ciassl!GL: x Book • J > r PRESENTED Wf NEW YORK UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION VALUES IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY AND THEIR INTERRELATION This thesis has been accepted by the Graduate School of New York University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Milton E. Loomis, Secretary of the Faculty. VALUES IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY AND THEIR INTERRELATION By MAURICE PICARD, Ph.D. Lecturer in Philosophy in Barnard College THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS 32 Waverly Place, New York City 1920 Copyright 1920, by The New York Univeesity Press $$ THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS COMMITTEE OP PUBLICATION Arthur Huntington Nason, PH;D„ Chairman Director of the Press Earle Brownell Babcock, Ph.D. Harold Dickinson Senior, M.B., Sc.D., F.R.C.S. Gift University OCT * J«$ KENNEBEC JOURNAL PRESS, AUGUSTA, MAINE cr- PREFACE IT would seem that an apology is due from me to Professor W. M. Urban for not having discussed his significant contribu- tion to value-philosophy, entitled, Valuation, Its Nature and Laws. My omission is not due to any failure to recognize that Professor Urban is, in this country, the most eminent repre- sentative of a large school of value-philosophers, among whom are A. Meinong, C. V. Ehrenfels, and G. Simmel. My reason for not discussing their views in the present work is similar to that which prompted me to pass by Munsterberg's The Eternal Values. Here are two schools of value-philosophy with presuppositions radically different from my own. That school which Professor Urban so well represents finds the locus of value in the "worth-fundamental," dis- covered by an analysis of mental life. Miinster- berg finds value in the region of the human will, and he believes that value implies an over- personal, metaphysically absolute will. Both find value primarily to be a quality which colors certain mental states — Munsterberg believes that it points toward an objective " Oversell" In contrast to this subjective point of de- vi PREFACE parture, I have treated value as relational, occur- ring in definite situations. I have used the psychological basis of values not as the sum and substance of valuation, but as a description of one term of value-relations, the other term, that of the environment, calling for equal attention. Thus I have been able to avoid the acrostic phil- osophy of the value-psychologists, which tends in the direction of epistemological realism, and the lack of concreteness incidental to it. I may note, however, that Professor Urban considers briefly, in the last chapter of his book, some of the problems which I discuss in detail. To Professor Herman Harrell Home of New York University, I am indebted for numerous suggestions and for a final reading of the proof ; and to Professor Arthur Huntington Nason, Director of the New York University Press, for critical oversight of publication. Above all, however, my gratitude is due to Professor Dickinson S. Miller of General Theological Seminary, for his kindness in reading my man- uscript and making many helpful suggestions as to the method of treatment of my subject. M. P. New York City, January 31, 1920. CONTENTS Introduction PART I THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES Chapter I. Two Classes of Values 7 Values as means or 'given as good,' J. — Their psychological basis in cog- nition and feeling, 9. — Independent character of contributory values, 13. — Objective and subjective, 14. — Ques- tionable status of logical, moral, and aesthetic values, 15. — Distinction be- tween values and value- judgments, 16. Chapter II. Truth and Immediate Value . . 20 Verification vs. recognition, 20. — Rick- ert's argument, 21. — Metaphysics and epistemology, 24. — Truth a matter of inference, not simple affirmation, 25. — Rickert's psychologizing tendency, 26. — Various oppositions, 28. Chapter III. The Interrelation of Values with Respect to Their Origin. . 31 Values not dependent upon presence of judgment, 32. — Standpoints of the agent and the observer, 33. — Value and the earliest stage of consciousness, 36. — vii viii VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Presence of interest the criterion of presence of value, 38. — Biological con- comitants of the earliest value-situation, 39. — Values from the observer's stand- point all contributory, 43. — Introspec- tive and sympathetic methods, 44. — Earliest stage of the standpoint of the individual, 45. — Introspective deter- mination of values of this stage, 46. — Values in the earliest stages of con- sciousness, 48. — Sensations and feeling- attitudes, 48. — Two directions of the development of conscious activity, 50. Chapter IV. The Interrelation op Values with Respect to Knowledge . . 54 Judgments as values and judgments of values, 54. — The value of acts of judgment, 57. — Content of judgments and their future usefulness, 59. — True judgments and their value, 61. — Value of false judgments, 66. — Degrees of contributory value, 69. — Value of theo- retical judgments, 73. — Limits of the discussion of judgments of values, 76. Origin of immediate judgments, 78. — Origin of contributory judgments, 80. — Tendency of contributory judgments to become independent of particular in- dividual needs, 82. Chapter V. The Interrelation op Values with Respect to Their Co-exis- tence 85 CONTENTS ix Different uses of the term 'environ- ment', 85. — Biological and psychological uses, 88. — Difference between the bio- logical viewpoint and that of instru- mental pragmatism, 90. — Environment and perception, 92. — Relevant disputes about aspects of consciousness, 94. — Conscious activity related to environ- ment through cognition and feeling, 97. Contact with environment through feel- ing, 99. — Cognitive and affective rela- tions of conscious activity, 104. — Rela- tion of mature to primitive conscious activity, 106. — Sensation as a bridge between cognition and feeling, no. — Further deductions, 112. PART II WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS Chapter VI. Subjective and Objective 119 The place of function in value-rela- tions, 119. — Are tastes objective or sub- jective? 121. — Possible existence of norms, 122. — Attractiveness of theory of objective immediate values, 124. Chapter VII. The Theory of Norms 126 I. Kant or Realism ? 128 Windelband's contradictory theories, 129. — Norms and natural laws, 130. — Relation of norms to particular con- sciousnesses, 132. x VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION II. Evolution and the Norms 134 Qualitative and quantitative factors, 135. — Their incompatability with the theory of natural selection, 136. III. The Parallel between Denken, Fuhlen, and W oil en 137 Falsity of the parallel between Den- ken and W oil en, 137. — A psychological scruple, 139. IV. The Independence of the Norms of Particular Consciousnesses . . 140 Independence of particular conscious- nesses not proved for norms, 141. — The case for parallelism of three realms of norms, 145. — Evolution of morality does not presuppose norms of morality, 148. — Supposition of moral and logical norms unnecessary, 152. — Aesthetic appreciations and the law of sur- vival, 153. V. Freedom and Responsibility 155 Freedom said to subsist in determined processes, 157. — Assumption of auton- omy on part of the individual, 160. — Causality, necessity, and responsibility, 162. — Ambiguity in use of the word 'character', 165. — Choice of possible de- cisions, 166. — Responsibility as a func- tion of the judgment, 169. Windelband's General Position . . 172 Conclusion 175 VALUES IMMEDIATE AND CONTRIBUTORY AND THEIR INTERRELATION INTRODUCTION IN this thesis, I purpose taking as my start- ing point the general agreement among writers as to the existence of values be- longing to two distinct classes, immediate and contributory. In order to put the distinction between the two classes beyond question, I shall limit the class " immediate " to those immediate values which are agreed to be subjective, i.e., dependent for their existence upon some par- ticular individual who holds them as values. The propositions, therefore, which I shall as- sume to be matters of general agreement are, " There is a class of values which may be named ' contributory \" " All contributory values are objective." " There is another class of values which may be termed ' immediate \" " Some immediate values are subjective." Having distinguished two classes of values as subject-matter for discussion, I proceed to treat of their interrelations. But, before this can be done effectually, it is found to be neces- sary to disprove a theory which, if true, would render the distinction between immediate and 4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION contributory values of slight importance. It has been held that the values known as con- tributory are dependent for their validity upon certain a priori immediate values because all truth is said to rest upon immediate recognition of its presence. I therefore devote a chapter to disproving this theory. With two classes of values of unquestioned distinction, I next discuss their interrelation with reference to their origin, with reference to knowledge, and with reference to their co- existence. Part II examines immediate values with a view to demonstrating that there are no ob- jective immediate values. This result confirms the validity of the initial distinction between objective-contributory and subjective-immediate values, and carries the proposition " Some im- mediate values are subjective " to the wider application of the proposition " It cannot be proved that there are any immediate values which are not subjective." PART I THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES CHAPTER I TWO CLASSES OF VALUES THE method to be pursued, as stated in the introduction, is to begin the dis- cussion by finding some point of agree- ment among writers on value. It is not to be expected that there may be discovered groups of values to whose clear cut distinctions all writers will subscribe. It is not unlikely, how- ever, that there may exist a fundamental dis- tinction in kind between certain values and cer- tain other values, and that the points at issue may be due to differences of opinion as to the correct assignment of other particular values. First, I shall point out two radically different types of value; secondly, I shall indicate the nature of those values which may not be as- signed summarily to one of the two classes. § i. The distinction which I have in mind is between contributory or instrumental values and immediate values. The adjectives "instru- mental " and " immediate " indicate that the distinction is a logical one, distinguishing values as given goods or as means. Contributory 7 8 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION values are not self-sufficient; they look beyond themselves to some end-in-view. They com- prise objects that are "good for" something, or acts that conduce to the attainment of some specific end. Thus, this pen is good for writ- ing; apples are good for food. I visit my physician in order to obtain treatment from him; he prescribes for me in order that I may get well. Pen, apples, and the acts of visiting and treatment are of contributory value. Immediate values, on the other hand, are " non-mediate." They do not look forward to an end, but are intrinsic, self-sufficient. They are ends-in-themselves in the sense that they are simply given as good when stated, requiring neither reference to any object or act beyond themselves, nor verification of any kind. Of such character are objects and acts which I like, demand, admire, approve, wish, want, etc. I admire a beautiful vase; it thus becomes of value to me, irrespective of any other vases that I admire. I disapprove of the act of taking human life; the act of killing thereby becomes of negative value to me. Sailing and smoking are valuable to me. § 2. The fundamental character of the dis- TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 9 tinction between immediate and contributory values will appear when their psychological basis is taken into account. Observe first that objects and acts of contributory value demand for their existence other objects or acts to which they may be related. They cannot stand alone. For a government note to be of the value of ten dollars, the ten dollars must actually exist somewhere. Apples, considered as good for food, imply the existence of some suitable diges- tive apparatus. If my visit to my physician is to be valuable as a means to getting well, I must now be capable of improvement in health beyond my present state. Now, as both contributory and instrumental values are here spoken of with reference to man, it is obvious that the psycho- logical basis of contributory values must be sought in some aspect of the human mind by which objects and acts may be related to other objects and acts. Cognition alone satisfies this requirement. We may say, therefore, that con- tributory values are closely associated with the cognitive aspect of consciousness, where comparison, memory, and reasoning furnish a mechanism for relating portions of our ex- perience. io VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Immediate values, on the other hand, do not require relation of two ideas in consciousness. They are simple, unique, self-sufficing facts. They are matters of taste, and " de gustibus non disputandum." What is the importance of the cognitive aspect of conscious activity with respect to such values? Must I know them in order to have them? Not any more than that the leopard must know that he has spots in order to have them. Knowledge of values, therefore, is quite distinct from values them- selves, and we shall do well always to bear this fact in mind. If cognition is merely incidental to immediate values, the psychological basis of immediate values must be sought in some aspect of con- sciousness other than the cognitive aspect. There remain, in the popular division, the fields of will and feeling. The words " like," " demand," "want," "admire," "approve," "wish," etc., which describe the type of relation that exists between the individual and the objects or acts which he immediately values, are all expressive of feeling. It is also noteworthy that, if the feeling is toward an object or act which the individual is not possessing or doing at the TWO CLASSES OF VALUES n time, there is also frequently present an impulse to gain possession of the object or to do the act. If I am sufficiently eager to sail, I am impelled to go down to the lake to get the boat ready. If my liking for peanuts affects me deeply, I am likely to go out and buy some. It appears, therefore, that immediate values are also closely associated with the will-aspect of consciousness, and this can be said without committing oneself to any particular theory as to the nature of that will-aspect. In the case of contributory values, however, there is a hypothetical characteristic which makes their relation to will quite differ- ent. Apples are good for food if I am hungry. My pen is good for writing when I want to write. In these examples, there is no impulse aroused by the act of contributory valuation; I may put the object or the act valued to service whenever a suitable occasion is presented, but the object or act will not itself create the occa- sion. I may conclude, therefore, that will and feeling are peculiarly associated with immediate values, and cognition with contributory values. § 3. I must not leave this preliminary con- sideration of the psychological basis of value without a caution and a deduction. The cau- 12 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION tion is that the assignment of two classes of values to different fields of psychological mani- festation must not be held to imply that the individual ever acts exclusively in any one " field " of consciousness. Cognition, feeling, and will are aspects of a conscious activity which is undivided. The distinction with refer- ence to value is one of emphasis rather than one of division. More than that, the distinction implies that we human beings, in our discussion and discrimination of values, recognize that we value things in different ways, according as we think, feel, or do them. But this is not to deny the presence of a minimum of feeling and im- pulse necessary to the presence of a thought. There are all gradations of emphasis of cog- nition, feeling, and will in conscious activity, and it is not unlikely that we may find situa- tions of conscious activity in which both classes of value are simultaneously present. The inter- relation of the two classes is, in fact, a subject of future discussion in this thesis. At this juncture, it is necessary only to point out that I do not mean to isolate any " field " of con- sciousness in the act, but only to emphasize that the two classes of value refer exclusively to different aspects of conscious activity. TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 13 The deduction which I wish to make is that contributory values have a measure of inde- pendence of any one individual, which imme- diate values cannot claim. Two facts make this evident: (a) The cognitive function by its process of comparison and relation of ideas one to another makes contributory values independ- ent of a particular time or moment in the activ- ity of the individual. If my umbrella is good for keeping off the rain, it is good for that purpose when next it rains, be it today, next Wednesday, or next month. I may verify con- tributory values. I may find out what my um- brella is good for. (b) The cognitive function has developed the convenient method of expres- sion of ideas of one individual to another by means of speech. It is conceivable that I might demonstrate the use of my umbrella to a soaked friend by gestures, but words greatly facilitate the process. In this way, contributory values are made independent not only of any special moment in the life of an individual, but also of any particular individual. This is in marked contrast with immediate values: the communi- cation of my likes and dislikes to my neighbor is a matter of some difficulty, and sympathetic 14 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION feeling always lacks something of the flavor of the original experience. § 4. With some care, the terms " objective " and " subjective " may be used to signify the distinction between immediate and contributory values. The independence which has just been recognized as characteristic of contributory values makes " objective " an appropriate des- ignation for them. If such values pass as coin among the members of a community, they must cling to the object rather than to the persons who employ them. This is not to say, however, that they would be values at all apart from the relation of the objects to individuals who value them, but they may be called " objective " in deference to the fact that they do not depend for their existence upon any particular member of a community. § 5. The term " subjective," in contrast, is applicable to at least some immediate values, in view of the fact that they cannot exist apart from the conscious activity of some particular individual. § 6. The second task which I set for myself at the beginning of the chapter was that of indicating certain classes of values over whose TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 15 position there is some dispute. The current differences of opinion are nearly all due to one fact, namely, that it is possible to use the cog- nitive function of conscious activity to express in thought and language facts of immediate value. As we have seen, it is necessary that there be a cognitive minimum in order to be conscious of an immediate value. This element, however, at first at a minimum, may grow to the very limit of cognitive development and attain ex- pression in the judgment. If apples are of immediate value, I may think of them as such, and I may make the judgment, " I like apples. " Some writers now argue thus : " I like apples " is a judgment. Judgments are capable of veri- fication. But immediate values do not demand verification. Therefore judgments of immedi- ate values are immediately true. It is further argued that truth, not only of value-judgments but also all truth, is of immediate value, because, it is claimed, in judgment there is always an element of approval or disapproval on the part of the judging individual. Clearly, therefore, truth is a value whose assignment is in dispute, if, indeed, it be a value at all. 16 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Again, in the judgment " I admire the vase/' there is expressed a fact of immediate value. Suppose that, in my admiration, I pronounce it beautiful. Is the beauty a quality of the vase, or only my feeling toward it? If the beauty is in the vase, there must be some standard of beauty outside my consciousness, and the imme- diate value of appreciation of the beautiful will not be subjective, but objective. The place of aesthetic values, therefore, is in dispute. Again, in judging an action to be good, am I expressing only my feeling toward it, or is my feeling governed by the presence of an objective standard of moral value which I instinctively recognize? Is it true that there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so? Or is there a moral standard, quite independent of my sentiments, which is valid for all time? The place of moral values, therefore, is in dispute. § 7. To discuss these disputed points will be a part of what follows. At this point, however, it is suitable to distinguish carefully between a fact of immediate value, and the expression of that same fact in a judgment about immediate value. My feeling toward the vase is quite a distinct and separate thing from the judgment TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 17 " The vase is beautiful." The one does not necessitate the other. I might like the vase, and never put my liking into words; or I might say, " The vase, no doubt, is beautiful, but I feel no liking for it." Judgments of immediate values, therefore, do not derive immediacy from the immediate values which they state. The psychological basis outlined earlier in the chap- ter must be preserved. Judgments, even judg- ments of immediate value, since they fall within the field of cognition, must be classed with con- tributory values, if they are values at all. And strange as it may appear, the judgment that a vase is immediately beautiful will be found to be of contributory value. 1 Discussion of the possible existence of ob- jective moral and aesthetic standards may be postponed to a later chapter. But discussion of the status of truth may not be postponed, because, if truth should be found to be imme- diate and antecedent to judgment, the distinc- tion between immediate and contributory values would be of slight consequence. There would then be too little separation between certain values with reference to the cognitive function 1 Cf. page 58. 18 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION and certain other values with reference to the feeling-function of conscious activity to make the distinction worth while. My next task, therefore, is that of discussing the place of truth in a classification of values. The substance of this chapter may be sum- marized as follows: § i. It is generally agreed that there are two groups of values which are distinct and separate and which may be named immediate and con- tributory values. The distinction is a logical one: contributory values are means to ends; immediate values are given as good. § 2. The psychological basis of contributory values is the cognitive aspect of conscious activ- ity; that of immediate values is the feeling- aspect, often joined with the will-aspect. § 3. It is not implied that any aspect of con- sciousness functions without the presence of the other aspects. §4. "Objective" applied to contributory values means that they do not depend for their existence upon a particular individual. " Sub- jective" applied to immediate values means TWO CLASSES OF VALUES 19 that they do depend for their existence upon some particular individual. § 5. It is generally agreed that contributory values are objective in this sense; and that some immediate values are subjective. § 6. Whether there are obj ective immediate values, in the realms of truth, beauty, and mor- ality, is a disputed question. § 7. Confusion between the classes of con- tributory and immediate values has been due largely to the fact that it is possible to make judgments as to immediate values. CHAPTER II TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE A CHIEF distinction between immediate and contributory values is that the latter admit of verification, while the former do not. If a friend tells me that a cer- tain brand of soap is good for taking off dirt, I can very quickly find out for myself whether what he says is true or not. I can discover whether soap is contributory to the end of cleans- ing. But if my friend tells me that he likes a perfume, I cannot verify the immediate value of his liking. He simply likes it, and it is valuable to him without any ado. Whether I find it agreeable, or what his other friends think about it, makes no difference; for him, it is of imme- diate value. Certain writers, however, tell us that the veri- fication of the soap as contributory to cleansing is not merely a matter of using it and watching its effect upon the skin. They say that the process of trial and observation is of secondary importance beside recognition of the truth that soap cleanses. And this recognition, they say, 20 TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 21 has nothing to do with verification, but is based on a powerful compulsion of the feeling-side of consciousness to assent to it as true. Truth, they say, is thus an immediate value. Now if truth be an immediate value, all those values which I designated as contributory are, in the last analysis, immediate, or, at least, based on immediate values. My whole thesis, on the other hand, assumes that there are the two classes of values, immediate and contributory, and that they are coordinate in rank. It be- comes of first importance, therefore, to disprove the theory that truth is an immediate value. A very subtle psychological argument has been advanced to prove this theory. The keen- est piece of analysis in its support has been made by H. Rickert in his Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. x It will be profitable to summarize and criticize Rickert's position. Starting with the classic conception of truth as located in the judgment, 2 Rickert emphasizes the practical character of knowledge. He ob- serves that there is no truth where there is only a succession of perceptions, and that the fully 1 Rickert, H., Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, Tubingen und Leipzig, 2 Aufl., 1904. 2 Op. cit., 84 ff. 22 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION developed logical judgment appears only when the individual takes an interest (Anteil) in the perceptions. He says that affirmation or nega- tion is logically implied in all judgments which are held to contain knowledge in the sense of true knowledge. Thus, knowing is appreci- ating (Kennen ist Erkennen). But apprecia- tion has to do only with values; therefore truth is a value. The value truth is coordinate with values derived from willing and feeling; that is, truth is an immediate value. The usual opposition made between perceptions and judg- ments, on the one hand, and feeling and willing, on the other, is false; the true opposition is between perceiving, on the one hand, and judg- ments of affirmation and negation together with feeling and willing, on the other. Affirmation and negation, since they are expressive of inter- est, are a kind of approval or disapproval, pleas- ure or displeasure. Knowing is a process deter- mined through the feelings. But truth differs from the appreciation that comes with feelings other than affirmation or negation, in that the appreciation that comes with chance feelings (i.e., immediate values) is unstable, whereas the feeling that appreciates truth is timeless. TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 23 A necessity of judgment is here felt, different from the necessity of perceiving (causal neces- sity). Necessity of judgment is logical neces- sity, Sollen, in contradistinction to Mussen. Sollen precedes Sein in existential judgments, because Sein is only expressible by a judgment. Now if this doctrine is sound, it is obvious that any separation of two classes of values, one of which excludes the element of judgment, is vitiated. For Rickert makes the true judg- ment dependent upon a necessary feeling of appreciation; that is, he makes of it an imme- diate value. According to his theory, the truth of my judgment " The tree is green " is ground- ed in a transcendental Sollen which compels me to judge it as green, if I judge at all. There is an immediate feeling of affirmation, appreci- ation, recognition, which requires me to say " green " rather than blue or red. Every fact implies a judgment. 3 In the preceding chapter, 4 I made the distinction between facts of imme- diate value and judgment concerning the truth or falsity of these facts. According to Rickert, I must have fallen into that " Positivismus, der die ' Tatsache ' und ihre Konstatierung fur das 3 Op. cit., 130. 4 Page 16. 24 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION einzige und letzte ansieht, was den Philosophen kummert." 5 It is necessary, therefore, at this point to criticize Rickert's position: § i. The doctrine that Sein depends upon a transcendental Sollen, is equivalent to saying that metaphysics is dependent upon epistemol- ogy, and many are the objections against such a position. 6 Here it may be remarked that Rickert, as all others who adopt that standpoint, does not live up to his doctrine. If it be true, as he states on p. 130, that existential facts imply a prior judgment, correct method would demand the proof of his theory on the basis of necessary judgments. Such a theory must not be constructed from any materials outside the sphere of judgments recognized (appreciated) as true. What apparently contradicts such a requirement is to be found on pp. 88-89. ^ n these pages, Rickert distinguishes between the quaestio facti of psychology and the quaestio juris of epistemology. He says that psychology is concerned with Sein, but he adds, " Sieht man die Feststellung solcher Tatsachen als Aufgabe der Psychologie an, so muss auch die 5 Rickert, op. cit., 130. 6 Cf. Marvin, W. T., The New Realism, 43-95. TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 25 Behandlung der Frage nach dem erkenntnis- theoretischen Wesen des Urteils mit psycho- logischen Feststeilungen beginnen, um dann zu sehen, welchen Dienst sie fur das V erst'dndnis des logischen Urteilsbe griff es leisten konnen." This is to say, you must start with certain ex- istential facts in order to obtain a basis for consideration of the judgment. Later, 7 he says that it is immaterial whether all judgments, psy- chologically speaking, contain either an affirma- tion or a negation, for the epistemological prob- lem concerns only those which do imply one. His developed theory, however, claims that all knowledge (true knowledge — even existential facts) contains an affirmation or a negation. What of the facts taken from psychology which he used to erect his theory? He has assumed the knowledge of certain facts in order to prove a theory of the dependence of reality on knowl- edge. It is an error of method. § 2. The position of Rickert, in holding that existential facts imply judgments, is to the effect that there are immediate truths. We know existential truth with existence, and the latter cannot be regarded as independent of the for- 7 Rickert, op. cit., 96. 26 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION mer. Rickert is not alone in supposing that there are immediate truths. This theory is held by Russell 8 and by James, among moderns. In the case of James, however, perhaps it is more a question of terminology, as knowledge, in his use of the word, is not restricted to propositions. Dewey (in a conversation with the writer) has brought a cogent argument in criticism of this doctrine of immediate truths. In the prop- osition " It is green," a whole background of experience is presupposed, the comparison of colors. If the judgment is to be verified, the use of spectrum analysis will be required. The truth of the simplest " atomic " proposition, therefore, is dependent upon a great number of " molecular " propositions. " It is green " may be a " snap judgment," associating a particular phenomenon with others that I have experi- enced, or it may involve the services of an ex- pert physicist, as in a law court. In either case, truth is a matter of inference, and the process is no simple, compelling affirmation, but a har- monization with past experience by comparison. § 3. If, therefore, truth always involves some kind of inference, there can be no such thing as 8 Cf. Russell, Bertrand, Scientific Method in Philosophy, 52 ff. TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 2.7 an " immediate truth." But what shall we say of the affirmation or negation which we are " compelled " to give to existential judgments? It seems to me that Rickert has been misled by his polemic against the object of knowledge conceived as " independent " of the individual. He feels that, if this conception is abandoned, a substitute must be found, not so crude, but still independent. Thereupon he infers an in- dependent Sollen from our feeling of necessity in affirming existential judgments. My criti- cism here is that the question of what is the object of knowledge need not be introduced to account for the affirmation or negation that we feel compelled to make. We need postulate only a center of experience, a succession of phenomena, memory, and association. Affirma- tion or negation will then be accounted for on the basis of agreement or disagreement of the phenomena by comparison in memory. Truth will then be applicable to those judgments which state relations that have proved constant. From the epistemological standpoint, it is wholly naive to seek an object that compels us to recognize similarity. § 4. Perhaps it may be urged that, in the 28 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION preceding section, terms have been assumed wrongfully to be given before relations, and that we have no right to use terms to explain the judgment, inasmuch as terms themselves imply existential judgments. My answer to this objection is: How then does Rickert feel justified in speaking of an opposition between perceiving (Vorstellen) and a class comprised of judgments of affirmation and negation, Fuh- len, and Wollen? What are perceptions if not terms? And, if they are existential judgments, how may they be opposed to judgments? And how can Rickert say that, when there is only a succession of perceptions, truth cannot enter? My conclusion is that affirmation or negation must not be held to be of more than incidental importance where the truth of judgments is concerned, and that its psychological explana- tion is ultimate. § 5. Rickert's correlation of Bejahen oder Verneinen with Billigen oder Missbilligen and Gef alien oder Missf alien is crude and super- ficial. Because there is an " either-or " in the case of Fuhlen and Wollen which distinguishes positive and negative immediate values, he con- cludes, without justification, that the " either- TRUTH AND IMMEDIATE VALUE 29 or " of affirmation or negation in Denken is similar in kind. It is undeniably true that, when we affirm or deny a proposition, the ele- ments of will and feeling are present in the act of affirming or denying. This is to say no more than that the fields of cognition, feeling, and activity are never isolated. It is quite another matter, however, to conclude that feel- ings determine knowledge. 9 The true correla- tion is, that, in connection with judgments and feelings and desires, there is a removal of some kind of opposition; but this is not to say that the determining factor is one of the elements, any more than another. It would be just as warrantable to say that cognition determines all feelings or all desires. No, there is opposition that is removed in Fuhlen, Denken, and Wollen, but the same factor does not operate in each of the three classes. One would have expected that Rickert would have hesitated to make Fuhlen responsible for Erkennen, in view of his recognition of the timeless 10 character of the " either-or " of affirmation and negation. It would seem that this timeless character should have made it evident to him that the 9 Rickert, op. cit., 106. 10 Op. tit., 112. 30 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION factor of interest " on the part of the individual is entirely incidental to the truth or falsity of judgments. It is psychological, not logical. To summarize the arguments, it may be said that truth is not an immediate value because: § i. The theory rests on a false derivation of metaphysics from epistemology ; § 2. Truth, even existential truth, is infer- ential ; § 3. A transcendental Sollen is superfluous, and unwarranted by the " feeling of the neces- sity of judgment"; § 4. The theory does not account for the existence of perceptions apart from judgment, though it presupposes them; § 5. The theory of the dependence of truth on the interest of individuals is logically un- sound. 11 op. tit., 105. CHAPTER III THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR ORIGIN NOW that it has been demonstrated that truth is not an immediate value, the way is cleared for discussion of the interrelations of the two classes of values. I purpose following an order which might be called the " natural history of values." I shall endeavor successively to answer the questions, " Where do values begin in the development of conscious life?" "What is their progress in the course of evolution ? " " What happens when we talk about them?" and "How are the two classes related in our daily experi- ence? " The first part of my discussion, there- fore, will be biological and psychological, the second, epistemological, and the third, biological and psychological. Before proceeding with the first part of my task, it will be necessary to describe the stand- point from which discussion of the origin of values is possible. Then I shall describe a series of steps in the development of contribu- tory and immediate values from the earliest 3i 32 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION stages of conscious activity to the mature, re- flective consciousness of the educated man. § i . It was stated in the first chapter 1 that knowledge of an immediate value is not neces- sary to its existence. This thesis bears two interpretations, both of which are true and applicable. It may mean : When I like a thing, I don't have to think or speak of it as a value. It may also mean: The feeling I have toward an object that I like is quite distinct from my knowledge of that feeling. Now these two interpretations of the independence of immedi- ate value of knowledge thus express the truths that (a) the immediate value is independent of the judgment, and (b) the immediate value is independent of its being thought. More ex- plicitly, the latter proposition means that my actual liking for grapes is different in kind from my thought about that actual liking. We may also argue that contributory values may exist apart from the judgment. Objects may be valued as means without judging them to be such. A man may find a branch useful for raising a stone. We may suppose him to be so accustomed to raising stones with branches 1 Page io. WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 33 that he gives no thought to the means which he employs. He simply picks up a stick and uses it as a lever. Such actions, in which we utilize past experience habitually without the medium of judgment, are of every-day occurrence. We may even use means instinctively, without ever having made judgment. The baby who searches for its mother's breast with hands and mouth is employing the latter as means without under- standing them to be such. Birds search in- stinctively for materials out of which to build their nests. The judgment evidently represents a very high level in the development of con- tributory values. § 2. In seeking for a standpoint from which to discuss the origin and development of values, it is evident that we must go back of the judg- ment. It is evident that values of both classes may be present in consciousness without the presence of judgment. There is a difficulty, however, that confronts us when we come to discuss the development of values from the earliest stage of consciousness. It is not an epistemological difficulty, but rather a difficulty of standpoint. In discussing value, it is quite possible to 34 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION confine oneself to the standpoint of the one who values. We may consider how much a man likes or dislikes something, or the value which he places on certain things, or the use- fulness of certain articles to him in accomplish- ing what he aims to accomplish. On the other hand, it is quite possible to take the standpoint of the spectator or observer, from the vantage-ground of the high plane of judg- ment. Then we may point out that certain things or actions were valuable to the man, were to his advantage. He may quite accident- ally have engaged room and board at a house where one who was to become his lifelong friend was staying. We may say that his coming to that house was a valuable action on his part, in view of the good fortune that came to him later from the friendship. We may say that the value which contributed most to Henry's success was his up-bringing in a home of cul- ture. In these cases, the values of which we speak are means to definite ends, but they are means to ends of which the observer, not the agent, is thinking. From the standpoint of the agent, they are simply causes leading to effects. This is indeed the difference between a con- WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 35 tributory value and a cause: to be of contribu- tory value, the element of interest must be added. And this interest may be that of the agent or of the spectator. If it appear that the distinction just drawn is confined to contributory value, observe also that immediate value was seen to be independent of its being thought. 2 I very much doubt whether any one will claim that the feelings of a man when he was a baby and could not understand them, were more than mechanical. One would hardly say that they were the same in signifi- cance as the likes and dislikes of later years. And yet, from our standpoint, we can look down and say that the infantile pleasures and pains were exhibitions of felt goods as much as the likes and dislikes of later life. We are again confronted with the distinction between the standpoints of the agent and the observer. What point of view are we to adopt in the discussion of the origin and development of values? That of the observer, surely, for our subject in this aspect reaches back long before ideation reached perfection. And yet we must bear the distinction in mind, for we shall dis- 2 Page 32. 36 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION cover that two equally reasonable interpreta- tions of certain situations are made harmonious only by being shown to proceed from two differ- ent points of view. This preliminary word on standpoint, therefore, is in the nature of a cau- tion and a warning. § 3. It is quite obvious that the meaning of the earliest stage of consciousness in terms of value can be discussed only from the standpoint of the observer. There could be neither a felt good nor an instrument directed toward an end, where no consciousness was present. What do we mean when we speak of a value in connec- tion with the appearance of the earliest stage of consciousness? We cannot mean a felt good, for our whole process of observation is bound up with judgment on our part. We can only mean that the appearance of the earliest stage of consciousness was valuable to an end which we have in view, viz., the development of con- scious life. It may be said, therefore, that, from the observer's standpoint, the earliest stage of consciousness, whatever may have been the nature of its elements, was of contributory value to the developing organism. § 4. This is not the place to frame a general WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 37 theory of the origin of consciousness. It is necessary, however, that we examine the origin of the earliest stage to such an extent that we may learn what element there is in it to cause us to ascribe value to the stage. Perhaps it may be said that it is sufficient that conscious- ness led to the creation of value on the part of the individual himself, and this is a true answer. But we may inquire further: what are the con- ditions of the earliest stage of consciousness which cause us to recognize it as a means to the appearance of value in the individual him- self? Perhaps there are general conditions ap- pearing which are biological concomitants of all values. Unless some such thing be found to be true, we might say that all evolution in the organic world was of contributory value with respect to the development of conscious life, and value would thereby be indistinguishable from causation viewed anthropocentrically. It is, of course, permissible for the spectator to look at the whole universe from the standpoint of man; an individual human being may even consider all past progress in every sphere of development as focussed on the great event of his appearance in the world. But such a way 38 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION of thinking would be regarded justly as one- sided, in view of the existence of so many other human standpoints. And so we must look upon man as man, and life as life, and not commit ourselves to an evaluation of the universe which will neglect the claims of other entities. If we are right, therefore, in ascribing con- tributory value to the earliest stage of conscious- ness, there must be some aspect of the causal elements of the situation which is of interest to the development of consciousness. The observer will here assume the standpoint of consciousness itself. He might say, " I am conscious activity. When the causal nexus brought me into being, what were the factors that were responsible for my appearance ? I shall regard these as of con- tributory value to my very existence." It should be observed that an earliest value of the kind that I have described will be, by its very nature, not an individual element of the causal chain, or even several individual elements ; it will rather be a certain situation that occurs in the course of evolution. This situation will not be identical with the sum of all the factors concerned in the event; it will rather be a selec- tion of those factors which characterize the WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 39 complete situation as being conscious, not un- conscious. To recapitulate: we are seeking a situation which is marked by interest, as contrasted with previous situations which do not contain this. This situation will be the earliest contributory value from the standpoint of consciousness, as interpreted by a spectator. If we attempted to describe the whole situa- tion that marks the transition from the uncon- scious to the conscious, we should be trying to solve a problem which has baffled psychologists for centuries. This is not our task, let me repeat. We seek a minor situation, the point at which we spectators see interest to enter. Whatever may be the ultimate factors which distinguish the presence of life from its absence, it is certain that, in the lowest forms of life, we have a substance of highly complex chemical structure which is extremely sensitive to con- tact. This substance, protoplasm, is capable of reacting to a variety of stimuli. As long as the reactions are separate events, unrelated to previous reactions in more than a mechanical way, we cannot speak of value in connection with the process. It is when the living structure 40 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION reacts to its environment in a round-about way, when some factor appears within the organism and overcomes an opposition, that we can first say that a contributory value is present. To illustrate, suppose a living, motile cell to be subject to a variety of stimuli. It swims about in a pool of water, drawn hither and thither by the influence of light, currents of water, tem- perature, perhaps color. If you could reckon all the stimuli and manipulate them, you could turn the cell into any direction of locomotion that you pleased. Now suppose there came a time when the cell responded in an unusual way to a stimulus. You know, however, by hypo- thesis, all of the possible stimuli from without the organism, and therefore can describe what has happened only by saying that some new factor has entered into the field and has neutral- ized or overcome the opposition of the stimulus which you projected. Here, I believe, we have the earliest stage of life in which we may speak of the presence of a value. Now it is very easy to say that no situation of this kind ever occurred. I think, however, that it will be possible to show that something like it must have occurred. Psychologists tell WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 41 us that primitive conscious activity is marked by rudimentary elements of cognition, feeling, and will. They are not able to agree which of the three is the most primitive aspect, but some declare that all of them must be considered equally fundamental — the will-aspect, perhaps, being associated with activity in general. To have rudimentary aspects of cognition and feel- ing, however, it is necessary that at least two sensations be related internally, and that there be a difference felt between them. Now I main- tain that the situation in which this could have come about would contain a relation of organ- ism to environment in which an opposition was somehow circumvented by the organism. " Feel- ing the difference between two stimuli " would involve an independent action on the part of the organism. We know that life has developed so that living beings have become centers of con- scious activity. There must have been some point of transition. We may be sure that, what- ever the situation may have been in its entirety, it included the phenomenon of an opposition of the organism to an environmental stimulus which failed to work in the accustomed way. I must add, however, that no portion of this theory is 42 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION intended to conflict in any way with a strict doctrine of determinism. It is not that the organism acts in an undetermined fashion, but that the determining factor is no longer in the environment, but in the organism itself. I may formulate the following conclusions as to the expression of the appearance of the earli- est stage of consciousness in terms of value: (a) The appearance of the earliest stage of consciousness is, from the standpoint of the observer, of contributory value with respect to the bringing about of the existence of value from the standpoint of the organism itself. (b) This is true because this earliest stage of consciousness gives birth to the initial require- ment of value from the standpoint of the organ- ism, namely, that there be a center of activity to serve as the basis of an interest that is di- rected outward, (c) The significant biological aspect is the presence of a situation where an opposition of some stimulus to a living organism is overcome by a factor that is the product of a process within the organism. Before I describe the origin of value from the standpoint of the individual himself, it may be well to keep the observer's point of view for WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 43 a moment, in order to determine what kind of value must be ascribed to the later developments of conscious activity from the standpoint of the observer. It seems to me that there is an a priori answer to this question. All values from the standpoint of the observer are contributory. This is true (a) because they are estimated, judged values, and (b) because it would be absurd to speak of a good that was felt by an observer with respect to a process in nature. One doesn't feel the good of a rainstorm. He estimates its good with reference to the supply of water in rivers and wells, or the effect of it upon the crops. The immediate values of felt coolness, the sparkle of light on the globules, etc., have nothing to do with the process as process. The observer, therefore, in making a survey of the development of conscious activity in the individual from its lowest to its highest forms, will recognize as values those developments which tend toward the end of value from the standpoint of the individual himself. Instinct, intelligence, memory, ideation, sympathy, etc., all will be contributory, from the observer's standpoint. 44 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Now it must be evident that the observer's standpoint, although it is the necessary point of view of the critic and the basis of all discussion of every kind, is not very productive as a method for the consideration of value. We need to take the standpoint of the individual consciousness itself, in order to arrive at the relations between the two classes of value. Two ways of doing this are open: (a) We may become intro- spective and seek the relation of the goods that we feel to the goods that we find useful. This method was that which gave me the initial distinction between immediate and contributory values. (b) Although our discussion itself must remain contributory in character, we can, however, look at the development of conscious activity from the standpoint of the individual himself. We view the process as a whole, yes, but we consider how one particular element of the whole is related to the other elements of the situation. The center from which we direct our attention to surrounding factors is the cen- ter of conscious activity that has come into being with the appearance of a particular con- sciousness. The relations between this center of activity and its environment will be values if they contain the element of interest. WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 45 The earliest stage of consciousness, as we have seen, contains a difference felt, and from the observer's standpoint the appearance of this stage is of contributory value. Can we speak of this earliest stage of consciousness in terms of value from the standpoint of the organism? Perhaps not at the very moment of appearance, for the felt difference has no relation to a pre- existent center of activity. But suppose the difference to take unto itself a new object of discrimination. Suppose that there is now pres- ent, in the most elementary form of perception, recognition of three diff events which constitute a little environment. Suppose, as we must, the presence of rudimentary feeling. It seems to me that, from this very earliest moment when the individual merits the title of individual, there is a situation which may be described in terms of value from the individual's own stand- point. There is a center of activity; the com- parison between the elementary perceptions is contributory toward future actions from that center; they are, therefore, contributory values. § 5. What of the feeling-aspect? From the observer's standpoint, these elements are of con- tributory value. Feelings of pleasure and pain, 46 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION however primitive, would act as warnings or as encouragement to the organism to desist from or persist in certain activities, just as percep- tion of " differents," the original end of feel- ings, is to help the organism get on with his environment. In this respect, the standpoints of the individual himself and of the observer are in agreement. But the fact that in con- scious activity every cognitive element has its accompanying feeling-tone or feeling-attitude gives a different color to the standpoint of the individual. The sensation which I get by touch- ing a hot stove is accompanied by a feeling of pain; but the idea of the stove which I retain is accompanied by a feeling-attitude which is more complex than the pain which I experienced, for the reason that the idea of the stove is some- thing more than hot-object. The various sen- sations which serve as the basis of my idea of the stove enter into a process of comparison with the ideas of past sensations. The feeling- attitude toward the idea of stove, therefore, is not a feeling accompanying a " simple sensa- tion," but one accompanying an idea that is full of inferential import from past experience. Stated in a proposition, this observation would WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 47 read: The feeling-attitude which accompanies an idea is different from the feeling which accompanies a simple sensation. § 6. How can this distinction best be ex- pressed? Feelings are feelings, and the differ- ence to which I refer can hardly be a psycho- logical difference. I believe that it can best be made in terms of value. We may say that the feeling which accompanies a simple sensation is of contributory value to the individual (from the standpoints of both individual and observer), but that the feeling toward the idea is of imme- diate value. In other words, when the cognitive process, by comparison and memory, develops ideas, there arise accompanying feelings which have exceeded the function of feelings which accompany sensations. The latter were con- tributory to the welfare of the individual; the former comprise the feeling-side of the indi- vidual's relation to his environment. From his conscious activity as a center, cognitive and feeling elements together are relating that cen- ter to surrounding reality; his environment grows like the concentric circles of ripples which move outward from the place where a stone has struck the water. 48 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION I have formulated this theory with reference to a mature conscious activity. The method of introspection facilitated the problem. Now, however, we may apply the theory to early con- scious activity which cannot be examined by introspection. In this connection we shall find it equally satisfying. § 7. The feeling element which is associated with the cognitive element in the very earliest appearance of consciousness is wholly contribu- tory from the standpoints of both observer and organism. The feeling elements that accom- pany the various cognitive elements as they arise, are likewise contributory, at the moment of their origin. But the comparisons between cognitive elements that are recorded in a rudi- mentary memory are accompanied by feelings which, though contributory from the observer's point of view, are the psychological basis of a new kind of value, immediate in character. We might, therefore, speak of contributory values as the stuff out of which immediate values arise. A corollary of this theory of immediate value must not be neglected. It follows that, in the case of a mature consciousness, one must dis- tinguish between feelings that arise unaccom- WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 49 panied by reflection, and those which have been influenced by the cognitive processes. For ex- ample, I must distinguish between the feeling of pain that comes to me when I touch a hot stove in the dark and the dislike for that feel- ing which almost instantaneously follows. The former feeling is of contributory value to me in prompting me to remove my hand; the latter marks my attitude toward my experience, and is an immediate value. It may be objected: Did you not say, however, that my liking for grapes must be distinguished from my thought about that liking, the actual liking being imme- diate, and the thought contributory ? Certainly, and it must not be supposed that, by a feeling- attitude which accompanies reflection, I mean the reflection itself. The distinction here is wholly within feeling. In the example of grapes, my liking for grapes as an immediate value is to be distinguished from the primitive feeling accompanying the sensation that I receive when I first put a grape into my mouth. § 8. It is not my purpose in this chapter to go beyond a discussion of the interrelation of values with respect to their origin. From the consideration of their origin, however, it is 50 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION possible to point out two divergent directions in the development of conscious activity. One of these starts with the comparison of cognitive elements in the primitive organism and develops through memory, ideation, intelligence, intellec- tion, judgment, etc., to knowledge, the highest point of contributory value. The other direc- tion of development is toward a growth of the individual's environment by the accumulation of feeling-attitudes which accompany the various cognitive elements. These two functions in conscious activity are never separated in any action, but they are nevertheless always distinct in character. And although feeling is never present without cognition, it is not necessary that a feeling-attitude which is recalled by the recognition of an object be accompanied by the same cognitive elements that were the original cause of the attitude. My attitude of liking or dislike toward a man may have followed in the first instance a complicated process of judgment in which I sized him up in various ways — his disposition, the color of his hair, etc. When I see the man again, the perception of him recalls my attitude, which is the same as it was before, although the elements which enter into my per- ception have been vastly simplified. WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 51 I believe that the two branches of conscious activity which I have described embody a more fundamental distinction than that made by Berg- son between instinct and intelligence. Bergson distinguishes instinct and intelligence as being two modes of life's action on the material world, " directly, by creating an organised instrument to work with; or else it [life] can effect it in- directly through an organism which, instead of possessing the required instrument naturally, will itself construct it by fashioning inorganic matter. ,, 3 According to Bergson, intelligence is characterized by its ability to make tools out of artificial objects; it would therefore be contributory. But instinct may also construct tools, 4 so that it must also be counted as con- tributory. Later, however, Bergson 5 identifies instinct with sympathy. It seems to me that tool-constructing (even out of organic matter only) and the feeling-attitude of sympathy are too different ever to be united in one term. I therefore believe that the distinction between instinct and intelligence as expounded by Berg- son cannot be fundamental. 3 Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, trans. Mitchell, 142. 4 Op. cit., 140. ^ Qp. cit., 176. 52 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION The results of the discussion contained in this chapter may be summarized as follows: § i. Neither contributory nor immediate val- ues require the presence of judgment for their existence. § 2. There are two possible standpoints from which values may be discussed, that of the ob- server and that of the organism which values. § 3. From the observer's standpoint, the ap- pearance of consciousness and all the elements of consciousness are contributory in value, both as to their origin and as to their persistence. § 4. The biological beginnings of value lie in this: that some stimuli are dangerous for an organism, and the organism overcomes them by a process originating within itself. § 5. Feeling is contributory in origin, but the feeling-attitudes which accompany ideas rather than simple sensations are immediate, from the standpoint of the individual. § 6. Cognition and feeling relate the indi- vidual to his environment in ways that are never isolated, but which always remain distinct in character. § 7. Contributory values are the stuff out of which immediate values arise. WITH RESPECT TO ORIGIN 53 § 8. The two divergent directions of the development of conscious activity, which have been described as leading to the experiencing of contributory and immediate values respectively, are more fundamentally distinct than Bergson's division into instinct and intelligence. CHAPTER IV THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE THE subject-matter of this chapter falls into two divisions. As in the discus- sion of the origin of values, there are here also two possible standpoints which may be taken. As observer, I may look over the course of evolution and observe judgment in the act itself; I may view the circumstances which gave rise to judgment; and I may view the content of judgment in its relation to the development of value in the individual. Or, from the stand- point of the individual himself, I may ask what values were first expressed in language by the individual, how the conception of value came to develop in the consciousness of the individual, and to what limit the process of evaluation may be carried. It must be remembered,, although it need not lead to confusion, that the field of the second division proposed for discussion is less inclusive than the first. From the observer's standpoint, I consider all types of judgment, not alone those judgments which state values. Judgment is here 54 WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 55 regarded in its aspect as the climax of develop- ment of the cognitive function. Judgments in general, therefore, will be contributory, accord- ing to the rule that all the elements of conscious activity, from the standpoint of the observer, are contributory both as to their origin and as to their persistence. 1 From the individual's standpoint, however, our attention is restricted to those cases of judgment which bring to ex- pression immediate or contributory values. At one point, it must be said, the standpoints of the observer and the individual may almost merge. Such a phenomenon was not possible in the case of the origin of values, because there had not developed a process of conscious reflec- tion. In the case of the judgment, however, it is possible for the individual to look back on the act of judgment and verify the result of the act. So that, in discussing the content of the judg- ment, it is immaterial whether we observers anticipate the individual in his verification or let him do it himself. In this case, therefore, the distinction between the two standpoints, while present, is immaterial to the discussion. For convenience I have placed this section of 1 Page 43, §3. 5 56 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION the argument under the same heading as that of the act of judgment, because judgments in general are treated of in both sections. I may, then, divide the discussion as follows: I. Judgments as values (Standpoint of the observer: A. Acts of judgment as values; B. Content of judgments as values (Stand- points merge). II. Judgments of values ( Stand- point of the individual). I. JUDGMENTS AS VALUES In discussing judgments as values, it is neces- sary to distinguish between the act of judging and the content of the judgment. An act of judging is called forth in obedience to stimuli in a particular set of circumstances. The pres- ence or absence of value in the act itself must be judged with reference to these particular circumstances and not to any later usefulness of the judgment. The value of any judgment, however, may also be determined with reference to its subsequent effect upon the activity of the individual — whether it is found to be service- able as a guide for future action. Value in this instance is determined with respect to its com tent. Each of these cases will be discussed in turn. WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 57 A. Acts of Judgment as Values § 1. The act of judgment has been contrasted with the content of the judgment. This lan- guage, though convenient, is inaccurate, for it is evident that in considering the act of judg- ment we are considering the judgment, and that the judgment without content would not be a judgment. What I mean, therefore, is rather that here the act of judgment is discussed with its content, but with reference only to the par- ticular stimuli which call it forth. For example, if I discuss the judgment " It is a fine day " with reference to the act, I discuss its meaning with regard to the circumstances which caused me to make it, not with reference to the thunder- storm which came up during the afternoon. Just as the act of judgment can be approached only from the standpoint of the observer, so is the discussion of the content as caused only to be carried out from that standpoint. § 2. Since from the standpoint of the ob- server all values are contributory, 2 the question is not as to what kind of values acts of judg- ment are, but whether acts of judgment are values at all. The answer seems to follow di- 2 Page 43. 58 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION rectly from a point made in a preceding chap- ter, 3 that, from the standpoint of the observer, values comprise whatever tends to the develop- ment of value from the standpoint of the indi- vidual himself. Under such a category are included all the developments of the cognitive function of conscious activity. For this reason I maintain that all acts of judgment are con- tributory. (a) But there may be some doubt expressed as to whether certain cases of acts of judgment may be deemed contributory. What of acts of existential judgment, false judgment, and theo- retical (vs. " useful ") judgment? These dis- tinctions are made from the standpoint of the observer with reference to the content, however, and, according to the rule just laid down, the content must be considered here only with ref- erence to the time of the act and the circum- stances which caused the act. In such a light, it will be seen that no matter what the content may be, the act of judgment must, like every other act, be a caused act. Furthermore, it is a caused act within the cognitive field of con- sciousness ; that is, the causal process takes place 3 Page 43. WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 59 within the organism itself. Therefore the act of judgment, whatever be the content, always adds to the functioning of conscious activity, and, since whatever adds to the development of interest around a center of activity directed outward is contributory, 4 all acts of judgment are contributory. B. Content of Judgments as Values It was comparatively easy to maintain that acts of judgment are contributory. One had merely to view the evolutionary process and see a series of caused actions directed outward from a center of activity called consciousness. Every element of this process is seen to be con- tributory to its smooth working; every act is the overcoming of obstacles that impede further action. When, however, we come to the consideration of the content of the judgment with reference to future action based on it, the case is more difficult. It may appear that certain acts of judgment, useful at the time of judging as steps in the active process, are valuable only as acts, later losing their value. Judgment is different * Pages 44-45- 60 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION from lower forms of cognition in that it may- be preserved in memory and expressed by an artificial medium. (Of course, the terms of judgment may also be remembered and ex- pressed. " Ideation " would be more accurate than "judgment," here.) The question of the permanence of the content as value arises. When is the content valuable as well as the act? The test is the future usefulness of the content. The individual himself has now arrived at the high plane of judgment. 5 He may there- fore discuss the matter himself, or we observers may do it for him; the two standpoints will not differ in their result. I shall endeavor to substantiate the following thesis : The content of judgments is contributory when the judgments are true, and may be con- tributory when the judgments are false but when the terms of the judgments are signs of real entities. The question of truth or falsity was imma- terial when consideration of the judgment was restricted to the act, and its content to the 5 Cf. page 55. WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 61 particular circumstances which called it forth. But when the value of the judgment is consid- ered with reference to future actions on the part of the individual, the question of truth or falsity- becomes important. If I find, when I come to verify a judgment, that I have been wrong, the content of that judgment will not be as useful to me as it would have been, had I been right in my judging. " It will not rain " may serve to overcome my hesitation as to whether I shall take an umbrella, but, if it does rain, I shall not keep dry. (i) True Judgments Are Contributory as to Content § 3. We have already ascertained that acts of judgment are contributory. Truth, however, is a term which does not apply to judgment in the act. At what point, therefore, it may be asked, does the term " truth " become appli- cable ? Of course the answer depends upon one's theory of the judgment. I can only state my position as a basis for discussion. I hold that truth is the expression in the judgment of real relations. A true judgment is one that ex- 62 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION presses a relation between real terms. It is evident that two requirements must be fulfilled if a judgment is to be true: the terms must be signs of real entities, and the relation between the terms must be a real relation. § 4. Now this criterion of truth is an ex- tremely hard one. It may take a judgment a long time to become verified; one may never be quite certain about the truth of some particular judgment. On the other hand, some judgments require no verification at all. When I formu- late a definition, I state the equality of two signs, and no special proof or verification is necessary, because the terms are signs invented for the same entity. Such a definition would be a mathematical definition of a circle, a line, etc. It may easily happen, however, that the explanatory term of the definition will require some measure of verification. We speak of " good definitions " and " poor definitions," ac- cording as the explanatory term marks off accu- rately a special portion of reality. Thus, if I define a horse to be a four-legged animal or a white quadruped, I shall not form a good defi- nition, because the explanatory term will be either too inclusive or too exclusive. No one WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 63 would deny the truth of the proposition " The horse is a four-legged animal " ; but every one would say that the proposition " The horse is a white quadruped " is false. The former judg- ment relates terms that are signs of real entities, but the latter judgment relates terms between which there is no equality as respects the por- tions of reality for which they stand. One judgment is true, the other false; and yet they are both poor definitions. There is apparently some confusion here. " Poor definition " means one that is not valu- able, or as valuable as it might be. But both true and false definitions, as we see, may be poor. It is obvious, then, that the criteria of truth and value are not the same. The criterion of truth has been mentioned. It is now neces- sary to discuss the relation of truth to value, and to do so, we must discover where the two criteria differ. § 5. The thesis which I laid down was, " True judgments are contributory." This proposition is the pragmatists' " Truth is use- ful." It by no means follows that " All con- tributory judgments are true" (the converse). In order to make clear the distinction, it will be 64 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION necessary to discuss the end to which judgments are contributory or useful. Truth itself has no need of an end; it is simply the expression in judgment of real rela- tions. Some authors have attempted to infer that truth is an end-in-itself, a given value. This, however, is illicit. I may indeed make truth an end, and it will thereby become a given good, an immediate value; but, according to the common realistic definition to which I adhere, truth is something apart from the interest of any individual. It does not arise from within the organism; it is rather the effect in con- sciousness of what is brute and obstinate in reality. The individual consciousness is not forced to become interested in any part of real- ity except that with which it comes into contact. It may find the truth ; it may not ; but it is forced in any case to attach value to its environment. Truth, therefore, represents the accurate re- lation of portions of reality in the judgment, while value represents the relation of portions of reality to my interest. And what is the nature of this interest? It is that of conscious activity directed toward an end whose character is disclosed in the evolutionary process itself: WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 65 conscious activity tends to describe and inter- pret reality in terms of itself; the individual by nature is ego-centric from his instinct of self- preservation to his most altruistic impulses. Note that ego-centric does not mean selfish; it means rather that the individual of matured conscious activity feels a sympathy toward, feels drawn toward the whole universe, that interest from the individual center of conscious activity tends to direct itself outward as far as possible. Such is the nature of the end to which contributory values are useful. § 6. It will be apparent, therefore, that, while truth in itself is no value at all, true judgments, proceeding from an individual, will always be contributory to putting him into touch with the reality which opposes him and which he must conquer by interpretation. But not only does it not follow that all contributory judgments are true, but it also does not follow that all true judgments are of the greatest, or of equal contributory value. There are degrees of contributory value, but there are no degrees of truth. One truth is just as true as another, but it may be of much less contributory value. The existential judgment, for instance, is true 66 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION and contributes to my taking stock of brute reality, so to speak; but the judgment "Fire exists " is not so contributory as " Fire burns " — yet both are equally true. (2) False Judgments May Be Contributory When Their Terms Are Signs of Real Entities To prove this portion of my thesis, it will be necessary to revert for a moment to discussion of the act of judgment. I shall ask, " What characterizes an act of judgment?" § 7. Acts of judgment were proved to be contributory. 6 My proof assumed that, in the case of every act of judgment, there is always present in consciousness a causal situation of which the act is the result. We may accord- ingly find cases of apparent judgment where there are no acts of judgment, properly so- called. A parrot may be taught to say, " This is just as good!" but he will not perform an act of judgment, because conscious interest is lacking. The schoolboy may write on his slate " The sun shines " a hundred times, and there probably is only one act of judgment, made in « Page 58. WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 67 connection with the first writing. A proposi- tion, done in writing, and buried in the Sahara desert, forgotten absolutely {pro argument 0) by its author, and never again seen by man, is not an act of judgment. In none of these cases is a value present, because the conscious situa- tion is lacking. To be contributory, judgment must be associated with interest, and this inter- est may be either from the standpoint of the observer in the act itself, or in an act of re-cog- nition on the part of the individual. § 8. It was easy to show that acts of false judgment are contributory from the standpoint of the observer, as well as acts of true judg- ment. It is now questioned whether the con- tent of the false judgment remains contributory after the act, with reference to further action on the part of the individual. From the preceding discussion it is apparent that our consideration assumes that the false judgment is related to future action on the part of the individual — otherwise the element of interest would disappear. Providing that its terms have reference to portions of reality, the situation of the false judgment is that the indi- vidual has stated a relation between signs of 68 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION real entities which does not hold in reality. Now the end to which judgments are contributory, as we have found, is the relation of reality to a center of conscious activity. By the false judg- ment, the individual has related portions of real- ity in terms of consciousness, but he has related them falsely. Ideation is contributory, along with the other developments of the cognitive function. There- fore, the terms of the false judgment are con- tributory, because they relate portions of reality to a center of conscious activity. It is asked whether the incorrect relation of these terms may ever be contributory. My answer is, " Yes ! " The individual thinks, believes that the false judgment is true (falsity is, therefore, from the standpoint of the observer, here also). He acts on this judgment as if it were true. Later he may discover that it was false ; he may never discover its falsity. Which- ever happens, the false judgment will serve, in all probability, as a basis of future action. We make mistakes in our judgment, but learn by experience. It would be very satisfying if we always judged correctly, but it would be ghastly if we never judged except when we were sure WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 69 that we were judging truly. To behave in such an impossible manner would necessitate our ac- cepting the judgments of one in whom we had as great faith as we have in our perceptions. Independent judgment would be denied to us. We could never make our own verifications. If we never made mistakes, we never should have certainty of anything. § 9. It is conceivable, however, that a false judgment may sometimes have the opposite effect of blocking future activity along the par- ticular lines of its terms. An example of such a judgment would be an obstinate prejudice. An obstinate prejudice implies a refusal by act of will to proceed in verification. Such a preju- dice could not be called contributory (unless we were to speak of it as a negative value, con- tributory to the end of imbecility). Mistakes, therefore, no more than true judgments, are ends in themselves; but both are, or may be, contributory to the biological end of value. (3) Measurement of the Degree to Which a Judgment is Contributory § 10. It was stated in § 6 7 that, although there are no degrees of truth, there are degrees 7 Page 65. 70 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION of value. In the present connection, it will be interesting to inquire whether there is some way of measuring the degree to which a judgment is contributory. This investigation, needless to say, is quite independent of that as to what de- grees of value the individual himself fixes in judgment. The latter investigation belongs to the section treating of judgments of values. The present question is most conveniently thought of as from the standpoint of the ob- server, although there would be nothing to pre- vent the individual himself from answering it. Indeed, if he wishes to coordinate his aims in life, he will think very seriously of this matter, and try to make his judgments of values har- monize with the degree to which his judgments are values. That is, he will try not to attribute greater or less value to anything in judgment, than the judgment actually is worth, when con- sidered with reference to the whole career of the cognitive function. But, as I have before remarked, attributing value in judgments is only a small part of judging in general; and consid- eration of the degree to which judgments are valuable is a larger and more inclusive subject than that of the degree to which value-judg- ments are valuable. WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 71 A common-sense answer to our question would be that the degree to which a contributory judg- ment is contributory is the extent to which it possesses " practicality/ ' But, as "practical- ity " is a general term including a number of elements, it will be worth while to analyze it. There appear to me to be at least three con- siderations involved in practicality, (a) To be contributory, a judgment must be concerned with reality, both in its terms and usually in the relation expressed between the terms. Near- ness, or readiness of reference, to " brute " reality is a prominent feature here. If a term is too far away from the portion of reality of which it is a sign, it may easily have lost sharp- ness of distinction ; its flavor may be gone. This is the reason why abstruse subjects are often best discussed with the use of words that are metaphorical, but very near to familiar objects. The effectiveness and permanent application of teaching by allegory is thus explained. If very theoretical terms are employed, their value will often be proportionate to the readiness with which they may be referred back to portions of reality. Thus, a formula of mechanics may be highly technical, but may be extremely valuable 6 J2 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION because of the ease with which it may be applied to reality, (b) Another factor which enters into the degree to which judgments of con- tributory values are contributory is their rela- tion to the special environment of the individual. A judgment may be very useful to a physician, but comparatively useless to an artisan. The biological end to which judgments are contribu- tory is the same for all men, but the field of judgment is so immense that different indi- viduals must work from different centers in the field, and no man can hope to attain all knowledge. Thus the practicality of a judg- ment will also be measured with reference to its possible application to the individual's line of activity, (c) What applies to the single individual here applies also to the human race. Humanity has an environment distinct from that of insects or birds, and the degrees of contributory value may well be distinguished by considering the degrees to which needs are common to mankind. It must not be inferred, however, that we have knowledge of any judg- ments that do not affect human environment. Such a possibility is excluded by the result of our study of the origin of value in conscious- WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 73 ness. I mean merely that certain judgments will be found to be more, or less, contributory to mankind, according as they overcome the oppositions common to the race rather than to a special class of men. § 11. Finally, it may be objected that it is possible, by manipulation of terms, to arrive at judgments which have no contributory function at all. I may speak of these as theoretical judg- ments. This class of judgments will not include those judgments which may be referred by a round-about way to reality, or to those which might have a possible application at some future time, but only to those which, for the sake of argument, are purely speculative and unreal. If there are any such judgments, their existence is still not a good argument against my theory of values. For, together with my general ac- ceptance of realism, I hold that judgments are additive to reality; i.e., they are portions of reality itself, insofar as they are preserved in memory. The extent to which such judgments are contributory will be the degree to which the individual is interested in the imaginary terms. Division I of this chapter may be summarized as follows: 74 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION I. Judgments as Values (Standpoint of the Observer). A. Acts of Judgment as Values. § i. More accurately, the act of judgment is here discussed with its content, but only with reference to the particular stimuli which call it forth. § 2. Acts of judgment are a development of the cognitive function of consciousness. All such developments are contributory values. Therefore, acts of judgment are contributory values. (a) Whatever be the character of the con- tent, an act of judgment is a caused act in the sphere of conscious activity; hence it is of con- tributory value. B. Content of Judgments as Values. This topic deals with the future usefulness of the content. (i) True judgments are contributory as to content. § 3. For a judgment to be true, its terms must be signs of real entities, and the relation between the terms must be a real relation. § 4. This criterion of truth is not the cri- WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 75 terion of value, as is shown by the illustration that a true and a false definition may be equally " poor." § 5. Truth has no end; value has a bio- logical end. § 6. True judgments, however, are values because they contribute to the biological end of value. (2) False judgments may be contributory when their terms are signs of real entities. § 7. To be valuable, a judgment must involve interest. § 8. The terms of false judgments, when they are signs of real entities, are contributory. The false relation is contributory if the indi- vidual uses it as the basis of future action; i.e., if it retains the individual's interest. § 9. Some false judgments may stifle inter- est in both terms and relation. These might be considered to be of negative value. (3) Measurement of the degree to which a judgment is contributory. § 10. The degree to which the content of a judgment is contributory is the degree of its nearness or readiness of reference to reality, 76 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION its nearness to the special environment of the judging individual, and its universality of ap- plication to mankind. § ii. The content of purely theoretical or imaginary judgments is contributory in propor- tion to the interest of the individual in the theo- retical terms. II. JUDGMENTS OF VALUES We now come to the discussion of judgments of values by the individual. Let us gain a clear conception of the subject-matter of this division. It is quite obvious that an individual may make judgments without expressing values from his own standpoint. He cannot make a judgment, of course, without expressing a value consid- ered from the observer's standpoint. 8 But he may make judgments that involve interest to him personally, and yet not think of his interest. The judgments by which a man expresses his needs and his wants, and declares what is con- tributory to the satisfaction of those needs and wants, form but a small proportion of his daily speech and thoughts. The confusion that is rife in this branch of the subject is largely due 8 §§2-9. WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 77 to the habit of some of mingling the standpoints of the observer and the individual. It is also due to the practice of certain writers of con- sidering truth as a " value-judgment." Having refuted this theory in a preceding chapter, 9 we shall do well to keep in mind the fact that, in the present case, we are dealing with only a very limited class of judgments. Our present investigation is parallel, in a way, with that of the origin of contributory and im- mediate values. There 10 a situation was sought where immediate and contributory values first emerged in consciousness. Here we seek a sit- uation where values first become expressed in the judgment, where the individual first ex- presses his own interest. The former investi- gation was entirely from the standpoint of the observer; the latter will be from that of the individual himself. In the discussion of the interrelation of values with respect to their origin, the data considered were biological. In the present investigation one might consider facts connected with the development of speech observed in savage tribes 9 Chapter II. 10 Chapter III. 78 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION (phylogenetic), or, as is more convenient, facts may be adduced with reference to the devel- opment of speech in the child (ontogenetic). Introspection may aid in confirming results ob- tained by the other methods. The reason why we are concerned with the origin of immediate and contributory judgments rather than with their interrelation in an indi- vidual of mature growth, is that we recognize, at the start, that a mature individual uses two separate and distinct kinds of judgments of value, immediate and contributory. It is upon this hypothesis that the whole discussion rests. The investigation may be divided conveniently into two parts: A. Origin of immediate judgments; B. Ori- gin of contributory judgments. A. Origin of Immediate Judgments § 12. The first words that a child uses are names of objects. He is taught words that symbolize certain perceptions. There is no ques- tion of expressing value here. The early stages of speech are just as mechanical as the act of perception itself. The fixation of meaning to certain verbal sounds does not imply that the WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 79 child has the ability to reflect upon that mean- ing. He names the objects that attract his attention. A young child has wants and needs. His attention is attracted to the objects that satisfy these wants. Some of his wants are necessary to his life — mother, water. But he may reach out his hands to grasp the moon, and cry, "Moon!" if he were taught the word that symbolizes that object. Many of the words that he first learns are words that symbolize objects that he wants and needs. Some of them merely satisfy the need of locating himself in his immediate environment. But in no case is there any question of his expressing a value. Identification of objects with symbols of ex- pression, therefore, is not fixing values upon objects, however valuable those objects may be to him from the standpoint of an observer. But the child comes to learn other words. Some of these may express feelings of desire, as " want," " like." He learns to combine these words with certain objects: " Love mother "; " Want milk." The case as regards value differs here. The child is now expressing a feeling-attitude in a simple form of judgment. He is expressing an 80 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION immediate value in words. He recognizes his personal interest. Our conclusion, therefore, with respect to the origin of judgments of immediate value may be expressed in the following proposition: The individual recognizes his interest when a situation occurs in which he identifies a feeling- attitude with words. B. Origin of Contributory Judgments § 13. I have illustrated the way in which a judgment of immediate value may be expressed very simply. The case is not so simple with lespect to contributory values. The child has a need ; let us say he is thirsty. He may have the need and be unable to connect his need with speech ; he may only cry or make foolish sounds. He may know the substance water by name, and call out " Water !" He may express not only the object of his desire, but the desire itself, and say, "Want water." (Here we have the expression of an immediate value in the judg- ment.) In the last named case, he connects the object of desire with the desire itself, but he does not express in the judgment the way in which the object will satisfy the desire. We WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 81 infer that when he gets the water his desire will disappear; but he does not express the fact that the water is for the purpose of satisfying the desire, that the water will be the means of attaining the end of his wish. In the judgment "Want water! " there is something lacking to make it express the fact that water is of contributory value. The need and the object of the need are expressed, but not the purpose of the need. To have the latter, there must be added some word or words that will symbolize the object in the process of satis- fying the need. Such symbolism is afforded by expressions of purpose, the simplest of which is the infinitive (with to or in ing). " Want water to drink " or " Want water for drinking " ex- presses in a simple way (a) the desire, (b) the object of desire, and (c) the fact that the object is the principal means of satisfying the desire. The third is attained by the use of a word that shows the desire in process of fulfilment by the use of the object. Here is the first case where a contributory value finds expression. Reflection will show us that contributory val- ues are always accompanied in their expression by some statement of their end. They are con- 82 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION tributary to something, not simply given as good. The satisfaction of thirst is an immediate value, given as good. I may connect that value with the object water, however, without thinking specifically of water as " good for " satisfying my thirst. The latter process is the outcome of reasoning about my desire. It contains the reflection that the object that I already want is wanted for a purpose which I now make clear to myself. Thus introspection confirms my previous illustration. It may therefore be stated as a proposition, that the individual gives expression to a con- tributory value first when he uses words that show how an object of desire satisfies the end of desire. § 14. I have described the simplest situa- tions in which the individual expresses an im- mediate and a contributory value. There is a further stage of expression of contributory value. This comes to view when the individual goes beyond his own desires in expressing values by judgment. He sees that others beside him- self have desires and that they may be satisfied by certain means. Certain desires he finds to be common to his kind. Contributory value WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE 83 may then be expressed by a general proposition, " Water is good to drink." He may extend the application of value still farther. He may apply it to objects which further the processes of nature, and may say, for example, " The soil is good for nourishing the plant." This is one way in which contributory values may become more and more objective, i.e., divorced from the individual who makes the evaluation. So that in expressing values by the judgment, we may state that contributory values arise in intimate association with immediate values, but that, as the power of expression develops, they may be- come entirely free from immediate values. This division of the chapter may be sum- marized as follows: A. Origin of Immediate Judgments. § 12. The individual first expresses an im- mediate value when a situation occurs in which he symbolizes a feeling-attitude by a form of words. B. Origin of Contributory Judgments. § 13. He first expresses a contributory value when he uses words that show how an object of desire satisfies the end of desire. 84 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION § 14. Contributory values in their expres- sion in the judgment arise in intimate associa- tion with immediate values, but, as the power of expression develops, they become free from the immediate, so that the individual of mature growth may express in the judgment two dis- tinct classes of values, immediate and contribu- tory. CHAPTER V THE INTERRELATION OF VALUES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CO-EX- ISTENCE IN Chapter I, two classes of values were defined and distinguished. They were dis- covered by introspection, but it was found that there is a psychological basis for the dis- tinction. Immediate values are grounded in the feeling-aspect of consciousness; contribu- tory, in the cognitive. The brief treatment of Chapter I, however, is inadequate to the im- portance of the distinction. In this chapter, I purpose more fully to discuss value-relations of the individual to his environment. To do this successfully, it will be necessary first to inquire just what is meant, in this connection, by the term " environment." The chapter may therefore be divided into two main topics: I. Environment; II. Environment and Values. I. ENVIRONMENT § I. The word "environment" is not re- stricted in common usage to the surroundings 85 86 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION of a living being. We speak of the " environs " of a city, using an almost identical word. It would be perfectly possible to speak of the en- vironment of a chair or a building. But most commonly it is used of the surroundings of a plant or animal; that is, an organism is con- trasted with surrounding organisms or objects. As our sphere of discussion is limited to the animal kingdom, we may at the outset limit its usage to the contrast between an animal organ- ism and its surroundings. § 2. How much of an organism's surround- ings does "environment" include? In an ex- tended sense of the word, we might say that there is no part of the world of matter and motion that does not belong to the environment of an organism. The influence of physical laws is so far-reaching that very remote physical disturbances may influence an organism quite apart from his knowledge. The conditions of environment may be altered by sun-spots, by an earthquake thousands of miles distant, or by the temperature of currents of water that wash the coast nearest an inland region. Man's en- vironment, in a sense, is the world. We see, therefore, that environment may be WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 87 considered to include a great deal. This most inclusive use of the word, however, cannot be useful to us in a discussion of value; for, by adopting it, we shall only find a synonym for " the world." It is desirable for us to restrict it in its application. Now there is a time-differ- ence between the stimuli that affect an organism from its environment. The sun is ultimately responsible for my perception of light, but the immediate cause is certain light-waves that strike the retina of the eye. There is a point at which the sensitive protoplasm of an organ- ism comes into contact with the world beyond itself; there are immediate stimuli that may be contrasted with those more remote in time and space. It is to these immediate stimuli that I shall refer when I speak of the action of environment with reference to an organism. Environment will designate that part of the world which directly influences it, that part with which the organism comes into contact. § 3. In reference to a very primitive organ- ism, this conception of environment is perfectly clear. No explanation was necessary when the word was thus used in Chapter III. There the contrast between organism and environment was 88 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION biological, rather than psychological. It was clear what was meant by saying that the bio- logical indication of the presence of value from the standpoint of the organism was the presence of a situation in which the organism responded to dangerous stimuli from the environment by a process originating within itself. The earlier stages of conscious activity were taken in their biological significance, and they were described with reference to the acts themselves. In the case of a mature individual, however, there is a complication. Here conscious activity has reached a highly developed form. Is it useful for us still to maintain the biological standpoint? When I speak of "my environ- ment," am I using the phrase in the biological or the psychological sense? The answer that I give to these questions will depend largely upon my philosophical pre-disposition. The problem of the relation between mind and body comes to the fore. And I am in danger of entering into an epistemological tangle. Let us examine a few of the ways that various philosophers may regard " environment." (a) The materialist, or the instrumental pragmatist, preserves the biological standpoint WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 89 intact. To him conscious activity is a function of certain cells of the body, and " conscious- ness " is as much a part of him as his hands or his feet. The relation of man to his environ- ment is the relation of man considered as body plus conscious activity. (b) Those who make a difference between mental and non-mental, whether they be inter- actionists or psycho-physical parallelists, may think of environment as the relation of con- sciousness to its objects. Environment may mean " mental environment " or " physical en- vironment." It may have to do with the rela- tion of mind to its objects (psychological) or the relation of the physical organism to sur- rounding objects (biological) or the relation of consciousness to objects in the world (psycho- physical). (c) Spiritualists (i.e., subjective and objec- tive idealists and the like) would find the con- trast one between one and another kind of mental entities. But the nature of the contrast between organism and environment would vary with the degree of " objectivity " attributed to the physical world. § 4. Now beside being intellectually dishon- 90 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION est, it would invalidate my reasoning if I should use the contrast between organism and environ- ment first in one sense, then in another. The question of philosophical pre-disposition, on the other hand, is not nearly so important as that I find a meaning of the contrast that will be most useful in the development of my theory of value. The " process originating within itself," which was seen to be the biological concomitant of the origin of value from the individual's standpoint, is likely to be agreed to be a very rudimentary form of conscious activity. In this case, there- fore, conscious activity was described wholly from the biological point of view. This stand- point was found to be entirely adequate to the discussion of my theory of value. Why not, then, keep to the biological standpoint in my discussion of the values of a mature individual? It will be seen that, in man, mature conscious activity can still be described in terms of the standpoint of the organism without trespassing beyond the biological aspect. § 5. This point of view is nearest like that of the instrumental pragmatists, as developed in Creative Intelligence. 1 It must not be in- 1 New York, 1917. WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 91 ferred, however, that I count myself one of their followers. In this connection there are two especial points of difference between us. (a) I must refuse to commit myself to a decision as to whether existent " reality " is a certain or an uncertain quantity. By " reality " I mean the physical world. If, however, the term be taken to include all that happens, I should agree that it is quantitatively uncertain. (b) As a logical consequence of their stand- point, the instrumental pragmatists get rid of " sensations " in the classical use of that term. Organisms differ, according to them, chiefly by the " emotional tone " of the relation of " or- ganic complexes " to other things. 2 While I also emphasize the importance of feeling-atti- tudes in my theory of value, I am not prepared to say that the cognitive aspect of conscious activity is not of as great importance to value as the feeling-aspect. That is, I recognize that the standpoint of the individual, formed by the " orientation " of complex relations about a center, may be described with respect to the value of these relations apart from the aspect of their " emotional tone." Nevertheless, it 2 Cf. Kallen, in Creative Intelligence, 415-416. 92 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION must be remembered that the individual ac- quired a standpoint of his own only when his first feeling-attitude appeared. But once the individual has attained a standpoint of his own, what were formerly relations without any " emotional tone " now become relations of in- terest to the individual in the cognitive aspect, without reference to the acquired " emotional tone." §6. In § 2, environment was defined for our purpose as those things which act directly upon the organism as stimuli, that with which the organism is in direct contact. As this use of the word was adopted for our convenience, we must be careful not to let it become a source of annoyance. It would be such if we conceived it with scientific accuracy. For one might ask, If my conscious activity is in contact with that chair by means of light-waves which strike the retina of my eye, are the waves at the very point where they meet the retina, my environment? This would be to make a practical working defi- nition worthless by over-refining it. Practically, we shall conceive environment to extend as far as our perception will carry us. It will include sensational experience, and also that amount of WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 93 inferential experience which is a part of our perception. But it will not include knowledge about an object which is buried in memory at the time of my perception. Thus, although I know that the wood of my chair came from a forest, and that some man cut the tree down and sawed it, planed, hammered, and polished it, the tree in the forest, the woodcutter, the saw-mill, the carpenter, the turner, and the polisher will not be included in my environment so far as my perception of the chair is con- cerned. If, however, the thought of these sug- gested itself to me as I looked at the chair, they would be included in my environment, and their importance in it would be determined by the extent to which I am familiar with them in actual experience. They would be much more important if, for instance, I had seen the very tree cut down and the whole process of manu- facture of the chair, than if I had only read about how chairs are made. The point that lies behind this argument is that conscious activity, conceived as one of the functions of an organism, is related to surround- ing objects in varying degree, just as other functions of the organism are related to sur- 94 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION rounding matter. The peculiar nature of con- scious activity lies in the fact that " contact with " is broader and freer here than in the case, for example, of a muscle or a hair. The importance of this difference for us is that value-relations have to do with that portion of environment with whiGh conscious activity is in contact. § 7. Now conscious activity, after it has emerged from what I called in Chapter III the " earliest stage of consciousness/' is in contact with environment under two aspects, cognition and feeling. I wish that this statement might be accepted without further discussion, but I fear that it will be necessary to digress a little and treat briefly of certain disputes among psy- chologists. It is the fashion among psychologists to an- alyze their states of consciousness to find out what aspects are present, and which may exist apart from other aspects. For example, Titch- ener asks, " Do we ever attend without feel- ing ? " 3 He answers, Yes, and points to reflex, automatic, and ideo-motor actions, " performed without the arousal of pleasantness-unpleasant- 3 Titchener, E. B., Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention, 2g6-zo2. WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 95 ness in consciousness. " May we, on the other hand, feel without attending? Wundt says that we may. Titchener says not. The latter adds, " I incline rather to find a fairly close parallel between degree of clearness [his criterion of attention] and degree of pleasantness-unpleas- antness, and thus to regard the relation between affection and attention, on this side, not as ex- ternal, but as intrinsic." Another dispute relates to the number and nature of affective qualities. Wundt's tri-dimen- sional theory of feeling postulates pleasantness- unpleasantness, excitement-tranquilisation, and tension-relaxation as the three " dimensions of affection." Thereupon psychologists introspect their feelings. Some, as Titchener, find only one dimension. The tri-dimensionalists speak slightingly of the "Dogma der Lust-Unlust- theorie" My criticism of such disputes, of which there are many, is twofold. The psychologists who indulge in them are (a) biased by a predis- position to hold the theory of psycho-physica] parallelism. Consequently, conscious activity is not conceived by them in the act itself, but epiphenomenally. The stimuli from environ- 96 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION ment are conceived as affecting the physical part of the organism, while it becomes of inter- est to inquire what happens at the same time in consciousness. Much opportunity is thereby afforded for introspective observation, but very little hope that correct conclusions may be reached. Consciousness is conceived as follow- ing alongside physical processes. It is assumed that these processes may throw off effects in consciousness, may partly do so, or may go along blissfully by themselves. Again (b), the nature of these disputes im- plies that consciousness may be divided into " faculties." When it is asked whether atten- tion may exist without feeling, the unit of con- scious activity is set aside. Cognition, feeling, and attention lose their character as aspects. The mere putting of such a question almost assumes that attention and feeling are separate parts of consciousness which often appear to- gether, but which might well be conceived some- times to be separated, only one appearing. At- tention, throughout, seems to be regarded as cognitive attention. At least, psychologists in- trospect to discover whether they are attending, and the introspective process is certainly cog- WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 97 nitive. They also introspect to discover whether they are feeling pleasantness or unpleasantness, and assume that, if they could not discover such a feeling, the feeling aspect would not be pres- ent. What about the pleasant feeling of strok- ing that a cat sometimes experiences? Is this dependent upon her knowing that she has it? § 8. Against such a point of view let me place a theory recommended by its simplicity and its ability to fit in with facts of observation. Conscious activity is always one in its func- tioning. There are certain distinct aspects of conscious activity, however, and sometimes one of these is more prominent than another. Such is generally the case. It would be difficult to conceive of a situation in which attention, pleas- antness or unpleasantness, and cognition were present in the same degree. Some form of con- templation would approach nearest to this con- dition, but contemplatives actually advise their disciples to keep attention away from feeling as far as possible. But where conscious activity is just emerging from non-conscious, there are not such pro- nounced aspects. Here there is a sensitive con- dition which doubtless exhibits the rudiments of 98 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION cognition, feeling, and will; but none of these appears in a prominent way. It is curious how willing some psychologists (except those who are " gefuhlsempfindungen" theorists) are to admit that feeling is of " elemental rank in con- sciousness " 4 but yet discuss the question of whether it need be present with other elements. I think that this is due to the epiphenomenalistic attitude of such writers. In later stages of development, one aspect of conscious activity is more prominent than others. The mistake of many psychologists is their cheer- ful assumption that, with the prominence of one aspect over others, the others disappear. But conscious activity is in contact with environment as a whole, not in a divided state. There is no warrant whatever for the supposition that, in a mature conscious individual, aspects of con- scious activity are transitory, flitting on and off the stage of consciousness. This view reeks of epiphenomenalism. The only support for such a theory is derived from introspection, which cannot be depended upon in this connection, as it is a cognitive process. § 9. For my present purpose, the importance 4 Titchener, op. cit, 289. WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 99 of my theory lies in the fact that, if it be a true description of what takes place, the feeling- attitude, or the " affective side " of conscious activity, must be regarded as present, even when it is not exhibited by feelings of pleasantness- unpleasantness. The latter feelings may better be regarded as cases where the feeling side is uppermost in conscious activity, not where feel- ing is absent. The obvious consequence of my theory is that conscious activity is related to environment as directly through feeling as through cognition. Logical knowledge may well be the best instru- ment for dealing with reality. It might be main- tained (though this is open to question) that cognition is the sole means by which we increase the extent of our contact with reality. But these admissions will in no way prove that " contact with " is limited to the cognitive aspect of con- sciousness; they will not remove the possibility that our " contact with " contains elements of feeling which have never resulted from cog- nition. Furthermore, the fact that we increase our contact with reality through cognition does not prove that the feelings which are aroused by the directive influence of cognition are de- ioo VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION pendent in their whole meaning upon the cog- nitive processes. They may have an independ- ent relation to reality apart from cognition. This doctrine may sound strange, and yet it fits in well with the facts of experience. It tells me that the portion of reality with which I am in contact is not restricted to what I am con- scious of through sensations and ideas, but that it also includes that portion with which I am in contact through the feeling-element of conscious- ness. This is neither to say, with Rickert, that knowledge is determined through the feelings, nor with the older psychologists, that feeling is dependent upon sensation. I mean rather that the portion of reality with which I am in contact is richer and fuller in my experience of it than the knowledge of it which I obtain through the senses ; and that, in defining " contact with " environment, I must include a certain relation to reality directly by feeling, and not indirectly through sensation. In the higher stages of con- scious activity, the presence of sensation may be the only path to the broadening of environ- ment; our experience of environment is always partly sensational; but in itself environment is more than relation to reality through sensation, WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 101 Of course this has nothing whatever to do with the theory that we can obtain knowledge di- rectly through feeling, or the theory that we can increase our " contact with " environment by plunging into states of feeling where cog- nition is at a minimum. I may give a few examples to illustrate direct contact with the environment through the feeling side of consciousness, where the latter predomi- nates over the cognitive aspect. Such examples can be drawn only from observation of the rela- tion of others to their environment, and from self-analysis based on knowledge gained after the experience that is instanced. Both of these methods of illustration apply in the following case : We notice in the experience of others and recall in our own past experience that we often conceive a sudden dislike for a person at first meeting. Later on, when we know him better, we discover why we dislike him. Traits are exhibited by him, opinions expressed, that are foreign to our point of view. Cognition has here confirmed the impression made upon us that resulted in a feeling-attitude. Women in general are reputed to be more " intuitive " in this way than men. Again, I am forced very 102 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION often to act when I am ignorant of some of the circumstances which should determine my action. On such occasions I either guess at the best course of action, or rely on a " feeling for " one course. To say that such a " feeling " is determined wholly by the general texture of my ideas and feelings, rather than by some kind of contact with the situation in hand, is to be dogmatic, and to beg the question. I may add that my theory, if true, would prove to be of the greatest service to religious apologists. Feeling and emotion have been em- phasized by most religions, so much so, in fact, that Arnold denned religion as " morality tinged with emotion." Now if the emotion associated with a religious experience (and let it be remem- bered that I believe feeling to be wholly psycho- logical and "subjective") has no point of con- tact with reality, if, that is, religious emotion is subordinate and a by-product of consciousness, it cannot be of much greater importance to religious experience than as a stimulus to action. The Christian faith, however, makes much of love between God and man. It claims that God bestows love upon his creatures and that man can return this love. From the Christian point WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 103 of view, therefore, emotion is a way of being in contact with environment. I do not say coming into contact with a spiritual world, although mystics and quietists make much of it as a method. In point of fact, Christian teachers of ascetic theology warn their pupils not to try to obtain " spiritual sweetness," as they call it. They even claim that " spiritual dryness " is a stage of progress in advance of the spiritual sweetness that is likely to attend the first efforts for spiritual progress. The same argument that is advanced with respect to contact with personalities on earth and with God, may also be applied to prayer and to communion with saints and angels. It proves nothing, of course. It only shows a possible means of intercourse, provided that spiritual beings form a portion of reality. It shows, too, how a worshipper need not be bound to his own conceptions of the spiritual world in order to worship effectively (that is, again, pro- vided Christian beliefs are grounded in reality). The peasant woman of limited intelligence, who gradually comes to identify the Virgin with the grotesque statue in front of which she is pray- ing, may not pray ineffectively. The experience 104 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION is always richer than the sensations and ideas that are derived from it. II. ENVIRONMENT AND VALUES Having built a foundation by discussion of the meaning of environment and of the relation of an organism to its environment, we may pro- ceed to the erection of a theory of co-existent values. I think that it will scarcely be disputed that whatever is of interest to conscious activity is valuable from the standpoint of that conscious activity. At the emergence of consciousness, the individual acquired a standpoint of his own. Conscious activity, starting in a rudimentary way, develops and increases the scope of its function. In the process of development, it widens in its contact with environment. Its relations to environment are value relations. § 10. Everything with which conscious ac- tivity comes into contact is valuable both as contributory and as immediate. Inasmuch as cognition and feeling are aspects of the same consciousness, objects of the environment will be related to conscious activity both as cognitive and affective. From the cognitive point of view, these relations are relations of contribu- WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 105 tory value. The objects related are "good for " some purpose. They are guide-posts to conscious activity in its contact with environ- ment. They help it find its way in and among other objects with which it is not in contact. They are the interests of consciousness from one point of view. But conscious activity is also related to the objects with which it is in contact from the feel- ing side. These relations are relations of imme- diate values. It is not necessary that pleasant- ness-unpleasantness be recognized to make ob- jects of immediate value. All that is necessary is that there be a feeling-tone of conscious activ- ity, and this affective aspect is present in all but the earliest stage of consciousness. The nestful of eggs, the " never-to-be-too-much-set-upon object" of the hen (James), does not demand the presence of recognition of pleasantness on the part of the hen to make it of immediate value to her. She probably never thought of it as pleasant; it was only "never-to-be-too-much- set-upon." Kallen 5 gives a good treatment of immediate values as relations of the organism's conscious activity to environment, but he wholly disregards the contributory aspect of value. 5 Creative Intelligence, 412 ff. 106 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION § ii. In Chapter III, the cognitive and feel- ing sides of conscious activity were spoken of as two directions in which that activity has developed. They diverge from a point at which conscious activity comes into contact with en- vironment. At only one point in the develop- ment of the organism is this divergence from an undifferentiated conscious activity to be ob- served, namely, at the first appearance of con- sciousness in an organism. But since the indi- vidual comes into contact with new factors of environment constantly, it becomes of interest to inquire just how new relations with the new objects are established. It is quite conceivable that conscious activity, a single function exhibiting two aspects, might react to stimuli from the environment at one time chiefly in one aspect, at another, chiefly in another. That is, in the case of a mature con- sciousness, we cannot speak with so great a confidence of a recurrence of the primitive con- dition of conscious activity whenever a new con- tact with environment is established. Our doubt is confirmed by comparing the functions of other organs and organisms. In plants, for example, we find a great variety of highly developed WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 107 organs which serve special adaptive purposes. The organs which perform these functions took their origin from cells whose protoplasm was ex- ceedingly sensitive to a great variety of stimuli. But when once certain cambial cells become differentiated into root, stem, leaf, or repro- ductive cells, it is usually very hard to change their direction of development. Of course there are exceptions : some of the hepatics have a gen- erous susceptibility to regeneration from vege- tative cells, and we all know how the shoots of some trees may be stuck into the ground with the result that root cells become differentiated from the cambium, and a tree grows up. The latter example, of course, only shows the un- differentiated character of cambial tissue; old cells seldom change their function. Now the fact that conscious activity has two aspects which fluctuate in preponderance shows that the sensitive character of consciousness is not determined in growth along one hard and fast line. And yet this is not to say that primitive conscious activity must necessarily be reenacted every time consciousness is stimulated by a new environmental factor. Conscious ac- tivity might be just fluid enough to respond to io8 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION some stimuli on the cognitive side, and to others on the feeling side. It is extremely difficult to describe what I mean in simple language. Per- haps a very imperfect illustration may aid me. Imagine two insulated wires wound together, but connected at one end. These may represent the two aspects of conscious activity taking their origin at a point where there is no differentiation into aspects, but continuing together inseparably after differentiation has taken place. The point of connection, however, is not the only connec- tion with environment. Connection occurs at many places along the line. The question is: Is the connection with new points made by each of the wound wires touching the environment at various points, or by a wire at each point that touches the new factor and immediately divides into two wires that make connection with the main wires? It may seem that I am asking questions which I ought not to ask in view of my disapproval of disputes as to whether we can attend without feeling or feel without attending. This is not so, however. It is not a question of what con- scious activity can do, but of how the environ- ment comes into connection with conscious ac- WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 109 tivity. Frankly, I do not know how this real question may be answered. I do not know how to apply scientific method in such a case, and I am sure that the method of introspection would be quite inadequate, because one cannot even observe the feeling side of consciousness when that aspect is not predominant and exhibited in consciousness by pleasantness or unpleasantness. At least I may be permitted to speculate on the matter. The basis for my own belief is my view of the nature of the earliest stage of con- sciousness. I do not believe in James's " bloom- ing, buzzing confusion/' It seems to me that this is far too complicated for the earliest stage of consciousness. It would better describe a mature state of conscious activity which never had a .chance to function in some strange envi- ronment into which it was suddenly plunged. Nor do I believe that " pure sensations " are entirely "simple" (in the sense of single). I believe that the earliest stage of conscious activ- ity is a situation where at least two factors are discriminated and the feeling side is present, though very rudimentary. (I have read some- where that Esquimaux brought to Broadway, New York City, did not seem alarmed by the no VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION buzzing confusion, but were quite unconcerned until they saw some skins hanging in a furrier's window.) It seems probable to me that, when a new factor of environment comes into contact with conscious activity, something of the same nature occurs. If it does, it is so quickly connected with memory images and the affective stream that to notice it, even in its cognitive aspect, is almost impossible. For this point of contact with environment, realized at the origin of con- scious activity, and again realized over and over, as new factors of environment come into relation with consciousness, I know no better term than " sensation," which may be considered in this connection to include the affective element (sen- tire means almost anything in the way of per- ception or affection). When sensation occurs, the sensitive protoplasm delays in its course be- fore responding to a stimulus; a moment passes and it blossoms out into cognition and affection, and is associated with accumulated memory images in the main stream. Sensation, thus considered, would be the bridge between cog- nition and feeling. § 12. New values, therefore, the outcome of WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE in new relations with environment, do not conflict with old values in respect to their origin. But they are modified by old values almost as soon as they appear. If this were not so, but if, on the contrary, new values retained their complete independence, we should be very inconsistent in our views of life. We are "that, and it is just because we have systems of value-relations that are more or less isolated one from another that we are so. This inconsistency may be trivial, or it may reach to abnormal proportions where dissociation of personality occurs. § 13. So far as value is concerned, we may see that the advantage of a mature conscious- ness over the earliest stage of consciousness lies in the ability of the former to control new values by means of registered memory-images. This control, I believe, though direct proof would be difficult, also comes about by reference of new affective elements to the affective side of mature conscious activity. But the main control is through ideas; and one chief element of the process of " gaining experience " is learning to control feelings by ideas. The experience of the primitive organism is narrower because the cognitive elements are simpler. H2 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION § 14. A corollary, requiring no proof, is that value-relations with the same objects change according as the objects are found useful in new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them change. § 15. No proof also is needed for this corol- lary: Every object with which conscious activ- ity is in relation is of both contributory and immediate value, but there is no constant ratio between the contributory and immediate values which exist by the relation of conscious activity to any one object. Chapter V may be summarized as follows: I. Environment. § 1. The word " environment " in our dis- cussion will be limited in its use to the sur- roundings of an animal organism. § 2. Environment will designate that part of the world with which an organism comes into direct contact. § 3. Whether the contrast between man and his environment is to be thought of wholly from the biological point of view depends upon one's philosophical predisposition. (a) The materialist and the instrumental WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 113 pragmatist preserve the biological point of view intact. (b) Those who make a difference between the mental and the non-mental may make the contrast psychological, biological, or psycho- physical. (c) Spiritualists would give varying an- swers, depending upon the degree of " objec- tivity " which they attribute to the physical world. § 4. In man, conscious activity may still be described in terms of the standpoint of the organism without trespassing beyond the bio- logical aspect. § 5. This viewpoint is nearest like that of the instrumental pragmatists, with two reserva- tions : (a) I do not commit myself to a decision as to whether the physical world is certain or uncertain in quantity. (b) The cognitive aspect of conscious ac- tivity must not be minimized. § 6. Our use of " environment " is practical, rather than scrupulously exact. § 7. In discussing the contrast between man and his environment from the biological point H4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION of view, we must take care not to conceive con- sciousness as epiphenomenal, or to divide con- scious activity into " faculties." § 8. Conscious activity is always one in op- eration, but it has two distinct aspects, one of which is generally more prominent than the other. § 9. Conscious activity is related to envi- ronment as directly through its feeling-aspect as through cognition. Some practical conse- quences. II. Environment and Values. § 10. Everything with which conscious ac- tivity comes into contact is valuable from both the contributory and the immediate points of view. § 11. It is probably true that, both in the case of the origin of conscious activity and in the case of contact of an existing conscious activity with new factors of environment, sensa- tion is the bridge between cognition and feeling. § 12. New values do not conflict with old values so far as origin is concerned, but the former are modified by the latter. § 13. The advantage of a mature conscious- WITH RESPECT TO CO-EXISTENCE 115 ness over the earliest stage of consciousness, so far as value is concerned, is the ability of the former to control new values on the basis of past experience. § 14. Value-relations with the same objects change according as the objects are found useful in new ways, or as feeling-attitudes toward them change. § 15. Every object with which conscious ac- tivity is in relation, is of both contributory and immediate value; but there is no constant ratio between the contributory and immediate values that exist by virtue of the relation of conscious activity to any one object. PART II WINDELBAND'S THEORY OF NORMS HP CHAPTER VI SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE HE terms " subjective " and " objec- tive/' applied to values, have pro- -*- voked much discussion. They may be used in a variety of ways, and a part of the diversity of opinion that prevails among value- philosophers is due to their slippery nature. As values are relations of interest between conscious activity and environment, both con- sciousness and environment are factors in the experiencing of values. I might think chiefly of the objects valued, and say that all values are objective; or I might think chiefly of my conscious activity which forms or finds values, and say that all values are subjective. There is no room for dispute when the words are used in so general a way. Correct application of the terms is not so easy, however, if I inquire which term of a value-relation functions chiefly in the formation of the relation. I then ask, " What makes a certain object valuable? Is it valuable because 119 120 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION it contains within itself the power to enter into a value-relation? Or is it valuable because my conscious activity has the power to draw it into such a relation ? Do I make it valuable, or does it compel me to recognize that it is valuable ? " I find objects to be of contributory value when they serve certain ends. They seem to have functions within themselves. A crowbar is good for raising a stone because it has quali- ties of strength and rigidity that permit of its being used as a lever. Food is good for nour- ishment because it contains substances which have the ability to replenish energy in animal cells. Such contributory values certainly owe their being to functions of the objects valued, and it is natural to speak of such values as " objective." Other contributory values have been fixed in an arbitrary way. Save for a general agree- ment among men, a dollar bill would not be good for the purchase of a certain quantity of a commodity. Here the value of the bill is not inherent in the nature of the piece of paper with a certain form of printing on it; the power of purchase is not a function of the object as such. And yet, when men have agreed that a dollar SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 121 bill shall have a definite purchasing value, the power of purchase has become a function of the object. Therefore we may call economic values objective, also. Judgments were found to be contributory. They have the power of putting those who make them or those who learn them into touch with their environment in such a way that conscious activity makes progress when it judges, as it could not if it did not judge. Judgments, there- fore, have functions which they perform. They may also be considered to be objective. All contributory values may be termed objec- tive. But a question arises when we come to consider immediate values. Are the things that I like, want, demand, and feel-toward, valuable because the things themselves possess the func- tion of satisfying my wants and demands? I like peaches. Now peaches, considered as a food, good for rebuilding bodily tissues, are of contributory value. But there is another kind of value associated with peaches, when I con- sider simply my liking. I may like them; an- other person may dislike them. They would serve as wholesome food for each of us. The contributory aspect must not be confused with 122 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION another aspect of value, that of my taste for them. Is this taste objective? Do the peaches draw me irresistibly to themselves, or do I go to them because my conscious activity has a peach-loving quality? Most persons will agree that tastes for certain foods go with the individual, rather than with the object. They will agree that some imme- diate values are not objective, but subjective. There are certain groups of values, however, which stand in doubt. Is a work of art beau- tiful because I have a taste that appreciates it, although others might not agree with my taste? Or is it beautiful because it conforms to a norm of beauty quite independent of my taste, and to which I am compelled to give assent? Are cer- tain actions that I contemplate right because I think of them in that way, or because they con- form to standards of right that appeal to my conscience ? An analogous question arises in the case of " secondary qualities." Are these objective in the Lockian sense? 1 Or are they, not " powers 1 Cf. Iyocke, John, Essay concerning Human Understanding, II, VIII, § 23 : " The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, &c." SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 123 in the object," but merely the forms in which primary qualities clothe themselves in conscious activity? Of course the answer to this ques- tion is quite independent of that to the question whether immediate values are subjective or ob- jective. Rickert, Windelband, and others believe that not only in the moral and aesthetic spheres, but also in the logical sphere, there are to be found immediate values objective in character. They argue that facts imply judgments, that feeling enters into the determination of facts, and that truth is an objective, logical norm. Some of the inconsistencies of Rickert's position have already been discussed. 2 The standpoint that recognition of truth is, in the last analysis, inde- pendent of inference and perceptual phenomena is of great assistance to those who would argue for the objective character of immediate values in the moral and aesthetic spheres. If it be true that existence is dependent upon knowledge (metaphysics upon epistemology, the Kantian position), reality and "immediate truth" are the same, and the permanent character of the logical norms will argue for the permanent char- 2 Chapter II. 124 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION acter of norms in other regions. Through much of the following discussion it is impossible not to feel that the battle is often against a ghost that has already been laid — the phantom of Kantian epistemology. And yet, how effectu- ally it has been laid is open to doubt when we read these words of a recent writer : " All that ought to be common property since the days of Kant and Fichte, and every new time only demands a new adjustment of these funda- mental insights to the changing knowledge of the period." 3 The attractiveness of the position that there are objective immediate values seems to me to lie, not in the support of the theory by Kantian epistemology, but in the facts ( I ) that the theory sets forth a teleological order of progress and gives permanence to man's ideals, (2) that there is associated with it the conception of a power in nature superior to the blind forces whose out- come is natural selection, (3) that under the theory man is able to take part in world-develop- ment, and (4) that conscience and responsibility are explained as directed toward actions that are of more than contingent import. 3 Miinsterberg, The Eternal Values, 49. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE 125 In my endeavor to determine whether there are objective immediate values, I shall choose for careful analysis the work of a representa- tive of the objective point of view. Rickert's treatment of the subject is most acute from the logical standpoint, but it is academic and does not afford the broad outlook of Windel- band's. I shall therefore examine Windel- band' s arguments, as contained in the two essays of " Praeludien," entitled, " Immanuel Kant " 4 and " Normen und Naturgesetze." 5 4 Windelband, Wilhelm, Immanuel Kant, in Praeludien, 5tb ed., 1915, I, 1 12-146. 5 Windelband, Wilhelm, Normen und Naturgesetze, ibid., II, 59-98. CHAPTER VII THE THEORY OF NORMS WINDELBAND'S interest in the prob- lem of immediate values is incidental to his interest in the problem of free- dom of the will. 1 He seeks a theory which will allow freedom and which, at the same time, will admit within its scope the deterministic forces which operate in nature. The problem of free- dom, in turn, is resolved into the problem of the nature of accountability. 2 Unless we felt that we were accountable for our actions, we should never have the sense of acting freely. Accountability, according to Windelband, is present not only in the moral field, but also in the fields of thought and feeling. 3 In the latter, it is independent of any expectation of reward or punishment, and may there be studied in its purity. One feels that there are commands which one ought to obey, from which, in the actual process of thought and feeling, he often deviates. There is not only a moral conscience, 1 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 59. */<*., II, 60. *Id. } II, 64. 126 THE THEORY OF NORMS 127 but also a logical and an aesthetic conscience. 4 Man feels a duty and an obligation to fulfil the commands given him in the three fields. Windelband's explanation of this triple con- science is that it serves a pedagogical purpose 5 in leading men to follow those rules or norms of thinking, feeling, and willing which are char- acterized by their inherent importance over all other ways of thinking, willing, and feeling. These rules are norms whose realization in human nature we are gradually approaching by a kind of elimination comparable to, but not identical with, the law of natural selection. 6 The feeling of obligation, or duty, is the push that we receive in the direction of fulfilling a normal demand, the nature of the push being an attraction from the norm itself. 7 The feel- ing of accountability arises when we realize that our characters and nothing else are the cause of our thoughts, actions, and feelings, and remorse arises if we feel pain in the knowledge that we could not have acted differently from the way in which we did act. 8 *id.,n, 67. *id., 11,95. *id., 11, 74. "id., II, 80. 8 Id., II, 94- 128 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION I shall divide my discussion of Windelband's position into a number of sections, as follows: I. Kant or Realism? II. Evolution and the Norms. III. The Parallel between Denken, Fuhlen, and Wollen. IV. Independence of the Norms from Par- ticular Consciousnesses. V. Freedom and Responsibility. I. KANT OR REALISM? Windelband, in common with others who de- fend an objective theory of immediate value, founds his argument on what he believes to be basic principles of philosophy achieved once and for all by the Kantian criticism. The essay Immanuel Kant is in praise of Kant's critical view over the older Greek view of knowledge as a subject-object relation. In statement of my view, I cannot do better than to refer again to the essay The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology, by Walter T. Marvin, in The New Realism. 9 The particular portion of Marvin's argument which I wish to employ in 9 The New Realism, New York, 1912, pp. 43-95- THE THEORY OF NORMS 129 my criticism of Windelband is that expressed in the title of the fourth chapter of his essay, " Epistemology does not give, but presupposes, a theory of reality." The argument of Marvin is with reference to the whole Kantian epistemology. I wish to show, however, that, after accepting the Kantian standpoint, Windelband does not keep to it con- sistently, but places the norms against a realistic background. § 1. In the essay Immanuel Kant, 10 he says, " The truth is that Kant has defined as the problem of philosophy reflection on the basis of the principles of Reason, i.e., the absolute norms, and that this reflection, far from being exhausted by the rules of thinking, only finds its conclusion through the rules of willing and feeling. ,, This is to say that the frame in which our experience is cast consists of norms of willing and feeling as well as norms of think- ing. Taken all together, the norms constitute the rules of all possible experience. In the essay Normen und Naturgesetze, how- ever, we find quite a different conception of norms. Here X1 Windelband contrasts the laws 10 Windelband, Praeludien, I, 141. lx Id., II, 72. 130 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION of nature with the norms. Having previously defined laws of nature in Kantian fashion as " those general judgments about the succession of psychical events, in which we recognize the existence of psychical activity, and from which we are able to derive the separate facts of the psychical life," 12 he speaks of the operation of the norms as only partly identical with the oper- ation of the laws of nature. 13 He says: All norms are thus special forms of the realization of natural laws. The system of norms represents a selection out of the infinite manifoldness of the forms of combination under which, according to the individual circumstances, the natural laws of the psychical life can unfold themselves. The laws of logic are a selection from the possible forms of the association of ideas; the laws of ethics are a selection from the possible forms of motivation; the laws of aesthetics are a selection from the possible forms of feeling activity. In this essay, norms appear as a selection from a manifold of possible — and actual — experi- ences; in the former essay, they are the con- ditions of any possible experience at all. This change of viewpoint, however, necessitates drop- 12 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 65. 13 Id., II, 72. THE THEORY OF NORMS 131 ping the Kantian conception of norms as the framework of all possible experience, and shift- ing the conception to that of norms operating against a background of laws of nature. § 2. Windelband might regard the laws of nature as the Kantian framework and the norms as additional laws existing together with them and exerting a selective influence which is felt in the individual through the triple conscience. In point of fact, however, he steadfastly re- gards the norms as identical with the Kantian "Regeln" His treatment brings out the diffi- culty of the Kantian position in the matter of defining truth. Where reality is simply the experienced, the conception of a mechanistic reg- ulation must work equally well in false as in true judgments. And where Regeln of willing and feeling are united with those of thinking, as conditions of possible experience, " truth " is applied to all experience (in some way). Win- delband says, " Thus, in the greatest philoso- phers, science recognizes by her side the ethical and the aesthetic sense as determining factors of the highest truth." 14 Truth here is consid- ered to have epistemological reference to all 14 id., 1, 141. 132 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION the elements of experience. In the other essay, however, it is the logical norms alone which have the " Zweck der Wahrheit." 15 It is again evi- dent that the possible content of experience is here thought of as consisting of more than the known. § 3. The difficulty of Windelband's theory of norms in its relation to the Kantian Regeln is also brought out in his discussion of the inde- pendence of the norms from particular con- sciousnesses. 16 He is right in his thesis that it is not necessary for the individual in whom the norms are working to be aware of the fact, if the norms are Kantian Regeln) but how will they be any more present if the individual is conscious of them? It is not the consciousness or the lack of consciousness of the norms that primarily causes the trouble, but the position that there can be degrees of presence, or, rather, that there can ever be absence. The difficulty of the Kantian position in general in explaining why it is that the Regeln are consciously present as Regeln to so few persons is a different objec- tion — one that is discussed by A. J. Balfour in 15 Windelband, Praeludien. II, 84. 16 Id., I, 83. THE THEORY OF NORMS 133 A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, Chapter VI. To say that norms exist independently of any particular consciousness, in the full sense of independence, would be Kantian suicide. The considerations which I have adduced seem to me to make it evident that Windelband has at least unconsciously modified the Kantian position in his treatment of norms. He seems to adopt a position of " naive realism " ; the norms and the laws of nature must work to- gether in reality. In giving up the full Kantian point of view, Windelband's theory loses some of the plausibility that it gained when the norms were presented in the guise of epistemological necessity, but the theory remains an attractive one. We are now compelled to assume that norms have a metaphysical existence; and, once this is done, there is always the possibility of a pre-established harmony between the psychic and the cosmic processes. I am not sure whether such a possibility can be disproved. The safe line of argument, the one adopted here, is to show that, unless the assumption of the meta- physical existence of norms is made at the start, the arguments advanced to establish that exist- ence fail. 134 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION II. EVOLUTION AND THE NORMS § 4. Windelband assumes that the world is actually the world that science describes to us. It has objective being; the law of causation is its binding principle. It is a deterministic uni- verse in the sense that the causal series described by science is the actual one and the only one possible. The causal sequence of nature tends to become known to man by natural processes. Man is able to observe, and to infer the nature of the factors of evolution which have led to the present result. Especially conspicuous to man is the inequal- ity which exists between the factors of evolu- tion. The development of the whole is pur- posive in the direction of the triumph of the most weighty factors. Nature is conceived as a mass of activities of which some few are des- tined to survive, either because of their fitness in the struggle for existence (by natural selec- tion) or because of their inherent importance. Windelband observes that some of the psychical factors which are of inherent importance also aid in the struggle for existence, as for ex- ample, cleverness, and the transcendental laws of thought. 17 But he notes that others, such as THE THEORY OF NORMS 135 the moral and aesthetic factors, are of indiffer- ent value in the struggle for existence and are often positively detrimental. He accounts for their persistence by saying that they must have an inherent importance. 18 A distinction between factors of quantitative importance in the physi- cal world and norms of qualitative importance in the psychical world would bring out Windel- band's meaning. Strictly speaking, the comparison between physical and psychical factors in evolution is not a parallel. The world is a unity, and the field of struggle the same for each group of factors. (The unity here is the fact that there is only one evolution in the physical world.) The working out of the causal process produces a great variety of organisms and psychical char- acters. The important characters become fixed gradually by the weeding out of the others. The wide variation in importance between the different characters necessitates the elimination of the less important characters. Saying that there is a difference of " importance " is ex- pressed in another way by saying that nature is purposeful in developing certain characters 17 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 76 ff. 18 Id., II, 80. 10 136 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION at the expense of certain others. These im- portant factors, as we have seen, are of a differ- ent nature in the physical and psychical worlds. The most pregnant criticism of such a view of evolution lies in a consideration of its work- ability. The difficulty rests in the incompati- bility of two sets of factors: factors whose survival-value is determined by their quanti- tative strength, and factors whose importance is due to a qualitative intensity. Windelband observes that, at the present stage of evolution, these factors are often in opposition, and, one may ask, what hope is there of a reconciliation? Sooner or later there must be a reckoning; and, judging from the fact that the realization of psychical factors is dependent upon the presence of favorable physical processes, we should infer that, no matter how qualitatively important the psychical factors may be, the latter will always be at the mercy of the former. The persistence of psychical development up to the present time argues for its persistence and co-existence with the physical in the future; but Windelband needs to show by what natural process the realization of the norms is assured. " Inherent impor- tance " is insufficient. THE THEORY OF NORMS 137 To me it seems that it makes no difference how closely the two sets of factors may be asso- ciated. A particular case of " right-and-its- circumstances " would, under the theory, have a greater survival-value than other groups of circumstances not containing " right." But it is not conceivable that the circumstances asso- ciated with right should always contain quanti- tative factoral preeminence. Therefore, it would have to be the qualitative factor often that effected the survival-value, and there would be bound to be the clash between quantitative and qualitative factors which I have described. III. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN DEN- KEN, FUHLEN, AND WOLLEN A. The Parallel between Dbnkbn and Wollen § 5. Windelband says that, just as in Denken there is but one correct thought, so in Wollen there is but one right action. 19 This, however, is no true parallel. " Thing-to-be-thought " is made parallel with " moral decision " ; the true parallel would be between " thing-to-be-thought " 19 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 63 ff. 138 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION and " thing- to-be-done." But there is never one objective action which is right independently of the doer; there is no right or wrong with refer- ence to the matter of moral decision. Buying two $5 seats at the opera is not right or wrong in itself, but for a particular person under par- ticular circumstances. The fault of the parallel is in the supposition that there is the same possibility of latitude in thought as in action. We should be obliged to think according to the Kantian norms, if they exist. Parallel with such norms would be norms of willing which would compel us to act in ways regulated by them. In either case there is no choice open to us, no case where the norms might not operate. The Kantian epistemology has no place for incorrect thinking. According to it, objects of consciousness are particular groupings of em- pirical representations according to the laws of the understanding. Incorrect thinking, accord- ing to some of Kant's followers, is unclear arrangement of our perceptions. I ask whether, when we are compelled to make a moral de- cision, of the various alternatives presented, one, the moral, attracts us because it is so much clearer than any other? THE THEORY OF NORMS 139 § 6. WindelbancTs theory, in that it assures independence of one another to the several series of norms, unwarrantably isolates cog- nition, feeling, and will. Thought, aesthetic feeling, and moral decision may well be taken as types of highest development of these " fac- ulties"; but, even in their highest develop- ment, they can never become independent. The grounds of this objection are found in two con- siderations, (a) Windelband speaks of truth as the " end " of thought. " End," however, is a word used properly only where activity is present. As long as there is thought-activity, so long must the active (will) element be asso- ciated with the cognitive. Complete disassoci- ation would be possible only in the case of absolute passivity of thought, a condition which would be indistinguishable from unconscious- ness, (b) If the norms of moral decision were independent of those of cognition, we should have a situation where moral laws were present without any matter on which they might act; or the matter of moral decisions would be that of empirical representations. The former sup- position is absurd; under the latter, it would be necessary for the perceptions to be arranged 140 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION in consciousness according to the laws of the understanding, before they could be of service for moral decision. In such a case, the norms of morality would be dependent on the logical norms. B. The Relation of Fvhlen to Den ken AND WOLLEN I shall discuss this portion of the subject together with the following section. IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NORMS OF PARTICULAR CON- SCIOUSNESSES Windelband constantly writes as if he believed that the norms were operating in a world of matter and motion. This presupposition leads him to try to prove that they exist quite inde- pendently of particular consciousnesses. 20 In his proof, he makes much of the very portion of the Kantian position which has been assailed most vigorously, namely, the varying degree to which the norms are present to the conscious- ness of individuals. The fact that most men have but a hazy idea of norms of truth, beauty, 20 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 81 ff. THE THEORY OF NORMS 141 and morality is taken to argue for independent, objective existence. Before presenting Windel- band's arguments, it may be asked whether the independent, objective existence of norms which may at one time not be present to the conscious- ness of a particular individual, and again at another time may be present, does not pre- suppose that there are objective entities which may pass to and from the knowing situation? And if so, is not this to take away from con- sciousness the sole privilege of organizing the material of empirical representations? Does not this lead to realism? A. Single Laws of Logic, Morality, and Beauty It is argued that the norms, when actualized, exist independently of the consciousness in which the actualization occurs. Windelband presents two proofs, the one based on our judgment of their actualization in others, the other derived from our appreciation of their actualization in ourselves. § 7. Norms are independent of the conscious- ness of the one in whom they are actualized because we give our approval or disapproval to 142 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION such a one whether or not he is conscious of such a realization in himself. 21 This argument is most plausible in the case of Denken. If we assume a realistic back- ground and the current presuppositions of sci- ence, we think of facts and the relations between facts as quite valid no matter whether there exist any perceiving consciousness at all. If we superimpose an idealistic epistemology, we still grant that the existence of a stable world stands or falls by the constancy and similarity of factual impressions. The case of Wollen, however, is different. That we are loath to give actions independent of conscious moral decision any ethical value so far as the agent is concerned, is shown by the fact that we do not grant that such actions have moral merit. Our praise or blame in such cases is the result of comparison with our own stand- ards. Without this comparison, there would be no " beautiful souls " who act morally from nature. I do not mean that, if the absolute value of our own moral standards be granted, such " souls " are not beautiful, but that, with- out recognition of their beauty by us, they would 21 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 81. THE THEORY OF NORMS 143 have no moral value whatever. It is useless for Windelband to show that moral actions may be independent of the consciousness of the agent, unless he can also show that they are independ- ent of the consciousness of others at the same time. And what we assume as to independent existence in the case of the objects of thought, is insuperably difficult if applied to the case of moral laws, where divergence of opinion is so wide. Without any implication that moral laws and aesthetic judgments stand upon a similar basis, we may say that the same argument ap- plies equally well to the consideration of uncon- scious creation of beauty. § 8. Some norms may excite approval or disapproval in the consciousness of the agent upon realization, without their actually being present to his consciousness. 22 We can create a beautiful object or appreciate a work of art without thinking of aesthetic norms, which are rules of criticism. This is very true. But in his desire to avoid a sub- jectivistic basis of logic and ethic, Windelband has overreached himself a little in applying the same arguments to aesthetic. In the case of **/<*., II, 83. 144 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION aesthetic judgments, there is a simple explana- tion of the phenomenon which he mentions, which entirely obviates the necessity of attrib- uting independence of consciousness to the norms. According to this view, aesthetic pleas- ure originates only when a cognitive element of consciousness stresses one aspect of feeling over other aspects. The more attention that is paid to special features of the object appreci- ated, and the more these special features are associated with other ideas in the mind, the greater the development of aesthetic feeling. Aesthetic rules may be formed upon introspec- tion, but they are merely the coming to self- consciousness of cognitive elements which were already present, although so tied up with the feeling elements that they were not separately recognized. Of course we do not need to have rules in order to feel beauty. Rules are the outcome of reflection over shades of feeling. But it is also true that the study of some aes- thetic system will aid very materially in later combinations of cognition and feeling in aes- thetic appreciation. One is not born a com- poser of beautiful music. No matter what may be the extent of the gift of musical feeling, it THE THEORY OF NORMS 145 is necessary that the cognitive elements of har- mony be learned by hearing good music in which the harmony is present, and generally by a study of theory. Beethoven, born on an island where no music was ever heard, would likely have beaten a drum. In the case of aesthetic feeling, Windelband argued from the truth that artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation do not demand conscious- ness of norms of beauty. But this apparent independence does not hold true of logical and moral norms, as Windelband himself admits. Here, he says, the norms are concerned with the " deciding moment " 23 in the process, and so are of the very greatest value to the conscious- ness of the agent. We are not likely to perform a moral act, unless we are conscious of a stand- ard of morality in deference to which we choose to act in one way rather than in another! B. Realms of Laws of Logic, Morality, and Beauty It may be objected, in reply to my criticism of Windelband's parallel between Denken, Fuhlen, and Wollen, that it is difficult to demonstrate 23 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 84. 146 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION pai allelism between single laws of thought, single moral decisions, and single appreciations of beauty; but that it would be easier to defend the existence of three realms of laws of logic, morality, and beauty. Perhaps the inconsist- ency of the parallel is only apparent, and results from a different kind of relation of each of the realms to an individual, rather than from the point of view of the three realms themselves. It is puzzling to know how we are to conceive the three realms of norms. In what does their objectivity consist? If we adopt the Kantian standpoint, we might consider a moral norm objective in the same sense that the laws of the understanding are objective. The moral norm in question would accompany the logical laws by which the whole situation is conceived, and the whole would be a " right-situation." But this objectivity would not be ontological, but epistemological. From the standpoint of realism, it is possible to assume that there is a pre-established har- mony between the psychological recognition of a right action and an objective " right " in- herent in a teleological universe — however the inherent " right " may collide at times with fac- THE THEORY OF NORMS 147 tors of natural selection. This position, how- ever, is one that Windelband does not adopt. He is anxious to put the norms on the same footing with the laws of nature, and makes his appeal to the Kantian standpoint. § 9. In order to show that there are three realms of norms influencing the logical, moral, and aesthetic " faculties " of man, it is neces- sary to demonstrate that there is a choice pre- sented, and that the norms point toward an action, thought, or feeling which would not be indicated clearly without them. Windelband's effort to prove the existence of such a choice is made in connection with his attempted demon- stration of a moral, a logical, and an aesthetic conscience, and with his belief that the factors operating in natural selection are inadequate to explain the facts. (a) He claims that the existence of a moral conscience in individuals cannot be accounted for by the law of survival. 2 * For, he says, in order to effect a moral purpose, a man can use only a part of the means at his disposal. Other possible actions are forbidden him. Further- more, the older a civilization grows, the less 24 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 77. 148 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION moral it becomes, a fact which shows that nat- ural selection does not operate here in choosing a factor of permanent advantage. 25 But he says that in the case of nations the moral value is identical with the survival value. It seems to me that this argument overlooks a whole field of inquiry, in which moral con- science has been described in wholly psycho- logical terms. Man became conscious of actions that were at first instinctive, and the memory of previous actions furnished circumstances to be considered by the side of later actions. Com- pare, for example, J. S. Mill's description of conscience. 26 This theory is strengthened in consideration of the fact that consciences are so different, resting as they do upon different psychological equipments. Moral conscience would seem to be a very imperfect instrument whose function it is to indicate our needs with reference to action. It would be easier to argue for metaphysical objectivity, if we found more uniformity in moral consciences. Moral laws, framed at first in accordance with instincts, might well have been possessed of survival value 25 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 79. 26 Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, Everyman ed., New York, 1910, p. 26. THE THEORY OF NORMS 149 for primitive man. Windelband seems to be under the impression that survival-values, to be such, must be operative through the whole of their existence — which is not true. (b) Moreover, Windelband's argument by the use of the term " moral decision " is faulty. When we speak of moral decision, we have emerged from the strictly psychological field of inquiry into the logical field. Moral decision, however quickly we may make it, is a matter of judgment. Moral choice is the outcome of deliberation (Aristotle). In his discussion of conscience in evolution and moral decision, it seems to me that Windelband has deviated from the point at issue. We are trying to determine whether there is ontological objectivity in an action that is felt as right. Moral decision, brought about by standards of right, the out- come of education, is concerned with mediate, not immediate values. If there are such onto- logical entities as moral norms, they must oper- ate immediately, in the case of felt right; as, for instance, when I feel that such and such an action is right in itself. Now when I become introspective, I do not find any feeling of conscience immediately in- 150 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION dining me to a way of acting. I find no actions which seem right or wrong in themselves. In every case where conscience enters, I find that I have been weighing possible actions, however brief may have been the process. I find my- self discriminating between different interests. Therefore, I cannot help concluding that actions in themselves are indifferent, and that moral distinctions are mediate. It is true that I am inclined to follow instincts, but I cannot find any moral quality as distinguished from instinct. I may say that moral distinctions grew out of my instincts, but nothing leads me to suppose that the distinctions themselves are anything but derivative. And, inasmuch as actions are meaningless from the standpoint of morality, when divorced from choice and deliberation, I conclude that the ontological objectivity of moral norms can only be defended by the supposition of a pre-established harmony. § 10. Windelband says that logical norms lead us to truth. 27 Now from the Kantian standpoint this position is more easily defended than from that of realism. If logical laws and physical phenomena are all considered epistemo- 27 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 84. THE THEORY OF NORMS 151 logically, one may be objective in the same sense as the other. There is some difficulty in dis- covering any epistemological falsity at all, how- ever, for everything just is. But Windelband uses the Kantian argument to make his position plausible at the start. Then he switches over to the Lockian conception of knowledge as true knowledge. According to the latter conception, he thinks of the psycho- logical processes as having a great number of possibilities of association of " ideas " in vari- ous ways in any one situation. That which leads the mind to prefer one over all the other possibilities is the quality of normality which it possesses. Thus the norms of thought are neither identical with nor contrary to the gen- eral laws of association of ideas. I do not see how we can admit these possibilities of associ- ation if we keep to the Kantian standpoint. According to Kant, we have to think according to these laws. I repeat, the position of Windel- band here is more in accord with Locke, and we must consider the matter in connection with the implied realistic background. Where is truth? If it is the real as the object of judgment, as the realists tell us, I cannot see 11 152 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION where logical norms are demanded. In such a case, we should be led to truth simply by what, in the last analysis, is perception — of objects and relations. To suppose the existence of norms would be to believe that there is a special conspiracy on the part of nature to bring organic beings into harmony with it from their psycho- logical standpoint. From the standpoint of evo- lution this would be a hysteron proteron; and it would render natural selection useless. If, on the other hand, truth is in the judgment, it would seem to be mediate, insofar as there is presented the possibility of a number of .judgments. But a logical truth of this kind, based on inference, is something quite different from immediate ap- proval of a correct thought. And logical truth ultimately traces back to perceptual phenomena, unless an idealistic complication is introduced. I cannot, therefore, see the necessity of suppos- ing ontologically objective norms of thinking. Epistemologically, they may be defended (with a problem as to the nature of the false idea). § ii. The strongest argument for ontologi- cal objectivity is found in the case of so-called aesthetic norms. We recall James's discussion of the place of affectional facts. 28 Beauty, as 28 James, William, Essays in Radical Empiricism, 137-154. THE THEORY OF NORMS 153 well as color and secondary qualities in general, can be thought of as a quality of the object. A beautiful vase so functions as to produce a feeling of immediate pleasure. I cannot prove that the beauty is entirely subjective any more than I can prove that secondary, or even pri- mary, qualities are entirely subjective. The pleasure of beauty may be only incidental. Why, then, does it seem more reasonable, ac- cording to my view, to consider the beauty as wholly psychological? Windelband says that one reason for con- sidering aesthetic norms objective is the fact that aesthetic appreciations cannot be accounted for on the basis of their survival by a process of natural selection. 29 He implies that there would be no need of supposing the existence of these norms, if such an account could be given. He says that, although it is true that there has been a gradual development of the nervous sys- tem in the case of organic nature, it is also true that the over-development of aesthetic ability is apt to be weakening, rather than strengthening. Now it seems to me that the preservation of aesthetic capabilities may be accounted for by 29 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 79. 154 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION natural selection. It has been observed that our aesthetic appreciations and our laws of beauty follow closely along the line of the structure of natural objects. Those organisms which har- monized with their environment would tend to survive. This would not preclude the possi- bility of later aesthetic development beyond the point of usefulness of the aesthetic factor as a survival value. A quite theoretical volume of appreciations might survive, for evolution casts off only dangerous developments, not harmless ones. If over-refinement led to weakness, the survival-value would assert itself on occasion. The primitive colors carry with them more aesthetic delight to an uncultured people than the more delicate shades. The rare colors give pleasure only to the " highbrow." Primitive colors, furthermore, are associated with many objects which have survival-reference. The warm colors, yellow and red, have pleasure associated with them perhaps because of their connection with the light of the sun and the warmth of fires. Cold blue is associated with the sea and sky; black, with the treacherous night. Observe, too, that the same object of appreciation may affect different individuals in THE THEORY OF NORMS 155 wholly different ways. The general uniformity of taste may be accounted for on the principle of harmony of organic with inorganic nature. Even so, beauty might be considered to be ontologically objective. In such a case, nature would have to be regarded as conspiring to give aesthetic pleasure to some of its organic com- ponents. Beauty, to be ontologically objective, must be a principle in nature distinct from the utility which operates in natural selection; that is, it must be so, if we are ever to prove its existence, for, of course, we might have faith in eternal beauty without the least bit of evi- dence to prove that it exists. However, the psychological explanation seems to me to be entirely adequate, and the proofs advanced to establish an over-personal beauty seem incon- clusive. Therefore, it seems wisest to adhere to the simpler viewpoint. V. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY § 12. After having attempted to show how norms and natural laws may fit into a single system, Windelband seeks to remove the Kantian dualism of a region of freedom and a region of natural law. His method is a consideration of 156 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION the meaning of freedom. He aims to show- that freedom and determinism are not incom- patible. He says, Freedom is the determination of the empirical con- sciousness by consciousness of the norm. . . . This freedom is in no wise a mysterious ability to do some- thing for which no cause is present; it demands no exception to the continuity determined by nature of the phenomena of the life of the soul; but it is rather the ripest product of natural necessity, that through which the empirical consciousness places itself under the law of the consciousness of the norm. 30 Aside from the notion of norms, I find myself in cordial agreement with Windelband in his contention that freedom and determinism are not incompatible. But Windelband seems t6 feel that norms somehow help to a reconcilia- tion, and in this I cannot agree with him. He seems to feel that freedom can be explained as a type of determination according to norms. It appears to me that nature is here regarded as static before possibilities of determination, on the one hand, according to quantitative factors of evolution, and, on the other, according to so Windelband, Praeludien, II, 88. THE THEORY OF NORMS 157 normal, qualitative factors. Now if the Kantian dualism is to disappear, it seems most natural that quantitative and normal factors should work themselves out in a single system along deterministic lines. The theory, however, shows no reason why normal factors should prevail. This was my first criticism of norms, here re- peated with special reference to the discussion of freedom. I do not think that the reader of Windelband' s arguments will be satisfied with his definition of freedom after a consideration of his subsequent discussion. Windelband escapes the main prob- lem of freedom by identifying freedom with a certain kind of determined processes. A human being cannot act outside of natural law in the carrying out of any plan. The means at his disposal are determined from the start; and, if he follows out a certain course of action, there is a chain of causation to whose links he must conform. When Windelband places freedom in a course of action determined according to consciousness of a norm, he appears to place it right in the causal series. It may be seen, however, that the issue does not lie here. Windelband speaks of the em- 158 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION pirical consciousness " placing itself " (sich stellt) under the law of consciousness of the norm. In the next sentence he defines freedom as the " autonomy " with which the individual consciousness makes of a norm, known and recognized by it, a maxim of action. Now this autonomy by which the individual consciousness is able to put itself under the determination of one of several possible courses of action is a different sort of freedom from that of the pre- ceding definition of freedom as the " determi- nation of the empirical consciousness through the consciousness of the norm. ,, In the case of the definition just quoted, nature is viewed as a battlefield wherein different laws, natural and normal, come into collision. The natural laws war among themselves, and the issue is decided by natural selection. The addition of norms to the forms of the evolution-process merely increases the number of laws which are at war. Now I take it that there are degrees of power among the factors of evolution, and that these degrees of importance are constant throughout the process of nature, so that there results a causal continuity. By Windelband's first definition, freedom THE THEORY OF NORMS 159 would consist in the consciousness of the trans- ference of the action of an individual from one type of mechanistic series to another type of mechanistic series. ** Freedom is nothing other than the consciousness of this determining power which the known and recognized norm is able to exercise over the thinking faculty and de- cision of the will." I interpret this to mean that norms are laws which exist only in relation to conscious beings; that natural laws reign supreme in inorganic nature; but that the indi- vidual conscious being is able to escape from the tyranny of an implacable mechanism by placing himself under the rule of higher laws which become operative only through the me- dium of consciousness. Now the important idea of this exposition is that consciousness makes a difference in the deterministic course of nature. Certain laws, norms, become oper- ative only when organisms become conscious of them. It is difficult, however, to see how aware- ness of norms, however influential a factor it may be, can itself be termed freedom, on the plea that this factor of awareness initiates cer- tain new deterministic lines. The awareness simply becomes one new factor. This fits in 160 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION well with the argument for determinism, but it ill accords with the admission of freedom. Free- dom seems to have become identified with a process of awareness. The plausibility of Windelband's argument seems to lie in the implicit assumption of another kind of freedom for the individual in addition to the one which he has defined. This second kind of freedom is expressed by his use of the words " autonomy " and " places itself." Free- dom, according to this second conception, is something within the factor of awareness, not identical with it. Freedom is the ability of one who is aware to accept or reject the normal way of acting. Decision of the will is a decision involving choice of action on the part of the one who is aware. I do not feel that Windelband has escaped the real problem of freedom by the method which he has employed. The old dis- cussion of whether the will is free comes again to the fore; it has been buried only temporarily. How can a conscious being " place himself " under the rule of one of several kingdoms of law? Windelband's only implied answer is, " Through being conscious. " He seems to feel that it is the peculiar glory of a conscious being THE THEORY OF NORMS 161 to be able to make selective choice of factors which shall govern his action. He seems to feel that, by making norms part of a determined system, he has made freedom intelligible. But the real dispute, it seems to me, is not over the question as to how courses of action work out (as, for instance, whether or not they are in causal series), but over how the individual is able to choose one course of action rather than another, it being taken for granted that any course is determined in the process. And I cannot see how the introduction of norms helps the situation at all. It only adds a complication to the factoral-complex of possible actions — about whose possibility it is mainly disputed. This is no essay on determinism, indetermin- ism, and freedom, but a discussion of the rela- tion of Windelband's conception of norms to his conception of freedom. I think that it has been shown that the assumption of norms only em- barrasses the discussion, and that without norms we can as easily suppose several courses of possible action, any one of which may be com- pletely determined in the process. There is nothing to be gained by printing one of these courses of action in red letters! 162 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Windelband fears that his notion of freedom will be challenged on the ground that it does not do justice to the feeling of responsibility and to the existence of responsibility in general. 31 He feels it important, therefore, to examine the notion of responsibility. As he has been trying to reconcile the concept of freedom with some kind of determinism, it is not necessary to reconcile responsibility with his theory of deter- mination by norms. He feels that the crux of the question lies in the admission that acts of moral decision are caused. But, at the outset, he finds that causation and responsibility are not incompatible. In fact, if moral actions were not caused, there could be no responsibility; all would be mere chance. We are only respon- sible when we cause our actions. Wherein, then, lies our feeling of repugnance in the mat- ter of making responsibility contain causation? Windelband feels that it lies in the notion of necessity which we must attribute to cause and effect, if causation is to have any "objective character." He proceeds to analyze the con- cept of necessity (as distinguished from the time-relation of succession, discussed by Hume) 31 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 88. THE THEORY OF NORMS 163 into two meanings. One of these, the meaning of Wirkens, " power," is not further discussed. The other is said to be that of logical dependence of the special on the general, Gesetzmassigkeit, " according-to-lawness." 32 Now our repugnance in the matter of admitting causation into the conception of responsibility is evidently a feel- ing that Gesetzmassigkeit destroys freedom. Windelband quotes the work of Rickert in con- nection with the analysis of Ursdchlichkeit, to the effect that many acts which are caused do not have a general law behind them. Such are all individual actions which never recur under exactly the same conditions. Therefore, Gesetzmassigkeit and Ursdchlichkeit are not co-extensive; and, if this be true, responsibility would sometimes have to do with causal rela- tions which are not predetermined according to a general law. Windelband does not examine Rickert's arguments, but passes to a consider- ation as to where one finds the idea of necessary connection in the case of unique actions. He says that a man's willing and acting are caused by his character. 33 The obedience to law in the 32 Id., II, 90. 33 Id., II, 92. 164 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION case of unique actions is found in the nature of character which sets forth a logical law of gen- eral nature; viz., if the circumstances were to be repeated (whether they are actually repeated or not), the man would act thus and so. Thus, "all effecting (Wirksamkeit) has epistemologi- cal meaning, and the logical form of Gesetz- massigkeit, even if its factual non-repetition or inability to be repeated excludes methodologi- cally its comparison with other examples." 34 Therefore, the causal relation is never present without Gesetzmassigkeit, even if this be only epistemological. It is somewhat puzzling to gather the precise significance which Windelband wishes us to attach to his analysis of causation. If Rickert's position were sound, causation would be relieved of some of the burden imposed on it by deter- minism; and responsibility would be affected similarly by a softening of the conception of causality. Windelband, however, feels the need of retaining the notion of necessary connection in some sense, and he endeavors to soften the sense of Gesetzmassigkeit. This he does by showing that, in cases of unique action, obedi- 34 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 92. THE THEORY OF NORMS 165 ence to law is only to be understood epistemo- logically. Supporting himself on the Kantian epistemology, Windelband is able to juggle terms between the laws of phenomena and logical laws, with an ontological implication that, as the one realm is as real as the other, it is permissible to take from each in building up a theory. My criticism of the analysis of causation is that it is not to the point. It is certainly true that the causal relation exists between the act of moral decision and the subsequent action that is carried out, but the question is as to whether the causal relation exists between the norm and the act of decision. We may represent the matter more clearly by the use of symbols. Let n stand for norm, b for the act of moral decision of a conscious being, c for the subsequent action, R for relation, and C for causal. Now my position is that responsibility certainly involves b — RC — c. This is well established by Windel- band. The important question, however, is not what kind of causal relation this may be, but whether there is another causal relation between n and b; is n — RC — b true, in other words? Windelband escapes consideration of this prob- lem by using the ambiguous term " character " 166 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION to cover both the norm and the act of decision, nb. He thinks that the difficulty connected with causation is settled by showing that nb — RC — c. But the matter is not settled by saying that " character determines willing and acting." He proves that an act of moral decision determines a subsequent action, by virtue of the " charac- ter " of the agent, and then assumes that there is no question as to determination within " char- acter," which contains at least the important elements of the act of moral decision and the presence of the norm. The point at issue is, Does the presence of the norm in the " character " determine the act of decision? This question can not be discussed without coming dangerously near assuming the discarded notion of " states of consciousness." A more psychological statement of the point at issue would be, Has a conscious being ability to reject or accept or choose between conscious impulses? This is the question whose answer is the answer as to whether man has freedom or not. This question is discussed subsequently by Windelband, and I shall criticize his treatment of it. He says that another objection brought THE THEORY OF NORMS 167 against the association of responsibility with causal necessity in the case of willing and act- ing, is the fact that, by popular usage, respon- sibility always implies the belief that a man could have acted otherwise than he really did act. 35 Whereupon Windelband answers that the possibility of a variety of actions in a situation is true only of man " in abstracto "; that a man " in concreto " could act otherwise only if he were otherwise. It is because his character is such as it is and because it has caused certain actions that we judge a man responsible for what he has done. Windelband here expressly denies that a man has any choice of possible actions. With it he implies that a man has no choice of possible decisions. The latter denial, to my mind, is the denial of the only kind of freedom that is worth anything. Observe two things. Note the confusion running through the argument with respect to willing and acting. Windel- band's original discussion had to do with the parallel between Denken, Wollen, and Fuhlen. Now, when he is temporarily discussing Wollen alone, a stranger has made his appearance, 35 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 93. 12 168 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Handeln. We now read of Wollen and Han- deln. They are spoken of in the same breath, and it is just because of this juxtaposition that Windelband can profit by his confusion between an act of decision of the will (Wollen) and the physical process (Handeln) which follows the act of decision. Observe, in the second place, that responsi- bility as interpreted by Windelband is here brought in to prove that a man has no choice of possible actions. This goes well if we take it literally: a man can be responsible only for a causally determined action. But how can he be responsible for an act of decision if it be caus- ally determined? If an act of decision of the will is the effect of a determining cause, respon- sibility for the decision must rest with the cause, not with the man himself. Windelband has said that a man cannot act otherwise than is determined by his character. His proof, as we have seen, relies upon use of the term " character " in an ambiguous sense. The difficulty in the matter of application of responsibility to the cause is now discussed by him as a new difficulty. He now asks, What is responsible for the character: circumstances, THE THEORY OF NORMS 169 society, or God? How can the individual be responsible for his character? " Als ob es noch irgendwie auszudenken ware, was das Indi- viduum im Unterschiede von seinem Charakter noch sein konnte! " 36 In such a case, Windel- band says, a man's character would have to be doubled; he would have to have an empirical and an intelligible character, and thus we should have a metaphysical conception which would not agree with the causal element of the conception of responsibility. Windelband's solution is to locate responsibility in the judgment whereby we transfer our approval or disapproval of a function to the individual who functions. 37 Windelband's main problem was to reconcile freedom with determinism. He found that, in order to do so, he would have to give an account of responsibility which would do full justice to it. His method was to show that causation and responsibility are not incompatible. We should suppose that he would find responsibility some- where in the series of causation, but he discovers that the problem of infinite regress is involved. He therefore concludes that, although causation in moral action is always associated with respon- 36 Windelband, Praeludien, II, 94. 3? j^ u j 95> 170 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION sibility, responsibility is only applied metaphor- ically to the person; that it is only a way of passing judgment on a portion of the causal series; that itself it is not a part of the causal series at all. How does this agree with Win- delband's method of showing that responsibility is not incompatible with determinism by norms on the ground that responsibility always involves the notion of causation ? If this notion of caus- ation is found ultimately to be of only meta- phorical application, has the objection to Win- delband's definition of freedom been removed by the location of a metaphorical causation in responsibility ? As to his objection that a man's character would have to be doubled in order to make it possible for him to change his character, I would reply that there is no more a problem here than there is in the facts that a conscious being pre- serves the memory of former experiences, or that one can make a judgment of approval or disapproval. The problem is contained in the question as to whether he can ever decide in favor of the less prominent factor. Windelband, as we have seen, has finally located responsibility in the judgment, and he THE THEORY OF NORMS 171 believes that it is a great pedagogical means of getting oneself and others into the way of obedi- ence to norms. These laws, by their " inherent importance," are destined ultimately to prevail, and responsibility is one factor in the process by which they reach supremacy in the lives of indi- viduals. If it were not for Windelband's appli- cation of the term " responsibility " to persons rather than to functions, I should be inclined to suppose that responsibility, like norms, was taken to be one more factor in the evolutionary process. He may, indeed, regard it in this light. Judgments, then, would be determined, and we should have here simply a case of a very prag- matic function of the intellect in cooperation with the rest of the order of nature. But the memory of Windelband's use of the expressions " autonomy " and " places itself," together with his apparent belief that responsibility is not entirely a delusive thing, leads me to wonder whether he does not, in effect, locate freedom in the judgment. Does he not assume (though it is out of harmony with his arguments) that we can approve or disapprove according to our will, and that we can put ourselves under the rule of one or another set of factors? That we 172 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION can teach others by our exercise of judgment of their actions? That we can do this in some real sense and not merely in conformity with a causal process? Unless something of this sort is felt by Windelband, I cannot see how the ethical sig- nificance of his doctrine is other than " laissez faire." If we have no real ability to bring the norms to bear on our lives and the lives of others, but just take part in the whole process of evolu- tion, with responsibility as a natural phenom- enon at work with the other factors, responsi- bility can be no more than a very involuntary pedagogical instrument, and the less mankind knows about Windelband's theory the better — that is, if it is not true! Windelband's general position is character- ized by passivity on the part of the individual to the forces which shape the course of develop- ment of body and mind. To be sure, he defends moral decision, and describes man as struggling upward, but the more powerful the attraction from the norms and the more merciless the evo- lutionary factors, the more evident it becomes that, so far as man is concerned, his battle is THE THEORY OF NORMS 173 only a sham battle after all. Now that we have shown that obligation and responsibility cannot serve the pedagogical purpose which Windel- band ascribes to them, they become a mockery to life. We look over the universe, and, indeed, we see duty and responsibility as factors in the world-process, but the teleological goal toward which we are moving seems to contain all the life-activity within itself. The whole world seems as if it were being pulled toward that high goal. The struggle is between more and less powerful factors in the process. We feel that in Windelband's view human beings are the tools of factors. Without the support of any philosophy, one feels the need of a view of the universe by which he may take some part in the struggle, and help toward the attainment of the goal. The pop- ular idea of moral responsibility has some such background as this. We feel that the individual ought to have the means of doing some of the eliminating. We feel that a deterministic world is but one side of the truth. Although nothing in the previous discussion offer a basis for belief in such a different kind of universe, we may at least feel encouraged 174 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION that it is not without the bounds of possibility, if Windelband's theory has been proved incon- sistent and untenable. CONCLUSION THE course of our discussion has led from the definition of two classes of values, immediate and contributory, and the discovery of their psychological basis in feeling and cognition, to a description of their natural history. First their origin in the earli- est stages of consciousness was described. The two types of valuing were held to signify two divergent directions of development of con- scious activity. It was emphasized, however, that neither of these ever occurs in isolation from the other, but that, rather, one was more prominent at a given time than the other. Next the relation of the judgment to values was discussed. In the act itself, it was found that all judgments are contributory. The value of the content of the judgment, however, de- pends upon the future usefulness of the content. All true judgments were found to be contribu- tory as to content, and also certain false judg- ments. The comparatively small group of judg- ments of value was treated briefly. It was noted that immediate values first find expression in 175 176 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION the judgment, and that the expression of con- tributory values grows out of judgments of immediate values. At a subsequent stage of development, however, contributory values be- come free from previous cognition of the means as immediate values. Chapter V carried on the natural history of values by discussing their interrelation. This topic concerned the relation of the individual to his environment through the expansion of his interests. The biological point of view was adhered to, and it was discovered that con- scious activity is related to environment directly through feeling and cognition. Thereupon it was shown how everything with which con- scious activity comes into contact is valuable both from the immediate and from the con- tributory points of view. Some practical con- sequences of this fact were deduced. Early in our discussion (Chapter II), we dis- posed of a theory which claimed to prove the existence of ontologically objective norms of truth. Part II examined in detail Windelband's theory of norms. The writer believes that he has proved that Windelband's position, in spite of its containing broad and suggestive state- CONCLUSION 177 ments, is self -contradictory, confused in outline, and untenable. It is desirable, in conclusion, to indicate our attitude toward those moral and aesthetic values which are so commonly recog- nized by human beings. We must bear in mind that we seek an in- terpretation that is psychological and biological. All values and standards of value, it is true, in- asmuch as they are entities of one kind or another, must have their place in a metaphysical account of the universe. But throughout this book it has been our care to disentangle the psychological and the biological from the meta- physical, and to deal with only the former. In a complete account of values, the metaphysical side must not be neglected, but we have not at- tempted to givQ a complete account. Our attack on Windelband's position is not so much an attack on the theory that there are ontologically objective norms of thinking, willing, and feel- ing, as an attack on the attempt to demonstrate the existence of such norms from psychological data. We have referred to J. S. Mill's description of conscience 1 . This description is an excellent 1 Page 148. 178 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION psychological account of the growth of stan- dards of moral value. It runs as follows : The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on vio- lation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Con- science; though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations, derived from sym- pathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encoun- tered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it. In terms of our theory of values it is evident that any individual act demanded by conscience in view of a standard of morality is related to CONCLUSION 179 consciousness in two ways. First there is the feeling-aspect. Mill well describes how the feel- ing commonly called "conscience" arises as the consequence of certain inhibitions and asso- ciated ideas. While the peculiar character of the feeling of conscience is thus dependent upon the matter to which the feeling is attached, it is no less true that, as one aspect of the relation of the individual to the act, the feeling of con- science, like other feelings, is a relation of im- mediate value. Obedience to the dictate of con- science brings with it a feeling of pleasure; dis- obedience results in a feeling of the unpleasant. The associated matter has not changed feeling to something new and original; it has merely heightened and intensified it. In the second place, any act the fulfilment of which is demanded by conscience, is related to consciousness also on the cognitive side. Here must be taken into account moral judgment. Any act that is the outcome of a decision in view of some moral standard and is not merely a habitual response prompted by some former de- cision, involves moral choice and deliberation. Here there is a rivalry among possible courses of action, and some principle of action emerges. 180 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Such principles are always judgments of values. What A. J. Balfour 2 calls "subordinate ethical propositions" are judgments of contributory values 3 . "I ought to make a true statement in this particular instance" may be subordinate to the "fundamental" ethical proposition "I ought to speak the truth." The fundamental propo- sition, however, is a judgment of immediate value. The word "ought" simply indicates that the feeling of liking is associated with a group of psychological factors in such a way that we name it a feeling of obligation. Two correlated topics require brief mention. First, the psychological processes involved in the formation of standards do not necessitate our consideration. They are identical with the de- velopment of concepts as described in any elementary psychology. Secondly, the point of view that we have adopted in no wise conflicts with the logical account of ethical propositions 2 A. J. Balfour, A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, 342. 3 If it be objected that the "subordinate" ethical propo- sition contains the word "ought" as well as the "funda- mental" proposition, and that therefore it too is a judgment of immediate value, let it be remembered that we defined an immediate value as a given good, "intrinsic, self-sufficient" (page 8). According to Mr. Balfour's definition of a "sub- ordinate" ethical proposition, the ought of such a proposition is not self-sufficient, but ever dependent upon the intrinsic ought of its "fundamental" proposition. CONCLUSION 181 given so acutely by Balfour. In reference to the fundamental ethical proposition, we do not have to explain why we have such immediate values, any more than we have to explain why there are such entities as value relations at all. It is interesting, however, to observe that logically, if certain statements of obligation are a priori, so also is there a contributory factor present in every a priori statement of obligation. "I ought to speak the truth" means — if it have any meaning at all for any individual — "I ought to say words that are contributory to truth- telling." There are two principal methods of investi- gation of aesthetic facts which are pursued by philosophers of aesthetics. One method is satis- fied with a wholly empirical, psychological treat- ment of the facts of appreciation of the beautiful as exhibited in individuals and races. A phil- osopher who finds his whole interest in this standpoint will be concerned with questions re- lating to the origin and development of such appreciations. I have already suggested 4 that natural selection may be a potent factor in the 4 Pages 153-154- 182 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION determination of what is recognized as beauti- ful. Among cultured persons, however, the great mass of aesthetic appreciations has lost its survival-reference. Just how far this is true would be a matter for empirical investigation. An empirical inquiry will also be concerned with an investigation of such principles as may be found to underlie the "secondary" systems of later development. Throughout the whole course of an empirical treatment, it should be borne in mind that, psychologically speaking, the aesthetic experience is one of feeling, not of cognition. But an empirical account will pass beyond a mere assignment of experiences to a particular aspect of consciousness, to a con- sideration of the cognitive elements to which the feeling-experiences are attached. Only on this basis are we justified in introducing such sub- jects as relation to natural selection, develop- ment of aesthetic standards, etc. If an em- pirical account is to be given, however, let it be wholly empirical, and let care be taken not to allow metaphysical assumptions to creep into the discussion. On the other hand, quite a different treatment is possible. The aesthetic philosopher may con- CONCLUSION 183 sider the metaphysical significance of the em- pirical facts of aesthetic appreciation. The psychological investigator need not be hostile to his metaphysical coworker; he would better be his friend. But it should be understood that the two methods are quite separate and distinct. What, then are the principles according to which the aesthetic metaphysician shall proceed ? They are the same as those employed by other metaphysical philosophers. In our day there has been much protest against the cut and dried systems of the older philosophers, and a cor- responding satisfaction in everything that pre- tends to empiricism. I believe, however, that the only justification of this point of view lies in the facts that classical metaphysics had at its dis- posal fewer scientific facts than are now avail- able, and that it often was willing to neglect such facts as were then known. With a sober view of the known facts, however, it is still a legitimate human impulse to want to transcend the facts in some measure and to ground the contingent in what is permanent. The philosophic impulse of Rickert and Windelband must be recognized as valid and admirable; fault is to be found only with their method — their attempt to deduce metaphysical truths from psychological data. 13 i8 4 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION The problem of a satisfactory and valid method in metaphysical research would seem to resolve itself into the question of how to utilize empirical data without utilizing them wrongly. We may make the following suggestions: Let the metaphysican frankly base his system upon a dogmatism. Let him announce his faith in the "real" existence of what he cannot prove to exist in the way in which he assumes its exis- tence. Let him work out to the full all the im- plications that arise from his assumptions. But he should not be content to rest his faith in arbi- trary assumptions, even though he must neces- sarily be arbitrary in the act of assuming. He should look over the body of facts that are known in his particular field. Then let him make bold guesses as to some trans-empirical reference of certain of the facts of observation. It may be objected that any dogmatic method is a waste of time because it can never reach ascertainable facts. Against the objection it may be urged that, empirically speaking, it is a human impulse to want to transcend the facts, and that, indeed, the roots of all scientific re- search are embedded in metaphysical assump- tions. It is entirely possible, also, that, in the CONCLUSION 185 future, some metaphysical system may be ac- cepted generally as being more comprehensive than any other, in view of all the facts known in every field of human experience. The build- ing of many systems, therefore, would be con- tributory to the formulation of such an inclusive system. While inclusiveness would not be a guarantee of truth, such a system, nevertheless, might claim the same degree of certainty as that attained in the formulation of laws of nature. There is, therefore, a wide field of investi- gation in ethic and aesthetic for the meta- physician to explore. If he be frank and sincere as to the element of dogmatism in his system, there is no reason why he might not attempt to correlate a realm of norms of beauty with a realm of ethical values. Let him, however, not attempt to extend expirical data from psy- chology and biology into a trans-empirical realm of being, without recognizing the necessity of dogmatism. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED * Balfour, Arthur James. A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, being an essay on the Foundations of Belief. By Arthur James Balfour, M.A., M.P. London. Mac- millan and Co. 1879. . . . Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. By Henri Bergson. . . . Authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell, Ph.D. New York. Henry Holt and Company. 1911. Dewey, John. Essays in Experimental Logic. By John Dewey. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Illinois. [1916.] James,, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. By William James. Longmans, Green, and Co New York. . . . 191 2. 'A good general bibliography of the subject of values is to be found in The Philosophical Status of Values, by J. E. Dashiell, 1913, New York (Columbia dissertation). Cf. the citations in Valuation, Its Nature and Laws, by W. M. Urban, 1909, London and New York. 187 188 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Locke, John. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. By John Locke. Collated and annotated, with Prolegomena, biographical, critical, and his- torical, by Alexander Campbell Fraser. . . . In two volumes. . . . Oxford at the Claren- don Press. M. DCCC. XCIV. Kallen, Horace M. Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and Religion. By Horace M. Kallen. Being pages 409-467 in: Creative Intelligence. Essays in the Prag- matic Attitude. By John Dewey, Addison W. Moore, Harold Chapman Brown, George H. Mead, Boyd H. Bode, Henry Waldgrave Stuart, James Hayden Tufts, Horace M. Kallen. New York. Henry Holt and Company. [191 7.] Marvin, Walter T. The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epis- temology. By Walter T. Marvin. Being pages 48-95 in: The New Realism. Cooperative Studies in Philosophy. By Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperrell Montague, Ralph BIBLIOGRAPHY 189 Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward Gleason Spaulding. New York. The Mac- millan Company. 19 12. . . . Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. By John Stuart Mill. Four- teenth impression. Longmans, Green and Co. . . . London, New York and Bombay. 1901. MUNSTERBERG, HUGO. The Eternal Values by Hugo Miinsterberg. Boston and New York. Houghton Mifflin Com- pany. The Riverside Press. Cambridge. 1909. RlCKERT, HEINRICH. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einfuhrung in die Transzendentalphilosophie. Von Hein- rich Rickert, Professor an der Universitat Freiburg i. B. Zweite, verbesserte und er- weiterte Auflage. Tubingen und Leipzig. . . 1904. Russell, Bertrand. Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. By Bertrand Russell, M.A., F.R.S. . . . The igo VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago. London. . . . 1914. Titchener, Edward Bradford. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention. By Edward Bradford Titchener. New York. The Macmillan Com- pany. 1908. . . . WlNDELBAND, WlLHELM. Praludien. Aufsatze und Reden zur Phil- osophic und ihrer Geschichte. Von Wilhelm Windelband. Funfte, erweiterte Auflage. [Two volumes.] . . . Tubingen. . „ . 1915. INDEX Accountability, 126-127 ; see Responsibility. Act, judgment in the, 54, *57~ 59, *66-67. Actualization of norms, 141. Additive character of judg- ments, 73. Agent; see Standpoint of indi- vidual. Aesthetic values: subjective or objective? 16, 122; their presence to individual con- sciousness, 143-145; argu- ment for their objectivity, 152-155 ; empirical and meta- physical treatment of, 181- 183. Affection, Wundt's dimensions of, 95- Allegory, use of, 71. Anthropocentric attitude re- jected, 37-38. Appreciation in relation to valuation, 22. Aristotle, 149. Aspects of conscious activity never isolated, *I2, 41, 50, *o6-o8, 104. Association, 151. Attention and feeling, 94-96. "Autonomy," 160, 171. Awareness of norms, 159. Balfour, Arthur James, 132- 133, 180. Beauty: subjective or objec- tive? 16; see Feeling, Aesthetic. Beethoven, 145. Bergson, 51; (implied refer- ence to,) 101. Biological concomitants of values, *37, 88, 90. Causal sequence of natural phenomena, 134, 157. Causation and responsibility, 162-172. Cause : distinguished from means and from con- tributory values, 34; of judgment in the act, *57, 66. Character, Windelband's anal- ysis of, 163-172. Choice, said to be determined by the functioning of norms, 147-150; see Freedom. Civilization, growth of, in reference to norms, 147-149. Classification: of values, 7-8; of disputed values, 15-16. Clearness : a criterion of at- tention, 95 ; a neo-Kantian criterion of truth, 138. Cognition : as psychological basis of contributory values, 9; an aspect of conscious activity, 96-98; and growth of the environment, 99; and 191 192 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION aesthetics, 144-145; and con- science, 179-180. Cognitive elements : may be different in memory from the original perception, 50; in relation to feeling, 91-92. Colors, 154. Concepts and standards of value, 180. Conscience, 124, 126-127, 148- 150, 177-180. Consciousness : earliest stage of, (r) in reference to value, 36, 106, (2) in refer- ence to the conditions which cause us to ascribe value to it, 37, 45 ff., (3) in reference to its aspects, 97-98; and environment, 88-89, 93-112; one in its functioning, *97- 98, 108-109, 139, 166; mature stage of, in; of individuals with reference to norms, 132-133, 140-155. Contact with environment : in reference to interest, 64; in reference to determination of the environment, 86-87, 92-93; two aspects of, 94- -112; new, 106-111. Contemplation, 97. Content: of judgments, 55, 59- 73; of false judgments, 67- 69. Contributory: acts of judg- ment are, 59; content of judgment may be, 59 ff., con- tributory judgments ex- pressed in language, 80-83; contributory relation of the individual to environment, 104-112; contributory values are objective, 119-121; con- tributory element in the fundamental ethical propo- sition, 181. Creative Intelligence, 90. Criteria of truth and value, 63. Definitions, 62-63. Degrees of contributory value, 65, 69-73. Desire: object of, 78-83; end of, 80-83. Determinism, 42 ; its relation to freedom, 155-172. Dewey, John, 26. Directions of the develop- ment of conscious activity, 50. Dissociation of personality, hi. Dogmatism, 184-185. Duty, 178. Education, 149. Ego-centric, 65. Emphasis : different in the several aspects of conscious activity, 12. Empirical account of aesthetic values, 181-182. "Empirical" consciousness, 158. End: of judgments as values, 64, 68, 69; of desire ex- pressed in judgment, 80-83; of contributory values, 7-14, 120; of thought, 139. Environment : simplest form of, containing value-relation. INDEX 193 45; growth of, 47; special, of individual and race, 72-73 ; definition of, 85-93; relation of, to conscious activity, 98; and values, 104-112. Epiphenomenalism, 95-98. Epistemology : in reference to metaphysics, *24, 123, *I28- 133; in reference to the psycho-physical problem, 88; and truth, 1 31-132, 150-152, idealistic, 142; and ob- jectivity, 146; and obedience to law, 164-165. Error, explained with diffi- culty in Kantian terms, *I3I- 132, 138, 151. Esquimaux, 109-110. Ethical propositions, 180. Evolution: end of valuation in, 64-65; and norms, 134- .137. "Experience", gaining of, in. Expression of values : see Language. "Faculty-psychology" depre- cated, 96-97; see Aspects. False judgments may be con- tributory, 60, 66-69. Feeling: as basis of immediate values, 10; in reference to sensations and ideas, *45- 51, 91-92; expressed in lan- guage, 79-80; and attention, 94-95; its part in conscious experience, 95-104; see Aesthetic, Conscience. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 124. Freedom, 126, * 155- 172. Freedom, value in relation to, 1 19-125. Future action and judgments, 59-73- Goal of the universe, 173. Hume, David, 162. Idealism, 69. Immediate values : self-suffi- cient, 10; independent of cognition, 35 ; arise out of contributory values, 48; ex- pressed in judgment, 78-80; and relation of the indi- vidual to his environment, 105-112; subjective or ob- jective? 121-125. Impulse : often associated with feeling in immediate values, n-12; egoistic and altruistic, 65. Independence : of contributory values, 13 ; of norms from particular consciousnesses, 132-133, *i4o-i55. Inference : in reference to en- vironment, 92-93 ; truth alleged to be independent of, 123. Instinct, 150. Interactionism, 89. Interest : incidental to truth of judgments, 30, 64; necessary to all valuation, 35 ; in refer- ence to the origin of values, *38 ff., 92 ; in reference to i94 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION judgment, 59, *67, 77, 79: in reference to moral choice, 150. Interrelation of values, (1) with respect to origin, 31- 53, (2) with respect to knowledge, 54-84, (3) with respect to co-existence, 85- II5- Introspection, 95-98, 109. Intuition, 101. James, William, 26, 105, 109, 122, 151, 152. Judgment: acts of, 57-59 5 con- tent of, 59-73; and memory, 60; when present, 66-67; and moral choice, 149-150; and truth, 152; and respon- sibility, 169-172; moral, 179- 180. Judgments : are all of con- tributory value, *i6-i7, 121 ; existential, 23, 26, 65; not essential to valuation, 10, 32-33; in reference to standpoint, 54; as the climax of development of the cognitive function, 55; as values, 56-76; true, *6i- 66, 131-132; false, *66-69, 131-132; of values, 70, *76- 83; origin of, 77-83; in form of general propositions, 82- 83. Kallen, Horace M., 105. Kant, Immanuel, 123-124, 128- 133- Knowledge: not essential to the presence of values, 10, 32-33', the interrelation of values with respect to, 54- 84; logical, the best instru- ment for dealing with reality, 99; not determined by feeling, 100-101. Language, expression of values in, 54-55, *76-83. Laws of nature in reference to norms, 129-133. Locke, John, 122, 151. Logical values so-called : see Judgment, Knowledge, Norms, Truth. Marvin, Walter T., 24, 128-129. Materialism, 88-89. Matter of moral decisions, 137-140. Metaphysical account of values, 177, * 182- 185. Method of metaphysical re- search, 183-185. Mill, John Stuart, 148, 177- 178. Mind and body, 88-89, 172. Moral values : subjective or objective? 16, 122; and natural selection, 137; paral- leled by Windelband with other norms, 137-140; and moral decisions, 142-143, 148-150. Miinsterberg, Hugo, 124. Music, 144-145. INDEX 195 Natural selection, 124, *I34- 137, *i47-i55> 158. Necessity: of judgment, 22, 27 ; Windelband's analysis of, 162-164. Norms: Rickert's views of, *20-30, 123 ; Windelband's theory of, 126-174; defined, 126-127; relation to Kant, 128-133; and evolution, 134- 137; three kinds of, 137-140; independence of, from par- ticular consciousnesses, 132- I33> *I40-I55; degrees of presence of, 132, 140-141 ; in reference to freedom and responsibility, 155-172. Objective : in reference to in- dependence, 14; meaning of, 119-123; attractiveness of the theory of objective im- mediate values, 124; see Norms, Realms. Obligation, feeling of, 180. Observer: see Standpoint. Opposition: removal of, in Fuhlen, Denken, and Wol- len, 29; overcoming of, by a primitive organism, 40. Origin: of values, 31-53; is from the observer's stand- point, 35; of judgments, 77- 83; of immediate values, 78- 80; of contributory values, 80-83. "Ought," meaning of, 180. Parallelism of realms of norms: see Realms. Perception: and judgment, 22, 28; and environment, 92- 93; and truth, 123, 152. Permanence of content of judgments as values, 60. Plants, 106-107. Pleasantness-unpleasantness, 95-104; the "dimension" of feeling, 95 ; always present in conscious activity, 96-98; practical consequences of our theory, 99-104; in refer- ence to conscience, 178-179. Practicality and judgments, 71-73. Pragmatism, 88-92. Pre-disposition, philosophical, 88-89. Pre-established harmony, 133, 146, 150, 152, 155. Protoplasm, 40, 87, no. Psychology: basis of values in, 10-12; concerned with Sein, 24; and environment, 88-89; an d conscience, 148. Psycho-physical parallelism, 89, 95-98. Purpose : expressions of, 81 ; in nature, 135-136. Qualitative and quantitative importance of norms, 135- 137, 156-157. Realism : in Windelband's theory, *I29-I33, 140-141, 151 ; "naive," 133. Reality: quantitative aspect of, 91 ; my contact with, *ioo- 104, IT2. 196 VALUES AND THEIR INTERRELATION Realms of norms, 145-155. Recognition, alleged to be a factor in immediate valu- ation, 20-21. Reflection, feelings accom- panying, 49. Relation of false terms, 68-69. Relations, real, 61-64. Religion, 102-104. Responsibility, 124, 126-127, *I55-I72. Rickert, Heinrich, *2i-30, 100, 123, 125, 163, 183. Russell, Bertrand, 26. Secondary qualities, 122-123. Selection and norms, 130-131. Sensation: "simple," 46, 109; a pragmatic use of, 91 ; in reference to environment, 92-93; as not exhaustive of the possibilities of relation with the environment, 100; definition of, no. Situation, earliest value-, 38-42. Sollen and Sein, 23 ff. Spectator: see Standpoint. Spiritualism, 89. Standards of value, 177-178; see Norms. Standpoint: of individual (1) defined, 34, (2) in expression of values, 76; of observer defined, 34; of individual and observer compared as methods, 44; in reference to judgment, 54 ff.; merging of, in judgment, 55, 60, 70; confusion of, by some writers, 76; development of the individual's, 104-112. Stimuli : calling forth judg- ment, 57; in reference to a definition of environment, 87, 92-95, 1 06- 1 12. Subjective: in reference to de- pendence, 14; meaning of the term, 1 19-122. Survival-value, 136; see Nat- ural. Terms: and relations, 27-28; of judgment, 60-73. Theoretical judgments, 72>- Titchener, Edward Bradford, 94. Truth: is it a value? 15, 123; as immediate, 25 ; involves inference, 26; of judgments in reference to value, 60-66; Kantian difficulty in refer- ence to, 131-132; and norms, 150-152. Uncognized values, 34-35. Unity of conscious activity: see Aspects. Usefulness of judgments: see Contributory. Value: relational character of, 9-10, 119; and truth, 63-66; alteration of, 112; function and, 1 19-120. INDEX 197 Values : two classes of, 3-4, 7- 8; from standpoint of ob- server are contributory, 43; present in earliest stage of consciousness, 48; acts of judgment as, 57-59; content of judgments as, 59-73; co- existence of, 85-112; and environment, 104-112; new, iio-iii; see Aesthetic, Con- tributory, Feeling, Inter- relation, Judgment, Know- ledge, Logical, Moral, Norms, Origin. Verification : of contributory values, 13, 20; of judgments, 55, 61-62; implies the possi- bility of false judgments, 69. Windelband, Wilhelm, 126-174, 183. Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 PreservationTechnologies