan- poo for the wounded, and almost all of them were luckily brought over; however, many of those who could not get into the ambu- lances walked all night with great difficulty until they reached the railway line (the coaling branch), by which they were transported to Mukden. Stores of provisions and other supplies were partly burnt and partly abandoned. This fate fell to the share of the entire Decaville Eailway net, established for the serv- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 29 ice of our positions. Lastly the troops of the Second Army Corps crossed over to the right bank, and the troops of the Third Army were located between the Khimkhe and the Shakhe. Here began the fractioning of the large iinits. Foreseeing that the trains conld only impede the movements of the troops, the commanders of the 10th and 8th Army Corps sent them to the north towards Telin, and, thanks to this disposition, these trains were the only ones saved. In the morning of February 18th a fight began near the village of Salinpoo, and continued until evening. We could not withstand the attack of the enemy, and retreated. February 19th. — The troops of the Second Armv occupied the positions Madiapoo-Youkhuantun-Fansintun-Padiaza. The units were all mixed up, but not accidentally; this took place by special order. Thus the 8tli and the mixed Eifles Corps de- tachments were to be f omid everywhere. It was quiet on that day on tlie front west of Mukden. We put the troops in order and occupied positions, while the Japanese were reinforcing their front at this point. The hostile column marched along the road from Sinmintjn to the village of Tashichao. The 1st Siberian Corps, which had been sent to the left flank, w^ns again called back, and was thus obliged to make again a forced march of 60 versts without taking any rest. The enemy occupied to- wards dawn the village of Soukhoudiapoo, on the lefii bank of the Khunklre, and later the village of Lanshanpoo, so that the front of the Third Army was somewhat shifted to the east (Madiapoo -lOioudiapoo -Eltgazooza -Tasoudiapoo -Lanshanpoo- Sakhepoo). To the north of the river Khunkhe no encounters took place to-day. The guard detachments of the hostile turn- ing column were detected some 8 to 9 versts west of the Mukden station, opposite the village of Youkhuantun. Fehruary 20th. — The 1st Siberian Corps has arrived from the left flank. The men are very tired. The Japanese have taken the offensive in the rayon Madiapoo-Oulinpoo-Yasytun on a front 30 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. some 5 to 6 versts in extension; all their! three stubborn attacks were rei^nlsed. General Tserpitski^ commanding the troops at this point_, reported that three Japanese divisions were operating against him; I think that this is exaggerated^ although it would be very important for the Japanese to break through the Russian lines at this pointy for then thq}? could cut our army in two ; it is therefore possible that large forces have been directed to this local- ity. Our troops have occupied the village of ^N'ewsytun, also Tin- tiantun and Igsytay after an insignificant fight. On the left bank of the Khunkhe the enemy pressed hard on the village of Elthaytze^ but all, his seven attacks were repulsed towards event- ing with great losses. The villages of Padiaza and Paodaotun were occupied by us in the evening after a fight for them. E'orth of the Khunkhe our troops were not very active either yesterday or to-day; if we except the repulsed attacks in the rayon of Madiapoo-Yasytun^ there were no fights Avhatever. The reason for this inaction lay in the necessity of finding out the distribu- tion of the units. But did this necessitate so much time? Was everything done to ascertain the disposition of the troops in the shortest time possible? Was not the cause of such slowness in the proceedings to be found in the self-love ol a chief or institu- tion? At any rate, this two days^ inactivity on the front west of Mukden, when the enemy was still weak, had most fatal con- sequences. Towards evening our troops occupied the following •positions on the western front: General Tserpitski, with 34 battalions, - from Madiapoo to Youkhuantun ; further. General Topornin, with 16 battalions, as far as the Sinmintin road; further still. General Gemgross, with 49 battalions; then came small detachments under Colonels Zapolski and Tsiekhanovichj General Burger, who had returned from under Sinmintin, and Colonel Bolkhovitinoff. General TIanenfeld commanded the re- serve of 4 battalions. There were in all on that front about 120 battalions and from 400 to 450 guns. These troops occupied the 'following positions : Madiapoo-Pulinpoo-Yasytun, Youkhuantun,- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 31 Newsyntun, Tintiantim, Igsytay, Fansytun, Padiaza, Paodaotun, Santayze. February 21st. — The Japanese stubbornly attacked our posi- tions in the vicinity of Oulinpoo-Yasytun ; they wanted at any cost to drive us out, for if they should sncceed here, it would be easy for them to reach the railway line and, seizing the cross- ing over the Khunivhe, cut off the retreat of our Third Army. Our troops often allowed the attacking detachment to approach within 200 to 100 paces and then opened a concentrated fire against them, and the enemy retreated, leaving literally heaps of corpses behind him. During that time the troops of General Gerngross continued successfully their retreat; they advanced in the rayon of the Sinmintin road and, after a stubborn fight, occu- pied Tsuanvanche, situated some 4 versts froui Tashichao, the occupation of which was their principal aim. His Majesty's 1st Siberian Kegiment was operating liere. The ranks are thinning. The losses are great, the men are tired, exhausted, having achieved a forced march of 60 versts immediately before the fight. The commander of the regiment feels that he is unable to take this important pomt; the enemy will try to keep it at any cost. In answer to his request for reinforcements, Colonel Losch receives the following answer: ^The commander of the troopsi is dissatisfied with your procrasti- nation." ^ight came and Tashichao was not taken. The com- mander of the regiment was unable to order a night attack. The soldiers fell and went olf to sleep while marching. During the night the enemy increased his forces, so that on the following day it was found impossible to take the village, not only with the 1st Siberian Regiment, but even with greatly increased forces. Early in the morning hundreds of guns began to roar and thousands of men advanced against each other. The desperate attacks of the tlapanese were sucessfully repulsed by our troops. The course of the retreat was strewn with corpses. Whole mounds of dead bodies rose in front of the entrenchments. Our 3- 32 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. opposition increased tlie stubbornness of the Jaipanese and one attack was followed by another, each one more fierce than the other. The results remained the same: they did not succeed in breaking us. The Japanese wanted at any cost to take possession of the village situated some G to 7 vei^sts from the Mukden station. After having suffered enormous losses^, they at last succeeded in taking it. But the point was too important to be left in the hands of the enemy, and our troops reconquered it by a desperate counter-attack. The enemy^ strengtliened by reinrorcements, again took possession of it and the village passed four times from the hands of the one into those of the other. Lastly the com- mander of the corps, General Tsei-pitski, led an entire regiment 5nto the attack for the purpose of maintaining this point in. our hands. AYhat a magnificent picture! The band playing, the banners waving, the regiment went into battle, its commander in the lead. Drawing themselves up to their full height, seeming to be still taller than in reality, the soldiers advanced bravely as if on parade, scorning all d'anger. The front ranks fell, others took their place. It seemed that nothing could withstand this Titanic onslaught. And, in reality, the enemy did not hold out, and fied, covering the field with corpses in his retreat. The village remained in our hands, and the enemy no more en- deavored to take it from us. It is difficult to imagine a more terrible and at the same time a mora majestic picture than this battle. The impassibility and courage of our troops were simply astounding. The occupied village presented a fearful aspect. The streets, the courtyards, the fanzas were filled with the dead and Avounded. It was impossible to take a step without touching a human body. Four times was the village occupied by the enemy and by us, and the corpses lay in strata. The aspect of the; wounds was dreadful — each time the fight ended with bayonet thrusts. The fanzas were filled with wounded^ who were TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 33 icapable of crawling from under the corpses piled above them. There were Japanese and our men, but now they were no more enemies — a common fate made them feel near to each other, and they lay down side by side, helping each other to dress in some way their bleeding and mutilated limbs. Where had disappeared tlie anger, the hatred, and the desire to destroy each other? The area west of the village was strewn with Japanese corpses, while to the east it was covered with the bodies of our men — i. e., on the side from which each attacked and retreated. I think that not less than 3,000 to 4,000 men laid down their lives on both sides for the possession of this village. Such ali'airs may be counted by the score in the present war. And the fight of the Zaraysk Eegiment? The enemy at- tacked with large forces the village occupied by this regiment. The Japanese opened fire, but it was not answered; without ceas- ing to fire, they advanced, without meeting with any opposition. They knew by experience that the Kussians did not leave their positions without giving fight, and that each of their successes has been dearly paid. There remained only some 150 paces to the village when a volley was fired; the front rard^s fell and their places were fallen by others, but they met with a similar fate ; the third and fourth ranks laid down in rear of their dead and wanted to silence the fire of the Zaraysk men by a deadly shower of bullets, but could not withstand their well-aimed firing, and ran, though few of them reached their positions. The corpses in this affair formed literally large hills. It looked from a distance as if heaps of goods had been piled on a large area.. Heart-rending cries sounded from these mounds of human bodies, while to the west there extended a ribbon of other corpses, thickly strewn in the beginning and growing thinner as it receded into the distance. It was sickening to gaze at all these horrors, all these dead bodies, of which breastworks were made, putting them transversally, some hundreds of sajens in extension, for the purpose of hurling death at the living from behind those dead ones. And the moans rising 34 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. from these mounds of human bodies! Cries o^f despair rang out from the tortured soul: "It is enough! For God's sake, enough of this slaughter! Stop! You are not beasts; you are men, belonging to civilized nations !" But this human invocation died unheeded, drowned by the cries of "Hurrah!'' and "Ban- zai!" The feeling of humanity was crushed by practical con- siderations, the interests of the country being on the first plan, and not the destruction of these hundreds of thousands of men. The grateful descendants will live over their tombs a better life, will mourn for them, and the monuments erected in their honor will remain as an eternal remembrance of their glorious death. Yet, while folly conscious of these horrors, fully conscious that, according to God's law, no one has the right to kill, one can- not help admiring the actions of these heroes, dealing deadly blows to their enemies. Such is the remarkable constitution of human nature. And the attacks of the 1st Siberian Regiment? Oh, what troops ! They are capable of carrying away the most cold-blooded man. They seemed not to see the enemy before them, not to feel their deadly machine-gun fire, not to notice the continuous flight of the heated metal. They did their duty as if on parade before their chief. I was accompanied by a correspondent of an Amer- ican paper, the Chicago Daily News, who had been present as a correspondent at all the wars of the latter time, and he said to me and wrote to his paper that he had never witnessed any- thing like it, and that such pictures could be seen only) once in a lifetime. There would be no end to the description of the heroic deeds of our troops. That day belonged to the Russians, as was communicated by that correspondent to his paper. February 22d. — The Japanese are fiercely attacking from early morning our positions at Yansintun-Youkhuantun, but, hav-, ing suffered great losses, towards 10 a. m. they desisted from THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 35 further attacks. Feeling probably that they could not break through into the rayon Madiapoo-Yansintun, they tried during tlie day to attack the village of Youkhuantun, proposing to move afterwards to the Mukden station along a road on which there is not a single village up to the very station. The enemy suc- ceeded in taking this village. We were threatened by great danger ynd the corps commander himself led the regiment (the Minsk^ I believe) into the battle. The enemy was repulsed. The Japanese made likewise energetic attacks in the Tashichao rayon and north of it. Here we retreated^ abandoning the villages of Tsuanvanche^ Padiaza, and Paodiatan, north of the Imperial Tombs, nnd which we had occupied yesterday. It was felt that the enemy was increasing his strength in that direction, endeavor- ing to occupy the railway line, so as to cut off our way of retreat. The enemy approached the railway, and at a distance of 4 versts from it began to fire at the passing trains. The telegraph was damaged one time. It was repaired under fire by the railway employees under the supervision of Controller Preobrajenski. It was necessary to have recourse to extraordinary measures for the driving back of the enemy. For this purpose the Orsk and Oro- vaysk Eegiments, supported by two battalions of the Insar Eegi- ment, advanced under command of Colonel Borisoff and occupied the village of Siaotuza. At tliat time the enemy was discovered north of that point some 10 versts from the railway off the Youshitay station. In that direction our cavalry detachment had antercepted yesterday the enem}^, probably his advanced posts, and thrown them back. Great fatigue is noticed. It is the fourth day that a continuous battle is being waged in the neighborhood of Mukden. February 23cl. — The enemy was pressing hard on that day in the rayon Padiaza-Paodaotun-Tkhenitun. We were some- what driven back here and occupied the following positions: Youkhuantun - Sandialir - Kholikha - Sakhedza - Takhetun - Say- tadze - Siaogotiza - Tsuertun. General Myloff was invested with 36 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. the command of Colonel Borisoff's troops^ which were to be reinforced by the division of Qeneral Artamonoii and General Herschelmann with 6 battalions^ thus making a total of 25 bat- talions. Colonel Borisoff occupied the villages of Tunchandza and Kusantun, but at this point he was lired at in the flank from the village of Tkhenitun. As yesterda/s attack of the enemy against Youkhuautun^ which cost him great losses, remained resultless, he again rushed to'-day against the village of New- sintun, but the same fate awaited these attacks. Our troops, pur- suing the enemy, took the offensive and made many prisoners. The First and Third Armies retreated on the positions sit- uated on the left bank of the Khunkhe ; the retreat went off with- out any encounters. Some of the units set fire to their stores before moving, and thus disclosed prematurely their retreat. February 2Jf.th. — A strong typhoon was raging to-day. Ev- erything was covered with a compact cloud of dust of enormous dimensions, penetrating everywhere and into everything, driven by a fierce gale. The dust fills the ears, eje^, nose, and mouth; it is difficult to breathe and impossible to see — nothmg can be made out at a distance of a few paces. A thick layer of dust covers the men occupying the trenches. An evil fate is pursuing us. Not- witlistanding this, our troops recaptured the village of Sataydze, which the enemy had taken from us. The enemy wanted to cap- ture at any price the railway at this point, but our troops repulsed all their attacks with stubborn resistance. C4eneral Myloff took the ofi;ensive: Colonel Borisoff was to take Gosytun and General Herschelmann was to take Khenitun. The attack was desig- nated to begin at 11 :30 a. m., as otherwise the enemy might take the offensive. General Launitz, commanding the troops in the rayon Khoiikha-Talvhetun-'Santaydze, was not able to iissist General Myloff, the enemy fiercely attackmg him, endeavoring to break through his ranks at any cost. At this time the Commander-in-chief arrived for the purpose of personally direct- ing the troops towards Tkhenitun, expressed to General Mylolf THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. . 37 his dissatisfaction at tiie premature attack, made without any orders from him, and rode further to the north. Colonel BorisofE occupied Gosytun and fell mortally wounded in the fight. In spite !of his stubborn attacks, General Herschelmann did not succeed in taking Tkhenitun, as this point was occupied by an entire hos- tile division, but succeeded in arresting the advance of the enemy. ■Kuropatkin arrived here abont 2 p. m., and, having investigated ithe condition of aKairs, approved of General Myloff's decision, admitting that the operation undertaken by him was timely. The Japanese concentrated large forces in this locality and continued their movement to the north. Towards evening the enemy broke through in the vicinity of Kiousan. It was ascertained at the same time that a detach- men of Japanese occupied the village of Tasintun, situated some 10 versts northwest of the Khushitay station. It was found im- possible to oppose large forces to the enemy at Khushitay. The breaking through of the center by the Japanese was not found fls important as supposed, as the enemy's forces were not consid- erable at this point. Order was given for all the troops to retreat to Telin. General Myloff was ordered to maintain the positions occupied by him, and to repulse the attaclcs of the enemy until the Second and Third Armies reached their destination. The retreat of the three armies began in the night of February 24th and 25th. Fehruary 25th.— On the eve of this day Kuropatkin told General Myloff that he would send a brigade to occupy the vil- lage of Tava on the Mandarin Eoad, to keep the Japanese from taking the rear guard in the rear. But this morning the Jap- anese began to lire against Tsuertun from the west and east, and it was found out that no brigade had been sent to Tava. It was necessary to maintain the positions at any cost, as far from all the troops had marched by and the rear guard, counting 25 bat- talions in all, whose ranks had been consideral^ly thinned already, had to fight on two fronts. General Kaulbars rode by in the 38 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. evening, and repeated the Commander-in-cliief^s order to keep the positions until all the troops had passed, until General Lau- nitz had marched by with his detachment. It was absolutely above human endurance to stand the cross-fire of the enemy. The chief of Staff, General Martoss, endeavored to arrest several retreating battalions, but they did not obey him. General Kaul- bars arrived and forced them to submit. A few new battalions brought into the fire helped to drive the enemy back and the narrow passage fired at by the enemy grew somewhat wider. If these new battalions had not been brought into action, the real guard would have been surrounded by the Japanese and destroyed. The Staff thought that if the rear guard, commanded by General Myloff, would succeed in protecting the march past of all our troops, it could not avoid destruction. The troops kept up bravely, fully conscious of the importance of the problem laid upon them, but there were very trying moments for the conmianders. For example, at the time that General Launitz's troops were retreat- ing from the southwest, several units passing through the chains of sharpshooters of the rear guard carried away in the general re- treating movement the men forming the chain. Due praise must be given General Myloff for his courageous and .skillful arrest of large hostile forces until all our troops, including the artillery and train, had passed. It is difficult to credit that a handful of) men, as compared to the forces of the enemy, could arrest the advanc- ing Japanese army. In addition to this, General Myloff was often forced to restore order in the retreating troops, by calling upon the chiefs of the units. The remnant of the Modlin Kegiment, about 1 l^attalion, occupied the wodds around the Imperial Tombs., probably mak- ing up the reserve. The order to retreat was forgotten to be given to these men. While passing onward some of the retreating sol- diers came upon the wood, many men of various units thus gath- ering tliere. Seeing there an entire unit, they halted. Suddenly the enemy began to fire at them from all sides — they were sur- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 39 rounded. The field officers were all killed, and there remained only two captains — ^Ivanofl: and another, whose name I do not remember. The soldiers who did not belong to the Modlin Eegi- ment began to grow excited; tlie Japanese demanded their sur- render. 1 do not know in what way two more banners were found here in addition to the standard of the Modlin Eegiment. All were saved, thanks to the heroic deed of Captain Ivanoff. He pushed through the soldiers and cried : "I am the commander of the Modlin Eegiment; all must obey me."' (He wore a jacket without any shoulder-straps, and consequently his rank could not be determined.) Seeing that the Modlin men obeyed him, the soldiers of the other regiments likewise gathered around him. When all were assembled and distributed, Ivanoff took the icon he was wearing on his chest under his clothes, and, holding it in one hand, raised his sword high with the other, and crying, "Fol- low me, brethren!" rushed forward. Inspired by his example, the soldiers made a bayonet attack and repulsed the enemy, break- ing through their ranks and saving all the banners. Many fell in this heroic fight. May God rest their souls! It seems to me that Cap Lain Ivanoff has been presented for the St. George. In the night, when the troops had finished passing by, the rear guard abandoned its positions and began to retreat along the railway. The soldiers marched singing. According to the disposition, the troops had to halt on the river Pukhe at the point where it crossed the railway, here to arrest the advance of the enemy should he come up to this phice before all our troops had gone to a certain distance. At one place the road was found obstructed or, rather, covered with men, who impeded the march of the artillery and train. On the road and on both sides of it men lay in a dense mass; fires were burning everywhere. Sev- eral regiments were found here, whose men were incapable of moving on out of sheer fatigue. General Mylofl; quickly assem- bled the chiefs of these troops, gave orders first of all to extin- guish the fires, which could attract the enemy, explained the 40 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. condition of affairs, and ordered to rise immediately and march on for at least 10 versts. With a heavy heart did the chiefs assem- ble their men and move on. General Myloff received on the road the order of the com- mander of the Second Army to draw up a disposition for the .occupation of the following position^ according to which the right flank on the left bank of the Pukhe was to be occupied by Gen- eral Artamonoff, while the center and left Hank were to be com- manded by General Herschelmann. The train moved and the artillery rattled in rear of the marching troops. From time to time a gun or a wagon was over- turned and arrested the movement of the troops. Time passed, and by n^orning the new positions had to be occupied so as to arrest the pursuing enemy. Confusion took place at the crossing of the I*ukhe: every- one desired to be the fir&t to get to the other bank; the banks were steep, and the two existing roads did not allow of a rapid crossing over of the entire train, the artillery and the men. The chief of the rear guard ordered new passages to be made, and, thanks to these, the crossing was soon effected. February 2Gtli. — According to the disposition, the rear guard occupied in the morning positions on the left bank of the Pukhe. The enemy soon reached this point and opened artillery and rifle fire. A turning movement was feared, as the Japanese were both on the right and the left north of the rear-guard position. It is necessary to mention here a painful incident : General Arta- monoff, who occupied the right flank, without breathing a word to anybody, retreated north to Telin. It was necessary to dis- tribute hastily among the remaining troops the positions aban- doned by General Artamonofl. During the night the rear guard continued its retreat and reached the station of Saytadze. One of Artamonoif's brigades was caught up with here, the brigade of General Petereff; the other, commanded by Artamonoff himself, had gone to Telm. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ^i General Kaulbars, who was at that time at the station., reproved General Peterefl and ordered him and General Churinoff^s bri- gade to remain in tlie rear guard, relieving General Myloff and General Herschelmann and their troops, exhausted by continuous fights and marches during four days, throughout which the men !had hardly slept at all. General ]\lylof!", whose hernia, already once operated upon, had been aggravated by a fall he had with his horse, was in a serious condition oni account of physical and mental strain. General Kaulbars remained for some time per- sonally with the rear guar(J. General Myloff^s detachment was leaving the Saytadze station when the Japanese occupied the vil- lage of Iloo, situated on the Mandarin lioad north of this station, some 3 or 4 versts east of the railway line. Febmary 27th. — The detachment which was in the rear guard, upon reaching the river Fankhe, found at the crossing troops, trains, and artillery which assembled here, and new pas- sages had again to be. made. The sapper battalion, which was here quite accidentally, worked; most energetically. The crossing was quickly effected. General Kaulbars moved slowly to the north with the rear- guard, unmolested by the enemy. February 2Stli. — The rear guard occupied a position on the river Fanklie. The troops of the First Aruiy occupied the posi- tions on the left flank; General Mischenko, who had not yet recovered from his wound, took the command of liis detachment and occupied tlie right fiank. March 1st. — The enemy began to advance against Fankhe, but was repulsed with great losses. Our troops took the offensive 9nd began to press upon him, walking over hundreds of hostile corpses. Our further advance was checked by reinforcements which reached the enemy. Slowly and in excellent order our troops began to retreat towards Telin. In the night of the 25th our troops began to approach Telin. They neared it in groups, wherein the men of various units were 42 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. mixed up., combatants as well as non-combatants, and occupied the valley. As they arrived without officers, they could not get provisions. I do not understand why it was supposed that, since the men had arrived ail in a jumble, ihcy could be left hungry. This circumstance was greatly the cause of disorders at Telin. It brought about marauding and robbing of stores. However, the disorders were, not on a grand scale and were soon quenched, although several soldiers were shot down by their officers for disobedience. Some of the men, feeling guilty, proceeded further to the north, taking along with them many absolutely innocent ones. The minds of the soldiers were in an excited condition and they could not clearly define the reason why and whereto they were going. Having left their units, they remained without food and hunger forced them to get it by violence. It is possible that kSome of them took other things in addition to provisions, but these, as a useless burden, were soon cast aside. Those that had gone north of Telin aggregated not more than 3,000 to 4,000 men. The chiefs at last began to evolve order out of this mixed- up mass of wandering soldiers and distribute them among their original units. There were in all about 20,000 of them. By the 1st of March there was not a soul at Telin, and even the rail- way depot was deserted. All was cleared and the troops were located where they belonged. Of course it can not be said that order was entirely restored. It is far easier to break it than to reestablish it. Many da3's passed before everything could be brought to its normal condition, so much the more as it had to be done while continuing to retreat. I was convinced by my conversations with several general g that order could be restored very rapidly by taking the offensive. 'This would so startle the enemy that he would be sure to retrace his steps. Our troops were undoubtedly capable of taking the offensive, but, alas! there was a lack of ammunition, especially of artillery projectiles. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 43 Under such conditions it was impossible to remain in the Telin positions, and our troops retreated further to the north, halting at the positions situated in the vicinity of the station of Sipingay, some 174 versts distant from Mukden and 332 from Kharbin. Wliat did the :Mukden disaster, screamed about in the foreign press and commented on in our own, consist in ? ^ It is true that morally we suffered defeat. We lost our prestige in the eyes of the Chinese and the nations, who desire to see a disaster in our imost insignificant non-success, magnifying it until it reached the dimen'sions of a catastrophe, so as to find a momentary con- solation in the fact; we have lost our prestige in the eyes of our weak-souled friends and also in the eyes of our still more weak- souled citizens, who do not wish and, may be, do not know how to see clearly into the existing condition of afi'airs, as our Gov- ernment spheres take generally little care to acquaint the public with it, and in this case did not lift a linger to help it to find out the truth. This contempt of public opinion is not timely, as it is exploited extensively for their own purposes by all who need it. We have suffered smaller losses in men than our victors. The loss of some 30 tol 40 guns, several wagons, and from three to four milllions' worth of stores is not so great a thing as to call it a disaster. It is true that we could not take advantage of the Telin posi- tions, deemed by specialists far stronger than those we occupied on the Shakhe. But from a strategic point of view I do not think that we have lost much. Our present situation is better than the one before Mukden. Our right flanlv is open (an uninhabited desert extends in front of it), so that we can see every movement of the enemy and can calculate his strength more accurately than at Mukden, in the numerous villages surrounded by clay walls. The left flank is in a mountainous region, easily defended with a comparatively small force. The thinned ranks have been filled again and there remains a surplus for further casualties, 44 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. All the rumors concerning our disaster emanated from pre- judiced accounts of our mode of retreat. A painful incident which took place in the train served as a basis for these accounts. Such a prejudiced view acted upon the already nervous public and engendered an exaggerated pessimistic feeling. Such was this painful episode. CHA.PTE11 VII. THE PAiVIC IN THE TEATN. General Kuropatkin, as I have already said, left on Febru- ary 34tli for the northern front, for the purpose of directing th- operations in person. It was already felt at that time that the moment to give a decisive blow to the enemy had passed, and that nothing was left but to prepare for retreat and. use all means to maintain order during that retreat. It is said that for that purpose the Commander-in-chief ordered on the morning of Feb- ruary .24th one of his immediate assistants to begin sending the trains to the north, the train of the Commander-in-chief, of the Staff, and of the quartermaster to start first. (According to the rule, this train must always be at a distance of one day's march from the headquarters. In this case this rule was not observed.) But as soon as the Commander-in-chief had left, this assistant's young wife came to see him, their interviews talving place at rare intervals, as, according to General Kuropatkin's orders, the presence of his subordinate officers' wives was absolutely forbid- den, even for a short time, in his train and in the train of his chief of Staif. Abnormal, unnatural sensations have a pleasant effect upon the nerves of the mentally distorted twentieth- century man. It may be that in the case under consideration the interview with his wife within the sound of the roar of guns and the moans of thousands of the best sons of his country, falling un- der the enemy's blows, at the moment when the fate of the war was being decided, produced some special sensation, awakening extraordinary ecstasies and making him forget his duty. ' By gome accident the train in which he was had no telephone connection in that critical moment. Only towards evening did the news arrive Teporting the breaking through of our center by the Jap- 45 45 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. anese, threatening the occupation of Mukden station from min- ute to minute, and only at 8 p. m. were orders given for the train to retreat to the north hy the great Mandarin Eoad. The train of the Commander-in-chief and of the quartermaster started after 11 p. m. on February 24;th, when at that time they ought to have been near Tehn, and these Avere those that siiU'cred most. In order to get to the Mandarin Koad, by whicli the trains Jiad to retreat, it was necessary to traverse Mukden or to make a circuit of some 13 versts. To traverse Mukden, especially in the night, was impossible. Thus the train started. It is diffi- cult to conceive how enormous this train was in dimensions and how fearful in unwieldiness. It extended for about 60 to 70 versts in one continuous ribbon of several rows. Artillery and artillery parks were added to it, as the artillery was not to take part in rear-giuard battles; carts loaded with the property of the Chinese Bank and its employees and of private citizens who left with the officials came likewise along. The presence of these ele- ments, foreign to the troops, in no way contributed to the main- tenance of order on the march. AVhenever one cart stopped, the whole caravan was arrested; some time elapsed before the cart ■was put in motion, those in the rear, especially the artillery, which admits of no obstacles, pressed on, and the disorder increased. Only at dawn of day did the head of the train emerge on the Mandarin Eoad. As the train advanced various non-combatant units joined it, as bakers, Intendancy detachments, and others. In some of the units the wagons looked like those loads which the inhabitants of the capital see when moving to and from the country: tables, stools, various household chattels, all that the thrifty striker did not wish to leave behind so as not to deprive his officer of comifort, possible in the field, was piled in these wagons. When the main part of the train Avas between Tava and Puldie, there appeared on the summit of one of the hills sev- eral hostile mountain guns and, ma^be. 3, sc[uadroc or two of TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 47 cavalry, evidently part of the troops which broke through our ranks near Kiuzan, and, coming np to this point, opened fire against the retreating train. The shrapnel screeched and the grenades hissed. One of these sliimosas fell and exploded in the midst of the train, overthroAving several carts and killing and Hvonnding several men and horses; there again a shrapnel burst, killing several men and beasts. The horses went mad and kicked and reared, the wagons crowded upon each other and turned over, cries and moans were heard, and the confusion was inde- scribable. Each and every one endeavored to get out of the dan- ger zone, and the general chaos and disorder increased. The non- combatant units, absolutely devoid of initiative, without leader- ship, were incapable of doing anything, and the disorder was in- creased by the presence of foreign elements, such as Chinese driv- ers with their arbas and wagons. All these were screaming and crazily rushing to and fro, while the shrapnel continued to burst overhead, and the sliimosas continually fell to the ground, vomit- ing columns of black, stifling smoke. The train servants, unaccus- tomed to fire, lost their heads, and in their fear looked for safety vrherever they could. Some of them rushed into the fields and madly jumped over the rows of ghiaolan; some were wedged in the lines of the train, and endeavored to unharness a horse, so as to flee likewise into the fields. The gunners and men of the artiller}' parks, though they all had already seen fights, influenced by the general panic, followed their example; the parks aud guns were abandoned, and sometimes a gun, pulled out of the line, was careering at full gallop, overturning everything which lay in its Avay. rortunately, the hostile fire was soon exhausted (it was found out later that there was an insufilcient number of pro- jectiles) and comparative order was gradually restored. How- ever, it was impossible to gather up the abandoned property, for the men who had unharnessed the horses had galloped far away. It is not knoAvn where Colonel Timofeyeff, of the General Staff, came from. Seeing the insignificance of the enemy's forces, 4— 48 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. and thinking that it would be easy to capture even his guns, hvi&hing in general to restore order, especially necessary in case of a repetition of a sudden attack, he rode up to some units and endeavored to stop them. The men were all in sheepskin over- coats, and it was difficult to make out if they were combatants or aion-combatants, so much the more as the latter likewise wore arms, though these were only a useless burden to tlicm. ^[otwitli- standing all his efforts, his remonstrances had no effect. lie then drew his revolver and made two shots, probably against those who answered him most impudently. They fell and their comrades lired at the Colonel. Hit by several bullets, he fell severely wounded. The men fled and every trace of them dis- appeared, prohably forever. , Justice will surely not find them, and what sense would there be in punishing them ? Eemorse, which each of them must have felt as soon as the first fits of panic had left them, will be a heavy enough burden for them to carry. At the time that all fiew, seized by unconscious fear, that one cart overturned the other, that one man trampled the other under foot, thinking only of his own salvation, one strange vehicle arrested the eye. Drawn by one horse, a soldier sitting on the box, it advanced evenly, slowly, as if no fearful confusion and disorder reigned around it, as if notiiing of what was going on mattered at all. A gun, drawn by six horses, came rushing on furiously, and it seemed tliat one moment more and it would reach the vehicle and smash it like so many others; but, when only at a few paces from that vehicle, the six frenzied horses swerved suddenly to the side, skillfully 2>assing it, and rushed furiously on. What vehicle was it? AVhy was ever3^one afraid to come upon it? The soldier, dazed by grief, carried in this vehicle his jcompany commander, dearly loved by his entire command. It was an exemplary officer, a chief loving his men and taking excel- lent care of them, standing up for their interests. The entire TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 49 company simply Avorshiped him. He died a hero's death on the field of battle, and his faithful strilcer, who always took aa tender care of him as a nurse, was carrying his body along. His entire love and devotion was now transferred to his commander's wife, who was traveling with him (m that same vehicle. From time to time he turned round and gazed with sorrowful, pitying eyes into her distracted face. With dishevelled hair, eyes filled with terror, this young, pretty woman was looking at the corpse of the dearly loved husband who represented to her all the joy of life. She, probably, did no more understand the drama taking place around the beloved man, did not comprehend whereto and why he was being taken. The striker was looking at her and big tears were running fa^t over his dusty face, leaving dirty furrows behind, which the fine dust that pervaded the air covered again \vith. a new -thick layer. Tormented by some sort of foreboding, the unhappy woman proceeded to the positions on that fatal night. She found with dilficulty her husband's company, and began questioning the sol- diers. Silence answered her. A fearful thought struck her like lightning, and she broke into a fearful, terror-striking laugh, which soon changed into sobs. The whole compa,ny then broke into sobs. "Come, lady dear,'^ begged the striker, tears rolling down his face, and both went to the field of battle. The pale dawn was feebly lighting the theater of the dreadful fight. The field was covered with corpses; one was lying with outstretched hands as if endeavoring to catch soniebod}^ another seemed to sleep quietly lying on his back stretched out to his full length, while a third one was sitting on his knees with his head bowed to the ground. What attitudes do not they take, these unhappy people, smitten by sudden death ! Here and there were heard the moans of the wounded who had not been picked up through the night. The poor woman regained consciousness and hope was kindled anew in her heart. "He may be here wounded,'^ she says to the striker, but the striker is silent; he knows that 5Q THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. his commander fell stricken unto death, and that his corpse, taken aside by the soldiers, is near at hand. Obeying an unconscious impulse, the poor woman walked briskly to the fatal spot. There he lies as in life — only a small spot mars his forehead and a drop (of coagulated blood stains its whiteness ; he lies on his back, with one arm stretched out. She fell on the loved, lifeless form. Her head lay on his outstretched arm, and it seemed that they were both resting in quiet slumber. Silently did the striker stand, moved unto the depths of his soul by this spectacle. But she came back from her swoon, and in her despair began to shake her husband^s body, as if to waken him from this fearful sleep. AVlien the soldiers had placed the body in the vehicle, noth- ing could induce her to leave it, and the striker was taking them both now to the north, to their country, without any thought as to when their journey would come to an end. Would it not have been better for this unhappy woman to have stayed at home than to witness all these horrors of the war ? Of what help could she be to her husband? Seeing all these terrors before her, she uselessly deranged her mind, and it may be that during her whole life she will not be able to rid herself of this morbid condition. Order was at last more or less restored, and the train pro- ceeded onward. The greater part of the abandoned guns were taken along, but some of them had fallen into ravines in the confusion, and it was an utter impossibility to pull them out. It was likewise necessary to abandon part of the vehicles, as no horses could be found to take the place of the killed ones and of those that had galloped away. But, in order that the effects should not be lost, the soldiers began to open the trunks and take all that it was possible to carry to the other vehicles. All that could not be carried along was thrown on the road. The whole area occupied by the train looked as if some catastrophe had taken place : it was strewn with linen, various articles, paper, broken and overturned carts, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 51 Along each side of the railway were retreating troops which had not taken part in the rear-guard fights. Telin was desig- nated as the assembling-point. The men, dirty, dusty, their fur caps covered with gray cloth, so as not to be conspicuous in bat- tle;, and looking like monks' cowls, had a weary, unprepossessing aspect. They marched along with their officers in good order, and had 50 versts more to walk. They w^ere looking with envy at the trains, carrying the wounded, which passed them by. But some of the bolder ones at the sidings, where the trains stop, jumped on to tlie platforms of the cars; they were followed by others, and soon all the platforms, the roofs of the cars, the footboards, the tenders, and even the locomotives were covered with men. The officers called to them, trying to stop them, but seeing that it was of no avail, dismissed them with a wave of their hands. The railway personnel treated likewise with great indulgence these unexpected passengers, fully comprehending what fatigue meant, and the trains proceeded on their way slowly, so as not to make any of the soldiers, hanging on to it m all kinds -of ways, fall oS.. The trains followed each other in a continuous chain and were in a like way covered with soldiers. The units were broken. The soldiers were separated from their officers. The ranks of the remaining ones were also broken and the retreat was continued in disorder. In the evening of February 28th I went with Colonel Obole- sheff, the Engineer officer Mikliaylovski, one of the surgeons, and ^'the granddaddy of General Mischenko,'^ the Montenegrin Plam- enatz, to gather up the wounded along the line. The platform of the Santayzy station was covered with wounded, some of which had not yet been attended to. One of the flying detachments (the St. Petersburg one, I believe) began to dress the wounds at the station, and we carried the wounded into the cars which had come with us. The sun had set and night was advancing fast. In the field, 52 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. oiot far from the station, noises were heard — talking and the neighing of horses ; it was the train which had halted for a rest. Vehicles, parks, guns, and trains wdth A>'ounded and men, cover- ing the platforms and roofs of the cars, continued to arrive. A volley was fired somewhere. Cries were beard : ^'The Japanese ! the Japanese cavalry I" Everything w^as confusion. The cries of the people intermingled with the neighs of horses and the rattle of overturned vehicles, rifle hre opened on all sides. Everyone who had a rifle fired without heed of the target. ]\Ioans, the howl- ing of thousands of men, the patter of rille fire w^as heard on all sides. The commandant, who had evidently received orders, in case of the arrival of the Japanese, to burn the stores, think- ing that the enemy was close, ordered to set them on fire, and feoon an enormous conflagration illuminated the awful spectacle of death met at the hands of our own brother soldiers. Past the platform rushed the artillery, overturning everything in its course; men, horses, all fled panic-stricken. Two or three bolder ones stood up on the platform, trying to arrest the fugitives. "Stop! stop! there are no Japanese.,'' The men, stopping for a moment, but disbelieving the communi- cation, rushed on still more rapidly, while bullets were hurtling b}^, striking the w^alls of the station, and here and tbere the moans of the wounded were heard. At last the rifle hre began to slacken, and gradually every- thing grew quiet. Many left the station buildings w^ith shamed faces. "I am the chief of defense of this station," screamed a colonel, who had come up from I know not where. On that night General Kuropatkin slept in a freight car at that station. During the few days that I had not seen him, he bad greatly changed and grown pale, while his eyes shone fever- . -hly bright. It is difficult, of course, to justify such a disorderly retreat, but too much severity ought not to be shown these men. Con- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 53 sider their mental condition, analyze their psychology, and you will understand much that seems incomprehensible. Eemember that these are the same men who yesterday and the day before repulsed the attacks of the enemy with such courage, such won- derful steadfastness, and stormed the hostile fortifications. They fought twelye days consecutivel}', inflicting enormous losses on the enemy. For twelve days they bore courageously hunger and cold (for in battle it is difficult to supply all the units), and not a word of murmur ran through the ranks. Each unit did its duty, not knowing the general trend of the operation, seeing only tli^ results obtained by itself. Each of them had to its account a series of heroically repulsed attacks. And suddenly in the very heat of battle the order to retreat reaches the positions, a painful order, oft repeated during the course ol this war. All TBcalled ther recent incident with General Grippenberg, his depart- ure, seemingly for the reason that the Commander-in-chief had ordered to retreat wJien it was necessary to contimie the fight in order to vanquish the enemy, and rumors as to Iris reception in St. Petersburg. "The chiefs are quarrelling, and A\e must perish on account of their quarrels. Are we food- for the guns?'- Such were the words heard among the troops. Is it miicli to be avou- dered at that under such conditions the men did not understand the order, that murmurs were heard, that faith in their chief was shaken, and that the discipline grew slack? The results aie evident. But who has to bear the respousil)ility ? 'Not all the units reached the ]\[an(larin Road, by which the retreat was to l)e eltected: some were caught by the enemy, and retreated fighting where they could break through, over the moun- tainous region east of the railway line, and reached late their destination ; many Avere taken prisoner, mostly the Avounded ones. At the evacuation of Mukden, the soldiers Avere alloAved to take from the stores provisions and other articles; for example, pres- ents sent from Eussia. But, unfortunately, some of the soldiers 54 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. fell upon spirits, became drunk, and lay down on the spot, incapa- ble of moving; it is said that of such from 2,000 to 3,000 were taken prisoner. The further retreat of our troops was effected in good order, slowly, without confusion, wdth small rear-gTiard lights of no con- sequence whatever. Chapter VIII. CHANGE OF COMMANDER-m-CHIEF. On March 4th General Knropatkin surrendered to General Linevich the command of all the land and naval forces operat- ing against Japan, and left. The recall of Kuropatkin did not •surprise anyone: everybody felt that there must be a change ot Commander-in-chief, but no one knew by whom he would be replaced, and everybody expected the new chief with great anxiety. The appointment of Linevich, well acquainted witn the troops and the mode of fighting of the Japanese, gave new cour- age to the Army and was received by all with great enthusiasm. Everybody knew that he was a courageous, resolute general and everybody was sure that he would be able to compel everyone to obedience. Some persons assert that he is not a remarkable strategist. I know nothing about this; it may be that it is. so and it may be not. There is no doubt, however, that he is a man endowed with the divine sparh and much can be achieved by this. It may be that the "deep thinking^'' by which our strategists distinguish themselves is not at all necessary; it may be that simple actions inspired by that divine spark, are all that is needed, that is indis- pensable with the present remarkably developed military tech- nique. The future will show who was right. All the disposi- tions taken by Linevich, as the Commander-in-chief of the armies, during the last days of my sojourn on the theater of war, were highly rational and communicated in a decisive tone, admitting of no controversies. This means a great deal and tes- tifies to the mode of action adopted by tlie Commander-in-chief. May the Lord give him strength and health and may the divine spark, that will lead us to victory, perhaps, shine on undimmed 1 55 5g THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. Only by reason of the iron will of the Commander-in-chier was it possible to restore order so rapidly in the troops. Some three days later, I believe, it was made known that General Kuropatkin had been appointed commander of the First Manchnrian Army, and that this appointment had been made according to his personal request laid before the Emperor. This fact made a very good impression npon the iirmy. I was pres- ent when General Kuropatkin rejDorted to General Linevich as a subordinate. Vfith his hand at his visor, General Kuropatkin reported his arrival. General Linevich, likewise at military salute, listened with a concentrated expression on his face to the report of his former chief and now his subordinate. Tlie two generals immediately entered upon their new roles. How fate sometimes plays Avith the destinies of man I Chapter IX. OPERATIONS OX THE LEFT ELAXK AND IN THE CENTEE. I have reported consecutiveh'^ according" to the days of their taking place^ the operations of onr troops in the vicinity of Muk- den — i. e., on the fronts west and north of this cit}', without men- tioning a word about the actions on the southern fronts — in the center and on the left flank. 1 did this for the purpose of giving tlie reader a general uninterrupted impression of the events which took place near Mukden, where the Eebruary drama was enacted, and which had such decisive inflnence upon the first period of the present campaign. On the extreme left flank there operated the detachments of ]\fandrikin; further to the east, the troops of the Generals ]\[as- loft, Eennenkampf, Alexiefl, and Danilof!; further still were the Siberian Corps. The forces of the enemy were very large and he began to press upon us. It was already known by Febrnary Stli that the Japanese intended to take tiie olfensi^e. The extreme advanced detach- ments of the enemy began to operate against our extreme left flank — the Tsynkhenchen detachment. During tlie two follow- ing days the advance grew more intense, wliile on the 11th and 12th of February the attacks were made with forces greatly supe- rior in numbers to tlie Russians, and, notwithstanding our stuljborn resistance and the great losses of the enemy, avc were forced to retreat to our positions. Our troops left with great unwilling- ness the fortified points; the attacks ended in bayonet fights, the enemy retreated repeatedly, leaving hundreds of corpses behind, but again reinforced, rushed on anew. It was necessary to ex- pel the officers by force from the occupied positions. On the 67 58 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 13tli and 14tli of February the Japanese made a stubborn attack against the entire front of our left fiank. After fierce fighting, our troops left the positions of Dalin Pass. The results of the last days were such, in general, that, having left our former posi- tions, we straightened out our front, pushing our left flank far to the south. The taking of Dalin Pass by the Japanese opened for them, so to say, the road to Fushun. and Telin. But the army 'of Linevich, which had taken firm hold of this region, did not allow them to take one step forward. Attacks and artillery fights took place daily in the center, but the result was always the same: they were all repulsed by us with enormous losses to the enemy. The Poutiloff and Nov- gorod Hills were fired at uninterruptedly from 11-inch guns. The valises, as the soldiers call the 11-inch projectiles, cut through the air with a fearful noise and their fragments, in the form of shapeless objects, produced a specially disagreeable hiss- ing sound. These noises had a very exciting eftect upon the !Qerves, precluding the possibility of ever getting used to them, forcing the men to be ever on the watch, and the soldiers had so well adapted themselves to the flight of these projectiles that the loss among them was insignificant. The fortifications, how- ever, suffered greatly. On the loth, 16th, and 17th the Japanese endeavored to break through our lines at any cost and at any point; all their efforts, however, were frustrated; though we too had to pay with an enormo,us number of victims, the enemy's losses were still greater. The hostile guard, counting 20,000 men, attacked the corps of General Zasulich, but all the attacks were repulsed. Thirteen attacks made within two days cost the enemy almost two-thirds of his contingent. General Zasulich here succeeded in taking his revenge upon the guard which defeated him under Turenchen. It may be said that the Japanese understood already on the 18th-19th of February that they would not succeed in breaking through the line on the left flank and dislodge General Line- TEE TRUTH ABOUT TEE WAR. 59 vich's army, defending itself with such eaitraordinary stubboxn- ness. The losses of the enemy were here so great that his army melted, so to say, before our eyes. Considering this affair as lost, the Japanese rushed first against the front, but at this point too all their efforts broke against the solidity of our defenders. Then they went further and fell upon our right; flank. On February 23d the army of General LineAdeh left the posi- tions which it had defended with such obstinacy against the fierce onrush of the enemy. The losses on both sides amounted to from 50,000 to 60,000 (we lost, as the defensie, about 21,000). On the 24th it occupied new positions on the Khunkhe Eiver, but already on the 25th moved further to the north in the direction of Telin. The retreat of this army took place in excellent order; it left not a vehicle nor a rifle as booty to the enemy, although here too some of the wagons looked like carts moving household goods to the country. It was told that General Eennenkampf, having halted, had a fire built and allowed the train to pass by him. One vehicle stopped ; the tired horse was incapable' of pulling it over the pass; the driver, not less fatigued than the animal, exerted all his strength to help it, but this did not improve matters. The vehicle, filled with all kinds of household articles, was exceed- ingly heavy. ^'Whose things are these ?" asked Eennenkampf of the driver. ^The company commander's, your excellency,^' answered he. ^'^Well, my friend, throw^ them into that fire.'" The soldier looked with incredulity at the General. "How is it possible to throw the property of the company commander into the fire ?" thinks he. How much pains had not he and the striker *taken to gather it up and bring it to this point, not desiring to leave anything to the Japanese. "That's all right, brother; throw "them in. I will answer for them." 60 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. The goods are thrown into the fire and the horse goes on easil}^ ]^ot a few of sucli vehicles met with the same fate. It could he gathered from the actions of the Commander- in-chief that he supposed as early as February 17th that the blow would be struck against the left flank and that the turn- ing movement of the enemy and his operations on the right flank were nothing but a big demonstration, as it would be impos- sible to explain otherwise the sending of the 1st Siberian Army Corps with one brigade to the left flank at the time when the turn- ing colunm had not only Ijeen sighted, but haxl come in touch with our armies. It is evident that he feared that the Japanese, having taken possession of Dalin Pass and others and having here driven out our troops, would move against Fushun and fur- ther against Telin so as to take us in the rear. It is probable that such a plan existed among the Japanese, but the events which took place against their Avishes forced them to adapt" themselves to the circumstances aceordingt to their development: they altered their plan according to the course of events. It is pos- sible that future events forced them to strike their principal blow, instead of the left flank against the right and end the operations at Mukden, perhaps with not so signal a success as when they could have executed their movement against Fushun-Telin. It is evident that it is drfacult to tell now what tlie enemy proposed to do. This will be seen after the war if the Japanese are sin- cere. At the present time we must limit oin^selves to probable sup- positions, so much the more as it is impossible to credit informa- tion from Tokyo even concerning events which have taken place long ago, as it is less than probable that the Japanese would like to disclose to everybody their tactics and mode of fighting. I repeat that it might be possible that the Japanese intended to overthrow General Linevich and advance further turning our two other armies. If this was, however, a. demonstration, as sup- posed by some, it was such a powerful one that had it not met ^vith such stubborn resistance from General Linevich's army, it THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ^VAR. 61 would have attained results which would have exceeded the prob- lems of any denionstrataon^ however large it might be. Such conclusion is brought about by the fact that on the left flank and in the center up to Februciry 19th and yOth, the Japanese made stubborn attacks with large forces, while at that time their suc- cess w^as doubtful on the right flank; only after February 20th did their attacks on this point grow weaker — it was evident that they had transferred some of their forces against our right flank, thus giving General Linevich the possibility of taking the offens- ive himself. It is possible that the Japanese, seeing the impos- sibility- of executing successfully the plan of operations drawn up by them east of Mukden, had shifted their decisive actions Avest of Mukden, seeing that our right Hank was the weaker of the two. Chapter X. SHORT SYJN'OPSIS OF THE MUKDEN OPERATIONS. Making a resume of the course of events, Ave see that on February 11th the Japanese had conoentratecl all their efforts for the purpose of overthrowiing the left flank of General Line- army, making fierce attacks at the same time against his right flank, so as to make it impossible for him to reinforce his left flank. They attacked just as stubbornly our right flank, and sent out a detachment along the Liaokhe valley for the pur- pose of turning us from the west. All these operations were planned either for the purpose of impeding us from sending re- inforcements to the left flank over which they might, had their operations at this point been successful, have marched on Fushun and further in a turning movement from the east, leaving a strong garrison at Fushun, or as a big demonstration oiu the left flank for the purpose of keeping us from sending reinforcements to the right flank. But the stubborn resistance of General Line- vich's army and the great losses incurred by the Japanese (Gen- eral Linevich's losses amounted to 21,000, while the Japanese, as the attacking pa,rty, lost probably near our fortifications at least 30,000 and maybe 40,000 men) altered here the correlation of forces, which was not in favor of the Japanese, and thus forced them to try to strike a blow in the west. On February 19th they began their energetic advance in that direction. Our passive actions on the 19 th and 20th of February gave us the possibility of concentrating here quite considerable forces. Supposing the numlerical correlation of the two armies to be expressed by the following figures^ — the Japanese 400,000 and ours 350,000, then on February 11th these forces were distributed as follows: The Japanese — the turning column, 50,000; the right flank, 62 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 63 120,000; the center, 70,000; the left flank, 120,000; the re- serves, 40,000. Our troops^the right flank, 120,000; the left flank, 110,000; the center, 80,000; and the reserves, 40,000. On February 17th we had on the right flank 100,000, ini the center 70,000, on the left flank 140,000, and in the reserves 40,000. Between the 20th and 23d of February our left flank was again weakened to 70,000, the center likewise, while the right flank had been reinforced. But at that time the Japanese had likewise concentrated here about 240,000, so that they had on their left flank and in their center about 120,000, and maybe still less. Thus on the western front the enemy had a numerical superior- ity over us. These figures, of course, are quite problematic, but their correlation is approximately correct. On the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d of February the Japanese strained all efforts to throw backward the Third Arm}^, occupying the left bank of the Khunkhe, and break tlirough its lines in the rayon oi Madiapoo-Youkhuntun, but all their attempts remained unsuccessful and they lost a greait number of men. It is not an exaggerated statement that they lost about 20,000 men in those days. Seeing that their etlorts did not succeed at that point, they advanced and strengthened their front north o in this year of padnful trials falling to the share of our country, the sentiment of citizenship had awakened in our hardened bureaucracy. The Intendancy question interested me not only as an observer, whose duty it is to place before the public the results of his observations, but also as a man who desired to convince himself that the general progress had also found its way into a midst which, so far, had been considered as hopeless. Thus, a stranger to everybody, I questioned the contractors, was an ap- parently accidental witness to deliveries, saw how the Army was provisioned and with what articles, how it was clothed and booted, and I must admit that I cannoit make a single complaint against this institution. It is true that the Intendancy strove for cheap- ness, sometimes manifesting too much zeal in this direction to the greater injury of the service. Thus the Intendancy wanted to maintain the prices, at any cost, on some articles, as bread, 67 68 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. grain, hay, etc. The contractors did not wish to lower their prices; the Intendancy, in its turn, refused toi buy at the prices demanded, and when, brought to the extremity, it consented, the prices rose and the contractors did not agree to sell for what they had first asked. Thus the products had to be bought at a higher price than could have been done earlier. This testifies to a lack of commercial aptitude among the Intendancy employees and to the preponderance of red tape over live work. The Chief Intendant, General Gniber, is the most honest man living. It will be impossible to find a man, even among his bitterest ene- mies, to accuse him of lack of integrity. He surrounded himself with young, prominent officers, mostly such as had graduated from the Intendancy Course of Instruction, likewise honest men and conscientious workers. I will not den}*, of course, that there was no bad egg in this family and that not always did everything go smoothly in this institution. But it is gladsome to see that abuse is not the general rule of this establishment, as it had been heretofore, there being only a few sad exceptions, a fact that may occur anywhere, and especially in such an enormous under- taking as that of the Intendancy. The Intendancy had no general deliverers — i. e., the pro- visions were obtained on an economic plan, from first hands, straight from the producers or through secondary contractors. The principal contractor was the renowned collaborator of Sko- beleff, GromoS, but he operated here more out of love of war and patriotism than out of love of gain. According to regulations concerning the administration of the armies and to the orders of the Commander-in-chief, the (preparation of provisions and other supplies was made by each army separately, the Commander-in-chief giving only general in- dications. The special conditions of the country, the existence of only one line of communications (tlie East Siberian Railway) hj which products could be brought, the limitation of the rayon in which the supplies could be obtained, on account of which, TEE TBVTB ABOUT THE WAR. 69 there being three armies, their ^ntendancies- might compete with each other-all this forced to deviate from the established reg- ulations and concentrate tire preparation of products and various provisions in the hands of one person-namely, in the hands of the Chief Intendant, attached to the Cominander-m-chiet. The character of the Commander-in-chief played likewise a role in the operations of the Intendancy. ^ The Chief Intendant placed before the Commander-m-chiei for approval his plans for the smaller cost of supplies, the meas- tires to be taken for the timely purchase of various provisions, aad SO forth. ^ ,_^ -;i -1 on For a pood of bean husks for the feeding of cattle was paid 1.20 roubles, while one pood of beans cost only 40 copecks. The dis- cremncy was evident: the remnants of tiie beans, after the oil had been extracted, cost more than the beans themselves. The exploitation was flagrant. The Chief Intendant proposed to have all the beans nnrchased and an oil-extracting plant estabhshed, so as to obtain the remnants at a very small cost in this manner. 4ccording to calcnlations, the price of tlie husks would be so much below tliat at which they were bought that it would have been of the greatest advantage to use them as fuel instead of wood, which was bought at from 60 to 100 roubles per cubic sagen. He likewise raised the question of cutting hay in the Mongol steppes and many other similar projects were placed by him Wore (the Commander-in-chief. Commissions were instituted by the Commander-in-chief for the purpose of deliberating upon them, refusing to decide himself upon these questions. But who ignores what it means to place something in the hands of a com- mission? The activity of the latter even here on the theater of war was not distinguished by greater energy, and often when the commission had passed a resolution, the time for its ex^utiun had passed, never to return. General Kuropatkin acted this way, evidently, out of pre- caution, desiring to avoid blame. But such caution is good in 70 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. time of peace and not in time of war^ when every minnte is precious^ and the fear of blame is still more misplaced in such a period. The responsible position of the Commander-in-chief waives by itself all possibility of blame for economical meas- ures. It is true that Government control was exercised over the Commander-in-chief. Thanks to the presence of this institution there existed the same red tape, the same routine w^hich, even in time of peace, kill every live work. I might point out scores and hundred of cases where people were awaiting, in consequence of red tape, for weeks the mooiey due them for materials deliv- ered by them. This killed in the contractors all desire to have anything to do with the Government, and thus the Government had to pay oai that account very large sums as compared to what it might have paid. Are these the results which the Government control desires to obtain? There arises then the following anomaly: A man is en- trusted with the entire wealth of the country, its honor and its future, while over a loss of 5 copecks control is instituted. Chapter XII. THE SxiNITAEY SERVICE. All tlie three armies are in excellent sanitary conditions, in the summer after the Liaoyang battle and especially in August, dysentery or the epidemic gastro-enteritis, as called by the physicians, and typhoid fever appeared in the Army, even in quite large proportions. But with the approach of winter the disease disappeared almost completely. In general, the percent- age of men who fell ill on the theater of Avar was smaller than in time of peace. This is explained, on the one hand, by the dry climate of Manchuria, where the sun is shining brightly during the entire winter; and, on the other hand, by the excellent pro- visioning of the Army and the warm clo'thing distributed to the soldiers. All the medico-sanitary establishments, as the military med- ical department^ tlie institutions of the Red Cross, the zemstva detachments, and detachments with other denominations, fulfill their duties most excellently during the time when there is no fighting. But tliis I cannot say about them at the time of battle. The military medical department is tlie one deserving of most blame, especiaUy its administration. In Mukden, Tclin, Kharbin, at every point tliere could bq found a great number of physicians pining for want of work. They desired work, but it was impos- sible for them to get an appointment. There were, for exam- ple, such cases: The medical authorities sent a party of physi- cians from Kharhin to Mukden; the local medical authorities did not receive tlie surgeons and sent them back to Kliarbin. And thus they traveled back and forth — they felt both offended and somewhat ashamed. But when large operations began, they were 71 72 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. hurriedly assigned to duty^ perhaps at points where they would be of but little use or even quite supierHuous ; part of them was kept to be detailed to accompany sanitary trains. In the mean- while hundreds of wounded were suffering, moaning, dying of loss of blood, awaiting their turn to have their wounds dressed; so some of them died before this turn came, and maybe, with timely aid, part of these might have been saved. I often had occasion to see at tbe dressing-stations a mass of wounded lying on the ground, an endless chain of them coming up, and still others brought, while there were only two surgeons and two to three hospital stewards to attend to the work under which they staggered. In addition to the dressing of the wounds, it is neces- sary to keep a list of the wounded who have been attended to. This work is done by the surgeon and the steward in turn. These surgeons and stewards are regimental ones, and the authorities never thought of sending to their assistance the physicians that were idling in the reserves. You see — the military medical department is a special establishment, almost a realm in itself. A well-applied first dressing of the womid isi of great importance in the course of recovery. The dressing-stations are always within the sphere of fire, as modern guns and rifles have a very long range and the Japanese pay but slight attention tO' the Eed Cross flags, often, it is true, entirely ignorant of their where- abouts. I stayed once two hours at the dressing-station, entering the names, family names, and other data concerning the woundedl attended to, allowing during that time the medical p&rson?iel to take care of the Avounded. AVhy should not each soldier have on jhim a ticket or card bearing all this information? then, instead of writing all this down and asking all these questions, the cards might be simply taken from them. The surgeons and stew- ards working at tlie dressing-stations are above all pradse; our hospital stewards are excellent — ^the bandages made by them are simply artistic. The same may be said about those working at THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 73 the hospitals^ where their labor is itu interrupted throughout day and night. The establishments of the Eed Cross are likewise impos- sible to be replaced. The flying detachments of the Eed Cross are of great service in the first aid to the w^ounded. Other detachments are likewise of great assistance^ but of all those I had the occasion to see^ I must give preference to the Eed Cross. The following strange fact must be noted with regard to the fly- ing detachments — at the time of battles they are obliged to choo'se themselves their theater of activity^ and they go where tliey believe they will be most needed. This comes from the utter impossibility for them to get indications from the military medical authorities as to where their pr£;sence would be most use- ful. TMs I explain by misplaced rivalry. Wliat shall I say about the Sisters of Mercy? This question is a hard one tO' treat; I might be taken for a woman-hater^ be accused of prejudice, should! I speak unfavorably about them, wdiile should I say nothing but good, I w^ould fall short of the truth. It is true that a woman's hand has a soothing eifect upon the shattered nerves of the wounded; that a woman is an excellent nurse, and that the Vounded look trustfully upon the Sisters of Mercy, knowing of their sympathetic feeling towards them; that the good done by them is invariable; that most of the Sisters are devoted heart iand soul to tlieir work. Much has been said and written about it and there is no need of adding or detracting anything. But there is another side to the question which not everyone will want to touch upon. The presence of women at advanced positions has negative sides. I will not treat this subject at length; I will say but one thing, and tliat is that the Sisters of Mercy ought to be kept exclusively at the sanitary medical institutions, established in the rear of the Army, and never at the front. I am convinced •that as soon as these regulations would be in force, many of the Sisters would abandon their new-fangled fad and return to their former occupations in their native country, and the institution 74 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. of Sisters ot Mercy would only gain and grow healthier through this circumstance. One of the Sisters^ who remained at Mukden after this city's occupation by the Japanese^ told that when she asked the Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Red Cross to give her the opportunity of making the acquaintance of the Japanese Sis- ters of Merc}^^ he answered her : "At the advanced posts we have no other women but prostitutes; our wives^ our Sisters of Mercy are far at the rear^ doing their work there." In our Army it is just the reverse — the Sisters of Mercy are at the front and the prostitutes at the rear. Talking about the personnel of the Eed Cross that had re- mained at IMukden^ I cannot help noting the following circum- stance. There had stayed behind at i\Iukden some 500 of O'ur wounded and about 400 Japanese. There were several scores of stewards^ some 10 or 15 surgeons, aaid a still greater number of Sisters of Mercy left to take care of these 1,000 wounded, and witli this personnel likewise refnained Chief Plenipotentiary of tlie Red Cross Guchkoif and his assistant, Counlt Olsufyeff. I ask. Was it necessary that for these 500 wounded, there should remain all this personnel with the Chief •Pleni2>otentiary at its liead? In addition to these we had over 60,000 wounded whom the Chief Plenipotentiai^y abandoned. I understand that should the medical personnel have declined to remain, ]\Ir. Guchkoff's act would have been an example to the others (but at all events without keeping his assistant Avith him), would have a reason, but tliere were so many Avho desired to stay, that there was no need of the Cliief Plenipotentiary's setting the example, and it was absolutely unnecessary for him to abandon an entire institu- tion with several tens of thousands of wounded entrusted to his care. There are among our Sisters of Mercy many such which are here dubbed "margarine Sisters." These are the wives of Various members of the Army enrolling as Sisters of Mercy to be near their husbands. These Sister-wives, of no use whatever THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 75 in the work of aiding the wonnded, have a nefarious influence on the Arni}^ During lulls in the militar}^ operations the young officers pay court to the wives of their chiefs^ the husbands grow jealous^ the wives nervous, while tlie officers neglect their duty. During battle the wives are anxious about their husbands, the husbands about their wives, messengers are sent several times a day with no'tes as to health, and it is easily understood, that the service does not benefit from all this anxiety and uneasiness. In addition to this, the wives have to be taken care of, dwellings Inust be found for them, cars on the railway, when everybody is suffering from lack of accommodation. This is especially trying on account of the continuous movements of the Army. I know of cases when the railway personnel was placed in the following dilemma : either send several wives of superior officers or a certain number of wounded, and in two cases the preference was given to the wives. Eemember the already mentioned consequences of the train having been sent to Telin IG hours late. I am convinced Ithat the presence of the wives of the chiefs at Port Arthur was not without its influence upon the premature surrender of this fortress. It is necessary that the condition of leaving the theater of war be placed on the Sisters of Mercy having husbands in the ranks, and in general, the wives ought not to be allowed to join their husbands, even for a short period. Before my departure from St. Petersburg, A. S. Souvorin asked me to investigate into the activity of Chief Plenipoten- tiary of the Red Cross Alexandrovski. Everybody was talk- ing about him at that time, and his actions were mentioned in connection with the ceasing of gifts being sent to. the Eed Cross, which received such generous contributions in the beginning of the war. Unfortunately, at my arrival I did not find Mr. Alex- androvski on the spot, and could not discuss the matter with him. I always keep to the principle, Audiatur et altera pars. From the data which I succeeded in gathering concerning the 76 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. sanitary organizations and from their comparison to the expendi- tures made by the Eed Cross at the seat of war during Mr. Alexandrovsld's administration^ I came to the conclusion that no special abuse was current in the lied Cross. It was even quite ■to the contrary; some expenditures of other saiidtary organiza- tions were greatly superior to similar ones made by the Eed Cross. For example, the maintenance of the medical personnel, with the exception of the stewards, amounted to 1 rouble per diem per man, including the morning teai with bread and butter, a dinner of two or three courses, the evening tea, a supper of one course, and other supplementary expenditures; the mainte- nance of the stewards came to 50 copecks per diem. Taking into /Consideration the high price of the products existing at present in Manchuria, such expenditure is not excessive. The Eed Cross hought horses at an average of T'7 to 81 roubles, and mules at the rate of 106 roubles per head; the %ing detachments purchased horses at an average of 81 to 93 roubles, while the military administration paid for them 100 roubles and more. One dress- ing cost the Eed Cross about from 8 to 13 roubles, while it cost the military administration from 15 to 18 roubles. As far as I remember, Alexandrovski was blamed for not havmg pre- sented his report in time — i. e., he neglected the formal side of the business.. But try to keep a systematic record with a limited personnel of clerks. Such a report would take, if conscientiously attended to, from ten to fifteen days of each month from the Plenipotentiary. What should he do? Keep up> formalities or devote himself to live work? Here, at the seat of war, -such reports would amount to nothing. Horses, products, all kinds bf articles are bought from the Chinese. According to rega- . lations, the report ought to be accompanied by documentary evi- dence — i. e., in this case by the receipted bills of the Chinese. The model of such a receipted bill lias even been elaborated. But what meaning would such bills convey to the Chinese? The con- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ^YAR. 77 tents are absolntely incompreliensible to them, as they are printed in Eussian. ^Tiat could the persons verifying the bills make out of the hieroglyphics painted by the Chinese on these bills? In order to avoid bothering Avith each of the sellers separately a system was elaborated for nsc in Manchnria not only by the Eed Cross, but by other institutions, to give several bills at once to be signed by the Chinese interpreters, in bulk, so to say, with- out its making any difference as to who made the hieroglyphics on the shps. If such a document was not attached to a report, dishonesty was flagrant; if it was, everything was right. What value conld have a report accompanied by such documentary evi- dence? Wonld it not have been better should the superintendent simply enter the sum of the expenditure and the article for which it was expended? The essence of the matter would not be altered, but there would be much less work and the time spent upon the writing up of reports could be ntilized for more important business. As to Mr. Alexandrovski's capacity as an administrator, I must say that he is an energetic man^ knowing his work exceedingly well, and that his departure was greatly felt by the Eed Cross in this direction. General Kuro- patkin knew what he did when he invited him to take the place of Chief of the Health Service of the First Army. Alexandrovski managed the sanitary organization of the First Army during the j^attles of Mukden, and, thanks to his energy, all the wounded Avere evacuated; there remained not a wagon, not a cart behind. General Linevich asked him to return, acknowledging his use- ful activity. It seems to me that on the theater of war it is not so much abuse that matters as certain party bickerings which screen truly useful work. If the cause of the decrease of contributions is looked for, it mufet be sought first of all in that same party spirit and in the fact that the sad occurrences in the Eed Cross during time of peace keep the contributors from beheving in the managers of the Eed Cross. , 78 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. The sanitary trains are very well organized and the personnel is excellent- They are of great assistance in the evaciiation of the wounded. Their number is^ however, insufficient, (and during fights the wounded had to be mostly transported in freight-cars, which, on account of lack of space, were literally filled with them. The Finnish two-wheel carts and tlie two-horse jDack stretch- ers afford excellent means of transportation. Chapter XIII. THE RAILWAY AND THE EVACUATION OF MUKDEN. The East Chinese Eailway is of enormous impoTtance in the present Russo-Japanese War. This line and, in general, the entire Siberian Railway present the only line of communication for more than half a million of troops, while one railway is nec- essary for each corps under normal conditions. The work of the Chinese Railway was increased by the circumstance that not only the troops and military stores arriving from Russia had to be carried, but also all kind of supplies, as fuel for the Army, timber and other materiel, bought and obtained on the spot. Dur- ing battle the railway had to transport ammunition, evacuate the wounded, and almost daily carry troops. It is wonderful that it was able to solve tJiis difficut problem with the means at its disposition, with the capacity of trafllc for which it was prepared. The same may be said about thei Siberian line. When General Jvhorvat took upon himself the management of the Chinese Railway, its construction was far from being com- pleted; according to the budget some 40,000,000 roubles were assigned for building expenditures. The traffic increased with every day, while the moneys for the bringing of the line to the requisite condition were not forthcoming (during thei last months before the war tlie traffic returns reached very large figures, almost 2,000,000 roubles per month). The war found the railway unprepared for the enormous amount of work in store for it at the beginning of the military operations. It w^as necessary to increase as rapidly as possible the number of sidings, enlarge the stations, install additional water-supply plants and many other apparatus. The work was energetically proceeded with, and, thanks to the unflagging 79 80 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. activity of General I-Qiorvat, his assistant, Prince Eiilkoff (the Chief of Eepairs), and the entire railway personnel j this difficult task was completed in the course of a few months. In addition to all this, there was a lack of fuel for such an immense traffic, ^ew coal-mine shafts had to he opened. There were excellent ■mines near the Yantay station, but after the battle of Liaoyang they remained in the hands of the Japanese. In addition to these, there was coal in the Fusliun mines, worked by the Chi- nese for an immense period of time — these being, probably, the oldest mines in the world. But they were situated at a distance of 40 versis from the railway line, and it was, consequently, necessary to build a branch line to this point. No means were Allotted for this purpose, and there was likewise no permit to build from the Chinese authorities. General Khorvat then con- structed at his own risk and peril this branch which played a prominent role during our occupation of the ^lukden rayon. Moreover, as the railway agents were acquainted with the local conditions, they were entrusted with various operations relating to the purchase of provisions, and they discharged this duty ac- curately and always in time. The employees, occupying for- merely apartmeiiits of two, three, and more rooms, were, during the military operations, quartered with their families in one room, while the available buildings along the whole line were trans- formed into hospitals, lazarets, and other military establishments, a measure which rendered enormous service. Only by the ener- getic, unselfish work of all the employees of the railway, ani- mated by the desire of giving all the assistance in their power to their native country, was it possible for this line to fulfill the difficult task which had fallen to its share. It is only by this self-sacrificing activity of the entire railway personnel that can be explained the scarcity o5 accidents in spite of such increased iiraffic. The same nuist be said about the activity of all the agents of the Siberian Eailway. AU the works for the purpose of increasing the carrying THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR, Ql capacity and the exploitation of tlie railway were carried out un- der the siinultaneons command of three chiefs : the Chief of the Railway ^Administration, attached to the Viceroy ; the Chief of the Military Transportation ot Troops, attached to the Commander- in-chief; and the Chief of the Eear. Each of these operated inde- pendentl\^, gave out orders and regulations, made out dispositions, and the outcome of all this was a chaos which hindered the rail- way ijcrsonnel from doing their work. This dilficult state of affairs was not altered after the recall of the Viceroy from the' theater of war; on thci conti^ary, matters grew still worse after his departure. General ^iedermiiller, whO' was Chief of the Rail- way Administration, attached to the Viceroy, possessed great tact and could be argued with, while his successor lacked these quali- ties. AVliat was tlie position of the Chief of the Line on whom rested the entire responsibility, having all these commanders above him, these managers; carrying no responsibility whatever? His orders were countermanded often by word of mouth, the rail- way employees did not know whom they were to obe}^, whom they were subordinate to — and all this had a nefarious influence upon their work. The principal thing is, that these indirect chiefs were often absolutely incompetent as far as railway matters were concerned. It is impossible to demand from them any knowledge as to rail- way business, for the capiability of directing the traffic and man- aging the complicated railway work is acquired by long practice, by a detailed acquaintance with all the springs of this mechan- ism. Under such conditions, tadt and caution must be the lead- ing principles. Want of tact, arrogance, fault-finding, often met even in the orders and documents of these managers of the rail- way, brought the perso7inel to the point of wanting to give up everything and leaving. I happened to hear more than once how the railway employees said with sorrow that for all their pains, all their work, leaving them literally without sleep or rest^ all they got wa^s insults. I know somewhat General Khor- 82, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. vat. He is a man understanding his work thoroughly, remarkably tactful and ambitious. It was necessary to be deeply imbued with the consciousness of his responsibility, his duty towards his mother country, the obligation to fulfill his duty, no matter what the con- ditions might be, to work under the circumstances andi within the atmosphere which surrounded him. The same may be said about the entire personnel. They were absolutely martyrs, laiowing no rest either by day or night. A¥hat immense work fell to their share during our 1-etreats — and we did nothing but retreat! How much self- abnegation did not they display in their work! The telegraph operators were the last to leave the depots. Wlien the Japanese reached onei semaphore, they were at the next, carr}dng! the tele- graph apparatus on their shoulders. The telegraph line was being repaired under showers of bullets. Trains were started under rifle and artillery fire. And these were civilian employees, serv- ing out of their own free will and under no obligation to risk thus their lives. All this arose from a sensie: of duty, from a desire to be of use to their country as far as it lay in their power. And for all this self-abnegation, for all this tremendous work, all they received was abuse — ^they heard not a word of gratitude or com- mendation from the higher commanders. Where is the man who did not abuse them ? Even after the celebrated attack and battle on the Shakhe, the CommandeT-in-chief issued an order in which he thanked all the participators in the affair, but not a word was said about the railway employees. Only after the Minister of Finance, in whose jurisdiction belongs the East Chinese Eail- way, had asked by telegraph about the work of the railway person^ ^el, did General Kuropatkin remember this branch and telegraph back that there could not be any two opinions about their highly useful and energetic activity. The Commander-in-chief »might, under stress of his many obligations, forget his railway employees, but such forgetfulness is absolutely unpardonable in the Chief of Military Communications, as it may be explained by the desire THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. §3 cf lesseniiig the usefulness of the railway personnel and thus in- creasing the impoTtance of the managers of military communi- cations. In General KhoTvat's order to the railway employees after the Minister of Finance had communicated to him General Kuropatkin's answer^ we read the following words in which a shade of bitterness may be noticed : ^'We do not work for praise, we work for the purpose' of assisting the Tsar and our mother country in this year of trials." Such relations of the Chiefs of Military Communications towards the employees of the railway could hardly serve as incentives to greater energy, so indispensa- ble in such difficult and trying times. If the railway personnel has successfully accomplished the problem placed before it, it was only thanks to their feeling of citizenship, the sentiment of their obligation to tlieir country with which they were penetrated. Happening to be often at the station, I could see how the personnel worked. I always found Messrs. Slavuta and Aghieff, chiefs of the sections of traffic, in the telegraph-room filled with tobacco smoke and vitiated air, sitting at their apparatus and send- ing out orders along the line. This was so both by day and by night. I absolutely could not undersand when these men rested, ate', and slept. It seemed as if they never left their tele- graph apparatus. And these men for such work could not even hope to receive thanks in an order issued to the troops. I shall not dispute the regulations, according to which the military autliorities in time of war extend their jurisdiction over the railways existing in the rayon of the military operations. It seems to me that they must have a constant eye to the traffic and the railways themselves, and in the present war, not only on the line traversing the theater of war, but on the entire Siberian Eailway, being the only line of communication and supplying artery of the Army. But this inspection must be organized in a practical way. It seemed to me that it would be better to place the entire Siberian and Chinese railways under the management 84 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. of one person, but with the condition that he should not meddle an the regulations issued for the immediate interior management of the line,, as any foreign meddling would bring only confusion into the complicated work of railway administration. This per- son should limit himself to making certain demands from the railway persofinel and seeing that these demands be accurately complied with. For this j)urpose he must be vested with great power. At present there are many chiefs : one on the Siberian Eailway line, another in the rear of the Army at Kharbin, and a third with the advanced troops. We must add to this the meddling with the administration of movements of troops of the General Staff. Their activity is in no wise concentrated and their orders are often conflicting. What can be expected? of such a con^ dition of affairs ? I remember well the evening of February 24th, when orders were given to retreat. There remained many wounded at the Muk- den station, also projectiles, the siege artiller}', and many mate-. rials which it was absolutely necessary to take along. It was also necessary to take all the rolling stock. The director of the traffic, Mr. Slavuta, assembled all the engine-drivers. They ar- rived tired out, black from the dirt and dust that had gathered on them and which, probably, it would be impossible for them to iwash off for several days. Mr. Slavuta told them of the impending hard work: "Gentlemen, orders have come to retreat. At the station there are many of our wounded brethren who shed their blood for our beloved countr}^, many materials of all kinds, which we caimot leave behind. All this must be removed before morn- ing, for to-morrow this station will be in the hands of the enemy. We will have to send out trains every two or three minutes. The way of the retreat is through tlie enemy's fire, which many of you have witnessed. This means that we will have to move in dark- ness. A difficult and responsible task is before you. Remember THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 85 that should a collision take place, our game would be lost. The traffic will be stopped, and then our wounded brothers and all the materiel so indispensable to us, will fall into the hands of the enem}^, the entire order of the retreat will be upset/' And the engineers answered him, all as one man, that they understood fully the responsibility resting upon them and that^they would do their utmost to avoid accidents. The trains, filled with wounded, started one after the other, each consisting of from forty to fifty cars. The engineers were forced to strain their eyes untO' pain, leaning with the entire body out of the caboose, to be able to distinguish something in the dark and to avoid collision with the train going in front of them. To- wards morning everything was successfully hauled away. The last train left Mukden at 6 o'clock in the morning. It was neces- sary to leave at Mukden several hundreds of seriously wounded soldiers. The sight presented by the evacuation of Mulvden was awful. An immense conflagration — the Intend ancy stores, tlie supplies of ghiaolan, wood, and timber were burning, and millions of sparks rose into the soft, mellow night, for not a breath of wind was stirring. The air was filled with burning atoms, which, illumin- ated by the fire, seemed an enormous swarm of moving insects. Flour-bags burst from the heat and columns of the finest dust rushed into the air like some extraordinary fireworl^s. The sight was imposing, unusually beautiful, but terror-inspiring. The platform of the station and/ all the surroundings were brightly illuminated. On the platfonn a string of stretchers with the wounded was continually passing by, some of these covered up with their heads in blankets from under which heart-rending means were heard, unconscious of what was going on around them^ heedless of this fearful light or of the darkness of night, for to them everything was dark from unbearable pain. Among the stretchers men were hurrying to the depot, some carrying valises, some ordinary bundles; each and every one wanting to take along 86 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. as much of his property as was possible. But they were met with disappointment at the station, for they were lucky if they found room for themselves on the train. Further, near the store, where the presents sent to the men from Eussia for the holidays were kept, soldiers were busy chosing various articles. Some of them took off their old felt boots to replace them by new ones, others changed their linen in the cold. All this was lit up by a gigantic conflagration. Further still a merchant^, retreating with the troops, unable to take along all his goods, was distributing them among the sol- diers in order that they should not fall into the hands of the enemy. A crowed of men surrounded his store. Upon receiving their presents, the recipients walked rapidly away, some carrying a bottle of brandy or of rum which the merchant had hoped to sell to the oiScers for a big price. Some of them opened the bottles on the way and drank as they w^alked. The gigantic bonfire was illuminating the scene. G-reaii bustling reigned at the station. Everyone tried to get into the nearest train, fearing to be left behind. None thought any more of his belongings^ being anxious only about himself. The platform was covered with various articles brought there to be sent away, but left on account of lack of room. Stretchers were coming up continually and were carefully transported into the cars. Somewhat aside a railway employee was standing in front of the house he had been occupying for years, w^here he had so lovingly made his home and with which he was loath to part. One after the othier the trains departed in long unbroken lines to the north. The last train was ready to start. The medical personnel remaining at Mukden assembled for the purpose of seeing off the last defenders of the former Eussian possession, which may the Lord allow us to* have lost but temporarily. The train moved, the last, good-byes of the travelers were heard, when a deafening report sounded — a salute to this last train. The ammunition- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 87 chests had exploded. Other reports were heard in the distaii c-o, reports that were silent during the night, but with the morning began again their dire work. Two nations were destroying each other for the possession of tliese already ruined points. Which of them will be called to remove the traces of destruction and implant new civilization? At the sound of the roar of artillery the last train, filled to bursting with wounded and unscathed soldiers, moved away from Mukden. The railway employees sat cloise to each other on the roofs of the cars, being the last ones toi leave Mukden, where they were the j&rst pioneers of civilization, l^hey were sorrowful, pained and ashamed to abandon and leave to other hands the work they had begun with so much love. An immense torch was lighting their way of retreat. The pale tints of dawn were already struggling with the red glow of this torch that was consuming tlie millions painfully earned by the Eussian people through the sweat of the brow. Cpiapter XIY. MILITAEY CEXSOESHIP. Tlie military censorshiiD is eoncentrated in Ihe' Staff of the Comniander-iru-cMef ; tliere are censor sections in the separate armies^ so that all the telegraphic information of the Russian and all the articles of the foreign correspondents^, without any excep- tion whatever, are authorized by the censor attached to the Commander-in-chief. Thus every telegraphic information sent from any of the telegraph stations at the advanced posts, before being forwarded to its destination, must go to the censor and then again back to the telegraph station to be for^varded to the addres- see. Such procedure hampers and postpones the timely forward- ing of correspondence. Only correspondence from Kharbin is authorized by the censorship established in the Staff of the Chief of the Eear. The censorship in the Staff of the Commander-ni- chief is entrusted to Colonel E. F, Pestich, of the Genearl Staff. 1 can say nothing but what is commendable about this officer, pos- sessing tact to the highest degree and imbued with the sentiment of his duty. Personally he considers the press from a much broader and more equitable point of view than his chiefs — ;the Staff of the Commander-in-chief with General Sakharoff at its head, a man looking upon the press as an inevitable evil, which has to be suffered in the Army only on account of the aberrate opin- ion as to the- usefulness of the press having taken root so firmly. General Sakharoff thinks that the correspondents are present on the theater of military operations only for the purpose of spying and denouncing everything that takes place in the Army; for this reason, according to his opinion, the correspondents must be treat- er with the utmost severity, and Colonel Pestich, consequently, could not but submit to the views of his immediate chief and was THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. §9 often placed in the luoct pamfui position. Tlie opinion of tlic Commander-in-chief was opposed to that of his chief of Staff, bnt, being continually busy, he was rarely accessible to the censors, and thus the point of viewt of the chief of Staff predominafed. Gen- eral Sakharoff did not wish to understand that the public desired and had a right to be acquainted with the course of affairs going on at the theater of war, that it is interested in each movement, even the most insignificant one of our armies, and that it must know the positive as well as the negative sides of the organization of all the military establishments and all those belonging to them. There, far away from their native countr}^, die thousands of men, not strangers ; there flows the blood of that same^ Kussian public, of its children, its brothers; on its means the very war is being waged — ^how should it not have the right to know^ what is happen- ing to those that are near to it and how its means are being ex- pended ? The chief of Staff forgot that the Eussian public could not, by his short and matter-of-fact informations, have the slight- est idea of the course of the war and. the condition of our Army, and that the press alone formed by its correspondents the only link between the public and all those that were engaged in the war. These correspondents alone informed the Eussian people how bravely fought and died for the honor and glory of Eussia their fathers, sons and brothers, under what conditions they lived and what they needed. It is true that not all the correspondents were at the height of their calling with regard to unpreiudiced representation of the events. Many had a strong tendency to show everything in a negative light, perhaps on account of the inclination, extant among the Eussian intellectual class, to self-condemnation. I recall a conversation I had with one of the correspondents : "Why,'' asked I, "don't you mention this fact?" "You see, I belong to the liberal part}-, and this is why I can not mention this fact so as not to awal^:en an optimistic sentiment in the public; as to yourself, it is quite different; you can doi it.'' 90 'J^-SE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ^T bog your pardon/^, I began with indignaition ; ^^do you mmn to say that if I mention a positive fact, which will bring joy to the Eussian people^ whose relatives and loved ones are here shedding their blood, I testify to my being a retrograde ? To tell the truth, is this to be a retrograde ? I deem it my duty to men- tion side by side with the negative faots — the suppression of which, according to my opinion, is likewise a crime^ — the positive 'ones. By this I do not by any means narrow my views as a free thinl^er/^ The position of a correspondent is not easy during war. Tne various institutions and persons take care of everybody, install everybody, but no one has thought of rendering the difficult task of the correspondents less heav}-. jS^ot mentioning the fact that tJie correspondent often does not know where to rest his head, as all available buildings are taken for military and other institu- tions; that he often does not know with what to appease his hunger — ^he never meets anyone aspiring to acquaint him with the true condition of affairs. What reproaches are heaped upon the correspondent for each inexact comm,unication ! But has any- one assisted him to verify the information received by him from without. I had recourse to the Commander-in-chief, asking him to establish a bureau where tlie correspondents could verify their informations. I was promised that such a bureau would be in- stituted, but there it ended. ISTot a few are the privations falling to the share of the correspondent during the pursuit of his voca- tion. I do not know why the public is under the impression that the correspondents are being courted. I will mention an incident which happened to me and wliich does not speak in favor of this belief. I came once to the staff of one of the armies (I shall not say which) ; it was night and the cold was 15 degrees below zero. As I naturally do not like higher chiefs, I laid before the chief of etapes my request for the assignment of some kind of shelter for the night, but he refused. I was obliged to have recourse to higher authorities. I foiuxd one general. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 91 "Please, find me some place for the night; it is cold out doors, my horse is tired, and, as it is so late, I can hardly get to another place/' "I have no room for you; some three versts from here is a fanza, where, maybe, you might find shelter," answered the general. "It will be difiicult for me to find this fanza alone in the dark; moreover, the eentinels may take me for a spy," I tried as a last argument. "Well, you may act as you please." I accidentally met an officer of my acquaintance, who iavited me to the dining-room to talve tea. I rejoiced, and we had already begun drinking our tea, when my friend was suddenly called aside. He was reprimanded for his invitation, and I found mvself again outdoors. That 's what it means to be a war correspondent ! ^Yhere was the vaunted Russian hospitality ? At any rate, could these people be called Russians ? I hasten to add that such cases are comparatively rare. I am sure that had the commander of the Army, whose Staif has received me with &o much cordiality, heard of this incident, knowing him to be: one of the most hospitable of men, he would surely not have praised his subordinates. In addition to privations, the sojourn of a correspondent at the seat of war is subjected to maaiy limitations. The permit to be present at the theater of war in general is given by the chief of Staff of the Commaiider-in-chief, in spite of which, whenever the correspondent desires to go to a certain army, he is obliged to get another permit for the sojourn in that pai^ticular army. Such a permit is likewise issued from the Staff of the Commander-in- chief. But, notwithstanding this, another permit has to be re- ceived from the Stafi: of the given army for the sojourn in one of its component parts (corps) ; in the Staff of that corps it isi nec- essary to obtain a third permit to be able to be present in one of its smaller units, and so forth ; one permit after another has to be issued indefinitely. How much time is spent uselessly to obtain 92 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. these permits! Each time the coTrespondent wished to go to an- other ariny, he must go to the headquarters for a new permit. Would it not be simpler to give, instead of all these permits, one general permit to visit all the annies ? and, should this be indis- pensable, the other permits might be issued, on the strength of the general one, for the sojourn in their component units. Should one keep strictly to the rules and regulations issued for military censorship and the guidance of the war correspond- ents, it v/ould be literally impossible to write about anything else but the weather, and tliis with caution, so that the enemy should not know^ if our soldiers suffer from the heat or the cold. There remains but one thing to he done — ^to repeat the telegrams- sent by the Commander-in-chief to the Emperor or to the? General Staff. These telegrams, since they are on the tapis, become loiown to the Army only through the telegrams of the St. Petersburg telegraph agencies. Let me ask, Whj are war correspondents wanted on the theater of military operation under such condi- tions? It is understood that it is impossible to conform to all these regulations^, and the censors must, nolens volens, deviate from them according to circumstances; but then, what sense is there in their issuing? Why should the censors be uselessly placed in an embarrassing position? The authorities issuing these reg- ulations limit themselves, as they always do, to issuing them, while the execution rests entirely upon the subordinates, and if, should the necessity arise, these subordinates are; forced to partly ignore them, all the responsibility rests on their shoulders : should any misunderstanding arise, they alone will answer. In additdon to censorship at the seat of war, there exists another — at St. Petersburg, in the General Staff — which, so to say, verifies the former and without 'this second censure no correspond- ence can be printed. It seems to me that, once the persons are ,on the spot where the events are taking place, they ought to know Avhat may and what may not be allowed to ^appear in the organs of the press; it! seems to me that one niilitary censure Isi suffi- TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 93 dent; but no, it is being controlled and corrected by other per- sons, some 10,000 versts distant on the other side of the globe, little acquainted witli the condition of affairs, ignorant of the po'sitive as well as of the? negative sides of the local military life. Is there any sense in such a control and is it not absolutely irrelevant ? Moreover, distrust seems to be one of the typical traits of our bureaucratic organization. Eacli of oui^ institutions is sub- ordinate to another controlling it. The public distrusts the bureaucracy, while the bureaucracy distrusts the public and itself. (This distrust is the only reason for the lack of truly useful work- ers in the arena of social and political life. Distrust alone is an- swerable for the fact that we lack talented men of our own. Is it possible to admit that in a nation counting 150,000,000 men there should be no distinguished ones ? They exist, but the general distrust hinders them from displaying their innate and acquired capabilities. I often could not recognize my telegrams, and yet each word, (each expression had been strictly weighed and discussed by the jlocal censorship, and sometimes in serious conversation with the Commander-in-chief. At the heojd of the censorship is at pres- ent General Polivanoff, appointed as assistant to the chief of the Greneral Staff, formerly the editor of the Russhi Invalid and the Yoyenniy ShorniJc. During his editorship these organs t)ecanie unrecognizable. It was interesting to read them, while formerly they served only to make known the orders and regulations of the military authorities. I believe tliat at present, when there is at the head of the censorship a man who, in addition to his other qual- ities necessary toi a sitatesman, understands fully the im^portance of the printed word, and wlieni the new Commander-in-chief has a high opinion of the importance of the press and his Staff con- curs in this opinion — the censorship of military correspondence will be established on other, more rational principles. Chapter XV. THE EEAE OF THE AEMY. There were three rears on the theater of war before the evac- uation of Mnkden: the closest one at Mukden, a more distant one at Telin, and the tfarthest at Kliarbin. Mukden was the center of all the establishments of the adtive armies. The Intendancy, the Control, the Exchequer, the Bureau of Military Communications, the lazarets, and so forth. Mukden as a big Chinese city, supplied the troops ^^dth various provisions. The station of Mukden was the terminus and the principal sta- tion of the, rail way line. At that station were various stores of provisions, ammunition, and other articles. No women were allowed at Mukden except the Sisters of Mercy and the "mar- garine Sisters.'^ A mass of various people had arrived here from tibroQfd and from Eussia as camp-followers: Caucasians, Greeks, Frenchmen, Italians from Chefoo* and Shanghai, and many Chi- nese from the Chinese and Manchu provinces. It is more than probable that there were many spies among these so-called "jack- als" of the Army. Telin was, so to say, a large intermediary etaye. Here were concentrated the bakeries, the stores of certain provisions and the hospitals. This was the hnal point in which the presence of woman was allowed, and for this reason there appeared here rest- aurants and other establishments, attracting young officers, who [used to come here for "recreation" during-* their short leaves of absence. Drunlven orgies and scandals even took place here. I must admit with regret tiiat drunkenness was in general greatly developed among the officers ; but cards, so prevalent in other wars, found no favor, and the officers sent most of their savings home. 94 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 95 The reports of the Chinese Bank and of the mail will be very in- teTesting concerning this feature. KJiarbin is our principal nucleus on the Chinese Eailway, running south to Port Arthur and east to Yladivostok. Here were concentrated the troops arriving from IJussia, the marching commands of the rank ajid file^ and the oilicers needed for the completing of the units. In general, this was the principal mil- itary eta'pe for all the J\[anchurian armies. Here were estah- iished the hospitals and lazarets for the sick and wouuded w1io could return comjD'aratively sooai to the active army. From this point were evacuated to.Eussia, after a certain period of time, the severely wounded ones and all those ^Adio needed a longer 'period for recO'very. Here took place the prejjai-ation of provis- ions, and were likeAvise concentrated the principal reserve stores. At Ivharbin was the seat of tlie administration of the entire East Chinese lia.ih\'ay^ and here AA'as a large branch of the Cliinese Bank. In addition to the military, Kharbin counted 40,000 inhabitants. To thi^s point ]iad migrated people fi'om all the localities of the world for tlie purpose of profiting in some way or other. Here were a large number of liotels, restaurants, and all kind of recreative establishments,, and a nuuierous contingent of "singers.'' Here is the realm of drunken bouts, of oi'gies and all kinds of disorders which I have no desire: to describe — in fact, would be ashamed to do so. Here is the kingdom of gossij:) and various rumors. What could not you hca.r' at J\haibin? The military and the civilians were both poss 3:-sed with the rage of telling news. .A man newly arrived from Ku^^ia is simply terror- stricken by these tales. ^'0 God^ where are we going?'' thinks he. But upon the arrival to the advanced posits these fears dis- appear^ and there arises the doubt if all these tale-bearers have ever been at the seat of war^ and if those terrible tales are not pure inventions ? All gossip : some because they are drunk and some because they have nothing to do; others, again, for tlie 2)ur- —7- gg THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. pose of fishing in troubled waters, and there are many of such in Kharbin and in general in all Manchuria. The corruption and cynicism reigning at Kharbin have no bounds. As an illustration of the cynicism and depravity, I will mention the following picture of Kharbin habits. I went once on foot with a colonel of the custom guards from the city to the station. In front of us there walked a well-dressed couple. They were follo^^^ed by two officers, probably from the reserves, and words which no censure would ever pass, fell in showers to the address of the lady. The couple increased their gait, the offi- cers did the same. At last the gentleman stopped and very cor- rectly stated to the officers: "Gentlemen, this is my wife and not a prostitute. I beg of you to deliver her from the necessity of listening to your im- proper speech/'^ To this one of the oificers pronounced the following tirade : "See here/' and there followed an unprintable Eussian word, "we have to shed our blood for you and we dare not touch your wives — " Only the interference of the colonel put a stop to the aggres- siveness of the officers, and maybe to something still more serious. In the time of peace, when the officers' corps deems one of their members unworthy to wear the uniform, they ask him to leave the Army, and he generally goes to tbe reserve. When the comi- try is in need of its best officers to lead the military operations, these officers, found unworthy during peace-time, again get into the Army. Men considered as a harmful element in time of peace again become the leaders of soldiers in time of war, when the strict observance of discipline and a good example are of the greatest importance. What may be expected of such leadership? Of course, there are exceptions, and we meet men who had suc- ceeded in reforming. I heard the following case from the lip^ of a person occupying a prominent post in the Army: "One day/' said that person, "there came to me an officer TBE TRUTH ABOUT THE Ti AB 97 at Mukden. He greets me and promises to come again. Of course, we are glad to see anyone here, but I could not recall where I had seen him and how I had made his acquaintance. At last I remembered. "I was told once," continued the narrator, "that a gentle- man wanted to see me. I received him and it came out that he was a retired officer ^without means,' and so forth. I gave him a certain sum. A few minutes later some errand brought me to my wife (I have two entrances on the same stair-landing). Wliat was my surprise when I saw in her apartment the same man with the same request for assistaiuce. It was evident that begging had become his profession.." It is not difficuH to see how much the Army would gain in time of war if it were rid forever of this element, undesirable even in time of peace. The rear in general is one of the plagues of the Army. I am not a cruel man by nature, but here I deem the most draconic measures necessary. The Chief of the Eear must be a man well known for his strictness, vested with immense power, including the right of condemning culprits to be shot without previous judgment. Chapter XVI. CAUSE OF OUR FAILURE. Now, after all the above mentioned, I will endeavor, without entering into details, to explain the causes of our failure in gen- eral and of the Mukden operations m particular. The principal cause of all our failures in the present war lies, according to my opinion, in the fact that we have but one .line of communication on thei theater of Avar — ^one pair of rails of the East Chinese Railway and a similar one pair of rails of the Siberian one, over which both the troops and the yvav male- riel has to be carried. But though we were unable to increase to the necessary dimensions the carrying capacity of. the Siberian Railwa}^, we had the possibility of building at the very seat of military operations two lines of communication for a more suc- cessful conduct of the operations, the movement of troops, the transpO'rtation of military supplies and provisions. We had ail the necessary means at hand, and only the lack of consciousness of the necessity of these two lines hindered us from taking ad- vantage of them. We could have easily built these two railway lines, one from Crundjulin, or, still better, from Kharbin, in the direction of Sinmintin along the valley of the Liaokhe River, tlie other from that same G-undjulin to Fushun, and further over a broken terrain, choosing the best system, at a distance of 25 to 35 versts from the existing railw^ay line. The construction of these branches could have been executed in a short time, as there could l-^e found on the spot a cadre of skillful technical engineer^ and the working force in the local Chinese population. Some difficulties might have arisen as to the railway materiel and the transportation of the materials would have had to take place with TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ^ 99 • A -Rni if wp take into consideration the :, l; ha.e been .ecessary-i. e. son. twenty ^s of h^.po - fuion ) Lastly, should it have been impossible to bring he :;'...« i;oiii Eu.ia, tl. ..is fi-om tlie i.a. ^o K aba roY»k might have been temporarily taken up and a mail coacli old ^ Ibed to that city. IChaharovsk .vould have suffered, bat how much would not the -'l^^axy operations have gam d Having two lines of commmiicatiou, ^mei by ra 1 with each other and with the Chinese Railway, two branches having been eln Wed-one, for example, on the parallel of Te hn and the ler on the pa.llel of Mukden-.ur Army eoum ... oa. y proceeded with all its operations. The ^^--^Vf''\''\'^^J''^^^ iiid of military supplies would have been -*f t t "l.c^nt what is still more important, we could have -f /" f ^ ^'ui .Here the necessity should arise large bodies o >-l ^ « - fatioaiin.. the soldiers. We would not have needed to be in feai S tlie toning movements of the enemy; on the con rai,, ^v. uld have made such turning movements ourselves without n.k- ■n" being cut off, for then we would have had a railwav hue m our rear carrying provisions and amimmition to our lines Om trfois always repulsed the open attacks ol the enemy ,,„a the Japanese did not have great success with them Init agams tl,e turning movements, especially those outs.de the Imuts of 1 inese ^ilway, we were absolutely defenseless, ^'^ ^';yr^^ always in our troops i-etreating. In general, we were httle capa e of maneuvering without the limits of our line « — m - eation; it looked as if we had lieen glued to the East Chnie.e Rail- way and did not even try to leave its region. Our too bulky and unwieldy train was a great impediment Lsrc 200 ^ ^^^ TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR to our facility of movemeiDt. I saw the retreat of the train to Telin, and therefore had the opportunity of observing all its di- mensions, for when it was distributed among its units, it did not catch the eye so much. Drawn out into one line, this row of yehicles with various military possessions, Avith stools, tables, barrels (I asked, "Why do you carry these barrels along?" and was answered, "Just so', we might need them, perhaps"), and other household articles, demanding large means of transporta- tion, made such an impTebsion that one doubted if it could ever get away and that one thought that should part of it fall into the hands of the enemy, we would not lose much by it. The Japanese, not desiring to abandon their booty, would carry it along with them, and then, perhaps it would be we, and not they, who would press upon the other — i. e., our roles might have been inverted. Where did all these housdiold articles come from? War is not a picinic, not a ^Mrtie de plaisir. In time of war who can think of comfort? and it is impossible to fight without privations, and even very great ones. Wlience comes this aspiration for a com- fortable life on the positions? The Eussian troops did not dis- tinguish themselves by such aspirations in former wars. Maybe it is the result of the general progress in civilization? I believe that this is not the case. The exam23le given by the higher authorities had much to do with it. To give a better idea of the luxury in which these higher authorities lived, I shall have, in spite of my desire to the contrary, to touch upon the life of the late Commander-in-chief and Viceroy m the Far East, Admiral Alexieff. Admiral Alexieif, in addition to the luxurious apartments of his house at Port Arthur, at Daln}', and, during the latter months, at Mukden, had a magnificent train consisting of Pnll- man cars with immense parlors, and dining-rooms for himself and for his entire Staff. He traveled like a Czar. Before the starting of his train anotlier was sent out for the purpose of THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. IQl ascertaining the safety and good condition of the road. Admiral Alexieff did not like to travel by night and stopped at the sta- tions; but he conld not endure the whistles of the locomotives and the movement of the trains by night was disagreeable to him. And;, so as not to trouble the rest of his Excellency, not a train was allowed to come nearer to the station than the samaphores, and all miovement was interrupted over the rails lying close to the stations. The trains with troop^s and war materiel were wait- ing, howeveT necessary they might be, no matter how feverishly they were expected on the field of battle. following the example of Admiral Alexieff, General Kuro- patkin likewise asked for sucli a train, his chief of Staff did not wish to fare worse, and in the end separate trains with Pull- man cars became the ownership of all the comananders of the armies and even of the chiefs of some establishments. It came about that thus all the passenger cars on the Chinese Railway were taken for the chiefs, while the' greater part of the officers and pas- sengers had to be transported in freight cars. Thus, while some of the officers traveled in freight cars, or the so-called '^cattle cars,^^ their comrades of the Staffs lived and traveled in parlor cars. Such difference could not have a favorable: influence upon etween the two was only a few verst.s, which could have ])een made without any dilFieuliy whatever in a carriage l)y a good mud ]"oad. But General Grippeiiberg desij'ed to travel in his train, and no assurances of the railway authorities, stating that the movements of his train, first to the main road and then again to the branch, took a great deal of time and hindered traffic, availed anything. It is well to mention here an incident whieh took place dur- ing the Franco-Prussian War. The royal train arrived at one of the stations. The chief of the station stated that if this train should be immediately aJlowed to j^rocecd, this would interfere A\ith the movement of the military trains and several days would be necessary to restore the order, but that should His Majesty re- main one day at this station, no ham]:>ering of the movement of trains would ensue. And the King remained at the station. I THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ^q^ Mill sure that^ should a case like this take place with oui^ Euler, he would have acted like the King; but the question is, Would any- one have dared to state the matter to him ? Should a case like this be placed before an}- of our generals^ the chief of the station would have received no end of abuse and heard the well-known "I will place you under arrest." The movements of the trains would, of course, have been stopped. And such cases took jilace more than once. The cleaning of refuse from such trains cost about 50,000 roubles a month to the administration of the rilway. During the present war the entire camp service is discharged by soldiers: that of the Japanese, by coolies. I think that we loo might have hired help for this purpose. This would cost a little more, but we would have many more bayoneiis. The non- combatant contingent of our armies, in general, is very large, about 30 per cent, and no selection is made, so that often a young, mag- nificent soldier becomes a non^comWant, while a grizzly Ixarded reservist goes to the ranks. 'J'hcre arc in our Army, as I was told, some 40,000 officers' servants for some 11,000 or 1-3,000 oliicers— /. c, more than 3 men per officer on an average. In most eases tliese are the best soldiers, because [he oiTicers choose tlie most in- telligent and skillful among tliem as strikers. Of course, tlic officers cannoi be left witliout servants, but tlieir number might l)o limited to, let us say, 2 per officer on an average. This would give s(ack to the I'olors. This would have added several more thousands of fight- ing units, and (who knows?) the results might have been different at Liaoyang and ^.Tukden if we had had these surplus bayonets. -^Q^ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. Little attention is paid in our Army, in general, to employ- jng hired help for various non-military purposes. For example, the engineers of the Chinese Eailway proposed to take upon them- selves the construction of various work& to be made by local work- men; such as roads, bridges, redoubts, and so forth, which are no^v being built by isappei" battalions and other troops. The num- ber of soldiers freed would have increased the contingent of combatants. This proposal, for some reason or other, was not accepted. The cavalry contingent on the theater of war is comparatively large, but in reality it is not sufficient even for reconnaissances; this is because cavalry is mostly requisitioned for convoys. Con- voys and orderlies are necessary, but the number in our Army is far above the required normal contingent.! Who has not a coinvoy and orderlies from among the cavalry ? The Staffs of the Commander-in-chief and of the command-. ers of armies knew little about the strength, movements, and intentions of the enemj^, while the Japanese knew literally every- thing concerning us. They received information concerning our dispositions even before these were made known to the command- ers of separate units. Our spy service, though considerable sums are expended upon it, is below all criticism. ]^ot one important information did we receive througii our spies. Here, likewise, large sums were expended absolutely unnecessarily, while in some cases, where they ought to have been paid, cents were grudged (the action of Oukhach-Oronovich in regard to the Chinaman who brought news as to the turning movement of the Japanese along the Liaokhe). In general, however well our spy service is organized at home, where Ave dispose of an entire army of spies, so l:)adly did we manage it here, where it was necessary to gain victory over the enemy. N"ot a few of our spies were in Japanese service and reported to us with the knowledge of their employers, and we believed such information. It has been said that our cavalry reconnoitered badly. It THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ^05 might be so^ but here too the system of distrust, reigning every- where among us, brought a great deal of harm. The distrust witli which the information secured by the reconnoiterers was received could have Idlled all 'desire for conscientious reconnaiissance. The principal thing was that no one endeavorc-d to verify the ground of such distrust, and nothing has such a baleful influence upon the work of subordinates as the unfounded distrust of their chiefs towards them. It is true that often the reports of the reconnoitering parties, especially concerning the numbers of the enemy, were: wrong. But this could not always be ascribed to the Jack of conscientiousness of the reconnoitering squads. It was difficult to obtain accurate information under the conditions in which they had to work. The rayon of military operations was thickly inhabited by Chinese; in almost each square' verst could be found a Chinese village surrounded by clay walls. It is not easy to find out how large is the numerical force of the enemy, taking into consideration that the natives, out of fear of the Jap- anese, always said what they were ordered. I was often a witness as to the way the chiefs received re- quests for reinforcements on accouni^ of the great losses suffered. In the greater part of cases such requests were refused, the re- fusal being explained by the statement that the commanders often exaggerated the importauce of their losses. It is true that some generals were ready to ask for reinforcements even before the light had begun ; but many asked for them only in case of actual need. Rarely did anyone ascertain if suppoTt was indeed neces- sar}^ — it was simply denied. There were many cases in which, en account of reinforcements not being sent, the affair took an undesirable aspect;, as^ for example, the already described affair of tlie 1st Siberian Regiment at Tashichao (battle of Mukden). The system of distrust reigned, in general, in the entire Army. The Commander-in-chief distrusted the commanders of the armies, as otherwise it would be impossible to explain why he gave instructions in regard to tlie most insignificant move- -^QQ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ments. The commanders of the armies had no right to move a single battalion without his knowledge. The dispositions were worked out up to the moat minute details in the Staff of the Commander-in-chief; this is why no one— 1 do not speak about the chiefs of small units — not even corps commaiKlcfs, could de- velop any initiative. The microbe of distrust had contaminated the entire Army — the chiefs distrusted their subordinates, the sub- ordinates distrusted their chiefs. All executed the orders only in a juechanical way, often not knowing anythiug as to cause and pur- port; each and every one aspired only to having a document — an order— 4o exonerate himself in case ot an unsuccessful ending of his operations. Tjie narrow limits of the order allowed no one to consider the good or evil arising from its execution. General Myloff was reprimanded for having decided to attack the enemy before the arrival of the Commander-in-chief, as had been or- dered the evening before. Later on the attack was admiitted as having been made at the opportune moment, and should the gen- eral have acted against liis convictio]i, the result might have been (liferent. Distrust came to the theater of war from Russia. Every- l)ody came to the active army with all the gossip, tlie intrigues and the ])ersonal feelings of peace-time. But this baggage of contaminated and corrupt contents could not have fallen on rich soil, if the higher authorities had shown in tb.eir relations to their su])ordinates tlie example of sincerity and trust. ^'All say that we have no generals." '•Where do you take this from?" I asked. "Well, has any of otir generals shown any capacity?'^ is the ordinary answer. "But, please, when and where liad they the possibility of showing their capacity ?'" "What is it you are saying? We are fighting one year and a half.^^ "xill this looks so to you, because you are here; but go to TBE TRVTH ABOUT THE WAR. 107 the front and you will see that our generals so far-I do not mention the chiefs of small units-even the corps eoir.n,anders, (had not until now the possibility of displaying any rndependerrce, taking anv initiativ-e. I say 'so far," hecau^e I think that with the new commander matters will be different." The system of General Kuropatkin-that of deciding upon everything himself, did not give his subordinate generals any possibility to act independcBtly and according to their own mi- totive. The generals Tserpitski, Myloff. Zarubayefl Misdrenko Rennenkampf. Ivanofi, Baniloffl, Kondratovich, Martynoff, and many others are all men possessing talent, energy^ and imtiaive. Let us -take General Mischenko as an example. Was it his place to be the chief of a cavalry, detachment? He is an artilleryman ,,nd would have made an excellent corps commander, even an army commander, to whom important independent operations might ha.e been entrusted, all initiative being left to him ^es^ we have men and many of them, but our system does no allow them to put out their heads further than .vhat ^^V^nMae- cordin. to formality. Have we fe^v talented colonels m the Staff. ,„d wWh the colors? I can name some ten of the most capable who might have commanded brigades and divisions Bu they are young, we are told, and have not the requisite grade. Therein lies the whole thing; we keep to the form, without paying any attention to the value. According to my opinion, if a colonel is eapable of commanding a corps, give him that corps ; if a talented captain may be a regimental commander, give him that regiment. It will be said to me : "What are their seniors to do':'" "If those seniors are incapable, untalented, let them go and rest. Military service is not a charitable institution; armies a re necessary for battles, and not for parades. Those who dub the officers of the General Staff as "do-littles arc wrong; they are wrong because not a few of them take part m . nil figVts, command separate units, and many of them have been jQQ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. Avounded and killed in the field. It is true that the General Staff has occupied all the posts, even such where the special knowledge acquired at the Academy of the General Staff is not necessar}^: the evacuation of the wounded, the management of tlie trains, the loading of the projectiles, the entraining of the troops, the administrative posts of the coinmissaries, all positions which could be occupied, with better success perhaps, by people ^vithoat any military training. Even the chief of train of the Commander-in-chief, a post which might have been given to a lieutenant of the reserve, was occupied by a lieutenant-colonel of the General Staff. This took place when there was a lack of officers of the General Staff for purely military purposes, as, for example, the officers of the General Staff' would have been far more useful and in tlieir place in reconnoitering service. In gen- eral, in the present war the entire management of all branches of the service was in the hands of officers of the General Staff, a,nd for this reason they are responsible for all the results. The character of the Commander-in-chief was clearly shown in all his actions. His irresolution, going hand in hand with ab- solutism and the distaste of listening to good advice, accommo- dated itself to the system adopted by him, that of passive resist- ance and the weakening of the enemy during the retreat. But this sj^stem was not approved of either by Eussia or by the Army, and with each new retreat discontent grew, this discontent forcing Ivuropiatkin to desist from the plan adopted by him and corresponding best to his character — and he suffered a fiasco. When the Army was entrusted to a man, it was wrong to ignore Siis character, which could not be altered according to desire. For this reason he ought not to have been interfered with. If later on it was admitted that his system could not bring about the desired ]'esults, it would have been necessary to replace him by some other man. But, leaving him at his post, it was wrong to make him deviate from the plan he had elaborated beforehand. General Kuropatkin is not an old man, is very hardwork- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. IQQ ing, and distinguishes himself by great activity^, while in real- ity the scope of the Commander-in-chief is rather limited, as it consists, mainl}^, in general management, in direotion without any active part in the real command of the troops. Such activ- ity did not satisfy the lively natnre of General Kuropatkin and he went beyond these limits, sometimes leading independent oper- ations in person. Such meddling, if the word may be used, in the affairs entering into the exclusive competency of the Army commanders, had its very negative sides; moreover, it deflected the attention of the Commander-in-chief from giving instruc- tions as to the general command. The command of an independent army, consisting in the direct management of the troops, is better suited to the charac- ter of tlie former Commander-in-chief. As soon as there arose indications as to the concentration of large hostile forces, accompanied by little information, the sen- sitive Commander-in-chief became nervous and shifted his troops without any real necessity. I have already observed how much hann arose from such mixing up, (the frequent occurrence of which only increased the evil and often influenced unfavorably the course oil the battles. The chiefs, in such eases, commanded troops which they did not know — the peculiar capacities, the endurance, the character of these strange units were unknown to them. This undermined the compactness, the integrity, the wholeness of the Army, which in all armies is obtained with so much difficulty. Grippenberg's departure and rumors as td his return were ex- plained by distrust felt in SU Petersburg towards General Kuro- patkin and to the system of constant retreat adopted by him. This undermined greatly the prestige of the Commander-in-chief at the time when on the theater of war arose the most critical, most serious moments, in which the faith in the higher commander ought to be strongest. It seem? to me that tlie enemy could not have chosen a better time to give us a decisive blow, The Japan- j^jQ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ese are excellent psychologists ; they understood well the feeling of our Army, its distrust of the Ccmmander-in-cliief, and^ as it may be seen, weighed all this before deciding upon their risky opera- tions near Mukden. Technique, so far as application of various technical means is concerned, stands lower in our Army than in the Japanese. They make use of all the modern improvements for the organiza- tion of the defense as well as of the attack. Tlic principal thing is their having a great nam]>cr of machine guns. They had appreciated already hefoi'c the war the value of this dreadful weapon. There is no doubt that machine guns play an ini port- ant role, especially in the defense — one machine gun l)eing equal to a company of soldiers. AV'e did not give due attention to tliis deadly arm in the beginning of the war. Even later on, after luniiig experieuced on ourselves all its iuiportance, we did not iiitjoduce it energetically enough into our Army; uji to this time the number of machine guns is much smaller in our Army tlian n\ that of the enemy. I have already described in tlie begiiming how our troops were brought from Russia to the theater of war, and how, on the road, on account of the imperfect organization of the trans- portation of troops, the discipline of the men was not at the necessary height. Why should not. these troops have been formed, while still in Russia, before their sending off, into temporary units (companies, for example), with non-commissioned officers and offi- cers in active service, though tliese might be in numbens below the normal status (they migiit return after having' taken the men to their respective detachments). Before their sending of! to the seat of war these temporary units might undergo military training for a week or two, go over the military regulations a.nd get acquainted with the new^ arms (there were such who, imme- diately upon their arrival, went into iDattle without having learnt how to handle our new rapid-fire rifle), restore their already, for- gotten military spirit, remind them of their soldiers' profession THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. m and of the difficult task lying befoTe tliem upon their reaching their destination. On the road military drill could likewise take place during the halts, a thing which would greatly benefit the men passing long hours without moving in the close atmosphere of the cars. Under such conditions no disorders would arise, no slackening of discipline, the troops would reach their destina- tion fully prepared for their difficult duties, and, what is most important, the contaminating microbe of insubordination and violation of discipline would ]iot have penetrated to the seat of war. The older the soldier, the more disaccustomed has he grown to military work, tlie less he is acquainted with the new regula- tions and the new arms, and, what is the most important, the less mobile he is. In wars like the present, waged far from the mother country, the sending of older reserve soldiers ought to be avoided, as long, of course, as there is no actual need to do so ; it must be limited to the younger men. It seems to me that in the actual war Russia was not forced to mobilize her entire reserve, and it would have been more to the point to mobilize all the districts instead of only certain ones, and to call to the colors only the youngest reservists. In that way, not only would the troops have been formed of the best material, but justice would have been main- tained Avith regard to the population, for under those conditions all Eussia would have paid her tribute to the war, as far as the taking part of her population is concerned, while under the sys- tem adopted some districts gave their entire forces and others gave almost nothing at all. There is one more cause of enmity between the officers of the Staif and those serving with the colors. The Staff officers easily obtain all kinds of decorations, while those serving in the line are rewarded for^actual bravery with great difficulty. The Stalf officers all have decorations, while among the officers of the line there are not a few wounded ones who have returned to their reg- iments even without the so-called ^"'cranberry" (Anna decoration 112 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. K>1 the fourth class). I remember how^ bel'orel the departure of General Kuroptakin, all the officers of the Staff rushed to get decorations. Several hundreds were distributed. It was dis- 'agreeable to listen to their disputes as to whO' was entitled to which particular decoration. All^ even those who, as we say, ^liadn^t smelt powder/' wanted orders with the swords for brav- er}^ It is very peculiar that not one of these intrepid Staff offi- cers had been wounded throughout the entire campaign. I am again referring to the Mukden operaitions. According to my opinion, as I have already stated, our failure at Mukden must be attributed, principally, to the circumstance that the Second Army passed two days in inactivity, giving the Japanese the opportunity to (concentrate their forces. It is very probable that thanks 'to this circumstance the enemy decided to transfer 'his principal operations and strike a decisive blow against our right flank, ignoring our remaining positions. As far as I know, this delay in the operations can not be laid at the door of the Commander-in-chief, for in the beginning of the Mukden affair, •temembering the still fresh incident with General Grippenberg, he limited himself to giving general directions. Later on, see- ing our failure, he again took the active direction into his hands. Here again we recognize General Kuropatkin's character. If he considered his system as the best adapted to the existing circum- stances, he ought not to have been confused by any reception given in St. Petersburg to any general, be he friend or foe, and sc much the more at such a critical moment, when the change of a system which had reigned throughout the entire campaign, could evolve only negative results. The final success of the Japanese at Mukden was not due Ito the fighting or numerical superiority of their army, or their yfekillful plan of operations, but to their knowledge of our Com- mander-in-chiefs psychology. They had studied carefully his plan of campajign, the character of his operations, his mode of fighting and made allowances for his state of mind alt the time TEE TRUTE ABOUT TEE ^VAR. H^ Ibeing. If we carefully consideT the Japanese operations at Muk- den, we can not find a single factor of a signal victory gained by fighting. In reality they could not, in spite of 'their technical and numerical superiority, take a single one of our more important positions near Mukden. 'Not a single remarkable movement can likewise be designated. They had but one important advantage on their side — ease of movement. Thus their understanding of the Commander-in-chief'''s psychology was the principal cause of their success. It allowed them to strike a decisive blow, sure of its success, in spite of the risky maneuvers and operations. It was they who led us, who forced us to do what they wanted. We obeyed their initiative as if hypnotized. Follow closely the Muk- den fights. The Japanese concentrated their forces at a certain point, or made believe that they concentrated them. Instead of endeavoring to make a counter-maneuver, we rushed towards them and shifted our troops from one front to the other. The Japanese changed the direction of their movements — wo followed them. All their efi^orts under Mukden to win by desperate at- tacks broke against our stubborn opposition. Meeting Avith fail- ure in affairs where skill does not play a prominent role, where true courage and steadfastness are the winning elements, the Japanese moved on towards the north and dragged us along after themi. If we had attacked his positions at the time when the enemy was extending his front, seemingly endeavoring to turn us, but in reality enticing us after him, it is possible that we might have' succeeded in breaking through his lines and frustrating all his plans by a skillful maneuver, forcing him to take up another position than the one that was advantageous to him. When we had extended our front to such a degree that we could no more follow the enemy^s movements, the Commander-in-chief decided to retreat— t. e., to escape from under the influence of the enemy at the time when the success of the Japanese was coming to an end. I derive it from the fact that during the retreat our posi- tion near Mukden was dangerous. A narrow passageway was H^^ THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. formed, fired at by the enemy from east and west. Our troops retreated by this passage, with tlie exception of General Linevich's army, which was retreating independently of the other troops. Both flanks of the enemy advanced some 10 versts more to the north than onr rear guard. This rear guard, under command of Greneral Myloff, was very insignificant, consisting in all of somd 25 battalions with. limited contingents, each numbering not over 500 men. The Japanese could easily lia^e achieved a junction at any point, and thus cut off our way of retreat, destroying our rear guard. How did it result? This handful of intrepid men, as compared to the forces of the enemy, skillfully commanded, surrounded in reality, keeps off the entire Japanese Army, and we succeed in calmly marching off with our troop.-, our train, and our artillery. Some 35 to 40 guns, and part of the train, which fell into the hands of the enemy, were abandoned by us through carelessness and negligence. Here, again, the Japanese did not take advantage of their victory to Tout us entirely and place us in the necessity to end the war on conditions dictated by them. This time, again, they allowed our Army to escape, giving it the opportunity to grow strong anew and become, as heretofore, capa- ble of fighting, their losses being not less than ours, Avhile the iiisoTganization and fatigue of their troops were so great that they had become incapable of pursuing further their victorious ad- vance. Where do you see, let me ask, the skill and remarkable tactics of the Japanese military commanders? I am confident that had we been in the place of the Japanese — i. e.^ w^ere our roles inverted in the Mukden afi'air, nothing would have remained from the Japanese Army, in spite of all our shoi^tcomings. Generally speaking, I failed to notice these marvels, these wonderful qualities of the Japanese, about which such legendary tales were being spread. They are fables, disseminated by those to whom they were needed, wdiile we took them up blindly and repeated them like parrots. We were told of the astounding bravery of the Japanese; that neither their oflicers nor their sol- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 115 diers knew what retreat was; that they shot themselves or per- formed the liamkiri rather than to allow themselves to be taken prisoners, and when captured they smashed their heads against the walls. I have seen nothing of the kind. It may be that some intellectually abnormal or over-enthusiastic officer kas taken his life, but this is an exceptional fact, which was likewise observed in our Army. There were likewise some among us who sent bul- lets through their brains when left wounded on the field of battle, not desiring to fall into the hands of the enemy. But I myself was a witness how Japanese officers, I do not mention the soldiers, fell on their laiees and raised their hands, begging for mercy. I saw their flights, saw how their troops met the fleeing with fire so as to keep them from retreating, and how, in spite of this, they were unable to arrest their flight. We were also told that the Japanese had excellent topographical mape, far superior to ours. This was not so. They had got possession of our maps, made Japanese inscriptions above the Eassian ones, and photographed them. These were the maps they used. I do not wish to dimin- ish their good qualities. The Japanese Army presents a compact, united whole, animated by a common spirit; the Japanese are stubborn, and intrepid lighters, but they are men like others. ■There is nothing superhuman in them, nothing of what has been sung in their praise. As 1 have already said, they are penetrated with the consciousness and understanding of the purpose of the war. These qualities were lacking in our troops. But has any one taken the trouble of explaining to them the importance of the present war to our country, and what benefit would be derived from its victorious ending? They were only told to "go and shed their blood for the Czar and the country.'^ It is true that this is beautiful, this means already a great deal. But in the present century, when, in spite of the low intellectual standard of the people, the lower classes begin to consider the present conditions critically, this is not yet all that is necessary for conscious in- spiration, indispensable to gain victory over the enemy, especially -j^-^g THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. an enemy like the Japanese, possessing more perfect military technique. Even now, after our defeat at Mukden, when the continuance of war until its victorious ending has become still more necessary to us, when the aim has grown more clearly de- fined, no one deems it necessary to explain all this to the troops, to tell them what they are shedding their blood for, what that victory is needed for. Tell them, lastly, that this victory is needed by us to re-establish our prestige as a great, powerful nation, to maintain our territory in the Far Easit and guard it from the /encroachment of the Japanese, who after having gained a strong l/ foothold in Korea and Manchuria, may take it from us when- ever they please, and becoming, in case of our defeat, absolutely invulnerable as far as we were concerned. Last of all, it is impos- sible to throw to the winds hundreds of millions of the nation^s savings, expended for the construction of the railways and the creation of cities in Manchuria. The liussian people will die, but will never surrender their Saratoff, Tamboff, Tomsk, or Irk- utsk. Why should Kharbin, created lilvc these with our flesh and blood, be less dear to us? Tell them all this, and you will see that they will be: penetrated with the consciouis understanding of the aim and its attaimnent, and that they will lead us to vic- tory like their fathers and grandfathers. And then the soul of the man, loving Eussia and the Russians, will not be racked by the pitying words pronounced by our friends for our consolation, so to say. These paroles de condoUance are far worse than the laughter of malicious joy that is heard in the camp of our ene- mies at each of our failures. I have frequently heard the opinion that d(ifeat would make us wise and force us to correct all the mistakes of our life, after which the economical conditions of Russia woaild soon improve and we would soon replace the losses suffered through this unfor- tunate war. France after the disaster of 1870 is pointed out as an example. But it seems to me that, in order to develop econom- ically, it is necessary to be politacally strong, it is needful to be TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 117 able to parry the, blows coming from without, for there is not a nation in existence that would be sincerely glad of our prog- ress, with the execption, maybe, of the Slavs. All are in fear of our power, and, everyone understands that economical progress would only increase our strength and would render us uncon- querable indeed. Therefore, as soon as our economic progress will begin to give young, healthy shoots, liable to grow into a magnificent plant, our enemies, taking advantage of our polit- ical weakness, will again striker a blow against us^ destroying the results of our dawning prosperity, and we will again return to I he former condition, remaining some ten years behind universal culture. Our victory over the Japanese would reestablish our pres- tige and give us back the respect and glamor we have lost. The France of 1870 can not serve as an example to us. The condi- tions were different; her downfall and the rise of Germany was of no interest to anybody, and this paralyzed the desire of Ger- many, who some ten years later was again desirous of striking a still more forceful blow, fearing her economic progress. Our conditions are not the same.- There is no country to whom our progress might be useful. No one will take our part; everyone, on the contrary, will endeavor to weaken our strength and power. All our hope is centered in ourselves, and if there i^ any one smil- ing at us, it is only for the purpose of deriving some direct or in- direct profit. We must conquer, and we can conquer if we get pene- trated with the consciousness of our vietory^s necessity, and if we succeed in inspiring our troops with this consciousness. It is said that it is necessary to make peace. Very well, let us consider the demands of Japan as the conqueror : (1) The evacuation of the whole of Manchuria; (2) The cession of Sakhalin; (3) The disarmament of Vladivostok and the condition of having no fleet a,t this point; (4) Political power over Korea; (5) The keeping of Port Arthur; (6) An indemnity of, let us say, 1,000,000,000 roubles. ^-j^g THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. We would thus lose our railway as far as V^ladivostok, and we would) have to build another branch from Sretensk to Vladi- vostok and again expend over 250,000,000 roubles. Our supremacy in the Pacific Ocean would be brought down to zero, and our distant boundary would be left to fate and to Japan. The pay- ment of 1,000,000,000 roubles would be the equivalent of a bur- den of 100,000,000 roubles l^eing placed on our budget, at a time when they are most needed for the development of culture, and there are no two opinions as to its being necessary. And all this independently of the cession of Sakhalin^ the humiliation of national dignity and self-love from the: loss of prestige and of hun- dreds of millions expended on the construction of the- Chinese Eailway and cities. 'No, you may sa}' what you wish, but I do not believe that a true citizen of the Eussian Empire would consent at present to all this when far from all the resources have been exhausted for the turning of the war into a new phase more favorable to us. I might understand the following compromise: Let Japan govern Korea de facto j let us withdraw our troops from Man- churia, keeping the concession of the railway; let the Japanese have even Port Arthur and the Chinese Eailway have Dalny as its terminus. But Japan, intoxicated with her triumphs, would not accept even such conditions. I am more than convinced that should the Zemski Sober (or whatever that assembly might be named) be convened to-morrow, it would surely resolve to continue the war straining all efforts to do so. Chapter XVII. THE FIEING. A mass of projectiles and bullets are fired uselessly by the artillery and the infantry, and therefore after each big battle the j\rn]y remains without any kind of ammunition. The same may be noticed among the Japanese. They shoot often without any reason and without need. It is said that the artillery causes great losses. Frankly speaking, I did not notice this in the ^lukden fights. It is true that I could see only the efi'ecc of the Japanese artillery. I do not know^ how ours worked; I know only that the Japanese guns caused very insignificant losses to us. I do not believe that more than 2 per cent of all losses in killed and wounded fell to the share of the artillery. It is true that many and frequent shots were fired, and everywhere the roar of the artillery was heard, everyhere flew shrapnel and s himosas, but they were all fired mto space, without causing any damage. In Manchuria, on broken terrain, covered with many hills, the artillery fires from behind these heights. The area of the hill in rear of which it is supposed that the artillety has taken up its position being small, it is not difficult to shower projectiles upon it and reach the artillery. It is easier to observe here the effect of the projectiles. Even here it is not always possible to determine in rear of which hill the artillery is posted. But in a plain like that, for example, wliere Mukden is situated, where the villages are close to each other and surrounded by clay walls and planted with trees, nothing can be seen at a distaaice of two hun- dred sajens. Yet there are many gullies and folds in the ground from which artillery can operate remaining absolutely invisible 119 120 TEE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. to the enemy. Try to find it; it is impossible to shower pro- jectiles over*an area of several scores of square; miles. The artillery, in general, adapted itself very rapidly to the technique of ar^tilkry combat and quickly grew used to the char- 'acter of the locality, taking advantage of its topogTa;phical feat- ures. The Japanese artillery, as far as the guns are concerned, is inferior to ours. Our field gun can fire 8 shots per minute, while the Japanese can fire only from 4 to 5 shots. But they manage better than we do all-around fire over a certain area which is the only effective one. They maintain their batteries in better touch and often several batteries of various units operate in joint action against the same area. Our artillery Imows nothing of such joint action. Our artillery has one general projectile — the shrapnel, which explodes, according to desire, either at a certain distance or by concussion. The Japanese have a system of loading in wliich the cartridge is separate frojn the projectile, and this decreases thi' rapidity of their fire. They have two kinds of projectiles: shrap- nel, bursting at a determined distance, and the shimosas (gren- ades), bursting by concussion. There is no doubt that there is greater al vantage in having only one kind of projectiles — there being no confusion, met with when firing with two different kinds, because it may often happen that when it would be nec- essary to fire shrapnel, grenades are at hand, and vice versa. This was often noticed in the Japanese Army. However, in the pres- ent war, in which Ihe numerous Chinese villages, surrounded by clay walls, play the role of fortified points, firing with grenades with the aim of destroying these fortifications is of great im- portance, shrapnel being absolutely useless for this purpose. The grenade in other cases is of little advantage, the only effect pro- duced being solely a moral one. The sound made by it when fly- ing and bursting is exceedingly disagreeable and acts very badly upon the nerves. However, with time the nerves are bluD^ed and its influence becomes almost unnoticeable. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 121 Large-caliber guns are indispensable for the damaging of f ortilications, but it is very difficult to take them along and use them with the field artilleTy. Fine roads are necessary first of all. The Japanese could take advantage of these only during winter. Moreover, one must be sure of victory, as they hamper greatly the retreat, not to say that in such a case it is quite im- possible to carry them away. 1 think that the artillery which is placed in position would be more useful if it remained there until the last moment during the attack, causing great losses to the enemy by its fire, even though it be necessary to abandon the guns afterwards in retreating. Our field mortars, having a maximum range of 3 versts, are of little use, as at so short a distance from the enemy it is diffi- cult to render them invisible and they risk being fired at and destroyed. According to my opinion, rifle fire is often indulged in with- out deriving any advantage whatever from it. It is of little efl'ect at long range, especially in thickly inhabited localities, where it is difiicult to distinguish anything, even at short distances, on account of tlie mass of villages covering them. It seems to me that the soldiers ought to be kept from firing at long range- thus developing stolidity and coolness in them. To illustrate long-range firing, I will mention the following .incident: The white smoke of bursting shra.pnel was seen here and (here on the horizon. I asked the officer detailed to the general conducting the coiribat : "This smoke seen there on the horizon, is this the enemy's shrapnel ?" "Yes ; our positions are there.^' I started for that point. I passed a redoubt occupied by our troops. Our battery was firing in rear of me and the projectiles flew over my head. The whistling sound produced by them was more disagreeable than that of the enemy's shrapnel bursting 122 ^^^ TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. around me. This uncanny feeling was' increased by the fact that there were cases when the shraipnel burst prematurely. I began to wonder what it meant. Our positions were far away, while the artillery was here. But, as nothing was said to me when I passed our redoubt, I proceeded further. Suddenly I heard the patter of bullets to one side of me; 1 looked, and saw our advanced line of sharpshooters. I dismounted and approached one of the sol- diers, who was firing m kneeling position. I knelt beside him and gazed in the direction of his aim, but, in spite of all my efforts, I saw nothing. At last I asked the soldier : "A^Tiat are you firing at?" ^^There, at the Japanese.'^ ^'"Where are- they ? I do not see them.' ' "There, there.''' "Do you see them ?" "Not by any means." "Why do you fire, then ?" "Just so, it makes you feel gayer." It came out that at the point wherQ the shrapnel was burn- ing were Japanese positions, and not ours, while the bursting shrapnel was that fired by the batteiy shooting over my head when I passed. Chapter XYIII. THE CONSEQUEXCES OF THE SURKEXDEK OF POET • ARTHUR. Speaking of artillery firing, I can not help mentioning tlie surrender of Port Arthur, which I can by no means get out of mj mind, not so much the very fact of its surrender— for there is no fortress that could hold out forever^ — as the mode of sur- render — i. e., the conditions on which the capitulation was made and all that General Stoessel found necessary to accept and puncl- ually execute. I shall not discuss the possibility of Port Arthur holding out still longer, although I had the occasion to talk witli many of the defenders of the fortress who maintained that there w^as no imperative need of surrender at the time. The conditions of the capitulation were such as are accepted when the enemy enters a fortress by force, and not when it is willfully surren- dered, and there was no necessity of agreeing to abandon to the enemy all the guns, projectiles, and other matevid of war in all their integrity. What would the Japanese have done to the de- fenders of Port Arthur had they taken it by storm, and not entered it on the conditions of the capitulation? Nothing, except lay- ing down the same conditions as those accepted by General Stoes- sel; but then all the guns might have been exploded or submerged, as well as all the projectiles, They might not have freed Gen- eral Stoessel and the other officers who returned to Russia with him. But no dishonor would have fallen upon them, and neit!. i Russia nor the Army would have suffered from it. But the sni- render of the guns and projectiles to the enemy wrought a great deal of harm to our troops. I cannot forget the horror which took possession of me at Mukden, near the Imperial Tombs, when 123 124 THE TRUTH ABOUT TEE WAR. a shrapnel burst close to me. I saw oil the fuse which I picked up the letter T and Arabic figures. An officer who happened to be with me explained to me that this was our shrapnel. The shots did not cease^ and in our terror we thought that our own battery was firing at us. But a colonel of the G-eneral Staff, who arrived at that moment, explained to us that opposite to us were drawn up the Port Arthur troops and they were firing against our men with our own guns and our own projectiles. Here are the results of the capitulation, thanks to which Eussia had the pleasure of seeing a few months earlier the hero of Port Arthur and his wife and to strew with flowers the road over which they traveled, in the perfume of which General Stoessel must have smelt likewise the reek of the innocent blood of the Russian heroes struck down by the guns and with the projectiles which he delivered to the enemy, so as to announce quicker to Russia how honestly and sacredly he had fulfilled his duty to the Czar and to his country. I cannot speak coolly about all this — I saw the mutilated bod- ies of our soldiers struck down by our own guns, I heard their moans and their curses, and my heart sheds tears of blood at the very thought of these horrors. Chapter XIX. THE CAERYmCx OF THE WOUNDED FEOM THE FIELD OF BATTLE. The carrying of tlie wounded from the field of battle is like- wise a very important question. There is no soldier in the world who would not, if this could be done without exposing him- self to shame and reprimand, leave the ranks during battle. This is why we see during battle the wounded led and carried by soldiers. It is true that, in addition to the desire of getting away from the danger zone for a while, they are likewise prompted by a feeling of humanity; his comrade is moaning and losing blood, how were it possible to let him lie? But as one wounded is mostly carried by four men, we can easily imagine how thin the ranks would grow if the soldiers were allowed to carry off the wounded. The officers forbid it as far as they can, but they too are men and their comrades fall at their sides; and if permission is given to take up an officer, the same permission must be given for the soldier, and the result is that all the wounded are thus carried from the field. More than once on this account success did not crown our arms. It would be cruelty to demand that the wounded be left un- til the end of the battle or the advent of night ; but however cruel be such a request, if no other solution can be found to this ques- tion, we must insist on it, for humaneness, displayed in such a "way, brings great harm, carrying in its wake the destruction of entire units, of thousands of men. It seems to me, however, that there is a solution, if not an entirely satisfactory one, one at least diminishing the harm en- duing from the soldiers' exit from the ranks for the purpose of 125 126 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MAR. picking up the wounded. Why should not our charitable societies, which have sent so many well-organized detachments to the front for the assistance of our wounded warriors^ create special units of carriers for the purpo'se of picking up the woimded and carry- ing them from the field of battle. The society or institution which would do this would in reality do a great deal of good. It would not only ease the sufferings of the wounded by having them taken up more quickly, but would free from such duty soldiers, whose principal aim is lighting, thus keeping them in the ranlcs for battle, in w^hich every man is of value. During lull in military operations these carriers might be employed for other useful Avork. This is easily found on the theater of war. It seems to me that this matter ought to be considered. Something might, perhaps, be done in that direction. As a rule, assistance is indispensable to the wounded on the very field of battle. It is badly organized in our Army.. Each soldier has his individual emergency package, but not every one of them knows how to use it, and there are wounded who would not be able to dress their wounds themselves. There ought to be a greater number of flying detachments which should give first aid to the woanded on the field of battle, then it would not be so necessary for some of the wounded to be immediately evacuated. Chapter XX. THE KIISSIAN SOLDIER. Before closing this essay^ I must say a few words about our soldier. Our soldier is very enduring; he is accustomed to all kind of privationS;, and bears them with resignation and without a murmur. I will not say that he is endowed with that dashing, reckless bravery with which people generally associate the Rus- sian soldier. Ke goes forward because it must be sO', but exalta- tion is not developed in him. He is not used to independence, his initiative is limited, he is not sufficiently observative and ori- ents himself badly; I had more than once occasion to observe that he remembers but imperfectly the roads by which he trav- eled and the villages in which he has been (the Cossacks are an exception; they orient themselves very well). This is not because he is lacking in innate qualities and capacities; he has been ren- dered such by his military education, the drill e7i masse, without any independent problems, without any necessary training dur- ing maneuvers for the purpose of his being able to orient him- iSelf in an unknown locality. The soldier in battle is steadfast in the repulse of attacks and intrepid in attack as long as he has a leader possessing the same qualities and as long as he is with him; but as soon as the commander leaves the ranks, the sol- diers feel lost like chickens without their mother hen. I had occasion to ol)serve myself how bravely a company' went into the fire as long as all the officers had not been put liors de combat; but after the loss of their last officer the soldiers grew confused, not knowing what to do, and had not the commander of a neigh- l)oring company come to their assistance ])y sending one of his 127 -j^23 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. officers^ the company would have retreated. It seems to me that, taking into consideration this peculiarity of our soldier, there ought to be in each regiment some reserve oiticers who should, in case of the loss of all the officers of a company, replace these. (This only for the present war, for it must be hoped that for future wars our soldier will be different.) The commander of one company cannot always know what is taking place in the neighboring units, and, moreover, he may not have any officers to spare. This is of great importance, considering the enormous loss among the officers which takes place in the present war. The Russian soldier is more than any other penetrated with love, kindness, and thoughtfulness. If he love his officer, his care for him knows no bounds ; he becomes his most tender nurse. He does everything in his power to lighten his life in the field; he (endeavors to find him a safe place in battle, risking his own life while looking for such a point. His kindheartedness is most conspicuous in his treatment of the prisoners. A Japanese prisoner becomes the guest of the Russian soldiers. They slap his shoulder, pronounce a few words, endeavoring to make him understand that he is safe among them. We often see scenes like the following and which are most touch- ing: A Japanese is sitting down; by his side is a Russian sol- dier. They converse and seem to understand each other. How they manage this 1 really do not know. Now the Russian sol- dier gets a lump of sugar and with a kindly smile, as if saying that he would like to treat him with something better, he presses it upon the Japanese. The Japanese tries to thank him the best he can for the tidbit. Taking from out of his uniform a white cake, he presents it to the soldier. The latter breaks off a small piece and gives back the rest, trying to explain that the Japanese, who is not accustomed to our brown bread, will need it himself. And both laugh in a kindly way. It is ditlicult to realize that these men rushed fiercely against each other some half-hour ago. I do not know how our men live in Japan, but the Japanese can- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ^yAR. - 129 not complain of the treatment received by their prisoners at our hands. The soldier is assured that a soldier's profession is one of the most honorable ones^ but he does not see this : he is not treat- ed as a man pursuing a high profession. Should more consider- ation be manifested toward the soldier by the authorities and the public not only in time of war^ but also in time of peace, the morale of our troops would be far higher. What a difference between our system of discipline and the Japanese. The Japanese discipline is more strict than ours in principle, while in form it is more humane. It does not lower human dignity or the honorable calling of the soldier. A private inay, in the presence of the officer, smoke, drink, and be present in all public institutions. Being in the same places as liis offi- cer, he learns to behave everywhere equally correctly, thus acquir- ing the esteem of tlte entire populaition. In our Army it is quite the opposite. In the presence of an officer the soldier has no right to smoke, nor to be at any public place, while if, as has been said already, he had the possibility of going to various public in- stitutions where his officer goes, he would acquire a certain tact in his relations not only to his officers, but everybody in general; a thing which would influence the general course of his life and raise the standard of his moral and human dignity. At present, unfortunately, the soldier is not always correct in various public institutions, and, on the other baud, our relations to the soldier lower his human and soldierly dignity. Is not the ccntemptuous ^'thou" with which, according to regulations, the officer addresses the soldier, even the one who has received a high education or wears a high military decoration — the St. Cleorge, an insult to the '^onoral)le calling of the soldier*? We must ajjandon in this case likewise the obsolete form, and adapt ourselves to the demands exacted by the new conditions of life. I cannot lielp remarking that the defense of the traditional ^•thou" in addressing the soldier, as met in military literature, can 130 Tin-: TltLTIi AHOVT THE ^VAli. Dot be considered in any way suflicieJit, as it is diKtirxguislied by great insincerity and naive sophisms. The military calling is in truth an honoral)le one^ and this honor ought to be evidenced everywhere down Lo the lowest ranks of military hierarchy. All deviations from this rule, arising from ancient customs which took 1)irtli in times of serfdom, have long lost all right to exist- ence and are in direct contradiction to the new conditions of Army life and the national solf-consciousness asserting itself so vividly. In Japan the soldier's calling is truly honorable and the troops are respected l)y the entire population. I will mention a very characteristic though maybe somewJiat misplaced fact, told me by a lieutenant of our fleet: ^'^A young and very pretty flower-girl, named Ishine-Musme, brought us beautiful chrysanthemums every morning. She at- tracted me greatly, and I wished to make a closer acquaintance with her. For this purpose I had recourse to an old woman of great skill in persuasion, whose elocjuence few could withstand. She never stopped at anything, there was no woman she would not approach. When I asked her to make me; acquainted with little Ishine^Musme, she answered rudely: ^N'o, no; I can^t do it.' ^How so?' I asked with astonishment. ^Why not?' ^She is a soldier's friend ; that is why I cannot speak to her about it.' " This old woman, who would try to persuade the daughter of a high official, without any qualms of conscience, did not wish to harm a soldier, a defend^er of her country. Two armies stand opposite each other in this war. The one is conscious of its dignity and its citizen's duty toward its coun- try, understanding its aim and purpose. Each Japanese soldier is conscious that in case of victory over the enemy, whose mili- tary strength appalled all nations, the glory of his people would be great, and Eussia, Avho hindered Japan from reaping the bene- fits of her victory over China, will be punished accordingly. He (knows tliat his country would acquire Sakhalin with its fisheries, so necessary to the Japanese population : Korea with its vast fer- THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. ^ 131 tile area which would come under full control of Japanese emi- grants, the dream of their forefathers; that the commerce of Japan would develop extraordinarily, and that all this would. en- hance the honor and importance of Japan in the eyes of the en- tire world, and that it would promote the economic life of the country, improving tlie material condition of all her citizens. The other is imbued only with the naked formula of disci- pline, which has already lost its former meaning, of absolute obe- dience and submission to the will of the chiefs wherever it might lead. Thus the difference in impulse with which the two armies marched against each other is enormous. If we add to this all the above-mentioned conditions, we can clearly see how great must be the power of the Eussian soldier to be able to hold out so long against the Japanese Army in spite of all its advantages. Between our oihcer and our soldier there is no other link but that of service. All inteilectual communion is lacking; the interests of the soldier have nothing in common with the inter- ests of the officer, who in tlie eyes ot' the private is a member of the privileged class, whieh generally is not looked upon with favor by our lower class — the mass of our Army. The lack of ordinary citizen's rights increases this estrangement. Everything is thug maintained only ])y service relations, by service ties. But this link disappears as soon as the soldier leaves the Army and returns to his village. Life outside tlie Army gives nothing which could alter his view of the privileged classes in general and the corps of officers in particular, and it may be easily understood that at his return to the ranks the lack of sucli a link is felt still more, especially taking into consideration that he comes to a new cadre of officers. We observe a diiferent condition of affairs among the Japanese. There all the elements of tlie Army are closely united by political and national interest^, and this, in addi- tion to the strict discipline, renders the Japanese Army a closel}' united whole. joo THE TRlTll ABOUT THE WAR. The Eussian soldieT is im untoiu-hed spring of high innate virtues. Raise his standard O't' culture, give the right direetion to his thouglit, and the like will not he found in the entire world, in spite of his nature lacking martial spirit. The reader cannot help asking tlio question: How do the soldiers of other nationalities, belonging to oiir Army, behave in this w^ar? In answer to this, I must say that T have never dreamt of the existence of such unity, such solidarit\- among soldiers of different nationalities and religions. They all bear without a murmur all the discom-forts of the campaign, are equally brave and stolid in the fight. No feud is noticed among them; they all live as one friendly family, without paying the slightest atten- tion to their differences of nationality and religion. The com- mon fate united them and formed them into a conglomerate of so solid a composition that races more indigenous by far would break against them. The Poles are splendid, intrepid soldiers. I accidentally was a witness to the following conversation (I cannot say if it was an ofiicer who talked with a soldier or some- one else) : ^"'You tight bravely, boys." ''We do our best; we try not to he outdone by the others.'^ "After all, what are you fighting for? The Russians oppress you and give you no rights.'' "That is in Russia, that is another matter. Here we are soldiers and must fight. A soldier's honor is above all things." The Caucasians, Bessarabians (Roumanians), Finns, Ger- mans, all behave alilve. How great the number of anecdotes on the cowardice of the Jews! Yet in the present war many of them have shown them- selves to be excellent, braA-e, and intelligent soldiers. Many of them have been rewarded by the St. George decoration, some of them, have even two and three of these decorations, and these crosses have been awarded them by the company, not by the TEE TRVTH ABOUT THE WAR. 133 authorities. And how the other soldiers loved these Jews! The oilieers liivewise could not say enough in their praise. All these gladsome features show that the Eussian people are devoid of national and religious fanaticism, transmitted from generation to generation, which admits of no criterion, no reason- ing, which hates blindly and unconsciously all that is foreign. When all the peoples of the Eussian Empire will enjoy the same rights; when all the artificial limitations, at present the cause of the existing feud, will have disappeared; when, enjoy- ing the same political rights, all will have become equally faith- ful citizens — then there will be formed one great Eussian family, always ready to rise as one man in the defense of the countr}^, for only under such conditions could be secured to all material welfare, the main motive principle of the masses, and then only will the poHtical power of Iiussia rise to an inaccessible height. April 1905. RUSSIAN WEIGHTS AND MEASURES. Russian Verst, 1. Geographic Mile, 0.144. English Statute Mile, 0.663. Degree of Equator, 0.0095.. 1 verst equals 500 sageus or 3,500 feet; 3 sagen equals 3 arshins or 7 feet; 1 arshin equals 16 vershoks or 28 inches; 1 foot equals 12 inches; 1 inch equals 10 lines. WEIGHTS. 1 berkovets equals 10 poods; 1 pood equals 40 Russian pounds or 36 English pounds: 1 pound equals 32 lots; 1 lot equals 3 zolotniks; 1 zolotnik equals 96 dolias. COINS. 1 imperial equals 10 roubles or $5.00; ] half imperial equals 5 roubles or $2.50; 1 rouble equals 100 copecks or $0.50; 1 poltinnik equals 50 copecks or $0.25; 1 dvugrivenny equals 20 copecks or $0.10; 1 piatachek equals 5 copecks or $0.02i^. l:-5 INDEX. Aghieff, Chief of Section of Chinese Railway 83 AVexandrovski, Red Cross Plenipotentiary 75 as administrator 77 Ak'xieff, General 57 yilexieff, Viceroy 100 Artnmonoff, General 63 his unauthorized retreat to Telin ■. 40 Artillery, rapidity of fire of Russian and Japanese 120 Ashitor, village of 12 Paotaydze, village of 25 Baoteytsze, village of 13 Beytaydze 26 Boikhovitinoff, Colonel 30 Borisoff, Colonel 35 occupies Tunchandza 36 wounded mortally 37 Burger, General 30 Camp service, how discharged 103 Carrying of the wounded from the field of battle 125 Cause of Japanese success 112 Cause of Russian failure 98 Cavalry, Insufficiency of^ — on the theater of war lOi Censorship at St. Petersburg 92 Change of Commander-in-chief 55 Chief of the Rear, necessity of his being vested wfth immense power 97 Churin, General 28 Churinoff, to relieve General Myloff 41 Commander-in-chief, characteristics of 108 his distrust of his subordinates 105 Coiisequences of the surrenaer of Port Arthur 123 Correspondents, criticism of some ..89 difficulties as regards censorship 88 party spirit among some 89 permits to be present at military operations , . . . . 91 position during war 90 Dalin Pass, evacuation of 58 Dariloff, General 57 Davanganpoo 27, 28 Departure of General Grippenberg 16 Detachments for the carrying of_ the wounded from the battle- field, establishment advocated'. 1'26 187 138 TIIK TRUril ABOUT Tllf^ WAR. riary of events ntar Mukclen 25 February 13th 25 February 14tli, loth, 16th 25 February 19th, 20th 29 February 21st 31 February 22d 34 February 23d 35 February 27th 41 D:scipline, comparison between Russian and Japanese r29 Disorders on road, cause of 7 liistrust, prevalent in Russian Army 93 Potay, village of 11 Elf gazooza, village of 29 Elthaytze, village of 30 Fankhe River, crossing of 41 Fanzas, explosives in 13 Fansintun 29 Fansytun 31 Field kitchens, commended 8 used in railway cars S Finnish two-wheel carts for transportation of wounded 78 Firing 119 artillei-y TIO rifle 121 Franco-Prussian War, incident during 102 Fushun, road to — open 58 Gerngross, General 30,31 Golembatovski, General 27 march to Mukden 28 Gosytun 36 occupation of 37 Government control, criticism of 70 Ciippenberg 102 departure of — destroys subordination and disseminates dis- trust of the commander-in-chief 19 dire results of departure 16 effect of departure 109 ignorance as to Japanese mode of fighting 17 interviews with newspaper men 17 Kuropatkin's letter to IS unwillingness to remain under command of General Kuro- patkin 16 Gromoff, contractor 68 Gruber. General Chief Intendant 68 Qiir>djulin 98 Hanenfeld. General 30 Kerschelmann. General 36, 37, 40, 41. 63 TgPitay .30,31 Iloo 41 Imperial Tombs 2^.35 fight at.. 38 Russians fired at from guns surrendered at Port Arthur.. ..123 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 139 In 1 he Army 9 Iiitendancy 67 mode of preparing and obtaining supplies 68 officers 63 prejudice against 07 Ivauoff, Captain, act of bravery 38 J vanoff. General 27,28 Jctpan, probable demands of 117 Japanese Army as compared to Russian 130 commendation of 115 forces at Mukden operations 62 Japanese Army, overrated 114 letreat of 20 takes offensive 29 Japanese prisoners, treatment of 128 Japanese soldiers, status of 131 Jews, as soldiers, commended 132 Ivanas ^3 Kaulbars, General 26, 27, 37, 38, 41 appointed commander of Second Army 22 Khandrapoo, village of 2w Kbarbin 43 as principal military ('/f/pf 95 as rear of the Army 94 center of railway and administration 8 testifying to colonizing capabilities of the Russian people. . 8 Khenitun 36 Khongoutay, village of 12 Khoiikha 35,36 Khorvat, General, builds railway branch to Fushun mines 80 chief manager of Chinese Railway 79 praise of 82 Khunkhe River 26,36 Japanese attack Third Army at 63 positions on 59 settlements on 12 Khushitay station 37 Kiousan 37 Kiuzan, Japanese break through Russian lines at 64 Kuropatkin, action at Sandepoo 38 appointed commander of First Army 56 attitude towards plans of General Gruber 69 commends Myloff 37 endeavors to make Grippenberg desist from his resolve to depart 18 letter to Grippenberg of no avail 18 luxurious railway train of 101 reprimands General Myloff 36 surrenders command to General Linevich 55 system of 107 Kusantun 36 140 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. l.adygenski, Colonel, correspondent of "Novoe Vremia" 65 Lanshanpoo 28, 29 Liaokhe River, General Mischenko's Army at 11 lyiiunitz, General 36, 38 temporarily in command of Second Army 27 I^inevich, General 26 discussed 55 leaves positions near Dalin Pass .. 59 only general living in /«v*.:f/.s 101 IJnshinpoo 28 Losch, Colonel, reinforcements refused to 31 Lydziavopoo, village of 13 Machine guns, first time in action 13 Madiapoo, village of 29,30,35,63 Malandan-Youoozipoo, 8th Army Corps on line of 13 Mandarin Road 37,41 Mandrikin, General, operating on left flank 5.' Margarine Sisters 74 Martoss, General 38 Masloff, General 57 Maturan 26 Mikhaylovski, Engineer Officer 57 Military Censorship 88 Military Medical Department, criticised 71 Mischenko, General, takes command of his troops 41 wounded 15 Mortars, Russian field 121 Mukden 43 arrival at 9 as rear of the Russian Army 94 burning of 85 cause of failure of Russian arms at 112 discussion of disaster at 43 Japanese at 113 life at 20 station of 27 Myloff, General 28, 39, 40, 63 commended by Kuropatkin 37 illness of 41 ordered to protect retreat of Russian Army 37 reprimanded by Kuropatkin 36 takes command of Borisoff 's troops 35 takes offensive 36 Nodzu, General, idea as to principle of discipline of 10 Nogi, General 26 Newsy tun, village of 30,31 Niedermiiller. General, chief of railway administration 81 Novgorod Hill ' 58 Obolesheff, Colonel 51 Officers, of the Reserve, criticised 96 Officers, their relations towards the soldiers 131 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 141 On the road to Mukden " Operations at Sandepoo 11 Disposition of Japanese troops 13 Disposition of Russian troops 11 total strength of Russian Army 11 Operations on left flank and in center 57 Oukhar-Oronovich, General, in charge of Service of Security and Information 21 Oulinnoo 29, 31 Padiaza 29, 30, 31, 35 Panic in the train 45 Paodaotun 30, Bl, 35 Peace, undesirability of 118 Permits, see correspondents 91 Pestich, Colonel, chief censor 88 Petereff, General 40 Petkhoza, village of 26 Peytkhoza, village of 26 Poles, attitude Russia and the Army 132 commended 132 their view of the soldier's duty 132 Polivanoff, General, chief censor at St. Petersburg 93 Port Arthur, premature surrender of 14 Poutiloff Hill, bombardment of 58 Preobrajenski, Controller, repairs telegraph line under fire.. .. 35 Projectiles of Japanese Army 120 of Russian Army . .120 Proposed second attack of Sandepoo 19 Pukhe River 40 halt at 39 train attacked near 47 Puliupoo, village of 30 Railway and evacuation of Mukden 79 chief of military transportation of troops 81 chief of railway administration 81 chief of the line, tiTing position of 81 chief of the rear 81 conflicting orders to personnel 81 cost of cleaning of refuse from trains de luxe 103 Decaville Railway 2S importance of East-Chinese Railway 79 one-track railway cause of failure of Russian arms 9S Railway personnel, excellent work of 80 sufferings of 82 Railway, possibility of constructing more branches for tEe period of duration of military operations 98 scarcity of accidents 80 the three chiefs of the railway . . 81 trains with wounded departing from Mukden 85 unpreparedness for work 79 142 THD TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. Rear of the Army 94 a plague of the Army 97 Reconnaissance, difficulties of 105 discussed 104 Red Cross, commendation of 73 expenditures of 76 Reinforcements, request for — refused 105 Rennenkampf, General .. 57 Reservists, discussed 100 Russia, apogee of political power how to be attained by 133 Russian Army, as compared to Japanese 130 attacks of 1st Siberian Regiment 34 attitudes of the various nationalities composing 132 beginning of retreat 37 esprit and morale of 9 fatal consequences of two days' inactivity before MuKden.. .. 80 fight of Zaraysk Regiment 33 forces in Mukden operations 63 lack of enthusiasm in 10 losses of 59 losses at Salinpoo 27 losses on February 21st 33 new disposition for retreat 27 passive condition of intellectual members of '. . . 9 positions on February 23d 35 restoration of order in retreating army 42 retreat discussed 65 retreat to left bank of Khunkhe River 36 sanitary condition of 9 strength of Second Army at Sandepoo 22 total strength at Sandepoo 11 total strength for second attack of Sandepoo 23 Russian lack of sympathy with operations in the Far East r> Russian Staff, its ignorance as to Japanese Army 104 Russian soldier 127 characteristics of 127 kindheartedness of 128 praise of 132 self-consciousness to be developed in 116 status of 131 Sakharoff, General : 89 his view on the press 88 Sakhedza 35 Sakhepoo 28, 29 positions at 63 Salinpoo 29 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. 143 Sandepoo, disposition for second attack of. 23 fortifications of lo information received on turning movement of Japanese . . . . 23 lake in vicinity of 14 machine guns at l.^» Japanese positions at ^ .. 12 proposed second attack of ly Russian losses at 1^ turning movement of Japanese reported 21 Sandiafir, village of 35 Sanitary condition of Army 71 Sanitary service 71 Santaydze, village of 36 Santayzy station 51 panic at 52 Sataydze 36 Saytadze 35 station 41 Sentkhayza, village of 27 Shakhe River 28 crossing of 29 positions on 43 Shimosas 120 Short synopsis of Mukden operations 62 Shrapnel 120 Shuango, village of 2G Siaobiakhe, Japanese reserves at 11 Siaogoiiza, village of 35 Siaosooza, village of .. 13 Siaotuza, occupation of 35 Sifontay, Mischenko's army at . . . . 11 Sinmintin, village of .. ..25,30 Sipingay, village of •. 43 Sisters of Mercy 73 Slavuta, addresses engine drivers at Mukden before retreat.. .. 84 chief of section of Chinese Railway 83 Soukhoodiapoo 28 Soumapoo, battle of 12 Spies, badly organized service of 104 i^taff officers 107 enmity of officers of the line towards 107, 111 Stoessel, General, criticised for surrender of Port Arthur 123 Strikers, excessive number in Russian Army 103 Surgeons, lack of on field of battle . . 72 Takhetun, village of 35,36 Tashichao 31, 3r, fatal issue of battle of 105 Tasoundiapoo 29 Tava 37 train attacked at 46 Telegraphic information, how forwarded 88 144 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR. Telin 29, 40, 41, 43 as rear of Russian Army 94 disorders at 42 road to^ — open 58 "Thou" criticism of when used in spealiing to soldiers 129 Tiadousianpoo, Japanese reserves at 11 Timofeyeff, Colonel, shot by panic-stricken men of train 48 Tintiantun /. 31 Tkhenitun 35, 36, 37 Tolmacheff, General 27 Topornin, General 30 Touelpoo 27 Traffic, impeded by maneuvers of chiefs' trains 102 Train, attacked on retreat 46 impediment to movements of troops 99 start on retreat 46 Ttans-Baikal Railway 8 Tsantapoo v ^28 Tserpitski, General 30 leads his regiment into fire 32 Tsiekhanovich, Colonel 30 Tsuanvanche 31, 35 Tsuertun 35, 37, 63 1 synkhenchen detachment 57 Tunchandza 30 Two-horse pack stretchers for the carrying of the wounded.. .. 7S Yv^'ives of officers, undesirability of their presence at theater of military operations 75 Yansintun 34, 35 Yasytun 29,30,31 Youkhuantun * 29, 30, 34, 36, 63 Youshitay Station 25 Zapolski, Colonel 30 Zasulich, repulse® thirteen consecutive attacks 5S OCT 9