UlBRARY OF CONGRESS.! 
 
 
 i UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. ! 
 
LETTER 
 
 LIEUT. GOV. STASTON 
 
 r,^..' 
 
 JC v>. ■R wv 
 
 IN REPLY TO 
 
 HON. THOS. EWING. 
 
 COLUMBUS: 
 
 PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL. 
 
 1862. 
 

LETTER. 
 
 Bellefontaine, Ohio, November 4tli, 1862. 
 
 Hon. Thomas Ewing — Sir : — Your letter dated October 4th, 
 1862, was received in the form of a printed pamphlet of twenty- 
 four pages, some ten days after its date. 
 
 I regret exceedingly that you should have deemed it your duty 
 to make yourself a party to a controversy in which Gen. Sherman 
 has involved himself, without any necessity or excuse. 
 
 He was not the Commander-in-Chief of the army at Shiloh, and 
 was not named in any communication of mine as one of the officers 
 who were responsible for the surj)rise, while other Generals were 
 named. If therefore he finds himself worsted, the occasion does 
 not justify you in coming to his aid, and making yourself a party 
 to a controversy which he has unnecessarily provoked. 
 
 From early life I have been accustomed to entertain the highest 
 regard for your talents and character. It is therefore a matter of 
 extreme regret to find myself compelled to engage in a public con- 
 troversy with you, in a matter of so much interest, or to sacrifice 
 my convictions of the truth of history, for the purpose of avoiding it. 
 
 Your letter assumes to be in reply to my charges against our 
 Generals, who commanded at the battle of Shiloh, and professes to 
 be prompted by a disintei'ested regard for the truth of history. 
 
 If you had said in your letter that Gen. Sherman was your son-in- 
 law, it would have enabled the public to judge with more accuracy 
 how far your patriotism and sense of justice was stimulated by a 
 desire to protect and defend the reputation of a member of your 
 own family, and how it happens that Gen. Sherman is made by your 
 letter so decidedly the hero of the battle, while Generals Grant 
 and Prentiss are only casually and incidentally mentioned. 
 
 I could excuse Gen. Sherman for referring to my official position 
 as giving me such prominence as warranted him in condescending 
 to notice me. He is a soldier, and perhaps not familiar with the 
 powers and duties of the office I happen to hold, and may have 
 supposed that it gave me some power or position. But no man 
 ■ knows better than you that so long as the Governor is in office, it 
 
,<i-ives neither power, honor or profit, and that anything I may say. 
 derives not one particle of additional significance, or importance, 
 from the fact that I happen to liold the office to which you refer. 
 
 You were President of the Convention by which I was nomina- 
 ted for this position, and know that I accepted it with reluctance, 
 and only because no man of such character and position as was de- 
 sired for that place upon the ticket, would accept it. 
 
 You therefore have no excuse for referring to my official position 
 as an excuse for replying to what I have said upon this subject. 
 
 I have been somewhat at a loss to imagine why I should be se- 
 lected as the person to be held responsible for a charge that was in 
 everybody's mouth, published in every newspaper from Portland to 
 San Francisco, and not drnlcd hi/ anyhody for more tlidn ten days 
 after the battle. 
 
 I suppose, however, that the true reason is to be found in what 
 you choose to denominate my ''extreme innocence of military know- 
 ledge." It was sujjposed that my ignorance of military affairs 
 would give to Gen. Sherman and yourself an easy victory over me 
 in the discussion of a question of military science. The public 
 has probably determined before this time, how far Gen. Sherman's 
 expectations have been realized. When this letter has been pub- 
 lished, the means of judging how much more successful you have 
 been, will be before the public. 
 
 I should be glad to know by what authority you charge that I 
 "had no means of acquiring correct information," when I wrote my 
 report of the 28th of April to the Governor, or when I wrote my 
 letter to the "Mac-a-cheek Press," of which you and Gen. Sherman 
 complain. 
 
 I had stated my means of acquiring correct information in my 
 letter to Gen. Sherman. And it will not do for you or any other 
 person to say that the officers and men with whom I conversed, were 
 not capable of giving me correct information. I certainly heard a 
 great many things that probably were not true, and to which I gave 
 no credit. But when a statement of a matter of fact was made to 
 me, by a General or Colonel, or any other brave and truthful man, 
 not contradicted by any body, and consistent with notorious facts, 
 I know no reason why I should not believe it. 
 
 I heard the report of one of the Generals read in manuscript on 
 the battle ground, and propounded to him, divers interrogatories up- 
 on the matters discussed in his report. You have his report as 
 published in the Public Documents. 
 
I have in addition, the facts developed by my cross-examination. 
 I had the statements of numerous Generals, and Colonels of the part 
 taken by their Divisions, Brigades, and Regiments in the battle, and 
 in almost every instance propounded such questions as were neces- 
 sary to enable me thoroughly to understand them. The localities 
 in which they occurred were pointed out to me upon the ground, so 
 that 1 was enabled to understand them much more thoroughly than 
 I could have done if I had not been upon the battle ground. 
 
 The truth is that my opportunities for "acquiring correct informa- 
 tion," have been a vast deal l;)etter than yours, after all the '' care" 
 you have bestowed upon the subject. My ability to " appreciate 
 the bearing of the facts" that came to my knowledge, is a question 
 I am entirely willing to submit to the public when our correspon- 
 dence is published. 
 
 I do not recognize the soundness of your proposition, that 
 whether my reports were true or false, their publication could pro- 
 duce only evil. All public functionaries, civil and military, are re- 
 sponsible either directly or indirectly to the people. 
 
 If a collector of public moneys, appointed by the President and 
 removable at his pleasure, steals the public money, and the Presi- 
 dent with knowledo;e of his "fuilt, continues him in office, he makes 
 himself responsible for the crime. So if the President puts a man 
 at the head of an Army who sacrifices the lives of- his men, and 
 disgraces the country, by his negligence or incompetence, and the 
 President continues him in his command, or promotes him, the 
 President is guilty of a grave error for which he must answer to the 
 people. The people have a right to know the whole truth, in rela- 
 tion to the conduct and qualifications of the men who command 
 the armies in which their sons and brothers ai*e serving. Neither 
 you nor I have any right to conceal from them any of the perils 
 of service in which we ask them to engage. We have no right by 
 false pretences, or fraudulent concealment, to enveigle men into the 
 service, without disclosing to them every fact known to us, that 
 may enchance its perils. 
 
 If men occupying so exalted a position as you, are found advoca- 
 ting concealment, and keeping the people in ignorance of the real 
 character of the officers under whom they are to serve, its effect 
 must be to impair their confidence in the Government, and make 
 them feel less anxious about its maintenance and support. 
 
 Let the idea be generally disseminated amongst the people, that 
 the Government is under the control of some sinister and selfish 
 
6 
 
 influence, tluit cai'es more for the reputation of some favorite Gen- 
 eral, than for the lives of a thousand men, and they will care very 
 little for the support of such a Government. I know of no better 
 way of disseminating such an idea, than for prominent and distin- 
 guished public men to urge the concealment of the truth of history 
 from the people, lest a knowledge of the truth should prevent them 
 from going into the service. 
 
 The President must take cognizance of facts that are known to 
 every body else, and he has power to make such inquiries as may 
 be necessary to satisfy his own mind, as to the chai*acter and quali- 
 fications of the Generals who command our armies, and he must 
 visit the. unworthy with prompt and stern condemnation and remo- 
 val from their commands. This is the country's only hope for re- 
 lief, from the load of titled imbecility under which it is now groan- 
 ing. 
 
 Your letter is in reply to my letter to Gen. Sherman, and you 
 profess to review the proofs of surprise given by me in that letter. 
 You will recollect that in that letter, after giving the statements of 
 a few persons, of facts which came under their observation, I stated 
 that I could multiply that kind of proof indefinitely, and that 
 much evidence might be found to contradict these statements ; and 
 therefore as such conflicting evidence could not be satisfactory or 
 conclusive, I would leave it. and rely upon undisputed facts, which 
 in my judgment established the surprise beyond controversy. I 
 then stated that we had no defensive works, no entrenchments or 
 rifle pits, no cannon mounted, not even a tree cut down to defend us 
 against an attack. It was argued that if the attack was expected, 
 some preparations for defence should have been made. If the at- 
 tack was not expected, it was a surprise. In reply to this, you say 
 just nothing at all. 
 
 I said the rebels encamped in force on Saturday night, within 
 hearing of our drums and bugles, while our Generals had no idea 
 that they were any where in striking distance. 
 
 In reply to this you make an issue with me about the distance the 
 rebels encamped from our lines on Saturday night. You quote me 
 as saying it was a mile and a half. You say it was three miles. It 
 is not a matter of the slightest consequence which is right, and I 
 will not discuss any such immaterial issues. 
 
 The essential and material fact is that the enemy encamped in force 
 on Saturday night within easy striking distance of our lines, and our 
 Generals remained in total ignorance of that material and important 
 
fact. This I charged was negligence. In reply to this you say the 
 wounded rebels who told me that they had encamped within a mile 
 and a half of our lines were " rogues," who were lying to me. 
 
 This will not do. This was negligence or it was not. The ques- 
 tion is essential to the settlement of the controversy between us, 
 and must be answered. 
 
 You insist upon holding me strictly to the letter of the original 
 charge. To this I certainly have no objection. But it is not iu 
 accordance with my practice in criminal cases, where I have an inno- 
 cent and honest client. But where I am defending a rascal, I am 
 sometimes compelled to resort to such shifts. If he is indicted for 
 burglary, I insist upon it that the proof makes a case of larceny, and 
 if the indictment is for larceny, I claim that the case made is bur- 
 glary. But if I have an honest client, I scorn all technical subter- 
 luges, and demand an acquittal on the ground that he has done no 
 wrong — committed no crime. But as you have declared your pur- 
 pose to avail yourself of a variance between the indictment and the 
 proof, I will address myself to that question. 
 
 My charge is all included in the single sentence : " The disasters 
 of Sunday, April 6th, were the result of surprise, which is justly 
 charo-eable on the commanding officers." 
 
 Our army of 38,000 men was attacked by 40,000 rebels, driven from 
 their camps a distance of two miles, to the shelter of our gunboats 
 upon the river, with the loss in killed and wounded of fully 10,000 
 men, and an immense amount of artillery and material of war. 
 This disaster is clearly attributable to the incompetence and negli- 
 gence of the officers, or the cowardice of the men. I say it was the 
 negligence of the officers. You say it was the cowardice of the men. 
 
 In support of your case, you rely solely on the statements of your 
 clients, made in writing, giving a detailed account of the part which 
 each of them took in the battle. Every one of them knew perfectly 
 well when they were making their statements, that if they admitted 
 a state of facts which showed a surprise, that they M'ere not only 
 disgraced, but were liable to be dismissed from the service and pun- 
 ished. 
 
 My clients are not permitted to make official reports to exonerate 
 themselves from the charge of cowardice, and have them filed away 
 in the Archieves of the Government. 
 
 I think you will hardly claim that your testimony is specially im- 
 partial or disinterested, and I certainly may apply to it the rule 
 which is applicable to pleadings in civil causes, that every pleading 
 
shall be construed most strongly against the party pleading it. Bear- 
 ing this in mind, I propose to look at some of the proof's which you 
 quote. 
 
 At page 11 of your letter you quote General Sherman's report as 
 follows : " About 8 o'clock, A. M., I saw the glittering bayonets of 
 large masses of Infantry in the woods beyond a small stream, and be- 
 came satisfied that the enemy designed a determined attack on our 
 whole camp." 
 
 This is given in quotation marks, to show that you are making a 
 literal quotation, and not merely giving the substance of the sen- 
 tence. 
 
 Now if you will turn to Gen. Shermans official report, you will 
 find between the woiti " satisfied" and the word " that," near the 
 close of the extract, these important and significant words, "/or the 
 first time.'' That is, at 8 o'clock on Sunday morning was the first 
 time he believed the enemy intended a determined attack upon our 
 whole line, and then the battle had been raging in front of Colonel 
 Hildebrand's Brigade for more than half an hour. 
 
 At page 8, you make a quotation from Col. Stewart's report as 
 Commandant of the 2d Brigade, which closes with these words in 
 italics : '•'■The disposition of my pi elects ivas reported to and approc- 
 ed by Gen. Sherman." 
 
 If you will turn to the official report you will see that you have 
 stopped in the middle of a sentence, and mutilated it and destroy- 
 ed its meaning. In the report, the following words are added to com- 
 plete the sentence : " At 7h o'clock on Sunday morning,'' making 
 the sentence read : " The disposition of my pickets was reported to 
 and approved by Gen. Sherman at 7^ o'clock on Sunday morning." 
 
 You will see that these materijil omissions in your quotations are 
 very unfortunate. They may lead evil minded and suspicious per- 
 sons to sus2)ect you of a design to garble and pervert the meaning 
 of the reports. 
 
 So it seems that at 7^ o'clock, on Sunday morning, Gen. Sherman 
 was receiving reports of the disposition of pickets, and approvint,' 
 or condemning, as his judgment dictated. 
 
 It will be necessary to enable the reader to understand the appli- 
 cation of the proofs you have referred to, as well as what I have to 
 offer, to have some idea of the disposition of our forces. The Army 
 was encamped on the west bank of the Tennessee, between Lick 
 Creek on the South, and Owl Creek on the North, and extending 
 out from the river, up Lick Creek on the left, and Owl Creek on the 
 
right, about three miles. The centre of the line was thrown forward 
 further in front than the wings, which gave it a sort of Crescent 
 shape. Three Brigades, the 1st, 3d and 4th, of Sherman's Divis- 
 ion were on the extreme right, resting on Owl Creek. His second 
 was on the extreme left, resting on Lick Creek. Between General 
 Sherman's 1st, 3d and -Ith Brigades on the right, and his 2d Brig- 
 ade on the left, was Gen. Prentiss' Division. These two Divisions 
 containing some 14,000 or 15,000 men, occupied an entire front, 
 which was nearly three miles in length. 
 
 In the rear of Gen. Sherman's, three Brigades on the right, was 
 Gen. McClernand's Division ; in the rear of Gen. Prentiss was Gen. 
 Hurlburt's Division, and in the rear of Gen. Hurlburt's Division, 
 near the landing, was Gen. Smith's Division, commanded by Briga- 
 dier General W. H. H. Wallace, on account of the sickness of Gen. 
 Smith. Gen. Sherman's 1st Brigade was composed of the 6th Iowa 
 Reg., Col. McDowell ; 40th 111., Col. Hicks, and the 46th Ohio, Col. 
 Worthington ; his 2d, of the 55th 111., Col. Stewart, 54th Ohio, 
 Col. T. Kirby Smith, and the 71st Ohio, Col. R. Mason ; his 8d, 
 of the 77th Ohio, Col. Hildebrand ; 53d Ohio, Col. Appier, and 
 the 57th Ohio, Col. Mungen ; his 4th, of the 72d Ohio, Col. Buck- 
 land ; 48th Ohio, Col. Sullivan, and the 70th Ohio, Col. Cockerell. 
 
 From the extreme right on Owl Creek, to the extreme left on 
 Lick Creek, the distance is between 2^ and 3 miles. The 1st and 
 4th Brigades of Sherman's Division were to the right of Shiloh 
 Church and the Corinth road, which crossed our lines at the 
 Church. The 57th Ohio formed the right of the 3d Brigade of 
 Gen. Sherman's Division, and rested its right upon the Corinth 
 road, The 70th Ohio, Col. Cockerell, formed the left of the 4th 
 Brigade, and rested its left upon the Corinth road, which separated 
 it from the 57th Ohio. Shiloh Church is situated on the Corinth 
 road at the point where it crossed our lines. Hence it will be seen 
 that an enemy advancing upon us by the Corinth road, would first 
 cjme in contact with the 57th and 70th Ohio, and with the 3d and 
 4th Brigades of Sherman's Divisions, commanded by Colonels Hilde- 
 brand and Buckland. 
 
 The 57th Ohio was commanded by Lt. Col. Rice, who made no 
 report of the part taken by his Regiment in the battle. Col. Hilde- 
 brand says in his report, page 76 : 
 
 "Early on the morning of Sunday the 6th inst., our pickets were fired on 
 and shortly after 7 o'clock, the enemy appeared in force, presenting hin-. 
 
10 
 
 self in columns of Regiments at least four deep. He opened upon odr 
 Camp a heavy fire from Infantry, which was immediately followed 
 BY shells. Having formed my Brigade in line of battle, I ordered an 
 advance. Tiie 77tli and 57th were thrown forward to occupy a certain 
 position, but encountered the enemy in force within three hundred yards 
 of our Camp. Unfortunately we were not supported by Artillery, and 
 were compelled to retire under cover of our Camp, the engagement be- 
 coming general along the entire front of ray command." 
 
 You quote this senteuce, and say '' the report of Col. Hildebrand 
 is not exact as to the order of events," etc. 
 
 It relates events in the order in which they occurred. 1st : His 
 pickets were fired on. 2d : The enemy appeared in force, etc. 3d: 
 He opened on our Camp a heavy fire from Infantry, which was im- 
 mediately followed by shells. 4th: He formed his Brigade in order 
 of battle, and ordered an advance. 5th: The 77th and 57th were 
 thrown forward to occupy a certain position, and met the enemy in 
 force within three hundred yards of his Camp. 
 
 This is substantially the account given me by the officers and men 
 of the 57th, the Sunday after the battle. One company of that 
 Regiment was recruited in this county, and I was well acquainted 
 with the officers and many of the men. They told me that the at- 
 tack was made, and their tents fired into without any notice, while 
 many of the men were eating their breakfasts. 
 
 I do not propose to name the officers or men who told me so, and 
 thereby point them out to Gen. Sherman, who still commands them> 
 as proper subjects of resentment. But if you will give me a tri- 
 bunal that has power to administer oaths, and compel the atten- 
 dance of witnesses, I will furnish a cloud of witnesses, who will 
 testify to the fadlfe I have stated. But they are not needed. Col. 
 Hildebrand states the facts precisely as they occurred. His camp 
 was fired into, and then, and not till then, he formed his Brigade 
 in line of battle. 
 
 Col. Cockerell of the 70th Ohio says in his report ; Ex. Doc. (56, 
 p. 65 : 
 
 "On Sunday morning, April G, 1862, an alarm was made in front of this 
 Brigade, and I called my Rec.iment from breakfast, and formed it 
 in line of battle on color line. I then heard heavy firing on the left and in 
 front of our lines," etc. 
 
 This firing on the left, and in front was doubtless the heavy In- 
 fantry firing, and tiring with shell upon the Camp of Col. Hilde- 
 brand, spoken of in his report. So sudden and unexpected was it, 
 that his Regiment was at breakfast, and they were called away, 
 leaving their breakfasts unfinished. 
 
 Gen. Sherman says in his letter to me, that the 57th Regiment 
 
11 
 
 occupied the very key to this position, and if its front was not well 
 guarded it was the fault of the officers of the Regiment. 
 
 These reports of Col. Hildebrand and Col. Cockerell, are corrobo- 
 rated by the reports of officers in other parts of the Camp. 
 
 The 2d Brigade of Gen. Sherman's Division was on the extreme 
 left, fully two miles from Hildebrand's Brigade, and was not attacked 
 until some time after the attack by Shiloh Church on the Corinth 
 road. 
 
 Col. Stewart commanding this Brigade, says : 
 
 "The disposition of my pickets was reported to and approved by Gen. 
 Sherman at 7>a o'clock on Sunday morning. I received a verbal message 
 from Gen. Prentiss, that the enemy were in his front in force. Soon after, 
 my pickets sent woi'd that a force witli Artillery wore advancing by the 
 'Back Road.' In a very short time I discovered the Pelican flag advancing 
 10 the rear of Gen. Prentiss' Headquarters." 
 
 From this it appears that the officers on the extreme left were 
 quietly reporting the disposition of their pickets, unconscious of 
 any danger, and the first that Col. Stewart saw of the enemy was 
 the Pelican flag in the rear of Gen. Prentiss' Headquarters, whose 
 flank had already been turned without his being aware of it ; for 
 it was Col. Stewart, and not Gen. Prentiss who sent to Gen. Hurl- 
 burt for re-inforcements. 
 
 Capt. Barrett, commanding Co. B. 1st Regiment Illinois Artillery. 
 
 says : 
 
 " We were stationed near the outposts, and on the alarm being given at 
 about half-past seven o'clock on Sunday morning, the Battery was prompt- 
 ly got in readiness, and in ten minutes thereafter, commenced firing on 
 the right of the Log Church, some 100 yards in front of Gen. Sherman's 
 Headquarters, where the attack was made by the enemy in great force." 
 
 So it seems that in ten minutes after the alarm was given, the 
 enemy made an attack " in great force" within 100 yards of Gen. 
 Sherman's Headquarters. 
 
 Col. Pugh, commanding the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, says ; 
 
 " Early on Sunday morning, April fith. while I was at breakfast, I 
 heard heavy firing in front. I immediately ordered out the -list Illinois 
 volunteers, who were in line in ten minutes, and at the same time I order- 
 ed my horse, and by the time I was mounted, 1 received orders from Col. 
 Williams, 3d Iowa, commanding the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, to take my 
 position on the left of the Brigade, which I did," etc. 
 
 Col. Logan, 32d Illinois volunteers says he formed his Regiment 
 in line of battle on the color line of his encampment at 8 o'clock 
 on Sunday morning. The battle had certainly been raging for half 
 an hour before his line of battle was formed. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Parker, 48th Ohio, in the 4th Brigade of Gen. Sher- 
 man's Division, says: 
 
12 
 
 "On the morning of the 6th, our Regiment met the enemy about 200 
 yards in front of our color line; they came upon us so suddenly that for a 
 short time our men retreated, but soon rallied again, when we kept him 
 back for two hours, and until Gen. Sherman ordered us to fall back to the 
 Purdy road. Although this Regiment was in line of battle, 200 yards in 
 front of their camp, yet it is perfectly apparent, that they started out on 
 a mere reconnoisance, and were completely surprised at meeting the ene- 
 my in force within less than half musket range of their Camp." 
 
 Col. Veatcli commanding the 2d Brigade, 4th Division, says : 
 
 '•On Sunday morning while most of the troops weke at breakfast, 
 heavy firing was heard on ocr lines in a direction South-west from my 
 Camp.' ' 
 
 The course from whence the firing came, shows that it refers to 
 the attack upon the left of Gen. Prentiss' Division, and not to the 
 earlier attack at Shiloh Church. 
 
 Col. Davis of the -t6th Illinois, says : 
 
 "That on Sunday morning the 6th inst., about 1)4 o'clock, the enemy's 
 fire was first heard in my camp, whereupon I warned my men to hold 
 themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice," etc. 
 
 They were not in line of battle then when the attack commenced. 
 
 Col. Bristow, 25th Kentucky Volunteers, says : 
 
 " About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, a rapid and heavy firing of 
 artillery and musketry was heard to our front, and in five minutes we re- 
 ceived orders to form in line of battle in front of our camp." 
 
 Col. McHenry, 17th Kentucky, says : 
 
 "My regiment was ordered into line early on Sunday the 6th inst., up- 
 on A SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED ATTACK upon our front lines by the enemy. 
 * » * Being on the left of the brigade, we were posted about one mile 
 in front of our camp, near the right of an open field, which was immedi- 
 ately in rear of a portion of the camp of Gen. Pi'entiss, which was at 
 
 THAT TIME OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY." 
 
 So it seems that before this regiment could form and take its 
 position after the "sudden and unexpected" attack upon our front 
 lines, the enemy was in possession of Gren. Prentiss' camp. 
 
 Lieut. Brotzman, commanding Manns' Missouri Battery, says : 
 
 "That on the 6th of April, at about half-past 7 o'clock, A. M., I heard 
 a continuous fire of Infantry and Artillery on the right wing of our army, 
 and in consequence thereof, I ordered the battery to be ready to move as 
 quick as possible." 
 
 It was in consequence of the attack, and not in pursuance of or- 
 ders that he ordered his battery to be ready to move as quick as 
 possible. 
 
 Col. Worthiugton, of the 46th Ohio, made the following entry in 
 his diary under date of April 6th, 1862 : 
 
 " A clear cool morning. Rode out to the pickets at sunrise, and soon 
 after the enemy were seen advancing past the Howell House. Directly one 
 of Col. Hick's regiment, 40th Illinois, was shot through the heart at not 
 less than 400 yards. Rode to McDowell's quarters (not up), and then 
 back to the pickets, and ordered the men who had fallen back, to advance 
 to the Howell fence. Returned to camp lor preparation, and at about 
 
13 
 
 seven A. M., the attack commenced on Hildebrand's and Buckland's bri- 
 gade. This might have been expected, but we were really not ready for a 
 fight. No hospitals at Pittsburg, nor even means to carry off the 
 wounded." 
 
 Col. Worthington, in a letter to Gen. Halleck, dated July 11, 
 
 1802, says : 
 
 "I hold General AV. T. Sherman responsible for the condition of the 
 army at Shiloh, up to the 7t.h of April, and besides what occurred in his 
 own Division, for everything arising out of that condition, directly or in- 
 directly. And for this reason, that to him was confided the advance of 
 the expedition of Tennessee. « * * lie (General Sherman), had or 
 might have had almost perfect means of knowing from day to day, what- 
 ever occurred at Corinth, or among the rebels near there. He might have 
 controlled the position of all the five Divisions at Shiloh. His request or 
 remonstrance, would have been equally regarded or acted upon. * * So 
 far as Gen. Sherman's handling of his Division is concerned, it is as bad 
 as it well could be; 1st. That with twelve regiments and three batteries, 
 but five regiments and two batteries were used to repel the first attack at 
 8 A. M. ; Appier's 53d Ohio, being so isolated that it could neither give 
 or receive support ; and Stuart's Brigade being in the same condition. 
 2d. That the first brigade was utterly ignored, when it might have sooner 
 and easier decided the fate of the day, than at length it did. 3d. That 
 Behrs' battery which might have been drawn off with the first brigade, 
 was thrown into the victorious path of the rebels, one gun only excepted. 
 4th. That the Artillery was not in position until half an hour 
 AFTER THE ATTACK COMMENCED ; that neither battery was on either flank 
 of his center, and oddly enough that the only battery (Behrs') which 
 could and should have delivered a most efi'eclive flank fire at short range, 
 was left idle till given up as above stated." 
 
 I have no room for further extracts, except for his conclusions, 
 
 which are given as follows : 
 
 " The conclusion, so far as General Sherman is concerned from the 
 above statements are, his utter disregard of the immediate and obvious in- 
 dications of an attack after Friday noon, as shown by his leaving all things 
 as they were. 2d. His utter disregard of his Artillery with respect more 
 especially to its ammunition ; 3d. His failing to make any provision for his 
 wounded and sick men ; 4th. His fatuity in leaving useless his right bri- 
 gade, to say nothing of his left, either of which might, if thrown upon 
 either rebel flank, have driven back the attack even as late as eight o'clock 
 A.M. .5th. His unaccountable sacrifice of five guns of Behrs battery, 
 when the whole might have been saved, as one gun was preserved with 
 the first Brigade ; 6th. His useless and reckless waste of life in the charge 
 of Col. Hicks' 4Uth Illinois Regiment; 7th. His so hastily leaving the 
 weakest, and most exposed part of his line, when his presence would seem 
 most needed ; and 8th. The fact of his leaving such a point so exposed, 
 present the strongest salients in his connection with the battle of, Shiloh 
 on the Gth day of April, 18G2." 
 
 Wm. Gr. Stevenson, (a son of Rev. John Stevenson,) who was 
 raised within a mile of this village, and who I believe is now Secre- 
 tary of the American Tract Society in New York, happened to be 
 in Arkansas at the breaking out of this rebellion. He was pressed 
 intu the rebel service, and compelled to go into the rebel army on 
 pain of instant death. He was an aid of Gen. Breckinridge at the 
 
14 
 
 battle of Shiloh, ami has since found his way to the North, and 
 published an account of his services in rebeldom, under the title of 
 " Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army." 
 
 His position gave him opportunities for being perfectly familiar 
 with the movements and plans and purposes of the rebels. 
 
 In his account of the battle of Shiloh, he says : 
 
 ""While it is no part of my duty in this narrative to criticise military 
 movements, and especially those of the Union forces, I may state, that 
 the total absence of cavalry pickets from Gen. Grant's army was a matter 
 of perfect amazement to the rebel officers. There were absolutely none 
 on Grant's left, where Gen. Breckinridge's Division M'as meeting him, so 
 
 THAT WE WERE ABLE TO COME UP WITHIN HEARING OF THEIR DRUMS EN- 
 TIRELY UNPERCEivED. The Infantry pickets of Grant's forces were not 
 above three-fourths of a mile from his advanced camps, and they were too 
 few to make any resistance. With these facts all made known to our 
 Headquarters, our arihy was arrayed for battle with the certainty of a 
 surprise, and almost the assurance of victory." 
 
 The statement of Mr. Stevenson corroborates in every particular 
 the statements of the rebel prisoners referred to in my letter to Gen, 
 Sherman, and I see no reason to doubt their accuracy. 
 
 Gen. Beauregard says that the rebel army encamped at the inter- 
 section of the Pittsburgh and Hamburg roads on the night before 
 the battle, which he says was four miles from Pittsburgh Landing. 
 Our front lines were full three miles from Pittsburgh Landing, 
 which makes the rebel camps within one mile of our lines. Your 
 quotations from the reports of the officers commanding in the bat- 
 tles show that immy of them had their regiments and brigades 
 drawn up in line of battle and advanced to meet the enemy before 
 they were attacked. 
 
 I have no doubt of it. I did not say that our lines were attacked 
 at all points at once, and before any part of our forces were aware 
 of the approach of the enemy. 
 
 The attack by way of the Corinth road at Shiloh Church, was 
 made before the enemy reached any other part of our lines. The 
 firing at that point alarmed the whole camp, and the troops at oth- 
 er points were drawn up in line of battle before they were attacked. 
 
 But the proofs I have given show that our camps were fired into 
 in Col. Hildebrands's brigade before he was aware of the approach 
 of the enemy, that Gen. Prentiss" left wing was turned within a few 
 minutes afterwards, and that we were thrown into confusion and our 
 lines broken, in a few minutes after the commencement of the 
 battle. 
 
 But I repeat now what I said in my letter to General Sherman : 
 If there is a conflict of testimony which leaves any doubt upon the 
 
15 
 
 subject, there is undisputed facts, which put the matter beyond con- 
 troversy. 
 
 1st. The rebels encamped within striking distance of us on the 
 night before the battle, while our Generals supposed they were 
 still at Corinth. 
 
 2d. No preparation for defence was made. No entrenchments 
 were made, no rifle pits were dug, no timber was cut, or abattis con- 
 structed to protect us against an attack. 
 
 You say there was no surprise. In what position do you place 
 General Sherman and the other Generals in command ? 
 
 You claim that they used all the vigilance and caution which their 
 situation and circumstances required. If so, they must have known 
 that the enemy were advancing upon them in force. At all events, 
 they ought reasonably to have apprehended an attack. 
 
 I again invite your attention to Col. Worthington's diary in this 
 view of the subject. He commences : 
 
 "Wednesday, the 26th of Miirch, 1862, at Camp Shiloh, three miles from 
 Pittsburgh Landing. A company being called for picket duty, detailed 
 Capt. Sharp's Company— B. Indications of an attack, if the country peo- 
 ple are to be believed. Their pickets are around and too near us, showing 
 a strong eflfective force. 
 
 Thursday, March 27, 1862. This afternoon two of Sharp's pickets were 
 fired on by the rebel horse, about 4^^ P. M., not a mile from Camp. A 
 disgrace to the Army that such should be the case, and an indication that 
 they are covering some forward movement, yet Sherman is as improvident 
 as ever, and takes no defensive, and scarce any precautionary measures. 
 He snubs me and has no time to hear even a suggestion. 
 
 Friday, March 28th, 1862. Having suggested to McPowell the sending 
 out of a stronger picket, he ordered thirty more men, which were immedi- 
 ately volunteered. If Beauregard docs not attack us, he and the chivalry 
 are disgraced forever, if for nothing else. 
 
 "Saturday, March 29, 1862. Sherman has refused to sign a requisition 
 for seventy-two axes for my regiment, making it twenty-two, and while a 
 slight abbattis might prevent or avert an attack, there are no axes to make 
 it, nor is there a sledge or crowbar in his Division, and scarce a set of 
 tools out of my Regiment. 
 
 Monday, March 31st, 1862. Further indications through the pickets 
 that an attack is imminent, and though I do not fear the result, a sudden 
 attack, if violently made as it will be, may throw us back for months. 
 The men are discouraged at our delay here, and the close vicinity of tlie 
 rebel pickets which should be driven off. Sherman is inviting an attacR, 
 which 1 hope may occur, but for which we are unprepared. 
 
 " Tuesday, April 1st, 1862. Have now over one hundred rounds of am- 
 munition for all available men, and feel easy on that point. Ordered the 
 Captains to send in accounts of clothing and material, which the Quarter- 
 master is very careless about getting. Still no axes, which he cannot 
 now get if he would, and which are worth more than guns at present. 
 
 "Thursday, April 3d, 1862. Rode to Pittsburg Landing. The place is 
 crowded and in disorder below, with noise and gambling above, across the 
 road from the Post Office. Hunted up and down for clothing and axes, 
 and found that Sherman had forbidden his Quartermaster from receiving 
 anything. That Gen. Smith's Quartermaster will answer no requisition 
 
16 
 
 outside of his immediate command, and the Post Quartermaster Baxter, 
 (Grant's) will only answer the requisitions of the Division Quartermas- 
 ters. 
 
 * * Jit * ******** 
 
 "The indications are still for attack, wliich I have also indicated to Mc- 
 Dowell. We should now have on our right at least six batteries, and two 
 regiments of Cavalry to warn the rear. With thick woods before us and 
 pickets scarce a mile out, we have no defenses whatever, and no means of 
 giving an alarm but by the sound of musketry. The troops cover too 
 much ground and cannot support each other, and a violent attack which 
 we may expect, may drive them back in detail. God help us with so 
 many sick men in camp, if we are attacked, there being over five thousand 
 unfit for duty. 
 
 "Friday, April 4, 1862. One of McDoweirs pickets was shot in the 
 hand about noon. A detail of Taylor's Cavalry was sent out three or 
 four miles, found four to six hundred reb3l Cavalry and fell back, return- 
 ing about 2 P. M. Every thing is carried on in a very negligent way, 
 and nothing but the same conduct on the other side will save us from dis- 
 aster. They can concentrate one hundred thousand men from the heart 
 of rebeldom, and with three or four railroads, and have far greater facili- 
 ties for handling troops than we have. Have Brigade orders to stack arms 
 at daylight till further orders. Keep two companies lying on their arms, 
 and though as quiet as possible, look for an attack every hour. 
 
 " Saturday, April 5, 1802. Rode out to Sharp's pickets at sunrise, and 
 found two men, (rebel pickets) wounded yesterday, who died last night at 
 the widow Howell's. About 7 o'clock, A. M. , the rebels drove in Lieut. 
 Craig from the widow Howell's, getting possession of their dead men. 
 Heard in the evening that the rebels had established three guns (six poun- 
 der.^) opposite Hildebrand s Brigade on our left, across the valley. Hear 
 of tive of their regiments arriving to-day.'' 
 
 I have already given the entry of Sunday, April 6ih, in Col. 
 Worthington's Diary. Why were all thet^e -warnings disregarded ? 
 You say he was not surprised, but expected an attack. Why then 
 did he refuse to permit Col. Worthington to have axes to prepare de- 
 fences for his own regiment ? 
 
 I do not believe he was disloyal, and desired ottr defeat, though 
 this record might well give rise to such a suspicion. I believe it 
 was simply the result of that arrogance, obstinacy and self-sufficien- 
 cy, which is characteristic of little minds. 
 
 He would not adopt the suggestion of a subordinate officer, lest 
 he should lo-se the ere lit aiiJ hanorof origin iting his plans himself. 
 And these facts are not to be got rid of by whistling Col. Worth, 
 ington down the wind, and impeaching his character and veracity. 
 
 Col. Worthington is a sou of Ex-<loveraor Worthington, is a 
 graduate of West Point, is now fifty-four years old. and withal a 
 high-toned, high-minded, and honorable gentleman. 
 
 But if his statements need corroboration, we have abundance of 
 it. There is appended to this diary, the following statement : 
 
 "April 25, 1862. 
 
 "The undersined hereby certify that most of tlie facts above set forth arc 
 correct from th-iir (our) own knowledge, and that Col. Worthington' s re- 
 
17 
 
 marks and anticipations are in correspondence ■with his general conversa- 
 tion for ten days before the battle of the 6th of April, 18(j2. 
 
 William Smith, Major 46th Regt., 0. V. I. 
 
 J. W. Heath, Capt. Co. A., " " 
 
 A. G. Sharp, Capt. Co. B. " " 
 
 John Weisman, Capt. Co. C. " " 
 
 Ed. N. Upton, Lt. Commanding Co. D. 0. V. I. 
 
 M. C. Lilley, Capt, Co. H., 46th Reg., 0. V. I. 
 
 C. C. Lvbrand, Capt. Co. I. " " 
 
 I. N. Alexander, Capt. Co. K. 46th Regt., 0. V. I. 
 
 I know that when the knowledge of the existence of this diary 
 reached (len. Sherman, he contrived to make Col. Worthington's 
 position so uncomfortable, that the Colonel was compelled to with- 
 draw from the service. But that does not impair the value of his 
 statement. 
 
 You claim that the officers to whom I referred in my letter to 
 Gren. Sherman, have failed to sustain me, but have endorsed Gen. 
 Sherman's conduct at the battle of Shiloh. Let us see how far you 
 are correct in this. You quote Greneral Halleck's letter to the 
 Socretary of War, giving Gen. Sherman the credit for saving the 
 fortunes of the day at Shiloh by his courage and gallantry. Who 
 ever denied it? I certainly did not. On the contrary I said in my 
 latter to Gen. Sherman that on account of his gallantry and courage 
 in the battle, I had omitted his name in my letter to the 31ac-a- 
 Chcek Pves!>, charging negligence on the commanding officers. Let 
 us have no evasions, no change of the issue. 
 
 I have not said that any of the officers whom I named, named 
 (ren. Sherman as being personally guilty of negligence, any more 
 than 1 did in my letter. But neither Gen. Halleck nor Gen. Mc- 
 Cook nor any other General named in my letter to General Sher- 
 man, have said, and will not say, that the attack of Sunday morn- 
 ing, April 6th, was not a surprise, and that some one or more of the 
 commanding officers were guilty of gross negligence. I did not 
 say it was Gen. Sherman, and the officers to whom I have referred 
 did not say so. 
 
 I have no doubt but Gen. McCook spoke in high terms of Gen. 
 Sherman's gallantry on Sunday the Gth, in presence of his brother 
 Daniel, as he certainly did in my presence on the Sunday after the 
 battle. And I did not use his name as charging negligence on 
 Gen. Sherman. 
 
 I said in my letter to General Sherman : "If you wish to know 
 the opinion of men who are competent judges of the question at <s- 
 siie hetict'ni us, dr." What was the question at issue between us? 
 2 
 
18 
 
 It was whether our army was surprised at Shiloh on Sunday, April 
 (5th ! Whether there was negligence on the part of any of our 
 Generals in suffering themselves to be surprised. Not whether 
 Gen. Sherman was the officer chargeable with it. 
 
 You quote Gen. Boyle, Gen. Nelson and Gen. Rosseau in sup- 
 port of Gen. Sherman's gallantry and courage, which has not been 
 called in ({uestion. 
 
 Gen. Kosseau says in his after dinner speech at Louisville, that 
 Gen. Sherman was not surprised, and that no man could surprise 
 him. The terms of extravagant eulogy used by Gen. Rosseau, are 
 of themselves sufficient to show that he spoke somewhat at random, 
 and probably would not desire to be held to a rigid literal construc- 
 tion of his language. 
 
 Now, sir, permit me to say, that the officers to whom I referred 
 were not named at random, without knowing something of their 
 opinions on the question in controversy. One of them prepared 
 charges of negligence and misconduct to present to the Secretary of 
 War against one of the commanding officers. He exhibited them 
 to me, and told me that he had shown them to other officers whom 
 he named, who said they agreed with him as to the truth of the 
 charges, but advised a little delay to see what action the Depart- 
 ment would take in the matter, of its own motion. 
 
 Another said in the most emphatic terms that the attack was a 
 surprise, which was the result of gross negligence, that the coni- 
 manding; officers ou2;ht to be court martialed and shot. I do not 
 propose to bring them into conflict with Gen. Sherman by giving 
 their names, or get up any issue or veracity about it. 
 
 As I have already said, there was on my first visit to Shiloh, 
 which was on the Sunday after the battle, but one opinion on the 
 subject in the army. And I did not then suppose that the officers 
 in command would deny the suprise. 
 
 When T returned some ten days later, I learned that the officers were 
 denying that there was a surprise. And it was upon this occasion 
 that Col. Leggett maintained in a conversation of some length that 
 there was no surprise. And I now repeat what I have already said 
 that he is the only man of the hundreds that I conversed with in 
 the Army, that entertained that opinion. And what I could not 
 but regard as a little remarkable, was, that he was selected to rep- 
 resent the State of Ohio in a Court of Inquiry that was got up by 
 the commanding officers. You say the soldiers who fought so 
 bravely have no quarrel with their Generals, and need no defence. 
 
19 
 
 Don't deceive yourt^elf. There is not a man who fought in the 
 ranks at Shiloh on that bloody Sabbath, who does not believe that 
 there ought to have been some means of defence provided, entrench- 
 ments, rifle-pits, or abattis, that would have enabled them to repel 
 the enemy without encountering the hardships and the horrors of 
 that, and the succeeding day, and the intervening night. The 
 thousands of brave men who were maimed and mutilated for life in 
 that battle, will not forget that they are suffering for the negligence 
 of men whose duty it was to care for them, and watch over them, 
 and warn them of the approach of danger, and furnish them the 
 best means of defence. 
 
 The tens of thousands of widows and orphans, and bereaved 
 fathers and mothers, whose husbands and fathers and sons are 
 mouldering upon the banks of the Tennessee, have a fearful reck- 
 oning to settle with those whose ignorance or negligence has hurried 
 their relatives to premature and untimely graves. You forget of 
 what manner of men our Army is composed. The great mass of 
 them arc educated and intelligent farmers and mechanics, who have 
 gone into the militai'y service from motives of the purest patriotism, 
 and not for the paltry consideration of thirteen dollars per month. 
 Every man of them does his own thinking. There are thousands 
 of them in the ranks who are the equals of the Generals by whom 
 they are commanded in every thing but mere military rank, and 
 perhaps military science and experience. 
 
 So far as my intercourse has extended with the bravest and best of 
 the rank and file of that army, the opinion is universal that the at- 
 tack on Sunday the Gth of April, was a surprise, which is justly 
 chargeable to the negligence of the Generals who commanded it. 
 I know that the influence of your name and character will do much 
 to establish a different opinion. But permit me to say, to you, 
 that you have undertaken a task that is beyond your strength, Her- 
 culean and gigantic as it may be. So wide-spread and deep-seated 
 is the conviction, that thousands of brave men were sacrificed to 
 the negligence and misconduct of their officers, that no human 
 power can change it. You have suffered your personal feelings to 
 wai'p your judgment, and you are attempting to sustain an error, a 
 delusion, a sham, that is got up to shield gentlemen who wear 
 stars upon their shoulders, from merited condemnation and disgrace. 
 Yoii cannot accomplish it. 
 
 Very llespectfuUy, Yours, &c., 
 
 B. STANTON. 
 
20 
 
 Bellefontaine, Dec. 4. 1862. 
 
 Hon. Thomas Ewing — Sir : — Since the pamphlet edition of my 
 letter of Nov. 4, was in the hands of the printer, I have received 
 your reply to it as published in the Mac-a-Cheek Pyv.ss. 
 
 As I am not ambitious of the honors of authorship, which you 
 and Gen. Sherman seem determined to force upon me, I pass over 
 your verbal criticisms as matters in which the public can feel no 
 special interest. You assume that I have abandoned the question 
 of surprise. 
 
 In this you ai-e entirely mistaken. It furnishes an excuse for 
 ignoring to the overwhelming and conclusive evidences of surprise, 
 to which your attention was specially invited, and therefore I am not 
 surprised at the assumption. 
 
 I desire to correct an error which you have fallen into, and upon 
 which your whole argument in reply to the proofs of surprise up- 
 on Col. Hildebrands Brigade, rests. At page 9 of your reply, you 
 say : " On Col. Hildebrand's left, was Col. Stewart, with the 2d 
 Brigade." It is undoubtedly true that Col. Stewart with the 2d 
 Brigade was to the left of Col. Hildebrand's Brigade. But your 
 letter is so carelessly written as to leave the impression that Col. 
 Stewart's Brigade was next to, and adjoining Col. Hildebrand on 
 the left, and your argument proceeds upon this assumption. Now, 
 the truth is, that the whole of Gen. Prentiss' Division was between 
 Col. Stewart and Col. Hildebrand, and that the distance between 
 Col. Stewart's right wing and Col. Hildebrand's left, must have 
 been about one mile and a half. Hence you will see that your as- 
 sumption, that the firing with shell spoken of in Col. Hildebrand's 
 report, before his Brigade was drawn up in line of battle, is the 
 same spoken of by Col. Stewart's report, is a great mistake. With 
 this correction of your letter of the 19th ult., I am entirely willing 
 to rest the controversy, and submit it to the judgment of a candid 
 and enlightened community. 
 
 Very Respectfully, Yours, &c., 
 
 B. STANTON. 
 
 P. S. Since the foregoing was in type, I have read the follow- 
 ing letter from C. Whittlesey, late of the 20th V. I., who com- 
 manded a Brigade in Gen. Lew Wallace's Division, at the battle of 
 Shiloh. It will be recollected that Gen. Wallace's Division was at 
 
21 
 
 Crump's Landing, six miles below Pittsburg Landing, at the com- 
 mencement of the battle on Sunday morning, and did not reach 
 the battle ground until Sunday evening. 
 
 Col. Whittlesey is a graduate of West Point, with a large experi- 
 ence, and one of the most intelligent and efficient officers in the 
 service. B. STANTON. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH— WAS IT A SURPRISE? 
 
 Cleveland, 0., Nov. 22, 1862. 
 Hon. B. Stanton, Lt. Gov., Bellefontaine, Ohio: 
 
 Dear Sir: — To reply fully to the enquiries of yours dated the Tthinst., 
 will require considerable space. Immediately after the unfortunate battle 
 of Shiloh, reports became current prejudicial to the reputation of Gen. 
 W. T. Sherman. 
 
 The General has replied in person, and his personal friends in high 
 positions have more than once undertaken his defence with great zeal and 
 ability. They charge our disasters to the cowardice of 10,000 of our citi- 
 zen soldiers. The public seems to believe them due to negligence; with 
 many, the criminal negligence, of a General or Generals. This is the 
 issue. Historians find it a difficult task to arrive at the truth, respecting 
 battles. In this case, as it is a recent affair, we may have access to the 
 personal statements of witnesses; the private letters of those present; the 
 public correspondence of newspapers ; and the official reports and bulle- 
 tins. All these are entitled to consideration. Official reports are not the 
 only credible sources of information. I have not been able to procure 
 Document No. 66, published by the Senate, and have not before me all of 
 the reports of the Generals. Whatever there is in Document 66 favorable 
 to his view of the case is no doubt made available by Mr. Ewing in his let^ 
 ter to you. 
 
 The command to which I belonged did not reach the field until nearly 
 dark on Sunday, and therefore 1 cannot speak from observation in refer- 
 ence to the attack on that morning. After examining the ground during 
 the next fortnight, I am free to state that my conclusions were that due 
 preparation had not been made to meet the impending attack. What offi- 
 cer is most to blame, if this conclusion is correct, or among what Gener- 
 als the blame should be divided, is not easily determined. The aft'air and 
 its results are of too much consequence to slacken in the pursuit of the 
 truth, whether it effects one or many. 
 
 A fortnight previous, Gen. Grant's corps consisted of 43, 768 infantry 
 and 4,814 cavalry and artillery. A sixth division under Brig. Gen. Pren- 
 tiss had been added to the camp at Pittsburg Landing; and Gen. Wal- 
 lace's Division was at Crump's Landing, six miles below on the same bank 
 of the river. 
 
 The five Divisions, encamped around Pittsburg on Sunday morning may 
 have varied in strength from 35,000 to 40,000. As I have seen no official 
 statement I can give it only V)y estimate. Whatever it was, all this force 
 came frightfully near being annihilated. At 6 p. m. of Sunday, as Gen. 
 Buell's advance reached the ground, very few of the Brigades retained 
 their organization. The camps of four Divisions were in the possession of 
 the enemy, and a large part of the corps in confusion and dismay were 
 
22 
 
 crowfling the river banks below the blutfs. The rebels were so near the 
 Landini that a building on the crest of the bluflFabove it, is well marked 
 with their musket shots. Our two gunboats were then enabled to attack 
 on our left; and Gen. Amnion's Brigade came up the hill just in time to 
 save our batteries. 
 
 Prentiss and his Division were captured, and a large part of the 2d 
 Division (Gen. C. F. Smith's) was also taken. So much of this misfortune 
 as could be remedied by the re-occupation of our camps and the reti-eat of 
 the enemy was effected the next day. 
 
 But 13, 763 men had been placed hors do combat ; of whom 1,735 lay 
 dead on the field. Seven thousand eight hundred and thirty-two 
 more, maimed and injured in various degrees, were many of them still up- 
 on the ground, suffering, bleeding and dying under a remorseless sky, 
 from which cold rains frequently fell upon tlieni. The remainder were in 
 the hands of the enemy. These men were American citizens comprising 
 the best talent, intelligence, blood and virtue of the nation. Was this 
 sacrifice necessary? Was the cause of the Union benefited or improved, 
 by an engagement which sti-ewed that field with so many men and horses? 
 Has the national reputation gained or lost? If the catastrophe was inevi- 
 table, or if the cause derived a corresiDonding advantage, the friends of 
 our departed soldiers would have grieved but would not have complained. 
 If their loss was unnecessary, it makes little difference how it was brought 
 about ; whether by a technical "surprise," or by a want of proper prepara- 
 tion which enters into the definition of a surprise. 
 
 The enemy was concentrated at Corinth, a place about 25 miles south of 
 ovir camp, where he was fortified. A railway existed in running order 
 from tTience west to Memphis, on the Mississippi— also southerly to all 
 parts of the State of Mississippi, and to Mobile. Gen. A. S. Johnson, one 
 of their ablest ofiicers, was in command, with Beauregard as his first 
 subordinate. Hi-; strength was variously reported at 50, 70, 100 and 150,- 
 000; but whatever it was our commanding General must have known. 
 In twenty-four hour's time it could be pi'ecipitated upon our lines. It had 
 a fortified position to fall back upon, and railwaj's by which to escape. 
 We had five Divisions in an open camp with a river at their backs. What 
 was good policy in the enemy under these circumstances ? What would 
 have been good policy on our part, even without other indications or warn- 
 ings? 
 
 During the week previous to the battle reconnoitering parties, scouts 
 and pickets of the enemy were close upon our lines. What did this indi- 
 cate ? General Sherman was placed in front, and says in his report that 
 a skirmish took place on the 4th of April, in which his pickets were 
 driven in at one and one-half miles from his headquarters. Buell had 
 been ordered by Gen. Halleck from Nashville to the Tennessee, but no part 
 of his force had arrived. Gen. Beauregard states that their force moved 
 from Corinth on the third at one o'clock in the morning, consisting of 
 three corps, under Polk, Bragg, and Hardee. Breckinridge had a fourth 
 corps as a reserve. In this state of affairs, were any preparations made 
 to strengthen our position at Shiloh by artificial works ? Were our ad- 
 vance 1 guards increased in strength, as is usual in such cases, to meet 
 the first shock of the enemy's advancing columns? Were any intrench- 
 ments made to shield our raw troops from the impetuosity of an attack, or 
 to protect the artillery ? What advantages the ground has for such de- 
 fenses will be noticed further on. It is ceitain that no commanding posi- 
 tions were taken in front, and no efforts made to embarrass the enemy 
 until he reached our lines. Gen. Beauregard states that their army rested 
 on Saturday night at the forks of the Hamburg and Pittsburg road, three 
 miles from Shiloh. Their movements had been greatly delayed by rains 
 and the consequent bad roads of a cluyey soil. There is much to show 
 that during the night large bodies of troops approached nearer than the 
 forks of the road. 
 
23 
 
 A large b'voiiac was oliserved by us after the bittle, not more than a 
 mile and a half in our front. Trains led to it from the west and soutb- 
 w 'St, made by regiments moving through the brush. 
 
 Capt. Alexander, of the 4Gth Ohio Volunteers, stated to me that, being 
 on picket duty, he saw at daylight of the sixth masses of men to his left 
 nearer the camp than he was. His position was in front of our right. Dr. 
 T. M. Carey, one of our surgeons who was captured near Shiloh on Sun- 
 day, has published a letter in the Cincinnati Commercial, wherein he 
 says: "Breakfast was had, with our usual self-security, about 6% a. m., 
 little thinking that just beyond the ravine (in front), in the woods, lay a 
 formidable enemy in full force. At daybreak on Sunday they were in 
 sight of our camps, and Gen Johnson remarked to Gen. Beauregui-d, 'Can 
 it be possible they are not aware of our presence?' Beauregard replied, 
 ' It is scarcely possible; they are laying some plan to cntrnp us.' " 
 
 New Orleans papers of the 4th, which were found on the prisoners, 
 stated that on the 4th of April Gen. Grant would be attacked. 
 
 Gen. Sherman says that our pickets were driven in on Friday, the 4th, 
 and that on Saturday the enemy were "very bold, coming well down to 
 our front, yet I did not believe he designed anything but a strong demon- 
 stration.'' General Grant passing Crump's Landing on his way down on 
 Friday evening after the skirmish is reported by an officer to have said it 
 was only evidence of a close reconnoisance and not of an attack. 
 
 This agrees with an extract published in the Cincinnati Gazette from a 
 private letter of Gen. Grant's. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs up to Saturday night. General Sherman's 
 position was the most responsible of all the Generals present on the field. 
 Gen. Grant's headquarters were at Savannah, where Buell was expected 
 to report. Neither of them knew the close proximity of the enemy or ex- 
 pected a serious attack. To Gen. Sherman particularly was confided the 
 protection and defense of his line, and the paramount duty of knowing 
 what was going on in front. 
 
 Early in the morning, according to the Athens Messenger, of April 24th, 
 a messenger was sent from the advanced guards to Gen. Sherman advising 
 him that the rebels were advancing in force, to which he replied, in a 
 jocose manner, that "they must be frightened out there." 
 
 On this point his own expressions are: "About 8 a. m., I saw glittering 
 bayonets of masses of infantry in the woods to our left front, beyond a 
 small stream (Oak Run) and then became satisfied for the first time 
 that the enemy designed a determined attack upon our whole camp." 
 
 General Grant and his friends assert that after the firing had com- 
 menced at Shiloh, on Sunday, which was heard at Crump' s Landing and 
 at Savannah, he considered it a feint; and that if attacked we should find 
 the real point of attack to be upon Adamsville. Our pickets were driven 
 in between (3: 30 and 7 o' clock a. m. In this state of affairs the battle opens. 
 What were the preparations for such an event'.' It matters little to the 
 nation or reputation of our arms, whether we are defeated by an enemy 
 suddenly springing upon us from a jungle, opening an unexpected lire 
 upon the General in person, or whether it is because we were found un- 
 prepared to meet him. 
 
 The accompanying maps, which I made on the ground, will give a much 
 better idea of the country than can be had by description. The general 
 course of tlie Tennessee river at Pittsburg Landing is westerly soon chang- 
 ing its course northward. The battlefield lies on the south shore, covering 
 the undulating upland between two mill streams. Lick Creek enters the 
 river af)out the same distance above that Snake Creek does below the Land- 
 ing. They are three and-a-half or four miles apart, and nearly parallel. 
 The soil and sub-soil is of red clay to unknown depths, forming bluffs 
 along the river, about one hundred feet above high-water. These creeks 
 and all branches, however minute, have worn deep and precipitous chan- 
 nels into the clay. Most of this region is covered with an original growth 
 
24 
 
 of oak, not very close, but a dense growth of underbrush of oak and 
 hickory has come up among the more ancient timber. The general sur- 
 face is level without hills, but with a multitude of valleys of excavation 
 which are generally filled with standing timber and brush. About a mile 
 back of the Landing is a small stream that runs nearly parallel with the 
 river westward, entering Snake Creek just above where the road from 
 Crump's Landing heads with this little stream. A rivulet with several 
 branches crosses it, and cutting a gap through the river bluifs enters it 
 above the Landing. The gunboats were opposite this ravine and fired 
 through it upon the enemy's right in the afternoon. Further south 
 another small creek, sometimes called "Oak Run,"' runs westerly, in front 
 of Sherman's line, emptying into Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, 
 near the Purdy road. The valley of Snake Creek is swampy and impassa- 
 ble for artillery. From the heads of Oak Run to the east are the knobs 
 and ravines of Lick Creek. Gen. Prentiss' division occupied this space 
 on the left of General Sherman. In this country the roads are very 
 crooked and in poor repair. They pass irregularly from farm to farm 
 through the woods. There are, however, two routes, called main roads, 
 that pass thi-ough the field of Shiloh. One comes from the west at Purdy, 
 crossing Owl Creek, passing in rear of Shiloh Church and over Lick 
 Creek to Hamburg. The other leads from Pittsburg Landing, southerly, 
 past the Church towards Corinth. A great many minor paths and roads 
 intersect the ground. Much more of the country is still covered with 
 standing timber and thicket, than is in cultivation. There is no point 
 from which the whole field, or any considerable part of it, is visible at 
 once. 
 
 Major General Smith's Division lay near the Landing, in command of 
 Brigadier General W. H. Wallace, on account of the sickness and absence 
 of its Chief. About a mile in rear were the divisions of Hurlburt and 
 McClernand. in an irregular line on or near the waters of the little stream 
 first described, McClernand on the right. The Corinth road passed be- 
 tween them. The second Brigade of Gen. Sherman's command, under Col. 
 Stuart, of Illinois, was detached to guard the fords of Lick Creek, at the 
 extreme left of our line. In front of the space between Prentiss' right 
 and Sherman's left, was the 53d Ohio, Col. Appier, half a mile distant. 
 
 The valley in front, and most of the country, is in timber, more or less 
 dense. From this timber, and the ravines extending from Owl Creek to 
 Lick Creek, the enemy opened fire nearly at the same moment. Pie was 
 massed along that whole line, within musket range, and the senior General 
 present did not know it, and did not expect a general engagement. I am un- 
 able to say what Gen. Prentiss' expectations were. An officer of General 
 Grant's staff, writing to the Cincinnati Commercial on the 21st of April, 
 says that one of Gen. Pi-entiss' officers told him tnat he was sent out early 
 in the morning, on the Corinth road, with two companies of men, to make 
 a reconnoisance. He met our pickets, driven in, about a mile from our 
 front. It is not necessary for your purposes to go into details of the action. 
 
 Considering the suddenness of the attack, and the fact that the troops 
 first assailed had never been under fire, that they had no breastworks, 
 abattis or other protection, that the enemy's artillery opened first, and 
 from cover, it is hazarding very much to call them to an account. 
 
 Col. Hildebrand, commanding the third brigade, reports that his pickets 
 (the 53d Ohio) were fired upon early in the morning, and shortly after 7 
 o'clock the enemy appeared in force, opening upon his camp a heavy fire, 
 followed up rapidly with shell. He formed the 57th and 77th Ohio, who 
 advancing encountered the enemy in force, within three hundred yards of 
 his camp. In a private letter, published in the Marietta Intelligencer, he 
 states they held this ground four hours, against four times their number. 
 
 Gen. Prentiss' command was driven back, but was not captured until 
 after 5 o'clock in the afternoon. This was after the centre of our second 
 line had been broken, on the left of McClernand. 
 
25 
 
 The fourth brigade, Col. Buckland, and the first, Col. McDowell, of 
 Sherman's Division, remained in line nntil between 10 and half past 10 
 a. m., which they left under orders. Altliougli overwhelmed by numbers, 
 and retreating, the fighting was kept up without intermission until night. 
 On ground so rough and complicated, maneuvers were of course difficult. 
 The commanders of regiments could seldom see their whole command at 
 once. Orders were communicated with difficulty. The enemy's artillery 
 was superior to our own, yet they were forced to bring their reserves into 
 action early in the day, every corps and regiment being engaged. Under 
 these circumstancee it requires very high authority to call in question the 
 bravery of ten thous;ind of our soldiers. Undei' the crushing power of 
 such an outset, could tlie lino have been held by the same number of 
 veteran troops ? 
 
 As a subject of military criticism, the following points are to be consid- 
 ered : 
 
 1st. If the rebel Generals were wise, should they not have determined 
 upon an attack of Grant's corps, precisely as they did, to come off on Fri- 
 day or Saturday before Buell arrived ? 
 
 2d. Should not a prudent General have anticipated such an attack un- 
 der the circumstances ? 
 
 3d. Was there good reason to suppose that a General of reputation, 
 like Johnson would pass our main army, and fall upon one Division of it, 
 several miles more distant, and ten miles nearer to BuelTs advance? 
 
 4th. If an attack was not expected on theoretical grounds, should not 
 a great movement of the enemy, commenced on the night of the 2d and 
 3d of April, have been known at our lines by the 4th of April ? 
 
 5th. If it was not known, should not the demonstrations of Friday and 
 Saturday, have been considered a sufficient hint of the enemy's inten- 
 tions? 
 
 6th. Between Friday and Sunday, would not a prudent and skillful 
 General have improved the time to strengtlien his front, slashing the tim- 
 ber in and beyond the ravines that protected his line, covering his artil- 
 lery by earth works, and his infantry by rifle pits? 
 
 ■Zth. If the attack had been made, as the rebels contemplated, on or be- 
 fore the 5th of April, would not Gen. Grant's corps have been entirely 
 destroyed? 
 
 Thib' letter has become more lengthy than I expected, but without even 
 now giving a full response to the questions propounded by you. 
 Very Respectfully, Yours, &c., 
 
 CHAS. 'WHITTLESEY. 
 
LETTER 
 
 LIEFT. GOV. STABTON, 
 
 IN REPLY TO 
 
 HON. THOS. E¥ING. 
 
 COLUMBUS: 
 
 PRINTED AT THE OFriCE OF THE OHIO STATE JOCRKAL. 
 
 1862. 
 
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 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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