E 713 .072 Copy 2 A DEFENCE OF THE LvlcKINLEY ADMINISTRATION iflictment of 'iiiiisti-atiou y Anti- 'JK'i'ialists. FROM ATTACKS OF Mr. CAKL SCHUPtZ AND OTHER ANTI-IMPERIAIilSTS. r.Y J0H:N^ R. DOS PASSOS, OF THE NEW YORK BAR. -aj^^ his COMPLIMENTS OF JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, NEW YORK CITY. JHE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. < I. The Anti- Imperialists appeal to the conscience of the indictment of i *^ i Administration by Anti- ijition upon a question of morality. They indict the President of the United States and his dministration, through Mr. Carl Schurz, of the charge of timing the " much-vaunted war of liberation into a war conquest and criminal aggression." They charge that " the President provoked an armed nflict with the Filipinos," and that " we used the FUipinos as allies, and we profited from their co-operation as allies, and, in point of fact, recognized and treated them as allies so long as they could be useful to us, and that, therefore, we owed them those moral obligations which are always recognized between honorable allies." Lud, lastly, it is declai-^^ '■'■that if toe had treate^Wlie Filipinos justly vje should have recognized their inde2)endence.'' (Carl Schurz, in the N. Y. Herald, July 14, 1900.) nd Mr. Schurz, with great emphasis, addresses a chal- lebe (N. Y. Times, July 25, 1900), which he solemnly rejats and reiterates to the people of this country, to the nperialists " and to the Republican party, to ' ' show me (him) in the history of the world a single act of perfidy committed by any Republic more infamous than that which has been committed by the McKiuley administration against our Filipino allies." [Ibid. ) have admired Mr. Schurz as a scholar; and I have iked upon him as an honest and independent critic of j:)lic events. His reiteration of these charges has been dsensational and dramatic, in fact, so vociferous; his Imperialists. 2 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. characterization of persons has been so bitter, malignant and vindictive, his w^holesale indictment of the people of this nation is so serious — that, together with his claim that he had received no answer to his broadly flaunted challenges, T have been induced to investigate the charges on my own account ; to go to the foundation of this melan- choly affair ; to follow all of its details from beginningto end, and to examine the questions, as they arose, in the li^ht of morality, as well as of the principles of internatio:al and constitutional law. The result of my labors I n»w give to the public. I rejoice and am proud that this n- vestigation shows that the charges preferred are unfoundd, base and unnatural, in fact and in law; that they h.ve been made either from gross ignorance of the facts, o a misapprehension of them, or from a deliberate disregarcof truth, and a malignant and unchristianlike hatred of ur civil officers, soldiers and sailors — from the President dftvn to the lowliest private. I have endeavored to arrange the events in chronolo i-TT. , official char- guinaldo. Who was he? What was he at this time? acto- analyzed. He was an exile, a mere private individual, with no public or official character or position of any kind whatever; he had voluntarily expatriated himself from his own country, and was prohibited by Spain from visiting there. He was not connected with any insurrection, except in so far as it might have his moral and pecuniary support— in fact, there is no evidence that any insurrection had begun. If anything, he was engaged in the business of launching a rebellion. He did not officially represent the Filii)inos, not only because he had not and could not land on their shores without the aid of the United States, but for the more powerful reason that they had no government what- ever. The insurgents had not, at this time, put them- selves in the field, except in a most scattered, insignificant way ; they had no arms and did not receive any until they were delivered through the instrumentality of the United States boats and troops ; the insurrection was not organ- ized ; the people had made no declaration of independ ence or sovereignty, they had adopted no constitution- no flag — no form- of government; they had neither legal nor local habitation nor name, nor any of the insignia of government; at most they were simply straggling mal- contents, without officers, arms or ammunition, wait- ing to be born, fed, clothed, organized and strength- ened into an insurrection by the influences of the navy and army and power of the United States Government; and ready to take advantage of any opportunity which might advance their interests. The argument that a series of talks at this time, no matter how deep and serious, between Aguinaldo and our Naval officers or Consuls, under such circumstances, can be made the basis of an international compact binding upon the people of the United States can- not be considered — it is absurd — nor would any alleged promises under the circumstances, even if coupled with 18 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. actual and beneficial war services rendered in pursuance of them, make any stronger case, as I shall endeavor to show ; for, among others, this reason : Aguinaldo was nothing — he represented nothing, and could represent nothing, because there was nothing to represent. What was the name of his government? What was its char- acter? Where was it located? Was it a monarchy, an aristocracy or a democracy? Where was the seat of o-overnnient? What was its official roster? I am now speaking of afi'airsand events previous to June 23d, 1S98; I am following closely and attentively each event during this period, because it seems to me that we should keep constantly in view and have a clear understanding of the status of Aguinaldo and his followers at each epoch of this history. On the 19th of May, and down to the 23d of June, when Aguinaldo dictatorially adox)ted a constitution, there could be no pretext whatever that any insurrection existed in the Philippine Islands with which Aguinaldo was asso- ciated in any official capacity. It is true that, like lago, he had designs — plans — in his mind, but he had been plainly told by our Consuls and other officers and by Dewey, that he could expect no ofiicial recognition from them or from this Government. Is there any question as to who we are to believe if there is a contest of veracity? It is undoubtedly true that Aguinaldo had deep designs, but they were concealed from our officers. According to the testimony of Colonel Kennon (Cong. Rec. 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2772), it appears that " On the 4th of May, 1898, Aguinaldo, Agoncillo and a few others held a meeting in this city (Hongkong), in which the 2)resent loarioas 2)lon)ied, in case the government of the islands was not turned over to them by the Americans. [Pure, guileless Aguinaldo!] It is to be noted that at the time in question they were not struggling patriots, but bought-off traitors, shrevHlly trying to turn the existing conditions to their own THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 19 personal advantage. Their plan was to %inite with the Ameri- cans, procure arms from them, which later were to he used against their liberators. I have myself read the minutes of this meeting, signed by Agoncillo, in which this plan is pro- posed by Aguinaldo. " The wisdom of the Government was never so apparent — ARuinaido's ^ *■ scheme to con- its prudence in holding Aguinaldo at arm's length never IJ^g'^Go^^^Jni* appeared more justifiable — than it does to-day, in the light un?ted"states of all of the recently disclosed and surrounding circum onMay4, isgs. stances — for it seems that this man had conceived from the very beginning a purpose of establishing a dictatorial gov- ernment in the Philippine Islands, of his own manufac- ture, without any regard to the wishes of the inhabitants, and that he had conceived the design of carrying that out, even in opposition to the United States, with the very weapons and arms which he expected to receive from our Government. And yet we find the Anti-imperialistic League all in tears for this great, mild, lovely and patriotic Aguinaldo ! He, who did not propose to give us time to breathe, before, anticipating any intention of ours, he would attempt to snatch the Philippines from us ! In the month of May, and down to the 23d of June, therefore, the situation in the Philippines was that the United States was trying to defeat Spain, the supreme and ^ Spain the *' <-" r 1 X- Sovereign of undoubted sovereign of these islands, and to capture them j^juneSl from her. This was as clear as the noonday sun, without a shadow of any intervening right or title between these two powers. It was clear that the Philippines were doomed to be lost tc Spain — clear to Spain — clear to the world — clear to Aguinaldo. Out of this inevitable result — out of the circumstances attending the capture of Manila — came the crystallization of the forces under Aguinaldo. The revolution, if it can be called so (and I claim that that is a misnomer), was born, nourished and grew out of the power and influence of the United States Government. It was a mere branch springing from the principal tree of 20 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. military and naval authority, planted by the United States in the Philippine Islands. It was a subordinate, subsidi- ary, parasitic growth from the great stem of American power. III. Events be- I will now cousider the acts and events transpiring tween May 19 , a • i t • j anci^August^ia, between the 19th of May, 1898, when Aguinaldo arrived ^capt£rr at Manila, and the 13th of August, the date of the taking of Manila. Dewey cabled the Government that Aguinaldo had visited him and that he might render assistance. Washington had also heard from Wiliams, the Consul- General at Manila, that the " insurgents of these islands " were making preparation for more successful war against Spain (Cong. Rec, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2512). The Administration, with great prudence, foresight, and good sense (for which they deserve infinite praise, not re- proach and contumely), immediately telegraphed, namely, on May 26th, to Dewey (as I have before stated, but think it important to state again in this connection), that : " It is desirable as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, not to have any political alliances icith the insurgents or any faction in the islands that loould incur lia- bility to maintain their cause in the future.^' To which, on the 6th of June, Dewey replied : " Have acted according to spirit of Department's instruc- tions from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance loith the insurgents or with any faction.'" The same caution was given to Consul-General Pratt at Singapore, and the Secretary of State informed him that : "• it iKOxdd not, in accepting Aguinaldo' s co-operation, con- sider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.'' (June 13-16.) (Cong. Rec, o5th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2513.) Instruction of Secretary of State to Officials to make no alliances with Aguinaldo. THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 21 And in a further letter to the same official, it is said : "This Government has hnoioa the Philippine insurgents only as discontented subjects of Spain." (Senate Documents, No. 62, Part I., 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 351.) Pratt replied to the Department that he had " held out 7io hopes to him {Aguinaldo) of any kind,''' &c. Wildman, our Consul-General at Hongkong, was in- structed to the same effect and replied in the same manner : " Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo." (Senate Documents, No. 62. Part I., 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 338.) It therefore overwhelmingly appears that all our offi- cials. Naval and Consulate, were distinctly informed in respect to the position which this Government held in regard to the Philippine Islands, and Aguinaldo had full and perfect notice that he would not be in anywise recog- nized by the Government. The Government wisely did not allow the grass to grow under its feet, but it promptly and broadly put itself upoti record. It stamped out any pretense of existing recognition of Aguinaldo. It gave not the slightest encouragement to him — it placed itself upon the basis of its clear rights — it kept out of entangle- ments which Spain might have been glad to take advantage of when the time for settlement and treaty arrived. Not content with instructing our officials, the Government took the further precaution, through the Secretary of War, to proclaim its views to the whole people of the Philippine Islands ; it was determined there should be no misunderstanding as to the precise relation which the Government of the United States occupied to them. On May, 19, 1898 — the very day Aguinaldo saw Dewey for the first time — the President issued instructions to the War Department, which were conveyed for public proclama- oFpretwent^of tion to General Wesley Merritt, commanding the army of towar^Depart- occupation to the Philippines. The relation of our ™1ng lover °'^" 1T-C1-- • 1 1 T- eignty over country to the Filipinos is clearly stated in this important P^mppines. May 19, 1898, 2-2 THE ANTI-IMPEKIALISTS ANSWERED. document, and our views set forth in accordance with the principles of international law; indeed, the language seems to have been taken oerhatim et literatim from a treatise on international law, because it follows so closely the doctrine laid down by all international law writers. Nothing can be clearer, nothing was more timely or proper, than this proclamation, which conveyed to the Filipinos the exact position which they bore to the Gov- ernment of the United States. Tens of thousands of these proclamations were translated into Spanish and distributed among the people of those islands. (Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Sess., p. 2515.) I quote the gist of it — that part relevant to this branch of the discussion : n * * * fijg gj.gt, effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political rela- tions of the inhabitants and the estahlishment of a neio politi- cal x>ower. [Here is a plain and distinct claim of sovereignty.] Under this changed condition of thinys, the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expe- dition immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation, declaring that we come not to make war upon the pjeople of the PJdlipjnnes, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their em- ployments, and in their personal and religio7is rights. All persons who either b}'^ active aid or by honest submission co- operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the award of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from sever- ity as possible. * * * Though the poioers of the military occiqyant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of persons and property, and providing for the punishment of THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 23 crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tri- bunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." (Congressional Record, ooth Con- gress, 3rd Sess., p. 2514.) Tills was the forerunner of the " benevolent assimlla- comparison tlon " proclamation, so bitterly denounced by the Anti- Proclamations. Imperialists, and about which I shall have something to say further on ; but it will be noted that a comparison of the two proclamations shows that their language is almost identical ! While the war was at fever heat between Spain and this country, this proclamation was issued to pacify the inhabitants of these islands. It was inevitable that we should conquer these islands — Filipinos with, or Filipinos against us. We were not making war on these people; we were driving out Spain. This proclamation told them so. It revealed our exact international relation to them. Was this wrong? Is there any criticism to be made of the President for the issuance of this proclama- tion? Was it not a beneticent, humane, prudent, friendly act to tender the olive branch to the people of these islands? Was it not consistent with the best policy to solicit and encourage, not merely their submission, but their hopes and friendship? At this time no one could know with certainty what would be the end of the war — what would be the basis of settlement between the two Powers — whether we would hold the PhilijDpines, or whether we would turn them over again to Spain. Still, I presume there was little doubt on the question. Why do not these lynx-eyed Anti-Imperialists criticise this first "benevolent assimilation" proclamation? If the second was bad, this one was equally so. 34 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. Juue 10, 1898, Aguinaldo's letter to tlie President. Aguinaldo never believed Uniteti States Government would ac- knowledge his Government. On the 10th of June, 1898, we have a most significant letter from Aguinaldo to the President of the United States, in which he thanked tlie nation for the efficient and disinterested protection whicli it was giving, and begged and protested tliat the " Government of the United States would retain these islands until the end of the war, and if Spain fails to pay the indemnity, will (not) sell them to an European Power, preferably Great Britain." — (Senate Doc. No. 62, part I., 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 360). It will be remembered that there was some wild talk in America of turning over these islands to Great Britain. Aguinaldo at that time was only interested in having them retained by this Government ; he then, apparently, was willing to fully and freely acquiesce in our having pos- session of them, but he did not want them disposed of to any other Power, and he begged us, in behalf of a " people which trusts blindly in you, not to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain." In face of all these facts, it is impossible to believe Aguinaldo when he asserts that he received any encour- agement from our officials or officers in the East that this Government would recognize him and the Filipinos as an independent government. Read the emphatic utterances of Dewey, Pratt and Wildman — and how can the naked word of Aquinaldo prevail against them? Instructed clearly and emphatically from Washington to enter into no entangling alliances, it is highly improbable that any of them would give him encouragement. Nay, 1 assert that a careful study of the facts shows that he never be- lieved, even from the beginning, that this Government would acknowledge his independence. It is an after- thought on his part if he says so. Else why the secret conspiracy of May 4th, 1898? And he is condemned out of the mouths of his own friends and officers, one of whom testified : " A short time afterwards (after July, 1898), as soon as he had some forces, he proclaimed independence in the few towns THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 25 wliich he had procured without the consent of Admiral Dewey, at whose orders he had come, and the first time I presented myself to him I heard from his own lips that neither Admiral Dewey nor any other American had ever promised him such independence." — (Vol. II,, Report Philippine Com- mission, p. 381.) So far, then, as the case of the Anti-Imperialists rests united states -^ never agreed Upon promises — verbal or written, implied or expressed, A'S'niUdI?! inferential or direct — that the United States would give or Govemment.i recognize the independence of Aguinaldo's government, it is absolutely without foundation. It has not a leg to stand upon. The denials are not equivocal or doubtful; they are direct, sweeping and overwhelming. Mr. Schurz is nervously anxious, constantly demanding, that some one would appear to discuss the facts with him. That anxiety and wish I am now gratifying. And with all of the evidence before me (and which I now tender and open to him) I proclaim that I shall be able to show that in his statement of all of the material facts and x)rinciples of law he is mistaken — wrong — misled far away from the the paths of truth. He says : ' ' While so profiting from the co-operation of the Filipinos as our military allies against the 'common enemy,' we know that the Filipinos believed that, fighting side by side with the Republic of Washington and Lincoln, they were fighting for their own independence. We had every reason for knowing that had they not so believed they would have acted dif- ferently. "—(N. Y. Titnes, July 25, 1900.) This is not correct. The facts condemn every material Filipinos never word of the statement. The Filipinos believed otherwise, MMauTdbe*"^ because they were told otherwise by our Generals and officers— by every one of them, as I have shown and shall show hereafter. Aguiualdo seized the occasion of this war between Spain and the United States to put himself in motion. It released him from exile. It gave him arms. recognized. 26 THE ANTI IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. It enabled him under our protection to gatlier around him troops. But at every step of 7iis game lie encountered the clear, plain, unmistakable utterances of our Generals, who refused to acknowledge his military or civil power or to give him any encouragement. Finding the road to his ambition was blocked, this bold, bad adventurer coldly, deliberately, with the premeditation of a murderer, cruelly plunged his unhappy countrymen in the most useless and suicidal rebellion ever waged — waged against their friends, who stood before them with the olive branch of friendship, and who were seriously engaged in the hu- mane occuj)ation of discovering what was best for their advancement, progress, health, education and liberty ! IV. Discussion of Apruinaldo's dictatorial Constitution. I wish now to discuss an eventof the 23d of June, 1898, separately. This date is important only because a consti- tution was dictated and promulgated by Aguinaldo at that time. What effect and influence has this document upon the merits of the Philippine question? In the flrst place, it was not the work of the people of the Philippine Islands. It was not the result of a pleblscitum— a vote — an official consensus of opinion of the people. It is a document dic- tatorially prei)ared by an individual — iVguinaldo, and promulgated by him to give the world the assurance that a government existed in the Philippines. I invoke the testimony of the Vice-President of the Congress : " This Congress was made up by Aguinaldo. All the mem- bers may be said to have been appointed. There was not an election. There were a very few members who were elected by the people, but a gi'eat majority were aj^pointed by Agui- naldo, and naturally the decisions of the Congress had to be as Aofuinaldo desired. THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 27 Q. Did Aguinaldo have the power to remove members that did not vote to suit his wishes ? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did he ever employ this right ? A. Yes, sir; he appointed me Vice-President of the Con- gress * * * Q. What importance did the Congress actually have '? Were its decrees put into effect or were they overruled by Aguinaldo and his Cabinet when they were not pleasing to them '? A. Whatever Aguinaldo wished. Q. I wish to know whether the Congress was dominated by Aguinaldo and his Cabinet or not ? A. Completely. " (Vol. II., Report Philippine Commission, pp. 386-7.) At most, this constitution of Aguinaldo was but a 'proposition^ to be adopted or rejected by the people. It had no efficacy or force until it was formally accepted either by direct ratification or by the people living under it. " A de facto government is one actually existing in a state and for the time possessing sufficient strength to exercise sov ereign powers." (Davis' Elements of International Law, p. 34.) But there could be neither a de facto nor a de jure gov- ernment established under the circumstances which pre- vailed in the Philippines at this period — at least not with- out the consent of the Government of Spain or of the United States. A war was in existence at this date, June, 1898, between the United States and Spain — Spain known to the world and recognized as the sole sovereign of these islands. If the United States prevailed, she need not, under principles of international law, recognize a third sovereignty — established without her consent ; and the same view would apply to Spain. The paper constitution put forth by the dictator, Aguinaldo, in the midst of this war, was therefore inefficacious for any purpose — except iS THE A NT! IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. SO far as it might be vivified into a living government by tlie ratification of tlie people of the Philippine Islands, when authorized and approved by the United States or Spain, whichever should prove to be the ultimate victor. The paper government inaugurated by Aguinaldo could receive no recognition as a government de facto or de jure from outside sovereignties or Powers. Suppose Aguinaldo had sent a representative to the Government of France or England, how would he have been received? Would either of those Powers have recognized a government cre- ated under such circumstances? France would have said to the representative : " Who are you? " " W^hat is your government? " " The Philippine Islands belong to S^min." " Do you claim to have carried through a successful revo- lution?" "Where is the evidence of a plebiscitum — a vote of the people? " " Sj)ain is the sovereign of those islands? " "If she is not, then they belong to the victor, the United States." " How can you intervene between these two Powers to take advantage of the weakness of Spain or the strength of the United States, without the consent of either or both? " "A Sovereign State may therefore be defined to be any nation or people organized into a body politic and exercising the rights of self government." (Baker's First Steps in Inter- national Law, p. 24.) The most that could be claimed for this constitution by Aguinaldo would be, that by ratification by the people — by approval of the United States or of Spain — it might in time ripen into a government. It was hardly worthy of being called a healthy seed which could produce fruit in the political soil in which it was sowed by Aguinaldo. Aguinaido's Then, it is urged that Aguinaldo procured and adopted a flag — which was displayed on boats running in and about Manila Bay — and which was recognized and respected by our navy and army. Aguinaldo's story of the flag is as follows : Flag. THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 29 "Then the Admiral advised me to at once have made a Filipino National Flag, which he said he would recognize and protect in the presence of the other nations represented by the various squadrons anchored in Manila Bay, adding, however, that he thought it advisable that we should destroy the povier of Spain before hoisting our national flag.'" (The Stoiy Told by Aguinaldo, p. 10.) "In conformity with my orders, issued on the 1st of Sep- tember (1898), all Philippine vessels hoisted the national flag, the marines of the Filipino flotilla being the first to execute that order." {Ibid., p. 15.) Under the circumstances disclosed, this flag was one for protection merely — it could represent nothing but the dis- tinct troops and property of the insurgents. It had no significance or meaning in international law. It would not be recognized by any foreign Power. It had no more effect than the flag of a brigade or regiment. It existed only by virtue of the permission of the United States. It was used for convenience to distinguish it from the Span- ish flag. It could be used later — when a real, bona fide government was created — as a national ensign. A flag of a sovereign Power, in international law, carries with it respect and protection. Aguinaldo's flag was in no sense a national emblem, because it carried no rights or protection — except so far as it was guarded by the United States Gov- ernment. This paper constitution and this ineffectual .7^^^ are boldly put forward as evidence of the existence of a gov- ernment, and it is claimed in effect that because one of the officers of the United States received one of these constitu- tions, and authorized and knew of the existence of this flag — because Dewey accepted one of these flags as a momento — a souvenir — that the people of the United States are estopped from questioning the existence of Aguinaldo's alleged government; that is, they seek to create a government by estoppel. Political States or Sov- ereignties are not created that way. 30 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. V. Aguinaldo never believed independence would be ac- knowledged by United States. In this connection I now come to examine a statement of Mr. Schurz, to this effect: " While so profiting from the co-operation of the Filipinos as our military allies against the common enemy, vje know that the Filipinos believed that, fighting side by side with the republic of Washington and Lincoln, they were fighting for their own independence. We Jtad every reason for knowing tJiat had they not so believed, they vioidd have acted. differently. Our Government jyermitted them to believe that this inde^yend- ence v)onld be the outcome of a common victory over the com- mon enemy, and meanwhile it continued to accept the benefit of their co-operation, which was based upon that belief." (New York Times, July iioth, 1900.) I characterize this statement as false, not imputing, of course, to Mr. Schurz any wilful intention of making- averments that he did not believe to be true, but he has concentrated in this small paragraph the false views which have been recklessly circulated in the community by the Anti-imperialistic League. I do charge Mr. Schurz with a failure to intently and carefully study the facts before circulating such a statement under his own powerful name. The Filipinos, in the first place, never fought ' ' side by side " with our troops. The present war against the United States Government was planned at Hongkong on the 4th of May, 1898, before Aguinaldo had entered the field — after they knew of the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila — and before they co-operated in any man- ner with the United States Government. This cabal, clique or coterie of conspirators, determined then and there to wage war against the United States if Aguinaldo was not recognized as representing the whole of the Philippine Islands. (Con. Record, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 2773; The Story Told by Aguinaldo, p. 10, Senate Document No. 208, Part II., 56th Cong., 1st Session, p. 5.) Why was this meeting held in advance of auj^ talk with Dewey or THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 31 our officers if Aguinaldo believed the United States would recognize him? The secret meeting of these conspirators was onl}' necessary because they felt they could not be recognized and they were determined to push their pre- tensions, even to a war with the great power of this Gov- ernment. The corresj)ondence, however, between our officers and Aguinaldo shows that they gave him no encouragement whatever, and it is absolutely incorrect, as stated by Mr. Schurz, that " Our Government permitted them to believe that this inde- pendence would be the outcome of a common victory over the common enemy, and meanwhile it continued to accept the benefit of their co-operation, which was based upon that be- lief," (New York Times, July 25th, 1900.) I shall show its falsity from every source. Aguinaldo, from the beginning, used the United States Government in every conceivable way to perfect his own plans, to in- crease and discipline his own army, to arm the insurgents and to carefully and skilfully place himself in a position where he could put forth the claim to represent the whole eight or ten million people of the Philippine Islands. As one of his friends and officers said : " He had no promise of it, and he had no hope of getting it, and he would not have been able to make war at all, or, in in fact, get here without the aid offered him by the blockade of the American squadron." (Vol. II., Rep. Philippine Com., p. 381.) The correspondence, however, between our officers and Aguinaldo clearly and emphatically shows that they gave him no encouragement whatever. There is no doubt that he did everything in his power to procure recognition, but it came not. What did come was an absolute ?iK\^ peremp- tory refusal to recognize 1dm eltlier as a civil or military power in the PJiilippines. Considering all the facts, look- ing at all the surrounding circumstances, this position was The corre- spondence be- tween A^ni- naklo and the United States :\liHtary Officers refus- ing to recog- nize him. 32 THE AhrTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. right and just to all interested — just to onrselves as a sovereign nation — just to the inhabitants of the Philip- pines, who were under our protection — just to Spain, with whom we were engaged in war, and from whom no terms had yet been vouchsafed or offered. Let us take up the correspondence. These letters began on July 4th, 1898. The first is from General Anderson to ' ' Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon. General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the natioe people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of of>erations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the ex- ercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule. * * * I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the perform- ance of their duties and not to assume that they cannot visit Cavite loithout j^ermission.'" (Senate Doc. 208, 5Gth Cong., 1st Sess. , p. 4.) To which Aguinaldo replied, expressing great satisfac- tion for the sympathy and amicable sentiments contained in the letter, and said : " I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes." {Ibid., p. 5.) THE ANTI-IMPERIAI.ISTS ANSWERED. 33 On July 6tli, General Anderson again addressed Agui- naldo, stating : " Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require more room to camp our soldiers, and also store- room for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and co operation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy." {Ibid., p. 5.) On the 9th of July, General Anderson wrote to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army at Washing- ton in relation to Aguinaldo, stating : " When we first landed he seemed very suspicious and not at all friendly. But I have now come to a better understand- ing with him, and he is much more friendl}' and seems willing to co-operate. But he has declared himself dictator and president and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect bis purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on onr part to establish a provisional gover?inient. " (Ibid. , p. 6. ) On July 14th he again addressed Aguinaldo : " Wishing to get complete information of the approaches to Manila from every direction, I therefore have the honor to request that you give my officers all possible assistance in making reconnaissance to the lines and approaches, and that you favor them with your advice." {Ibid., p. 6.) On July 17th, the Quartermaster, Major-General Jones, addressed a letter to Aguinaldo : " We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporta- tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the natioe population are not willing to give us this assistance as proinptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties 34 THE ANTI-IMPEKIALISrS ANSWERED. to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people and the return we are asking is comparatively slight." {Ihid.^ p. 7.) There was no response to this letter, and it was followed by another on July 23d, from the Brigadier-General of the United States Army to Aguinaldo, to this effect : " When I came here three weeks ago, I requested j'our Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no response. As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition directly on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox- carts." {Ibid., p. 11.) These facts had been previously reported to the Govern- ment at Washington by General Anderson on July 21st, in the following letter : "Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator., and has jjrohibited any supplies being given us except by his order. * * * JUs assumption of civil authority I have ignored and let htm. know verbally that I could and woidd not recognize it, ichile I did not recognize him as a military leader. It seems strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt. But I have let it be known in every other way that v-e do not recognize the dictatorship.'" {Ibid., pp. 12-13.) On the 24th of July, Aguinaldo addressed General Anderson in respect to furnishing horses, buffaloes and carfs, explaining why he had not resjjonded, and said : " I have circuhated orders in the provinces in the proximity TFIE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 35 that in the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure j^our Excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last." {Ibid.., p. 12.) General Anderson replied to this letter and stated to Aguinaldo on the same day : "I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of caramates, etc., told our people that they had orders to sup- ply nothing except by your orders.'''' [Ibid., p. 12.) On Angnst 1, 1898, Aguinaldo vA^rote to Mr. Williams, Consul at Manila, stating : "I pray you earnestly, as also the distinguished Generals who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat the Government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the Filipinos." {Ibid.., p. 16.) Aguinaldo was also informed by General Anderson, as follows, in relation to the treatment which he had com- plained about : " If you apparently have been treated harshly it is from military necessity and not for want of confidence. We had to take Manila to effect the purpose of our war. While we may admit the justice of your insurrection, to prevent all possible complications, still it is thought judicious and necessary to have only one army in Manila at once. The Government of the United States, you may be assured, which, as its agent, I can make no promises, will deal fairly with the Filipinos, but we must now insist, for the good of all, there shall be no joint occupation of Manila. * * * We most earnestly and sincerely hope and trust that there may be no conflict between us, but ^ we are prepared to enforce our orders in this matter and expect from time to time large additions to our strength. We desire most sincerely to remain friendly with the Filipinos, and have nothing but their best interests at heart in all our dealings with them." {Ibid., pp. 18-19.) 36 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. On August 24th, 1898, Major-General Wesley Merritt addressed Aguinaldo as follows : ■' So far as any 2^romises as to vihat should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty bettoeen the United States and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of the Zlnited States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been in- formed, you may depend upon the good-vnll of the Americans out here and the Government, of tohich you already knoio the beneficence, to determine these ■tnatters in the future. ^^ {Ibid., p. 24.) On the 27th of August, Aguinaldo addressed a letter to General Wesley Merritt, in which he begged him to " reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships from free navigation and permit me to insist if you wish upon the restitution of the position that we are now going to leave if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknoAvledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines." (Ibid., p. 26.) I have given as much of this correspondence as is neces- sary to throw light upon the thoughts, motives and acts of both Aguinaldo and the officers of the United States Army, with whom he had the corresjiondence. These letters show the extent and spirit of Aguinaldo's co-opera- tion. The letters, beginning with the reciprocal expres- sions of good- will and confidence in each other, inevitably tapered off into questions of right and duty. Aguinaldo was laboring for recognition of a revolutionary, independ- ent government. Generals Anderson, Merritt and Otis w^ere equally positive in declining to make such promises, and positively refused to recognize either the civil or military authority. I invite any one who is not satis- lied on this point to read this whole correspondence with care. It will be seen Aguinaldo cannot put his Jinger upon a solitary expression or point to an isolated act loldcli could cause him to believe that he would be THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 37 recognized. His co-oi)eration consisted in his desultory operations against the Spaniards, made easy by the pres- ence of our troox)S and the moral influence of our power. The assertion, therefore, that " Our Government permitted them to believe that this independence would be the out- come of a common victory " is false as a statement of ex- press agreement — it is false as a general fact — it is false as a deduction or inference. His belief must have been that he would not be recognized. The correspondence sJiows tliat he loas an impedimeiit — not an ally. VI. Now I take up the question of the co-operation and ser- vices that Aguinaldo rendered to the Americans. I will not detract from them one jot or tittle. The Anti- Imperi- alists, through Mr. Scburz, make this broad claim: " The co-operation of the Filipino forces against the com- mon eneiuy was most effective. While our troops were gradu- ally arriving, they crippled the common enemy as we could not possibly have crippled him with our strength then at hand. They made themselves masters of the entire island of Luzon, outside of Manila, and of other important jjarts of the Archi- pelago, so that the Spanish power substantially ceased to exist there. They took many thousands of Spanish prisoners, and they so hemmed in the Spanish forces in Manila on the land side, that they could not receive reinforcements or escape into the interior, while we blockaded Manila on the sea side. Thus the Filipino army became one of the decisive factors in the capture of that city. " (New York Times, July 2oth, 1900.) This is an exaggerated view of the services which these Filipinos rendered to us, and it is entirely against the opinion of our officers there, as can be found in their let- ters; the military work of the Filipinos was of no such AguinaUlo's co-operation with Amer- ican forces. 38 THE AN TI- IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. importance as is portrayed by their friends. Tlie state- ment is made the basis of a charge that " we used the Filipinos as allies — that we profited from their co-operation as allies, and in point of fact recognized and treated thera as allies so long as they could be useful to us, and that therefore ?oe oxoed to them those moral obligations tohich are always recognized between honorable allies." (New York Herald, July 14th, 1900.) I am compelled to say that in almost every statement that Mr. Schurz makes there is an error of fact, and where he undertakes to deduce a principle of law, as applicable to such false or suppositious facts, he is necessarily and logically wrong. Filipinos not He savs that the Filipinos were our allies. I deny this allies of "^ ^ "^ United States, proposition. They aided us; but they were auxiliaries of which we availed ourselves, as we would have availed our- selves of every other factor which we found at hand — dis- tinctly, openly and empliatically at all times repudiating any idea of alliance or of present or future recognition. In the first place an ally signifies an independent state or sovereign power. Chancellor Kent defines an ally to be : " A nation which has entered into an alliance with another nation." (1 Kent's Com., 69.) And all other definitions agree with this. " A term implying in a military sense any nation united to another under a treaty, aggressive or defensive, or both." Farrow's Military Dictionary. " A prince or a state united to another by treaty. " Hamers- ley's Naval Encyclopedia. " A state or prince bound to one by a treaty or league — a confederacy." Imperial Dictionary. "A state, sovereignity or chief leagued with another by treaty, agreement by treaty, agreement or common action. " Standard Dictionary. " One united to another by treaty or league — usually applied THE AMTI-TMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 3aurence's Wheaton on International Law, 2nd Anno. Ed., p. 99, note 39, citing: Fleming i^s. Page, 9 How., 615. Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How., 190. Liebensdorfer m. Webb, 20 How., 177.) In the case of Cross et al. vs. Harrison, 1(3 How., U. S. Rep., 189, Judge Wayne, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said : * * * " Early in 1847 the President, as constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, authorized the military and naval Commanders of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror and to form a civil government for the conquered country, and to impose duties on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the government and of the army which had the conquest in possession. No one can doubt that these orders 56 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. of the President and the action of our Army and Navy Com- manders in California in conformity with them were accord- ing to the law of arms." And in Sir Sherstou Baker's First Steps in International Law (p. 360, § 16) it is stated : That "the President of the United States can make no treaty without tlie concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and his authority over ceded conquered territory, though derived from the law of nations, is subordinate to Congress. But, as a constitutional Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to form a civil or military government for the conquered terri- tory during the war, and when such territory is ceded to the United States, as a conquest, the existing government, so established, does not cease as a matter of course or as a con- sequence of the restoration of peace." It was not necessary for the Commander-in-Chief of our Army and Navy to wait until the treaty was actually rati- fied by the Senate. He had conquered the Philippines. After the 21st of December, 1898, Spain would never have lifted her hand against the victorious progress of our troops. Spain had fought for the Philippines through her Commissioners at Paris, and had finally agreed to cede them to the United States. The United States would have been guilty of perfidy to the Filipinos if it had allowed these islands to go back to Spain. What law or provision of the Constitution prevented Mr. McKinley from making his proclamation ? Assumption is neither proof nor argument. Why should he wait ? Could he not act in anticipation ? Could he not assume that the Senate would in all honor and decency — to say nothing of the merits — confirm the deliberations of an independent Commission composed of Americans and Spaniards ? And when it should be confirmed by a sort of jus postlimini it retroacted to the date of its original adoption, and its confirmation reacted back and ratified all of the acts of THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 57 tlie President as Commander-in-Cliief. The fact of its contirmution by tlie Senate silences all objections. It is urged that American sovereignty did not exist at this time. But it did, and the proclamation of May 19, 1898, seven months previously, had claimed its existence by conquest. Read the commencement of the proclamation of Decem- ber '21st and it is seen thatitdoes not rest upon the treaty alone. It asserts that : "The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron, comuiaiuled by Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of /Spanish sovereignty. " But it is further claimed that its language was so injiam- matory that General Otis suppressed some of the language and substituted a proclamation of his own! The inliam mation is in the criticism and not in the proclamation. Its language is temperate, fair, clear and firm. It is such an accurate reproduction of the principles of international law, acquiesced in everywhere, that, as I said before, it might have been copied from a law book on the subject involved. General Otis had his own reasons for changing the lan- guage of the President. That circumstance is of no moment. The proclamation can stand on its own bottom. It is also claimed that this proclamation was substantially a declaration of war against the Filipinos. If this is so the war was declared long before by the proclamation of May 19, 1898. But let us go deeper into this wonderful point of the Anti-Imperialists. Suppose the treaty had not been ratified. War would then have existed between the United States and Spain. Was the President, then, not right in claiming sovereignty over these possessions, the property of Spain? But the treaty was ratified — and 58 THE ANTI.IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED.. Mr. Bryan indorsed and supported the treaty between Spain and the United States. ratified through the conceded influence of Mr. Bryan. Hear what this Arch Anti-Imperialist now admits : " When the President finally laid before the Senate a treaty which * * * provided for the cession of the Phili})pine Islands, the menace of Imperialism became so apparent that many preferred to i-eject the treaty and risk the ills that might follow, rather than take the chance of correcting the errors of the treaty by the indejjendent action of this country. I was among the number of those who believed it better to ratify the treaty and end the war, release the volunteers, remove the excuse for war expenditures, and then give to the Filipinos the independence which might be forced from Spain by a new treaty. In view of the criticism which my action aroused in some quarters, I take this occasion to restate the reasons given at that time. I thought it safer to trust the American people to give independence to the Filipinos than to trust the accomplishment of that purpose to diplomacy with an unfriendly nation. * * * j believe that we are now in a better position to wage a successful contest against Imperialism than we would have been had the treaty been rejected. With the treaty ratified a clean-cut issue is presented between a gov- ernment by consent and a government by force. If the treaty had been rejected the opponents of Imperialism would have been held responsible for any international complications which might have arisen before the ratification of another treaty. * * * The title of Sjyain bemg extinguished we xoere at lib- erty to deal vnth the Filipinos according to American princi- ples. " (Mr. Bryan's letter of acceptance.) Here is a distinct admission that Spain had a title to cede. It completely upsets a favorite argument of the Anti Imperialists that Spain had no title to the Philip- pines at the date of the treaty. To uphold or sustain the consistency of this admission with other declarations in this remarkable letter of acceptance is fortunately not a nut for me to crack. The children of Israel had a hard time to make bricks without straw, but their task was easy when compared to that THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 59 which Mr. Bryan has put upon his followers — to reconcile the sentences of that letter. One marked difference be- tween Mr. Bryan and Mr. Schurz is that the former is willing to trust the future of the Philippines in the hands of the American people, where Mr. McKinley has safely placed it, while Mr. Schurz loudl}^ clamors for an imme- diate recognition of their independence. When Anti- Imperialists fall out the Filipinos will get their dues. Supposing, for argument's sake, the President did act prematurely. What follows? He coin mitted no offense — invaded none of the provisions of the Constitution or of the treaty. He simply took time by the forelock and opened up the way to a smooth and friendly relatioushi^^ with the Filipinos. He was guardian of the interests of the Filipinos until, by the terms of the treaty, Congress acted. It was with this body, under the Constitution of the United States, and under the express provisions of the treaty, that the whole question of the rights, government and future of the Fili- pinos was confided. Until it acted the matter was in the hands of the President in the double cax^acity of Execu- tive of the nation and of Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Even if he were technically wrong, which I emphatically deny, there was a mere question of good taste involved. Good manners demand that the President of the United States should be free from criticism when acting in the performance of his duties as Executive, if he is not violating any law. The President under the Constitution has a certain scope and liberty of action. Within this sphere, if a part of the nation does not agree with him, good taste, gentle breeding and politeness re- quire silence. We may not agree with him in his method of living, his dress, his religion ; but he has been selected as Chief of the nation by the people. He needs to be re- spected. In the present instance Mr. McKinley conscien- 60 THE ANTI-IMPEKIALISTS ANSWERED. tiously believed he was acting for the true interests and real welfare of the Filipinos. Every step he took was the result of much care and thought. He was, for the first time in the history of this country, confronted with an en- tirely new problem — thrust upon him by the unexpected occurrences at Manila. It was a situation that required study, and as long as he was acting in good faith and for the interests of the whole people — which nothing but a brazen mendacity can deny — he should have been sup- ported by everybody, because there was no question of politics involved. His action has been fully confirmed by the Senate. The intemperate and inflammatory criticism of him by the Anti-Imperialists has, then, no foundation in principles of morality or law — they have simply invaded the domain of good breeding and manners, and behaved with disrespect toward the Executive of this great nation. If they need to be enlightened about the real merits of this question they should have studied the facts and records. As for their bad manners, I cannot undertake to correct them. I simply point out to them that the office of the President of the United States — no matter by whom it is administered — whether by Mr. McKinley or Mr. Cleve- land, whether by a Republican or Democrat — is entitled to respect. The occupant should in the domain of his dis- cretion be free from calumnious, slanderous or libellous criticism. And the men who indulge in such ungentle- manly pastimes should be held up in the pillory of public execration. I take in this connection an episode in the life of Jefi'erson — whose isolated words the Anti-Imperialists are never tired of quoting. In the acquisition of the territory of Louisiana, Mr. Jefl'erson saw a great opportunity to benefit the people of the United States. Its purchase could not be postponed, and yet between its acquisition and his constitutional opinions there stood a formidable THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 01 barrier. He had honest doubts whether any territory could be acquired by the United States without an amend- ment to the Constitution, but he saw that if he did not avail himself of the opportunity quickly and promptly the occasion would be lost. He took the territory. Let Mr. Tucker, his biographer, tell the rest of the story : " He had good reasons for this caution as it respected France, since the American ministers at Paris soon afterwards wrote that if the negotiation were then to take place, the same treaty could not be obtained, and that if the United States gave the French Government the least opening they could declare it void ; and that a ' warning ' to this effect had been given to them ; and moreover a strange letter relative to the treaty had been recently written by their minister (Pichon) to our Sec- retary of State. In communicating the preceding facts to Colonel Wilson C. Nicholas, then residing in Albemarle, Mr. Jefferson again expresses his opinion that they could not in- corporate Louisiana with the United States without an amend- ment to the constitution ; but Colonel Nicholas had expressed the opinion that the power given to Congress to admit new States into the Union extended to territor}^ beyond their limits at that period. It clearly appears by the same letter that Mr. Jefferson did not think that the constitution authorized this addition to the national territory and that it would be necessary to obtain a special amendment for that purpose. 'The Constitution,' he remarks in the same letter, 'has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The exec- utive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much ad- vances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the Constitution. The legislature in casting behind them meta- physical subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful ser- vants, must ratify and pay for it, and throw themselves on their country, for doing for them unauthorized, what we know they would have done for themselves, had they been in a situation to do it.' He assimilates the case to that of a guardian who exceeds his authority to make an advantageous purchase for 62 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. his ward, relying on his confirming it when he conies of age, and adds, ' But we shall not be disowned by the nation, and * their act of indemnity will confirm and not weaken the Con- stitution by more strongly marking out its lines.' " (Life of Jefferson, by Tucker, Vol. 2, p. 147.) No constitutional amendment was ever passed, and Mr. Jefferson's views have since been shown to be unfounded by historical precedent, and judicial authority. But no act throws more glory upon his political career than his endeavor to save this great body of land for this countr^^ at the sacrifice of his own opinions. Let the Anti -Impe- rialists draw a lesson from this — at least of good manners. But I must not fail to notice in this connection another proposition of the Anti-Imperialists, viz. : that by issuing the proclamation of December 21, 1898, the President " substantially declared war against the Philippine Islanders striving for their freedom and independence." (New York Herald, July 14, 1900.) and the question they put in connection with it — ' ' Was it the President's ' duty ' thus directly to provoke an armed conflict with the P'ilipinos? " and the answer which they make to their own question, that the act of the President was ' ' a barefaced usurpation of power which only an unscrupulous partisan spirit would overlook or excuse.'' {Ibid.) I have shown that Aguinaldo determined as early as May 4th, 1898, to wage war against the United States if his dicta- torial government was not recognized (ante, p. 18 e^ seq.). I have shown by the correspondence between himself and Generals Anderson, Merrirt and Otis that he was waiting every opportunity to put this purj^ose into execution (ante, p. 31 et seq.). I have shown that as early as May 19, 1898, the United States had claimed the sovereignty of these islands by conquest (ante, p. 22 et seq.). I have endeav- ored to show that in the exercise of his power as Com- THE ANTI-IMPERFALrSTS ANSWERED. 63 niander in Chief of the Army and Navy the President was justified in issuing the proclamation of December 21, 1898 (ante, p. 50 et seq.). I have shown that Aguinaldo did not represent the people of the Philippine Islands (ante, p. 17 et seq.) or their sentiments (ante, p. 46). I will add but one word more. I will bring notice home so directly that no one can deny it. Negotiations took place in January, 1899, between Commissioners of Aguinaldo and officers appointed by General Otis. " With great tact and patience the Cominanding General had held his forces in check, and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by appointing a Commission to meet a sim- ilar body appointed by Aguinaldo and to ' confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understand- ing of the intents, purposes, aims and desires of the Fili- pinon people and of the people of the United States.' Six sessions were held, the last occurring on January 29, 1899, six days before the outbreak of hostilities. No substantial results were obtained, the Filipino Commissioners being either unable or unwilling to give any definite statements of the ' intent, purposes, and aims of the people.' At the close of the last session they were given full assurances that no hostile act would be inaugurated by the United States troops," (Vol. I., Rep. Philippine Commission, p. 175.) The proclamation of December 21, 1898, is used as a mere pretext to embarrass the question. It was in no sense a declaration of war, nor was it so regarded by Aguinaldo. It is an afterthought on the part of the Anti- Imperialists to call it such. Aguinaldo knew the position of the United States from the beginning. He was plainly and clearly notified that his pretended military or civil power would never be recognized. He was not consulted as to the terms of the treaty, because he was in no proper sense an " ally " of the United States — he was for a short time an auxiliary — precisely as an additional indigenous regiment or regiments would be. His whole capital con- sisted of the moral force of the United States. 64 THE anti-impEriaLists answered. Againaldo was not an "ally," for the additional and weighty reason that he was never consulted by and never directly co-operated with our forces — not in one single in- stance. Between June and August 13, 1898, when Manila was captured, he ran a campaign of his own, inducing the Filipino militia to desert the Spanish army with their guns and ammunition, and fighting desultory bands of Spanish soldiers. All of his successes were at- tributable to the moral force of the United States. He guarded the land side of Manila, it is true, but Manila was ours without him or his aid. His whole campaign, the augmentation of his forces, and keeping them together, was to fight the United States. Until hostilities actually begun, on the eve of the ratification of the treaty by the United States — February 6th, 1899 — Aguinaldo skulked around the outj)osts of the United States xlrmy. It was with the greatest difficulty our generals and officers could reach him. This "aZZy/" of ours never condescended to have a personal interview with either Generals Anderson, Merritt or Otis ! Long before the Senate ratified the treaty he had con- cluded to attack Manila, for a few days before hostilities began Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who were friendly to him to seek refuge outside the city. (Vol. I., Report Philippine Commission, p. 174.) And after the war began the Administration held out the olive branch to these insurgents. A Commission was appointed, one of whose objects was "to assist in the peaceful extension of American authority and the estab- lishment of civil and peaceful government among the people." This Commission issued a proclamation ex- pressing these views, and had several conferences with Aguinaldo's Commissioners — they tried to see him per- sonally, but all of their efforts for agreement and peace were ineffectual. THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 65 This is in brief the history of this rebellion against the sovereignty of the United States by the Filipinos. It was an unnecessary, cruel, premeditated, criminal war, inaugurated and carried on by Aguinaldo against the best friends of his country. The parties responsible for it are two, Aguinaldo and liis sympathizers in the United States — the so-called Anti- Imperialists. Without the latter the war would never have been commenced. With their aid it has been kept alive. The responsibility upon them is as great as that which men have ever shouldered in any public crisis. They can never shake it off. IX. Heretofore I have endeavored to fully answer all of the charges made by Mr. Schurz and the Anti Imperialists. If there are any which I have not expressly alluded to it is not because they have been overlooked, but because they are insignificant or are answered by some general state- ment of law or of fact. Out of these undisputed or con- ceded facts there flow certain consequences, based on prin- ciples of international law. 1. At the commencement of the war, and at the lime of the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila, Spain was the supreme and sovereign authority in the Philippines. She did not, and could not, make any disposition of them after the war began, which would have interfered with the American right of conquest. Spain having been van- quished, gave up these possessions to the conqueror, the United States. They thus became the property of the United States by a double title — that of conquest and cession. 2. As to the inhabitants of these islands, it made no difference whether they were many or few. They passed with the islands — they followed the conquest or cession. Legal conse- quences flow- ing from the conquest of Philippines. 66 THE ANTI.IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. Innumerable historical instances of the correctness of this proposition are found in this country and elsewhere. If any one doubts this assertion let him study the cir- cumstances surrounding the purchase of Louisiana, Flor- ida, Alaska — let him study the history of California, New Mexico and Texas. One of the most striking and cruel illustrations of this j)rinciple of international law I will cite for the benefit of Mr. Carl Schurz-^that of the forcible wrenching of Alsace and Lorraine from the sovereignty of France by Germany, his native land. The people of these two provinces were forced to become subjects of Germany, or to expatriate themselves and to give up their homes, .birthplace, and all of those sacred and tender ties which attached them to their native land. I believe if it were put to a vote to-day the inhabitants of Alsace would overwhelmingly vote to become French subjects again; but they, in their own native land, are held down by force of conquest and cession. To those Anti-Imperialists overflowing with a lachrymose philanthropy and of the eternal principles of liberty, as they call them, I point to Alsace and Lorraine. Over this sad event they can shed all of their crocodile tears. But international law sanctioned the conduct of the Germans. When, therefore, Mr. Schurz and his associates talk of transferring bodies of people like sheep — en bloc — they entirely overlook the clear precepts of international law as laid down by every w^riter, and the necessary results of conquest or cession of territory. Here are some excerpts which establish the doctrine : " The conqueror wl^ acquires a province or town from the enemy, acquires thereb}^ the same rights which were possessed by the State from which it is taken. If it formed a constituent part of the hostile State, and was fully and completely under its dominion, it passes into the power of the conqueror upon the same footing, It is united with the new State upon the THE ANTI-IMPERIAI.ISrS ANSWERED. 'I? same terms on wliicb it belonged to the old one; that is, with only such political rights as the constitution and laws of the new Satte may see fit to give it. It retains no political privi- leges or immunities, but may acquire those it never possessed before. In political rights it maj^ be the gainer or the loser by the change ; if from being a part of an absolute monarchy it becomes a part of a republic, its liberties will be enlarged, or, if the reverse, they will be restricted. But such restric- tion, in any case, must be in conformity with the rights of conquest and the laws of war. When New Mexico formed a part of the Mexican Republic, it enjoyed the right of repre- sentation in the Mexican Congress; on the conquest of that territory by the arms of the United States, under Gen. Kearny, a clause was introduced into the new organic law for sending a representative to the Congress of the United States. This part of the organic law was disapproved by the President, and, even without such disapproval, it was utterly inoperative, for this right of representation was a political right, Avhich was lost by the very act of conquest, and could be restored to it only by the action of Congress, after its permanent incor- poration into the conquering republic. The case, however, is different where the enem}' possessed only a quasi-sovereignty, or limited political rights, over the conquered province or town. The conqueror acquires no other rights than such as belonged to the State against which he has taken up arms. ' War,' says Vattel, ' authorizes him to possess himself of what belongs to his enemy. If he deprives that enemy of the sovereignty of a town or province, he acquires it, such as it is, with all its limitations and modifications. Accordingly, care is usually taken to stipulate, both in particular capitulations and in treaties of peace, that the towns and countries ceded shall retain all their liberties, privileges and immunities. But where such conquered provinces and towns have themselves taken up arms against him, thus making themselves directly his enemies, the conqueror may regard them as vanquished foes and treat them precisely as he would treat other con- quered territory.' " {Ilalleck's International Laio [Baker's Ed.], Vol. 2, page 482, Sec. 2; citing Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. R., 194; 68 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. American Ins. Co. %). Canter, 1 Peters R., 542; Marcy to Kearny, Jan. 11, 1847, Ex. Doc, No. 17, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. H. R. " Where a conquest is confirmed, or in any other way made complete, the allegiance of the inhabitants who remain in the conquered territory is transferred to the new sovereign. The same effect is produced by an ordinary cession of such terri- tory. In either case the national character of the inhabitants who remain is deemed to be changed from that of the former to the new sovereign, and in their relations with other nations they are entitled to all the advantages, and are subject to all the disadvantages, of their new international status." (Sir Sherston Baker's First Steps in International Law, p. 153, Sect. 30.) 3. The inhabitants of a conquered or ceded country, if they do not agree or sympathize with the form of gov- ernment of the conqueror, or purchaser or cessionee, can quit it; they have the admitted right of expatriation. This is generally provided for by treaty, but in the absence of express agreement the right to expatriate still exists. It was not provided for in the treaty between Spain and the United States. No one ever imagined, until an un- founded agitation arose in the United States, that the Filipinos would not have been amply satisfied with any temporary provisional and eventually permanent govern- ment which the United States would establish. But the right of expatriation is still open to them. "If the inhabitants of the ceded territory remain in the territory after such transfer, they are deemed to have elected to become subjects and thus have consented to the transfer of their allegiance to the new sovereignty. If they leave sine animo revertendi, they are deemed to have elected to continue aliens to the new sovereignty. The status of the inhabitants of the conquered and transferred territory is thus determined by their own acts. This rule is the most just, reasonable and convenient which could be adopted. It is reasonable on the part of the conqueror, who is entitled to know who become his subjects, and who prefer to continue THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 69 aliens; it is very convenient for those who wish to become the subjects of the new State; and it is not unjust toward those who determine not to become its subjects. According to this rule, domicile, as understood and defined in public law, determines the question of transfer of allegiance, or rather is the rule of evidence by which that question is to be decided. "This rule of evidence, with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of ceded conquered territory, may be incon- venient to those who do not become subjects of the new sov- ereignty, as it requires them to change their domicile ; but it is necessary for the protection of the rights of those who elect to become subjects of the new Government, and especially necessary for determining the rights and duties of the Gov- ernment which acquires their allegiance and is bound to afford them its protection. It would not do to leave the status of the inhabitants of the acquired territory uncertain and undeter- mined, and to suffer a man's citizenship to continue an open question subject to be disputed by any person at any time, and to change with his own intentions and resolutions as might best suit his convenience or interest. Count Platen Hallemund was prime minister of Hanover at the time of the capitulation of its army to Prussia in 1866. Hanover was afterwards forcibly annexed to Prussia, but before the annexation Count Platen left Hanover in the suite of the ex-King who, by the terms of the capitulation, was allowed to choose his own resi- dence together with a suite of attendants. They took up their abode at Vienna, and, while there. Count Platen was sum- moned to appear before the Supreme Court in Berlin on a charge of high treason, alleged to have been committed by him abroad " as a royal Prussian subject," after he had ceased to reside in Hanover. According to the lav^' of Prussia only a Prussian subject can be prosecuted before a Prussian court for an act of high treason committed abroad, and it was, there- fore, necessary to assume that Count Platen had become a Prussian subject in consequence of the annexation of Hanover by Prussia. He pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that he had never become a Prussian subject. The court, however, overruled the plea and proceeded against the 70 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. Count in co«- such soldiers. All parties being agreed as to the general prin- ciple, a long succession of Mutiny Bills passed without any discussion, except when some particular article of the military code appeared to require amendment. It is, perhaps, because the army became thus gradually and almost imperceptibly one of the institutions of England that it has acted in such perfect harmony with all her other institutions, has never once during a hundred and sixty years, been untrue to the throne or dis- obedient to the law, has never once defied the tribunals or overawed the constitutent bodies." (Macaulay's History of England, Chap. XL, p. 189) (1689). Then when we turn to the history of our country we lincl that the framers of our Constitution had no fear of a " Standing Army," nor had the people who ratified their work. The subject was vividly present to their minds, but they unhesitatingly committed the whole subject to the discretion of Congress, which " shall have power * * * 12. To raise and support armies * * * 13. To provide and maintain a navy. 14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. 15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. 84 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 16. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia * * * " g^^. The wisdom of the people in placing this extensive power in the hands of Congress has been amply justified by history, and the assertion that a " standing army" has been or is anywise detrimental to the Republican institu- tions^ or demoralizing to the people of the country, is utterly unsupported by the facts. The truth is far the other way. Of all of the parts of our government a " standing army " has been one of the most successful and commendable. The distinction between civil and military power has been well defined by our Courts whenever the subject lias come before them ; and it has been as well preserved here as Mr. Macaulay states it has in England. The line between civil and military anthority is main- tained with the greatest nicety, respect and fidelity by American officers and b^^ our soldiers and sailors. We have had no trouble at all with a "Standing Army," neither in whole nor in part. That it is a necessary and essential feature of our Government every one must admit; that its history and record are matters of felicitation and pride no intelligent man can deny. Why, then, go back to a period previous to the reign of William the Third to find argu- ments against a "Standing Army," and undertake to apply them to existing and essentially ditt'erent conditions ; to drag out of the past old and effete doctrines which can have no applicability to present circumstances? As well may we endeavor to cultivate oranges and figs at the North Pole as to attempt to plant the reasons which the people then had against a " Standing Army " in the soil of our X)resent civilization. Everything is different — everything is changed. "Circumstances alter cases" is a trite but exact maxim. If our institutions and our training are not adequate to sustain all dangers coming from a " Standing Army " we had better abandon them. We are not x)lants THE ANl'I-IMPERIALISrS ANSWERED. 85 to thrive by living in a liouse of glass. A "Standing- Army " is more of a necessity to-day than ever before for reasons which will occur to all, among others that it furnishes the nucleus for a greater army if one becomes necessary. In proportion to our population an army of 100,000 would be absolutely innocuous. We have tried the experiment of armies in this country and they have never given any honest student or lover of our institutions the slightest cause for anxiety or regret. Their record is glorious in war and in peace. If ever the country was tested in this respect it was at the time of the Civil War, when in the North and South it is estimated that four millions of soldiers bore arms. The Union Army alone at the close of the war contained 1,084,064 soldiers. And yet this vast soldiery, as soon as the war finished, "melted down into the body of the people and ceased to show a trace of their existence," as Macaulay says in speaking of the wars of the Commonwealth. What nobler record can be shown than this? Do not such instances disclose the true nature of our soldiery and shed light on the character of our people and our institutions? The attempt on the part of Mr. Bryan to attack the character of the soldiers and sailors of this country and their loyalty to our institutions will recoil upon him and his party. It was an unfortunate moment when he invaded the armories of past history — long gone by — and undertook to use the old and rusty weapons which he found there to uphold the flimsy and shallow arguments of his party. As the matter is forcibly put by the Chicago Times-Herald : "To-day the man who talks of militarism as an impending danger to the repubHc as a ' menace to our liberties, ' as threat- ening us with 'a vast military service and conscription,' is a demagogue or a fool, whose knowledge of and faith in the American people could be mobilized on the point of a cambric needle." And thus vanishes " Imperialism " and its alleged ad 86 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED junct a "Standing Army" before the stern countenance of truth, facts and history. The only hope of the Anti- Imperialists is that their ad- herents will do as they have done — not read or study the cold, unerring facts. If they do, the false and shallow doc- trines which have been promulgated will disappear like snow before a summer's sun. The question of " Imperialism," as it relates- to these Philippine Islands, has not yet definitely arisen. What the future may bring forth it is too early to forecast. Whether, if the Filipinos should ever become fit for self-govern- ment or any well-chosen form of government adapted to their own needs and aspirations, and should then, with something approaching to unanimity, demand a separation froin us (thus placing themselves in a situation resembling our own at the time of the Declaration of Independence), that demand should be recognized and under what condi- tions—then the question so eagerly urged by the Anti- Imperialists will, in fact, have arisen. The Filipinos have never yet governed themselves — nor have they ever made an attempt for independence against the Spanish domination — as I have shown. To ask them to go through a probative period is not making a great demand either upon their patience or philosophy. In the meantime I see no occasion to fear "Imperialism" con- sidered as an abstract proposition. I am quite prepared to define what it really is, to discuss it in the light of history and experience when the occasion arises. The American people, when they are really awakened to the importance of it, are ready to discuss and deal with any question which affects their vital, political or moral principles or future prosperity and happiness. It is a miserably narrow and mistaken view to ascribe to a government merely selfish ends. A government has an object, as a man has a pur- pose in his creation. If, in the interest of our own devel- opment, and of Christianity and civilization, we are led THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 87 iDto new territorial fields, I hope I am not paying the American people and their institutions an unmerited eulogy when I say that they have the character, intelligence and courage to meet every situation which may occur in their national life. "In pubHc speeches," says Mr. Schurz, " I have again and again challenged the Imperialists to showrae in the history of the world a single act of perfidy committed by any rejmhUc more infamous than that which has been committed by Presi- dent McKinley's administration against our Filipino alHes." New York Herald, July 14, 1900. What is ' ' perfidy ? " We are told by the lexicographers, legal and others, that it is " the act of one who has en- gaged his faith to do a thing and does not do it, but does the contrary.'' Did this Republic engage its faith to Aguinaldo? I have shown that it never did, directly or indirectly, by express or implied engagement ; by infer- ence or assumption. Let Mr. ^chwvz prove the " perfidy " and I will then compare the conduct of this Republic with that of other Republics, ancient and modern. But I will answer a challenge based upon no evidence by another founded upon fact : Show me if you can in the history of any government — I will not confine you to Republics — a more undignified, unmerited, malicious and unfounded attack upon any Ad- ministration than that made by you and your associate Anti-Imperialists upon Mr. McKinley and his Cabinet. New York, August, 1900. LiUKHKY Uh CUNUKtb^ 013 744 626 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 013 744 626 1 ^