Class U- i u . • Bnnk . IB 6 ^, COPmiCHT DEPOSm'^'"' "1^ THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ' THE WAR OF THE FUTURE IN TPIE LIGHT OF THE LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR " BY GENERAL von BERNHARDI ^ AUTHOR OF "GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR," ETC. % TRANSLATED BY F. A. HOLT, O.B.E. 'd. appleton and company NEW YORK MCMXXI CoWbp COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY PBINTED IN THB CNITED BTATXS OF AMERICA ^ FEB 10 1921 'g)CLA60S302 PREFACE The following pages were written either dur- ing the late war itself or shortly after it ended. The conclusions which they contain are entirely the product of the war. The immediate pur- pose of the book was to give to all officers who were not in a position to see the war from a central point a survey of the nature of modem war: to present them with a frame into which they could fit their special knowledge. Fur- ther I intended to suggest the principles on which the future development of the Army should be based. That purpose has now become utterly vain. A large proportion of our magnificent Corps of Officers lies on the battlefields ; another part has been compelled to give up the splendid pro- fession by wounds or disease ; the rest has been dissolved side by side with the Army and is trying to pick up a precarious livelihood in other walks of life. Thus the number of my readers in that circle can be but small. But that is not all. There is no longer a Ger- man Army, for the few men we are allowed to vi PREFACE keep after the Peace Treaty cannot be consid- ered as such. Our colonies are a thing of the past. Our fleet is at the bottom of the sea. It would be sheer madness to think of preparing for war now, even if only in theory; for it is utterly impossible for us to make war. It would be a crime to hanker after war now when peace has just been concluded and it is the duty of us all to work for the economic recovery of our people. Moreover, our present Govern- ment is doing everything to elhninate war from international intercourse, and there can be no doubt that the success of this attempt will be very welcome so long as the interests and honor of the German nation can thereby be preserved. Whether this ambition will actually succeed is another question. I do not think so unless Germany submits blindly to the will of the hostile states around her, or human nature entirely changes. But no obstacles should be placed in the way of this effort ; it should pro- ceed in the most favorable conditions possible, and in these circumstances it would be a mis- take to hint at a coming war. If in spite of all this I am publishing my work and have found a publisher willing to take on the thankless task of printing it for the benefit of the public, I am pursuing a twofold PREFACE vii aim. In the first place I shall hope to show how a war — that is a war on modern lines — is ut- terly unthinkable for Germany, impoverished and broken. Secondly, it must be remembered that the military interest in the World War, which, with its subsequent effects, is undoubt- edly ushering in a new period of world history, will very soon revive in all quarters. It is thus our duty to consider the important lessons of this great struggle, under the impressions of which we are still laboring, to visualize and grasp them so that coming generations who may have to apply them cannot charge us with irresponsible negligence and carelessness. This book is to meet that theoretical need and pro- claim our helplessness. It is, therefore, far from any desire or intention to sharpen the sword of vengeance. Its purpose is only to show that as things are we are no longer physically able to do so; it will teach about the war which we are no longer in a position to make. For the rest, there will doubtless be many gaps in my work. That is inevitable, because to all intents and purposes I am basing my ob- servations on personal experience, and that must necessarily be limited. I shall be grateful viii PREFACE to any one who feels called on to supplement what I have to say. Mountain warfare is left undiscussed of set purpose, as I have had no personal experience of it. Some one with greater qualifications must write on that subject. From my own personal experience I can only say here that there are doubtless many points of comparison with trench warfare in France, so that my remarks on this aspect are in many respects applicable to that also. VON Bernhaedi General CUNNERSDORF CONTENTS CBAPTKR PAOB Preface v Introduction xi L The Determining Factors in Modern Wab: 1 I. Masses 2 II. Military Technics 16 II. Tactics 53 I. Infantry 54 II. Artillery 86 III. Cavalry and Aircraft 125 IV. Fortifications, Engineers, and Eailway Troops 146 III. Attack, Defense, and the Initiative . . . 167 IV. The Principles of the Offensive .... 182 V. The Sources of Power 192 VI. The Influence of Politics and Economics . . 208 VII. The General Distribution of the Troops . . 229 VIII. The Battle 245 I. The Struggle for Local Advantage in Trench Warfare 254 II. The Barrage 275 III. The Decision in Trench Warfare . . 279 IV. Attack and Defense in Open Waepaeb . 290 IX. Conclusion 305 IX INTRODUCTION In my book Vom heutigen Kriege,^ which ap- peared in 1911, I showed that the great funda- mental laws of war remained the same at all times and in all circumstances, because they were based on human nature and the very es- sence of the use of force. I demonstrated, however, that their outward manifestations fre- quently varied in accordance with the political structure and culture of the warring nation, and indeed with the means and methods cm- ployed in war. These very external manifesta- tions have a compelling character and involve a certain adherence to rule, though only an ad- herence which changes periodically with the changing circumstances of life and military eifort. Thus the art of war moves between perma- nent laws and those which change periodically and are ever undergoing fresh development. It is only within these limits that our art offers the prospect of success to military undertak- ings. ' Modern War xi xii INTRODUCTION Neither the unchanging nor the periodic laws may be infringed with impunity, and it is the task of him who leads an army to give effect to the general and eternal elements of circum- stances which have temporary peculiarities and features. This is just where the difficulty lies, for there is always the danger that the commander will regard something which under certain given circumstances was in accordance with the rules, and therefore justifiable, as an eternal verity and therefore applicable even though the con- ditioning circumstances have already changed, so that he is acting under the impulse of pre- conceived opinions which, in view of the changed situation, must bring him to ruin and defeat. Thus, in 1806, the Prussian army took the field with the old linear tactics which could no longer cope with the changed battle forms of the Napoleonic period, and in spite of all its heroism suffered a severe defeat. So again in 1866 the Austrians had been too late to realize the importance of the breech-loading rifle : they kept to their old percussion rifle and their Na- poleonic columns and shock tactics, and were simply decimated by the Prussian infantry, which relied on its weapon and fought in open INTRODUCTION xiii formation. Examples of this kind can be mul- tiplied at will. In such circumstances it is the commander who has to bear the consequences of insufficient preparation and energy on the part of the governments which have not real- ized the progress and development of the art of war or learned to keep pace with that de- velopment by prompt reforms. But the commander is faced with the further danger of being overawed by external phe- nomena and under their pressure neglecting to give full effect to the great fundamental and eternal principles of war, either because he has an insufficient grasp of these principles himself or because his control of the war-machine is in- sufficient to enable him to apply his knowledge. The last Russian campaigns offer eloquent ex- amples. In the war with Japan, for instance, Kuropatkin utterly underestimated the impor- tance of the initiative and the offensive and con- fined himself to defensive operations — without any offensive reaction — from the outset. On the other hand, he was unable to maneuver and employ the mass of the Russian army, unwieldy and mentally inert as it was, in such a way as to do justice to his plans. Apart from the lack of the offensive spirit and many other defects, his schemes broke down time after time on the xiv INTRODUCTION want of judgment and resolution displayed by his subordinate commanders. He patently failed to remedy the friction in the military ma- chine, friction which is a phenomenon of every war and was particularly noticeable in the great masses of the Russian army. Nor could he make the latter conform to the great laws of war. These difficulties, which are of the very es- sence of war, have increased materially in re- cent times, for we also are living in a period of many changes in the external phenomena of war, a period of great development and trans- formation of many military values which seem calculated to confuse judgment and lead us on wrong paths. In the main this development be- gan during the war itself and on many points has taken us by surprise. Of course, develop- ments had been foreseen in some directions without our fully realizing how far they would go. In other directions we had foreseen noth- ing and got on wrong lines. But the voices which told us we were straying were not heeded. That heavy artillery would play a more im- portant role was expected and, within certain limits, allowed for. But we did not realize how great that role would be. The strength of for- INTRODUCTION xv tresses was utterly exaggerated because the power of the hostile artillery was underesti- mated. Nor had we foreseen what enormous masses of combatants would have to be called up for the World War. No measures were therefore taken for such a wholesale levy. The policy of peace at any price which we pursued, and our wholly baseless confidence that we should be al- 'lowed to pursue it, had blinded the eyes of our leading statesmen. All who raised a warning voice were denounced as unscrupulous fire- brands or officially cautioned, and the army bills in the last years before the war were totally inadequate. The importance of cavalry was totally mis- understood. It was considered an offensive weapon in spite of the obvious effects of mod- ern firearms. We hopelessly underestimated the impor- tance of aircraft and, in naval operations, the submarine arm, the development of which was at the outset held up for the benefit of the bat- tle-fleet. Lastly, we absolutely misunderstood the importance of the economic side, although warning voices were raised on this matter. We had made no sort of preparation for the block- ade of all our ports and frontiers, or for a sit- xvi INTRODUCTION uation in which we should be completely cut off from maritime communication with our import- ing and exporting countries. The wholesale transformation of our economic system which those eventualities inevitably involved had to be improvised. Indeed, we had not even thought of warning and recalling our merchant vessels which were in foreign waters, so little did we believe in the possibility of war even when Russia was in the throes of mobilization. It might be said that as a result of our total failure to realize the world situation we walked blindfolded into the trap which our enemies had set for us. However, we entered upon the struggle itself with the extended military and political views, so to speak, which had devel- oped out of the war of 1870, and to a certain extent the experiences of the Russo-Japanese war. In the General Staff, indeed, thanks to tireless work, many of the requirements of the times had been realized, if not all. Unfortu- nately our efforts thoroughly to exploit our knowledge failed time and time again, owing to politically false judgTQents of the situation which not only prevailed in political circles but were reenforced by the chronic shortsightedness and prejudice of the Reichstag, which allowed itself to be swayed by domestic party contro- INTRODUCTION xvii versy and liad lost all vision for the peril with- out. Before the war every one who pointed out the true significance of political developments was exposed to complete and hopeless miscon- struction in these circles. Thus, when the war assumed a scale which had never been foreseen, we found ourselves unprepared and faced by absolutely novel con- ditions, so that to cope with them we had to im- provise in the very middle of the war. Both the army and the fleet have shown that they were quite equal to this colossal task and able to gain the upper hand in every department, even in a war against practically the whole world — a world which had prepared for this war for years. German science also has performed brilliant feats in assisting the combatant forces and, in the early years at any rate, German labor, with relatively few exceptions, proved itself an auxiliary force of the first rank in pro- ducing the weapons of war. The only failures were the civil government — notwithstanding devoted efforts on the part of many officials — and the politicians, who were too often influ- enced by the Reichstag, and by their defective measures made the nation's task in its heroic struggle considerably more arduous. I shall not go in any detail into these matters xviii INTRODUCTION in this book, which deals with the purely mili- tarj'' aspect alone, though it is only natural that the direct effects of politics and economic ques- tions on the operations, as they have developed in present-day circumstances, must be exam- ined and discussed, as those effects are of far- reaching military importance. Otherwise my essential purpose is to inquire into the significance of all the novel phenomena of modern times which determine the form of military operations, phenomena some of which facilitate them, while others make them more arduous. Secondly, I have to consider how, in the changed circumstances, the great fundamen- tal and vital principles which mean success in war can be vindicated even to-day : retaining the initiative; using the offensive as the decisive form of action ; concentration of force at the de- cisive point; the determination of that point; the superiority of the moral factor to purely material resources ; the proper relation between attack and defense ; the will to victory ; the un- conditional dependence of policy on the require- ments and results of strategy or military ef- fort. It is of vital importance to every army, and therefore every state, to be perfectly clear on these points. Thus, and thus alone, can policy INTRODUCTION xix and war be successfully conducted. In that way only will states be in a position to develop their full powers unhindered. There is a certain beautiful dream of nations living in peace side by side, voluntarily impos- ing restraints upon themselves and recognizing their obligation to have regard for the just needs and wishes of other states. It is a dream in which the peoples which are morally and in- "tellectually the strongest will be in a position to assert themselves as the arbiters of culture, even though such a thing is impossible without a more or less autocratic authority, which is in- compatible with equal rights. But it is none the less a dream only. As long as men remain men, force in its widest sense will determine the political and cultural im- portance of states. In the last resort it is the foundation of all intellectual and moral prog- ress. THE WAR OF THE FUTURE CHAPTER I - THE DETERMINING FACTORS IN MODERN WAR When we look over the whole range of the lessons and experiences of the World War, we soon realize that they fall into two great groups, which are the determining factors in modem war : on the one side the employment of colossal armies such as the world had never seen, with all their attendant phenomena, and on the other the immense development of the mechanical side and chemistry, which have re- sulted in the appearance of a whole series of new weapons or weapons the power of which has been greatly increased. Both together have revolutionized war conditions. The first group has mainly influenced strategy, though it is not without a certain tac- tical importance, while the new triumphs in military mechanics have primarily brought about tactical changes and have affected 1 2 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE strategy and maneuver to a secondary degree, and that to a certain extent indirectly. I. — Masses When we mobilized in 1914 we put a mighty army into the field. A large number of reserve divisions had been formed according to plan and a number of Landsturm battalions called up as frontier and railway guards. But it would be impossible to speak of a general summons of the nation to arms. We were not prepared for anything like that. We had neither the arms nor the equipment. Still, our army seemed strong enough to carry through our plan of campaign. This plan, in its main lines, was based on our belief in a slow Russian mobiliza- tion, and aimed at overthrowing France deci- sively at the outset and then concentrating against Russia which would meanwhile have been kept in check by a few army corps and an Austrian offensive. This plan broke down because the Russian mobilization — though not perhaps officially — was actually in progress for a long time while we were still thinking it possible to preserve peace and taking steps with that end in view. East Prussia was overrun by the enemy before THE DETERMINING FACTOES 3 we had thought it possible. Troops had to be brought from the west to protect the very core of Prussia, and the result was that in France our armies were not strong enough to exploit strategically the tactical successes they had gained. We had to fall back on the defensive and extend our front to the sea in order to save our right wing from envelopment. As the Russians had meanwhile deployed all their armies and were pressing forward on a broad front, it became imperative to strengthen our armies, and we now proceeded to call upon the man-power of the whole nation for the bene- fit of the army. New army corps were formed of men who had not previously been called up, all the Landsturm were summoned to arms, and even depot troops were sent to the front to fill the yawning gaps. The enemy, however, re- plied with similar measures. In France the last man was called up. Savage peoples were brought to the European battlefields. Italy joined the ranks of our enemies. Rumania and finally America followed her example. Com- pulsory service was introduced in England. In- dia had to send her dusky sons and Africa her black children to Europe. Thus gradually those giant armies came into being which were compelled to stretch their line 4 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE from sea to sea, on the one hand to be safe against envelopment, and on the other to make full use of their weapons. It was a distribution of force which can be described by the expres- sion '' linear strategy." Then, with a view to increasing the powers of resistance of these far-flung lines — safe against envelopment — against frontal attacks by a superior force, and with the further purpose of keeping down the losses inflicted by shell fire in a long and stub- bom defense, the process of fortifying the posi- tions began. Deep trenches and shell-proof shelters were constructed to provide cover for both attacker and defender without preventing either from using his own weapons. Obstacles were erected to make it difficult for the enemy to approach and hold him do^vn under the fire of the defender. This form of battle had a vital influence upon the attacker also. In the first stage, in his en- deavor to keep on enveloping the enemy lines, threaten their tactical flanks and upset or cut their communications, he was compelled to reach out ever farther until the sea or land frontiers stayed his progress. Then he had to change his method entirely. Before the war the envelopment of one or both of the enemy's wings was considered the THE DETERMINING FACTORS 5 decisive form of operation. The real problem of the commander was to bring about strategic envelopment and finally carry it through tac- tically. We entered the war imbued with those ideas. Our operations were in accordance with them at the beginning of the war, and every one knows how brilliantly Field Marshal von Hin- denburg translated this theory into action in his great and annihilating victories in the east. Unfortunately, in view of the new linear strategy, this form of operation is feasible only under particularly favorable conditions. Where there are no flanks to be turned there is nothing for it but to attack the enemy frontally. We had never expected that in peace time. The voices — among others my own — which said that even break-through battles ^ were possible, and might become inevitable under modern condi- tions, were either ignored or not heard. As a matter of fact it was in that direction that mat- ters developed. In the trench warfare of to-day there are no flanks to envelop. Almost everywhere we find ourselves facing a long continuous front. The flank to be enveloped has first to be produced by an irruption into the enemy's lines, and the enemy stops at nothing to prevent such a breach * Vurchiruchsschlachten. 6 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE and close any gaps with reserves. Thus the frontal battle has become the inevitable and characteristic feature of mass warfare. To prepare for it and carry it out successfully is the great and vital — though extremely difficult — problem of the commander, a problem which both we and our opponents have often vainly endeavored to solve. The art of war has thus assumed a totally different aspect, for it is now a matter — at any rate in the opening stage — not of strategy but of concentrating and em- ploying by surprise so large a force at a given point of the enemy's front that success is as- sured. As we shall see later, this is no simple task. But if, as a result of mass armies, the frontal attack has become a permanent feature of operations, we must guard ourselves against the assumption that it must always be so. This view of the form of action must not become axiomatic. We can realize that by remember- ing the first battles of this war, not to mention the actions in Rumania or the last stage of the fighting in Russia. Indeed, this method of operation will become inevitable only where the enemy really succeeds in establishing a continu- ous front which cannot be enveloped at any point; such a front as the French from the THE DETERMINING FACTORS 7 Swiss frontier to the North Sea, or the Italian from the Swiss frontier to the Adriatic. If the enemy cannot do so, former conditions will be reproduced and it will once more be a ques- tion primarily of strategical and tactical en- velopment. There is even a definite relation be- tween the size of the theater of war and the strength of the army to be employed in it. The purely frontal action became inevitable in France because the Franco-British armies were large enough to hold a continuous front, and where any gap occurred close it again with reserves. In Russia, on the other hand, the same course was possible only within certain limits, because the front was too long in itself and became even longer as the theater of war extended eastwards with the successive en- forced retirements of the armies of our enemy. The combined Russo-Rumanian armies man- aged to form some sort of continuous line from the mouth of the Danube along the Car- pathians and northwards to the mouth of the Dvina, even though apparently they were with- out the necessary reserves. But when that line was once broken, geographical circumstances forced the hostile armies apart, and it was no longer possible for them to reestablish a single front. The conditions of a war of movement 8 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE once more came into their ovm, and we saw how relatively weak German forces destroyed first the Rumanian and then the Russian army with- out their even being able to oppose a permanent and continuous front to their enemy. This relation between mass and space must therefore always be borne in mind in consider- ing war under modern conditions. Otherwise there is a danger of slipping into linear strateg^^ ■without adequate reserves, a proceeding which contains the germ of defeat. There are thus, broadly speaking, two forms of modem operations : trench warfare with the frontal "break-through" battle, and maneuver warfare, which always comes into its o\sti where the defender, for geographiciil or numerical reasons, is unable to establish a front which cannot be enveloped, or, ha\'ing originally had such a front, finds it sundered and broken through once and for all by the attacker. Yet it ^^'ill always be the task of the commander to produce the conditions of maneuver warfare, as the chances of a decisive victory are far greater by this method than in a purely frontal battle. The result is that in the last resort the idea of envelopment must remain the dom- inant motive even in the strategic frontal action. The first stage will be a constant endeavor to THE DETERMINING FACTORS 9 envelop salients in the enemy's lines. But en- velopment must also be the final goal of the frontal attack. The enemy's line must be broken through at some point, in order that the portions of the line adjacent to the point of irruption (which will then have become wings and unsecured flanks) may be enveloped and the process of rolling up the rest of the front which is stationary may be begun. If the enemy, in spite of being defeated and thrown back, succeeds in closing the gaps and preserving the continuity of his line at the point of breach by throwing in reserves and thus pre- venting the adjacent parts of his front from be- ing rolled up, the success of the attacker may be described as a serious tactical victory, but not as a decisive victory in the strategic sense. If, on the other hand, the attacker succeeds in getting at and enveloping the flanks of his opponent, then operating where possible against his communications, and finally rolling up the part of the enemy's front which still holds (either eccentrically or concentrically) he may expect a complete strategical and tactical vic- tory. As we can see, Schlieffen's principle of en- velopment holds good for military operations under all circumstances. This has always been 10 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE 80, however various the forms it has taken — whether the oblique order of battle of Epami- nondas and Frederick the Great, Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae, Napoleon's break-through battle, or Hindenburg's encir- cling strategy at Tannenberg and in Masuria. In modern war, indeed, it may often be brought about indirectly as the result of a break-through. But the influence of masses on strategy is not exhausted with its effects on strategic opera- tions and the area of the theater of war. It makes itself felt in all questions relating to the supply of the armies with food and war mate- rial. As late as 1870-71 it was still possible to live mainly on the country, and supplies from home were, generally speaking, only supplementary to the supplies obtained on the spot. Of course in long sieges, such as the siege of Paris, the reverse was true, but this was an exception to the rule, and even on that occasion a good deal of food was contributed by the country itself. Every one who went through that siege will still have memories — rather disagreeable mem- ories — of the French mutton which, with the solidified pea-soup sent from home, formed our daily ration. THE DETERMINING FACTORS 11 Those conditions have entirely changed. Only very fertile regions are in a position to keep a modern mass army going for a short time. Once the war has passed over a particular dis- trict, or the army finds itself compelled to re- main in one place for a considerable time, its requirements must be supplied from home and a complicated network of roads and railways, .as well as an enormous amount of rolling stock, will be needed to solve the supply problem. The demands on the network of communications will be increased — as we shall see — by the demand for war material of the most various kinds, a demand which has grown to enormous propor- tions in comparison with former wars, and of itself imposes the heaviest burden on the lines of communication. The latter will further be subjected to an additional strain by the move- ments of the troops themselves. In view of the enormous size of the modem theater of war and the masses which have to be moved backwards and forwards over great dis- tances, it is impossible to carry out such move- ments on foot. Marching would mean relatively slow movement, which would be exposed to en- emy reconnaissance in the highest degree. It is therefore absolutely necessary to carry out strategic movements of troops by rail if at all 12 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE feasible, and if possible to conceal what is going on from the knowledge of the enemy. A developed road and railway system which would be equal to these requirements is cer- tainly not to be found in any part of the world. It is thus essential to construct new railways and roads and keep them continually in order. This, however, means great swarms of labor troops, and these in turn increase the mass of the armies and the demands for food and other military supplies, while at the same time re- quiring a giant apparatus of administrative au- thorities and officials, so that the impedimenta of a modem army has become simply colossal, especially considering all the troops which are required, particularly in enemy country, to guard the lines of communication. The movements of the army itself are made extraordinarily difficult by all these complica- tions. An amazing apparatus, which is system- atized down to the last detail, is required to carry out the strategic movement, concentra- tion and diversion of a single army group. In all these questions there is a further ob- structive element in the influence which the mass levy has had, and was bound to have, on the tactical value of the troops themselves. The more new formations of recruits and older THE DETERMINING FACTORS 13 classes of men with previous military train- ing there are, the lower must be the percentage of active^ N.C.O. 's and men among them and the smaller the number of active officers with the individual units. Their places are taken by reserve and Landwehr officers and N.C.O. 's, and with the best will in the world these elements, owing to their inferior technical training and [pss experience, never make so solid a frame- work for the unit or lead it so well in battle as men to whom soldiering is their life-work. Further, as such units consist of men some of whom are recruits mth a very short training, while others are older men who have left the military profession for a considerable time, it is only natural that their tactical value cannot be equal to thajt of regular regiments which are mobilized in the normal way. If the war lasts for a long time and the men of the peace establishment gradually disappear as the result of death and wounds, the tactical level of all regiments, regular as well as new formations, tends gradually to become the same and the old regular units have only one advan- tage, though it is certainly an advantage of great importance for the tactical efficiency of a unit. It is tradition and the spirit which ani- "As opposed to reserve. (Tr.) 14 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE mated the men of the peace establishment. The latter cannot easily be replaced in units which are new formations because these do not get the men from home who are the representatives and heirs of that spirit. It is only very gradually that this defect can be made good in the course of a long war and only after a series of glorious achievements has created a tradition, though a new one, of its own which gives birth to an esprit de corps which will tolerate nothing weak or unworthy. In the same way the corps of officers which does not consist of professional officers can only gradually attain the highest standard of efficiency as the result of war experience and will seldom reach that standard, as death in battle is ever tearing bloody gaps in the ranks and usually carries off the best and most capable officers, those who wish to set their subordinates a brilliant example and therefore freely expose themselves to the bullets of the enemy. The same is true of the N.C.O.'s, who, in ordinary circumstances, are the sheet-anchor of the unit. We must further remember that by the calling-up in mass of all men who are in any degree physically fit, morally inferior elements get into the army, elements which degenerate still more under the influence of war and fre- THE DETERMINING FACTORS 15 quently have the most harmful influence upon their weaker comrades. Finally, it is inevitable that the standard of physical efficiency among the older classes should be lower than that of young healthy men. They also lack the energy and enthusiasm of youth, although, on the other hand, they are often less excitable and more reliable. Yet, notwithstanding these advantages, the value of a unit for general purposes can be very mate- rially reduced by a heavy percentage of older men. Units which consist of practically noth- ing but these older men can, in general, be em- ployed on a few special war services only. Thus the commander of a modern army has to struggle with the greatest difficulties, even in employing his troops on the various tasks which face him. On the one hand, special units only, as a rule, can be employed for special purposes and on the other, war service and intensified training have to go hand in hand in order that the drafts (which arrive not always fully trained) may be familiarized with their fighting tasks and welded with the field troops into a tactical whole. This is particularly true of a long war where an exhausted unit has to be brought up to strength again time after time. Hence the remarkable fact, never before ob- 16 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE served to the same degree, that the theater of war is not only a battlefield but simultaneously a maneuvering ground on which efforts are con- tinuously being made to solve the changing problems of modem war — trench and open war- fare, defensive and offensive tactics. This is all the more necessary as with the progressive improvement in arms and war ma- terial — a phenomenon which was continuous in the World War — greater and greater demands have to be made on the tactical efficiency of the troops. Let us now turn our attention to this aspect of the matter. II. — MiLiTAEY Technics In all the novelties in the department of mil- itary mechanics, the multiplication and im- provement of weapons form the starting-point for all changes in tactics, while these in turn frequently have a decisive influence on ma- neuver and strategy. Other discoveries have, of course, had a vital influence on the art of war in many respects. We shall naturally have to deal with them' also. But their influence has not been as far-reaching as that of modem fire effect. The latter has become an absolutely determin- ing factor in a modern action. It is, therefore, of great interest to inquire THE DETERMINING FACTORS 17 not only how these new effects make themselves felt, but also how effect and counter-effect have conditioned and intensified one another, for it is only by the study of their mutual relation that any inference can be drawn as to future devel- opments. Yet that is always the vital problem in the science of war. It is only when we have solved it successfully, even to a limited degree, that we are secure against surprises from some opponent who has been more farsighted, or be in a position to face subsequent decisions with confidence. As I have said, even before the war, the steps to a sound development had been taken in our army. The logical inferences, however, had not been drawn. In many respects we were be- hind requirements, in others we had started from false premises, while in some directions the course of development was open to dispute. We very distinctly overestimated the effects of artillery fire, and thus believed that we should not require more than a limited number of batteries. I, myself, fell into that error. On the other side, we underestimated the defensive power of modem quick-firing weapons, and thus had not shown sufficient energy in increasing them. We had certainly made a beginning with the introduction of heavy artillery as well as 18 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE the macliine gun for the field army, thus setting our feet upon a promising path. But, as I shall show only too soon, we did not go anything like far enough in these directions. Heavy, flat-trajectory fire had been very much neglected in peace. We had not realized its great importance. We were hopelessly wrong in our calculations of ammunition requirements, and this led to serious crises more than once. Our cavalry was trained on thoroughly wrong principles. Battles of position had frequently been seen in the Russo-Turkish and still more the Russo-Japanese War, and had revealed how important such operations might be in certain circumstances. Actions for the possession of fortified positions had been the subject of dis- cussion and maneuvers with us in Germany. But they had been considered only in connec- tion with strategic movements, and temporary field fortifications alone had been contemplated. No one had ever thought of genuine frontal trench warfare. The few mortars, heavy field howitzers and 10 cm. and 13 cm. guns which the army had were considered enough for field oper- ations, and heavier and the heaviest guns were provided for use against enemy fortresses only with a view to enabling us to smash through the ring of forts as soon as possible. Yet THE DETERMINING FACTORS 19 even that meant a great step in the right direc- tion, as it secured us a great superiority over our enemies at the outset. But this certainly does not mean that the importance of artillery for the coming war was fully appreciated. It was the events of the war itself which first brought it home to us. The result was that we entered upon the war with views and systems which were to a certain extent imperfect and had not been thoroughly thought out. The means and resources at our disposal were the logical outcome of them. Just as we had failed to realize what masses of men the war would require, and thus had to im- provise them after it began, we soon found our- selves far short of requirements in the matter of armament, just because our ideas of the ef- fect of modern weapons did not correspond alto- gether to reality. In our first victorious battles our infantry suffered very heavy losses which swept away the flower of our youth, while our cavalry was sacrificed in futile attacks, to some extent against obstacles, because their wholly erroneous peace training had been devoted prac- tically exclusively to this form of operation. All this has already been discussed.' When our front extended more and more * See Introduction, p. xv. 20 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE after the battle of the Marne and we were com- pelled to defend ourselves against hostile mass attacks in long, thin lines, we found our- selves under the necessity of digging in, in order to escape the destructive effects of the enemy's fire and keep down our losses, thus in- creasing our power of resistance. Efforts were also made to protect the troops against the en- emy's fire by the provision of steel helmets and the construction of armored shelters. All this made the task of the attacker more difficult, especially as before long the defender found means to intensify his own fire by an in- creased use of machine-guns. The attacker now saw himself compelled to take counter- measures. Infantry rushes against an en- trenched defender were seen to be anything but hopeful, because they produced heavier losses than an attack in open warfare. Meas- ures had to be thought out for keeping down the fire of the defender. For that purpose machine-guns alone were inadequate in an attack. The natural result was the increase and improvement of the artillery. The enemy's trenches and obstacles had to be destroyed, his infantry kept underground, his artillery fought down and if possible silenced, if the way for the attack was to be prepared. THE DETERMINING FACTORS 21 Further, flat-trajectory field-guns had to be re- placed in ever increasing measure by high- angle fire if the enemy was to be reached when behind cover. The defender, however, immediately replied by strengthening his trenches with shell-proof, concrete dug-outs, then by increasing his artil- lery which was assigned the task of not only en- gaging the attacker's artillery but directing an annihilating fire at the enemy's avenues of ap- proach, his assembly trenches and concentra- tion points, and by sweeping the area imme- diately before the defender's trenches, laying a curtain of fire in front of its own infantry, a curtain which the enemy could penetrate only at the cost of the heaviest losses. (The bar- rage.) The attacker on his side now saw himself compelled to assign further tasks to his artil- lery. His problem was not merely to destroy the enemy's defense works and get his infantry under a destructive fire. He had to neutralize the defender's artillery also, completely, if pos- sible, in the hope of preventing its disastrous effects on his own artillery and particularly his infantry. Finally, hostile aircraft had to be fought from the earth also, and it was found that artillery 22 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE was indispensable even in really mountainous regions. Thus both the number and types of gnns had to be increased, and adequate supplies of ammunition had to be furnished for them. This again had its effect on the defender, and thus this arm acquired a growing importance for both sides. The most varied types of guns were introduced for the various purposes, and supplied with correspondingly varied natures of ammunition. It has already been said that the enemy's concrete dug-outs and fortified trench-systems had made a great increase of high-angle fire necessary, from the lightest up to the heaviest calibers. In addition it was shown to be neces- sary to destroy or damage the enemy's roads and cantonments, depots and important indus- trial establishments, neutralize or silence his artillery at long range and sweep extensive areas with flanking fire, if possible with the widespreading cone of shrapnel. Thus the field-piece remained a useful weapon, though it was replaced by a weapon of longer range. Side by side with it developed the construction of long-range high-angle fire batteries, and heavier flat-trajectory batteries of even longer range. The development attained an impor- tance which had not altogether been foreseen, THE DETERMINING FACTORS 23 and finally culminated in the construction of the gun with which we bombarded Paris from a distance of about 120 kilometers. Apart from this special achievement, guns were constructed the great majority of which were not above 15 cm. caliber, though there were calibers up to 38 cm. Some were sup- plied with motor transport, while others were •made mobile by rails so that they could be fought as railway guns without being removed from the rails. For defense against aircraft guns were con- structed with elevations up to 85 degrees. Some of these were on a fixed base, while others were mounted on motor-lorries and were thus mobile. Lastly, mountain artillery, such as had not been seen before the World War, was produced for special purposes. In the Carpathians and the Alps, where German troops also fought and conquered, it was absolutely necessary to sup- ply the men with artillery which they could take with them anywhere. This purpose was achieved by the construction of a special type. But though ample provision was made for long-range fire by all these measures, it also proved necessary to obtain effects at the short- est distances from our own lines — particularly in trench warfare — effects which were equal to 24 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE those of artillery, without diverting that arm from its proper task (firing at distant targets and doing all the damage possible to the enemy troops and particularly to his artillery) for the sake of dealing with targets close at hand. This purpose was served by the trench-mor- tar, which was placed in or immediately behind the forward infantry lines and assigned the task of taking the nearest enemy trenches under annihilating fire. Here again various calibers were constructed, and trench mortars were di- vided into heavy, medium and light, according to their effect and mobility. The latter were such as to accompany the infantry even in an attack and could also be employed as flat-trajec- tory guns at short ranges when the infantry in the course of their advance came up against targets with which they were unable to deal with their own weapons. The same necessity gave rise to the batteries of infantry-guns which were light, flat-trajec- tory field-pieces. Their task was to accompany the infantry closely and destroy hostile strong points by direct fire, whereas the light trench- mortar could perform that duty at ranges of 800 to 1,000 meters at the outside, though it could also be employed as a high-angle weapon, as we have observed. Even the medium trench- THE DETERMINING FACTORS 25 mortar, which had a very violent detonating and explosive effect, could be made mobile and used against targets which were difficult to deal with. The heavy trench-mortar, on the other hand, was principally for use against fortified works and had to be firmly built in. To strengthen the defense against hostile at- tacks on trench lines recourse was finally had to trench-guns, quick-firing weapons of 3.7 cm. up to 5 cm. caliber, which had a considerable effect at short range owing to their high rate of fire. When we turn to the question of gun anununi- tion, high explosive has recovered its impor- tance as compared with shrapnel even against isolated living targets, partly because of its greater moral effect, partly because it is more easily and rapidly served, and further because mass production in war-time failed to produce time-fuses so reliable that accurate settings were possible. This was owing to the shortage of many kinds of raw material. High-angle fire is primarily required against targets in shell-proof emplacements or "blind" targets. It is true that time-fuse ammunition was also produced for this purpose because the burst is not only forwards but also backwards and down- wards, but in general its use was impossible for the same reason as that of shrapnel, i. e., 26 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE the difficulty in war-time of producing reliable fuses in large numbers. Thus, generally speak- ing, we relied on the tried high-explosive shell, which was also easy to handle. The fuses, how- ever, were delay-action fuses, so that the shell did not burst until it had penetrated the target. Others were extremely sensitive, so that the burst occurred the moment the shell came into contact with the target, thus increasing lateral fragmentation. Shells with hardened caps were used also against targets with a high power of resistance. Finally, certain special natures were produced for exceptionally long-range work (stream-line and false cap shell). In this book, which deals only with broad out- lines, there is no need to discuss minute points of gun construction, which are mainly of tech- nical importance. On the other hand, in speak- ing of artillery we must not omit to mention a new weapon, gas, which attained great impor- tance especially as associated with artillery. Poisonous gases and irritants of various compo- sition were first used as an independent weapon during the war. Such gases were originally condensed in steel cylinders. The latter were placed in position in the trenches, and when the wind was favorable the gas was released THE DETERMINING FACTORS 27 towards the enemy, upon whom it had a ter- rible effect — if he was taken by surprise. In the long run, however, this system proved impracticable. It depended too much upon the wind, which in certain circumstances might blow back the gas into our own lines. Our troops were also exposed to danger when the hostile artillery destroyed the gas cylinders. All the same, considerable successes were obtained by this method so long as the enemy was not pre- pared against this weapon. Finally, however, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages, and we therefore proceeded to produce artillery and trench-mortar gas shell. This had the advantage that we were less de- pendent upon the wind than hitherto, as the point of impact of the shell could be arranged behind or at the side of the target^ — according to the wind — and even if the wind direction was unfavorable there was far less danger to our own men than when the gas was released from our own lines. Moreover, we could now gas or infect troops and areas far behind the enemy's front, and this was particularly important, see- ing that the hostile artillery was always a long way back. The gases produced effects according to their nature, either by irritating the respiratory or- 28 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE gans, nose and eyes, and thus putting the victim hors de combat for a certain time, or by caus- ing death on inhalation, or by infecting a whole area which had been heavily gassed for a con- siderable period so that no one could enter it with impunity for several days. Such gases are not only frequently fatal on inhalation but have a deleterious effect on the skin with which they come in contact and also produce blind- ness, while the effect of the first-mentioned gases is certainly injurious from a long dis- tance, but the effect does not last long. Gas masks have now been introduced uni- versally as a defense against gas. They ab- sorb the dangerous elements on inhalation and thus render it harmless. Of course they are not a protection against all gases, and if worn for a long time on end they prevent both the hostile infantry and artillery from taking very much part in the action. A form of warfare which is related to gas though quite different in its effects is the use of smoke shells and bombs. They do the enemy no direct harm but often effectively hinder him from using his ovm weapons. In particular, they conceal the attacker's movements from the eyes of the enemy so that it is possible to ap- proach his lines under cover, so to speak, and THE DETERMINING FACTORS 29 thus the factor of surprise is much increased. Of course, it frequently hinders the attacker's o\vn movements also, as it is not always easy to keep direction or indeed use his own weapons in an area shrouded in smoke. In addition to the far-reaching changes in the composition and range of action of the ar- tillery, shooting itself has also undergone very material modifications. Before the World War we were, generally speaking, restricted to ground observation and this is the case to-day, at any rate in open warfare. Good observa- tion posts have become much more important. But in view of the immense range of modem guns, ground observation is certainly not pos- sible in all cases, and, generally speaking, is limited to actions at close quarters. The artil- lery also makes the fullest possible use of cover to escape observation. Distant targets can thus usually defy direct observation. In such cases the latter is replaced by observation from the air, captive balloons or artillery aeroplanes which report by wireless or telephone the posi- tion of the shots from the battery in action, so that correction is possible. Even this system is not always feasible, partly owing to the action of hostile aircraft and also because it is very difficult to pick out 30 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE individual shots when a number of batteries are in action close together. It thus becomes neces- sary to fire at a target with some prospect of success even without direct observation. This aim has been acliieved by the use of various types of range-finders. In the first place the emplacement of the battery which is to fire is fixed trigonometrically, the survey posts are established, also by trigonometry, at various points in the neighborhood. From these points bearings are obtained at various angles upon the flashes from the enemy guns and thus the emplacement of the battery in action is estab- lished (flash-spotting). In other cases the posi- tion of the hostile battery is determined by cal- culating the time which the sound waves take from the moment of firing to reach the ranging posts. These calculations enable the position of the batteries firing to be determined quite accurately (sound-ranging). By this method it is also possible to determine the fall of the shots from one's owti batteries by the reports of their bursts, and thus fix them on the map. By con- tinuing the process they will be corrected to the target. In flash-spotting, on the other hand, bearings are taken if possible on the smoke of the bursts, the point of impact determined ac- cordingly and the corrections made. THE DETERMINING FACTORS 31 Where the area in which the shells are falling cannot be seen from the survey posts, the fall of the shots can be determined with the help of the altimeter system in which a shot is fired in- tentionally with a very high time-fuse burst. From this the prospective point of impact of the shell if it had completed its trajectory is a matter of calculation. Corrections are made accordingly. When observations of the shell-bursts are im- possible from the ground or in any other way, we have to fall back on shooting without obser- vation altogether, but this is always exceptional. The conditions precedent to any measure of success are accurate knowledge of one's own position and that of the target, good maps and attention to the atmospheric "errors of the day" as well as the ''special errors" which in- fluence the trajectory of the shell. In these cir- cumstances our whole ranging and map system has reached a high degree of development. The army meteorological service had also been very useful. The direction and strength of the wind, the humidity of the atmosphere, air pressure and other factors influence the trajectory of the shell to a very considerable degree. In shoot- ing it is essential to take these ** errors of the 32 THE AVAR OF THE FUTURE day'* into account. Meteorological observation posts are therefore established which note these atmospheric influences every day and report them to the batteries, so that these are in a position to take the influence of these various factors into consideration in practical shooting (which is put in tabular foiin). In this w^ay accuracy in shooting has been very greatly in- creased. There are, however, other special "errors'* which vary with the individual gun, and are due essentially to the different degrees of wear and tear. These special errors are determined at intervals by firing every single gun at a given range, so that the sighting for each piece is worked out for all ranges (the Pulkowsky sys- tem). This certainly makes shooting rather more difficult, but results in a considerably higher degree of accuracy for the whole battery. We have seen that the fire-power of the de- fending infantrj' and the fact that they have to hold a long and fortified trench system gave the first impetus to an extraordinary increase in the amount of artillery, and in the course of the war to the introduction of the most varied types of guns and a complicated system of shooting. "We shall now see that the infantry itself witnessed far-reaching changes in its own THE DETERMINING FACTORS 33 weapons and thus in the whole sphere of tactics. Before the war the high rate of fire, range, trajectory and accuracy of the modem infantry rifle, which promised annihilating effects at short range, justified the supposition that fight- ing would mainly be at long range and that the attacking infantry would only gradually succeed in acquiring a superiority of fire and getting within storming distance of the defender. Our whole system of tactics was based on that as- sumption, and the first actions in the World War certainly took that form. We may also assume that, in future also, similar conditions will lead to similar actions in the case of en- counter battles in open warfare. But conditions changed completely when trench warfare began. The two opponents now came extremely near to each other, and the busi- ness of both attacker and defender was either to get at the enemy, who was protected by his trenches and wholly or partially invisible, or from the shelter of their own trenches to keep the enemy under fire when he stormed forward across the narrow space between, and this with- out exposing themselves too openly to the en- emy's fire. At first we had snipers armed with a rifle with telescopic sights who, from the cover of an armored shield, could hit even the small- 34 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE est targets. Next the hand grenade was intro- duced, a weapon which was in use even before Frederickian times, and had been employed sys- tematically in the Russo-Japanese "War. It was now the principal infantry weapon at close quarters, as it was absolutely indispensable when working round the traverses which pro- tected the trenches against enfilading fire. It was equally necessary for surprise attacks on isolated posts and strong points. This, however, does not conclude the chapter on changes in infantry armament. The more enemies entered the field against us Germans — Italians, Rumanians, the newly-formed English national army, Asiatics, Africans, and finally Americans — and the more our losses accumu- lated in countless battles and actions, the more urgent did it become for us in defending our long battle-line to economize reserves in order to be able to bring them up to threatened points. This, and the requirement of concentrating our own fire-power in the attack, brought home to us — and by reaction to our enemies, who wanted to annihilate us by sheer force of numbers — the necessity of increasing the fire-power of the infantry while at the same time exposing as few men as possible to the enemy's fire in the front-line trenches in order to minimize losses. THE DETERMINING FACTORS 35 These apparently contradictory demands were met by the introduction of the light ma- chine-gun, which gradually became the princi- pal infantry weapon and, as we shall see, has an immense influence upon its tactics. This light gun, which could be carried by one man, was equivalent to the fire of a whole platoon equip- ped with infantry rifles, and therefore enabled us to hold our front lines with a relatively small number of men both in attack and de- fense, and so economize reserves. This satis- fied our requirements. Even though it was necessary that the gun should be accompanied by a number of ammunition carriers, the total number of men emj)loyed was far less than would have been the case if the same fire-power had to be obtained by rifle fire alone. The heavy machine-gun, to which was as- signed the task of firing at the enemy from dom- inating or flanking positions as well as from long range, was of course retained and to-day it forms — through its indirect fire also — a mate- rial support for the infantry, especially in the defense. Further help in the defense was given by the stick-bomb thrower, which was useful for intensifying the barrage, and by the rifle gre- nade, which is certainly rather a primitive weapon. 36 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE Yet it soon appeared that it was necessary to intensify the power of the infantry, especially in the attack, after this problem had been solved as regards defense by the introduction of trench guns and mortars. Realizing this fact and taught by experience that the advanced trench system could be so overwhelmed by the attacker's artillery and trench-mortars that it would be quite impossible to keep the defender's infantry in a position to resist, the latter proceeded to convert the whole area behind the front lines into a deep, defen- sive zone. There were not only several lines and positions one behind the other, but in the inter- vals between them, strong points and machine- gun nests were established, if possible, on a chessboard pattern, most of which would be hard for the hostile artillery to find and which would keep holding up the enemy as he ad- vanced. Thus the attacking infantry, even when they had captured the front lines, would find themselves continually being faced with fresh obstacles with which they could not deal with their owni resources. Yet their own artil- lery, which was a long way back, could not al- ways give them effective support, owing to the confusion of the action and the distribution of the strong points. The attacking infantry would THE DETERMINING FACTORS 37 still have some in front of them while others would have been passed or left behind. In such circumstances observation and accu- rate shooting from the usual emplacements of the artillery is not always possible. The artil- lery cannot follow the successive phases of the infantry action very closely, and so cannot in- tervene at the decisive point soon enough. It is, therefore, necessary that the attacking in- fantry should have the appropriate weapon ^vith them. They must thus be supplied with artillery escorts — light field batteries and bat- teries of '^ infantry*' guns of similar construc- tion — and very mobile portable trench-mlortars which will be able to settle the hostile centers of resistance with the help of ground observa- tion and direct fire. For the same purpose the infantry is now equipped with flame-throwers which shoot a mass of flaming liquid at the enemy and thus annihilate him, though, of course, only at short ranges. But even these measures did not seem to strengthen the attack enough to make it cer- tain of getting right through. Automobiles were therefore constrncted, our enemies being first in the field in this department, which were armored cars completely closed in and armed with machine-guns and quick-firing guns. 38 THE WAR OF THE FUTUEE These were the so-called tanks, which were fit- ted with very strong petrol engines and, be- ing proof against infantry fire, were sent for- ward against the defender's lines with a view to opening a road for the infantry following up behind. They were constructed in such a way that they smashed through obstacles, climbed over trenches and artificial cover quite easily, and brought an overwhelming enfilading fire to bear upon the enemy's broken lines. This tank, which was somewhat clumsy and rather slow at first, was gradually improved very materially, and to-day must be regarded as the principal weapon in the armorj'- of the Entente. At the moment it is quite impossible to say where this development will lead and whether the tanks will permanently prove their value. However that may be, they were con- structed in thousands by our enemies and at first gained great successes by surprise. They were of the most varied types. The original type of clumsy and slow-moving tank was subsequently used only for transporting ammunition and other material into the front lines. The real battle tanks, on the other hand, were constructed in practically two types, the heavy battle tank and a lighter and faster tank which was commissioned to rush forward into THE DETERMINING FACTORS 39 the enemy lines as fast as possible and cause a panic on the lines of communication. Further, there were yet larger tanks, which were not for fighting only but designed to carry a con- siderable number of men and machine-guns which could be deposited behind the enemy lines when these had been broken through, so that they could take the defenders in the rear. Tanks were divided into male, female, and hybrid tanks according to their armament. The males were those which had two quick-firing guns in addition to machine-guns, females those which had machine-guns only, while the hybrids had machine guns and only one quick-firing gun. Taking them all round, these armored cars are a weapon which must not be underestimated. They may, however, be perhaps compared with the elephants which Pyrrhus originally brought into the field against the Romans. He sent them out in front of his infantry and at first they produced an immense military and moral effect upon his enemy. Before long, however, the surprised Romans found the right antidote, and the elephant attack failed before their in- telligent courage. Similar armored cars were constructed in Germany also, and they must certainly be re- 40 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE garded as in no way inferior to those of the enemy. These contributions to the armory of the at- tack naturally led to counter-measures on the part of the defense. Infantry ammtmition was produced which could pierce the armor of the tanks. Special anti-tank guns were introduced for the purpose of achieving that object with greater certainty. Special guns were placed in the defensive zone for the purpose of fighting tanks. They were supplied with armor-piercing shell and assigned the task of destroying the advancing tanks by direct hits at close range. Narrow passages which the tanks had to pass through were fitted with concrete slabs which the dreaded war-machine could not get past (especially in the back areas). Lastly, the de- fenses, known as ** tank-traps," were con- structed in such a way that it was very difficult for the tanks to climb over them. We thus suc- ceeded in paralyzing the influence of this war- machine to a very material degree. We cap- tured or destroyed large numbers of them. All the same, when properly employed, they were a useful weapon. But though the arming of the infantry, and more particularly the artillery, with the new weapons assigned to these two principal arms THE DETERMINING FACTORS 41 has settled the form of conducting a modem action and determined the character of the de- cisive battle, there are other discoveries in the realm of armament which have in many respects a very vital influence. Aviation must be given the place of honor here. Even before the war a decided beginning had been made with the development of the air arm. Dirigible airships had already reached a stage approaching perfection. The captive bal- loon was certainly not appreciated as it should be, but aviation, the growing importance of which was certainly not fully realized, was un- doubtedly making gratifying progress though it was still in its infancy. This all changed very quickly when the war began. The captive bal- loon recovered its place of honor as an observa- ation post both in trench and open warfare, and before long aircraft attained high strate- gical and tactical importance with which the construction of the machines themselves kept pace, while that of dirigibles, which had still played a certain part at the beginning, became more and more secondary as we succeeded in constructing aeroplanes with a great radius of action and an increased carrjdng capacity. To-day this problem has been completely solved. The following types are now distin- 42 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE giiished: recomioitering squadrons, bombing squadrons, battle and pursuit flights, all of which have their special tasks to perform either individually or in regular tactical units — the necessity of which I had already emphasized in my book. Modern War. The principal task of the reconnoitering squadrons is to photograph the hostile lines and find out what the enemy is doing far be- hind his front. Aeroplane photography has reached a very advanced stage of development. Photographic work can also be done from cap- tive balloons. Thus air reconnaissance, espe- cially for strategical and tactical distant recon- naissance, is a substitute for cavalry which in the nature of things has no place in trench war- fare and in open warfare receives very material assistance from air reconnaissance. Air craft are also responsible for close reconnaissance, where they work with infantry patrols, while this duty falls exclusively to the infantry in trench warfare. Another duty of reconnoitering planes is to assist the artillery to find their targets by spot- ting and reporting the bursts. They also keep the front infantiy lines in touch with their com- mand posts in the rear. In certain conditions they are able to carry ammunition and food to THE DETERMINING FACTORS 43 infantry in action (infantry flights). In order to keep in touch with the troops, the machines, especially the artillery machines, are fitted with wireless telegraphic and telephonic apparatus while the troops are supplied with a similar apparatus. The bombing squadrons consist of machines with very great carrying capacity so that bombs up to 1,000 kg. can be carried. There are large bombers and giant bombers, the latter being the largest of all. They carry bombs and their function is to attack hostile billets, supply dumps, railways, hangars and important indus- trial establishments from the air. The effect of their bombs is sometimes very extraordinary. They may have very sensitive or delay-action fuses according to whether their purpose is to obtain a great, low and wide lateral burst or sm'ash through a target offering much resist- ance. On special occasions bombing squadrons were accompanied by smaller machines, to which were assigned such tasks as attacking trains, for which purpose they had to dive down over the target in order to hit and destroy it with the so-called aeroplane ''mines." The battle flights, on the other hand, were deputed to intervene directly in the battle of the other arms going on below. The pursuit flight 44 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE had the duty of protecting the other categories when at their work, to attack hostile machines wherever found and fight for the mastery of the air. They were constructed specially for that purpose and were therefore particularly fast and handy. All aeroplanes are armed, some in front for offensive purposes, others in such a way as to be able to beat off hostile attack from the air. The reconnaissance, battle and bombing ma- chines each have one fixed and one mobile ma- chine-gun. The armored infantry planes, which are thus as safe against rifle and machine-gun fire as it is possible to make them, form an ex- ception. At first they had a pair of coupled machine-guns in the floor of the observer's seat, these for shooting vertically downwards, in ad- dition to a mobile machine-gun for the observer. Subsequently, the coupled machine-guns proved unsuitable and were replaced by a single one. Finally the pursuit machines were armed with two fixed machine-guns. In addition to their special functions all air- craft were used for purposes of signaling and communication, whether by wireless messages to the headquarters or units (e. g., batteries) or by dropping smoke indicators — which can be seen from a great distance — which contained THE DETERMINING FACTORS 45 messages in a special case. Carrier pigeons could also be sent out from aeroplanes. Tlie air arm with its many functions thus represents an extremely important discovery for all armies, and seems destined to exercise an influence which will be decisive in many re- spects on the development of strategy and tac- tics. Even the question of fortresses will be affected by it— as I prophesied before the war. It has already given a very important proof of its influence on strategy in the fact that we are now compelled to carry out all strategic and operative movements at night, in order to con- ceal them from aerial observation. It has also led to numerous camouflage measures in order to make battery emplacements, defenses and so on unrecognizable by enemy airmen. The mechanical side of war has had a vital influence in another very important department —the intelligence and signal service— and for the first time made possible the control and command of modern mass armies in theaters of war as large as those the World War has seen. The usual Morse telegraph system, which is still employed for minor telegraphic communica- tion (and for long after 1870-71 formed the only means of communication between the different armies and units), has otherwise completely 46 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE vanished from the army. The telephone is the ordinary means of communication between the different units of the army and between the army and home. It is the indispensable means of communication between the division and all its subordinate units, and where necessary, con- versation is in code so that if the enemy over- hears it no harm is done. Between the division and the corps the so-called "tapper" is in use, a device which enables six hundred words an hour to be transmitted. It is a telegraphic ap- paratus which gives taps corresponding to the Morse code, and these are heard by the receiv- ing station. Between the corps, army and army group headquarters the telegraph is used, which, thanks to a clever American invention, is able to transmit one thousand words in writing per hour, so that the receiving station gets the com- munication in the form of a written telegram which no one else can read. Between the group headquarters and general headquarters, as well as between the latter, the central authorities at home and other theaters of war — possibly very far away — the Siemens high-speed telegraph is employed, a system which transmits five thous- and words an hour, the receiving station again getting the communication in the form of a THE DETERMINING FACTORS 47 written telegram. The apparatus required is fixed, and specially-sprung rolling stock is necessary when it has to be moved. To such extraordinary heights and perfec- tion has ordinary telegraphy attained. Side by side with it wireless telegraphy is also in current use in the army. According to the apparatus employed, it permits communica- tion one or both ways. In the first case, mes- sages can only be received; in the other, both received and transmitted. A wireless detach- ment is assigned to every division, and with its help the latter can keep in touch with its subor- dinate organizations, brigade, regimental and battalion headquarters, as well as artillery com- mand posts. It is advisable, however, to im- pose certain restrictions on its use, as other- wise the individual exchanges get out of order very easily. For instance, artillery aeroplanes should have transmitting apparatus only when they are spotting for the artillery ; the batteries concerned should have only a receiving appa- ratus. The larger units also are in wireless com- munication with each other. The divisional wireless detachments are given power-buzzers, which, by using the conductivity of the earth, establish wireless communication 48 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE without any special apparatus being necessary. The earth itself transmits the communication. The installation, which is a very simple affair, can be used both for transmitting and receiv- ing. An amplifier valve makes it possible for the human ear to catch even comparatively weak currents which pass through the ground. The same principle is utilized for the listening set stations, which enable the occupants in cer- tain circumstances to listen to the enemy's con- versation by telegraph or telephone, because the electric currents which the enemy is using, and which are to a certain extent running at large through the ground, may be caught up in the receiving apparatus. In addition to these electrical hearing and communication systems, lamp signaling is still resorted to. Powerful electric lamps flash sig- nals which correspond to the Morse code from the front to the rear, and vice versa. They are generally used by the division, and put it in com- munication with all parts of the line down to companies in the front line, trenches and artil- lery observation posts. According to the power of the lam'p and its corresponding range, the apparatus is classified as large, medium and small. Unfortunately, its radius of action is very limited in wet or foggy weather. THE DETERMINING FACTORS 49 Where all these resources fail, messenger dogs and carrier pigeons are employed and supplied to the troops. The pigeons return to their homing lofts very quickly and the mes- sages they carry are then sent on by telephone. Carrier pigeons have often done very good work where all other means of communication failed. Generally speaking, they were particu- larly reliable. Message shells can also be used in appro- priate circumstances. Specially constructed projectiles were fired from trench-mortars (light) or bomb-throwers in the front line to a receiving station behind ; on impact they burst open, giving off a good deal of smoke, and thus deliver the message which is contained in a special case. Finally, signals which have pre- viously been agreed upon can be given by light- balls of various colors and shapes — demands for artillery fire at a certain spot ; lengthening or shortening the range, etc. Further, sound signals, sirens and similar devices which carry a long way can be used as alarm signals, for ex- ample, or to convey some message which has been agreed upon beforehand. These communication systems, every detail of which has been thought out, make it possible, generally speaking, to get safe and compara- 50 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE lively reliable conuHunication between the va- rious headquarters in the rear and the troops in the line, even during the most violent artil- lery drum-fire. On the other side, they assure certain communication between headquarters which are separated by immense distances. For example, the Siemens high-speed telegraph in- sured rapid communication between Berlin and Constantinople. Apart from rapid communication between the central organization and the individual units of the mass army, the latter itself has to be made as mobile as possible. I have already referred to the importance of railways and roads in this connection. After the rapid re- construction of the main lines and their subse- quent extension in the theater of war, field railways, which are quickly laid, are an indis- pensable aid to the transport of modem armies to-day. However, seeing that such a railway network cannot be made movable, but is always more or less a fixture, some extension had to be found which could not be supplied by horse- transport alone. This gap was filled by the automobile, both motor-cars and lorries, which materially facil- itated and, indeed, alone made possible the sup- ply of the army, at any rate, in regions where THE DETERMINING FACTORS 51 good roads were to be found. This invention has made it possible to convey considerable loads in relatively few vehicles, thus shortening the columns, to expedite transport very mate- rially, and lastly— in theaters where there is a large network of good roads— to economize horses, which are thus to a great extent released for roadless regions where the use of heavy motor transport is impossible. Motor transport is put to special uses in con- nection with artillery. It is employed very largely for bringing up ammunition and also used for moving heavy guns. Such guns are also mounted on motor lorries, which then serve the double function of emplacement and means of locomotion. Motors are, moreover, very use- ful for accelerating the removal of the wounded and for taking superior officers on long jour- neys. Thus, in their different forms and meth- ods of employment, they are a very considerable help in conducting the operations and move- ments of a modern army. In an emergency whole units can be transferred from one part of the front to another by mechanical transport. Our enemies in the West frequently made use of this system. Indeed, it is worth considering whether it would not be possible to make much 52 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE groator iiso of petrol veliiclos for luoviiig artil- lery, perhaps ovoii on tlie battletield. We have already seen hoNV the tiuiks were used iu au advance. CHAPTER II T ACT ICH It is obvious that a revolution in the mili- tary art Huch an the Groat War witnoKSod muHt also have had an onormouH infiuoncc on the manner in which the different arms were employed. The introduction of now weapons chan^cid the form of operations completely; on the other hand, the fact that the relation be- tween the size of the armies and the area of the theater of war inevitably involved new methods in the conduct of those operations (as I have already shown), and the further fact that the very variety of armament and the dif- ferent standards of training which the mass levy made inevitable had the same effect, in- troduced a factor of uncertainty into fighting which must always be borne in mind if military action is to be effective. Thus, before we can get a proper idea of modern tactics, we must first ascertain what influence all the discoveries of the World War have had on the movement and employment 63 54 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE of tho individual arms. Only thus mil it be possible to formulate tactical principles which "svill be able to lay some claim to universality. In many directions this has already been done. In so doing it is essential to start with the infantry, even though the role of the artillery has become much more important in modern times. The infantry is undoubtedly the arm which by its attack makes victory tangible, even tliongh the way was paved by its sister arms, ajid gives practical expression to it by gaining ground or taking a large number of prisoners. It is the infantry again to which the strategic exploitation of tactical successes is mainly as- signed. "SVe must therefore give the place of honor to the intluence which the new discoveries of the war have had upon it. I. — Infantry The idea that the infantry action would begin at long range and only gradually lead to fighting at close quarters has now proved erroneous, for the stronger the artillery became in com- parison with the infantry and the weaker the latter became (at any rate in Germany), owing to the losses incurred in years of lighting, the greater was the prominence which the action at close quarters attained. The attack presup- TACTICS 55 pOBes numerical superiority in both arms and moral superiority at any rate in the infantry. In this way — as we saw — the attacker's artil- lery is in a position to keep down the hostile artillery, while at the same time cooperating with the trench-mortars in so innning the de- fender's infantry down to their cover that they can make no use of their weapons during the ar- tillery preparation, and will not be able to do so until the attacker's artillery "lifts" to allow his infantry to go forward. The latter, under the protection of their superior artillery, presses on against the enemy without suffer- ing too heavy losses, but can itself make effec- tive use of its weapons only when the defender's infantry appears behind its cover in order to fire. Thus the infantry action generally be- gins at very close quarters. Yet this certainly does not mean that the process may not often take a different form. When there is no definite superiority on one side, for whatever reason, and particularly in open warfare, the character of the infantry action will probably change, and it seems quite possible that the fighting in these circumstances would again begin at long range and victory would be brought by some means other than a superior artillery. One method of making a 56 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE successful frontal attack without such a supe- riority has already been tried. Our enemies have repeatedly attempted to enable their infantry to get forward, without the necessity of silencing the defender's artil- lery as a preliminary, by making their attacks as great a surprise as possible. Several ''waves" of tanks, follo^^'ing closely on each other, covered the advance of the infantry and tried to claim the defender's attention so com- pletely and draw his fire so effectively that it would be possible for the attacking infantry, under the protection of these armored vehicles, not only to get to close quarters with their op- ponents but to break through their lines and roll them up. The attack was also frequently shrouded in artificial fog to conceal it from the enemy. This method gained our enemies sev- eral important successes, and in turn demanded new counter-measures appropriate to the cir- cumstances. Infantry methods were also affected by the fact that the machine-gun has become its prin- cipal weapon. The requirements of defense first led to an increase in the number of heavy machine-guns, and then — in order to get on level terms with the attacker again — to the in- troduction of the light machine-gun, which en- TACTICS 57 abled a really great fire-power to be developed in the attack by even a thin line in open order, so long as the required ammunition was at hand. They gave the defender the further advantage that they are quite independent of the terrain and permit a rapid concentration of fire at the decisive point. As I have said, the supply of heavy machine-guns to the troops was also in- creased; these represent a very great addition to the fire-power, particularly in the defense, and are able to inflict most serious losses on an imprudent attacker. This has led to changes in the whole tactical grouping of the infantry. As compared with former times, the distribution has been com- pletely revolutionized. If the requirements of defense and subse- quently of a more powerful attack led to the in- troduction of the machine-gun as the main weapon of the infantry, the situation thus pro- duced involved the necessity of equipping the infantry with new weapons for its task in the attack. This increase of offensive power was also required as a reply to certain tactical measures which were designed to supplement the intensified fire-power of the defense. The chief of these measures was the estab- lishment of a defensive zone to which I have al- 58 TllK WAIJ OV TllK FUTURFi ready ivt'orrod. It had boon ooutimially tJu> oaso that tho attackiiii:: infantry simply t>vorran tho front lino and oaptnrod tho i::arrison. Tho ilofondor awordiiigly distribiitod his trv^ops in depth and while holding his front lino relatively lightly, spread his men over a oom- plox of strong points, niaolii no-gun nests, treneli mortar groups and single battery oni- plaeoments some way hixok. Those did not fi>rni a continuous line and therefore oould not be subjected to siinultaneous bombanhnent if they wore distributed skillfully and ineonspieuously over the area in question. Thus tho attaeking infantry, even when they had taken the front linos, found themselves faeed with fresh cen- ters of resistance whidi could often be over- <.Hnne only by artillery, anil when at length they had masteroii this fortitieii zone they came up against the defender's main line of resistance and u\et tho full force of a counter-attack by tho hostile reserves as well as the tire of the defender's artillery (which was far biick), and this frequently without their owii artillery be- ing able to give them adequate support. Thus the problem before the attacker was to got through this defensive zone — oven when his own artillery had not completely prepared it for assault by tho preliminary bombardment — and TACTIC8 59 to hit ahht to haai off the hostile coant^r-atta/jk, aprain with h/V; ariiWcry . A-6 I hav^j haid b^^forc, all thin imuic' it rj';r:/;»- uary that the nUmmu'^ Inf^tdry nhouUl ha n^ii^- plUui w'tih ''Uifauiry f^un'* to acc/>mpany thcrfl, OH wall aw ftorbihUi light trerich-mortar« whirii c^iuI/1 d^jhtroy the ^in^jmy'K *'rK;8t«'' by dinxit fire if poHHihUt at «hort range, and b^.-ing entirely at the ^indence. The defender however, c^mnterfjd them with groups similarly composed. 7'hiH arrangement naturally presupposed cer- tain definitfj cr^nditions, c/mditions which per- mitted the main line of resistance to be estab- lished behind the rear-mont line of the defensive zone, so that this ry^uld be abandoned to the enemy in case of ne^^d. Where this is not the case and a definite line— say a water-course or a line of heights— has to be held and there is no a/lvaneed zone which can be occupied, a dif- ferent system muni, of courne, be adopted. But even in these clrcumstanc^^s the direct cooper- ation of infantry with trench-mortars and bomb- 60 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE throwers, artillery in the form of trench-guns, and hea\y machine-guns has proved advanta- geous. The same applies to the encounter battle in open warfare. It all depends upon circumstances. It is only the situation at the moment which can decide what measures must be taken. In these circumstances there is no room for tactics which are universally applicable like those before the war. On the other hand, certain individual principles may be laid do^vn by which action should be determined in particular circum- stances, and which, with a few formal manuals, form the basis of the rules. In such conditions it would be a mistake for the rules to go too far. The first principle which must be accepted as of universal application in infantry tactics is that the light machine-gun (which is undoubt- edly capable of improvement) is the principal weapon of the infantry, that every man must be perfectly familiar with its use and yet must be trained with the rifle also. The latter require- ment is indispensable. It will not always be possible to employ the machine-gun, and tar- gets will often present themselves with which that weapon is unfitted to deal. On reconnoi- tering patrols and similar enterprises the ma- chine-gun would be a hindrance rather than a TACTICS 61 help. It requires big targets to give full effect to its fire-power. Further, every man must be familiar with the use of the hand grenade, for there is no soldier who will not find himself in need of it some time or other. It is inval- uable against targets behind cover, e. g., in trench or street fighting. Next we may be quite certain that infantry fighting (i. e., infantry against infantry), apart from small raids due to special circumstances, will never again be possible without artillery support, because the fire-power of infantry which have not been rendered helpless by artil- lery is far too great and destructive for it to be overcome even by a superior force of in- fantry without the help of the sister arms. Thus the attacker especially cannot possibly dispense with powerful artillery support, and it will be a necessity for the defender also if his own infantry is prevented from making full use of its weapons by the hostile artillery fire. Given these general principles for the tactical employment of troops, two broad groups of fighting methods must be presumed, groups which correspond to totally different conditions -—fighting for a fortified position and the battle in open warfare. These two characteristic 62 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE p:ronps can also bo distina^nished in real moun- tain warfare, but in tliis ease the ])eeuliarities ol" the terrain^ frecjuently liave sneli a decisive influence that this kind of warfare requires spe- cial and separate consideration. In this book I \vill confine mj^self to war in hilly or flat coun- try. In the first place, we must clearly realize that the first group permits of numerous variations, while the second will never be entirely ^vithout the use of field fortifications. The defender will always tiy to dig in, and a pure encounter bat- tle will be seen only when two attacks collide, and then only until one of the two opponents decides to act on the defensive, and thus resorts to the intrenchinj::-tool once more : that is, if the maneuvers of his enemy do not compel him to defend himself like^vise by maneuvering, e. g., meeting the threat of envelopment by a counter- attack. It is thus impossible to lay do^^^l fixed and uniform rules even for these two great groups. There must always be a margin within the lim- its of which there must be liberty to take the special local circumstances into consideration. xVt the same time certain rules will always hold good under all conditions. Of these the most important are : TACTICS 63 1. That whatever tactical systems or forms are employed, the increased power of artillery fire (which is quite extraordinary in compar- ison with past times) mlist he allowed for to the fullest extent. 2. That wherever unmounted troops are employed, there must be a certain distribution in depth. 3. That no attack may be initiated which has no definite center of gravity. The whole enemy front must not be attacked in equal strength at all points. The main force of the attacker's fire and offensive power must be concentrated at one point, so that victory may be won at that point, a victory the effect of which will rapidly spread to the rest of the bat- tle-front. In the same way no one must ever act on the defensive without reserves with which to meet the decisive thrust of the enemy. These definite principles will determine the depth of the distribution, the comparative strength of the individual elements of the defensive organ- ization and the task which falls to each of those elements. We will take the attack first. In real open warfare the fundamental prin- ciple of the organization in depth will be the same as hitherto. The first wave must remain, 64 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE but it will consist of lines of men in open order and as thin as possible, in order to keep do^\Ti losses, and a very large number of machine- guns, so that the greatest possible lire-power can be developed. Behind them will come the supports, whose business it is to replace the losses in the front line and strengthen it if circumstances require. They must also be in extended order, and must always dig in if they have to stay in one place for any considerable time. They may also go fonvard in waves if circumstances make it necessary. Still farther back \xi]l be the reserves, which will be used to feed the action when all the sup- ports have been dra^vn in ; if the battle is fluctu- ating they ^vdll be employed to force a decision by a resolute attack in close order, or perhaps to beat off a hostile counter or flank attack. They may also use open order if the enemy's fire makes it necessar3^ Escort batteries and infantry gims must accompany the reserves, to enable them to intervene quickly and support the storm troops innnediately their own artil- lery is prevented, by defective observation or any other cause, from helping the infantry at- tack directly and at all points with its fire. In attacks against a fortified position two cases must be distinguished, according to TACTICS 65 whether the defender is compelled by local cir- cumstances to hold his front line, or is occupy- ing a forward zone— an outpost zone, so to. speak— with a view to gradually falling back fighting on his main line of resistance, and even if that is broken through, continuing his re- sistance in a prepared battle zone behind. In the first case the enemy will always at- tempt to put down a curtain of fire— barrage or annihilating fire— in front of his own lines, in order to prevent a rapid advance of the attack- er's infantry, and enable his own troops promptly to leave the cover to which the at- tacker's artillery fire has driven them. When this happens the business of the attack- ing infantry is not so much to develop a great fire-power in their first wave— as it will usually be unnecessary for them to subdue the defend- ing infantry by their own fire— as to get through the hostile barrage or destructive curtain as quickly as possible and with the minimum loss. In such cases it will frequently be necessary to organize the front fighting line in several well-separated waves, with big intervals be- tween the individual riflemen and machine-gun- ners. In this case the successive waves will have different tasks. Generally speaking, the first will have to advance to a definite point— tk» TUK WAlx OK rilK FT ri RK «»n«a\y*S! t\r?«t pv^^siuou. How it will tVnvd by tiio $t>«HUui Tho other wuvos will IwYO to **nK>p uv^** tho wpturxxi trvnoht^^ aiul iUwl with any of tho dotViuior^ sJlill in thoan. Others will havo to hriw^ up out:ivuohiii^ tvHvK amniunitioti at\d machin«>-^iu$ «;> quiokl>>* as jHVjiij^iWo* in oixlor to adv^^pt tho o^^^tunxl tr^m^OiS' fivr dotVuso without dolay. If tho tVout of tho attaok is limittxi s^nvial storm trxH^vs will K^ assi»nu\l tho ts^sk of sovniriu^ tho tlauks of tho oc»pturv\i iH^sitiou in orvlor to bo safo against Kx\^l ommtor-attaoks by th^ o«on\y. Liistly« rosor\*os will follow to o:xtond tho su«s cess iraint\i» if at all v^vi^iblo, carry on tho attack aiivi o^unplotol^- soourv tho oapturod jTWHlud. Tho object of tho organiiation in dopth. and thoroforv^ its distribution* will Iv otherwise wUoro the attack is dealiu^r with an enojivv who is not inervl\- endeavoring to hold a certain line, but has arnwigovl a mobile defense dt^ signtxl to bring the attack to a head in the forwaixi Kone» brt\Hk its foiw therx\ atul vleal the divisive blow with the mavtt forvv only when tho attacking trvH^ps haw roacht\l a line much farther back. The attacking infantry in this case must ad\*anco in sever ' w vo«i. each wav\? OTfrfinhcj] in ii<:\,i\i; Uk-, tiUTfi})<',r of lhrt batteries and light trench -mo Ha fh rnuHt follow hard on thr; heeln of tfie Htorrn troopH in order to defitroy the enemy 'h wnterH of rcMminncAi without delay. The infantry of the firnt wave must not allow itH(;lf to be heM u^) by the (MauHCH of the enemy. They rnuxt mjikr; i-^vcry f;ffort to turn the hoHtile ntrong pointw, aH frontal attackK wonld co8t too heavy Iohhch, and not allow their progreHH to be hindered by them. Their cap- ture muflt be left to later waven, which must ()8 TllK. W Alx OK TllK FrTUUE try to (v^tlnro thorn from Iho tlnnks, or. if pos- siblo, tlio roar, aftor tlio infantry i»'nns ai\d lij^lit tronohinortars liavo proparoii thoni for assault by dirool tiro. FiVory possiMo otVort must bo luaclo to arrive before the enemy's main line o\^ resislanee in the ii'reat est [>ossibU> stroniilh and fnrthor to have fresh rosorvos at hand at this moment. for a hostiU^ eonntor-attack. or a position which is parlienlarly stronj>-ly const rnetod and heUl, nmst now be expected. The position may con- sist of a series of strong' points or of one contin- uous lino, and can therefore bo dealt with only by a strong" force. It is also obvious that the attacker's artillery must prepare this line for assault as soon as possible, and also subject the area bchiuil it to a ho.wy bombardment, to prevent the .approach of the enemy's reserves and break up their counter-attaok. In these circumstances a very deep distribu- tion of the attacker's infantry in two, three or more w.avos is oi' vital importance, as I h.ave said. Generally speakii^ii". it will be necessary to divide the individual comi\anios into three parts — a front line in open order, supports to follow them, and lastly an assault detachment at the disposal o( the company conuuauilor. an clement desig:ned io secure him some intlnonce TACJTICS 69 on the courHo of th(! fM^ht Tho hoavy machino- ^uriH will he. id po'inin which command or cn- iWndv, iho fi(;J(J of action, and the commander will endeavor to direct their fire to the point w}j(!n! ifio docinion in bein^ Hought. They must b(! (;oncenlrat(!(l aH I'ar an poHnible, in order to make full ijhc of their great fire-power. The tank attack, to which I have already re- ferred, will aJHO be UHeful in such circum- HtanccR. The tanks advance fifty to one hun- dred paces ali(!ad of the infantry, in order to destroy all obstacles, break through the enemy's lines, and thus enable the infantry to get througli. They will also endeavor to throw the enemy into confusion and attack him from the rear. The effect of their fire is relatively small — especially in rough country, and as a result of the artificial fog, which is designed to protect them against th(» enemy's fire — as ac- curate shooting is nvndered very difficult by their movement and the conditions mentioned. On the other hand, they are, to a certain extent, capable of putting down men and machine-guns behind the enomy's brok(!n lines, and thus threat(!ning him in the rear. Before them goes an artillery barrage, de- signed to keep the enemy's infantry under cover and frustrate the fire of the anti-tank 70 THK WAIC OK TUK KlTrKK jjuns, Vot this K'\n\M>io onn soKloiw bo voiy ovonl^* div'^tributvHl v>r uuifonw. as all tho tanks v'.v.not j?\H forwnnl at tho samo paoo in nnovon cinintry — thoy niovo factor mor tirnt. Knol iironmi thaw on a ditVunilt tt'miht — iiuvi thns thoY soon fail to koop in lino. Whon at last, in orvlor to uj^o thoir arnuunont, thoy appoar out of tho fo>r whioh has oiMnvalod thoir ap- prv\\i>l\, tlio barraijv^ whioh has a^VvMnpaniini thoir advaniv has boon loft bohind auil thoy oomo within rai\ir\^ of tho tiro of tho ant i tank vr\ins: thoy an^ o'norally soon shot to piooos or ^vmpollovi to rot urn. as tho tank squadrons cannot bo U\l vm- oontrollod any loui^M*. Takiivv: all thoso thing-s into oonsidoration, it is plain that thoir otYoot is mainly moral. Thus tho duty of tho attaokor's infantry, whioh is following: up tho tanks, is primarily to ex- ploit tho otTtvt whioh thoso havo on tho dotond ors. Thoy must, thori^foro. koop as oloso up to tho tanks as possible, to inoroaso tho confusion thoy havo spri\'ul. and break throuiih tho out^ my's linos. If thoy koop t'ar behind they will lose the benetits of tho barraj^\ For thoso rwnsons infantry yvirtios will often advance between the tanks to develop the suoooss of the attack without delay, prevent the defenders TACTICS 7J from w/'Wirif/^ out of ihair way, and Inienmtj fbe All thr;H<; a/Jva;»taj a c^;rtain (fxienif ('/juniMrhaliiric/'A by f,hintH captun^j which have not been dc/niroycd by the tankn in pa«Hing — and thi.H without there being any need to delay the advanc/; of the front line which rnuHt Htill be able U> follov/ the tankn a/;roHH the lines which have been hu c/'/tHHi'uUy broken throrjgh. Further, art-iilery rnunt awornpany the latfjr infantry waveH, in order to fa/;ilitate the cap- ture of Htrong pointH Htill intact and deal di- rectly with the anti-tank gunn. Ah the (•/>T)ir(>] and direction of the tanks are practically impoHHible during the HfdUm itnelf, the tank line rnunt be given a definite objective, and a point rnuHt be fixed to which the attack- ing infantry ban to })<-. led. The tanks will then 72 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE have to return to reserve, as they are not, of course, suitable for defense. The light tanks only will still try to get across the captured po- sition and reach the area behind the enemy front in the hope of spreading confusion in the enemy's rear and doing as much damage as possible. Even then their operations will have to be limited to a certain extent, as otherwise their retreat will be most seriously menaced, especially if the enemy is prepared for them. Just as the attacker has to allow for all conceivable methods of defense, the defender on his side has to prepare for all possible methods of attack. If this idea be properly examined, one is soon led to the conclusion that the defense will have to adopt offensive methods to a greater degree than has been the case hitherto. In modem war it must be assumed that the attacker will always have a very powerful, and generally a very superior, force of artillery, and the in- evitable result is that every defender who con- fines himself to holding a certain position purely defensively accepts the risk that his line will have been so shattered by the attacker's artillery that he will not be in a position to hold it with infantry. This will always be the case in open warfare TACTICS 73 where the attacker is able to make systematic preparation for the assault on the hostile posi- tion. The defender must therefore devote all his efforts to upset such preparations to the best of his power. This can be done in various ways, though only by unexpected counter-at- tacks either against the flanks of the enemy or with a view to recapturing the position he has stormed. The garrison of the front line must therefore be weak as a rule, in order that as few troops as possible may be exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, but behind the front large reserves must be held ready to counter- attack and recover the lost sector. An excep- tion to this rule may be made only when the enemy is unable to concentrate a superior force of artillery with which to prepare the attack. If the attacker finds himself forced to the defensive by a counter-attack he must at once dig in, in order to hold up the enemy's advance in a favorable line. But he will not use his reserves for fixed or local defense, but must al- ways endeavor to group them if possible in such a way that he can employ them offensively, because that is the only way in which protec- tion can be obtained, at least to a certain extent, against the enemy's artillery fire. In this case the tactics of the infantry will, generally speak- 74 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ing, be the same in attack as before the war, with the difference that the machine-gun must be considered as the principal weapon of the infantry, both in attack and defense, rather than the rifle. Thus in open warfare the only change, even in defense, is that allowance has to be made for more powerful artillery fire, machine-guns and trench-mortars. It is otherwise in trench war- fare. If a definite line must be held at all costs it is an advantage to have a forward zone and to construct the defensive trench-system in such a way that the enemy is unable to discover in which line the main resistance will be offered. He will thus be unable to concentrate the fire of his artillery upon that line. Dummy trenches will be an advantage in deceiving the enemy. The ''forward" troops, on the other hand, must put up a vigorous resistance, hold up the enemy's approach from their fortified strong points, and try to draw his harassing and annihilating fire upon themselves. The ac- tion in the forward zone must also serve to deceive the enemy and to gain further time for the supports to be organized for battle and re- serves brought up. In the main line of resistance, which it is TACTICS 75 intended to hold, the garrison must be under shell-proof cover as much as possible, so that their fighting powers will be comparatively un- impaired when the enemy arrives. If there is time, concrete dug-outs will be useful. At the same time reserves must be assembled, so that if the enemy gets through he may be immedi- ately driven back again by a counter-attack. If this local counter-attack fails, a general counter-attack, well prepared by artillery and carried out by strong reserves specially brought up, is necessary, while such of the original gar- rison as are still holding their part of the line must secure their flanks against the enemy, even if he has broken through, and oppose the most stubborn resistance to any attempt to roll up the whole line. If the proximity of the enemy or any other reason makes it impossible to hold a forward zone, every effort must be made to keep the garrison of the main line of resistance under shell-proof cover, strengthen the obstacles in front of the line as much as possible, and put down a dense barrage in front of the defensive system, so that in case of attack the garrison will have time to open fire on the attacker as soon as his artillery has lifted in order to open the way for his storm troops. 76 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE But in any case the chances of victory for the attacker in these circumstances are very great, and so the main instrument of the defense will be the counter-attack, which must be planned and organized beforehand. The defender's artillery must be distributed in such a way that immediately after the successful attack it can subject what was previously the defender's front line to an annihilating fire and simultane- ously keep down the hostile artillery. Further, the artillery of the adjacent sectors must op- erate against the broken sector. Under the protection of this bombardment the lost posi- tion must be recovered by a counter-attack with reserves promptly brought up, while the artillery prepares to harass the enemy's in- fantry as it streams back and doubles its efforts to silence the hostile artillery. If the intention of the defense is not to hold a definite line or position at all costs, but to defend a certain zone, the conditions mil be similar to those obtaining in the defense of a position with a forward zone, and the only dif- ference is that in this case the main line of resistance does not now play so unportant a part as in the cases already discussed. It will be held with energy and resolution, but there will be no compulsion to recover it by a counter- TACTICS 77 attack. Resistance will continue to be offered, with the same stubbornness as in a forward zone, in a fortified rear zone to which the de- fender's troops will retire. In certain condi- tions it will be possible for the defender to draw the attacker so far after him that if the attacker's artillery is to play any further part it will have to change its position and get the range again, while his own artillery, which will have prepared for this eventuality and retired to new battery positions where all the new ranges are known, will only now begin to pro- duce its full effect. During this, the enemy's weak moment, every effort must be made to launch a counter-attack under the cover of the most violent artillery fire and with strong reserves. This counter- attack will presumably find the enemy's in- fantry scattered to a certain extent, and its prospects of success are thus good. It will also have the advantage that the defender's artil- lery, which is now in turn compelled to change its position, can return to its former emplace- ments, and thus the change of position can be carried out with the greatest rapidity. In this kind of defense, from the tactical point of view, there will be assault, resistance, withdrawal and counter-attack of individual 78 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE groups which must give each other mutual sup- port and cooperate intelligently though not in one continuous line. This form of action, how- ever — and there must be no sort of doubt about this — is possible only if one has at one's dis- posal an infantry which is a perfect instrument of war, well trained tactically, completely re- liable, and in the hands of officers and N.C.O. 's, do\\Ti to the smallest commands, who are ac- customed to act on their own initiative, hold their own even in the most difficult situa- tion and preserve touch between the different groups. It must be an infantry which never allows a retreat to turn into flight. If one's troops are not in that category it is better to fight in and for a definite line of defense. A self-possessed infantry with strong nerves is also an indispensable weapon for the defeat of tank attacks. It will never be possible, except within defi- nite limits, for the defender's infantry in the front line to attack or disable the tanks by themselves. They will have to try to protect themselves locally by tank traps and tank mines, so far as circumstances permit those measures. Otherwise the duty of the defend- er's infantry in the front line is to deal with TACTICS 79 and hold up the attacking infantry which is fol- lowing or advancing in line with the tanks. With a view to doing so they must get out of the sway of the tanks, allowing them to pass them, and must, therefore, never themselves fight in one continuous line. They must be dis- tributed in groups to admit the passage of the enemy's attacks, and must be in a position to take cover outside or in the attacked trenches themselves. They must also quietly let the enemy's barrage sweep over their heads. The defending infantry must further be organized in depth so that hostile infantry and machine- gun parties which are deposited by the trans- port tanks behind the front lines can be at- tacked and if possible annihilated before they have time to cause trouble and confusion. The rear groups of the defending infantry are also intended to protect the emplaced or mobile anti- tank guns and light trench-mortars, so that these without anxiety for their own safety can destroy the tanks or compel them to return. Any cavalry which is following the tanks, as frequently happens, will then be easily dealt with. Here again we see the infantry fighting in groups and working in the closest cooperation with artillery and trench-mortars. Indeed, 80 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE small independent groups, composed of these three arms, will be formed — the so-called tank forts — ^^'hich will be in a position to prove an insuperable obstacle to the advance of the tanks. Mobile anti-tank gims also ^^'ill often have to be concentrated. If the defender has further succeeded in holding up the hostile in- fantry follo^Ning up the tanks with the aid of the rifle and machine-gun parties left unsub- dued by the latter, a counter-attack, well pre- pared by artillery, will often find a situation which holds out the greatest promise of success. The vital element is that the infantry must not let its morale be shaken, the anti-tank guns must be correctly distributed and the whole area systematically prepared for defense against the tanks. Looking generally at the demands which will be made on the infantry, both in attack and de- fense — and in open as much as trench warfare — ^we shall soon realize that an immense change has taken place in the tactical uses of all arms, and that our organization and regulations must make full allowance for it. The company will certainly remain the small- est tactical unit, but its constitution must be revolutionized. The division into three pla- toons has proved its value, but the platoons TACTICS 81 themselves must be organized in groups com- posed of machine-gunners and riflemen. Every company must have telephone detachments and runners. In case of necessity the company commander must have an assault detachment as a special reserve. It would be a last reserve which that officer can throw in at the decisive point. All the men must be trained with the rifle, the machine-gun and the hand grenade, *as I said above. The heavy machine-guns must be formed into separate companies so that their ifire may be as concentrated as possible when they are brought up to the decisive sector of the battlefield. It is only in the defense that the commander will be frequently compelled to use them by sections. The old war establish- ment of 250 men to the company has proved too high in the modem ''group" action. The es- tablishment must be 150, not counting the train ^ personnel and necessary details. The division of the regiment into three bat- talions has proved sound. It would be better, however, to keep the battalion of four com- panies so that the battalion commander vdW have a reserve at his disposal even when he is compelled to hold a comparatively broad front and tactically to distribute his men very widely ' Corresponds with our Ai3.C. (Tr.) S2 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE or deeply. A heavy macliiiie-giiu company will also be attached to each battalion, and a labor company formed of less fit men, the latter for the purpose of supplying drivers for the trans- port, clerks, officers' servants and all the details which are continually being required behind the front, supply orderlies, work in the various supply, ammunition, pioneer and stores depots, and similar necessities. Further, a telephone detachment — not too small — must be attached to the battalion staff. At the present time all these detachments, most of which do not re- quire the full standard of medical fitness, make the most ruinous inroads on the fighting -Strength of the unit. Lastly, individual groups will have to be put under the direct orders of the regimental head- quarters staff. First among these we must place the telephone detachment with all its branches and then the labor companies. The trench-mortars, constituted in special tactical units, must be under the direct command of the regimental commander, while every regiment must have a batteiy of infantry gims — six guns to the battery, which may be distributed among the battalions if necessary — permanently at- tached to it. These batteries will be under the divisional artillery headquarters for technical TACTICS 83 •and artillery purposes, but under the com- mander of the infantry regiment for tactical purposes. Whether it is necessary to give the three regiments which compose the division a brig- adier is a question which is much debated in the army. The brigade has often been nothing more than a channel of communication. Per- sonally, I regard it as absolutely necessary. The divisional commander is not so well able to have a continuous and thorough grip on the regiments and their tactical movements as the brigadier, whose principal function it is to ex- ercise such control and insure a uniform con- duct of the infantry action. Both in peace and in war a stage between divisional and regi- mental headquarters is extremely necessary, even from the practical point of view. The movements and action of the infantry must be restricted to the most simple principles (this was done to a large extent even during the war), and the essence of all training must be the physical and, above all, the moral train- ing of the men and their leaders. Fighting in separate isolated groups, which are none the less animated by one fundamental idea, de- mands a high degree of tactical knowledge and personal resolution from all the subordinate 84 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE leaders, for it is quite impossible to direct such fighting by general orders. The object of the action and its final goal must be kuown to all the individual groups — indeed, to all the individual men. They must be familiar with the general principles of ac- tion, but definite instruction on the methods to be adopted c^ninot be given — as tliey used to be for infantry attacks in the old days — and it is cert^^in that orders will not always reach the individual groups in action. The letter of ac- tion is entirely secondary to the spirit, and the former will be subject to perpetual changes. With this method of training strict discipline and severe drill of tlie individual soldier must go hand in hand in order that a sense of duty may become second nature to him and accustom him to the resolute concentration of all his moral and physical powers. The regulations will take account of these desiderata, and the whole training will be aimed at their realiza- tion, for we shall be compelled to give far greater latitude to the independent decisions of the leaders — down to the most subordinate commands — than we have hitherto, and will have to confine ourselves to seeing that they are inspired by right principles. The independence of all leaders of troops, TACTICS 85 especially those in direct command of men, has become very much more important. This fact determines the character of the whole training. At the same time vital importance must be at- tached to the training of individual character. The demands upon the endurance, courage and audacity of the individual have been very much increased by the immense power of modem weapons. In addition there is the fact that, as 'the result of modern fighting methods, the men are left to their own devices much more than before. They are no longer carried along by the crowd; they are frequently deprived of the influence of their officers, and find themselves with nothing to depend upon but their own sense of duty and their own inherent worth. They can be equal to the requirements of the situation only if the bond of unity is strong, their moral sense high, and the idea of dis- cipline, that true soldierly virtue, has become part of their flesh and blood. All this, of course, makes the highest de- mands on those in positions of command who are destined to be trainers, instructors and leaders, demands far greater than have ever been made before. At the same time it gives the officer's profession an even higher status and consecration than it has ever known. 86 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE n. — Artii.lery It is jnst as impossible to spoak of iiiiifonn artillory taotios as of uniform infantry tactics. The functions of avtilloiy have uniltipliod and become far more important. The number of types, calibers and natures of ammunition have increased, the enemy has now to be fought in the air also, and the dilTerent species of opera- tions make fundamentally ditYerent demands. Moreover, the character of the theater of war has a very material intlueuce on the mobility of this weapon, and therefore on the opportu- nities of employing" it. In roadless Russia the same giins cannot always be used nor artillery operations take the same forms as in France, which is well supplied with roads and railways, or in the mountainous regions of tlie Alps and Carpathians. We must first draw a distinction between the uses of artillery iu open warfare and in trench warfare, while pure mountain warfare requires separate consideration, even from the artiller)' point of view. In the tirst case. i. e., operations in which both sides maneuver and the attacker is not faced by continuous, uniform and more or less fortilied lines which he ))nL^t attack frontallv, if TACTICS 87 at all, (tvan io-ihxy much the Hamo principlcH ap- ply a8 wf;re valiH before th(j World War. The field artillery, including the heavy field-how- itzerfl, are the deciding factor. Whether it ifi p^>HHible to (^ive the troopn heavy lonj<-rarj^e ^nR and rnortarH depends upon the nature of the battlefield and the condition of the lines of communication. I have known cases in Rus- sia where 10 cm. guns had to be left behind because they crjuld not be got forward any farther. Anti-aircraft guns, on the other hand, must accompany the divisions everywhere. In open warfare, in any case, the artillery must be much stronger than hitherto in com- parison with the infantry, so that the enemy's fire, which will be more intense than heretofore, may be dominated and the way opened for the infantry attack. It will be extremely important to make the fullest possible use of the factor of surprise in concentrating the mass of one's artillery against that part of the enemy's front against which the main and decisive assault is to be delivered. To attain this object it will be absolutely necessary, as I insisted even before the war, to avoid assigning all the artillery to divisions, and to concentrate a large artillery reserve in the hands of the army or army- group commander (in certain circumstances 8S THE WAR OP THE FUTURE even tlio corjis coinniaiider) , so that it can bo oinployed at the docisivc point. Tlio same rule applies to the ainmiinition supplies. In other respeets artillery operations will take mneh the same form as before. The artil- lery will practic^illy be restricted to shooting from obser\'ation, either ground observation or with the help of balloons and aircraft. The importance of tlash-spottino: and sound-ranging units, as well as squared maps, will become secondary, because one will hardly over have sutVicient time to make the necessaiy prepara- tions. These circumstances will also limit the use of the greatest ranges. Generally speak- ing, the artillery will be employed in large groups and without material distribution in depth, partly bec^uise of the limited opportu- nities for observation and partly for the sake of securing centralization of control and effect in the short period of preparation. In this connection it must be remembered that in the majority of cases the action \\nll develop out of strategic maneuver and that the time in whicli to prepare for the attack will be adequate only if one of the two sides decides to adopt the defensive in a fortified position. Even then it will be ad\'isable to make the at- tack as soon as possible to prevent the enemy's TACTICS 89 having time to settle down in the position he has selected. In addition to the main artillery force, the task of which is to silence the hostile artillery and hold down the hostile infantry until the time for assault is ripe, certain units of field artillery must directly accompany the infantry attack, for even in open warfare it must be as- sumed that as the attack proceeds enemy strong points and machine-gun nests will be encoun- tered which have not been discovered or suffi- ciently silenced by the main artillery force and will now open a surprise fire at the decisive moment. They must be dealt with promptly and effectively if the attacking infantry is to be spared heavy losses. This task will be as- signed either to the infantry-gun batteries and light trench-mortars which are ijermanently attached to the infantry, or else to the escort batteries drawn from the main artillery force for this precise purpose. It must be possible not only to employ these batteries in complete formations but to distribute them in sections or even in single guns. This principle applies, of course, to the same batteries in trench war- fare, and means that the subordinate com- manders must have a particularly good tactical training. In other respects artillery opera- 90 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE tions in trench warfare are absolutely different from those in open warfare. In this second case the artillery, which is strung out along a very extensive front, has the duty of being ready to meet a hostile attack at any moment and also to damage, and keep on damaging, the enemy by maintaining a steady fire on his artillery and infantry, har- assing his transport and shelters and destroy- ing his fortifications. Finally, it will have the duty of hindering hostile aerial observation as much as possible and protecting important points — stations, dumps, headquarters, billets — ^by anti-aircraft defenses. For this purpose the anti-aircraft guns must be distributed not only behind the whole front, but well over the back areas also, and at points which are favor- able for the purpose in view. They will be concentrated in considerable numbers some- times at one point, sometimes at another, ac- cording to the importance of the operations in view. Further, machine-guns will be assigned on the largest scale possible to all batteries; their function will be to protect the batteries against attack from the air and defend them against infantry attacks if the enemy breaks through. Yet the most vital function of the artillery TACTICS 91 in offensive operations is to silence the hostile artillery so completely that it can no longer do any harm to the advancing infantry ; further, to prepare the enemy lines and fortifications for assault, while paralyzing the hostile in- fantry and shattering their nerve so effectually that they are no longer in a position to offer serious resistance. Generally speaking, the ordinary daily tasks of the artillery require its uniform distribution over the whole battle-front and a certain or- ganization in depth, both in order to make full use of the ranges and also to avoid present- ing, by too much concentration, that splendid target for the hostile artillery which batteries grouped together always represent. For purposes of defense, the artillery must be grouped in such a way that the hostile lines of approach can be harassed by heavy and the heaviest long-range fire, or at short range by field guns also, while the assembly trenches of the enemy's infantry can be brought under destructive fire and a barrage or cur- tain of destructive fire of the greatest pos- sible density laid over the area which the at- tacking infantry must cross to reach the de- fender's lines. As a rule high-angle fire will be employed against the enemy's assembly 92 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE trenches, because the target is generally behind cover, and a further requisite is that the hostile marise gas bombardment will certainly cause losses, and in any case — as I have said before — it will compel the enemy to wear masks and thus make it extremely difficult for them to serve their guns or bring up ammunition. Be- sides, it is quite impossible to go on working in nriasks for any length of time. Thus, if the gas-shelling begins before the infantry attack and the gas-cloud is kept thick as long as pos- 100 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE sible, the hostile artillery will frequently be silenced or compelled to ^^^thdraw. In certain circumstances high explosive can be used as well as gas-shell, in order to inflict bloody losses on the enemy, destroy his ammuni- tion and damage his material. Further, the attacter's artillery must be so strong that, in addition to gassing and neutralizing the hostile artillery, it c-an perform its ordinaiy tasks, and while doing so continue the gassing of the defender's artilleiy with an adequate number of batteries. These other tasks may be summarized as the duty of doing the greatest possible damage to the enemy's defense works so that the way will be cleared for the infantry attack, accom- panying that attack as long as possible mth a barrage, thus enabling progress to be made without heavy losses. The barrage will consist of high explosive or gas-shells from the largest possible number of field guns and heavy hoAvitzers. It will go forward at fixed intervals (which must be set- tled beforehand in accordance T\^th the infan- try's anticipated rate of progress) from sector to sector in order to keep the hostile infantry immediately in front of the storm troops under TACTICS 101 cover, shake their nerve, and thus spare the at- tacking infantry heavy losses. The heavy mortars can also be used to co- operate by sectors in the barrage, but in that case they must fire ahead of it for fear of in- juring their own infantry. They will direct their attention to the most formidable of the enemy's strong points and defense works which will first be reached by the infantry behind the barrage. It would be very desirable if this systematic barrage, the time and direction of whose movements have to be fixed before- hand, could be made elastic so that it could directly conform to the advance of the infantry, whether fast or slow. Unfortunately there are practically insuperable difficulties in the way. This point will be discussed in a later chapter. If an adequate force of artillery is available the effect of the bombardment can be intensi- fied by giving it a certain depth. Our enemies, who had guns innumerable at their disposal, sometimes gave their barrage a depth of sev- eral kilometers. Thus the defenders have not merely to endure the fire of a narrow barrage for a relatively short time, but to hold out dur- ing the long period which a barrage of a depth of several kilometers takes to pass over their heads. In such conditions the attacker's pros- 102 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE pects of putting the defending infantry out of action are naturally much greater than with an ordinary barrage, at any rate if the density of the deep-zone fire is anything like that of the narrow. As a rule it will be impossible to carry out these tasks completely from the artillery posi- tions in ordinary trench warfare — which are very far back — as full use cannot be made of the ranges in the manner required by the of- fensive. And so, at the risk of being suddenly attacked, the batteries which are to neutralize the most distant hostile batteries destroy the enemy's defense works in the back area and participate in the barrage must be brought as close up to the departure trenches as is pos- sible with due regard for secrecy. On the other hand, the batteries which are to engage the nearer targets must be placed farther back. The most forward batteries should, if possible, be brought into position only the night before the attack. As a rule registration will have to be dispensed with. Generally speaking, shooting will have to be by the map (very accurate maps, of course) or the Pulkowsky system, while the greatest possible use will be made of aeroplane observa- tion later on. TACTICS 103 Further, it is very difficult to give the in- fantry the protection of artillery fire and sup- port them in their task when they have once passed the extreme limits of the ranges of the guns. Whether the surprise has succeeded or not, their task will become more difficult the farther they advance, for the hostile reserves concentrated in the back area or brought up from a distance, reserves which the attacker's artillery has not been able to reaeh, will now appear on the scene and face the attacker's infantry, which is perhaps already exhausted. Its need of artillery support will then be all the greater. The artillery must therefore stop at nothing to follow it up and continue firing from new positions, if possible without inter- rupting or diminishing the volume of fire. It is an extremely difficult matter to achieve this feat. The part played on such occasions by escort and infantry-gun batteries has already been discussed in the chapter on infantry tac- tics. They will be the first to follow the at- tacking infantry, either immediately or as close behind as they can get. The first serious obstacle in their path will be the very difficult ground which is the first fruits of trench warfare. Between two trench- systems which have been the scene of fighting 104 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE for a considerable period there is usually a No Man's Land which has been plowed up all over by the artillery of both sides, a waste where all roads and tracks have been destroyed and the shell-holes are innumerable. If this area is to be made practicable for artillery, labor units, with the necessary ma- terial, must follow hard on the heels of the storm troops, in order to construct roads for the guns, Bridge trenches and shell-craters, and deal with impassable places. This is fre- quently a very difficult problem, which involves a great loss of time, particularly in areas with much ground water. Adequate preparation must be made, and the work carried through with the greatest energy. Good roads must be made, especially for the bulk of the artillery, heavy guns and ammunition columns. The quicker the artillery is sent ahead the better it will be. Of course the difficulties will be less where there has not been so much ordinary trench warfare before the battle and No Man 's Land is less plowed up. Yet it will always be a troublesome business to make the enemy's lines and trenches (which have been destroyed by the attacker's artillery) practicable for its advance. With a view to having artillery ready to go TACTICS 105 forward without weakening the attacking ar- tillery still in action, it is advisable to have a second relay of guns behind the latter. These guns will have taken no part in the artillery action and can be brought up immediately the ground has been made sufficiently practicable. These batteries will be followed by the hind- most batteries of the attacking artillery the moment they have to stop firing owing to the range having become too great for them. On the other hand, precautions must be taken against sending forward too much artillery at once and thus placing too great a strain on the roads, as guns cannot be fought without the necessary ammunition. Batteries and ammuni- tion must be sent up in fixed proportions. The batteries must follow the infantry as far as possible and try to fire with the help of ground observation at first, aerial observation subse- quently. Their method of operation will then be de- termined by the requirements of open warfare. As there can be no centralized direction or control of the artillery in these circumstances, it would be a good plan to assign the artillery, both light and heavy batteries, which first ar- rives, to the infantry regiments, so that sepa- rate self-contained tactical groups are formed. 106 THE WAK OF THE FFTURE Each infantry regiment will then indicate to its artillery the tasks the fulfillment of which is necessary to the further development of the action. As the batteries come up they will gradually be formed into groups, but it is only when the bulk of the artillery has followed the infantry- that the artillery conmiander ^vill be able to resume command of the batteries and groups, so far as their attachment to the infantry regiments is not found to be neces- sary for some further period. If there was originally a second artillery wave, another one will now be formed, com- posed, of course, of batteries other than those which had constituted the first, and thus the next stage of the advance will be prepared. If time and circumstances allow, it will natur- ally be desirable, if possible, to settle on the new battery positions on the first day of the attack and supply the necessary artillery maps so that the guns can shoot by the map even where ground and aeroplane obsen'ation are impossible. This method will suffice, however, only when a large number of theodolites are available — at least one to every two batteries — while the batteries press forward directly behind the reserves of the advancing infantry with the artillerv officers who are to reeon- TACTICS 107 noiter and Hite the new emplacements. An abundant .supply of material for artillery maps muHt alHo be taken with them. As this is sel- dom possible, however, the fixing of aiming- points for the new emplacements will generally have to be dispensed with. In any case, it is more important to follow the infantry as rapidly as possible and give them good artil- lery Hupijort Sit the earliest possible moment after they have got beyond the range of the most advanced batteries of the attacker's artil- lery. For that purpose it will be important, apart from promptly making the ground prac- ticable for artillery, to send the sausage bal- loons forward as soon as possible, and get the artillery aeroplanes into action under the pro- tection of the pursuit flights. Wireless must be immediately carried forward with the artil- lery for the X)urpose of communication with the observation aeroplanes. The vital neces- sity is that the artillery attack should be kei>t going continuously, and that its fire should not be allowed to die down or diminish even for a moment. Although I have been discussing the employ- ment of artillery for a special kind of attack, it is essential to point out that methods of at- tack may be extremely varied. It has repeat- 108 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE edly happened that the attack, when favored by the conformation of the ground or concealed from the eyes of the enemy by natural or arti- ficial fog, has dispensed with a preliminary bombardment altogether in order to have the advantage of complete surprise. In such cases it is accompanied by a deep and dense barrage only. Such a method is particularly advisable when the attacker has a sufiBcient number of tanks which precede the infantry, flatten out the enemy obstacles and chmb over his trenches and shelters. The moral effect of such an at- tack can be very great. In contrast to the surprise method, the at- tacker may choose to continue the prelimi- nary bombardment and the neutralization of the hostile artillery by the expenditure of a vast amount of ammunition in harassing and anni- hilating fire which goes on for days on end. The purpose of this method is to make it com- pletely impossible for the defender to remain in the area attacked, and destroy all his de- fense works one after the other by the use of the heaviest guns. This last system can even be combined with the tank attack, which should aim at the greatest possible effective surprise. Thus the tasks of the attacker's artillery will be extremely varied. But there will always TACTICS 109 be the difificulty of the artillery concentration, and also the necessity of sending batteries forward after the storming infantry when the attack has succeeded. These difficulties will be particularly formidable after days of drum fire extending far into the enemy's back area. The method of the attack determines the form of the counter-measures to be adopted by the defending artillery. Of course, its pri- mary task is to annihilate the attacker's in- fantry in their assembly trenches, or, if this fails, to deal with them as they advance towards the defender's infantry lines. But it will only be able to fulfill this duty if it has not been previously silenced or neutralized by the attacker 's artillery. Thus, the first business of the defense is to maneuver with its artillery in such a way that the latter cannot be neutralized by the enemy's artillery. If the enemy's intention to attack has been discovered in time and the defender has a sufficient artillery reserve at his dis- posal, he will endeavor to strengthen the artil- lery on the threatened sector to such a degree that it will be equal, or if possible superior, to that of the attacker. Further, the defender will make full use of gas bombardment. As the area of the enemy's battery emplacements 110 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE will not be entered by the defender's own troops, he can saturate it with gas and thus compel the attacker's artillery to evacuate it. Of course this will require an enormous ex- penditure of gas-shell. The defender will always be forced into this kind of life-and-death duel with the attacker's artillery when the lines of the opposing sides are very close and the defender's front line must be held for local or strategic reasons. In these conditions, if the attack comes by sur- prise so that an adequate reenforcement of the defending artillery is impossible, while the front line itself is not very strong or in a position to withstand the heaviest bombard- ment (perhaps open to a tank attack also), the attacker's prospects of success are very great. The defender's chances are a good deal more favorable when he has any kind of deep for- ward zone in front of his main line of resistance. This would mean that the enemy's artillery has to keep at a more respectful distance, while his infantry have to master the forward zone under the fire of the defender's artillery before they reach the main line of defense. The defending artillery must therefore be distributed in such a way that it can lay an annihilating barrage in front of the forward TACTICS 111 zone, fight the hostile artillery, and yet pre- serve some of its batteries from the attentions of the enemy's fire. To a certain extent these are patently self-contradictory demands, which can be met only if the defender has an extraor- dinary force of artillery at his disposal. If • the hostile artillery is equally strong or stronger, the defender will be compelled to choose between the two sets of requirements, and by skillfully grouping the various natures of guns, try to attain his end at least to some extent. The most favorable situation of all for the de- fender, from the artillery point of view, is when circumstances enable him to give his opponent the impression that he intends to hold a certain position, while in reality he evades the blow and meets his adversary's thrust in a position lying considerably farther back. In such a case he can keep his whole artillery— with the exception of a few batteries sent forward to de- ceive the enemy — out of range of the latter 's fire. His artillery will be distributed behind his main line of defense in the rear; he wil] concentrate his whole fire in front of the latter, and thus make it quite impossible for the en- emy's infantry to storm it. In such a case the attacker will be able to ad- 112 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE vance only by stoges, and when he has captured the dummy position he has to arrange a fresh artillery deployment before he can continue the attack. His chance of surprising the defender has definitely gone, and with it a very material and often decisive advantage for the attack. If the attacker's artillery is so strong that it can search the whole area of the defender's lines in days of drum fire, the defender will withdraw his own artillery — and even the bulk of his infantry, except such part of it as can be accommodated under shell-proof cover — out of range of the enemy's fire, and distribute it in such a way that it can take the advancing hostile infantry under the most effective de- struction fire. The defender will then endeavor to harass the enemy's artilleiy with long-range gunfire only until sufficient artillery reserves have been brought up to deal with them effec- tively. The maintenance of the position will then depend upon the success of the counter- attack. A tank attack makes special demands upon the artillery of the defense. If this attack is to be beaten off the first requirement is that the tanks should be exposed to an intense de- struction fire during their advance, which is generally shrouded in fog. In the second stage, TACTICS 113 when they have come out of the fog, they must be fought and destroyed by a large number of anti-tank guns distributed over the area con- cerned for this very purpose. These anti-tank guns will work by direct observation. If the. destruction fire is to be really effective, it will be essential in this case also to distribute that part of the defender's artillery to which this task is assigned so far back that the hostile artillery will not be able to neutralize it in time. On the other hand, it is important that the anti- tank guns which are to destroy the tanks at short range, as well as the light trench-mortars on special mountings which are to be used for the same purpose, should be as close as possible up to the line in which the enemy's attack is to be held up, and which the tanks must there- fore break through. The difficulty in this case is for these guns and their detachments to remain an effective fighting force during the preliminary bombard- ment by the enemy's artillery and while his bar- rage is passing over them. In fact it will be possible only if their position is unknown to the enemy and the men at least are under shell- proof cover. In the case of the mobile anti-tank guns there will be the further difficulty that the teams 114 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE also have to be preserved from destruction. Generally speaking, this will be possible only if the defender succeeds in neutralizing the at- tacker's artillery to a certain extent, so that the latter is compelled to employ part of his artillery permanently against the defending ar- tillery. This again will be made more difficult by the fact that no small part of the defender's force of field guns have to be employed as anti-tank guns from the outset, and therefore can take no part in dealing with the attacker's artillery. Here, again, the defender is faced with con- tradictory and apparently irreconcilable de- mands which can never be wholly satisfied. The upshot of the whole matter is the brute fact that in this case, as in every other, the defending artillery can never be too strong. If it is kno^vii that an attack is imminent all artil- lery reserves within call must be brought up. Emplacements for artillery reenforcements must be established in every part of the front to be defended. The ranges must be established and suitable artillery maps supplied. Turning to artillery methods in detail, it is of course necessary that, if it is at all pos- sible, shooting be from observation. This sys- tem alone is a guarantee of adequate results. TACTICS 115 An endeavor should always be made to obtain ground observation or observation from bal- loons or aeroplanes. But this will not always be possible. Observation is out of the question at night or in dense fog, and yet even in these circumstances the infantry cannot be left with- out any artillery protection, nor can the enemy be allowed to advance unmolested. Targets of considerable size can be engaged without observation by shooting by the map, due consideration being paid to weather or other special influences. By this method the whole area occupied by the enemy can be harassed, roads and railways swept and bil- lets and stations shelled. Fire of this kind, even without observation, is particularly im- portant in a large-scale operation. It can always be employed where it is de- sired to sweep considerable areas or definite sectors, but not to engage small targets. Thus unobserved fire is inevitable in gassing hostile groups of batteries or considerable portions of the enemy's lines and assembly trenches for the simple reason that these operations are best carried out at night. In this case the intention is merely to spread thick gas-clouds over a considerable area. Again, observation is neither possible nor necessary for the creep- 116 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ing barrage, the forward movement of which has to be settled by the clock. All that is re- quired here is to pay the most careful atten- tion to the errors of the day and other special influences. The ordinary barrage, and frequently de- struction fire also, have to be carried on with- out observation. This barrage means that the defender spreads a curtain of fire of the great- est possible density in front of his own lines. The attacking infantry have to pass through this curtain. The method will be effective only if the defending artillery is so strong that the barrage is extraordinarily dense, and if pos- sible comes from the flanks. Otherwise — ^if there are gaps — it is only too easy for the 'at- tacker to slip through. As I have said before, shrapnel (if the shell is really reliable) is the proper nature for this operation, especially in the case of an enfilading barrage, though the time-fuse shell also is very useful in these cir- cumstances. The batteries concerned must have registered very accurately beforehand. It is impossible to correct the range once the barrage is begun, as it has to be laid down at its maxi- mum intensity the moment it is required. In cases where the necessary density cannot be obtained, destruction fire is a useful substi- TACTICS 117 tute. The latter does not, indeed, cover the whole front, but its effects against the known or suspected assembly points of the hostile infan- try are even greater, and it can quickly be con- centrated against them. As a rule it will be observed fire against known targets. If it is to take the place of the barrage, without ob- servation being possible, it will be directed against the enemy's prospective assembly points on which the batteries concerned will have registered beforehand. In this case, how- ever, it must not be a fixed and rigid curtain like the barrage, but must be shifted to the flanks or rear as occasion requires. It will frequently be necessary to bring it back sharply to catch the hostile infantry as they leave their assembly trenches. The fire must be distributed in such a way that the enemy can never know for certain where it will fall and make his ar- rangements accordingly. Destruction fire against smaller targets — batteries, individual strong points, command and observation posts — will be useful only when it is accurately checked by observation. If the artillery is to be safe — as far as safety is ever possible — against the enemy's destruction fire, the batteries must shift their positions fre- quently as soon as they suspect that their em- 118 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE placements have been discovered by the enemy. Among the weapons used in preparing an attack we must not forget the gas-shell mortar, which in a certain sense fonns a separate arm, but in \Hew of its functions is part of the artil- lery. This mortar is built into its emplace- ment and fires gas or high-explosive shells at ranges up to 3,000 meters. These mortars are fired by electricity, so that all of them can be fired simultimeously. Thus their moral and physical effects are very great when an ade- quate number has been concentrated. The area affected, though restricted of course, is envel- oped in an immense cloud of gas w'hich causes heavy losses if the defenders are surprised. The concentration of these weapons must therefore be kept a strict secret, and they must be cxirefully camouflaged. If high-explosive shell is used, it is desirable that the infantry attack should begin inune- diately after the explosion, so that its enormous moral effect may be exploited to the full. Of course these mortars can fire only once at the same spot, for the enemy wall immediately bom- bard their emplacements, and it takes a consid- erable time to prepare these mortar batteries for a second round. The direction and control of the artillerj-' in TACTICS 119 all these circumstances is a very difficult mat- ter. On the one hand, especially in trench war- fare, it is essential that the artillery be in a position to develop and concentrate all its power without any observation, relying solely on careful calculations and accurate artillery maps and giving due consideration to all errors. In this case, a single direction by one central authority is essential and 'this authority must assign the targets, decide the distribution and scale of ammunition and settle all questions of time. On the other hand, it is often essential that all the subordinate commanders down to the gun captain should have a free hand to deal with targets which suddenly present themselves and act on their own responsibility, though in the sense and spirit of their general instruc- tions, without waiting for orders, which quite frequently will never reach the individual offi- cer. These demands represent extremes which may have to be observed in certain circum- stances. Between these limits, however, there lies a broad sphere of the most varied artil- lery tasks in which the problem is to reconcile the demands of a central control and direction— of the lower units, at any rate— with that in- dependence of the subordinate commanders 120 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE which special circumstances frequently make inevitable. It means that these commanders, right down to the gun captains, must have a high standard of tactical knowledge. When we contemplate the whole range of artillery operations we shall very soon be con- vinced that the peace organization on which the training and tactical emplojTnent of the artillery was based before the war is quite un- suitable for modem conditions. The system of four guns to the batteiy has certainly proved sound. Six guns are required only in the case of the infantry-gun batteries, as these may have to be distributed in sections to the three battal- ions of the regiment. On the other hand, the separation into field and foot artillery has been seen to be a mistake. A number of natures which previously formed part of the foot artil- lery have become field artillery to-day, and are employed in exactly the same manner as the old field artillery. The artillery officers must be as familiar with the one as with the other. Both species must frequently be employed in one tactical unit under the same command. To the field artillery belong not only the field guns and light howitzers, but even the heavy field how- itzers, the long 10 cm. guns, and to a certain extent the 21 cm. mortars also. TACTICS 121 Only the heavy flat-trajectory and high-angle guns, i. e., 13 cm., 15 cm., 21 cm., 30 cm. and 38 cm. guns and the heavy mortars with a caliber of 28, 30 and 42 cm., are in a category by them- selves. These are employed on specialist tasks in particular circumstances, and generally speaking play no part in open warfare. It may be questionable whether the 21 cm. mortars also do not fall into this category, as in cer- .tain conditions — e. g., in the roadless regions of Russia — they cannot be employed in open warfare. On the other hand, in France they were in use during the whole war and fre- quently employed in conjunction with the field artillery. It will therefore be advisable to con- stitute special battalions of 21 cm. mortars, count them as part of the field artillery, and leave them behind only when the road system is particularly bad. In all other respects it would be advisable to let the field artillery regiments comprise field- gun and field-howitzer Abteilungen,^ and also assign an Ahteilung of heavy field howitzers and 10 cm. guns to each of them, so that all the officers and men can be trained indiscriminately on all these guns. The regiments thus formed will be part of the division. Other regiments, *An Ahteilung is a group of three batteries. (Tr.) 122 THE WAR OF THE FUTUKE comprising long heavy guns and liea\^ field howitzers, would form corps artilleiy and be under the orders of the corps commander who would also direct and control the mortar bat- teries. It would be best for the anti-aircraft bat- teries to be assigned to the divisional and corps artillery. Further, all batteries will be et|uipped with machine-gims, either for defense against aircraft or for dealing with infantry at- tacks at shoi-t range. It must be anticipated that in trench warfare a very much larger artil- lery force will be required than for open war- fare. In open warfare it will be essential for the corps and the aniiies to have an artillery reseiTe at their disposal, and our peace organi- zation must boar this requirement in mind. In trench warfare, on the other hand, it is essential that the annies, army groups, and G.H.Q. itself should have a large artillery reserve, so that the artillery center of gi'avity may be shifted as circumstances require. These reserves must comprise field artillery regiments and anti- aircraft guns also. The necessary material must be brought up, and the required officers and men must be duly trained. It is therefore possible that the divisions will have more artil- leiy regiments than they cm\ use in ordinary TACTICS 123 circumstances and open warfare, and this be- cause these units must j>rovide Uie necessary reserve in time of war. In any case, as com- pared with former times, the artillery of the field army will have to be increased much more than the infantry. As regards long-range guns and the heaviest howitzers, it would be best to form them into mixed battalions as a special and independent arm under an Inspector-General. They should be assigned to corps and divisions for special maneuvers only. No s]r>ecial tactics are required for this heavy artillery. It must know how to move about, get into position, shoot and cooperate with the other arms, particularly infantry. In this last department nothing like enough was done be- fore the war. Even for the field artillery tac- tical operations can be reduced to the sim^dest form. Of course it is necessary in open war- fare that batteries and groups should know how to move about safely and smartly, and how to get into position. For the rest, good shooting is all that is required. Shooting with direct observation at short ranges must be prac- ticed very frequently in the closest cooperation with the infantry. This applies not only to the infantry-gun batteries, which are permanently 124 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE attached to infantry regiments, but to all field- gun batteries without distinction. Finally, far greater importance than hitherto must be at- tached to the independent action of the subor- dinate commanders. All section commanders and gun captains must know how to control and direct fire and must have reached such a standard of tactical training that they can take over the duties of the post above them at any moment and without hesitation. Artillery material must be simplified as much as possible. The demands of the war have led to the introduction of many new natures which did not correspond to the changing circum- stances. Great mobility (therefore the mini- mum of weight), long ranges and a rapid rate of fire, combined with very simple construction and ability to stand the hardest wear, are the absolutely essential properties which every gun must have. The ammunition wagons also must be constructed to stand hard wear. Motor transport must be used as largely as possible for this purpose, and produced on the scale re- quired. Fresh education is required in the matter of ammunition, which must be simplified as much as possible to meet all the eventualities of war with its changing requirements. In the course TACTICS 125 of the giant conflict, as I have already said, shrapnel was driven out of use almost entirely by high explosive for the reason that in mass production it is not possible to manufacture really reliable time-fuses. Under normal cir- cumstances of production it will recover its old importance. On the other hand, special attention must be devoted to the production of a shell of a particularly high penetrating power for use against tanks. Ill- — Cavalby and Aiecraft If I deal with cavalry and the air force in one chapter my reason is that the functions of the former have to a certain extent been taken over by the air service. The mounted arm has changed its character very materially. In trench warfare it has practically ceased to ex- ist as cavalry. Mounted troops are helpless against the long fortified lines of the enemy. They can be used only as a police force behind the front. Apart from infantry patrols, the du- ties of reconnaissance have been almost entirely taken over by aircraft, though the activities of the latter are certainly supplemented by the work of spies and secret agents. Yet these activities are subject to the great disadvantage that aircraft can work only in more or less fa- 126 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE vorable weather, aiid are as good as useless for this purpose at night or in dense fog. At night, movemonts by railway and, in some circumstances, the position of villages and c^mps are all that aeroplanes can usually dis- tinguish. It is only when flying \ery low and at short distances that it is possible for aero- planes to light up the area they wish to recon- noiter. On the other hand, in good weather aeroplane reconnaissance is often able to show better results than caA^alrj^ could ever have done. The whole area occupied by the enemy can be photographed from the air. This makes it possible to fix the position and organ- ization of the enemy's system of defenses in the greatest detail. Further, it is possible to observe and photograph from the air the move- ments of trains, the position of stations and rolling stock, aerodromes, the size and approx- imate capacity of camps, magazines and am- munition depots, the emplacements of hostile batteries and the presence of tanks (either directly or by distinguishing their tracks on the roads). Of course the enemy will do his level best to conceal all these establishments from aerial observation, but if the reconnaissance is really careful and systematic it will often be possible TACTICS 127 to make out preparations for a hostile attack, the increase or decrease of the enemy's artil- lery, the arrival of reserves, and similar prepa- rations, and thus render the commanders the most valuable services. But just as the cavalry found the field for reconnaissance open only when they had driven off the hostile cavalry, the air force also will frequently be in a position to carry out this task effectively only when the supremacy of the air has been fought for and won. The enemy will not only attack our reconnoitering ma- chines whenever he has the chance, but he will also frequently patrol the area himself over his own lines to prevent our machines from break- ing through, and he is certain to take the of- fensive himself in adequate force to find out what he requires to know about his opponents. As I have said elsewhere, it is the function of the chaser squadron to fight the enemy's machines and to clear the way for the recon- naissance maichines. For this purpose they are constituted in tactical units, the strength of which is not, of course, fixed by rule. The largest unit is the squadron which may consist of four to six flights and is in charge of a com- mander. The flight, which normally consists of fourteen machines, is subdivided into chains of 128 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE six to eight machines. The employment of a whole squadron always indicates the intention to destroy the largest possible number of hos- tile machines. The duty of the squadron-conunander is to lead the whole squadron, organized as a single formation, to fight the enemy. The commander himself, who always flies lowest in order to be seen by all the machines, arranges that he has, e. g., one flight each on his right and left; another follows behind, while the fourth is echeloned in height. Fixed tactical forms have not yet been developed and even the strengths of the individual tactical units will vary with the number of the machines and the personnel available. If the squadron meets a hostile force the action, which is always offensive, will break up into a number of separate duels. In these fights everything practically turns on getting above one's opponent, attacking him with the sun behind and shooting only at close quarters (there must be no hesitation about closing with the enemy) in order to be certain of hitting. After a successful action the squadron resumes its original formation round the squadron-com- mander who has been circling over the scene of battle. If the squadron meets a hostile squadron TACTICS 129 which is flying higher, it must attempt to entice the enemy to come down and give battle, and then rob him of the advantage of height by skill- ful climbing. On the other hand, if the squad- ron meets individual hostile machines flying be- low it, only one machine should dive down upon the enemy, or in case of emergency it may be helped by one other at most. The squadron itself must remain at its original height and not be induced to come down, as otherwise it would find itself in a disadvantageous position with regard to any other hostile formation which came up later. In the individual duel everything turns on attacking the enemy from behind, and the enemy will do everything in his power to avoid being attacked from that quarter. With good climb- ers like our latest Fokker machines,^ the enemy can also be attacked advantageously from be- low and behind. Against hostile balloons the best effects can be obtained with organized units and in cooperation with heavy artillery. Whole groups of balloons are attacked simul- taneously, and their beds bombarded by heavy long-range guns to prevent the balloons from being promptly hauled down. Isolated ma- chines will often be able to surprise and destroy ' I cannot say whether they still represent the latest type. 130 THE WAR OF THE FUTUKE a balloon by making skillful use of the clouds. The same principles which apply to the squad- ron naturally hold good for smaller units which act independently. The offensive, first and all the time, must be the dominant note in air tactics whether a large formation or a single machine is concerned. Success depends upon it far more than in fighting on land. The war has proved it up to the hilt. It may often mean that a considerable number of flights — drawn from adjacent fronts also — have to be concen- trated in a certain area so that the supremacy of the air may be secured, come what may, at the decisive point. Some such systematic concentration must be carried out particularly for a defensive action and it is, of course, indispensable when an of- fensive operation is intended, for in this case the control of the air at all altitudes must be secured beyond dispute both before and more particularly after the infantry assault. It will thus be necessary to keep back reserves of chaser squadrons in order to deal with enemy counter-attacks. A single command of the air forces is necessary under all circumstances. Success in the air wdll make it possible to rec- onnoiter much more thoroughly and accurately, and fulfill in increasing measure the other duties TACTICS 131 of the flying arm, for the air service has taken over the role of cavalry in another department and in trench warfare is alone in a position to perform it — I mean harassing the communica- tions of the enemy. In trench warfare the cavalry can never get behind the hostile front, while aeroplanes can fly over it and attack the enemy's lines of com- munication, troops marching behind the lines, camps and aerodromes, dumps, stations and railways, and this either with bombs or ma- chine-gun fire. These attacks can be far more successful and carried much farther behind the hostile front than in the days when this duty was assigned to the cavalry. As a rule these attacks will be carried out by bombing squad- rons which have a very great radius of action and usually work by night, though by day also against nearer targets, and then generally un- der the protection of chaser flights. Cavalry cannot intervene as such even in bat- tles in trench warfare so long as these have not led to a complete rupture. But the cavalry effect of surprise, if not its methods of oper- ation, can be obtained by the battle flights. These machines which, as we saw, are specially equipped for action against ground targets, can dive down (of course under the protection 132 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE of cliaser squadrons) unexpectedly from high altitudes, sweep the enemy's trenches, troops in action, columns on the march and batteries in action with machine-gun fire at the shortest range. These attacks can be directed not only against the enemy's front line but also against defense works farther back and reserves as they arrive. In this way very material assist- ance can be rendered to the infantry in their hard struggle, and the situation will often be saved. The machines must come down very low, ignoring the enemy's fire altogether, if they are to make good use of their weapons and spread terror and confusion in the enemy's ranks. Armor protection for the most important parts will materially facilitate this task. Thus the machine can be employed for attack as a kind of cuirassier of the air. On such occasions it will be a great advantage to organize the air forces into battle squadrons, each with a special task. As tactical units they will be sent into action where the decision is being sought either in attack or defense. In trench warfare the cavalry can partici- pate only when it is dismounted. They will be employed exactly in the same manner as infan- try, and must be equipped and organized TACTICS 133 accordingly. The horses will be left in safe places while the men will be organized in regi- ments within which the squadron forms the tac- tical unit. The peace training of this arm must provide for their employment dismounted, for even in open warfare their dismounted role will play a vital part. In other respects open war- fare, which will mark the beginning of a cam- paign or succeed a victorious rupture of the enemy's front, will make quite different de- mands on this arm from those of trench war- fare. Its peculiar characteristics will then again play their full part. Of course mounted fighting — ^by which I mean shock tactics — will be limited to a few exceptional occasions, as I pointed out even before the war, of course with- out being believed. It is only the patrols on both sides which will continually get to close quarters. On the other hand, the strategic functions of this arm will become of vital importance. The speed of the horse will be used no longer for attack but for rapid strategic maneuvers. In this department an independent force of cavalry, properly handled, will obtain great successes of much strategic importance. Its main function will be to attack the flanks and rear of the enemy during a battle, cut his com- VM TilK WAlx OK THK Fl'TllxK munioations as tho oporation proooods ami cause ooufiision bohiiul tho hostile front, hi action itself cavalry wiU usually tight dis- mounted and with the assistauee ot' the aux- iliary anus assiii'ued to it. Mounted lighting will take place only when it meets the enen\y's niountcii cavalry, or when it falls by surprise on hostile tivops in tlight, or tiuds a transport column on the march without escort. These will certainly be exceptional occurrences and dismounted tighting will be the rule both in attack and in defense proper. These considerations must determine the tac- ticfU uses and tlierefore the organization of this arm upon which they are based. The form of action requires that a tactical disuioimted unit uuist bo tlie foundation of the whole or- ganization. Every two squadrons, which num- ber alnnit 150 men when dismounted i^apart from patrols and oiiierlies, etc.), must there- fore form the tactical unit under the senior captain or a statf othcer. The cavalry regiment must consist of at least ten squadrons in" addi- tion to the reserve squadron in order to form a dismounted battalion with a total establish- ment of about 750 men. The larger formations also must have a pn^portional establishment. The brigade Tuust consist of two or three regi- TACTICS V/> nuiniHf »o that it can cjtnHtiiuUi two or three (ViHmounU'A ImiUiUoiin, while the division nnujt have thr<'^; hn'j^a^JeH, ho tftat it can represent a nanouH i\iihi\u'/_ forcji even aft/^r (hdadaing one hriga/Je. i'oth briga/JeK and (Vivmona mtut hf; f'uJJy ('j\m\)[t(ii\ with tli/j auxiliary weapon* and indeed on kucJj a »cale tfiat each brij^ade forrnx an independent tactical hK>dy. The iiu>Ht vital r<'/\u\r('j(ii'Jii in thai monuUA tr^xjps hhould have miif'Aiinc^i^n Hrjua/JronH, if pOBHibhj one to ea/jh rejrinjent. Thi» in particularly imjrxjrtant, an the li^ht rnachinr^^n, b^iing difficult t^i carry on hornebaek, cAmuot be UH^i^L The machine- g^un Kquadron rnuKt be able t^j develop a really Heriouw fin^power. The cavalry formation* rniJHt alHo receive a Btrong forwi of artillery, if poHHJble light field howitzers of special con- Htnjction Ix^jaune the useH of the latter are far more varl'id than thoHo of gunH. Ad(if{UiiUi am- munition muHt be taken by a large number of ammunition cjlumnn. Under all circumiitances it will be TKiCMHH'dry for cvary brigade to have a battery which in permanently atta/;hed to it, and the divisional commander mu8t liave a group of three l)atterieH at his immediate diu- pOHal. Provision must also be made for the rc-quire- mentn of tronch warfare by f^quipping the 1S6 TllK WAU^ OK THK KT riKV: ORVsUrv with lijilit m.iohitio ii'uns. A Inviiv nuui- Wr of mon ntus^t U\orv>fori^ bo tniiuod ii\ tho use of tiiis \v^\»VHni ovo!\ tho\iii'h it ^vvniiot bo oarriini aKnit ponnHMontly in ovhm\ warfarw Tho foivo niuiit hrtvx^ a larjiv uun\bor of oiUutwii;^ for briii^iiV^ up tho novv^sary fvnidor and ii sor\ os of matorial, aiid it will Iv advisablo to form s|Hvial osvvrt {^quadrvMis to protivt tho ivhmiws on tho niarv^h and, at tho san\o tinu\ porforni tho dutios of olo$o nxvnnaisv^anoo. Thus and thus ah\no will a sutlio.iont fi\HHion\ of niovon\ont bo gioourwi to tho wholo forvv. Anothor funo tion of thoso osoort squadrons will bo to n\)ui- iiition t\Hxi supplios and foddor fixnn tho coun- try itself. As it will usually bo in\possiblo to n^lN- on gv^ttiiVi? supplios frvmi tho ronr. it will W partioularlN' important to tuako tho fnllost uso of Kval rosourvH^s. Tho osv.vrt squadrons must thoivforo not bo too woak. auvi may bo traimxi as mountiHl infantry, as monntixl t\jj:ht- ing is most unlikol>\ If all thoso dutios. and parlioularly n\\nisitioninii' and protootinji: tho transports, had to bo porformod by tho tl^htin^ tixH^ps thomsolvos thoir tijihtinsj: stivngth would soon bo vory soriously rvninood. Tho samo considerations apply to distant roivnnaissiUico, which oxv>orionoo has shown absorbs a vory largo forco and puts a strain TACTICH L37 on iha hhrni'M wh'wh in thoht',H of n/'XtmiHiaHiiiK'/i flying rjrjit« rrjuxt ^*#* hiUuJfU'A U) th<; cavaJry ari/J fonfif'A and or- gan/V^J in Huch a way that th/; n^^y^'KHary air- craft can h<; ami'tHK-A avdu to (itiiiuthtA bn;^a/J/^, thoMjfh thrjy rnuHt all Jkj nnd*^J of th/; ii>'',r()]>\itu(', that will nlmoHi always Ik; jiOft- HJbh;, jrjKt an it will b/; fhUHihhi to (iHinhViSih Mtijtablo tifirfAroman under tho protraction of the rmmnUA irodpn. Thana a^oplan<;H rnunt n;coii- no'iUtr the country ahead and on b/Ah Hide» of the cavalry ho thoroughly that the latter will alwayn be gafe aj^ainnt Hurj-jrige or attack by a superior for/;/; when on the march or oth/;rwi»^. If Huch an a/;roplane deta/:Jinrj/nit i» to UAlow iha r;avalry permanently it muHt be particularly mobile, for it alH/> has to phrfonn the duty of Kpotting for the attach^;/! artillery. This aim can be ax'M'itiViA hy the pr//vi«ion of iulofiusiUi motor transport. The c/^mrnander of the flying Hqua/lron or an Air Fore/; YitiiHon officer must always jr tho noivplanos, as \Yi>ll as motor ivu\^ aiul motor oyolistj*. Thoso vohiv^los iwust iviuaiu whoro tho oavalry tonwaliouvS (ivrps» divisions, or brigados) t\x tUoir hoad- quartors. In choosii\^4i' tlioso points ^^and tho roqniro monts of tlio atlaoiu\i th ing nnits nuist bo l)ori\o in mind for this pnrposo'l tho ooimtry will havo to Iv iwoiuioitorod boforoliand. and tho sitos soKHxlod indioatod by oortain si>5:nals a^irotnl upon by tiio indiviilual oavalry nnits. Tlioro n\nst ivrtainly bo a landing- liTound oK>so to tho otluvr in oonnnand of tho oavalry, and it wonlii bo tlosirablo that aiivraft shonUi bo ablo to land i\oar to divisional and bri^i-ado lioadqnartors as woll For tho rost. tM'viors anvi n\ossa>ivs wonld havo to bo oonvoyovi by wiivloss or mossaiiv baii's drc^ppod from aoro- planos. Tho movomonts of tho tlyin^i* dotaoh- mont imist bo by stajivs on ordors fnnn tho oon\- mandor, anii nnist bo dotorniinod by tho prog-- ivss or tho intondiHl stratojjio on\ploymont of tho acHnnnpiinyini^ cvwalry t*orn\ation. This nwnnaissanoo from tho air oortaiidy vioos not ivliovo tho oavalry of tho dnty i>f oU>so rooon- naissanoo or lookin^j;: aft or its own safoty. bnt TAOTICH l^ it Uiki'H ovar iha (vtvalry ftmfdUm of dininni, r('j'/>nfniin¥,}i.fi('/- - - - * on iUf/r injr t/> th^r w';alh';r Kvtin that in a v^ry vulimhUt a/Wnnimeo.. /y;i«fjy, a eydint ymiiaVum or a force of fn- ffiniry in hocHc/i or rntdor ]ornfin ifiay bf? itXUu'hi'A to ihi', f',ii.wH\ry. On th/; otii/;r band, it JH not hjdvinhhht that it nhouUl \xi 'dC/'jompanuA by infantry or .I'lffcr (nt for^t, an that woaW rnat^jrially r<;«trict itH mobility. For althongh th^; '' march Inpr rJay" hUouU] not F><; too Ionj< for Hcvcsftl Htu^if'j'M/tvo, (layn, if cavalry in t/> Ui fit lo fnnnanvnr at a critirjal mornont, it in abb? to r^iv<; mwl that to (riv^; \nth',\>*:nt\f',ni c/fivtilry (iiviHionH Uia HircnitSh I bav^; auay^'/iiU-A involvcH an unnoc/'Mnary [furdcji tm 'lU HtraU;^'c mobility, yiccjinnc o\fv\onAy it in nfit an ea«y uiidU'T to prov'ultt MO large a forc/5 with <5very- thinpr it r<'/\\i'\r('.n, 1 do not Hhan; that vif;w. In th<;Hf', dayn of m/iHH arrni^iH, wh^;n;v<;r jf''^;at re- HultH arr; fi'irncA at a {rr^^at forc^j niu«t alwayg b<; fiinjAoycA. A vjc/aV. forty; fa/]o« away Ytfifora \h(', powarn of rcHiKbtncA now (ViH^AaycA by even quito Hmall (h.Ui/'Mmcjiin, txnd in cnt/frpriue* Hijch aH v/<; hav^; bf;f',n diHcuHHin^ 'tn Htnm^h in Hoon (-.xhiiiiHioj]. ()n the other hand, the authori- tieB ('/>ncA:ni(-A with the 8tix>ply of food and 140 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE forage to the troops may always rely on finding large snpply depots in the rear of the hostile armies, as no modern army can move withont them. Living on the country was a feature of past wars, and ^vill be possible only in quite exceptional circumstances in future. There are certainly a good many critics who are so impressed by trench warfare that they consider large-scale cavalry operations impos- sible under modern conditions. I need only refer these doubters to our campaigns in Russia and Rumania and the operations of our army cavalry during the campaign of 1914, in which the independent cavaliy force performed re- markable feats, and could have done even greater things if it had been strong enough. As an example I need only mention our break- through at Slocow, in the summer of 1917, when it would imqnestionably have been possible practically to destroy the armies opposed to us if — as had actually been planned — a strong cavaln^ corps had been sent out in the enemy's rear. It would be easy to multiply similar in- stances. Unfortunately, we were compelled by cir- cumstances to transform our cavalry very largely into dismounted troops, and thus to weaken even the divisional cavalry very seri- TACTICS 141 ously. At the last there was only one weak squadron to each division. That is far too weak, oven for trench warfare, in which it has the duties of police work behind the front and supplying mounted orderlies. One squadron is hopelessly inadequate for open warfare, in which it has to perform the tasks of close reconnaissance, orderly duties, requisitioning and so on, in addition to providing flank protec- tion and intervening in the action where cir- cumstances require. It would certainly be a mistake to replace cavalry by mounted infantry — apart from the escort squadron, to which we have already re- ferred. For distant marches and successful and effective raiding, efficient and skillful cavalry are an absolute necessity. Further, only cavalrymen can really keep their horses fit in the long run. Forming mounted infantry units is nearly always a half measure and has had little success, even in the Boer "War, where the English used them on a large scale. The methods of dismounted fighting must be exactly the same as with the infantry. Here again the enemy's fire will compel the attack to be or- ganized in groups, while everything will depend on refraining from attacking formidable strong points frontally and leaving them on on© 142 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE side, so that they can be captured by envelop- ment. In this case the attacker will strive to break through at the point of least resistance, and leave the capture of strong points to the infantry waves coming up behind. Batteries will have to accompany the attacking troops directly, with a view to breaking down obstinate local resistance by artillery fire. Distribution in depth is just as important as in the case of the infantiy. In trench warfare particularly, the methods of dismounted cavalry will be determined by the same considerations, as in the case of the infantry, but it will be otherwise in open war- fare, because, in this case, cavalry will seldom be employed in a purely frontal attack shoulder to shoulder with the sister arm. The com- mander will endeavor to make the fullest pos- sible use of the mobility of this force. He will send out his cavalry from the wings against the flanks and rear of the enemy, and thus strive to strike him in the most sensitive spot. In the action itself the commander will en- deavor to make his frontal and flank attacks react upon one another and thus, by envelop- ment, reach that goal which can be attained only in a purely frontal action by distribu- tion in depth. In this case the distribution need TACTICS 143 not be so deep as in the purely frontal attack. At the same time the flanks and rear of the attacking cavalry must be protected against surprise from approaching hostile reserves by reconnoitering squadrons thrown out far ahead. Indeed, generally speaking, it will be possible to contemplate employing such a mass of cavalry only after previous reconnaissance has established that there are no hostile re- serves in the vicinity. If their approach has been discovered it is the business of the cavalry to place itself across their path or keep them from getting nearer to the battlefield by at- tacking them in flank. In affairs of this kind the cavalry will have to cooperate with the flying arm not only for reconnaissance purposes but in the action itself. Battle flights can not only introduce their attack on the marching columns of the enemy, but support it very effectively. Bombing squadrons can deal with hostile batteries em- placed behind the battle-front or advancing in the open, or they may be used against ammu- nition depots or columns on the march. In every kind of operation in open warfare the systematic cooperation of cavalry and aircraft will be very useful. If we ever see cavalry battles in the grand 144 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE stylo ag'ain in some future war (which is not altogvthor impossiMo), it is certain that there ^^•ill be no question of the so-eaUed "throc-liue" tactics with its supports. Even before the war it could be seen that these tightiuii; methods and maneuvers were entirely out of date. Unfor- tunately, it has had an unhappy intlnence upon the development of the cavalry arm, and led it into false paths in spite of all warning-s. Under the conditions of to-day there can be no question of putting in the division as a tac- tic*nl unit, even in a cavalry action, in view of the etfects of artillery and machine-guns. It \n\\ first be necessary' to try and neutralize the hostile batteries and maoliine-gims witli one's own artillery, and then send out one's brigades and regiments with individual com- missions in such a way that they can execute a tlank movement as much as possible out of range of the enemy's fire before they actually open their att-ack. In maneuvering they must advance in separate colunms and concentrate for united action only when they reach the battlefield. The object will again be to envelop the enemy, and can alone bring \ictor\'', as a frontal attack in close order will only lend straight into the enemy's fire and present it with the most splendid target. The cooperation TACTICS 145 of the various columns can bo socurod by com- munication through aircraft as well as by fixing tlie rate of thf3 advance beforehand. In the atta<^;k itHelf, which, as a rule, will bo only against hostile cavalry, as far as circum- stances permit the cavalry will be divided into two lines, the first being considerably the stronger of the two. The enemy must never be allowed to outflank them. If circumstanrji^s make it at all possible, the cavalry commander will have a reserve at his disposal, and in any case he will provide him.self with artillery sup- port and operate in such a way that without exposing himself to the enemy's fire he will get the latter under his own guns before he gets to close quarters with cold steel. This is a lesson which I did my best to bring home, both in theory and practice, even before the World War. Unfortunately for the cavalry arm, I preached to deaf ears. At the beginning of the war particularly, our attacking and mass tactics cost our cavalry very Kerious and utterly useless losses in both men and material. The war has justified me at every point, and to-day there is reason for fearing that we are going 1^> far in the opposite direction by completely underestimating the value of cavalry as such, and expecting nothing more from its strategic 146 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE activities simply becauso it was so often used wrongly in the war. It would be a great dis- aster if this view gained ground. IV. — Fortifications, Enqineees and Railway Troops The art of fortification is so essential a factor in the conduct of modern operations that it must be regarded as an element in the tactics of all arms. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine an action ^\ithout the use of the entrenching tool or the otlier technical engineering re- sources. In trench warfare all arms must be familiar with methods of fortification. The batteries must know how to provide themselves with \s'ire and defenses in order to be able to deal with hostile infantry or tanks which have broken through. In trench warfare the cavalrj'- fights exactly like infantry and therefore re- quires the same technical training. The infan- try itself must be in a position to construct its defenses Avithout assistance, and call in the engineers only as supervisors in the heavier technical work, such as concrete construction, tunneling, etc. In case of emergency, moreover, the infantry must know how to do everything necessary unaided, ordinaiy trench-digging and wirine:, for instance. TACTICS 147 Nov(3rthclcHS, unuHually difTicult tochnical workH, for which a wpecialist training in re- quired, muKt remain the province of the en- g-ineer.s. They alone can do the heavier Hpecies of bridging, whether with proper engineering apparatus or only with improvised material. They or the railway troops must blow bridges up when required, as is so often the case in war. Mining is itself a special service within the com- pass of engineering. So is pontoon work, while all pioneers must be trained in temporary bridging as must the auxiliary pioneers in the infantry, i. e., infantrymen who have had a special training in the necessary pioneer work. But even if the art of fortification has thus become the common property of the troops to a certain extent, the fact remains that the tech- nical engineering problems of field warfare have increased so immensely in number and sig- nificance that the engineering arm has become very much more important and must be strengthened in comparison with the other arms so that it can relieve the infantry of many tech- nical engineering functions and thus release it for its proper work of fighting. On the other hand, it must be realized that in future there will be no fortifications in the true sense of the word. 148 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE Even the greatest fortified cities can be bom- barded by the long-range artillery of present times without the attacker's being compollcd to sit down to a proper siege. The fire of long- range flat-trajectoiy gams can be reenforced by the bombs of bombing squadrons which can attack the fortress from great altitudes, while the defense measures, such as anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft itself, can be no certain protection against such attacks. Even a ring of forts at a considerable distance from the to^vn cannot save it from bombardment by long-range guns. Indeed, these forts offer the most favorable target to the attacking artillery, for even the strongest reenforced concrete and armored turrets at the disposal of the defend- ing artillery cannot withstand the effects of heavy high-angle fire. They will be destroyed in a very short time, and cannot prevent the attacker from gaining access to the town itself. Antwerp, the strongest fortress in Europe before the war, was able to hold out only twelve days. Thus the fortress ceases to perform its true function of being a safe depot and center for war material and the civil authorities, as well as a defense for important strategic points, such as river-crossings, railway junctions and TACTICS 149 so on, for a considerable time, even though the field army is temporarily compelled to leave it to its fate. Neither Paris nor Metz would have been able to hold out as long as they actually did in 1870-71 if they had been attacked by modem artillery, even if they had had the same resources for defense as Antwerp had in the last war. To-day the only value of Paris as a fortress is that it would compel its assailant to concentrate and deploy a large force of artil- lery. After that concentration was complete it is absolutely out of the question that it could hold out for any length of time when once it had lost touch with the field army. It may perhaps be suggested that the case of Verdun is a proof to the contrary, for Verdun certainly succeeded in defying capture. That case, however, has no weight. In the first place Verdun was never out of touch with the army. It always formed a sector of the French line. Moreover, it was not the fortifications which saved the fortress from capture. It was the extraordinarily favorable configuration of the ground, which was particularly suitable for defense and offered the defenders shell-proof cover in subterranean tunnels which, combined with the general military situation, made it pos- sible for the town to hold out. Notwithstand- 150 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE ing all tliis, it never performed its function of a safe supply center. Nor did it protect an army or even its own garrison, tliough that is what was expected of a fortress in former times. On the other hand, it was itself protected and saved by the field army. These are great differences, and prac- tically reduce its value as a fortress to nothing. The real forts and armored works were soon destroyed by the attacker's artillery and played a relatively subordinate part during the whole siege. There can be no possible doubt that fortresses have lost their value in face of modern methods of attack. Even before the war I prophesied that that would be the case. Under modern conditions it is quite impos- sible to protect railway junctions, river cross- ings, and similar important strategic points locally, either against artillery as soon as the latter has got them within range, or against air- craft, for anti-aircraft guns are a very limited protection. In actual practice such points can be pro- tected only by the offensive both on land and in the air, an offensive which keeps the hostile columns at such a distance that they cannot reach the object to be destroyed "svith their ai-til- TACTICS 151 lery, while the bombing squadrons are attacked with the greatest vigor before they appear over their target on their nocturnal visit. Important dumps can bo protected in this way only, and further, by being established at places which the enemy does not suspect and which are as safe as care can make them against discovery from the air. In future, whenever one side is compelled or elects to stand on the defensive, fortresses will be replaced by field fortifications in selected areas. The defenses will be planned on the same lines as defenses in trench warfare, but in certain circumstances will be permanent con- structions, as will be the case in trench warfare also where time and other conditions permit. Whether it will be necessary even in peace time to construct pennanent defenses on part of the frontier on the principles of field fortifi- cation, and then make them as safe as possible even against heavy artillery, must depend upon political, military and local conditions. Such defense works would undoubtedly impose upon the prospective enemy a concentration of artil- lery which would mean a loss of valuable time. As regards field fortifications themselves, the most varied and fundamental changes have taken place during the war. While certain lo2 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE arrangoments which had proved their value in some circumstances were generalized, it often happened that instructions were issued which had no place in other circumstances. In actual fact it is quite impossible to draw up a manual of universal application ; all orders must he de- termined by the special circumstances of each particular c^ise. Thus only quite general prin- ciples can be elucidated, for their execution in practice depends upon the nature of the ground in which the work is to bo done, the amount of ground-water, the question whether the area before and behind the selected position is over- looked, the material and labor resources avail- able, the prospective natures and strength of the enemy *s artilleiy and other oflfensive arms, and finally the purpose which the trench system is intended to ser^-e, i. e.. whether it is to be de- fended merely for a short time or held for a considerable period. Tlie plan of construction must be determined by all these considerations. If there is time geologists will be chilled in to help, so that the nature of the soil and the question of water can bo considered from the outset. It is of the very greatest importance to dry the trenches by a suitable system of drainage. I proved the truth of that mvself both in Russia and France. In TACTICS 153 countricB where there is much ^ound-water it will be impoHHible to dig very deep and it will often be necenKary to keep renewing the para- pets. Where the trenches are on a declivity the water will frequently pour into them from above. In such a case appropriate stejjs must be taken to drain it off. If possible, hydraulic engineers must be called in to advise. The trenches must always be sited in such a way that they do not easily collapse under artillery fire. The profile must be determined accord- ingly, and a method of revetment adopted which avoids the scattering of splinters when a direct hit is scored, as is the ease with revet- ments of planks for instance. In view of the effects of modem artillery, covered-in trenches with loopholes from which to fire — the system so freely used by the Rus- sians — must be emphatically condemned. It is also important to make the trenches as invisi?jle to the enemy as is possible and particularly to protect them from observation from the air. The field of fire must be adequate. It must be possible to fire over the wire in front, as otherwise the bullets will cut through it. Lastly, the trenches must give the men, if at all possible, weather and shell-proof cover from which they can quickly get to the fire-step. By 154 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ' * sliell-proof , " however, I mean only cover against 15 cm. shell at the outside, as protection against heavier calibers is only possible under particularly favorable circumstances. Further, there must be safe communication with the rear if in any way possible. The more formidable the hostile artillery fire to be anticipated, and the more the whole trench system is exposed to the enemy's view, the more essential does it be- come to provide cover in the shape of shell- proof dug-outs. In some circumstances it may also be neces- sary to construct the defensive system not as a continuous line of trenches but as a series of strong points. In that case it will be essential to provide safe means of communication be- tween the individual strong points (though frequently such communication trenches can be concealed from view only by camouflage), and further, it will be necessary to establish second-line strong points, chessboard-wise, be- hind the gaps in the front series, so that when the enemy has broken through he will find him- self faced with fresh centers of resistance. If time and the available labor permit, rear lines or a series of strong points will be estab- lished even behind the continuous front-line system. In these resistance will be offered to TACTICS 155 the enemy after he has broken into the front line, the impetus of his attack will be shattered, and he will be held up long enough for the counter-attack of the defender's reserves to make itself felt. These trenches or strong points will also serve the purpose of providing cover for local reserves. The same principles apply in the case of the fortification of a deep defensive zone from which it is intended in certain circumstances to retire slowly, but fighting all the time, on a line farther back. In many cases it is advisable to select a posi- tion on the reverse side of a slope which cannot be directly seen or observed by the enemy. But, to my eyes, this slight advantage is nothing compared with the great disadvantages of such a position. In the first place it is clear that the defender himself cannot see the enemy, and therefore is very liable to be surprised. For that reason posts have to be established on the crest of the hill in all circumstances, and their position is very unfavorable. Moreover, the advantage of not being seen directly is very small, at any rate in my opinion, for even a trench system on the (to the attacker) far side of the slope can be observed from aircraft and 156 THE AYAK OF THE FUTURE often ovoii from balloons at i^roat heights, and thus brought under artillen- lire. In considering the proper method of oon- strnotiniT a system of defenses it will always be of iniportano^^ to site the trench lines or strong points in snch a way that they win give each other mutual flank protection, mainly by raachine-gim fire. Continuous lines must be adapted to the ground and broken up in such a way that each part naturally secures the flanks of the others. Strong points must be established and adapted to folds in the ground in such a way that the area on front of each of them is covered by the fire of the adjacent works. The strong points behind must not only, command the inters'als between those in front, but also the area in front of the works in the advanced line. As a rule the so-Ciilleii tank forts \nU. be at dominating points if possible, and so close be- hind the main line of defense that they can deal with tanks as they approach the latter or after they have successfully broken through it. The whole area which is likely to witness a tank att^nck must be commanded by them. In an emergency mobile anti-tank guns must be close at hand ready to render assistance. The posi- tion of the obstacles is of particular importance. TACTICS 157 For th(tH(i, barbed wiro ontanglernentH will almoHt always bo uhcA. Tho forward zone in front of tho syntorn of dofonncs will bo pro- tected by the doopost poHHiblo bolt of wire, 80 that attacking,' infantry will bo hold up by it and exposed U) the fire of the defender for as long as possible. Wirin^^ rnay take very different forms. There may bo wide belt.s of flat wiro formed of closely intorwined strands of wire which are carried diagonally across an immense number of stakes. Or there may be the so- oaJlod "P'landors' chevaux-de-fri^je/' which consists of a largo number of high but only lightly strung wire fences, fairly far apart, and in this case also the iron or wooden stakes will be braced laterally h>y wire. The flat entanglements represent a consid- erably greater obstacle to advancing infantry, but are easily distinguished by aircraft and thus betray the position of the whole trench system. They are also an excellent target for artillery and trench-mortars. The chevaux-de- frise, on the other hand, cannot be seen so easily and are more difficult to destroy by artil- lery fire, though they do not present anything like so great an obstacle as the flat entangle- ments. The method to be chosen will thus de- pend upon the special circumstances. Where 15S THK WAlx OK VllK FlTrUK ouomy\< viow -4>von f«\>u\ (ho wu^ tho tlat wiro svi^toiw will always bo olu^sou. l.{\stl>\ Ivtwoon tho ditYoivut Ivltji or rouos of wuv it will aljio Iv jH>85tihlo to put trip wiro, wiiv nottiiv^c. or tn^ps which i\hh bo soattonnl fivo^v ovor tho jj:nninvl, ami arx^ intouiKHi to oatoh tho avlvamMUg infantry who oanuot soo thoiw. Tho moihiHl of oiwtiui? iho ontaii^«:lon\ontvS is also iiujH^rtaut. It has alroailx' boon said t]\at tho ilofondor n\ust bo ablo to titv ovor tho oiitaivv:lomoi\ts, t>i\rticularly thoso cv^nsistiu^i* of vory donso wiiw It is al^o important that thoy should bo sitod at\d distributod in suoh a way that thoy CiU\ bo ontiladod by inaohino-jiun t\ro alou^jT thoir wholo lon^th; thoy must also loavo brvv\d iT^H^^ through whioh tho outposts can w-ithdraw if a rotiron\out is decided upon or from which one's own infantry can omorgo for an attack. Thoso gaps must bo oasi^v rooi^gnixablo by ono*ii own tivops. On tho other hand, it must Iv made very ditlicult for the enemy to dis- tiiViTuish them and it must bo possible to close thom at a n\on\ent's notice with appropriato material O'^^^^^o-rests" and portable ontanglo- ments^, which arc always kept close at hand. Further, thoy must bo open to avvurato tiro from iiui'tr (nwri rnachlri'j-^jrjji nvtfri at ii'if^hL firoof r'/>vf; brooj^lit out into th'! op<;fi ho that tfuiy hav^; a fn;<; fj<;l/i of fin; in <;v*jry rlirfectjori. It m particularly difficuJt to pla/;*^ ohnitu^fm &f(n'triHi tank hiUutkn f^ifon? th<; Iin^;H, an tankn nirnply cruHh rJown wiro (-jdfiUi^UimhniH and dirnb parap<;t« arid tn^nchen without any diffi- rjfjity. Th^. main tfumriH of (h-AhxiUfi aj^ain^t tankH an; iUarcforc, ikm f^rd of anti-tank j^inH and th^; fact that they rjan ^k; attacked by in- fantry with Hp^^cial anti-tank riflen and c^^n- c^jntratcd char^e«, and by rnachin^^-gtinH with Hpocial ammunition. If a lar^e number of them are employee] clone together it in not difficult to put them out of action. P'urther, local obHta/jJeH may alH^> be used a^ain«t them. Deep and wide HheIl-hole« in which ^ound-watcr of at le?i«t one meter in depth ban CfAlhaicA cannot UHually be f^roHHt-A by them, nor can very rnarHhy ^^round and trenche.'i of more than four iru-Mrn in width and proportionately deep. KoadH can be cloHcd by strong concrete barri- c^kIch if the tankn cannot jret around them. TT-jey may have j0 TUF. W Alx OV rilK Kl'TUKK bo svnvti with tank niinos, whioli I'mu'tion in 8Uo.h a way that llioy aiv hanuloss to orvliiiary tratVio but oxpU^lo whou tho hoavy tanks cn>ss tluMu. This kinii vM' work is bost oarrioil out by tho ouiiiuoors, or thoy shouKl at loast diroot and oimtrol it. Thus tho pionoors havo a oonipU^x i>t' dutios. and ovou though iu u\y viow thoro is uv> riH>u\ for thorn in roal fortross operations, thoir aotivitios havo assun\od a nnioh largor so;Uo and ro^\niro far more uion than hithorto. Wlioroas iu fonnor wars thoy woro onuagvd on spooial taf^ks. thoy havo to oooporato pornia- nontly with all tho tight ing anus to-iiay, pri- marily in trouoh warfaro, but also in opou warfaro and particularly in tho otTonsivo. As I havo already said, tho rosult is that it is nooossary io strongthou tho pionoor arm in rela- tion to the other arms and also to train all pioneers iu the solution of ru\ijr<:H, c/fncj-c.Ui worU, 'Jrairi- inj< ircncUcH arwJ Hirnilar dutir'H muHt U; r/jan- f,<;n;ri f>y (;vr;ry fu(:u\\)cs of ih<; \)\()UCMr arrn. 'rh(5 c/funisiicXion of rofi^ln ov<;r ha^i j^rounrl ih ariofiior d<;partrriorit of f^d/l opu(;(-TH rniJHt hf; familiar. It iH v^;ry rifi<',ri ri(;r'/;HHary to brirjj< up hridj(';H and other rjrrir;r^r;rK;y material in ord<;r t^^ rriakr* Horne wiIdf;rn<;HH of HhrjIl-hoh'H pa«Hablo, frv^ifj for h(;avy artillery and ammunition wagonH, in the F-hortent pOHHihIe time. Of courHe thin work will generally h't r;/irried out by the ordinary labor troopH, but the pioneerH rnuHt direct them and parform cmxV.uu Hpecial technical duticH. Hannuif, aU theHe thinp^H in mind, it in abso- Intely vital that a Htron^ pioneer battalion of three or four ('/>in\niu\<'/ri be attached to every diviHion and h<; fjermanently at its diflpoHal. G.FI.Q., moreover, will require further Hpecial pioneer troopH which it can diHtribute to the individual army groupH and annicH, thouj^h they need not be UHed equally at all pointH, for the C5^>nHtruction of rallying powitionH in the rear, brld^^ing j.;reat rivern, the rapid eHtablinh- ment of lifieH and blocking trenchcH which the divinional pioneerH could not manage by them- 162 THE WAlx OF THK KITIKK sol\*\^s. Tho bridiriuij of tho ^'istula at Ivan iivrod and '"' -.stniotion of tho Siocfrioil l.iuo aro ox. \ of thoso s^Hvial taskv^^ wliioli tho divisional onginoors oo\iki not, or woiv too busy to porfonn. This foivo of army pionoors must, of oourso. bo ostnMishod in poaoo tiu\o. At thoboirinniuji'of tho \\-:u- tlio fortross-piouoor battalions ^oriiiiually intondod for ompU\vmout in attacks on fortivssos") woro assij^nod thoso duties. As this will bo uuuooossary in futuro it will bo advisable to form oorps piouoor bat- tiilious in addition to tho divisional piouoors, and those corps battalions will bo available for spivial employment in time of war. Tho railway troops, tho importanoe of wliieh hais inoreasod very eonsidorably, nuist bo un- der the sole orders of the Supreme Command, tho Chief of tho OonenU StatY or a Special In- speotor both in peace and in war. Tho restora- tion of railways which have boon destroyed, the construction of now broad-irauiiv linos, and the establishment of field railways have assumed a scale in comparison with previous wars which no one ever suspected. In trench wart'nro par- ticularly all troops must bo connected with the great railway arteries by a complex of tield railways if thoy aro to bo kept pormanontly supplied. This roipuros a L'U\iio force (much TACTICH U'//, larK'-r ihan Uiyhhrijt) of raUwuy and raiJway- c/)nyXru('X'\(m troopH, th^; miiiuU'M'dncji of wh'icM will not bo (;x('/'.pi]()UfiUy oxp<;nHive, aw the rnf^n will bo cjfi\t\<)y('A on railwayn and rallway- c<)jiHinicX'i()ii in pf;a<'^; tirnr(.U:ri'.u('At, will bo j<'ivon to thoHO from callJn^H which arc a Hpocial training for thoir dijti<;H in war. Of c/mr^Jt pioneer and railway U()<)\>H nniJHt be trained in the »imple«t form of infantry fiprhiinfr. They will remain HoldierB under all eireumHtanrii;H, and thiH work munt never be fiWHig-ned to civilian labor. There in one jioint, however, on which we must be quite clear. The hbch to which pioneers and the troopH aHHociated with them can be put have become very much more important. Their numherH have K^^'own very cj^>n.«iderably, but, whatever happenH, thiH anri can no longer per- form one tank which waH formerly their prin- cipal function — prof,eclinj< the frontiern against the enemy by fortJ/icationn. Of Cyourna the pioneerH, in conjunction with the other arrriH, can delay an invasion for a time, hut they can- not save the area which they are to protect against shelling by the enemy. Long-range 164 THE WAR OF THE FUTUEE guns — the ranges exceed 120 kilometers even to-day — mil ravage the area far and ^ade, and carry ruin and destruction deep into the enemy's country. There is therefore no option to take the offensive or stand on the defensive. We must take the offensive if we are to protect our own country against hostile shelling. Of course the defender also can bring up long-range guns and thus, to a certain extent, revive the conditions of bygone days. But the situation will be quite different. In the first place, the side which determines to conduct operations on its own frontiers will concentrate its guns in peace time or, at any rate, prepare their emplacements. The enemy can do the same for the matter of that, but it will never be possible to discover the emplacements so completely that the guns will be unable to in- flict the most serious injury on the enemy's country before their positions are ascertained and they can be dealt with in such a way that they can fire no more. This will be particularly true when they fire from alternative emplace- ments which will be difficult to find even with the help of aircraft. Thus he who intends to fight within his own frontiers is bound to expose a large area of his own country to devastation by the enemy's TACTICS 165 long-range artillery, while he who wishes to avoid such a fate must carry the war into the enemy *s country. In other words, all future wars will start with offensive operations, and the side which attacks too late or first suc- cumbs in the attack will abandon his country to his enemy who cannot help gradually turning it into a desert, for that is the inevitable conse- quence of trench warfare which seems unavoid- able to-day. Woe to him who attempts to fight within his own frontiers at the outset ! By his own action he will lose his chance of keeping war and its horrors from his own country, and will only bring down ruin upon a large part of it. Thus, even though the pioneer arm has be- come much more important, and exercises a great influence on the fighting methods of the other arms, it is none the less dominated by the artillery and gives the offensive greater latitude than had ever been thought. Its tacti- cal value has increased, but its strategic value can be felt only indirectly. To think of and arrange for the offensive is thus essential under all circumstances. Even from the political point of view the pioneer arm makes itself felt with great force. The days of the small state which protected it- 166 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE self with fortifications are over. From the military point of view it can exist only if asso- ciated with some great state, and political cir- cumstances alone can protect its neutrality. A Belgium is possible only if bound by the closest ties to one of its great neighbors, and Holland, Switzerland and Poland mil not survive after their larger and more powerful neighbors have ceased to have an interest in their continued existence. CHAPTER III ATTACK, DEFENSE AND THE INITIATIVE In his immortal book on war, Clausewitz has said that the defensive is the stronger form of action. In saying that, he did not, of course, mean to deny the immense material and moral advantages which the initiative and the offen- sive mean in military operations, but simply that in the then conditions of armament- assuming equal numbers on both sides — the defender had the advantage, which was un- doubtedly true. It is equally true to-day. But a very different answer must be given to this question when we look at it from the point of view of generalship. For even in Clausewitz 's time the decision was determined by issues quite other than the theoretical superiority of the defense. Had not Frederick the Great, in his heroic struggle, which even to-day remains unique, shown how the weaker side could cope victo- riously even with enormously superior foes, by renewing its attacks again and again and 167 168 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE firmly maintaining the initiative which forces the enemy to follow one's lead and calls in- c^ilculable factors into existence! In this sense the offensive — to-day perhaps more than ever before — is certainly the superior form of gen- eralship, though not the superior form of action, and indeed for the reason that a rigid defensive without offensive reaction is possible only in quite exceptional cases. The methods and re- sources available to the defense have increased enormously, but certainly not on the same scale as those of the offensive. Modem artillen- can destroy any defenses that have yet been constructed; where it is in a position to subject a defensive system to a continuous and concentrated destruction-fire, no infantry in the world is in a position to maintain itself. It will simply be destroyed. The men can do nothing but tiy to keep alive in shell- proof dug-outs — until the latter get hit — and can use their weapons only when the enemy's fire is ''lifted" farther on in order to make way for the infantry attack and prevent the approach of reserves. It may now be objected that the defender c^n have an equally powerful artillery, and therefore is in a better position to annihilate the enemy's infantrv when he attacks than the ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 169 attacker to deal with the defender's, who are under cover in fortified lines. That is true enough. The advantage of the attacker is the fact that by keeping the initiative he gets a great start over his opponent, and can there- fore concentrate unexpectedly a superior force of artillery against the sector to be attacked, so that he will be in a position to neutralize the artillery of the defense before it can be re>- enforced and also subject the enemy's defenses to so annihilating a fire that no resistance can be offered. It is the chance of concentrating a superior force of ai-tillery and infantry, as well as tanks for the offensive, and then attacking by surprise which is the main reason of the superiority of the offensive. In addition there is the prospect of over- coming the hostile obstacles with tanks, con- cealing the attacking infantry from the enemy's view by artificial fog, and on top of this there is the great moral effect which offensive oper- ations always have. Nothing is worse for a soldier than to have to sit down idle under an annihilating fire and simply contemplate death without being able to take any sort of action. All weaknesses of character then make them- selves felt, and fear steals upon even the stout- est heart. If the soldier can only do something 170 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE himself, fight, shoot or niako an advanoo, the mental strain becomes more toUn*able, and this often foUow^ the moral exhaustion of even the greatest heroism. It is the attacker who pri- marily enjoys this advantage of action, but it is so important that the defender also must at- tempt to secure it for himself, at least partially. As a pure defensive appears to be more or less hopeless against an opponent who is strong in artillery, unless the defender has the protection of shell-proof cover, the latter must keep strong reserves behind his front line in order to coun- ter-attack and throw back any of the enemy's troops who have broken through. Of course these reserves will have to go through the enemy's destruction-fire or bar- rage, and are thus bomui to suffer heavy losses, bnt they need not be exposed permanently to the enemy's fire, and will naturally have every inducement to go forward as quickly as possible in order to get out of it. Here is the opportun- ity for the defender's tanks to make their pres- ence felt. At the moment of his successful break-through, the attacker can have only a few guns in a position to be dangerous to the de- fender's tanks, and these should thus be able to help their infantry in the counter-attaclv. Of course this will not be easy, even then, be- ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 171 cause the defender has to deal with a superior artillery which can fire at the tanks from a dis- tance. But if the attacker in trench warfare gets his superiority only through surprise and his tanks, this advantage will probably be increased in open warfare, for in this case it is not merely a question of an unexpected concentration of superior forces behind the front, but of pre- paring and carrying through unexpected en- veloping and similar movements. The ox>por- tunities for surprise are greatly increased. Of course in open warfare the opportunities for reconnaissance are much greater than in trench warfare, for where the two opponents are fight- ing in detached army groups, the latter expose their flanks to reconnaissance, and reconnoiter- ing by aircraft can be supplemented by similar activity on the part of the cavalry, while in trench warfare there is absolutely no room for cavalry as such, and all that can be ascertained is what is going on behind the hostile lines. Yet even here the advantage is with the at- tacker. In open warfare the possible strategic ma- neuvers are very numerous and varied and fre- quently difficult to discover. Further, the stra- tegic movements which are the preliminaries to 172 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE the battle are executed relatively rapidly, and therefore deprive the defender of the possibility of taking prompt counter-measures, even when he has discovered the enemy's movements. Lastly, in open warfare the army is tied to the lines of communication available, and unex- pected troop movements are usually more dif- ficult to carry out — especially from the point of view of the necessary supplies of ammunition and food — than in trench warfare in which an extensive and specially constructed network of roads and railways, field railways, depots for annnunition, food and engineering materials are provided to meet any circumstances, so that all troop movements are facilitated to an amazing degree. When we turn to consider the general stra- tegic situation, the superiority of the side on the offensive appears to be even greater than on the battlefield itself. Over immense areas, such as those between the Swiss frontier and the Channel, or between the Baltic and the Black Sea, the attacker can choose the precise spot at which to attack. He can demonstrate at any point, and thus try to deceive his opponent as to the real sector in w^hich the attack is coming. The defender must be ready for the attack ever>"where. The only ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 173 data available to him in divining the enemy's intentions are the directions in which the en- emy's attack would probably produce important resultH, and secondly, the form of the enemy's railway communications. For the rest, he is left to the reports of spies, the statements of prisoners and deserters, the results of tapping telephones and telegraphs, and reconnaissance from the air. The reconnoitering machines, however, have an extremely difficult task, as all artillery movements are carried out by night, and all battery positions and defenses are con- cealed as far as possible from aerial observa- tion. Further, it is almost impossible to distinguish between dummy and real defensive systems. The defender will often come to the conclusion that an attack is imminent because he notices increased railway movements behind the hostile front, but here again he may be deceived by what are really demonstrations. Thus, in actual fact, both we and our enemies repeatedly suc- ceeded in concealing preparations for intended attacks, while on other occasions the intention to attack was discovered in time, because suf- ficient care had not been taken to. conceal it and the attack failed as a result of prompt counter-measures. 174 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE Thus, while the attacker knows pretty accu- rately beforehand at what points he must con- centrate his forces and make his preparations, the defender is compelled to assemble his re- serves of men, ammunition, and even food in some circumstances, at certain central points. Further, he must always have his rolling stock and motor transport ready for moving these re- serves the moment the enemy's intentions have been definitely ascertained. Any error in mov- ing reserves may have fatal consequences. In such a case, to meet the emergency he may be compelled to adopt such measures as unpre- pared troop movements, breaking up larger units, and similar improvisations which are often disastrous. Such measures only too easily throw the systematic and regular troop and sup- ply movements into confusion — those move- ments without which a modern mass army can- not be handled at all. They may also have a serious effect on the morale of the troops which, as we shall see, is to-day a more vital factor than ever before. Lastly, the superiority of the offensive lies in the fact that it alone can bring the decision. "Wars cannot be won by pure defense. Even a successful defense can mean superiority only when it gives the defender a chance to pass from ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 175 it and seek a decision by the offensive. A de- fensive victory is never anything but a half victory, and the hope that the enemy can be forced to make peace by attrition, i. e., the ex- haustion of his forces, is in its nature a snare and a delusion. For no one can by a pure de- fensive compel the enemy to consume his troops if he does not, for his own part, attempt to force a decision by the attack, and thus prove once more that only the offensive can bring victory. If one side believes that the enemy's forces can be worn down to such an extent that the foe will be compelled to make peace from sheer exhaustion, he must keep on attacking him time after time, in order to compel him to use his troops. As long as it is left to the option of the enemy, whether and how far he will sacrifice his men, it is obvious that no end of the war can be in sight, and it is for the enemy to say what form that end shall take. Professor Hans Delbriick — a well-known arm- chair strategist — ^has invented the term ''attri- tion strategy" for this negative species of oper- ations, and seems to think that he has said something very clever. In actual fact, of course, there is no such thing as a strategy which avoids the offensive in order to obtain a vie- 17G THE WAR OF THE FUTURE torv by wearing: down the enemy. Defensive strategy means rather that one side wishes to delaj' the decision because it no longer feels capable of forcing that decision itself; but in doing so it renonnees the prospect of military victory, and leaves the enemy to decide how long he will continue his efforts. The issue of the war will then be the result of factors wliich are not the outcome of its own operations. The wars of Frederick the Great are only a superticial proof of the justice of Delbriick's view. The enemies of Prussia certainly shied at a decision by force of arms, and tried to win the war by exliausting their foe. In the end, however, they lost it. They were exhausted themselves sooner than the King. The latter turned their hesitation to fight to good account, and therefore gave battle only when he found himself compelled to do so. The war would have ended victoriously for the Austrians and their allies long before had they made up their minds to try to obtain a victory in the field. Thus, in all circumstances, the offensive is the inevitable preliminary to a victorious de- cision in war, so far as this is dependent en- tirely upon the course of military operations and is not affected by changes in the political and economic conditions which prevail at the ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 177 beg-inriing of the war. Even in the strategic defensive it is always the vital factor. It is the soul of generalship in all times and places, and in the last resort the whole art of war con- sists of initiating a decisive offensive under favorable conditions. This fundamental law of war is, of course, unaffected by the fact that one has frequently to adopt an attitude of pure defense, at any rate in a strategic sense. In those cases, "delaying" action is adopted be- cause one wishes to create favorable conditions for the offensive at some other point or in some other way. In this connection I need only to refer to **the Law of Numbers," which I discussed very fully elsewhere.^ It is not numbers in themselves which bring victory in war; the vital factor is the possibility of concentrating numerical, mental, and moral superiority on the decisive battlefield or theater of war. Where that ap- pears feasible, war is justified — ^from the purely military point of view. Where it does not, a favorable decision can be expected only as the result of circumstances which do not depend upon military successes. Thus, if one desires to be justified from the military point of view at the beginning of the ' Vom hcutigen Kriege, Vol. I, II, 2, p. 97. 178 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE war, it must be probable that so decisive a victory can be won over the enemy that the latter loses his power to bring about a decision which has any prospects of success for him. Such a victory can, as a rule, be secured only by the offensive and will, in any case, have to be exploited offensively if it is to lead to the goal of the operations. This law, as it has developed in the course of time, naturally holds good even under the con- ditions of the World War, and determines the relations between defense and offense. Defense is justified exactly to the degree that it enables the defender ultimately to pass to that offen- sive which is necessary under all circumstances. This truth must be borne in mind in military operations of every kind, and to-day more than ever before, as the offensive, both from the strategic and tactical point of view, has un- doubtedly proved the stronger form of strategy and action. But if the offensive is the soul of operations, even when it cannot be pursued directly in all circumstances, and if it remains an arriere pensee, even in the defense, the logical result is that in war it is always essential to try to keep the initiative in one's own hands. This is a principle of the art of war which is gen- ATTACK, DEFENSE, INITIATIVE 179 crally recognized, and I ahi saying nothing new in repeating it. The initiative brings the ad- vantage — an advantage which cannot be over- estimated — that the enemy is compelled to con- form to one's own actions, and one is not bound to conform to his. As long as one avoids an attitude of passive expectation and is always engaged in some enterprise or other, or in cre- ating a new situation, the enemy is compelled to conform to one's actions and keep changing his own plans, which are based on a given situa- tion, simply because this situation has been modified by initiative action. Thus one keeps the upper hand in all operations, and gets the start of the enemy both as regards place and time. Of course it is very important to distinguish between the initiative and the offensive. Be- cause one side seizes or maintains the initiative, it need not always be contemplating the of- fensive. Even in the defensive the initiative can be kept, or an attempt made to recover it when it has been lost. I have already said that a pure defensive can never lead to positive victories, and frequently will not result even in a purely defensive victory. Thus every defense requires a corresponding offensive, either to retain or recover the sectors attacked by the 180 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE onomy. or to bo initiator at somo otlior point \Yhoro tho oiioiuy has povhaps woakonod him- solf, or tho dot'oiiso docidos to sook tho decision. This is Olio of tho Nvays in which a lost initiativo CiUi bo rocovorod, and tho onomy to rood to oon fonn to onr own actions. On tho other hand, tho defender is certainly not bonnd in overj* case to boar the shock of tho enemy's attack at the point which the latter has selected. ^Vhere a loss of i^ronnd is not particnlarly vital, the defender may withdraw, if he w-ishes. to another position which is tacti- cally bettor and has perhaps boon established and fortitied beforehand. Tho defender will thns briniT his foe into a position which is nn- favorable to him from tho tactical point of view. Sncli a retirement may also be combined with a decisive otYonsive. In this case tho de- fender \vill prepare the connter-attack behind the lines on which he is withdrawinir. nnd then lanncli it by snrprise airainst his nnsnspoctinii; enemy. Tlie object will always be to keep tho nppor hand, and by nnoxpoctcd action coni- pol tho onomy to conform to one's own move- ments, and to impose npon him that conrse of action which we desire. In the lonir rnn. a de- cisive battle, that is. an otTonsivo or a dofon- ATTACK, DEFEXSIO, INITfATIVK 18) Bivft f(>\\<)v/(t(\ hy a ('/mnUtr-fdi'ddkj j'h alwayn tho n;Hulf, f^r in Hi alive action. A purely local dcforiHC iH pr^nniHHiblc only wh<;rc Ujo cJefondor Ih fi^^hlinj^ for time a^ainnt a Hijperior enemy in a region which iH particu- larly favorable to dofenHe, and hiH flankn aJHO are Hccurr;. Such ca«cs are conceivable, e. ^,, where the defender in hopinj< for the Hubnequent intervention of an ally or the releawe of troopH for the offenHive from some other theater. They will, no doubt, be frequent. On the other hand, in theaterH in which the decision is being Houi^ht they are inconceivable, or, at any rate, penniHHibir; on the HmallcHt Hcale only, and Boloiy in local actions. CHAPTER IV THE PEINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE Our old Prussian "Training Manual" states that the best form of tactical offensive is the simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of the enemy. This statement is true only of small affairs in which fire from front and flanks can be concentrated locally against an opponent con- sisting of a single body. Otherwise it is funda- mentally false. In attempting to enunciate a principle we must assume that both sides are equal numer- ically and the conditions are the same for both. If that is so the defender — thanks to his frontal superiority — can successfully hold the front at- tack with forces weaker than those the attacker can employ, and at the same time concentrate superior forces to protect his flanks. He will thus be superior in the flank action, which is decisive by virtue of its direction, and is bound — ceteris paribus — to win. This is a matter of mathematics. The advantage which the offen- sive has in modem war is not great enough to 182 PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE 183 outweigh this advantage enjoyed by the de- fense. The defective teaching of our ' ' Training Manual" erroneously assumes the superiority of the attack either in numbers or in fighting value. Thus the only formal rule we possess in the sphere of taxjtics is wrong, and in the sphere of strategy there are no rules at all. This is in- deed quite natural, for the circumstances under which a strategic attack can or must take place are so varied that apparently no rules of uni- versal application can be deduced from them. From the tactical point of view also, it is to- day apparently impossible to give definite rules after the war has assumed forms so different as open warfare on one side, and trench war- fare on the other. On the other hand, there are certainly a few principles which apply both tactically and strategically, and from these the form of attack in every single case can be de- duced by paying due regard to all special cir- cumstances. One of them may be put in the words of Fred- erick the Great, and runs: ''He who tries to protect everything will protect nothing." The other was put by Field Marshal Eindenburg, in the words : ''A General must never fight with- out a center of gravity." The expressions sup- 1S4 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ploiuoiit oaeli otlior. and aro the product of the same spirit. At first sight the words of Fredorielv the Great seem to refer to pure defense. When we look into them moiv closely, however, we soon realize that their eliaraoter is olTensive and nothing else. It is only by reading an of- fensive meaning into "prv^teetion" that the sentence has any strategic sense at all. If we try to protect a long front by a pure defen- sive, but leave some sector unprotected, the enemy will, of course, break through at this point, come in on the tlanks and rear of the front which is held, and thus reap vital ad- vantages. If King Frederick, who had to pro- tect both East Prussia and Silesia, for ex- ample, had decided to let East Prussia go in order to stand on the defensive with his whole anny in Silesia, he would undoubtedly have lost the war in a very short time. But if, with- out dividing his forces between tlie two prov- inces to be protected, he decided to beat his enemies in Silesia by a resolute olYensive, in order that he c, too, its etforts to spread such illusions. But if this v>oint of view be departed from, and one side fails to deceive its opponent as to its real power, it will often suddenly tind itself faced with a war, as Germany was when the World War began. Before we start a political game, we should fairly ask ourselves whether in case of need we are ready and williuir to take up arms to attain our end. If that is not the case, or if the position chauires in our adver- sary's favor as time goes on, we must change our course and save anything that c^m bo saved. That is the general principle and only supor- ticially immoral. Of course it aims primarily either at hoodwinking the adversary or a pre- ventive war, but both are justilied. The first duty of every man is to his fellow countrymen. That must always be kept in miud. The neces- sary deception can be secured without a single untrue statement's Innng made. That is just where the art of diplomacy comes in. Prince Bismarck was an adept in tliis art. He is even now without a peer in the realm of great diplo- mats, and no one could possibly call his actions POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 213 immoral. The prcvontive war, also, is justified, bccaufio the Bacrifices which are exacted by a war which was inevitable because the adversary intended it are nothing- compared with those wliJch will have to bo made if such a war is lost. The World War has certainly brought that home to us forcibly enough. It is true that in his Gedanken tmd Erirmer- tmrjen Prince Bismarck declared himself against preventive wars. On the other hand, he wrote this book in his old age, and his own actions were inconsistent with that expression of opinion. Indeed, his real greatness lies in the contrast. We must, therefore, not be afraid of distinguishing between the aging Bismarck and the man of action. It is the deeds of the latter only which are beacons for the great man's successors. To continue, a good many successes can be obtained by diplomatic methods because the military power of each side is actually equal. In such cases success falls to the side which knows how to make the best use of that power, but behind everything the real power is there and is not forgotten. ** Negotiations without arms are like notes without instruments, '^ said Frederick the Great, and he was undoubt- edly right. Thus the diplomatic game always 214 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE turns on real power or the appearance of power, and he who thinks that success can be secured by civic ideals will be bitterly deceived sooner or later. It is the nature of the averagv nuin to look after his o^^^l interests; he does not think of giving up something merely because it is right to do so or might be to the advan- tage of another. AVar is nothing but the continuation of di- plomacy by other methods. It is always purely a question of weighing the real or apparent resources (both our own and those of the ad- versary), trj'ing to deceive our opponent, or spoiling his game and winning our owni by threatening war or unexpectedly beginning it. In this game there is no room for generosity, and such an emotion would, indeed, be a crime against the nation. AMiere the threat of real power does not acliieve its purpose, or the at- tempt to deceive is unsuccessful, war is in- evitable if we intend to attain our ends, nnd then arises the qiiestion as to what is the rela- tion between diplomacy and war when we have decided to appeal to the latter, the ultinw ratio. It is obvious that in every political affair we must be quite clear as to whether a war is possible if we do not succeed in settling the mat- ter at issue in a manner corresponding to our POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 215 interests by the methods of peace. We must know whether we are willing to take up arms on behalf of those interests, whether we attach suf- ficient importance to the whole matter to make this extreme step necessary, and whether we have come to the conclusion that the enemy has decided to act in the same manner. In such a case we must make political preparations for war, and, if possible, in such a way that the enemy will notice nothing. Of course it will be quite impossible to con- ceal the military measures which we consider it necessary to take, and which must be in keep- ing with the magnitude of the political aim in view. But it is otherwise with the political measures. In the case of the former it is al- ways essential to avoid half-measures and leave the opponent in no doubt that we have decided to take the most extreme steps in case of neces- sity. The last two army bills which were passed in Germany before the war were half- measures, which could give the enemy no kind of misgiving and could be recognized as half- measures. They are fittingly described by the proverb, "Wash my fur, but don't wet me.*' The Government at that time was told as much in unmistakable terms, but the only result was that we were forbidden to repeat our objections. 216 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE But while the military preparations must be made publicly and with the greatest energy, and while half-measures in this sphere mil have the effect only of encouraging tlie enemy, the political preparations must be carried on in complete secrecy. This is what our enemies at- tempted to do, though they did not hoodwink those who were not willfully blind. Of course we could not tell exactly what was going on, but wc could certainly realize that serious pians were being made for a general attack on Ger- many. In these circumstances it was essential that we should consider war as at any rate pos- sible, and act accordingly. We had to prepare for the war by making alliances. Further, it is essential to prevent states from participating in the coming war by making con- cessions which must be kept secret. Thus, in the case in point, we ought to have concluded treaties with Turkey and Bulgaria, and no one need have known. We should also have tried to come to some arrangement with North Amer- ica, which certainly would not have been impos- sible. The same course should have been taken mth Italy and Rumania. There were other political measures which could certainly have been taken, but about which it is impossible to form an opinion, as POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 217 all the facts are not known. In case of emer- gency, we ought to have decided on a preventive war if the whole existence of the State seemed in danger by our refusal to do so. Thus, when it is possible that there will be war, everything must be done to prepare for it under the most favorable conditions, or the statesman must realize that ho must give way altogether if he does not succeed in deceiving his enemy as to the true position. But the task of diplomacy is quite different when war has actually broken out. It still has the duty of keeping other states from partici- pating in the war. Indeed, it will make con- cessions to them corresponding to the advan- tages the enemy would derive from the entry of the state in question into the struggle. But this step must be taken only in agreement with the Supreme Command. In all other respects the only duty of diplomacy is to support the military with all its might. It must conform to their wishes entirely, and give up any idea of taking any step without consulting them. That is equally necessary, of course, in the case of affairs which may possibly lead to war — for there must always be a proper relation between the statesman and the general. But a breach of this rule never produces its effects more di- L'lS THE WxVR OF THE FUTUKE rectly and ininiediately than in war itsolf. The military penalty follows the political mistake at once. Diplomacy must therefore oonrtne it- self to preparing" the way for military victories and exploiting them, but only in accordance with instructions to he given hif the military authorities. Where this rule is not observed, militaiy and political measures might pursue the same aim and yet in a totally dilTerent spirit, and that might easily give wholly contra- dictory results. The upshot is that, where possible, military and political direction should be in one hand, and for that purpose military and political functions should be combined in one person. That was the c^ise with Frederick the Great. He knew how to reconcile the political and mili- tary influences in the conduct of war in the most wonderful way. This appears clearly from a study of his wars, although not a word is said about it in the official history of those wars published by the General Staff, a history which completely ignores the political aspect of Frederick's generalship and reads as if every action of the King were to be attributed to purely military issues and considerations. No one else has ever enjoyed quite the same position as the Great King, and where that is POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 219 HO th<^ political authority — in old PrusBia, therefore, the King himself — must know how to keep in ilia backj-^round and leave the mili- tary authority to (U^c'ida what is to be done. The politician must unconditionally submit to the will of the soldier, for the combination of political and military action is the main object, and military re^juirements determine the politi- cal. The military leader must be selected acc(irdingly, and where that cannot be done it is much better that some one less expert in politics should settle the broad lines of diplo- macy than that the soldier and the statenman should work against each other. As long as the war is in progress and there is no immediate prospect of a suitable peace, military victory alone must be pursued and everything else must be directed to furthering those efforts. If peace is in sight, on the other hand, it is again for the soldier to judge whether it is nec^issary to secure it by intensi- fying the military effort or whether it is better to adopt the diplomatic method, i. e., by making concessions. Only the soldier is in a position to judge. Not the least of the causes of Ger- many's downfall is the fact that this simple rule was not obser-ved. Thus it is simply foolish to require that 220 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE diplomacy must always be carried on with all the cards on the table. One might just as well ask that the strategist should always tell the enemy beforehand what are his intentions in his operations. It is perfectly obvious that diplomacy must always be secret simply be- cause — ^apart from technical reasons for that course — if we did the opposite, i. e., made all our diplomatic arrangements openly, we could never be quite certain that our opponent or opponents would act as honorably as ourselves. We ought to have learned that at least from our downfall. Our enemies did not show their hands until the last moment, while we Germans made a point of concealing nothing from them. We must abandon that principle if we are ever to be anything in the world in future. It is not too much to ask that a reasonable govern- ment should enjoy so much confidence that the nation will draw the obvious inferences and as- sume responsibility for the results of its secret diplomacy. It is hoped that by forbidding secret diplo- macy the so-called ''people" will be secured against the outbreak of war which, as a whole, they have not foreseen; but the fact that this is simply cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is wholly ignored. There is obviously no POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 221 security against anything while the opponent is given an absolutely free hand. Nor must there be any indulgence in delu- sions with regard to domestic policy. We must know for certain what can be expected from our own people and what is beyond their powers. We must be quite certain that the great mass can never realize logically what the common welfare means; that it is certainly Capable of a momentary enthusiasm for some ideal, but is never able to pursue that ideal with resolution and energy; that it is quite ready to make certain sacrifices, but, generally speaking, has its eye on material well-being only. The statesman who is working for the welfare of the whole body politic is not understood by the masses, and in some circumstances is there- fore bound to use force to cany through his plans. This course requires a high degree of sense of duty and energy, and success alone can justify action which is superficially irre- sponsible and high-handed. For example, the French authorities took drastic measures when about seventy-five regiments mutinied, and yet in the long run their action proved necessary for the common good. Of course I know as well as any one else that the whole of French policy was based on the interests of the great financial 222 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE magnates, but in this case — when once the war had begun — their interests coincided with those of the whok> nation. The politiciil head must therefore have the courage to take the sharpest measures against his own peopk> if occasion requires. But be- fore he c^in do so he must be well informed of what is going on among the people, so that he can intervene in time and prevent the ring- leaders (for there always are ringleaders) from doing anj' harm. He must therefore bo as wtII informed about the domestic situation as about the secret intentions and resources of the neigh- boring states. Indeed, it is the courage he dis- plays in dealing with his own people which is the real hall mark of the great statesman. It is just the same with the economic situa- tion. Here, again, it will be necessary to use force when occasion requires. Of course it is impossible to be permanently prepared for all conceivable wars. But probabilities can and must always be borne in mind without trusting entirely to the enemy's sense of honor. The errors of this last course we can appreciate from the attitude of our present enemies, who have not the slightest idea of adhering to their own statements. We can also realize the fool- ishness of relying on the honor and enthusiasm POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 223 of mankind by considering what is happening with us at homo now. There have never been so much stealing and dancing as at the present moment, in spite of the great national disaster. Of course, in considering the measures to be taken, it is very material whether a country is wholly or partially cut off from the outer world, or not. To all appearances Germany cer- tainly was. When Italy, France and Russia close their frontiers, the Northern neutrals are under the power of England, and in the East the poor communications of Turkey and the all- pervading influence of England cut off all sup- plies, Germany is left to her own resources, for it is obvious that she can make no use of her merchant fleet. The situation is quite different for England. Supplies from outside can reach her as well as France. In return she supplies half the world with coal, while France has to rely mainly on imports. Submarine operations affect both states, and can certainly hinder the import and export of coal to a very material degree. This applies to Italy also, which is dependent upon imports for its food and coal, and cannot even exist without them. Such are the considera- tions which these states have to bear in mind when war becomes probable. Russia, on the 224 THK WAK OF THK FUTURE otlior hand, can novor bo out off fnnii Asia, though lior world-trade oiiu bo interrupt od, as it is carried on u\ainly throuirh the Baltic, l^istly, Turkey and tinnve are as irv^od as de- pendent upon V^.ngland, whieh will before long dominate the routes throiiirh the Mediterranean and into the interior of Asia. Thus the states which more or less depend upon imports will do everything in their power to make these safe against submarines, (lor- many, on the other hand, just because slie can be cut off frv^m ever>* form of maritime com- nmnioation, must import a large number of things as soon as war is in sight, i. e.» commodi- ties which cannot Ix^ produced in the countrj- itself. She must also adapt her agriculture acooniingly. There is no need to say here what must be cultivateii and what not. It is the busi- ness of the Government to discuss all this with the farmers, and tlie World "War itself has given us the necessary tinger-posts. All I will say is that provision must be made for the necessary food supplies and the indispensable raw materials. For the rest, diplomacy must endeavor to keep the trade routes open, which is conceiv- able only if there is a complete revolution in our present system of alliances. Time will POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 225 Hhow UH what can ho (Jonc in this roHpoct. LaHtJy, tho fj-hoat weapon must bo devoloporj to the highoHt pitch of capacity, notwithntand- in^' the prcHcnt peace cr^nditionB. That both this and the reorganization of the army are poHKible is proved by the years after 1806, in which 200,000 men were trained under the eyes of the French garrisons instead of the 42,000, ihii number permitted. This example is a fur- ther proof that diplomacy which sets out to do anything must be, so to speak, always on the offensive. Of course that does not mean it must be always aiming at war. On the con- trary, it must never forget that its business is to preserve the peace, but it must always be active and always desiring and striving for something if it is not to be dictated to. Thus diplomacy is subject to exactly the same laws as war. We must never lose the initiative and never give the other parties in the game a completely free hand to pursue their designs. Our own schemes must always interr>ose and cross the intentions of our adversary; thus keeping the initiative is the golden njle of diplomacy, and it applies equally to national economy. We must always be prepared for all eventualities and never let ourselves be sur- 226 THE WAK OF THE FUTURE prised. " Toujinus <;» vedette" must bo our motto. Of course it would be a great mistake to be coutinually uusettliug trade by appreheusions of war, as, for iustauoe, by recalling all our mercluiut ships wheuever there was the slight- est prospect of war. That would moan saori- tieiiig the present for the sake of a conjoeture; but we must always know exactly what we want, as I jxnntod out at the beginning of this discussion. AVe must be clear at the outset whether wo are prepared to lot matters go to the lengtli of war, and whether what is at stake for the enemy is gn^it enough for him to risk a war also. When wo have come to the conclu- sion that war is probable we nmst have the courage to take appropriate measures both in the ^x^litie^U and economic sphere. In the for- mer it means that tiual preparations for war must be made, and if necessary a preventive war embarked upon. The same course must be tiiken in the economic sphere. Action must be prompt and of such a nature that, if possible, the prospective enemy notices nothing. Home supplies must bo supplemented and secured for a long time to come. Our ships in foreign waters must be n^called and the neces- sarv instructions issued to the agricultural POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 227 intcrostH. It will thuH be soon that the prelim- inary work muHt be^nri early if the preparations for war are not to be noticed by the enemy, and that it iH impoK.sihle to do what is necessary publicly. If we took that course we should always be too late. Thus we must not be afraid of making secret preparations for war or of hcj^inmnfr it ourselves. The real responsibility will be exclusively at the door of those who have made the preservation of peace impos- sible. We must not let ourselves be drawn into wrong paths by superficial ideals which will receive the applause of the masses. It is the greatest cruelty towards one's own people to lack the courage to begin a necessary war, to abandon vital interests in order to keep the peace, and to sacrifice the wfjlfare of the whole state to attain an ideal which is unattainable. He who directs national policy (policy in its widest signification), and is thus responsible for the welfare and prosperity of the whole state in its ever changing relations with the other great powers, must know how to keep the initiative in every sense in his own strong hand. That is the first and vital law in both the political and economic spheres. But there is another factor which must receive his atten- tion, the factor of military power. If policy 228 THK. WAK^ OK TUK. FlITrKTI depoixds wholly on this last factor, \t will bo essential to dovoU^p it to tho hii::host possible standaixi auii thus extend the prospeets open to statesmanship. If the statesman is always to keep the initiative he n\nst vealixe that his dianoos are proportionate to the n\ilitary power behind him. Thus the principal task of statesmanship is to further the development of the national forces. Our enemies fully realize this. CllAi'TKU. VJI THK oksfmaIj ijiH'iiiiHf:'ii(j:i or -jhk rjiOOJ'H In diHciJHHJrjj^ tho luiUvMcji of politico an^J '-.(•/tri'iTiucM in t-hf; origin and cauHt; of warH wf; ron\o i\>ui iwaiui) whioli mndo this iwloulation orrouious. Wo thoit failed to tuui tho vvnraiiv to aot ot\ purx^ly n\ilitary ointsidorations and abauilon Kast IVusjiia to tho ouoniy for a tiino. li\stoad. wo traujifomHi a iwnwbor of anny corps fvvMU the woiitorn to tho oajiicrn theater, and thus lost our ciiauce of a ilecision in order ti> save a province. I have r\>f erred to tl\is e.-ise before, if I am not mistakeii, and laid stress on the fact that I >\*j\s in no way criticiy.iu^ii" the Supreme Com- nuand. Invause I an\ not sutVieieutlN' a^Hiuainttxi with all the cireumstanivs. Yet this case is svij- niticant Invause it teaches us hvnv ditVieult it is to pursue one idea to its losjical ciu\cJusiou, to avoid beinsr distracted from it by a temporary setback and yet to abandon it at the riiiht mo- ment. It is particularly dithcult for a kinji: to diXMdc to alviuvlon a fertile province to the enen\;k\ That aspect of the matter must, of course, Iv considered, but what is rcvpiired of a real ivmmander is a certain courage to take resv>onsibility and a ivfusal to allow himself to Ik» intluenciHl by such sentimental objections, Tu Germany at that time there was no such tisiure at the head of our militarv machine, and DISTiniMJTIOM OF TIMO TKOOPH 231 ha who wuH n;Hf)oriHib)o for our ntratc^ wan a Hick man. Ah war can fx; c/mducicd only r>ff<;nHivcly, and ifi(5 offVjnHJvc thuH dfdorrnincH all Htratf;jcy» 1,h(; biU.cr muHi b(; ^ivftn Hpocial w<;iKht in con- nidoring' llic diHtrif>ulIon of the troopH. Jiut tho rcquircmcntH of lh(! dcfcnHivc hIho mnHt be borne In mind, ;ind, if poiJ„',il)h;, in Huch a way ihai the nienHureH thf^y involve are the Hame an thoHe which can Herve for the offenHivf; if ro- quin!d. Vet, wlntre there Ih any conflict be- tween th(!ni, offenHive dinponitionH muHt be preferred. Thin Htatenn^nt in a funfJamental rule nf>f)lyirif^ to both trench and opfji wjirfare, Thit diviHiori, an the unit whieh Hhould ne,ver be broken uf> if it e;in be helper], haH proved itHclf the real baHic unit in war. In open war- fan; it lookH aH if that unit wen; the eorpH. Its C}r>rnpoHition UHually n;niainH unchanged while an action in in proj^rr-HH. The divinion only in rnov<'.d from one f)art of a theater of war to anoth(!r, or from one theater to another, while the army corps remainn in one place. ThuH the corfjH in perpetually clmui^'inf^ itH divinionH. Th(5 n;Hult Ih that th(; influence of the (^>rp8 commander on the men Ih purely iliuHory, while the diviHional c/>mmander in the rf;ally rcHpon- Hible figure. ThiH has proved quite a practical 232 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE system. It is particularly conspicuous in trench warfare, less so in open warfare, as I have said before. Thus, in trench warfare we see the divisions perpetually in movement, while in the second case the situation is more permanent. This is due to special circum- stances. In trench warfare the really effective divisions have continually to be sent to that part of the battle-line which is most seriously threatened by the enemy, while troops which have done their share are sent to the quietest sectors or brought back into rest billets. In open warfare the distribution is generally per- manent until it develops into trench warfare again for one reason or another. The next higher unit is the army, which usually consists of three to six corps. Several armies form the army group. As regards open warfare itself, from a stra- tegic point of view at any rate, much the same laws apply as in the case of earlier wars, for a rigid defense, such as that of Frederick the Great at Bunzelwitz (which 'was extremely similar to modern trench warfare), is all the more unlikely because such operations were inspired by the peculiarities of the enemy and the characteristics of war at that time. It will be far more a matter of advancing or retreat- DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS 233 ing until the successful blow has been delivered at a decisive point, when the other army groups will have to advance or retire in conformity. As a rule, it will only be when the theaters of war are at a great distance from each other that one of them will have no influence on the other. But where a decision is reached either in the sole theater or (where there are two or more) in an adjacent theater, it will usually have its effect on the other fronts. The distribution of the troops will be deter- mined on these principles. We shall always direct the bulk of our divisions to the point at which we think a victory would strike the enemy's vitals, and these divisions will be sent to the selected points during the approach in order that the object of the whole operation may not be betrayed by their lateral move- ments by railway or road. It will also be essen- tial to effect the approach as rapidly as possible in order that the time available to the enemy to take his counter-measures may be very short. The cavalry will be disposed on the wings to hinder hostile reconnaissance or assist our own. Marching will be only by night, to prevent ob- servation by enemy aircraft, and this will also be dealt with in the air itself. Here, again, the functions of the artillery will nssmuo i::roator imporiaiioo than ovor be- fore. Wo shall oiuloavor to appoar ou tho battletioKl with tho laruvst jH^Svsiblo force of ariillory from iho poim of viow i>f both num- Ivi-^ {Uid caliber. This artillery will be taken from the army reserve of the army in qnostion, ai\il it is [>laiu that every army must have such a reserve, whieh will consist primarily of heavy guns. The infantry action will be essentially a machint^gnn action, and tho cavalry w ill play a relatively unimportant itMe. After tlie ac- tion, on the other hand, its functions will be muoli more important, as it will have to per- form the duty of pursuing the enemy laterall\' or defendinsi: us a^iinst such a VHivsuit. liMhc ensuinir operations everythiiiJi' will depend upon the speed of the horse. These considera- tions will be Ix^rne in mind in distributiuii" the tivopji, and tho independent c^'walry force will Iv sent to the point where maneuver warfare is in prv\siTess or to be anticipated. In action itself it will have to rely entirely ou its lii*o- arms. As roiTJvnls tivnch warfare, we shall first dis- tribute as many divisions on the line appointed for defense as we consider absolutely necessary to beat otY the tirst hostile attacks. AVhat other svHHnal arrangements are made will depend DTSTRTBTJTION OF TTTE 'rKr)Oi»H %\U \\\)u\\ a ^r(;ai variftfy of cin;urriHtanco8. Th<; f;on/i^uniiIori of llu; j^roufKl, Uk; inf.ftrilioriH of ihr; (jnorriy arifJ JjIh un- try. There miwt be at lea«t one Hucb main line for (-.very army, and ^iom'iUy two. It will all depend on the nize of the army, which In m turn (hij[Kinots, arsenals, medirjal stores, and so on— will be dis- tributed on these lines and thi- main railways, as well as in adjac^.-nt villages. The longer an army remains in one place the more establinh- ments of this kind will it accumulate, and these 240 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE can become a positive danger when it advances, and particularly if it retreats. We shall thus do our best to avoid keeping supplies close to the line, and we must arrange things in such a way that only what is essential is brought up as it is required. The main depots will be es- tablished very far back, if possible in the home country. Of course, the greatest attention must be devoted to the railway arrangements, for if there is any failure in this department universal confusion is produced, and the troops are the first to suffer. It is extremely impor- tant to come to a right decision as to what can be stored permanently in depots and what must be sent out to the troops. The longer we think we can hold a certain position the more we can venture to establish depots close up to the line. In this matter the whole railway system at our disposal is the determining factor. The larger the number of railways leading straight to the front line the larger the quantity of supplies we can accumulate behind it, but we must be careful to secure that, in case of emergency — e. g., where a sudden retreat becomes necessary — we have the requisite rolling stock to get them away. In deciding this question of de- pots, there will often be a conflict between our desire to give the army what it wants and the DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS 241 necessity of keeping it as mobile as possible. Another important aspect of this matter will be our anxiety for our rolling stock. In view of the enormous number of troops which have to be moved hither and thither, the colossal demand of the home country, and the output of industrial establishments (which is increased by the manufacture of war material), it is prac- tically impossible to keep the permanent way and rolling stock in a proper condition. It naturally deteriorates in time, and in many cases it will be impossible to effect the neces- sary repairs, especially when the war has lasted a considerable time. This question of material is of great importance, and involves that perfect system of supervision which is possible only with a really first-rate railway staff. Unfortunately, in a modern war in which every man fit to fight is called to the colors, such a staff is not always available. Thus, in modern times military operations are dependent upon the available railway sys- tem. If the defense is tied to railways, the attack is even more so. It depends not only upon the existence of railways, but also upon their condition, because rapidity of movement is everything. In distributing the troops we must pay the greatest attention to the railway lU2 the war of the FUTURE system, and, above all, consider the enemy's, as otherwise it may happen that the enemy who has realized our intentions may be able to bring np more troops than we ourselves. But, when all is said, the proper distribution of tlie troops is an exceedingly difficult prob- lem, especially in the defense, for the defender is generally compelled to follow his opponent's lead, and often has the worse rail and road c<)nmiunioations, the reason being that if there is any element of surprise in the enemy's attack he generally has no time to develop it adequately. To sum up everything I have said, we shall always have to distinguish between open and trench warfare, although they often shade off into each other. In trench warfare our first business w411 be to man our lines with the number of divisions we think necessary to hold the front involved. "We shall dispose the rest of our troops, and particularly our infantry, artillery and recon- noitering force, at suitable railway and road junctions, in order that we can use them if re- quired as reserves, or have them available for our own counter-attack. Everything else, in- cluding material required by the army, we shall have behind, close to the railways leading back DISTRIBUTION OF THE TK001\S 243 to thfi homo crjuntry 80 that they will bo handy for Bonding up to the armios or can ?jo easily moved if required. Iji open warfare, on the other hand, our re- HervoH will alHO be dintributed among the armies, but the distribution will take place at the very outset, i. e., before the operations start. As we know for certain where we intend * to send our main force, our reserves can be directed from home straight to the point at which they will be needed to help in securing a decision. The cavalry will, in any case, be posted on the wings of the armies and, indeed, well ahead. In trench warfare, on the other hand, it will be disposed behind the main wing of the attack, and then only when a decisive break-through is planned, so that the transition to open warfare is imminent, a matter which we shall discuss in the next chapter. The mass of the cavalry will be concentrated at the point which is to be the center of gravity of the whole attack. As regards the lines of commu- nication, the only difference will be that, in one case, they are tied to one place, while in the other they go forward by stages. The armies have to be supplied in either case, and the de- pots must therefore be continuously pushed forward in open warfare, until at length they 2U THE WAR OF THE FUTURE become a fixture again, so to speak, when trench warfare is resumed. It is obvious that in both cases they must be in close touch with the rail- ways. The railway net ^vill have to be extended correspondingly if we think we are likely to remain peimanently in contact with the enemy. It will be under the control of the Lines-of- Communication Inspectorate and be comprised in its area. I discussed the question of supply in open warfare at great length in my book Vom heuti- gen Kriege} * Tom lieuii^en Kriege, Vols. I, II, Chap. \i. CHAPTER Vni THE BATTLE It is a great mistake, though unfortunately- made only too often, to regard the last war as being the one and only war, and, therefore, to imagine that the next one must be always on the model of the past. In the case of the World War this is a double mistake, for it is certain that we have just opened a new world period, and this for two reasons. In the first place, the last war obviously represents the beginning of a new evolution; it is a war of development, not the last chapter of a historical period which has ended. We must therefore assume that many of its phenomena will undergo very material changes before they attain a certain degree of permanence, and that the war of the future will take forms different from any which we have known from past experience. In the second place, it must be remembered that the last war w^as fought under conditions which probably will never recur. Germany and Austria stood alone against a 245 1!4(; THE WAU OF THE FUTURE world ill arms. Thanks to our mistakes of policy, all the slatos wlioao power made them serious opponents combined against us, and even savage races found themselves in the enemy's ranks. We defeated Ihem all, until at length we succumbed to our own nation, and the revolution put tin end to tho war. Wo wore cut olT from all maritime communications, sur- rounded by enemies on all sides, and our allies bore the germ of defeat within them. The re- sult of all this was that the war was not con- cluded in a military sense but brought to an end by politicid occurrences. These circum- stances are not in the least likely to recur. Wo shall have a dilTorent alliance policy, and there- fore occupy a different position in tho world. This is not the place to discuss the political prospects which are opening for us as the re- sult of the present situation. But our inter- national position will no doubt undergo a change. We must lind allies on whom we c^in rely, and, above all, make ourselves so strong that we can hold our own and win the conii- detice of our neighbors. In future it is highly improbable that we shall see another combina- tion of all the powers against us and the utter collapse of our weak allies. If there is another war — and wars will never be altogether THE BATTLE 247 avoided, in Hpito of all socialiHtic theories — it will be under different circum.stanceH from those of the World War. We can think of in- numerable cases in which a war would be fought under quite different conditions from those in which Germany fought the world. In the present world situation it is easy to imag- ine war in the most varied conditions, but none of them can even remotely resemble the con- ditions of the past. It must further be remembered that, as we saw, every future war will have to be offensive if the parties desire to protect their own soil. The result is that the present strategic methods of our enemies already seem utterly out of date. In addition there is the fact that fortresses no longer hold out any prospects for the defense. It is true that in the last war fortress opera- tions took fdace on more than one ocf;asion — I need only refer to the siege of Antwerp — but, generally speaking, the uselessness of fortresses is universally recognized, and, in future, no one will be able to rely on holding them. Thus there is no reason to devote a special chapter to fortress operations. The les- sons which could be drawn from the different sieges are out of date, because the siege of a fortress is not likely to be witnessed again. IMS THE AVAR OF THE FITTURE In the e^iso of tho Ivittlo for a fortified sector, which has taken the place of the old sieg:e, the same principles apply which determine the form of operations for loeal advantages in trench warfare. I mnst therefore refer the reader to the special chapter on this subject, with the sole distinction, whicli is, of course, important, that on the one side the defense works will be permanent and therefore rela- tively stronir, while, on the other, the artillery which is to deal with them mnst comprise cor- respond in uly large calibers. We shall have to bring np the heaviest gnns on which we can lay hands, while onr opponents, for their part, will constnict the shelters for the garrison in sneh a way that it can endnre even the heaviest lire and still remain etYective. AVhich side will prove the victor in this dnel is as obvions as the fact that hitherto artilleiy has proved it- self superior to fortifications, and will certainly remain so in the future. On the other hand, the defender Avill gain time in all cases, and that is a particularly important matter in the defense. But if a decision is gained, the fonner defender will have to launch a corresponding offensive himself. Another characteristic of modern war is that the issue is decided by the artillery, and that TJIK liATTLE 249 the only function of the infantry in to reap the fruitH of the artillery victory. It thus re- mainH the queen of urmH, becauHC war in incrmccivable without it, and its advance gives the rneafiure of the HUCAc/nH attained. A decisive victory in irnpoKHible without infantry, but this does not alter the fact that a victory can be secured only if we pofiscHs an artillery superi- ority. All these circumKtanfi^'H are peculiar to mod- ern war, as we have i^acn it, but without careful examination no one can assume that they will have the same importance in future. It is therefore necessary to study modem war very cloHely in order to ascertain which of its char- acteristic elements seem pennanent and which temporary. It is also necessary to decide in what direction we are bound to expect changes, and how developments will end. The last topic must form the subject of a future book, but, so far as the recent war is concerned, my task in the present work is to discuss its characteristic phenomena — as far as is possible in the present state of knowledge — in such a way as to give a general picture of modern military operations, and also enable every one to come to some conclusion as to what may be expected in the future. 250 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE The distribution of the troops in war (as it is to-day, and in this particular matter has ever been) is generally dependent upon the plan of campaign. In the last war this plan was determined by events which I have already described. It was a war which began as a war on two fronts — France and Russia — and gradu- ally developed into a world war as the result of the participation of England, Italy, Ru- mania, and finally America — mainly as the result of our mistakes, I am sorry to say. In such circumstances it was impossible to adhere to a set strategic program. Our original idea of the war was a two-front war in which we intended to stand on the defensive at first in Russia until a decision Avas reached in France. This situation gradually changed. As the re- sult of the transfer of troops from west to east, the Battle of the Marne, and the help which we had to send to the Austrians, we were compelled to stand on the defensive in France and take the offensive in Russia, Rumania, and Italj^ We won brilliant victories and then passed to the defensive in those theaters while we made our final attempt to secure a decision in France — a goal we unfortunately did not reach — before the Americans appeared in masses on the western theater and the revolu- THE BATTLE 251 tion broke out in Germany. The result was that the last war was essentially a trench war. I have already said elsewhere everything that needs to be said about its tactical aspects. In the west it was the Battle of the Mame which made this development inevitable. In the east it arose gradually out of the numerical superiority of the Russians, which finally dom- inated the whole war. In trench warfare, which will interest us first, we must assume that the two sides are equal and that the equality — at any rate, the element of morale — is such as can change only gradually. Open warfare, on the other hand, ensues where no continuous lines have yet been formed, or when one of the two sides has succeeded in breaking his oppo- nent's line, and thus in reestablishing the con- ditions of maneuver warfare. As long as trench warfare is in progress, the form of operations will be not so much an action for a decision as a general forward or backward movement of the opposing lines. Of course, such movement may involve great dis- tances. It may represent a great gain to one side and a great loss to the other, but a de- cision can never be reached merely by this process. Open warfare alone can bring the decision. When the attacker is exhausted and 252 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE has to give up the idea of enveloping his op- ponent, while the defender succeeds in pre- serving the continuity of his line by bringing up troops from both sides, there will, of course, be a loss of ground and large captures of giins, machine-guns and prisoners ; but it will be im- possible to speak of a real decision. This is what happened to us in all our great victories in France. It happened in our great offensive in the spring of 1918, in the fighting on the Lys — the so-called Battle of Armen- tieres — and the capture of Mount Kemmel. There can be no doubt that our troops per- formed almost superhuman feats, but it was impossible to speak of a real annihilation of the hostile armies because they succeeded in re- establishing their lines locally and tactically. From the Battle of the Marne onwards we fought the whole war in France without ever obtaining a decision, although we won brilliant victories at different points and exhausted the enemy almost to the point of extinction. We must not deceive ourselves on this point in con- sidering the war as a whole. In all our battles we never succeeded in breaking through the enemy, and as far as we can see it would have been very difficult for us to do so after the Americans had appeared in the western THE BATTLE 253 theater and increased the numbers at the dis- posal of our enemies very considerably. By that time a complete victory was certainly out of the question, but it would still have been possible to bring the war to an honorable con- clusion. It was otherwise in the Russo-Eumanian theater. There we succeeded time after time — quite apart from the battles at the beginning of the war, of course — in breaking through the hostile lines and obtaining a decision which led to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk after the Revolu- tion had prepared the way. People may say what they like about that. My business is simply to emphasize that a de- cision is possible only in open warfare, and that everything turns on transforming trench war- fare, which may have been necessitated by circumstances, into open warfare in which the enemy can be enveloped, at any rate, on one flank, and his communications threatened. Such operations alone are capable of forcing a decision, for in no other way is it possible to throw the hostile armies into really disastrous confusion. In war that is the only goal. We must start by considering trench warfare with limited objectives, because it represents the larger part of modern operations. Next, •J54 THE AVAR OF THE FUTUKE wo must discuss trouoh warfare which is iu- toiidod to load to a docisiou. Last, wo must deal with open warfare, because such opera- tious aud the docisiou thoy briuc; are the tiual goal of war. In doing" so. we nuist always remember that wo are thinking only of war in its prcseiit stage of development, not of the war with whieli the future may possibly present ns. I. — The STRrGoi>E for Loo.vl, Advantages in Truxoh "Warfare In considering the subject of actions for local advantages in trench warfare (and I take it first because such actions are peculiarly char- acteristic of modern warV we must realize at the outset that they involve a gain of ground and their purpose is to intiict on the enemy the greatest possible damage or rob him of some particularly im]^x>rtant area. In either case, the attack will have to be purely frontal. It will therefore be necessary to concentrate so superior a force for the attack that the defender is rendered helpless before the real infantry assault begins, and the latter must be accom- panied by a barrage which is bound to break the last attempts at resistance of the enemy's infant ly if it is still capable of the effort. THE BATTLE 255 As I have alrea(3y said, the most diflScult part of this proi^ram is the artillery concentration. It must be effected without the enemy's notic- ing anything. It must be on such a scale that the artillery can reduce the enemy to helpless- ness in the shortest possible time; the hostile infantry mu.st be made incapable of bringing the attack to a standstill. The barrage must set- tle the defending infantry once and for all. We must also arrange that the batteries can at once follow the storming infantry, so that the hostile artillery has no chance of deploying afresh out of our range and, supported from the wings and rear if possible, to neutralize the effect of our guns. We shall also have to take suitable precautions against hostile aircraft. Thus the movements which so tedious an opera- tion as concentration requires, and our prep- arations to cross the so-called "No Man's Land," will have to be carried out by night only. The arrangements required for crossing No Man's Land will be particularly numer- ous and complicated. Bridging-material must be prepared, roads must be constructed and improved, and labor units must be at hand with all the paraphernalia they require. In short, a huge and complicated operation is needed if 256 THE WAR OP THE FUTURE the attack is to have the element of surprise and to be a real success. As regards the defensive system itself, quite apart from the effects of shell-fire this will fre- quently bo made almost impassable to the attacker by trenches and mre entanglements. In addition, the enormous amount of ammuni- tion which the attacker requires has to be brought up to the front lines and then sent for- ward as the advance proceeds. As regards food, however, we shall be able to rely to a cer- tain extent on the supplies we shall find in the enemy's lines. To trust to these alone is very unwise, for we can never tell exactly what we shall find. A certain amount of food must therefore be sent up to the advancing infantry in order to be on the safe side. For the rest, it is advisable to select an area for our deploy- ment which is as safe as possible from hostile observation and enables us to conceal our batteries and ammunition dumps. It will thus be realized how difficult such a deployment is, and what a number of aspects have to be con- sidered. The best course, to all appearances, is to deploy the artillery in two waves, as I said elsewhere. The first must be strong enough to fulfill all the duties which the attack imposes, while the second (provided with the THE BATTLE 257 necessary ammunition) must be ready to ac- company the storm troops immediately they go forward. Such a disposition will mean that the enemy's guns (a sufficient number of them, at least) will never have time to adopt defensive dispositions, and the attack will roll forward uninterruptedly. The artillery which is subse- quently to accompany the infantry with its barrage will first participate in the neutraliza- tion of the hostile artillery, and only start its barrage work when the enemy's artillery can be regarded as silenced and our own infantry leaves its trenches. Turning to the infantry attack, it will be best to adopt dispositions similar to those we have considered for the artillery. We shall not con- tent ourselves with sending our infantry for- ward in a single wave which is just strong enough to perform its task. We prefer to ar- range for several waves composed of the same arms, so that when the force of the first is spent the second (or the third, as the case may be) is immediately available to continue the attack. Quite apart from the ordinary artillery dispo- sitions, we shall have our infantry accompanied by assault batteries, which— as I have said be- fore—have the duty of supporting their ad- 258 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE vance directly, though not in the same way as the barrage. The attack will thus go forward until it reaches its objective. The infantry must then be strong enough to deal with the enemy's counter-attack and hold their ground against further attacks, which may become very violent after a time. It must be considered a very serious mistake to assign too few troops to a projected attack or expect more of them than they can possibly achieve. Again, the attack must never be broken off before we have reached ground which is suitable for defense. If this rule be neglected we shall find that when the force of the attack has spent itself we are in an extremely awkward position. For instance, if we leave the enemy in dominating positions in front of our new line, or if we have no observation over his new front, when once the attack is over it will be very diflficult to escape the enemy's observation or find out his intentions. Thus, before we plan our attack we must find out how many troops the enemy has in the sector itself and how many more he can bring up after the moment at which he realizes that the attack is coming. The enemy will find himself perfectly help- less if the attack comes as a complete surprise THE BATTLE 259 to him and is really well prepared. All he can do is to bring up reenforcements from the flanks or the rear, and these will not be ade- quate to hold up our progress if our arrange- ments have been good. It is much more likely that we shall reach our objective. The course of events will be very different if the enemy has noticed our preparations for the attack and is ready for it. In that case he also can bring up infantry and artillery in time and confront the attackers with troops some of which are, at any rate, of equal value. The probability is that an indecisive action will be the result if the attack is pressed through. The position will be far more favorable for a de- fender if, in the particular case, he decides not to hold his front line, and from the outset confines himself to maintaining another line farther back. Of course his enemy must know nothing of this intention. The defender will, therefore, keep at any rate part of the garrison in the front line, and if necessary sacrifice it. He will take the same course with part of his artillery, which naturally cannot abandon its positions altogether without betraying the secret. But the defender derives enormous advantage in other ways. All his artillery re- enforcements, duly provided with ammunition. 260 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE can be concentrated beyond the range of the attacker's artillery. The same course may be taken with the infantry whose function it is to defend the line which is intended to be seriously held. The hostile barrage will affect only a small part of the defending infantry, and the defender knows this beforehand. There will be no need to send up ammunition and food as is required when the front line is reenforced. In short, the defender is in a much better position than the attacker, as to a certain extent he can settle beforehand what sacrifices he is prepared to make. Of course, the attacker's artillery will par- tially annihilate the infantry force which the defender has left in his front line for the pur- poses of demonstration. It will also be able to silence such of the hostile artillery as has not been withdrawni. The artillery reenforcements will not be harmed, nor that portion of the in- fantry to which is assigned the duty of holding the selected main line of defense. On the other hand, the attacker's infantry, which has cap- tured the first line of defense with obvious ease and probably quickly overrun the defender's first artillery positions, now comes within range of destruction fire from the enemy's ar- tillery reenforcements and the main infantry THE BATTLE 261 force, both of which have suffered no injury at all, as they were disposed beyond the range of the attacker's guns. It may be assumed that in these circumstances the attacker will suffer the heaviest losses and fail to achieve his purposes altogether. He will be able to avoid absolute ruin only by realizing his mistake in time and refraining from the fatal on- slaught on the enemy's main line of defense. He will certainly have captured his adversary's front lines, but the losses he will have suffered will be losses out of all proportion to this limited gain. The defender, on the other hand, will only have lost ground which need never be of great value. The losses he has suffered, on the other hand, will be practically nothing in comparison with those of the attacker. If this process is repeated fairly frequently, in the long run the losses of the attacker will be so great that he will not dare to venture on a decisive battle, and ultimately will find that he has lost the war. Such a development of events must be avoided at all cost, but as it is extraordinarily difficult, in spite of all precautions, advantages of ground and demonstrations at various points, to conceal the preparations for the at- tack, especially when the enemy has got wind 262 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE of it and knows how to recognize the signs (he will frequently find out that an attack is immi- nent by examining deserters and prisoners), I can see only one way in which he can reach his goal, and that is by combining retirement and the attack. The fundamental idea behind this suggestion is that the complicated machinery of attack should be got ready behind a line in the rear which is to be the starting-point for the attack itself, so that this line would be quite out of the range of hostile reconnaissance and observation, not to mention artillery fire. When this line had been prepared for the attack in every detail the attacker would withdraw his front to it and open his attack by surprise after the enemy had come forward into the open. It is essential for the success of such a plan that the retirement seem perfectly genuine to the enemy, and for that reason it should involve a shortening of the front or the aban- donment of a position which is strategically and tactically unfavorable. As it will also be very difficult to prevent the enemy from finding out through deserters or prisoners that an attack is imminent, we must arrange matters in such a way that our own troops themselves know nothing about it. THE BATTLE 263 It will thus be seen that the vital point is to prevent the enemy from knowing anything about the attack, so that it will come as a sur- prise and find him, if possible, unprepared. We shall attain this end if we select the point on our available front for our proposed attack in such a way that, as I have said, our with- drawal seems natural, and involves the loss of an area which must not be too small (without leaving the enemy positions which are easy to defend). "We must also be entitled to hope that the ensuing attack will cause the enemy great losses, fatal losses if possible, and also reach objectives of strategic importance. We shall now construct the real line which is to be the starting-point of our attack behind our original line, which can be abandoned to the enemy for a time without any serious disad- vantage. If at all possible, it must leave the enemy an unfavorable forward zone, while our own (and the developments which are in prog- ress behind it) are safe from hostile observa- tion owing to the lie of the ground. The trenches will be constructed as well as the necessary cover. Battery ranges will be established and artillery maps drawn up. An adequate amount of ammunition will be brought up. The divisions earmarked for the 264 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE subsequent attack ^vill be disposed at the proper distance behind. The road system will be developed. Then the artillery will gradu- ally be concentrated. In short, all arrange- ments will be made for the attack as inconspicu- ously as possible. We shall also pretend that we are ourselves expecting a great enemy attack, and intend to retire to our rear line of defense either when it begins or when we know it is imminent. As an example, I might refer to Hindenburg's retirement to the Sieg- fried Line. As no sort of preparation for an attack would be made behind the advanced position it would be only natural for our own troops to assume that we have no idea of such an attack, and probably they will say as much. The enemy, too, will observe no preparations for attack, but will probably discover that a posi- tion in rear is being constructed, and assume from this fact that an intention to attack is out of the question. We may strengthen the illusion by making preparations for a great attack, at least superficially, behind our front line at some other point and taking steps which seem to point to such an intention, e. g., con- structing field railways, moving columns at THE BATTLE 265 night, bringing up batteries, establishing sham ammunition dumps and so on. While our preparations for the real attack from the roar position are in progress, and be- fore we abandon our forward position, we must make certain arrangements in the latter which will be useful to us during our subsequent attack, but the object of which will be unknown to the enemy. I refer to the selection of em- placements for the batteries which we shall rush up to these points when our attack has passed our original front line, so that we can be certain of having artillery support for the next stage of the advance. The artillery maps must be ready and the survey posts measured and indicated so that it will be possible for our guns to get on again with sufficient rapid- ity. If circumstances make it desirable similar artillery emplacements should be established between the front and rear positions so that the batteries can be sent forward by stages. As I have already said, it is very desirable that a second artillery wave should be disposed behind the batteries we have earmarked for the first attack, so that we can *'lift" our artil- lery fire without having to diminish the volume of our artillery fire from the first wave — at any rate, while the latter is going forward. 2(>0 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE li is nlso (losirablo not to make too heavy demaiuls on the atiacUini:: infantry. After a war has histed some tinu% the infantry will not be so ('llieienl as when it l)ei»an. liattle methods require that all Ihe subordinate com- manders have a hij»"li (h\4;ree of indepenthMice and self-n>liance. As a nuitter of fact, the shortai»t> of olllieers and N.dO.'s means that these (jualities are to be found only to a limited extent, especially when we remember that, j^-emn-ally speakina:, little time can be spent on trainiuii: men to act on their own uiitiative. Moreover, in war we have always to reckon with unforeseen circumstances and occurrences — the unexpected appearance of hostile re- sen'es and so on — and we nuist not forget the disinteg'ratini]: aiul, to a certain extent, demor- ali//ini»^ effects of modern battle on troops which are not a perfect instrument of war. It is thus advisable to assemble as many infantry waves for the attack as our numbers permit and circumstances require. The larger the number, the greater will be our prospect? of reaeJiing the strategic objective which we have set before us, instead of sticking halfway because our infantry fails us. It would be better to limit the number and scale of our at- THE BATTLP: 2G7 tacks than to impose restrictions upon our- selves in this respect. As soon as we have made all these arrange- mcfnts in the way \ have (IeHcrih(!(], arrange- ments which will doubtlcHH be regarded by our own troops as preparations for retreat, we shall begin our real withdrawal to the prepared position in the rear, taking care to destroy all shell-proof dug-outs, and carrying out the movement by stages, so that the enemy will follow us up slowly and have time to bring his artillery with him. We must do everything in our power to com- pel the enemy to follow us up. High ground, villages and areas he had previously lost must be offered as a bait to his military pride. Casual announcements of our intention to with- draw must challenge him, and local counter- attacks must keep him in check th(i whole time the withdrawal is in progress. Before the re- treat starts the hostile artillery must be freely gassed (with the "yellow cross" gas-shell) in order to compel it to leave its emplacements. This gassing will not only assist our own with- drawal, but its after-effects will make them- selves felt in our subsequent attack, for it will first make the enemy leave his position as quickly as possible, and then prevent him from 268 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE conccntratina; in the same area. Yet it is prac- tically immaterial whether the enemy follows us very quickly or not. Indeed, it is better to give him a few days in which to get up all his forces, particularly his artillery, to the se- lected spot. It is not easy to determine the right moment for our attack, for if we are to make full use of our advantages of position, it is essential that w^e surprise the enemy at the moment in which his defensive arrangements — particu- larly his artillery and signal system — which have been disorganized by the general change of position, have not yet settled do^vn again. Too much delay will mean letting him get too strong and involves a risk to the masses of material and ammunition we have assem- bled. On the other hand, a premature thrust into the void is far more dangerous. It is for this reason that, beginning with the first day of the retreat, our whole observation system — surveying, balloons, aircraft, ground observa- tion — ^will be directed unceasingly to discover- ing the movements of the enemy, and especially the arrival of his artillery. Familiarity with the area to be occupied by the enemy — which can be obtained by reconnoitering and examin- ing the lines before the retreat — will prove THE BATTLE 2C9 very useful to all concerned later on. The results of reconnaissance during these few days will be the foundation of our artillery work. When we have thus arrived in our ''depar- ture" position, we shall only allow ourselves long enough to ascertain by aircraft and other observation that at any rate the bulk of the enemy's artillery has arrived. Then, in the last night, the attacking infantry and escort batteries will take up their position in the lines and immediately launch the attack. By so do- ing we shall reap the following advantages : The concentration of the artillery and the deployment of the attack divisions will be con- cealed from the enemy. The delicate work of reconnoitering and surveying the battery posi- tions, fixing the aiming points, and so forth, will be done much more carefully out of the enemy's range. For the same reason the heavy business of concentrating our batteries and bringing up ammunition, which will be favored by the good roads of the back area, will pro- ceed more smoothly and safely, and without in- volving wastage in men, horses, equipment and ammunition. This advantage will also enable us systematically to distribute the concentra- tion of the necessary material over the whole period at our disposal before the day fixed for 270 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE the attack. This and the strict control of traffic, which nnist bo suporvisod by officers right ni) to the front lino, will prevent that un- usnally heavy traffic in the back area wliicli only too often betrays one's intentions. A few re- ports of particnbir activity will, as a rule, be constrned by the enemy as the construction of a position in rear, and, as I have said, tliis pretense will help to conceal our purpose even from our own troops. All the preparations, down to the last details, will be under the personal supervision of senior officers. In this way we shall take the enemy entirely by surprise, and find him in unprepared lines. We need not expect to meet strong enemy re- seiTos at the start, and if they are brought up subsequently their intervention can hardly be systematic. A deep zone pitted with shell- holes is a formidable obstacle. In the area just evacuated we shall find a good network of roads and light railways. The enemy himself will have made great efforts to restore what w^e had to destroy. The possibility of bringing up heavy artillery to the front line will secure our artilleiy preparation the necessary depth, so that we can silence even the distant hostile artillerj' and deal with occupied positions in THE BATTLE 271 the rear. These preparations may to some de- gree be extended to what will be enemy terri- tory also. Battery emplacements can be fixed, and officers and men familiarized with the ground beforehand. The artillery can recon- noiter targets, and ascertain suitable points for observation and emplacements. The signal service will be able to work on the preparations 'for quickly establishing a signal system in the enemy's territory. The lines of approach can be repaired and road-mending material can be accumulated at inconspicuous points in the heart of the enemy's ground. It is even pos- sible to accumulate small ammunition dumps for the infantry gun batteries in secret places. Lastly, the employment of gas batteries on a great scale as a weapon of attack is quite pos- sible, thanks to the favorable conditions for the concentration. A salvo of about a thousand trench-mortar gas-shells to every kilometer of front will have an enormous effect, and in favorable circum- stances throw the enemy into confusion even a long way behind his front line. The work of emplacing these mortars must be started long beforehand and carefully concealed from aerial observation. The ammunition itself must not 272 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE bo brought up to the line before the uight of the attack. In these eircuuistaiu'cs, the eoueent ration of all our resourees for the attack and the fact that the enemy, who will not have hail time to dig himself in, is without cover, enable us to curtail our artillery preparations very appre- ciably and thus secure a gfreat advantage over the enemy's approaching reser\^es. As I have said before, this artillery preparation itself will be extremely violent and may therefore be short. The excellent conditions in which the concentration has been carried out will permit an expenditure of material and ammunition on a scale surpassing all previous experience. In these conditions a complete success is ex- tremely probable, but it will be far from easy to repeat such an operation with equal success a second time. It is therefore advisable to use this tystem of attack once only for a vital otTensive, and thus secure the decision of the whole campaign. In what I have been saying I have invol- untarily adopted the German point of view, and for the rest described the forms of action which practically made up the war and with which I myself have been familiar. Yet it must not be forgotten that the offensive has other THE BATTLE 273 methods in addition to those I have described, while, generally speaking, the defense can- not take a form very different from that I have outlined in my pages. I cannot, of course, discuss these other methods on the same lines, because I liave had no personal experience of them, and such discussions must be based on personal experience. Moreover, T should only 'repeat myself on very many points if I went into them in any greater detail. After all, the weapons available are always the same — artil- lery, tanks and infantry — though the methods of cooperation may vary. It all comes back to the same thing. In every case surprise will be the vital factor. Tanks can be concentrated much more rapidly than infantry if an adequate road system is available. We can therefore produce the ef- fect of surprise much more easily with tanks than with infantry. Our enemies seem to have succeeded by this method on several occasions. But as regards artillery, success depends to an enormous degree on the number of guns at our disposal. In the last war four European arm- ies were united against us, and they were joined by the American in the last year, while on our side Turkey and Bulgaria only counted in so far as we ourselves had to supply them with 274 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE guns and ammunition. Tho industries of the whole world wore at tho service of our foes, so that it is hardly surprising* that towards the end tlioy had a great preponderanoe of tanks and guns, i. 0., neither in attack nor in defense did they have to employ as many troops as we in order to reach the same goal. That was an immense advantage, of course, which made it- self felt in course of time on every occasion. This advantage was conspicuous, particu- larly in the last battles of tlie campaign of 1918. At the end the enemy's superiority, especially in tanks, was very great, and even in artilkny the Allies had a heavy preponderance. All this must be borne in mind in considering tlie later course of events. The longer the war lasted, the larger the number of killed and wounded on the Oerman side, and the w*orse the drafts which came out to take their places, the greater became the superiority of the Allies in spite of the immense losses which they suf- fered. The initiative gradually passed into their hands and their offensive itself took more varied fonns. The resources of the defender, on the other hand, were rapidly vanishing. Ho had no new defensive methods with which to reply to the tanks and the intensitied barrage, and while the uses of technical material were TIIK liATTI.F. 275 coniinuouHly dian^In^ during llio war ho hirri- soir had io Hily, lakiri/^ it all round, on the sarno oHlabliHlicd nudhodn. Tho (Jof(jnrlor could not do nion; than conc(3ntrat(i hiH iroopH tho moment ho realized an attack waH coming, adopt th(! variouH deferiKlvo rn^ithodH af)pli(5abl(; to the enemy 'h methodw of attack, and otherwise; trust to the courage of his troopH. (JircumHtances •themHelvcB made it imposHibh; for the German Supreme Command to adopt new methods and recover th(! initiative — while this was easy for our enemies. It is possible, on the other hand, that it could have organized the barrage better, so that the capacity of the guns could have been mad(; more use of than was actually the case. I will therefore permit myself to add a few words on this jjoint. II. — The Barrage We have seen that no infantry attack is pos- sible without the protecting curtain of a creep- ing barrage, which is designed to break down the last resistance as the storming infantry approaches. Unfortunately the great drawback to such a barrage is that its rate of progress has to be fixed once and for all. Whether the infantry advances quickly or slowly the barrage 276 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE goes forward at this regular pace, and thus — as frequently happened during the war — gets too far ahead of the infantry, and the hostile troops recover themselves when it has passed and renew their resistance. On the other side, it may compel its own infantry to go slower than the situation would otherwise permit. Thus the problem of the attacl^er is to make tlie barrage elastic, so that it will automatically accompany the infantry advance. In practice, this problem has not yet been solved, and I can thus only make suggestions which have not yet stood the test of reality. If we look at the practical necessities of the case, the first and most obvious idea is that the regimeutal CO. of the infantry should be able directl}^ to influence the pace of the barrage ahead of his unit by using some simple foim of flare. This scheme seems perfectly feasible. The area to be attacked must be divided into barrage zones, with which the regimental zones must broadly coincide, and be indiciited by the same color. If we now calculate two regiments in the front line per division, only four different col- ored flares will be required, and confusion will be impossible. If the line of attack is com- posed, as it generally is, of more than two THE BATTLE 277 divisions, the alternation of colors in the other sectors will have to ha settled, but, in any case, red, yellow, white and green will be enough. Of course, it is possible that there may be a gap between two regiments where, according to requirements, the barrage of one is going faster or slower than the barrage of the other. This, however, can never make much differ- ence if the regimental CO. knows his business, and the enemy will never be able to use it to break through the infantry line. If in the course of the attack one regiment crosses into an adjacent zone, it must, of course, let the artillery commander in this zone know, and use the color of the new zone when it wishes to signal to the artillery. As it will always be doubtful whether the latter will see the signal, there must be special observation balloons, one per division for example, which will pass on the signal to the batteries which are supplying the barrage in the sector in ques- tion. On seeing a flare of their own color, for instance, these batteries would bring back their barrage to their last two hundred-meter line in fifty-meter stages, each lasting five minutes, and then again send it forward automatically if no further flares are sent up. Of course, the time can be fixed otherwise. Everything de- 278 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE pends on the speed with which the attacker thinks his infantry can advance. It is advisable not to ask too much of them in this way. The reasons are obvious, and besides it is as well that a regiment should have working arrange- ments with adjacent regiments. In any case a slow barrage is to be preferred to a fast one. The attacker can be far more certain that his infantry will keep up with it and will not need to make much use of their flares. But it is certain that such an elastic barrage will be possible only if it is quietly and systematically prepared for beforehand. Such preparations can be made only when the army has been brought back before the attack. Generally speaking, under no other circum- stances will the attacker be able to insure that no batteries fire out of their proper color-zone, and that batteries are emplaced in the direct line of fire. It is equally necessary that the commanders of the infantry regiments and those of the artilleiy be perfectly familiar with the zones in question. As a rule all these officers will have an adequate knowledge of the ground only when they have had an oppor- tunity to study it closely and carefully before the retreat. Thus, in general, the elastic barrage can be re- THE BATTLE 279 sorted to only when a retreat has been planned before the attack and when the various color- zones are in a straight line, as otherwise it will be impossible for the infantry-gun batteries to keep one line of fire all the time, though this is absolutely essential, allowing for the slight variations which are inevitable with every bar- rage and particularly the elastic barrage. III. — The Decision in Trench Warfaee The operations which are intended to bring about a decision in trench warfare are to all in- tents and purposes the same as those in which there is no such intention, but in the first ease the attack is mounted quite differently. In the one case the distribution of the troops is practically uniform along the whole line, though the configuration of the ground and the be- havior of the enemy may involve a comparative concentration of troops at one point or another. Such operations will be based on strategic con- siderations only if their purpose is to capture some particular area. It is a totally different matter where the whole mounting of the attack is determined by the intention to secure a decision. In this case the troops will be massed behind tlmt wing on which the decision is sought, and at this point a double objective will 280 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE be assigned to them. The front line will have the duty of thrusting straight forward and throwing back the enemy as far as it can. The task of the second line will be to wheel out- wards and roll up that wing of the enemy with which it comes in contact. The object of these moves will be to effect a real rupture of the enemy's lines at the point of impact, so that there will be a wholesale breach of the hostile system of defenses, and the troops which are rolled up from the flank will be completely separated from those which have been diiven straight back. Of course the enemy will do his best to prevent this. He will bring up reserves from all points in order to hinder a complete rupture and close the breach. That is exactly what must be prevented, and for this purpose the attacker will have reen- forcements ready and will therefore make the troops he has massed behind the wing so strong that if necessary he can hurl a superior force into the gap. As a rule, cavalry will be used for this purpose, as it can get ahead very quick- ly and throw back such of the enemy as it finds in the breach. This cavalry will be given an adequate force of artillery, so that it can deal promptly with the enemy. We can now easily understand how it was that the English THE BATTLE 281 and French assembled their cavalry behind the battle-line in order to complete and exploit the rupture. But they did not use this arm prop- erly, for they always sent out their cavalry at the moment they met too strong a hostile force, and therefore had to attack frontally. Of course that must be avoided. The cavalry must be held back until the area in question is prac- tically free of enemy troops, and must then be distributed in two groups which separate in wholly different directions. One of them makes for that part of the enemy 's line which is to be rolled up, and the other for the sector which can only be thrown back frontally. Both must press forward with the greatest energy in order that between them the ground may be thoroughly cleared and they themselves may have the freedom of movement they require. It will therefore be necessary to concentrate a large mass of troops at this point and press forward as quickly as possible so as to prevent the enemy from bringing up reenforcements in time. We shall therefore intensify the artillery preparation to the highest possible degree, and also keep a strong force of artillery, ready horsed, which we shall be able to employ at once against the portion of the enemy line 282 THE WAR OP THE FUTURE which wo intend to roll up, whilo our main ad- vance proceeds remorselessly. Our road sj^stom must correspond to the groainoss of our (ask, and proper arrangements be made for the su[)ply of amnmnition. For, of course, an enormous amount of ammunition will be required if we are both to make rapid progress in front and also have enough avail- able for our attack on the Hank. Rapid progress at this point is of quite special importance, and it will be facilitated to a very great degree if we succeed in taking the hostile forces here, which must simultaneously be attacked front- ally, under a concentric lire, so that we can soon compel them to give way and ra«pidly ex- tend the breach, into which the cavalry can hurl itself. The latter must go straight on only until it is more or less out of the enemy's range. It must then separate into two bodies, as I have said, and turn against the enemy's communica- tions. The main and field railways in par- ticular must be attacked and destroyed, or, at any rate, those which might sen^c for bring- ing up hostile reenforcements, ammunition and troops. Of course they will not destroy the sectors which the attacker will subsequently THE BATTLE 283 need himself if he is to press his advance at the highest speed. It will thus be seen that the most thorough preparation is required to effect a real breach at any particular point, and that an immense amount of thought is necessary if we are to see clearly on every point. Nothing may be left to chance. Once the breach has been made, .everything turns on the operations on the en- emy's flanks, for it is only at this point that a decisive victory can be secured. Circumstances will decide at what point we shall seek this de- cision, but as a rule the critical thrust will be against that part of the enemy's line which was not originally attacked frontally. The bulk of the attacker's troops will be employed against this sector, because the enemy will be least pre- pared for an attack here. It may also be, of course, that the sector which is originally at- tacked only frontally is intended to be rolled up also, so that the center of gravity of the whole operation is on the enemy's inner wing. In both cases a very large striking force will have to be brought through the gap, once it is made, in order to keep the action going and force a real decision. In the second case there is probably greater danger of failure, for, what- ever the rate of the advance, the enemy will •JSI TllK WAIC OV TllK KUTlHIKi .i»'iM»tM-.Mlly MU'i'cH^l in bringiiii;" np roiMifoiTo- nuMils io llu* froiil wliioh is iiuMi.'H'(>(l by llio fronlMl nUju'U, nnd wi^ shall linvt* (o donl with tll«'S(> .Ml t>lUH\ N\luM» llu> .mKju'Ium' liMs br«>ktM» lln-oui;li, lio must tl(^pU\v on an tniM* t^xltMulini;' froul as lu> ailvauoos, in imior io st'curo l»is own oulor wijiU's aii'aiust iMivoU>pnuMil. ^IMicy imist ho so- oui't^l on ho\\\ siih's, \'ov \\\o iMUMiiy will always try to briuij: up roont'orconuMils from both siiK^s, niul thus I'liiso Iht^ i;af>. 'V\\o main Ihinii' will bo Io thvslroy I ho railways whioh rnn i^aralUM wilh iho I'ronl allaok, anil il will oasily ho niulor- sltu>(l (hal cavalry nvo bosi lilUnl Tor lliis work. Thoy alono aro ablo \o n\o\o wilh Iho spood Ihis work roipiiros. II is t^bvious thai iindor those oironnislanoos tliov must pross t'onvavd \vith- (Mil sto[>piui;" anil livi^ on Iho oonnlry anil Iho onomy snpplios thoy mauaiio to liuil, without Ironblin;;- about thoir own oonnnnnioalions. It will also bo roali/.od how imiiorlanl il is to i^vl our railways up bohind Iho troops whioh havo brokon Ihronnh. and how Ihorouii'hly this "t'ol- low-U[>" uuist bo t>rii'Mui/od it' Iho broak-lhrou^'h is to bo a roal suoooss. II will thus bo roadily approoiatod that an alliMn}^! o( this kind oannol bo t'ro(]nontly ro- nowod, so that wo uuisl havo a two or Ihroo fold TIIK BATTLK 285 Huporiorily b<;foro wo tako up thin iwo-cAi/cj] weapon which often cornpolH tho corjcontraiiori of maHHOK of* Iroofm, and Ihoroforo makoH it fiouhJy difficult to conceal Huch a w>nc(intration from the enemy. ThuH, the rnoHt important preliminary quea- tion of all in the point at which the break- through is to take place, for upon this will de- pend the HUcccHH of the whole operation, apart from the f>urely technical preparations. This bringH uh to the vital quewtion, What iv the de- cisive point? If my reader wishes to look into this question more closely, he will find it in the approf>riate chapter in the Hccond volume of my book, Vom hf'utifjfm Kricjje? I will only say here that, on the one hand, it deyjends on purely tactical considerations, and on the other — as soon as the decision of the whole war in in prosyjcct — on qucHtionn of a geographical and political nature. The decisive point can never be settled by purely theoretical considerations. This matter can be illustrated only by actual examplcH, because circum- stances vary in every individual case. Against Russia the vital direction for a German attack was against Petersburg through the Baltic Provinces, the right flank being adequately pro- >VoI. n, TV, Cliap. V. 286 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE tected. From Austria it was from Galicia, in the general direction of Moscow. In the west, on the other hand, several decisive points must be distinguished, each depending upon the po- litical situation. As long as England was not participating but only threatened us with her intervention, or had merely her weak regular army on French soil, the direction of Calais was undoubtedly decisive, as Count Schlieffen had always insisted. On the other hand, as soon as the English new armies appeared in France the decisive direction was the line which separated the English and French armies. England was undoubtedly the more danger- ous enemy, the adversary whose will was hard- est to break. Thus our best plan was to destroy the English army first, and thus compel Eng- land — ^where the coal shortage could at the same time be made absolutely intolerable, because she had to supply her allies, practically single- handed, with the black diamonds — to make peace. After a successful break-through, we should thus turn against the English army and destroy it, while standing on the defensive against the French for the time being. Of course we might have gone to work the other way: attacked the French army first, while adopting a defensive attitude towards England, THE BATTLE 287 if we regarded France as the more dangerous opponent. When the intervention of the Americans was in sight, everything turned on forcing a decision as soon as possible before the American army could appear on the scene. Whether we were really strong enough to attempt this is an- other matter which I shall not inquire into here. The historical material so far available does not enable us to come to any decision. I shall therefore pass no sort of criticism on our Supreme Command, as their reasons and mo- tives are unknown to us. We are simply dis- cussing purely theoretical considerations. From that point of view the only thing to be said is that a particular direction cannot be re- garded as vital once and for all, and that each case must be decided on its own merits. The tactical side of the question must also be borne in mind. The tactical advantages or disadvan- tages may be so important that they outweigh strategic considerations. It is for the com- mander in chief alone to decide what particular course shall be taken, and his personality will play a very important part in the decision. One man will venture more than another, and thus have greater prospects of success. The decisive direction will thus always be 288 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE fixed bj'^ considerations which can be determined beforehand. The defender, on the other hand, will find it very difficult to ascertain for certain at what point his enemy intends to seek a de- cision. In certain circumstances all he will be able to do is to drag out the war so long that the attacker will finally decide to make peace. In this case there is no decisive point for him except in so far as it is his business to divine the enemy's intentions accurately, and to find out in time at what pomt of the front he is thinking of breaking through. He will then send up all his resei'ves to that point, though it will be important — as it is always important in the case of bringing up reserves — ^not to de- train these troops too near to the fighting line. If that happens they cannot be sent into action systematically, as they will not be concentrated in a large mass, nor will they be in a position to take up a line in which they can offer an effective resistance or themselves pass to the counter-offensive. The defender would run the risk of putting in his reserves by driblets with- out achieving his purpose. The defender must further realize his dan- ger in time, and must be able to decide whether an ordinary or a decisive attack is in progress, and therefore how many men he must bring THE BATTLE 289 up. He must know the direction in which the decisive thrust will be made and he must be able to calculate from a number of thoroughly un- certain factors how near he can bring up his reenforcements by his lateral railways without exposing them prematurely to defeat. H'e is thus swimming in a sea of uncertainties. At the same time we must concede to the de- fender the advantage that all these drawbacks make themselves fully felt only when the at- tacker succeeds in keeping his preparations for attack from his enemy altogether, or at any rate so long that the latter is not in a posi- tion to take effective counter-measures. Of course that is a very difficult task, and doubly difficult where it is a matter of effecting those immense concentrations of troops which are necessary for a break-through and are intended to play a part which is to decide the whole war. Every conceivable precaution must be taken to conceal the intention to attack from the enemy. Such a precaution, and the most important is the combination of the attack with a previous retreat. Thus when we contemplate an offen- sive which is to decide the war (because the general situation imposes such a step upon us), it will be advisable for us to associate it with a retreat. That will make it far easier for us to 290 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE concentrate unobserved the great masses which are required for such an undertaking. IV. — Attack and Defense in Open Wabfake Open warfare is always either the sum and substance of military operations, or else it has a tendency to settle do\vn into trench warfare. That is inevitable. As long as the attacker is pressing forward he is always endeavoring to secure a decision by arms. The defender either accepts battle or evades his fhrust. In the first case, the defender can choose whether to fight for a decision then and there, or to take to trench warfare. He will adopt the second course when the retreat in which he falls back on his reenforcements has brought his forces up to such a level that he thinks he will be able to accept battle. This was the case with the Russians at Borodino. He will take to trench warfare when he has enough time and troops adequately to prepare the position which he proposes to hold. The nature of the ground — whether suitable for defense or not — ^will be one factor. In this case the ordinary laws of trench warfare will apply. If open warfare continues, the commander in chief must bear in mind the laws which hold good for this form of operation, and so the THE BATTLE 291 decision becomes the vital matter. This is what actually happened at the beginning of the war, as well as in the Russian and Rumanian the- aters later on. Where the two sides came in collision and there were no continuous forti- fied lines, so that there was a certain amount of room for maneuver, a decision was always sought and very soon secured. It was thus with the battles in Belgium and France, Hinden- burg's famous campaign in East Prussia, the retreat into Silesia, the invasion of Wallachia, the advance on Brest-Litovsk, and the campaign which ended with the capture of Riga and the invasion of the Russian Baltic Provinces. These are the operations which alone we are considering. In them envelopment recovers all its old rights. The greater the range of weapons and the fewer the fortifications and other tech- nical devices of trench warfare which are en- countered, the greater will be the part envel- opment will play. As regards the strategic aspect of these oper- ations, we may certainly stand by what I said in my book, Vom heiitigen Kriege, which ap- peared shortly before the war, but we must pay special attention to the tactical changes which characterize this war and distinguish it from all previous wars. 292 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE The following points deserve special notice: (1) tlie iniprovonient and increase of the ar- tillery; (2) the far-reaching changes in infan- try and cavalry methods; (3) aircraft; and (4) supply; which has become much more formid- able owing to the masses employed. Other ele- ments do not apply so much to open warfare, as they are not likely to be present as a rule, owing to the short time available. The tanks alone require a special mention. No experiences of their employment in open warfare are available, but there is no funda- mental reason why they cannot be incorporated in the march-columns like other troops, and subsequently employed in battle for their spe- cial functions. We may expect to find tanks in open warfare in the future, and particularly where the road system is such as to permit un- interrupted use being made of them. We must be familiar with the methods of operation which are uecessarj' in dealing with tanks, and in some circumstances we shall use them our- selves. How far their employment will extend cannot be foreseen at the moment. For that reason we must have a very clear idea of the future factors which are bound to influence any future war. In the first place we must concentrate at the THE BATTLE 293 deciHive point a very much larger force of ar- tillery than in the past and it must include heavy guns, for the attacker will not merely have to shake the nerve of the hostile infantry, as in the old days, but to silence the defender's artillery and render his infantry utterly help- less in order to x^ermit the approach of the at- tacking infantry to the enemy's lines. Thus speed is everything if the enemy is to be pre- vented from bringing up reenforcements in time. This was equally true of the wars of the past, but we must not forget that the enemy also will have a very much larger force of artillery, so that it will not be as easy to silence it as it used to be. The result is that we must appear at the decisive point with a relatively far greater superiority than hitherto. Yet the fact that so much greater a mass of artillery is re- quired complicates and retards all movements, so that it is necessary to have a road system such as was never seen in past wars. Where such a system does not exist the preparations for the attack will take much longer than hith- erto because the roads required will have to be made first. It will be essential to keep this period as short as possible. The second point which we must discuss con- cerns the new methods of infantry and cavalry 294 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE fighting. The methods of both these arms in- volve the use of machine-guns and hand gre- nades on a much larger scale than hitherto, and for that reason the attacking infantry- must be able to get close to the enemy. Hence the in- crease of the artillery. As the cavalry will seldom have a chance of fighting mounted, but will usually take part in action on foot, the decision cannot be secured so soon as in the past. After the action, on the other hand, this arm will have to make an even greater use of its speed in maneuver if it is to perform its special functions. It will certainly preserve its functions of reconnoitering and operating against the enemy's communications, with the sole difference that it will make greater use of firearms, and therefore the actions will not be over so quickly as in former times. We shall thus realize how important these reconnoitering elements are. During the World War we were, of course, practically forced to do away with our cavalry, but this was due only to bitter necessity because the infantry and even the supply and transport personnel are more important than the cavalry, and it is im- possible to conduct military operations with- out them. All the same, cavalry are quite in- dispensable if we want to make war with any THE BATTLE 295 prospect of success. I attach special impor- tance to this point because I can see that it is on this very arm that our modern national bene- factors — who know nothing whatever about the realities of war — have fixed their eye, and in- tend to procure the complete abolition, or, at any rate, wholesale reduction, of the cavalry at any price. It must not be. It is the cavalry which must be active in front and on the wings of the ar- mies, so as to prevent the enemy from finding out what is going on on our side of the line. In doing so it must act offensively by preference for, from the tactical point of view, it is only by the offensive that it can score successes. It will fight mounted, if at all possible, for otherwise it will not win that speedy victory which is strategically necessary. Of course all this de- pends to a certain degree upon the action of the enemy's cavalry, which will use its firearms also, and thus attempt to force an action. In such a case it will be essential to try to prevent the attack from being frontal and to avoid a dis- mounted action by executing a flanking move- ment, thus enabling us to continue our recon- naissance. We shall have to be very careful that in so doing we do not imperil our own re- tirement, or allow our screening work to be in- 296 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE terrupted, for as a rule these are the vital ele- ments in strategic maneuvers. This double object can best be secured by a skillful dis- tribution of the troops and by patrols. It is safe to bet a hundred to one that the enemy will retire when he finds himself outflanked, and it is very doubtful whether he will be in a position to send out enough patrols to continue his own reconnaissance. Boldness is doubly necessary for the cavalry. The third point which requires consideration is the improvement and increase of aircraft and particularly its effects on military operations. Its existence has put the art of war on quite a new footing. Marching in former times was ordinarily regarded as a daytime operation. Night-marching has now become an essential factor in military activity. Of course there was plenty of night-marching in the old days. Fred- erick the Great, for example, ventured on a night-march before the Battle of Hohenfried- berg. But this was none the less exceptional, whereas to-day night-marching has become an ordinary feature of troop movements. Every- thing which it is desired to keep from the enemy must be carried out at night. It frequently happens that one part of our troops — as many as the enemy can be allowed to see, if it cannot THE BATTLE 297 be helped — is moved by day, while the rest are moved by night. In this way we shall make the greatest effort to conceal from the enemy the concentration of our forces at what we consider the vital point. It is easy to imagine the im- mense influence which such methods must have on the whole art of war. Even more important, perhaps, is our own .reconnaissance work and the effort to obstruct that of the enemy, particularly in open w^ar- fare, where one side or the other will always be on the offensive. Everything must be done to find out how the enemy's armies are dis- tributing while hindering his reconnaissance activities. Aircraft can work only by day and in a good light. It is almost impossible to ob- tain suflBcient knowledge of the enemy's move- ments by the use of cavalry under modem con- ditions, as in present-day warfare such long fronts must be anticipated that the cavalry could not reach any point from which the whole of the enemy's movements could be seen and prompt information brought back. Reconnais- sance from the air is, therefore, a necessity, and should be combined with cavalry reconnais- sance. The reports thus received will give the best picture of the development of events which is possible under the circumstances. We shall 298 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE send out our aircraft as far as possible over the hostile lines so that they can find out, if allowed to, what is going- on behind the enemy's front. At the same time we shall do everything in our power to conceal our own anny and its move- ments. Even that will be impossible with cav- alry alone, and in any case very difficult if the cavalry force is not strong enough. Thus we shall not be able to carry out these operations — reconnoitering for ourselves and preventing the enemy from doing the same — unless we obtain such a domination over the hostile aircraft that they are unable to per- form their functions. The attacker must, there- fore, try to obtain the mastery of the air just as he must reduce the enemy's cavalry to pow- erlessness, and for this reason it will probably be advisable in open warfare to attach pursuit flights to all the columns. These pursuit flights ^^dll have the special task of attacking hostile aircraft and rendering them innocuous. They will have plenty of work. It will be only later — when open warfare has come to an end, either because a decision has been secured or because the transfonnation to trench warfare is com- plete — that other types of aircraft, with quite different functions, will be required once more. In any case, enemy aircraft may cross our THE BATTLE 299 lines even at night. Bombing squadrons have done so frequently. But if they do so their reconnaissance work will not do us much harm because their range of vision will be small. It will always be advisable to show no lights at night, so that the enemy cannot draw any in- ference from their presence. We must also pro- tect roads with a certain aircraft screen, for even though any particular area cannot be lit up 'except from a very short distance and when flying very low, it is possible to illuminate sec- tions of road, and the enemy can thus find out whether there is any traffic or not. We must also consider the question of sup- ply, which bristles with difficulties for the at- tacker. Generally speaking, it will be impos- sible to live on the land, as no theater of war will have sufficient supplies to stand the passage of a modern army more than once. All the ammunition and food required must, therefore, be taken with the troops. My book, Vom heuti- gen Kriege, shows how difficult that is. It will certainly be necessary to help ourselves out at times by making greater use of our iron ration. Our columns will always have to do a good deal of marching by night, and to a certain extent we shall have to make new roads and railways to effect the necessary movements. Indeed, 300 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE where the conditions of the battle area require, we shall have to take mobile railways with us so that we can lay down lines quickly in an emer- gency. I discussed this operation earlier on. The laying of such lines is undoubtedly an ex- cellent method of deceiving the enemy. If we establish railway arteries behind the whole line of our advance, the enemy can never ■ tell which of them are serving the main attack, especially if the attacker succeeds in screening the movements on these lines. It is only when the defender realizes where the main blow is coming that he can take useful counter-meas- ures and develop his own railway system ac- cordingly. Even then he will be compelled to construct his new lines more or less parallel to his front. If he has to retreat he will perhaps abandon them to the enemy, while the advance of the attacker is favored by the fact that from the outset his railway communications lead straight and iminterruptedly to the front. Turning to the case of the defender, much that has been said about the attack will apply to him also. In infantry and cavalry opera- tions he has the same prospects of success as the attacker. This is equally true as regards aircraft and artillery. His greatest disadvan- tage is the fact that he can effect a concentra- THE BATTLE 301 tion of these arms only in reply to some move- ment on the part of the enemy. Thus it is ab- solutely vital for him to find out the enemy's intentions in time. If he does not do so he can- not take effective counter-measures, as I have said. He will thus concentrate the infantry and artillery required for the defense on the decisive wing — distributed in echelon behind the threat- ened point — and the bulk of the cavalry will likewise be posted there. The disposition to be preferred is the concentration on the flank and somewhat in rear of the wing, both because this gives longer time for the concentration than a simple extension of the front and also because it enables the defense to be conducted offensively after the enemy has begun to at- tempt the envelopment of the front with which he has established touch. Yet the latter opera- tion must always be the attacker's goal, as it offers by far the greatest prospect of victory. If we succeed in finding out the distribution of the enemy's forces in good time, it will be advisable to give or accept battle — the battle for a decision — somewhat farther back, as the de- cision can be secured only by a general reserve held ready in the rear. This applies to a mod- em campaign even more than to earlier times. With regard to aircraft, the chances of con- 302 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE centration and success are fairly equal on both sides. On the other hand, the defender would appear to have the advantage at first in the matter of supply. He is falling back on Eis supplies, and need not bring them up, as they can be distributed as the retiring movements require. This sit- uation changes, however, as soon as troops have to be transferred unexpectedly to one flank or the other. The movement has not been antici- pated, and thus no preparations have been made. In this case the operation bristles with difficulties, particularly when we remember the huge masses employed in modern major opera- tions. In these circumstances the advantage may become an additional disadvantage. When we sum up finally the prospects of suc- cess for both the attacker and the defender we are forced to the conclusion that there can be no doubt about the advantages enjoyed by the former, in as much as the defender must keep his reserves spread over his whole front until he knows how his opponent's forces are distrib- uted, while the attacker is able to work on a definite plan from the stari;. The upshot is that we must always take the offensive unless it is absolutely impossible. It is obvious that the character of the coun- THE BATTLE 303 try will have a great influence on our decision. In many cases the determining factor will be the roads, in others the stocks of cattle and food available. For instance, operations in France will take a very different form from those in Russia because there is a great differ- ence between these two theaters in these re- spects. It will also be admitted that operations in Russia throw a greater burden on the Gen- eral Staff, and make troop movements exceed- ingly difficult. Yet the army on the offensive has the advantage from all these points of view. The only advantage enjoyed by the defender is that he usually has more time and greater op- portunities to adapt the country to his require- ments. "We realized that often enough in Rus- sia, where the enemy always succeeded in evading our attack or awaiting it in prepared positions. As a rule these could not be stormed out of hand, and gave the enemy a few days' respite in which to make preparations for the next stage of his retreat. All this brought it home to us forcibly that in the offensive speed and surprise are everything. The attacker must, therefore, stop at nothing to get forward at top speed, and press through every intended at- tack without a moment's delay. The factor of surprise must be exploited to the full, and thus 304 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE an uninterrupted advance is an absolute necessity. The aircraft must attack first, last and all the time. The army cavalry must develop the high- est possible standard of operative nimbleness in working roimd the flanks and rear of the enemy. It must not hesitate, though it nuist al- ways be well informed. The fullest possible use must bo made of the railways, both the old and the new. But the vittd requirement is that the commander in chief be equal to the situation. He must know exactly what he intends to do. He must have the courage, if circumstances re- quire, to denude his front and concentrate the bulk of his force against one of the hostile wings. In other words, he must seek a decision w^herever a decision is to be found. CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION I HAVE come to the end. I have described war as it really is, and I think I have dealt with everything required at the present day for a great struggle between nations. I have shown that we cannot make war in the same way as boys {)lay at soldiers or pirates, but that years of ceaseless effort on the part of the whole na- tion are necessary to wage it to a victorious conclusion. Masses of men must be called upon, masses such as have never been seen before. What are Napoleon's armies or those of the great national coalition against France com- pared with this? To-day whole nations are called to arms, superficially for the purpose of satisfying national and economic ambitions, but in reality to struggle for the; highest interests of mankind. An artillery will be set in motion the like of which the world has never seen ! Modern guns have a range of more than one hundred kilometers, and can simultaneously sweep any selected area in such a way that no 305 306 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE human being can exist there and make use of any weapon ! No region is so fertile or well supplied that it can support such masses for any length of time. None has an adequate railway and road system. In addition, everything the armies re- quire — enormous masses of ammunition and food — has to be sent out to them from home. For that purpose railways and roads are es- sential, and if necessaiy they must be con- structed. Mobile railway material must be taken with the troops in order to facilitate a rapid transformation to trench warfare where cir- cumstances require, or convey the masses to the decisive point. The technical resources of war have more than doubled. We fight in the air and under the ground to-day. In the one case we try to blow our adversary up sky-high, and in the other hurl him to earth to meet death and de- struction. We dig deep graves in order to find cover against the enemy's fire, and yet get to close quarters with him with the hand grenade and bayonet in order to overcome him in a sheer melee. Never have the sacrifices which our nation was compelled to make been so great as in the recent war; never has so much blood flowed. CONCLUSION 307 The conductivity of the earth has been used to discover the enemy's intentions, and we have communicated our thoughts over thousands of kilometers to the states associated with us. War can be waged only offensively if it is to have any prospects of success. A pure defen- sive leads inevitably to defeat. It is perfectly clear that such operations can be directed and carried out by experts only, and that years of study are required to master the whole range of knowledge which is needed to conduct a modem campaign. Indeed, the en- tire span of a man's life will be required to cover all the ground. A man who stages such a war in the manner of the dilettante will find that it is lost before it has even been begun. The course of policy which leads up to such a war because it cannot avert it must be in the hands of men who know the ambitions of the states of Europe, and therefore realize against what forces they may have to fight and what resources are at their own disposal. They must be men who understand how to make war at the right moment, and have the courage to see things as they are and not merely as they would like them to be; men who have sufficient mili- tary instinct to know what they are doing when they appeal to the decision of arms and appre- 308 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE ciate that they must intelligently follow the clircctions of the Chief of the General Staff, who will be a permanent adviser. Without courage and resolution no one can either direct an army or lead a state to its goal in the Euro- pean political game. May the men who now direct the destinies of Germany ask themselves frankly what is re- quired for war, and whether their "Five-Mark Volunteers," who are possibly serving for the pay and that alone, fight as well as old troops. Are men who obey only when they want to and otherwise do exactly what they like in a posi- tion to form an army such as modem conditions require, an army such as our enemies will un- doubtedly possess? Let them answer the ques- tion whether a Soldiers' Council, which does not even know what it wants and consists of men who have no idea of real war, is better quali- fied to conduct a campaign than a Chief of the General Staff who has spent his whole life studying the question and is advised by the most expert helpers. Of course I know that for the moment we are utterly at the mercy of our enemies, and that we are absolutely unable to create a real army after our present government has handed us CONCLUSION 309 over, tied and hound, to the power of our en- emies. I also appreciate that the present inter- ests of our enemies require that we should be helpless for as long as possible. But I know also that a nation of seventy mil- lions, a number which can be appreciably in- creased when German Austria joins us, cannot be oppressed forever or reduced to the status of a race of slaves. I know that there will be changes in the political sphere also, that there will come a moment — and that soon — when wo shall be needed on one side or the other, and that this moment will be favorable for our res- urrection. I cherish an unshakable confidence that our nation, which at the moment seems to be sunk in self-seeking, will return to its man- hood, and a chastened and ennobled peofjle will arise, who can prove themselves worthy of their great ancestors and even look on war as it really is. It is most unlikely that I myself shall ever live to see that great day. My life has been spent in helping to build up that state which is a ruin to-day. Yet I write comforting words for the future. What I have written will be appre- ciated in the days to come, and my words, which hitherto have resounded into the void, will turn 310 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE out to be seeds which have not fallen among thorns. In that confidence I lay down my pen for the moment. Germany will rise again. She has a great future before her! (1) THE END % LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Illlllll'lll'lllill 01 1 395 099 7