me THE DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION: iiiatflriral $k^ WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT, NEW YORK : D. APPLETON & CO., 200 BROADWAY M, DCCC.LII, Entered according to Act of Congress, by WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina. HONORABLE RICHARD RUSH. Dear Sir — I THINK I can fairly hold you somewhat responsible for the venture I make in publishing the following pages, and will not, therefore, apologize for asking you to .resume yoiu' old functions, and present me at the Court of that Public Opinion which is certainly, in our day, the most powerful of sovereigns. At any rate, I am sure there is no one to whom I could with more propriety dedicate this volume, than to one of whom it has been said eloquently, but not extravagantly, by an eminent Senator, that in the course of an unusually long and important diplomatic career he " never said a word that was improper, nor betrayed a thought that might peril his country's fortunes." I know, moreover, that nowhere could I find a juster ap- preciation of my motive, nor a kinder criticism of my imper- fect performance. Permit me then, my dear sir, to inscribe your name here, in acknowledgment of that valuable and pleasant intercourse which warrants me, I trust, in signing myself, TiMily and respectfully, your friend, WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT. Barnwell Island. So. Ca., April 8th, 1852. PREFACE. This volume is literally what it pretends to be — an Historical Essay, not a History. My object has been, at a time when the influence of our foreign policy is beginning to govern largely the fortunes of the country, to ask attention to the spirit and character of those negotiations which secured us a place in the world. I have stated facts with care, and drawn conclusions with caution ; but the general impression of these pages must of course justify itself. The best of diplomatic histories is undoubtedly the record of the negotiations themselves, but as the mere diplomatic cor- respondence of the Revolution — that is, the communications of the foreign ministers of the United States with Congi-ess — takes up twelve goodly octavo volumes, besides requiring for its comprehension a wide field of contemporary history, it is certain that very few, whatever interest might be felt on the subject, would have either time or inclmation to master then- own conclusions. This is, therefore, simply an eflfoi-t to render more familiar to the public mind an important and interesting period of the country's history. It would have been easy to have made a larger book : the labor of this, such as it is, has been to condense its material into the fewest e pages. In concluding, I must express my great obligations to Mr. Vlll PREFACE. Sparks, the ominent president of the University of Cam- bridge, for the kindness with whieli he allowed me to con- sult his invaluable MS. collection of documents relating to the early diplomatic history of the United States. I only wish that I felt any confidence that I had acknowledged my obli- gations, by using them to the most advantage for a subject, which I would be glad if this volume would provoke him to rescue from the hands of so incompetent a guardian as myself. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. Introductory, ...... 1 CHAPTER II. Negotiation with France, . . , . 15 CHAPTER III. Spain, ....... 59 The Armed Neutrality, . . . .73 Treaty with Holland, ..... 82 CHAPTER IV. Negotiations for Peace with England, . . 94 CHAPTER V. Conclusion, . . . . . .144 ^jPExmx. Arthur Lee — Rayneval's Mission, . . . 163 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. CHAPTER I. IKTRODUCTORY. In general opinion, the idea of Diplomatic His- tory has been strangely misconceived : and men of even educated intelHgence are apt to regard diplomatic correspondence as a wearisome anti- thesis of studied ambiguity and disingenuous acuteness. Negotiation has almost come to be considered a sort of national special pleading which too often consumes time and obstructs justice ; while the restless spirit of modern society, eager for results, and regardless of either inter- vening rights or duties, rejects as mischievous surplusage in the economy of government a ser- 1 2 DIPLOMACY OF TPIE REVOLUTION. vice, the particular purpose of whose labor is to elaborate doubts into difficulties, and to check the selfish extravagance of one interest by demon- strating the reasonable selfishness of another. " Time and I," said Cardinal Mazarin, " against any other two ;" but the course of modern policy seems to prove that every nation now regards the colleague of that sagacious statesman as its most terrible enemy. Whatever, is to be done must be done quickly, and the action of the world no longer lets " I dare not wait upon I world." And the mischief of this impetuous temperament is aggravated by that other charac- teristic of modern times, which tests the worth of public measures solely by their agreement with popular passion — a habit which elevates every popular paroxysm into a fit of inspiration, and denies that the people can ever imagine a vain thing. Now, diplomacy involves, first, delay in order to discussion — the admitted possibility of there being more than one strong will or one just inte- rest ; and next, it requires in its sphere as tho- rough a concentration of power into individual hands as is compatible with national safety. The method and forms of diplomatic labor INTRODUCTORY. 3 have also contributed to this general misconcep- tion. For although it is matter of historical proof that all great negotiations have been the expression of large national interests, yet, as in the earlier periods of European diplomacy those interests were represented in the persons of almost absolute sovereigns, and preserved in the antique shape of feudal rights, parchment charters, and complex institutions, a superficial criticism has confused the substance and the form, and identi- fied the labors of learned and liberal jurists (for such ambassadors undoubtedly once were) with the maintenance of dynastic privileges and the perpetuation of antiquated formulas. Often, too, the chief merit of diplomatic skill is in what it prevents rather than in what it achieves. And as it usually happens that important negotiations are not made public until after the men and the events which governed them have passed away, this very success contributes to its own deprecia- tion ; for each generation finds itself too busily employed in discharging instant claims, to give much time or study to past history and past heroes. The following language of a recent bio- grapher of an eminent diplomatist contains a general truth, of which he is not the only illustra- 4 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. tion : " The labors of an ambassador, whatever difficulty and danger, whatever importance, re- sponsibility, and even dignity, may belong to them, are from their nature necessarily so ob- scure, so unlike those of men whose deeds, being associated with eloquence and military glory, are ' bruited ' through the world, that the name of him to whose memory these pages are devoted, and who is considered by those who knew what he did and was as the greatest of English ambas- sadors, is so little known, that many have asked, or will ask, who was he who is thus highly esti- mated?"* But above the tumultuous hurry of modern events — away from the passionate wilful- ness of popular statesmanship — independent of that noisy recognition which the world calls fame — in presence of the men whose dispatches have recorded the phases, and whose counsels have governed the crises of modern history, whose names are stamped indelibly upon those great charters of modern civilization — the treaties of "Westphalia, of Utrecht, of Vienna — it can be safely and surely said that diplomatic history has its own full and peculiar value. * Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell, K.B., preface, page V. INTRODUCTORY. The leading fact in modern history is — to bor- row a philosophical phrase almost generalized into common use — its progress by antagonism. For if any period be selected for special exami- nation, while it will be found to have a general tendency, a uniform character, and a precise result, yet all this will have been attained by the conflict of opposing national interests ; and in each nation, the governing interest will have been matured through the contest of opposing parties. And it has usually happened that every histori- cal period determines in one of those epochs where the interests of nations are so inextricably confused, that the history of the whole only can be the true history of any one. It is the compre- hension of these great stages in human progress that gives to history its highest value, for here we learn the point which has been reached, and strive to learn the course which will be travelled. To study profitably such periods, we want not merely to catch what is called the spirit of the times — a vague consciousness of the onward sweep of the historical current ; but we need the careful ana- lysis of those conflicting elements which have modified each other into one broad result — the items of those great national claims upon whieh 6 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. Time has stricken the balance. "Now, at the ful- filment of all these periods — at the close of every one of those fearful struggles which have con- vulsed in order to calm the nations of the world — the diplomatists of each era have been gathered together to determine the objects of national de- sire, count the cost of national success, and re- adjust the respective values of national power. In the record of their deliberations there should be found the justest estimate of national necessities, the strongest reflection of national sentiment, the truest summary of national history. But there is another special value in the trea- sured experience of diplomatic records. The periods of modern history have never been cha- racterized by the domination of some one great and absorbing empire. The civil code of no mighty capital has ever been elevated into the supreme law of a subject civilization ; the vigor- ous spirit of no one people has controlled the direction and the form of modern thought. The results of our centuries have been attained by the constant conflict of equal nations. In that strug- gle has been developed the grandest system of national justice that the world has ever seen. The sufferings of every war, and the blessings of IN^ODUCTORY. 7 every peace ; the varied sagacity of every nation, and the common instincts of every people ; the practical experience of busy life, and the pro- founder wisdom of studious philosophy, have all contributed to its glorious perfection. And the Law of Nations, founded on principles of univer- sal justice, sanctioned by the precepts of Chris- tian revelation, illustrated and justified by the great events of history, appeals both to the pride and safety of the nations for its sacred preserva- tion. But in the strife of so many interests, it has been and will ever be to the temporary ad- vantage of some one nation, to deny the force of these impartial rules, and refuse a wise obedience to this common authority. On all such occasions it has been the peculiar duty of an enlightened and instructed diplomacy to invoke the experi- ence of the past, and to vindicate at all hazards the absolute inviolability of international law. And even in those disastrous periods which the world has seen, when the unreasoning force of armed selfishness has trampled on recognised right, the language of diplomacy has been that of constant and spirited protest, and history has thus preserved upon its records strong testimony for Truth's appeal to after and better times. The 8 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION'. value of this perpetual witness cannot be exag- gerated ; for, borne as it has been bj the most powerful nations in their day of humiliation, it gives to international law a constant and consist- ent authority, under which the weakest people may shelter themselves securely. Diplomatic history is also to some extent a history of motives and principles. For while general history, like the record of a legal verdict, announces simply a result, diplomatic negotia- tions, like the argument of counsel, declare the value of adverse claims^ and thus vindicate the moral merits of the contending parties. To every nation, therefore, its diplomatic records are of the highest importance, indicating as they do the various interests which in the lapse of time have determined its policy, the motives which under changing circumstances have governed its con- duct, and the principles of public law which it has sanctioned as authority. To no people, how- ever, does the study of their Diplomatic history recommend itself with more practical force than ourselves. It is the mistaken pride of present opinion that we stand apart from the world, intrusted by God's providence with our peculiar and separate mission ; that our wisdom is the INTRODUCTORY. 9 summary of the world's experience, and our future independent of the world's control. But if history forces upon us any one conclusion, it is, that we belong as much to the past as to the future ; that we are an essential and inseparable portion of that Christendom whose deliberations are common because their interests are one ; and that our progress can be neither safe nor wise unless we realize, not only our value in, but our connexion with the world. Whatever may have been our situation once, we are now placed between the two highways of the world's com- merce; and if we have extended the circle of national relations, we have not left, and cannot leave, the limits of national duty. That this was the earnest conviction of the great men who founded the Kepublic, their words and deeds are left to show. When the United States of America claimed from the nations of Europe a recognition of their independence, they declared in explicit language the position to which they thought themselves entitled ; and in their Diplomatic Correspondence with the Governments to whom they applied, they recog- nised most emphatically the rights and responsi- bilities which that claim implied. It is true that 1* 10 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. mighty changes have been wrought since their day ; but these changes, it must be remembered, have resulted from the natural development of principles at work even then. And if ampler power and maturer knowledge have brought increased weight, it will be matter of pride as well as advantage to know that the country is moving in the direction indicated by those great men who perhaps " builded better than they knew," but who surely laid the foundations of this present power. It is no slight thing for a nation to possess a traditional policy. And if there is found in the diplomatic history of the Eevolution the outline of that foreign policy which the country's interests seem now to require ; if, consistently with national obligation and the broad requirements of national justice, may be found even then indicated the germ of that system which after events have only developed into fuller consistency, we will have that highest guarantee of political wisdom, the solemn and impartial approbation of the past. In the diplomatic history of Europe previous to the American war, there were three periods of great and general interest, indicated respect- ively by the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of INTRODUCTORY. 11 Utrecht, and the Peace of Paris in 1763. The negotiations of Westphalia comprehended the interests of all continental Europe ; for the pre- ceding war, which had commenced with the religious differences in Grermany, had ended by involving all Europe in what appeared to be an interminable conflict. The mass of interests to be discussed, and the nature of many of the ques- tions between the Catholic and Protestant States of Germany, which were rather legal than politi- cal, depending often for decision upon charter claims, disputed feudal rights, and contested civil privileges, gave a complicated and somewhat technical character to much of the proceedings. But the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated the authority of international law, by proclaiming so close a community of interest betweeu the nations of Europe as to justify and even necessi- tate common counsels ; and it recognised the power of an European Congress to adjust national claims according to an understood system of national rights which was then the public law of Europe. The negotiations at Utrecht went further. The questions then dis- cussed were not so much questions of right as of interest. They declared the existence of an 12 DIPLOMACY OF THE RKVOLUTIOX, European balance of power not dependent upon dynastic rights nor feudal constructions, but regulated by the exigencies of great national interests. They recognised in every nation the right to protest against the exaggerated extension of any other nation, requiring for the common good a relative equality of national power. The interests, however, which had hitherto governed the foreign policy of nations was chiefly terri- torial ; and this influence determined to a great degree the character of that balance between the great states of Europe which it was the aim of the Treaty of Utrecht to establish. It was not until some time later that broader and more directly popular interests began to control the course of governments. But from that period the relations of nations were perpetually chang- ing, and alliances seemed made only to be broken. Interests the most diverse were mixed up in the same issues, and, to borrow an apt illustration, " men fought in Saxony for the possession of Canada." That balance of power which had been made the system of Europe was very much modified after the Peace of Utrecht, by the family compact of the Bourbon dynasties, and the famous Treaty of 1756 between France and INTRODUCTORY/ 13 Austria. But the Treaty of Paris, 1768, by which France abandoned her valuable North American colonies to England, was a still wider departure from the old principles. That treaty established, or rather recognised, two facts, which were to shape the policy of at least the immedi- ate future. The first was, the vast and admitted maritime superiority of Great Britain, which threatened to destroy the system of the Peace of Utrecht, by introducing a new element into the calculation of national strength, the influence of which was almost monopolized by one power. The second was, that England's Colonial posses- sions were part and parcel of her national power, and, as such, direct makeweights in the European balance. A few years after the negotiation of this Treaty, the United States of America declared their Independence. They found in full author- ity a political system based on these three principles: First, the community of national interest warranting national interference : Second, the recognised necessity of a relative equality of national power : and third, the direct importance to the European system of any changes in the Colonial strength of the European maritime 14 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. powers. Did the United States accept the prin- ciples of the system into which they sought to enter ? And what practical obligations did such an acknowledgment imply ? These are questions of deep interest to a nation called to play no small part in the world's affairs : for it has been well and nobly said, " that it is impossible to separate the policy of the country from the con- science of the nation." CHAPTER II. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. The Declaration of Independence by the United States required, as a necessary consequence, an appeal to the nations of Europe. ' For closely connected as was the whole system of the Euro* pean powers, the change in the relative strength of England, caused by this separation, was a matter of great moment — a new political element, which their interests forced them to examine. Not only so, but the commercial relations of the new power were either directly with European nations or their remaining colonial possessions ; and it was, therefore, of the first importance to the United States to determine as speedily as possible the character of those relations which depended for their adjustment upon other wills than their own. No sooner, therefore, had the idea of independence taken a practical shape in the deliberations of Congress than the subject of foreign alliances began to attract the thoughts and exercise the judgment of the national legisla- 16 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. ture. At the very outset of these discussions there was manifested a broad difference of opinion. One class of statesmen thought that the wisest and most dignified course was to conduct the war of Independence to its issue, and, having achieved its purpose unaided, to leave the great commercial advantages of the country to plead their own claims, and draw by their own attraction the regards and proposals of European powers. They thought — to use the expressive language of Dr. Franklin to Arthur Lee, when on his fruitless errand to Spain — '''A virgin state should pre- serve the virgin character, and not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others."* Another class, with a broader appreciation of political necessities, and, as it proved, a juster sense of the national interest, advocated the policy of diplomatic advances. They saw and proved that the interests involved in the question of Inde- pendence were, to a certain extent, European interests — affecting, by their modification, the entire balance of European power — and they felt themselves warranted in demanding efiicient * Diplomatic Corresp. vol. ii. p. 57. Franklin to Lee, March 21, 1111. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. H support iu exchange for practical benefits. "I think," said John Adams — who more than any other man contributed to plan and execute the wise scheme of American policy — "I think we have not meanly solicited for friendships any- where. But to send ministers to every great court in Europe, especially the maritime courts, to pro- pose an acknowledgment of the independence of America and treaties of amity and commerce, is no more than becomes us, and in my opinion is our duty to do. It is perfectly consistent with the genuine system of American policy, and a piece of respect due from new nations to old ones."* These differences were, however, without dif&culty harmonized into a plan of practical action, and perhaps, after all, consisted more in the argumentative statement of extreme opinions, than in any want of concert when the necessity appeared for a prompt and positive policy. It is certainly as great an error to suppose that the one party opposed all treaties, as to infer that the other advised " treaties with all the world ;" and * Diplom. Corres. vol. v. p. 361, Adams to Franklin, Oct. 14, 1780. For a reverse opinion see Life of Gouverneur Morris, by Sparks, vol. i. p. 205-7. 18 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. it should be added that, if the abortive and mor- tifying negotiations with Prussia, Russia, and Spain, justify the caution of one course, the treaties with France and Holland are triumphant vindications of the bold sagacity of the other. And indeed, the very principles laid down in discus- sion by the advocates of foreign alliances, defined with strict and rather narrow limitations the sphere in which they should be sought. For Adams, who, from the autumn of 1775 through the spring and winter of 1776, was anxiously engaged in pressing upon Congress the three great points of national policy which were ulti- mately adopted, viz. Independence, the forma- tion of State governments, and foreign alliances — has left on record his opinions as then expressed. " Some gentlemen," says he in his autobiography, " doubted of the sentiments of France, thought she would frown upon us as rebels and be afraid to countenance the example. I replied to these gentlemen, that I apprehended they had not attended to the relative situation of France and England ; that it was the unquestionable interest of France that the British continental colonies should be independent ; that Britain, by the conquest of Canada and her naval triumphs NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 19 during the last war, and by lier vast possessions in America and tlie East Indies, was exalted to a height of power and pre-eminence that France must envy and could not endure. But there was much more than pride and jealousy in the case. Her rank, her consideration in Europe, and even her safety and independence were at stake. The navy of Great Britain was now mistress of the seas all over the globe ; the navy of France almost annihilated. Its inferiority was so great and obvious, that all the dominions of France in the West Indies and in the East Indies lay at the mercy of Great Britain, and must remain so as long as Korth America belonged to Great Britain, and afforded them so many harbors abounding with naval stores and resources of all kinds, and so many men and seamen ready to assist them and man their ships. That interest could not lie; that the interest of France was so obvious, and her motives so cogent, that nothing but a judi- cial infatuation of her councils could restrain her from embracing us ; that our negotiations with France ought, however, to be conducted with great caution, and with all the foresight we could possibly obtain ; that we ought not to enter into any alliance which should entangle us in any 20 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. future wars in Europe ; that we ought to lay it down as a first principle, and a maxim never to be forgotten, to maintain an entire neutrality in all future European wars ; that it never could be our interest to unite with France in the destruc- tion of England, nor in any measures to break her spirit or reduce her to a situation in which she could not support her independence. On the other hand, it could never be our duty to unite with Britain in the too great humiliation of France ; that our real, if not our nominal inde- pendence, would consist in our neutrality. If we united with either nation in any future war we should become too subordinate and dependent on that nation, &c. * * * That, therefore, in preparing treaties to be proposed to foreign powers, and in the instructions to be given to our ministers, we ought to confine ourselves strictly to a treaty of commerce ; that such a treaty would be an ample compensation to France for all the aid we should want from her. The opening of the American trade would be a vast resource for her commerce and naval power, and a great assistance to her in protecting her East and West Indian possessions, as well as her fisheries ; but that the bare dismemberment of the British NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 21 Empire would be to her an incalculable security and benefit, worth more than all the exertions we require of her, even if it should draw her into another eight or ten years' war." Or, as he has condensed it in another shape, " Is any assistance attainable from France ? What connexion may we safely form with her ? 1. No political con- nexion ; submit to none of her authority ; receive no governors or officers from her. 2. No milita- ry connexion ; receive no troops from her. 3. Only a commercial connexion — that is, make a treaty to receive her ships into our ports ; let her engage to receive our ships into her ports ; furnish us with arms, cannon, saltpetre, duck, steel."* * These two extracts will be found in the Life and Works of John Adams, edited by his grandson, vol. ii., the first at pages 504-506, the last at pages 487-489. The first quotation is in every way so remarkable, not only as forcibly stating the principles of the country's policy then, but actually anticipating in its counsel the difficulties that arose in the administration of Washington with regard to the course to be pursued between England and France, that it is proper to state that it is taken from the autobiography, not the diary, and the former was written long after the events which it narrates. But the latter quotation appears to be a note made at the time of the debate, March, 1776. 22 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. "^^""he idea of a treaty on so narrow a basis was, under the stress of circumstances, aban- doned ; and the country, finding advantageous alliances within reach, was forced to assume reciprocal obligations of a more warlike character.;^ But these opinions express the first intentions even of the extremest party in Congress. Go- verned by these views, on June 12th, 1776, a committee, consisting of Dickinson, Franklin, Jno. Adams, Harrison, and Kobert Morris, was appointed by Congress to prepare a plan of treaty to be proposed to foreign powers. On September 17th of the same year a plan was submitted, discussed, and adopted, and, in a few days after, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee were commissioned to represent the United States of America at the Court of Versailles.^ The treaty which they were instructed to propose, and under circumstances to modify, was based on the princi- ples expressed above. It was essentially and only a treaty of commerce. It asked for no mili- tary aid, it stipulated no political conditions. The only recognition of the probable interfer- ence of France consisted in express provisions : 1. That if, in consequence of the treaty, Great * Secret Journal of Congress, vol. ii. pp. 7-29. NEGOTIATION WITH PRANCE. 23 Britain should declare war against France, the United States should not assist Great Britain with men^ money, ships, or any articles consi- dered contraband under the provisions of the treaty. 2. That France should never invade, or under any pretence attempt to take possession of Labrador,^ New Britain, Nova Scotia, Acadia, Canada, Florida, Newfoundland, &c., &c., it being the intent of the treaty that the United States should have the sole, exclusive, undivided, and perpetual possession of the countries, cities, towns on the said continent, and of all the islands near it, which were or had been under the jurisdiction of Great Britain, whenever they should be united or confederated with the United States^ 8. That if France should, in case of war, get possession of any British colony, there should be the same freer dom of trade between such conquests and the United States, as between France and the United States. To these very stringent articles, implying certainly no very great sense of weakness on one side, and manifesting but small confi- dence towards the other, were added the com- mercial clauses, providing for the freest trade between France and the United States ; proclaim- 24 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. ing the most liberal principles of maritime law ; requiring the protection of the French navy as convoy in certain cases, and guaranteeing that France should protect the subjects and vessels of the United States against the depredations of the Barbary powers " as effectually and fully " as the King of Grreat Britain, before the commencement of the war, protected the people and inhabitants of the United States '^then called British colonies in America." That such a treaty could be negotiated seems fairly impossible. For, in the first place, it implied that the independence of the United States was not a matter of European discussion at all ; the treaty assuming it as a fact beyond the control of the very nations whose interests it was to influence. In the next plate, it offered no guarantee to France that such independence could be preserved, even if recognised ; for there was nothing in the treaty to prevent a reconcili- ation with England, and at any moment France might have found the combined forces of England and America acting in concert to check the progress of her arms. And lastly, the only advantage held out, in exchange for the commer- cial privileges demanded, was free trade with a NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 25 country covered with invading armies, and at war with the great maritime power of the world. Indeed the treaty went so far, in one of the pro- visions just quoted, as to demand free trade with conquests to be made with no assistance from the party who thus hoped to reap the benefit. The Commissioners, however, were provided with instructions which relieved them from the neces- sity of supporting the high tone of the treaty ; for not only were they authorized to waive, if necessary, some most important points, but they were informed, "It is highly probable that France means not to let the United States sink in the present contest : but, as the difiiculty of obtaining true accounts of our condition may cause an opinion to be entertained that we are able to support the war on our own strength and resources longer than in fact we can do, it will be proper for you to press for the imme- diate and explicit declaration of France in our favor, upon a suggestion that a re-union with Great Britain may be the consequence of delay ;" and further, '' you are desired to obtain, as early as possible, a public acknowledgment of the independency of these States on the crown and 2 26 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. Parliament of Great Britain, by the Court of France."* To carry out these instructions would require, it is obvious, a closer as well as a wider treaty than that they were authorized to negotiate. A declaration of France in favor of the United States, or a formal recognition of their indepen- dence, involved higher questions, and embraced a vaster scope of consequences than any com- mercial arrangements. Furnished with these instructions, the Commissioners joined each other in Paris on December 22d, 1776, and on the 28th of the same month had, to use their own words, their first audience of " His Excellency the Count Vergennes, one of his Most Christian Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. We laid before him our commission, with the articles of the proposed treaty of commerce. He assured us of the protection of his Court, and that due consi- deration should be given to what we offered. "f Copies of the papers were sent to the Count * Secret Journal of Congress, vol. ii. p. 29, 30. f Diplom. Corres. vol. i, p. 250. Commissioners to Com- mittee of Secret Corresp. Jan. 17th, 1777. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 2*7 d'Aranda, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, and the Commissioners were fairly entered upon their doubtful and difficult labors. Before their progress can be followed with profit, it will be necessary to understand dis- tinctly the position of France, and the views which that Court was prepared to take of the American Eevolution. The diplomatic success of the Due de Choiseul in negotiating the treaty of 1756 with Austria, and uniting the scattered strength of the Bourbon dynasties under the provisions of the Family Compact, produced an immediate and startling effect upon the whole European system. The idea of the balance of power claimed by French historians as an original creation of French policy, which had been established by the Treaty of Westphalia and confirmed in principle by the Treaty of Utrecht, was based upon the assumed rivalship of the great powers of France and Austria. In the conflicting interests and necessary antagonism of these two powers, the minor states of Europe found, according to this system, the guarantees of their safety. And although it might fairly be argued that the concentration and settlement of Prussia, and the prodigious 28 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. and constantly increasing superiority of England^s maritime power, effectually disturbed the old system, and called imperatively for a change in national relations, yet such a departure from a traditional policy necessarily started new ques- tions and worked unforeseen conclusions ; for neither to nations nor men is it given to "look into the seeds of time, And say which grain will grow and which will not." The war which terminated in the Peace of Paris in 1763, closed under circumstances that promised no permanent stability. The naval power of England had grown to gigantic propor- tions, and the wants of her commerce demanded continents for its monopoly. The conditions of that treaty forced from France all of her Ameri- can colonies ; and although, in a very pardonable spirit, she might declare that the vast extent of Canada was of very moderate commercial advan- tage, and the rich soil of Louisiana was almost uninhabited, yet her Spanish allies found no safety for their colonial possessions in the spread of British provinces ; and her own pride found it a bitter reflection, that the French flag no longer floated in sovereignty over lands consecrated by NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 29 the chivalrous courage of Montcalm, and illus- trated by the heroic enterprise of La Salle. At the death of Louis XY. and the accession of Louis XYL, although it is true that the Bourbons reigned in France, Spain, Sicily, and Naples, and by family alliances were united with the houses of Savoy, Bavaria, and Saxony, yet in no period of history was the influence of France upon Europe so weak. Louis XY., whose diplomatic tastes are proved by the elaborate memoirs which were furnished for his special study by his cabinet of secret correspondence, was interested enough to speculate, but not ener- getic enough to act ; and the partition of Poland certified to the world both his weakness and his apathy. From 1763, however, to the accession of Louis XYL France was employed in nursing her strength, and especially in reconstructing her navy. And although shorn of some of his proudest possessions, and compelled by national necessities to hold a wary course in his foreign policy, that monarch realized fully, and in the opening of his reign sustained nobly, the character and power of the King of France. And if the language of his ministers may be justly regarded 30 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. as the expression of his own will, neither the genius nor the fortune of his most renowned ancestors could have conferred upon him a purer fame, than the fulfilment of his own right- minded ambition. For early in 1777, the Count de Yergennes, in submitting to his consideration certain questions of foreign policy, gives the fol- lowing wise and elevated counsel. "France, constituted as she is, ought rather to fear than to desire increase of territory. A larger extent would be only a weight placed at the extremities to weaken the centre. She has in herself all that makes real power : a fertile soil, precious staples with which other nations cannot dispense, zealous and obedient subjects devoted to their monarch and their country. The glory of conqueror kings is the scourge of humanity, while the fame of a beneficent mon- arch is its blessing. It is this, sire, which should be the birthright of a king of France, especially that of your majesty, who lives but for the good of human kind. France, placed in the centre of Europe, has a right to influence in all its great affairs. Its king, like a supreme judge, can re- gard his throne as a tribunal instituted by Provi- dence to vindicate the duties and fitness of royalty. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 31 If, at the same time that your majesty busies yourself anxiously to restore order in your inter- nal economy, you direct your policy to establish the opinion that no greediness of conquest, no ambitious hopes move your spirit — that all you wish is order and justice, — your example will do more than your arms. Justice and peace will reign everywhere, and all Europe will recognise with gratitude the blessings which it owes to your majesty's wisdom, virtue, and magnanimi- ty."* Circumstances soon tested the spirit of the king, the wisdom of his minister, and the extent of his resources. The difficulties between Great Britain and the thirteen colonies, which com- menced not long after the treaty of Paris in 1763, had by 1775 developed into a difference so serious in its character and so threatening in its results, as to attract the attention of foreign pow- ers. Early in 1776 Yergennes, who had carefully considered the probable consequences of this political change, prepared and submitted to his majesty an elaborately reasoned Memoir e on this subject in all its relations. The Memoir e was, by order of the king, referred on 12th March, * Flassans, Diplomatie Fran9aise. Tome viL pp. 139, 140. 32 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. 1776, to the examination of the celebrated Turgot, at that time Comptroller-General of France, and he was instructed to report upon it in writing. In the following April the opinion of the Comp- troller-General was reported in a long and mas- terly paper, giving proof, in its reasonings and anticipations, of an almost prophetic statesman- ship.* These documents may justly be referred to in proof of the opinions which the French Court held in regard to the American revolution. The first point to be settled was what would be the probable result of the contest. Whether, 1. A reconciliation by which the English ministers, recognising its impracticability, should * The report of Turgot may be found in any complete edition of his works. I quote from the edition in two large 8vo. volumes, edited by M. Eugene Daire, and forming part of the "Collection des Prinoipaux Economistes." The Memoire will be found at page 441, tome ii. The Mhnoire of Ver- gennes I have read in the collection of Mr. Sparks, President of Cambridge University, at pages 10-14 of the folio MSS. entitled "Correspondence, chiefly between the French and Spanish Ministers, concerning the American Revolution. Copied from the originals in the Ai'chives des Affaires Etrang^res, Paris." As the report of Turgot states fully and fairly the points of the Memoire of Vergennes, I have quoted the former only in the text. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 33 abandon their plan of subjugating the colonies, and restore things to their condition before the passage of the Stamp Act. 2. The conquest of the colonies, which, by increasing the power of the crown, might give op- portunity and temptation to an attack by the Eng- lish monarch on constitutional liberties at home. 8. The defeat of the British power in America, which might induce the British minister to look for indemnities at the expense of France and Spain, in order first to retrieve their disgrace, and next, to offer to the rebels, as a means of reconciliation, the commerce and provisioning of the conquered West Indies, or, 4th, and lastly, the termination of the war by the absolute independence of the colonies, which was considered as an inevitable, though perhaps remote result. The next point to be determined was, which of these results was most agreeable to the inte- rests of France and Spain ; and the last, what course of policy it became the two courts to adopt. " In reviewing," says the Memoire^ " with M. le Comte de Vergennes the different manners in which the quarrel of England with her colo- nies may be supposed likely to terminate, it ap- 34 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. pears to me that the event most desirable for the interest of the two crowns will be that England should overcome the resistance of her colonies and force them to submit to her yoke— because if the colonies should be subjugated only by the ruin of all their resources, England would lose the advantages which she has hitherto drawn from them, whether in peace by the increase of her commerce, or in war by the use she has made of their forces. If, on the contrary, the colonies, reconciling themselves with England, preserve their wealth and population, they will also pre- serve their courage and the desire of independ- ence, and will compel England to use one portion of her forces to prevent their rising anew." And with regard to the policy to be pursued, the Memoir e adds, " My opinion is exactly the same as that of the Comte de Yergennes as to the necessity of rejecting every plan of aggression on our part. In the first place, for the moral reasons so conformable to the known habits of thought of the two monarchs ; in the second place, on account of the state in which the king has found his finances and his forces, both land and sea ; on account of the time necessary to revive all these branches of his power, and of the danger of NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 35 eternizing our weakness by making a premature use of our strength ; and in the third place, for the decisive reason that an offensive war on our part would reconcile England with her colonies, bj giving the ministry a pretext for yielding and the colonies a motive for accepting proposi- tions, in order to gain time to mature their pro- jects and multiply their means." And the practical course recommended was to prepare for war in case it should come, and in the meantime to facilitate for the colonies the means of procur- ing munitions and even money, in the way of commerce, but without abandoning a proper neutrality or furnishing direct assistance. Acting on these views, the French government put itself in connexion with Arthur Lee, through Caron de Beaumarchais, and with Benja- min Franklin through Dubourg, offering to the United States the supplies they needed. These secret and rather embarrassing negotiations were ultimately conducted by Silas Deane, who ar- rived in the middle of 1776 in Paris, and whom the French Government, it may be added, refused to deliver up as a rebel subject on the demand of the British ambassador. At this time neither Government recognised 36 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. fully the necessity of its position. They were both anxious to make as much and yield as little as the condition of events would permit. With the United States old sentiments were still strong, and they felt a justifiable apprehension in respect to alliances which might become pro- tectorates ; and France paused and hesitated before taking the initiative step in a new and unexplored direction. Accustomed to treat only with old and familiar kingdoms, and concerning traditional interests, the very boldness of this new policy was an argument against its wisdom ; and she anticipated the startled inquiry of her ancient colleagues when she should introduce into their counsels this unknown, perhaps unwelcome equal. Well might the Count de Yergennes, when the British ambassador indignantly remonstrated against the reception of Franklin, reply, " II est vrai qu'il en est fort question. Si cela avait lieu la France et I'Angleterre en seraient fort etonnees." The Declaration of Independence, the presence of the American Commissioners, the instructions which speedily followed them, and the march of events compelled the negotiators on both sides to take broader views, and forced them to more rapid and decisive conclusions. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 37 The reception of the Commissioners, though informal, was an interference on the part of France, which, let its effect be what it might, would be neither forgotten nor forgiven by the English government. The Declaration of Inde- pendence, if supported by effective ^military resistance, was a perpetual barrier to any condi- tional reconciliation between the colonies and the mother country. Still there were grave difficul- ties in the way. The armies of the United States had as yet won no great advantages ; the invin- cible haughtiness of British powder was stimulated by the probable intervention of France to redou- bled energy; affairs in Europe were perplexed and endangered by the death of the Elector of Bavaria, which threatened a general continental war ; and Spain, the confidential ally of France, regarded with instinctive aversion the success of the colonial rebellion. The instructions which reached the American Commissioners soon after their arrival indicated great and increasing anxiety on the part of the United States for foreign alliances. They were directed to abandon the strictly commercial grounds of their primary negotiation, and to offer the aid of their government to France for 88 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. the conquest of the West India Islands, and to Spain for the subjugation of Portugal.* The necessity for a political connexion was admitted, and concessions authorized in order to obtain it. But France had already done all that she intended to do;f and the Commissioners, although they acted with prudence and spirit, were too unfa- vorably situated to negotiate with advantage. Months necessarily elapsed before they could communicate with the authority at home ; news came slowly and anything but surely. What did come was at first of the gloomiest descrip- tion ; and the English ambassador, prompt with every unfavorable rumor, pressed the French ministry with a confidence, the very energy of which threatened future retribution. Perhaps it is proper to add that the unfortunate distrust and jealousy of each other which characterized the proceedings of this Commission, and which, though not formally, were still to a certain extent recognised by the French minister, con- * Secret Journal of Congress, vol. ii. pp. 3S-41. f Letter from Count de Vergennes to Marquis d'Ossun, accompanied by a paper submitted to the king, January, 17*77, in presence of Maurepas, and endorsed by his majesty, approved. MS. Collection already referred to, p. 68. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 39 tributed its full share to their weakness, and accounted for the ministerial reserve of which Mr. Adams complains even late in 1778, nearly a year after a treaty of alliance had been signed. The negotiation, therefore, dragged slowly; the duties of the Commissioners were confined to pressing upon the attention of the French minis- try the necessity of prompt and public assistance, employing such opportunities as occurred for the supply of munitions, and using their personal influence wherever it reached in correcting false impressions of their country, government, and cause. But they evinced as much wisdom in abstaining as in acting, until the news of Bur- goyne's surrender, which reached France in December, 1777, wrought an immediate and most important change in the conduct of the French court. This brilliant achievement, in connexion with the military capabilities both of the country and its people, proved by the position of the American arms, satisfied France that the United States had the intention, and, if supported, the ability to maintain their independence. In the memoir already referred to, Turgot had said, "The abso- 40 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. lute separation of the colonies from tlie mother country appears to me very probable. There will result from it, when the independence of the colonies is complete and recognised by the Eng- lish themselves, a total revolution in the political and commercial relations of Europe and Ame- rica; and I believe firmly that every mother country will be forced to abandon empire over its colonies, establish perfect freedom of trade with all nations, share with others this liberty, and preserve with their colonies the relations of friendship and kindred. If this be an evil, I believe there exists no mode to prevent it — that the only part to take is to submit to the absolute necessity, and make the most of it." This result, therefore, which the ministry had all along anticipated as a final but distant conclu- sion, was accepted when it came, although so much sooner than was expected, and the policy of the minister was immediately adapted to this last alter- native, as he had originally conceived it. The Commissioners represented forcibly to the court the necessity under which the United States now stood to know explicitly the intentions of France and Spain. On the 17th December, 1777, they had an interview with Mr. Gerard, who, by order of KEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 41 the King, informed them, to use his own language, " That after a long and full consideration of our affairs and propositions in council it was decided, and his Majesty was determined, to acknowledge our independence, and make a treaty with us of amity and commerce. That in this treaty no advantage would be taken of our present situa- tion to obtain terms from us which otherwise would not be convenient for us to agree to : his Majesty desiring that the treaty once made should be durable, and our amity subsist for ever ; which could not be expected if each nation did not find its interest in the continuance as well as in the commencement of it. It was, therefore, his intention that the terms of the treaty should be such as we might be willing to agree to if our State had been long since esta- blished and in the fulness of strength and power, and such as we shall approve of when that time shall come. That his Majesty was fixed in his determination not only to acknowledge, but to support our independence by every means in his power : that in doing this he might probably soon be engaged in a war with all the expenses, risks, and damages, usually attending it, yet he should not expect any compensation from us on that 42 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. account, nor pretend that he acted wholly for our sakes; since, besides his real good will, it was manifestly the interest of France that the power of England should be diminished by our separa- tion from it. He should, moreover, not so much as insist that, if he engaged in a war with England on our account, we should not make a separate peace. He would have us be at full liberty to make a peace for ourselves whenever good and advantageous terms were offered us. The only condition he should require and rely on would be this, that we, in no peace to be made with England, should give up our indepen- dence and return to the obedience of that government."* On the 6th February, 1778, after some further negotiation, the two treaties of commerce and alliance were signed by Conrad Alexander Gerard on the part of his most Christian Majesty, and by Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and "Arthur Lee on the part of the United States of America. The treaty of commerce did not differ materially from the plan proposed by Congress, but the treaty of alliance not merely modified, but * Diplomat. Corresp., vol. i. p. 356. Commissioners to Com- mittee of Foreign Aifairs, 18th Dec. 1111. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 43 completely altered the character of the connex- ion. The commercial provisions were of the most liberal character, and recognised a system of maritime rights, which, however generous in theory, never was and perhaps never is destined to be the realized practice of any nations who possess and are conscious of great naval power. Indeed, however wise and necessary the policy of freedom to neutrals might appear to the states- men of the United States, the Commissioners were not unaware of the immense and justifiable advantages which a more stringent theory of neutral law sometimes conferred upon bellige- rents : for on September 8th, 1777, they write to the Committee of Foreign Affairs: "As the English goods cannot in foreign markets face those of the French or Dutch, loaded as they are with the high insurance from which their com- petitors are exempted, it is certain the trade of Britain must diminish while she is at war with us and the rest of Europe in peace. To evade this mischief she now begins to make use of French bottoms, but as we have yet no treaty with France or any other power that gives to free ships the privilege of making free goods, we may weaken that project by taking the goods of the 44 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. enemy wherever we find them, paying freight."* And if maritime strength is as essential an element of national power as territorial extent, it is difiicult to say why one nation supporting its energies and securing its defence by its force on land, should enjoy under neutral flags an undis- turbed and profitable commerce, while the other, whose corresponding advantage is its power on sea, is compelled to hold in costly inactivity its most effective means of offence. But be this as it may, the treaty recognised as one of its funda- mental bases the maxim that free ships make free goods. What benefit to American commerce this declaration worked when circumstances rose to test its value, was not demonstrated until years after. The Droit d' Aubaine was abolished as to citizens of the United States. And although this privilege seems not to have been confidently anticipated by Congress, as the Commissioners were authorized to waive it, yet the French government accorded it without difficulty ; and as it had been conceded in other cases, it may be considered as a part of that general policy * Diplom. Corresp., vol. i. p. 322-3. See also another letter on the same subject at page 33Y. NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 45 adopted by Vergennes towards the neutral powers. The United States were put upon the footing of the most favored nation ; and all ques- tions of contraband, right of search, prizes, and the like, regulated under the broadest rules of mutual right. The treaty of alliance varied in its general character, and in many special provisions, from the treaty first suggested by Congress. It was directly the reverse of the idea expressed by Adams, for it was both a military and a political alliance. It recognised the independence of the United States ; provided for combined offensive movements ; made the negotiations for peace a matter of joint consultation and interest; stipu- lated for the division of probable conquests; guaranteed respectively the possessions of the respective parties, and provided for the admission of other powers whose interests might become involved in the contest. Congress had originally declared, in the ninth article of their original project, that the British possessions from Canada to Florida, including all the islands lying near the continent, in the seas, in any gulf or river, should be without the pale of French conquest, all such countries being reserved to the jurisdic- 46 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. tion of the United States, whenever they could be united to the same. The treaty stipulated, Article V., that "if the United States should think fit to attempt the reduction of British power remaining in the north- ern parts of America^ or the islands of the Bermu- das, those countries or islands, in case of success, shall be confederated with or dependent upon the said United States." Article YI. renounced, on the part of France, for ever, the possession of the Bermudas, and any portion of the continent of North America, which, before the treaty of Paris in 1763, or in virtue of that treaty, was acknow- ledged to belong to the crown of Great Britain, or to the United States, heretofore called British colonies, or which at the time of the treaty were or lately had been under the power of Great Britain. Article VII. reserved all conquests in the "West Indies to France ; Article XI. contained reciprocal guarantees, and the arms of the allies were not to be laid down until the independence of the United States was secured. Events that followed obviated the necessity of the discussion ; but it is proper to state that the provisions of the treaty were considered by some as obviously stopping short of the requirements of the clause referred to NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 47 in tlie original project; and it was thought that the ambiguous expression, " British power in the northern parts of America," in addition to the omission of the islands named, instead of the full recital, was meant to leave room for such after constructions as the participation of Spain might require in regard to the Floridas. Arthur Lee,* in a letter replying to Ealph Izard, who had ex- pressed these doubts, states distinctly that the fifth article originally stood, "Si les Etats-Unis jugent apropos de tenter la conquete de la Cana- da, de la Nouvelle Ecosse, de Terre Neuve, de St. Jean et des Bermudas, ces conquetes, en cas de succ^s, appartiendront aux dits Etats-Unis." "Even this," he adds, "did not appear to me adequate to the intentions of Congress. I there- fore proposed that it should be as extensive and explicit as was marked out to us in the ninth article of the plan proposed by Congress. My colleagues did not agree with me ; and I remem- ber perfectly Dr. Franklin's answer was, that Congress had receded from those claims since, by the concessions directed to be made to Spain. How the fifth article came changed so much from what it was at first I never could learn." * Diplom. Corresp, vol. ii. p. 406-7. Arthur Lee to Ralph Izard, May 23d, 1778. 48 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. Dr. Franklin, whose unwavering confidence in the French court was certainly justified by its efficient and generous support from the recogni- tion of independence to the treaty of peace, may have been right in his reasoning, but a recent and apparently well informed diplomatic histo- rian, in referring to Mr. Gerard's mission to the United States, says, "The American deputies had expressed the desire that the king should engage his co-operation for the conquest of Cana- da, ISTova Scotia, and the two Floridas. But the policy of the cabinet of Yersailles considered the domination of England over these three countries, and especially over Canada, as a useful principle of uneasiness and watchful- ness for the Americans. The neighborhood of a redoubtable enemy could not but make them feel more sensibly the value they should attach to the fj'iendship and support of the king of France. Mr. Gerard was, therefore, ordered not to make any positive promise relative to the proposed conquests. In case, however, that Con- gress should make the overture, the minister was authorized to answer that the king would not re- fuse to concur in the execution of such a plan, but that the incalculable chances of the war did not permit, in such a case, any formal engage- NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 49 ments. It was foreseen tliat in case Congress became too pressing, a decided refusal would give room for suspicion as to the good faith of the French ministry. Mr. Gerard, therefore, was to meet the wishes of the American government, observing, however, that the execution of this article could not be placed in the category of abso- lute conditions of the next peace."* And it may be added that this policy is perfectly consistent with the opinions expressed in the Memoire of Turgot already referred to. But even assuming this intention as the motive of the changes, it is easy to conceive a state of political affairs — not at all improbable as national relations stood at the time of the treaty — which would justify on the part of France so refined and tortuous a policy. France had obligations to the old world as well as the * Histoire Generale des Traites de Paix, tfec, depuis la Paix de Westphalie, ouvrage coraprenant les Travaux de Koek, Schoell, cfee, tfec, par M. le Corate de Garden, ancien ministre plenipotentiare. This work is not yet complete — 10 vols, only as yet have appeared. It may be proper to state that the account of the treaty of peace of 1783, from which the above extract is taken, is copied almost literally from the introduction to Botta's History of the Revolutionary War — and it is quoted from this work in preference, because as it is the most recent it is the most authoritative. See Tome quatri^rae, p. 306-30'7. 50 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. new, and the alliance witli the United States was a political experiment which called for caution. It would be gross historical injustice to draw conclusions on such a subject from an American point of view only. And while it is matter of high and just pride that the statesmen of the Kevolution felt that they were acting for a vast and potent posterity, and therefore claimed, as their inalienable birthright, all that wide territory which Anglo-Saxon enterprise had rescued from the wilderness, and Anglo-Saxon courage had wrested from the armed hold of feebler pioneers ; yet it does not follow that the French ministry was bound to support a policy which belonged rather to the future of the nation's career than to the establishment of that independence which was the main point of the alliance. But whatever may have been the intention, and although the suspicion did have its effect upon the after negotiations of the peac(3, the lan- guage of the treaty was never so restricted in its application ; and without a doubt upon its mo- tives or a censure upon its provisions this treaty stands first in place as in importance upon the roll of American records. In reviewing its spirit and character it is worthy of remark — NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 51 First, That in the whole course of the negotia- tion which preceded and accompanied the treaty of 1778, the American government never asked, and the French government never offered any peculiar sympathy for republican institutions. As to the character of the new government, all that was asked was, " Is it efficient to execute its plans, and stable to fulfil its promises?" The statesmen of the revolution wanted no recogni- tion of their republicanism : that was their affair. They asked only the acknowledgment of their independence ; that they felt to be the joint inter- est of themselves and the nations among whom they claimed a place. The one party, therefore, indulged in no abuse of kings whose aid they needed, and the other felt no antipathy towards a commonwealth by whose commerce they hoped to profit. The language of the United States to France was this : You have certain political and com- mercial interests which it is your right and duty as a nation to protect and foster : Providence, in the distribution of national peculiarities, has so arranged it, that those interests are in a measure dependent upon our situation : will you recognise the fact ? So long as we were poor and strng- 52 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. gling colonies, dependent upon England, we had no place in the world's counsels because we repre- sented no interests upon which the world was forced to deliberate. But we have grown in God's good time into a nation. Three millions of people have settled this continent ; are pos- sessed of a commerce which will enrich those who share it ; have raised armies ; constructed governments ; preserve order ; already begin to affect your balance of power. Surely this is a great fact which England may have contributed to establish, but the knowledge of which she cannot expect to monopolize. Will you recog- nise it ? — And France saw that this was true ; that her interests were involved in America in various ways: that the United States did raise armies, and build cities, and freight ships, of their own wisdom and strength and riches, and France said : You are a nation, we recognise you as such : and the two governments compared their interests and adjusted their laws to meet what they considered the necessities of the case. And in doing so they recognised no new-fangled notions of liberty and equality. If the new nation was fitted for independence, it was en- titled to its own government ; and the only prin- NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 53 ciple established by the treaty was the special one, — That where a colony has so developed its resources, and is so naturally situated that its growth has affected and will continue to affect the interests of the world, that then that colony has ceased to be an object of solicitude to the mother country only ; that the world is concerned in its affairs ; that it has become a nation, not by favor of any parchment treaty, but by its own growth and God's will; and that as no one nation can take the place of the mother country whom this growth has dispossessed, justice to all requires that such a colony shall be admitted to the world's counsels as an equal nation. This principle was a necessary development of the European colonial system, and must and will play its part until the colonial world has matured into national equality. Now it is matter of indifference whether such a colony be the scene of an experiment in government or not. The recognition of its nationality in no way involves an approbation or condemnation of its constitutional theory ; and the very fact of its nationality puts its form of government beyond the interfering criticism of those who recognise it. Viewed then in its 54 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. proper light of a question of large national and material interests, there was no inconsistency in the recognition of a republic by a monarchy. This idea is important, for it has been attempted to construe the recognition of the United States by the nations of Europe into a new doctrine of the rights of man : whereas it was but the old principle involved in the independence of the Netherlands, only more distinctly stated, and embracing in its application larger consequences. And to consider the American revolution as a precedent for every violent outbreak against con- stituted authority, is a wilful and mischievous perversion of historical truth. Second, Another conclusion from this treaty is the necessity recognised for the establishment of a maritime balance of power. It has been already said that from the Peace of Utrecht, the wonderful developments of England's commer- cial interests, and her corresponding naval strength, introduced a new element into political calculation. For from the seventeenth to the close of the eighteenth century, by her colonial possessions, England had not only increased her territory to an enormous extent, but she had so chosen her conquests as to make each colony the NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 55 centre of a new commerce, the nurse of a new- navy. Combination among the minor maritime powers of Europe to check this portentous aggrandizement, was under most circumstances impracticable, and alwa3^s useless ; because no general alliance could be formed for this purpose which did not put in jeopardy certain other interests which the traditional policy of conti- nental Europe guarded with jealous care ; and every combination thus came with the seeds of its ow^ dissolution. The recognition of the independence of the United States furnished an available means to this end, because it stripped England of so much territorial extent and so large a commercial monopoly, deprived her of ports of supply and points of concentration for future conquests, and developed by the independence of the colonies a marine inheriting her own enterprise and stimu- lated into rival activity. Besides, in admitting the United States into the circle of nations, the interests of the new world became through this ally matter of direct concern, and colonial acqui- sitions of immediate European importance. And the establishment of the principle already illus- trated, of the natural and inevitable growth of 56 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. colonies into independent nations, was thus sanc- tioned^ and held out the promise that in time all the vast colonial possessions of European nations would be resolved into independent states free to form their own alliances and distribute their own commerce. The war of the revolution, therefore, was, as much as many territorial European wars, a war in defence of the balance of power, adjusted, however, for a wider scale than the political necessities of the world had hitherto required. As a natural consequence, therefore, it interested more particularly the rival maritime powers of Europe ; and in supporting it, with a view to the ulterior independence of the colonies, France was only acting out her natural antago- nism to England, and was in perfect conformity with the established principles of the great European system. And this was so generally admitted, that when the King of Prussia was pressed to recognise the new republic, his reply through his minister to Mr. Lee was : " With respect to the declaration which you again desire of the King, in favor of the independence of the Americans, I have frequently explained that his Majesty having, by the position of his domi- nions, and those of his neighbors, very different NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. 57 interests from those powers that are properly- called maritime ones, he has no right to expect a direct influence in maritime affairs ; and that he could not in wise policy take any measures in those affairs, because they would always be unfruitful, as they could not be supported by a warlike marine.""^ Finally, it is worthy of remark, that the United States were the first nation whose relation with other states stood expressly and only upon com- mercial interests. From the time of Cosmo de' Medici — when every country from Persia to Andalusia was tributary to his trade ; when, at the courts of barbarous monarchs, his factors supplied the places of the expelled agents of Genoa and Venice; and when his exile from Florence threatened to bankrupt the manufac- tures of the ungrateful city — to the deadly struggle between France and England for the imperial wealth of the conquered East, nations had felt the influence of commerce in determining their policies. But it was in no case the sole bond that joined them. Neighborhood, crown, connexions, relations derived from that feudal * Diploni. Corresp. vol. ii. p. 853. Win. Lee to Com. Foreiga Aff., Sept. 28th, IV'79. 58 DirLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. system whicli was once the common law of nations, all attached the states of Europe to each other by recognised and vigorous obligations. And when commercial questions did arise, it was between powers whose relations to each other were already ascertained. The United States, on the contrary, were free to choose their connex- ions. The only natural association that they had was broken by the war, and would not for some years at least be willingly renewed ; and in making their new selection but one practical guide presented itself, and that was their commer- cial interest. Not that once introduced into the world's councils, that introduction did not imply reciprocal duties, but it gave this peculiarity to the relation — It was not simply the addition of one nation more to be subject to precisely the ancient rules, but it was the meeting of a new system with an old, involving no contradiction, and bringing with it the means of harmonizing both into one broad, generous, and conservative policy. CHAPTER III. SPAIN THE ARMED NEUTRALITY TREATY WITH HOLLAND. The recognition of the independence of the United States by France materially modified the character of the American question, for it has always been and perhaps always will be the dangerous privilege of French power, to drag by its action European interests into compulsory conflict. Acknowledged as equals by the proud- est monarchy of the civilized world ; supported by an experienced and adroit diplomacy in their further advances into the society of nations ; strengthened in their hitherto doubtful contest by fleets and armies from whose flags the tradi- tional glories of Louis XIV. had not yet quite faded ; the United States felt themselves invigo- rated for victory. Nor was this all. The recog- nition of France involved a war with England ; war between England and France was almost cer- tain to extend into a general continental war ; and then, as parties without whose preliminary con- sent France could not, according to treaty stipu- 60 DIl'LOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. lations, make any peace, their opinions became at once matter of the gravest concern to all Europe. The question of their independence ceased to be one of slow and gradual settlement among indif- ferent nations. Mixed up as it was by their con- nexion with France in the general issues of the war, a general pacification would naturally settle it promptly and permanently. Indeed it may be fairly considered, and this makes its chief value, that the alliance with France, coupled with the express obligation of a joint peace, carried with it the necessary implication of a speedy European recognition. And this consideration ought to be a sufficient reply, not only to the suspicions of the Commissioners, who complained that Ver- gennes was slow in supporting their diplomatic claims upon Eussia, Spain, and Holland, but to those historians also who have found reason for censure in what they regard as a dilatory supply of men and money at certain critical conjunctures; for the practical aid of French arms was the least of French benefits. The formal declaration of the treaty by France led to an immediate rupture with England. Just about the time of its open avowal, however, the English government, fearful of its reality and SPAIN. 61 somewhat sobered by the defeat of Burgoyne, sent over to America a conciliatory commission, consisting of the naval and military commanders then in the country, the Earl of Carlisle, Wm, Eden (afterwards Lord Auckland), and Grovernor Johnstone. The propositions they were author- ized to make conceded freedom from taxation, representation in Parliament, in short everything / but independence. But it was too late : the Commissioners were never even officially recog- nised by Congress ; and during their stay, which gave great uneasiness to the French court, and doubtless a great impulse to the negotiations in Paris, news of the treaty arrived in the United States. The uselessness of any further attempts at a compromise arrangement was acknowledged by the abrupt departure of the Commissioners, and the question of independence left to the deci- sion of that originally selected arbiter, the sword. With the progress of the war these pages have no concern ; but before the opening of a new communication between the contending parties, three events to some extent both strengthened and complicated the position of the United States. These were, the declaration of war against England by Spain in 1779 ; the formation 62 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. of the Armed Neutrality in 1780 ; and the treaty of the United States with Holland in 1782. And first, as to the declaration of war by Spain."^ From the early commencement of the colonial difficulties the Count de Yergennes had not only followed the progress of the quarrel with careful interest, but he had been in earnest and constant communication with the Spanish court as to the probable result, and more particu- larly as to the course of policy required by the interests of the two crowns. Frequent interviews took place between the respective representatives and ministers of the two courts, and elaborately prepared memoirs were exchanged, comparing and enforcing their peculiar opinions. At first there was perfect agreement in this mutual advice : both powers considered that they could not, in safety or consistency, interfere openly in behalf of revolted provinces, but both acknow- ledged an eager interest in the humiliation of * Correspondence, chiefly between the French and Spanish ministers concerning the American revohition, copied from the originals in the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris. MS. Coll. Histoire de la Diplomatic Fran9aise par FlassaiR. Tome vii. Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution ; Jay's letters, vols. vii. and viii. Garden's Traites de Paix, Tome quatridme. SPAIN. 63 English pride, and tlie reduction of English power. Both disclaimed any intention to inter- fere, and both cherished a mischievous desire to meddle : and they finally agreed that while they could neither justly nor wisely invade the rights of the British crown, they would continue to evade the obligations of their British treaties. Believ- ing that it was their policy to foment the colonial disturbances, they lent secret aid in men and money, holding all the while the language of an open and honest neutrality. Such a policy could not be effective and consistent, and on more than one occasion they were forced to sacrifice secresy to success. England could not refuse to see what she was made to feel, and her protest was neither slow nor weak. The necessity, therefore, for some more positive and manly conduct soon called for higher counsels. Vergennes became more pressing that Spain should make herself, as France was about to do, a party to the contest for independence. But neither the pride nor the policy of the Spanish court could be urged beyond a certain point. Wrongs indeed she said she had to redress, rights to vindicate, and interests to maintain. But the colonial posses- sions of Spain were immense : the traditional 64 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. glory of a new world discovered, conquered, and owned, was too great to be perilled by a quixotic crusade for colonial independence, and the practi- cal interests of Spain in America might not thrive under the shadow of this new republic. War with England Spain desired, but for Spanish interests : and the treaty of 1763, which had torn so cruelly from France her proudest and oldest colonial possessions, might have opened the eyes of French statesmen to the worthlessness of distant colonies, but it had not reduced the value of Mexican mines nor South American trade. Spain was, therefore, resolute not to recognise ■, }^ the independence of the colonies. Affairs became \ A more critical. The presence in Paris of Hiitton/]V^ the Moravian, a British emissary and the friend of Franklin, alarmed Vergennes ; and in a letter to Montmorin, then ambassador at Madrid, of Jan. 8th, 1778,* he manifests the greatest anxiety as to the possibility of a negotiation between England and the American commis- sioners. On the 7th Jan. 1778, a Memoire arguing at great length the policy of an immedi- ate alliance with the Americans was read to the King of France, approved by him, and forwarded * MS. Coll. pages 189-144. ■r SPAIN. 65 to the Spanish court. The answer was unsatis- factory, doubtful, and full of cautionary sugges- tions as to every possible course ; and on the 30th January the Count de Yergennes informed the Count Montmorin, that although the French court felt sensibly the reasoning of the Spanish cabinet, an imperative policy compelled it to sign the treaty. The difference between the French and Spanish courts in their appreciation of the American question was this. Yergennes recog- nised at the outset the ultimate certainty of American independence. He did not anticipate that circumstances would progress so rapidly as they did, nor did he realize how thoroughly independent the colonies had practically been years before the commencement of the Revolu- tionary War. But looking on the whole subject with the eye of a statesman, he not only foresaw that in time the United States would be free, but he comprehended that in the broad interests of a future policy they ought to be free. As soon, then, as the opportunity offered, he abandoned the tortuous contrivances of a merely selfish purpose, and met the necessity with bold and frank wisdom. He resolved to act by the United 66 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. States as their probable future seemed to warrant ; took no advantage of their temporary weakness, and proposed a treaty generous in its spirit and liberal in its provisions; a treaty of which he could say, as he did, with an honest and com- mendable pride, "If it is read without prejudice, there will be found no trace of a covetous spirit eager to draw to itself all possible advantages. We have exacted nothing of the Americans which they cannot, if they will, give in common to all the nations of Europe, even to England herself when they shall have made peace with her."^ Spain, on the other hand, neither sympa- thized with the struggle nor rejoiced in any of its probable results. So far as a colonial rebel- lion crippled England's force, she accepted it : so far as she might hope to aggrandize her own possessions by the distributions and re-arrange- ments of a general pacification, she preferred the complication : but except as a means of future diplomatic bargaining by which she might obtain the Floridas, shut the navigation of the Missis- * Letter from Vergennes acknowledging the receipt of a letter from Montmorin, in which the latter informs him of the dissatisfaction of the Spanish court, dated February 6, 1778. JVIS. Coll. p. 167. SPAIN. 67 sippi and thus control the Gulf of Mexico, she felt little interest, and made, it must fairly be added, but small profession. She declared war for her own purposes, and was ready to use any chance advantage that might aid in achieving them. Congress, however, did not seem to reahze the full consequences of their French alliance, nor the extreme imprudence and improbability of a Spanish one. Soon after the declaration of war by Spain, they sent an ambassador to Madrid with a profusion of promises and an ample argument. Able as he was, Mr. Jay, upon whom the embassy had been conferred, made no impression. Consultations without a conclusion, correspondence without an object consumed his time, while harassing demands for money which he could not obtain tried his temper. His instructions on the subject of the Floridas, the north-western lands, and the navi- gation of the Mississippi, which were at first bold, manly, and admirably argued, were finally with- drawn, and the navigation of the Mississippi was I formally abandoned. But to no purpose ; and the opening of the negotiations with England found the United States, as regarded Spain, just 68 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. where they were at the ratification of the treaty with France. Fortunate indeed that it was so, for any treaty with Spain must, at that period, have been made at disadvantage. The United States could never have afforded, as they offered, to sacrifice the navigation of the Mississippi ; for as Mr. Jay truly said, " The cession of this navi- gation will, in my opinion, render a future war with Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other."^ And in exchange the United States would have obtained only a recognition of their independence, which a general pacifica- tion was sure to bring as a matter of course, and the aid of Spanish arms, which the war with England compelled Spain in her own interest to furnish as effectually as possible. Except, there- fore, as making one enemy more and thus indi- rectly inducing England to a speedier peace, the * Diplom. Corresp. vol. vii, p. 464, Mr. Jay to President of Congress, October 3, 1781. Although Mr. Jay's mission was unsuccessful, his correspondence is of the greatest importance and interest. It may be referred to with pride as an example of the ability and dignity with which the American ambassa- dors of that day bore themselves, under circumstances most unfavorable to their purposes, and most irritating to their pride. SPAIN. 69 presence of Spain was rather a hindrance than a help. And it is very questionable whether even this slight advantage was not overbalanced by the final difficulties in the Spanish negotiation for peace, and by the distrust created in the minds of the American Commissioners, lest France should be secretly supporting the exclu- sive and impracticable demands of the Spanish crown. Certain it is that to the experience of Mr. Jay at Madrid is to be credited the suspicion which induced the Commissioners, in a patriotic but mistaken spirit, to sign the preliminaries of the treaty with England, without the knowledge of the French court. The difficulty of persuading Spain to make the independence of the colonies an object of her arms, was anticipated and forcibly stated by Tur- got in the Memoir e to which reference has been made ; and the conduct of the Spanish court from the treaty with France to the peace with England was slow in counsel, sullen in action, and selfish in aim. In fact, it woLild scarcely be exaggera- tion to say that the probable results of the colo- nial struggle, once clearly demonstrated, served rather to stay than stimulate the Spanish zeal for an English war. It is true that the declaration 70 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. of that war was useful to the American cause, and it has been said that there existed between France and Spain a secret treaty, by which France bound herself not to accept a peace without the inde- pendence of the colonies."^ But even this treaty, admitting its existence, is scarcely positive assist- ance ; and the judgment and feeling of the Span- ish court may be best inferred from the strong language of Count d'Aranda, who was Spanish minister at Versailles during the whole period of the war. Upon his return to Spain he submitted to the Spanish monarch a most remarkable me- moire^ whether regarded in reference to his view of the past or his recommendations as to the future. This paper, which warns the king of the consequences of the independence of the United States, and suggests as a remedy the formation of the Spanish American colonies into independ- ent Spanish monarchies, united under one family dynasty, says of the treaty of 1783, " The inde- pendence of the English colonies has been there recognised. It is for me a subject of grief and * Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i. p. 250. Note taken from the " Harris Papers." I know of no other authority for this assertion. It is stated there very confidently. SPAIN. Tl fear. Fraace has but few possessions in America ; but she was bound to consider that Spain, her most intimate allj; had many, and that she now stands exposed to terrible reverses. From the beginning France has acted against her true interests in encouraging and supporting this independence, and so I have often declared to the ministers of this nation."^ * This Memoire will be found in the Translation of " Coxe's Spain under the House of Bourbon," by Don Andreas Muriel, the sixth volume of which consists of additional chapters by the translator. The language quoted above certainly implies a decided and uniform opinion on the part of D'Aranda in regard to American independence. But as early as 27th Janu- ary, 1777, long before the French court had looked to this independence as a part of their immediate policy, the Count d'Ossun, then French ambassador at Madrid, in reply to a letter from Yergennes announcing the arrival and propositions of the American Commissioners, makes the following strange statement. It may be proper to add that the letter of Yer- gennes, to which it is a reply, is accompanied by a paper read to the king in the presence of Maurepas, and by him endorsed approved, in which the French Court declines any closer con- nexion with the Americans than the supply of secret succors. After stating the approval by the Spanish court of this course, D'Ossun adds, " Cependant conime le Comte d'Aranda a eerit avec une vehemence et une chaleur extremes pour demontrer la convenance de conclure sans delai un traite de commerce et d' alliance offensive et defensive avec les colonies Americaines, 72 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. The second event to which reference has been made as exciting the hopes of American states- et d'entrer immediatement en guerre avee I'Angleterre, M. le Marquis de Grimaldi se propose de difFerer quelques jours k donner une reponse ecrit sur eet objet, parcequ' il veut qu'elle soit appuye par I'avis du comite et par des raisons assez evi- demment solides pour que M. le Comte d'Aranda soit force de convenir qu'il a adopte un rnauvais syst^me : Ton pourrait soup- 90nner cet arabassadeur d'etre oflfusque par des vues perso- nelles, et je ne dois pas vous cacher qu'en proposant ses idees il a mande a sa cour que eelle de France ne les desapprouvait dans le fond, mais qu'elle voulait etre pouss6e." It is certainly difficult to reconcile these facts ; to say whether D'Aranda changed his views in consequence " des raisons assez evidemraent solides," or whether, finding that he saw too far and too soon, he purposely contracted his sphere of vision. The diplomatic correspondence of the court of Spain has never, I believe, been opened to curious inspection, as both the English and French archives have been. Tlie letter quoted above is taken from the MS. collection of Mr. Sparks, already referred to. Perhaps I could find no more appropriate place to say that it is now practicable, and certainly most desirable, that the Go- vernment should obtain from England, France, and Spain, permission to make copies of all those papers in their respect- ive archives which relate to the diplomatic settlement of the Revolution. They are of great interest and absolute import- ance to our national history. The collection could be made at very moderate expense, if conducted under the inspection of our ministers at these courts, and would perhaps be as profita- ble employment as our distinguished diplomats could be engaged in. THE ARMED NEUTRALITY. 1S men, and exercising a large though indirect influ- ence upon the relative position of the belligerents, was the formation of the Armed Neutrality of 1780.* Its history is important under two as- pects — first, as affecting the practical combination of European nations, and second, as declaring a new system of maritime law. The treaty of 1763 had, to a great extent, separated England from a continental connexion, and in the war with her colonies she was absolutely without an ally. The treaty between France and the United States, the declaration of war by Spain, the very uncertain temper of Holland, compelled England to renew, if possible, an alliance with some of the European powers. Sir James Harris, after- wards better known as Lord Malmesbury, was despatched to St. Petersburgh to effect, if possi- ble, a political combination. Sanguine, adroit, and bold, he hoped too soon, moved too fast, and * Flassans, Diplomatie Fran9aise, tome "vii. Garden's Traites de Paix, tome cinqiiieme, chap. xxi. Diaries and Corre- spondence of the Earl of Malmesbury. Notices Historiques sur le Systeme de la Nentralite Armee, et son Origine, par M. le Comte de Goertz. Diplom. Corresp. of the Revolution. Haute- feuille, Droits et Devoirs des Nations Neutres ; Discours Preli- minaire. Wheaton's History of International Law. 4 74 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. ventured too much ; and without paradox it may be said that his very ability disabled him. He found the power of the court divided between Potemkin, a rising, and Panin, a setting favorite. He secured the one, but provoked the other ; and although he estimated their positions rightly, he found, to use the apt comparison of Goertz, that if Count Panin was " a star that hastened visibly to its decline, it was still above the horizon, and those even who most desired to see it disappear, still believed that they stood in need of its light." Having obtained, through the influence of Po- temkin, two private interviews with the Empress Catharine, he succeeded, after some important concessions, in persuading her to consent to an English alliance. But when he received, in reply to his home-communications, full powers to negotiate such a treaty, he discovered to his mortification that Panin, to whom the English alliance was both politically and personally dis- tasteful, and from whom the preliminary inter- views with Catharine had been carefully con- cealed, had succeeded in undoing his work, and as Foreign Minister was prepared with a formal refusal to negotiate. As if to remedy his disappointment, how- THE ARMED NEUTRALITY. 75 ever, news soon arrived in St. Petersburgh of the seizure of two Russian vessels laden with corn and taken by the Spaniards in the Mediterranean. The indignation of Catharine, peculiarly sensitive as to her commerce, blazed out ; and, supported by Potemkin, Lord Malmes- bury, with great ability, used the fortunate accident to persuade her to demand from Spain peremptory satisfaction, and at the same time to fit out a fleet at Cronstadt to be sent to sea at the first opportunity. These preparations were again carefully concealed from Count Panin, and Lord Malmesbury naturally and joyfully anticipated their inevitable result — an embroil- ment with Spain and her belligerent allies. Panin soon discovered the extent and direction of this well contrived manoeuvre, and defeated it by a policy at once bold and subtle. He expressed deep sympathy with the natural indignation of the Empress at this violation of her neutral rights, but suggested that instead of being an exception- al case needing correction, it proceeded from a false system of public law, against which now was the time to protest. If England agreed with Russia in condemning the seizure, the condemna- tion by Russia of the principle would be equally 76 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. acceptable. He therefore persuaded the Empress to publish a declaration to all the belligerents that such a violation of neutral rights would not be tolerated, and to call upon all the northern and neutral powers to make common cause in de- fence of the just principles of maritime law. He satisfied her that this was not only conformable to the desire of the English ambassador, but placed her at the head of a great league for a high and worthy purpose. He further induced her to keep her communications to the foreign courts secret until they should have reached their desti- nation. The despatches were v^ritten and the couriers started, without any discovery by Lord Malmesbury of the nature of their missives. The Empress indeed informed him that in a day or two such communications would be made to his court as would amply satisfy their desires, and this gracious news he himself hastened to communicate. Great then was the surprise and indignation of the English cabinet when they received from Russia a formal declaration of maritime law con- tradicting the whole practice of the English government, and striking at the foundation of the system which England had always haughtily maintained, and could at this very juncture least the: armed neutrality. 1*7 of all afford to dispense with. Eussia demanded ^ that free ships should make free goods — that even \ the coasting trade of belligerents should be ' opened to neutrals — that contraband should be limited and blockades stringent. England re- ceived the declaration coldly. The northern powers eagerly combined with Eussia to form a league in defence of this system, and the belKge- rents whom Lord Malmesbury hoped to discomfit seized their advantage. Spain made restitution, and in recognising the justice of the new code pleaded the arbitrary violence of England as her excuse for having violated it ; while France ap- proved the magnanimous wisdom of the Empress, and readily consented to what, by the ordinances of 1778, she had already enacted in principle as the law of her own marine. Unwilling to aban- don principles which she had openly avowed and always acted upon, England saw her last hope of a continental alliance destroyed by this European league. Irritated by Holland's evasion as to her treaty obligations, and the adhesion of that republic to the armed neutrality soon after, Eng- land declared war against the Dutch. The prac- tical result of the armed neutrality therefore was to add one more to the open enemies of England, 78 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. and to render still more impracticable any com- pensating alliance. In this view it was certainly to the United States an event of great im- portance. Considered as a declaration of a new system of maritime law, intended to guard neutral rights and check the supreme dominion of the English navy, it is far from deserving the importance attached to it at the time. In the first place it took its rise in an accidental intrigue, and was never at any time more than a diplomatic by-play of temporary interest. It passed its short life without activity, and died of natural exhaustion : and the Empress herself judged it rightly when she told Lord Malmesbury that it should be called rather nullite armee than neutralite armee. The great maritime belligerent powers who acceded to it, never recognised its principles except when convenient, and it did not even reflect the prac- tice of Russia itself For in a despatch dated 26th May, 1780, Lord Malmesbury says of Ad- miral Greig, an eminent ofiicer in the Russian service, " As soon as he read the declaration and saw the grounds on which the instructions were to be made, he collected the various sentences which had been pronounced last war in the THE ARMED NEUTRALITY. Y9 Archipelago by the Kussian tribunal instituted for that purpose, and at which he frequently presided, on neutral ships. After proving in the clearest manner that they confiscated and con- demned Turkish property wherever they found it, and the only prizes they made were such pro- perty on board neutral ships, he gave in the whole to Count Czernicheff, signifying that as a faithful and affectionate servant of the Empress he thought himself obliged to set before her eyes, that if she carried her present measures into exe- cution she would act in direct contradiction to herself"* In the next place the declaration, ''free ships, free goods," was not the statement of a principle, but the expression of an interest — an interest as shifting as any of those movable necessities which have always regulated political combinations, never recognised in war by those very belligerents who have declaimed about it in peace. The effort to elevate it into an interna- tional law has been only a struggle to legalize one sort of selfishness at the expense of another ; and such a rule can take its place only in a sys- tem which, in the emphatic language of Sir Wm. * Malmesburj's Diaries, &c., vol. i. p. 264. 80 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. Scott, "if it is consistent, has for its real purpose an entire abolition of capture in war — that is, in other words, to change the nature of hostility as it has ever existed among mankind, and to intro- duce a state of things not yet seen in the world — that of a military war and a commercial peace.""^ The Congress of the United States, however, fancied that they saw in the sentiment of this purely selfish coalition, indication of such a ge- neral liberality of political judgment as would respond to the spirit of their resistance. Although discouraged by the more sober wisdom and better information of the French court, they expressed in strong resolutions their approbation of the code of the neutrality, forwarded these resolutions through Mr. Adams to the various courts who had entered into the league, and finally, on De- cember 19, 1780, despatched Mr. Francis Dana as minister to St. Petersburgh. In their instruc- tions they say to him, " You will readily perceive that it must be a leading and capital point if these United States shall be formally admitted as a party to the convention of the neutral maritime powers for maintaining the freedom of commerce. * Judgment of the High Court of Admiralty upon the Swe- dish convoy, in the case of the ship Maria, Paulsen, master. THE ARMED NEUTRALITY. 81 This regulation, in whicli the Empress is deep- ly interested, and from which she has derived so much glory, will open the way for your favor- able reception, which we have greater reason to expect, as she has publicly invited the bellige- rent powers to accede thereto."* One would have supposed that the maintenance of their own freedom was quite enough for the attention of Congress ; and it was, to say the least, a broad interpretation of Catharine's invitation to suppose themselves included under the term bel- ligerents. But it must be said for the statesmen of that day, that they never forgot what they intended to be ; and the uniform language of their diplomacy was bold even to what their circum- stances might have stigmatized as presumption. But the anxiety with which they sought to intro- duce themselves into the affairs of Europe was ample evidence that they did not intend their independence to be isolation. They had resolved to be one of the nations of the earth — one to whom the politics of the world were to be matter of practical interest, and they considered their commerce as the means of direct connexion. It will be now generally admitted that any partici- * Secret Journal of Congress, vol. ii. p. 358. 4* 82 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTION. pation by the United States in this coalition would have been a useless complication of their affairs, serving no national purpose and contri- buting to no general good. The opportunity, however, was never offered ; for Mr. Dana's efforts, however able, were very useless. His presence in St. Petersburgh resulted only in affording Lord Malmesbury the small triumph of preventing his public reception by Eussia, even after the acknowledged independence of the United States, and enabling him to close his career of disappointment at that court by trust- ing that he had "suspended the appearance of the American agent here in public, till such time as it may take place without having any disagree- able or extraordinary effect."* The third event which had an important influ- ence upon the fortunes of the United States was the Treaty with Holland. The neighborhood and trade of the Dutch West Indies — the large com- merce, vast capital, and banking character of Holland, rendered an alliance with the Nether- lands more important to the United States than any European connexion after that with France. * Malmesbury's Diaries,