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 PRESENTED BY 
 
A DEFENCE OF 
 FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH. 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF MR. J. S. MILL'S 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
 A DEFENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH. 
 
 BY 
 
 JAMES M'COSH, LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS, QUEEN'S COLLEGE, BELFAST ; AUTHOR OF ' THE 
 METHOD OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT,' ' INTUITIONS OF THE MIND,' ETC. 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 186 6. 
 
 [The right of Translation is reserved.] 
 

 ?>v 
 
 Gift 
 MR, HUTCHFSON, 
 10 0*00 
 
 EDINBURGH I T. CONSTABLE. 
 PRINTER TO THE QUEEN. AND TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction— Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mill, . . 1 
 
 CHAPTER H. 
 The Method of Investigation, 24 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Mr. Mill's Admissions, 50 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Sensations, 70 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Mind, Personality, Personal Identity, Substance, . . 79 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Body, .101 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 The Physiology of the Senses, 146 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PAGS 
 
 Memory, Association of Ideas, Belief, and Unconscious 
 
 Mental Operations, . . 173 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Judgment or Comparison, 200 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Relativity of Knowledge, 216 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Man's Power of Conception as a Test of Truth, . . . 235 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Self-Evidence and Necessity the Tests of Intuition, . . 242 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Causation, 256 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 The Logical Notion, 267 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 Logical Judgment, 285 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 Reasoning, 298 
 
CONTENTS. Vll 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Secondary Logic ; or Thought as Directed to Particular 
 
 Classes op Objects, 317 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 Logical Discussions : The Province of Logic, .... 327 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 What is Truth ? Criteria of Truth, 348 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 Utilitarianism, 358 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 Natural Theology, 388 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 405 
 
CHAPTEE I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION — SIR W. HAMILTON AND MR. MILL. 
 
 If any one competent to offer an opinion on such a 
 subject were asked, \Vho are the most influential philo- 
 sophic thinkers of Britain, in this the third quarter of 
 the nineteenth century ? he would at once and unhesi- 
 tatingly name Sir William Hamilton and Mr. John 
 Stuart Mill. For the last twenty or thirty years the 
 former has had great authority in Scotland, and con- 
 siderable power in Oxford and among the Dissenting 
 colleges of England ; has been much admired in the 
 United States of America ; has been favourably known 
 in France, and heard of even in Germany, where few 
 British metaphysicians attain a name. Mr. Mill has 
 qualities which specially recommend him to the English 
 mind, and of late years he has got a firm hold of the 
 rising thought of Oxford and Cambridge, where young 
 minds, in the recoil from the attempt to impose the 
 mediaeval forms upon them, have taken refuge in the 
 Empiricism and Utilitarianism so lucidly expounded by 
 him ; while writers bred at the great English Univer- 
 
 A 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 siti.es have, in certain portions of the London press, 
 been constantly and apparently systematically quoting 
 him, or referring to him, as possibly the only philo- 
 sopher known to them, or at least appreciated by them. 
 It should be added that he is known in France as the 
 English representative of their own Positive School ; 
 and his clear logical expositions have been esteemed 
 by not a few in Germany, anxious to escape from the 
 inextricable toils of Kant and Eichte, Schellino- and 
 Hegel. 
 
 These two men are alike in the greatness of their 
 intellectual power, and in the range of their attain- 
 ments. But they differ widely in their peculiar mental 
 endowments and predilections, in the manner in which 
 they have been trained, and the influences under which 
 their opinions have been formed. Hamilton is known 
 to have received a thoroughly complete collegiate edu- 
 cation in classics and philosophy ; to have afterwards 
 had his logical powers sharpened by the study of law, 
 and his extensive information widened by his researches 
 when Professor of History ; while his pursuits were 
 made finally to centre in mental science by his ap- 
 pointment as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in 
 the University of Edinburgh. Eeceiving his early col- 
 lege training in Glasgow, where the influence of Eeid 
 was predominant, he retained through life a profound 
 reverence for the common sense philosopher. Com- 
 pleting his academic education at Oxford, he fell under 
 the sway of Aristotle, and found in him much that was 
 congenial to his own intellectual nature, and was led to 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 3 
 
 study his philosophy not only in his own writings, but 
 in the pages of his commentators, and in the modifica- 
 tion of his logic constructed by the schoolmen. In the 
 course of his multifarious reading he could not but fall 
 in with constant references to Emmanuel Kant as a pro- 
 found thinker, and, as he entered upon the study of his 
 works, could not but be impressed with the vast logical 
 power of the German metaphysician. These three, 
 Eeid, Aristotle, and Kant, are the men who have 
 exercised the greatest influence on the studies and the 
 thoughts of the Scottish philosopher. But in his vast 
 and rare reading he delighted to find truth scattered 
 like gold dust in the pages of forgotten writers of all 
 ages and countries, and, rejoicing in the discovery, he 
 often magnified its value as he hastened to bring it 
 forth to the public view in an age and country which 
 seemed to him greatly deficient in scholarship. 
 
 His intellectual features stand out very prominently. 
 A discerning eye might have seen from the beginning 
 that his independent and impetuous mind would impel 
 him to follow a course of his own ; and that, while pro- 
 bably destined to lead, he would not be led— certainly 
 would not be driven by others. He is evidently moved 
 by a strong internal appetency to master all learning, 
 and he spent his life in accumulating stores which, after 
 all, fell immeasurably beneath his high ambition. Along 
 with this he has a masterly capacity of retention and 
 power of arrangement. His skill in seizing the opinions 
 of the men of all ages and countries : the ancient Greeks, 
 the philosophic fathers of the Church, the schoolmen, 
 
4 IFTROLUGTIOX. 
 
 the thinkers of the age of the Eevival of Letters, — such 
 as Scaliger, and of the continental metaphysicians from 
 the days of Descartes to about the year 1830, has never 
 been equalled by any British philosopher. His powers 
 of logical analysis, generalization, and distribution are 
 scarcely surpassed by those of Aristotle or Thomas 
 Aquinas or Kant. I have to add, that while he has 
 also superior powers of observation, he has, like most 
 metaphysicians, often overridden and overwhelmed 
 them by logical processes, and hastened by dissection, 
 division, and criticism to construct prematurely a com- 
 pleted system of philosophy — such as is to be built 
 up, only as systems of physical science are formed, by 
 the careful inductions of successive inquirers conducting 
 their work through successive ages. In this respect he 
 has imbibed the spirit of Kant, and has not followed 
 the examples set by the more cautious school of Reid 
 and Stewart. 
 
 His manner and style are very decided and very 
 marked. Any man of sharp discernment could easily 
 recognise him at a great distance, and detect him under 
 the most rigid incognito. To some ears his nomencla- 
 ture may sound uncouth and crabbed, being coined out 
 of the Greek or borrowed from the Germans ; but these 
 persons forget that chemistry and geology and anatomy 
 have all been obliged to create a new terminology, in 
 order to embody the distinctions which they have 
 established. Hamilton is certainly without the power 
 of poetical or oratorical amplification for which Brown 
 and Chalmers of the same University were distinguished; 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 5 
 
 and he is deficient in the aptness of illustration in which 
 such writers as Paley and Whately excel ; still his 
 manner of writing has attractions of its own. His 
 phraseology, if at times it sounds technical or pedantic, 
 is always carefully explained and defined, and is ever 
 scholarlike in its derivation and articulate in its mean- 
 ing. His style is never loose, never tedious, never dull : 
 it is always clear, always terse, always masculine, and 
 at times it is sententious, clinching, and apothegmatic. 
 In reading his works the reader need entertain no fear 
 of being led into a Scotch mist, or being met by a fog 
 from the German Ocean. Not unfrequently dogmatic, 
 at times oracular, resolute in holding by his opinions 
 when attacked, and on certain occasions, as in his 
 assaults on Luther, Brown, Whately, and De Morgan, 
 giving way to undue severity and passion, he is ever 
 open, manly, and sincere. He uses a sharp chisel and 
 strikes his hammer with a decided blow, and his ideas 
 commonly stand out before us like a clean cut statue 
 standing firmly on its pedestal between us and a clear 
 sky. Indeed we might with justice describe his style 
 as not only accurate, but even beautiful in a sense, from 
 its compression, its compactness, its vigour, and its point. 
 His thoughts, weighty and solid as metal, are ever made 
 to shine with a metallic lustre. At the places at which 
 his speculations are the most abstract and his words 
 the baldest, he often surprises us by an apt quotation 
 from an old and forgotten author ; or a sudden light is 
 thrown upon the present topic by rays coming from a 
 hundred points. If we have not the flowers or the riches, 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 we are at the same time without the sultriness of a 
 tropical climate ; and in the arctic region to which he 
 carries us, if the atmosphere feels cold at times, it is 
 always healthy and bracing, and the lights in the sky 
 have a bright and scintillating lustre. 
 
 Mr. Mill's characteristics are of a different kind. It 
 is understood that he received no collegiate education ; 
 but it is clear that he has been instructed with care, and 
 I should suppose upon a system, in the various branches 
 even of academic learning. If not so technically erudite 
 as Hamilton, it is evident that he is well acquainted 
 with the various departments of physical science ; that 
 he is extensively read in all historical and social 
 questions ; and that he is competently conversant with 
 the opinions of philosophers and logicians in different 
 ages. His thinking has many of the qualities of a self- 
 educated man : that is, it is fresh and independent, but, 
 at the same time, it is often exclusive and angular, in 
 consequence of its not being rubbed and polished and 
 adjusted by being placed alongside of the philosophic 
 and religious wisdom of the great and good men of the 
 past. Taught to think for himself from his boyhood, 
 he has prepared opinions on all subjects ; he has pub- 
 lished many of these in his writings, and has evidently 
 many more to advance in due time, as circumstances 
 may seem to require, and the world is able to bear 
 them. He received, I rather think, his first intellec- 
 tual impulse from his own father, of whom lie always 
 speaks with profound reverence — a circumstance credit- 
 able alike to the father and the son. But Mr. James 
 
HAMILTON AXD MILL. 7 
 
 Mill, though a clear and independent, was by no means 
 (so I think) a comprehensive or profound thinker. The 
 title of his philosophical work, Analysis of the Pheno- 
 mena of the Human M hid, indicates its character and 
 its contents ; it is an analysis of the operations of the 
 mind into as few elements as possible, and preceded by 
 no careful observation of the nature and peculiarities of 
 the mental phenomena which he seeks to decompose. 
 One so trained could not but have his attention drawn 
 to the speculations of Dr. Thomas Brown, who, largely 
 following the Sensational School of France, had shown 
 his ingenuity in deriving the complex phenomena of the 
 mind from a few ultimate laws. Like the older Mr. 
 Mill (in this respect unlike Dr. Brown), the younger 
 Mr, Mill delights to trace ideas to sensations ; like 
 Brown and James Mill, he represents all our mental 
 states as "feelings," and like them he generates our 
 ideas by means of suggestion or association. 
 
 These are evidently Mr. Mill's immediate predecessors 
 in psychology. In historical speculation he was early 
 seized with an admiration of the general principles of 
 the philosophy of M. Auguste Comte, who was becoming 
 known to a select few at the time when the character 
 of the young Englishman was being formed ; and M. 
 Littre claims Mr. John Mill as the first who gave " a 
 public adhesion to the method of the positive phi- 
 losophy." Xot that he has followed the founder of the 
 Positive School in every respect ; in particular, he has 
 been prevented by his adherence to his father's meta- 
 physics from following M. Comte in his denunciations 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of all attempts to study the human mind by conscious- 
 ness. But he was' led by the influence of this teacher 
 to regard it as impossible for the mind to rise to first or 
 final causes, or to know the nature of things ; and to 
 adopt his favourite method of procedure, which is by 
 deduction from an hypothesis, which he endeavours to 
 show explains all the phenomena. Though a fairly 
 informed man in the history of philosophy, he has 
 attached himself to a school which thinks it has entirely 
 outstripped the past ; and so he has no' sympathy with, 
 and no appreciation of, the profound thoughts of the 
 men of former times : these are supposed to belong to 
 the theological or metaphysical ages, which have for 
 ever passed away in favour of the positive era which 
 has now dawned upon our world. Bred thus in a 
 revolutionary school of opinion, his predilections are in 
 all things in favour of those who are given to change, 
 and against those who think that there is immutable 
 truth, or who imagine that they have discovered it. 
 His expressed admiration of Coleridge may seem to 
 contradict this statement, but it does so only in appear- 
 ance, for he has no partiality for any of the favourite 
 principles of that defender of transcendental reason ; it is 
 clear that he delights in him chiefly because his specu- 
 lations have been acting as a solvent to melt down the 
 crystallized philosophical and theological opinions of 
 England. The school of Comte has hitherto had no 
 analyst of the mind (the founder of it was a phrenolo- 
 gist, and studied the mind through the brain) ; and Mr. 
 Mill may be regarded as, for the present, the recognised 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 9 
 
 metaphysician of the school, and will hold this place 
 till he is superseded by the more comprehensive system, 
 and the bolder speculative grasp of Mr. Herbert Spencer. 
 
 With an original clearness of intellectual apprehen- 
 sion, his whole training has disposed him towards dis - 
 tinct enunciations and practical results. Engaged for 
 many years in a public office, he has acquired habits 
 which enable him to understand the business of life 
 and the condition of society. He is particularly fitted 
 to excel in the exposition of those media axiomata upon 
 which, according to Bacon, " depend the business and 
 fortune of mankind." With an English love of the 
 concrete, he has a French skill in reducing a complex 
 subject into simple elements, and a French clearness of 
 expression. He is ever able to bring out his views in 
 admirable order, and his thoughts lie in his style like 
 pebbles at the bottom of a transparent stream, so that 
 we see their shape and colour without noticing the 
 medium through which we view them. I have to add, 
 that in his love of the clear, and his desire to translate 
 the abstract into the concrete, he often misses the deep- 
 est properties of the objects examined by him ; and he 
 seems to me far better fitted to co-ordinate the facts of 
 social science than to deal with the first principles of 
 fundamental philosophy. As to his spirit, there are 
 evidences of a keen fire, of enthusiasm, perhaps of 
 passion, burning within, but the surface is ever still 
 and ever green. 
 
 These two eminent men, whose systems evidently 
 stood all along so widely apart from each other, have 
 
10 IXTRODUCTIOX. 
 
 now been brought into violent collision by the publica- 
 tion of Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton? s 
 Philosophy. Such a collision was inevitable. Hamilton 
 was the ablest and most learned, I do not think the 
 wisest or most consistent, defender of intuitive or a 
 priori truth in our country in the past age. It was 
 felt to be absolutely necessary, in these circumstances, 
 by the British section of the school of M. Comte, that 
 the fundamental positions of Hamilton should be re- 
 moved out of the way of the advancing deductive 
 empiricism. I rejoice that the attack has been made 
 by Mr. Mill himself, so that we see all that can be ad- 
 vanced by the acutest representative of the experiential 
 or sensational philosophy in our age and country. It 
 is to be hoped that the formidable assault will be met 
 by some disciple of Hamilton who has caught the spirit 
 and who understands the system of his master. As the 
 result, the student of philosophy will be in circumstances 
 to decide what he should receive with gratitude, and 
 what he should refuse or reject with regret, in the philo- 
 sophy of the last of the great Scottish metaphysicians. 
 
 In the title of his work, Mr. Mill announces it as an 
 examination of " the principal philosophical questions 
 discussed in his writings ;" and in his introductory re- 
 marks he declares, " My subject, therefore, is not Sir 
 W. Hamilton, but the questions which Sir W. Hamilton 
 discussed." It is this circumstance which makes the 
 work so important in the view of the students of mental 
 science generally, and which has induced me to review 
 it. In examining his opponent, Mr. Mill has taken the 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 11 
 
 opportunity of developing his own philosophic system, 
 and has put us in a position to judge of its principles 
 and results. It is true that we had the germs of that 
 system embedded in his treatise on Logic, and ger- 
 minating there. No doubt he is continually telling us 
 in that work that he avoids metaphysics, but there is a 
 metaphysical system underlying and running through- 
 out all the deeper discussions. He refers, and evidently 
 adheres to a large extent, to a sensational theory of the 
 origin of our ideas in his chapter, " Of the Things de- 
 noted by Names ;" he seeks to undermine all intuitive 
 truth in his chapters on " Demonstration" and " Causa- 
 tion ;" and he has exposed with a special zest the errors 
 of the a priori school in his book on " Fallacies." He 
 has thus been preparing those who have studied his logic 
 for accepting his metaphysics. In these circumstances 
 I rejoice that in his recent work he has furnished us 
 with the means of thoroughly estimating his theory of 
 the mind, of which we had only hints and glimpses in 
 his logical treatise. It is this theory which I profess 
 to examine in this volume. 
 
 In performing this special task it is not necessary to 
 enter into the controversy between Mill and Hamilton. 
 Far more important questions than the merits of the 
 individuals have been started. I certainly do not feel 
 that it is a duty devolving on me to offer a defence of 
 the philosophy of Hamilton. Since the year 1854, 
 when I reviewed his doctrines of the " Eelativity of 
 Knowledge " and of " Causation," in an appendix to 
 the fourth edition of my work on the Method of the 
 
12 IXTRODUCTIOX. 
 
 Divine Government, I have been opposing certain of 
 his favourite principles. I offered my strictures with 
 excessive reluctance, as feeling a profound reverence for 
 the vast erudition and logical power of the Edinburgh 
 professor, and cherishing a lively gratitude for the 
 services he had rendered to philosophy in refuting old 
 and widely-received errors and establishing important 
 truth. I advanced my criticisms wdiile he was yet 
 alive, and I have continued them in articles in reviews, 
 and in my work on The Intuitions of the Mind, while 
 his reputation was at its greatest height, and his dis- 
 ciples were indignant at any attempt to dispute the 
 infallibility of their master. 
 
 Hamilton, as it appears to me, was never able to 
 weld into a consistent whole the realistic matter he got 
 from Eeid with the subjective forms he took from Kant. 
 In his review of M. Cousin, he took up a negative posi- 
 tion, which did not leave him free to follow thoroug^hlv 
 the positive revelations of consciousness. In his Dis- 
 cussions he developed a theory of causation which pre- 
 vented him from rising from the phenomena of the 
 world to a belief in the existence of Deity; and he ex- 
 pounded a doctrine as to the relativity of knowledge 
 which makes us perceive objects under forms, and with 
 additions imposed by the perceiving mind, which landed 
 him avowedly in a system of nescience. Kant is claimed, 
 with some truth, by M. Littre as in fact a precursor of 
 the school of Comte. I have felt all along that Hamilton 
 adopted principles from the Critical Philosophy, which 
 made it impossible for him to stand up for the trust- 
 
HAM IL TUX AND MILL. 13 
 
 worthiness of our faculties and the reality of things, 
 which yet as a follower of Eeid he seemed to be esta- 
 blishing. I declared openly and repeatedly, and in a 
 number of places, that the admissions he made would 
 sooner or later be followed to their logical eonsequen ses ; 
 that without meaning it, he was preparing the way for 
 a nihilist philosophy ; and that it would be seen that 
 he had not left himself ground from which successfully 
 to repel the attacks of scepticism. ^Yhen Dr. Mansel 
 published his famous Bampton Lectures, On the Limits 
 of E Thought, notwithstanding my great rever- 
 
 ence for his erudition, his acuteness, and his high 
 character, I immediately opposed his application of 
 Hamilton's doctrine of the unconditioned to our know- 
 ledge of God and of good and evil, which I represented 
 as being fraught with disastrous logical consequences. 
 As having anticipate'! Mr. Mill in many of his objec 
 tions to Hamilton's philosophy, and having advanced 
 others against doctrines which Mr. Mill applauds and 
 turns to his own uses, and believing it to be impossible 
 to defend fundamental truth from the positions assumed 
 by Hamilton, I feel that it is not for me to propose to 
 defend the philosophy of the Scottish metaphysician 
 front the assaults of Mr. Mill. 1 
 
 At the same time, I cannot give my adherence : 
 many of the objections which have been taken by 
 his new opponent. Notwithstanding incongruities in 
 some parts of his system, he has furnished more valu- 
 
 1 I have placed in an Appendix to this volame a summary of the objec- 
 tions I have taken to Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 able contributions to speculative philosophy than any 
 other British writer in this century. ISTo man has ever 
 done more in clearing the literature of philosophy of 
 commonplace mistakes, of thefts and impostures. He 
 has shown that it is dangerous to quote without con- 
 sulting the original, or to adopt without examination 
 the common traditions in philosophy ; that those who 
 borrow at second-hand will be detected, and that those 
 who steal without acknowledgment will sooner or 
 later be exposed. He seems to experience a delight in 
 stripping modern authors of their borrowed feathers, 
 and pursuing stolen goods from one literary thief to 
 another, and giving them back to their original owner. 
 More than any other Englishman, Scotchman, or Irish- 
 man, for the last two centuries, he has wiped away 
 the reproach from British philosophy that it is narrow 
 and insular. For years past ordinary authors have 
 seemed learned, and for years to come will seem learned, 
 by drawing from his stores. In incidental discussions, 
 in foot-notes, and notes on foot-notes, he has scattered 
 nuts which it will take many a scholar many a day to 
 gather and to crack. It will be long before the rays 
 which shine from him will be so scattered and diffused 
 through philosophic literature— as the sunbeams are 
 through the atmosphere — that they shall become com- 
 mon property, and men will cease to distinguish the 
 focus from which they have come. By his admirable 
 powers of division and subdivision he has placed the , 
 philosophic systems of various ages and countries, into 
 appropriate compartments, which enable us at once to 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 15 
 
 see the form and the nature of each. Mr. Mill regrets 
 that he " did not write the history of philosophy." I am 
 not sure whether the Scottish professor had all the quali- 
 fications necessary for such a work ; whether, in parti- 
 cular, he could always enter sympathetically into the 
 spirit of the times in which the philosopher lived, and 
 whether he could have given us an easy and continuous 
 narrative. But every student should be grateful to him 
 for what he has actually performed ; for arranging under 
 proper heads, and stating, always with admirable brevity, 
 and commonly with unimpeachable accuracy, the 
 opinions of philosophers, ancient and modern, on most 
 of the topics of speculative interest which still continue 
 to be agitated. Looking to his original contributions to 
 philosophy, his defence of the principles of common 
 sense is characterized at once by extensive learning, by 
 unsurpassed logical acumen and consummate judgment. 
 His immediate theory of sense-perception, if it does not 
 remove all difficulties, appears to me to be more consis- 
 tent than any other with the facts both of psychology 
 and of physiology. His logic is too Kantian in its 
 manner and spirit, and will require to be carefully 
 sifted ; but I believe it is the most important addition 
 made in our day to the analytic of the laws of thought. 
 I am persuaded that his distribution of the mental 
 faculties, given in the second volume of his Metaphysics, 
 is upon the whole the best we yet have, and any 
 one who would improve it must make extensive use 
 of it. Nor is it to be forgotten that he has intro- 
 duced fresh topics into British philosophy, and has 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 always thrown light upon them even when he has not 
 succeeded in settling them. 
 
 I am sure Mr. Mill means to be a just critic of his 
 rival. But from having attached himself to a narrow 
 and exclusive school of philosophy and of history, he 
 is scarcely capable of comprehending, he is certainly 
 utterly incapable of appreciating some of Hamilton's 
 profounder discussions. It could be shown that not a 
 few of the alleged inconsistencies of Hamilton arise 
 from misapprehensions on the part of Ms critic. I have 
 observed that some of the supposed contradictions are 
 merely verbal, and originate in his using a phrase in its 
 usual acceptation, perhaps to a promiscuous class in one 
 place, and employing it ina more technical sense after 
 explanation in another. Xor is it to be forgotten that 
 the writings published by himself appeared in the form 
 of articles in reviews, and of notes and appendices to 
 works edited by him; and that his Lectures, which 
 contain his complete system, though carefully edited 
 by Professors Mansel and Yeitch, had not the advan- 
 tage of being reduced to thorough consistency by him- 
 self. It has to be added, that, being wulling to take a 
 thought that struck him as true or important from any 
 quarter, he was not always able to join the materials 
 he had gathered into a harmonious structure. Hence 
 his philosophy takes the appearance of a squared and 
 diamonded mosaic, in which it is not always easy to dis- 
 cover the unity of the plan. But I verily believe that 
 Hamilton had after all a complete system, which, with 
 some hiatuses and incongruities, and some fatal errors 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 17 
 
 adopted from Kant, is, as a whole, consistent, and con- 
 tains valuable truth. His critic, from his training and 
 sectarian predilections, is incapacitated for forming a due. 
 estimate of many of his higher excellences, and every- 
 where examines him from his own standpoint, which 
 is very narrow, and by his own experiential system, 
 which is lamentably defective. But I leave the work 
 of defending Hamilton to his pupils and disciples, and 
 I rejoice to believe that in many points, and these very 
 important ones, their defence will be triumphantly 
 successful. 
 
 In that curious retribution which we often discover 
 in the affairs of this world, we find that those who are 
 severe in judging others, may come in the end to be 
 severely judged themselves. 1 The late Sir W. Hamilton 
 was often harsh, at times I think unjust (not intention- 
 ally) in his censures on those who had possession of the 
 philosophic ear of the country at the time when he was 
 forcing himself into public notice in opposition to the 
 spirit of the age. In saying so, I do not refer so much 
 to his able and manly, though not altogether successful, 
 criticism of M. Cousin, or to his non-recognition of any 
 special merit in Mr. James Mill (of which his son com- 
 
 1 Have we an illustration of this in the manner in which Plato, who is 
 supposed to have treated the Sophists with injustice, is himself treated in 
 his turn by Mr. Grote, in his Plato and the other Companions of Socrates ? 
 The exposition of the Search Dialogues in that able and learned work is 
 admirable, but the positive doctrines of Plato are examined from the stand- 
 point of M. Comte, Mr. Mill, and Professor Bain ! Is there no living 
 Archer Butler among British scholars to defend Plato's high aspirations, 
 and to show that he had glimpses of great verities which have never 
 disclosed themselves to the view of the ancient Sophists or modern 
 Positivists ? 
 
 B 
 
18 IXTRODUCTIOX. 
 
 plains), so much as to the censorious manner in which 
 lie refers to Dr. Brown and Archbishop Whately, who, 
 if not very profound or erudite, were certainly fresh, 
 acute, and honest thinkers. He has now been repaid 
 for all this in his own coin, by one who has a great 
 admiration of Whately, and who has sprung from the 
 school of Brown and Mill, and who writes as if he had 
 public wrongs to avenge, and an accumulation of ac- 
 cepted errors to scatter. The time will come, I doubt 
 not, when the avenger may himself have to suffer for 
 the excess of punishment he has inflicted. But I beg 
 to say that this is not the spirit in which I have written 
 this review. I have really no pleasure in exposing the 
 inconsistencies, the misunderstandings, and mistakes, 
 to be found in Mr. Mill's Examination, or any of his 
 other works. Acuter minds, or more pugnacious spirits, 
 or earnest souls irritated as they see the evils which 
 must arise from the prevalence of a philosophy which 
 undermines fundamental truth, will, I suspect, rejoice 
 to do this, and may be tempted to do it in excess. But 
 I have no personal antipathies to gratify, no wrongs to 
 avenge. The deepest feeling which I entertain towards 
 Mr. Mill is that of admiration of his talents, and grati- 
 tude for the clear exposition which he has given of 
 many important principles. 1 My aim in this work is 
 simply to defend a portion of primary truth which has 
 
 1 Simply to illustrate this, I may mention that the part of his Logic 
 which treats of induction, has a place in my college classes, and on my 
 recommendation, joined to that of the corresponding professors in Cork 
 and Galway, has a place in the examination for the Bachelor's and Master's 
 degree in the Queen's University in Ireland. 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 19 
 
 been assailed by an acute thinker who has extensive 
 influence in England. 
 
 Some of his admirers claim for Mr. Mill, that he is 
 the genuine philosophical descendant of Locke. I ac- 
 knowledge that in some respects he resembles our 
 great English metaphysician. He is like him in his 
 clearness of thought and diction. Both are careful to 
 avoid, as far as possible, abstruse arguments and tech- 
 nical phrases. Both have a name in other departments 
 as well as mental philosophy, — Locke having thought 
 profoundly on political questions, and Mr. Mill having 
 given us one of the best works we have on political 
 economy. Both have written on toleration or liberty, 
 and defended views in advance of those generally enter- 
 tained in their own times. I am inclined further to 
 admit that Mr. Mill has quite as much influence in our 
 day in England as Locke had in his. But with these 
 points of likeness there are important points of differ- 
 ence. Locke had an originality, a shrewdness, a saga- 
 city, and a high-principled wisdom and caution which 
 have not been equalled by the later speculator. Locke 
 avows extreme enough views in opposing the doctrines 
 of professed metaphysicians, but he is saved by his 
 crowning sense, and his religious convictions, acquired 
 in Puritan 'times, from taking up positions adverse to 
 the sound sense of mankind. Vehement enough in 
 opposing a doctrine of innate ideas supposed to be held 
 by philosophers, and labouring in vain to derive all our 
 ideas from sensation and reflection, we do not find him 
 tailing back on such extreme positions as those of Mr. 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Mill, when lie endeavours to draw our higher ideas out 
 of sensation by means of association, and maintains that 
 we can know nothing of mind except that it is a series of 
 sensations, aware of itself, or of matter, except that it is 
 a possibility of sensations. I believe that Locke aban- 
 doned, without knowing it, some important fundamental 
 truths ; but he resolutely held by many others, as that 
 man has high faculties working on the original materials, 
 and that in particular he has an intuitive knowledge 
 " which is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces 
 " itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever 
 " the mind turns its view that way, and leaves no room 
 " for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is 
 " presently filled with the clear light of it" {Essay, B. iv. 
 c. 2). Mr. J. S. Mill is the successor and the living 
 representative of an important British school, but it is 
 that of Hobbes, of Hartley, of Priestley, of David Hume, 
 and of James Mill. I have studiously left Thomas 
 Brown out of this list, because, while adopting much 
 from Hume, he carefully separates from him on the 
 subject of intuition, maintaining that we have original 
 and irresistible beliefs in our personal identity, and in 
 causation. It will be seen as we advance how close the 
 philosophy of Mr. J. S. Mill comes to that of Hume. I 
 rather think Mr. Mill is scarcely aware himself of the 
 extent of the resemblance, as he seems to have wrought 
 out his conclusions from data supplied him to some ex- 
 tent by Brown, but to a greater extent by Mr. James 
 Mill, both of whom drew much from the Treatise of 
 Human Nature. But even on the supposition that Mr. 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 21 
 
 Mill is the Locke of the nineteenth century, it would be 
 necessary to examine and correct his views. Tor while 
 the Essay on the Human Understanding evolved much 
 truth, and exercised, upon the whole, a healthy influence, 
 it contained very grave defects and errors, which issued 
 in very serious consequences both in France and in this 
 country ; in the former landing speculation in a miser- 
 able sensationalism, and in the latter originating the 
 wire-drawn attempts to fashion all our ideas out of one 
 or two primitive sources by means of association. I 
 have already intimated that I believe the errors of Mr. 
 Mill to be far more numerous and fundamental than 
 those of Locke ; and should his sensational and nescient 
 system come to be adopted, it will be followed, both in 
 theory and in practice, with far more fatal results than 
 any that ensued from the combined idealistic and rea- 
 listic philosophy expounded in Locke's great work. 
 
 Among a considerable portion even of the reading 
 and thinking people of England, there is a strong aver- 
 sion to all professedly metaphysical speculation, — which 
 they regard as a net of sophistry spread out to catch 
 them. But in avoiding an avowed and elaborate dis- 
 cussion of fundamental truth, it often happens that they 
 are taken in by a plausible smartness, which is really 
 metaphysics, but bad metaphysics, — treating every pro- 
 found subject in a superficial way. In this respect 
 some of our countrymen act very much like those ex- 
 cessively cautious and suspicious persons to be met 
 with in the world, who are so afraid of everybody 
 cheating them, that they become the dupes of those 
 
22 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 more designing schemers who are ever warning them 
 against the dishonesty of others. There are readers of 
 Hobbes, who, on perceiving how free he is from mysticism, 
 and how readily he seems to explain all our ideas by 
 sensation, and all our actions by selfishness, are tempted 
 to think that this man who speaks so clearly and dog- 
 matically must be speaking truly. They are about as 
 wise as the excessively far-sighted individuals who so 
 easily account for all extraordinary actions on the simple 
 principle that all mankind are fools, or rogues, or mad- 
 men ! The Englishman is thus often led astray by a 
 deception which pretends to be simplicity itself. I 
 abhor as much as any man the introduction of meta- 
 physics into the discussion of commonplace or practical 
 subjects. But there is another error, quite as common, 
 and to be equally dreaded, and that is the introduction 
 of superficial metaphysics furtively, by those who would 
 gain your confidence by telling you that they avoid 
 metaphysics. If we are to have metaphysics, let them 
 avow that they are metaphysics, and let the investiga- 
 tion be conducted scientifically and systematically. By 
 all means let us have clear metaphysics, just as we 
 would wish to have clear mathematics and clear physics. 
 But clearness to the extent of transparency is of no value, 
 provided it be attained, as in the case of the French sen- 
 sational school, only by omitting all that is high or deep 
 in man's nature. I certainly do not look on Mr. Mill 
 as a superficial writer. On the contrary, on subjects 
 on which he has not been led to follow Mr. James Mill 
 or M. Comte, his thoughts are commonly as solid and 
 
HAMILTON AND MILL. 23 
 
 weighty as they are clearly expressed. But, speaking 
 exclusively of his philosophy of first principles, I believe 
 he is getting so ready an acceptance among many for 
 his metaphysical theories, mainly because, like Hobbes 
 and Condillac, he possesses a delusive simplicity which 
 does not account for, but simply overlooks, the dis- 
 tinguishing properties of our mental nature. 
 
CHAPTEE II. 
 
 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 M. Cousin brings it as a charge against Locke, that 
 in his Essay on the Human Understanding, he treats of 
 the origin of ideas before inquiring into their nature. 
 Locke thus announces his method : " 1st, I shall in- 
 " quire into the original of those ideas, notions, or what- 
 " ever else you please to call them, which a man observes, 
 " and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the 
 " ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished 
 " with them" (Introd. s. 3.) Upon this, his French critic 
 remarks that there are here " two radical errors in regard 
 " to method : 1st, Locke treats of the origin of ideas be- 
 " fore having sufficiently studied these ideas ; Idly, he 
 " does more, he not only puts the question of the origin 
 " of ideas before that of the inventory of ideas, but he en- 
 " tirely neglects this last question" (Lectures on Locke, ii.) 
 M. Cousin seems to lay down an important principle 
 here, and to be so far justified in blaming the English 
 philosopher for neglecting it. In order to be able to 
 settle the very difficult question of the origin of our 
 ideas, we must begin, and, I believe, end, with a careful 
 inspection of their precise nature. In the very passage 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 25 
 
 in which Locke proclaims his mode of procedure, he 
 speaks of inquiring into the original of those ideas which 
 a man "observes, and is conscious to himself." The 
 observation by consciousness should certainly precede 
 any attempt to furnish a theoretical decomposition of 
 ideas. I am convinced that in the construction of his 
 theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and 
 reflection, Locke did not patiently and comprehensively 
 contemplate all that is in certain of the deepest and 
 most characteristic ideas of the human mind. I do not 
 ground this charge so much on the fact that he treats, in 
 the First Book, of the Origin of Ideas, before coming, in 
 the Second Book, to discuss the Nature of Ideas, as on 
 the circumstance that in the Second Book he is obliged 
 to overlook some of the profoundest properties of our 
 ideas, in order to make them fit into his preconceived 
 system. But we find Mr. Mill justifying Locke, and con- 
 demning Cousin. " I accept the question as M. Cousin 
 " states it, and I contend that no attempt to determine 
 " what are the direct revelations of consciousness can be 
 " successful or entitled to regard, unless preceded by 
 " what M. Cousin says ought to follow it — an inquiry 
 " into the origin of our acquired ideas" (Exam. p. 145). 
 Mr. Mill at this place examines Sir W. Hamilton's 
 constant appeals to consciousness. Sir William would 
 often settle by consciousness alone questions wdiich I 
 suspect must be solved by a more complicated and 
 difficult process. It is thus, for instance — that is, by an 
 appeal to consciousness — that he would determine that 
 we know immediatelv an external or material world. 
 
26 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 In language often of terrible severity, he charges Brown, 
 and nearly all philosophers, with disregarding conscious- 
 ness : " But it is thus manifestly the common interest of 
 " every scheme of philosophy to preserve intact the inte- 
 " grity of consciousness. Almost every scheme of philo- 
 " sophy is only another mode in which this integrity has 
 " been violated " {Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 283). Mr. Mill 
 shows successfully (as I think) that the question between 
 Hamilton and his opponents is often not one of the tes- 
 timony of consciousness, but of the interpretation of con- 
 sciousness : " We have it not in our power to ascertain, 
 " by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the 
 " time when its revelations were in their primitive purity. 
 " It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, 
 " when these original revelations are overlaid and buried 
 " under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and per- 
 " ceptions" (pp. 145, 146). Mr. Mill then goes on to ex- 
 plain his own method, which he calls the Psychological : 
 " And here emerges the distinction between two different 
 " methods of studying the problems of metaphysics, form- 
 " ing the radical difference between the two great schools 
 " into which metaphysicians are fundamentally divided. 
 " One of these I shall call for distinction the Introspective 
 " method, the other the Psychological." He rejects the 
 Introspective method : " Introspection can show us a 
 " present belief or conviction, attended with a greater or 
 " less difficulty in accommodating the thoughts to a dif- 
 " ferent view of the subject ; but that this belief or con - 
 " viction or knowledge, if we call it so, is intuitive, no 
 " mere introspection can ever show." He therefore re- 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGAT10X. 2 7 
 
 sorts to the other method : " Being unable to examine 
 " the actual contents of our consciousness until our 
 " earliest, which are necessarily our most firmly knit 
 " associations, those which are most intimately inter- 
 " woven with the original data of consciousness, are fully 
 " formed, we cannot study the original elements of mind 
 " in the facts of our present consciousness. Those origi- 
 " nal elements can only come to light as residual pheno- 
 " mena, by a previous study of the modes of generation 
 " of the mental facts which are confessedly not original, 
 " — a study sufficiently thorough to enable us to apply 
 " its results to the convictions, beliefs, or supposed in- 
 " tuitions which seem to be original, and determine 
 " whether some of them may not have been generated 
 " in the same modes, so early as to have become insepar- 
 " able from our consciousness before the time at which 
 " memory commences. This mode of ascertaining the 
 " original elements of mind I call Psychological, as 
 " distinguished from the simply Introspective mode " 
 (pp. 147, 148). These quotations furnish a sufficiently 
 clear view of his account of the two methods, and of his 
 reasous for rejecting the one and adopting the other. 
 
 I have long been of opinion, and I have endeavoured 
 to show elsewhere, 1 that Sir William Hamilton's use of 
 " consciousness" is very unsatisfactory. He avows that 
 he employs the phrase in two distinct senses or appli- 
 cations. First, he has a general consciousness, discussed 
 largely in the first volume of his Metaphysics. This he 
 
 1 Particularly in a review of Hamilton's Metaphysics in the Dublin 
 University Magazine for August 1859. 
 
28 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 tells us cannot be defined (vol. i. p. 158) ; " but it com- 
 prehends all the modifications, all the phenomena of the 
 thinking subject" (p. 183). " Knowledge and belief are 
 both contained under consciousness " (p. 191). Again, 
 " consciousness is co-extensive with our cognitive 
 faculties;" "our special faculties of knowledge are 
 only modifications of consciousness" (p. 207). He 
 shows that consciousness implies discrimination, judg- 
 ment, and memory (pp. 202-206). This is wide enough ; 
 still he imposes a limit, for consciousness " is an • im- 
 mediate, not a mediate knowledge" (p. 202). Already, 
 as it seems to me, inconsistencies are beginning to creep 
 in ; for whereas he had before told us that conscious- 
 ness includes " all the phenomena of the thinking sub- 
 ject," now he so modifies it as to exclude "mediate 
 knowledge," which is surely a modification of the think- 
 ing subject. Throughout these passages he uses the 
 phrase in the wide, loose sense given to the German 
 Bewusstsein by the school of Wolf. He stoutly main- 
 tains, what no one will deny, that this general conscious- 
 ness is not a special faculty ; but when he comes to 
 draw out a list of mental powers, in the second volume 
 of his Metaphysics, he turns to the Scottish use of the 
 phrase, and he includes among them a special faculty 
 which he calls consciousness, but to which, for distinc- 
 tion's sake, he prefixes self, and designates it self- 
 consciousness. It is the office of this special faculty to 
 " afford us a knowledge of the phenomena of our minds" 
 (vol. ii. p. 192). It is an inevitable result of using the 
 phrases in such ambiguous senses, that we are ever in 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 29 
 
 danger of passing inadvertently from the one meaning 
 to the other, and making affirmations in one sense 
 which hold good only in another. Hamilton is ever 
 appealing to consciousness, as Locke did to idea, as 
 Brown did to suggestion, and as Mr. Mill does to asso- 
 ciation, but without our being always sure that the 
 various affirmations are made in the same sense of the 
 term. His appeal to consciousness, both in establishing 
 some of his own positions and in summarily setting 
 aside those of his opponents, is often far too rapid and 
 dogmatic. He represents the principles of common 
 sense as being emphatically " facts of consciousness," 
 whereas they are not so any more specially than our 
 acquired and derived beliefs, which are equally under 
 consciousness. In fact, these principles are not before 
 the consciousness as principles. The individual mani- 
 festations are of course before the consciousness (though 
 not more so than any other mental exercise), but not 
 the principles themselves, which are derived from the 
 individual exercises by a reflex process of abstraction 
 and generalization. Consciousness cannot decide directly 
 which of our convictions are intuitive. Consciousness 
 reveals only the present state of mind, and it cannot 
 say whether it is original or derived. That state is pro- 
 bably a very complex one, and may embrace secondary 
 beliefs mixed up with the primary ones ; and if we are 
 to separate these and fix on the true primitive convic- 
 tions, we must subject the whole to a process of analysis. 
 Again, consciousness can reveal to us only the singular, 
 only the present state as an individual perception ; but 
 
30 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 in psychology, as in every other science, we are in search 
 of the principle, and if we would gather the law out of 
 the particulars we must generalize. In order, then, to 
 the discovery even of an " intuitive principle," there 
 must be what Bacon calls " the necessary rejections and 
 exclusions," or what Dr. Whewell calls the " decompo- 
 sition of facts," and then the co-ordination of the facts 
 into a law by induction. In order, then, to the con- 
 struction of metaphysics, more is required than a simple 
 exercise of consciousness or introspection ; there is need 
 of discursive processes to work the facts into a science. 1 
 It is of the utmost moment to remove these misappre- 
 hensions out of the way, as Mr. Mill, with his usual 
 acuteness, has taken advantage of them ; and after he 
 has shown that introspection cannot do everything, he 
 leaves upon us the impression that it can do nothing. 
 
 But consciousness, after all, is the main instrument 
 in determining what are first principles. Let us en- 
 deavour to ascertain its precise province. The method 
 followed by Mr. Mill in his psychology (and also in his 
 political economy) is evidently what he calls the de- 
 ductive, and which he represents in his Logic (B. iii. 
 chap. xi. sect, i.) as consisting of three operations : 
 " The first one of direct induction ; the second of ratio- 
 cination ; and the third of verification." Now, of these 
 three steps the first and the third are, properly speak- 
 ing, inductive ; they depend entirely on observed facts. 
 In physical science the agent of observation is the 
 
 1 I may be permitted to mention that I have fully wrought out these 
 cautionary rules in The Intuitions of the Mind, Part First. 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 31 
 
 senses, aided, it may be, by artificial instruments, and 
 corrected by careful methods as enjoined by modern 
 accuracy. In mental science the observing agent is 
 consciousness. We bend back the mental eye, and 
 observe what is passing within as it passes. As this 
 is often a very difficult and delicate operation, more 
 particularly when thought is rapid and feeling intense, 
 we must resort to other operations, but in which con- 
 sciousness is still the main instrument. We must by 
 memory bring up the past as much as possible in its en- 
 tirety, and notice all that is in it. Not only so ; in order 
 to correct the narrowness of our personal observations, 
 we must look to external quarters ; we must gather 
 what are the convictions of other men from their deeds, 
 ever passing under our notice, and as recorded in his- 
 tory ; and from their conversation and their writings, as 
 the expression of human thought and sentiment. This 
 may not be introspection in the narrow sense of the 
 term ; still it is inspection of the soul of man, and it 
 may be referred in a general way to self- consciousness, 
 for it is by what we feel within ourselves that we are 
 enabled upon evidence to comprehend the experience 
 of others. 
 
 But let it be observed that consciousness, understood 
 in this enlarged sense, has to take the first step, and the 
 final step in the process. It has to observe and gather 
 the original facts which suggest the law. It has again 
 to collect and notice the verifying facts which establish 
 the law. In comparison with these, the intermediate 
 step, the ratiocination, is a subordinate and a dependent 
 
32 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 one. If the commencing and closing inductions are 
 conducted improperly, the reasoning which issues from 
 them or leads to them will only bind the blunders 
 more closely together. Thus, if in the original obser- 
 vations part of the light has been obstructed, conse- 
 quential deductions will only widen the shadow, — as the 
 mistake of a wrong datum is only increased by multi- 
 plying it. We see this strikingly illustrated in most of 
 our rational systems of philosophy, — as, for instance, in 
 that of Spinoza, who began with an ill-observed account 
 of substance, and ended in the bogs of a horrid pan- 
 theism. Again, if in the final observations the facts are 
 mutilated in order to fit them into an ingenious hypo- 
 thesis, the error is thereby confirmed, and the system- 
 builders feel themselves justified in adhering the more 
 resolutely to a creation of their own minds. We see 
 this exhibited in the history of most of those systems 
 of empiricism which, as Bacon characterizes them, leap 
 and fly at once from particular facts to universal prin- 
 ciples, which are supposed to explain all the phenomena, 
 and can easily get instances quoted to support them, 
 found by " a vague and ill-built" observation. 
 
 In conducting this work of observation by conscious- 
 ness, there is a constant temptation to oversight, to 
 hasty conclusions and distorted representations. In 
 physical investigation there is less room for conscious 
 or unconscious deception, as modern research insists on 
 having the phenomena weighed or measured in some 
 way : that we cannot apply such a corrective to the 
 alleged facts of consciousness, constitutes one of the 
 
THE METHOD OF IXVESTIGATIOX. 33 
 
 disadvantages under which psychology labours. Xo 
 doubt, we have immediate access at once to the facts as 
 being in our minds — and this seems to entitle every man 
 to be a metaphysician ; but, from the impossibility of 
 employing a numerical test, there is room for great 
 looseness in the observation and inaccuracy in the 
 statement, and these issue in augmented errors in the 
 results reached by deduction. In these circumstances, 
 there is great need in mental science of intellectual 
 shrewdness, to keep us from mistaking one fact for 
 another, and still greater need of high moral quali- 
 ties, such as a spirit of self-restraint and caution, of 
 integrity and candour. In particular, great pains must 
 be adopted to guard against taking a part, and over- 
 looking and rejecting the rest, because it may not fit 
 into a pre-conceived theory to which the individual 
 may have committed himself. In order to secure this 
 we must as it were go round the mental phenomena 
 and view them on all sides, and in all their aspects, 
 both hi our own minds and in those of others. AVe 
 must mark their various properties, adding none and 
 subtracting none, lessening none and magnifying none, 
 disguising none and correcting none, but making each 
 stand out in its own form, in its proper action, and with 
 its natural accompaniments. We ought, as Hamilton 
 expresses it, to exhibit each "- in its individual integrity, 
 neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative 
 place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination" (Ap- 
 pendix to RcicVs Works, p. 747). Till this careful and 
 candid observation has been completed, we are not at 
 
 c 
 
34 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 liberty to begin to analyse or theorize. When we 
 venture on these processes, all we can do is to dissect 
 the concrete, to generalize the individual, or find out the 
 producing cause. But the errors will only multiply 
 upon us in these steps if we have not commenced with 
 accurate observations. 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton says, " Philosophy is wholly depen- 
 dent on consciousness" (Reid's Works, p. 746). This 
 is going too far, as philosophy cannot be constructed 
 without discursive processes. But Mr. Mill has com- 
 mitted a far more serious error, when he says that 
 " Locke was therefore right in believing that the origin 
 of our ideas is the main stress of the problem of mental 
 science, and the subject which must first be considered 
 in forming the theory of the mind" (p. 147). M. Cousin 
 seems to me to be altogether right when he lays it down 
 as a rule, that in psychology we must begin with a 
 painstaking inquiry into the actual nature of our ideas. 
 Mr. Mill has thus reversed the order of things, placing 
 that which is first last, and that which is last first — 
 putting the theory of ideas before the observation of the 
 ideas, which evidently holds out great temptations to 
 him to determine their nature by his theory. 
 
 Not that we are precluded from making an inquiry 
 into the origin of ideas. This is a very fair subject of 
 investigation, provided always that we acknowledge its 
 difficulties and its uncertainties, and proceed in a 
 cautious manner, and in the proper method. But even 
 here the main agent must be consciousness, in the sense 
 which has been explained, that is, as giving us directly 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 35 
 
 a knowledge of our own mental operations, and in- 
 directly an acquaintance with those of others. In order 
 to the successful resolution of ideas into their originals, 
 we have two objects, or classes of objects, to look at. 
 We have first to consider the ideas or convictions which 
 we would seek to account for, and, secondly, the ele- 
 ments into which we would resolve them. The first of 
 these operations must be done by consciousness exclu- 
 sively. Even in the other and more complicated and 
 perplexing inquiry, introspection must be the main 
 agent. No doubt, it is possible that some light may be 
 thrown on the origin of certain ideas by the brain and 
 nerves, and in this physiological investigation the in- 
 struments must be the eye and the microscope. But 
 no unconscious action can account for conscious ideas. 
 The attempt to explain ideas must always proceed by 
 deriving the more complex from the simpler mental 
 phenomena. But in the determination of the precise 
 nature of the simpler mental affections, we are again 
 thrown back on consciousness. Suppose that the at- 
 tempt be, as in the school of Mr. Mill, to get our ideas 
 from sensations, and associations of sensation, we must 
 begin to determine what sensations are, and what the 
 laws of association are, by the internal sense. I am quite 
 willing to adopt Mr. Mill's psychological method, but 
 only on the condition that we take introspection as our 
 main instrument of observation. 
 
 Mr. Mill tells us that "the proof that any of the 
 alleged Universal Beliefs or principles of Common Sense 
 are affirmations of consciousness, supposes two things — 
 
36 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 that the beliefs exist, and that they cannot possibly have 
 been acquired" (p. 147). I have no objection to accept 
 these two conditions, with an explanation of the one 
 and a correction of the other. 
 
 As to the first rule, there are some points which con - 
 sciousness can settle at once. It lets us know what is 
 our present idea or conviction. This is altogether com- 
 petent to it, this in fact is its office ; its revelations 
 carry their own evidence with them, and from them 
 there is no appeal. This is admitted by Mr. Mill : 
 " Introspection can show a present belief or conviction." 
 " If consciousness tells me that I have a certain thought 
 or sensation, I assuredly have that thought or sensation" 
 (p. 141). Now, in the mature mind there are a vast 
 number and variety of ideas and convictions. We have 
 perceptions, apprehensions, and beliefs, about matter and 
 mind, about time and space, about things changing and 
 things abiding, about the near and the remote, the past 
 and the future, about activity and efficiency, about 
 priority and succession, about cause and effect, about 
 right and wrong, eternity and immensity. Now, it is 
 the office of consciousness to reveal all that is in these 
 ideas, and psychology should begin with attending to 
 its revelations. Mr. Mill refers particularly to the al- 
 leged universal beliefs. The word "belief" is unfortu- 
 nately a very vague one, and may stand for a number of 
 very different mental affections. When I am speaking 
 of first or intuitive principles, I use the term to signify 
 our conviction of the existence of an object not now 
 present, and thus I distinguish " primitive faith " from 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 37 
 
 " primitive knowledge," in which the object is present. 
 But however wide we may make the application of the 
 phrase, it does not embrace all that is before conscious- 
 ness. Thus we are capable of immediate knowledge ; 
 w x e have such in every exercise of self-consciousness, 
 and I maintain also in all perception through the senses. 
 The mind, also, is ever pronouncing judgments, declaring, 
 for instance, that things agree, or that they differ, or 
 that this change indicates a cause. We have not only 
 intellectual operations, we form moral perceptions, and 
 pronounce moral judgments, — as when we decide that 
 kindness is a virtue and cruelty a sin. If we would 
 construct a science of psychology, we must survey care- 
 fully these apprehensions, beliefs, and decisions. If we 
 would establish or dis-establish any metaphysical point, 
 we must view, firstly and finally, and all throughout, 
 what is in the mind's notion and conviction. Or if, 
 what is more to our present review, we would resolve 
 any idea into simpler elements, we must determine all 
 that is in the idea by a searching introspection. Con- 
 sciousness has thus not only to settle that certain ideas 
 or beliefs, or convictions " exist," but ascertain for us all 
 that is in them. Now, it has been repeatedly brought 
 as a charge against the school to which Mr. Mill belongs, 
 that, so far as the deeper notions and beliefs of the 
 mind are concerned, they have never carefully observed, 
 weighed, and measured the phenomenon which they seek 
 to explain by means of such elements as sensations. I 
 believe that this accusation is just, and I hope to sub- 
 stantiate it in the course of this review. 
 
38 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATIOX. 
 
 Mr. Mill's second rule of proof can be admitted only 
 with a restriction. I allow that it is not so easy a 
 matter as Sir W. Hamilton imagines to determine what 
 is a first principle ; and that this cannot be done by an 
 immediate introspection. But is it not demanding too 
 much to require that we are not to accept any beliefs 
 as universal till it has been shown " that they cannot 
 possibly have been acquired"? The burden of proof 
 seems rather to lie on those who maintain they are 
 acquired. AVere any man of science to affirm that 
 hydrogen is not an element, chemists would be quite 
 prepared to listen to him, but they would insist, as a con- 
 dition of their giving a positive assent, that he should 
 decompose the substance, and until this is accomplished 
 they would continue to regard hydrogen as at least 
 provisionally an elementary body. On a like principle, 
 we should be quite ready to attend to Mr. Mill when he 
 maintains that he can resolve our idea of moral good 
 into simpler elements, but until he brings forward his 
 components, and shows them to be quite sufficient to 
 produce the result, we may surely be allowed to hold 
 that our sense of duty is an ultimate principle. 
 
 But instead of thus throwing the onus iirobandi from 
 one side to another, I think it better to avow broadly that 
 the question is not to be settled by possibilities or im- 
 possibilities, by may he or cannot he, but by the ordinary 
 rules of evidence. On the one hand, persons are not to 
 be allowed to imagine that they have resolved an alleged 
 fundamental idea into something else, unless they can 
 explain all that is in the idea by means of some principle 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 39 
 
 competent to produce the idea with all its peculiarities. 
 On the other hand, we are not to assume a conviction to 
 be ultimate till it has been tried by clear and sufficient 
 tests. Such tests, I believe, can be had. Almost all 
 philosophers have appealed to them. We shall find Mr. 
 Mill implicitly admitting them. "We shall be able, I hope, 
 to reach a precise expression of them as we advance. 
 Following these general principles, the following rules of 
 proof may help at once to guide and guard inquiry : — 
 
 I. No one is to be allowed to imagine that he has made 
 a successful resolution into simpler elements, of an idea, 
 belief, or conviction, unless lie can explain all that is in 
 tlie mental phenomenon. It is necessary to enunciate 
 this rule, from the circumstance that it has so often been 
 violated. Hobbes, and the sensational school of France, 
 were able to derive all our ideas from sensation, simply 
 by refusing to look at and to weigh such ideas as those 
 which we have of substance and power, moral good and 
 infinity, so different from mere sensitive affections. It 
 has been shown again and again against Hume, that all 
 our ideas are not copies of impressions, — that we have 
 convictions of the existence of things, of personal identity, 
 and of power, which cannot be traced to impressions, 
 whatever be the meaning attached to that vague phrase. 
 I am convinced Mr. Mill has been guilty of like over- 
 sights, when he would draw all our ideas, even those 
 we have of mind and body, extension, personal identity, 
 causation and moral obligation, from sensations, and 
 associations of sensations : he can appear to himself and 
 his admirers to be successful, solely by not noticing the 
 
40 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 characteristic qualities of these profound and peculiar 
 ideas. In these dissections, this school of mental anato- 
 mists destroys the life, and then declares that it never 
 existed. Mr. Mill defines mind as a series of sensations : 
 we shall see that the phenomenon to be explained is the 
 consciousness of self; that even in sensation we are 
 conscious of self. He describes our conviction of per- 
 sonal identity as a series of sensations, with the mind 
 being aware of itself as a series : I shall show that we 
 know in consciousness a present self and in memory a 
 past self, and that in comparing the two we declare them 
 to be the same. He makes body the possibility of sen- 
 sations : it will be proven, that in his hypothetical ex- 
 planation, he utterly fails to render any account of that 
 idea of externality which we attack to matter. He re- 
 solves our idea of extension into length of time, and 
 length of time he makes identical with a series of 
 muscular sensations : it will not be difficult to establish 
 the essential difference of the three phenomena which are 
 thus confounded. In treating of ethical questions, he 
 shows that we might be led to do good by motives de- 
 rived from pleasure and pain : but he has failed to 
 account for the very peculiar ideas involved in such 
 phrases as " duty," " ought," " obligation," " sin," and 
 " reproach." 
 
 It has been resolutely maintained by the profoundest 
 philosophers of all ages, that there are certain convic- 
 tions in the mind which have the characters of self- 
 evidence and necessity. These constitute the " residual 
 phenomena," which cannot be explained by a gathered 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 41 
 
 experience, and to account for which we must call in a 
 new cause. We know, or believe, or judge so and so, on 
 the bare contemplation of the objects ; we must do so, 
 we cannot do otherwise. Mr. Mill has looked at this 
 mental phenomenon, and lias endeavoured to account 
 for it in accordance with his general theory by two 
 principles, which it can be shown miss, and utterly fail 
 to account for, the peculiarities of our conviction. We 
 may here look at these for a moment, as illustrating the 
 importance of our rule, reserving the more thorough dis- 
 cussion of them to future chapters. 
 
 It is alleged by the whole school, that our belief in 
 certain general principles, supposed to be ultimate, can 
 be accounted for by experience. But the word " ex- 
 perience" is a very uncertain one, and may cover a 
 number of very different mental actions and affections. 
 Everything that has been within our consciousness, all 
 that we have seen or felt, may be said in a vague general 
 sense to have fallen under experience. In this sense our 
 intuitions of sense and consciousness, our original be- 
 liefs and primitive judgments, all come within our ex- 
 perience. But thus understood, experience can explain 
 nothing, can be the cause of nothing;-. The thing' ex- 
 perienced may, but not the experience, that is, the mere 
 consciousness or feeling. As to the thing experienced, 
 it should not be called experience ; and as to what it 
 may produce, we must determine this by looking at the 
 nature of the thing, and not at our experience of it. 
 But there is a sense, and this a very important one, in 
 which experience can furnish us with a principle, and 
 
42 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 this may be mistaken for an intuitive one. Thus we 
 have observed, not once, or twice, or thrice, or ten 
 times, but a hundred, a thousand times, that our friends 
 have been in the habit of speaking the truth, and we 
 expect them to do so in time to come as they have done 
 in time past. There have been metaphysicians who 
 regarded our trust in testimony as an original instinct 
 of our nature. But it is surely quite competent for 
 persons to attempt to show that the conviction can 
 be explained by an early, a lengthened, and a uniform 
 observation ; and they may be allowed to be successful 
 when they have proven that the experience is capable 
 of producing the conviction entertained. Let it be 
 observed, that when thus employed experience means 
 an induction of instances to establish a general rule or 
 law. And I take this opportunity of stating, that when 
 I have occasion to refer to this power of experience, I 
 call it a gathered experience, to distinguish it from a mere 
 individual feeling. I admit freely that a gathered ex- 
 perience can generate a strong conviction, such as the 
 trust we put hi testimony, and our belief in the uni- 
 formity, or rather uniformities, of nature ; that is, it will 
 account for all the marks of our convictions on these 
 subjects, for their gradual formation, for their extent 
 and their limits, — as when we allow that our friends 
 may at times commit mistakes in their testimony, or 
 that there may have been miraculous occurrences in 
 the midst of the regularities of nature. But then, it is 
 said that there are, and I hope to show that there are, 
 convictions of a verv different nature, which are as strong 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 43 
 
 in early youth, and in early stages of society, as in later 
 life and in more advanced communities, and which 
 allow of no limitation or exception. As examples, we 
 may give mathematical axioms, as that two straight 
 lines cannot enclose a space, and moral maxims, as that 
 ingratitude for favours deserves reprobation. Our con- 
 victions of this description spring up on the bare con- 
 templation of the objects, and need not a wide collection 
 of instances ; and their necessity and universality can- 
 not be accounted for by a gathered experience. The 
 school to which Mr. Mill belongs explains the pheno- 
 mena only by failing to distinguish between two sorts 
 of convictions, and neglecting to mark the characteristics 
 of those which announce themselves as self-evident, 
 necessary, and universal. 
 
 But Mr. Mill has another principle, by which he thinks 
 he can explain the necessity 7 and the unlimited expec- 
 tation ; this is the law of the association of ideas. 
 When we have often thought of two things together, 
 the idea of the one comes invariably, in the end neces- 
 sarily, to call up the other. Thus Martinus Scriblerus, 
 having never seen a lord mayor without his fur gown 
 and gold chain, could never think of a lord mayor 
 without also thinking of his appendages. But here 
 again Mr. Mill has missed the characteristic of the 
 mental phenomenon. " If we find it impossible by any 
 trial to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of 
 necessity the mind is capable of" (p. 264). But this is 
 to confound two things which are very different, the 
 association of two ideas, so that the one calls up the 
 
44 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 other, with the judgment, which declares that the two 
 things are necessarily related. When he heard the lord 
 mayor named, Martin could not but think of his gown 
 and chain ; but he did not therefore decide that the 
 mayor and his wig had always been together, that they 
 would always be together, that it had never been other- 
 wise, and could not be otherwise. The laws of associa- 
 tion may account for the rise of one idea along with 
 another, or immediately after another, but they do not 
 come near explaining the self-evidence and necessity of 
 certain cognitions, beliefs, and judgments, which may rise 
 on the contemplation of single objects perceived for the 
 first time, or on the immediate comparison of two 
 objects. 
 
 II. In resolving an alleged fundamental idea or con- 
 viction into certain elements, we must assume only known 
 elements, and ive must not ascribe to them more than can 
 be shown to be in them. To illustrate what I mean : It 
 is quite competent to any one to attempt to explain 
 chemical action by mechanical causes, or vital action by 
 mechanical and chemical forces. But if he understand 
 the problem which he hopes to solve, and grapple with 
 it fairly, he must not give to mechanical action, or 
 mechanical and chemical action combined, more than 
 is in them. The whole attempt would be denounced 
 as a mere pretence if he gave a chemical affinity to 
 the mechanical power, or a power of assimilation and 
 absorption to the mechanical and chemical action. 
 Now we are surely entitled to impose a like restriction 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 45 
 
 upon the analyst of the human mind. It is perfectly 
 competent to him to attempt to resolve such convic- 
 tions as those of identity, causation, and moral good, into 
 any other principle. But we can require of him to 
 specify the principle, to prove that it actually works in 
 the mind, to unfold its nature and its laws, and to show 7 
 from its ascertained action that it is quite sufficient to 
 produce the conviction. In particular, he must not be 
 allowed, when he starts with an element, to add new 
 properties to suit his purpose as he goes along. Or if 
 he does so, he must formally announce the introduction 
 of the new power, specify its nature, and honestly avow 
 it to be a new element. 
 
 This is a rule wdiich has been habitually neglected by 
 that school of metaphysicians who delight to reduce all 
 the operations of the mind to a very few principles. 
 Locke succeeded, to his own satisfaction, in deriving all 
 our ideas from sensation and reflection, but it has been 
 shown by distinguished philosophers, British and Con- 
 tinental, that in accounting thus for such ideas as 
 substance, and time, and power, he changed, wuthout 
 perceiving it, the sensations and reflex perceptions 
 into something entirely different. It can be proven 
 that Mr. Mill is ever falling into a like error. The 
 operation by which he derives all our ideas and beliefs 
 from a few elements, is a sort of jugglery, in which he 
 alters the elements without its being discovered ; and it 
 may be added, that in the product which he shows, he 
 has not the real phenomenon which he professes to 
 have explained. 
 
46 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 The main elements which he employs are sensa- 
 tions and associations of sensation. But he works up 
 sensations into convictions of mind and body, of space 
 and time, of personality and personal identity, of infinity 
 and obligation to clo good, which are not contained in 
 the nature of sensations, and which could be imparted 
 to them only by a new power superinduced, which 
 power would require to have a place allotted to it in his 
 system, and its laws enunciated, and its significance 
 estimated. Again, it will be shown that Mr. Mill has 
 made an unwarrantable use and application of the laws 
 of association. These are the laws of the succession of 
 our ideas, and nothing more. Give us two ideas, 
 and place these two ideas together in the mind, and 
 association will tend to bring them up once more in 
 union. But it is not the office of association to give us 
 the ideas which must first be furnished to it. We shall 
 see that Mr. Mill is for ever giving to association a 
 power, which does not belong to it, of generating new 
 ideas by an operation in which we see sensations go in, 
 and a lofty idea coming out, solely by the idea being 
 surreptitiously introduced, without any person being 
 expected to notice it. The process carried on by this 
 whole school of analysts is like that of the alchemists, 
 who, when they put earth into the retort, never could 
 get anything but earth, and could get gold only by in- 
 troducing some substance containing gold. The philo- 
 sopher's stone of this modern psychology is of the same 
 character as that employed in mediaeval physics. If we 
 jjut in only sensations, as some do, we have never any 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 47 
 
 thing but sensations, and a " dirt philosophy," as it 
 has been called, is the product. If we get gold (as cer- 
 tainly Mr. Mill does at times), it is because it has been 
 quietly introduced by the person who triumphantly 
 exhibits it. 
 
 III. Tests may he furnished to try intuitive truths. 
 From the days of Aristotle down to the present time, it 
 has been asserted that there are first truths, the support 
 of other truths, while they themselves require no sup- 
 port. Profound thinkers have systematically or inci- 
 dentally been striving to give us the marks of such 
 truths. Amidst considerable difference of nomenclature 
 and confusion of thought and statement (such as we 
 might expect in the first efforts to catch and express the 
 exact truth in so difficult an investigation), there has 
 been all along a wonderfully large amount of agreement 
 in the criteria fixed on. These have been such as self- 
 evidence, necessity, and universality. Some have fixed 
 on one, and some on another of these, as their favourite 
 testing principle, and have overlooked the others. Some 
 have employed two, overlooking the third. But these 
 three are, in fact, the tests which, in a loose or more 
 stringent form, have been announced or applied by the 
 great body of deep and earnest thinkers. It could be 
 shown that Aristotle had at least glimpses of all of them. 
 In modern times, Locke formally propounded the self- 
 evidence, referring incidentally from time to time to 
 the necessity and universality. Eeid was in the way 
 of referring, not always in a very clear or satisfactory 
 
48 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 way, to all the three. Leibnitz brought out prominently 
 the necessity ; and Kant, followed by Sir W. Hamilton, 
 conjoined necessity and universality — all three over- 
 looking the self- evidence, in consequence of their keep- 
 ing away very much from realities, and dwelling among 
 mental forms. 1 We shall find Mr. Mill employing all of 
 them, without, however, fully apprehending their char- 
 acter or seeing their significance. 
 
 As we proceed, we shall gather these tests into heads, 
 and establish their validity, and give them their proper 
 expression. We shall show that association of ideas, 
 which is supposed to work such wonders, cannot give 
 these characters to any apprehension or proposition. 
 "No experiential or derived truth can stand any one, or 
 at least the whole of these tests. A general truth dis- 
 covered by a gathered experience, as that night succeeds 
 day, cannot be said to be self-evident. Nor can it be 
 represented as having any necessity in thought, for we 
 can easily apprehend it to be otherwise. Nor can it be 
 described as universal, for the time may come when, in 
 consequence of a change of mundane arrangements, the 
 day or the night may cease. 
 
 Following out these principles, I mean, in discussing 
 the questions started by Mr. Mill, to proceed in the 
 following method : — 
 
 (1.) I allow him to try his power of analysis, according 
 to his psychological method, on all alleged fundamental 
 truth, without reserving any exception. This is what 
 
 1 These tests will be considered, infra, Chap. xii. A. historical and 
 critical review of them will be found in The Intuitions of the Mind, 
 Part i. B. ii. c. 3. 
 
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 49 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton would not have done, as he regarded 
 consciousness as deciding the whole question at once, and 
 authoritatively and conclusively. I hold that conscious- 
 ness has a most important part to act. It has to disclose 
 to us what are the ideas and convictions in the mind 
 when it begins to reflect, and what is the precise nature 
 of the elements into which we would resolve them. 
 But I admit that in the mature man all is not intuitive 
 that is spontaneous and apparently instantaneous. And 
 so I freely permit Mr. Mill to attempt to decompose any 
 idea into simpler composites. But as he does so, I claim 
 the right to sit by and watch him, lest he unconsciously 
 change the elements in the process ; and at the close I 
 carefully inquire whether he has explained all the char- 
 acteristics of the idea and conviction. 
 
 (2.) When he fails, as I believe it will be found that 
 he does fail, in regard to certain mental principles, then 
 I hold that these principles which the acute intellect of 
 Mr. Mil] cannot decompose may be regarded as ele- 
 mentary, at least provisionally so ; that is, till some 
 abler man (which is not likely to happen) makes the 
 attempt and succeeds. 
 
 (3.) I bring the alleged first truths to the test of self- 
 evidence, necessity, and universality, and when they can 
 stand these criteria, I pronounce them conclusively to 
 be original and primary and fundamental* 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 
 
 The common impression regarding Mr. Mill's phi- 
 losophy is that it needs no intuitive principles ; that 
 the author of it does not presuppose or allow that there 
 is anything innate in the mind. Some of his admirers 
 give him credit for weaving a rich fabric without any 
 material except sensations, and with no machinery 
 except experience. Mr. Mill's cavils against those who 
 support fundamental truth, and the manner in which 
 he expounds his own system, are fitted to leave this 
 impression. He begins the construction of his theory 
 with sensations; he goes on to fashion them into various 
 forms by association of sensations ; he allows among 
 the series of sensations a memory of the past, an expec- 
 tation of the future, and a power of observing coexist- 
 ences and successions, resemblances and differences 
 between sensations ; and he makes the mind as it ad- 
 vances receive powerful aid from the artificial instru- 
 mentality of language. These seem, at least to a cursory 
 observer, to constitute the matter and the agency by 
 which he ingeniously constructs the ideas, many of 
 
MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 51 
 
 tliem so grand and far-ranging, which the mind of man 
 is capable of forming. But while these seem to be the 
 original furniture of the mind and the sum of the 
 assumptions he has to make, we find if we look more 
 carefully that in rearing his fabric he is ever and anon 
 calling in other principles, some of them openly and 
 avowedly, and others unconsciously and furtively ; and 
 that these form when placed together a huge but ill- 
 fashioned and incongruous body of what are in fact, 
 whatever he may call them, intuitive principles or 
 metaphysical truth. 
 
 It will be found, indeed, that the mental analysts, 
 whose ambition it has been to reduce the original 
 capacities of the mind to a very small number, have 
 been obliged to bring in a vast body of assumptions 
 and new elements as they advance. Locke satisfied 
 himself that he had derived all our ideas from sensa- 
 tion and reflection, but then he called in faculties to 
 work upon the materials thus furnished ; he finds ideas 
 " suggested " as these powers operate ; he gives an im- 
 portant function to " intuition," and supposes the mind 
 capable of discovering " necessary " relations. Even 
 Hume, who of all metaphysicians is disposed to make 
 fewest admissions, remarks in criticising Locke, " I 
 " should desire to know what can be meant by asserting 
 " that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or passion be- 
 " tween the sexes, is not innate" (Works, vol. iv. p. 23). 
 The Sensational School made all our ideas transformed 
 sensations ; but in order to get such ideas as those 
 of personal identity, power, and duty, they quietly gave 
 
52 MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 
 
 the transforming act a power of transmuting one thing 
 into another. I am now to show how many principles 
 Mr. Mill has been obliged to call in, as he goes along, 
 in order to explain the actual phenomena of the mind 
 on his hypothesis. I must give considerable extracts in 
 order to do justice at once to his views and my argument. 
 The admissions are no doubt candidly made, and they 
 are always clearly stated. Our readers must judge as 
 to how far they affect the apparent simplicity and 
 modify the logical consistency of his system. As I 
 may have occasion to refer to them in the course of 
 the discussion, I number and designate them by the 
 letters of the Greek alphabet 
 
 a. There is an immediate and intuitive knowledge. 
 His language is express. " We do know some things 
 " immediately and intuitively" (p. 126). 
 
 /3. From the truths known by intuition, others are 
 inferred. " Truths are known to us in two ways ; some 
 " are known directly and of themselves, and some 
 " through the medium of other truths. The former are 
 " the subject of intuition or consciousness, the latter of 
 " inference. The truths known by intuition are the 
 " original premisses from which all others are inferred" 
 (Logic, Introd. § 4). 
 
 <y. Reasoning carries us hack to intuition, from which 
 it derives its ultimate premisses. He thus follows up the 
 passage last quoted : " Our assent to the conclusion 
 " being grounded upon the truth of the premisses, we 
 " never could arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, 
 " unless something could be known antecedently to 
 
MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 53 
 
 " reasoning." And in the work more immediately nnder 
 review : " Unless, therefore, we knew something imme- 
 " diately, we could not know anything mediately, and 
 " consequently could not know anything at all" (p. 126). 
 Elsewhere he says First Principles cannot be proven : 
 " To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all 
 " first principles : of our knowledge as well as of our 
 "conduct" (Utilitarianism, 1 ^. 51). 
 
 These statements are very satisfactory as to the exist- 
 ence of intuition, and the place occupied by it, and the 
 purpose served by it. He does not in these passages 
 state the grounds on which he admits intuition, nor the 
 tests by which he would try it. These, however, may 
 come out incidentally as we advance. Let us inquire 
 what he represents as exercises of intuition. 
 
 8. Consciousness is a form of intuition. This is im- 
 plied throughout, and will be shown to be so by the 
 passages quoted under other heads. 
 
 e. Whatever consciousness reveals is to he received. 
 " According to all philosophers the evidence of con- 
 " sciousness, if only we can obtain it pure, is con- 
 " elusive " (p. 1 2 6). " If consciousness tells me that I 
 " have a certain thought or sensation, I assuredly have 
 " that thought or sensation" (p. 141). 
 
 f. Consciousness and intuitive convictions are arbiters 
 from which there is no appeal. " The verdict of con- 
 " sciousness, or, in other words, our immediate and 
 " intuitive conviction, is admitted on all hands to be a 
 " decision without appeal" (p. 12 7). 
 
 7). The truth revealed by consciovtsness rests on its oura 
 
54 MB. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 
 
 evidence. " All the world admits, with our author, that 
 " it is impossible to doubt a fact of internal conscious- 
 " ness. To feel, and not to know that we feel, is an 
 " impossibility. But Sir William Hamilton is not 
 " satisfied to let this truth rest on its own evidence. 
 " He w T ants a demonstration of it. As if it were not suf- 
 " ficiently proved by consciousness itself, he attempts to 
 " prove it by a reductio ad absurdum " (p. 132). He then 
 criticises, I think justly, Sir William Hamilton's proof, 
 which he says carries us " round a long circuit to return 
 " to the point from which w r e set out." " He has deduced 
 " the trustworthiness of consciousness from the veracity 
 " of the Deity ; and the veracity of the Deity can only be 
 " known from the evidence of consciousness" (p. 138). 
 Mr. Mill himself would have the truth " rest on its own 
 " evidence." I rejoice in this appeal. Tor what is this 
 ultimate test but that of Self - Evidence, so often enun- 
 ciated, or at least referred to and implied in the writings 
 of profound thinkers, from Aristotle downwards, and 
 among others, very expressly by Locke ? Nothing can 
 be clearer or more satisfactory than Mr. Mill's language : 
 " We know intuitively what we know by its own evi- 
 " dence — by direct apprehension of the fact." 
 
 6. It is impossible to doubt or deny the facts made 
 known by consciousness. " A real fact of consciousness 
 " cannot be doubted or denied" (p. 134). What is this 
 but the other famous test of first truths, the test of 
 Necessity appealed to by Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, 
 and so many other profound thinkers of ancient and 
 modern times ? Already, then, we have the two tests of 
 
MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 55 
 
 Self-Evidence and Necessity sanctioned. In the passage 
 quoted under last head he had, as most philosophers 
 have done, mixed them up together as being intimately 
 connected. " It is impossible to doubt a fact of internal 
 " consciousness. To feel, and not to know that we feel, 
 " is an impossibility :" and so he would have the truth 
 " rest on its own evidence." The law of necessity is 
 repeatedly appealed to. " The facts which cannot be 
 " doubted are those to which the word consciousness is 
 " by most philosophers confined; the facts of internal 
 " consciousness ; the mind's own acts and affections. 
 " What we feel, we cannot doubt that we feel. It is 
 " impossible for us to feel, and to think perhaps that 
 " we feel not, or to feel not, and think perhaps that we 
 "feel" (p. 132). Sir William Hamilton has nowhere 
 made a more decisive use of the law of necessity and 
 principle of contradiction than Mr. Mill has done in 
 these passages. 
 
 i. JS T o man ever doubted of the facts of consciousness. 
 " Consciousness in the sense usually attached to it by 
 " philosophers, consciousness of the mind's own feelings 
 " and operations, cannot, as our author truly says, be 
 " disbelieved. The inward fact, the feeling in our 
 " minds, was never doubted, since to do so would be to 
 " doubt that we feel what we feel " (p. 141). As in a 
 passage previously quoted, the tests of self- evidence and 
 necessity were joined, so in this the tests of Necessity 
 and Universality (universality of conviction) are com 
 bined, and the universality is traced to. the necessity. 
 The fact " was never doubted," since to do so would be 
 
56 MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 
 
 to doubt that we feel what we feel, which is represented 
 as impossible. We thus find the tests of intuition, as I 
 cursorily sketched them in last chapter, and mean to 
 unfold them more fully in a future chapter, employed 
 by Mr. Mill, and in the very logical order in which I 
 have placed them. He makes an appeal to self-evi- 
 dence ; the truth " rests on its own evidence." He tests 
 this by the principle that " to feel, and not to know that 
 " we feel, is an imposibility." And now we find him 
 appealing to catholicity or common consent, and found- 
 ing it on necessity, the fact " was never doubted," since 
 it " cannot be disbelieved." 
 
 k. In arguing with the sceptic ice cere entitled to call in 
 the assurance of immediate knowledge as a test. " I put 
 " to him (the sceptic) the simplest case conceivable of 
 " immediate knowledge, and ask, if we ever feel any- 
 " thing ? If so, then, at the moment of feeling, do we 
 " know that we feel ? Or if he will not call this 
 " knowledge, will he deny that we have a feeling, we 
 " have at least some sort of assurance, or conviction, of 
 " having it ? This assurance or conviction is what 
 " other people mean by knowledge. If he dislikes the 
 " word, I am willing, in discussing with him, to employ 
 " some other. By whatever name this assurance is 
 " called, it is the test to which we bring all our convic- 
 " tions " (p. 126). This passage has not the logical 
 power of some of Hamilton's arguments, but it is alto- 
 gether after his manner. I have quoted it to show, that 
 Mr. Mill thinks himself justified in appealing to the as- 
 surance of consciousness as an ultimate and decisive test. 
 
MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 57 
 
 A. The revelations of consciousness, together with what 
 can be inferred from them, constitute the sum of our know- 
 ledge. "What consciousness directly reveals, together 
 " with what can be legitimately inferred from its reve- 
 " lations, composes, by universal admission, all that we 
 " know of the mind, or indeed any other thing " (p. 107). 
 I do not admit that this statement is correct, unless he 
 make consciousness synonymous with intuition, and 
 include the senses and our primitive beliefs, which also 
 contribute, and this largely, to what we know. I quote 
 it to show how deep a place our author allots to the 
 revelations of consciousness. 
 
 These admissions all relate to Consciousness, the word 
 being used, however, now in a wider and now in a 
 narrower sense ; sometimes being coextensive with intui- 
 tion, as when (see £.) he speaks of " consciousness, or in 
 " other words, immediate and intuitive conviction ;" and 
 in other passages meaning (see i.) " consciousness of the 
 " mind's own feelings and operations." In the heads 
 that follow, his admissions relate to facts it may be 
 attested by consciousness, but not beyond it. 
 
 fi. We may be sure of what we see as well as of what we 
 feel " What one sees or feels, whether bodily or men- 
 " tally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels " 
 (Logic, Introcl. § 4). This is a satisfactory statement, 
 but he afterwards detracts from it by observing that we 
 often suppose that we see what we do not see, and he 
 is evidently doubtful whether we see anything beyond 
 ourselves. This topic will require to be carefully 
 examined in a future chapter. Meanwhile I bring 
 
58 MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 
 
 forward the statement to show, that if it can be proven 
 that we do intuitively see external objects, and that 
 our intuitions of externality and extension are not 
 resolvable into anything simpler, then we must be 
 prepared to grant that the objects exist. Speaking 
 elsewhere of the " first premisses of our knowledge," he 
 says, that " being matters of fact they may be the sub- 
 " ject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of 
 " fact, namely, our senses and our internal conscious - 
 " ness" (Utilitarianism, p. 51). 
 
 v. We know existence, and make assertions aoout exist- 
 ence. Thus he places existence among his categories, 
 and does not attempt to resolve it into anything else. 
 " Besides the propositions which assert sequence or Co- 
 " existence, there are some which assert simple exist- 
 " ence," etc. {Logic, B. I. v. § 5, 6). 
 
 (■. We are capable of experiencing and knowing sen- 
 sations. We need not produce passages or references 
 to prove this, for the evidence of it runs throughout his 
 works. 
 
 o. Pleasure and pain a,re what we feel them to he, and 
 nothing else. Speaking of these he says of Hamilton, 
 that " he is not so much the dupe of words as to sup- 
 " pose that they are anything else than what we feel 
 " them to be'"' (p. 479). 
 
 ir. Extension is an essential part of the concept of hody. 
 " The truth is, that the condition of space cannot be 
 " excluded ; it is an essential part of the concept of body, 
 " and of every kind of bodies" (p. 327). This is not an 
 adequate statement, but it implies that man has at least 
 
MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 59 
 
 one necessary concept as to body, and I shall endeavour 
 to show that this cannot "be resolved into sensation or 
 association. 
 
 p. There is evidently an ultimate fact in memory. 
 " Our belief in the veracity of Memory is evidently ulti- 
 " mate : no reason can be given for it which does not pre- 
 " suppose the belief, and assume it to be well-grounded" 
 (p. 174). This statement appears in a foot-note, 1 and 
 
 1 Mr. Mill makes the admission frankly and candidly, but he was driven 
 to it by a criticism of Dr. Ward : — "I would ask of these philosophers 
 " (those who build wholly upon Experience), do they mean by ' experience ' 
 " the experience of the present moment, or do they include past experi- 
 " ence also? If they say the former, I reply it is obviously false that 
 " they do in any sense build their philosophy wholly or chiefly on experi- 
 " ence. But if they answer (as they most certainly will) that they do in- 
 " elude past experience as well as present, then again I deny their allega- 
 " tion, that they build their philosophy wholly on experience." "How 
 " can you even guess what your past experience has been ? By trusting 
 " memory. But how do you prove that those various intuitive judgments, 
 " which we call acts of memory, can rightly be trusted ? So far from this 
 " being provable by past experience, it must be in each case assumed and 
 " taken for granted before you can have any cognizance whatever of your 
 " past experience." " As it is most desirable to bring this point quite 
 " clearly home, I will cite and apply a passage in which Mr. Stuart Mill 
 " states his own philosophical doctrine. ' There is no knowledge a priori; 
 " no truths cognizable by the mind's inward light, and grounded on in- 
 " tuitive evidence. Sensation and the mind's consciousness of its own 
 " acts are not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our 
 " knowledge.' Let us test, then, by these principles an act of memory. 
 " I am at this moment comfortably warm ; but I call to mind with great 
 " clearness the fact, that a short time ago I was very cold. What datum 
 " does ' sensation' give me ? Simply that I am now warm. What datum 
 "does 'consciousness' give? that I have the present impression of 
 " having been cold a short time ago. But both these data are altogether 
 " wide of the mark. The question which I would earnestly beg Mr. Mill 
 " to ask himself is this : — What is my ground for believing that I was 
 " cold a short time ago ? ' I have the present impression of having been 
 " cold a short time ago ;' this is one judgment. ' I was cold a short time 
 " ago ; ' this is a totally distinct and separate judgment. There is no 
 " necessary, nor even any probable, connexion between these two judg- 
 " ments, — no ground whatever for thinking that the truth of one follows 
 " from the truth of the other, — except upon the hypothesis that my mind is 
 
60 J/i?. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 
 
 our author does not even try to show how it fits info i 
 his system. The justification of the principle will fall 
 under our notice under another head. Meanwhile I 
 call attention to the admission. He declares that 
 memory carries with it its own veracity, and that our 
 belief in that veracity is li ultimate," and " evidently 
 ultimate." I shall endeavour to show that the full facts 
 of memory are not embraced in this brief statement. 
 But there is much stated, and there is more implied. 
 He here concedes fully that there is a " veracity" in 
 at least one other faculty of the mind besides internal 
 consciousness, that there is a " belief" that can be trusted, 
 and that this belief is " ultimate," is in fact " evidently 
 ultimate." He who allows so much might have in- 
 quired whether there may not be other beliefs of the 
 same kind, and equally veracious, involved in the exer- 
 cise of other faculties of the mind. Mr. Mill is con- 
 stantly and terribly severe in his strictures on the 
 Intuitive School of Philosophy ; but it is clear he him- 
 self belongs to an intuitive school, without knowing or 
 at least avowing it. Admitting an intuitive conscious- 
 ness and an ultimate belief, he makes no attempt to 
 show how far they modify his empirical philosophy, 
 and he enters upon no scientific investigation of the 
 
 1 ' so constituted as accurately to represent past facts. But how will either 
 " ' sensation ' or ' consciousness,' or the two combined, in any way suffice 
 " for the establishment of any such proposition ? " (On Nature and G 
 1860, pp. 26-28). The Philosophical Introduction is the work of a 
 mind of extraordinary acuteness, and has unfolded many important philo- 
 sophical truths. Published at the same time as the first edition of my work 
 on The Intuitions of the Mind, both Dr. Ward and myself have noticed 
 curious coincidences in the two works. 
 
MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 61 
 
 nature, the laws, or the mode of operation of these ele- 
 ments of our nature. 
 
 a. The mind, whatever it be, is aware of itself, is 
 aii-are of itself as a series of feelings, is aware of itself 
 as past and present. The statements he makes are very 
 curious : " Our notion of Mind, as well as of Matter, is 
 " the notion of a permanent something, contrasted with 
 " the perpetual flux of the sensations and other feelings 
 " or mental states which we refer to it" (p. 205). " If 
 " we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are 
 " obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series 
 " of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." 
 Again, if but a series of feelings, it " can be aware of 
 itself as a series" (pp. 212, 213). I shall have to sub- 
 ject this language to a sifting examination in the two 
 next chapters, where it will be shown that it does not 
 fairly or fully embody the facts of which we are con- 
 scious. I quote it at present to show that Mr. Mill is 
 obliged to allow that there is something permanent in 
 mind, and that the mind is in a sense aware of itself 
 and of this permanence. 
 
 The above seem to be very much of the nature of 
 those first or original principles which the Intuitive 
 School of Metaphysicians, to which Mr. Mill is so much 
 opposed, are in the way of putting forward. Those 
 that I am now to state seem to be of the nature of 
 laws or faculties operating in the mind. No doubt, 
 as we are ever being told, we prove that they exist 
 by observation. But while it is by experience we 
 discover them and learn their nature, they must 
 
62 MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 
 
 operate prior to our experience, and independent 
 of it. 
 
 t. There is a native law of expectation. He tells us 
 that the psychological method which he adopts " postu- 
 " lates, first, that the human mind is capable of Expec- 
 " tation. In other words, that after having had actual 
 " sensations, we are capable of forming the conception 
 " of Possible sensations ; sensations which we are not 
 " feeling at the present moment, but which we might 
 " feel, and should feel if certain conditions were present, 
 " the nature of which conditions we have, in many cases, 
 " learnt by experience" (p. 190). Almost all meta- 
 physicians have postulated, that the mind has a capacity 
 and a tendency which prompt it to look forward from 
 the past and present to the future. They have done so 
 because internal observation shows that there must be 
 some such principle, and they have endeavoured to give 
 the proper expression of it : some describing it (unfor- 
 tunately, as I think) as an expectation that the future 
 will resemble the past ; others (also unfortunately, as I 
 think) as a belief in the uniformity of nature ; by 
 others, more philosophically, as a belief in the identity 
 of self and of other objects, together with a conviction 
 that the same agents, acting as a cause, will produce 
 the same effects. But it does not concern us at present 
 to inquire what is the accurate and adequate expression 
 of the law (this discussion will be taken up as we 
 advance) ; only, I may remark, that Mr. Mill's version 
 seems to me to be about the most defective and con- 
 fused I have met with, experience being the arbiter, for 
 
MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 63 
 
 lie makes a series of feelings, each one of which must 
 pass away before another appears, expect something of 
 itself. It is satisfactory, however, to find him crrantino- 
 that there is such a law ; and surely he cannot object 
 to others making a like postulate, and endeavouring to 
 give an account of it which they regard as being more 
 in accordance with our conscious experience. 
 
 v. There are original laios of association. The psycho- 
 logical theory " postulates, secondly, the laws of the 
 " Association of Ideas." Then follows an enumeration of 
 these laws. It is unnecessary to give it at this place ; 
 it will subsequently fall under our notice and review. 
 It does not seem to me to be the best in our language ; 
 and we shall find that he enormously exaggerates the 
 power of association. I refer to it at present to show 
 that he is admitting at this place a new law, or rather 
 group of laws operating in the mind. 
 
 cf). The mind can form very lofty ideas as to the Infinite 
 and the Absolute, In this respect he adopts deeper and 
 in some respects juster views than those of Hamilton. 
 " Something infinite is a conception which, like most 
 " of our complex ideas, contains a negative element, 
 " but which contains positive elements also. Infinite 
 " space for instance : is there nothing positive in that ? 
 " The negative part of this conception is the absence of 
 " bounds. The positive are, the idea of space, and of 
 " space greater than any finite space, so of infinite 
 " duration," etc. Again, " Absolute, in reference to any 
 " given attribute, signifies the possession of that attri- 
 " bute in finished perfection and completeness. A being 
 
64 ME. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 
 
 " absolute in knowledge, for example, is one who knows, 
 " in the literal meaning of the term, everything. Who 
 " will pretend that this conception is negative or un- 
 " meaning to us" (pp. 45, 47). This is a very just account, 
 so far as -it goes, of our apprehension of the infinite and 
 perfect 1 - — a better phrase than the absolute. Mr. Mill 
 does not say that this conception implies any intuitive 
 capacity ; in fact, he neglects to tell us how it is 
 formed. Whether ultimate or not, it is acknowledged 
 that the mind has such a conception ; and Mr. Mill, if 
 he account for it on his psychological theory, will re- 
 quire to bring in something much deeper than the sen- 
 sations and associations of sensation, from which he 
 seems to draw our ideas. 
 
 We have yet to look at some other laws which look 
 excessively like the first or ultimate truths, which 
 metaphysicians of the Intuitive School have been in the 
 way of enunciating and employing. 
 
 %. Beliefs are ultimate when no reason can he given for 
 them which does not imply their existence and veracity. 
 I have already (see p.) given the passage which autho- 
 rizes this law. After stating that belief in the veracity 
 of memory is evidently ultimate, he adds, " No reason 
 " can be given for it which does not presuppose the 
 " belief, and assume it to be well grounded." After an- 
 nouncing this principle, he might have been expected 
 to inquire whether it does not sanction other cognitions 
 
 1 I have endeavoured to show {Intuitions of the Mind, Pt. n. B. ii. c. 3) 
 that we have a positive notion of some thing as infinite, say space or time, 
 or Deity, and that we regard that thing as (1.) ever exceeding our widest 
 image or notion, and (2.) such that nothing can be added to it. 
 
MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 65 
 
 and beliefs, such as those which we have of the externality 
 and extension of bodies, and the existence of time and 
 of an abiding self. It can be shown that every attempt 
 to derive these from other elements presupposes the 
 ideas and the convictions. 
 
 -^r. There are truths implied in other truths necessarily, 
 unci according to cm ultimate law, internal or external 
 He is speaking of logical Proprium, and of its being in- 
 volved in the attribute which the name ordinarily or 
 specially connotes ; and he affirms, that " whether a 
 " Proprium follows by demonstration or by causation, it 
 " follows necessarily ; that is to say, it cannot out follow 
 " consistently with some law which we regard as a part 
 " of the constitution either of our thinking facultv or of 
 " the universe" {Logic, B. I. c. vii. § 7). As I under- 
 stand this statement, it implies that when a Proprium 
 follows by demonstration, it does so according to a law 
 which is part of the " constitution " of our " thinking- 
 faculty." The language reminds us of that of Eeid and 
 Hamilton. 
 
 co. Any assertion lulvich conflicts with the Fundamental 
 Laics of Thought is to us unbelievable, and this may very 
 possibly proceed from the native structure of the mind. 
 His language is very remarkable. He is speaking of 
 the three Fundamental Laws of Thought, — those of 
 Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and he 
 thus comments upon them : " Whether the three so- 
 " called Fundamental Laws are laws of our thoughts by 
 " the native structure of the mind, or merely because 
 " we perceive them to be universally true of observed 
 
 E 
 
60 MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 
 
 " phenomena, I will not positively decide : but they are 
 " laws of our thoughts, now and invincibly so. They 
 " may or may not be capable of alteration by experi- 
 " ence, but the conditions of our existence deny to us 
 " the experience which woidd be required to alter them. 
 :: Any assertion, therefore, which conflicts with one of 
 " these laws — any proposition, for instance, which 
 " asserts a contradiction, though it were on a subject 
 " wholly removed from the sphere of our experience, is 
 " to us unbelievable. The belief in such a proposition 
 " is, in the present constitution of nature, impossible as 
 "a mental fact" (p. 418). The language is cautious 
 and hesitating. It is evident that he woidd fain explain 
 the incapacity of believing contradictory propositions 
 by his favourite law of association. We shall see as we 
 advance that this law cannot explain our peculiar con- 
 viction, but meanwhile it is interesting to notice that 
 he will not decide whether these fundamental principles 
 mav not be " laws of our thoughts by the native struc- 
 ture of the mind." The hesitation implies a doubt of 
 the whole system of empiricism. 
 
 Some of my readers in looking at these passages thus 
 brought into convenient (or inconvenient) juxtaposition, 
 may require to be assured that I have not taken them 
 from Hamilton's works, instead of the Easamination of 
 Ham ilton and other works of Mr. Mill. And were it not 
 that in the expression of them they have not the homeli- 
 ness and depth of Eeid, nor the clinching logical grasp 
 of Hamilton,, they might be mistaken for utterances of 
 
MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 67 
 
 the two great Scottish metaphysicians. I have allowed 
 Mr. Mill to speak for himself. All that I have done is 
 to cull out the scattered statements as to ultimate truth, 
 and present them in relievo, that students of philosophy 
 may mark their significance. I mean to refer to them 
 from time to time in the coming discussion ; but I do 
 not make use of them simply as concessions by Mr. 
 Mill. I would not think it worth while employing a 
 mere argumentum ad hominem. I feel no pleasure in 
 pointing out real or seeming incongruities in the meta- 
 physical system of an eminent thinker, who, in other 
 departments, such as political economy and inductive 
 logic, has done so much to advance knowledge. I employ 
 these admissions because they contain important truth, 
 not always in the best form, but capable of being fully 
 vindicated. 
 
 Mr. Mill, I believe, would urge that many of the 
 admissions thus made are not separate and distinct 
 from each other, and that several of them might be in- 
 eluded under one head. Be it so, it is nevertheless of 
 advantage to haA r e them spread out in the several shapes 
 in which they are presented, the more so that some of 
 these imply very important principles with far-looking 
 results. 
 
 The first principles thus avowed in the course of his 
 exposition should have had a formal place allotted them 
 in the system, say at the commencement or the close. 
 Had this been done it would have utterly destroyed the 
 apparent simplicity, and I believe also the symmetry of 
 his system, which would have been seen to be a very 
 
08 MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 
 
 complex and heterogeneous one. Seemingly a continu- 
 ation of the philosophies of Hobbes, Condillac, and 
 Hume, it contains as many assumptions as are de- 
 manded by the Scottish metaphysicians, who appeal 
 to fundamental laws of thought, or by the German 
 metaphysicians, who stand up for a priori forms. 
 
 It will not be difficult to show, as we proceed to take 
 up one special topic after another, that these admissions 
 logically imply vastly more than is conceded in the 
 metaphysical system constructed. In particular, it will 
 be proven that they are made on avowed or implied 
 principles, such as those of the veracity of conscious- 
 ness, and of ultimate beliefs, such as those of self-evi- 
 dence, necessity, and universality, which require that 
 vastly more be conceded. 
 
 Already it is clear that the question between Mr. 
 Mill and the school he opposes cannot be said to be one 
 as to the existence of intuition. I am not sure that 
 any judicious defender of fundamental truth would de- 
 mand or postulate a greater number of first principles 
 than those allowed by the most influential opponent of 
 necessary truth in our day. The question is not one as 
 to the reality, but as to the nature and significance of 
 ultimate truth. 
 
 Of this I am sure, that the pressing philosophical 
 want of our day is an exposition, with an enumeration 
 and classification of the intuitions of the mind which, 
 we have seen, must be admitted even by those who are 
 supposed to deny them. It is time that those who 
 allow them incidentally should be required to avow 
 
MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 69 
 
 them openly and formally, and give a separate place 
 to them. A flood of light will be thrown on metaphy- 
 sics, and a world of logomachy between riyal schools 
 scattered, when we have an earnest attempt, by one 
 competent for the work, to unfold the laws of our 
 intuitions and their mocle of operation. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 SENSATIONS. 
 
 In the school to which Mr. Mill has attached him - 
 self, there is a perpetual reference to Sensation. Those 
 who look into their works with the view of discover - 
 ing the deeper properties or higher affections of the 
 mind, are wearied by the everlasting recurrence of 
 the word, and by the perpetual obtrusion of the thing 
 denoted by it. 1 Some members of the school seem to 
 be incapable of comprehending anything but matter, 
 and the sensations excited by matter. I bring no such 
 charge against Mr. Mill. He is clearly capable of 
 mounting into a higher and more spiritual region. 
 But even he is often dragged down to the dust of the 
 earth by the weight of the theory which he has under- 
 
 1 The mental sciences elevate those who study them in proportion as 
 they exhibit the higher faculties and ideas of the mind. This leads me to 
 remark, that in the Competitive Examinations which now exercise so great 
 an influence on the studies of our young men, care should be taken that 
 the Examiners in Morals should not be taken mainly from the Sensational 
 School, and that they be kept from so setting their questions, as to en- 
 courage the reading only of the works of writers belonging to that school. 
 In those departments in which the mental sciences have a place, they are 
 surely meant to stimulate and to test a different order of tastes and talents 
 l'rom those called forth by the physical and physiological sciences. 
 
SENSATIONS. 71 
 
 taken to support. As we are threatened with a revival, 
 under a new and disguised, and somewhat more elevated 
 form, of the Sensational system which wrought such mis- 
 chief in France at the end of last century, it is essential 
 that we inquire what sensation is, and settle what it 
 can do, and what it cannot do. In other words, let us, 
 with the internal sense as our informant, look carefully 
 at the original matter out of which Mr. Mill draws our 
 higher ideas, with the view of determining whether the 
 seed is fitted to yield such fruit. 
 
 What then is Sensation ? It is allowed on all hands 
 that it cannot be positively defined. This arises from 
 its being a simple quality, and there is nothing simpler 
 into which to resolve it. All we can do in the way of 
 unfolding its nature, is to bid every man consult his 
 consciousness when any bodily object is affecting his 
 senses or sensibility. But while we cannot furnish an 
 affirmative definition, we can offer some explanations to 
 remove misapprehensions, and some decided denials to 
 oppose accepted errors. 
 
 It should be understood that the word is employed 
 to denote an affection of the conscious mind (whatever 
 that may be), and not of the mere bodily frame. It 
 should further be borne in mind that it does not include 
 that knowledge of bodily objects, of their externality 
 and extension, which is now denoted by the phrase 
 ' sense -perception.' It is of special importance to press 
 attention to the circumstance that sensation is not a 
 separately existing object like this stone, this tree, or 
 this bird, but is an attribute of an object. At this 
 
72 SEXSATIONS. 
 
 point we are coming in collision with Mr. Mill. Else- 
 where (Logic, B. I. c. iii.) lie has an ingenious distribu- 
 tion of nameable things or realities into substances, 
 attributes, and feelings, the last of course including sen- 
 sations. " Substances are not all that exist : attributes, 
 " if such things are to be spoken of, must be said to exist, 
 " — feelings certainly exist." " Feelings, or states of con- 
 " sciousness, are assuredly to be counted among realities, 
 " but they cannot be reckoned among substances or 
 " attributes." This distribution of realities, especially 
 this separation of feelings from substances or attributes, 
 seems to me to be curious : I have not met with it else- 
 where. It is favourable to Mr. Mill's purpose, which we 
 did not so well know when we had only his work on 
 Logic, but with which we are now made fully acquainted 
 by the fuller exposition of his views in the Examination 
 of Hamilton : that purpose being to banish, to as great a 
 distance as possible, substance and attribute, and leave 
 only feelings. We are not yet sufficiently advanced, in 
 these discussions, to deal with the confused metaphysics 
 of substance and attribute. The present topic is sensa- 
 tion, and sensation I maintain is an affection, that is an 
 attribute, of the conscious mind. 
 
 But Mr. Mill tells us that " the sensations are all of 
 which I am directly conscious " (Logic, B. I. c. iii. § 7). 
 This mode of representing our conscious states was in- 
 troduced by Hume, who derived his sceptical conclusions 
 from it. He maintained that we are conscious only of 
 impressions and ideas, the ideas being merely fainter 
 impressions. Hume took care never to enter into any 
 
SENSATIONS. 73 
 
 explanation as to what lie meant "by "impression;" 
 whether it implies, as it should do if it has any mean- 
 ing, a thing impressing and a thing impressed. The 
 doctrine of the school of Mill is that we are conscious 
 merely of feelings, and among these, the first and all 
 along the main place is given to sensation. Now, in 
 opposition to these defective statements, I maintain that 
 we are conscious, not of a mere impression, but of a 
 thing impressed, not of sensation apart, but of self as 
 sentient. On hearing this statement, metaphysicians 
 will be disposed to ask with amazement, perhaps with 
 scorn, "What! are we really then conscious of self?" 
 And they will tell us that the child has never said to 
 itself, " This is I." If they think it worth while going any 
 further, they may then in condescension, or compassion 
 towards our ignorance, explain to us that the Ego is a 
 metaphysical notion, the product of advanced reflection. 
 But I disarm all this at once, by allowing that we are 
 never conscious of a self, apart from self as sentient, or 
 as engaged in thinking, willing, or some other operation. 
 And I balance this statement by another, that we are 
 just as little conscious of the sensation, or the impres- 
 sion, or the thought, or volition apart from self. The 
 child has never said to itself, " This is I ;" but just as 
 little has it said, "This is an impression;" "This is a 
 sensation." We are in fact conscious of both in one 
 concrete act ; ever conscious of self in its present affec- 
 tion, conscious of self as affected. Mr. Mill uses lan- 
 guage which implies this when he says (§ 4) that 
 " sensations are states of the sentient mind ;" and every 
 
74 SENSATIONS. 
 
 body employs like expressions if lie does not happen to 
 be upholding a special theory. He who leaves out 
 either of these elements, is not giving a correct inter- 
 pretation of consciousness. "We may, by abstraction, 
 separately contemplate the two, and important intellec- 
 tual purposes are served by such a process. Each of 
 the things we thus distinguish in thought has a real ex- 
 istence ; the one as much as the other : the sensation or 
 feeling has an existence, but so has also the self, ^ot 
 that either has a separate existence, or an independent 
 existence, or an existence out of the other. As the one 
 is an abstract, so is also the other. If you call the one, 
 say the self, a metaphysical entity, you should in con- 
 sistency describe the other, the sensation, as in the same 
 sense a metaphysical entity. The correct statement is 
 that we are conscious of the sensation as a sensation of 
 self, and of the self as under sensation. And as Ave can 
 never be conscious of the self, except as sentient or 
 otherwise affected, so we can never be conscious of a 
 sensation except as a sensation of a sentient self. It is 
 high time, when physiologists and metaphysicians are 
 drawing such perverted conclusions, to put this seem- 
 ingly insignificant and yet really important limitation 
 upon the common statement. 
 
 I am quite willing that Mr. Mill should apply the 
 sharp razor of his Psychological Method to sensation. 
 I have called in consciousness to declare what is in 
 sensation, but I do not allow consciousness to decide at 
 once, and without further inquiry, that sensations are 
 and must be primary and elementary. I freely allow 
 
SENSATIONS. 75 
 
 the mental analyst to put them in his crucible, and to 
 try if he can decompose them. No such attempt has 
 been made ; I believe no such attempt will ever be 
 made. Mr. Mill and his school acknowledge that they 
 are unresolvable and ultimate. I am glad to have one 
 element allowed, — it may prepare the way for the ad- 
 mission of others on the same title. In particular, the 
 self (I will show in next chapter) may turn out to be 
 quite as unresolvable as the sensations of self. 
 
 As so much is made of sensations by this whole 
 school of philosophy, we must be careful to inquire 
 what is really embraced in them, and not allow any- 
 thing to be drawn from them which is not truly in 
 them. It is necessary in these times to utter even such 
 a truism as this, that a sensation is a sensation, and is 
 nothing more. A sensation is not a thing extended, is 
 not extension, is not space. A sensation being only 
 momentarily under consciousness, is not the same as 
 time, which has a past and a future. A sensation is 
 not matter or body, which is extended and occupies 
 space. A sensation may be preceded by resistance, but 
 is not itself resistance, which implies one body opposing 
 the movement of another. It is important even to 
 make the further statement, that we are conscious of 
 many other mental acts and affections which are not 
 identical with sensations. A sensation is not memory, 
 say the remembrance of my reading Mr. Mill's book at 
 a particular time. A sensation is not expectation, the 
 expectation which I cherish that truth will in the end 
 prevail over error. A sensation is not an imagination, 
 
76 SENSATIONS. 
 
 as wlien I paint a glorious ideal of beauty or of virtue. 
 A sensation is not judgment, even when that judgment 
 is about sensation, as when I decide that the sensa- 
 tions produced by a noise are not so pleasant as those 
 excited by music. Certainly, sensation is not reasoning, 
 as when I argue that mere sentient affections cannot 
 yield our higher ideas and deeper convictions. Sensa- 
 tion is not even the same as emotion, as when I fear 
 that the sensational philosophy is to prevail for a time 
 in this country. A sensation is something far lower 
 than sentiment or affection, as when I would love God 
 and my neighbours, — even those from whom I differ in 
 most important points. A sensation is not a volition, 
 as when I resolve to do my best to oppose prevailing 
 error, — even when countenanced by influential names. 
 
 But may not sensation be the cause of something 
 else? I can answer this question only after giving 
 an explanation. In ordinary mundane action, an effect 
 is always the result of the operation of more than one 
 agent or antecedent. " A man," says Mr. Mill, " takes 
 " mercury, goes out of doors, and catches cold. We say, 
 " perhaps, that the cause of his taking cold was ex- 
 " posure to the air. . . . But to be accurate, we ought to 
 " say that the cause was exposure to the air while under 
 " the effect of mercury" (Loyic, B. in. c. v. § 3). I 
 agree with this doctrine of Mr. Mill (it will be ex- 
 pounded more fully in chapter xiii. of this treatise), 
 and I would apply it to the supposed causative influence 
 of sensations. Sensation may be one of the antecedents 
 which go to make up the cause, but it cannot, pro- 
 
SENSATIONS. 77 
 
 perly speaking, be a cause in itself ; it is a condition or 
 occasion, and can produce an effect only when con- 
 joined with some other agent. A sensation may be the 
 occasion of something else, — say of a violent derangement 
 of a bodily organ; but that derangement is not the 
 sensation, and in accounting for it we must look not 
 merely to the sensation, but the properties of the organ 
 affected. A sensation may, in like manner, be the occa- 
 sion of a new thought arising, but the thought should 
 not be confounded with the sensation ; the sensation 
 is not even the cause of the thought. Such a sensa- 
 tion in a plant (supposing it to be capable of feeling), 
 such a sensation in one of the lower animals, would 
 give rise to no such thought. The sensation, can ori- 
 ginate the thought only by stirring up a mental capa- 
 city in the soul, which mental potency is to be regarded 
 as the main element in the complex cause. And yet 
 this essential element is inexcusably, culpably over- 
 looked by the Sensational School, when they derive all 
 our thoughts from sensations. They make the mere 
 auxiliary or stimulating condition the producing power, 
 as if, to use a homely illustration, we should make the 
 setting of the pointer, which roused the attention of the 
 sportsman, the cause of the killing of the bird shot by 
 him. The mind of man, consciousness being the wit- 
 ness, does entertain a vast variety of ideas, some of them 
 of a very elevating character, such as those we entertain 
 of God, and good, and eternity. I doubt whether these 
 are the product of sensations in any sense. Of this I 
 am sure, that they do not proceed from sensations ex- 
 
78 SENSATIONS. 
 
 cept when sensations are employed and moulded by 
 lofty mental faculties, which faculties, and not the sen- 
 sations, are the main agents in the production of the 
 effect ; and they should have their nature, laws, and 
 modes of action unfolded by any one who would give us 
 a correct theory of our mental operations. 
 
 By insisting on such points as these, we lay an effec- 
 tual arrest on those rash speculations of our day which 
 derive man's loftiest ideas from so low and subordinate 
 an agent as sensation. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 MIND, PERSONALITY, PEESOXAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 
 
 Me. Mill admits fully the veracity of consciousness 
 and the reality of the facts attested by it (see 8, e, rj). 
 But his view of the objects of which it is cognisant is 
 very defective. It seems to be derived, through Mr. 
 James Mill and Dr. Thomas Brown, from Hume and 
 the Sensational School of France. Condillac, and those 
 who followed him, designated all the states of the mind 
 by the words sentir and sensibilite, which conveniently 
 embraced two such different things as sensations excited 
 by outward objects, and mental emotions, such as 
 hope and fear. We have no such pliable word in our 
 tongue, and Brown, who caught so much of the French 
 spirit, had to adopt a narrower phrase when he habi- 
 tually represents all states of mind as Feelings : thus he 
 speaks of " feelings of relation " and " feelings of appro- 
 bation," both of which imply judgment. Mr. James 
 Mill says, " In the very word feeling, all that is implied 
 " in the word consciousness is involved." And now we 
 rind Mr. J. S. Mill declaring " a feeling and a state of 
 
80 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 " consciousness are, in the language of philosophy" [that 
 is, in the philosophy of Thomas Brown and James Mill], 
 " equivalent expressions : everything is a feeling of which 
 " the mind is conscious ; everything which it feels, or, in 
 " other words, which forms a part of its own sentient 
 " existence." Again, " Feeling, in the proper sense of the 
 " term, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and 
 " Thought are the subordinate species" {Logic, B. I. c. iii. 
 § 3). Of course Mr. Mill is at liberty to choose his 
 own nomenclature, and use it in the signification he 
 thinks fit to attach to it. But others have an equal 
 liberty to reject it and give their reasons. It seems to 
 me an unwarrantable use of the phrase to make Feel- 
 ings embrace Thought, and I may add Volition ; and 
 those who so use it will be found, in spite of themselves, 
 and of all explanations, understanding the w T ord in its 
 habitual and proper signification ; and when all other 
 ideas and resolutions are spoken of as " feelings," the 
 impression will be left that they are part of our sentient 
 and (at best) emotional nature. 
 
 Mr. Mill claims the liberty of examining all the facts 
 of consciousness, and of resolving them if he can into 
 simpler elements. I freely grant him this power. Our 
 sensations, he grants, are simple and original. But I 
 have argued that when we are conscious of a sensation, 
 we are always conscious of self as sentient. Now I am 
 quite ready to allow Mr. Mill or any other to reduce the 
 self to something more elementary. But I am sure no 
 components, which did not contain self, could give us 
 self. Surely our perception of self could not be given 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 81 
 
 by mere sensations, that is, by sensations in which self 
 is not mixed up. We are as conscious of the self as of 
 the sensation ; and the sensation could as little give us 
 the self as the self could give the sensation. It should 
 not be forgotten that this self appears in all our other 
 mental exercises — thus showing that it is more essential 
 than our very sensations ; it is found in our memories, 
 beliefs, imaginations, judgments, emotions, and volitions. 
 We are conscious of these not separately or as abstracts ; 
 but of self as remembering, self as believing, self as 
 imagining, self as judging, self as under feeling, self as 
 willing. 
 
 This self is what I call a Person. Thus understood, 
 it is altogether correct to say that we are conscious of 
 ourselves as persons. Xot that we are conscious of 
 personality as a separate thing ; we are conscious in one 
 concrete act of this person as sentient, or as thinking, 
 or resolving:. I believe that the infant, that the child, 
 does not separate the two. Even the mature man sel- 
 dom draws the distinction unless, indeed, he be addicted 
 to reflection, or has to speak of the ego and the non ego. 
 It is onlv on our remembering; the self, and finding it 
 necessary to distinguish between the various states of 
 self, and on our discovering that there are other conscious 
 beings besides ourselves, that we ever think of forming 
 to ourselves the abstraction personality, or taking the 
 trouble to affirm that we are the same persons to-day 
 as we were yesterday,, or that we are different from all 
 other persons. 
 
 So much for our consciousness of our present self, or 
 r 
 
82 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 of ourselves as persons. The truth now evolved enables 
 us to develop the exact psychological nature of our 
 conviction of personal identity. In all our waking 
 moments we have a consciousness of a present self. 
 But in every exercise of memory we have a remembrance 
 of a past self. We remember the event as in past time. 
 We remember it as an experience of self. Thus, in re- 
 membering that we visited the London Exhibition, we 
 recollect not merely the Exhibition, but ourselves as see- 
 ing it. True, this recollection of ourselves may be very 
 faint in comparison with that of the brilliant objects 
 witnessed ; and, from laws of memory to be afterwards 
 referred to, it may very much disappear ; still it is there 
 wrapt up in one concrete act with the image of the exter- 
 nal things. In this remembrance of ourselves we have 
 more than a recollection of a past thought or a past 
 feeling, say of the feeling we had when visiting the 
 Exhibition, we remember the feeling as a feeling of self. 
 Here, as in so many other cases which will come under 
 our notice, Mr. Mill has failed to apprehend and unfold 
 all that is in the fact of consciousness. " The feeling I 
 had yesterday," is his account {Logic, B. 1. c. iii. § 2), 
 " is gone never to return ; what I have to-day is another 
 feeling exactly like the former, but still distinct from 
 it." This is not the correct statement. What I had 
 yesterday was a conscious self under one affection, say 
 grief; what I have to-day is also a conscious self under, 
 it may be, a like affection of grief, or it may be under a 
 different affection, say joy. Having thus a past self 
 brought up by memory, and a present self under con- 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 83 
 
 scion sn ess, we compare them and affirm that they are 
 the same. This is simply the expression of the fact 
 falling under the eye of consciousness. Let Mr. Mill, 
 if he choose, try his sharp analysis upon it. If he does 
 so, he will find the edge of his instrument bent back 
 as he would cut it. It is a rock, itself needing no sup- 
 port, but fitted to act as a foundation. It is a self- 
 evident truth, attained by the bare contemplation of 
 the objects ; and no one can be made to come to any 
 other decision, or to allow that he is a different person 
 now from what he was when he recollects himself at 
 some given instant in the past. 
 
 We see what is meant by personality and personal 
 identity. We can express both these, without wrapping 
 them in that awful mystery in which they have so 
 often been made to appear. Personality is the self of 
 which we are conscious in every mental act. Personal 
 identity is the sameness of the conscious self as per- 
 ceived at different times. The phrases do not point to 
 some unknown essence, apart from or behind the known 
 thing. They simply designate an essential, an abiding 
 element of the thing known. As the personality and 
 personal identity appear, we are entitled to insist that 
 they be brought out to view and expressed in every 
 proper science of psychology. One of Aristotle's defi- 
 nitions of the soul is " that (tovto) by which we live, 
 and feel, and understand." 1 Some have charged him 
 with introducing an unmeaning phrase when he men- 
 
 1 'H ijjvxy Se tovto <L ^toju.ev, /cat aio~#ai/6;U.e#a., ko.1 Sic.i'oi'O/oi.efla. Trpartas' ioare Aoyos tis 
 av elr) koX elSos, <iAA' oi>x v\r) kcX to tiiro)cet/i.6vov. — De Antrim, II. 'J. 
 
84 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 tions not only certain qualities of the soul, but a that 
 by which we exercise the qualities. But Aristotle was 
 far too comprehensive and accurate a thinker to omit 
 the tovto, by which, no doubt, he meant to designate a 
 thing, an existence, or rather a thing having existence, 
 and capable of living, feeling, understanding. As we 
 advance, we shall see that Mr. Mill is obliged to use 
 similar phrases to denote the permanent thing that 
 abides, amid the changes of attribute or exercise. In 
 ordinary circumstances, no doubt, our attention is 
 directed most forcibly to the changing element, to 
 the action and new manifestation, and may allow the 
 other, which is ever the same, to fall very much into 
 what Mr. Mill calls " obliviscence." But it is the 
 office of the careful psychologist to observe it ; to 
 bring it out from the shade in which it lies ; and to 
 give this conscious self, this remembered self, this iden- 
 tical self, the same place in his system as it has in the 
 mind of man. 
 
 We are now in circumstances to judge of Mr. Mill's 
 account of mind, and his psychological theory of the 
 nature and genesis of the idea we form of it. In fram- 
 ing these he has neglected to look carefully and 
 patiently at the actual facts of consciousness, both in 
 regard to the idea and conviction, and the elements out 
 of which he would fashion it. He acknowledges that 
 mind involves some sort of notion of what Kant calls 
 Perdurability. He begins, indeed, by telling us that " we 
 " neither can know nor imagine it, except as represented 
 " by the succession of manifold feelings which metaphy- 
 
PEESOXAL IDEXTITY, SUBSTANCE. 85 
 
 " sicians call by the name of states or modifications of 
 " mind" (p. 205). I have put in italics the words which 
 Mr. Mill uses, must use, to express the facts ; the words 
 which correspond to the tovto of Aristotle. He goes 
 on to say, " It is nevertheless true that our notion of 
 " Mind, as well as of Matter, is the notion of a perma- 
 " nent something contrasted with the perpetual flux of 
 '•' the sensations and other feelings or mental states 
 " which we refer to it ; a something which we figure as 
 " remaining the same, while the particular feelings 
 " through which it reveals its existence change." This 
 is an inadequate account of the idea and conviction 
 entertained by us in mature life. We do not refer the 
 mental states to it, we know it in a particular state. 
 We do not figure self as remaining the same, we judge 
 or decide the conscious self of to-day to be the same as 
 the conscious self of yesterday remembered by us. It 
 does not reveal itself tliroiigli feelings, we know it as 
 feeling, the one being as immediate as the other. 
 
 Xevertheless his account, though confused and never 
 exactly hitting the facts, is a very remarkable one. We 
 must look at it carefully : — " Besides present feelings, 
 " and possibilities of present feeling, there is another 
 " class of phenomena to be included in an enumeration 
 " of the elements making up our conception of mind. 
 " The thread of consciousness, which composes the 
 " mind's phenomenal life, consists not only of present 
 " sensations, but likewise in part of memories and ex- 
 " yjectations. Xow, what are these ? In themselves, 
 " they are present feelings, states of present conscious- 
 
86 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 " ness, and in that respect not distinguished from sen- 
 " sations. They all, moreover, resemble some given 
 " sensations or feelings, of which we have previously 
 " had experience. But they are attended with the 
 " peculiarity, that each of them involves a belief in more 
 " than its own existence. A sensation involves only 
 " this : but a remembrance of sensation, even if not 
 " referred to any particular date, involves the sug- 
 " gestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a 
 " copy or representation, actually existed in the past : 
 " and an expectation involves the belief, more or less 
 " positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which it 
 " directly refers, will exist in the future. Nor can the 
 " phenomena involved in these two states of conscious- 
 " ness be adequately expressed, without saying, that the 
 " belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or 
 " that I myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, the 
 " sensations remembered or expected. The fact be- 
 " lieved is, that the sensations did actually form, or will 
 " hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or 
 " threads of consciousness, of which the remembrance 
 " or expectation of those sensations is the part now 
 " present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a 
 " series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the state- 
 " ment by calling it a series of feelings which is aware 
 " of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to 
 " the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is 
 " something different from any series of feelings or pos- 
 " sibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that 
 " something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feel- 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 87 
 
 " ings, can be aware of itself as series" (pp. 212, 213). 
 This surely is an excessively roundabout and far-fetched 
 account of a very clear fact, in order to suit it to an 
 empirical theory. Making the mind " a thread of con- 
 sciousness," " a series of feelings," he is obliged to give 
 to this thread or series a set of attributes, such as that 
 it is aware of itself, in order to make it even in appear- 
 ance embrace the obvious phenomena. He prefaces the 
 above by an acknowledgment that " the theory has in- 
 " trinsic difficulties [they are those stated] which it seems 
 " to me beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to 
 " remove." The intrinsic difficulties are very much the 
 creation of the theorist. We decline certainly being 
 shut up to the position, that the mind is " a series of 
 feelings aware of itself," for if thus aware of itself, it is 
 more than a series ; the genuine fact is that the mind 
 is aware of itself as abiding. But as little do we con- 
 sent to take the other alternative, that the mind is 
 something different from the series of feelings ; it is 
 an abiding existence with a series of feelings. 
 
 He adds, " the truth is, we are here face to face with 
 " that final inexplicability at which, as Sir William 
 " Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we 
 " reach ultimate facts." As finding himself shut up to 
 such an issue, he should have exercised more patience 
 in dealing with those who, like Eeid, Kant, and Hamil- 
 ton, have been painfully striving to give an adequate 
 account of these ultimate facts. If he says they are 
 beyond investigation or expression, I meet him with a 
 direct denial. The operations are within consciousness, 
 
88 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 and we can observe and co-ordinate them. The fact is, 
 Mr. Mill himself has been trying to nnfold them, but has 
 given a very insufficient and perplexed rendering. " The 
 " true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something 
 " which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be in 
 " a manner present : that a series of feelings, the infinitely 
 " greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered 
 " up, as it were, into a single present conception, accom- 
 " panied by a belief of reality. I think, by far the wisest 
 " thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, with- 
 " out any theory as to how it takes place." This is a most 
 circuitous and inadequate, I believe, indeed, an inac- 
 curate statement of the fact. That which has ceased to 
 exist is not present, it is the remembrance, which is a 
 very different thing, that is present. The future is not 
 gathered into the present, we at the present anticipate 
 the future. We cannot, of course, give a theory of the 
 production of an ultimate fact, but we can state it 
 correctly, and even, I believe, seize and express its law. 
 Let us inquire what he makes of the fact according 
 to his Psychological Method. We shall find him accu- 
 mulating statements which bring in new ideas, without 
 his being able to reduce them even to an apparently con- 
 sistent system, or to resolve them into simpler elements. 
 " The belief I entertain that my mind exists, when it 
 " is not feeling, nor thinking, nor conscious of its own 
 " existence, resolves itself into a belief of a Permanent 
 " Possibility of these states. If I think of myself as in 
 " dreamless sleep, or in the sleep of death, and believe 
 " that I, or in other words my mind, is or will be existing 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 89 
 
 " through these states, though not iu conscious feeling, 
 " the most scrupulous examination of my belief will not 
 " detect in it any fact actually believed, except that my 
 " capability of feeling is not in that interval perma- 
 " nently destroyed, and is suspended only because it does 
 " not meet with the combination of outward circum- 
 " stances which would call it into action : the moment 
 " it did meet with that combination it would revive, and 
 " remains, therefore, a Permanent Possibility" (p. 205). 
 It could be shown that at this place we are brought 
 very nearly to the doctrine of Hume, who represents 
 the mind as " a bundle or collection of different percep- 
 tions," to which we are led, by certain tendencies, to give 
 a fictitious identity (see Works, vol. i. pp. 318-334). But 
 we have here to do not with Hume but with Mr. Mill, 
 who represents mind as a series of feelings, with a belief 
 of the permanent possibility of its states. It is admitted, 
 then, that there is more than feelings, more than even 
 a series of feelings, there is belief. Surely Mr. Mill 
 might have inquired more particularly into the nature of 
 this belief, and he might then have seen that it is quite 
 as noteworthy a phenomenon and quite as essential to 
 the mind as the very feelings themselves ; he might have 
 found that it is quite as " ultimate " as the belief in 
 the veracity in memory is acknowledged to be (see p) ; 
 or rather he might have found it involved in that ulti- 
 mate belief. 
 
 Observe how mental attributes are growing in number, 
 without an attempt to reduce them to simpler elements. 
 He seems to allow that they cannot be resolved into 
 
90 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 sensation. " They are attended with the peculiarity that 
 " each of them involves a belief in more than its own pre- 
 " sent existence. A sensation involves only this." There 
 is a ' belief/ a ' permanent ' something. Mark that 
 we have now Time. He has stolen in imperceptibly 
 (time always does so), but we should notice him now 
 that he is in ; and we are entitled to ask him what he 
 is and whence he has come ; and he is far too important 
 a personage to allow himself to be dismissed at our wish. 
 It is a permanent possibility, we decide that there may 
 be things in this enduring time. Observe what we have 
 now gathered together. We have sensations ; we have 
 a series of sensations ; we have a belief ; we have a 
 belief in time ; a belief in time as permanent, and of 
 possibilities in time. These are evidently different from 
 each other, consciousness being witness. The belief is 
 not the same as the sensations, or the series of sensations. 
 The permanence is not identical with the belief. The 
 possibility is different from the permanent. I know no 
 philosopher who has called in so many unresolved 
 instincts to account for our convictions of memory and 
 personal identity as Mr. Mill has done. His psycho- 
 logical method is multiplying, instead of diminishing, 
 ultimate elements. His system, so far from being simple, 
 is in reality very complex ; and its apparent simplicity 
 arises merely from his never summing up, or distinctly 
 enunciating, the original principles lie is obliged to 
 postulate and assume. 
 
 But I would not have objected to his system merely 
 because of its complexity, provided it had embraced all 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 91 
 
 the phenomena. But I deny that he has noticed, or 
 stated correctly, the facts of consciousness. ~No doubt 
 there is a belief; but it is a belief in my past existence, 
 conjoined with a knowledge of my present existence. 
 There is time, an idea of time, and a conviction of the 
 reality of time ; but it is in the form of a belief that I 
 existed in time past. There is more than a belief, 
 there is an immediate decision, that the present self 
 known is the same with the past self remembered. 
 There is more than an idea of mere possibility, there is 
 the assurance that I did exist at a particular time, and 
 that I who then existed do now exist. I acknow- 
 ledge, that I have no intuitive certainty that I existed 
 every moment of a dreamless sleep. I have intuitive 
 assurance that I existed when I fell asleep, and that I 
 exist now when I have awoke, and I am led by the 
 ordinary rules of evidence to believe that I existed in 
 the interval. Here it is that Mr. Mill's permanent 
 possibility of feeling comes in : I believe that had I 
 been awakened sooner I should have been consciously 
 active as I now am. But these very possibilities all 
 proceed on an intuitive remembrance of self, and an in- 
 tuitive decision as to the identity of self. 
 
 Mr. Mill labours to prove that his psychological 
 theory leaves the doctrines that our fellow-men exist, 
 and that God exists, and that the soul is immortal, 
 where it found them. For we look on other people's 
 minds as but a series of feelings like our own ; and we 
 may regard the Divine Being as " a series of the Divine 
 thoughts and feelings prolonged throughout eternity ; " 
 
92 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 and our immortal existence to be " a succession of feel- 
 ings prolonged to eternity" (p. 207-211). Now we are 
 not yet in a position to inquire (which is the all-im- 
 portant question) whether Mr. Mill's theory admits of 
 the usual arguments for the existence of our fellow-men, 
 and of God, and of an immortal life ; or whether, if it 
 cannot adopt the old arguments, it furnishes new ones. 
 But before leaving our present subject I may remark, 
 that the common doctrine, which I believe to be the true 
 one, and which I have endeavoured to enunciate philo- 
 sophically, is much more in accordance with our 
 cherished convictions and sentiments than the subtle 
 one defended by Mr. Mill. As believing that I myself 
 am more than a series of feelings, that I have a perma- 
 nent existence amid all mutations, I can, on evidence 
 being adduced of their existence, take the same view of 
 my fellow-men, of my friends, and my family ; that is, I 
 can look upon them as having not only a permanent 
 possibility of feelings but a permanent personality, round 
 which my affections may cluster, and which leads me to 
 treat them as responsible beings like myself. He says 
 elsewhere (Logic, B. in. c. xxiv. § 1) : "My belief that 
 " the Emperor of China exists is simply my belief that 
 " if I were transported to the imperial palace or some 
 " other locality in Pekin, I should see him. My belief 
 " that Julius Caesar existed, is my belief that I should 
 " have seen him if I had been present in the field of Phar- 
 " salia, or the senate-house at Eome." This is to reverse 
 the proper order of things, and to confuse all our con- 
 ceptions. Looking on ourselves as persons with a per- 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 93 
 
 manent being, on evidence produced of their existence, 
 we take the same view of the Emperor of China and 
 Julius Cresar, and thus believe that if we were in Pekin 
 we should see the one, and that if we had been in the 
 battle of Pharsalia we should have seen the other. The 
 picture presented of the Divine Being, in this new phi- 
 losophy, will appear to the great body of mankind to be 
 unattractively bare and unmeaning, or rather in the 
 highest degree shadowy, uncertain, and evanishing ; and 
 they will rejoice when they are invited to contemplate 
 Him instead as Jehovah, I am that I am, the indepen- 
 dent and self-existent One. I am not inclined to urge our 
 conviction of personality and personal identity as in 
 itself a proof of our immortality ; but in constructing 
 the cumulative argument, and cherishing the hope of a 
 life beyond the grave, I feel it satisfactory to regard 
 myself, I believe on sufficient evidence, not as a perma- 
 nent possibility of feeling, but a permanent being, the 
 same in the world to come as in this. 
 
 We may now combine the results which we have 
 reached. In every conscious act we know an existing 
 thing, which when we begin to reflect we learn to call 
 self, manifesting itself in some particular way which we 
 are taught to regard as an attribute. Again, in all 
 remembrance, we recollect self as exercising some par- 
 ticular attribute in time past, and we know self as now 
 remembering ; and on comparing the tAvo we decide that 
 they are the same. This is a bare statement of the facts, 
 as they daily present themselves. I defy Mr. Mill, or 
 any other mental analyst, to reduce these facts of con - 
 
94 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 sciousness to fewer or simpler elements. In all con- 
 sciousness, I have a knowledge of self as a person ; in 
 all remembrance, a recollection of self as a person ; 
 and in the comparison of the two a perception of their 
 identity. 
 
 And let it be observed, that both in the conscious 
 self and the recollected, we have the self perceived by 
 us as operating in a great number of ways, with thoughts 
 and emotions in infinite variety. We come too to dis- 
 cover (in a way which will come under our notice below) 
 that there are other beings besides ourselves, w T ho have 
 the same personality and identity, and the like incal- 
 culable number and diversity of ideas, wishes, and 
 feelings. As we begin to reflect on all this, and as we 
 would speak about it, and make ourselves intelligible, we 
 find it convenient to have a word to denote that which 
 abideth in us, and is the same in us and in others. 
 We have such a word in Substance, and we say that 
 ' mind is a substance.' In saying so, we mean nothing 
 more than this, that in us and in others there is (1.) 
 an existing thing; (2.) operating; (3.) with a permanence. 
 But in saying this, we say much, that is, w T e make a 
 statement full of meaning. By multiplying words of 
 description or explanation we should only confuse and 
 perplex the subject, which may be clearly discerned if 
 only we look steadily at it, and weigh the several parts 
 which make up the indissoluble whole. 
 
 And here I feel myself called on to state that no 
 doctrine of modern philosophy, not even the ideal theory, 
 or theory of representative ideas, so condemned by Keid 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 95 
 
 and exposed by Hamilton, has wrought such mischief 
 in speculation as that of Locke in regard to substance- 
 His statements on this subject are unsatisfactory through- 
 out, and when they were attacked by Stillingfleet he de- 
 fended them by a sparring and fencing unworthy of such 
 a lover of truth ; he employed himself in repelling the 
 objections of his opponent, instead of seeking to make 
 his own views clearer. " So that if any one will examine 
 " himself concerning the notion of pure substance in 
 " general, he will find he has no other idea of it at 
 " all, but only a supposition of he knows not what 
 " support of such qualities, as are capable of producing 
 " simple ideas in us" (Essay, B. n. c. xxiii. § 2). In 
 the controversy he affirms and re-affirms that he does 
 not deny the existence of substance, or that we have an 
 idea of it, and is very indignant with Stillingfleet for 
 saying that he does. But he makes it to be " the sup- 
 port," but " unknown " support of qualities. As the 
 support was something unknown, Berkeley in the next 
 age did a good service to philosophy by discarding it 
 altogether, so far as matter is concerned. But in the suc- 
 ceeding age the avenger came, and Hume took away the 
 unknown substratum from mind, as Berkeley had done 
 from body. Eeicl rushed in to save fundamental truth ; 
 but he did not show his usual shrewdness and wisdom 
 when he retained Locke's " substratum," and argued so 
 tenaciously that the known quality intuitively suggests 
 an unknown substance. We should have been saved a 
 world of confused and confusing controversy if Eeid, 
 when abandoning Locke's " idea," had also rejected his 
 
96 MIND, PERSONALITY, 
 
 " unknown support of qualities." Kant met the Scottish 
 sceptic in a still more unsatisfactory manner, when he 
 allowed that by the outward senses and by the internal 
 consciousness we perceive only the phenomenon, and then 
 referred us to some noumenon beyond. In the schools 
 which have ramified from Kant, the question has ever 
 since been, Is there merely a phenomenon, or is there a 
 noumenon also ? Sir William Hamilton in this, as in 
 so many other topics, has endeavoured to combine Eeid 
 and Kant. He identifies the phenomenon of the German, 
 with the quality of the British, philosophy ; he argues 
 that the quality implies the substance, and the pheno- 
 menon the noumenon, but makes the substratum or 
 noumenon unknowable. Mr. Mill takes much directly 
 or indirectly from Hume ; he favours in Kant all that 
 is destructive ; he allows to Hamilton all his negative 
 positions : and so we find him building on the miserably 
 defective views which they have given of substance. 
 " As our conception of body is that of an unknown 
 " exciting cause of sensations, so our conception of mind 
 " is that of an unknown recipient or percipient of 
 " them, and not of them alone, but of all our other 
 " feelings. As body is the mysterious something which 
 " excites the mind to feel, so mind is the mysterious 
 " something which feels and thinks " {Logic, B. I. c. iii. 
 S 8). He finds no great difficulty, as Hume had done 
 before him, in putting aside this unknown and myste- 
 rious something. And it is high time, I think, that 
 those metaphysicians who defend radical truth should 
 abandon this unknown and unknowable substratum or 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 97 
 
 nouinenon, which has ever been found a foundation of 
 ice, to those who would build upon it. Sir William 
 Hamilton having handed over this unknown thing to 
 faith, Mr. Herbert Spencer has come after him, and 
 consigned religion to it as to its grave, — and there, it 
 ruay safely be said, it will disturb no one, not even by 
 sending out a ghost from its gloomy chambers. 
 
 We never know quality without knowing substance, 
 just as we cannot know substance without knowing 
 quality. Both are known in one concrete act. We 
 may, however, separate them in thought. In contem- 
 plating any given object, such as the thinking self, Ave 
 may distinguish between the ' thinking ' which changes, 
 and the ' existence ' which abideth. As both are known 
 in the concrete, so both may be said to have an existence, 
 not an independent existence, but an existence in, or 
 in connexion with, each other. The one always implies 
 the other, that is, the thinking always implies a thinking- 
 existence, and the thinking existence is always exercised 
 in some thought.. Mr. Mill gets a momentary glimpse 
 of this doctrine, but does not follow it out. " We 
 " can no more imagine a substance without attributes, 
 " than we can imagine attributes without a substance " 
 (logic, B. i. c. iii. § 6). Taking this view, we cannot 
 without protest allow persons to speak of substance as 
 being something unknown, mysterious, lying far down in 
 a depth below all human inspection. The substance is 
 known, quite as much as the quality. True, the sub- 
 stance is never known alone, or apart from the quality, 
 but as little is the quality known alone, or apart from a 
 
 G 
 
98 MIFD, PERSONALITY, 
 
 substance. Each should have its place, its proper place, 
 neither less nor more, in every system of the human 
 mind. 
 
 Much the same maybe said of 'phenomenon' and 
 1 noumenon,' which, however, have a still more mysteri- 
 ous meaning than ' quality' and ' substance.' Pheno- 
 menon means an appearance, but appearance is an 
 abstract from a concrete ; we never see an appearance 
 apart from a thing appearing. It is the object appearing 
 to the subject seeing it. If the phrase is to be retained 
 in philosophy, let us understand what is meant by it. 
 Let us not as we employ it deceive ourselves by imagin- 
 ing that we have, or can have, an appearance apart from a 
 thing appearing. A phenomenon is a thing manifesting 
 itself to us, as a quality is a thing in action or exercise. 
 As to the ' noumenon,' it is not so easy to determine what 
 can be meant by it. If it signifies the thing perceived 
 by the mind, this is neither less nor more than the phe- 
 nomenon. If it means a thing perceived by no mind, 
 I allow that there are certainly things existing not per- 
 ceived by the human mind, but then these things may 
 be perceived by other minds, — I suppose must certainly 
 be perceived by the Divine Mind. But if the nou- 
 menon means something acting as the ground of the 
 thing manifesting itself, or behind it as a support, I 
 declare that we have no evidence of there being such a 
 thing, and I can see no purpose, philosophical or prac- 
 tical, to be served by it in the way of hypothesis or 
 otherwise. Here Mr. Mill seems to me altogether right : 
 <: This unknown something is a supposition without evi- 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 99 
 
 dence." But I abandon it, because we have a known 
 something ; in the case of mind a thing existing, acting, 
 and permanent. 
 
 But then it is said we do not know the thing in itself 
 (Ding an sich). It is high time to insist on knowing 
 what is meant by this phrase, taken from Kant, and 
 with which of late years so many metaphysicians have 
 been conjuring. It cannot be allowed to play a part 
 any longer till it explains itself. It seems full of mean- 
 ing, and yet I believe that if we prick it, it will be 
 found to be emptiness. I understand what is meant 
 by the thing; it is the object existing. But what is 
 meant hy in itself? I acknowledge no itself beside, or 
 besides, or beyond the thing. I confess to be so stupid, 
 as not to be able to form any distinct idea of what is 
 meant by the thing in itself. If it mean that the thing, 
 the whole thing, is within the thing, I have about as 
 clear a notion of what is signified as I have of the whale 
 that swallowed itself. If it mean that there is a thing, 
 in addition to the thing as it manifests itself, and as it 
 exercises property, I allow that, for aught I know, there 
 may be many such things. My knowledge of the thing, 
 of all things, nay, of any one thing, is confessedly 
 limited. As to what may be beyond the phenomenon, 
 the thing as it appears to me, and to others who may 
 report to me, I venture to say nothing, as I can know 
 nothing about it. But believing that no other man 
 knows anything about it any more than I do, I pro- 
 test against its being represented as being a support 
 of the thing known, or in any way essential to it. 
 
100 MIXD, PERSONALITY, ETC. 
 
 Though I were to get new faculties and know that 
 great unknown, I am not sure that it would make the 
 thing known the least clearer, in any way more mys- 
 terious or less mysterious than it now is. As it is con- 
 fessedly unknown, I can trace no relation of dependence, 
 or of anything else between it and the known. Lying 
 as it does in the region of darkness which compasses 
 the land of light, I think it best to leave it there. 
 
 We are thus brought to the doctrine which commends 
 itself to our first thoughts, that we know self imme- 
 diately as existing, as in active operation, and with 
 a permanence. This primitive knowledge furnishes a 
 nucleus round which we may gather other information 
 by experience and by reasoning, till we come at last to 
 clothe mind with qualities so many and varied that it 
 is difficult to classify them. I confess I grudge the 
 school of Comte the epithet ' Positive.' It is a title 
 which they have no right to appropriate to their crude 
 system, which observes only the more superficial facts 
 in these two wondrous worlds of mind and matter. I 
 have in these two last chapters stated what I believe 
 to be the true positive doctrine in regard to mind, that 
 is, the expression of the facts without addition or omis- 
 sion or hypothesis. 
 
CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 BODY. 
 
 We have now to face a more perplexing subject, the 
 idea and conviction which we have in regard, to an ex- 
 ternal world, the way in which we reach these, and the 
 objective reality involved in them. In this border 
 country there has been a war for ages in the past, and 
 there is likely to be a war for ages in the future. There 
 are real difficulties in the inquiry arising from the cir- 
 cumstance that conscious mind and unconscious matter 
 are so different — while yet they have an evident mutual 
 relation, and also from the apparent deception of the 
 senses ; and speculators have gathered an accumulation 
 of imaginary ones by their refined and elaborate specu- 
 lations, so that now there are not only the original 
 obstacles in the way, but a host of traditional feuds. I 
 cling to the conviction that there is a doctrine of natural 
 realism, which, if only we could seize and express it, 
 will be found encompassed with fewer difficulties than 
 any far-fetched or artificial system. 
 
 Sir "William Hamilton has given us a very elaborate 
 classification of the theories of sense- perception. It is 
 
102 BODY. 
 
 not needful to follow him in this treatise. But in order 
 to correct errors and prepare the way for a fair discus- 
 sion, it may serve some good purposes to look at the 
 account given, of the steps involved, by the three British 
 metaphysicians who have given the greatest attention 
 to the subject. To begin with Dr. Thomas Eeid. Ac- 
 cording to him, there is, first, an action or affection of the 
 organism ; there is, next, a sensation in the mind ; thirdly, 
 this sensation as a sign, suggests intuitively an external 
 object. The two points on which he dwells chiefly are, 
 first, that there is no idea between the external object 
 and the mind perceiving ; and secondly, that we reach 
 a belief in the external world intuitively, and not by 
 any process of reasoning. " This conviction is not only 
 " irresistible, but it is immediate ; that is, it is not by 
 " a train of reasoning and argumentation that we come 
 " to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive" 
 {Works, p. 259). I believe that he has established his 
 two points successfully, and in doing so he has rendered 
 immense service to philosophy. Dr. Thomas Brown 
 gives a different account of the operation. There is 
 first, as in the other theory — indeed in all theories, an 
 affection of the bodily frame ; secondly, a sensation in 
 the mind ; and thirdly, a reference of that to an external 
 object as the cause. He calls in two general mental 
 laws to give us the reference. The first is an intui- 
 tive law of cause and effect, which impels us when Ave 
 discover an effect to look for a cause. We have a sen- 
 sation of resistance, of which we discover no cause with- 
 in the mind, and therefore we look for it beyond the 
 
BODY. 103 
 
 mind. The second law, of which he makes large nse, 
 is that of suggestion, which connects sensations, so that 
 one becomes representative of others. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mill are for ever criticis- 
 ing these two doctrines, but it may be doubted whether 
 either has given a clear and correct exposition of them. 
 Hamilton, when he commenced his edition of Eeicl, 
 thought that philosopher's views were the same as his 
 own (we shall see wherein they differ immediately) ; as 
 lie advances, he sees that this is not the case ; and he 
 nowhere gives us a precise account of Eeid's theory, 
 which, whether well founded or not, is consistent and 
 easily understood. As to Brown, Hamilton is for ever 
 carping at him, as if he had a cherished determination 
 to remove his system out of the way, as one that opposed 
 the reception of his own. The circumstance that neither 
 Eeid's theory nor Brown's theory would quite fit into 
 his compartments, is a proof that Hamilton's classifica- 
 tion of theories, though distinguished by great logical 
 power, is not equal to the diversities of human concep- 
 tion and speculation. He clearly does injustice to 
 Brown, by insisting on making him an idealist — he 
 makes him a cosmothetic idealist. Now there is no 
 idea in Brown's system, as there was in the older 
 theories. He made great use of sensation, and was in 
 great difficulties when he attempted to show how, from 
 this sensation, we could infer an external world ; but 
 the sensation is an existing, and not an imaginary thing- 
 like the idea ; and the sensation was held by him to be 
 an effect, but not at all a representative, of an external 
 
104 BODY. 
 
 and extended object. Mr. Mill, in criticising Hamilton's 
 criticism, would make Eeid an idealist (p. 177). This 
 is obviously a mistake. Eeid did call in a sensation 
 as a sign, but it was not supposed to be representative, 
 that is, to bear any resemblance or analogy like the old 
 idea to the external object. All that is asserted of it 
 is that we are conscious of it, which we are not of the 
 idea, and that it suggests a belief in an external object 
 intuitively, and by the appointment of Him who gave 
 us our constitution. Mill represents Eeid and Brown 
 as holding substantially the same doctrine : " The dif- 
 " ference between them is extremely small, and, I will 
 " add, unimportant" (p. 175). Eeid held that we never 
 could reason from the sensation within to the extended 
 object without. Brown labours to show that the whole 
 process is one of ordinary inference, proceeding always on 
 the intuitive law of cause and effect, aided by the asso- 
 ciation of ideas. But Mr. Mill tells us that " Brown also 
 " thinks that we have, on the occasion of certain sensa- 
 " tions, an instantaneous conviction of an outward object" 
 (p\ 164). I am surprised at such a statement from one 
 who has imbibed so much from Brown, who so clearly 
 represents the process as involving inference. "We find 
 everywhere such passages as the following : " Percep- 
 " tion, then, even in that class of feelings by which 
 u we learn to consider ourselves as surrounded by sub- 
 " stance, extended and resisting, is only another name, as 
 " I have said, for the result of certain associations and 
 " inferences that flow from other more general principles 
 " of the mind" (Lectures, xxvi.) I call the theory of Brown 
 
BODY. 105 
 
 (which is taken from the Sensational School of France) 
 the Inferential, as distinguished from the Ideal theory on 
 the one hand, and the Intuitive theory on the other, 
 
 Hamilton's doctrine differs both from that of Eeid 
 and Brown. It is, that there is first an action of the 
 organism, and secondly, a simultaneous sensation and 
 perception. He labours particularly to show that sense- 
 perception being evoked, there is nothing between it 
 and the object, no sensation, no idea ; but that we gaze 
 at once on the object, in fact are conscious of it, con- 
 scious at one and the same time of the ego and the non 
 ego. Between this and Brown's doctrine there is an 
 irreconcilable difference. Brown makes the process 
 one of inference, implying, no doubt, an intuition, but 
 an intuition of a general character bearing on all other 
 mental operations. Hamilton makes the perception 
 primitive, and original, and immediate. Hamilton also 
 differs from Eeid, but the point is not so important. 
 Eeid makes the sensation precede the perception; 
 whereas Hamilton, in accordance, I think, with the 
 revelations of consciousness, makes them contempor- 
 aneous. Both make the operation intuitive and not 
 inferential. This doctrine of Hamilton is not without 
 its difficulties. It leaves many points unexplained — 
 perhaps they are ultimate and cannot be explained 
 — possibly they are so simple that they do not need 
 explanation. It does not profess to show hoiv the preced- 
 ing organic affection is connected with the mental per- 
 ception. Perhaps the human faculties cannot clear up 
 the subject. Possibly the question itself may be un- 
 
106 BODY. 
 
 meaning, for there may be no hoiv to ask about, no 
 connexion except this, that the cognitive mind is so 
 constituted as to know the bodily frame with which 
 it is so intimately connected. This doctrine, as it is 
 the most simple, seems to me to be upon the whole the 
 most truth-like, that has yet been propounded. It does 
 not profess to clear up all mysteries, but it embraces 
 the acknowledged facts, and it starts no hypotheses. I 
 regret the dogmatism which the author displays in 
 asserting it. I do not agree with him in thinking that 
 it can be established at once by an appeal to conscious- 
 ness. But embracing as it does only facts, I am in- 
 clined to adhere to it, till some facts not contained in 
 it be ascertained by physiology or pyschology, or the 
 two combined. I am certainly not disposed to abandon 
 it for so hypothetical a doctrine as that adopted by Mr. 
 Mill and elaborated by Professor Bain. 
 
 In the mature man we find certain ideas, beliefs, 
 and, I would add, judgments. I readily allow all of 
 these to be subjected to an analysis. Mr. Mill is quite 
 justified in declaring that " we are not at liberty to 
 " assume that every mental process which is now as un- 
 " hesitating and rapid as intuition was intuition at its 
 " outset" (p. 144). At present we have to look at the 
 ideas and convictions which we entertain in regard to 
 the external world. I allow at once that " we have no 
 " means of now ascertaining by direct evidence, whether 
 " we were conscious of outward and extended objects 
 " when we first opened our eyes to the light" (p. 147). 
 I am willing, therefore, to consider Mr. Mill's theory of 
 
BODY. 107 
 
 the genesis of our apprehension and belief. His theory 
 seems to be, that we can get them by means of sensa- 
 tions and associations of sensation. " All we know of 
 " objects is the sensations they give us, and the order of 
 " the occurrence of these sensations." " Of the outward 
 " world we know and can know absolutely nothing, ex- 
 " cept the sensations we experience from it" (Logic, B. I. 
 c. iii. § 7). The result reached by him is, that " matter 
 may be defined a permanent possibility of sensation" 
 (p. 198). He does not commit himself, but he is not 
 averse to the idea that " the non ego altogether may be 
 but a mode in which the mind represents to itself the 
 possible modifications of the ego" (p. 189). 
 
 In the discussion which is forced upon us by this 
 doctrine, which at first sight seems so strange, there are 
 two points to be specially attended to : First, is Mr. 
 Mill's account of the ideas and convictions which we 
 have concerning body correct ? Under this head our 
 appeal must be to consciousness. I believe that it de- 
 clares that Mr. Mill, in his analysis, commonly leaves 
 out the main element. A second question has to be 
 answered, Does Mr. Mill's hypothesis explain all that 
 is in our apprehension and belief? In answering 
 this question we must be careful not to allow him to 
 do, what Mr. Crosse and M. Pouchet are suspected of 
 having done in professing to establish the doctrine of 
 spontaneous generation by experiment. Mr. Crosse is 
 alleged to have had the germs of the acari produced by 
 him in his carelessly cleaned vessels ; and M. Pouchet 
 to have had the germs from which he derived animals 
 
108 BODY. 
 
 in the putrescent matter. Certain it is, that when other 
 persons performed the same experiments as Mr. Crosse, 
 taking care to exclude all organized bodies, no animals 
 were produced ; and M. Pasteur maintains that, if you 
 allow him to destroy the germs in the putrescent fluid, 
 no life will appear. Now, we must keep a strict watcli 
 on Mr. Mill, lest he be guilty of a like oversight in de- 
 riving all our ideas and convictions from so few germs. 
 As we do so, we shall find that in order to prop up the 
 theory, which he professes to rear on so narrow a basis, 
 he is obliged to add buttress after buttress in the shape 
 of new ideas and implied faculties. In particular, we 
 shall find him guilty of a very grave logical mistake : 
 he is ever assuming, without perceiving it, the idea 
 which he professes to explain. In admitting the vera- 
 city of memory, he himself lays down a most important 
 principle, that we should assume the belief " for which 
 " no reason can be given which does not presuppose the 
 " belief, and assume it to be well-grounded." We shall 
 find that in unfolding his theory of the genesis of our 
 ideas of body he neglects this rule, and without being 
 aware of it, assumes the ideas of Externality, and 
 Eesisting Force, and Extension, which he is seeking to 
 generate and explain by a circuitous process. Let us 
 look at these ideas in the order now mentioned. 
 
 (1.) WJiat is implied in Externality 1 Mr. Mill says 
 we are aware of ourselves as a series. If I were in- 
 clined to adopt this representation, I would say that by 
 externality we mean a something without and beyond 
 the series. But I have objected to this account as 
 
BODY. 109 
 
 inadequate. I have endeavoured to show that in all 
 mental action, even in sensation, there is a perception 
 of self as existing, that in memory there is a remem- 
 brance of self, and that we proclaim the present self 
 and the remembered self identical. ISTow, by an exter- 
 nal object I mean a thing existing but not this self, a 
 thing different from this permanent and identical self. 
 I believe that our first perceptions of externality are 
 derived from things apprehended as extended, as having 
 a direction and stretching away in space. But as this 
 involves extension, the consideration of it falls under 
 next head. For the present we must look at externality 
 simply as denoting an existing thing, different from, 
 and not part of, the ego known by self-consciousness. 
 Mr. Mill admits that every man comes to entertain 
 some such apprehension. " I consider them (the sen- 
 " sations) to be produced by something not only existing 
 " independently of my will, but external to my bodily 
 " organs and my mind" (Logic, B. I. c. iii. § 7). I am 
 here to examine his account of the generation and the 
 nature of this idea and conviction. I have found great 
 difficulty in handling the subject, owing to the gossamer 
 character of the theory, which is far too subtle and in- 
 genious to be solid or true. 
 
 In conducting this whole discussion, we must be on 
 our guard against being misled by an ambiguity in the 
 use of the phrase ' outward world.' It may mean the 
 world out of the conscious mind — this I venture to call 
 the extra-mental world ; or it may mean the world be- 
 yond the body— this, for distinction's sake, I call the 
 
110 BODY. 
 
 extra- organic world. I am not sure that Mr. Mill, or 
 Mr. Bain who helps him to develop his system, have 
 escaped the perplexities thus arising. I insist that they 
 are not at liberty to assume the existence of the bodily 
 frame, and then and thus account for the idea of a 
 world beyond. Assuming only a series of sensations 
 aware of itself, they must thence generate something 
 exterior. 
 
 Mr. Mill thus gets the idea of externality : — " I see a 
 " piece of white paper on a table. I go into another 
 " room, and though I have ceased to see it, I am persuaded 
 " the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations 
 " which it gave me ; but I believe that when I again 
 " place myself in the circumstances in which I had 
 " those sensations, that is, when I go into the room, I 
 " shall again have them ; and further, that there has 
 " been no intervenino; moment at which this would not 
 " have been the case. Owing to this law of my mind, 
 " my conception of the world at any given instant con- 
 "" sists, in only a small proportion, of present sensations. 
 " The conception I form of the world existing at any 
 " moment comprises, along with the sensations I am 
 " feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation" 
 (p. 192). I wish Mr. Mill would employ language con- 
 sistent with his theory, and we should then be in a posi- 
 tion to judge whether he is building it up fairly. As yet 
 we know nothing of " white paper," " a room," " another 
 room ; " least of all can we be aware of beiug placed in 
 " circumstances :" all which certainly imply the very ex- 
 ternality he is seeking to gender. We may believe that 
 
BODY. Ill 
 
 Mr. Mill does not forget, but it is necessary to warn his 
 readers against forgetting, that we have yet only one 
 sensation succeeding another. He refers to " a law of 
 mind." The law he postulates is, " that the human 
 " mind is capable of Expectation. In other words, that 
 " after having had actual sensations, we are capable of 
 " forming the conception of possible sensations" (p. 190). 
 It is one of the many postulates he is ever making. 
 His assumptions are far from being the fewest and the 
 simplest fitted to explain the phenomena. If he had 
 postulated that in every act of sense-perception we ap- 
 prehend a something external, the facts would have 
 been explained much more satisfactorily. But let us 
 go on with his explication. He calls attention to the 
 circumstance, that " the sensations are joined in groups," 
 so that " we should have, not some one sensation, but a 
 " great and even an indefinite number and variety of 
 " sensations, generally belonging to different senses, 
 " but so linked together that the presence of one 
 " announces the possible presence, at the same instant, 
 " of any or all the rest" (p. 194). But let it be observed 
 that w T e do not yet know that the sensations belong to 
 different senses, or come from different parts of the 
 body, and the groups of sensations can no more give us 
 externality than the individual sensations. But then 
 " we also recognise a fixed order in our sensations." 
 We have not yet cause and effect, but we have " an 
 " order of succession which, when ascertained by obser- 
 " vation, gives rise to the ideas of cause and effect." 
 " Whether we are asleep or awake the fire goes out, and 
 
112 BODY. 
 
 " puts an end to one particular possibility of warmth 
 " and light. Whether we are present or absent, the 
 " corn ripens and brings a new possibility of food." I 
 have again to remind Mr. Mill's readers that we do not 
 yet know that we have bodies to sleep or wake ; the 
 sleeping and waking, the fire and the corn, are all in us 
 as sensations. The "present" and the "absent" slip 
 in very dexterously ; but as yet we know no place at 
 which we are present, or from which we may be absent. 
 The incipient cause and effect are as yet mere ante- 
 cedence and consequence within the mind. 
 
 " When this point has been reached, the Permanent 
 " Possibilities in question have assumed such unlikeness 
 " of aspect, and such difference of position relatively to 
 " us, from any sensations, that it would be contrary to 
 " all we know of the constitution of human nature 
 " that they should not be conceived as, and believed to 
 " be, at least as different from sensations as sensations 
 " are from one another" (p. 196). Still, all is within the 
 thread of consciousness. But then it is said there is 
 something in our " constitution" that makes us believe 
 the possibilities to be different from sensations. I am 
 glad of an appeal to our constitution, in which there is 
 more, I believe, than Mr. Mill has unfolded. Yet I fear 
 that the actual appeal is in no way complimentary. 
 Our constitution makes us believe this "possibility" 
 of sensations to be different from the sensations. But 
 Mr. Mill does not say, and would not say, that our 
 constitution is right in all this, or that there is any 
 reality corresponding to the belief. I am not quite 
 
BODY. 113 
 
 sure to what law of our constitution he refers. If it be 
 his favourite principle of association of sensations, it is 
 clear that it cannot help him, for the associated sensa- 
 tions are all in the mind ; and if a train of sensations 
 could give us (which, I believe, it cannot) what is not 
 in the ideas, it must be in virtue of some power in 
 the train which is not unfolded. If he mean the ten- 
 dency, on which he dwells so much elsewhere, to give 
 an external reality to things within, I admit that there 
 is such a tendency in loose thinking ; but then it is in 
 minds that have already reached a knowledge of some- 
 thing outward, and it is for Mr. Mill to show, which 
 would be difficult, that it could exist in a mind that as 
 yet had no idea of externality. I cannot see that by 
 either process Mr. Mill has got the conception of an 
 outward world, and I am sure that neither process would 
 justify our belief in the reality of such a world. A be- 
 lief generated by an accidental or fatalistic association 
 might be error quite as readily as truth, and the dis- 
 position to give an external embodiment to internal 
 feelings is avowedly illusory. Already we see those 
 flaws in the foundation which render the whole struc- 
 ture insecure, and make it impossible for man to be 
 certain that he can reach any truth beyond the con- 
 sciousness of the present sensation. 
 
 Our author now crosses at one leap the widest gulf 
 of all. " We find that they (possibilities of sensation) 
 " belong as much to other human or sentient beings as 
 " ourselves." " The world of possible sensations, succeed- 
 " ing one another according to laws, is as much in other 
 
114 BODY. 
 
 " beings as in me, it has therefore an existence outside 
 " me ; it is an external world." But where in the pro- 
 cession of internal feelings which has passed before us 
 can other human beings come in ? "I conclude that 
 " other human beings have feelings like me ; because, 
 " first, they have bodies like me, which I know in my 
 " own case to be the antecedent condition of feelings ; 
 " and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts and other 
 " outward signs which in my own case I know by ex- 
 " perience to be caused by feelings." Doubtless, if we 
 had got our bodily frames as out of ourselves, the argu- 
 ment might have been conclusive. He tells us that we 
 observe bodies which do not call up sensations in our 
 consciousness ; and since they do not do so in my con- 
 sciousness, I infer that they do it out of my conscious- 
 ness. The inference might be legitimate, provided we 
 had otherwise got an apprehension of things out of and 
 beyond the consciousness. All reasoning is usually said 
 to be from what we know ; but in this inference we 
 have in the conclusion what is not in the premisses. 
 Or, if we take Mr. Mill's theory of reasoning, that it is 
 from particulars to particulars, by some sort of registered 
 observation, the argument is seen to be equally falla- 
 cious ; for we have no register of objects out of ourselves 
 to authorize us to infer that these possibilities constitute 
 an external world. I am not at all sure that Mr. Mill 
 (p. 207) has cause to condemn Eeid, when he main- 
 tains that a like position taken by Hume lands us in a 
 system of solitary egoism, or, as Mr. Mill expresses it, 
 that " the non ego altogether may be but a mode in 
 
BODY. 115 
 
 i{ which the mind represents to itself the possible rnocli- 
 " fications of the ego." I am convinced that it is not by 
 such a process, that babies come to believe in the exist - 
 ence of those who nurse them and are round about 
 them. So far as I can see, ^Ir. Mill has never logically 
 got out of the shell of the ego ; nor can I see how any 
 one can get out of it, except by means of an original 
 impulse. I suspect that in Mr. Mill's belief of the exist- 
 ence of his fellow-men, for whose benefit he has written 
 so many able volumes, there is involved a spontaneous 
 step more convincing than his reflex logic. 
 
 The conclusion reached is : " Matter may be defined, 
 a permanent possibility of sensation" (p. 198). We 
 shall not be in circumstances thoroughly to examine 
 this definition till we have fully unfolded, in the next 
 two heads,, the nature of our perceptions of Resistance 
 and Extension,, which enter essentially into our appre- 
 hension of Matter. Considered as an account even of 
 Externality it is defective. I believe, indeed, that it is 
 the only result which Mr. Mill can reach from his in- 
 duction or his premisses. It should be observed that 
 he does not, as some would expect him, define matter 
 the Cause of sensations. Mr. Mill says what he means, 
 and means what he says, when he describes Matter as 
 the Possibility, not the cause of sensations. Dr. Brown, 
 by help of ingenuity and tAvisting, could reach a cause, 
 for he called in an intuitive conviction, which impels 
 us when we discover a phenomenon to look for a cause ; 
 and when, as in the case of certain sensations, we can- 
 not get a cause within, we are driven to seek it without. 
 
116 BODY. 
 
 His theory, however, was after all defective, for it 
 makes matter, as a cause, unknown, whereas we 
 know matter, as we shall see forthwith, as resisting 
 our effort, and as extended. But Mr. Mill cannot be 
 sure, and does not profess to be sure, that he has 
 reached matter even as an unknown cause. For our 
 sensations have no discoverable causes within the mind ; 
 and as we have no sensitive experience of sensations 
 having causes, and no original conviction constraining 
 us to seek for a cause, it is quite conceivable that they 
 have no causes. But do these ' possibilities' amount 
 to the idea, which we have, of an outward world ? So 
 far as we have gone, we do not seem to be beyond the 
 ' series of feelings,' for the idea we have got is simply 
 of possibilities of sensation. Mr. Mill thinks that 
 " both philosophers and the world at large, when they 
 " think of matter, conceive it really as a Permanent Pos- 
 " sibility of Sensation" (p. 200). 1 The ' permanence' is 
 really an important element, presupposing the idea of 
 time, and of the past and the future; all of which 
 carry us into a region high above sensation, and imply 
 mental faculties with an extensive capacity and wide 
 
 1 Mr. Mill (p. 200) admits that the majority of philosophers fancy that 
 matter is something more, and that the world at large, if asked the ques- 
 tion, would undoubtedly agree with the philosophers. But then he 
 accounts for this " imaginary conception," as he calls it, by two tenden- 
 cies of the mind,— one derived from our observation of differences, the 
 other from our observation that every experience has a cause ; it is thus 
 that we are led to suppose that things have a substantive reality. As I do 
 not stand up for a substance different from the thing known, I do not re- 
 quire to examine this theory. In future chapters his defective view of the 
 comparative power of the mind and of causation will be subjected to 
 criticism. 
 
BODY. 117 
 
 range. But not even with this addition does the de- 
 scription come up to the reality, I mean mental reality. 
 Mr. Mill says that these "Permanent Possibilities" are 
 now " conceived as, and believed to be, as different from 
 " sensations as sensations are from one another" (p. 
 196). It should be observed that the sensations thus 
 discovered to be different, are all sensations hi the 
 " series of feelings" or " thread of consciousness." But 
 our apprehension of an outward world is of something, 
 not only differing from the sensations as one sensa- 
 tion differs from another, but different from the self, 
 which, as we have found in last chapter, we know as 
 sentient. We apprehend the material object as an 
 existing thing — quite as much as the self, but distinct 
 from the self. 1 It never has been shown how the ego, 
 
 i Professor Bain reaches the conclusion : " It is quite true that the 
 " object of consciousness, which we call Externality, is still a mode of 
 " self in the most comprehensive sense, but not in the usual restricted 
 " sense of 'self and 'mind,' which are names for the subject to the ex- 
 clusion of the object" {Senses and Intellect, p. 381). We are accus- 
 tomed to say that " light exists as independent fact, with or without any 
 " eyes to see it. But if we consider the case fairly, we shall see that 
 " this assertion errs not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can 
 " have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming that to 
 " have an existence out of our miuds which we cannot know but as in 
 " our minds. In words, we assert independent existence, while in the 
 "very act of doing so we contradict ourselves" (p. 385). Again, "we 
 " are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material 
 " world ; the very act is a contradiction" (p. 379). At this point extreme 
 sensationalism and extreme idealism, Mr. Bain and Mr. Ferrier, meet and 
 are one ; it would be a contradiction to speak of the one as independent 
 of the other ; they are joined in this philosophy of identity, which tran- 
 scends that of Hegel himself ! But joking aside, it is easy to represent the 
 doctrine which affirms the existence of independent objects out of the mind 
 so as to make it contradictory ; but there is no contradiction in the doc- 
 trine when correctly stated. Of course, knowledge is in a mind, but it 
 may be of an existence " out of our minds." 
 
118 BODY. 
 
 by reasoning or any other logical process, can give the 
 non ego. I must therefore look on the ego as having a 
 capacity of discovering the non ego, directly or indirectly. 
 Mr. Mill has utterly failed to rear up the actual mental 
 idea and conviction from the postulated materials. Till 
 such time as a mean can be pointed out by which we 
 can reach the outward world as an existence, I cling to 
 the belief that the self is endowed with a capacity of 
 immediately knowing not only the self, but the not-self. 
 
 But it will be necessary to review Mr. Mill's theory 
 of the genesis of our idea of Matter more carefully. 
 We shall find it throughout a series of assumptions, no 
 one of which admits of proof, and some of which can be 
 disproven. Often do I wish, as I examine it, that Sir 
 William Hamilton had been still alive to brush away by 
 his sweeping logic the ingenuities which are employed 
 to support it. " Our conception of Matter," says Mr. 
 Mill, " comes ultimately to consist of Eesistance, Exten- 
 " sion, and Figure, together with miscellaneous powers 
 " of exciting other sensations" (p. 219). There is a pal- 
 pable omission here, for it omits those powers (specially 
 mentioned by Locke, Essay, B. n. c. ii. § 23) by which 
 one body operates upon another ; " thus the sun has a 
 power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid." 
 It is enough for us here to examine Mr. Mill's theory 
 of the production of the idea of Eesistance and of 
 Extension. 
 
 (2.) We have certainly an idea of Resistance and a 
 belief in it. In the mature man it becomes a perception, 
 and a conviction of an object out of the body, or in the 
 
BODY. 119 
 
 "body, resisting an effort to move a member of the body. 
 In next chapter I will give some account of the sense 
 which reveals the resisting object; for the present we 
 are examining Mr. Mill's theory (see pp. 219-21). " Ee- 
 " sistance is only another name for a sensation of our 
 muscular frame, combined with one of touch." It should 
 be remarked that this language is not meant to imply 
 that w r e have a muscle, or that we have skin ; the re- 
 sistance and the touch must yet be considered as sen- 
 sations in the mind. " When we contract the muscles 
 " of our arm, either by an exertion of will or by an 
 " involuntary discharge of our spontaneous nervous ac- 
 " tivity, the contraction is accompanied by a state of sen- 
 " sation, which is different according as the locomotion, 
 " consequent on the muscular contraction, continues 
 " freely or meets with an impediment. In the former case 
 " the sensation is that of motion through empty space." 
 We shall see that we seem to have no sensation of 
 motion in empty space. When our muscular effort is 
 not opposed by anything without the body, what we 
 have is a feeling of tension, or of one muscle resisting 
 another. But let this pass, as having no special con- 
 nexion with our present discussion. He goes on to 
 say, that if we will to exert our muscular force, and the 
 exertion is accompanied by the usual muscular sensa- 
 tion, but the expected sensation of locomotion does not 
 follow^, we have what is called the feeling of resistance, 
 or, in other words, of muscular motion, and that feeling 
 is the fundamental element in the notion of matter. 
 He shows how " skin sensations of simple contact in- 
 
120 BODY. 
 
 11 variably accompany the muscular sensations of resist- 
 " ance ;" how our sensations of touch " become represen- 
 " tative of the sensations of resistance with which they 
 " habitually coexist ;" and " our idea of matter as a re- 
 " sistiug cause of miscellaneous sensations is now consti- 
 " tuted." Every one knows that the muscular sense and 
 touch combine, to give us the knowledge of matter as 
 a resisting object. But does Mr. Mill's account come 
 fully up to the facts falling under the eye of conscious- 
 ness ? Does his theory explain the facts ? Both 
 questions must be answered in the negative. In touch, 
 as we shall see in next chapter, we localize, I believe 
 intuitively, our sensations in a given direction, and at 
 a given point in the surface of the body. Again, in 
 the exercise of the locomotive energy, accompanied by 
 muscular sensation, we have a sense of a member of our 
 body which we will to move, of which member we 
 must have some idea, otherwise we could not form a 
 volition regarding it ; and we have a perception of this 
 member in motion, resisted by a body out of our frame. 
 Mr. Mill's theory does not yield all of these, — I rather 
 think not even any one of these thoroughly. It takes 
 no notice of the volition which moves the member, for 
 this would introduce an element above sensations. It 
 is not consistent with that idea of a member of the 
 body, which is necessary to the volition ; for the theory 
 to be consistent must presuppose that we have yet no 
 knowledge of our bodily frame. There can yet be no 
 apprehension of motion in space, for as yet we have no 
 idea of space. The idea is not even of resistance, pro- 
 
BODY. 121 
 
 perly speaking, for we have no idea of a resisting 
 object. So far as we have gone we have only sensa- 
 tions differing from each other in feeling or in intensity, 
 and sensations coexisting, and sensations succeeding 
 each other, and sensations the signs of other sensations. 
 
 (3.) The mature man has also an idea of Extension 
 and a belief in Extended objects. We have an apprehen- 
 sion and a conviction of our bodies as extended, and of 
 other bodies as extended, that is, as occupying space, as 
 being contained in space, as being of a certain spatial 
 form, and as being movable in space. Can the sensa- 
 tion and association theory account for the generation of 
 this mental phenomenon? I believe it breaks clown 
 both psychologically and physiologically.- 
 
 At this point Mr. Mill hands us over to his friend 
 Professor Bain, who, in The Senses and the Intellect, has 
 elaborated into a minute system the general statements 
 scattered throughout Mr. Mill's Logic. Beginning with 
 Feelings he goes on to Thought, making; its fundamental 
 attributes to be Consciousness of Difference, Conscious- 
 ness of Agreement, and Pietentiveness ; and he builds 
 up his system mainly out of Feelings by means of the 
 laws of Association by Contiguity and Eesemblance. I 
 cannot in a work like this, devoted to a different indi- 
 vidual, review Mr. Bain's theories. But I beg to ask 
 whether we ever have Feeling without some perception 
 of an object, say self, as feeling ? Feelings, even such 
 as joy or pain, are mere abstracts separated from our con- 
 sciousness of self, as rejoicing or in distress. A proper 
 psychological system should begin with the concrete 
 
122 BODY. 
 
 perception, and not with a quality separated from it. 
 So much for his foundation. And as to his mode of 
 building, it will he shown to he altogether unsatisfac- 
 tory, in the strictures we have to offer on such subjects 
 as Association of Ideas, Comparison, and Eelativity of 
 Knowledge, as treated by Mr. Mill. Mr. Bain has 
 received great praise for combining physiology with 
 psychology. It is true that in his introduction, and in 
 various parts of his work, he has given an account of 
 the anatomy and physiology of the brain and nerves 
 and organs of movement. But there is a mighty gap, 
 which he can scarcely be said to have tried to fill 
 up, between these unconscious parts and the conscious 
 thoughts and feelings of mind proper. The most valu- 
 able part of his work is that in which he describes, more 
 minutely than had ever been done before, the feelings 
 excited by muscular and nervous action, accounting, I 
 think, so far successfully, for many of our spontaneous 
 and supposed instinctive movements. But he is out of 
 his proper region when he comes to deal with the pecu- 
 liar operations and the higher ideas of the mind. With 
 a fine capacity for observing bodily affections, and an 
 undoubted vigour and tenacity of intellect in dealing 
 with material facts, he seems to be unfitted for realiz- 
 ing fully pure mental or spiritual phenomena, as falling 
 simply under the eye of consciousness. He makes as 
 much use of nerve-forces as Hartley did of vibrations, 
 and seems to identify conscious feelings with them, 
 making the current and the consciousness two sides 
 of one thing. Even when he is professedly treating of 
 
BODY. 123 
 
 Emotions, Thoughts, and Volitions, he has great dif- 
 ficulty in rising above nerve affections ; and when he 
 does make the attempt, it is immediately to fall back 
 to his old level of sensations. He is to be constantly 
 watched when he would draw our higher ideas of neces- 
 sary truth, of beauty and of moral good from sensitive 
 affections variously associated. It could be shown, that 
 in treating of our intellectual and moral and voluntary 
 operations, while apparently proceeding in so matter of 
 fact a manner, he is continually passing, without seeing 
 it, from unconscious to conscious action, from bodily 
 sensations to mental ideas, and advancing hypotheses as 
 to the influence of nervous and muscular action, which 
 could be shown to be true only by their explaining all 
 the mental facts revealed by consciousness ; and this he 
 cannot be said to have attempted, as consciousness is 
 seldom consulted, even formally or professedly. There 
 is proof of all this in his theory of what constitutes our 
 idea of extension and its mode of growth. 
 
 In the earlier editions of his Logic (B. I. c. iii. § 7), 
 Mr. Mill had described Brown as showing clearly that 
 the notions of extension and figure are derived " from 
 " sensations of touch, combined with sensations of a class 
 " previously too little adverted to by metaphysicians 
 " — those which have their seat in the muscular frame." 
 He adds, characteristically, " Whoever wishes to be 
 " more particularly acquainted with this admirable 
 " specimen of metaphysical analysis, may consult the 
 " first volume of Brown's Lectures or Mill's Analysis of 
 " the Mind." The thought has germinated, and in his 
 
124 BODY. 
 
 later editions he is able to refer to Mr. Alexander Bain 
 and Mr. Herbert Spencer as following out the investi- 
 gation. Mr. Bain has certainly taken up the idea, and 
 ridden it to exhaustion, I should say to death. 
 
 " We may accede,''" says Professor Bain, as quoted by 
 Mr. Mill (p. 226), "to the assertion sometimes made, 
 " that the properties of space might be conceived or felt 
 " in the absence of an external world, or any other 
 " matter than that composing the body of the percipient 
 " being ; for the body's own movements in empty space 
 " would suffice to make the very same impressions on 
 :> the mind as the movements excited by outward objects. 
 " A perception of length, or height, or speed, is the 
 " mental impression or state of consciousness accompany- 
 " ing some mode of muscular movement, and this move- 
 " ment may be generated from within as well as from 
 " without.'*' In criticising this theory, so cloudy in its 
 outline, we are placed in difficulties, in consequence of 
 its not being clear whether Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain 
 assume the existence of the bodily frame as a material 
 object, in the common acceptation, as implying objective 
 existence and extension, or, even in their own sense, as 
 " the mere possibility of sensations." Are they accounting 
 for the extra-mental world, including the bodily frame ? 
 or simply for the extra-organic world ? In most places 
 Mr. Bain seems to posit the body as a reality. In the 
 passage quoted, he speaks of the matter composing "the 
 body of the percipient being," as if he needed it to 
 explain our idea of " the properties of space." He 
 talks of a movement being " generated from within," 
 
BODY. 125 
 
 which cannot mean within the mind, which is a mere 
 series of feelings ; it must mean within the body, which 
 is quietly assumed. The whole plausibility, I had 
 almost said intelligibility, certainly the expressibility, 
 of the theory lies in its being supposed that there is a 
 body, and even an extended body. He derives all from 
 nerve- currents which imply space, and motion in space 
 and he constructs the idea of extension by a sweep of the 
 hand, or a sweep of the eye, or a volume of feeling, which, 
 if taken metaphorically, explain nothing, and if taken 
 literally, that is, as actualities, imply space and motion 
 in space. But if the body is assumed as known imme- 
 diately, then there is admitted a vast body of intuition, 
 of which he should have measured the amount, and ac- 
 knowledged the significance. Or if it be said that the 
 bodily frame is assumed as an hypothesis, the answer 
 is obvious. If it explains, as he thinks (I do not), the 
 whole facts, then the hypothesis is rendered probable, 
 and he must adhere to it ; for the author of an hypo- 
 thesis cannot be allowed to employ it to reach a con- 
 clusion and then abandon it ; on the contrary, he must 
 keep by it and all its logical consequences. On what- 
 ever ground assumed, it is clear that when assumed 
 there is little left to call for explanation. After we 
 have got our own bodies, with " matter " composing 
 them, capable of taking a " sweep," and of having " a 
 movement generated within," it can be no difficult 
 matter to conceive of other bodies being extended, 
 and in motion, and resisting our movement. 
 
 But in this discussion I must in all fairness suppose 
 
126 BODY. 
 
 that he does not assume the existence of the bodily 
 frame. 1 His business is to show, on his theory, how 
 our conception in regard to body is generated. As he 
 attempts to do so, I am entitled, after this statement, 
 to take care that he does not assume surreptitiously 
 what he professes to produce by a process. He has as 
 yet got nothing but a series of feelings, with a possi- 
 bility of sensations coming no one can tell from what 
 quarter. I cannot allow him, in order that he may in- 
 geniously get more, to employ a supposed body with 
 a " sweep" and " contractions." 
 
 " When a muscle," says Mr. Bain, as quoted by Mr. 
 Mill (see pp. 222-24), " begins to contract, or a limb to 
 " bend, we have a distinct sense how far the contraction 
 " and the bending are carried ; there is something in 
 " the special sensibility that makes one mode of feeling 
 
 1 Since writing the above, I find Mr. Herbert Spencer saying of Mr. 
 Mill : " If, knowing more than his own states of consciousness, he declines 
 " to acknowledge anything beyond consciousness until it is proved, he 
 " may go on reasoning for ever without getting any further ; since the 
 " perpetual elaboration of states of consciousness out of states of con- 
 " sciousness can never produce anything more than states of conscious- 
 " ness. If, contrariwise, he postulates external existence, and considers 
 " it as merely postulated, then the whole fabric of his argument, standing 
 " upon this postulate, has no greater validity than the postulate gives it, 
 " minus the possible invalidity of the argument itself. The case must not 
 " be confounded with those cases in which an hypothesis or provisional 
 " assumption is eventually proved true by its agreement with facts ; for 
 " in these cases the facts with which it is found to agree are facts known 
 " in some other way than through the hypothesis : a calculated eclipse of 
 " the moon serves as a verification of the hypothesis of gravitation, because 
 " its occurrence is observable without taking for granted the hypothesis 
 " of gravitation. But when the external world is postulated, and it is 
 " supposed that the validity of the postulate may be shown by the ex- 
 " planation of mental phenomena which it furnishes, the vice is that the 
 " process of verification is itself possible only by assuming the thing to be 
 " proved."— Art., M^ll v. Hamilton, in The Fortnightly Review, No. V. 
 
BODY. 127 
 
 " for half contraction, another for three-fourths, and an- 
 ". other for total contraction." " If the sense of degrees of 
 " range be thus admitted as a genuine muscular deter - 
 " urination, its functions in outward perception are very 
 " important. The attributes of extension and space fall 
 " under its scope. In the first place, it gives the feel- 
 " ing of linear extension, inasmuch as this is measured 
 " by the sweep of a limb or other organ moved by the 
 " muscles. The difference between six inches and 
 " eighteen inches is expressed to us by the different 
 " degrees of contraction of some one group of muscles ; 
 " those, for example, that flex the arm, or, in walking, 
 " those that flex or extend the lower limb. The in- 
 " ward impression corresponding to the outward fact of 
 " six inches in length, is an impression arising from the 
 " continued shortening of a muscle — a true muscular 
 " sensibility. It is the impression of a muscular effort 
 " having a certain continuance ; a greater length pro- 
 " duces a greater continuance (or a more rapid move- 
 " nient), and, in consequence, an increased feeling of 
 " expended power. The discrimination of length in 
 " any one direction includes extension in any direc- 
 " tion." This reads very like assuming an extended 
 bodily arm taking a sweep, and thus giving us the idea 
 of extension. Of course we understand, on reflection, 
 that the sweep is only a sensation in the " series of 
 feelings," but when we understand this, we see how far 
 we are from having the idea of extension produced. 
 
 In explanation of the theory, Mr. Mill says, " Mr. 
 " Bain recognises two principal kinds or modes of clis- 
 
128 BODY. 
 
 " criminative sensibility in the muscular sense : the 
 " one corresponding to the degree of intensity of the 
 " muscular effort — the amount of energy put forth ; 
 " the other corresponding to the duration — the longer 
 " or shorter continuance of the same effort. The first 
 " makes us acquainted with degrees of resistance, 
 " which we estimate by the intensity of the muscular 
 " energy required to overcome it. To the second we 
 " owe, in Mr. Bain's opinion, our idea of extension." 
 I have already commented on the defects in Mr. Mill's 
 account of oar apprehension of resistance. We have 
 here to consider the theory of the genesis of the idea of 
 extension. It is referred to the continuance of a sen- 
 sation. 
 
 And here it is proper to state, that some deny the 
 existence of such a sensation as arising when the arm 
 sweeps through empty space. E. H: Weber had come, 
 in 1852, to the conclusion : — " Of the voluntary motion 
 " of our limbs we know originally nothing. We do not 
 " perceive the motion of our muscles by their own 
 " sensations, but attain a knowledge of them only 
 " when perceived by another sense. The muscles most 
 " under our control are those of the eye and the voice, 
 " which perform motions microscopically small, yet 
 " we have no consciousness of the motion. We move 
 " the diaphragm voluntarily against the heavy pres- 
 " sure of the liver, etc., yet with as little consciousness 
 " of the motion. It follows that the motions of our 
 " limbs must be observed by sight or touch in order 
 " to learn that they move, and in what direction." 
 
BODY. 129 
 
 Mr. Abbot quotes this passage in Ms Sight and Touch 
 (p. 71), and lie adds, " The more recent researches of 
 " Aubert and Kainmler not only confirm this result, but 
 " tend further to prove that there is not in the muscles 
 " any sense whatever of their contraction." " Accord- 
 " ingly, they remark that the friction of our clothing is a 
 " considerable aid in judging of our motions, especially 
 " if it is close fitting. When wearing boots, etc., with 
 " which we are not familiar, we are less certain of our 
 " judgments, and .this is the more noticeable in riding, 
 '•' as the eye does not then control our judgment." The 
 question is for physiologists to settle. I am not satis- 
 fied that the Germans referred to can have established 
 their point. But until there is a more thorough deter- 
 mination of the exact function of the nerves attached 
 to the muscles, it is preposterous to found a huge meta- 
 physical theory on our muscular sensations when the 
 arm moves in empty space. 
 
 My opinion on such a subject is of no value, but I 
 am disposed to think that we have a sense of the con- 
 traction of at least some of our muscles, and of its con- 
 tinuance. 1 On the supposition that we have a sense of 
 resistance, which seems established, the muscles of our 
 arm, being always in a state of more or less tension, 
 must feel the resistance offered bv one muscle to another. 
 
 1 Mr. H. Lewes thinks he has demonstrated the existence of the Mus- 
 cular Sense. He skinned a frog, and thus made it insensible to external 
 impressions, and found it " to manifest all those phenomena usually attri- 
 buted to the muscular sense" (Brit. Assoc, 1859). We require a more 
 thorough investigation of the relations, ?nd differences, of the precise 
 functions of the nerves of touch-proper and the muscular se:ise. 
 
 1 
 
130 BODY. 
 
 Dr. Kirkes says that the muscles " possess sensibility 
 " by means of the sensitive nerve-fibres distributed in 
 " them. The amount of common sensibility in muscles 
 " is not great." " But they have a peculiar sensibility, 
 " or at least a peculiar modification of common sensi- 
 " bility, which is shown in that their nerves can com - 
 " municate to the mind an accurate knowledge of their 
 " states and position when in action" (Phys., p. 530, 
 5th ed.) We may, therefore, know the contractions. 
 Bat let us take along with us the full facts. The sense 
 of touch-proper, as we shall see in next chapter, always 
 refers the sensations to the points in the skin at which 
 the nerves terminate ; and the muscular sense merely 
 intimates that one organ is resisting another. In that 
 " sweep of the arm," of which Mr. Bain makes so much, 
 there is implied, first, a direction of the points of sen- 
 sation in the skin, secondly, a muscular resistance, and, 
 I rather think, thirdly, an experience to enable us to 
 combine the two. There is, I suspect, a further element. 
 In whatever way it may begin, the continuance of the 
 experimental bending of the arm, which Mr. Bain em- 
 ploys, must be done by the will. But a vague direc- 
 tionless effort will not move a limb, still less continue 
 to move it in a certain way. The volition to continue 
 the sweep of the arm implies a contemplated end, or 
 some idea of the arm, and a belief in its existence, and, 
 1 should think, in its extension. It thus appears that 
 it is to reverse the proper order of things, to make the 
 continuance of " the sweep of the arm" constitute or 
 give us the idea of extension. In the very movement 
 
BODY. 131 
 
 we have an idea of an extended arm by touch-proper 
 or feeling ; as we move the arm, we become acquainted 
 with the resistance of one felt member by another ; and 
 in order to the continuance of the voluntary sweep, 
 there must be some apprehension, more or less vague, 
 of the limb which we continue to move. 
 
 There are many serious physiological difficulties in 
 the way of accepting this muscular theory. The extent 
 of a sweep of the arm does not depend merely on the 
 amount of force put forth ; nor does it depend solely on 
 the continuance of the effort : it depends also on the 
 proportionate length of the two arms of the lever on 
 which the muscle operates. For instance, the biceps 
 muscle of the arm is inserted an inch below the elbow- 
 joint, whilst the distance from the point of insertion to 
 the end of the limb may be sixteen inches. When the 
 muscle contracts to a certain extent, the rapidity of the 
 movement at the extremity will be sixteen times as 
 great as it would have been if the insertion had been 
 at the extremity ; and, on the other hand, the force em- 
 ployed by the muscle has been sixteen times as great 
 as would have been required if the insertion had been 
 at the extremity. A large amount of force is thus ex- 
 pended in order to secure the great advantage of rapidity 
 of movement. It is clear, therefore, that neither the 
 intensity nor the extent of contraction can give us the 
 amount of motion in the part on which the muscle 
 operates ; and, that while the muscular sense may in- 
 form us of the intensity, and extent of the intensity, and 
 extent of the contraction of the fibres of a muscle, it can 
 
132 BODY. 
 
 give us no information of the extent of the movement 
 of our limbs, till after long experience applied to each 
 limb. " It is doubtful/' says Dr. Kirkes (Phys., p. 646), 
 " how far the extent of muscular movement is obtained 
 " from sensations in the muscles themselves. The sen- 
 " sation of movement attending the motions of the hand 
 " is very slight ; and persons who do not know that the 
 " action of particular muscles is necessary for the pro- 
 " duction of given movements, do not suspect that the 
 " movement of the fingers, for example, depends on 
 " action in the forearm." Mr. Abbot has pressed some 
 of the difficulties (Sight and Touch, p. 70) : " Let us 
 " suppose a blind man trying to get the notion of dis 
 •• tance from the motion of his hand. He finds a cer- 
 " tain sweep of the hand brings it into contact with a 
 " desk ; the distance of which, therefore, is represented 
 " by that effort. But it requires a greater effort to 
 " reach the eyes or the nose ; and distance being 
 " z= locomotive effort, it is demonstrated that the nose 
 " extends beyond the desk. The top of the head must 
 " be conceived as more remote, and the back farthest 
 " of all. In general, when we refer distances to the 
 " eye, as we habitually do, objects four inches from the 
 " eye must appear farther from us than those at twelve. 
 " This is another novelty. But again, since the hand 
 " moves in curves, and cannot without considerable 
 " effort be made to move in a straight line, it is also 
 " demonstrated that an epicycloid is shorter than a 
 " right line between the same points." 
 
 But, after all, the question is to be decided by psycho- 
 
BODY. 133 
 
 logical rather than physiological considerations. The 
 phenomenon to be explained is our idea of extension, 
 and consciousness will require to be consulted. The 
 theory was started by Brown, and Hamilton had thus 
 examined it (Append., Eeid's Works, p. 869) : " The 
 " notion of Time or succession being supposed, that 
 " of longitudinal extension is given in the succession of 
 " feelings which accompanies the gradual contraction 
 " of a muscle ; the notion of this succession constitutes 
 " ipso facto the notion of a certain length ; and the 
 " notion of this length" (he quietly takes for granted) 
 " is the notion of longitudinal extension sought. The 
 " paralogism here is transparent. Length is an ambi- 
 " guous term ; and it is length in space, extensive length, 
 " and not length in time protensive, whose notion it 
 " is the problem to solve." Mr. Mill (p. 227) quotes 
 this language, and tries to avoid the argument by urging 
 that the " assertion of Brown, and of all who hold 
 " the Psychological theory, is that the notion of length 
 " in space, not being in our consciousness originally, 
 " is constructed by the mind's laws out of the notion of 
 " length in time. The argument is not, as Sir William 
 " Hamilton fancied, a fallacious confusion between two 
 " different meanings of the word length, but an iden- 
 " tification of them as one." This statement is cer- 
 tainly sufficiently clear, but it crowns the absurdity. 
 " When we say that there is a space between A and B, 
 " we mean that some amount of these muscular sensa- 
 " tions must intervene ; and when we say the space is 
 " greater or less, we mean that the series of sensation 
 
134 BODY. 
 
 " (amount of muscular effort being given) is longer or 
 " shorter." " Now this, which is unquestionably the 
 " mode in which we become aware of sensation, is con- 
 " sidered by the psychologists in question to be exten- 
 " sion." I need not repeat that what is here represented 
 as unquestionable, has been questioned physiologically. 
 But we are now discussing the psychological question. 
 
 We have here three different phenomena — con- 
 sciousness being the witness. We have — (1.) Series of 
 Muscular Sensations ; (2.) Length of Time ; (3.) Length 
 of Space. These three may have relations one to an- 
 other, but they are surely diverse from one another. 
 Mr. Mill explains that he does not draw the one from 
 the other, which would be preposterous enough, but he 
 declares them identical, which is absurd in the extreme. 
 It matches the doctrine of Hegel, justly regarded as the 
 reductio ad absurdum of his whole philosophy, that all 
 things are one. Hegel lessened the absurdity of this 
 statement by another, that all things are different ; but 
 Mr. Mill has no such explanation to offer, for he de- 
 clares muscular sensations, time, and space to be iden- 
 tical, without a difference. Mr. Mill gives a scanty 
 enough account of the faculties of the mind, but he 
 acknowledges that we possess a power of discerning 
 differences. If we can trust our capacities at all, they 
 declare that the three things under consideration are as 
 different as any one thing can be from any other. 
 
 A series of muscular sensations and length of time are 
 surely different. They are different in themselves, and 
 we can conceive an animated being, say a lobster, to 
 
BODY. 135 
 
 have a succession of sensations, and yet no idea of time. 
 Again, series of muscular sensations and extension are 
 not the same. The series of feelings excited as I pass 
 my hand over a table is not the same as the yard square 
 which is the size of the table. Curious consequences 
 would seem to follow from this doctrine of identity. If, 
 in the next attempt with the same series of sensations, 
 my hand passed over a table two yards long, the theory 
 would identify the time with two yards, as before it did 
 with one ; and as Mr. Mill admits the law of identity 
 (see ©.), or, that things which are identical with the 
 same thing are identical with one another, it would make 
 one yard, which is the same with a series of sensations, 
 identical with two yards, which is identical with the 
 same series of sensations. To represent this otherwise. 
 The length of time taken by us to travel between 
 London and Paris does not merely help us (as every 
 one admits) to estimate the length of way when we 
 have an idea of the rate at which we are travelling (as 
 the thermometer measures heat for us), but is the very 
 same with the length of the way ; and as we travel it in 
 a longer or shorter time, or with more or fewer sensa- 
 tions, so is the length of way actually longer or shorter 
 at different times. If we draw back from such conse- 
 quences by appealing to a different measure, would not 
 this show that we had unfortunately taken the wrong 
 rule ? But, after all, I will not positively affirm that 
 such consequences follow, for the doctrine is one that 
 baffles all reasoning, because it sets aside the first pre- 
 misses of reasoning. Mr. Abbot says very properly. 
 
136 BODY. 
 
 • : Indeed the obvious differences between the two ideas 
 " are so great, that a philosopher who has neglected 
 " them can scarcely be convinced by more abstruse 
 " considerations. Thus, muscular effort- has degrees, its 
 " parts are not equal ; extension does not admit of 
 " degrees, its parts are equal. Extension has three 
 " dimensions, muscular effort only one. The parts of 
 " extension are co-existent, those of muscular effort are 
 " successive." Finally, length of time and length of space 
 are not the same. As well might we identify colours 
 with smells, sounds with shapes, sweet with sour, light 
 •with darkness, love with hatred, virtue with vice, Mr. 
 Mill with Sir William Hamilton, as identify extension 
 with duration. 
 
 Mr. Mill's attempt to get support to his hypothesis 
 from the sense of sight is, if possible, still more unsuc- 
 cessful. He is obliged to suppose that in vision we 
 have originally only a sensation of colour, and that the 
 idea of an extended surface is given by, or rather is 
 identical with, the time occupied by the muscular sen- 
 sations as we move the eye. Sir William Hamilton, in 
 reviewing Berkeley, had noticed the doctrine that the 
 eye gives us only colour, and his criticism has commonly 
 been regarded as amounting almost to a demonstration : 
 " All parties are, of course, at one in regard to the fact 
 " that we see colour. Those who hold that we see ex- 
 " tension, admit that we see it only as coloured ; and 
 " those who deny us any vision of extension make colour 
 " the exclusive object of sight. In regard to this first 
 " position all are therefore agreed. Nor are they less 
 
BODY. 137 
 
 " harmonious in reference to the second ; that the power 
 " of perceiving colour involves the power of perceiving 
 " the differences of colours. By sight we, therefore, per- 
 " ceive colour, and discriminate one colour, that is, one 
 " coloured body, — one sensation of colour, from another. 
 " This is admitted. A third position will also be denied 
 " by none, that the colours discriminated in vision are, 
 " or may be, placed side by side in immediate juxta- 
 " position ; or one may limit another by being super - 
 " induced partially over it. A fourth position is equally 
 " indisputable ; that the contrasted colours, thus bound- 
 " ing each other, will form by their meeting a visible 
 " line, and that, if the superinduced colour be sur- 
 " rounded by the other, this line will return upon itself, 
 " and thus constitute the outline of a visible figure. 
 " These four positions command a peremptory assent ; 
 " they are all self-evident. But their admission at once 
 " explodes the paradox under discussion" — (that exten- 
 sion cannot be cognised by sight alone). " And thus : 
 " A line is extension in one dimension — length ; a figure 
 " is extension in two — length and breadth. Therefore 
 " the vision of a line is a vision of extension in length ; 
 " the vision of a figure, the vision of extension in length 
 " and breadth" (Metaph. vol. ii. p. 167). 
 
 Mr. Mill acknowledges " I cannot make the answer 
 to this argument as thorough and conclusive as I could 
 wish" (p. 239). His attempts to lessen its force are 
 exceedingly weak and palpably insufficient. He calls 
 attention to the circumstance that the eye " does not 
 " cognise visible figure by means of colour alone, but 
 
138 * BODY. 
 
 " by all those motions and modifications of the muscles 
 " connected with the eye, which have so great a share 
 " in giving us our acquired perceptions of sight." Be it 
 so, the demonstration remains untouched, that we take 
 in figure when we take in colour. He says, that an eye 
 immovably fixed " gives a full and clear vision of but a 
 small portion of space." The admission is sufficient for 
 our purpose. He throws us once more on Mr. Bain, who 
 tells us, " When we look at a circle, say one-tenth 
 " of an inch in diameter, the eye can take in the whole 
 " of it without movement," The tenth of an inch is as 
 good as a whole inch, or a foot, or a yard. In the tenth 
 of an inch is extension with a boundary, and may be a 
 measure to aid us in ascertaining the extent we can 
 take in by the sweep of the eyes. Mr. Mill admits " a 
 " rudimentary conception must be allowed ; for it is evi- 
 " dent that even without moving the eye we are capable 
 " of having two sensations of colour at once, and that 
 " the boundary which separates the colours must give 
 " some specific affection of sight." He would lessen the 
 significance of this admission in a very unworthy man- 
 ner : " But to confer on these discriminative impres- 
 " sions the name which denotes our matured and per- 
 " fected cognition of extension, or even to assume that 
 " they have anything in common with it, seems to be 
 " going beyond evidence." No one maintains that our 
 primary vision of a surface by the eye comes up to our 
 perfected cognition of extension ; still it is a surface, 
 and it has a boundary, and therefore it has something 
 in common with it. Mr. Bain tells us, " We may still, 
 
BODY. 139 
 
 " however, see very strong grounds for maintaining the 
 " presence of a muscular element, even in this instance." 
 Be it so, the demonstration of Hamilton holds good, 
 that in the two colours in this space, whether with or 
 without the aid of the muscles, we have lines and 
 spaces. But he adds, " In the second place, the essential 
 " import of visible form is something not attainable 
 " without the experience of moving the eye. If we 
 " looked at a little round spot, we should know an 
 " optical difference between it and a triangular spot ; 
 " and we should recognise it as identical with another 
 " round spot." And then, subjecting the fact to his theory, 
 instead of forming his theory from the facts, he tells us, 
 " We mean by a round form something which would 
 take a given sweep of the eye to comprehend it." I 
 suppose this is what he means by the import of form, 
 that it is the time spent in muscular action (!), which I 
 rather think might be the same for a square, or a triangle, 
 or an oval, of a certain size, as for a circle. I really 
 cannot understand how we should optically know the 
 difference of the figures, unless we perceived them as 
 figures. In spite of all these perverted attempts at the 
 resolution of them into something else, there still re- 
 mains the surface and the boundary perceived by the eye. 
 Failing utterly in the psychological analysis, Mr. 
 Bain and Mr. Mill (p. 232) fall back on a statement of 
 Platner, which Sir William Hamilton had copied into 
 his Lectures without knowing what to make of it. " In 
 " regard to the visionless representation of space or 
 " extension, the attentive observation of a person born 
 
140 BODY. 
 
 " blind, which I formerly instituted in the year 1785, 
 " and again in relation to the point in question, have 
 " continued for three whole weeks — this observation, I 
 " say, has convinced me that the sense of touch by 
 " itself is altogether incompetent to afford us the repre- 
 " sentation of extension and space, and is not even 
 " cognisant of local exteriority ; in a word, that a man 
 " deprived of sight has absolutely no perception of an 
 " outer world beyond the existence of something effec- 
 " tive, different from his own feeling of passivity, and in 
 " general only of the numerical diversity, — shall I say 
 " of impressions or of things ? In fact, to those born 
 " blind, time serves instead of space. Vicinity and dis- 
 " tance means in their mouths nothing more than the 
 " shorter or longer time, the smaller or greater number 
 " of feelings which they find necessary to attain from 
 " some one feeling to another. That a person blind 
 " from birth employs the language of vision — that may 
 " occasion considerable error ; and did, indeed, at the 
 " commencement of my observations, lead me wrong ; 
 " but, in point of fact, he knows nothing of things as 
 " existing out of each other ; and (this in particular I 
 " have very clearly remarked) if objects, and the parts 
 " of his body touched by them, did not make different 
 " kinds of impressions on his nerves of sensation, he 
 " would take everything external for one and the same. 
 " In his own body he absolutely did not discriminate 
 " head and foot at all by their distance, but merely by 
 " the difference of the feelings (and his perceptions of 
 " such differences was incredibly fine) which he ex- 
 
BODY. 141 
 
 " perienced from the one and from the other, and, 
 " moreover, through time. In like manner, in external 
 '- bodies, he distinguished their figure merely by the 
 " varieties of impressed feelings ; inasmuch, for example, 
 " as the cube by its angles affected his feelings differently 
 " from the sphere." 
 
 Let it be observed of this account, that it is largely 
 theoretical, by one who believed with Kant, that there 
 were a priori forms of space and time in the mind, 
 and that these were brought forth empirically only by 
 the sense of sight. Platner does not give us the facts 
 to enable us to judge for ourselves ; he favours us only 
 with his conclusions. His observations carry us as far 
 back as 1785, when the distinction between touch- 
 proper and the muscular sense was not established. 
 Later physiological research has shown that, in the case 
 of the blind, as in all others, touch-proper makes us 
 localize the affections of our bodily frame, and that the 
 muscular sense gives us " something effective, different 
 from our feeling of passivity : " we may add, different 
 from our felt bodily frame. It has been proven by 
 later and fully detailed researches, that those born blind 
 know their own body as extended by the common sen- 
 sations of feeling, and know extra-organic objects by 
 the resistance offered to their muscular efforts. Even 
 Mr. Mill is obliged to modify and explain Platner 5 s 
 statement (p. 233) : — " But Platner, though uninten- 
 " tionally, puts a false colour on the matter when he 
 " says that his patient had no perception of extension ; 
 " he had conceptions of extension after his own man- 
 
142 BODY. 
 
 " ner ;" in fact, " all that is meant by persons who see." 
 Without this explanation the statement of Platner would 
 be fatal to the theory of Mill, who makes us get our 
 knowledge of extension from the muscular feelings, 
 and not as Platner, whose avowed aim is to get it from 
 sight. With this explanation it can help neither side, 
 for it puts those who see in the same position as the 
 blind, and those who see will be admitted by all to 
 have " a perception of an outer world" by the sense of 
 touch. I believe that Platner may be right when he 
 says that " local exteriority," that is, objects out of the 
 body, may not be given by touch-proper or feeling ; but 
 this is certainly given by the muscular sense in the case 
 of the blind, as in that of the seeing. When he speaks 
 of time serving instead of space to those born blind, and 
 that vicinity and distance means only shorter or longer 
 time, or the smaller or greater number of feelings which 
 they find necessary to attain from some one feeling to 
 another, I believe he was led astray by not distin- 
 guishing between our apprehension of space and the 
 measure of space. The idea of members of the body 
 localized is given most probably by all the senses. 
 But the actual measurement of space is always a sub- 
 sequent process, implying comparison and a standard. 
 I believe that in all of us the succession of our feelings, 
 of our muscular feelings, but also of our mental ideas 
 and feelings as well, is one means of helping us to 
 measure (not only time, but) space ; we measure it in a 
 loose way, by the feelings we have experienced in pass- 
 ing over it in travelling, or by a member of our body. 
 
BODY. ' 143 
 
 Those born blind must be specially dependent on such 
 a measure. Those who see have a natural measure 
 provided in the surface which falls under the perception 
 of the eye. Those born blind have such a measure in 
 the surface of the body given by touch, and in the effort 
 of the locomotive energy reported by the muscular 
 sense. We shall see in next chapter that a very dif- 
 ferent account from that of Platner is given by later 
 German physiologists. 1 
 
 As the result of these discussions, it appears that we 
 have ideas and convictions of externality, of resistance 
 to the energy of self, and of extension, that cannot be 
 resolved into any elements which do not imply them. 
 But do these subjective apprehensions and beliefs im- 
 ply corresponding objective realities ? This is the old 
 
 1 In order to be able to form an intelligent opinion on these subjects, I 
 put myself in communication with the Rev. J. Kinghan, who for twenty- 
 years has been connected with the institution for the Blind in Belfast, 
 first as assistant, and now as Principal. He declares that he has never 
 found anything, in all his teaching of the bliud, or intercourse with them, 
 to confirm Platner's statement. Those born blind cannot have the visual 
 idea of space, but they have, he says, a veiy clear notion of figure and 
 distance got directly from the sense of touch. With his aid I have experi- 
 mented with very young children born blind. I put two small pieces of 
 wood, one triangular and the other square, under the palm of the hand, 
 and without being allowed to move the hand over it, they at once told us 
 the shape of each. When their head, and their legs, and their arms were 
 pricked exactly alike, they at once showed us the seat of sensation, and 
 knew the points to be out of each other. I moved their hand first over a 
 book seven inches long, and then over a desk fourteen inches long, 
 occupying the same time with each process, and they at once declared 
 that the latter was much longer than the former. We allowed a boy to 
 feel round a room with which he was unacquainted, and he at once de- 
 clared its shape. One of these children was a girl of the age of eight, just 
 entered the Institution, so ignorant that she did not know the meaning of 
 angle or corner or point, calling the corners of the figures " little heads." 
 She said the square had two little heads and two little heads, but was 
 not sure that two and two make four. 
 
144 BODY. 
 
 question of metaphysics. To treat it historically, logi- 
 cally, and critically, would require a separate volume. 
 Fortunately it is not necessary here to enter upon the 
 wide question. Mr. Mill grants that there is an assur- 
 ance which is " a test to which we may bring all our 
 convictions" (see k), and that " we may be sure of what 
 we see as well as what we feel" (see //,.) Following 
 these admitted principles, I do not see that Mr. Mill 
 can object to the reality of an extended world, provided 
 always that it be shown that our ideas as to externality 
 and extension cannot be resolved into simpler ele- 
 ments. The conviction we entertain as to an external 
 world is of the nature of a primitive perception, and 
 not a derivative idea. We perceive objects out of our- 
 selves resisting us and extended. This perception, 
 like that of consciousness, is self-evident : we seem to 
 look at once on the object. It is also necessary : no 
 doubt we can imagine it to be otherwise, but we can- 
 not be made to judge or believe that our hand is not 
 an extended object. It is universal : all men entertain 
 it and act upon it. Ingenious objections may be urged 
 against all this, but they are such as are advanced not 
 only against all truth, but against all inquiry, and pro- 
 ceed upon a universal scepticism, which Mr. Mill, who 
 professes to be a lover of truth, does not avow. 
 
 These same considerations justify us in looking upon 
 body as a substance. It will be remembered that I do 
 not stand up for an unknown substratum beneath the 
 known thing. Whatever is knowm as existing, as 
 acting, and having permanence, I regard as a substance. 
 
BODY. 145 
 
 Mind is a substance, as it can be so characterized. But 
 we have seen that we know body as an existence, in 
 operation, and with, as Mr. Mill allows, a permanence ; 
 it is therefore a substance. It is vastly more than a 
 "possibility;" it is an actuality. It is more than a 
 possibility of "sensations;" it has an existence even 
 as the sensations have ; and a body is known not only 
 as giving sensations, but as capable of acting on other 
 bodies in a variety of ways, which it is the office of 
 physical science to classify and to reduce to laws. By 
 adhering to these simple principles we are made to feel 
 that we are out of the region of phantoms and in the 
 land of realities. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 There is an impression among many that Mr. 
 Mill's theory has the support of physiology, and this is 
 strengthened by the anatomical and physiological de- 
 tails which constitute so large a portion of Mr. Bain's 
 work. But I cannot discover that either has found 
 a basis, or even a starting-point, for their general theory 
 of the mind, or for their particular theory of the man- 
 ner in which we reach the idea of an extended world, 
 in any ascertained phenomena of our bodily frame. 
 Their speculations receive no aid from physiology, and 
 must stand or fall by their psychological merits or 
 demerits. The physiology of the senses is still in a 
 very uncertain condition, and, whatever it may do in 
 ages to come, can as yet throw little light on strictly 
 mental action, except, indeed, in the way of correcting 
 premature hypotheses. It may be profitable to look at 
 some of the later researches into the senses conducted 
 by eminent physiologists, especially in Germany. We 
 shall find that they give no sanction to the hypothesis 
 of Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain, and seem to favour a theory 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 147 
 
 of a very different character. In the sketch that follows, 
 I have made free "use of the great works on physiology 
 which have been published in our country, and still 
 more particularly of the admirable historical, critical, 
 and expository summary by Wundt, in his Beitrage zur 
 Theorie der Sinneswahmehmung. 
 
 Touch. 
 
 The scientific investigation of this sense may be said 
 to have commenced with the researches of J. Muller 
 and E. H. Weber. The general result reached by Muller 
 is, that " every point in which a nerve-fibre ends is 
 represented in the sensorium as a space-particle" 
 (Wundt, Theor. Sinneswah?\) There are disputes as to 
 how the general law should be stated, but we have a 
 fact here which has not been and cannot be set aside. 
 The nerves of touch proper, setting out from the base of 
 the brain, tend towards the periphery of the body. They 
 reach the skin each at a determined point : there is a 
 special aggregation of these points in the mid-finger and 
 the tip of the tongue. Now, wherever the nerve termi- 
 nates, there the sensation is felt : thus, if we prick a 
 nerve which reaches the mid-finger, the pain is localized 
 at the point where the nerve terminates. If we stretch 
 or pinch the ulnar nerve, by pushing it from side to side, 
 or compressing it with the fingers, the shock is felt in 
 the parts to which its ultimate branchlets are distributed, 
 namely, in the palm and back of the hand, and in the 
 fourth and fifth fingers. "According as the pressure 
 
148 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 " is varied the pricking sensation is felt by turns in the 
 " fourth finger, in the fifth, in the palm of the hand, or 
 " in the back of the hand ; and both on the palm and 
 " on the back of the hand the situation of the pricking 
 " sensation is different, according as the pressure on the 
 " nerve is varied ; that is to say, according as different 
 " fibres or fasciculi of fibres are more pressed upon than 
 " others. The same will be found to be the case in 
 " irritating the nerve in the upper arm" (Miiller's Phy- 
 siology, by Baly, p. 740). So strong is this tendency to 
 localize the sensation at the extremities of the nerves, 
 that when an arm or leg is amputated the person has 
 still the feeling of the lost limb. Miiller has collected 
 a number of such cases (76., pp. 746, 747). "A student, 
 " named Schmidts, from Aix, had his arm amputated 
 " above the elbow thirteen years ago ; he has never 
 " ceased to have sensations as if in the fingers. I 
 " applied pressure to the nerves in the stump ; and M. 
 " Schmidts immediately felt the whole arm, even the 
 " fingers, as if asleep." " A toll-keeper in the neigh- 
 " bourhood of Halle, whose right arm had been shattered 
 " by a cannon-ball in battle, above the elbow, twenty 
 " years ago, and afterwards amputated, has still, in 
 " 1833, at the time of changes of the weather, distinct 
 " rheumatic pains, which seem to him to exist in the 
 " whole arm ; and though removed long ago, the lost 
 " part is at those times felt as if sensible to draughts of 
 " air. This man also completely confirmed our state- 
 " ment, that the sense of the integrity of the limb was 
 " never lost." When there is a change made artifi- 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 149 
 
 ciaJly in the peripheral extremities of nerves, the sen- 
 sations are still felt as if in the original spots. " When, 
 " in the restoration of a nose, a flap of skin is turned 
 " down from the forehead and made to unite with the 
 " stump of the nose, the new nose thus formed has, as 
 " long as the isthmus of skin by which it maintains its 
 " original connexions remains undivided, the same sen- 
 " sations as if it were still on the forehead ; in other 
 " words, when the nose is touched, the patient feels the 
 " impression in the forehead. This is a fact well known 
 " to surgeons, and was first observed by Lisfranc" 
 (lb., p. 748). 
 
 No doubt it is possible to ascribe all this to experi- 
 ence and the association of ideas. We first, it is said, 
 find by observation that a certain sensation originates 
 in a particular part of the body, and the same sensation 
 ever after suggests the part. But the facts, as a whole, 
 Avill not submit to this explanation. It is difficult to 
 see how the phenomena quoted can be thus accounted 
 for. For surely an experience of thirteen or twenty 
 years might have been sufficient to change the associa- 
 tions acquired at an earlier date, and to place the per- 
 sons under the influence of new ones, provided always 
 that the original ones had not been instinctive or native. 
 In the case of the transference of the flap of skin, Mtiller 
 says, " When the communication of the nervous fibres 
 " of the new nose with those of the forehead is cut off 
 " by division of the isthmus of skin, the sensations are 
 " of course no longer referred to the forehead ; the sen- 
 " sibility of the nose is at first absent, but is gradually 
 
150 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 " developed." This language implies that the old refer- 
 ence to the forehead ceased in spite of the old asso- 
 ciation when the isthmus was cut ; and that the new 
 reference to the nose was occasioned by the sensibility 
 of the nerve, according to the physiological law, which 
 makes us ascribe the sensation to the extremity of the 
 nerve. It is not easy to see how experience could give 
 us the ready localization of the sensation, more parti- 
 cularly when the feeling is within the body, and in a 
 part which has never fallen under the senses of touch 
 or sight. It is hard to believe that the instantaneous 
 voluntary drawing back of a limb when wounded, and 
 the shrinking of the frame when boiling liquid is poured 
 down the throat, can proceed from an application of an 
 observed law as to the seat of sensations. From a very 
 early age, and long before they give any evidence of 
 knowing distance beyond their bodies, or having any 
 other acquired perceptions, children will indicate that 
 they know at least vaguely the seat of the pain felt by 
 them, — if a child is wounded in the arm, it will not 
 hold out its foot. But the question seems to be set at 
 rest by a physiological fact, thus stated by Dr. Baly : — 
 " Professor Valentin (Repertor. fur Anat. und Physiol, 
 " 1836, p. 330) has observed, that individuals who are 
 " the subjects of congenital imperfection, or absence of 
 " the extremities, have, nevertheless, the internal sensa- 
 " tions of such limbs in their perfect state. A girl aged 
 " nineteen years, in whom the metacarpal bones of the 
 " left hand were very short, and all the bones of the 
 " phalanges absent — a row of imperfectly organized 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 151 
 
 " wart-like projections representing the ringers, assured 
 " M. Valentin that she had constantly the internal sen- 
 " sation of a palm of the hand, and five fingers on the 
 " left side as perfect as on the right. When a ligature 
 " was placed round the stump, she had the sensation of 
 " ' formication' in the hand and fingers ; and pressure 
 " on the ulnar nerve gave rise to the ordinary feeling 
 " of the third, fourth, and fifth fingers being asleep, 
 " although these fingers did not exist. The examina- 
 " tion of three other individuals gave the same results" 
 (Jb., p. 747). 1 
 
 Miiller maintains, that in this way we get a know- 
 ledge of the greater nuniber of the parts of our body, 
 and in all the dimensions of space ; and that when our 
 body comes into collision with another body, if the shock 
 be sufficiently strong, the sensation of our body to a 
 certain depth is awakened, and there arises a sensation 
 of the contusion in the whole dimensions of the cube. 
 He thus makes the knowledge not only of the third 
 dimension of space, but of our own body, to depend on 
 an original disposition (Anlage). He carries this doc- 
 trine so far as to hold that as the nerves of all the senses 
 are extended over the frame, so there is a representation 
 of space given not only by touch and sight, but also by 
 taste and smell — the sense of hearing alone not giving 
 us a perception of space, because it does not perceive 
 
 1 Mr. Mill refers (p. 246) to a case given him by Hamilton from Maine 
 de Biran, of a person who had lost the power of the motor nerves, hut who, 
 though still alive to the sense of pain, was nnable to localize the feeling. 
 The case is valueless, as evidently the functions of the nervous apparatus 
 were deranged. 
 
152 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SEXSES. 
 
 its special extension. " The first idea of a body having 
 " extension, and occupying space, arises in our mind 
 " from the sensation of our own corporeal extension. 
 " This consciousness of our own corporeal existence is 
 " the standard by which we estimate in our sense of 
 " touch the extension of all resisting bodies" (Physiology, 
 p. 1081). Wundt says (p. 2), " These views, if they are 
 " not always carried out with such consistency, are in 
 " their essential fundamental positions still acknow 
 " ledged at this day by most physiologists." 
 
 It is interesting to notice that a like doctrine was 
 held on independent grounds by two of the greatest 
 psychologists of this century, — by M. Saisset in France, 
 and Sir William Hamilton in this country. The former 
 dwells on the localization of our sensations in their 
 various organic seats (see Art. " Sens " in Diet, des Sciences 
 Philos.) The latter says that " an extension is appre 
 " hended in the apprehension of the reciprocal exter- 
 " nality of all sensations," and that " in the conscious- 
 " ness of sensations relatively localized and reciprocally 
 " external, we have a veritable apprehension, and con- 
 " sequently an immediate perception of the affected 
 " organism, as extended, divided, figured," etc. (App., 
 Eeid's Works, pp. 884, 885. )* I confess that I have a 
 great partiality for this doctrine. Even the sense of 
 hearing, if it does not yield the extension of our frame, 
 may give a direction to the sound heard in the ear. The 
 conclusion is the result of accurate physiological research, 
 
 i It is interesting to find D. Stewart saying, " It is characteristical of 
 " all sensations of tovxh, that they are accompanied with a perception of 
 " the local situation of their exciting causes " {Elem., vol. iii. p. 310). 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 153 
 
 and it seems to me to clear up most of the psychological 
 difficulties connected with the senses, and to favour a 
 metaphysical realism which enables us to stand up for 
 the veracity of our original sense-perceptions, which are 
 mainly of the body as affected. It supposes that when 
 the soul is roused into consciousness by an affection of 
 the nerves, it gives a direction and a localization to its 
 sensations, and as it feels simultaneously a number of 
 sensations from different members of the body, it feels 
 them to be out of each other, and related in respect of 
 direction ; and as sensations accumulate and succeed 
 each other, it gives a sensation, or rather perception, of 
 our capacity of being affected at very different points of 
 the periphery, and consequently of a volume. When 
 in a tepid bath we have not only a pleasant sensation 
 (which is all that Mr. Bain allows), we have a feeling 
 of the frame as affected over the whole surface. But 
 let not this statement be misunderstood. No one 
 means to affirm that we have as yet a representation or 
 image in the mind of the external configuration of the 
 body, and of its several parts, such as we reach when 
 we come to feel them with the hand or see them in a 
 mirror. This is a subsequent attainment made by a 
 gathered experience through the combination of various 
 senses ; and we are often in perplexity from the diffi- 
 culty of uniting the intuitive with the acquired know- 
 ledge, as when we know that the pain in toothache is 
 in a certain direction, and yet are in doubts as to what 
 tooth corresponds externally to the internal localization. 
 But as the ground of the whole, we have a localized 
 
154 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 perception of points, and of different points and direc- 
 tions, in our bodily frame, which, I may add, is felt to 
 be ours by the command which our efforts have over it, 
 and the sensations of which it is felt to be the seat. 
 Some parts of this general view seem to me to be 
 established by physiological arguments, and the theory 
 as a whole is vastly better fitted to meet and account 
 for our idea of extension than the baseless hypothesis 
 sanctioned by Mr. Mill. 
 
 The curious experimental researches of Weber seem 
 to confirm the general doctrine that Touch Proper or 
 Feeling is very specially, as the Germans represent it, 
 a space-giving organ. His experiments were conducted 
 by means of a pair of compasses sheathed with cork, 
 with which he touched the skin while the eyes were 
 closed, in order to determine how close the points of the 
 compasses might be brought to each and still be felt as 
 two bodies. The distance between the points necessary 
 to indicate different sensations was found to vary in 
 different parts of the body, from one-half Parisian line 
 on the tip of the tongue to thirty Parisian lines on the 
 back of the body, thus showing the sensitiveness of the 
 one part to be sixty times finer than that of the other 
 part. The capability of discerning the difference of 
 sensation is somewhat different in different individuals, 
 but it is said that their relative proportion in different 
 parts of the body remains tolerably constant in the 
 same individual. The researches seem to imply that 
 the sense of touch indicates to us, in a way which can- 
 not be the result of a gathered experience, both points 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 155 
 
 of space and intervals of space, always within and not 
 beyond the bodily frame. The points must be per- 
 ceived immediately, and an interval or line between is 
 either perceived immediately, or is necessitated in 
 mathematical thought by the comparison of the differ - 
 ent points. 
 
 Weber regards the skin as a sort of mosaic of circles 
 or compartments, which in different positions have 
 different magnitudes and shapes, and that each has its 
 own capacity of sensation. The theory suggested by 
 Fick is thus stated by Dr. Carpenter : " Each nerve- 
 " fibril breaks up into a pencil of fine filaments at the 
 ' : periphery, which are distributed over a certain space, 
 "perhaps on the average about 1'25 of an inch in 
 " diameter. An impression made upon any one of these 
 " filaments conveys the same sensation to the sensorium, 
 " providing no other nerve be distributed to the same 
 " space ; but this hardly ever occurs, and hence com- 
 " pound sensations arise by which our perception of the 
 " precise spot of the skin touched by a point is accurately 
 " determined. It is obvious that the closer these 
 " ' sensory circles' are, and the more intimately the 
 " branches of different nerves are intercalated with one 
 '•' another, the greater will be the sense of locality of 
 " that part ; or, in other words, the greater will be 
 " the facility with which minute differences in the pre- 
 " cise spot touched will be appreciated" (Hum. Phys., 
 p. 611). The subject has been keenly discussed in Ger- 
 many. According to George, movement is the source 
 of all objective consciousness. If by objective con- 
 
156 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 sciousness is meant not that of our bodily frame, but 
 of something beyond, I believe the doctrine is correct. 
 We discover extra-organic objects by the resistance 
 offered to our movement, Fortlage ascribes our intui- 
 tion of body to the restraint laid on our impulse 
 (Triebhcmmung). It is thus, no doubt, we know the 
 existence of objects beyond our bodies, but already in 
 touch we have an apprehension of our frames as ex- 
 tended. Lotze has observed much, and speculated more 
 on this whole subject He says that when two object - 
 points come into perception through two excitations 
 of the nerves, the consciousness of their spatial near- 
 ness to one another is not given ; and he starts the 
 hypothesis that this is furnished by a third nerve- 
 process, which he calls " place indicators." Meissner has 
 sought to bring Lotze's hypothesis into unison with 
 physiological and anatomical researches. He thinks he 
 has discovered "touch- corpuscles," which he represents 
 as the actual touch-organs. These are found specially 
 in the hand and the foot, and they at once give us 
 bodies without us as objects, apart from the sensation 
 of pressure. These researches and discussions all pro- 
 ceed on the idea that our knowledge of an extended 
 world is obtained not exclusively by a sweep of the 
 hand, but by some special provision in the sense of 
 touch proper or feeling. 
 
 The admitted conclusions are thus stated by AVundt 
 (pp. 64, 65) : " With every single sensation (Empfind- 
 " ung) is connected involuntarily the representation 
 " of the place at which it occurs. As soon as there 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 157 
 
 " are two contemporaneous sensations in the percep- 
 " tion (Wahrnehmung), there is thence given a dim re- 
 " presentation of the extent of the skin which the 
 " impressions embrace, whereby the impressions are 
 " immediately conceived as spatially separated. But 
 " about the magnitude of their separation in space 
 " nothing determinate can yet be declared, as that re- 
 " presentation is for this purpose altogether indistinct. 
 " It is usually only when one is first led through an 
 " internal or external impulse to resolve upon an esti- 
 " mation by measure, that there is raised a clear image 
 " of the entire parts of the body and of the points 
 " touched, and thereby is first given the determinate 
 " representation of the interspace which lies between 
 " the impressions." He then explains, that, in regard to 
 the distance which is to be found between two impres- 
 sions, the soul, in that it perceives two different sensa- 
 tions of place (Ortsempfindungen), is compelled to put 
 an interspace between them, and to represent this out 
 of the like experience through sight or the muscular 
 sense. 
 
 Musculak Sense. 
 
 Sir Charles Bell established the great truth, that the 
 nerves of sensation differ from those of motion. From 
 his physiological researches, and the ingenious psycho- 
 logical speculations of his contemporary, Dr. Thomas 
 Brown, has proceeded the very general acknowledgment 
 in this country of the existence of a Muscular Sense to 
 be distinguished from Touch Proper. Physiologically 
 
158 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 the Muscular Sense consists of a Motor nerve, under the 
 control of the will, going out from the brain and moving 
 the muscle attached to it, and of a Sensor nerve going 
 back to the brain and giving intimation of the motion. 
 Psychologically this sense serves as important purposes 
 as either touch proper or sight. It may be doubted 
 whether, apart from this endowment, we should have 
 a sense or knowledge of any object beyond our bodily 
 frame. Feeling, or the skin-sense as it has been 
 called, seems to give us merely the periphery of our 
 bodies ; and when we become cognizant of an extra- 
 organic object, as when on pressing the palm of the 
 hand on a table we feel a surface, I believe there is a 
 combination of the two senses of touch proper giving us 
 a sense of the surface of the hand, and of the muscular 
 sense giving a knowledge of an outward object resisting 
 this surface. " If we lay our hand upon a table, we be- 
 " come conscious, on a little reflection, that we do not 
 " feel the table, but merely that part of our skin which 
 " the table touches" (Muller, p. 1081). Even as to the 
 coloured surface falling under the eye, it is doubtful 
 whether we should place it certainly out and beyond 
 our organism without the concurrence of the muscular 
 sense and a gathered experience. The boy born blind, 
 whose eye was couched by Cheselden, said that objects 
 at first seemed " to touch his eyes as what he felt did 
 his skin." In a like case operated upon, and recorded 
 by Home, objects seemed at first to touch the eye. The 
 expressions are somewhat vague, but it is clear that the 
 objects were felt as having a close relationship to the 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 159 
 
 eye, and were not known as being at a distance. It is 
 certain that it is mainly and most effectually (if not 
 exclusively) by the muscular sense that we obtain an 
 apprehension, or rather knowledge, of an object beyond 
 our bodily frame, and independent of it. Dr. Carpenter, 
 with his usual sound judgment, declares that it is 
 probably on the sensations communicated through this 
 sense that " the idea of the material world, as some- 
 " thing external to ourselves, chiefly rests ; but that this 
 " idea is by no means a logical deduction from our ex- 
 " perience of these sensations, being rather an instinc- 
 " tive or intuitive perception directly excited by them " 
 {Hum. Phys., p. 612). 
 
 I cannot do better than quote once more from Wundt, 
 who gives us the result of German research (p. 427). 
 ' ; The first acts of sense-perception are grounded on the 
 " operation of the Muscular Sense [that is, so far as 
 " objects beyond the body are concerned]. When we 
 " move our members we come upon external resist - 
 " ances*. We observe that these resistances some- 
 " times give way before our pressure ; but we find 
 " at the same time that this takes place with very 
 " different degrees of facility, and that in order to put 
 '■ different bodies in motion we must apply very different 
 '■ degrees of muscular force ; but to every single degree 
 u of the contraction-force there corresponds a determi- 
 " nate degree in intensity of the muscular sensations. 
 :: With these muscular sensations, the sensations of the 
 ' : skin which cover our members of touch so continually 
 " mingle, that the intensity of these touch-sensations 
 
160 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 " goes parallel to the intensity of the accompanying 
 " muscular sensations. "We succeed in this way in con- 
 " necting the degree of intensity of the muscular sen- 
 " sations in a necessary manner with the nature of the 
 " resistances which set themselves against our move- 
 " ment." 
 
 Vision. 
 
 The eye is a more complicated structure than any of 
 the other organs of sense, and there are more disputes 
 as to the functions and operations of its parts than in 
 regard to those of any of the other senses. On some 
 points, however, there is a pretty general agreement 
 among the scientific physiologists in Germany, who have 
 devoted so much attention to the subject ; and these are 
 sufficient for our purpose, being opposed to the hypo- 
 thesis supported by Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain. 
 
 It seems to be admitted on all hands, that by the eye 
 we have immediately a perception of space in two 
 dimensions, or of a surface. In stating the views of 
 Miiller, Wundt says (p. 95), "We can perceive spatial 
 " extension and the relation in position of outward objects 
 " only so far as we have a spatial sensation of our own 
 " retina and the relative position of its single points. 
 " As the retina spreads itself in a surface, the images of 
 " objects obtain upon it only two dimensions. But this 
 " disadvantage, under which sight labours as compared 
 " with feeling, is compensated by the body's own move- 
 " ments, by means of which we can view successively the 
 " one object from different stand-points. As regards 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES, 161 
 
 " the sense of sight, the perception (Anschauung) of the 
 " third dimension is through a judgment, and so Miiller 
 " calls it a representation (Vorstellung), while he desig- 
 " nates the intuition of surface as a sensation." " The 
 " grand principle of the theory of Miiller, that the 
 " perception of a surface is a sensation, and that the 
 " perception of depth on the other hand is a represen- 
 " tation formed through judgment, is to this day the 
 " universally received one, and the researches remain 
 " settled, although this department since that time has 
 " been enriched by a great many new facts, and although 
 " this principle, so far as certain matters of fact are 
 " concerned, does not seem to be sufficient." The in- 
 sufficiency does not relate to the original discernment 
 of a surface by the eye, which seems to be acknow- 
 ledged on all hands, but to the provision in the eye 
 itself for discovering the three dimensions of space. 
 " The perception of superficial space, which goes before 
 " all representations of space, and makes the same 
 " possible, is bound up in the sense of sight so inti- 
 " mately with the pure sensation, that there is nowhere 
 " in the consciousness any act lying in the middle be- 
 " tween the sensation and its perception in the form 
 "' of space" (p. 145). It should be added that Waitz 
 and Lotze are opposed as to whether the chief impor- 
 tance should be attached to the sensible or motor 
 factors : Waitz ascribing the greater value to the sensa- 
 tion ; and Lotze, to the motor element. Wundt (p. 104) 
 says that all observation shows that both exercise an 
 influence at the same time. 
 
 L 
 
1G2 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SEXSES. 
 
 So much for our perception of a superficies by the 
 eye. But there is a provision in the organ of sight for 
 giving us space in three dimensions, and for discover- 
 ing the distance of objects. This can be done even by 
 the single eye, not immediately with every perception, 
 as may be done by the two eyes, but by a succession of 
 perceptions. This is accomplished in the case of a 
 single eye by its power of accommodating itself to dif- 
 ferent distances. Much attention has been given of 
 late years to the nature of the accommodation-mechan- 
 ism by Helmholtz and others. The accommodation 
 seems originally to be involuntary and unconscious, but 
 is brought under our notice by the attached muscular 
 feeling. So far as this means is concerned, the deter- 
 mination of distance by one eye is confined within very 
 narrow limits ; but there is a great help to it in the 
 movement of the ball of the eye, of which intimation is 
 given by the attached muscles. But by far the most 
 important provision in the visual organ for discovering 
 the third dimension of space is to be found in binocular 
 vision, that is, in the convergence of the axis, according 
 as the objects are near, and in the different aspect of the 
 object falling under each eye. Wundt again supplies us 
 with an excellent summary : " The measurements which 
 " we are able to bring out by means of our senses which 
 " give us the intuition of space show this remarkable 
 " difference between the two, that the eye as the sense 
 " operating in the distance measures space according to 
 " all the four dimensions; whereas sensations by the skin, 
 " which are effected only by the immediate contact of 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SEXSES. 163 
 
 " the outward object with the surface of the skiu, are all 
 " disposed only over one surface. The perception of the 
 " third dimension of space through the sense of sight is, 
 ' : however, so far as can be proven by experience, a 
 " mediate one derived from the movements of the 
 " muscles of the eye (partly of the external, which move 
 " the apple of the eye : partly of the internal, which 
 "regulate the accommodation - mechanism). These 
 " measurements of distance depend on nothing but 
 " the estimation of the muscular sensations acconi- 
 u panying the movements, and therefore the percep- 
 " tion is accomplished only by means of a lengthened 
 " experience and practice, and hence arise the great 
 " uncertainty and incompleteness of all measurements 
 " of that kind. Originally all spatial sense-intuitions 
 " are of surfaces; depth for the eye conies forth gradually 
 " out of the surface ; the sense ever penetrates deeper 
 " and deeper into boundless space, its circle of vision 
 '•' widening as the visual circle of its experience ex- 
 " tends" (p. 29). 
 
 That the eye is immediately cognizant of direction 
 and superficial figure, is proven by the reported cases of 
 persons born blind, but who acquired eye-sight by 
 means of a surgical operation. The best reported case 
 is that of Dr. i ranz of Leipzig (Phil. Trans, of Roy. Soc. 
 1841), and I shall quote from it at considerable length. 
 The youth had been born blind, and was seventeen years 
 of age when the experiment was wrought which gave him 
 the use of one eye. When the eye was sufficiently 
 restored to bear the light, " a sheet of paper on which 
 
164 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 " two strong black lines had been drawn, the one hori- 
 " zontal, the other vertical, was placed before hirn at 
 " the distance of about three feet. He was now allowed 
 " to open the eye, and after attentive examination he 
 " called the lines by their right denominations." " The 
 " outline in black of a square, six inches in diameter, 
 " within which a circle had been drawn, and within the 
 " latter a triangle, was, after careful examination, recog- 
 " nised and correctly described by him." " At the dis- 
 " tance of three feet, and on a level with the eye, a solid 
 " cube and a sphere, each of four inches diameter, were 
 " placed before him." " After attentively examining 
 '" these bodies, he said he saw a quadrangular and a 
 " circular figure, and after some consideration he pro- 
 " nounced the one a square and the other a disc. His 
 " eye being then closed, the cube was taken away and 
 " a disc of equal size substituted and placed next to the 
 " sphere. On again opening his eye he observed no 
 " difference in these objects, but regarded them both as 
 " discs. The solid cube was now placed in a somewhat 
 " oblique position before the eye, and close beside it a 
 " figure cut out of pasteboard, representing a plane out- 
 " line prospect of the cube when in this position. Both 
 " objects he took to be something like flat quadrates. A 
 " pyramid placed before him with one of its sides to- 
 " wards his eye he saw as a plain triangle. This object 
 " was now turned a little so as to present two of its 
 " sides to view, but rather more of one side than of the 
 " other : after considering and examining it for a long 
 " time, he said that this was a very extraordinary figure ; 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 165 
 
 " it was neither a triangle, nor a quadrangle, nor a 
 " circle ; lie had no idea of it, and could not describe it; 
 " ' in fact,' said he, ' I must give it up.' On the con- 
 " elusion of these experiments, I asked him to describe 
 " the sensations the objects had produced, whereupon 
 " he said, that immediately on opening his eye he had 
 " discovered a difference in the two objects, the cube 
 " and the sphere, placed before him, and perceived that 
 " they were not drawings ; but that he had not been 
 " able to form from them the idea of a square and a 
 " disc until he perceived a sensation of what he saw in 
 " the points of his fingers, as if he really touched the 
 " objects. When I gave the three bodies (the sphere, 
 " cube, and pyramid) into his hand, he was much sur- 
 " prised he had not recognised them as such by sight, 
 " as he was well acquainted with mathematical figures 
 " by his touch." These observations show that the eye 
 takes in surface and superficial figure at once, but can- 
 not immediately discern solidity. If the persons have 
 the use of both eyes, they would observe the difference 
 between a disc and a solid, but they would not be able to 
 say, till they feel it, that the latter is a solid. It re- 
 quires to be added, that persons who have their sight 
 thus given them require observation and thought to recon- 
 cile the information they had got from touch with that 
 which they are now receiving from sight — just as persons 
 who have learned two languages, say German and French, 
 require practice to enable them readily to translate the 
 one into the other. In the case reported by Cheselden, 
 the boy, " upon being told what things were whose form 
 
166 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 " he before knew from feeling, said he would carefully ob- 
 " serve that he might know them again." Dr. Carpenter 
 tells us of a boy of four years old, upon whom the opera- 
 tion for congenital cataract had been very successfully 
 performed, that " he continued to find his way about 
 " his fathers house rather by feeling with his hands, as 
 " he had been formerly accustomed to do, than by his 
 " newly acquired sense of sight, being evidently per- 
 " plexed rather than assisted by the sensations which 
 " he had derived through it. But when learning a new 
 " locality, he employed his sight, and evidently perceived 
 " the increase of facility which he derived from it " 
 (Man. o/Phys., p. 593). 
 
 All the recorded cases show that there is also a pro- 
 cess of reasoning and experience in the discovery of dis- 
 tance. Mr. Abbot (p. 150) gives the following account of 
 the observations of Trinchinetti : — " He operated at the 
 " same time on two patients (brother and sister), eleven 
 " and ten years old respectively. The same day, having 
 " caused the boy to examine an orange, he placed it 
 " about one metre from him, and bade him try to take it. 
 " The boy brought his hand close to his eye (quasi a 
 " contatto del suo occJiio), and closing his fist, found it 
 " empty, to his great surprise. He then tried again a 
 " few inches from his eye, and at last, in this tentative 
 " way, succeeded in taking the orange. When the same 
 " experiment was tried with the girl, she also at first 
 " attempted to grasp the orange with her hand very 
 " near the eye (colla mano assai vicina all' occhio), 
 " then, perceiving her error, stretched out her forefinger 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 167 
 
 " and pushed it in a straight line slowly until she 
 " reached the object." Other patients have been observed 
 (by Janin and Duval) to move their hands in search of 
 objects in straight lines from the eye. Trinchinetti 
 " regards these observations as indicating a belief that 
 " visible objects were in actual contact with the eye." 
 It is clear that the eye gives direction to the object, but 
 does not apprehend distance immediately. Franz says 
 of his patient, that " if he wished to form an estimate of 
 " the distance of objects from his own person, or of two 
 " objects from each other, without moving from his 
 " place, he examined the objects from different points of 
 " view by turning his head to the right and to the left." 
 The German physiologists have paid great attention 
 to the case of persons born blind, and the conclusions 
 reached do not correspond with those of Platner. " As 
 " respects persons born blind," says Wundt (p. 60), 
 " who are not supported by the accompanying and pre- 
 " ceding experience of the sense of sight, the perception 
 " of the sensation of place takes place after a much 
 " more tedious and laborious manner. The blind man 
 " receives the representation of his body wholly through 
 " his own touch. While he touches with the finger or 
 " hand different parts of his body, there arise in the 
 " muscles of the arm just as many different muscular 
 " feelings. These become to him a measure of different 
 " distances. Thus he receives from the mutual spatial 
 " position of single points a representation of his skin- 
 " surface, and while at the same time, at every point, 
 " the Quale of the sensation corresponding to the same 
 
168 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 " imprints itself, he is placed in a position also to de- 
 " clare the place where are to be found the impressions 
 " which work from without." 
 
 This is more fully explained (p. 31) : "The represen- 
 " tation of the third dimension can also be awakened 
 " in the person born blind, but this only through a long 
 " series of conclusions, in which the changing impres- 
 " sions of the sense of feeling, and the muscular sensa- 
 " tions of the entire self-moving body, work together. 
 " As the person seeing remains in his place, and lets 
 " the objects in a manner come towards him, while 
 " he, at his will, opens his eyes to the far or the near ; 
 " so must the blind person, when he would discover 
 " the outer world, go and seek out the objects which 
 " remain to him in unchangeable rest," " The person 
 " seeing accommodates only his eye, the blind man his 
 " whole body, to the objects." 
 
 It does not concern us in this discussion to inquire 
 what truth there is in the Berkeleyan theory of vision. 
 If the above conclusions be trustworthy, as I believe 
 they are, they show it can be accepted only with im- 
 portant modifications. Berkeley was positively mistaken 
 in arguing that the eye is percipient only of colour, 
 and not of extension. He was further guilty of an 
 oversight in nob attending to the very special provision 
 in the organs of vision for enabling us, always by ex- 
 perience, to discover the third dimension of space, and 
 distance. It is firmly established that a surface is ever 
 presented to the eye, and is perceived immediately ; and 
 this surface supplies a measure to us in all our other 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 169 
 
 visual perceptions. It is now proven that there is a 
 beautiful teleological apparatus in each eye, and still 
 more in the relative position of the two eyes, whereby 
 we can discover the solidity and estimate the distances 
 of bodies. 1 
 
 As the result of this criticism, conducted on the 
 Psychological Method, we find ourselves entitled to 
 adhere to a certain body of intuitive truth respecting 
 both mind and matter. Instead of looking on mind as a 
 mere " series of feelings," w 7 e apprehend it as an abiding- 
 existence, with various properties which evolve them- 
 selves from day to day in our experience. Instead of 
 regarding matter as a " possibility," we contemplate it 
 as having a permanent being, with diverse forms of 
 activity, which are ever manifesting themselves to our 
 senses. On this intuitive truth we build others by a 
 gathered observation, and as we clo so we feel that they 
 are laid on a foundation which cannot be shaken. 
 
 Some object to this realistic doctrine, whether as held 
 by the world at large or by professed metaphysicians, 
 that it is contradicted by the established truths of 
 modern physical science, which shows that light and 
 heat are not substances, but vibrations in an ether, and 
 that all the other physical forces are correlated with 
 them. But these discoveries of recent science are all 
 consistent with a doctrine of natural realism, when the 
 same is properly expounded. Our senses afford us 
 primarily a knowledge of the affections of our bodily 
 frame, these affections being always localized. Such 
 
 1 Thus far there is truth in Abbot's Sight and Touch. 
 
170 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 information is given us by touch, by sight, and pro- 
 bably also by smell, taste, and hearing. Then, by the 
 muscular sense, we come to know objects resisting the 
 movement of our localized organs, and external to these 
 organs. In these operations, and especially in muscular 
 resistance, we know motion and force, that is, we are 
 sensible of a limb moving in consequence of an effort, 
 and being stayed by an extended object with a resisting 
 force. This is all we know primarily of matter by the 
 senses, and it has not been set aside by any doctrine of 
 modern physical science. 
 
 I have no partiality for the distinction between the 
 Primary and Secondary Qualities of bodies. In fact, as 
 has often been acknowledged, the secondary qualities, 
 such as heat and smell, are not so much properties of 
 matter as felt affections of our organism, which may in- 
 deed imply an external cause, but with which they are 
 not to be identified. We can, however, specify the 
 qualities of body which are primarily or intuitively 
 known. These seem to be Externality, Resisting Force, 
 and Extension, together, I think, with Motion in Space. 
 All besides, such as temperature, odours, tastes, and 
 sounds, are mere affections of our organism, giving notice 
 of changes in our bodily frame. Lotze says that our 
 sense of pressure and of temperature is not an object, 
 but a condition which the incitement in the parts of the 
 skin brings forth. Meissner, following out the same 
 doctrines, says that they are not sensations (Em/pfind- 
 ungen), but feelings, in so far as they do not stand in 
 relation directly and immediately to an object, but are 
 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 171 
 
 a condition of the subject, our own selves. Even colour 
 itself, though more objective, is felt merely, as in the 
 seen surface, standing in relation to our eye, and we can 
 say nothing more of it than that it affects us in a par- 
 ticular manner. 
 
 Taking this view of matter, we see that we have first 
 an original or intuitive knowledge. To this we are ever 
 adding by observation, by generalization, and by deduc- 
 tion. But then, in the rapidity of thought and the 
 hurry of life, our observations are often loose, our 
 generalizations too wide, and our reasonings hasty. 
 Hence the errors into which we are led, which, how- 
 ever, are not to be charged on our senses, but upon the 
 judgments we have superinduced upon the information 
 which they furnish. It cannot be shown that our in- 
 tuitive perceptions, being those that have the sanction 
 of Him who made us, ever do deceive us, or that they 
 are contradicted by any established truth of science. 1 
 
 Adopting these views of our original perceptions, w T e 
 see how we have a confirmation of their trustworthiness 
 in the circumstance that the different senses yield the 
 same testimony. I am persuaded, indeed, that our 
 conviction rests primarily, and all along most firmly, on 
 the assurance we have as to the veracity of each sense 
 (see //,.) Still it is possible to get verifications even of 
 our intuitions and demonstrations, — thus land nieasur- 
 
 i I "have endeavoured to show that the difficulties connected with the 
 apparent deception of the senses can be removed by attending to three 
 distinctions : — (1.) That between our Original and Acquired Perceptions ; 
 (2. ) That between Sensation and Perception ; (3.) That between the Objects 
 Intuitively Perceived ; all of them being extra-mental, but some of them 
 also extra-organic— {Intuitions, Pt. n. B. n. c. i. § 3.) 
 
172 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 
 
 ing and astronomy corroborate our geometrical deduc- 
 tions. It is certainly satisfactory to find that, in their 
 original depositions, the senses, which are so far inde- 
 pendent witnesses, thoroughly concur. Thus both 
 touch and sight give us surfaces, which a little experi- 
 ence enables us to discover to be identical. It is pro- 
 bable that all the senses give us direction outward. It 
 is certain that they all give us information directly or 
 indirectly of external objects ; and thus each in its own 
 way prepares us for looking out upon and estimating a 
 world which, beginning at self as a centre, extends as 
 far into space as the eye, aided by the telescope, can 
 penetrate. 
 
CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, BELIEF, AND UNCONSCIOUS 
 MENTAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 The faculty of Memory has not received any very 
 special consideration in the writings of Mr. Mill. When 
 we turn to the account given by his predecessors in the 
 school, we find it defective, in fact, as is usual with 
 them, overlooking the main element. Our recollections 
 are represented as ' revived sensations.' The statement 
 might be allowed to pass in common conversation, or 
 in loose literature, but cannot be accepted from a meta- 
 physician. There may be a revival not merely of our 
 sensations, but t of our mental operations generally, of 
 our thoughts, our emotions, — of our very recollections. 
 And in every exercise of memory there is more than a 
 revival of our experience. As the new and the essential 
 element, there is a belief that we have had the experience, 
 and that the event has been before us, in time past. All 
 this being matter of constant consciousness, we seldom 
 notice it, just as we pay no attention to the bodies 
 which we ever see falling to the ground. But as it was 
 the falling apple, which ordinary men thought beneath 
 their regard, which seemed to Newton (if the common 
 
174 MEMORY, ASSOCIATIOX OF 
 
 story is to be credited) the phenomenon to be weighed, 
 and which actually furnished the key to the explanation 
 of the path of the moon and planets in their orbits ; so 
 it is in the familiar facts of onr consciousness that the 
 psychologist finds the means of clearing up the more 
 complex laws of our mental nature. In particular, 
 every one who would dive into the deeper mysteries 
 of raiiid must specially estimate what is involved in 
 memory, which is quite as important a faculty as even 
 sensation in our mental constitution. 
 
 In memory, let it be observed, we are beyond the 
 territory of immediate knowledge, with the object before 
 us : we are now in the region of Faith. We believe in 
 the existence of an object not now present ; in that, say, 
 of a departed friend never again to be met with in this 
 world. We believe that this friend lived, and that we 
 had frequent intercourse with him, in time past, I 
 call this the Eecognitive Power of Memory, to distin- 
 guish it from the mere reproductive, the recalling and 
 imaging power. What we thus experience, what we are 
 conscious of, cannot be called ' a revived sensation ' 
 without giving the revival much that was not in the 
 sensation. We have now not only Faith in its rudi- 
 ments, we have Time in all its significance. Xo doubt 
 it appears first in the concrete mixed up with other 
 things ; but so do all our ideas, so do our very sensa- 
 tions. It comes in the form of an event believed to 
 have happened in time past. But it is there in the 
 mind, consciousness being witness ; and we have only 
 to abstract the time from the event to have the abstract 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 175 
 
 idea of time, — just as we have the idea of sensation by 
 separating in thought the sentient from the self-sentient. 
 Time thus reached has quite as real an existence as the 
 very sensation which may have been conjoined with 
 our original perception of the event. 
 
 Mr. Mill, in language already quoted (supra, pp. 
 59, 85), admits the existence of the belief involved in 
 rneniory, and asserts its veracity and ultimate veracity. 
 Our memories and expectations are present feelings, .but 
 " each of them involves a belief in more than its own 
 existence." A remembrance involves " the belief that 
 " a sensation, of which it is a copy or representation, 
 " actually existed in the past ; " and an expectation in- 
 volves the belief, " that a sensation or other feeling to 
 which it directly refers will exist in the future ;" and 
 the belief the two include is, " that I myself formerly 
 " had, or that I myself and no other shall hereafter 
 " have, the sensations remembered or expected." He is 
 fond, as we shall immediately see, of ascribing most of 
 our convictions, beliefs, and judgments to association of 
 ideas. Mr. James Mill had declared broadly, " that 
 " wherever the name Belief is applied, there is a case of 
 " the indissoluble association of ideas ;" and that " no 
 " instance can be adduced in which any thing besides 
 " an indissoluble association can be shown in belief" 
 (Analysis, p. 281). But his son has been obliged to 
 modify this doctrine, and to allow that there is an 
 " ultimate " belief prior to association, and independent 
 of it. I am sure that he is right in calling in such a 
 belief. But I am also sure that he should have called 
 
176 MEMORY, ASSOCIATIOX OF 
 
 in other beliefs equally independent of association ; and 
 we shall have to supply his deficiencies as we advance 
 by showing how wide is the domain of faith. Mean- 
 while let us observe how much is involved in the faith 
 of memory and expectation. We have seen in last 
 chapter that the senses directly or indirectly open to 
 us the distant and the remote, till our minds are lost 
 in the immensity of space. Now we see time stretching 
 away into the past and the future, till it goes out into 
 eternity. And it is interesting to notice, that while these 
 ultimate beliefs, like the senses, carry with them their 
 own evidence, they are ever meeting with corroborations. 
 We remember a field, a dell, a cottage which we once 
 visited ; we have not seen it for many years, but as we 
 now go back to it, we find it as we have been picturing 
 it in our minds. These confirmations of our lower 
 faiths help us to put a more implicit trust in our 
 higher natural beliefs, which may not admit of any 
 confirmation by sense. Already, in this belief of 
 memory and expectation, we have the beginnings and 
 the rudiments of that faith in the unseen, which in its 
 higher flights carries us so far beyond ourselves, and 
 lifts us as on wings high above this world. 
 
 The subject of Association of Ideas, which is inti- 
 mately connected with Memory, has long engaged the 
 attention of British metaphysicians. It is referred to 
 by Hobbes, who was evidently aware of what Aristotle 
 had written. It was employed by Locke to explain 
 certain anomalies and eccentricities of mind and char- 
 acter. Its importance in accounting for ordinary mental 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 177 
 
 action was first brought out fully by Francis Hutcheson, 
 who showed in particular how it helped to create secon- 
 dary affections. Some of its properties had a prominence 
 given them by Hume, who used it to help his sceptical 
 purposes by explaining by it many of the beliefs usually 
 ascribed to reason. A fuller and a juster account of it 
 than any previously published was given by Turnbull 
 (the preceptor of Eeid) in his Moral Philosophy. Hart- 
 ley speculated upon it in an empirical and peculiarly 
 Anglican manner, identifying association with vibrations 
 in the nerves. All the Scottish metaphysicians, in- 
 cluding Eeid, Beattie, and Stewart, discoursed upon it 
 with greater or less fulness. But as universal attention 
 was called to it, its power and significance came to be 
 greatly exaggerated. This was certainly done by Alison 
 when, passing far beyond the more sober views enter- 
 tained on the same subject by Hutcheson and Beattie, 
 he sought to account by this one principle for all the 
 phenomena of beauty. Brown drew back from so ex- 
 treme a position, and maintained that there was excited 
 by beautiful objects a class of feelings which could not 
 be resolved into association of ideas nor anything else. 
 But in his mental physiology suggestion plays a very 
 important, I would say the principal, part. He treats 
 of our intellectual operations under the heads of Simple 
 and Belative Sucwestion, and indulges in an excess of 
 ingjenuitv in making these two faculties manufacture 
 so many of our ideas. Mr. James Mill followed, and 
 carrying out a hint thrown out by Brown, that all our 
 associate feelings could be reduced to " a fine species of 
 
 M 
 
178 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 proximity" (Lecture xxxv.), resolved all suggestion into 
 the one law of contiguity ; and abandoning Brown, who 
 stood up for intuitive beliefs, and adhering to Hume, 
 accounted for our very beliefs and judgments by associa- 
 tion. The time for a reaction had now come. Artists 
 never favoured Alison's reduction of beauty to associa- 
 tion. New and profound ideas were introduced into 
 English metaphysics by Coleridge, and through the 
 taste stimulated by him and others for German specu- 
 lation. But the recoil was actually called forth by Sir 
 James Mackintosh's Dissertation on Ethical Science, 
 which at once created the opposition of our higher 
 moralists to the attempt made by him to manufacture 
 our idea of moral good by means of association. Sir 
 W. Hamilton, who belongs to this period, devoted 
 his penetrating intellect to the more thorough expres- 
 sion of the laws of the reproduction of our ideas, and 
 has thrown not a little light on the subject, at the same 
 time keeping the principle in its own place. Some of us 
 had hoped that this tendency to exaggerate the power 
 and importance of association had enjoyed its day, and 
 was now past for ever. But the wheel of speculative 
 opinion seems to have come round to the position it 
 had an age ago ; and we find association of ideas oc- 
 cupying in the writings of the younger Mill and Mr. 
 Bain as high a place as it ever had in the works of 
 Alison and Brown, of Mackintosh and the older Mill, — 
 or, we may add, as it had two ages earlier still in the 
 philosophy of Hume and of Hartley. There is evidently 
 clear room for a new discussion of the whole subject. 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 179 
 
 Of late it has been taken up by the German metaphy- 
 sicians generally ; and the School of Herbart, in particu- 
 lar, has been seeking to give a mathematical expression 
 to the laws of the succession of our ideas. I should like 
 to see the results of the investigations of the British 
 School — especially of Hamilton, and of the later German 
 metaphysicians, wrought out into a consistent system. 
 
 Mr. Mill can scarcely be said to have added much 
 to our knowledge of the laws of association. He spe- 
 cially dwells on two points, and he exaggerates and 
 distorts both. The first is what he calls the Law of 
 Inseparable Association. " Associations produced by 
 " contiguity become more certain and rapid by repeti- 
 " tion. When two phenomena have been very often 
 " experienced in conjunction, and have not in any 
 " single instance occurred separately, either in experi- 
 " ence or in thought, there is produced between them 
 " what has been called Inseparable Association ; by 
 " which is not meant that the association must inevi- 
 " tably last to the end of life, that no subsequent ex- 
 " perience or process of thought can possibly avail to 
 " dissolve it, but only that, as long as no such experience 
 " or process of thought has taken place, the association 
 " is irresistible, it is impossible for us to think the one 
 "thing disjoined from the other" (p. 191). We have 
 here an important truth, which was much dwelt upon by 
 our author's father. It can scarcely be raised to the dig- 
 nity of a law : it results from higher laws. According to 
 the frequency with which two ideas have been together, 
 so will be the tendency of the one to recall the other. 
 
180 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 When they have often "been associated, the one will 
 bring up the other, not only without an act of will on 
 our part, but it may be in opposition to our utmost 
 efforts. Thus there are painful recollections which we 
 would fain be rid of, but they cleave to us with horrid 
 pertinacity, because conjoined with objects which are 
 for ever pressing themselves on our notice. The only 
 way of dissolving such a combination is by forming a 
 new one, — as in chemistry we dissolve a compound by 
 bringing to bear upon it another substance, which having 
 a strong affinity to one of the elements, draws it away 
 from that with which it is now united. It is thus we 
 break up an old set of associations by forming new 
 ones, say by a change of scene or society. 
 
 So far we have a well-known operation, according to 
 a well-known law. But let us understand precisely 
 what is involved. We shall find that Mr. Mill has so 
 stretched the law as to make it embrace an entirely 
 different phenomenon. It is implied that two ideas 
 having been together, the one will never cast up with- 
 out the other tending to follow. But this does not re- 
 quire that we judge or decide that there is, and still less 
 that there must be, some relation between them in the 
 nature of things, or discerned by the mind. On the 
 contrary, we may see them to be utterly discrepant, 
 and wish that we could only break the links that join 
 them in the chain of association. Thus there is a 
 lovely spot where we once saw a foul act committed, 
 and ever since, as we pass it, the whole scene rushes into 
 our mind ; but we never think or conclude that there is 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 181 
 
 any necessary or even natural connexion between the 
 place and the deed. Mr. Mill has slipped in a word 
 very dexterously, when he says, " It is impossible for 
 us ever to think the one disjoined from the other." 
 This is true only when by ' think ' we understand 
 ' having the idea of.' It is a fact that the one idea re- 
 calls the other, but we do not therefore think the one 
 to be joined to the other, either in the nature of things, 
 or according to the laws of thought. 
 
 We have here come to one of the gravest errors into 
 which Mr. Mill has fallen in his theory of the operations 
 of the mind. It is that of making the association of 
 ideas usurp the province of judgment, which declares 
 that two ideas or objects have a relation. I admit that 
 the two, suggestion and judgment or comparison, often 
 coincide and co-operate, and accomplish most important 
 ends as they do so. Things that have a natural con- 
 nexion are often presented to us together, they are thus 
 brought under the law of association, and they are 
 henceforth often recalled at the same time. In this 
 way the association of ideas may lead to a hasty belief, 
 not founded on a careful comparison of facts. I believe 
 that much of what is usually reckoned understanding 
 or judgment, contains little else than an association of 
 ideas. The so-called ' thought ' of the lower animals, 
 of children, and even of men of mature years, consists 
 mainly in ideas succeeding each other in a train deter- 
 mined by outward circumstances or by habit. It has 
 to be added, that association of ideas often essentially 
 aids us in forming a mature judgment, by bringing 
 
182 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 things that have a positive relation into juxtaposition, 
 whereby we are enabled to discover the connexion. 
 As the association helps the judgment, so the judgment, 
 when it once connects the two things, creates an asso- 
 ciation of ideas, whereby the one tends to bring up the 
 other, and thereby we may be led to discover further 
 relations, real or imaginary. But the actual comparison 
 of two ideas or objects, and the predication of their 
 agreement or disagreement, is always an operation dif- 
 ferent from, and should be regarded as higher than, the 
 mere alliance of them by an accidental association in 
 our minds. The psychologist, instead of confounding, 
 should be careful to distinguish them. Philosophy 
 should aim at delivering us as much as possible from 
 the power of accidental conjunctions, and bringing us 
 under the habitual influence of a judicial temper of 
 mind, which looks to the nature of things. Mr. Mill 
 has done as much as within him lies to degrade human 
 intelligence, by grounding beliefs on association, when 
 he should have led us to seek for a deeper foundation 
 in the mind's capacity of discerning realities and their 
 relations. This is a subject which will come more fully 
 before us when we consider Comparison. 
 
 Mr. Mill makes great use of another peculiarity of 
 association, which had been much dwelt on by Brown. 
 " When impressions have been so often experienced in 
 " conjunction, that each of them calls up readily and in- 
 " stantaneously the ideas of the whole group, these ideas 
 " sometimes melt and coalesce into one another, and 
 " appear not several ideas but one" {Logic, B. vi. c. iv. § 3). 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 183 
 
 Thus far we have a correct statement. When ideas have 
 often been in company, they flow together so spontane- 
 ously, and in the end so rapidly, that we cannot stay or 
 even watch them in their course. As thus having no 
 attention bestowed on them, some, or perhaps the whole, 
 pass away into oblivion, according to a law to be imme- 
 diately unfolded. Possibly we do not declare them to 
 be one — I rather think we make no declaration about 
 them at all ; but we do not, we cannot, distinguish them 
 one from another. And when high feeling mingles with 
 them, there may be produced upon our nervous orga- 
 nism a combined result of a peculiar, perhaps of an 
 intense, kind, which may abide when the mental ideas 
 and emotions are gone. 
 
 But Mr. Mill goes much further than this. " When 
 " many impressions or ideas are operating in the mind 
 " together, there sometimes takes place a process of a 
 " similar kind to chemical combination" {Logic, B. vi. 
 c. iv. § 3). This he explains, " The effect of concurring 
 " causes is not always precisely the sum of the effects 
 " of those causes when separate, nor even always an 
 " effect of the same kind with them;" thus water, the 
 product, differs in its qualities from its two elements, 
 oxygen and hydrogen. We must be very careful here 
 to ascertain the precise facts, to guard against exagger- 
 ating them, or allowing them to be turned to illegiti- 
 mate purposes. Let it be observed, that in chemical 
 action we have always two substances, each with many 
 properties known and unknown : we bring them into 
 a certain relation to each other ; an action takes place 
 
184 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 very much of an unknown character, but implying the 
 operation of electricity, or of one of the correlated forces 
 of the universe ; the result is the formation of water, 
 which possesses properties different from the oxygen, 
 and the hydrogen, and the energy exerted in producing 
 the changes, but which is always capable of being re- 
 solved into the same old elements with the same mea- 
 sure of energy. Now the question is, is there an 
 analogous operation produced by the association of 
 ideas ? I have admitted that, as the result of long and 
 repeated conjunction, ideas, each, it may be, with its 
 own peculiar feeling, succeed each other w T ith incalcul- 
 able rapidity, so that we cannot distinguish between 
 them ; and that they may coalesce in a result. Show 
 the mother a plaything which belonged to a deceased 
 child, and what a rush of remembrances and attached 
 emotions will spring up, which she is not only not in- 
 clined, but not able, to analyse. But is there anything 
 in all this like chemical action ? There is a mighty tor- 
 rent, but it appears to me that in the confluence there 
 is nothing after all but the individual ideas with their 
 corresponding feelings. There may be new associations, 
 but there does not seem to be a new idea. Some of the 
 ideas may pass away on the instant never to be recalled, 
 whereas others may bulk largely before the mind, and 
 leave their observed or abiding consequences. But in 
 the agglomeration there seems to be nothing but the 
 ideas, the feelings, and their appropriate impressions, 
 coalescing; there is no new generation, no generation 
 of an idea not in the separate parts of the collection. 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 185 
 
 In particular, it is altogether ■unwarrantable out of 
 mere associated sensations to draw those lofty ideas 
 which the mind can form as to substance and quality, 
 cause and effect, moral good and moral obligation. Let 
 us observe with care what is implied in the production 
 of a new body by chemical composition. There is one 
 element with its properties, and another element with 
 its properties, a mutual action in which there is poten- 
 tial energy expended, and a new product with its pro- 
 perties. And this mutual action we reckon a wonderful 
 action of bodies ; we distinguish it from mechanical 
 action ; we call it by the name of chemical affinity, and 
 we seek to determine its laws. But let us suppose that 
 instead of two elementary bodies we have two sensa- 
 tions, say of two colours, or two smells, or two sounds, 
 and that these have been often together, so that the one 
 always comes up immediately after the other ; I ask, 
 whether we have any ground to believe that these would 
 of themselves generate a third thing different from the 
 two ? If they do, it must be by some causal power in 
 the sensations, or out of the sensations, in the mind or 
 out of the mind ; and it is the business of the psycho- 
 logist not to overlook this power, not to confound it 
 with the mere association of old ideas, but to separate 
 it from them carefully, diligently to observe it, and 
 endeavour to discover its laws — as the chemist seeks to 
 find the law of elementary affinity. I can discover no 
 evidence that two sensations succeeding each other will 
 ever be anything else than two sensations, or that two 
 t remembered sensations will ever be anything else than 
 
186 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 two remembered sensations. When a further product 
 appears, such as the idea of power, or the idea of the 
 good, it cannot be the effect of a mere sensation, except 
 in the sense above explained (p. 76), of an occasion, im- 
 plying a co-operative capacity in the mind, such as a 
 judgment or a power of discerning moral good, — which 
 capacity should be noted as carefully as the sensations. 
 In short, the laws of association are the mere laws of 
 the succession of our ideas and attached feelings, and 
 can generate no new idea, without a special inlet from 
 without or capacity within. Association cannot give a 
 man born blind the least idea of colour, and as little 
 can it produce any other idea. By mixing the colours 
 of yellow and blue the hand could produce green ; but 
 give a person the idea of yellow and the idea of blue, 
 and from the two he could not manufacture the idea of 
 green ; still less could he from these sensations, or any 
 others, form such ideas as those of time or potency. 
 
 There are two points in regard to the association of 
 ideas which require to be cleared up. The first is the 
 precise and ultimate expression of the law, that things 
 which are related, in particular, that things which are like 
 suggest each other. This law, under one form or other, 
 has appeared in nearly every classification of the laws 
 of the succession of our mental states from the time of 
 Aristotle downwards. Mr. Mill puts the law in the 
 form, " Similar phenomena tend to be thought of to- 
 gether" (p. 190). I believe that other related things 
 do also suggest each other ; but let this pass. The 
 unsettled question is, must the relation be seen by the 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 187 
 
 mind before the law operates ? I see a portrait, and it 
 at once suggests the original I have never seen the 
 two together ; I see the portrait for the first time, the 
 original is not present, and yet it is immediately called 
 up. It can scarcely be alleged in such a case that I 
 first discover the resemblance, and then have the idea 
 of the original, for until the idea of the original springs 
 up I cannot discover the resemblance. Is the law then to 
 take this form, that like suggests like before the likeness 
 is observed ? This is a topic on which Hamilton often 
 pondered, and he has advanced some subtle considera- 
 tions which are perhaps not sufficiently reduced to a 
 consistent system. Mr. Mill severely criticises Hamil- 
 ton, but has not himself sounded the depths of the sub- 
 ject, which requires to be further cleared up before we 
 have an ultimate expression of the laws of association. 
 In endeavouring to explicate it, we must ever keep a 
 firm hold of the distinction between the observation of 
 relations, which is an act of comparison, and the mere 
 suggestion of one thing by another. We shall see that 
 the school of Mr. Mill has perseveringly confounded 
 them. 
 
 The other point requiring further elucidation relates 
 to the Secondary Laws of Suggestion, as they have been 
 called by Brown, or the Law of Preference, as it has 
 been called by Hamilton. To explain what this means : 
 suppose that the idea now before the mind has been 
 associated with a great number of others, according to 
 the laws of contiguity and correlation ; the question 
 arises, why among these ideas does it go after one rather 
 
188 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 than another ? I met with a dozen people at a dinner : 
 what makes me think of some one of them rather than 
 the others ? Many references had been previously 
 made to the facts bearing on this subject, but the first 
 enumeration of Secondary Laws, as different from the 
 Primary, was made by Brown, whose arrangement though 
 clear was defective in logical reduction. I am sure 
 there are two Laws of Preference which have a powerful 
 influence. One of these is the law of native taste and 
 talent. We go after the ideas which have the deepest 
 interest to our natural faculties. Some, for instance, 
 have a great tendency to observe resemblances, and 
 among possible associations they will find likenesses, 
 analogies, and affinities coming up most strongly and 
 frequently. Some have constitutionally certain strong- 
 appetencies or passions, and their thoughts will tend 
 towards the corresponding objects. The mother with a 
 strong love of offspring will find every topic started and 
 event occurring, suggesting possible perils or enjoyments 
 to her children. I need not dwell on this, as it has no 
 special reference to our present discussion, which cer- 
 tainly the other has. 
 
 I call it the Law of Mental Energy. Those ideas 
 are brought up most readily and frequently on which 
 we have bestowed the greatest amount of mental force. 
 Every mind seems to be endowed with a certain amount 
 of power, and, according to the power expended on an 
 idea, so is it remembered for a greater length of time, 
 and so is it suggested more easily and frequently. It 
 may be an energy of sensation, as when the idea has 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 189 
 
 been very pleasurable or very painful. It may be an 
 energy of intelligence, as when we have devoted one or 
 several of our faculties, eagerly or for a length of time, 
 to a given object. It may be an energy of emotion, as 
 when a lively hope or an anxious fear has collected 
 round a particular event. Or it may be an energy of 
 will, as when we have given earnest attention to a sub- 
 ject. Of course, the ideas, when they appear, always 
 come up according to such Primary Laws as those 
 of contiguity and correlation ; but the Law of Energy 
 shows why, among a variety of objects which it might 
 follow, the mind takes one rather than another. It is 
 thus we explain that Law of Inseparable Association 
 on which Mr. Mill dwells so much : the ideas have 
 been together, and much energy having been expended 
 on them in their frequent combination, they come up 
 together, and they come up often. Much the same 
 effects as are produced by frequent occurrence follow 
 from a very strong energy being exerted only for a brief 
 period, only, may be, for a few minutes or moments. 
 A strong sensation, as that of an avalanche, heard, it 
 may be, only once in our lives, may leave a life-long 
 impression of itself. We can never forget the moment 
 when, after long search and toil in some branch of re- 
 search, a glorious thought burst on our view like the 
 sun, and threw a flood of light on all surrounding 
 objects. A terrible convulsion of fear will imprint it- 
 self on our souls for life, and be renewed by every cor- 
 related circumstance. An acute sorrow will burn itself 
 into the soul, and leave a wound which a thousand cir- 
 
190 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 cumstances will tend to open, — thus the widow can 
 never pass the spot where her husband was thrown out 
 of a carriage and killed in her presence, without having 
 the whole scene with its nervous agitations revived. 
 
 This train of thought and observation opens to us what 
 I regard as a very deep and fundamental law of memory 
 in its recalling power. I believe we are momentarily con- 
 scious of every sensation, idea, thought, or emotion of the 
 mind. But it is mercifully provided that many of our 
 mental states are never reproduced : they are happily 
 allowed to pass away into forgetfulness, at least they 
 cannot be brought up in ordinary circumstances, — though 
 there are curious recorded instances of their reappearing 
 in extraordinary positions. We should certainly be in a 
 pitiable condition if every tick of the clock in the room 
 in which we sit, if every act of will put forth in moving 
 our limbs, if every passing thought in our day dreams or 
 our night dreams, came up as readily as our more import- 
 ant cogitations, which have engaged and engrossed much 
 thought and attention. While we are conscious (so it 
 appears to me) of every mental operation, it seems to be 
 necessary that a certain amount of mental force should 
 be expended in order to our having the capacity to re- 
 call it. Very possibly this mental law may be con- 
 nected with a physiological one, with what has been 
 called by Dr. Carpenter " unconscious cerebration." I 
 am inclined to think that our conscious mental affec- 
 tions tend to produce an unconscious brain affection, 
 and that the concurrence of the brain thus affected is 
 necessary in order to memory, or the reproduction of an 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 191 
 
 idea. Now, a certain amount of mental force may be 
 necessary to produce the cerebration, without which 
 there can be no recollection. Whether from purely 
 mental or cerebral causes, or as I think from the two 
 combined, it looks as if the recalling of ideas requires 
 that they should first have been in the consciousness 
 with a certain amount of force or vividness. Many 
 ideas which have been in the mind never reappear, and 
 those which do, come forth, according to the power or 
 prerogative we have imparted to them— like the stars, 
 which do not all show themselves, — for otherwise the 
 sky would be one blazing concave, but which, when 
 they do appear, come out according to their nearness to 
 ns and their magnitude. 
 
 It is by this broader and deeper principle that I 
 account for what Mr. Mill chooses to call the Law of 
 Obliviscence. I agree with Sir William Hamilton in 
 thinking that there may be more than one object before 
 the mind at one time. Suppose that there are five 
 objects before the eye, I believe that we could notice all 
 of them. But our apprehension of all and each is so 
 spread and dissipated, is so faint and vague, that the 
 chance is, that no one of them ever presents itself to the 
 mind at any future time. But let one of them be of a 
 very brilliant colour, or let it have a large amount of 
 attention centred upon it for a special end, or suppose 
 that it had created an interest in itself in time past 
 so that it now awakens lively feeling, that object will 
 be found to have so imprinted itself on the mind, 
 that it will remain when others pass into obliviscence. 
 
192 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 " After reading," says Mr. Mill (p. 260), "a chapter of 
 " a book, when we lay down the volume do we remem- 
 " ber to have been individually conscious of the printed 
 " letters and syllables which, have passed before us ? 
 " Could we recall, by any effort of mind, the visible 
 " aspect presented by them, unless some unusual cir - 
 " cumstance has fixed our attention upon it during the 
 " perusal ? Yet each of these letters and syllables must 
 " have been present to us as a sensation for at least a 
 " passing moment, or the sense could not have been 
 " conveyed to us. But the sense being the only thing 
 " in which we were interested- -or, in exceptional cases, 
 " the sense and a few of the words or sentences — 
 " we retain no impression of the separate letters and 
 " syllables." By the same principle, we account for the 
 facts which of late years have been commonly ascribed 
 to Unconscious Mental Action. 
 
 Mr. Mill has done essential service to philosophy by 
 opposing the tide which, both in Germany and in Britain, 
 has been flowing too strongly in favour of this theory. 
 And yet I am not sure that he has apprehended all that 
 is in the facts supposed to favour the doctrine. 
 
 (1.) I hold that the soul, from the very first, is en- 
 dowed with certain powers or tendencies. Even matter 
 has capacities which lead to action, and to changes of 
 state when the needful conditions are fulfilled ; and 
 much more must the soul have original properties, 
 which come forth in operation according to the law im- 
 posed on them. But in these primary endowments 
 there is no action, conscious or unconscious ; there is 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 193 
 
 simply a capacity of action. Some of the German 
 philosophers who support the theory confound these 
 a priori powers or regulative principles of the mind, of 
 which we are certainly not conscious, with the actions 
 that proceed from them, and of which we are con- 
 scious. 
 
 (2.) The mind by action is ever acquiring and laying 
 up power, capacity, tendency. AYe have something 
 analogous in physical nature. In the geological ages, 
 the plants by drinking in the sunbeams acquired a stock 
 of power, which went down with them into the earth as 
 they sank into it, which abides in the coal which they 
 helped to form, and is now ready to burst out in heat 
 and flame in our fires, and supply mechanical power to 
 our steam-engines. There seems to be a like laying up 
 of power in the mind ; of intellectual, and, I may add, 
 of moral or immoral power — the result of continued 
 mental action. "When we have done an act, we have a 
 greater capacity, along with a tendency to do it again. 
 Thus it is that we are, all our lives long, and on every 
 day of them, acquiring powers, tendencies, dispositions, 
 habits, inclinations, which are to abide with us for years 
 — perhaps for ever. This is one of the regulating princi- 
 ples in the reproduction of our mental states generally, 
 and particularly in the association of ideas. What is 
 done, and especially what is done repeatedly, leaves its 
 trace on the soul, and may appear in deeds long long 
 alter. Ideas which have been together simultaneously 
 or in immediate succession, have the property and the 
 tendency to come up together, and this in proportion to 
 
194 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 the mental energy which has been expended in pro- 
 ducing them, and under this to the frequency with which 
 they have been together. This is one of the elements 
 which gives its beneficent and its awful power to habit. 
 But let it be carefully observed, that in all this we have 
 not come in sight of unconscious mental action. We 
 were conscious of every step of the actual operations of 
 the mind, and we were responsible for them throughout. 
 Those who support the theory mistake the unconscious 
 acquired power for unconscious acts. 
 
 (3.) The mind by action may affect the structure of 
 the brain, or the forces — mechanical, chemical, vital — 
 operating in it, and in the nervous system. Material- 
 istic physiologists represent high mental capacity as 
 resulting from a large or finely constructed brain. The 
 more probable theory is, that a nicely adapted and a 
 finely strung cerebral structure results from high mental 
 capacity and activhy. It is not the casket which forms 
 the jewel, but it is the jewel that determines the size 
 and shape of the casket ; or, to use a better illustration 
 in such a connexion, it is the kernel that determines 
 the form of the husk. The finely organized brain thus 
 produced may, in man and the lower animals, tend to 
 go down by the ordinary laws of transmission from 
 parent to offspring. It is thus, that in certain of the 
 West India Islands, by examining the heads of the 
 nep'roes on a plantation, a hatter can tell at what age 
 their forefathers were transplanted from Africa, — the 
 brain being larger hi those families w T hose ancestors 
 have been longest in contact with civilized men. It is 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 195 
 
 thus, that in our own country, the average size of the 
 heads of the educated classes is larger than that of the 
 uneducated. But in this, the actual action of the mind 
 is conscious throughout. It is only the organic product 
 of which we are unconscious. 
 
 This is not the place to work out these principles to 
 their results. They imply important and far-ranging 
 consequences — mental and organic. But these are not 
 the doctrines defended by those whose opinions I am 
 here reviewing. Xot satisfied with native endowments, 
 aud acquired powers, and bodily effects, which are un- 
 conscious, they insist on the existence of actual opera- 
 tions which are unaccompanied with consciousness. 
 They are not agreed among themselves as to what is the 
 nature of this action. The theory was introduced into 
 modern speculation by Leibnitz, who connected it with 
 the essential activity of his monads. It was eagerly 
 seized by certain of the pantheistic speculators of Ger- 
 many, who maintained that the Divine Idea awakes to 
 consciousness according to certain laws. As held in the 
 present day, it takes two different, I should say incon - 
 sistent, forms. According to a numerous school in 
 Germany, which may be held as represented by the 
 younger Fichte, the unconscious mental action is 
 thought, and thought of the highest kind : the thought 
 which in the bee constructs the cells on mathematical 
 principles ; which bursts out in the highest products of 
 genius, artistic, literary, and philosophic, and gives birth 
 even to inspiration. The theory under this form seems 
 to me to be fanciful in the highest degree. As to ani- 
 
1 9 G MEMOR Y, A SSOCIA TION OF 
 
 mal instincts, they are clearly to be traced to original 
 or inherited properties, obeying laws not yet determined. 
 And as to genius, it is to be explained by far different 
 principles. We account for it by high mental endow 
 ment, often stimulated into intense action by a peculiar 
 nervous temperament. We have no evidence that, prior 
 to Bacon composing the Novum Organum, or Shak- 
 speare writing Hamlet, there was any mental operation 
 below consciousness. There were lofty gifts in both, 
 and also a training and experience which leit their per- 
 manent effects ; but when these came forth into action, 
 I apprehend that the illustrious authors were quite 
 conscious of them, though they might not have been 
 able or disposed to furnish a metaphysical analysis of 
 them. 
 
 The theory of Hamilton is of a more sober character, 
 but seems to be equally devoid of evidence to support 
 it. The class of facts on which he rests his opinion are 
 misapprehended. " When we hear the distant murmur 
 " of the sea, what are the constituents of the total per- 
 " ception of which we are conscious?" (Metaph., vol. i. 
 p. 351.) He answers that the murmur is a sum made 
 up of parts, and that if the noise of each wave made 
 no impression in our sense, the noise of the sea, as 
 the result of these impressions, could not be realized. 
 " But the noise of each several wave at the distance, 
 " we suppose, is inaudible ; we must, however, admit 
 " that they produce a certain modification beyond con- 
 " sciousness on the percipient object." He speaks of 
 our perception of a forest as made up of impressions 
 
IDF AS, BELIEF, ETC. 197 
 
 left by each leaf, which impressions are below con- 
 sciousness. There is an entire misapprehension of the 
 facts in these statements, and this, according to Hamil- 
 ton's own theory of the object intuitively perceived. 
 The mind is not immediately cognizant of the sound 
 of the sea, or of its several waves, — nor of the trees of 
 the forest and their several leaves. All that it knows 
 intuitively is an affection of the organism. The im - 
 pression made by the distant object is on the organism ; 
 and when the action is sufficiently strong, the mind is 
 called into exercise, and, from the perceived affections, 
 argues or infers the peculiar nature of the distant cause. 
 In this class of phenomena there is no proof of a mental 
 operation of which we are unconscious. 
 
 Hamilton explains, by supposed unconscious acts, a 
 class of mental phenomena with which we are all fami- 
 liar. We walk in a " brown study" from a friend's house 
 to our home : there must have been many mental acts 
 performed on the way, but they cannot be recalled. 
 The question is, were they ever before the conscious- 
 ness ? Dugald Stewart maintains that they were for 
 the time, but that we cannot recollect them. Notwith- 
 standing the acute remarks of Hamilton, I adhere to 
 the explanation of Stewart. I do so on the general 
 principle, that in propounding an hypothesis to explain 
 a phenomenon, we should never caH'in a class of facts, 
 of whose existence we have no other proof, when we 
 can account for the whole by facts known on indepen- 
 dent evidence. Hamilton tells us, " When suddenly 
 
198 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 
 
 " awakened during sleep (and to ascertain the fact, I 
 " have caused myself to be roused at different seasons 
 " of the night) I have always been able to observe that 
 " I was in the middle of a dream;" but, he adds, that 
 he was often scarcely certain of more than the fact that 
 he was not awakened from an unconscious state, and 
 that we are often not able to recollect our dreams. He 
 represents it as a peculiarity of somnambulism, that 
 we have no recollection when we awake of what has 
 occurred during its continuance (vol. i. pp. 320-322). 
 Every one will admit that we are often conscious of 
 states at the time, which we either do not remember at 
 all, or more probably cannot remember, except for a very 
 brief period after we have experienced them. We have 
 thus an established order of facts sufficient to explain 
 the whole phenomena, and do not require to resort to 
 alleged facts of which we have and can have no direct 
 evidence. We walk home of an evening from a place 
 at a distance conversing as we go along with a friend. 
 In order to our reaching our dwelling, there must have 
 been a number of mental acts to enable us to thread our 
 way, along possibly a very perplexed road. Next morn- 
 ing we remember the topics gone over in the conversa- 
 tion, but have entirely and for ever forgot the acts of 
 will implied in guiding our steps. But I venture to 
 affirm that at the time we were conscious of both, that 
 we were conscious even of the volitions that brought 
 us safely to our home, and that we should have seen 
 this and acknowledged it, and remembered it, had 
 
IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 199 
 
 there been anything to call our attention to it at the 
 time. The reason why the one is remembered while the 
 other is forgotten, is to be found in the circumstance, 
 that the conversation excited our interest, whereas the 
 walk, as being the result of long acquired habit, called 
 forth no feeling, and so passed into oblivion. 
 
CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 JUDGMENT. OR COMPARISON. 
 
 In this chapter I have to point out. first, a grave de- 
 fect, and then a still graver error. 
 
 There is no part of the psychology of the school to 
 which Mr. Mill belongs in which their defects are so 
 evident as in their account of the Judging, Comparative, 
 or Correlative capacity. They may have been misled 
 in part by Brown, who joined in one suggestion and 
 relation, under a faculty which he called Eelative Sug- 
 gestion, whose function it is at once to discover relations 
 and suggest objects according to relations. Brown was 
 wrong, I think, in allowing two such diverse functions 
 to one power ; but it is justice to him to say that he has 
 given a comprehensive view of the relations which the 
 mind of man can discover. He has a generic and a 
 specific division. He has first a grand twofold division 
 into Co-existence and Succession. Under the first he 
 embraces Position, Besemblance or Difference, Propor- 
 tion, Degree, Comprehension ; and under the second, 
 Causal and Casual Priority. The later members of the 
 school, such as Mr. James Mill, Mr. J. S. Mill, and 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 201 
 
 Mr. Bain, have been lessening the number, and lower- 
 ing the importance of the relations which can be dis- 
 covered by our faculties, and thus narrowing our mental 
 powers, so as to enable them the more readily to account 
 for the phenomena of the mind by sensations and asso- 
 ciation. Mr. James Mill does speak of Eelative Terms, 
 but contrives to get them without calling in a special 
 faculty of Comparison. Mr. J. S. Mill, after specifying 
 1st, Feelings, 2d, Minds, and 3d, Bodies, as included 
 among nameable things, mentions, " 4th and last, the 
 " Successions and Co- existences, the Likenesses and 
 " Unlikenesses between feelings or states of conscious- 
 " ness." In explanation, he tells us, " Those relations, 
 " when considered as subsisting between other things, 
 " exist in reality only between the states of conscious 
 " ness which those things, if bodies, excite, if minds, 
 " either excite or experience" {Logic, B. i. c. iii. § 15). 
 This statement is quite in accordance with his general 
 theory as he has now developed it. As we know ori- 
 ginally only feelings or states of consciousness, so the 
 relations we discover can only be between feelings and 
 possibilities of feeling. No doubt most people imagine 
 that in comparing Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, and 
 Napoleon Buonaparte ; and in comparing or contrasting 
 Louis Napoleon with Augustus, Comte with Hobbes, 
 and Mill with Hume, we are comparing things out of 
 our states of consciousness : but the new philosophy 
 corrects this vulgar error, and in doing so is consistent 
 with itself — whether it be consistent with our intuitive 
 assurances or no. To complete the simplicity of the 
 
202 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 reduction, Mr. Bain tells us, in reviewing Grote's Plato 
 (Macmillan's Magazine, July 1865), "These two facts, 
 " Cognisance of Difference and Cognisance of Agree- 
 " ment, can be shown to exhaust the essence of know- 
 " ledge, and both 'are requisites. All that we can 
 " know of a gold ring is summed up in its agreement 
 " with certain things, round things, small things, gold 
 " things, etc, and its differences from others, squares, 
 " oblong, silver, iron," etc. 
 
 I maintain that this account of man's power of cor- 
 relation is far too narrow, — consciousness being the 
 witness and arbiter. Profound thinkers have given a 
 much wider sweep to the intellect. I have quoted the 
 enumeration by Brown, and I have presented below the 
 classifications of such thinkers as Locke, Hume, and 
 Kant. 1 I ask the reader to look at them, and to decide 
 for himself whether they can all be reduced to agree- 
 ment and disagreement. Mr. Mill gives a place to co 
 existences and successions. In this he is surely right : 
 for when I say that Shakspeare and Cervantes died the 
 same year, and that the ancient epic poets, Homer and 
 Virgil, lived before the modern ones, Dante and Milton, 
 I indicate more than an agreement in the former case 
 and a disagreement in the latter, — I intimate the point of 
 
 1 Locke specifies Cause and Effect, Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, 
 Proportion and Moral Kelations {Essay, B. II. c. xxxvii.) Hume mentions 
 Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, 
 Cause and Effect. Kant's categories are, — I. Quantity, containing Unity, 
 Plurality, Totality. II. Quality, containing Reality, Negation, Limita- 
 tion. III. Relation, containing Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and 
 Dependence, Community of Agent and Patient. IV. Modality, containing 
 Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and Non-Existence, Necessity 
 and Contingence. 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 203 
 
 relation, which is that of Time, — a relation, I may 
 add, the significance of which has not been estimated by 
 Mr. Mill. When I say that one figure before my eyes 
 is a disc, and another a solid, I declare more than a dif- 
 ference or co- existence, I declare that the two differ in 
 respect of their occupation of space. Again, when I 
 affirm that oxygen is one of the elements of water, I 
 predicate a relation of part and whole, and imply one 
 of composition, which is surely more than agreement, 
 or co -existence, or succession. The same may be said 
 of other relations, such as that of quantity, when I 
 maintain that Chimborazo is higher than Mont Blanc ; 
 and of active property, when I declare that the sun 
 attracts the earth, and that oxygen combines with 
 hydrogen to form water. 1 
 
 We are now in a position to discover and expose 
 what is perhaps the most fatal error in the whole 
 theory : it consists in ascribing to association the func- 
 tions of judgment. Mr. James Mill thus sums up a 
 statement : " We have now then explored those states 
 " of Consciousness which we call Belief in existences : 
 " Belief in present existences ; Belief in past existences ; 
 " and Belief in future existences. We have seen that, in 
 " the most simple cases, Belief consists in sensation alone, 
 " or ideas alone ; in the more complicated cases, in sen - 
 " sation, ideas, and association, combined ; and in no 
 " case of belief has any other ingredient been found." 
 
 1 I have arranged the Kelations as those of Identity and Difference, 
 Whole and Parts, Space, Time, Quantity, Besemblance, Active Property, 
 and Cause and Effect.— Intuitions, P. II. B. in. c. i. 
 
204 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 As to Propositions, he says they are either of general 
 names or particular names. Of the former he says, 
 " They are all merely verbal ; and the Belief is nothing 
 " more than recognition of the coincidence, entire or 
 " partial, of two general names." As to the latter, lie 
 says, " Propositions relating to individuals may be ex- 
 " pressions either of past or future events. Belief in 
 " past events, upon our own experience, is memory ; 
 " upon other men's experience, is Belief in testimony ; 
 " both of them resolved into association. Belief in 
 " future events is the inseparable association of like 
 " consequents with like antecedents" {Analysis, pp. 290, 
 307, 308). I am not sure whether the son w T ould adopt 
 the whole of this statement : he has been obliged to 
 admit that memory yields an ultimate belief, wdiich is 
 not the result of association. But his theory in the 
 main coincides with that of the father. It is admitted 
 that there is an original consciousness of sensations, 
 and that there is a memory of sensations, which cannot 
 be resolved into anything simpler. It is further postu- 
 lated that there is an association of sensations according 
 to contiguity and agreement, and that there is an ex- 
 pectation of sensations. Out of these, as I understand, 
 spring our judgments (if indeed we have the pow r er of 
 judging) and our beliefs, which imply, and can imply 
 nothing more than contiguity or agreement in the sen- 
 sations. I charge this doctrine with stripping man of 
 the capacity of judging of the actual relations of things ; 
 and making all our beliefs, except those involved in sen- 
 sations, and the memory of them, to be the creation of 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 205 
 
 circumstances, and capable of being changed only by 
 circumstances with their conjunctions and correspon- 
 dencies, which, for anything we can ever know, may 
 be altogether fortuitous or fatalistic. 
 
 The defects of the theory commence in the account 
 given of the matter with which the mind starts : this 
 is supposed to be merely sensations. But the fatal con- 
 sequences do not become evident till we see what must 
 be the explanation rendered of the mind's capacity of 
 Judgment. I have endeavoured in this treatise to meet 
 and stop the error at its inlet, that so we may be pre- 
 served from the issues. I have shown that the mind 
 starts with an original stock of knowledge and belief. 
 In sense-perception it knows objects, with an existence, 
 external to self, extended, and capable of resistance and 
 of motion. In self- consciousness it knows self as an 
 existing thing, sentient, or knowing, or remembering, or 
 believing, or judging, or resolving, or entertaining moral 
 or other sentiments. In memory we remember our- 
 selves and the event in the past, and thus have a con- 
 tinuous and identical self, with the important element 
 of time. And now we can compare all these, and dis- 
 cover relations among them. By this further faculty 
 the domain of our knowledge is indefinitely extended : 
 in fact our acquaintance with an object is very vague 
 and very limited till we have detected its connexions 
 with other things. But what I wish specially noticed 
 is, that the comparison is not between mere " feelings 
 or states of consciousness," but between things, with- 
 out us as well as within us. I compare self in one state, 
 
206 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 say under sensation, with self in another state, say re- 
 collecting or resolving. I compare one extended object 
 with another, and declare the one to be larger than the 
 other. I compare events remembered, and declare that 
 they happened at different times. I compare my very 
 comparisons, and discover further, it may be more recon- 
 dite, proportions and harmonies, till we link all nature 
 within and without us in a series of uniformities. And 
 let it be observed, that our judgments throughout are 
 judgments as to realities. As being cognizant of ex- 
 tended objects in perception by the senses, on noticing 
 two extended objects, say St. Paul's and its door, we 
 declare the one to be greater than the other ; and our 
 judgment is about things, and not about sensations, or 
 the mere possibilities of sensation. On seeing two per- 
 sons on our right hand and two persons on our left hand, 
 we declare them to be four, as soon as we understand 
 what ' two' and what ' four' mean. We remember our 
 school days and our college clays, and we declare the 
 one to be prior to the other. Our comparisons in such 
 cases are of things, and our judgments upon things, and 
 not on mere feelings, or mere possibilities of feeling. 
 Circumstances have not produced the judgments, nor 
 can circumstances change or modify them. In all cir- 
 cumstances I decide that the house is larger than its 
 door ; that two and two make four ; and that an event 
 which occurred when we were ten years old must be 
 prior to one which happened when we were twenty. 
 
 I admit that association tends to produce action, in- 
 dependent of judgment upon a comparison of the things. 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 207 
 
 When tilings have often been together in the mind, we 
 go spontaneously from the one to the other ; and if action 
 be needed to secure the second, we will be disposed to 
 exert it. As Mr. Bain, in unfolding the nature of our 
 Beliefs, expresses it (Emot. and Will, p. 579), 1 " An 
 " animal sees the water that it drinks, and thereby 
 " couples in its mind the property of quenching thirst 
 " with the visible aspect. After this association has 
 " acquired a certain degree of tenacity, the sight of 
 " water at a distance suggests the other fact, so that, 
 " from the prospect, the animal realizes to some degree 
 " the satisfying of that craving. The sight of water to 
 " the thirsty animal, then, inspires the movements 
 " preparatory to actual drinking ; the voluntary organs 
 " of locomotion are urged by the same energetic spur 
 " on the mere distant sight, as the organs of lapping 
 " and swallowing under the feeling of relief already 
 " commenced. This is the state of mature conviction 
 " as to the union of the two natural properties of water." 
 I reckon this as a case mainly of association, and not of 
 judgment. I do allow that association tends to make 
 us form judgments. When two objects have been often 
 brought together, we are led to discover a resemblance, 
 real or imaginary, between them. But admitting all 
 this freely, I maintain that the mind has a power of 
 judgment, upon the bare contemplation of objects, and 
 apart altogether from the association of instances. On 
 the simple consideration of two straight lines, I am sure 
 
 1 Mr. Bain admits Intuitive Beliefs, but then they deceive us. " The 
 inborn energy of the brain gives faith, and experience scepticism," p. 582. 
 
208 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 they cannot enclose a space. I have only to hear of a 
 case of ingratitude for favours to declare it to be bad 
 and blameworthy. 
 
 While the two, association and comparison, often 
 help each other, yet they are never the same. The one 
 may exist without the other; and the one does not 
 increase nor decrease with the other. In many cases 
 there is a strong and inseparable association without 
 the judgment perceiving any relation, nay, where it 
 would declare that there is no connexion in the nature 
 of things. Thus the letter A naturally suggests the 
 letter B, because they have come so often together in 
 our repetition of the alphabet ; yet no one thinks that 
 the two have in themselves any bonds of union. It so 
 happens that, when the name St. Patrick is brought up, 
 I always associate with it the legend I heard in my 
 youth about the saint swimming from Donaghadee to 
 Portpatrick, with his head in his teeth ; yet the fre- 
 quency of the conjunction has not been able to coiwince 
 me of the possibility of the act. Often have the num- 
 bers 17 and 20 been together in my mind, from the 
 accident of their having been printed together on a 
 card on which I had frequent occasion to look ; but it 
 has never occurred to me that the two must have a 
 necessary connexion. It thus appears that frequency 
 of association cannot of itself generate a judgment with 
 its attached belief. On the other hand, a judgment 
 declaring that there is a connexion does not imply that 
 there has been a frequent association. Comparatively 
 seldom have 17 + 20 been conjoined in my mind with 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 209 
 
 3 7 — certainly not so frequently as 1 7 has been asso- 
 ciated with 20, — and yet, on the bare contemplation 
 of 17 -f- 20, I declare them to be equal to 37, and 
 cannot be made to decide otherwise. If I hear that 
 Peter Jones robbed his master John Smith who trusted 
 him, I declare that Peter Jones deserves punish- 
 ment, and' this though I never heard of Peter Jones 
 before. 
 
 Mr. Mill is prepared to carry out his principles to 
 consequences, which seem to me a reductio ad aosurdum 
 of the principles. He tells us (p. 69) that " the reverse 
 " of the most familiar principles of geometry might have 
 " been made conceivable, even to our present faculties, 
 " if these faculties had co-existed with a totally different 
 " constitution of external nature," and quotes at length, 
 in proof of this, from Essays ~by a Barrister, in which it 
 is said, — " There is a world in which, whenever two 
 " pairs of things are either placed in proximity or are 
 " contemplated together, a fifth thing is immediately 
 " created and brought within the contemplation of the 
 " mind engaged in putting two and two together. This 
 " is surely neither inconceivable, for Ave can readily 
 " conceive the result by thinking of common puzzle 
 " tricks, nor can it be said to be beyond the power of 
 " Omnipotence. Yet in such a world surely two and 
 " two would make five." This certainly would be the 
 result on Mr. Mill's theory. But such consequences 
 can be admitted only by those who deny the mind all 
 power of knowing the nature of things. Those of us 
 who stand up for a power of independent judgment, 
 
 o 
 
210 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 that is, a judgment founded on the perception of things, 
 cannot allow such conclusions. Were we placed in a 
 world in which two pairs of things were always fol- 
 lowed by a fifth thing, we might be disposed to believe 
 that the pairs caused the fifth thing, or that there 
 was some prearranged disposition of things producing 
 them together ; but we could not be made* to judge 
 that 2 + 2 = 5, or that the fifth thing is not a different 
 thing from the two and the two. On the other suppo- 
 sition put, of the two pairs always suggesting a fifth, 
 we should explain their recurrence by some law of 
 association, but we would not confound the 5 with 
 the 2 -f 2, or think that the two pairs could make 
 five. 
 
 The same ingenious gentleman supports the theory 
 by another illustration, and receives the sanction of Mr. 
 Mill. " It would also be possible to put a case of a 
 " world in which two lines would be universally sup- 
 " posed to include a space. Imagine a man who had 
 " never had any experience of straight lines through the 
 " medium of any sense whatever, suddenly' placed upon 
 " a railway stretching out on a perfectly straight line 
 " to an indefinite distance in each direction. He would 
 " see the rails, which would be the first straight lines 
 " he had ever seen, apparently meeting, or at least 
 " tending to meet, at each horizon ; and he would thus 
 " infer, in the absence of all other experience, that they 
 " actually did enclose a space when produced far enough." 
 Now I allow that this person, as he looked one way, 
 would see a figure presented to the eye of two straight 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 211 
 
 lines approaching nearer each other; and that as he 
 looked the other way he would see a like figure. But 
 I deny that in combining the two views he would ever 
 decide that the four lines seen, the two seen first and 
 the two seen second, make only two straight lines. In 
 uniting the two perceptions in thought he would cer- 
 tainly place a bend or a turn somewhere, possibly at the 
 spot from which he took the two views. He would 
 continue to do so till he realized that the lines seen on 
 either side did not in fact approach nearer each other. 
 Or to state the whole phenomenon witli more scientific 
 accuracy : Intuitively, and to a person who had not 
 acquired the knowledge of distance by experience, the 
 two views would appear to be each of two lines ap- 
 proaching nearer another ; but without his being at 
 all cognisant of the relation of the two views, or of one 
 part of the lines being farther removed from him than 
 another (see supra, pp. 160-168). As experience told 
 him that the lines receded from him on each side, he 
 would contrive some means of combining his observa- 
 tions probably in the way above indicated ; but he never 
 could make two straight lines enclose a space. 
 
 The same remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to a third 
 case advanced by the Barrister. Thomas Beid, who was 
 a man of humour and addicted to mathematics, amused 
 himself and relieved a dry discussion by drawing out a 
 "Geometry of Visibles" (Works, p. 147), in which he 
 exhibits the conclusions which could be deduced from 
 the supposed perceptions of sight. He proceeds upon 
 the Berkeley an doctrine of vision, and supposes that by 
 
212 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 sight we could have " no conception of a third dimen- 
 sion " of space ; and that a person with sight, but with- 
 out touch, would see length and breadth, but could 
 have no idea of thickness, or of the distinction of figures 
 into planes and curves. Such a one, he thinks, might 
 be driven by geometry to the conclusion that " every 
 " right line being produced will at last return into 
 " itself;" that "any two right lines being produced will 
 " meet in two points ; " and that " two or more bodies 
 " may exist in the same place."* But these inferences 
 can be deduced only by denying to vision functions which 
 belong to it, and ascribing to it others which are not 
 intuitive or original. We have seen that the eye takes 
 in intuitively a coloured surface, and if there be two 
 colours on the surface, divided by a curve line, we at 
 once have the perception of a curve. Again, by bin- 
 ocular vision we have, if not intuitively, at least by an 
 easy process of experience and inference, space in the 
 third dimension. It is further to be borne in mind, that 
 in our acquired perceptions we lay down rules which 
 may help us in common cases, but which, not being 
 absolutely correct, may lead into error when improperly 
 applied to other cases ; as when we argue from the 
 crooked image presented to the eye that there is a 
 crooked stick corresponding to it in the water. Pro- 
 ceeding on such assumptions as these, it is possible to 
 show that we are landed in the consequences so graphi- 
 cally pointed out by Eeid. But the consequences are 
 not legitimate, because they are drawn from a mis- 
 apprehension pf the precise nature of our intuitive 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 213 
 
 perceptions in vision. There is and can be no evidence 
 that a person with the sense of sight, but without the 
 sense oi] touch, would draw them. I hold that the very 
 vision of two straight lines would prevent us from 
 being led to declare that they could meet at two 
 points. Upon the bare contemplation of the lines, 
 whether made known bv sight or touch, we at once 
 reject all such conclusions, however ingeniously con- 
 structed from premisses which have not the sanction of 
 our constitution. 
 
 When such consequences are allowed and defended, 
 we see how ominous is this conjunction in the philo- 
 sophic firmament of the School of Comte with that of 
 Hume. The philosophy thus generated places truth, 
 that is, a knowledge of the nature of things, beyond the 
 reach of the human faculties ; which commence with 
 they know not what, and close, after a laborious process, 
 with results which may have as little reality as a suc- 
 cession of dis'solving views. Stripping us of a power of 
 independent judgment, it leaves us the servants, I should 
 rather say the slaves, of circumstances, with their con- 
 junctions and correspondences, which may all be the 
 issue of blind chance or dead mechanism, — certainly 
 without our being able to say that they are not. Along 
 with independence, I fear there is also taken away all 
 responsibility, of judgment and belief, — except, indeed, 
 such accountability as we may require of a horse or a dog 
 when we associate its vices with a lash, simply to pre- 
 vent the animal from doing the deed again. I am per- 
 
214 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 
 
 suaded that such a creed must exercise, whether the 
 persons are or are not aware of it, whether they do or 
 do not confess it, a deadening influence on those who 
 actually believe it and come under its sway; and if 
 ever it should be accepted in its results (I say results, 
 for its processes are too subtle to be grasped by the 
 rough hands of the common people), and its appropriate 
 sentiments diffused, in a community, the consequences 
 would be as fatal as those which flowed in the end of 
 last century in France, from the prevalence of the Sen r 
 sational Philosophy, when it gave a wrong direction to 
 the great political upheaval, and helped to degrade the 
 national character. 
 
 We can avoid these issues only by maintaining that 
 man is so constituted as to know originally something 
 of the reality of things, and to be capable of rising to 
 an acquaintance with their relations. Association may 
 help us to form a reasonable judgment — and it is a 
 happy circumstance when it does so ; but whether we 
 are or are not so aided, we should be taught that it is 
 our duty to found our beliefs on a previous judgment, 
 in which we look to the nature of things as the same 
 can be discovered by us. One end, no doubt, of a good 
 training is to encompass us with profitable associations 
 in the family, in the social circle, and in the community ; 
 with associations originating in the highest sentiments, 
 and sanctioned by the common conscience and the uni- 
 versal reason of the men of former ages. But it is a 
 still higher end of the highest education to raise us 
 above all hereditary and casual association of times 
 
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 215 
 
 or circumstances, and to constrain ns to base our 
 beliefs on an inspection of realities and actualities. 
 Every youth should be taught that he is endowed with 
 an inherent power of discernment, which he is not at 
 liberty to lay aside in any circumstances, and for the 
 proper use of which he is responsible. 
 
CHAPTEE X. 
 
 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 When Professor Ferrier propounded the theory that 
 one's self mixes as an integral and essential part with 
 our knowledge of every object, and Sir William Hamilton 
 unfolded his doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, I 
 felt constrained to declare that there were views pre- 
 valent in metaphysical speculation which were working 
 as much mischief as the ideal theory had done in the 
 days of Berkeley ; and I ventured to affirm that if Pro- 
 fessor Terrier's speculations were not regarded as a 
 reductio ad aosurdum of the whole style of thinking, 
 " the next phenomenon appearing in the philosophic 
 " firmament must be a Hume or a Fichte " (Meth. of 
 Div. Govern., 4th Edit. App. pp. 536-539). In now 
 holding that this fear has been realized, it is not need- 
 ful to maintain that Mr. Mill is in every respect like 
 either the great Scottish sceptic or the great German 
 idealist, any more than to assert that these two are like 
 each other. Mr. Mill is not so original a thinker as 
 Hume, nor does he like him profess scepticism. He 
 does not possess the speculative genius of Fichte, and 
 
RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 217 
 
 lie defends his system in a niucli more sober manner. 
 But it can be shown that his philosophy comes very 
 nearly to the positions taken up by Hume, when Hume 
 is properly understood ; and in maintaining that mind 
 is a series of feelings aware of itself, and that matter is 
 a possibility of sensations, he has reached conclusions 
 quite as visionary as those of Fichte. As Hume brought 
 out fully the results lying in the philosophy of Berkeley 
 — as one of the offshoots of the philosophy of Locke, and 
 as Fichte carried to their logical consequences certain of 
 the fundamental principles of Kant, so Mr. Mill, and 
 we may add Mr. Herbert Spencer, are pursuing to their 
 proper issues the doctrine floating in nearly all our later 
 metaphysics, that we can know nothing of the nature 
 of things. 
 
 Mr. Bain speaks complacently of " the great doctrine 
 " called the Eelativity of Knowledge, which has risen 
 " by slow degrees to its present high position in philo- 
 " sophy." But unfortunately — I should rather say for- 
 tunately — no two defenders of the doctrine have agreed 
 as to the sense in which they hold it ; in fact I can see 
 no point in which they meet except the Comtian posi- 
 tion, that the knowledge of the actual nature of things 
 is beyond the reach of man. Mr. Mill remarks very 
 properly (p. 5), that the phrase "relativity of knowledge " 
 admits of a great variety of meanings, and that when a 
 philosopher lays great stress upon the doctrine, " it is 
 " necessary to cross-examine his writings, and compel 
 " them to disclose in which of its many degrees of 
 " meamng he understands the phrase." 
 
2 1 8 EEL A TIVITY OF KKO WLEDGE. 
 
 There is a doctrine sometimes passing by this name, 
 which will recommend itself to all sober thinkers : who 
 will admit — (1.) that Ave can know objects only so far as 
 we have faculties of knowledge ; (2.) that we can know 
 objects only under the aspects presented to the faculties ; 
 and (3.) that our faculties are limited in number and in 
 range, so that not only do we not know all objects, we 
 do not know all about any one object. These posi- 
 tions have been disputed by none except some of the 
 Alexandrian Neo-Platonists in ancient times, and a few 
 German defenders of the Absolute Philosophy in modern 
 times. A doctrine embracing these positions has been 
 known and acknowledged under such designations as 
 that of " the limited knowledge of man," and should 
 not be expressed by so ambiguous a phrase as " the 
 relativity of knowledge/' which is applied to a very 
 different theory. That theory has of late years assumed 
 four different forms. 
 
 I. There is the form given to it by Sir W. Hamilton. 
 He thus unfolds it (Metaph. i. 148) : " Our knowledge is 
 " relative, — 1st, because existence is not cognisable ab- 
 " solutely and in itself, but only in special modes ; 2d, 
 " because these modes can be known only if they stand 
 " in a certain relation to our faculties." Mr. Mill thus 
 comments : " Whoever can find anything more in these 
 " statements than that we do not know all about a 
 " thing, but only so much as we are capable of knowing, 
 " is more ingenious or more fortunate than myself." 
 But surely it is desirable to have even this much al- 
 lowed and clearly enunciated ; only I think it unfortunate 
 
RELA TIVITY OF KNO W LEDGE. 2 1 9 
 
 that two such inexplicable phrases as ' absolutely ' and 
 ' in itself should have been introduced. Sir William 
 gives a third reason, and here the error appears. " 3d, 
 " Because the modes, thus relative to our faculties, are 
 " presented to, and known by the mind only under modi- 
 " fications determined by these faculties themselves." 
 This doctrine is thoroughly Kantian hi itself and in its 
 logical consequences. It makes the mind look at things, 
 but through a glass so cut and coloured that it gives a 
 special shape and hue to every object, " Suppose that 
 " the total object of consciousness in perception is = 12 ; 
 " and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, 
 " the material sense 3, and the mind 3, — this may enable 
 " you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of 
 " the object of perception" 1 (Metaph. ii. p. 120). This 
 doctrine very much neutralizes that of natural realism, 
 which Hamilton seems, after the manner of Eeid, to 
 be so strenuously defending. To suppose that in per- 
 ception or cognition proper we mix elements derived 
 from our subjective stores, is to unsettle our whole con- 
 victions as to the reality of things; for if the mind 
 adds three things, why not thirty things, why not three 
 hundred, till we are landed in absolute idealism, or in 
 the dreary flat into which those who would float in that 
 empty space are sure in the end to fall, that is, absolute 
 scepticism. By assuming this middle place between Eeid 
 
 1 Sir William Hamilton has used very unguarded language as to human 
 nescience ; hut I have reason to believe that he thought himself misunder- 
 stood, and I am inclined to think that he had some means of satisfying 
 himself that he held by the reality of things. There is a point here on 
 which it is hoped some of his pupils may be able to throw light. 
 
220 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 and Kant, this last of the great Scottish metaphysicians 
 has been exposed to the tire of the opposing camps of 
 idealism and realism, and it will be impossible for the 
 school to continne to hold the position of their master. 
 
 It required no great shrewdness to foresee the logical 
 consequences that would be drawn, and so I take no 
 credit for resolutely opposing the doctrine from the 
 time of its publication. It should.be allowed that 
 sensations, feelings, impressions, associate themselves 
 with our knowledge, but every man of sound sense 
 easily separates them ; and it should not be difficult for 
 the philosopher to distinguish between them, to distin- 
 guish between our intuition of a tooth and the pain of 
 toothache, between the perception of a landscape and 
 the aesthetic emotions which it calls up. Following the 
 spontaneous convictions of assurance and certitude in 
 the mind (see k.), which all but the sceptic allow specu- 
 latively, and which even the sceptic must actually pro- 
 ceed upon in defending his scepticism, we should hold — 
 (1.) that we know the very thing as appearing, and not 
 a mere appearance without a thing to appear ; and (2.) 
 that our knowledge is correct so far as it goes, and is 
 not modified by the subjective forms of the mind. I 
 have been striving in these chapters to show that we 
 immediately know a self and extended objects beyond. 
 But we have the same grounds for affirming that our 
 knowledge is correct as for asserting that we have 
 knowledge. In the event of man's intuitive knowledge 
 being mistaken or fallacious in any point, it is certain 
 he could never discover it to be so with his present 
 
RELA TIV1TY OF KNO WLEDGE. 221 
 
 faculties. Our perceptions of sense, consciousness, and 
 intuitive reason all combine in a consistent result, and 
 we must receive the whole or reject the wdiole. Hamil- 
 ton declares that " no attempt to show that the data of 
 " consciousness are (either in themselves or in their 
 " necessary consequences) mutually contradictory, has 
 " yet succeeded." " An original, universal, dogmatic 
 " subversion of knowledge has hitherto been found 
 " impossible" (App. to Eeid's Works, p. 746). That 
 there should be such consistency in intuitive truth that 
 the acutest human intellects have not been able to de- 
 tect a contradiction, is not the primary proof, but is a 
 confirmation of its truth. That there should be such 
 consistency in total error, or in a mixture of truth and 
 error, is scarcely believable : w^e could account for it 
 only on the supposition that it w r as produced by a mis - 
 chievous deity, who wished so to deceive us that we 
 could never discover the deception, — a supposition con- 
 tradicted by the circumstance that the whole constitu- 
 tion of our minds and of things is fitted to impress us 
 with the importance of veracity, showing that the 
 Creator and Euler of our world is a God of Truth. 
 
 II. Mr. Mill has enunciated the doctrine in a second 
 form, and accepts it as expressing " a real and impor- 
 " tant law of our mental nature. This is, that we only 
 " know anything by knowing it as distinguished from 
 " something else ; that all consciousness is of difference ; 
 " that two objects are the smallest number required to 
 " constitute consciousness ; that a thing is only seen to 
 " be what it is by contrast with what it is not" (p. 6). 
 
222 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 He tells that the employment of the phrase to express 
 this meaning is sanctioned by high authorities, and he 
 mentions Mr. Bain, " who habitually uses the phrase 
 ' relativity of knowledge' in this sense." It is quite 
 true that the doctrine, that all knowledge consists in 
 comparison, has appeared again and again in speculative 
 philosophy ; but as destroying the simplicity of our 
 mental operations, and reversing the order of nature, it 
 has wrought only mischief. 
 
 The mind, as I apprehend, begins its intelligent acts 
 with knowledge, and, we may add, with beliefs, and then 
 it can go on to compare the things known and believed 
 in, and thereby widens the domain both of knowledge 
 and belief. It commences, w T e may suppose, with a 
 perception — which is knowledge — of an external object, 
 and a consciousness — which is knowledge — of self as 
 perceiving the object. Then it remembers, and in doing 
 so has a belief in the object which has been perceived. 
 In all this there is no comparison, but having this, the 
 mind can forthwith institute a comparison and pro- 
 nounce a judgment. Thus, having a knowledge of body 
 in the concrete, the mind can then, when a purpose is 
 to be served by it, declare that body exists, and that it is 
 extended ; and having a knowledge of self, it can assert 
 that it exists, and that it is under grief or joy — as our 
 experience may be at the time. Eemembering an event 
 as happening in time past, it can declare that the event 
 is real, and the time real. But while such judgments 
 are involved in our primary cognitions, I rather think 
 that they come in later life : the child, I rather think, 
 
RE LA Tl VITY OF KNO WEED GE. 2 2 3 
 
 as knowing its own existence and never doubting it, is 
 not at the trouble of asserting it. But the child on 
 perceiving two objects successively, or it may be simul- 
 taneously, delights to discover a relation between them. 
 Such judgments follow so immediately on the cognitions, 
 that it is not necessary to distinguish them from one 
 another except in scientific psychology. But if meta- 
 physicians lay down an opposite doctrine, and draw 
 consequences from it, it is absolutely necessary to 
 correct the statement. 
 
 I suppose Mr. Mill would represent the mind as be- 
 oinnino; with sensations. We have then a sensation. 
 Is there comparison in this ? I cannot discover that 
 there is. Xo doubt, upon another sensation rising up, 
 we may compare the one with the other and discover 
 an agreement or difference. But in order to this com - 
 parison there is memory ; and memory, in recalling the 
 sensation, must bring it up prior to the comparison. 
 But Mr. Mill may say that we have two sensations 
 simultaneously, — say a sensation of resistance by one 
 sense, and a sensation of colour by another, and w 7 e de- 
 clare them at once to agree or to differ. But could we 
 not have the sensation of resistance or the sensation of 
 colour though each came alone? Even when they 
 come simultaneously, we are able to compare them, be- 
 cause we know so much of each. We ever proceed on 
 a supposed knowledge of the objects when we compare 
 and decide. When I say that 2 + 2 = 4, it is because 
 I know what is meant by the terms. If I say Ben 
 Nevis is a few feet higher than Ben Macdhui, it is 
 
224 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 because I know somewhat of the height of each moun- 
 tain. If I say that Aristotle's Induction w T as not the 
 same as Bacon's ; that Comte's Positive Method differs 
 essentially from Bacon's Inductive Method ; that Locke 
 was not a follower of Hobbes ; that Condillac had no 
 right to proclaim himself a disciple of Locke ; that 
 Eeid met Hume in a more sagacious manner than Kant 
 did ; that Brown vainly endeavoured to combine the 
 Sensational School of France with the British Associa- 
 tion School and the School of Beid ; and that a good 
 Inductive Logic must combine certain principles of 
 Whewell with those of Mill, — I do so because I think 
 I know something of the philosophic systems of which 
 I speak, and am thus able to compare or to contrast 
 them. 
 
 But Mr. Mill may refer me to the philosophy of 
 Hamilton, which declares that in the very first act of 
 consciousness we discover the relation of the ego and 
 the non ego. My readers, however, will have seen by 
 this time that I am not bound to follow Hamilton, who, 
 in fact, though without meaning it, prepared the way 
 for a farther doctrine from which he would have turned 
 away with the strongest aversion. I believe that in our 
 conscious sense -perceptions we know both the self and 
 the not- self in one concrete act ; and of course we have 
 in all this the materials for a judgment; but I doubt 
 much whether the infant actually pronounces the judg- 
 ment. But then it is said that our knowledge of the 
 object is an apprehension of the relation of the object 
 or sensation to the perceiving mind. Now I believe 
 
RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 225 
 
 that a relation is formed in the very act of knowledge. 
 But my knowledge does not consist in the perception 
 of the relation ; on the contrary, the relation may arise 
 simply from the knowledge. I apprehend the President 
 of the United States of America ; as I do so, I have 
 constituted a relation between myself and him ; but 
 there may have been no previous relation ; and if I 
 declare the relation, it is by a consequent and subse- 
 quent act. I strive to rise to a contemplation of the 
 Divine Being ; there is no doubt a relation of my mind 
 to the object viewed ; but the relation consists in my 
 contemplation. When the Divine Being looks down 
 on His works and pities those who suffer, it is not be- 
 cause the Creator in all this is dependent on His crea- 
 tures ; the viewing of them by Him with regard and 
 commiseration constitutes the particular and interest- 
 ing relation. It is high time to lay an arrest on that 
 style of representation, so frequent in the present age, 
 which would make us perceive a relation before per- 
 ceiving the things related, and make the very Divine 
 knowledge, so far as we can comprehend it, depend on 
 creature relations. 
 
 I take exception, on like grounds, to another part of 
 the same doctrine : " That a thing is only seen to be 
 " what it is by contrast with what it is not." I admit 
 that where we can discover contrasts, our notions are 
 rendered more distinct and vivid. But I cannot allow 
 that we should not have known a sensation, say the 
 feeling of a lacerated limb, to be painful, unless we had 
 contrasted it with a pleasurable one ; on the contrary, 
 
 p 
 
226 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 I maintain that in order to contrast the two we must 
 have experienced them in succession. I cannot believe 
 that we should never have known body as extended, 
 unless we had previously known something as unex- 
 tended; or that no one could know and appreciate moral 
 good unless he had been acquainted with moral evil. 
 
 The doctrine I am expounding in this volume makes 
 the relations to be in the things compared, and not the 
 creation of the mind as it compares them. The oppo- 
 site doctrine reverses the order of the mind's procedure, 
 and, logically followed out, unsettles the foundation of 
 knowledge. It makes us discover relations between 
 things in themselves unknown, and it leaves us stand- 
 ing on a bridge of which we do not know that it lias a 
 support at either end. If we know a thing only in 
 relation to another thing, and this only in relation to 
 some other thing, as we thus ever chase the thing with- 
 out catching it, we are made to feel as if we had only a 
 a series of strings put into our hands, at which we have 
 to pull for ever without their bringing anything but 
 other strings. 
 
 Mr. Mill's theory obliges him to accept the special 
 doctrine I am now examining in its very lowest form. 
 The school of Kant, both in its German and British mo- 
 difications, supposes that the mind has a rich furniture 
 of forms and categories, out of which can be fashioned 
 an ideal world of a very lofty character. But the school 
 of Mill, admitting no a priori elements, and limiting the 
 comparative capacities of the mind, can furnish no such 
 glorious creation. Mr. Mill gives us the power of dis- 
 
MELA TI VITY OF KNO WLEDGE. 2 2 7 
 
 covering only the relations of co- existence and succes- 
 sion, and of resemblance and difference. He says that 
 " equality is but another word for the exact reseni- 
 " blance, commonly called identity, considered as subsist- 
 " ing between things in respect of their quantity." And 
 then, in explaining what is implied in quantity, " When 
 " we say of two things that they differ in quantity, just 
 " as when we say they differ in quality, the assertion 
 " is always grounded upon a difference in the sensations 
 " which they excite" {Logic, B. i. c. iii. § 11, 12) : thus 
 making us know nothing of either quality or quantity 
 or number, except as denoting agreements in the sensa- 
 tions forming the series which we call mind. Mr. Bain 
 goes down to a still lower level, when he tells us, in a 
 passage already quoted (p. 202), that cognisance of dif- 
 ference and cognisance of agreement exhaust the essence 
 of knowledge: that all we can know of a ring is its 
 agreement with certain things, and its differences from 
 other things ; which other things, of course, can be known 
 only as they agree with, or differ from, yet other things. 
 Knowledge can have no resting-place when driven from 
 one thing to another in this shuttle-cock process. It 
 falls through, by being placed between such instabili- 
 ties. The way to meet all this, and put knowledge on 
 its proper basis, is by showing that we have an original 
 knowledge of self, and of objects, such as a ring, beyond 
 self; and that, proceeding on this, we are able to discover 
 not only resemblances and differences, but various other 
 important relations, which enable us to combine every 
 one thing known with others as also known in a com- 
 
228 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 pact structure, in which every one part binds all the 
 others, and helps to support the whole. 
 
 III. Mr. Mill would especially apply the phrase, 
 " relativity of knowledge," to a third doctrine, being, in 
 fact, his own theory of the mind. " Our knowledge of 
 " objects, and even our fancies about objects, consist of 
 " nothing but the sensations they excite, or which we 
 " imagine them exciting in ourselves." " This know- 
 " ledge is merely phenomenal." " The object is known 
 " to us only in one special relation, namely, as that 
 " which produces, or is capable of producing, certain 
 " impressions on our senses ; and all that we really 
 " know is these impressions." " This is the Doctrine of 
 " the Eelativity of Knowledge to the knowing mind, in 
 " the simplest, purest, and,, as I think, the most proper 
 " acceptation of the words " (pp. 7-14). I confess I can 
 see no propriety in applying to such a theory a phrase 
 which had been appropriated by Sir William Hamilton, 
 or by some of us who had criticised him, to a different 
 doctrine. I do not see that it has any right to claim 
 the title of ' knowledge,' or that it can get ' relations,' 
 when it has no tilings to bring into relation. The 
 theory is simply that we know sensations, and possi- 
 bilities of sensations, while we cannot be said to know 
 what sensations are. But I have no interest in giving 
 the phrase any one special application rather than 
 another — I believe it to be vague and ambiguous — in 
 fact, not used by any two philosophers, I rather think 
 by no one philosopher, at different places, in one and 
 the same sense ; and I think it should be altogether 
 
BEL A TIVITY OF KXO WLEDGE. 2 2 9 
 
 banished from speculation. And as to the doctrine to 
 which Mr. Mill would specially apply it, I need not 
 enter upon the consideration of it here, as I have been 
 examining it all throughout this volume. But there is 
 a fourth form of the general theory, defended by an 
 illustrious member of the same school, which demands 
 a notice. 
 
 IY. Mr. Grote, in his exposition of Plato's philosophy 
 (Art. Thewtetus), has developed a theory of relativity, 
 which he ascribes to the Sophists, at least to Protagoras, 
 and which he himself is prepared to accept. It is the 
 doctrine of Homo Mensura, which, construed in its 
 true meaning, is said to be, " Object is implicated with, 
 " limited or measured by, Subject: a doctrine proclaiming 
 " the relativeness of all objects perceived, conceived, 
 " known or felt— and the omnipresent involution of the 
 " perceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling, Subject : 
 " the Object varying with the Subject. ' As things ap- 
 " pear to me, so they are to me : as they appear to you, 
 " so they are to you.' This theory is just and important 
 " if rightly understood and explained" (vol. ii. p. 335). 
 " So far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and 
 " implication between Subject and Object, with actual 
 " multiplicity of distinct subjects — denying the reality 
 " either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute 
 " and separate Object — I think it true and instructive " 
 (p. 340). Proceeding on this general doctrine, he reaches 
 another : " What is Truth to one man, is not truth, and 
 " is often Falsehood, to another : that which governs the 
 " mind as infallible authority in one part of the globe, is 
 
230 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 " treated with indifference or contempt elsewhere. Each 
 " man's belief, though in part determined by the same 
 " causes as the belief of others, is in part also determined 
 " by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks 
 " of Truth, he means what he himself (along with others, 
 " or singly, as the case may be) believes to be Truth ; 
 " unless he expressly superadds the indication of some 
 " other persons believing in it" (p. 360). 
 
 I have looked from time to time into the Platonic 
 and Aristotelian discussions on the subject, but I con- 
 fess I have never been able to discover what was the 
 precise philosophy of the Sophists, or whether indeed 
 they had a philosophy, or whether they were anything 
 more than instructors of youth, professing to teach 
 wisdom — without knowing what wisdom is. So far as 
 any of them, such as Protagoras, had a philosophic 
 system, I think it probable that they meant it to be 
 that which has been elaborated by the British Section 
 of the school of Comte. But I have here to do not 
 with the Greek Sophists, but with Mr. Grote. I am 
 surprised to find him repeating the juggle, which has so 
 often been exposed, arising from the ambiguity of the 
 phrase ' Subject and Object/ No doubt, if you use the 
 terms as correlative, meaning by 'subject' the mind 
 contemplating an object, and by ' object' a thing con- 
 templated, then the subject implies the object, and the 
 object the subject, as the husband implies the wife, and 
 the wife the husband. But as we cannot argue from the 
 husband implying the wife that every man has a wife, 
 or from the wife implying a husband that every woman 
 
RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 231 
 
 has a husband, so we cannot argue from the mere ex- 
 istence of a mind that there must be an external thing 
 to think about, nor from the bare existence of an object 
 or thing that there must be a mind to think about it. 
 As to the allegation that the subjective mind necessarily 
 mixes its own shapes and colours with the things 
 knowm, I have already examined it when discussing the 
 first form of the theory of relativeness. There is, there 
 can be no proof advanced in its behalf — that is to show 
 that the mirror does not correctly reflect the object pre- 
 sented to it. We have the same grounds for believing 
 in the accuracy of our primitive knowledge as we have 
 for believing in the existence either of the subject or 
 the object. 
 
 But the fatal part of the doctrine lies in the assertion, 
 that truth varies with the individual, and with the cir- 
 cumstances in which he may be placed : a tenet which, 
 if held by the Sophists, deserves all the reprobation 
 heaped upon it by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, — and, 
 I may add, that the defence of it, in the further light 
 we now enjoy, is worse than the original offence. By 
 truth, I mean what philosophers in general have under- 
 stood by it — the conformity of our ideas to things. 
 There is no truth where there is no correspondence of 
 our notions to realities. I admit that human knowledge 
 never comes up to the extent of things. I allow that 
 human knowledge is often partial, that is, is only partly 
 correct, and may have error mixed up with it. But 
 truth, so far as it is truth, is the agreement of thoughts 
 with things. To illustrate this, I will not trouble the 
 
232 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 school with transcendental or religious truth. I appeal 
 to judgments pronounced on more common and familiar 
 affairs. Were any one to affirm that there never had 
 been such a country as ancient Greece, such a man as 
 Socrates, or such a sect as the Sophists ; that Queen 
 Victoria is incapable of cherishing the memory of de- 
 parted friends, that Louis Napoleon is a man of guile- 
 less transparency and openness of character, or that 
 President Lincoln was a man given to crooked and dis- 
 honest policy ; that Mr. Grote was utterly illiterate, had 
 never written, and could not write a history of Greece, 
 and had never been favourable to vote by ballot, — I 
 would say of this person, not that he had got what is 
 truth to himself, but that he had not reached truth at 
 all. Were I to allow myself to think that a certain 
 London banking-house of high repute is on the point of 
 bankruptcy, and that those who manage it are a band 
 of rogues and robbers, I should in the very act be guilty 
 not only of error but of sin ; and I am sure that were 
 I to give expression to such a thought, I should be 
 justly exposed to punishment. 
 
 Mr. Grote represents his doctrine as forming the 
 basis of the principle of toleration, and the opposite 
 doctrine as fostering intolerance (p. 362). I reverse 
 this account, and declare that the person who avows 
 that he cannot distinguish between truth and error, is 
 not in circumstances to exercise the virtue of tolerance ; 
 for he has not discovered an error which he is bound to 
 tolerate ; and Mr. Grote's principle would lead him to 
 refuse toleration, if ever he did reach positive truth. 
 
RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 
 
 The principle of toleration, as I understand it, is, that I 
 am bound to tolerate what I believe, what I may know, 
 to be error ; that the power of punishing error as error 
 has not been put into my hands, has in fact been mer- 
 cifully withheld from me by One who claims to be 
 Himself the Judge. I am quite sure that there is a God 
 who rules this world in justice and love, and yet I feel 
 that I must bear even with the " fool who says in his 
 heart, There is no God." This is my idea of toleration, 
 which I reckon a much deeper and juster one than that 
 held by those who say that truth varies with the indi- 
 vidual, the age, and the circumstances. 
 
 But then Mr. Grote tells us " no infallible objective 
 " mark, no common measure, no canon of evidence, re- 
 " cognised by all, has yet been found" (p. 360). I 
 admit freely that we cannot obtain what a certain school 
 calls an absolute criterion of truth ; for I admit that the 
 word ' absolute ' is about the most unintelligible in the 
 language, whether as used by those who favour or op- 
 pose the doctrine it is employed to designate. I allow, 
 further, that it is in vain to search for any one criterion 
 which will settle for us what is truth in all matters. 
 But we have tests quite sufficient to determine for us 
 what is truth and what is error in many matters, both 
 speculative and practical; these I shall endeavour to 
 unfold in a future chapter (see xix.) I have intuitive 
 evidence of my own existence ; and evidence from testi- 
 mony of the existence of India, which I never saw ; and 
 evidence from induction and deduction of the existence 
 of the law of gravitation, — and I declare of any one who 
 
234 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 denies any of these that he is in error, and this however 
 strong his beliefs may be. To believe without evidence, 
 and not to believe when we have evidence, may both 
 be sinful when our belief or unbelief involve duties 
 which we owe to ourselves, to our fellow-men, and to 
 God. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 man's power of conception as a test of truth. 
 
 The word ' conceive,' with its derivatives ' conceivable' 
 and ' inconceivable/ is one of the most ambiguous in 
 the philosophic nomenclature of this country. When I 
 say I cannot conceive the distance of a star which re- 
 quires hundreds of thousands of years to transmit its 
 light to our earth, I use the term in the sense of ' image' 
 or ' represent.' When I affirm that I have a conception 
 of the animal kingdom, I mean that I have a general 
 notion of beings possessing animation. When I declare 
 that I cannot conceive that God should be unjust, I 
 signify that I cannot so believe or decide. These three 
 senses are at once seen not to be the same when the 
 difference is pointed out. AVe cannot easily imagine 
 the distance of a fixed star, but we decide on the evi- 
 dence produced, or believe on the authority of astro- 
 nomers, that it is at the distance it is said to be. We 
 cannot image the class ' animal kingdom,' for it includes 
 innumerable objects, yet we can intellectually think 
 about it, that is, about objects possessing the common 
 attribute of animal life. We cannot be made to decide 
 
236 MAN'S POWER OF CONCEPTION 
 
 or believe that Cleopatra's Needle should be in Paris 
 and Egypt at the same time, yet with some difficulty we 
 can simultaneously image it in both places. 
 
 It could easily be shown that the phrase is used in 
 all these senses in philosophy, as well as in our current 
 literature. " By conception," says Stewart [Elem. c. iii.), 
 " I mean that power of the mind which enables us to 
 " form a notion of an absent object of perception." Sir 
 William Hamilton professes to use the word in the 
 same sense as the German Bcgriff, that is, for the gene- 
 ral notion formed by an indefinite number of objects 
 being joined by the possession of a common attribute. 
 "With or without avowing it, philosophers have also 
 employed it in the third sense. Hamilton often ex- 
 plains conceive by " construe in thought," which must 
 denote an act of judgment ; he must employ it in this 
 sense when he says it is inconceivable that space should 
 have limits. Dr. Whewell's arguments in favour of 
 necessary truth are valid only when he uses it in the 
 signification of judging, as when he says, " we cannot 
 conceive reasoning to be merely a series of sensations" 
 (Phil. hid. Sciences, i. 44). 
 
 The question arises, and must now be settled, in which 
 of these senses, or in what other, is the word employed 
 when man's power or impotency of conception is sup- 
 posed to be a test of truth. It is clear that it cannot 
 be employed in the first -mentioned sense. Man's capa- 
 bility of imaging an object is no proof of its existence : 
 I can picture a hobgoblin without supposing it to be 
 a reality. Man's incapacity to image or represent an 
 
AS A TEST OF TRUTH. 237 
 
 object is no proof of its non-existence ; a blind man 
 cannot have an idea of colour, but this does not prove 
 even to him that colour has no existence. Xor can it 
 be used in the second signification above intimated. I 
 can form a notion of a class of mermaids without being 
 convinced that mermaids were ever seen by any human 
 being. In these senses of the words there is much con- 
 ceivable by man which has no existence, much inconceiv- 
 able by man which has an existence. Conceivability 
 and inconceivability can be employed as a test of truth 
 only in the third meaning of the term, as signifying 
 " construe in thought" (whatever that may mean), judge 
 or decide. 
 
 Both the defenders and opposers of intuitive truth 
 have been in the way of going from the one of these 
 meanings to the other. Hamilton uses the phrase both 
 in the first and third of these significations without per- 
 ceiving that they are not the same ; and it is very much 
 because of this ambiguity that he is able to make it 
 appear that there is a contradiction in human thought. 
 He says, on the one hand, that we cannot conceive 
 space or time as without bounds ; which must mean, 
 when properly interpreted, that we must always give 
 a boundary in the image we form of it. But then he 
 tells us, on the other hand, that we are altogether 
 unable to conceive space or time as bounded ; that is, 
 when rightly understood, we cannot be made to judge 
 or decide that it has bounds. He has constructed a set 
 of opposed propositions as to space, time, and infinity, 
 the seeming contradiction arising very much from the 
 
238 MAN'S POWER OF CONCEPTION 
 
 double signification of the word ' conceive ' (see Art. on 
 " Unconditioned" in Discussions). But the philosopher 
 who has made the most frequent use of the impossibility 
 of conceiving the opposite as a test of truth is Dr. 
 Whewell. He tells us that necessary truths are those 
 " in which we cannot, even by an effort of imagination. 
 " or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of that which 
 " is asserted." " Necessary truths are those of which 
 " we cannot distinctly conceive the contrary" (Phil. 
 Ind. Sc, i. 55, 59). The phrase 'imagination' and the 
 phrase ' distinctly ' might lead us to think that by 
 ' conceive ' we are to understand ' image,' yet we must 
 attach a different meaning to it when he tells us more 
 accurately of necessary truths that we " see" them — 
 which must mean 'judge' them — " to be true by thinking 
 about them, and see that they could not be otherwise " 
 (lb., p. 20). But so loosely does he use this test, that 
 he declares that laws acknowledged to be discovered bv 
 experiment, such as the laws of motion and of chemical 
 affinity, are such that it is inconceivable that they 
 should not be true. " For how, in fact, can we conceive 
 " combinations otherwise than as definite in kind and 
 " quantity ?" " We cannot conceive a world in which 
 " this should not be the case" (lb., i. 400). When the 
 defenders of fundamental truth fall into such ambiguity 
 of phraseology, and apply their test so unsatisfactorily, 
 there is some excuse for those who criticise and oppose 
 them when they take advantage of their mistakes. 
 
 I say ' some excuse,' for I cannot allow that this is 
 an entire justification of Mr. Mill when he uses the 
 
AS A TEST OF TRUTH. 239 
 
 word, as I shall show he does, in so many different 
 senses ; and when, in criticising Hamilton and Wliewell, 
 he employs it in a way they would not have allowed. 
 Mr. Mill is aware that, when Sir William Hamilton is 
 wishing to bring out his full meaning, he uses such 
 phrases as "think" and "construe in thought;" and 
 Dr. Whewell, while he also uses the word " think," is 
 careful to represent Conceptions as modifications of 
 Fundamental Ideas, which he enumerates and classifies. 
 Mr. Mill always employs the phrase in a vague manner, 
 and often in more than one signification. He must 
 use it in the sense of ' image' or ' picture' when he says, 
 " We cannot conceive a line without breadth ; we can 
 " form no mental picture of such a line" {Logic, B. n. 
 c. v. § 1). This is all true, but it is also true that we 
 — can form an abstract notion of such a line. He states 
 that Dr. Whewell's idea of necessary truth is " a pro- 
 " position, the negation of which is not only false, but 
 " inconceivable." But then, in criticising this test, he 
 uses the word in quite a different sense : " When we 
 " have often seen and thought two things together, and 
 " have never in one instance either seen or thought of 
 " them separate, there is, by the primary law of associa- 
 " tion, an increasing difficulty, which in the end becomes 
 " insuperable, of conceiving the two things apart " 
 (lb., § 6). It is clear that while Dr. Whewell uses the 
 phrases as applicable to a proposition declared to be 
 true, Mr. Mill employs it in the sense of mental pictures 
 joined by association. This is one other instance of an 
 amphiboly, which we have noticed before, and which 
 
240 MAN'S POWER OF CONCEPTION 
 
 will require to be noticed again in examining Mr. Mill's 
 attempt to explain necessity of thought by association 
 of ideas. 
 
 He tells us, " The history of science teems with incon- 
 " ceivabilities which have been conquered, and supposed 
 " necessary truths, which have first ceased to be thought 
 " necessary, then to be thought true, and have finally 
 " come to be deemed impossible" (p. 150). And then 
 he gives us once more his famous case of persons not 
 being able to conceive of antipodes, being " merely the 
 effect of a strong association." But let us understand 
 precisely in what sense our forefathers had a difficulty 
 in conceiving the existence of antipodes. It is evident 
 that they could have little difficulty in imagining to 
 themselves a round globe with persons with their feet 
 adhering to it all around. Their difficulty lay in decid- 
 ing it to be true ; and the difficulty was increased by 
 the very vividness of the picture of men, as they would 
 have said, with their feet upward and their head down- 
 ward. It is clear that Mr. Mill, when he applies it to 
 such a case, must be using the word in the sense of 'judge' 
 and ' believe.' But let us understand on what ground 
 our ancestors felt a difficulty in yielding their judgment 
 and belief. Not because of any supposed intuition or 
 necessary truth, — I am not aware that they ever ap- 
 pealed to such ; not even because of a strong association : 
 but because the alleged fact seemed contrary to a law of 
 nature established by observation. A gathered experi- 
 ence seemed to show that there was an absolute up and 
 down, and that heavy bodies tended downwards, and 
 
AS THE TEST OF TRUTH. 241 
 
 thus, and not on any a priori grounds, did they argue 
 that there could not be antipodes, as persons so situated 
 would fall away into a lower space. As a narrow ex- 
 perience had created the difficulty, so it could remove 
 it by giving us a view of the earth as a mass of matter, 
 causing human beings to adhere to it over its whole 
 surface. And such a case does not in the least tend to 
 prove, that truths which are seen to be truths at once, 
 and without a gathered experience, could ever be set 
 aside by a further experience : that a conscious intelli- 
 gent beiug could be made to regard himself as non- 
 existing ; that he could believe himself as having been 
 in existence before he existed ; or that he could be led 
 to allow that two straight lines might enclose a space 
 in the constellation Orion. 
 
 It is in the highest degree expedient, at the stage to 
 which mental science has come, that the word 'con- 
 ceive/ and its derivatives, should be abandoned alto- 
 gether in such a connexion ; as being fitted to confuse our 
 ideas and mislead our judgments. The greatest and 
 wisest philosophers have not appealed to the possibility 
 or impossibility of conception as tests of truth or false- 
 hood, but have pointed to other and clearer and more 
 decisive criteria} 
 
 1 The printing of this work had proceeded thus far, when I observed 
 that Mr. M., in 6th edition of Logic, just published, has been obliged, in 
 defending himself against Mr. Spencer, to notice that ' conceive ' might 
 signify 'to have an idea' or 'to have a belief (i. 303). But he himself 
 continues to take advantage of the ambiguity, which is greater than he 
 yet sees. I have been labouring for years to make metaphysicians per- 
 ceive the ambiguity. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 
 
 Me. Mill freely admits the existence and the veracity 
 of intnitive perceptions. But he has not inquired into 
 their nature, their mode of operation, their laws, their 
 tests, or their limits. What he has failed to do must 
 be undertaken by others ; and in the process it will be 
 seen that intuition has quite as important a place in 
 the mind as sensation, association, or any of Mr. Mill's 
 favourite principles, and that it must be embraced and 
 have a distinct place allotted to it in a sufficient theory 
 of our mental operations. 
 
 Our intuitions are all of the nature of perceptions, in 
 which we look on objects known or apprehended : on 
 separate objects, or on objects compared with one an- 
 other. Sometimes the objects are present, and we look 
 on them directly, by the senses and self- consciousness. 
 In other cases they are not present, but still we have 
 an apprehension of them, and our convictions, whether 
 beliefs or judgments, proceed upon this apprehension. 
 A very different account has often been given of them. 
 According to Locke, the mind in intuition looks at 
 
THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 243 
 
 ideas, and not at things. According to the theory ela- 
 borated by Kant, and so far adopted by Hamilton, it is 
 possessed of a priori forms, which it imposes on objects. 
 Such views are altogether indefensible, and have in 
 fact hindered the ready reception of the true doctrine. 
 Making our intuitions mere ideas or forms in the mind, 
 they have very much separated them from realities. 
 The intuitions I stand up for are all intuitions of things. 
 In opposition to 1ST. Comte and his school in all its 
 branches, I hold that man is so constituted as to know 
 somewhat of things, and the relations of things. What 
 we know of things, with their relations, on the bare in- 
 spection or contemplation of them, constitutes the body 
 of intuitive truth, and the capacity to discover it is called 
 intuition. Taken in this sense, the exercise of intuition 
 is not opposed to experience, but is in fact an experience : 
 only it is not a gathered experience ; it is a singular ex- 
 perience at the basis of all collected experiences. 
 
 Our intuitive perceptions are all, in the first instance, 
 individual or singular. Thus, by the external senses, 
 we observe an extended and coloured surface before us, 
 or by the internal consciousness we experience ourselves 
 in a certain state of thought and feeling. Our very in- 
 tuitive judgments or comparisons are singular. On 
 finding that a particular rod, A, is of the same length 
 as another rod, B, and that B is of the same length as a 
 third rod, C, we at once declare that A is equal to C. 
 But we can generalize these intuitive judgments, and 
 then they become maxims or axioms. We see that 
 what is true of the rods A, B, C, would also be of the 
 
214 SELF EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 
 
 rods D, E, E, or of any other objects found equal to 
 one another, and we feel ourselves entitled to declare 
 that ' things which are equal to the same thing are equal 
 to one another/ As the generalization is the result, not 
 of an intuitive, but a discursive process, it is possible 
 that error may creep into it, that the generalized ex- 
 pression of our original perceptions may be mutilated 
 or exaggerated. But on the supposition that the gene- 
 ralization has been properly conducted, the maxim is as 
 certain as the individual perception is allowed to be. 
 
 By standing up for this distinction between what we 
 may call our spontaneous and our generalized intuitions, 
 we can answer an objection urged against the existence 
 of necessary truth by Mr. Mill. " The very fact that 
 " the question is disputed, disproves the alleged impos- 
 " sibility. Those against whom it is needful to defend 
 " the belief which is affirmed to be necessary, are un- 
 " mistakable examples that it is not necessary" (p. 150). 
 But what is the dispute ? It is commonly not as to the be- 
 lief, but simply as to whether it is intuitive, which, as Mr. 
 Mill knows and asserts, is not to be settled by intuition. 
 Take only one example : the sums of equals are equals ; 
 there is no dispute as to the truth of this. What Mr. 
 Mill's school objects to is, that it should be represented 
 as intuitive. But again, what the upholders of necessary 
 truth maintain is, not that every man must hold specu- 
 latively by intuitive truth, that is, hold by it in the 
 generalized form given it by philosophers ; but that all 
 believe in, and spontaneously act upon, their individual 
 primitive perceptions. It is quite possible for Mr. Mill 
 
THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 245 
 
 to maintain that the law of cause and effect is not 
 necessary or universal, and that there may be a pheno- 
 menon without a cause in the Dog-star ; but meanwhile 
 it will be found that on any given occurrence presenting 
 itself, he will look for something as producing it. 
 
 If we look carefully into the nature of the intuitive 
 perceptions of the mind, they will be found to be of 
 three kinds. Some of them are of the nature of Primitive 
 Cognitions : the object is now present, and we look upon 
 it. It is thus we are conscious of self as existing in a 
 particular state. This being self-evident, we cannot be 
 made to regard ourselves as non-existent, and not in 
 that particular state. In other exercises our intuitions 
 are of the nature of Primitive Beliefs : the object is not 
 present, but we contemplate it, and discover that it is 
 of such a nature. It is thus that we believe of space, 
 that it does not cease when our eye is no longer able to 
 follow it : this appears from the very nature of space ; 
 and having such a conviction, we cannot be made to 
 believe that space, at the point at which it ceases to be 
 invisible, should come to a termination. Again, some of 
 our intuitions are of the nature of Primitive Judgments, 
 in which by bare inspection we discover relations be- 
 tween things apprehended. Thus we are told first of 
 one man that he died at the age of fifty, and then of 
 another man that he died at the age of fifty, and we at 
 once declare that the two men died at the same age ; 
 and this being evident from the contemplation of the 
 things, we cannot be made to decide otherwise. 
 
 The truth reached by intuition in these its three 
 
246 SELF EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 
 
 forms is of course limited, — is confined, indeed, within 
 very stringent boundaries. It is narrowed, first of all 
 by the original inlets, which are the outward and inward 
 senses ; and secondly, by the limited capacity of man to 
 discover what is involved in this primitive stock. What 
 intuition may do of itself is best seen in mathematical 
 demonstration ; in which every step taken is seen to be 
 true at once, on the bare contemplation of the figures or 
 numbers ; and by which we reach a body of truth of 
 immense scientific value. But the main service of in- 
 tuition consists in its furnishing a point from which 
 experience may start, and a foundation on which to 
 build. Our original perceptions lie at the basis of all 
 our acquired ones. I allow that our acquired ones, 
 obtained by a gathered experience, carry us far beyond 
 our primitive perceptions. But in fact intuitions, for 
 example those of sense and consciousness, mingle with 
 all our mental operations, and upon them we must fall 
 back in the last resort, when required to specify the 
 ground on which experience rests. 
 
 Keeping these explanations and distinctions in view, 
 it should not be difficult to find tests of intuition. The 
 primary mark I hold to be Self-Evidence. The evidence 
 is in the objects, and is discerned by the mind on the 
 bare contemplation of them. From the mere inspection 
 of consciousness we perceive self in some action or under 
 some affection. From the simple apprehension of 2 + 2 
 we see that it makes 4. And wherever there is Self- 
 Evidence there will also be Necessity. But let us ob- 
 serve carefully what this necessity consists in. It is 
 
THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 247 
 
 not a fatalistic necessity imposed upon us from without, 
 and for anything we know in an arbitary manner. It 
 is necessity arising solely from the nature of things as 
 the same is perceived by the mind. 1 This conviction 
 of necessity may assume two forms, a positive and a 
 negative. On the bare contemplation of 2 + 2 I see 
 that it must make 4 : this is the positive form. I am 
 further constrained to decide that it cannot be other- 
 wise, that 2 + 2 cannot be 3, or 5, or any other number : 
 this is the negative form. These two forms depend on 
 each other, or rather they both depend on the Self- 
 Evidence ; and we may in argument of any kind em- 
 ploy the one or other as may suit our purpose. And 
 as is the nature of the original perception, so is the pre- 
 cise nature of the conviction of necessity. We have 
 seen that our intuitions may be of the nature of cogni- 
 tions, of beliefs, or of judgments; and whatever the 
 intuition be, we must adhere to it, and cannot be made 
 to give our assent to the opposite. Thus, if our intuition 
 be a cognition of an object as existing, we cannot be 
 made to acknowledge it as non- existing : if I know 
 self as thinking, I cannot be made to allow that it is 
 not thinking. Again, if our intuition be a belief, such 
 
 1 Mr. Herbert Spencer, following in this respect Sir William Hamilton, 
 stands up for Necessity as a test of ultimate truth, but overlooks Self- 
 Evidence, the evidence in the thing looked at. " No matter what he calls 
 " these indestructible relations [of Consciousness, using consciousness in 
 " a very vague and perverted sense], no matter what he supposes to be 
 " their meanings, he is completely fettered by them. Their indestructi- 
 " bility is the proof to him that his consciousness is imprisoned within 
 " them" {Fortn. Rev. No. v.) I have given a more pleasant account of 
 them. The necessity is not a fetter or a prison, but a conviction arising 
 from an immediate perception of the nature of the thing. 
 
248 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 
 
 as that I saw a particular person yesterday, I cannot be 
 made to believe that I did not see him. The same is 
 true of our judgments : deciding that two straight lines 
 cannot enclose a space, I cannot be made to allow that 
 they can form a closed figure. Thus understood, the 
 necessity of conviction (and not the mere incapacity of 
 conceiving) becomes a criterion of fundamental truth, 
 clear and certain, and not difficult of application. 
 
 To these some have added Universality. But the 
 phrase has been used in two different significations. 
 As employed by some it means the universality of the 
 truth. In this sense the universality is involved in 
 the necessity , we cannot be made to believe that two 
 straight lines should enclose a space at any time or in 
 any world. Thus understood, the test of universality 
 is not different from that of necessity ; but as present- 
 ing the conviction under a very important aspect, it 
 may often be usefully employed in determining whether 
 a truth is intuitive. But Universality may also mean 
 being entertained by all men. This property of intui- 
 tive truth may be more appropriately designated by 
 Catholicity or Common Consent. This quality does 
 belong to all primary truth, and where it is found it 
 may be regarded as a presumption that the truth is 
 intuitive. But it is not a proof ; for it may spring not 
 so much from any inborn principle as from the unifor- 
 mity to be found in the experience of all men. All 
 men expect that the sun will rise to-morrow, not from 
 any intuitive principle, but from the gathered observa- 
 tions of the past carried forward to the future. 
 
THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 249 
 
 These two then, Self-Evidence, and Necessity with 
 implied Universality, are the decisive tests of intuitive 
 truth. All intuitive truths possess these characteristics ; 
 no others do. The question now to be discussed is, Can 
 these .marks be produced by Association of Ideas, or 
 by Experience, the two principles from which Mr. Mill 
 gets all our general convictions ? 
 
 (1.) " As for the feeling of necessity, or what is termed 
 a " necessity of thought, it is of all mental phenomena 
 " positively the one which an inseparable association is 
 " the most evidently competent to generate" (p. 299). In 
 answer to this it can be shown, in the first place, that 
 in many cases of immediate and necessary conviction we 
 have not two ideas to be associated. This holds of our pri- 
 mitive cognitions and primitive beliefs. Take the con- 
 sciousness which the infant has of a sensation, or rather 
 of self as sentient. Here we cannot point to two objects 
 which have been often together : we have only one ob- 
 ject, the sentient self as existing, and we cannot be made 
 to know it as not existing or not sentient. Again, I 
 remember that I was under a peculiar sensation of pain 
 two days ago : I never had the same feeling before ; 
 the object is one, and there has been no repetition, and 
 therefore no association can have been formed ; and yet 
 I have the most perfect assurance that I existed two 
 days ago under that sensation, and I cannot be made to 
 believe otherwise. These are cases of intuition allowed 
 by Mr. Mill (see e, p), but in which association cannot 
 generate the conviction. 
 
 In other cases, I admit that there is a combination of 
 
250 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 
 
 two ideas or two objects, that is, those in which we in- 
 stitute a comparison or pronounce a judgment. But 
 even in such the judgment is pronounced not in con- 
 sequence of the mere association, but on a comparison 
 of the things brought together. What Mr. Mill means 
 by the feeling of necessity, which can be generated by 
 his examples, is evident from his examples. " Many 
 " persons who have been frightened in childhood can 
 " never be alone in the dark without irrepressible ter- 
 " rors. Many a person is unable to revisit a particular 
 " place, or think of a particular event, without recalling 
 " acute feelings of grief or reminiscences of suffering" 
 (p. 265). This is a very glaring example of mistaking 
 the point to be proven. Mr. Mill is aware what those 
 who hold necessary truth mean by it. " Necessary," says 
 Mr. Mill, " according to Kant's definition, is, that of 
 which the negation is impossible." But the necessity 
 which he looks at and accounts for is of a very different 
 character ; it is not a necessity of conviction, of belief, 
 or judgment, but is a mere association of two ideas or 
 thoughts, so that the one never comes up without the 
 other. He explains his meaning : "When an association 
 " has acquired the character of inseparability — when the 
 " bond between the two has been thus firmly riveted, 
 " not only does the idea called up by the association 
 " become, in our consciousness, inseparable from the 
 " idea which suggested it, but the facts or phenomena 
 " answering to those ideas, come at last to seem inse- 
 " parable in existence : things which we are unable to 
 " conceive apart, appear incapable of existing apart" 
 
THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 251 
 
 (p. 191). The word ' conceive' has here come in with all 
 its ambiguity, and the two things denoted by it, having 
 an idea, and judging or deciding, are here represented 
 as being one. But the two are very different. The 
 fright in childhood may long continue to raise up terror, 
 but cannot of itself create conviction ; as may be seen in 
 the case of multitudes who experience the fear but 
 have never believed in ghosts. When Pascal was cross- 
 ing a bridge in a carriage, the two leaders took fright 
 and plunged into the Seine ; the shock broke the traces, 
 and the carriage remained on the brink of the precipice; 
 ever after he felt as if there was an abyss on his left 
 hand, and had a chair placed there to tranquillize his 
 mind. But this association, while it raised the painful 
 idea, did not convince his judgment that there was 
 actually a river ever running at his left hand. I never 
 pass a particular spot without being reminded of a 
 youthful companion whom I met there for the last 
 time before his removal from this world ; but this asso- 
 ciation of my friend and the spot has not convinced 
 me that the two have any real connexion. The mother 
 never thinks of a particular churchyard without remem- 
 bering that her boy sleeps there ; but she does not there- 
 fore think that her child will be there for ever ; on the 
 contrary, she may firmly believe that he will rise again. 
 (2 .) Just as little can experience, I mean a gathered 
 experience, create the self- evidence and its consequent 
 necessity. A truth reached by an accumulation of 
 instances cannot be self-evident, for the evidence is 
 collected from the uniformity of many, perhaps of in- 
 
252 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 
 
 numerable cases. Neither is it accompanied with any 
 conviction of necessity. We do not affirm of a general 
 law thus discovered that the opposite of it is impossible, 
 and we allow that there may be exceptions. Some per- 
 sons are so situated that they see crows daily, and they 
 have never seen them with any other colour than black ; 
 they have sufficient evidence of the general law that 
 crows are of this colour, and when the idea of a crow 
 comes up before them, it will always be in a sable hue : 
 but it is not self-evident that crows are black ; and they 
 do not decide that they must be of this colour, or that 
 there cannot possibly be white crows in any other world 
 which God has made. 
 
 We have seen iu a former chapter that the mind is 
 endowed with a capacity of observing relations. Some 
 of these are discovered by a process of lengthened ob- 
 servation. It is thus we know that all matter attracts 
 other matter, and that the elements of bodies have 
 certain chemical affinities which can be expressed in 
 numerical proportions. But there are other relations 
 which can be discerned immediately. In saying so, I 
 do not affirm that they are noticed independently of 
 things compared ; I mean that they are discovered on 
 the contemplation, the bare contemplation, of the objects, 
 and without a gathered experience or an induction of 
 instances. Thus, on comparing my conscious self of the 
 present moment with the remembered self of yesterday, 
 I at once, and without any mediate proof, declare an 
 identity of person. A triangle being a figure with three 
 angles, I need no experiments to convince me that one 
 
THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 253 
 
 of the angles being a part is less than the whole, and 
 that the three angles make np the whole. I may never 
 have tried whether I could enclose a space by two 
 straight lines : I do not require to try it, for I see it at 
 ouce ; and I would declare of any apparent or professed 
 attempt to make them form a closed figure, that it must 
 involve some deception, and that the two lines cannot 
 be straight. 
 
 Mr. Mill derives what are usually reckoned intuitive 
 truths by " simple enumeration without a known excep- 
 tion ;" a method which Bacon declares to be ' puerile' and 
 useless, as the next iustance may prove an exception. 
 " The principles of number and geometry are duly and 
 " satisfactorily proved by that method alone, nor are 
 " they susceptible of any other proof" (Logic, B. ill. 
 c. xxi. § 2). This makes the evidence for mathematical 
 axioms the same in kind as that which the Hindu has 
 for water being always liquid ; as that which we have 
 for crows being black all over the universe ; and for the 
 alternation of day and night continuing for ever. AVe 
 see now how he should be obliged in logical consistency 
 to maintain that two and two may make five in other 
 worlds. I meet this by showing that, there is an essential 
 difference between the two classes of cases. In the one 
 we see nothing in the nature of things to necessitate the 
 law ; we adhere to it simply on the ground of the number 
 of instances ; and we can readily be made to believe tl\at 
 the law is limited in range, and that there are exceptions. 
 But in the other class the relation is in the very nature 
 of the things ; we discover it at once by looking at 
 
254 SELF-EVILEXCE AXD NECESSITY 
 
 the things ; we believe it to hold wherever the things 
 exist, and we cannot be made to decide otherwise. In 
 order to account for the conviction of necessity and 
 universality which attaches to mathematical truth, Mr. 
 Mill refers to the circumstance that geometrical curves 
 admit of being distinctly painted in the imagination, so 
 that we have " mental pictures of all possible combina- 
 tions of lines and angles " {Logic, B. II. c. v. § 5). But 
 what, I ask, makes he of algebraic demonstrations, 
 where there can be no such painting of the imagination, 
 while yet there is the same necessity ? And I call atten- 
 tion to the circumstance that mental pictures do not 
 constitute an accumulation of instances, or tend in the 
 least to bring the case under the law of simplex cnume- 
 ratio. They do, however, serve a purpose. They enable 
 us to perceive more clearly the nature of the objects, 
 and to conceive the "possible combinations of angles 
 and figures," so that we see the certainty and necessity 
 of the truth. Supposing, he says, that two straight lines 
 after diverging could again converge, " we can transport 
 " ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a 
 " mental image of the appearance which one or botli 
 " the lines must present at that point, which we may 
 " rely upon as being precisely similar to the reality." The 
 clearness of the image does help us, but it is simply in 
 the way of giving us an apprehension of the " reality," 
 and thus enabling us to pronounce a judgment on which 
 we may " rely." 
 
 By means of these tests we can without much dim- 
 cult v distinguish between truths which are intuitive, 
 
THE TESTS OF IXTUIT10X. 
 
 and truths which are reached by a gathered experience. 
 
 nave seen that Mi Mill proceeds on these crit 
 (see fj, 0, i). And if any one will take the trouble to 
 look back upon the chapter in which I have collected 
 his "Admissions," he will see that Self-Evidence, and 
 Kece--::- with Universalis .. sanction, and justify 
 
 all the intuitive principles he has avowed But as not 
 following out these criUria consequentially, he rejects 
 as intuitive, and labours to establish otherwise, truths 
 which can stand these tests quite as clearly and 
 
 as those acknowledged by him. Hence the 
 heterogeneous character of his theory, which looks as if 
 
 ood altogether on sensation, and was reared by asso- 
 ciation, but requires to be buttressed on all sides by in- 
 tuition to keep it from falling. It is only by logically 
 carrying out these tests that we can construct a con- 
 sists: : system of philosophy, in which we give t 
 intuition what belongs to intuition, and to expert 
 what belongs to experience. Let us now inquire 
 whether our conviction as to causation can stand the 
 tests of intuition. 
 
CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 CAUSATION. 
 
 On this subject a much sounder doctrine than that 
 entertained by most metaphysicians has been laid down 
 by Professor Bain, who, however, has neglected to un- 
 fold all that is in the mental phenomenon which he has 
 noticed. "As regards muscular exertion, there is a 
 " notable specialty, a radical difference in kind, signified 
 " by such phrases as ' the sense of power/ ' the feeling 
 " of energy put forth/ ' the experience of force or re 
 " sistance/ This is an ultimate phase of the human 
 " consciousness, and the most general and fundamental 
 " of all our conscious states. By this experience 
 " [observe, not a gathered experience] we body forth 
 " to ourselves a notion of force or power/'' He be- 
 lieves that " the combined movements of locomotion 
 are original or instinctive" (Senses dnd Intell, pp. 98, 
 267). Here, then, we have a perception, original and 
 intuitive, of things exercising power. We are imme- 
 diately conscious of power exerted, and we find it pro- 
 ducing an effect. Again, things become known to us 
 as exercising power upon us, and we know an effect as 
 
CAUSATION. 257 
 
 proceeding from a cause. This perception of power 
 exercised by us, and upon us, is the primary cognition 
 of things on which all our judgments as to causa- 
 tion are founded. Our knowledge both of self and 
 of external objects is of things effecting and being 
 effected. 
 
 Mr. Mill tells us in his Logic, that he has no inten- 
 tion of entering into the merits of the question of cau- 
 sation " as a problem of transcendental metaphysics." 
 And yet in his logical treatment of the subject he is 
 ever introducing, I think unfortunately, metaphysical 
 speculations. In the discussion he has confounded (in 
 this respect like some of the Scottish metaphysicians) 
 the principle of causation with that of the uniformity 
 of nature. When we say that nature is uniform, we 
 mean that nature constitutes a course or system ; that 
 there is in it a determinate number of agents, or rather 
 a fixed amount of energy, actual or potential, operating 
 according to laws and in an arranged constitution. That 
 there is an invariable uniformity in nature, is discovered 
 by a long experience. It is certainly not an obvious 
 truth forced upon us by an early and easy observation. 
 Judging by first appearances, it looks as if nature often 
 acted unsystematically, or was swayed by influences out 
 of its sphere. The mother finds her child in health to- 
 day, sick to-morrow, better the third day, and dead the 
 next ; so far from showing a uniformity, it seems rather 
 to indicate a change of agency, springing either from an 
 unknown fatality or the will of a supernatural being. 
 It is only as the result of long and patient research, 
 
258 CAUSATION. 
 
 conducted independently in the various departments of 
 nature and of history, that we reach the reasonable con- 
 viction that there is a fixed system constituted amidst 
 these seeming irregularities. 
 
 Now it is, in fact, of this uniformity of nature that 
 Mr. Mill is treating in his chapter on the " Evidence of 
 Universal Causation." He is right in saying of it, " There 
 " must have been a time when the universal prevalence 
 " of that law throughout nature could not have been 
 " affirmed in the same confident and unqualified man- 
 " ner as at present." He is further right, so far as the 
 uniformity of nature is concerned, when he says that 
 the reasons for our reliance on it " do not hold in cir - 
 " cumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible 
 " range of our experience. In distant parts of the 
 " stellar regions, where the phenomena may be entirely 
 " unlike those with which we are acquainted, it would 
 " be folly to affirm confidently that this general law 
 " prevails, any more than those special ones which we 
 " have found to hold universally on our own planet. 
 " The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise 
 " called the law of causation, must be received not as a 
 " law of the universe, but of that portion of it only 
 " which is within the range of our means of sure ob- 
 " servation, with a reasonable degree of extension to 
 f 1 adjacent cases." In this passage he identifies " the 
 uniformity in the succession of events" with "the law 
 of causation." But these are not the same. It is quite 
 conceivable that there may be worlds in which there is 
 a universal causation, and yet no self-contained system 
 
CAUSATIOK 259 
 
 of natural causes. Some, or many, or in fact all of the 
 phenomena might be produced by agents acting from 
 above or beyond the phenomena themselves, — say by 
 the Divine Being, or angels, or demons. In such a 
 world spring might follow winter one year, and be pre- 
 vented from following it the next by the action of a 
 supra-mundane influence ; and no one would be able 
 from the past to anticipate the future. In this state of 
 things there would be no uniformity of physical agen- 
 cies, and yet there would be an invariable causation. 
 Now the grand metaphysical question is not about the 
 uniformity of nature, but about the relation of cause 
 and effect. There is a momentary discovery of the 
 difference of the two, and yet a studious identification 
 of them in the following passage : — " There was a time 
 " when many of the phenomena of nature must have 
 " appeared altogether capricious and irregular, not 
 " governed by any laws, nor steadily consequent upon 
 " any causes. Such phenomena, indeed, were com 
 " monly in that early stage of human knowledge as- 
 " cribed to the direct intervention of the will of some 
 " supernatural being, and therefore still to a cause." 
 
 It is admitted that the great body of mankind, whe- 
 ther they are or are not persuaded of the existence of a 
 uniform system of nature, believe as to every effect, as 
 to every new thing produced, or change upon an old 
 thing, that it must have had a cause, whether natural 
 or supernatural. The question is, Is this belief in- 
 tuitive ? 
 
 This conviction can stand the tests of intuition. On 
 
260 CAUSATION. 
 
 the bare contemplation of a new phenomenon, that is, 
 of a new thing appearing, of a thing which did not 
 exist before, we declare that it has had a producing 
 cause. It certainly appears in very early life, before 
 there can be a lengthened or wide observation or enume- 
 ration of instances. It is strong in very primitive 
 states of society, long before mankind had observed an 
 invariable uniformity in the occurrence of natural phe- 
 nomena. It can be shown that it is necessary and uni - 
 versal. Mr. Mill indeed tells us, "I am convinced that 
 " any one accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who 
 " will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose, will, 
 " when his imagination has once learned to entertain 
 " the notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in 
 " some one for instance of the many firmaments into 
 " which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, 
 " events may succeed one another at random, without 
 " any fixed law ; nor can anything in our experience or 
 " in our mental nature constitute a sufficient, or indeed 
 " any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case." 
 The phrase, " fixed law," here employed, is ambiguous ; 
 it may mean a mere natural or physical law, such as 
 that of attraction. And I acknowledge at once that it 
 is quite possible to apprehend and to believe that there 
 may be worlds in which new phenomena, or changes on 
 old phenomena, may be produced, without the operation 
 of that law of gravitation which seems to act everywhere 
 in our mundane system. But the real question is, would 
 not the mind insist, and this according to " a fixed law" 
 of our " mental nature," that the event must have a 
 
CAUSATIOX. 261 
 
 cause in an agent physical or spiritual ? "VTe may ob- 
 serve that the old misleading phrase, ' conceive/ is once 
 more casting up. I admit we can have the idea of, that 
 is, image :: jurselves, a new phenomenon without any 
 necessary precedent. But I hold that we cannot be 
 made to judge, decide, or believe, that in any firmament 
 there could be a new event, — say a world springing into 
 being with no cause to produce it. 
 
 The mental phenomenon, the conviction and its at- 
 tached necessity, Mr. Mill would explain by the ass. - 
 ion of ideas. But then, in order to save himself from 
 obvious and pressing difficulties, he is obliged to lay down 
 very stringent precautions as to when association can 
 generate a feeling of necessity. In order to produce the 
 inseparable association, the phenomenon must be " so 
 - linked in our experience, that we never perceive 
 '• the one without at the same time, or the immediately 
 ' ; succeeding moment, perceiving the other." Again. u No 
 " frequency of conjunction between two phenomena will 
 " create an inseparable association if counter associations 
 '• are being created all the while" (p. 266}. By help of 
 these two principles he tries to avoid the objection which 
 might be urged to his mode of accounting for the convic- 
 tion of necessity. But he is seen to be involved in hope- 
 perplexities when these laws are applied to causation. 
 For neither of them would allow the necessary convic- 
 fcion to be formed as to cause and effect from mere ex- 
 perience. For it is not the case that we never perceive 
 a cause without perceiving an effect, or that we never 
 observe an effect without also observing a cause. On 
 
262 CAUSATION. 
 
 the contrary, the effects of causes operating, and the 
 causes of effects falling under our notice, are very often 
 concealed from us. Of how few of the occurrences 
 happening in the circle of our experience, or in the 
 times in which we live, are we able to estimate the con- 
 sequences ? In a large proportion of the physical effects 
 which come under our notice, the cause is not discovered 
 at the time, and is only found out in the end by a pro- 
 cess of elaborate experiment, fitted to distract instead of 
 aiding association ; and in the case of a large number of 
 the occurrences of our personal experience, or recorded 
 in history, we never do rise to the discovery of the 
 causes. Again, as to the other precautionary rule, we 
 find that in the case of cause and effect there is a 
 constant formation of " counter associations/' by reason 
 of the complexity of the conditions which meet in the 
 cause, and of incidents which attach themselves to the 
 effect, and of the combination of each of these with a 
 host of concomitant circumstances to disturb the forma- 
 tion of an inseparable association. A friend dies : no 
 doubt there has been a physical cause of the occurrence, 
 but how many things prevent us from discovering or 
 even inquiring about it ; and finding little satisfaction in 
 the contemplation, we dwell rather on the regard we 
 had for the departed, on his excellent qualities, on the 
 loss we have suffered ; or if we think of what led to it, 
 we prefer referring the whole to the appointment of 
 God. That amidst all these complications, and in spite 
 of appearances to the contrary, mankind should ever 
 have clung to the belief that there is a cause, natural or 
 
causation: 263 
 
 supernatural, to every event, is a proof that the convic- 
 tion is deeply seated in our nature. 
 
 When Mr. Mill confines his attention to the physical 
 and logical nature of causation, he throws light upon 
 the subject. " The statement of the cause is incomplete 
 " unless in some shape or other we introduce all the 
 " conditions." " In practice, that particular condition 
 " is usually styled the cause, whose share in the matter 
 " is superficially the most conspicuous, or whose re- 
 u quisiteness to the production of the effect we happen 
 " to be insisting upon at the moment." " The real cause 
 " of the phenomenon is the assemblage of all the con- 
 " ditions." There is new and important truth in this 
 statement. But I am not sure that Mr. Mill has got 
 a full view of the facts. In material nature there is 
 always need of the action of two or more agents in 
 order to an effect. If a ball moves in consequence of 
 another striking it, there is need of the one ball as well 
 as the other, and the cause, properly speaking, consists 
 of the two in a relation to each other. But not only 
 is there a duality or plurality in the cause, there is the 
 same (Mr. Mill has not noticed it) in the effect. The 
 effect consists not merely of the one ball, the ball 
 struck and set in motion, but also of the other ball 
 which struck it, and which has now lost part of its mo- 
 mentum. By carrying out this doctrine, we can determine 
 what is meant by 'condition' and 'occasion' when 
 the phrases are applied to the operation of causation. 
 When we speak of an agent requiring a ' condition,' an 
 1 occasion,' or ' circumstances,' in order to its action, we 
 
264 CAUSATION. 
 
 refer to the other agent or agents required, that it 
 may produce a particular effect. Thus that fire may 
 burn, it is necessary to have fuel, or a combustible 
 material. In order that my will may move my arm, it 
 is needful to have the concurrence of a healthy motor 
 nerve. So much for the dual or plural agency in the 
 cause. But there is a similar complexity in the effect, 
 and we need a like phrase to designate the part of it 
 which we do not require to consider at the time. Thus 
 the steam which has raised a certain weight has ex- 
 pended meanwhile a certain amount of force ; but per- 
 sons striving merely to have the weight raised care 
 nothing for the other, and may call it 'incidental ;' which 
 incidental part, however, may be the essential element 
 in the view of the engineer who requires to generate 
 the steam. In the proper enunciation of the cause and 
 the effect — the invariable and unconditional cause and 
 effect — there should be a statement of all the concurring 
 antecedents, and all the involved consequents, including 
 the conditions in the cause, and the incidents in the effect. 
 By carrying out this doctrine consistently, we are able 
 to give (which Mr. Mill has not done) its proper place 
 to the 'Agent' and 'Patient;' the distinction between 
 which has been noticed in some form or other by most 
 philosophers from the time of Aristotle. The agent and 
 patient are certainly not to be identified with the cause 
 and effect ; but they are to be found in the cause, that 
 is, in the assemblage of circumstances necessary in order 
 to the production of the effect. These circumstances or 
 agencies must concur, in short, must operate on each 
 
CAUSATION. 265 
 
 other, in order to action and change. Tims, in order 
 to the production of water, there must be both oxygen 
 and hydrogen ; the two act on each other according to 
 their nature and laws ; and both are changed and appear 
 in the product. That which we consider as acting may 
 be called the Agent, that which we regard as acted on 
 may be considered as the Patient. It should be observed 
 and remembered, that the agent under one aspect is 
 always a patient under another, and the patient may 
 also be viewed as an agent ; for that which acts is 
 always acted on, and that which is acted on always 
 acts ; and action is always equal to reaction. The 
 account now given enables us to settle a question 
 which has often been started, but never determined 
 satisfactorily. The question is, Is the effect always 
 posterior in time to the cause, or may it not be con- 
 temporaneous ? The answer is, that the complex effect 
 always follows the complex cause ; but that the con- 
 current agents which constitute the cause may be re- 
 garded as acting on each other simultaneously. The 
 oxygen and the hydrogen influence each other con- 
 temporaneously, and are followed by the production of 
 water as the effect. 
 
 The reader may compare the statement now offered 
 with that given by Mr. Mill in his chapter " Of the Law 
 of Universal Causation." Mr. Mill has not seen that 
 as the cause consists in an assemblage of conditions, so 
 the effect consists in an assemblage of consequences. 
 In the agents concurring in the cause there is a real 
 distinction between agent and patient, whereas he says 
 
266 CAUSATION. 
 
 the distinction vanishes on examination, or rather is 
 found to be merely verbal. He has discussed, but 
 avowedly does not know how to settle the question as 
 to whether the cause precedes the effect. He has also 
 noticed the circumstance, that in some cases when the 
 cause ceases the effect also seems to cease, whereas in 
 others the effect appears to remain ; but he has not been 
 able to give a full explanation of the phenomenon. The 
 effect remains when the assemblage of circumstances 
 which constitute the cause abides. It is thus a book 
 remains on the table as long as the table is in a posi- 
 tion to uphold it. It is thus oxygen and hydrogen 
 abide in water till an element with a stronger affinity 
 with one of them succeeds in drawing it off. In other 
 cases the concurrence of agencies acting as the cause is 
 ever liable to be broken up, and the effect ceases when 
 the complex cause has disappeared. It is thus that the 
 book is upheld in my hand, only so long as I stretch 
 out my arm : thus that the room is illuminated by day 
 only so long as the sun shines, and by night only so long 
 as the lamp continues to burn. In all cases a change 
 implies a new agent, or a new concurrence of agencies. 
 
 But we are now in the heart of our author's logical 
 discussions. Mr. Mill's Logic has never been subjected 
 to a careful review on the part either of his supporters 
 or opponents. It deserves such an examination because 
 of its excellencies, and it requires it because of its errors, 
 which many students are accepting along with the 
 truths. I undertake this review in the immediately 
 succeeding chapters. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 Formal Logic is usually represented as dealing with 
 the Notion, Judgment, and Reasoning. Mr. Mill has 
 no separate exposition of the Notion. He treats instead, 
 of Names : as if Names did not stand for Thoughts, the 
 nature of which should have been previously investi- 
 gated. This is surely a defect in an elaborate Logical 
 Treatise. In his controversial work he has given us his 
 theory of the Notion or Conception. It will be neces- 
 sary to examine it. 
 
 The Notions, that is, apprehensions of things, which 
 the mind can entertain, are of three sorts : — First, There 
 is the Singular Concrete Notion, such as Homer, Virgil, 
 Dante, Milton, this man, this dog, that daisy, that book. 
 This notion is singular, as it embraces a single object. 
 It is concrete, as it contemplates the object as possess- 
 ing an aggregate of qualities. The consideration of the 
 nature of this notion does not, properly speaking, come 
 under Formal Logic, which has to do only with Discur- 
 sive Thought ; that is, thought in which there is a pro- 
 cess from something given or allowed to something 
 
268 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 founded upon it. It is furnished to us by intuition, 
 primarily by the senses and consciousness, and does not 
 imply any logical operation. But then it comes into 
 Logic when it is combined with the abstract and general 
 notion in the proposition and argument. Thus, when 
 we say, ' Locke was an independent thinker,' the sub- 
 ject is a singular concrete notion compared with a 
 general notion in the predicate. Logic, therefore, can- 
 not overlook this notion, but it may hand over the 
 special discussion of its origin and validity to psycho 
 logy or metaphysics. Mr. Mill gives us a correct enough 
 account of it, though he does not specially investigate 
 its nature : " A concrete name is a name which stands 
 for a thing" (B. I. c. ii. 4). 
 
 Second, There is the Abstract Notion. It is the appre- 
 hension of a part of an object as a part, say of the head 
 of a horse as the head of a horse. More technically it 
 is the apprehension of an attribute. " An abstract name 
 is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing" (lb.) 
 In this latter sense the part cannot exist separate from 
 the whole : thus transparency cannot exist apart from a 
 transparent object, such as glass or ice. But though an 
 abstract quality cannot exist apart from an object, it is 
 not to be regarded as a nonentity or a fiction of the 
 mind. Bationality cannot exist apart from a rational 
 being, but it has a real existence in a rational being, 
 such as man. 
 
 On account of the defective view which he takes of 
 the intellectual faculties of man, Mr. Mill has not been 
 able to furnish an adequate account of the Abstract No- 
 
THE LOGICAL FOTIOK 269 
 
 tion. Speaking of the notion of length without breadth, 
 " According to what appears to me the sounder opinion, 
 " the mind cannot form any such notion ; it cannot con- 
 " ceive length without breadth" (B. I. c. viii. 7). And 
 in his recent work, " The existence of Abstract Ideas — 
 " the conception of the class qualities by themselves, and 
 " not as embodied in an individual — is effectually pre- 
 " eluded by the law of Inseparable Association" (p. 314). 
 The ambiguous word ' conceive' has once more cast up 
 without his telling us in what sense he employs it, I 
 should say that in these passages he uses it in the sense 
 of ' image/ in which signification the statement is true. 
 I believe that length cannot exist except in an extended 
 object which has also breadth, and I am sure that I can 
 image length only in an extended object. He adds, that 
 the mind " can only, in contemplating objects, attend to 
 " their length, exclusively of their other sensible quali- 
 " ties, and so determine what properties may be predi- 
 " cated of them in virtue of their length alone." This 
 is not a sufficiently comprehensive account of the Abs- 
 tract Notion ; but it implies that there is more than a 
 mere image. If we inquire carefully into its nature, we 
 shall find that as a thought it implies not only attention 
 but a comparative act. We apprehend the attribute to 
 be an attribute of the concrete object, thus comparing 
 the part and whole. This apprehension is the Abstract 
 Notion, and we can compare the attribute apprehended 
 with other attributes, or with concrete objects of various 
 kinds, and make affirmations or denials. Tims, on per- 
 ceiving a cone of sugar as a concrete object, we can in 
 
270 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 abstract thought fix on the figure, and from the con- 
 templation of it we might by a further abstraction fix 
 on the conic sections, and by a process of reasoning- 
 evolve their properties. In all this we should be deal- 
 ing, not with mere hypotheses, but abstracted realities ; 
 and the conclusions we reach will be found true of all 
 cones, and of all sections of the cone, including the 
 elliptic figures in which the planets move. 1 
 
 Third, There is the General Notion, such as man, 
 poet, animal. We are so constantly forming notions of 
 this sort, that it should not be difficult to evolve the 
 processes involved in it. The two first steps are, — (1.) 
 that we observe a resemblance among objects ; (2.) that 
 Ave fix on the points of resemblance. The first is accom- 
 plished by the mind's power of perceiving agreements, 
 and the second by an operation of abstraction. No ab- 
 solute rule can be laid down as to which of these pro- 
 cesses is the prior. I believe that in most cases there 
 is first a perception more or less vague of a likeness, 
 and then the separate consideration of the points of 
 likeness. But in other cases we seem rather to fix pri- 
 marily on an attribute, and conjoin by it all the objects 
 which we discover to possess it. Thus, in zoology the 
 naturalist fixes on the possession of a backbone, and 
 
 i Regarding Logic as the Science of the Laws of Discursive Thought, as 
 above defined, the Abstract Notion is clearly embraced in it, as in it Ave 
 draw an attribute out of the concrete object given, and we must endeavour 
 to unfold the Laws of Thought involved in it. The following may serve 
 provisionally till a better list be furnished : — I. The Abstract Quality im- 
 plies a Concrete Object. II. When the Concrete Object is real the Abs- 
 tract Quality taken from it is also real. III. When the Abstract is a 
 Quality, it is not to be regarded as having an independent existence ; its 
 existence is in a Concrete Object. 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 271 
 
 makes it the bond of a class of animals. But there is 
 more in generalization than either or than both of these 
 steps. (3.) The consummating step is, that we constitute 
 a class which embraces all the objects possessing the 
 common attribute or attributes. Till this step is taken 
 there is no generalization. When this step is taken the 
 general notion is formed. Let it be observed that there 
 is here an operation beyond the other two. In the first 
 step we must have observed or contemplated more or 
 fewer objects, and perceived them to resemble each 
 other ; still the number was limited. In the second 
 step we fixed on a quality or qualities common to the 
 objects noticed. But in the final step the number of 
 objects is indefinite, and must include not merely those 
 we have observed and compared, but all others pos- 
 sessing the mark or marks fixed on. On seeing only 
 half a dozen red deer I may have been forcibly struck 
 with their resemblance, and may have been able to fix on 
 their points of likeness, — such as their shape and their 
 noble antlers. But when I take the decisive step and 
 form the class red deer, that class must include not 
 only those I have seen, but all others with that form 
 of body and horns ; not only these six deer, but all 
 other deer now living, and all deer that ever lived 
 or shall live ; not only so, but all imaginable deer, 
 the deer sung of by all the poets, and the deer that 
 may be created by the ever active imagination. A 
 notion is not general unless it embraces all the objects 
 possessing the mark or marks fixed on. 
 
 Now this consummating step has not been noticed, 
 
272 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 or at least has not had its appropriate place allotted to 
 it, by most psychologists and logicians. Dr. Brown 
 dwells very fondly on the feeling of resemblance, as he 
 calls it (he should have said the observation of the 
 relation of resemblance), but takes no notice of the all- 
 important act by which the species is made to embrace 
 all the objects having the resemblance. This specially 
 intellectual step was from time to time before the mind 
 of Hamilton, as when he says, that "concepts have 
 " only a potential, not an actual, universality ; that is, 
 " they are only universal, inasmuch as they may be 
 " applied to any of a certain class of objects." But with 
 an occasional glimpse of the truth, he loses sight of it 
 immediately after, and he talks of a mysterious " syn- 
 " thesis in consciousness," wherein " the qualities, which 
 " by comparison are judged similar, and by attention 
 " are constituted into an exclusive object of thought, — 
 " these are already, by this process, identified in con- 
 " sciousness ; for they are only judged similar, inas- 
 " much as they produce in us indiscernible effects" 
 {Logic, Lect. viii.) His whole exposition is confused 
 and unsatisfactory, and it issues in his finding a con- 
 tradiction in the general notion. He loses his consis- 
 tency and clearness in endeavouring to find some sort 
 of reconciliation between nominalism and conceptualise. 
 Mr. Mill has unfolded no elements in the general no- 
 tion except the attribute and the name. " We create 
 " an artificial association between those attributes (to 
 " which we wish to devote our exclusive attention) and 
 " a certain combination of articulate sounds, which 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 273 
 
 " guarantees to us when we hear the sound, or see 
 " the written characters corresponding to it, there will 
 " be raised in the mind an idea of some object pos- 
 " sessing those attributes, in which idea those attri- 
 " butes alone will be suggested vividly to the minds, 
 " our consciousness of the remainder of the concrete 
 " idea being faint." " The association of that particular 
 " set of attributes with a given word is what keeps 
 " them together in the mind by a stronger tie than that 
 " with which they are associated with the remainder of 
 " the concrete image" (p. 322). There is a great over- 
 sight here. There is no reference to the discovery of 
 resemblances among objects as constituting the com- 
 mencement of the whole process. He ascribes to the 
 name what is done by the possession of common quali- 
 ties. " For a class is absolutely nothing but an in- 
 " definite number of individuals denoted by a general 
 " name. The name given to them in common is what 
 " makes them a class." But what makes the name 
 applicable to the indefinite number of objects ? What 
 enables us, when we discover a new object, to say 
 whether it is or is not entitled to the name? The 
 answer to these questions will force us to look beyond 
 the name to the like attributes in the objects, as making 
 the objects pass under the same name, as enabling us to 
 understand what is denoted by the name, as being the 
 meaning of the name, and, in fact, constituting the bond 
 which joins the objects in a class. There is a passage 
 in which he has a glimpse of the consummating step, 
 and indeed of the whole process. " The only mode in 
 
 s 
 
274 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 " which any general name has a definite meaning, is by 
 " being a name of an indefinite variety of things, 
 " namely, all things known or unknown, past, present, 
 " or future, which possess certain attributes" (Logic, 
 I. v. 3). This language does point to something else 
 than the name as bringing together " the indefinite num- 
 ber of individuals in the class :" it points to the pos- 
 session of " certain attributes" in the " indefinite variety 
 of things ; " and it implies, though it does not just 
 state, that the class must include all the objects pos- 
 sessing these attributes. This account, consequentially 
 followed out, makes the common notion embrace three 
 elements : objects resembling each other ; points of re- 
 semblance ; and the inclusion of all objects having these 
 points. But Mr. Mill habitually loses sight of some of 
 these essential characteristics, and ever falls back upon 
 the attribute and the name. This omission in the 
 theory of the notion comes out in positive error in the 
 account of the judgment and reasoning. 
 
 According to the exposition now given, the Class- 
 Notion always includes both objects and attributes, 
 objects having a resemblance, and common attributes 
 possessed by them. So far as it embraces objects, it 
 is said to have Extension. So far as it contains attri- 
 butes, it is said to have Comprehension or Intension. 
 This distinction was indicated in the Port-Royal Logic, 
 and was enunciated in several logical works published 
 in the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the 
 eighteenth century. 1 It has been elaborated with great 
 
 i In particular, I have found it in a Compend of Logic, prepared and 
 printed (there is no evidence of its having been published) for use of the 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 275 
 
 care, at times with an excess of refinement, by Sir 
 William Hamilton. That every general notion should 
 have both these aspects, follows from the account I have 
 given of its formation and constitution. In every 
 General Notion there must be objects compared ; this 
 constitutes the Extension. There must also be marks 
 to bring the objects together under one head ; this is 
 Comprehension. The former is got by observation and 
 comparison, the latter by abstraction. We see that as 
 the one rises the other falls, and that as the one falls 
 the other rises. As we multiply the marks or attri- 
 butes, there must be fewer objects possessing them. As 
 we multiply the objects, they must have fewer common 
 marks. Hence the rule, that the greater the Extension, 
 the less the Comprehension, and the greater the Com- 
 prehension, the less the Extension. 
 
 Upon this distinction the remark is, " that the Ex- 
 " tension is not anything intrinsic to the concept ; it is 
 " the sum of all the objects, in our concrete images of 
 " which the concept is included : but the comprehension 
 " is the very concept itself; for the concept means 
 " nothing but our mental representation of the sum of 
 " the attributes composing it" (p. 333). It is clear, that 
 of the three constituents of common notions he gives 
 the chief, or rather exclusive, place to the attributes. 
 " All men, and the class man, are expressions which 
 " point to nothing but attributes ; they cannot be inter- 
 Scottish Universities, by order of a Parliamentary Commission, 1795 ; in 
 an Introduction to Logic" (2d edit., 1722) by Gershom Carmichael of Glas- 
 gow University ; and again in a Compend of Logic by Francis Hutcheson, 
 which was used in Glasgow College till towards the close of last century. 
 
276 THE LOGICAL NOTIOX. 
 
 " preted except in comprehension" (p. 363). In oppo- 
 sition to this, I maintain that the Extension of the 
 notion is quite as important an aspect of it as the Com- 
 prehension ; that every common notion may be inter- 
 preted in Extension as well as Intension ; that in the 
 class there must be objects to combine as well as attri- 
 butes to combine them ; and that a mental representation 
 must be inadequate which does not embrace the objects 
 as well as the sum of the attributes possessed by them. 
 The Universal Xotion is of objects possessing common 
 attributes, the notion including all the objects possess- 
 ing the attributes. We see here, in Mr. Mill's logical 
 doctrine, a taint at the fountain, which will be found 
 running through the whole stream. 
 
 " General concepts, therefore, we have, properly 
 " speaking, none." " I consider it nothing less than a 
 " misfortune that the words Concept, General Xotion, 
 " or any other phrase to express the supposed mental 
 " modification corresponding to a class name, should 
 " ever have been invented. Above all, I hold that 
 v nothing but confusion ever results from introducing 
 " the term Concept into Logic ; and that instead of the 
 " Concept of a class, we should always speak of the 
 " signification of a class name" (pp. 321, 331). But 
 surely it is desirable to have a word to express the 
 " mental modification" when we contemplate a " class," 
 and Conception or General Xotion seems appropriate 
 enough. I also think it desirable to have a phrase to 
 denote, not the " signification of a class name," but the 
 thing signified by the class name ; and the fittest I can 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 277 
 
 think of is Concept. Mr. Mill would replace Abstract 
 and General Idea by " the connotation of the class 
 name." I reckon the epithet ' connotation' a very good 
 one for some purposes. It was used by the schoolmen ; 
 it was a favourite one with Mr. James Mill ; and 
 has had a clear meaning attached to it. " A connota- 
 " tive term is one which denotes a subject and implies 
 " an attribute." Thus, ' white' is connotative ; * it de- 
 " notes all things white, as snow, paper, the foam of the 
 " sea, etc. ; and implies, or, as it was termed by the 
 " schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness." But 
 while ' connotative ' is an expressive enough epithet, 
 applied to certain predicates, it does not bring out what 
 is contained in the class-notion. ' Horse,' for example, 
 is a general notion, embracing an indefinite number of 
 objects ; but all this is not expressed by applying the 
 phrase ' connotative.' " It denotes a subject ;" but 
 what is the subject ? This question is left unanswered. 
 It can be answered only by saying that it consists of all 
 the objects possessing the attributes ; and as to the 
 phrase "signification of the class name," it leaves it 
 unsettled what the thing signified is. I am inclined to 
 think that the words Conception and Concept serve a 
 good purpose ; they express the signification of the 
 class name. 1 
 
 The General Notion bein^ formed in the way ex- 
 plained, we fix it and preserve it, and think of it by 
 
 1 The following are some of the Laws of Thought involved in the General 
 Notion : — I. The Universal implies Singulars. II. When the Singulars are 
 Real the Universal is also Real. III. The Reality in the Universal consists 
 in the possession of common attributes by all the objects embraced in it. ., 
 
278 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 means of a Sign. The Sign may be one or other of two 
 sorts. Lauding the founder of his School, Mr. Mill 
 says, " It is a doctrine of one of the most fertile thinkers 
 " of modern times, Auguste Comte, that, besides the 
 " logic of signs, there is a logic of images, and a logic of 
 " feelings. In many of the familiar processes of thought, 
 " and especially in uncultured minds, a visual image 
 " serves instead of a word" (p. 329). Omitting the 
 consideration of the logic of feelings as not coming 
 specially before us, the doctrine attributed to Comte as 
 so " fertile" a thinker was long ago proclaimed by 
 Aristotle, and has floated ever since, in a more or less 
 correct form, in logic and speculative philosophy. Ac- 
 cording to Aristotle, a notion is not the same as a 
 phantasm, but it is never found without a phantasm. 1 
 The expression of Mr. Mill is much more loose. He 
 talks of a " logic of images ;" whereas it is not a logic, 
 but a notion entertained by means of an image. He 
 speaks of the image being a " visual sensation" and 
 " visual appearance ;" whereas it may be a phantasm 
 by any of the senses, — it may be of a smell, or a taste, 
 or a touch, or a sound. 
 
 I believe that the General Notion is kept before the 
 mind primarily by the phantasm. In every such no- 
 tion the objects are indefinite — are innumerable; and 
 so the human mind (whatever angelic minds may do) 
 cannot image them all : but it images one as a sign of 
 
 i Distinguishing between Notions, vorj/xara, and cpavrdafxaTa, Aristotle 
 says (see Anim. III. 7), NoTj/xara rivl hiolaet rod /xr) cpavTaafxara elvai, ij 
 ovde ravra (pavrdafxara, dXX' ovk dvev (pavTaa/xaTuv. 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 279 
 
 the others. The attribute, or aggregate of attributes, 
 cannot be imaged apart from objects, but we labour to 
 fashion an object which may give prominence to the 
 one attribute, if there be only one, or combine them if 
 there be many. This, I am persuaded, is the original 
 and spontaneous agency by which we carry with us and 
 compare our concepts. Mr. Mill has a glimpse of this, 
 and nothing more, when he says that " in uncultured 
 minds a visual image serves instead of words." The 
 more correct expression would be, that in cultured 
 minds the word often comes to serve the purpose of the 
 image and to supersede it. I believe we naturally 
 resort to the image ; but the image is always felt to 
 be inadequate. Hence the common remark, that we 
 cannot have an adequate idea, that is, in the sense of 
 image, of a class. Suppose the notion to be ' quadruped :' 
 when we think about the class, we may, and do com- 
 monly, image some sort of beast with four limbs ; but 
 if the limbs be those of a horse, they cannot be those of 
 a dog, and if they be those of a dog, they cannot be 
 those of the horse ; and if they be different from either, 
 they cannot be those either of the horse or the dog. 
 All this does not prove that we cannot in thought form 
 a general notion, or that we cannot legitimately employ 
 it in judgment and reasoning ; it merely shows that 
 the image, as being single, is not equal to the indefinite 
 number of objects, and, as being concrete, cannot be 
 identical with the attribute, which is abstract. The 
 fact is, the image, or, as I prefer calling it, with Aristotle, 
 the phantasm, is a mere sign, — one for the many, that 
 
280 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 one being as far as possible a type of the many. The 
 mind spontaneously forms such representations, and de- 
 lights to do so ; and when it can have them, the think- 
 ing is rendered much more vivid and pleasant, and is 
 more readily accompanied with excitement and emotion. 
 But when the generalizations are very high, when the 
 abstractions are very refined, and the common attributes 
 are very numerous, or not very definitely fixed, it be- 
 comes all but impossible to construct a phantasm which 
 will represent the class. We can form a pretty fair 
 representative image of quadruped, but what phantasm 
 could stand for such complex notions as civilisation, 
 liberty, politics, art, and science ? In striving to com- 
 pass such notions, we naturally resort to artificial sym- 
 bols, particularly language. If there be a word suitable 
 to express the thought, it will employ it ; if there be not, 
 it will labour to invent one. But so far from images 
 serving instead of words, the words serve our purpose 
 as being images. It has been remarked by metaphysi- 
 cians that most names were originally of individual 
 objects. An individual object, or the image of it, was 
 first taken to represent the class ; and then the name of 
 the individual, as a sound or a written character ad- 
 dressed to the eye, was used as a briefer and more con- 
 venient symbol. The advantage of such verbal signs, 
 which are always, be it remarked, in a sense phantasms 
 addressed to the eye or ear, is, that they do not distract 
 us with the peculiarities of individual objects, and allow 
 us in thinking to proceed only on the common qualities 
 of objects. All this renders the notion less lively and 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 281 
 
 emotional — unless indeed by those who resort to word- 
 painting to raise up a phantasm — but at the same time 
 better fitted for the conducting of rigid thought. The 
 most perfect artificial signs for the limited end in view, 
 are those employed in algebra, in which meaningless 
 letters denote quantities known or unknown, and we can 
 employ them according to the settled laws of reasoning 
 in quantity without thinking of what they stand for, 
 till we reach the result, when we translate the sign into 
 what it signifies. When we lose sight for the time of 
 what the sign stands for, this is what constitutes, pro- 
 perly speaking, Symbolical Thought. But it is always 
 to be understood that the sign does stand for a notion, 
 and has always a tacit reference to it ; that we can pre- 
 dicate of the sign only what we could legitimately pre- 
 dicate of the notion; and that in passing it on from 
 premisses to conclusion in a chain of reasoning, we must 
 be sure that we proceed on principles which are appli- 
 cable to the thing signified. And in order to determine 
 whether we are or are not making a proper predication, 
 we can always, and should often, require that the sign 
 should be translated into the notion, and the notion 
 compared with the thing. 1 
 
 1 The following are some of the Laws of Thought involved in the nse of 
 Signs as Instruments of Thought :— I. Every Logical Term stands for a 
 Notion, which may be a Singular Concrete, an Abstract, or a Universal. 
 II. According as it stands for one or other of these, so is it to be inter- 
 preted. III. We can predicate of the Sign only what might be predicated 
 of the Notion. IV. In order to determine whether we are making a pro- 
 per predication as to the Sign, we may demand at any time that the Notion 
 be substituted for it. V. In order to determine whether we are making a 
 proper predication as to the Notion, we must inquire what is the nature 
 of the Things from which it has been formed. 
 
282 THE LOGICAL X0T10X. 
 
 A distinction of some importance may be drawn be- 
 tween two kinds of Concepts. In the one the class is 
 determined by a single attribute, or by it together with 
 the attributes implied in it. Such are the classes de- 
 signated by adjectives, as generous, faithful, virtuous, — 
 pointing to one quality of an object, along with those 
 that may be involved in that quality. It is to these 
 phrases that the epithet f connotative' is specially ap- 
 plicable ; they denote an attribute, and connote objects 
 possessing it. In other cases the Comprehension of the 
 class consists of an aggregate of attributes. Thus, we 
 
 CO O ' 
 
 cannot fix on any one attribute of the class Man, and 
 derive all the others from it, Eationality is one quality, 
 but he has many others : 
 
 " Men define a man 
 The creature who stands frontward to the stars, 
 The creature who looks inward to himself, 
 The tool-wright, laughing creature. 'Tis enough ; 
 We'll say instead the inconsequent creature man, 
 For that 's his specialty. What creature else 
 Conceives the circle, and then walks the square?" 
 
 The one kind of notions I would be inclined to call, 
 when it is necessary to draw the distinction between 
 them, the Generalized Abstract, because in it we seize 
 on a single quality, and put all the objects possessing 
 it into a class. The other I call the Generalized Con- 
 crete, because in it we bring together, by certain resem- 
 blances, individuals with their aggregate of qualities. 
 It was to the latter that the schoolmen appropriated 
 the phrase Species ; I think they would scarcely have 
 applied it to the Generalized Abstract such as 'rational' 
 
THE LOGICAL NOTION. 283 
 
 or ' irrational.' The Generalized Concrete evidently in- 
 cludes all natural classes, such as reptiles, fishes, birds, 
 mammals, in the animal kingdom, and rosacese, crucifera?, 
 solanacese in the vegetable kingdom; the objects em- 
 braced in these have all a number of common qualities. 
 
 It is of importance to keep these distinctions in view 
 in considering the nature of Definition. In defining the 
 Generalized Abstract Notion, we have only to bring out 
 the one common quality, and the work is completed. 
 But in attempting to define the Generalized Concrete, 
 we cannot fix on any one quality as being the essential 
 one ; and it often happens that the common attributes 
 are so numerous, that it would be vain and presumptu- 
 ous to attempt to specify all of them. Thus, no one 
 can tell what are the properties embraced in horse, dog, 
 metal, mineral. It fortunately, I believe providentially, 
 happens that we have in nature classes called Kinds, 
 the nature of which has been so well expounded by 
 Mr. Mill. In these, one of the Marks is an invariable 
 accompaniment, and therefore a sign of the others ; and 
 in specifying it we have truly fixed the significates of 
 the notion, that is, comprised all the objects embraced 
 in it and excluded others. Thus it is a good definition 
 to say, " Man is a rational animal," for all his other 
 special attributes are conjoined with rationality. If we 
 call the attribute fixed on the Differentia, the others 
 may be represented as Propria, if we wish to retain, 
 after amending it, the distinction of Porphyry between 
 Differentia and Proprium. 
 
 Mr. Mill has offered some valuable remarks on De- 
 
284 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 
 
 finition, but from overlooking the distinction between 
 the Extension and Comprehension of a Notion, he has 
 not given us a thoroughly scientific account of the 
 logical process. Sir William Hamilton is right in say- 
 ing, after older logicians, that it is effected according to 
 the Comprehension of a Notion ; that is, it reflectively 
 brings out the Marks by which those who spontaneously 
 formed the concej)t combined the objects. From over- 
 looking Extension Mr. Mill has omitted Division, a 
 subject which ought to be discussed in all logical 
 treatises. Logical Division proceeds according to the 
 Extension of a Notion, and spreads out the co-ordinate 
 species of a genus, according to marks added, so that 
 the species exclude one another, and together make up 
 the genus. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 Theee is no part of Logic which has greater need of 
 being thoroughly cleared up than that which relates to 
 Judgment. In particular, first, what precisely are the 
 things compared, and in regard to which the affirmation 
 or denial is made ? In the common logical treatises we 
 are said to compare two notions and declare their agree- 
 ment or disagreement. Mr. Mill has made an im- 
 portant correction of this statement : " Propositions 
 " (except when the mind itself is the subject treated of) 
 " are not assertions respecting our ideas of things, but 
 " assertions respecting the things themselves. In order 
 " to believe that gold is yellow, I must indeed have the 
 " idea of gold and the idea of yellow, and something 
 " having reference to these ideas must take place in my 
 " mind ; but my belief has not reference to the ideas, 
 " it has reference to the things" {Logic, I. v. 1). " Do 
 " we never judge or assert anything but our mere 
 " notions of things ? Do we not make judgments and 
 " assert propositions respecting actual things" (p. 346). 
 There is truth here. But is the whole truth set forth ? 
 
286 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 The judgment is pronounced in regard to objects, but 
 then, it must be of objects of which we have a notion. 
 The judgment is not pronounced of our notions as mental 
 phenomena, but neither can it be of things of which 
 we have had no notion, — of such we can make no pre- 
 dication. He tells us again and again, " The judgment 
 is concerning the fact, not the concept." But then he 
 is obliged to allow, " that in order to believe that gold 
 " is yellow, I must, indeed, have the idea of gold, and 
 " the idea of yellow, and something having reference to 
 these ideas must take place in my mind ;" and he adds, 
 that in order to belief, " a previous mental conception 
 of the facts is an indispensable condition." I ask, 
 should not this indispensable condition have a place in 
 the full statement of the nature of propositions ? There 
 is a sentence in which he has got at least a momentary 
 view of the correct doctrine : " The real object of belief 
 " is not the concept, or any relation of the concept, but 
 " the fact conceived" (p. 348). Yes, the facts conceived 
 are what we compare. If we could get philosophers to 
 reserve the word ' conception' for the mental operation, 
 and apply the word ' concept' exclusively and consis- 
 tently, not to the mental product as Hamilton does, but 
 to the things conceived, then the proper account of Judg- 
 ment, when we have a class-notion, would be, the act 
 in which we compare two concepts. This account em- 
 braces the full mental operation, and throws us back 
 first upon the notions that we may judge of them, and 
 these throw us back on the things from which the 
 notions have been formed. 
 
LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 287 
 
 This leads me to notice another misapprehension of 
 our author's. Here, as all throughout his Logic, he 
 makes us look to names rather than to thoughts. But 
 surely Locke has shown, in that third book of his Essay, 
 which Mr. Mill so commends, that names should ever 
 carry us back to ideas, which ideas, as Bacon had pre- 
 viously shown, should ever carry us back to things. 
 Logic has to do primarily with Thought as employed 
 about Things, and with Names only secondarily and 
 incidentally, as being the expression of Thoughts. It is 
 thus only that we can employ the laws of thought, 
 which are fixed, to enable us to examine and correct 
 language, which is variable. But Mr. Mill reverses 
 this order, and makes Logic deal primarily with the 
 proposition or expression, and not with the judgment 
 or comparison (p. 357). 
 
 But the important and unsettled question is, What is 
 the precise relation between the two Concepts or Terms 
 in Judgment ? "When it is said to be an agreement or 
 disagreement, the language is far too vague for philo- 
 sophic purposes. Sir William Hamilton vacillates in 
 the account given by him. His common representation 
 is that the relation is one of whole and parts. " We 
 " may articulately define a judgment or proposition to be 
 " the product of that act by which we pronounce, that, 
 " of two notions thought as subject and as predicate, 
 " the one does or does not constitute a part of the other, 
 " either in the quantity of extension or in the quantity 
 " of comprehension" {Logic, I. p. 229). In other places 
 the relation seems rather to be spoken of as one of equa- 
 
288 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 lity, and he would interpret "all men are mortal" as 
 " all men = some mortals." Again, he seems to make 
 the relation one of identity ; for he says that the law of 
 identity " is the principle of all logical affirmation and 
 definition" (lb. p. 80), and he speaks of the two notions 
 being " conceived as one" (lb. p. 227). 
 
 It is not very easy, amidst Mr. Mill's criticisms of 
 others, to find his own theory. He tells us, " Existence, 
 " Co-existence, Sequence, Causation, Eesemblance, one 
 " or other of these, is asserted or denied in every pro- 
 " position without exception." But then he explains 
 away the affirmations and denials as to Existence and 
 Causation ; for Existence, that is, noumenon, is unknown 
 and unknowable, and Causation is unconditional se- 
 quence. There remain only three relations, and the 
 judgment is a recognition of a relation " of a succession, 
 a co- existence, or a similitude between facts" (p. 353). 
 But he has a way of still further reducing the number 
 of relations. For propositions which assert a resem- 
 blance, such as ' this colour is like that colour,' " might 
 " with some plausibility be brought within the descrip- 
 " tion of an affirmation of sequence, by considering it 
 " as an assertion that the simultaneous contemplation of 
 " the two colours is followed by a specific feeling, termed 
 " the feeling of resemblance." And as to the allegation 
 that the propositions of which the predicate is a general 
 name, affirm or deny resemblance, he says, that what is 
 declared is the possession of " certain common peculi- 
 arities," " and those peculiarities it is which the terms 
 " connote, and which the propositions consequently 
 
LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 289 
 
 " assert, not the resemblance" {Logic, i. v. 6). By this 
 subtle but not satisfactory process, in which, as usual, 
 he reaches simplicity by overlooking the peculiarities 
 of the phenomenon, he makes propositions to declare 
 " that a certain attribute is either part of a given set of 
 " attributes, or invariably co-exists with them" (p. 361). 
 His final reduction is thus expressed : " Propositions in 
 " which the concept of the predicate is part of the con- 
 " cept of the subject, or, to express ourselves more phi- 
 " losophically, in which the attributes connoted by the 
 " predicate are part of those connoted by the subject, 
 "are a kind of Identical Propositions : they convey no 
 " information, but at most remind us of what, if we un- 
 " derstood the word which is the subject of the propo- 
 " sition, we knew as soon as the word is pronounced. 
 " Propositions of this kind are either definitions, or parts 
 " of definitions. These judgments are analytical : they 
 " analyse the connotation of the subject-name, and 
 " predicate separably the different attributes which the 
 " name asserts collectively. All other affirmative judg- 
 " ments are synthetical, and affirm that some attribute, 
 " or set of attributes, is, not a part of those connoted by 
 " the subject-name, but an invariable accompaniment 
 " of them" (p. 359). This analysis accords thoroughly 
 with Mr. Mill's psychological theory, and helps to prop 
 it. It makes all judgments relate to attributes, and 
 simply to proclaim either an identity, or co-existence 
 among them, — which attributes are in the end sensations, 
 or possibilities of sensation. But it is not in accordance 
 with the revelations of consciousness, which show us 
 
 T 
 
2C0 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 that the mind pronounces judgments not as to abstract 
 attributes, but as to things with attributes ; and not only 
 of identity and co- existence, but of whole and parts, of 
 resemblance, of space, of quantity, and active property 
 (see supra, pp. 202, 203). 
 
 Much clearness, as it appears to me, may be intro- 
 duced into this subject by distinguishing three classes 
 of judgments, corresponding to three classes of notions : 
 
 (1.) There are judgments in which the objects com- 
 pared are Singular Concretes ; as when by the eye I see 
 two marbles and judge them to be of the same size, or 
 by the ear hear two sounds and declare one of them to 
 be louder than the other. In the order of time these 
 are the first judgments pronounced by the mind. It is 
 by a succession of them, that is, by observing resem- 
 blances among a number of individual objects that we 
 form the General Notion. It is to these, as I understand 
 his doctrine, that Dr. Mansel applies the term Psycho- 
 logical Judgments (Proleg. Log., p. 63). I have already 
 expressed my opinion, that the' relations which the 
 mind can perceive among objects are very numerous 
 and diversified — much more so than Mr. Mill supposes. 
 What is the nature and what the best classification 
 of these comparisons ; these are very important ques - 
 tions in psychology, but do not specially fall under the 
 science which treats of discursive thought, 
 
 (2.) There are judgments in which we compare Abs- 
 tracts, by which I do not mean mental states or modi- 
 fications, but tilings abstracted. For example, ' Honesty 
 is the best policy,' where both ' honesty' and ' the best 
 
LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 291 
 
 policy' are Abstracts, being neither Singular Concretes 
 on the one hand, nor Common Concepts on the other, 
 that is, they do not denote separately existing things, 
 such as ' this man,' nor an indefinite number of objects, 
 like ' man.' Under this fall all definitions such as 
 'Logic is the science of the laws of thought.' Here 
 both the subject, 'Logic,' and the predicate, ' the science 
 of the laws of thought,' are not independently existing 
 things on the one hand, nor do they embrace indefinite 
 objects on the other. In this same class I place judg- 
 ments regarding space, time, and quantity, such as ' the 
 zenith is the point of the visible hemisphere directly 
 over the head of the observer;' ' mid- clay is 12 o'clock 
 in the day ;' and '2 + 2 = 4/ Here both the terms are 
 abstract. We never met with such separate things 
 as 2 + 2 or 4 ; nor can we describe either 2 + 2 or 4 
 as a class embracing objects ; in fact we cannot say 
 of such abstract notions that they have Extension. 
 
 In all such judgments the relation is one of identity 
 or of equality. The judgments are convertible or sub- 
 stitutive ; that is, we can change the position of the 
 terms, or substitute the one for the other, without any 
 change ; in fact we can make either term the subject 
 or the predicate, as may suit our purpose. Thus we 
 reverse the order given above, and say, ' the science of 
 the laws of thought is logic ;' 'the point of the visi- 
 ble hemisphere directly over the head of the observer is 
 the zenith;' '12 o'clock in the day is mid-day;' and 
 '4 = 2 + 2.' Great clearness is introduced into this part 
 of Logic by separating these judgments, in which we 
 
292 LOGICAL JUDGMEXT. 
 
 compare Abstracts, from those in which we compare 
 Singulars or Concepts. 
 
 (3.) A more important, but a more complicated, class 
 of judgments remains for consideration. It consists of 
 those in which there is an attributive, and in fact, or by 
 implication, a Concept or a class-notion. This lan- 
 guage requires to be explained. When we say, { this cow 
 ruminates,' we have abstracted an attribute and ascribed 
 it to the animal In this proposition the subject is 
 singular. But in judgments of this kind the subject 
 may be a class-notion ; thus we say, ' cows ruminate,' 
 meaning that the whole class do so. A judgment of 
 this description is called attributive. One of the terms 
 is, properly speaking, the subject, and the other the 
 predicate. And the terms cannot be converted simply ; 
 in other words, the predicate cannot be made the sub- 
 ject without limitation. Because all cows possess the 
 attribute of rumination, we cannot say all ruminating 
 things are cows. 
 
 All Attributive judgments are judgments in Com- 
 prehension, but they may also be made judgments in 
 Extension. Tor we may reckon ' ruminant ' as a class 
 embracing not only the cow but other animals, such as 
 the sheep and the deer. It will be admitted that this 
 is always possible. On the other hand, I do not affirm 
 that this is always done. In by far the greater num- 
 ber of propositions the primary and uppermost sense is 
 in comprehension. Thus, when we say ' larks sing,' we 
 probably mean not that larks are among the class of 
 siuging birds, but that they have the capacity of singing. 
 
LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 293 
 
 But we may always interpret in Extension the proposi- 
 tion which is primarily in Comprehension. This follows 
 from the account given in last chapter, of the mutual 
 relation and dependence of the two. When we have a 
 mark, we may always form a class, embracing the objects 
 possessing the mark. The mind in its discursive opera- 
 tions tends to go on from Comprehension to Exten- 
 sion. When the predicate of a proposition is a verb, as 
 in the example just given, the thought is in Compre- 
 hension. But then we have also adjectives and com- 
 mon nouns as predicates. When we say the ' man 
 hoards money,' the thought is in Comprehension ; but 
 we also say that ' he is penurious,' and the thought is 
 rising to Extension ; and when we say ' he is a miser,' 
 the thought is in Extension as well as Comprehension, 
 for we have established a class, ' miser/ to which we 
 refer the individual. Mr. Mill seems to get a momen- 
 tary view of this ; for while he holds that all judgments 
 (except where both the terms are proper names) are 
 really judgments in Comprehension, he allows that "it 
 " is customary, and the natural tendency of the mind, 
 " to express most of them in terms of Extension." The 
 " tendency" to do this must surely proceed from some 
 law of thought as applied to things ; and the possibility 
 of doing it surely implies an intimate relation between 
 the Comprehension and the Extension. In not a few 
 propositions the uppermost thought is in Extension. 
 Thus, when the young student of Natural History is 
 told that 'the crocodile is a reptile,' his idea is of a 
 class, of which he may afterwards learn the marks. As 
 
294 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 in the other cases, the mind tends to generalize the 
 attribute, and make the proposition one in Extension, 
 so in this case it should go on to translate the idea 
 in Extension into one in Comprehension. That pro- 
 positions can always be interpreted in both ways, is 
 a clear evidence of the indissoluble connexion of the 
 operations. 
 
 It appears then that in all judgments belonging to 
 this head the relation is always one of Comprehension, 
 and may also .and always be one of Extension likewise. 
 This cannot be said of the second class, or those in which 
 we compare mere Abstracts. We cannot call such attri- 
 butive ; thus there would be no propriety in saying that 
 4 is an attribute of 2 + 2. Nor can such judgments be 
 intelligently explained in Extension. At this point we 
 see that Sir William Hamilton has fallen into error, from 
 looking merely, in his Logic, to the Conception or Gene- 
 ral Notion, and overlooking the Abstract Notion. He 
 makes all logical propositions capable of being inter- 
 preted both in Extension and Comprehension. But 
 when we affirm that 4 X 4 = 1 6, we have no General 
 Notion, and the phrases Extension and Comprehension 
 are not applicable. In all cases, however, in which the 
 predicate is a formed class-notion or Concept, the pro- 
 position should be interpreted both ways. Not only so, 
 but when the predicate is merely attributive, it is still 
 possible to interpret the proposition in both ; and we 
 shall see in next chapter that in reasoning its upper- 
 most meaning is always in Extension rather than Com- 
 prehension. 
 
LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 295 
 
 At this point we see the error of Mr. Mill, as at the 
 other we saw that of Sir William Hamilton. Mr. Mill 
 maintains that " the supposed meaning in Extension is 
 " not a meaning at all, until interpreted by the meaning 
 " in Comprehension ; that all concepts and general 
 " names which enter into propositions require to be 
 " construed in Comprehension, and that their Compre- 
 " hension is the whole of their meaning." Again, " The 
 " Extension of a concept is not, like the Comprehension, 
 " intrinsic and essential to the concept ; it is an exter- 
 " nal and wholly accidental relation of the concept, and 
 " no contemplation or analysis of the concept itself will 
 " tell us anything about it" (pp. 362, 364). There is an 
 accumulation of mistakes in this statement, all arising 
 from the inadequate view taken by him of the elements 
 involved in the General Notion. We have seen that in 
 the General Notion there are objects as well as attri- 
 butes ; objects to combine as well as attributes to com- 
 bine them. In all propositions falling under this head 
 the Extension has quite as distinct a meaning (it con- 
 notes objects) as the Comprehension (which denotes 
 attributes) ; and both are " intrinsic and essential to the 
 concept." Extension is involved in every concept, and 
 should always be noticed when we are using the con- 
 cept, and brought out into distinct view when we ana- 
 lyse it. Even in cases in which the primary sense of 
 the predicate is attributive, we may also turn it into a 
 class-notion and explain it in extension ; and we shall 
 see that we always do so think it when we use the pro- 
 position as a premiss in an argument. 
 
296 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 
 
 Looking upon all judgments of this class as having 
 both Extension and Comprehension, we can obtain from 
 any given proposition a set of what have been called by 
 Kant Syllogisms of the Understanding, and by Hamil- 
 ton Immediate Inferences, or what I call Implied or 
 Transposed Judgments. Thus, the judgment being- 
 given, ' All men are responsible,' we can by Extension 
 derive such judgments as the following : — that man is 
 a species in the genus responsible ; that some respon- 
 sible beings are men ; that any one man is responsible ; 
 that it is not true that no men are responsible ; or 
 that some men are not responsible ; that men of 
 genius are responsible with their genius ; and that God 
 who calls men to account is calling to account respon- 
 sible beings. Again, by Comprehension we can say, 
 that responsibility should always accompany our notion 
 of man ; that responsibility exists, being found in man 
 who really exists ; that no man is irresponsible ; that 
 irresponsible beings cannot be men ; and since responsi- 
 bility is to God, man being responsible is responsible to 
 God. These implied judgments bring us to the very 
 verge of mediate reasoning. By subalternation we 
 declare that all men being responsible, some men are 
 responsible : there is but a step between this and me- 
 diate reasoning, in which we argue that all men being 
 responsible, the New Zealanders who are men, that is, 
 some men, are responsible. These Transposed Judg- 
 ments appeared in the old Logic under the heads of 
 Opposition and Conversion ; and in the New Analytic 
 they have been drawn out fully in Archbishop Thomson's 
 
LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 297 
 
 Laws of Thought (p. iii., where, however, they are not 
 drawn by Extension and Comprehension). It is a 
 defect in Mr. Mill's work, professedly A System of Logic, 
 Ratiocinative and Inductive, that it does not discuss 
 such topics. 
 
CHAPTEE XVI. 
 
 REASONING. 
 
 In order that they may reason, and reason validly, it 
 is not necessary that persons be logicians. Man reasons 
 spontaneously. The logician reflects upon the natural 
 operation, and seeks to unfold its nature and its laws ; 
 and he strives also to lay down rules fitted to guide 
 and guard us as we reason. The grand question to be 
 determined in scientific logic is, what is the regulating 
 principle of spontaneous ratiocination ? On this subject 
 there is a general agreement, and yet considerable diver- 
 sity of opinion, among logicians. Almost all admit that 
 the principle (when the conclusion is affirmative) may 
 be expressed, ' Things which agree with one and the 
 same agree with one another.' But this form is too 
 vague, for it does not specify the nature of the agree- 
 ment. And so logicians have endeavoured to make the 
 statement more definite. According to the Dictum of 
 Aristotle, the things must agree in being both under 
 some higher class or genus. The form has sometimes 
 been put, ' Things are the same which are the same 
 with a third.' Mr. Mill expresses it, ' Things which 
 
REASONING. 299 
 
 co -exist with the same co- exist with one another.' The 
 distinctions which have been drawn in the two last 
 chapters in regard to the Notion and Judgment will be 
 found, if followed out, to throw light on some of these 
 points. 
 
 First, There are simple cases of reasoning in which 
 the terms are Singular or Abstract : — 
 
 Thomas a Kempis was the author of the ' Imitation of Christ ;' 
 Gerson was not Thomas a Kempis ; 
 .'. Gerson was not the author of the ' Imitation of Christ.' 
 
 Or the unfigured syllogism of Hamilton : — 
 
 Sulphate of iron is copperas ; 
 Sulphate of iron is not sulphate of copper ; 
 . \ Sulphate of copper is not copperas. 
 
 In the same class may be placed all reasoning in 
 which the propositions are definitions or substitutive : 
 as, ' Logic is the science of the laws of thought ; Ethics 
 is the science of the laws of our moral nature ; therefore 
 Logic is not Ethics.' Under this head I put all quan- 
 titative reasoning ; as, ' A = B ; B = C ; therefore A = C 
 In such examples none of the notions is properly a 
 class-notion or attributive. As none of them has quan- 
 tity or extension, so we cannot speak of a minor or 
 major term, or of a minor or major premiss. The 
 division into figures has no place ; for, as any one 
 will at once see on trial, the middle term may be 
 made, as we please, the subject or the predicate of 
 either premiss. The regulating principle in all such 
 cases is either, ' Things are the same which are the 
 same with a third/ or ' things which are equal to the 
 
300 REASONING. 
 
 same are equal to one another.' Much confusion is 
 avoided by allotting reasoning of this description to a 
 separate head. As there is no class-notion the Dictum 
 cannot be the regulating principle. 
 
 Second, There is more complex reasoning in which 
 there is an attributive predicate or a class-notion. In 
 this the old Aristotelian Dictum remains, after all dis- 
 cussion, the fundamental regulating principle : ' What- 
 ever is predicated of a class may be predicated of all 
 the members of the class.' No other proposed Dictum 
 has lived beyond the age of its inventor. I am con- 
 vinced that the same fate awaits that propounded by 
 our author (Logic, II. i-iv.). 
 
 The " really fundamental axiom of ratiocination," as 
 announced by him is, " Things which co-exist with the 
 same thing, co- exist with one another;" and "a thing 
 " which co-exists with another thing, with which other 
 " a third thing does not co -exist, is not co-existent 
 " with that third thing." But the phrase ' co-exist,' if 
 limited to co-existence in respect of time or space, does 
 not include most important cases of reasoning ; and if 
 widened beyond this it becomes meaningless. When 
 we argue that the man having committed murder de- 
 serves punishment, the premisses and the conclusion 
 have reference, not to space or time, but to far different 
 relations. When we infer from A being equal to B, and 
 B to C, that A is equal to C, we are not making affir- 
 mations about co-existence. In explanation, he tells 
 us (p. 202, footnote, 6th ed.), " the co-existence meant 
 is that of being jointly attributes of the same subject." 
 
REASONING. 301 
 
 This statement is still vague, and is not adequate, for it 
 does not specify what is " the same subject," and it 
 does not bring out that the attribution involves Ex- 
 tension : but it contains partial truth, and it has a 
 meaning, which we can examine. 
 
 This new Dictum gives him the following universal 
 formula : — 
 
 Attribute A is a mark of Attribute B ; 
 A given object has the mark A ; 
 .•. The given object has the attribute B. 
 
 But what does this first premiss mean when we trans- 
 late it from abstractions into concrete realities ? As 
 there cannot be an Attribute existing separately or 
 apart from objects, it must mean, ' Whatever objects 
 have the attribute A have the attribute B.' And what 
 is this but the major premiss of the old syllogistic for- 
 mula? The second premiss requires an explanation. 
 " A given object has the mark A :" this object may be 
 one object or a class of objects. In order to give the 
 formula a meaning, we must interpret it, ' Whatever in- 
 dividual or class has the attribute A has the attribute 
 B ; a given object or class C has the attribute A ; there- 
 fore it has the attribute B.' The new Dictum and new 
 Syllogistic formula are just bad versions of the old ones. 
 I call them bad versions, for the phrase " co-exist" does 
 not bring out the precise relation of the terms on which 
 the thought proceeds ; and the phrase, " Attribute A," 
 requires to be interpreted in order to have a relevant 
 signification. 
 
 But he has given us another form, which he represents 
 
302 REASONING. 
 
 as " an universal type of the reasoning process. ' We 
 " find it resolvable in all cases into the following ele- 
 " ments : Certain individuals have a given attribute ; an 
 " individual or individuals resemble the former in certain 
 " other attributes ; therefore they resemble them also in 
 " the given attribute" (lb. II. in. 7). It may be observed 
 that the phrase ' co-exist' has disappeared, and another 
 and equally vague one has taken its place ; it is a 
 " resemblance" in certain attributes, and in other attri- 
 butes. It is allowed that this is not " conclusive from 
 the mere form of the expression." By itself it would 
 sanction fallacious reasoning quite as readily as valid. 
 ' All men have immortal souls ; the brutes resemble 
 them in certain attributes (as instincts and bodily 
 organs) ; they must also have immortal souls.' We shall 
 see immediately that Mr. Mill allows that the syllogism 
 is an admirable test of the validity of reasoning, which, 
 it is conceded, this alleged " universal type" is not. It 
 wants the essential testing element, the general rule 
 that guarantees the conclusion, and which in the 
 syllogistic formula is embodied in the major pre- 
 miss, — the necessity of which is pressed on us by the 
 Dictum. 
 
 But may there not be reasoning in Comprehension as 
 well as in Extension? In answering this question it 
 should be admitted fully, that reasoning in Extension 
 may always be translated into reasoning in Compre- 
 hension. The reason of this is very obvious : it follows 
 from the account given of the nature of the Concept. 
 Extension always implies Comprehension ; that is, the 
 
REASONING. 303 
 
 objects in the class are joined in the class by the posses- 
 sion of common marks : 
 
 He who lias intelligence and free agency is responsible ; 
 Man has intelligence and free agency ; 
 . \ Man is responsible. 
 
 This reasoning in Extension may be put in Compre- 
 hension : 
 
 Responsibility is an attribute of all who have intelligence and 
 
 free agency ; 
 Intelligence and free agency is an attribute of man ; 
 . \ Responsibility is an attribute of man. 
 
 Mr. Mill maintains that all reasoning is in Compre- 
 hension, and not in Extension. " All propositions into 
 " which general names enter, and consequently all rea- 
 " sonings, are in Comprehension only. Propositions 
 " and reasonings may be written in Extension, but they 
 " are always understood in Comprehension" (p. 363). I 
 have granted that, so far as propositions are concerned, 
 spontaneous thought is chiefly in Comprehension. In 
 simple affirmation and denial, we commonly mean to 
 do nothing more than declare or deny that an object 
 or class of objects has or has not a certain attribute, 
 but without turning the predicate into a class-notion, 
 or inquiring whether there may or may not be other 
 objects, which have or have not the same attribute. 
 When we say that 'the horse is warm-blooded,' we 
 may be looking exclusively to the attribute, without 
 caring, at the time, whether there are other warm- 
 blooded animals. But it seems to me to be different 
 in regard to reasoning, the uppermost thought in 
 which is always in Extension. It seems to me to be 
 so when, not knowing whether the horse is or is not 
 
304 REASONING. 
 
 warm-blooded, we call in a middle concept, and argue 
 ' that the horse being a mammal, and all mammals 
 being warm-blooded, the horse must be so.' Here we 
 place the horse in the class mammal, and mammals 
 among warm-blooded animals, and thus reach the 
 conclusion. Again, to take an example of negative 
 reasoning (falling naturally into the second figure) : 
 AVhen we argue that ' the rat, not bringing forth its 
 young by eggs, is not a reptile,' we find in thought 
 that the class rats, not being in the class of animals 
 winch bring forth their young by eggs, cannot be in 
 the class reptiles, which always bring forth their 
 young by eggs. Here, as in all other cases, we under- 
 stand the attributive terms — such as bringing forth 
 their young by eggs — as class-notions in order to draw 
 a conclusion. This is seen very clearly when we have 
 to determine whether our conclusion should be uni- 
 versal or particular ; that is, of the whole class, or a 
 part. We argue (in the third figure) that ' as the con- 
 nexion of soul and body, though incomprehensible, is 
 yet to be believed, that therefore — not all things, but- — 
 some things to be believed are incomprehensible ; and 
 how do we reach this conclusion ? Because in thought 
 we have made a class of ' things to be believed/ and 
 found that in this class are things incomprehensible. 1 
 
 Such considerations convince me that our sponta- 
 neous reasoning is in Extension. I allow that Sir AY. 
 
 J Mr. Kidd, in his very able work, A Delineation of the Primary Prin- 
 ciples of Reasoning, shows, p. 121, " The conception of a class is present 
 in every instance of reasoning." 
 
REASONING. 305 
 
 Hamilton has furnished a valuable contribution to Logic 
 by exhibiting the forms of reasoning in Comprehension. 
 But I look on these as secondary and derived, and not 
 entitled to the same primary rank as those in Exten- 
 sion. Most logicians— teachers and taught — have shrunk 
 from his 108 Modes as being an oppressive burden on 
 the mind, both on its memory and its intellectual appre- 
 hension. I am inclined to think that all the purposes 
 of Logic will be accomplished by retaining the old forms 
 of reasoning in Extension, and showing how, when any 
 end is to be served, they can be turned into the forms 
 of Comprehension. As to Mr. Mill, he has got a 
 partial and imperfect view of reasoning in Comprehen- 
 sion, but has not taken the trouble of showing us how 
 his theory is adequate to explain the processes of spon- 
 taneous reasoning. 
 
 He utters an emphatic denial regarding the syllogistic 
 form and its rules, that they are not " the form and the 
 " rules according to which our reasonings are neces- 
 " sarily, or even usually, made." But all wise logicians 
 have allowed that in spontaneous reasoning persons 
 have not before them the Dictum of Aristotle, and still 
 less the modes and figures of the syllogism. The 
 former of these is the regulative principle of reasoning, 
 and the latter are expressions constructed to test the 
 validity of ratiocination. What I maintain is that the 
 mind in all reasoning grasps the three notions, that is, 
 things apprehended, and the relation between them. 
 We see a new kind of leaf that never fell under our view 
 before, and we notice that it is netted in its veins, and we 
 
 u 
 
306 REASONING. 
 
 infer that the plant on which it grew must be dicoty- 
 ledonous : we do so on the principle, gathered probably 
 from botanical books, that all netted-veined plants are 
 dicotyledons; and we see the relation of ' this plant, hav- 
 ing netted leaves, and being dicotyledonous.' But we do 
 not enounce the Dictum, nor do we spread out major, 
 minor, and conclusion. We leave all this to logicians, who 
 construct a reflex science out of a spontaneous process. 
 
 He makes two most important admissions in favour 
 of the syllogistic analysis. One is that all reasoning 
 can be reduced to the formula of the syllogism ; and the 
 other, that this formula is admirably fitted to expose 
 invalid reasoning. The value of the syllogistic form, 
 and of the rules of using it correctly, is said to consist 
 " in their furnishing us with a mode in which those 
 " reasonings may always be represented, and which is 
 " admirably calculated, if they are inconclusive, to bring 
 " their inconclusiveness to light." But I ask, how does 
 it happen that all our reasoning can be reduced to this 
 form ? How is it that it comes to test so admirably the " 
 conclusiveness and inconclusiveness of all reasoning ? 
 It is surely strange that there is a rule to which all 
 reasoning is conformable, and which acts as a criterion 
 of all reasoning, and yet is not the natural law of 
 reasoning. I believe that all arguments can be made to 
 take this form, because it is the right one. I believe it 
 is a crucial test of the soundness or unsoundness of all 
 arguments, because it is the law of thought, springing 
 from the mental constitution with which our Maker has 
 endowed us. 
 
REASONING. 307 
 
 I suppose Mr. Mill would account for the conform- 
 ableness of all reasoning to the syllogistic form, and for 
 its aptness to act as a test, by saying that, though all 
 reasoning is naturally in Comprehension, it can be 
 represented in Extension. But if this be so, it would 
 show, I think, that propositions and reasoning must, 
 contrary to what Mr. Mill alleges, have a meaning in 
 Extension as well as in Comprehension. And if reason- 
 ing be naturally in Comprehension, we should expect 
 that formulas drawn out on that principle must be 
 better fitted than those derived from Extension to ex- 
 hibit the validity or in validity of arguments. Mr. Mill 
 has, unfortunately, not favoured us with a development 
 of the forms of reasoning according to Comprehension. 
 We are therefore not in a position to say whether these 
 would or would not be superior, as a means of testing 
 inference, to those furnished in the old Logic. I am 
 convinced that such forms, constructed even by so clear 
 a thinker as Mr Mill, would have a more artificial, a 
 more twisted and translated look, and would be far less 
 fitted to expose fallacies in reasoning. I rather think 
 that we should have to translate them back into Ex- 
 tension before we could fully recognise their meaning. 
 Looking upon reasoning as proceeding naturally by 
 classification, rather than attribution, I maintain that 
 the great body of logicians, from Aristotle downwards, 
 have acted properly in drawing out their formulas 
 according to Extension, and that it is when they are 
 thus drawn out that they are most easily understood 
 and readily applied. Mr. Mill has made a most im- 
 
308 REASONING. 
 
 portant admission (p. 429) : — " The propositions in Ex 
 " tension, being, in this sense, exactly equivalent to the 
 " judgments in Comprehension, served quite as well to 
 " ground forms of ratiocination upon : and as the validity 
 " of the forms was more easily and conveniently shown 
 " through the concrete conception of comparing classes 
 " of objects, than through the abstract one of recognis- 
 " ing co-existence of attributes, logicians were perfectly 
 " justified in taking the course which, in any case, the 
 " established forms of language would doubtless have 
 " forced upon them." The two circumstances, that the 
 validity of the forms is more easily and conveniently 
 shown by comparing " classes," and that the established 
 forms of language, which are expressions of the natural 
 processes of the mind, would have forced an expression 
 according to classes on logicians, is surely a presump- 
 tion, if not a proof, that the forms in Extension are the 
 development of spontaneous thought. 
 
 " I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing in- 
 " ferences from our personal experience, and not from 
 " maxims handed down to us by books or tradition, we 
 " much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars 
 " directly, than through the intermediate agency of any 
 " general proposition." JSTow, nearly all philosophers 
 have allowed that the mind begins its observations with 
 particulars, or, to use a better phrase, singulars. Hav- 
 ing observed a number of individuals, it can reach a 
 general conclusion ; but it is only by a process which 
 the logician should fully unfold. Having observed or 
 heard that crows everywhere are black, we conclude 
 
REASONING. 309 
 
 that the crow which we hear, without seeing, is black. 
 But we can argue thus only on the condition that the 
 induction is such as to justify the general proposition 
 that all crows are black. The syllogism is so admirable 
 a means of bringing to light the inconclusiveness of fal- 
 lacious reasoning, just because it requires the general 
 proposition to be expressed in one of the premisses. 
 
 " All inference is from particulars to particulars ; 
 " general propositions are merely registers of such infer- 
 " ences already made, and short formulae for making 
 " more." He thinks that the error of the syllogistic 
 theory arises from not distinguishing between " the in- 
 " f erring part and the registering part, and ascribing to 
 " the latter the functions of the former." Now I admit 
 that the general proposition may be the record or regis- 
 ter of a previous induction. And if there has been 
 reasoning in the process of induction by which this has 
 been reached, there must have been a prior general pro- 
 position got by an earlier induction, or given by in- 
 tuition. But in any given argument we do not look to 
 the previous accumulation of particulars, but to the 
 register embodied in a general proposition. The gene- 
 ral proposition is certainly no part of the inference, but 
 it is an essential part of the assumption from which we 
 infer the conclusion, and should therefore have a dis- 
 tinct place allotted to it in the premisses. Mr. Mill has 
 a partial view of the truth when he says (lb. c. iv), " In 
 " drawing this inference we conform to a formula which 
 " we have adopted for our guidance in such operations, 
 " and which is a record of the criteria by which we 
 
310 REASONING. 
 
 " thought we had ascertained that we might distinguish 
 " when the inference could and when it could not be 
 " drawn." In any given argument, as an argument, all 
 that we have to do is to look to this register, or record, 
 or general proposition. If doubts arise as to its accuracy, 
 we must go back on the processes by which we reached 
 it ; and if there be reasoning in the processes, we must 
 test them in the same way. But our record being 
 settled, the general proposition in which it is announced 
 is implied in the argument, and should therefore haye 
 a place in the formula of reasoning. We haye already 
 noticed that " universal type of the reasoning process," 
 according to which we find that ' certain indiyiduals haye 
 a giyen attribute, and that an indiyidual or indiyiduals 
 resemble the former in certain attributes, and therefore 
 resemble them in the giyen attribute.' We remarked 
 upon the yagueness of this type as leaying us in doubt 
 as to what are the " certain attributes" which entitle us 
 to infer the presence of the " giyen attribute." It is the 
 general proposition embodied in the major premiss, 
 which spreads out the rules which, when we take the 
 minor premiss along with it, entitles us to draw the 
 conclusion. 
 
 But it is asked, if all reasoning implies a major pro- 
 position, where do we get our first major, that with 
 which we start ? Aristotle did not oyerlook this ques- 
 tion, and he answered it. He tells us again and again 
 that the beginning of demonstration cannot be demon- 
 stration, and that all demonstration carries us back to 
 Intuitive Pieason (i/ov?, see Anal. Post, I. 3, 22, 23). 
 
REASONING. 311 
 
 In certain acts of reasoning, primitive perceptions, such 
 as ' the effect has a cause/ give us the one proposition, 
 and ordinary observation the other, and the two neces- 
 sitate the conclusion. But in far the greater number of 
 arguments the general proposition is the result of a 
 gathered observation. The criteria of these gathered or 
 inductive general laws will come under our notice in 
 next chapter. 
 
 " The child, who, having burnt his finders, avoids to 
 " thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned or in- 
 '•' ferred, though he has never thought of the general 
 " maxim, Fire burns. He knows from memory that he 
 " has been burnt, and on this evidence believes, when 
 " he sees a candle, that if he puts his finger into the 
 " flame of it, he will be burnt again. He believes this 
 '• in every case which happens to arise ; but without 
 " looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. 
 " He is not generalizing ; he is inferring a particular 
 '•' from particulars. In the same way, also, brutes 
 " reason." " Not only the burnt child, but the burnt 
 " dog dreads the lire." I am inclined to think that in 
 these cases, that of the child and the dog, the process 
 is very much one of the association of ideas and feel- 
 ings. The fire and the sensation have been together, 
 and upon the fire presenting itself there is a tendency 
 to a feeling which causes shrinking. There is really 
 no conclusion from observed, from remembered, from 
 gathered particulars. Should the fire only once have 
 burnt the child it will turn away from it, possibly 
 without remembering the previous case, certainly with- 
 
312 REASONING. 
 
 out an induction of particulars, or an inference from 
 them. 
 
 I have called attention to the circumstance that 
 while Judgment and Association are not the same, 
 they do yet conspire in their action (pp. 181, 182, 206, 
 207). I have now to apply this remark to reasoning 
 and suggestion. Inference is not to be confounded with 
 mere association. In all reasoning there is comparison, 
 there is the perception of a relation between things 
 about which we reason. Thus we argue, ' A deer, being 
 horned, is ruminant.' Here the mind grasps the three 
 concepts and their relation : ' deer/ ' being horned,' 
 ' are among ruminant animals.' Unless there be a 
 positive perception of the connexion of the things 
 there is no reasoning. Herein is argument at once dis- 
 tinguished from association, which does not imply any 
 connexion between the things which have been to- 
 gether in the mind, any comparison, or any observed 
 relation. But while the two mental operations are not 
 the same, association greatly helps reasoning. In all 
 inference there is a discovered relation, and the related 
 things may often have been together, and thus the one 
 tends to suggest the others. Some think that it is a 
 native law of the mind that correlated things, such as 
 like things, and cause and effect, call up each other. 
 However we may account for it, whether from things 
 being often together or an original tendency, correlated 
 things come up simultaneously, altogether independent 
 of our observing the relation. Indeed it is often the 
 circumstance that they have come up together which 
 
REASONING. 313 
 
 invites or constrains ns to notice the connexion. Now 
 all this helps ns to condnct the operation of reason- 
 ing. Thus fire suggests the burning sensation, and we 
 collect cases till we reach the general truth that fire 
 burns, and then the process may become one of infer- 
 ence. It is in this way we are to account for the 
 readiness, the rapidity, and for what is often called 
 the unconsciousness of the reasoning process. The 
 laws of association call up correlated objects, and the 
 mind perceives the correlation and draws the infer- 
 ence. Thus 'deer' suggests 'horned;' and having heard 
 that horned animals are ruminant, ' horned' suggests 
 ' ruminant ; ' and perceiving the class relation of the 
 terms, we draw the conclusion that horned animals are 
 ruminant. 
 
 I believe that very much of what some regard as rea- 
 soning in the brute creatures arises from mere associa- 
 tion, without the relation of the things being discovered. 
 In like manner the laws of suggestion operate in chil- 
 dren to excite fears and expectations, before there are 
 those observed relations which must enter into reasoning. 
 All our lives we act on impulses produced by mere asso- 
 ciation, without any accompanying argument. A loud 
 noise will raise up fear, without our having inferred 
 that it proceeds from a cause implying danger. The 
 person who has been seriously hurt by a horse or dog- 
 can never look on a horse or, dog without a feeling of 
 tremor. In such mental action I admit that there is 
 no class-notion, no general proposition, no regulating 
 principle of Extension. But just as little is there an 
 
314 REASONING. 
 
 induction of particulars, or attribution, or reasoning in 
 Comprehension ; there is no such process as ' Attribute 
 A being a mark of Attribute B, and C having the mark 
 A.' But then it is one aim of intellectual teaching, and 
 one very special end of Logic, to raise us above the ani- 
 mal state and the infant state ; to keep us from being 
 driven along passively by more casual associations ; and 
 train the mind to look narrowly into the relations of 
 things that pass before it, and of which it must have 
 some conception, that it may thereby reach sound con- 
 clusions which can be justified. In all such pro- 
 cesses of real reasoning, it will be found that there is a 
 general proposition involved, and this should have a 
 place in the formula which systematizes the spontane- 
 ous operation. 
 
 But Mr. Mill tells us that " in every syllogism con- 
 " sidered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there 
 " is a petitio principii" But did any one ever maintain 
 that the syllogism is " an argument to prove the con- 
 clusion?" It has usually been represented as the form 
 to which the argument can be reduced. The petitio 
 principii is a fallacious mode of reasoning; but the 
 syllogism cannot with any possible propriety be repre- 
 sented as a mode of reasoning, valid or fallacious, for it 
 is not reasoning, but the formula of reasoning. I sup- 
 pose Mr. Mill meant to affirm that all reasoning in 
 syllogistic form involves a petitio. If so, then he is 
 caught in inextricable toils, for he admits that all 
 reasoning can be reduced to syllogistic form, which 
 seems to imply that it involves a begging of the ques- 
 
REASONING. 315 
 
 tion. The petitio princvpii is a fallacy in which one of 
 the premisses is either the same as the conclusion, or 
 depends upon it. But in reasoning, according to the 
 syllogistic analysis, the conclusion follows, not from one 
 of the premisses, but from the two, or rather from the re- 
 lations between the things compared and the premisses. 
 It is when the relations predicated in the two proposi- 
 tions are brought before the mind that we see the force 
 of the inference. We wish to determine — what we are 
 not expressly told in the gospels — -whether the Baptist 
 was a priest : give us only one premiss, as, that ' the Bap- 
 tist was the son of a priest/ or, that ' the sons of priests 
 were priests/ and we can infer nothing ; but place the 
 two together, and the conclusion is necessitated. The 
 one of these premisses is a particular fact, the other is 
 a general proposition, and both are necessary to the 
 validity of the conclusion. Both premisses are, in the 
 reasoning, assumptions — they must be given or granted ; 
 but neither of them is an assumption of the conclusion ; 
 the two are assumptions which warrant the conclusion. 
 As to whether the assumptions are or are not warranted, 
 this is to be determined by a previous investigation, to 
 be tested by the criteria of induction, intuition, or 
 reasoning. And it should be for ever pressed on Mr. 
 Mill, that the objections he brings against the Dictum 
 of Aristotle are quite as applicable to his own. " Things 
 " which co-exist with one and the same thing co- exist 
 " with one another ; " this is quite as much a truism as 
 the old Dictum, while it is much more vague ; and 
 reasoning proceeding upon it must be quite as liable to 
 
316 REASONING. 
 
 the charge of being a begging of the question, as 
 reasoning according to the syllogistic formula. 
 
 It should not be omitted that Mr. Mill does not enter 
 upon any special consideration of the nature of Con- 
 ditional Keasoning, whether Hypothetical or Disjunctive. 
 This is a great defect in a work which professes to give 
 us a full Logic of Inference. There are very important 
 questions started as to the regulating principle of Con- 
 ditional Arguments, and these should be discussed in 
 every logical treatise worthy of these advanced times. 
 He tells us, in his " Examination of Hamilton," that a 
 Hypothetical Judgment is " a judgment concerning 
 judgments ;" but he does not attempt to enounce the 
 principle which connects the 'judgment' with the 
 'judgments' with which it is concerned. He further 
 lets us know that he looks on a Disjunctive Judgment 
 as compounded of two or more Hypotheticals, but he 
 does not inform us what is the relation of these Hypo- 
 theticals to one another (pp. 454, 455). I confess I 
 should like to see his attributive theory of reasoning 
 tried by its application to Conditional, and specially to 
 Disjunctive reasoning. When we argue that 'the 
 season when a particular event took place not having 
 been spring, summer, or autumn, must have been 
 winter,' we seem to proceed on the principle of Division, 
 which is made according to the Extension and not the 
 Comprehension of a concept. But I allude to these 
 topics here, not in order to discuss them, but to show 
 that as Mr. Mill has avoided the discussion, he cannot 
 be said to furnish a full system of Logic. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 SECONDARY LOGIC ; OR THOUGHT AS DIRECTED TO 
 PARTICULAR CLASSES OF OBJECTS. 
 
 I AM inclined to justify Mr. Mill in introducing into 
 the science other topics besides those treated of in what 
 we may call Primary Logic. The effort made by certain 
 purists to exclude such matters as Demonstration, In- 
 duction, and Evidence generally, must fail, and ought to 
 fail. It is of vast moment to have these subjects dis- 
 cussed in a scientific manner, and Logic is the field for 
 the discussion ; and our definitions of the science are too 
 narrow if they exclude them, and should be so widened 
 as to give them an acknowledged place. In treating of 
 such topics, or at least two of them, Induction and 
 Evidence, our author occupies a far more distinguished 
 place than he does in Formal Logic. Still, even in this 
 department, his work, while possessed of great merits, 
 may be charged with grave errors, springing, I believe, 
 from his mistaken views of fundamental truth. 
 
 I have commented already (Chap, xii.) on his account 
 of Necessary Truth generally. His defective appreciation 
 of intuition has led him to an erroneous exposition of 
 
3 1 8 SECONDARY LOGIC. 
 
 the nature and office of Mathematical Definitions and 
 Axioms (Logic, II. v.-vii.) Definitions are represented 
 as hypotheses, and the necessity of the truths derived 
 from them consists in the relation between the supposi- 
 tion and the conclusions drawn from it, " Axioms are 
 " experimental truths ; generalizations from observation. 
 " The proposition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a 
 " space — or in other words, Two straight lines which 
 " have once met, do not meet again, but continue to 
 " diverge — is an induction from the evidence of our 
 " senses." 
 
 I reckon these views as radically erroneous. Defini- 
 tions are Abstracts, that is, things abstracted from 
 known concrete realities. ' A line is length without 
 breadth,' that is, we consider the length without regard- 
 ing the breadth. ' A superficies has breadth and length 
 without depth/ that is, in all reasoning we agree to 
 look to the length and breadth without taking the depth 
 into account. But Mr. Mill tells us " there exist no 
 real things exactly conformable to the definition;" 
 there exist no lines without breadth, no surfaces with- 
 out depth. I admit that there can be no such lines or 
 surfaces with a separate or independent existence. But 
 still they have a reality ; they have a reality in extended 
 obj ects — which have, besides, length and breadth. Man's 
 mind is so constituted that he can think about them, 
 and draw deductions from them. But he tells us, " A 
 line, as defined by geometers, is wholly inconceivable," 
 where the word that covers so much confusion appears 
 once more, and in his latest edition. We certainly cannot 
 
SECONDARY LOGIC. 319 
 
 image such a line, but we can image an extended object, 
 and think about its length. I believe that all further 
 mathematical truths are derived from Definitions. But 
 when I say so, I do not mean that they are obtained 
 from ideas in the mind, but from things abstracted from 
 concrete realities, and having a reality in existing con- 
 crete objects. As there is a reality in the things defined, 
 so there is also a reality in all the conclusions logically 
 drawn from them. The deductions derived two thou- 
 sand years ago from the definition of the ellipse, are 
 found to be realized in the planetary bodies, so far as 
 they move in elliptic orbits. I cannot see how this 
 should follow, unless the thing defined had been a 
 reality. 
 
 Mr. Mill thinks that demonstrative truths follow 
 from Postulates and not Definitions. We postulate that 
 there may be a line with length without breadth, and 
 get deductions from our assumptions. True, in all 
 deduction the premisses are assumptions, but in 
 mathematical definitions the assumptions are abstracted 
 realities. Here, as in so many other departments, his 
 acuteness has given him a partial view of the truth, 
 and he says that " our reasonings are grounded upon 
 matters of fact in our definitions." When I say that 
 mathematical demonstration is founded upon definitions, 
 I mean upon the matters of fact or things defined, 
 which no doubt are postulated, but postulated as 
 realities, giving us corresponding realities in all legiti- 
 mate deductions from them. To support his confused 
 theory, he is obliged to give a twofold view of defini- 
 
320 SECONDARY LOGIC. 
 
 tions. The definition of a triangle, he says, obviously 
 comprises not one but two propositions perfectly distin- 
 guishable. The one is, ' There may exist a figure 
 bounded by three straight lines ; ' and the other, ' this 
 figure may be termed a triangle.' But there is no 
 advantage secured, in the way of clearing our thoughts 
 or otherwise, by drawing such a distinction ; for demon- 
 stration relates throughout not to the word, but the 
 thing, a figure bounded by three straight lines. He 
 argues that definitions, as such, are the premisses only 
 in the reasonings which relate to words, and that if we 
 take any other view, " we might argue correctly from 
 true premisses, and arrive at a false conclusion." Thus 
 let the definition be, ' A dragon is a serpent breathing 
 flame,' out of this we may carve the following syllogism : 
 ' A dragon is a thing which breathes flame; but a 
 dragon is a serpent : therefore, some serpents breathe 
 flame/ — " in which both premisses are true, and yet 
 the conclusion false." But surely the premisses are 
 here true or false according to what we understand as 
 to the objects compared. If we are speaking through- 
 out of imaginary things, the conclusion is true in the 
 same sense as the premisses are. If we are speaking 
 of actually existing things, both the premisses and the 
 conclusion are false. 
 
 After what I have said in regard to necessary truth 
 (Chap, xii.), it is not necessary to dwell on his theory of 
 Mathematical Axioms. They are represented as mere 
 generalizations of an outward experience. I believe, 
 indeed, that in the axiom in its generalized form there 
 
SECONDARY LOGIC. 321 
 
 must be generalization. But they are not generaliza- 
 tions of an outward or sensible experience. On the 
 bare contemplation of a whole object, say a table, we 
 declare it to be larger than a part of it, say its 
 leg. I do so at once on the mere sight or thought 
 of the object as known to me, and not from any 
 induction of particulars falling under my experience in 
 time past. Perceiving that I would do the same in 
 every like case, I may generalize the judgment and put 
 it in the form of an axiom, that 'the whole is greater 
 than its part/ But this general truth is not the gene- 
 ralization of a lengthened experience ; it is not reached 
 by our having observed a thousand times or ten thousand 
 times that a whole thing is greater than a part of the 
 same thing : we see it at once on the bare inspection of 
 any one thing; our conviction could not be made stronger 
 by multiplying examples ; and we cannot allow that 
 there should be an exception. I may have observed of 
 ten thousand plants with netted leaves that they have 
 all sprung from two seed-lobes, and I feel justified in 
 laying down the general rule, that ' netted-leaved plants 
 are dicotyledonous ; ' but the law is reached by a gathered 
 experience. I do not assert that it can Tiave no excep- 
 tions ; and when I learn that there is a tribe of plants 
 (including Arum, etc.) which have netted leaves, and 
 yet spring from one seed-lobe, I may wonder at the fact, 
 but I do not say that it is impossible. But the mind 
 having discovered, from its knowledge of the nature of 
 things, that the whole is greater than a part, I cannot be 
 made to allow that there is anywhere an exception. 
 
 x 
 
322 SECONDARY LOGIC. 
 
 To apply these remarks to mathematical truth : In 
 proceeding with its demonstrations, the mind pronounces 
 its judgments immediately on the objects defined being 
 presented to it, and it does not need the axiom in its 
 generalized form ; indeed it feels the force of the reason- 
 ing quite as clearly before as after the maxim is an- 
 nounced. In learning geometry, the beginner seems to 
 discover the truth of the axiom from the judgment 
 pronounced in a given case, rather than to recognise the 
 validity of the argument in the particular example by 
 the maxim. Still the axiom is the expression of the 
 regulating principle of reasoning, and it serves important 
 purposes to enunciate it at the commencement of the 
 demonstration. It is one of the greatest defects of Mr. 
 Mill's work on Logic, that in consequence of mistaking 
 the nature and functions of definitions and axioms he 
 has not been able to give a correct account of the Method 
 employed in Demonstration. That Method I call the 
 Joint Dogmatic and Deductive. I call it Dogmatic, for 
 it begins with assumptions, with truths not proven, 
 with truths perceived hj intuition; and I call it Deduc- 
 tive, for it draws other truths from its assumptions. 
 The criteria of its assumptions are the tests of intuitive 
 truth, that is, Self- Evidence and Necessity ; the criteria 
 of its deductions are the forms of reasoning. 
 
 Mr. Mill's Book on Induction is far the most valuable 
 part of his Logic ; it contains the best exposition which 
 we have of the Method of Induction in our own or in 
 any other language. His Canons of Causes are a great 
 improvement upon the Prerogative Instances of Bacon, 
 
SECONDARY LOGIC. 323 
 
 and are an advance upon the rules proposed by Sir J. 
 Herschel. But, while he has admirably expounded the 
 functions of Prerogative Instances or Canons in physical 
 science, he does not seem to see what is the precise 
 logical purpose, that is, the purpose in thought, served 
 by them. Induction consists of two parts : the gathering 
 of individual facts, which, however numerous, must 
 always be limited ; and the derivation from them of a 
 law announced in a general proposition. In the first of 
 these, there is no special exercise of reasoning ; the 
 whole is the work of observation and trained sagacity. 
 But in the derivation of the law from the scattered and 
 incomplete facts there is inference. Now, what is it 
 that justifies the inference ? If there be any truth in 
 the Aristotelian or syllogistic analysis, there must be a 
 general principle involved, which, when the reasoning 
 is put in syllogistic form, becomes the major premiss. 
 Now, such rules as these, involved in the Prerogative 
 Instances of Bacon, and the Canons of Mr. Mill, are the 
 general propositions which supply the major premiss ; 
 and the particular set of facts give us the minor premiss ; 
 and the two necessitate the conclusion. I drank brandy 
 on Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday, and had a head- 
 ache the succeeding mornings ; I drank no brandy on 
 Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, and had no 
 headache on the following days. When I conclude 
 that my drinking brandy was the cause of the headache, 
 I have, as my major premiss, such a general proposition 
 as the Canon of Difference : ' If, in comparing cases in 
 which the effect takes place with other cases in which 
 
324 SECONDARY LOGIC. 
 
 it does not take place, we find the latter to have every 
 antecedent in common with the former except one, 
 that one circnmstance is the canse, or a part of the 
 cause;' and as my minor premiss, the facts as constitut- 
 ing such a case ; and the conclusion follows syllogistically. 
 The excellence of Mr. Mill's Canons is, that they are 
 the simplest and most complete yet enunciated of the 
 general principles which guide us in rising from the 
 collection of individual facts to the causes. Had Mr. 
 Mill clearly perceived that there is reasoning in all 
 induction, he would have heen prevented from reversing 
 the natural order by representing the reasoning process 
 as an induction. 
 
 But the discovery of causes is not the sole end of 
 science. In some departments the object is to resolve 
 the compounds of nature into their elements. This is 
 one of the main ends sought in chemistry, and also in 
 psychology. There should, therefore, be Canons of 
 Composition 1 as well as Canons of Causes. 
 
 1 In the absence of an attempt by any Logician to supply them, Ave may 
 give the following : — (1.) We have decomposed a compound when we have 
 decomposed it in separation from all other substances. (2.) Having found 
 the elements of a compound in one case, we have found them in all. A 
 caution requires to be added, that the elements reached are to be regarded 
 as such merely provisionally. The first rule theoretically guards against 
 a mistake, which is difficult to avoid in practice. The second shows that 
 one decisive experiment may settle the whole question of the decomposition 
 of a substance. Hence it is that in Chemistry we may not require a large 
 induction, such as is necessary in Natural History and many departments 
 of Natural Philosophy. As Chemistry did not exist in the days of Bacon, 
 he does not seem to have contemplated the possibility of so rapid a method 
 of reaching a law ; and his rules as to the necessity of a wide induction, and 
 the gradual rising from particulars to minor, middle, and major axioms do 
 not apply to this science, at least in its present advanced stage, — though I 
 rather think they did at its earlier stages, before the nature of chemical 
 
SECONDARY LOGIC. 325 
 
 In another important group of sciences, those called 
 the Classificatory by Dr. Whewell, the end sought is not 
 the discovery of Causes or of Composition, but of Classes; 
 that is, Natural Classes. 1 I mention these things to 
 show that, while Mr. Mill has given us the best exposi- 
 tion we yet have of the Logic of Induction, he has by 
 no means completed the investigation. Much remains 
 to be done by other men and by other ages. 
 
 There has been an important discussion between Dr. 
 Whewell and Mr. Mill as to whether we may now expect 
 more from the Method of Induction or of Deduction. 
 Mr. Mill maintains that in most departments of science 
 our hope of discovery lies more in Deduction than in 
 the Induction of Bacon. On the other hand, Dr. Whewell 
 holds that, whatever may be the case with the social 
 sciences, in the physical sciences discoveries may be 
 expected to be made in time to come, as they have been 
 
 affinity had been ascertained. The caution guards as against concluding, 
 when we have reached certain components, we must have got the ultimate 
 elements. Every chemist allows that these sixty elements are to be es- 
 teemed such, merely till there has been a successful decomposition of them. 
 1 The following Canons of Classes may serve till better are furnished :— 
 (1.) We have found the resemblance among the objects in many and varied 
 cases. (2. ) We must be in circumstances to say that if there be exceptions 
 we should most probably have fallen in with them. These two rules will 
 prevent us from drawing rash generalizations from a few cases, or cases con- 
 fined to a limited region. But in order to determine whether the class is or 
 is not a Natural Class, we require a more important rule. (3.) The class 
 may be regarded as a natural one when it is one of Kinds ; that is, when 
 the possession of one mark is a sign of a number of others. Thus we may 
 reckon Mammal as a Natural Class ; for though founded on the single cir- 
 cumstance of the animals belonging to it suckling their young, it is found 
 that this characteristic is a sign of others,— as, that they are warm-blooded, 
 and that their heart has four compartments. Such Orders as Ranunculacese, 
 Cruciferae, Rosacese, are obviously Natural Classes, for the plants included 
 in each have a number of resembling points. 
 
32G SECONDARY LOGIC. 
 
 in time past, by a patient induction. Much confusion 
 lias crept into this controversy from the circumstance 
 that these two eminent men have not come to an agree- 
 ment as to what is involved in the processes about which 
 they dispute. According to Mr. Mill, the Deductive 
 Method consists of three operations : the first, one of 
 direct induction ; the second, of ratiocination ; and the 
 third, of verification {Logic, III. xi.) Now, of these three 
 steps, the first, the direct induction of particulars, and 
 also the third, the verification by facts, are essentially 
 inductive ; they consist in collecting facts, with the view 
 of determining the law of the facts. What Mr. Mill 
 calls Deductive, I am inclined to designate the Joint 
 Inductive and Deductive Method. In those departments 
 of science which are yet in their infancy, we must trust 
 mainly to a careful collection of facts, and allow the 
 facts to suggest the law, at which we may not yet be 
 able even to guess. But in advanced sciences in which 
 laws have been established, and are ready to form the 
 general or major proposition, advances may be expected 
 mainly from the combination of Deduction with Induc- 
 tion. Dr. Whewell and Mr. Mill have both done much 
 to unfold the steps of this Joint Method. But much yet 
 remains to be done, by showing what is the separate 
 province of each, and how they may be combined so as 
 best to yield the wished-for results in the different 
 departments of science. 
 
CHAPTEE XVIII 
 
 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS : THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 
 
 In this country Formal Logic is dealt with in four 
 different ways at this present time. 
 
 I. By some it is reckoned antiquated and exploded, 
 and never referred to without a sneer. Though these 
 persons are not likely to attend to me, or favour me 
 with an answer, yet I beg to ask them whether it would 
 not be very desirable to have a Logic to unfold the laws 
 of thought, and direct thought in its various walks — in 
 which it is so apt to err ? If they can be induced to 
 reply candidly in the affirmative, I would then invite 
 them to look into what earnest and able thinkers have 
 done ; and I would show them how the Aristotelian 
 Logic has cast up again and again, in spite of all 
 efforts to suppress it ; and that no other Logic has 
 stood longer than a single age : in particular, no one 
 now sets any value on the attempts that were made to 
 construct a logical science by the school of Locke and 
 the school of Condillac. 
 
 II. There are those who accept the Aristotelian Logic 
 without criticism or modification. Most of these are 
 
328 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 inclined to accept it in the form in which it is put by 
 Whately, who, by his new and fresh illustrations and 
 examples, threw such life into the bones which had 
 become dry. The mastering of Whately's Elements is 
 certainly a most profitable gymnastic to all young men, 
 and is fitted to exercise a salutary influence upon their 
 intellectual habits, which is likely to continue with 
 them all their lives. But those who have a taste for 
 the study ought not to content themselves with such an 
 elementary exposition; they should go on to make them- 
 selves acquainted with the discussions in our day in 
 regard to logical forms ; and neither young nor advanced 
 students must be allowed to forget that we have now a 
 Logic of Induction quite as important as the Logic of 
 Deduction. 
 
 III. There is a British modification of the Logic of 
 Kant which has able supporters, the leader having been 
 Sir W. Hamilton, who has had able and learned fellow- 
 workers in Dr. Mansel and Archbishop Thomson. The 
 Logic of this school has many excellencies. It has 
 allotted a distinct and intelligible province to the science, 
 which is described as that of the Laws of Thought. It 
 has so defined the department as to make it embrace 
 the Concept and the Judgment, as well as Eeasoning. 
 Sir W. Hamilton has revived the distinction between 
 the Extension and Comprehension of the Concept, and 
 has evolved and applied it in a more scientific 
 manner than was ever done before. Not satisfied with 
 the Dictum of Aristotle as the one and universal re- 
 gulating principle of reasoning, the school is seeking to 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 329 
 
 enunciate a wider Canon, and important minor rules 
 derived from it. It lias successfully shown that 
 reasoning may be put in the form of Comprehension as 
 well as Extension. It has subjected all the forms of 
 reasoning, Categorical and Conditional, to a sifting 
 examination, which has introduced greater scientific 
 accuracy into the technicalities of Primary Logic. 
 With unsurpassed acuteness and erudition, Dr. Mansel 
 has introduced us to important Aristotelian and scho- 
 lastic distinctions. Archbishop Thomson has given us 
 an admirable chapter on Language as the instrument of 
 thought, has clearly expounded the distinction between 
 Substitutive and Attributive Judgments (though he has 
 not seen what is the precise nature of the forms), and 
 drawn out a comprehensive scheme of Immediate In- 
 ferences, 
 
 But on the other hand the Logic of the school is 
 tainted throughout with the false metaphysics of Kant, 
 and should not be accepted without important ex- 
 planations and modifications. It proceeds all along on 
 the principle that there are subjective forms in the 
 mind itself, which impose on objects as we think about 
 them, much that is not in the objects themselves. From 
 this general error there arise several particular ones. 
 
 (1.) The school represent Logic as an a priori 
 science. Now this doctrine cannot be allowed without 
 an important explanation which changes the whole 
 theory. It is all true that the mind in logical thought 
 proceeds according to native principles. But the princi- 
 ples, as general rules, are not before consciousness. It is 
 
330 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 upon the bare inspection and comprehension of the case be- 
 fore it that the mind proceeds in the exercises of thought. 
 It being understood that a crocodile is a reptile, and that 
 all reptiles bring forth their young by eggs, we at once 
 conclude that the crocodile must do so ; but without 
 having consciously before us the Dictum, that whatever 
 is predicated of a class may be predicated of all that 
 is contained in the class. It needs objects to call the 
 native capacities of the mind into exercise. Not only 
 so, but the exercises are always individual. It is by a 
 process of generalization that we derive the general 
 law from the individual cases ; and as there may be 
 oversights and inaccuracies in the generalization, so 
 there may be discussions and disputes about the ex- 
 pression of the general law. The laws of thought may 
 be in the mind a priori, but we cannot discover and 
 unfold them a priori. In order to find the general 
 principles of logical thought, and to construct a science 
 of Logic, there must be a careful and extensive observa- 
 tion of thought as directed to objects, and various 
 classes of objects. 
 
 (2.) Kant represents Logic as " making abstraction of 
 " all content of the cognition of the understanding and 
 "of the difference of objects, and having to do only 
 " with the form of thought." Sir W. Hamilton makes 
 a like statement : " Logic is conversant with the form 
 of thought to the exclusion of the matter" {Logic, 
 I. 1 5). ISTow this account contains both a truth and 
 an error. It is quite true that Logic does not look to 
 the objects of thought, but to thought : but it is 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 331 
 
 equally true that thought must be employed about 
 objects. If Logic, then, considers thought, it must con- 
 sider thought as employed about objects, — only it con- 
 siders the thought and not the objects. Taking this 
 view, we see that we are warranted (though, perhaps, 
 Kant was not, according to his principles) in adopting the 
 division of the science, which we shall explain further 
 on in this chapter, into Universal and Particular Logic. 
 
 (3.) From the same mistaken view of thought, the 
 whole school represent the Xotion or Conception as 
 being formed by the mind, according to a priori laws, 
 not altogether independent of objects, but imposing on 
 objects what is not in them. Hamilton speaks of " an 
 " act of thought as the recognition of a thing as coming 
 ' under a concept f and again, " Thought is a know- 
 " ledge of a thing through a concept or general notion, 
 " or of one notion through another" (lb. p. 43). This 
 language proceeds on the idea that there is a concept 
 prior to the thing, above the thing, and ready to be 
 imposed upon it, so as to shape and colour it. But 
 surely the correct statement is not that thought is 
 through a concept, but that a concept is a thought 
 formed on the contemplation of things. The General 
 Xotion is fashioned by the mind on the apprehension 
 of objects, by putting together the objects, real or poten- 
 tial, having common properties. 
 
 (4.) The whole Kantian school omits the Abstract 
 Xotion in the construction of logical science. Sir W. 
 Hamilton, indeed, gives a brief but correct account of it 
 in his Metcqjhysics (Lect. xxxv.), showing that it implies 
 
332 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 comparison, and that " there is nothing necessarily con- 
 nected with generalization in abstraction." Bnt in his 
 Logic, the laws which he lays down apply only to the 
 Concept or General Notion. This omission not only 
 leads to a defective acconnt of Simple Apprehension in 
 the first part of Formal Logic, but makes him overlook 
 a class of judgments and a species of reasoning in which 
 the terms are abstract. 
 
 (5.) In consequence of neglecting to give the Abstract 
 Notion a separate place, Sir W. Hamilton and Archbishop 
 Thomson have been led to represent every Notion as 
 having Extension and Comprehension. Now, these are 
 properties exclusively of the General Notion. The 
 Abstract Notion, say tranquillity, cannot be said to 
 have Extension, for it denotes not objects, but an 
 attribute. 
 
 (6.) In a previous chapter I have shown that Sir W. 
 Hamilton has not unfolded fully nor accurately the 
 nature and the relations of the things compared in 
 Logical Judgment. He represents the comparison as 
 between two conceptions or concepts as mental pro- 
 ducts, whereas it is between concepts as things con- 
 ceived. He vacillates in the account which he gives of 
 the relation discovered between the concepts, speaking 
 of it at times as being identity, at other times as that 
 of whole and parts, and in some places as equality. 
 
 (7.) One of Sir W. Hamilton's supposed improve- 
 ments in Formal Logic consists in his insisting that the 
 predicate should always be quantified ; that is, declared 
 to be either universal or particular. Thus the proposi- 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 333 
 
 tion, ' All men are mortal,' he would write, ' All men 
 are some mortals.' He defends this on the general 
 principle, that whatever is in thought should be un- 
 folded in the statement which professes to express 
 thought. I admit the principle, but I do not admit 
 that it requires the predicate to be quantified. For I 
 have endeavoured to show that in by far the greater 
 number of propositions the uppermost thought is in 
 Comprehension, and we do not think at all of the Ex- 
 tension. When we say ' the clog barks/ we mean that 
 the dog is engaged in the act of barking, and we may 
 not think of a class of barking animals ; we certainly 
 do not trouble ourselves with inquiring whether there 
 are or are not other animals that bark. Even in propo- 
 sitions in which the Extension is in the thought, we do 
 not always settle whether the subject is or is not co- 
 extensive with the predicate. Thus, when we say ' Man 
 is rational,' we may not have determined whether there 
 are or are not other rational beings besides man. It is 
 sufficient to lead us to form the judgment that man has 
 the attribute rationality, or that he is in the class 
 rational, whether this class include other beings or not. 
 I hold that in the vast majority of propositions the 
 predicate is not quantified in thought. I urge, further, 
 in opposition to the doctrine, that in those propositions 
 in which the terms are abstract, the predicate, properly 
 speaking, has no quantity or extension, for it is not a 
 class-notion. When we say that 3X3 = 9, neither 
 subject nor predicate has an indefinite number of objects 
 embraced in it. I admit that in reasoning, Avhen the 
 
334 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 predicate is known to be distributed, we can convert 
 the subject into the predicate, and the predicate into 
 the subject, without any change, and draw a conclusion 
 which we should not otherwise be entitled to do. Thus 
 when we have it demonstrated, both that ' all equilateral 
 triangles are equiangular,' and that 'all equiangular 
 triangles are equilateral/ we can, upon a given triangle 
 being found equilateral, declare it to be equiangular. 
 Such cases are worthy of special notice, and might have 
 a separate place allotted them in logical treatises, but, 
 being so limited, should not be allowed to change the 
 whole analytic of reasoning. 
 
 (8.) The new Canon of Eeasoning adopted by the 
 school is very vague. It is thus stated in the Outlines 
 of the Laws of Thought : " The agreement or disagree - 
 " ment of one conception with another, is ascertained 
 " by a third conception, inasmuch as this, wholly or 
 " by the same part, agrees with both, or with only one 
 " of the conceptions to be compared" (§ 93). Now, the 
 phrase ' agree' is not explicit ; it does not specify what 
 the concepts agree or do not agree in. This defect may 
 be remedied by distinguishing between those cases in 
 which the terms are singular or abstract, and those in 
 which one at least is general. In the former the regulat- 
 ing principle is ' things which are the same with, or equal 
 to, one and the same thing, are the same with, or equal to 
 one another.' In the latter, in which we have a general 
 conception, the main regulating principle is, I believe, 
 the Dictum, which the founder of Logic propounded. 
 While this is the main law of thought, I am convinced 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 335 
 
 that there may be others involved, such as that of whole 
 and parts, and of division in all disjunctive reasoning. 
 A thorough analytic of logical forms should unfold all 
 these laws, and give each its separate place. 
 
 (9.) Sir "W. Hamilton places reasoning in Compre- 
 hension on the same level as reasoning in Extension, 
 or rather he gives it a prior and higher position. I have 
 stated my reasons for thinking that reasoning is primarily 
 in Extension. It may, indeed, always be translated 
 into the forms of Comprehension, and it is desirable 
 that students should know how to do this, and do it 
 when any purpose is to be served by it. But it is not 
 necessary to burden the mind with the numerous modes 
 which appear when we insist on always quantifying the 
 predicate, and join on the same footing reasoning in 
 Comprehension and reasoning in Extension. 
 
 IY. There is a large class who accept implicitly the 
 Logic of Mr. Mill. x These consist chiefly of persons 
 who are disgusted with the scholastic Logic as being so 
 abstract and technical, and are not prepared to give 
 their adherence to the Kantian reformation, as they feel 
 that its forms keep us too far removed from things. 
 Xow, I rejoice to proclaim that there are remarks, 
 as true and important as they are fresh, scattered 
 throughout Mr. Mill's treatise. In Book First he has 
 many useful observations on Naming, which make us 
 regret the more that they are indissolubly mixed up 
 
 1 I should here have referred to the very able attempts of Prof. De 
 Morgan and the late Prof. Boole to give us a mathematical theory of 
 reasoning. But it would take us altogether out of our present line of 
 thought to discuss it thoroughly, and I think it better not to enter upon it. 
 
336 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 with sensational metaphysics. His Book on Induction 
 is by far the most valuable part of his work, though it 
 is much injured by doubtful speculations as to the 
 nature of our belief in causation. 1 There are practical 
 lessons of much utility conveyed in his Book on 
 Fallacies, only it is to be regretted that in pointing out 
 with so much keenness and relish the errors of the old 
 philosophy, he leaves unnoticed the still more glaring 
 fallacies of the nescience and association schools. His 
 closing Book is very defective as a full Logic of the 
 mental and social sciences, more particularly in not 
 estimating what is involved in man's essential freedom ; 
 but is of value as the commencement of a discussion 
 which must grow in interest and importance. I pro- 
 pose to sum up the defects of the work as gathered from 
 the survey taken in the last four chapters. 
 
 (1.) He denies that Logic is entitled to be regarded 
 as a separate science. " So far as it is a science at all, 
 " it is a part or branch of Psychology ; differing from 
 " it on the one hand as a part differs from the whole, 
 " and on the other, as an Art differs from a Science " 
 (p. 388). Now, there is no doubt that Logic is closely 
 connected with Psychology, is in fact largely dependent 
 on it for some of its elementary truths. The same may 
 be said of Metaphysics, or the science of the laws of 
 
 1 I regret to see that in the later editions Mr. Mill is crowding his "work 
 with still more of metaphysical discussion. Students would feel it to be a 
 great advantage to have his book on Induction in a separate form, and 
 with the discussions on Intuitions left out. This would leave them at 
 liberty to get their Formal Logic elsewhere, and to resort to his complete 
 work when they want to know his theory of the mind and his other 
 opinions. 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 337 
 
 intuition ; of ^Esthetics, or, as I prefer calling it, Kalo- 
 logy, the science of the laws of the Feelings ; and 
 Ethics, the science of the laws of our motive and 
 moral nature. It is no doubt one part of the office 
 of Psychology to gather from an observation of the 
 operations of the mind the laws of discursive thought, 
 as it is also to find out the laws of our immediate 
 perceptions, of our emotional and moral nature. But 
 having ascertained that there are such laws, and shown 
 how they act in the mind, it does not seek in a special 
 way to formalize them, to inquire into their relation to 
 external things, or to apply them to scientific or practical 
 ends. Psychology leaves all this very appropriately 
 to the other mental sciences, which are no doubt her 
 daughters, but have their separate households, where 
 they are married to their different objects, each with 
 its own alliances. In particular, Logic strives to give 
 a strictly scientific form and expression to the mode of 
 the mind's procedure in apprehending, judging, and 
 reasoning, and in gathering laws and causes ; and from 
 these it draws rules for the guidance of thought in its 
 various walks of investigation. Logic has the proper 
 characteristics of a science ; it is systematized truth, 
 systematized natural truth. 
 
 (2.) He does not give its proper place to the element 
 of thought. No doubt he has done great service to the 
 study, by calling our attention to the objects of thought, 
 which the scholastic and Kantian logicians had very 
 much declined to look at. But Logic has not to do 
 with things as things. This it leaves to other, and what 
 
 Y 
 
338 LOGICAL DISCUSSIOXS : 
 
 have been called material, or real, or what in such a 
 connexion might be called objective, sciences. Logic 
 has to do not with objects, but with thought as employed 
 about objects. If this distinction is not kept constantly 
 in view, the logician is ever tempted to mix up physical 
 or psychological questions with those that properly be- 
 long to Logic. 
 
 (3.) He makes Logic treat of Names, Propositions, 
 and Arguments, and not, as our more philosophical 
 logicians make it, with Simple Apprehension, Judg- 
 ment, and Eeasoning. Every one allows that Appre- 
 hensions may be expressed in Names, Judgments in 
 Propositions, and Eeasoning in Arguments, and that 
 Logic should look to these incidentally, as the expres- 
 sion of thought. But the science should deal primarily 
 and throughout with the laws of thought, always as 
 applied to things, leaving the laws of language to a 
 special department of science now being formed. It is 
 to be remembered, that as a term may consist of one 
 word, or twenty words, we cannot by merely looking at 
 words so much as know what the term is ; and that we 
 cannot make an intelligent predication in a proposition 
 without knowing the meaning of the terms : all which 
 shows that Logic should expound thought rather than 
 names. Xor is it to be forgotten that the laws of 
 thought constitute the fixed element, while the names 
 or phrases differ not only in their sound, but in what 
 they express and embrace in different languages. And 
 then the forms of language are often defective, and not 
 unfrequently erroneous, and need to be amended by the 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 339 
 
 invariable and, I believe, unerring laws of thought ; 
 which we should endeavour so to analyse and formalize 
 as to aid the advancing Science of Language, — which 
 will again, as it makes progress, greatly help the Science 
 of Thought. 
 
 (4.) In looking at language instead of thought, he has 
 given a very imperfect account of the topics usually ex- 
 pounded in the first part of Formal Logic, that which 
 deals with Simple Apprehension. Instead of examining 
 the various classes of apprehensions, and carefully dis- 
 tinguishing them, he confines his own attention and 
 that of his readers to the name and its connotation, 
 without regard to the notion which the name expresses, 
 or bringing out accurately what things, or aspects of 
 things, the notion embraces in its different forms. 
 
 Owing to his defective psychology, he has no ade- 
 quate idea of the capacity of the mind to discover 
 relations among things, and he has failed to give us a 
 full or accurate exposition of the relation of the two 
 apprehensions in logical Judgment. He makes us look 
 not at the act of comparison, which is surely the 
 primary and main element, but at the attribute con- 
 noted, overlooking, in the General Notion, the class of 
 objects combined by the attribute, and the mental con- 
 cept combining them. 
 
 (5.) The error goes up into his analysis of reasoning, 
 and makes him give a very partial exhibition of the 
 process, in which he sees only the attribute, and over- 
 looks the general conception and general proposition, 
 which are involved in the validity of the inference. 
 
340 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 (6.) Mr. Mill has given us the most valuable contri- 
 bution since the days of Bacon to one important depart- 
 ment of Logic, that which treats of Induction. But 
 still there are very grave mistakes in his exposition of 
 the topics that fall under Particular or Secondary Logic. 
 These spring from his erroneous theory of Demonstra- 
 tion, more particularly of the nature, functions, and 
 value of mathematical definitions and axioms ; from 
 his mixing false metaphysics with his logical exposition 
 of causation ; from his not seeing that the discovery 
 of the Decomposition of compounds and of Natural 
 Classes are among the ends aimed at in science, and 
 requiring Special Canons : and finally, from an im- 
 perfect view of the nature of the phenomena of the 
 mind, which it is the office of Psychology to co-ordinate, 
 and for the aid of which Logic should furnish a method. 
 
 It now only remains to gather from this discussion 
 what is the Province of the science of Logic. It has to 
 do with thought : but what is meant by thought in 
 such an application ? It must evidently be so ex- 
 plained as not to include the motive exercises of the 
 mind, and to exclude intuition, in which we perceive 
 objects or truths at once, and which has always been 
 allotted to Metaphysics. By thought, in the technical 
 sense in which the word is used in Logic, is meant Dis- 
 cursive Thought, in which we proceed from something 
 given or allowed to something else derived from it. It 
 implies a process, which must have laws. In order to 
 construct the science of Logic, we must endeavour to 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 341 
 
 gather the laws of thought, by a careful observation of 
 the operations of thought. 
 
 Kant has a twofold division of the science, as Logic 
 of the universal or of the particular use of the under- 
 standing. " The first contains the absolutely necessary 
 " laws of thought, without which no use whatever of the 
 " understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to 
 M the understanding, without regard to the difference of 
 " objects on which it may be employed. The Logic of 
 " the particular use of the understanding contains the 
 " laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of 
 objects" (Kritik of Pare Reason, Meiklejohn's trans., 
 p. 46). This language is not unexceptionable, more 
 particularly as pointing to laws independent of the ob- 
 servation of objects ; and it is doubtful whether Kant, 
 in consistency with his account of the science, which 
 " makes abstraction of all content of the cognition, that 
 is, of all relation of cognition to its object" (lb. p. 49), 
 could adopt such a division. But if we take the proper 
 view of thought, as always engaged with objects, then 
 we can accept and justify the arrangement. We have, 
 first, a Universal, or, as I prefer calling it, a Primary 
 Logic (identical with what is commonly designated 
 Formal Logic), conversant with the laws of thought, not 
 independent of objects, but ivhatever be the objects. We 
 have, secondly, a Particular, or, as I would call it, 
 Secondary Logic, considering the operations of thought 
 as directed to particular classes of objects, say to intui- 
 tive perceptions, as in Demonstration; and the collection 
 of scattered facts, external or internal, as in Induction. 
 
342 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS': 
 
 Under the first head Logic treats of Simple Appre- 
 hension, Judgment, and Seasoning, which, no doubt, all 
 look to objects, but are the same for all objects. It has 
 to consider, first, our apprehensions. Some of these are 
 of objects singular and concrete, what we may call Per- 
 cepts, as being immediately perceived by the mind. 
 Some of them, again, are of Abstracts, or parts considered 
 as parts of a whole, more particularly of attributes of 
 objects. Others are of Concepts, or of things having 
 common attributes, and joined in a class which em- 
 braces all the objects possessing the attributes. All 
 Concepts have both Extension and Comprehension. 
 Logic does not deal immediately with the formation of 
 Percepts, which are intuitive ; but it evolves the 
 laws involved in the construction of Abstracts and Con- 
 cepts. In Judgment we compare two of these Per- 
 cepts, Abstracts, or Concepts. This process also has 
 laws, such as, when the things compared are Abstracts 
 the relation is one of identity or of equivalence ; and, 
 when there is a general notion the relation is both of 
 Comprehension and Extension. There are also laws 
 involved in Eeasoning, in which we compare two of our 
 apprehensions by means of a third. These are derived 
 very much from the nature of the apprehensions com- 
 pared. Thus, in cases in which we compare Abstracts, 
 the regulating principle is that of identity or equality, 
 " things which are the same with a third, or equal to a 
 third, are the same with, or equal to one another." But 
 when there is a class -notion involved — and there is so 
 wherever there is attribution, — then we must proceed ac- 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 343 
 
 cording to the class -notion, and the regulating principle 
 is, ' whatever is predicated of a class may be predicated of 
 all that is contained in that class.' TThile these are the 
 main ruling principles involved in all cases of reasoning, 
 there may also be other principles implied in all cases, 
 or in special cases. Thus the principle of whole and 
 parts is involved when we include an individual in a 
 class, or a species in a genus. The Comprehension of 
 the Xotion is to be taken aloncr with us, when we trans- 
 late reasoning in Extension, so as to make Comprehen- 
 sion the uppermost thought. A principle of Division, 
 that the co-ordinate sub-classes must make up the class, 
 is involved in all Disjunctive Seasoning : thus when 
 we argue that this man, being either a knave or a fool, 
 and not being a fool, must be a knave, it is implied 
 that knave and fool make up the class to which this man 
 must belong. 
 
 Taking this view of Logic, we do not separate it so 
 entirely from realities as the scholastic logicians did, 
 and as the Kantian logicians still do. It has not, in- 
 deed, to do with things directly. Many of Mr. Mill's 
 discussions would lead us to think that it has, and we 
 are thus involved in questions which can be settled 
 only by the sciences — material or mental, — which deal 
 with objects. Logic has to do not with objects, but 
 with thought as directed to objects. This account makes 
 it quite competent for Logic to consider not only Appre- 
 hension, Judgment, and Eeasoning, which are the same 
 for all objects, but also Thought as directed to parti- 
 cular classes of objects. The great body of thinkers in 
 
344 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 
 
 modem times have felt that Logic ought to embrace 
 other topics besides those treated of in Formal Logic, 
 in particular that it ought not to exclude the Method of 
 investigation propounded by Bacon. The exposition I 
 have given makes it include not only Induction but 
 other modes of discovering truth. 
 
 It may consider thought as proceeding in the way of 
 Demonstration. Here all that is assumed in start- 
 ing, and all that is assumed throughout, must be seen to 
 be true intuitively. The Method of Investigation is 
 what I call the Joint Dogmatic and Deductive. It is 
 Dogmatic, in that it assumes ; but then it should assume 
 only what is seen to be true on the bare contemplation 
 of the nature of objects. It is Deductive, in that it 
 derives other truths from these assumptions by a pro- 
 cess of reasoning. But this Method is applicable only 
 within a very limited range, only so far as we have an 
 immediate intuition of the nature of things. In most 
 walks of investigation Demonstration is not available. 
 What we have before us are individual and scattered 
 facts, falling under the senses or the consciousness. It 
 is out of these that we must gather the law. So far as 
 we observe and co-ordinate the facts with the view of 
 rising to their law, whether this be a class, or a cause, 
 or the constitution of compound objects, the Method 
 pursued is the Inductive. In this process we gather the 
 facts and tabulate them, and, without 'anticipating' 
 nature, we allow the facts to suggest the law, which is 
 accepted only when it embraces and explains all the 
 facts. But as science advances, by this method we 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 345 
 
 reach laws, which may he regarded as at least provision- 
 ally established, and we inquire — in certain departments 
 with the powerful aid of Mathematics — what conse- 
 quences would follow from these laws ? Another, and a 
 very powerful Method, now becomes applicable. I call 
 it the Joint Inductive and Deductive, in which we in- 
 quire what results must follow from certain supposed 
 laws, and then compare these with facts got by observa- 
 tion or experiment. In all our advanced sciences this 
 must now be the principal mode of investigation. 
 
 I am inclined to think that Whately is right when 
 he represents Logic as both a Science and an Art. It 
 is a science, inasmuch as it is a systematized body of 
 natural truth. It is reared by the observation and co- 
 ordination of the spontaneous operations of discursive 
 thought. But it may also become an art, or a body of 
 precepts drawn out to enable us to accomplish a par- 
 ticular end, that is, to think correctly, and expose con- 
 fused thought or invalid reasoning;-. It should aim at 
 nothing less than the discovery of the laws of thought 
 operating in the mind as it contemplates objects. When 
 Ave have accurately apprehended and expressed them, 
 we may then apply them to test and correct actual 
 thought. For this purpose we may derive from them 
 rules, and put these in various formulae, which admit 
 of a ready and useful application to our everyday think- 
 ing, and to scientific investigation. In particular, Logic 
 is of great use in clearing our notions ; it shows what 
 notions are singular and what universal ; what concrete 
 and what abstract ; and guards us against using a general 
 
3-16 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS : 
 
 term as if it were a singular concrete. It cannot tell 
 us what judgments are true and what false (this must 
 be done by the departments of knowledge which deal 
 with objects), but it tells us what is the precise relation 
 between the Percepts, Abstracts, and Concepts com- 
 pared, and thus places our notions in such a light that 
 we are better able to say whether a given proposition is 
 true or false. Again, the syllogistic analysis lets us see 
 that in reasoning we have to look to the relation of 
 three notions, Percepts, Abstracts, or Concepts ; and 
 that when one of the notions is a Concept, we always 
 need by implication a general proposition ; and the 
 formulas derived from this analysis unfold the various 
 possible forms of reasoning, and enable us to test our 
 own inferences and those of others. In the Secondary 
 (but not less important) Logic, there can be tests laid 
 down, such as those of self- evidence, necessity, and 
 catholicity, sufficient to decide readily and certainly 
 what truths are intuitive, and so entitled to become 
 assumptions in Demonstration ; while the processes of 
 deduction from intuitive truth may all be tested by the 
 syllogism. The Canons of Causes enunciated by Mr. 
 Mill settle for us, when we are entitled to argue that we 
 have discovered the cause of a given phenomenon ; and 
 I hope that in due time we shall have Canons of Decom- 
 position and Canons of Classes, to determine when we 
 have reached the elementary constitution of bodies 
 (provisionally), and when we have discovered natural 
 classes. We have already some Canons of Historical 
 Investigation to aid us in finding whether the evidence 
 
THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 347 
 
 is sufficient to establish the alleged facts, and these 
 Canons should be adopted into Logic, and made as suc- 
 cinct and comprehensive as possible. Logic has thus a 
 wide and most important field as an art ; it furnishes 
 guiding rules and tests in every path of inquiry. It is 
 thus fulfilling some of the old pretensions made in its 
 behalf. I do not like the phrase, ' Art of Thinking,' for 
 men think spontaneously, without any science or art ; 
 but Logic supplies rules to guard against confused and 
 erroneous thinking. It is in a special sense the ' Science 
 of Method ;' that is, of the Method to be pursued in 
 discovering scientific and historical truth. It is the 
 ' Science of Sciences,' not because superior to other 
 departments of knowledge, but because it supplies rules 
 to guide and guard in every other science. 
 
CHAPTEK XIX. 
 
 WHAT IS TRUTH ? CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 
 
 It is very evident that Mr. Mill has a pleasure in 
 seeing himself and his opinions reflected in the convic- 
 tions and writings of young men. On the other side, 
 the youth who give themselves up to his guidance seem 
 as if they could look only straight before them in the 
 path in which he leads them, and as if they were in- 
 capable of taking a comprehensive view of things lying 
 on either side. As, however, they will be obliged to do so 
 sooner or later, it might be as well if they now stopped 
 for a little, in order to look round them and inquire 
 whither he is leading, and where he is to leave them ? 
 "What have we left us according to this new philosophy ? 
 We have sensations ; we have a series of feelings aware 
 of itself, and permanent, or rather prolonged ; and we 
 have an association of sensations, and perceived resem- 
 blances, and possibilities of sensations. The sensations 
 and associations of sensation generate ideas and beliefs, 
 which do not, however, either in themselves or their 
 .mode of formation, guarantee any reality. W T e have an 
 idea of an external material world ; but Mr. Mill does 
 
CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 349 
 
 not affirm that there is such a world, for there are laws 
 of the series of feelings which would produce the idea, 
 whether the thing existed or not ; and our belief in it 
 may be overcome, — just as our natural belief in the sun 
 rising is made to give way before the scientific convic- 
 tion that it is the earth that moves. He thinks he is 
 able by a process of inference to reach the existence of 
 other beings besides ourselves. But the logic of the 
 process is very doubtful. I believe that neither Mr. 
 Mill nor any other has been able to show how from 
 sensations, individual or associated, we could ever legiti- 
 mately infer the existence of anything beyond. "What 
 he claims to have found is, after all, only other ' series 
 of feelings.' 
 
 But have we not, it is said, a body of scientific truth, 
 for which Mr. Mill has done as much as any living man, 
 by showing how it may be best arranged. I acknow- 
 ledge that in the view of those who believe in the reality 
 of things, and who further believe in a Gocl who made 
 and arranged, and still upholds them, this systematized 
 truth is a glorious body, — like the sun itself, with a 
 central solidity which keeps it firm, while it holds other 
 bodies circling round it, and with a gloriously illumi- 
 nated atmosphere, scattering light and heat all around. 
 But what is all this when interpreted in philosophic 
 accuracy ? It is simply possibilities of sensations, 
 coming in groups, and in regular succession, and with 
 resemblances which can be noticed. And is this the 
 sum of what has been gained by the highest science of 
 the nineteenth century ? As we contemplate it, do we 
 
350 WHAT IS TRUTH? 
 
 not feel as if the solid heart of truth and the radiating 
 light were both gone, and as if we had left only a series 
 of systematic vibrations in an unknown ether ? Does 
 this satisfy the convictions and the longings of man ? 
 Does not the intelligence declare that it has something 
 deeper than this ? Does not the heart crave for some- 
 thing higher than this ? And when the youths, who 
 are led on so pleasantly by the clear enunciations of Mr. 
 Mill, stop at any time to inquire what he has given 
 them, must they not feel that they are, after all, in 
 darkness, with only a camera obscura displaying figures 
 before them, always according to sternly scientific laws ? 
 If they are satisfied with this, are they not in the act 
 abnegating the deeper capacities, and refusing to follow 
 the higher aspirations of their souls, which, for want 
 of proper exercise, will become dry, and shrunk, and 
 withered ? And if they are not satisfied — as our higher 
 minds will certainly not be, — how piteous must be the 
 wail of disappointment and anguish coming from the 
 depths of their bosoms, as they crave for truth on the 
 one hand, and feel that they can never catch it on the 
 other ? I do fear for the consequences, when our pro- 
 mising youths awake, and in despair of attaining truth, 
 are tempted to plunge into deeper and yet deeper dark- 
 ness. Fortunately such a state of things — the deeper 
 instincts of human nature being so strong — cannot con- 
 tinue for any length of time ; and however lamentable 
 may be the experience and history of individuals, the 
 hour of thickest darkness will be found to excite the 
 cry for the returning light. 
 
CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 351 
 
 " By nature/' says Aristotle, " man is competently 
 " organized for truth ; and truth in general is not beyond 
 " his reach." Truth is usually defined as the agreement 
 of our ideas, or apprehensions, with things. Profound 
 thinkers have assumed, or laboured to prove, that, on the 
 one hand, man has ideas ; that, on the other hand, there 
 are things ; and that man can reach ideas which cor- 
 respond with things. Let us inquire ay hat view must 
 be taken of truth by those who follow out Mr. Mill's 
 system to its consequences ? 
 
 Mr. Mill acknowledges that we have ideas. But he 
 takes great pains to show that these originate in sensa- 
 tions, and grow out of sensations, according to the laws 
 of the association of sensations. I am not sure whether 
 he acknowledges the existence of material things out of, 
 and independent of, sensations. He often uses language 
 which seems to imply that he does ; but his system all 
 tends the other way. This is certain, that even if body 
 exists we can never know anything of it, except as " the 
 possibility of sensations." All that we know of objects 
 is the sensations which they give us, and the order of 
 the occurrence of those sensations. " There is not the 
 " slightest reason for believing that what we call the 
 " sensible qualities of the object are a type of anything 
 " inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its own nature. 
 " A cause does not, as such, resemble its effects ; an east 
 " wind is not like the feeling of cold, nor is heat like the 
 " steam of. boiling water : why then should matter 
 " resemble our sensations ? " {Logic, I. ill. 7). Then as 
 to the internal world : all that we know of it is a series 
 
352 WHAT IS TRUTH? 
 
 of feelings, with a prolongation in time, which again is 
 identical with a series of muscular sensations (supra, 
 p. 133). I suppose he would further say — though I do 
 not remember any passage in which he does say it, — 
 that we do not know what is the nature of these sensa- 
 tions. As things are thus unknown, and must be un- 
 known with our present faculties, and in the condition 
 in which we are placed, so man seems to be precluded 
 from reaching any truth beyond the consciousness of 
 present sensations, and the possibility of other sensations. 
 But some have defined truth as the accordance, not 
 of our own ideas with things, but of our ideas with one 
 another. This is a view which I do not think worth 
 the pains of defending. It is quite compatible with the 
 existence of a universal system of delusion and deception, 
 provided always that this system were consistent with 
 itself. Give a mathematician such a false assumption 
 as that matter attracts other matter inversely according 
 to the distance (and not the square of the distance), and 
 he might construct from it an imaginary world, every 
 part of which would be in agreement with every other, 
 but no part in accordance with the reality of things. 
 It is imaginable that the truth which man discovers is 
 all of this description : a consistency between an un- 
 founded hypothesis, and the results following from it 
 according to the laws of our ideas. Some ideal philo- 
 sophers would be content with such a view of truth. 
 But then they think that this consistency is given by 
 the laws of reason, and that man can actually reach 
 truth, not it may be in congruity with phenomenal things, 
 
CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 353 
 
 but, with the principles of reason — some of them would 
 say absolute and eternal reason. But truth thus under- 
 stood is, according to our author's system, quite as much 
 beyond the reach of man as truth in the other sense. 
 For any accordance that there may be between our 
 ideas might be produced, not by independent reason, or 
 consequential reasoning, but by the association of ideas, 
 by the laws of contiguity or resemblance. When two 
 phenomena have been very often experienced in con- 
 junction, and have not, in any single instance, occurred 
 separately, either in experience or in thought : " When 
 " the bond between the two ideas has thus been firmly 
 " riveted, not only does the idea, called up by association, 
 " become, in our consciousness, inseparable from the idea 
 " which suggested it, but the facts or phenomena answer- 
 " ing to these ideas come at last to seem inseparable in 
 " existence : things which we are unable to conceive 
 " apart appear incapable of existing apart" (p. 191). 
 Thus 2 and 2 having been associated in our experience 
 with 4, we give them a relation in the nature of things ; 
 but if 2 and 2 had been followed by the appearance of 
 5, we should have had a like assurance of 2 + 2 and 5 
 being equal. Truth in Mr. Mill's philosophy is not 
 even a logical or rational consistency between ideas ; it 
 can be nothing more than an accordance of our ideas 
 with sensations, and laws of the association of sensation ; 
 which sensations come we know not whence, and are 
 associated by resemblances, existing we know not how, 
 or, more frequently by contiguity, implying no relation 
 of reason, no connexion in the nature of things ; and 
 
354 WHAT IS TRUTH? 
 
 very possibly altogether fortuitous, or absolutely fatal- 
 istic. 
 
 We see now the issues in which the doctrine of the 
 relativity of knowledge, as held by Mr. Mill, lands us. 
 The geometrical demonstrations of Euclid and Apol- 
 lonius and Newton may hold good only within our ex- 
 perience, and "a reasonable distance beyond." The 
 mathematics taught in Cambridge may differ in their 
 fundamental principles from those taught in the corre- 
 sponding university of the planet Jupiter ; where two 
 and two may make five, where two straight lines may 
 enclose a space, and where the three angles of a triangle 
 may be more than two right angles. Mr. Mill is ex- 
 ceedingly indignant at Dr. Mansel for maintaining that 
 the Divine morality is not to be measured by human 
 morality, declaring that " it is simply the most morally 
 pernicious doctrine now current" (p. 90). But I can 
 discover no ground on which the rebuker can stand, in 
 pronouncing such a judgment on Dr. Manser's applica- 
 tion of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. Any 
 one with half the acuteness of Dr. Mansel could show 
 that if two and two may make five, it is also suppos- 
 able that lying may be a virtue, and veracity a vice, in 
 other worlds ; and that God (if there be a God) may 
 commend deceit in the constellation of the Plough, even 
 as He encourages truthfulness in our world ; and this 
 doctrine, I rather think, is quite as " morally per- 
 nicious" as any now current, and certainly much more 
 so than that entertained by Dr. Mansel, who holds 
 resolutely (whether consistently or not) by an absolute 
 
CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 355 
 
 morality, which does not change with times or circum- 
 stances. 1 
 
 Some represent Mr. Mill as falling back upon the 
 position of Berkeley. And I suppose we may reckon 
 Mr. Mill as favouring all the negative statements of 
 Berkeley ; hut he has discarded all those grand views 
 and elevating sentiments which render Iris system so 
 attractive to certain minds. No consistent thinker can 
 stay at the place taken up by the Irish metaphysician ; 
 he had to give way before the Scotch one, — who used 
 the arguments against the independent existence of 
 matter, to undermine our belief in the independent 
 existence of mind. 2 Our author's system, both in its 
 
 1 " We can point to a doctrine which cannot be less morally pernicious 
 than Mr. Mansel's, than which none indeed can be more morally pernicious." 
 " If in some other world two and two may make five ; in some other 
 world what we regard as virtue may be vice, and our wrong may come 
 forth there as right" {London Quarterly Revietv, Jan. 1866). A very able 
 contributor to that periodical has anticipated Mr. Mill in many of his ob- 
 jections to Hamilton's philosophy, but rejects Mr. Mill's philosophy as a 
 substitute. 
 
 2 Some are looking with extreme anxiety to the course which the pupils 
 of Hamilton may adopt at this crisis in the history of philosophic thought. 
 It is clear, from their published writings, that Dr. Cairns and Dr. Calder- 
 wood will be prepared to defend natural realism, and the veracity of our 
 native convictions. But what line is to be taken by those who occupy 
 chairs of philosophy, and have students under them ? I am convinced that 
 they cannot now stand where their illustrious master endeavoured to 
 stand,— half way between Reid and Kant — between realities and forms. 
 Are they to fall back on an intuitive perception of things and necessary 
 truth ? Or, abandoning the position taken by Hamilton, and defended by 
 him in many a brave fight, are they to betake themselves to the lines occu- 
 pied by Kant or by Berkeley, and which have been found so utterly un- 
 tenable ? If they take the latter course, it will be seen by every shrewd 
 observer that they cannot stand one hour before the keen play of Mr. 
 Mill's musketry, or Mr. Spencer's heavier artillery. Those of their pupils 
 who may try to stand on the sliding-scale, will only thereby be made to 
 fall more rapidly to the base — where the school of Mill will welcome 
 them. 
 
356 WHAT IS TRUTH? 
 
 premisses and conclusion, has many striking analogies 
 to that of Hume. Does the one begin with sensations, 
 these are very much the same as the impressions of the 
 other. The later metaphysician is only following the 
 elder, in labouring to show we get our ideas out of 
 sensations and impressions, by means of association. 
 They concur in not knowing very well what to make of 
 time and space ; but neither allows them any separate 
 reality. Both hold that there is no such thing as sub - 
 stance ; that all we can know of mind is, that it is a 
 bundle of states or a series of feelings, to which we give 
 some sort of unity or permanence, not justifiable by 
 reason or any higher principle; and that body is an 
 unknown something, from which we suppose we get our 
 sensations. Both deny that we have any intuitive 
 conviction as to cause and effect ; and both make the 
 relation between these to consist in invariable or uncon- 
 ditional conjunction, within the limits of experience. 
 Both admit some sort of original power : Hume stands 
 up for innate instincts ; and Mr. Mill for an ultimate 
 belief in memory ; and it should be added that neither 
 knows very well what to make of these inborn princi- 
 ples. Both derive our motives originally from sensations 
 of pleasure and pain ; and both, it is well known, were 
 clear and eloquent expounders of the utilitarian theory 
 of morals. Nor is it unworthy of being mentioned, that 
 both point not unobscurely to changes, which they think 
 ought to be made, in the marriage relation. It should 
 be admitted, that with these prominent points of corre- 
 spondence there are also points of difference. Hume's 
 
CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 357 
 
 account of the relations which the mind of man can dis- 
 cover, is much more comprehensive than that of Mill. 
 On the other hand, it is pleasant to find that the writer 
 of this century assumes a higher moral tone than the 
 writer of the last ; both, however, concurring in over- 
 looking or despising the special Christian graces. But 
 the main difference lies in this, that Hume discovers 
 flagrant contradictions in human intelligences ; whereas 
 the other maintains that the most certain principles 
 reached by us, being all the product of circumstances, 
 might have to give way before new circumstances or in 
 other conditions. Hume had to say, that " the intense 
 " view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections 
 " in human reason has so wrought upon me and heated 
 " my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and 
 " reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more 
 " probable or likely than another." The modern author 
 is saved from all such contradictions ; for if one set of 
 experiences showed him that two and two make four, and 
 another that two and two make five, he would proclaim 
 both true in the different conditions. The consequence 
 is, that the one is an avowed sceptic or professed pyrrho- 
 nist — at least in many parts of his writings — delighting 
 to play off one dogmatist against another ; whereas the 
 other is a supporter of the doctrines of nescience and 
 relativity, holding that we can never reach truths which 
 may not be modified or set aside in other times and cir- 
 cumstances. I am not sure which of the issues is the 
 more blank : I rejoice that I do not feel myself required 
 to make a choice between them. 
 
358 WHAT IS TRUTH? 
 
 I hold that human intelligence begins with truth, 
 and if it proceeds properly it ends with truth ; which 
 may at times be mysterious, but never contradictory ; 
 which may be indefinitely enlarged, but cannot be up- 
 turned or reversed. In the course of these discussions 
 we have gathered the means of trying the supposed 
 verities proffered for our acceptance. There is to us no 
 one absolute criterion of all truth ; but there are tests 
 of the various kinds of truth, both of those with which 
 we start, and of those which we reach in our progress. 
 Of Intuition itself we have tests in self- evidence, neces- 
 sity, and universality. Of Eeasoning we have stringent 
 tests in the forms of the syllogism. By these two com- 
 bined we can try Demonstration, which consists in a 
 union of intuition and deduction. We have tests, too, 
 of truths reached in physical, in psychological, and in 
 historical investigation, by the - Collection of Facts. 
 These are to be found in the Canons of Induction and 
 in the Canons of Verification ; which we may confi- 
 dently expect to be more and more perfected in their 
 formalization and expression as the separate depart- 
 ments of knowledge make progress. 
 
 It is admitted that these criteria demand that we 
 leave unanswered many questions which the questioning 
 mind of man can put. Whatever alleged truth cannot 
 stand such tests should be regarded as unsettled, and 
 allowed to lie for the present in the land of darkness. 
 As we use the criteria we shall be led to see that there 
 are very stringent limits set to man's power of acquiring 
 knowledge. But we shall see at the same time how wide 
 
CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 359 
 
 is the field of inquiry, and even of certainty, thrown 
 open to us. Geology can carry us back in the history 
 of our earth to periods removed from us by millions of 
 years. Astronomy, aided by mathematics, lets us know 
 of the existence of bodies millions of miles away ; and, 
 aided by chemistry, gives us an insight into the com- 
 position of the atmosphere of a body so far removed 
 from us as the sun. Nor is it to be forgotten that, by 
 the observation of the evidences of design in nature, 
 combined with the principle of cause and effect, and our 
 moral convictions, we can rise to a most reasonable belief 
 in the existence of an Almighty and All-Perfect God. 
 Man should ever claim this wide field as an inheritance, 
 and allow no one, on any pretence, to deprive him of it. 
 And having such an inheritance he should be glad and 
 grateful, — the more so as, attending always to the tests 
 appointed to guide and guard, he can indefinitely widen 
 and extend his possessions. 
 
CHAPTEE XX. 
 
 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 In specifying the influences under which Mr. Mill's 
 opinions were formed, I might have referred to Jeremy 
 Bentham and his utilitarian theory, as having not a 
 little swayed the opinions of the young thinker, either 
 directly, or indirectly through his father, who was a 
 friend of Bentham's. But in this treatise I meant to 
 look more to Mr. Mill's general philosophic system than 
 his specially ethical views ; and however eminent as a 
 jurist, Bentham had no name as a metaphysician. Our 
 author's philosophy is essentially a combination of that 
 of Mr. James Mill and of M. Comte, — however, the 
 utilitarianism of the older Mill and of Bentham 
 thoroughly fits into the system. It would require a 
 volume instead of a chapter to discuss historically, 
 psychologically, and ethically the utilitarian theory. 
 We can touch here only on a few points intimately 
 connected with the preceding discussions. 
 
 I. Can Mr. Mill's psychological theory account for 
 the peculiar idea and conviction which we have in 
 regard to moral srood and evil? He admits that the 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 361 
 
 mature man in the advanced stages of society has a 
 conscience and moral ideas : let us inquire how he 
 generates them. And first, let us try to ascertain what 
 he makes the original motive powers or springs of action 
 in the mind of man. " The utilitarian doctrine is, that 
 " happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as 
 " an end" (p. 51). It is clear that he makes, as every 
 other philosopher does, the desire of personal pleasure 
 a primary motive to action. But I am not sure whether 
 he makes the desire of promoting the happiness of other 
 beings also an originating appetence in man. There- 
 are passages which look as if he did, or at least wished 
 to be regarded as doing so. In rearing his theory he is 
 ever appealing to " the social feelings of mankind ; " 
 and he maintains with Bentham, that man is urged to 
 the ' greatest happiness' principle both " by interest and 
 sympathy" (pp. 45, 47). " The idea of the pain of 
 " another is naturally painful ; the idea of the plea- 
 " sure of another is naturally pleasure" (Dis., p. 137). 
 I am sure that the great British moralists who lived 
 at the beginning of last century, have succeeded 
 in demonstrating that man is riot in his nature and 
 constitution an utterly selfish being, but is capable 
 of being swayed by a desire to promote the welfare 
 of others ; and the arguments of Shaftesbury, Hutche- 
 son, and Butler have been repeated and strengthened by 
 the Scottish school of philosophers generally, including 
 Beid, Stewart, and Brown, and by M. Cousin, and the 
 Eclectic school of France. But these writers have 
 shown that the same facts and arguments which lead 
 
362 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 us to admit an original principle of sympathy, require 
 us also to call in a cognitive and a motive moral power. 
 He allows as a psychological fact that virtue may 
 become " a good in itself, without looking to any end 
 beyond it," and that the mind is not in a right state 
 unless it love virtue " as a thing desirable in itself" 
 (p. 53). In indignantly repelling the objections of Dr. 
 Sedgwick, he maintains, " It is a fact in human nature 
 " that we have moral judgments and moral feelings. We 
 " judge certain actions and dispositions to be right, 
 " others wrong : this we call approving and disapproving 
 " them. We have also feelings of pleasure in the con- 
 " templation of the former class of actions and disposi- 
 " tions — feelings of dislike and aversion to the latter ; 
 " which feelings, as everybody must be conscious, do not 
 " exactly resemble any other of our feelings of pain or 
 " pleasure. Such are the phenomena ; concerning their 
 " reality there, is no dispute." He then seeks to account 
 for the phenomena by his famous principle of the 
 chemistry of the association of ideas. " The only colour 
 " for representing our moral judgments as the result of 
 " a peculiar part of our nature, is that our feelings of 
 " moral approbation and disapprobation are really 
 " peculiar feelings. But is it not notorious that peculiar 
 " feelings, unlike any others we have experience of, are 
 " created by association every day?" (Dis. pp. 139, 140.) 
 He instances the desire of power, the feelings of ambi- 
 tion, of envy, of jealousy, and of the miser towards his 
 gold. Now, as to some of these appetencies, I believe 
 them to be natural. We see them working strongly in 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 363 
 
 certain individuals, showing that they are elements of 
 their inborn character. We see them descending here- 
 ditarily from father or mother, to son or daughter or 
 grandchild ; and we find them stronger in certain 
 families and races than in others. As the love of power 
 is a native appetence by which men may be swayed, 
 surely the conscience and the felt obligation to do that 
 which is right may be the same. 
 
 But our present question is one not so much of mere 
 appetency or desires as of moral perceptions, judgments, 
 and sentiments. I grant that persons may be led by mere 
 prudence to attend to the duties of an outward morality, 
 and by a kindly disposition to relieve distress, altogether 
 irrespective of a moral sense. But there is a very 
 special obligation felt in regard to those actions which we 
 call moral, and which does not bear on other parts of our 
 conduct ; we are convinced that we ought to attend to 
 them, and that if we neglect to do so our conduct is blame- 
 worthy. Whence the very peculiar and profound ideas 
 denoted by the phrases ' obligation/ ' ought/ ' blame- 
 worthy.' Take the perception of conscience, that deceit 
 is a sin. Take the conviction, that we are not at liberty 
 to tell a lie when we might be tempted to do so. Take 
 the judgment, that the person who has committed the 
 act is guilty, eondemnable, punishable. Take the feel- 
 ing of remorse, which rises when we contemplate our- 
 selves as having told a falsehood. We have here a series 
 of mental phenomena quite as real and quite as worthy 
 of being looked at, as our very sensations, or beliefs of 
 the reality of the past in memory, or our expectation of 
 
364 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 the future. I am convinced that as these last are ad- 
 mitted to be ultimate (see p, a, t), so are the others 
 also. " This instinct/' says Isaac Taylor, " flushes in 
 " the cheek of every sensitive child, and it prevails 
 " over the laborious sophistications of the philosopher. 
 " This belief is cherished as an inestimable jewel by the 
 " best and purest of human beings ; and it is bowed to 
 " in dismay by the foulest and the worst ; its rudiments 
 " are a monition of eternal truth, whispered in the ear of 
 " infancy ; its articulate announcements are a dread fore- 
 " doom ringing in the ears of the guilty adult. You say 
 " you can bring forward a hundred educated men, who, 
 " at this time, will profess themselves to be no believers 
 " in a moral system ; but I will rebut their testimony 
 " by the spontaneous and accordant voices of as many 
 " millions of men as you may please to call for on the 
 " other side." 
 
 I have already examined the general theory which 
 generates a new idea by means of an association of 
 sensations, and have shown how little truth there is 
 in it (pp. 180-186). Give us mere sensations, say of 
 sounds, or colours, or forms, or of pleasure and pain, 
 and they will never be anything else in the reproduc - 
 tion of them than the ideas of sounds, colours, forms, 
 pleasures, or pains, — unless, indeed, there be some new 
 power introduced, and this new element in itself, or in 
 conjunction with the sensations, be fitted to produce a new 
 idea, and that very idea. In none of its applications is 
 the theory seen to fail so utterly, as in the attempt thus 
 to produce our moral perceptions. Provided we once 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 365 
 
 had the ideas, the laws of association might show how 
 they could be brought up again ; how in the reproduc- 
 tion certain parts might sink into shadow and neglect, 
 while others came forth into prominence and light ; and 
 how the whole feeling, by the confluence of different 
 ideas, might be wrought into a glow of intensity ; but 
 the difficulty of generating the ideas, such ideas, ideas so 
 full of meaning, is not thereby surmounted. The idea 
 I have of pain is one thing, and the idea I have of 
 deceit, that it is morally evil, condemnable, deserving of 
 pain, is an entirely different thing — our consciousness 
 being witness. On the supposition that there is a 
 chemical power in association to create such ideas as 
 those of duty and merit, sin and demerit, this chemical 
 power would be a native moral power ; not the product 
 of sensations, but a power above them, and adapted to 
 transmute them from the baser into the golden sub- 
 stance. 
 
 It will be needful at this place to correct a misappre- 
 hension into which Mr. Mill has fallen. He repre- 
 sents the intuitive school of morals as holding that 
 " the principles of morals are evident a priori" (p. 3). 
 Now I admit that influential members of the school 
 have used language fitted to warrant this statement. 
 But there are others, and these the wisest defenders of 
 intuition, who have given a different account. Our in- 
 tuitions are perceptions of individual objects or in- 
 dividual truths ; and in order to reach an axiom or 
 " principle of morals," there is need of a discursive pro- 
 cess of generalization. Our author makes the intuitive 
 
366 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 agree with the inductive school, in holding that " the 
 " morality of an individual action is not a question of 
 " direct perception, but of the application of law to an 
 " individual case." The proper account is that the law 
 is generalized out of our direct perceptions. On the bare 
 contemplation of an ungrateful spirit, the conscience at 
 once declares it to be evil, apart from the conscious 
 apprehension or application of any general principle. 
 The enunciation of the law is a reflective and not a 
 spontaneous process, and is undertaken when we wish 
 to construct a code of morals or a science of ethics. 
 This representation saves the intuitive theory of morals 
 from many of the specious objections urged against a 
 different version. Our moral intuitions are not a priori 
 forms, which the mind imposes on objects, but imme- 
 diate perceptions of qualities in certain objects, that is, 
 in the voluntary dispositions and actions of intelligent 
 beings. Taking this view of them, I believe they can 
 stand the tests which settle what truth is intuitive. 
 They are self-evident : on the simple apprehension of 
 disinterested love we declare it to be good and com- 
 mendable. They may be described, if we properly 
 explain the statement, as necessary: give us a correct 
 representation of a deed of intentional deceit for a selfish 
 end, and we condemn, and cannot be made to commend 
 it. They have, in a sense, even catholic consent 
 in their favour : all men will condemn deceit if it is 
 properly laid before them, but the deceit may be so 
 painted as that we do not see its true nature, and 
 then we give our approval, — not of the deceit, but of its 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 367 
 
 accompaniments. Mankind can be so deceived as to 
 give diverse judgments on moral actions, only by the 
 blinding influence of sin, disguising and distorting the 
 real nature of things. 
 
 II. Does utilitarianism embrace sufficient sanctions 
 to induce us to approve virtue and condemn vice ? 
 Our author labours to show that the motives usually 
 supposed to lead to virtue are left untouched by this 
 theory. But this is not the question, the main question ; 
 and if any defender of a priori morals had been guilty 
 of such an ignoratio elenchi, we can conceive that the 
 acute logician would have exposed it with extraordinary 
 zest. The question is not about sanctions which other 
 systems may employ, but it is, Does utilitarianism con- 
 tain within itself a body of motives, or motive powers, 
 fitted to lead to virtuous conduct ? If it does not, if it 
 is obliged to make us look elsewhere for motives, then 
 it is without one of the essential constituents of an 
 adequate theory of morals. Utilitarianism bids us seek 
 to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest 
 number. ' But why should I strive to attain this end V 
 asks the inquiring youth. Practically, and in reference 
 to his future conduct, theoretically, and as interested in 
 the science of ethics, he insists on a reply. 'Why 
 should I give up my immediate ease and comfort and 
 expected enjoyments, and restrain my strong native 
 impulses and indulged habits in order to look after 
 others, who may be quite able to look after them- 
 selves?' 'Or why, at the best, may I not content 
 myself with attending to the feelings and immediate 
 
368 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 wishes of the few persons in my family or circle, with 
 whose welfare my own is bound up, or of the single 
 person to whom I am attached ? ' As he presses these 
 questions he will not be satisfied to be told that other 
 ethical systems have sanctions, and that utilitarianism 
 leaves them where it found them. 
 
 But let us look at those sanctions with which it is 
 said the theory does not meddle. AYe may find, as to 
 some of the guarantees or sureties to which we are re- 
 ferred, that their credit is undermined, and that they are 
 rendered bankrupt, by the principles of the new philo- 
 sophy. Mr. Mill tells us, that if persons believe that 
 there is a God, they may still have the motives derived 
 from their religion to induce them to practise morality. 
 This starts the question, what religion has our author's 
 system left us ? It is clear that utilitarianism deprives 
 us of one of the arguments which has been felt by pro- 
 found thinkers to carry the greatest weight, that derived 
 from the moral law in the heart arguing a moral law- 
 giver. Xor is it to be forgotten, that our greatest 
 moralists have not been in the way of appealing first to 
 the Divine power or will, as a motive to lead us to do 
 good, but have rather sought, by the principles of an 
 independent morality, to show that we ought to obey 
 God. We may omit entering further into this inquiry 
 at present, as the whole subject of the relation of Mr. 
 Mill's philosophy to natural theology will come to be 
 discussed in next chapter. But we must look here at 
 some other sanctions which it is supposed utilitarianism 
 has left untouched. 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 369 
 
 " The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard 
 " of duty may be, is one and the same, a feeling in our 
 " own mind ; a pain more or less intense attendant on 
 " violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral 
 " natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking 
 " from it as an impossibility ; " and " the ultimate sanc- 
 " tion, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) 
 " being a subjective feeling in our own minds," he thinks 
 that utilitarianism has as powerful a sanction as any 
 other theory can have (pp. 40, 41). But it is not fair to 
 represent those who hold the opposite theory as making 
 the ultimate appeal, standard, and sanction, to be in 
 " feeling," in mere " subjective feeling," a " feeling of 
 pain " attendant on the violation of duty. It cannot be 
 said to consist in " feeling," except we use the phrase in 
 so wide and loose a sense as to include all mental opera- 
 tions, and the native principles of action from which 
 they spring. It should not be represented as a mere 
 " subjective feeling," for it points to and implies an 
 objective reality, a real good and evil in the voluntary 
 acts of intelligent beings, independent of our sense of it, 
 being in fact the object to which the sense looks. Still 
 less should it be regarded as a mere " feeling of pain ; " 
 it has been shown again and again by moralists, that the 
 feeling of pain rises in consequence of a prior percep- 
 tion of the evil of sin. According to our most esteemed 
 moralists, the mind, in looking at moral good and evil, 
 is exercising a higher attribute than mere feeling or 
 emotion. By some it is represented as a Sense looking 
 to and discerning a moral quality — as the eye discerns 
 
 2 A 
 
370 UTILITA RIANISM. 
 
 colour and surface. More frequently it is described as 
 Reason, or as analogous to Reason, and the Moral 
 Reason, which perceives at once the good and the evil, 
 and distinguishes between them, declaring the doing of 
 the one and the avoiding of the other to be obligatory 
 on all intelligent beings, and the one to be of good 
 desert and rewardable, and the other of evil desert and 
 punishable ; and the feeling of pleasure or pain is the 
 consequent and not the essence of the conviction. 
 
 But then the feeling, which is the essence of con- 
 science, is " all encrusted over with collateral associa- 
 " tions, derived from sympathy, from love, and still 
 " more from fear ; from all the forms of religious feeling ; 
 " from the recollections of childhood and of all our past 
 " life ; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, 
 ■' and occasionally even self-abasement." " Its binding 
 " force consists in the existence of a mass of feeling, 
 : ' which must be broken through in order to do what 
 " violates our standard of right, and which, if we do 
 " nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have 
 "to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse " 
 (p. 41). He reckons this complicated feeling as furnish- 
 ing quite as strong a sanction, and one quite as likely 
 not to be violated, as that which might be awakened by 
 a distinct moral faculty. Xow, I concede at once, that 
 other and secondary motives may and should gather 
 and cling round our primary conviction of duty, to aid 
 and strengthen it. But meanwhile, as the centre, and 
 in the last resort, as the support of them, there should 
 be recognised obligations of morality. The intelligent 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 371 
 
 youth, when lie comes to rise beyond his educational 
 beliefs, and to think for himself, will not be satisfied 
 with the mere existence of the mass of feeling ; he will 
 ask, Is it justifiable, is it binding ? If satisfied on this 
 point, then he will feel himself called on to encourage 
 all these associations, and to live under their influence. 
 But if not satisfied, if taught they have no obligation in 
 reason or the nature of things, then why should he not 
 uncoil them, as he does some other hereditary prepos- 
 sessions ; or even if he should be inclined to retain 
 them, will they not be apt to give way before the strong 
 and seductive temptations which are ever assailing him ? 
 Let it be observed of many of these associations which 
 have been gathered, and sentiments which have been gen- 
 dered, that they have been generated in individuals, or 
 grown up in a state of society, entertaining and cherish- 
 ing the belief that there is an independent rule of duty. 
 Such, for example, are our " religious feelings ; " such, 
 too, our "remorse;" such our "self-abasement," — they 
 arise mainly from the promptings of a conscience, which 
 carries with it its own authority and its own sanctions. 
 Bemove the support which bears them — as the stake 
 bears up the vine — and they will speedily fall, or rather 
 will never rise to any height. Let the school beware 
 lest, in striving to destroy the inborn sense and native 
 perceptions of good and evil, they be not doing as much 
 as within them lies to cut down the tree that lias borne 
 the fruit ; or, to use a still more familiar image, to kill 
 the hen that has laid the golden eggs. And as to the 
 " recollections of childhood and of our past lives," and 
 
372 UTILITA RIA XISM. 
 
 the feelings of " sympathy " and "self-esteem," and " the 
 desire of the esteem of others/' these can foster virtuous 
 sentiment and lead to virtuous conduct only where 
 there is a high moral and religious standard in the family, 
 and in the community, and may tend the opposite 
 way in other states of society; as, for instance, that 
 which existed in ancient Rome in the decline of the 
 empire, or among the educated classes in France in the 
 age before the Revolution, or which may be found in 
 certain circles in Paris at this present time. The vessel, 
 which is sailing along gracefully with its present struc- 
 ture, may be speedily dissolved and its crew wrecked, 
 when a magnet (to refer to a well-known fable) has 
 been applied, which draws out the bolts that kept the 
 parts together. 
 
 I deny that the two kinds of sanction are on the 
 same footing and of equal strength. The one sort is 
 derived from a mere agglomeration of feelings, which are 
 generated by associations created independently of our 
 choice, and mainly by outward contiguities. Some of 
 these, such as those mentioned by Mr. Mill, may be 
 laudable, and may tend to promote virtuous conduct. 
 But others, though arising from like associations, pro- 
 duced by the same circumstances, may be of an opposite 
 character. Such are the fears which spring from a 
 degraded superstition with its horrid ceremonials ; such 
 are the animal lusts that may grow up along with a 
 purer love ; such are the jealousy, malice, and envy 
 gendered by the rivalries of trade and fashion ; such are 
 the expectations excited when large pleasure and profit 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 373 
 
 to ourselves or others may be had by one bold deed of 
 selfishness ; and such is the despair awakened when 
 there has been a failure in the favourite ends of a man's 
 life. These feelings, growing from the same root of 
 associations and circumstances, will tend to moral evil 
 as the others do to good ; and surely it is of moment to 
 have a moral obligation above either, and calling on us 
 while we allow the one to disallow the other. How 
 vastly inferior must be the sanction supplied by this 
 conglomeration of associations to that which the higher 
 moral theory furnishes, when it declares that certain 
 affections, such as gratitude, and love, and justice, are 
 themselves good, and that certain other affections, 
 such as ingratitude, and malice, and deceit, are evil in 
 their very nature ; that the mind is organized to discern 
 the distinction between good and evil, just as it dis- 
 covers the difference between truth and error; that 
 the moral power by which it does this is not only in 
 the mind, but claims to be supreme there ; that it 
 implies and points to a God who is the guardian of the 
 law, and will call every man to account for the deeds 
 done in the body, whether they have been good or 
 evil. 
 
 III. Does utilitarianism furnish a sufficient test of vir- 
 tuous acts and of virtuous motives ? It tells us that a good 
 deed is one tending to promote the greatest happiness 
 of the greatest number. But in the complicated affairs 
 of this world, the most far-sighted cannot know for cer- 
 tain what may be the total consequences of any one 
 act ; and the great body of mankind feel as if they were 
 
374 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 looking out on a tangled forest, and need a guide to 
 direct them. Utilitarian moralists, like Bentham, may 
 draw out schemes of tendencies for us ; but the specific 
 rules have no obliging authority, and, even when under- 
 stood and appreciated, are difficult of application, and 
 are ever bringing us into cross avenues into which we 
 may be led by self-deceit. With no other standard 
 than ultimate tendency, the timid will ever be afraid to 
 act as never clearly seeing their way, while the bold will 
 ever be tempted at critical junctures, and in order to 
 gain ends which are dear to them, and which they have 
 identified with the good of their country, — as when 
 Julius Caesar crossed the Eubicon, and Louis Xapoleon 
 ventured on his coup cTetat, — to commit crimes in the 
 name of virtue. I am aware that on any theoretical 
 system men will commit sin ; but on this system they 
 will commit crimes of the highest order, and justify 
 themselves as they do so, on the ground of the great 
 advantages to be secured by themselves and others. 
 
 Mr. Mill's defence of the theory proceeds on the 
 principle, that there may be a distinction drawn be- 
 tween the virtuousness of the act and the virtuousness 
 of the agent. " He who saves a fellow-creature from 
 " drowning does what is morally right, whether his mo- 
 " tive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble ; 
 " he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a 
 " crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to , 
 " whom he is under greater obligations" (p. 26). The 
 test of a virtuous act is beneficial tendency, but what, is 
 the test of the virtuous motive ? Is it, too, beneficial 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 375 
 
 tendency ? Is the agriculturist who improves the soil, 
 so as to make it feed more men and cattle than it did 
 before, or the master manufacturer who sets up a large 
 public work which gives food to thousands, necessarily 
 virtuous, and this in proportion to the good done, and 
 though in the depths of his heart he may be influenced 
 1 >y no other consideration than the love of gain ? We 
 do run a considerable risk in these times of the pre- 
 valence of a cosmopolitanism, originating in a deeper 
 selfishness, and prosecuted in a spirit of self-righteous- 
 ness, and going on to overwhelm and supersede the 
 gentler and the humbler private and domestic virtues, 
 which our fathers so valued before utilitarianism was 
 heard of. But Mr. Mill is too wise a man to make 
 beneficial tendency a test of excellence in the agent. 
 " The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the 
 action, though much with the worth of the agent." He 
 tells us that it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian 
 mode of thought to conceive it as implying so wide a 
 generality as the world or morality at large, and he says 
 of M. Comte, that " he committed the error which is 
 " often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of 
 " utilitarian moralists : he required that the test of con- 
 " duct should also be the exclusive motive to it" {Comte 
 and Posit., p. 138). It is not very clear what constitutes 
 a virtuous agent, according to our author. . The follow- 
 ing statement is sufficiently vague, and yet it is the 
 clearest I can find on a point which should not be left 
 in uncertainty for a moment : " The great majority of 
 " good actions are intended not for the benefit of the 
 
3 7 6 UTILITA RIA NISM. 
 
 " world, "but for that of individuals, of which the good of 
 " the world is made up : and the thoughts of the most 
 " virtuous man need not on these occasions travel he 
 " yond the particular persons concerned, except so far 
 " as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting 
 " them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legiti - 
 " mate and authorized expectations, of any one else" 
 (l >. '2 7). There is some truth here, hut it is surely far from 
 being the full truth. The impelling motive of an action 
 entitled to be called virtuous is love, leading us to per- 
 form that which is right ; that is, according to moral law, 
 the law of God. The love is a well- spring ready to 
 burst forth, and the law is the channel provided in 
 which the stream may flow. Without the love there is 
 no virtue ; and without the love regulated by law there is 
 in > virtue — in the agent. It is to the credit of M. Comte 
 that, separating himself from cold utilitarianism, he- 
 reckoned love as of the essence of excellence : but it is 
 an evidence of the narrowness and bigotry which so 
 distinguished him, that he does not see that he has de - 
 rived this principle from Christianity, which he repre- 
 sents as deriving all its motives from the selfish fear of 
 hell and hope of heaven. 
 
 And what makes an action sinful according to this 
 philosophy ? It is still more difficult to find what is the 
 answer to that question. Sin is quite as much a fact of 
 consciousness and of our moral nature as even virtue. 
 ' Thou shaft not kill ;' ' Thou shaft not commit adultery;' 
 ' Thou shaft not steal ;' ' Thou shalt not bear false wit- 
 ness,' — these laws are clear, and the violation of them is 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 377 
 
 sin according- to Scripture, and according to conscience. 
 But what is sin according to utilitarianism ? It is 
 acknowledged not to be the mere omission to look to 
 the general good. What then does it consist in ? Mr. 
 Mill speaks of " reproach" being one of the checks on 
 evil ; but when is reproach justifiable ? Not knowing 
 what to make of sin, the system provides no place for 
 repentance. The boundary line between moral good 
 and evil is drawn so uncertainly, that persons will ever 
 be tempted to cross it without allowing that they have 
 done so, — the more so that they are not told what they 
 should do when they have crossed it, 
 
 IV. Does utilitarianism embrace all the virtues ? In 
 answering this question, it should at once be allowed 
 that the system contains an important body of truth ; 
 it errs only so far as it professes to embrace and unfold 
 the whole of morals. It is a duty devolving on all to 
 promote the happiness of their fellows. So far as the 
 system recommends this, it can have nothing erroneous, 
 — it should be added that it has nothing original. But 
 even at this point where it is supposed to be strongest, 
 it is found to fail when we narrowly examine it. For 
 whence can utilitarianism draw its motive and obliga- 
 tion to constrain us to look after the general happiness ? 
 He says, " No reason can be given why the general hap- 
 " piness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he 
 " believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness " 
 (p. 52). But it would need more acuteness than even 
 Mr. Mill is possessed of to show that this principle re- 
 quires us to promote the best interests of others. It is 
 
378 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 proper to refer to this here ; but I need not dwell upon 
 it, as I have urged it under another head. 
 
 Utilitarianism has a special merit in all questions of 
 jurisprudence. The reason can be given. The end of 
 legislation is not the maintenance of the law of God, 
 but the promotion of the interests of the nation. But 
 even in this department a higher morality has a place, 
 though only a negative one. The governing power is 
 not entitled to enact what is in itself sinful, on the pre- 
 tence of adding to the pleasures of the community. 
 The people of this country are right in their religious 
 and moral instincts when they declare that on no 
 pretence whatever should the Government take upon 
 itself the licensing of places of prostitution, even on the 
 pretence of regulating them, and restraining the evils 
 that flow from them. Nor is the magistrate at liberty 
 to punish an act unless it be sinful ; for example, he 
 would not be justified in punishing a person, who, with- 
 out meaning it, had brought infectious disease into a 
 city, whereby ten thousand inhabitants had perished ; 
 whereas he would be required to inflict a penalty for 
 the theft of a very small sum from a rich man who 
 never felt the loss. Why the difference ? Plainly be- 
 cause the former act is not a sin, that is, implied no 
 evil disposition, whereas the other does. But while 
 the civil government should punish only when sin has 
 been committed, and has thus to look to the moral law, 
 it does not punish sin as sin, but as inflicting injustice 
 on others, and injurious to the best interests of society. 
 The utilitarian theory, as developed by Bentham, has. 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 379 
 
 consequentially and historically, been the means of 
 alleviating the harshness of our penal code, and giving 
 a more benignant aspect to legislation generally. 
 
 Mr. Mill has given a contribution to public ethics in 
 his treatise on Liberty. The work is stimulating in its 
 spirit, but at the same time far from being satisfactory 
 in its results. It might have been expected in a re- 
 newed discussion on such a subject, after all that has 
 been written during the last two centuries, that we 
 should have had some principles laid down to guide us 
 as to the moral limits to be set to the expression of 
 sentiment, and the attempt to create a public feeling 
 against what we believe to be evil. A gentleman, let 
 me suppose, settles in my neighbourhood, of polite man- 
 ners, of cultivated mind, and apparently of general bene - 
 ficence. But he has a wife and a mistress, and maintains 
 that he is justified in having both, and might allowably 
 have more. What is to be my demeanour towards him ? 
 Am I to ask him to my house, and introduce him to my 
 sons and my daughters ? Am I never to speak against 
 him and his conduct, never to warn my family against 
 being influenced by his example ? Am I to hasten to 
 elect him to places of honour and trust in the parish or 
 in the town ? Or, if I decline thus to countenance him, 
 am I to be declared intolerant ? Eising beyond such 
 personal to public questions, am I not to protest against 
 a public evil, and seek to create a public sentiment 
 against it ? If I am not at liberty to do this, Mr. Mill 
 is laying clown a doctrine of liberty which is interfering 
 with my liberty. Such questions as these start points, 
 
380 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 on which many anxious to cultivate a spirit, not only 
 of toleration, but what is far higher, of charity, are 
 anxious to have light, which is not vouchsafed in this 
 treatise. 
 
 The spirit which it is fitted to engender is that of 
 ' individualism ;' and when it has had time to produce 
 its proper fruits, it will be found to have raised up a body 
 of young men who reckon it a virtue to be peculiar in 
 their opinions, and rather commendable to be eccentric. 
 The spirit of hero-worship produced indirectly by 
 German pantheism, and directly by the writings of 
 Carlyle, has happily lost its sway over our young men, 
 and is now to be found, in some of the remains of it, 
 only among literary gentlemen of respectable middle 
 age. But we are sure to be flooded in the coming 
 generation with something still more intolerable, in 
 ambitious youths each affecting to strike out a path of 
 his own, in opinion and sentiment, speculative, practical, 
 and religious. This spirit, as it runs to excess, will be 
 (juite as deleterious, and will be more foolish and offen - 
 sive, than the old habit of subjection to authority or 
 reverence for the great. The genuine temper is not a 
 prostration before antiquity or before genius on the one 
 hand ; but just as little is it a love of novelty or a 
 love of change on the other : it is a love of indepen - 
 dence, which, believing that truth in all important mat- 
 ters is attainable, sets out earnestly in search of it ; not 
 rejecting the old because it is old, or accepting the new 
 because it is new, but willing to take light from what- 
 ever quarter it may come. 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 381 
 
 While giving to utility an important place, I deny 
 that it is the only thing to be looked at as a good, 
 as a test, or as a standard. Take the duties we 
 owe to God, the love and reverence we should cherish 
 towards Him, and the worship we should pay Him in 
 private and in public. Surely man's moral nature justi- 
 fies him in holding that there are such duties : but on 
 what foundation can utilitarianism rest them \ Is it on 
 beneficial tendency to the individual or to society I So 
 far as the individual is concerned, the salutary influence 
 is produced on his spirit only when he pays the ser- 
 vice, because it is right. If he is constrained to render 
 it from any other motive, it will rather chafe and irri- 
 tate, and end in unbelief and rebellion. And as to 
 worship paid to God merely for the good of the com- 
 munity, it is the very consummation of public hypo- 
 crisy — which in the end would deceive no one. Th<- 
 defenders of the utilitarian theory, in the form given to 
 it by Bentham, have never attempted to build upon it 
 a code of religious duties. I believe that any attempt 
 of this description would only show that the foundation 
 was not broad or deep enough to bear such a super 
 structure. The same may be said of not a few of the 
 duties we owe to our fellow-men. Take gratitude for 
 undeserved favours. I would not choose to found it on 
 the mere desire to promote our own happiness or that 
 of the person from whom the benefit has come : in order 
 to be a virtue, it must spring from a sense of the duty 
 we owe to the benefactor. 
 
 There are symptoms of a renewed attempt being made 
 
382 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 in our age to construct a morality without a godliness. 
 I speak of it as a renewed attempt, for it has been tried 
 before. In the second century, when paganism was 
 losing its hold of educated minds, and young Christianity 
 was advancing with such rapid strides, an attempt was 
 made by the Neo -Platonic School of Alexandria to 
 construct a theology, and, by the Stoic School of Eome 
 a morality, higher than that of the Bible. Every stu- 
 dent of history knows how these schemes were soon 
 seen to terminate in a humiliating failure. The Neo- 
 Platonic ecstasy evaporated into empty air, and the 
 Stoic self-sufficiency hardened into offensive pride ; and 
 neither offered any effectual resistance to the triumph- 
 ant march of a religion suited in every way to the 
 wants of man's nature. Analogous projects have been 
 devised and are being recommended in our day. For 
 some time past the God of the Bible has been repre- 
 sented as not sufficiently pure — as being too anthropo- 
 morphic ; and mystic thinkers have sought to picture 
 to us a God of a more spiritual and ethereal character. 
 This style of thinking in Germany has issued from, or 
 culminated in, a shadowy pantheism, which, followed 
 to its logical and practical consequences — as it will be 
 in this country — must identify God with the evil as 
 w T ell as with the good, or in fact make evil only a form 
 of good. And now it looks as if we are to have persons 
 presenting to us a morality higher and broader than that 
 of the New Testament. 
 
 After speaking hi very exalted terms of the doctrines 
 and precepts of Christ, Mr. Mill asserts " that man}' 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 383 
 
 " essential elements of the highest morality are among 
 " the things which are not provided for, nor intended to 
 " be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the 
 " Founder of Christianity, and which have been entirely 
 " thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis 
 " of those deliverances by the Christian church. And 
 " this being so, I think it a great error to persist in at- 
 " tempting to find in the Christian doctrine that com- 
 " plete rule for our guidance, which its author intended to 
 " sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide." " I 
 " believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved 
 " from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by 
 " side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regene- 
 " ration of mankind" {Liberty, pp. 91-92). Now, it may 
 be admitted that the precepts of the Word of God do not 
 contain specific directions as to what mankind should 
 do in the infinitely varied positions in which they may 
 be placed. The Christian system first shows the sinner 
 how he may be delivered from the burden of past sin, 
 which so weighs him clown in his efforts after regenera- 
 tion. It then furnishes motives to induce him to per - 
 form the duties which devolve upon him. It enjoins, as 
 the regulating principle of our conduct, love to God and 
 love to man. It lays down many and varied precepts 
 as to how we should feel and what we should do, in 
 very many and varied situations, and supplies numerous 
 warnings against evil, and examples of good. Speaking 
 as unto wise men, it leaves the rest to ourselves, to the 
 motives which it has called forth, and the royal law 
 of love, which is its grand moving and ruling principle. 
 
384 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 ^\Ir. Mill is not very specific as to what lie supposes 
 the code of Christian morality to be deficient in. 
 He complains of our " discarding those secular standards 
 " (as for want of a better name they may be called) 
 " which heretofore co-existed with and supplemented 
 " the Christian ethics." But 1 believe this has been pro 
 vided for in such passages as these, scattered every 
 where : " Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever tilings 
 " are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever 
 " things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatso 
 " ever things are of good report ; if there be any virtue, 
 " and if there be any praise, think on these things." 
 Narrow Christians may have overlooked some of these 
 graces and virtues ; but in order to correct them, we do 
 not require to go beyond the Scriptures themselves. 
 He fixes on one department of duty which he supposes 
 to be neglected in the Word of God, and that is the 
 duty we owe to the State : " In the purely Christian 
 ethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed 
 or acknowledged." I am amazed, I confess, at this 
 charge. The history of ancient Israel, recorded in the Old 
 Testament, exhibits the most fervent patriotism in every 
 page. How nobly does it burst forth in the exclamation 
 of the Psalmist, " If I forget thee, Jerusalem," etc. 
 Paul has caught the same spirit : " Brethren, my heart's 
 desire and prayer for Israel is, that they might be saved." 
 We find it burning and flaming in the bosom of our 
 Lord himself: "0 Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would 
 " I have gathered thy children together, even as a 
 " hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 385 
 
 " would not." The Word of God requires obedience 
 from the subject : " Eender therefore to all their dues ; 
 tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, 
 fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour." But he 
 adds, " It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience ; 
 " it inculcates submission to all authorities thought 
 " established, who indeed are not to be actively obeyed 
 " when they command what religion forbids, but who 
 " are not to be resented, far less rebelled against, for 
 " any amount of wrong to ourselves." I admit that the 
 Bible does not give minute rules as to when subjects may 
 claim the right to refuse obedience, — nor do I know of 
 any moral code that does. But it prescribes the function 
 of governors : " A minister of God to thee for good," 
 " sent for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the 
 praise of them that do well." I do believe that Chris- 
 tians are not at liberty to rebel merely because of wrong 
 done to themselves personally. But when the governor 
 commands what is evil in itself, when the government 
 ceases to fulfil its proper office, Christians have thought 
 themselves entitled, always with excessive reluctance, to 
 resist, and have drawn their warrant from the Word of 
 God. So at least thought the Huguenots of France, and 
 the Puritans of England, and the Covenanters of Scot- 
 land, and the Bishops at the Bevolution Settlement; and 
 their descendants, who have inherited the blessings 
 secured through them, have been proud of the example 
 they set. 
 
 Mr. Mill and his school have, unfortunately, not drawn 
 out this code of morality, which is to be purer and nobler 
 
 2 B 
 
3S6 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 than the Christian. But we may gather what it would 
 be from occasional statements. With perhaps some few 
 additions, it would probably be such as we find in 
 the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the 
 Eoman emperor who so rigorously opposed the progress 
 of Christianity. Mr. Mill says of his writings, that 
 " they are the highest ethical product of the ancient 
 mind/ 5 and that they " differ scarcely perceptibly, if 
 they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings 
 of Christ" (76. p. 49). Surely Mr. Mill forgets that 
 Jesus began his public teaching by " preaching the 
 " gospel of the kingdom of God, and saying, The time is 
 " fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand : repent 
 " ye, and believe the gospel" (Mark i. 14, 15) ; that the 
 first beatitude and the second beatitude in the Sermon 
 on the Mount are, " Blessed are the poor in spirit ; " 
 " Blessed are they that mourn;" and the prayer com- 
 manded is that of the publican, " God be merciful to 
 me a sinner." I have met with no such injunctions, no 
 such spirit, in the Meditations of Antoninus. This work 
 of the heathen emperor was much read by the moral 
 school of divines last century; and the precepts en- 
 joined were those they recommended. We know the 
 result. The self-righteous system, whether recommended 
 by the stoic moralists in ancient times, or by the 
 rationalists of last century, was favourably regarded by 
 a few persons belonging to the middle class, mostly in 
 comfortable worldly circumstances, and not in a position 
 to be much in fear of poverty, or the deeper trials of 
 life. In them it produced or favoured a spirit of self- 
 
UTILITARIANISM. 387 
 
 sufficiency and pride, which tended to make their 
 characters hard and unlovely, and exposed them often 
 to grievous falls, from which it could not lift them. 
 And as to the great body of the people of all classes, 
 but especially the poor, the tried, and the unfortunate, 
 they turned away from it with loathing, as not adapted 
 to their wants and circumstances, pretending, as it did, 
 to keep up by their own strength those who felt that 
 they needed higher support, and providing no means of 
 raising the lapsed or comforting the mourner. I do not 
 allow that it would be an elevation of morality to set 
 aside the peculiar Christian graces of penitence, meek- 
 ness, and humility, and to substitute for them a sense of 
 honour, a sense of our own merits, and a spirit of self- 
 sufficient independence. 
 
CHAPTEE XXI 
 
 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 The School of M. Comte, both in its French and 
 British departments, is essentially a Sect, separated 
 from other philosophies, and with very narrow sym- 
 pathies. It has been made so partly by the circum- 
 stance that its adherents were at first few, and had to 
 meet not only with opposition but with contempt from 
 the leading metaphysicians of the age ; but it is so es- 
 sentially, because it has cut itself off from the streams 
 which flow down from the past, and, like a pool, it has 
 no connexion with anything beyond itself. Though no 
 longer a small body, and though by their intellectual 
 power and perseverance they have compelled their op- 
 ponents to respect them, the disciples have still the ex- 
 clusiveness of a sect : they read one another, they quote 
 one another, and they criticise one another, they are in- 
 capable of appreciating any other philosophy. The two 
 articles of their creed, and the two points that unite 
 them, are the theory of nescience, and that of the steps 
 by which knowledge has made progress. I have been 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 389 
 
 examining the first all throughout this work. Before I 
 close I must notice the other. 
 
 The famous lav/ of sociology, as developed by M. 
 Comte, is about as rash a generalization as was ever 
 made by a Presocratic physiologist, a mediaeval school- 
 man, or a modern German speculator. It realizes the 
 description given by Bacon of empiricists, who are re- 
 presented as rising at once from a limited observation 
 of facts to the highest and widest generalizations. The 
 theory contains a small amount of truth, which it has 
 misunderstood and perverted. In the early ages of the 
 world, and in simple states of society at all times, man- 
 kind are inclined to see God or the gods as acting with- 
 out any secondary instrumentality, in operations which 
 are found subsequently to take place according to natural 
 law. The reason of this is very simple, and very ob- 
 vious, and has often been noticed : it is that mankind 
 are prompted by the native principle of causation to 
 seek for a cause to every event, while they have not so 
 large an experience as to enable them to discover the 
 uniformity in the cosmos. This state of society con- 
 stitutes what M. Comte calls the Theological Era ; 
 which, however, does not imply that men are more dis- 
 posed to see God in His works, and to worship, love, and 
 obey Him, than in other ages ; but simply that they 
 believe Him to act or interpose by a free operation, 
 independent of all physical causation. 
 
 As observation widens and intelligence advances, men 
 learn to abstract and generalize upon the phenomena of 
 nature. They are apt to do so in the first instance — as being 
 
390 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 the easiest method — by mere mental force or inward cogita- 
 tion. Not having learned to perform experiments, they 
 cannot distinguish between the various subtle powers 
 and elements which operate in nature, nor to make what 
 Bacon calls the necessary " rejections and exclusions." 
 Generalizing the obvious facts, they represent the sun 
 and stars as moving daily round the earth, and, as they 
 find they cannot thus explain the whole phenomena, 
 they give a special motion to the moon and planets, and 
 call hi eccentrics and epicycles. Or, abstracting what 
 seems common in the obvious operations of earthly 
 agents, they represent the components of the universe as 
 being the fiery, the aerial, the aqueous, and the solid 
 powers ; and speak of certain bodies being in their very 
 nature light and others heavy. This is what is called the 
 Metaphysical Era. Not that mankind are then inclined 
 to cultivate metaphysics in any proper sense of the term, 
 or more than any other department of inquiry ; but 
 simply that they hasten to grasp the operations of nature 
 within and without them by mental acts, and have not 
 learned — what it required a Bacon to tell us — that in- 
 vestigation must proceed gradually, and by means of 
 enlarged observation and careful experiment. So far 
 from being in any peculiar sense a metaphysical age, it 
 sought to penetrate into all the departments of nature, 
 and inquired into the origin and structure of the uni- 
 verse, and the movements of the celestial bodies. It did 
 enter upon metaphysical subjects, but it was as it rushed 
 into physiological and astrological speculations ; and it 
 discussed them all in the same spirit. The Presocratic 
 
XATURAL THEOLOGY. 391 
 
 schools, for example, did inquire into the nature of 
 knowing, and being, and the human soul ; but it was as 
 they inquired into the primary principle or elements of 
 the universe. They satisfied themselves with a few 
 common observations, and then proceeded to apply 
 thought to them. In pure metaphysical questions they 
 distinguished in a rude way between Sensation and 
 Reason, and when this division was found insufficient, 
 they called in a vague intermediate principle called 
 Opinion or Faith. Such ages have no special title to be 
 called the Metaphysical Era : they treat physics and 
 metaphysics in the same undistinguishing and uncertain 
 manner. Nor are they to be regarded as necessarily 
 non-theological ages. No doubt there were curious 
 questions started, which could not be settled, as to the 
 relation between these rapidly generalized and abstract 
 powers, and the gods who ruled in heaven. There were 
 thus stirred theological questions which tended to under- 
 mine the old superstitions, and to prepare the way for a 
 better era. It was at this time — ' the fulness of time ' 
 — that Christianity was introduced as a seed into a soil 
 ploughed to receive it. 
 
 In the natural advancement of intelligence, especially 
 after the great awakening of thought in the sixteenth 
 century, it was felt that the old methods were waxing 
 old, and must soon vanish away. These methods are 
 happily described by Bacon as the ' Rational' so presump- 
 tuous, the 'Empirical' so narrow, and the ' Superstitious' 
 which made religion accomplish what could be clone only 
 by science. At this time there appeared such men as 
 
392 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 Galileo practising careful experiment, and Bacon himself 
 to expound the general principles of the true mode 
 of procedure — of which method the Positive Philosophy 
 is merely a monstrous outgrowth. This Era should be 
 called the Inductive. It may be quite as metaphysical 
 as the previous ones, only it will conduct the investiga- 
 tions in a new spirit and mode, that is, according to the 
 Method of Induction. This new spirit (though the 
 method was not yet properly understood) sprang up in 
 the seventeenth century, and was fostered by such men 
 as Descartes, who taught us to look into the mind to 
 discover its operations, and by Locke, who appealed to 
 experience. Since that time an inductive mental science, 
 distracted from time to time by an ambitious a priori, 
 or by a narrow empirical philosophy, has run parallel to 
 physical science. Nor is this era necessarily an untheo- 
 logical one. Never were questions of divinity discussed 
 so keenly as in the ages when the inductive spirit sprang 
 up, and was applied to the study of the human mind. 
 And I believe that there is as much, and as intense, 
 religious feeling in our country at this present time as 
 there ever was in any country since man appeared on 
 the earth ; and sooner or later there will be a tremen- 
 dous reaction against the present attempt to deaden the 
 religious instincts among our young men by a cold 
 unbelief. No doubt educated men cannot now see the 
 constant interpositions of Gocl which were noticed in 
 early ages ; but it is because they take an enlarged and 
 enlightened view of the course of nature, which they re- 
 gard as ordered by God in infinite wisdom, and as the 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 393 
 
 expression of His will, and not requiring to be inter- 
 fered with. It is all true that men with a proud and 
 self-dependent spirit may now find it easier to dis- 
 believe in a personal God, and to band over the universe 
 to unconscious natural law. But the truth is, persons 
 who do not like to retain a pure and holy God in their 
 hearts, had at all times an outlet. That outlet was fur- 
 nished in ancient times by superstition, which degraded 
 the Divine character, and in modern times by infidelity, 
 which denies His existence or His constant operation. 
 
 It is a pleasant circumstance to reflect upon, that 
 nearly all the great philosophers of ancient and modern 
 times have been anxious to show that their systems 
 favour religion. There is every reason to believe that 
 the Ionian physiologists recognised the Divine existence 
 and the Divine agency : certainly Anaxagoras, who 
 seems to have been the greatest of them, allotted the all- 
 important place in his system to the Divine Intelligence. 
 The founder of the Eleatic School, Xenophanes, while he 
 ridiculed the popular mythology, represented God as the 
 essential existence. We know little of the Pythagorean 
 system, but it is clear that it had a Zeus as the centre 
 of the order which it delighted to unfold. The two 
 great truths which Socrates held by firmly, amidst his 
 doubts and his love of dialectic, were the providence of 
 God, and the tendency of virtue in the government of 
 God to promote happiness. When Plato rises above 
 the intellectual gymnastic which he so delighted to 
 exercise, it is to merge his philosophy in a theology in 
 which the God is represented as for ever contemplating 
 
394 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 eternal ideas, and developing all things according to 
 them. Even Aristotle, cold though he be in his 
 references to divine subjects, falls back on God as the 
 principle and ground of all things. In the Stoic system 
 there was a fiery deity, who pervaded all nature, and 
 continued unchanged amidst the periodical conflagration 
 of all things. Cicero wishes everywhere to be thought 
 a pure theist ; and the later Latin Stoics; such as 
 the philosophic emperor, were more religious than the 
 Greek founders of the school. Mediaeval scholasticism 
 consisted essentially in the application of Logic to 
 Theology. In the reaction of the sixteenth and seven- 
 teenth centuries, philosophic thinkers delighted to show 
 that their systems could bear up and confirm true 
 religion. Bacon excluded final causes from physics, but 
 gave them and formal causes a place in the higher field 
 of metaphysics, which stand next to and support theo- 
 logy at the apex of the pyramid. Descartes maintained 
 that the mind has an idea of the infinite and perfect, 
 which implies the existence of an infinitely perfect 
 Being. Locke wrote much on religious subjects, and in 
 the Fourth Book of his Essay, he shows that his system 
 leads to a reasonable belief in the existence of a sjriritual 
 Being. The founders of the German School, Leibnitz 
 and Kant, embraced the existence of God as essential 
 parts of their philosophies, and in this they were followed 
 by the ideal pantheists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
 The Scottish School, from Hutcheson to Hamilton, in- 
 cluding Brown, has been at great pains to expound and 
 defend the great truths of natural religion. 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 395 
 
 It is surely an ominous circumstance, that in this the 
 nineteenth century there should arise a system of philo- 
 sophy, supported by very able men, and with very ex- 
 tensive ramifications and applications, especially in 
 social science, but which contains within it no argument 
 for the Divine existence, or sanctions to religion. The 
 founder of the school was an avowed, indeed a rabid, 
 atheist ; and I am not aware that any of his French 
 followers have made any profession of religion, — most 
 of them are favourers of a materialism, which does not 
 admit of a spiritual God. 1 The British branch of the 
 school seems, with one accord, and evidently on a system, 
 to decline uttering any certain sound on the subject ; 
 they certainly do not pretend that their philosophy, em- 
 bracing though it does, all mental, moral, and social 
 problems, requires us to believe in the existence of God, 
 in the immortality of the soul, or a day of judgment. 
 Mr. Mill's method of dealing with the subject is uniform, 
 and evidently designed. Though fond of uttering 
 opinions on most other topics, he declines saying what 
 are his convictions, or whether he has any convictions, 
 in regard to religious truth. He satisfies himself with 
 declaring, that if you believe in the existence of God, or 
 in Christianity, I do not interfere with you. He does 
 not pretend that his philosophy does of itself give any 
 aid or sanction to religion ; but if we can get evidence 
 otherwise, he assures us that he does not disturb us. 
 
 i A vigorous opposition is being offered to the prevailing Materialism 
 by a number of able French writers, as M. Cousin, M. Eemusat, and 
 M. Janet (see his Materialisme Contemporain) . 
 
396 XATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 Without saying that it has convinced him, he speaks 
 with great respect of the argument from design in favour 
 of the Divine existence, and advises us to stick by it, 
 rather than resort to a priori proof. The advice is a 
 sound one. The greater number, even of metaphysicians, 
 are in doubts whether there has ever been an a priori 
 argument constructed by Ansehn, by Descartes, by 
 Leibnitz, or by Clarke, which can of itself prove the 
 existence of God, apart from the observation of the traces 
 of wisdom and goodness in the Divine workmanship. 
 The reaction against the argument from final cause, 
 which has been fostered by the German metaphysics for 
 the last age, is far from being a wise or a healthy spirit 
 and sentiment. The proof from design is that which 
 ever comes home with most force to the unsophisticated 
 mind. 
 
 But the important question is not about our author's 
 personal predilections and convictions, but is, — Does his 
 philosophy undermine the arguments for the existence 
 of Deity, and the immortality of the soul, and a day of 
 accounts ? It is clear that many of the old proofs cannot 
 be advanced by those who accept his theory. The 
 argument from catholic consent can have no value on 
 such a system. That derived from the moral faculty in 
 man, so much insisted on by Kant and Chalmers, is no 
 longer available when it is allowed that the moral law 
 has no place in our constitution, and that our moral 
 sentiments are generated by inferior feelings and associ- 
 ated circumstances. But then, he tells us, that the 
 Design argument " would stand exactly where it does " 
 
XATURAL THEOLOGY. 397 
 
 (p. 210). I doubt much whether this is the case. I see 
 no principles left by Mr. Mill sufficient to enable us to 
 answer the objections which have been urged against it 
 by Hume. Kant is usually reckoned as having been 
 successful in showing, that the argument from design 
 involves the principle of cause and effect. We see an 
 order and an adaptation in nature, which are evidently 
 effects, and we look for a cause. Has Mr. Mill's doctrine 
 of causation left this proof untouched ? Suppose that 
 we allow to him that there is nothing in an effect which 
 of itself implies a cause ; that even when we know that 
 there is a cause, no light is thereby thrown on the nature 
 of that cause ; that the causal relation is simply that of 
 invariable antecedence within the limits of our ex- 
 perience ; and that beyond our experience there may be 
 events without a cause, — I fear that the argument is 
 left without a foundation. And there are other questions 
 pressing on our notice, and demanding an answer. Can 
 God be shown to be infinite on the principles of this 
 philosophy ? If so, what are these principles ? If God 
 exists as a designer, is He also a moral governor ? Will 
 He call His creatures to account, and reward those who 
 do good, and punish those who do evil ? Is this world the 
 only world to us, or is there another ? It is clear that the 
 argument drawn from the abiding, the substantial, and 
 spiritual nature of the soul is entirely cut off by a philo- 
 sophy which makes mind a mere series of feelings. The 
 more convincing argument from God's justice calling His 
 responsible creatures to account, can have little or no 
 force in a system which admits no independent morality. 
 
398 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 I should like, I confess, to have the proof and the 
 doctrine of natural religion drawn out according to this 
 philosophy. The argument for the being of a God 
 founded on any native principles is unavailable, but we 
 are allowed to weigh the a posteriori evidence. It is 
 conceivable that the adherents of the system may thread 
 their way through the series of feelings and possibilities 
 of sensations, and as they do so discover traces of what, 
 if done by man, would be reckoned design and benefi- 
 cence : but whether these phenomena within our expe- 
 rience entitle us to argue that there is a Being beyond 
 who has caused them, is a question in regard to which 
 some are waiting for light, to come from the head of the 
 school or some other quarter. Those who believe that 
 an effect of itself implies a cause, have no hesitation in 
 concluding that the design in nature implies a designer ; 
 and those who look on man as having a moral nature, 
 and constrained by inward principles to believe in 
 infinity, can clothe the designer with moral and infinite 
 perfections. But there are not a fe*w, both of those who 
 oppose and those who support Mr. Mill, who cannot see 
 that his system warrants us in reaching any such result. 
 And there is the more puzzling inquiry, whether there 
 is proof that the thread or prolonged throb of conscious- 
 ness exists after its external bodily conditions or possi- 
 bilities have been evidently dissolved by death. These 
 are questions which some of our youths, who have com- 
 mitted themselves to this philosophy, are sporting with 
 in utter levity, and which are wringing the hearts of 
 others till feelings more bitter than tears burst from 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 399 
 
 them : and what are they to do in this transition state, 
 with the old undermined and the new not yet con- 
 structed ? 
 
 I have carefully refrained throughout this work from 
 urging any argument from consequences, or from reli- 
 gious considerations, against the philosophy I am ex- 
 amining. I have, to the best of my ability, and with 
 an anxious desire to reason fairly, met my distinguished 
 opponent on the ground of consciousness, and of legiti- 
 mate inference from it. But neither he nor I, neither 
 those who follow nor those who oppose him, can avoid 
 looking at the results. Scepticism, as Hume delights to 
 show, can produce no mischief in the common secular 
 affairs of life, because there man is ever meeting with 
 circumstances which keep him right in spite of his 
 principles or want of principles. But it is very different 
 in those questions which fall to be discussed in higher 
 ethics and theology. A man will not be tempted by 
 any sophistry to doubt the connexion of cause and 
 effect when he is thirsty and sees a cup of water before 
 him ; in such a case he will at once put forth his hand 
 and take it, knowing that the beverage will refresh him. 
 But he may be led by a wretched sophistry to deny the 
 necessary relation of cause and effect when it would 
 lead him upward from God's works to God Himself, or 
 to seek assurance and peace in Him. Hence the im- 
 portance of not allowing fundamental truth to be 
 assailed : not because the attack will sway any one in 
 the common business of life, but because it may hold 
 back and damp our higher aspirations, moral and re- 
 
400 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 ligious. I put no question as to the religious convic- 
 tions of its supporters ; but I may surely ask — What is 
 the religion left us by the new philosophy ? 
 
 M. Comte provided a religion and a worship for his 
 followers. He had no God, but he had a ' Grand Etre/ 
 in Collective Humanity, or " the continuous resultant of 
 all the forces capable of voluntarily concurring in the 
 universal perfectioning of the world" — being in fact a 
 deification of his system of science and sociology. In 
 the worship he enjoined he has nine sacraments, and a 
 priesthood, and public honours to be paid to the Collec- 
 tive Humanity ; but with no public liberty of conscience, 
 or of education, in sacred or indeed in any subjects. The 
 religious observances were to occupy two hours every 
 day. Mr. Mill tells us, " Private adoration is to be ad- 
 " dressed to Collective Humanity in the persons of worthy 
 " individual representatives, who may be either living or 
 " dead, but must in all cases be women ; for women, being 
 " the sexe aimant, represent the best attribute of huma- 
 " nity, that which ought to regulate all human life, nor can 
 " Humanity possibly be symbolized in any form but that 
 " of a woman. The objects of private adoration are the 
 " mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing seve- 
 " rally the past, the present, and the future, and calling 
 " into active exercise the three social sentiments — vene- 
 " ration, attachment, and kindness. We are to regard 
 " them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian angels, 
 " ' les vrais anges gardiens/ If the last two have never 
 " existed, or if, in the particular case, any of the three 
 " types is too faulty for the office assigned to it, their 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 401 
 
 " place may be supplied by some other type of womanly 
 " excellence, even by one merely historical" (Comte and 
 Posit, p. 150). The Christian religion surely does not 
 suffer by being placed alongside this system, which is 
 one of the two new religions which this century has 
 produced — the other being Mormonism. The author 
 clung more and more fondly to this faith and ceremonial 
 as he advanced in years. His English followers are 
 ashamed of it, and ascribe it to his lunacy, — as if he had 
 not been tinged with madness (as his poor wife knew) 
 all his life, and as if his whole system had not been 
 the prod ict of a powerful but constitutionally diseased 
 intellect. 
 
 He denounces his English followers, because they did 
 not adopt his moral and social system ; he characterizes 
 the conversion of those who have adopted his positivity 
 and rejected his religion as an abortion ; and declares 
 that it must proceed from impotence of intellect, or in- 
 sufficiency of heart, commonly from both ! {Polit Posit, 
 tome I. pref. p. xv. ; in. p. xxiv.) There is a basis of 
 wisdom in this complaint. All history shows that man 
 is a religious, quite as certainly as he is a feeling, and 
 a rational being. But what has the British School 
 provided to meet man's religious wants ? As yet they 
 have furnished nothing. But Mr. Mill, who always 
 weighs his words, and who is too skilful a dialectician 
 to say more than he means, evidently points to some- 
 thing which is being hatched, and may some day burst 
 forth. While he has the strongest objection to the 
 system of politics and morals set forth in the Politique 
 
 2 C 
 
402 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 Positive, he thinks " it has superabundantly shown the 
 " possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even 
 " without the belief in a Providence, both the psycholo- 
 " gical power and the social efficacy of a religion : making 
 " it take hold of human life, and colour all thought, feel- 
 " ing, and action, in a manner of which the greatest 
 " ascendency ever exercised by any religion may be but 
 " a type and foretaste " ( TJtil., p. 48). More specifically in 
 his latest work he says, that " though conscious of being 
 in an extremely small minority," — a circumstance which 
 is sure to catch those ' individualists' who are bent on 
 appearing original — " we venture to think that a religion 
 " may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion 
 " without a God may be, even to Christians, an in- 
 " structive and profitable object of contemplation" 
 (Gomte and Posit., p. 133). He tells us, that in order to 
 constitute a religion, there must be " a creed or convic- 
 tion," " a belief or set of beliefs," " a sentiment connected 
 with this creed," and a " cultus." I confess I should like 
 excessively to see this new religion, with its creed and 
 its cultus, fully developed. It would match the theolo- 
 gies, with their ceremonial observances, projected by doc- 
 trinaires in the heat of the French Eevolution. There 
 is no risk of the British School setting up a religion and 
 a worship so superbly ridiculous as that of M. Comte, 
 but I venture to predict that when it comes, it will 
 be so scientifically cold, and so emotionally blank, as to 
 be incapable of gathering any interest around it, of ac- 
 complishing any good — or, I may add, inflicting any 
 evil. 
 
NATURAL THEOLOGY. 403 
 
 Leaving the religion to develop itself in the future, 
 let us ascertain what we have without it in the philoso- 
 phic system. Within, we have a prolonged series of 
 feelings ; without, we have a possibility of sensations ; 
 both regulated by the most unbending laws of necessity, 
 within the limits of experience and a reasonable distance 
 beyond ; and beyond that beyond — if there be such — a 
 land of darkness and eternal silence. This is the cold 
 region into which thought, as it moves on in its orbit, has 
 brought us, in the third quarter of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury. And is this, then, what is left us after all the 
 dialectic conflicts, and as the result of all the scientific 
 discoveries of the last two thousand five hundred years 
 that have elapsed since reflective thought was awakened ? 
 We know how keenly some patriotic and high-minded 
 Frenchmen feel when they are obliged to contemplate 
 the present state of their country, and to confess how 
 great the humiliation implied in the bloody revolutions 
 through which they have passed, ending in a military 
 despotism, which restrains on all hands liberty of thought 
 and action. I am sure that a like feeling will rise up in 
 many noble and hopeful minds when they are made to 
 see that all these discussions, philosophic and religious, 
 in the past, that all these throes and convulsions of 
 opinion and sentiment have left us only a series of feel- 
 ings and a possibility of sensations, beginning we know 
 not with what, and carrying us we know not whither, — 
 all that we are sine of being, that the sensations and 
 feelings are conveyed along pleasantly or unpleasantly, 
 and ranged into companies suitably or unsuitably, and 
 
404 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 our very beliefs generated, by a 4 fatalistic law of con- 
 tiguity and resemblance. Some may be content with 
 this lot, as being caught in the toils and despairing of 
 an escape : but there will be others — I venture to say 
 nobler and better — who feel that they must be deli- 
 vered from this mental bondage at all hazards, and will 
 hasten to attempt it even at the risk of new conflicts 
 and new revolutions. It should not after all be so diffi- 
 cult for humble and sincere men to escape from this net 
 which sophistry would weave around them. Let them 
 follow those intuitions and ultimate beliefs, the exist- 
 ence and the veracity of which Mr. Mill has acknow- 
 ledged — while he has declined to pursue them to their 
 consequences ; let them gather around them a body of 
 acquired observations with their appropriate sentiments ; 
 and, as they do so, they will reach a body of truth, 
 practical, scientific, and religious, sufficient to stay the 
 intellect and satisfy the heart, — while what still remains 
 unknown will only incite to further explorations, and 
 lead to new discoveries. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. — See p. 13. 
 
 I have taken exception to certain doctrines of Hamilton in the 
 Method of Divine Government (m. d. g.) ; in the North British 
 Review, Nos. liv. and lix. (]sr, b. r.) ; in Dublin University Magazine, 
 Aug. 1859 (d. u. m.) ; in Intuitions of the Mind (i. m.) ; in Super- 
 natural in Relation to Natural (s. N.) ; in Appendix to Stewart's 
 Outlines (s. o.) ; and now in this work (d. 7. t.) 
 
 1. His Method. — n.b.r. liv. 427 ; lm. 96 ; d.f.t. 34. 
 
 2. His ambiguous use of Consciousness. — n.b.r. liv. 428 ; 
 
 D.u.M. 159, 160 ; lm. 96; d.f.t. 25-30. 
 
 3. His omission among the Reproductive Powers (Metaph. 
 
 vol. ii.), of the Recognitive Power by which we 
 believe the remembered event to have fallen under our 
 notice in time past. — d.u.m. 160 ; d.f.t. 174. 
 4 His view of Time and Space. — n.b.r. liv. 429 ; lm. 
 178, 179. 
 
 5. His doctrine of Unconscious Mental Operations. — d.u.m. 
 
 161, 162; d.f.t. 196-198. 
 
 6. His unsatisfactory way of appealing to Faith without ex- 
 
 plaining its nature. — n.b.r. lix. 150, 151 ; lm. 
 168-173 ; s.n. 355. 
 
 7. His view of all Knowledge implying Comparison. — lm. 
 
 207-210 ; d.f.t. 222. 
 
 8. His defective view of the Relations which the mind can 
 
 discover. — d.u.m. 162, 163; lm. 211. 
 
406 APPENDIX. 
 
 9. His doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. — m.d.g. 
 536-539; n.b.r. liv. 428-429; d.tj.m. 163, 164 ; 
 i.m. 109, 340-341; s.o. 132 ; d.f.t. 218-221. 
 
 10. His doctrine of Nescience. — m.d.g. 520 ; n.b.r. liv. 
 
 430-431 ; i.m. 342-345; d.f.t. 219. 
 
 11. His defective doctrine as to our idea of the Infinite. — 
 
 m.d.g. 534 ; n.b.e. liv. 430, lix. 150, 154, 156 ; 
 i.m. 193-197; s.n. 141. 
 
 12. His axiom that truth lies between two extremes. — i.m. 
 
 304, 338. 
 
 13. His doctrine of Substance. — i.m. 146, 148. 
 
 14. His doctrine of Causation. — m.d.g. 529, 530 ; n.b.r. 
 
 liv. 430 ; d.u.m. 164. 
 
 15. The application by Dr. Mansel of the doctrine of Relativity 
 
 to Moral Good and Evil. — n.b.r. lix. 157 ; s.n. 356, 
 357. 
 
 16. His view of the Theistic Argument. — m.d.g. 520 ; n.b.r. 
 
 liv. 431, lix. 152; s.n. 355; s.o. 140. 
 
 EDINBURGH : T. CONSTABLE, 
 PRINTER TO THE QUEEN, AND TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
 
WORKS BY DR. M'COSH 
 
 Eighth Edition. 
 
 THE METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVEENMENT, 
 PHYSICAL AND MOEAL. 
 
 " It is refreshing to read a work so distinguished for originality and 
 soundness of thinking, especially as coming from an author of our own 
 country." — Sir "William Hamilton. 
 
 " Dr. M'Cosh's work is of the compact cast and thought-eliciting com- 
 plexion which men do not willingly let die ; and we promise such of our 
 readers as may possess themselves of it much entertainment and instruc- 
 tion of a high order, and a fund of solid thought, which they will not soon 
 exhaust." — Hugh Miller, in ' Witness.'' 
 
 " This work is distinguished from other similar ones hy its heing hased 
 upon a thorough study of physical science, and an accurate knowledge of 
 its present condition, and by its entering in a deeper and more unfettered 
 manner than its predecessors upon the discussion of the appropriate 
 psychological, ethical, and theological questions. The author keeps aloof 
 at once from the a priori idealism and dreaminess of German speculation 
 since Schelling, and from the one-sidedness and narrowness of the empiri- 
 cism and positivism which have so prevailed in England. In the pro- 
 vinces of psychology and ethics he follows conscientiously the facts of 
 consciousness, and draws his conclusions out of them commonly with 
 penetration and logical certainty." — Dr. Ulrici, in Zeitschrift fiir 
 Philosophie. 
 
 THE SUPEENATUEAL IN EELATION TO THE 
 NATURAL 
 
 " A work whose scientific value as a contribution toward the defences 
 of the faith it would be difficult to overrate." — Patriot. 
 
 THE INTUITIONS OE THE MIND. 
 
 New and Improved Edition. 
 
 " I have given an approving notice of Dr. M'Cosh'* Intuitions of the 
 Mind in my Jahrbiicher fiir Deutsche Theologie (1861). I value it for 
 its large acquaintance with English Philosophy, which has not led him 
 
to neglect the great German works. 1 admire the moderation and clear- 
 ness, as well as comprehension, of the author's views. While entertain- 
 ing a great respect for the Masters of the Scottish Philosophy, such as 
 Sir W, Hamilton, this has not restrained his independent judgment, or 
 kept him stationary." — Dr. Dorner of Berlin. 
 
 " The undertaking to adjust the claims of the sensational and intuitional 
 philosophies, and of the a posteriori and a priori methods, is not only 
 legitimate, but accomplished in this work with a great amount of success." 
 — Westminster Beviev), April 1865. 
 
 " No philosopher before Dr. M'Cosh has clearly brought out the stages 
 by which an original and individual intuition passes first into an articu- 
 late but still individual judgment, and then into a universal maxim or prin- 
 ciple ; and no one has so clearly or completely classified and enumerated our 
 intuitive convictions, or exhibited in detail their relations to the various 
 sciences which repose on them as their foundations. The amount of 
 summarized information which it contains is very great ; and it is the 
 only work on the very important subject with which it deals. Never was 
 such a work so much needed as in the present day. It is the only scien- 
 tific work adapted to counteract the school of Mill, Bain, and Herbert 
 Spencer, which is so steadily prevailing among the students of the pre- 
 sent generation." — London Quarterly Review, April 1865. 
 
 " Though treating of the intuitions of the mind, and thus labouring in 
 that particular division of philosophy which is most liable to degenerate 
 into imaginative, or at best merely speculative notions, Dr. M'Cosh pre- 
 serves a clear, calm, and sober intelligence. The history of many philo- 
 sophic opinions, and the peculiarities of many philosophical schools, are also 
 passed in review in the notes to the work, in a concise yet thorough man- 
 ner ; and the criticisms that are made upon several of the celebrated 
 theories of the past are candid and exhaustive." — Dr. Shedd, in Intro- 
 duction to Second American Edition. 
 
 " When the original edition of this work appeared, we characterized it 
 in terms of strong recommendation, such as we rarely bestow on any 
 work, and pointed out at some length its distinctive merits. We will 
 just say here, that, in regard to all the greatest issues between Mill and 
 Hamilton, indeed all the great issues raised by either of these eminent 
 authors, or their respective philosophical schools ; and in regard to nearly 
 every great issue raised between the philosophic scepticism and ther~~~ 
 Christian philosophy of our day, Dr. M'Cosh quite generally takes the 
 right side." — Princeton Review, Oct. 1865. 
 
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