E669 '^ ,0^ o' '^^0^ :^ O ' , . s t'V /% /----% .^^w^S /.---^ .^y <. 'o.T* ,G^ "Ko *^T*' 'V <. 'o.»* G^ 'o *;7^s* A V • * * "' c DIPLOMATIC FIASCO. THE EEJECTED TREATY FOR ST. THOMAS. EDWARD L. PIERCE. BOSTON 1889. A^ i?. A DIPLOMATIC FIASCO. Some time ago Scribuer's Magazine contained a paper entitled " K Diplomatic Eijisode/' by Miss Olive Risley Seward, which undertakes to narrate the negotiations with Denmark for the purchase of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John in 1866- 1869 by Mr. Seward (then Secretary of State), and the con- nection of the Senate Committee on Foreign Aifairs (Mr. Sumner being chairman) with its consideration and failure of ratification. AYitli many words, the introduction of superliuous incidents and assertions of facts not verified by reference to sources, she gives an air of mystery to what was a jjlain transaction and a very simple question. A map is inserted, as if to produce an optical illusion, on which a number of straight lines converge to St. Thomas as a common centre of islands, continents and commercial marts, just as all roads once led to Rome. Among the statesmen of the time no one except Mr. Seward thought the island worth having at any price, or being taken as a gift for any purpose of peace or war. In a foreign Avar it would have been useless for offense and diflfi- cult of defense ; and while, during the civil war, when the Con- federates held most of our Southern Atlantic coast, one of the An- tilles would have served a purjjose as a coaling and supply station, it is no part of national duty to make military prejiaration for civil war, certainly not a part of ours with the nation consolidated by the abolition of slavery. Impartial authorities describe St. Thomas as exposed to hurri- canes passing once in twenty years over it and doing great dam- age ; with very frequent earthquakes coming with serious shocks at intervals ; with often recurring droughts ; with no running stream and only one small spring, the only resource for fresh water being the storing of rain ; its only present productions "a few vegetables, a little fruit and some guinea grass," insufficient for one-tAA'entieth of its inhabitants; its population "one-tenth white, two-thirds black and the remainder mixed ; " its utility for commercial purposes dwindling from year to year, and its im- ports falling off one-half from 1870 to 1880 ; abandoned as a ren- dezvous by the British Mail Company in 1885, with other impor- tant lines following its example. From the end of our civil war, during which its trade had a temporary stimulus, its descent in importance has been constant. ["American Cyclopaedia," "En- cyclopaedia Britannica," article "St. Thomas."] This is the prize which Mi-. Seward won for us, but which was lost by the mysterious indifference and perversity of all the statesmen of his time ! Of St. John little need be said here, as scarcely anything was said of it during the discussion. In extent it is somewhat larger than St. Thomas, but so unattractive and repelling that it was "an almost abandoned island" (C. H. Bithome to Mr. Sew- ard, May 13, 18G7). Providence, as if to save us from a Avild venture, gave in the midst of the negotiations a triple warning by an earthquake, a tidal wave, and a hurricane, in quick succession. Ours, too, is a country of the temperate zone, and the aspira- tions of its people are continental. There has been among us a healthy resistance to going further southward than we have now reached, or seeking islands either in the Atlantic or the Pacific ; an instinctive reluctance, as shown in the later case of St. Do- mingo, to enter on a career of tropical extension, with dangers and embarrassments to free institutions which could not be measured in advance. It is not difficult, since the recent astouuding revelations of Mr. Lincoln's biographers, to comprehend the wildness with which Mr. Seward entered on this extra-territorial scheme. It now appears that he was hardly warm in his seat as Secretary, Avhen, with a civil conflict of tremendous import at hand, he proposed to the President to rush madly into a war with France and Spain, and nominated himself for dictator ! The patriot of to-day cannot value too highly the wise instinct of the American people which at Chicago in 1860 preferred Lincoln to Seward. It is now apparent why the good President, though he kept his own counsel, leaned after- wards rather on Mr. Sumner than on his Secretary when foreign questions were pending. The admii-ers of Mr. Seward have a new task of apology and defense quite enough to exhaust their in- genuity. The underlying thought of "^ A Diplomatic Episode" is that the Senate of the United States in withholding assent to Mr. Sew- . ard's negotiation put our country in the position of acting in bad faith to Denmark. This contention has no basis in fact, or po- litical ethics. The Constitution of the United States, of which all the world in doing business with us must take notice, confers on the President " power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." It confides this great power, an incident of sovereignty, to the President and Senate, each acting with an inde- pendent responsibility and discretion, neither having the right to abdicate in favor of the other. This discretion of the Senate has been freely exercised in dealing with strong as well as with weak nations ; for instance, in the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty on the one hand, and of the St. Domingo treaty on the other. All publicists are agreed, among our own the authors of the Federalist, as well as Story and Wheaton, that treaties bind neither party in law or in honor, until finally ratified by all the bodies in which the authority is placed by the constitution of the State. Whence comes this gloss on the Constitution that the treaty- consummating power is now wholly lodged in the Executive, and that the Senate has lost its constitutional right of withholding its advice and consent ? If this notion were to prevail some future Secretary, head of a bureau not established by the Constitution, swaying some future Andrew Johnson, might carry our dominion into Mexico, to the Isthmus, to the Amazon, even to Cape Horn, to say nothing ot countless islands ; and the Senate, representing sixty millions of people, would have to stand aloof in amazement, shorn of all power to arrest the madness I Aside from its merits, the fate of the St. Thomas treaty was of great advantage, in that it established against a monstrous assumption of one-man power the prerogative of the Senate to act on all treaties with absolute freedom of judgment, unhampered by executive initiation and pledges. The purchase of Alaska from Eussia is not analogous to the attempt to acquire St. Thomas. In the one case the territory was continental, in the other extra-continental and insular ; in the one case lying to the north, in the other tropical ; the one bringing wealth in fisheries and furs and fair climatic conditions, while the other was without resources actual or undeveloped, and even sub- ject to derangements of nature unparalleled within the same limited space ; the one checkmating the colonial empire of Great Britain in tlie northwest, and opening the way to the dominion of the continent which has been the thought of far-seeing statesmen like Sumner and Cobden, while the other was to bring to us two worthless islands of the size of a county, two of the thousand in the Caribbean Sea, with a waste of money in peace and complica- tions in war. Alaska exceeded half a million square miles and the price was .$7,300,000, while the bargain with Denmark called for 17,500,000 for a meagre area of only seventy-five square miles. It is true that Mr. Sumner added to his main argument for Alaska, made April 9, 1867, the consideration that 'Uhe dishonor- ing of the treaty," as he called it, at that stage would involve a serious responsibility. But he was very careful to confine this ohiter dictum to tho case in hand ; and Miss Sewarcl, very deftly, as well as abruptly, cuts short her quotation from his speech when Ghe reaches his emphatic exclusion of all other treaties from any implied sanction. He went on to say that " had the Senate been consulted in advance before the treaty was signed or either pow- er publicly committed, as is of lea done on important occasions* it (the Senate) would be under less constraint," a clear intima- tion that this should be the practice in such cases. And then, to make his caveat emphatic, he said, " Let me add that, while for- bearing objection now, I hope that this treaty may not be drawn into a precedent, at least in the independent manner of its negotia- tion. I would save to the Senate an important power justly be- longing to it ;" and, he added, " this treaty must not be a prece- dent for a system of indiscriminate and costly annexion." He also expressed his anxiety that our expansion should come from natural processes, without war and even without purchase, the latter to be justified only under jDeculiar circumstances. Mr. Sumner in this caveat gave Mr. Seward and the Danish negotiator timely warning as to the determination of the Senate to hold fast to its constitutional prerogative, which they had no excuse not to * Mr. Seward submitted in 1863, in advance, the draught of a convention with Mexico for the assumption in part of her debt, and, the Senate advisin- against it, the negotiation went no further. " 5 keep in mind the following October when they made their defi- nite arrangement. No one knew this constitutional limitation better than General Raasloff, the jsrincipal negotiator on the Danish side. He had lived among us almost as a citizen when engaged in engineering enterprises ; and he had already represented his country in the United States as Consul General and Minister. He wrote our language without foreign idiom and spoke it almost without foreign accent. He knew our polity as well as we know it ourselves. Indeed, unlike the case of Russia, where the Czar holds the power absolutely and exclusively without hindrance from any one, the Constitution of Denmark contained a limitation analogous to that of our own, making the treaty-consummating power dependent on the decision of the Rigsdag. The treaty was itself explici-, reserving, as conditions, ratification by our Senate and by the Danish Rigsdag, and also by the islanders themselves. Rejection by any one of the three would have involved no breach of faith. It was natural that the Danish negotiator, whose personal pride as well as whose party interests were at stake, should make the point of good faith ; but he labored hard in insisting upon it when pressed before the Committee on Foreign Affairs by Mr. Fesseuden's question, ** Would, in your opinion, the United States have a right to complain if your Rigsdag had refused their consent to the ratification of the St. Thomas treaty ? " His an- swer was that in that event the Rigsdag would have been dis- solved, and a new election ordered ; and then, if the new Rigs- dag followed the action of its predecessor, the Cabinet itself would have resigned. And this was all the satisfaction he could suggest as possible ; clearly none for a nation disappointed in a bargain, and insisting on a point of good faith. He thought, too, that we should still have had the right to complain that his government had trifled with us " in having neglected to secure beforehand the ratification of the treaty," — an intimation that Mr. Seward should have made himself surer of his footing, and have consulted the Senate in advance, as pointed out to be the proper course by Mr. Sumner in his speech on the Alaska pur- chase. Whatever color of Justice there may have been in Denmark's point of good faith came from Mr. Seward's unauthorized as- surances that the enterprise was sure of approval in the Senate ; and according to the A^ashington correspondence at the time, the Committee on Foreign Affairs at their hearing January 28, 1869, thought them to be "an egregious blunder" when General Eaasloff made them the basis of his appeal. Mr. Seward said to the Danish negotiator, June 28, 1866. that " the Executive could always count upon the assistance of Congress in matters of this kind provided the proceedings had been correct ;" and in other communications gave the Danish Government to understand that there need be no fear as to the ratification. Arguments in news- papers and iDamphlets at the time put the case for ratification chiefly on tlie ground that Mr. Seward had committed us to the treaty by his ill-considered and precipitate action. Eaasloff's intimate friends laid the blame of his misfortunes on Mr. Seward. Mr. G. V. Fox, writing to Mr. Sumner, January 31, 1869, concerning General Raasloff's appeal for his good offices to assist the treaty, suggested that the Foreign Affairs' Committee invite his ojjinion, and said, " This course seems to me the only one which enables me to satisfy my friend, General Eaasloff, that I have attempted to aid him in the most unpleasant position in which Mr. Seward's diplomacy has placed him. I can see that there is no iMssibility of success for him, and that the rejection is fatal to his future in his own country." Eaasloff himself, writing to Mr. Sumner January 12, 1869, and referring to the effect of the rejection on his own career, speaks of himself as " having been more than anybody else (Mr. Seward, of course, excepted) instrumental in bringing such a calamity and humiliation upon my country." The parenthesis, which is his own, is significant. The writer of the " Episode " insinuates that prejudice against Seward as well as Johnson accounts for the want of welcome which awaited the St. Thomas treaty in the Senate. It is un- necessary to resort to this theory, for the objections against the treaty would have been equally fatal if it had been negotiated by a Secretary and a President who were retaining the confidence of the country. It is true that Mr. Seward had been ''swinging around the circle" with Mr. Johnson. He is understood also to have been the originator of that fatal policy of the President which revived the rebel spirit, disorganized the whole Southern country, led to barbarous legislation against the colored race, eventuated in riots, massacres and Ku-Klux raids, and postponed for a decade the pacification of the restored States ; consequences which in charity we must believe he was not wise enough to fore- see. He avowed himself openly its supporter, and historical writers declare him to have been its author. The general dis- favor into which he fell may have had something to do with pro- ducing the popular distrust of the Johnson-Clarendon negotia- tion; but it does not appear to have affected the convention with Denmark. One thing is certain, that Mr. Sumner at no time pre- judged Mr. Seward's diplomatic enterprises; but uniformly came to their consideration with an open mind. They had parted politically, but the spell of an old friendship and common mem- ories was still on Mr. Sumner, probabh' also on Mr. Seward. Together they had fought the good fight of " the irrepressible conflict." They had long enjoyed intimate fellowship in the Sen- ate, never broken by antagonism or weakened by rivalry. They had sat often at each other's table, and these household recogni- tions continued to the end of Mr. Seward's service in Washington. Mr. Sumner had been at least once a guest at Auburn, where another than Mr. Seward regarded him with almost motherly af- fection, addressing him even by his Christian name. There had been full sympathy between them in personal trials and sufferings, and in bereavements, and also when each at different times was pros- trated by the assassin. Each had a fascination in manner and spirit which the other felt ; and who, with large sympathies with his kind, that has known either has not felt the same ? On a day in June, 1860, shortly after his loss of the nomination for Presi- dent. I dined at Mr. Seward's house in Washington, with Sum- ner and Adams as the only other guests ; and it was difficult to keep back the tears as our host with profound disappointment but in no unmanly way spoke of what had recently passed at Chi- cago. Between Mr. Seward and Mr. Sumner there were differences in the treatment of public questions, sometimes temporary chafing and soreness, particularly during Mr. Lincoln's administration, when the President gave heed on important questions of foreign policy to the Senator rather than to Mr. Seward, as with reference to the issuing of letters of marque and reprisal, so that the latter said impatiently, "there are too many Secretaries of State." But never was Mr. Sumner inhospitable to Mr. Seward's plans or wishes, even after the contest between Congress and President Johnson had begun. As soon as Mr. Seward had negotiated the treaty for Alaska, a few hours before it was signed, he sent for Mr. Sum- 8 ner, March 29, 1867, to come to his house the same evening to confer with him and the Russian minister concerning it. With what vigor Mr. Sumner sustained that treaty is a part of history. When shortly after its ratification I asked him how he came to take so much interest in it, and to prepare so laborious a speech in its defense, he stated several reasons of a public nature ; but first in order of time he gave Mr. Seward's earnest desire to carry it through. Mr. Sumner recognized always the duty of co-operating cor- dially with public officers with whom he might not at the time be in political sympathy. He continued during Johnson's adminis- tration to call often at the State Department when Mr. Seward was Secretary, and to keep himself informed as to its business and needs, and in debates, even during the heats of the impeachment controversy, contended so vigorously for Mr. Seward's recommen- dations as to clerical force and the contingent or secret service fund as to invite the suggestion from some associates that he was too much the partisan of that department. Any one curious in such matters may verify this statement by consulting the Congressional Globe's reports for January 30 and 31, February 4 and 7, and June 23 and 23, 1868. The "Episode" makes and reiterates against the Senate the charge of delay in acting on the St. Tliomas treaty, a charge which lies against the negotiators rather than the Senate. More than three years passed between January 1, 1865, when Mr. Seward opened up the subject of the purchase to General Eaasloff at Washington and the time when the treaty and necessary papers were rine for the consideration of the Senate. The intervening period was occupied with inaction on both sides, principally the Danish ; more or less skirmishing between the parties as to the government from which the first offer of amount should come ; prolonged silence and inattention of the cabinet at Copenhagen after Mr. Seward's first offer, which our minister at that court Avas unable to break [Mr. Yeaman's letters to Mr. Seward, January 21. March 13 April 27 and 30, and May 2, 1867]; finally, instead of an accept' ance of Mr. Seward's offers one counter proposition and then another ; the Danish minister at Washington going home and leaving no successor ; the insistence of Denmark after the pnce had been fixed on a vote of the islanders, which, in view of what they were, could be of no significance, and 9 which involved vexatious questions and postponements, so that the treaty was not signed till October 24, 180 7, and not sub- mitted to the Senate till December, and the vote of the island- ers was not communicated till January 17, 1868, Although in December, 1867, when the treaty was referred, Mr. Sum- ner promptly requested the papers from the State Depart- ment, they were not forthcoming for seven Aveeks, and Avhen they had been printed and were available for use, the time fixed by the treaty for ratification, February Ji4, 1868, had expired, and an extension of time became necessary. So sluggish were the Danes in the Avhole business that our Minister, Mr. Yea- man, could not control his inijjatience, and wrote of the national characteristic, ''In everything, from cobbler to king, they are the most deliberate and leisurely people in the world." In the pur- chase of Alaska, on the other hand, between the first broaching by the Russian Minister and the final signature there was less than a six months' interval. No one saw more clearly than Mr. Seward the peril to which the delay at Copenhagen exposed the treaty. Its only chance of approval in this country grew out of the peculiar exigencies of a civil war, when a long southern coast was held by the insurgents, and that period was receding. Military considerations were di- minishing in force, and ambition for territory was not the passion of the hour. Every day, too, the administration, of which Mr. Seward was the inspiring leader, was losing the confidence of the country. He telegraphed January 19, 1867, to Mr, Yeaman, " Tell Raasloff, haste important," In a letter to Mr, Yeaman, August 7, 1867, he urged on the Danish government " prompt- ness in the pending negotiation as essential to success;" and in let- ters September 23 and September 28, a month before the conven- tion was signed, he emphasized the hazard to whicli the procras- tination at Copenhagen had exposed the whole business, as in the meantime the people of the couutry had lost interest in the acquisition of a naval station in the West Indies and were turning their attention to other and cheaper projects. He wrote: "The desire for the acquisition of foreign territory has sensibly abated. The delays which have attended the negoti- ation, notwithstanding our urgency, have contributed to still further alleviate the national desire for enlargement of territory. In short, we have already come to value dollars more and do- 10 minion less." It was evident that Mr. Seward before the treaty was submitted to the Senate, and even before the convention was signed, had lost faith that it would be ratified, not because of any peculiar adverse influences in that body, but because the Amer- ican people had become unfriendly to such a purchase. It was a dead treaty when Mr. Seward handed it to the Senate, as he well knew at the time. This appears from his letters to Mr. Yeaman, as well as from his letter to Mr. Sumner, November 9, 1868, when replying to the hitter's inquiry as to another matter, he wrote : " It is true on the contrary that instructed by the de- bates of Congress and the tone of the jDublic press during the past year, I have declined all recent suggestions in regard to the acquisition of naval stations anywhere in the West Indies, espe- cially the mole of St. Nicholas."'* The author of the "Episode" suggests foreign influence at Washington operating against the treaty. This, of which she gives no proof, is the creation of her imagination. When, where, and on whom was it exercised ? Was Mr. Seward approached in that way, and does this account for his losing heart in the pro- ject ? Was Fessenden bought up by some German lobbyist ? Did British gold find its way into Cameron's pockets ? How were Morton, Patterson, Harlan, Casserly, and Sumner taken care of ? One, without recurring to Horace {Nee deus inter)