E 480 
 .B64 
 Copy 1 
 
 
 liEV^IE^^^ 
 
 
 HON. J. COLLAMEll'S SPEECH, 
 
 
 MADE 
 
 
 IN THE SENATE, ON THE 16TH JANUARY, 1865, 
 
 
 THE BILL FOR THE REPEAL OF THE EIGHTH SECTION 
 
 
 OF THE ACT OF JULY 2d, 18G4, RESPECTING 
 
 
 TRADE WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE 
 
 
 REVOLTED STATES. 
 
 
 1 " 
 
 J 
 
 
 By col. p. E. bland, op Memphis, Tenn. 
 
 
 WASHINGTON, D , C . : 
 
 
 McGUiL & WrniEUOW, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS. 
 
 
 1865. 
 

REVIET^ 
 
 HON. J. COLLAMEirS SPEECH, 
 
 IN THE SENATE, ON THE 16TH JANUARY, 1865, 
 
 THE BILL FOR THE REPEAL OF THE EIGHTH SEGTIOiN 
 
 OF THE ACT OF JULY 2d, 1864, RESPECTING 
 
 TRADE WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE 
 
 REVOLTED STATES. 
 
 By col. p. E. bland, of Memphis, Tenn. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C: 
 MoGII-L & WITUEKOW, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS. 
 
 1865. 
 

 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2010 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/reviewofhonjcollOOblan 
 
12/ E] "V" I E! "VT" 
 
 HON. J. COLLAMER'S SPEECH. 
 
 In presenting this bill, the distinguished Senator from 
 Vermont expressed his idea of its vast importance in the 
 most empliatic terms. He says : "I am entirely convinced 
 in my own mind that unless this bill, or such a one as this 
 in eftect, be passed, we never shall subdue this insurrection, 
 it never can be ended, it never will be ended. I regard it 
 as the most important measure on which I have ever had 
 occasion to speak in the Senate." 
 
 It is apprehended that these expressions do not in the 
 least magnify the importance of the bill in its relation to 
 the results of the present war, and the weal of the country. 
 It is proposed, however, to demonstrate that its importance 
 rests in considerations quite opposed to those presented by the 
 distinguished gentleman ; that it rests on the mischievous 
 results which will attend its passage, and the happy conse- 
 quences wdiich must flow from its defeat. 
 
 It may well be assumed, from the large experience and 
 eminent ability of the distinguished Senator from Vermont, 
 and from his estimate of the vast importance of the subject, 
 that his speech presents, if not all, at least the leading and 
 most potential arguments which may be adduced in favor 
 
of the bill ; and therefore we may safely examine the sup- 
 posed merits of the bill, in the points presented by the 
 gentleman, which are the following, viz : 
 
 1st. The section sought to be repealed, and the policy 
 based thereon, are opposed to an inherent law of war, and 
 render all efforts to subdue the rebellion nugatory. 
 
 2d. They defeat the objects of the blockade. 
 
 3d. They defeat the blockade itself and end it, 
 
 4th. They defeat the confiscation act. 
 
 Itis proposed to demonstrate, in the first place, the fallacy 
 of each of these positions, examined in the light of fact and 
 law ; and in the second place, that the policy enunciated by 
 the Government, and based on the 8th section of the act of 
 July 2, 1864, or something at least as liberal, is the only 
 policy which can bring us early success in completely sub- 
 duing the rebellion, and maintaining throughout its entire 
 domain the national integrity, and that prosperity and social 
 order which every patriot must devoutly pray for. These 
 two propositions being clearly demonstrated, it is appre- 
 hended that no man in the countrj' will come to their sup- 
 port more heartily than the distinguished gentleman from 
 Vermont. 
 
 I. The distinguished gentleman asserts that it is an inhe- 
 rent law of war — a law" by the force of war itself— that war 
 and trade cannot be carried on at the same time between 
 belligerents. Of course he does not intend to assert a ph}-- 
 sical incompatibility, for manifestly there is none. 
 
 The proposition is obviously this; that while carrying on 
 a war we cannot trade with the people of the enemy's 
 country without paralyzing the efforts of war and render- 
 ing impossible the attainment of its objects. 
 
 iSTow let us see if this be true. In determining this, we 
 must consider, 1st, how the trade to be carried on attectii 
 our financial strength and that of the enemy; 2d, how it 
 affects the morale of ourselves and that of the enemy ; 8d, 
 how it affects our wants and those of the enemy ; and 4th, 
 how it affects our knowledgeof the strength and movements 
 of the enemy, and his knowledge of our strength and 
 
movements. If, in all these, the trade gives to us the 
 decided advantage, the distinguished gentleman himself, it 
 is believed, will be among the first to uphold and advance 
 the trade policy of the Government. 
 
 He estimates the quantity of cotton at four millions bales. 
 There are, doubtless, that number of bales in the whole 
 South, of the old and new crops. But it is believed that 
 four millions is very largely an over estimate of the quantity 
 which could be actually gotten into market, even under the 
 most liberal policy. Two millions, or between two and 
 three millions bales is as much as can be reasonably expected 
 to be actually handled during the present year. If the dis- 
 tinguished gentleman's estimate be correct, however, it will 
 only serve to strengthen the view here expressed. 
 
 Suppose the Government of the United States, under its 
 present system of trade, brings into market two millions 
 bales, averaging four hundred and fifty pounds per bale, 
 making a total of nine hundred millions pounds : How will 
 this quantity afifect our revenue directly, and how will it 
 impress our finances ? Our Government gets on this cotton, 
 directly, in the shape of revenue, including duty and tax, 
 thirty-one per cent of the New York net value of the cot- 
 ton. Cotton being worth in New York $1 15 per pound, 
 and assuming 15 cents per pound, which is a very large es- 
 timate, to cover costs of transportation, handling, and sale, 
 there is left $1 per pound net, in New York, or thirty- 
 one cents per pound of revenue to the Government, yielding 
 in revenue on the nine hundred millions pounds the enor- 
 mous sum of two HUNDRED AND SEVENTY MILLIONS OF DOL- 
 LARS ! This is so much directly put into the treasury of the 
 United States. 
 
 Magnificent as this result of the trade is, it is yet insig- 
 nificant as compared to the impression on our finances, as 
 aftecting exchange and the balance of trade. Nine hundred 
 millions pounds of cotton in our hands for exportation, with 
 the loss of three crops, creating a demand which inevitably 
 must support prices, could not fail to create in our favor so 
 enormous a balance of trade as to appreciate our currency, 
 
as if by magic, to par with gold. Indeed, so patent is this, 
 that during the gentleman's speech, one of his friends, [Mr. 
 FosTiiR,] as if to aid his argument, suggested that by the 
 time the cotton got to New York, if enough were gotten 
 there, the greenbacks paid the Southern producer would 
 be equal to gold ! a fact which the distinguished gentleman 
 could not but accept, without apparently, in the heat of dis- 
 cussion, perceiving its tremendous effect against the argu- 
 ment he was making. Is it not true, then, that as magnificent 
 as is an increase of two hundred and seventy millions of 
 revenue from the trade, yet that increase is overshadowed 
 and dwindles in presence of the impression made upon our 
 national finances, in the appreciation of our currency? If 
 the distinguished gentleman was right in assuming that 
 financial strength constitutes "the sinews of war," and no 
 sound thinker or enlightened reader of history doubts it for 
 a mmnent, then indeed does this trade, successfully managed, 
 
 give to us "THE SINEWS OF WAR." 
 
 But, to be fair in this discussion, and to arrive at accurate 
 and just conclusions, we must not forget to weigh the effects 
 of this trade upon the Confederate finance. Let us assume 
 the figures of the gentleman himself, (supposing the cotton 
 to be paid for in our currency,) that the Southern pro- 
 ducers or holders are paid fifty cents per pound. This would 
 make a total to the Southern people of four hundred and fifty 
 million dollars in our currency. Of this four hundred and 
 fifty millions, the people are compelled by the Confederate 
 Government to pay into the Confederate treasury eight cents 
 per pound on all cotton sold by them to us, making revenues 
 directly from the sale of the nine hundred millions pounds, 
 to them of seventy-two millions, against the revenue accru- 
 ing to us of two hundred and seventy millions. But as as- 
 tonishing as this difference is in our favor, it is as nothing 
 compared with the immense difference in the impression 
 made upon our and their finances. With us it creates a 
 balance of trade in our favor of well on to a thousand mil- 
 lions dollars. With them it is far different. They have 
 transferred to us that which creates a balance of trade, and 
 
hold in its stead the four hundred and lifty millions dollars 
 we have paid them for their cotton. From the pressure of 
 their wants and the high price of goods, they will be com- 
 pelled to expend the whole of this large amount, except the 
 seventy-two millions taken b}' the Confederate Government, 
 in purchasing of us the commodities they need. Thus they 
 not only transfer to us their only basis of credit — the cot- 
 ton — but return to us almost the entire sum we paid them 
 for it, to the utter prostration of their credit and the para- 
 lyzing of their finance. 
 
 Thiy is the'most favorable view, for tlic distinguished gen- 
 tleman's argument, to take of the financial efi'ects to the 
 South of this trade ; but it is not a sound view, because it 
 is not the practical and matter-of-fact view. Practicallj' and 
 in fact, (as the regulations permit and the Southern people 
 desire,) the cotton, to the extent of one-third of its value, 
 would be paid for in goods. The people, so long accustomed 
 to the most exorbitant prices, would regard goods sold them 
 at a hundred per cent, profit as purchased at very reasonable 
 and moderate prices. Assuming the New York net value 
 of cotton, after paying all charges and expenses, to be $1 
 per pound, the purchaser would be authorized to give goods 
 to the extent of one-third of that amount at invoice prices 
 for every pound bought ; but then he charges one hundred 
 per cent, profit on his goods, and that enables him to pay 
 the seller of cotton 66f cents on evevy pound of cotton in 
 goods at selling rates. It must be manifest, then, that in- 
 stead of paying them for their cotton in our currency, we 
 pay them for it entirely in goods. Thus we not onlj- 
 get the cotton, without paying money, but reap the rich 
 harvest of two hundred and twenty-five millions dollars in 
 the shape of profits on the goods exchanged for it. 
 
 What, then, have they gotten in lieu of what they have 
 given ? They have perishable goods which will be worn out 
 and gone in six or twelve months — goods which do not, to 
 the extent of a single dollar, strengthen their credit or favor- 
 ably impress their funds. What have we gotten ? that 
 which, while they retained it, was a substantial basis of 
 
8 . 
 
 credit to them, but which, transferred to to us, becomes a 
 tower of financial strength, imparting stability, confidence, 
 credit, and, as if by magic power, lifting our funds to par 
 witli gold. 
 
 The distinguished gentleman proclaims that " cotton is 
 king." If cotton is king, and we are unable to dethrone it, 
 let us make it a tributary king, let us compel it to con- 
 tril)ute streiigth to our financial system and help to furnish 
 us with "the sinew-s of war." 
 
 Taking the distinguished gentleman's estimate of the 
 quantity of cotton, that is four instead of two millions bales, 
 as correct, just doubles the force of this argument, while at 
 the same time it must be apparent to every mind, pro- 
 foundly examining this subject, that in assuming the im- 
 mense financial results of this trade in favor of the South, 
 which he mentions as eight hundred millions dollars, with 
 no results favorable to us, the distinguished gentleman had 
 failed to take into consideration the true elements of the 
 question. 
 
 Having demonstrated that the effect of this trade must 
 essentially be the wonderfully strengthening of our finances 
 and the disastrously weakening those of the enemy, it fol- 
 lows that the carrying on of the trade by us is not opposed to 
 the law of war; because, by its financial relations, it supports, 
 reinforces and upholds all our military operations. As be- 
 tween the belligerents themselves, where the rights of other 
 nations are not involved, the sole criterion of the lawfulness of 
 any policy is the advantage which results from it in impart- 
 ing military strength and success to the power making use 
 of it. 
 
 Let us now take up the second element to be considered 
 in determining whether this trade is incompatible with the 
 carrying on of the war, is contrary to the laws of war, and 
 inquire how the trade will affect the morale of ourselves and 
 that of the enemy. If its tendency is to strengthen the de- 
 termination of our people to prosecute the war to the entire 
 suppression of the rebellion on the one hand, and on 
 the other to weaken the zeal and ardor of the Confederates 
 
in the prosecution of the rebellion, then, surely, it will not 
 be contended that the trade is incompatible with tlie laws of 
 war, inasmuch as it imparts strength and vigor to our mili- 
 tary system and weakness to that of the enemy — and hence 
 is clearly admissible to us. 
 
 In this connection we must keep steadily in mind several 
 great facts : 1st. That we vastly preponderate in numbers 
 and in all the material resources of war; 2d. That the coun- 
 try is so prosperous that everywhere, not contiguous to the 
 theatre of war, the traveller in passing sees no indications 
 to remind him, were he not otherwise advised of the fact, 
 that the country is waging one of the most stupendous wars 
 of the world ; 3d. That abundance, to the extent of luxury, 
 is ours in its usual profusion. 4th. That their country is 
 desolated, impoverished, and in want; that everywhere the 
 ravages of war appear and the footsteps of the prowling 
 conscriptor are heard. 5th. That our actual condition is stu- 
 diously veiled by the Confederate authorities from the peo- 
 ple, who are made to believe that we are exhausted in men 
 and means and reduced to extremity like themselves ; and 
 6th, that hatred towards us is studiously inculcated into 
 their minds by their leaders. 
 
 Under these circumstances, what must be the inevitable 
 effect upon the ISTorthern and the Southern mind of that 
 coming together, and the exchange of facts and information, 
 and the cultivation of kindlier sentiments, which the trade 
 would necessarily bring about? The JSTorthern man thus 
 learns the actual weakness of the South and spreads abroad 
 the information through letters and travel ; and the Northern 
 people, seeing what great things had been accomplished, are 
 nerved with still stronger determination to carry the war to 
 complete success. But the Southern man, coming with his 
 products to trade, through the commerce of facts and infor- 
 mation, learns our actual condition of strength and prosper- 
 ity, is astonished at the contrast presented in his own region, 
 and shocked at the deception he finds had been practiced 
 upon him. Coupled with all this, the advantages flowing 
 from this trade to him and his wife and his little ones, es- 
 
10 
 
 pecially if he meets with reasonable consideration and kind- 
 ness fron\ the authorities, turn tlic tide of his animosity, 
 and send it drifting back in the direction of friendly senti- 
 ment. The tendency of all this is to sever the ties which 
 bind him to the Confederac^y — to reveal to him its liopeless 
 weakness, and its inevitable doom. Such is the effect upon 
 him ; but not upon him alone. On his return to his home 
 he spreads the light among his neighbors — public sentiment 
 becomes impressed — confidence in the Confederacy is lost — 
 all heart is gone, and the way is gradually paved for the 
 restoration of social order among these people, when the 
 war shall end, and a present adverse sentiment engendered, 
 aiding to bring the end about. To sum up this whole mat- 
 ter, it must be apparent that the intercourse wliieh this 
 trade must produce could not fail to weaken the attachment 
 of the Southern man to his government, from which he only 
 experiences oppression ; while it would in the same propor- 
 tion increase and strengthen that of the Northern people for 
 their Government. It must take from the Southern mind 
 the last vestige of hope for the success of the Confederacy, 
 against such tremendous odds. It must bring them to con- 
 trast their wretched condition with that of those who live 
 and flourish under the protecting folds of the '-old flag." 
 Recipients, then, of kindness and benefits, kindlier senti- 
 ments would spring up among them towards our people, and 
 birth would be given to a desire of reuniting their destinies 
 to those of the irrepressible and glorious Republic. Under 
 these considerations, it cannot be doubted that the trade, 
 wisely conducted, with a view to such results, could not fail 
 to demoralize the rebellion speedily and surely. And thus 
 the march of trade and commerce, though silent and unos- 
 tentatious, woukl be more triumphant, and attended by more 
 decisive and happier results to our cause, than the march of 
 armies. 
 
 Let us now pass to a consideration of the third element in 
 this question, viz : How does such trade affect our wants 
 and those of the enemy ? If the wants of the respective 
 belligerents are such that the exchanges effected in fulfilling 
 
11 
 
 them build up the one and impoverish the other, who will 
 doubt but that the trade so resulting is an adjuvant of war 
 to that one so built up, and should be employed, if possible, 
 by it as a war measure. In the memorable contest between 
 the English and ISTapoleon, it will be remembered that that 
 sagacious statesman, as w^ell as greatest soldier, conceived 
 the vast design of combining the powers of continental Eu- 
 rope in the policy of non-intercourse with England. It was 
 a master conception ; and had he been successful in indu- 
 cing or compelling the combination, the results of that con- 
 test must have been far different, and the supremacy of 
 England checked if not destroyed. But v^'hat was the prin- 
 ciple of that policy? — that trade with the people of the hostile 
 country was incompatible with war ? Not at all ; for he was 
 ever ready to trade with the people against whose govern- 
 ment he waged war, when the general balance of advantage 
 was decidedlj' in his favor and to his strength. The princi- 
 ple W'as this : the peculiar power and vigor of the British 
 monarchy rested then, as now, upon her manufactures and 
 commerce. The proceeds of her mills and ships enriched her 
 people, imparting to them prosperity and resulting ability to 
 maintain with ease the most protracted and exhaustive war, 
 while with the products of her looms she drained from con- 
 tinental Europe its riches to pour them into her own lap and 
 sustain her own enterprises. Her essential want was the mar- 
 kets of the world. Through them she constrained the world to 
 be tributary to her, and thus to sustain her vigor and power. 
 While her system was exhausting other nations, it was building 
 up and perpetuating her vastly preponderating financial 
 strength and prosperity. ISTon -intercourse struck at the very 
 rootsof this policy, and if successful must have undermined the 
 power of Britain and brought her to terms. But its failure 
 left that policy in full vigor, and England to grow rich and 
 powerful — able to protract the struggle, and ultimately to 
 triumph over her mighty foe. In this war we occupy pre- 
 cisely the position England did in the wars of Napoleon, 
 and the revolted States precisely that occupied by the con- 
 tinental powers. Our wants are imperious, and being ful- 
 
12 
 
 • 
 
 tilled, give to us immense wealth, prosperity, and resulting 
 strength. The wants of the revolted States are also impe- 
 rious, but being fulfilled, yield them poverty and weakness. 
 "VVe have looms and operatives — we want cotton to work up ; 
 if we cannot get it, our mills are closed up, our people 
 starve, and the resources of the nation diminish ; give it to 
 us, and proprietors and operatives are prosperous, and the 
 country is opulent and powerful. We want cotton for export to 
 increase our balance of trade and impress our finance ; give 
 it to us and we can carry on this war indefinitely if neces- 
 sary. Trade gives us this cotton in exchange for goods, 
 realizing to us large profits on the goods, and thus making 
 the cotton cheaper to us than to have produced it. What 
 then does the trade, based upon our wants, do for us ? It 
 gives employment and supports industry; it enables us to 
 manufacture, and )iot import our cotton goods ; it prevents 
 the enormous drain upon our resources which importation 
 would create; it yields us revenue counted by hundreds of 
 millions; it creates a balance of trade in our favor which 
 relieves our finance from every embarrassment, imparting to 
 it stability and strength, and lifting our funds to par with 
 gold ; and it enables us to compel the enemy to become 
 tributary to our power and prosperity. 
 
 But how do the wants of the revolted people, when satis- 
 fied, afi^ect them ? They want goods and supplies which are 
 speedily consumed in their use. These they get in exchange 
 for their cotton. Kot a farthing is added to their financial 
 strength — not a farthing to their credit, while they transfer 
 to us a solid basis of credit and financial power. The inev- 
 itable consequence to them is exhaustion, impoverishment, 
 paralysis. 
 
 It may be well to advert here to that most remarkable 
 passage of the distinguished Senator's speech, in which he 
 expresses his conviction that the splendid results of our 
 military operations, on the Mississippi, have been infinitely 
 overbalanced by the ill efiects of the limited trade carried 
 on, by the President's authority, under the act of 1861. He 
 says : " Upon the whole, the best information that we can 
 
13 
 
 get of it is that so far from the acquisition of the Mississippi 
 by us, obtained by much of skill and blood and treasure, 
 resulting in benefit to our country and to our cause, it has, 
 
 AFTER ALL, RESULTED IN FURNISHING SUPPORT TO THE EN- 
 EMY AND RELIEF TO THEM INFINITELY MORE THAN IT HAS 
 BEEN OF ADVANTAGE TO US." 
 
 It is difficult, indeed, in view of the facts and principles 
 involved, to conceive how so enlightened a gentleman, as 
 the distinguished Senator from Vermont, could have suffered 
 himself to be drawn into such entire and utter misappre- 
 hension of a subject as is here presented. The only solu- 
 tion which occurs to us is that he was misled by the letter 
 of G(>neral Canby, iorgetting, doubtless, that the profession 
 of arms, and even high military position, do by no means 
 imply any profound insight into questions which belong to 
 the statesman ; nay, more, that the combination of great 
 military genius, in the same man, with that breadth, depth, 
 and scope of intellect which make the statesman is exceed- 
 ingly rare, but when found gives to the world a Csesar or a 
 Napoleon, We have surely nothing to say derogatory of 
 General Canby as a soldier. Certainly his campaign in the 
 distant West was highly creditable. Whether he possesses 
 the qualities of a great soldier in the field, the country will 
 doubtless learn when opportunities shall have aflforded him 
 the means of demonstrating himself. But this much we do 
 think his letter proves, that he will mislead all those who 
 yield to his guidance in matters relating to sound policy 
 and administration, not purely of a military character. 
 
 Let us examine this singular proposition of the distin- 
 guished Senator. The elements of the question are : — the 
 measure of advantages which have resulted to us from the 
 acquisition of the Mississippi, whether of a militarj- or com- 
 mercial character; and the measure of disadvantage result- 
 ing from it, in the shape of support and relief to the enemy. 
 
 Take a survey of the military situation at the commence- 
 ment of the campaigns for the " acquisition of the Missis- 
 sippi." Grant, then a Brigadier General, was concentrating 
 at Cairo, then our southernmost position. A powerful Con- 
 
14 
 
 federate army occupied Columbus, in what was supposed 
 an impregnable position, some twenty miles south of Cairo. 
 That ma_o-nifieent river — the marc internum of the valley — 
 from Columbus to the Gulf, stretching a distance of a 
 thousand miles, with all its tributaries south of the Ohio, 
 too-ether with those rich States reaching on the west to the 
 Rio Grande and on the east to the Atlantic, was in the un- 
 disputed possession and control of the Confederacy, These 
 States, with Virginia and North Carolina, presented one 
 continuous domain, united under one de facto govern- 
 ly^ent — its territory unbroken — its communications perfect — 
 its soil a stranger to the ravages of war. Such was the sit- 
 uation then. The acquisition of the Mississippi was then 
 the objective of these campaigns. By a masterly strategic 
 movement Grant struck Donelson, and the sequence was, 
 immediate or remote, that we got the Mississippi down to 
 Helena, including the greater portion of Tennessee. Then 
 followed Helena, opening to us the Mississippi as far as 
 Vicksburjr. New Orleans, in the meantime, had fallen to 
 us, by a campaign projected from the East, and we con- 
 trolled the Mississippi from its mouth as far up as Port Hud- 
 son. Still Grant was pressing on, with that invincible will 
 which sooner or later overcomes all opposition, and at last 
 Vicksburg and Port Hudson were subdued and the whole 
 Mississippi is ours. The "Southern Confederacy" is irre- 
 mediably cut in two, its parts dissevered, and its communi- 
 cations lost. Louisiana reconstructs her government, abol- 
 ishes her system of slaver}'-, and knocks at the door of the 
 National Government for readmission. Arkansas does the 
 same, and Tennessee follows the noble example. Thus, not 
 only was there an acquisition of the Mississippi, but also of 
 the rich States which border her shores on the west and 
 east with the exception of Mississippi. Memphis, Vicksburg, 
 and New Orleans become the bases of operations now af- 
 fecting the great issues of war, on the Atlantic coast and 
 even in Virginia. In the order of cause and effect, the Mis- 
 sissippi was first, then as its sequences in successive order, 
 came Chattanooga, Atlanta, Savannah, and in the order of 
 
15 
 
 sequences not yet falfilled, Charleston and Richmond. So 
 vast is the field of results hanging on the acquisition of the 
 Mississippi, that the mind staggers in its attempt to gather 
 them into one connected view, and to trace out the relations 
 of that great campaign. We have read in history, with ad- 
 miration, of those splendid campaigns of Cyrus, of Alexan- 
 der, of C?esar, of Lucullns, of Pompey ; but what were these, 
 compared with the conquest of the Mississippi and its de- 
 pendencies ? In grandeur, in extent, in results, some ful- 
 filled and others yet to come, this conquest parallels the 
 proudest of antiquity. Yet we are gravely told, by the dis- 
 tinguished Senator, that the acquisition of the Mississippi 
 "has resulted in furnishing support to the enemy and relief 
 to them, infinitely more than it has been of advantage to 
 us!" 
 
 What was this wonderful support and relief? Let us as- 
 sume, what every man, who has attentivel}^ noticed the cur- 
 rent of things in the region west of the Mississippi, under- 
 stands to be preposterous, that the entire trans-Mississippi 
 Confederate army was thoroughly supplied, armed, and equip- 
 ped from the trade permitted on the Mississippi, — nay, let us 
 suppose this trade to have created and outfitted the entire 
 Confederate army operating in that region. What does it 
 amount to? What has that army accomplished, worthy to 
 be mentioned in comparison with the splendid results which 
 have followed, and are following, the conquest of the Mis- 
 sissippi ? In the comparison, all the achievements of that 
 army dwindled into absolute insignificance. How then, even 
 on the absurd hypothesis that the trade made, armed, 
 equipped, and supported that army, how can the statement be 
 upheld that the advantages resulting to the enemy have been 
 "infinitely" greater than to us, ^ .m the conquest of the 
 Mississippi ? 
 
 The fact is that while the Confederate army got a portion 
 of the supplies going into the country through this trade, 
 that portion was small and insignificant ; because there were 
 never permitted supplies enough to answer the actual neces- 
 sities and wants of the people. But there was a source of 
 
supply wliich is daily growing in magnitude and importance, 
 through which the trans-Mississippi Confederate army has 
 been able to obtain its supplies, viz : Matamoras and other 
 points along the Rio Grande. 
 
 Now let us for a moment consider the bearing of the 
 trade on the Mississippi, in its relation to the prosperity of 
 the country, and the successful prosecution of tlie war. It 
 is estimated that for the last three years about two hundred 
 thousand bales have come out annually through this channel. 
 This has sufficed to keep our operatives employed, our 
 mills running, and largely, if not entirelj^, to supply ourhome 
 demand for cotton goods. In itself, the trade amounting 
 to two hundred thousand bales does not seem to be a very 
 large matter ; and 3'et it is believed that the absence of those 
 two hundred thousand bales would liave been so potential 
 an element in the disturbance of our industry' and finance as 
 to have rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to have main- 
 tained our credit, and greatly to have embarrassed the pros- 
 ecution of the war. Let us suppose this trade on the Mis- 
 sissippi, whicli tlie gentleman thinks v/as so detrimental to 
 us, had not been permitted. Then we would either have 
 had to stop our mills, or buy of England. The shutting 
 out from trade of two hundred thousand bales, and we be- 
 coming purchasers instead of exporters, would have im- 
 pressed prices and ranged them high. In all probability 
 prices would have ranged at $1 per pound in coin, the only 
 thing with which, in that case, we could buy. This, it is evi- 
 dent, would have created a drain upon our coin resources to 
 the extent of ninety millions annually, or, forthe threeyears, 
 
 TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY MILLIONS IN GOLD ! That drain Upon 
 
 us would liave been absolutely necessary in placing us in the 
 same situation, in respect to industry and supplies, in which 
 we were placed by this Mississippi trade. Could we have 
 stood that drain ? It must be obvious that such a draft upon 
 our resources would have paralyzed our finance, and left us 
 unable to protract the struggle. If this view of the case be 
 sound, that trade which the gentleman so deprecates has 
 operated to the salvation of our credit and finance, and 
 
17 
 
 afforded us the power of carrying on the war so successfully 
 and gloriously to the present moment, with every prospect 
 of early and complete success. It is true there may have 
 been much of irregularitj-, much to be deprecated, much to 
 be regretted, clinging to and following up this trade. But 
 we are to judge it, in view of its grand features, purposes, 
 and results, and not by a microscopic view of an excrescence 
 which attaches here and there. It is no doubt true that 
 Kirby Smith's army, to a certain extent, was benefitted by 
 this trade. What of that ? The benefits to him, compared 
 to the grand and saving results to us, are like friction to 
 machinery — inseparably incidental to, but not staying its 
 grand movements and mighty results. Will any man reject 
 the steam engine, the locomotive — an iron thing of life and 
 power — because of the friction inseparable from its action ? 
 Those benefits, compared to our advantages, are like a small 
 and almost imperceptible wart, growing on a face of iieavenly 
 beauty, mirroring a soul of angelic purity and sweetness. 
 Shall the face, and the beauty, and the pure soul be rejected be- 
 cause of the wart? If a trade which results in upholding our 
 credit, our industry, our finances, imparting to us vigor and 
 power for the prosecution of the war to a successful end, car- 
 ries along with it as incidental to it, and inseparable from it, 
 the clothing and feeding — nay, even the arming of Kirby 
 Smith's army, the plainest dictates of right, reason, and 
 common sense, urge its adoption bj' us. When the right 
 time comes in our military combination seriously to ad- 
 vance upon him, we expect to rout and destroy his army, 
 however well he may be supplied. This we can accomplish ; 
 but if we permit paralysis to come upon our finances, we 
 will never go to meet him. 
 
 We come now to consider the fourth and last element in 
 determining whether trade with the revolted people is opposed 
 to the inherent law of war, viz : how tliis trade ati'ects the 
 enemy and us in respect to information of numbers, posi- 
 tions, movements, &c. 
 
 The distinguished gentleman, after mentioning Beaufort, 
 Memphis, and Pensacola, as designated points of purchase, 
 2 
 
18 
 
 says: "Of course the eftect is to admit to these places, in 
 our military possession, all the people of that country, and 
 to allow them free intercourse to and from those places," 
 * * * " so that you open your camps entirehj to these peo- 
 j)le." And this view is supported by the quotation from 
 General Canby's letter, wherein he says of cotton specula- 
 tors, "I have not sent an expedition into the enemy's lines 
 without finding agents of this character in communication 
 with the rebels, giving them information regarding our 
 movements." He says it is to the interest of these men " to 
 give information of every contemplated movement." That 
 this should be a grave and serious argument against the 
 policy of trade in the mind of the distinguished Senator, 
 who is a statesman, but, I believe, making no pretension to 
 experience in the camp, is not remarkable; but it is not a 
 little surprising to see it urged by a soldier of high rank and 
 most responsible position, and is only accounted for as one 
 of those statements which occasionally drop from a man, by 
 inadvertence as it were, in a matter that has not seriously 
 engaged his thought. 
 
 The assumption that the trade exposes our armies neces- 
 sarilj^to the inspection of tlie enemy is a misconception of 
 the case. Let ns take Memphis as an illustration for all 
 ■the rest. It is assumed that the Southern people throng 
 -that city, as sellers of cotton and purchasers of supplies ; 
 that they leave the city freighted with information for the 
 •enemy touching our position, movements, &c. I^ow, in the 
 first place, there is not one in a thousand of these men who, 
 if they were to try, could take back with them an}' valua- 
 ble or accurate information about the army. Any one who 
 has ever visited camps about a city understands this. The 
 only danger would be that skillful spies would come in un- 
 der pretence of trade. But there is no need of such pre- 
 tence, for the river front is open to the ingress of all. Any- 
 body can gain access in that waj', and, being there, can have 
 access to the camps. Again, the closing of the lines oper- 
 ates, practically, to exclude the honest and well disposed from 
 ingress, -while the accomplished spy, through his art and 
 
19 
 
 cunning, can always, by one means andanotl er, gain admis- 
 sion. The man who honestlj' approaches the city, friendly 
 it may be to us, has no motives to prompt him, nor skill to 
 enable him, to overcome the obstacles he meets at the picket 
 line. He turns back, but the spy enters. What is the re- 
 sult? We are cut off from all the information of the enemy's 
 movements fifty or a hundred miles distant which well-dis- 
 posed persons would otherwise bring us, while we do not es- 
 cape ourselves the scrutiny of the enemy. An instance illus- 
 trative of this point has just been related to me by a gentleman 
 of high character from Memphis. I^Totlong since a gentleman, 
 most friendly to us, approached the picket line with a few- 
 bales of cotton. He was not permitted to enter, and was 
 turned back. Subsequently it was ascertained tliat he had 
 information to impart which, in the expression of an experi- 
 enced military man, would have been "worth more than a 
 regiment." 
 
 The fact is, that in all onr camps about the cities we are 
 closely scrutinized, and there is no escape from it. The 
 military man who supposes he can escape this, humbugs 
 himself. The fact of trade or no trade will scarcely 
 make an appreciable difference. This has been so since war 
 has been waged, and will be so as long as there are armies. 
 The experienced leader of an army understands and appre- 
 ciates this fact, and instead of trusting, too largelj-, in the 
 vain effort to be safe from observation by excluding the 
 possibility of the access of spies, he trusts to other meas- 
 ures. He organizes his own spy system, and puts it on the 
 most efficient footing possible to enable him to keep 
 thoroughly and accurately advised of the strength, position, 
 and contemplated movements, of the enemy, while he so 
 conducts liis own affairs as to leave for observation the least 
 possible traces of what he intends to do, and at the same time, 
 by his detectiv^e system, he renders observation of his camps 
 dang-erous and difficult. Were it not far wiser that a mili- 
 tary leader form his plans and combinations and lock them in 
 his own bosom until the time arrives for their development? 
 Then there would be no information given of "contemplated 
 
20 
 
 movements." Holding the army in thorough discipline, 
 and at all times in readiness to move at the shortest possible 
 notice, such a general confounds the spies by his reticence 
 and thorough discipline, and his blows are struck ere those 
 who would give information know where they are to fall. 
 I[e who makes himself transparent, or who fails to hold his 
 army compactly in hand and ever in readiness, whatever 
 precautions he may take to keep spies out, will be an open 
 book to the enemy, and may expect every movement to be 
 more or less anticipated. Trade never has and never will 
 have any appreciable effect in bringing about or varying 
 these results. 
 
 Again, the camps are, and ought to be, on the outskirts 
 of the city, ranging from a mile and a half to two miles out. 
 Those coming to the city to trade would never see them, 
 and certainly would not approach them on any legitimate 
 trade business. The prompt arrest of those who should ap- 
 proach the camps under suspicious circumstances, would 
 soon put an end to curiosity, and render the camps as per- 
 fectly safe from observation as they could be made were no 
 trade being carried on. 
 
 From the above considerations, and in whatever aspect 
 the question is viewed, it appears that the advantages result- 
 ing to us, from the proposed trade, are great and decided, 
 imparting strength and stability to our finances, paralysis to 
 those of the enemy — vigor and confidence to us, weakness 
 and distrust to them — to us triumph, to them defeat; there- 
 fore this trade, so far from being opposed to the laws of war, 
 is itself the chief support and reinforcement of the war. 
 
 II. The second position taken by the distinguished Sen- 
 ator is, that for us to trade with the people of the revolted 
 States operates to defeat the objects of the blockade. 
 
 ISTovv, what are the objects of the blockade? Obviously 
 to prevent commercial intercourse between thepeople of the 
 revolted States and foreign nations. The purposes accom- 
 plished by this restraint are several : 1st. It prevents the 
 ingress of arms and munitions of war ; the material and ma- 
 chinery for the construction, equipment, and outfit of ships 
 
21 
 
 and vessels; tLe possibilit}- of transporting the hostile armies 
 from point to point by sea ; the importation of railroad iron and 
 machinery for building, equipping, and repairing railroads; 
 and material and machinery for the manufacture of guns and 
 munitions of war. 2d. To prevent that financial strength 
 accruing to those States which would have resulted from 
 foreign trade. Under a wise administration of such trade, 
 restricting importations to the actual necessities of the coun- 
 try, and receiving gold in exchange for cotton, the finances 
 of the revolted States would have been as favorably and as 
 potentially impressed, as it has been above shown ours will 
 be by the trade which this 8th section of the act authorizes. 
 Such being the confessed objects of the blockade, it is 
 difficult to perceive upon what principle the proposed trade 
 would defeat those objects — inasmuch as those objects are 
 left entirely operative, and anafiected by such trade. 
 
 III. The third and most important position taken b^^ the 
 distinguished Senator now claims attention. This position 
 is, that for our Government to permit the trade, contem- 
 plated by this 8th section of the act, and by the Executive 
 order providing for its execution, does, in efi'ect, render the 
 blockade unlawful, and end it. 
 
 It is proposed to demonstrate, both in principle and on 
 authority, that this position is wholly and entirely unsound. 
 
 The authority quoted by the distinguished gentleman, 
 from Dean, on war and neutrals, is undisputed, and its gen- 
 eral statement of the law of blockade is undoubtedly cor- 
 rect. But it has no application to the case under discussion. 
 It consists of two distinct and independent statements of 
 law. 1st. That " all blockade, which excludes the subjects 
 of all other countries from trading with the ports of the 
 enemy, and at the same time permits a general access to 
 
 THOSE POETS TO THE SUBJECTS OF THE STATE WHICH IMPOSES IT, 
 
 is irregular, illegal, and null." Waiving, for the present, 
 the great fact that the blockaded ports are our own ports 
 and not foreign ports, and the questions of law which spring 
 out of that fact, must it not be clear that unless the pro- 
 posed trade involves "a general access " of our people to 
 
22 
 
 the blockaded ports, this statement of the law can have no 
 application whatever to that trade ? Bat the 8th section of 
 the act of July 2, 186-1, does not involve any such access ; 
 nor do the Treasury regulations made in pursuance of that 
 section, and approved by the President, involve such access; 
 but, on the contrary, in locating all the points of purchase at 
 places other than such blockaded ports, these reoulations 
 
 ARE CONCLUSIVE THAT NO SUCH ACCESS IS PERMITTED. This 
 
 disposes of the first clause of the authority quoted by the 
 distinguished gentleman. He seems, however, not to have 
 relied on this clause, and the rule of law therein stated, but 
 wholly on the second clause, viz : " All blockade being for 
 
 THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A COMMERCIAL xMONOPOLY for the 
 
 private advantage of the State imposing it, would be void 
 on the very principles on which the right of blockade is 
 formed." Still waiving, for the present, the fact that the 
 blockaded ports are our own ports, let us see if this is not 
 as clearly inapplicable to the proposed trade and its legal 
 effect on the blockade as the 1st clause of the distinguished 
 gentleman's quotation. According to this statement of the 
 law, the lawfulness of a blockade, imposed by one nation on 
 the ports of another, depends upon the object of the 
 BLOCKADE. If tliis ohjcct be lawful, under the law of na- 
 tions, the blockade is lawful. And this is true, notwith- 
 standing the situation and geographical relations of the 
 belligerent nations may be such that, as an incident of the 
 blockade, a monopoly of trade may spring up under it, 
 accruing to the nation imposing it. To determine, therefore, 
 the lawful, or unlawful character of the blockade, the inquiry 
 must be confined solely and exclusively to the object of its 
 imposition. If that object be the obtaining " a commercial 
 monopoly for the private advantage of the State imposing 
 it," the blockade is unlawful beyond any dispute. Because, 
 by the law of nations, all nations are equally entitled to 
 trade with any nation willing to trade with them, except so 
 far as their rights of commerce are restrained by a blockade, 
 legitimately imposed in accordance with the rules of war — 
 that is, a blockade imposed by one belligerent nation upon 
 
23 
 
 the ports of another, to enable it to accomplish the ends of 
 war. And hence, to impose a blockade for any other pur- 
 pose, is to injure the rights of neutrals, and gives rise to just 
 cause of war against the State imposing it. This is the 
 principle. Now the distinguished Senator has himself stated 
 the objects for which this blockade was imposed, viz : to cut 
 oft" all trade with foreign nations, and thus aid in accom- 
 plishing the ends of the war by weakening the war power of 
 the enemy, in preventing the supply to him of the material 
 and machinery of war, and that immense acquisition of 
 financial strength which would inevitably result from foreign 
 trade. But this is not all ; if such be not the object of the 
 blockade, then all argument on the question (on the hypoth- 
 esis that the blockaded ports are foreign ports) is useless and 
 futile. Because, in that case, the blockade is, and always 
 has been unlawful and void, without any reference whatever 
 to the legal effect of the proposed trade. The mistake of 
 the distinguished gentleman's argument, is his failure to 
 discriminate between that which is the incident merely, and 
 that which is the object of the blockade. All nations would 
 have just cause of war against us for blockading those 
 ports, if they were foreign ports, for the purpose of creating 
 a commercial monopoly for our private advantage. But no 
 such right of war accrues to them, if we have imposed the 
 blockade for a legitimate and lawful object, notwithstanding, 
 owing to the peculiar geographical relations of the belliger- 
 ents, a monopoly of trade accrues to us, as an incident to, 
 BUT NOT A PURPOSE OF, the blockadc. 
 
 To illustrate this view, let us take the case of Spain and 
 Portugal. Let us suppose them at war, and Spain for a 
 lawful object to have blockaded the ports of Portugal. Their 
 geographical relations are such that trade might be car- 
 ried on between them, across their land frontiers, without in 
 any manner disturbing the blockade or touching the block- 
 aded ports. Spain might discover that such trade would 
 reinforce her war vigor and powerfully aid in accomplishing 
 the ends of the war— it would create in her behalf a mono- 
 poly of trade. But that monopoly, being an incident merely 
 
24 • 
 
 and not the object of the blockade, could uot in any man- 
 ner aft'ect its lawful character. 
 
 If any one doubts this proposition, let him consider 
 whether the continuance of the lawfully imposed blockade 
 by Spain, at the" same time that she enjoys this incidental 
 monopoly of trade, would constitute, in behalf of neutrals, 
 a just cause of war against her; because that is the criterion 
 of judgment as to whether the conduct of one nation towards 
 another, is lawful or unlawful. 
 
 Vattel clearly lays down the law on this subject; he says: 
 " The right of employing force or of making war belongs 
 to nations no fartlier than is necessary for their own de- 
 fence and the maintenance of their rights. ISTow if any one 
 attacks a nation or viohites her perfect rights he does her an 
 injury. Then, and not till then, that nation has the right 
 to repel the aggressor and reduce him to reason." * * * 
 "Let us then say, in general, the foundation or cause of 
 every just war is ivjury, either already done or threatened." 
 * * * " When, therefore, we would judge wiiether a 
 war be just, w'e must consider whether he who undertakes 
 it HAS IN PACT RECEIVED AN INJURY, or whether he be really 
 threatened with one, and, in order to determine what is to 
 be considered as an injury, we must be acquainted with a 
 nation's rights, so called — that is to say, her perfect 
 rights." * * * " Whatever strikes at these rights 
 is an injury and a just cause of war." "If a nation takes 
 up arms when she has received no injury, nor is threatened 
 with any, she undertakes an unjust war." Vattel's Law of 
 :N"ations, Book III, page 302. 
 
 It is clear from the above authority that the conduct of a 
 nation must inflict ^'■injury'' upon the ^'■rights'' of another 
 to constitute that conduct unlawful, as being just cause of 
 war. The two essential elements in that which constitutes 
 just cause of war, therefore, are "rights," and "injury" in- 
 flicted on those " rights." But it is very clear there can 
 be no possible injury to rights where no rights exist. 
 Such is precisely the case here. It is conceded that every 
 nation has the " right" to trade with every other nation de- 
 
25 
 
 siring such trade, in time of peace, and equally so in every- 
 thing not contraband of war, in time of war, except at and 
 through blockaded ports, cohere the blockade has been imposed for 
 a laioful object. The exception here stated no lawyer or 
 sound thinker will for a moment doubt. But the exception 
 COVERS THE WHOLE QUESTION ; for the blockadc being lawful 
 in its objects, intervenes and destroys the "rights " to trade 
 through those ports which neutrals would otherwise enjoy. 
 Those rights no longer exist under the law of nations ; and 
 therefore, having no legal existence, could not be the sub- 
 ject or injury. The supposed case of Spain is our actual 
 case. Our blockade is lawfully imposed, and so recognized 
 by all foreign Powers. It has in its legal operation annulled 
 and destroyed all foreign rights of commerce there. Such 
 rights no longer exist, and, not existing, cannot be injured 
 by us, either through trade or otherwise. Trade, therefore, 
 is beyond all question lawful to us, provided only we do not 
 conduct it through the blockaded ports, and this our geo- 
 graphical relations enable us to avoid. 
 
 So far the discussion has proceeded on the hypothesis, 
 assumed for the sake of the argument, that the blockaded 
 ports are foreign ports — ports belonging to an independent 
 nation, with which we happen to be carrying on war. But 
 the fact is that these are our own ports. In legal contem- 
 plation, the acts of the various assemblies and conventions, 
 declaring the separation of the insurrectionary States from 
 the nation, were mere nullities, and could have no such legal 
 operation as was intended by them. These acts, and others 
 which accompanied or followed them, and the taking up of 
 arms by the people, imparted to those States the character 
 of belligerent and revolted States, but did not sever them 
 from the nation. 
 
 On these facts arise two views of the question : the one 
 touching our rights respecting trade with foreign nations at 
 those ports which are now blockaded, as those rights would 
 exist if the country were in profound peace, and the other, 
 touching our right to regulate, permit, or prohibit all for- 
 
26 
 
 eli^n trade at the ports of States belonging to the nation, but 
 ill actual revolt agaiust her authorit3^ 
 
 The llrst of these views is this, that in time of peace, and 
 much more in time of war, every nation has the undoubted 
 right to disallow any and all commerce between herself and 
 foreign nations, if in her own judgment she deems it to her ' 
 advantage and safety. Japan exercised this right for centu- 
 ries, and unquestioned by any nation. Vattel lays down 
 the doctrine thus : " Since, then, a nation cannot have a nat- 
 ural right to sell her merchandises to another that is unwil- 
 ling to purchase them, since she has only an imperfect right 
 to buy what she wants of others, it belongs to these last to 
 judge whether it be proper for them to sell or not ; and 
 finally, since commerce consists in mutually buying and sell- 
 ing all sorts of commodities, it is evident that it depends on 
 the will of any nation to carry on commerce with another, 
 or to let it alone. If she be willing to allow this to one, it 
 depends on the nation to permit it under such conditions as 
 she shall think proper." (Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 39.) 
 A nation, then, may decline all trade, or if she choose to 
 permit some, slie may "permit it under sucu conditions as 
 SHE SHALL THINK PROPER. '\ That is precisely what Japan is 
 doing to-day. It must be clear, therefore, from the above 
 authority, that the United States, did her interests and safety 
 dictate to her such a course, and were she in a state of pro- 
 found peace, would have the undoubted right, as between 
 herself and foreign nations, to prohibit all foreign commerce 
 at and through any of her ports, which she might designate, 
 and open to trade such others as she might desire — and this 
 without giving any offence or just cause of war to foreign 
 nations. ISTot only so, but when she has laid a prohibition 
 upon such trade, at any particular port or ports, "any viola- 
 tion OF IT IN (iENERAL SUBJECTS THE SHIP AND GOODS TO 
 
 SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION, as in casc of smuggling, whether 
 by exporting or importing proliibited goods." (Sec Vattel, 
 p. 38 and note 37, and the authorities there cited.) 
 
 Since, therefore, as clearly appears from the above author- 
 
27 
 
 ities, even tliongh there were no war, we would have the 
 lawful right to close those very ports against all foreign trade, 
 whether impelled by motives of interest or of safety, it follows 
 that the blockade is the mere assertion of, and the instru- 
 ment for, the enforcement of a perfect right which we pos- 
 sessed before — a right which we might lawfully assert against 
 those violating it, with or without a blockade. Now, the 
 important legal consequence deduced from all this is, that 
 our blockade does not depend for its lawful character upon 
 the object and purpose of its imposition, or upon the fact of 
 war — but on the right belonging to every nation, whether in 
 time of war or peace, to determine the conditions under 
 which and the ports at which other nations may trade with 
 her. And, hence, for us to carry on trade, whether in peace 
 or war, with the people of the States in which the blockaded 
 ports are located, would constitute no violation of our block- 
 ade — nay, more, that a trade by us, through those very ports, 
 with the people of those States, would be lawful, and consti- 
 tute no violation of our blockade. 
 
 The other of the two views above adverted to, is this, that 
 under the law of nations, all commercial intercourse what- 
 ever, by foreign nations, with a revolted State, before its 
 separate independence has been acknowledged, is illegal. Vat- 
 tel states the doctrine, rather obscurely it is true, for so per- 
 spicuous a writer, in these words : "And since the perfec- 
 tion of a nation consists in her aptitude to attain the end of 
 civil society and the perfection of her condition, in not 
 wanting any of the things necessary to that end, no nation 
 ought to hinder another from attaining the end of civil 
 society or to render her incapable of attaining it. The gen- 
 eral principle forbids nations to practice any evil manoeuvres, 
 tending to create disturbance in another State, to foment 
 discord, to corrupt its citizens, to alienate its allies, to raise 
 enemies against it, to tarnish its glory, and to deprive it of 
 its natural advantages." (Vattel's Law of jSTations, p. 142.) 
 The doctrine is much more clearly and emphatically enun- 
 ciated by Mr. Chitty, who is of equally great authority as 
 Vattel himself, in his note to the above, in which he says : 
 
28 
 
 "An instance of this rule is, the illegality of any commer- 
 cial intercourse with a revolted colony before its separate 
 independence has been acknowledged." See this note and 
 the authorities there cited. Commercial intercourse with 
 revolted States, therefore, being illegal, the attempt at it 
 would draw upon the ships and goods the penalty of illegal 
 acts, viz : seizure and confiscation. In this view of the case, 
 again, the blockade becomes the instrument of vindicat- 
 ing the law of nations in our belialf, and of supporting our 
 right to prevent such commercial intercourse, and is not 
 itself the foundation of that right. And hence, again, it 
 follows that we may lawfully trade with the people of the 
 revolted States, while we ourselves, by means of the block- 
 ade, enforce the law of nations which prohibits foreign 
 trade with thern. 
 
 Thus it appears, in view of the fact that the blockaded 
 ports are our own ports, not only that the proposed trade, 
 which docs not involve any access by our people for com- 
 mercial purposes to those ports, is lawful, and therefore does 
 not reflect any unlawful character on our blockade, but that 
 we have the right, under the law of nations, to monopolize 
 that trade and to carry it on through those very ports, while 
 at the same time, by our blockade, we enforce the non- 
 intercourse of other nations with the revolted States in 
 which those ports are situate. And such being our mani- 
 fest right, its exercise could not give lawful offence to neu- 
 trals, would not constitute just cause of war, would not be 
 unlawful, would not end the blockade. 
 
 IV. This brings us to the fourth and last point made by 
 the distinguished Senator, viz : that the trade would practi- 
 cally defeat the confiscation act. 
 
 The reply to this position is, that if more important con- 
 sequences, if far greater advantages result to the United 
 States from the operation of the trade policy of the Gov- 
 ernment, under the act of July 2, 1864, than from such par- 
 tial execution of the confiscation act as is alone practicable, 
 we should not hesitate to uphold that policy and give to it 
 the fullest possible operation. 
 
29 
 
 It seems indeed to be a law of nature that all great ad- 
 vantages must be attended by certain disadvantages. This 
 law impresses itself everj^where upon human enterprises. 
 We trace it in mechanics, where splendid results are attained 
 only with the outlay of immense power in friction. We 
 behold it in commerce, where the rewards of successful ad- 
 venture, which come back to enrich the merchant and ren- 
 der opulent the State, are possible only by the vast outlay 
 of means and through eminent risks. The statesman who 
 does not recognize this law, in determining what line of 
 policy he shall support, needs yet to learn some of the first 
 principles which underlie his calling. 
 
 Now the confiscation act, so far as it takes eftect on the 
 property afl:ected by the proposed trade, is manifestly capa- 
 ble of only a very partial practical execution. When it 
 shall have been seen by the Southern people, that the settled 
 policy of our Government will be to confiscate their pro- 
 ducts as our armies subdue the country, having no hope left 
 them, exasperated by the idea of being stripped of every- 
 thing, they will commit to the flames all these products as 
 far as possible for them to do it. 
 
 The gentleman sees scattered through the Soutli " four 
 million bales," worth "eight hundred million dollai's." 
 Through confiscation, he would reach forth the right hand 
 of the Government to grasp this cotton and seize this splen- 
 did prize ; but when he wakes from his dream he will find 
 that ashes alone are in the hand of seizure — his eight 
 hundred millions dollars have melted into smoke and van- 
 ished away. To afford to those people, then, no escape from 
 confiscation and from utter ruin and want, is itself the most 
 complete and effectual method of defeating the act and all 
 its revenue objects. But the trade policy of the Govern- 
 ment steps in, and discovers to those people a means of es- 
 cape from this all-destroying act. They can sell their cot- 
 ton to the Government itself The cotton, instead of being 
 turned into ashes, is turned over to us to augment the reve- 
 nues, to enricb our people, to impress our finance, and, in a 
 word, to give to us all those splendid results wdiich, as has 
 
30 
 
 been demonstrated in another place, must flow to ns from 
 the proposed trade. 
 
 But what will be the effect of such relief from confisca- 
 cation upon the morale of the rebellion ? Confiscation 
 tboroughlj enforced reduces the entire population to abject 
 pcnurj' and want, to such wretchedness as no human strength 
 can bear, and so completely shuts out liope for the future 
 that every man would consider death for himself and his 
 familj' a boon most devoutly to be desired, in contrast with 
 such wretchedness. Who does not see that, with this condi- 
 tion of surrender before them, the people would forget every 
 other thought but the thought of resistance? and Avho does 
 not also see that resistance, thus begotten of the complete 
 despair of a whole people, must needs be unto death, and 
 draw to itself a vigor and endurance, a multiplying of its 
 normal power, such as at the least to protract the struggle 
 for years ? In this event the cost to the nation of thus pro- 
 ti'acting the war would be many times greater than the 
 value, in cash to-day, of the distinguislied gentlemairs "four 
 millions bales." 
 
 On the other hand, give the people to feel secure in their 
 property ; to be assured that as our armies advance and 
 their country falls within (mr lines, that they can sell their 
 products to us; that tliej^ will not be stripped, ruined, utterly 
 destroyed by us, but protected in their rights of propert}?- 
 and afforded a market, and the moral effects upon them 
 will be quite the opposite to those above delineated. Dis- 
 armed of their hatred by what appears to theiu a just course 
 on our part, their interests being now involved in our suc- 
 cess — our early occupation of their country being now their 
 salvation instead of their ruin — they hail with joy our 
 approach. Public sentiment drifts against the Confederate 
 rulers, every embarrassment is thrown in their way, and 
 fiiudly the Confederate arm is paralyzed, and trade has led 
 the triumph of armies. 
 
 Since })enning the above paragraphs, 1 have read in the 
 Baltimore JJoih/ Gazette of to-day, (Jan. 25,) an extract 
 from the Richmond i)/6;2^rtfcA of Jan. 10, which contains a par- 
 
31 
 
 agrapli remarkabl}' illustrative of the view above expressed, 
 that the cutting oft' of all hope from the Southern people, 
 by the rigorous enforcement of the confiscation act, tends to 
 arouse the entire population to the most determined and 
 protracted resistance. The confiscation of all the cotton 
 found in Savannah doubtless gave rise to the suggestions it 
 contains. The paragraph is this : " Our only hope for anj-- 
 thing is in the success of our struggle. Tliose who are sac- 
 rificing Confederate securities for any other forms of prop- 
 erty, with any idea of thus avoiding the hazards of the 
 contest, are exhibiting an ignorance and a folh^ that sur- 
 passes even their cowardice. We must fight the battle 
 through and must win it, or all is lost. It would be wise in 
 us to give a fourth or a half, na^^, the whole, in taxation or 
 gifts, rather than be conquered, for in that case we would 
 lose all, and our liberties besides." What a tremendous 
 argument is here furnished the leaders of rebellion to wield 
 against us, in rousing to the last degree of desperation the 
 entire population of the South, and bringing tliem to glor^- 
 in sacrificing everything, both property and life, in their 
 unholy cause ! 
 
 The conduct of the great Themistocles, after the battle of 
 Salamis, presents us a noble example, whose lesson we should 
 not fail to heed. He had achieved a complete and splendid 
 triumph over the Persian fieet, destroying the greater part 
 and putting the rest to flight. The Persian monarch fled in 
 dismay from Greece, carrying the bulk of his army with 
 him. The Greeks insisted upon seizing tlie only avenue 
 left for the escape of the remnant which had been left 
 behind, and which, though dispirited and panic-stricken, was 
 numerous, with a view to cutting ofl' its retreat, and to its 
 total destruction. But Themistocles refused to do it, insist- 
 ing that the true policy was to leave open a channel of 
 escape, lest, by cutting ofl" that possibility, the Persians, con- 
 centrated, reorganized, and nerved with the motive of 
 despair, should become tenfold more vigorous than they 
 were before, and the tide of success thereby turned in their 
 favor. His wise counsels prevailed ; the Persian army 
 
 ^ 
 
32 
 
 escaped, and the tide of war which threatened to inundate 
 and overwhelm his country was rolled back upon the aggres- 
 sor. 
 
 There is another view of the case which our Government 
 should not fail to consider, viz : that, under the law of na- 
 tions, a war which in its beginning is nnjust and unwar- 
 rantable, ma}', by the extreme objects and purposes of the 
 opposing belligerents, become just and command the sym- 
 pathies and assistance of the world. We have the undoubted 
 right to wage this Avar with whatever vigor and energy we 
 possess, and it is our highest duty to do so, to the entire and 
 complete suppression of the rebellion, and the maintenance 
 of the national integrity. But when we push our claims 
 beyond that, when we are not content to accomplish this 
 legitimate purpose, but insist upon the ruin and destruction 
 of the whole of the belligerent people, by stripping them of 
 everything they possess after they shall have surrendered 
 to us, and casting them adrift, penny less and beggars, with- 
 out a ray of hope to sustain them, the war on their part 
 changes from its original, unholy, and unjust character, to 
 a war for self-preservation, which the law of nations recog- 
 nizes as just, and which could not fail sooner or later to 
 obtain the intervention of foreign powers. Vattel states the 
 doctrine thus: ^^ Jushan est bellum, quibus necessarimn; et 
 pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur sjyes," and cites 
 the case of the Samnites, who, " instigated by the ambition 
 of their chiefs, had ravaged the lands of the allies of Rome. 
 When they became sensible of their misconduct, they 
 oftered full reparation for the damages, with every reasona- 
 ble satisfaction ; but all their submissions could not ap- 
 pease the Romans; whereupon Caius Pontius, general of the 
 Samnites, said to his men, ' Since the Romans are abso- 
 lutely determined on war, necessity justifies it on our side ; 
 
 AN APPEAL TO ARMS BECOMES LAWFUL ON THE PART OF THOSE 
 WHO ARE DEPRIVED OF EVERY OTHER RESOURCE.' " (Vattel's 
 
 Law of Nations, p. 305.) 
 
 But why should any statesman or patriot insist npon or 
 desire the rigorous enforcement of the act of confiscation, 
 
33 
 
 either pending tlie war or after the South shall have yielded? 
 That distinguished leader of our armies, Major General W. 
 T. Sherman, does not desire it, as fully appears by his or- 
 ders and letters. The President of the (Jnited States, hold- 
 ing the unbounded confidence of the nation, does not desire 
 it, as evidenced by his proclamation of amnesty and pardon. 
 It is opposed by that moderation which becomes a wise and 
 magnanimous people, and no less by the maxims of national 
 law. Says Vattel : " Sound policy and humanity are in 
 perfect accord. What fidelity, what assistance, can you ex- 
 pect from an oppressed people ? Do you wish that your 
 conquest may prove a real addition to your strength, and be 
 well affected to you ? — treat it as a father, as a true sover- 
 eign." He then adds that he is charmed with the answer 
 of the ambassador from Privernum, who, in the Koman 
 Senate, being asked " If we show you clemency, what de- 
 pendence can Ave have on the peace you are come to sue 
 for?" answered, "If you granted it on reasonable conditions 
 it will be safe and permanent, otherwise it will not last long;" 
 and, says Vattel, "Some took offence at the boldness of his 
 speech ; but the more sensible part of the Senate approved 
 of the Privernian's answer. * * * ' Can it be im- 
 agined, (said those wise Senators,) that any nation, or even 
 any individual, will longer continue in an irksome and 
 disagreeable condition, than while compelled to submit to 
 it? If those to whom you give peace receive it voluntarily, 
 it may be relied on. What fidelity can you hope from those 
 you wish to reduce to slavery ?' ' The most secure domin- 
 ion,' said Camillus, 'is that which is acceptable to those 
 over whom it is exercised.'" Vattel's Law of Nations, pp. 
 389 and 390. This learned writer adds : " Such are the 
 rights which the law of nature gives the conqueror and the 
 duties which it imposes on him." * * * " lu general, he 
 ought to consult the true interest of his own State, and by 
 sound policy to reconcile them as far as possible with those 
 of the conquered country." 
 
 Here let it be observed that the same rule applies to a civil 
 as to a foreign war. Savs Vattel : " Whenever, therefore, a 
 3 
 
34 • 
 
 numerous body of men think they liave a right to resist the 
 sovereign, and feel themselves in a condition to appeal to 
 the sword, the war ought to be carried on by the contending 
 parties in the same manner as by two diiFerent nations ; 
 and they ought to leave open the same means for prevent- 
 ing its being carried to outrageous extremities, and for the 
 restoration of peace." " When the sovereign has subdued 
 the opposite part}', and reduced them to submit and sue for 
 peace, he may except from the amnesty the authors of the 
 DISTURBANCE," whicli implies necessarily that all others 
 ARE ENTITLED TO AMNESTY. (Vattcl's Law of ISTations, p. 
 425-6.) Finally, on this point it ma}^ well be asked whether 
 it is becoming for us to follow the example of the Duke of 
 Alva, of evil fame, in the extreme severity practiced by him 
 towards the rebellious Netherlands, and to such extent as to 
 leave them no hope but in victory, which they accordingly 
 won, or that noble example of Henry the Great of France, 
 in the hour of his triumph over his rebellious subjects, from 
 whom he had suffered outrage and indignity — "Yet," says 
 Vattel, " his victories were ever accompanied by a uniform 
 clemency; and that excellent prince at lengtli obtained the 
 success he deserved : he gained a nation of faithful sub- 
 jects ; WHEREAS THE DUKE OF AlVA CAUSED HIS MASTER TO 
 
 LOSE THE United Provinces." Vattel's Law of Nations, 
 p. 422. 
 
 To my mind it is clear as the sunlight, that we now hold in 
 our hands the power to protract this war, drawing after it 
 the most unhappy and disastrous results both to ourselves 
 and to the eneni}', or equally to bring it to a speedy and 
 happy close. The one or the other will happen, as we shall 
 observe the one or the other of two lines of policy open be- 
 fore us. If we press them with harsh and extreme meas- 
 ures — measures which reduce them to utter penury and 
 want — measures which destroy the very germs of hope, we 
 may rest assured, unless human nature belies herself and 
 history be false, that we shall thereby add greater vigor to 
 the rebellion than it has ever yet attained, and that thous- 
 ands of millions of treasure and rivers of blood must be ex- 
 
35 
 
 pended in subduing it, and tliat, after it is subdued, large 
 armies must be held in reserve to watch and keep down its 
 new outbursts. But if, on the other hand, we give opera- 
 tion to the trade policy of the Government, with all those 
 attending and happy results which have been above demon- 
 strated; if, at the moment our armies are winning victories 
 in the field, our policy shall conquer the acquiescence of the 
 people, draw them to us, raake them interested in our early 
 success ; then the war comes speedily to an end, to be fol- 
 lowed by a solid and continuing peace, in which the people 
 of the South much more perfectly, and on a much higher 
 plane, because on the piane of freedom, will rapidly coalesce 
 with us again, and bring back to the great Union an empire 
 of States, thenceforward to be cemented with us in national 
 unity, forming the one grand Republic whose destiny shall 
 be upward and onward forever. 
 
 Having demonstrated, as it is believed, that a properly 
 regulated trade with the people of the revolted States, by us, 
 is not opposed to the laws of war; that it does not defeat the 
 objects of the blockade; that it does not violate or end it; 
 that it reinforces the war ; that it puts two hundred and 
 seventy millions of dollars in the national treasury ; that it 
 sustains our mills and enriches our people; that it creates 
 an enormous balance of trade in our favor, and could not 
 fail so powerfully to impress our finances as to lift our funds 
 to par with gold ; that it demoralizes the rebellion and brings 
 it to a speedy and hap[)y termination — having demonstra- 
 ted these points, it may well be inquired whether it were not 
 wiser to repeal all that part of the act of July 2, 1864, which 
 restrains this trade, and so to amend the act as to facilitate 
 the trade policy of the Government, rather than by repeal- 
 ing the 8th section of the act to destroy the trade altogether, 
 and thus lose those splendid results which, it has been seen, 
 must follow its successful prosecution.