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 iiiiliill 
 
566 Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESEl,TATIVES. j Document 
 
 '2 Session. j \ No. 1444. 
 
 liELA'llONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC 
 
 OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 MESSAGE 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 TRANSMITTING 
 
 REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE SUBJECT OF RELA- 
 TIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
 COLOMBIA. 
 
 March 1, 1913. — Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and ordered to 
 
 be printed. 
 
 To th( Senate and tJte House of Representatives: 
 
 I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress a report 
 made to me on February 20, 1913, by tlie Secretary of State, on the 
 subject of relations between the United States and the Republic of 
 Colombia. 
 
 Wm. H. Taft. 
 The White House, 
 
 Wa.shington, March 1, 1913. 
 
 The President: 
 
 In the report which I had the honor to submit to you on May 17, 
 1912, and which was transmitted in your message of May 22, 1912, 
 to the Senate in response to the Senate's resolution of March 1, 1912, 
 requesting the transmission of correspondence ^\^th the Government 
 of Colombia, I stated that the possibihty of finding any reasonable 
 means to put an end to the remaining ill feehng between the RepubUc 
 of Colombia and the United States had, by your direction, long been 
 the subject of study by the department. That study having cul- 
 minated in the program ai)proved by your letter of ^'ovember 30, 
 1912,1 deem it mv duty now to report upon the outcome of the efforts 
 wliich the departnient had made to carry out that program and thereby 
 to replace the relations of the two countries in a state of cordia] 
 friendship and mutual confidence. That program was the result of 
 
2 UISriTED STAINS AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 the exhaustive study and earnest endeavors which, by your (hrection, 
 had engaged the attention of the department from the beginning of 
 the administration, in accorchmce with your conviction and tliat of 
 the department that, so far as consistent witli the dignity and lionor 
 of the United States and with the principles of justice when apphed 
 to the true facts, no effort should be spared in seeking to restore 
 American-Colombian relations to a footing of completely friendly 
 feeling. 
 
 Before discussing the generous advances of this Government, which 
 I regret have been, I think so mistakenly, rebuffed by the Govern- 
 ment at Bogota, it will be convenient by way of recapitulation to 
 sketch, in a measm'3, the antecedents of the recent attempts of the 
 department to reach the hoped-for adjustment. Inasmuch, however, 
 as the present report is not submitted with a vdew to its transmission 
 to the Congress, nor intended as a complete survey of the very ex- 
 tensive and complex historical background of the subject, I shall 
 endeavor to confine it withm reasonable limits, which would not be 
 possible if the vast amount of material on the subject now on file in the 
 department were to be included or exhaustively summarized. 
 
 The necessity for some brief review of what had preceded is en- 
 hanced by the fact that the subject of arbitration, now again urged 
 by Colombia, is intimately associated with political problems affecting 
 the status of Panama, and the efforts of the Government of the United 
 States to brmg about an adjustment of concatenated questions in 
 which, as a party directly interested because of its rights in regard to 
 the Panama Canal, this Government is the more deeply concerned. 
 
 It seems obvious that, even assuming that any tangible issue for 
 arbitration between the United States and Colombia could be made 
 out, evidently no terms of arbitral submission could be entertained 
 which might call in question the right of Panama to exist as a sover- 
 eign State. 
 
 At this point it should be recalled that Colombian proposals of 
 arbitration, inadmissible for this and other reasons, have twice been 
 rejected by this Government after full consideration b}^ two former 
 Secretaries of State, Mr. Hay and Mr. Root. 
 
 Mr. Hay, writing to Gen. Reyes on January 5, 1904, said: 
 
 Entertaining these feelings, the Government of the United States would gladly 
 exercise its good offices with the Republic of Panama, with a view to bringing about 
 some arrangement on a fair and equitable basis. For the acceptance of your proposal 
 of a resort to The Hague tribunal this Government perceives no occasion. Indeed, 
 the questions presented in your "statement- of grievances" are of a political nature 
 such as nations of even the most advanced ideas as to international arbitration have 
 not proposed to deal with by that process. Questions of foreign policy and of the 
 recognition or nonrecognition of foreign States are of a purely political nature and do 
 not fall within the domain of judicial decision; and upon these questions this Govern- 
 ment has in the present paper defined its position. 
 
 Mr. Root, writing to a succeeding Colombian minister on February 
 10, 1906; said: 
 
 The real gravamen of your complaint is this espousal of the cause of Panama by the 
 people of the United States. No arbitration could deal with the real rights and 
 wrongs of the parties concerned unless it were to pass upon the question whether the 
 cause thus espoused was just — whether the people of Panama were exercising their 
 just rights in declaring and maintaining their independence of Colombian rule. 
 
 We assert and maintain the affirmative upon that question. We assert that the 
 ancient State of Panama, independent in its origin and by nature and history a separate 
 political community, was confederated with the other States of Colombia upon terms 
 
 D. OF 0. 
 
5^ 
 
 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 ' ^ which preserved and continued its separate sovereignty; that it never surrendered 
 • that sovereignty: thai in the year 18S5 the compact which bound it to the other States 
 
 V of Colombia was l)r()ken and terminated by Colombia, and the Isthmus was subjugated 
 
 "^ by force; that it was lield under loreign domination to which it had never consented; 
 
 sj'' and that it was justly entitled to assert its sovereignty and demand its independence 
 from a rule which wasimlawlul. o])pressive. and tyrannical. We can not ask the people 
 of Panama to consent that this right of theirs, which is vital to their political existence, 
 shall be submitted to the decision of any arbitrator. Nor are we willing to permit any 
 arbitrator to determine the political policy of the United States in following its sense 
 of right and justice by espousing the cause of this weak people against the stronger 
 Government of Colombia, which had so long held them in unlawful subjection. 
 
 There is one other subject contained in your note which I can not permit to pass 
 without notice. You repeat the charge that the Government of the United States 
 took a collusive part in fomenting or inciting the uprising upon the Isthmus of Panama 
 which ultinialely resulted in the revolution. I regret that you should see fit to thus 
 renew an aspersion upon the honor and good faith of the United States in the face of 
 the positive and final denial of the fact contained in Mr. Hay's letter of January 5, 
 1904. You must be well aware that the universally recognized limitations upon the 
 subjects proper for arbitration forbid that the United States should submit such a 
 question to arbitration. In view of your own recognition of this established limitation, 
 I have been unable to discover any justification for the renewal of this unfounded 
 assertion. 
 
 It is important to note also that the Government oT Colombia has 
 never to this clay presented anything even a])proaching a question 
 justiciable by arbitration, it being a universally recognized principle 
 that neither indefinite nor i)urely political matters are of a nature to 
 be arbitrated. 
 
 It is perhaps useful to advert somewhat more to the background 
 of previous events. On January 22, 1903, was signed at Washington 
 the treaty between the United States and Colombia, known as the 
 Hay-Herran treaty, for the construction of an interoceanic canal by 
 the" United States. This treaty, although essentially conforming to 
 the pro}K)sals of Colombia, besides being eminently just and even 
 generous, was enthusiastically welcomed by its direct beneficiaries, 
 the people of the Panaman Isthmus. In Bogota it was coldly received. 
 At the first signs of opposition in the Colombian Congress discontent 
 and resentment were maniiested in Panama. As the possibility of 
 the treaty's being rejected at Bogota grew to a i>robability, the idea 
 of regaining their historical autonomy awakened and became strong 
 in the minds of Panamans. The contingency of secession was openly 
 discussed and advocated. Months before the event the representa- 
 tives of Panama in the Congress at Bogota raised their voices in 
 unheeded warning. The certainty, which soon became evident, that 
 the canal treaty would be rejected ]iroved their warning true. The 
 bloodless revolution of November 3, 1903, followed, with instant 
 success. Within 48 hours from the proclamation of Panaman inde- 
 jiendence the last vestige of Colombian authority on the Isthmus had 
 disap])eared and the jieople of Panama, through the unanimous vote 
 of their mimicipalities, had ratified the Republic. 
 
 Imbued with the inherited spirit of territorial nationality and the 
 recollection of their ancient geograpliical entity, the keen interest of 
 the Panaman people in the estabhshment of interoceanic transit 
 through their territorv is readily comprehensible and it is no cause 
 for siirprise that they were impatient of the obstacles set by the 
 Government at Bogota, through its rejection of the Hay-Herran 
 treaty, in the way of the accomphshment of the stupendous work of 
 the canal. The feehngs of the people of Panama were early shown 
 
4 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 throiigii the declaration made by their representative in the Colom- 
 bian Congress and echoed by other farsighted members, that a fail- 
 ure to ratify the canal treaty would be followed immechatel}'^ by a 
 separatist revolution. It was a matter of common notoriety in the 
 city of Bogota that such an outcome of the rejection of the treaty 
 was inevitable. Although amply forewarned, the authorities at 
 Bogota appear to have courted the impending result. The Colom- 
 bian President contributed to bring it about by liis amazing departure 
 from the practice of nations iu failing even to recommend for approval 
 a treaty signed under the explicit direction of its President on behalf 
 of the sovereign State by its empowered agent. In the Hght of the 
 manifested spirit of the people of Panama, it is evidently quite 
 superfluous to allege that this revolutionary sentiment was fomented 
 by persons in the United States. Outside pressure, even by inter- 
 ested private parties, would seem to have been a work of superero- 
 gation, even if its existence were a fact. The separation became a 
 patent certainty from the moment the Colombian executive and 
 Congress foredoomed th3 treaty to failure. 
 
 The Government of the United States, being satisfied that a de 
 facto government, republican in form and without substantial oppo- 
 sition from its own people, had been there established, extended its 
 recognition to the new Republic of Panama on November 6, 1903. 
 From almost the very day in November, 1903, that Panama regained 
 the attribute of self-government which that State had possessed 
 without question from the time of emancipation from Spanish domi- 
 nation to the time of its incorporation by conquest into the centralized 
 Government of Colombia, the Government of the United States bent 
 its earnest efforts toward effecting a just and practical settlement to 
 which Panama, equally ^^dth the United States and Colombia, should 
 be a party. 
 
 The earlier representations of the Colombian Government, after the 
 recognition of the Republic of Panama and the conclusion of the 
 canal treaty, did not urge arbitration, except by way of alternative 
 submission of pending questions to an impartial court should a 
 diplomatic arrangement not be feasible. These representations were 
 made up of complaints and charges against the United States with 
 imputation of violation of treaty and general bad faith. Colombia 
 then insisted upon reparation being made by the Government of the 
 United States. This is shown by the correspondence heretofore 
 published. 
 
 As an element of the proposed negotiation for a conventional set- 
 tlement a suggestion of arbitration was made which looked to '' the 
 settlement of the claims of a material order wliich either Colombia or 
 Panama by mutual agreement may reasonably bring forward against 
 the other as a consequence of facts preceding or following the decla- 
 ration of independence of Panama." Tliis proposition, as formu- 
 lated, was favored by Secretary Hay, together with the proposal 
 that a plebiscite should determine whether the people of the Isthmus 
 preferred allegiance to the Republic of Panama or to the Repubhc 
 of Colombia (Mr. Hay to Gen. Reyes, Jan. 13, 1904). Both these 
 proposals were considered in the subsequent negotiations of the tripar- 
 tite treaties, wliich aimed to settle all claims ''of a material order" 
 between Colombia and Panama and which were, in terms, largely 
 
UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 5 
 
 responsive to the Colombian demands in this regard; but the only 
 .subject to be submitted to arbitration under the abortive treaty 
 l)etween Colombia and Panama signed by Messrs. Cortes and Arose- 
 niena was the boundary line in the long-disputed district of Jurado. 
 No |)ro^^sions for a Panaman plebiscite appeared therein. Even that 
 l)ro|)osed ahernative of arbitration thus disappeared when the })arties 
 to the controversy reached- tlie conventional accord formulated in the 
 tripartite treaties of January 9, 1909. 
 
 The negotiations of these treaties with the United States and 
 Panama for the adjustment of all c{uestions between the tliree parties 
 were ])roposed by the Government of Colombia itself. 
 
 The negotiations stretched over a period of some three years, 
 being interrupted from time to time by fresh demands on the part of 
 Colombia and liampered in their course by what seemed a very 
 inconsistent reversion of the Colombian plenipotentiaries of the time 
 to attem])t to create issues any bases for which had in effect been 
 set aside by Colombia's own proposal to settle the material questions 
 involv(Ml. On one occasion the obstructive tactics of the Colombian 
 ])lenipotentiary were virtually disavowed by his recall and the 
 substitution of another more in accord with the policies of his 
 Government. 
 
 The issue had thus been early narrowed to the cjuestion of com- 
 pensation for the losses and injuries pleaded by Colombia, and, it 
 being undeniable that Colombia had suffered by failure to reap a 
 share of the benefits of the canal, the Government of the United 
 States was entirely willing to take this consideration into account, 
 antl to endeavor to accommodate the conflicting interests of the three 
 parties by the conventional fixation of a just measure of com- 
 pensation, in money or in material equivalence. Throughout the 
 whole discussion the course of the United States was marked by 
 kindly forbearance and ec(uitable generosity. The result was the 
 signature on January 9, 1909, of three treaties, one between the 
 United States and the RejDublic of Colombia, one between the United 
 States and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colombia and 
 Panama, all three being interdependent, to stand or fall together. 
 The treaties between the United States and the respective Repubfics 
 of Colombia and of Panama received the ad^dsory and consenting 
 approval of the Senate on the respective dates of February 24 and 
 March 3, 1909. That between Colombia and Panama was ratified 
 by the Repubhc of Panama January 27, 1909, while the treaty with 
 the United States was ratified by Panama three days later. 
 
 It seems unnecessary for the purposes of this report to narrate the 
 elaborate negotiations which preceded the signature of the "tripar- 
 tite" treaties. The Senate, in executive session, was apprised of the 
 processes by wliich the conventional results w^ere reached and the 
 nature of those results is made apparent by the text of the three in- 
 struments. That their jn-ovisions sought to deal, adequately, justly, 
 and in the only practical manner so far suggested, with the interna- 
 tional jiroblems growing out of the secession of Panama and out of 
 the assumption by the United States of the great work of construct- 
 ing the canal, would appear to be evident to the unprejudiced mind. 
 The interests and honor of the three countries were, throughout the 
 negotiation, jealously guarded by their respective plenipotentiaries, 
 and their agreement on all vital points was a confirmatory safeguard. 
 
6 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 Nevertheless, negotiated as these treaties were at the instance of 
 Colombia, and framed as they were with every desire to accommodate 
 their terms to the just expectations of Colombia; and although they 
 were accepted by the Colombian cabinet, which made repeated efforts 
 to bring about conditions favorable to their approval by the Congress, 
 the treaties still remain unacted upon. 
 
 It thus remained for the Colombian Government to hold up the 
 treaties, to propose the nullification of all the negotiations which had 
 led up to their conclusion and which it had invited, and to suggest 
 entrance upon new negotiations with the United States alone. This 
 suggestion the United States then declined to accept, holding that 
 the ' 'tripartite" treaties must stand or fall together and that no such 
 substitutionary arrangement could be considered without the har- 
 monious agreement of all three parties. In the same attitude, the 
 Colombian Government, without seeking the consent of the United 
 States to enter, after these two rebuffs, upon a discussion of an en- 
 tirely different character, sought to revert to its former proposal of 
 some kind of settlement by arbitration. 
 
 The next proposal of Colombia, on January 5, 1910, was that the 
 United States and Panama should agree to submit to a plebiscite the 
 question of the separation of Panama with the promise that the inter- 
 ests of the United States in the Canal Zone should not be affected by 
 the result. This proposal as made was considered intangible and 
 impracticable, although, as late as March 26, 1910, it appears to have 
 been the subject of an informal suggestion- of the Colombian minister, 
 coupled with the promise that if the vote should be unfavorable to 
 the status of Panama the Government of Colombia would formally 
 recognize the acts of Panama in the canal matter. 
 
 Again the suggestion of arbitration in somewhat more tangible 
 form appears in the shape of a confidential memorandum, under date 
 of November 30, 1910, expressing the view of Senor Olaya, the Colom- 
 bian minister for foreign affairs, that, as the provision of Article 
 XXXV of the treaty of 1846 m regard to the guarantee by the United 
 States of Colombian sovereignty over the territory of the Isthmus 
 was differently interpreted by the two Governments, the question 
 Avhether the acts of the United States on the Isthmus in 1903 were 
 not in harmony with the engagements of Article XXXV, appeared 
 to be a judicial issue proper for arbitral determination. This in- 
 formal suggestion appeared to involve proposals already rejected by 
 Secretaries Hay and Root. It did not, moreover, materialize in a 
 shape admitting of discussion, and was lost to sight when, about the 
 same time, a new turn was given to the matter by the suggestion of 
 the Colombian foreign office'that, with a few changes ("more appar- 
 ent than real") the treaties might be approved. No tangible pro- 
 posal was offered, however, as to the changes desired, although it was 
 intimated in January, 1911, that they might import confirmation of 
 Colombia's claim to the ownership of the Panama Railway and of 
 alleged rights and interests in any canal contract or concession 
 granted by Colombia. This intimation, like others put forward dur- 
 ing 1910, never reached the stage of diplomatic discussion. 
 
 Still another phase supervened when, on March 28, in view of the 
 statement alleged to have been made by ex-President Roosevelt in an 
 address delivered at Berkelev, Cal., on March 23, to the effect that 
 "he took the Canal Zone," the Colombian minister, Senor Borda, 
 
UNITED STATES AND KEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 7 
 
 const I'll inii' this rt'porlod utterance as an admission tliat Jiis nation had 
 been " ^gratuitously, prol'ouiidly, and unex])ectedly oft'cnded and 
 injured," demanch'd that the divinity and lionor of Colombia should 
 "receive satisfaction."" No diphnnatic discussion of this incident 
 ensued. 
 
 At tiie end of May, 1911, iSeiior Borda took leave of the President, 
 and returned to Colombia, being replaced by Gen. Pedro Nel Ospina, 
 who presented his credentials ]\Iay 31, 1911. 
 
 No record exists of any effort by tliis new minister of Colombia to 
 reach an nnderstanding in regard to the Panama controversy or the 
 tripartite treaties nntil Iiis note of November 25, 1911. In that note 
 he reciteil " tiie ntter iinlikeliliood" of a di])lomatic settlement of the 
 Panaman issues; characterized the attempt to regulate tlie situation 
 by the direct agreement embodied in the tripartite treaties of 1909 as 
 " most inifortunate," owing to the adverse sentiment of the Colombian 
 people which had brought about the expatriation of tlie head of the 
 Government and of the plenipotentiar}^ (Senor Cortes) by whom tliey 
 were signed; asserted that it had been demonstrated practically that 
 the desired settlement of the existing differences could not be reached 
 l)y direct agreement, and urged resort to the decision of an impartial 
 tribunal as to the inter])retation to be given to that part of the still 
 existing treaty of 1S46, by which the United States, in return for 
 valuable concessions, assumed the obligations to guarantee to New 
 Granada (now Colombia) '^the rights of sovereignty and property 
 which she has and possesses over the territory of the Isthmus of 
 Panama." 
 
 In conformity with usage, it was to be expected that the envoy 
 would follow uj) such a communication by seeking personal conference 
 with the Secretary of State to clear the way for formal treatment of a 
 proposal alike so important and so vaguely comprehensive. As a 
 matter of course, and as a part of the public duty of his office, the 
 Secretar}- of State was and is, at all times, ready to hold such con- 
 ference with a foreign representative, knowing the advantage to both 
 parties in such a case, of thoroughly understanding each other's views 
 before their expression in official correspondence. Moreover, a just 
 regard for the sensibilities of a nation with which this Government 
 sincerely desires to maintain friendly intercourse naturally made 
 the Secretary of State averse to making a categorical refusal of the 
 proposition, while on the other hand the vagueness of the proposal, 
 like the nature of some of its implications, forbade its academic dis- 
 cussion without a more distinct understanding of its true scope. Gen. 
 Nel Isjiina, however, held aloof from the Department of State. 
 
 blatters were in this posture when, on the eve of the departure of the 
 Secretary of State on a mission of good will and earnest amity toward 
 the several Republics of the Caribbean, a kindly personal intimation 
 of the pleasure it would afford the Secretary to include Colombia in 
 his itinerary was met by the assertion that such a visit would be 
 '■ inopportune. ■■ Included in this reply to an urbane note were 
 arguments and also accusations tending to impugn the honor and 
 good faith of the United States. It is gratifying to know that this 
 singular course of the minister was taken on his own initiative and was 
 reprobated by his Government. The incident was not of interna- 
 tional moment, but it was closed by the spontaneous recaU of the 
 envoy by his Government, leaving nothing in the path of that good 
 
8 UjSTITED states and EEPUBLIC of COLOMBIA. 
 
 understanding which this country desires to maintain with its fellow 
 Republic. 
 
 It is thus seen that the request of Colombia for arbitration has only re- 
 centl}^ advanced from the status of a suggested contingent alternative, as 
 a resort m case of failure to attain a diplomatic adjustment, to that of a 
 request predicated on the impossibility of such a direct settlement, an 
 impossibility, if it be one, only because of the act of the Colombian 
 Government in twice repudiating settlements already agreed upon on 
 two occasions by the procedure usual in the intercourse of nations. 
 
 It is also to be seen that, while the request takes the same form as 
 the earlier suggested contingent alternative and appears to confine 
 the subject matter of arbitration to ascertainment of the true intent 
 of an isolated clause of Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846, a deci- 
 sion m that regard would revive the old charges and bring them mto 
 the arbitral proceedings. 
 
 It does not seem timely or pertinent to the purposes of this mes- 
 sage to discuss these charges, which were exhausted in the corre- 
 spondence of 1904 and 1905, and which were necessarily laid aside 
 when the two Governments entered upon negotiations for a friendly 
 adjustment of their differences, with the result of agreement upon 
 conventional terms of settlement. It suffices to say that the thirty- 
 fifth article of the treaty of 1846 is necessarily to be construed as a 
 whole, that the reciprocal obligations of the United States and Co- 
 lombia were framed to enable this country to enjoy and maintain the 
 enjoyment of the privileges of free uninterrupted isthmian transit, 
 and that the transit was to be kept open by the United States upon 
 occasion, free from disturbance from within or aggression from with- 
 out. The stipulation which the Colombian Government isolates 
 from its context and seeks to make the sole basis of its contention is 
 in its essence a part of the rights reserved to the United States in 
 order to secure to itself the tranquil and constant enjoyment of the 
 advantages of the transit. 
 
 While it is styled as being in compensation for these advantages 
 and in return for the general commercial privileges accorded by the 
 convention, it is perfectly clear that, like the ''perfect neutrality" of 
 the Isthmus, the guarantee of the rights of sovereignty and property 
 is to the end ' ' that the free transit from the one to the other sea may 
 not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this 
 treatj^ exists." And here it may not be out of place to observe that 
 the neutrality of the Isthmus is not its international-law neutrality. 
 The word neutrality has many meanings and shades of meaning 
 besides its strictly technical sense of impartiality between alien 
 belligerents, and is too often indefiniLely or irrelevantly employed. 
 In tills instance, the obvious sense is ttiat the territorv covered bv 
 the transit is not to be allowed to become an arena of foreign assault 
 or internal disturbance that may impair the tranquil enjoyment of 
 its use. The United States has exercised the right to prevent such 
 interruption in the past upon occasion, sometimes with the consent 
 of Colombia, sometimes without it, sometimes at the request 
 of Colombia herself in times of civil disturbance, and in the latter 
 case not in fulfillment of any supposed duty to uphold the authoritv 
 of the titular Government of the territory, but to prevent disorderly 
 interference with the transit. Indeed, the very acts of the United 
 States upon the Isthmus of which Colombia complained comport 
 
 \ 
 
UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 9 
 
 I'lillv with llic rii;ht and duty of the United States under the treaty 
 of IS46 to keo]) the hne of transit free from the paralyzing disturbance 
 of civil war, just as it would have been a right and duty to prevent 
 its being a i)re3^ of alien rapacity in violation of the territorial rights 
 of its own nationals. 
 
 When a new American minister, Mr. James T. Du Bois, was sent 
 to Colombia, in the latter half of 1911, he was informed of the desire 
 of the United States to find some means consistent with its dignity 
 and honor whereby an end might be put to the ill-feeling of Colom- 
 bia. The view of this Government that, as a condition precedent to 
 any real hope of this desirable result, there should be some modifica- 
 tion of attitude in the direction of reasonableness on the part of the 
 Colombian Government was explained, and much time was given 
 by Mr. Du Bois to a careful study of the relations between the two 
 countries. In the summer of 1912 he returned from Bogota to confer 
 with the Department of State as to how a just and fair settlement 
 of our differences with Colombia could be reached. 
 
 A program having been evolved which was thought fully responsive 
 to all the needs of the situation, as fresh evidence of the sincere 
 desire of the United States to allay once for all the ill feeling existing 
 in Colombia, the minister was given full instructions and proceeded 
 to his post. In view of the experience of this Government in seeing 
 adjustments carefully made twice shattered by the failure of their 
 final acceptance at Bogota, it was felt that any fresh formal proposals 
 should certainly emanate from the Colombian Government. The 
 minister was therefore authorized simply to make known through 
 informal and confidential conversations certam bases which, if 
 reduced to the form of proposals made to the United States by the 
 Government of Colombia, would receive sympathetic consideration 
 by this Government as forming a practical means of complete adjust- 
 ment of all existing differences with Colombia. 
 
 The program which the minister laid before the Colombian Gov- 
 ernment in the tentative and informal manner indicated comprised 
 the following points: 
 
 (1) That if Colombia would ratify the Root-Cortes and Cortes- 
 Arosemena treaties as they stood the United States would be willing 
 to sign an additional convention paying to Colombia 110,000,000 
 for a permanent option for the construction of an interoceanic canal 
 through Colombian territory and for the perpetual lease of the islands 
 of St. Andrews and Old Providence. In the event that the Colombian 
 Government felt that on account of their relationship with Panama 
 there existed difficulties in which they might desire the assistance 
 of the United States the minister was to intimate that there might 
 be added a stipulation that the United States would be willing to 
 use its good offices with the Government of Panama for the purpose 
 of securing an amicable adjustment by arbitration or otherwise of the 
 Colombia-Panama boundary dispute and of any other mattei's 
 pending between the two countries. Again, if such a proposal by 
 Colom1)ia seemed impossible the minister was instructed to intimate 
 that in addition to the foregoing the Government of the United 
 States would be willing to conclude with Colombia a convention sub- 
 mitting to arbitration the question of the o^^'nership of the reversion- 
 arv rio:hts in the Panama Railwav. which the Colombian Govern- 
 
10 UNITED STATES AND EEPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 nient asserts that it possesses, and looking to proper indemnity 
 should the Colombian contention be sustained. 
 
 (2) In the event that the Colombian Government should be 
 strongly averse to making a proposal involving the ratification of the 
 Cortes-Arosemena treaty with Panama, then the minister was to 
 intimate that this Government would be wilhng to consider the 
 foregoing proposal, even with certain amendments. These amend- 
 ments were to be: First, the addition of a protocol whereby the United 
 States would undertake to use its good offices on behalf of Colombia 
 in the adjustment of boundary questions between it and Panama; 
 and, second, a convention whereby the Root-Cortes treaty between 
 Colombia and the Uaited States should be amended to the extent of 
 eliminating its interdependence upon the Cortes-Arosemena treaty 
 while preserving to Colombia the important advantages it would give 
 that country in reference to the use of the Panama Canal — one effect 
 of this charge being that Colombia would have either definitively to 
 forego the payment of $2,500,000 to be made it under the original 
 tripartite arrangement, or at least to forego such pajmient until such 
 future time, if ever, when the Colombian Government might find it 
 convenient to ratify the Cortes-Arosemena treaty. 
 
 The minister returned to Bogota on January 15, 1913, and at once 
 proceeded to carry out his instructions. 
 
 The foregomg constituted the complete program of the extreme 
 limits to which, m the judgment of the department, the Government 
 of the United States would be justified, from any point of view, in 
 going in the rather extraordinary efforts thus undertaken to eliminate 
 once for all all causes of friction, whether justified or not, between 
 the two countries. 
 
 The lease of Colombia's rights in two small Caribbean Islands was 
 included as a possible safeguard in the matter of canal defense and 
 for the purpose, regardful of Colombia's dignity, of clothing the dis- 
 cussion with a larger aspect of mutuality of consideration. The 
 option for an interoceanic canal through Colombian territory where 
 there has been, from time to time, recrudescent discussion of such a 
 possible canal project in the Atrato region was introduced in accord- 
 ance with the same policy which actuated the Government of the 
 United States in encouraging the recent convention with Nicaragua, 
 although the probability of such an undertaking m that region is 
 regarded as far more remote than is true with reference to the Nica- 
 raguan route. In pursuance of the same broad policy of setting at 
 rest once for all all talk of any rival interoceanic canal not controlled 
 by the United States, the department was convinced of the desu'- 
 ability of such a convention, which, like the lease of the islands 
 above mentioned, offered further opportunity to give semblance of 
 consideration for the payment proposed. 
 
 The remainder of the program is quite simple and offers to give 
 to Colombia all the advantages given by the tripartite treaties 
 and in a manner most considerate of the present Colombian feeling 
 toward the Republic of Panama, while, at the same time, as is of 
 paramount necessity, jealously guarding the fixed rights and interests 
 of the United States, which, of course, could not be permitted to be 
 called in question. 
 
 On January 20, Mr. Du Bois had a preliminary conversation with 
 the President of Colombia and informally discussed with him the 
 first alternative of the program, viz, that including the ratification 
 
UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 11 
 
 by Colombia of the tripartite treaties. He was informed by the 
 President that ho coiihl not and would not consent to recommend 
 to the ColombianCon<;ress ratification of the^Vi'osemena-Cortes treaty. 
 In reply to an inquiry from the minister whether he should proceed to 
 offer the secontl alternative, he was informed by the Secretary of 
 State that he could do so if and when he was absolutely satisfied 
 that the decision of the Colombian President was final, it being under- 
 stood that the United States could not consider any other or further 
 concession than incUcated in the second form of the program. 
 
 The minister tlien proceeded further with his conversations, and 
 on January 27, 1913, telegraphed to the Secretary of State that the 
 proposition for the perpetual lease of the islands of Old Providence 
 and St. Andrews was embarrassing to the Colombian Government, 
 l)eing regarded as practically a sale of the islands, which could not 
 be ratified. Inquiry was made by the minister for his information 
 and guidance whether a liberal option for coaling, airship, and wireless 
 stations on one or ])othof the islands, together with a 60-year option 
 on the Atrato Canal route would be acceptable to the United States. 
 The minister in rc])ly was cautioned to avoid maldng any proposals, 
 which should logical!}' come from the Government of Colombia, but 
 was informed that if he could assure the Dej^artment of State that 
 that Government would accept and the Colombian Congress ratify 
 the agreement, without seeking any additional concessions, should this 
 Government be willing to accept coaling stations instead of the 
 ])erpetual lease of the islands, the proposal would be considered. 
 With respect to ])lacing a time limit on the canal-route option he 
 was instructed that he sliould discourage positively any thought on tlie 
 ))art of Colond)ia tliat a 60-year term would be acceptable if the United 
 States were to ])ay any such figure as was named in his instructions. 
 
 The next information received from the minister was contained in a 
 telegram, dated January 31, 1913, and was to the effect that the 
 Colombian Government seemed determined to treat with the incoming 
 Democratic administration. 
 
 These friendly, considerate, and conciliatory efforts to put the rela- 
 tions between the United States and Colombia on a more cordial basis 
 having thus failed, the minister at Bogota was instructed by telegraph 
 on February 7, 1913, to drop the matter after communicating to th^ 
 Colombian Presi(h'nt a personal note as follows: 
 
 Althoiish your excellency will doubtless appreciate that those intimations which I 
 liave been able to give of the nature of a proposal which, if made by Colombia, would 
 be considered by my Government naturally had reference only to the time at which 
 1 had ihe honor to make them, nevertheless, in order to avoid even a remote possibility 
 of misunderstandins:. I am directed to make it entirely clear to your excellency that 
 nothing which has transpired in these purely personal and informal conAersations is 
 to be regarded as any indication of what may be the future disposition of the Govern* 
 ment of the United States or as committing my Government in any respect whatever, 
 my efforts to arrive at some definite conclusion having, to my regret, come to naught. 
 
 The minister has informed the department that after final discus- 
 sion he has presented a note in the above sense. 
 
 The most recent telegrams from the minister show that quite aside 
 from his instructions and acting upon his personal responsibility, 
 Mr. Du Bois, as a matter of curiosity, sounded the Colombian Govern- ' 
 ment still further in order to elicit a clearer idea of its pretentions. 
 It was intimated to the minister that if the Colombian Government 
 would make })ro])osals in accordance with his informal suggestions a 
 revolution would, in its opinion, result. 
 
12 UNITED STATES AND EEPFBLIC OF COLOMBIA. 
 
 Continuing in his evident personal desire to sound, if possible, the 
 limits of Colombian pretentions, the minister also inquired whether 
 an offer of $10,000,000 without the considerations which had been 
 suggested would be acceptable. To this he was informed that it 
 would not; that all his suggestions fell short by far of what Colombia 
 could accept. To his inquiry, what terms Colombia would accept, 
 the reply was: "The arbitration of the whole Panama question or a 
 direct proposition from the United States to compensate Colombia 
 for all the moral, physical, and financial losses sustained by it because 
 of the separation of Panama." This, it was intimated, was the last 
 word of the Colombian Government. 
 
 The very latest telegram from Mr. Du Bois shows that in a subse- 
 quent interview he took it upon himself informally to ask whether if 
 the United States should, without requesting options or privileges of 
 any kind, offer Colombia $25,000,000, its good offices with Panama, 
 the arbitration of the question of reversionary rights in the Panama 
 Railway, and preferential rights of the canal, the Government would 
 accept; to which he was answered in the negative. 
 
 Included in this most recent telegraphic correspondence is a state- 
 ment of the impression of the legation at Bogota that the Colombian 
 Government cherishes the expectation that the incoming administra- 
 tion will arbitrate the entire Panama question, or will directly com- 
 Sensate Colombia for the value of the territory of Panama, the Panama 
 !,ailway, the railroad annuities, and the contract with the French 
 Canal Co. 
 
 I merely mention the results of these personal inquiries made by 
 Mr. Du Bois, as I have said, in his personal capacity and without any 
 authority, because they throw so much light upon the Colombian 
 obsession with regard to this whole subject. This attitude resulting 
 in the rebuff of generous overtures by the United States is undoubtedly 
 due in a great measure to a radical misconception of real public 
 opinion in the United States, engendered probably by reiterated 
 criticism in certain uninformed quarters leveled at the policy of this 
 Government at the very time it was bending every eft'ort to adjust 
 its relations with Colombia and required for such adjustment an 
 atmosphere of calm instead of one of captious attack and unreasoning 
 encouragement of an arbitrary attitude on the part of the foreign 
 country with which it was dealing. 
 
 Feeling that this Government has made every effort consistent with 
 the honor, dignity, and interests of the United States in its sincere 
 aim to bring about a state of better feeling on the part of the Govern- 
 ment of Colombia, it is with regret that I have to report that these 
 efforts are thus far still met by a desii'e for impossible arbitrations, and 
 80 have proved unavailing unless, indeed, they may yet prove fruitful 
 in the course of time of a more reasonable and friendly attitude on 
 the part of Colombia. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Government of Colombia would appear to have 
 closed the door to an}^ further overtures on the part of the United 
 States. 
 
 Respectfullv submitted. 
 
 P. C. Knox. 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, February 20, 1913.. 
 
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 000 158 643 9 I