S' 1S00 M Glass _^ 1 J SPEECH o'6 V MB. ROBERTSOl^, OF VIRGINIA, i^^f ON HIS MOTION TO RECOMMIT THE REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE «f TBI SUBJBOT OF ABOIilTlOM SKUVERID I» T«» HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Mat, 188«. WASHINGTON CITY: PRINTED BY DUFF GREEN. 1836. N 6' 3 7 ^». SPEECH. Mr. PiNCKNEY, on leave, presented a report from the Select Committee on the subject of the abolition of slavery. In making this report, Mr. P. remarked that it had received the unanimous assent of the committee, and he trusted it would meet the unanimous approbation of the House. By the instruction of the committee, he moved that it be read and printed. Mr. Mercer moved that the report be laid on the table without reading, and printed. Mr. Claiborne, of Mississippi, asked for the reading of the report, which was accordingly done. The reading occupied about an hour and a half. The report concluded with the following resolutions: Resolved^ That Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere in any way with the institution ©f slavery in any of the States of this confederacy. Resolved, That Congress ought not to interfere in any way with the slavery in the District of Columbia. And whereas it is extremely important and desirable that the agitation of this subject should be finally arrested for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to the public mind, your committee respectfully recommend the adoption of the following additional resolution, viz: Resolved, That all petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers, relating in any way, or to any extent whatsoever, to the subject of slavery, or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being either printed or referred, be laid upon the table, and that no further action whatever shall be had thereon. Mr. PiNCKNEir was instructed to move that 5,000 extra copies of the re- port be printed. This motion gave rise to a desultory debate. Mr. Robertson expressed himself greatly diBsalisfied with tho report and resolutions. It might be true, he remarked, as the gentleman from N. Carohna (Mr. Speight) had said, that they maintained every ground which the South had contended for, except o?ie— but that exception embraced every thing worth contending for— /Ae unconstitulionality of the measures proposed by the abolitionists. In waiving that, the committee had surrendered the only gronnd upon which the rights or the peace of the South could ever scarcely repose. - . He objected to the printing of an extra number, or any number oi ine report and resolutions; intending, he said, to submit a motion which, it it should prevail, would supersede the necessity of printing them, at least m their present form. After a few other observations, Mr. R. concluded by moving to re commit the report and resolutions to the Select Commiltee^ with instructions to report the following resolution: Resolved, That Compress has no constitutional power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia^ or in the Territories of the United States. Thursday, Mat 19th. After Mr. Btnum and Mr. Pinckney had addressed the House, Mr. Robertson rose in reply to those gentlemen, and in support of his motion. . , , • • «• ^r He said, he ought perhaps to feel much honored by the special notice oi go distinguished a leader of the great democratic party, as the gentleman from N.Carolina, (Mr.BYNUM.) That gentleman, Mr.Speaker, seems greatly at a loss to comprehend my reasons for submitting the resolution now under consideration, which in his opinion, it seeme, is fraught with danger to the Union. Sir, I am not to be deterred from defending the rights and interests of my constituents, by groundless charges or apprehensions of danger to the Union. The Union is always in danger, in the estimation of the dominant party, from all who dare to resist its schemes or measures. Similar efforts were made by the federalists when in power to bring suspicion and odium upon the old republican party, by ascribing their opposition to French in- fluence, and enmity to the Union. But, sir, I rise with no view of replying lo remarks of this character; nor with the vain expectation of satislying the gentleman from N. Carolina. My object is to endeavor to vindicate the resolution upon your table, lo the satisfaction of this House, and more espe- cially of those who sent me here, and who have a right to know the reasons which influence my public conduct. I must confess, sir, that to me it seems not a little strange, that objections should be 60 vehemently urged to this resolution by the gentleman from N. Carolina, and the chairman of the Select Committee. They both admit the justice of the principle it asserts, and are prepared, as they tell us, to sustain it by their votes; yet they are both un.villing that a direct vote should be had upon it, and resist every effort to bring it before the^ House. They denounce a measure they themselves proclaim to be just. Surel> it ought to be a sufficient answer to these gentlemen to say, I urge it, on the contrary, because it is just, and asserts, as they themselves concede, thecon- Bfitutional rights of the people. But though this reason ought to be sufficient, there is an additional con- •idepation, Mr. Speaker, by which I am influenced, the force of which none can deny. With me, It carries the weight of the mo3t direct and positive instructions. I allude to the sentiments expressed throughout the ^vhole Southern country, and more especially by my own State, in regard to the ; very question involved in the resolution. I set up no pretensions, sir, to be^ the exclusive representative of the South; but I may at least be allowed' to understand something of the views and feelings of my native State. Are gentlemen aware that a resolution, denying the power of Congress t(y< interfere with slavery, in the precise terms of the resolution on your table, was adopted by the General Assembly of Virginia during iis late session, by an almost unanimous vote, and transmitted to each of iier representatives on this floor? In taking the course, then, so much dispproved by these" gentlemen, I do but speak the voice of my constituents— of the entire State indeed, which I have in part the honor to represent; and maintain their rights upon the very ground they themselves have placed it. Knowing their wishes, and satisfied with the justice of their cause, I could not shrink from main- taining it, to the best of my ability, without being a recreant to my trust. Are gentlemen answered ? i > • u But we are told, if we press this question we must inevitably lose it; that there is an overwhelming majority against us. How have gentlemen ascer- tained the fact asserted with so much confidence ? What vote has ever yet been taken from which the sense of the House could be known ? Mr. PiscKNEY explained: he did not say that he knew of his own know- ledge that the resolution would be negatived. He merely apprehended that such would be the case. As the matter now stood, Congress was uncom-, mitted on the subject. Mr. Robertson. Sir, I am opposed to all noncommittals upon so vital a question. I desire to see a direct vote upon it. It is necessary that the people should know the extent of their danger, that means may betaken iii time to provide against it. The gentleman from South Carolina informs us, that there are 34,000 names subscribed to the abolition memorials. Of these about 15,000 are the names of females; the residue, nineteen or twenty thousand, of males; all of whom, perhaps, are entitled to the right of suffrage. These constitute the van-guard-, the bold, the daring, the reckless of the abolitionists. There are doubtless many more; double, triple, perhaps quadruple the number, who secretly wish well to the cause. It is impossible to measure the power and influence of this formidable band. I repeat that they have obtained all that they could rationally have anticipated ; and even more. They must have known that they could not, at this session, procure the passage of a law abol- ishing slavery: it is not the proper time to press it. But they have succeeded in getting up agitation, from one extremity of the Union to the other ; and this report, in waiving the question of constitutional power, upon the ground now avowed, that a majority of Congress is prepared to assert it, is calculated to inspire them with fresh hopes, and to increase, rather than to allay, the apprehensions of the South. It is not to be expected liiat the abolitionists, under these circumstances, will desist from their nefarious schemes. 1 am unwilling therefore to give up the only barrier which can effectually protect us, without a struggle to defend it. I will not believe that Congress ih disposed to wrest that barrier from us, or to deny us its protection- tJut il such be the fact, let us know it, that by an amendment of the cousUtution we may put an end to a pretension so incompatible with our safety. It ig for this reason, sir,I wish the question niret and decided, by a direct and un- equivocal vote. I desire to see the rights of the Southern people rested, Bot on the fluctuating and capricious notions of moral obligation, or tire shifting ground of political expediency, but on the firm basis of the consti- tution: on fixed ])rinciples: on principles which all may appeal to, and which are the same to-day, to-morrow, and for ever. [The morning hour having expired, the House proceeded to the orders of the day.] Saturday, Mat 21. • Mr. Robertson, who was entitled to the floor, again addressed the House. •I avail myself of the permission of tiie Chair, (said Mr. R.) to enter in- to a fuller exposition and vindication of the resolution I had the honor to submit a few days past, than I then had an opportunity of doing. This is due to myself; to those who sent me here; but above all, to the solemn im- portance of the question, and the vast magnitude of the interests it involves. 1 shall endeavor, sir, to perform this task, for which, however I am con- scious of possessing no adequate powers, either physical or mental, as calmly and dispassionately as the nature of the subject will permit; and to abstain, if possible, from those exciting topics, by which its discussion has been al- njDst invariably characterized. I have already assigned some reasons for dissatisfaction with the report of the Select Committee, and for the opinion expressed, that it would be con- sidered as virtually surrendering the constitutional question. If it could have been met satisfactorily to the South, no sufficient excuse can be offered for waiving it; and all will believe it was avoided, because of the difficulty of making good the position for which wc contend. The cliairman tells us, asan apology for taking this course, that the committee abstained from ex- amining it, '< because they ivere not insttmcied iu discuss it.'' Sir, the in- structions, so far from prohibiting this discussion, plainly authorized and re- quired it. They enjoined it upon the committee, to report that '' in the opinion of this House, Congress ought not to interfere, in any way, with slavery in the District of Columbia, because it would be a violation of the public faith, unwise, impolitic, and dangerous to the Union; assigning ,v?/c/» reasons for these conclusions, as in the judgment of the committee, may be best calculated to enlighten the ■public mind, to ullay excitement., to re- press agitation, to secure and maintain the jusl rights of the slavehold- ing States, and of the people of this District, and to restore liarviony and tranrjuiUity among the various sections of this Union.'' Thus it appears, that full latitude was allowed the committee in supporting the conclusions which the House desired to see maintained; and what stronger reason could tlicy have assigned, than tlut the proj)Osed interference with slavery in this District, would he a direct infraction of the constitution? This reason alone would have been suflicienf . It embraced all the positions the House htJd taken; for if the measure ' t»ald be shown lo bo unconstitutional, it must, of necessity — be a breach of faith, unioise, impolilic, and dangerous. Sii-, the committee were not justified in omitting to interpose this constitutional barrier, in defence of the rijjhts they were instructed to mninlain. Independently of his instructions, the chairman of the committee, espe- cially, stood bound to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the proposed in- terference. In a letter to which his name is affixed, addressed to the elec- tors of the Charleston electoral district, (South Carolina,) he uses this language: *' And now I ask my fellow citizens seriously to consider, and candidly to decide, whether, as I have already succeeded in obtaining a solemn declara- tion by Congress that ' any interference with slavery in the District of Colum- bia, would be a violation of the public faith,' if I should also succeed in procuring the adoption of a report, insisting and demonstrating that a viola- tion of the public faith is unconstitutional, and that therefore^ and up- on that ground. Congress will not, and ought not to interfere in any way with slavery in the District of Columbia; whether doing this, I really de- serve to be stigmatzed as a traitor to the South." Sir, I will apply no such epithet to the chairman of the committee, whether he succeed or fail. But is he likely to realize the expectations he has raised? Does not the report declare that the committee have abstained even from the- examination of the constitutional question? It is true, that in another part of the report, the ground indicated in this letter is approached. Even there, however, it is not directly occupied. It is not alleged, nor demonstrated, that a breach of faith is unconstitutional; but that, to prove the act in question a breach of faith, is tantamount , in its binding obligation, to a positive declaration that it would be so. The moral obligation does not necessarily import a constitutional obligation, but is something of eqaiva- lent force. Not satisfied, however, with this position,the report goes on to insist, that the moral obligation is even more efficacious. " What is the meaning of the declaration adopted by the House, in rela- tion to the District of Columbia? Is it not that Congress cannot and will not do an act which it has solemnly proclaimed to involve a violation of the public faith? Does it not afiford every security to the South which it is in the power of the Federal Government to afford? Is it not tantamount in its binding obligation upon the Government to a positive declaration, that the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia would be unconstitu- tional? Nay, is it not even more efficacious in point of fact? Constitutional provisions are matters of construction. The opinion of one House upon an abstract controverted point, may be overruled and reversed by another. But when Congress has once declared that a particular act would be a violation of the public faith, is it to be supposed that it would ever violate a pledge thus given to the country?" The whole stress of the argument is to prove, not that to violate the pledge would violate the constitution, as the letter proposes, but that such a pledge gives a security equal, or even superior, to the constitution itself. But does not every man see that this argument is unsound and fallacious? I confess I was surprised to hear it addressed at this time of day, to the representatives of the American people; by a gentleman, too, coming from the South. What folly was it in our ancestors, if this be so, to spend days and months in anxious deliberation, framing written constitutions for each of the States, and for the Union, containing guarded limitations against abuses of power? Why did they not discover the superior efficacy of this moral obligation, which prohibits every act that violates good faith between man and man, 8 and reposes the rights of their countrymen, upon th« good faith, the good sense, and the justice of those who are to administer their Government? If, 33 the report declares, a succeeding Congress may reverse the opinion of a prior one, in reference to the construction of a written constitution, may they not also controvert an opinion in respect to the existence or efficacy of a moral obligation? Must there not exist even greater contrariety of opinion^ upon questions of moral propriety, than of legal construction? Sir, if the chairman of the committee could have placed the rights of the District upon the ground of the constitution, he has neglected to place them upon the strongest of all positions; upon the only ground on which they can long or successfully be defended. I cannot agree, that notions of moral obligation merely, are higher security than the positive injunctions of our fundamental law. As our sole dependance, they are not worth a rush. Give us the constitution as our defence; we want no higher security. We had a right to expect this from him. It has been affirmed on this floor, by one of my colleagues, (Mr. Wise,) that the chairman gave an explicit pledge, that the question sliould be placed upon that ground. I have heard no denial of this statement. But the gentleman, I observe, is not now in his seat, and I forbear, therefore, to make any further remark upon that subject. Perhaps he will in- sist that he has redeemed his promise; that he has convinced, or will convince the House, that every breach of good faith is a violation of the constitution. I fear he will find himself mistaken; but if not — if he shall succeed in pro- ducing this conviction — then the House, I trust, as well as himself, will con- cur in supporting the resolution now under consideration. If the majority «hall be of opinion that the measure is unconstitutional, and will unite in saying so, it is immaterial by what course of reasoning each may arrive at that conclusion. Let us declare the opinion that it is a violation of the constitution, and each reconcile his vote to his constituents, or his own conscience, upon whatever grounds his judgment may best approve. It is to the constitution, Mr. Speaker, that those \vhom I have the honor to repre- sent, nay, sir, the entire State itself from which I come, acting through her immediate representatives, has appealed for protection. I have already adverted, Mr. Speaker, to the resolution on this subject, adopted at the last session of the General Assembly of Virginia, of which the instruction I have moved is an exact copy. That resolution was adopted in the House of Delegates, by a vote of 106 to 13. It was offered, permit me to say, not by one of those whose patriotism might be questioned, on the ground of opposition to the ruling powers, but by one of the orthodox faitli — by a staunch friend of the administration. The administration naa- jority in that House almost unanimously — perhaps without an exception — sustained it. Nor does Virginia alone assume this position; tlie Legisla- tures of Georgia^ Mississippi, and Louisiana, if I have not been misin- formed, have adopted similar resolutions; one of them perhaps going still farther, and threatening to secede from the Union, if any measure should be adopted endangering the security of the slaveholding States. I do not ad- vert to these threats as approving them: they ought, perhaps, never to be made. It will be time enough to talk of secession when the crisis shall arrive, if it ever should, when no other alternative is left us, but to sever the Union, or lurrender the rights it was intended to protect. But such language shows, what ought to be known, the danger to result from countenancing, in any- way, the schemes of the abolitionists. ,The States of South Carolina and Alabama, also, it is said, have de- uoimced tlie measure in question as an usurpation. This is precisely equivalent, all will admit, to a declaration that it is unconstitutional. Thus 9ix Southern States have concurred in pronouncing the contempla- ted interference an infraction of the constitution. With this fact before us, who shall condemn their Representatives, believing that ground to be just, for maintaining it on this floor. But, say gentlemen, where is the policy of assuming this position? There is an overwhelming majority against you? The gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Pinckney) asks, why occupy this ground with a moral cer- tainty of being driven from it? Sir, the same rules that should govern us in onr- private transactions, should govern us in our representative character. in both, hGnesti^ is the best policy. This may not be the politician's creed ; and, if not, I thank God I am no politician. The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr Bvnum) can see no reason for pressing this proposition, un- less it ia that "the party, with which he supposes me to act, are more accus- tomed to defeats than he is. Sir, it may be so. I vole for every measure which I consider constitutional, and beneficial to my country; otherwise 1 Vote against it, and never stop to inquire whether the administration party, or the opposition, vote with me or against me. The idea of being in a mi- nority has for me no terrors. We may.be defeated by this overwhelming majority; but in contending against it, the fewer our numbers the greater the honor of the struggle. , . V In vindicating the claims of the South, on the very grounds it has assu- 'med, I trust her representatives will be united. In an early period of the discussions on this subject, this was the view, as I understood it, of alniost ;he whole Southern delegation; especially of that of my own State. My colleagues, three of whom now sit near me, were, for the most part, deci- dedly of xjpinion that we should insist upon a direct and unequivocal vote; a disclaimer of the power to do what the abolitionists demanded. In a speech delivered by one of them, (Mr. Garland,) much commended in the loyal prints of the day— and I do not mean to question its merits— I find thus pas- sage: " But, say gentlemen, why press the constitutional question now.-- I rei>ly, we press it from the most urgent and imperious necessity. It is due to our safety, to our quiet, that we press it. Every other form m whicH this question has been presented has failed to secure us against the repetition of these memorials and petitions. Nothing, it seems, short of a declaration on the part of Congress of their want of constitutional power, will restrain these fanatical crusaders from seeking the intervention of Congress in aid ol their diabolical schemes, and perpetually harassing the country. \^U. Garland rose and said, he not only had taken the ground, as stated by his colleague, but desired distinctly to repeat that he still adhered to it.] Mr. Robertson: I did not suspect my colleague of any intention to abandon it; nor will I believe there is one of them who has maintained it, that-can be seduced or driven from it. They are prepared, I trust, to meet all the consequences it may involve; to make a voluntary saci.hce, it neces- sary, of political prospects, of life itself, sooner than shrink from what they consider their duty to their country and its constitution 1 hey arc assigned to defend the pass which may lead to its destruction ^^^^'^.^'^"^'"S '*' X j less as it may .eem^-they ,ma.y maintain it; or should they fail, may yet afloM 2 10 tiai^ for those whom ihey would protect, to prepare for a better defepce.- We are stationed on the ramparts of the constitution. Shall vye be mduced to march out of our safe entrenchments and meet the enemy in the open fieid. Sir if the commander-in-chief, on a memorable occasion, had committed this follV we should never have heard of the glorious victory of New Orleans. No; sir; never let us give up the strong hold of the constitution Let us not repose too much confidence in the jrood faith, or the justice of those who have power over our lives or our liberties. Those who trust too much to the mercy of men in power, may possibly realize the fate of the unfortunate Texians who fell at Goliad. They may surrender at discretion, and be ue- stroved in detail— nurdered by division.s. For myself, if I stood alone, never but with life, would I yield up the citadel of our rights. If the day shall come when it must fall, I am content to perish with it, ^Mr. R. gave way, without concluding, for the orders of the day .J Tuesday, Mat 24. Mr. Robertson continued. . Mr Speaker- 1 have said more, than I had intended on the preliminary grounds justifying the submission of the resolution now under discussion. I come now directly to the question- involved in It. r i . «u In examining that question, I shall enter into no discussion of what the Venerable member from Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams,) tauntingly terms the sublime merits of slavery; which, however sir permit me to say, whatever they may be, are not perhaps greatly excelled by the suul.me merits of modern abolitionism. _ , i .• „r tu^ \or will 1 bestow a moment's attention upon the resolution of the Seiect Committee, denying the right of Congress to interfere with slavery in the States. I have never considered that question proper to be debated n this Hall. 1 voted against its reference, because such reference seemed to imply a doubt respecting rights held by a title, paramount to the au.hority 4? Coiwess, and toJ firmly settled to receive any additional strength trom its ^'^^ Pion beibre us. Mr. Speaker, is one that admits of h Ul pby o ihefancv; and rejects even, were it in my power to command U^em a rhetor cal ornaments. It is a dry question of constitutional law; and om sn.ti e however, all must' acknowledge its ntrinsic '".portance, IpTe calculated to attract the attention of any but gentlemen accustomed to ^^^1 '^^T^ror. all that ha. been said, it is my nite, I f^a.-, to address an un vil nnuditory-one, perhaps, that has already prejudged the question. \ verV ne. imp?ession,^n^ can doubt, exists among -''• '^^l^^- l^''^.^ oVtl -No h thatL abolition of slavery is clearly w.th.n the constitut oi 1 ^owc^ of Con. rress. Nothing is more natural . Born or raised under m.t tu ,^ n idvcr* to slaverv, and under which it has, in most cases, been long Ulshed*ev readily adopt the opini<.n, that it is lawful or every other Go!^ nm^nt to do theinme.' It is natural, sir, but not logical, that they should ,\ U. is conclus'on without nicely examining into its grounds. Ufa h .vhat is still more d.mcult to encounter, with their prejudtcts. 1 he> have 11 probably, in few instances, ever thought to inquire whether Ihe provisions of the federal constitution, which bear upon this question, correspond with their own. Yet every candid man will admit, that that constitution is the test by which the proposition is to be tried. I have endeavored to examine into ■this matter with some care, and think I may venture to say, that while there is, perhaps, not one of the Northern States, whose fundamental law may not be rbasonably construed to give the power of abolishing slavery to the respective Ic'J-islative bodies, they all of them, in this particular, vary essentially from that of the State of Virginia, and of the United States, under both of which such power is denied to exist. I do not entertain the vain hope of removing the impressions, or changing the opinion, of any gentleman on this floor. The powers of a Chatham or a Cicero, would in all probability work no such effect. But we may hope, from the interesting nature of tlie subject, that every "-entleman will examine, fully, into the reasons of his belief; renounce it if his own reflections prove to him that it rests upon Aiilacious principles; or, if otherwise, show us the substantial grounds upon which ii can be maintained. . The reasons, Mr. Speaker, why the institutions of the Northern States admit or require the interpretation I have mentioned, must occur at once to every one. In those States, during our revolutionary struggle, slaves were comparatively few, and the intention of abolishing slavery, if not actually carried into eflect, entertained in almost all. It would have been absurd, therefore, in framing their constitutions, to close the door to abolition, or throw any serious obstacle in its way. The reverse, however, u-as the case in the South; and there, it was reasonable to expect, that the fundamental law would be more guarded, in protecting what was a most important interest in a lar"-e proportion of the community. The fact, it is believed, will be found, in a great degree, to correspond with these views. Look, sir, to the constitution of New Hampshire. The clause which may be regarded as bearing upon this point, is a part of the 12th section of the bill of rights. It is in these words: " Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property; he is therefore bound to contri- bute his share in the expense of such protection, and to yield his personal service, when necessarv,or an equivalent; but no part of a man's properly shall be taken from him, onapplietl to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people." Provisions nearly, or precisely similar, are to befound in the bill o{v\g\\isoi Massachusetts, sec. 10; of Ddatvare, sec. 10; of Vermont, sec. 10. The constitution, moreover, of each of thess Slates confers ample power on its legislative body to pass all laws for the s^ooct and welfare of the commonwealth, not repugnant to the constitution itself. (Const. New Hampshire, const. Mass., art. 4; const. Vermont, sect. 2.) Taking these provisions together, it may be fairly con- tended, that there is full authority to take away private property, whether wanted for public use or otherivise, whenever, in the opinion of the Legis- lature, the measure would conduce to the ^'good and welfare'" of the com- monwealth. Rhode Island denvcd her institutions from King Charles the Second, of blessed memory, and still reposes under the protection of the royal chr;rter. That charter gave to tiie governor and company, authority to |)ass all laws, as to them might seem meet for the '-good and welfare" of the said com- 15' pany, ^'C. so as such laws be not contrary and repugnant to the laws of England; and as slavery was an institution not recognized by the laws of England, whatever doubts may exist of the right to establish it in Rhode Island, none can possibly exist as to the right to abolish it. Co?inecticut, like Rhode Island, remained during our revolutionary struggle, under the regulations of a charter granted by Charles the Second. She never formed a constitution till the year 1S18. By a provision of her bill of rights adopted in 1784, sec. 2, it was declared that " no man's goods t\\ou\\\ he iii'ken unless cleai'ly warranted by law. ''^ All that was necessary to justify the taking of them, was to pass a law to that effect; and the royal charter gave full authority to pass all laws not contrary to the laws of England. An act accordingly for its gradual abolition was passed in 1784, and it ceased, probably, to exist before the adoption of the new constitution. • In Neio York, the old constitution of 1777 gave, if possible, still greater latitude. It vested the supreme legislative power in two bodies; it con- tained no direct provision, as far as I have seen, protecting private property from seizure, except what is coiitained in the 13th section, which declares "that no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges ^cct^rerf to the subjects of this State, by this constitu- iion, UNLESS by the law of the land^ or the judgment of his peers." Thus., then, in New York, not only was the right of the citizen in his property not secured by any constitutional provision, but even if it was, it might at. any time be wrested from him, by any '< law of the land," passed by the supreme \e^\s\o^\.\\Q]}o\veT: supreme, indeed, since it might abrogate the cou- slitution itself. Nor do I find in the constitution of New Jersey any recognition of the inviolability of private property. The Legislature is clothed with power simply "to pass laws." The common law of England is declared to be in force: and it follows, consequently, that the Legislature might, (as the om- nipotent Parliament of Great Britain might,) under the common law, and in the abscence of any restrictive clause, exercise the power of abolishing slavery. Pennsylvania, it is known, passed a law abolishing slavery as early as 1780. I have already shown that the right to do so existed under similar provisions to those which existed in the institutions of New Hampshire, and other Northern and Eastern States. It would be tedious, and unnecessary to the purpose of my argument, to enumerate in detail, the various provisions in the constitutions of those States where slavery still exists. It is enough to .«ay, in general, that Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, in reference to the securi- ty of private rights, adopted, with perhaps slight modifications, the provisions of the 29th ch. of Magna Charta. [9 Hen. HI.] One example taken from the bill of rights of Tennessee, (art. 8.) may suffice for all. It is in these words: " That no freeman shall be taken, or im- prisoned, or disseized of his freehold or privileges, or ouilawed, or exiled. or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." The constitution of Kentucky, contains a special provision on the subject of emancipation. It declares that "The General Assembly ^hall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of 13- iheir owners, or without paying their owners> previous to such emancipation, a full equivalent in money for the slaves so emancipated." Virginia, in her bill of rights, inserted the provisions of the 29th chapter of Magna Charta, and in regard to private property, adopted a provision varying from those in the other States and closely resembling that in the Constitution of the United Stales. In the sixth article, the language is this: "All men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own con- sent, or that of their representatives so elected." But whatever opinions, Mr. Speaker, we may form, from the peculiar struc- ture of the different State constitutions or from general reasoning, as to the legislative power of abolishing slavery, when we look to the constitution of the United Slates, to which alone we must refer to ascertain the extent of our authority, we shall find little room for doubt or difficulty. , The fifth article of the amendments to the Federal Constitution is in these words: '< Nor shall private property be takenyir public use without just com- pensation." What is the just interpretation of this provision? Is it not obviously this? Private property may be taken for public use: and wh°n so taken, must be paid for. This construction is, indeed, expressly maintained in the report of the Select Committee. " The true meaning (says the report, p. 15) oi this provision obviously is, that private property shall be taken only fov public use, but shall not betaken even then without adequate remuneration." It is impossible to deny this, without perverting the terms from their ordi* nary signification. To found a claim for taking private property, it must be wanted for the public use. No learned lawyer need be consulted to give the true meaning of this simple language. You can have it expounded without difficulty, by the plainest farmer or mechanic of the country. Can it be pretended, that those who framed the constitution, could be ignorant of the import of the terms they employed ? No attempt can be successfully made, to construe these terms as conferring a right on Congress, to seize upon private property, whenever they may suppose the public good, the general welfare, require it. No expression can be found justly warranting gp.jaold a proposition. The enlightened men who framed the provision, would never have consented to such a grant of power, which would, indeed, authorize the invasion of private property, at the raere will and discretion of Congress. They designed that it, should be held sacred and inviolable by^ the Government, unless it was necessary to appropriate it to the exigencies of the public. Wiien that was the case, and then only, could it be touched^. For example, is land wanted for an encampment? it may be lawfully occupied; slaves, servants, and horses, munitions of war, provisions, may be impressed, when the country requires them for its own uses or necessities: but for no other purpose. You cannot take the property of one man to bestow upon another; stiil less can you confiscate it under & pretext o( ihe general lue/fure: nor under an authority to use it, render it absolutely incapable, as property of any future lise whatever. Such would be the necessary consequence of abolition. In this view. Congress has no more right to effect it under the constitution, than to confiscate a merchant's goods, and throw them into the Potomac, or to waste and destroy his lands, or turn them out as a common. 14 ^.\An alternpt, however, has been made to call in aid that provi^iop of the constitution, which gives to Congress the right to exercise exclusive legis- lation over the District. Exclusive legislation for what? For all purposes? No, sir. For ail lawful and constitutional purposes: for no others. You cannot break over the limits of the constitution within the District, more than .in the States. The claims of our citizens to its protection, are not forfeited within the magic circle of the ten miles square. Can Congress establish a national church in the District of Columbia? put down the press? suppress the liberty of speech? or take away the trial by jury? No man will assert tliis, yet these infractions of the rights of the citizen are prohibited by no higher authority than that which forbids the Government from laying its hands upon private property, unless for the use of the public. If under tiiis clause you can abolisii slavery in the District, it is becausii you interpret the words public use, as of the same import with public good and general ivelfare. The docirine of the general welfare breaks down all limitations of power. Where, sir, would this construction stop? The clause in question was not designed solely for the protection of this District. If, by this forced construction, Congress can seize upon the slaves of the District, what is to pievent it from stretching its arm across the ten rniie^ square, and seizing upon those in the Slates? If you may confiscate that pro- perty in the District upon the plea of the general welfare, constitutionally, may you not, with still greater propriety, use that pov/er to remove the supposed evil existing in the State, on so much more extensive a scale ? The inference cannot be resisted. Human ingenuity cannot assign a solid reason for ex- pounding the clause in question, so as io protect the citizens of the States, and yet to leave those of the District exjwsed. I call upon gentle aien to show, if they can, any solid reason for the distinction. There is none. Wherever a citizen of the United States may be, within the limits of the Union, the constitution throws its mantle aromid him. If}ou may trample upon his privileges here, you may trample upon them every where: if you may seize upon one, you may. seize upon all; and there is no barrier against the absolute power of the Federal Government. [The House proceeded to the orders of the day.] Wednesday, May 24th. It is with unfeigned reluctance, Mr. Speaker, that I throw myself once more upon the i;i(Tuigcncc of the House. I trust to their kindness to make allowances for the frequent interruptions to which I have been subjected, during the brief hour allotted to the consideration of the question before us, by the pressure of other important business. I will hasten, sir, to a close, as speedily as possible, that I may relieve the House from what, I fear, so far as I am concerned, must be a dry and uninteresting discussion; and yield the floor to gentlemen, every way better entitlci to its attention. Permit me, sir, biielly to connect the broken thread of my argument. The jjositions uhich I have endeavored to establish, are : That under a reasonable interpretation of the fundamental institutions of all those States, in which slavery has been abolished, private properly may he taken, at the discretion of the Legislature, for any purpose ichnttver, deemed conducive to the public welfare. That under the constitution of the United States, on the contrary, pri- 15 yate 'pro|)6rty can be taken Jor no other purpose than for the use of the pti'blic. ' ""' ' . . ^ ■ The'claijse referred' to, ' of our peace may hurl their firebrands and bombshells among us. These are the consequences of the j)Osition that Congress has power, under the clause in question, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. The same reasoning that would cstablisl) such a power over the Di.?trict, equally If maintains it within the limits of the States; yes, in the very heart of every State of the Union. I, sir, claim the benefit of the rule laid down by the gentleman from Massachusetts. I ask him; I appeal to every reasonable and candid man, whether such an interpretation is not wholly irreconcileable with the intentions of those who framed the constitution? Whether they do not know, that had such a provision been inserted in that instrument at the time, or such an interpretation anticipated, there Is not a single Southern State that would have ever entered into the LFnion? Once concede to Congress the constitutional power to abolish slavery, here or elsewjiere, and all that remains for the abolitionists to do, is to show that it is expedient to exercise it. They are to prove this to those who assert the power, and who come from States which have already shown their belief of the expediency of exercising it within their own limits. But, the committee say, it would be a breach of faith! Sir, the answer will be, there can be no breach of faith, where no promise has been exacted; no pledges ^iven. If the power was granted, it was granted like all others, that it might be exercised, whenever it should be thought expedient by those entrusted with it. Appeals to honor and good faith were not sufficient to prevent the strenuous efforts to enforce the unconstitutional Missouri re- striction. No, sir, if we yield this power, the day is not far distant when it will be exerted. And what then will be our condition? If we resist it, instead of a rightful resistance of usurpation, we shall be regarded, upon our own con- cession, as in rebellion to constitutional power; our resistance will therefore be denounced as unlawful. We shall be put under the ban of an ultra federal proclamation, and subjected, by a democratic republican majority, to the tender mercies of a force bill. Sir, the South never can consent: x\evti ought to consent, to occupy this position. Mr. Speaker, the doctrine contended for by the Southern States is not, as seems to be supposed, asserted now for the first time. If it has not been often urged, it is because no serious apprehensions were entertained, until of late, of attempts to interfere with their rights. But gentlemen seem to have forgotten that it was maintained in this very Hall on a former occasion. In the session of 1828-9, memorials praying for abolition in the District, wer« referred to a Select Committee, of which Mr. Alexander, of Virginia, was the chairman, and he made a report directly controverting the power of Con- gress upon constitutional principles. Upon what grounds, sir, give me leave to ask, can Congress »how a valid title to such a power? It is no where expressly granted. It is not essential to the due execution of any granted poWer. It cannot be assumed, upon the pretext that slavery may otherwise be perpetual; or that abolition would conduce to the general welfare. It is not conferred by the clause giving Congress exclusive legislation ov»r the District of Columbia. So far from being in conformity with the expressed or implied intention of the parties, it is absolutely incompatible with such intention. It is interdicted by the provision that forbids the taking of private proper- ty, unless when the public themselves have occasion to use it. Nor are these the only grounds, Mr. Speaker, that disprove the exiatenco of the power in question. There is still another clause of the constitution 3 which appears to me equally to forbid it: still another defence thrown around the rights of the people. The Ath article of the amendments of the con- stitution declares that, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per- sons or things to be seized.'' This clause, we are bound to suppose, meant something. The expression "unreasonable searches and seizures" is certainly a vague one: but it necessarily admits of construction. It is not more vague than the subsequent provision, that excessive bail shall not be required. It may be difficult to define what is excessive bail. Yet if a law should authorize bail to be de- manded for a debt often dollars, in a penalty of S10,000, no judge or legis- lator would hesitate to say, such bail was excessive, and its requisition uncon- stitutional. The constitution thus gives a practical security. Now, sir, I proceed to show that the power contended for cannot be exercised without a palpable violation of the article which prohibits inireasonable searches and eeiztires. In doing this, I shall invoke the aid of the Select Committee. All that is necessary, is to concede that the propositions are true which they have maintained — and maintained, 1 trust to the satisfaction of all — that the mbolition of slavery in the District ivoiildbea breach of faith, ttmvise, im- politic, and dangerous to the Union. The abolition of slavery, without the consent of the owner, necessarily implies his dispossession; — a forcible seizure of his property. Can a seizure then, I would ask, be deemed a reasonable seizure, which violates good faith, is u7iioise, — unwise, sir, — im- politic, and dangerous to the U^iion? To hold one to bail in a penalty, 50 or 100 fold the amount of the debt, would be to demand excessive bail, and therefore unconstitutional: to seize a large amount of property tosatisfy a triflngdebt, would, it must be admitted, be unreasonable; and therefore unconstitutional. But to seize his whole estate, without any charge of crime or debt, wnofer circumstances of such outra- geous injustice and folly, as to threaten the very dissolution of the Govern- ment itself, is no violation of the provision which prohibits •unreasonable seizures. It is reasonable then to violate good faith, common sense, and common justice, and to subvert the Union! It may be said, the clause in question applies only to seizures hy color of legal process. Be it so; but dispossession under a law abolishing slavery, would be a seizure under legal process — under authority or color of law. If it be not, then though this clause of the constitution would not apply, there is another that would; that already cited, declaring that property shall not be taken without due process of lau\ If the seizure be, therefore, by due process of law, it is tinrcasonable, because unwise and unjust, and therefore unconstitutional; and if without such process, it is equally uncon- stitutional, since all seizures arc prohibited loilhout due process of law. Unless this construction of the clause ir. question be adoj)ted, it atfords no security for the rights it professes to protect. Congress is supreme, despotic: and the property of the citizen may be confiscated, and his body imprisoned, »t its will and pleasure. This view must have presented itself to the committee: it lay directly in 19 their path; but they shunned it as though it had been an adder. The ele- mentary principles were before them which demonstrated the unconslitu- tionality of the proposed interference of the abolitionists; but they evaded the conclusion. The route prescribed to them led directly to the door of truth: they refused to enter. They were sent forth to battle for the rights of the people, armed with the iegis of the constitution: they gave it up for the frail paper shield of morality. They threw away the sword, and fought with the scabbard. It is much to be regretted, Mr, Speaker, that the Select Committe should have been influenced, by any considerations, to place the great question con- fided to their examination, eorc/w.vave/y upon the grounds they have taken, instead of that contended for by the South. In exploring the coast, to find some safe landing place for our rights, they might have rested them upon the firm ground of the constitution: it was full in their view: they circumnavi- gated it without even attempting to land. But in their homeward voyage they touched, it seems, at Albany — a place famous, it is said, for coining new fangied doctrines — and have brought us a cargo of Albany notions: among them this notion of relying on speculative oj)inions of morality, not in aid merely, but in place of the plain provisions of a written law or com- pact. To show you, sir, that this notion had its birth in Albany — for one I could have rejoiced, had it been suffered to die, and be buried, on the spot where it was born — I refer you, sir, to a celebrated letter of one of the candidates for the presidency. I allude to the letter of Mr. Van Buren, to certain gentlemen in North Carolina: a letter, I will take occasion to say, characterised throughout by artful and disingenuous evasions. Mr. Adams enquired if the gentleman from Virginia had the letter: he wished it read. Mr. Robertson replied, that he had not intended to fatigue the House with reading the letter: it was a very long one. His chief object in adverting to it, was to show the coincidence between the doctrines of Mr. Van Buren and the Albany meeting, and those maintained in the report of the Select Committee: but he had no objection to the reading, if any gentleman desired it. Mr. Adams said he was exceedingly anxious to have that part read, con- sidered by the gentleman from Virginia as evasive. Mr. Robertson requested the clerk to read the following passngc; '*These views, thus expressed and sanctioned by myself, appear to me to coverthe whole ground, save the abstract question, to which you have been pleased to call nxy attention, and I cheerfully embrace the opportunUy you have felt it your duty to afford me, to explain myself fully on that also. As anxious as you can possibly be, to arrest all agitation upon this disturbing subject, I have considered the question you have propounded to me, with a sincere desire to arrive at the conclusion that the subject, in respect to the District of Columbia, can be saiely placed on the same ground on which it stands in regard totheStates, viz: thewant of constitutional power in Congress to interfere in the matter. I owe it, however, to candor, to say to you, that I have not been able to satisfy myself that the grant to Congress, in the con- stitution, of the power of " exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever^' over the Federal District, does not confer on that body the same authority over the subject that would otherwise have been possessed by the States of Maryland and Virginia; or that Congress might not, in virtue thereof, take 20 such steps upon the subject in this District; as those States might themselves take within their own limits, and consistently with their rights of sovereignty. "Thus viewing the matter, I would- not, from the lights now before me, feel myself safe in pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of interfering with or abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. But, whilst such are my present impressions upon the abstract question of the legal power of Congress — impressions which 1 shall at all times be not only ready, but disposed, to surrender upon conviction of error — I do not hesitate to give it to you as my deliberate and well-considered opinion, that there are objections to the exercise of this power, against the wishes of the slaveholding States, as imperative in their nature and obligations, in regulating the conduct of public men, as the most palpable want of con- stitutional power would be.'^ Sir, this letter was obviously framed to suit all parties — all things to all men. To the North, it seems to concede the power; to the South, it protests against exercising it: and then, as if apprehensive of going too far, seeks to conciliate the good will of the Quakers. The question was a plain one: one that might have been answered in three lines; in two words, yes or no. Do you^ or do you not, believe in the const itutioyial power of Congress to abol- ish slavery in the fJistrlct of Columbia? How is it met? I repeat, sir, by a tissue of evasions. The question was put to him here, in Washington; down he dives, out of sight, and rises at Albany. He begins with exjiressing his great desire that his views should be thoroughly understood; and his inten- tion to disclose them in the fullest manner: but in tUe first place, as the sen- timents he has avowed for the last two years may not be known, he must communicate them, before answering the specific enquiry. Then follows an account of the Albany meeting, and the sentiments there expressed, in which he declares his full concurrence. Leaving Albany, on he moves dodg- ing and shuffling, until at length he approaches the point to which lie was bound. But does he approach it by a direct, manly, unequivocal course? Does he, sir, after ail, expre-is any decided opinion one way or the other? Mark his language. He owes it to candor to say that he has not been able to satisfy himself, that the grant of the power of exclusive legislation, does not confer the power of abolishing slavery in the District. But is he satisfied that it c/oe.v? Thus vietoing the subject he would not feel himself sa/e — I believe it, sir; he did not feel himself sajc: he was looking I fear, sir, more to his own safety than to that of the Soutli: — he would not feel himself safe in pro- nouncing, — that Congress does not possess the powtr. But does he feel himself safe in pronouncing that Congress dues possess the power/ No, sir; he speaks of his impressions; his present impressions upon the abstract question; impressions which he is ready, and disposed to surrender, upon conviction of error. I should hope these slight impressions, which he is so willing to renounce, have yielded to a more deliberate exami- nation. They do not deserve the name of opinions. Sup[)Osc, sir, by way of illustration, ihe question were propounded to me, whether certain i^eiule- men in this House, in my oj)inion, were or weie not abolitionists? and I tihould reply, J owe it to candor to say, that I have not been aide to sa- tisfy myself that the gentlemen in question are not abolitionists — would the gentleman from Massachusetts understand me to affirm that they are ? And if I should add, I do not, from the lights now before vie, feel myself 2i iufe in pronounolng that they arc not abolitionists — would he undertake to say that I expressed a decided opinion the one way or the other ? But it was with no view, Mr. Speaker, of commenting at large, upon the equivocating language of this letter, that I thought proper to advert to it. It was principally with the view of pointing the attention of the House, to the doctrine it inculcates, that moral obligations are equally imperative irk regulating the conduct of public men, as the prohibitions of the constitu- tion itself; and more especially to point out the coincidence between this Albany doctrine, and that of the report of the Select Committee. In carrying out this doctrine, as I have already shown, the committee have even gone fur- ther than its original authors, by asserting the superior efficacy of moral, over legal restrictions. Sir, I regret to see the attempt in that report, to maintain a doctrine like this; an attempt to reconcile us to a surrender of power on the faith that it will not be exercised to our injury: to substitute the notions of justice, wisdom, or policy, entertained by moralists and politicians, as a sufficient restraint upon men in power, in lieu of the fixed and permanent landmarks of a written law. Nor, is this the only novel doctrine we have heard up6n this occasion. Not only is this moral obligation a better security, but it is even dangerous, it seems now, to rely at all on our constitutional rights. Sir, it is more dan- gerous to surrender them. If the temple of our liberty is indeed in so totter- ing a condition, that we dare not enter it, it is time to repair it, or look out for better shelter. But where is the danger.'' Are we to be told — and that by democratic republicans — that it is dangerous the people should know, what they know, and what greatly concerns their safety? Are the people, like children passing a church yard, to shut their eyes for fear of seeing ghosts? The abolitionists, it seems, will be encouraged, if they discover that a majority of this House is with them on the question of power: yet gentlemen tell them it is morally certain that the fact is so, and object to bring the ques- tion to a vote, on the ground of our inevitable defeat. Sir, the abolitionists are awake: they know all that we know, and probably much more: and I am unwilling that the people should not be as well informed, as their ene- mies, of the extent of the danger. We should not consent that they shall be hoodwinked, and bound hand and foot, while we unmuzzle the ilogs that worry them. There is one other constitutional objection, Mr. Speaker, to the power claimed for Congress of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, which it would not be proper to omit: — that to be deduced from a just view of the power of appropriation. It is important to recur, occasionally, to funda- mental principles: to the doctrines and opinions entertained at an earlier period of our history, by the sages who were called on to frame, or expound, the institutions under which we live. On a question like this, the opinions of none are entitled to greater weight, than those of the venerable Madison. According to the creed of the old federal party, the power of appropiation had no other limit than the general welfare: or in other words, the discretion of Congress. But this was not the (idctrine of the republicans of 179S. They insisted that public money could not be constitutionally expended, to effect any objects, except such as were expressly enumerated in the constitu- tion. This was the principle maintained in Mr. Madison's celebrated Re- port of 1799, on the alien and sedition laws. That report has been regarded 22 as the text book of State right politicians; the standard of republican ortho- doxy. I request that the clerk may read a passage from the argument upon this question, in which the import of the terms general ivelfare is com- mented upon. The Clerk read the following passage: '«e or confiscate them in the States. Or say, that we are confined to the District: that we may open a market here and here only for the purchase of slaves, with a view to emancipation: then the District may become a great mart for slaves, and the treasury ex- hausted in purchasing them, brought in, as they would be, from all the slave- holding States. Whether the power of appropriation imply or confer the power of abolition, or not, there is no doubt that abolition or emancipation, necessarily supposes and authorizes appropriation. If slaves be purchased, or taken against the owner's consent, they must be paid for. Now I inquire of the State-right politicians, the democratic republican majority of this House, if they are prepared to assert this doctrine? Have we not heard from them, heavy denunciations of one of the candidates for the presidency, for having as it is said, expressed the opinion, that public money may be lawfully applied for the liberation of slaves, in aid of the Colonization Society? And will they now, by affirming the constitutionality of abolishing slavery, and the consequent appropriation of money to that object, assert the very doctrine they have condemned? If we can lawfully emancipate slaves, here or elsewhere, we must hare the power of determining what shall be done with them; of providing the means, if necessary, of removing them: and in that case there can be, surely, no impropriety in putting them under the care of the Colonization Society. I warn the party, that they cannot maintain the power it is supposed they are prepared to assert, without splitting upon the doctrine they profess so much to abhor. But if they will assert it, I trust we shall at least hear, from them, no more denunciations against others for defending the same principle. Let us trace a little farther, the consequences of this power. If you may confiscate .or purchase slaves, you may hold them. Has the House considered the consequences of authorizing the General Govern- ment to become a slaveholder? How will you dispose of them? Where will you place them? If you can confer the right to freedom, you may prescribe the conditions on which it shall be enjoyed; and if these be not complied with, re-convert them, as is done in some of the States, to slavery. You may make it a condition, that unless they depart from the District within a limited time, they shall forfeit their freedom. But suppose the States will not consent, that such a crew of ignorant and unprincipled pau- pers and vagabonds, shall be turned loose upon them. Have you the power to compel their admission? Will you attempt to enforce that power? or will you confine them within the bounds of the District? or give them up to the Colonization Society? When you shall have emancipated them, what sir, let me ask, is to be their condition? Are they to be regarded as citizens of the United States? I know of no means whereby the United States can acquire citizens, but two: by birth, or by naturalization: but emancipated slaves are neither citizens by birth, nor by naturalization. Will you then admit them to an equality of rights with the free citizens of the different States? make them eligible to all offices, civil and military; foreign emba*. 24 - sies; the presidency itself? or are they to be freedmen, and not freemen? citizens without the privi!eg»^s of citizenship? But, perhaps, you will enlist them as soldiers! It must be confessed, better materials could not be found for a standing army. They might serve an admirable purpose too, to keep the South quiet; or the Capital may be s-urrot^nded by a chosen band of black Janissaries, and the day may come, when no man shall dare to rai?T his voice in this Hall, in defence of right against power. Are gentlemen prepared to assert a claim fraught with these monstrous, these momentous consequences? 1 trust not; for sir, I repeat, the people of the South can never admit it. They cannot consent to hold their property, their lives, and their liberty, at the mere discretion of a majority of Congress. They never will be, they never ought to be satisfied, until a power so dangerous to their rights, so fatal fo their peace, shall be solemnly ^iy^jo,-.^.^^ i^y ♦<-■•; rv^y.^rnmenf: or if ? Hmibt exis^, the pretension for ever put to rest by a constitutional provioio.i, too plain to bu perverteu. LHO.p, i^^^