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THE 
 
 PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 ITS ANTECEDENTS, 
 
 AS DEVELOPED HY TUE 
 
 REPORT OF MAJ/GEN. GEO. R McCLELLAN, 
 
 AXD OTHER 
 
 PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS, 
 
 BY 
 
 J. Ct. BARNARD, 
 
 LIEITTENANT-COLOSKL OF ENGINEER'S AND IlltIO AniKK-OENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS, AND 
 CUIEF ENC.INEF.B IN THE AttMV OK TIIK POTOMAC FROM ITS ORGANIZA- 
 TION TO THE CLOSE OF THE I'KNINSCLAB CAMPAIGN. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 D . VAX X O S T R A X D , 1 9 2 B R A D W A T. 
 
 18 6 4. 
 
fll-r 
 
 Entered accordiug to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by 
 
 D. VAN NOSTRAS D, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, tor 
 
 the Southern District of New York. 
 
 '05 
 
 8 T E U K O T Y P F, I> n Y 
 
 SMITH & McDOUOAL 
 82 & 84 Beekuian St, N. Y. 
 
 C. 8. 
 
 PRINTED 1)T 
 
 W E S T C O T T & 
 79 John Street 
 
 Co. 
 
 W ^'^L P 
 
 9'- # 
 
PREFATORY REMARKS. 
 
 The year of our Lord, 1863, opened upon tlie darkest 
 .Deriod in the history of the momentous struggle in which we 
 are yet engaged. The Army of the Potomac, which had 
 gone forth in April of the previous year, at a period when 
 victory had recently everywhere favored our banners and it 
 Bccmed left only to give one vigorous blow to quell forever 
 the rel)ellion, had been disastrously driven from Richmond, 
 and called back to Washington, to arrive barely in time to 
 save that city from the grasp of an enemy resuscitated in 
 strengtli, and, with renewed audacity, assuming everywhere 
 a vigorous oflensive action. In t]ie;WeSt the course of things 
 had but too faithfully followed the reverses of the East. The 
 renewed hope which followed the repulse of the rebel armies 
 from Maryland had been darkened by the long delays whicb 
 ensued, and the subsequent disastrous failure at Fredericks- 
 burg. 
 
 Military calamities, disheartening as they might be, would 
 have been of comparatively little moment, however, had 
 military calamities been all that darkened the aspects of the 
 time. The country was rich in men and means, and its re- 
 sources had, as yet, been lightly drawn upon. It had put 
 forth its strength, indeed, but not its whole strength. Men 
 did not feel dismayed because they doubted the ability of the 
 
4 PKEFATOET EEMAEKS. 
 
 nation to carry the struggle to a successful issue, but because, 
 for the time, the power of the nation was partially paralyzed. 
 Yet there never was a moment when the public safety, and 
 the safety of the common cause more urgently demanded the 
 exertion of all the nation's strength. Why, then, did men 
 doubt ? Where was the origin of this paralysis ? ' It was in 
 the charge, audaciously made, impudently persisted in, 
 that to the blunders and incapacity of the Administration, 
 all our disasters were due ; that, with such incapacity at the 
 head of afiairs, our resources, though they were poured fortli 
 like water, would, like water, too, be spilt on the ground. 
 Men will sacrifice much in great emergencies, but they never 
 will give their lives or their money merely that such treasures 
 may be ignorantly or wantonly wasted. 
 
 " Had McClellan but had his way, had he not been inter- 
 fered with, had not his army been reduced and taken away 
 from him, and his movements in a thousand ways ham|)ered 
 and balked, had he, in short, had the sole control of military 
 affairs, all would have been difierent. Kichmond would 
 have been ours, the rebellion would have been subdued, and, 
 instead of disaster and prolonged war, a triumphant peace 
 might have been our happier lot." To such charges against 
 the administration which had raised him to his position, and 
 which, through the President, had ever showed him un- 
 wearied kindness, and given him all the confidence it could 
 give, Gen. McClellan lent the full weight of his name and 
 reputation. Throwing himself into the arms of a party bit- 
 terly hostile to that administration, associated with men who 
 loaded the agents of the Government with reproach, and ' 
 among whom were some so insensible to the honor of the 
 country and the sacredness of the cause as to court foreign "* 
 mediation and to meditate a disgraceful and humiliating 
 peace, (1) to hiyn, and to the erroneous ideas disseminated z 
 
PEEFATORY KEMAEKS. 5 
 
 concerning his capacity, merits and agency, the paralysis of 
 doubt was due, as it was to him were justly ascribable the 
 disasters which brought our military affairs to so low an ebb. 
 
 The administration, thus denounced, was, for better or 
 worse, the constituted agency through which the war, if it 
 were to be carried on at all, 'ymist be conducted. That fact 
 could not be altered. The men who weakened the arm of 
 the nation's sole war-making power, just to that degree en- 
 dangered the nation's cause. Therefore the question of Gen. 
 McClellairs responsibility for our disasters ceased to be a 
 mere abstract question about which men might differ with- 
 out prejudice to the public interests ; it became a national 
 question, and one of vast import. 
 
 It was imder such circumstances that, in writing an official 
 report, at the request of Gen. McClellan himself, of the 
 engineering operations of the Army of the Potomac, I 
 deemed it my duty to state what I believed to be the sources 
 of failure of the campaign of the Peninsula. The opinions 
 therein written down were no afterthoughts. Six months 
 before I had formed them, and when I spoke at all, (which 1 
 did not do openly,) expressed them. I had formed them 
 painfully, reluctantly, at a period when political questions 
 had not become involved with this subject, and no such 
 causes c'xistcd to inlluence, in any manner, my judgment. 
 It was at a period when for Gen. McClellan I entertained the 
 warmest personal regard — a feeling which I distinctly and 
 sincerely expressed in -writing on leaving him in August, 
 1SG2. AVith no man have I ever, with a more absolute free- 
 dom from any other feeling than one of personal kindness, 
 been so long closely associated, and if, at any moment, there 
 seemed to me to exist some slight grounds for complaint, 
 they were never such as to be remembered, or to have any 
 abiding place in my breast. 
 
b PKEFATOKY KEMAEKS. 
 
 But there are cases in wMcli personal feelings must be 
 allowed little weight. The destinies of nations cannot be 
 trifled with, and in all that affects them, convictions of truth 
 must be uttered. The Report of the engineering operations 
 of the Army of the Pjotomac, and the statements of these 
 pages, are the utterances I am constrained to make. 
 
 The review which follows was first prepared as a magazine 
 article. It has not been thought necessary to alter the 
 phraseology, though another form of publication is adopted. 
 
 J. G. B. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Gex. McClellan had been called to the command of the 
 Army of the Potomac with an unanimity of feeling and 
 lavish bestowal of confidence, which stand almost alone in 
 our history. The army looking npon Gen. Scott as past the 
 age of further active service, and npon most of the officers 
 of rank as superannuated or otherwise incapable of meeting 
 such an emergency, hailed the advent of a new chief, whose 
 juvenile promise, whose thorough military education, and 
 whose already extended reputation, seemed to give assurance 
 of precisely the one thing needed — a capable leader. 
 
 Under such circumstances, neither the nation, nor the 
 administration, nor the army, were disposed to exercise — nor 
 did they exercise — undue pressure. Every indulgence was 
 extended to one upon whom so heavy a responsibility had 
 been laid, for the acknowledged difficulties of the situation, 
 and for his own inexperience and want of preparation. 
 
 Kow, had Gen. McClellan been a Kapoleon, with the 
 prestige of a hundred victories — or even a Scott — old in the 
 regard of the people — old in experience of war even upon a 
 comparatively limited scale, but rejuvenated in years — ^liad 
 he been either of these — he might with propriety, if he 
 thought the case demanded it, have drawn heavily upon the 
 indulgence so freely extended. Being neither, it was impor- 
 
O THE PENINSULAK CAMPAIGN 
 
 tant tliat he Bhoiild make tlie lightest possible draft ; that, at 
 the very earliest moment, he should do something to confirm, 
 continue and justify the nation's confidence. Of all Gen. 
 McClellan's faults and incapacities, nothing — not even his 
 irresolution and mismanagement in face of the enemy, nor 
 his inability ever, in any case, to act when the time came — 
 furnishes a clearer proof of the lack of those qualities which 
 make a great general or a great statesman, than his failure 
 to do this. 
 
 Let it be granted that it was not best to make any great 
 movement till the winter of 1861-'62 had wholly passed 
 away, (though there were the strongest political reasons 
 against such delay,) yet Gen. McClellan should have been 
 aware that, unless his prestige, through these long months, 
 should be supported by some deeds, he would find himself 
 virtually destitute of the power to carry out his own plans 
 when the moment proper for such a movement should arrive ; 
 and so it happened. But, after six long months of omission, 
 he added to his imprudence the positive folly of making an 
 extravagant and senseless draft upon that confidence of the 
 administration and the public, which in the beginning had 
 been so generously given him, but which he had so lightly 
 permitted to be, in a measure, lost. 
 
 Grant, again, that the lower Chesapeake loas the true line 
 of approach to Richmond, and the sole route by which to 
 attain results of such magnitude as Gen. McClellan pre- 
 dicted from its adoption, yet, it was nevertheless true that 
 this route was strongly disapproved by the President, and by 
 many whose judgment carried great influence, and that it 
 involved, in the minds of not a few, great danger to the 
 Capital. Yet, in the face of all this, Gen. McClellan, who 
 had never furnished any adequate evidence of his ability to 
 plan or execute a great campaign, persisted in carrying off 
 his army, at enormous expense, to a distant point, leaving 
 that enemy, to whom he attributes a force of no less than one 
 hundred and fifty thousand men, " well disciplined and under 
 able leaders," confronting Washington, with nothing but the 
 garrison of the place, and its very imperfect system of forti- 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 9 
 
 fication.-, to protect it. The line of forts on the Yirginia side 
 of the Potomac had been hastily thrown up, and was really, 
 at that time, considering its great extent, very incomplete and 
 weak ; on the Maryland side it was so imperfect as hardly to 
 deserve the name of a fortified line. 
 
 Gen. Barnard in his official report says, " "When the army 
 was to go by Annapolis, 1 felt confident that one-half would 
 1)0 no sooner embarked than the other would be ordered 
 back to Washington." Ko one could, we think, have spent 
 a week in AVashington, at this period, without being con- 
 vinced that, whether reasonably or not, such would have 
 been the result of a mere demonstration of the enemy 
 against the city. Congress was in session. Half its mem- 
 bers already hostile to, and without confidence in, Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan, looked upon his plan with distrust. In the event 
 supposed, the citizens would have been frightened, and the 
 President and Cabinet, alarmed and worried, could not have 
 refrained from interfering to prevent the army fmm being 
 withdrawn — more especially from being led away by one 
 who had yet to establish his claim to such unlimited confi- 
 dence in his military abilities. 
 
 Looking back to the middle of October, we find, by Gen. 
 McClellan's own statement, that, there were at that date 
 Ti),2S5 men under his command, disposable for an advance. 
 There were yet before us three months of the finest weather, 
 and the finest roads that were ever known in Virginia. It 
 was of the Jird importance that Gen. McClellan should 
 show himself possessed of a just claim to the nation's confi- 
 dence ; it was of higher importance that foreign nations should 
 not be allowed to see the rebellion swell, unchecked, until it 
 should reach a stage which would justify their interposition. 
 
 Bear in mind, too, that at this very date, when he ac- 
 knowledged himself to have a force, disposable for an advance, 
 of 75,000 men, there commenced a series of events in the 
 highest degree disreputable to the national cause — the blun- 
 der of Ball's Blufif and tJie hhckade of the Potomac — and 
 that for six weeks the enemy had flaunted his hateful banner 
 in the very sight of the Capitol. 
 
iO THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGlf 
 
 After rehearsing instructions given in I^ovember, as Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief, to various Commanding Generals, Gen, Mc- 
 Clellan remarks, (p. 42,) " The plan indicated in the above 
 letters comprehended in its scope the operations of all the 
 armies of the Union, the Army of the Potomac as well. It 
 was my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its vari- 
 ous, parts should be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, 
 and in cooperation along the whole line. If this plan was 
 wise — and events have failed to prove that it was not — then 
 it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have en- 
 abled the Army of the Potomac to perform its share in the 
 execution of the whole work." 
 
 "We cannot regard this as other than an afterthought / and 
 we think that the character of many other portions of the 
 report, and its laboriously apologetic spirit, render this con- 
 clusion not uncharitable. There never was that concert of 
 action, and never could be, between the forces in the differ- 
 ent sections of the extended theatre of war, which would 
 justify the Army of the Potomac in waiting a day for 
 movements elsewhere. Moreover, the unnecessary inaction 
 of the Army of the Potomac extends back, as we have 
 shown, to a period prior to Gen. McClellan's assuming the 
 functions of Commander-in-Chief 
 
 In his apology to the President and exposition of his pet 
 scheme of " changing his base" of operations to the lower 
 Chesapeake, he says : 
 
 "When I was placed in command of the armies of the 
 United States, I immediately turned my attention to the 
 whole field of operations, regarding the Army of the Potomac 
 as only one, while the most important, of the masses under 
 my command. 
 
 " I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence 
 of a general plan which had before existed, nor did I know 
 that utter disorganization and want of preparation pervaded 
 the western armies. 
 
 " I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, 
 in condition to move towards the fulfilment of my plans. I 
 acknowledge that I made a great mistake. 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 11 
 
 " I sent at once, Avitli the approval of tlie executive, oflicers 
 I considered competent, to command in Kentucky and Mis- 
 souri. Their instructions looked to prompt movements. I 
 soon found that the labor of creation and organization had to 
 he performed there ; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, 
 discipline, all -were wanting. These things required time to 
 })rucure them. 
 
 " The eenerals in command have done this work most 
 creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a 
 general advance could be made during the good weather of 
 1 )ecembcr ; I was mistaken." 
 
 Take this in connection with the paragraph of page 42, 
 just quoted, and we are bound to believe that no sooner did 
 lie reach the supreme command than he deliberately deferred 
 all action of the Army of the Potomac, not because it was 
 not recuhj to ad, but until " a general advance could be made 
 durinc: the crood weather of December." Without comment- 
 ing upon the censure cast upon his illustrious and venerable 
 predecessor, Gen. Scott, for the " total absence of a general 
 l)lan, ttc.," " the utter disorganization and want of prepara- 
 tion in the western annies, t^'c," we remark that if the 
 westera armies were unprepared it was mainly because of 
 his own insatial)le demands for everything the nation could 
 furnish, for all that he asked for was granted, as much as if 
 he had been abeady commander-in-chief; moreover that, 
 1 hough he kept the Army of the Potomac spell-bound, wait- 
 ing for ''disorganized" and "unprepared" armies to move, 
 those very armies actually did move, took Fort Henry, Fort 
 Donelson, Columbus and Xashville, reached the very southern 
 borders of Tennessee, and fought the battle of Shiloh before 
 the Army of the Potomac had faii'ly inaugurated its cam- 
 })aign. Indeed, an admirer of Gen. McClellan's strategy of 
 that day entered into a long newspaper argument to show 
 why this great movement of the inght icinrj must take place 
 htfore the Army of the Potomac could l)e released from its 
 compulsory inactivity. 
 
 Gen. McClellan camiot assign the mud obstacle, (hitherto 
 po mucli insisted upon,) as an apology for inaction in a region 
 
12 THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN 
 
 selected hj liimself, and where, according to his own most 
 formal statements, now published with his report, he believes 
 that the roads are jpassable at all seasons of the year. Let us 
 therefore accept his apology — he was waiting for the "com- 
 bined " movements of other armies which actnaUy onoved — 
 effected great conquests and fought one desjperate pitched 
 hattle^ before the campaign of his own Army of the Potomac 
 was commenced ! 
 
 But even if mud and the weather had been a cause for 
 delaying the great movement in January, and February, and 
 March, 1802, it was no reason that nothing should be done. 
 The capture of ^Norfolk would have been a most important 
 step, preliminary and accessory to a campaign against Rich- 
 mond, Avith the James River, or, indeed, any part of the 
 " lower Chesapeake " as a base. The failure to take that 
 place during the winter virtually frustrated all Gen, McClel- 
 lan's plans in this direction. The capture of this most im- 
 portant point would, if it had had none of the other results 
 we have pointed out, have quieted the public mind, have 
 given Gen. McClellan another lease on the rapidly waning 
 public confidence, and have had an important bearing upon 
 our European relations. The fitting up of the Merrimac as 
 an iron clad ram was known to be going on at that period. 
 Serious forebodings of the consequences which might ensue 
 — forebodings afterwards too fully realized — \vere entertained 
 by the Navy Department, by whom the capture of the place 
 was urgently desired. Gen. McClellan alone seems to have 
 been insensible to its importance. (2.) 
 
 A recent publication of Lieut.-Col. Lecomte, contains 
 some matter of interest concerning this period of inaction, 
 from October to March. The writer, a Swiss officer, who 
 served as volunteer aid on Gen. McClellan's staff up to, and 
 during a portion of, the siege of Yorktowii, ha^ translated 
 into French the report of the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the "War, with notes and comments. These additions are 
 thoroughly in the McClellan interest, defending his late 
 chief against every charge, and lauding his generalship. 
 
 Col. Lecomte says the " secret service " of the army of the 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 13 
 
 Potomac was " particularly well " performed — that our in- 
 lunnatiuu of the force and position of the enemy was very 
 thorougli — in fact that it was the special business of the 
 Orleans Princes, (admirable youTig officers, doubtless, but 
 not the best fitted, as foreigners, for the secret service duty,) 
 and that on the 21st of February the " Count of Paris" pre- 
 sented Gen. McClellan with a statement of the enemy's 
 force as follows : — 
 
 Division Holmes, (rrom Fredericksburg to Dumfries,) . . . 12,000 
 
 Division Whiting, (from Dumfries to tho Occoquan,) .... 6,000 
 
 A Division ou tho Occoquan, 10,000 
 
 A Brigade about Manassas, 3,000 
 
 Division Smith, between Manassea and Union Mills, . . . 17,000 
 
 A Brigade of Cavalry at bridge over Bull Run, 3,000 
 
 A Division, (Longstrcct,) at Centrcville, 14,000 
 
 Brigade, (Hill,) at Lecsburg, 6,000 
 
 Total, 70,000 
 
 And tho " Divisiou Jackson " at Winchester, .... 12 to 18,000 
 
 Now Gen. McClellan states, in his Eeport, (p. 56, last par.,) 
 that " from the Report of the Chief of the Secret Service," 
 there were on the 8th of March at 
 
 Manasses, Ceutreville, Bull Run and Upper Occoquan, . . . 80,000 
 
 Brooks' Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, 18,000 
 
 Leesburg, 4,500 
 
 Total, 102,500 
 
 And in the Shenandoah Valley, 13,000 
 
 A discrepancy of from 27,000 to 33,000 in the aggregate, 
 and of 30,000 in the estimate of the rebel forces east of the 
 lUue Ridge, and confronting "Washington and the Potomac. 
 
 Col, Lecomte further states that, on visiting the rebel po- 
 sitions on the 11th of March, the Count of Paris had his 
 map in hand, and found the accuracy of his estimates con- 
 tinued in a remarkable manner.* Xow, the estimates so 
 
 * Those estimates attribute to the eneniy 70,000 naen, from Fredericksburg 
 to Leesburg — less than Gen. McClellan's "disposable force" of Oct. 15, 1861. 
 Yet Gen. McClellan, at that early date, expressed officially his behof, founded 
 
14: THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 remarkably confirmed assign to Centreville, Bull Eim and 
 the Occoquan an aggregate of 47,000 men, whereas the 
 report of the " Chief of the Secret Service," cited, assigns to 
 the same region, exclusive of the "Lower" Occoquan, an 
 aggregate of 80,000 men. The above statements and esti- 
 mates may be properly left to Col, Lecomte and the " Chief 
 of the Secret Service" to reconcile. They furnish evidence, 
 however, of the real value of the " secret service" estimates 
 as they are quoted in the " Report." Col. Lecomte's state- 
 ment of numbers does not differ very much from one laid 
 by Gen. McClellan before a council of w^ar on the 2d of 
 March. (24.) 
 
 It is next to certain that nothing like the numbers given 
 even by the lowest estimate were in front of us, from Fred- 
 ericksburg to Leesburg, at that time, and also that the evac- 
 uation commenced several weeks before the 8th of March. 
 Wm. Henry Ilurlbert, who certainly had most excellent op- 
 portunities of judging, and whose admiration of Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan would not cause Mm to err consciously on the unfa- 
 vorable side, says : — 
 
 " I have reason to believe that, when the history of the 
 present war shall come to be written fairly and in full, it will be 
 found that Gen. Johnston never intended to hold Manassas 
 and Centreville against any serious attack ; that his army at 
 these points had suifered greatly during the autumn and 
 winter of lSGl-'2 ; that from October to March he never 
 had an eifective force of more than 40,000 under his orders ; 
 that his preparations for an evacuation w^ere begun as early 
 as October, 1861 ; and that after that time he lay there sim- 
 ply in observation." 
 
 Lecomte's remarks on tlie fortifications of Washington 
 deserve special attention, considering the inspiration under 
 which he writes. It has always been supposed that these 
 fortifications, scarcely commenced when Gen. McClellan as- 
 sumed the command, but renewed with immense energy 
 
 on reports of "spies, prisoners, &c.," that "tbo enemy had a forco on the Poto- 
 mac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled, &c." 1 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 15 
 
 from that moment — carried on nndcr his own frequent in- 
 spection — were part of his gi'eat strategic phm ; that they 
 ■were to give security to Washington wliile he should move 
 the bulk of his army even to a place like the Peninsula, 
 where it could not possibly act directly in the defence of the 
 Capital. It has been supposed, too, that the works consti- 
 tuting the defences of Washington, thus sanctioned and 
 directed by Gen. McClellan, planned and executed by Gen. 
 Barnard and his subordinates, emanating principally from 
 one liead and executed by one wall, would form a system 
 having unity and consistency, and in which we might find 
 happy adaptations, and even high specimens of engineering 
 skill. Col. Lecomte's account gives, however, quite a differ- 
 ent view : — 
 
 '' The construction was carried on under a feverish excite- 
 ment ; the soil was tormented, without truce or respite, 
 throughout all the District of Columbia, and beyond." 
 
 "Every one ordered, in turn, a bit {lai hout) of fortifica- 
 tion, according to the needs of the moment, whicb fragment 
 soon made necessary others in its connection; and so it con- 
 tinued, wnthoiit having even yet ceased after more than two 
 years. The result was a network of forts for which no per- 
 son conld be really responsible." 
 
 Another note-worthy renuirk of Lecomte. His low opin- 
 ion of the fortifications of Washington does not permit him, 
 consistently with his admiration for Gen. McClellan, to sup- 
 pose that the latter liad any confidence in tliem, and he is 
 authority for the following design or idea on the part of his 
 hero : — 
 
 '* As to the place itself, (i. e., Washington,) to leave a por- 
 tion of tlie works of the right bank (i. e., forts) outside of 
 the real line of defence, and to ynine them and Now theni iip 
 under the enemy's feet. It was for this cause, doul)tless, 
 that the armaments of several forts had been neglected. 
 This design, one may readily comprehend, could not be 
 spoken of beforehand, nor exposed to indiscretions" !"" 
 
 • So far from tho "armament of several forts having been neglected," there 
 wa3 not a single fort in the line that had not been heavily armed. Tho ouljun- 
 
16 THE PEXmSULAE CASIPAIGN 
 
 The only eeal defence Washington had, then, was the 
 Army of the Potomac, and that, as we know, was to be car- 
 ried off to a region where by no possibility could it render 
 aid, should the enemy, paying no attention to the safety of 
 Kichmond, choose to turn upon the capital. (3) 
 
 The mov^ement by the lower Chesapeake having been de- 
 termined upon, it was necessary to move the troops by water, 
 and the President insisted upon the destruction of the ene- 
 my's batteries on the Potomac. Gen. McClellan admits the 
 incredible fact that, under his authority, " preparations had 
 been made for throwing Hooker's division across to carry 
 them by assault." The barges (canal boats) were collected 
 and fitted up, and the time of the expedition fixed. A 
 JBaWs Bluff affair, ten times intensified, would have been 
 the certain result. Yet the assault \ooiild have heeii made 
 but for "■ an adverse report from Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard." 
 (See p. 50.) He adds that " a close examination of the ene- 
 my's works and their approaches, made after they were evac- 
 uated, showed that the decision was a wise one." And yet 
 this project was deliberately gotten up as a preliminary to 
 the embarkation of the army ! 
 
 Just as the movement to the lower Chesapeake was about 
 to be executed, the a})pearance of the long-expected Merri- 
 mac threw the whole scheme again into uncertainty. Kow, 
 though the "power" of the Monitor may have been " satisfac- 
 torily demonstrated" by tlic combat which occurred, it never 
 was " satisfactorily demonstrated" that she could neutralize 
 the Merrimac. It was all conjecture. All that the Secre- 
 tary of the Kavy, or Mr, Fox — all that Commodore Golds- 
 borough — could aftirm, was that she should not escape from 
 Hampton Iloads. The filling of Hampton' Poads with 
 transports, under such circumstances, was attended with 
 great risk. The Prince de Joinville says : " These were the 
 circumstances in which I arrived at Fortress Monroe. Soon 
 the Roads were filled with vessels coming from Alexandria 
 or Annapolis, and filled, some with soldiers, some with 
 
 armed or slightly armed works were those at Upton's Mill, Avhich had special 
 objects, and which it was never intended to arm permanently. 
 
AXD ITS ANTECEDENTS. 17 
 
 horse?, cannon and munitions of all kinds. Sometimes I 
 counted several hundred vessels at the anchorage, and among 
 them twenty or twenty-five large steam transports waiting 
 for their turn to come up to the quay and land the fifteen or 
 twenty thousand men whom they brought. The reader may 
 judge how fearful -would have been the catastrophe had the 
 ^lerrimac suddenly appeared among this swarm of ships, 
 striking them one after another, and sending to the bottom 
 these human liivcs with all their inmates! The Federal 
 authorities, both naval and military, here underwent several 
 days of the keenest anxiety. Every time that a smoke was 
 seen a])ove the trees which concealed the Elizabeth Kiver, 
 men's hearts beat fast. But the Merrimac never came. She 
 allowed the landing to take place without opposition. 
 
 " ^Vhy did she do this ? 
 
 " She did not come because her position at ^Norfolk, as a 
 constant menace, secured without any risk two results of 
 great importance. In the first place, she kept paralyzed in 
 Hampton Roads the naval forces assembled to join the land 
 army in tlie attack upon Yorktown ; in the second place, 
 and tliis was tlie principal object, slie deprived the Federal 
 anny of all the advantages which the possession of the James 
 woidd have secured to it in a campaign of which Kichmond 
 was the base."' 
 
 Xothing, however, could divert Gen. McClellan from his 
 movement " by the lower Chesapeake" — neither considera- 
 tion for the President's convictions nor the dictates of ordi- 
 nary prudence ; but it is amusing that he should attribute 
 tlie " retirement of the enemy" to his ascertaining that " the 
 movement to the Peninsula wa.'^ intended.'''' Supposing the 
 enemy to have had anything like the forces attributed to 
 him, this theory supposes him to have been possessed with a 
 stupidity inconceivable. Had he been timid as Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan professes to believe, he would not have abandoned 
 his strong and fortified '' central position" until something 
 more tlian rumors of an intention to embark our army 
 should have reached him. He would have held his position 
 till the movement had become lyronounced. Had 'the 
 
18 THE PENINSTJLAE CAMPAIGN 
 
 enemy's " leaders" had, moreover, a small modicum of the 
 " ability" which Gen. McClellan attributes to them, with an 
 army of 115,000 men, they would not have retired even 
 then. A serious menace upon Washington — to say nothing 
 of a serious attack — would have frustrated the movement to 
 the Peninsula. 
 
 The truth is, the enemy abandoned Manassas because his 
 force was too weak, and because the risks were too great, to 
 permit him to remain longer where he was. lie abandoned 
 Manassas after the President's orders for advance had been 
 given — a iveeh after a coimcil of ivar had heen held to deter- 
 mine the means and modus operandi of attacking him 
 cohere he was. It is likely that he feared an " intention" of 
 attack more than an intention of a " movement to the Pen- 
 insula," where he actually had a fortified line strong enough 
 {as it turned out) to arrest our army a whole month. 
 
 Having with such affluence of argument demonstrated to 
 the President the superiority of his " plan" — having tena- 
 ciously cherished it for four long months — having persisted, 
 even against risks of no ordinary magnitude, and against 
 tlie settled convictions of the President, in carrying it out, 
 we cannot doubt that at least Gen. McClellan has perfect 
 knowledge of the new theatre of war upon which he is en- 
 tering — or, at least, such knowledge as would justify his 
 assumptions and approve his military judgment. What, 
 then, is our astonishment when we find that he carried his 
 army into a region of which he was wholly ignorant — that 
 the quasi information he had about it was all erroneous — 
 that within twelve miles of the outposts of troops under his 
 command a powerful defensive line had been thrown up 
 during the winter and spring, of which he knew nothing 
 whatever, though it lay across his meditated line of march, 
 and altered the whole character of the problem — that the 
 roads " passable at all seasons" were of the most horrible 
 character, and the country a wilderness. His own account 
 of his information is given as follows, (p. 74 :) 
 
 " As to the force and position of the enemy, the informa- 
 tion then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 19 
 
 !Mucli of it was obtained from the staff officers of Gen. 
 AVool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was sur- 
 rounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong 
 water batteries on the York River, and garrisoned by not 
 less than 15,000 troops, under command of Gen. J. B. Ma- 
 gruder. IMaps, which had been prepared by the topographi- 
 cal engineers under Gen. Wool's command, were furnished 
 rae, in which the Warwick River was represented as flowing 
 parallel to, but not crossing, the road from Newport News 
 to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberiy Island a 
 real island ; and we had no information as to the true course 
 of the AVarwick across the Peninsula, nor of the formidable 
 line of works which it covered." 
 
 And again, (p. 75 :) '* In the commencement of the move- 
 ment from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encoun- 
 tered, from the want of precise topographical information as 
 to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to 
 be found, and the country, though known in its general fea- 
 tures, we found to be inaccurately described in essential 
 particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or 
 papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to 
 streams and r<^ads were frequently given, and no dependence 
 could be placed on the information thus derived. This dif- 
 ficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions 
 of the State of Virginia, tlirough which my military opera- 
 tions have extended." 
 
 The censure thrown upon " Col. Cram" and " the topo- 
 graphical officers under Gen. Wool's command," is an un- 
 generous means of justifying himself. (4) It was for Gen. 
 McClellan and his " secret service" to establish such investi- 
 gations as would give him some light on the fundamental 
 data of his campaign. 
 
 The withdrawal of the corps of Gen. McDowell from this 
 expedition is the great incident upon which have been based 
 the liercest invectives against the administration for its 
 " interference," and the charges upon it of responsibility for 
 
20 THE PENINSTTLAE CA3IPAIGN 
 
 the failure of the campaign. "We shall go no further into 
 the mattei', here, than to say, first, that the decision of the 
 corps commanders (pp. 59 and 60) and the approval of the 
 Secretary of War (p. 60) were the sole points of understand- 
 ing between Gen. McClellan and the War Department. 
 jN^otwithstanding that Gen. McClellan was in the vicinity of 
 Wasliino;ton ei2;liteen davs after those conditions were estab- 
 lished, he never had, or took pains to have, an under- 
 standing as to how they were to be executed. (5.) The 
 vei'u day he sailed (April 1) he sent to the Adjutant-General 
 a statement of his dispositions, and this, submitted by the 
 Secretary of War to military advisers, and decided by them 
 to be not a fulfillment of the conditions, prompted and 
 justified the order withdrawing McDowell. With the Sec- 
 retary of War and his advisers it was simply a question 
 Avhether the conditions which the President had imposed in ap- 
 proving, or rather in jyermiUing^ Gen. McClellan's eccentric 
 movement, had been fulfilled. They had not been fulfilled, 
 and the whole thing had been canied on from the beginning 
 in disregard, not only of the President's wishes, but of his 
 positive orders, and ofvthe conditions which he (through a 
 council of war) imposed upon the movement. (6) 
 
 Citing the order detaining McDowell, Gen. McClellan re- 
 sorts to the unworthy subterfuge of representing it as a 
 iDitlidrawal of troops from his command, by the President, in 
 violation of his promise " that nothing of that sort should be 
 repeated," (he refers to a previous withdrawal of Blenker's 
 division — a body of troops of which he had more than once 
 expressed his determination to rid himself in some way,) 
 " that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed 
 with no further deductions from the force upon which its 
 operations had been planned ;" whereas it was simply an en- 
 forcement of th*e conditions upon which the President reluc- 
 tantly sanctioned the plan. lie goes on to say : — 
 
 " To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated 
 all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was 
 too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of 
 continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled 
 
AXD ITS AXTECEDE^TS. 21 
 
 the adoption of another, a different and legs efi'ective plan of 
 campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossi- 
 ble. It was a fatal error." 
 
 The very circumstances he here details stultify his conclu- 
 sions. ""Rapid and brilliant operations" loere more than 
 ever 'i?nj)o.'<ed iqxni h'uii. When Napoleon, with his handful 
 of men, drove the Austrians out of Italy, though twice and 
 thrice placed, by the paucity of his numbers, in almost des- 
 perate situations, it was not by admitting that "rapid and 
 brilliant operations" were "impossible," (a word, by the by, 
 which he (i\cv repudiated,) but by recognizing that in them 
 alone his hope lay. 
 
 The order referred to was received by Gen, McClellan 
 simultaneously, almost (April 5th,) with the arrival of his 
 army before the lines of YorktoAvn. As to the propriety of 
 assaulting those lines, if there ever was a case in which such 
 a step was not merely justifiable and advisable, but demanded 
 by the circumstances, it was surely this. Through various 
 causes not necessary to enumerate, the morale of the rebel 
 forces was at its lowest ebl). Tliat of our armies was high. 
 Gen. McClellan, entering upon a campaign which he had ob- 
 stinately inaugurated against the most earnest remonstrances 
 of the President, found himself interrupted by an obstacle 
 wholly unknown to him, proving, at the same time, the utter 
 defectiveness of his data, and his own culpable negligence 
 in failing to obtain proper information upon which to base a 
 campaign. He had trifled with the destinies of the nation in 
 thus, with more than childish levity and obstinacy, leading 
 its most powerful army into such a situation. There was but 
 one way to get out of the scrape — to break down the obstacle 
 by a vigorous assault. Again, he was entering upon his vir- 
 gin campaign as commander of a great army. Had there 
 been no antecedents it would have become him to inaugurate 
 this campaign and his career by a coxij) de v'ujxiexir which 
 should carry terror to his enemies, and finnly fix himself in 
 the estimation of his troops. But there xoere antecedents. 
 Eight months of inactivity had shaken his reputation with 
 the President and M"itli his own nearest friends, while it had 
 
22 THE PENmSULAK CAMPAIGN 
 
 destroyed confidence in the minds of tlie majority of tlie 
 most influential of Ms countrymen. The attack of I^apoleon 
 on tlie bridge of Lodi was certainly the very sublimity of 
 rashness ; he made it with nice apprehension of the relative 
 morale of his own troops and of that of the Austrians, and 
 of the effects of an action of such extraordinary boldness. 
 Though not to the same degree, perhaps, there was a corres- 
 ponding difference in the morale of the Union and rebel 
 armies, and the most powerful motives for a corresponding 
 boldness of action. All chances of success of the campaign 
 turned upon not being delayed at Yorktown. 
 
 We believe that there must be some error in the assertion 
 that Gen. Barnard "expressed the judgment that these 
 works could not, with any reasonable degree of certainty, be 
 carried by assault." Gen. Barnard pointed out where the 
 lines were weak, and, without recommending one thing or 
 the other, expressed the opinion that if lie could dejpend upon 
 his troops, he would assault there. It was for Gen. McClel- 
 lan, who knew his troops better than Gen. Barnard, (the 
 latter's duties not bringing him into close connection with 
 them,) and who was solely responsible, to decide the matter. 
 
 The description of the works extracted from Gen. Bar- 
 nard's report, (p. 8-i,) to the Chief Engineer U. S. A., gives 
 their condition as it was May bth, one month after we first 
 encountered them, and after the whole force of Johnston had 
 been working during all that time upon them ; the process of 
 throwing up earth works, mounting guns, forming embra- 
 sures, &c., having been going on day by day, under our ob- 
 servation, for the whole period. When we first saw them, 
 (April r)th,) there were very few guns upon them, and those 
 mostly field or siege guns on travelling carriages, in barbette, 
 and which could not have maintained their positions against 
 a vigorous cannonade. The connection betM'cen Fort Ma- 
 gruder and the " red redoubt " was a mere rifle pit, and from 
 the " red redoubt " to the swamp there loas nothing whatever. 
 
 The ground between and behind these two works was seen 
 and could be swept by our artillery fire. Our assaulting 
 columns would have been from two-thirds of a mile to one 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 23 
 
 mile removed from tlic artillery of Yorktown, from tlie fire 
 of which undulations of the ground afforded much cover, 
 even supposing that the fire of that place could not have 
 been subdued by our own batteries. The "red redoubt" 
 towards which the assault would have been dii'ected was a 
 very insignificant work. 
 
 Wiien Gen. Grant arrived before Yicksburg he thought it 
 necessary to try the efficacy of an assault. In so doing he, 
 at least, satisfied his anuy and satisfied the public mind. 
 All the motives which could justify Gen. Grant existed in 
 the case before us, intensified by the circumstances we have 
 already noticed. (7) 
 
 We shall not pause here to dwell upon the battle of 
 Williamsburg. That a tierce battle was fought at a point 
 where there was a strong probability that such a rencontre 
 would occur, (for it was reasonable to suppose that the enemy 
 wt»uld ri^i^iire further time to secure his retreat and save his 
 trains, and liere was a fortified position perfectly adapted to 
 such a temporary stand,*) that it occun'ed without foresight, 
 preparation or orders, and that there was utter confusion with 
 regard to the command and direction of the troops, that the 
 Commanding General himself, though only 12 miles distant, 
 was " completing the preparations for the departure of Gen. 
 Franklin's troops by water, and making the necessary ar- 
 rangements with the naval commander fur his co-operation," 
 that we lust 22SS men in an affair in which we gained 
 nuthing and which need not have cost us a man, is all now 
 well understood. 
 
 Neither shall we dwell on the extraordinary sluggishness 
 uf the march from AVilliamsburg to the Chickaliominy, fol- 
 lowing the Commanding General's boastful declaration that 
 he should '' push the enemy to the wall." (A dispatch, by 
 the by, which he has suppressed in this report.) AV^e shall 
 < 'uly stop to call attention to the dispatch of the Secretary 
 of AVar of May ISth, (p. 96.) and to the following comment 
 of Gen. McClellan : " It will be observed that this order 
 
 * " It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near 
 •"» Willianisburgh," (McClellan's Report, p. 7t.) 
 
 i\ 
 
24 THE PENESrSULAE CAMPAIGN 
 
 rendered it impossible for me to use the James Kiver as a 
 line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on 
 the Pamunkcy, and to approach Richmond from the north. 
 
 " I had advised and preferred that reinforcements should 
 be sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be 
 more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest 
 the army on the James River whenever the navigation of 
 that stream should be opened, 
 
 " The land movement obliged me to expose my right in 
 order to secure the junction, and as the order for Gen. Mc- 
 Dowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great 
 risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustra- 
 ted the plan of the campaign." 
 
 We here remark that it was at Roper'' s Church, where the 
 army was on the 11th of May, that it was necessary to decide 
 whether we would cross the Chickahominy near that place 
 and approach the James (then open to us by the destruction 
 of the Merrimac) or continue on the Williamsburg road to 
 Richmond. The great mistake of not taking the James 
 River route was made eight days previous to the date of this 
 order, and was due to Gen. McClellan's total ignorance of 
 the topography of the country he was operating in, to his 
 Avant of any due appreciation of the superior value of the 
 James as a base, and not to an order received eight days 
 later. 
 
 In his eagerness to make this grave charge against the 
 "War Department, and to manufacture excuses for his own 
 oversight, (to use a very mild term,) he has forgotten his own 
 evidence, given under oath, before the Committee on the 
 I Conduct of the War, as follows : — 
 
 " Question. — Could not the advance on Richmond from 
 Williamsburg have been made with better prospect of success 
 by the James River than by the route pursued, and what 
 were the reasons for taking the route adopted ?" 
 
 '■'■ Ansioer. — I do not think that the navy at that time was 
 in a condition to make the line of the James River perfectly 
 sure for our supplies. The line of the Pamunkey offered 
 greater advantages in that respect. The place was in s 
 
AND IT8 ANTECEDENTS. 25 
 
 better position to effect a junction -with any troops that might 
 move from Washington on the Fredericksbnrgh line. I remem- 
 ber that tlie idea of moving on the James Iliver was seriously 
 discussed at that time. But the conclusion was arrived at 
 that, under the circumstances then existing, the route 
 actually followed was the best. I think the Merrimac was 
 destroyed while we were at "Williamsburg." (8) 
 
 Next to the taking away of McDowelFs corps the most im- 
 portant specilication against tlie administration for interfer- 
 ence, has been founded upon the compelling of Gen. McClel- 
 lan to base himself upon the York and Pamunkey Rivers, 
 instead of the James, in order to connect with McDowell, 
 and Gen. McClellan himself does not scruple to assert it, 
 though, in so doing, he contradicts himself. The stamp of 
 disingenuous afterthought — so palpable on every page of the 
 report to those who are familiar with the march of events 
 of this campaign — is here made palpable to the general 
 reader. 
 
 On the 18th of May our depot was lirmly established on 
 the York liiver. The army was well nigh up to the Chick- 
 ah(;miny, the right wing on the 'New Bridge road, the left 
 winj* on the Bottom's Brid2;e road. 
 
 Gen. Barnard has given in his report a concise description 
 of tliat ( now ) well-known stream, calling it " one of the most 
 formidable military obstacles that could be opposed to the 
 advance of an army ; an obstacle to which an ordinary river 
 though it be of considerable magnitude, is comparatively 
 slight.'' Formidable as it was, Gen. B. further remarks, 
 " the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at 
 Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making 
 use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of 
 Kew Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th, and 
 even earlier, had measures been pressed for taking it." 
 
 In reference (o the same j)e?'iod and the same obstacle we 
 find in the report before us, (p. 100, 1st par.,) " In view of 
 the peculiar character of the Cliickahominy, and the liability 
 of its bottom land to sudden inundation, it became necessary 
 to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville, 
 
26 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 eleven (11) new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive 
 log-way approaclies." 
 
 It may liere be remarked tliat we knew as little of tlie 
 " peculiar character of the Chickahominy " and " the liability 
 of its bottom land to sudden inundations" as we confessedly 
 did of the topography and roads and physical character of 
 this whole region — nothing at all. 
 
 The " eleven new bridges," (including in this enumeration 
 the railroad bridge. Bottom's Bridge and New Bridge,) are 
 here emphatically mentioned as if at that date, (^Ifiy 21th,) 
 it was as " necessary to construct " all these, as if the con- 
 struction of each and all had been part of the programme, 
 preliminary to any further motion. If this is not asserted, 
 the idea is conveyed by the 1st par., p. 100, and confirmed 
 by the Sth and 9th. (" The work upon the hridges was 
 commenced at once," &c., &c.) 
 
 By reference to Gen. Barnard's report, (p. 21,) it will be 
 seen that, at this period, three points for bridges were selected 
 in front of the right wing of the army near "Kew Bridge," 
 viz. : one, a half mile above, another, the same distance be- 
 low the " ]^ew Bridge," and the J^ew Bridge itself. The 
 latter was the crossing of the turnpike, and required no more 
 than an hour or two of work in throwing a pontoon bridge, 
 when the time of crossing should come. The otlier two re- 
 quired corduroy work, which could not be done at all, (at 
 least it was not part of the plan to do it,) until the same mo- 
 ment should arrive. All that could be done is stated in 
 Gen. Barnard's Report, viz. : to " collect the l)ridge materials 
 and corduroy stutf ;" nor was any very extensive work an- 
 ticipated, as the bottom lands were quite dry, and no inun- 
 dation had yet occurred or was anticipated. Gen. McClellan 
 was not waiting for the bridges, but the bridges were waiting 
 for Gen. McClellan. At Bottom's Bridge, (one of the 
 "• eleven,") two new bridges had 'been completed, approaches 
 and all, on the 23d, (May.) Oh the 27th the railroad bridge 
 was completely repaired. 
 
 Intermediate between Bottom's Bridge and tlio three 
 points mentioned by Gen. Barnard, (where alone a passage 
 
AND IT3 ANTECEDENTS. 27 
 
 was to be forced,) Gen. Sumner had built two bridges with 
 lonf^ corduroy approaches throuojh the swamp ; they were 
 hot h flushed ahowt the 2Sth. There was no enemy to op- 
 pose their construction. 
 
 Gen. Barnard says, "So far as engineering operations 
 were concerned, the whole army could have been thrown 
 over as early as the 28th." And such an operation was 
 daily looked for in the army, and was the avowed intention 
 of Gen. McClellan. 
 
 But, (between Gen. McClellan's plans and their execution 
 there is always a "■ but,") "• a considerable force on his right 
 Ihink " caused him to delay and to send off Porter to achieve 
 his "glorious victories" M'hich so puzzled the President, and 
 of which he is so unable to " appreciate the magnitude." 
 
 This really useless expedition was undertaken just at the 
 moment when Gen. McClellan was " ready," (if he ever was 
 ready,) to force the passage of the Chickahominy. The last 
 few days of comparatively dry ground, favorable for the exe- 
 cution of this operation, were thus lost. On the 30th the 
 tremendous rain storm set in which inundated the swamp 
 and bottom lands. On the 31st the enemy attacked our 
 isolated left Aviug. Had lie delayed that attack twenty-four 
 Iiours it would have been fatal to that wing, and put a disas- 
 trous period to the campaign ; for Sumner could not have 
 crossed, and the two coi'ps assailed would have been crushed 
 without his aid. Man cannot control the elements, indeed, 
 and man, perhaps, could not foresee this inundation ; but 
 everij delay, in military affairs, is a rlsl\ and such proved to 
 be the risks which this needless delay involved — a delay 
 voluntarily incurred in a false and dangerous position. 
 
 The promptness of Sumner, and the intelligent foresight 
 he displayed, enabled him to reach the field, and to turn 
 defeat into victor}'. His columns were fonned and their 
 heads pushed up to the bridges, that, Avhen the expected 
 order shoidd come, he might be at once in motion. There- 
 after the battles which ensued took the usual course. Gen. 
 Sumner, the highest officer of the army next to Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan, arrived latcTin the day, with a part of his corps, to 
 
28 THE PENIX8ULAB CAMPAIGN 
 
 meet tlie enemy on ground he had never seen — to aid another 
 body of troops the positions of which he knew nothing of. 
 Kightfully, after his arrival, he commanded on the ba*"tle- 
 held, but neither he nor Gen. Heintzehiian encountered each 
 other, nor could act with intelligent reference to each- others 
 position. JSTo supreme head, knowing the whole ground, 
 gave unity to action or coherence to the masses. On the 
 second day, indeed, Gen. McClellan, when the serious work 
 of the day was ended, made his appearance. (9) 
 
 The enemy being finally repulsed, at an early hour on 
 Sunday, (June 1st,) the "only available means" of uniting 
 our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond, and 
 thus to obtain some results from our victory, was not to 
 march them twenty-three miles, a-s described p. 112, (a con- 
 siderable exaggeration of the necessary average march of the 
 army by the route described,) but to move a force from Sum- 
 ner's command to take possession of the heights near Gar- 
 nett's and Mrs. Price's houses, and then to bring over our 
 right wing by the New Bridge, (actually made and passable 
 for troops and artillery at 8.15 A. M. on the morning of 
 June 1st.) A single division could have cleared those 
 heights. 
 
 Gen. McClellan states, (p. 113 :) " In short, the idea of 
 uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vig- 
 orous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking 
 him before he reached Richmond, only five miles dis- 
 tant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I 
 presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any 
 one connected with the Army of the Potomac." (9A) 
 
 An ingenious evasion of the real point at issue. It was 
 not to " overtake the enemy before he reached Richmond," 
 but to folloio him up into Riclnnond^ that constituted a 
 " taking advantage" of the victory of " Fair Oaks." That 
 we might have entered Richmond, all the information since 
 obtained goes to prove. Wm. Henry Ilurlbert says : " The 
 roads into Richmond were literally crowded with stragglers, 
 some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the 
 trees — all with the same story, that their regiments had been 
 
AND ITS AXTECEDENT3. 29 
 
 * cut to pieces ;' that the ' Yankees were swarming on the 
 Chickahominy like bees,' and 'fighting like devils.' In two 
 days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guards 
 collected between 4,000 and 5,000 stragglers and sent them 
 into camp. What had become of the command no one 
 knew." 
 
 Gen. Ilcintzelman states that, " after the enemy retired, 
 he gave orders to pursue them ;" that he " countermanded" 
 the order on Sunday, in consequence of Gen. Kearney's sug- 
 gestion and allegation that " Gen. McClellan would order a 
 general advance in two or three days." The next morning, 
 on learning that the enemy had fallen back in great confu- 
 sion, he sent his troops " forward, and they got within about 
 four miles of Richmond ;" but, on sending word of it to 
 Gen. McClellan, he was ordered to " stop and fall back to 
 the old lines." 
 
 Gen. Simmer testifies : " If we had attacked with our 
 whole force, we should have swept everything before us ;" 
 and "■ I thiidc the majority of the officers who were there 
 think so now." 
 
 Gen. Keyes testifies : " After the battle of Seven Pines 
 there was another time when I think, if the army had 
 pressed on after the enemy with great vigor, we should have 
 gojic to Hichmond ; and, in connection with this last, I am 
 compelled to state that I think Gen. McClellan does not 
 excel in that quality which enables liim to know when to 
 spring." 
 
 AV^e have, thus positively, the opinions of the commanders 
 of the three coqjs engaged in the battle. 
 
 The Prince de Joinville says : " Some persons thought, 
 ai\d t/ii'nli still, that if, instead of Sumner alone, a*ll the divi- 
 sions of the right wing had been ordered to cross the river, 
 the order would have been executed. It is easy to see what 
 must have liappened if, instead of 15,000, 50,000 men had 
 been thrown upon Johnston's flank. But Sumner's bridge, 
 no doubt, would not have sufficed for the passage of such a 
 force. At midnight the rear of his column was still strug- 
 gling slowly to cross this rude structure, against all the diffi- 
 
30 THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN 
 
 culties of a roadway formed of trunks, wliicli slipped and 
 rolled under tlie horses' feet, of a muddy morass at either 
 end, and of a pitchy dark night rendered darker still Ly the 
 density of the forest. But several other bridges were ready 
 to be thrown across at other points. ]^ot a moment should 
 have been lost in fixing them, and no regard should have 
 been paid to the efibrts of the enemy to prevent this from 
 being done. Johnston had 2^ct7'aded a hrigade ostentatiously^ 
 as a sort of scarecrow^ at the ^points which loere most fitting 
 for this enterprise / Ijut the stake ivas so vast, the result to he 
 sought after so important, the occasion so ttnexpected and so 
 favorahle for striking a decisive Moio, that in oiir judgment 
 nothing should have 2)i"evented the army from attempting 
 this operation at every risk. Here again it paid the penalty 
 of that American tardiness wdiich is more marked in the 
 character of the army than in that of its leader. It was not 
 till seven in the evening that the resolution was taken of 
 throwing over all the bridges, and passing the whole army 
 over by daybreak to the right bank. It was too late !" 
 
 The Prince here labors under that excusable confusion of 
 ideas which arises from an amiable unwillingness to carry 
 his own convictions to a logical conclusion. " It was not till 
 seven in the evening that the resolution was taken,''^ &c. 
 Now, the army had been waiting for several days for that 
 " resolution" to be taken. The moment it was taken the 
 bridge building commenced. The rising flood and the dark- 
 ness of the night interfered with any progress till daylight 
 dawned ; but at eight o'clock the next morning one bridge 
 was finished, and the passage practicable for all arms ' 
 during the day two other passages became practicable for 
 iifantry. So far from being too late, the bridges were 
 ready just in time. 
 
 The Prince further says : " What might not have hap- 
 pened, if at this moment the 35,000 fresh troops on the 
 other bank of the Chickahominy could have appeared upon 
 the flank of this disordered army, after passing the bridges 
 in safety !" 
 
 Gen. Barnard states (p. 23 of his "Report") that "at 8.15 
 
AND IT3 ANTECEDENTS. 31 
 
 A. M. (June 1st) tlie pontoon bridge at the site of 'New 
 Bridge was complete and practicable for infantry, cavalry 
 and artillery. Abont noon tlie ' npper trestle bridge' was 
 practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practi- 
 cable bridge for infantry was obtained at the ' lower trestle 
 bridge.' " He adds that, owing to the overflowed condition 
 of the bottom lands, the two last bridges could not be made 
 jn-acticable for " cavalry or artillery^'' without extensive cor- 
 duroying, lie further remarks: "There was one way, 
 however, to unite the army on the other side; it was to 
 take advantage of a victory at Fair Oaks, to sweep at once 
 the enemy from his position opposite Kew Bridge, and simul- 
 tancDUr^ly to bring over, by the Xew Bridge," (with which, 
 we remark, a raised turnpike commimicated,) " our troops 
 of the right wing, which could then have met with little or 
 no resistance." 
 
 "Our lirst bridges carried off or rendered impassable," 
 (alluded to p. 1(10,) were the two bridges made by Gen. 
 h>uinner, which were too remote to have ever been counted 
 on for the close connection of the parts of the army. Wo 
 hriih/es^ thus designed or commenced, were ever carried 
 away, for none v:ere commenced Ijefore the flood occurred. 
 Bottom's Bridge, it is true, became " impassable," but this 
 was never counted on for movements of troops, being too 
 remote. The railroad bridge continued passable, and sup- 
 plied our army, and by its means also infantry, in unlimited 
 numlters, could pass. 
 
 The true statement of the case is, that the favorable time 
 for forcing a passage at the " New Bridge" (by far the best 
 crossing of the Chickahominy, and one which no inundation 
 could seriously impair,) having been trifled away, as has been 
 already shown, and the opportunity of seizing this passage 
 which the battle of Fair Oaks offered having been lost, then 
 the h.3avy labors of bridge building commenced, and the 
 inundated condition of the swamp necessitated the laborious 
 and extensive structures called "Woodbury and Alexan- 
 der's" and " Duane's" bridges, besides two or three foot 
 bridges, which required little labor. Then, too, in prose- 
 
32 THE PENESrSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 cuting tlie " upper" and " lower trestle bridge" corduroys, 
 " our men were exposed to the enemy's fire," and as it is 
 impossible to lay lieavy corduroy roads under fire, thty were 
 abandoned and never became available. 
 
 We have passed through one crisis, and have shown that 
 it was invited by the dispositions of Gen. McClellan, by 
 which our army was permitted to be for a whole week divi- 
 ded into two distinct portions, entirely isolated. (10) This 
 arrangement took place at a moment when Gen. McClellan 
 avows his belief that the enemy's numbers " greatly exceed 
 our own," and that he has every reason to expect desperate 
 work. (p. 98.) The weaker of the two isolated portions was 
 thrust forward to within seven miles of Richmond, Avith no 
 obstacle whatever between it and the enemy's superior forces, 
 on ground that had no natural strength, and to which little 
 artificial strength could be given, under the circumstances. 
 The position, too, in which our troops were thus risked was 
 never seen by the commanding General until after the battle 
 of Fair Oaks. 
 
 The weakness of the enemy, combined with his blunders, 
 alone saved us. Gen. McClellan did not believe in his 
 weakness — he had no right to count on his blunders. Such 
 is the generalship which can do nothing " rapid or brilliant," 
 owing to alleged numerical weakness, but which, in delay, 
 hesitation and uncertainty, incurs risks such as the rashest 
 of daring and energetic generals seldom encounter. (11) 
 
 The ftiilure of the enemy to crush our left wing, though 
 he unquestionably exerted his whole strength to do it, might 
 well shake Gen. McClellan's credulity with regard to his 
 "superior numbers," and authorize his otherwise illogical 
 statement (see telegram, June Ttli, p. 115) that he sliould be 
 " in iKvfect readiness''' to move forward and " talie Rich- 
 mond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will 
 admit the passage of artillery." AVith " superior numbers" 
 of the enemy and " strong works" around Eichmond, it is 
 astonishing with what facility he is always " taking Eich- 
 mond" — in his disjjatches ! 
 
 Again, (June 10th,) though he has information that 
 
AND IT3 ANTECEDENTS. 33 
 
 " Beauregard has arrived," and " some of liis troops are to 
 follow him," he announces, " I shall attack as soon as the 
 weather and ground will permit ;" and he reiterates in the 
 same dispatch, lest he should not he understood or helieved, 
 " I wish to he distinctly understood that whenever the wea- 
 ther permits, I Mill attack with whatever force I may have," 
 &c. (p. 116.) 
 
 :N[cCall arrived on the 12th and 13th. The rains of the 
 early part of the month slackened as the month advanced, 
 so that on the 14th the General announces " weather now 
 very favorable." The ground grew iirmer as the June sun 
 continued to act upon it, and by the 20th artillery could op- 
 erate with facility. On this date the General telegraphs 
 that he has " no doubt Jackson has been reinforced from 
 here." Xow, then, is the time to " move forward" and to 
 '" take Richmond." But, instead of "perfect readiness," we 
 hear the " difficulties of the country" expatiated upon — we 
 learn that '* by to-moiTOW night" certain defensive works 
 will be finished — that the construction of these " defensive 
 Avorks" is rendered necessary by his " inferiority of num- 
 bers," so that he can bring the " greatest possible numbers 
 into action," ifcc, ike. Instead of " aUacking loith lohatever 
 force he has'' — instead of "perfect readiness" to act, (though 
 he learns the enemy has been reduced by detachments,) he 
 is waiting for " defensive works ;" and, instead of " taking 
 Iiichmond," or doing anything towards it, he " would be 
 glad to have permission to lay before the President, by letter 
 or telegraph, his views as to the present state of military 
 affairs iJiroughoui the whole countnf \ 
 
 Bear in mind that, two months before, Gen. McClellan 
 had been relieved from a position which made the expression 
 of such views a part of his official duty ; and now, after 
 having been so relieved, at such a moment as this, when the 
 President is eagerly scanning each telegram to know if the 
 army has really " advanced" and '* taken Eichmond," he is 
 astounded to lind only an offer of " views" on the " present 
 state of military affairs throughout the whole country," 
 coupled with a modest request to know " the numbers and 
 
 3 
 
34: THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 positions of tlie troops not under his command in Virginia 
 or elsewhere." In other words, Gen. McClelhm, ai a mo- 
 ment so critical to himself, and nnder circumstances which 
 should concentrate all his thoughts upon the w^ork imme- 
 atelj in hand, asks to be informed of the numbers and posi- 
 tions of all the troops of the United States ! 
 
 So neither McCall's arrival nor fine weather constituted 
 " perfect readiness to advance." All the " eleven" bridges 
 are finished — even the " defensive works" will be ready " by 
 to-morrow night (viz., June 21st) — and yet he does not 
 " move forward." 
 
 Here is something, at least, that ought to start him. 
 Thus far " all the information previous to June 24th," &c., 
 (p. 119) induced the belief that Jackson was at Gordonsville, 
 receiving reinforcements ^/y;;/^, Ilichmond. Now (June 21th) 
 Gen. McClellan learns that Jackson was moving to Fred- 
 ericshall with his own troops and all those " reinforce- 
 ments" that had gone to liim, for the purpose of " attacking 
 my rear on the 28th." 
 
 Surely now is the time, if ever, to " move forward ;" in 
 two or three days the enemy will receive heavy re-inforce- 
 ments. So, at last, on tlie 25th, our In'idges and intrench- 
 ments being " at last completed," (N. B. The bridges were 
 all completed by the 19th, the "defensive works" were an- 
 nounced June 20tli, as to be completed to-morrow night," 
 viz., June 21st, and, we remark, tliey were ready enough at 
 any time for an advance,) sornething is really to bo done. 
 The reader holds his breath to know what is to follow — it is, 
 " (ui advance of our jnclcet lines of the left prepakatory to a 
 ireneral forward movement." One would think that the art 
 of " preparation " had been exhausted, but if so simple as to 
 believe that the time for pr^j^a/'/;?^ to do a thing ever ends, 
 and the time of executing it ever commences, his military 
 education could not have been acquired imder Maj.-Gen. 
 I\rcC]ellan. This preparatory operation at any rate must be 
 the last. But alas ! though " successful in what we have 
 undertaken," the courage which, in the morning was screwed 
 up to order " an advance of our picket line of the left, pre- 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 35 
 
 paratory to a general forward movement," has all oozed out 
 by "6.15 P. M." "Several contrabands," (we hope they 
 vere intelligent! !) "just in," announce that "Jackson's ad- 
 vance is at or near Hanover C. II. ;" that the perpetual bug- 
 bear, Beauregard, " had arrived," and that the rebel " force 
 is stated at 200,000 men, including Jackson and Beaure- 
 gard."* 
 
 The " general forward movement " of the morning is 
 tottdly forgotten after the interview with these " contrabands," 
 and we have this feeble announcement : " But this army will 
 do all in the power of men to hold their ])osition and rejpulse 
 a)n/ aftac/i.^'' Hegretting his " inferiority of numbers," for 
 which he is not " responsible," he " will do all that he can do 
 with the splendid army he has the honor to command," 
 (Oh, that in such a moment sm*ely every reader will aspirate 
 such an army /lad but a leader,) and if destroyed by "over- 
 whelming numbers " " can at least die with it and share its 
 fate." J'or once, however, he feels that " there is no use in 
 again asking for reinforcements." 
 
 Thus in the morning we are treated with a grand " pre- 
 paratory movement," (what the particular necessity of losing 
 a whole day, when time was so precious, in this absurd man- 
 ner, the uninitiated can scarcely comprehend,) for a " gene- 
 ral advance," and by sunset we have this feeble wail of de- 
 spair. Does any one believe that any such sudden and por- 
 tentous change had come over the state of afiairs, as would 
 justify such a change in the spirit of the General, or that the 
 tales of "several contrabands" could so coifipletely turn the 
 tallies? If he does not believe this, then the alternative is 
 to believe the Beport which contains such statements to be a 
 mere veil — transparently thin — with painful labor, drawn 
 over the writer's conscious ignorance of his own plans, inten- 
 tions or situation. 
 
 He goes on to say, (p. 122,) "on the 26th, the day upon 
 which I had decided as the time of our final advance^'' (it 
 
 • As early as June lOlh the General lias " inforraatiou that Bcanregard had 
 arrived," and "that some of his troops were to follow him." The "contra^ 
 br.nds'" bring no neKS after all (See ■p. 33, anU^ 
 
36 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 lias already been at least six days since the -whole category 
 of conditions for moving forward and taking Kichinond aas 
 been fullilled, and six days since an additional conditioa 
 tnrned np in his ftxvor — the reinforcing of Jackson at Gor- 
 donsville, from Riclimond — it has been two days since he 
 learned that the powerful corps of Jackson, thus reinforced, 
 was but two or three days march off, on his way to join Lee,) 
 " the enemy attacked our right in force, and turned my at- 
 tention to the protection of our connnunications and depots 
 of suj)j)ly f both of which, by the by, were lost, and were 
 expected to he lost, since he telegraphs the Secretary of War 
 " not to be discouraged if you learn that my communications 
 are cut off and even Yorhtown in 2'>ossession of the enemyP 
 
 ]^ow, on the morning of the 2()th, Jackson's main body 
 was yet a full daifs march off. It was noon on the 26th, 
 (p. 124,) before the enemy was discovered to be in motion, 
 and 3 P. M., (p. 125,) before he had " formed his line of bat- 
 tle " to attack McCall, at Beaver Dam Creek. The troops 
 which attacked on the 26th were not Jackson's, but a part 
 of the very force Gen. McClellan was to have attached him- 
 self. Thus we learn the curious and astonishing fact that 
 the "general forward movement," or, as styled, p. 122, "our 
 final advance decided upon for that day," was postponed and 
 abandoned in consequence of an attach of the enemy'' s lohich 
 tooh place at 3 P. M. of the same day ! 
 
 N^ow if the case was really hopeless, we would fold our 
 hands in resignation, only asking why the conclusion was not 
 arrived at three weeks earlier ; for we afSrm that nothing 
 happened np to the 20th to make a " moving forward and 
 taking Kichmond " more impracticable than when Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan, (on the Tth,) announced that he should be " in per- 
 fect readiness " when McCall arrived and the ground dried- 
 conditions all fulfilled as early as the 20th. (12) Even to the 
 25t]i nothing that has occurred has daunted the ostensible 
 determination to "advance and take Richmond," and a 
 grand "preparatory" movement to a "general forward 
 movement " was ordered. But man cannot control events, 
 and who could forbode that, almost simultaneously with tJiQ 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 37 
 
 order for " an advance of our picket line of the left prepara- 
 torv, S:c., c*e:c.," several contrabands would be on their way 
 with tidin<:;3 of Beaure^rard and Jackson ! that a " linal ad- 
 vance " for to-morrow, (the 2Gth,) will be utterly frustrated 
 by a counter advance made by a disobliging enemy at 3 
 o\ioch ill the afternoon of that day ! 
 
 Truly " the case is a difficult one," but we need not lose 
 hope, for tlie General will do his best to " out-mana3uver, 
 out-wit and out-light the enemy." 
 
 AVith an army of 100,000 ra^n j^resoit for duty — an enemy 
 divided into two portions, even if " greatly superior in num- 
 ber," we would fancy something/ might be done, even had we 
 not this voluntary pledge of brilliant generalship. Indeed it 
 has been our notion that these were just the circumstances 
 that called for energetic action — a prompt and bold initiative 
 on the part of a general. 
 
 Admitting that the enemy really numbered, (as is stated 
 on the authority of the "secret service,") 180,000 men, and 
 admitting that tlie "advance" on Richmond had ceased to 
 l)e practicable, and that a retreat to the James River had 
 become the best course, why amuse us in this official lieport 
 of past events with the pretence, kept up till the 25th, nay, 
 to the 20th, of a "general forward movement?" Such a 
 movement was surely more j)racticable while Jackson was at 
 Gordonsville, or even when only three marches off, than 
 when he arrived. Why, if really intended^ was it not made ? 
 
 In view of a retreat to the James River it was wise to hold 
 the position at Beaver Dam on the 26tli. All Porter's baggage 
 train might have been, (and wc believe vxis^ brought over 
 on that dav. So mii'ht have been the " sieixe jiruns." It was 
 a blunder unparallelled to expose Porter's corps to light a 
 battle by itself on the 27th against overwhelming forces of 
 the enemy. With perfect ease that corps might have been 
 brought over on the night of the 26th, and, if nothing more 
 brilliant ci>uld have been thought of, the movement to the 
 James might have been in full tide of execution on the 2Tth. 
 A more propitious moment could not have been chosen, for, 
 besides Jackson's own forces, A. P. Hill's and Lonorstreet'a 
 
/ 
 
 38 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 corps were on tlie south (left) bank of the Chickahominy ou 
 the night of the 26th. Such a movement need not have 
 been discovered to the enemy till far enongli advanced to in- 
 sure success. At any rate he could have done no better in 
 preventing it than he actually did afterwards. The Prince 
 de Joinville, conceding the necessity of the movement says, 
 " there was a vast difference between making this retreat^'' 
 (styling it very properly what it was,) " in one's own time and 
 by a free, spontaneous movement, and making it hastily 
 under the threatening pressure of two hostile armies ;" and 
 surely the difference became vaster when, instead of being 
 made merely xinder pressure^ it became the necessary result 
 of a decided defeat. 
 
 But the enemy had no such numbers, nor was the case 
 so hopeless. The " secret service," which reported the in- 
 credible number of 100,000 men under Johnston, at Manas- 
 sas, is authority for the 180,000 now massed against Gen. 
 McClellan ; but it also reports the force made up of two 
 hundred battalions of infantry and cavalry and eight battal- 
 ions of " independent troops," five battalions of artillery and 
 some fragmentary bodies. JSTow, 500 men to a battalion Avas 
 a full estimate^ and so recognized by the " secret service." 
 Out of the organizations enumerated it would, therefore, be 
 hard to make a total of more than 110,000 or 115,000 men, 
 while our own aggregate (sick and well) is given by Gen. 
 McClellan (p. llfat 117,000. Wm. Henry Ilurlbert, who 
 had been in Richmond throughout the campaign, and had 
 had excellent opportunities of judging, gives liis opinion 
 that Lee's army numbered 90,000, and Jackson's, 30,000, 
 making 120,000 in all. Mr. Ilurlbert also says: "Very 
 few, if any, of his (Beauregard's) troops were in Yirginia." 
 In other words, he knew of none at all, and there has never 
 been furnished a particle of proof that a single man of 
 Beauregard's army was there. 
 
 Ihit even Mr. Ilurlbert's estimate is largely in excess. 
 The divisions of Longstreet, A. P. Hill and D. H. Hill, and 
 the corps of Jackson, were, as we know, engaged in the 
 action with Porter on the 27th, and this force has been esti- 
 
AND ITS ANTi;Ci:i)KNTS. 39 
 
 mated from 60,000 to 70,000 men. The R.clim )iicl papers 
 of that date, deseribing the battle, stated it at 65,000 men, 
 and the probability is that it did not vary mucli from that. 
 Tlie enemy made his effort upon our riglit under Porter, and 
 naturally concentrated against it all the troops he could 
 spare, while keeping up a show of force about Richmond. 
 Independently of sucli an inference, we have the fact that 
 Gen. Magruder, in his official report, describes the situation 
 of the rebel forces left on the Richmond side as " one of the 
 gravest peril," and states that '' there were but 25,000 men 
 between McClellan's army of 100,000 men and Richmond," 
 (13) The same Richmond paper which, a few days after the 
 battles, mentioned the amount of Confederate force (as 
 above stated) engaged with Porter, speculated upon what 
 mnjld Jiave hapj^ened had McClellan on the 2Tth attac]>:ed 
 Jilchmond. The rebel Gen. Stuart, in an interview with a 
 distinguished officer of our army which occurred a few 
 weeks after these events, j)h'(7(/ed /u's honor that the Confed- 
 erate force did not exceed 90,000 men. That he 'knew what 
 that force was is certain, and it is not likely that he would 
 tell a gratuitous falsehood. Xothing that occurred in any 
 of the encounters during the seven days, or afterwards, 
 warrants the belief that the Confederate army exceeded 
 that number. The vevy same corps and divisions which, on 
 the left of the Chickahominy, fought Porter at Gaines' 
 Mill, turn up, with Magruder and linger alone added, at the 
 tierce and momentous combats of Glendale and i\[alvern Hill. 
 Conceding, however, to Gen. McClellan an adversary 
 which his '* secret service," aided by " several contrabands," 
 had conjured up, the passive inactivity with which he met 
 this crisis forfeits for him every claim to generalship even of 
 the most indiiferent character. AVith an enemy 180,000 
 strong, divided into two distinct portions, we believe that 
 there might have been found some way of displaying gen- 
 eralship; at least, with intrenchments on the right bank of 
 the Chickahominy which 20,000 men could have held 
 against 100,000, he need not have permitted one-third of his 
 army to be defeated (m the other bank, within siglit and 
 
40 THE PENINSULAJB CAMPAIGN 
 
 cannon range of tlie other two-tliirds. But, considering tlie 
 real strength of Lis enemy, (as we believe it to have been,) a 
 niore lamentable failure to fulfill " hopes formerly placed in 
 liim," a more striking instance, not so much of being '* out- 
 witted" as of destitution of " wit," and of unreadiness in 
 action, is scarcely to be found in military annals. 
 
 The enemy having been checked at Beaver Dam Creek in 
 the afternoon of the 20th, no time should have been lost in 
 withdrawing from this position and in bringing Porter over 
 the Chickahominy, as could have been done with the great- 
 est ease the night of the 26th. If it had been determined, 
 liowever, to fight on that side, he should have been with- 
 drawn in the night to the position selected, and at the same 
 time reinforced with the whole of our left wing, except 
 20,000 men to hold the intrenchments and Bottom's Bridge, 
 and to guard the passages of the White Oak Swamp. Thirty 
 or forty thousand men should have been sent over to 
 Porter. (14) 
 
 Gen. McCall, who commanded the force at Beaver Dam 
 Creek which received the rebel attack under A. P. Hill on 
 the 2Gt]i, says, in reference to the order to withdraw : " This 
 ord^r, I confess, gave me some concern. Had it reached me 
 at iriidnight, the movement might have been made without 
 difficulty and without loss ; but now it would be daylight 
 before the movement which, under fire, is one of the most 
 delicate and' difficult in the art of w^ar, could be com- 
 menced." 
 
 The movement, ordered at nightfall of the 2Gth, could 
 have been executed without risk or damage. Delayed till 
 morning, it involved the risk of the utter destruction of 
 Porter's corps of 27,000 men. Not a dlght risk merely, 
 such as we must constantly incur in making w^ar, but a seri- 
 ous risk, and, moreover, a totally unnecessary one. Porter 
 acknowledged his hesitation to give the order for withdraw- 
 ing his force, and even seemed, when morning came, inclined 
 to suspend it, alleging the fear that McCall's division would 
 be cut to pieces. Not only McCall's division, but Porter's 
 whole command, were in fearful risk of being " cut to 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 41 
 
 pieces" or captured, by being M-liere they were that morning 
 of tlie 2Tth, as we shall show. 
 
 Gen. Stoneman, with a small command of infantry and 
 cavalry, had been sent towards " Old Church" to obstruct 
 roads, destroy bridges, and prevent, as far as possible, Porter's 
 right from being turned. Jackson, who, in marching from 
 Hanover C. II., kept well towards the Pamunkey, with the 
 obvious intention of turning Porter's right, on coming in 
 sight of Stoneman's troops near " Old Church," bore off 
 towards Mechanicsville. His troops filed past in full view 
 of Stoneman from 4 P. M. till after dark, and were estima- 
 ted by him at 35,000 strong. (Jackson oioio had, besides his 
 own troops, those " reinforcements" which we have seen 
 were sent a week or two ago, out of Pichmond, to join him.) 
 Let us suppose that Jackson, instead of being diverted from 
 l>*s course by the handful of troops of Stoneman, (and it is 
 astonishing that he should have been,) had kept on towards 
 Cold Harbor. Porter's case would have been hopeless. 
 
 lie bore off towards Mechanicsville, and encamped some- 
 where near Shady Grove Church. Had he put his troops in 
 motion before dawn and marched parallel to Porter's line 
 of retreat, he could have attacked his retiring columns and 
 rendered it difficult, if not impossible, for him to reach the po- 
 sition where he actually gave battle. Finally, that the force 
 of Porter was not utterly destroyed by its defeat, is due 
 simply to the fact (not to have been exi^ected) that the 
 enemy did not commence his attack till 3.1 P. M., and did 
 not accomplish his victory until after nightfall. These, it 
 may be urged, were risl's incidental to war ; but they were 
 risks of the gravest character, and we are unable to see what 
 erpiivalcnt risks (rather than positive advantages) would 
 have attended the withdrawal of Porter the night of the 2Gth. 
 
 Cicn. AlcClellan announces that "the object we sought for 
 had been obtained." " The enemy was held at bay." (But 
 why incur a disastrous defeat to hold him "at bay" in a po- 
 sition where he could not attack us unless we chose to be 
 attacked.) '* Our siege guns and materials were saved.''^ 
 (Everything was brought over on the 2Gth except the siege 
 
42 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 guns, and tliey might have been,) " and the right wing now 
 joined the main body of the army," (which it mighi have 
 done the night of the 26th.") 
 
 Per contra^ we lost twenty-two guns " captured" by the 
 enemy," (better have abandoned and spiked the " siege artil- 
 lery " than to have lost in hattle twenty two guns.) We lost 
 in killed and wounded)B9,000 men, when Porter might have 
 been withdrawn without the loss of a man, and we incurred 
 a disheartening defeat besides. (15) 
 
 As to the answers of the corps commanders to the circular 
 of the 26tli, asking if they could spare troops to reinforce 
 Porter, we need hardly remark that when circulars of this 
 kind ai'e sent to commanding officers, one style of answer 
 f^^^ly can be anticij^ated. Each commander, without precise 
 knowledge of the situation, or of the plans of the general, 
 feels bound to provide for the worst possible case. No one 
 lias any troops to spare. It is for the commanding general 
 himself to decide, in view of his own plans, how many men 
 are wanted at diiferent points, and with how many each 
 shall be held. !Now it may be safely said that the " defen- 
 sive works " on the right bank of the Chickahominy could 
 be held with 20,000 men against 100,000. They were built, (as 
 explained by Gen. McClellan himself,) " that he might bring 
 the greatest possible numbers into action," and, built in this 
 view, they must have liad some considerable strength. Gen. 
 Barnard describes these lines as consisting of six redoubts, 
 connected by rifle pits or barricades. These rifle pits were 
 in fact infantry parapets, raised to the height of the breast 
 above the natural surface, the ditch or excavation being on 
 the outside. The redoubts were arranged with embrasures 
 and had in several cases magazines provided. The woods 
 outside the lines were felled and formed, along the greater 
 portion, an obstacle impossible to be passed under fire of the 
 works. Gen. McClellan, in his brief report of July 15th, 
 (which he has not inserted in this volume) saw fit to style 
 these defences " slight earthworks," — a term which one 
 would apply to such works as troops could throw up in a 
 night. On these our troops had been working for twenty- 
 
AXD ITS ANTECEDENTS. 45 
 
 five days, and lie liimsclf has stated tlie object of tlicV ^i»- 
 stnictiuii, (p. lis,) and by his manner of speaking of them 
 
 > has indicated that tiiey were not a night's work, but a seri- 
 ous labor. (IG) TlV/y he afterwards styles them, dispara- 
 
 • gingly, '" slight earthworks " is very apparent. It would be 
 otlierwise unintelligible why 70,000 elfective men lay idle 
 behind them, while, within cannon shot, 27,000 were under- 
 g(»ing a disastrous defeat. 
 
 Two defensive battles have now been fought on the Chick- 
 ahominy, and Gen. McClellan has either blundered into 
 lighting them, or been comiKlkd^ l)y the circumstances of 
 his position, to tight them, the first with about one-half, the 
 Bccoiul with less than one-third, of his force; and now, (not 
 a single offensive action having occurred during this invasive 
 campaign,) with a '" splendid army," as he rightly styles it, 
 he is forced, though still superior, or at least ecpial in num- 
 bers, to "change his base," or, in other words, to beat a re- 
 treat. 
 
 lie has spent weeks in building bridges which establish a 
 close connection between the wings of his army, and then 
 lights a great battle with a smaller fraction of his army than 
 when lie had a single available bridge, and that remote. 
 He, with great labor, constructs ""defensive works" in order 
 that he "may bring the greatest possible numbers into 
 
 j action," and again exhibits his ability to utilize his means 
 
 ' by keeping r>5,U00 men idle behind them, while 35,000, un- 
 aided by " defensive Avorks " t)f any kind, fight the bulk of 
 his adversary's forces, and are of course overwhelmed by 
 '' superior numbers." 
 
 AVe believe there were few connnanding ofticers of thf» 
 Anny of the Potomac who did not expect to be led oj^en 
 slvchj against the enemy on the 2Gtli or 27th. (17) Plad 
 Buch a movement been made it is not improbable that, it 
 C7iergetically led, we should have gone into Richmond. 
 Jack*jn and A. P. Hill could not have got back in time to 
 Buccor Magruder's command, if measures of most obvious 
 
 -propriety had been taken to prevent them. "\Ye might have 
 beaten or driven Magrudcr's 25,000 men and entered Rich- 
 
44 THE PENESTSULAE CAMPAIGN 
 
 mond, and then reinforced by tlie great onoral acquisition of 
 strength this success would have given, have fought Lee and 
 re-estabhshed our communications. At any rate something 
 of this kind was Avorth trying. (18) 
 
 The story of "the campaign is nearly told. What follows 
 is but the denouement. The retreat to the James River, 
 considering that the bulk of the enemy was on the left bank 
 of the Chickahominy, and that he had a long march before 
 he could reach our flank, was not very difficult. The troops 
 were moved judiciouslj^, and were put in j)osition at the 
 most obvious points ; but so far as the " fighting " is con- 
 cerned it is as usual, pellmell, no one knowing exactly who 
 and where his neighbor is, and what is worse, oio common 
 head near at Jiand, who does know all, to direct and give 
 coherence and unity to the operations. 
 
 On the 30th of June our army stretched across the country 
 from White Oak Swamp bridge to the James, occupying a 
 line about eight miles long. Franklin held the right at the 
 bridge. Porter and Keyes the extreme left. Farther than 
 midway (five miles about) from the James, this long line of 
 battle was intersected by two, (the " Charles City " and the 
 " New Market " or " Long Bridge ") converging roads. Here 
 yvus the decisive 2)oint — if the line should be broken here it 
 would be the destruction of our army. Here, too, the enemy 
 made a desperate effort. Lee commanded in person, and 
 Longstreet's and A, P. Hill's veteran divisions, numbering 
 18 to 20,000 men, made the attack. Jeff Davis himself was 
 said to be present. (So Gen. McCall, while a prisoner that 
 evening, was informed). It was an eventful day and an 
 eventful point ; central, too, to the general position of the 
 army. Where was the Commanding General during this 
 battle ? At the very extreme left, and for a considerable 
 portion of the time o)i a gunhoat, (see p. 135,) "having made 
 arrangements for instant communication by signals." Pead 
 the ]-eport of Gen. McCall, the extracts from those of Sum- 
 ner, and Ileintzelman, and others, and their testimony before 
 the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and see how 
 much the control of the Commanding General was needed • 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 45 
 
 % his knowledge of the field and of the positions of the differ- 
 ent troops. Then think of the disastrous consequences that 
 
 ' would have followed the breaking of our line at that point, 
 (Longstreet iTifonncd Gen. Mcfcall that JLee had 70,000 
 
 ' men bearing on it, all of which would arrive before mid- 
 night,) and let each one form his own conclusion as to 
 whether the commanding General had on this occasion any 
 appreciation of his duties, or, if he had, whether he dis- 
 charged them. 
 
 '' It was very late at night," says Gen. McClellan, " before 
 my aids returned to give me the results of the daifs fi'jiding 
 along the lohole line, and the true position of affaii'sy It 
 may well be doubted whether, in all the recorded reports or 
 " dispatches " of military commanders, a parallel to this ex 
 traordinary avowal can be found. "VYe supposed it the es 
 pecial bu>iness of a general to know, at each moment, "the 
 true position of affairs," and to have some agency in ruling 
 it. Here v;e find the " day's fighting" all done, the results, 
 for better or worse, accomplished, and " very late at night " 
 the ct)nimanding General just learning about them ! '" Yery 
 late at night " Gen. Franklin concluded he could no longer 
 Iiold his position and retired. Pending word to Gens. Sumner 
 and Ileintzelnian. These officers, though they assert they 
 received no such message, heard of the movement, somehow, 
 and wisely concluded that they must retire, too. Here 
 again was a matter of the gravest importance, which, that it 
 should l>e decided at the proper time, required the com- 
 mandrng General to be at hand — to know, promptly, " tht 
 situation" and the "results of the day's fighting." Gen. 
 McClellan makes no pretence that he gave any orders tc 
 Franklin, nor that he would have given any to the other 
 corps commanders had not Franklin, vnthout orders, fallen 
 back. He affirms that on learning of Franklin's withdrawal 
 he sent orders to Sumner and Ileintzelman to withdraw, but 
 admits that they were both in motion vnthout his orders. (19) 
 
 I !Now had not this withdrawal taken place that night, the 
 next day would have probably witnessed the destruction of 
 the Army of the Potomac. Lee, as we have seen, was at the 
 
4:6 THE I^iyNINSULAE CAMPAIGN 
 
 very central point, ready to break in, with a force of ^0,000 
 men, as stated by Longstreet to Gen, McCall. The salvation 
 of the army was due, not to McClellan's arrangements or 
 foresight, but to Gen. Franklin's fortunate decision to with- 
 draw. The army was saved in spite of Gen. McClellan's 
 ignorance of the " position of affairs " and " results of the 
 day's fighting," and consequent incapacity to give intelligent 
 orders. (20) 
 
 Our army is now concentrated on the James ; but we have 
 another day's fighting before us, and this day we may expect 
 the concentrated attack of Lee's whole army. "We know not 
 at what hour it will come — possibly late, for it requires time 
 to find out our new position and to bring together the at- 
 tacking columns — yet we know not when it will come. 
 "Where, this day, is the commanding General ? Oflf, with 
 Capt. Rodgers, to select " the final positions of the army and 
 its depots." He does not tell us that it was on a gunboat, 
 and that tliis day not even " signals" would keep him in 
 communication with his army, for his journey was ten or 
 fifteen miles down the river ; and he was thus absent till late 
 in the afternoon, (21) 
 
 Tliis is the first time we ever had reason to believe that 
 die highest and first duty of a general, on the day of battle, 
 was, separating himself from his army, to reconnoitre a place 
 A retreat ! However that may be, that night and the day 
 following, the whole army, with the exception of Gen. Keyes' 
 corps, marched into a cul-de-sac from which it could not 
 have been extricated had the enemy been able promptly to 
 follow us up. 
 
 We think it will now be understood why "a large number 
 of Gen, McClellan's highest officers — indeed a majority of 
 those whose opinions have been reported to me," (see Gen. 
 Ilalleck's letter, p. 157) are in favor of " the withdrawal from 
 the James." If the enemy luas indeed, as Gen, McClellan 
 estimated, (Gen. Halleck's letter, p, 156) 200,000 strong, and 
 daily increasing, a renewal of an oftcnsive canq^aign from 
 the J ames was simple madness. Once^ by his own accounts, 
 he had been foiled and driven hack, with no little hazard of 
 
AXD ITS ANTECEDENTS. 47 
 
 r ^ro/"'\'^^'' ;^^-'ny, by "superior numbers," and now bo 
 
 ^ T ! "''" """;bf ed Avith tbe 30,000 reinforcements lie 
 n.kec ) ao-amst RK-bmond, lield by 200,000 men. No one 
 .vbo bas read attentively tbe report before us, and tbe dis- 
 patcbes tberein contamed, Mill be surprised at tbe .vant of 
 logical sequence m any particular plan, statement or ar^^u- 
 incnt, since^ complete destitution of sucb a quality is 5ie 
 unrT'f.i f'^^v^ole; but any intelligent reader .-ill 
 n s a,a th.t tbere were no rational cbances of success, 
 
 moid do ' T^^""' '^^''^'^'^'^ "^ " -dyancing on Ricb- 
 
 le il T n '' '" "''"^' "^ '^^'^^^ "^-^ "^-^^ to bat- 
 tle, and elated by success, witb but 120,000 men (->■>) He 
 
 can understaiid too, Hiat auofAer disastrous repulse in tbis 
 
 region was likely to result in tbe loss of tbe army and tbe 
 
 capture ot A\ asl.ington-indeed, tbe ruin of tbe cause. 
 
 . It tbe enemy had 200,000 men it was to be seriously ap- 
 
 prebended tiat, leaving .50,000 bebind tbe "strong wirks" 
 
 of^ Ivu-bmond, be would march at once witb 150,000 men on 
 
 ANashington. AMiy .hould be not? Gen. McClellan and 
 
 bis eulogists have held up as highly meritorious stratec^y the 
 
 leaving ot AV ashington defended by less than 50,000^ men 
 
 1.0,000 strung, and moving off to take an eccentric line of 
 operations against Richmond; and now the reverse case is 
 prcsrnted, but with an important difference. The enemy at 
 Manassas, on learning Gen. McClellan's movement, could 
 either^^y to tbe defence of Richmond or attack Washington 
 
 Intvv ^ T:" "''''^^"'^ ^'" AVasbington, can only 
 
 attack Richmond ; by no possibility can he % to the defence 
 
 'V) 'f^""-*"°- J^'''^''^ ^^ i^ interior in numbers (accord- 
 ing to his o^yn estimate) even to Lee's marchinc. army. Here 
 m a nutshell, is tbe demonstration of the folly of the errand 
 ^^ic n^ovement on Richmond, as giv4 by its^wn 
 
 If the enemy bad nothing like 200,000 men-(and a very 
 
^g THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 reliable estimate put his forces in the early part of August . 
 at about 55,000 around Richmond, and the rest with Jackson 
 confrontinc. Pope, probably not more than ^0,000) if he 
 never had had more than 90,000, or at the utmost 120,000-it 
 Gen McClellan had been driven away from Eichmond by 
 equal or inferior numbers, there were still strong reasons, 
 (which we need not indicate,) after the recent experience 
 undergone, for not permitting him to incur the hazard ot 
 
 another advance. . -, , 
 
 The critical situation of affairs at this period, the urgent 
 necessity of providing for the safety of Washington and of 
 eifectino- the reunion into one whole of our shattered and 
 reduced^'armies in Yirginia, demanded imperatively the with- 
 drawal from the James. The great misfortune was that the 
 order was not given immediately on our reaching Harrison s 
 
 Landing. „ r. ,i 
 
 Had Gen McClellan made his "reports" of the various 
 actions of the Army of the Potomac as they occurred, he 
 would probably have done himself more credit, (though the 
 slicvht specimen we have in his report made July loth ot 
 the seven days' battles hardly warrants this opinion,) tnan 
 ho has by this laborious but disingenuous production. He 
 has, however, done the country and done history a service 
 In o-ivin- so many of his own dispatches he has furnished 
 the%niest tests of his actual abilities as a general and a 
 thinker, and in the matter and in the arrangement of it he has 
 given us an illustration of his animus as a historian. In this 
 point of view the Eeport may be safely recommended to 
 readers of all classes and all parties. In takmg leave of the 
 Armv of the Potomac he somewhat ostentatiously promised 
 to mike himself the historian of its exploits, and we have 
 before U8 now, in the pages we have just examined, the re- 
 sult of his six months' incubation on such a theme. ^^ 
 
 " Whoever has committed no faults has not made wa 
 was the remark of one of the great marshals of Prance whe> 
 questioned as to the cause of a defeat, and acknowledging it 
 to have been the result of his own mistakes ; and there would 
 have been no lack of indulgence and charity for the failure of 
 
AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. 49 
 
 aii inexperienced subaltern suddenly converted into a general, 
 and called upon to plan campaigns and direct armies of such 
 unusual magnitude, under circumstances of no ordinary 
 didiculty, were they presented to us in the spirit of Marshal 
 Turenne's avowal ; but when exactly the reverse is the case, 
 when the claim to eminent generalship is arrogantly asserted, 
 when plans which we have shown to be lacking in the essen- 
 tial elements of consistency in themselves, and of concert 
 with those who must be depended upon to carry them out, 
 are held up for our admiration, when all liuilts are denied 
 and the burden of each particular mishap, and, in the end, 
 of the failure of the whole campaign, is thrown upon tiie ad- 
 ministration ; when, in short, the whole Eeport is one inces- 
 sant complaint against the President and the War Depart- 
 ment, culminating at length in the outrageous charge ad- 
 dressed to the Secretary of War on the eve of Porter's defeat, 
 (a fit finale to the two days' blundering,) " You have done 
 your best to sacrifice tliis army," we think charity should 
 withdraw her mantle 'from the errors and inconsistencies! and 
 incapacity which we here exhibit. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 The intorost attached to the origin, motives, and causes of that 
 plan of campaign which removed the Army of the Potomac from 
 its primitive base to the lower Chesapeake, induces me to add the 
 following " Memoranda" furnished to Gen. McClellan. 
 
 On one of the last days of November, 1861, I was at Gen. 
 !McClellan's Head-quarters, and found myself alone with him, 
 Casually, apparently, he mentioned the plan he had recently con- 
 ceived of moving the army, by water, to the Rappahannock. The 
 features of the plan, as I now recollect, were, principally, these: to 
 carry the whole, or at least the greater part, of the army, to Ur- 
 banna, by water, and by a rapid march to cut off and " bag" Ma- 
 gruder's force on the peninsula — seize Richmond, all before John- 
 ston's force from ^lanassas could arrive to succor it. To prevent, 
 or at least delay the arrival of that army, the " railroad bridges" ol 
 the different roads between Richmond and Manassas were, at the 
 proper moment, to be destroyed. The General intimated that he 
 had agents to do this work upon whom he could rely. {2S) 
 
 The '• memoranda" following, of the 5th and Gth of December, 
 arc the results of my reflections on that plan. 
 
 About the middle of January 18G2 1 was directed to see Col. Ingalls 
 in reference to water " transportation" for troops. The memoran- 
 dum of January 18th was written after consultation with that officer. 
 The tenor of the paper will show that I had no positive knowledge 
 of the object for which such transportation was to be collected ; but 
 suspecting that object, I took occasion to repeat my strong convic- 
 tions of the injiidiciousness of such a step. 
 
 When, early in March, 18G"2, I formed one of a council of war 
 of twelve general ofHcers to whom, by order of the President, this 
 important question was submitted, I had no other intimation of a 
 serious intention to make such a movement than the casual mention 
 of it to me by Gen. McClellan, in the latter part of November. 
 Not having any reason to suppose that any officer of the council had 
 
^9 APPENDIX. 
 
 any more intimate knowledge of the intention than myself; and 
 knowing how much thought the slight intimation I had received had 
 cost me, I naturally expected deliberation and discussion To my 
 great surprise, eight of the twelve officers present voted, offhand, 
 for the measure, witJiout discussion ; nor was any argument on my 
 part available to obtain a reconsideration. 
 
 Memorandum for General McClellan {written and sent 5th of 
 December, 1861). 
 
 The idea of shifting the theatre of operations to the James, York, 
 or Rappahannock has often occurred. The great difficulty I have 
 found in this matter is that of moving a body as large as necessary 
 rapidly, and of making the necessary preparations for such a move- 
 ment so that they should not, in themselves, give indications of the 
 whereabouts of the intended operations in time to meet them. 
 
 Tlae first thing to be considered is the old danger attendmg all 
 similar operations. In cutting the enemy's line of operations you 
 expose yourself-and a bold and desperate enemy, seeing himself 
 anticipated at Richmond, might attempt to retrieve the disaster by 
 a desperate effort upon Washington. Leaving then, as we shou d 
 do the great mass of the enemy in front of Washington, it would 
 noi be safe to leave it guarded by less than 100 000 men-that .s, 
 until we became certain that he had withdrawn from our front, so 
 for as to render his return upon it impracticable. It seems o me 
 too, that X^. full garrisoning of the works np to the standard fixed 
 . upon should be completed without delay. These works will bu 
 imperfectly serve their purpose if they are not defended by troops 
 who have some familiarity with their positions. ^ ^ 
 
 I dwell on* this matter somewhat, since if the army moves-p«r- 
 ti<ndarly if it makes a flank movement leaving the enemy m front- 
 the measures for defence of the city can not be too carefuUy aken 
 
 Now as to the expedition. Considering the great difficulty of 
 transporting, «^ one /m., large nuinbers-the confusion which will 
 attend the landing, and consequent difficulty of gettuig the columns 
 into prompt marcldng order after landing, with our new troops, if 
 the numbers are great-I should be disposed to make the first de- 
 scent with a comparatively small but select corps-not over .0, at 
 outside 30,000 men. 
 
APPENDIX. 53 
 
 Let it be supposed the latter number is adopted — how shall the 
 movement be made so as to attract least attention in its prepara- 
 tions and to deceive the enemy as to their object 1 
 
 Gen, Ijurnside's force I suppose to be about 10,000 men. His 
 fiotilla, including his seven sailing vessels and five "floating bat- 
 teries," will carry that number. (In my former memorandum I 
 estimated 14,850, but I now exclude the "surf boats" and 
 '• launches," and diminish the numbers, as I then estimated for a 
 short voyage not leaving the Potomac.) 
 
 I suppose there would be three batteries and say 1,000 cavalry 
 accoinpanying this division. I suppose that among the large 
 steamers about Baltimore the additional transportation for this ar- 
 tillery and cavalry could be found. If so, we have a force of 
 10,000 or 11,000, with artillery and cavalry, provided for. 
 
 For a second column, I think I Avould embark it from the Port 
 Tobacco River. The concentration of troops under Hooker would 
 cover a movement that way, and it would threaten the Potomac 
 batteries. 
 
 Now for additional numbers. I am inclined to think it is easier 
 to c^arry troops to New York (12 hours) — embark them there, and 
 make but one thing of it — than to bring the shipping to Annapolis 
 or the Potomac. 
 
 However that may be, if it is determined that the additional 
 number shall be 10,000 men, or 20,000 men, or more, I would 
 command the transportation at once in New York — the place where 
 ever 11 thing can be had in unstinted quantities and of the most suit- 
 able kind. All sea steamers (not otherwise chartered), the largo 
 Sound steamers, the large North River, Sound and coasting propel- 
 lers, can be had there, and there all the appliances to fit them for 
 troops, horses, etc., can be quickest made. 
 
 Perhaps the best way, therefore, would be to commence at once 
 and send the troops, artillery, and cavalry, to Fort Monroe — to 
 hold themselves ready for shipment at a moment's notice — to order 
 the transportation necessary in New York, 
 
 According to the foregoing propositions, there would be three 
 columns ready for a simultaneous movement — 10,000 at Annapolis, 
 10,000 at Port Tobacco River, and 10 or 20,000 at Fort Monroe, 
 The times of starting could be arranged so that the times of arrival 
 should be as desired. Probably it would be better to have more 
 than one point of debarkation. 
 
54 APPENDIX. 
 
 As soon as the first columns were landed, the transports could go 
 immediately to Annapolis or Baltimore for more. 
 
 The arrangements give no indication of the intended point of 
 attack. They threaten the Potomac, or Norfolk, or the Southern 
 coast, as much as, or more than, the Rappahannock. 
 
 I presume there would he no difficulty in sending our steamers 
 down to Port Tobacco — whether there would be in towing the 
 barges there I do not know. This Potomac column does not satisfy 
 me as well as the others, for the collection of troops at Port To- 
 bacco, in connection with collections at Fort Monroe and Annapolis, 
 would rather indicate an operation in the lower Cliesapeake. 
 
 Distances of points mentioned to Urbanna. Annapolis 120 
 miles — Port Tobacco 90— Fort Monroe GO. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 J. G. B. 
 
 Ifemorandum. 
 
 ■Washingtox, December 6, 1861. 
 My dkar General :— 
 
 When you suggested to me a Southern movement I told you 
 that my ideas had turned towards Norfolk. 
 
 Its capture would not be so great an operation as the successful 
 execution of the project you propose — still it seems to me worthy 
 of consideration as attended with less risk. To execute successfully 
 the operation you propose with a moderate army (say 20 or 30,000 
 men) to be afterwards reinforced, depends upon auxiliary aids 
 which 7nai/ fail. 
 
 If the railroad bridges are not destroyed — or but imperfectly — 
 the enemy may overwhelm our expeditionary army — while to exe- 
 cute the difficult operation of transferring at once a lar(/e army — say 
 100,000 men to that line, I look upon as impracticable, if not other- 
 wise imprudent. 
 
 There is one very important consideration in this matter of 
 changing the line of operations. The army of the Potomac hag an 
 object of immense importance to defend — the Capital, to lose which 
 would be almost to lose everything. 
 
 We cannot withdraw the bulk of the army from Washington 
 with the enemy in our front — I would not trust enough to its fortifi- 
 cations for that. 
 
 On the other hand the enemy in front has nothing to defend. If 
 
APPENDIX. 55 
 
 we throw 30 or 50,000 men on to the Kappahannock, he can abandon 
 entirely his position at ^[anassas, and have object enough to do so 
 in the liope of overwhelming our force — and I think it is too great 
 a hazard to risk, upon the expectation of his railroad bridges being 
 destroyed. 
 
 There is another operation which I should think well worthy of 
 weighing. To throw an army of 30,000 men on to Norfolk, landing 
 between the Elizabeth and Nansemond. The enemy's army at 
 Norfolk would be cut off. The Nansemond and Dismal Swamp 
 would, I should judge by the map, give us a defensive line against 
 the enemy's reinforcements, (breaking the railroad as far as pos< 
 siblc) and the capture of Norfolk would be, if not so brilliant and 
 decisive as what you propose, yet a great blow, particularly if, at 
 the same time, we captured its army. At the same time a demon- 
 stration in force on the enemy in our front would either prevent 
 his making detachments, or compel him to abandon his position and 
 his batteries on the Potomac. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 J. G. Barnard. 
 
 Memorandum for General McClellan. 
 
 Washington, January 13th, 1862. 
 
 On consultation with Col. Ingalls, who says he has been engaged 
 in investigating this subject for several weeks, and has visited the 
 Northern cities, he tells me that for an expedition to be made in 
 smooth water (such as the Potomac or even the Chesapeake) trans- 
 portation can be collected at Annapolis for one division of 12 regi- 
 ments infiintry — 1 regiment (1000) cavalry with horses — 4 bat- 
 teries artillery horses and men — one ponton bridge train, say 70 
 six-horse wagons, horses, drivers and 2 companies pontoniers — and 
 250 quarter-master wagons, -ambulances, with provisions for one 
 week — in three weeks^ time. 
 
 He thinks that more than one division could not be simul- 
 taneously embarked without withdrawing vessels in service of the 
 Government elsewhere. 
 
 In this estimate, however, Col. Ingalls does not include some 10 
 or 15 clipper ships which could be had and which draw too much 
 water to approach the shore, or to enter shallow bays or rivers. I 
 should not think this objection decisive, since there is water enough 
 
56 APPENDIX. 
 
 in the Chesapeake, Potomac, Rappahannock or York, for such ves- 
 sels, and they need not approach the shores ; the landing of troops 
 can be effected through the aid of the lighter vessels of the other 
 division. 
 
 If these ships are employed, as well as lighter vessels, another 
 division — two in all can be simultaneously embarked — and it would 
 require four (4) weeks to have them all at Annapolis ready to 
 receive troops. 
 
 In this estimate, I understand, are included Sound steamers 
 North River steamers, propellers, canal barges and tow boats (from 
 New York and Philadelphia), and, in fact, everything that would be 
 available in a limited time, fit for the purpose. 
 
 As Col. Ingalls has made this subject his study, I presume I am 
 justified in saying that transportation for two, and only two, divi- 
 sions can be assembled at Annapolis in four weeks. If craft of 
 light draught alone are demanded, transportation for only one can 
 be had, and that can be furnished in thi-ee weeks. 
 
 With reference to what can be found here, I have stated in my 
 memorandum of December that the Navy had (or did have not 
 long ago) four side-wheel steamers and the steamer " Stepping 
 Stones" capable of carrying 3,500 men, and the quarter-master's 
 department had two large steamers and some smaller ones capable ot 
 carrying (as stated to me by Col. Rucker) 5,000 men, besides sev- 
 eral large Schuylkill barges. I learn that there are, on the Chesa- 
 peake and Ohio Canal, between here and Cumberland, from 250 to 
 300 good canal boats, 90 feet long, 14i beam, and about 6 feet 
 depth; they will carry 150 to 200 men each. 
 
 During the present mild weather these boats could be got down 
 the canal, and they would carry troops, but they are ill adapted to 
 carrying horses. Besides these canal boats and vessels in employ 
 of the Government, there is very little else to be found here now. 
 
 But it is impracticable to move large bodies of men, on vessels 
 of this kind, past the enemy's batteries on the Potomac, and hence, 
 troops could be moved from here only to points above such bat- 
 teries. 
 
 If Col. Ingalls' statement is taken as a basis of our resources in 
 this matter, it ensues that without withdrawing vessels from other 
 service of the Government, the means cannot be obtained, that is, 
 speedily, to transport four or five divisions at one time. 
 
 It seems likely that two divisions could be simultaneously trans- 
 
APPENDIX. 57 
 
 ported, and the same means be used to bring on very speedily 
 thereafter two more divisions, &c. 
 
 The proposition to move four or five divisions by water, seems 
 to imply the transfer of the base of active operations from here to 
 some other point, as the Rappahannock or York Rivers. 
 
 On this point I would refer to memoranda of December 5th 
 and Gth. This investigation of the matter of water transportation 
 has confirmed my previous impressions of the difficulty of making 
 such a transfer without unmistakable indications which would 
 enable the enemy, in great measure, to prepare for it. The cost of 
 such a transfer cannot be less than one or two millions.* 
 
 We have now our base established here. In operating upon the 
 enemy's centre at Occoquan we cannot fail to break it, or force him 
 to abandon Northern Virginia, or give us battle. On this line 
 we have the Potomac by which to do most of our heavy transpor- 
 tation, thus palliating the winter difficulty of bad roads. We have 
 the Potomac fiotilla to aid our operations. (If a few of the new 
 regular gunboats could be added, it would be a great advantage.) 
 
 Forcing the line of the Occoquan we shall at once clear the Po- 
 tomac of the enemy's batteries, and from Aquia and Fredericks- 
 burg, have a convenient base of operations against Richmond, 
 
 Simultaneously with the passage of the Occoquan, Sickles' 
 brigade might cross to Mathias Point ; that position is, I should 
 judge, very defensible, and from it, if circumstances favored, the 
 batteries at Potomac and Aquia Creek could be captured. 
 
 J. G. B. 
 
 * The actual cost of the transfer of the army to the Poninsula was many times 
 this coujectural amount. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 Note ]. — Page 4. 
 
 The following paragraphs from the well-known letter of Lord 
 Lyons, to his government, dated Washington, November It, 1862, 
 very clearly illustrate the identification of Gen. McClellan with the 
 party to which I allude ; and they illustrate too, the views and ob- 
 jects of " leaders " of that party. 
 
 That Gen. McClellan's dismissal " dashed their hopes " in more 
 senses than one is very true — for, from the very beginning, it was 
 through his influence over the army that it was intended and hoped 
 that that powerful political element should be wielded against the 
 administration. Whether or not the administration had thrown 
 itself into the hands of the " extreme Radical party," it is very 
 evident that it had ample cause to desire no longer the services of 
 Gen. McClellan (as will clearly appear in the text of this review), 
 especially as that officer himself had " throAvn himself into the 
 hands " of its political opponents. 
 
 " On the following morning, however, intelligence arrived from 
 Washington which dashed the rising hopes of the conservatives. It 
 was announced that Gen. McClellan had been dismissed from the 
 command of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to repair to 
 his home ; that he had, in fact, been removed altogether from active 
 service. The General had been regarded as the representative of 
 conservative principle in the army. Support of him had been made 
 one of the articles of the conservative electoral programme. His 
 dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself 
 entirely into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and that the 
 attempt to carry out the policy of that party would be persisted in. 
 The irritation of the Conservatives at New York was certainly very 
 grqgt ; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed with consternation 
 and despondency. 
 
 " Several of the leaders of the Democratic party sought inter- 
 views with me, both before and after the arrival of the intelligence 
 
NOTES. 59 
 
 of Gen. McClellan's dismissal. TIic subject uppermost in their 
 minds while they were speakinjr to me was naturally that of for- 
 eign mediation between the North and South. Many of them 
 seemed to think that this mediation must come at last ; but they 
 appeared to be very much afraid of its coming too soon. It was 
 evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign 
 intervention would atford the Radical party a means of reviving the 
 violent war spirit, and of thus defeating the peaceful plans of the 
 Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present movement as 
 peculiarly unflivorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it 
 would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad that 
 it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Government 
 should be in the hands of the Conservative party. 
 
 " I gave no opinion on the sul)ject. I did not say whether or not 
 I myself thought foreign intervention probable or advisable ; but I 
 listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and 
 hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I per- 
 ceived a desire to put an end to the tvar, even at the risk of losing the 
 Southern States altogether ; but it was plain that it was not thought 
 prudent to avow this desire. Indeed, some hints of it, dropped be- 
 fore the elections, were so ill received that a strong declaration in 
 the contrary sense was deemed necessary by the Democratic Icadex's. 
 
 '• At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of the Conservative 
 party call loudly for a more' vigorous prosecution of the war, and 
 reproach the Government with slackness as well as with w^ant of 
 success in its military measures." 
 
 Note 2. — Page 12. 
 
 In his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
 we find the following : 
 
 '• Question. "Would not the destruction of the Merrimac have 
 been a great point gained, and have rendered the movement upon 
 Richmond, liy way of the James or York Rivers, very much more 
 safe r 
 
 " Answer. As things turned out, yes. But I do not think that 
 the importance of the Alcrrimac was appreciated until she camo 
 out. I remember very well that the Navy Department thought that 
 
60 NOTES. 
 
 the Congress and Cumberland were capable of taking care of tlie 
 Merrimac." 
 
 That two sailing vessels lying at anchor should be capable of 
 " taking care " of a powerful iron-clad steamer is an idea which 
 ought not to be attributed to the Navy Department. That Depart- 
 ment knew of the conversion of the Merrimac into an iron-clad, and 
 had painful forebodings of the consequences, and it was at the sug- 
 gestion of the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Fox, that I drew up, for him, 
 in February, the memorandum on the " taking of Norfolk," alluded 
 to in the following letter : 
 
 Letter of Mr. Fox. 
 
 "Washington, April 30, 1864. 
 
 " Dear Sir — I have the honor of enclosing herewith copies of a 
 letter from the senior officer at Hampton Roads, called for with 
 reference to the anxiety of this Department constantly manifested 
 to attack Norfolk and thereby get rid of the Merrimac. Also a 
 letter of Rear-Admiral Goldsborough, which will acquaint you with 
 the Navy impression as to the Merrimac. 
 
 " The frigate Congress, having half a crew, was ordered to leave 
 Newport News, but at the earnest request of Gen. Wool, who put 
 men on board from the marine brigade, she was detained, but the 
 steam-tugs to attend the Congress and Cumberland in case of an 
 attack were not on hand when she came out. 
 
 " My impression of your memorandum about the taking of Nor- 
 folk is, that it was made at my request, that our design of taking 
 Norfolk should receive the weight of your judgment when presented 
 to Gen. McClellan. The General admitted its force, but took no 
 action. Yours, very truly, 
 
 {Signed) G. V. Fox. 
 Brigadier-General John G. Barnard, U. S. Army. 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Extract from a Letter of Admiral Goldsborough. 
 
 ^'{Confidential.) U. S. Flag-ship Minnesota, 
 
 Hampton Roads, October 17, 18G1. 
 
 Sir — I have received further minute reliable information with re- 
 gard to the preparation of the Merrimac for an attack on Newport 
 
NOTES. 61 
 
 News and these roads, as I am now quite satisfied tliat unless her 
 stability be compromitted by her heavy top works of wood and iron, 
 and her weight of battery, she Avill, in all probability, prove to be 
 very formidalilc. The supposition of the insurgents is that she will 
 be impregnable, and a trial of her sufficiency to resist shot of the 
 heaviest calibre, at a short range, is to take place before she is sent 
 out to engage us. She is still in the dry-dock at Norfolk, and yet 
 needs a goodly quantity of iron to complete her casing, all of which 
 is furnished from Richmond. She has her old engines on board, 
 and they have been made to work tolerably well. They are not 
 expected, however, I understand, to atlbrd anything more than a 
 moderate velocity. 
 
 " On coming out, she must, necessarily, proceed as low down as 
 about Scwall's Point before she can shape her course to the west- 
 ward for Newport News, and this will bring her within three and a 
 half miles of us. !N[y present purpose is to let her get well over 
 towards the Congress and Cumberland, off Newport News, and 
 then to put at her with this ship and every thing else that may be on 
 hand at the time, with a view of bringing her between the fire of 
 those ships and these, and cutting off all retreat on her part. It is 
 understood that she is to be assisted by the two steamers up James 
 River, but as thoy cannot be made very powerful, I attach no very 
 great consequence to this intention, 
 
 '• Nothing. I think, but very close work can possibly be of service 
 in accomi>lishing the destruction of the Llerrimac, and even of 
 that a great deal may be necessary. From what I gather, boarding 
 is impracticable, as she can only be assailed in that way through the 
 ports, of which she has, in all, but fourteen. 
 
 If I could be furnished with a couple of tugs or small steamers, 
 to attend upon the Congress and Cumberland, in season, so as to 
 tow these promptly into position in case of necessity, they might 
 prove of very groat service. It will be, I infer, at least a fortnight 
 before the Mcrrimac will make her attempt ; but in the meantime 
 I could employ those tugs or steamers very advantageously in the 
 way of guard vessels at night, despatch and tow vessels by day, etc., 
 etc. ****** 
 " Your most obdt. servant, 
 
 (Signed,) " L. M. Goldsborough, 
 " To the Hon'ble " Flag Officer. 
 
 " The Secretary of the Navy." 
 
62 NOTES. 
 
 Extract from Letter of Capt. John Marston. 
 
 «' ( Conjideniial.) " U. S. Steamer Roanoke, 
 
 "Hampton Roads, February 21, 1862. 
 " Hon. Gideon Welles, 
 
 " Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 " Sir : * * * By a dispatch which I received last evening 
 from General Wool, I learn that the Merrimac will positively 
 attack Newport News within five days, acting in conjunction with 
 the Jamestown and Yorktown from James River, and that the at- 
 tack will be made at night. I can only regret that the Roanoke 
 should be without an engine, and has a deficiency of 180 men in 
 her crew ; but you may be assured we shall do our best. 
 " Very respectfully, your obd't. servant, 
 
 " (Signed,) John Marston, 
 " Captain and Senior Officei*." 
 
 By the last extract it will be seen that, during the latter part 
 of February and early part of March, the attack of the Merrimac 
 was daily expected, and, by Mr. Fox's letter, so fiir from the Navy 
 Department depending on the Congress and Cumberland to " take 
 care" of the Merrimac, the Congress had actually been ordered 
 away from Newport News, as a precaution, in consequence of her 
 deficient crew. 
 
 This was exactly the period when General McClellan was pre- 
 paring to fill the waters of the " lower Chesapeake" with transports 
 crowded with troops. 
 
 Note 3. — Page 16. 
 
 Col. Lecomte's remarks are noticed only on account of the in- 
 spiration under which he writes, and the associations which he has 
 had. In the published translation of a former work of his, entitled,, 
 " The War in the United States," his account of " the Federal artil- 
 lery" is thus characterized, in a foot note (p. 59), by Gen. Barry : 
 " It would be scarcely possible to collect more errors in so small 
 a space." He has demonstrated the possibility, however, in his ac- 
 count of the fortifications of Washington. Looking over the map 
 of the defences as it is, or as it was during Col. Lecomte's service 
 
NOTES. . 63 
 
 here, I find but one single one >vhich was not primarily selected 
 either by myself or by subordinates charged with carrying out my 
 views in reference to the general design. That single exception 
 was a site so prominent and so excellent that it was strange it had 
 been thus far overlooked by us, and that its primary selection should 
 bo due to another — the late and lamented General Richardson. 
 Some of the sites selected were examined by Gen, McClellan, and, 
 in general, all Avere known and approved by him previous to com- 
 mencement. That the individual works were models of engineering 
 skill (and it is in this point of view alone that our critic deigns to pay 
 us a compliment) is not pretended. As individual works they were 
 very defective, and have required numerous alterations. The pres- 
 sure was too great to admit of matured plans or elaborate construc- 
 tion. The line remains to this day essentially as it was established 
 in the months of August and Septemberj 1861, and though not 
 throughout absolutely the. best, perhaps, that could be selected, is 
 so nearly so as to surprise those who, undei'standing the enormous 
 difficulties of fixing such a line in so short a time, in a country so 
 broken and covered with woods, have carefully examined it. 
 
 In another place Col. Lecomte has given additional evidence of 
 the extraordinary talent which so astonished Gen. Barry. In refer- 
 ence to our ignorance concerning the topography of the Peninsula, 
 affirmed by me in my official report, and confirmed by Gen. McClel- 
 lan, he sapiontly, and with a high spirit of justice doubtless, re- 
 marks, " The blame must chiefly rest upon Gen. Barnard himself, 
 >Vho, as commander of the engineers, was bound to procure in 
 advance all possible information as to topography and hydrography 
 of the country." 
 
 Col. Lecomte's business in this country was to observe the war 
 and to study the organization, etc., of the armies of the United 
 States. As a member of Gen. !McClellan's staff he had peculiar 
 facilities for studying the organization of the Army of the Potomac 
 — then a type of our organizations elsewhere. Shall we impute it 
 to ignorance that, in his three or four months of service, he did 
 not learn that there were on the staff of that army two distinct 
 Chiefs of Engineers — the one of engineers proper, and the other of 
 Topofjrophirnl enrjlnccrs? that it was the province of the latter to 
 collect the information which he specifies 1 This supposition seems 
 incredible. It is, moreover, negatived by a foot-note, which he has 
 adopted as his own to the translation of his book, by which he re- 
 
G4: . NOTES. 
 
 cognizes the existence (at the time) of a Corps of Topographical 
 Engineers. 
 
 It was the function of the Chief of Topographical Engineers to 
 obtain the topographical information for the intended campaign ; 
 but neither he nor any one else could do it without an intimation 
 as to where such researches were required, and Gen, McClellan has 
 exhibited the sources of the (worse than useless) information that he 
 had, and has relieved everybody but himself from the blame of 
 something worse than neglect of duty. 
 
 As to the real value, at that time, of the works for defending 
 Washington, the following is General McClellan's testimony 
 (p. 427) : 
 
 " I regarded the defences of Washington as adequate for its pro- 
 tection, and that the movement of the Army of the Potomac would 
 necessarily draw from in front of Washington the force that had 
 previously threatened it. My mind had always been clear and 
 distinct that the moment the army moved on any line from the 
 lower Chesapeake, the rebels must necessarily abandon Manassas. 
 I never doubted that a second — always bearing in mind that the 
 defences of Washington were complete.'''' 
 
 I have made some statements elsewhere as to the degree of com- 
 pleteness, containing my written official opinion given Dec. 6, 1861 
 (in connection with this very matter), that it " would not be safe 
 to leave Washington guarded by less than 100,000 men — that is, 
 until we had become certain that the enemy had withdrawn from 
 our front so far as to render his return upon it impracticable." (See 
 Appendix.) 
 
 My argument was precisely the reverse of that above quoted 
 from Gen. McClellan. If the enemy had 100,000 men at Manas- 
 sas, and our army moved on any line from the lower Chesapeake 
 (leaving Washington guarded by much less than 100,000 men) he 
 would not abandon Manassas, but attack Washington. 
 
 Note 4.— Page 19. 
 
 " Knowing that Gen. Ilugcr could easily spare some troops to 
 reinforce Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's 
 army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and 
 
NOTES. 65 
 
 York Rivers to the same points, I proposed to invest that town 
 without delay. 
 
 "The accompanying map of Col. Cram, U. S. Topographical 
 Engineers attached to Gen. Wool's staff, given to me as the result 
 of several months'' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design." 
 
 Note 5.— Page 20. 
 
 Nor did the Navy Department ever undertake to reduce the bat- 
 teries at Yorktown. 
 
 The following extracts from the testimony of Ass't. Sec'y Fox, 
 Admiral Goldsborough, and Major-Gcn. Hitchcock, are important 
 to a full understanding of this matter. 
 
 A letter had been addressed by me by order of Gen. McClellan 
 to Mr. Fo.x concerning the Mcrrimac. Mr. Fox testifies : 
 
 " To this dispatch I sent the following reply : 
 
 '"Navy Department, March 13, 1862. 
 
 '■'The J^fonitor is more than a match for the Mcrrimac, but she 
 may be disabled in the next encounter. I cannot advise so great a 
 dependence upon her. 
 
 " ' Bunisidc and Golds])orough arc very strong for the Chowan 
 River route to Norfolk, and I brought up maps, explanations, &c. 
 It turns everything and is only 27 miles to Norfolk by two good 
 roads. Burnside will have Newbern this week. 
 
 '• 'The Mcrrimac must go into dock for repairs. The Monitor 
 ma}-, and I think will destroy the Mcrrimac in the next fight, but 
 this is hope, not certainty. 
 
 «'G. V. Fox, 
 " ' Assistant Secretary. 
 •• ' Major-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 " ' Fairfax Court House.' 
 
 " Then I got a private note from Gen. McClellan dated, ' Fairfax 
 Court House, March 14,' in which he says : 
 
 " ' From all accounts received I have such a living faith in the 
 gallant little ^Monitor that I feel that we can trust her; so I have 
 determined on the Fort Monroe movement.' 
 
66 NOTES. 
 
 " That is all the correspondence there was with the Navy Depart- 
 ment upon that subject. It shows that this plan of Gen. McClellan 
 was changed between the time I arrived at Old Point Comfort, 
 which was on the morning of the 9th of March, and the time when 
 I got back to Washington, which, I think, was on the 12th. It was 
 determined that the army should go by way of Fort Monroe. The 
 Navy Department never was consulted at all, to my knowledge, in 
 regard to anything connected with the matter. No statement was 
 ever made to us, why they were going there beyond this. All that 
 we Avcre told about it is what I have read here. Admiral Golds 
 borough was put in communication with Gen. McClellan and di- 
 rected to cooperate with him ; and all the force we had available 
 was placed at the disposal of the admiral. I have no knowledge 
 that anything that Gen. McClellan wanted in the way of attack or 
 defence was ever neglected by our people. No complaint was ever 
 made to the Navy Department. There was never any plan devised 
 by the War Department that I know of, that required the navy to 
 operate. The Secretary simply ordered the ships there to do what 
 they could as the exigencies arose. In the private letter from which 
 I have read. Gen. McClellan speaks of operations against Yorktown 
 and Gloucester. But I do not think any of the army officers ex- 
 pected those places to be attacked by ships. Yorktown is sixty or 
 seventy feet above the water ; the vessels could not reach the bat- 
 teries on the crest of the hill, and therefore they would be exposed 
 to destruction without being able to return the fire. Admiral 
 Goldsborough was in constant communication with Gen. McClellan, 
 and they were very well disposed towards each other to the last 
 moment so far as I ever knew. 
 
 " Question. It has been said that one reason for the failure of the 
 Peninsula campaign was the detention of the army before the lines 
 of Yorktown a whole month, in consequence of the navy not being 
 able to co-operate and secure to us the free navigation of the York 
 and James Rivers. Will you state what you know in relation to 
 that matter ?" 
 
 " Answer. So far as I know all the vessels that Gen. McClellan 
 required in his operations against Yorktown, were placed at his dis- 
 posal by Admiral Goldsborough. I am not aware that he ever 
 required that Ave should attack Yorktown, or that it was ever 
 expected that we should do so. All the avenues of supply to the 
 army there were free and open as far as the army had possession. 
 
NOTES. 67 
 
 Gen. McCIellan expected the navy to neutralize the Mcrrimac, and 
 1 promised that it should be done, and that she should never pass 
 Hampton Roads." 
 
 Admiral Goldsborough testifies : 
 
 " With regard to that campaign no naval authority whatever to 
 my knowledge was ever consulted until after a considerable part of 
 the army got down there. The whole matter was arranged here in 
 Washington by officers of the army, as I understood. I believe 
 (hey never said a word even to the Secretary of the Navy. Cer- 
 tainly nothing was ever said to me till the eleventh hour. Then it 
 was that I he;ird that they expected the navy to cooperate with 
 them. The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Watson, came down 
 to see me in behalf, as he said, of the Secretary of War and the 
 President of the United States. He told me of the great anxiety 
 felt in Washington in regard to the Mcrrimac ; that they were 
 apprehensive that she might get up the York River and entirely 
 disconcert all the movements of the army. I told Mr. Watson 
 that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the 
 Mcrrimac going up the York River ; that she never could get there, 
 for I had ample means to prevent that. This was in the latter part 
 of March, 1SG2. The army at that time was about assembling at 
 Old Point Comfort. Gen, McCIellan had not then arrived. I recol- 
 lect making such observations to the Assistant Secretary of War as 
 I think left liini perfectly well satisfied that the Mcrrimac could 
 never get up the York River. The plan of going up the York River 
 was a matter decided upon here in Washington, 
 
 *' Question. AVcre you ever requested by Gen, McCIellan to per- 
 form any naval service in connection with the operations of the 
 army that you did not perform ? 
 
 " Answer. No sir, I was requested to perform services in con- 
 nection with the army, and every thing was done that was asked. 
 Gen, McCIellan, before coming down himself sent Col, Woodbury 
 to consult me in regard to the best plan of attacking Yorktown, I 
 pointed out to that officer, what I considered the best mode, A day 
 or two afterwards Gen. McCIellan sent down Gen, Barnard to con- 
 sult me, I told him that I had already explained my views very 
 fully to Col, Woodbury and repeated them to him. Some short 
 time after that Gen, Hitchcock came down ; whether sent by any 
 
68 NOTES. 
 
 body I don't know. He came on board my ship to consult me 
 about the matter, and I pointed out to him what I thought the best^ 
 plan, and he as well as the other two officers, seemed to agree with 
 me perfectly. When Gen. McClellan came down, he did not go on 
 shore the first day, but immediately came on board my ship to con- 
 sult with me as to the best mode of attacking Yorktown. The 
 approach to Richmond was to be up the York River ; the approach 
 up the James River was never mentioned." 
 
 General Hitchcock goes at great length into the merits of the 
 plan of campaign, and into the causes which caused McDowell's 
 corps to be retained. (Franklin's division was sent, however, and 
 afterwards McCall's, so that on the Chickahominy Gen. McClellan 
 had all the troops he ever counted upon having, except King's divi- 
 sion, wliich was replaced by troops received from Fortress Monroe 
 and elsewhere.) Though necessarily long. Gen. Hitchcock's testi- 
 mony should be read, and most of it is introduced here. 
 
 " A military objection to the plan was his separating his army 
 from its proper base, which was Washington, and transferring it to 
 a point from which it could not return in case of disaster without 
 great danger. That is a military principle which Gen. McClellan 
 himself recognized in a communication to the President in objection 
 to a jilanof the President, as 1 understood. That military objection 
 is substantially this : that in taking the army up the Peninsula Gen. 
 McCIelhxn made two points of defence, one the city of Washington 
 and the other the position he assumed on the Peninsula. These two 
 points were widely separated, and did not communicate with each 
 other. He thus gave the enemy an opportunity of concentrating 
 upon either of them, while it obliged the Union forces to be divided 
 in order to secure the defence of the military point here at Wash- 
 ington. That, among military men, I believe, is considered, to bo 
 one of the most dangerous conditions in which a body of troops can 
 be placed. It is particularly illustrated in the history of Frederick 
 the Great, who destroyed in succession three armies which were 
 separated, and not in communication with each other, and gained 
 his chief military glory from that fact. My objection to the whole 
 of that plan was very serious, and I should on no account have 
 acquiesced in it had I been consulted. 
 
 " When the President issued his order acquiescing in the move- 
 ment proposed by Gen. McClellan, he required, as that order will 
 
NOTES. 69 
 
 show, that "Washington should be left entirely secure in the opinion 
 "of all the corps commanders then there. That opinion, as appears 
 by the report of their council, on the 13th March last, required, 
 according to the view of three of those corps commanders, that all 
 the forts south of the Potomac should be fully garrisoned ; the forts 
 north of the Potomac should be occupied, and in addition to that a 
 covering force of 25,000 men. The other corps commander, Gen. 
 Sumner, was of the opinion that 40,000 men would be sufficient to 
 make the city secure, indicating nothing in regard to their distribu- 
 tion. 
 
 " There is a feature in the proceedings of that council which is 
 very important in this connection. The council agreed to the pro- 
 posed movement by way of the Peninsula, provided the rebel steamer 
 JMerrimac could be neutralized, and they were unanimous in that 
 opinion. Gen. McClellan did not regard that part of their report, 
 but proceeded to execute his plan while the Merrimac was still sup- 
 posed to be in good condition, with a power that no one can very 
 easily estimate. If she had not been afterwards destroyed, she 
 might have destroyed all of the navy and all of the shipping about 
 Fortress Monroe, and then would have been the means of destroy- 
 ing McClellan's army, cutting it oft' from supplies, and leaving it 
 helpless. Subsequent events fortunately relieved Gen. McClellan 
 in a great degree from the consequences of disregarding that feature 
 in the decision of the council. The immediate consequence of dis- 
 regarding that ojiinion of the council was, that the navy was unable 
 to cooperate to its full extent with Gen. McClellan in reducing 
 Gloucester Point and Yorktown, being held at Fortress Monroe to 
 watch this single vessel the Merrimac. 
 
 "With regard to the opinion of the council as to what was re- 
 quired for the defence of Washington, I consider it as applying to 
 the capital itself, to Washington, and its immediate front towards 
 the enemy," and as not extending to the Shenandoah Valley, to Har- 
 per's Ferry, or to Baltimore. I construe the opinion of the council 
 as requiring that all the forts in the neighborhood of Washington 
 should be manned, and that, over and above that, there should be 
 an army or unit of force of 25,000 men as a covering force in front 
 of the city. 1 am not able to find in the public reports connected 
 with these proceedings any evidence that this requirement of the 
 council was complied with. 
 
 •• General McClellan made a report, dated steamer Commodore, 
 
70 NOTES. 
 
 April 1, 1862, showing a certain distribution of forces for the de- 
 fence of Washington. That report enumerates 18,000 men left at 
 Washington for the immediate defence of the capital. It speaks of 
 the forces under Gen. Abercrombie and Gen. Geary amounting to 
 7,780. This report of Gen. McClellan is so miscellaneous in its 
 mode of statement that it is difficult to determine with any accuracy 
 the precise forces left at the various points referred to in it. It 
 seems to count Blenker's division as a part of the force in front of 
 Washington, and yet speaks of his design to order that division 
 from Warrenton to Strasburgh. It was ordered from Warrenton 
 through Strasburgh, and still further on out of this vicinity entirely 
 into the Mountain Department. It speaks of Banks' division as if 
 in front of Washington, and yet that division was ordered into the 
 Valley of the Shenandoah, in consequence of the attack made by 
 Jackson upon Shields at Winchester, so that both Banks and Blen- 
 ker were removed from in front of Washington, and could not be 
 considered as a part of the 25,000 required as a unit of force in 
 front of the city. 
 
 " Making that deduction, I find the force in the city and the two 
 guards, for they were little else, under Abercrombie and Geary, 
 altogether make less than 25,000 men. I considered, therefore, that 
 the order of the President with respect to the defence of the capital 
 had been ' neglected,' to use his own phrase. I did not consider the 
 force in the Shenandoah Valley as available for the immediate de- 
 fence of the capital, being required for the defence of that Valley. 
 Tlie report made by Gen. Wadsworth to the Secretary of War on 
 the 2d of April, which I understand is in possession of the Com- 
 mittee, will show the condition and character of the troops under 
 his command. When this state of things became known to the 
 Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, he required Gen. Thomas and my- 
 self to make a report upon the execution of the President's order, 
 the letter of Gen. McClellan of the 1st Api-il, the report of Gen. 
 Wadsworth on the 2d April, and one or two other papers con- 
 nected with them, requiring us to give a distinct opinion whether 
 Gen. McClellan had complied or not with the requirements of the 
 order of the President. On examining those papers we were of 
 opinion that the order of the President had not been complied with, 
 and so reported. This report of course went to the President, and 
 on the next day, if I mistake not, the 3d April, the President came 
 to the War Office, and had quite a long conversation with the chiefs 
 
NOTES. 71 
 
 of the various bureaus of the War Department, the Secretary of 
 ■ ar being present. At the conclusion of that consultation, the 
 President himself ordered that one of the corps of the Army of 
 .he Potomac which were then in front of Washington, should be 
 detained for the defence of the capital. The selection was left with 
 ■;he Secretary of War, who designated the corps commanded by 
 Gen. McDowell. I will mention that Gen. McDowell himself was 
 lot present, and I believe knew nothing of the steps which led to 
 lis detention here until after the order was issued. As soon as 
 General McClellan heard of this he complained of it. He wished 
 ;he whole of McDowell's corps sent to him. If he could not get 
 :he whole of it, he wanted ]McCairs and Franklin's divisions, leaving 
 jne division only here. Failing in that, he wished particularly to 
 !iave Franklin's division ordered to join him. The President again 
 came to the War Office on the 11th April, if I mistake not, and 
 held another conference of considerable length with the same 
 afllcers as before, the chiefs of bureaus, and the Secretary of War. 
 It was plain that the President was extremely anxious to gratify 
 Gen. ^McClellan and to give him every possible support in his 
 power, not losing sight of his imperative duty to see that this capi- 
 tal w;i.s sufTieiontly guarded. The result of that conference was, 
 that he ordered Franklin 's division to join McClellan, and it was 
 iccordingly sent down to him. 
 
 ****** 
 
 " QHcstion. Do you understand now the movement made by 
 General McClellan to Fortress Monroe and up the York River was 
 in compliance with the recommendation of the council of generals 
 commanding army corps, and held at Fairfax Court House on the 
 I3th !N[aroli last, or in violation of it ? 
 
 '' Answer. I have considered, and do now consider that it was in 
 violation of the recommendation of that council in two important 
 particulars ; one particular being that portion of their report which 
 represents the council as agreeing to the expedition by way of the 
 Peninsula provided the rebel steamer Merrimac could first be 
 neutralized. That very important proviso General McClellan disre- 
 garded, llie other particular that he disregarded was the leaving a 
 force for the safety of Washington. He did not leave the force 
 jvhieh, as I have considered, the council contemplated in that report 
 Eis necessary. 
 
72 NOTES. 
 
 *' By the Chairman. 
 « Question. On whom did the responsibility rest for the violation 
 of those orders and the consequences that followed that violation % 
 
 « Answer. I had occasion a few days since to answer a question 
 similar to that before the court in the case of Gen. McDowell. I 
 believe that among military men it is a settled principle that when- 
 ever a subordinate assumes to depart from a strict obedience to the 
 orders of his superior, he takes upon himself the entire responsibility 
 of all that follows ; and he can only protect himself from the mili- 
 tary penalties of disobedience by some brilliant success. I have 
 considered that Gen. McClellan was in that condition; that m de- 
 parting from the original instructions received from the President, 
 he took upon himself the entire responsibility of that whole move-^ 
 ment and when subsequently the President found it necessary to 
 detain a part of McClellan's forces in front of Washington to make 
 good his original order, he performed an act of imperious duty, 
 and Gen. McClellan had no right to complain of that act as an m- 
 terference with his command or as tending to embarrass his opera- 
 tions. „ _„ , . , 
 
 " Situated as Gen. McCllelan was in front of Washington, under 
 
 the orders of the President, his first duty was to comply with thesf' 
 
 orders— and having done that, then to consider whether he hac 
 
 sufficient force to accomplish the expedition he contemplated. If h( 
 
 found that he had not a sufficient force for that purpose, then he, 
 
 should have so represented to the President, and then the relatiout 
 
 of the parties would have been entirely changed, and the responsi-^ 
 
 bility would have been entirely with the President. But inasmuch 
 
 as General McClellan did not adopt that course, but went on his 
 
 expedition of his own motion, following a plan different from thaj; 
 
 of the President, he took upon himself the entire responsibility bt 
 
 all that followed. The President, in yielding to the plan of Gen. 
 
 McClellan, put him under very explicit orders to leave Washington 
 
 entirely secure, not only in his own opinion, but in the opinion of 
 
 all the four commanders of corps-d'armee. These four commanders 
 
 gave an opinion. As I understand the matter, Gen. McClellan did 
 
 not comply with that opinion, and therein Gen. McClellan took 
 
 upon himself the responsibility of all the results that grew out of 
 
 his campaign." 
 
NOTES. 73 
 
 Note 6.— Page 20. 
 
 The Council of Corps Commanders held at Fairfax Court House, 
 March 13, 1862, were of opinion [vide McClellan's Report, pp. 59 
 and 60) : 
 
 " I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordons- 
 ville behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the 
 generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried 
 on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the 
 York and James Rivers. """ 
 " Provided, 
 " 1st. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralized. 
 " 2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate 
 transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington 
 and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; and 
 
 " 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in 
 silencing the enemy's batteries on the York River. 
 
 " 4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be 
 such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from 
 menace. (Unanimous.) 
 
 " II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved 
 against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the eai-liest possible 
 moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing rail- 
 \ roads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the 
 army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexan- 
 dria, and Aquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.) 
 
 " N. B. That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac 
 fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occupied, a coverino- 
 force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice, 
 (Keys, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for 
 the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumnei*.)" 
 
 It is to be particularly observed that, if the four conditions or 
 provisos imposed upon the adoption of the first plan " cannot be," 
 then " the army should be moved against the enemy behind the 
 Rappahannock, &c." 
 
 Now the " enemy's vessel, the Merrimac" was not neutralized, 
 and nothing was established concerning her further than that she 
 should not be permitted to escape from Hampton Roads. 
 
 As to the second proviso, the council does not fix what it means 
 by an " immediate transfer," but it is well known that only trans- 
 
T4 N0TE8- 
 
 portation for part of the army, at a time, could be furnished, and 
 that three weeks were consumed in getting less than three corps, to 
 Fort Monroe. 
 
 As to the third proviso, the council define with some precision 
 what they mean by their emphatic language " the force left to cover 
 Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for 
 its safety from menaceP 
 
 If these conditions cannot be fulfilled, the army is to be at once 
 " moved against the enemy behind the Kappahannock." The con- 
 ditions were not fulfilled, nay more, they were completely dis- 
 regarded, and in his conduct in thus disregarding the counsels of 
 others as to the safety of Washington, and leading his army into a 
 region, of which he had no knowledge. Gen. McClellan exhibited at 
 least infatuation and levity of conduct, not to speak of the gi'aver 
 aspect of his course as a positive disobedience of orders. 
 
 Note 7.— Page 23. 
 
 The following English criticism may properly find place here. 
 (United Service Magazine, February, 1864) : 
 
 " As regards the value of the plan, in a merely military point of 
 view, three faults may be enumerated : 1st. It was too rash. 2d. 
 It violated the principles of war, 3d. Its application was too 
 *imid. 
 
 " 1st. An army of 130,000 volunteers should not be moved 
 about as if it were a single division. 
 
 "2d. The choice of Fortress Monroe, as a secondary basis, involved 
 the necessity of leaving Washington, or the fixed basis, to be threat- 
 ened, morally at least, by the enemy. The communications also 
 between these two places were open to an attack from the Merrimac, 
 an iron-plated ship, which lay at Norfolk on the south side of Hamp- 
 ton Koaas. 
 
 " The first movement to Fortress Monroe was the stride of a 
 giant. The second, in the direction of Richmond, was that of a 
 dwarf When the army arrived in front of the lines at Yorktown, 
 it numbered, probably, 100,000 men, and here there was no timid 
 President to interfere with the command ; nevertheless McClellan 
 suffered himself to be stopped in the middle of an offensive cam- 
 
NOTES. 75 
 
 ^aign by Magruder and 12,000 men. His previous information, 
 ^Tiiich was afterwards found to be incorrect, had stated this number 
 at 20,000, and ^fagruder made such skilful dispositions as effectually 
 completed the deception. But a general who, as Napoleon used to 
 say, knows his trade, will seldom be deceived. Why did he not 
 take means to ascertain the truth ? Supposing, however, that his 
 previous information had been correct, he should not have wasted 
 his time waiting for McDowell when every moment of it was pre- 
 cious. But every hour's delay after he had heard of that general's 
 retention, created eighty chances to one against his ultimate success. 
 The hour of his arrival in front of the lines should have been the 
 liour of his attack upon them. Two overwhelming masses, to which 
 life and energy had been communicated, should have been hurled on 
 separate points. ^lagruder not only defeated but destroyed ! The 
 morale of the Federal army raised ! The result of the campaign, 
 although it might not have been decisive, would have been more 
 honorable.'' 
 
 Note 8. — Page 25. 
 
 Tlie Prince de Joinville alludes as follows to the route taken : 
 " On May IGth " (the Prince was with head-quarters) " we reached 
 the White House, etc. * * * * * 
 
 " At AVhite House the Pamunkey ceases to be navigable. The 
 York River Railroad, which unites Richmond with this river, crosses 
 it at this point by a bridge, which the enemy liad destroyed, and 
 then runs in almost a straight line to the Virginian capital. Tliis 
 road had boon scarcely injured. Having neither embankments nor 
 viaducts it was not easy to destroy it. A few rails only had been 
 removed, and were soon replaced ; all the rolling stock had been 
 run off, but the Federal army had locomotives and cars on board of its 
 transports. The whole flotilla was unloaded at White House, where 
 a vast depot was established under the protection of the gunboats, 
 and all the bustle of a seaport soon became visible. The army re- 
 commenced its march to Richmond, following the line of the rail- 
 way, which was to be the vital artery of its operations." 
 
76 NOTES. 
 
 Note 9.— Page 28. • 
 
 General Heintzelman testifies as follows (pp. 351 and 352, Report 
 of Committee on the Conduct of the War) : 
 
 " As soon as I had found the attack was serious, I had sent an 
 officer over to inform Gen. Sumner and Gen. McClellan. Gen. 
 McCIellan at once ordered Gen. Sumner to cross his troops over the 
 Chickahominy. However, Gen. Sumner, as soon as he had heard 
 the firing, and without waiting for orders, had put his troops under 
 arms and marched them out of camp, thus saving an hour or so, 
 which was of great service to us. There was one brigade of Gen. 
 Casey's division, under Gen. Naglee, on our extreme right, that 
 held its position pretty well. The centre gave way, and fell back 
 some distance. We succeeded in rallying them and repulsed the 
 enemy. My right held its ground until some time after dark, when 
 it fell back and joined us in the field-works we had thrown up a little 
 west of the Chickahominy. In the night I got a telegram from Gen. 
 McClellan that he wanted to see me at the railroad station on 
 the other side of the Chickahominy. I got on a locomotive and 
 went down there and saw him. I told him what had occurred and 
 what we could do. He said that he relied upon my holding the 
 position we then occupied, and that he would either spend that night 
 with Gen. Sumner, or come over the next morning to keep rank off 
 me, as he said Gen. Sumner ranked me. When I got back I got a 
 note from Gen. Sumner, saying that from all he could learn he ex- 
 pected to be attacked with overwhelming force in the morning, and 
 wanted me to assist him. I replied that any aid I could give him 
 he should have. 
 
 " In the morning I went to the front, and had not been there long 
 before I heard firing in the direction of Gen. Sumner's forces. I 
 had the half of Gen. Hooker's division there ; the other half was at 
 Bottom's Bridge. I immediately sent that half division forward in 
 the direction of the firing. They soon met the enemy, who were 
 repulsed by Gen. Sumner's troops and mine. The whole affair was 
 over in a very short time. 
 
 " About two o'clock in the afternoon Gen. McClellan came over 
 to my headquarters and congratulated me on our success ; and said 
 that he had relied upon my doing what I had promised him." 
 
 General Sumner testifies (pp. 302 and 303) : 
 
 " On reaching Fair Oaks I was met by Gen. Couch, who told me 
 
NOTES. 77 
 
 that he had been separated by the enemy from the rest of the army, 
 and was expecting an attack every moment. I formed this division 
 of Sedgwick together with Couch's troops, assuming command of 
 the whole as quickly as possible, with a battery of artillery between 
 the two divisions. Before the formation was comjjleted the enemy 
 made a ferocious attack on my centre, evidently with tlic expectation 
 of getting possession of my battery. My forces were formed in two 
 lines, nearly at right angles. I had six regiments in hand on the 
 left of the battery. After sustaining a very severe fire for some 
 time, those six regiments charged directly into the woods, crossing 
 a broken-down fence in doing so. The enemy then fled, and the 
 action was over for that day. During that night, Saturday night, I 
 succeeded in getting up Richardson's division and formed it parallel 
 with the railroad. About 7^ o'clock on Sunday morning the troops 
 became engaged on the railroad. It is not exactly certain which 
 party fired first. • A very severe fight continued then for the space 
 of three or four hours, in which I lost many valuable officers and 
 men ; the enemy were then entirely routed, and fled. There was 
 fighting on the same day on my left by a portion of Gen. Ileintzel- 
 mail's troops, but that was at such a distance that I have myself no 
 knowledge of the circumstances. There was no communication at 
 that time between us. 
 
 ****** 
 
 " Question. "Who had the command at the battle of Fair Oaks, or 
 Seven Pines ? They arc the same thing under those two names, I 
 understand. 
 
 " Answer. No,-sir, they were two distinct places. The battle in 
 which I commanded on Saturday and Sunday was at Fair Oaks. 
 The battle of Seven Pines was a separate battle some miles from 
 Fair Oaks. Gen. Ileintzelman was in command at Seven 
 Pines." 
 
 '• Question. "Where was Gen. McClellan during those battles ? 
 
 '' Ausicer. Gen. McClellan came over to me at Fair Oaks about 
 1'.2 o'clock on Sunday. The action of Sunday had then ceased. I 
 asked him at once if he had any orders to give. He said no ; that 
 he had no changes to make ; that he was satisfied with what had 
 been done." 
 
 So incoherent was the whole aflliir, that Gen. Sumner states that 
 the battle of the Seven Pines was " a separate battle" from that at 
 which he commanded ("' Fair Oaks"). lie is mistaken, however, 
 
78 NOTES. 
 
 in his assertion that it was " several miles" from Fair Oaks ; it vras 
 scarcely more than a mile. 
 
 Tlie railroad station on the other side " of the Chickahominy" at 
 which Gen. Heintzelman had his interview with Gen. McClellan on 
 Saturday night, was just about seven miles by railroad from the two 
 fields, and about 7.30 Sunday morning the fighting was resumed 
 at Fair Oaks, and a " severe fight continued there for the space of 
 three or four hours." Gen. McClellan made his presence on the 
 field known to Gen. Sumner at 12 m. and to Gen. Heintzelman at 
 2 p. M. lie had told Gen. Heintzelman that he would be on the 
 field the same night or " the next morning," to " keep rank off him" 
 (Heintzelman). It would appear, therefore, that, failing to notify 
 Heintzelman that he was to be under the orders of Sumner — posi- 
 tively encouraging him to feel himself independent of Sumner — he 
 foiled to appear himself, and left the two generals to do their own 
 fighting " on their own hook." 
 
 Note 9.\.— Page 28. 
 
 In reference to this paragraph, it is proper to say that the way of 
 getting the right wing over the Chickahominy (in other words of 
 " uniting the two wings of the army") in time to take part in the 
 battle, " make a vigorous pursuit," or to do whatever else the occa- 
 sion might require, was the one theme in the minds of all, at Head- 
 quarters as elsewhere. The bridges over the river had been ordered 
 the night before, and Col. Alexander had spent the whole night in 
 bridging the numerous ditches intersecting the bottom lands, all for 
 this single object. Gen. Smith's division had been ordered down to 
 the " New Bridge," and Bi'ook's brigade was waiting at the bridge 
 for the order to pass. 
 
 I have stated in my official report (p. 35) that the " New Bridge 
 was passable" for all arms at 8.15 a. m. ; that a few hours later I 
 fo md the bottom lands so completely overflowed that, while the 
 enemy held the commanding heights in front with artillery, I did not 
 think the passage practicable ; and that at that moment I was ut- 
 terly ignorant of the condition of aflairs on the other side. The 
 preceding evening had brought us gloomy accounts of our situation. 
 The battle had been renewed in the morning, and was going on. I 
 knew not whether it was with success or with additional disa&- 
 
K0TE8. 79 
 
 ter to us. Now the time of this report from me was actually about 
 (somewhat preceding) that of the final repulse of the rebels by 
 Gen. Sumner. It was the very time at which to decide to take ad- 
 vantage of our victory to sweep the hostile forces from the heights 
 facing " New Bridge," and to bring over our right wing — " unite" it 
 to the loft, and '' make a vigorous pursuit," etc. 
 
 Note 10.— Page 32. 
 
 The only bridges existing might have been seized by the enemy 
 simultaneously with his attack, as pointed out in the following ex- 
 tracts : 
 
 " The left cannot be turned, being protected by the impenetrable 
 morasses of White Oak Swamp ; but the right might be surrounded. 
 At this very moment, indeed, a strong Confederate column is mov- 
 ing in that direction. If it succeeded in getting between Bottom's 
 Bridge and the Federal troops who are fighting at Savage's Station, 
 the whole left wing is lost. It will have no retreat left, and must 
 be overwhelmed. But exactly at this moment (6 o'clock p. m.) new 
 actors came upon the stage." — {Prince de Joinville.) 
 
 " Had the attack which Sumner met and repulsed been made 
 simultaneously with the assault in front, a single battalion, nay, a 
 single company, could have seized and destroyed " Sumner's Upper 
 Bridge," the only one, as before remarked, then passable. Sumner 
 would consequently have been unable to take part in the battle, 
 and our left wing would have been taken in flank, and, in all prob- 
 ability, defeated. — (" The Peninsular Campaign^'' AUantic Monthly, 
 March, 1864.) 
 
 Note 11.— Page 32. 
 
 A sentence in the President's dispatch of this period (May 24th), 
 " I wish you to move cautiously and safely," is italicized by Gen, 
 McClellan as approving of and justifying the astonishingly dilatory 
 proceedings intended to be considered •' cautious" and " safe." This 
 was while Heintzelman and Keyes were for a whole week lying in 
 their remarkably " safe" positions. 
 
80 ' NOTES, 
 
 Note 12.— Page 36. 
 
 The following is Gen. McClellan's testimony, pp. 432-33 (1) : 
 
 Ques(io7i. — " "When were those bridges completed, or were they 
 ever completed ? ' 
 
 Anstvcr. " The most important ones were completed, I should 
 think, about the 20th of June— not far from then." 
 
 Question. " After the completion of the bridges, why was not 
 the attempt made to drive the enemy from that position ?" 
 
 Answer. " The main causes of the delay were, I think, the condi 
 tion of the ground and the necessity for finishing the defensive works 
 regarded as necessary for the safety of the army should it meet with 
 a disaster in the attack." 
 
 Question. " At what point were the defensive works to which you 
 refer ?" 
 
 Answer, " They were mainly in the vicinity of the battle-field of 
 Fair Oaks, and then to the right of that, looking to the position of 
 the enemy at New Bridge. The affair of the 25th of June was the 
 beginning of the operations against the enemy. I had expected to 
 attack the position in rear of New Bridge by the 26th or 27th of 
 June, but was prevented by the series of occurrences known as the 
 seven days' battle." 
 
 The " defensive works" were to be completed, as per Report 
 (p. 21), June 21. The " condition of the ground" was good enough 
 at any time after those dates. 
 
 Note 13.— Page 39. 
 
 Magruder's language as quoted by Pollard, is : 
 
 " Had. McClellan massed his whole force in column, and ad- 
 vanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at 
 Austcrlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest captain of 
 any age, though the head of the column would have suffered greatly, 
 its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation 
 of our works about Richmond, and consequently of the city, might 
 have been his reward." 
 
 Pollard, it is true, attempts to refute Magruder, and says that by 
 12 M. of Friday (June 27) the communications of Lcc's main 
 body with Richmond wore re-established, by the possession of the 
 New Bridge. But the attack described by Magruder should have 
 
NOTES. 81 
 
 been made by daylight ou Friday. Whether at that hour, or 
 later, was immaterial, however, so far as the isolation of Lee was 
 concerned, for part of our operation would have been to occupy the 
 la-ights from Dr. Garnett's house to opposite Mechanicsville with 
 artillery. Lee could not have repassed the Chickahominy without 
 great delays and disastrous losses, and time would have been 
 acquired for all that Magruder describes. 
 
 Note 14. — Page 40. 
 
 Mr. Iliram Ketchum of New York has made a praiseworthy 
 effort to illustrate Gen. McClellan's military exploits ; in doing 
 which he has apparently considered it necessary to his purpose to 
 convict mo of baseness of conduct and of being actuated by dis- 
 honorable motives. lie finds it " melancholy to think that men, 
 who never lack courage in the field of battle, should ever fail to 
 speak their honest conviction where they have reason to suppose 
 their undisguised convictions will give offence to those in power." 
 
 He sees '" a melancholy example of this truth in the case of Gen. 
 Barnard," and does not hesitate to affirm that I " knevT what kind 
 of testimony the Committee w^anted," and to insinuate that I shaped 
 it accordingly (I was unconscious that such a Committee yet existed 
 when I wrote the report which constitutes the bulk of my " testi- 
 rnony.") 
 
 I should not have noticed this " Ileraclitus" among military 
 critics, this " melancholy" libeler of the moral character of others, 
 and sorry apologist of Gen. McClcllan, but for a letter to him of 
 F. J. Porter, written to "bear cheerful testimony to the accuracy of 
 his statements in reviewing the operations of this campaign, and to 
 the soundness of his " conclusions." 
 
 In this letter the writer says, '' But what induced me to address 
 this note to you at this time is your recent review of the battle of 
 Gaines' ^Mill. Our forces which amounted to 32,000 were under my 
 command in that battle. The force of the enemy brought against 
 us was more than double our numbei*. If, in this battle, I had been 
 reinforced in time with 15,000 fresh troops, the enemy who was 
 repulsed three times would have been fmally driven back and the 
 battle won on our side." 
 
 Whatever the above "cheerful testimony" may be, in other 
 
82 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 respects, it is a " stunner" indeed in its bearings upon the general- 
 ship of his Chief. Fighting a decisive battle with 32,000 men 
 against double numbers of an enemy who employed the bulk of his 
 army in the attacl<, leaving between us and Richmond only just 
 enough troops to keep up a show of force, while nearly 70,000 of 
 our men lay idle a few miles distant, witnesses almost of the battle 
 — it becomes evident to the dullest comprehension that (in F. J. 
 Porter's words) '• all we wanted to insure success before Richmond 
 was the reinforcements which had been repeatedly called for by 
 Gen. McClellan, and which by a vigorous and prompt effort could 
 have been supplied." 
 
 Note 15. — Page 42. 
 
 Pollard's "Second Year cf the War" has the following para- 
 graph : 
 
 "The assault of the enemy's works near Gaines' Mill is a memor- 
 able part of the engagement of Friday, and the display of fortitude, 
 as well as quick and dashing gallantry of our troops on that occa- 
 sion, takes its place by the side of the most glorious exploits of the 
 war. Gen. A. P. Hill had made the first assault upon the lines of 
 the enemy's intrenchments near Gaines Mill. A fierce struggle 
 had ensued between his division and the garrison of the line of de- 
 fence. Repeated charges were made by Hill's troops, but the 
 formidable character of the works, and murderous volleys from the 
 
 artillery covering them, kept our troops in check," 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
 " The works carried by our noble troops would have been in- 
 vincible to the bayonet, had they been garrisoned by men less 
 dastardly than the Yankees. All had been done on our side with 
 the bullet and the bayonet. For four hours had our inferior force, 
 unaided by a single piece of artillery, withstood over 30,000, 
 assisted by 26 pieces of artillery." 
 
 The above quotations are made in order to contradict their auda- 
 cious misrepresentations. 
 
 The battle of " Gaines' Mill" was fought on unfortified ground, ail 
 our fortifications being guarded by the 70,000 men on the other side 
 of the river. There was not a defensive work of any kind on that 
 side of the Chickahominy, and as to the " inferior force" of the 
 
NOTES. 83 
 
 rebels, there were by Pollard's own statements present, the corps 
 of Jackson estimated at 35,000; the corps of Longstreet, consist- 
 ins; of his own division and that of D. II. Hill ; the corps of A. P. 
 Hill ("about 14,000 men'' — Pollard) and the troops of Brig.-Gen. 
 Branch (number unknown). The number of 65,000, given after- 
 wards in the Richmond papers, is fully made up in the above 
 organizations. Porter's corps (including McCall) numbered about 
 27,000; it was reinforced to about 35,000, but Slocum's division, 
 the only reinforcement that took part in the battle, kept on its legs 
 from 7 A. M., did not get into action until 3.30 P. M. 
 
 Concerning the manner in which reinforcements were actually 
 furnished to Porter, the following extract is made from Gen. Frank- 
 lin's testimony, showing how the only body of men that actually 
 did reach Porter in time to take part in the battle, was handled : 
 
 " At 7 o'clock in the morning of that day I was ordered to send 
 Gen. Slocum's division to assist Gen. Porter. This order was coun- 
 termanded about 9 o'clock, after a part of the division had crossed 
 the Chickahominy ; the division was then sent to its old position. I 
 was again ordered about 2 o'clock in the afternoon to send it to the 
 assistance of Gon. Porter. It did go over and was severely engaged, 
 losing nearly 2,000 men. 
 
 " Question. Do you know why the order for Slocum's division to 
 move forward was countermanded 1 
 
 " Answer. The order to send the division over was signed by Col. 
 Colburn, and I sent back some word, I do not remember what. Gen. 
 jNIarcy answered that he hardly supposed the general commanding 
 could have intended to send the division over; that there must have 
 been some mistake about it, he thought. Then about 9 o'clock, 
 perhaps nearly 10, the order was countermanded, the order coun- 
 termanding coming from Gen. ]McClellan, although I do not remem- 
 ber who signed it. "What was the reason for ordering the division 
 back I do not know." 
 
 At 5 p..\r., when the fortunes of the day had become desperate^ the 
 brigades of French and Meagher were ordered over, arriving, as 
 might be supposed, too late to render any important service ; in- 
 deed, I heard at the time, that the shouts of ^Meagher's men caused 
 our troops in front to believe the rebels had got in their rear, and 
 thus increased the disorder." 
 
84 NOTES. 
 
 Note 16.— Pagi: 43. 
 
 Pollard describes the works on each side of the railroad as " turn- 
 ing out to be an immense embrasured fortification, extending for 
 hundreds of yards on either side of the track." 
 
 As these works were not taken by " assault " from the " dastardly 
 Yankees," he has no reason for the exaggeration, or rather falsehood 
 used in reference to the imaginary " intrenchments near Gaines' 
 Mill ;" nor are the Avords used a very great exaggeration of the 
 truth. These " defensive works," though styled by Gen. McClellan 
 " slight earthworks," were heavier works than those at Manassas 
 and Centreville, which he has, with another object, characterized as 
 " strong lines of intrenchments," " heavy earth- works," etc. 
 
 Note 17.— Page 43. 
 
 General Franklin testifies as follows : 
 
 " Question. If there was a necessity to keep a portion of our 
 troops on the left bank to do that, ought there not to have been 
 communications opened from the one bank to the other, so that the 
 two wings could have been united without delay 1 
 
 '■'■ Ansioer. That was impossible, as the land lay then, without 
 whipping the enemy at Old Tavern, opposite New Bridge. 
 
 " Question. In your judgment should not the enemy have been 
 drivoi from that position instead of being allowed to remain there ? 
 
 " Ansiver. They should have been ; and I think that ought to 
 have been done by concentrating the whole army on the same side 
 of the river before making the attack. I think the whole of Fitz- 
 John Porter's command ought to have been withdrawn to the right 
 bank of the river on the night of the 2Gth of June, instead of fight- 
 ing where they did the next day." 
 
 Note 18.— Pack 44. 
 
 In Gen. McClellan's self-satisfied and self-laudatory report of 
 June 15th, the battle of Gaines' Mill and the holding of the enemy 
 *' at bay," were but necessary incidents to the " changing of baso" 
 
NOTES. 85 
 
 to the Janios, and he scuds Gen. Woodbury on the morning of the 
 28tli " to increase the number of bridges " over the White Oak 
 Swamp, as it'somc hod already been made. All the bridges and pas- 
 sages of the White Oak Swamp had long been, as Cen. McClellan 
 ■well knew, destroyed and obstructed, and uhen Gen, Woodbury 
 arrived at White Oak Swamp Bridge, on the morning of the 28th, 
 he fijund Gen. Peck still engaged in increasing the obstructions. The 
 confusion of ideas between retreating to the James and " taking 
 Richmond " pervades all the statements in relation to this period. 
 In answer to one question he tells the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the War that the battle of Gaines' Mill enabled him " to withdraw 
 the army and its material ;" and in another he tells them that the 
 retreat to tlie James was only " a contingency he thought of. But 
 my impression is, that up to the time of the battle of Gaines' Mill, 
 I still hoped that we should be able to hold our own." 
 
 In his dispatch to the Secretary of War, of June 28th, 12.20 a.m. 
 (p. 131), the General says : " Had I 20,000, or even 10,000, fresh 
 troops to use to-riiorrow, I could take Richmond. * * * If* at 
 this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain the 
 victory to-morrow." Quite likely that he could, even without the 
 additional men ; that is, that an able commander could have done 
 so. But, after having previously stated that his enemy was nearly 
 double his own force in numbers — that Richmond was defended by 
 strong works — this assertion on the very heels of a disastrous de- 
 feat ! Let the reader, even though he has been one of those who 
 have laid all the blame of the disastrous failure of Gen. McClellan's 
 campaign on the administration, and has vilified it for putting on 
 the shelf its " ablest " commander, attentively read the dispatches 
 pul)li.slied in this Report, and say what confidence any administra- 
 tion could, at this period, have in their author. The dispatch just 
 quoted from, winds up by telling the Secretary of War, "You have 
 done your best to sacrifice this army T' 
 
 Note 19. — Page 45. 
 
 ■^riie following extracts from the testimony of Generals Sumner, 
 Ileintzelman, Franklin, and McCall are given in this connection. 
 Gen. Franklin's story is very brief, but pertinent : 
 
 '•'' Not being able to communicate with head-quarters I determined 
 to evacuate the position [i. e., at White Oak Swamp Bridge) at 10 
 
86 NOTES. 
 
 o'clock at night, and fall back to the James River. Before evacuat- 
 ing I sent word to Gen. Heintzelman that I was about to leave." 
 
 Sumner. " That action also closed at dark. About 8 o'clock in 
 the evening, while we were collecting the wounded and dead. Gen. 
 Seymour came to me and told me that Gen. Franklin had retreated, 
 and that Gen. Heintzelman was preparing to follow him. I had re- 
 ceived no orders to retreat, and should not have retreated if I had 
 not received this information. But finding myself left with my 
 corps entirely unsupported, I felt compelled to fall back with the 
 rest of the army to Malvern. I accordingly fell back and reported 
 at day-light the next morning to Gen. McClellan- on the James 
 River. He told me that he had intended that the army should have 
 held on where they were the day before, and that no orders had 
 been sent to retreat; but as the rest of the army had fallen back, he 
 was very glad I had done so. The next morning the troops were 
 placed in position by direction of Gen. McClellan, under the imme- 
 diate orders of the Engineer officers. Tiie action at Malvern com- 
 menced on the left about 10 o'clock in the morning. Gen. McClel- 
 lan had deemed it necessary to go down to Harrison's Landing to 
 determine on the point to which the troops were to retire. I 
 therefore found myself, by virtue of my seniority of rank, in com- 
 mand of the army, without having been invested formally with that 
 command, or having received any instructions in relation to it." 
 
 Heintzelman. " About that time it got to be dusk and soon 
 after that the firing ceased, except some little cannonading. I met 
 three of Gen. McClellan's aides, and by one of them I had sent word 
 how we were situated and what I thought could be done. I thought 
 we could not hold our position, but would have to fall back. About 
 8 or 9 o'clock that night an ofilccr came to me and told me that 
 Gen. Franklin had fallen back from White Oak Swamp Bridge. I 
 could not believe it, because that at once gave the enemy a chance 
 to cut us off. After a while Gen. Seymour of the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves came to me and told me the same thing. I asked him if 
 he was sent to inform me, and he said he was not, I then said that 
 was no authority for nic and that I could not fall back. Gen. 
 Slocuni wanted me to fall back. I said that I was ordered to hold 
 the position and must obey orders ; that I had sent to head-quarters 
 to report the condition of aflfairs, and expected to get an answer. I 
 
NOTES. 87 
 
 sent an <iide to learn the facts. He came back and reported that 
 Gen. Franklin had actually fallen back, and the enemy were ropair- 
 inc the bridge and would soon be over. I then made arrangements 
 to fill back, I went to Gen. Sumner's head-quarters and got him to 
 write a note to Gen. ^IcClellan and state to him what had occurred." 
 
 McCall. "To !Mct 'all's division was assigned by order of the 
 General-in-Chief (through Gen. Porter) a position a short distance 
 in front of the point, where the line of march turned abruptly 
 from the Newmarket road towards the river. I accordingly 
 formed my divisions in two lines crossing at right angles the 
 Newmarket road, and in front of the Turkey Bridge or Quaker 
 road leading to the river, and along which the trains were then 
 moving. Sumner's position was at some distance to the left of 
 mine and somewhat retired ; Hooker was on Sumner's left and 
 slightly advanced ; Kearney was on the opposite side of the road 
 and consecjuently on my right ; there was more or less interval be- 
 tween each two. The Confederate forces advanced from Richmond 
 down the Newmarket road, Lee's object being to cut or break 
 through the Union army at this point. Had he succeeded in doing 
 so, he could have seized and strongly occupied the only two ap- 
 proaches to James River and then the left wing of our army 
 (Heintzelman's and Franklin's corps) would inevitably have been 
 cut off from McClellan, and the right wing would have been taken 
 in rear on its march. That this was Lee's object, as it was his 
 expectation to accomplish it, is established by the declaration of 
 Gen. Longstreet, that, if McCall's division had not fought as well 
 as it did, they would have captured the Federal army. (See Sur- 
 geon ^larsh's testimony herewith.) And from the disposition of 
 Lee's forces it necessarily followed that the brunt of the attack 
 would be on my position. It was so ; and to my division, which 
 had been fighting and marching for four days and nights without 
 rest for a single night, it was indeed a desperate affair. My divi- 
 sion, with the exception of an unimportant reinforcement, had 
 fought the battle of Mechanicsville single-handed, on the 2Gth, and 
 had inflicted on Lee the only defeat the Confederates acknowledged 
 they sustained in front of Richmond ; their own accounts admit- 
 ting they were repulsed at every point with unparalleled loss. On 
 the 27th my division fought again at Gaines' Mill, and having lost 
 heavily in the last battle, they were now reduced to about 6,000 
 
0» NOTES. 
 
 men. On the 30th, at Newmarket Cross Roads, the attack M^as 
 made on my division by Longstreet and A. P. Hill's division, crack 
 troops, and about 18,000 strong. For some time my division alone 
 was engaged, several attempts having been made to find a weak point 
 in my line. 
 
 ****** 
 
 " Had my division been routed, the march of the Federal army 
 would certainly have been seriously interrupted by Lee forcing his 
 masses into the interval. (See Gen. Porter's statement herewith.) 
 When I was surrounded and taken prisoner, I was conducted at 
 once to Lee's head-quarters. Here Longstreet told me they had 
 70,000 men bearing on that point, all of whom would arrive before 
 midnight ; and had he succeeded in forcing McCIellan's column of 
 march, they would have been thrust in between the right and left 
 wings of the Federal army. Now, under this very probable con- 
 tingency, had I not held my position, (see Gen. Porter's report 
 herewith,) the state of affairs in the left wing of McCIellan's army 
 would have been critical indeed ; but Lee was checked (as Long- 
 street admitted) by my division (see Surgeon Marsh's report here- 
 with) and the divisions in the rear, together with the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves, and others moved on during the night and joined Mc- 
 Clellan at Malvern Hill before daylight." 
 
 Note 20.— Page 46. 
 
 The " rout of McCall's division," refuted by Gen. McCall him- 
 self has been a subject of controversy. That the division con- 
 tributed most essentially to the saving of the army, and that it 
 was in no propei- sense of the w'ord " routed," is maintained, and I 
 think, successfully by that general. 
 
 " It -was very late at night," indeed, before it w\as known at head- 
 quarters that any disaster had taken place with McCall — that he 
 himself was captured — that Meade was wounded, Simmons killed, 
 and Seymour's brigade dispersed and himself missing. The affliir 
 was over at dark and the distance from Dew's house, where (after 
 dark) was Gen. McClellan, about three miles. Yet such was the 
 efficiency of the command and of the staff* arrangements, that an 
 event upon which hinged the fortunes of the next day and the fate 
 of the army, was not known until " very late at night," nor even 
 
NOTES. S9 
 
 then was '• the true position of afiairs" at all understood. Tlie army 
 (as stated elsewhere) was saved by the independent action of the 
 corps commanders. 
 
 Note 21.— r age 4G. 
 
 The commanding general in his evidence before the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War is strangely oblivious of a six hours' 
 journey made on a day of battle. 
 
 '• Question. At what point or points were you from the time you 
 left the field until you returned ? 
 
 ^' Anstver. I was at head-quarters, near ITaxalPs house. 
 
 " Quest ion. Were you down to the river or on board the gun- 
 boats during any part of that day, between the time you left the 
 field and your return to it ? 
 
 ^'■Ansircr. I do not remember ; it is possible I may have been) 
 as my camp was directly on the river." 
 
 In the report, however, (p. 138) it is stated that after making the 
 "entire circuit of the position, I returned to Ilaxall's, whence I went 
 •with Capt. Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its 
 depots," and that he " returned to ^lalvern before the serious 
 fighting comineiu'cd." 
 
 On the 2Gth June we have seen that the encm.y was so dis- 
 courteous as to frustrate our '• final advance," decided upon for that 
 day, by '" attacking our right in strong force" at 3} p. m, of same 
 day. On this memorable day of Malvern he is far from being so 
 disobliging, since he waits until after 5 p. m. for the general's re- 
 turn to commence his "serious fightinfr." 
 
 TIic fallowing is Gen. Heintzelman's account : 
 
 "After some time I rode over to Malvern Hill, and found Gen. 
 !McClcllan, who had just got information of what was going on" (he 
 alludes to the filling back of the army from Glendale and Wliitc 
 Oak Swamps, of which I have quoted his account in Note 16.) 
 " He directed mc to go and find Gen. Porter and Gen. Barnard, his 
 chief engineer, and they would point out the ground on Malvern 
 Ilill we could occupy. I found them, but it was so dark that we 
 could not do anything. It was half past one o'clock in the morning 
 then. I laid down and slept a little while. At daylight I called 
 those generals, and they went out to see where we could be posted. 
 
90 " NOTES. 
 
 After an hour or irore they came back and pointed out the direction 
 very indefinitely. A few minutes after Gen. McClellan arrived. 
 I joined him and we went round, and he pointed out the position for 
 Gen. Porter's corps and told me where to post mine. I left staff- 
 officers to post the troops, and went around and left Gen. McClellan 
 at his camp on James River. About 10 o'clock that day the enemy 
 commenced an attack with artillery. We replied to them when, 
 after a while, it ceased. Not long after it commenced again. They 
 sent some infantry up. That attack was repulsed and ceased. Late 
 in the afternoon they made their grand attack on our extreme left. 
 That lasted until some time after night. We gave them a very 
 thorough repulse; Late in the afternoon Gen. Porter sent to Gen. 
 Sumner for a brigade and battery. Gen. Sumner turned to me and 
 asked me what I thought of it. I said, ' by all means furnish it ; 
 if we are beaten, we may as well be vdefeated at one place as at an- 
 other.' I also sent a brigade and a battery, and the consequence 
 was we gave them that terrible defeat so that they did not follow 
 us the next day. 
 
 " Question. Where was Gen. McClellan during that fight 1 
 ^'- Ansiver. He was down at his head-quarters on the James 
 River. He came up some time late in the afternoon. Gen. Sum- 
 ner told one of his aides that he had sent up, that he intended to 
 mass his troops, unless he gave orders to the contrary. That was 
 made known to Gen. McClellan and he sent up orders not to move 
 the troops. He came up and was with Gen. Porter about half an 
 hour." 
 
 In reference to the battle of Malvern, Gen. McClellan states 
 (p. 138) : 
 
 " Gen, Barnard then received full instructions for postmg the 
 troops as they arrived,"' and Gen. Ileintzelman testifies above, " that 
 those generals, (Porter and Barnard,) after making a tour of the 
 field," came back and "pointed out the direction very indefinitely." 
 
 I knew nothing about Gen. Porter in this connection, but I know 
 that I returned, as stated by Gen. Ileintzelman, and " pointed out" 
 to him the direction, &nd described as well as I could the where- 
 abouts of a position for him— it being out of my power at that 
 moment to do anything more. Excepting an orderly I was alone. 
 My acting aide-de-camp, Lieut, Abbot, had gone down to " Haxall's" 
 Bick— my adjutant, Lieut. Hall, had been taken from me by Gen. 
 
K0TE8. 91 
 
 \farcy forty-eight hours before, without any intimation to me, 
 md I had not seen him the previous day or night. Col. Alexander, 
 Jeut. Comstock, and Lieut. Farquhar had been sent away on a 
 econnoissance and had not since reported. I could not lead Gen. 
 leintzelman's corps to its position, but desirous of getting it ou t oi 
 he way (as the other corps were now rapidly crowding in) indicated 
 he road to take, and described as definitely as possible an approxi- 
 nate position ; I sent a pressing request to head-quarters for aides, 
 nd returned to an examination of the field, presuming Gen, 
 leintzelman would move his corps in the direction I indicated, and 
 hat I should place it more " definitely" afterwards. 
 
 It seems that Gen. McClellan gave orders to me to " post the 
 roops," went to Ilaxall's, and gave exactly the same order to Gen. 
 lumphrey?, without notifying him or me of the other's orders — 
 Ian went on to the field and (according to Gen. Ileintzelman's ac- 
 ount) posicd the (roops himself* 
 
 In my report (p. 42) I have done injustice to Gen, Humphreys 
 1 speaking of him merely as an assistant, I was not aware that he 
 ad independent orders, nor that the officers who accompanied him 
 ad been primarily directed to report to him, and not to me. As 
 tated in my report, the execution of the " posting" was done by 
 thers after I left that part of the line (the relative positions of the 
 ifforent corps having been agreed on between us) and was done 
 nder direction of Gen. Humphreys. The giving of independent 
 rders to Gen. Humphreys and myself, and the subsequent direct 
 rdera to corps commanders, and the ignorance, in which Gen. 
 umner was left as to the positions of the troops, when, by Gen. 
 IcClellan's departure, the command of the whole army devolved 
 pon him (see Note 19) are all characteristic. 
 
 Note 22.— Page 47. 
 
 Inept to confirm and take advantage of an existing superiority 
 1 the morale of his army, as we have seen Gen, McClellan to be at 
 rorktown, to seize a moment of victory and of. very complete demo- 
 alization in the enemy's ranks after the battle of Fair Oaks, it be- 
 
 * Gen. McClollan also states in his evidence before tlie Committee on the Con- 
 uct of the War : " I selected the positions in a general way. ♦ * * 
 idicating io the different commanders the approximate positions they were to 
 ccupy." 
 
92 NOTES. 
 
 comes almost amusing to read the folio-wing, from his testimony 
 before the Committee on the Conduct of the War : *' 
 
 " Question. Will you state in what you consider your chances for 
 success would have been greater with the addition of 20,000 men to 
 the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than they were 
 when you were in front of Richmond, and before Jackson had 
 formed a junction with the rest of the rebel forces 1 
 
 " Answer. I should have counted upon the effect of the battles 
 which had just taken place upon the enemy. We had then strong 
 reason to believe that the enemy's losses had been very much hea- 
 vier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much 
 demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern Hill." 
 
 A battlefield from which we made a precipitate retreat, leaving* 
 our dead and wounded in the hands of the enemy, was- not a matter 
 to cause great elation on our side, nor seriously to demoralize our 
 enemy ; and as for losses, whatever they might have been to the 
 enemy. Gen. McClellan estimates his numbers at 200,000 men. It 
 is almost perverting language to use it seriously as used in the 
 above quotation. Our own army, if not demoralized, had lost all 
 that self-confidence — that sense of invincibility, which makes, when 
 it exists, the moral strength of an army. It had not the " elan" of 
 victory, for it knew not what victory was. After four mouths of 
 hardship, unrelieved by any brilliant successes — always in its bat- 
 tles (even at Williamsburg) fighting on the defensive — driven at 
 length from Richmond, and barely succeeding in each combat on its 
 retreat in holding its own, while abandoning dead and wounded and 
 losing heavily in that of which the loss so much touches the soldier's 
 pride — artillery — the army was certainly disheartened, and in the 
 higher ranks, confidence in the commander was wanting. 
 
 To appreciate the state of feeling in the rebel army (whether its 
 " losses " had been " heavier " than our own or not), let the circum- 
 sfances be considered. Hardly more than one month before a rela- 
 tive of Jeff Davis wrote : " When I think of the dark gloom that 
 now hovers over our country, I am ready to sink with despair. 
 * * * Uncle Jeff thinks we had better go to a safer place 
 than Richmond." ***** 
 
 And now, at this moment of which we write, the great source of un- * 
 happiness was that Gen. McClellan's army had been permitted to escape 
 at all. 
 
NOTES. 93 
 
 Pollard (''Second Year of the War"), page 75: 
 
 . ' "The glory and fruits of our victory may have been seriously 
 diminished by the grave mishap or fault by which the enemy was 
 permitted to leave his camp on the south side of the Chickahominy, 
 in an open country, and to plunge into the dense cover of wood and 
 swamp, when the best portion of a whole week was consumed in 
 hunting him and finding out his new position, only in time to attack 
 him under the uncertainty and disadvantage of the darkness of 
 night. 
 
 " But the successes achieved in the series of engagements which 
 had already occurred were not to be lightly esteemed, or to be de- 
 preciated, because of the errors which, if they had not occurred, 
 would have made our victory more glorious and complete. The 
 «eige of Richmond had been raised; an army of 150,000 men had 
 been pushed from their strongholds and fortifications and put to 
 flight ; we had enjoyed the eclat of an almost daily succession of 
 victories; we had gathered an immense spoil in stores, provisions, 
 and artillery; we had demolished and dispersed, if we had not suc- 
 ceeded in annihilating, an army which had every resource that could 
 be summoned to its assistance, every possible addition to numbers 
 within the reach of the Yankee government, and every material 
 condition of success to ensure for it the great prize of the capital of 
 the Confederacy, which was now, as fiir as human judgment could 
 determine, irretrievably lost to them, and secure in the protection 
 of a victorious army." 
 
 Tiic dashing, fearless, and enterprising army which Lee brought 
 against Pope is the most perfect illustration of "the effects of the 
 battles which had just taken place upon the enemy ;" and it was 
 against such a body of men, numbering 200,000 (according to his 
 own estimates), that Gen. McClellan was going to march with 
 I'iO.OOO men, counting upon the demoralization produced (" especi 
 ally'') by Malvern Hill! 
 
 It was, as we all know, the habit of Napoleon to estimate m num- 
 bers the chances for and against success in his plans of campaign. 
 Gen. McClellan, however, quite exceeds Napoleon in accuracy of 
 calculation. From an enemy 200,000 strong, " very much demor- 
 alized"' (as we know) by "the battle of Malvern Hill," we, with 
 120,000 men, " can take Richmond if we have but half a chance.''^ — 
 (Dispatch of July 12, 18G2.) 
 
94 NOTES. 
 
 Note 23, to Appendix, page 51. 
 
 It may be doubted whether this is a fair exhibition of Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan's plan ; Avhether such a scheme could really have been 
 soberly entertained. 
 
 Urbanna is 50 miles in a straight line from Richmond. Across 
 the route lay the " Dragon Swamp " (head of the Piankatank River), 
 the two formidable rivers, the Matapony and Pamunkey, and the 
 well-known Chickahominy. 
 
 From Fredericksburg to Richmond is, in a straight line, but 
 about 50 miles ; from Manassas Junction to Richmond 80 miles, or 
 by railroad 120 miles. To collect transports for 35,000 or 40,000 
 men ; to embark that number, move to Urbanna, land that force, 
 with its artillery, horses, and supplies, force the passage of the 
 Piankatank, the two great rivers mentioned, and the Chickahominy, 
 before the enemy could move his forces at Fredericksburg and 
 Manassas, 50, 80, and 120 miles, with railroads all the way, is truly 
 an incredible conception. Here, however, is Gen. McClellan's tes- 
 timony : 
 
 " Question. Did you anticipate that that movement could be made 
 without the knowledge of the rebels, and in such a manner as to 
 enable you to cut off or intercept their retreat from Manassas to 
 Centreville ? 
 
 " Answer. I do not think that w^c could entirely intercept their 
 retreat to Richmond, but the chances were that if this movement 
 was fairly started, before they were aware of it, we could fight them 
 in front of Richmond to their disadvantage, before they could get 
 all their troops in hand. 
 
 " Question. Do you mean by that that you expected to intercept 
 their retreat to liichmond in such a manner as to divide their forces, 
 leaving a part of it on this side of the point where you intercept 
 their communications, and then fight the balance of it at Richmond ? 
 
 " Answer. In reply to that I can only repeat that I hoped, if pro- 
 per secrecy was observed, to reach the vicinity of Richmond before 
 they could concentrate all their troops there ; that they could not 
 get all their troops down from Manassas, and before wc got there." 
 
NOTES. 96 
 
 Note 24.— Page 14. 
 
 1^ '^''Col. Lecompte's statement of numbers differs considerably from 
 one laid before a council of tear, by Gen. McClellan, on the 2d of 
 
 I ^farchr 
 
 I Since writing tlio above, I have found a memoranduni taken at 
 the time by me, which shows that even Col. Lccompte's statement 
 does dirtcr " very much'' as to an important portion of the rebel 
 forces, from " one laid before a council of war." The council was 
 instituted as follows : 
 
 Memorandum. — "Generals Barnard, McDowell, Ileintzelman, 
 and Hooker, to meet Gen. Marcy and Capt. Wyman" (U. S. N.), 
 " to-morrow, *2d March, to propose and prepare the details of a 
 plan for opening the lower Potomac on the following basis, &c., &;c." 
 
 (This was after the plan mentioned (p. IG) "for throwing Hooker's 
 division across to carry" the rebel batteries " by assault," had been 
 abandoned.) 
 
 A map was laid before the council, on which was marked the 
 probable positions and numerical strength of the enemy's forces at 
 Manassas and Centrevillc, and thence along the line to Dumfries 
 They were as follows : 
 
 On tbo Dumfries Road and Jones' Station, all within 4^- 
 miles of Dumfries road, between Xcabsco and Powell's 
 
 Creek, 6,400 
 
 Between Dumfries, Evansport, and Shipping Point, . . 3,200 
 
 Hampton's Legion, Occoquan and Colchester, . . . 4,000 
 
 13,600 
 
 Near Wolf Run Shoals, 7,000 
 
 At Manassas, ......... 900 
 
 Near Mauassiis, ..... 
 Union Mills, \ Taylor's Brigade, . . 
 
 ) Elzoy's 
 At other point,'? not specified in Memorandum 
 Road from Centrovillo to Blackburn's Ford (Bo 
 
 « i n * Ml ) 6th Virginia, 
 At Centreville, t „ 
 
 ) 5 Companies, 
 
 At Cub Run, [Jones' Brigade, . 
 
 ) Tomb's " 
 At " Stone Bridge," Stuart's Cavalry, 
 
 . 3,600 
 4,000 
 2,800—6,800 
 
 . 4,800 
 nham), . 4,000 
 1,000 
 
 300—1,300 
 2,500 
 3,000—5,500 
 
 . 3,000—36,900 
 
 50,500 
 
 By this estimate there were therefore at " Manassas, Centreville, 
 Bull Run, and Upper Occoquan," 36,900 men instead of the forty 
 
96 NOTES. 
 
 odd thousand of the " Count of Paris," and the eighty thousand of 
 the report of the " Chief of Secret Service," of March 8th, quotec?, 
 by Gen. McCIellan. 
 
 It is a noticeable fact, however, that, even by this diminished 
 statement, there were in the immediate vicinity of the batteries 
 against which " preparations were even made for throwing Hooker's 
 division across the river to carry them by assault" (p. 50), a force 
 of 9,600 men, and within two or three hours' march, 11,000 more. 
 
 To the total aggregate of 50,500, east of the Blue Ridge, a few 
 thousand should be added for troops at Leesburg, Fredericksburg, 
 and between the latter place and Dumfries. 
 
 It would appear, therefore, that, according to the most reliable 
 estimate, (for none other would be furnished to a council of war), of 
 the "secret service," and Gen. McClellan's belief, the rebel force 
 " in the Potomac " did not, on the 2d of March, exceed about 60,000 
 men. 
 
 This approximates the probable truth, exceeding Mr. Hurlburt's 
 estimate by 20,000 men. (See pages 13, 14, and foot note.) 
 
THE 
 
 PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 
 
 IT8 ANTECEDENTS, 
 
 AS PEVELOPF.D UY THE 
 
 REPORT OF MAJ.UEN. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
 
 AVD OTHER 
 
 PUP.JJSII i:i) DOCUMENTS, 
 
 B Y 
 
 J. G. IJAIJ, NARD, 
 
 LIKUTrXAN-T-rHLOXri. OF KNillNF.ICRS AND RltlOADIKR-nirNRKAL rtp VOLUNTKKRR, AlTD 
 ( RIKF RNGINP.KIl IS TIIK AEMV OK TUB POTOMAC FROM ITS ORGANIZA- 
 TION TO Tint l-LiWK OF TIIK rKMNSlTI.AR OAMrAIUN. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 D . V A N X O S T R A X 1) , i 2 K H O A D TV A Y". 
 
 18 4. 
 
h^ 
 
 NOTICES OF THE PRESS, 
 
 "Of all the host of military publications that have been printed 
 for the last three years, perhaps no one possesses; more vital interest 
 than Tlie Peninsular Campaif/n and !/s AntcreiJeuts^ as developed 
 by the llepoi't of Major-General Geo. 1'.. McClellan and olliei' pub- 
 lished documents, l)y J. G. Barnard, Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers 
 and Major-Gener.al of Volunteers. General Barnard vas Chief 
 Engineer in the Army of the Potomac from its (Mganization to the 
 close of the Peninsular Campaign. TTeuce his opportunities for 
 becoming acquainted with the cause of our falhirc in 1S(V3 — a failun 
 to which all subsocpient faihircs aiv due— weiv of the first order 
 and in this thin octavo volume we have tlie decision to wliicli h 
 has come. 
 
 "A careful study of fliat volume will leave no doubt in any m | 
 prejudiced mind that (Jeiieral Mc('Iell;ui was ulterly uufil for tl ] 
 position into which lie was jiushed, and tliat it is a mcrc\ lliat t 
 counti-y was dclivei-cd from his services." — Uns/oii Traveller. 
 
 " It shows up, in severe but jusl tciiiis. llu> incomjietency, t 
 hesitation, llie Avant of general coni|)reh(Mision. fhi^ hwk of resoin-. 
 which characterize that campaign on tlie part of the (>ommam' ^ 
 General ; his failure to accomplish anylhiiig. or to take advanta 
 of the best ojijiort unities, in spite of the ]>eipetunl annoiuicenu 
 that he was about to ■' |tusli the euciuy to the wall'"' add to m) 
 that great (inward movenu-ut wliieii was always to c<uiie of 
 to-nmrrow, ImiI which \\.\^ nevef aeeoinplished." — Xein Tirdh 
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