THE McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATIONS 1897-1909 BY JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.Litt. AUTHOR OF THE HI6T0RY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 TO THE FINAL RESTORATION OF HOME BULE AT THE SOUTH IN 1877 ; HISTORICAL ESSAYS ; LECTURES ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR DELIVERED AT OXFORD ; H18TORY OF THE CIVIL WAR ; FROM HAYES TO MCKINLEY Nefo gork THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1922 All rights reserved . PhlNTID IN TBS L"NITEI> bTATKS Of AMERICA COPTBIGHT, 1922, By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and elcctrotyped. Published November, 1922. NortoooU #rr«g J. 8. Cu ulth Co. Norwood, Ma,.., ; - \ CIA' CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE Mark Hanna 1 Mark Hanna Secures McKinley's Nomination ... 12 The St. Louis Convention 13 McKinley and Hanna, Bimetallists 13 The Resolution of the Convention for Gold . . .15 Nomination of McKinley 16 Gold and Silver 17 Nomination of Bryan 18 Bryan an Effective Campaigner 20 Coin's Financial School 22 Republican Fight against Free Silver .... 23 McKinley's "Front Porch" Speeches 25 McKinley's Election 29 CHAPTER II Hanna's Fight 30 Secretary Sherman 31 Senator Hanna 35 The Dingley Tariff 37 McKinley and Arbitration with Great Britain . . 40 The Cuban Question 41 CHAPTER III Cleveland and Cuba 44 McKinley and Cuba 46 The Maine 49 The President's Ultimatum to Spain 53 Spanish Procrastination 54 v CONTENTS McKinley Averse to War The War Might Have Been Avoided Declaration of War against Spain CHAPTER IV George Dewey . Battle of Manila . George Dewey . German and French Opinion German Action Progress of the War Theodore Roosevelt - r Juan Hell . Ami.imi w Depression, July 3 Spanish Despair Battle of Santiago . Debtbu< nOH 01 mi; Spanish Fleet Tin. < ll.ll.M Tin. Defeat of Spain- page 60 62 66 69 73 75 76 79 81 83 ,85 87 88 91 93 96 97 CHAPTER V Spain RELINQUISHED CUBA Tm. Pbotocoi Tin. Piin.'iTr. 1 I Opinion . M< KiM.r.v \m> mi: Pun iitim.s Tin. M"-- I I ' i;im. . Tin. PHILIPPINE In-i i:i Bawad .1 P. MOBOAM .... [no pbt 1 i LsoisLi noil . I I \ Y Hat, '!,ii \u v or State 99 101 102 101 100 100 111 112 115 117 L19 1 21 I 121 CONTENTS vii PAGE The "Open Door" 126 China — The Boxer Uprising 127 Peace with China 131 CHAPTER VI The Presidential Campaign of 1900 132 Theodore Roosevelt, Vice-President 135 William J. Bryan, Democratic Candidate . . . .136 The Contest of 1900 139 Mark Hanna 140 Roosevelt 141 The Election of 1900 143 J. P. Morgan 144 Andrew Carnegie 145 United States Steel Corporation 148 Andrew Carnegie 151 J. P. Morgan 154 The Stock Panic of 1901 155 John D. Rockefeller 157 The Standard Oil Co 159 McKinley's Second Inaugural Address .... 169 Assassination of McKinley 170 McKinley and the Tariff 173 McKinley and Civil Service Reform 174 CHAPTER VII Puerto Rico 176 Cuba 177 The Philippines 183 The Anti-Imperialists 188 The Schurman Commission 190 The Filipinos 194 Elihu Root, Secretary of War 195 The Taft Commission 197 CONTENTS Root's INSTRUCTIONS i.i.a Warfare tobtube by a.mlrm an soldiers Root, Cbeatob; Taft, Administrator I and I'ilE SUPBEMB COURT Roosevelt and Taft The Phiiipi'ines Cameron Forbes Ki.ihu Root Archibald C. Coolidge CHAPTER VIII Roosevelt as President .... Tin. NOBTHEBN SeCUBITIES CASE Booker WASHINGTON .... The Chableston Exposition . ?b New England Tour . ROOSLYI.U 'fl A< I [DENT .... CHAPTER IX The Anthracite Coal Stbike of 1902 EtoosEVELi Banna — Baer GbOVEB < 'i.E\ BLAND . Plan The Shi i eemem ' ii.HM \\Y Vi m Bl BLA . Tin- Ai.v k \ Boi m>\kv Di-it 1 1: I hie British Navy (HAITI i: X The Fib I li • i Paoncbfote Tri \ 1 I The Bh< OND BaI PaUNCSFOTB TRI I PI •I The II w Hi .in: w Tri my The 1''-. ".: >. Rj VOI i . 198 202 203 206 208 210 212 213 213 215 218 221 227 231 233 235 236 239 240 242 243 247 254 260 261 262 263 266 26S CONTENTS 1X PAGE The Hat-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 275 Bryce on the Panama Canal 2/6 CHAPTER XI Roosevelt's Extraordinary Ability 279 Roosevelt — Hanna 281 The Convention of 1904 288 Death of Hanna 289 Character of Hanna 289 CHAPTER XII Record of the Republican Party 292 Parker's Charges 293 Result of the Election of 1904 295 Attack on the Financial Interests 296 "Our Friends Who Live Softly" 297 Roosevelt No Demagogue 299 The St. Louis Fair 300 CHAPTER XIII The Russo-Japanese War 302 Peace of Portsmouth 307 Death of Hay 31 ° Root, Secretary of State 311 Morocco Affair ox * Algeciras Conference 314 Roosevelt — The Kaiser 315 San Domingo 318 China 319 CHAPTER XIV Railroad Rate Legislation of 1905 323 The Hepburn Bill 324 The Senate Bill 325 Rate Making by Interstate Commerce Commission . . 327 x CONTENTS Meat Inspection Act and Pure Food Law Muckraking The Brownsville Affray Japan Third International Conference . CHAPTER XV PAGE 334 337 339 341 342 The Panic of 1907 . 344 J. P. Morgan . 348 The President . 348 Irrigation . 354 The Reclamation Act .... . 356 The Convention of Governors . . 360 CHAPTER XVI The Navy . The Voyage around the World . . 369 Japan . 376 CHAPTER XVII Republican Convention of 1908 Roosevelt for Taft HiNHY CABOT Lodge, Chairman Taft, Nomina n;n 1 : ami TrzbD Ti:km r, a Bookish Maw Oltvsb P. Morton . 'I'm. I'hi.-ii.i m \m, High Ftnanci Asdiu.u .1 \, KBOM Broad-iondbd •1 I M 1 1 LBT7I ; ' TUT, U KA2M 378 379 3S0 381 383 390 392 394 THE McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATIONS THE McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATIONS 1897-1909 CHAPTER I This volume naturally begins with the political cam- paign of 1896 during which three men absorbed public attention — McKinley, Bryan and Marcus Alonzo Hanna, or, as he was familiarly called and will be known in this book, Mark Hanna. Of McKinley and Bryan, up to 1896, the student of affairs will have had some idea, but Mark Hanna deserves an introductory notice before the last eight years of his crowded life are related. Called an enigma in New York City, he was no enigma whatever to his intimates, except that they failed to gauge his towering ability. They knew him for a shrewd money- getter, able and diligent in business, but they could not believe that he would reach a high position in public affairs — that during one administration he would be known as the "king maker" and during another the champion of the financial magnates against Theodore Roosevelt — that he would at least divide with Roose- l 2 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 velt the allegiance of the Labor Unions. In all essentials except political ability he was no enigma to his friends, for he wore his heart upon his sleeve. New York City is a good point of survey and from this point Hanna's appearance in public life was like that of a comet in the sky. Although fifty-nine years old in 1896, he had gradually, but with steady ambition, been working up to the place from which he was now to begin his most important achievements. His restless mind had always cast about for a new enterprise and, not being a student or reader of books, and having no sympathy with a man who devoted his whole ability to the acquirement of money, he entered the field of politics. Before he was thirty-two he made an informal alliance with an enter- prising young man of Cleveland to break up the Repub- lican machine that dominated city politics. Botli were good Republicans but objected to the manner in which city affairs were conducted. Somewhat later when the Republican machine nominated one of their representa- tive men for mayor, Hanna led a revolt against the machine and, with the aid of a number of independent associates, nominated a Democrat of excellent business ability and elected him 1 although the rest of the Repub- lican ticket was chosen. In city and ward politics, he was always noted for his independent action and often showed no hesitation in supporting Democrats when they were better men than the Republican nominees. At fche age (, f forty-three lie was reei.inii/ed as i me of the prominent business men of Cleveland. His business was coal, iron ore and pig iron; in L867 he had been Mailed in it by his father-in-law, an iconoclast in Society and 1 In 1873. Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 3 trade and an uncompromising Democrat in politics. Hanna's independence however did not come from any- family association ; it was inherent in himself and gained for him the dislike of the solid financial men of Cleveland, who had built up the city and were naturally the dominant figures in its financial circles. In spite of the dislike of these magnates, Hanna pushed ahead until in 1880, the year of the Garfield campaign, he was known as a reliable Republican and had acquired a very considerable local prominence. He was head and front of the business men's meetings in Cleveland and fully favored making the campaign on the tariff and business issue rather than on the "bloody shirt." Closely connected with the Pennsylvania railroad through business relations, he formed a link between that great organization and the candidate of his party, afterwards president-elect. From that time on he never lost an opportunity to identify him- self with any Republican movement. Although he had never read Cicero, he shared the Roman's belief that he must keep himself constantly before the public. Hanna was attracted to the Civil Service Reform movement and attended the meeting of local organization in Cleveland. 1 He had no hope of being the president of the Cleveland association, but he did aspire to the chair- manship of the Executive Committee. The organization was controlled by men who did not like Hanna and who entirely ignored him in their dispositions, not even awarding him the consolation of membership on the Exec- utive Committee, of which he would have liked to be the directing head. From that night, Hanna must have argued, there is a ring of reformers as well as a ring 1 Either in January or February, 1882. 4 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 of politicians. I think the politicians will suit me better. His failure to secure election as district delegate to the Republican National Convention of 1884 and his sub- sequent success in being chosen delegate at large gave him an inkling of what was needed for political success. At the Convention he was an avowed supporter of John Sherman, whose candidacy met with little favor. He opposed Blaine, yet when the Convention named him as its candidate Hanna gained prominence in his party by his earnest and sincere efforts for Blaine's election; but no sooner was Blaine defeated than Hanna began to work for Sherman's nomination in 1888. Securing the unani- mous support of Ohio, a portion of Pennsylvania and many delegates from the Southern States, he went to the Convention as a delegate confident of success. In my last volume I have told how Harrison's nomination came to be made but, soon after Sherman's defeat, Hanna real- ized that under certain circumstances McKinley might have been the man; accordingly he decided no longer to put his money upon the wrong horse and became an open advocate of McKinley's nomination for the next presidency. Between 1890 and 1892 Hanna had serious but Iness troubles \\ hich, to a certain extent, distracted his Qtion from politics and he was not as powerful a factor in the Convention of 1892 as he bad been four years be- fore; he might have been thought to be losing his grip on politics bul lie was simply biding bis time. After the bounding Republican victory in the flection tit' ism, he went to bis younger brother, thru a business partner, and told him that, for the future, he purposed giving more time to politics and le£ to bu ^rrangemente were Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 5 made with this end in view and thenceforward he gave nearly his entire attention to securing the nomination of McKinley in 1896. Boston, apart from a few men in State Street, did not like Hanna. His brusque manner, unconventional talk, ignorance of literature and art alienated many, and he did not always live up to the moral ideals in politics that were professed in this city. The general opinion was afterwards well stated by Henry S. Pritchett, a true West- erner, although at that time living in Boston, the efficient President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "The papers to-day," he said in a speech to the Bowdoin Alumni Association on February 16, 1904, "have been full of the life of an interesting man, who now lies dead in Washington. He was a strong man, a man of noble parts, of splendid personal power and of high ability for service and he has played a great part as a leader in this country. He deserves for all that high praise. And yet we can never forget in estimating him as a public man that he must be judged, not only for his high personal qualities but also for the quality of his public service. One cannot fail to regret in looking back over that life that it should have carried with it the noble qualities of devotion, of energy, of ability and of loyalty to a friend and yet have not had with it also a higher level of what public service means . . . and a higher estimate of moral and intel- lectual force rather than pecuniary force in politics." 1 New York City and other communities may have had their opinions influenced by the prevalent caricatures which always have something to do with the formation of public sentiment. Hanna once said that, although 1 Boston Herald, Feb. 17, 1904. 6 CLEVELAND^ ADMINISTRATION [1*96 his ancestry was Scotch-Irish there was more Irish than Scotch in his composition ; thus with a plausible exaggera- tion of his features he was often portrayed as a bloated whiskey-drinking Irishman. A much-repeated cartoon showed him and McKinley sitting over a bottle of whiskey in earnest confabulation. These caricatures caused his friends no little amusement, so entirely were they un- founded in fact. Hanna drank no wine until he was past middle life, did not care for it, and used stronger liquors only for medicinal purposes. McKinley pre- ferred water to wine at a banquet or dinner or any other occasion. Indeed, if the cartoonist had shown McKinley and Hanna, sitting calmly together over a bottle of Wau- kesha or Poland water drinking to the toast "Here's to honest water which ne'er left man i' the mire," he would have been much nearer the truth. "I shall never forget," said Senator Scott of West Vir- ginia, "one morning during the campaign of 1S96" when Hanna handed me a New York paper containing a car- toon of himself pictured as a huge monster, clad in a suit covered over with dollar marks, smoking an immense cigar, and trampling under foot women and children until their eyes protruded from the sockets and their skeleton forms writhed in agony. After I had looked at it for a moment he said to me, 'That hurts.' " ■ This was a favorite caricature, Banna covered all over with the dollar mark, the implication being that he be- lieved money could buy anything. The Nation wrote during the heated political campaign of 100S: "The frankly commercial spirit in which Mark Ilanna man- aged the two campaigns in which In* was chairman is no- 1 Address, April 7, 1904, 39. Ch. I] MARK HANNA 7 torious. A prominent and honored Ohio Republican has said of Mr. Hanna that his only notion of political activ- ity was 'to go out and buy somebody.' " l This remark, born probably of factional hostility, was unjust. Hanna paid the penalty of talking too frankly about the use of money, but no one knew better than he that money would not accomplish everything and, after he had gained power and influence, nothing perturbed him more than to be looked upon simply as an office-broker. Collecting money for a political party must be regarded differently from getting means for the support of a church, a university or a charitable institution and, according to the cynical view of politics that obtains in certain quarters, the corruption of voters seems to inhere in the use of the party chest. But many voters looked upon the Republican party as something sacred, whose control was necessary to the well-being and perpetuity of the Republic. The man who raised money in order to insure its continuance in power was looked upon by them as doing holy work. Some such idea must have passed through Hanna's mind when, without concealment, he continually preached the use of money to save the party. His outspoken scorn of bookish men and respect for those who had money to contribute lent color to The Na- tion's criticism, but in this matter and in others Hanna stood in need of a certain hypocrisy which was lacking in his nature. Making no bones of confessing his igno- rance of Shelley and Pasteur, he loved Shakespeare as he saw his plays acted on the stage and took delight in a good performance of " School for Scandal," in Joseph Jefferson's "Rip Van Winkle," "Rivals" and "Cricket 1 Oct. 8, p. 328. 8 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 on the Hearth." During the fifties when the Lyceum system was at its height, he was a constant attendant and liked above all the lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. It is ordinarily thought that men in active life are apt to become victim;-; of wine, woman or play. Judged by this standard, ITanna was a severely moral man who needed no refuge in the dictum of the preacher, "The moral man is he who is not found out." A generous giver of dinners, he was a spare eater except for an insatiable fondness for sweets to which his corpulence and rheu- matism in later life were due. Loving the society of re- fined and well-bred women, he might be looked upon as a model of chastity. Passionately fond of cards, he pre- ferred whist or bridge without a money stake ; he never played draw poker except when a party for his favorite whist was unavailable and then only in what was known as a "small game." He had a pure mind, rarely told a smutty story and did not relish hearing one unless there was something in it that he thought clever. He was nevertheless rather undiscriminating in his response to humorous fancies and, though some of his intimates found in him an amusing companion, it was mainly his whole hearted audacity that made them laugh. He \itated toward the society of the best men. Amongst those one me1 at his dinner table in Washington were Root, Justice White, Taft, Long, 0, II. Piatt, Hobart, Allison, Udrich and occasionally Secretary Hay and Senator Lod Popular knowledge of a man of aotion who lefl few letters, did not keep a diary nor write a book depends ■ ely upon his biographer and, in this respect, Qanna was exceptionally happy. Hi- son selected Herbert Croly, Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 9 who made the work a labor of love and has presented the real Mark Hanna with remarkable perspicacity and skill. Some of Hanna's friends, on hearing of the selection, may- have shuddered at the thought of an author with social- istic proclivities undertaking the biography of a strong individualist; yet the accomplished editor of the Amer- ican Statesmen series had chosen Carl Schurz, an avowed tariff reformer, to write the life of Henry Clay and the wisdom of this selection had been fully demonstrated. Even so was the choice of Herbert Croly to write the life of Mark Hanna. One may learn from that book what manner of man was Hanna when he determined to bend all his energies to the nomination of McKinley in 1896. Hanna and McKinley were warm personal friends. They had first met in 1876 in the Court House at Canton, Ohio, where were being tried one miner for assault with intent to kill and a number of others for being engaged in a riot. Hanna as head of his Coal Company was active in prosecution and McKinley was one of the attorneys of the Stark County bar who had volunteered for the defence. It was a trial in which bitterness developed on both sides and McKinley won attention from the prose- cution by his personal resemblance to Daniel Webster, and by his gentle consideration for the men who had deemed it their duty to prosecute the offending miners. In the same autumn McKinley was elected to Congress and by degrees he and Hanna became intimate acquaint- ances. At the National Convention of 1884, they shared an apartment at a hotel ; their relations were cordial although McKinley was for Blaine and Hanna for Sher- man. The Convention of 1888, when they both supported Sherman, increased the mutual attachment. Each saw 10 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 qualities in the other that drew them together and, as both were working for the same end, they were now in complete sympathy. Hanna's admiration for McKinley was profound. He shared his belief in the protective tariff as something sacred and not to be touched by profane hands. A man put forward for the presidential nomination should lose no opportunity of seeing influential men in the several States and commending himself to them by his personal bearing. Once when Hanna had with some difficulty secured an assemblage of men to meet the prospective candidate in an Eastern city, McKinley sent regrets on account of the illness of an invalid wife. This, for the moment, irritated Hanna as he thought that the wife might in her chronic condition have been left to the care of a doctor and nurse, as she was by no means danger- ously ill and that McKinley might have kept the engage- ment which would have been a signal aid to his candidacy. This misfortune seemed to Hanna a considerable obstacle in the path of McKinley's advancement yet he was so struck with the man's sublime devotion to his invalid wife that he could not help exclaiming, "McKinley is a saint." Hanna "had not a single small trail in his nature," declared Roosevelt. "I never needed to be in doubt as to whether he would carry through a fight or in any way go back on his word." ' Hanna's friendship with Ben Butterworth embodied a rare unselfishness thai dignified his strenuous and success- ful career. Croly prints -"me Letters from Butterworth to Hanna that are charming in the devotion shown by 1 Cr„]y, . Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 11 him who stuck to the lesser man through thick and thin. Butterworth was of too independent and impulsive a nature to be successful in politics but his honest appear- ance and conduct gave him a standing with leaders that he seemed unable to acquire with the mass. When he was unsuccessful in politics Hanna redoubled his assist- ance and when at last he fell fatally ill Hanna watched by his bedside in a Cleveland hotel with the same devotion that he would pay to a brother. The campaign for the nomination was proceeding apace when McKinley gave it a set-back through his own finan- cial failure. He made himself liable by endorsements to help a friend for one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, a large sum in 1893 and an enormous one for the Gover- nor of Ohio. He had no other idea than that the debt must be paid in full and it seemed to him as if the labor necessary to this end meant the close of his political career. But Hanna, Myron T. Herrick, H. H. Kohlsaat and many others came to his aid and saved him from bankruptcy. These facts were more or less publicly known and McKinley was reproached with having put himself in the power of these men by accepting financial favors for which they would expect repayment in some way. But it does not appear that any of them asked for consideration nor that anything was done for the raisers of the fund except for Hanna and Herrick who received McKinley's support on entirely different grounds. 1 1 In this characterization I have been helped by Life of Hanna, Herbert Croly; Mark Hanna, Solon Lauer, Cleveland, 1901; William Allen White's article, McClure's Magazine, Nov. 1900; Murat Halstead, Review of Reviews, Oct. 1896 ; the contemporary cartoons ; many newspaper notices of Hanna's death in Feb. 1904. My son, Daniel P. Rhodes, was private secretary of Mark Hamia for a year and a half covering 1897 and a part of 1898 ; to him I owe a careful revision of this whole chapter. 12 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 Croly has related in sufficient detail Hanna's labor in securing the nomination of McKinley. From January 1, 1895, his whole attention was devoted to the work and everything that energy, social entertainment, political blandishment and the judicious use of money could ac- complish was forthcoming in full measure. He spent, said Croly, "something over $100,000" (which would not now ' be considered a large amount) obtaining almost no assistance from his friends. "Corrupt methods were always expressly and absolutely forbidden," wrote Croly, but when Hanna put in his own time and energy he could make a dollar go a great way, as he did in this case al- though he had opposed to him Quay and Thomas C. Piatt, adepts in all the arts of political management, as well as a hearty New England backing of Thomas B. Reed who, by common consent, was well fitted for the place. Yet it was not Hanna's work alone that won the prize. McKinley, in capacity and manner, was well fitted for the White House; moreover, since 1893, affairs had been working his way. Tin* panic of 1893 had been fol- lowed by a commercial crisis and business was extremely bad. Tli' 1 Republicans ascribed the evil condition to Democratic sure.-- and to the avowed promise of a re- duction of the tariff. The tariff was reduced during the summer of L894 and the autumn elections for Congress- men showed a Complete change in public sentiment. It was natural that a distracted public should turn to the arch-protectioni-i for relief. McKinley was reelected ( rovernor of ( ttuo in 1*'>"> by an increased majority ■ and in i graphical anil all other respects was an available candidate. 1 1919. • For M< Kin. I my vol. vui. 374. Ca. I.] THE ST. LOUIS CONVENTION 13 Henry Clay said in the bitterness of his disappoint- ment at failing to receive the Whig nomination in 1840, "If there were two Henry Clays, one of them would make the other President of the United States." l But McKinley's and Hanna's relations were so intimate that Hanna might be called an alter-ego. What one could not do, the other could. McKinley knew the men in public life through and through, and Hanna learned how to manipulate conventions and secure delegates ; and he thought that he was serving party and country well in putting to the fore an arch-protectionist. By May 1, 1896, if not before, Hanna felt that McKinley's nomi- nation was assured, but before the Convention met on June 16 in St. Louis the question of platform was the most important one, and the only portion on which there was a marked divergence of opinion related to silver; this difference grew as the time for the assembling of the Convention approached. When the delegates began to come together, the Committee on Resolutions, of which Foraker was the chairman and Senator Lodge the Massa- chusetts member, had many declarations to consider but, out of the confusion and heat of convention days, only two resolutions are important for the historian; these are the McKinley-Hanna resolution, which Hanna brought with him to Chicago, and the resolution finally adopted by the Convention, on which the canvass of 1896 was made. Both McKinley and Hanna were bimetallists. While in Congress, McKinley had in 1877 and 1878 voted for free silver, for the Bland- Allison bill and for its passage over President Hayes's veto ; but in his support of silver » Schurz's Clay, ii. 181. 14 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 he was backed by both senators from Ohio and all the representatives except James A. Garfield. In the dis- cussions of Garfield's course, which were of daily occur- rence among business men in Cleveland, his dissenting voice was generally approved, but Hanna vigorously opposed his position and endorsed that of the other mem- bers, especially of the representative from Cleveland, who was a personal and political friend. Thus McKinley and Hanna had been favorable to silver for eighteen years when it fell to them to decide the issue on which the cam- paign of 1896 should be made. And they both, for ob- vious reasons to anyone who understands their political careers, desired to have the paramount issue the tariff, while silver should be relegated to a subsidiary place. In 1896 in Ohio it was no disgrace to be a bimetallist. It was much easier to favor a single gold standard in New York or Boston ; yet in Boston some of the most eminent statesmen, authors, business men and politi- cians, under the brilliant leadership of General Walker, had embraced the doctrine of silver and, though opposing the free coinage of the metal, were eager for its adoption as a money standard by international agreement. Be- tween 1894 and 1896 many of these Bostonians were con- verted to a single gold standard although they still held to the fiction of international agreement which, as the wisest of them knew, was out of th*' que>tion. This con- version was undoubtedly due to the great work o! Grover Cleveland and while most Republicans would have ipurned the idea of having beeD bo influenced yet to the historian it appears that they were thus unconsciously swayed. In the pre-Convention days in St. Louis the Eastern Ch. I.] GOLD AND SILVER 15 men, whose leader may be said to have been Senator Lodge, were eager for the mention of gold ; many from the Middle West desired a plank which could be inter- preted as favoring gold in the East and yet not condemn- ing silver in the West. The McKinley-Hanna resolu- tion read: The Republican party "would welcome bimetallism based upon an international ratio, but, until that can be secured, it is the plain duty of the United States to maintain our present standard, and we are there- fore opposed under existing conditions to the free and unlimited coinage of silver at sixteen to one." Before these words, it spoke of "maintaining all the money of the United States whether gold, silver or paper at par with the best money in the world and up to the standard of the most enlightened governments." The resolution adopted by the Convention, which was agreed to by Sen- ator Lodge and his associates, read: "We are opposed to the free coinage of silver except by international agree- ment with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency must be maintained at parity with gold and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States and all our money, whether coin or paper at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth." It is easy to see that the controversy turned on a few words. Should the Re- publican party "maintain our present standard" or pre- serve "the existing gold standard"? To the historian conversant with the action of Grover Cleveland, the dif- ference does not seem great, but to the framer of platforms 16 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 and the campaigner it was immense. One resolution declared in favor of gold by name, the other did not ; hence it turned out that the Republicans were known throughout the campaign as the party of gold, the Dem- ocrats as the party of silver. It is no wonder, then, that the adoption of this resolution is considered so important an episode in the history of the Republican party and of the country, and that so many lay claim to a paramount influence in securing its insertion. When Hanna saw that, owing to the sentiment devel- oped among the delegates, his own view could not pre- vail, he accepted the result gracefully and persuaded McKinley to do likewise. The Committee agreed on the financial plank and reported it to the Convention, which adopted it by a vote of 812| to 110£. Before the adop- tion of this plank, Senator Teller of Colorado offered a sub- stitute demanding the free coinage of silver but obtained only 105£ votes against 818.}; this vote foreshadowed the adoption of the financial plank by nearly the same majority. After making some pathetic remarks, he, with thirty-three others, seceded from the Convention. The rest of the platform was then adopted by acclama- tion. 1 McKinley was then nominated by (Ml \ votes, his lead- ing opponent, Thomas B. Reed, receiving SU. Garret A. Hobart of New Jersey was named for Vice President. 'Lift- <>f Sauna, Croly; Foraker, Nbtoa of i Busy Life, i. ; Charles Emory Smith, PkUaddph P < June 24, L896, cited by Boston Duly Adverti-ir; Tin- Autobiography <>f T. C. I'lntt; MS, statement of I B Draper, Chairman of the Maea delegation, Jan. 9, 1900; II. II. Kohl- oaaf ) /■ Pott, \;.mI 80, 1910; I tl of Frank 8. Wither- v | /•■ /• - V'.i i :. 1910; u \ White, M .-('lure'*, Nor. lyoo; Balatead In /; . | /. - Od I • I : fc c, Speechei and Addreetat, 1900; Stanwood, Slat of the Presidency. Ch. I.] GOLD AND SILVER 17 On June 18 when McKinley was nominated, Republi- can success was deemed more than probable. Mark Hanna was made Chairman of the Republican National Committee but thought of taking a yacht cruise along the New England Coast to obtain a needed rest after "the great strain" imposed by the work resulting in McKinley's nomination. "I would have been glad," he wrote in a private letter, "to have escaped the responsi- bility of managing the campaign, but there was no way out of it and I feel that I am ' enlisted for the war ' and must win." This letter was written on July 3 when Hanna had no idea that he had an easy victory before him; as between June 18 and July 3 public sentiment showed that the Republican party in identifying itself with gold had run the risk of losing some of the Western States. "I must get the work of education started," he said, " before I can take my necessary recreation." "The fight will be in the Mississippi Valley States," he added. "The 'gold' basis is giving us lots of work." 1 The Democratic Convention in Chicago, meeting on July 7, denned the issue plainly between gold and silver and changed the hoped-for victory of the Republicans into a premonition of defeat. There were many indica- tions that the Democrats would espouse the cause of free silver. Richard P. Bland of Missouri was their idol, leader and probable candidate for the presidency and he had publicly said that the Democracy of the West was convinced that "the gold standard meant bankruptcy" and that the Convention would declare for the "free coinage of silver at 16 to l." 2 The delegates who were 1 Letter from Cleveland. 2 Twenty Years of the Republic, Peck, 492. 18 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 known as Cleveland men made a valiant fight, but their financial plank was rejected by 303 to 626 and their en- dorsement of Cleveland's administration by 357 : 564. During the discussion of the financial resolution, William J. Bryan leaped into prominence through a speech that carried the Convention. "Upon which side will the Dem- ocratic party fight," he asked, "upon the side of the idle holders of idle capital or upon the side of the struggling masses? . . . Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commer- cial interests, the laboring interests and the toilers every- where, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them : 'You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.' " ' The platform as re- ported by the Committee on Resolutions was adopted by 628 to 301. It declared that, "Gold monometallism is a British policy and its adoption has brought other nations into financial servitude to London. . . . We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation." 2 Some of the other resolutions were judged to be "anar- chistic" ; they were certainly extremely radical for 1S96. Bryan's speech, especially the last clause of the last sentence cited above, made him tin' Democratic candi- date for the presidency. "The Chicago convention ha? changed everything," wrote Iianna in a private letter on July 10. It has knocked out my holiday and cruise along the New Eng- land coast. The campaign "will be work and hard work 'Bryan, TV First little, 206. ' Stunwood, 542. Ch. I.] THE MONEY QUESTION 19 from the start. I consider the situation in the West quite alarming as business is all going to pieces and idle men will multiply rapidly. With this communistic spirit abroad the cry of 'free silver' will be catching." Both Hanna and McKinley felt that the Republican party was united on the tariff but divided on the silver question. During a conference, probably before Bryan's nomina- tion, McKinley said, "I am a Tariff man standing on a Tariff platform. This money matter is unduly promi- nent. In thirty days you won't hear anything about it," when William R. Day 1 remarked, "In my opinion in thirty days you won't hear of anything else." 2 Even after the Chicago Convention, Hanna expressed himself as not wishing to allow the tariff issue to be over- shadowed by the financial. 3 But the logic of events taught both McKinley and Hanna that a determined fight must be put up against free silver in the Western States; and in point of fact their belief in bimetallism, but only on an international basis, proved as effective in the conduct of the campaign as if they had been uncom- promising advocates of the single gold standard. The Republican secession affected the vote in some of the Western States but the Democratic "bolt" was more significant. It took two forms : one, the nomination of separate candidates for President and Vice President known as gold Democrats, and the other votes given di- rectly to McKinley as the surest means of beating Bryan. There is no question that business was much depressed and that many men were out of employment. The Re- publicans had hoped to charge this condition to the Dem- 1 Now Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1919). ■ Life of McKinley, Olcott, 321. 3 Life of Foraker, i. 492. 20 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 ocratic administration and to the Tariff bill of 1894, and therefore McKinley, who represented protection more than any other man in the country, was the logical can- didate. He was the "advance agent of prosperity" and promised the "full dinner pail"; prosperity was to be secured by a return to the protective tariff of the Repub- lican party. On the other hand, the Bryan Democrats, though agreeing to the Republican estimate of present conditions, promised an entirely different remedy for the hard times, and proposed a different policy for reducing the army of the unemployed. Remonetize silver, coin it at the ratio of 16 to 1, stop measuring money by the English standard but increase its volume, they averred, and the distress of men in legitimate business and of honest la- borers out of employment will disappear. The demone- tization of silver enhanced the value of the circulating medium and was in the interest of the creditor ; restore it to its proper place, they argued, and the augmented circulation will enable the debtor to pay his debts and start all the wheels of industry going. Bryan proved an effective campaigner, although his first move was not successful. Determined to open the campaign in "the enemy's country" lie formally accepted the nomination in a speech in Madison Square Garden, New York City. But he commit ted an error in reading the speech which he had carefully written out. For Bryan, though an orator, was a poor reader. Other conditions were against him. The weather, even for the second week of August, waa extremely hot and the noti- fication speech unduly long. The large audience who had expected to laiiLih at "his five We-tern sallies and audacities" found him "transformed into a Professor Ch. I.] WILLIAM J. BRYAN 21 Dryasdust prosing through two mortal hours. . . . No wonder that they fled before his portentous pile of manuscript with cries of 'Good-night, Billy.'" l New York and other Eastern financial centres breathed a sigh of relief. They had been greatly alarmed at Bryan's stirring speech before his nomination and his short addresses on the way from Lincoln to New York City, but now they heard or read a dull economic argument, which could not carry conviction to thinking men and which utterly failed to rouse the proletariat. Depression at the fear that Bryan and his financial fallacies would carry the country was succeeded by a momentary and undue elation of the conservative forces. But when Bryan began his trip through the country, his native ability as an orator and his sincere belief in the fallacies that he advocated gained him large audiences and shaped convictions. Farmers, obliged to accept a low price for their products, and laborers, who desired work but could not get it, were glad to learn that free sil- ver was the one simple remedy for their trouble. The distress was indeed grave. If we subtract from Dr. Tal- mage's remarks what they contained of rhetorical ex- aggeration, an extract from his non-partisan sermon will give us an excellent idea. " Never within my memory," he said, "have so many people literally starved to death as in the past few months. Have you noticed in the newspapers how many men and women here and there have been found dead, the post-mortem examination stating that the cause of death was hunger? There is not a day when we do not hear the crash of some great 1 The Nation, Aug. 20, 134. 22 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 commercial establishment and as a consequence many- people are thrown out of employment. Among what we considered comfortable homes have come privation and close calculation and an economy that kills. Millions of people who say nothing about it are at this moment at their wits' end. There are millions of people who do not want charity but want work." l Goldwin Smith, a keen observer, felt Bryan's " pre- ternatural power of clap-trap declamation." 2 The Dem- ocratic National Committee cooperated skilfully with their candidate and made their appeal for funds in an attractive manner. Their pressing need was the hiring of speakers and the distribution of documents "for the dissemination of the truth." One hundred and twenty- five thousand of "Coin's Financial School" were circu- lated, a device that showed how clever they were. This little book was made up of addresses purporting to be delivered daily to large Chicago audiences, that were hereby instructed in the science of money by Coin, a "smooth little financier." The fascination of his manner, his ready argument, apparent fairness, cannot fail to charm even the reader of to-day who knows that the school was a fiction designed to serve as the subject of an attractive book in which fallacious arguments might be presented that would otherwise remain unheard. So this amiable-looking little man was supposed to deliver six lec- tures from the platform of a large hall of the Art Insti- tute; and these were attended fictitiously by men promi- nent in business and finance, who were argued with and either convinced or refuted. This was not a difficult 1 s.-pt 27. Thi kttli . Bryan, 474. ■ Sol I Ch. I.] "COIN'S FINANCIAL SCHOOL" 23 task as the opponents were men of straw, and the sym- pathetic reader of the book was quite ready to believe that "the little financier could not be cornered." England cannot always be defended, but it was un- merited ill-luck that her work in the cause of sound finance should be bandied about in the course of an ex- cited political campaign. "Coin's Financial School" is illustrated with rude but effective wood-cuts and, when Cleveland or Sherman is lampooned, such illustrations can be considered only proper game ; but the comity of nations is transcended when Uncle Sam is pictured firing a cannon to the utter discomfiture of England with the amiable little Coin standing by, doffing his silk hat to the hurrah, "What our answer to England should be." This sentiment he elaborated in his last lecture : "A war with England," he said, "would be the most popular war ever waged on the face of the earth. If it is true that she can dictate the money of the world and thereby create world-wide misery, it would be the most just war ever waged by man." l To no better team could the defence of the financial honor of the country have been confided than to McKin- ley and Hanna. When they came to appreciate that the fight must be against free silver, they wrought like vet- erans in the cause. Hanna exerted his wonderful talent of organization and threw himself into the contest with unstinted energy. He raised the necessary funds. Soon gaining the confidence of New York City financial men, he obtained from them important contributions to his campaign. Some concerns were assessed by Hanna ac- 1 Coin's Financial School, by W. H. Harvey, 150 pages and 64 illus- trations. Popular edition, 25 cents ; Cloth, $1.00. This book sold well. 24 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 cording to what he conceived to be their financial interest in the canvass, a uniform assessment of one quarter of one per cent being levied on the banks. He systematized the expenditure and had the books kept on true business principles. The Republican National Committee spent between three and three and a half millions and had also in reserve a guarantee fund which was not called upon. Hanna early perceived that this was to be a campaign of education. Six hundred thousand dollars were spent for documents that were printed in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch and Hebrew, as well as English ; among those which were carefully distributed were Sherman's, Carlisle's and McKinley's speeches. The New York Evening Post's Free Coinage Catechism was much in demand and gladly sup- plied. It was written by Alexander D. Noyes, the Post's financial editor, and two million copies of it were circu- lated. Carl Schurz was induced to enter the canvass on behalf of McKinley, and one million and a half copies of a clear and convincing speech of his were scattered abroad. This speech lent itself to sententious quotations; hence the leaflets called Schurz nuggets that wore placed before many readers. Innumerable speakers of lesser note pre- sented the case against free silver. Men in every county of the pivotal Western States wore supplied with sound money literature; and, as they could not give their time for nothing, they were hired to read and explain the pam- phlets and talk to the few or many who might gather at the school-houses or other places of resort to hear ex- pounded the political issue of the day. Probably the most effective speaker in gaining votes was McKinley himself. Declining to emulate Bryan in his "whirlwind Ch. L] McKINLEY'S "FRONT PORCH" SPEECHES 25 tour," he spoke from the front veranda of his house in Canton to many deputations, some of them spontaneous, others arranged for, discussing mainly the financial ques- tion. He almost always knew what the visiting spokes- man was going to say so that he was often able to revise his own address beforehand. These speeches of McKin- ley's were carefully prepared, as he well knew that he was addressing the newspaper-reading public of the whole country as well as the men who had travelled some dis- tance to greet their candidate in person. Close students of the art of guiding public sentiment assert that people will often read in the newspaper a speech that has been orally delivered while they pass by an essay or letter in the same type and given the same prominence. McKin- ley's efforts were called his "front porch " * speeches and, in their general tenor were of a piece with the formal letter of acceptance that was given to the public on August 26. Acknowledging that the money question was the chief issue of the campaign he gave it the first and most prom- inent place in his letter. "The meaning of the coinage plank adopted at Chicago," he wrote, "is that anyone may take a quantity of silver bullion, now worth fifty- 1 John Hay said in his Memorial Address on McKinley delivered in the Capitol at Washington on Feb. 27, 1902: "From the front porch of his modest house in Canton he daily addressed the delegations which came from every part of the country to greet him in a series of speeches so strong, so varied, so pertinent, so full of facts briefly set forth, of theories embodied in a single phrase, that they formed the hourly text for the other speakers of his party and give probably the most convincing proof we have of his surprising fertility of resource and flexibility of mind. All this was done without anxiety or strain. I remember a day spent with him during that busy summer. He had made nineteen speeches the day before ; that day he made many. But in the intervals of these ad- dresses he sat in his study and talked, with nerves as quiet and free from care as if we had been spending a holiday at the seaside or among the hills." 26 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 three cents, to the mints of the United States, have it coined at the expense of the Government and receive for it a silver dollar which shall be legal tender for the pay- ment of all debts, public and private. . . . Until in- ternational agreement is had, it is the plain duty of the United States to maintain the gold standard. It is the recognized and sole standard of the great commercial nations of the world with which we trade more largely than with any other. Eighty-four per cent of our for- eign trade for the fiscal year 1895 was with gold standard countries and our trade with other countries was settled on a gold basis." Addressing himself to the argument that the "present industrial and financial depression was the result of the gold standard," he declared, "Good money never made times hard." Hanna had a high opinion of the influence of the Fourth Estate and knew the hold that the weekly county journals had on their readers. He sent them specially prepared matter, plates and ready prints. It was fortunate that nearly all of the large daily newspapers, whether Demo- cratic or Republican, were ardent advocates of the cause of sound money ; copies of these were industriously dis- tributed. "Of course," wrote Croly, "cartoons, posters, inscriptions and buttons wore manufactured by the car- load — the most popular poster being the five-colored, single-sheet lithograph, bearing B portrail of McKinley with the inscription underneath, 'The Advance Agent of Prosperity.'" l During AuguM Hanna was somewhat staggered by the poll of Iowa which indicated that this sure Republican State would cast her electoral vote for Bryan. Yet ad- i P. 218. Ch. i.] Mckinley — bryan 27 mitting, for the moment, that Iowa must be placed in the doubtful column, he was still confident of McKinley's election, believing that at the worst it would be a close shave, while he really hoped for a stampede. At any rate, the campaign was to him too serious a matter for any phase of it to be left to chance; indeed, he and McKinley had decided that, if matters got desperate, McKinley should take the stump in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Iowa and Kansas. The Methodist, the Roman Catholic and the other churches were mainly on the side of sound money and many preachers did not hesitate to bring politics into the pulpit during their Sunday exhortations. Na- ture gave a welcome help to Hanna in an advance in the price of wheat. Now do something for corn came a witty demand from the Indian corn-growing States. To Bryan's oratory more than to any other one cause was due the impression that the campaign was one of the masses against the classes. Some of the resolutions of the Chicago platform were deemed anarchistic 1 and in- fluenced votes against Bryan who thought it wise to deny the imputation. "We have been called anarchists," he said. "I am not an anarchist. There is not beneath the flag a truer friend of government or a greater lover of law and order than the nominee of the Chicago con- vention." 2 It is difficult to describe with strict impar- tiality a heated political campaign in one's own country and one's own time, but a keen observer from England should have been able to view the events of 1896 with a comparative lack of bias. "I have never thought the Republic in [such] serious peril as I do now, " wrote Gold- 1 Ante. 2 Speech in Baltimore during September, 463. 28 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 win Smith, "when I see the organization of the Demo- cratic party captured by Anarchism and Repudiation. Bimetallism, you will understand, is the least part of the matter; even Repudiation is not the greatest. The greatest is the uprising of disorder, in all its forms and grades against the institutions of the American Repub- lic. . . . Bryanism is a vast cave of Adullam, in which are combined all the distressed, all the discontented, all who have nothing to lose and may hope to gain by a general overturn. ... In November the Republic of the Fathers will be fighting for its life." l During October the stampede to McKinley took place. General J. D. Cox, who was then living in Cincinnati, Ohio, wrote on October 26 in a private letter: "When I went East in June I am sure nine-tenths of the Ohio Republicans were ardent bimetallists, with more leaning to free silver than to gold monometallism. Now nearly every man seems to rival his neighbor in putting gold forward as the single standard. . . . The claim of Re- publican managers that there is a 'landslide' going on in McKinley 's favor, I assume to be sufficiently true to war- rant a confident expectation of his election." Bryan made a wonderful cam ass, travelling IS, 000 miles and addressing audiences almost every day. The mere factof his bearing the physical strain he was under- going and the eagerness <>f people to see and hear this famous orator must have counted in hi- favor. 2 1 Saturday B toig. l. Sept. •">. Oct 31 'In this aooount of the campaign of 1896, I have been aiwiwtftd by Crniv'.s I. iff of Banna; Oloott'a Life "f McKinley; Bryan, The First Battle; Peek; Stanwood, ii. I of the Presidency; The \ ijini; Geldwin Smith's articles in the Saturday Bavin EToraker, Notes of a Busy Lifr, i.; Conversations with Mark Ihinna, A.Ug. 28, Dec. 20. Ch. I.] THE ELECTION OF 1896 29 On Tuesday, November 3, nearly fourteen millions voted. McKinley was triumphantly elected. He was to receive 271 electoral votes to Bryan's 176, a majority of 95. His plurality in the popular vote was somewhat over six hundred thousand. "No President since U. S. Grant," wrote Croly, "entered office supported by so large a proportion of the American people as did William McKinley." l Bryan congratulated McKinley on his election and the successful candidate made a graceful reply. McKinley carried the New England States, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania by large majorities. The Middle Western States gave him their electoral votes. He invaded the solid South, carrying Delaware, Kentucky, West Virginia and Maryland, Maryland by an imposing plurality. Bryan carried Kansas and Nebraska, all the mining States except California, and also Washington, while Oregon voted for McKinley. North Dakota did likewise, while South Dakota gave her electoral vote to Bryan by a small plurality. Ohio, the State of McKinley and Hanna, was a disappointment to the Republicans. While they never regarded seriously the boasts of the Bryanites that they would carry the State, yet her plu- rality, being less than that of Michigan and about one third that of Illinois, showed that Ohio was somewhat uncertain. For, in the August forecast, Michigan was set down as very doubtful and, while Illinois was con- sidered less doubtful, she was not regarded, like Ohio, as safe beyond peradventure for McKinley. »P. 227. CHAPTER II After the election of McKinley, Mark Hanna occupied an enviable position. Had it been usual, the freedom of Cleveland would have been conferred upon him. "He can own this city," said an enthusiastic financial adherent. "What a glorious record Mark Hanna has made this year!" wrote John Hay in a private letter. "I never knew him intimately until we went into this fight together, but my esteem and admiration for him have grown every hour. He is a born general in politics, perfectly square, honest and courageous with a coup d'oeil for the battle- field, and a knowledge of the enemy's weak points which is very remarkable. I do not know whether he will take a share in the government, but I hope he will." ' McKin- ley desired him to accept a Cabinet position and for a while he revolved in his mind whether he would not take the post of Secretary of the Treasury, a place which he was entitled to and which he would have admirably filled. On looking into the matter, however, he found the routine and confinement of the office objectionable ; more- over, he aspired after the senatorship from his State — an office that would give him tin' inlluence he desired to exert, and yet effectually preserve his independence. Therefore he made public the declaration that he would accept no office from the McKinley administration. I Croly. 228. 30 Cn. II] SECRETARY SHERMAN 31 Hanna did not appreciate that this statement would rise up to plague him. For he had conceived the idea of inducing the President to appoint Senator John Sherman Secretary of State and of being appointed by the Governor of Ohio to succeed him for his unexpired term in the Sen- ate [March 4, 1899]. During his many interviews and conferences with McKinley he canvassed the matter, with the result that on January 4, 1897, the President- elect offered to Sherman the position of Secretary of State . in his administration, and this was promptly accepted. 1 The course of events gave efficient support to those who wished to attack McKinley and Hanna, as it demonstrated that the appointment was utterly unfit owing to mental failure on the part of the Secretary of State. The critics averred that Sherman had given way to unusual excite- ment, both on the floor of the Senate and in a newspaper interview, that his memory had been failing for two or three years, that this fact was so presented to Hanna and McKinley that they ought to have recognized it, staying their hands from such procedure ; that it was in short, a case of an aged statesman being "kicked up- stairs" to make a place for Mark Hanna. Sherman him- self, after the resignation of the office of Secretary of State [April 25, 1898] by newspaper interview and private let- ter, confirmed this criticism. "No doubt," he wrote con- fidentially on November 8, 1898, "I ought to have re- mained in the Senate during my term, which would not have expired until the 4th of March next. At that time I regarded McKinley as a sincere and ardent friend, whom I had assisted and whose election I had promoted. When J Life of McKinley, Olcott, 329. 32 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 he urged me to accept the position of Secretary of State, I accepted with some reluctance and largely to promote the wishes of Mark Hanna. The result was that I lost the position both of Senator and Secretary. . . . They deprived me of the high office of Senator by the tempo- rary appointment as Secretary of State." l Wisdom after the event is the source of much criticism, and so it is in this case when the well-meant plan of Hanna and McKinley turned out badly. Hanna had twice supported Sherman for the presidential nomina- tion, and had a high idea of his wisdom, not only in finance but in foreign affairs ; seeing something of his work as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, he admired his clear comprehension and ef- fective statement, and as he felt in a measure responsi- ble for the success of the McKinley administration, he really thought that he was contributing to it by helping Sherman to the leading place in the Cabinet. His atti- tude to the stories that came to him regarding Sherman's mental failure was characteristic ; he had such confidence in Sherman's ability and so desired the succession to the Senate that he did not believe the stories, oven though some of them must have been endorsed by his New York financial friends to whom he had been drawn closely by the exigencies of the political campaign. He knew Sher- man well socially; was aware that he had always been temperate in eating and drinking, moderate in all of his pleasures and, although nearly 71. Could not see that there 1 Note* of i I'.usy Life, Foraker, L BOB. Sherman died in 1000. This letter was handed to Porakei by General Miles, March I, 1002, but was not printed until the first edition of thia book, which was published in February, l'JIU. Ch. II.] SECRETARY SHERMAN 33 was any reason for thinking, apart from the stories that were afloat, that he might not be physically and mentally fit for six years to come. The Nation, which became a severe critic of the appointment, said in an editorial on August 20, 1896: " Senator Sherman can make a good speech when he tries to do so. His speech at Columbus on Saturday was one of the best he has ever made." x McKinley's first impression against Sherman's appoint- ment was entirely different from the result. The Sena- tor was generally considered as the leader of his party in his State and McKinley feared that on account of his masterfulness he would wish to dominate the adminis- tration. It is not surprising, therefore, that with this idea fixed in his mind McKinley should have made little account of the reports that he heard of Sherman's mental failure and should write to Joseph Medill on February 8, 1897: "I concur in your opinion that the stories re- garding Senator Sherman's 'mental decay' are without foundation and the cheap inventions of sensational writers or other evil-disposed or mistaken people. When I saw him last [this was January 15, 1897] I was convinced both of his perfect health physically and mentally, and that his prospects of life were remarkably good." 2 Sherman was glad to accept the Secretaryship of State. He exchanged two years in the Senate with a doubtful succession for apparently a four years' tenure of the Cabinet head of the new Republican administration, which was undoubtedly a promotion. It was not un- usual, however, for Senators to decline Cabinet appoint- 1 P. 134 ; see also June 24, 1897. 2 Life of McKinley, Olcott, i. 334. 34 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 ments, and it was open to Sherman to do so, but as matter of fact the prospect was attractive. He had enjoyed himself in the Treasury Department under Hayes, hav- ing great influence with the President and he might well have thought that a similar experience now awaited him. The important question was, would Governor Asa Bushnell appoint Hanna ? The two belonged to different factions in the Republican party in Ohio and there was no love lost between them. Sherman used his influence to get the Governor to name Hanna as his successor, and the President-elect wrought powerfully in his friend's be- half. Nevertheless the Governor did not want to appoint a factional enemy and he authorized his personal and political friend, Joseph B. Foraker, to offer the place to Theodore E. Burton of Cleveland, then a Representative in Congress who, however, declined it. During the first part of February, McKinley must have despaired of the carrying out of this part of the program, as he still urged Hanna to accept a Cabinet position, writing to him on February 18, 1897, "I have hoped, and so stated to you at every convenient opportunity, that you would yet conclude to accept the Postmaster-Generalship." The Treasury was no longer at the President-elect's disposal, as on January 28 he had authorized the announcement that he had selected for that post Lyman J. Gage of Chicago. 1 "You have as often declined," McKinley con- tinued in this letter to Hanna, "and since our conversation on Tuesday last (February 16) I have reluctantly con- cluded that I cannot induce you to take this or any other 1 The Nation, Feb. 4. Ch. II.] SENATOR HANNA 35 Cabinet position. You know how deeply I regret this determination and how highly I appreciate your life-long devotion to me. You have said that if you could not enter the Senate you would not enter public life at all." Those who like to consider the " might have been" may conjecture whether, if Hanna had even now decided to go into the Cabinet, McKinley would have induced Sherman to withdraw his acceptance of the office of Secre- tary of State on the ground that he would prefer not to have two men from Ohio in his Cabinet ? In which event he would have appointed as Secretary of State a man flatly opposed to a warlike intervention in favor of Cuba, as at that time McKinley was himself. Hanna, more persistent than McKinley, had no idea of giving up the game. Bushnell was a candidate for the Republican nomination for Governor who would be elected in the autumn of 1897, and, if he failed to appoint Hanna Senator, he would jeopardize materially his chance of nom- ination. Finally, through fear of failing to receive the renomination he desired, and from the unmistakable sen- timent in the Republican party in Ohio that Hanna should have the place, he determined to appoint his an- cient enemy, and wrote to him on February 21, "I wish to communicate to you my conclusion to appoint you as the successor of Senator Sherman when his resignation shall have been received." 1 William McKinley was inaugurated on March 4, 1897, and in his address made clear the immediate policy of the 1 Life of Hanna, Croly, 240. This book has been used freely in this account. Also Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, i. ; Life of McKinley, Olcott; John Sherman, Theodore E. Burton; do. W. S. Kerr, ii.; The Nation, passim. 36 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 government. 1 There were "depression in business, dis- tress among the people." The government needed more revenue and ought to get it by an increase in tariff taxation. On this point he spoke to a united party and had Congress and Republicans with him ; to carry out this purpose he summoned an extra session for March 15. The position which McKinley took need not have sur- prised anyone ; nevertheless, the gold Democrats who had supported him were disappointed that he did not put the money question to the fore and advocate legislation which should fix by law permanently the gold standard ; this development received fit expression in the speeches of ex-President Cleveland and ex-Secretary Carlisle at the New York City Reform Club dinner of April 24. Cleve- land could speak with authority, as he was the hero of the gold standard even as McKinley was the apotheosis of a protective tariff. And Cleveland and his Cabinet had given McKinley a hearty welcome, unusual in a change of one party administration to its opponent. But McKin- ley was wiser than his critics in declaring that the securing of adequate revenue must precede financial legislation. So far as finance was concerned he must endeavor to effect international bimetallism ; until that was decided, the ex- isting gold standard would be maintained. The Presi- dent knew that no act such as he desired could pass the existing Senate, and his foresight was confirmed by that body adopting, within less than a year, a resolution which declared that the principal and interest of the govern- ment bonds were payable in silver dollars at the option 1 Tin- [nnugund addn m ii printed in Cong Eteoord, xxx. Pt. 1. For McKinley 'a Cabinet, w;c l'cck, 621. Ch. II.] THE DINGLEY TARIFF 37 of the administration. 1 McKinley made a sincere at- tempt to obtain international bimetallism but, when Great Britain blocked the way, 2 he appreciated that busi- ness in the United States must be conducted on the single gold standard. In the attempt to secure this by proper legislation, he said, in a confidential talk with Senator Hanna and Secretary Alger on one of the last evenings of August, 1897, the Republican party may go down and I may go down with it but, after that temporary sacrifice, the Republican party devoted to such a noble cause will rise again. Everything was in proper shape to enact a protective tariff to take the place of the Democratic Act of 1894. It had been tacitly agreed that Thomas B. Reed should be reelected Speaker of the new House, and Nelson Dingley, also of Maine, should be chairman of the Com- mittee on Ways and Means ; this tacit agreement was at once carried into effect. This Committee, which was substantially the same as that of the preceding Congress, had at that session, after hearing abundant testimony, prepared a tariff bill which was now introduced into the House and passed on March 31. The Senate offered many amendments and did not pass their bill until July 7, when it went to a Committee of conference whose re- port was adopted by the House on July 19 by yeas 187, nays 1 16, and by the Senate on July 24 by yeas 40, nays 30 ; on this day the President signed it and it became a law. "We expect," Dingley had written in a private letter, "to cut nearly all our duties considerably below those of 1 Life of McKinley, Olcott, i. 358. It was a concurrent resolution. It passed the Senate by a vote of 47 : 32 on Jan. 28, 1898, and was rejected by the House on Jan. 31, the vote standing 133 : 181. * Ibid., 355. 38 McKINLEY'9 ADMINISTRATION [1897 the Act of 1890." J To no better man could the tariff bill have been confided. No one in public life, except McKinley and Senator Aldrich, understood the subject better. For Dingley, it was a labor of love, and with the assistance especially of Sereno E. Payne of New York and John Dalzell of Pennsylvania, fellow members of the Com- mittee, he presented to the House "a fairly good pro- tectionist measure." 2 As showing the confidence felt in him by the President, he had been offered the Treasury Department which, on account of a question of health, he had declined, but saying at the same time that he could do more for the success of the administration as chair- man of the Committee on Ways and Means than he could in the Treasury. 3 The measure is quite properly called the Dingley Act and is so known in history. When Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island reported the bill from the Senate Committee on Finance, he said that it was "thoroughly understood throughout the country in the last political campaign, that if the Republican party should be again entrusted with power, no extreme tariff legislation would follow." 4 Dingley and Aldrich ex- pressed the idea of the Republican leaders and, while the House was readily controlled by the power of the Speaker Thomas B. Reed, it was quite different when the tariff question was opened up in the Senate. Tt was as John Sherman had previously said, "When Republicans and Democrats together arc f ruining a tariff, each Member or Senator consults the interest of his 'district' or State." 6 'Turbdl, Tariff in Our Time, 343. 'Ibid, 243. 3 Ufa and Times of Nelson Dingley, 413. * Stan wood, American Tariff Controversies, ii. 3S4. 1 Recollections, ii. llbo. I irlncu- ^%£^^_ ZJ^ Ch. II.] THE DINGLEY TARIFF 39 A feature of the case in hand is told by Edward Stanwood, "The plans of the Republican leaders were overturned ... by senators who were more in favor of silver than of a protective tariff." l The Dingley Act, when it became a law, had rates of duty higher than they had been under any preceding tariff. 2 The McKinley Act was a 49^ per cent tariff, the Wilson, 40 to 41 f, while the percentage of the Dingley Act ran from 49| to 52. 3 McKinley enjoyed the first few months of his presi- dential life more than the later ones. As he did the hon- ors of the White House, he appeared to have lived there always, so well did he fit into the place. He had a gen- uine liking for his predecessor. "Fine old fellow, wasn't he?" was a not uncommon remark to his Secretary. Alive to the power and influence of the presidential office, he said to Cleveland as they drove together to the Capi- tol on Inauguration Day, " What an impressive thing it is to assume tremendous responsibilities!" 4 And Cleve- 1 Stanwood, ii. 386. 2 Ibid., 391. 1 Noyes, Amer. Finance, 269. The Dingley Act reimposed the duties on wool ; brought about a duty on hides that had been on the free list since 1872 ; imposed lower duties on cotton goods than those of 1890 but higher on silks and linens; re- stored the rates on chinaware of 1890. Iron ore was dutiable at 40£, pig iron at $4, steel rails $7.84 per ton, the same as in 1894. Tin plate under the Act of 1890 paid 2£$i, in 1894, 1U, and in 1897, IU per pound. On sugar the differential was the same as under the act of 1894. "But the moral effect was very different. The House in 1897 had adopted the plan of leaving things as they were and had successfully resisted the effort of the refining monopoly to secure more." — Taussig. Tariff History, 5th ed., 328, 332, 335, 336, 342, 347, 352. See also correspondence in Life and Times of Dingley, 424 et seq. " The Dingley Act restored the duty on works of art, free under the Tariff of 1894." — Tarbell, 243. " European travellers could bring in free only one hundred dollars worth of goods bought abroad." — Dingley, 443. "The tariff of 1897 like that of 1890 was the outcome of an aggressive spirit of protection." — Taussig, 358. * Olcott, ii. 367. 40 McKINLEYS ADMINISTRATION [1897 land returned the liking and respect. "McKinley was dis- tinguished, great and useful," he declared in his Memorial address at Princeton, "patriotic and faithful as a soldier, honest and upright as a citizen, tender and devoted as a husband and truthful, generous, unselfish, moral and clean in every relation of life." 1 Cleveland and Olney had negotiated "a treaty for the arbitration of all matters in difference between the United States and Great Britain" which Cleveland had trans- mitted to the Senate during January, 1897, where it was pending when McKinley took the oath of office. Believing that politics should cease at the water's edge, he took the rather unusual course of approving emphatically a treaty negotiated by a preceding administration, which was that of a partisan opponent. "We want no wars of conquest," McKinley said in his inaugural address; "we must avoid the temptation of territorial aggression. War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed ; peace is preferable to war in almost every contin- gency. Arbitration is the true method of settlement of international as well as local or individual differences. . . . Since this treaty [the Olney-Pauncefote treaty of Jan. 11, 1897] is clearly the result of our own initiative, since it has been recognized as the leading feature of our foreign policy throughout our entire national history — the adjust- ment of difficulties by judicial methods rather than by force of arms — and since it presents to the world the glorious example of reason and peace, not passion and war, controlling the relations between two of the greatest nations of the world, an example certainly to be followed 1 This address W9M delivered on Sept. 19, 1901, Andrew F. We*t, Cen- tury Magazine, Jan., 1909. Ch. II.] THE CUBAN QUESTION 41 by others, I respectfully urge the early action of the Sen- ate thereon, not merely as a matter of policy but as a duty to mankind. The importance and moral influence of the ratification of such a treaty can hardly be over- estimated in the cause of advancing civilization." l The Senate acted on the treaty but failed to ratify it, the vote on May 5, 1897, standing 43, to 26, less than the necessary two thirds. The result was a disappointment to the President and his intimate friends. McKinley felt fully competent to deal with the tariff, which was one of the absorbing questions during his first months in the White House, and he gave efficient aid to the supporters of the Dingley Act. The Cuban ques- tion troubled him from the first. With Cleveland at the White House on the evening before' his inauguration, he manifested the subject uppermost in his mind — the threatened conflict with Spain and the horrors of war. "Mr. President," he said, "if I can only go out of office at the end of my term, with the knowledge that I have done what lay in my power to avert this terrible calamity, with the success that has crowned your patience and per- sistence, I shall be the happiest man in the world." 2 Sherman's failure disturbed him, but during April 3 he called to his aid William R. Day as Assistant Secretary of State. Day had inherited his essential qualities from his father who was of fine subtle fibre all through and a re- tiring nature. 4 William R. Day was a fellow practitioner 1 Moore, International Law Digest, vii. 75 et seq. 1 Parker's Rec, 249. 3 1897. Day was nominated April 24. The nomination was not re- ceived in the Senate until May 3. He was confirmed on the same day. * Riddle, Rec, 234. 42 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 of McKinley at the Canton, Ohio, bar, and was known by the President as one comes to know one's daily associates and competitors. The two now wrought together in en- tire harmony and, so far as one may judge by the diplo- matic correspondence, foreign relations did not suffer from the defection of Sherman. Sherman, however, could not brook his relegation to an inferior place and he there- fore resigned on April 25, 1898, leaving Day the nominal as well as the real Secretary of State. 1 For a long while McKinley thought that he could settle the Cuban ques- tion without war and that he would have the country at his back, but he was hampered in the choice of a minister to Spain. He wanted Seth Low, and he thought that he might have persuaded him to undertake the difficult job could he have induced him to visit Washington. His next choice fell upon General J. D. Cox, an admirable appointment, who for personal reasons was obliged to de- cline it. McKinley would have liked John W. Foster, but finally he named Stewart L. Woodford 2 whose work turned out much better than might have been expected. From his inauguration to the assembling of Congress at its regular session in December, 1S97, McKinley tasted the sweets of office. After the adjournment of Congress on July 24, he took a trip East, stopping at a hotel on the New York side of Lake Champlain. One day he crossed over into Vermont and was struck with the sturdy patriot- ism of the men of the Green Mountain State and their devotion to Republican party ideals. Returning to his own State, he paid a memorable visit to Mark Hanna, 1 Day was nominated aa Secretary' of State and confirmed on April * Woodford WEI Dominated on June 16, 1897. ch. ii.] Mckinley 43 whose hospitality he enjoyed for a number of days, meet- ing men connected with his administration and Republi- cans whom he looked to for countenance and support. Of a genial nature and possessing attractive manners, he commended himself to all sorts and conditions of men and, at this time, might sincerely have felt that his influence was second to that of no other man in the country. CHAPTER III McKinley's opinion expressed to Cleveland regarding his treatment of Cuban affairs was thoroughly sincere, and at this distance may be justified. "Patience and persistence" were well applied to Cleveland's and Olney's management. The Cuban insurrection began in Febru- ary, 1895, and failed to be suppressed by a humane governor-general who conducted the war in accordance with civilized usage. He was succeeded less than a year later by Weyler, who adopted at once drastic methods, the most important of which was his proclamation re- quiring a concentration of inhabitants at military head- quarters in the provinces still under his control. To re- quire people to quit their plantations and villages where they might secure a living and herd together in towns subject to starvation and disease was extreme cruelty and deserved McKinley's statement that "it was not civil- ized warfare" but "extermination." ' v During the spring of 1896, both Houses of Congress adopted a concurrent resolution declaring thai in their opinion the United States should accord to the insur- gents belligerent rights 2 but Cleveland and his Secretary •Annual Message, Dee. •>. IS97. "The cruel policy of concentration WBS initiated February 1»>. IS'.tti' ibid. Sec The Relations of the I'nited States and Spain, Diplomacy, Chadwiok, 181. This valuable hook will be referred to afl Chadwiok. 'The Resolution as finally passed, April 6, 1896, declared that the United Btatet Should be Strictly neutral granting belligerent rights to both parties ami lhat the president hoiiM offer the friendly offioefl of the United States to Spain for the recognition of the independence of Cuba. Tde resolution ai passed was the Senate one. The milder one of the House was rejected by the Senate and the BOUM reeedod. 44 Ch. III.] CLEVELAND'S CUBAN POLICY 45 of State Olney declined to act in accordance with this ad- vice, not deeming that the insurgents had acquired a condition of proper belligerency. In his last Message to Congress, Cleveland told clearly the actual state of af- fairs. While Spain held " Havana and the seaports and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roam at will over at least two thirds of the inland country. . . . If Spain has not yet reestablished her authority, neither have the insurgents yet made good their title to be re- garded as an independent state. . . . The excesses on both sides have become more frequent and more deplor- able. . . . The rural population is required to concen- trate itself in the towns." The industrial value of the island, consisting very largely in its capacity to produce sugar, was fast diminishing. In most of Cuba a state of anarchy existed, where property was no longer protected and life was unsafe. Despite the avowed sympathy of the inhabitants of the United States, the number of resi- dent Cubans ready to help their brother insurgents, and the utter ruin threatening a neighboring and fertile coun- try, our obligations to Spain, so Cleveland asserted, had been duly observed. But he uttered a note of warning when he said that a situation may be presented "in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be su- perseded by higher obligations." i Reviewing carefully the last two years of Cleveland's administration, his conduct and that of his Secretary of State Olney in regard to Cuba merit commendation ; they might easily have brought on a war with Spain. The Cuban question was inherited by McKinley. The 1 Message of Dec. 7, 1S96. 46 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 Senate at the special session called in March, 1897, passed a resolution in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents, but it was never acted upon by the House, as Speaker Reed had not appointed a Committee on Foreign Affairs to which it should properly be referred. Anarchy in Cuba continued. In the destruction of prop- erty and disregard of life, the insurgents were equally to blame with the Spaniards. "The deliberate destruction of the support of a people," wrote Chadwick, "shown in the orders of Gomez [the insurgent leader] are deep stains upon the conduct of the Cuban cause." A large number of sugar mills were wrecked and this wreckage involved deprivation of work, and consequent suffering and death to vast numbers of working people. "Historic truth," Chadwick added, "demands the setting forth of the fact that Cuban and Spaniard were alike regardless of the mis- ery caused by their methods and of its extent." ' During the summer and autumn of 1897, McKinley gave the subject much anxious thought which was ap- parent in his first annual Message to Congress. He re- ferred with elation to the performance of its full duty ac- cording to the law of nations by the United States. The Government had "successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws." He argued against the recognition of the belligerency or the independence of Cuba and did not deem it wise to intervene for the pres- ent in the contest. Rather should we await the result of the entire change of policy promised by the new ministry in Spain. 2 The reactionary premier had been assassi- 1 P « Message of Doc. 6, 1897. Ch. III.] CUBA AND SPAIN 47 nated and Sagasta, a Liberal, had succeeded to the head of the new ministry which was in sympathy with his aims. When John Hay was first Secretary of Legation to Spain, he wrote in his Diary during 1869 : "Sagasta is the hardest hitter in the Cortes. Everybody calls him a scamp and everybody seems to admire him nevertheless. He is a sort of Disraeli — lithe, active, full of energy and hate." * A writer in the Encyclopaedia Britannica said that Sa- gasta was a " leader, skilful in debate, a trimmer par ex- cellence." He now appreciated in some degree, if not fully, the pressure from the United States. His ministry "re- called the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world ; it modi- fied the horrible order of concentration and has under- taken to care for the helpless and permit those who de- sire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so." It also proclaimed by decree a scheme of autonomy to be- come effective upon ratification by the Cortes. 2 It was extremely doubtful whether the Spanish mind under- stood autonomy as did the British and American, and a self-governing colony as was Canada could hardly be ex- pected, but Sagasta was sincere in offering autonomy as he understood it. It is easy to see that the President hoped for a peace- ful solution despite the fact that the Sagasta scheme was not satisfactory to the extremists on either side. Riots oc- curred in Havana, which was loyal to Spanish interest, directed against the governor-general and autonomy; owing to the prevailing excitement the United States Consul-General in Havana thought that it might be neces- 1 Life of Hay, W. R. Thayer, i, 321. * McKinley Message, Dec. 6, 1897. 48 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 sary to send a war-ship thither for the protection of the American residents. The President considered the mat- ter and determined to send the battleship Maine to Ha- vana, but the statement was made to the Spanish minis- ter that it was "an act of friendly courtesy" and it was so given out to the press. Spain looked upon "the pro- posed visit of the Maine" as a proof of "cordial friend- ship," and replied that "wishing to reciprocate such friendly and courteous demonstrations we shall arrange, also, that vessels of our squadron may visit the ports of the United States in passing to and from the island of Cuba." x While the President feared that the scheme of autonomy had come to nothing, he nevertheless exhibited his continued friendship to Spain. At the diplomatic dinner of January 27, 1898, he showed marked attention to the Spanish minister and congratulated him on the fact that "we have only good news." 2 These friendly relations were interrupted by an indis- cretion on the part of the Spanish minister in Washington, de L&me. A confidential letter written by him during the previous December to a friend sojourning in Cuba was "surreptitiously, if not criminally obtained" 3 and, on February 9, published by a New York newspaper. De Lome said : "The message [the President's of December 6, 1897] has been a disillusionment to the insurgents who expected something different ; but I regard it as bad [for us]. Besides the ingrained and inevitable ill- breeding with which is repeated all that the press and public opinion in Spain have said about Weyler, it once more shows what McKinlcy is, weak and a bidder for the 1 Npaniuli Chit mm. I I Mrs, 68, 60 ' Ibid., 71. • Day, Kon.'npi Relations, 680. Gh. III.] THE MAINE 49 admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be poli- tician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party." l De Lome's folly was astounding. It was well known in Spain that while Congress was for war, the President was earnest for peace and no one could be in daily relations with him without feeling the sincerity of his purpose. The aim, therefore, of a Spanish diplomatist should have been to humor the President, not to impugn his motives. So far, however, as McKinley was concerned, he found most objectionable the intimation further on in the letter that the negotiations for commercial reciprocity with the au- tonomous government of Cuba might be "for effect" only. But as Assistant-Secretary of State Day wrote, "The publication of the letter created a good deal of feel- ing among Americans." 2 De L6me at once cabled to Madrid his resignation which was promptly accepted. Day conducted the affair with discretion and on March 3 was glad to tell Stewart L. Woodford, our minister to Spain that the de Lome incident was "fortunately closed." 3 Meanwhile an occurrence took place in Havana which prevented the peaceful solution that the President sought. At forty minutes past nine on the evening of February 15, the Maine, lying peacefully at anchor in the harbor, was destroyed by an explosion with a loss of two officers and 258 men. The Spanish Government and the Cuban authorities expressed at once their sympathy with the United States on account of this dreadful occurrence, and their immediate action was all that could be desired. 1 Foreign Relations, 1007. * March 3. Foreign Relations, 680. 8 Ibid. 50 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 The Court of Inquiry into the disaster was composed of three members and a judge advocate of the American Navy. Captain William E. Sampson was at its head and another member was Captain French E. Chadwick, whose excellent book on "The Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy," gives an account of the transaction. "The situation," wrote Chadwick, "pre- cluded any haste, and the inquiry was carried on deliber- ately, carefully, and searchingly for twenty-three days and with every effort to reach a fair and just finding." 1 The question in the official and public mind was, did the de- struction take place from an external or an internal explo- sion ? Chadwick was one of the two members of the Court who had thought the explosion was internal, and he and his colleague were convinced against their prepossessions. 2 On March 28, 1898, Congress and the public were in- formed of the finding of the Court by a special message of the President to Congress. The Court determined that the disaster was not in any respect due to the fault or negligence of officers or crew. "In the opinion of the Court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. The Court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons." a John D. Long, who at this time was Secretary of the Navy, in his book published in 1903, wrote : "The mystery of the loss of the Maine remains yet to be solved." 4 Chadwick, however, had keener insight, writing in his i P. 543. •Chadwiok, 563 n. 'Senate Doc Destruction of Battleship Maine. * The New American Navy, i. 144. Ch. III.] THE MAINE 51 book published in 1909 that he "would welcome an exam- ination of the wreck by a complete exposure of it as it lies. It could only result in substantiating the description of the injuries by the Court whose examination was too complete to leave chance of serious error." ! Chad- wick's expressed wish was gratified. In 1911, by a fine piece of engineering, the wreck was exposed and a board of one army and four navy officers made an examination of it, reporting on December 1, 1911, that the destruction was due to "the explosion of a charge of a low form of explosive exterior to the ship. . . . This resulted in ig- niting and exploding the contents of the 6-inch reserve magazine, said contents including a large quantity of black powder. The more or less complete explosion of the contents of the remaining forward magazines followed. The magazine explosions resulted in the destruction of the vessel." 2 Contemporaneous material and many later books at- tribute much influence to Senator Redfield Proctor's speech in the Senate on March 17, which, owing to the confidence reposed in him by the country, held their at- tention. "My trip," he said, "was entirely unofficial and of my own motion." Of the six provinces in Cuba, "my observations were confined to the four western prov- inces which constitute about one half of the island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the in- surgents, except the few fortified towns. ... All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns 1 Chadwick, 5G3 n. * House Docs. 62d Cong. 2d Sess. No. 310. 52 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family. . . . General Blanco's [the governor-general succeeding Weyler] order of November 13 last somewhat modifies the Weyler order but is of little or no practical benefit. ... In fact though the order was issued four months ago I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning." "I am not in favor of annexation," he declared; and while Senator Proctor suggested no plan it is easy to see that intervention would have from him powerful support. "To me," he said, "the strongest ap- peal is not the barbarity practised by Weyler, nor the loss of the Maine . . . terrible as are both these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the en- tire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge." ! The Spanish minister 2 in Washington was much im- pressed, telegraphing to the home government that Sen- ator Proctor's speech had "produced great effect because of his temperate stand. He set forth In black colors the situation of the reconcentrados, declared that the country was opposed to autonomy and favorable to independence. . . . Before making the speech he had seen the President •Cong. Record, 2916 rt Mg. Senator Proctor gave alio the eetimated population of Cuba with its racial divi.--ii.iis. II,- also discussed the mili- tary and political situations, i'roctor had been Si-, retury of War under Harrison. ' Polo, who succeeded de Lome. Ch. III.] THE MAINE 53 and Day, for which reason more importance is attached to his words. My impression is that the President will try to withstand the powerful public sentiment in favor of the insurrection." l As early as March 20 the President learned confiden- tially that the naval board would make a "unanimous re- port that the Maine was blown up by a submarine mine." 2 This knowledge and Proctor's account dictated Day's midnight telegram of March 25 to Woodford at Madrid: "The concentration of men, women and chil- dren in the fortified towns and permitting them to starve is unbearable to a Christian nation geographically so close as ours to Cuba. ... It was represented to the President in November that the Blanco government would at once relieve the suffering and so modify the Weyler order as to permit those who were able to return to their homes and till the fields from which they had been driven. . . . The reconcentration order has not been practi- cally superseded. There is no hope of peace through Spanish arms. . . . The Spanish government seems un- able to conquer the insurgents. ... We do not want the island. . . . Peace is the desired end." 3 Be it re- membered that Congress, the country and Spain had the report of the Naval Board concerning the destruction of the Maine on Monday, March 28. Next day was sub- mitted to the Spanish ministry what turned out to be the President's ultimatum. Premising that "the President instructs me to say that we do not want Cuba," Wood- ford said in conversation with Sagasta, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for the Colonies, who, 1 Spanish Corr. and Docs., 95. 2 Foreign Relations, 692. s Ibid., 704, 712. 54 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 being well acquainted with English, acted as interpreter, "we do wish immediate peace in Cuba." The President "suggests an immediate armistice lasting until October 1, negotiations in the meantime being had looking to peace between Spain and the insurgents through the friendly offices of the President of the United States. He wishes the immediate revocation of the reconcentration order." With effect, does Chadwick, in recounting the history of the diplomacy of these days, speak of Spain's "fatal habit of procrastination." 1 On March 31, two days after Woodford's conversation, she showed this in her answer to the President's reasonable request. Far from accept- ance of the suggestion relating to the Armistice and con- sequent negotiations, it laid down propositions utterly in- admissible. Well did Woodford write to McKinley on April 1, "Yesterday's conference was a sorrow to me, for I have worked hard for peace." 2 On March 30, the day between the President's request and Spain's answer, Day apprised Woodford of the state of affairs in Washington. "You should know and fully appreciate," he telegraphed, "that there is profound feel- ing in Congress and the greatesl apprehension on the part of most conservative members that a resolution for inter- vention may pas^ both branches in spite of any effort which can be made. Only assurance from the President that, if he fails in peaceful negotiations ho will submit all the facts to Congress at a very early day, will prevent im- mediate action on the part of Congress." s It was evident thai BubmissioD of the question to Con- gress meant a declarati >n of war against Spain. Public * P. 654. » Foreign Relations, 7J7 ■ Ibid., 721. Ch. III.] SPAIN AND CUBA 55 sentiment had been worked up by the sensational press, frequently called the "yellow press"; it had manipu- lated the real news, spread unfounded reports, putting all before their readers with scare headlines. Newspaper editors and their assistants differed from those between 1850 and 1860, who made their appeals to the electorate by cogent editorials directed against the slave power. Now recourse was had to the news columns in which Spain was painted as perfidious and untrustworthy. Af- ter the Naval Board had made its report in regard to the Maine, it was impossible to convince the multitude that Spain had not, in some way or other, touched off the sub- marine mine which caused the explosion. " Remember the Maine" became the watchword. Appeal was made to what England would have done under like circum- stances, whose "commonest phrase" was, "I wish you would take Cuba at once. We wouldn't have stood it this long." J Public sentiment acted effectually upon Congress, a dominant majority of which wanted war with Spain. "Every Congressman," said Boutelle of Maine, "had two or three newspapers in his district — most of them printed in red ink . . . and shouting for blood." 2 It may be affirmed that if a referendum had been taken on April 1, 1898, a majority would have voted for war with Spain in order to expel her from Cuba. But the financial and business interests of the country were op- posed to the war, as they deemed it needless and they shrunk from its horrors and expense. The Jingoes taunted men who held this view with being influenced by Wall Street, and it proved an effective taunt, but really Wall 1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 166. 1 Oct. 22, 1898. Boston Herald, Oct. 23. 56 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 Street was only one part of this sentiment which was shared by business men throughout the country whose fit representative was Mark Hanna. "I am not," he declared, "in favor of heedlessly precipitating the coun- try into the horrors of war" on account of the Maine in- cident or Spain's attitude to Cuba. 1 As late as April 5, he wrote in a private letter that in his opinion the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ought to pass a resolu- tion giving the President some discretion ; otherwise, he added, "War cannot be avoided, and even under the most favorable circumstances it must come unless Spain backs down, which I believe she will do." A phase of the reflecting and intelligent part of the com- munity was well represented in the private letters of Gen- eral J. D. Cox. "The dreadful accident to the Maine," he wrote, "ought to make everybody sober and reasonable in thinking of foreign affairs. It ought to be a very good cause that would justify a war in which such things might be happening any day. 1 don't envy the public man who should have to look back on an unnecessar3 T war as in any part the work of his hands ; and to rush into it for mere wantonness, as many seem inclined to, is such un- speakable folly as to make one wonder that it is possible in an enlightened age." Again, od March 2, "It is en- tirely incredible that a civilized government should have ordered or approved the destruction of a ship in her port in time of peace." And on March 29, "as to inter- vention, the whole island and everybody on it are not worth the American volunteers who would inevitably die of yellow fever if we sent an army there." The officers and men who went forth to fight Spain, 1 Interviews, N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 24, 27. Ch. III.] ROOSEVELT 57 obedient to a dominant public sentiment and the fiat of Congress, might have used the words with a variation suitable to the time and country, which Philip Gibbs put into the mouth of British soldiers who suffered and fought in the trenches during the great World War: "I don't want to die — I want to live. Why should I be sacri- ficed to please the politicians of the world — those fools who are the cause of all this? People at home don't understand what we have to suffer. They don't care. Those infuriated old females in England, those compla- cent old bald-heads in St. James Street Clubs would see us all smashed to pulp, and die to the last man, without a question. They think it natural and nice, 'Dulce et de- corum est,' etc." 1 A phase of the sentiment of "literary fellows" was re- flected by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and John Hay. "When the Maine was blown up in Havana harbor," wrote Roosevelt in 1913, "war became inevita- ble." 2 He, in 1898, was impatient that the President did not act more promptly and wrote in a private letter,' "The blood of women and children, who have perished by the hundred thousand in hideous misery, lies at our door ; and the blood of the murdered men of the Maine calls not for indemnity but for the full measure of atone- ment which can only come by driving the Spaniard from the New World. I have said this to the President before his Cabinet ; I have said it to Judge'Day . . . ; and to my own chief;" 3 and again, "McKinley has no more backbone than a chocolate eclair!" 4 1 Boston Herald, May 4, 1919. 2 Autobiography, 232. 3 Letter of March 21 to Brooks Adams, J. B. Bishop. Scribner's Mag- azine, November 1919, 524. * Peck, 642. 58 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 Henry Cabot Lodge wrote in 1S99: "The outside en- gine of destruction [of the Maine) was a government sub- marine mine and had been exploded without the author- ity or knowledge of the Spanish government by men who wore the uniform of Spain. ... The result had been inevitable since the fatal 15th of February, although men did not understand it at the moment and still thought they could stay the current of events which had been gathering strength for seventy years and broken loose at last." ' On May 8, 1898, John Hay, now our Ambassador to England, wrote in a private letter : "I detest war and had hoped I might never see another, but this was as neces- sary as it was righteous. I have not for two years seen any other issue." 2 One may wonder if Roosevelt, Lodge and Hay took fully into account the Spanish habit of procrastination. Did Roosevelt with his habit of omnivorous reading come across the reported remark of Lord Clarendon: "Span- ish dynasties go and come ; Spanish queens go and come, and Spanish ministries go and come; but there is one thing in Spain that is always the same — they never an- swer letters" ? 3 Senator Lodge of course knew all about Lowell's mis- sion to Spain, and he mighl have read before the Spanish War his impressions of the people to whom he was ac- credited. "I [ike the Spaniards very well so far as I know them," Lowell wrote, "and have an instinctive sympathy with their wanl of aptitude for business." 1 The War with Spain, SI >: scq. 'Life of Bay, Thayer, ii. 167. * Life of Lord Granville, Fitztnaurke, 1905, ii. 31. Ch. III.] THE SPANIARDS 69 "They are unenterprising and unchangeable." "Spain is as primitive in some ways as the books of Moses, and as Oriental." "They fancy themselves always in the age of Charles V, and the perfect gravity with which they al- ways assume the airs of a Great Power is not without a kind of pathetic dignity. We all wink at the little shifts of a decayed gentleman, especially when he is Don Quix- ote, as this one certainly is." l John Hay in Spain, as first Secretary of Legation in 1869-1870, during the earlier insurrection, was impressed with her procrastination. Sagasta was one of the minis- try and defended the government "with wonderful vigor and malice." "This government," wrote Hay in 1870, "wants to sell Cuba but daresjiot, and has no power to put a stop to the atrocities on the island. The only thing left to our government is to do nothing and keep its mouth shut; or interfere to stop the horrors in Cuba on the ground of humanity or the damage resulting to Ameri- can interests." 2 The pressure upon the President in 1898 to refer the matter to Congress was great. The Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger, said to a senator: "I want you to ad- vise the President to declare war. He is making a great y mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the Republican party by standing in the way of the people's wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll get run over and the party with him." A bellicose sen- ator said to the Assistant Secretary of State : "Day, don't your President know where the war-declaring power is 1 Dec. 23, 1877, Apr. 14, 1878, May 2, 1879, Dec. 30, 1879. Letters of James Russell Lowell (1894), ii. 205, 213, 241, 246. 1 Life of Hay, Thayer, i. 324. 60 McKINLEVS ADMINISTRATION [1898 lodged? Tell him that if he doesn't do something, Con- gress will exercise the power." l Congressman Boutelle, who was opposed to the war, is authority for the state- ment that forty or fifty Republican members of Congress held a caucus, sent a committee to the President and told him that unless he sent an aggressive message to Con- gress, they would introduce a resolution for war and vote with the Democrats to carry it through. 2 Olcott, the biographer of McKinley, is authority for the statement that the Vice President and a number of senators who were opposed to war polled the Senate in order to see if they could sustain a veto should a war resolution be pre- maturely passed ; 3 but this must have been only a mo- mentary thought, as for the President to veto a declara- tion of war by Congress was hardly to be considered. McKinley was averse to war. He said to Senator Fairbanks: "It isn't the money that will be spent nor the property that will be destroyed, if war comes, that concerns me ; but the thought of human suffering that must come into thousands of homes throughout the country is almost overwhelming." 4 But he was much perturbed at the idea that his action might break up the Republi- can party. He could not sleep without sleeping powders. During the week when he sent what turned out to be his ultimatum to Spain he was much cast down but, on re- ceiving her rejection of his terms, he determined to go with the war party and to turn the affair over to Congress. "Congress," wrote Senator Lodge, "has no diplomatic functions or attributes. Willi a foreign nation it has 1 Life of McKinley, Olcott, ii. 2& •Boston Herald, Oct 28, L898. •Olcott, ii. 28. ♦Life of McKinley, Oloott, i. 400. Ch. III.] McKINLEY 61 but one weapon — the war power ; and when a President calls in Congress in a controversy with another nation, his action means that Congress, if it sees fit, must exer- cise its single power and declare war." l The President had decided to send his message to Congress on Monday, April 4 ; he postponed it until the 6th, then until Mon- day, April 11th, on account of an urgent request from the Consul-General in Havana to delay it in order that he might insure the safe departure of Americans from Cuba. On that day [April 11th] the message went to Congress: this action meant war with Spain. No one can go through carefully the diplomatic des- patches without thinking that up to March 31 McKinley's conduct of the affair had been faultless. The pressure exerted upon the Spanish ministry and people was marked by courtesy, discretion and thorough knowledge of the situation. John D. Long is the excellent authority for the consideration which McKinley and his Cabinet showed for the susceptibilities of the Spaniards. 2 But just about as the President was to succeed completely he abandoned his policy and went over to the war party. "To the peo- ple we come sooner or later," wrote James Bryce, 3 and the ministry of the cabinet government of Spain, though eager for peace, could go no further than they could count upon the support of public sentiment. On April 3, Wood- ford telegraphed to the President: "The Spanish Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs assures me that Spain will go as far and as fast as she can. ... I know that the Queen and her present ministry sincerely desire peace and that the Spanish people desire peace, and if you can still give 1 The War with Spain, 36. 2 American Navy, i. 133. 8 American Commonwealth, i. 270. y/ 62 McKINLEVS ADMINISTRATION [1898 me time and reasonable liberty of action ... I am sure that before next October I will get peace in Cuba, with justice to Cuba and protection to our great American interests." l For the sake of clearness reference will again be made to the President's ultimatum of March 27-29. 2 He de- manded the immediate revocation of the reconcentrado order and an armistice until October 1. The revocation of the reconcentrado order was at once made. And now the Pope, assisted by Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, who went to Washington by his order, 3 interfered in the interest of peace. His intervention, supported by that of "six great European powers," induced the Spanish ministry to direct on April 9 the governor-general of Cuba to grant immediately an armistice, leaving the length of time to himself. Having submitted this action to Day, Woodford telegraphed on April 10 to the Presi- dent that if he could get full authority from Congress he might secure a final settlement "before August 1st on one of the following bases : either such autonomy as the insurgents may agree to accept, or recognition by Spain of the independence of the island, or cession of the island to the United States. I hope that nothing will now be done to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that the present government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it can." 4 The President and his immediate advisers had been brought by the logic of events to see that no permanent 1 Foreign Relations, 732. ■The di patch of I ).i\- t<> Woodford was Sunday, March 'J7; the sub- i of the ultimatum to the Spanish ministry, Tuesday, March 29. The report on the ifaint went ti> Congress on Monday, March 2R. 'Spanish Corr. and DoOB., Ill, 11-'. * Foreign Relations, 746, 747. Ch. III.] McKINLEY 63 peace could be secured unless the Spaniards abandoned Cuba ; and in this they agreed with the war party. But the Jingoes desired to smash Spain and were " spoiling for a fight" ; and the well-informed men of the war party did not believe that Spain would give up Cuba without war. But they could not see things as we see them now. The Spanish ministry feared that a contest with the United States would be hopeless. Whatever might happen at first they appreciated that America had the " sinews of war." The unanimous passage by the House of the bill placing fifty millions at the President's disposal did not excite the Spaniards but "stunned them." * On March 31, Woodford telegraphed to the President: "I believe the ministry are ready to go as far and as fast as they can and still save the dynasty here in Spain. They know that Cuba is lost. Public opinion in Spain has moved steadily toward peace." 2 " Speak softly and carry a big stick," was Theodore Roosevelt's idea of a foreign policy. Up to March 31 McKinley had spoken softly, but after that he failed to continue the soft speech and yet he had strong and what might have been efficient support. The Speaker of the House, the Vice President, all of his Cabinet but two, nearly all of the leading Re- publicans in the Senate were with him. 3 For it seems clear that the Spaniards might have been led to grant in- dependence to Cuba through negotiation. Jules Cam- bon, Ambassador from France, representing on the part of his country financial and personal sympathy with 1 Woodford, March 9. Foreign Relations, 684. * Ibid., 727. 3 Letters of T. Roosevelt to Captain Cowles, March 29, 30, 1898; to Douglas Robinson, March 30 ; to Elihu Root, April 5 ; to Dr. Henry Jack- son, April 6 ; J. B. Bishop ; Scribner's Magazine, Nov. 1919, 524. 64 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 Spain, could see that she ought not to go to war with America, and labored to bring about a peaceful result. McKinley feared a rupture in his own party, and on ac- count of that fear, had not the nerve and power to resist the pressure for war. We may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been President there would have been no war with Spain. As much of a partisan as McKinley, he would have had the self-determination to resist the war party and the confident belief that he could secure the end desired without war and without the rupture of the Republican party ; at all events he would have taken the risk. 1 That the President had cast his lot freely with the war party was evident from his reply to the six representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy, who hoped that further negotiations would lead to peace. We must end a situation, he said, on Wednesday, April 6, "the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable." 2 1 John W. Foster said at the Conference of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes on Dec. 15, 1910: "It is well known tli.it President McKinley was strongly opposed to the war, and he was ably supported in striving for peaoe by General Woodford, to whom too much praise cannot be given for his conduct of the negotiations. It is now apparent that had not the President yielded to the war clamor in the country and the demands of Congress, the war might have been averted. ... In the light of the Woodford despatches, we must con- clude that bad Preaidenl McKinley displayed the same firmness as Grant and Cleveland and continued to 'keep hold of the reins of diplomacy' the Spanish War with its long 'rain of OOnsequences might never have come upon us." Sec the Speeches of General Woodford and Congressman Boutelle before the Massachusetts Club, Oct. 22, W |s > ; BofltOO Herald, Oct. 23; Chadwiok, 575; Remarks in the Senate by Senators Hah- and Depew, May 25, 1008 I bement, Columbus, Ohio, May 25. Boyle was priv • ry <>f McKinley when governor of Ohio, and after* wards his appointee as consul to Liverpool. B I n Evening Transcript, 20, 1906; l' ' - . M y 10, 1018; Oot r r cr e ations with Mark II anna and Henry s. Pritchett : Foreign Relations, Til Ch. III. J McKINLEY 65 His message to the Congress on Monday, April 11, brought on the war. "With this last overture in the di- rection of immediate peace" [his ultimatum of March 27-29], he said, "and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his effort." l The disaster to the Maine was put in a subsidiary place in his message. 2 The President said toward the end of the message: " The issue is now with Congress. . . . I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action." 3 To the crowning effort of his diplomacy of being able to secure peace and in all probability Cuban independ- ence, he referred in the last two paragraphs of his mes- sage in a perfunctory manner. "Yesterday" (Sunday, April 10), he said, "and since the preparation of the fore- going message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain di- rects General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the dura- tion and details of which have not yet been communicated to me." 4 Congress, the country and Spain knew that this message meant war. Congress immediately addressed itself to the subject and after certain disagreements united in the fol- 1 Foreign Relations, 755. 2 " In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there." 8 Foreign Relations, 760. 4 Foreign Relations, 760. 66 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 lowing resolutions, which were adopted on April 19, and signed by the President on the next day. 1 They said : "First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, of right ought to be, free and independent. "Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. "Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the en- tire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the mili- tia of the several States to such extent as may be neces- sary to carry these resolutions into effect. "Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic- tion or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof and asserts its determination, when that is accom- plished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people." 2 President Tail ish War was an al- truistic war. 3 The ground OD which such a statement may be defended lies in the fourth resolution. It was of- fered by Senator Teller of Colorado and agreed to in the Senate without a division. Ii le wonderful thai the United States, large and powerful, about to make war on 1 Thi' itafM which led i 'lutions and the disagreement* are well told by Hi'nrv Cabot Ix>dKe in the War with Spain, 35 ft stq. ; see also Chadwirk. I •Fop 'ions, liv. 'John W. Foster, I.e. Ch. III.] DECLARATION OF WAR 67 Spain, weak and decadent, should renounce solemnly any desire to get Cuba. The fertile island, the Pearl of the Antilles, Cuba, had long been coveted by America, and now when the plum was ready to drop into her mouth she abjured the wish of conquest. But it seemed impos- sible to convince the Spaniards that our aim was not the annexation of Cuba. This resolution had the sympa- thetic adhesion of the President and many, if not all, of his warmest friends. It lightens up the declaration of this unnecessary war. CHAPTER IV Nothing excites a nation so much as going to war. The first few days after its declaration, tumult reigns. So it came to pass in 1898. The feeling in Congress was intense and all the more so because it had been so long suppressed, awaiting the President's action. A large majority of Congress was in favor of war to expel the Spaniards from Cuba, and most of the Democrats, assisted by some Republicans, desired, as a stage in the pro- ceedings, to recognize the republic of the Cuban insur- gents. Two days after the President's Message was sent to Congress, the members of the House met in "a state of frenzied excitement" with "partisan passion running high." During a passionate colloquy, a Republican mem- ber said to a Democrat, "You are a liar," when the Demo- crat seized a bound copy of the Congressional Record and hurled it at his opponent. The missile fell short ; the two members rushed for one another, and the House, so a reporter wrote, "was in an uproar. Shouts of anger and indignation were beard on every hand. Members in the crush espoused the cause of the two original com- batants, and there were several exciting collisions but no blows struck." At last, owing to the work of the Speaker and the Scrgeant-at-Anns, the efforts of a dosen muscu- lar members and an impassioned appeal by Dingley, the us Ch. IV.] GEORGE DEWEY 69 fighters were restrained, the angry members took their seats "and a resemblance of order was restored." l " Beware of entrance to a quarrel, but being in, Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee." In such wise did the McKinley administration conduct the Spanish War. Congress formally declared that war with Spain had existed since April 21. Excitement had given way to alarm in the public mind lest the Navy might not prove equal to the job when the country learned that the first successful blow had been struck in the Orient on May 1 by the Asiatic squadron, under the command of George Dewey. 2 During the autumn of 1897, Dewey thought that we were drifting into a war with Spain and, of all things, he desired the command of the Asiatic squadron. Theo- dore Roosevelt, in his position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had made up his mind that Dewey was the man for the place, but political influence was pushing another officer who was his senior. 3 "I want you to go," Roose- velt said to him. "You are the man who will be equal to the emergency if one arises. Do you know any sen- ators?" "Senator Proctor," 4 was the reply, "is from my State. He is an old friend of the family and my father was of service to him when he was a young man." 1 N. Y. Tribune, Apr. 14; Recollections of Henry S. Pritchett. 1 "The newspapers of May 2 had a brief announcement of the victory." Dewey, Autobiography, 228. These first (May 2) announcements were from Spanish sources and gave no adequate idea of the completeness of the victory; the reading between the lines made it possible to arrive at a conclusion that made the headlines of victory justifiable. * Theodore Roosevelt. Autobiography, 231. 4 Redfield Proctor, "who was very ardent for the war." Ibid. 70 MoKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1898 "You could not have a better sponsor," Roosevelt re- joined. "Lose no time in having him speak a word for you." Dewey at once enlisted the favor of Senator Proc- tor, whose influence with the President secured him the appointment. 1 In a Japanese harbor on January 3, 1898, Dewey took over the command of the Asiatic squadron and hoisted his broad pennant on the Olympia. In his accurate and modest account of his work, written soon after his return to Washington in 1899, 2 he told of the care- ful preparation that he made for an attack on the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. Before he heard of the disaster to the Maine, the news of which reached him on February 17, he had decided to take the squadron to Hong Kong. An evidence of the common working of two minds bent on war is Roosevelt's despatch to Dewey of February 25, 1898. "Order the squadron to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of dec- laration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands." 3 In Dewey's account of the interchange of hospitalities among the ships assembled at Hong Kong during the month of March, he related a conversation that he had with Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, who remarked "that he did not believe thai the [lowers would ever allow the United Slates to annex Cuba." "We do not wish to annex Cuba," Dewey answered, "but we cannot Buffer the horrible condition of affairs, 1 Dewey, Autobiography, 168 1 Dewey, Autobiognphyi vi. This accouut was not published until 1913. 1 Dewey, Autobiography, 179. Oh. IV.J GEORGE DEWEY 71 which exists at present in that island at our very doors, to continue, and we are bound to put a stop to it." "And what are you after? What does your country want?" the Prince asked jokingly on another occasion; ! and, although a word in jest, it represented the European attitude which could see in our action only a desire to acquire a rich territory. Having served under Farragut, Dewey looked upon him as a master. "Valuable as the training of Annapolis was," he wrote, "it was poor schooling beside that of serving under Farragut in time of war." 2 On April 25 came this word from Secretary Long : "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Com- mence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use ut- , most endeavors." 3 Two days later Dewey set sail, on his 600-mile voyage to Manila Bay. The Hong Kong newspapers stated that Manila was impregnable, and in the Hong Kong club which was British, whose members were in thorough sympathy with the United States, it was not thought that Dewey would be successful in his attack. Arriving off Manila, he signalled for all the com- manding officers to come on board his flag-ship and said to them, "We shall enter Manila Bay to-night, and you will follow the motions and movements of the flag-ship which will lead." 4 That night (as he told the story) he asked himself, 1 Dewey, Autobiography, 185. 3 Dewey, Autobiography, 50. 8 The New American Navy, Long, i. 182. 4 Dewey, Autobiography, 206. 72 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 "What would Farragut do?" and he thought he would have done exactly as proposed. 1 On April 30 at 11.30 p.m., with all lights masked, the gun crews at their guns, Dewey entered the South Channel, and with eminent suc- cess ran by the batteries. After half of the squadron had passed, a battery opened fire but none of the shots took effect. 2 Now he was in Manila Bay in which was the Spanish fleet that he must "capture or destroy." "In action," Dewey wrote, "we had six ships to the Spaniards' seven, but we were superior in class of vessel and in armaments." 3 Proceeding across the bay at slow speed at 5.15 in the morning of May 1, his squadron was fired upon by three batteries at Manila, two at Ca- vity 4 and by the anchored Spanish fleet. Still Dewey went forward to the attack, leading the column with his flag-ship Olympia; the rest of his command followed with a distance of 400 yards between ships. Two submarine mines exploded, but they were two miles ahead, "too far to be effective." 5 At 5.40 a.m., when two and one half miles away from their objective, the Spanish fleet, Dewey said to his captain, "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." 6 At once the squadron opened lire. Firing without cessation as they moved, three inns were made from the eastward ami two from the westward ; the length of each run was aboul two miles. Approaching on the fifth run, when Dearest, within 'JDiiO yards, this rapid 1 Autobiography, 60. 7 Dew rt, M;iv t Appendix to the report of tin- Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 70. Thia « ill I" n f erred to m ( Srowninahield. ' Autobiography, 203; see also 212, '-'i I > Cavite* WSJ tan miles from Manila, bad 5000 people, a navy yard, arsenal and fortifications Lodge, Hie War with Spain, 53. Saportj I Srowninahialdi 70. • Autobiography, 214. Ch. IV.] BATTLE OF MANILA 73 and concentrated fire — "smothering," he called it — demolished the Spanish fleet. At 7.35 a.m., an erroneous report was made to the Commodore that his ship was short of ammunition ; this caused him to withdraw the squadron from action, and gave his men time for break- fast, as they had made the fight on coffee served in the early morning. All but one of the Spanish fleet, however, had been destroyed, and as Dewey naively remarked, " Vic- tory was already ours, though we did not know it." 1 At 11.16 a.m., he returned with the squadron to the attack. "By this time," he said in his report, "the flag-ship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 p.m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted." 2 The Spaniards lost at least thirteen vessels : three were sunk, eight burned [only seven of these were in line of battle] ; two tugs and a number of small launches were captured. Their casualties were 381 men. 3 In Dewey's squadron none was killed and only seven slightly wounded. "The squadron," he reported, "is in as good condition now as before the battle." 4 "The completeness of the result," wrote Senator Lodge, "which is the final test, gives Manila a great place in the history of naval battles and writes the name of George Dewey high up among the greatest of victorious admi- rals." 5 The rapid and concentrated fire of the Americans destroyed the Spanish fleet. This disconcerted the Span- iards whose valor was remarkable but whose fire was hasty and inaccurate. Dewey told the secret of his suc- 1 Autobiography, 218. 2 Crowninshield, 70. 8 Ibid., 71, 92. 4 Ibid., 71. B The War with Spain, 67. 74 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 cess. "It was," he wrote, "the ceaseless routine of hard work and preparation in time of peace that won Manila." l It looked " 'so easy' after it was all done." 2 But let one imagine Dewey with his Americans on the defence in the position of the Spaniards with their many resources and incentive to preparation, and let one con- ceive the Spanish admiral and his fleet the attacking party, and the result would have been just the contrary. But in truth the Spanish admiral would not have attacked, nor would any American of "the respectable common- place type." 3 To attack a foe seven thousand miles from a base was a risk too great to take for any comman- der who did not pattern after Nelson and Farragut, as defeat or even "failure to gain a decisive victory" would have been a disaster. 4 Dewey was long-headed as well as daring and took into account all the conditions of the game. "In the event of defeat," he wrote, "no ship of our Asiatic squadron would have been afloat to tell the story." 5 Honors and congratulations came. The President made him a rear-admiral. Congress thanked him, his officers and men. In writing to him, his "old friend" John Hay spoke of his "mingled wisdom and daring." Roosevelt, who appreciated Dewey before and admired him greatly after the battle, cabled, "Every American is your debtor." 6 It was the "man behind the gun" that did the business. The Spanish Captain-General in his war proclamation 1 Autobiography, 2 31 ' The War with Spain, 62. I iography, 281. 'Admiral Lure, cited by Dewey, Autobiography, 189 n. ' Autobiography, 252 '■ I >> wry, Autobiography, 229. Ch. IV.] GEORGE DEWEY 75 had declared that the North American people "were constituted of all the social excrescences ;" their squadron was " manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor discipline." As a matter of fact, the percentage of American-born seamen in Dewey's squadron was about eighty all told. The Archbishop of Manila who, it was said, had written the Captain-General's proclamation, visited the Olympia some months afterwards and Dewey had the ship's company paraded in his honor. "As he saw the fine young fellows march past," wrote the Ad- miral, "his surprise at their appearance was manifest." "Admiral," he said, "you must be very proud to com- mand such a body of men." "Yes, I am," was the reply, "and I have just the same kind of men on board all the other ships in the harbor." "Admiral," the Archbishop rejoined, "I have been here for thirty years. I have seen the men-of-war of all the nations but never have I seen anything like this," as he pointed to the Olympia' s crew. Dewey paid tribute to his officers as well as to his men. "I doubt," he said in his report, "if any commander-in- chief under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my command." J The moral effect of Dewey's victory was great. It gave the country confidence in her navy. It was gener- ally thought that on paper the Spanish Navy was supe- 1 My authorities for the battle of Manila Bay are Dewey's account printed in his Autobiography; reports of Dewey, Gridley, Coghlan, Walker, Dyer, Wood, Wildes, Montojo, the Spanish Admiral, printed by Crowninshield. I have also used The War with Spain, Lodge ; The New American Navy, Long; and I have consulted the Autobiography of Roosevelt; Twenty Years of the Republic, Peck; America as a World Power, J. H. Latan6 (Hart's American Nation Series) ; The Nation, May 5, 12, 1898. 76 McKIXLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 rior, and it might prove so in action. As a formidable fleet would certainly be sent across the ocean, imagina- tion ran riot as to the destruction it might cause to the seaboard cities and to the summer resorts on the coast. Many Boston men took their securities inland to Worces- ter and Springfield. Roosevelt spoke of it as a "fairly comic panic" and wrote truly, "The state of nervousness along much of the seacoast was funny in view of the lack of foundation for it." ' For the authorities in Washing- ton, naval and otherwise, had perfect trust in the Amer- ican Navy and felt that with a fair show it would destroy any Spanish squadron sent across the water to take a necessary part in the war. Now Dewey's victory showed the stuff in the officers and men of the American Navy and imparted a confidence to the general public that was sorely needed at the commencement of hostilities. Sympathy in the large powers of Europe on the con- tinent was with Spain, and especial manifestations were in Paris and Berlin. If there was any design to interfere in the conflict, it was checked by the attitude of England, who favored decidedly the United States. Dewey's vic- tory strengthened the position of England by rendering any intervention on the part of the continental powers impossible. Sentiment on the continent was that, in the first encounters, Spain would be victorious, such was the confidence felt in her navy and distrust in the American sea power. Andrew D. White, our Ambassador to Ger- many, gave a vivid account of the sentiment, as shown in the German newspapers and in an interview granted by Momxnaen, on the conduct of the United States toward Autobiography, 286. Ch. IV.] GERMAN AND FRENCH OPINION 77 Spain. This, White wrote, "was even more acrid than his previous utterances and exhibited sharply and at great length our alleged sins and shortcomings." 1 Fol- lowing the Spanish newspapers, which liked to call their opponents "Yankee pigs," the "continental press teemed with the grossest caricatures, in which the Americans were drawn as swine." 2 Anatole France in his novel "L'Anneau d'Am6thyste " (226), published in 1899, gave this lively account of a conversation in a Paris salon : A general expressed the opinion that "in declaring war on Spain the Americans were imprudent and it may cost them dear. Having neither an Army nor a Navy it will be difficult for them to maintain a conflict with a trained army and experi- enced sailors. . . . The Americans are not prepared for war, and war requires long preparation." "Now then, general," cried a lady, "do tell us that those American bandits will be beaten." "Their success is doubtful," replied the general. "I should say that it would even be absurd, and would amount to an insolent contradiction of the whole system in vogue among military nations. In short the victory of the United States would constitute a practical criti- cism of principles adopted in the whole of Europe by the most competent military authorities. Such a result is neither to be expected nor desired." "What luck!" exclaimed the lady, "Our friends the Spaniards will be victorious. Vive le roi !" "Certain facts seem to indicate that the Americans are 1 Autobiography, 11, 160, 17S. White saw the proof sheets of the in- terview but it was never published. * Peck, 544, 553. 78 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 beginning to repent of their rashness," said a gentleman of the party. "It is said that they are terrified. They expect any day to see Spanish warships appear on their Atlantic coast. Inhabitants of Boston, New York and Philadelphia are fleeing in great numbers toward the in- terior of the country. It is a general panic." A servant brought in the mail. "Perhaps there will be news of the war," said the gentleman opening a news- paper. Amid an intense silence, he read aloud: "Com- modore Dewey has destroyed the Spanish fleet in the port of Manila. The Americans did not lose a single man." "On the 30th of April, 1898," wrote Dewey, "I had been practically unknown to the American public. In a day my name was on everyone's lips. The dash of our squad- ron into an Oriental bay seven thousand miles from home had the glamour of romance to the national imagina- tion." ! After the battle of Manila Bay, Senator Redfield Proc- tor wrote to President McKinley : "Dewey will be as wise and safe, if there are political duties devolving on him, as he is forcible in action. There is no better man in discretion and safe judgment." 2 The sequel showed how profoundly the Senator comprehended the Admiral. After the battle, Dewey established a blockade of Manila which he aimed to maintain thoroughly and impartially. A good student <>f international law, he was guided in his conduct by the best of authorities, and his attitude to the men-of-war Bent by several nations to Manila Bay for purposes of observation, was correct. The English, who 1 Autobiography, 289. J Ibid., 228. Ch. IV.] GERMAN ACTION 79 thoroughly sympathized with the United States, the Japanese, who partially did so, and the French, whose feeling was favorable to the Spaniards, respected Dewey's authority and permitted him to prescribe rules for their guidance. Not so the Germans, who were a law unto themselves and chafed against the exercise of any author- ity not their own. After Dewey's return to Washington, at a dinner at the White House given him by the President, the Presi- dent desired to know the truth of the statements fre- quently made in the newspapers regarding the friction between him and the German Vice- Admiral. "There is no record of it at all on the files," McKinley said. "No, Mr. President," Dewey answered, "as I was on the spot and familiar with the situation from day to day, it seemed best that I look after it myself, at a time when you had worries enough of your own." 1 Dewey came into collision with the Germans a number of times before the arrival of the Vice- Admiral von Diedrichs. On June 12, he came in on his flag-ship, the Kaiserin Augusta making the third German cruiser in the harbor ; another was expected and a transport had already arrived. In accordance with naval etiquette, Dewey made the first call upon Diedrichs and referred to the large German force and the limited German interest in the Philip- pines. The British, with a much larger commercial interest, with a greater number of resident subjects, with the largest naval force of any power in far Eastern waters, never had at any one time during the blockade more than three warships in Manila harbor. To Dewey's gentle Dewey, Autobiography, 252. 80 McKINXEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 remonstrance Diedrichs answered, "I am here by order of the Kaiser, sir." ■ Dewey properly entitled his chapter "A Period of Anx- iety." He had news of a more powerful squadron than his own on the way from Spain to the Philippines ; he awaited with great anxiety intelligence from Sampson's fleet in the Atlantic ; at the same time it was evident from the action of the Germans that they did not accept his interpretation of the laws of the blockade. They were on the most cordial social terms with the Spaniards in Manila, and the talk of the town was that the Germans would intervene in favor of Spain. Dewey addressed a formal letter to Vice-Admiral von Diedrichs in which he said : "As a state of war exists between the United States and Spain, and as the entry into this blockaded port of the vessels of war of a neutral is permitted by the blockad- ing squadron as a matter of international courtesy, such neutrals should necessarily satisfy the blockading vessels as to their identity. ... I claim the right to communi- cate with all vessels entering this port, now blockaded with the forces under my command." 2 To this Died- richs demurred and notified Dewey thai "he would sub- mit the point to a conference of all the senior officers of the men-of-war in the harbor." Only Captain ( ihichester of the British ship Immortality answered the call, and his expressed opinion was decidedly on Dewey's side. Never- theless it took further and peremptory action on the pari of Dewey to convince the German that his orders in Manila Bay must be obeyed.' 1 Dewey, Autobiography, 267. ■Dewey, Autobiography, 286 ■My authority is oh. xvii. of Dewey's Autobiography. Bui ! D. White, A'/ ihy, ii. 160 <■' seq.; Chadwick, the Spanish- Auicncuu W;ir, ii. 864; Long, ii. iii.; Lodge, 106; Peek, 6" Ch. IV.] PROGRESS OF THE WAR 81 The glamour of our entrance into the Orient through Dewey's victory could not take the public mind, nor that of the historian, off the real centre of the war, which was in Cuba, and from the direction of affairs, which lay in Washington. On April 22, President McKinley pro- claimed a limited blockade of Cuban ports, and four days later he declared "that the policy of this government will be not to resort to privateering but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris." On April 23, he called for 125,000 volunteers and a little over a month later for 75,000 more. 1 The Secretary of War, Alger, wrote that, as events turned out, the additional call was unnecessary, as 136,000 volunteers did not leave the United States. 2 But it is a tradition in American administration that Lincoln in his first call for 75,000 demanded too small a number, so that McKinley, if he erred at all, was bound to err on the safe side; but a prolongation of the war would have justified the larger number. Before the United States declared war the President had appointed Captain William T. Sampson commander of the North Atlantic squadron. Advanced over seven- teen other officers, he was made rear-admiral at the out- break of the war and placed in supreme command of all operations on the Atlantic coast. Appointed rear- admiral sixteen days before Dewey, the appointment came to him as a surprise, causing him to feel deep responsibil- ity rather than any elation. 3 1 Richardson x. 202 et seq. 2 The Spanish-American War, 19. ' The Relations of the United States and Spain : The Spanish War, Chadwick, i. 18 et seq. Chadwick was Captain of the flag-ship New York and also Sampson's chief of staff. This valuable and useful work is in two volumes published in 1911 and will be referred to as Chadwick, The Spanish American War i. and do. ii. ; see also The New American Navy, Long, i. 211. 82 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION !1898 The "sinews of war" were carefully looked after. Two hundred million of an authorized loan of double that amount was offered to popular subscription and eagerly- grasped at. Although paying but three per cent, it was oversubscribed seven and one half times, was entirely taken at home and went to a premium of six per cent within three months. 1 A revenue bill was carefully framed by Dingley and his Republican associates on the Ways and Means Committee and adroitly piloted through the House and eventually the Senate ; it became a law on June 13. 2 It was known that a Spanish fleet under command of Admiral Cervera had left Cape Verde Islands on April 29, and was steaming westward. The public was uncertain as to its destination, but the Navy Department felt sure that it was either Puerto Rico or Cuba. As it proceeded much more slowly than was estimated, it was a source of mysti- fication and alarm ; it arrived at Martinique, a French island, on May 12, and one week later in Santiago harbor, Cuba. Cervera's choice of Santiago and decision to remain there made the battle, which finally took place, the decisive one of the war. In due time, his fleet was blockaded so that he could not make a sortie without a fight. The President appreciated that to gain a decided re- sult the Army must cooperate with the Navy, and Cer- vera's entrance into Santiago fixed that place as the Army's objective point. Consequently an expedition was prepared to proceed thither. Theodore Roosevelt, a participator in the war and the historian of a phase of it, 1 N"ii\i -■«, A morion n Finance, 279 1 Life of Nelson Dingley, Jr., 462 el seq. Ch. IV.] ROOSEVELT 83 called the chapter on it in his Autobiography "The War of America the Unready," and this title is true so far as it applied to the Army. With the charitable and in- telligent view of men and affairs, which was a real dis- tinction in a man of active life, he wrote, "Secretary Al- ger happened to be Secretary when war broke out, and all the responsibility for the shortcomings of the Depart- ment were visited upon his devoted head. He was made the scapegoat for our National shortcomings. The fault was not his; the fault and responsibility lay with us, the people, who for thirty-three years had permitted our representatives in Congress and in National executive office to bear themselves so that it was absolutely im- possible to avoid the great bulk of all the trouble that occurred, and of all the shortcomings of which our people complained during the Spanish War." x But it was dif- ferent in the Navy, as no one knew better than Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary when the war broke out. "The Navy," he wrote, "really was largely on a war footing, as any Navy which is even respectably cared for in time of peace must be. The admirals, captains and lieutenants were continually practicing their profession in almost precisely the way that it has to be practiced in time of war. Except actually shooting at a foe, most of the men on board ship went through in time of peace practically all that they would have to go through in time of war." 2 If one desires to read a graphic account of the bad man- agement and confusion attendant upon our getting 18,000 troops 3 from Tampa, Florida, to Santiago, let him read 1 The Autobiography (1913), 244. 2 Ibid., 242. 1 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War, ii. 77. 84 McKINLEVS ADMINISTRATION [1898 Roosevelt's books. 1 "We were kept several days on the transport," he wrote, "which was jammed with men, so that it was hard to move about on deck. Then the fleet got under way, and we steamed slowly down to Santiago. Here we disembarked, higgledy-piggledy, just as we had embarked. Different parts of different outfits were jum- bled together, and it was no light labor afterwards to as- semble the various batteries. For instance, one trans- port had guns, and another the locks for the guns; the two not getting together for several days after one of them had been landed. Soldiers went here, provisions there ; and who got ashore first largely depended upon individual activity." 2 In some way or other the Army •The Rough Riders; Autobiography. Roosevelt went to Cuba as Lieut. Colonel of the Rough Riders of which Dr. Leonard Wood was the Colonel. In a private letter to Dr. \V. Sturgis Bigelow of March 29, 1898, Roosevelt wrote: "I do not know that I shall be able to go to Cuba if there is a war. . . . But if I am able to go I certainly shall. ... I like life very much. I have always led a joyous life. I like thought and 1 like action, and it will be very bitter to me to leave my wife and children; and while I think 1 could face death with dignity, I have no d< Bire before my time has come to go oul into the everlasting darkni - • So I -hall riot go into a war with any undue exhila- ration of spirits or in a frame of mind in any way approaching reckless- ness or levity." — J. B. Bishop. Scribner'e Magazine, Nov. 1919, 531. 1 Autobiography, 255. Roosevelt wrote in his diary which was given in 1921 by Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt to the Roosevelt Memorial Associa- tion: "June 3 — Reached Tampa in morning. Railroad system in wild- « ' "nfusion; it tool; us twelve hours to gel into camp with our baggage. "June 5- -No words can paint the confusion No head; a breakdown Of both the railroad and military systems of the country. "June — No plana ; no Btaff officers ; no instructions to us. Each officer finds out for himself and takes his chances. "June 8- Told to go aboard transport Worst confusion yet. No allotment of transports; no plans ; utter confusion." Boston Herald, Sept. 29, 1921. Roosevelt wrote to Ins sister, Mrs. Robinson, on June 12: "11 seems tome that the people at Washington are inexcusable for putting us aboard ship and keeping us crowded to suffocation on these transports for six days in Tampa harbor in a Bemi-tropical sun." Previously one whole night had been spent "standing Up Opposite a railway track waiting for ii tram to COme, and finally taking coal cars m the morning." — Mrs. Robinson's Roosevelt, 109. Ch. IV.] FIGHT AT SAN JUAN HILL 85 was entirely ashore by June 27. * The General in com- mand was Shafter, a regular army officer of talent. 2 but entirely unfitted for a tropical expedition. Sixty- three years of age, weighing over 300, with a tendency to the gout, mounting a horse with difficulty, 3 his physi- cal disabilities weighed upon him to an extent to unfit him entirely for his dangerous and responsible job. "I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning," Shafter wrote to Sampson on June 30. 4 He was as good as his word, and the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill resulted. The fort at El Caney was captured, but the fight at San Juan Hill was the more important. Cap- tain John Bigelow, who was a captain in the regular cav- alry with the expedition, wrote: "The enemy's position was about as nearly ideal as a real position can be. I have seen the famous stone wall at Fredericksburg backed by Marye's Heights. It is hardly a circumstance to this position. San Juan was more suggestive of Gettysburg than of Fredericksburg. Our attack seemed hardly less desperate than that of Pickett's division. At Gettys- burg a cannonade of several hours' duration designed to shake the morale of the defence, preceded the advance of the attacking infantry which, during this period of preparation, was kept out of fire. At San Juan there was 1 "The Army was in a region with a character wholly unlike that of any in its experience. Nearly the whole of the regular force of which it was composed had been accustomed to harrying Indians over treeless plains or arid mountains. In this case however it found itself in a country cov- ered with brush so heavy that, almost impassable to the individual man, it was altogether so to troops in formation." Chadwick, The Spanish- American War, ii. 62. 2 Chadwick, Spanish-American War, ii. 6 ; Alger. 8 Chadwick, ii. 110; R. H. Davis, The Cuban and Porto Rican Cam- paigns, 185. 4 Chadwick, Spanish-American War, ii. 75. 86 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION 11898 hardly any preparation by artillery, and the infantry and dismounted cavalry, who made the attack, were exposed to the enemy's fire for about an hour immediately pre- ceding their advance, most of them not being able or permitted to fire back." x The work was done by the regular troops, "the flower of the American standing army," Senator Lodge so termed them. 2 They were assisted by three volunteer regiments, only one of which, the Rough Riders, under the command of Theodore Roose- velt, 3 did effective service. The Cuban insurgents helped the Americans by doing their part in cutting off the sup- plies from Santiago, but were not as valuable support as had been expected. San Juan Heights was taken on this July first. "The attack," wrote Chadwick, "was indeed one of high heroism ... as gallant a deed as was ever done." 4 No word of praise can be too high for the work of the soldiers that day, but their creature comforts were not looked after. They fought on empty stomachs, as the commissariat was badly managed ; they were also short of tobacco so highly prized by soldiers in the field. "Their woolen clothing," said Roosevelt, "was exactly what I 1 Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign, 127. 1 P. 130. Chadwick wrote: "Our first army WU one of extraordinary quality; such probably as will never a: the field, as the condi- tions of its training can never be repeated. It was the product of long years of war against tin- wiliest and moei capable of savage races. Schooled in every trick of Savage warfare, inured to every privation of lent and cold, individualized as no other soldier ever has been, these men of the plains were accustomed to fighting their own battles, and took with them to San Juan 1 bll the qualities and character which made this u force, which it is not too much to say, has never been equalled in general effi- ciency." ii. L2. J W ! ! i I been advanced to a brigade command which made Roose- velt colonel Of the RoUgb Meiers. • ii. %. Ch - IV] AMERICAN DEPRESSION 87 would have used in Montana in the fall." » The Span- iards were better armed and equipped and had a larger supply of smokeless powder. Nevertheless, the events justified the charge on the fortified position, as Spanish firing was less deadly than the climate. But the loss at El Caney and San Juan Hill was over ten per cent of the men engaged; the casualties among the officers were unusually heavy. 2 Next day, July 2, while the Spaniards made no attempt to retake San Juan Heights they kept up an incessant firing This and the heavy losses of July 1 completely demoralized bhafter who, suffering from malarial fever, almost always accompanied by mental depression, was thoroughly de- spondent when, on July 3, he telegraphed to Washington I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position." ■ 0ther officerg of ^ army shared his anxiety but nevertheless two captains of the regular troops came to Roosevelt desiring him to protest against any retirement. Roosevelt, who always disliked the word retreat, cordially agreed with them "that it would be far worse than a blunder to abandon our posi- tion." * But Shafter had not forgotten the American game of bluff and at 8.30 that morning demanded the surrender of Santiago, which was peremptorily declined by the Spanish commander. Senator Lodge gave a graphic account of the feeling in Washington on July 3. "It was the one really dark day of the war," he wrote, "and the long hot hours of that memorable S unday were heavy with dou bt, apprehen- 1 Chadwick, ii. 66. 2 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War, ii 100 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War ii 109 * The Rough Riders, 148; Chadwick, ii. 108 88 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 sion and anxiety." l But if the administration in Wash- ington and Shaft er could have known the sentiment of the Spanish camp, their despondency would have given way to elation. For Santiago was reaching the point of capitulation ; while the fleet had food for about a month longer, the army and the city had been reduced to rice. 2 The fleet, however, was the important thing. "The eyes of every nation," wrote Captain-General Blanco to Cervera from Havana, "are at present fixed on your squadron on which the honor of our country depends." 3 Before this Blanco had suggested to Mad- rid that all the land and naval forces in the Western waters be placed under his supreme command and his suggestion had been complied with. 4 Admiral Cervera, the commander of the Spanish squadron, was discouraged at the outlook. He wrote on June 25, eight days before the dark day in Washington, to the Spanish general in command at Santiago ; "I have considered the squadron lost ever since it left Cape Verde. . . . To-day I con- sider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, after having contributed to its defence, or whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of their cooperation, thereby precipitating its fall. ... It is therefore for the Captain-General to decide whether I am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those 2000 sens of Spain." On the same day he telegraphed to the Captain-General, "In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of ' P. 1 : •Chadwick, ii. 111. 'Juno 26, ibid., 119. * June 30-26, ibid., 115. Ch. IV.] SPANISH DESPAIR 89 the squadron and majority of its crews." l Blanco de- sired the escape made "from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in" on a dark night and in bad weather, but to this Cervera replied, "With the harbor entrance blockaded as it now is, the sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being closer inshore." 2 Thus stood affairs until the army made the attack of July 1, after which the Spanish general in command re- ported the "exhausted and serious condition of Santiago." The result of that battle brought the Spanish authori- ties to a decision. Cervera had lent his "landing forces" to the army for the defence of Santiago, and to make a proper sortie he must have them reembarked. He re- ceived an order from Blanco on July 1 to reembark "the crews" and to hasten the sortie from the harbor. This was followed up by a despatch next day to go out immedi- ately. A telegram to the general in command showed plainly the thought that dwelt in Blanco's mind : "Main thing is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it, Spain will be morally defeated and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can be recovered ; the loss of the squadron under these cir- cumstances is final and cannot be recovered." 3 It was impossible to make the sortie in the afternoon of July 2, so the morning of July 3 was decided upon. The historian is able to look into both camps — a look of course impossible to either Sampson or Cervera. There was friction between Sampson and Shafter as well iChadwick, ii. 116, 118. 2 Ibid., ii. 118, 119. 3 Ibid., ii. 122, 124. 90 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION 11898 as between the Army and Navy departments in Washing- ton. When the Naval Board announced — an announce- ment which was endorsed by the Secretary — that it was better to sacrifice a number of soldiers rather than to lose one battleship, such an opinion was regarded as in- human although probably based on good naval strategy. Shafter, appalled at the losses of July 1, did not want to sacrifice further his men, and desired Sampson to force an entrance into the harbor on the Farragut plan, which, on his part, Sampson did not want to do on account of the risk of losing a battleship. Shafter was ill and tele- graphed to Washington on July 3 : "I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, 1 but am retaining the command. ... I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor and will have consultation with him this morning." 2 This conference was to be had at Shafter's headquarters, for which place Sampson on his armored cruiser, the New York, started on the morning of July 3. The port at which he proposed to land was eight miles from his posi- tion in the blockading squadron. No fortune could have been worse for Sampson. Since June 1 he had main- tained a perfect blockade of Santiago Harbor. "The faithful search-light" 3 made him feel secure at night. "When I wake up," he said, " and can see from where I lie the operation of the search-light, I can fall asleep quite contented, knowing that everything is all right." Among the eventualities which he considered, was the escape of 'On July 4, after the nival battle of BantiagOj Shafter wrote to the Adjutant-General in \\ a bington, "I am nil wrv much exhausted, eat- ing a little this p.m. f, >r the fir>t tune in four >l:ivs." Chadwick, ii. 192. * Ibid., lU'J. • Long, ii. 7. Ch. IV.] BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 91 ships from the harbor, and he had issued the order, "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore"; 1 but he could have had no idea that the plan of battle which he had considered and care- fully thought out would be put into force on that day. Not only was the commander-in-chief and his cruiser New York absent, but the Massachusetts had gone away forty miles in order to coal. The Spanish squadron consisted of the armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya, Cristdbal Colon and two torpedo-boat destroyers; the American, of the armored cruiser Brooklyn, the battleships Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana and the auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen. The Spanish vessels came out of the harbor of Santiago on this Sunday morning, July 3, "a superb day," 2 between 9.35 and 10 ; the flag-ship Maria Teresa was in advance and, following at a distance of about 800 yards, were the Vizcaya, Cristdbal Coldn and the Oquendo and at a greater distance the torpedo-boat destroyers. The men on the American ships were at Sunday "quarters for inspection," which was to be followed by divine service. But their officers were on the alert and, at the first sight of the Spaniards, the American ships, carrying out Sampson's standing orders, closed in and began the work of destruc- tion which their careful labor of preparation and accurate firing enabled them to do. The Spaniards advanced with coolness and courage. The Maria Teresa "presented a magnificent appearance," wrote Robley Evans, Cap- tain of the Iowa, and the fleet "came at us like mad 1 Long, ii. 7. 2 Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 295. 92 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 bulls." ' At first the fire of the Maria Teresa was rapid and accurate, but as the American fire "smothered" her, it grew "ragged and inaccurate." 2 "I felt sure," wrote Cervera, "that the disaster was inevitable ... al- though I did not think our destruction would be so sud- den." 3 Between ten and half past the Maria Teresa andOquendo, "with large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach" when about seven miles from Santiago. At quar- ter past eleven the Vizcaya, when fifteen miles from San- tiago, "turned in shore and was beached"; she "was burning fiercely and her reserves of ammunition were already beginning to explode." 4 Meanwhile the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers had been smashed by the fire of the battleships and especially by that of the auxiliary, Gloucester, a converted yacht. Remained "the sleek foxy Coldn," 5 the "best and fastest vessel" 6 of the Span- ish fleet, which was overhauled by the Brooklyn and Oregon; at twenty minutes past one, forty-eight miles from Santiago, she hauled down her colors and sur- rendered. "I regard," wrote Sampson in his Official Report, "this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt 1 A Sailor's Log, 446. : [bid., i 16. ■ Chadwick, ii. 188, 185. * Admiral Sampson's Official Report, July i. r >. Crowninahield, 507 ei «eq. 'SpOUB, Our Navy in t ho War with Spain, 319. * Sampson. Ch. IV.] BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 93 to escape at night and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight." 1 President Roosevelt, with a comprehension of naval affairs such as few or no civilians had, after a careful re- view of all the facts, wrote, "It was a captains' fight." 2 The casualties of the Spanish squadron, which num- bered 2227, did not exceed 474 and were probably fewer ; the American loss was one killed, one seriously wounded. 3 "It is safe to say," wrote H. W. Wilson, an English au- thority, "that most Englishmen, with their knowledge of 1812 and the feats of the Civil War, confidently ex- pected the Americans to win. It is equally safe to say that no one anticipated that two important victories would be secured at the cost of but one American life. . . . After less than five hours' fighting a modern squadron was completely annihilated with infinitesimal loss and infinitesimal damage to the victors. It is the low cost at which victory was purchased that renders this great battle so honorable to the American Navy." 4 The naval battle of Santiago was a great victory and decisive of the war. "Do not Europeans regard us as barbarians?" was asked of a man, who, though not a 1 Crowninshield, 509. Secretary Long wrote: "The battle of July 3 was actually fought and the great victory won in accordance with the plan of the commander-in-chief," ii. 8. President Roosevelt wrote, Feb. 18, 1902: "Sampson's real claim for credit rests upon his work as com- mander-in-chief; upon the excellence of the blockade; upon the prepar- edness of the squadron ; upon the arrangement of the ships head-on in a semicircle around the harbor ; and the standing order with which they instantly moved to the attack of the Spaniards when the latter appeared." Long, ii. 208. 2 Long, ii. 208. 3 Chadwick, ii. 176. According to Spanish authority the Spaniards had 323 killed and 151 wounded. * The Downfall of Spain, 69, 334. 94 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 native American, had passed enough time in the United States to speak and write English well and, although devoted artistically to Europe, had gained a thorough comprehension of Americans. " They did," was the reply, "until you smashed two Spanish fleets, but they think so no longer." Such is the judgment of the civilized world. Our work toward the elevation of humanity, toward the greater diffusion of education, are counted as naught in contrast with these naval victories. Noteworthy as was the victory of Santiago it was sup- plemented by humane action. "As the Maria Teresa struck the rock, the tars of the Texas . . . began to cheer." But their Captain Philip exclaimed, "Don't cheer, boys; the poor devils are dying." ' When Cap- tain Robley Evans instantly handed back the surrendered sword to the Captain of the Vizcaya, his "blue shirts" cheered lustily. 2 "So long," he wrote in his report of July 4, "as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen ; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women." 3 "This rescue of prisoners," wrote Admiral Sampson in his re- port, "including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were explod- ing, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers ami men until their work of hu- manity was complete." * Cervera in his report eulogized "Long, ii. 39. * A Sailor's Log, 161. » CrowHinahield, 539. * Crownmshiold, 509. Ch. IV.] THE SPANISH FLEET DESTROYED 95 "the chivalry and courtesy of the enemy. They clothed the naked," he wrote, "giving them everything they needed ; they suppressed the shouts of joy in order not to increase the suffering of the defeated, and all vied in making their captivity as easy as possible." l He wrote to the Captain of the St. Louis when "at sea" on his way home, "I thank you for the delicate and mani- fold acts of kindness through which you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfortune." 2 In other words, the American seamen fought like gentle- men and not like brutes. Exactly the same may be said of the American soldiers who contended before Santi- ago. 3 As has been previously stated, the naval battle of San- tiago was the decisive one of the war. Blanco thought that the squadron must make a fight to save Spanish honor but he recognized that its destruction meant that the game was up. The annihilation of the fleet, wrote Cap- tain Concas, the acting chief-of-staff of Cervera, deprived "Spain of the only power still of value to her, without which a million soldiers could do nothing to serve her; of the only power which could have weight in a treaty of peace ; a power which, once destroyed, would leave Spain, the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba as so many ignorant persons believed, completely at the mercy of the enemy." 4 The fall of Santiago quickly followed. Puerto Rico was also captured. "In comparison to the Santiago 1 Crowninshield, 562. See also Cervera to Blanco and Sampson. Chadwick, ii. 189, 190. 2 Foreign Relations, 1898, 798. 1 Chadwick, ii. 262 ; Peck, 598. * Chadwick, ii. 128. 96 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 nightmare," wrote Richard Harding Davis, "the Porto Rican expedition was a 'fete des fleurs.'" l Meanwhile it was learned that the reserve fleet of Spain was despatched to the Philippines, and soon thereafter an American squadron was collected, the destination of which should be the Spanish coast. This was publicly announced. The reserve Spanish fleet went through the Suez Canal, but the public announcement of the desti- nation of the American fleet, together with the news of the destruction of Cervera's squadron, compelled its re- turn to Spain. A glance must now be had at the Orient. Troops were sent at different times until on August 6 there were about 8500 men ashore in the Philippines. General Merritt commanded the land forces and, in conjunction with Dewey, demanded the surrender of Manila and the Span- ish forces in occupation. On August 13, an attack was begun which soon terminated, as arranged through "the good offices of the Belgian consul," by the surrender. 2 The 10,000 Filipino insurgents under Aguinaldo had rendered valuable assistance in the investment of Manila and now made "a passing demand for joint occupation of the city" and, as the situation was difficult, Merritt and Dewey asked for instructions from Washington. President McKinley in reply directed that there "must be no joint occupation with the insurgents." 3 "Had not the cable been cut," wrote Dewey, "there would have been no attack on August L3, for while our ships — counting the twelve hours' difference in time 1 i be ( Subao and Porto RA tn ( iampaigna, 296. ■ Ghadwick, ii 408. • Chmiwick, u. 428; Riclmrdsou, x. 217. Ch. IV.] THE WAR DECIDED 97 between the two hemispheres — were moving into posi- tion and our troops were holding themselves in readiness for a dash upon the Spanish works, the Protocol was being signed at Washington. The absence of immediate cable connection had allowed no interruption to the fateful progress of events which was to establish our authority in the Philippines." 1 The smashing of the two fleets decided the war, and this was acknowledged by the Spaniards themselves. They had made resistance to save their honor but recog- nized that, when the fortunes of war decided against them, it was useless to prolong the conflict. Through a letter from the Spanish Minister of State to President McKin- ley 2 they started negotiations through Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, who showed wonderful qualities. Frankly on the Spanish side, he saw clearly the American position, appreciated the magnitude of the naval vic- tories and the helplessness of Spain. He found McKin- ley inflexible and disposed to drive a hard bargain. Be- lieving that the "Conqueror resolved to procure all the profit possible from the advantages it has obtained," 8 he advised Spain to give him authority to sign the Pro- tocol. This was done and the Protocol was signed by him and Secretary of State Day. 4 The Protocol provided that Spain should relinquish all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, that she should cede to the United States Puerto Rico and an island in the Ladrones. This cession was in lieu of a pecuniary in- 1 Autobiography, 282. J Olcott, ii. 59. 3 Chadwick, ii. 440. 4 Elihu Root said when Secretary of War (Nov. 15, 1902) that Cambon was an " ideal ambassador," the " sympathetic representative and de- fender " of Spain. Miscellaneous Addresses, 145, 147. 98 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 demnity for the cost of the war. Furthermore, "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and har- bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and gov- ernment of the Philippines." Five Commissioners on the part of the United States and five on the part of Spain should meet in Paris not later than October 1 to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace, subject to ratification by the constitutional au- thorities of both countries. This Protocol was signed on August 12 and involved a total suspension of hostilities. 1 The war was over, having lasted 113 days [April 21 to August 12], less than four months. 2 1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 828. 2 Authorities on the Spanish-American War : First, and foremost, the two volumes of Admiral French E. Chadwick. Chadwick has used the Spanish as well as the American documents with the result that he has enabled us to see both camps at the same time. He has written an impartial account. His action on the New York before and during the naval battle of Santiago made him an excellent interpreter of the docu- ments, showing no animosity whatever to Spain. At the end of Vol. ii. he has given an excellent bibliography. Reports of Battle of Santiago by Sampson; Schley and Cook of the Brooklyn; Chadwick of the New York; Clark of the Oregon; Philip of the Texas; Taylor of the Indiana; Evans of the Iowa; Wainwright of the Gloucester; Report of Cervera; Crowninshiold, 506 et seq.; Auto- biography of George Dewey ; Foreign Relations, 1S98 ; The New Ameri- can Navy, Long ; Lodge, The War with Spain ; Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, Rough Riders; R. A. Alger, The Spanish- American War; Evans, A Sailor's Lor; John Bigelow, Jr., Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign; II. \V. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain; Et H. Davis, The Cu- ban and Porto Rican Campaigns; F. D. Millet, The Expedition to the Philippines; Bpesx'a Our Navy in the War with Spain; Mahan, Les- sons of the War with Spain; Peek ; Latum'-, America as a World l'ower, Hart's American Nation a Secretary Long wrote that the trip of the Oregon "has no parallel in history," n. 54, Admiral Sampson spoke of her "brilliant record" under Captain dark, Crowninshield, MO. "Her performance," wrote Chad- wick, "was one unprecedented ID battleship history and was one which will probably long preserve its unique distinction," i. 16. ( fa "the Ore- gon' Spear's chap. xii. For Hobson's exploit, see Chadwick, i. 338; Long, ii. 71. CHAPTER V In the first article of the Protocol, Spain relinquished Cuba. This rich island might fall to the United States. It was a ripe plum l that needed only the plucking. But there stood in the way the sentiment of a majority of the American people embodied in the so-called Teller Amend- ment to the resolutions adopted by Congress when the United States went to war with Spain. Although long a favorite policy that Cuba ought to belong to the Uni- ted States, she now disclaimed any intention of taking the island, but proposed to leave it to the Cubans them- selves. Any other large country would not probably in the first place have adopted the Teller Amendment but, even had it done so, its occupancy would have been made the prelude on one pretext or another to an eventual ab- sorption. Undoubtedly a powerful minority would have supported McKinley in such a policy, but he deserves credit that, believing in the terms of the Teller Amend- ment when adopted, he held to them firmly, after the quick result of the war, and wrote a glorious page in his country's history as the pledge was faithfully carried out. In lieu of a pecuniary indemnity for the cost of the war and because it was desirable that Spain should quit the Western Hemisphere, Puerto Rico and other islands under the Spanish dominion in the West Indies were taken. Also on the ground of pecuniary indemnity an island in the Ladrones was required ; this article resulted in the 1 Substantially the same remark was made in chap. iii. 99 100 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1898 selection of JGuam. Remained the Philippines, which caused much discussion in the Cabinet, country and with the Spanish Peace Commissioners, who by the terms of the Protocol, met in Paris those sent from the United States to negotiate a treaty of peace. When the letter of the Spanish Minister of State was received [July 26] l the President on a hot afternoon took the members of the Cabinet on a lighthouse tender for a trip down the Potomac, when were thoroughly discussed the terms of peace. This resulted later in the submission by Secretary Day of an article which proposed to "re- linquish all of the Philippine Islands to Spain except suf- ficient ground for a naval station." 2 On this proposi- tion the Cabinet was about equally divided. It is easy to see that had the President then decided not to take the Philippines he would have had a powerful backing. Dur- ing the war he had displayed a shrewd trading instinct thus expressed, "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get ; when the war is over we must keep what we want." 3 Now he did not desire to come to a positive decision, and preferred to leave the matter open for the development of circumstances and until we had more information and especially some enlightening word from Dewey. The President said to Jules Cambon : "The negotiators of the two countries will be the ones to decide what will be the permanent ad- vantages that we shall demand in the archipelago and finally the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. The Madrid government may be assured that up to this time there is nothing determined d priori 1 This is printed by Oloott, ii. 5 ( J. 1 Life of McKinley, Oloott, ii. 6L ■ Ibid., 1G5. Ch. V.] the peace COMMISSIONERS 101 in my mind against Spain ; likewise I consider there is nothing decided against the United States." 1 Therefore, Article III in the Protocol, agreed to with Jules Cambon, left the disposition of the Philippines until a formal treaty of peace should be concluded. The Protocol provided for the appointment of five Commissioners to meet in Paris an equal number from Spain. The President named William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, William P. Frye, Senator from Maine, Whitelaw Reid, editor and proprietor of the New York Tribune and ex-minister to France, and George Gray, Senator from Delaware, the only Democrat on the Commission. The discussion between the Peace Commissioners and the different despatches of the Americans to Washing- ton make interesting reading, but it is apparent that the decision of the main points rested with the President, who used the communications from the Commissioners as materials on which to base his own judgment. He decided at once that neither the United States nor any government which she might set up in Cuba would as- sume any portion of the so-called Cuban debt which had been largely incurred in fighting two insurrections. The greatest contention, however, was in regard to the Philippines. These consisted of a number of islands with a combined area of 115,000 square miles, nearly as large as England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The largest is Luzon with nearly 41,000 square miles, substantially the size of Ohio. The total population was more than seven and one half millions; the population of Luzon was 1 Despatch of Cambon to Spain, Aug. 4, Chadwick, ii. 436. 102 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 3,798,507 and that of Manila, the chief city, 219,92s. 1 "The Philippines were a rich prize for any ambitious power," was Dewey's opinion after his victory. 2 After the Protocol was signed, the President inclined toward taking the Philippines. Of his five Peace Com- missioners, three, Davis, Frye and Reid, were avowed im- perialists. In his instruction to the Commission of Sep- tember 16, 3 he wrote that we must have the island of Luzon and on October 26 he had his Secretary of State, John Hay, 4 telegraph as follows to Commissioner Day : "The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to the Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required. The Presi- dent reaches this conclusion after most thorough consid- eration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility." 6 •Life of McKinley, ii. 146; Foreign Relations, 1898, 925. "The en- tire population, according to the census of 1903, was 7,(335,426. Of these G,987,6S6 were classed as civilized and (547,740 as wild. The civilized na- tive inhabitants are practically all adherents of the Roman Catholic Church. < )f the wild tribes at leasl two-fifths are Mohammedan Moros. Wiih the exception of the aboriginal Negritos, who are widely dispersed through the mountain regions, all the natives are believed to be Malays." Latane, 79. itobiography, 261 ■ Foreign Relations, 904. 4 John llnv had become Secretary of State succeeding William R. Day. L Hay to Day, Foreign Relations, 1898, 935. CS. V.] THE PHILIPPINES 103 Between October 10 and 22 McKinley visited the Omaha Trans-Mississippi Exposition ; in going thither and returning he made a number of speeches at convenient rail stops. 1 Senator Hoar called it "his famous Western journey." 2 Unquestionably Hoar is correct in attribut- ing to McKinley too great a reliance on the sentiment exhibited by the enthusiastic crowds that he addressed, but in truth his deductions from the meetings only con- firmed what he had already determined. By direction of the President, General Merritt went from Manila to Paris and gave a full report to the Peace Commission. While he was careful not to express himself positively in response to certain questions, a fair inference from his testimony is that it was desirable to take the whole group. 3 The President had before him Dewey's report, from which it may be gathered that the Admiral favored the retention of Luzon alone, but General Greene, who brought to the White House this report, with whom McKinley had a "long talk" and whom he found "thoroughly well informed," approved decidedly our taking all of the Philippines. 4 The President had also 1 For these speeches, see New York Tribune, Oct. 11-23, 1898. 1 Autobiography, ii. 311. 3 Foreign Relations, 1898, 918. * "Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands and therefore the one to retain." — Dewey, Aug. 29. General Greene said in his Memorandum of August 27 which represented his opinion when he had the "long talk" with McKinley on September 28 : "If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy prior to our arrival, and we can- not ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is com- pletely demoralized and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of res- urrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surren- dered them. . . . On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the 104 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION 11898 before him the opinion of the several members of the Peace Commission before it was necessary to arrive at a final decision. The opinions of the three imperialists, Davis, Frye and Reid, tallied with his own ; that of Day was a compromise, 1 but Senator Gray's opinion deserves consideration. "I cannot agree," he said, "that it is wise to take Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity gov- erns case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances, against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. . . . Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at conclusion of war. On contrary interest and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz. . . . "So much from standpoint of interest. But even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful and Christian nation ; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful materia] advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boa bfully assumed. We rnunt.rv v. itho ] I x , no. 62 ; ' i I .--] ain, 37 !. 383 ; For- 115, '.H7. 1 I oraign Relations, 1 398, 93 Ch. V.J SENATOR GRAYS OPINION 105 should set example in these respects, not follow the self- ish and vulgar greed for territory which Europe has in- herited from mediaeval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word." » Admiral Chadwick, after citing Gray's dissent, wrote : "There is no questioning the cogency of Judge Gray's argument, nor the nobility of its sentiment. To demand the Philippines was undoubtedly to alter the moral po- sition of the United States and change its attitude from one of altruism to one of self-interest. This much is self-evident and scarcely requires statement." 2 But McKinley stuck to his determination and had Hay tele- graph it to Commissioner Day on October 28 : "The sen- timent in the United States," he said, "is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sen- timent the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold them or turn them back to Spain. "Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can see but one plain path of duty — the accept- ance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more seri- ous complications, administrative and international, would follow any other course. The President has given to the !Oct. 25, Foreign Relations, 1898, 934. 2 ii. 461. 106 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 views of the Commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the conclusion above announced, in the light of information communicated to the Commission and to the President since your departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity." • On November 13, the President's idea was further elaborated by Hay's despatch again to Commissioner Day. "Do we not owe an obligation to the people of the Philippines which will not permit us to return them to the sovereignty of Spain?" he asked. "You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines and, if necessary, pay to Spain $10,000,000 to $20,000,000. . . . The trade and commer- cial side as well as the indemnity for the cost of the war are questions we might yield. They might be waived or compromised but the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out." 2 The biographer of McKinley shows us the working of his mind in some words he addressed to his Methodist brethren: "The truth is," he said, "I didn't want the Philippines and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. . . . I sought counsel from all sides — Democrats as well as Republicans — but got little help. 1 thought first we would take only Manila ; theD Luzon ; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnighl ; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees 1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 937. 2 Ibid., 949. For an interesting account of the work of the Peace Com- misaiou, see Life of Whitcluw Reid, Cortissoz, ii. chap. xiii. Ch. v.] Mckinley 107 and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way — I don't know how it was, but it came : (1) that we could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany — our commercial rivals in the Orient — that would be bad business and dis- creditable ; (3) that we could not leave them to them- selves — they were unfit for self-government — and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly." x It is true that McKinley was inconsistent in his public words. In his message of December, 1897, he had said, "Forcible annexation . . . cannot be thought of; that, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." 2 One cannot read the proceedings of the Peace Commis- sion in Paris and see in any other light than that our tak- ing of the Philippines was " forcible annexation." In his instructions to the Commissioners of September 16, 1898, he had said that the United States must be "scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement." It should not be tempted into "excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths." 3 But our attitude to Spain denied the injunction to show mag- nanimity, and our demand for and the taking of the 1 Interview, Nov. 21, 1899. Life of McKinley, ii. 109. 2 Richardson, x. 131. 3 Foreign Relations, 1898, 907. 108 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 Philippines was an excessive demand and a venture on untried paths. Yet McKinley was entirely sincere. He was truly re- ligious, and when he told his Methodist brethren of the working of his mind, he told exactly the truth as he saw it. When he wrote, "The war has brought us new dutic and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization," l he meant what he said ; and many good moral and re- ligious men were entirely of his mind. Indeed it was a troublesome question to decide. The opinion of a ma- jority of the American people was opposed to allowing the islands to go back to Spain ; and yet as we see it now, that was the only alternative. They and the Presi- dent did not believe that things should be permitted in the Eastern Hemisphere that they had gone to war to stop in Cuba. While the humanitarian impulse did the President honor, he had no right to commit bis country to a dangerous course, to run the risk of "an adventurous departure on untried paths," on account of a religious sentiment. Despite the obvious opinion of the majority, which with "his ear close to the ground" - he well knew, his hold on the country was bo great, increased as it was by a victorious war, that he could have led it to accept any conditions that he deemed necessary for the con- clusion of a peace. The only possible alternative, Leav- ing the islands to Spain, niiulit have been done under conditions suggested by Commissioner Day. 1 Such cpn- 1 ForciKn Relations, 1898, 907. i p.rk, 669. 1 ">■ igo K< lations, 1898, 926, '.»34. Ch. V.] THE MONROE DOCTRINE 109 ditions would have filled the measure of humanity; but there would naturally have been the query whether Spain would or could carry them out. 1 An American condition, however, should have influ- enced the President without fail. The Monroe Doc- trine had come to be regarded as sacred and the spirit of it, if not the letter, was violated when we annexed the Philippines. We held that no European Power should take territory or increase what she possessed in the West- ern Hemisphere. In other words we said, "You keep away from us and we will keep away from you." 2 By the same token we were bound not to encroach on the Eastern Hemisphere. A cartoon in Punch entitled " Doc- trine and Practice" represented Dame Europa in a gar- den, her attitude haughty, saying coldly to an intruder, "To whom do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?" The intruder, in face, figure and get-up of the well-known type, replied "Ma'am — my name is Uncle Sam!" When came the rejoinder, "Any relation of the late Colo- nel Monroe?" 3 True it was urged that we had grown too large to be confined by the Monroe Doctrine, that the teachings of Washington, Monroe and John Quincy Adams applied to the country as it was then and had no longer application. 4 Others reasoned that the Monroe 1 General MacArthur said in his Testimony before the Senate Com- mittee on the Philippines on April 11, 1902: "When we landed [Mac- Arthur sailed for Manila from San Francisco on June 27, 1898] we found the entire population [of the Philippines] in open, violent, vindictive re- sentment against Spain, as an expression of their desire to be emanci- pated from that monarchy. ... I think if they had been granted the reforms which were extended to the people of the peninsula [of Spain] that the Filipinos would have been loyal Spaniards to-day. " — Part ii. 1384. 2 The Nation, Nov. 10, 1898, 345. 3 Punch, Aug. 6, 1898; Winslow Warren in Boston Herald, Apr. 18, 1919. 4 See The Nation, May 19, 1898, 376. 110 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 Doctrine only obliged us to keep out of Europe and had no reference to Asia. 1 But it was entirely easy for Presi- dent McKinley to set aside such reasonings did he so desire. The Secretary of State, John Hay, was influenced by the opinion of England as she had been the sole large European power on our side during the Spanish War. "The dull hostility between us and England which ex- isted a year ago," he wrote while Ambassador, has been changed into a firm friendship. "If we give up the Phil- ippines it will be a considerable disappointment to our English friends. ... I have no doubt that Germany has been intriguing both with Aguinaldo and with Spain. They are most anxious to get a foothold there ; but if they do there will be danger of grave complication with other European powers." 2 With the determination of the President, events moved forward to the Treaty of Peace which was signed on De- cember 10, 1898. It followed the Protocol as regards Cuba, Puerto Rico and the island in the Ladrones [Guam], but it further provided for the cession of the Philippine Islands and the payment by the United States to Spain of twenty million dollars. Neither the Cuban nor the Philippine debt was assumed. McKinley had a difficult time in getting his Treaty confirmed by the Senate which considered it from January 4 to February 0, 1899, and finally ratified it by 57: 'J7, only one vote more than the necessary two thirds. Senator Gray sinned the Treaty, advocated it in the Senate and afterwards accepted the position of judge from President McKinley. Naturally 1 LAtan6, Cotters of Aug. 2, Sept. '.». Life of McKinley, ii. 135. Ch. V.] THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION 111 his after-conduct does not agree with the heretofore cited opinion anent taking the Philippines ; but in a news- paper interview and in his speech in the Senate for the Treaty he explained his change of mind. 1 Both Senators Hoar and Hale, Republicans, opposed it, but Bryan came to Washington during its pendency and urged enough of Democrats to vote for it to secure its ratification. 2 Two days before the ratification of the Treaty, the Fili- pinos, whose leader Aguinaldo was exasperated at the non-establishment of a Philippine Republic with him- self at the head of it, attacked the American soldiers at Manila 3 and war began, which, with an ensuing guerilla warfare, continued for more than three years. In truth the United States had paid twenty millions for "a white elephant." It was " scarcely comprehended," wrote Dewey, "that a rebellion was included with the pur- chase." 4 It cost the United States to subdue the Philip- 1 Jan. 20, 1899; Jan. 31, Feb. 1, 1899, New York Tribune. 2 Life of McKinley, ii. 139; George F. Hoar, Autobiography, ii. 322; Latane, 77. 3 The following I believe to be the truth about the much disputed ques- tion, who began the actual hostilities : "About 8.30 on the night of Febru- ary 4, four Filipinos approached within five yards of an American outpost near the San Juan bridge and, ignoring the command to halt, were fired upon by the sentry. A Filipino detachment near by returned the fire and the firing soon became general along the entire line. . . . The Filipinos at that particular hour were unprepared for attack or defence. The expected battle came when they were off their guard, most of the higher officers being absent at Malolos." — The Philippines, Charles B. Elliott (1916), i. 452. J. A. Le Roy wrote: "The strained condition of affairs' between the American and Filipino forces, having reached a climax, virtually brought on trouble of itself ; a subordinate Filipino officer, un- checked by the discipline of his superiors, was the chief deus ex machina of the affray of February 4 ; the American authorities in Manila, having taken a more positive stand at the close of that week regarding encroach- ments upon their line, let loose the dogs of war they had been holding ready, and promptly followed up the provocation given." The Ameri- cans in the Philippines (1914), J. A. Le Roy, ii. 16. 4 Autobiography, 284. 112 HARRISON'S ADMINISTRATION [1893 pine insurgents nearly one hundred and seventy millions, 1 while the cost of the Spanish War was three hundred million. 2 The one was attended with glory, the other with apology, despite the splendid results accruing from our rule. Nearly all writers agree that the annexation of Hawaii 3 was brought on by the Spanish- American War, and by the taking of the Philippines. Hawaii, wrote John W. Fos- ter, was a link in the chain of our possessions in the Pa- cific. 4 Like Cuba it had long been coveted by some Ameri- can officials and a crisis occurring in January, 1893, fur- nished the fit occasion. "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it," wrote our minister. 5 A revolution, assisted by the United States forces, took place ; the corrupt and des- potic government of the Queen was overthrown and a provisional government established in its place. This government at once despatched a Commission to Wash- ington with a treaty of annexation which had the thorough sympathy of President Harrison, who on Fel unary 14, 1893, signed it and submitted it to the Senate. The Treaty was favorably reported but, before action could 'Peck, 61") ; Senate. nu l.-i S. ss. no. 416. June 20, 1902. 2 Lif.- of McKinley, ii. 112. '"The Hawaiian Islands constitute a group of several islands in (he mi I Pacific having a total area of tiii'.i square mile-. According to the United States census of 1900 their total population was 164,001 (or, de- ducting '_'7 l persons in the military and naval service >>f the United states, 153,727). 'The latter number was made up of 61, 122 ( Chinese, 25,7 12 Japan- 29,83 1 I la v. pari Sawaiians, 28,533 Americans, K)7 South Sea [slanders, and 254 " - Willoughby, rerritories and De- pendencies of the i inted States, 61. 4 American l Kplomacv in the I blent, 38 I max} i. L893 Prat. Cleveland's message of Dee. 18, 1898. Richard on, ix 16 i Ch. V.] CLEVELAND — HAWAII 113 be taken on it, Cleveland became President and during March, 1893, withdrew it ; in his special message of De- cember 18, 1893, he gave the reason for this withdrawal and for his subsequent action. Believing that a grievous wrong had been done to the government of the Queen by the United States forces, he endeavored to restore her to her preexisting power, but his movement was defeated by the recalcitrant action of the Queen herself. With his sturdy sense of justice Cleveland could do no other than permanently to withdraw the treaty of annexation, but his attempt to restore the Queen was at the time un- popular and does not now merit approval. As the United States would not have Hawaii and the Queen's govern- ment was impossible, the revolutionary parties estab- lished a republican form of government which was recog- nized by the Powers, including the United States. This new government administered affairs " through a period of four years," so John W. Foster 1 wrote, "in which the country enjoyed unexampled peace and prosperity. Never before in its history had there been such honesty in administration, such economy in expenditures, such uniform justice in the enforcement of the laws and re- spect for the officials, such advance in education and such encouragement of commerce and protection to life and property." 2 When McKinley became President Hawaii was annexed by joint resolution of Congress. 3 This form was used as 1 Foster was Secretary of State under Harrison at the time the treaty of annexation was presented. 2 American Diplomacy in the Orient, 381. 3 A treaty of annexation was signed June 16, 1897, and submitted the same day to the Senate, which body removed the injunction of secreoy on it the next day. — Senate Jour., 55th Cong. 1st Sess., 181, 183. 114 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 doubt existed whether a two-thirds vote for the ratifica- tion of a treaty could be secured in the Senate. "What is to be thought of a body," wrote John Hay in a pri- vate letter from London, "which will not take Hawaii as a gift and is clamoring to hold the Philippines?" l But on July 7, 1898, Hawaii became part of the United States by a two-thirds vote in both Houses, 2 a little over two months after Dewey's victory at Manila. Had it not been for the foreshadowed policy in regard to the Philippines, it was a case of let well enough alone. A good government under a republican form was func- tioning in Hawaii and it was taking too great a risk to annex territory 2089 miles away. 3 "The story of alternating 'booms' and panics," wrote Noyes, "is largely the story of modern industrial prog- ress." 4 Those who believe in the periodicity of panics and recovery therefrom may note with elation that it was twenty years from the panic of 1873 to that of 1893, and twenty years from the "boom" of 1879 to that of 1899. As in the earlier case, recovery began sooner than was generally appreciated and is placed by Noyes in the middle of 1897. 5 Certain it is that the revival would have been in full swing had it not been for the Spanish War. War is a disturbing factor in finance and business and, when it was declared, no one would have dared to proph- esy its brief duration. The "boom" year of 1899 re- sembles that of 1S79. Both were the result of recupera- 1 May 27, 1898, Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 170. ■ Foster, 383. • Authorities : Foster ; Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies of the United States; Cleveland's special message of Dec. 18, 1S93; Peck. * American Finance, 258. 6 P. 262. Ch. V.] JOHN PIERPONT MORGAN 115 tive years after panics and both were attended with large crops in the United States, a failure in Europe, or, as Noyes expressed it, "A European famine and a bumper crop at home," immense exportations of breadstuffs, an import of gold and a buying-back of securities which Europe had taken in former years. Hay and Adams in their walks, discoursed of "the insolent prosperity of the United States." x While the dominant characteristics of 1879 were an advance in the price of pig iron and rail- road shares, 1899 was noted for its "boom" in industrials and putting railroads on their feet. John Pierpont Morgan is the hero of 1899 and of the succeeding years, and he came into public notice from his reorganization of railroads which had been badly hurt by the panic of 1893 and by conditions prevailing before and after. While circumstances favored his operations, they were really marvellous and may be fully appreciated by putting the question whether any other man in the country could have accomplished what he did. Not by affability and not by any strong hold on public sentiment did he work his results ; for he was reticent, taciturn, decisive and blunt ; his manner was stern and brusque ; endowed with great energy, he was ruthless. He lacked a wide range of knowledge, but somehow he arrived quickly at decisions involving millions to the amazement of the beholder. He rarely read books and, on a con- stitutional question, he once displayed an ignorance that would have disgraced a College freshman. But the apologists for a mathematical training may point to Mor- gan as a shining example. From the English High Hay, Letters, iii. 140. 116 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 School of Boston he went to the University of Gottingen where he so distinguished himself in mathematics that the professor, under whom he sat, wanted him to remain. "You would have been my assistant as long as I lived," he said, "and unquestionably at my death you would have been appointed professor of mathematics in my place." l This incident Morgan used to tell in the day of his success with justifiable pride. His action showed " precision" and " wariness of mind" which John Stuart Mill mentioned as some of the "excellencies of mathe- matical discipline." 2 The railroads had tried competition with the result that large numbers of them were in the hands of receivers and the sounder ones had difficulty in making both ends meet. Morgan substituted combination for competi- tion. In the parlance of the street his first name was Jupiter and this was properly bestowed, for his word was ''I command." Those who wished a reorganiza- tion of their railroads must accept his terms; and the result proved their justification. A contrast of the con- dition of the railroads in 1899 and before that year is one between excellent business management and the proper payment of interest and dividends, and a cut- throat competition that did no one, except perhaps spec- ulators, any good. Naturally Morgan added to hi-; great reputation of a banker that of a reorganizer of railroads. He always bore in mind what his father told him. .Junius S. Morgan was one of America's first men of business who developed an influential London banking house. This was the advice he gave to his son: 1 Life of Morguu, Hovey, 31G. * See my vol. ii. 333. Ch. V.] the steel INDUSTRY 117 "Remember one thing always. Any man who is a bear on the future of the United States will go broke. There will be many times when things look dark and cloudy in America, when everyone will think there has been over development. But remember yourself that the growth of that vast country will take care of it all. Always be a 'bull' on America." l Along with the reenhancement of the railroads was the revival of industrial conditions. Captains of indus- try showed their ability and power and forged to the front with their manufactures, so that Europe began to hear of what they called the " American invasion." " European nations," said the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, "must close their ranks and fight shoulder to shoulder, in order successfully to defend their existence." 2 A conspicuous development was in the steel industry which is fully represented in a report of Charles M. Schwab, dated May 15, 1899. "I know positively," he wrote, "that England cannot produce pig iron at actual cost for less than $11.50 per ton, even allowing no profit on raw materials, and cannot put pig iron into a rail with their most efficient works for less than $7.50 per ton. This would make rails at net cost to them of $19.00. We can sell at this price and ship abroad so as to net us $16.00 at works for foreign business, nearly as good as home business has been. ... As a result of this we are going to control the steel business of the world. You know we can make rails for less than $12.00 per ton, leaving a nice margin on foreign business." 3 Schwab 1 McClure's Magazine, Nov., 1910, 16. 2 Noyes, 273. 8 The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Co., Bridge, 314. 118 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 was President of the Carnegie Steel Co. and his report was to Henry Clay Frick, chairman, his superior officer, but both were under Andrew Carnegie, who, despite his obvious faults, was the greatest iron master of the world, was now at the head of the best equipped steel works and could make steel cheaper than anyone else. "Between 1893 and 1899 our export of manufactures actually doubled." l In the old school-books it was set down that the de- velopment of a State lay in commerce, manufactures, and agriculture. Agriculture was the largest single in- terest in the United States and commerce and manu- factures owed more to it than it owed to the others. In 1899 the farmer was prosperous. "Every barn in Kan- sas and Nebraska has had a new coat of paint." "For anyone," wrote Ray Stannard Baker, "who knew the West of 1895 and 1896, with its bare weather-stained homes, its dilapidated barns, its farm machinery stand- ing out in the rain, its ruinous ' boom ' towns, its discon- tented inhabitants crying out for legislation to relieve their distress, this bit of observation raises a picture of improvement and smiling comfort such as no array of figures, however convincing, could produce. The West painted again : how much that means ! The farmer has provided himself with food in plenty and the means for seeding his fields for another year; he has clothed him- self and his family anew ; he has bought an improved harvester, a buggy and a sewing machine; and now with the deliberation which is born of a surplus and a sturdy confidence in himself and in the future, he is painting his »Noyes, 275. Ch. V.] legislation for GOLD 119 barn. Paint signifies all of these preliminary comforts. And after paint comes a new front porch, a piano and the boys off to college." l Baker might have added that cancelled farm mortgages were reckoned by the carload. 2 Since the campaign of 1896, there had been an enor- mous increase in the production of gold so that circum- stances were ripe for the Republicans to fulfil the prom- ises they had made in their platform of 1896 and during that lively canvass. Unquestionably the gold Demo- crats, who had supported McKinley, were disappointed that financial legislation was not enacted as the result of his victory, but those who believed in a protective tariff dominated the councils of the party and before they tackled the subject of finance they felt that the tariff de- manded their attention: hence the Dingley Tariff Bill. McKinley and his immediate advisers had come to be- lieve in a gold standard and were right in their convic- tion that a better law could be later secured than in 1897. But this conviction was based on the education of their party, as they could not have foreseen how Na- ture was going to work on their side. On March 14, 1900, a law was enacted declaring the gold dollar to be the standard unit of value. It provided that " United States notes [greenbacks] and Treasury notes" issued under the Act of 1890 " shall be redeemed in gold coin ; and, in order to secure the prompt and cer- tain redemption of such notes, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to set apart a reserve fund of 1 Ray Stannard Baker, The New Prosperity, McClure's Magazine, May, 1900, 86. 1 In addition to authorities already cited, I have used The Nation for 1899, and conversations with Mark Hanna and J. P. Morgan. 120 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 one hundred and fifty millions in gold, which fund shall be used for such redemption purposes only." If that fund should fall below one hundred millions it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to replenish it to the maximum sum of one hundred and fifty millions, by the sale of three per cent bonds, of which the interest and principal should be payable in gold. The proceeds of these bonds should not "be used to meet deficiencies in the current revenues." United States notes, when re- deemed and reissued, should be held "in the reserve fund until exchanged for gold." The legal tender quality of the silver dollar was unaffected. 1 During the summer of 1900 affairs in China claimed the attention of the State Department, and Hay as its head directed the admirable course of the United States, showing great ability in state-craft. John Hay, as he gave an account of himself, "was born in Indiana, grew up in Illinois, was educated in Rhode Island. I learned my law," he continued, "in Spring- field and my politics in Washington, my diplomacy in Europe, Asia and Africa." - He had an innate sense of refinement but his cultivated manner never obscured his Western raciness. He loved society and talk. Residing ten years in Cleveland, he organized a dinner club, called the Vampire, of which he was the life. Hay used to come to the dinners primed with circumstances and anecdotes and, eating and drinking little, he gave him- self up to talk and was listened to with Interest and de- light. Not infrequently one of the wits of the club 1 I . S St.'itutos. xvxi. I A. 1 Life of Ilay, Thayer, i. 2. C 'u I'l/rii/h! Ou Pa&l Bnl/Urt. Ch. V.] JOHN HAY 121 would prod Hay and, with his rare sense of humor a witticism of the sort served for an additional display. Occasionally he would fall into a serious strain and talk of political events or his acquaintances in New York or England, but always replete with intelligence. Some- times, although with seeming reluctance, he would speak of his work on Lincoln, on which he was then engaged, and the business men, who gathered at that round table, were eager to hear of the processes of a live author. But it was a common remark that he never repeated himself. " What things have we seen Done at the Mermaid [Union Club of Cleveland] heard words that have been So nimble and so full of subtile flame." "There is no longer the play of wit and raillery," wrote Professor Matthews, ''the brilliancy, the concen- tration, the rapid glancing at a hundred subjects in suc- cession, which there used to be in the attic nights of John- son, Burke, Garrick and Sheridan." l But had the Professor dined with the Vampire, when Hay was at his best, he might have thought it an attic night. Hay was the soul of the club and when in 1879 he felt compelled to accept the position of Assistant Secretary of State, offered him by William M. Evarts, he left a void, which, although the dinners went on, was not filled until his return to Cleveland, when he was welcomed with glee. Hay was not a trained historian in the way of knowing thoroughly the masters of the art. He did not read with rapt attention Gibbon, Macaulay, Parkman or any other iThe Great Conversers (1874), 42. 122 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 historian except Henry Adams. He was apt to have at hand some high class French novel or Memoirs. He was especially fond of Tourgu6neff. Is there in literature, he asked, such another story of a suicide so dramatically told, as that of Nejdanof in Terres Viorges? During a long acquaintance I never heard him talk of historians except of his friend Henry Adams, but he had at his tongue's end what we used to call belles-lettres and his conversation thereon was a profit and delight. In his familiar letters written to his coadjutor Nicolay in re- gard to the History, when he spoke of condensation or the troubles of narration, there is never a question how Macaulay or Parkman would have treated the one or solved the other. We "must seize every chance to con- dense," he wrote. "We could cut down a good deal and present what would be a continuous narrative in about half the space we have taken for our book." ' Unques- tionably had he followed out this idea, the History would have been more popular and less criticized. Although Hay did not possess the power of generaliza- tion of Gibbon he had two qualities invaluable for a his- torian — that of narration and a skepticism that influ- enced in a marked degree his judgment of men and of events. And no writers in America ever had more price- less material. As private secretaries of Lincoln, feeling that he was the central figure of the time, thinking that some day they might write a history of these eventful years, they made memoranda and garnered up their im- pressions. Robert T. Lincoln, the President's son, had a large body of material which he placed at their dis- 1 Thayer, ii. 28, 35. Ch. V.] JOHN HAY 123 posal. The two merits which Gibbon ascribed as those of a historian, diligence and accuracy, they possessed. The ten volumes of the History testify to their diligence ; that they rarely, if ever, failed in the correctness of a quo- tation or a reference is a warrant of their accuracy. Hay was a partisan and he carried partisanship into his historical work, but he aimed at impartiality. "We ought to write," he said, "the history of those times like two everlasting angels who know everything, judge every- thing, tell the truth about everything, and don't care a twang of their harps about one side or the other." Yet in the same letter he wrote, "I am of that age and im- bued with all its prejudices," and "We are Lincoln men all through." * Therein lay an unconscious partisanship. Nicolay and Hay made Lincoln out a saint and, when he came into contact with other men, the saint was always right. "No man," Hay wrote in a private letter, "can be a great historian who is not a good fellow." A "good fel- low," a genuine man was Hay in every respect. An earnest Republican, he took great interest in poli- tics and cooperated with the managers of the Republican cause in Ohio and in the country at large. Those who knew him best thought that, until McKinley appointed him in 1897, his ability was not appreciated by those high in power, as the offers to him of office were below his merits. He helped Hanna in the nomination of McKin- ley and when McKinley was elected, among the large number of well-backed aspirants for the English mission, Hanna's voice was for Hay; as Hay jocosely wrote, 1 Thayer, ii. 33. 124 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 "Hanna is a good judge of men and he recognizes infalli- bility when he sees it." McKinley named him Ambassa- dor to Great Britain, a position which pleased him im- mensely and which he was abundantly qualified to fill. McKinley and Hay took to one another, drawn to- gether by an innate sense of refinement, for McKinley appreciated culture. Hay was decidedly a cultivated man. His natural propensity for culture was fostered by the reading of books and by mingling in the best society. Having a notable aptitude for acquiring knowl- edge at second hand he used this knowledge in his talk with wonderful skill. Always meeting interesting peo- ple he absorbed incidents that in turn set off his own con- versation. He loved wit and humor and any manifes- tation of them was to his latest day a passport to his favor. He was a remarkable dinner-table talker and, in a dis- cussion of the subject, a man of wide experience could think only of two shining lights of Boston and Cambridge who were his equal or superior. In August, 1898, McKinley offered Hay the position of Secretary of State for which he had no wish, as he would have preferred to remain Ambassador to Great Britain. 1 Thus he wrote during September to his brother-in-law : "I did not want the place and was greatly grieved and shocked when it came — but of course I could not refuse to do the best I could. It was impossible, after the Presi- dent had been so generous, to pick and choose, and say, 'I will have this and not that.' But I look forward to the next year with gloomy forebodings." 2 •The Education of Henry Adams, 3G1 ; Life <»f II. iy. Thayer, ii. 173 rt •"/. ■ Thayer, ii. 183. Ch. V.] CHINA 125 The correspondence between McKinley and Hay, when Hay's first canal treaty was rejected by the Senate, is honorable to them both. Hay showed consideration for the President in offering his resignation and McKinley in declining it, affirmed his loyalty to his Secretary of State. "Your administration of the State Department," he wrote, "has had my warm approval. As in all matters you have taken my counsel, I will cheerfully bear what- ever criticism or condemnation may come." 1 In his sym- pathetic eulogy delivered before the Congress, Hay rose to a sublime height, as he depicted the ability, moral greatness and success of his master. His countenance was the picture of his mind and heart. "His face," he said, "was cast in a classic mold; you see faces like it in antique marble, in the galleries of the Vatican ; . . .his voice was the voice of the perfect orator." 2 China, devoted to Oriental civilization, did not wish for Western modern improvements, had no desire for railroads and telegraphs, the importation of English and American cotton fabrics and of American petroleum. She could see no use in them ; they disturbed her calcu- lations and her mode of life; she was satisfied to be let alone. To the European nations she seemed inert — a fat goose for the plucking — and therefore, on one ac- count and another, these foreign nations claimed and ob- tained "spheres of influence or interest." Especially was this the case with Great Britain, Germany and Rus- sia, and, from their point of view, such spheres in China were economically and politically like their own terri- tory. The China trade was important to the United 1 Thayer, ii. 228. 2 Memorial Address, Feb. 27, 1902. 126 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 States and the American manufacturers desired part of the consumption of the three hundred and fifty million Chinese. Did these nations adopt preferential tariffs in their spheres of interest, the American manufacturers would suffer, and for aid they looked to the State De- partment which was alive to the situation. On September 6, 1899, Hay addressed a note to Great Britain in which his English predilection tallied with her traditional and declared policy for freedom of trade, and he asked her to maintain the "open door" policy which meant that the commerce and navigation of the world should receive equality of treatment within the "spheres of influence or interest." On the same day, he addressed notes to Germany and Russia pleading to these protec- tive tariff countries for the "open door" policy within their spheres of interest, although to them he did not use the term "open door." On November 30 England re- plied that she would declare for the "open door" pro- vided that the other powers concerned would do likewise. During December Germany and Russia answered, af- firming the principle under like conditions. Meanwhile Hay addressed similar notes to Japan, France and Italy, from all of whom he received satisfactory answers. This led to his note of March 20, 1900, to the several six na- tions, giving the course of his negotiations and saying that as each nation had "accepted the declaration sug- gested by the United States concerning foreign trade in China" he considered the assent of each one addressed "as final and definitive." ' Hay's sanguine anticipations were substantially realised. 1 Corr. concerning Amer. Commercial Rights in China, Foreign Rela- tions, 1899. Ch. V.] THE BOXER UPRISING 127 But the game of grab had received a check. The worm trodden on will turn. Before 1900, there were mutter- ings of the coming storm which is known as the Boxer uprising. The Boxers were a secret Chinese society and their name may be freely translated as "The Fist of Righteous Harmony." Sir Robert Hart "looked upon the Boxer movement as a national and patriotic one for freeing China of the foreigners to whom, rightly or wrongly, is attributed all the country's misfortunes dur- ing the last half century." * Hart was properly called by the Encyclopaedia Britannica, an Anglo-Chinese states- man and his remark was made after the suppression of the uprising which had individually cost him much; it stated a condition that the Boxers, dominated by the fa- natics, sought to remedy, but the remedy was worse than the disease. The Empress Dowager who sympathized with the fanatical Boxers said in a secret edict, "The va- rious powers cast upon us looks of tigerlike voracity, hus- tling each other in their endeavors to be the first to seize upon our innermost territories." 2 A Chinese politician declared that the Boxer movement "was due to the deep- seated hatred of the Chinese people towards foreigners. China had been oppressed, trampled upon, coerced, ca- joled, her territory taken, her usages flouted." 3 While this feeling against foreigners as such was undoubtedly the main cause of the Boxer uprising, it was mixed with antagonism toward Christian missionaries who were try- ing to convert the Chinese to an alien religion. Mate- rial conditions likewise fostered the movement. In De- 1 Foreign Relations, 1900, 207. * Nov. 21, 1899. Foreign Relations, 1900, 85. * J. W. Foster, Amer. Diplomacy in the Orient, 416. 128 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1900 cember, 1899, our minister E. H. Conger wrote to John Hay, "Crops have failed on account of the drought; great poverty and want prevail." 1 Little wonder was it that a placard was issued saying, "The Roman Catholic and Protestant religions have ruined and destroyed Buddhism. Their adherents . . . have irritated heaven and in consequence no rain has fallen. ... If foreigners are not swept away no rain will fall." 2 Swayed by these different impulses the Peking Boxers attacked the foreign legations. On June 11, 1900, Conger wrote to Hay : "We are besieged in Peking, entirely cut off from outside com- munication. ... In a civilized country of course there would be no question as to our safety, but here, with prac- tically no government, and the army only a mutinous horde of savage ruffians, there can be no predicting what they may attempt." 3 Ordinarily, government soldiers would protect foreign legations but in this case the armed Boxers, who were looked upon as patriots, were assisted by the Imperial troops. The entire city of Peking, wrote Conger on June 15, is "in the possession of a rioting, mur- dering mob, with no visible effort being made by the gov- ernment in any way to restrain it." 4 Five days later the German Minister, who had ventured out on an official errand, was murdered. Nearly all the foreigners repaired to the British legation, which was made a veritable for- tress; their lines of defence were quickly shortened and straightened ; trenches and barricades were built. "The Chinese army," related Conger on August 17 after relief came, "had turned out against us; the whole quarter of 1 h. :. L8Q0 Foreign Relations, 1900, 77. •-■ \m 80, L900, Foreign Relations, 128. 'Ibid., 145. 4 Foreign Relations, i"> t. Ch. V.] THE BOXER UPRISING 129 the city in which the legations are situated was sur- rounded by its soldiers, firing began on all sides and the battle against the representatives of all foreign govern- ments in China was begun. . . . Until July 17 there was scarcely an hour during which there was not firing upon some part of our lines . . . varying from a single shot to a general and continuous attack along the whole line. Artillery was planted on all sides of us." l Culminating by July 17, a thrill of horror ran through Europe and the United States at the idea that the lega- tions to an ostensibly friendly country were besieged and in danger of massacre. London, Paris and Berlin be- lieving that the worst had happened, mourned for those who had suffered this conjectured untimely fate. On July 16 it was stated in the House of Commons that the government entertained ' ' no further hope for the safety of the foreign community in Peking." The London Times, the most conspicuous journal in Europe, which con- tained this news, printed in the same issue conventional eulogies of the British Minister, of the Times correspond- ent and of Sir Robert Hart, and gave a list of British officials and others who were in the Chinese capital. While those connected with the American press were in- clined to the belief of their confreres over the sea, the Chi- nese Minister in Washington, Wu, Secretary John Hay and President McKinley doubted the story of a general mas- sacre. Amid a period of excitement Hay and McKin- ley did not lose their heads and cooperated in efforts to relieve the suffering garrison. Hay was determined to get correct news and through Minister Wu sent a des- 1 Foreign Relations, 162. 130 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 patch to Conger on July 11, "Communicate tidings bearer." Conger replied under date of July 16, received in Washington four days later : "For one month we have been besieged in British legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can pre- vent general massacre." l Five days later (not received in Washington until August 5) Conger telegraphed through the Consul-General at Shanghai: "All well. No fighting since 16th by agreement. Enough provi- sions; little ammunition. Hope for speedy relief." 2 In his despatch of July 21, Conger was somewhat too op- timistic as the situation was one of ebb and flow. Nev- ertheless relief was at hand and he had the satisfaction of announcing on August 14, "We are safe." 3 The occupying forces 4 restored order and organized a provincial administration, which gave way eventually to a reestablished Chinese government. Protracted ne- gotiations followed, with the result that suitable punish- ment was meted out to the guilty and an indemnity in a lump sum agreed upon. The success of President McKinley and Secretary Hay lay in their confidence in the Southern viceroys. As Hay said in his eulogy on McKin- 1 Foreign Relations, 155, 156. "Your telegram was the first communi- cation received by anyone from outside since the siege began and mine the first sent out." Conner to Hav, ibid., 161. > Ibid., 156. 5 Ibid., 160. The paraphrase of Conger's message of Aug. 17 ran: "Ex- cepting the Imperial palace the entire city is occupied by 2000 Americans, 2000 British, 3000 Russians, 8000 Japanese and 200 French and is being apportioned for police supervision. The Chinese army has fled. The Imperial family and court have gone westward. . . . There are no rep- resentative* of the. Chinese government in sight. The palace will b« taken at once. . . . Conditions chaotic." It must be noted that our rapid action of relief wa« due to our having troops in the Philippines. * For what the occupying forces were which relieved the foreign com- munity in Peking, see note 3. Ch. V.] PEACE WITH CHINA 131 ley, " While the legations were fighting for their lives against bands of infuriated fanatics, the President de- cided that we were at peace with China ; and while that conclusion did not hinder him from taking the most en- ergetic measures to rescue our imperilled citizens, it en- abled him to maintain close and friendly relations with the wise and heroic viceroys of the south, whose reso- lute stand saved that ancient Empire from anarchy and spoliation." 1 They also believed Minister Wu ; and their voices, as friends of China, were for the preservation of her integrity and for moderation in every respect. "Hay's achievement," wrote Thayer, "in this Chinese contest gave him an immense prestige. Throughout the world he was now looked upon as a statesman, honest, disinterested, resourceful and brilliant." 2 Reference is had to the "open door" correspondence as well as to his conduct during the Boxer uprising ; lapse of time con- firms fully this effective statement. The brother Vam- pires who listened to Hay's brilliant talk when he was forty were not surprised at the development of his parts until he became Secretary of State. They were prepared for the History, knew that he would be an excellent Am- bassador to Great Britain, but were amazed at the able statecraft he displayed in handling Chinese affairs. 3 1 Addresses, 1G2. 2 Life of Hay, ii. 249. 3 Authorities : Foreign Relations, 1900 ; Life of Hay, Thayer ; Life of McKinley, Olcott; President's Messages of Dec. 1900 and Dec. 1901; Peck. CHAPTER VI President making was a concern of the year 1900, which in this case meant practically the action of the Re- publican Convention that assembled in Philadelphia dur- ing June. There was no difference as to the presidential candidate, none as to the platform. According to the prevailing sentiment McKinley had deserved well of the party and the country, and was entitled to another term. The platform was on the point-with-pride order and glo- ried in the achievements of the Republican party. Mer- ited indeed was all that it said about the Republican opposition to the free coinage of silver and the preserva- tion of the gold standard ; for the action of the Republi- can party had been in line with what believers in sound money advocated. While the platform commended the foreign policy of the President it could not ignore entirely the bloody suppression of the Philippine rebellion which was still on foot, so that the statement regarding the Philippines limped and took no account of patent facts as I have stated them. The platform was adopted with unanimity; there is not "a particle of objection to it," a delegate from New Jersey declared, 1 and he spoke the unanimous voice of the Convention. The nomination of McKinley and the platform had practically been decided by public opinion freely ex- pressed in various way.- in :i [ire-convention canvass, and traversed Ostrogorski's statement thai a National Con- vention is "a colossal travesty of popular institutions." 2 1 < MBoial Proceeding* of the Etepub. Nat. Com. of 1900, Ms i ii. 278. 182 Ch. VI.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 133 The Convention and the Republican party were well repre- sented in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, a delegate at large from New York State, who seconded McKinley's nomination. "We nominate President McKinley," he said, " because he stands indeed for honesty at home and for honor abroad ; because he stands for the contin- uance of the material prosperity which has brought com- fort to every home in the Union ; and because he stands for that kind of policy which consists in making perform- ance square with promise." l The whole ticket of 1896 could not be renominated as Hobart, the Vice-President, had during the year previous passed away. A new candidate must therefore be chosen and the convention is remarkable for its choice. The services of Theodore Roosevelt during the Spanish- American War made him Governor of New York State, where he came into collision with Senator Piatt and the Republican organization who were influenced by "the big corporation men." 2 Roosevelt desired a renomina- tion for governor by the New York State Convention, which would be held subsequent to the National Con- vention in Philadelphia, as the governorship interested him and he had policies which he desired to perfect and carry out ; and he did not want to be sidetracked as Vice-President. He positively declined a number of times to be a candidate for that office. Hanna regarded Roosevelt as erratic and "unsafe" and was emphatically opposed to his nomination as Vice-President. The natu- ral antagonism between the two became publicly known at this Convention. Hanna was for the old order with an Official Proceedings, 119. 2 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 110. 134 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 important modification, Roosevelt for the new. And President McKinley in an unobtrusive way let it be known that he did not want Roosevelt as a running mate. Roosevelt arrived in Philadelphia on Saturday, June 16, and next day had an interview with Hanna, in which he said frankly to the Senator, "I am not a candidate for Vice-President and I don't want the nomination. What I want is to be Governor of New York." l Roosevelt's own account of the matter may be set down as true his- tory : "Senator Hanna appeared on the surface to have control of the Convention. He was anxious that I should not be nominated as Vice-President. Senator Piatt was anxious that I should be nominated as Vice-President in order to get me out of the New York Governorship. . . . My supporters in New York State did not wish me nom- inated for Vice-President because they wished me to con- tinue as Governor ; but in every other State all the people who admired me were bound that I should be nominated as Vice-President." 2 A supplement to this is a telephone despatch to President McKinley which reached him late on Sunday evening, June 17: "The Roosevelt boom is let loose and it has swept everything. It starts with the support of Pennsylvania and New York practically solid and with California and Colorado back of it also. The feeling is that the thing is going pell-mell like a tidal wave." 3 On this Sunday Hanna and Roosevelt failed to reckon the strength of popular sentiment. Roosevelt, on ac- 1 OI<-,,tt, ii. 275. 'Autobiography, 882. •Oloott, ii. 271. In the midst of tin- r\ritrnn-iit Mrs. EtobmSOO, who hud hastened to Philadelphia at Roosevell a request . found him in his hotel room reading flu- "History of Josephus." My Brother, T.Roosevelt, Mrs. Robinson, 1%. Ch. VI.] ROOSEVELT VICE-PRESIDENT 136 count of his course during the Spanish-American War and the governorship of New York was one of the most popular men in the country especially in the West, of the inhabitants of which he was fond. He could not ignore the manifestation in his favor and was forced to bow to the will of the people thus expressed. McKinley also arrived at the same opinion by the Tuesday and thus telephoned: "The President's close friends must not undertake to commit the Administration to any candi- date. It has no candidate. The convention must make the nomination ; the Administration would not if it could. The President's close friends should be satisfied with his unanimous nomination and not interfere with the vice- presidential nomination. The Administration wants the choice of the convention and the President's friends must not dictate to the convention." 1 As soon as Hanna knew of the President's wishes, he abandoned his oppo- sition and favored unanimity. This was effected on Thursday, June 21 ; Roosevelt received on the ballot taken the vote of every delegate except his own. 2 The Democratic Convention was held in Kansas City on July 4. Bryan had made so gallant a fight four years previously that no one else was talked of for presidential candidate. He had the nomination for the asking and he purposed dictating the policy of his party. His article in the North American Review for June showed what was passing in his mind. "The issue presented in the campaign of 1900," he wrote, "is the issue between plutoc- 1 Olcott, ii. 279. 2 Besides the Life of McKinley and Roosevelt's Autobiography I have used freely the Life of Hanna by Croly, and the Official Proceedings. I have also consulted The Nation, passim; the Life of Foraker, ii. ; Piatt's Autobiography, chap. xix. 136 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 racy and democracy. All the questions under discussion will, in their last analysis, disclose the conflict between the dollar and the man." Later on he came to details. " To-day," he wrote, " three questions contest for primacy — the money question, the trust question and imperial- ism." l In placing the money question to the fore, Bryan displayed greater consistency than wisdom, but as he had made the contest of 1896 on the remonetization of silver on the basis of 16 : 1, he was determined that the question should not now be ignored. He dominated the committee on resolutions and the Convention in Kan- sas City. They therefore demanded the "free and un- limited coinage of silver ... at the present legal ratio of 16 : 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation"; but in an earlier resolution they declared that "the burning issue of imperialism" was the paramount one of the campaign. On the first ballot Bryan was unanimously nominated for President and at Indianapolis on August 8 accepted the nomination in what he regarded "as one of the most if not the most important of his political speeches." The speech in the authorized volume "revised and arranged by himself" is entitled "Imperialism" and is mainly devoted to the Republican management of the Philip- pines. The Philippine Islands were acquired as the result of the Treaty with Spain and it was a well-known fact that the Treaty could not have beeD ratified without Demo- cratic votes. This is tersely Btated by Senator Hoar in his Autobiography. "Seventeen of the followers of Mr. 1 Pp. 753, 758. Ch. VI. 1 WILLIAM J. BRYAN 137 Bryan voted for the Treaty. 1 The Treaty would have been defeated, not only lacking the needful two-thirds but by a majority of the Senate but for the votes of Dem- ocrats and Populists. Mr. Bryan in the height of the contest came to Washington for the express purpose of urging upon his followers that it was best to support the Treaty, end the war, and let the question of what should be done with our conquest be settled in the coming cam- paign." 2 In his speech on "Imperialism," Bryan ac- knowledged the truth of this statement, defended his position in a careful argument, and then addressed him- self to the question, What should we do with the Philip- pines ? He and the Democratic party say, treat the Fili- pinos as we have promised to treat the Cubans. Why ought not the Filipinos "of right to be free and indepen- dent" as well as the Cubans? Admiral Dewey reported that the Filipinos were more capable of self-government than the Cubans, and Bryan stated plainly his purpose. "If elected," he said, "I will convene Congress in ex- traordinary session as soon as inaugurated and recommend an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose, first, to establish a stable form of government in the Philippine Islands, just as we are now establishing a stable form of government in Cuba; second, to give independence to the Filipinos as we have promised to give independence to the Cubans ; third, to protect the Filipinos from out- side interference while they work out their destiny just as we have protected the republics of Central and South America, and are, by the Monroe Doctrine pledged to 1 Ten of these were Democrats. *ii. 322. This has been briefly stated in chap. v. 138 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 protect Cuba." * Bryan enforced his argument by a poetical citation : " Would we tread in the paths of tyranny, Nor reckon the tyrant's cost? Who taketh another's liberty His freedom is also lost. Would we win as the strong have ever won, Make ready to pay the debt, For the God who reigned over Babylon Is the God who is reigning yet." 2 The important printed contributions to the campaign are this speech of Bryan's and McKinley's letter of ac- ceptance of September 8 ; of this two-thirds are devoted to the Philippines and a defence of his management. The letter is in effect a reply to the speech and on the whole may be deemed an effective answer. The majority of voters probably thought so, although the quotable por- tions of McKinley's speech of July 12 may have had the greater influence. We have fulfilled the pledges we made in 1890, he declared, "We have prosperity at home and prestige abroad," yet by the action of the Democratic party, "the menace of 1G : 1 still hangs over us. The Philippines are ours and American authority must be supreme throughout the archipelago. . . . There must be no scuttle policy." "No blow has boon struck except for liberty and humanity and none will be." The Republi- can party "broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves" and now it has liberated 10. (Hid. 000 "from the yoke of imperial- ism." 3 Kipling's words fepresenl McKinley's action : 1 Speeches, ii. 16. 5 In ft oourteou letter to D, M. Matteaon, Willi ■mi .1. Bryan says the citation we from a poem written : \. I dgerton. Official Proceedings, pp. 1 18, 1 19, 160. Ch. VI.] THE CONTEST OF 1900 139 "Take up the White Man's burden . . . By open speech and simple An hundred times made plain, To seek another's profit, And work another's gain." The decisive jury was the thirteen and a half million voters. The logical result of Democratic policy was to turn over the Philippines to Aguinaldo and his associates, and there were many who thought as did Senator Lodge, the permanent chairman of the Republican convention, that Aguinaldo was "a self-seeking adventurer and usurper." While the bloody suppression of the Philip- pine rebellion militated against Republican success, there seemed no other way out. Even if we had an undesir- able acquisition, it was ours and our authority must be preserved. McKinley and Hay, who took an eager though imper- sonal l view of the contest, were solicitous that Hanna should continue as chairman of the Republican National Committee and, when he decided to do so, the President wrote to him: "I am delighted that you have accepted the chairmanship of the National Committee. It is a great task and will be to you a great sacrifice." 2 As we see it now, the election of McKinley appeared a foregone conclusion, but during the canvass there was anxiety among the knowing ones. On September 25 Hay wrote to Henry Adams : "Hanna has been crying wolf all sum- mer, and he has been much derided for his fears, but now everybody shares them. Bryan comes out a frank an- archist again in his letter of acceptance ; and Mitchell 1 See letter to Samuel Mather, Life by Thayer, ii. 254. 2 Croly, 319. 140 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 with his coal strike has thrown at least a hundred thou- sand votes to him." • The anthracite coal strike dis- turbed Hanna and he used his influence with the coal operators to get it settled before election. 2 Hanna was unquestionably the chief man on the Re- publican side. All of his executive ability and his knack at raising money were exercised in behalf of his candi- date and party. So far, it was 1S96 over again, but he had learned to make effective speeches on the stump and, as he was much in demand from the several committees, he appeared before many audiences throughout the coun- try. The burden of his talk was that Republican suc- cess and administration had given prosperity to the man- ufacturer, merchant and financier, and the full dinner pail to the laborer. His more effective work was through his personality. Westerners beyond Ohio had the idea that he was a "bloated millionaire," ami when they came to see a man of easy bearing, of democratic ways, placing himself on a par with the common man and hear his rough speech adapted to their easy comprehension, they were converted to the Hanna cult. "This trip," wrote Croly with singular penetration, "helped to make Mr. Hanna personally popular throughout the West, just as his first stumping tour in Ohio had made him personally popular in his own State. As soon as he became known, the vir- ulence and malignity with which he had been abused reacted in his fa\r a famine" was a common expression ami the hard years were followed by the "Ben- ner boom" of 1S79 when prices wait beyond all reason. This, with less violent fluctuations after 1SS1, was the history of the iron trade bo the panic of 1803. Requiring large capital and managing ability, the Dumber of steel 1 Life of Hanna, 341. Ch. VI.] MORGAN — CARNEGIE 145 mills was not large, but the feeling among them was not harmonious unless the common dislike of all the others for Andrew Carnegie and his methods might draw them together in sympathy. Between 1893 and 1900 a pro- cess of consolidation had been going on so that a large part of the steel business of the country had become cen- tred in seven concerns outside of the Carnegie Steel Company. The consolidation was effected by promoters and " water" was a component part of all of the common and preferred stocks which made up the capitalization. The rebound from the panic of 1893 made easy the flotation of these securities and in some of the concerns Morgan had an interest. The question arose after the election outcome of 1900, Could not these seven be united into one concern? and with one accord it seemed to be agreed that Morgan was the man to finance the enter- prise. Attracted to it, he went to work and soon had under way the combination of the seven, which would have been a huge concern with the Carnegie Steel Com- pany its chief opponent. 1 Andrew Carnegie came from Scotland to America as a poor boy and got a job in a cotton mill in Allegheny City at the wage of $1.20 per week. He told of his ex- perience : "For a lad of twelve to rise and breakfast every morning, except the blessed Sunday morning, and go into the streets and find his way to the factory and begin to work while it was still dark outside and not be released un- til after darkness came again in the evening, forty minutes 1 A convenient list of these seven plus the Carnegie Steel Co., the Ameri- can Bridge Co., and the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines is given by Cotter, 22. See likewise Berglund, 102. "The American Bridge Co., and the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines entered the Steel Cor- poration soon after its organization." 146 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 only being allowed at noon, was a terrible task." l At fourteen he became a messenger boy in a telegraph office, attracted the attention of Thomas A. Scott who asked him to be his "clerk and operator." Scott took a fancy to Carnegie and suggested investments, so that he de- veloped into what his boy friends termed a " capitalist." When Scott became Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Carnegie became superintendent of the Pitts- burg division and remained for a number of years in the service of this great company. Prospering in his invest- ments he organized the Keystone Bridge Works, which was among the first, if not the first, to construct success- ful iron bridges. 2 Thus, becoming a business man, work- ing on his own account, he resigned his position on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and devoted his attention first to the making of pig iron and then by a natural develop- ment to the manufacture of steel. Financial vicissitudes, differences with partners, manufacturing difficulties had to be overcome, but in 1900 he was the greatest steel- maker in the world and could produce steel rails cheaper than anywhere else on earth. His history has been told in an unsympathetic yet truthful way by J. H. Bridge, who had been private secretary of Herbert Spencer and literary assistant to Carnegie bimi elf ; ye1 from a careful reading of this book one cannot be otherwise than con- vinced that, in this day of material progress, Carnegie was a great man. Carnegie's faults were those of many self-made men and lay on the surface, lie was egotistical and con- 1 The Gospel <>f Wealth, \. "The hours hung heavily upon me and in the work itsatf I took bo pleasure." Carnegie's Autobiography, 34. 1 See Carnegi' '^ Autobiography, L15, L22 Ch. VI.] ANDREW CARNEGIE 147 ceited and had an opinion dogmatically expressed on many subjects on which confessed ignorance would have been better. Apparently without reverence for those who had made study the pursuit of a lifetime, he took issue with Greek scholars on the desirability of a study of Greek; and there was scarcely a subject in English or American politics as to which he had not a positive opinion. Dispensing a generous hospitality from his Scotch retreat of Skibo Castle he was much run after for contributions to all sort of enterprises. This phase of his life is well represented in a contemporary cartoon. 1 Was it not humiliating, said an observer, "to see people in a London drawing-room cringing before him in order to get a cheque?" But it was no better in the United States, where he was besieged by all sorts of men for money contributions to their favorite enterprises. "With sincerity," said Confucius, "unite a desire for self-culture." Carnegie was sincere. "The man who dies rich, dies disgraced," he wrote in 1899. 2 He was not then rolling in superabundant wealth, but when he pos- sessed it after the event I am about to relate he carried out his dictum of years before. That he had a desire for self-culture is evident from his reading of books which he displayed in his writings and from his benefactions. When he was a working-boy in Pittsburg he had con- stant recourse to a free library, and he told of his "in- tense longing" for a new book. "I resolved," he wrote, "that if ever wealth came to me, it should be used to establish free libraries." 3 The Anglo-Saxon world knows how well this resolution was carried out. 1 Cleveland Plain Dealer; Cosmopolitan Mao., Sept. 1901. 2 The Gospel of Wealth, 19. ■ Ibid., 28. 148 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 Such was Andrew Carnegie, the poor boy, the great manufacturer of steel and after 1901 the possessor of two hundred and fifty millions. Of course he was helped by the high tariff and he took advantage of all the condi- tions in the country that he had made his own. Men may poke fun at him because he wrote, "I sym- pathize with the rich man's boy and congratulate the poor man's boy," for most of the "immortals" have been born to "the precious heritage of poverty," 1 but it was the sincere observation of a poor boy, who during his life had amassed millions. We now return to the organization of the United States Steel Corporation in which were displayed some of Mor- gan's best and doubtful qualities. He was keen enough to see that the Carnegie Steel Company must be in the combination and while Carnegie was desirous of selling, the Scotchman was determined to get a good price. His policy of threat was effectually used. According to Bridge, he wrought through a "press agent" and by newspaper interviews. It was given out that owing to a dis- agreement with the Pennsylvania Railroad he would give all possible business to the railroad running from Pittsburg to Conneaut, the Lake Erie terminus, and would also take advantage of the cheap water transporta- tion. Striking thus directly at the Pennsylvania Pail- road, he also threatened to build at Conneaut the largest 1 The Gospel of Wealth, xii. In his Autobiography, 31, Carnegie gave n charming picture <>f the life of hie family after they had left Scotland and settled In Allegheny City and then trrote: "The children of honest poverty have the most precious <>f all advantages over those of wealth. The mother, nurse, rook, governess, teacher, saint, all in one; the father, l>lar, guide, OOUnaellor and friend! Thus were inv brother and 1 brought up. What has the child of millionaire or nobleinau that counts compared to auch a heritage?" Ch. VI. J ANDREW CARNEGIE 149 and best equipped tube works in the country, giving a direct blow to Morgan who was largely interested in the National Tube Company, one of the combining concerns. It was likewise well known that the Carnegie Steel Com- pany could make steel cheaper than any other company in the world. Carnegie had his price which Morgan, with apparently little hesitation, paid. It was said at the time that the canny Scotchman had outwitted the New Eng- land Yankee. Thus the so-called "billion dollar trust" was launched. It consisted of 550 million common stock, 550 million preferred, and 304 million * 5 per cent bonds ; all of the bonds went to the Carnegie Steel Company of which Andrew Carnegie got the lion's share. The Carnegie Steel Company also received $98,277,120 in preferred stock and $90,279,040 in common stock at par. Reckoning the bonds of $303,450,000 worth one hundred cents on the dollar, the preferred stock at 82 and the common stock at 38, the Carnegie Steel Company re- ceived $418,343,273 for their property. It was no won- der then that Andrew Carnegie was counted worth $250,- 000,000. The other combining companies 2 took stock. Of the 1,100,000,000 stock all of the common and some of the preferred was " water" ; but as there was an abundance of "water" in the combining companies, the increase of stock and the increase of "water" do not seem to have been objected to. For their services the Morgan syndi- cate received 649,897 shares of the common stock of the 1 Probably $303,450,000. There were also about 5G million of bonds owned by the combining companies which the U. S. Steel Corporation assumed. Berglund, 71. 2 See again Cotter, 22 ; Berglund, 102. 150 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 United States Steel Corporation and an equal number of the preferred. At $38 a share for the common and $82 a share for the preferred, this amounted to $77,987,640. This was all effected on a cash capital of 25 millions, which the syndicate received back, plus 200 per cent in dividends. 1 Although J. P. Morgan himself never speculated in the way of buying or selling stocks on a margin, he comprehended the stock market well and engaged a celebrated manipulator to market the shares, which were put upon the market as paying div- idends of four per cent on the common and seven per cent on the preferred. Starting on the curb at 38 for "steel common" and 82| for " steel preferred," these stocks were soon admitted on the Stock Exchange and within a month advanced to 55 and 101£ respectively, although perhaps considerable of this advance was due merely to "matching of orders." 2 It was popularly supposed that the United States Steel Corporation possessed about two-thirds of the Lake Su- perior iron ore and Connellsvillo coal of the country, al- though the actual figures of production do not substan- tiate the popular belief. In the four years, 1902-1905 inclusive, the United States Steel Corporation shipped 56 per cent of the Lake Superior ore, produced 36 per cent of the Connellsville coke, 70 per cent of Bessemer steel ingots, 60 per cent of Bessemer Bteel rails and 51 per cent of open hearth Bteel Ingots and castings. There was naturally some efficiency in operation by bringing so many plants under our bead and management, and there was 1 American Finance, Noyce, 300; Life of Morgan, Hovcy, 216. • Noyce, 800. Ch. VI.] THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION 151 a praiseworthy effort to get workingmen, superintend- ents and other employes interested in the Company by selling them shares at lucrative rates. The United States Steel Corporation constantly stabilized prices. After its formation there was no violent enhancement of values during a time of "boom," no "runaway market" in steel. On the other hand, during times of depression, prices never went below what would give a fair profit. The distribution of interests by Jupiter does not work in our common world and did not under Morgan. In short, the United States Steel Corporation was too big for effective work. As Morgan discovered, it is exceed- ingly difficult to find a man of sufficient ability and char- acter to head so large a concern. His first efforts were failures and while the present x "chief executive officer," Judge Elbert H. Gary, is a decided success, it is doubtful whether his successor will possess his eminent qualities. But at no time has the United States Steel Corporation made steel absolutely or comparatively as cheap as did the Carnegie Steel Company just before the combination was made. Carnegie said that "his partners knew noth- ing about making stocks and bonds but only the mak- ing of steel." 2 The difference lies in the combination of companies and the adjustment of interests with a sharp- ened pencil on a writing pad in a Wall Street office and presence at the works among the men where steel is turned out. Charles M. Schwab, the first President of the United States Steel Corporation, in New York 1 1920. 2 Trusts of To-Day, Montague, 37. "America is soon to change from being the dearest steel manufacturing country to the cheapest." — Written before the sale to J. P. Morgan. Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie, 227. 152 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 City and Europe, was a different Schwab from him who, in the grime and dirt of Pittsburg, administered the affairs of the Carnegie Steel Company. "Schwab had graduated at Braddock under Captain Jones and, displaying exceptional ability as a manager of men, had quickly won his way from one of the lowest posi- tions in the yards to the highest in the office. His cheery friendliness made him especially popular among the workmen." • Anyone who knew personally William R. Jones, or as he was familiarly called, Captain Bill Jones, and what he stood for, may well join in this tribute which Bridge paid him: "Greater than all of Jones's inventions was his progressive policy. . . . The young men whom he trained ably seconded him. . . . The famous scrap heap for outgrown, not outworn, machinery was instituted by Jones, who never hesi- tated to throw away a tool that had cost half a mil- lion if a better one became available. And as his own inventions saved the company a fortune every year, he was given a free hand. Under this greatest of all the captains of the American steel industry [Jones] a group of younger men grew up, trained in his broad views and habituated to his progressive methods ; so that when in 1889 he was killed in a horribly tragic way by the ex- plosion of one of his furnaces, there were men ready trained to take up his work and continue it." - Carnegie said that he owed his success to Jones and to Schwab ; ■ and 1 Bridge, 246. Schwab wrote, July 24, 1919, on hu photograph which is reproduced in Carnegie'a Autobiography op|x>site '_'."><>: "To my dear- eat friend and ' Master ' with the sincere love of ' Hi- Boy. ,M : Bridge, 105. 1 Cotter, 89. "Jones," so wrote Amlnw Carnegie in his Autobiogra- phy, "bore trace* of his Welsh descent. . . . He came to us a two-dollar- Ch. VI. 1 ANDREW CARNEGIE 153 he once suggested for his epitaph, "Here lies the man who knew how to get around him men who were cleverer than himself." x He said, "The nation that makes the cheapest steel has the other nations at its feet." 2 Hen- drick also affirmed that Carnegie did not like "this Wall Street coterie." 3 What a pity that, with his desire to get out of business, such inducements were offered that he must perforce go in with them ! For the United States Steel Corporation has never been the asset for the coun- try that the Carnegie Steel Company was or might have been. Carnegie in the United States was greater than Krupp in Germany. The one made the implements of peace ; the other was skilful in the production of neces- saries of war. Carnegie had a fit successor in Henry Clay Frick to carry on his work while he might have de- voted himself to his noble benefactions. Unfortunately however, the two had quarrelled. While the Carnegie foibles are apparent, he was ahead of his age in his devotion to "gentle Peace." How much he thought of it, why the world ought to have it, why a-day mechanic from the neighboring works at Johnstown. . . . He had volunteered as a private during The Civil War and carried himself so finely that he became captain of a company which was never known to flinch. Much of the success of the Edgar Thomson Works belongs to this man." In later years, Carnegie offered him an interest which would have made him a millionaire without entailing any financial responsi- bility. This Jones declined saying, "No, I don't want to have my thoughts running on business. I have enough trouble looking after these works. Just give me a big salary if you think I am worth it." "All right, Captain, the salary of the President of the United States is yours." " That's the talk," rejoined Jones. P. 203. "Captain Jones described me as having been born with two rows of teeth and holes punched for more, so insatiable was my appetite for new works and increased production." — Ibid., 112. 1 The Age of Big Business, B. J. Hendrick, 68. 2 The Age of Big Business, Hendrick, 60. * P. 81. 154 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 war was the worst of evils, are amply testified to in his writings, private letters, expressed desires and by his benefactions. No wonder then that the great war of 1914 broke his heart. 1 Different from Carnegie, J. P. Morgan had inherited wealth and a good education ; he possessed the confidence of the investing public. It was thought in 1901 and 1902 that he could accomplish anything. Ex-Mayor Grace's experience was that of many. One morning he received a brief letter by post saying that he had been awarded a hundred thousand dollar share in the Underwriting syndicate of the United States Steel Corporation. Hav- ing had no conversation with Morgan on the subject, knowing only by hearsay of the organization of the "bil- lion dollar" trust, he sent his cheque for what was asked for, being $8000, from his entire confidence in the banker. Although liable up to the amount of 8100,000 he never got a further call for more but in due time received back the money he had sent and his share of the enormous profits of the Underwriting. "I never made money as easy as that," he said. 2 The organization of the "billion dollar steel trust," as the Steel Corporation was called, the impetus of McKinley's second election, the rebound from the panic of 1893, the war of 1898 and the stock depression of 1899 turned men's heads in 1901. Stocks went up, money was easily made, thoughts ran in hundred millions, men and women were extravagant, champagne corks popped, the assertion was made thai the day of panics had passed 1 Prefun- to Carnegie'i Autobiography by Mrs. Carnegie, v. 1 Life uf Murgiwi, llovey, 216. Ch. VI.] THE STOCK PANIC OF 1901 155 and all went as merry as a marriage bell. "The out- burst of speculation during April 1901," wrote Noyes, "was something rarely paralleled in the history of specu- lative manias." Men who were made millionaires by their sales of United States Steel Corporation shares be- came speculators in Wall Street. "The 'outside public' meantime seemed to lose all restraint. A stream of ex- cited customers of every description brought their money to New York and spent their days in offices near the Stock Exchange. . . . The newspapers were full of stories of hotel waiters, clerks in business offices, even doorkeepers and dressmakers, who had won considerable fortunes in their speculations." 1 Happily this booming condition was for a time brought to an end by a quarrel between Edward H. Harriman on one side and Morgan and James J. Hill on the other. Both parties desired control of the Northern Pacific Railroad and began bidding against one another for its possession. The stock ran up from 160 to 1000 but "all other stocks broke violently" and a good part of Wall Street was for two hours on that day of May 9, 1901, "technically insolvent." 2 Those who term this a real panic and are fond of historical parallels may refer to 1881 and point to the facts that the Indian corn crop in 1901 was with two exceptions 3 the smallest in twenty years and that a President was also assassi- nated. The strife for the Northern Pacific was a battle of financial giants but all this turmoil would have been avoided had they composed their differences before in- stead of after this Wall Street shock. 1 Noyes, 301. (1900 the crop was 2,105,000,000 2 Noyes, 306. 3 1881, 1894. In 1901 the crop was 1,522,000.000 [1902 the crop was 2,523,000,000 166 McKIXLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 Elated with his success in the Steel combination Morgan attempted a similar enterprise in connection with trans- port across the Atlantic Ocean. He got hold of the Do- minion Line, the American and Red Star, the Atlantic Transport Company, the White Star Line and the Leyland, paying for the ships more than they were worth. The chairman of the Leyland Company told the share- holders that Morgan's offer was so high "that no man- agement had a right to refuse it." l Morgan attempted to get hold of the German lines and the Cunard Company but these for similar reasons would not sell their ships. As I have previously written, the whole amount of cash in the flotation of the United States Steel Corpora- tion was twenty-five millions ; the rest was faith in Mor- gan. It may be readily conceded that he alone in the country could effect such an organization but, was it worth while to abuse that faith and put upon the market at a supposedly valuable price more than 550 millions of "water"? True, Morgan's friends argued that the cap- italization was based upon earnings and not upon the value of the property; but what consolation was that to "widows and orphans" who had invested in Steel Com- mon at from 38 to 55 because it paid four per cent, when the Corporation suspended dividends on the Common and the stock went below 10 as it did in 1903? The de- cline in the market was from loi fur the Preferred down to 49, and from .v> for the Common I i 10. No wonder thai Morgan was ed coming as it did with the utter failure of his ship combine. Morgan has "fallen down" in his steamship combination, was a usual remark. This depression in 1903 was called " the rich men's 1 Noyea, 303. Ch. VI.] JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 157 panic." After what is known as the Northern Pacific Railroad corner, speculation again grew rampant as the "bumper wheat crop" in 1901 made up for the shortage of corn, but early in 1903 it became apparent that the old rules of business and finance remained in force and the "little panic" between two economic crises occurred. As Morgan said in a newspaper interview it was a case of "undigested securities." l The Boston Herald of January 10, 1920, commented on "The Greatest Epic in the History of Big Business" by which it meant the Standard Oil Company, that is typi- fied by John D. Rockefeller. In the constituent com- panies which made up the United States Steel Corpora- tion one finds the "Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines," which is put down as the "Rockefeller interests" and which was necessary to the Corporation as owning a large quantity of Lake Superior iron ore. Lake Su- perior ore had become the basis of the steel industry from its quantity and, while the Bessemer process ruled, from so much of it being low in phosphorus. Ores high in phosphorus were inadmissible as that element was at enmity with steel. The "Rockefeller interests" were not absorbed until after the Carnegie Steel Company. The transaction is simply related by Rockefeller. "After some negotiation," he wrote, "Morgan made an offer which we accepted whereby the whole plant — mines, ships, railways, etc. — should become a part of the United 1 Noyes, 308. Besides works already referred to, I have used in this account, Trusts of To-Day, G. H. Montague ; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 1900, 1901; The Nation, 1900," 1901; Articles of deed, Mac- chen, Ely, Cosmopolitan Mag., 1901 ; article of R. S. Baker, McClure's Mag., Nov. 1901; Peck; Life of Hill, Pyle, ii. 158 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 States Steel Corporation. The price paid was, we felt, very moderate considering the present and prospective value of the property." 1 John D. Rockefeller was one of the directors of the huge corporation and he is comprehensible to us from a study of Napoleon I and from a remark made by Her- bert Spencer in 1882 when he was considered a great phi- losopher, "Practically business has been substituted for war as the purpose of existence." 2 From a bookkeeper Rockefeller had become a partner in a small commission house on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, when the dis- covery of petroleum in Western Pennsylvania started many men in Cleveland, bent on making their fortunes, in that direction. Nothing like the excitement had been known since the discovery of gold in California. 3 Sam- uel Andrews had invented an easy and cheap process of cleansing the crude oil with sulphuric acid and oil refin- eries went up in Cleveland as if by magic. Rockefeller, like Cassius, was not fat and thought much and he made up his mind that for him success lay in oil ; he embarked on its manufacture, made a copartnership with Andrews and H. M. Flagler and the three went into the business as did many others. For a while the demand for "the light of the world" could not be supplied but eventually the supply became greater than the demand and Cleve- land manufacturers wen* confronted with the fact that the refining of oil in Cleveland for the whole trade of the 1 Random Reminiscences, 131. 1 After-dinner speech in New York, Nov. 0. lssiv Kssays, iii. 484. 'An fi 1 1 i 1 1 iri 1 1 -c 1 account of the discovery of oil and the excitement en- suiriK \M given by Oberholtier in his History of the United States, i. 250 el stq. Ch. VI.] THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 159 world was a geographical absurdity, as the bulk of the trade lay east of the oil regions. The Cleveland re- finers were engaged in a cutthroat policy ; they bid against one another in the purchase of the crude oil from Pennsylvania, and in the other direction were intense competitors for the sale of the refined. In 1870 the Stand- ard Oil Company was formed with Rockefeller as the directing agent, who conceived the idea of uniting all under one head by the purchase of all of the Cleveland refineries. This he did, paying a fair price and giving the owners the choice of Standard stock or cash for their works. Those who took cash thought that they were getting a bargain ; those who took stock became rich. Rockefeller had difficulty in raising money to meet his desires as the financial " bigwigs" of Cleveland, with two exceptions, were opposed to his scheme and thought that he was taking too many and too great chances. At this time he would have preferred to pay for the refineries that he was buying in stock rather than in money, as the one commodity was more plenty than the other. "We invariably," he wrote, "offered those who wanted to sell the option of taking cash or stock in the company. We very much preferred to have them take the stock because a dollar in those days looked as large as a cart-wheel, but as a matter of business policy we found it desirable to offer them the option and, in most cases, they were even precipitate in their choice of the cash. They knew what a dollar would buy but they were very skeptical in regard to the possibilities of resurrecting the oil business and giving any permanent value to these shares." l The tale 1 Random Reminiscences, 95. 160 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 of Rockefeller's financial anxieties seems strange to the younger generation which associates him with unlimited amounts of money, but those whose memory goes back to the time know how true is his account and that he does not exaggerate in any way his difficulties. "We had our troubles and setbacks," he wrote, "we suffered from severe fires; and the supply of crude oil was most un- certain. ... At best it was a speculative trade and I wonder that we managed to pull through so often." 1 The Standard Oil Company was thus launched. 2 If Rockefeller did not say it, he thought that, "The coal oil business belongs to us." 3 Keeping in mind the simi- larity and the difference between war and trade how like Napoleon's expression in 1811, "Three years more and I am lord of the universe!" 4 With great method and untiring zeal Rockefeller wrought for the control of the manufacture and business of refined oil. He acted in accordance with the conditions of his time. After the panic of 1873 railroad business became poor and the rail- roads were "cutting one another's throats" for whatever business was in sight. Rockefeller took in the situation and, by his control of a large amount of desirable freight, compelled rebates not only on his own shipments but on those of his competitors. William H. Vanderbilt, who succeeded his father in the control of the New York Central and Lake Shore Railways, important lines of communication for the oil 1 Random Eli miniacencea I 2 I do Qol digres into a history of the South Improvement Company, believing thai it died in embryo. Bee Wealth against Commonwealth, llcurv I). Lloyd, 59. 3 Bistory <>f the Standard Oil Company, Tarbell, ii. 34. * Slotinc's Napoleon, ii. -35. Ch. VI.] VANDERBILT— ROCKEFELLER 161 business, was then supposed to be the richest man in the country, worth $200,000,000. Only one man in the world, the Duke of Westminster, had an equal amount, but his return from this capital was not as great as Van- derbilt's. His appreciation of the ability shown in the management of this enterprise is therefore important. Vanderbilt testified in 1879: "These men [the Standard Oil Company managers] are smarter than I am a great deal. They are very enterprising and smart men. I never came in contact with any class of men so smart and able as they are in their business." l Rockefeller's handling of the railroads placed him in a commanding position. Herbert Spencer said in the speech already quoted, "I hear that a great trader among you deliberately endeavored to crush out everyone whose business competed with his own." 2 This was unques- tionably Rockefeller's method but he was absolutely fair to all of his stockholders and gentle to competing refineries who would work with him on his own terms, which in every case turned out advantageously for those manufacturers. The crude oil producers looked upon him "with superstitious awe," so Miss Tarbell wrote. "Their notion of him was very like that which the English common people had for Napoleon in the first part of the nineteenth century ... a dread power, cruel, omniscient, always ready to spring." 3 He undoubtedly squeezed the crude oil producers as he did recalcitrant partners of friends whom he started in outside operations. It was owing to these tactics that the man who from nothing 1 Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, ii. 252. * Essays, hi. 4S4. * Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, ii. 63. 162 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 had made a billion, had to be guarded by detectives. He could have no such funeral as Peter Cooper had, of which a journalist at the time said Jay Gould, a rich man of the day, with all of his money, could not buy such a funeral. Rockefeller accepted the conditions of the game and played it accordingly. The management of the Standard was one of efficiency in every direction. "It seemed absolutely necessary," Rockefeller wrote, "to extend the market for oil by exporting to foreign countries which required a long and most difficult development." x This was in exact keeping with the ideas of the day and ex- pressed a thought in many minds. Rockefeller put the idea in active operation, and, while making money for the Standard made it an important factor in the country's foreign trade. 2 When the "spellbinders" declaimed that the tariff was the mother of all trusts, the Standard Oil Company must be excepted, as its operations were not dependent on the tariff legislation of Congress. In line with efficiency, every bit of waste was carefully looked after. His scientific men were encouraged in the development of by-products which were sold cheaply, brought comfort to many households and swelled the foreign exports. Rockefeller himself was a remarkable judge of men and gathered around him a number of able lieutenants who wrought loyally under his direction. While he himself was a puritan in life he never made his personal system of morality a guide in the choice of those 1 Random Reminiscences, 82 • Exports fiscal yean 1870-71 to lsw i,()7.-.,30f Man," u ■ Mag., Dec, 1910, 251. ■ Report, House Docs., 57th Cong. 1st Seas., 39. Ch. VII.] CUBA 179 experimental test in the course of the investigation, and who died of the disease, should be written in the list of the martyrs who have died in the cause of humanity." * A census was taken showing a population of 1,572,797, of whom 34 per cent were able to read and write, while 66 per cent were illiterate. The desire and need of popu- lar education were great and both private and public efforts were made in this direction. The wise President of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot, was to the fore, raised a fund for the purpose and invited a number of Cuban teachers to the summer school in Cambridge where they could learn from masters of the art how to instruct others eager for education but ignorant of the way to get it. These teachers, 1281 in number, spent the summer in attending the school and in a study of neighboring institutions of art and practical manufacture, and, before they went home, were given a free visit to New York City and Washington. 2 All the while, progress was making toward the training of the people of Cuba for self-government. A basis of suffrage was agreed upon 3 and on June 16, 1900, munici- pal officers throughout the entire island were elected. As soon as the new municipal governments were fairly in- stalled, a call for a constitutional convention was made, and thirty-one delegates to it were orderly chosen. The convention met in Havana on November 5, 1900, and was opened by General Wood. But before Cuba could be let go, the relations between the island and the United States must be defined. This was done in the Piatt 1 Report of Dec. 1, 1902. House Docs. 57, Cong. 2d Sess., 10. 1 Military and Colonial Policy, Root, 198. ' For restrictions on universal suffrage, ibid., 194. 180 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill which be- came a law on March 2, 1901. The author of this was Orville H. Piatt of Connecticut who is fitly described by his biographer, Louis A. Coolidge, as "an old-fashioned senator," and the biography is said to be "the story of a life unselfishly devoted to the public service." He feared that he could not pass the measure independently through the Senate at the short session and so had recourse to a rider to an appropriation bill. The Piatt Amendment provided that : I. The independence of Cuba should not in any way be impaired by any compact with a foreign power. II. A proper limitation was made as to the amount of any public debt that Cuba should contract. III. Cuba consented to the intervention of the United States "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty and for discharg- ing the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States." IV. The acts of the United States during the military occupancy should be validated. V. Cuba would maintain "and as far as necessary" extend the work of sanitation. VI. The Isle of Pines should bo omitted "from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba." VII. Cuba was to furnish tin- United States "lands necessary for coaling or naval stations." l Article III caused the greatest amount of opposition in the Cuban constitutional convention and this was 1 See America u.s i World Power, ImfiuoA, iiuris American Nation Scries, 189. Ch. VII.] THE PLATT AMENDMENT 181 finally quieted by a statement of Senator Piatt and an official communication to a committee of the convention by the Secretary of War. 1 Then the provisions of the Piatt Amendment were appended to the Cuban Constitution. Like many important documents the authorship of these wise provisions has been in dispute. The editors of the series of the Root publications have maintained that it was drafted by Secretary Root and this claim was made indeed during the lifetime of Senator Piatt. The true genesis of the Piatt Amendment, however, is truth- fully and effectively told by Senator Piatt in a private letter of January 1, 1904: "The original draft was my own. ... It was changed from time to time, somewhat in language but not in spirit, in consultation both with Republicans of the Committee, President McKinley and Secretary Root. A final consultation between myself and Senator Spooner put the document in its complete form." 2 Root's titles to greatness were so many that he would be the last man to claim aught that was not fully his own, while Senator Piatt's admiration at an early day for Root was unbounded. He, said the Sena- tor, is discharging the duties of Secretary of War better than any other man could. But he could fill any position in the Cabinet and indeed he might serve as President with capacity and wisdom. "At any rate," wrote the Senator in a private letter, "the United States will always, under the so-called Piatt Amendment, be in a position to straighten out things if they get seriously bad." 3 1 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 344 ; Military and Colonial Policy, Root, 214. 2 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 351, et ante; Military and Colonial Policy, Root, viii. 3 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 349. 182 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 Elections were held in Cuba under the Constitution on the last day of December, 1901, when governors of prov- inces, members of the House of Representatives and presidential and senatorial electors were chosen ; these electors met during the following February and elected a President, Vice-President and senators. The civil govern- ment of Cuba was duly inaugurated and the American troops withdrawn on May 20, 1902. With pardonable pride Elihu Root wrote as Secretary of War in his report of 1902 : "I know of no chapter in American his- tory more satisfactory than that which will record the conduct of the military government of Cuba. The credit for it is due, first of all, to General Leonard Wood." In his order of July 4, 1902, Root said that the officers and enlisted men "have with sincere kindness helped the Cuban people to take all the successive steps necessary to the establishment of their own constitutional government ; . . . they have governed Cuba wisely, regarding justice and respecting individual liberty ; have honestly collected and expended for the best interests of the Cuban people the revenues" of the island. 1 The peace, the health, the independence of Cuba are necessary to the United States. A commercial arrange- ment should bo made with her under which she can live, said Root in his report of November 27, 1901. 2 This meant that in a reciprocal arrangement the duties on her sugar and tobacco should be reduced. This proved to be a long and tedious process owing to the opposition of some Belnshly protected interests, bul the arrangement was finally submitted to both Bouses of Congress. 1 Report oi Deo. i. v.>m. 9, if * P. 53. Ch. VII.] THE TREATY WITH CUBA 183 Through the influence of President Roosevelt and the work of Senator Orville H. Piatt (to mention some of the agencies working to this end) a treaty of reciprocity be- tween Cuba and the United States was ratified late in 1903. During the contest Senator Piatt wrote in a pri- vate letter: "The reduction on Cuban imports will not hurt the sugar or tobacco industry one particle. Neither the sugar trust nor the tobacco trust will derive the slight- est benefit from it. The talk about it has been the great- est exhibition of expansive bosh that I have ever known." l By the Piatt Amendment it was provided that a treaty between the two countries should embody its provisions. This was made. Our course towards Cuba is well summed up by Theodore Roosevelt: "We made the promise to give Cuba independence; and we kept the promise. . . . We also by treaty gave the Cubans sub- stantial advantages in our markets. Then we left the island, turning the government over to its own people." 2 The Philippines is a knotty question. It has been a political issue and the course of the administration has aroused sentimental objection. The literature on the subject is enormous and observers, who have remained long and have written candid accounts, have arrived at opposite conclusions. 3 It is best, therefore, in the maze 1 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 381. 2 Autobiography, 545. In this study of Cuba I have been much helped by Latane"s "America as a World Power." See the Chapter in Life of Piatt on "Cuban Scandals and Allowances." 3 Charles B. Elliott wrote: "Many writers, American and English, who have favored the public with their views on the Philippines . . . sug- 184 McKIXLEY AND THE PHILIPPINES (1898 of contradictions to rely on the man, who, more than any other one, is responsible for our policy — Elihu Root. It will be told later how he came into administrative office. For the moment it suffices to say that he regarded the United States as the greatest of his clients, and that an ambassador of the Russian Czar said that having met most of the public men of Europe, he knew no one who was as able as Elihu Root. Before he called Root to his aid President McKinley had inaugurated the government of the Philippines. His message to Otis, who was the military commander in the islands, stated the mission of the United States but in it he said that we had succeeded to the "sovereignty of Spain" and that our aim was "benevolent assimilation." Now McKinley was entirely sincere and the anti-Impe- rialists, who afterwards played upon those words, failed to comprehend the depth of his religious nature. The overpowering feeling which swayed him was religious and this cannot be better stated than in the private letter to him of Senator Orville II. Piatt of Augusl 15, 1S98. "I feel that I ought to say," he wrote, "that during tin- past week I have been well over the State of Connecticut and I am satisfied that nine-tenths of the people of the State have an Intense feeling that we should insisl upon the cession of all the Philippine Islands. Those who l>c- gest Kipling*! famou I' tl M. P.' who visited India in winter and "f the beat "f [ndis as the Asia solar myth.'" As his entertainer returned homeward be v. rot< : "And lii i drove from the station but tin- mirth died out on my lips As I thought "f the fools like Pagett who write of their Eastern Trips." The Phflippint i to the End of the < Sommi -ion ( tovernmi nt, 376. Ch. VII.] THE PHILIPPINES 185 lieve in Providence see, or think they see, that God has placed upon this government the solemn duty of provid- ing for the people of these islands, a government based upon the principle of liberty, no matter how many diffi- culties the problem may present. They feel that it is our duty to attempt its solution. Among Christian thoughtful people the sentiment is akin to that which has maintained the missionary work of the last century in foreign lands. I assure you that it is difficult to over- estimate the strength and intensity of this sentiment. If, in the negotiations for peace, Spain is permitted to retain any portion of the Philippines it will be regarded as a failure on the part of this nation to discharge the greatest moral obligation which could be conceived." l Connecticut is a small State but it has great influence especially in the Western States through which President McKinley made his "famous Western journey" and had his own opinion confirmed. The attempt of many anti- Imperialists to hint that love of gain was the prime cause of our taking the Philippines is not borne out by the record. The first interference by Congress with the Commis- sion government was by the Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill, which was approved on March 2, 1901 ; this was decidedly opposed to any attempt to exploit the islands. 2 The Philippine Commission, in their report to the Secretary of War of November 1, 1902, spoke of "the burdensome restrictions upon the investment of x Lifc of Piatt, Coolidge, 287. 2 The Spooner Amendment is printed in Root, Milit. and Colonial Policy, 255. See speech of Senator Lodge on an earlier bill. Speeches and Addresses, 317. 186 NO LAND-GRABBING GAME [1901 capital in lands and mines in these islands. . . . The re- quirements," they continued, "that no corporation shall own more than 2500 acres, stops absolutely the invest- ment of new capital in the sugar industry and in the to- bacco industry. It takes away any hope of bringing prosperity to these islands by the extending of the acreage in the cultivation of these two important products of the archipelago. It very much interferes with the invest- ment of capital in railroad enterprises, because they are naturally connected with the possibilities of transporta- tion of sugar and tobacco from the interior to the sea- ports." 1 In their report of December 23, 1903, they re- turned to the subject and recommended that "the limi- tation ought either to be removed entirely or be increased so as to allow the acquisition of at least 25,000 acres of land." 2 The charge that our acquisition was "a greedy land- grabbing game" may have come from the open plans of promoters of new enterprises. So far as I have been able to discover there were no extravagant profits except those made out of the 70,000 American soldiers by some half dozen "American trading companies," who acquired "quick and large profits" referred to by Civil Governor William II. Taft in his report of November 15, 1903. 3 It was the old story of Pistol, "I shall sutler be Unto the Camp and profits will accrue." * While on this subject the idea may at onCS be dismissed that the United States made any money out of the Phil- ippines. Archibald C. Coolidge, whose authority can- 1 i;. port, 7. ; port, 9. •P. 10, 4 King Henry V.. act ii.. MOM 1. Ch. VII.] THE PHILIPPINES 187 not be gainsaid, wrote in 1908: "American capital has not come in in the way that was expected, partly on account of the legislation passed to protect the natives against exploitation, but more particularly because people have found it safer and more profitable to invest their money nearer home." l It is true that the manipulation of the tariff, although a concession was made to the prod- ucts of the Philippine Islands, was not enlightened pol- icy. Governor Taft desired absolute free trade with the islands but it took a number of years, and then under his own presidency (1909), to effect this consummation. President McKinley was a conscientious Methodist, and he fully believed that in the Philippines the white man's burden was laid upon the United States. As men act from mingled motives, the idea of personal fame doubtless was bound up in his action. He was a student of American history and knew it well for the years that came within his personal remembrance. Every American President since 1865 has emulated the fame of Lincoln, as did McKinley, when in his speech accepting the nomi- nation in 1900, he declared : "The Republican Party . . . broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves and made them free, and to the party of Lincoln has come another supreme opportunity which it has bravely met in the liberation of 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of im- perialism." 2 He likewise believed that the possession of the Philippines would be an assistance to our growing trade in the Orient. No one can write on this subject without devoting a large amount of study to the arguments of the anti- 1 The United States as a World Power, 170. J Life of McKinley, Olcott. ii. 287. This was then stated 188 STOREY — SCHURZ [1901 Imperialists with whose statements, so far as they can be tortured into reasoning that we had no business trying to govern people 7000 miles away, I am in entire sympathy. Moorfield Storey's acute logic and large present intelligence would make one almost feel that Charles Sumner was on earth again interpreting the Constitution and the acts of the President by the truths of the Declara- tion of Independence. His opposition to our work in the Philippines was sincere and was urged by a sacrifice of present ease and earthly honors. For he was of the stuff of which martyrs are made and, in earlier days, would have suffered for his opinions at the stake. Carl Schurz, according to a personal friend, was a revolutionist and thus he showed himself in his opposition to the Philippine policy. His speeches were those of an orator and his well-rounded periods put his position with great force. His argument, which was generally concurred in by the anti-Imperialists that we should treat the Philippines as we had treated Cuba, was well put, attested as it was by the despatch of Admiral Dewey that the Filipinos "are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self- government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." 1 But Schurz's plan in giving self- government to the Philippines was "to make the Philip- pine Islands neutral territory as Belimmi and Suit /.(Miami are in Europe." - Schurz fortunately did not live to Bee the guarantee of Belgium's neutrality treated as a mere "scrap of paper," nor did he become disabused of his profound admiration for the (ierman Emperor, Wilhelm 1 Di patch of Dewey to See. of Navy, June 27, 1808. ■ Speech of Oct 17, L889. Speeches, etc, vi. 1U8. Ch. VII.] THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY 189 II. "Whether the Emperor of Germany did not at one time wish to acquire the Philippines, I do not know," he said. "But if we offered him the Philippines to-day with our compliments, he would doubtless ask, 'How large an army do you have to employ to subjugate the country?' The answer would be, 'At present 60,000 men ; we may need 100,000. ' The Emperor would smil- ingly reply, 'Thank you. Offer this job to someone who is as foolish as you have been.' He would probably be too polite to say so, but he would doubtless think so." x At this time a majority of the best informed people in the United States and England believed that Germany would take these islands if she could get them and apply, if need be, the ruthless methods which the Emperor told his troops to employ in China. "Spare nobody," he said, "make no prisoners, use your weapons in a manner to make every Chinaman for a thousand years to come forego the wish to as much as look askance at a Ger- man." 2 The opposition of Senator George F. Hoar was pathetic. A true Republican, he loved McKinley, who, late in 1898, was committed to taking the Philippines. When he saw the President during December of that year and was taken by the hand with the question, "How are you feel- ing this winter, Mr. Senator?" "Pretty pugnacious, I confess, Mr. President," "The tears came into his eyes and McKinley said, grasping my hand again, 'I shall always love you whatever you do.'" 3 Hoar planted 1 Speech of Sept. 28, 1900, ibid., 248. 2 July 2, 1900. The Kaiser's Speeches, Wolf von Schierbrand, 260 (1903). 3 Autobiography, ii. 315. 190 GEORGE F. HOAR [1899 himself on the Declaration of Independence that "gov- ernments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." He was a true disciple of Charles Sum- ner "to whom," he said, "the Declaration of Independ- ence was another gospel." l We ought to have treated the Philippines as we did Cuba, he affirmed, and had we done so, a government under Aguinaldo and his associates would have been formed as stable as the governments from the United States to Cape Horn. A democracy, he declared, "cannot rule over vassal states as subject people without bringing in the elements of death into its own constitution." 2 This idea was extensively elaborated by Carl Schurz, but it had great force coming from a true American and a loyal Republican like Senator Hoar. In truth there is something admirable in these three men pleading for the rights of ci .lit million brown people as they had hitherto for four million blacks. It is the old story of the superior taking the part of the inferior, and it involves the subjugation of race pride and putting one's self in the place of the brown or black man. McKinley had aspirations after culture and was es- pecially fond of college men. lie decided to send a Com- mission to the Philippines, at whose head should be Jacob G. Schurman, President of Cornell University. During January, 1899, Schurman was summoned to Washington and such an invitation was extended to him. lie de- murred Brs1 because he feared thai he could not Leave the University and then he said, "To be plain, Mr. Pres- ident, I am opposed to your Philippine policy; 1 never 'Speech in the Senate, Jan. '.'. L899; see Senator Lodge's argument en "consent of the governed." Speeches and Ad dr ess e s, 826. ■ Senal oh. Ch. VII.] THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION 191 wanted the Philippine Islands." "Oh," was the reply, "that need not trouble you ; I didn't want the Philippine Islands either; and in the protocol to the treaty I felt myself free not to take them, but in the end there was no alternative." The American people certainly would not consent to leave the Philippines to Spain, the Presi- dent argued, and, as that was no longer a question, if "American sovereignty were not set up, the peace of the world would be endangered." We, so he implied, cer- tainly owed responsibilities to the world at large. The President desired this Commission to act as an advisory Cabinet and he especially wished to know what sort of political relations it was wise to establish between the United States and eight million ! brown men of Asia. He desired aid in shaping such a policy and at the same time a tactful cooperation with the naval and military authorities at Manila. 2 Schurman accepted the Presi- dency of the Commission and McKinley named as his associates Admiral Dewey, General Otis (who was the mil- itary commander in the Philippines), Charles Denby and Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan. When Schurman arrived in Manila he found a war in progress which was an interruption to his peaceful errand. The American and Philippine armies had faced each other near Manila for a number of weeks in hostile array. The Americans had bought the sovereignty of the islands from Spain but the Filipinos supposed that in the event 1 The first Commission adopted that figure (15). The Census of 1903 made the population somewhat less. Enc. Brit. ; Blount, Amer. Occupa- tion of the Philippines, 567. Williams wrote that the population to the square mile was about 66, to 350 in Java, 290 in Japan, 200 in In- dia. Odyssey of the P. Com., 306. * Schurman, A Retrospect and Outlook, 2. 192 THE REVOLT OF THE FILIPINOS [1899 of American success they were to be granted their inde- pendence. The fight which broke out on February 4, 1899, was therefore one between sovereignty and inde- pendence. The feeling which became pretty general among the Filipinos may be stated thus : "If the Amer- icans are going to look on us and treat us as the Spaniards have done for three hundred years we do not want them here." l Aguinaldo was the head of the Filipinos and he was a Malay of marked ability. A born leader he knew how to consolidate the different factions in the islands. While he was far from being the "George Washington of the Orient," as some of the anti-Imperialists in Amer- ica called him, he probably conducted as well as possible the war for independence. But it is a question whether he and most of his followers would have opposed the Americans had they known that they came there not to exploit the islands but to assist them in their progress toward civilization. The Filipinos, however, had been fed with promises until they had come to distrust the white man; and the minute blood was shed the sympa- thy of the mass ran with their brown brothers. The Filipino soldiers were, however, no match for the Amer- icans, and while they had modern rifles they did not know how to use them, so thai casualties on their side were large and entirely out of proportion to the losses of the Americans. By the end of 1S99 organized resistance to the United States ( rovernment came to an end, and there- after the insurrection took the form of guerilla warfare which, in many cases, degenerated into brigandage. In November of this year Aiminaldo disappeared into the i Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife, Edith Moeea (190S\ 74 Ch. VII. J THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION 193 wilderness and apparently played little or no part in the guerilla warfare. The Schurman Commission became one of investiga- tion and in their report of January 31, 1900, maintained that the Philippine Islands could not stand alone. To become "self-governing and independent" they needed the "tutelage and protection of the United States." But the "goal of the intelligent Filipinos" was ultimate in- dependence — "independence after an undefined period of American training." l "Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn," it said, "the Commission be- lieve that the government of the Philippines would speed- ily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them." 2 About ten per cent of the Filipinos were educated men, of high intelligence. They knew Spanish, the civilization and the literature of Spain, but naturally they were not all saints. A goodly proportion of them were office- seekers of the type we know in the United States, and they desired independence in order to hold the purse strings of the nation, while if they were under an Ameri- can protectorate they would be protected from other Asiatic and European countries by the American Navy, in the event that they should misconduct themselves in foreign affairs. The radicals, whose true leader was Agui- naldo, influenced a majority of this ten per cent and they swayed the mass. All but less than a million were Ro- 1 Report, 83. 2 Senate hearings on affairs in the Philippine Islands, 2983. Henry Cabot Lodge was the efficient chairman of the committee before whom the hearings were had. 194 THE FILIPINOS [1900 man Catholic Christians and this religion was imposed upon them by the Spanish conquest three hundred years before, and the Spaniards brought to them also Spanish civilization which proved to be an element of great prog- ress. In one respect at least the Filipinos stood high in comparison with other Orientals and even Europeans — in their regard for women. Antedating the Spanish con- quest there was an equal inheritance law. Never were soldiers and officers of the American Army more mis- taken than when they called the Filipinos "niggers," as in all essentials the Filipinos stood far in advance of the American negro. 1 Really the Filipinos and Americans should have stood shoulder to shoulder instead of appeal- ing to force for their varying immediate aims. But as Carl Schurz sagely remarked, "The best government will always be unpopular if it is foreign government." 2 When Storey, Hoar and Schurz opposed the Philippine policy of the administration on the ground that "govern- ments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed" they were entirely logical, for the course of events makes it evident that the Filipinos did not desire American rule ; but it was no more flagrant a case than the war of the North on the Confederate States, as the Southern people desired a government of their own with slavery amply protected. Lincoln conducted the war on the ground that a majority of the Southern people were not of the same mind as their leaders, and McKinley, Root and Taft made war on the Philippine insurgents with a similar view. 1 As to this Me Blount, Americas Occupation of the Philippines, 365. 1 Schurz, Speeches, vi. 175. Ch. VII.] ROOT SECRETARY OF WAR 195 i McKinley was a rare judge of men. When he forced the resignation of Russell A. Alger as Secretary of War, he appointed to the position Elihu Root of New York. The appointment was made during July, 1899, and Root thus told the story: " Having just finished the labors of the year and gone to my country home, I was called to the telephone and told by one speaking for President McKinley, ' the President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of War.' I answered, 'Thank the President for me, but say that it is quite absurd. I know nothing about war. I know nothing about the army.' I was told to hold the wire, and in a moment there came back the reply, 'President McKinley directs me to say that he is not looking for anyone who knows anything about the army ; he has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of those Span- ish islands and you are the lawyer he wants.' Of course," proceeded Root, "I had then, on the instant, to deter- mine what kind of a lawyer I wished to be, and there was but one answer to make, and so I went to perform a law- yer's duty upon the call of the greatest of all our clients, the government of our country." Root described his labor : "It was a fascinating work. It was the work of applying to some ten millions of people in Guba and Porto Rico and the Philippines, the prin- ciples of American liberty. They were living under laws founded upon the customs of their lives, customs drawn from old Spain and developed in social and industrial activity quite unlike that of the United States ; and the problem was to apply those principles which are declared in our constitutions, which embodied the formative idea of the Declaration of Independence that all men are en- 196 ROOT AND McKINLEY [1901 dowed with inalienable rights, among which are life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to the customs and the laws of people which had come down from the Spain of Philip the Second and the Inquisition." ! Root's opinion of McKinley after more than two years of official and personal intercourse may well be cited : "How wise and skilful he was! how modest and self- effacing ! how deep his insight into the human heart ! how swift the intuitions of his sympathy ! how compelling the charm of his gracious presence ! He was so unselfish, so thoughtful of the happiness of others, so genuine a lover of his country and kind. And he was the kindest and tenderest friend who ever grasped another's hand. Alas that his virtues did plead in vain against cruel fate!" 2 As President McKinley was unable to secure the re- turn to the Philippines of his first Commission, he ap- pointed a new one: William H. Taft, Professor Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan, Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Professor Bernard Moses of the University of California. It must be premised that Tail was Judge of the United States Circuit Court and the height of his ambition was a scat on the United States Supreme bench. lie was desig- nated as President of the Board and has thus told the story of his appointment: "It was in February, 1900, that in the court house in Cincinnati I received from Mr. McKinley a telegram which read like this, 'If you have no other engagement, you will do me a great favor by calling on me in Washington some time next week.' I 1 Milit:ir> and Colonial Policy, Root, riv, w. : I., 112. Ch. VII.] THE TAFT COMMISSION 197 did not know of any vacancy existing on the Supreme Court bench but I went to Washington just the same. Arriving at the White House I was ushered into the Cab- inet room and there I met the President. 'Judge/ he said, 'I'd like to have you go to the Philippines.' I said, 1 Mr. President, what do you mean by going to the Philip- pines?' He replied, 'We must establish a government there and I would like you to help.' ' But, Mr. Presi- dent/ I said, 'I am sorry we have got the Philippines. I don't want them and I think you ought to have some man who is more in sympathy with the situation.' ' You don't want them any less than I do/ replied the President, 'but we have got them and in dealing with them I think I can trust the man who didn't want them better than I can the man who did.' You can readily understand," continued Taft, "the feelings of a man whose only ob- ject in going to Washington was the hope of finding a vacant cushion on the Supreme Court bench to be asked to go 10,000 miles from home. But after I had talked with Mr. McKinley and with Secretary Root I decided I would go and in a hurry. I went under the influence of Mr. McKinley's personality, the influence he had of making people do what they ought to do in the interest of the public service. Mr. McKinley said he would stand by me in the Philippines and he did." l The instructions to this Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed to the Secretary of War are properly called the magna carta of the Philippines. It is asserted by the editors of the Root volumes 2 that this paper was 1 Speech of President-elect Taft, New York City, Dec. 13, 1908, Bos- ton Herald. 2 Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. 198 ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 11900 drafted by Root and with "trifling verbal changes "signed by the President. 1 This is asserted by other writers and so far as I know not contradicted, so it may be recorded as a fact. As the military government was now supreme and it was desirable to avoid any conflict with the Civil Commission, both the general in command and the Com- mission were directed to report to the Secretary of War. The Commission should at first "devote their attention to the establishment of municipal government, in which the natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control, which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native con- trol show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order, and loyalty." Next should be the organization of government in the large administrative divisions, the intent being to substitute civil for military control. On September 1, 1900, the legislative authority which had been exercised by the military governor should be trans- ferred to the Civil Commission. "Exercise of this legis- lative authority," the instructions continued, "will in- clude the making of rules and orders, having the effect of law, for the raising of revenue by taxes, custom duties and imports; the appropriation and expenditure of pub- lic funds of the islands; the establishment of an educa- tional system throughout the islands; the establishment of a system to secure an efficient civil service ; the organiza- tion and establishment of courts; the organization and 1 Military and Colonial Policy, 226. Ch. VII.] ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 199 establishment of municipal and departmental govern- ments, and all other matters of a civil nature. . . . Wher- ever civil governments are constituted under the directions of the Commission, such military posts, garrisons and forces will be continued for the suppression of insurrection and brigandage and the maintenance of law and order as the Military Commander shall deem requisite, and the military forces shall be at all times subject, under his orders, to the call of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority." Natives of the islands should be preferred for the offices but they must be absolutely and unconditionally loyal to the United States. The government established is "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theo- retical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." Then followed, substantially, the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution ; but the right to bear arms and trial by jury were not included in the enumeration of the safeguards of liberty. Education should be promoted and extended. This was an easy matter as the desire for education was almost universal and the wish to learn English eager. With wisdom the direction to the Com- mission was: "Instruction should be given in the first instance in every part of the islands in the language of the people. In view of the great number of languages spoken by the different tribes, it is especially important to the prosperity of the islands that a common medium 200 ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 11900 of communication may be established, and it is obviously desirable that this medium should be the English lan- guage. Especial attention should be at once given to affording full opportunity to all of the islands to acquire the use of the English language." The compre- hensive instructions ended with: A "high and sacred obligation rests upon the Government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom and wise, firm and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I," said the President of the United States, " charge this Commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Phil- ippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila and set their land under the sovereignty and the protection of the people of the United States." ! The way was paved by the introduction of a bill from the Committee on the Philippines which, although not enacted, offered a statement from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was in full sympathy with our possession of the Philippines. On March 7, 1900, he said : The "Presi- dent, under the military power, which still controls and must for some time control the islands, could do all that this bill provides. . ■ . We follow the well-settled pre- cedents of Jefferson and Monroe. . . . We may safely tread in the footsteps of the author of the Declara- tion of [ndependence. Be saw no contradiction be- 1 Messages and Papers of the Prcidont, Supplement, 139. Ch. VII.] ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 201 tween that great instrument and the treaty with Napoleon." l These instructions were approved by the Spooner Amendment (March 2, 1901) and by the Philippine Gov- ernment Act of July 1, 1902. Upon this magna carta was built the government of the Philippines. The Com- mission had full power to rule the islands. Root was the creator and Taft the practical instrument; both were backed loyally by Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, and all wrought together in perfect harmony, furnishing an example of the wise administration of colonial pos- sessions on a new and original plan. Certainly no gov- ernment was better served. The Commission had a guerilla warfare to reckon with. During 1900 this was kept alive by the hope of Demo- cratic success in the presidential election, as the leaders assured the masses that, in the event of Bryan's triumph, their independence would be secured. 2 During March, 1901, Aguinaldo, who was termed "the incarnation of the insurrection," was captured, as the result of a "desperate enterprise" by General Funston with four American officers, assisted by about eighty Mac- cabebes, who, though Filipinos, had a long-standing feud with their brothers, had been loyal to the Spanish authorities and transferred that loyalty to us. "I take pride," wrote Theodore Roosevelt to General Funston, "in this crowning exploit of a career filled with cool courage, iron endurance and gallant daring, because you have added 1 Speeches and Addresses, 317 et seq.; letter from Senator Lodge, Nov- 15, 1920. 2 The Americans in the Philippines, Le Roy, ii. 135 n. 202 AGUINALDO [1901 your name to the honor roll of American worthies." 1 On April 19 Aguinaldo took the oath of allegiance to the American Government and has faithfully kept this oath. 2 He also issued a proclamation in which he said : "The cause of peace . . . has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow countrymen who are already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust, in the belief that under its protection our people will at- tain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy. The country has declared unmis- takably in favor of peace ; so be it. Enough of blood ; enough of tears and desolation. . . . By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire archipelago, as I now do, without any reservation whatever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved Country. May happiness be thine." 3 On September 1, 1900, the Taft Commission entered upon their legislative work; on July 4, 1901, Taft was appointed Civil Governor of the islands. By July 4, 1902. the guerilla warfare was at an end and Root issued this address to the soldiers: "The President thanks the offi- cers and enlisted men of the army in the Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and forti- tude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago againsl the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States." When the organized resistance "had been over- 1 Theodore Roosevelt and BQsTime, Bishop, i. 108. 1 Blount, American Occupation i»f the Philippines, 352. 3 The Philippines, Military Regime, Elliott, 826. Ch. VII.] THE PRESIDENT THANKS THE ARMY 203 come, they were required to crush out a general system of guerilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the information necessary for successful pur- suit or to guard against surprise and ambush." They "had to do with a population among whom it was im- possible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in count- less instances used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. . . . Under all these adverse circumstances the army of the Philippines has accom- plished its task rapidly and completely. . . . Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars it has relentlessly followed the guerilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and jungle and crushed them. ... Its officers have shown high qualities of command and its men have shown de- votion and discipline." l So far as I know the charges that were made as to the use of torture by American soldiers consisted in the ap- plication of the "Water-cure" to elicit information as to the whereabouts of hostile bands. A bamboo reed was placed in the victim's mouth and water was poured down through it to the disturbance of all the digestive organs. When the victim was permitted to void the water, the desired intelligence was frequently procured by the threat of a renewed application. While very painful this tor- ture was seldom fatal nor permanently damaging. 2 The 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Supplement, 396. 2 Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 202. 204 ROOSEVELT — ROOT [1902 American soldiers despised the Filipinos and were ready to practise the principle of "an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth," but in most instances they were restrained by their officers. 1 Theodore Roosevelt, who as President was thoroughly informed, who had a high rega -d for humanity, who ap- preciated fully the harm of torture both to the tortured and to him who inflicts the torture, has written the truth on this subject in a few words. "Under the strain of well nigh intolerable provocation there were shameful instances, as must happen in all wars, where the soldiers forgot themselves and retaliated evil for evil. There were one hundred thousand of our men in the Philippines, a hun- dred thousand hired for a small sum a month apiece, put there under conditions that strained their nerves to the breaking point, and some of the hundred thousand did what they ought not to have done." 2 Root fully appreciated the burden which he had as- sumed. "It concerned the credit and honor of our coun- try that we should succeed in the Philippines," he de- clared. But he admitted during September, 1902, that there were moments of despair. "There come always," he said, "in every great and difficult undertaking, times when failure seems possible; times when discourage- 1 The army Bong wgnifiw the feeling : "Damn, damn, damn the Filipino P aiarked Khakiao ladrone : [Copper-oolored thief] Underneath the starry Han Civilise him with a Krag. And return iu to our own beloved home," emitf t'i the tune of " [ramp, tramp, (rami'," Blount) 270. 1 [he Philippines, Mrs. C. Daunoey (1910), 5 \ see T. Roosevelt and Hia Time, Bishop, i. 191; also T. K.'- letter to Bishop Lawrence and ad- to Arlington Cemetery, ibid. ; My Sistorieal I 238. Ch. VII.] CIVIL GOVERNMENT SUBSTITUTED 205 ments and difficulties and doubts beset the pathway of endeavor." "As armed resistance ceased," wrote Root, in " island by island, province by province, town by town, civil gov- ernment was substituted for military government; the bill of rights extended its protection over the people ; the writ of habeas corpus became the guaranty of their liberty; elections were held at which the people chose the officers of their own towns and provinces ; a native constabulary was organized and proved faithful and effec- tive for the protection of life and property ; the people resumed their customary vocations under the protection of law. . . . The personnel of civil government has been brought together under an advanced and comprehen- sive civil service law which has been rigidly enforced. . . . The Philippine people will follow in the footsteps of the people of Cuba ; more slowly indeed because they are not so advanced" yet as surely, they will grow in ca- pacity for self-government, and receiving power as they grow in capacity, will come to bear substantially such rela- tions to the people of the United States as do now the people of Cuba, differing in details as conditions and needs differ, but the same in principle and the same in beneficent results." ! In those days German opinion in reference to admin- istration was highly regarded. The circular of the Ger- man government for 1901, said, "that the American ad- ministration of the affairs of the Philippines has, as far as the economic betterment of the country is concerned, already achieved extraordinary success." 2 1 Milit. and Colonial Policy, Root, 77, 80, 101, 103; 1902, 1904. 2 Ibid., 78. 206 ROOT AND TAFT [1902 The opponents of the policy of the administration maintained that "the Constitution followed the flag," but the United States Supreme Court validated the pro- cedure of the President and of Congress who were sus- tained by public opinion that denied the inhabitants of the Philippines "equal rights under the Constitution." John H. Latan6 has written an intelligent chapter analyz- ing the different decisions in cases relating to Puerto Rico and the Philippines, 1 in which their burden was this sub- ject, and at its close he intimated what has been humor- ously put by Dooley, "No matter whether the Consti- tution follows the flag or not th' Supreme Court follows th' illiction returns." 2 As Root was the creator of the Philippine policy so was William H. Taft its administrator. It was he who by suave and persistent negotiation settled the difficult question of the friars' lands. The friars were Domini- cans, Augustinians, Franciscans and Recolectos, held sway in the country and represented the most tyrannical aspect of the Spanish dominion. 3 Making themselves obnoxious to the Philippine people who were, neverthe- less, good Catholics, they and their lands must in some way be disposed of , were success to attend the American occupation. To an arrangement which, while maintain- ing the right of private property, should take away the undoubted grievance of friar ownership, Taft, under au- thority of an Act of Congress, addressed himself with eminent success. During the progress of the negotiation 'Chap. viii. Amr-rira as a World Power. ■ The Philippines, Military Regime, Elliott, 496 a. •"The people hated the Priare worse than they did the locusts." Odyaacy of the P. Com., Williams, iss. Ch - VII.] GOVERNOR TAFT 207 he made a visit to Rome and in the end brought the own- ers of the lands practically to his terms, finally closing "the purchase of upward of 410,000 acres at a price of $7,239,000 gold." He then proposed to dispose of the lands "to the tenants on contracts of sale with easy pay- ments for a number of years." This was done. We did not purchase these lands, he wrote "with a view to a profitable investment ... but merely for the purpose of ridding the administration of the government in the is- lands of an issue dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the people." » The account which he gave of these negotiations in his report of November 15, 1903, sub- stantiated as it is by other sources, stamps him as an un- usual colonial administrator. In fact all the glimpses one gets of his work in the islands are much to his credit. His unabated energy, his determination to commend himself to the Filipinos, his smile and hearty handshake, 2 his tactful speeches, his attendance at dinners and balls, his excellent dancing thereat 3 — all show his resolution to make his mission successful. At a meeting in the sec- ond city of the islands, an observer wrote, "Taft pre- sided with that cordial good-natured expression which is one of his greatest charms and which cannot but inspire confidence and good-will." In another province the observer was impressed with Taft's master talk. "It was in detail, yet succinct and clear, fitted to the com- prehension of the people." 4 Personally, he told a Senate Committee in Washington during February, 1902, "I did not favor going into the 1 Report, Nov. 15, 1903, 44. 2 Blount, 286. " Odyssey of the P. Com., Williams, 310. 4 Ibid., 179, 182. 208 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 Philippine Islands. I was sorry at the time that we got into it. But we are there. ... I have been called an optimist ; I think the Mark Tapley of this business. It is true I am an optimist. If I did not believe in the suc- cess of what we are attempting to do out there, I would resign and come home. Certainly no man ever succeeded who did not believe in the success of what he was doing. We think we can help these people ; we think we can elevate them to an appreciation of popular government ; and we think that because the experiment has not really ever been tried before is not reason for saying that the trial of the experiment may not be a success in this in- stance." ' In truth he had an opportunity to go home. Presi- dent Roosevelt cabled to him late in 1902 : "On January first there will be a vacancy on the Supreme Court to which I earnestly desire to appoint you. ... I feel that your duty is on the Court unless you have decided not to adopt a judicial career. I greatly hope you will ac- cept." To this Taft replied: "Great honor deeply ap- preciated but must decline. Situation here most critical from economic standpoint. . . . Nothing would satisfy individual taste more than acceptance. Look forward to the time when I can accept such an offer but even if it is certain that it can never be repeated 1 must now decline." At the same lime he cabled to Secretary Root : "Chance has thrown every obstacle in the way of our success but we shall win. 1 Long for a judicial career but if it must turn on my present decision I am willing to lose it." Late in November Taft received this letter 1 Sc-uatc Hearing! on Affairs in tin- Philippine i Put i 846. Ch. VII. 1 ROOSEVELT AND TAFT 209 from President Roosevelt: "Dear Will, I am disap- pointed, of course, that the situation is such as to make you feel it unwise to leave, because, exactly as no man can quite do your work in the islands, so no man can quite take your place as the new member of the Court. But, if possible, your refusal on the ground you give makes me admire you and believe in you more than ever." But about one month later President Roosevelt wrote to Taft, the letter being received January 6, 1903 : "Dear Will, I am awfully sorry, old man, but after faithful effort for a month to try to arrange matters on the basis you wanted, I find that I shall have to bring you home and put you on the Supreme Court. I am very sorry. I have the greatest confidence in your judgment, but after all, old fellow, if you will permit me to say so, I am Presi- dent and see the whole field. . . . After the most careful thought, after the most earnest effort as to what you desired and thought best, I have come, irrevocably, to the decision that I shall appoint you to the Supreme Court in the vacancy caused by Judge Shims' resignation. . . . I am very sorry if what I am doing displeases you, but as I said, old man, this is one of the cases where the Pres- ident, if he is fit for his position, must take the respon- sibility." In answer to this letter Taft sent this cable to the Pres- ident: "Recognize soldier's duty to obey orders." But "I presume on our personal friendship, even in the face of your letter, to make one more appeal, in which I lay aside wholly my strong personal disinclination to leave work of intense interest half-done." These people are convinced "that I am their friend and stand for a policy of confidence in them and belief in their future and for 210 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 extension of self-government as they show themselves worthy. . . . Announcement of withdrawal pending settlement of church question, economic crisis, and formative political period when opinions of all parties are being slowly moulded for the better, will, I fear, give impression that change of policy is intended because other reasons for action will not be understood. ... I feel it is my duty to say this. If your judgment is un- shaken I bow to it." To this came a cable from Presi- dent Roosevelt, "All right, stay where you are. I shall appoint someone else to the Court." l One of the most interesting matters in American his- tory during the first two decades of the twentieth cen- tury is the relation between Roosevelt and Taft ; to end the Supreme Court incident a violation of chronology in the narrative is needed. We therefore go on to 1906 when Taft was Secretary of War in President Roosevelt's Cabinet. He was again offered a position on the Supreme Court bench but in a personal interview showed unwill- ingness to accept it. Shortly afterwards, on March 15, 190G, Roosevelt wrote to Taft a letter in which he said: "My dear Will, it is preeminently a matter in which no other man can take the responsibility of deciding for you what is best for you to do. . . . But I appreciate, as every thoughtful man must, the importance of the part to be played by the Supreme Court in the next twenty-five years. . . . There are strong arguments against your tak- ing this justiceship. In the first place, my belief is that, of :ill the r i it*ii who have appeared so far, you are the man, who is most likely to receive the Republican nomination, •Mrs. w. II. Taft, Recollections, 262 a seq. Ch. VII.] ROOSEVELT AND TAFT 211 and who is, I think, the best man to receive it. It is not a light thing to cast aside the chance of the Presidency, even though, of course, it is a chance, however, a good one." Taft considered the offer over four months and then wrote to the President (July 30, 1906) from Murray Bay, Canada, where he was taking his summer vacation, declining the offer, saying: "I would much prefer to go on the Supreme Bench for life than to run for the Presi- dency. . . . But circumstances seem to me to have im- posed something in the nature of a trust to me personally that I should not discharge by now succeeding Justice Brown. In the nature of things the trust must end with this administration and one or two years is short to do much. Yet the next session of Congress may result in much for the benefit of the Filipino and, it seems to me, it is my duty to be in the fight." 1 While still in the Philippines Taft twice put aside the coveted place and remained in the islands, the climate of which was unsuitable. Before he appeared before the Senate Committee in Washington, on leave for the state of his health, and before these first two offers were made to him of a supreme judgeship, he had submitted to two surgical operations and was in bed for a number of weeks, but maintained "his usual cheerful frame of mind." 2 His wife, too, was debilitated and needed a change to America. Finally, at the end of 1903, he left for Wash- ington to accept the position of Secretary of War. He was popular with the native inhabitants; they loved him and their anxiety when he was ill knew no bounds. 1 J. B. Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, ii. 99 et seq. 1 Mrs. W. H. Taft, Recollections, 229; Unofficial Letters, Edith Moses. 187. 212 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 At the time when President Roosevelt insisted on his acceptance of the second offer of supreme judgeship and it leaked out that Taft was going to leave the Philippines, there was a sincere demonstration in his favor in the city of Manila which was placarded with the sentiment in various languages, "We want Taft." In his farewell speech he declared that the Philippines were for the Fili- pinos. It need not occasion surprise that President Roose- velt in a review of this colonial administration said that Taft's work in the Philippines is as great as Lord Cro- n.cr's in Egypt. The cost of the Philippines by the end of 1907 is esti- mated at $300,000,000 ; besides, the cost per annum of the native scouts and the 12,000 American troops was about 14 millions. 2 The government of the islands is self-supporting, wrote Governor Forbes, and this, accord- ing to Blount, is true except for the expense of the scouts and the American soldiers. In February, 1002, Taft told a Senate committee: "I think the intervention of the United States in the Philippine Islands is the best possible thing that could have happened to the Filipino people but ... for the people of the United States it probably 1 Mrs. W. H. Taft, Recollections, 267. 'The American Occupation of the Philippines, Blount, 600. In his report of Dec. 1. 1902, Rool wrote : "Since the ending of the insurrec- tion and the complete establishment <>f civil government in the Philip- pines, it has been possible t<» make :i farther reduction of the Army and on 11 ber 24, L902, an order was made reducing the enlisted strength to 69,8('><>. . . . The effect of carrying out this order will be to bring the rican troop. Btationed in the Philippines down to an enlisted strength of 13,480." in hie report of Dec 7, 1903, he said, "The Imerican troops, in tin- Philippines consisted of 843 officers and 14,667 enlisted men. . , ■ The number can still further be reduced." 1 nave assumed that the num- ber was reduced to 12,000 as Blounl was very unfriendly to the American administration. Ch. VII.] CAMERON FORBES'S OPINION 213 would be better that chance had not thrown the Filipino people under our guidance and protection." x And dur- ing May, 1907, in a speech at St. Louis, he admitted that the islands had been a financial drain. 2 W. Cameron Forbes, when Vice-Governor, wrote in the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1909: "We have completed the separation of Church and State, buying out from the religious orders their large agricultural prop- erties, which are now administered by the government for the benefit of the tenants. We have put the finances on a sound and sensible basis. . . . We have established schools throughout the archipelago, teaching upward of half a million children." And Forbes affirmed that with some natural exceptions it was "safe to travel everywhere throughout the islands without carrying a weapon. We," he continued, "have given the Filipinos almost complete autonomy in their municipalities. . . . The record of the Americans in the Philippines is one of which no American need be ashamed. . . . We are casting off the shackles which held down the laboring classes of the Philippines and, with the laboring classes raised, we are raising all the people to a higher and nobler plane. We may not as yet have given independence to the Philip- pines but we are certainly giving independence to the Filipinos." 3 All the money raised by internal taxation was spent on the islands. There was absolutely no exploitation. "As I look back," wrote Elihu Root in 1916 in a preface 1 Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Part 1, 406. * Blount, 357. 3 Article entitled "A Decade of American Rule in the Philippines." The citations down to "weapon," are made by Blount in his American Occupation of the Philippines. 214 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 to Charles B. Elliott's book, "over our American admin- istration in the Philippines .... down to the close of the Taft Administration in the spring of 1913, I think the American people are entitled to say to themselves that their work was well done. We maintained in the islands a very able and honest government which con- stantly and effectively kept in view the very high stand- ard of purpose with which we began. By limiting this statement to the end of the Taft Administration I do not mean to imply that 1 think any differently of our adminis- tration since that time. I simply do not know enough about it since then to make an assertion one way or the other. The time during which I knew about the Phil- ippine government covers the first fourteen years, and as to that time I say that the people of the United States ought to be proud of their government in the Philippines and grateful to the men and women who reflected credit on their country by giving their strength and lives to that public service." l Root was a broad-minded man as well as a great law- yer. His allusion to "my friend Air. Schurz" 2 at the time that Carl Schurz was assailing the Philippine policy with all the force of his periodic eloquence, shows an ab- sence of partisan spirit. Like Webster, Root earned the title of "Defender of Peace"; in December. 1913, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. When Secretary of State, 3 and .lames Bryce was Ambassador from Greal Britain, the two by wise diplomacy settled all matters 1 Prefatory not<> The Philippine^ To the End <>t the Military Regime, • Military and Colonial Policy, R m t, 43. rotary of Wta from 1899-1004, Secretary of State from i/ - ' Ch. VII.] COOLIDGE'S OPINION 215 of dispute between the two countries. I may parallel what 1 wrote of Webster : The social intercourse between Root and Bryce while they were at work on these treaties is one of those international amenities that grace the history of diplomac} 7 . 1 It is well now to hear from Archibald C. Coolidge, an academic man, yet a man of the world, a traveller, an observer, a thinker, who comprehends thoroughly the Orient. "Criticize as we may the details of the present policy" [in the Philippines], he wrote in 1908, "no im- partial observer will deny that since 1898 the Americans have accomplished a great deal in their task of transform- ing the islands. Improved means of communication, public works of all kinds, modern sanitation, justice, public security, honest and efficient government, popular participation in the government and a system of general education form a record to be proud of. In all this, good fortune has counted for but little." 2 1 See my vol. i. 139, 140. Bryce said in London, July 28, 1920, on the occasion of unveiling a copy of the Saint-Gaudens statue of Lincoln: "If I may venture to express what I believe to be the general feeling in Amer- ica, America looks upon Elihu Root as the greatest Secretary of State it has had since Daniel Webster. It was my good fortune to have to nego- tiate with him in Washington not a few treaties between our two coun- tries, and I have never known in either hemisphere anyone with a wider range of vision or with a mind more fair and just in handling diplomatic questions. He always showed the sincerest wish for perfect concord and friendly cooperation between our two great countries. With such a man it was a pleasure to negotiate, and to listen to such a man is a privilege." London Daily Telegraph, July 29, 1920 ; private letter from Elihu Root Dec. 24, 1920. * The United States as a World Power, 170. The Taft Com. reported on Nov. 1, 1902: "By the war and by the rinderpest, chiefly the latter, the carabaos or water buffalos have been reduced to 10 per cent of their former number. The chief food of the common people of these islands is riee and the carabao is the indispensable instrument of the people in the cultivation of rice, as they cultivate it, as it is also the chief means of transportation of the tobacco, hemp and other crops. The loss of the 216 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 James A. Robertson wrote in 1917 : The American policy may have resulted in a "loss of efficiency in gov- ernment. There has been extremely little of ' Woe to the conquered' spirit from Americans, and the slogan 'The Philippines for the Filipinos 'has been real. ... On the whole the result has been better than the most ardent advocates . . . had hoped." The American experiment "has attained valuable results which, notwithstanding the political and anti-imperialistic diatribes against the sincerity of Americans, has been conducted not without honor." l Theodore Roosevelt wrote truly: "The Eng- lish and Dutch administrators of Malaysia have done admirable work ; but the profit to the Europeans in those States has always been one of the chief elements con- sidered ; whereas in the Philippines our whole attention was concentrated upon the welfare of the Filipinos them- selves, if anything to the neglect of our own interests." 2 What shall we do with the Philippines, as a large ma- jority of the American people desire to be rid of them if the riddance can be safely and honorably done? Theo- dore Roosevelt, who, as President for over seven years, gave the subject grave thought, made an answer sound and complete. Thus he wrote in 1913 : "We are govern- ing and have been governing the islands in the interests of the Filipinos themselves. If, after due time, the l'ili- Barabao has reduced the production of rice in the island- 7" per cent and the 2 in imminent danger from the locusts. " Gov. Taft wrote in hie report of Nov. r>, L903: "Prom the first of January until late in August then was a droughl in the island* of unusual length which interfered with the successful reaping of many of the crops, and with the drought a pest of U> I that hade fair to consume V\ part | f the food supply that grew above the ground." 1 Atnerieam Historical Ii>~view, July, 1917, 817, 830. 1 Autobiography, 544. Ch. VII.] THE PHILIPPINES 217 pinos themselves decide that they do not wish to be thus governed, then I trust that we will leave ; but when we do leave it must be distinctly understood that we retain no protectorate — and above all that we take part in no joint protectorate — over the islands and give them no guarantee of neutrality or otherwise; that, in short, we are absolutely quit of responsibility for them of every kind and description." x 1 Autobiography, 545. Authorities : Dewey's Autobiography ; Rich- ardson, x. ; McKinley's Messages of Dec. 1899 and 1900 ; Roosevelt's Message, Dec. 1901, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Supplement, 1889-1902; Moorfield Storey, Letter to a Friend, Oct. 21, 1899, Sec- retary Root's Record in the Philippine Warfare (1902), What Shall We Do with Our Dependencies (1903), Before the House Committee on In- sular Affairs (1906), Political Pamphlets in Boston Athenaeum; George F. Hoar, Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 9, 1S99, Letter, Our Duty to the Philippines, Jan. 11, 1900, Autobiography, ii., 309; Carl Schurz, Writ- ings, etc., hi., Speeches, etc., vi. ; Schurman, Report of Philippine Com- mission, 1899, A Retrospect and Outlook, Address, 1902; Senate Hear- ings on Affairs in Philippine Islands, Parts 1, 2, 3, Senate Docs. 23, 24, 25; Reports of Secretary of War, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903; Reports of Philippine Commission, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, House Docs. ; Coolidge, The U. S. as a World Power; Elihu Root, Milit. and Colonial Policy; Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime; ibid., To the End of the Commission Government; James A. Le Roy, The Americans in the Philippines, i. & ii. ; Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present, i. & ii. ; Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines; Williams, The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission; Edith Moses, Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife ; The Philippines, Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, Introduction by Theodore Roosevelt; Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography; Mrs. W. H. Taft, Recollections; Latan6, America as a World Power; Olcott, Life of McKinley; Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies ; Scribner's Magazine, June, 1920. CHAPTER VIII On taking the oath of office at the time of McKinley's death Theodore Roosevelt was entirely sincere when he said that "in this hour of deep and terrible bereavement ... it shall be my aim to continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley." [September 14.] The student of Roosevelt's seven and one-half years in the White House will fail in their comprehension if he does not believe thoroughly in Roosevelt's sincerity and cour- age. On the train carrying the late President's body be- tween Buffalo and Washington, Senator Mark Hanna, who must be regarded as the inherited representative of McKinley's policy, said, "Theodore, do not think any- thing about a second term." That no thought of the sort at this time entered Roosevelt's head is apparent from the remark he made to Joseph B. Bishop on his first day in the White House: "I don't know anything about seven years. But this I do know — I am going to be President for throe years and I am going to do my ut- most to give the country a good President during that period. ... I am no second G rover Cleveland. I ad- mire certain of his qualities, but I have no intention of doing with the Republican party what he did with the Democratic party. I intend to work with my party and to make it strong by making it worthy of popular sup- port." l 1 Theodore EtootevsH and Eia Time, Bishop, i. 150. When here- , irork I shall ref er to it m Biahop. 218 Copyright by Underwood & Underwood. Ch. VIII.] ROOSEVELT AS PRESIDENT 219 "Wise legislation," declared Roosevelt in seconding McKinley's nomination at the Republican convention in Philadelphia during June, 1900, "is vitally important, but honest administration is even more important." l The importance which he gave to administration is ap- parent from his action during the time that he was Presi- dent. Believing that a bad colonel makes a bad regi- ment, he was particular in getting efficiency at the head of departments and in other places where the master gave the cue to his subordinates. He knew McKinley to be a good judge of men and Roosevelt was not of the sort who believed so thoroughly in his own selections that he could not accept those of others. He would take a good man wherever he found "him. Root, Hay, Knox and Gov- ernor Taft were all chosen by McKinley, yet they be- came trusted counsellors of Roosevelt. On September 17 he asked all of the members of the Cabinet to remain in office, which they consented to do. 2 "It is a dreadful thing," he wrote to his friend Sena- tor Lodge, "to come into the Presidency in this way; but it would be a far worse thing to be morbid about it. Here is the task and I have got to do it to the best of my ability, and that is all there is about it." 3 Continuing "absolutely unbroken the policy of Presi- dent McKinley" was not the same as continuing the heads of the departments. That Roosevelt meant ex- actly what he said when he took the oath of office is un- doubted, but what he promised was entirely impossible. 1 Official Proceedings, 118. 2 The reasons for the retirement of Gage, Smith and Long are given by Leupp, The Man Roosevelt, 73 et seq. » Bishop, i. 151. 220 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 I am, he said, temperamentally more like Cleveland than like McKinley. The legacy which McKinley left to his countrymen in his Buffalo speech was to revise the tariff in the direction of lower duties by means of reciprocity treaties. And there is no doubt that Roosevelt balanced the policy of attacking the tariff first instead of attack- ing the trusts. Not that he believed that the tariff was the mother of all trusts but he wrote, "As regards politi- cal economy I was of course while in college taught the laissez-faire doctrines — one of them being free trade — then accepted as canonical." 1 By extreme tariff men he was not regarded as sound on account of this educa- tion, as Harvard College was looked upon as devoted to the doctrine of free trade. Although he felt that he could carry a reduction of duties through Congress such a course would divide his party, while in an attack on the Trusts he could carry his party in Congress with him. Therefore during his administration there was no revi- sion of the tariff 2 but his light against Big Business was one of his keynotes. Roosevelt endeavored to carry out faithfully what he had said on the day that ho took the oath of office. He wrote a cordial letter to Senator Ilanna requesting an early conference and received this reply: "There are many important matters to lie considered from a politi- cal standpoinl and I am sure we will agree upon a proper course to pursue. Meantime 'go slow.' You will he be- 1 Charles O, Washburn, Theodore Roosevelt, 112. Autobiography, 80. 'Charl G Washburn, Theodore H rait, ill; see Roosevelt's on The Tariff and Trust Speech in Cincinnati, Sept. 20, 1002. i •.•!!. Hi. Life Meaning and ' , The CWrenJ IAL Pub. Co., lyiu. 32 Ch. VIII.] THE NORTHERN SECURITIES CASE 221 sieged from all sides and I fear in some cases will get the wrong impression. Hear them all patiently but reserve your decision." l McKinley's inheritors did not like the position which Roosevelt took towards the large financial interests of the country. He touched upon the subject in his first An- nual Message and submitted what he said to Senator Hanna, receiving the advice not to give it so much promi- nence, but this suggestion he disregarded. 2 His action ought not to have been a surprise to those who had fol- lowed his course while Governor of New York and had rated correctly his many public utterances. Neverthe- less the announcement of it in the merger of two com- peting railroads into the Northern Securities Company caused a shock to the financial world. The Northern Pacific and Great Northern railroads ran from Lake Superior to Puget Sound on the Pacific coast, and on through traffic were competing lines ; but for a number of years their relations had been altogether friendly. Both desired a terminal in Chicago which should connect with their St. Paul-Minneapolis lines, and after much discussion and negotiation acquired the Chicago/Burlington and Quincy. James J. Hill, as hon- est a man as ever lived, whose career from early poverty to superfluous wealth was noted for the confidence other men reposed in him, may be said to be the hero of the merger of the three railroads. He formed a company 1 Oct. 12, 1901. Bishop, i. 154. One cannot fail to be reminded of Polonius's advice to Laertes : " Give every man thy ear, but few thy voice : Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment." Hamlet, Acti.,Sc. 1. 2 Bishop, i. 159. 222 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 called the Northern Securities which was to own theC, B. and Q. property as well as that of the other two. This was a holding company whose officers should manage the three railroads and divide the dividends among the stock- holders of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern ; the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy stockholders were paid by joint bonds of the two purchasing railroads. Hill's idea in making the merger was for the sake of no vulgar profit but to render the stock of the Northern Securities Company an investment to men and their heirs who would have a greater protection in the event of the death of those now in control. Hill and his attorneys studied the precedents, laws and regulations and especially the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Knight case, arriving at the conclusion that the Anti- Trust Act of 1890 did not apply to such a merger ; they went forward therefore with their plans. And if James J. Hill could have left men who would carry on business as he had carried it on, the merger could not be said to interfere with the public good. But he had to reckon with Theodore Roosevelt, who was antagonistic to the operations of large financiers and believed that it was incumbent on him as President to protect the public againsl their operations. While Roosevelt liked Hill, he did not consider J. Pierpont Morgan, who was an active coadjutor with Hill in this enterprise, a good financial adviser. When Morgan heard of the President's opposition to the merger he went to Washington and said to him, "If ^< i have done any- thing wrong semi your ni:in (meaning Attorney-General Knox) to my man (naming one of his lawyers) and they can fix n up." "That can't be done," said the President. Ch. VIII.] MORGAN — HILL — ROOSEVELT 223 "We don't want to fix it up," added Knox who assisted at this interview, "we want to stop it." Morgan in- quired, "Are you going to attack my other interests, the Steel Trust and the others?" "Certainly not," replied the President, "unless we find out that in any case they have done something that we regard as wrong." When Morgan went away Roosevelt expressed his opinion, saying to Knox: "That is a most illuminating illustra- tion of the Wall Street point of view. Mr. Morgan could not help regarding me as a big rival operator, who either intended to ruin all his interests or else could be induced to come to an agreement to ruin none." l Roosevelt con- sidered Hill a good financial adviser but said that he had to be on the watch that Hill, in giving him counsel, had not an eye to his own interest. Still Roosevelt appreci- ated a man who from nothing had amassed a fortune of sixty millions, although he did not rate as the highest ability the acquiring of wealth in this country of enor- mous resources. His heroes were drawn from another class. It is interesting to note the conflict between these two honest men. Roosevelt requested an opinion from Attorney-General Knox, who on February 19, 1902, author- ized the publication of the following statement: "Some- time ago the President requested an opinion as to the le- gality of this merger, and I have recently given him one to the effect that, in my judgment, it violates the provi- sions of the Sherman Act of 1890 (the Anti-Trust Act), whereupon he directed that suitable action should be taken to have the question judicially determined." 2 1 Bishop, i. 185. 2 Meyer, History of the Northern Securities Case. Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 142, 258. 224 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 This was a bomb shell in Wall Street and the beginning of the active hostility of the large financial interests to Theo- dore Roosevelt, whojiirected the course of his Attorney- General. Knox knew the ground well, as before McKin- ley had drawn him from the active practice of his profes- sion, he was a corporation lawyer. He began suit in the United States Circuit Court in St. Paul on March 10, 1902 ; and on April 9, 1903, a decision was rendered by four Circuit judges sitting in St. Louis. This tribunal "decreed that, as the combination known as the North- ern Securities Company violated the Anti-Trust Act of 1890, that Company is enjoined from attempting to ac- quire further stock of the Northern Pacific or Great Northern Railways; it is further enjoined from voting the stock already acquired or attempting to exercise any control whatsoever. The Northern Pacific and Great Northern are enjoined from permitting any such action on the part of the Securities Company and from paying to that Company any dividends on stock which it now claims to own." l The case went to the United States Supreme Court, the majority opinion of which was written by Justice Harlan (March 14, 1904) which took the ground that the merger was opposed to the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and therefore illegal; the decree of the lower Court was af- firmed. 2 It was given out thai the Court had decided in favor of the Government by 5: I bul Justice Brewer, in stating his agreement in the main with the four others, differed in Bome degree, bo that it was jocularly said that ' 193 V. S. Reports, 265. J Tin- opinion ma oonourred in i>v Justioei I lion a, McKenna and Day. 193 r B. Report*, L98, 817. Ch. VIII.] THE NORTHERN SECURITIES CASE 226 the Government had won by 4| to 4f . Many were vi- tally interested in the decision and the gossip of the day put Justice Holmes, who was appointed by Roosevelt, on the side of the Government. It was a great surprise therefore that when the decision was known, he should be found on the other side, giving the grounds of his judg- ment. 1 Gossip of the day was also concerned with two other judges who were counted against the Government, but as matter of fact concurred with Harlan in his opin- ion. This gossip redounded to the majesty of the Court. Hill's opinion soon after Knox's announcement was given in a private letter. "It really seems hard," he wrote, "when we look back on what we have done and know that we have led all Western companies in opening the country and carrying at the lowest rates, that we should be compelled to fight for our lives against the po- litical adventurers who have never done anything but pose and draw a salary." 2 But when the Supreme Court decision, which he thought would be favorable to his enterprise, was rendered, he said, "We must all bow to the law of the land," 3 and steps were taken to undo the work of combination. Through the decisions of the Courts, no property was sacrificed, but shares, which had been transferred to the Securities Company, were returned to their original owners ; but any such holding company as the Northern Securities was forbidden. No one who has read carefully the life of Hill can do otherwise than feel sympathy with the man when one of 1 Both Justices Holmes and White delivered dissenting opinions ; with them concurred Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Peckham. 193 U. S. Reports, 364, 400. 2 March, 1902. Life of Hill, Pyle, ii. 171. • Ibid., 175. 226 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 his darling projects was defeated, but as we look at it now, President Roosevelt was right and the decision of the Court was sound. While this combination as directed by Hill may not have been against the public good, the mischief lay in the precedent, for, were this merger ap- proved, a few men by successive steps might have con- trolled the railroad system of the country. Hill, Mor- gan and a few of their associates holding the majority of stock or representing it in the Northern Securities Com- pany, would have controlled the business of the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroads ; and by the same token a few men might have controlled the railroad system of the country. Roosevelt's idea of the Knight case, which had been de- cided by the United States Supreme Court in January, 1895, with but one dissenting voice, 1 was that such a merger as that involved in the Northern Securities case could be reached only by the action of the States them- selves ; but by the decision of the same court in the ac- tual (i. c. the Northern Securities) case the nation might act and for this Roosevelt contended. He thus wrote : "By a vote of five to four the Supreme Court revere d its decision in the Knight case, and in the Northern Se- curities case sustained the Government. The power to deal with industrial monopoly and suppress it and to con- trol and regulate combinations, of which the Knighl case had deprived the Federal Government, was thus restored to it by the Northern Securitie " 2 1 Chief Justioe Puller delivered the opinion of the Couxi Justice n.-ir- Ian dissented. 156 U. S. Reports, 1. The dtffiwfrffl *TM on the -M.-t. 1 Autobiography, 469. I hive been much indebted to Meyer's ac- count, ante. Ch. VIII.] BOOKER WASHINGTON 227 From the day of Knox's statement, the line was drawn between Roosevelt and the large financial interests of the country. A goodly part of the history of his adminis- tration is due to that conflict, and as Roosevelt was ef- fective as a fighter, he was ready to throw down the gauntlet. "The Northern Securities Suit," he wrote during Au- gust, 1904, "is one of the great achievements of my ad- ministration. I look back upon it with great pride for through it we emphasized in signal fashion, as in no other way could be emphasized, the fact that the most power- ful men in this country were held to accountability be- fore the law." 1 Roosevelt had been in the White House only a little over a month when he set tongues to wagging both South and North, among negroes and whites, by having Booker Washington to dinner. His own account of the incident, written in a private letter of November 8, 1901, is an ac- curate relation: "When I asked Booker T. Washington to dinner I did not devote very much thought to the mat- ter one way or the other. I respect him greatly and be- lieve in the work he has done. I have consulted so much with him it seemed to me that it was natural to ask him to dinner to talk over the work, and the very fact that I felt a moment's qualm on inviting him because of his color made me ashamed of myself and made me hasten to send the invitation. I did not think of its bearing one way or the other, either on my own future or on anything else." 2 Roosevelt was exceedingly hospitable and it was entirely natural for him to invite a man with whom he Bishop, i. 325. * Bishop, i. 166. 228 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 had business to break bread and eat salt. Washington in- deed from his clear comprehension and unselfish advo- cacy made you forget his color. A North Carolinian, then editor of the Atlantic Monthly, had a similar ex- perience. Not having completed his business when lunch- eon time came, he naturally asked Washington to go along with him and was only reminded of the fact that his guest was a man of color from the attitude of the waiters and the gaze of other patrons in the public res- taurant. Washington was thoroughly tactful, and did his best to avoid having any public mention of the honor which was paid to him, and in fact throughout the whole affair, with one exception, acted the part which his well-wishers might have desired. The dinner incident was on Octo- ber 18. Five days afterwards Roosevelt and Washing- ton, attending the Bi-Centennial of Yale University, met in the Hyperion theatre at New Haven, the President on the platform where he was to receive the degree of Doc- tor of Laws and Washington in the body of the theatre as delegate from the Tuskegee Institute. Justice Brewer, an old Yale graduate, delivered the oration and during it said, "Thank God, there have always been in this coun- try college men able to recognize a true Washington whether his first name was George or Booker." 1 Booker was immensely popular io the North. Andrew Carnegie expressed a dominant opinion when he wrote, "We should all lake our hats off to the man who not only raised him- self from Blavery but helped raise millions I?] of his race to a higher Btage of civilization." 2 Echoing Justice 1 Yak Aluinia Weekly. ' Autobiography, 'J7G. Ch. VIII.] THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 229 Brewer's statement the theatre resounded with applause and Booker Washington got up and bowed. This of course was a jarring incident amid the best of behavior, but he may have been urged to this recognition by some- one at his side. The mischief of Roosevelt's action lay first, in his being looked upon by the negroes as a saviour. President Lin- coln had given them political freedom and now President Roosevelt was to raise them to social equality. And sec- ond, in its effect on the white people at the South. Their attitude is well expressed by the words of a Southerner living in Tuskegee who was full of praise for Washington's work, "Now when I meet the man who has done all this I can't call him Booker like I would an ordinary nigger, but thunder ! I can't call a nigger Mister, so I just say, Professor." A young Southerner said to Leupp : "I love that man [Theodore Roosevelt] ; I would do anything in the world for him, follow him anywhere. But the one thing in his career which I shall never get over is the Booker Washington incident. Understand me : I do not disparage Washington's work — I appreciate it as much as you do. I admit all that you say of his personal worth. He has been in my mother's parlor and invited to sit down there. I don't know that I should have had any feeling about the President asking him to lunch or dinner by themselves. But to invite him to the table with ladies — that is what no Southerner can brook!" l At the end of the letter already cited, Roosevelt on November 8, wrote, " As things have turned out I am very 1 The Man Roosevelt, 230. This book has been of much use to me in writing of the Booker Washington incident. 230 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 glad that I asked him [Booker Washington], for the clamor aroused by the act makes me feel as if the act was neces- sary." l This was a note of defiance but his mature opin- ion afterwards was different. He said to me that he had made a mistake in asking Booker Washington to dinner ; that among the Southerners there was prejudice against such action and, while he could not comprehend their feeling, it was there and had to be reckoned with. He began his administration with great consideration for the South in the matter of Federal appointments and while, after the Booker Washington incident there was criti- cism in regard to some of them, on the whole he stood pretty well at the South. "Half my blood is Southern," he wrote. 2 It was understood that he did not approve of the policy of forcing negro suffrage upon the Southern States involved in the Reconstruction Acts of Congress and the XV Amendment and he never repeated the Booker Washington incident. 3 In his Autobiography written in 1913 he made no mention of it. But his action did not injure him permanently in the South. When he came before the people for election in 1904 he carried Missouri by a handsome majority, the first time in her history since 18G8 when she had voted for the Republican can- didates. The result in Maryland was so close that he was adjudged one electoral vote. 4 "The year 1902," wrote Bishop, "was one of incessant activity for Roosevelt." 5 How could it be otherwise with a man of his capacious brain, equal in action and study to that of three men! Henry Adams, who was on p, i. L66 Bishop, L L54 'William K. Thayer's Roosevelt, 284 • A History of the Presidency (1916),Stanwood, ii. 137. »P. 188, Ch. VIII.] THE CHARLESTON EXPOSITION 231 terms of social intimacy, wrote: "Power when wielded by- abnormal energy is the most serious of facts and all Roose- velt's friends know that his restless and combative energy was more than abnormal. Roosevelt . . . was pure act." He might wield " unmeasured power with immeasur- able energy in the White House." * When he opened the South Carolina Interstate and West Indian Exposition in December, 1901, at Charleston it was an expansionist President who hoped "that it may prove of great and lasting benefit to our industries and to our commerce with the West Indies." 2 "Of the making of expositions there is seemingly no end," wrote James B. Townsend. " The Pan-American at Buffalo had hardly closed its gates in November [1901] when the . . . Charleston Exposition threw open its doors. ... It is a far cry from Buffalo to Charleston — over a thousand prosaic miles in actual figures but in midwinter seemingly half the globe in climate and sur- roundings. The traveler who turned his back upon the deserted halls of the Pan-American, swept by the wintry blasts from the North and found himself thirty-six hours later in Charleston, her feet bathed in the almost tideless summer seas, her quaint old buildings recalling the far past, a warm sun making the city beautiful, and the Cher- okee roses blooming in its old gardens, felt himself in- deed the pleased victim of a transformation carried by magic 'from lands of snow to lands of sun.' " 3 The Ex- position opened on December 1, 1901, and continued until June 1, 1902, and on April 9, President Roosevelt 1 Bishop, 152; Education, 417. 2 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1902, 644. 3 Cosmopolitan Magazine, March, 1902, 523. 232 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 was in Charleston and addressed the "Men and women of the South, my fellow-citizens of the Union." " Charles- ton," he said, "is a typical Southern city. . . . All of us, North and South, can glory alike in the valor of the men who wore the blue and of the men who wore the gray. Those were iron times and only iron men could fight to its terrible finish the great struggle between the hosts of Grant and Lee." I nominated as Vice-Governor of the Philippines, he said, an "ex-Confederate, General Luke Wright of Tennessee, who in the Civil War fought with distinction in a uniform of Confederate gray. ... Of course," he declared in conclusion, "we are proud of the South. ... I am proud of your great deeds, for you are my people." ' June, 1902, found the President attending the Com- mencement Exercises of Harvard University when his Alma Mater conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Laws. President Eliot, in one of his famous charac- terizations, spoke of him as "a true type of the sturdy gentleman and the high-minded public servant of a dem- ocracy." 2 After Roosevelt's speech at the Alumni din- ner, Eliot said of him, in the hearing of John Hay, who was the recipient of the same honor, "What a man! Genius, force and courage and such evident honesty." 3 In this speech Roosevelt complimented John D.Long and Senator Hoar, and referred to Henry Cabot Lodge as his "closest, Btanches! and mosl loyal personal friend." He spoke highly of Hay, Root, Taft and Leonard Wood, 1 Eta Presidential Add r esses, etc. Tho Rmimc of Rct'iew* Co. (1910 .: L8«J • f 1 "l - i : i 1 title wwt United Mine Workers of America. 1 Organunl LftbOT, Mitclu'll, ix. 236 Ch. IX.] MARK HANNA 237 Mark Hanna was another. As owner of bituminous coal mines, he had had a large experience with striking miners. He had tried the old-fashioned lock-out, nego- tiation with the miners' union and the substitution of green men for the old miners, with the purpose of breaking up a strike or ending a lock-out. He had come to the conclusion that of all of them, negotiation with the min- ers' union was on the whole the best plan. His business experience was now joined to his political standing and he gave the benefit of both to the public. Then there was President Roosevelt. With a practi- cal agreement between the three it might have seemed as if a resolution were easy ; and they had to deal with only six organizations as through mining and railroad com- binations, the whole business of mining anthracite coal may have been said to be centered in these six, chief of whom was George F. Baer, President of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company as well as of the Railroad Company. Baer, a self-made man, a lawyer by profession, seems to have dominated all the rest and even for a time to have prevailed over J. P. Morgan who had great influence with all of the coal operators. The bituminous coal miners in session at Indianapolis during July, 1902, decided against a sympathetic strike, for the reason that they had a contract with the pro- ducers not expiring until the following April ; but al- though living up to their contract, they arranged to give to their brothers in the anthracite region the largest amount possible of material assistance which enabled them to prolong the strike. Thus affairs continued dur- ing the summer of 1902. There was a dead-lock between the miners and producers. When September came, 238 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1902 the public in eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and New England began to be alarmed regarding their supply of anthracite coal, as on that depended prac- tically their domestic use. Much pressure was brought to bear that in some way the matter be settled so that the public should have their usual supply. Of this pres- sure the greatest amount was on the President, who appre- ciated thoroughly the gravity of the situation, and on September 27 wrote to Senator Hanna : "What gives me the greatest concern at the moment is the coal famine. Of course we have nothing to do whatever with this coal strike and no earthly responsibility for it. But the pub- lic at large will tend to visit on our heads responsibility for the shortage in coal. . . . But I do most earnestly feel that from every consideration of public policy and good morals, the operators should make some slight con- cession." Y No one after the President bore so important a part in this matter as did Mark Hanna. He had temporarily settled the anthracite coal strike of 1900, had now be- come chairman of the Industrial Department of the Civic Federation, 2 whose object was to prevent strikes and lock- outs through trade agreements by means of collective bargaining. This position gave him an added influence with the men. He shared the President's ''anxiety in regard to the coal situation." Visiting him at Oyster Bay he went thence to New York City where he saw- Mitchell and Morgan. He obtained from Morgan a proposition of settlement which Mitchell, on behalf of ' life of Banna, Cn.lv, 397. 1 As to Hunua'fl connection with da' Civic Federation see Croly, 390 el seq. Ch. IX.] ROOSEVELT — HANNA 239 the miners, agreed to accept. "I really felt encouraged," he wrote to the President, "to think that I was about to accomplish a settlement. I went to Philadelphia and saw Mr. Baer and to my surprise he absolutely refused to entertain it." J Apparently at this time Baer was the master of the situation. He maintained that the operators must con- trol their own business and not allow any dictation from a miners' union. To the demand for arbitration their reply was, "We have nothing to arbitrate." Hanna felt that the operators were determined on starving the miners to submission which seemed to him difficult as they were "getting abundant supplies from their fellow- workmen all over the country." 2 Roosevelt appreciated every point in the situation. On the same day that he wrote to Hanna, he wrote to Senator Lodge. The operators "have said that they are never going to submit again to having their labor- ers given a triumph over them for political purposes, as Senator Hanna secured the triumph in 1900. They are now repeating with great bitterness that they do not intend to allow Quay to bully them into making any concession for his political ends any more than they would allow Hanna to do it for his." 3 Roosevelt, however, made up his mind to leave nothing undone. He invited representatives of the operators and miners to meet him in Washington on October 3, and on their assembling, he made them a brief address, telling them that he was impelled to his action by "the urgency and the terrible nature of the catastrophe impending 1 Hanna's letter of Sept. 29, Croly, 398. 8 Hanna's letter of Sept. 29, Croly, 398. 3 Bishop, i. 200. 240 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 over a large portion of our people in the shape of a winter fuel famine." x The story of the Conference is told by the President in a letter of October 3 to Hanna. "Well ! I have tried and failed," he wrote. "I feel downhearted over the result both because of the great misery ensuing for the mass of our people and because the attitude of the operators will beyond a doubt double the burden on us who stand between them and socialistic action. . . . At the meeting to-day the operators assumed a fairly hope- less attitude. None of them appeared to such advan- tage as Mitchell, whom most of them denounced with such violence and rancor that I felt he did very well to keep his temper. Between times they insulted me for not preserving order." Mitchell proposed "that all matters in dispute be submitted to the arbitration of a tribunal selected by the President." 2 The President continued in his letter to Hanna, "If the operators had acceded to Mitchell's proposition, 1 intended to put you on the commission or board of arbitration. But the operators declined to accede to the proposition. ... A coal famine in the winter is an ugly thing and I fear we shall see terrible suffering and grave disaster." 3 Now entered upon the scene Grover Cleveland. He read in the newspaper of October \ the account of the Conference of the preceding day and in a private letter to the President expressed himself as "especially dis- turbed and vexed by the tone and substance of the oper- ators' deliverances." Be suggested that for the moment the proprietors and miners sink their present controversy, produce coal sufficient "to serve the necessities of con- 'Bahop, i. 208. 1 1 prised Labor, Mitchell, 887. •Croly, 8 Ch. IX.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 241 sumers" and afterwards "take up the fight again where they left off ' without prejudice.'" Roosevelt was glad to receive such a letter; he had been studying Cleve- land's and Olney's action in the Pullman car strike 1 and he expected to act with the same firmness that they had shown. Now he told Cleveland that the operators " re- fused point blank" to consider Mitchell's proposition of arbitration, and he had substantially adopted the sug- gestion of the letter. On October 6 the President pro- posed that if the men would go to work, he would appoint a commission to determine matters in dispute promising to do all in his power to have what legislation they pro- posed enacted. This offer was refused by Mitchell for what he deemed good and sufficient reasons. 2 The President was not especially pleased that his plan to settle the trouble was thus rejected by Mitchell but this feeling was soon overcome by his irritation at the standpoint of the operators; he now proposed to ask Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, and two eminent men to make a thorough investigation and to say how the dispute should be settled. He ear- nestly begged Cleveland to be one of the three. Re- ceiving the Ex-President's assent on October 13, he "im- mediately wrote to a certain Federal judge asking him to be the third member of the Commission." As the investigation would consume considerable time, the Pres- ident determined that operations should begin at once, so he arranged with Senator Quay to have the governor of Pennsylvania notify him that he could not keep order in the coal regions without Federal interference. Then 1 See viii. 424. 2 Organized Labor, 388. 242 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 Roosevelt decided to send thither Lieutenant-General John M. Schofield, who was on the retired list of the army, with a sufficient number of regular troops ; he should act as receiver, put down all violence, take full charge of the mines and operate them to supply the present de- mand. Secretaries Root and Knox, both being excellent lawyers, would not have advised this straining of the Con- stitution ; nevertheless they supported the President loyally. 1 There was considerable violence in the coal regions but where the fault lay it was bootless to inquire. Cer- tainly Mitchell's advice was against anything of the sort and the President who knew all of the facts in the case, stated in a private letter to Bishop on October 13, the matter fairly: "I have been told, on excellent authority, that the disorder has been very great and of very evil kind. On equally good authority I am told the exact contrary. ... I stand against socialism, against anarchic disorder." 2 Soon after the conference of October 3, all of the national guard of Pennsylvania was sent to the coal regions to act toward the preservation of peace. It was frequently stated by the operators that, if men were properly protected, enough could be secured to man the mines, but this did not prove to be the case. 3 The President s;iw accurately the probable course of things, writing thus to Robert Bacon: "The situation is bad, especially because it is possible it may grow in- 1 On Aug. <>, 1908, ftoosi veil wrote :i letter to the Outlook in which he Rave a large part of the Cleveland oorreepondenoe. Hie Outlook, Aug. 22, 1908, 881. it i- al o printed by Bishop, L 2M n.r rather than to have me make Bishop Spalding or anyone else 'the eminenl sociolo- gist,' and add the labor man. 1 instantly told them that 1 Life of llaiinn, Cruly, 399. Ch. IX.] ROOSEVELT — HANNA 245 I had not the slightest objection whatever to doing an absurd thing when it was necessary to meet the objection of an absurd mind on some vital point, and that I would cheerfully appoint my labor man as the ' eminent sociolo- gist.' It was almost impossible for me to appreciate the instant and tremendous relief this gave them. They saw nothing offensive in my language and nothing ridicu- lous in the proposition, and Pierpont Morgan and Baer, when called up by telephone, eagerly ratified the absurd- ity; and accordingly at this utterly unimportant price we bid fair to come out of as dangerous a situation as I ever dealt with." l Roosevelt desired to appoint Grover Cleveland on the Commission in lieu of the army engineer, but to this the operators would not agree. In 1915 Roosevelt wrote to Charles Washburn, "I think the settlement of the coal strike was much the most important thing I did about labor from every standpoint." 2 The President wrote to Senator Hanna: "Last night when it became evident that we were going to get a Commission which would be accepted by both sides, I remarked, 'Well, Uncle Mark's work has borne fruit,' and everybody said 'yes.' The solution came because so many of us have for so long hammered at the matter until at last things got into shape which made the present outcome possible." 3 In effect- ing such a compromise the personality of men counted for much and Roosevelt and Hanna seemed the men of all men to bring about such a result. 1 Bishop, i. 214; Private Conversation with the President, Nov. 16, 1905. 2 Roosevelt, Thayer, 246 ; Charles G. Washburn, 82. 3 Oct. 16, Life of Hanna, Croly, 400. 24G ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 The Commission was : Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, retired, formerly Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. ; E. W. Parker, expert mining engineer, chief statistician of the coal division of the U. S. Geological Survey and editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal; George Gray, Judge of the United States Circuit Court, Dela- ware; E. E. Clark, Chief of the Order of Railway Con- ductors, sociologist ; Thomas H. Watkins, practically connected with the mining and selling of coal ; Bishop John L. Spalding of Illinois; Carroll D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Recorder of the Commission. 1 "Most of the miners were Roman Catholics" and "Mit- chell and the other leaders of the miners had urged me to appoint some high Catholic ecclesiastic." Bishop Spalding was "one of the very best men to be found in the entire country." 2 Judge Gray was chosen chairman of the Commission. The miners at once went to work. The relief felt in the eastern part of the country was very great. The well-to-do were spared much hardship, the poor, freezing. Coal, of which there was still a small stock, had advanced to fabulous prices. Now normal conditions obtained. Many homes accustomed to genial warmth blessed Roose- velt because he had used the high office of President to give them comfort. In five months the Commission made their report to the President, with their different awards. They ad- judged that the miners should have an increase of ten per cent in their wages; that their should be no dis- crimination againsl union or aon-union laborers; a slid- 1 Bishop, i. 217. 1 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 6U7, 600. Ch. IX.] SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE 247 ing scale of wages was fixed which should increase the pay of the miners with any advance in the price of coal ; the award should continue for three years. The Com- mission further adjudged that any differences of opinion should be referred to a permanent joint committee to be called a Board of Conciliation, to consist of six persons, three of whom should be named by the mine workers and three by the operators. In the event that the six could not agree, the umpire should be "one of the circuit judges of the third judicial circuit of the United States, whose decision shall be final and binding in the premises." 1 John Mitchell maintained that the Commission indirectly acknowledged the miners' union, writing, " While dis- claiming the wish to compel the recognition of the United Mine Workers of America, the Commission in actual practice made that recognition inevitable and imme- diate." 2 "Time," wrote Joseph B. Bishop in 1920, "has com- pletely justified the President's course. Not only did the findings of the Commission secure peace in the anthra- cite mines during the three stipulated years, but perma- nently, for since 1902 there has been no strike there and no serious labor trouble." 3 Germans living in Venezuela had claims against her which were assumed by the German Government ; there were also British and Italian claims which had been assumed respectively by Great Britain and Italy so that the question of indemnity became one between govern- ments. For our purpose, Italy may be left out of con- 1 Report of Anthracite Coal Commission, 80 et seq. 2 Organized Labor, 394. 3 Vol. i. 219. 248 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 sideration and our attention directed to Germany and Great Britain, between which the printed records of For- eign Relations show a community of interest and feeling. In 1901 these two powers offered a number of times to submit the dispute to arbitration and especially by the note of the German Government of July 16, 190 1, 1 but Venezuela refused such an offer. In 1902 Germany and Great Britain had a squadron of war-vessels off the Vene- zuelan coast for the purpose of collecting what was due their citizens. The story would be no other than one of shiftiness on the part of a South American power in her diplomacy and action were it not that the proceeding of the German Government in 1902 gave the occasion of a bout between the President and the Kaiser. In December, 1902, Venezuela desired arbitration, which now Germany did not want, and the suspicion of Roose- velt became aroused that she "intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms on the model of Kiauchau [Kiaochow] - with a view to exercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs generally." England and Germany at this time threatened a block- ade and on December 9, 1902, captured all of the Venezue- lan war-vessels in the port of Caracas, her capital ; and four days later, the united fleets bombarded the forts 1 Foreign Relations, 1904, 507. : EGaoehow Bay, n hrur inlel in China, "was seised in November, 1^07, iiv tin- Qennaa Beet. , , , The bay and land on l">tli sides "t" the en« trance were leased to Germany for '.»'.) years. During the continuance of the lease Germany ww^wwf .ill the rights to territorial sovereignty, in- cluding the right to erect fortiGcations." Encyclopaedia Britannica, xv. 788. Ch. IX.] THE GERMAN MENACE 249 of the town of Puerto Cabello, the cause being an alleged insult to the British flag on a British merchant vessel. 1 Germany favored a "pacific blockade" while Great Brit- ain did not believe there could be such a thing. "Has war been declared?" the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, was asked in the House of Commons, and he replied, "Does the honorable and learned gentleman suppose that without a state of war you can take the ships of an- other power and blockade its ports?" 2 In October, 1915, William Roscoe Thayer writing a chapter, "The German Menace Looms Up," in his "Life of John Hay," gave the inside of Germany's ulterior pur- pose; this history aroused great interest. Roosevelt on August 21, 1916, wrote a letter to Thayer in which he told the whole story, 3 confirming what Thayer had already written and elaborating the incident. In his Message to Congress of December, 1901, the President had said, "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil." To Roosevelt it seemed that the result of Germany's action would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and, if she refused to arbitrate the whole question, she would wage war against Venezuela and take possession of a seaport. "Germany," he wrote, "declined to agree to arbitrate the question at issue be- tween her and Venezuela and declined to say that she would not take possession of Venezuelan territory, merely saying that such possession would be 'temporary.' " 1 Foreign Relations, 1903, 790, 797. 2 Dec. 17, 1902, Foreign Relations, 1903, 455. 3 Thayer printed this letter as an appendix to his second edition. 250 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 The attitude of England was different. Henry White heard on December 16 Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Minister, say in the House of Lords, "It is not intended to land a British force and still less to occupy Venezuelan territory." 1 The correspondence with Great Britain was conducted by Henry White, the first Secretary of Le- gation, who, seeing his own country's side with persist- ency could present it to a foreign power with the courtesy that obtains in diplomatic transactions — "the most useful man in the entire diplomatic service during my presidency, and for many years before was Henry White," 2 said Roosevelt. "I speedily became con- vinced," wrote Roosevelt, "that Germany was the leader and the really formidable party in the transaction and that England was merely following Germany's lead in rather half-hearted fashion." "I saw the Ambassador" [Holleben, of Germany] re- lated Roosevelt, "and explained that in view of the Ger- man squadron on the Venezuelan coast I could not permit longer delay in answering my request for an arbi- tration and that I could not acquiesce in any seizure of Venezuelan territory. The Ambassador responded that his government could not agree to arbitrate and that there was no intention to take 'permanent' possession of Venezuelan territory. I answered that Kiauchau was not a permanent possession of Germany — that I understood it was merely held by a 99 years' lease and that I did not intend to have another Kiauchau, held by similar tenure, on the approach to the Isthmian Ca- 1 Foreign ReUtii L53. •Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, 3S3. Ch. IX.] THE GERMAN MENACE 251 nal." The President further said that if he did not re- ceive a favorable reply within ten days, he should order Dewey and his fleet thither to resist any attempt of the Germans to take possession of Venezuelan territory. Roosevelt was aware that he could back up the threat. Paying much attention to naval matters he knew that our Navy was in efficient condition. Dewey was at Cu- lebra, Puerto Rico, "in command of a fleet consisting of over fifty ships, including every battle-ship and every torpedo boat that we had, with orders from Washington to hold the fleet in hand and be ready to move at a moment's notice." A few days afterwards Holleben came to see the Presi- dent but said nothing in reference to Venezuela, and when he rose to go he was asked if he had heard anything from his government regarding the matter in dispute. The answer was no, whereupon the President said he would advance the time he had proposed and order Dewey to sail twenty-four hours previous to the expiration of the ten days. But before the President found it necessary to cable to Dewey, Holleben informed him that the German Emperor would consent to an arbitration and desired that Roosevelt should be arbitrator. This, after due consideration, was declined and the case went to the Hague Tribunal. 1 This account is confirmed by a letter of President Roosevelt to Henry White dated August 14, 1906: "At the time of the Venezuela business I saw the German Ambassador privately myself ; told him to tell the Kaiser that 1 had put Dewey in charge of our fleet to maneuver 1 Thayer, Life of Hay, ii. Appendix. , 252 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 in West Indian waters; that the world at large should know this merely as a maneuver and we should strive in every way to appear simply as cooperating with the Germans ; but that I regretted to say that the popular feel- ing was such that 1 should be obliged to interfere, by force if necessary, if the Germans took any action which looked like the acquisition of territory there or elsewhere along the Caribbean ; that this was not in any way intended as a threat, but as the position on the part of the Government which the American people would demand, and that I wanted him to understand it before the two nations drifted into such a position that trouble might come. I do not know whether it was a case of post hoc or propter hoc, but immediately afterward the Kaiser made to me the proposition that I should arbitrate myself, which I finally got him to modify so that it was sent to The Hague." My authority for this bout between the President and the Kaiser is Thayer's account and Roosevelt's letters of August, 1906 and 1916. There seems to be no opposition between them and the printed diplomatic correspondence, Roosevelt's speech of April 2, 1903, cited by John Bassett Moore in his Review of Thayer's Life of Hay, 1 and the President's Message to Congress of December, 1903. It is well known that much diplomatic work is not set down in the printed Foreign Relations. Charles Francis Adams, who had occasion to investigate some phases of English diplomacy, was insistent on the part that private Letters played in certain negotiations J and in our own country the daily talk ami telephone communications must be considered. Therefore Roosevelt's recollection of this 1 l V, had Science QwtrUrly, Mure!), 1917, ll l J. Ch. IX.] GERMANY ARBITRATES 263 episode, although not given to the world until 1915 and 1916, seems to me good historical evidence. In no way does the printed record contravene it. In fact, in a study of the correspondence with Germany one may well be convinced that the whole story is not therein told, as many of the despatches are simply given in "paraphrase." The differences regarding arbitration between Great Britain and Germany may be detected and it is easy to believe that Ger- many was forced in 1902 to an arbitration of the dispute. After the controversy with the Kaiser had ended with his submission, affairs proceeded smoothly. Both Great Britain and Germany made certain reservations that should not be submitted to the Tribunal. Both coun- tries blockaded the Venezuela ports from December 20, 1902, to February 16, 1903, during which time negotiations went on which resulted in the arbitration. Both of these circumstances were apparently with the consent of Pres- ident Roosevelt. The Hague Tribunal made its award on February 22, 1904. 1 President Roosevelt's action toward another European power demands attention. "I feel," he wrote to Finley Peter Dunne [Dooley] a a sincere friendliness for Eng- land ; but you may notice that I do not slop over about it, and that I do not in the least misunderstand England's attitude." 2 "I think more of England than of any other foreign country," the President said a year later. "She is more sincerely our friend. I detest the Anglophobists. Sometimes when discussing matters with the Irish I am tempted to become an Anglomaniac." 3 For an om- 1 Foreign Relations, 1904, 506. 2 November 1904, Bishop, i. 348. 3 Conversation with President Roosevelt, November 17, 1905. 254 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 nivorous reader, as was Roosevelt, no other feeling was possible. The majority of the many books that he read were by English writers. He thoroughly believed in the high civilization expressed in her literature. To him that the two nations possessed the common language of Shakespeare and Milton was no unmeaning talk ; it was indeed ingrained in the fibre of his being and he was al- ways ready to acknowledge England as the predominant partner. One may see into his very thought in reading his letter to John Morley [Jan. 17, 1904] wherein he says, "Personally I feel that with all their faults Gibbon and Macaulay are the two great English historians." 1 This feeling toward England must therefore be taken into account in considering the Alaska boundary dispute. Every British map until 1884 shows the disputed Alaskan territory belonging either to Russia or to the United States according to which had dominion, and no claim was made by Canada to this territory until 1S98 when Lord Herschell, at the head of the Joint High Commission, ap- pointed to consider twelve subjects of difference between Canada and the United States, asserted it. eliciting this comment from John Hay, then Secretary of State. On Jan- uary 3, 1899, he thus wrote to Henry White : "In the ease of Alaska it is hard to treat with patience the claim set up by Lord Herschell, that virtually the whole coast belongs to England, leaving us only a few jutting promontories without communication with each other. Without going into the historical or Legal argument, as a mere matter of common Bense it is impossible that any nation should ever have conceded, or any other nation have accepted, 1 Bishop, i. 269. Ch. IX.] ALASKA 255 the cession of such a ridiculous and preposterous boun- dary line. We are absolutely driven to the conclusion that Lord Herschell put forward a claim that he had no be- lief or confidence in, for the mere purpose of trading it off for something substantial. And yet the slightest suggestion that his claim is unfounded throws him into a fury." 1 It was not only, indeed I think not chiefly, due to the belief that the contested region might be gold-bearing, but rather to the desire to get ports contiguous to the Klondike. This was especially true of Skagway at the head of the Lynn Canal. It was the chief port for the Klondike and under the Canadian claim would be British territory. The reason of this claim is not far to seek. In 1896 gold was discovered in the Klondike. British Columbia and Alaska went wild over the discovery. Gold might exist in this disputed territory so that it might be of value to either country. Herschell and the British members of the Commission would settle no other question unless the Alaska boundary was first determined, and as the Joint High Commission could not agree on that, they adjourned without arriving at any conclusion. It was therefore one of the foreign matters bequeathed to the Roosevelt administration. Then came the South African War [1899-1902] and out of friendship to England, the President did not want to press the matter; he was indeed in no hurry but, if gold were discovered, he intended to occupy the territory. The English proposed arbitration. Our Ambassador favored that disposition of the matter and possibly so 1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 205. 256 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 did our Secretary of State. But the President said, no. It is no question for arbitration. Roosevelt indeed dis- trusted the opinion of our Ambassadors to England ; they were prone to see the English side of any question. 1 James Bryce wrote in 1888 : "Even in these days of vig- ilant and exacting constituencies one sees many members of the House of Commons, the democratic robustness or provincial crudity of whose ideas melts like wax under the influence of fashionable dinner-parties and club smok- ing rooms." 2 Educated men know the charm of English society and can appreciate how our official representa- tives, recipients as they are of manifold attentions, fall victims to that charm. The President was firm. The result was the Conven- tion of January 24, 1903, which constituted a Tribunal of "six important jurists of repute," to determine the boundary line between Alaska and British Columbia. Three members were to be appointed by the President ; three by his Britannic Majesty. A majority should determine the award. 3 The President named Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, Elihu Root, Secretary of War, and George Turner, ex-Senator from Washington. Before these were definitely appointed the President endeavored to get a Justice <>f the Supreme Court, but he decline. 1 on the ground that the post was not in lino with his duties. Another Justice was ap- proached witli a like result. 1 The selections of the Presi- 1 Conversation with the President, Nov. 17, L905; Life of Bay, Thayer, ii. 207, 208; Life of Roosevelt, Thayer, 17 I But see Life of Choate, Maiim. ii. 228, 235, 237, 238. 'American Commonwealth, ii 230. 3 Foreign Et lations, 1903, 188 4 Diplomatic Memoirs, John W. Foster, ii. 109. Ch. IX.] THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 257 dent were criticised, both in Canada and the United States, as not being according to the Treaty which called for "impartial jurists of repute." The editor of Hall's In- ternational Law (ed. 1904) spoke of the choice of the American members as a "serious blot on the proceed- ings." But the British government did not officially make any complaint. They named as members, Baron Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England, Louis A. Jette, Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, and A. B. Aylesworth of the Toronto bar. 1 London was selected as the place for the sitting of the Tribunal. After the appointment of the Tribunal and before its decision, the President wrote to Justice Holmes a letter [July 25, 1903], which he might show "privately and un- officially" to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secre- tary. He also wrote one of similar import to Henry White which as desired was shown to Arthur Balfour, Prime Minister. In the letter to Justice Holmes the President said: "Nothing but my very earnest desire to get on well with England and my reluctance to a break made me consent to this appointment of a Joint Com- mission [officially a Tribunal] in this case ; for I regard the attitude of Canada which England has backed, as having the scantest possible warrant in justice. How- ever, there were but two alternatives. Either 1 could appoint a commission and give a chance for agreement ; or I could do as I shall of course do in case this Commis- sion fails and request Congress to make an appropriation which will enable me to run the boundary on my own hook. . . . The claim of the Canadians for access to deep 1 Diplomatic Memoirs, J. W. Foster, ii. 198. 258 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 water along any part of the Canadian [Alaskan] coast is just exactly as indefensible as if they should now sud- denly claim the island of Nantucket. There is not a man fit to go on the Commission in all the United States, who would treat this claim any more respectfully than he would treat a claim to Nantucket. . . . But there are points which the Commission can genuinely consider. There is room for argument about the islands in the mouth of the Portland Channel. . . . The objection raised by certain Canadian authorities to Lodge, Root and Turner, and especially to Lodge and Root, was that they had committed themselves on the general propo- sition. No man in public life in any position of promi- nence could have possibly avoided committing himself on the proposition. . . . Let me add that I earnestly hope that the English understand my purpose. I wish to make one last effort to bring about an agreement through the Commission which will enable the people of both countries to say that the result represents the feeling of the representatives of both countries. But if there is a disagreement I wish it distinctly understood, not only that there will be no arbitration of the matter, but that in my Message to Congress I shall take a position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration here- after; a position, I am inclined to believe, which will render it necessary for Congress to give me the author- ity to run the line as we claim it , by our own people with- out any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada."' And Hay wrote to Foster on September 20, 1903: "I hear the usual pessimistic foreoastfl — some Bishop, i. 259; Thayer, Life of Roosevelt, 176. Ch. IX.] ALASKAN TRIBUNAL 259 from London — some from this side. But I shall not believe, until I am forced to, that Lord Alverstone can so shut his eyes to law and evidence as to give a verdict against us, especially as he must know that this is the last chance for an honorable and graceful retreat from an absolutely untenable position. I am sincerely sorry they have got themselves into such a fix ; but it is their own fault and they will make a fatal mistake if they refuse to avail them- selves of the opportunity we have given them to get out." * The decision of the Tribunal was made October 20, 1903, and fixed the land boundary well back of all the inlets, as was the chief contention of the United States. This was done by a vote of four to two, Lord Alverstone siding with the Americans and the two Canadian members dissenting. The Tribunal was unanimous in giving to Canada two of the four uninhabited islands. 2 The two Canadian members not only did not sign the award but gave to the press "a carefully prepared interview in which they declared that the decision was not judicial in its character." John W. Foster, who criticised the appeal to the press by the Canadian members, did not share the censure meted out to them for their failure to sign the award. He wrote with the impartiality which dis- tinguishes his work : " A similar precedent is to be found in the Halifax Fisheries Arbitration of 1877, when the American member not only refused to sign the award but questioned its validity. A better practice was ob- served in the Fur-Seal Arbitration at Paris in 1893. The two American members, Justice Harlan and Senator Morgan, were outvoted on almost every one of the six 1 Diplomatic Memoirs, John W. Foster, ii. 206. 3 Foreign Relations, 1903, 543 ; Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, ii. 203. 260 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 points submitted to the Tribunal ; but, without with- drawing their votes they cheerfully united with their colleagues in signing the award." Foster went on to say, "The people of the United States were very angry at the Halifax award and were by no means pleased with the result of the Fur-Seal Arbitration at Paris." 1 On June 8, 1911, Roosevelt wrote to Admiral Mahan : "The settlement of the Alaskan boundary settled the last serious trouble between the British Empire and our- selves as everything else could be arbitrated. ... I feel very differently towards England from the way I feel towards Germany." 2 Roosevelt, shortly before his death [January 6, 1919], wrote to Mahan a letter that may be taken as his legacy to his countrymen : "I regard the British Navy as prob- ably the most potent instrumentality for peace in the world. I do not believe we should try to build a navy in rivalry to it but I do believe we should have the second navy in the world. Moreover I am prepared to say what five years ago I would not have said, I think the time has come when the United States and the British Empire can agree to a universal arbitration treaty. In other words I believe the time has come when we should say that under no circumstances shall there ever be a resort to war between the United States and the British Empire, and that no question can arise between them that cannot be settled in judicial fashion." 3 1 Diplomatic Memoirs, ii. 201. - Life of Mahan, Taylor, 203. 1 Life of Malum, Taylor, 224. In this aOOOUnt 1 have also consulted J. W. Poster's Article on tin- Alaskan Boundary, National Ooographie Af'H/dzine, Nov. 1899, printed as Doc. No. 2, 58th Cong., Special Session; The Com of die r. s. ; The Argument of the U. £>., both of which ure printed by the CJuv't Printing Ullieo. CHAPTER X "By far the most important action I took in foreign affairs during the time I was President," wrote Roose- velt, " relates to the Panama Canal." 1 At the time Hay became Secretary of State there was a feeling in the coun- try decidedly in favor of joining the two oceans by a ca- nal. Long existent, the feeling had been fostered by the events of the Spanish-American War and especially by the voyage of the Oregon around Cape Horn. As she was desired to reinforce the Atlantic fleet, it could not be ignored how much sooner she would have made the junction had there been a canal from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with England, made in 1850, 2 stood in the way. Hay set to work to supersede this and negotiated a Treaty which was signed by him and Lord Pauncefote, the British Ambassador, on February 5, 1900. Roosevelt, who was then Governor of New York, in a friendly letter to Hay criticised severely two points in the Treaty : the first was the prohibition of fortifying the canal, and the second was a virtual in- vitation to foreign powers to a joint guarantee that in his view would tend to invalidate the Monroe Doctrine. 3 Hay was irritated that the Senate did not ratify the Treaty; he deemed it an " irreparable mistake of our Constitution" which put it into "the power of one- third + 1 of the Senate to meet with a categorical veto any treaty negotiated by the President." 4 He spoke against 1 Autobiography, 553. 2 Vol. i. 199. 3 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 339. * To Choate. ibid., 219. 261 262 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 the Senate "almost with ferocity." 1 His sayings re- ported by tale bearers did not help his cause with the senators and he was never popular with the Senate. Yet much more than anything of the sort, the ideas which lay at the bottom of Roosevelt's friendly criticism affected the Senate's action in regard to the Treaty and they made amendments to it which embodied tacitly these objec- tions. The British Government did not accept the amendments. Hay resigned his position as Secretary of State in the following words : "Dear Mr. President: The action of the Senate indicates views so widely diver- gent from mine in matters affecting, as I think, the na- tional welfare and honor, that I fear my power to serve you in business requiring the concurrence of that body is at an end. I cannot help fearing also that the news- paper attacks upon the State Department, which have so strongly influenced the Senate, may be an injury to you if I remain in the Cabinet." McKinley, in a very manly letter, refused to accept his resignation. 2 Hay did not let his irritation prevent his going ahead with the project, and he took steps toward the negotia- tion of a new Treaty. Meanwhile Roosevelt had become President and the new Treaty, which is known as the sec- ond Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, was signed by Hay and Pauncefote on November 18, 1901, was ratified by the Senate on December 16 by 72 : 6 and concurred in by the British Government. Under this Treaty, the canal was built. It provided that it should supersede the conven- tion of 1850 and that the canal might be constructed 1 Life of Haw Thuvrr, li. 2\i'3. ■ Ibid., il 238. Ch. X.] THE PANAMA CANAL 263 either by the United States or by corporations that it might aid. 1 A clear statement of its meaning on one disputed point is given by Shelby M. Cullom, who was then a member and soon to become chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. "The first and second Hay-Pauncefote treaties must be construed together; the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty contained a prohibi- tion against fortifications; the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty neither prohibited nor in terms agreed to fortifi- cations, but was silent on the subject ; therefore, the legal construction would be that Great Britain had receded from the position that the canal should not be fortified." 2 The canal was fortified. James Bryce wrote: "The visitor who sees the slopes where these forts and batteries are to be placed, asks who are the enemies whom it is desired to repel. Where is the great naval power that has any motive either of national enmity or of self- interest sufficient to induce it to face the risks of a war with a country so populous, so wealthy and so vigorous as the United States?" 3 The peace-loving American who gazes at the forts on the cliffs of Gibraltar might put pari passu the same question. Public sentiment had decided that there should be an inter-oceanic canal and that it should be constructed by the United States. The question was should it go by Nicaragua or across the Isthmus of Panama ? When Hay wrote on January 15, 1900, "The canal is going to be built, probably by the Nicaragua route," 4 he expressed 1 Digest of International Law. John Bassett Moore, iii. 219. The Treaty is printed in full and the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty is given on p. 210. 2 Fifty Years of Public Service, 381. 3 South America, 32. * Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 222. 264 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 the popular opinion. The Nicaragua canal "has become a sentiment," said Senator Hanna in his great speech advocating the Panama route. Three commissions had decided in favor of it. "I want to confess," declared Hanna, "that in common with all my fellow citizens I shared in that feeling and belief and, as the necessity- seemed to grow and demand an isthmian canal [through Nicaragua], I would have been prepared, under the in- fluences which then existed, to give my hearty support to that project." The advantage of Panama over Nicaragua was well put forward by Hanna in this speech. "The Panama Canal route," he said, "is 49 miles long as against 183 miles of the Nicaraguan route." The New Panama Canal Company (French) which had previously offered to sell its plant, rights, privileges, franchises and con- cessions for 109 millions had now come down to 40 mil- lions. 1 Included in this offer were all of the existing shares of the Panama railway except about 1100; the total was 70,000 shares. The last Commission had, on receiving the new offer of the French company, made a supplementary report (January IS, 1902) recommend- ing the Panama route. The question of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, of the cost of construction and opera- tion was all in favor of the canal by way of Panama. 2 This was Hanna's greatest effort in the Senate. Ac- cording to Senator George F. Boar, QO mean judge, he eloquent as he
  • and ,- '. 1002, is reported in the Congressional Record, 6817 ft < , o Life of Hanna, Croly, 379 rt < 'J. Ch. X] THE PANAMA CANAL 265 bearings. "He changed the whole attitude of the Sen- ate," wrote Cullom, "concerning the route for an inter- oceanic canal. We all generally favored the Nicaraguan route. Senator Hanna became convinced that the Pan- ama route was best and he soon carried everything be- fore him to the end that the Panama route was selected." 1 A bill providing for the construction of the Nicaraguan canal had passed the House almost unanimously and to the bill as it came to the Senate, Spooner had added an amendment providing for the purchase of the rights, privileges, franchises, concessions, right of way, unfin- ished work, plants and property of the New Panama Canal Company of France for 40 millions, and the con- struction of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama, but if "the President be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary terri- tory of the Republic of Colombia within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," then the President 1 Fifty Years of Public Service, 281. "The United States had been committed for thirty years to an isthmian canal by the Nicaragua route. It came to be considered as 'the American line.' The resolution in its favor had passed the House. Senator Hanna gave to the study of the question, which was purely a business one, a mind long trained in con- struction contracts. He came to the conclusion that we should build on the Panama route. . . . He accomplished that rarest of triumphs, the command of a listening Senate." — Senator C. M. Depew. Senator Charles Dick who succeeded Hanna in the Senate said: "His greatest achievement in this body was in converting a hostile majority to favor the route for an isthmian canal which his judgment declared was the best. He came to this conclusion only after most thorough investigation. When he entered upon this contest few of the Members of Congress agreed with him. . . . He was told that his efforts would be futile. He entered upon the contest with all the zeal and energy of his strong nature. By personal appeals, by labors in committee and on this floor he urged his views." Memorial addresses, 104, 131. 266 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 "might fall back to the Nicaragua route." l This passed the Senate by 42 to 34, 2 was accepted by the House, signed by the President and was entirely satisfactory to public opinion. On the basis of this act Hay negotiated what is known as the Hay-Herran Treaty, signed January 22, 1903. Dr. Herran was the charge d'affaires of Colombia in Wash- ington. Colombia's executive officer was Marroquin, a usurper who had been Vice-President and now assumed to be acting President. He was called a dictator by Roosevelt and those who supported his action, but his word was far from being law. At first really in favor of the Treaty, he succumbed to a popular sentiment, which was excited by the Finance Minister and the press of Bogota, and did not advocate strongly the Treaty before the Colombia Congress as Roosevelt and Hay thought he should have done. The Treaty was not valid unless approved by the Colombia Congress and the popular feeling, at least in Bogota, the capital, was that the ten million bonus and the $250,000 per year after nine years, which was what the United States had agreed to pay by the Hay-Herran Treaty, was not sufficient compen- sation for that which Colombia was conceding to the United States. It was thought that the provision of the Spooner Act that, unless proper arrangements could be made with the Republic of Colombia and the French Canal Company, the United States was empowered to construct the Nicaraguan Canal, was a mere bluff to make better terms; with Colombia which looked upon the Isth- i \.ts of Congren relating to the Panama Canal, 27. This included 68,863 alums of the Panama llailroad Company out of a total of 70,000 almre8. 1 Life of liuuua, Cruly, Ch. X.] THE HAY-HERRAN TREATY 267 mus of Panama "as a financial cow to be milked for the benefit of the country at large." l Therefore the Senate of Colombia in two different sessions, as a response to popular sentiment aroused largely by the press of Bo- gota, rejected the Treaty in August and postponed the consideration of it indefinitely in October. 2 Unquestionably the Hay-Herran Treaty should have been ratified. The arguments of Roosevelt and Hay in its favor are unanswerable, but the idea of the Bogota" press and the Colombia Senate was that more money might be had. General Reyes, who was really a friend to a fair composition between the two countries, thought that ten millions from the French Company and an in- crease of five millions from the United States would in- sure the ratification of the Treaty. 3 The more radical pretended that the French concession expired in 1904 and, if ratification were postponed, Colombia might re- ceive the whole forty millions which the United States had agreed to pay to the French Company. But this concession to the French Company had been extended to 1910, and to repudiate such a plain contract would hardly have been done even by a country so regardless of plighted faith as was Colombia. Take it all in all, the action of Colombia was blackmail and aroused all the fighting qualities in Roosevelt's nature. A true convert to the Panama Canal, he determined that the canal should there be built. Events now moved swiftly. Hay telegraphed on July 13 to Beaupre, our Minister at Bogota: " Neither of the 1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 304. J August 12, October 30. As the Senate rejected it the House did not pass upon it. 3 July 9, Foreign Relations, 1903, 163. 268 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 proposed amendments mentioned in your telegram [Reyes's suggestion ante] received to-day would stand any chance of acceptance by the Senate of the United States, while any amendment whatever or unnecessary delay in the ratification of the Treaty would greatly im- peril its consummation." 1 It was bruited about in Bogota that, in the event of non-ratification of the Treaty, Panama would secede from Colombia, get the ten million bonus and the annual stipend herself, but as to that the Colombia Senate, backed by popular sentiment, was willing to take the chance. Colombia had a population of five millions divided into nine departments of which Panama was one, and the number of its inhabitants was about 250,000. The Co- lombian army consisted of 10, 000. 2 Now appeared upon the scene Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a celebrated French engineer, who had been connected with the French Canal enterprise and was now much concerned in having the Panama route adopted and the French Company receiving actually the forty millions without any deduction in favor of the "corruptionists" of Bogota ; he therefore fomented with great skill a revolu- tion in Panama. It was practically a bloodless 3 revolution and resulted in a Treaty between the Republic of Panama and the United States, providing for the construction of the canal. While neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary Hay connived at the revolution, they sympa- thized with it. "No one," declared President Roosevelt ' I - ,,-, i i, Ri ' itior I I, 164 'Reyes, Foreign Relatione, 288. 3 < )nc Chinaman was killed. D< patch of Ehnnao to Hay, Nov. 4. Ehrman irai ' on ul-Genera] in Panama. Foreign Relations, 1903, 232. Ch. X.] THE PANAMA REVOLUTION 269 in his Message of January 4, 1904, " connected with this Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or en- couraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and that, save from the reports of our military and naval officers, no one connected with this Government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs." ! In August, wrote Roosevelt, "it began to appear probable that the Colombian legislature would not ratify the treaty. . . . Everyone knew that the revolution was a possibility but it was not until toward the end of October that it appeared to be an imminent probability. Although the Administration, of course, had special means of knowledge, no such means were nec- essary in order to appreciate the possibility and toward the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary outbreak and of its success." 2 As Roosevelt said to William R. Thayer many years later, "The other fellows in Paris and New York had taken all the risk and were doing all the work. Instead of trying to run a parallel conspiracy I had only to sit still and profit by their plot — if it suc- ceeded." 3 The President ordered naval ships to Colon (the port of Panama on the Caribbean Sea which was an arm of the Atlantic) and thus prevented the landing of a rein- forcement of Colombian troops that would have sup- pressed the revolution. How much the revolutionists foreign Relations, 1903, 272. Also Hay, ibid., 295, 310; T. Roose- velt, Autobiography (1913), 564. 2 Message of January, 1904. Foreign Relations, 1903, 263, 264. 3 Roosevelt, 190. 270 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 were dependent on the United States is seen by a citation from Bunau-Varilla's book. "From the morning of the 2d November (1903)," he wrote, "all the inhabitants of Colon were looking towards Kingston, hoping for the appearance of the ship symbolizing American protection. As the hours passed, disappointment gradually invaded all hearts. Towards nightfall despair was general, when suddenly a light smoke arose in the direction of the north- east. This was a ray of hope ! If it were the liberator ! Little by little, the smoke thickened, the ship emerged above the horizon and soon the Star-Spangled Banner dominated the Bay of Colon. A burst of delirious en- thusiasm shook the whole Isthmus. It was really true ! Bunau-Varilla had effectually obtained for the unfortu- nate country the protection of the powerful Republic ! At this moment, without one word having been uttered the revolution was accomplished in the hearts of all. . . . In the morning of the 3d of November General Tovar (of Colombia) arrived quietly with about 500 soldiers. . . . If these troops had arrived twenty-four hours earlier nobody would have made a move. . . . The Independent Republic of Panama was proclaimed. The revolution had been made without shedding a drop of blood." 1 The ship which arrived so opportunely for Bunau-Va- rilla's scheme was the Nashville. It may therefore be said that unless President Roosevelt had ordered our vessels-of-war to Colon the Panama revolution would 1 Panama, Hunaii-Varilla, 835. The incident is repeated in The Qieet Adventure of Panama (1920) in which Hunau-X 'anlla fclao .slate-, "All in Havnl [by the arrival < > f the N(uhoHl$\. . . . Colombia can say to-dav that the Republic of Panama was l>orn owing to American pro- tection." 2\;s, 347. Ch. X.] THE PANAMA REVOLUTION 271 have been suppressed. 1 "I simply lifted my foot," af- firmed Roosevelt. "Oh, Mr. President," said Attorney- General Knox in Cabinet meeting, "do not let so great an achievement suffer from any taint of legality." 2 It is probable that Roosevelt had better have exer- cised the virtue of patience as he was so advised by Sena- tor Hanna. 3 Many things might have happened with- out the secession of Panama. Popular sentiment in the United States was now in favor of the Panama route. Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, who although a Democrat had been made chairman of the Inter-Oceanic Canal Committee by a Republican Senate, on account of his enthusiasm for an Inter-Oceanic Canal, had made the Senate majority report in favor of the Nicaragua route. But Hanna was the "instigator of the minority report and became the leader in the Senate of the pro- Panama party," 4 and the successor of Morgan as the chairman of the committee. He was as enthusiastic for Panama as was Roosevelt, and could probably have influenced the Senate in its favor, despite the backing- down of Colombia. The eruption of Mont Pel6e in Mar- tinique during May, 1902, costing about 40,000 lives, was a powerful argument in favor of Panama, as it was well understood that the danger from volcanoes and earth- quakes was greater by the Nicaragua route. "Volcanoes and earthquakes," said Hanna in the Senate, "seem to be a burning question just now while Mount Pel6e is discharging its fire, and they have led to a more careful consideration of that matter." 6 1 For the disposition of the vessels reinforcing the Nashville, see Roose- velt in Foreign Relations, 1903, 266. 2 Impressions, Abbott, 139, 140. 3 Bishop, i. 278. 4 Life of Hanna, Croly, 380. 6 Record, 6319. 272 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 A mischief in Roosevelt's action was that it aggravated the suspicions of the Central and South American re- publics of the United States and led them to believe that the doctrine of might makes right prevailed in Yankee- dom ; so that if exercising the virtue of patience involved a delay of only twelve months, it better have been exer- cised. Moreover it may have been wise to nurse a co- terie in the Republic of Colombia in the hope that the violent public sentiment of Bogota might pass away. Marroquin, unpopular as he was in Bogotd, had appointed as governor of Panama Senator Obaldia. "Obaldia's separatist tendencies," wrote our Minister Beaupr6 to Hay, "are well known and he is reported to have said that, should the canal treaty not pass, the department of Panama would declare its independence and would be right in doing so. That these are his opinions there is of course no doubt." ' Reyes, the probable and actual successor of Marroquin, was well worth cultivating and his dignified correspondence with Secretary Hay during December, 1903, and January, 1904, manifest a man with whom one could bargain. "Such a scheme;" [that of the secession of Panama and itfl annexation to the United States), wrote \ John Hay" in the New 1 Foreign Relations, 1903, 193. 1 Life (if Hay, Thayer, ii ' ; i I Ch. X.] THE PANAMA REVOLUTION 273 York Times of October 2, 1904 ; from James C. Carter's criticism ; from George L. Fox's brochure of 1904, entitled "President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat" ; from Leander T. Chamberlain's article entitled " A Chapter of National Dis- honor," reprinted from the North American Review of February, 1912, as a Senate document; and from George L. Fox's letter to the New York Nation of February 24, 1916, reprinting the protest of many Yale professors of December 24, 1903, against the treatment of Colombia. 1 Saddest of all was the attitude of Senator George F. Hoar. In a speech in the Senate on December 17, 1903, he said : "No man in this country desires more eagerly than I do to support the Administration and to act with my Republican associates in this matter. I desire the build- ing of the canal. It is one of the great landmarks, rarely found once in a century, in the progress of humanity, bringing nations together and making the whole world kin. I hope that it is a laudable ambition that this may be accomplished in my time by the party with which I have acted from my youth, and by the Administration of my choice. Nothing can be more delightful to me than that it shall be accomplished by the President of whom I have supposed I had the right to speak as an honored and valued personal friend. . . . Before the revolution broke out our Government instructed its man-of-war to prevent the Government of Colombia from doing any- thing in anticipation of the revolution to prevent it. . . . Colombia was a friendly nation. ... It is said that she 1 The address of Storey and article of D. II. Chamberlain are preserved as pamphlets in the Boston Athenaeum. The article of L. T. Chamberlain is in a bound volume of "Tracts." In regard to James C. Carter see Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 324. 274 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 negotiated a treaty with us by her Executive, and then that her Executive took no steps to persuade her Con- gress to ratify it. Indeed she did exactly what we did with Denmark thirty years ago in the case of St. Thomas, what we have done lately with several commercial treaties and what the present Administration did with Great Britain within a year in the matter of the Newfoundland fishery treaty." 1 Senator Shelby M. Cullom was present at an interview between President Roosevelt and Senator George F. Hoar and has thus related the incident : "The President wanted the Senator to read a Message which he had already pre- pared in reference to Colombia's action . . . [probably the Message of January 4, 1904]. The President was sitting on the table, first at one side of Senator Hoar and then on the other, talking in his usual vigorous fash- ion, trying to get the Senator's attention to the Message. Senator Hoar seemed averse to reading it but finally sat down, and without seeming to pay any particular atten- tion to what he was perusing, remained for a minute or two, then arose and said 'I hope I may never live to see the day when the interests of my country are placed above its honor.' He at once retired from the room with- out uttering another word." 2 It must not be forgotten however, that Roosevelt, Hay and Root who was Secretary of War at the time of taking Panama, are a powerful trio to combat. Roose- velt and Hay represented a common-sense view while Root's legal analysis is very strong. 3 Their action was 1 Record , 316 ei seq. 1 Fifty Years of Public Service, 212. 8 Bishop, i. 301 el seq. Ch. XJ PANAMA 275 in no way for self-aggrandizement but solely in the in- terest of the country that they represented. "The canal would not have been built at all save for the action I took," declared Roosevelt in 1913. J There is no question that he believed this sincerely to the day of his death, but for the moment in this statement he indulged in prophecy forgetting Hosea Biglow's remark, "Don't never prophesy — onless ye know." A Junta of the provisional government of Panama appointed Philippe Bunau-Varilla "Envoy Extraordi- nary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the Government of the United States with full powers for political and financial negotiations." On November 13 the Republic of Panama was recognized by the United States. This action was followed by like recognition of France, Ger- many, Denmark, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Nicara- gua, Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa Rica, Japan and Austria-Hungary. 2 On November 18 Hay and Bunau-Varilla signed the Treaty which goes under their names. It was soon ratified by Panama. 3 The United States Senate ratified it on February 23, 1904, by a vote of 66 : 14. Under it the canal was built. "We were able to make with Panama a much more satisfactory treaty than we had with Colombia," wrote Cullom. 4 The United States guaranteed the indepen- dence of Panama. Panama granted to the United States a zone of land ten miles wide from which the cities of Panama and Colon (the Pacific and Caribbean seaports) 1 Autobiography, 569 ; see also Fear God and Take Your Own Part, written in 1916, 305. 2 Roosevelt, January 4, 1904. Foreign Relations, 276. * Panama, P. Bunau-Varilla, 349, 364, 367, 372, 384. 4 Fifty Years of Public Service, 383. 276 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 were excepted, but the United States was given full power to enforce the sanitation and public order of those two cities. The United States was to pay to Panama ten millions in gold coin and, beginning nine years after the ratification of the treaty, an annual payment of S250,000. Panama granted to the United States authority to fortify the canal and "if it should become necessary at any time," to employ its land and naval forces at its discre- tion. 1 " After paying $40,000,000 to J. P. Morgan & Co. for their subsequent transfer to the new company." so wrote Bunau-Varilla, "the American Government re- sumed on the 4th of May 1904, the work of completion of the great French undertaking after fifteen years, four months and twenty days practical suspension of activ- ity." 2 James Bryce wrote about the canal in a manner to gratify the American heart, when the source is considered. "In these forty miles of canal," he said, "(or fifty if we reckon from deep water to deep water) the two most remarkable pieces of engineering work are the gigantic dam (with its locks) at Gatun and the gigantic cutting at Culebra, each the hugest of its kind that the world has to shew. . . . Nothing less than an earthquake will 'Treaties relating to the Panama Canal, 13. 1 Panama, 43(). I have used Foreign 1 . 1903, more than the citations to them ■ • on to warrant. All the despatches <>f our competent minister to Colombia, Beaupre*, are well worth reading. Theodore i; i-veit, Autobiography; Life of Hay, Thayer, ii.; do Roosevelt; Bishop; Life of Banna, Croly; Panama, Bunau-Varilla; <1". The Great Adventure of Panama. 1 have also used Boo evelt, Pear Qod and Take Your Own Part; Life of Bi Leupp; do. Lewis; The Panama Bishop; Life of Poraker, ii. : Bncyclopcedia Britannica; Senate •e i>ii To it. with Columbia, open e: il. 1921, (f Senator 1 i I tOTah arul .1"!.: Ch. X.J PANAMA 277 affect them and of earthquakes there is no record in this region though they are frequent in Costa Rica, two hun- dred miles away. . . . There is something in the magni- tude and the methods of this enterprise which a poet might take as his theme. Never before on our planet has so much labor, so much scientific knowledge, and so much executive skill been concentrated on a work de- signed to bring the nations nearer to one another and serve the interests of all mankind. . . . The chief engi- neer, Colonel Goethals, is the head not only of the whole scheme of construction but of the whole administration, and his energy, judgment and power of swift decision are recognized to have been a prime factor in the progress of the work and the excellence of the administrative de- tails. The houses erected by the United States govern- ment are each of them surrounded on every floor by a fine wire netting which, while freely admitting the air, excludes winged insects. All the hospitals have been netted so carefully that no insect can enter to carry out infection from a patient. . . . The discovery, made while the United States troops were occupying Cuba after the war of 1898, that yellow fever is due to the bite of the Stegomyia, carrying infection from a patient to a healthy person, and that intermittent fevers are due to the bite of the Anopheles, similarly bearing poison from the sick to the sound, made it possible to enter on a campaign for the prevention of these diseases among the workers on the Isthmus. . . . One may be for days and nights on the Isthmus and neither see nor hear nor feel a mos- quito. To have made one of the pest houses of the world ... as healthy as Boston or London is an achievement of which the American medical staff and their country 278 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 for them, may well be proud ; ' and the name of Colonel Gorgas, the head of that medical staff to whose unwea- ried zeal and care this achievement is largely due, deserves to stand on the roll of fame beside that of Colonel Goe- thals, the chief engineer and chairman of the Commis- sion, who has directed and is bringing to its successful issue, this whole great enterprise. . . . It is expected that the construction of the canal will be found, when it is finished, to have cost nearly §400,000,000." 2 Bryce in 1921 disposes of what was at the time a mooted question. " It deserves to be noted," writes Bryce, "as a mark of Roosevelt's good sense and dis- cernment that he had, at an early stage in the long debates over the canal project, made up his mind that a sea level canal was practically out of the question. There was a grandiosity about the idea of an ocean highway with no locks which might have been expected to attract him. But his gift for weighing arguments and reaching the correct conclusion made him grasp and hold fast to the decision [that of a lock canal] which experience has abun- dantly approved." 3 1 For a striking article on the sanitation of the Isthmus see Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Historical Society, May 1911, 610. 2 South America, '-'3 it seq. The coal up to 1916 according to Theodore KommvHi was $375,000,000, Fear Clod and Take Your Own Part, 311. Up to June 30, 1920, 1467,431,267.41 had been appropriated for the canal. Of this $379,840,741.92 was appropriated for the construction of the canal and its immediate adjuncts. The reel went to: fortifications, 168,400.81; nine annual payments to Panama. 12,250,000; for opera- tion and maintenance, 150,51 1,91 L68. Dp t<> the same -laic $7,215,288 68 had been repaid on tin- oosi of construction; I 31.67 had been collected in tolls. Other receipts besides those two make tin- total re- oeipts to June 30, 1920, $42,176,261.22. Report of Governor of the Pan- ama Canal. 1920, 155, I 3 Review of ,i B. Bishop's Roosevelt. The Literary Soviets, N- ^ l- <■ Post, Feb. 19, L92L CHAPTER XI Henry White wrote in a private letter, "Roosevelt was the only man I have ever met who combined the qualities of an able politician at home with those of an equally good diplomatist abroad." We have seen some- thing of his work as diplomatist in Chapter IX and shall see more as the history goes on ; he was now to measure himself against the ablest politician in the United States, unless he himself were entitled to that designation, Mark Hanna. The stake was the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1904. Hanna did not approve of Roosevelt's action toward the large financial interests of the country, yet feeling that Roosevelt might have the country at his back did not act openly in opposition. On the contrary, to a certain extent, he worked with him and the President was grateful for his assistance. Writing to Taft, then Civil Governor of the Philippines, under date of March 13, 1903, he said, "With both Hanna and Aldrich I had to have a regular stand-up fight before I could get them to accept any trust legislation, but when I once got them to say they would give in, they kept their promise in good faith and it was far more satisfactory to work with them than to try to work with the alleged radical re- formers." l Under this seeming harmony there was, however, a quiet opposition. Hanna had the support of the finan- cial and business interests of the country but he was 1 Bishop, i. 237. 279 280 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 keen enough to know that something beside the backing of Wall Street and associated interests was necessary to the man who had political aspirations. He secured the support of the Labor Unions. During August, 1902, he declared: "The natural tendency in this country, ay, and in the world over, has been the selfish appropriation of the larger share by capital. As long as labor was in a situation which forced it to submit, that condition would to a very large degree continue. If labor had some griev- ance and each laborer in his individual capacity went to his employer and asked for consideration, how much would be shown to him? Not much. Therefore when they banded together in an organization for their own benefit which would give them power, if necessary, to demand a remedy, I say organized labor was justified. . . . It is truly astonishing to consider what trivial disagree- ments have occasioned some of the most serious strikes. I have seen two parties stand apart, each with a chip on his shoulder, defying his opponent to knock it off. . . . While labor unions may have proved a curse to England, I be- lieve that they will prove a boon to our own country. . . . Two factors contributed to the prosperity of our nation — the man who works with his hands ami the man who works with his head — part ners iii toil who ought to be partners in the profit of thai toil." And again in May, 1903, "I be- lieve in organize! labor and I believe in organized capital as an auxiliary." ' Collective bargaining was Hanna'e remedy for Labor troubles and this doctrine he thoroughly elaborated. By his famous "stand pat" Bpeech at Akron during Septem- ber, L902, he won the Bupporl of manufacturers and busi- 1 Croly, 405 << ■ "/- : & ■<• Croly, 117, for i full Mootmf of it. Ch. XI. I ROOSEVELT — HANNA 281 ness men who did not want the present tariff disturbed. That Roosevelt and Hanna seemed to be drifting apart troubled a supporter of Roosevelt who was likewise a thorough-going Republican; together, he said, their power among Republicans was immense ; should they openly differ and put up a fight they could smash the party. This was reported to Hanna who looked grave but said nothing. To a further remark that he seemed to have with him two inconsistent influences, the finan- cial interests and organized labor, he said simply, I have the support of both. Hanna had likewise the backing of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Salvation Army, so that he was not an opponent to be despised and he was not in any respect thought slightingly of by Roose- velt. The opposition between the two became public during May, 1903, and the occasion was the Republican State Convention of Ohio which met in June. Roosevelt de- sired ardently the presidential nomination ; he was popu- lar throughout the country evidenced by many official declarations in his favor. He kept himself before the public, travelling about the country, speaking constantly and was in the far West when this threatened disturb- ance in the relations between Roosevelt and Hanna be- came known. Foraker, who was senior Senator from Ohio, belonged to a different section of the party from the Hanna-McKinley section and felt that he had not re- ceived his share of the patronage under the McKinley administration. For this and from the antagonism that had grown up between him and Senator Hanna, he was willing to widen the breach between the President and the Senator. Prompted as he affirmed, by expressions 282 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 from Hanna's henchmen, he gave out during the last of May, 1903, an interview in which he declared : "Roose- velt has made a good President. He has been alert, ag- gressive and brilliant and with it all he has been success- ful. ... He is to-day the best known and the most popu- lar man in the United States. . . . Many States indorsed and declared last year in favor of him as our candidate for 1904. Nearly all the Northern States will make sim- ilar declarations this year. I do not know of any reason why Ohio should not also declare in favor of him. ... I think it would be very wise for the Republicans of Ohio at the approaching State convention not only to indorse the administration of President Roosevelt, but also to declare their intention to support him next year as our candidate for the Presidency." ' On May 24 Hanna replied to this in a statement which was given to the press. "I am not, and will not be, a candidate for the Presiden- tial nomination. On account of my position as Chair- man of the Republican National Committee and the further fact that this year I am supposed to have a vital interest in the results in Ohio as bearing upon my reelec- tion to the United States Senate, it would be presumed that I might have some influence as to the policy or action of the State convention this year in national affairs. In that connection, it would seem apparent that whatever that influence might be it had been exerted in a direct inn which would cause just criticism on the part of any other person who ni'mht aspire to be a candidate for the Re- publican Domination for President in 1904. For these reasons I am opposed to the adoption of such a resolu- tion." 1 Notei of u Busy Life, Foraksr, ii. no. Ch. XL] ROOSEVELT — HANNA 283 On the same day Hanna telegraphed to the President who was at Seattle, Washington: "The issue that has been forced upon me in the matter of our State con- vention this year indorsing you for Republican nomina- tion next year has come in a way which makes it neces- sary for me to oppose such a resolution. When you know all the facts I am sure that you will approve my course." Roosevelt replied on the same day: "Your telegram received. I have not asked any man for his support. I have nothing whatever to do with raising this issue. Inasmuch as it has been raised, of course, those who favor my administration and my nomination will favor in- dorsing both, and those who do not will oppose." This brought from Hanna the rejoinder on May 26: "Your telegram of the 23d received. In view of the sentiment expressed I shall not oppose the indorsement of your administration and candidacy by our State convention. I have given the substance of this to the Associated Press." On May 29 in reply to a letter from Hanna Roosevelt wrote from Ogden, Utah: "Your interview was everywhere accepted as the first open attack on me, and it gave heart, curiously enough, not only to my oppo- nents but to all the men who lump you and me together as improperly friendly to organized labor and to the work- ing men generally. . . . The general belief was that this was not your move save indirectly ; but that it was really an attack by the so-called Wall Street forces on me, to which you had been led to give a reluctant acquiescence. . . . After thinking the matter carefully over I became sure that I had to take a definite stand myself. I hated to do it, because you have shown such generosity and straightforwardness in all your dealings with me that it 284 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 was peculiarly painful to me to be put, even temporarily, in a position of seeming antagonism to you. No one but a really big man — a man above all petty considerations — could have treated me as you have done during the year and a half since President AIcKinley's death. I have consulted you and relied on your judgment more than I have done with any other man." ' Two days pre- viously Roosevelt wrote confidentially to Senator Lodge : "I decided that the time had come to stop shilly-shally- ing and let Hanna know definitely that I did not intend to assume the position, at least passively, of a suppliant to whom he might give the nomination as a boon. ... I rather expected Hanna to fight, but made up my mind that it was better to have a fight in the open at once than to run the risk of being knifed secretly. ... I am pleased at the outcome and it simplifies things all round, for in my judgment, Hanna was my only formidable opponent so far as the nomination is concerned." 2 There can be no question that the President gained in this controversy. The adroit cartoonist of the N< w York Herald illustrated this in a picture of Hanna shak- ing his fist at Foraker and with not the best grace in the world, handing a bouquet, labelled "endorsement" to Roosevelt who expressed himself as "delighted." 3 Put no change in their personal relations followed. On June 10 the President attended the marriage of Hanna's daughter Ruth to Joseph Medill McCormick, addressing in his hearty manner the Senator who met him at the railway station as "Uncle Mark." The Senator made 1 Croly, 424 -< taq, i I'., hop, i. 246. * A Cartoon History of Ri relt'sCai . UbertShai Ch - XI -1 ROOSEVELT — HANNA 285 the wedding a festive occasion and gathered together a number of personal and political friends. Mark Hanna's eye was on the Ohio political campaign of 1903 when the issue was fairly made. Should he be reelected to the senatorship over his Democratic oppo- nent? His party had carried Ohio the previous year by an immense majority but a strict personal issue was ab- sent. It may be said that he now [i. e., in 1903] dominated the campaign, carrying the State by over 100,000 for the Republican nominee for governor, Myron T. Herrick, and with a Republican majority on the joint ballot of 91 in the legislature, a very gratifying result which put Mark Hanna to the fore again as a candidate for the presidential nomination. In the meantime the President had lost the support of a part at least of organized labor. On May 19, the Public Printer discharged William A. Miller; the' real reason was his expulsion from a local union. Miller contested his dismissal and carried the case to the Civil Service Commission that reported in his favor, where- upon the President ordered him to be reinstated. The American Federation of Labor took up the case and de- cided the action of the President unfriendly. Roosevelt gave their Executive Council, at the head of which was Samuel Gompers, their President, an interview in which he justified his action, writing in a private letter some- what before his talk to the labor representatives: "It is a sheer waste of time for those people, through such resolutions as those of the unions you quote, to threaten me with defeat for the Presidency next year. Nothing- would hire me even to accept the Presidency if I had to take it on terms which would mean a forfeiting of self- 286 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 respect. ... I should refuse to take it at the cost of un- doing what I did in the matter of Miller and the Labor Union. The labor unions and the trust magnates may perhaps unite against me. If so, I shall do my level best to make the fight an open one and beat them — and I think I run a good chance of winning ; and if I fail I shall not regret the policy I have pursued." l The President thought that he had at his back the "one-suspender men," otherwise called by a sturdy democrat, "the dinner-pail men," the small shopkeepers and a large proportion of the farmers. The Wall Street men and Hanna are working together to prevent my nomination in Chicago, said the President. So far as Wall Street was concerned he was right. The financial interests were opposed to Roosevelt and they believed that anything to beat him was the correct policy. A reasonable amount of money could be raised to secure for Hanna the nomination and election, and they and certain politicians were at one in the conviction that Roosevelt if nominated could not be elected. But Hanna would give them no countenance, nor would he declare for Roosevelt. The breach widened. George B. Cortclyou, who had been McKinley's and Roosevelt's private sec- retary and was now Secretary of the new Department of Commerce and Labor, made an attempl to bring the two together. He wont to Bee the Senator, who declared that "he was not a candidate, that he had never been nor would be a candidate." So he had assured Roosevelt but lie was tired, he said, "of going to the White House every day, of putting bia hand on his heart and being 1 Biihopi i 261. \ tl Miller ease, ibid., 240 M valt, Monnnffon Cvmni Lit. Pub Co , L 159 d Ch. XL] ROOSEVELT — H ANN A 287 sworn in." Somewhat later Cortelyou went to see the President and found him in conference with three friends, one of whom was a member of the Cabinet and another a Senator. The President said in his emphatic way, "Yes, Mr. Hanna ought to make an unequivocal public statement of his position," when Cortelyou assured the President and his friends that "Mr. Hanna has no inten- tion of being a candidate for President." x Thus affairs continued during December, 1903, and Jan- uary, 1904. It is not difficult to understand Hanna's position. He did not believe in Roosevelt's policy toward the financial and business interests of the country and Hanna knew that he had their backing and also that of the Labor Unions; had he been ten years younger and in good health he would probably have made a fight against Roosevelt for the Republican nomination. But his health was poor, he was 66, he knew the power which the national administration could exert for the nomina- tion and he hesitated to take up the contest. With de- sign therefore, he let the golden moment slip when he was present at Columbus, making a brief speech of thanks to the Ohio legislature for the senatorship and failing to announce his candidacy for the presidential nomination. Late that month Cornelius N. Bliss said that Hanna had wittingly let pass the nick of time ; had he eighteen days previously declared himself a candidate, he and Roosevelt would have been competitors for the nomination. 2 Some of Hanna's advocates were determined to force 1 Croly, 437. According to Croly, James R. Garfield, then Commis- sioner of Corporations, and Theodore E. Burton, representative from the Cleveland district, were effective in preventing the breach from widening. See also letter of O. H. Piatt, cited by Croly, 441. 2 The address in Columbus was Jan. 12, 1904; the talk of Bliss, Jan. 30. 288 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 the nomination upon him and argued that, as the call of States was in alphabetical order, Alabama and Arkansas would first be called, would vote for Hanna whence there would come a tidal wave that would result in his nomina- tion. Charles G. Washburn, a friend and college class- mate of Roosevelt, wrote : "I was a delegate to the Con- vention that nominated Roosevelt for President in 1904. A portrait, of heroic size, of Mark Hanna, hung over the platform. I said to a man who sat next to me 'What would happen if Hanna were living?' He said in reply, 'He would be nominated here to-day.'" l By the end of January, 1904, Roosevelt was confident, writing thus to Shaw : "In confidence I can tell you that outside all the Southern States I am now as certain as I well can be that if Hanna made the fight (for the nomi- nation) and with all the money of Wall Street behind him, he would get the majority of the delegations from no State excepting Ohio; and from the South 1 should have from a third to a half of the delegates, and most of the remainder would have been pledged to me and would have to be purchased outright against me. I believe that the best advisers among my opponents themselves see this and have very nearly made up their minds to give up the contest. In a few weeks I think that most of the Wall Street Republicans will have concluded that they have to, however grudgingly, support me. . . . My Domination has become assured, in my judgment, be- fore they give up the contest." ■ Hanna wa capable of a high as] iration and tins took the form with him of a reconcilement between capital 1 Roosevelt, 53. « Bishop, i. 311. Ch. XL] HANN A— ROOSEVELT 289 and labor to which he was willing to devote his business experience and political standing. Unquestionably he as leading Senator and Roosevelt as President might have accomplished much ; both loved their country and would make personal sacrifices for it ; both had personal morals above reproach; both had a high idea of service; but the two could not work sympathetically together. Shakespeare told why, "An two men ride of a horse, one must ride behind." l Now entered upon the scene the King of Terrors. Hanna died on February 15, 1904. While lying upon his death-bed in the Arlington Hotel, the President called to inquire after his condition and on February 5 received this pencilled note: "My dear Mr. President: You touched a tender spot, old man, when you called person- ally to inquire after [me] this a.m. I may be worse, before I can be better, but all the same such ' drops of kindness' are good for a fellow." To this Roosevelt replied: "Dear Senator: Indeed it is your letter from your sick bed which is touching, not my visit. May you soon be with us again, old fellow, as strong in body and as vigorous in your leadership as ever." 2 His death was regarded as a calamity in Cleveland; and in his State of Ohio, it seemed as if a prop to the na- tion had been taken away. Roosevelt wrote to Root on the next day: "No man had larger traits than Hanna. He was a big man in every way and as forceful a person- ality as we have seen in public life in our generation." 3 The Chaplain of the Senate, Reverend Edward Everett Hale, spoke thus over his dead body : "This man had at 1 Much Ado, iii. 5. 2 Croly, 453, 454. 3 Bishop, i. 315. 290 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 once as no other man had, the confidence of capital and labor. He could mediate between the men who provide the tools and the workmen who handle them." Later his senatorial associates paid him high tributes. Foraker said : "He was one of the really great men of his day and generation. . . . He had before him seven years of ser- vice." His personal friend, Senator Piatt of Connecti- cut, declared, "that when Marcus A. Hanna died all the people mourned with a grief that was deep and un- feigned." Senator Fairbanks said truthfully, "He pos- sessed in full degree the power of great initiative." Sena- tor Beveridge said that, "He was the man of affairs in statesmanship . . . ; he was the personification of our commercial age." 1 "The New York Evening Post crowd," as Roosevelt called them, could not join in these tributes. They may have taken their cue from their great progenitor who wrote, "I do not like the Western type of man." 2 In that they differed from Roosevelt who broke out, "I do like these Westerners." Between these eulogists and detractors of Hanna it is pleasant to hear from a moderator, Edward D. White, who as Justice of the Supreme Court was well acquainted with Hanna, admired and loved him, who one night in December, 1920, long after he had bun Chief Justice, could talk of naught else, testifying his high regard for the ability, honor and unselfishness of Hanna. Hanna was now out of the way. No man in public life took liis place in part ial antagonism to Roosevelt. The coast was clear. lie was nominated by acclamation at the Republican National Convention thai assembled 'Memorial Addressee, pp. L5, 81, 49, 77, no. 1 Life of Godkin, Ogden, ii. Ch. XL] HANNA 291 in Chicago, June 21, 1904. Charles G. Washburn, later Congressman from the Worcester district, a keen judge of men, wrote in his book adding to what I have already cited: "Of course Hanna would not have been nomi- nated. . . . The old order which was incarnated in Hanna had not then passed away but it was passing. . . . When McKinley and Hanna died, the old dynasty fell." l 1 Roosevelt, 54. CHAPTER XII In accepting the nomination for the presidency Roose- velt showed that he was a true partisan Republican as, in his speech of acceptance, he dilated on the "Record of the Republican party," on the currency and the tariff. "We have placed the finances of the Nation upon a sound gold basis," he said. "We have enacted a tariff law under which during the past few years the country has attained a height of material well-being never before reached." In his letter he elaborated his position on the tariff taking the ground of the educated man who had been led to believe in the virtue of protection. "The question of what tariff is best for our people is primarily one of expediency, to be determined not on abstract academic grounds but in the light of experience. It is a matter of business"; and he repeated the Republican stock argument against the Democratic tariff of 1894. 1 The Democrats had nominated Alton B. Parker, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of the State of Now York, wlio, declining to run on a platform squinting in the di- rection of free silver, had eliminated from the contesl the money question. Nor was the tariff an issue to be decided. The issue of the campaign w:is Roosevelt. "Your personality lias been the Administration," wrote l-.lihu Root. 1 This meant largely what Roosevell had done in attacking the great financial interests of the eoun- 1 The ipeeob tru July 27; the letter, September L2. Current Lit. Pub. Co , 108, 200, 218. - Bishop, i. 323. 202 Ch. XII.] ALTON B. PARKER 293 try which, after much consideration, had selected Parker as their candidate. They had coquetted with Grover Cleveland. "It is evident," wrote Roosevelt to Senator Lodge on May 4, 1903, "Cleveland has the presidential bee in his bonnet, and it is equally evident that a large number of people are desirous of running him again." l Nevertheless his decision not to accept another nomina- tion became "unalterable." Toward its end Parker brought personalities into the campaign which must be considered. Roosevelt had se- lected as chairman of the Republican National Commit- tee George B. Cortelyou, after having vainly endeavored to secure Elihu Root, W. Murray Crane and Cornelius N. Bliss. Cortelyou had been Cleveland's executive clerk, private secretary of McKinley and Roosevelt, and was then Secretary of Commerce and Labor, appointed by Roosevelt. A fair inference from Judge Parker's speeches was that President Roosevelt and Cortelyou had used their official positions to induce corporations to contribute funds. Roosevelt, having a high regard for the dignity of his office, had held aloof from a public participa- tion in the campaign but these speeches of Parker gave him along-sought-f or opportunity of taking a hand in the contest as a fighter, and on November 4 2 he made this statement : "The assertion that Mr. Cortelyou had any knowledge gained while in an official position, whereby he was enabled to secure and did secure any contributions from any cor- poration is a falsehood. . . . The assertion that there has been made in my behalf and by my authority, by bishop, i. 241. 2 The election was on November 8. Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana was chosen Vice-President. 294 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION 11904 Mr. Cortelyou or by anyone else, any pledge or promise, or that there has been any understanding as to future immunities or benefits, in recognition of any contribu- tions from any source, is a wicked falsehood. ... As Mr. Cortelyou has said to me more than once during the campaign, if elected I shall go into the Presidency un- hampered by any pledge, promise or understanding of any kind, sort or description, save my promise made openly to the American people, that so far as in my power lies I shall see to it that every man has a square deal, no less and no more." l The Nation, which was an enthusiastic supporter of Parker, maintained that the gravamen of Parker's charges was that the beneficiaries of the tariff policy of the Re- publican party were to be recouped for their contribu- tions in the event of Republican success. But Roosevelt did not so interpret the charges. Indeed The Nation failed to iterate with its accustomed vigor Parker's charges against Roosevelt and Cortelyou, proposing apparently to shield him under the stock Democratic argument against the tariff and the Republican party. 2 Of the same nature was the Harriman attack which was made public more than two years later and which was to the effect that Roosevelt had requested Harriman to raise $250,000 for the presidential campaign. Roose- velt denied this emphatically. "I never," he said, "re- quested Mr. Harriman to raise a dollar for the Presiden- tial campaign of 1904. On the contrary, our communi- cations as regards the campaign related exclusively to the fight being made against Mr. Higgins for Governor of ' ( 'am nt LA Tub. Co., 222 s passed on February l 1. L903, an act creating a Department of Commerce and Labor including :> Bu- reau of Corporations. Such action was due to the warm 1 Fiftv Yfvirv of P i Bervioi 392 ■ Mi < ■ of Deoernber, 1904. : Letter to Jaim-a L. Watson. Current Lit. Pub, Co., 4u0. Ch. XII.] THE PENSION ORDER 297 recommendation of the President, who appointed as its first Secretary George B. Cortelyou. During March, 1904, the President established by execu- tive order " a service pension for all veterans of the Civil War" between 62 and 70. * This was called by his op- ponents an unconstitutional exercise of power and a bid for the soldiers' vote as represented by the Grand Army of the Republic. But supporters of Roosevelt will adopt a defence of this action as exhibited in his private letters. In one written during May he said that the feeling in Congress "was overwhelmingly for a full service pension — that is $12.00 a month beginning at the age of 62." Such a measure would have cost the Government about fifty millions annually, while his order would carry only about five millions. "So much," he wrote, "for the technical argument." But "I hold that the ruling was absolutely right and proper. Most of our friends who live softly do not understand that the great majority of people who live by hard manual labor have begun to 1 D. M. Matteson has prepared the following note : The order which is signed by the Commissioner of Pensions is dated March 15, 1904. It is based on the Act of June 27, 1890, which declared that the pension should be from $6 to $12 according to the degree of inability to earn a support. The order said, "old age is an infirmity the average nature and extent of which the experience of the Pension Bureau has established with reason- able certainty." As the Act of 1887 established an old age pension for Mexican War veterans 39 years after that war, and as 1904 is 39 years after the Civil War, therefore it is ordered that all veterans of the Civil War of 62 years or more shall be considered as "disabled one half in ability to perform manual labor" and entitled to $6 a month; after 65 years, to $8; after 68, to $10; and after 70, to $12. President Cleveland had issued an order making 75 years a complete disability and President McKinley one making 65 a half disability. Congress on Feb. 6, 1907, established a regular old age pension for Mex- ican veterans of a minimum of 60 days' service and Civil War veterans of a minimum of 90 days' service, giving $12 a month at 62 as the minimum and $20 at 75 as the maximum. 298 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 find their wage-earning capacity seriously impaired by the time they are sixty. . . . Now the average wage worker does not lay by enough money to keep him in his old age, and when he has fought in the Civil War I am entirely willing that he shall be cared for to the extent indicated in my order." ' The phrase "our friends who live softly" is a partial keynote to Roosevelt's administrative career. Assuredly he thought more highly of them if they were doing what he considered good work than of men devoted to the mere amassing of wealth, and he was willing to award them full credit ; but other letters written at about this time show that he did not look to them for his main sup- port. They were "the gentle folk," as he wrote to his friend Owen Wister after the election of 1904, "the people whom you and I meet at the houses of our friends and at our clubs ; the people who went to Harvard as we did." But I owed my election "above all to Abraham Lincoln's 'plain people,' to the folk who worked hard on farm, in shop, or on the railroads, or owned little stores, little businesses which they managed themselves." 2 In the same vein he wrote to Sir George Otto Trevelyan soon after his inauguration in 1905: "My supporters are to be found in the overwhelming majority among those whom Abraham Lincoln called the plain people. . . . The farmers, lumbermen, mechanics, ranchmen, miners of the North, East and West have felt that I was just as much in sympathy with them, just as devoted to their interests, and as proud of them ami as representative of them as if 1 had sprung from among their own ranks." s 1 Biahop, i ::is tt seq. •Bishop, i. 345. * Ibid., 364. Ch. XII.] ROOSEVELT 299 Yet Roosevelt was far from being a demagogue. He upheld without ceasing the right of private property; he was bitterly opposed to socialism and he agreed in the main with those who held to individual ideas; he enjoyed the companionship of men who lived softly and he liked a good dinner party. To those who appreciated the innate refinement of John Hay, his words come with peculiar force. "It is a comfort to work for a President who. . . happened to be born a gentleman." 1 As the event has shown, the financial interests and many of the men who lived softly — perhaps a majority — committed an error when they did not at this time hold up the hands of Theodore Roosevelt. Publicity was important for the investor, which he had through the Fourth Estate; the prohibition of rebates was necessary for the small business men; the watering of stock was a menace to the sterling interest of the country; the wage earners had their journals which kept them informed of the do- ings of Big Business. To them it seemed easy work to cut off coupons, to draw dividends, to take the air by riding about in automobiles, and they looked upon Roose- velt as a champion who was going to insure them a better time, although they had leaders like John Mitchell who interpreted for them correctly what the Roosevelt good time meant. In the state of public sentiment succeed- ing the Cleveland-McKinley r6gime the financial inter- ests should have looked upon Roosevelt as their best friend. It was true, as Elihu Root told many of the rep- resentatives of Big Business at the Union League Club during February, 1904: "You say Roosevelt is an un- Bishop, i. 263 300 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 safe man. I tell you he is a great conservator of property and rights." l The year 1904 must not be passed by without a men- tion of the St. Louis World Fair which celebrated the Louisiana Purchase. John Hay "grumbled when the President made him go to St. Louis to address" the rep- resentatives of the press. " The years of my boyhood," he said, "were passed on the banks of the Mississippi, and the great river was the scene of my early dreams." 2 But Henry Adams remarked, "John Hay was as strange to the Mississippi River as though he had not been bred on its shores." Adams went with Hay and has thus described a part of their journey from Washington to St. Louis: "In this great region from Pittsburg through Ohio and Indiana, agriculture had made way for steam ; tall chimneys reeked smoke on every horizon, and dirty suburbs filled with scrap-iron, scrap-paper and cinders formed the setting of every town." Hay's address was a glorification of material progress, of the advance of America, of the great significance of the Louisiana Purchase, but the comment of his friend, Henry Adams, strikes more forcibly the student of affairs : "The St. Louis Exposition," he wrote, was the first crea- tion of the new American "in the twentieth century and for that reason acutely interesting. One saw here a third rate town of half-a-million people without history, edu- cation, unity, or art and with little capital . . . doing what London or New York would have shrunk from attempting. This new social conglomerate, with no tie but its steam power and QOl inueli of that, threw away hburn'fl Roosevelt, 67. 'Addresses, 244. Ch. XII.] THE ST. LOUIS EXPOSITION 301 thirty or forty million dollars on a pageant as ephemeral as a stage flat." There were "long lines of white palaces exquisitely lighted by thousands on thousands of elec- tric candles." l But the correspondent of The Nation thought that in architectural beauty the St. Louis Exposition was in- ferior to that in Chicago and further said that in elec- trical display it had not the mighty Niagara for help. 2 A feature was the "Congress of Arts and Science," the main purpose of which "was to place within reach of the investigator the objective thought of the world, so classi- fied as to show its relations to all similar phases of human endeavor, and so arranged as to be practically available for reference and study." To the disinterested and valu- able advice of President Nicholas Murray Butler and President William R. Harper the Congress was under heavy obligations. The teaching was in the form of lectures and the reading of papers and more than a hun- dred leading scholars of Europe assisted the American contributors "under conditions where academic fellow- ship on an equal footing was a necessary part of the work. It was a real feast of international scholarship." 3 » Henry Adams, Education, 466. 2 The Nation, 1904. 3 Congress of Arts and Science. Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904, i. 3, 133. H. J. Rogers, Hugo Munsterberg. CHAPTER XIII Before Roosevelt was inaugurated and before he began therefore the term which was his own, he showed his power as diplomatist. War between Russia and Japan began on February 10, 1904, and had in him an attentive observer. In his own words he tells the story. "During the early part of the year 1905," he wrote in his Auto- biography, "the strain on the civilized world caused by the Russo-Japanese War became serious. The losses of life and of treasure were frightful. ... If the war went on I thought it on the whole likely that Russia would be driven" farther west. " But it was very far from cer- tain. There is no certainty in such a war. Japan might have met defeat and defeat to her would have spelt over- whelming disaster ; and even if she had continued to win, what she thus won would have been of no value to her, and the cost in blood and money would have left her drained white. I believed therefore that the time had come when it was greatly to the interest of both com- batants to have peace, and when therefore it was possible to get both to agree to peace." 1 During January he "pri- vately and unofficially advised the Russian Government, and afterward repeated the advice indirectly through the French Government, to make peace." "The European powers want peace." But "it looks as if the foreign powers did not want me to act as peacemaker," 2 he wrote to Secretary Hay, who was in Europe on account of his physical condition. 1 P. 583. ■ Bishop, L 878, 877. 302 Ch. XIIL] GERMANY— ENGLAND 303 In the two chapters which Bishop has devoted to this subject one may well be amazed, from the confidential correspondence there disclosed, at Roosevelt's knowledge of European conditions and at his various characteriza- tions of European powers and their rulers. Talleyrand said of Alexander Hamilton that he had divined Europe. We may well affirm that Theodore Roosevelt in the early part of the twentieth century had divined Europe. "The Kaiser," he wrote, "has had another fit and is now convinced that France is trying to engineer a congress of the nations in which Germany will be left out. What a jumpy creature he is anyhow!" ! He is a "fuss-cat." He desired that peace should be made between the two warring powers but he wanted to have a hand in it and was willing to accept other people's ideas if he could call them his own. The Kaiser, he wrote to Hay on April 2, "sincerely believes that the English are planning to attack him and smash his fleet, and perhaps join with France in a war to the death against him. As a matter of fact the English harbor no such intentions, but are themselves in a condition of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intend to form an alliance against them with France or Russia, or both, to destroy their fleet and blot out the British Empire from the map ! It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bring- ing two people to the verge of war." In the same letter to Hay he gave his opinion of the Russian Emperor. "Did you ever know anything more pitiable than the condition of the Russian despotism? The Czar is a pre- posterous little creature as the absolute autocrat of 1 Biahop, i. 377. 304 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make war and he is now unable to make peace." l Roosevelt told the Japanese, "it was in my judgment wise to build a bridge of gold for the beaten enemy " ; and they took his advice. On May 27 and 28, 1905, the Japanese annihilated the Russian fleet in the Sea of Ja- pan. Roosevelt, who was an excellent judge of naval matters, thus characterized the engagement, "Neither Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as complete — as overwhelming." 2 With amazing wisdom, directly on the heels of this great naval victory, the Jap- anese made overtures in writing for peace. Roosevelt saw at once the Russian ambassador and "told him to say to the Czar that I believe the war absolutely hope- less for Russia." Now he had the help of the Kaiser. Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge on June 16: "The more I see of the Czar, the Kaiser and the Mikado, the better I am content with democracy, even if we have to include the American newspaper as one of its assets — liability would be a better term. Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and shifty, and so incompetent, that I am utterly unable to say whether or not it will make peace or break off the negotiations at any moment. Ja- pan is, of course, entirely selfish, though with a veneer of courtesy and with infinitely more knowledge of what it wants and capacity to get it." He wrote in a let t er later to Senator Lodge soon after the negotiations had begun: "The Russians are utterly insincere and treach- erous; they have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts in the face, no regard for others of any sort 'Bishop, i. 378, 37U. ■ Ibid., 351, 352. Ch. XIII.] THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 305 or kind, no knowledge of their own strength or weakness ; and they are helplessly unable to meet emergencies." l As related by Bishop the tactfulness and patience of Roosevelt were unsurpassed. With the main point set- tled many questions of detail arose. There was natur- ally a conflict as to the place where the plenipotentiaries should meet, and after much debate Washington was fixed upon ; then, after that was decided, Russia desired to change the place of meeting to The Hague. She now ran up against a stone wall. Roosevelt, disgusted with so much shilly-shallying, sent this word to George von L. Meyer, our ambassador in Russia, with instructions to impart it to the Foreign Minister and if necessary to the Czar himself. "I notified Japan that Washington would be the appointed place and so informed" the Rus- sian ambassador. "I then gave the same announcement to the public. It is, of course, out of the question for me to consider any reversal of this action and I regard the incident as closed, so far as the place of meeting is con- cerned." 2 " Meyer," wrote Roosevelt, "who was, with the exception of Henry White, the most useful diplomat in the American service, rendered literally invaluable aid by insisting on his seeing the Czar at critical periods of the transaction when it was no longer possible for me to act successfully through the representatives of the Czar, who were often at cross purposes with one another." 3 Roosevelt said in a private letter to Senator Nelson of Minnesota, "I have led the horses to water, but Heaven 1 Bishop, i. 394, 395. 2 Bishop, i. 391. 3 Autobiography, 587; Life of Meyer, M. A. de Wolfe Howe, 196 et 306 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 only knows whether they will drink or start kicking one another beside the trough." x As the conference was to function during the summer, it was recognized that Washington would be too hot, there- fore the place of meeting was changed to the Portsmouth Navy Yard 2 near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The plenipotentiaries were all men of distinguished capacity. Russia was represented by Witte, Secretary of State, and Baron Rosen, Russian ambassador to the United States; Japan by Baron Komura, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Takahira, Japanese minister in Washington. The reception of the envoys by Roosevelt showed him a thorough man of the world accustomed to do the proper thing at the proper time. They went separately on two war vessels from New York to Oyster Bay, the summer resi- dence of the President, and were there received by him on board the United States steamer Mayflower. Noth- ing occurred to mar the meeting of the two hostile envoys. The President had a luncheon prepared but, as they all moved together into the saloon and as it was taken stand- ing, no question of preference could be raised. At its end the President proposed this toast: "I drink to the welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and peoples of the two great nations whose representatives have met one another on this ship. It is my most earnest hope and prayer, in the interest of not only these two great powers but of all mankind, that a just and lasting peace may speedily be concluded between them." 3 The en- ' Bishop, i. 398. * The Portsmouth Navy Yard was realty in Kittery, Maine. * Bishop, i. 405. Ch. XIII.] THE RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE 307 voys then went to Portsmouth and set about their im- portant work. The President needed all of his tact and influence to prevent the Conference from breaking up. By despatches to Japan and to Russia he was, as Bishop wrote, its "guid- ing and controlling force." Late in August the crisis occurred and it arose from the Japanese demand for an indemnity and the cession of the island of Saghalien. The President suggested, sending the suggestion at the same time to the Kaiser and the Mikado, that Russia should pay no indemnity whatever and should receive back the north half of Saghalien "for which it is to pay to Japan whatever amount a mixed commission may determine." This suggestion brought about the terms of peace. Japan with paramount wisdom accepted the suggestion. "The Emperor," so came the word to Roose- velt, "after presiding at a Cabinet Council, decided to withdraw the demand of money payment for the cost of war entirely, if Russia recognize the occupation of Saghalien Island by Japan, because the Emperor regards humanity and civilization far more than his nation's welfare." 1 "An agreement was reached on August 29, 1905, on the terms laid down by the President and on September 5, 1905, a treaty of peace embodying them was signed." 2 The President received praise from all sides. Baron Kaneko wrote to him: "Your advice to us was very powerful and convincing by which the peace of Asia was secured. Both Russia and Japan owe to you this happy conclusion." The Kaiser, the King of England, the 1 Bishop, i. 412 et ante. * Ibid., 412. 308 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 Czar and the Mikado expressed their approval grace- fully. 1 On September 6 the President wrote to the Mi- kado a letter in which, in giving him high praise, he re- flected also his own ideas. "I express," he wrote, "as strongly as I can, my sense of the magnanimity, and above all of the cool-headed, far-sighted wisdom, you have shown in making peace as you did. . . . During the last eighteen months your generals and admirals, your sol- diers and sailors, have won imperishable renown for Nip- pon. . . . You have crowned triumphant war by a peace in which every great object for which you fought is se- cured, and in so doing you have given to the world a sig- nal and most striking example of how it is possible for a victorious nation to achieve victory over others without losing command over itself. ... A continuance of the war, no matter how damaging to Japan's opponent, would also have been necessarily of damage to Japan far beyond what could have been offset by any resulting benefit. The greatness of a people, like the greatness of a man, is often attended quite as clearly by moderation and wis- dom in using a triumph as by the triumph itself." 2 Roosevelt was modest in regard to his part in the trans- action. He wrote to his daughter : "I am credited with being extremely long-headed. As a matter of fact I took the position I finally did not of my own volition but because events so shaped themselves that I would have felt a,s if I were flinching from a plain duty if I had acted otherwise." Thus ho wrote to Whitelaw Reid, our Ambassador in London, "The Kaiser stood by me like a trump"; but I got only "indirect assistance" from the English ( rovernmenl . ; 1 Bishop, i. 112 at ante. Bi bop, L 415. 'Bishop, i. 115. Ch. XIII.] THE JAPANESE 309 Roosevelt's ideas of nations and of men are always valuable. He wrote to Sir George O. Trevelyan on Sep- tember 12 : "I am bound to say that the Japs have im- pressed me most favorably, not only during these three months but during the four years I have been President. They have always told me the truth. ... I cannot say that I liked Witte, for I thought his bragging and bluster not only foolish but shockingly vulgar when compared with the gentlemanly self-respecting self-restraint of the Japanese." 1 Witte was much impressed with the great prosperity, wealth and industries of this country; the " barbaric strength" was what appealed to him. Why all this talk about corruption? he inquired. I ask what is this corruption and they tell me that Murphy, the boss of New York, helps great financiers and then accepts presents from them. Why shouldn't he? he asked. Witte, in Roosevelt's opinion, was thoroughly selfish; everything for himself, the country second ; while the Japanese were patriotic, so much so that they desired to withdraw that part of the correspondence in which they had made overtures for peace. This request Roosevelt denied and then they were surprised that he was going to make no mention of the matter in his message. 2 Witte said of Roosevelt: "When one speaks with President Roosevelt he charms through the elevation of his thoughts. . . . He has an ideal and strives for higher aims than a commonplace existence presents." Rosen wrote that Roosevelt "had the moral courage to undertake the delicate and risky task of mediation"; bishop, 418. 2 In this account, I have been assisted by my conversation with the President on Nov. 16, 1905. 310 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 he brought about "the Portsmouth Conference and the subsequent termination of the war by a peace of justice and conciliation." Martens, who was an adviser of the Russians, wrote, "The man who had been represented to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness displayed a gentleness, a kindness and a tactfulness mixed with self-control that only a truly great man can com- mand." 1 For his services Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize amounting to $36,734. 79. 2 The negotiations were conducted entirely by the Pres- ident. He did not have the aid of his official Secretary of State, John Hay, who was in Nauheim, Germany, seek- ing a restoration of his health that never came, as on July 1, 1905, he passed away. Roosevelt paid a sincere tribute to the memory of his friend and showed an attach- ment to the refined gentleman from the West. 3 He had, so Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge, a "great career in political life" and has "also left a deep mark in litera- ture"; to Senator Beveridge, "Hay was a really great man." Hay wrote in his diary seventeen days before he died : "I say to myself that I should not rebel at the thought of my life ending at this time. ... I have had many blessings, domestic happiness being the greatest of 'Bishop, i. 419 et scq. ; see also Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, Abbott, 131. 1 For the disposition of the money see Bishop, i 422; also Albert Shaw, Review of Review, 151, 152. The Brooklyn Timet says under the car- toon, "'Teddy the Good' in a new role, it is ■ very laudable purpose but would anybody bu1 Theodore Etoo svell ever think of dedicating a Christmas windfall of $40,000 fur such a purpose?" [Theoauseof indua trial peace.] 5 It used to be said tint Hay ptm a Western man with Eastern culture, .••It an Raatern man with Western principles. Ch. XIII.] HAY — ROOT 311 all. ... I have had success beyond all the dreams of my boyhood. My name is printed in the journals of the world without descriptive qualification, which may, I suppose, be called fame. By mere length of service I shall occupy a modest place in the history of my time. ... I know death is the common lot and what is universal ought not to be deemed a misfortune ; and yet — instead of confronting it with dignity and philosophy, I cling in- stinctively to life and the things of life as eagerly as if I had not had my chance at happiness and gained nearly all the great prizes." x Roosevelt appointed to the vacant position, Elihu Root. "I wished Root," he wrote to Senator Beveridge, " as Secretary of State partly because I am extremely fond of him and prize his companionship as well as his advice, but primarily because I think that in all the country he is the best man for the position, and that no minister of foreign affairs in any other country at this moment in any way compares with him." To Senator Lodge he wrote, "I hesitated a little between Root and Taft, for Taft, as you know, is very close to me." 2 These expressions exhibit Roosevelt as a rare judge of men and how deeply he prized the counsel of his official advisers. With Root and Taft to be called on for ad- vice, he felt that he could not go far wrong ; they were both good lawyers and men of affairs. An opinion prevails among diplomatists that President Roosevelt averted a war between France and Germany in 1905. The story is told in a modest letter of the Pres- 1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 408. 2 Bishop, i. 369 et seq. 312 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1905 ident to Whitelaw Reid dated April 28, 1906, and first printed by Bishop in 1920. Included in this is Roose- velt's attitude at the outset, which may be seen in a letter to W. H. Taft of April 20, 1905, who, while Roosevelt was on a bear hunt and Hay seeking recuperation in Europe, was acting Secretary of State, touching which Roosevelt wrote to him, "Dear Will : I think you are keeping the lid on in great shape!" Roosevelt further said: "The Kaiser's pipe dream this week takes the form of Mo- rocco. Speck [Baron Speck von Sternburg, German Ambassador to the United States] has written me an urgent appeal to sound the British Government and find out whether they intend to back up France in gobbling Morocco. ... I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter. At the same time ... I am sincerely anxious to bring about a bettor stale of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Govern- ment and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England." On the same da}- ho wrote to Sternburg, "( >ur interests in Morocco are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in en- tangling our Government in tin 1 matter." It would 1 1 think) have been better for Roosevelt to adhere to his fir>t position and absoluti ly to refuse to interfere in a Eu- ropean dispute. "The ( Shlkt ian nations in Africa, " wrote Herbert Spencer in 1905, are "like hungry dogs around Ch. XIII.] MOROCCO 313 a carcass ; they tear out piece after piece, pausing only to snarl and snap at one another." 1 As long as a different view obtained, however, Roose- velt's action was wise and just. When he returned to Washington at the end of May, 1905, he found Jusserand 2 and Sternberg "greatly concerned lest there should be a war between France and Germany." Therefore Roose- velt determined to do his best to avert so great a trouble. "It really did look," he wrote, "as if there might be a war and I felt in honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the first place, because I should have felt such a war to be a real calamity to civilization ; and in the next place, as I was already trying to bring about peace between Russia and Japan, I felt that a new conflict might result in what would literally be a world conflagration; and finally, for the sake of France." To settle the Morocco difficulty, the Kaiser desired a Conference. He thought France's policy aggressive ; that France and Spain were a "political unity" who wished to divide up Morocco between themselves; and he feared England's support of France. Therefore, he deemed war with France a possibility. France finally gave way and accepted "the idea of a Conference in spite of serious reasons," as her Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote, "we had to entertain objections to such a project." 1 Fortnightly, June, 1895. "Apart from the satisfaction of a somewhat childish pride, what does it matter to either France or Germany which of them owns Morocco. ... In order that the French might acquire Morocco, England and France in 1905 and again in 1911, were brought to the verge of war with Germany. . . . Viewed as a means of obtaining any tangible gain, a diplomatic contest, such as that waged over Morocco, is a childish absurdity." Bertrand Russell, Atlantic Monthly, March, 1915, 371. 2 Jusserand had been French Ambassador to the United States since 1902. 314 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 Meanwhile in Washington Roosevelt's efforts were entirely directed to the maintenance of peace. He had the confidence of both nations whose ambassadors to the United States were wise and peace-loving men. "Jusserand," wrote Roosevelt, "is a man of such ex- cellent judgment, so sound and cool-headed, and of so high a standard of personal and professional honor that I could trust him completely. Indeed it was only be- cause both Jusserand and Sternberg were such excellent men that I was enabled to do anything at all in so diffi- cult and delicate a matter." The Conference was held at Algeciras, Spain, and began on January 16, 1906. After it opened, the Kaiser by rattling his sword in the scabbard desired to sway its con- clusions. Nevertheless, they were on the whole against Germany although she accomplished all that she pro- fessed to want. The Kaiser was a sincere admirer of Roosevelt, who wrought earnestly for peace and who had as one of his representatives at Algeciras Henry White, then our Ambassador to Italy. White saw eye to eye with the President and operated at Algeciras as the other did in Washington with the view of preserving the peace. "Loyal though Sternberg was to his Govern- ment," Roosevelt wrote soon after the Conference opened, "both Root and I became convinced that down in his heart the honest, brave little gentleman did not really believe Germany was acting as she should act." Finally, however, a Treaty was accepted by the Kaiser and on April 6 was signed by all the powers represented. 1 1 The authority for this account and the citations made are from Roosevelt's letter to Whitclaw Reid printed by Bishop, i. 467 et seq. See also La Conference d'Algeciras, Andr6 Tardieu. " Xo one can peruse Ch. XIII. J ROOSEVELT — THE KAISER 315 It will be germane to make a contrast between Theo- dore Roosevelt and the German Emperor who were not infrequently compared. At this time Roosevelt was an admirer of the Kaiser, writing to Sternberg on June 25, 1905, "I feel that His Majesty stands as the leader among the sovereigns of to-day who have their faces set towards the future, and that it is not only of the utmost impor- tance for his own people but of the utmost importance for all mankind that his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired." l Lapse of time and a personal acquaintance during 1910 modified this view. The only man of real ability I saw, speaking of his trip through Europe, he said, among the crowned heads was the German Emperor and he is superficial in his intelligence but has real executive ability. He was eager to get my opinion of himself and at last I said, If you were an Amer- ican and lived in America you would carry your own ward, which is more than I can say for any other of the crowned heads. The Kaiser understood perfectly the remark and knew that it was a compliment. And he treated all the other kings with disdain except the King of England. A year later Roosevelt expressed himself as not being friendly to Germany. I seem, he said, to feel less near to them than to any of the peoples I met while abroad. They are not capable of a broad humani- tarian impulse like the English, Americans and French. this correspondence without a wish that there were in the world more diplomatists of the Roosevelt type. Everything he wrote was clear and concise with none of the tedious formalisms and conventional phrases of the old fashioned diplomacy; and though it went straight to the point it was tactful and calculated to influence those for whom it was meant and whose idiosyncrasies he had considered and allowed for." James Bryce, Lit. Rev., Feb. 19, 1921. bishop, i. 485. 316 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1910 The German Emperor is a capable administrator of superficial knowledge, and a great bluffer; he is proud of the things in which he has a superficial knowledge and not very proud of the matters in which he excels. 1 On Roosevelt's arrival in Berlin during May, 1910, he took luncheon with the Kaiser at Potsdam, who invited him next day to see some remarkable field manoeuvres, of which Henry White gave to Abbott an account. The Emperor was dressed in the uniform of a general of the army while Roosevelt was in a simple riding suit of khaki and wore a black slouch hat. During the review the Emperor surrounded by his body-guard of officers in bril- liant uniforms said in German, "Roosevelt, mein frcund, I wish to welcome you in the presence of my guards ; I ask you to remember that you are the only private citizen who has reviewed the troops of Germany." 2 Punch, in a well known cartoon in 1904, pictured the two as talking to one another with defiant mien and la- belled it "Kindred spirits of the strenuous life." The page containing this was confiscated by the Berlin police, whereupon the same artist drew one respectable Berlin citizen and three soldiers looking at a representation of the same cartoon with amused expressions of laughter as they seemed to be asking, What are the Berlin police afraid of? 3 The Kaiser resembled Roosevelt in being a wonderful talker. Reverend Francis G. Peabody kindly has given me this exact account of what took place: "At the Cen- tenary of the University of Berlin, the German Em- 1 Conversations wit h Mr. Roosevelt in Dec. 1910 and l\>c. 1911. 5 [mpn -us of Etooeovolt, Abbott, 248. 'Autobiography, .v,s, 662. Ch. XIII.] ROOSEVELT — THE KAISER 317 peror gave a state dinner to many delegates and after the dinner received them in a ' Gercle , ' passing from one to another with a hospitable word. President Hadley and I stood together as the Emperor approached and, after a few formal words, Dr. Hadley delivered a message of greeting which President Roosevelt had asked him to convey. Thereupon I added, in a lighter vein, that the question had been raised in America, in the light of President Roosevelt's extraordinary conversational gift, whether in the Emperor's interview with him there had been much opportunity for His Majesty to speak. The Emperor laughed heartily and replied, 'I'll tell you. Some of my people looked over toward the corner where we were talking and said it was like two windmills going around like this,' emphasizing his remark with a violent waving of his arm. The inference was that the conver- sational competition was practically a draw." The Emperor gave Roosevelt a photograph of the two on horseback talking one to the other with this inscrip- tion on the back, "The Colonel of the Rough Riders lecturing the chief of the German Army." 1 Many Americans who visited Berlin, struck with the Emperor's "very marked attractiveness of personality and manner," 2 scouted before the Great War the sug- gestion that Roosevelt was his equal in ability. An emi- nent diplomatist, who was well acquainted personally with both, bore contrary witness ; he had not the least doubt that Roosevelt was a match for the other in in- tellectual power. Opinion in France at this time was that the two attracted more attention in Europe than 1 Bishop, ii. 252. 2 Impressions of Roosevelt, Abbott, 248. 318 ROOSBVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 any other men, but Roosevelt was trusted and the Kaiser was not. It is impossible to conceive of Roosevelt mak- ing such a shipwreck of his life and career as did the Ger- man Emperor when he precipitated or allowed to be precipitated the Great War. The Kaiser respected and partly feared Roosevelt, feeling that he had a great coun- try at his back. It is the opinion of some very well in- formed persons that had Roosevelt been President the Great War would not have occurred during his occupancy of the White House. Regarding San Domingo, Roosevelt acted simply as a policeman. The story was the usual one of the bor- rower getting more money than he could pay and of for- eign powers threatening to interfere for the payment of debts. Naturally Roosevelt's action convinced his op- ponents that he proposed following the example of Grant thirty-five years previous, and that the result would be the annexation of San Domingo. In regard to annexa- tion, he was entirely sincere when he wrote to Bishop, "As for annexing the island, I have about the same de- sire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to." ' At the request of the San Domingo government, the President took charge of their custom-houses ; he was to turn over to them forty-five per cent of the receipts and distribute the rest to foreign powers that had claims ; he made a Treaty embodying these provisions and on February 15, 1905, submitted it to the Senate. The Senate did not immediately ratify the Treaty but the President administered San Domingo affairs by virtue 1 Bishop, i. 431. Ch. XIII.] SAN DOMINGO 319 of it on the principle that the President might do, not only what the Constitution authorized but what it did not distinctly forbid. Finally, during the spring of 1907, the Senate ratified the Treaty. In a speech to the Har- vard Union Roosevelt gave a true tale of the affair : "The arrangement has gone on for two years now, while the coordinate branch of the Government discussed whether or not I had usurped power in the matter, and finally concluded I had not and ratified the Treaty. Of the fifty-five per cent we have been able to put two and a half millions towards paying their debts; and with the forty-five per cent that we collected for them, they have received more money than they ever got when they col- lected one hundred per cent themselves ; and the island has prospered as never before." 1 In diplomatic action, Roosevelt had an opportunity to show the true magnanimity of his soul. As a result of the Boxer rebellion of 1900, China had agreed to pay to the United States nearly 24 and a half million dollars as an indemnity for this action endangering American lives and property. It occurred to Dr. Arthur H. Smith, an American missionary residing in China, that the United States might remit a portion of her claim with the understanding that China should use the money, or the income from it, for the purpose of educating young Chinese in American institutions of learning, thereby fostering a spirit which should bear good fruit. Smith came to see Lyman Abbott, who was an intimate friend of the President, and who asked him to set a day for an interview. On the day appointed, early in March, 1906, 1 Bishop, i, 435 ; Autobiography, 548 ; President's Messages to the Senate, Feb. 4, 1905. March 6, Review of Reviews Co., ed., iii. 241, 273. 320 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 Lyman Abbott was unable to keep the appointment, therefore at Roosevelt's suggestion, Lawrence F., his son, went in his place with Dr. Smith to plead for the re- mission of a part of the indemnity. Their visit was at- tended with success. This story is interestingly told by Lawrence F. Abbott who refers for its sequel to the official document. By June 1, 1907, a little over six millions had been paid and on June 15 the Secretary of State, Elihu Root, wrote to the Chinese Minister that he was "authorized by the President to say that ... at the next session of the Con- gress he will ask for authority to re-form the agreement with China under which the indemnity is fixed by re- mitting and cancelling the obligation of China for the payment of all that part of the stipulated indemnity, which is in excess of the sum of SI 1,655,492.09 and in- terest at the stipulated rate." J This the President did in his Message of December/1907, and on May 25 follow- ing, Congress adopted a joint resolution providing "for the remission of a portion of the Chinese indemnity." While there is no specification in the joint resolution, it was a tacit agreement that the proceeds of the sum remitted were to be used in the education of Chinese in America. As one goes over diplomatic correspondence, in which so much of it seems a game of grab, it is agree- able to read the despatch of Prince Ch'ing to our Min- 1 Tli is is the amount as Stated in H< >< >( - letter Imt :is given in the joint p olution and in the President's executive order of Dec. 28, 1908, it is 113,666,492.69 and interest. The difference is explained in the resolution thus: "the Bum of two million dollars be reserved from the Chinese in- demnity . . . for the payment" of American olaims upon the Chinese indemnity which, having been rejected by the U. S. oommissionera may be submitted t> novo to the court of claims and approved by it. the bul- anoe out of the 12,000,000 to be returned to China. Ch. XIII.] CHINA 321 ister in Peking. "I was profoundly impressed," he wrote, "with the justice and great friendliness of the American Government, and wish to express our sincere thanks." At such small cost was the friendship of a great Asiatic country purchased. 1 1 Impressions of Roosevelt, Lawrence F. Abbott, 143 et seq. ; Doc. 1275, House of Reps., GOth Cong. 2d Sess. CHAPTER XIV "America had reached the point," so wrote ex-Senator Albert J. Beveridge, "where a transition from an outworn to a modern economic and social order was indispensa- ble. . . . For a long time there was no labor congestion — first, because there was so much work to be done and secondly, because free land constantly drew people away from industrial centers. . . . Finally this outlet was closed. Free land was all gone." Labor troubles came. There was a "general unrest among the masses of the people." Then Theodore Roosevelt became President, tackled the question and, according to Beveridge, con- stituted "The Roosevelt Period." » Roosevelt appreciated fully the task. "At this mo- ment," he said, "we are passing through a period of great unrest — social, political and industrial unrest." 2 The railroads were the largest aggregate, of capital represent- ing fourteen and a half billions of dollars, and were the most salient object of attack by the reformer. For on the old theory, they were built on the King's highway .ill were subject to the State. But admitting this, with a power of generalization the envy of all, Senator Lodge said, "It is the railroads which have made the rapid yet solid development of the United States possible" ; they are a great "proof of the energy and intelligence of the Amer- 1 Sat 1 \nr. S. 1010, 10. ■ Apr 11, Ixciivr qf Rawi'tw, ed., < l.v Ch. XIV.] RAILROAD RATE LEGISLATION 323 ican people." l The railroad rate legislation of 1905 and 1906 was " stimulated by the aggressiveness of the Executive," 2 and it is a proper classification to call it Roosevelt's work, although by the progress of events he was led to a more radical stand than he at first proposed. On December 6, 1904, in his Annual Message to Congress he said, "While I am of the opinion that at present it would be undesirable, if it were not impracticable, finally to clothe the Interstate Commerce Commission with general authority to fix railroad rates, I do believe that, as a fair security to shippers, the Commission should be vested with the power, where a given rate has been chal- lenged and after full hearing found to be unreasonable, to decide, subject to judicial review, what shall be a rea- sonable rate to take its place ; the ruling of the Commis- sion to take effect immediately, and to obtain unless and until it is reversed by the court of review." 3 But the House of Representatives was more radical than the President and by a very large majority passed a bill on the principle, "Resolved, That we don't like railroads and wish we knew some way to bang 'em good." 4 This is known as the Hepburn bill fathered by William P. Hepburn, a representative from Iowa, and passed the House on February 9, 1905. There the matter rested, as it was the short session of Congress, expiring March 4, 1905 ; therefore the Senate and the country had the opportunity to look at the question on all sides. Roosevelt held to his original position . ' ' My proposal , ' ' he wrote in his Message to Congress of December 5, 1905, "is not to give The Interstate Commerce Commission 1 Feb. 12, 1906, Record, 2415. 2 Washburn's Roosevelt, 129. 8 Review of Reviews, ed., iii. 134. * The Nation, Feb. 16, 1905, 126. 324 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 power to initiate or originate rates generally, but to regu- late a rate already fixed or originated by the roads, upon complaint and after investigation." * Nevertheless, as it was a new Congress, the House repassed the bill on February 8, 190G, by a vote of 346:7. Three answered "present," and twenty-nine did not vote. 2 The discussion in the Senate was illuminating. Sena- tor Philander C. Knox said, "The framers of this bill have succeeded in producing a measure which permits an administrative body to make orders affecting property rights, gives no right to the owners of the property to test their lawfulness in proceedings to enforce them and penalizes the owner of the property in the sum of $5000 a day if it seeks a supposed remedy outside of the pro- visions of the bill by challenging either its constitutional- ity or the lawfulness of the acts performed under its pro- visions." Knox referred to two United States Supreme Court decisions, one of which was, "When we recall that as estimated over ten thousand millions of dollars are invested in railroad property, the proposition that such a vast amount of property is beyond the protecting clauses of the Constitution, that the owners may be deprived of it by the arbitrary enactment of any legislature, State or nation, without any right of appeal to the courts is one which cannot for a moment be tolerated." 3 Then Senator Knox went on to say: "From the decisions of the Supreme Court it will be seen that railroads have a constitutional right to just compensation for Bervices rendered, and that by direct act of legislation i r indirectly through an administrative body, as tlinui lieriew qf h\ . it i , ad . iv. ■' . ' Record, 2808. ' LOGO, 176 1 '. S. L67, 172. Ch. XIV.] FIXING OF RAILROAD RATES 325 state Commerce Commission, they cannot be deprived of this right. They are entitled to their day in court." x Senator John C. Spooner said on the day that the bill passed the Senate, "The bill as it came to us from the House failed to provide affirmatively for a judicial re- view of the order of the Commission fixing rates. That objection has been eliminated." 2 The Senate made such an amendment and by its other action improved the bill. It passed on May 18 by a vote of 71 : 3 ; not voting, 15. Among the yeas were Knox and Lodge. For- aker made one of the three nays. Aldrich and Burton were among the "not voting." 3 As the Senate and House disagreed, the bill went to a Committee of Conference and the report of the Committee was adopted by both houses. The bill was approved by the President on June 20, 1906, and therefore became a law. The important difference between advocates and op- ponents of this legislation lay in the question : Should the Government have the right to fix rates through the Inter- state Commerce Commission? Roosevelt who began with tentative recommendations was finally brought to the position that the Interstate Commerce Commission should have that power. It is a quality of great minds that when they set out on a reform the bent of their think- ing runs to action in the same direction and carries them further than they at first intended. I would not venture 1 March 28, 190G, Record, 4377, 4381. 2 May 18, 1906, Record, 7065. In addition to other authorities cited see Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, ii. 210 et seq. ; Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service, 330. 1 Record, 7088. Aldrich was absent. The statement was made that he would have voted yea; his general pair, Teller, voted yea. Burton evidently had no pair ; no statement was made in his behalf. Depew was silent. Tom Piatt was "unavoidably absent" ; he would have voted yea. 326 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 to differ with so great a man as Roosevelt were I not but- tressed by the opinion of Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt's intimate and faithful personal and political friend. If one will compare the German assertions favoring com- plete action by the State, freely indulged in before the Great War of 1914, with Roosevelt's arguments in favor of the Interstate Commerce Commission, one will be struck by their similarity in their ascription of power respectively to the State and a creation of the State. It was asserted that the Hepburn Act led to socialism but any such result was resisted by Roosevelt. "Public ownership of railroads," he declared, "is highly undesir- able and would probably in this country entail far-reach- ing disaster." 1 As to this result the President and the Senator were at one, the Senator referring to Govern- ment ownership as "the worst of all disasters." 2 Nor did Roosevelt alter his conviction. In a speech delivered on October 4, 190G, he spoke of Government ownership of railroads as "a policy which would be evil in its re- sults from every standpoint." "Great corporations," he said in his Message of 1904, "are necessary, and only men of great and singular mental power can manage such corporations successfully, and such men must have great rewards." 3 "The corporation has come to stay just as the trade union has come to stay," he said a year later. "We must all go up or go down together." I have no "hostility to the railroads. . . . On the whole our rail- roads have done well ami not ill. . . . The question of transportation lies at the rool «»f all industrial success." 4 1 Mcssii^c of Deo. 5, 1906, Bt taM, ad . iv. 570. 1 Feb. 12, 1906, Eli ord, 2422. J Review <•} u- * w . ad., iii L28, v. 837. 4 lici'icw a/ Jicvicwa, ud., iv. 502, 572, 573, 57o. Ch. XIV.] HENRY CABOT LODGE 327 Before dilating on the differences between Roosevelt and Lodge it will be well to have the President's opinion of the Senator which he wrote on February 23, 1906. "Lodge has violent enemies. But he is a boss or the head of a machine only in the sense that Henry Clay and Daniel Webster were bosses and heads of political ma- chines ; that is, it is a very great injustice to couple his name with the names of those commonly called bosses. ... He and I differ radically on certain propositions, as for instance on the pending rate bill; . . . but I say deliberately that during the twenty years he has been in Washington he has been on the whole the best and most useful servant of the public to be found in either house of Congress. . . . Lodge is a man of very strong convictions. ... He has a certain aloofness and cold- ness of manner that irritates people who don't live in New England. But he is an eminently fit successor of Webster and Sumner in the Senatorship of Massachu- setts. He is a bigger man than Sumner." x Eleven days previous to this letter Lodge had made a great speech in the Senate opposing in the main the rate-making power of the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion. He began his speech by a citation from Coleridge's Table Talk in reference to a bill before Parliament: "I have heard but two arguments of any weight adduced in favor of passing this reform bill, and they are in sub- stance these: 1. 'We will blow your brains out if you don't pass it. 2. We will drag you through a horsepond if you don't pass it ' ; and there is a good deal of force in both." Lodge in this citation undoubtedly 1 Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, Abbott, 97 ; Bishop, ii. 6 ; see Autobiography, 383. 328 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1906 referred to the public sentiment which demanded that in some way the railroads be shorn of the power which they possessed. Such a sentiment was powerful in the country. It was shared by most shippers who desired lower rates on their products and who were apprehensive lest large competitors had in some way intrigued for greater advantages. Farmers thought that their grain and meat were debarred from markets by a high railroad tariff. Small business men could see greater profits if a reduction of rates were secured. The proletariat looked upon Wall Street with suspicion and thought that a blow at the railroads was one at the evil centre that might in- sure them a greater share of the good things of life. All together it formed a potent sentiment that had great sway in the House of Representatives. And the Presi- dent deemed it necessary to warn his followers that an act of Congress could not do everything. "The most perfect laws," he said, "that could be devised by the wit of man or the wit of angels would not amount to anything if the average man was not a pretty decent fellow. . . . Nothing can take the place of the individual factor, of the average man's quality and character, his industry, his energy, his thrift, his decency, his determination to be a good man in his own home, a good neighbor and a good citizen in his relations to the State." ' To return to Senator Lodge's speech. "I have the gravest doubts," he said, "as to the wisdom of govern- ment rate 1 1 1 .■ i k i 1 1 li even in the mosl Limited form." "We should not go too far in rate making by the government. The Lessons to be Learned from the experience of other 1 Fork, Pa. Oct 4, 1 '.«'»« i li, ,p, ii. 32. ' .. , ecL, 740, 7ii,7 L3, 71.".. Ch. XIV.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 333 "There is plenty of iniquity in business, in politics, in our social life," he said. But that is no reason why we should follow the "wild apostles of unrest" in "their campaign of hysterical excitement and falsehood." Al- though "the reactionaries and the violent extremists show symptoms of joining hands against us," this legis- lation was enacted in no spirit of "hysteria and rancor." "Better no legislation at all than legislation couched in a vindictive spirit of hatred towards men of wealth." The Hepburn Act drew the line plainly between Big Busi- ness and Roosevelt. High Finance thought that he had inaugurated a campaign of hysteria, w T hile he himself deemed that he had pursued a middle course between the reactionaries and those who looked with favor on socialism. 1 So might anyone be convinced who, affected by the magnetism of his presence, listened to his argu- ments in private conference, and so may anyone now think who bases his judgment on his messages to Con- gress and other public utterances. He had the country at his back; "the plain people who think — the me- chanics, farmers, merchants, workers with head or hand." 2 Members of Congress, who while in Washington toward the end of the session swore that they would no longer be swayed or dictated to by Theodore Roosevelt, re- turned at the commencement of the next session ready to follow whither he led because meanwhile they had been in contact with their constituencies. Men west of the Missouri River said when we hear that a week has 1 Renew of Reviews, ed., 573, 794, S35, 837, 917, 931. 2 Review of Reviews, ed., 919. The Minneapolis Journal gave the title to their cartoon: "The country is back of him. Go ahead, Teddy," whichever path you choose you have U. S. back of you." See also Auto- biography, 383. 334 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 passed and that "Teddy" has smashed no evil we think he must be ill because, owing to his activity, he must be crushing something that bodes no good to the body politic. No wonder he said, I love those Westerners. 1 A veteran senator declared that he had only one objection to the President — with his restless mind he was always doing something. "We passed a law," wrote Roosevelt speaking of the work of Congress and himself regarding the Hepburn Act, "giving vitality to the Interstate Commerce Com- mission, and for the first time providing some kind of efficient control by the National Government over the great railroads." 2 President Roosevelt might have said to Senator Lodge, "The ill that's done ye can compute but never what's resisted" ; and the Senator could have replied, "Nature's patient ways shame hasty little man." Whatever criticism may be meted out to the President for his action giving the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion the power to fix railroad rates cannot obtain as we consider the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food law. By special message to Congress of June 4, 190G, he trans- mitted the report of a special committee and urged the "need of immediate action by the Congress in the direc- tion of providing a drastic and thorough-going inspection by the Federal Government of all stock yards and (lack- ing houses and of their products, so far as the latter enter '1 have said this previously. The Tot* '<> Bladt cartoon en- titled Roosevelt "ia pretty good at 'winning the Weet' himself." Al- l.crt Shaw, Review of Review, 172. 1 Bishop, ii. 131. Sec the cartoon "Then and Now. The lt.nilro.ids mm'I Roosevelt (Before and after the loim struggle for anti-rebate lcgis- lation)," Albert 8haw, Review of Revii 166. Ch. XIV.] MEAT INSPECTION ACT 335 into interstate or foreign commerce. The conditions shown," he added, "to exist in the Chicago stock yards are revolting. It is imperatively necessary in the in- terest of health and of decency that they should be radi- cally changed. . . . The stock yards and packing houses are not kept even reasonably clean and the method of handling and preparing food products is uncleanly and dangerous to health." 1 Senator Albert J. Beveridge had offered an amendment to the appropriation act of the Department of Agriculture and the President urged that this be substantially enacted. It is a mark of Roose- velt that he never claimed credit unless it was his due and an evidence of this is seen in a letter to Beveridge on the day after he had signed the bill. "You were the man," he said, "who first called my attention to the abuses in the packing houses. You were the legislator who drafted the bill which in its substance now appears in the Amendment to the Agricultural bill and which will enable us to put a complete stop to the wrong-doing complained of." 2 Senator Beveridge who had read much and travelled much and was yet to write his magnus opus, "The Life of Chief- Justice Marshall," which could have been written only by a man of letters and the law, was not outdone in generosity, declaring in open Senate that the act "we owe to the courage, determination and the absolutely unselfish devotion to the interest of the people of President Roosevelt." 3 Of the same mind when he penned his eulogy, he wrote, " that important reform never would 1 Review of Reviews, ed., 772. 2 July 1, 1906. The Sat. Eve. Post, Apr. 5, 1919. 'June 20, Record, 8766. 336 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 have had the slightest chance of accomplishment had not President Roosevelt thrown himself into the fight with every ounce of his personal power and all the re- sources of the Administration." "The fight over that measure," he said, "was one of the most desperate in our legislative history." l "The enactment of the pure food bill," so Roosevelt wrote to Congressman Watson on August 18, "and the passage of the bill which rendered effective the control of the Government over the meat packing industries are really along the same general line as the passage of the interstate commerce law and are second only to it in im- portance." 2 The title of the pure food law was, "An act for preventing the manufacture, sale or transporta- tion of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or de- leterious foods, drugs, medicines and liquors and for regu- lating traffic therein." This applied of course only to foreign and interstate commerce and was approved by the President on June 30. The act defined precisely what should be understood by adulterated drugs, confectionery and food. In the case of food it forbade the addition of anj poisonous or deleterious ingredient "which may render such article injurious to health." In brief the act was in the interest of the health of the community and was a protection to the purchaser of food and drugs. "Partly by law and partly by executive order," Roose- velt wrote, "we have completely reorganised the consular service of the United States." s As President, he was as true to the cause of Civil Service Reform as he was as Civil 1 The Sat I • r ■ t, Apr. a, 1019. ■Currmi Lit Pub. Co. 101. P, u 181. Ch. XIV.] MUCKRAKING 337 Service Commissioner. "In my opinion," wrote in 1919 William D. Foulke, a veteran in the cause, "Roosevelt was more consistent and energetic than any other Presi- dent in advancing the reform." 1 An employers' liability act for corporations engaged in interstate commerce was passed. Declared uncon- stitutional by the United States Supreme Court, a law which met the objections of the Court was enacted at a subsequent session of Congress. 2 "Do come on and let me see you soon," Roosevelt wrote to Dooley on June 18. "I am by no means as much alone as in Cuba, because I have an ample surrounding of Senators and Congressmen, not to speak of railroad men, Standard Oil men, beef packers and venders of patent medicines, the depth of whose feelings for me cannot be expressed in words." 3 Roosevelt's muckrake speech attracted much attention from the people and from the press. The verb to muck- rake was speedily coined, obtained wide currency and finds a place in Webster's New International Dictionary published in 1909 with a direct reference to this very address. The speech was delivered at the laying of the corner-stone of the office building of the House of Repre- sentatives on April 14, 1906. "In Bunyan's 'Pilgrim's Progress,'" 4 he said, "you may recall the description 1 Fighting the Spoilsmen, 257. 2 Bishop, ii. 80, 131. The original act was passed June 11, 1906; it was declared unconstitutional on Jan. 6, 1908. The amended act was passed April 22, 1908, and upheld by the Court on Jan. 15, 1912. The objection to the original act was that it was not limited to injuries in- curred in interstate commerce. 3 Bishop, ii. 34. 4 " Bunyan's ' Pilgrim's Progress ' is to my mind one of the greatest books that was ever written." Roosevelt to Dr. Milner, Bishop, ii. 115. 338 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 of the Man with the Muckrake, the man who could look no way but downward with the muckrake in his hand ; who was offered a celestial crown for his muckrake but who would neither look up nor regard the crown he was offered but continued to rake to himself the filth of the floor." Muckraking leads to slander that may untruth- fully "attack an honest man or even assail a bad man with untruth. An epidemic of indiscriminate assault upon character does not good but very great harm," de- clared the President. He had found an important deterrent to the entrance to the public service of able men of normal sensitiveness, in the gross and reckless assaults on their character and capacity both without and within Congress. "Hysterical sensationalism is the very poorest weapon wherewith to fight for lasting righteousness," he said. "There is mighty little good in a mere spasm of reform." Sanity as well as honesty is needed. Mud slinging is as bad as whitewashing. 1 That Roosevelt should know his Shakespeare and his Burke is not surprising ; that this preachment should be on a text from Bunyan is more surprising ; but it is really amazing that one of his illustrations should be from the "Ecclesiastical Policy" of "that fine old Elizabethan divine," Bishop Hooker, who, one might suppose, was read only by students of terse and expressive English. The Constitution makes the President Commander-in- Chief of the Army of fche United States and Roosevelt manifested thai this was to him an earnest provision. Near midnight on August 13, 1906, the city of Browns- ville, Texas, near Fort Brown, was shot up; one person Poc the muckrake speech, see Review of Reviews, cd., 712. Ch. XIV.] THE BROWNSVILLE AFFRAY 339 was killed, a number were assaulted with the intent to kill, women and children were fired at and nearly every one in the city was frightened. As Roosevelt said in his second Message to the Senate, "These crimes were cer- tainly committed by somebody." x After making a thor- ough investigation of the subject through officers in whom he had confidence, he and the Secretary of War, William H. Taft, came to the conclusion that "from nine to fifteen or twenty of the colored soldiers" belonging to B. C. and D. colored of the 25th regular infantry took part in the attack. The "original crime," declared the President, was "supplemented by another ... in the shape of a successful conspiracy of silence for the purpose of shield- ing those who took part in the original conspiracy of mur- der." 2 Therefore "1 ordered the discharge of nearly all the members of Companies B.C. and D. of the 25th infantry by name in the exercise of my constitu- tional power as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army." 3 "It appears that in Brownsville," the President said, "the city immediately beside which Fort Brown is sit- uated, there had been considerable feeling between the citizens and the colored troops of the garrison companies. Difficulties had occurred, there being a conflict of evidence as to whether the citizens or colored troops were to blame." But "any assertion that these men were dealt with harshly because they were colored men is ut- terly without foundation." "I condemned in unstinted terms the crime of lynching perpetrated by white men, 1 Jan. 14, 1907, Review of Reviews, ed., 1097. ■ Dec. 19, 1906, Review of Reviews, ed., 1065, 1070. 3 Ibid., 1063. 340 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 and I should take the instant advantage of any oppor- tunity whereby I could bring to justice a mob of lynchers. In precisely the same spirit I have now acted with refer- ence to these colored men who have been guilty of a black and dastardly crime." l "The evidence shows beyond any possibility of honest question that some individuals among the colored troops whom I have dismissed com- mitted the outrages mentioned." Roosevelt's private letters support his public view. "I have been amazed and indignant," he wrote, "at the attitude of the negroes and of shortsighted white senti- mentalists as to my action. . . . There has been great pressure, not only by the sentimentalists but by the Northern politicians who wish to keep the negro vote. . . . I believe in practical politics . . . but in a case like this where the issue is not merely one of naked right and wrong but one of vital concern to the whole country, I will not for one moment consider the political effect." 2 Awarding equal sincerity to Senator Foraker, I have read carefully the three chapters in his book which he has devoted to the "Brownsville Affray" ; but I am not convinced that he has made out his case. The contest be- tween him and the President had become embittered from some other cause, and his sarcasm directed against the President and the Secretary of War does not add to the cogency of his i Military matters in any case require prompt decisioi] and the despotic quality nat- urally inheres in any executive action. Hut a calm re- view of the whole matter cannot fail to convince the Im- : Bm • / R ; L079, 1097. J Biahop, ii Iter's Notes ->f :i Busy I. iff, ii. ; also Fifty Vein, Cullom, 350. Ch* XIV.] THE PRESIDENT AND JAPAN 341 partial observer that the President was right and acted on the best evidence, both legal and human, that was obtainable. The President's tribute to Japan in his Message to Congress of December 3, 1906, represented fully the senti- ment of the American people as it was during the war between Japan and Russia, when public opinion was largely on the side of Japan. Since that time, however, an "attitude of hostility" has developed which though " limited to a very few places, is most discreditable to us as a people and may be fraught with the gravest con- sequences to the Nation. . . . Since Commodore Perry, by his expedition to Japan over half a century ago, first opened the islands to western civilization, the growth of Japan has been literally astounding." Then, "Japan's development was still that of the Middle Ages ; now she stands as one of the greatest of civilized nations ; great in the arts of war and in the arts of peace ; great in mili- tary, in industrial, in artistic development and achieve- ment. . . . We have as much to learn from Japan as Japan has to learn from us. . . . Throughout Japan Americans are well treated and any failure on the part of Americans at home to treat the Japanese with a like courtesy and consideration is just so much a confession of inferiority in our civilization. ... I ask for fair treat- ment for the Japanese as I would ask fair treatment for Germans or Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians or Ital- ians. ... I ask it as due to humanity and civilization. I ask it as due to ourselves because we must act uprightly toward all men." l No lover of peace can feel otherwise than thrilled when 1 Review of Reviews, ed., 957, 958, 960, 961. 342 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 he reads that part of the President's Message of Decem- ber, 190G, which is devoted to Secretary Root's visit to South America. The third International Conference was held at Rio Janeiro from July 23 to August 29 and the Secretary of State was sent as our delegate. It was con- sidered a great honor by the South American republics that we should send so high an official and one of such distinction. He was cordially received and made an honorary President. How well Roosevelt understood the value of such a meeting is seen in the words of his Message. "The example," he wrote, "of the representa- tives of all the American nations engaging in harmonious and kindly consideration and discussion of subjects of common interest is itself of great and substantial value for the promotion of reasonable and considerate treat- ment of all international questions." After the Con- ference Root "visited Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Panama and Colombia. He refrained from visit- ing Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador only because the distance of their capitals from the seaboard made it im- practicable with the time at his disposal. He carried with him a message of peace and friendship, and of strong desire for good understanding and mutual helpfulness ; and he was everywhere received in the spirit of his message." There was a misunderstanding in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. The prevalent idea was that it involved an assumption of superiority and the right to exercise some kind of protectorate by the United States over the South American republics. "That impression/' Baid the President, "continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade.'' Ch. XIV.] THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 343 "It was part of Secretary Root's mission to dispel this un- founded impression" ; and he therefore made an address at Rio on July 31, in which he said : "We wish for no vic- tories but those of peace ; for no territory except our own ; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the small- est and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Re- public. . . . Let us preserve our free lands from the bur- den of such armaments as are massed behind the frontiers of Europe." The arches which spanned the streets in the city of Buenos Ayres had the names inscribed on them of Wash- ington, Jefferson and Marshall and also those of James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay and Richard Rush, a silent testimony to the friends of South America who had labored for them in the greater republic. It was a "graceful courtesy" on the part of the Government of Brazil that the building in which the Conference was held was labelled "Palacio Monroe." The President said, "Our grateful acknowledgments are due to the Governments and the people of all the coun- tries visited by the Secretary of State for the courtesy, the friendship and the honor shown to our country in their generous hospitality to him." l In these words the President represented the senti- ment of the American people. 1 Renew of Reviews, ed., 960, 907, 908, 909, 970. CHAPTER XV Nineteen hundred seven may be called the Panic Year. In making a study of the panic of 1857 I wrote, "The reason of panics lies deep in the human heart." Pass- ing through the panic of 1873 as a business man, those of 1893 and 1907 as an investor, I have seen no reason to change this opinion. Accepting the theory of perio- dicity of panics it is unnecessary to explain fully why the period is not always the same ; sixteen years elapsed be- tween 1857 and 1873, twenty between 1S73 and 1893, and fourteen between 1893 and 1907. But the cause is always the same. If men were always wise, if they them- selves or corporations in which they held stock never ran into debt, if there were never fluctuations in the prices of produce — in short if all business was done for cash, if men never incurred obligations which they could not at once meet, if they did not spread out with the idea that every extension, every conversion of liquid into fixed capital meant a larger income from their enterprise, finan- cial panics would never occur. But a society of that kind would lack commercial energy, would cease ite material progress and, in fact, would be impossible in one based on European ci\ ilization. Taking into account the actual state of affairs debt seems a necessary adjunct. Certain men have more energy than money; others more money than enenj It was entirely Datura! then thai ou1 of this condition should be developed on the one >ide the manager and the Ch. XV.] THE PANIC OF 1907 345 promoter and on the other the investor. Banks are the basis of all financial affairs and they are deeply in debt to their depositors. It is a commonplace that the func- tion of a bank is to lend money to borrowers at a higher rate of interest than it pays its depositors. Finan- cial panics mean a loss of confidence, and one of its marks is that Savings Banks depositors start a run on banks where their savings are placed. This puts a strain on National Banks which have a large amount of Savings Bank money and besides have their own troubles to face in the vain endeavor to collect their loans and to meet the demands of their own depositors. So far as I know such have been the characteristics of the panics of '57, '73 and '93. Theodore Marburg in his business dissertation attempted to show that "each recurring panic has its own special causes" l but to my mind he in no way trav- erses the general law. It is true enough that 1857 and 1873 were caused by the too rapid building of railroads, that the operation of the silver purchase provision of the Act of 1890 was a contributing cause to the panic of 1893, but if one needs one word to describe the cause of all these he finds it in "overtrading." A Boston banker found in a printed description of the panic of 1857 substantially the same characteristics as were passing before his eyes in 1907. A. Piatt Andrew, Assistant Professor of Economics at Harvard University, in an article printed in the New Year's number of the New York Journal of Commerce on January 2, 1907, found a close parallel between the situation at the begin- ning of the year 1907 with that of 1857, and wrote further 1 Address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, April 10, 1908. > 316 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1907 that a financial panic might occur during the year as it had a half a century earlier. 1 The devotees of high finance ascribed the panic wholly to the Roosevelt policies both "legislative and execu- tive." 2 A cartoon in Life pictured Roosevelt emerging from a bear hunt in the South with the usual eyeglasses, showing his front teeth on the broad grin, dancing in high glee and shooting to the death "Big Game" labelled "prosperity." 3 The cartoon represented the general feeling among financial men as is shown in Roosevelt's speeches and messages, in his private letters and in varied recollections of the period. Everywhere that these men congregated, the conversation was Roosevelt and the financial ruin which he had brought upon the country. A glance at Roosevelt's own description will be useful. "We have our ups and downs," he said on October 22, "no law and the administration of no law can save any body of people from their own folly. If a section of the business world goes a little crazy, it will have to pay for it ; and being excessively human, when it does pay for it, it will want to blame someone else instead of itself. If at any time a portion of the business world loses its head, it has lost what no outside aid can supply. If there is reckless overspeculation or dishonest business manage- ment, just as sure as fate there will fellow a partial col- lapse. There has been trouble in the stock market, in the high financial world during the past few months. The statement has frequently been made that the policies for which I stand, Legislative and executive, are responsi- 1 Letter of A. Rati Andrew, Oct I". L921 ; Boeton Daily AdMrtUtr, Nov. 2, 1907. ■ Rooeevelt, Speech, Oct. 22, 1907, /.'- • Lxfe, Oct. 31. Ch. XV.] THE PANIC OF 1907 347 ble for that trouble." • In another speech Roosevelt admitted that his policies might have possibly been a contributory cause to the panic ; 2 but in a special Mes- sage to Congress of January 31, 1908, he said, "So far as the business distress is due to local and not world wide causes and to the actions of any particular individuals, it is due to the speculative folly and flagrant dishonesty of a few men of great wealth who seek to shield them- selves from the effects of their own wrong-doing by ascrib- ing its results to the actions of those who have sought to put a stop to the wrong-doing." The panic began with a "flurry in stocks" in March, it gained new strength in August 3 and reached its height during October and November. On the 22d of October the Knickerbocker Trust Company failed; the Electric and Manufacturing Company, of which George Westing- house was President, applied for the appointment of receivers. 4 General Electric stock which had sold at 162 during the year went to 90, and other shares suffered a like decline. Banks in all of the large cities issued clearing-house certificates of which 84 million dollars were emitted in New York City alone. There were runs on many of the banks and practically all of the banks in large cities requested their customers to make their cheques through the clearing house only and to draw no currency unless absolutely needed. Currency went to a premium of 4| per cent, which lasted from the first day of November through the first half of December. Money on call, if it could be had during the days before 1 Oct. 22, Review of Reviews, ed., 1464. 2 Oct. 1, ibid., 1377. 3 Bishop, ii. 43; Review of Reviews, ed., 1358. * Oct. 23, Life of George Westinghouse, Leupp, 208. 348 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 the banks issued clearing-house certificates, was lent at 125 per cent. Summoned from the General Episcopal Convention in Richmond, where he was a diligent reader of the newspapers, J. P. Morgan arrived on the scene and took command. Indeed the financiers desired a general and he was one in whom all had entire confidence. Back of Morgan were the old and experienced men of finance, who had regarded with no favor the operations of the new school of financiers who had been conspicuous in the overtrading that brought on the panic. They might have said with Prometheus, "Youthful pilots rule Olym- pus." ' The new school had originated the system of "chain banking" which meant the buying up of the ma- jority of shares of any one bank, then hypothecating these shares and with the proceeds purchasing the control of another bank which was dealt with in a similar manner and so on until a coterie controlled a number of banks which assisted them in their wild speculations that were those of "infatuated promoters and grumbling millionaires." 2 Nightly meetings were held in Morgan's library and methods were devised to allay the panic. The Secretary of the Treasury, George B. Cortelyou, came to New York and gave his timely aid. The President took a hand in the same direction and acted with his usual prompt- ness. One evening he was informed that two representa- tives of the United States Steel Corporation desired to see him early next morning, when in company With Sec- retary of State Root lie saw them and nave this account of the interview dated November 1. "Judge E. 11. Gary and Mr. 11. C. Frick, On behalf 1 Lawton, Atlantic Monthly, 62, 215. 1 Noyat, Forum, Jan. 1908, 313. Ch. XV.] THE PRESIDENT— STEEL CORPORATION 349 of the Steel Corporation, have just called upon me. They state that there is a certain business firm (the name of which I have not been told but which is of real impor- tance in New York business circles), which will undoubt- edly fail this week if help is not given. Among its assets are a majority of the securities of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. Application has been urgently made to the Steel Corporation to purchase this stock as the only means of avoiding a failure. Judge Gary and Mr. Frick informed me that as a mere business transaction they do not care to purchase the stock ; that under ordinary cir- cumstances they would not consider purchasing the stock, because but little benefit will come to the Steel Corporation from the purchase ; that they are aware that the purchase will be used as a handle for attack upon them on the ground that they are striving to secure a monopoly of the business and prevent competition — not that this would represent what could honestly be said, but what might recklessly and untruthfully be said. "They further informed me that, as a matter of fact, the policy of the company has been to decline to acquire more than sixty per cent of the steel properties, and that this purpose has been persevered in for several years past, with the object of preventing these accusations, and, as a matter of fact, their proportion of steel properties has slightly decreased, so that it is below this sixty per cent, and the acquisition of the property in question will not raise it above sixty per cent. But they feel that it is immensely to their interest, as to the interest of every responsible business man, to try to prevent a panic and general industrial smash up at this time, and that they are willing to go into this transaction, which they would 350 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 not otherwise go into, because it seems the opinion of those best fitted to express judgment in New York that it will be an important factor in preventing a break that might be ruinous ; and that this has been urged upon them by the combination of the most responsible bankers in New York who are now thus engaged in endeavoring to save the situation. But they asserted that they did not wish to do this if I stated that it ought not to be done. I answered that, while of course I could not advise them to take the action proposed, I felt it no public duty of mine to interpose any objections." l The President acted wisely, and was completely vindi- cated by the Courts ; first by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and then by the United States Supreme Court. 2 Judge Gary and Frick had told the President the truth. Gary had then begun to gain the confidence of the newspaper reading com- munity that with the years has been largely augmented. Henry Clay Frick had worked up from the bottom, was truthful, cool and shrewd. The action of the President which was announced on the Stock Exchange at its open- ing that morning did much toward allaying the disturbed confidence. Notwithstanding the financial stress, the pressure of various kinds brought to bear upon him, Roosevelt pro- posed to pursue his policies. If they, he declared, have been a contributory cause to the panic they "must be accepted as a disagreeable but unavoidable feature in a course of policy which as Long as 1 am President will not 1 Autobiography, its 'Tin Court di - in 1020 and it stood 4 to 3. The I by Justioe MoKenn*. Ch. XV.] THE PRESIDENT — THE PANIC OF 1907 351 be changed." l ''Everyone," he said in his special Mes- sage to Congress of January 31, 1908, "must feel the keenest sympathy for the large body of honest business men, of honest investors, of honest wage-workers who suffer because involved in a crash for which they are in no way responsible. At such a time there is a natural tendency on the part of many men to feel gloomy and frightened at the outlook." 2 But he wrote in his Annual Message of December 3, 1907, "swindling in stocks, cor- rupting legislatures, making fortunes by the inflation of securities, by wrecking railroads, by destroying com- petitors through rebates — these forms of wrong-doing in the capitalist" must be stopped. 3 "If it were true," he said to Congress on January 31, 1908, "that to cut out rottenness from the body politic meant a momentary check to an unhealthy seeming prosperity, I should not for one moment hesitate to put the knife to the cor- ruption." 4 "Our main quarrel," he said in the same Message, "is not with the representatives of the interests. They derive their chief power from the great sinister offenders who stand behind them. They are but puppets who move as the strings are pulled. It is not the pup- pets, but the strong cunning men and the mighty forces working for evil behind and through the puppets with whom we have to deal. We seek to control law-defying wealth." 5 Roosevelt's own comment is highly interesting. Thus he wrote to his brother-in-law during November: "Of course I am gravely harassed and concerned over the 1 Oct. 1, Review of Reviews, ed., 1377. 2 Review of Reviews, ed., 1636. s Ibid., 1528. 4 Ibid., 1637. 6 Ibid., 1619. 352 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 situation. ... I am doing everything I have power to do ; but the fundamental fact is that the public is suffer- ing from a spasm of lack of confidence. Most of this lack of confidence is absolutely unreasonable and there- fore we can do nothing with it. There is a part for which there is a substantial basis however. There has been so much trickery and dishonesty in high places ; the ex- posures about Harriman, Rockefeller, Heinze, Barney, Morse, Ryan, the insurance men and others have caused such a genuine shock to people that they have begun to be afraid that every bank really has something rotten in it. In other words they have passed through the pe- riod of unreasoning trust and optimism into unreasoning distrust and pessimism. I shall do everything I can up to the very verge of my power to restore confidence, to give the banks a chance to get currency into circula- tion." « Roosevelt was especially severe in his criticism of Rocke- feller whom I have already considered ; but Rockefeller would have been astonished to know that he was classed with men of evil intent ; on the contrary he was at this time working at the back of Morgan and with the same purpose in view as that of the President "to restore con- fidence." It was, it is true, a selfish purpose, as to dis- turb the complex arrangements of business and of finance was worse, so far as the amount of loss is concerned, for the large financiers than for the wage-earner and small shop-keeper. By February I, L908, confidence was practically re- stored. On the last day of 1007 the premium on cur- 1 Bishop, ii. 48. Ch. XV.] THE PANIC OF 1907 353 rency was only \ of one per cent. But the strain had been great. One week during November the deficit in the legal reserve was 54 millions ; this was when the weekly statements were made on the old basis before the passing of the Federal Reserve Act. One hundred million dollars of gold were imported from Europe. At the close of the year the Bank of England rate was the highest for thirty-four years. So far as New York City was concerned the panic according to Alexander D. Noyes was not approached in 1893 and hardly paralleled in 1873 ; although the remark would hardly hold true of the West. 1 In the West was a large amount of so-called desert land. But "the very condition of aridity," wrote George Wharton James in his useful book, "is an assurance of great fertility when water is applied. . . . The most fer- tile countries are the arid ones, and not the humid and 1 An excellent authority is Alex. D. Noyes whose articles in the Forum for July, Oct. 1907, and Jan., April, 1908, give a true and exact account of the panic. I have also consulted The Nation for Oct. and Nov. 1907, the financial articles in which were probably written by Noyes; also the N. Y. Tribune for Oct. 21, 22, 23, 24 and Nov. 5. "During the panic of 1893 no bank failure of any consequence occurred in New York City. In October, 1907, one national bank, four trust com- panies and six state banks closed their doors in that locality and in the closing week of January the suspension was announced of four banks do- ing business in Manhattan Island. These were not institutions of the first importance but at the start they threatened complications to the general situation. ... All of these January bank failures represented the cleaning up process which followed an experiment in reckless and un- usual banking undertaken during the recent boom. These banks, directly or indirectly, had been involved in the process known as 'chain bank- ing.' " — Noyes. The Forum, April, 498. In July, 1893, in New York City only one national bank suspended with assets of $800,000 and one state bank with assets $400,000. During August, 1893, two more state banks and during December another state bank closed their doors. 354 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 well watered ones." l And water was plenty but it came from the mountains, partly from the melting of snow, and during the late winter and spring rushed down the river-beds in torrents, frequently overflowing the plains and sometimes carrying destruction to farms, villages and towns. The rain descended and the floods came and the winds blew. The problem was to chain this force, to store the water when it was plenty and let it loose during the intense heat of the summer and whenever wanted. The method to be applied was well known ; the money and the ability properly to spend it were necessary fac- tors. Something had been done by private companies and by State and other official organizations but they could not furnish the means to operate irrigation on a large scale. Soon after Roosevelt became President, GifTord Pinchot and Frederick H. Newell called upon him and presented "their plans for National irrigation of the arid lands of the West." They found in Roosevelt a ready listener and one thoroughly comprehending. As a young man he had passed much time on a ranch 2 and understood the marvels of irrigation, so that no argument was needed to convert him to the scheme which he ad- vocated in his first Message to Congress. "The forest and water problems," he declared, "are perhaps the most vital internal problems of the United States. 3 On June 17, 1902, he had the satisfaction of signing the bill which provided for the work being done by the Nation. This is known as the Newlaiuls Art from it- author, Senator New- lands, who had wrought strenuously to effect its passage. 1 Reclaiming the An i My Brother. T. Roosevelt, Mrs. Robinson, chap. vi. 'Autobiography, 431. Ch. XV.] IRRIGATION 355 Part of James's book reads like a magical romance. "For a life-time," he wrote, "I have sung the majestic chorus of Mendelssohn from Elijah, 'Thanks be to God; he laveth the thirsty land.' Again and again have I thrilled to its passionate power, but never did I dream of its full significance until I saw water pouring through the irrigation canals of our thirsty West; the gentle murmuring of the flowing waters suggesting the music made by the land as it soaked up, absorbed, drew into every thirsty pore, the life-giving, stimulating, seed- growing fluid." 1 When one thinks that the United States is, according to European opinions, a loosely administered country, one reads with satisfaction James's tribute to the "knowl- edge, skill, ingenuity, tact, patience and equanimity of the officials, engineers and managers of the Reclamation Service" ; 2 and one cannot help thinking that nowhere else could so large an undertaking have been more efficiently conducted. James is not a Californian, possessed with the idea that his is the greatest country on earth and full of blind enthusiasm for the Western States, as he is fully conversant with the English work in Egypt and India and the irrigation system of Argentina. 3 Roose- velt, on the completion of the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona, thanked the engineers present "for their admirable work, as efficient as it was honest and conducted according to the highest standards of the public service. As I looked," he said, "at the fine, strong, eager faces of those of the 1 Reclaiming the Arid West, 34. 2 James dedicates his book to John W. Powell, Francis G. Newlands, Charles D. Walcott, Frederick H. Newell, William E. Smyth, George H. Maxwell, Arthur P. Davis, Franklin K. Lane. » Reclaiming the Arid West, 11, 37, 390. 356 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1902 force who were present and thought of the similar men in the service, in the higher positions, who were absent and who were no less responsible for the work done, I felt a foreboding that they would never receive any real recognition for their achievement." 1 Roosevelt had a clear comprehension of what was needed when he became President. "The idea that our natural resources were inexhaustible," he wrote, "still obtained, and there was as yet no real knowledge of their extent and condition. . . . Our magnificent river sys- tem with its superb possibilities for public usefulness was dealt with by the National Government not as a unit but as a disconnected series of pork-barrel problems. ... On June 17, 1902, the Reclamation Act was passed. It set aside the proceeds of the disposal of public lands for the purpose of reclaiming the waste areas of the arid West by irrigating lands otherwise worthless and thus creating new homes upon the land. The money so ap- propriated was to be repaid to the Government by the settlers, and to be used again as a revolving fund contin- uously available for the work." 2 The storage dam, called after Roosevelt, at the canyon of the Salt River — "a wild, ragged and picturesque spot," is an excellent example of irrigation. "To create a dam here of sufficient power to stop and tame the Salt River, especially at flood time, meant a gigantic piece of solid engineering." 1 Such a one was constructed and the result is best told by a citation by Charles (1. W:u?hburn 1 Autobiography, i-'ifi. The men whom Roosevelt held up especially for honor w.rc Gifford Pinchot, John W. Powell, P. ll Newell, Charles D. Waloott, I'r.mris c. Newlands, <; ll. Maxwell, Dr. .!. \Y. McGee, ■Autobiography, 480, i:;i. - Reclaiming thr W'.-t, James, 71. Bee that book for ■ tin.- account. Ch. XV.] THE ROOSEVELT DAM 3S7 from an Arizona newspaper printed probably about 1916 : "Ten years ago farm land in the Salt River Valley was worth from thirty-five to a hundred dollars per acre. It is now worth from seventy-five to five hundred dollars. . . . What effected the change? The credit should be given to the Roosevelt Reservoir. . . . The Roosevelt Reser- voir right now has more water in it than it ever had be- fore, giving positive insurance of crops in the Salt River Valley for years to come. It is three-fourths full and will be entirely filled before the snow stops melting this spring." 1 The Roosevelt Dam was nearly five years in construction, 2 and was opened by ex-President Roose- velt in March, 1911. The Colorado River is the Nile of America, only it is not navigable ; it was dammed at Yuma, 251 miles south- east of Los Angeles. 3 The results were excellent and made for civilization. "Every item," wrote Roosevelt in 1913, "of the whole great plan of reclamation now in effect was undertaken between 1902 and 1906. By the spring of 1909 the work was an assured success and the Government had become fully committed to its con- tinuance." 4 James, in his chapter entitled "A Vision of the Future," the last one of his book published in 1917, wrote, "Who that is familiar with the destructive floods of, say, three Western rivers alone, the Columbia, Colorado and Sac- ramento, does not understand that the real conquest of these rivers has not yet even begun." There are 80 1 Washburn's Roosevelt, 126. 2 Sept. 20, 1906 to March, 1911, James, 80. 5 For a full account, ibid., 97. 4 Autobiography, 432. 358 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 million acres of swamp lands and 400 million acres of deserts, mostly public domains, in the United States. ' ! Our swamp and overflow lands, ' ' he continued, ' ' embrace an area greater than the whole superficial area of the Philippines. Their reclamation would give employment for years to hundreds of thousands of laborers and later would afford opportunities for the establishment of approximately two and a half million families in homes of their own. Two or three harvests from these lands would suffice to pay the entire cost of reclamation. . . . The Man of Destiny is the hydraulic engineer." l Theodore Roosevelt was no engineer but he appre- ciated fully the material interests of his country. "A primeval forest," he wrote while governor, "is a great sponge which absorbs and distils the rain water. And when it is destroyed the result is apt to be an alternation of flood and drought. Forest fires ultimately make the land a desert." "I was a warm believer in reclamation and in forestry," he wrote while President. 2 Forestry is the science of caring for and cultivating forests. "Con- cerned over the destruction of the forests," Roosevelt as President did what he could for their preservation. He was attracted to Gifford Pinchot to whom he paid a warm tribute. "He led," so Roosevelt wrote, "and in- deed during its most vital period embodied the fight for the preservation through use of our forests." 3 The enemies of the foresl were fires, the sawmill and other inventions for getting timber and wood-pulp. By legis- lation which he furthered and by executive action the President had always in mind that a fight must be made 1 Pp. 3Sf Review, ed., 962. : [bid., L178. » Ibid., 1198. 4 Life of Roosevelt, Lewi . 24 I Ch. XVI.] THE WAR OF 1812 367 asm evoked by a great military leader. Roosevelt was a profound student of naval operations, writing his first book on the subject at twenty-four, so that his advice to study our failures was the result of scholastic inquiry as well as practical observation. There was only one way, he affirmed, in which the War of 1812 could have been avoided as is well shown in Captain Mahan's his- tory. "If," Roosevelt wrote, " during the preceding twelve years, a navy, relatively as strong as that which the country now has, had been built up and an army provided relatively as good as that which the country now has, there never would have been the slightest neces- sity of fighting the war ; and if the necessity had arisen, the war would under such circumstances have ended with our speedy and overwhelming triumph. But our people during those twelve years refused to make any preparations whatever regarding either the Army or the Navy. They saved a million or two of dollars by so do- ing ; and in mere money paid a hundredfold for each million they thus saved during the three years of war which followed — a war which brought untold suffering upon our people, which at one time threatened the gravest national disaster, and which, in spite of the necessity of waging it, resulted merely in what was in effect a drawn battle, while the balance of defeat and triumph was al- most even." l In 1906 he asked Congress ''for the building each year of at least one first-class battle-ship." 2 But one year later he had changed his opinion and asked for four battle- 1 Review of Reviews ed., 983. 2 Annual Message, ibid., 984. The American Navy at that time had nine battleships and eight more in course of construction. Life of Roose- velt, Lewis, 201. 368 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 ships. The second Hague Conference, that held from June to October, 1907, meanwhile had declined to limit naval armaments; therefore "it would be most unwise for us to stop the upbuilding of our Navy. To build one battle-ship of the best and most advanced type a year would barely keep our fleet up to its present force. This is not enough. . . . The only efficient use for the Navy is for offence. The only way in which it can efficiently protect our own coast against the possible action of a foreign navy is by destroying that foreign navy." ' "This is a very rough-and-tumble, workaday world," Roosevelt wrote in a private letter ; 2 and we peace-lovers must admit that he comprehended Europe in 1907 better than we did. Nobody could assert that he foresaw the terrible conflict which began in 1914, but he believed in being ready for any emergency and was less trustful of our European contemporaries than were we who sat in comfortable libraries and constructed theories. 3 There- fore the years have demonstrated that he was supremely right when he asked for four battleships, and we wore wrong when we cut him down to two. 4 "Our army and navy," he wrote, "and above all our people learned some lessons from the Spanish War and applied them to our own uses. During the following decade the improvement in our army and navy was very great ; not in material but also in personnel, and, above all, in the ability to handle our forces in good-sized units. By 1908 . . . the navy had become in every respect as fit a fighting instru- 1 Message of 1907, Review of Reviews ed., 1573. 1 Bishop, ii. 28. ' [bid 4 ,\f Room vrit, I Ch. XVI.] THE JAPANESE QUESTION 373 and I finally made up my mind that they thought I was afraid of them. ... I found that the Japanese war party firmly believed that they could beat us, and, unlike the Elder Statesmen, thought I also believed this." l During 1907 and possibly a part of 1908 the friction between California as the leader of the Pacific coast and Japan became acute. The question of excluding the Japanese from the public schools was to the fore and there was also a hostile feeling regarding the Japanese possession of land. The opposition to the immigration of the Japanese was not on account of their inferiority as being of the yellow race, but on account of their su- periority. They could live for less, work for less than the Caucasian and did they become actual possessors of land could cultivate it better and get more from it. Any- one who will take the trouble to compare the square miles and population of Japan with the area of California, Oregon and Washington and their number of inhabitants 2 can see at once the reason of the covetousness of Japan and the resistance of the Caucasian. It was fortunate that in the presidential chair was a man of culture who appreciated the Japanese civilization and at the same time was a true American full of sympathy for the West and who understood the view of the Calif ornians. To continue the story from the Autobiography: "I made up my mind that it was time to have a show down in the matter; because if it was really true that our fleet could not get from the Atlantic to the Pacific it was much better to know it and be able to shape our policy 1 Bishop, ii. 249. 2 Japan, 148,000 square miles, population over 48 millions ; California, Oregon and Washington, 318,000 square miles, estimated population in 1907, three millions. 374 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 in view of the knowledge. Many persons publicly and privately protested against the move on the ground that Japan would accept it as a threat. To this I answered nothing in public. In private I said that I did not be- lieve Japan would so regard it because Japan knew my sincere friendship and admiration for her and realized that we could not as a Nation have any intention of at- tacking her. . . . When in the spring of 1910 I was in Europe I was interested to find that high naval authori- ties in both Germany and Italy had expected that war would come at the time of the voyage. They asked me if I had not been afraid of it, and if I had not expected that hostilities would begin at least by the time that the fleet reached the Straits of Magellan? I answered that I did not expect it ; that I believed that Japan would feel as friendly in the matter as we did ; but that if my expectations had proved mistaken, it would have been proof positive that we were going to be attacked anyhow and that in such event it would have been an enormous gain to have had the three months' preliminary prepara- tion which enabled the fleet to start perfectly equipped. In a personal interview before they left, I had explained to the officers in command that I believed the trip would be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take ex- actly the same precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if we were at war with all the nations of the earth ; and that no excuse of any kind would be accepted if there were a sudden attack of any kind and we were taken unawares. . . . "The cruise did make a very deep impression abroad. . . . But the impression made on our own people was of far greater consequence. No Bingle thing in the history of Ch. XVI.] THE VOYAGE AROUND THE WORLD 375 the new United States Navy has done as much to stimu- late popular interest and belief in it as the world cruise. "I first directed the fleet of sixteen battle-ships to go round through the Straits of Magellan to San Francisco. From thence I ordered them to New Zealand and Aus- tralia, then to the Philippines, China and Japan and home through Suez. . . . Admiral Evans commanded the fleet to San Francisco ; there Admiral Sperry took it. . . . The coaling and other preparations were made in such excellent shape by the Department that there was never a hitch, not so much as the delay of an hour, in keeping every appointment made. All the repairs were made without difficulty, the ship concerned merely falling out of the column for a few hours, and when the job was done steaming at speed until she regained her position. Not a ship was left in any port; and there was hardly a desertion. As soon as it was known that the voyage was to be undertaken men crowded to enlist, just as freely from the Mississippi Valley as from the seaboard, and for the first time since the Spanish War the ships put to sea overmanned — and by as stalwart a set of men-of-war's men as ever looked through a port- hole, game for a fight or a frolic, but also self-respect- ing and with such a sense of responsibility that in all the ports in which they landed their conduct was exemplary. The fleet practised incessantly during the voyage both with the guns and battle tactics and came home a much more effective fighting instrument than when it started sixteen months before. l . .. . "It was not originally my intention that the fleet should visit Australia but the Australian Government sent a 1 For the torpedo boat destroyers incident see Autobiography, 596. 370 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 most cordial invitation which I gladly accepted. . . . The reception accorded the fleet in Australia was wonderful and it showed the fundamental community of feeling between ourselves and the great commonwealth of the South Seas. The considerate, generous and open-handed hospitality with which the entire Australian people treated our officers and men could not have been sur- passed had they been our own countrymen. . . . "The most noteworthy incident of the cruise was the reception given to our fleet in Japan. In courtesy and good breeding, the Japanese can certainly teach much to the nations of the Western world. I had been very sure that the people of Japan would understand aright what the cruise meant and would accept the visit of our fleet as the signal honor which it was meant to be, a proof of the high regard and friendship 1 felt and which I was certain the American people felt for the great Island Em- pire. The event even surpassed my expectations. I cannot too strongly express my appreciation of the gen- erous courtesy the Japanese showed the officers and crews of our fleet and I may add that every man of them came back a friend and admirer of the Japanese. On October 28, 1908, Admiral Sperry wrote me that in Yokohama as many as a thousand English-speaking Japanese college students acted as volunteer guides. ... In Tokyo there were a great many excellent refreshment places, where the men got excellent meals and could rest, Himke and write letters and in none of these places would they allow the men to pay anything though they were more than ready to do so. The arrangements were marvellously perfect." l 1 Autobiography, .?.!_' <-t •»> si '... on Main* inquiry, 50; on Spanish INDEX 403 procrastination, 54 ; on Santiago expedition, 85 n., 86 n. ; on the Oregon voyage, 98 n. ; on acquiring Philippines, 105. Chain banking and panic of 1907, 348. Chamberlain, D. H., on Panama Revolution, 272. Chamberlain, Joseph, and Alaskan boundary, 257. Chamberlain, L. T., on Panama Revo- lution, 273. Charles Scribners' Sons, acknowledg- ment to, 399 n. Charleston, Exposition, Roosevelt at, 231. Chicago, Hanna on stump in, 141. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Rail- road. See Northern Securities. Chichester, Sir Edward, at Manila Bay, 80. China, foreign attitude, American trade and spheres of influence, 125 ; Hay and open door, 126 ; Boxer uprising, 127-131 ; partial concellation of American indemnity, 319-321. Ch'ing, Prince, on American Boxer indemnity reliquishment, 320. Civic Federation, Hanna in, 238. Civil Service reform, Hanna's attitude, 3, 175; McKinley and, 174, 175; under Roosevelt, 336. Clarendon, Lord, on Spanish procras- tination, 58. Clark, C. E., Oregon voyage, 98 n. Clark, E. E., Anthracite Coal Com- mission, 243, 246. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, abrogation, 261. Cleveland, Grover, on postponement of gold standard measure, 36 ; and McKinley, 36, 39; and Cuban Insurrection, 44, 45 ; and Hawaii, 113 ; and anthracite coal strike, 240, 241, 245 ; and candidacy (1904), 293 ; and old-age pension, 297 n. Cleveland, Hay and the Vampire Club, 120, 121 ; oil refineries, development of Standard Oil, 158-160. Coal. See Anthracite. Coin's Financial School, 22, 23. Colombia, rejection of canal treaty, 266-268. See also Panama Canal. Colonies. See Imperialism. Commerce, American invasion of Europe, 117; increase of exports, 118: American, in China and open door, 125, 126 ; Morgan's steamship combine, 156; Department created, 296. See also Railroads ; Tariff ; Trusts. Concas y Palau, V. M., on naval battle of Santiago, 95. Conger, E. H., and Boxer siege of Peking, 12S-130. Congress, Fifty-fourth: and Cuba, 44. — Fifty-fifth: Hanna's appointment as senator, 30-35 ; extra session, silver in, 36; tariff, 37-39; and British arbitration treaty, 41 ; Cuban belligerency, 46 ; Proctor's Cuban speech, 51-53 ; war feeling. 54, 55 ; Cuban intervention resolu- tions, Teller Amendment, 65-67; and Cuban Republic, uproar, 68; declaration of war, 69 ; thanks to Dewey, 74 ; war finances, 82 ; treaty of peace, 110, 136; Hawaii, 113. Fifty-sixth: gold standard act, 119 ; Puerto Rico, Foraker Act, 176; Cuba, Piatt Amendment, 179-181 ; Philippines, Spooner Amendment, 185, 200, 201 ; Hay-Pauncefote draft treaty, 261, 262. Fifty-seventh: Philippines, 201 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 262 isthmian canal route, 263-266 reclamation, 354. — Fifty-eighth Cuban reciprocity, 183 ; canal treaty with Panama, 275 ; railroads, Elkin Act, 296, 323; Department of Commerce and Labor, 296. Fifty-ninth: complexion, 295; old- age pension, 297 n. ; railroads, Hep- burn Act, 323-334 ; meat inspection and pure food, 334-336 ; employers' liability, 337. — Sixtieth: and Roosevelt, 388. Congress of Arts and Science, 301 n. Conservation, Governors' Convention on conserva tion, 360, 363 ; division of powers and control, 361-363; judicial support of policy, 363. See also Forest reserves ; Reclamation. Consular service, reform, 336. Coolidge, A. C, on Puerto Rico, 176; on Cuba, 177 ; on lack of exploitation of Philippines, 1S6; on results of American rule in Philippines, 215. Coolidge, L. A., on Piatt, 160. 404 INDEX Corn, crops (1900-2), 155 n. ; export (1870-1900), 162 n. Corporations, Bureau created, 296. See also Trusts. Cortelyou, G. B., and Hanna's presi- dential candidacy, 286 ; as campaign manager, and contributions, 293 ; Secretary of Commerce and Labor, 297 ; and panic of 1907, 348. Cotton, export (1870-1900), 162 n. Cox, J. D., on probabilities (1896), 28; and Spanish mission, 42 ; and Spanish War, 56. Crane, W. M., and campaign of 1904, 293. Crist6bal Col6n, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. Croly, Herbert, as Hanna's biographer, 8 ; on campaign of 1896, 26 ; on Hanna on stump, 140 ; on mandate of election of 1900, 144. Cuba, Teller Resolution on, American renunciation, 66, 70, 71 ; Spain relinquishes, 97, 99, 110; war debt in peace negotiations, 101, 110; American attitude and admini-tni- tion, 177, 182, 183; sanitation. 178; population, education, training for self-government, 179 ; relations with United States, Piatt Amendmenl 179-181, 183; inauguration of civil government, Root on results, l^L' reciprocity with, 182, 183; dis- turbances, American intervention and control, 364-366. 7 ; depression of L203, 157; McKinley's second inaugural 162; rise of ElooseveH Period, 823 meat inspection and pine food INDEX 405 laws, 334-336. See also Agricul- ture ; Commerce ; Conservation ; Fi- nances ; Labor ; Trusts. Education, in Cuba, 179 ; promotion in Philippines, 199. Edward VII., on Roosevelt and Russo- Japanese peace negotiations, 307. El Caney, battle, S5-87. Elections, 189G: Hanna and Mc- Kinley's candidacy, 4 ; McKinley's candidacy and financial failure, 11 ; Hanna 's efforts for McKinley's nom- ination, 12 ; silver question in Re- publican Convention, 13-16 ; Re- publican nominations, 16 ; Hanna's attitude toward campaign, 17, 18 ; Democratic Convention, free silver and Bryan's nomination, 17, 18 ; silver and tariff as issues, 18-20 ; party secessions, 19 ; Bryan's cam- paign, 20-22 ; free silver literature, 22 ; Hanna's conduct of campaign, 23 ; Republican campaign and litera- ture, 24, 26; McKinley in campaign, 24-26 ; period of Republican doubt, 26, 27 ; sectarian attitude, influence of crops, discontent as issue, 27 ; period of Republican ascendancy, 28 ; results, 29. 1900: Republican platform, Philippines, McKinley's renomina- tion, 132, 133 ; Roosevelt's nomina- tion for Vice-President, 133-135; Democratic Convention, free silver and anti-Imperialism, 135, 136 issues, Imperialism, 136-139 Hanna as campaign manager, 139 and coal strike, 140, 238, 239 Hanna on stump, 140, 141 ; Roose- velt on stump, 141 ; Bryan on stump, Democratic strange bed- fellows, 142 ; influence of economic conditions, results, 143 ; mandate for business expansion, 144 ; and Philippine Insurrection, 201. 1904' Hanna as timber, his support, 279-281, 286-288; Ohio indorsement incident, 281-284 ; labor and Roosevelt, 285 ; Hanna's attitude toward candidacy, 286-288, 291 ; Roosevelt's confidence in renomination, 288; Hanna's death, 289; Roosevelt nominated, hie letter of acceptance, Democratic nomination, issue, 292 ; campaign contribution personalities, 293-295; results, 295; as trust regulation mandate, 296. 1908: Roosevelt's disclaimer of candidacy (1904), 295; his refusal to be a candidate, his reasons, 378- 388; Republican Convention, Taft as Roosevelt's candidate, 379-381 ; result, 388. Electricity, and Buffalo Exposition, 169. Eliot, C. W., and Cuban teachers, 179 ; on Roosevelt, 232. Elliott, C. B., on beginning of Philip- pine Insurrection, 111 7J. ; litera- ture on Philippines, 183 n. Employers' liability, interstate commerce acts, 337. Evans, R. D., on battle of Santiago, 91; at the battle, 94; command in battleship voyage, 375. Exports, increase, 118; development of petroleum, 162; grain, cotton, and petroleum (1870-1900), 162 n. Fairbanks, C. W., on Hanna, 290. Finances, big interests and Roosevelt, 224, 227, 296, 299, 333, 351-353, 394-396. See also Economic condi- tions ; Money ; Panics ; Trusts. Flagler, H. M., and beginning of Standard Oil, 158. Flour, export (1870-1900), 162 n. Food, pure food law, 336. Foraker, J. B., and silver, 13; and Bushnell, 34 ; Puerto Rico bill, 176; and Hanna, 281; on Hanna, 290; and Hepburn Bill, 325; and Brownsville affair, 340. Foraker Act, 176. Forbes, W. C, on American rule in Philippines, 212. Forest reserves, creation, 358 ; ad- ministration, 363. Foster, J. W., and Spanish mission, 42; on Spanish War as unnecessary, 64 n. ; on Hawaii, 112, 113 ; on Alas- kan boundary, 259; on Panama Revolution, 273. Foulke, W. D., on McKinley and Civil Service reform, 174 ; on reform under Roosevelt, 337. Fowle, Miss, acknowledgment to, 399 n. Fox, G. L., on Panama Revolution, 273. 406 INDEX France, Anatole, on battle of Manila Bay, 77, 78. France, and American-Spanish crisis, 64; and Spanish War, 76-78; and blockade at Manila, 79 ; and open door, 126. See also Algeciras Con- ference. Friars' lands in Philippines, 206. Frick, H. C, as iron master, 118, 153 ; and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. purchase, 348-350. Frye, W. P., peace commissioner, 101 ; and Philippines, 102. Fuller, M. W., Northern Securities dissent, 225 n. ; Knight case, 226 n. Funston, Frederick, captures Agui- naldo, Roosevelt on, 201. Gage, L. J., Treasury portfolio, 34 ; retirement, 219 n. Garfield, J. A., and silver, 14. Gary, E. II., as head of steel trust, 151 ; and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. purchase, 348-350. General Electric, and panic, 347. Gerald, Miss, acknowledgment to, 399 n. Germany, and American-Spanish crisis, 64 ; and Spanish War, 76 ; and Manila blockade, 79, HO; and Philippines, 110; and open door. 126; Kiaochow Bay, 248 n. See also Algeciras Conference ; Vene- zuela ; Wilholm II. Gibbs, Philip, on war, 57. Gloucester, in battle of Santiago, 91, 92. Godkin, E. L., and Reconstruction, 392. Goethals, G. W., and Panama Canal, 277. Gold Democrats in campaign of 1896, 19. Gold standard, naming in Republican platform, 15; McKinley'a post- ponement <>f measure, 86, 119; act, 119. See also Silver. Gompor;. Samuel, and Roosevelt, 286. Cordis, W. C.i and conquest of yellow- fever, 178; sanitation of Canal 278. Governors' Convention, 360; effect, 363. W. I! , and -tril merger, 154. Robert, OH BufTulu Exposition, 109. Gray, George, peace commissioner, 101; and Philippines, 104, 105, 110, 1S9 ; opinion on American rule in Philippines, 205 ; Anthracite Coal Commission, 246. Great Britain, Democratic denuncia- tion (1896), 18, 23 ; and international bimetallism, 37 ; draft general ar- bitration treaty, 40 ; and Ameri- can-Spanish crisis, 64 ; and Spanish War, 76 ; and Manila blockade, 78 ; and Philippines, 109, 110; and open door, 126 ; Venezuelan affair, 247- 250, 253 ; Roosevelt's attitude, 253, 260 ; Roosevelt on navy as peace factor, 260 ; abrogation of Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, 261-263; and Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, 308 ; and Algeciras Conference, mutual fear of Germany, 312. See also Alaska. Great Northern Railroad. See Northern Securities. Great Heart, Roosevelt as, 398. Greene, F. V., and acquiring Philip- pines, 103. Guam, ceded to United States, 97, 99, 110. Hadley, A. T., at Berlin University Centenary, 316. Hague Tribunal, Venezuelan case, 251, 253. Hale, E. E., on Henna, 289. Hale. Eugene, and Philippines, 111; on Roosevelt, 398. Halifax Fisheries Arbitration, 259. Hamburg-American Line, and combine, 156. Hanna, M. A., career and character, 1—10 ; early years in politics, 2. I business man, 2, 4 ; and Civil Sen - ice reform, 3, 175 ; in national conventions, 4 ; and money in Polities, 5-7; temperance, 6; and literature. 7; morals, biography, 8 . persona] relations with McKinley, 9, in. L3; and tariff, 10; Large- heartedness, 10; and MeKinley's financial failure. 11; efforts for McHinlsy'a nomination. 12, 13; and silver Question, 13-16; En Campaign, SJ chairman of National Committee, L7 19, 23. 26. 30; and silver as issue, 19; and Cabinet, INDEX 407 30, 34 ; senatorship and Sherman's Cabinet appointment, 30-35 ; McKinley's visit (1897), 42; and war sentiment, 56, 64 ; and Hay and English mission, 123 ; and Roose- velt's nomination for Vice-President, 133, 134; in campaign of 1900, chairmanship, on stump, 139-141 ; and coal strike (1900), 140, 238, 239 ; advice to Roosevelt, 220, 221 ; and organized labor, 237, 280, 288, 290 and coal strike (1902), 238, 244, 245 and route of isthmian canal, 264 265; and Panama Revolution, 271 and Roosevelt's trust attitude, 279 labor and other political support, 279-281, 286, 288; Ohio indorse- ment incident, 281-284 ; personal re- lations with Roosevelt, 2S4 ; reelec- tion to Senate, 285 ; attitude toward presidential candidacy, 286-288, 291 ; and Roosevelt as leaders, 288 ; death, Roosevelt and last illness, 289; tributes, 289, 290; end of a dynasty, 291. Harlan, J. M., Northern Securities decision, 224 ; in Knight case, 226 n. ; as arbitrator, 259. Harper, W. R., and Congress of Arts and Science, 301. Harriman, E. H., contest for Northern Pacific, 155 ; and campaign of 1904, 294 ; and rate legislation, on venal government, 331 ; and panic of 1907, 352. Harrison, Benjamin, and Hawaii, 112. Hart, Sir Robert, on Boxer uprising, 127. Harvard University, and Cuban teach- ers, 179 ; Roosevelt at Commence- ment, 232. Hawaii, revolt and annexation treaty, 112; area and population, 112 n. ; withdrawal of treaty, republic, 113; annexation by joint resolution, 113. Hay, John, on McKinley in campaign of 1896, 25 n. ; on Hanna as cam- paign manager, 30; on Sagasta, 47 and war, 58 ; on Spanish procrasti- nation, 59 ; on Dewey's victory, 74 and acquisition of Philippines, 102 106, 110; Secretary of State, 102 n. 124; on Hawaii, 114; character 120, 300 ; Vampire Club, 120, 121 as historian, 121-123; in politics. English mission, 123 ; and McKinley, 124, 125 ; culture, 124 ; open door policy, 126 ; and Boxer uprising, 129-131 ; in campaign of 1900, 139, 143 ; Roosevelt's tributes, 232, 310; on Roosevelt, 233 ; on Alaskan boundary, 254, 258 ; and abrogation of Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 261-263 ; and Senate, attempt to resign, 261, 262 ; on canal route, 263 ; canal treaty with Colombia, 266 ; and rejection of it, 267 ; and Panama Revolution, 274 ; canal treaty with Panama, 275 ; on Roosevelt as gentleman, 299 ; and St. Louis World Fair, 300 ; death, on his own career, 310. Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, 275. Hay-Herran Treaty, Colombia's re- jection, 266, 267. Hay-Pauncefote treaties, first, criticism and rejection, 261 ; second, fortifica- tion of canal, 262, 263. Hearst, W. R., Harriman on, 332. Heinze, F. A., and panic of 1907, 352. Henry of Prussia, Prince, on Cuba, 70. Hepburn, W. P., railroad rate legisla- tion, 323. Hepburn Act, 323-325; justice of it, 325-331 ; big business and, 331-333; public support, 333. Herrick, M. T. f and McKinley's financial failure, 11 ; election as governor, 285. Herschell, Lord, and Alaskan boundary, 254. Higgins, F. W., campaign for governor, 294. Hill, J. J., contest for Northern Pacific, 155; Northern Securities, 221-226; and Roosevelt, 222, 223. Hoar, G. F., and acquisition of Philip- pines, 103, 111 ; on Bryan and Imperialism, 136 ; as anti-Imperial- ist, 189; Roosevelt on, 232; on Hanna and Panama Canal, 264; and Panama Revolution, 273, 274. Hobart, G. A., vice-presidential nomi- nation, lfi; elected, 29; and war, 60, 63; death, 133. Hobson, R. P., exploit, 98 n. Holleben, Barnn von, and Venezuelan affair, 250, 251. Holmes, O. W., appointment and 408 INDEX Northern Securities decision, 225 ; and Alaskan boundary, 257. Hooker, Richard, Roosevelt's knowl- edge, 338. Hughes, C. E., candidacy for governor, 332 ; and presidential candidacv (1908), 380. Ide, H. C, Philippines Commission, 196. Imperialism, development of decision to acquire Philippines, 100-107 ; Commissioner Gray's argument against, 104, 105 ; justice of decision considered, 107-110, 112; Repub- lican platform on Philippines, 132 ; as issue (1900), 13G-139 ; McKinley's aim, 184-1S7; anti-Imperialists considered. Ls7-190; Root as colo- nial minister, 195 ; constitutionality, 206. See also Philippines. Indiana, battle of Santiago, 91. Industry. See Economic conditions. Infanta Maria Teresa, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. Inland Waterways Commission, 360. Interstate Commerce Commission, and railroad rates, 323-325 ; justice of power, 325-334. See also Rail- roads. Iowa, battle of Santiago, 91. Ireland, John, and Spanish War, 62. Iron and steel, revival of industry, 117 ; American steel rails, 117; Carnegie ae master, l is ; effects of competitive system. Ill; inception of m 145 ; career and character of < iarne- gie, 145 148; ('anionic Works and merger 148; terms of merger, n 149, L56; results of merger, 150- 153, 156 ; Rod efeller interest merger, ore fields, 157. Irrigatii in. >'> ■ 1 1 I' nrition. Isthmian fcran it. See Panama I Italy, and American-Spanish cri I open door, 120; Venezuelan affuir, 247. im \\i>n w I' iosei alt's appreci- ation Jamas, G. vl . on reclamation, 853, Japan, ai 'I Manila bloel ada 7fl and open door, 126; attitude and VOyaga of American batti- 370-374, 377; reception of fleet, 376. See also Russo-Japanese War. Japanese, Roosevelt and, in United States, 341, 371, 372, 377; basis of problem, 373. Jefferson, Thomas, and Imperialism, 200 ; Roosevelt on, 397. Jette. L. A., Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, 257, 259. Jingoism, fear of Roosevelt's, 364. Joint High Commission, and Alaskan boundary, 254, 255. Jones, W. B., as iron master, 152. Judiciary, Roosevelt on, 395. Jusserand, J. J., and Morocco, 314. Kansas, prosperity, 118. Kasson, J. A., reciprocity treaties, 173. Keneko, Baron, on Roosevelt and peace negotiations, 307. Kentucky, in election of 1896, 29. Ketteler, Baron von, murdered, 128. Keystone Bridge Works, beginning, i if.. Kiaochow Bay, German lease. 248 n. Kipling, Rudyard, on Roosevelt, 399. Klondike, gold discovery and Alaskan boundary, 255. Knickerbocker Trust Company, failure, 347. Knox, P. C, and Northern Securities, 224 ; and coal strike, 241 ; and Panama, 271 ; on railroad rate legislation, 324; vote on Hepburn Bill, 325. Kohlsaat, H. H., and McKinley's financial failure, 11. Komura, Baron, peace conference, 306, 307, 309. Labor. Roosevelt on organized, 235; Mitchell on orj 1,2 6; Sanna'a mi 288, 290; political support of H i Roosevelt igonisea organised, 285 ; Depart- I lyera' lia- bility in interstate oommeroe, 337. Set ite coal Ladroni v • I hiam. Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, and merger, ] r K., and n lamat Lansdowne, Lord, on Venezuelan affair, 250. INDEX 409 Latan6, J. H., on Cuba, 178 ; on constitutionality of colonial govern- ment, 206. Lazear, J. W., martyr in cause of humanity, 178. Lee, Fitzhugh, and the Maine, 47 ; and delay in war message, 61. Lee, R. E., Roosevelt on, 397. Leo XIII., and Spanish War, 62. Le Roy, J. A., on beginning of Philip- pine Insurrection, 111 n. Lewis, W. D., on Roosevelt and con- servation, 363 n. Leyland Line, combine, 156. Life, on Roosevelt and panic, 345. Lincoln, Abraham, Roosevelt on, 298, 381, 384, 397, 398. Lloyd, H. D., on Standard Oil, 165. Lodge, H. C, and silver, 13, 15 ; and war feeling, 58 ; on Congress and diplomacy, 60 ; on battle of Manila Bay, 73 ; on battle of San Juan Hill, 86 ; on Washington and Santiago ex- pedition, 87 ; and Imperialism, 139 ; as chairman of Philippine Committee, 193 n. ; on administration of Philip- pines, 200 ; Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, 256-259 ; on railroads and national development, 322 ; vote on Hepburn Bill, 325 ; Roosevelt on, 327 ; on power to fix railroad rates, 327- 330 ; as chairman of Republican Convention (1908), 380; and Tre- velyan, 390. Lome, E. D. de, indiscretion and recall, 48. London Times, on Boxer uprising. 129. Long, J. D., on destruction of the Maine, 50 ; on MeKinley and war, 61 ; order to Dewey, 71 ; and Santiago, 90 ; on credit for Santiago naval victory', 93 n. ; on the Oregon's voyage, 98 n. ; retirement from Cabinet, 219 n. ; Roosevelt on, 232. Low, Seth, and Spanish mission, 42. Lowell, J. R., on Spanish procrastina- tion, 58. MacArthtjh, Aethur, on Spain and Philippines, 109 n. McGee, J. W., and reclamation, 356 n. McKenna, Joseph, in Northern Securi- ties decision, 224 n. ; Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. decision, 350 n. McKim, Charles, and Roosevelt, 398. MeKinley, William, Hanna and presi- dential possibility, 4 ; temperance, 6 ; personal relations with Hanna, 9, 10, 13 ; financial failure, rescue. 11; Hanna and nomination cam- paign, 12, 13 ; and silver question in convention, 13-16; nomination, 10; and silver as issue, 19 ; in campaign, "front-porch" speeches, 24-26; pre- pared to stump, 27 ; election, 29 ; and Hanna for Cabinet, 30, 34 ; and appointment of Sherman, 31-35; inauguration, address, 35, 40; tariff priority over gold standard, 36 ; and international bimetallism, faith- fulness to gold standard, 36, 37, 119; and Cleveland, 36, 39; and British arbitration treaty, 40 ; and Cuban problem, Day and Sherman, 41 ; and Spanish mission, 42; trips (1897), popularity, 42; waiting at- titude toward Cuba, 46, 48 ; and de Lome incident, 48 ; and Proctor's speech, 52 ; ultimatum to Spain, 53, 54 ; war pressure on, 59 ; averse to war, 60; yields, unnecessary war message, 60-65 ; reply to powers, 64 ; and Teller Amendment, 67, 99 ; blockade order, no privateering, calls for volunteers, 81 ; and Philip- pine insurgents against Spain, 96 ; and protocol, 97 ; first and later attitudes on acquiring Philippines, 100, 102-110, 1S4, 191, 197; and peace negotiations, 101 ; and Hawaii, 113; gold standard act. 119; and Hay, 124, 125, 262; and Boxer up- rising, 129-131 ; renomination, 132, 133; and Roosevelt's nomination, 134, 135 ; letter of acceptance and Imperialism, 138 ; reelected, 143 ; second inaugural, enjoyable fruits of office, 169; assassination, 170, 171 ; Roosevelt and continuance of policies, 171, 218-221; and Con- gress, popularity, 172, 196 ; and reciprocity, 173 ; and Civil Service reform, 174, 175 ; and Piatt Amend- ment, 181 ; aim in Philippines, 184- 1S7; and Hoar, 189; first Philip- pine Commission, 190; and Root, 195 ; second Commission, 196, 201 ; instructions to Commission, 107 ; and old-age pensions, 297 n. Magoon, C. E., in Cuba, 365. 410 INDEX Maine, sent to Havana, 48 ; destruc- tion, cause, influence, 49-51, 55-58, 65. Manila, surrender, 96; population, 101. Manila Bay, Dewey's appointment and preparations, 69-71 ; battle, 71—73 ; credit for victory, 73-75 ; moral effect on American people, 75 ; diplomatic effect, 76-78 ; blockade, conduct of Germans, 78-80 ; troops sent, surrender of city, 96. Marburg, Theodore, on panics, 345. Marroquin, Jos6, and canal treaty, 266, 272. Martens, Frederic de, on Roosevelt, 310. Marvland, in election of 1896, 29 ; of 1904, 295. Massachusetts, and battle of Santiago, 91. Matteson, D. M., on old-age pensions, 297 n. Matthews, Brander, on attic nights, 121. Maxwell, G. H., and reclamation, 355 n., 356 n. Meat Inspection Act, 334-336. Merritt, Wesley, at Manila, 96; and acquisition of Philippines, 103. Methodist Church, in campaign of 1896, 27. Meyer, G. von L., and Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, 305. Miller, W. A., discharge and reinstate- ment, 285. Millet, F. D., and Roosevelt, 398. Mississippi River, Roosevelt's trip and speech, 359. Missouri, in election of 1904, 295. Mitchell, John, and coal strike (1902), 236, 238, 241, 242; on orgi labor, 236; on Commission and or- ganized labor, 247; a-- interpreter of Roosevelt to labor. 299. Mommsen.Theodor.on Spanish War, 76. Money. 8et Cold standard ; Silver. Monroe Doctrine, and acquisition of Philippines, 109: and Venezuelan ir, 249; South America and. 342 igue, Q. H . on effect of Standard Oil. 165. Morgan. J. P., character, 115; and railwnv combinations, 116; steel margi - L44, 145, L48 LSI, 154. 156, 157, contest for Northern Pacific, 155; ship combine, 156; on crisis of 1903, 157 ; and Roosevelt and Northern Securities, 222, 223 ; and anthracite coal strike, 237, 238, 243-245 ; and panic of 1907, 348. Morgan, J. S., and "bulling" on America, 116. Morgan, J. T., as arbitrator, 259; and isthmian canal, 271. Morley, John, on Roosevelt, 397. Morocco. See Algeciras Conference. Morse, C. W., and panic of 1907, 352. Morton, O. P., Roosevelt on, 392. Moses, Bernard, Philippine Commis- sion, 196. Muckraking, Roosevelt's speech on, 337. Municipal government, as preparation for self-government in Cuba, 179 ; and in Philippines, 198. Mutsuhito, on Roosevelt and peace negotiations, Roosevelt's letter prais- ing Japan, 308. Myers, G. H., acknowledgment to, 399 n. Napoleon I., Roosevelt and, 397. Nashville, and Panama Revolution, 270. Nation, on Hanna and money in politics, 6 ; on Sherman, 33 ; on Standard Oil, 166, 167; on McKinley and reci- procity, 174 ; on campaign con- tributions, 294 ; on St. Louis World Fair. 301. Natural resources. Sec Conservation. Navy, American, preparedness (1S9S), 83; and Roosevelt, 366, 369; Roosevelt's building programme, 367-369; purpose of world voyage, and Japan, 369-374, 377; effect of voyage 374; its suooess, receptions. 375. 37fi : review on return. 377. Navy, British, rmd peaoe, 260. Nebrs il a prosperity, 1 18. 1 i •',■. Roosevelt on, 392. Negroe , and Booker Washington incident. 229; Brownsville affair, 340. \,-ir York, and battle of Santiago, 91. New York City, Bryan's speech (1896\ 20. fork Ermine Pott, in campaign of 1R96. 24; Roosevelt on "crowd," 290. INDEX 411 Neweli, F. H., and reclamation, 354. 355 n., 356 n. Newlands, F. G., and reclamation, 354, 355 n., 356 n. Newlands Act, 354, 356. Newspapers, yellow, and war feeling, 55 ; Roosevelt on American, 304. Nicaragua, and route for canal, 263- 266, 271. Nicholas II., Roosevelt's characteriza- tion, 303 ; on Roosevelt and peace negotiations, 308. Nicolay, J. G., as historian, 122. Nobel Peace Prize, award to Roose- velt, 310. Northern Pacific Railroad, contest for control, 155. See also Northern Securities. Northern Securities Company, forma- tion, 221, 222; Roosevelt's opposi- tion, financiers' misunderstanding of it, 222-224 ; dissolution ordered, 224 ; decision considered, 225. Noyes, A. D., in campaign of 1896, 24 ; on revival of prosperity, 114, 115; on speculative mania, 154 ; on panic of 1907, 353. Obaldia, J. D. de, and canal treaty, 272. Ohio, in campaign of 1896, 28, 29; Republican indorsement incident (1903), 281-284; Republican suc- cess (1903), 285. Olcott, C. S., on Congress and war, GO. Olney, Richard, and Cuban Insur- rection, 44, 45. Olympia, Dewey's flagship, 70. Omaha Trans-Mississippi Exposition, 103. "Open door," Hay and policy in China, 126. Oquendo, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. Oregon, battle of Santiago, 91, 92; voyage, and Panama Canal, 98 n., 261. Osier, William, on conquest of yellow fever, 178. Ostrogorski, Moisei, on national con- ventions, 132. Otis, E. S., command in Philippines, 184; Philippine Commission, 191, 193. Pacific Coast, Japanese question, 341, 371-373, 377. Panama Canal, abrogation of Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, fortification, 261- 263 ; public support, 263 ; route question, Hanna and choice of Panama, 263-266, 271 ; draft treaty with Colombia, Colombia's rejection, 266-268 ; Panama Revolution, Roosevelt and, 268-275 ; construc- tion treaty with Panama, provisions, 275 ; construction, Bryce on, as achievement, sanitation, 276-278 ; bibliography, 276 n. ; lock type, 278 ; cost, 278 n. Panama Republic, revolt, Roosevelt and, 268-275 ; recognition, guaran- tee, 275. See also Panama Canal. Pan-Americanism, Root's visit and, 342, 343. Panics, periodicity, 114; little, of 1903, 157; cause, 344-346; Roose- velt's policies and (1907), 346, 350- 352; events in 1907, 347; and chain banking, administration and, 348 ; Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. incident, 348-350 ; restoration of confidence, 352 ; severity, 353 ; compared with 1903, 353 n. See also Economic conditions. Parker, A. B., nomination for President, and silver, 292 ; campaign personal- ities, 293 ; defeat, 295. Parker, E. W., Anthracite Coal Com- mission, 246. Pauncefote, Lord, canal treaties, 261, 262. Pavne, S. E.. and tariff, 38. Peabody. F. G., on Wilhelm II., 316. Peace, Carnegie's advocacy, 153 ; Roosevelt and, 39S. Peckham, R. W., Northern Securities dissent, 225 n. Peking, Boxer siege and relief, 128-131. Penrose, Boies, and Standard Oil, 332. Pensions, old-age liability order. 297. People, the, and Roosevelt, 298, 333, 385-3SS, 393. Percy, Eustace, on Puerto Rico, 176. Petroleum. See Standard Oil. Philip, J. W., at battle of Santiago, 94. Philippine Government Act, 201. Philippines, insurgents and American- Spanish War, 96; Spanish War protocol on, McKinley's first at- titude. 98, 100; area and popula- tion, 101 ; development of decision to 412 INDEX acquire, 102; Commissioner Gray'e opposition, 104 ; justice of acquisition considered, 1U7-110, 112; in peace treaty, payment for, debt not assumed, 110; beginning of insur- rection, cost of insurrection, 111 responsibility for beginning, 111 n. Republican platform on (1900), 132 as issue, 136-139; diverse literature on, 183; Root as authority on, 184; American aim, no exploitation, 184- 187 ; anti-Imperialists considered, 1 s~-190 ; first Commission, purpose, 190, 191 ; progress and reason for insurrection, Ag as leader, 191-194 ; findings of first Commis- sion, 193 ; Root as minister, 195, 201, 204 ; appointment <>f - Commission, Taf t, 196 ; instructions to Commission, government, 197- 200 ; education, language, 199 ; prece- dents of rule, 200 ; cong v proval of government, 201 ; guerilla warfare and election of 1900, ca of Aguinaldo, 201 ; his peace procla- mation, 202 ; inauguration and progress of civil government, 202, 205; end of insurrection, conduct of American soldiers, 202-204 ; friars' lands, 206; Taft as Governor. 207 212; cost of ruling, 212; t ults of American rule, 212-216 ; peace army in, 212 n. ; economic disasters. 21."> n. ; future. 216; bibliography, 217 n. Pinchot, Gifford, and reclamation, 354, 356 n. ; and forest reserves, Pipe lines, development of oil, 164. 11.. and Piatt Amendment, 180, 181; and' Cuban reciprocity, i on du1 in Philip] i Piatt, T. C.i and MoE r_' and Rooi evelt's nomination as President, 133, 134 ; and Hep- burn Bill. 325 n. provisions and authorship, L79 181 ■ Banna i •! oommen Lai spirit, 5-7 i on acpomph-linnTii* under practical, 369 n. See also ■ ;nnn. Polo y Ilornabo, Luis. on Proctor'; Population. Philippines, 101. 101 . Hawaii, 112 n. ; Cuba, 179 ; density in Orient, 191 n. Portsmouth Navy Yard, peace negotia- tions at. 306. 307. Powell, J. W., and reclamation, 355 n., 356 n. Preparedness, contrast of navy and army (1898), 82-85; Roosevelt's advocacy, 367. President, Roosevelt's interpretation of powers, 242, 319, 383-385, 388, 395. Pritchett, H. S., on Hanna, 5. Proctor, Redfield, speech on Cuba, 51- 53 ; and Dewey, 69, 70 ; on Dewey as diplomatist, 78. Propertv, Roosevelt and rights, 299, 395. Property. See Economic conditions. Public debt. See Debt. Public lands. See Forest reserves; Reclamation. Publicity, Roosevelt and, as weapon, 296, 299. Puerto Rico, occupation, 95 ; ceded, 97, 99, 110; and free trade, 173; American rule, Foraker Act, 176; cor 206. . on acquisition of Philippines, 109; on Roosevelt and the Kaiser, 316. Pure food law, 336. Quay, M. S., and McKinley's candi- ,12; and coal strike, 241. Railroads, Morgan and combinations, 116; American rails. 117; contest for control of Northern Pacific, 155; oil rebatec 160; Elkina Act for- bidding i < 296 ; problem, and national devel 22; Roose- velt's original position on rate 328; Hepburn Act, 23-325 ; justice -.fit 325 331,334 : public ownership. lie opinion on. 32S ; Big Bu Hepburn Act. 331-333; public support of act, 333; ero- liability, 337. See also Northern Securities. McKinley's advocacy. 173; Cuban. 182, 183. Reclamation, problem of arid lands, t. Xcwlands t sffldenoy of Service, 355-357 ; future. 357. INDEX 413 Reconstruction, Roosevelt on, 392. Reed, T. B., presidential candidacy (1896), 12, 16; Speaker, 37; and Cuba, 46 ; and war feeling, 63. Reed, Walter, and conquest of yellow fever, 178. Red Star Line, combine, 156. Reid, Whitelaw, peace commissioner, 101 ; and Philippines, 102. Republican Party. See Congress ; Elections ; Hanna ; McKinley ; Roosevelt. Reyes, Rafael, and canal treaty, 266, 272. Rhodes, D. P., and Hanna, 11 n. Rio Janeiro, Pan-American Conference, Root at, 342. Robertson, J. A., on American rule in Philippines, 216. Rockefeller, J. D., and steel merger, 157 ; business methods, 160-164 ; judge of men, 162 ; suppression of middlemen, 163 ; and pipe lines, 164 ; public ethics of career, 165-168 ; and panic of 1907, 352. Roman Catholic Church, in campaign of 1896, 27 ; in Philippines, 102 n. ; friars' lands there, 206 ; support of Hanna, 281. Roosevelt, Theodore, on Hanna, 10, 289; and war feeling (1898), 57; and appointment of Dewey, 69, 70 ; on Dewey's victory, 74 ; on war panic, 76 ; on military unpreparedness and mismanagement, 82-84 ; in Spanish War, Rough Riders, 84 n. ; battle of San Juan Hill, 86 ; and Shafter's demoralization, 87 ; on credit for Santiago naval victory, 93, 93 n. ; and McKinley's renomination, 133 ; nomination for Vice-President, 133- 135 ; on stump, 141 ; election, 143 ; becomes President, 171 ; and con- tinuation of McKinley's policies, 171, 218-221 ; and Cuban reciprocity, on American conduct toward Cuba, 183 ; and Philippines, on Funston's capture of Aguinaldo, 201 ; on con- duct of soldiers in Philippines, 204 ; and Taft and justiceship, 20S-211 ; on Taft as colonial administra- tor, 212; on rule and future of Philippines, 216 ; Hanna's advice, 218, 220 ; political attitude on assuming presidency, 218 ; and McKinley's Cabinet, attitude to- ward advisers, 219, 233, 311; and tariff, 220, 292 ; and trusts, 221, 222 ; fight against Northern Securities, 222-227 ; and opposition of large financial interests, 224, 227, 299, 333, 351-353, 394-396 ; Booker Washing- ton incident, 227-230; restless energy, 230 ; at Charleston, expan- sionist, 231 ; on the South, 232, 361, 397 ; at Harvard, tribute to assist- ants, 232 ; speeches on regulation of trusts, 233, 234 ; on legislation and thrift, 234, 328; accident, on or- ganized labor, gospel of work, 235 and anthracite coal strike, 237, 23S futile conference on strike, 239 proposed commission and investiga- tion, 241 ; and extra-constitutional action, and violence, 242 ; and personnel of commission, 243-246 ; and credit for settlement of strike, 245-247 ; Venezuelan incident, 248- 253 ; on Henry White, 250 ; attitude toward England, 253, 260; and Alaskan boundary, 255-260 ; on British navy and peace, 260 ; on importance of Panama action, on first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 261 ; and Colombia's rejection of canal treaty, 267; and Panama Revolution, 268-275; and lock- type canal, 278 ; Hanna and trust legislation, 279 ; Hanna and Ohio indorsement incident, 281-284 ; per- sonal relations with Hanna, 284 ; antagonism of organized labor, 285 ; and Hanna's presidential candidacy, 286 ; confidence in renomination. 288 ; and Hanna as leaders, 289 ; and Hanna's last illness, 289 ; on Westerners, 290, 334 ; renomination, 290; partisan letter of acceptance, 292 ; as issue, 292 ; and campaign manager, 293 ; and campaign con- tributions, 293-295 ; reelected, dis- claimer of third-term candidacy (1904), 295; trust-regulation man- date, on publicity as trust-regulation weapon, Elkins Act and Department of Commerce and Labor, 296 ; and old-age pension liability, 297 ; and "common people," 298, 333, 385- 388, 393 ; and property rig' 395; and Russo-Japanese War, 302; 414 INDEX knowledge of European conditions, characterization of Kaiser and Czar, 303 ; on battle of Sea of Japan, on character of warring nations, 304 ; and arranging of peace conference, 305 ; reception of envoys, 306 ; and negotiations, 307 ; credit and praise, 307, 308 ; letter on wisdom of Japan, 30S ; on envoys, envoys on, 309; Peace Prize, disposal, 310; tribute to Hay's memory, 310; appointment of Root, on it, 311; and Morocco imbroglio, 311— 314; compared with Wilhelm II., 315-318; Bryce on, as diplomatist, 315 n. ; would have prevented World War, 318 ; and San Domingo, 318 ; interpretation of presidential powers, 319, 383-885, 388, 395; and Boxer indemnity fund, 319-321 ; Roosevelt Period on economic prob- lems, 322 ; original position on railroad rate legislation, 323 ; and Hepburn Act, 325, 330-334; on public ownership of railroads, 325; on Lodge, 327, 380; and meat inspection and pure food legislation, 334-336 ; and Civil Serv- ice reform, 336; on oppon muckrake speech, 337; on Pilgrim's Progress, 337 n. ; literary knowledge, 338; and Brownsville incident, 338-341 ; and Japanese question. 341, 371, 377; on Root's visit and Pan-Americanism, 342, 343; policies and panic of 1907, 346-348, 350 and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. incident, 348-350 ; and reclam- 354-357; and forest reserves, trip on .' ; I River, 359, and conservation, Governors' Con- vention, 360, 363; on division of powers and twilight zone. 862; and jingoism, 364; and intervention in Cuba, 364—366; Navy and Arms and, 366, 369 ; and pn naval building programme 887 369; on acoomplishmei ts under pr.e tioal polities, 869 *.; put of world voyage of Beet, and Japan. 369-374, 377; on success of vo 874 876 . r e view on return, 377 . ns for refusing to be a candidate (190S), 378-388; enjoyment pr*Mdr>n<-v. 378 ; choice of SUOCI ■ 379, 381 ; on Lodge as chairman of Convention, 380 ; later relations with Congress, 388 ; personality, ability, 389, 399 ; and children, 389 ; bookishness, 390 ; literary labors, 390 n. ; criticism of Rhodes's His- tory, on Reconstruction, 392; tem- perance, and cultivated classes, 393 ; appreciation of Jackson, 396 ; on Jef- ferson, 397; on Lincoln, 397, 398; Napoleonic traits, 397; deliberation, seeks counsel, and art, Great Heart, 398 ; greatness, and peace, 398, 399. Roosevelt Dam, 356. Root, Elihu, on Cambon, 97 n. ; on McKinley, 172. 190; and Cuba. 177; on sanitation there, 178; and Piatt Amendment, 181 ; on success in Cuba, on commercial relations with her, 182 ; as Cabinet officer, 184 ; as colonial minister, 19.5. 201, 204; instructions to Philippine ( iommis- sion, 198-200 ; address to soldiers in Philippines, 202 ; on peace army in Philippines, 212 n. ; on results in Philippines, 213 ; character, 214 ; Bryce on, 215 n. ; Roosevelt's tribute, 232 ; and coal strike, 241. 243; Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, 256-259; and Panama Revolution. 274 ; on Roose- velt as issue, 292; and campaign of 1904, 293; on Roosevelt and property rights. 299, 394 ; appoint- ment to State portfolio, Roosevelt on, 811; South American tour, 312, 343 ; and presidential candidacy (190S),379; and Trevelyan. 390. . Baron, pcaee conference, 306, 307, 309 ; on Roosevelt, 309. Rough Ridei B4 a.; in battle of San Juan Hill Russell, Bert rand, on control of COO, 313 n. Russia, and American-Spanish crisis. 64; and open d'"ir. 126; Roosevelt on the Caar, 303. See also J.' W :ir Russo-Japanese W'.ir, Roosevelt's interest. 302; Japan's victories and peace overtures. 804 108 I velt on character tints. 304 ; Roosevelt and arranging for 98 conference. "01 306 ; his recc;'ti..n of envoys, 806; nopotia- INDEX 415 tions, Roosevelt's influence, 307 ; credit to Roosevelt, 307, 308; Roosevelt on envoys, 309. Ryan, T. F., and panic of 1907, 352. Sagasta, P. M., and Cuba, character, 47. Saint Gaudens, Augustus, and Roose- velt, 398. St. Louis World Fair, 300, 301 ; Con- gress of Arts and Science, 301. Salvation Army, support of Hanna, 281. Sampson, W. E., Maine inquiry, 50 war command, 81 ; and Shafter absence at battle of Santiago, 89,90 blockade, 90 ; and the victory, 92 93 n. ; on rescue of prisoners, 94 on the Oregon's voyage, 98 n. San Domingo, Roosevelt and financial administration, 318. San Juan Hill, battle, 85-87. Sanitation, in Cuba, 178 ; at Canal Zone, 278. Santiago, Cuba, Cervera at, 82 ; American military expedition, mis- management, 82-87 ; battle of El Caney and San Juan Hill, 85-87 ; demoralization of American com- mander, 87 ; sortie of Spanish fleet, 88, 89; friction between American naval and military forces, 89, 90 ; American blockade and naval orders, 90; naval battle, 91, 92; credit for naval victory, 92, 93 ; decisiveness of naval victory, results, 93, 95 ; American humanity, 94 ; surrender of city, 95. Schofield, J. M., and coal strike, 242. Schurman, J. G., Philippine Commis- sion, 190, 193. Schurz, Carl, in campaign of 1896, 24 ; of 1900, 142 ; as anti-Imperialist, 188, 190, 194 ; and Reconstruction, 392. Schurz nuggets, 24. Schwab, C. M., on American steel rails, 117; and steel merger, 151; and Carnegie, 152 n. Scott, T. A., and Carnegie, 146. Sectionalism, disappearance, 169. Shafter. W. R., expedition command, unfitness, 85 ; demoralized, 87, 90 n. ; and Sampson, 89. Sherman, J. S., and Harriman, 332; nomination for Vice-President, 380 n. Sherman, John, Hanna's support (1884, 1888), 4; appointment as Secretary of State, unfitness, 31, 41 ; candor of appointment, 32-34 ; appointment and Spanish War, 35 ; relegation, resignation, 41, 42. Sherman Anti-Trust Act. See North- ern Securities ; Trusts. Silver, question in Republican Con- i vention (1896), 13-16; Democratic plank for free, 17, 18; as issue in campaign, 18-20 ; Bryan's campaign presentation, 20-22, 28 ; Democratic campaign literature, 22, 23 ; Re- publican literature, 24-26 ; Senate resolution for payment of bonds in, 36 ; failure of international bi- metallism, 37 ; in campaign of 1900, 132, 136; eliminated as issue (1904), 292. See also Gold standard. Skagway, as port for Klondike, 255. Smith, A. H., and Boxer indemnity fund, 319. Smith, C. E., retirement from Cabinet, 219 n. Smith, Goldwin, on Bryan, 22, 28. Smyth, W. E., and reclamation, 355 n. South, and Booker Washington inci- dent, 229, 230 , Roosevelt's attitude, 232, 361, 397. South America, Root's tour, 342, 343. South Carolina Interstate and West Indian Exposition, 231. South Improvement Company, 160 n. Spalding, J. L., Anthracite Coal Commission, 243, 244, 246. Spanish War, and appointment of Sherman, 35 ; McKinley and Cuban problem, 41 ; appointment of minis- ter to Spain, 42 ; Cuban Insurrec- tion, Weyler'sreconcentration policy. 44 ; Cleveland and Cuban belligor- ency, 44, 45 ; Congress and belliger- ency (1907), conduct of insurgents, 46 ; McKinley's waiting policy, 46, 48 ; Sagasta's reform measures, 47 ; disturbances in Havana, send- ing of the Maine, 47, 48 ; de Lome's indiscretion, 48 ; destruction of the Maine, cause, influence, 49-51. 55-58. 65 ; Proctor's speech on Cuban conditions, 51-53 ; Day's dispatch on reconcentration, 416 INDEX McKinley's ultimatum, 53 ; Spanish procrastination, 54, 58, 59 ; Day's warning against delay, 54 ; public attitude, influence of yellow press, 54-56 , attitude of leaders, 56-58 ; pressure on McKinley, 59 ; his attitude and war message, 60 ; evidences of Spanish submission, McKinley's yielding to war con- sidered, 61-65 ; McKinley's reply t . t he powers, 64 ; intervention rest ilu- tions, 65, 66; Teller Amendment renouncing Cuba, 66, 70, 71 ; question of recognizing Cuban Re- public, 68 ; declaration, 69 ; Dewey's appointment to Asiatic Squadron, 70; his preparations, 70. 71 ; battle of Manila Bay, credit for victory, 71-75; effect of victory on Ann morale, 75 ; diplomatic effect. 75 78; blockade of Manila, conduct of Germans, 78-80 ; blockade of Cuba, no privateering, calls for volunteers, Sampson's command, 81 ; finances, 82 ; Cervcra's cruise to Santiago, 82; American Santiago expedition, lack of preparation, mismanagement. 82 ^7; battle of El Caney and Sail Juan Hill, 85- 87 ; demoralization of American commander, gloom at Washington, 87, 90 n. ; sortie of Cervera's fleet, Santiago, naval battle, 88-92; credit for naval victory at Santiago, 92, 93; decisiveness of \ id i- . results, 93, 95; American bum surrender of Santiago, 95 ; occupation of Puerto Rico, 95; Spanish reserve fleet, 96, troops to Manila, surreml 96; protocol, terms, 97-101 ; b raphy. 98 n.; McKinL - first attitude on Philippines. 100 oomm Burners, 101 ; developmenl ol decision to acquire Philip 100-107; Cuban di of decision t<. acquire Philippines considered, 107-110; treaty of ••o, Senate's ratification, 110, •'..st. Ill- Speck von Sternhurg. Baron, and sdoroooo, 813, 814 llation, mania (1001), and contest for Northern Pacific, 1.S4, 157. See nUo Panic*. Spencer, Herbert, on business and war, 158, 161. Sperry, C. S., command in battleship voyage, 375, 376. Spooner, J. C, Philippine amendment, 201 ; and isthmian canal route, 265 ; and railroad rate legislation, 325. Spooner Amendment, 185, 201. Standard Oil, and Big Business, 157 and steel merger, 157; beginning 158-160 ; development, rebates business methods, 160-162 ; develop ment of export, efficiency, 162 suppression of middleman, success and dictation, 163 ; pipe lines, 164 litigation, 105; economic effect ethics, 165-16S ; and rate legislation Roosevelt on, 332. St an wood, Edward, on Dingley Bill. 39. Steamship combine, 156. See Iron. . Moorfield, as anti-Imperialist, 188; on Panama Resolution, 27_'. Sumner, W. G., on government, 166 n. Supreme Court, on constitutionality of colonial government, 206 ; Taft declines appointment, 208-210; Northern Securities decision. 224 226; on Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. purchase, 350 ; and conserva- tion, 363. Taft. YV. H., on Spanish War as altru- istic, 66 ; appointment to Philippines Commission. 190; as head of Com- mission, 201 ; Civil Governor 202 ; character as Governor, 206 1 211; and friars' lands. 20fi puts aside judicial honors. 208-211 on results of American rule. 212 Roosevelt on, 232, 381 ; and Brownsville affair, 339 ; in Cuba, 36S; Roosevelt's choice as presi- dential candidate, 379-381; elected, 888; on Roosevelt. 389. Takahira, Kogoro, peace conference, 306, 307. 309. Talmagi T ds \Y . on distress, 21. I -uniiKiiiv Hall, in election of 1900. 142. Santiago expedition at, 83. 84 n. 11. I. M., on awe of Rockefeller. 161 ; as historian of Standard Oil. L66. Tariff, Hanna's attitude, 10; in cam- INDEX 417 paign of 1896, 12, 19, 20; priority over gold standard, 30 ; Dingley Act, 37-39 ; Silverites and, rates under Dingley Act, 39 ; McKinley and reciprocity, 173 ; Puerto Rico and free trade, 173 ; Cuban reci- procity, 182, 183 ; Roosevelt's atti tude, 220, 292. Taussig, F. W., on Dingley Act, 39 n. Taxation. See Tariff. Taylor, C. H., on Roosevelt and jingoism, 364. Teller, H. M., and free silver, secedes from Republican Convention, 16 ; Cuban resolution, 66 ; and Hepburn BUI, 325 n. Teller Amendment, 66 ; adhered to, 99. Tennessee Coal and Iron Company incident, 348-350. Texas, battle of Santiago, 91. Thayer, W. R., on Hay and China, 131; on Roosevelt on stump, 142; on Venezuelan affair, 249 ; acknowl- edgment to, 399 n. Tirpitz, A. P. F. von, and American battleship voyage, 372. Tovar, General, and Panama revolt, 270. Townsend, J. B., on Charleston Ex- position, 231. Trevelyan, Sir G. O., Roosevelt's appreciation, 390. Trusts, as issue (1900), 136; steam- ship combine, 156 ; Roosevelt's attitude, 221 ; Roosevelt's speeches on regulation, 233 ; election of 1904 as mandate for regulation, 296 ; publicity as remedy, Bureau of Corporations, 296 ; Roosevelt and property rights, 299, 395; "twilight zone" and regulation, 361-363. See also Finances ; Iron and steel ; Railroads ; Standard Oil. Turner, George, Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, 256-259. "Twilight zone," Bryan and Roose- velt on, 361-363. United States Steel Corporation, and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co., 348-350. See also Iron and steel. United States t>. Knight, and Northern Securities case, 226. Vampire Club, 120, 121. Vanderbilt, W. II., financial position, 160; on Standard Oil, 161. Venezuela, European claims, 247 ; coercion, Roosevelt's suspicions of Germany, 248-250; British attitude, 250 ; Roosevelt's demand and threat to Germany, 250-252 ; arbitration, settlement, 251, 253 ; accuracy of Roosevelt's account, 253. Vizcaya, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. Walcott, C. D., and reclamation, 355 n., 356 n. Wall Street, crisis (1901), 155. See also Finances; Panics. War of 1812, and lack of preparedness, 367. Washburn, C. G., on Hanna's presi- dential candidacy, 288, 291 ; on Roosevelt Dam, 356 ; on Roosevelt and Congress, 388. Washington, Booker, White House dinner incident, 227-230. Washington, George, Roosevelt and third-term precedent, 377, 383 ; Roosevelt on, as President, 381, 384. Water-cure in Philippines, 203. Watkins, T. H., Anthracite Coal Commission, 246. West, in campaign of 1896, 17, 19, 29 ; Roosevelt and, 290, 334. West Virginia, in election of 1896, 29 ; of 1904, 295. Westinghouse, George, and panic, 347. Weyler, Valeriano, policy in Cuba, 44. Wheat, export (1S70-1900), 162 n. White, A. D., on Germans and Spanish War, 76. White, E. D., Northern Securities dissent, 225 n. ; on Hanna, 290. White, Henry, and Venezuelan affair, 250 ; Roosevelt on, 250 ; and Alaskan boundary, 257 ; on Roosevelt, 279 ; and Algeciras Conference, 314; on Roosevelt at Potsdam, 316. White Star Line, combine, 156. Wildman, Miss, acknowledgment to, 399 n. Wilhelm II. of Germany, and Philip- pines, 188; Roosevelt's characteriza- tion, 303 ; and Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, 304, 308 ; and Roosevelt and peace, 307 ; and Morocco, 312- 314 ; mutual fear of Geat Britain, 418 INDEX 312 ; compared with Roosevelt, 315-318. Williams, D. R., on friars' lands, 206 n. Willoughby, W. F., on Hawaii, 112 n. ; on l'oraker Act, 177. Wilson, H. W., on naval battle of Santiago, 93. Wilson, J. M., Anthracite Coal Com- mission, 246. Win.slow, Lanier & Co., and Morton, and Roosevelt, 393. Witte, Count, peace conference, 306, 307 ; Roosevelt on, on America, on Roosevelt, 309. Wood, Leonard, Rough Riders, 84 n. ; brigade command, 86 n. ; as Gover- nor of Cuba, 178, 179, 182 ; Roose- velt's tribute, 232. Woodford, S. L., minister to Spain, 42 ; and American ultimatum, 53, 54 ; on Spanish yielding, 61-63 ; conduct of negotiations, 63 n. Worcester, D. C, first Philippine Commission, 191, 193; second Commission, 196. Work, Roosevelt on gospel, 234, 235. Wright, C. D., and coal strike (1902), 241, 246. Wright, L. E., Philippine Commission, 196, 232. Wu Ting Fang, and Boxer uprising, 129, 131. Wvman, Miss, acknowledgment to, 399 n. Yale University. Booker Washington at Bi-Centennial, 228. Yamamoto, Gombei, and Japanese in America, 371. Yellow fever, conquest in Cuba, 178. Yellow press, and Spanish War, 55. This Index was made for me by D. M. Matteson. 31+77-1 I . -