Glass. Book— COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT THE WORLD WAR FOR LIBERTY A Comprehensive and Authentic History of the War by Land, Sea and Air THREE BOOKS IN ONE VOLUME Book /. Military History of the War " 2. World Issues of the War " 3. America's Part in the War Editors FRANCIS ROLT-WHEELER, Ph. D. FREDERICK E. DRINKER Author of Author of "Wonder of War on Land," "War for Human Rights," "Wonder of War in the Air," etc. , "Sinking of the Lusitania," etc. Fully Illustrated with Reproductions from Official Photographs, including Maps and Drawings ?1 ATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. No. 241 American Street PHILADELPHIA, PA, Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1919, by Ifational Publishing Co., in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. \ FEB 15 1919 >CI.A5lJ55o PREFACE. In presenting ''The World War for Liberty" to the public, the Publishers desire to state that it is an invaluable contribution to the permanent and abiding literature of the war. It is more. It is the Story of the War as a whole, written with an insight into the conflicting issues which makes it as remarkable as its clear and easy style makes it readable. The Editors are peculiarly fitted for their task. Dr. Francis Rolt- Wheeler has been writing books in co-operation with the American and European governments for many years, he has lived in France, in Russia and in the Balkans, he knows European capitals and politics at first hand. He has contributed widely to the literature of the war and possesses the confidence of military, naval and diplomatic authorities. Mr. Frederick E. Drinker is an American of the purest stock, a keen student of Americanism and a well-known writer. He has published widely on American phases of the war — his book on the Lusitamia is a. classic — and he possesses a wide outlook on the future of the United States. Many years must elapse before the conditions brought about by the world war can subside. For many years to come the issues dealt with in this book must necessarily be points in dispute. The world upheaval has been too great for its settlement to have final immediacy. New republics must be put on trial. New frontiers must beget new passions. Liberty is a plant of slow growth among peoples unaccus- tomed to it. ''The World War for Liberty" will do more than explain what has been, it will help to guide Americans to an understanding of the issues which still remain, and which, in one form or another, will trouble the world for many years to come. TABLE OF CONTENTS. BOOK I. CHAPTER I. THE END AND THE BEGINNING. Collapse of the House of Hohenzollern — Downfall of Imperialism — Empires Totter and Kings Are Unseated — Gathering War Clouds — Estrangement of Serbia and Austria — Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand — The Storm Breaks — Declaration of War 17 CHAPTER II. THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM. The First Shots of the War — The Luxemburg Frontier — Defence of Liege — Per- manent Fortification Becomes a Useless Art — Siege Howitzers — Two Small Forts Stay the Onrush of the Hosts of Mars — Fall of Namur — The Archers of Mons — The Night of Charleroi 24 CHAPTER IIL THE MARNE, DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR The Greatest Fighting Retreat in History — Rival Strategies, German Mass-Drive and French Lozenge — British Exj^editionary Army Cut to Pieces — The Rag- ged Legion, Mobilized in Taxi-Cabs, That Saved Paris — Joffre's Tactics — How Foch Won the Victory in Half an Hour 38 CHAPTER IV. THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE. The Germans Hurled Back in Confusion — Von Zwehl and the Siege Guns — ^The Defeated Hosts "Dig in" to Get a Foothold — Crossing the Aisne, First and Second Phases — The Bombardment of Rheims — Vandalism of the Cathedral — Beginning of the Four Years' Deadlock 52 CHAPTER V. THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA. Capture of Brussels — Siege and Fall of Antwerp — Exile — Atrocities of Aerschot to Louvain — The Battles of the Yser — Dixmude, Holding the Line — Ypres, the Key — Passchendaele Ridge — Poison Gas — The Chemin des Dames — Unconquered Belgium 64 CHAPTER VI. THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE. Both Sides Essay a Ruse at Mulhausen— The Bath of Blood at Altkirch— Strate- gical Value of the Vosges — Invading French Army Defeated at Luneville — Guerrilla Fighting — Failure of Campaign as a Conquest, Success as a Buffer Against Attack Toward Belfort 83 CHAPTER VII. VERDUN! "THEY SHALL NOT PASS!" The Franco-German Frontier — The German Crown Prince — Fearful Loss of Life at Fort Douaumont— The French 75's — Modern Artillery Methods — Changing Plans of Defence — Strategic Railways— St. Mihiel Salient — Nancy, Toul and the Southern Chain of Forts 93 rv TABLE OF CONTENTS V CHAPTER VIII. THE CHANGING TIDES OF WAR. The To-and-Fro Swing of the Battle-Line for Three Long Years — Neuve Chapelle — The Labyrinth — Lens — No Man's Land — Barbed Wire Entangle- ments — Battles of Great Intensity for Minor Gains — Soissons — English Tanks Break Through the Hindenburg Line 104 CHAPTER IX. DRIVING THE GERMANS OUT. The Great Teuton Oflfensive of 1918 an Utter Failure — Foch Starts at Last — American Regiments at the Front — Chateau Thierry and St. Mihiel — Tactics of "the Pincers"' — Ludendorff Out-Maneuvered — The Kriemhilde Line — German Retreat, Rout and Disaster 117 CHAPTER X. SERBIA UNDER THE STEEL-SHOD HEEL. Mutual Invasions on the Eastern Front — Austrian Defeat at the Drina — Belgrade Changes Hands Four Times — Reorganization of Austrian Armies — Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey at the Rear — Fall of the Iron Gate — Surrender of Monastir — German Conquest of Serbia 129 CHAPTER XI. FIGHTING ON THE ROOF OF EUROPE. Italy's Entrance Into the War — Strategic Passes into Austria — The Dolomites — The Battles of the Isonzo — Aerial Railways in the Julian Alps — The Bridge- head of Goritzia — The Carso — Feats of the Bersaglieri — The Dead-Line to Trieste 140 CHAPTER XII. THE HEROIC DEFENCE OF THE PIAVE. Sudden Smashing Descent of the Invaders Into the Italian Plains — Propaganda and Treachery — Venice Threatened — ^A Human Barrier to the Guns — Allied Rush to the Support — Italian Mastery of the Air — Collapse of Austria — Heights Re-won by Sheer Gallantry 149 CHAPTER XIII. THE HAIR-TRIGGER OF SALONIKI. Civil War Questions in Greece — Port Desired by Germans as a Submarine Base — King Constantine and Yenizelos — Practical Impossibility of Transport Con- ditions — Fighting in Macedonia — Establishment of Allied Supply Bases — Final Collapse of Bulgaria 155 CHAPTER XIV. THE RUSSIAN STEAM-ROLLER BLOWS UP. Cossack Success at Lemberg — East Galicia Captured— Occupation of Przemysl — Turn of the Tide at Cracow — Debacle of Tannenberg — Battle of Lodz — Decisive Winter Campaign of the Masurian Lakes 162 CHAPTER XV. THE ROAR OF GUNS IN FROZEN LANDS. The Kaleidoscope of Divided Russia and Siberia — War Supplies in Vladivostock — String of Conflicts Along the Trans-Siberian Railroad — Czecho-Slovaks With Their Backs to the Wall — German-Made Revolt in Finland — Allied Troops on the Murman Coast 174 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER XVI. THE INTREPID ANZACS AT GALLIPOLI. German Seizure of Constantinople — Turkey in the War — The Impregnable Darda- nelles — Seven Months in a Hail of Fire — The Storming of Suvla Bay — The Three Great Assaults — Final Failure of British and Abandonment of the Campaign 183 CHAPTER XVII. THE CRUSADERS IN JERUSALEM AT LAST. The Turkish Advance Towards Egypt— British Alliance With Arab Tribes- Failure of the Jehad — Campaign in the Holy Land— Greatest Cavalry War in Modern History — The Holy City — Capture of Damascus — The Mesopotamian Campaign, Capture of Bagdad 189 CHAPTER XVIIL JAPAN'S PLACE IN THE SUN. The Attack on Tsing-Tao — Capture of Kiao-Chau— German Prestige in the Orient Lost at One Blow — Conquest of Solomon, Caroline and Marshall Islands — The Surrender of German New Guinea — ^No Teuton Naval Base Left in the Pacific 201 CHAPTER XIX. THE HUN'S HAND LIFTED FROM AFRICA. Campaigns in Togoland, Kamerun, German East Africa and German Southwest Africa— Teuton Barbarities in Their Colonies— A Naval War Fought Two Thousand Miles From the Ocean — Boer Generals and Troops Bear the Brunt of Allied Battles in the Dark Continent 205 CHAPTER XX. THE ARMED VIGIL OF THE NORTH SEA. Great Britain Blockades Germany on the First Day — Submarine Mines and Mine- Sweepers — Affair of Helgoland Bight — German Sea-Power Becomes a Mockery — Bombarding Inoffensive Villages — The Battle of Jutland — The Plug- ging of Zeebrugge — Shameful Surrender of Fleet 215 CHAPTER XXL NAVAL GUNS SWEEP THE MEDITERRANEAN. France's Position as Naval Ally Bottled Up Austria — The Goeben and the Breslau, a Romantic Ruse of the Sea — British Bombardment of the Dardanelles — The Italian Fleet Takes Pola, Austria's Chief Naval Base — The Central Powers Barred From the Sea 227 CHAPTER XXII. HUNTING DOWN THE MODERN PIRATES. Tropical Adventures of the Konigsberg — The Emden, the "Terror of the East" — Australians Make the Germans. Walk the Plank — The Fight Off Coronel — Von Spec's Defeat of an English Fleet and the Terrible Revenge of the Battle of the Falklands 231 CHAPTER XXIII. OUTWITTING THE WILY SUBMARINE. The Strength and Weakness of Submarine Attack — Commerce Raiders — Sinking of Three British Cruisers by One "Fritz" — Underwater Boats and Neutral Ships — Torpedoing the Red Cross — Trying to Starve England Out — The Three- fold Queller of the Submarine 240 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii CHAPTER XXIV. DEATH-DEALING SQUADRONS OF THE SKY. Development of Types of Air-Craft — Dirigibles and Their Uses — Summary of Mili- tary Failure of Zeppelin Raids — The Difference in Aeroplanes Required for Bombing, Spotting, Reconnoissance and Combat — Aerial Strategy — Aces — Famous Feats of Daring 244 CHAPTER XXV. MODERN WEAPONS OF LAND WARFARE. The Rifle and Machine Gun— Light Artillery— The French "75"— Heavy Artillery — The "Big Bertha" and the Siege Howitzers — Aerial Guns — Bomb and Shell — Hand Grenade and Bolo — Gas and Explosives — Sapping and Mining 248 BOOK II. CHAPTER XXVL ALLIANCES AND ENTANGLEMENTS. Close of the Franco-Prussian War — Congress of Berlin — League of the Three Emperors — Triple Alliance — Dual Alliance — Fashoda Incident — Boer War Enmities — Moroccan Trouble — Tripoli and the Concert of Europe — Triple Entente 261 CHAPTER XXVIL THE ALLIED NATIONS, A GENERAL REVIEW. Military, Political and Economic Conditions of the Twenty-eight Nations Aligned against Germany — Colonies of the Allies in Africa, Asia and Oceanica — Gradual Change in the World Sentiment During the War — Shipping as the Key to Victory 270 CHAPTER XXVIII. THE BRITISH LION AND THE LION-CUBS. The Empire as a Whole — England, Scotland and Wales — Ireland— Dominion of Canada — Newfoundland — Commonwealth of Australia — Dominion of New Zealand — Union of South Africa — Anglo-Egypt — India — Naval Bases — Imperial Aims Realized 277 CHAPTER XXIX. BELGIUM, THE BATTLEFIELD OF EUROPE. Congress of Vienna — Flemings and Walloons — Revolt for Independence — Inter- vention of the Powers — Perpetual Neutrality — Hunt for a King — Policy of Bismarck — German Treachery — "A Scrap of Paper" — Failure of "Frightful- ness" — Luxemburg 290 CHAPTER XXX. INDOMITABLE FRANCE AND ALSACE-LORRAINE, Napoleon and the Map of Europe — Royalists and Republicans — Siege of Paris — War Indemnities and Alsace-Lorraine — ^Verdun and Frontier Fortification — "They shall not pass" — World Significance of the Battle of the Marne — The Genius of the War 298 vm TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER XXXI. ITALY REDEEMED AND UNREDEEMED. The Great Spiritual Drama — Garibaldi — Quirinal and Vatican — The Unholy Alliance — Meaning of "Italia Irredenta" — Adriatic Sea as the Key to the Mediter- ranean — The Red Week — The Perilous Decision — Forged Propaganda and the Piave 305 CHAPTER XXXII. SERBIA AND THE JUGO-SLAVS. Buffer States — Divisions of the Southern Slavs — Incessant Wars With Turkey — Bosnia the Fuse oi nie World Explosion — The Three Historic Assassinations — Serajevo the Match to the Fuse — The Allies' Inability to Prevent Balkan Disaster 313 CHAPTER XXXIII. LITHUANIA, POLAND AND THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS. Race Barriers in Eastern Europe — Tragedy of Poland, Once a Master Powder — Polish Heroism in the War — Stubborn Lithuania — The Letts — Esthonia — High Standard of Czech Culture — Bohemia — Moravia — The Slovaks — Czecho-Slovak Forces in Siberia 321 CHAPTER XXXIV. MODERN JAPAN AND THE NEW CHINA. Shogunate and Samurai — The Restoration — Korea — Russo-Japanese War — The "Yellow Peril" — Old China — Boxer Rebellion — Manchuria — The Chinese Republic — Significance of Capture of Kiao-Chau by Japan — New "Spheres of Influence" in China 332 CHAPTER XXXV. THE CENTRAL POWERS— A GENERAL REVIEW. Military, Political and Economic Conditions of the Three Empires and Their Bulgarian Link — The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railway — Colonies of the Central Powers — The Breakdown of the Kaiser-forged Chain and Appeals for a Separate Peace ^27 CHAPTER XXXVI. THE MILITARISTIC GERMAN EMPIRE. Old Germany a Loose Confederation of States — Bismarck, "Old Blood and Iron" — Dropping the Pilot — Nietzsche and Treitsche — Bernhardi and Pan-Germanism — Kaiserdom and junkerism — War! — The Crucial Mistake — An Error in Race Psychology 344 CHAPTER XXXVIL AUSTRIA-HUNGARY THE UNSTABLE. The Shadowy Holy Roman Empire — Franz Josef the Juggler — Sadowa — The Aual Monarchy, a Harlequin State and a Nation without a Soul — The Magyars — The Teuton Whip — International Trickery — The Treaty of Bucharest — Absolute Collapse From Within 355 CHAPTER XXXVIII. BULGARIA AND THE BALKAN MUDDLE. Bulgars a Tartar Stock — Meteoric Rise — San Stefano and "Great Bulgaria" — England's Compulsion of "Little Bulgaria" — Battle of Slivnitza — Montenegro — Tearing Up the Treaty of Berlin — Bulgaria a Bitter Foe to World Peace Plans. . 363 TABLE OF CONTENTS h: CHAPTER XXXIX. ORIENTAL TURKEY AND THE NEAR EAST. The Terrible Importance of Constantinople and the Dardanelles — Asia Minor and the Armenians— Syria and the Holy Land — Mesopotamia, the Garden of Eden — The Arab Tribes and the Menace of Islam — Persia, the Land of Golden Opportunity '. 371 CHAPTER XL. NEUTRAL AND SEE-SAW NATIONS. Military, Economic and Political Conditions of Nations Who Either Stayed Com- pletely Out of the War, or Who, at One Time or Another, Were Secretly or Actively Allied to Both Sides — Their Effect on the Respective Belligerents .. 380 CHAPTER XLI. BLIND RUSSIA, MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISUNDERSTOOD. Czar and Zemstvo — Moujik and Merchant — Trans-Siberian Railway — Japanese Checkmate — German Infiltration — Court Intrigue — Betrayal — Three-Headed Revolution — Shame of Brest — Litovsk — Ukraine — Bolshevism — Sanity of Mur- man and Siberia 386 CHAPTER XLII. FEUDAL ROUMANIA, A COUNTRY OUT OF DATEw An Island of Latins Entirely Surrounded by Slavs — Bessarabia as a Second Alsace-Lorraine — Dobrudja, the Mouth of the Danube and the Port of Con- stanza — Half-Hearted Entrance into the War — Greater Roumania a Possible First Class Power ., 401 CHAPTER XLIIL FALLEN GREECE, A LAND OF CIVIL STRIFE. Levantine Weakness — Result of Balkan Wars — King Constantine and Premier Venizelos Deadlocked — Macedonia a Bone of Contention Between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece — Albania Coveted by Serbia, Greece and Italy — The Occupation of Saloniki 405 CHAPTER XLIV. SWEDEN AND FINLAND, WRESTLERS OF THE NORTH Gustavus Adolphus and the Baltic — Scandinavia — Separation oi Norway and Sweden — Norway Pro-Ally and Sweden Pro-German in the War — Finland Taken from Sweden by Russia — Her Strategic Importance — 'German Intrusion and Local Bolshevism 410 CHAPTER XLV. DENMARK AND HOLLAND, THE "STRICTLY NEUTRALS." The Teuton Bullying of Little Denmark, With Schleswig-Holstein as Booty — Wide Difference in Spirit Between Schleswig and Holstein — Holland, the Hater of England — Feeding Germany on the Sly — The Kaiser Kindly Received 415 CHAPTER XLVL SWITZERLAND THE EYE OF THE CYCLONE. A Single-Souled Nation With Three Faces and Three Languages, French, German and Italian — Geneva Convention and the Red Cross — Marvelous Organization for Defense— The Refuge of the Hunted— The Diplomacy of Independence... 420 X TABLE OF CONTENTS BOOK III. CHAPTER XLVII. AMERICA AS A NEUTRAL. Futile Peace Efforts— Financial Depression— Aroused by German Barbarities- Work of Helping Hun Victims Abroad— German Spies and Propaganda- Protests Against U-Boat Attacks and the Killing of Americans— "The Strict Accountability Note"— Re-election of President Wilson— Germany's Broken Pledges — Armed Neutrality 425 CHAPTER XLVIII, THE AMERICAN CALL TO ARMS. President Wilson's War Message to Congress — The Memorable War Declaration —The War Resolution— The Big War Program — German Ships Seized — Arrest of German Agents and Enemy Aliens — Big Loans to Allies — Raising the War Funds — How the Country Prepared 437 CHAPTER XLIX. THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. The Regular Army and the National Guard — National Army Conscription Plan§ — Drafting of Citizens— Recruiting— Camps and Cantonments — Training of Sol- diers — France's Appeal for Men 448 CHAPTER L. THE TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS. General Pershing and Staff Sent to France— Secret Sailings— From Camp to Seaport —Movement of Trains— The Use of Former German Steamships— A Record in Troop Shipments 457 CHAPTER LL THE AMERICAN NAVY. The Force in Foreign Waters— The Naval Reserve— Dogging the U-Boats— The Convoying of Troop Ships— Training Camps — Sea Planes and Chasers — A Remarkable Record of Service 464 CHAPTER LII. THE ARMY ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE. What American Hustle Accomplished — Engineer Wonder- Workers and Fighters — Supply Arrangements — Training Camps and Methods — ^The First American Army — Final Organization >j 473 CHAPTER Lin. THE IRRESISTIBLE MARINES. Organization— Their Glorious Past— First Overseas— In the Trenches— "American Shock Troops" — A Traditional Display of Heroism — On Marne and Meuse — Heavy Losses 480 CHAPTER LIV. THE RED CROSS, THE MOTHER OF SOLDIERS. Organization — Financing — Behind the Lines — On the Battle Fronts — Mothers to All— Ambulance Service — Hospitals and Night Raiders — Real Dogs of War — The Red Star 488 TABLE OF CONTENTS xi CHAPTER LV. ARMY WELFARE WORK. New Ideas in the Training of Soldiers — Protection of Health — Recreation — Educa- tion — The Y. M. C. A. — Huts and Canteens — The Salvation Army — Knights of Columbus 498 . CHAPTER LVI. AMERICAN HEROISM FROM CANTIGNY TO SEDAN. The Capture of Cantigny— Chateau Thierry— An American Wall of Strength — Turning the Tides of War— The Heights of Ourcq— St. Mihiel— Sacrifice and Heroism — Swimming the Meuse Under Fire — Sedan and the Last Shots — Negro Troops Cited — Foch's Tribute to Americans — President Wilson's Christ- mas With His Soldiers in France 506 CHAPTER LVII. PERSHING'S OWN STORY, Summary of Operations of the American Expeditionary Force as Cabled to Secretary of War Baker by General John J. Pershing on November 20, 1918... 515 CHAPTER LVIII. THE ARMISTICES AND AGREEMENTS. What the Central Powers Gave Up on Surrender — The Stern German Agreement — Austria's Sacrifice — Bulgaria — Turkey 530 CHAPTER LIX. THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION. The Start Toward the Rhine — Heroic American Troops Comprise Third Army of Occupation — King Albert and the Queen of Belgium at Antwerp and Brussels — Marshal Petain at Metz — General Pershing in Luxemburg — Flags and Bunt- ing Fly — Enthusiasm Everywhere — Into Germany 538 CHAPTER LX. THE WORLD PEACE PLANS. President Wilson Goes to Attend Paris Conference — Enthusiasm Marks His Arrival — Made Citizen of Paris — The Personnel of the Peace Conference — A League of Nations — The Terms of Peace — Plans for Enforcement 543 INTRODUCTION. There is a gripping need for such a book as "The World War for Liberty/' written, as it is, to show Americans the dark forces that were behind the war, the desperate gallantry of the nations who fought therein and the great goal of democracy which lies beyond. The book is needed because America and the Americans have entered upon an era of their history wherein they have become a world power. As such, world problems must be grappled with; as a self-governing people, Americans must understand those problems. This book is by no means a mere History of the Events of the War. It is this, but it is far more. It is a book designed to reveal the war. Every reader of the daily newspapers during the four years of the war realized that there were half-told questions of diplomacy, court intrigues, backstairs politics, racial antipathies and patriotic theories of every sort and description underlying the actual happenings on the field of battle. Some of these were fraught with vital importance, as when the overturn in Russia imperiled the Allies' cause, as when France and England compelled the abdication of King Constantino of Greece, as when America realized that honor demanded the drawing of the sword of justice. Such topics do not belong necessarily to a mere narrative history, but in the larger sense of a world war for Liberty, they are all-important. For this reason the Editors have placed the world war before their readers in three parts : Book I, which gives the military history of the war, as a historian would write it ; Book II, which gives the world issues of the war, as they bore on every country directly or indirectly involved, and in which will be found analyzed such topics as Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, Italia Irredenta, Macedonia, Bessarabia, Dobrudja, the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav peoples, Bolshevism, Junkerdom and the rest ; and Book III, dealing with America's part in the war, showing I the sublimity of self-sacrifice with which the soldiers and people of the XII INTRODUCTION xm United States set their whole hearts to the task when once convinced that the call of war was the call of Eight. A cold, tame, impersonal record of such a war would not be an American book. It is because of a profound conviction that the war was inevitable, that it was forced on the world by selfish desires and unjustifiable aggression, that it wab, necessary for civilization and for the cause of liberty that peace-loving nations should beat the plowshare into the sword, that this book has been written. That it may further enlighten America and that it may enhance the pride of the people of the United States in the rightfulness of their cause is the aim and purpose of The Editors. FOREWORD In all the straggles of man against man and nation against nation since the beginning of time itself there has been no counterpart of * ' the World War for Liberty" which ended on November 11, 1918, with the collapse of the German Empire and the abdication of the autocratic Emperor William Hohenzollern, followed by his flight into Holland, leaving a train of desolation and ruin in his wake. No other great empire ever came to so sharp an ending and no emperor was more ignominiously driven from his throne. The vaunted power which he wielded was wrested from him and the conceit of Kaiserism and Junkerism which he personified was crushed to the earth. Yet these are but incidents of the most momentous achievement in the world's history. The fall of German autocracy marked not merely the end of an empire but a decisive victory for forces of the universe holding to the principle that just governments derive their power from the consent of the governed. All down the ages the contest has been waged for acceptance be- tween the irreconcilable conceptions of government — autocracy and democracy. The German Kaiser — a mere creature of an intolerable system — would deny to men the right to govern themselves and by force of arms subject them to his will and perpetuate a decaying form of government. In the bygone days of ignorance and superstition it was part of the rudimentary political game for selfish class groups to make people believe that some arch conspirator, proclaimed a ruler, derived his authority from a just God, and that it was part of their religious duty to obey. Under the cloak of religion unscrupulous potentates prac- ticed inconceivable cruelties until an enlightened world demanded the separation of religion and State. Just as in the barbaric ages the Kaiser sought to convince his peo- ple and the world that a God-given power was his. He and his ilk XIV FOREWORD XV dominated a peoples who had imbibed this teaching and accepted his imperial mandates. Those who refused to recognize his '* God-given right to rule" were proclaimed his enemies and the enemies of his people. The swing of his rule was circumscribed by the independent thoughts of millions outside of his domain. His forebears and the ring of which Kaiser William was the rep- resentative saw the circle growing smaller about them — saw nations rent and peoples fight to the death for freedom — and they began to create a fighting machine which would support them m their unhal- lowed positions and provide force to break the encroaching circle and overrun the earth. Peace-loving nations sought to avoid an inevitable conflict between the forces adhering to two diametrically opposed theories of govern- ment until the Emperor, with his military machine made ready, seized upon the unfortunate assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of Austria, at the close of June, 1914, as a pretext for war and set out to subject peaceful nations. Thus started the struggle which involved twenty-eight nations of the world, having an aggregate population of nearly 1,600,000,000, or practically eleven-twelfths of the human race, entailing a loss of life approximating 10,000,000, with nearly three times as many wounded, and an estimated cost of $250,000,000,000. To those who would have a simple, understandable and compre- hensive story of the war, reciting the sacrifices and struggles of na- tions and the heroism of those who fought not for glory, but to defend their ideals and make men free, this volume is offered with the hope that it will prove a source of information and pleasure and fill a wide- spread need. Book I MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR Editor FRANCIS ROLT-WHEELER, Ph. D. XVI CHAPTER I. THE END AND THE BEGINNING. Collapse of the House of Hohenzollern and the Downfall of Imperialism— Empires Totter and Sings are Unseated— Gathering War Clouds— The Estrangement of Serbia and Austria— The Assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand— The Storm Breaks— Declarations of War. "And everyone that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sandr "And the rain descended and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it." Matt. VII-26.27. SO fell the Imperial house of Germany on Monday, November 11, 1918. With a crash that echoed 'round the earth it collapsed, bringing glorious peace out of the greatest struggle of men in all history. Builded, as was the house of that other foolish man, upon an un- stable foundation, the imperialistic structure of which William Hohen- zollern, Emperor of Germany, and his forebears were the architects, swayed and rocked in the world storms which swept about it and came tumbling to the earth a wreck. Two shots fired in the little city of Serajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, pierced the ominous clouds which hung over central Europe threat- ening the peace and liberty of men, and marked the beginning of the storm, which in its gathering frenzy, rent the houses of Hapsburg in Austria and Romanoff in Russia; sent the Emperor Francis Joseph to his death, the unfortunate Czar Nicholas to an untimely grave; battered from their thrones King Constantine of Greece, King Ludwig of Bavaria, King Ferdinand and King Boris of Bulgaria, the Emperor Charles of Austria, and left seatless the German Kaiser. It gathered into the vortex of conflict twenty-eight nations of the world with a total population of nearly 1,600,000,000, or all but one- twelfth of the entire human race, cost 10,000,000 of lives and visited injury upon 17,000,000 more, besides involving untold suffering, and incalculable loss of property and the expenditure of more than $200,000,000,000. 2— W. L. 1*^ 18 THE END AND THE BEGINNING. Christians and Jews, Mohammedans and Buddists fonght with and against each other; fathers were set against sons and brothers against brothers ; men burrowed into the ground, dived into the seas and soared into the air to gain points of vantage in the universal struggle which was brought about by the ambition of the Kaiser and the Junker classes of Germany to spread the mantle of Impeiialism over nations and create a world empire that would resist the growing forces of democracy over aU the earth. The ambition was one borne of generations of training and sought but an opportunity to give it sway. Nations are not longer permitted, however, to wage war for mere conquest, and even Germany, prepared and waiting to strike a blow at peaceful peoples, must needs find an excuse for stretching out her military arms and seizing coveted lands. The pretext for war was the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian throne, whose appearance in the little city of Serajevo, Bosnia, drew fire from the pistol of a Serbian fanatic. The Pretext for War. It was a beautiful Sunday morning in the Bosnian capital and the city was astir with expectancy. The Archduke, who had been attend- ing military manoeuvers in the vicinity, had announced his intention of inspecting troops in the city. The streets of Serajevo were thronged with picturesquely dressed men and women, for it was Serbian fete day. The Archduke and his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, had been met at the railway station by the local Governor and his staff and were slowly motoring through the crowded thoroughfares to the scene of the military inspection when a package fell upon the open hood of the royal car. The Archduke seized and tossed the bundle to the street where it exploded, injuring several lesser dignitaries and military attendants who were in an escort oar. The bomb thrower had been arrested, the Archduke had delivered an address and was on his way to visit the victims of the bomb when a second explosive missile was hurled at his car. When it failed to explode the man who threw it — a, Serbian student — rushed forward and began firing at the royal party. One bullet from his flashing pistol struck the Archduke in the neck, another marked the Duchess for its THE END AND THE BEGINNING 19 victim. Both became unconscious and died shortly after being removed to the Government House. How the assassination of an Austrian prince by a misguided Serbian student could be made a pretext for war is a story of intrigue, conspiracy and abuse of power involving the history of Austria and the German Empire and of races, and of the Balkan states with their wars and uprisings to throw off the yoke of autocracy and secure independence. The complexities of the situation as developed to this point in world history may be traced with interest in the chapters of this work dealing with the parts played by the various nations. Serbia, with her territory greatly increased by the war with Turkey in 1912-13, and her national spirit aroused, had become the scene of a '* Greater Serbia" movement, largely directed against Austria- Hungary, which held Bosnia, Croatia and Herzegovina, land which by Nationality and by speech were Serbian, and which in control of Austria barred Serbia from the sea. Serbia and Austria Alienated- The estrangement of Serbia and Austria was primarily due to the latter 's high-handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908 and the thwarting of Serbia's desire to secure an outlet to the Adriatic in 1913. Serbia's ambition was therefore not in keeping with Germany's plans for the Berlin-Bagdad railroad, which must run through Serbia, and conceived in the German mind the control of Serbia by Austria. The theory that a principal is responsible for the action of his agent was applied to Serbia, and the nation was held to be culpable in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, because the assassin was a Serbian, although an Austrian subject, and even though the crime was committed in Bosnia, under Austrian control. There were at the time four groups or divisions among the conti- nental powers. Germany, Austria and Italy were bound together in what was known as the Triple Alliance, and Great Britain, France and Eussia stood side by side in the Triple Entente. A smaller group, whose neutrality was guaranteed by treaties, was Belgium, Denmark, Holland and the Duchy of Luxemburg, sandwiched between Germany and France and Belgium, together with Switzerland. There were in a fourth group the Balkan nations, including Bulgaria, Servia, Monte- negro, Greece, Turkey and Roumania, more or less closely drawn to 20 THE END AND THE BEGINNING. Russia, though Germany had secured a foothold in Turkey. With these stood the Iberian nations Spain and Portugal. The immediate train of events which gathered the war clouds over Europe goes back to the interference of other powers in the adjustment of affairs between Russia and Turkey in 1877. The nations had agreed upon a larger Bulgaria and an enlarged and independent Serbia, but at the Berlin conference, which Austria had taken the initiative in calling, Austria sought to have as much of the Christian territory of southeast Europe kept under the domination of the Turks. Fearing the influence of Russia with her increasing strength over Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, and with the object of ultimately acquiring the territory- from the Turks, Austria secured by agreement at the conference a trusteeship over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the right to temporary occupation and management of the territories. The Balkan War. Later, when Russia was defeated by the Japanese and the Young Turks reformed their government, Austria no longer fearing Russia, but feeling that the Turks might demand the evacuation of Bosnia, notified the powers represented at the Berlin conference that it had been decided to make Bosnia and Herzegovina part of the Austro- Hungarian Empire. Serbia's hope of getting an outlet to the Adriatic was blasted, and she was greatly embittered. Then came the war in which Serbia joined with little Montenegro and Greece to drive the Turks out of Europe. The great powers sought to prevent the conflict but without avail and the Balkan war is a matter of history. Serbia for her participation in the picturesque war was to secure as her share of conquered territory part of Albania, but again Austria stepped in, and working with Germany secured the operation of a plan which made Albania a separate state or principality with a German prince to rule over it. Serbia was further embittered and demanded of Bulgaria part of the territory assigned to that country to compensate her for the loss of Albania. Bulgaria stood upon her rights and the second phase of the Balkan war was precipitated, Serbia joining forces with Greece against Bulgaria. When the smoke of battle cleared away Serbia had acquired THE END AND THE BEGINNING 21 addiuional territory to the south, but she was still landlocked and cut off from the sea by Bosnia^ Montenegro and Albania. There was in consequence of these events a strong anti-Austrian sentiment in Serbia and Austria stood ready to chastise her belligerent neighbor. In fact, in August, 1913, a year before the great conflict started, Austria had communicated to Italy the fact that she proposed to attack Serbia. Italy refused to join with Austria in the attack and urged Germany to dissuade Austria from her purpose. Germany, thus made aware that she could not receive the support of Italy, de- clined to begin the war at that time. She hastened, however, to com- plete the Berlin-Bagdad railway and the rebuilding of the Eael canal, necessary tp her scheme of world-wide expansion. After the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, how- ever, Germany with Austria formulated a policy which when adopted in connection with the tragedy would be sure to precipitate war. Ger- many's immediate connection is traced to a conference held in Potsdam on July 5, a week after the assassination, and which was attended by the Kaiser who hurried home from a hunting trip, together with statesmen, diplomatic, military, financial and industrial leaders of Geimany. At this time it was announced that Germany would be ready for war in a few weeks. Austria's Terms to Serbia. The demands presented to Serbia by Austria in reparation for the slaying of Francis Ferdinand provided for the unconditional acceptance of the terms within forty-eight hours and were regarded by world diplomats to be the most arrogant and insulting ever pre- sented by one nation to another. One of the provisions was that the Serbian government should compel the dissolution of the society Narodna Obrana (the chief society of the country for Serbian propa- ganda), as well as all other organizations that might engage in propa- ganda against Austria-Hungary, and to further eliminate from teach- ing and from the schools, anything which might serve to foment propa- ganda against Austria. It was demanded, too, that in bringing the slayers of the Archduke to justice and that in the suppression of the Pan-Serbian movement — the Greater Serbia idea — Serbia accept the collaboration of Austrian officials. Serbia accepted all of the demands on July 25, but denied to 22 THE END AND THE BEGINNING. Austria the right to exercise judicial authority in Serbia. Diplomatic exchanges began at once between the various powers to avert war and Italy made it known that she was not in sympathy with the Austria- Hungary note to Serbia. Finally, on July 27, Austria issued a note in which she said that Serbia's acquiescence to her demands was unsatisfactory and ''filled with the spirit of dishonesty," and on the following day, July 28, 1914, declared war on Serbia. That Germany was bent upon war was made clear by ttie fact that when Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, sent peace proposals for a Council of Europe to both the Kaiser and the Czar, the Kaiser's answer was an order for mobilization and an ultimatum to Eussia to stop mobilizing. France and Italy had supported England in the proposal but this did not prevent Germany from demanding of France a statement as to her attitude in the event of a Russo-German war. This was on July 30, and the same day Austria invaded Serbia. On the following night military law was proclaimed throughout Germany and Eussia ordered a general mobilization. The Invasion of Belgium. Personal messages meanwhile passed between the Kaiser and the Czar, to both of whom King George sent appeals for peace, but on August 1, and while Austria was still negotiating with the Czar, Emperor William declared that "the sword had been forced into his hand" and declared war on Eussia. France, a lender of money to Eussia, and party to the Triple agreement, ordered a mobilization of military forces. There was no longer doubt that Europe was to be shaken by a great conflict nor was the possibility lessened when, on August 2, the Kaiser sent an ultimatum to King Albert of Belgium demanding free passage of his armies through Belgium. The same day German forces crossed the frontiers of Luxemburg and France, and Germany declared war on France. On August 4 the German troops invaded Belgium, though bound by treaty to respect and preserve the latter 's neutrality. Belgium appealed to England to preserve her neutrality and the latter demanded the withdrawal of German troops. Failing to obtain satisfaction Eng- THE END AND THE BEGINNING 23 land declared war on Germany to the latter 's dismay, the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg expressing himself as unwilling to believe that England would go to war "just for a scrap of paper,'' an expression that gave the world one of its first glimpses of how little honor had to do with the conduct of affairs in Germany. The die was now cast and the train of events started which led around the earth. Austria was already bombarding Belgrade, the plain of Luxemburg was overrun by Uhlans and the frontier guards of Lorraine were making their reply to the Kaiser's challenge. Europe was aflame. The storm had broken. CHAPTER II. THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUH. The First Shots of the War— The Luxemburg Frontier— Defence of L16ge— Permanent Fortifications Become a Useless Art— Siege Howitzers— Two Small Forts Stay the Onrush of the Hosts of Mars— Fall of Namur— The Archers of Mons— The Might of Charleroi. THE utter disregard by Germany of the neutrality rights of in- nocent and peaceful Belgium was the incident of action at this critical moment which was destined to bind the whole world in bitter struggle. It was Germany's plan to crush France before Russia could mob- ilize and then turn eastward to crush the forces of the Czar. Time was an important factor in this military plan and unfortunately the quickest and easiest path over which the Germans could pass on their way to Paris was through Belgium. Therefore all consideration for the country of King Albert was thrust aside. In the German Reichstag the Imperial chancellor defended this course, and admitting the wrong declared, ''We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law." Hostile Entrance Into Belgium. Straightway one of the greatest horrors of all history began — the invasion and devastation of Belgium. The German forces had pre- i^iously entered the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which was in a state of disarmed neutrality under the protection of its neighbors. Its sole defence consisted of about 300 volunteers and gendarmes. When the vanguard of the German forces — several motor cars filled with officers and men — came into the once powerful city of Luxem- burg and demanded the right of passage through the little country, the Grand Duchess motored up and turned her car across the roadway to bar the soldiers' progress. She was ordered home and her chauffeur was compelled to turn away. A minister of State who had made protest was laughed to scorn and the gendarmes were swept aside. On August 4, when hostilities began, the Belgian army wag still 24 © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. WOODROW WILSON, President U. S. A. His record in the World War, for Democracy, is known throughout the world. His determined efforts brought forth results which were crowned with glory. © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. FRENCH PREMIER, GEORGES CLEMENCEAU. Lorri'ini'^tVBisma'^Pk^ T^'i'q^ ^^''''^^A "^-^ opposed the yielding or Alsace and ■h^^t^ lu^ -J ^?^ ,^'S- ^^ ^91S he said: "I make war, I make war The victorv IS to the side which lasts to the last quarter o( an hour " And Alsace and Lor^ raine were returned to France. "ywi- i\M^ Aibace ana j-.or- © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. BRITISH PREMIER, LLOYD GEORGE. The international brains of tlie economic side of the war, the one man who was able to form a coalition cabinet in Great Britain, which fused every political party into a phalanx of united effort. From L nderwood & Underwuud, N. Y © Clinedlnst. Washington, D. C. GENERAL. JOHN J. PERSHING. Commander of the United States forces in France and Belgium. General Pershing was born in 1864, in Laclede, Missouri. Every inch of his six feet is fighting material. "Lafayette, we are here." — Pershing. The greatest four-word speech in history. © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. MARSHAL FERDINAND FOCH. Generalissimo of Allied Armies. "Leave it to Focli," they said ; and leave it to Foch they did. He outgeneraled the Germans, and the world knows the result. 1, N. Y. Sill DOUGLAS llAIG. General Haig's family tree dates back many centuries, and he comes from the very flower of Scotch stock. The virtues of the "Haigs of Bamersyde" were extolled by the poets in the thirteenth century. © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM. "Belgium, re-established in all its rights, will rule its destinies according to its aspirations and in full sovereig-nty." Prom his re-entry into Brussels address. © L'nderwuud & Underwood, N. Y. GICNKUAL, DIAZ, TIM ITALIAN HIOUO. The General who led Italy's Army to glorious victory. THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 25 in the process of mobilization along the river Dyle and covering the advance upon Brussels and Antwerp and there was no infantry to support the forts. Troops — the Third Division and a mixed Brigade, were rushed to Liege and the civic guard of the city joined the forces. This hastily mobilized force of probably 20,000 was set to defend the city. Gangs were put to work digging trenches and throwing up breast- works, and houses and buildings in the line of fire were leveled. The resistance of the Belgians aroused the ire of the Germans and from thence on the doom of the country was sealed so far as the Hun army was concerned. Germany had said, ''Let us go through your land and we will compensate you for damages when the war has been won. ' ' But King Albert, with an army of less than 200,000, prepared to defend his country and in answer to Germany *s proposal said to his people: **I have faith in our destinies. A nation which defends itself commands the respect of all. Such a nation cannot perish. God will be with us in a just cause. Long live independent Belgium!" German/s Plan for Entering Belgium. The First German Army of von Kluck was concentrated at a point along the Rhine above Aix-la-Chapelle ; the Second Army, in command of von Bulow, below the first; the third army, under the Duke of Wurtemburg, along the river Moselle; the Crown Prince's army was that on the frontier opposite Luxemburg; the Fifth Army, under the Crown Prince of Bavaria, outside of Metz, and the Sixth Army_at ai point some miles from Nancy, under General von Heeringen. "i There was no mystery about the German plan. It was the famous mass-drive at the centre and flanking movement at both ends, in so faifl as this might be possible with regard to the lay of the land. At th^ northern end, a very heavy German force had been gathered, for ifl would be necessary for the First, Second and Third German Armies to enter the battle-ground by the comparatively narrow defile between the Holland frontier and the Ardennes and then sweep out fan-fashion to the sea. It was the intention of the German High Command to send the First Army by forced march and the occupation of the Belgian railways to Brussels and Antwerp. The Second Army, to which were attached the heavy siege howitzers, was directed against the two pow- erful fortresses of Namur and Maubeuge. The third Army was to force 26 THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM the Moselle by Givet, not waiting for the reduction of Namur. This was like a great sickle sweeping the Belgians into the sea. It will be noted that the Third Army had the shortest distance to travel. This was designed because it was to form a junction with the mass-drive or ''shock" centre of the army. The Fourth Army, under the German Crown Prince, was designed to attack the French-Luxem- burg frontier (for this reason the violation of Luxemburg territory was a necessary part of the German plan), centering near Sedan. The Fifth Army, under the Bavarian Crown Prince, was to strike north of Verdun towards Rheims. Thus the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies, were converging on Paris, with the whole driving force of the German Empire behind them. The Teuton Project Disarranged. The southern portion of the Fifth Army and the whole of the Sixth Army formed the southern flank. In this territory the Germans knew the enveloping movement to be impossible. In the first place, it was out of the question to overrun Switzerland as they planned to invade Belgium. That would take time, and delay meant disaster. In the second place, France had fortified the Verdun-Toul-Epinal-Belfort chain of fortresses with such strength that the Germans did not believe that the line could be forced without the greatly feared delay. The German Sixth Army, then, was a defensive army, designed to prevent a French invasion of the Rhine Valley through Alsace. This was a highly dangerous point, and von Heeringen was sent there as one of the keenest strategists in the German command. To recapitulate. The First and Second Armies were to sweep Belgium; the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies were to drive on Paris; the Sixth Army was to hold its ground and prevent a French attack in Alsace. That was the plan. Little Liege disarranged the plan. Liege, the Marne, Ypres and the Piave are the four great names of the war. It will be well to con- sider Liege closely, for only those who have studied the war from the military point of view assign to it the importance that its defense warrants. Liege was what was known as a ''ring fortress," that is to say, the town itself was not fortified, but it was surrounded by a ring of six forts of the first order, Pontisse, Barchon and Fleron on the north and east; Loncin, Flemalles and Boncelles on the west and south. Between THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 27 tliese and at points of less strategic importance were six smaller forts, or fortins, Evegiiee, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, Hollogne, Lantin and Liers. Tliese forts were moderately well armed, but the nine-incb gnns, ordered from Krupps several years before, had never been received. It afterwards became known that the German government had ordered Krnpps not to deliver the order. In the twelve forts there were four hundred guns, mainly six-inch and 4.7-inch guns, and eight-inch mortars Liege Fortifications Not Invulnerable to Siege Howitzers. Moreover, these forts had been built by Brialmont in what was the very latest fashion at the time he built them — but that was twenty years before the opening of the world war. Each of the six main forts was built as a triangle, commanding a strong natural position, and approached by a steep artificial mound. At the top of the earth slope was a deep ditch, the counterscarp of which was a masonry wall topped with wire entanglements. The entire earth slope, ditch and wall was exposed to heavy guns throwing shrapnel shell, as well as to machine- gun and rifle fire. Quick-firing guns, mounted in cupolas at each angle of the triangle, swept the sunken ditch with an enfilading fire. No troops could storm that ditch. On the main inner triangle was the infantry parapet, shaped something like a heart, pierced for rifle fire and with more machine-gun emplacements. In the hollow of that heart- shaped space, and sunk therein, rose a solid central mass of concrete, on and in which were the shelter and gTin cupolas for the heavier guns and mortars. The cupolas rose from the floor of the hollow, outside the central mass. They were invisible to the foe until raised by their inner machinery, but once raised, the turreted guns could fire their six-inch shells in any direction. When Brialmont built the forts they were absolutely impregnable. The impregnability of such fortifications as those of Liege, how- ever, was only in relation to the guns and howitzers of the period of 1§94. They were still impregnable to direct-fire guns in 1914. Events proved that they were not invulnerable to long-range howitzers. As these "siege guns," or, more correctly, siege howitzers, were the domi- nating factor of the early part of the war, it is necessary to explain their tremendous importance, and to show how they changed the entire character of modern warfare. 28 THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM The difference between a gun and a howitzer lies in the fact that a gun depends largely for its destructiveness on its striking power or its velocity, while the destructiveness of a howitzer depends on the power of the exploding charge of its shell. The shell from a large gun travels with a muzzle velocity of over half a mile a second. It must have as flat a trajectory as possible to increase its striking power. A howitzer shell needs only just enough velocity to carry the high; explosive to the point desired. It flies with a high trajectory, being lobbed up in the air to drop almost perpendicularly on the point desired. A howitzer generally looks as though it were shooting at the moon. Now, Brialmont had built the ring of forts of Liege in such a way that every point which would give shelter to a howitzer of the power of his time could be swept by a six-inch gun, for, as has been shown, a gun has a far longer range than a howitzer. Moreover, the sunken forts of Liege, by reason of their hidden character, could laugh even at a naval gun. At the time of the building of these forts, the six-inch was the biggest howitzer. The Invasion of Belgium Begiin. Knowing this — for Belgium was honeycombed with German spies — the German High Command had sent 8.4-inch howitzers with the First Army, or, to speak more exactly, with that part of the First Army, under General von Emmich, to which was entrusted the reduc- tion of Liege. It was a mathematical problem, purely. The German High Command had reasoned that these large howitzers could be located at points behind small rises of ground, sheltered from the six- inch gunfire of the forts, and that they could reduce Liege. The famous siege howitzers, as has been said, were crawling on their way with the Second Army for the reduction of Namur and Maubeuge, where the Germans expected a fiercer resistance than Belgium could improvise tit Liege on the surprise attack, on the first day of the war. On the evening of August 3, 1914, though war had not yet been declared, the German forces crossed the Belgian frontier. At nine o'clock in the morning of August 4, the second advance line of von Emmich reached Vise, north of Liege and close to the Dutch frontier. The first shots of the war were exchanged with a Belgian guard. The Belgians then blew up the bridge across the Meuse at Vise and the Germans commenced to bombard the town. Early in the afternoon THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 29 they crossed on a pontoon bridge. The armed invasion of Belgium i.ad begun. By evening, Liege was invested on three sides. Shortly before five o^clock in the evening of that day, cavalry patrols appeared before the little fortin of Evegnee. The fort barked defiance. Within the hour, infantry, light and heavy artillery appeared and, before darkness fell, the bombardment of Forts Barchon, Evegnee and Fleron had begun. By eleven o 'clock Chaudf ontaine was engaged, and by midnight, Fort Embourg. By three o'clock in the morning Fort Boncelles began to speak, and just as dawn broke, Fort Pontisse, in the far north of the ring, opened fire with its larger guns. Within twelve hours of the time that the first German cavalry had been sighted, every fort on the eastern side of the Meuse was engaged. The first infantry attack was against Fourt Embourg, one of the smaller forts. The supposedly unprepared Belgian infantry not only defended the fort with great gallantry, sweeping down the massed formation of the Germans by thousands, but counter-attacked with vigor. At eight o'clock the Germans were forced to withdraw. The first engagement of the war was won by Belgium. Heavy Losses by the Germans Before Liege. By noon, German troops had made nine attacks at one or other of the forts. They were beaten back every time. At least 15,000 men fell during the morning, without achieving any result. Briahnont's forts were too strong and the Belgians were too brave to fall under any mass attack, no matter how heavy and powerful. The howitzers, however, told another story. Shortly before noon of that day, August 5, the hoisting machinery of Fort Fleron, one of the larger forts, was put out of commission by a howitzer shell. The two smaller forts on either side, Chaudfontaine and Evegnee, could not close the gap. The Belgian infantry were eager to try and hold the gap by rifle fire, but General Leman realized that this would be folly. On this day, the Belgians had 22,500 against 120,000 Germans, a numerical superiority of almost six to one. What was still more disastrous, the railway from Herve into Liege, which had been guarded by Fort Fleron, fell into German hands. With the guns of Fleron silenced, the German howitzers which had been bombarding^ that fort now turned to the two little fortius, Chaudfontaine and Evegnee. Following the German policy of con- 30 THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM tinuous attack, fresh troops advanced constantly against the Belgian garrisons, which thus had no time for sleep and hardly any time for food. The howitzer shells dropped on the fortins and ripped away their stone, cement and earth protections as though these had been but cardboard. By the morning of August 6, the way into Liege was open from the east. General Leman, consulting with his officers at military headquarters, was almost captured. He escaped over a wall. General Leman promptly ordered the evacuation of the city by the infantry, and the follomng day, August 7, 1914, Burgomaster Kleyer and the Bishop of Liege negotiated for the surrender of the city. Heroic Resistance of the Belgians. The situation was excessively bad for the Germans. The High Command had given von Emmich forty-eight hours to take Liege. It had taken three days. But — as it turned out, a very large "but" — the western forts of Liege were not silenced. General Leman withdrew to these, announcing his intention to fight to the last gun. The importance of this decision may be grasped when it is said that Fort Pontisse controlled the Liege to x\ntwerp railway, Fort Loncin domi- nated the Liege to Brussels railway and Fort Boncelles swept the Liege to Paris railway. As long as those forts held out, the German army could not move. The city of Liege, indeed, had been taken by a three-day siege; the strategic fortress of Liege had not. Even the eastern conquest was not without its annoyances. When Chaudfon- taine could no longer fight, the commandant sent half a dozen locomo- tives at full speed into the tunnel from opposite ends, so that they would collide in the middle and block the tunnel. The Verviers to Liege rail- way, therefore, was also out of business for the transport of German troops. The people of Liege, fearing that the Germans would wreak repri- sals on the city if the forts resisted, begged General Leman to sur- render. The heroic commander, knowing that each day's delay at that time was worth a week, or maybe a month, later, answered curtly, ''The forts must hold!" The German High Command had not anticipated this resistance. Fort Pontisse and Fort Flemalles to north and south of Liege respec- tively, commanded the crossings of the Meuse. There was no satis- factory artillery position for the 8.4 howitzers. The reduction of the THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 31 forts was attempted by infantry attack. At Pontisse, ten pontoon bridges were built across the Meuse by the Germans, with desperate courage, but, every time, the six-inch guns of the fort blew the bridges to atoms and the troops which had crossed were cut off and killed to a man. At Flemalles, the troops crossed, but the heavy artillery could not get over. Fort Boncelles, unprotected by the river, became "the stoke-hold of hell," as the Commandant was heard graphically to describe it. Without sleep, with little food, the Belgians fought on. The 8th, the 9th and the 10th still saw 120,000 Germans stopped by a Belgian army, now raised by reinforcements to 36,000 men. On the 10th, Gen- eral Leman had both legs crushed by falling masonry. He refused to go to a hospital, but was carried to his motor-car. He slept in it. He fought his forts from it. Von Emmich grew savage and desperate. He must send for help. The great siege guns, crawling south to Namur, had to be diverted and brought north to reduce those indomitable little forts. It took those wide-mouthed monsters three long days to crawl up to Liege. The Germans Steadily Advance. Such guns had never been seen before. They were Germany's great war secret. Their weight was seventy-one tons. Each gun was transported in four pieces, each part being dragged by three traction engines on caterpillar wheels, a fourth huge leader engine going ahead to test the road and to give an added pull to the three powerful tractors when going up hills. The calibre of the gun was 42-centimeter (16.4-inch) . The explosive force of one shell from these guns could destroy four city blocks. When these arrived. General Leman knew the end had come. He ordered the infantry to retire on the Dyle. With less than 100 men the hero awaited the final bombardment of Fort Loncin. Three shells were sufficient to destroy it. The great steel cupolas were uprooted like weeds, pieces of concrete larger than a room were sent flying like pebbles. General Leman was pinned under the wreckage, grievously wounded, but not fatally. It had taken Germany ten days to open the railways to the west. The northern wing of the fan, the right flank of the German armies, instead of sweeping out ahead of the mass-attack, was a week behind. 32 THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM Germany's whole initial manoeuvre was changed by the seven days' delay created by the three small forts. With the fall of the forts, the long-delayed tidal wave of graycoats swept over Belgium. The cavalry tried to force the Dyle at Haelen, at Tirlemont and at Eghezee, but were beaten off. The Belgians fought like heroes. At last, on August 14, the cavalry, which were only acting as a screen, were withdrawn, and the four German army corps which had been stopped at Liege began to thunder forward. Diest, St. Trond and Waremme fell, but the Belgians held fast again at Aerschot. Each day, yes, every hour, the Belgians* expected to see French troops coming up from the south or British troops landing at Ostend. Neither ap- peared. The Belgians feared that they were being sacrificed. The Belgian main army retreated on Antwerp, and the right wing, becoming a rearguard, covered its retreat at Louvain. Here a bitter battle occurred, lasting two days. Louvain fell to the Germans, but the Belgians retreated in good order, having safely covered their main army. On the 23rd a counter-offensive drove the Germans out of Malines. Still, each day, the Belgians expected the landing of British troops. None came. Notwithstanding, for three weeks the Belgians held back the German divisions striking northwards. That they were able to do so was because von Kluck's army was pivoting for a south- ern blow, realizing that the time could not be afforded for the outward sweep to the sea. British and French Forces Combine. Why had not the British arrived at Ostend? The real answer was simple. They had landed at Boulogne, the first transports arriving August 9. Rightly realizing that Germany's goal would be Paris and that Brussels was only a side-issue, the British military leaders decided to join with the French Army and take up such position as the French leaders should deem best. General Joffre, the re organizer of the French Army, was naturally the man for the supreme command. He showed his mettle as a strate- gist, rather than a tactician, by taking up what seemed to be a strong position in a right-angled position, with the corner of the angle at Namur. This was typical French strategj^, being the operative comer of a strategic square, a manner of handling armies which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter, when showing the system in operation. Namur was chosen as the corner for two reasons, one that it was a^ to * t< c 2 t; " "O -IS "s! •-• T5 ^ S O a! C fc. i£ £ m ni 0 c S S « o .- ZURlCH TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ALLIES ACCORDING TO THE ARMISTICE Allies. v^ermany, evacuated by the Qerman army and occupied by the THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 33 directly in the path of the advancing hosts, the other that, as a fortified place and well situated at the junction of the Rivers Sambre and Meuse, it had strong natural advantages. General Leman had held back the Germans for nine days with two forts; it was therefore possible that Namur, with the French army backing it, could hold out even longer. This reasoning was unsound. Fort Loncin had only held out for an hour or so, after the 16.4-inch howitzers had reached there. Namur had four forts and five fortius of the Liege type, constructed by the same engineer, defended by the same weight of guns. The next question was the proportion of numbers. The French- British forces on the right angle cornering on Namur were approxi- mately 300,000 men. Joffre had reason to anticipate the attack of a German army of 400,000 men, a serious enough disproportion in itself, but discounted by the fact that this army would be striking against a right angle and therefore unable to use the weight of a massed straight line. As a matter of fact, under von Kluck, von Biilow and von Wur- temburg combined, there were certainly 700,000 men and possibly 800,000. Even had Liege justified confidence in fortification, this over- whelming superiority in numbers was more than a menace, it was a prophecy of disaster. Reduction of the Forts of Namur. The Germans, however, had learned a lesson at Liege. They were not going to waste time and men by infantry attack on the forts of Namur. Two of the 42-centimeter (16.4-inch) siege guns, such as the two which had finally reduced the Liege forts, were seen by Allied scouts rolling over the Belgian plains a day or two before the attack on Namur. They were probably used. But, in any case, the Germans had thirty-two 28-centimeter guns, large enough to fire from beyond the reach of the fortress guns. Namur was doomed before the first shot was fired. At sundown of August 20, the Germans were in position, and the Second Army trained its heavy artillery on the forts. The Belgian guns were outranged. It was merely wasting ammunition to answer. One long-continued hail of high-explosive shell fell on the forts. Stone was blown to powder, wooden beams to splinters, while the vacuum produced by the explosion of a shell did not kill or wound, but prac- tically fused flesh, bone and blood into pulp. Even under these condi- tions the forts of Namur held out until August 23, though, as will be 3— w. L. • 34 THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM seen, the defense of the last two days meant nothing to the bulk of the German Army. Namur was settled in a few hours. Already, on the morning of the 21st, it was evident to the Germans that it could not stop their advance. The first clash between the Germans and the Allies was at hand, the fortified armor covering their operative corner having been incinerated in a tornado of fire. The battle was to join along Joffre's right angle, then, back of Namur, Charleroi being the actual corner. Lined up from the west was the British Expeditionary Force, a marvelous organization of fighting men, not civilian troops, like the French and German armies, but ''regulars." There were but 70,000 of these, and they took up the line from Conde through Mons to Binche. There, the Fifth French Army, with 120,000 men, under General Lanrezac, took up the line, holding the Charleroi corner and extending southeastward to Dinant. General Langle de Gary, with the Fourth French Army, also of 120,000 men, continued the southern line until he conjoined with the Third, under General Ruffey, which did not enter into this particular campaign. Numerical Superiority of the German Army. Opposite the British Expeditionary Force of 70,000 men was von Kluck's First German Army with 250,000 men. Their disposition is of importance. Two army corps, or 100,000 men (a German Army Corps, on a war footing, carries a reserve which makes it larger than a French or English Army Corps), were to the west of the westernmost part of the British line; two corps, or 100,000 men, were facing the 70,000 British ; and the fifth corps of 50,000 men was facing the weak! junction point between the French and British Commands. Von Biilow, with the Second German Army, also had five army corps, or 250,000 men, against Lanrezac 's 120,000; the Duke of Wurtemburg, with the Third German Army, had the same proportion. Moreover, though this was not known until long after, two cavalry divisions, under Gen- eral von Hansen, had come through the Ardennes and were ready to pierce through and aid the German drive at the Charleroi corner. The disproportion in numbers, however, was not fundamentally as great as it was tactically. The Germans were throwing most of their force forward. The French were holding theirs back. Figures were never given out for this period, but the conditions of fighting show that on August 20 the Allies had about 1,100,000 men in the field THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 35 (inclusive of Russia) and the Germans, 1,400,000. Germany's reserve military man-power, however, was far greater than that of the Allies, while the Allies' population-power, out of which trained man-power might slowly be brought, was greater than that of the Central Powers. A few cavalry skirmishes on Friday, August 21, marked the German realization that Namur was no obstacle. In the afternoon artillery fire began at Jemappes. Toward evening German artillery took up posi- tion against Charleroi and Thuin. A few shots were fired, to get the ranges. The stage was set for the Battle of Charleroi. The following morning, early, von Biilow attacked Charleroi in full strength. While it cannot be said that the French were unpre- pared, the reports from Namur, which showed that some of the forts were still holding, gave them little notice of the suddenness of the blow. Nor was the air scout work of the Allies yet sufficiently advanced to inform General Lanrezac of the forces opposing him. The Germans fought from six o'clock in the morning until nearly noon before they forced the bridge at Chatelet. Von Kluck swung sideways, between the British and French, and carried the bridge at Thuin, at two o'clock in the afternoon. Germans Win at Charleroi. The Fifth French Army, holding the point of the angle, was thus flanked on both sides. A hasty retreat was the only resort. Into the retreat, just as it began, plunged the mysterious von Hansen army, with two strong cavalry divisions. Lanrezac was on the point of anni- hilation. He fled, leaving behind him his wounded and many of his guns. It was a matter of minutes. Half an hour's delay would have caused the Fifth French Army to be surrounded and cut down. Satur- day evening was a wild flight, and midnight saw Charleroi in flames, although Turco and Zouave troops had charged back into the city several times and driven the Germans out in hand-to-hand fighting. The Germans failed before cold steel, but their artillery was irresistible. In order to shorten the line, the Fourth French Army promptly fell back on Philippeville, thus closing the gap almost created by von Hansen's impetuous push. Sunday, August 23, saw the French armies retreating rapidly, but in better order. The operative comer still held. None the less, the Namur-Charleroi battle was a decided victory for Germany. It has been stated that von Kluck had swung eastward, between the British and French lines, on Saturday afternoon, and had taken 36 THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM the bridge across the Sambre at Thuin. This not only flanked the French under Lanrezac, but it also flanked the British right. On the same day, moreover, von Kluck detached his cavalry and the western- most of his army corps. The cavalry he sent outward in a wide sweep beyond Tournai, the corps he put in motor transports and sent them on a forced advance west of Conde. Of both these movements, the British commander, Sir John French, was supremely ignorant. The cutting off of the British from the French, at Thuin, prevented direct communication between Lanrezac and Sir John French. The rout, which began at six o'clock in the evening, was of so complete a character that telegraph instruments were never set up. Two dispatch riders sent by Lanrezac to the British failed to arrive, being either shot or captured. German spies behind the lines cut Lanrezac 's wires to Headquarters. Retreat of the British From the Mons to the Mame. On Sunday morning, August 23, therefore, the British, holding the exposed Conde-Mons-Binche position, were uninformed as to the dis- aster at Charleroi. They did not know that their right flank was not 3nly unprotected, but actually flanked by one of von Kluck 's arm^ corps. Von Kluck, with admirable restraint, held back from attacking. The church bells rang. The morning services proceeded without inter- ruption. It was nearly one o^clock before British cavalry patrols hastened back with the news of a German advance through the woods. A few minutes before half-past one, the battle of Mons began. It developed rapidly. By two o'clock, the British lines were being severely shelled, and Sir John French, anticipating the fire of 300 guns, found more than 600 marshaled against him. At half-past three the German infantry attacked in mass formation. Their rifle fire was poor. The loss of life was heavy. The Germans fell back, and artillery duels resumed sway. In view of later knowledge it becomes possible to understand why von Kluck did not rush the British position on that Sunday. He had advantage enough in men and guns to have done so. As a matter of fact, he did not try to take the Mons position. He was employing the whole of two army corps and the halves of two others to keep the British engaged, while the rest of his force was engaged in flanking the British on both sides. It was good tactics. THE MAILED FIST STRIKES BELGIUM 37 Then, at five o'clock iu the evening, what Sir John French called **a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph" told of the Charleroi disaster and revealed to the British commander that he was outnumbered on the fighting line by three or four to one and in imminent danger of being flanked on both sides. ' Almost simultaneously came a second German attack. It was then that occurred one of the most curious of the psychic experiences of the war. German prisoners and British soldiers agreed that there sud- denly appeared, in the evening light, long lines of ghostly English archers, such as those of the wars of six centuries before, which ad- vanced across the Mons canal, shooting cloth-yard arrows at the Ger- mans. The attack suddenly lost its fury and died down. Dusk of that Sunday found the British Expeditionary Force in a desperate position. That evening the men of the Irish Rifles, the Middlesex Regiment, the Gordon Highlanders and other famous British regiments, held the advanced lines and even made brisk counter-offen- sives, to deceive the Germans, in their turn, to cause them to believe that the British were still unaware of the disaster at Charleroi. Such was the British situation, when in the cold gray of before-dawn on Monday, August 24, Sir John French ordered the great fighting retreat from the Mons to the Marne. CHAPTER III. THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR. The Greatest Fighting Retreat in History— Rival Strategies, German Mass^Drive and French Lozenge- British Expeditionary Army Cut to Pieces— The Ragged Legion, Mobilized in Taxi-Cabs, That Saved Paris— Joffre's Tactics— How Foch Won the Victory in Half-an-Hour. THE unliappy delay of the dispatch recounting the fall of Char- leroi, not received until 5 P. M. of that most important Sunday, August 23, 1914, left the British Expeditionary Force in an advanced position, twenty-four hours to the rear of the retreating French armies. This spelt one terrible word — Sacrifice. If the Germans were to be prevented from breaking through, if all Joffre's strategy was to be saved from hideous ruin, then the British Army must retreat slowly, fighting rearguard actions aU the way. It must allow itseK to be cut to pieces, bit by bit. The agony must be drawn out. Each day, each hour, was priceless. i The famous '' fighting retreat from Mons to the Mame" was a gigantic strategic plan, requiring the boldness of a big mind for its decision and the loyalty and courage of heroes for its carrying out. It meant the deliberate abandonment of a large section of Northern France and the establishment of a powerful line of defence pivoting on Verdun, the southern arm reaching to Belfort, the western arm to Paris. This decision of Joffre's was based upon the discovery that the fortifications of Namur could not support the G-reat Siege Guns. In that case, Joffre argued, the next line of defence along the lines of La Fere-Laon-Rheims was untenable. Sir John French had 80,000 men on the morning of the battle of Mons, including cavalry. Against him were 150,000 men under von Kluck, engaged in a frontal attack-, 50,000 men working forward to his left flank; and 20,000 cavalry, which had already flanked him on that fatal Saturday and Sunday, coming up on his left rear. In addition to these odds 100,000 men under von Biilow had driven through the Charleroi-Namur breach of the angle, as shown in the last chapter, and 38 THE MAENE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 39 were massed on his right. Von Hansen's cavalry, acting as a harassing force to the flying Fifth French Army, was on his right rear. The English force of 80,000 men was facing a German army of 300,000. Yet, despite this disproportion of numbers, the English dare not fall back on French support, for such action would smash all Joffre's strategy. The strategy saved France but cost England the flower of her army. To understand this necessity, the main principle of French strategy must be made clear. The principle of French strategy is the strategic square, or 'dia- mond, acting on the basis of a spring bent back to the utmost, which, when it is released, rebounds forward with tremendous force. Under this plan, the whole group of armies is divided into four parts, placed like the bases on a baseball diamond. One point, like second base, is pointed toward the enemy and is called the ''operative comer," two armies, like the first and third bases, respectively, are the "manoeuvr- ing masses," the last, corresponding to home base, is the "army of reserve. " It is a form of strategy based on achieving big results with the smallest possible number of men. German and Allied Strategy Compared. The principle of German strategy is that of hurling the largest possible force of men and metal on a given point in an opposing line, breaking the line, and as the ends of the line close in to try and piece it together again, flanking the converging ends, rolling the army in on itself and, in military language, "annihilating it." Given, as in the case of the beginning of the world war, a larger force and a heavier weight of metal on the German than on the Allied side, the German strategy is sure of success, provided the opposing forces are also in formation of line. Note, however, how Joffre 's strategy vitiates this plan. A big army must spread out over a long line. There is a definite limit to the amount of traffic a road or a bridge can carry in a given time. "When, therefore, the massed line strikes an opposing point, it is not necessarily heavier at that point than the defending force. Moreover, it is in the discretion of the defending general to swing his two armies of manoeuvre either to right or left, together, and strike the opposing force at an unexpected point. Therefore, the opposing force dare not weaken its whole line to help the middle which is in contact. 40 THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR Since the point of the diamond is only an advance point, it can retreat. Indeed, it is expected to do so. That is what it is there to do. But a retreat is not a flight. On the contrary, every mile taken to the rear shortens the transport of supply, and brings the point of the diamond back on the manoeuvring masses and the reserve army. It is like pulling an arrow back to its head. If the string then be released the arrow springs forward with tremendous energy. That was exactly this position of the Retreat to the Marne. The British Army was the point, at second base; Verdun was first base, Conde was third base, and Paris was home base. The British Army, as the operative point, therefore, dared not let the enemy flank it, for then von Biilow would break inside the square. It must retreat in the shape of an inverted V, fighting all the while at the apex and on both flanks, until it made connections with the masses of manoeuvre, who were also retreating. Being twenty-four hours behind in starting the retreat, there was a gap. That gap was the danger. The "Fighting Retreat" to the Mame. At 4 o 'clock in the morning, the retreat began. It was covered by a gallant attack on Binche, by a couple of regiments, designed to con- vince the Germans that the British were advancing. Few men re- turned alive from that charge. In the half-light the Germans attacked furiously, and Sir John French, fearing a charge along the whole line ordered the First Division forward as though to retake Binche. It was heavily punished, but the Second Corps withdrew on the Quarouble- Dour-Frameries line, the right, however, suffering heavy losses. The British cavalry were then brought into play, and General Allenby, who later was to become famous in the Palestine campaign, charged on the German flank. The 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars ran into a wire entanglement and were cut to pieces. The arrival of the 19th Infantry Brigade somewhat strengthened the left, at a crucial moment, but the continued retirement of the French meant that the British must go, also. They were a day behind, and therefore exposed to the full fury of the foe. The night of August 24-25 found the British on the Bavai-Maubeuge line, and a slight slackening on the right showed that the German hoped to entice the British commander to make a stand there. Maubeuge was a fortress of the first rank, but, as Sir John French put the matter: **The THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 41 determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position. . . . The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also owing to the exhaustion of my troops.** Indeed, by the morning of August 25, matters were grave for the British. Whereas, on Sunday morning. Sir John French had faced von Kluck*s army of 250,000 men, on Sunday afternoon this had been raised to 300,000 by the addition of von Hansen's cavalry and during Monday at least one army corps from von Bulow was attacking or preparing to attack, near Maubeuge. On the other hand, counting all branches, the British had raised their numbers to 82,500 men, less the casualties of Sunday and Monday, certainly not less than 7,500 men. The odds at this point, then, were 300,000 to 75,000. The British Army Greatly Exhausted. It has already been shown that the British Army was twenty hours in arrear of the retreat schedule, owing to the failure to communicate the fall of Charleroi, but it must also be mentioned that Joffre 's strategic plan of falling back to the Rhine inevitably forced on the British the longest distance to travel, for the line was pivoting on Verdun. Two things, only, were in the British favor. The first was that the Germans, trying to envelop, were all the time on the outside of the arc and thus had even further to go. Sometimes this makes a great difference, for modern armies can only travel on good roads. The other was that the railroads and the excellent highways of France were in Sir John French's hands, ready for use, if he could but cover his retreat. The Allied lines were shortening and strengthening with every mile south, the German lines were lengthening and weakening with every mile of ad- vance. The strategy of the square was in operation ; the spring was be- ing bent back. Tuesday, August 25, was a critical day. Sir John French gave the army only four hours ' sleep, and a detachment sent back to intrench the Le Gateau line did not have any sleep at all. Through the day the army retired steadily, fighting rearguard actions all the while. General Allenby's cavalry, though men and horses were dropping with fatigue, fought all the long day through. 42 THE MAENE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR liate in the evening, amid all the confusion of trying to make camp, the First Division of the Fir^t Army Corps, under General Haig, was suddenly pounced upon by an advance guard of von Kluck's army, at Maroilles. Out of the night came sudden relief. A few companies of the Fifth French Army appeared, as though from nowhere, and helped the British. These French troops were off their road, for the main army was being pursued hot-foot by von Bulow. At ten o'clock Haig reached Landrecies, his men at their last gasp. Yet, before he made camp, Haig took the precaution of putting up barbed wire defenses and the machine guns were placed to command the entry to the little town. The men lay down to sleep. They had not slept ten minutes when a full division of the German 9th Army Corps was at them. Staggering like drunken men from weariness, the Guards Bri- gade drove back the foe with heavy loss. They lay down on the ground to sleep again, but, three hours later, Haig inexorably roused them to the rearward march again. It took seasoned troops to endure such ter- rible handling. The Glorious Stand of Le Cateau. That same evening, the Second Army Corps, under General Smith- Dorrien, found itself in eqiially desperate straits. It reached Le Ca- teau by a more westerly route, some battalions having marched thirty miles. Many of the men dropped to sleep without waiting for food. To wake them was almost an impossibility. Sir John French sent word to General Sordet's Cavalry Corps, asking for support. He received reply that the horses were too esjiausted to move. So, with constant attacks and skirmishes, passed the night of August 25-26. Stiff, haggard, hungry and nerve-racked the British Army stood to arms before daybreak of August 26, dogged will-power forcing a gal- vanic obedience to commands which had become impossible to fatigue-dulled consciousness. At the extreme left, a single division was compelled to resist a terrific attack from at least three Army Corps. So fierce and heavy was this drive that Smith-Dorrien reported it to be more dangerous to retreat than to stand. Words could not say more. Sir John French answered that if he must fight, he must, but to break off the action at the very first moment possible. He had not so much as a platoon to spare to send him. Fortunately, a loose body of French Territorials under General d'Amade was forming to the west and these kept Smith-Dorrien from being flanked. Somehow, anyhow — they THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 43 never knew how themselves — one and a half British corps, at the break- ing point of exhaustion, fought five German corps, including some crack German troops, fresh for the fray. x\nd, when the whole Prussian Guards Cavalry Division charged one infantry brigade of 1200 men, it was thrown back "with heavy loss and in absolute disorder." If this seem too extraordinary for belief, it is to be remembered that these were the British ** regulars," not a militia army, and war has always fihown the marvelous power of veterans in staving off attacks, even of the most overpowering character. Against such enormous odds, no offset of gallantry and training could long endure, however, and at 3.30 in the afternoon, to escape annihilation, retirement was attempted. ''The movement," says Sir John French, "was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself suffered heavily. . . . Fortunately, the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit." This was termed, even in the cold dispatches of Sir John French, "the glorious stand" of Le Cateau, and though it cost the British 5,000 men at least, enemy casualties were far heavier. On this same day, the French forces, which had been forming to the west, took rapid shape, and by the evening of September 26, Gen- eral Manoury's army, which was to do so much in saving Paris, pro- tected the British flank. When Smith-Dorrien dropped south, he was not alone, the French were beside him. Von Kluck 's enveloping move- ment, which had threatened the whole position for four continuous days and nights, was checked. Large Depletion of the British Expeditionary Force. The First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, however, was by no means out of danger. It had retreated on Guise, and, dangerous though the policy might be, a halt of several hours was made for food and rest. The army suffered from this delay next day, when the Second Munster Fusilliers were cut off and either killed or captured to a man. On the 28th, very heavy cavalry detachments of the enemy harassed the British, but the rear-guard actions were annoying rather than dangerous. On the 29th the First Corps halted near St. Quentin. (Lest the reader be confused by the names of the British generals, it may be said that there was but one British Army, commanded by Sir 44 THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR John French, comprising the First and Second Army Corps, com- manded respectively by Generals Haig and Smith-Dorrien.) General Joffre was at last in a position to come to the British relief. General Manoury, ^vith the Sixth French Army, moved up to cover the British left; the Fifth French Army, under Lanrezac, which had borne the brunt of the Charleroi fight, moved west to cover the British right. The British Army, what was left of it, retired without opposition to a point north of the Aisne between Compiegne and Soissons. Official figures have not been given out, indeed, they have been scrupulously withheld, yet there is reason to suppose that not more than 30,000 reached that line. Many detachments which were lost, or strayed, turned up later, but it is sure that over one-third of the British Expeditionary Force was on the casualty list after the heroic ''four days' battle" which marked the first stage of the Retreat from Mons to the Marne. Military Wisdom of the Retreat to the Marne. It will be clear to the reader that two French armies had advanced to cover the British. They would therefore have to sustain the shock of stopping the pursuing German hosts. It came at once. In the west. General Manoury, knowing that his army was as yet loosely thrown together, and realizing the danger of being outflanked, only felt the German pressure and retreated slowly towards Paris, keeping von l^luck on the move. In the centre of the line, however, these tactics were impossible. Between Guise and St. Quentin, the Fifth Army (which at this point had its command transferred from General Lanrezac to General d'Esperey) not only stood ready for the contact with the oncoming invaders, but counter-attacked furiously, driving back the German Guard and the Guard Reserve Corps. The next day, the Germans were again checked at Rethel. This is not a history of military tactics, but of the war as a whole, so it will be better not to confuse the main issue by further tactical details of the retreat to the Marne. But, that the superlative strategy of Joffre in this campaign may be made clear, it is necessary to show why it was military wisdom to retreat so far. Ferris words the matter neatly when he says: *'Joffre was putting von Kluck on the horns of a dilemma of which it would be difficult to say which would be the more THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 45 fatal: to assault Paris with all the Allied armies intact; or to refuse and attack those armies on ground that they had chosen." Just for a moment, let the first horn of the dilemma be considered. Paris could not be taken by direct assault ; that was out of the question. It would have to be invested all around. Now the ring of the outer forts of Paris has a circumference of nearly a hundred miles. It would take half a million men to invest Paris with a sufficiently strong wall of steel. Germany could not spare so many men, at least not with the Allied armies intact. Her line of communications would be broken at once, and that would be the end of it. The Allied armies, therefore, must be beaten first. But, to do so, the Germans had to defeat them on their own chosen ground, with reinforcements growing daily, with excellent railroad supply bases, with an intimate knowledge of the ground, and with a heavy mass of untired reserves behind. On the German side, the men were wearied, bad lost heavily, and their line of communication was long. Positions of the Opposing Forces. ' No matter which policy the German High Command adopted, Paris was at a dangerous point. She would either be the central point of attack, in which case the masses of manoeuvre would swing behind, or she would be the pivot of a central attack somewhere between herself and Rheims. On August 1, the government commenced to evacuate Paris ; on September 2, the diplomats and ministers left ; on September .3, the proclamation was made that the seat of the French government had been established in Bordeaux. The failure of the Germans to force Nancy, an engagement known as Le Grand Cournonne of Nancy, and which ended on September 4, Avas a determining factor in deciding the Germans to attack towards the western end of the line. General Sarrail, with the Third French Army, had succeeded in holding the pivotal point of Verdun, ever since the first day of the war — thanks as much to the amazingly bad general- ship of the German Crown Prince as to French gallantry — and the German decision to strike between Paris and Rheims was based upon the mistaken assumption that Joffre's reserves were behind Verdun, at the eastern end of the line. On that same day, September 4, French aviators reported that von Kluck was wheeling to the southeastward. Evidently, then, the main attack was not to be made on Paris. 46 THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR ■ Just for clearness, it is well to review the opposed forces, naming them from the west, as before. First came the First German Army, under von Kluck, facing Paris; next came the Second German Army, under von Btilow; then came von Hansen's interposing force, now added to by two Saxon corps and the Prussian Guard; next came the Third German Army, under the Duke of Wurtemberg; next came the Crown Prince's Army. Facing these were, first, the now firmly organ- ized Sixth French Army, under General Manoury, which had been facing von Kluck in the retreat. It lay northeast of Paris. Next came the forces under General Gallieni, which formed Paris' defending* army, including the famous Ragged Legion of Paris. Next, to the rear, in reserve, was the British Expeditionary Force, now raised in force to nearly 100,000 men by continual reenf orcements from England. Next came the Fifth French Army, formerly under General Lanrezac, but now under General d'Esperey, facing von Biilow. Next came Joffre's surprise, the spiral of the spring, the army of reserve, a pow- erful, fresh, well-equipped army under France ''s greatest tactician. General Foch; it faced von Hansen. Next came the Fourth French Army, still under General Langle de Cary ; it faced the Duke of Wur- temburg. General Sarrail, with the Third French Army at Verdun, faced the Crown Prince of Germany, as he had done from the beginning. The Battle of the Marne Begins. The reader will do well to observe that the weight of numbers lay with the French. The Germans had added only the Saxon Corps and the Prussian Guard to the original line. France had added General Manoury 's Army, General Gallieni 's Army, the absolutely new French Seventh Army, under General Foch, and the British reinforcements. The odds were now about five to four in favor of the French. Besides which, they had the enormous advantage of position. The Battle of the Marne began on Saturday afternoon, September 5, and the first offensive movement was taken by Manoury. Learning from air scouts that von Kluck was massing his men to the south, evi- dently driving at the gap between Paris and the Fifth Army, held by the British, Manoury decided to flank von Kluck. It took just one hour to give both Manoury and von Kluck an unpleasant surprise apiece. Manoury found that von Kluck 's artillery, especially when defending a small stream (the Ourcq), was a terrific THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 47 obstacle to encounter, even when only reserves were behind it. Von Kluck found that Manoury's force was far more dangerous than he had supposed it to be. Manoury's sudden flank attack made hash of the plans of the First German Army. All that Saturday night, von Kluck 's men had to march back, to be ready to face Manoury in the morning. Manoury, on his part, did not need to be told that von Kluck would recoil. Joffre shifted reserves to Paris. Every taxi-cab, motor bus and private automobile in Paris rushed troops to Manoury in the early dawn. Twelve and fourteen men piled into and onto a single taxi-cab. They hung on the outside, like insects on a leaf; they were packed, on the inside, like sardines in a can. But it was easier and quicker than marching. By 9 o'clock that morning Manoury's army had been rein- forced by 70,000 troops. The army was lamentably weak in artillery, however, for field guns cannot be loaded into taxi-cabs. All Sunday, notwithstanding, Manoury held von Kluck at a standstill. JofFre's Strategical Manoeuvre. That same Sunday morning, early, the British ambushed two bodies of cavalry, which von Kluck had posted as a precaution against a flank attack, if the British should move north. They did move north. They caught the cavalry by advancing through a wood. They turned shrapnel on them, like a blast from the pit. Into the struggling mass of men and horses the English cavalry swept and finished the rout. The fortress of Maubeuge fell on Monday, sending reenforcements to von Kluck, whose army was far stronger than that of Manoury. On Monday, therefore, von Kluck commenced to flank Manoury; on Tues- day he did flank him; on Wednesday he almost encircled him, and pre- pared to swallow him on Thursday. It was a most successful movement — for von Kluck. It remained to see whether it was a successful or a wise manoeuvre for the whole strategical plan of the German High Command. Joffre, seeing his chance, bade the British feel out von Kluck 's left wing, not driving him back, but, if possible, decoying him forward. It is this manoeuvre, little understood, which gave rise to the mistake made by some magazine writers to the effect that the British failed to drive forward to help the French at the Mame. They didn't drive. They decoyed. Mark what this meant! It meant that all von Kluck 's 48 THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OP THE WAR army was being led westward, the northern wing by Manoury, the southern wing by the British. The German main attack was south- eastward. There was, therefore, a steadily thinning German line, and a highly dangerous gap was appearing between von Kluck and von Biilow. The Fifth French Army, under d'Esperey, had been reenforced by three reserve corps and had become a powerful army of 250,000 men. With the aid of English heavy artillery, lent for the purpose, this army steadily pushed back von Biilow on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, crossing the Marne and holding the bridgeheads. Von Biilow was eager to flank d'Esperey '^s left, but every time he did so, he came in contact with the slowly advancing British. More Strategy by French Generals. Leaving the new army, Foch's Seventh Army (in some reports miscalled the Ninth), for the moment, it may be pointed out that on this same Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, General Langle de Gary had held firm, and General Sarrail could not be budged from Verdun. There was a tempting chance to drive forward and hit the Crown Prince a blow on Tuesday, but the commanders of both these French armies rejected it as weakening Joffre's main strategic plan. The blow was reserved for Foch. On Sunday, Foch, in command of one of the strongest French armies (300,000 men, including reserves), sagged back under the driving blows of von Hansen, though the latter had one of the weakest German armies (probably 225,000 men). On Monday, Foch sagged still further. On Tuesday, whether following the manoeuvre or whether suddenly embarrassed by his own tactics, the Seventh French Army bent back very awkwardly. General d'Esperey lent Foch an extra army corps to help cover his left. On Wednesday, at midday, the Germans were in full position to break through between Foch and Langle de Cary. Foch's left had stood firm, but his right had sagged back ten miles. Langle de Cary had stood firm. There was thus a ten-mile-wide diagonal gap between Foch's right and Langle de Cary's army. Von Hansen, wild with eagerness, thinned his line of all the men he could afford to hurl them into this gap, forgetting, as he did so, that he was thinning them at a very dangerous point, just where- the plateau of Champagne drops suddenly to the marshes of St. Gond. THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 49 At midday, Jb'och, with a liait'-smile, ordered the Forty-second Divi- sion, one of the crack corps of the French Army, to fall back and rest. All that afternoon, while the skies grew blacker and blacker with a coming thunderstorm and the cannons rumbled louder than the thunder, the Forty-second Division lay grumbling on the grass with piled arms, hearing the battle only two miles away. And von Hansen, with the piercing of the line dangling before his grasp, ever sent more and more men to the southeast. At exactly four o'clock in the afternoon, the Forty-second Division, rested and eager, received its long-awaited orders. It was ordered to advance through the pine woods, and, taking up position among the trees, to charge forward at five o'clock to the minute. Meantime, an order was sent along the whole French line, bidding them stiffen their resistance at five o'clock, and be ready for a counter-attack. The spring was now drawn tight. Von Hausen's Wild and Panic-Stricken Flight. Came five o'clock! Out from the pine woods, shouting with the terrible joy of battle, leaped the Forty-second Division. For a moment the roar of French cries drowned the tumult of the artillery, and then unnumbered batteries of the ''Soixante-Quinze," the French 75-milli- metre gun, came galloping to the front. That was, throughout the war, the best field weapon, but never did the gunners work as they did that evening. The Prussian Guard, thinned to a mere shadow of a line by von Hansen's impetuous attempt to force Foch's right wing, could give no more resistance to the French than a paper hoop gives to a circus rider. So furious was the French charge of fresh, well-rested troops, conscious that they were Victory's own thunderbolt, that the Prussian Guard had no time to flee. It was trodden underfoot. The shouting lines went through! The extra army corps which d'Esperey had lent to Foch, on the left, followed on the heels of the Forty-second. The very horses of the batteries seemed to know that they were galloping for France, and the guns whirled forward, unlimbered, fired, limbered and galloped forward again. The right flank of von Hansen's Saxon army was cut to pieces. German communication was excellent. In fifteen minutes voii 4— W.L. 50 THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR Hausen learned that his right was broken. His whole army was thus practically entrapped in that gap into which Foch had decoyed him. Five minutes later, von Hausen learned that his line was pierced. The great German drive, to which forty-five years of unceasing military preparation had been given, halted, wavered and went to pieces. At twenty minutes past five, Foch hurled his reserves forward. No longer were the French retreating, no longer need they shame- facedly pass through villages they were deserting to the foe. The whole force of the strategic square was released. Flight, wild and panic-stricken, was von Hansen's only resource. He turned and fled, the vengeful furies of France close on his heels. The Finish of the Battle of the Mame. The thunderstorm, which had held off long enough to allow the French to charge and break the line, now broke over the heads of the Germans in a torrent of rain. Woe for their heavy artillery, then! The roads, rapidly turning to sticky mud, prevented escape, while the lighter 75 's could still pursue. The French red-trousered infantry, in the delirious fever of success, could not, would not stop. Hour after hour through that rainy night, the dripping trees saw a slaughter grim and great. Tens of thousands were slain, thousands of prisoners were captured, hundreds of guns fell into French hands and vast stores of ammunition became part of the prize. Midnight came. Foch was willing to halt, but, wise old soldier that he was, he knew the driving power of a victorious army. Von Hausen, who had allowed himself to be decoyed southwards, had a long way to go before he could regain touch with the German armies, which, on the same day, had been pushed northwards. Not until early morn- ing did the French officers compel the men to halt, and brave men who had fought all day and all night wept with rage that their hands were stayed, even then. Foch was inexorable. He had established his head- quarters in La Fere Champenoise, twenty-five miles in advance of his iieadquarters of the night before. He had established his connections >vith Langle de Gary on the right and d'Esperey on the left. Before him yawned a gap in the German line, where once von Hansen's army had been. By seven o'clock of the evening of the flight, von Kluck had received news of von Hansen's disaster. With the prize of Manoury's THE MARNE— DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR 51 army practically in his hands, he was forced to retire, and that swiftly. Otherwise, Foch, advancing next day, could cut off the First and Second German Armies from the Third and Fourth. It was patent that Joffre planned such an offensive. Von Kluck, a really able general, saw his danger. Deep-cut with rage and chagrin, he withdrew his army from the terrible horseshoe into which Manoury had been forced, and re- treated all night long, northeastward. Von Biilow did likewise. When the morning of Thursday, , September 6, shed light enough for air scouts to reconnoitre, the full measure of Foch's hammer-blow became apparent. One German army had been annihilated, two were retreating in haste. Manoury had escaped from the dangerous trap by only a few hours; Paris was relieved; the British, practically untouched in the battle, were moving forward; d'Esperey was advanc- ing in full force; Foch, like a giant rejoicing in his strength, held an advanced position; Langle de Gary was on the move; and Sarrail, at Verdun, had held the pivotal key with a stubborn gallantry that resisted alike the mass of men and weight of metal. Paris was saved. The Allied armies were intact. The German drive was recoiling, whipped. The great conflict on the result of which the German Empire had placed its whole dependence was over. The Battle of the Mame was won ! CHAPTER IV. THE COMPUXSIOK OF TRENCH WARFARE. The Germans Hurled Back In Confusion— Voa Zwehl and the Siege Gan»— The Defeated Hosts "Dig la" to Get a Foothold— Crossing the Alsne, First and Second Phases— The Bombardment of Rheim»— Vandalism of the Cathedral— Beginning of Four Years' Deadlock. IT happens not infrequently in war that the finest generalship is shown during a retreat, not during a victory. The British retreat from Mons to the Marne proved Generals French, Haig and Smith- Dorrien to be commanders of the most supreme ability. The same period showed up Lanrezac's weakness, and, as has been mentioned, he was superseded by General d'Esperey. The German retreat from the Marne to the Aisne, covering the period September 8-12, 1918, told the same lessons. General von Kluck demonstrated himself to be an able commander. Although Manoury, the British, and d'Esperey were all on his heels, he extricated his army in good order. He handled his rearguard actions with firmness and fierceness, though his troops were punished severely by the nimble and deadly French 75 's. He began his retreat, as has been said, on the evening of Wednesday, September 9, the day of the final victory of the Marne. That same evening, von Hansen was in flight, not in retreat. The French pursued him all night. He was unable to re-form at all. It was a most disgraceful rout. The German General Staff promptly forced von Hansen to relinquish his command, a pretext of illness being given, and the Saxon forces were divided between von Kluck and von Billow. The latter general had not been faced with any great difficulty in the first part of his retreat, for, during the four days ' Battle of the Marne, he had been forced steadily to the northward, holding his line in good order. When, however, Foch commenced to march forward on that drench- ing morning of Thursday, September 10, after the Victory of the Marne, von Billow's troubles commenced. Knowing every yard of the 52 THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE 53 ground, Foch drove at the two flanks of von Billow's army, bending it in on itself. Ordinarily, this would be bad tactics, for such an arc strengthens the opposing army, but Foch knew that between the two horns of the enemy's forces were the Marshes of St. Gond. Now, marshes are a very different question before and after a heavy rain. Twenty-four hours before, von Biilow had not troubled much about the low-lying land. But a torrential downpour all night, and still continu- ing, made those marshes boggier every minute. Before evening, in ypite of the difficulty of moving his men, Foch turned von Billow's flank and almost the whole of two German army corps were flung into Ihe slimy mud. The French General magnanimously forbade the artil- lery to fire on the entrapped invaders. About 2,000 men perished, 60,000 were made prisoners and forty large guns were taken. This quickened von Billow's retreat to the Aisne. Friday, September 11, was occupied by the two German commanders in taking up position3 on the new line of defense. Germany's Defense of the Aisne. This line was of unexampled strength. A well-known strategist, writing of the Battles of the Aisne, says of the position; ''From the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, there is no natural line so strong as that which was then taken up by the Germans." There were sev- eral minor shifts of line, but for clearness only that one will be men- tioned which formed the basis for the final intrenchment. This line ran, roughly, through Noyon, Vic-sur-Aisne, Soissons, Craonne, then dipped down towards Rheims, Ville-sur-Tourbe, Varennes and Forges, a small place on the Meuse, north of Verdun. The key of this position was a triangular wooded height known Si^ the Craonne plateau. The base of this triangle is the steep cliff or series of cliffs commanding the River Aisne, running from Vic to Craonne. Between Vic and Noyon the plateau slopes gently but domi- natingly down to the valley of the Oise ; on the east, between Craonne and Laon, it comes down sharply; while the slope to the north is grad- ual, facilitating German transport. From Rethel to Vic run bluffs from 400 to 700 feet high, overlooking the river, with natural spurs jutting out from point to point to enfilade the stream and banks. Events on the Aisne showed that the German General Staff had not been blind to the possibility of non-success in their first drive. The 54 THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE engineer corps of the several armies engaged in the attack did not join in the advance to the Marne. For more than a week, work had been proceeding night and day on the Craonne plateau, with the intention of creating an invulnerable fortress, strong as the Rock of Gibraltar. Long before the war, plans had been drawn up for the defense of the Aisne. The time had come for Germany to put them into effect. Every spur was bristling with guns and there was not a bridge which was not under the concentrated fire of both heavy and light artillery. It will be recalled that Maubeuge had fallen on Monday, Septem- ber 7, during the actual progress of the Battle of the Marne. The defense of Maubeuge was heroic, but, viewed from the movement of the war as a whole, its importance lay only in one fact. Its resistance kept General von Zwehl and the siege guns employed there so long that the heavy artillery employed in the reduction of that fortress was not available for any part of the Battle of the Marne. Had von Hansen's advance, for example, been protected by von Zwehl 's guns, Foch would have never been able to break through and the Battle of the Marne would have been a very different story. Guns Hauled by German Military Slaves. On Tuesday, September 8, the great guns commenced to crawl forward. On Wednesday came the German disaster, and, in the evening, the terrific rainstorm. Von Zwehl, who was well informed as to the plans of the General Staff, realized that after von Hausen's defeat, it was imperative that he should get his guns as rapidly as possible to the defensive lines on the Aisne. But the rain poured in torrents. The thirteen traction engines could not move the guns alone and von Zwehl set the infantry at hauling them, with long ropes, hun- dreds of men to a fourth part of a gun. Like the slaves of Egypt who built the pyramids, von Zwehl 's military slaves toiled under blows, curses and threats of death. During the last twenty-four hours of the march, the 18,000 troops and the guns covered forty-one miles. This seems incredible, but it v/as so. Human nature rebelled and red mutiny showed its head for a second, but von Zwehl had a nature as hard as the steel of his guns. Every murmurer was shot dead in his tracks. The death-potent monsters crawled on. The guns reached Laon at 6 A. M. of September 13, and before seven o'clock they were In position and in action. THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE 55 If von Zwehl had been a day later, the Germans would have lost the possibility of holding the Aisne, for, under that battle-scarred old warrior, was not only the heavy siege train intended for the reduction of Paris, but also most of the heavy artillery belonging to von Kluck's and von Billow's armies, which they had left in his charge in order to lighten their movements in pursuit of the supposedly fleeing French and British. But von Zwehl got there, and the stupendous roar that was mouthed across the Aisne Valley at seven o'clock that Sunday morning warned the Allied Forces that the heaviest artillery the world had ever seen was in position against them. It took four years to dislodge von Zwehl 's guns. The Crossing of the Aisne. Since the famous ''Crossing of the Aisne" by the British, on Sep- termer 13, 1914, has been pronounced "one of the greatest military feats in modern history," it is of interest to mark what was done and how it was done. The Aisne is a wide, unfordable, sluggish river. Every foot, yes, every inch, of it was under big-gun, howitzer, machine- gun and rifle fire. The guns were under the direction of von Zwehl, and no man alive understood artillery better. That same morning, more- over, the already enormous armies of von Kluck and von Billow had been reenforced by the arrival of a supporting army under Field Mar- shal von Heeringen, who was released from the Alsace-Lorraine cam- paign by the failure of the French to achieve more than a series of local victories at heavy cost. Von Heeringen at once took the position of generalissimo over von Billow and von Kluck. That put a masterly tactician in command of the operations on the Aisne. The British task was to cross the river and storm an impregnable height, against heavy odds, under a withering fire. A Third Army Corps, under General Pulteney, had been added to the army, the Second still being under Dorrien-Smith and the First under Haig. Sir John French, of course, was commander-in-chief. At daybreak, September 13, Pulteney 's corps advanced on Soissons. The engineers succeeded in putting a pontoon bridge across with a loss of half their number. Howitzer fire promptly destroyed the bridge. A regiment of French Turcos went across in rowboats and had a fierce struggle in the streets of Soissons, but achieved nothing. Pulteney then tried to cross by the destroyed bridge at Venizel. Under a hail of 56 THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE ehrapnel the engineers repaired the bridge and four regiments — or parts of them — crossed and gathered at Bucy-de-Long early in the afternoon, under the direct fire of the great hill of Vregny. There was no shelter, each minute meant deaths by scores, so Pulteney's men worked swiftly down into a little ravine and there intrenched. The heights frowned above them, but, at least, they were across the river. Few they were, and unsupported. The Second Army Corps, under Smith-Dorrien, tried to force the bridge at Conde, soon after daybreak. That was simply inviting anni- hilation, and had to be abandoned. The British gommander then divided his force into two detachments, east and west of the bridge. By pontoons, both got over. That was a case, also, of hasty intrench- ing. Deaths averaged a hundred a minute. A few men had been rafted over during the night near Missy, three at a time on a raft. It was courageous, but useless. For sixteen days those men had to stay in their dug-outs without food, their only water what they could snatch at night, between star-shells. Storming the Heights of the Aisne. An Irish and Scotch brigade of the First Corps, under Haig, fought like Paladins. The bridge at Arcy had been destroyed, but one girder still spanned the stream. Even under the most favorable circumstances, it would have been walking giddy enough to turn the brain. Under the hail of shell, of machine-gun fire and of rifle fire it was a feat appar- ently beyond the nerves of any man. The brigade went across it. Not a man hesitated, though many a hundred fell dead into the stream below. V, Sunday night beheld a lurid flame of battle hitherto unseen in the world. The whole length of the Aisne River cliffs was red as though under a Bengal fire flare from the continuous spitting of the guns. Searchlights played maliciously up and down, star shells and calcium balloons burst or floated above the valley. In that evil light, of red, of yellow and of ghastly white coruscations, amid the never-ceasing rever- beration of the cannonade, engineer companies worked to construct bridges, till the last man was killed, and then other companies stepped forward to take their place. In the teeth of a sinister hissing of bullets and shrapnel, small bodies of infantry moved forward to cross and join their comrades in the trenches on the other side. Most fell, but some got over. It took all the roar of the cannonade to overpower with THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE 57 its noise the sound of moaning that rose from the wounded in that stricken valley. To the east, that same Sunday, the Fifth French Army, under d*Esperey, crossed, without great difficulty. Their task lay ahead of them, for the Craonne plateau, at that point, sloped down to the plain rather than to the river. . Monday was notable for the German defense of a sugar factory, which was held in a manner worthy of the best traditions of war. The British attacked with two regiments, then with three, with four and with five. The Germans hurled them back. Twice the Teutons were driven out. Twice they forced their way in again. Not until the Guards were added and the Germans were outnumbered more than two to one did they give ground. Most of them died at their posts. That sugar factory held back an entire army corps for more than half a day. By evening, however, Haig had made good an intrenched posi- tion on the plateau itself, which held for more than three weeks of severe fighting. Haig never talks of himself, but he said once: "The greatest triumph the men under my command achieved in this war, in my opinion, was the storming of the heights of the Aisne." Western Phase of the Battle of the Aisne. Von Heeringen and von Zwehl were a difficult combination to out- manoeuvre. The next day, Tuesday, September 15, they launched a whirlwind counter-offensive against Manoury, with the Sixth French Army, intrenched at Nampcel, at the extreme west of the line. The French were crumpled up and thrown back like pieces of paper before a gale. The Germans regained control of the spurs guarding the Aisne near the Morsain ravine. There was no chance on the east, either, to catch the Iron General of the Guns napping. The Fifth French Army fought with great gal- lantry on Wednesday, but the natural steepness of the Craonne pla- teau, mounting that incredible quantity of guns, was too strong a force. On Thursday, Manoury, on the west, revenged himself and retook the quarries. This eased the pressure on the British line. Then von Zwehl 's artillery drove him out again. With each new attack, the Germans launched a fresh bombardment at the city of Soissons. At last Manoury managed to make a strong enough intrenchment to hold the quarries and that end of the line was deadlocked. 58 THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE These six days, then, September 13-18, constituted what may be called the Western Phase of the Battle of the Aisne. It proved, beyond a doubt, two things. Of these the first was that man-power alone, no matter of what courage and gallantry, cannot storm heights held by modem machine-gun fire. The other was that no direct gun fire, how- ever powerful, can force men out of well-made trendies. On the 18th, then, Manoury was in the quarries, the British Third Corps had some small bodies of men intrenched on the northern bank of the river, but could do nothing further ; the Second Corps was in a similar position ; Haig, with the First Corps, had secured a footing on the plateau, but could not advance, being unsupported; d'Esperey, with the Fifth French Army, had found Craonne impregnable. If the Ger- mans had not succeeded in their attack, they had done so in their defense. The deadlock was absolute. The Eastern Phase of the Battle of the Aisne centered around Rheims, and entirely different armies were brought into play. The defense of the Craonne plateau had been divided between the First German Army, under von Kluck ; the Second German Army, under von Billow, and the Seventh German Army, which had come up with von Heeringen. It had, also, the heavy siege trains, under von Zwehl. Opposing it, as has been shown, were the Sixth French Army, under Manoury; the British Army, under Sir John French; and the Fifth French Army, under d'Esperey. Futile Attempts to Dislodge the French Armies. On the line from Craonne to Metz were the German Third Army, under the Duke of Wurtemburg; and the Fifth German Army, under the German Crown Prince. Opposing them were, respectively, the Seventh French Army, under Foch; and the Fourth French Army, under Langle de Cary. The attack began suddenly on Friday, September 18, when the Duke of Wurtemburg threw his right wing forward against Foch, under the direct leadership of the generalissimo, von Heeringen. It was a sharp blow, well delivered, and Foch fell back. He took up a position at Souain and was hard driven to it to keep his line intact. However, the wizard-like handling of the French batteries of 75 's saved the day, and by nightfall Foch had brought up his reserves and Joffre had sent reenforcements. Foch, the master tactician, placed and intrenched his THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE 59 troops in such wise that they were not to be reached by the distant heavy artillery. If the Germans were to break into Rheims, they would only be safe if Foch were out of the way. Since artillery would not reach, they must carry Foch's position by assault. Against Foch's troops, lightly intrenched between Pouillon and the Mountain of Rheims, von Heeringen threw enormous masses of men. At irregular intervals, for four days and nights, the gray-clad battalions flung forward. But while the French had no such heavy artillery as the Germans, they had not acted in vain when they had ordered the Creusot works to turn out the 75-mm. guns by hundreds. Against German mass-drives those light field guns — much more power- ful than their three-inch calibre indicates — cut swathes of death. Again and again and yet again von Heeringen ordered the charge. As many times it was hurled back. The night of September 19-20 was the culmination. Four successive attacks were made on that one night. And when bright sunshine burst on the scene next morning, the French lines still stood firm, while, so far as the eye could see, lay little heaps and long lines of gray figures, some moving feebly, but most of them still. Two Thousand German Hussars Annihilated. The Battle of the Aisne, indeed, was over, but September 26 was to see an aftermath engagement which hurt German pride sorely. At dawn of that day all that were left of the redoubtable Prussian Guards, about 16,000 men, made a swift sortie to try and cut the railway line between Rheims and Verdun. A French aid scout, who was already in the air at daybreak, saw this move and warned his commander. Foch could think quickly. He ordered a regiment of cavalry at full gallop to occupy the small village of Auberive, just to annoy the ad- vancing Prussian Guards. Meanwhile, the light artillery, which were at Jouchery, five miles away, were ordered to come up at topmost speed, and the infantry, also, at the double. The Prussian Guard reached Auberive and the French cavalry rode forward prepared to the charge. The German commander was puzzled by this, for he feared that the cavalry might be only a screen for a large force behind. Accordingly, he halted and sent up air scouts to find out what was before him. This caused half an hour's delay, a vital half-hour. The scouts reported only a regiment of cav- alry ahead, but a detachment of artillery coming up from Jouchery. 60 THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE The German commander fumed at having been stopped by a mere regiment of cavalry, marched forward and captured Auberive within an hour. Before doing so, however, he detached 2,000 of the Death *s Head Hussars, one of the proudest cavalry corps in the German serv- ice, to surprise those French field guns coming up on the trot. They went, those Hussars, delighting in the certain seizure of the guns, for by no means could the French know of their approach. The French artillery did not know. But-, through a gap in the trees, the Hussars were seen not more than two minutes' ride away. Then came the value of manoeuvres. In ninety-four seconds — by the record of one of the artillery officers — the teams were unharnessed, the guns were in position and the gunners at their places. As the gun numbers fell into place, the Hussars charged at less than a hundred yards' range. The shrapnel burst. The line melted. Again the guns spoke, and there rose above their crackle, the cries of the wounded and the screams of horses in pain. A third time the battery fired. There were very few left now, not more than a hundred or so, but they were charging still. A fourth round and a fifth ! When the smoke cleared, neither man nor horse was standing. Four minutes had passed since the Hussars had been seen through a gap in the trees, and, of those 2,000 gallant horsemen, nor man nor beast escaped. The Bombardment of Rheims. Meanwhile the infantry from Jouchery had come up at the double. Italian troops, only, can move faster than the French. The Zouaves had outstripped their comrades and were taking the Prussian Guards in the rear. Von Heeringen saw the failure of his plan. Foch had acted too quickly. Either he must abandon the Guard or make a frontal attack, to draw off Foch. It meant a loss of men with no purpose gained than to remedy a mistake, but there was no other way. A force of 3,000 men of the Guards Corps was hurled at the French line. They charged five times. * ' As they came up for the fifth assault, ' ' says a writer of that action, **a wild cheer of admiration broke out along the French line." But there was no appreciation of gallantry in the mouths of the 75 's and after the fifth assault only 125 men were left, most of them wounded. They surrendered honorably. Much has been written and said on the question of the bombard- ment of Rheims, as an open town, and of the vandalism of the Germans, THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE 61 who deliberately fired on its cathedral. The Germans reply that the town was defended, which made it liable to bombardment, and that its towers were occupied for observation purposes. The artillery lieuten- ant who claimed to have fired at the Cathedral claimed that he did so only as a warning, and fired only two shells. Richard Harding Davis produced abundant evidence to show that this statement was untrue. There is abundant evidence to prove that Rheims Cathedral was wrecked in a deliberate desire for vengeance. At the same time, it would be misleading to suggest that the Ger- mans did not have the right to fire on Rheims. They did. The town was defended. It had to be defended. As a railway junction of the highest importance, controlling the railway which sent all the supplies to Verdun, Foch could not possibly have abandoned it to the Germans, simply because of the beauty of the Cathedral. The Power and Capacity of Guns and Rifles. Moreover, Rheims has a historic value as the shrine of France, where her kings were crowned; and a romantic value because of its association with the Maid, Joan of Arc. For that reason, also, it would have been unwise to have allowed the Germans to occupy a city with so many memories for France. Often a sentimental reason is of the highest military importance in its relation to the morale of the army. No, Rheims could not be left undefended. If defended, it was unavoid- able that some shots might fall on the glorious Cathedral. But to make a definite mark of the Cathedral, as was done, that was Vandal- ism, ruthless and reckless barbarism, without a show of excuse. The deadlock on the Aisne established that new mode of war, known as trench warfare. The necessity of this merits a word. In what has been said in the foregoing two chapters with regard to the effect of the 42-centimeter siege guns on the forts of Liege, of Namur and of Maubeuge, it has been made clear that permanent fortifica- tions, even though made of steel-reenforced concrete, cannot resist the effects of modem high-explosive shells dropped from long-range, high- angle howitzers. At the same time, the British feat of crossing the Aisne and the German mass attacks on Foch*s lines near Rheims had negatived the old von Moltke theory that any place can be taken by storm, so long as the storming party was strong enough. 62 THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE Modem field artillery has changed all that. The French 75-nim. can fire fifteen shells a minute. Each shrapnel shell holds 300 bullets. That means that one gun can send 4,500 bullets a minute into an advancing army, the bullets scattering fan-wise after the burst of the shell. It only takes eight men to handle a 75-mm., including drivers. A machine-gun, handled by two men, fires 600 shots a minute, and in the hands of a good gunner its destructiveness is deadly. Modem rifles have a killing range at an almost flat trajectory of a thousand yards and a modern rifle will fire thirty shots a minute. It would not require a very large force to pour 100,000 bullets per minute into an advancing force. As any charge, no matter how good the cover, would take at least three minutes, it would face 300,000 bullets. Even if only one out of every twenty bullets killed or wounded an enemy, the casualties on that charge alone would be 15,000 men. A trench, however, is curiously unattackable. It is not to be reached by direct gun fire at all. Even for dropping fire it affords only a very small target. In the first winter of the war, before new Artillery tactics had been built up (such as barrage, etc.), the trench was impregnable. Of course, that was true for both sides. If the French could not push the Germans back, neither could the Germans continue their drive onward. Open operations became impossible on the Aisne, except at a fearful cost of life, and, even with that cost, actions were not productive of any important result. Oifense and Defense in War. War, be it remembered, like all great forces in the world, is a balancing of opposites. At one period, attack is stronger than defense ; in the next, defense is stronger than attack. In the two months of August and September this change took place twice. When the war opened, the defense of the forts of Liege, Namur and Maubeuge was thought to be stronger than any attack which could be brought against them. The 42-centimeter howitzers destroyed that idea. The attack took the lead. Wars of attack mean quick and decisive engagements. Wars of antagonistic defense mean long and indecisive engagements. Had the Germans been able to carry all before them in a war of attack, the war would have been short. The moment that they were compelled to change it into a war of defense, it necessarily became long-drawn-out. THE COMPULSION OF TRENCH WARFARE 63 It could not be otherwise. It could not become decisive until it turned again into a war of attack. How this came about will be treated in a later chapter, showing the shiftings of the battle-line, and the entire change of battle tactics. But, throughout all changes, the Aisne line never moved mate- rially. The Craonne plateau remained a German stronghold. Rheims, though always under fire of guns from near the Craonne plateau, remained a French stronghold. At various times, during the next four years, dispatches related this or that minor victory for either side. Often, by the use of maps drawn to large scale, the capture of a thou- sand yards would look larger than a victory which gained several score of miles, drawn to a small scale. This was highly confusing to the casual reader of newspapers and magazines, though, of course, it was unavoidable as picturing the news of the day, week or month. The essential thing to be remembered by the reader who wishes io gain a true picture of the war as a whole is that the main defensive line taken up by the Germans on the Aisne on September 12, 1914, was still in their hands in the summer of 1918. Not until the actual Allied drive which ended the war began, did the defenses of the Aisne fall. CHAPTER V. THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA. Capture ef Bnisselft— Siege «ad Fall of Antwerp— Exile— Atrocities of Aerthet to LonTaln— The Battles of the Yser— Dlzmude, Holding the Line— Ypres, the Key- Passchendaele Ridge— Poison Gas— Uncon- quered Belgium. SO far, the story of the war has lent itself to clean-cut and straight- forward narrative. The next phase was more complicated. It is (necessary to show why. There are four gaps in the mountainous and hilly country between Germany and Paris, one north of the Ardennes, near Liege ; one by the Luxemburg frontier ; one north of the Vosges at Nancy ; one south of the Vosges at Belf ort. Only the first two were in- volved in the drive on Paris. Their story has been told. The Germans drove at Paris, were stopped at the Mame, fell back and intrenched on the Aisne. So told, the matter is simple enough. The next group of moves was considerably more involved, but, if the main issues be kept clear, a tolerably consistent picture may be presented. The northward race to the sea resolved itself into two main desires. The first was the German desire to seize and hold as much in- vaded territory as possible. The second was the French desire to flank the German armies on the Aisne and cut one of their main railroads of supply. This railway ran on the western side of the Craonne plateau, up the Oise Valley and thence northwestward through St. Quentin and Maubeuge, dividing to Brussels and Liege. With this aim in view, Joffre took up a new strategical plan. As early as September 18, at the close of the Western Phase of the Battle of the Aisne, he had seen that the war had become one of defence. It had become static, rather than dynamic. If the Germans could not be forced out of their holes on the Aisne by frontal attack, then an attempt must be made to get in behind them, to cut their communication and hinder their sources of supply. By a combination of speed and organ- ization, there was a possibility that the main railroad might be strad- dled by Allied troops. 64 Q > I— I ^ tf -o >. CO o o 5 > HI CO ^H ctf (l) H s§ 1. 1~ ^H > fin P __ 'a o 0) :-F a CO From Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. © Committee on Public Information. THE GUN WITH THE PUNCH. Hug-e American railway artillery of 16-inch calibre for the U S Armv This bis gun can be put into position in 15 minutes and will fire all around the 'horizon The am- munition car for shell and powder is attached. "uii^uu. ±rie am THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 65 From the British point of view, a shift of plans was essential. The British Expeditionary Force had been sent over to help France at a very desperate pinch. It had done so. It had covered itself with undy- ing glory in the Retreat from Mons to the Mame. Now, however, that the Aisne had become a deadlock, it would be a mistake of organization for the British Army to be so far south, since its supplies were coming from England. If any troops were to be shifted northwards, the British should go. Thus they would be shortening their line of supply, saving time, men and material. Immediately, therefore, even while the Western Phase of the Battle of the Aisne was continuing, French troops began to replace the British in the trenches before the Aisne. It was not, however, until October 3, that the main body started, though small detachments had been steadily entraining for the north. When the Western Phase of the Battle of the Aisne came to a definite end, after September 26, it was clear that more men could be spared from this sector. The collapse of the Alsace- Lorraine campaign — which was a complete affair in itself and will be told in full in the next chapter — also released the troops which had been employed in the Vosges. Objectives of French and German Troops. But, while the French were seeking to turn von Kluck's western flank, the Germans were striving to force their way westward, not only to cover their line of communication, but, as has been said, to occupy and intrench themselves on as large a piece of invaded territory as pos- sible. The Germans and the French each suffered from a disadvantage. The French weakness lay in the fact that, being on the outside of the curve, they had a longer distance to travel, and, moreover, the lines of supply were not extensions of existing plans, but new ones. The Ger- man weakness lay in the fact that they dared not shoot out great masses of troops to the northwestward, for, if they did so, these individual mCasses might be surrounded and cut off. They were therefore com- pelled to build their line northwestward, block by block, not adding an army corps until it had been solidly founded on the corps to the south of it. The Germans, then, were driving northwestward. The French were pushing northeastward. Being in constant contact, the net result was that the line established was half-way between the two aims. If the Germans did not gain Calais, neither did the French and British suc- 5— W. L. 66 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA oeed in driving east far enough either to out the main railroad nor to save Antwerp. Leaving aside, for the moment, the actions which occurred in the formation of this north-making line, it is worth while, first, to consider the armies that made up the line itself. Beginning from the Aisne, northward, the first army to be encountered, naturally, would be that of Manoury, still intrenched in the quarries, but pivoting slowly so that the quarries became its right wing. The left wing, thus, would be try- ing to pinch in von Kluck 's flank. Line of Opposing Armies. Immediately north, and following the Oise Valley to Peronne, was General Castenlau with the Second French Army, which had been brought round from Lorraine. It was a well-equipped, seasoned army. In reserve and partly behind him, but still to the north, was a small group of Territorial units under General Brugere. North of this was the main French Army of the West, a newly constituted group under General Maud 'huy, occupying the line from Arras to La Bassee. From La Bassee to Ypres came the British Army, the Second Army Corps to the south, then the Third, with the First to the north. From Ypres to Dixmude was also a newly organized army, known as the French Army of Belgium, under General d'Urbal, which included a fine body of French marines under Admiral Ronarc'h. From Dixmude to the sea at Nieuport was the Belgian Army, which, after the fall of Antwerp, was strongly reenforced and became a magnificent line of defense. The German forces were greatly changed and altered at this time. Roughly, von Heeringen remained in charge of the Aisne defence, von Kluck faced Castelnau, von Bulow faced Maud 'huy, the Crown Prince of Bavaria faced the southern part of the British Army (which included three French divisions under General Bidon) and the Duke of Wurtem- burg faced the north of the British line, d'Urbal and the Belgians. One fact strikes the eye at once in this line from the Aisne to the sea. It is the fact that all of Belgium except a tiny comer from Nieu- port to Armentieres had come into the hands of the Germans. Yet, when von Kluck was compelled to swing south in the great attack at Mons-Charleroi, Tournai had been the westernmost point to which the Uhlans had swept. This needs explanation. On August 9, 1914, General von Emmich, in occupation in Liege, THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 67 bui desperate because the forts would not give in, appealed for the 42- centimeter siege guns. On October 9, 1914, two months later, Antwerp fell after a nine-day siege. The story of those two months is a black one. It is a record of atrocities unparalleled in the history of the world. The acts of the Germans in Belgium were ferocious, filthy and foul. No apologist can excuse, no reason can condone, no indemnity can palliate the enormity of the guilt of that long-continued glut of horror. It began almost from the very first week of the invasion. German arrogance had not dreamed that Belgium would dare to resist. German vanity received a sore blow when Belgium not only resisted, but did so with such gallantry that the great German Army was held back for nine days by the forts of Liege. German vanity was still more seriously wounded when the Belgians proved conclusively that, man for man, they were far better soldiers than the Germans. Surrender of Brussels. When, at Fort Embourg, the Germans came up under a white flag of truce and then treacherously attacked (this, once disputed, has been definitely substantiated), the Belgians turned and drove them back. At Wandre, on the 11th, the Belgians routed a German force and sent it flying helter-skelter over the Dutch frontier. The successful charge of one Belgian squadron of cavalry against six squadrons of Prussian cavalry carried on Germany's shame. At Eghezee on August 13, at Landen on the 14th, at Waremme on the 15th, and at Diest on the 16th, all German attacks were beaten off. The Belgian Army held the road to Brussels against odds of seven to one. On the 17th, the Queen and the ministers evacuated the capital ; and on the 18th, the Belgian Army fell back on Brussels, first punish- ing the Germans at Aerschot with terrible severity, though at enormous loss to themselves. One heroic detachment of 288 Belgians had but seven survivors. On the 19th, the Belgian Army took up positions in the woods, but air scouts reported the size of the German Army under von Kluck, not far away to the south, to be in such force that it was thought wiser to surrender the capital than to have it bombarded. On August 20, therefore, Brussels was entered by a parade march of 40,000 men, detached for the purpose from von Kluck 's army, an unwearied, fresh force. No military show was ever finer. Preceded 68 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA by a scouting party of Uhlans, this army corps filed through Brussels, horse, foot, artillery and sappers, every unit complete. The infantry fell into the famous stiff-kneed '* goose-step" as they passed through. Two Belgian officers, manacled and fastened to the leather stirrups of two Uhlans, was Germany's delicate way of suggesting conquest. But the civil authorities had been urgent that the townsfolk should not give the Germans the least pretext for reprisals, and no outbreak occurred. Brussels was unharmed. The Germans contented themselves with fining the city $40,000,000, just as a fine of $10,000,000 had been put on Liege. London and Paris at once telegraphed to the Belgian Government a loan of $50,000,000, without interest. Brutalities of the Germans. Before passing on directly to the nature of the atrocities, a few dates and concise facts may be given, taken entirely from reports of official investigating commissions. At Orsmael and Neerhespen, August 10, 11 and 12, an era of cruelty was begun, on the latter date a man being hanged head downward and burned alive. At Herrsfelt, August 36, a peasant having protested to the Germans in the name of Chris- tianity, was carried into his house, his wife and family forced to sit around the table, their hands being nailed to the table and their feet to the floor by large spikes. At Aerschot, August 19, the town was turned over to the soldiers to do as they pleased, and there fol- lowed a three days' pillage, 150 people being massacred and brutalities of every description being wreaked on women and girls of all ages. The same day, Diest, Tirlemont, Schaffen, Lummen and Loenstede were similarly treated. The atrocities and mutilations in the village of Corbeek-Loo, August 20, cannot be cited on a printed page; their parallel is only to be found among the Apache Indians, and the latter spared women and children, which the Germans did not. On August 25, in Hofstade, similar atrocities occurred. In Sempst, in imitation of Nero, the Germans poured petroleum on the clothes of innocent villagers and set them afire. The city of Termonde and thirty-seven villages were burned to the ground. On August 28, in Louvain, 7,000 persons, many of them women and children, were packed into a riding school, where, like the Black Hole of Calcutta, more than 1,000 were stifled to death during the night. THE RACE OF TWO ARMIBS TO THE SEA 69 What was Germany's answer to the explosion of wrath which burst over the civilized world? On August 30, the Grerman General Staff issued an official communication, dated from Berlin, which said, in part: ''The barbarous attitude of the Belgian population in all parts has not only justified our severest measures, but forced them on us for the sake of self-preservation. '* Nor should it be thought that German atrocities stopped with Belgium. The French official report on atrocities committed within the French border during August and September brought to light not hundreds but thousands of similar oases, though the savagery of muti- lation was rarer than in Belgium. '*It can be stated," said the report, "that never has a war carried on between civilized nations assumed the savage and ferocious character of the one which at this moment is being waged on our soil by an implacable adversary. Terrible Destruction by the Huns. ''Pillage, rape, arson and murder are the common practices of our enemies, crimes against women and children have been of appalling frequency, and the facts which have been revealed to us day by day at once constitute definite crimes against common rights punished by the codes of every country with the most severe and the most dis- honoring penalties, and which prove an astonishing degeneration in German habits of thought since 1870." Through many generations Belgium has been noted as a hive of industry, and one of the richest countries in the world. The fields were tilled like gardens, and everywhere was a civilization rich, warm, compadt and continuous. Everywhere were relics of the Flemish Renaissance, and in towns throughout the country was some of the finest brick and stone work of that period. Ancient church spires rose in all parts of this land of plenty, and in town and hamlet alike were masterpieces of Flemish tapestry and painting — ^the handiwork of Rubens, Vandyck, Bouts and Matsys. Old and beautiful cities were looted by the Germans, and many masterpieces of the middle ages were destroyed, never to be replaced. Louvain was the chief university town of Belgium, one of the intellec- tual centres of Catholic Europe. Its university was one of the oldest in Europe, and contained in its library many famous manuscripts. On the evening of August 26, while the Belgians occupied Malines, there 70 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA *was a sudden outburst of rifle fire, and several Germans were hit. The Germans announced that it was a plot among the civilian populace, instigated by the Belgian government; the Belgians declared that a detachment of Germans, driven back from Malines, was fired upon in mistake by the German troops of occupation. An order was at once given by a Major von Manteuffel, who was in command, for the destruction of the city. The soldiers followed instructions as systematically as they could. Small incendiary tablets and fagots soaked in paraffin were thrown through windows broken by the destroyers. Houses were looted, and what the demons of de- stmction could not carry away they destroyed and threw into the streets. Presently the city was a blazing inferno. The university disappeared and with it the great library, the Halles with their noble arches became charred ruins, and only the walls of the great cathedral of St. Peter remained. Some of the noblest houses in the land became charred ruins, the town hall alone being saved. The salvation of this building is one of the mysteries of the destruction of the city. It, apparently, was to be destroyed along with the other historic buildings; when suddenly the German troops turned in and used almost superhuman efforts to save the historic building. Louvain Sacked and Destroyed. The destruction of Louvain was an act of vandalism surpassing anything which has come down to us from the history of the great fighting nations. Nothing the German people can ever do will make amends for the burning and sacking of this treasure city which neither time nor money can restore. The German soldiers went about their task of dynamiting the fair city deliberately and with malice aforethought. Nothing was spared, and the destruction of human beings was consummated with as little thought for the crime committed as would have prevailed if the whole thing had been but the make-believe destruction of a moving picture city and its make-believe inhabitants. The destroyers moved steadily from house to house and from institution to institution, with the fire brand ever active and efficient. After houses had been sacked the things that remained were put in stacks and burned. The sacking of Louvain marked the beginning of a period of de- THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 71 struction of the peaceful cities of Belgium. Nothing but blood and lust was apparent in the thirst of the Germans for revenge. They killed everywhere, and thievery and destruction were as the bread of life to them. Learning that it would be impossible to hold the ancient city of Malines the Belgian troops had quietly left it, a few days after having captured it from the Germans. On the day following the destruction of Louvain the Huns, still drunk with wine and blood lust, suddenly began bombarding Malines. The roof and walls of the ancient cathedral of St. Rombaut, which dated from the thirteenth century, were riddled with shells, and the civilian populace fled in a panic. The firing ceased, but a few days later it was taken up with re- newed energy, the cathedral being completely destroyed, the bells which had rung out their sweet music for five centuries going down to destruction with the tower. Near the end of September when the scared inhabitants began to creep back to the city, there was a third bombard- ment, which resulted in a fire which raged furiously for days, com- pletely ravaging the city. Outrages by the Germans. The city of Termonde, another historic place with treasures in stone and lime, was also deliberately destroyed because the fines levied by the Germans were not instantly forthcoming. Hundreds of little towns were laid waste, the Germans managing the work of destruction in a most thorough and scientific manner. Soldiers wheeled tanks of paraffin up and down the streets, and the houses and places of historic value were sprayed with the liquid. Then the torch was applied, and the treasures of ages were wantonly destroyed. The work was ruthless and unnecessary. It was not for the ad- vancement of military strategy that Belgium was laid waste. If the treasure buildings of a nation be in the way of a military movement, then those treasure buildings must go. But in the case of Belgium but little destruction was the result of necessity. Louvain was laid waste at the leisure of the invaders, the destruction being carried on while the German army was the army of occupation. Malines and Termonde were bombarded merely as an outlet of blood lust, and because the Germans wished to teach the inhabitants that Germany must be obeyed. There was no defence by the inhabitants. 72 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA Robbery, scientific and malignant, was one of the main objects in the destruction of the cities of Belgium. Louvain was plundered down to the last piece and farthing. An American writing of the destruction of Aerschot said: ''Quite two-thirds of the houses had been burned and showed unmistakable signs of having been sacked by the maddened soldiery previously. Everywhere was the ghastly evidence. Doors had been smashed ; windows had been broken ; furni- ture and pictures were wantonly destroyed ; mattresses had been ripped open with bayonets in a hunt for treasure; outer walls of houses were spattered with blood and pock-marked with bullets ; the sidewalks were slippery with broken wine bottles; the streets were strewn with women's clothing." Modern warfare does not permit of looting, much less does it permit of the making of warfare on civilians. The fact remains that civilian non-combatants were outraged by the invaders, and many were the cold-blooded murders done in the name of warfare which could no more be classed in that category than could the assassination of a ruler be called self-defence. Unmentionable Crimes by Drunken Soldiers. There were numerous alleged cases of murders of old people, and unarmed citizens were bayoneted and slain, sometimes on the charge of having firearms in their possession, sometimes purely as an exemplary measure. There were many crimes against women and girls, and the drink-maddened soldiers even went so far as to use the women and girls as shields as they invaded the cities. Many stories of horrible scenes and of mutilation cannot be recoimted. It has been definitely established that there were many sexual outrages, although a protest was lodged against this charge by the Germans. But the indictment of Germany and of Prussianism was complete. The findings of the Hague Convention as to the conduct of war and the rights of civilians were simply ignored. However Germany might deny, these things were definitely proved by the testimony secured by a special conunission appointed by Eling Albert, the findings of which were laid before President Wilson by a Commission consisting of Henry Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice ; Messrs. de Sadeleer, Hymans and Vandervelde, Ministers of State, together with Count Louis de Lichtervelde, serving as secretary of THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 73 the mission. Merely by way of illustration this incident of the report is given: ''Near the village of Corbeck-Loo, on Thursday, August 20, German soldiers were searching a house where a young girl of 16 lived with her parents. They carried her into an abandoned house and, while some of them kept the father and mother off, others went into the house, the cellar of which was open, and forced the young woman to drink. Afterwards they carried her out on the lawn in front of the house and violated her successively. She continued to resist and they pierced her breast with bayonets. Having been abandoned by the soldiers after their abominable attacks, the girl was carried off by her parents, and the following day, owing to the gravity of her condition, she was administered the last rites of the church by the priest of the parish and carried to the hospital at Louvain." The German Time-Table Disarranged. Drink was undoubtedly one of the leading causes for the devasta- tion of the land through which the Germans tramped. The soldiery swilled heavy red wine with the same freedom that they drank light beer and light Rhine wines, and the results were disastrous. There was a reign of sheer murder, and the vandalisms of the seventeenth century were equalled, if not exceeded, by the sacking of Belgium. It will be remembered that the German general plan had been, at the first, to sweep through Liege unopposed, clear out Brussels and Antwerp in a few days, reach the sea and then strike south. The forces under General von Emmich were scheduled to move forward with the mathematical precision of a time-table. This time-table idea was at once the strength and the weakness of the German plan. As long as it operates, its scientific exactitude is the most perfect military ideal conceivable. But, on the other hand, the more exact and rigid is it, the more does it cause confusion when disarranged. Therein lies one of the great difference between the French and German handling of armies. The French is much less per- fectly ordered and therefore essentially weaker in actual operation, but it is vastly more flexible and therefore essentially stronger when the changing conditions of war bring about a reorganization. It is the difference between an iron bar and a piece of wire. The bar cannot 74 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA be bent to a new shape until it is heated and hammered into that shape. The wire can easily be made to conform to any shape. Liege disarranged the German time-table. Von Emmich could not sweep to the westward, and much of von Kluck's armies could not pass over the railways held by the unbeaten Liege forts. The whole plan for the invasion of Belgium, therefore, had to go by the board, so that von Kluck might hurry down to Mons and get there in time to meet von Biilow. It was for this reason that only a small force was detached to make the parade march through Brussels. The moment that the defeat of the Marne was known in Germany, however, the General Staff realized that the main troops engaged in the drive would have all they could do to hold themselves on the Aisne. It was, therefore, in the highest degree dangerous to leave an unde- feated Belgian Army at Antwerp, the more so as there was a strong possibility that England would soon get reenforcements from overseas, first, volunteers, or Territorials, next the regulars and the native regi- ments from India, and, later, the Colonies. The rally for the Empire showTi in India and the British colonies had killed the German hope that England would find herself alone. A counter-attack by a Belgian- British force at Liege would cut the German railroad of supply. Ac- tion was imperative. The German Advance on Antwerp. Marshal von der Goltz was at once appointed Governor-General of Belgium and reserve corps were sent forward, under General von Besseler, who had been in command of the parade troops at Brussels. Definite figures as to the number of army corps actually in Belgium at this time are unobtainable, nor would they be of much service, for large numbers of men were employed in transport, in garrison duty, in reorganizing the Belgian towns and cities under German rule and in the general multifarious duties incident on the occupation of an enemy's country. Von Besseler, however, does not seem to have had a very large army at the first, probably not more than 125,- 000 troops of the line. He had, however, the siege train which had been deflected from the advance to Namur, including two of the 42- centimeter siege guns. The German advance on Antwerp was' slow and measured, singu- larly unlike the German drive on Paris. There were two reasons for THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 75 this. The first was that it was not a drive, but an onward march of occupation. The second was, that there was no need for haste. Ant- werp was first approached from the southwest, Audeghem fell on September 26, the same day as the German defeat near Rheims. Thus the end of the western phase of the Aisne and the beginning of the advance on Antwerp came on the same day. It is a mistake to present the Germans as idling through Belgium during September. They were not. They were devoting their whole force to sustain the armies driving on Paris. The moment that aim was deadlocked, they turned their attention to Belgium. On September 27 the little village of Lebbekke was attacked by a small force of Germans, which was repulsed. Instead of attacking with a heavier force a second time, the Germans withdrew and the western roads out of Antwerp were left free. There is no doubt that von Besseler could have invested Antwerp if he had wished. That he did not do so seems to have been a part of Marshal von der Goltz' plan. The Field Marshal did not want to destroy Antwerp, he wanted to occupy it, and to increase its importance as a strategic point. De- struction of the city, therefore, would vitiate his plans. He wanted to drive the Belgians out, not to slaughter them in the streets. For this reason the northern outlet by river and the western roads were left clear. Malines was bombarded that day. Forts of Antwerp Attacked. On September 28 Malines was again bombarded and the first general attack on the forts of Antwerp began. Antwerp was regarded as the most strongly fortified city in the world, with the possible exception of Paris, and, besides, it is peculiarly situated for defense. Two rivers, the Rupel and Nethe, swing round the city to the south. A circle of nineteen forts protected this line. A circle of eight inner forts supported them. On September 28, 29, 30 and October 1 von Besseler was held back by the River Nethe, partly owing to the diffi- culty of using his heavy guns owing to the low and muddy nature of the land, which made the building of concrete foundations difficult, and partly because von der Goltz was anxious not to inaugurate a reign of destruction. It would have injured his further plan. On October 3, the first detachment of British troops, numbering about 8,000 marines, arrived in Antwerp. They brought two large 76 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA naval gxins, which were mounted on armored trains. The fighting became desperate, but it was marked that though the 42-centimeter guns were directed once or twice against outlying forts, their use was sparing and was not turned against the city itself. This rendered the fighting hand-to-hand and more furious. All that day, all night and until noon of October 4 the Germans fought to put a pontoon bridge across the Nethe River at Waelhem. They succeeded at last, and the fight passed on to Lierre, where it continued savagely. This was mainly a light artillery and infantry battle. ]VIeantime, German aviators had been flying above Antwerp, drop- ping circulars which advised the Belgians to evacuate the city. Other proclamations were warnings to the British marines to retire and leave the city to ** peaceful occupation." On October 6 the Germans crossed in force and on October 7 the evacuation of the city began. It was a terrible exodus, a fearful flight. The condition of the refu- gees was pitiable in the extreme. Many fled to Holland, which could not organize relief for the tens of thousands which streamed over the border, lacking food and many of the essentials of life. The suburbs of Antwerp were destroyed, but this was done mainly by the Belgians themselves in clearing away ranges for their defensive guns. Surrender of Antwerp. On October 8 and October 9 the inner forts took up the cannonade, over the ruins of the suburbs. Some of them, notably Forts Three, Four and Five, were wrecked by the return fire. The people continued to flee, a few on railroads, more on tugs plying up the river to Holland, but by far the greater number on foot. About 200,000 people left Antwerp in these two days. By the morning of October 10 Antwerp was on fire. The oil tanks had been struck with shells and were blazing fiercely. The water supply had been cut off by the destruction of the main reservoir. At noon, on October 10, Antwerp surrendered. Without loss of time, the Germans were set at work putting out the fire and restoring order in the streets. On October 11 Marshal von der Goltz arrived from Brus- sels and found that his orders had been carried out. Antwerp had been taken after a fourteen-day siege and not more damage had been done than could be helped. As in Brussels, so in Antwerp, von der THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 77 Goltz established an eflBcient well-ordered German rule at onoe. Within a week, the shops were open, the street cars were running, the bridges were temporarily repaired and life was in safety though under the iron heel of a severe martial supervision. A considerable part of the Belgian forces together with a brigade of British marines was cut off by the Germans and compelled to retreat across the Holland frontier, where they were promptly dis- armed and interned. The larger part, however, struck out westward. With Antwerp occupied, the Germans rushed up from the south. Some of the Belgian troops were cut off at Ghent, which the Germans entered on October 13. Others were compelled to flee along the coast when the Germans approached Ostend later on the same day. By October 14 von Besseler 's army was divided into at least three parts, if not four, for Bruges, Thielt, Daume and Esschen were all seized on that day. When the Belgian and British troops were taken away from Ostend on October 15, that seaport, also, fell into German hands. The cavalry swarmed everywhere, and, as has been shown, the policy of "fright- fulness" was established to keep the Belgians in terror of any action against these small bodies of cavalry. By October 20 the Belgian- British line had been solidified from Nieuport to Ypres, and the rest of the line continued south as has been shown earlier in this chapter. Series of Vicious Engagements. This line, however, had not been attained without a number of very sharp actions, some of them large enough to be dignified with the name of battles. It would give them a disproportionate importance to relate them in detail, but a brief summary will show what was hap- pening between the Aisne and the sea during the time that Belgium was being overrun and Antwerp was being captured. On September 23, Manoury^s force tried to break in behind von Kluck to seize the railway junction at Tergnier. The blow failed, though it gave rise to a violent action at Tracy-le-Mont. On Septem- ber 26 the Germans retreated from Amiens and the first train from Paris arrived. Amiens was again in French hands. Then followed a series of most vicious engagements wherein the towns of Peronne and Albert were repeatedly taken and lost. This continued on until the first days of October. 78 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA In turn, Arras became the center of warfare, and when war burst on that city, it was in its most dreadful form. On October 1 the French were driven out of Douai. On October 6 Arras was subjected to a heavy bombardment, many fine old buildings being destroyed. That same day, attacks having been begun on Lille, the engagement centered at La Bassee. On the 9th a party of Uhlans entered Lille, fighting began in the streets and bombardment began. But October 12 Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was in ruins, and the town surrendered on the 13th. Its resistance, which had lasted a week, however, enabled the Allies to consolidate their line just behind it. The British had thrown forward a force on the Lys to protect Ypres, but the main line was at the latter point. On October 15, 1914, therefore, the line, Nieuport-Dixmude-Ypres- Armentieres-La Bassee-Lens-Arras-Albert-Roye-*Lassigny-Noyon and thence along the Aisne, was firmly established. From Ypres to the Craonne Plateau, or rather to Verdun, was the huge smnging iron chain, which was to swing to and fro for the next four years. The granite wall of Verdun-Rheims has been spoken of, there remains to show the solidity of the Nieuport to Ypres support. Foch in Command of Armies North of the Aisne. When the Western Phase of the Battle of the Aisne had come to a close, that is, when the Aisne situation had definitely settled into a deadlock, at the end of September, Joffre made Foch the generalissimo of the French armies running north from the Aisne. It was his task to co-ordinate the activities of the armies of Castelnau, Brugere, Maud'huy, the division under Bidon, and the northern army under d'Urbal. He took up his headquarters at Doulens on October 3, and on October 8 Sir John French arrived there to prepare a joint plan. That plan revealed itself as a defensive, not an offensive, movement, and its salient points developed in the four battles of the Yser, of Lys- Ypres, of La Bassee and of Arras. A short notice of each of these will close the record of the establishment of the ''western front." The lands about the Yser Canal, especially those running north- ward from Dixmude to the sea, resemble Holland. They are below sea level and protected by dykes. Dixmude was the angle of this battle. On October 16 the 6,000 French marines under Admiral Ro- THE KACE OF TWO AEMIES TO THE SEA 79 narc'h and 5,000 Belgians under General Meyser were ordered to hold the trenches for four days. The gallant sailors and soldiers held it for a fortnight, most of the time in trenches flooded with water, all the time in mist and pouring rain. On October 17 five Belgian batteries arrived north of Dixmude. Acting in co-operation with regiments of mounted Morocco troops and some of General d'Urbal's cavalry, a forward movement was made. On the 18th the Ostend road was taken, but it could not be held. On midnight of the 19th, the Allies were back in the trenches on the west side of the canal. All was readiness, on the German side, for a tre- mendous drive in the morning. That day, however, in response to an urgent message sent on the 16th, there appeared off Nieuport several shallow-draught monitors, carrying long-range naval guns. (The story of these ''tanks" of the sea will be told in later chapters dealing with naval operations.) The villages in which the Germans had taken up quarters for the night were suddenly shelled with a terrific fire, the shots seeming to come by infernal magic from out of the fog-covered sea. The Germans Harassed. When morning broke, the Germans were in an excessively awk- ward position. If they intrenched to face the sea, they could be enfi- laded by fire from the Allied trenches on the canal, which ran at right angles to the ocean; if they intrenched against the army, the naval guns enfiladed or shot lengthwise along them. Naval balloons and hydroplanes directed the fire from the monitors. Moreover, the ships themselves were free from attack, for the Germans had no such artil- lery as could meet the range of a naval gun. The fire was exceedingly heavy. One monitor, alone, fired a thousand high-explosive and shrap- nel shells in a day, absolutely blotting out all possibe German infantry action for a space of three miles inland from the shore. That confined the German attack — and accordingly strengthened the Allied defence — to a four-mile front, between Eamscapelle and Dix- mude. On October 24 the invaders forced their way across the canal at heavy loss. Then the lock gates were opened, the waters entered and (frowned the invading Germans in hundreds. The fighting still went on, the trenches now obliterated, a wierd sort of a combat in a shallow lake, sometimes knee-deep, sometimes waist-deep in water. 80 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA This was a fight of cold ateel, wheref or the Germnns showed little taste. By October 30 Ramscapelle was recovered; on November 3 the old trenches were retaken. The lock gates were closed and the country slowly drained clear. Then came the winter, with the Yser canal holding firm. The second of the battles which was coincident with the formation of the western front was that of Lys-Ypres. It began with an ambi- tious program, nothing less than the recapture of Bruges and Grhent. Sir John French believed that only a small force of Germans lay in the direction of Roulers, northeast of Ypres. On October 16 the British Army, which had consisted of two corps during the retreat from Mons, and of three corps on the Aisne, was increased by the addition of a fourth corps under command of General Byng. On October 17, four French cavalry divisions were added to Byng's somewhat incomplete corps and on the 18th the army advanced, almost to the Passchendaele Ridge, five miles west of Ypres. On the 19th the First Army Corps moved to Ypres. On the 20th air scouts brought back news of huge German armies moving upon Byng. General Byng's Desperate Position. The lightning-like concentration of these armies under von Deim- ling and von Fabeck was masterly work on the part of the German staff. They struck on the 21st and struck hard. The cavalry was forced back at once. Byng, very stubbornly, got into trenches on a line running roughly from Langemarck to Zillebekke and thence to Hollebekke. The whole plans of the British Army at this point had miscarried. Yet there was reason for Sir John Frenches supposition that the Germans would be few in numbers towards the northeast. He had already sent Smith-Dorrien to the southeast and on the 17th — the day that the Byng forward movement was ordered — Haig reported further advance toward Lys impossible. He intrenched solidly in order to hold Armentieres and one of the most intense periods of fighting oc- curred at Croix Marechale and Neuve Eglise. For sixteen days the attacks never slackened. They dug in for the winter under a most terrific fire. Byng, however, was in a most desperate position. An order, taken from a German officer prisoner, stated mat General von Deimling, with THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA 81 three full army corps and reserves, was entrusted with the task of breaking through the line north of Ypres, and that 'Hhe Emperor himself considered the success of this attack to be one of vital im- portance to the issue of the war.'* The Germans did their best to make it so. This decisive action, sometimes called the First Battle of Ypres, came to a head on October 31. There were three British divi- sions against three Teuton army corps, and at the point of attack, the Germans c-ame on at odds of about six to one. By noon, the British First Division was broken, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers were sur- rounded and taken. Early in the afternoon, the British divisional headquarters was struck by a shell and six of the staff officers were killed outright. Two brigades were crumpled up, one on the right and the other on the left of the Seventh Division and for ten minutes there seemed no hope of recovery. Then, most amazingly, the capture of the small village of Gheluvelt by the Second Warwickshires, at the point of the bayonet, formed a tiny point of rallying. The line held for another hour and liberated a cavalry brigade which sacrified itself to make good the trenches for half an hour longer. As evening drew on, a powerful force of French cavalry came up. Though almost ex- hausted, they helped hold the line, dismounted, until dark. Four of the regiments which received their first baptism of fire on this terrible day were volunteers. Gallantry of British Soldiers. "No more arduous task," said Sir John French in his report, "has ever been assigned to British soldiers, and in all their splendid history there is no instance of their having answered so magnificently to the desperate calls which of necessity were made upon them. Words fail me to express the admiration I feel for their conduct, or my sense of the incalculable services they rendered." Their services that day, indeed, were incalculable. They had saved Belgium from becoming a German province and they had kept Ger- many from Calais, the sea, and a possible invasion of England. In revenge, the Germans bombarded Ypres at long range, destroying the famous architectural marvel, the Cloth Hall, a confession of failure of much the same character as their bombardment of Rheims Cathedral when thev were thrown back at that point by Foch. 6— W. L. 82 THE RACE OF TWO ARMIES TO THE SEA The third of these battles was that of La Bassee. Though im- portant in itself, it had far less tensity as a matter of strategy than the two northern battles of the Yser and Ypres. For, even if the Ger- mans pierced the line at La Bassee, it would gain them little. They would not dare make too deep a salient with powerful armies to the north and south. It was far more a trench battle. The main attack at La Bassee began on October 22, the day after the beginning of the First Battle of Ypres. The point was held by the British, with a heavy addition of Indian troops. These latter fought absolutely like demons, in spite of the new and unnatural method of warfare. The British were driven back. On October 24, the Gordon Highlanders, a famous fighting regiment, were driven out of their trenches. The Germans succeeded in seizing Neuve Chappelle on Octo- ber 27. The whole line was greatly confused at this time, some units of either side being intrenched in the lines of their opponents. There was little plan to this battle, it was fought out by regiments, even by companies. By October 29 the Allied troops were forced back to the La Bassee gate. For three days and nights the Germans attacked and attacked again. They could not budge the lines another inch. There Smith-Dorrien dug in for the winter. The Arras battle was similar. The main attack began on October 20 and lasted for six days. Von Biilow, with heavy forces and a power- ful concentration of artillery, pushed Maud'huy back, fighting for every inch of ground, until he was within gun-fire of Arras. In this desperate need, Joffre hurried forward some reserves which had been held at Albert and relieved Maud'huy just in time to save the northern gate of Arras. Maud'huy dug in for the winter, likewise. Thus was formed the line -of the western front. The actions and engagements of the next five months were not the clash of armies, but the sorties of small groups of men. There were no great gains, no great losses. Shiftings of the front were measured in yards, not in miles. The capture or loss of a trench— which had absolutely no effect on the front as a whole— assumed the importance of a battle. Rifle and bayonet were laid aside for pickaxe and spade. CHAPTER VI. THE FRENCH OrFENSIVE IIT ALSACE-LORRAIirE. Both Sides Essay a Ruse at Mulhaasen— The Bath of Blood at Altklrch — Strategical Value of the Vosges —Invading French Army Defeated at Metz— Guerrilla Fighting— Failure of Campaign as Conquest, Success as Buffer Against Attack Toward Belfort. NOW that the somewhat breathless recital has been made of the German invasion of Belgium, the smashing of the first line at Mons-Charleroi, the Battle of the Marne, the intrenchment of the Ai&ne and the establishment of the western front, it is possible to turn to another part of that first great moment of the opening of the world war. All that has been recounted heretofore is part and parcel of the same plan — the German drive on Paris. But, though the Kaiser went so far as to reserve a certain date and a certain hotel for his tri- umphal banquet, he never got there. Beginning also from the first day of the war there was a French drive. It was directed at the Rhine Valley and had for its chief pur- pose the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine, two provinces which had been taken from France by Germany as an indemnity after the war of 1871. It was a double drive, a northern attack into Lorraine, and southern attack into Alsace. In a preceding chapter it was stated that there are four gaps in the mountainous and hilly country of the Belgium-Luxemburg-France frontier. Those at Liege and Longwy were used by the Germans in their drive on Paris. The two lower gaps, respectively at the north and south ends of the Vosges mountains, were used by the French in their drive into Alsace-Lorraine. It must be remembered that the chain of the Vosges mountains, while itself a strong defensive line for France in the event of German attack, was likewise a strong defensive line for Germany in the event of French attack. And, while the French frontier was protected by the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal and Belfort, the German frontier was protected by the fortresses of Dieden- 83 84 THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE hofen, Metz, Strassburg and Neu Breisaoh. To these must be added groups of forts at Molsheim, Banzenheim and Basel. Behind these, and guarding the Rhine, were Germersheim, Mainz, Coblentz and Co- logne. (All of these were occupied by the Allies after the close of the war, as part of the conditions of armistice.) In order that the reader may understand the campaign more clearly, the movements of the armies will be traced in two parts, as they operated through each of these gaps. The southern or Alsace campaign will be taken first, the Lorraine campaign, second. But, before actually dealing with operations, it may be well to give the armies aligned on the two frontiers, as they developed in the course of the first three weeks. The OppoiinK Forces on the Alsace-Lorraine Frontier. The southernmost was the First French Army, under General Dubail, who was relieved of his conunand a few days after the war began and replaced by General Pan; it held the line from Belfort to Epinal. Then came the Second French Army, under General de Castelnau, holding the line as far north as Nancy; this was the army which, after the Battle of the Aisne, took up its place above Manoury and fought the Lassigny-Roye battles on the western front. North, again, from Toul to Longwy, came the Third French Army under Gen- eral Ruffey (later under General Sarrail) ; this moved north later and helped cover Verdun. North of Longwy came the Fourth French Army, under Langle de Cary, who held the eastern side of the operative comer on the Mons-Charleroi battle, and who, at the Battle of the Marne, held firm the line between Verdun and Foch's army. Opposing the forces were first the German Eighth Army, under General von Deimling, who, after the Alsace-Lorraine campaign was over, entrained and made the entire circuit of the western front, ar- riving to attack at Ypres a month later; this army faced the Gap of Belfort, resting on the forts at Basel on the Swiss frontier with its other end on the fortress of Neu Breisach. From Colmar to Saarburg, with Strassburg at its back, came the Seventh German Army, which army, as the reader will remember, after the Battle of the Marne was hurried round to the Aisne to support the diminished armies of von Kluck and von Biilow; this was under the command of General von Heeringen. From Saarburg to Metz came the Sixth German Army, THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE 85 under the Crown Prince of Bavaria; and, facing the Longwy gap, was the Fourth Army under the German Crown Prince. In spite of the attack on Liege, France could not believe that Ger- many intended to throw the main force of her armies through the neutral territories of Belgium and Luxemburg. Therefore, as an offensive defense — as well as an offense itself — she struck forward into Alsace-Lorraine. It is probable, also, that Joffre felt it to be a neces- sary response to French public sentiment. On Wednesday, August 5, the day after the declaration of war, French troops crossed the German frontier. On August 7 a French brigade with cavalry and artillery occupied Altkirch, and on August 8, after a sharp but short fight with retiring German troops, entered Miilhausen in the even- ing. It was a patriotic and political success of the first water, but it was entirely unsound from a military point of view. Advance and Retreat of the French. In the first place, it was too easy. That, in itself, is often a sus- picious circumstances in warfare. In the second place, strategically, Miilhausen meant nothing. Neu Breisaoh lay fifteen miles to the north, with guns which completely controlled the valley of the River 111 (a tributary of the Rhine) over to Colmar and the slope of the Vosges; Basel lay to the southeast ten miles with a strong garrison, and there was a fortified point at Banzenheim, six miles to the east. The capture of Neu Breisach would have been a cause for rejoicing, Miilhausen, much less so. Moreover, in the excitement of the greeting which the Alsatians gave the French troops, the latter forgot that they were in an enemy's country. The Germans did not forget. They had only retired sufficiently to ''feel" the enemy, and air scouts had reported that the force of the advancing army was but small. All night von Deimling brought up and manoeuvred his forces. By the morning of August 9 he was ready. He attacked with a whole army corps from Neu Breisach; he sent two divisions simultaneously from the Forest of Hard, to which point they had been marched during the night; and he started, also at daybreak, a flank attack on the French from Sennheim. There was nothing to do but to retreat and to do it quickly. The French fell back after the first sharp encounter and intrenched lightly at Altkirch, only a few miles beyond the border. 86 THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE It is to this day an unexplained mystery why Dubail sent forward into Miilhausen a mere 20,000 men. He had a large army, 200,000 men, if garrison troops be included, for France, in mobilizing, had concentrated her forces on the German frontier. The other part of his advance, the seizure of the Vosges heights, was better managed and by the 14th all the passes had been secured. The advance in the plain, however, was sternly disapproved by the French High Command, and General Pau, who had been a second choice for the Supreme Com- mand, took charge of the First Army. The Failure of General Pau. Pau handled his advance with entirely different tactics. Instead of advancing with a small force on a wide front, he attacked slowly and simultaneously from the Vosges and from Belfort, storming Thann, St. Blaise (where von Deimling was wounded) and Dannemarie, tak- ing Miilhausen on August 20. Here General Pau adopted a strong position on the Miilhausen-Sennheim-Thann-Col de Busang line and awaited attack. That night he received news of the disaster in Lor- raine, and realizing that he could do nothing unsupported and only stood the risk of losing a large part of his army by an overpowering force, he retreated to Altkirch, solidifying the tiny Col de Busang- Thann corner so solidly, however, that it remained in French hands until the end of the war. There was a terrific outcry in France concerning the abandonment of the Alsace campaign, and, had the military leaders in command been of less fame than Generals Joffre and Pau, it is more than probable that popular sentiment would have demanded some beheading in offi- cial ranks. But, by this time, the menace in the north was beginning to shape. Air scouts had reported the great concentration of the German armies on Namur, and the withdrawal of Pau's army from the Alsace campaign released more men for the north. The failure of Pau to gain a permanent footing in the Rhine Valley, it has been shown, was the news of a defeat in Lorraine, which would leave him unsupported. It was, of course, absolutely essential to any campaign in the south that the First and Second French Armies should unite on the further side of the Vosges. Why did this prove impossible? What had happened in Lorraine? The Second French Army, under General Castelnau, had proceeded THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE 87 with far more caution than the unhappy leader of the first campaign into Alsace. The Germans had been advancing on Longwy and Verdun, but not in great force. General Castelnau had thrown back several enemy attacks on Nancy. All these actions were of that type of mili- tary operation which is known as "feeling out the enemy." In other words, they were not battles, but only feints to draw out information as to the strength of the foe. How little this was understood in Paris was shown by an official announcement on August 15 that the Germans had been thrown back at Nancy, that the invasion of Belgium had been foiled and so forth. This simply demonstrated that the Germans were so cleverly en- veloping their advance in secrecy that, as late as August 15, France did not yet know where the chief danger lay. Lest this should seem strange, in view of all that has been said about the Belgian invasion, it is to be remembered that cavalry patrols, acting as a screen in ad- vance of the main armies, invariably cut telegraph and telephone communication. The world knew absolutely nothing as to the size, movement and plans of the German armies until several weeks later. French Successes in Lorraine. When, therefore, on August 15, General Castelnau advanced into Lorraine with the Second French Army, he had no reason to doubt the essential correctness of Joffre's strategy, for the Alsace-Lorraine invasion was an important part of the whole French plan. On Sunday, August 16, the French were in force at Avricourt, just across the Ger- man frontier on the main line from Luneville to Strassburg, which runs through Saarburg. On the same day the left wing of the First French Army, coming down from the Vosges passes, reached Schir- meck, on the Saales-Strassburg line (a German strategic railway) and captured 20 guns and 1,500 prisoners. The left wing of the Second Army had seized Fenetrange, a marshy region, but important as the railway junction from which diverged the Strassburg railway to Metz and Nancy respectively. It is worthy of notice that these tactics were excellently handled by Castelnau, for on Monday, August 17, Saarburg was menaced from north, west and south simultaneously. Near Lorquin, directly south of the important supply point of Saarburg, on the River Saar, a strong artillerj^ position had been taken up. That is, the position 88 THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE was strong, though, as afterwards proved, the French heavy artillery was as weak compared to the German as its light artillery was strong. On Tuesday, August 18, Saarburg was taken, with a sharp but not a heavy battle, and the main railway between Strassburg and Metz was broken. From a military point of view this was highly important, for Strassburg was the main supply of the advanced fortress of Metz. News was now beginning to filter through of the heavy German con- centration in the north, and this news justified Castelnau in the sup- position that a swift blow at the Rhine would cause a diversion of the German drive on Paris. It would, at least, he supposed, force the Ger- mans to weaken their main push by the necessity of sending reenforce- ments to the Rhine. On August 19, therefore, he pushed forward through Dieuze and Morhange. The Germans Retaliate. It stands to reason that, had the Germans wished to do so, they could have thrown strong forces across the line between Metz and Strassburg and held back the French advance on the very first day. That they did not do so, was evidently due to one of two causes, either that the armies available were not strong enough for the pur- pose; or that the French were being decoyed into a salient on which an attack would fall with greater force. The latter proved to be true. On Thursday, August 20, with absolute co-ordination, three Ger- man armies launched themselves on this horseshoe-shaped French ad- vance. The first struck south of Saarburg, the second at Dieuze, the third, the heaviest, at Pont-a-Mousson. Von Heeringen led the southern attack, the Crown Prince of Bavaria the central, and the Metz garri- son the northern. The latter, also, had a powerful quota of heavy artillery, as would be natural in garrison forces. Besides this, the Germans had the advantage of position. The Battle of Metz, as it was called, was appallingly short. Von Heeiingen's strategy, the artillery of Metz, and the overpowering forces that poured down from every direction like a gray tidal wave, formed an irresistible tempest of battle. The Seventh German Army swung in toward the slopes of the Vosges and formed an anvil on which the hammer of the Metz garrison fell and fell again. Compared with the immensely lengthy actions of the latter part of the war, Metz THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE 89 could not be compared for size. It was, indeed, a battle of the old sort, when armies fought for themselves on their own ground. But, though it was short and local, it was none the less decisive. The Pont-a-Mousson line was pounded to pieces in two hours. Less than an hour later the Bavarians tore through the French line at Chateau Salins. The Fifteenth French Division gave way ; the Germans claimed that it fled. Ten batteries and 9,000 men were taken prisoners. Castelnau was utterly taken aback at the strength of the troops opposing him, but he covered the hole made by the Fifteenth Division (which gallantly recovered itself next day) and drew to the rear. On the 21st the whole French left retreated to the frontier. On the 22nd it had been driven back to the strong position on the ring of hills near Nancy, known as the Grand Couronne, which figured a few days later in the Battle of the Mame. On the 22nd also the centre of the Alsace-Lorraine campaign, that is to say, the troops which had stormed the plain from over the passes of the Vosges, was compelled to with- draw, and Miilhausen was abandoned two days later. On the 23rd Luneville, well over the French border, was taken by the Germans, and Nancy itself was only saved by the French taking up the main defense line between the fortresses of Verdun, Toul and Epinal. General Joffre's Evacuation Order. Undoubtedly there would have been a counter-thrust, but for the woeful news which came from the north. That same Saturday, August 22, when the two French Armies were driven back across the frontier, and the Alsace-Lorraine offensive was defeated, came the staggering news that the great fortress of Namur, intended to hold out for a week or two, had fallen in an hour. That evening, as Castelnau was taking up his position on Le Grand Couronne of Nancy, came the news of the French defeat at Charleroi and the collapse of the main operative corner. On Sunday, August 23, on the day that Luneville fell, came the news of the isolation of the British and the heroic defence at Mons, followed by the beginning of the retreat. There was but one thing for Joffre to do. He did it. In his com- munique of August 26, the bald facts were thus stated: ''The Com- mander-in-Chief, having to summon all the troops of the Mouse front, ordered the evacuation of the occupied territory. The great battle is engaged between Maubeuge and the Donon (the effort to hold there 90 THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE failed, as the reader will remember) ; on it depends the fate of France, and, with it, of Alsace. It is in the north that the Commander-in-Chief calls all the forces of the nation to the decisive attack. Military action in the Rhine Valley would distract from it troops on which victory might depend. It is necessary, therefore, to leave Alsace for the present. It is si cruel necessity which the army of Alsace and its chief have submitted to with pain, and only at the last extremity." Many histories of the war, especially those written in England and America, have given but little space and attention to this Alsace- Lorraine campaign, and, even in voluminous military accounts, the Battle of Metz is given a minor place. German histories of the war, however, regard the matter with very different eyes, and Hilaire Belloo, an English critic of tactics, envisions the effect of Metz so clearly that one cannot do better than quote his words. Views of an English Critic. ''Here we have a nation," he writes of Germany, ''which has re- ceived within the first month of a war which it had proudly imposed upon its enemies, the news of two victories (Metz and Tannenberg) more startlingly triumphant than its most extreme expectation of suc- cess had yet imagined possible. *'Let the reader," he continues, "put himself into the position of a German subject in his own station of life, informed by a daily press which has come to be his sole source of opinion (like the Ameri- can). . . . Let him remember that this man has been specially tutored and coached into a complete faith in the superiority of himself and his kind over the rest of the human race. . . . "Let the reader further remember that in this, the Germans' rooted faith, their army was for them at once its cause and its expres- sion ; then only can he conceive what attitude the mind of such a man would assume upon the news from the West and the East in those days, the news of the avalanche in France and the news of Tannenberg. It would seem to the crowd in Berlin that they were indeed a part of something not only necessarily invincible, but of a different kind of military superiority from other men. "These, from what would seem every quarter of the globe, had been gathered to oppose him, merely because the German had chal- lenged his two principal enemies. Though yet far from being imper- THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE 91 illed by so universal a movement, he crushes it utterly, and in a less time than it is under arms he is overwhelmed by the news, not of his enemy's defeat, but rather of his annihilation. (It was thus that the German newspapers interpreted it.) "Miles of captured guns and hour upon hour of marching columns of prisoners are the visible effect of his triumph and the confirmation of it; and he hears, after the awful noise of his victories, a sort of silence throughout the world — a silence of awe and dread, which pro- claims him master. It is the anniversary of Sedan. ''Only in an appreciation of this psj^chological phenomenon," writes Belloc, "can one understand the after development of the war. After the Battle of Metz, after the sweep down upon Paris from the SambrC; after the immense achievement of Tannenberg (which will be told in Chapter X of this volume), the millioned opinion of a now united North Germany was fixed. It was so fixed that even a dramatic- ally complete disaster might still leave the North German unshaken in his confidence. Defeats would still seem to him but episodes upon a general background, whose texture was the necessary predominance of his race above the lesser races of the world. ' ' This is the mood we shall discover in all that Germany did from that moment forward. It is of the first importance to realize it, because that mood is, so to speak, the chemical basis of all the reactions that follow. That mood, disappointed, breeds fury and confusion; in the event of further slight successes, it breeds a vast exaggeration ; in the presence of any real thought by local advance, it breeds the illusion of a final victory. It is impossibe to set down adequately this intoxica- tion of the first German victories. "The line had swung down irresistible. . . . Not only had there fallen back before its charge all the arrayed armies of the French and their new ally, but also all that counted in the hopes of the defenders had failed. All that the last few years had promised in the new work of the air, all that a generation had built up of permanent fortified work, had been proved impotent before the new siege train. The bar- rier fortresses of the Meuse, Liege and Namur had gone up like paper in a fire. Maubeuge was at its last days. "The sweep has no parallel in the monstrous things of history. Ten days had sufiiced for the march upon the capital. Nor had there been in that ten days a moment's hope or an hour of relaxation. No 92 THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE such strain has yet been endured, so concentrated, so exact an image of doom. "All along the belt of that march, the things that were the sacra- ment of civilization had gone. Rheims was invested, the village churches of French Flanders and of Artois were ruins or desolations. The peasantry . . . had been massacred in droves, with no purpose save that of terror ; they had been netted in droves, the little children and women with the men, into captivity .... ''But there was to come — it was already in the agony of birth — the moment, a day and a night, in which one effort rolled the wave right back (the Battle of the Marne). Thereafter, with the passage of many days, with the gradual broadening of vision and, in time, the aspect though distant, of slow victory, the creeping domination ac- quired over the mass of spiritually sodden things that had all but drowned the race, the pressure of the hand tightening upon the throat of the murderer, was released a certain high potential which those who did not know it could no more comprehend than a savage can compre- hend the lightning which civilized man regulates and holds in the electric wire. And this potential made, and is making, for an intense revenge. ' * It is in the light of this incredible spiritual arrogance that the atrocities in Belgium and Northern France can be understood. It was comparable to the use of the torture chamber by the Holy Inquisi- tion as a means of bringing heretics to God. It was this mental atti- tude which made Prussia dangerous and will keep her dangerous for manj^ years to come. Many things contributed to heighten and ag- grandize that arrogance, at the beginning of the war, but none more than the proud boast — true to the very last day of the war — that the tide of battle did not rage on German territory. This boast was only made possible by the impotent outcome of the French campaign in Alsace and Lorraine. CHAPTER VII. ▼BKDUHI "THEY SHALL HOT PAMI" The rraac*-G«nuui Fromtler— Tba Oemuia Crown Prince— Fearful L«h of LU« at Fort Douaumoat— Tb« Fr*ncli "TS'a"— Modem Artillery Method*— Changing Plana of Defeaf»-Strateflc Rallwara— St. Mlhlel Salient— Nanc7, Tool and the Sonthem Chain of Fortt. JUST as Ypres to Ostend was the solid embankment of Belgium against which the German generals, reckless of human life, hurled their tens of thousands of men; so Verdun was the French wall. It will give a true picture to represent Nieuport to Ypres, in the north, and Belfort to Verdun, in the south, as two granite walls, between which a heavy iron chain was swinging. The Germans could not knock down the walls. They did, from time to time, swing the chain. A word or two will explain the importance of Verdun. The Franco- German frontier, between Luxemburg and Switzerland, as it then was mapped, was almost a right angle, with the point of the angle directed toward Strassburg. The south to north side of this angle ran along the line of the Vosges Mountains and was impassable to heavy military transport. There was a narrow gap to the south, near the Swiss fron- tier. The east to west side of the angle is fairly flat land, being com- posed of the valleys of the Saar and Moselle Rivers. Since the forested hills of the Argonne protect the Luxemburg frontier, it is this valley which is the opening to the plains of Champagne and the road to Cen- tral France. Owing to the violation of Belgian and Luxemburg territory, the Germans had invaded and captured much territory in Northern France. Germany could have reached the plains of Champagne by a slightly different route, viz, by coming down the western side of Verdun, on the other side of the Meuse, and entering back of St. Mihiel, near Bar- le-Duc. Verdun, however, was again the corner to that move. As long as that fort was unreduced, it would be of no avail to pass it. Belfort-Epinal-Toul- Verdun was the stone wall, and the great swinging chain was moored at Verdun. Everything hinged on that one fort. When the Germans willingly lost 500,000 men at that one point, 93 94 VERDUN! ''THEY SHALL NOT PASS!" it was because they knew that one point to be the crux of the western front. France knew it also. Between 1870 and 1914 she had spent $1,500,000,000 in the Longwy-Verdun-Toul-Epinal-Belfort fortification line. Half of this money was wasted on works which the thitherto un- known siege guns rendered useless, the other half saved Verdun, which saved France. The Battle of the Grande Couronne of Nancy, on September 8 and 9, 1914, has been told in its place as a part of the Battle of the Mame. It has also been shown that General Langle de Gary stood firm, thereby imperilling Foch. It is also to be noted that de Gary, with the Fourth French Army, did not join the pursuit of the fleeing Germans. It was his job to hold Verdun. He held it. Verdun's Wonderful Stand. On September 10, the battle-line ran due south from Verdun, turn- ing by Bar-le-duc and Vitry toward Paris. On the 11th the fleeing Germans were on a line running through Chalons and Epernay. On the 14th, the Verdun pressure was slackening, with the line running through St. Menehould. On the 18th, the Germans had been driven back to the Aisne, with Verdun relieved from fear of attack from the southwest. In all that has been said heretofore, the character of the Verdun defense has not been described, for it seems wiser to deal with that pivotal fortress as a separate entity. For the same reason, while the movements of the armies on either side of Verdun have been described, the Verdun Army has been left until now. The Third Army, at first under General Ruffey and later under General Sarrail, was at Verdun. From this it is clear that the beginning of the Verdun story lies with the movements of the Third French Army. Verdun being a right angle, it was open to attack either from the north, at the northeast angle, or on the east. It was confronted, therefore, by three German armies, when the Marne battle-line commenced to form. The northern side was confronted by the Fourth German Army, under the Duke of Wurtemburg, the angle by the Fifth German Army, under the Crown Prince of Germany, the eastern side by the Sixth German Army, under the Crown Prince of Bavaria. Verdun, therefore, had to sustain attack from three directions. This task continued without cessation during the four years of the war. VERDUN! ''THEY SHALL NOT PASS!" 95 It may have escaped observation that, up to this point, all such points as Liege, Namur, Maubeuge, and the German group, Metz, Strassburg, etc., have been spoken of as "fortresses," but that in this chapter the writer has called Verdun and Belfort ''forts." This change of phrase is intentional. It was around the beginning of September that all these fortresses became forts. The matter demands a little explanation, for it will explain why- Liege fell in nine days, Namur in an hour, and Verdun not in four years. The Construction of a Fortress. A fortress, in the sense of the word as used before the world war, was a fortified place, the fortifications of which consisted of a number of large and small forts erected on hills or strategic points arrounding a central point. The fire of these forts was so arranged that, if one of them should be stormed by the enemy, the attacking party would be under the fire of the forts on either side. No fort, therefore, could be attacked mthout the invaders being subjected to the concentrated fire of three forts. In addition to the fact that each fort was as impregnable as possible in itself, this system absolutely prevented any individual fort being surrounded and cut off from the others. All forts were connected with each other and with the central point by good roads, frequently by light railways for handling muni- tions and other supply. Liege and Namur were smashed to dust and splinters because the forts surrounding them were fixed. Once the huge howitzers got the exact range they could fire from tremendous distances and reduce the works at pleasure. The forts could not reply by direct gun fire, for the howitzers were always placed in trenches or behind low hills. As long as there were fixed forts which could be destroyed by high- explosive shells, so long were those forts but death-traps. Namur proved that conclusively. The attacking power directed against a fort was stronger than the defensive force. Old style fortresses were doomed. Verdun had ceased to be a fortress. In place of masses of ma- sonry, of earthworks, of disappearing cupolas, and the like, all the heights became a network of trenches, roads were multiplied, especial development being given to those which ran through woods and forests and were invisible from aeroplanes flying overhead. The great guns 96 VERDUN! ''THEY SHALL NOT PASS!'* nestled in greenwood glades. Narrow-gauge gun railways ran in every direction like the web of an eccentric spider and no amount of aerial reconnaissance served to tell the Germans exactly what was hap- pening on that group of heights crowned by the citadel of Verdun. All the defenses thus were merged into one, and Verdun became one huge interlocked, intertwining fort, running up and down a dozen hills rather than a fortress composed of little forts. The same change, modified by the character of the ground, took place at Toul, Epinal and Belfort. In a minor sense, the same process was hastily carried out, at the beginning of the war, on the circle of hills near Nancy, known as Le Grand Couronne. Verdun lies distant from Paris 140 miles and from Toul 40 miles. The city of Verdun was never attacked, though bombarded, and throughout the four years of the siege, farm life continued peace- fully on the slopes and crops were garnered under the continuous roar of the guns. The Defense of Le Grand Couronne. The attack on Verdun took four phases, the first at Le Grand Couronne of Nancy, which was an attempt to circle both Toul and Verdun; the second at St. Mihiel, which was an attempt to circle Verdun from the east; the third at Ste. Menehould, which was an attack to encircle Verdun from the north; and the great frontal attack, designed to take the whole chain of hills by storm, at what- ever cost. The defense of Le Grand Couronne, as has been said, was one of the principal factors which decided the Germans to concentrate their forces on the western end of the Marne line, for they argued that Le Grand Couronne could never have been held by the French unless the defenders had the vast proportion of their forces at that eastern point. But this engagement — it was hardly a battle — is of the highest im- portance in its relation to Verdun and to the famous St. Mihiel salient which is inseparably associated with Verdun. The lay of the land rendered it imperative for Castelnau's army to be defeated first. If this semi-circle or crown of hills — more like a diadem than a crown — could be stormed, then Nancy would lie at the invaders' mercy. If the Nancy heights were taken, then the Germans would possess ideal gun positions for their heavy artillery, with Photo from Underwood & Underwood. N. Y. GERMAN WOMEN WHO OPERATED MACHINE GUNS. Tliis photograph was taken from the body of the German In the gray sweater at the left, on July 28, 1918. The three women operated about fifteen miles from Chateau Thierry. runs against the United States forces If'' ' iii^^^ i.^ V. >:'r . )-. ^ H*'.^ |k ^^^^fUjjf^i^if^m^ ^ '*-\. KV^H^M^BH"^ Phcto by American Press Association. WOMEN WHO FOUGHT FOR RUSSIA — "BATTALION OF DEATH." Members of a Russian Regiment of Amazons, who fought fiercely and with great tenacity in m,any battles on tha Riga front. imm M'-^' ^%-^ T ... .^i,^ Ly-i ^>. ^ t •' I'hoto from Underwood & Underwood. INSIDE OP A COMMUNICATION TRENCH. This photograph shows two French soldiers carrying a wounded soldier back to a dressing station through one of the trenches in the Somme. BIG MEN WHO DID BIG THINGS. Secretary McAdoo. Treasury. Secretary Daniels, Navy. © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. © G. V. Buck. From Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. Secretary Baker, War. Secretary Lansing, Stale. © Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. © G. V. Buck. From Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. Tlieir deed.s will stand in history for all time. ,c) Western JNewspaper Union Photo Service. TRAINING DOGS FOR WAR SERVICE. A despatch dog clearing a barbed wire. These message bearers were sometinies invaluable in lighting zones. © Western Newspaper Union Photo Service. TRAINING DOGS FOR WAR SERVICE. Many different types were u.sed in "No Man's Land" with good results. The photograph shows them starting out for a morning's training. I D _o =3 p o > E