^.^ \}iO\tLjy%\^t^ XVUfAVO^ yf., 1 oJp^t^ ^..e.^^ Wtubfe^ c>i^. ^\,,j^ Glass J^Vll Book \j^ f |3 — Copyright }^^ -vN COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT A COKKECT HISTORY OF , and Fitz Joliii Porter AT THE Second Battle of Bull Run AUGUST 20, 1862. / By 1. WORTHINGTON, Late Coloxel 46th Ohio Volunteers. COPYRIGHT SECURED, '^'^ Of Cc- -~^ i"b30 ^■»- WASIIINGTOX, D. C. : Thomas McGill & Co.. Law Printers, 1107 E Street Northwest. 1880. 1 s.-^M' in PREFACE. Report of Gcncrah Schojield caul Terry and Colonel Getty. From the report of the board of officers — General Scho- field, General Terr}', and Colonel Getty — convened to ex- amine and report on the evidence on which General Porter was cashiered, it appears, (page 3,) in their own words, that " While the Army of the Potomac was withdrawing from its position on the James River in August, 1862, the Army of Virginia under General Pope was ordered to hold the line of the Rappahannock, and to stand on the defensive until all the forces coukl be united behind that river. " General Pope was given to understand that when this concentration was effected Major-General Hal leek, the commander-in-chief, was to take the field in command of the combined armie's. On the other hand, it appears that General McClellan, of the Army of the Potomac, was given to understand that he was to direct the operations of all the forces in Virginia as soon as they should be united. " It appears further, that on the 25th of August Pope was SECRETLY informed that an active or offensive cam- paign was immediately to be commenced without any union of the forces, and under some other commander than Halleck or McClellan." Which commander turned out to be himself, or really McDowell, by whom the orders, and evidence, and opera- tions plainly prove that they were misdirected and bedev- illed for the next five days — 26th to 30th August. Just as at and previous to Shiloh, every order and opera- tion and neglect before and during the battles of the 29th and 30th were directly calculated for the defeat of the united armies of about fifty thousand men, which defeat would have been accomplished but for the disobedience of a corps commander, never pressed for his evidence, which will prove that by such disobedience on the Union right his own corps and the army were rescued from capture or dispersion. The direct evidence of this diabolical intrigue concocted between Halleck, McDowell, and the '^'Aulic counciV in Washington is not given, but, if not destroyed, doubtless exists, if any other evidence is wanting than the orders of General Pope, suggested or dictated by McDowell, from the 26th to the 30th August, 1862. Avoiding the use of all this conclusive evidence as not within the rule of their •commission, the board plainly state that " they have taken due care to avoid inquiry into the conduct of the officers ■of the Army of Virginia, and take that view of the subject which in the least possible degree involves any question of the acts, motives, or responsibility of these (entirely respon- sible) officers." This the writer hiiving found to be literally the fact— a fact depriving the evidence of at least nine-tenths of its force as applied to General Porter's case and the truth of history — and the case being so nearly parallel to his own case, and to the atrocities of Shiloh, the underlying and suppressed facts of the cases directly corroborating each other, he has deemed it an individual right and a public duty to introduce this episode into the Shiloh history. The conduct of Halleck, Grant, and Sherman at Shiloh is so closely allied to that of Halleck, Pope, and McDowell at Manassas, that the same rule of the logicians and natur- alists must apply to both — that in such cases the true solution of any doubt is that lohich reconciles all the plaint}/ established facts. In both cases such facts by the score are only to be rec- onciled by an intent to defeat the Union armies; proving that Halleck, having failed to obtain the recognition of the Confederacy by the defeat of the Union armies at Shiloh, was transferred to Washington to accomplish the same purpose through the instrumentality of Pope and 6 to the relations of John Pope and Fitz John Porter ckiring- the whole afternoon of August 24, 1862, as will appear further on. General Porter was found guilty of disobedience that day to a joint order directed to him and McDowell, — an order it was impossible for Porter, the junior officer, to disobey, but which was in spirit disobeyed by McDowell, his senior in command, as far as possible. Here is the joint order: [No. 2G.] Headquarters Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 1862. You will please move forward witli your joint coiiimands towards- Gainesville. I sent General Portei- written orders to tiiat effect an liour and a lialf ao;o. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton tnrnpilie, and must now be not far from Gainesville. r desire tl)at, as soon as communication is establisiiod between this force and yoin- own, the whole command siiall iialt. It may be neces- sary to fall back beliind Bull's Kiui at Ceutrevillt^ to-niglit. I pre- sume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way witli the movements of McDowell's troops, except wliat I sent by his aide- de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here shoidd fall on the enemy's (lank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I liave not been able to find out wjiere General McDowell was until a late hour tiiis morn- ing. General McDowell will talve immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the otiier divisions of Ills corps as soon as possible. If any consid(M-able advantages are to be gained l)y departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out." One tiling must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which tliey can reaeh Bull Run to-niglit or by morning. Tlie indications are that the whole force of tlie enemy is moving in tliis direction at a pace that will bi-ing tiiem liere by to-morrow night or next day. My own head- quarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's Corps, or at this place. John Pope, Major-General Connnanding. This order being discretionary, it was impossible to dis- obey except by advancing towards the enemy, in not at- tacking whom, with no order to attack, originated a ground- less charge of disobedience. That is, Porter was ordered to advance no further than essential to connccl with troops on his right, and was charged with disobedience for not advancing when the order was fulfilled, as follows: The joint order handed McDowell by or before 10 a. m.. SECOND HULL-RUN BATTLE GKOUND G. — Gainesville. L. L.— Longstreet. J. J.— Jackson. U— Reynolds. August 29, 18r,2, Q McDowell, li> a. m. Pope. [J specifies that so soon as, in advancing on the converging routes, the pike and the raih'oad connection occurs, the whole command should halt. How the advance was to be made is not specified, but, being near the enemy, it was of course understood that they were to advance in line or abreast, by flanks of regiments or companies, so as to admit of being instantly thrown into line of battle. When the order was received McDowell came into command of about 17,000 men, not counting Ricketts', whose men were purposely worn-out by hunger and perpetually useless marching day and night. King's division was near the Sudly road, 8,000 strong, and Porter's column extended two miles towards Gainesville, 9,000 strong. These 17,000 men, with artillery and cavalry, would about have tilled the four miles or less along the Sudly road to the pike. Eeynolds, of McDowell's corps, would have extended the line a mile or more north of the pike, to a point about opposite Jackson's left, and the troops of Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno would have constituted a line of equal extent in their front or rear. The first condition was, therefore, fulfilled. The order contemplates anything but a battle, and posted as above stated, the troops would have been near their sup- plies and secure against attack till suificiently rested to meet it ; while the divisions of Ricketts at hand. Bank? 8,000 men at Bristoe, and Couch not far ofi', with Sumner and Franklin waiting transportation at Alexandria, and Cox's just up, and some 20,000 men constituting the imme- diate defenses of Washington, in all about 130,000 men, would have left little or no chance of Lee's 50,000 jaded men getting back to Riclnnond, had the object been any- thing else than the defeat and capture of Pope's army foi ulterior and sinister purposes, some time to be developed McDowell's Operations and the 4:30 p. m. Order, August 29, 1862. But to return to McDowell, who, when he came up with Porter in presence of the enemy at Dawkins' run, ex- claimed, in accordance with the joint order, " Porter, you are too far out," and that that was no place toUght ahattle, in apprehension douhtless that if Porter attacked, even with J 7,000 men, at noon, there was a probability of gaining the ])attle he (McDowell) was striving so hard to lose. To insure which defeat, instead of deploying King's 8,000 men into line towards Reynolds, near the pike, which he testiiied could have been done out of reach and sight of the enemy, had there been one there, which he on oath denied; in- stead of deploying King's or Porter's troops on a line King had marched over the night before, he invoked defeat by losing four hours in taking King four to six miles round by the Sudh- road and reaching the pike about sunset, aftei' which he viciously pushed his troops forward, under pre- tense that the enemy was in retreat, knowing such was not the fact, and thus accomplisliing the slaughter and capture of several hundred men, without other result than weaken- ing the army for next day's battle. Meantime, without a possibility of making any effective use of King's troops,^ such as Porter was about doing at noon, he left him in the condition of the rifleman behind his tree, with near a mile of open ground before him and M'ith more than double his force in the woods beyond, the enemy having 2,500 cavalry and ample artillery in position, which Porter had not in hand or could not have used, and had he attempted an advance the destruction or dispersion of his cor{)s would have been inevitable, as the board report, by less than half his force, according to all martial proba- bilities. Now, if McDowell did then and there order Porter to sittack with 9,000 men, or double that miniber, he should, according to the evidence of Warren, &c., have then been, as he should be now, dropped from the Army Register as an •otiicer detrimental to the service, in accordance with a law of July 17, 1862, under which, by the by, it was recom- mended, on the suggestion of the Shermans, that the col- onel of the 46th Ohio, after his sentence was declared a nullity ISTovember 19, 1862, should be dropped from the rolls as an ofhcer of such loeU-known mcapacUy as to l>e im- pedimental to the welfare of the service, the recommenda- tion being consequent on holding his position .on the field •of Shiloh several hours after his regiment and the field had been deserted by his three immediate commanders — doubt- less on Falstaff's plea as to the constituents of valor. And had justice been, as injustice was, the rule in 1862, what could have been more just than General Pope's sub- jection to this law, had he really been, as he was not really, responsible for this most treacherous 4:30 p. m. order of August 29, 1862. This trap set for Porter, and suggested ■doubtless by McDowell himself And while it is in hand, let this order be crucibled as it would have been by General Schofield's board had they not, as they say, " taken due care to avoid all inquiry into the conduct of Pope, McDowell, and Halleck,''^ thus giving us more or less of a paraphrase of the play of Hamlet with Hamlet's part omitted. The order is as follows : [Xo. .39.] Headquarters in the Field, August 'l^d, 1SG2— 4.30^;. m. Mnjor-Genoviil Porter : Your line of niarcli briiig.s yoii in on tiie enemy's v\g\\t flank. 1 (lesii-c you to pnsii forward into action at once on tiie enemy's Hank, juid, if possible, on liis rear, keeping- yonr riglit in communication witii General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be siielled out as soon as you engagui tiieir tiaiik. Keep heavj' reserves and use join- batteries, keeping well closed to your right all tiie time. In case you are obliged to fall b:ick, do so to yonr right aiul rear, so as to keep you in close coninuuiication with tiie riglit wing. John Pope, Maior-General Commanding. 10 The most prominent feature of this most muddled, de- signing, and impracticable order, thrice repeated, is to keep in connection with Reynolds, some two miles on Porter's right. Should he have made an attack without implicit obedi- ence to the condition of first connecting with the force on his right, (made impossible by McDowell, if at all possi- ble,) he could have been held responsible for inevitably disastrous results. The dispersion or capture of his corps, followed by that of the army, as is proven, was intended b}' this order, which General Schotield intimates was ''part of a (jcneral plan,^'' which doubtless it was, lor that specific pur- pose. To have connected with Reynolds in the daj'-time over a route made practicable for artillery, would have required hours of work by thousands of men doubtless as destitute of tools as the army was of transportation, subsistence, and forage, though the machinations of the commander-in-chief and the ^' Aullc cowiciV^ in Washington meanwhile denounc- ing McClellan for such deficiency, as is now done. This bar to connection would have existed with no enemy in front and as Porter was situated. General Warren, of the engineers, has testified that it could not have been safely accomplished with less than 30,000 men, against 25,000 of Longstreet's corps. Suppose, however, the required connection made with Reynolds, half a mile (as he is placed) east of Groveton, on the pike. The left of Porter would then have been near the railroad, and with the right of the enemy no further south, and one or one and a half miles in front. To attack this flank, except certain that Reynolds could at the same time beat back Jackson, Porter must lengthen his line to make a flank, or even a front attack, as ordered, and break the connection. Suppose again, however, this connecting condition ful- flUed, there are two others still impossible. 11 One is, on a line of attack requiring not less than 12,000 men, to keep heavy reserves and the connection also, with 9,000 men. The other is to make use of his batteries in the advance over ground next to impassable by day and of course more so by night. Meantime, while making this attack, he must obey the Joint order, twice stated and not countermanded, to get back that night behind Bull Run for supplies. " For sup- plies'''' !! ! And here is another notable instance of the avoidance by the inquiry board into the conduct of the officers of the Army of Virginia, of which Ilallack was to have been the cheif, after the union with that of the Poto- mac, which armies, just as happened at Shiloh, were to bo defeated about the time of their junction — the blame at Shiloh having been prepared for Buell, and at Manassas forMcClellan. At Shiloh the defeat was well-nigh accomplished both days by keeping back reinforcements, while here the main engine of ruin was the withholding of transportation and suppUes; next, the exhaustion of the troops, and keeping 25,000 of them off' the iield, (Banks, Kicketts, Couch, &c.,) the supplies being largely accumulated at Manassas for destruction by the Confederates, of what they could not use after their long invasive march. Shiloh and Manassas are the Castor and Pollux of bat- tles lost by treachery, as Cannae and Thrasymenus in the days of Rome were the twin battles of Hannibal, the swarthy prince of all able commanders, won by strategy and tact. Could there be a plainer proof of foul play than the fat;t that while professing to the troops and the country to be operating on the defensive, this army of 50,000 worried and worn, sleepless, and half-starved Union volunteers, exhausted by useless marching two or more days and nights, should thus be unsuspectingly pushed forward into 12 inevitable and most l)loody battle, without proper stores sufficient for a single day ? Verily, yea verily, more than sufficient for that day was the evil thereof, if its architects continue to pass with im- 'pimiUj. Note 1. — As to the 4:30 p. m. order. One most important question never yet mooted is why, when writing the 4:30 order, and, ignorant at the date of the order where Poi'ter and McDowell were, of course supposing them together. Why was not this also a Joint order or an order to McDowell alone, as senior commander ? The writer has been unable to read all the evidence, but he finds no such query addressed to Pope on the court-martial, and, doubtless apprehending such ques- tions, he paid no attention to a summons to attend the board of inquiry. Everything plainly indicates that Mc- Dowell not only dictated this order but saw Pope just be- fore or when it was written. Every dictate of truth and right demands that Pope should be called to answer why McDowell's name was omitted in this 4:30 p. m. order, August 29, 1862, unless he knew McDowell on the march. Note 2.— On McDoivcirs position, 29th August, 4:26^;. ni. An illustrative ''Map No. 2, Battle-field of Manassas,'' showing positions and niorciuents of troops August 24, 1862, to accompang closing argument of counsel for the gorernmcnt. Positions laid doion bg him. Time of dag, 6 /). m. McDowell is located at 4 p. m., in first position , one-half mile east of Groveton, as seeming to have advanced by Compton's lane with King's division under Hatch. At 6 p. M. this division is located one-half mile west of Grove- ton in action, doubtless to represent the night attack or- dered by McDowell on pretense of pressing a retreat by which hundreds were wantonly captured, crippled, and killed. 13 It is plainly a McDowell glorification map, showing that McDowell was in the battle-field at 4 p. m., and therefore- miist have seen Pope before the 4:30 order was written,, and was in action with the division of King under Hatch half an hour before sunset. Pope has improved in this map on one made iov the "Aidic coimcil" in which Mc- Dowell, with Hatch, has the enemy in his front, near a mile west of Groveton, on the pike, with Schenck, Reynolds, and Sigel a mile in rear of his advanced troops. APPENDIX. The first part of General Pope's evidence on General Porter's trial shows that he reached the battle-field, just east of Groveton, Va., about noon, and told General Heintzolman, &c., that they were expected barely to hold their ground, as McDowell and Porter would soon attack Jackson's right flank, some four miles ott', towards Gaines- ville. 2. That he waited near Groveton for these two (2) oflS- cers till about 4J p. m., when, as neither appeared, he wrote the 4.30 order directing General Porter to attack Jackson's right flank, not knowing ivhere he was at the time, though expecting him both at Groveton and near Gaines- ville!!! The fair inference from the statement that neither Mc- Dowell nor Porter appeared at 4.30 p. m., was that they were together under the joint order of the morning, and that therefore the- order to attack should have been a joint order, and on this inference the above note, i^o. 1, was printed. Looking further at Pope's evidence, he states that Mc- Dowell reached Groveton at half-past 5 or G; then states. 14 the time about 5 ; and a map made up by him and Mc- Powell shows the last on the field near Groveton at 4 p. m. Now, firstly, from this evidence, (supposing the first part correct,) it may fairly be inferred that the 4.30 order should have been a joint order, and lastly, that it was suggested by McDowell as a trap for Porter; as it can now be proven, outside the map, that McDowell and Pope met before 4.30 p. M., August 29, 1862, near Groveton. As above stated, Pope tells Heintzelman, &c., from 12 to 4J p. m., that he was expecting McDowell and Porter to attack Jackson's right, well back or west, towards Gainesville, which he afterwards repeats, and then writes the 4.30 order, because neither appeared on the field east of Groveton ! ! What was such evidence worth ? Pope's evidence further proves (if such evidence proves anything) that when he wrote the 8 or 9 a. m. joint order (which he also states was written between 5 and 6 a. m.) it must have been understood between McDowell and Pope that the former was to march, ashe did march, with King's division, direct from Manassas to Groveton, leaving Porter with less than 10,000 men to march on Gainesville and at- tack Longstreet's 25,000 men, as Pope well knew, before noon, were up; while the right wing, Heintzelman, &c., were, of necessity, to remain skirmishing or inactive east of Groveton, and not to march at all, though stated in the order that they were marching at 9 a, m,, the great object plainly being to insure the junction of the Confederate "forces, and then by the defeat and dispersion or capture of Porter's corps to eftect that of the whole arm}', and the recognition of the Confederacy. Pope's entire evidence is a tangled mass of '^^non mi ri- cordos,^^ contradictions, and evasions, entirely justifying the charge that he and McDowell were made use of by Hal- 4eck, &c., for that purpose alone — the defeat of the Army of Virginia. Let justice first be done General Porter, and then, by all 15 means, let us have the court-martial rightly proposed by Senator Burnside, demanded, as it is, by every considera- tion of justice, truth, and right to the army, the govern- ment, and the people, T. W. CONCLUSION If there is any substantial evidence of the secret and contradictory intentions of the War Department, as set forth in the report of the inquiry board, there was no case for the government on Porter's trial; and without such secret intentions on the fiice of the joint order and the 4.30 order of August 29, 1862, there was no ground for a charge of disobedience against any officer in the Army of Virginia, but ample proof of criminality against the Union com- manders. T. W. To THE Officers and Soldiers of the Civil War. To the volunteers of the Civil War, and especially to West Point graduates, I would, as a graduate of 1827, ear- nestly submit that if it comes to be understood among the people that officers educated at the Military Academy may with impunity become the wiUing instruments of ambitious politicians, the days of the Academy are, and ought to be, numbered; and therefore — I request their signatures to a memorial I shall forward, either for the court-martial proposed by General Burnside in the Senate, or as a preliminary to an inquiry by Con- gress, with leave to the military committees to call for per- sons and papers in regard to the battles of Shiloh and the second Bull Run, to determine upon whom the responsi- bility should rest of these days of disaster and dishonor to the military character of the Eepublic. T. WORTHINGTON. NOTICE. The next of two additional parts of the history of the second Bull Run battle will, if published, contain a dissec- tion of the narrative part of the ''joint ordcv,^'' plainly prov- ing what is stated in tlie unsigned report of McDowell's board of inquiry, that he was plainly responsible for the junction of Lee's army, when Jackson's capture, but for his action on the 28th of August and the night following, would have been in e vital)! e. That General Lee was acting under an understanding with some Union authority when he allowed Jackson to keep so far ahead of Longstreet, is just as plain as that General Johnson at Shiloh would never have exposed his- right flank and rear by his plan of turning the Union left without assurance that this flank and his rear would not be, as they were not, disturbed by Grant. I would be deeply grateful to officers of the army and others who receive this paper for ten cents, more or less, in postage-stamps, or one dollar for the complete histor}' of Grant at Shiloh, with the corroborative episode of the second Bull Eun battle, more especially as by performing this last duty as a soldier of the civil war, I shall I'isk all chance of collecting my dues from the Government. T. WORTIIINGTON, Late Colonel 46tli Oliio Vols. Washington, D. C, Febniarv 15, 18S0. For Sale at Ja,nies An^lim S)- Co.'s Bookstore, IJf^Ji, F Street northwest. Price 1 cts. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 013 701499 3 # >y