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S^A.:FET"^2" IFIIiST 
 
 EXTENSION OF REMARKS 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. AUGUSTUS P^^^ARDNER 
 
 OF JVL^SSA-CHTJSETTS 
 
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 JANUAKY 15, 1915 
 
 78166—14434 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 1915 
 
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 D. of D.- 
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 Safety First. 
 EXTENSION OF REMAKKS 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER, 
 
 of massachusetts. 
 In the House of Representatives, 
 
 Friday, January 15, 1915. 
 Mr GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, in accordance with the permis- 
 sion granted me by the House on January 15. I print the fol- 
 lowing two articles which I have recently published in the 
 newspa])ers : 
 
 Chapter I. What is the matter with the ^avy? 
 Chapter II. What ails the Army? 
 
 I. What is the Matter With the Navy? 
 
 ALWAYS SOME OTHEK DAY. 
 
 "The rule is jam to-morrow and jam yesterday, but never 
 jam to-day," said the white queen in "Through the Looking 
 
 Gl'T^S " 
 
 The white queen did not happen to be talking of the American 
 Navy, but she might just as well have been doing so. 
 
 Listen to thfe debates in Congress and you will be convinced 
 that the pages of history furnish an impregnable defense for 
 this country. If John Paul Jones could change a peaceful mer- 
 chantman into the Bonhomme Richard and defeat the British 
 man-of-war Serapis, why can not the like be done again? What 
 man has done, man can do— such is the burden of the song ot 
 the gentlemen who believe that American genius and American 
 freemen need no preparation for war. Is anyone such a dastard 
 as to deny that our gallant Naval Militia admirals can on any 
 pleasant afternoon forsake their counting houses for the quar- 
 terdeck and smash the British superdreadnaughts to smither- 
 eens with a fleet of converted Long Island Sound steamers? 
 
 Perish tlie thought. .,^i,^^i 
 
 But if you are so skeptical as to be dubious lest the school 
 historv book and the Chautauqua lecture may not be adequate 
 to rer^el the attacks of the effete monarchies of Europe and 
 Asia, then peruse the hearings for the last 10 years before the 
 congressional Committee on Naval Affairs and you may be com- 
 forted A more complete docket of experiments about to be 
 made and contracts shortly to be entered into and reports to 
 be orderetl in the near future and boards soon to be appoiiited 
 can not be found outside the records of the circumlocution office 
 about which Dickens wrote. ^ ^ *. ^^ -^^ 
 
 The American air man. Wright, was the first in the wide 
 world to build an aeroplane which would actually fly. and ever 
 since that time we have been experimenting and inspecting and 
 reporting and contracting and considering— in fact, we have 
 78166 — 14434 3 
 
been doing everything except building aeroplanes. On July 1, 
 1914. France owned 1,400 aeroplanes, while Uncle Sam owned 
 23, most of them out of date. However, we recently ordered 
 from abroad an up-to-date French aeroplane with two Sahuson 
 motors and an up-to-date German aeroplane with two Mercedes 
 motors. We were' in hopes that at last we were in a fair way 
 to establish a little brood of air craft; but just then the 
 European war broke out. Wicked foreigners commandeered 
 our purchases; so here we are again just where we started. 
 
 We have as many as 12 submarines on the whole Atlantic 
 coast, not counting those at Colon in the Canal Zone. To be 
 sure, no one has accused the outfit of being any too new tangled ; 
 but, then, pray remember that we are still arguing about the 
 best type with which to experiment. Meanwhile the modest 
 proportion of 11 out of those aforementioned 12 divers were 
 not in diving trim when Commander Stirling reported his 
 fleet last November in obedience to the mobilization order. 
 
 Instead of the fleet of fast scout cruisers which the General 
 Board of the Navy has told us that we need for our safety we 
 have built just three, and they never were of much account, 
 even when they were new. For about 10 years we have been 
 considering and contemplating types for scouts; but before 
 long it is confidently expected that a satisfactory conclusion will 
 be reached. 
 
 Admiral Strauss in his annual report tells us that evei'y 
 American battleship in connnission to-day is equipped with 
 obsolete toipedoes, but that orders have been given and plants 
 are being enlai'ged, and that in two years relief will be in sight. 
 
 DAWDLE, DAWDLEj DAWDLE. 
 
 So it goes dawdle, dawdle, dawdle all along the line from 
 voter to President. The fact is that the whole ♦Navy has got 
 into a rut. It needs a good hard jolt to get it out of the rut, 
 and then it needs to be trimmed up and enlarged until it is a 
 strong weapon fit for the defense of a strong nation. 
 
 Now, do not blame it all on poor old Secretary Daniels. It is 
 only partly his fault, even if he did deprive the seadogs of their 
 grog and enter the sailormen in the lowest grade of the kinder- 
 garten. 
 
 Of course, Daniels with his super-peace ideas ought not to be 
 Secretary of the Navy any more than a liquor dealer ought to be 
 chairman of a temperance rally, but that is a small matter. 
 
 Neither is the blame to be imputed to the Navy bureau chiefs. 
 There has not been one of them for years who at heart would 
 not have been glad to speak right out in meeting and tell the 
 country the whole truth as to our needs. But the country has 
 hitherto been in no listening mood, and it would have been a 
 bold bureau chief, indeed, who cared to face the molten lava 
 from the tongues of the " little Navy " men. Let an officer speak 
 up and he was damned up and down as a seeker for increased 
 rank and power. Let a civilian speak up and he was muckraked 
 from stem to stern as a minion of some armor-plate concern. Let 
 an association or a league speak up and its membership was 
 grilled to find out whether any one of them had a share of steel 
 stock or copper stock or any other kind of stock in the family 
 unto the third or fourth generation. Neither is the blame to be 
 visited on Congi-ess. If any one of us talked about national 
 78166—14434 
 
defencelessuess, some one else talked about jackasses in solon's 
 garbs. 
 
 There is just one party who ought to bear the blame, and 
 that is the great American Republic, whose exact mirror we 
 Congressmen are. Six months ago, if I cared to empty a room, 
 nil I need do was to discuss our national defenselessness. To- 
 day, if I am anxious to fill a hall, I have but to say. that our 
 Army and Navy will be my topic. Six months ago I should Iiave 
 lieen a mighty poor politician if I had preached about our lack 
 of national defense. To-day I should be a mighty poor politician 
 if I were to drop the subject. 
 
 If I were a real hero, I should promise to keep up this crusade 
 as long as the Lord might grant me grace. Not being a real 
 hero. I content myself with a promise to keep on shouting so 
 long as the press will grant me space. 
 
 A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE AND RECOMMEND. 
 
 One disease from which both our Army and Navy are suffer- 
 ing is mortmain, especially mortmain of ideas. Mortmain is 
 an old English law term, which signifled the " rule of a dead and 
 gone hand." We ought to have this case of mortmain treated 
 by an impartial commission of inquiry with some new blood and 
 no arteriosclerosis of the intellect among the commissioners. 
 What we need is a definite plan for the future. What sort of a 
 plan for the national defense can we get out of four different 
 full committees and four different subcommittees of the House 
 and Senate? Yet it was those committees to which we were 
 referred when a commission of inquiry into our defenselessness 
 was refused us by the administration. Moreover, it does not 
 do to forget that those committees, so far as the experienced 
 mem'jers are concerned, are' practically invited to inspect the 
 results of their own handiwork. 
 
 Let us see how the inspection is faring. Just how far have 
 they gone with this investigation? Both the House Committee 
 on Military Affairs and the House Committee on Naval Affairs 
 have now closed their hearings. Both committees confined them- 
 selves almost entirely to the examination of the graybeards of 
 the service and to the particular graybeards wh^i the com- 
 mittees selected, at that. My requests for the summons of 
 Admiral Wainwright, Admiral Winslow, Admiral Brownson, 
 Gen. Wood, and Gen. Wotherspoon were absolutely and pre- 
 emptorily refused. 
 
 A commission of inquiry, such as I advocated, would summon 
 not only bureau chiefs in all their panoply but the hard-worked 
 juniors and the experienced enlisted men as well. A commission 
 of inquiry would allow the complainant to produce witnesses, 
 a privilege which has been denied me by the committees to 
 which I have referred. 
 
 SHORTAGE OF MEN PUT SHIPS OUT OF COMMISSION. 
 
 Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Admiral Badger have testi- 
 fied that we are now 18,000 men short of the number required to 
 man the serviceable part of our present fleet. This estimate 
 takes no account of the crews requisite for vessels now building. 
 The General Board of the Navy maintains that in case of war 
 we should need from 30,000 to 50,000 additional trained men-of- 
 warsmen, and there is no source of supply except about 8,000 
 naval militiamen. 
 78166—14434 
 
Ou the other hand. Admiral Blue has testified that we are only 
 4.565 men short in case of war and that there is little doubt 
 that this demand would be met by ex-service men now in civil 
 life. 
 
 To this Admiral Fiske replies that it would take five years to 
 get our Navy up to a state of efficiency necessary to fight a 
 first-class enemy. 
 
 Let us see what all this juggling and counterjuggling of fig- 
 ures means. Does it mean that these admirals differ as to the 
 number of men needed to man any particular vessel? Not a 
 bit of it. It means that they differ as to how many vessels we 
 need and how many vessels we have which are worth manning. 
 The next time, gentle reader, that you hear about our fleet of 
 33 battleships ask how many of those battleships are in " cold 
 storage" to-day with fragmentary crews or no crews at all. 
 You will find that no less than 32 of them are launched on their 
 way to that bourne whence no traveler returns. Naval authori- 
 ties euphoniously term the three stages of a warship's road to 
 oblivion as " in reserve," " in ordinary." and " out of commis- 
 sion." To be sure, those same naval authorities gravely inform 
 us that our " cold-storage " fleet can be got ready for "battle in 
 from 3 to 12 months, but they are put to it to explain exactly 
 what the resuscitated veterans would be good for when ready 
 for battle. By the way, for fear that these 12 battleships should 
 feel lonely, there are nearly 80 more of our flghting craft " out 
 of commission " or " in ordinary " or " in reserve " to keep 
 them company. 
 
 ONLY EIGHT FIGHTING FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHII'S COME NEXT MARCH. 
 
 Perhaps you are saying to yourselves. " Even if 12 battleships 
 out of 33 are out of the game, that still leaves a mighty tidy 
 fleet." But how about the other 21 battleships, which consti- 
 tute our fighting force? Are they 100 pei'centers? Not by a 
 long shot. Ten of them belong to the so-called first line and 
 11 of them belong to the so-called second line. Of the first 
 liners, 2 ships, to wit, the Michigan and the South Carolina, 
 are to be relegated to the second line on March 3, 1915. The 
 honest factjas that on March 4, 1915, we shall have just S first- 
 class battleships in full commission. Now, where is the com- 
 mon sense in prating about our 33 battleships? 
 
 If anyone tells you that our .second line of battleships is a 
 formidable part of our defense, just pin him down and find out 
 how he makes that fact out. I have heard a Navy official 
 testify that the second line would be of service if our first line 
 was destroyed and the other fellow's first line was destroyed 
 as well. So would a police force of octogenarians be of sei'vice 
 if policemen were not called upon to handle any criminais under 
 80 years old. In private most naval officers regard our second 
 liners as an admirable force wherewith to soothe the nerves of 
 the timid in case of war. Perchance for that purpose they might 
 be as useful as the venerable culverins ha.stily installed at sun- 
 dry places on the Atlantic Coast at the outbreak, of the Spanish 
 War. It would be cheaper, however, for Uncle Sam, when he 
 puts his war paint ou, to conduct a daily clinic for the free 
 administration of anesthetics. 
 
 Yet the General Board of the Navy says that we need 48 
 battleships under 20 years old for our defense. For our de- 
 fense against what nation? For our defense against any na- 
 tion except England, so we are told. 
 78166—14434 
 
Ask any member of that General Board which he would 
 rather have : 
 
 1. A fleet of 48 battleships ranging in age uniformly from 20 
 years old down to brand new ; or 
 
 2. A fleet of 24 battleships, all of them less than 6 years old. 
 What the American people want, in my opinion, is a Navy 
 
 up to date, even if it is necessary to enlarge the scrap heap to 
 an extent which would make the bureau chiefs' hair curl if 
 you could find any bureau chiefs with the requisite quantity of 
 thatch for curling purposes. 
 
 THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM. 
 
 Permit this ignoramus to make a suggestion : 
 
 First. Appoint an independent commission of level-headed 
 men. and see to it that not too many of them are imbued with 
 the idea that they know it all about the national defense. 
 
 Next, require that commission to summon the best naval ex- 
 perts we have and find out — 
 
 First. What war vessels do we need to make us safe against 
 any nation on earth? 
 
 Second. How many of those vessels is it safe to put in 
 "reserve"; that is to say,'with skeleton crews? 
 
 Now, if it is decided that we are aiming too high in taking 
 leave to ask for a Navy capable of swapping shots with John 
 Bull, why then we can cut down the estimates accordingly ; but, 
 for heaven's sake, let us know the truth. 
 
 The problem as to the number of ships which we can safely 
 keep in " reserve " depends very largely on two factors, as 
 follows : 
 
 First. How long does it take to make a landlubber into a 
 man-of-war's man? 
 
 Second. How many former men-of-war's men, adequately 
 trained, can be depended on to return to the Navy in time of 
 war? 
 
 On those two questions I should as lief have the opinion of 
 a few intelligent junior oflicers and enlisted men as the opinion 
 of all the naval experts who ever poured over an encyclopedia. 
 
 On the answers to the question as to the number and types 
 of war vessels needed and on the answer to the question as to 
 the proportion which can safely be kept in " reserve " with 
 fragmentary crews, depends the preparation of any intelligent 
 plan for the future. On the answers to those questions depends 
 the number of officers and enlisted men which we ought to 
 authorize. Do not forget that our Naval Academy can not be 
 enlarged in a day without serious deterioration, and that the 
 standard of the American man-of-war's man ought not to be 
 lowered by the incorporation in our Naval Establishment of 
 vast drafts of hastily trained recruits. On the answers to those 
 questions depends our building program, and I hope that no one 
 is so ignorant as to fail to realize that a very long time is 
 required for warship construction. So the inquiry can not 
 begin too soon. 
 
 MINOR DEFICIENCIES. 
 
 The shortage of ammunition to which Secretary Daniels testi- 
 fied before the Committee on Naval Affairs, the shortage of 
 mines which was admitted by Admiral Fiske, the antiquity of 
 the battleship torpedoes which Admiral Strauss pointed out, 
 even the pitiable air-craft situation which Capt. Bristol re- 
 78166—14434 
 
vealed ; all these facts are startling enough, but a determined 
 General Staff of the Navy with plenty of funds could remedy 
 them in a year or two. Not so the deficiencies in the ranks of 
 our fighting vessels nor the deficiencies in the personnel which 
 is to man them. 
 
 Dreadnaughts and crews can not be improvised when the 
 war cloud appears above the horizon. Admiral Fiske states 
 that it would take five years to get our Navy in a condition to 
 fight an eflicient foreign enemy. This opinion is not indorsed, 
 perhaps, by the Secretary of the Navy, but it is most distinctly 
 in line with what Navy men say when they express their private 
 opinions of the privatest kind. 
 
 II. What Ails the Army? 
 
 There is still truth in the old, old story that it is the man be- 
 hind the gun who counts. But for heaven's sake, how far be- 
 hind the gun do you want the man to be? Must he be so far 
 behind the gun that he has not even a bowing acquaintance with 
 it until war breaks out? Yet that is where we stand to-day. 
 Our Regular Army is an admirable handful. Our reserve army 
 is a farce. A good deal over one-third of our militia absolutely 
 struck their guns off their visiting lists during the whole of last 
 year. 
 
 THE MEN. 
 
 We have only 30,000 Regulars available for a field army and 
 120,000 militiamen besides, so says the report of the Secretaiy 
 of War. In other words, if every mother's son of them answers 
 the call, we shall have 150,000 men to defend us while a new 
 army is being made. That means that we could cover a battle 
 front of 30 miles on the old Civil War reckoning of 5,000 men 
 to a mile. Thirty miles is a long, long way from the distances 
 which modern battle fronts cover. 
 
 How about it? Will all our militiamen turn up if they are 
 summoned, and what will they do when the howitzer begins to 
 howl? It is the correct thing for really patriotic orators to say 
 that by nightfall every militiaman will be on hand, bubbling with 
 heroism. 
 
 The fact is that this fiction of a trained citizenry rushing head 
 over heels to arms in time of war is purely the creature of a 
 deft imagination adroitly interpreted by a clever tongue. The 
 streugtli of the trained-citizenry argument does not lie in its 
 own soundness, but in the fact that most of us are politically 
 estopped from saying what we really think about the militia, 
 or National Guard, as it is called. Owing to the blessed cir- 
 cumstance that my congressional district is amazingly one- 
 sided, I shall make bold to say what I really think. I believe 
 that most men are actuated by the very best and most unselfish 
 motives when they undertake the thankless duties of militia 
 service. I believe that militiamen are keenly conscious of the 
 fact that many persons scoff at them as " tin soldiers." At all 
 events, I know that when I was a militiaman I was sensitively 
 alive to the good-natured superciliousness with which my friends 
 regarded what to them appeared to be my harmless vanity. I 
 believe, moreover, that as the duties are made more arduous 
 and more serious the militia steadily improves, although it be- 
 comes harder and harder to fill its ranks. On the other hand, I 
 do not believe that over tvi'o-thirds of our militia would mate- 
 rialize in war time, and I do not think that dependence could 
 78166—14434 
 
9 
 
 be placed upon them until months of severe training and a 
 weeding-out process had hardened them into military shape. 
 
 I can not forget that no less than 16 States of the Union fell 
 short by greater or less amounts of furnishing their quotas of 
 troops during the Spanish War. I can not forget that after 
 the first burst of enthusiasm was over cities and towns offered 
 bounties in order to fill their quotas of troops in the Ci^al War. 
 I can not forget that the National Government later on gave a 
 large sum of money to each veteran who would reenlist. nor 
 that both the North and the South were eventually obliged to 
 resort to the hateful necessity of compelling men to join the 
 army against their wills. All those things are none the less 
 facts because they are unpopular facts and because it is the 
 fashion to blink at them. 
 
 Neither can I shut my eyes to the report of the Chief of Staff 
 on the record of the militia for the year ending June 30, 1914. 
 Out of 120.000 militiamen, all tolrt, 23.000 failed to present 
 themselves for the annual inspection, 31,000 absented themselves 
 from the annual encampment, and 44,000 never appeared on the 
 rifle range from one year's end to the other. 
 
 WHEN THE CAPITOL WAS BURNED. 
 
 The President says that we have always found means to de- 
 fend ourselves against attack, but the President is quite mis- 
 taken. " We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas in 
 the future as in the past," says he in his annual message to 
 Congress. That was the very same position which President 
 Madison took at the time of the War of 1812. " We shall take 
 leave," quoth Madison, and take leave he certainly did. bag and 
 baggage, militia, statesmen, clerks, lobbyists, julep mixers, and 
 all. Down into Virginia he went, leaving the Capitol and 
 the White House to be burned by the victorious British. 
 
 Poor Dolly Madison ! She saw it all, and she wrote her sister 
 Anna these bitter lines : 
 
 Alas, I can descry only groups of military wandering in all direc- 
 tions, as if there was a lack of arms or of spirit to fight for their own 
 firesides. 
 
 But there was no lack of spirit in those militiamen from 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania and Virginia. Far from it. They 
 had spirit enough and arms enough to defend their own fire- 
 sides, but they did not know how to do it, because they had not 
 been molded into an army. They were but a mob of citizenry 
 under arms. The sad part of it all was that they had had two 
 years in which to prepare, for these events did not occur until 
 the summer of 1814. But the administration of that day had 
 fostered the belief that the country had been misinformed and 
 that the Government had not been negligent of the national de- 
 fense. Hence it was that these poor militiamen were not ready 
 when the day or trial came. A maddened Nation roared for a 
 sacrifice and a sacrifice was vouchsafed unto them. Armstrong, 
 the Secretary of War, was made the scapegoat, just as Alger 
 was made the scapegoat for our unreadiness to fight Spain, and 
 just as Garrison would be made the scapegoat to-morrow if we 
 were to attempt unsuccessfully to put a large force of men into 
 the field. 
 
 But the removal of Armstrong did not erase an exceedingly 
 distressing passage from this Nation's histoiy. That disastrous 
 story harasses us to-day as it harassed our fathers before us. 
 It will fulfill a useful purpose, perhaps, if it serves us as a 
 
 78166—14434 
 
10 
 
 bittei.' warning against being unprepared. On the coast of 
 beautiful County Down, in Ireland, stands the picturesque 
 town of Rosstrevor. For all its picturesqueness, I shall never 
 visit that town and I shall never see the granite shaft which 
 dominates its market place. That graceful monument was 
 ei-ected to the memory of Gen. Robert Ross, who burnt the 
 Capitol at Washington, and its cost was defrayed by the officers 
 of the Chesapeake force. I do not care to see it. 
 
 So much for our Regulars and our militia. There remains 
 to be considered our reserve army of former enlisted men. We 
 can dismiss it with a word, for President Wilson says that we 
 are not to depend on a large reserve army. Perhaps it is just 
 as well not to depend on it entirely, for at present it consists 
 of but 16 men. 
 
 THE GUNS. 
 
 Come to think of it. I have got quite a distance away from 
 the gun in following the man who ought to be behind it. If 
 by the word " gun " a ritle is meant, then we have plenty to 
 give to all comers; that is, at the rfutset of any war. If, how- 
 ever, when we say " gun " we mean cannon, then the first 
 difficulty facing tlie man would be to find the gun to get 
 behind. 
 
 Nine weeks ago, Maj. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, Chief of 
 Staff and virtually head of the United States Army, made his 
 annual report to the Secretary of War. If Gen. Wotherspoon 
 had never done anything in life except write page 12 of his 
 report, he would deserve the thanks of the Nation for that 
 superb act of courage alone. I know of nothing of the sort 
 which approaches it except the courage of Admiral Fiske when 
 last month he testified to the condition of our Navy. Perhaps 
 I ought to include in the same category the fearlessness of Capt. 
 HoBsoN, who for years has stood the gibes of his colleagues and 
 faced the ridicule of the press while he thundered in the ears 
 of an unattentive public the sad story of the dwarfing of our 
 Navy's normal growth. 
 
 But to return to page 12 of Gen. Wotherspoon's report. He 
 tells us that before a war breaks out we must accumulate rifles, 
 cartridges, field artillery, and field-artillery ammunition. He 
 tells us how much we ought to have and how much is actually 
 on hand or in sight. Here is the table : 
 
 Chief of Staff's report, Nov. 15, 19U (p. 12). 
 
 Munitions 
 required as a 
 
 reserve in 
 
 anticipation 
 
 of war. 
 
 Munitions 
 on hand or 
 in process of 
 manufacture. 
 
 Rifles 
 
 Rifle cartridges 
 
 Field guns (exclusive of giant guns,) 
 Field gun ammunition, rounds 
 
 642,541 
 
 646,000,000 
 
 2,834 
 
 11,790,850 
 
 698,374 
 
 241,000,000 
 
 852 
 
 580,098 
 
 So you see that we are short 400.ri00,000 rifle cartridges. 
 11.000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 2,000 fleld guns, 
 if Gen. Wotherspoon's judgment is sound. 
 
 Of course, I am not an expert in these matters, but 580,000 
 rounds of fleld artillery ammunition seems rather inadequate 
 78166—14434 
 
11 
 
 as a reserve in the light of Gen. Wood's testimony that Russia 
 shot away 250,000 rounds against the Japanese in the Battle of 
 Mukden alone; yet 580,098 rounds is all we have on hand. I 
 am told that Lieut. Hunsaker's report, lately sent over from 
 France to the War Department, tells of a French cannon firing 
 500 shots in a day. Of course, that must be an extreme case. 
 But cut the figure in half and you will find that 1,000 such guns 
 would shoot away in two days all the artillery ammunition 
 which we have now plus all which we shall manufacture up to 
 July 1. By the way, Russia had 1,204 guns engaged at Mukden 
 and Japan had 922 guns extending over the same front, so 1,000 
 guns is not an imaginative figure. I do not know whether Gen. 
 Wotherspoon's estimate of 2,834 field guns is excessive or not. 
 The testimony before the fortifications committee in 1913 showed 
 that Russia at that time had 6,000 field guns, while Germany 
 had 5.000 field guns. 
 
 The horrid significance of the whole business lies in the fact 
 that it takes so long to make these munitions of war, even with 
 unlimited appropriations. The good Lord knows that we never 
 shall have unlimited appropriations for public undertakings In 
 defense of our Nation so long as we need unlimited appropria- 
 tions for public buildings in defense of our seats in Congress. 
 
 SLOW WORK MAKING GUNS AND AMMUNITION. 
 
 Last year and this year the Committee on Military Affairs 
 took up the question of the length of time required to make 
 munitions of war. The following facts stand out impressively : 
 Working three shifts night and day, all the factories in this 
 country. Government and private as well, can turn out in the 
 first six months after war is declared but 400,000 rounds of 
 artillery ammunition, or only 150,000 more rounds than Russia 
 shot away in a single battle. They can make about 1,600 rounds 
 per day, or enough to keep 8 guns going under an ordinary 
 battle condition of 200 shots per day. In one year all Govern- 
 ment and private factories put together can turn out 500 field 
 guns, or one-quarter of our shortage, as (Jen. Wotherspoon 
 estimates it. 
 
 FRIEND hay's TABLES. 
 
 My friend Hay, chairman of the Committee on Military 
 Affairs, publishes a table of our requirements in the way of 
 munitions of war which differs vastly from Gen. Wotherspoon's 
 table. Three times I have publicly asked Chairman Hay to 
 summon Gen. Wotherspoon and put him through his paces for 
 his temerity in ignorantly setting up his opinions against a 
 Congressman's. The first time, the good chairman pointed out 
 that the general had gone on the retired list a few days ago; the 
 second time, he invited my attention to the fact that the hear- 
 ings before his committee were closed ; and the third time, he 
 told me that it was no use summoning Gen. Wotherspoon, 
 because he knew all about his ideas ali'eady. 
 
 Incidentally my efforts to secure the summons of Maj. Gen. 
 Leonard Wood have been equally unsuccessful. Yet, Gen. 
 Wood is not on the retired list. He preceded Gen. Wotherspoon 
 as Chief of Staff, and he now commands the Department of the 
 East. 
 
 As to Chairman Hay's tables. I note, for instance, that he 
 estimates 200,000,000 cartridges as a sufficient equipment for a 
 field army of 460,000 men. That estimate is ju.st one-third of 
 78166—14434 
 
12 
 
 the estimate made by the General Staff of the Army for that 
 identical number of men. It is true that 200,000,000 cartridges 
 will equip the machine guns and will fill the men's belts and will 
 suffice for the combat train and the first ammunition train, but 
 400,000,000 additional cartridges are needed for the advance 
 basis and the general bases. At least, the General Staff says 
 so. However, Gen. Crozier, the star witness for the defense, 
 coincides with Chairman Hay on this point. It is fair to admit 
 that the general was frank enough to admit that Army men 
 do not agree with him. 
 
 WHY NOT A FEW TITANIC GUNS FOK US? 
 
 But where are all the giant guns which we progressive Amer- 
 icans ought to have? How are we off for these wonderful 
 implements of warfare with which other nations have been 
 arming themselves? We still are shaking hands with ourselves 
 over our biggest gun, the 6-inch howitzer, and doubting those 
 newspaper stories about the big field guns in Europe. 
 
 Tradition hath it that after the Battle of Crecy a board of 
 French generals was called together to report on the new- 
 fangled weapons called cannon which England had used in the 
 fight. After profound cogitation, the generals decided that no de- 
 pendence whatever could be placed in gunpowder and that cannon 
 could be useful only under exceptional circumstances never likely 
 to occur again. By a unanimous vote, so the story runs, they re- 
 ported to their ruler that the trusty manganel and the stout cata- 
 pult would triumph in the future as in the past. If anyone wishes 
 to know the moral of this tale, let him inquire of our ordnance 
 experts. It may be that we have no need of guns with greater 
 diameters than 6 inches. Still Germany's 16J-inch howitzers 
 and Austria's 12-J-inch guns seem' to be fairly serviceable in 
 battering to bits anything from an impregnable fortress or a 
 venerable cathedral down to a covered trench. Sir John 
 French — foolishly, perhaps — seems to place some reliance in 
 his 9i-inch thunderers. We smile at their puerile performances 
 and continue to estimate and plan and report and consider and 
 congratulate ourselves that we have the tidiest little 3-inch field 
 guns which can be made, even if we are a little bit slow in rush- 
 ing into the making of big ordnance. Let those foreigners waste 
 their money on perfecting submarines and aeroplanes, Zeppe- 
 lins and howitzers. We propose to keep our money in our 
 pockets. That is the way to talk if you want to catch the 
 votes. Let us waitfnlly watch and then proceed to reap the 
 benefits of the foreigner's experiments without costing us a 
 cent. All of which is vastly crafty, no doubt, provided no for- 
 eigner starts to experiment on us. 
 
 THE DOWNY DOVE. 
 
 Oh, well, what's the odds, since the apostles of pudginess tell 
 us that they are going to put an end to wars by the brotherhood 
 of man. In the sweet bye and bye, perhaps, when we have 
 abandoned the Monroe doctrine and when the Californian in- 
 termarries with the Chinaman and the Mississippian intermar- 
 ries with the negro. Until that day is at hand, do not forget 
 the parable of the foolish virgins, who had no o.i in their 
 lamps when the fateful moment came. 
 
 78166—14434 
 
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