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THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 BECAUSE I AM A GERMAN 
 
 By Hermann Fernau 
 
 Edited, with an Introduction, 
 by T. W. Rolleston 
 
 $i.oo net 
 
 "A masterly and courageous attack on Prus- 
 sianism." — The Times. 
 
 "... his work is interesting and of conse- 
 quence because it adds another voice to those 
 already crying out in the European wilderness 
 for more sanity and justice and righteousness 
 and democracy in the conduct hereafter of Eu- 
 ropean affairs." — The Bookman. 
 
 "... Mr. Fernau pleads his case with 
 dispassionate earnestness. He is no reviler of 
 his country — he mourns for it — but rather the 
 defender of its better self against its worst." — 
 The New York Evening Post. 
 
 "... a scathing arraignment of the German 
 motives behind the present war. It contains 
 a clear and terse statement of Germany's case 
 against Prussianism, but it is in no sense a plea 
 for the Allies." — The Boston Globe. 
 
 E. P. BUTTON & CO., New York 
 
THE 
 COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 BY 
 
 HERMANN FERNAU 
 
 AUTHOR OF "BECAUSE I AM A GERMAN" 
 
 "The civil constitution of every State must be republican" 
 
 Immanuel Kant, Ferpettial Peace 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 E. P. BUTTON & CO. 
 
 68i FIFTH AVENUE 
 
v<^ 
 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 191 7, 
 By E. p. button & CO. 
 
 ^^rVi- 
 
 pKnted in the Qtiited States cf Htnmca 
 
PUBLISHERS' NOTE 
 
 The American reader of "The Coming Democ- 
 racy" will note in several places, for example on page 
 122 and page 259^ that the author of this book is 
 thinking of Russia as an empire and an aggressive 
 autocracy, v^hose political aims must be guarded 
 against. The explanation of this is of course that 
 the original German version of this book was pub- 
 lished in Berne, Switzerland, just before the Russian 
 Revolution broke out, and this fact should never he 
 lost sight of while reading the hook. The title as 
 published was "DurchI . . . Zur Demokratie." 
 
 The suddenness with which the Russian Revolution 
 broke out in March upset a great many political 
 theories and political prophecies, not only in Germany 
 but in this country and in England. One can imagine 
 if the author of "The Coming Democracy" had 
 delayed publication for another three months with 
 what joy he would have hailed the Russian Republic 
 and what a lesson he would have read in the triumph 
 of the Russian people for the people of his own 
 land. 
 
 Another great and significant event which he did 
 not foresee was the entry of America into the war 
 on the side of the Allies. This again would certainly 
 have given him great encouragement and a proof of 
 
vi PUBLISHERS' NOTE 
 
 the final triumph of democracy which he could have 
 made use of so effectually in his appeal to his own 
 people. Written as it was before these two momen- 
 tous happenings in the march towards universal 
 democracy, the book is a remarkable piece of forward- 
 looking and constructive work, especially considering 
 the source from whence it comes. 
 
 As Herr Fernau's earlier book, "Because I am 
 a German," was an appeal to his people tO' find 
 out with whom lay the guilt of willhig and commenc- 
 ing this appalling war, so this new book, "The 
 Coming Democracy,'* is an appeal to them to 
 make it forever impossible that any man or clique 
 of men should be in a position to plunge the world 
 into such horrors again. 
 
 Friends of democracy cannot but sympathize with 
 this German citizen who sees, even as we see, the 
 danger and iniquity of great hereditary privilege; 
 and they must especially commiserate with him be- 
 cause those whom he accuses are of his own blood 
 and his own speech. 
 
 It is safe to say in the days tO' come when Germany 
 has recovered her senses that this courageous call by 
 a German to Germans, this merciless yet judicial ar- 
 raignment of the German dynastic political system,, 
 will be looked back to as a landmark in the history of 
 German progress. 
 
 The Publishers. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Some Problems for Future German Historians . . 1 
 
 n 
 
 Of Dynasties in General and the German Imperial 
 
 Constitution in Particular 36 
 
 III 
 
 The Basis of the Dynastic Power 70 
 
 IV 
 
 The Principles of German Policy: also a History 
 OF the Events Leading up to the World- 
 War 94 
 
 MANIFESTATIONS OF GERMAN MILITARISM— WILLLOE 
 n. AND THE WORLD PEACE— THE HAGUE CON- 
 FERENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES— WHY ALL 
 ATTEMPTS AT UNDERSTANDING WERE WITHOUT 
 RESULT — PREMONITIONS OF THE STORM. 
 
 vii 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 V 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The German Dynasty and the German Notion of 
 Culture. To which is added a Study of 
 the Intellectual Antecedents to the 
 War 159 
 
 german philosophers, professors, and histo- 
 rians — international law! on this side and 
 on that — the german racial science and 
 deductions therefrom — concerning the free- 
 dom of german culture — german culture, 
 then and now. 
 
 VI 
 
 The German's Fatherland 212 
 
 VII 
 The Origin of and Meaning of the War . . . 233 
 
 THE opinions OF GERMAN PACIFISTS AND SOCIAL 
 democrats — DYNASTIC STATESMANSHIP AND WAR — 
 THE MEANING OF THE PRESENT WORLD-WAR. 
 
 VIII 
 
 Onward! to Democracy! 267 
 
 dynasty or humanity? — dynastic politics and 
 culture — the prerequisite conditions for a 
 european peace — the errors and advantages 
 of democracy. 
 
THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 I 
 
 SOME PROBLEMS FOR FUTURE GERMAN 
 HISTORIANS 
 
 The task of German historians in the future will 
 be in the highest degree both a thankless and a painful 
 one. How will they ever be able to explain the en- 
 thusiasm, the marvellous cohesion and the bed-rock 
 belief in the holy mission of the German cause, with 
 which the German people embarked upon this World 
 War? Will they, no longer under the restraint of 
 personal liberty, i.e., under the guardianship of the 
 German General Staff, be honestly able to maintain 
 those ideas as to the necessity for and origin of this 
 universal conflict, which are prescribed in Germany 
 to-day? Or, will they not, by the light of the over- 
 whelming proofs already at hand, reject them as 
 historically untenable ? Moreover, allowing that their 
 love of truth compels them to it, how will they, in 
 this case, be possibly able to explain to posterity 
 that Germany did not rush into this World War with 
 feelings of anguish and horror, but with a shout of 
 joy, as though marching out to a festival ? 
 
2 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 I fear that the German historians of the future 
 will only be able to read the German newspapers 
 (particularly the comic papers) of the first months of 
 the war with reluctant amazement, so thoroughly 
 un-German and barbaric will the extraordinary ideas 
 of right and wrong, the intoxication of victory, the 
 wrongheadedness, and, to speak plainly, the braggado- 
 cio of the leading organs of the Press and men in Ger- 
 many appear to them, in view of naked, historical facts. 
 
 And their reluctant amazement will change into 
 silent pain or sheer indignation as soon as they have 
 studied the question: Was it necessary? Was the 
 World War actually and really inevitable? Relieved 
 from the thraldom of personal restraint, and now 
 only engaged upon the unprejudiced establishment 
 of historical truth, will it be easy for them to find 
 an answer to this question? No! it need not have 
 happened! It might have been otherwise! 
 
 Then, finally, why was Germany, on August ist, 
 1914, obliged to declare war upon Russia? Because an 
 heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated at 
 Serajevo? Nobody regards this murder as a casus 
 belli per se, because no one can imagine that, in 
 civilised Europe, people have ever lived who value 
 the life of a prince as equal to that of millions of 
 humbler mortals. Moreover, later German historians 
 will never understand how this murder was made a 
 pretext for the ultimatum to Serbia, which set the war 
 machine rolling. When, in 1894, the French Presi- 
 dent, Carnot, was murdered in Lyons by an Italian an- 
 archist did it occur to anyone in France to denounce 
 the Italians as a ''filthy pack" (this is how the Austro- 
 Hungarian statesmen and newspapers described the 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 3 
 
 Serbs) and to declare that a "punitive force'^ must at 
 once be launched against them? When the Empress 
 Elizabeth of Austria was assassinated on the Lake 
 of Geneva in 1898 by an Italian anarchist, did a single 
 person in Austria ever moot the idea of an ultimatum 
 to Switzerland, on the ground that the Swiss Federal 
 Council was intriguing against Austria and supporting 
 the Irredentist movement in Italy? Not a bit of it. 
 The whole world was indignant at these acts. The 
 murderers were punished, and everyone agreed that 
 this was the only possible expiation. 
 
 That, however, in 191 4, the Serajevo murder (which 
 was not perpetrated by Serbs, but by Austrian subjects 
 on, Austrian soil) was made the subject of diplomatic 
 action against Serbia is a fact which deserves condem- 
 nation from a legal point of view. A State which, in 
 consequence of such an occurrence, makes such per- 
 emptory demands cannot be regarded as pacific; it is 
 aware, beforehand, that its action is sure to entail a 
 risk of war. 
 
 "The assassination of this prince at Serajevo did 
 not cause this World War," German annals will reply 
 to later historians. "That Germany, on August ist, 
 1 914, was forced to declare war upon Russia was a 
 consequence of her treaty obligations to Austria. 
 The Serajevo murder was simply an outward and visi- 
 ble sign of those Serbian and Russian machinations 
 which had long been menacing Austria's position as 
 a World-Power. Serbia felt herself strong, owing 
 to her protection by Russia. Since we were allied 
 with Austria, we could not permit this threatening 
 attitude, and were forced, since Russia wilfully 
 interfered in the Austro-Serbian dispute, to hurry to 
 
4 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 our ally's aid against Russia. Thus the World War 
 arose/' 
 
 This statement can only be of intrinsic value for 
 historical investigation if properly supported by 
 evidence. But the historians of the future will look 
 in vain for actual proofs of this Serbian and Russian 
 menace. From multitudinous diplomatic papers, they 
 will be unable to unearth a single document which 
 unequivocally proves that Russia had actually en- 
 couraged the Serbs to hostile resistance to Austria. 
 As little will they be able to discover any reliable 
 document whatever showing that the Serajevo murder 
 was planned and carried out with the cognisance 
 of the Governments of either Russia or Serbia. On 
 the contrary, they will have to fall back upon No. 140 
 of the Russian Orange Book, and the eminently con- 
 ciliatory Serbian reply to the Austrian Ultimatum, 
 as proofs that Russia recommended the Serbs to 
 observe moderation, and that Serbia followed this ad- 
 vice. For a more conciliatory reply than Serbia gave 
 to Austria it is impossible to conceive. If nearly all 
 German accounts maintain that Austria-Hungary was 
 most terribly menaced,^ there are wanting, as already 
 said : firstly, actual and historical proofs of this men- 
 ace, and, secondly (and this is more important), ac- 
 
 ^ To pick out one instance from among hundreds : Prof. Her- 
 man Oncken writes ("Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 
 1915. P- 540) ' "It was inevitable that this cruelly wronged Great 
 Power, after having so long and so patiently endured this men- 
 ace, should rise up at this crisis. It was not a question of 
 external prestige, no ! her very existence was in jeopardy, if she 
 suffered this attack." What legally conclusive evidence has 
 Prof. Oncken for his statement that Austria's "existence was 
 ever in jeopardy"? 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 5 
 
 tually credible evidence that Austria could not, through 
 a Court of Arbitration, have attained her rights more 
 cheaply and more reasonably than by sacrificing mil- 
 lions of men. 
 
 Future German historians, who will be better versed 
 in the psychology of the cases of Prochaska, Fried- 
 jung, etc., than we, will be forced to discredit the state- 
 ments of the Austrian diplomats, who continually 
 speak of "plots," without being able to adduce any 
 tangible evidence in support of their statements. 
 
 On the other hand, as regards Germany's treaty- 
 obligation towards Austria, they must allow that, as 
 events show, she was not only loyal in her observance 
 of it but even officious. For Germany not merely 
 presented a twelve-hour Ultimatum to Russia at the 
 very moment when Austria herself had already de- 
 clared her readiness to reopen negotiations with Rus- 
 sia (Red Book Nos. 55, 56). She not only nullified 
 this pacific attitude adopted by Austria at the eleventh 
 hour, but declared war upon Russia full five days be- 
 fore Austria herself, although the latter was alleged 
 to have been so severely threatened. Surely greater 
 loyalty was impossible! 
 
 Unfortunately, the German historians of the future 
 will be compelled to discount this "Nibelung-faith- 
 fulness," when they further investigate the history 
 of the war. For when on May 23rd, 19 15, Italy sud- 
 denly declared war on Austria, then Germany, with all 
 her loyalty to her alliances, entirely Ignored this new 
 and much more dangerous threat to her ally. Was 
 Austria's existence and her position as a Great Power 
 less menaced by Italy than by Serbia? Who was in 
 the sublime counsels of the diplomats of that day? The 
 
6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 fact remains, Germany did not declare war upon Italy. 
 Either, then, so will our later German historians de- 
 duce, our treaty-loyalty to Austria was truly sincere, 
 but, if so, our attitude towards Austria in May, 191 5, 
 was a breach of contract; or, perhaps after all, it 
 was only a diplomatic lie, and, if so, our predecessors, 
 if they genuinely desired peace, could as well have 
 held themselves aloof from a conflict between Aus- 
 tria on the one hand and Serbia and Russia on the 
 other, as they could later from one between their ally 
 and Italy. 
 
 From the foregoing it is evident that neither the 
 assassination at Serajevo, nor the constantly asserted, 
 and ever unproven, Serbo-Russian intrigues, nor, 
 even, the German treaty obligations to Austria, could 
 be the real cause of the World War. Future German 
 historians will exclaim: *'It is impossible that our 
 ancestors could ever have declared war upon half 
 the globe without having been first actually assaulted 
 and attacked. Even if they were so enamoured of 
 war, they would scarcely be so arrogant as to attack 
 four Powers at once. It is evident that an attack upon 
 our country, infringement of our national dignity, in 
 short, an armed attack upon our Fatherland, must have 
 driven us into war." 
 
 But, ah! here we have a bona fide casus belli. 
 (German White Book, p. 14.) "However, before 
 a confirmation of the execution of this order had 
 been received, that is to say, already in the after- 
 noon of August 1st. . . . Russian troops crossed our 
 frontier and marched into German territory.'* It 
 is plain that we could not tolerate that. Of course, 
 the German declaration of war naturally resulted from 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 7 
 
 this Russian invasion. Let us examine the facts. 
 Here we find (White Book, Exhibit 26) the official 
 German declaration of war upon Russia. What? Is 
 it dated August ist, 1914, 12.52 p.m.? How could it 
 be known in Berlin at 12.52 p.m. that Russian troops 
 had on the afternoon of that day crossed the German 
 frontier? And what does that mean? The German 
 declaration of war was not, of course, the result of an 
 invasion of Russian troops ! "Seeing that Russia has 
 refused to comply with this demand (the suspension 
 of military operations) and by this refusal has an- 
 nounced that its action was directed against Germany, 
 I have the honour, etc. . . ." Accordingly it was not 
 the Russian incursions (p. 14) that drove us to war 
 with Russia, but (p. 46, Exhibits 26, 2y) the disre- 
 gard of the Ultimatum addressed to Russia. This 
 contradiction in the German official documents is ab- 
 solutely bewildering. Did not the German Govern- 
 ment know why it was bound to declare war upon 
 Russia? Did Russian forces actually violate our ter- 
 ritory, or did we only declare war upon that country 
 because she refused an answer to an Ultimatum, 
 which, from the short term set for reply, was bound 
 to be regarded as an insult? What an extraordinary 
 contradiction in such a serious and sanguinary af- 
 fair! 
 
 Our own supposition arising out of this contradic- 
 tion (namely, that we did not declare war upon 
 Russia because we were obliged, but because we 
 wished) amounts to a certainty by the light of a 
 semi-official article in the Pester Lloyd (Government 
 organ of the Austro-Hungarian Government in Buda- 
 pest) of May 27th, 1916. In replying to a speech 
 
8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 of the then English Cabinet Minister, Grey, in which 
 he had emphasised the fact that the war would have 
 been avoided had his proposals for a Diplomatic Con- 
 ference (English Blue Book Nos. 6y, 84, loi, 103) 
 been adopted, the article proceeds: "how great and 
 unswerving was our determination to settle our differ- 
 ences with Serbia in such a way that the criminal 
 menace should be once and for all disposed of, Sir 
 Edward Grey can be assured, since we can honestly 
 state that : even had the Russian Government desisted 
 from or suspended the mobilisation she had, despite 
 her hypocritical assurances and avowals to the con- 
 trary, been secretly continuing, Austria-Hungary 
 would never have gone to any Conference, but would 
 have insisted, untrammelled by any third party, on 
 bringing her differences with Serbia to a final issue, 
 in accordance with the necessities of her future se- 
 curity.'* 
 
 Even had Russia desisted from or suspended its 
 mobilisation! Now every doubt has vanished. For 
 it is no longer Germany's enemies who assert this, 
 but a semi-official organ of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government making this ''statement" in "complete 
 honesty." For us, this statement is an historical 
 document, from which we, unfortunately, are bound 
 with unequivocal clearness to deduce that Austria, 
 backed up by Germany, absolutely determined upon 
 war. 
 
 SjT ^ ^ S|« !^ 
 
 And what of France? It is true that we cannot 
 understand how the German Government at that time 
 could have become obsessed by the idea that a war 
 ^with Russia was inevitable; but it is still more un- 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 9 
 
 intelligible why she was obliged to declare war upon 
 France (and, as a result of this, unfortunately, 
 upon Belgium also). Here we have the speech of the 
 German Imperial Chancellor of August 4th, 1914, 
 in which he states : "Bombing aeroplanes, cavalry 
 scouts, and companies violating our Alsace-Lorraine! 
 In this way, France, although no state of war has been 
 declared, has broken the peace and actually attacked 
 us." There appears to be here no possible doubt : we 
 were, as the Chancellor solemnly assures us, "actually 
 attacked!" It certainly strikes us as curious that 
 the Imperial Chancellor in the very next sentence of 
 the same speech confesses that we ourselves had al- 
 ready crossed the French frontier before the declara- 
 tion of war: "Of the French complaints as to viola- 
 tions of their territory on our part, we can only allow 
 one single instance. Contrary to express orders, it ap- 
 pears that, on August 2nd, a patrol of the i^th Army 
 Corps under command of an officer crossed the fron- 
 tier." The Chancellor endeavours to invalidate the 
 import of this fact by adding: "but long before this 
 violation of territory occurred French aeroplanes 
 penetrated into South Germany and threw bombs upon 
 our railway communications." 
 
 We cannot be blamed if, once having established 
 the falsity of the German representations touching the 
 Russian violation of territory, we here again require 
 evidence of this "actual attack." First, we place 
 on record that the German declaration of war, 
 delivered by Herr von Schoen in Paris at 6.45 p.m. on 
 August 3rd, 1914, did not refer to any infringement of 
 territory, but only to the aeroplane aggression 
 upon which the Chancellor insisted : "the German Ad- 
 
lo THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 ministration and military authorities have established 
 a certain number of palpably hostile acts committed 
 on German soil by French aeroplanes. Several of these 
 have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium, by fly- 
 ing over the territory of that country. One of them 
 attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel, others v^ere 
 observed over the Eiffel country, and another threw 
 bombs on the railway line near Karlsruhe and Nurem- 
 berg. I am commanded, and have the honour, etc. 
 . . ." (French Yellow Book No. 147). 
 
 The Imperial German Chancellor could have greatly 
 assisted our investigations by furnishing dates and » 
 details. But these are absolutely wanting in his speech. 
 Hence we were obliged to scrutinize carefully the 
 Wesel, Karlsruhe, and Nuremberg papers for the 
 period July 25th-August 3rd, 19 14. The work was 
 all the more arduous in that our search yielded, alas ! 
 no result. Not one of these newspapers contains a 
 single reference to the throwing of bombs. Can 
 anyone believe that they would have remained 
 silent in the face of such a sensational occurrence? 
 But we have not been alone in seeking for evidence 
 for the cause of the war as alleged by the Imperial 
 Chancellor and the German Ambassador. Since the 
 outbreak of this World War, honest German patriots 
 made a like investigation and, discovering nothing, 
 asked the German authorities for information. One 
 of them. Dr. Schwalbe, editor of the Deutsche Medi- 
 zinische Wochenschrift, received the following reply 
 to his question in a notification from the Nuremberg 
 Chief Magistrate (Oberbiirgermeister), dated April 
 3rd, 19 1 6, and published in his weekly journal of May 
 i8th, 1916: 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS ii 
 
 "The Acting General Commandant of the 3rd Ba- 
 varian Army Corps in this city has no information 
 that bombs were ever thrown by enemy aeroplanes 
 upon the railway lines Nuremberg-Kissingen or 
 Nuremberg-Anspach, either before or after the out- 
 break of war. All such assertions and newspaper re- 
 ports have been found to be false." 
 
 Found to be false! Then the justification for the 
 declaration of war upon France was a pure myth! 
 Accordingly, we did not declare war upon France be- 
 cause she "actually attacked" us, but because we in- 
 tended to attack her under trumped-up pretexts ? So 
 the whole business was a pure fiction? It is staggering 
 to have to conceive that, in this twentieth century, 
 there were people capable of such fabrications, and of 
 solemnly proclaiming in the same breath: "Gentle- 
 men, we are now on our defence!" and "Necessity 
 knows no law !" 
 
 In the East, incursions of Russian forces; in the 
 West, aeroplane bombs on South German railways. 
 In the East, an awkward contradiction between 
 the Chancellor's speech and the German official 
 declaration of war. In the West, a still more 
 flagrant contradiction in two sentences of the same 
 Chancellor's speech. On the one hand, the state- 
 ment made in "full honesty" by a highly official 
 publication that it had been determined at the 
 outset to accept no Conference (i.e., war at all 
 costs). On the other, the equally categorical state- 
 ment of German officialdom, that the "actual attack" 
 upon which the German declaration of war upon 
 France was based is a pure fiction of the German 
 Government. 
 
12 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 This Imperial Chancellor is, indeed, a marvel in the 
 
 world's history. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
 That, moreover, is evident from the speeches which 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg has delivered since the 
 outbreak of the war. For instance, in his celebrated 
 speech of November 9th, 1916, he said: *The act that 
 rendered this war inevitable was the Russian general 
 mobilisation, ordered in the night 30th-3ist July." 
 We confess we do not understand how, after twenty- 
 seven months of war, anyone could talk to the German 
 people in this way. The mobilisation in Russia, 
 Austria, Germany and France was patently the re- 
 sult of eight days' preliminary diplomatic negotia- 
 tions, i.e., the final act of the great world drama, 
 which opened with the delivery of the Ultimatum to 
 Serbia on July 23rd. As one cannot tame a horse 
 by his tail, so a play cannot begin with the fifth act. 
 And this is most particularly true in this connection, 
 because in the preamble to the German White Book 
 (p. 6) we find the ominous words : **We were fully 
 conscious of the fact (in giving Austria our sanction 
 to this Ultimatum) that an eventual military action 
 on the part of Austria-Hungary might bring Russia 
 into the field, and thus, in accordance with our treaty 
 obligations, involve us also in war." This sentence 
 clearly shows that in German quarters, as early as 
 July 23rd, 1914, the risk of a European war had 
 been carefully and advisedly considered. Long before 
 the Russian mobilisation had been proclaimed, Austria 
 had declared war upon Serbia and begun it by bom- 
 barding Belgrade. On its side, the German Govern- 
 ment had rejected two English and two Russian 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 13 
 
 proposals for mediation, and, moreover, had simply 
 suppressed (no other word for it) a personal note 
 from the Russian Czar (asking that the Austro- 
 Serbian differences should be submitted to The Hague 
 Conference). 
 
 The discussion of the question of guilt must, accord- 
 ingly, if it is to proceed without prejudice and con- 
 scientiously, begin with the words "fully conscious" 
 of the sentence cited above.^ To single out from 
 this series of events the Russian mobilisation, and 
 to treat it as something standing by itself, is not 
 permissible and would only give the impression of a 
 deliberate disregard of the events leading up to the 
 mobilisation. 
 
 But even if, out of courtesy to the Imperial Chancel- 
 lor, we should pause and discuss the Russian mobilisa- 
 tion as a thing by itself, we should be unable to agree 
 with him. The Chancellor said : "As regards the de- 
 fensive character of the Russian grand mobilisation, I 
 
 *In my book "Because I am a German!" (London, Constable 
 & Co.; New York, E. P. Button Co.) I, on pp. 96-102, formu- 
 lated some of the preliminary essential questions which should 
 be asked before the Russian mobilisation is discussed. Vide, in 
 this sense also, pp. 82-8 of the same work, re the reply to a 
 pamphlet of Dr. Helfferich. (Contradicting Herr von Bethmann 
 Hollweg's assertion, his colleague Helfferich says, moreover, the 
 Russian mobilisation was ordered on the "early morning of 
 July 31st.") Again, in the German White Book (p. 13) it is 
 stated that the Russian general mobilisation was ordered "as 
 early as the morning" (of July 31st). Again, as to the question, 
 When did the Russian general mobilisation take place? the 
 German White Book replies: "in the forenoon" (Vormittag) 
 of July 31st, Dr. Helfferich, "in the early hours (Friihrnorgens) 
 of July 31st," and the Imperial Chancellor, "in the night from 
 July 30th-3ist." Three German official statements contain, ac- 
 cordingly, three contradictions. Which is one to believe? 
 
14 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 will, in this place, expressly assert that, at the outbreak 
 of the war in 1914, an instruction of the Russian Gov- 
 ernment, issued as early as 19 12, contains the fol- 
 lowing sentence: *His Majesty has given orders that 
 proclamation of the mobilisation shall be, simulta- 
 neously, proclamation of war with Germany.' " 
 
 Here again, in order to oblige the Imperial Chan- 
 cellor, we will not investigate the question why he only 
 published this document after twenty-seven months 
 of war, instead (as any other statesman in his position 
 would have done) of doing so immediately, when from 
 all sides Germany was being accused of having, of 
 malice aforethought, brought about the war. More- 
 over, we will for a moment suppose with the Chancel- 
 lor that the Russian mobilisation actually took place 
 earlier than the Austrian (how very assailable this po- 
 sition is, and that, in any event, it can only have been 
 a matter of a few hours, is demonstrated by Yellow 
 Book No. 115 and Red Book No. 53^). Despite all 
 these extenuating presuppositions, we are, after all, in 
 a position to demonstrate the futility of Bethmann 
 Hollweg's assertion (that the Russian general mobili- 
 sation had rendered war inevitable, in that it was tan- 
 tamount to a declaration of war) by four facts, which 
 do not admit of any argument. 
 
 Firstly J by the following telegram of the Czar to 
 William II., dated Petrograd, August ist, 19 14 
 (dispatched after the Russian and German general 
 mobilisation had been ordered) : *1 have received 
 
 ^Cf., in this connection, also the description in "J'^ccuse" and 
 J. W. Headlam "The History of Twelve Days" (London, T. 
 Fisher Unwin), p. 220. 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 15 
 
 your telegram, and understand that you are compelled 
 to mobilise, but I should wish to have from you the 
 same guarantee that I have given you, namely, that 
 these measures do not mean war, and that we shall 
 continue to negotiate . . ." (see German White Book, 
 p. 12, the Czar's message of August ist). Here we 
 have the solemn word of the Czar repeated, that mo- 
 bilisation does not imply war. What moral and legal 
 international justification had the German Govern- 
 ment for disbelieving this solemn assurance of the 
 Czar? Why did not William 11. reply to this telegram 
 by giving the assurance requested, instead of by an- 
 other demand for immediate demobilisation, and 
 couched in the momentous words : *'Until I have this 
 reply from you, I am sorry not to be in a position to 
 enter upon the subject of your telegram" (German 
 White Book, p. 114) ? Why? 
 
 Secondly, Russia and Austria, both in 1908 and also 
 later, in 1912, stood for weeks fully mobilised on their 
 frontiers and did not go to war. Why? Because at 
 the time neither of the negotiating diplomatists 
 was secretly resolved upon war. Therefore, in spite 
 of mobilisation on both fronts, the negotiations were 
 carried on and the differences peaceably adjusted. 
 Moreover, Count Berchtold, at that time Austrian 
 Minister, expressly (Red Book No. 17) pointed to 
 these precedents to make it manifest to all the world 
 that mobilisation on one or the other side does not by 
 any means signify war. 
 
 But, thirdly, every child in Germany knew that 
 a Russian general mobilisation was in itself by 
 no means such an immediate danger for Germany 
 as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg would lead us to 
 
i6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 believe. In consequence of its vast territory and de- 
 ficient railway communications, Russia required for 
 the full mobilisation of its forces about four times as 
 much time as other European military States. This 
 very comforting circumstance for Germany ought in 
 itself to have enabled the German Government to wait 
 without risk for a few days — that is, to continue the 
 pourparlers. But the German Government, far from 
 regarding this slowness of the Russian mobilisation as 
 a welcome opportunity for further negotiations, relied 
 upon it as a factor of prospective victory in its plan 
 of war. In fact, the German war plan (down to the 
 battle of the Marne) was, as far as is known 
 to us to-day, based upon the slowness of the 
 Russian and the rapidity of its own mobilisation. 
 That is to say, it was, at the beginning, directed 
 not against Russia at all, but against France and 
 Belgium. This was so much the case that, relying 
 upon the slowness of the Russian mobilisation, the 
 German main army was launched through Belgium 
 upon France, the East Prussian frontier being only 
 garrisoned by insufficient forces, with the result that 
 Germany lost the battle of Gumbinnen, relinquished 
 half of East Prussia, and was forced, at the begin- 
 ning of September, 19 14, to withdraw considerable 
 forces from France and send them against Russia, so 
 as to avert utter catastrophe in East Prussia. This 
 brought about the defeat on the Marne, the bank- 
 ruptcy of the German war plan, and the dismissal of 
 its author, Moltke. The undoubted historical fact ac- 
 cordingly remains that the German General Staff con- 
 ceived the Russian general mobilisation to be, for 
 weeks to come, so little dangerous, and its slowness 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 17 
 
 so certain, that it built its whole war plan upon this 
 theory and, immediately after the declaration of war, 
 did not turn against Russia, but launched its forces ex- 
 clusively against Belgium and France. All the same, 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg dared to describe that 
 mobilisation to his contemporaries as a war-storm 
 which was to burst in the very next second, and which 
 compelled Germany, for the sake of her existence, to 
 strike madly in all directions. 
 
 Fourthly, we must place on record the very ex- 
 traordinary fact that Austria herself (for whose sake 
 it was said the German Government acted with such 
 precipitancy) had, indeed, mobilised almost simulta- 
 neously with Russia, but quietly continued its diplo- 
 matic negotiations with Petrograd (Red Books Nos. 
 53 » 55> 56) > ^^^ ^^^ ^ot declare war upon Russia un- 
 til five days later than Germany herself. 
 
 The danger of the Russian mobilisation (which, 
 according to Herr von Bethman Hollweg' s account, 
 rendered the war inevitable) is thus refuted (i) by a 
 solemn and reiterated assurance of the Russian Czar; 
 (2) by historical precedents, and their quotation by the 
 German ally, Count Berchtold; (3) by the formula- 
 tion and execution of the German war plan; and (4) 
 by the attitude of the Austrian Government itself, 
 which deemed the Russian general mobilisation to be 
 of such little danger that, in spite of it, it continued ne- 
 gotiations and did not declare war upon Russia before 
 August 5th. 
 
 Viewed by the light of these historical facts, the 
 statements and the logic displayed by the German Im- 
 perial Chancellor do not appear to us to hold water. 
 That nobody in the German Empire protested against 
 
i8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 them at the time is an extraordinary phenomenon, 
 only explicable by the condition known as the ''Biirg- 
 frieden/' Our ancestors denoted by ''Biirgfrieden'' 
 that extraordinary institution by the aid of which the 
 German Government could stifle every free utterance, 
 and be in the right in any and every event. 
 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg proceeded to say in his 
 speech : *The Hague Tribunal, which he (Lord Grey), 
 it is true, suggested, is, of course, apparently very 
 momentous; but it was offered when Russian forces 
 had already been dispatched against us." Here, again, 
 this sentence shows us how convenient for the then 
 German statesman (free from all responsibility to- 
 wards the people) this Burgfrieden was. 
 
 Firstly, Lord Grey did not suggest The Hague Tri- 
 bunal, but the Serbian Government did so in its reply 
 to Austria (French Yellow Book No. 49). This pro- 
 posal had been already made to Austria on July 25th, 
 when there was nowhere any talk about Russian 
 troops. Instead of adopting this proposal, the Aus- 
 trian Government simply broke off negotiations and 
 declared war upon Serbia. For this action of his al- 
 lied Government, as precipitate as it was brutal, Herr 
 von Bethmann Hollweg never found a single word of 
 blame, on the contrary (German White Book, p. 7) 
 he expressly approved it. 
 
 Secondly, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal was 
 suggested by the Czar in a despatch to William II. 
 This despatch bears date July 29th, 1914. Twice 
 repeated, it was neither answered by the German 
 Government nor made known at all to the German 
 people. It was only when the Moniteur OfUciel 
 of the Russian Government (January 31st, 191 5) 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 19 
 
 indicated the existence of this despatch that the Ger- 
 man Government condescended to admit that it had 
 been received, and then issued it in a second edition of 
 its White Book. This fact alone is more illustrative of 
 the guilt for the war than all the Chancellor's utter- 
 ances together, down to November 9th, 19 16. Let us 
 keep the dates clear : The Hague Arbitration Tribunal 
 was proposed by Serbia on July 25th and by the Rus- 
 sian Czar on July 29th, 19 14. The Imperial Chan- 
 cellor stated in his speech of November 9th, 191 6, 
 that the Russian mobilisation "was ordered in the 
 night July 30th-3ist, 19 14," and in his speech of Au- 
 gust 4th, 1 9 14, he said that "Russian troops had al- 
 ready crossed our frontiers in the afternoon of August 
 1st." Whence, it appears, in the first place, that The 
 Hague Tribunal was twice proposed at a time when, as 
 yet nowhere, "Russian troops were marching against 
 us," and, in the second place, that Herr von Beth- 
 mann Hollweg was compelled knowingly to represent 
 facts differently than they historically proved to be. 
 For only in this way could he, in apportioning the 
 blame, get rid of the most material fact that The 
 Hague Tribunal was twice offered him and his Vienna 
 colleague, when no Russian troops whatever were 
 being moved against us. 
 
 The Imperial Chancellor proceeded to lay stress in 
 his speech on the point that he had exercised pres- 
 sure in Vienna in favour of peace, and advised the 
 acceptance of Grey's mediation proposal. He referred, 
 in making this assertion, to two despatches. As to 
 the first, he said : "the instructions I gave our Am- 
 bassador in Vienna on July 30th are well known." 
 The text of these instructions the Imperial Chancellor 
 
20 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 had already made known in his speech of August 19th, 
 19 1 5. He then added that he had had this despatch 
 pubhshed in the EngHsh Press shortly before the 
 outbreak of the war. And it was actually printed 
 in the Westminster Gazette of August ist, 191 4. But, 
 otherwise, it is omitted from all official budgets of 
 documents, and notably from the German White 
 Book. The facts regarding this despatch are as fol- 
 lows: It was published in one single English news- 
 paper and nowhere else. It was not until twelve 
 months later that the German Chancellor announced 
 this publication as his work. English historians have 
 deduced from this remarkable fact that the so-called 
 document was a fiction and was, at the critical mo- 
 ment, sent to the English paper with the sole intent 
 of restraining England from war, that is to say, of 
 creating the impression that the German Government 
 had seriously recommended Grey's mediation proposal 
 in Vienna. But whether fictitious or not, the fact 
 yet remains that the German Government has never 
 given any plausible explanation why this despatch is 
 missing in all official publications. No statesman who 
 feels he is in the right, and finds himself in such a 
 difficult position as the German Imperial Chancellor 
 then did, can have any motive for concealing such 
 documents for years. For, at the very beginning of 
 the war, the Imperial Chancellor was accused on all 
 sides of not having worked in Vienna in the cause of 
 moderation and mediation, and of thus having ren- 
 dered the catastrope inevitable. Why did he not pub- 
 lish documents which would prove the direct contrary, 
 and at a time when no one could possibly doubt their 
 genuineness ? 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 21 
 
 The same remark is applicable, and in a far greater 
 degree, to the second despatch that the Chancellor, 
 for the first time, made known in his speech in Novem- 
 ber 9th, 19 1 6. After twenty-seven months of war, he 
 suddenly made known a despatch to his Vienna Min- 
 ister, which, inter alia, states : "the political prestige of 
 Austria-Hungary and the honour of its army, as well 
 as its justifiable claims upon Serbia, might be suffi- 
 ciently safeguarded by the occupation of Belgrade, or 
 other strongholds. We must, therefore, urgently and 
 most emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to consider 
 if it would not be advisable to accept the mediation on 
 the conditions offered. The responsibility for the con- 
 sequences which otherwise are sure to ensue would be 
 an exceedingly heavy one for Austria-Hungary and 
 ourselves." Unfortunately, the Imperial Chancellor 
 does not supply us with the exact date on which he 
 sent this important despatch to Vienna. He only says : 
 "I telegraphed 'then' to Vienna": Then! As if the 
 most exact indication of the time was not of the ut- 
 most importance. And all the more so, seeing that 
 this telegram (like the last above mentioned) is no- 
 where to be found in the budget of the despatches 
 exchanged. Let anyone try to fit it in, and he will 
 only discover that, try as he will, its contents are in 
 sheer contradiction to other German documents that 
 have preceded it. (See, for instance, the German 
 White Book, exhibit 12, where the Imperial Chancellor 
 expressly declares to his London Ambassador: "It 
 is impossible for us to drag our ally in his dispute with 
 Serbia before a European Court.") 
 
 But still more vital than the question why these 
 despatches were not published earlier, and why they 
 
22 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 stand in such glaring contradiction to other German 
 diplomatic Notes, is that further question: What re- 
 ply did Austria-Hungary make to these despatches? 
 We are still waiting in vain for this document. 
 
 There are here only two possibilities: Either the 
 Austrian Government did not trouble its head about 
 these German recommendations at all, and that would 
 be a gross insult to the allied German Cabinet ; or it 
 honestly endeavoured to comply with them, and in 
 this case there exists no reason for withholding any 
 documents which would clearly prove that to be the 
 case. But such documents are wanting.^ 
 
 Consequently, the historical fact remains that the 
 Austrian Government disregarded the advice given 
 it from Berlin. If, then, despite the above considera- 
 tions, it be for a moment assumed that the genuine- 
 ness of those despatches has been proved, i.e., that the 
 German Government did actually, in the sense alleged, 
 exercise pressure upon Vienna, then we are in this 
 
 *The way in which the Chancellor juggled with the facts is 
 evidenced by this : that in his speech of November 9th, 1916, 
 he dared to represent No. 51 of the Austrian Red Book (Note 
 of Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassadors at London 
 and Petrograd) as being a reply to the instructions he dis- 
 patched to Vienna. But, from this No. 51, he quoted, wisely 
 enough, only a portion, and left out the third paragraph alto- 
 gether. From the third paragraph of this No. 51 it is, however, 
 clear that No. 51 is only the Austrian reply (and a wholly insuffi- 
 cient reply) to No. 84 of the English Blue Book (proposal for 
 a Conference of four in London), and can in no wise be re- 
 garded as a reply to, or compliance with, the instructions "then" 
 given by Berlin to Vienna. (For this refers, as its contents 
 show, to No. 88 of the English Blue Book: Proposal of the 
 Powers for mediation after occupation of Serbian territory by 
 Austria.) 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 23 
 
 case confronted by the logical deduction that those 
 despatches sent to our Ambassador at Vienna, and with 
 which the German Imperial Chancellor sought to jus- 
 tify himself, do, in fact, the more seriously incriminate 
 both him and his allies. For since it is proved that 
 Austria refused to entertain those proposals (vide also 
 the above-cited semi-official article of the Austrian 
 Government in the Pester Lloyd of May 27th, 1916), 
 there results, first, clear evidence of the desire for 
 war of the Austrian Government; and secondly, a dis- 
 regard of the advice of the allied Berlin Cabinet, which 
 was a direct insult to Germany. Suppose A. is al- 
 lied with B. ; B. enters into a quarrel with C. and A. 
 seriously advises him not to exaggerate matters, as 
 he has no desire to make war on his account; and 
 then B. casts all this good advice to the winds, because 
 he has made up his mind beforehand *'to go to no 
 Conference," even if C. has dropped or suspended his 
 mobilisation. Is there, in this case, any obligation 
 upon A. to come to the assistance of B. ? Has he not 
 rather now the right to be indignant at B.'s obstinacy 
 and desire for war and leave him to his own fate ? 
 
 Either the German Imperial Chancellor did seriously 
 advocate the acceptance of Grey's mediation proposals 
 in Vienna, in which case, when Austria shut her ears, 
 it was his moral duty to cut adrift from such a blood- 
 thirsty ally; or, those despatches were (even though 
 genuine) mere make-believe. 
 
 We repeat: this Imperial Chancellor is a marvel 
 in the world's history. At least we cannot recall an- 
 other example of a statesman who, while striving to 
 justify his actions, perpetually incriminated himself. 
 
 In his famous speech of November 9th, 191 6, the 
 
24 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Imperial Chancellor Inveighed particularly against the 
 then English Minister Grey and the latter's speech of 
 October 23rd, 19 16. After having in the way above 
 described proved Germany's innocence, it was a grate- 
 ful task for him to refute Grey's assertion, accord- 
 ing to which the premature announcement of the Ger- 
 man mobilisation in the Lokal-Anseiger (Berlin, July 
 30th, 19 14 was an *'Ems telegram," with which the 
 German Government wished to force Russia to im- 
 mediate mobilisation. This supposition of the Eng- 
 lish Minister was not very happy, and absolutely 
 Irrelevant as regards assigning the blame for the war. 
 We readily believe Herr von Bethmann Hollweg that 
 the German Government was no party to the pre- 
 mature announcement in the Lokal-Anzeiger. He 
 was, therefore, fully entitled to say "We need not fear 
 any tribunal," and to produce a credible refutation of 
 Grey's allegation. 
 
 This portion of Grey's speech and of Bethmann 
 Hollweg's reply was absolutely superfluous. There 
 have never been In the history of the world so many 
 and such obvious *'Ems telegrams" as during the 
 period from July 23rd till August 5th, 1914; Lord 
 Grey had really, therefore, no need to Invent another 
 and to overlook the ones actually In existence. By 
 an "Ems telegram," the people of Europe were wont 
 to understand the manoeuvre which Bismarck invented 
 In 1870, and which Is exhaustively dealt with In 
 his "Reflections and Reminiscences." Its chief es- 
 sentials were, by means of forged, mutilated, or even 
 fictitious official documents, to Incite the opponent 
 to war, and win the approval of the public at home 
 for a war already planned. In order to be con- 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 25 
 
 vinced of the staggering fact that, in the period 
 July 23rd-August 5th, 191 4, at least a dozen of 
 such *'Ems telegrams" were concocted and pub- 
 lished, one need only take up any German or 
 Austrian paper at random during those dark days. 
 It was the aim of the German and Austrian Govern- 
 ments, towards the end of July and the beginning of 
 August, to persuade the people that a manifestly of- 
 fensive war (also called preventive war) was a holy de- 
 fensive war, and thus kindle that patriotic enthusiasm 
 without which no modem State could wage war. This 
 end was attained by numerous ''Ems telegrams." 
 
 See, for instance, the "semi-official communique'' 
 of the Vienna Press Bureau of July 28th, 1914 
 (French Yellow Book No. 75 his), published in all the 
 German and Austrian newspapers, which presented the 
 Serbian reply, for popular consumption, in such a way 
 as to convey that therein lay a war challenge to 
 Austria and the necessity of rushing to arms for the 
 defence of the menaced Fatherland. 
 
 A similar "Ems telegram" lies before us in the 
 publication of the Serbian reply in the columns of 
 the Norddeiitsche Allgemeine Zeitung of July 29th, 
 19 14. This announcement, although it was dated the 
 25th, and, at latest, reached Berlin and Vienna early 
 on the 26th, was only issued on July 29th. Moreover, 
 it exhibited glosses, which are absolutely unallowable 
 in the publication of such documents. This means, 
 then, that the Serbian reply was only published in 
 Germany after Austria had already declared war upon 
 Serbia, and that the people were confronted with a 
 fait accompli. And, in apprehension lest the Serbian 
 reply should create a too favourable impression upon 
 
26 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the public, it was "mutilated" by "glosses," which 
 served the obvious purpose of anticipating the judg- 
 ment of the reader and awakening his belief in the 
 villainy and dishonesty of the Serbian Government. 
 Why these glosses? What other purpose did they 
 serve than to disguise the submission of the Serbian 
 Government, and to justify a declaration of war, which 
 from an impartial reading of the Serbian reply could 
 never for a moment have been deemed justifiable ? 
 
 An "Ems telegram" of quite a different character 
 is the following "Official Explanation of the French 
 Action," which can be read in all German newspapers : 
 
 "Berlin, August 3rd (Official Announcement) : 
 hitherto German troops, acting under orders, have not 
 crossed the French frontier. On the other hand, since 
 yesterday, French forces have, without declaration of 
 war, attacked our frontier posts. Although the French 
 Government, only a few days ago, agreed to the keep- 
 ing of a neutral zone of 10 kilometres, they have at 
 various points crossed the German Frontier. French 
 companies yesterday occupied German villages, bomb- 
 ing aeroplanes made their appearance over Baden and 
 Bavaria, violated Belgium's neutrality by crossing her 
 territory, penetrated into the Rhine Province and at- 
 tempted to wreck our railways. France has thus first 
 made an attack upon us. The safety of the realm de- 
 mands counter measures. The Emperor has issued the 
 necessary orders. The German Ambassador in Paris 
 has been notified to demand his passports." 
 
 Here we have no longer to deal with a pure interpre- 
 tation and mutilation of official documents, as in the 
 two previous cases, but (as we positively know to-day) 
 with a sheer invention. Every German of those days 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 27 
 
 was accustomed blindly to believe the "official 
 announcements" of his Government ; on reading in all 
 the newspapers and learning from the mouth of the 
 Imperial Chancellor (Reichstag sitting of August 4th) 
 that 'Trance had actually attacked us," he rushed to 
 arms, in holy indignation, for the defence of his Fath- 
 erland. The object of this *'Ems telegram" had been 
 brilliantly attained. But for the facts asserted in it 
 the German Government does not only not produce a 
 tittle of evidence, but has, on the contrary, even fur- 
 nished a refutation of its own assertions (vide the 
 above-cited notification from the Chief Magistrate of 
 Nuremberg of April 3rd, 191 6). 
 
 We, who without prejudice and passion only serve 
 historical truth and have all the documentary evidence 
 of those days at our disposal, cannot understand why 
 the statesmen of the countries then leagued against 
 Germany made subsidiary episodes, like the premature 
 special edition of the Lokal-Anzeiger, a subject of long 
 discussion, instead of drawing the attention of the 
 German Imperial Chancellor to these and similar *'Ems 
 telegrams." After twenty-seven months of war, peo- 
 ple on both sides finally arrived at the conclusion that 
 the conditions of peace must be made dependent upon 
 the allocation of the blame for the war. Happily, both 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and the whole German 
 Press associated themselves with this point of view and 
 declared themselves ready to co-operate towards a 
 reasonable answer anent this question of liability. 
 Under these circumstances, there ought to have been 
 but one question for the statesmen of the Quadruple 
 Alliance to propound to the German Imperial Chan- 
 cellor : with what tangible, legally provable and proven 
 
28 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 facts can the German Government maintain that it 
 was ^'actually attacked"? By what valid documents 
 can it show that those "official announcements" of the 
 German and Austrian Governments, which we consider 
 to be "Ems telegrams," were, as a matter of fact, no 
 "Ems telegrams" at all? If it could be indisputably 
 shown to us that Germany was, in fact, "actually 
 attacked" and is now waging a defensive war, then we 
 are prepared to suit our conditions of peace to this 
 fact, and to conclude a peace that will in future secure 
 Germany from similar attacks. 
 
 And if, on the other hand, Herr von Bethmann 
 Hollweg "had to fear no tribunal" and was at the 
 same time of opinion that the apportionment of the 
 blame (which would have to be determined by the 
 evidence of the twelve critical days) must be a con- 
 dition preliminary to the opening of peace negotia- 
 tions, why did he not anticipate such questions and 
 insinuations? Why did he (just like his antagonists) 
 discuss only the side and single issues of those eventful 
 twelve days ? 
 
 Offensive or defensive war ? That is here the ques- 
 tion. It cannot be answered by general assertions, but 
 only by historically provable or proven facts. Thus, 
 either Herr von Bethmann Hollweg must furnish the 
 evidence that those "official announcements" (and 
 his speech in the Reichstag of August 4th) were no 
 "Ems telegrams," but incontestably truthful presenta- 
 tions of facts .... then, we should be in a position 
 to examine further how far his statement (that Ger- 
 many had been maliciously assailed) is correct. Or, 
 supposing he does not adduce this actual evidence 
 (and, unhappily, he has not yet done so), then it is 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 29 
 
 clear that those "official announcements'* were pure fic- 
 tions, which could only serve one purpose, viz., to rep- 
 resent to the German people a palpable war of aggres- 
 sion as a defensive war. But if this Is proved (and it 
 is proved to-day), then everything the German Impe- 
 rial Chancellor has told me about the Russian general 
 mobilisation, of his endeavours to exercise pressure 
 in Vienna in favour of peace, etc., etc., is invalidated 
 and hardly deserves any further refutation. 
 
 From the mass of diplomatic and generally historical 
 testimony that lies before us to-day (as it did also then) 
 there emerges the incontrovertible certainty that this 
 terrible war was not fate and necessity, but design and 
 will, and by no manner of means a holy war of defence 
 on the part of Germany against foreign aggression. 
 
 A careful study of the German literature of those 
 days has, moreover, forced upon us the conviction that 
 Germany waged a palpable war of conquest. We leave 
 entirely aside the historical fact that Prussia has never 
 fought a victorious campaign without acquisition in 
 land or money. Although this is a peculiarity which 
 Prussia shares with no other State, it is not adduced 
 here by way of evidence. But if, as was the case in 
 the World War, an "actually assailed" country, simul- 
 taneously with its protestations that it had been 
 grievously attacked, brings out enormous annexation 
 projects, which find enthusiastic support among the 
 people and the open support of its leading statesmen, 
 that is, to some degree, a serious matter. Whoever, 
 like the German philosophers and politicians in those 
 days, speaks in the same breath of defence and con- 
 
30 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 quest, is manifestly using the theory of defence only 
 as a subterfuge. 
 
 Scarcely had the first blows been delivered upon 
 unhappy Belgium than the most influential persons in 
 Germany began to demand its annexation. The first 
 thirty months of the World War had, it is true, to a 
 certain extent run in favour of Germany, but, for good 
 reasons, the German Government had prohibited the 
 discussion of her war aims. Firstly, she could not, by 
 making known her projects of conquest, stamp her 
 elaborately constructed fable of a war of defence as 
 pure fiction; secondly, she realised fully that the war 
 was not at an end, and that Germany, if the first at- 
 tempt miscarried, would never be in a position to an- 
 nex anything whatsoever. It was no use. The more 
 the German specious successes increased, the louder 
 became the clamour that the miserable Imperial Chan- 
 cellor should allow the discussion of the war aims. 
 And as the most elementary wisdom compelled him to 
 silence, because the bear, whose skin the agitators were 
 in their assurance of victory continually dividing, was 
 as yet not killed, they accused and abused him in the 
 vilest manner. It was both a ludicrous and a shameful 
 spectacle that Germany then presented to the world. 
 
 The German people thought it was waging a holy 
 and defensive war against a ruthless attack by the 
 *Tand Partition Syndicate" (so the Triple Entente 
 was styled in Germany), and had to look on for two 
 whole years (as long as the war conditions were fa- 
 vourable for Germany) while new land partition syndi- 
 cates were daily being formed in Germany. Some 
 dreamed of a ''Greater Germany," extending from 
 Antwerp to Bagdad ; others of the "emancipation" of 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 31 
 
 the Flemings, Baits, Poles and Letts; others of the ap- 
 propriation of rich coal and iron mines in the North of 
 France, of the French colonies in North Africa, of a 
 sea-controlling German world empire, and many other 
 splendid things.^ Fortunately for Europe the events 
 of the war finally checked their greedy appetite. For 
 had their plans been realised, then, instead of the peace- 
 ful Europe which we had known for fifty years, and 
 which we are striving to secure for coming genera- 
 tions with yet firmer guarantees, we should experience 
 once again in Europe the same gigantic armaments, 
 the same policy of violence, which, to the distress of the 
 nations, has continued from 187 1 to 1914. For the 
 surest way to bring about "unavoidable" wars is an- 
 nexation against the will of the annexed. 
 
 * As early as the summer of 1915 the six chief German Indus- 
 trial Associations (the Farmers' League, the German Peasants* 
 League, the Westphalian Peasants' Union, the Central League 
 of German Industrials, the Manufacturers League, and the Im- 
 perial German Middleclass League) demanded, in an address 
 to the Imperial Chancellor, the annexation of Belgium, the 
 North of France, the Baltic Provinces, etc., etc. The address 
 of the German high school teachers made similar demands. A 
 petition of March, 1916, to the Federal Council ("Richtlinien 
 fiir Wege zum dauernden Frieden") demands the annexation 
 of Belgium, the "acquisition of a favourable military frontier 
 comprehending the for us indispensable mineral fields" lying 
 towards France, "the forcing back of Russia as far as ever 
 possible from territories not inhabited by the Great Russians," 
 the "establishment of the largest possible continuous extent of 
 colonial territory in Africa," etc., etc. A comprehensive survey 
 of the German annexation demands is published by Payot & 
 Co., Lausanne ("Das annexionistische Deutschland," compiled 
 by S. Grumbach). The authentic material condensed into this 
 volume is extraordinarily voluminous and enough to shame 
 every democratically-minded German. 
 
32 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 The schemes of conquest of the so-called Pan-Ger- 
 manists of those earlier days were so monstrous that a 
 Minister of Finance who should hit upon the idea of 
 taxing the Pan-Germanist megalomania by levying, 
 say, a shilling on every square yard of land those gen- 
 tlemen desired to annex, could, by means of this an- 
 nexation tax, cover all the German war expenses and 
 make beggars of Rohrbach, Bassermann, Chamberlain, 
 Reventlow, Harden and a hundred others. 
 
 The German "victories'* of the first thirty months 
 of the war were needed to lay clear before our eyes 
 the extravagance of the German greed of territory. 
 Certain books, which advocated the wildest annexation 
 demands, ran into editions of 200,000 copies and more. 
 Even numerous German Socialists, who had hitherto 
 been regarded as level-headed, fell victims to this 
 disease. People like Lensch, Kolb, Geek, Adelung, 
 Quark, Landsberg, Siidekum, Heine, Hanlsch, and 
 many other so-called Socialists, cynically spat upon 
 the testaments of their great predecessors, — Marx and 
 iBebel — and, like the crowd of Pan-Germanists, 
 spoke of "frontier readjustments," "safeguards for 
 our existence," "guarantees against future aggres- 
 sion," etc., etc.^ At a time when the war had 
 already entered upon a critical stage for Germany, 
 
 *In this strain writes, for example, the deputy Hanisch (Vor- 
 warts, September 6th, 1916) : "But as far as the much discussed 
 annexations are concerned, I have for my own part never made 
 a secret of the fact that, in the interest of the German people 
 and especially of the working classes, I consider a considerable 
 extension of our frontier lines towards the East, possibly as 
 far as the Narew line, a highly desirable war aim." And, then, 
 a few sentences further: "therefore I roundly state that. In my 
 view, the peace aims of the Social Democratic Party will have 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 33 
 
 royal personages, such as the King of Bavaria, in- 
 fluential industrial and economic societies, leading 
 newspapers and politicians, incessantly demanded, as 
 an understood thing, conquests and an acquisition of 
 power, in a manner which proves that the ridiculous 
 and the barbaric were in those days regarded in Ger- 
 many as the patriotic} 
 
 To-day, w^hen we know the fortunately unfortunate 
 issue of this war for Germany, the whole of this im- 
 mense mass of literature does not merely throw a woe- 
 ful light upon the idiocy and bombast of the then 
 spokesmen of the German nation, but it is before all 
 else, as already said, the clearest refutation these peo- 
 ple have themselves given of the official pronouncement 
 of a holy defensive war. Anyone who, confronted 
 with this vast mass of literature, in which robbery of 
 land and money is treated as a perfectly natural result 
 of the *'holy defensive war forced upon us," can 
 still for a moment entertain any doubts as to the 
 true significance of this war must be scoffed at as a 
 simpleton. 
 
 There was, at the time, so far as we can perceive, 
 
 to lie more or less in the same direction as those peace aims 
 which the Imperial Chancellor laid down in his well-known 
 speech of December 9th, 191 5, and later." Similar expressions 
 of eminent Social Democratic leaders are to be found in the 
 Sozialistische Monatshefte, in the Hamburger Echo, in the 
 Chemnitzer Volksstimme, and other party organs. 
 
 ^Even when the war situation had become so hopeless that 
 the Imperial Chancellor in his above-cited speech of November 
 9th, 1916, had to state that he "had never declared the annexa- 
 tion of Belgium to be our intention," the spokesmen of the 
 Centre, the National Liberals, and Conservatives still persisted 
 that Belgium, politically, militarily, and economically, should 
 remain in German hands. 
 
34 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 in the whole of Germany but one eminent man, 
 Maximilian Harden, who had the courage openly to 
 confess adherence to his old opinions, that is, he 
 called the long-desired war of conquest by its right 
 name, as soon as it had broken out. 
 
 "Away with the miserable attempts to justify Ger- 
 many's action. Finish with this vulgar abuse of our 
 foes. 
 
 "We did not embark upon the enormous risk of 
 this war like irresponsible fools. We willed it, 
 because we were obliged and bound to will it. May 
 the Teuton devil throttle the whiners, whose prayer 
 for pardon makes us ridiculous amid the marvels of 
 great events. We do not stand, we do not place our- 
 selves before the tribunal of Europe. Our might shall 
 create a new right in Europe. Germany strikes. If 
 it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood 
 of all the gods shall belaud the good war. We do 
 not wage the war in order to punish sinners, nor 
 to free enthralled peoples and then bask in the con- 
 sciousness of unselfish magnanimity. We wage it 
 from the bed-rock of conviction, that Germany, after 
 having completed its task, can and must demand 
 further elbow room and further potentiality for de- 
 velopment in the world. Spain and the Netherlands, 
 Rome and Hapsburg, France and England have 
 possessed, ruled and colonised vast tracts of the most 
 fertile soil. Now the hour of German ascendancy 
 has struck." {Zukunft, October 17th, 1914). 
 
 The truth is, the diplomatic origin of this World 
 War, the contradictions and forgeries about the 
 "actual attack" that were fabricated and confessed to 
 by the German Government itself, the voluminous 
 
PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 35 
 
 literature demanding annexations, and the annexation 
 craze which infected the ranks of the German So- 
 ciaHsts, compel us to the admission, which, though sad- 
 dening for us Germans, is yet incontrovertibly true, 
 that no war of modern days has ever borne the stamp 
 of a war of conquest more unmistakably than that 
 which Germany, on August ist, 191 4, embarked upon 
 against one half of the world. 
 
II 
 
 OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL AND THE GER- 
 MAN IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION 
 IN PARTICULAR 
 
 How was it possible that the German Government 
 could conceal from its people the true character of 
 this war and, in the way we have delineated, instil 
 into them the conviction that warlike possibilities 
 were actualities, infringements of rights acts of self- 
 defence, and purely fictitious attacks "actual" ones? 
 With what right could it demand the sacrifice of the 
 lives of its citizens, when it is historically proven 
 that the real causes of the war, and the war aims, 
 were different from those for which the German citi- 
 zen was prepared to lay down his life? To propound 
 this question (and it must be propounded) involves 
 the solution of a problem which, remarkably enough, 
 has not hitherto been solved in Germany. I say *'re- 
 markably," because Germany is regarded as a civilised 
 State of the first rank; and because, without a rea- 
 sonable discussion and solution of this problem, it 
 is really no civilised State at all. Since England, 
 France, and Italy led the way in the solution of this 
 problem, most of the other European States fol- 
 lowed their example. Even the small, almost despised 
 Balkan States recognised this as the most important 
 of all political problems, and each, according to its 
 national individuality, has furnished a solution. 
 
 36 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 37 
 
 This problem, practically unknown in Germany, 
 or in any event excluded from any public discussion, 
 can be comprehended in one word : Dynasty. 
 
 In my book "Because I am a German,"^ I said 
 in reference to the origin of wars : "War is never 
 a 'logical consequence' or a 'necessary result'; war 
 is a will. Not the will of a revengeful God, nor of 
 any other supernatural power, but the will to power of 
 individual men. . . . The exuberant will to power of 
 the few individuals who still, by virtue of antiquated 
 Constitutions, enjoy an absolute political power : that 
 is the virus of war. That, and that alone, has the 
 power to transform the latent war-madness existing 
 in certain classes of the population into an acute war 
 crisis." 
 
 It is clear that dynasties are hereby intended. As 
 there can be no religion without gods, no art without 
 ideals, in like manner there can be no wars^ without 
 dynasties. Dynasties are the gods of wars and the 
 spirit of a warlike thought in the world. "Cherchez 
 la femme," said Dumas relative to the investigation 
 of the cause of crime. "Cherchez la dynastie!" one 
 must exclaim to all those who are seeking the true 
 causes of wars. 
 
 The whole world instinctively feels that there is 
 an intimate correlation between dynasty and war, but 
 
 M Constable & Co., Ltd., London; E. P. Button & Co., New- 
 York, p. 123.] 
 
 ^ The notion "war" is in this book intended to mean a bloody- 
 conflict between whole nations. This notion of war naturally, 
 therefore, presupposes the existence and the full employment 
 of the general obligations for national defence. Civil and 
 colonial wars do not come within the compass of our argu- 
 ment. 
 
38 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 hitherto this instinctive feeling in mankind has never 
 found clear and practical expression. And for simple 
 and readily intelligible reasons. For since dynasties 
 are at once both lawgivers and judges in their own 
 cause, and dispose, moreover, of powerful armies, 
 all pacific, scientific, and philosophical investigations 
 on this topic are only permitted so long as they do 
 not run counter to the interests of the dynasties. But 
 as the investigation of political truth is altogether 
 against the interests of dynasties, this may well be 
 the reason why the otherwise so versatile German 
 scholars and politicians have until now avoided an 
 unprejudiced approach to this problem. Particularly 
 lamentable is, in this connection, the fact that most 
 German "scientific'* pacifists in many, far too many, 
 books have spoken about the causes of wars, without 
 uttering a single word about dynasties. We shall 
 recur later to this peculiarity. 
 
 First, what is a dynasty? 
 
 The word comes from the Greek and means power- 
 wielder, ruler. In the Greek political system, those 
 were called dynasts who had by an act of violence 
 gained possession of the government. In modern 
 speech, we understand by dynasties ruling families, 
 who preside over the destinies of a country, whose 
 sovereign right is vouched for by the gods of the 
 Christian, heathen, or Mahomedan faith, as being 
 hereditary and absolute; and, thus, can neither be 
 impugned by human powers, nor in any way compared 
 with other human institutions. 
 
 The dynasties arose and are based upon the national 
 necessity of defence and leadership. Everywhere in 
 history they crop up, first as protectors, liberators, 
 
 J 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 39 
 
 or fortunate conquerors, then as the anointed of the 
 Lord, and, finally, as tyrants and oppressors. The 
 history of every dynasty begins with popular en- 
 thusiasm and ends with popular revolt. It is the his- 
 tory that the Brothers Grimm have so dramatically 
 described in the legend of Frau Ilsebill: the ever- 
 lasting story of growing arrogance which ends in a 
 catastrophe. 
 
 Among primitive peoples, who have no legal or 
 political organisation, and who love personal liberty 
 beyond all else, their leaders were mostly chosen only 
 for the period of the war, and afterwards again lost 
 their power. But when the primitive peoples came 
 to settle down, and began to exhibit political and 
 national cohesion, then their leaders, who had been 
 victorious in war, retained their position in time of 
 peace. They exercised, mostly in conjunction with 
 the medicine man and the elders of the tribe, author- 
 ity over their companions; and their ruling rights 
 gradually usurped all spheres. When such leaders 
 were not merely strong and successful as warriors, 
 but also shrewd as lawgivers, and gifted with or- 
 ganising faculties and generally ambitious, they 
 gradually ousted the medicine man, made themselves 
 sorcerers and priests, proclaimed themselves prophets 
 of God, and exercised a despotic power, which was 
 the more unlimited the more arrogantly they asserted 
 themselves, the more absolutely they obtained the sym- 
 pathies of the leading men of the tribe, and the more 
 superstitious the race became. So Moses was not 
 only the chief war lord of the Jews, but was at the 
 same time a lawgiver who had intercourse with God 
 Himself. 
 
40 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Their descent from and intercourse with the Divin- 
 ity are the essential characteristics of every dynasty. 
 Gods and kings are colleagues. The kings stand 
 either, as was formerly the case among the Chinese, 
 in direct kinship with the Divinity and call them- 
 selves sons of Heaven, or they style themselves, as 
 is the case to-day in Germany, *'by the grace of 
 God" and exercise their functions as the chosen in- 
 struments of Heaven (speech of William II., August 
 25th, 1910). As is their descent, so also are their 
 powers of a divine nature. Among the Incas, they 
 caused the sun to rise; in the case of the Egyptians 
 and Persians, they held sway over all the good and 
 evil spirits of heaven and earth; among the Chinese, 
 they controlled even the degree of bliss after death, 
 and, among us Germans, the Lord of Hosts is the 
 annihilator of our enemies (speech of William H., 
 June 5th, 1916, at Bremerhaven). 
 
 Somewhat unscientifically, but with psychological 
 subtlety, Anatole France describes in his *Tenguin 
 Island" the origin of kingship and the nation of sov- 
 ereignty. An intelligent man disguised himself as a 
 dragon, and, as such, terrified the inhabitants of the 
 surrounding villages, stole their cattle at night, and 
 exercised an uncanny reign of terror over the dis- 
 trict. But as his dark, illegal existence began after 
 a while to displease him, he hit upon the brilliant 
 idea of regularising it. Accordingly he made his ac- 
 complices among the people ventilate the idea that the 
 dragon was a bewitched god which could only be de- 
 stroyed, that is, set free, by a virgin. He then ar- 
 ranged a theatrical display with the said virgin, who 
 thereupon slays this dragon in the open and finally 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 41 
 
 frees the country from the beast. The dragon here- 
 upon adopted human form and declared itself a higher 
 Being. In consequence, that which he formerly stole 
 was henceforth brought him as tribute by the grate- 
 ful inhabitants of the liberated district. Thus he 
 became king, surrounded his majesty, which had been 
 hallowed by a virgin, with the indispensable safe- 
 guards, provided for his children by making his dig- 
 nity hereditary, and ruled, beloved of all, until his 
 blissful end. 
 
 If we leave antiquity aside and confine ourselves 
 to the Christian era, we can also set up for dynasties 
 a "theory of declension," similar to that taught by 
 Marx in the realm of economics. When the victory 
 of Christendom and the migration of nations had 
 shattered heathen civilisation into fragments, there 
 ensued a long period of lawlessness and arbitrary rule 
 in Europe. Every rich, strong and adventurous 
 chieftain, patrician, prince of his Church, landowner 
 or bandit leader, possessed the possibility of being 
 able by force, cunning, marriage, or inheritance, to 
 obtain for himself by violence the absolute lordship 
 over a territory and its inhabitants; that is, to found 
 a dynasty. The early centuries of the Christian era 
 were dominated by the struggles of these numerous 
 dynasties for the hegemony. Of course, in these 
 struggles, the small man had to give way to the big, 
 and many a proud emissary of God had to atone for 
 his dream of power in the dungeons of a stronger 
 emissary of God. Well into the eleventh century 
 the royal dignity in Europe was, in consequence of 
 the numerous competitors, who were to be found 
 in every feudal castle, neither surrounded by special 
 
42 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 protective laws, nor yet hereditary. The king was 
 elected ; and, in many instances, this election required 
 not merely the consent of the princes, the nobility, 
 and the clergy, but of the people also. 
 
 The first country in which the royal title became 
 hereditary and absolute, and in which accordingly the 
 lesser princes gradually declined in favour of the 
 greater, was France. The Merovingians, by dint of 
 fierce struggles against the small dynasties and the 
 nobility, laid so securely the foundations of the king- 
 ship, that their heirs, the Capets, became the first, 
 in every sense the all-powerful, dynasty in Europe. 
 Their originally beneficent activity (the unification of 
 the nation, the laying of the first foundations of a 
 system of organised administration, etc.) soon de- 
 veloped into disaster for the country and found, in 
 the French Revolution, its inglorious end. In the 
 rest of Europe, as, for instance, in Italy and Ger- 
 many, the division of the dynastic power remained. 
 A thousand and one dynasties vied with each other 
 for the pre-eminence. The endeavours of the Haps- 
 burgs and the Hohenstaufens to found a world power 
 suffered shipwreck on the rocks of resistance of the 
 Papal and the minor German dynasties, as did the 
 struggles for world dominion of the Papacy and the 
 struggles for independent sovereignty of the minor 
 dynasties on the resistance of the German Empire. 
 But, after the Reformation, and particularly after 
 the introduction of the universal German *Teace,'* we 
 perceive both in Germany and Italy the gradual de- 
 clension of the minor dynasties. 
 
 In France, it is true, for the first time in modern 
 history, the divinity and infallibility of dynasties be- 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 43 
 
 came jeopardised by a revolt of the national con- 
 science, but this revolution only prepared the way for 
 the new dynastic star of first magnitude, which, with 
 Napoleon's advent, arose in the European sky. Ac- 
 cordingly, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, five 
 powerful dynasties altogether held sway over the Eu- 
 ropean Continent and its inhabitants: Bonaparte in 
 France, Italy, etc., the Hohenzollerns in Prussia, the 
 Hapsburgs in Austria-Hungary, the Romanoffs in 
 Russia, and the Osmanlis in Turkey. The Hohen- 
 zollerns had, since the battle of Fehrbellin (1675) 
 shown themselves powerful, adventurous conquerors. 
 They clearly understood how continually to add to 
 their possessions, to equip them with a new culture 
 and rule them with economy. Since 1701 they had 
 become kings by the grace of God, although the then 
 holder of all divine authority, the Pope, had with- 
 held from them his blessing. With Frederick 11. the 
 Hohenzollern dynasty had become a respected power 
 in Germany and even in Europe. As early as 181 3 
 the decline of the other German dynasties had pro- 
 ceeded so far that the German races vehemently clam- 
 oured for a centralisation of the supreme power 
 under the leadership of the Hohenzollerns. The dy- 
 nasty of the Hapsburgs opposed this German national 
 desire, which, as we know, was only prepared and 
 realised by the defeat of the House of Hapsburg in 
 1866, and in 1870-71 by the crushing of the Bona- 
 partes. 
 
 To-day there are still three powerful dynasties in 
 Europe which, despite all the revolutions, inventions, 
 and progress of the last century, still wield nearly all 
 the divine privileges and powers of the absolute dy- 
 
44 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 nasties of antiquity. These are, first, the Hohenzol- 
 lerns, who, in consequence of their briUiant victories 
 and their first-class army, are, no doubt, at present 
 the most powerful dynasty in Europe ; next, the Haps- 
 burgs, who, by reason of their defeats of 1866 and 
 their attitude in this World War, are still more or less 
 dependent upon the Hohenzollerns ; and thirdly, the 
 Romanoffs, at once Emperors and Popes, the 
 wealthiest persons and the greatest landowners in the 
 world. As a fourth, one might mention the Osmanlis. 
 But their sovereignty has been so much diminished 
 in the last century that they can be regarded as a 
 dynasty and Great Power of the second class only. 
 
 In order to obviate any misapprehension, I must 
 emphasise here that wherever in this work ''dynasties'* 
 are spoken of, only these three, or at most four, are 
 intended: the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgers, the 
 Romanoffs, and the Osmanlis. The remaining Euro- 
 pean dynasties, as, for instance, that of Brunswick- 
 Liineburg-Hanover, which rules over England, or that 
 of Savoy, which holds sway over Italy, we exclude, in 
 this book, from the denotation "dynasty," because, in 
 one form or another, they stand under the control of 
 popular parliaments — that is, they are no longer 
 equipped with the same divine and absolute attributes 
 as their four above-mentioned colleagues. Seeing that 
 the dynasties ruling over England, Italy, Spain, 
 Sweden, etc., no longer possess the divine right of 
 deciding upon war and peace, it follows that the word 
 ''dynasty" can only here be applied to those Great 
 Power Governments that stand under no popular con- 
 trol and have only to be responsible to Almighty God 
 for their actions. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 45 
 
 Again, I should wish here to emphasise expressly 
 that, in this book, the word "dynasty" is not con- 
 fined to single individuals and direct relations of the 
 ruling houses. It is rather applicable to all those 
 who, in conjunction with these "God-appointed" 
 rulers, ordain the destinies of a people. Thus, wher- 
 ever I employ the word "dynasty," an "oligarchy" or 
 a "camarilla" can be equally substituted. As I have 
 never lived at the Court of an absolute ruler, and 
 cannot, therefore, know whether this or the other gov- 
 ernmental act was ordained by an oligarchy (that is 
 to say, to suit a privileged class) or by a camarilla 
 (that is to say, by influential favourites in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the throne), the expression "dynasty" 
 appears to me to fit best the purpose of this investiga- 
 tion in every case. 
 
 For the persons of the rulers are, of course, of 
 divine origin and fulfil the wishes of Providence upon 
 earth, yet, all the same, they are not omnipotent and 
 omnipresent as is the Deity. 
 
 For instance, such a rare consummation of dynastic 
 universality as William 11. could not be content merely 
 to rule. William II. is, to be sure, at once Imperial 
 Chancellor and Chief of the General Staff, Bishop of 
 the State Church and clergyman in ofBce, a final au- 
 thority in all matters of science and art, an expert 
 in industry, trade, agriculture, education, sport, archi- 
 tecture, etc., etc. ; he is present at every laying of a 
 foundation stone, christening of a ship, dedication of 
 a church, statue, or barrack; musical festivals, exhi- 
 bitions, automobile and horse races are for him not 
 merely recreations, but also opportunities for the de- 
 livery of speeches displaying his expert knowledge of 
 
46 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the subject in question ; he is constantly arousing the 
 unbounded admiration of his associates, because, just 
 where he might naturally have been expected to appear 
 merely as a layman, he reveals himself an expert au- 
 thority and critic; yet, none the less, in a huge coun- 
 try like Germany, he cannot overlook and arrange 
 everything exactly in accordance with his views. Like 
 all his colleagues by the grace of God, he therefore 
 requires ministers, officials, advisers, courtiers, to 
 whom he, wholly or partially, transfers his authority, 
 and who administer the country in his name. 
 
 In this way, around the sun of dynastic power, 
 circles an aristocratic satellite class of wielders of 
 arbitrary power, who, either in conjunction with the 
 sovereign lord, or by intrigues and the pursuit of 
 personal interests contrary to the will of the ruler, 
 govern land and people according to their own fancy. 
 "The patricians formed a class of a higher order; 
 they were descended from the gods, and were alone 
 capable of performing the religious ceremonies and 
 observing the omens correctly, and, hence, were 
 ordained by the grace of God to rule the masses."^ 
 So it was in ancient Rome, according to Prof. Del- 
 bruck's description, and so it is still to-day in modern 
 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia ; save and ex- 
 cept that we do not in the modem Germany of these 
 days speak any longer of patricians, but of Junkers. 
 
 It certainly frequently happened (as lately in Ser- 
 bia) that a dynasty, in this way, quietly reared up 
 
 'Prof. Hans Delbriick: "Regierung und Volkswille" (Berlin, 
 I9i3> P- 96). This description by Delbriick contains the precise 
 definition of what I, in this book, mean by "dynasty." The 
 reader should not overlook that. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 47 
 
 another side by side with itself, which, as soon as it 
 felt itself strong enough, in its turn asserted its divine 
 rights, ousted the first, and put itself in its place. 
 The normal course of development was, however, as 
 a rule, this : that the rulers had, in the stress of affairs, 
 to abandon something of their power. Thus arose 
 the very varied forms of ancient and modern po- 
 litical systems; from the despotism of Asiatic States, 
 in which the person of the sovereign is so hallowed 
 that no mortal eye may gaze upon it, and where his 
 representatives are the sole rulers in the land, down 
 to the feudal monarchy, which has a parliamentary 
 constitution and ministers appointed by the Crown. 
 When the dynasties were not always happy in their 
 warlike adventures and consequently lost in prestige, 
 or when they, despite their divinity, showed them- 
 selves too human, i.e., too egoistical, a conflict arose 
 between dynasty and people (the latter, according to 
 the characteristics of land and people, now imploring, 
 then demanding, and finally in open revolt), and be- 
 came a Mene Tekel for the dynasties. After the 
 Greeks, who, in many matters, attained a degree of 
 perfection unknown to us of these days, had given 
 to the world the first examples of pure popular gov- 
 ernment, we nowhere find the idea of popular govern- 
 ment entirely disappear. It existed in both Athens 
 and Rome in the beginnings of Christendom and dur- 
 ing the peasant and religious wars of the Middle Ages, 
 till finally at the French Revolution it animated a 
 whole nation and, with spontaneous force, substituted 
 the modern State principle of a sovereign nation, that 
 Is, the government of the people by the people, for 
 dynastic divinity and absokitism. Almost all Euro- 
 
48 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 pean dynasties at those times rushed to arms against 
 this attack on their divine privileges,^ but they were 
 only so far successful in that their attacks upon the 
 new secular-republican State ideal aided the birth 
 of the new dynasty of the Bonapartes, the activity of 
 which filled the beginning and the middle of last cen- 
 tury with wars, victories and defeats, and, finally, re- 
 sulted in the European dynasties (with the exception 
 of Russia) being compelled to accept the principle of 
 participation in government by the people. 
 
 So after a thousand birth pangs, and against the 
 will of the gods, the modern legal State arose upon 
 earth, one possessing a constitution and conceding to 
 the people, in one or other form, an influence upon 
 the Government. But only in France, and earlier 
 still in England, was this victory of the democratic 
 idea a veritable one. In other countries, the dynasties 
 overcame the revolutionary reaction, only ostensibly 
 accommodated themselves to the new demands of a 
 new epoch, and remained what they had hitherto 
 been, divine, absolute and hereditary. To-day, as we 
 have said, we have in Europe three or four dynasties, 
 whose absolute powers, compared with the pre-revo- 
 
 "Tlie well-known German historian, Heinrich von Sybel, cer- 
 tainly considers that the wars of the French Revolution were 
 no crusades on the part of the dynasties against the modern 
 idea of popular sovereignty, but, on the contrary, propaganda- 
 and conquest-wars of the then all-powerful Girondist party. 
 But Herr von Sybel is like most other German historians in 
 that, in consequence of having been appointed an acting Prus- 
 sian Privy Councillor, he knew how to make out a case for the 
 dynasties. That he and his official colleagues were not per- 
 mitted to give any other account we can but regret, but cannot 
 help. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 49 
 
 lutionary period, have changed at most in form, but 
 not in actuality. 
 
 That the Hohenzollern dynasty is to be classed 
 among these will be indignantly denied by most of 
 my countrymen. If you dare tell an average German 
 that the Hohenzollern dynasty to-day rules Germany 
 almost as absolutely as, for example, Louis XIV. 
 in his day did France, then if he is polite he will 
 calmly smile in a condescending way and, from the 
 height of his political satisfaction, give you to under- 
 stand that you would do better not to discuss mat- 
 ters of which you are so utterly ignorant. First, for 
 example, in our case, the King is not absolute, but 
 constitutional — that means that his arbitrariness is 
 held in check by Parliament, House of Lords, Federal 
 Council and Imperial Diet. Secondly, in the opinion 
 of our average German, pure parliamentary govern- 
 ment, such as France, England, Italy, etc., possess, is 
 a "matter long since settled," since it only leads to 
 corruption and faction; it is just because Germany 
 does not possess this sort of parliamentarism that it 
 has been enabled to develop itself into the most pro- 
 gressive of all civiHsed countries. And, finally, that 
 sort of system does not fit in everywhere; that which 
 all civilised nations regard as the basis of their po- 
 litical systems does not suit the peculiarity of German 
 civilisation. 
 
 In this fashion, our average German will prove to 
 you, with a thousand good reasons, that our country 
 has the most ideal of Constitutions, the most united 
 policy, the grandest ideal of civilisation, and many 
 
so THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 other things, which other nations so much begrudge 
 us that we must declare war upon them. 
 
 But if, in an attack of pardonable malice, you go 
 further and tell your average German that Germany, 
 constitutionally regarded, is no nation at all, but is 
 only a dynasty, which accordingly means that the 
 German Fatherland does not belong to the German 
 people, then, if he has been hitherto polite, he will 
 begin to be rude and wrathful. Have not we Ger- 
 mans the finest freedom of the press, of speech, meet- 
 ing, coalition and religion in the whole wide world? 
 Where is there another State in existence that has 
 democratised education in a way such as we have? 
 Where is there a better organised national army, 
 where a more efficient school system or a more equi- 
 table system of taxation to be found? Have we not, 
 in the realm of science, commerce, social legislation, 
 public sanitation, and many other things, become the 
 pioneers of the world? What have all these German 
 achievements to do with the form of the German 
 government? Nothing whatsoever; they exist and 
 develop in the sight of all in complete independence 
 of the dynastic government. At length, this defensive 
 speech of our average German will become so 'elo- 
 quent that he himself, without intending it, will stand 
 before you as a living proof of the fact that modern 
 Germany actually finds its embodiment in a dynasty. 
 As often as I have discussed this same theme with 
 my countrymen I have excited their contradiction and 
 wrath. You can talk calmly with a Russian, a Turk, 
 or an Asiatic about his dynasty, but hardly ever with 
 a German. If he is not altogether speechless with 
 amazement that one can talk about a dynasty, as 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 51 
 
 about other things, then he generally becomes 
 frightened. 
 
 This trait goes through the whole German people. 
 Those constitutional questions which for a hundred 
 years past have occupied all other European civilised 
 nations and convulsed them to their depths have never 
 been really popular in Germany. Our constitutional 
 struggles were, in point of fact, always decided before 
 they properly began, and the special privileges of 
 God-appointed dynasties have never been seriously 
 questioned. From Privy Councillor down to artisan, 
 from Countess to chambermaid, everyone in Germany 
 either knows nothing of the existence of a dynastic 
 problem, or is silent on the subject. There are cer- 
 tainly hundreds of thousands of Germans who would 
 gladly welcome drastic reforms; and there are mil- 
 lions of socialistically inclined German labourers who 
 instinctively feel the dynasty to be hostile to them; 
 yet they only reluctantly discuss it, because they fear 
 the Use majeste paragraphs. But there are in Ger- 
 many hardly a hundred, all told, who see the dynasty 
 as it really is. And among those hundred there are 
 scarcely a dozen serious democrats who have fully 
 realised the dynastic side of this World War. Even 
 those who only yesterday were declaring themselves 
 opponents of the dynasty, for instance, the German 
 Social Democrats, hurried in the hour of danger to 
 ask pardon and to prove to the world that their former 
 anti-dynastic attitude was only "put on." 
 
 Let us, next, in order to form a picture of the com- 
 prehensive authoritative powers of the German dy- 
 nasty, make a brief survey of the German Constitu- 
 tion. 
 
52 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 The law concerning the Constitution of the German 
 Empire bears date April i6th, 1871. According to it 
 the German Empire forms an "eternal league." The 
 wielders of the Imperial power are the federated 
 princes and their instrument, the Federal Council. 
 The Federal Council is composed of the plenipoten- 
 tiaries of the twenty-two German princes and of the 
 Senates of the three Hanseatic cities. It is, in short, 
 a sort of collective Sovereign. Its powers are, how- 
 ever, more of a theoretical than practical nature. The 
 German Emperor, as President of the Council, is, in 
 regard to it, entirely independent. He remains Em- 
 peror by heredity. And, as against the German fed- 
 erated princes, the Federal Council, and the German 
 people, he is free from every legal responsibility. The 
 chief Imperial powers, above all the military, were not 
 delegated to him ; he possesses them directly by virtue 
 of the Constitution. The Federal Council is nothing 
 but a deliberative body; the execution of its resolu- 
 tions is the affair of the German Emperor. 
 
 Prussia, whose King bears the title of ''German 
 Emperor," is president of the "eternal league." By 
 Article 6 of the Imperial Constitution, Prussia dis- 
 poses in the Federal Council, out of 58 votes (the 
 three Alsace-Lorraine votes have only an "advisory 
 co-operation"), of 17. To what degree Prussia dom- 
 inates the Federal Council appears from Article 78 
 of the Imperial Constitution: "Changes in the Con- 
 stitution must be made by way of legislation. They 
 are regarded as rejected when, in the Federal Coun- 
 cil, 14 votes are given against them." Seeing that 
 Prussia, as was said, disposes of 17 votes in this 
 assembly, it follows that no constitutional change can 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 53 
 
 take place without her consent. And as, on the other 
 hand, any important reform in poHtical life is un- 
 thinkable without a constitutional change, we can at 
 once realise how resolutely the president of the league 
 has brought all the threads of the political life of 
 the nation into his hands. This Article No. 78 is, 
 moreover, the clearest demonstration of our above- 
 mentioned theory of the decline of the small dynasties 
 to the advantage of the great, for it is an act of 
 abdication of the minor German princes into the hands 
 of the Prussian King and German Emperor. 
 
 Altogether, the legal status of the German Imperial 
 Monarchy is fixed neither by the Federal Council and 
 Imperial Diet nor by the Imperial laws, but solely 
 by the Prussian land laws. Constitutionally, then, the 
 German Imperial Monarchy can by no manner of 
 means be viewed as a fundamental German institu- 
 tion, but merely as an appendage to and extension of 
 the Prussian kingship and Prussian political power. 
 For instance, it is a remarkable fact that the costs 
 of the Imperial dignity are defrayed by the King of 
 Prussia. The Emperor has no claim upon the Im- 
 perial Exchequer for the grant of his Civil List; the 
 Imperial budget only annually places a certain amount 
 of funds at the Emperor's disposal. 
 
 By Article 11, the German Emperor represents the 
 Empire internationally ; he has the right to declare war 
 and conclude peace, to enter into alliances and treaties, 
 to accredit and appoint envoys. As far, then, as for- 
 eign intercourse is concerned, the German Empire is 
 a purely monarchical-absolutist State. This Article 
 II, which consigns the conduct of the German for- 
 eign policy to the sovereign decision of the German 
 
54 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Emperor, is the key to the history of Germany of 
 the past forty years. It is, moreover, the key to the 
 World War. Whoever, as champion of this war, dis- 
 cusses the origin of the present catastrophe without 
 this Article ii is as cowardly as a surgeon who 
 shrinks from what would be a successful operation 
 only because he does not wish to incommode the pa- 
 tient. The fact that, among a thousand German 
 writers who speak on the subject of the war, scarcely 
 one mentions Article 1 1 of the German Imperial Con- 
 stitution, is only a proof that our "'great time'* has, 
 indeed, found but a puny race. 
 
 An absolutist complement of Article ii is Article 
 68 of the German Imperial Constitution : "The Em- 
 peror can, when public security within the federal ter- 
 ritory is threatened, declare any portion of it in a 
 state of war.*' The pronouncement and putting into 
 effect of such a state of war is provided for by the 
 Prussian law of June 4th, 1851. This Article con- 
 cedes to the German Emperor the absolute right, at 
 any moment when it appears to him to be necessary, 
 to extinguish the civil authorities, the liberty of the 
 Press, speech, meeting, union, and even travel, and 
 entrust the military authorities with the protection of 
 the whole political life of the nation. In other words. 
 Article 68 confers upon the German Emperor the sov- 
 ereign right to invalidate all the other articles of the 
 German Imperial Constitution for any time he pleases. 
 Article 68 expresses the constitutional possibility of 
 ruling the German State without a Constitution. This 
 state of siege or state of war (called poetically "Burg- 
 frieden") has prevailed in Germany since July 31st, 
 1914. The Imperial Chancellor did, it is true, at the 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 55 
 
 beginning of the war, give a formal assurance that the 
 state of siege would not extend beyond the period of 
 mobilisation, but no one can compel him to adhere to 
 this promise; for here, as already said, everything 
 is subservient to the sovereign pleasure of the German 
 Emperor. It is evident in what close correlation 
 Article 68 stands to Article 11. And, therefore, this 
 ordinance of the German Imperial Constitution stands 
 in direct connection with the outbreak of the World 
 War. 
 
 Article 18 (Imperial departments and officials) 
 makes the German Emperor head of the whole Im- 
 perial administration. He appoints the Imperial of- 
 ficials, has them sworn in, and, in case of need, ordains 
 their dismissal. 
 
 Article 19 nominates the Emperor executor against 
 members of the league who do not fulfil their con- 
 stitutional federal obligations. "The execution can 
 be extended to the sequestration of the land in ques- 
 tion and its sovereign power." The German Emperor 
 is thus absolute master in the house of each of his 
 minor German colleagues. 
 
 The legislative bodies of the Empire are the Fed- 
 eral Council and the Imperial Diet (Reichstag). The 
 Federal Council is, as we have seen, not a Parliament, 
 but the theoretical expression of the sovereignty of 
 the federated German princes; its deliberations are 
 secret and are not under any public control. Laws 
 formulated by the Reichstag are either accepted or 
 rejected by the ''Bundesrat" (Federal Council). The 
 German Emperor himself possesses no right of sanc- 
 tion or veto; this means, therefore, that he can, in 
 theory, be forced to rule by laws which appear to him 
 
56 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 to be intolerable. But as the Bundesrat is in point 
 of fact scarcely anything more than a gathering of 
 nominees of the German Emperor, who would never 
 venture to be of a different opinion from their Presi- 
 dent and executor, such a case could not arise. Articles 
 19 and 78 suffice in every case for the suppression 
 of any possible tendency to opposition. 
 
 The Imperial Chancellor, appointed by the Em- 
 peror, and at once the representative of the Emperor 
 in the Bundesrat and the embodiment of Imperial 
 authority in the country, presides at the sittings of the 
 Bundesrat. Both In his selection and dismissal the 
 Emperor has an entirely free hand. Again, the Im- 
 perial Chancellor is only a servant of the Emperor. 
 The Imperial Chancellor is, accordingly, a stranger 
 to the German people, inasmuch as he stands in no 
 direct constitutional relation to them whatever. He 
 Is appointed, not elected. That the ordinances and 
 other contracts of the German Emperor require the 
 counter-signature of the Chancellor has a purely 
 formal value, for the Imperial Chancellor is only the 
 executor of Imperial orders and wishes. If the Im- 
 perial Chancellor were elected by the Parliament and 
 stood before the Emperor as representative of the 
 popular will, then he could, if necessity demanded, 
 oppose the Imperial will; for he would feel himself 
 responsible to the people and its deputies and would 
 have to base his policy upon a parliamentary majority. 
 But, as it is, the position of the Imperial Chancellor 
 and his counter-signature are only a secularisation of 
 the divinity of the dynasty. As the person of the 
 Emperor is God-appointed and above controversy, 
 while, on the other hand, exercising a decisive influ- 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 57 
 
 ence in politics, it requires a secular representative. So 
 the German Imperial Chancellor is, for the country, 
 only the symbol of the Emperor; when German poli- 
 ticians and newspapers erroneously treat him as the 
 responsible leader of German affairs of State, they do 
 so only out of respect for the person of the real di- 
 rector of German destinies. Whoever criticises the 
 Chancellor actually criticises the Emperor. 
 
 Responsible Imperial Ministers are unknown to the 
 German Constitution. The Imperial Chancellor is 
 not the German but the Prussian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. The various administrative departments of 
 the Empire have, as their chiefs, Secretaries of State 
 who act merely as representatives of the Imperial 
 Chancellor. 
 
 In these circumstances, naturally, the Imperial Ger- 
 man Constitution does not contain any law estab- 
 lishing the responsibility of Ministers or Secretaries 
 of State. The opinion of the Reichstag does not in- 
 fluence the Imperial Chancellor and his secretaries, 
 the opinion of the Emperor is everything. As against 
 the Imperial Chancellor and his secretaries, the Reichs- 
 tag finds itself in the position of a man who every 
 moment expects to be warned by his landlord that he 
 is really living in a hired house. The Reichstag clearly 
 possesses, under these circumstances, no right to 
 censure the instruments of the Government. In prac- 
 tice, the German Empire has but one responsible Min- 
 ister. Yet his responsibility is, as regards the people, 
 purely theoretical; as a fact, he is only responsible 
 to the Emperor; that means that he is, in fact, as 
 irresponsible as the monarch himself, only that, in con- 
 . sequence of his earthly parentage, he condescends to 
 
58 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 discuss the politics of his lord with the popular repre- 
 sentatives. The responsible post in the German Em- 
 pire is, therefore, not, as in other civilised States, oc- 
 cupied by a responsible statesman, but by a nominated 
 official. 
 
 Up to Article 19 the German Imperial Constitution 
 was, in fact, merely a summary of the absolute powers 
 of the German Emperor. One could, in fact, cancel 
 the first nineteen articles of the German Imperial 
 Constitution and replace them by a single sentence: 
 "The German Emperor is the God-appointed absolute 
 lord of Germany," and the practical result would be 
 the same. 
 
 With Article 20 begins a limitation of the Imperial 
 absolutism by the Reichstag. This Reichstag, founded 
 in 1867 by Bismarck primarily for the North German 
 Confederation, became, after the foundation of the 
 German Empire, the corporate representation of the 
 German people. As it is elected by universal, direct 
 suffrage, with secret ballot, it is such a democratic in- 
 stitution that Bismarck at the end of his life heartily 
 lamented his great liberality and seriously contem- 
 plated ''retrieving" the greatest mistake in his life, the 
 creation of universal equal suffrage,^ that is to say, 
 again suppressing the Reichstag. 
 
 All our statesmen have lived in perpetual appre- 
 hension that they have been too liberal; they have 
 almost always robbed us again of what they had 
 given us a moment before. Scarcely had Bismarck 
 by creating the Reichstag perpetrated the most liberal 
 act that we in Prussia have experienced since Baron 
 vom Stein, when he with his Socialist law committed 
 . ^Vide Delbruck, "Regierung und Volkswille," pp. 61-65. , 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 59 
 
 the greatest conceivable violation of the new German 
 civil rights, which he had himself initiated, and 
 scarcely had this Socialist law been repealed, when 
 our Government brought in a so-called revolutionary 
 bill, which was a repetition of the Socialist law, and 
 from which we escaped only by a miracle. 
 
 From the very outset, the Reichstag had no sover- 
 eign but solely a constantly menaced and circum- 
 scribed existence. In other words, it never was re- 
 garded by our Government as a constitutional gov- 
 ernmental necessity, to check and modify the absolute 
 regime, but as a support and popularising resource 
 of the Government. *'The soldier and the army, and 
 not parliamentary majorities and resolutions, have 
 welded together the German Empire. My trust I place 
 in my army," said William II. on April i8th, 1891, 
 in Berlin; and on October i8th, 1894, he repeated: 
 "The only pillar upon which our Empire rests was 
 its army. And this is true to-day/' German po- 
 litical authorities are, of course, of like opinion. "In 
 Germany," says Professor Delbriick in a transport of 
 pride in the respect of the Germans for their dynasty, 
 "popular representation arose, because the Government 
 summoned it and placed it side by side with itself." 
 And Professor Lamprecht adds^ : "The intention was 
 to win by this means the support of the multitude of 
 enthusiasts for German unity, on behalf of a Prus- 
 sianised central administration." For Bismarck, the 
 democratic franchise of the Reichstag was no modern 
 principle of government, but merely a sort of con- 
 venient referendum towards the foundation of the 
 German Empire; vulgarly expressed: the democratic 
 
 *Karl Lamprecht, "Deutsche Geschichte," Vol. II., p. 215. 
 
6o THE COMING DEMOCRACY] 
 
 honey with which the democratic Southern German 
 States were caught for the German idea of unity 
 under Prussian hegemony. As soon as the franchise 
 had played its part, it was, as being an unwelcome 
 limitation of the dynastic power, again slowly ren- 
 dered innocuous (Socialist law, educational law, pro- 
 longation of the electoral period, the so-called septen- 
 nate, non-distribution of electoral divisions, attempts 
 at restricting liberty of speech, repeated dissolutions, 
 threats of abolition, etc., etc.). Bismarck was a mas- 
 ter in such matters. His Electoral Law of May 31st, 
 1869, and the electoral regulation of 1871, announce 
 that every German is an elector from his twenty-fifth 
 year onwards, and that, on the average, one deputy 
 should fall to every 100,000 inhabitants. And, in 
 fact, the German Empire was then divided into elec- 
 toral constituencies including 100,000 souls in each; 
 this yielded the number of 382 deputies, which (after 
 the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine) was increased to 
 397. Now Article 20 of the Imperial Constitution 
 states: "Until the legal regulation, which is reserved 
 in par. 5 of the Electoral Law of May 31st, 1869," 
 but there is a modest addition, in a note to Article 20 : 
 "The legal regulation has not yet been effected." That 
 means that the German Empire of to-day, containing, 
 as it does, 66 million inhabitants, instead of having 
 660 deputies, counts but 397, as in the year 1871, 
 when it had barely 40 million. That means, again, 
 that the 100,000 souls have, in many cases, in con- 
 sequence of the growth of cities and industrial cen- 
 tres, become 500,000 (Berlin, for instance, elects, with 
 a population of over two milUons, only six deputies), 
 whilst, in other cases, in consequence of emigration. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 61 
 
 and similar phenomena, the 100,000 have been re- 
 duced to 50,000 and less, and yet return their deputy. 
 Whence results the remarkable fact that the less in- 
 telligent country districts have, compared with the en- 
 lightened metropolis, been ludicrously favoured. 
 
 Since, then, the vote of one Lower Pomeranian or 
 Upper Bavarian peasant is equivalent to the votes of 
 ten progressively minded Germans of the urban pop- 
 ulation, we cannot be surprised that our Government, 
 by the aid of this unconstitutional distribution of elec- 
 toral districts, can always count upon a Conserva- 
 tive and Clerical majority in the Reichstag. Without 
 this happy majority, the Reichstag would, probably, 
 have long ceased to exist, for it is, as already stated, 
 by its very nature not a sovereign but only a subordi- 
 nate factor of government. If, at any time, the Gov- 
 ernment loses its majority in the Reichstag, it either 
 dissolves the latter (the Emperor only requires for 
 this purpose the assent of the Bundesrat, of which 
 he is assured beforehand), or simply ignores it. Pro- 
 fessor Delbriick would have us beHeve that Prince von 
 Billow had, in 1908, to retire from the Government be- 
 cause he could not obtain a majority for his ''Inheri- 
 tance tax,"^ but we are aware that he was not obliged 
 to go, but himself wished to go On December 4th, 
 1913, the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg 
 received, as a result of the Zabern debate, with its 293 
 against 54 votes, the plainest possible intimation to 
 preside no longer over the destinies of the German 
 nation. Even in States like Serbia and Bulgaria 
 (even, perchance, in modern China) a Minister so 
 sharply reprimanded by the popular representative 
 * Delbriick, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 60. 
 
62 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 body would have to retire. In Germany, nothing of the 
 sort. This Imperial Chancellor, who manifestly did 
 not rule in accordance with, but contrary to, Ger- 
 man public opinion, was the same who, eight months 
 subsequently, declared war, in the name of the Ger- 
 man Empire, upon Russia, Belgium, and France. 
 
 Of all rights pos-sessed by the Reichstag, the voting 
 of the Budget and the taxes is, beyond doubt, the 
 most important. In so far as the Reichstag, by 
 Article 69 of the Constitution, controls the expenses 
 of the Government and either grants or rejects its 
 proposals, it locks the door against any unlimited 
 financial arbitrariness on the part of the absolute 
 regime; this beautiful theory of fiscal control is, how- 
 ever, most unfortunately disregarded in practice 
 owing to a loophole. There is, to begin with. Article 
 62, which separates the military budget from other 
 imperial finances, and thus practically withdraws it 
 from any parliamentary control. Then there is fur- 
 ther the practice of introducing the Budget and dis- 
 cussing it in the Reichstag itself, which by Budget 
 law (particularly in military votes) properly only pos- 
 sesses a right of voting the supply.^ The problem of 
 State financial control by popular parliaments cer- 
 tainly requires (mainly in consequence of the arma- 
 
 *Thus, for instance, the military expedition to China (1900), 
 the cost of which amounted to £7,500,000, was resolved upon 
 and carried out entirely without consulting or obtaining the 
 approval of the Reichstag. After everything had been arranged, 
 the Reichstag was calmly invited to give its subsequent sanc- 
 tion to the steps taken. When it wished to complain of this 
 violation of the Constitution, the "responsible" Chancellor, von 
 Hohenlohe, was suddenly dismissed, and his place taken by 
 Herr von Biilow, who, of course, knew nothing about the mat- 
 ter. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 63 
 
 ments policy) considerable readjustment in all States, 
 but in Germany more than elsewhere; for the reason 
 that the Reichstag does not, in principle, possess any 
 sovereignty. 
 
 The Reichstag has, again, the right to initiate laws 
 and to present petitions to the Bundesrat, i.e., the 
 Chancellor. But, as the German Government, in vir- 
 tue of its inaccessibility and infallibility, unfortunately 
 makes a rule of not participating in the discussions 
 of proposals emanating from the Reichstag, here the 
 theory is again more satisfactory than the practice. 
 Likewise, petitions submitted by the Reichstag are, 
 for the most part, ignored by the Government. It 
 was not until the World War was fully launched that 
 it began, here and there, to make some modification 
 in these feudal customs. 
 
 According to the Imperial Constitution, the Reichs- 
 tag has no right of interpellation. It is true that it 
 arrogated to itself this right and that the Government 
 tacitly conceded it. But, in accordance with the per- 
 fectly correct theory, that without responsibility of 
 ministers even the right of interpellation is superflu- 
 ous, the responsible-irresponsible men reply to the 
 questions of the deputies (that is, if they ever trouble 
 to reply) only as persons who need not do so. 
 
 From this it is clear, in the first place, that uni- 
 versal suffrage in Prusso-Germany is not a fact, but 
 merely a pious fraud. The Reichstag is nothing more 
 than a debating society, and a wilfully bungled imi- 
 tation of other Parliaments; semblance and not reality. 
 Continually muzzled and bullied by the dynasty, it 
 could never develop into a real Parliament. Prince 
 von Billow tells us, it is true, that "PoHtical life in 
 
64 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 a modern monarchy, as created by our Constitution, 
 entails co-operation between the Crown and the peo- 
 ple,"^ but we are no longer impressed by these flowers 
 of speech. What do we want with a "co-operation," 
 in which the representatives of the people are not 
 treated like equally privileged collaborators, but are 
 forced to play the role of inferiors? What use to us 
 is a right to co-operate in the framing of laws, when 
 we have no right to watch over their execution, to 
 expose their deficiencies and to protest against their 
 infringement? 
 
 Prince von Billow further instructs us that it is not 
 so much a matter of constitutional reform, but rather 
 that we "are so lacking in political judgment and 
 political training." That is to say, Herr von Biilow 
 assures us once again (more politely, be it said, than 
 Hegel and Bismarck in their day but none the less 
 plainly) that we are still too ignorant for the exercise 
 of new political rights. Even Prince von Biilow 
 does not forsake the good old Prussian style. He, 
 also, treats us as a man whose money one first steals 
 and then comforts him by saying that he did not 
 know how to take care of it, and whom, at last, when 
 nothing further is to be done, he roundly abuses, say- 
 ing that money, after all, has not the value that the 
 silly world attaches to it. Herr von Biilow honestly 
 assures us: "It is an old mistake to want to gauge 
 the concern of the nation in political affairs solely 
 by the rights granted to the representatives of the 
 people."^ You tell us nothing fresh, Serene High- 
 ness ! pray, obey, pay taxes, or : God, King and Father- 
 
 * Prince von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," Cassell & Co., Ltd., 
 London, p. 313. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 65 
 
 land. That is, in the view of an old German demo- 
 crat, better suited to us Germans than political rights 
 of which we know nothing. But what galls is not 
 so much the assertion that, blockheads as we are, we 
 do not understand the value of money, but the demo- 
 cratic lie with which our dynasty describes its money 
 wealth as a "co-operation of Crown and people." Be- 
 lieve me, your Serene Highness! this hypocrisy is 
 worse than the very absolutism it conceals. 
 
 For, in truth, Bismarck never dreamt of a serious 
 "co-operation between Crown and people." For him, 
 the sole point was to leave the God-appointed dynasty 
 its old rights, and at the same time give the new 
 German Empire the semblance of a modern political 
 system. Germany could not and would not enter the 
 councils of the European nations without a concession 
 to the modern ideas of the nineteenth century. But, 
 although the buildings of the Reichstag may look more 
 splendid and imposing than the edifice of the "Cham- 
 bre des Deputes" on the banks of the Seine, yet there 
 resides therein not the will of the people, but the will 
 of the dynasty. The German Government needs the 
 Reichstag as an advertisement and emblem of its mod- 
 ernity. For the purpose of ruling, it has as little 
 need of it as a tradesman has of the opinion of his 
 employes as to the working of his business. 
 
 Moreover, there exists between Government and 
 Reichstag in Germany not merely a constitutional but 
 also a strictly patriarchal order of precedence. Only 
 the nobility, endowed with divine insight, is entitled, 
 in Prusso-Germany, to fill the most important offices 
 and to solve the most difificult political problems. Con- 
 sequently all leading governmental administrative and 
 
66 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 military posts are filled by members of the nobility.^ 
 If an exception is occasionally made, the civilian ad- 
 vanced to be Minister or General is, as a rule, at 
 once *'raised" to the rank of nobility. A German 
 deputy can, under such circumstances, hardly ever 
 become Minister; and, on the other hand, a former 
 Minister, after his dismissal, can scarcely ever be- 
 come again a deputy; he would thereby desecrate the 
 rank already conferred upon him, and render himself 
 unfit for Court and governmental circles. Since, con- 
 sequently, not one German deputy has ever actually 
 taken part in Government business, it follows that 
 expert critics of the Government are altogether lack- 
 ing in the Reichstag. In other Parliaments there are 
 at least a dozen members who have previously been 
 Ministers and are, hence, in a position to exercise a 
 sound criticism upon their successors. In the Reichs- 
 tag, such a case is unthinkable ; thus the deputies know 
 only the theory but not the practice of governing; the 
 story of the man who does not understand the value 
 of money is, it is plain, likewise the story of our 
 popular representatives.^ 
 
 This is in keeping with the conception that our 
 Reichstag deputies have (and must have) of the dig- 
 nity of popular representation. A French or English 
 and a German deputy are about as far apart as the 
 proprietor of a business house from his employes. 
 
 ^ Cf. here, footnote p. 46. 
 
 ^ While I write this, news arrives from Russia that there a 
 Vice-President of the Imperial Duma (Protopopoff) has been 
 appointed Minister of the Interior. A similar case has not 
 occurred in the forty-four years' life of the German Reichstag. 
 If it be remembered that Russia has only possessed a Constitu- 
 tion since 1905, one may conclude that it has developed its par- 
 liamentary regime more quickly than Prusso-Germany. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 67 
 
 Where the one acts independently, the other scarcely 
 dare intrude a modest objection; where the one is 
 animated by the feehng that he is looking after the 
 interests of the people, the other is only oppressed 
 by his helplessness, and is forced to bargaining and 
 so-called *'horse-dealing," in order to obtain the 
 smallest concessions from the Government. A clas- 
 sical example is the passing of the first great naval 
 Bill, which Capri vi received at the hands of (!) the 
 Poles; by making liberal promises in the matter of 
 Germany's brutal policy towards the Poles he won their 
 support for a cause which was utterly repugnant to 
 them. 
 
 The feeling that they only distantly control the Ger- 
 man Government, instead of leading it, deprives our 
 deputies of that proud feeling of responsibility which 
 national representatives in other lands display. It 
 can only happen in Germany that the President of 
 the Reichstag should say in a public sitting: "The 
 Emperor understood his time ; he said : T live in 
 the days of publicity and free speech, and I will not 
 be a so-called constitutional monarch, who reigns and 
 does not rule.' I am convinced that it would not be 
 agreeable to our glorious Emperor if he were asked 
 to accept such a role. . . . Gentlemen, this ought 
 to fill us with admiration, and we ought to thank 
 Providence that we have in these times such an Em- 
 peror; this should stimulate us, to the best of our 
 ability, and, so far as our conviction allows it, to 
 anticipate and further the great intentions of our 
 Emperor."^ 
 
 ^ Speech of the President of the Reichstag, Count von Balles- 
 trem, January 27th, 1900. 
 
68 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Such Byzantine utterances cannot be publicly im- 
 pugned. As soon as a deputy makes a sign of criti- 
 cising the person of the Emperor, he is at once called 
 to order. When the deputy Liebknecht (senior) re- 
 mained seated when cheers were called for the Em- 
 peror, a motion was made by the Government to prose- 
 cute him for Use majeste; the motion was rejected, 
 though by a bare majority. 
 
 How matters generally stand with the liberty of 
 speech and competence of the Reichstag is to be seen 
 from a book, "Unser Kaiser und Sein Volk,'* which 
 was published in Germany and caused a considerable 
 sensation.^ A passage in it runs : "The President of 
 the German Reichstag, 'gasping' in humility and 
 obedience at the foot of the throne, has found it to 
 be advisable, in order to shield the very assailable 
 utterances of the Emperor from the criticism of Par- 
 liament, only to permit the discussion of such speeches 
 as are published in the Reichsanzeiger. Since these 
 tactics passed into law, the official journal cautiously 
 avoids taking note of any of the Emperor's polemical 
 speeches. It pretends, with a clumsy naivete, that 
 speeches of the monarch have never been delivered, 
 although the official telegraph bureau distributes them 
 in thousands of copies to the smallest provincial 
 papers." 
 
 That, since then, little change has been made in the 
 Byzantine habits of the President of the Reichstag is 
 
 * Published by Paul Waetzel (Leipzig, 1906), this book "von 
 Einem Schwarzseher" is the despairing cry of a German patriot. 
 The "Schwarzseher" is not a Social Democrat, but earnestly 
 protests against the "personal regime" because it is continually 
 pouring water on the mills of that social democracy which 
 knows no fatherland. 
 
OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 69 
 
 shown us by the present "Hberal" President Kampf, 
 who telegraphed to the German Emperor on the oc- 
 casion of the second anniversary of the declaration 
 of war, "May the blessing of Heaven continue to 
 be with your Majesty, our whole Fatherland, and 
 our faithful allies," thus obsequiously placing the 
 well-being of the Emperor before that of his country. 
 
 If we reflect that the institution of the Reichstag 
 was an act of grace, and its subsequent continuation 
 only due to toleration on the part of our dynasty, 
 we can understand why a flavour of servility and 
 •Byzantinism has always clung to it, of which it is 
 itself quite unconscious. The constitutional impotence 
 of the Reichstag, which is lamentable apart from this, 
 is thus displayed in its most glaring light and makes 
 our German Parliament a laughing stock for every 
 serious democrat. 
 
 If, in spite of all these constitutional and self- 
 inflicted evils, our intellectuals and politicians clutch 
 at and hold fast to the illusion of a democratic Ger- 
 man popular Government and "working community,'* 
 then that may demonstrate to the world that we Ger- 
 mans so instinctively adore the democratic conquests 
 of the nineteenth century that we gladly imagine that 
 we possess some of them, and cannot endure it when 
 someone by the light of facts tries to dash this fair 
 illusion to fragments. 
 
Ill 
 
 THE BASIS OF THE DYNASTIC POWER 
 
 Germany accordingly possesses neither a parlia- 
 mentary nor a really constitutional, but, at best, an 
 autocratic system of government, adorned with a 
 democratic fagade. If there sat in the Reichstag a 
 majority of far-seeing straightforward democrats, 
 then they certainly could limit certain of the ruling 
 rights of the German Emperor by Imperial laws, but 
 never his God-given monarchical rights. As by the 
 decree of God and of His representatives on earth 
 such a Reichstag has never been vouchsafed tq us 
 (and never could be vouchsafed), so in Germany 
 there are only liberal institutions without a liberal 
 spirit, popular rights without popular government. 
 Ministers without responsibility, deputies without 
 plenary powers; and, on the other side, unassailable 
 rights of the Crown, the widest scope for the im- 
 position of dynastic arbitrary will, supervision and 
 domination by the King of Prussia over the Federal 
 princes and the Federal Council, and Articles 5 and 
 37 of the Imperial Constitution, by virtue of which 
 Prussia's vote in legislation touching the military sys- 
 tem, the Imperial Navy, Customs and indirect taxa- 
 tion everywhere is preponderant in the Bundesrat, 
 when it is cast for the "perpetuation of the existing 
 
 70 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 71 
 
 condition of things/' We have, then, a political sys- 
 tem, the political basis and spirit of which so clashed 
 with the demands and — in other countries — actualities 
 of modern days, that it was compelled to adopt the 
 civilised institutions of these modern times at all 
 events as a trimming and a phrase. 
 
 That Prussia watches jealously in Germany not 
 only over "the maintenance of the existing order of 
 things," but also over that of ''feudal conditions," 
 is shown with compelling clearness by the relation 
 of our dynasty to the army. "Where lies, after alL . 
 the true power? It lies in arms. The question byX 
 which to decide the inner character of a State is, 
 accordingly, always. Whom does the army obey?"^ 
 
 This question, as Professor Delbriick rightly affirms, 
 is the most vital of all political questions, and perhaps 
 that is why it is so rarely discussed in Germany. 
 The army is, in fact, the basis and the most indispen- 
 sable bulwark of a dynasty. Every dynasty has been 
 brought into being by means of an army, can only 
 by the aid of an army raise itself to power and pres- 
 tige, and could not endure without a military pro- 
 tective force. "As the living forces of Parliament 
 reside in the parties, of whom there is not a word to 
 be found in the Constitution, so does the essence of 
 a monarchy consist not in the functions that the 
 Constitution allocates to it, but in the forces that took 
 origin, long before any legal declarations, in the re- v 
 mote past; namely, the relations of the dynasty to the f^ 
 army. ^ 
 
 This extremely personal and, in all its aspects, 
 
 ^Delbriick, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 133. 
 ^Ibid., p. 141. 
 
72 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 somewhat selfish relation, in which the army stands to 
 the dynasty, is in the modern world, and especially 
 in Germany, not only disregarded, but, as far as pos- 
 sible, disguised from the people. 
 
 If, for instance, you ask a German with an average 
 political education whether Germany has a "national 
 army," the chances are a thousand to one that he will 
 not only answer this question with an unhesitating 
 affirmative, but also be seriously indignant that you 
 should have thought of asking it. Most Germans do 
 not entertain the slightest doubt not only that we have 
 the best but the most national army in the world. Is 
 not every healthy 'German of full age liable to mili- 
 tary service? Can there be a more national army 
 than one maintained by taxes levied upon the whole 
 population and composed of all the citizens of the 
 nation without distinction? Does not, therefore, the 
 German army form a nation in arms in the grandest 
 sense of the word? 
 
 The fact that in the course of the past hundred 
 years a thorough revolution has been effected in the 
 domain of the military system, which not only com- 
 prises universal military service, but also the right of 
 the citizens to control the organisation and employ- 
 ment of the army — our German either does not know 
 at all, or he does not wish to know it. He confines 
 the notion "national army" to universal military serv- 
 ice, and, out of respect to his dynasty, takes good care 
 not to extend it to the command, the spirit, and the 
 organisation of the army. 
 
 Before the great French Revolution all armies were 
 only the instruments of dynastic interests. Of course, 
 we find national armies in bygone days among the 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 73 
 
 Greeks and Romans — that is, soldiers who served not 
 a dynasty, but their country. But with the decay of 
 these States the idea of national defence of country 
 became completely lost. In the Middle Ages there 
 was no idea of fatherland, and thus no idea of the 
 defence of country; the armies were the avowed play- 
 things and instruments of the princes. That is, they 
 were composed of mercenaries and adventurers, stood 
 in no relation to the people, and obeyed only the 
 behests of their princely possessors. The most per- 
 fect pattern of this standing dynastic army was cre- 
 ated by the Prussian King, Frederick William I. His 
 army of the "tall fellows" was a purely personal cre- 
 ation without any national character. All the nations 
 of the world were represented in it. Frederick Wil- 
 liam I. would have been very angry, had anyone at- 
 tempted to criticise the composition of his army. He 
 stood in relation to his army as an artist to his work. 
 He never could understand that he could not enlist 
 a "tall fellow" because he happened to be a French- 
 man or Englishman, and, as such, could not fight with 
 zeal and love for Prussia. 
 
 This army, which Frederick II. took over from his 
 father, did not go to battle out of love for a father- 
 land (this idea died, as we have said, with the Greeks), 
 but out of a sense of duty and because it was paid 
 for its services by its lord and master. Prussia's 
 military ascendancy over its then enemies resided in 
 the iron discipline of these royal hirelings. It was a 
 superiority in drill and method, having no concern 
 with any popular or national idea.^ 
 
 * Prince von Bulow in his book, "Imperial Germany" (Cas- 
 sell), pp. 133-4, says: "From the very first, Brandenburg-Prus- 
 
74 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 The French Revolution begat two things which 
 impressed their stamp upon the military system of 
 modern days : love of country, and the resulting na- 
 tional military organisation. The triumphant Revo- 
 lution declared the people to be, in every sense, sov- 
 ereign. The dynastic army that had fought out of 
 a sense of duty and for pay was replaced by the na- 
 tional army, which fought out of devotion to coun- 
 try. The soldier stands no longer in a mercenary 
 relation to his leader, but is sworn to uphold the 
 Constitution of his country. Not fealty to a mon- 
 arch, but love of country, becomes henceforth the 
 impelling force and ideal of an army. The soldier 
 of the modern national army became, accordingly, 
 the armed citizen of his land, in the defence of which 
 he is bound to have an interest, because he possesses 
 an effective share in his country's government. 
 
 Just as Frederick II. found in the pattern army of 
 his father a superior instrument for the prosecution 
 of his dynastic campaigns, so now did Napoleon I. find 
 in this popular army begotten of the Revolution, and 
 founded upon entirely new principles, an engine of 
 war superior to all the armies launched against him. 
 Prussian superiority in drill and sense of duty was 
 of no avail against the new moral ascendancy of the 
 soldier fighting with religious ardour for his country. 
 And it was only when Stein, Scharnhorst, and 
 
 sia's military power was founded on the two great supporting 
 forces of national life in the State: the love of home and 
 country and the conception of State Power"; but he himself 
 partly contradicts this assertion (pp. 140-1) when he says that 
 it was due to "the master mind of Scharnhorst" that "In the 
 war of liberation, the Prussian Army became the nation in 
 arms." 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 75 
 
 Gneisenau had organised for Prussia also the first 
 national army on the French pattern that the victory 
 of Prussia over Napoleon was rendered possible. 
 
 Napoleon I. was the first who abused the new prin- 
 ciple of a national army which had been born of 
 the French Revolution. Just as the dynastic armies 
 of feudal days were all, more or less, drilled for attack 
 and conquest, it was intended that the new national 
 army should only be animated by the proud idea of 
 pure national defence. The Constitution of 1791, 
 par. VI., leaves no doubt on this point. *'The French 
 nation expressly declares that it renounces any idea 
 of waging wars with the intent of making conquests, 
 and will never employ its power against the liberty 
 of another people.'* 
 
 The National Convention, when it had driven away 
 the King, and openly revolted against all divine dy- 
 nastic rights, was simultaneously attacked on five 
 fronts. Valmy and Jemappes were the victories of 
 the new national idea over the dynastic world of the 
 Middle Ages. On the eve of the battle of Valmy, 
 Goethe exclaimed prophetically: ''From here and 
 from to-day a new era opens, and you can say that 
 you were present at its birth." 
 
 Napoleon retained the universal levy (for it pro- 
 cured him, as we have said, an enormous superiority 
 over his antagonists), but he was the first to betray 
 the intrinsic purpose of the national army, for, in 
 his arrogance, he proceeded from national defence 
 to the dynastic war of conquest of feudal times. His 
 army had, in form, remained national, but, in regard 
 to its employment, the soldiers of Jena, Austerlitz, 
 
7.6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 and Friedland only obeyed the arbitrary will of their 
 ruler. 
 
 After Napoleon's fall, France returned more or less 
 openly to the principles of the dynastic army. For 
 even if the army of Napoleon III. was no longer 
 composed of foreigners and mercenaries, it yet con- 
 sisted of soldiers of seven years' service, and the 
 universal military service had, owing to all manner 
 of limitations, purchases of exemption, etc., been prac- 
 tically abolished. Napoleon Ill's campaigns served 
 so successfully his dynastic interests that they brought 
 about the same result as did the wars of his great 
 predecessor: the entry of the enemy into Paris, to- 
 gether with an enormous territorial and pecuniary loss 
 and the fall of the dynasty. 
 
 To return to Prussia : the victories of Frederick II. 
 had been the brilliant achievement of dynastic armies. 
 The defeats, from Valmy to Austerlitz, had furnished 
 proof that the dynastic principle was not adapted to 
 a modern army. Prussia found herself faced with the 
 necessity of organising for herself a national army, 
 and in the well-known proclamation, *'To My Peo- 
 ple," the Prussian King, Frederick William TIL, prom- 
 ised that fundamental reform without which a na- 
 tional army is impossible : the co-operation of the peo- 
 ple in the government of the country. It is patent, 
 and the French Revolution had dinned it audibly 
 enough into the ears of all the dynasties, that the 
 soldier can only possess a fatherland if he is called 
 upon to participate in its government. How could he 
 be ready to die for a country in which he has only 
 obligations and no rights? 
 
 The royal promise of a democratic Constitution was 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 77 
 
 reiterated by the Prussian Minister, von Hardenberg, 
 at the Vienna Congress of 181 5; moreover, it was 
 formally assured to the Prussian people by the law 
 of May 22nd, 181 5, "concerning a representative Con- 
 stitution." Yet not only was this promise never kept, 
 and this law never put into force, but the grateful 
 dynasty went so far as to see that any person who 
 reminded King Frederick William III. or his suc- 
 cessor of its ever having been given was cruelly per- 
 secuted as a demagogue and traitor. Just as all the 
 endeavours of William von Humboldt at the Vienna 
 Congress for the attainment of a united and liberal 
 Constitution for Germany were wrecked by the op- 
 position of Austrian diplomacy, so later, all his re- 
 peated efforts in this direction were wrecked by that 
 of the King of Prussia. In 181 9 this very incon- 
 venient would-be reformer fell into disgrace. Only 
 the little State of Saxe- Weimar, then under Goethe's 
 influence, kept the promise it had given of a liberal 
 Constitution. 
 
 In Prussia everything remained as of old. That is 
 to say, Prussia had, it is true, modernised its army, 
 the Prussian nation had, thanks to this modernisa- 
 tion, saved the throne for its dynasty, but had after 
 all, by so doing, only increased its obligations. From 
 this time forth we Prussians had, indeed, a national 
 army, in the sense of universal military service, but 
 as far as the control, equipment, and employment of 
 this army were concerned, we had, as before, only 
 the right of not interfering with the King. From the 
 fresh obligations that the Prussian citizen had taken 
 upon himself the Prussian dynasty merely reaped new 
 rights for itself. 
 
78 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Professor Delbriick^ tells us that, when the old 
 Roman kings had trained their peasantry to efficiency 
 in war, there came as the "inevitable consequence" 
 of this popular war organisation a democratic ele- 
 ment into the hitherto absolutist regime. Yes! when 
 the monarchy was too obstinate in resisting the democ- 
 ratisation of the political system, the latter was simply 
 abolished by the people, who had been forced to mili- 
 tary service, and replaced by the consular system. 
 Nietzsche was wrong: history is not an eternal re- 
 currence. At all events, the Prussian King, when he 
 forced his peasants and citizens to universal military 
 service, had, fortunately for himself, no Roman peas- 
 ants to deal with. What Professor Delbriick styles an 
 "inevitable consequence" of the popular war organisa- 
 tion may possibly be applicable to France and per- 
 haps even to modem China. For Prussia all this 
 remained a promise which was often repeated but 
 never kept. Professor Delbriick may say what he 
 likes. What in the case of the Romans, the Greeks, 
 the French, the Swiss, and, latterly, even in that of 
 the Chinese, led to democracy, i.e., the institution of 
 universal military service, led in Prusso-Germany, on 
 the contrary, to a reinforcement of dynastic absolut- 
 ism. For in Prussia there began, after the introduc- 
 tion of universal military service and the victories 
 over Napoleon which it made possible, instead of a 
 democratic era, its exact contrary — that terrible re- 
 action which, beginning with Metternich, celebrated 
 its highest achievement in the violent imposition of 
 the autocratic Prussian Constitution of 1850 and, 
 
 ^ Delbriick, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 100. 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 79 
 
 finally, under Bismarck, took on the legal forms of 
 the Socialist law, etc. 
 
 Yes! the Romans were better off than we are. It 
 is certainly a fact that Frederick William IV., in 
 1848, again renewed the solemn promise and vow to 
 make his army thenceforth take the oath to the Con- 
 stitution of the country. But this promise was again 
 not kept. The Parliament which resulted from the 
 Revolution of 1848 was forcibly dissolved in Novem- 
 ber of the same year under the pretext that "it had 
 exceeded its authority" (?), and Prussia was com- 
 pelled to accept that feudal Constitution by which it 
 is still governed. In days when even the Chinese have 
 emancipated themselves from dynastic ideas, the 
 Prusso-German soldiers, as in bygone days, swear 
 their oath to the colours not upon the Constitution >4 
 of their country, but to the King and Emperor, as/ 
 their War Lord. They swear, according to Article 
 64 of the German Imperial Constitution, *'to render 
 unconditional obedience to the orders of the Em- 
 peror." And, in order to put the matter beyond doubt, 
 par. 108 of the Prussian Constitution expressly adds: 
 "a, swearing-in of the army upon the Constitution of 
 the country does not take place." 
 
 The idea that the introduction of universal mili- 
 tary service must involve the democratic right of the 
 people to have a voice in its employment, and thus 
 end the era of offensive wars, is so self-evident that 
 it was always treated by most German authors and 
 politicians as practically a matter of course. Gustav 
 Freytag, for instance, in 1870, demonstrated with 
 great complacency that it was Prussia's duty to bring 
 civilisation to France in the form of universal military 
 
8o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 service. "With this highest and noblest form of war- 
 service the possibiHty of insolent v^ars of conquest 
 and of an insane military vanity, those repulsive mala- 
 dies of the French, is inevitably extinguished." And 
 he emphatically asserts that "universal military serv- 
 ice makes a nation not merely redoubtable in v\/ar, but 
 also peaceable in peace."^ 
 
 The same idea is to-day expounded by those Ger- 
 man authors who have undertaken to prove Germany's 
 innocence in this war. Professor Ernst Troeltsch 
 says, for example, "But, above all, this universal 
 arming of the people brings about the important con- 
 sequence that an effectual war can only be waged 
 with the actual consent and enthusiasm of the people, 
 and must, accordingly, be always a war of defence/'^ 
 
 A statement of this sort, examined by the light of 
 the German Constitution and the facts mentioned in 
 the first chapter of this book, strikes one as simply 
 ludicrous. Gustav Freytag could not know, of course, 
 in 1870 what use would one day be made of uni- 
 versal military service in Germany; but Professor 
 Troeltsch, who does certainly know our Constitution 
 and the true facts as to the outbreak of the World 
 War, should know how easily, in the country of the 
 "Ems telegram" and the Treitschke conception of 
 constitutional law, "the consent and enthusiasm of the 
 people" can be secured under false pretences. Wher- 
 ever, as in Germany, universal military service is 
 not accompanied by the right of the people to an 
 active share in the government, it becomes not only 
 
 * Gustav Freytag, "Der Kronprinz und die deutsche Kaiser- 
 krone," 8th ed., Leipzig, 1889, p. 43. 
 
 =* "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 1915, p. ^2. 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 81 
 
 no check upon offensive wars, but, on the contrary,V 
 an encouragement to them. 
 
 The fact that universal mihtary service v^ithout pop- 
 ular sovereignty is sure to encourage offensive wars 
 even Professor Delbriick, who has himself just nar- 
 rated to us the prophetic story of the Roman peas- 
 ants, was obliged to concede indirectly. With a na'ive 
 pride in the pretorian organisation of the German 
 army, he ventures to inform us^ that the Prussian 
 officers-corps is even to-day animated by the spirit 
 of the ancient Germans, who fought not for their 
 country, but for their prince, and never troubled their 
 heads about the aim and object of a war, or the po- 
 litical ideas of their chief, but were merely pledged 
 to him personally by their oath of fealty. 'The King 
 is, still to-day, the head of his retinue; he is the 
 comrade of his officers, and to him they look up as 
 their War Lord, and such is the foundation of our 
 political system. In the Prussian Constitution it is 
 merely stated that the King is the Commander-in- 
 Chief of the army, and this is stated also in the 
 Imperial Constitution.*' 
 
 Yes ! thus it is actually written, and thus it is ; the 
 German officers are the retinue of the King; they are 
 pledged by their oath to do him personal service, and 
 they trouble not a jot about the political ideas of 
 their prince. The German Emperor possesses an army, 
 and those who compose and defray the cost of this 
 army, namely, the German citizens, have no voice 
 whatever in the organisation and employment of this 
 army — ^not even the Imperial Chancellor, not even the 
 Minister of War. Under the German constitution 
 ^Delbruck, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 137. 
 
 y^ 
 
82 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 there is no legal connection whatsoever between the 
 army and the people. The German army does not 
 exist for the sake of the country, but for the sake of 
 the Emperor ; for "a swearing-in upon the Constitution 
 of the country does not take place." In peace, as in 
 war, the German Emperor is the personal and absolute 
 governor of his army and navy. Nothing has been 
 altered in Prussia in this respect for the last two 
 hundred years. There are only two essential points 
 of difference between William 11. and the creator 
 of the Prussian military power, Frederick William I. ; 
 firstly, William II. no longer needs to send recruiting 
 sergeants into other countries to impress "tall fellows" 
 at a high rate of pay; his soldiers are granted him 
 by the Reichstag and paid by the people; and when 
 this Reichstag objects to the military demands it 
 is straight away dissolved.^ Secondly, the German 
 soldiers of to-day no longer fight, like the "tall fel- 
 lows" did, grudgingly and for money; their bravery 
 no longer has to be kept up to the mark by means 
 of the cudgel. No! the modern soldiers are animated 
 by that love of country which was born of the French 
 Revolution, and the moral advantages of which have 
 been turned to use by the Prussian dynasty, without 
 any corresponding recompense. Otherwise there is, as 
 we have said, no difference between then and now. 
 For then, as now, the army was only subservient to 
 the royal will ; then, as now, the appointment, advance- 
 ment, punishment, or cashiering of officers was left 
 solely to the personal and arbitrary decision of the 
 
 ^E.g., on May 6th, 1893, on which occasion William II. de- 
 clared openly that he would "crush the opposition," which, in 
 fact, he did, for the Reichstag very promptly voted all the 
 soldiers he had demanded. 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 83 
 
 King. In those days, as in these, the Prussian officer 
 did not trouble his head about the poHtical aims of 
 his prince; he fought, 'like the good old Germans,'' not 
 for his country, but only for his War Lord. To-day, 
 as then, the King is the first officer in the land, struts 
 about in the uniform of his troops, devotes his main 
 energies to his army, and concedes it the first position 
 in the life of the State. It is true that he does not, 
 as Frederick William I. did, arrange the marriages of 
 his officers by a peremptory decree, and that he does 
 not perform sentinel duty in person at Potsdam, but 
 he forces his officers to observe special ideas of 
 honour, protects them against any civilian attacks, 
 prescribes for them marriages suitable to their rank, 
 and grants them at his Court privileges that the most 
 famous university professor cannot enjoy unless he 
 happens to be an officer of the Reserve. To-day, as 
 then, the spirit of the army is the same : sense of duty, 
 blind obedience, absolute fealty to the lord of the land. 
 As we have pointed out, the only things that have 
 been altered since those bygone days are the composi- 
 tion of and the cost of maintenance of the army, 
 which, in consequence of the liability of citizens both 
 to serve in its ranks and pay the taxes, are no longer 
 a private concern of the King but the affair of the 
 nation at large. Ever^^thing else (including the brutal- 
 ities which form part of the education of the Prussian 
 soldier) has remained, in principle, undisturbed, and 
 the idea of defence of country is, after all, only a 
 tacit assumption on the part of patriotic citizens. 
 
 :^ ^ * * * 
 
 I can hear the indignant remonstrances of my Ger- 
 man readers, and I am prepared to hear the shouts of 
 
84 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the ninety-three signatories of the famous appeal to 
 the civilised world: 'It is not true! It is not true!" 
 
 But it is true I In these calamitous days it is doubly 
 true, and it needs to be proclaimed to the whole world ; 
 the Prussian army is feudal, not national; dynastic, 
 not democratic. It is only in the imagination of the 
 German taxpayer, only in the credulity of the German 
 people, that there exists a national army, employed 
 for national defence. The tradition of Prussia, the 
 form of its constitution, the spirit which rules in it, 
 and the absolutism of the German Emperor, based 
 upon Article ii of the German Imperial Constitution, 
 stamp this army as being pre-eminently a royal and 
 Imperial bodyguard — that is, an instrument for the 
 safeguarding of the dynasty. 
 
 If anyone still has any doubts on this subject, let 
 him read the proclamations and speeches of William 
 II. Immediately on ascending the throne, on July 
 15th, 1888, he addressed a proclamation to his army, 
 in which occur the words: "So we belong together, 
 I and my army, so we were born together, and so will 
 we indissolubly hold fast to one another, come, as 
 God wills, peace or storm." In William II.'s speeches, 
 wherever they relate to the army, we find the possessive 
 pronoun of the first person : my army, my guard, 7ny 
 engineers, my officers, my soldiers, my fleet, etc., etc. 
 In this way he insists, on every opportunity, that the 
 chief quality of the German soldier must be uncon- 
 ditional, blind, and unfaltering obedience. And that 
 not only in time of war, but also in internal emer- 
 gencies. William II. feels so intensely that he is the 
 personal owner of the German army that on every 
 occasion of the swearing-in of recruits he perpetually 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 85 
 
 reiterates : "You have sworn me the oath of alle- 
 giance"; and on November 23rd, 1891, he declared to 
 the newly sworn recruits: ''More than ever before 
 unbelief and dissatisfaction lift their heads in the \r 
 Fatherland, and the occasion may arise when you r^ 
 will have to shoot down or bayonet your own brothers 
 and relations. Then seal your allegiance with the 
 sacrifice of your heart's blood!" Again, at Breslau, 
 on December 2nd, 1896, he says: "The more people 
 shelter themselves behind catchwords and party con- 
 siderations, the more firmly and securely do I count 
 upon my army, and the more confidently do I hope 
 that my army, either without or within my realms, will 
 wait upon my wishes a^id my behests." "You have 
 the honour to belong to my guard and to stand in 
 and about my residence and my capital. You are 
 called upon, in the first place, to protect me against 
 internal and external foes." Thus William II. ad- 
 dressed the newly sworn recruits at Berlin on Novem- 
 ber 1 6th, 1893. And, on June 15th, 1898, in the 
 Lustgarten at Potsdam : "I assumed the Crown with 
 a heavy heart; my capacity was everywhere doubted, 
 and everywhere I was wrongly judged. Only one * 
 had confidence in me, only one believed in me, and A 
 that was the army; and, with its support, and trust- 
 ing in our old God, I undertook my responsible ofifice, 
 knowing full well that the army is the mainstay of my 
 country and the chief pillar of the Prussian throne, to 
 which God in His wisdom has summoned me." 
 
 Anyone who is acquainted with the internal develop- 
 ment of afTairs during the reign of William II. will 
 also know that the Kaiser's thirst for personal pos- 
 session and power does not merely extend to the army 
 
86 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 as a whole, but has also thrust the General Staff and 
 the Ministry of War into a subordinate position. Just 
 as William II. was always his own Imperial Chancel- 
 lor, so as an ardent soldier was he even more pro- 
 nouncedly his own Chief of the General Staff. 
 
 *'A far more modest role even than that of the 
 Chancellor in relation to William II. is that of the man 
 who occupies the responsible post of Chief of the 
 General Staff of the Army. It is characteristic of the 
 startling importance that our Emperor attaches to 
 purely external considerations that a Moltke was sum- 
 moned to the post as soon as one was available. A 
 man like the 'great man of silence'^ William II. could 
 just as little have endured at his side for any length 
 of time as first military adviser, as he could endure 
 the Chancellorship of Bismarck. But he wanted to 
 have a Moltke." ^ 
 
 And so in this field William II. had such an ab- 
 solute sense of personal property in his army that he 
 conferred its chief command on any one, according 
 to his fancy, though the person he selected, as in 
 Moltke's case, was manifestly incompetent, and though 
 he had the opinion of all competent Generals against 
 him. 
 
 Anyone, therefore, who is not satisfied with the evi- 
 dence afforded by the German and Prussian Consti- 
 tutions cannot fail to be convinced by the speeches and 
 acts of William II. that we have not a national but 
 a dynastic army, which is entirely subservient to the 
 private judgment of the sovereign ruler, and regarded 
 
 ^i.e., Moltke, of whom it was said that he was silent in seven 
 languages. 
 
 ^"Unser Kaiser und Sein Volk," von einem Schwarzseher, 
 Leipzig, 1906, p. 10. 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 87 
 
 by him as the "chief pillar of the Prussian throne." 
 Let anyone point out to me one single passage in 
 the Emperor's speeches in which William II. has placed 
 the defence of our country before that of his person, 
 his house, and his personal power! Let anyone cite 
 me the speech of a German Minister where the ques- 
 tion of the right of the people to have a voice in mili- 
 tary matters is treated with anything but contempt. 
 Such a speech will be sought in vain. Instead, you 
 will find at every turn expressions such as : "The 
 German people must deem it an honour to wear the 
 Emperor's uniform and protect the Emperor's house." 
 "With God for King and country !" This watchword, 
 emanating from Frederick William III., and, since 
 1 87 1, converted into "with God for Emperor and Em- 
 pire," expresses clearly and unmistakably what Wil- 
 liam 11. has emphasised over and over again, that in 
 Germany the Emperor and King come first, and the 
 Fatherland afterwards. 
 
 The fact that such a state of things should exist 
 in the modern world is, as we have said, so distress- 
 ing to a German that he either pretends not to notice 
 it, or else denies it. Ever and again the German news- 
 papers speak of "our brave greycoats," "our redoubt- 
 able troops," etc. ; that is, they try to take it as a mat- 
 ter of course that the German army is the concern of 
 the German people. Moreover, there are large num- 
 bers of Social Democrats who declare quite seriously 
 that the German army is the people and the people 
 the German army. 
 
 But, unfortunately, viewed by the light of the Con- 
 stitution and of facts, all this is only pious humbug, 
 which may possibly be uttered in ignorance and good 
 
88 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 faith, but by its incredible naivete is only a fresh 
 proof of the fact that we Germans are wont to invest 
 anything incredible in our politics with the lying sem- 
 blance of the normal democratic. Here, more than 
 anywhere else, the naked truth, in all its medisevalism, 
 is utterly intolerable to us. 
 
 The pious legend of the German popular army does 
 not become a fact because it is constantly referred to 
 by distinguished German writers. For example, the 
 late German Imperial Chancellor, von Biilow, assures 
 us quite seriously: *'the army to-day is what history 
 has made it; the vigorous expression of the unity of 
 Empire, State, and people." ^ And he adds, with 
 great complacency, "so it is also in France, the re- 
 publican State and the French nation are blended to- 
 gether in the army.'' Seeing that Herr von Biilow 
 studiously avoids speaking about the constitutional 
 structure of this army and only praises its superb quali- 
 ties and excellent conduct in the course of history, 
 he has no difficulty in assuring us that "the officers 
 and men both in the North and the South feel them- 
 selves before all else members of the German army, 
 subjects of the German nation in arms." Indirectly, 
 indeed, his ebullitions show that this so-called "na- 
 tion in arms" is, in fact, nothing more nor less than 
 a monarchical army, which lives "apart from all in- 
 ternal politics, from particularism and parties gen- 
 erally," but he endeavours, in the same breath, to make 
 the reader understand that the German army is, like 
 the French, the strong expression of the national will 
 and character. We are sorry, Your Highness; the 
 
 * Prince Bernhard von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 148. 
 (London: Cassell & Co.) 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 89 
 
 times are really too grave for such conjuring tricks! 
 In the first place, the question is not what the Ger- 
 man officers and men feci themselves to be, but what 
 they are under the constitution. And, as a matter of 
 fact, our constitution absolutely forbids and renders 
 impossible any blending of the Army and the people 
 in Germany. The fact that the officers and men swear 
 allegiance expressly to the person of the King instead 
 of to the welfare of the nation creates an impassable 
 gulf between the Army and the people. The two exist 
 side by side, without interfusion and without any legal 
 interdependence. Our very constitution — or rather 
 the hankering of the dynasty for power which finds 
 expression in our constitution — establishes the Army 
 as a State within the State, as an inviolable dynastic 
 institution, placed high above the citizen and his 
 morality. If anyone still has any doubts on this head, 
 he may learn from the Kaiser's speeches that in Ger- 
 many the Army and the people are rigorously sundered 
 by the clearly and repeatedly expressed intention of 
 the Kaiser that the Army should be employed at his 
 pleasure against "the enemy within our frontiers." 
 And, in the second place, Herr von Biilow is pleased 
 to deceive both himself and us. For the German of- 
 ficers do not by any means "feel'' themselves what he 
 pretends. Professor Delbriick emphasises with uncon- 
 cealed pride, in his book "Regierung und Volkswille," 
 the wide difference between the German and the French 
 Armies: "Now let us suppose this (the French sys- 
 tem of parliamentary control of the Army, without 
 which no national army is really possible) transferred 
 to Prusso-Germany. Let us assume a control of the 
 Army by parliament, and select anyone you please 
 
90 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 from the House of Deputies or the Reichstag and 
 let him be our Minister of War. Anyone who has 
 the least acquaintance with our officers and generals 
 knows that this is an impossibility, knows that our 
 Army would need to have experienced a Sedan in the 
 French sense before it would submit to such a state 
 of things." 
 
 Yet Prince von Biilow is perfectly well acquainted 
 with Article 64 of the German and paragraph 108 of 
 the Prussian constitution; he is acquainted also with 
 the numerous speeches of William 11. relative to the 
 Army; he knows the spirit of our Officers Corps, and 
 he knows that Delbriick's description (written a year 
 before the war) is entirely in accordance with facts. 
 It is true that he enjoys the reputation of seeing things 
 in the rosiest light, and we can understand that in 
 the midst of the stress of this World War he should 
 more than ever feel the need of insisting on the rosy 
 aspect of things, but, none the less, the problem is 
 so momentous a one for the future of Germany that 
 we are compelled to answer him with the most em- 
 phatic contradiction : No, Your Highness ! The Ger- 
 man Army is not "the vigorous expression of the unity 
 of Empire, State and people"; it is the expression, 
 guaranteed by the constitution and by tradition, of 
 the thirst for power of the German dynasty. It is 
 what the soldier-king, Frederick William I., made it, 
 and what it has been plainly and repeatedly declared 
 to be by the soldier-emperor, William 11. : the chief 
 support of the Prussian throne. 
 
 That is the German Army. Anyone who ventures 
 to compare the French Army with this Army, organ- 
 ised entirely upon dynastic principles, and to speak of 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 91 
 
 this as a "national army," must incur the suspicion of 
 deliberate falsification. 
 
 But it is the same with our army as with our Reichs- 
 tag. Democratic notions have, nowadays, attained 
 such an ascendancy over public opinion, and are felt 
 by every rational man as being so self-understood, 
 that we Germans quite instinctively try to represent 
 as democratic things that are two centuries behind 
 democracy. Hence it comes that Biilow and other 
 representatives of German culture, including also the 
 majority of our Social Democrats, ever and anon talk 
 about a "nation in arms," a "popular army," and other 
 democratic triumphs, which only live and have their 
 being in the imagination of ignorant or wilfully blind 
 patriots, and which, consciously or unconsciously, de- 
 ceive the German people as to the real aspect of af- 
 fairs. For the true facts in all their mediasvalism are 
 so disgraceful that no one dares admit them in Ger- 
 many. 
 
 It is without parallel in the world's history that a 
 dynasty contrived, not merely to retain in the modern 
 world all its absolute feudal powers, but also to take 
 advantage of modern progress (universal military ser- 
 vice and universal taxation) to enhance them still 
 further, without, in return, giving the serving and pay- 
 ing portion of the nation a democratic equivalent. 
 This marvellous achievement of dynastic government 
 could only occur in a State such as Prusso-Germany, 
 in which thousands of servile and learned sophists 
 were ever ready in pompous speeches to represent to 
 the people their dearest wishes as accomplished facts. 
 
 It is surely not presumptuous if to-day, confronted 
 with the World War, we at last exclaim "Enough!" 
 
92 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Let the German people be honestly told how matters 
 stand. Tell them that, constitutionally, they are not 
 fighting for their country, but for their Emperor. Ex- 
 plain to them that, by their Constitution, they have 
 no right to inquire into the why and the wherefore of 
 the war, and that the true meaning of the word Burg- 
 frieden must be sought in the attempt to disguise the 
 dynastic policy of power. 
 
 Then we shall see what the German people, who do 
 not know (but at most guess) this state of affairs, 
 really think : Whether they will, perchance, with Pro- 
 fessor Delbriick, find their ideal in fighting, "like the 
 Germans of old,'* not for country, but for the chief- 
 tain, without knowledge of his political aims, and only 
 attached to him blindly by the oath of allegiance; or 
 whether the German people will continue to be be- 
 fooled by the rhetoric of Billow and Scheidemann, 
 and to believe that we possess a "popular and a na- 
 tional army." 
 
 What Professor Delbriick in 191 3 arrogantly 
 scoffed at as an impossibility, namely, that the Ger- 
 man Army should some day experience such a Sedan 
 as that which democratised the French Army, is more- 
 over imminent, and it will bring about the same result 
 as in France. It is the fate of nations and of the 
 rulers of nations that they only learn in war that they 
 have learnt nothing from war. Professor Delbriick 
 and the other worshippers of the German Empire did 
 not suspect what, if they had been a little more modest, 
 they might have learnt from the world's history, 
 namely, that the same spirit in which they declaim so 
 arrogantly against the French military system was also 
 the spirit which conjured up the World War and 
 
BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 93 
 
 helped to prepare that Sedan which inspires them with 
 so much uncalled for sympathy for France and her 
 army. 
 
 Yes! the German people will learn this bitter les- 
 son from the World War. Henceforth, to the ques- 
 tion "Whom does the army obey ?" it will reply, *The 
 German people." 
 
IV 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY: 
 
 ALSO A HISTORY OF THE EVENTS 
 
 LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 
 
 Manifestations of German Militarism 
 
 Whenever the Reichstag in a serious controversy 
 attempted to raise its voice, it was either ignored, or 
 roundly told that a police sergeant with twelve men 
 would suffice to dissolve it, or it was actually dissolved. 
 
 Our Reichstag has been at infinite pains to make 
 something of itself. And in spite of its unconstitu- 
 tional composition, as already described, it would have 
 become a good, domestic, progressive Reichstag, had 
 this only been allowed. But was this ever allowed? 
 It protested, in 1878, against the disgraceful Socialist 
 law ; it was dissolved, and the Socialist law for twelve 
 years exposed Germany to the scorn of the world. 
 
 In 1887 it had the audacity to propound the ques- 
 tion: Imperial or parliamentary army? and voted the 
 effective force of the army for three instead of seven 
 years ; it was dissolved, and never again attempted to 
 talk about a parliamentary control of the army. 
 
 Again, in 1893, ^t ventured to protest against the 
 
 94 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 95 
 
 constant increase of armaments ; it was once more dis- 
 solved, and henceforth was obliged to vote not only 
 the land armaments, but also the whole new naval 
 programme of William II. 
 
 In 1907 it raised its voice against the colonial- and 
 world-policy; it was again dissolved, and (despite the 
 augmented numbers of the opposition votes) the dy- 
 nasty again carried the day. 
 
 More than once it vigorously protested against the 
 ill-usage of the soldiers; their ill-treatment was re- 
 gretted, but not suppressed, for it is part and parcel 
 of the iron discipline of the Prussian military system. 
 It protested (in May, 19 12) against the duelling ob- 
 ligation of the officers ; but although an Imperial Order 
 in Council (January ist, 1897) had done the same, a 
 fresh Order in Council, in defiance of Parliament, 
 confirmed what the Imperial Chancellor had already 
 in person told it, that an officer who was not at any 
 time prepared pistol in hand to defend his honour 
 (which was a special honour) could remain an officer 
 no longer. 
 
 In the affair of the Daily Telegraph, the Reichstag 
 had emphatically protested against such an interven- 
 tion of the Emperor as sensational and dangerous to 
 the safety of the State (November, 1908)^; but Herr 
 
 "^On October 29th, 1908, the Daily Telegraph published some 
 remarks of the German Emperor regarding his relations with 
 England, William 11. expressed therein his dissatisfaction that 
 the English did not credit his peaceful assurances. "Lies and 
 deception are foreign to my nature. My actions speak for 
 themselves. You have paid heed not to my actions, but to those 
 who misrepresent and misinterpret them." The Kaiser de- 
 clared that it would be difficult for him to maintain a friendly 
 relation, because the feeling of the German people was exceed- 
 ingly hostile to England; that he was, to his regret, in the 
 
96 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 von Billow, who had dared to convey to the monarch 
 the modest wishes of the popular representative body, 
 had to go at the first available opportunity, and Wil- 
 liam II., in his Konigsberg speech (August 25th, 
 1 9 10), once again asserted that the royal power "had 
 been granted to him alone by the grace of God and 
 not by Parliaments, popular assemblies, and popular 
 resolutions." With greater distinctness than this no 
 modern sovereign has ever rejected the principle of 
 popular co-operation in government. It is not estab- 
 lished whether it was Louis XIV. or Elizabeth of 
 England who uttered the famous phrase "Uetat, c'est 
 moi" ; but it cannot be gainsaid that at the beginning 
 of the twentieth century William 11. repeatedly and 
 emphatically made this notion, "I am the State," the 
 keynote of his public utterances. 
 
 Poor Reichstag! Over and over again it initiated 
 proposals for an act establishing the responsibility of 
 the Imperial Chancellor; but the GoTcrnment treated 
 all such endeavours with contempt. Many and many 
 a time it tried to alter its standing orders and, for 
 
 minority, as it were, among his own people; that he had shown 
 during the Boer War what peaceful sentiments he nourished 
 towards England, when he refused to receive the mission from 
 the Boers and to associate himself with the proposed inter- 
 vention of France and Russia, and even worked out a plan of 
 campaign for the overthrow of the Boers, and sent it to the 
 Queen. (William II. forgot to mention the famous telegram 
 to Kriiger, and explained his desire for a powerful navy as 
 due merely to the necessity of protecting Germany's world- 
 wide trade.) These statements William II, allowed to be pub- 
 lished without any previous consultation with his Chancellor. 
 It turned out that the Imperial Chancellor had, as a matter 
 of fact, approved the publication of this Imperial utterance, 
 but that, wonderful to relate, he was wholly ignorant of its 
 substance. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 97 
 
 example, oblige the Chancellor to reply to questions 
 within a specified time; the Government always re- 
 mained deaf to these entreaties. Often did the Reichs- -. 
 tag demand rewards for the heroes of the war of y 
 1870-71, but the Government had already distributed^N 
 a portion of the five milliards of francs it received 
 from France between Moltke and his General Staff, 
 and nothing remained over for the soldiers who had 
 fought and bled. 
 
 And, finally, the Reichstag, in December, 19 13, in- 
 dignantly protested that the military authorities should 
 brutally overrule the civilian authorities in a Consti- 
 tutional State, and that a mere lieutenant should have 
 superior rights to those of a German civil authority. 
 Poor Reichstag! The vote of censure passed by the 
 Reichstag was not only absolutely ignored by the dy- 
 nasty, and the Imperial Chancellor, who had under- 
 taken the impossible task of proving a glaring wrong 
 to be right, remained still more firmly established in 
 office, but, in addition, the Zabern criminals were dec- 
 orated and congratulated, and the German people were 
 once again given to understand that in Germany only 
 one will prevails, and that is the will of the dynasty. 
 
 So we find, in the whole course of the Reichstag's 
 history, only a long, dismal chain of oppressions, dis- 
 solutions and unwilling submission of the popular will 
 to the thirst for power of the dynasty. It was only 
 in subordinate matters that the Reichstag was allowed 
 a free hand. Yes! when Biilow, in consequence of 
 the rejection of the probate duty, retired from the 
 conduct of State affairs, we were filled with delight, 
 and pictured ourselves as living in a parliamentary 
 model State. The delight was of brief duration. 
 
98 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Billow's place was taken by a man who soon put an 
 end to the "liberal era," declared Social Reform to be 
 completed, and in every respect revived the old regime. 
 
 The simple German has fared with his Reichstag 
 much as did "Hans in luck" of the fairy tale, when he 
 exchanged his lump of gold for a horse, and then the 
 horse for a cow, the cow for a donkey, and so on, 
 until he had nothing left, but still comforted himself 
 with the reflection that he was the richest and luckiest 
 man in the world. Similarly, the promises made to the 
 German people after the war of 1870-71 may be com- 
 pared with a veritable lump of gold of democratic 
 rights and privileges. But Bismarck, and still more 
 the "new course" of William IL, forced our popular 
 Assembly to make one exchange after the other. 
 When the simple German, on the occasion of the well- 
 known Zabern affair, was able to some extent to strike 
 the balance of his democratic rights and liberties, he 
 found that all that was left of his lump of gold was 
 a lordly building, before which stand a column of 
 Victory and a gigantic Bismarck in bronze, to wit, a 
 glittering Nothing, surrounded by military symbols 
 and serving purely military ends and objects. But 
 comfort was forthcoming from his intellectual su- 
 periors ; they proved to him over and over again that 
 he had no use for gold, that he was, nevertheless, the 
 wealthiest and luckiest of Europeans, since, as Herr 
 von Billow says, "the degree of popular participation 
 in State affairs is not to be measured merely by the 
 sum of the rights accorded to the popular assembly." 
 
 And the simple fellow was comforted. Could he be 
 aught else? To him, as Herr von Biilow so politely 
 put it, "political talent was denied." He convinced 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 99 
 
 himself, again to quote von Biilow, that *'we are not 
 a poHtical people.'' So he buried his disgust and 
 vexation with politics in philosophy and social science. 
 And here, where, so long as he only stuck to theories, 
 he was free from dynastic interference, he became the 
 most revolutionary being in the world. 
 
 No one ever planned such brutal revolutions on 
 paper as Kautsky and the other devotees of the social 
 economy of Marx. No one was so energetic in re- 
 valuing all values, or so merciless in philosophising 
 against the good God with a hammer as Nietzsche 
 and his disciples. And while the German riddle was 
 presenting itself to us with a more threatening aspect 
 every day, Haeckel, Ostwald, and Eucken, with bold 
 intellectual flights, solved the riddle of the universe, 
 severed friendship with the gods above, and built up 
 a monistic theory of civilisation the audacity of which 
 was only exceeded, if at all, by the revolutionary 
 phrases of the social-democratic orators. Then there 
 were the radical theories concerning free love and the 
 education of children, and all the daring reforms in 
 literature and art, in the theatre, the school, and the 
 association ! 
 
 It seemed as if revolution were ready to blaze up 
 at every turn and corner. A cloud of dissatisfaction 
 brooded over Germany, and to observant foreigners 
 it seemed as though the flashes of lightning were pro- 
 claiming the approach of a new Germany. 
 
 But alas ! This same simple German, who had just 
 overthrown all the gods, who had criticised without 
 mercy the whole ordering of civilian society and law, 
 and had constructed the most ideal freedom in the 
 upper air, became as red as a schoolboy if a policeman 
 
loo THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 at the next corner of the street looked at him more 
 suspiciously than usual; his revolutionary theories 
 evaporated completely at sight of an officer's uniform, 
 and all his beautiful ideals of freedom fluttered away, 
 as if they had been criminal fancies, as soon as a Gov- 
 ernment organ showed the slightest tendency to disap- 
 prove of them. An impassable something separated 
 the idea of liberty from the liberating act. Revolu- 
 tionary views and reactionary realities! Of what 
 avail to the German citizen was disrespect for the gods 
 in heaven, if the gods of the earth forcibly demanded 
 his respect at every turn? 
 
 Herr von Biilow was right; we are not a political 
 people! Nowhere, not even in Freemason lodges, not 
 even in the trade unions, dare we discuss politics. The 
 statutes of every respectable association contain the 
 rule that political (and religious) discussions are pro- 
 hibited. Where three Germans talked politics, the 
 walls had ears. Questions such as : Republic or Mon- 
 archy? Whom does the army obey? Who decides 
 upon war and peace, and our future development as 
 a nation? — questions of life and death, and right and 
 liberty, which can be traced through the political his- 
 tory of all civilised peoples and gave the dynasties of 
 Athens and Rome more trouble than all their ex- 
 ternal foes put together, may, among us, only be de- 
 bated and answered in a purely monarchical sense. 
 There was a deluge of prohibitions of meetings, Press 
 prosecutions, and charges of Use majeste whenever 
 anything smacked of "Revolution" and "liberty"; and 
 anyone who tried to write a word of truth on political 
 matters was in danger of imprisonment. 
 
 We are certainly not a political nation. We lacked 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY loi 
 
 a political ideal. Seeing that in the nineteenth cen- 
 tury political ideals are necessarily democratic, our 
 dynasty, to save trouble, forbade us to concern our- 
 selves with politics, declaring that we were too stupid 
 for them. It instinctively felt that, in a free contest 
 of opinions, it could not hold its own in these days, 
 and so it allowed us all possible liberties, except the 
 one which is the key to all of them — political liberty. 
 
 This is the explanation of the peculiarity Herr von 
 Billow has constantly taxed us with — that we have 
 remained an unpolitical people, and this procures for 
 us also the satisfaction of being unanimously praised^ 
 by our professors as a ''monarchically-minded people." (\ 
 
 The simple German instinctively felt that a danger 
 and a reaction were concealed in the political events 
 of the past forty years, but he could not and dared 
 not realise the secret opposition which necessarily arose 
 in a feudal military State like Prusso-Germany be- 
 tween dynastic rights and privileges and nineteenth- 
 century notions of civil law. Hence, the German peo- 
 ple never comprehended the more deeply rooted causes 
 of the arbitrary acts which constantly offended their 
 sense of justice in German home politics. The mon- 
 strous fact that, wherever the prestige of the dynasty 
 or the privileges of the officer or official were con- 
 cerned, the whole theory of right under civil law was 
 simply put on one side and replaced by a military- 
 dynastic theory of right, was, as far as possible, con- 
 cealed from him. The simple German allowed him- 
 self to be perpetually assured by his superiors that 
 our Government was the most progressive of all 
 Governments, that everything took place in accord- 
 ance with a well-thought-out plan, and that the 
 
102 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 national welfare was always the end in view. 
 
 I On ascending the throne, the Emperor first ad- 
 
 "Ns^ dressed his army, then his navy, and only then "My 
 
 ' people," just as though the people was there for the 
 
 army's sake, and not the army for the sake of the 
 
 people. But the simple German regarded this as merely 
 
 a tradition, which was no doubt intended to be more 
 
 friendly towards the people than it appeared. 
 
 Did not a cobbler don an officer's uniform, and by 
 aid of this costume, which renders a person in Ger- 
 many all powerful, rob the town-chest of a burgo- 
 master and arrest both him and his secretary? The 
 simple German only saw the comic side of this episode, 
 and did not reflect what an alarming proof of the 
 militarised mentality of the German civil authorities 
 this Kopenick affair really was. 
 i^ William II. declared to his soldiers: "You wear 
 the Emperor's coat, therefore you are raised above 
 other men!" (Kiel, December 3rd, 1894.) Here again 
 the simple German only regarded this as a chance 
 phrase, which, though it annoyed him, could not rob 
 him of his joy in the proud German army. 
 
 That the Emperor always appeared in public 
 dressed as a soldier and never spoke to the citizens of 
 the nineteenth century in mufti, that the Prussian Min- 
 ister of War and other State officials also showed 
 themselves in the popular assembly in uniform, and 
 that even the President of the Reichstag strutted about 
 in the uniform of a lieutenant of the Reserve when- 
 ever he was permitted to appear in his Majesty's train 
 — all this had no deep significance for the simple Ger- 
 man. These things made no impression on him; he 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 103 
 
 regarded them as a custom, and could not imagine 
 them otherwise. 
 
 Although at all the official receptions, parades, and 
 banquets the military always took precedence of civil- 
 ians; although the Imperial acts of grace referred only 
 to military persons; although the Berlin Court was 
 such a glitter of uniforms that the late English Min- 
 ister of War, Haldane, felt abashed amid all this 
 brilliancy, and modestly declined the Imperial invita- 
 tion to the manoeuvres; although, from these and a 
 hundred other customs axid events, it became clearer 
 and clearer that the officer in Germany takes the first 
 place, while the citizen is, as it were, regarded only 
 as an adjunct to the military, still the honest German 
 failed to realise the true import of these facts. On 
 the one hand, a rational co-operation in politics was 
 denied and abused to him, and, on the other, he had 
 been so much drilled, both by education and habit, 
 into a military conception of the State that he hon- 
 estly believed the whole system to be part and parcel 
 of the organisation of a modern constitutional State. 
 Yes, he perceived in all this merely evidence of a higher 
 culture. His views were, as we have said, influenced 
 by people who, like Herr von Bialow, honestly assured 
 him: "The voice of our national conscience tells us 
 what German militarism really is : the best thing we 
 have achieved in the course of our national develop- 
 ment as a State and a people" ;^ or, again, by chemists, 
 who, unfortunately for Germany, have a passion for 
 generalities, for instance, Professor Ostwald, who, 
 from the height of his scientific knowledge, preaches 
 
 ^Prince von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 147. (London: 
 Cassell & Co.) 
 
104 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 -^L that German militarism "actually represents the high- 
 
 . I est degree of civilisation yet developed."^ 
 
 There is certainly no objection to be made to the 
 simple German and his betters regarding as both nor- 
 mal and civilising what all other modern States regard 
 as contempt of the people and political slavery. If 
 the political development of the German people had 
 arrived at a point where the army was regarded not as 
 the servant, but as the master of the nation, this was 
 to be lamented (as a proof that we, out of servility to 
 our dynasty, are about a hundred years behind the 
 times), but was at the same time perfectly compre- 
 hensible. We Germans have had the belief forced 
 upon us that the Hohenzollerns, thanks to their mili- 
 tary genius, saved the united Germany ; we were told 
 so much about the unfavourable position of Germany 
 and the resulting devastations of the Thirty Years' 
 War, about the deplorable disunion of the German 
 races, and other things of the sort, that we were, 
 finally, led to believe that the drill-master was our 
 only salvation. 
 
 Hence, we must define German militarism as an 
 historical product, and realise that the German people 
 had gradually become militarised, not only in their or- 
 ganisation, but in their whole outlook and philosophy. 
 We might, therefore, in agreement with the repre- 
 sentatives of German culture, laud German militarism 
 as the basis of German culture, and prove that, far 
 from being a menace to, it is actually a safeguard of 
 the peace of the world. Unfortunately, however, the p 
 principles which govern a State's home policy also 
 
 ^Prof. Wilh. Ostwald, "Monistische Sonntagspredigten" 
 XMonistic Sunday addresses), December ist, 1914. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 105 
 
 govern its foreign policy. And, unfortunately, conduct 
 which at home only vexes or pleases the private citizen, 
 when extended beyond the frontiers becomes a source 
 of vexation or pleasure to other nations. 
 
 And since Germany's foreign policy is far less sub- 
 ject to national control even than her home policy, the 
 same principle which at home only produces a comedy 
 like the Kopenick incident or a tragedy like the Zabern 
 affair may become a danger to the whole world. If 
 even a man like Biilow has to admit that : "The his- 
 tory of our home policy, with the exception of a few 
 bright spots, is to the time of the World War a history 
 of political mistakes," ^ one may imagine the nature of 
 a foreign policy governed by the same principles. 
 
 For whereas in home policy the dynasty was still 
 frequently obliged to disguise the answer to the 
 question " Whom does the army obey ? " with all 
 kinds of democratic phrases, there was no such restraint 
 upon its arbitrary will in the case of foreign policy. 
 Moreover, in the realm of foreign policy, the dynasties 
 have at their disposal a perfectly irresponsible secret 
 diplomacy, which on the ground of higher interests 
 of State renders account to no one of its proceedings. 
 Even in a democratic State like France, this secret 
 diplomacy concludes treaties and alliances over the 
 head of the Parliament. How much more must this 
 be the case in a State like Germany, where, as we have 
 seen, the dynasty, in virtue of Article 11 of the Consti- 
 tution, pronounces the supreme decision in everything. 
 
 It is well-known that the foreign policy of all States 
 has hitherto been guided solely by military considera- 
 
 ^ Prince von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 158. (London : 
 Cassell & Co.) 
 
io6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 tions. Humanity is still waiting for the genius who 
 shall compel Governments to apply the same standard 
 of civic justice and morality to their foreign policy as 
 they (apart from exceptions) already apply to their 
 home policy. Hitherto, in the realm of international 
 politics, everything has been a question of military 
 strength. Without intending to insult the diplomats, 
 they might be described as anarchists in kid gloves, 
 who, in their conversation, with the utmost amiability 
 and discretion, make constant allusion to their pro- 
 vision of bombs, in order to give more emphasis to 
 their demands. Hence the attitude of a State, its 
 demands and its threats are regulated according to 
 the armed might which it has behind it as a last resource 
 for proving the justice of its conduct. The only excep- 
 tions to this sublime rule are the small States like 
 Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, etc., which support 
 their foreign policy not so much by armed strength as 
 by exploiting the rivalries of the Great Powers. 
 
 Thus, in reference to foreign policy, armies are no 
 longer considered as passive instruments for the de- 
 fence of the country ; in the hands of the diplomats they 
 become threats and standards of right and wrong. 
 
 Down to the French Revolution it was an under- 
 stood thing that the Almighty had only created 
 nations for the sake of kings. Still, the dynasties of 
 feudal days were so considerate that they only enforced 
 their policy by means of soldiers, whom they hired, 
 much as an African explorer hires his escort. Hence, 
 the fact that the foreign policy of those times 
 openly and honestly served only the interests of the 
 dynasties, and that dynasties waged war upon each 
 other at will and upon the most trifling pretexts, 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 107 
 
 without the slightest regard to the welfare of their 
 peoples, is perfectly intelligible. For they employed 
 for the purpose, as already stated, only such soldiers 
 as voluntarily undertook the task. Love of country, 
 defence of country, blessings of civilisation, etc., were, 
 in those days, not dreamt of. Politics and *'their 
 continuation by other means," that is to say, by war, 
 was not a national question but a private concern of 
 the dynasty. When Soubise was defeated at Rossbach 
 the Paris populace hardly concealed their jubilation 
 that the braggarts of Versailles had got a rebuff. 
 When, in 1792, Prussia and Austria marched upon 
 France, the Prusso-Austrian peoples hardly troubled 
 their heads about it; no one regarded the defeats at 
 Valmy and Jemappes as a national disaster; and 
 Goethe's ^'Campaign in France" treats this campaign 
 as a purely dynastic episode, and one looks in vain, 
 in his description of it, for any patriotic sentiment. 
 
 This epoch of absolute lordship, and of undisguised 
 camarilla politics, when war was openly regarded not 
 as a crime against nations, but merely as an adventure 
 for illustrious personages, led to the great French 
 Revolution, which gave it the death-blow. 
 
 That birth certificate of modern society, the declara- 
 tion of human and civic rights formulated by the 
 French Revolution, states, in Article 3, "the principle 
 of all sovereignty essentially rests in the nation; 
 and no corporation, no individual, can express any 
 authority which has not originated from it." With 
 these words the people themselves undertook the shap- 
 ing of their destiny; the armed force was, henceforth, 
 based upon universal military service, and was inspired 
 by the sacred idea of defence of country. The modern 
 
io8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Fatherland, that is to say, the constitutional State 
 striving towards ever-increasing justice and liberty, 
 had come into being. 
 
 It is patent that foreign politics v^ere thus, at one 
 stroke, revolutionised. The political organisation, 
 army, administration and government of the new form 
 of State were bound, for the future, to place their 
 services at the disposal of the common weal. 
 
 These new and excellent ideas were, to be sure, 
 overthrown in France, at any rate in practice. The 
 National Convention conquered the left bank of the 
 Rhine and Napoleon I. waged war against all Europe. 
 All the same, this fundamental readjustment of 
 the aspirations and aims of foreign policy became, 
 in theory, a model for all States. Dynasties were 
 compelled to bow to the common weal. From a 
 purely dynastic affair, the policy of the State and 
 all that appertained thereto (especially the military 
 system) became nationalised. Henceforth, if a dynasty 
 wished to engage in war, it had first to prove to its 
 subjects that its aim was not to increase by this means 
 its own power and exchequer, but to promote the 
 welfare of the people at large. 
 
 But in this, as in everything, the dynasties only 
 unwillingly and apparently yielded to the new de- 
 mands. The same France which had proclaimed to 
 the world those magnificent ideas reverted openly in 
 its foreign policy (in spite of the fact that these same 
 principles had again been insisted upon in the Revolu- 
 tion of 1848) to the dynastic point of view. With the 
 Crimean War and the Mexican campaign. Napoleon 
 III. annihilated the last remnants of the Holy Alliance 
 and raised the Bonaparte dynasty to the zenith of its 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 109 
 
 power. France, to be sure, became once again '7a 
 grande nation" and the most redoubtable military 
 Power in Europe, but the French people had to pay 
 for this patriotic satisfaction (just as the German 
 people had after 1871) with the loss of all those politi- 
 cal liberties that they had painfully won in the course 
 of three revolutions. Like causes produce like effects. 
 The France of 1850-1870 was a precursor of the 
 Germany of 1871-1914; detested and feared by 
 other nations, condemned by the whole world as 
 arrogant, vain, and thirsty for war, the Second Empire 
 was, in its home policy, reactionary through and through. 
 It is an historical law (alas! disregarded) that every 
 increase of dynastic power must be paid for by 
 the people with a corresponding diminution of their 
 rights and privileges, and, at the same time, regarded 
 by neighbouring countries as a danger and menace of 
 war. Napoleon III. wrote several books (just as 
 William II. made a host of speeches), in which he 
 vigorously endeavoured to prove that his foreign policy 
 was only subservient to the weal of the French nation. 
 Yet dynastic weal and popular weal are poles 
 asunder, just as are capital and labour. They can 
 only be reconciled by pious phrases and lies. 
 Napoleon's wife destroyed the effect of the whole of 
 his literary work with a single sentence : "C'est ma 
 guerre !" she exclaimed with great complacency on the 
 outbreak of the Franco-German War. Possibly the 
 long ennui of Court festivities prompted this desire for 
 other distractions; in any case, this expression shows 
 clearly that the assertion of human rights and the 
 democratic aspirations of the nineteenth century 
 had made no impression on this exalted personage. 
 
no THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 In the eyes of a dynasty nations have only the 
 right to serve "higher interests," that is to say, to 
 gather laurels for their rulers on the bloodstained 
 fields of battle. 
 
 After the death of Frederick II. foreign politics 
 were little discussed in Prusso-Germany. The Wars 
 of Liberation, the ensuing Vienna Congress, and 
 the Holy Alliance won for Prussia once more some 
 respect in Europe. Yet how little Prussia's forei^ 
 policy was dictated by considerations for the public 
 weal was immediately after displayed to the nation 
 by Frederick William III. in that terrible reaction 
 which followed the Wars of Liberation and only 
 terminated in 1848. After the brief, bright interval of 
 1848 Bismarck entered upon Metternich's inheritance. 
 
 Bismarck's speeches and letters, his ''Reflections and 
 Reminiscences," are full of proofs that he, as he 
 acknowledged, regarded himself only as the ''servant of 
 his lord." He was very skilful in proving to the Ger- 
 man people that dynastic weal is tantamount to public 
 weal. We were wrong in believing him. For Bis- 
 marck, though in his youth imbued with republican 
 ideas, was the absolute negation of all those democratic 
 ideals which had already been more or less put into 
 practice in the politics of Western Europe, and without 
 which a popular form of government had become in- 
 conceivable. 
 
 Bismarck's foreign policy, which was directed first 
 against the Hapsburgs, then against the Bonapartes, 
 resulted, when he had triumphed all along the line, in 
 a united German Empire with a constitution which, 
 as we have said, placed all the power in the hands of 
 the German Emperor and stamped it henceforward not 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY in 
 
 as a liberal-progressive, but as an autocratic State 
 with a democratic veneer. 
 
 It may be asserted that Bismarck's foreign policy 
 was advantageous to Germany. In fact, almost all 
 German historians and politicians agree that the 
 victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 brought the 
 nation that moral prestige which enabled it to develop 
 its commercial and technical capacity and to become a 
 State with a world-wide trade of the first rank. 
 
 But there appertain to the common weal not merely 
 material but ideal blessings, of which the greatest 
 and most essential is political liberty. Moreover, if 
 we place Germany's material progress since 1870 to 
 the credit of the Bismarck wars, we must reflect that 
 France also has, during the same period, achieved 
 a similar result. The astounding economic develop- 
 ment of Germany during the past forty years 
 must then be attributable to other causes than Bis- 
 marck's foreign policy. Otherwise the vanquished and 
 ruined France would not be able to show a like 
 phenomenon. 
 
 This is not the place to furnish evidence that 
 victorious wars can never be the cause of material 
 national prosperity. But, speaking generally, we may 
 say that if Bismarck had welded the German races 
 into national unity without any war, the national 
 prosperity of Germany would, thanks to the genius of 
 the German merchant and technologist, have developed 
 just as brilliantly as, and certainly more safely than, 
 it did through Bismarck's annexation and armament 
 policy, which brought us forty years of unrest, 
 oppressive taxation, and finally this World War. 
 
 The war of 1870-71 was, like the present war, 
 
112 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 ushered in with hollow bombast. Then, as to-day, 
 much was talked about progress, liberty, and unity. 
 But, as so often before, pompous words only veiled 
 private interests. The German nation hoped to achieve 
 through the war not only its unity, but its political 
 emancipation, but it soon discovered that the only 
 result of the war was to raise the rank of its dynasty. 
 The battles of Worth and Weissenburg had hardly 
 been fought when the Crown Prince Frederick 
 asked : "And what is to be the position of the 
 King of Prussia after this war?" and he himself 
 furnished the reply: "He must become Emperor!" 
 But why should he become Emperor ? Gustav Freytag^ 
 explained to his prince the dangers of Imperialism: 
 the glamour of Majesty, of Court life, uniforms, etc., 
 would displace the simplebluecoatof theHohenzollerns. 
 The self-importance of the princes would increase the 
 self-importance of the nobles. Not merely the bureau- 
 cracy and the army, but also the people at large would 
 gradually be infected with a snobbish and servile spirit 
 and the highest military commands conferred upon 
 persons on account of their birth, and no longer on 
 account of their proved efficiency. The strong, demo- 
 cratic undercurrent of the time would pass unheeded. 
 And how did the Crown Prince, in the face of these 
 just objections (they read to-day like prophecies), 
 none the less establish his claim to the Imperial crown ? 
 Listen! "When I was in Paris with my father in 
 
 * Gustav Freytag, "Der Kronprinz und die Deutsche Kaiser- 
 krone" [Leipzig, 1889, 8th ed.], p. 21 et seq.: Freytag accom- 
 panied the Crown Prince during the campaign in France, and 
 he tells us in his preface to this work that "the august gentle- 
 man very kindly assured the author that he had understood his 
 friendly intention." 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 113 
 
 1867 during the French Exhibition, the Emperor 
 Napoleon sent word that, seeing that the Emperor 
 of Russia had announced his visit, he wished to learn 
 from the King how he desired the question of the 
 precedence of the distinguished guests to be arranged, 
 and he would do everything in accordance with the 
 King's wishes. Thereupon my father replied : *The 
 Emperor, of course, has precedence. No Hohenzollern 
 ought to say that, it ought not to be true of a Hohen- 
 zollern,' he concluded, fiercely." And this man, who 
 was imagined to be entirely occupied with his plans of 
 campaign, had, in the midst of the stress of war, noth- 
 ing more important to do than to sit down and dictate 
 a memorandum to Count Bismarck, in which he urged 
 energetically the conferring of the Imperial title upon 
 the Hohenzollerns. 
 
 This, then, was the main issue. Before the all- 
 important question, whether the Czar of Russia should 
 in future take precedence of the Hohenzollerns, all 
 other reflections and democratic tendencies of the 
 century were scattered like chaff! No longer to rank 
 below the Czar of Russia; that, in the mind of the 
 Crown Prince, was the pre-eminent question. It was 
 in order that "this should be no longer true of a 
 Hohenzollern" that the German nation had gone to 
 war. 
 
 What a glaring light this casts upon the secret causes 
 leading up to war! Freytag's gossip "out of school" 
 only confirms what history tells us on every page, that 
 behind the fair talk of public weal and liberty there 
 are generally concealed the most terribly trivial 
 dynastic interests. Bismarck, in his "Reflections and 
 Reminiscences," tries to represent himself as having 
 
114 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 first devised the "imperial plan," and carried it through 
 single-handed against a world of opposition, but this 
 was not the case. The Hohenzollerns were less modest 
 than Bismarck's respect and the servility of German 
 professors would have us believe. The Diary^ of the 
 Crown Prince, his memorandum to Bismarck composed 
 at the beginning of the war, Gustav Freytag's notes 
 and other documents, sufficiently demonstrate that 
 the idea of a German Emperor by divine right had 
 ever been a secret ambition of the Hohenzollerns. 
 They had rejected the Imperial crown of the German 
 Democracy in 1848, because their good God, their 
 martial fame, and a victorious army appeared to 
 promise them more stable guarantees than the demo- 
 cratic basis of popular political liberty. 
 
 It is clear then that the assertion that the Franco- 
 Prussian war was undertaken in the cause of the public 
 welfare and of liberty is one of the many pious frauds 
 to be met with everywhere in Germany, when one talks 
 to the people. It is not merely contradicted by the 
 subsequent forty years of German home politics, but 
 also, directly after the war, received a staggering 
 refutation in the remarkable fact that the leading men 
 of Prussia had unhesitatingly, and materially, enriched 
 themselves by the war. Immediately after the con- 
 clusion of peace a so-called Donation Bill was presented 
 to the Reichstag. Moltke received for his glorious 
 part in the campaign a gift of £45,000; and many of 
 
 ^When, at the end of the 'eighties, Prof. Geffken published 
 these Diaries, Bismarck was so incensed that he sent an imme- 
 diate report to the Emperor, took proceedings against Geffken, 
 and had him arrested. But the genuineness of the Diaries could 
 not be questioned, and in January, 1889, Geffken had to be 
 released from custody. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 115 
 
 the other Generals £15,000 or more. Bismarck re- 
 ceived the Sachsenwald Estate. And so forth. For 
 the soldiers, who had actually shed their blood in order 
 to win from France, for the dynasty, the Imperial 
 crown, five milliards of francs, Alsace-Lorraine, and 
 universal prestige, there was nothing left. Again in 
 1910 a reward for the soldiers of 1870 was refused 
 by the Government. 
 
 The Aristotelian theory, that war, like hunting 
 and agriculture, belongs to the natural sources of 
 livelihood (while trade and banking are unnatural), 
 was, despite all modern ideas, brutally confirmed by 
 Prussia in the midst of the nineteenth century. The 
 dynasty of the Hohenzollerns had not only, owing to 
 its victories, risen suddenly from a small Power 
 into the rank of the first European military Power, it 
 had also become materially wealthier, having acquired 
 Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse-Nassau, Hanover, Alsace- 
 Lorraine, five milliards, as well as statesmen and 
 staff officers ^ who made war a personal source of 
 income; to boot, the finest army in the world, a 
 down-trodden people, and a Constitution that only 
 masked and did not curb dynastic omnipotence; 
 that was the harvest of Bismarck's policy. These, 
 as every impartial critic will allow, were purely 
 dynastic gains, which were very soon to develop into 
 distressing losses for the people. One of the few 
 German democrats of those days who did not allow 
 themselves to be led astray by the loquacious humbug 
 of sycophants and orators, namely, the scientist, Karl 
 Vogt, wrote as early as 1870 the prophetic words ^i 
 
 ^ Vide note to p. 46. 
 
 " Karl Vogt, "Politische Briefe an Fr. Kolb," p. 18, Bid, 1870. 
 
il6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 "In my opinion there is nothing whatever behind the 
 whole Bismarck-Moltke machinery save the desire to 
 perpetuate in Germany the iron mlHtary regime, and 
 by a marvellous organisation to keep the whole of 
 Germany *in strict Prussian discipline/ in obedience 
 to its hereditary ruler and in humble subservience to 
 that Providence which is represented on earth by the 
 Government." 
 
 This criticism by an influential German has been 
 completely confirmed by Germany's development 
 during the past forty years. Prussia became the model 
 and the ruler, and made of Germany a modern Sparta, 
 admired by many, feared by most, and sincerely 
 loved by none. Step by step it pursued its iron way, 
 from the formation of the Triple Alliance to its naval, 
 colonial, and world-policy, from the threat to France 
 in 1875 to Tangier, Agadir, and Serajevo, with ever- 
 increasing armaments, with more and more boastful 
 journalists, with more and more servile professors, 
 and more and more undemocratic Social Democrats. 
 A new nation, a strong nation, but also, alas ! a nation 
 which, as a result of political serfdom, unalleviated by 
 any democratic experience, had remained blind to the 
 dangers of despotism; a nation devoted to peaceful la- 
 bour and organisation, arbitrarily cut off from politics, 
 which, in its need for gratitude, unthinkingly attrib- 
 uted the marvellous development of German com- 
 merce and wealth to the results of Bismarck's policy. 
 Prevented by force from attaining political maturity, 
 it rejoiced in its material development, and at last 
 regarded the "strict Prussian discipline" as God-sent 
 pre-eminence in culture. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 117 
 
 William II. and the World Peace 
 
 When William II. ascended the throne, he already- 
 enjoyed the reputation of being a prince of warlike 
 disposition. [Most of the Hohenzollern princes have 
 a similar reputation, from the Emperor William I., 
 who in 1848 was named by the people the "Grapeshot 
 prince'' ("Kartatschenprinz"), down to the present 
 Crown Prince of the German Empire, who with his 
 talk of ''brisk and joyful war/' and so forth, was the 
 despair of every earnest pacifist.] 
 
 William II. quickly showed that he was better than 
 his reputation. In his Speech on the occasion of his 
 accession, on June 25th, 1888, he said: "In foreign 
 politics I am resolved to keep the peace with everyone, 
 as far as in me lies. My devotion to the German army 
 and my position in relation to it will never lead me 
 into the temptation of depriving my country of the 
 blessings of peace, unless the necessity of going to war 
 be imposed on us by an attack on the Empire or its 
 allies. Our army shall safeguard our peace, and if 
 peace should none the less be broken, regain it with 
 honour. This it will not fail to achieve, owing to the 
 strength afforded it by the last Army Bill, which you 
 passed imanimously. It is far from my ideas to utilise 
 this power for offensive purposes. Germany needs no 
 further martial glory, nor any conquests whatsoever, 
 now that it has, finally, conquered its right to exist 
 as a united and independent State." 
 
 This speech was joyfully welcomed by the German 
 people and sympathetically approved in foreign 
 countries. To be sure, the subsequent utterances of 
 the monarch very soon aroused the disapproval and 
 
ii8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 indignation of the people, notably, that notorious 
 speech on the occasion of swearing in the recruits at 
 Potsdam (November 23rd, 1891), in which, with an 
 unmistakable allusion to social democracy, he enjoined 
 upon his soldiers to shoot down father and mother at 
 his orders should necessity arise; but our nation is, 
 like all nations, optimistic. The imperial speeches at 
 Hamburg and at the opening of the Kiel Canal (June 
 1 8th and 21st, 1895), which were again clear manifes- 
 tations of the Emperor's love of peace, were enthusi- 
 astically received throughout Germany. 
 
 As a result of the great talent for speech-making of 
 William II., a whole book could be filled with the 
 speeches he has delivered during his long reign in which 
 he again and again emphasised his desire for peace. 
 Particularly notable in this respect are his speeches 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle on June 19th, 1902, in which he 
 emphasised the spiritual nature of the German world- 
 empire, and that delivered at Bremen on March 22nd, 
 1905. 
 
 But what concerns us democrats and pacifists is 
 not whether a dynasty desires peace (that we demand 
 of it in this modern world as a matter of course), but 
 how it proposes to secure peace and whether its actions 
 are in agreement with its words. In the above-men- 
 tioned speech on his accession, William II. is already 
 speaking of "our army" which is to maintain the 
 peace for us. On October 5th, 1899, we find William 
 II. saying to the Prince of Wales : "Germany possesses 
 an army corresponding to its needs; and, if the 
 British nation has a fleet corresponding to its needs, 
 this will be regarded by the whole of Europe as an 
 important factor in the maintenance of peace." In 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 119 
 
 his Bremen speech of 1905 he certainly stated that we 
 ''never aspire to an empty world dominion," yet he 
 added, "with every new battleship that leaves the 
 yards we have one more guarantee of peace on earth," 
 and *'that we can stand, hand on sword, shield lying 
 before us on the ground, and exclaim: Tament let 
 come what will come." The Emperor's idea that peace 
 could only be sustained by strong and ever stronger 
 armies was still more clearly expressed in his Konigs- 
 berg speech of August 25th, 1910, in which he said: 
 " ... so we will be always on the alert, above all 
 keeping our armour without a flaw, in view of the 
 tremendous progress our neighbouring Powers have 
 made. For our peace rests entirely upon our arma- 
 ment." 
 
 And like an echo it is repeated in the book "Deutsch- 
 land in Waff en" ("Germany in Arms"), to which the 
 Crown Prince contributed a preface, that "The sword 
 will, until the end of all things, ever remain the decisive 
 factor." 
 
 Upon what then, in the Emperor's mind, does the 
 security of the world's peace rest? Upon armies, 
 battleships, preparations for war, that is to say, upon 
 a constant increase of war material, of militarism, and 
 of the fear which these inspire? The German Emper- 
 or's love of peace cannot be better illustrated than by 
 a consideration of the following facts : 
 
 The whole policy of William II. towards France 
 was permeated by a certain graciousness. The 
 holding of the international conference for the protec- 
 tion of labour at Berlin (1890) aroused in France, 
 which had just overcome the Boulangist danger, uni- 
 versal approbation, and William II. was proclaimed as 
 
120 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the "Protector of the peace of Europe." Jules Simon, 
 whom the Emperor WilHam 11. honoured with his 
 special friendship, published in 1894 in the Revue de 
 Paris his impressions of the Berlin Court, obtained 
 after long residence in that city. They amount to 
 an enthusiastic appreciation of the young monarch, 
 which gained for the latter many friends in France. 
 Among other matters, Jules Simon narrates the 
 following observation which William II. made to him 
 relative to a possible collision between Germany and 
 France: "Therefore, I regard the man who should 
 try to drive Germany and France into a war as 
 both a fool and a criminal." Whenever France was 
 shocked by any disaster (the assassination of Carnot, 
 the death of Jules Simon, the fire at the Paris Charity 
 bazaar, the loss of the Bourgogne, the mine explosion 
 of Courriere, etc., etc.), the German Emperor was 
 always ready with his telegrams of sympathy, which 
 were intended to improve the strained Franco-German 
 relations, but were regarded by the French people as a 
 proof of the Emperor's sympathy and desire for peace. 
 The Emperor, on the death of the valiant defender of 
 St. Privat, Marshal Canrobert, even went so far as to 
 express his deep sympathy with the family. In this 
 manner he wished to prove to the French that he was 
 chivalrously and peaceably inclined. 
 
 Now compare this demonstration with the fact that 
 William IL, neither on the decease of the great pacifist, 
 Bertha von Suttner, nor on any other occasion, 
 addressed a word of encouragement to those pacifists 
 whose purpose it was to secure peace, not by military 
 intimidation, but by the methods of civil law, that is 
 to say, by the development of international law. He 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 121 
 
 had such an admiration for the hero of St. Privat 
 that he made his death the occasion for a declaration 
 of his peaceable intentions. For the gifted woman who 
 had championed the new ideal of justice and peace he 
 had, despite the fact that she sprang from a highly 
 aristocratic Austrian family, not a word. 
 
 It may now be asserted that the Emperor's love 
 of peace was genuine, with the proviso that it was 
 diametrically opposed to the demands of modern 
 humanity, and was so ill-suited to the times in which 
 we live that it was bound, in the long run, to jeopardise 
 the peace of the world. 
 
 The Hague Conference and its Consequences 
 This present catastrophe had been long foretold. 
 People like Tolstoy and Iwan Bloch in Russia; 
 Frederic Passy, d'Estournelles de Constant, and Jean 
 Jaures in France; Bertha von Suttner, A. H. Fried, 
 and Bebel in Germany ; Herbert Spencer and Norman 
 Angell in England, etc., etc., had again and again 
 declared that Europe was in an unstable condition; 
 that the armaments, which were ostensibly intended 
 to secure peace, as a matter of fact undermined 
 peace, and that the time was at hand when civilised 
 Europe must finally emancipate itself from these 
 barbaric peace-guarantees by forcible methods, and 
 through the development of international law, force 
 its way to a peace based upon the principles of civil 
 law. This modern pacifist idea, which was expounded 
 by Grotius, the Dutchman, and the French abbot de 
 Saint Pierre, and raised by Kant, the German, to a 
 legal science, had gradually, in spite of wars and 
 imperial speeches, found enormous support in the 
 
122 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 world, and to the delight and surprise of the universe 
 was, in 1898, presented to civilised humanity for 
 practical discussion by a dynasty. 
 
 The Czar of All the Russias, Nicolas II., on August 
 24th, 1898, invited the Governments of all the States 
 to an International Congress, in order to discuss 
 the possibilities of general disarmament and arbitra- 
 tion. This action is so much in conflict with the 
 main thesis of this book, that I am bound to mention 
 it as a laudable exception to the general rule. It 
 was, in fact, neither the French Republic nor the 
 English democracy that offered this glad hope to the 
 world, but a dynasty by divine right, which was, by 
 reason of its whole tradition, regarded as being the 
 most reactionary in Europe, and from which we 
 might least of all have expected such a step. I need 
 hardly say that we democrats and pacifists have a 
 deep abhorrence of the banishments to Siberia, the 
 pogroms and gallows of Russian policy. We are the 
 first to be horrified at the sufferings of the Russian 
 people, and to place them to the account of the Russian 
 dynasty. Yet all this cannot prevent us from recog- 
 nising in Nicolas 11. a man who, sympathising with the 
 ideas of Tolstoy and Bloch, clearly perceiving the state 
 of the world, honestly endeavoured,^ despite all 
 dynastic traditions, to establish peace on some other 
 basis than invincible armaments, sharpened swords, 
 and dry powder. 
 
 ^The incorrigible professor of "history," Schiemann, whose 
 oracular sayings are repeated by the whole German national 
 Press, demonstrates, of course from the height of his "science," 
 that the Czar summoned this Conference only out of fear of 
 England {vide "Ein Verleumder," Berlin, 1915, p. 9 et seq.). 
 I propose that in the future treaty of peace an international 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 123 
 
 The Czar's proposal was hailed with great enthu- 
 siasm by the civilised world, and not least by Germany, 
 but not by the German Government. What? Was 
 there to be any other basis of peace than armies and 
 battleships ready for immediate action? Prussia's 
 whole tradition and political conceptions were doomed 
 if such were the case. Hence, our dynasty regarded the 
 Czar's proposals as so absurd that, from the first day 
 it made no disguise of its attitude. Scarcely two 
 weeks had elapsed from the Czar's manifesto when, 
 on September 7th, 1898, William XL declared at Oyn- 
 hausen : "Believe me, peace will never be better safe- 
 guarded than by a perfectly organised and prepared 
 German army. . . . God grant that it may always 
 be possible for us to preserve the world's peace with 
 this sharp and well-kept arm." This was a categorical 
 rejection of the Czar's ideas. The German Press was 
 so much the more compelled to recognise it as such 
 in that, the following December, a new Army Bill 
 was introduced in the new Reichstag. As a reply to 
 the Czar's proposal, the German Government demanded 
 a vote of about 2y miUions more for the equipment of 
 the army. There is an almost comic contradiction 
 in the fact that in the Imperial Speech at the opening 
 of the Reichstag (on December 6th, 1898) the "press- 
 ing necessity" of this increase in the new army budget 
 
 agreement shall be contained to this effect: "Whosoever, as 
 public political writer or speaker, in questions of foreign pol- 
 itics, knowingly and demonstrably perverts the truth shall, in 
 the name of Peace, be punished with. . . ." By this means one 
 would checkmate the mischief-making and deliberate instigators 
 of war, and, in the interests of peace, free Europe from a danger 
 which, under the cloak of learning, is a disgrace to civilised 
 humanity. 
 
124 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 is emphasised, and ( following it) "the warm sympathy" 
 with which William II. greets "the noble suggestion of 
 my dear friend — His Majesty the Czar of Russia — 
 for the meeting of an International Conference.'* 
 
 Acting on the hints conveyed by the Imperial 
 speech at Oynhausen, the German Press commenced 
 to treat the idea of disarmament and arbitration as 
 childish utopianism, or a cunning trap for Germany. 
 When, in spite of all these attempts to frustrate it, 
 the Conference proposed by the Czar nevertheless 
 took place in May, 1899, the German delegates were 
 instructed by th.eir Imperial Government to wreck the 
 whole magnificent plan. These delegates, who, be it 
 remembered, did not represent at The Hague the views 
 and wishes of the German people, but, as the personal 
 nominees of the German Emperor, only those of the 
 German dynasty, were Count Miinster, the German 
 Ambassador at Paris, the Munich professor, Baron 
 von Stengel, Privy Councillor Dr. Zorn, professor at 
 Konigsberg, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, and 
 Captain von Siegel of the Imperial Navy. 
 
 The very selection of these delegates was equivalent 
 to a mockery of the idea of disarmament, for, only a 
 few weeks previously. Professor Stengel had published 
 a violent pamphlet against the Czar's proposal. 
 
 The attitude of the German delegates aroused the 
 indignation of the other members of the Conference. 
 
 At the fifth sitting of the Commission (June 26thj 
 1899) Colonel von Schwarzhoff replied to the Russian 
 proposal that the Powers should pledge themselves 
 not to increase their armies for the present, and then 
 enter into an agreement not to increase for a definite 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 125 
 
 period the existing strength of their armies, in these 
 terms : 
 
 'The German nation is not oppressed by the burden 
 of armament and taxation; it is not sHding down- 
 wards on a steep path; it is not advancing towards 
 ruin and exhaustion. On the contrary; both public 
 and private wealth are increasing, the general wealth, 
 the standard of life is rising year by year." And then 
 he shelters himself behind technical questions, main- 
 tains that there is a great difference between a domestic 
 law voting the army for five years and a binding 
 international convention, etc., and, finally, ends by 
 declaring categorically that he cannot accept the 
 proposal. 
 
 In the question of obligatory arbitration, Pro- 
 fessor Zorn stated his views in the seventh meeting 
 of the third Commission (July 20th, 1899) as follows : 
 "to take this momentous step without sufficient 
 experience seems to me dangerous and likely to lead 
 to dissension rather than to harmony. I think that 
 the German nation is not alone in regarding the 
 question from this point of view." And, that there 
 should be no mistake, he adds. "Had the article 
 (touching obligatory arbitration) had a formal juristic 
 character, it would have been unacceptable to me. 
 In this case, I should have been in complete accord 
 with the objections raised by the representatives of 
 the Balkan States. As it stands, it has no formal 
 juristic character whatever, it only contains a recom- 
 mendation of a purely moral nature. In other 
 words : I refuse obligatory arbitration, but I willingly 
 accept optional arbitration, because it does not bind 
 us to anything." 
 
126 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Professor Zorn further advanced in the commission 
 of inquiry that the German Government could 
 only deliver its opinion as to the organisation of a 
 permanent Court of Arbitration after having had 
 previous experience of a temporary one. Zorn, in 
 obedience to his instructions, refused to be talked 
 round, and again declared that, for the present, he 
 could only agree to a "temporary" permanent Court 
 of Arbitration.^ 
 
 It was Professor Zorn also who resolutely insisted 
 on the removal of the word ''Tribunal" and demanded 
 the title "Cour permanente d'arbitrage," instead of 
 the original "Tribunal permanent d'arbitrage." We 
 see here the same spirit at work as that which, fifteen 
 years later, prompted the writing of the arrogant 
 words: "It is impossible for us to drag our ally, 
 in its dispute with Serbia, before a European court" 
 (German White Book, Exhibit 12). The actions of 
 
 ^In the course of the World War, Professor Zorn, in a con- 
 troversy with the French senator, d'Estournelles de Constant, 
 and the Swiss professor, O. Nippold, has been forced to confess 
 that the attitude of the German representatives at The Hague 
 left something to be desired (vide Nos. 1134, 1171, and 1278 of 
 the Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 1916). Professor Zorn, who is still 
 in an official position, cannot, of course, admit that the asser- 
 tion of d'Estournelles de Constant and Nippold (that the repre- 
 sentatives of the German Government had, in obedience to in- 
 structions, thwarted the endeavours of the Conference) is in all 
 points correct, and can be substantiated by numerous documents. 
 Yet his assurances to the contrary lack the note of sincerity. 
 Moreover, with all due respect to Professor Zorn's scientific 
 knowledge, we must strongly question his impartiality. Pro- 
 fessor Zorn is not a free agent. Anyone who is capable of 
 writing such an article as he published in the Woche ("Un- 
 serm Kaiser," January 23rd, 1915) — a specimen of the most 
 absolute submission and servility — has forfeited the right to 
 have a voice in the republic of Letters. ' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 127 
 
 God-ordained dynasties are not subject to the juris- 
 diction of ordinary mortals. 
 
 It is impossible here to enter into all the details of 
 the negotiations. But I cannot forbear to cite a few 
 passages from a book^ by the President of the Amer- 
 ican delegation to The Hague. These passages have 
 the value of historical documents. Mr. Andrew White 
 writes on May 24th : 
 
 '^Meeting Count Miinster, who, after M. de Staal, 
 is very generally considered the most important per- 
 sonage here, we discussed the subject of arbitration. 
 To my great regret, I found him entirely opposed 
 to it, or at least to any well-developed plan. He 
 did not say that he would oppose a moderate 
 plan for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that 
 arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that 
 Germany is prepared for war as no other country 
 is or can be; that she can mobilise her army in ten 
 days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other 
 Power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply 
 give rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, 
 and would therefore be a great disadvantage to 
 Germany.'' 
 
 Again, under date June 12th: 
 
 *'More surprising was the conversation of Count 
 Miinster. Bearing in mind that the Emperor William, 
 during his long talk with me just before I left Berlin, 
 in referring to the approaching Peace Congress, had 
 said that he was sending Count Miinster because what 
 
 * Andrew D. White, "My Autobiography." White was at that 
 time American Ambassador in Berlin, and, as can be gathered 
 from his book, a personal friend of William II. and was well 
 acquainted with and a sincere admirer of Germany. 
 
128 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Conference would most need would be 'common 
 sense,' and because, in his opinion, Count Miinster 
 had 'lots of it,' some of the Count's utterances 
 astonished me. He now came out, as he did the day 
 before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration, 
 declaring it a 'humbug,' and that we had no right to 
 consider it, since it was not mentioned in the first 
 proposals from Russia, etc. 
 
 "It is clear that, with all his fine qualities — and he 
 is really a splendid specimen of an old-fashioned 
 German nobleman devoted to the diplomatic service 
 of his country — he is saturated with the ideas of fifty 
 years ago." 
 
 Again, June 13th, he writes: 
 
 ''This morning come more disquieting statements 
 regarding Germany. There seems to longer any doubt 
 that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration 
 and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference, and 
 that he will insist on his main allies, Austria and Italy, 
 going with him. ... I had learned from a high 
 Imperial official, before I left Berlin, that the Emperor 
 considered arbitration as derogatory to his sovereignty, 
 and I was also well aware, from his conversation, that 
 he was by no means in love with the Conference idea; 
 but, in view of his speech at Wiesbaden, and the peti- 
 tions which had come in to him from Bavaria, I had 
 hoped that he had experienced a 'change of heart.' 
 
 "Possibly he might have changed his opinion 
 had not Count Miinster been here, reporting to him 
 constantly against every step taken by the Conference. 
 . . . There is no telling what stumbling blocks Ger- 
 many and her allies may put in our way; and, of 
 course, the whole result, without their final agreement, 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 129 
 
 will seem to the world a failure and, perhaps, a ^farce.* 
 
 'The immediate results will be that the Russian 
 Emperor will become an idol of the 'plain people' 
 throughout the world, the German Emperor will be 
 bitterly hated, and the Socialists, who form the most 
 dreaded party on the Continent of Europe, will be 
 furnished with a thoroughly effective weapon against 
 their rulers. 
 
 "Some days ago I said to a leading diplomatist 
 here : 'The Ministers of the German Emperor ought 
 to tell him that, should he oppose arbitration, there 
 will be concentrated upon him an amount of hatred 
 which no Minister ought to allow a sovereign to incur.' 
 To this he answered : 'That is true ; but there is 
 not a Minister in Germany who dares tell him/ " 
 
 June 15th: 
 
 "I then spoke very earnestly to him — more so than 
 ever before — about the present condition of affairs. I 
 told him that the counsellors in whom the Emperor 
 trusted — such men as himself and the principal 
 advisers of His Majesty — ought never to allow their 
 young sovereign to be exposed to the mass of hatred, 
 obloquy, and opposition which would converge upon 
 him from all nations in case he became known to the 
 whole world as the sovereign who had broken down 
 the Conference and brought to naught the plan of 
 arbitration. I took the liberty of telling him what 
 the Emperor said about the Count himself — namely, 
 that what the Conference was most likely to need was 
 good common sense, and that he was sending Count 
 Miinster because he possessed that. This seemed to 
 please him, and I then went on to say that he of all 
 men ought to prevent, by all means, placing the young 
 
130 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Emperor in such a position. I dwelt on the gifts and 
 graces of the young sovereign, ' expressed my feehng 
 of admiration for his noble ambitions, for his abilities, 
 for the statesmanship he had recently shown, for his 
 grasp of public affairs, and for his way of conciliating 
 all classes, and then dwelt on the pity of making such 
 a monarch an object of hatred in all parts of the 
 world. 
 
 "He seemed impressed by this, but said the calling 
 of the Conference was simply a political trick — the 
 most despicable trick ever practised. It was done, he 
 said, mainly to embarrass Germany, to glorify the 
 young Russian Emperor, and to put Germany and na- 
 tions which Russia dislikes into a false position. To 
 this I answered, *If this be the case, why not trump the 
 Russian trick? or, as the poker players say, "go one 
 better," take them at their word, support a good 
 tribunal of arbitration more efficient even than the 
 Russians have dared to propose; let your sovereign 
 throw himself heartily into the movement and become 
 a recognised leader and power here ; we will all support 
 him, and to him will come the credit of it.' " 
 
 June 1 6th: 
 
 "This morning Count Miinster called and seemed 
 much excited by the fact that he had received a des- 
 patch from Berlin in which the German Government — 
 which, of course, means the Emperor — had strongly 
 and finally declared against anything like an arbitra- 
 tion tribunal. He was clearly disconcerted by this too 
 literal acceptance of his own earlier views. . . . 
 
 "Later Count Miinster told me that he had decided 
 to send Professor Zom to Berlin at once in order to 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 131 
 
 lay the whole matter before the Foreign Office and 
 induce the authorities to modify the instructions. I 
 approved this course strongly, whereupon he suggested 
 that I should do something to the same purpose, and 
 this finally ended in the agreement that Holls should go 
 with Zom." 
 
 Mr. White wrote a long private note to Herr von 
 Biilow (then a persona grata with William II.), ex- 
 plaining the intricacies of the case and imploring him 
 to bring the Emperor to reason : "I present them to you 
 as man to man, not only in the interest of good rela- 
 tions between Germany and the United States, but of 
 interests common to all the great nations of the earth — 
 of their common interest in giving something like 
 satisfaction to a desire so earnest and widespread as 
 that which has been shown in all parts of the world for 
 arbitration." 
 
 All in vain. 
 
 On June 21st Mr. White had to make the following 
 entry in his diary : 
 
 "Billow has sent to the Emperor my long private 
 letter to himself, urgently urging the acceptance by 
 Germany of our plan of arbitration. Prince Hohenlohe 
 seems to have entered most cordially into our ideas, 
 giving Holls a card which would admit him to the 
 Emperor, and telegraphing a request that His Majesty 
 see him. But the Emperor was still upon his yacht at 
 sea, and Holls could stay no longer. Biilow is trying 
 to make an appointment for him to meet the Emperor 
 at the close of the week.'* 
 
 The battle was lost. White, on July 29th, made the 
 following ironical entry in reference to the solemn final 
 sitting of The Hague Conference : 
 
132 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 ''Count Miinster, the presiding delegate from 
 Germany, replied in French, and apparently extempo- 
 raneously. It must have been pain and grief to him, 
 for he was obliged to speak respectfully in the first 
 place of the Conference, which for some weeks he had 
 affected to despise; and, secondly, of arbitration and 
 the other measures proposed, which he had denounced 
 as humbug; and, finally, he had to speak respectfully 
 of M. de Staal, to whom he had steadily shown de- 
 cided dislike. He did the whole thing quite well, all 
 things considered." 
 
 No progressively inclined German reader can fail 
 to read these sketches by a (''neutral") high-minded 
 American without a pang. They afford a glimpse 
 behind the scenes of the workings of the world's 
 history. Whilst a comedy of good will is being played 
 upon the stage, behind it the powers of progress are 
 desperately striving against the forces of darkness. As 
 disarmament is impossible in face of the dynastic 
 power, the dynastic conception is victorious all along 
 the line. The first Hague Conference firstly renounced 
 the idea of disarmament, and, secondly, that of obliga- 
 tory arbitration. Its whole result remained a possible 
 arbitration tribunal which in practice is worthless. 
 
 The German delegates, in conformity with their 
 instructions, and owing to their petty bureaucratic 
 objections, rendered a question of vital import for the 
 world at large null and void, and as a reward for this 
 meritorious work Count Miinster received the title of 
 "Prince" from the Emperor. 
 
 Given the choice between mediaevalism and modern- 
 ism, that is to say, between brute force and the modern 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 133 
 
 civilised conception of peace guarantees, the dynasty, 
 here again in accordance with the Imperial Constitu- 
 tion, declared itself for "the maintenance of existing 
 conditions." How could it be otherwise? For the 
 first time in the world's history The Hague Confer- 
 ences endeavoured to create that "League of Nations" 
 demanded by Kant as a "fundamental condition" of 
 eternal peace. But Kant clearly stated : "the civil 
 constitution of every State must be republican!" In 
 fact, the conception of peace by rightful methods 
 can only be realised when all States have a more or 
 less republican form of government. This self-evident 
 condition of international understanding has hitherto 
 (for obvious reasons) not been insisted on by any 
 leading representative of the science of pacifism, but 
 it is logically contained in the whole idea. For the 
 chief aim of The Hague Conferences was, after all, 
 the final extirpation of the divine right of dynasties 
 to dictate war and peace. 
 
 We do not know how Nicholas II., in a given case, 
 would have responded to this fundamental demand 
 expressed by Kant. But we have seen, from the 
 conduct of the German delegates at The Hague, that 
 William II. strongly disapproved of it. William II. 
 has never recognised the right of national assemblies. 
 And even supposing that, in the interests of the world's 
 peace, he had been prepared, for his own part, to 
 renounce a portion of his sovereignty — that is to say, 
 in questions of foreign policy to admit the co-operation 
 and control of the Reichstag — would he have been able 
 to do so? He was, in fact, bound hand and foot by 
 that Camarilla which, in the absence of a controlling 
 
134 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 national assembly, always surrounds the person of 
 an absolute ruler. Wherever, as in Prusso-Germany, 
 the responsible advisers and popular representatives 
 are reduced to mere ciphers, the reins of power pass 
 into the hands of the irresponsible. 
 
 The omnipotence of those irresponsible advisers, 
 founded on Article 1 1 of the German Imperial Consti- 
 tution, the impotence of the German popular assembly, 
 and the absolute belief of William II. in his divine 
 mission; these, as everywhere else, were the decisive 
 factors in ''our'* attitude at The Hague. Hand in glove 
 with the Turk, we had demonstrated to the world that 
 we were that European nation which, in defiance of all 
 democratic tendencies, obstinately held to our "shining 
 armour" and our "faultless equipment;" that is to 
 say, were prepared to pit our military might against 
 the noblest aspirations of civilised humanity. A man 
 of a world-wide reputation, like Mommsen, could scoff 
 at The Hague Conferences as being a "printer's 
 error" in the world's history, and gain the applause 
 of the Government Press. The National Liberal 
 leader, Bassermann, told the Reichstag that "a more 
 pacific review of the situation" would only ensue when 
 The Hague Conferences were "happily vanquished.'* 
 No less ironic and contemptuous were the expressions 
 of the Prussian Minister of War of that time.^ All 
 persons of reputation and influence in Germany con- 
 sidered themselves, with a few exceptions, bound to 
 follow the Government's lead and to represent The 
 
 * Vide, A. H. Fried, "Handbuch der Friedensbewegung," vol. 2, 
 p. 174. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 135 
 
 Hague Conferences as utopianism or a cunning device 
 on the part of Germany's enemies.^ 
 
 Thus Germany, in the midst of a world filled with 
 new aspirations and hopes, deliberately isolated herself. 
 Instead of here taking the lead (as would have been 
 only becoming in the Fatherland of Kant), and thus 
 making herself a link between Western and Eastern 
 civilisation, our dynasty insisted that in the future, 
 as hitherto, the Rhine, and not the Vistula, should be 
 the frontier between democracy and autocracy. In 
 sure reliance upon its military invincibility, our 
 Government, with an allusion to the geographical 
 position of Germany, declared for the perpetuation 
 of a policy which, just by reason of this geographical 
 position, was the most dangerous for Germany that 
 could be conceived of. 
 
 For what was the result of The Hague Conferences? 
 An unconquerable mistrust of Germany by all other 
 States and, as a consequence of this, their natural 
 desire for union and protection. Thus it was our 
 dynasty that itself created the menace of which it 
 to-day so bitterly complains. 
 
 Republican France was not linked to imperial 
 Russia by any ties. The former was the birthplace 
 of the rights of civilisation and humanity, the land of 
 liberty and of popular government; the latter a still 
 
 * Moreover, the German Press and the German White Book 
 relative to The Hague Conferences v^ere forced to falsify the 
 account of the negotiations at The Hague; otherv^^ise, the 
 German reader might not have understood the brutally unac- 
 commodating attitude of the German delegates (c/. Schiicking, 
 "Die Organisation der Welt." Alfr. Kroner, Leipzig, 1909, p. 
 605, and O. Nippold, "Die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz." 
 Duncker und Humblot, Leipzig, vol. 2, p. 201). 
 
136 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 semi-barbaric police- and official-ridden State, devoid 
 of constitution and culture, the most crying contrast 
 to France. It was Bismarck who, in spite of the 
 formation of the Triple Alliance, contrived for two 
 whole decades to maintain the so-called "insurance 
 policy" with Russia. William II. embarked upon a 
 new course, which first revealed itself in the dismissal 
 of the Russophil Chancellor. Hardly two years had 
 elapsed, when the Romanoffs, who had always been 
 the allies of the Hohenzollerns, became the allies of 
 republican France. This unnatural alliance, as we 
 must repeat again and again to those who bemoan 
 the "encirclement of Germany,'^ only took place ten 
 years after the formation of the Triple Alliance. Until 
 about 1900 it had remained more or less undefined. 
 But when Germany had laid its cards on the table at 
 The Hague, it took such a positive form that France, 
 now feeling its increased security, was enabled to 
 realise a long-desired popular reform, and in 1905 in- 
 troduced the two-years' military service. 
 
 But the lesson of The Hague influenced England's 
 policy to a still greater degree. Nothing could seem- 
 ingly have brought the English and the French to- 
 gether. They were separated by quarrels dating cen- 
 turies back. Both Louis XIV.'s colonial aspirations 
 and those of Napoleon I. had been ruthlessly annihi- 
 lated by the English. They had, in league with Prus- 
 sia, overthrown the aspiration for world-empire of the 
 Capets as they had that of the Great Corsican. The 
 Boer War and the humiliation of Fashoda had, to- 
 wards the close of the nineteenth century, so aggra- 
 vated the Anglo-French antagonism that numerous 
 distinguished French politicians had declared : "With 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 137 
 
 Germany against perfidious Albion!" Professor 
 Oncken^ even tells us that France and Russia, "when 
 the Boer War was at its height . . . addressed a pro- 
 posal to the German Government to join with them 
 in forcibly bringing the war to a conclusion, and 
 thus save the Boers and humble England to the dust." 
 Now it was doubtless a fact that William II. re- 
 fused this Franco-Russian suggestion in order, as 
 Professor Oncken says, "not to come into conflict 
 with a naval Power like England." But Oncken, 
 alas! does not inform us why William II. did not at 
 least utilise this splendid chance of ameliorating Ger- 
 many's relations both with France and Russia, and 
 of aggravating England's dangerous "splendid isola- 
 tion," at any rate morally, by relieving the Franco- 
 German tension. 
 
 Here, as always, William 11. followed his own 
 plans. He had long before this, by his sudden initia- 
 tion of a very ambitious naval and colonial poHcy, 
 converted the centuries-old sympathy of England for 
 Prussia into silent mistrust. This mistrust turned to 
 indignation when, on January 3rd, 1896, William II. 
 dispatched that notorious telegram to the President of 
 the South African Republic, congratulating him on 
 having "annihilated the armed forces that had broken 
 the peace and invaded his country, and preserved its 
 independence against attacks from without." Wil- 
 liam II. certainly endeavoured to make good this pub- 
 lic insult by conferring the Order of the Black Eagle 
 upon Lord Roberts, and making his troops, in Sep- 
 tember, 1897, cheer Queen Victoria, etc. But when 
 at Stettin (September 23rd, 1898) he uttered the 
 
 ^ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 478. 
 
138 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 phrase that subsequently became a winged word In 
 Germany, "Our future lies on the water !" then, even 
 the dullest Englishman understood that the "new 
 course" was a zigzag one, the aim of which was hid- 
 den from the ordinary mortal, but that it was in any 
 event a course hostile to England. 
 
 Yet in vain England looked around for friends. 
 The Russians in East Asia and Persia, the French in 
 Morocco and Egypt, were against her. The sym- 
 pathies of the entire world were then on the side of 
 the little Boer nation, struggling so heroically for its 
 independence. No one wanted to have anything to 
 do with the Englishman. Ever since Napoleon's days 
 he had been decried as a selfish, brutal shopkeeper, 
 and his oversea policy brought him into conflict with 
 the whole world. Then came the first Hague Con- 
 ference. What ten years of English friendliness to- 
 wards France could not effect was achieved in a few 
 months by the attitude of the German Government 
 at The Hague Conference, namely, the Anglo-French 
 rapprochement, and, at the same time, the consolida- 
 tion of the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
 
 The whole perspective was changed in a moment. 
 Yesterday isolated and hated, to-day England pos- 
 sessed two powerful friends: "We" had, almost by 
 force, driven them into her arms. Yesterday in a po- 
 sition to gain Franco-Russian sympathies, or at any 
 rate to keep the old English sympathies, Germany to- 
 day found herself suddenly isolated, mistrusted and 
 
 feared by the whole world. 
 
 ***** 
 
 The German dynasty did not perceive in this threat- 
 ening aspect of things the fruits of her military co- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 139 
 
 ercive policy. The Power that possesses the strongest 
 army in the world is infallible. When, in 1907, the 
 second Hague Conference was called, in order, in spite 
 of the first plain refusal of the German Government, 
 to continue nevertheless the difficult task of securing 
 a democratic guarantee of peace, the opportunity was 
 not made use of by William II. in order to conciliate 
 and to disarm the democratic coalition of Europe 
 against him (it would have been such an easy and 
 graceful task) ; but he continued in his old paths. He 
 did not, to be sure, again dispatch the same uncouth 
 delegates to The Hague, but, on this occasion, men 
 with better manners and better intentions; but he 
 would not recede a single inch from his conception of 
 peace as based upon force of arms.^ 
 
 As in 1899, so also in 1907, Germany was again the 
 sole Great Power that formally rejected the institution 
 of compulsory arbitration, and so nullified the chief 
 task of the second Hague Conference. Baron Mar- 
 shall von Bieberstein, president of the German dele- 
 gation, in the fourth sitting of the first Commission 
 (October 5th, 1907), in reply to the proposals to com- 
 
 ^ Even before its opening, the second Hague Conference was 
 treated in the Reichstag with mockery and derision (sittings 
 of April 23rd, 24th, and 30th, 1907). The Prussian Minister 
 for War, von Einem, jeered: "The Governments will, in any 
 case, put forward still further demands." The anti-Semitic 
 Liebermann von Sonnenberg remarked contemptuously : "This 
 whole peace movement is only a matter for old women and 
 degenerates. We place our trust in God and our superlative 
 army. . . . We have still our mailed fist — let them only come." 
 The Agrarian, Oldenburg von Januschau, said: "If we Con- 
 servatives had our way, we should send the Minister of War 
 to The Hague" (applause from the Conservative benches), 
 etc., etc. 
 
HO THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 pel the nations to submit to arbitration by means of 
 permanent arbitration treaties (world-treaty), stated 
 that he had first to regret that a certain unanimity 
 prevailed in the assembly for making arbitration ob- 
 ligatory; he was sorry to be in the minority; but he 
 could not agree to the system of a compulsory world 
 arbitration treaty. Germany had since 1899 made 
 satisfactory application of the optional arbitration 
 which had been established at that date, and had al- 
 ready concluded two treaties of this character. She 
 would continue in the future to adhere to this **in- 
 dividual system," that is to say, to conclude only such 
 arbitration treaties as she desired. But Germany would 
 not be coerced into concluding such treaties with all 
 the nations of the world. Such compulsion would 
 have an irritating rather than a calming effect upon 
 the world-situation. One must not always be snatch- 
 ing at moral effects and momentary successes; it be- 
 hoved one to seek rather after practical results, etc., 
 etc. Equally emphatic was Privy Councillor Kriege, 
 when he declared before the Commission of Exam- 
 ination on August 6th, 1907: Germany could accept 
 none of the proposals put forward for making ad- 
 justment of disputes by arbitration universally com- 
 pulsory. Just as for a hundred years past in Ger- 
 man internal politics, it was repeatedly asserted by 
 the German delegates at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 
 that the question was not yet ripe; they must not be 
 precipitate; experience must first be collected; too 
 hasty action might effect the exact opposite of what 
 was intended, etc. In the eyes of dynasties, nations 
 are never sufficiently mature to decide their own 
 destinies. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 141 
 
 Owing to this attitude of the German delegates, the 
 second Hague Conference could make but little altera- 
 tion in the resolutions of the first. In fact, it only 
 supplemented them in respect of a few minor points 
 (for instance, the institution of a legal procedure). 
 
 It is noteworthy that even the representative of an 
 Asiatic despotism like Persia declared that the advan- 
 tages of a world arbitration treaty were so great, and 
 the guarantees it offered to the whole world so con- 
 siderable, that it was the duty of the Conference to 
 remove the comparatively insignificant obstacles. 
 
 All in vain! 
 
 When the final vote was given on this proposal, 
 thirty-two States were in its favour, nine against it, 
 and three (among them Italy) refrained from voting. 
 Those against the proposal were Germany, Austria- 
 Hungary, Turkey (upon principle), Rumania (out of 
 friendship for Germany), Bulgaria, Greece, Monte- 
 negro (because they were at that time already pre- 
 paring their war of liberation against Turkey), and 
 finally (for purely formal reasons) Switzerland and 
 Belgium. Seeing that such Conferences do not act 
 like Parliaments, that is to say, the majority does not 
 impose its will upon the minority, but can only pass 
 a resolution upon the basis of unanimity, "the great 
 central problem of the whole Conference" (as Pro- 
 fessor Zorn himself styled compulsory arbitration) 
 was again left unsolved. 
 
 The aim of the German dynasty, therefore, was 
 here, as everywhere else in their foreign policy, to dis- 
 credit the whole principle of international law. The 
 same mentality that approves annexation against the 
 will of the annexed, and, in foreign policy, system- 
 
142 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 atically ignores the popular will, was also bent, in a 
 diplomatic discussion of this principle of international 
 law, on securing its absolute rejection. 
 
 Touching the result of this second Hague Confer- 
 ence, Professor O. Nippold very clearly states:^ *'It 
 appears to me that the German Imperial Government 
 should, from a diplomatic point of view, have ar- 
 rived at an entirely opposite conclusion. . . . For the 
 impression which 'the irreconcilable opposition' of the 
 German Delegation was bound to make upon the other 
 States was a factor impossible to underestimate. 
 ... It is clear, at any rate, that the German Delega- 
 tion, In the case in question, was opposed by general 
 opinion at The Hague, and that it did not allow itself 
 to be influenced by this fact in the slightest degree. 
 The delegates of the other civilised States left The 
 Hague under this Impression. Will not this fact make 
 itself felt politically?" And again, p. 217: 'Twist 
 and turn the objections to the Arbitration Court how 
 you will, they were in any case not of such importance 
 as to justify a nation in so seriously compromising Its 
 whole international and political situation for their 
 sake." 
 
 It had been already sufficiently compromised by the 
 first Hague Conference! Professor Nippold might 
 have added. For the political isolation of Germany 
 had been accomplished at the first Hague Conference. 
 Instead of using the second Conference to recover lost 
 ground our Government completed the "work of en- 
 circlement" of King Edward VII. : the Franco-Russo- 
 English Entente now became an open offensive and 
 defensive alliance against Germany. Germany was 
 
 *"Die Zweite Haager Konferenz," Leipzig, 1908, pp. 213-14. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 143 
 
 now surrounded by a world of "silent foes," less 
 animated by a desire for Germany's military humilia- 
 tion than by a common desire to get rid, once and 
 for all, of that era of useless and yet so expensive 
 competitive armament, which since Bismarck's day 
 had descended upon Europe and stifled all healthy 
 progress. 
 
 Why all Attempts at Understanding were 
 WITHOUT Result 
 
 It must be confessed that the Chauvinists and war 
 parties in France, England, and Russia took full ad- 
 vantage of the new situation of affairs created by 
 the attitude of the German dynasty, and that, owing 
 to their machinations, the warlike mood in those coun- 
 tries became intensified as much as in Germany itself. 
 Germany has not the monopoly of warHke feelings. 
 It is true that no modern State can boast of a Moltke, 
 who regarded war as part of the divine ordinance of 
 the universe, and scoffed at the idea of perpetual peace 
 as a dream, "and not even a beautiful dream." It is 
 true that no other country possesses "thinkers" who, 
 like Hegel, Treitschke, Mommsen, Lasson, Schiemann, 
 Liman, Lamprecht, Bernhardi, Harden, etc., etc., 
 preach war as being the supreme aim of policy; and 
 still less do other countries possess celebrities who, 
 like Clausewitz, Hartmann, Bronsart von Schellen- 
 dorf, von der Goltz, Hindenburg and others, declare 
 a brutal mode of warfare to be the most humane, be- 
 cause it is, so they say, the shortest. But, even if 
 other countries in their intellectual glorification of war 
 are far behind the country of Kant and Goethe, yet 
 in them also there were and are a great number who, 
 
144 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 for one reason or another, have an interest in war. 
 France, England, and Russia have, Hke Germany, a 
 "national Press" which, as has been proved, stands at 
 the service of the manufacturers of war materials and 
 methodically moulds popular opinion in favour of war. 
 They have a war budget, great industries working for 
 war, influential officials, traders, and financiers, whose 
 greed of gain increases with the increasing desire for 
 war. In short, they also possess the same methods, 
 developments, and influences, which, in the case of all 
 Great Powers, foster those phenomena and activities 
 that we collectively style Chauvinism, Nationalism, 
 and so forth. 
 
 It would have been in some degree unnatural if 
 these people and this Press, now that the German 
 dynasty had for the second time flatly refused to agree 
 to an international legal organisation for safeguard- 
 ing the peace, had not been more clamorous than ever ; 
 but, as regards the assertions of the German Govern- 
 ment that the Triple Entente was a cynical land-par- 
 titioning syndicate, that the cause of the war was envy 
 of Germany's increased prosperity, and so forth, it 
 ought in fairness to be mentioned that the forces 
 working for war in France, England, and Russia 
 were dwindling forces, and were not supported by 
 public opinion, and, further, that in no case did they 
 possess any demonstrable and effectual share of po- 
 litical power. 
 
 France, in particular, studiously endeavoured to 
 give Germany no cause for mistrusting her or her 
 policy. In 1905 she dismissed her Minister Delcasse, 
 because the formation of the Triple Entente seemed 
 to have made him arrogant and eager for war. In 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 145 
 
 the same way she not only most readily agreed to 
 all the German proposals in the Morocco affair, but 
 repeatedly made others of her own, as, for instance, 
 in July, 191 1, when Germany, by the dispatch of the 
 Panther, insisted on her claims in Morocco. There is, 
 indeed, in the whole of Germany scarcely a single 
 serious politician who sincerely attempted to assert 
 and prove that the policy of France had during the 
 past ten years been defiant and warlike. Even our 
 Government has never gone so far as to contend that 
 France was to blame for the outbreak of this war. 
 
 Germany much more regards England as responsible 
 for the establishment of the Triple Entente and the 
 outbreak of the World War. But it is easy to show 
 that in England also the elements favourable to war 
 nowhere exercised any appreciable influence upon pub- 
 lic opinion or even upon the Government. Allowing 
 it to be true that the Triple Entente was due to 
 England, it is equally true that England only regarded 
 this entente as a defensive alliance. England's en- 
 deavours to arrive at an understanding with Germany 
 as regards naval armament have in the last ten years 
 been so numerous, so energetic, and so conciliatory, 
 that their genuineness cannot be impugned, and one 
 can only wonder how responsible German politicians 
 can absolutely ignore them. On the occasion of the 
 World-Peace Congress in London (1908), Lloyd 
 George made an enthusiastic speech in favour of an 
 Anglo-German understanding, as did also the Prime 
 Minister Asquith, at the Lord Mayor's banquet in 
 London of the same year. Even more clear in its 
 intention was Asquith's speech in the House of Com- 
 mons on March i6th, 1909, which found an echo in 
 
146 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Reichstag, but was dismissed by our Imperial 
 Chancellor with the remark that he anticipated no 
 tangible results from negotiations touching the limita- 
 tion of naval construction.^ McKenna, First Lord of 
 the Admiralty, stated in the House of Commons in 
 July, 1909, that England in the past three years could 
 show not only words but deeds towards promoting 
 an Anglo-German understanding. 
 
 England's unceasing endeavours to bring about an 
 understanding with Germany were openly acknowl- 
 edged in a sitting of the Reichstag on December loth, 
 19 10, by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who said: 
 "Regarding our relations with England and the al- 
 leged negotiations with her, as to a contractual limita- 
 tion of naval armaments, I must at once say that it 
 is, certainly, piihlici juris, that the British Government 
 has repeatedly expressed the wish to enter into a treaty 
 to this end. The English Government made a like 
 suggestion at The Hague, and has since then repeatedly 
 renewed it, without, however, formulating any definite 
 proposals which could form a basis for acceptance or 
 rejection." It is thoroughly characteristic that this 
 text of the Imperial Chancellor's speech was "modi- 
 fied" by Wolff's Bureau by substituting the words: 
 "fixing of the naval strength" for "limitation of arma- 
 ments."^ 
 
 *In July, 1906, England had reduced her Naval Estimates by 
 25 per cent, for battleships, by 60 per cent, for destroyers, and 
 by 2Z per cent, for submarines, and this voluntarily; and, more- 
 over, expressly declared that she took this step in order, before 
 the meeting of the next Hague Conference, to show the world 
 that she was prepared to take the lead in disarmament, in the 
 hope that other nations would follow suit. 
 
 ^Cf. Bertha von Suttner, "Der Kampf um Vermeidung des 
 Weltkrieges," vol. 2, p. 295 (Orell Fuszli, Zurich, 1917.) 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 147 
 
 The more the English Ministers tried to press our 
 Government for a public discussion of the problem, 
 the cooler the reception they found at the hands of the 
 German Government and the more were they mocked 
 at by our Pan-German Press. In reply to a further 
 request on the part of Sir Edward Grey, Herr von 
 Bethmann Hollweg clearly stated in a sitting of the 
 Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, that the question 
 of disarmament was insoluble "as long as men re- 
 mained men and States remained States." That reads 
 almost Irke a sneer at the repeated English proposals 
 for an understanding. But England's Liberal Min- 
 isters refused to be discouraged; and at the begin- 
 ning of February, 19 12, dispatched their Minister of 
 War — Haldane — on a private mission to Berlin, in 
 order, in a private audience, to consult with the Em- 
 peror and Chancellor as to the possibilities of an under- 
 standing. We are aware to-day, from the Chancel- 
 lor's speech of August 19th, 1915, that our Govern- 
 ment then suggested to England that she should, in 
 the event of a Continental war, in any case, remain 
 neutral ; in other words, separate from the Triple En- 
 tente. England offered to give Germany the formal 
 assurance that she would not attack her, but Germany 
 demanded, in addition, the assurance of English neu- 
 trality in any event. Without acting the traitor to her 
 allies, England could not agree to these terms. 
 
 England made yet more advances. The new Eord 
 of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, stated in the 
 House of Commons, on March i8th, 191 2, that Eng- 
 land was prepared to repeat the experiment of the vol- 
 untary reduction of the fleet, as in 1906; if Germany 
 ceased adding to her armaments or even reduced them. 
 
148 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 England would, in any case, do the same, "which 
 would be a blessing for both countries/' 
 
 And, finally, Churchill, on March 26th, 191 3, pro- 
 posed to Germany a naval holiday of a year to begin 
 with, during which time both countries should engage 
 not to build any new ships of war. 
 
 All to no purpose. The English Ministers were 
 secretly scoffed at in Berlin. How could they pos- 
 sibly, after their experiences at The Hague, seriously 
 persist in clinging to the Utopian idea that Germany 
 desired any other peace-guarantee save that of ever 
 more formidable armaments ? The logic of our lead- 
 ing junkers and Pan-Germanists absolutely annihi- 
 lated the logic of the most enlightened minds in Eng- 
 land: if England built ships, the Reventlows, Rohr- 
 bachs and Chamberlains and their followers exclaimed, 
 Beware ! The English are preparing for war I Why ? 
 It is clear that they intend to attack us. We are lost 
 if we do not also prepare. But if England built no 
 ships and voluntarily reduced her naval estimates, 
 if the Czar proposed a Peace Conference, and the 
 English Admiralty a naval holiday, if France reduced 
 her period of military service? Then, the same gen- 
 tlemen vociferated yet more noisily: Beware! We 
 are going to be tricked ! These English, French, and 
 Russians are so cunning, that they will speak of peace 
 to our face and continue to make preparations for war 
 behind our back. They want to give the stupid honest 
 German another box on the ear. We are done for, if 
 we do not meet these deceitful tricks by a further 
 increase of armaments ! 
 
 If, finally, the responsible leaders of the Entente 
 gave way in despair before this marvellous logic, which 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 149 
 
 was constantly and vigorously re-echoed in the Em- 
 peror's speeches, and if, consequently, the Belgian Min- 
 isters at Petrograd, London, and Paris had to report^ 
 a certain nervousness and warlike mood, who was 
 really to blame? Who did actually "encircle" us? 
 The diplomacy of the Triple Entente, which offered 
 "us" not only one but a hundred opportunities of put- 
 ting things on a different footing? Or was it not 
 rather our dynasty, which, conscious of its military 
 might, in reliance upon its old German God, obstinately 
 stuck to its mediaeval principles, and regarded peace 
 
 ^ It may be mentioned in this connection that the Belgian docu- 
 ments found in Brussels, and since published by Mittler & Sohn, 
 of Berlin, do, as a fact, afford much incriminating evidence 
 touching the policy pursued by the Triple Entente. The majority 
 of writers who wish to exculpate Germany of any guilt in this 
 war studiously avoid reference to The Hague Conference and 
 to the account given by the American Ambassador, Mr. Andrew 
 White, and only talk of the Belgian papers and documents, about 
 which they write whole reams. But it is evident that the Ger- 
 man Government did not publish all the documents found in 
 Brussels. Both dates and numbering show that a careful selec- 
 tion was made. Moreover, it is here, as in most diplomatic 
 reports, a question only of a survey of transitory moods with- 
 out reference to their causes. Diplomatists are not his- 
 torians. Otherwise, they would in the case before us have 
 had to point out that the nervous feelings and tendencies in 
 Paris, London, and Petrograd were but the logical outcome of 
 the German Governm.ent's attitude at The Hague Conference. 
 The preliminary history of the war in the narrower sense 
 begins with July 23rd, 1914, but the preliminary history of the 
 war in the wider, more general sense begins with August 24th, 
 1898, that is to say, with the Czar's Conference proposal. 
 Whoever writes on the history of the "encirclement" with- 
 out referring to The Hague Conferences will describe effects 
 without causes. And it is only considered in relation to this 
 fact that the reports of the Belgian Ministers have any his- 
 torical value. 
 
ISO THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 as being only the fruit of incessant preparations for 
 war? 
 
 And what authentic evidence do the German his- 
 torians possess that this encirclement was part of a 
 malicious plan to compass our humiliation in the field ? 
 I have sought long and conscientiously for actual 
 (that is to say, emanating from the Governments of 
 the Triple Entente) warlike actions or threats; to 
 this end I have read a host of German writing, all 
 of which promised to furnish this evidence. But, 
 alas! here again I had the same experience as in the 
 case of the Serbian machinations, the invasions of 
 Cossacks, the bombs on Nuremberg, and other crimes 
 of the Triple Entente. That is to say, I found nothing 
 but assertions, accompanied by citations of opinions, 
 books, speeches, and manifestoes of the Chauvinists 
 in France, England, and Russia, but never of respon- 
 sible people occupying a position of authority. If 
 books, newspapers, speeches and manifestoes of private 
 people are to be taken to prove anything at all in re- 
 gard to the desire for war of a Government, then this 
 evidence will turn out to our overwhelming disad- 
 vantage. For no country in the world possesses so 
 abundant, so ponderous, so "scientifically" and system- 
 atically constructed a war-literature as the Germany 
 of the last forty years. As far as the Press and the 
 disposition of a certain circle is concerned, we too ap- 
 pear in a very unfavourable light. Only a year be- 
 fore the war Professor Nippold published a little 
 work,^ which contains a most alarming collection of 
 Press extracts and quotations from the most respected 
 
 *Otfried Nippold, "Der deutsche Chauvinismus,' Stuttgart, 
 1913. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 151 
 
 German politicians and newspapers, in which the neces- 
 sity of a war of conquest is frankly alluded to. If 
 there was a League of Patriots in Germany there was 
 a Pan-German League quite ten times as strong, both 
 as regards membership and influence, as well as a 
 Defence League, a Naval League, an Eastern Marches 
 League, a Peasants' League, and other powerful asso- 
 ciations, which, protected by the official good will, 
 devoted their chief energies to popularising the no- 
 tion of conquest, and, since the beginning of the World 
 War have clamoured with one voice for annexations. 
 
 Truly, people who disregard a Crown Prince, a 
 Bernhardi, a Pan-German League, with their enor- 
 mous intellectual, financial, and moral resources, in or- 
 der to heap abuse upon a Delcasse, a Lansdowne, or an 
 Iswolsky, and to draw attention to the machinations 
 of the French League of Patriots, give the impression 
 of people who trip up in the street over a straw, while 
 in their room is a beam, which they do not choose to 
 see.^ 
 
 It looked for a moment as though the German 
 dynasty had at length realised that a new era had 
 dawned, in which disputes between nations could be as 
 
 * As Germans, we have no cause to uphold the policy of Mon- 
 sieur Delcasse. As pacifists, however, we may perhaps recall 
 the fact that on January 23rd, 1893, Delcasse said in the Cham- 
 ber that France had been the first nation to approve the Czar's 
 proposal for disarmament. And he added : "Differences must, 
 unfortunately, always arise between great States, but I be- 
 lieve (the friends of peace have long believed it!) that there 
 are none that it would not be possible to settle by a spirit of 
 conciliation. And in this spirit I settled the Fashoda affair." 
 Has any German statesman of the last decade ever spoken in 
 this way? I have sought for an instance, but I have not found 
 
152 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 easily referred to a civil tribunal as disputes between 
 individuals. On September 25th, 1908, French sol- 
 diers forcibly arrested certain deserters from the For- 
 eign Legion under the protection of the German Con- 
 sul at Casablanca. This episode threatened a serious 
 conflict with France. To the general satisfaction of 
 Europe, this squabble was promptly settled by a de- 
 cision of The Hague Tribunal (May 22nd, 1909). 
 
 This proves that the German dynasty was, in spite 
 of its unaccommodating attitude at The Hague, ready 
 to adapt itself to the new principle of arbitration. 
 Moreover, the peaceful adjustment of the far more 
 momentous Franco-German difference in the matter of 
 the Agadir warship (at the beginning of June, 191 1) 
 seemed to prove that Germany's foreign policy had 
 adopted something of that modern spirit which the 
 whole world was so anxious to see in her. 
 
 In the years Immediately preceding the World War 
 the Reichstag had become a mere shadow of the dy- 
 nastic sun. In the spring of 1912, the Minister for 
 War had solemnly promised that, after passing the 
 moderate Army Bill, it would for a long time not be 
 asked to vote any new Bill for increasing the military 
 strength. As If In mockery of his promise, hardly a 
 year later, the biggest military budget in the history 
 of the world was laid before It. This measure at one 
 stroke raised the strength of the army by 25 per cent., 
 and demanded of the German citizen that. In addition 
 to existing taxation, he should furnish another 
 £40,000,000. Thus, In the midst of peace, a demand 
 was made upon the German people that not even van- 
 quished and ruined France had asked her citizens to 
 agree to, when she had to pay £200,000,000 to Ger- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 153 
 
 many. It was manifest to persons of any penetra- 
 tion that William II. on the one side and the Reichs- 
 tag on the other were puppets in the hands of the 
 militarists and Pan-Germanists and their preposterous 
 requirements (in spite of the fact that they had only 
 a fraction of the people behind them). 
 
 After the passing of the great Defence Bill, a lead- 
 ing Pan-Germanist paper declared triumphantly : "The 
 demands of the Chauvinists or Super-Patriots have 
 been accepted in official circles; and these demands 
 have been approved by those parties that six months 
 previously had more or less condemned them as ex- 
 cessive. In short, people were now brought logically 
 to Chauvinism, or to what was formerly implied by 
 that term" (Tagliche Rundschau, May 23rd, 1913). 
 
 This sounded like mockery and scorn of the "hesi- 
 tating" Government, like open exultation that the Gov- 
 ernment itself had now become "Chauvinist." Under 
 the circumstances, the words spoken by William II. 
 on May 14th, 1891, at Diisseldorf, evoke only a tragic 
 approbation : "I only wish that the peace of Europe 
 lay in my hand alone; I would, at all hazards, take 
 care that it should never be broken." If by these 
 words he undoubtedly wished to express that he was 
 not the sole arbitrator of the destinies of Europe, he 
 was now made to feel that, in reality, he no longer 
 possessed any power, even in his own country, that 
 he had become the captive of the military party, which 
 he had himself instinctively created and supported. 
 
 Premonitions of the Storm 
 
 From this time on matters proceeded without a 
 check. The year 19 13 was marked by the celebration 
 
154 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 with great pomp and jubilation of the centenary of 
 the "Wars of Liberation/* Alas! when I travelled 
 through Germany in this year, I gazed at the Battle 
 of the Nations monument at Leipzig, and I then 
 realised clearly what Germany was and what she in- 
 tended. This massive, clumsy symbol of imperialism 
 confronting the world was the sequel of that Sieges- 
 allee,^ in which Luther and Kant appear so diminutive 
 by the side of the majestic figures of their princes 
 that they have the appearance of being their hired 
 underlings. The Siegesallee glorifies the past ; the 
 Leipzig obelisk the German present and future. There 
 is nothing in this pyramidal work that is not awk- 
 ward, clumsy, huge, and overbearing. 
 
 In vain one's eye attempted to discover in it a single 
 trace of a free, noble, or even delicate line. In vain, 
 amid all these heavy blocks of stone and gigantic 
 figures, did one endeavour to breathe freely and to re- 
 joice in the ''Liberty" it was supposed to symbolise! 
 It was impossible! One is conscious of something 
 threatening, unnatural, and oppressive in this monu- 
 ment. When the guide described the dimensions and 
 the ideas underlying these massive blocks of granite, 
 I became quite depressed. I still only saw the heavy 
 melancholy of this monument, which both in style and 
 purpose contained a challenge to free humanity, a 
 glorification of power, a mockery of free art, and a 
 terrible menace for the future of Germany. The flat, 
 huge block of stone that crowns the edifice took away 
 my breath; I had the feeling that at any moment it 
 would crash down and bury with it the last atom of 
 
 ^ Cf. p. 206. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 155 
 
 spiritual liberty we still possess in Germany. No free- 
 dom, no humanity, no distinction, no upward point- 
 ing spires and pinnacles ; nothing but gigantic figures, 
 guardians of the dead, corners, square stones and 
 tombstones put together without grace or humanity. 
 The whole thing was nothing more than a result of 
 forty years of imperialism; the symbol of a sinister 
 military despotism and a living testimony to the fact 
 that we have now delivered over our German soul to 
 the Prussian idea that force triumphs over right and 
 utility over beauty. 
 
 What did it serve that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
 lamented in the Reichstag on May 30th, 191 3: 
 "Nationalism is the bitterest foe ... of our whole 
 policy, and every measure taken to hamper the work of 
 this nationalism promotes the welfare of the country 
 and Empire." It was too late! The open confession 
 of the Imperial Chancellor that Germany was in dan- 
 ger of being oppressed by nationalism is really comic 
 when one considers that it was this very Chancellor 
 who, according to the instructions of his imperial 
 master, did all he could to deprive the Reichstag of its 
 rights, though the Reichstag afforded the sole possi- 
 bility of overcoming this danger. 
 
 Nobody will deny that the German Crown Prince 
 was the declared champion at the Berlin Court of a 
 war of conquest. His attitude during the Morocco 
 crisis of 191 1; his prohibition of Hauptmann's Peace 
 drama at Breslau; his interference in the Brunswick 
 question in 191 3; his contribution of a preface to the 
 book, "Deutschland in Waffen" ; his talk about a "fresh 
 and joyful war"; his "By heaven! if it were only 
 the real thing"; his attitude in the Zabern debate in 
 
156 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Reichstag, and his famous telegram "Immer feste 
 druff"-^ to the Zabern criminals; these, and his whole 
 demonstrative support of the Pan-Germanistic idea,^ 
 had made him the centre of the war party at the 
 Berlin Court. Harden's Zukunft, and the Leipziger 
 Neuesten Nachrichten, edited by his friend, Paul 
 Liman, were, owing to their warlike sentiments, re- 
 garded in the whole country as mouthpieces of the 
 Crown Prince. Books like "Der Kronprinz," by Paul 
 Liman; *'Wenn ich der Kaiser war!" by Daniel Fry- 
 mann; "Des Deutschen Relches Schicksalsstunde," by 
 Frobenius; "Deutschland und der nachste Krieg," by 
 Bernhardi (only to select a few of the more impor- 
 tant), were, with official recommendation, scattered 
 in hundreds of thousands of copies among the Ger- 
 man people, and criticised, more or less openly, the 
 Emperor's ^'immoderate love of peace," which they 
 contrasted unfavourably with the bold and aggressive 
 temper of the young Crown Prince. 
 
 The Frankfjirter Zeitiing wrote apprehensively on 
 February 12th, 1914: "It is true that the present 
 Emperor's love of peace is universally recognised, but 
 
 ^ "Stick to it !" 
 
 ^For instance, the Crown Prince telegraphed his admira- 
 tion to Lieut.-Col. Frobenius, author of "Des Deutschen 
 Reiches Schicksalsstunde." And what is there in this book? 
 Very much the same as in Bernhardi's : "Deutschland und 
 der nachste Krieg." Among many other startling things, Fro- 
 benius definitely warns us that 'Trance must in 1915 or 1916, 
 under any circumstances, press for war with Germany," and 
 therefore demands that Germany shall at once anticipate her. 
 Of course, the publisher made immediate and skilful use, for 
 purposes of advertisement, of the Crown Prince's recommenda- 
 tion, and obtained an enormous circulation for this mischievous 
 book. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 157 
 
 who can vouch for the permanence of his present 
 frame of mind, and who can vouch for his successor ?" 
 
 With impatient cynicism the intellectual leader of 
 the German war-party, General von Bernhardi, wrote : 
 "Wait we dare not . . . , the situation in the world 
 affords us numberless points to which we can apply 
 the lever."^ And Professor Delbriick wrote in 191 3 
 the equally cynical and impatient words: "Public 
 opinion in Germany is to-day full of impatience and 
 is despairing as to whether any ends are being really 
 pursued. But one thing is certain, if such ends are 
 being pursued they cannot be attained in the space of 
 twenty-four hours; not only must our armaments be 
 sufficient, but we must also, above all, choose the right 
 moment. And, moreover, it is self-evident that this 
 policy can be the more readily carried into effect if, 
 as in our case, the highest authority lies in the hands 
 of those who look far ahead, and do not take the whole 
 world into their confidence."^ 
 
 This means, therefore, that the whole German for- 
 eign and peace policy were entirely dependent upon 
 the "feelings," views, and impulses of certain human 
 beings only responsible to God, and that the Frank- 
 fiirter Zeitung nowhere discovered any guarantee for 
 the permanence of the peaceful feelings of these in- 
 dividuals. In other words, we must, in accordance 
 with Bernhardi's view, "regard war as an indispen- 
 sable instrument of politics and culture . . . and face 
 it manfully." It means, further, as Professor Del- 
 briick points out with patroitic cynicism, that, thanks 
 
 ^General v. Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War." Ed- 
 ward Arnold, London. 
 ' Prof. H. Delbriick, "Reglerung und Volkswille," p. i86. 
 
158 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 to the supreme merit of our Constitution, the German 
 people, thank God, cannot interpose a word when its 
 lords and masters deliberate behind closed doors on the 
 life and death, the liberty and welfare, of the German 
 nation. 
 
 I believe that if an Englishman or a Frenchman 
 were to get up and assert that the main advantage of 
 a national policy was that it was not determined by 
 the popular will, but by the chance opinions of a God- 
 appointed dynasty, he would quickly incur general 
 contempt and have to retail his mediaeval sentiments 
 through some obscure organ of the Press. Nothing 
 of the kind in Germany. We Germans are powerless 
 against barbarians posing in the robes of scientific 
 professors. For, thanks to the dynasty, the Delbriicks 
 hold the chief offices in our State, educate the royal 
 princes, wear the highest orders, and dispense their 
 imperialist poison in the leading university lecture- 
 rooms of the nation. 
 
V 
 
 THE GERMAN DYNASTY AND THE GERMAN 
 
 NOTION OF CULTURE. TO WHICH IS 
 
 ADDED A STUDY OF THE INTELLECTUAL 
 
 ANTECEDENTS TO THE WAR 
 
 German Philosophers, Professors and Historians 
 
 Dynasties could not, however, despite their mili- 
 tary and political power, become the embodiment of 
 great States, had they not also behind them the sup- 
 port of intellectual forces. In these days of national 
 schools, franchise, and military service, rigid military 
 discipline would by itself have given a far too despotic 
 impression. Since, moreover, the gods are long since 
 dead, that is to say, have been relegated to their true 
 empire, heaven, a dynasty can no longer be content 
 merely to point to the divine ordering of the universe. 
 
 For these and other reasons, the dynasty requires 
 a philosophical and scientific justification of its rule, 
 which will prove the more effectual in proportion to 
 the skill it exhibits in making the views of the mod- 
 ern world serve the private ambitions of earthly gods. 
 
 Since the days of Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and 
 Feuerbach, the divinity hedging round the dynasty had 
 in Prusso-Germany, as elsewhere, become more and 
 more a fiction, in which the people themselves had no 
 
 159 
 
i6o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 longer any faith. But in contrast to France, where the 
 philosophical ideas preached by Voltaire, Diderot, and 
 Rousseau were consistently converted into action, 
 philosophical doctrines in Germany never passed be- 
 yond the stage of mere theory. In France the restora- 
 tion of the divine ordering of the world completely 
 collapsed. Charles X. had to be taught, in 1830, that 
 the gods intended, once and for all, to insist upon the 
 first of the ten commandments. Louis Philippe, the 
 successor of the last Bourbon, was no longer King by 
 God's grace, but a citizen-king, "citoyen-roi." Even 
 Napoleon III., although he had founded his Empire 
 upon a coup d'etat and emphatically supported the 
 hegemony of Rome, refrained from insisting too much 
 on his divine origin. Even in the days of the most 
 acute reaction (1851-1869) the spirit of Voltaire 
 dominated the French intellectual world. Napoleon 
 possessed the strongest army in Europe, he ruled over 
 the most bigoted country in Europe, but he had no 
 power over the consciences of the French Intellectuals 
 of the day. That is to say, he did not control the 
 national sense of right and was incapable of fettering 
 the free play of science by Bonapartist laws. 
 
 Not so in Prusso-Germany. The storms of the 
 revolutions were, in our case, only storms in the heads 
 of professors and students. Consequently, the nat- 
 ural aspiration of all despots (to gain popularity by 
 suppressing intellectual forces) was bound, in the 
 country of '^pure reason" and critical methods, to give 
 vent to itself in a more brutal and systematic man- 
 ner than elsewhere. Even Kant, who had for a mo- 
 ment forgotten himself and spoken as a Republican, 
 was severely reprimanded by the King and had to 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 161 
 
 promise amendment. Fichte, who had only dared to 
 express his Republican ideas under the French regime, 
 held his peace after the Wars of Liberation. Politi- 
 cal and military democrats, like Baron vom Stein, 
 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Jahn, Scharnhorst, Gnei- 
 senau, etc., were merely made use of to assist the King 
 in recovering his power; and afterwards fell into 
 disgrace. The German republicans, Schiller and Klop- 
 stock, died at the right time; and so did not witness 
 the intellectual ignominy which followed the ''Libera- 
 tion." Goethe, who himself, a Minister, exercised dy- 
 nastic power, was adroit enough to hold his peace on 
 all political topics, but he ill concealed his antipathy 
 to Prussia. Goethe, the two Humboldts, Jean Paul, 
 Uhland, and a few others were the last heroes of the 
 waning glory of classic Germanism. From this time 
 forth, Metternich undertook the political and Hegel 
 the intellectual leadership of Germany. 
 
 George William Frederick Hegel is the great man 
 whose merit it is to have secularised, that is to say, 
 modernised, the dynastic idea. He did not attempt 
 to re-establish on earth the gods that the French En- 
 cyclopaedists and Kant had hurled to the ground. He 
 created a new divinity, which ostensibly followed in 
 the steps of the achievements of the French Revolu- 
 tion and Kant's doctrines, namely. The State. Hegel's 
 doctrine, that the State is a divine entity and that man 
 is not an end in himself, but only a brick in the fabric 
 of the State, and that the people is that portion of 
 the State that does not know what it wants, became 
 the root idea of that Prussianism which finally tri- 
 umphed under Bismarck. In his learned and elegant 
 though obscure style, Hegel supplemented to such good 
 
i62 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 purpose the somewhat brutal and mediaeval principles 
 of Metternich, that he was made a Prussian State 
 philosopher and overwhelmed with honours. 
 
 Hegel's philosophy has, not without reason, been 
 called an intellectual force. A doctrine may be ever 
 so obscure and ever so pedantic, yet, if it obtains 
 official sanction, it is sure to find a host of youthful 
 enthusiasts and be proclaimed in the journals, uni- 
 versities, and drawing-rooms as the acme of political 
 wisdom. Such was the case with Hegel's philosophy 
 in Prussia. Everyone in Germany was henceforth, 
 in one shape or another, compelled to acknowledge 
 Hegel's principle, that the State is everything and the 
 individual nothing. That is to say, all those German 
 intellectuals who sympathised with the French Revolu- 
 tion and regarded the individual as an end in himself, 
 and political freedom as the foundation of all culture, 
 were outlawed and persecuted, had to leave their 
 country or renounce all their activity in the field of 
 poHtical science. Heine and Borne, Herwegh and 
 Freihgrath, Prutz and Pfau, and a hundred other 
 German thinkers and poets fled before the Prusso- 
 German reaction, and, from foreign lands, hurled their 
 scorn and derision against Germany in cries of anguish 
 and revolt. Uhland, the last poet in Germany to 
 celebrate the democratic idea of freedom, kept silent 
 until 1848. "Young Germany" never reached man's 
 estate. Metternich, the merciless gaoler of the intel- 
 lectual prison of three dynasties, was everywhere tri- 
 umphant. He placed a muzzle upon the German in- 
 telligence, such as has seldom been worn by a nation, 
 and one which Bismarck found very apt to his pur- 
 poses after the ill-starred Revolution of 1848. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 163 
 
 We find Schopenhauer ironically remarking that a 
 Government will never appoint professors who teach 
 the opposite of that which forms the foundation of 
 their governing authority. And he adds, with biting 
 sarcasm, that our official professors of philosophy, 
 such as Hegel and Schelling, do not live ''for but hy 
 philosophy," and that, therefore, they cannot be re- 
 garded as unprejudiced investigators of the truth. 
 
 Schopenhauer might have added, further, that there 
 exists nowhere a body of professors and scholars under 
 such strict supervision as in Germany. The Prussian 
 State has always possessed the indisputable monopoly 
 of education. She has never tolerated free schools 
 and universities, such as exist in France, Belgium, 
 England, Switzerland, etc. All professorial chairs are, 
 without exception, in the nomination of the State. 
 German professors are State officials. In 1898, for 
 instance, a so-called ^'Privat-dozenf'^ law was passed 
 for Prussia, placing even these lecturers under Minis- 
 terial discipline. In the same year, disciplinary pro- 
 ceedings were instituted against Professor Delbriick 
 (whom we have already referred to as a loyal sup- 
 porter of the Emperor). In his capacity of a Prussian 
 State official he had in his Preussische Jahrbiicher at- 
 tacked the brutal expulsion policy directed against 
 Danish subjects, and, in consequence, in March, 1899, 
 received from the Disciplinary Court a reprimand and 
 an order to pay a fine of £25. Prussian royal officials, 
 or any who aspire to become such, are thus not en- 
 titled to their independent opinions in politics (wit- 
 
 *A Privat-dozent is an unsalaried lecturer at a German uni- 
 versity, who receives only the students' fees. 
 
164 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 ness the cases of Lohnlng, Willich, Arons, Michels, 
 Delitzsch, Traub, Jatho, etc.). 
 
 German professors have unhmited hberty in the ex- 
 ercise of their calhng, with the exception of the hberty 
 to differ from the Government. Provided that they 
 regard the Prussian State as a model State, the dynasty 
 as appointed by God, and the existing Constitution 
 as the highest expression of civic bHss, they have even 
 the hberty to rebel against the Almighty (Hackel, 
 Ostwald, Eucken) or to criticise the existing economic 
 order from a socialistic point of view (Schmoller, 
 Sombart, etc.). Hence, among the German profes- 
 sors, we find extraordinarily bold spirits — Free- 
 thinkers, Freetraders, pedants of Reform, theorists of 
 Socialism, sexual-reformers, and even intellectual 
 anarchists; but there are among them no actual Dem- 
 ocrats, Republicans, or apostles of popular liberty. In 
 other countries, professors, after quitting the lecture- 
 room, again become citizens and take their place, as 
 such, in the political world, without regard to the 
 Government. Professors who belong to the Socialist 
 party and openly acknowledge the fact, are not un- 
 known in England, France, Italy, Switzerland, etc. 
 In Germany such a state of things is unthinkable, 
 because there professors, in their private Hfe, still re- 
 main Government officials. A century of intellectual 
 drilling has reduced them to such a condition of ab- 
 solute dependence upon the State, as bread-giver, that 
 the dynasty can blindly rely upon them. They are 
 never guilty of an act of lawlessness; they, in duty 
 bound, combat ^'revolution,'* write huge folios in praise 
 of science, and in a few years become Privy Council- 
 lors and only seldom, and then as mouthpieces of the 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 165 
 
 Government, intermeddle with politics.^ But, as a 
 general rule, they remain aloof from politics. I be- 
 lieve that there is not in the whole of England and 
 France a single professor who is not acquainted with 
 the main principles of his country's constitution and 
 who would not, at any moment, in obedience to a 
 natural impulse, be prepared to break a lance for the 
 inviolability of civic rights and liberties. In Germany, 
 on the other hand, there are professors of world-wide 
 renown {e.g. Hackel), who have not the slightest ac- 
 quaintance with politics, which they regard as an oc- 
 cupation unworthy of a man of learning. 
 
 The German professors have been styled "the in- 
 tellectual bodyguard of the Hohenzollerns," and in- 
 deed, if they are not an ornament of free science, 
 they are certainly a source of satisfaction to our Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 In order rightly to estimate the spirit and ideals 
 animating the development of German culture during 
 the past century, these peculiarities must be borne in 
 mind. For example, our labours in the field of his- 
 tory and international law, eminently important 
 
 ^That there are laudable exceptions to this rule can be 
 proved by the case of the Munich Professor, Ludwig Quidde, 
 who published at the beginning of the 'nineties a pamphlet 
 "Caligula" (a study of Roman Caesar madness). In this he 
 characterised the person and acts of the young Roman Emperor 
 in a manner that left no room for doubt as to the reason of his 
 presenting the German public at this time with this study. The 
 pamphlet ran through more than thirty editions and made a 
 great sensation (it is to-day even more worth reading than it 
 was then). Accused of Icsc majeste and asked, in cross-exam- 
 ination, "Whom do you mean by Caligula?" Professor Quidde 
 replied, with astonishment : "Whom do you mean, Mr. Attorney- 
 General?" The proceedings had to be dropped for want of 
 evidence. 
 
i66 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 factors in the guidance of coming generations, have 
 always been confided to the safe hands of Privy Coun- 
 cillors and Excellencies. It is not surprising, there- 
 fore, that the volumes on history which Hegel, Ranke, 
 Sybel, Treitschke, Mommsen, Lamprecht, Delbriick, 
 Schiemann, etc., have bequeathed to us always have at 
 bottom the same idea, viz., that the logical significance 
 of the world's history must be sought in the rise of 
 the Hohenzollerns to the German Imperial dynasty. 
 Although differing in scope, form, and method, the 
 work of the German historians is terribly monotonous 
 in its treatment of this fundamental idea. The theory 
 that the old German dream of the Emperor Barbarossa 
 has been finally realised, thanks to Bismarck's astute- 
 ness, for the happiness of the German people, has with 
 innumerable variations formed the constantly recur- 
 ring theme of all the German historians since 1870. 
 
 The French historians, such as Michelet, Taine, 
 Blanc, Thiers, etc., differentiated between the interests 
 of the dynasty and those of the people, and finally 
 even went the length of asserting that the interests 
 of a dynasty could only be promoted or the reverse 
 at the expense of the people; and consequently they 
 have always inspired a secret horror in our "Privy 
 Councillor historians." In the eyes of the latter, his- 
 tory is nothing but a collection of the martial deeds 
 of a handful of men, towering above the formless 
 and ineffectual mass of the people, and endowing it 
 with life and significance by means of their wars. No 
 doubt, these historians have achieved wonders in in- 
 vestigating and elucidating ancient civilisation; the 
 science of historical research has ever stood high in 
 Germany. But the idea that populations exist as well 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 167 
 
 as dynasties, and that these populations are, after all, 
 entitled to the same consideration as their God-ap- 
 pointed lords, is one which, though now and again it 
 dawns upon the German historians, they are forbidden 
 to express in connection with Germany. In France, 
 where even the dynastic power of the last Napoleon 
 was unable to stifle the consciences of scholars, his- 
 torians could entertain other ideals. The whole of 
 Michelet's historical work is, .for instance, nothing but 
 a paean of praise for the vigour of the people and 
 their enthusiasm for liberty. But if a German were 
 to write a history of the German nation in which he 
 proved that the greater the power and glory of the 
 Hohenzollern dynasty the greater the loss of the Ger- 
 man nation in respect of political dignity and liberty, 
 he would never become professor and Privy Council- 
 lor and never be allowed to attain celebrity. Uhland 
 was, in fact, the last German professor of history 
 holding democratic views. And even Uhland, in spite 
 of the fact that he laboured in South Germany, and 
 not in Prussia, only continued in his appointment for 
 three years. Then he gave up the struggle, or he 
 would, like so many of his colleagues, have had to 
 reflect behind prison bars that the history of the Ger- 
 man people must perforce be a glorification of the 
 ruling dynasty. 
 
 In the same way that Metternich found in Hegel a 
 philosopher after his own heart, so did Bismarck dis- 
 cover in Treitschke an intellectual partner for the 
 furtherance of his diplomacy. Treitschke was, like 
 Hegel, loaded with the highest Prussian honours and 
 offices and proclaimed a German national genius. His 
 influence upon modern Germany was tremendous. 
 
i68 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Any one in the new German Empire who laid claim 
 to education must sit at the feet of this half-deaf Ex- 
 cellency. He may, without exaggeration, be styled 
 the intellectual father of the present German genera- 
 tion. He and his pupils (e. g. Delbriick, Lamprecht, 
 Schiemann, and General von Bernhardi) furnished 
 Pan-Germanism and the idea of conquest with that 
 scientific constitutional basis which (say what one 
 will) became the theoretical forcing-bed for the 
 policy of war and armaments of the Court Camarilla, 
 which now rules over Germany. 
 
 International Law — on this Side and on That 
 
 No less than did Bismarck as the successor of 
 Metternich in the sphere of politics, Treitschke, as the 
 successor of Hegel in the sphere of history and inter- 
 national law, revealed himself the inveterate opponent 
 of all the democratic ideas and ideals of the nineteenth 
 century .*4Jl'The State is Power." This phrase is the 
 essence ol Treitschke's teaching,^ and is in the sharpest 
 contradiction to the idea proclaimed by the French 
 
 *ThIs phrase is the idea underlying Treitschke's leading work, 
 "Politics" (London: Constable & Co.), lectures delivered in 
 Berlin (1875-1895 and 1898-99). These lectures have become 
 in Germany a sort of political gospel. Treitschke's funda- 
 mental idea, "The State is Power," denotes, first, the ignoring 
 of all international treaties and possibilities of amicable under- 
 standings, and, secondly, as a positive result, the glorification 
 of war. The whole of the domestic and foreign policy of the 
 German Empire has, since Bismarck's day, been dominated by 
 this leading idea. Had Treitschke himself been Germany's rep- 
 resentative at The Hague Conferences, he could not have ex- 
 pressed this view better than did Count Munster and Marshall 
 von Bieberstein. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 169 
 
 Revolution: ^he State is Justice." It is true that 
 Treitschke also affirms that justice is one of the main 
 functions of a State, but anyone who takes the trouble 
 to dip beneath the surface of his teachings immedi- 
 ately perceives that the other function, namely, the 
 conduct of war, is by far the more important. 
 
 In Treitschke's writings there is not the faintest 
 trace of the spirit of classical Teutonism. For in- 
 stance, Wilhelm von Humboldt's doctrine that the 
 main task of the modern State is the conservation of 
 individual liberty was regarded in "modern" Germany 
 as antiquated and *'long since superseded." Might 
 and War; War and Might; this after 1870 became the 
 password, which Hegel had still named "State and 
 Politics," and Humboldt "Liberty and Justice." 
 
 All the English and French philosophers of the past 
 two centuries have been yearning and striving for an 
 ideal Constitutional State. Justice and popular liberty 
 were also the aspirations of our classical philosophers : 
 Leibnitz, Kant, Lessing, Herder, Humboldt, Fichte, 
 Feuerbach, and Schleiermacher all maintained this — 
 each in his own way. But with Hegel began the phi- 
 losophy of the State and of the striving for Power. 
 In the field of politics the existence of these mutually 
 opposing tendencies is shown by the fact that both 
 English and French philosophers were coming to re- 
 gard war more and more as a thing of the past, in the 
 last resort as a terrible necessity, but always as some- 
 thing immoral, from which the civilised world must 
 emancipate itself.^ 
 
 On the other hand, the German philosophers, f ollow- 
 
 *A few exceptions, like Ruskin in England, Jules De Maistre, 
 J. P. Proudhon and others, have not altered the general trend 
 
lyo THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 ing the example of Hegel, glorified war as a neces- 
 sary means towards a continual increase of Power, 
 as a source of national progress, and, in short, as a 
 divine, holy, normal, and moral law governing the 
 development of the human race. In his ''Politics," 
 Treitschke devotes a whole chapter to the holiness of 
 war, declaring it to be the "most potent force in the 
 shaping of nations," and "the sole cure for decaying 
 nations," and demonstrates his direct relationship with 
 Hegel by adding: "And herein lies the grandeur of 
 war, that the mere individual is lost sight of in face 
 of the great ideal of the State." 
 
 If Hegel be compared with Treitschke, and the lat- 
 ter again with Bernhardi, we can, step by step, trace 
 the increase in brutality which German ideas of culture 
 have suffered under Prussian leadership. In Hegel, 
 after all, the doctrine of universal citizenship of the 
 Kant and Goethe period is still discernible, but we 
 find in Treitschke only the narrow-minded, power-in- 
 toxicated nationalist; whilst Bernhardi appears to be 
 nothing better than a Red Indian, save for the fact 
 that he is able — most unfortunately for us — to read 
 and write, and that he has the entree at the court of 
 an absolute ruler. 
 
 The French Revolution had thrown overboard every 
 idea of a dynastic State and proclaimed the sovereignty 
 
 of intellectual progress in these countries. It is true that 
 Proudhon, "the father of Anarchism/' celebrated war in two 
 thick volumes and fulminated against the "jurists," Grotius, 
 Vattel, Kant, etc. Yet the final result of all his researches 
 is the assertion: Mankind will not tolerate war any longer! 
 Moreover, Proudhon conceived of war as being entirely a "chiv- 
 alrous duel." In this sense, he is in direct opposition to Clause- 
 witz and his followers, who scoff at legalised warfare as weak 
 and puerile. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 171 
 
 of the people. It was the origin of that science which 
 all, with the exception of German professors and in 
 spite of the present World War, name "International 
 Law." In a legal sense, International Law is the 
 codification of legal principles touching the attitude 
 and relations of civilised States to each other. Now 
 the French Revolution had set up an entirely new 
 morality in respect to these relations between State 
 and State. This morality culminates in the proposi- 
 tion (but tell it not to any German professor!) that 
 every country has the incontestable right to administer 
 its own affairs. 
 
 It is clear at a glance that an International Law 
 resting upon this basis is a negation of the former 
 divine constitutional right of dynasties, as Machiavelli 
 taught it, and as it has been modernised by Hegel and 
 by Treitschke. 
 
 The people had been hitherto the absolute chattels 
 of their princes, and could by war, barter, treaty, or 
 marriage be transferred at will from one dynastic 
 house to another. Now, however, the Revolution de- 
 clared the nations to be independent individuals and 
 collective souls, and exhorted them to govern them- 
 selves. Mirabeau proudly stated in the Constituent 
 Assembly that henceforth Right was the sovereign in 
 the world; no longer that right which a dynasty pos- 
 sesses only so long as it is in a position to defend it 
 against all comers vi et armis, but that hallowed, un- 
 written Right common to every being born into the 
 world which slumbers in the collective consciousness 
 of every people under the sun. 
 
 These new theories of the free right of nations 
 to control their own destinies were immediately put 
 
172 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 into practice hy the Revolution. When Alsace de- 
 manded its incorporation with the French Republic, 
 the new French Government ordered first of all a 
 plebiscitum of the Alsatians. When Savoy made a like 
 application it submitted to the National Convention a 
 popular resolution in these words: "The Nation of 
 Savoy, seeing that the deposition of Victor Amadeus 
 and his heirs has been proclaimed, declares itself a 
 free and sovereign nation," and, as free and sovereign, 
 "it unanimously desires to be united to the French 
 Republic." The National Convention replied that it 
 gladly conformed with this wish, since it had been 
 shown that "the free and unfettered desire of the sov- 
 ereign people of Savoy, as expressed in their com- 
 munal assemblies, was that they should be united to 
 the French nation." The Mayor of Annecy an- 
 nounced to his compatriots that they were hence- 
 forth citizens of the French Republic and proudly 
 added : "We are not a conquered, but a free people." 
 
 What "International Law" imports is visible yet 
 more clearly in a report that Carnot laid before the 
 French Government in regard to the incorporation 
 of Monaco: 
 
 "It is the inalienable right of every nation to live 
 apart from others, if it so pleases, or, for the vindica- 
 tion of their common interests, to unite with others, if 
 such be its desire. We French, who know no other 
 sovereigns save the peoples themselves, have fraternity 
 and not lordship as our system. We worship the prin- 
 ciple that every nation, be the territory it occupies 
 ever so small, is absolute master in its own house, 
 and must, as regards its rights, be treated as equal 
 with the greatest; and that nobody can justifiably 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 173 
 
 violate its independence, unless its own is manifestly 
 imperilled."^ 
 
 This new, clearly formulated, and eminently logical 
 right of the nations to free self-government, which 
 forms the basis of our present international law, was, 
 it is true, frequently infringed by France herself; not- 
 withstanding, it still shines, as a guiding star of Eu- 
 ropean popular aspirations, above the realm of politics. 
 The whole European history of the past century is 
 characterised by a striving for national forms of gov- 
 ernment. The nations no longer intend to be ruled 
 by alien conquerors, but themselves intend to control 
 their own fate. 
 
 After nearly a hundred years of conflict, the Balkan 
 States emancipate themselves from the Turkish 
 domination of the last four centuries. Greece, Rou- 
 mania, Bulgaria, and Serbia gain their independence, 
 thanks to French and partly also to English and Rus- 
 sian aid. Poland is maintaining a stout, though an 
 alas ! indecisive struggle against the domination of the 
 foreigner. Italy, Hungary, and Prussia throw off the 
 Hapsburg yoke. The Teutonic States, after having 
 in 1848 vainly striven to attain, in a peaceable way, a 
 democratic empire, had, after two bloody wars, con- 
 solidated their national unity. Popular liberty was the 
 cry from one end of Europe to the other. But it was 
 not everywhere understood in the same sense. The 
 people meant by it their national and their political 
 liberty. Not so the dynasties; these (mostly unin- 
 vited) were astute enough, in this struggle, to pose as 
 advocates and champions of the popular will, while all 
 
 ^ Cf. Gabr. Seailles, "L' Alsace-Lorraine," Paris, 1915, pp. 
 15-17. 
 
174 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the time they only meant by liberty the freedom of 
 their States outside their borders. For instance, the 
 Prussian dynasty wages, in the name of this principle 
 of nationality, three successive wars, but, at once, pro- 
 ceeds to annex foreign territory, and, by its treatment 
 of the annexed peoples, to trample this very principle 
 of nationality under foot. 
 
 Only France remained, to some extent, faithful to 
 that idea of popular and international liberty pro- 
 claimed to mankind by the Great Revolution. It is 
 a feather in the cap of Napoleon III. that, despite 
 the fact that he was the most powerful sovereign in 
 Europe, he always respected this right of the people 
 to autonomy. Before, in 1859, annexing Savoy and 
 Nice, he required their inhabitants to approve, by 
 vote, the treaty which, as a result of the Italo- Austrian 
 War, ceded these countries to France. Modern Italy 
 came into being (between 1859 and 1871), partly 
 through Napoleon^s aid, only by virtue of the popular 
 vote. Even if it were really the fact, as has been 
 often asserted, that these plebiscites were only com- 
 edies, yet the fact remains that Napoleon III. recog- 
 nised the new International Law, at all events in prin- 
 ciple, as a political theory, although by virtue of his 
 dynastic power he was never obliged to do so. After 
 the war of 1866 Napoleon III. went actually so far 
 as to have a clause inserted in the Treaty of Prague 
 by which Prussia pledged herself only to incorporate 
 Schleswig-Holstein in the German Confederation after 
 it had signified its consent to this course by popular 
 vote. Prussia endorsed this pledge but with the firm 
 resolve never to abide by it. For the right of nations 
 to free autonomy, proclaimed by the Great Revolu- 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 175 
 
 tion, though opposed in Europe by Austria-Hungary, 
 Russia, and Turkey, found its bitterest enemy of all 
 in Prussia. 
 
 Yet Prussia, unlike Austria and Russia, did not 
 support its antagonism to international law by the 
 bloody arbitrament of war, but by very edifying 
 juristic and philosophical theories. Prusso-Germany 
 was not and is not a State bent on bloody conquest; 
 no! it is the home of jurisprudence, of progress, and 
 of popular liberty! In contrast to Russia, it possesses 
 a Constitution and a democratic popular assembly and 
 army, and it likewise possesses a culture that hence- 
 forth envelops it with the nimbus of a modern and 
 progressive State! 
 
 Prussia never makes conquests; she acts either in 
 self-defence or in virtue of higher rights. Any one 
 who is backed by a victorious army and is executing 
 the will of Providence is entitled to claim for himself 
 both a special standard of right and a special wisdom. 
 An act that, in. the case of a private individual, would 
 be called either thieving, swindling, or extortion be- 
 comes, thanks tO' a victorious army, a praiseworthy act 
 of self-preservation and higher justice. 
 
 It was the task of Treitschke and his apostles to 
 condense Bismarck's diplomacy and the invincibility 
 of the Prusso-German army into a philosophical and 
 legal system. Although this problem seems, at first 
 glance, rather difficult, they solved it admirably. 
 
 In contrast to the "revolutionary" right of nations 
 to free autonomy, Treitschke and his school were the 
 champions of "historical" right. Thus, if a country 
 like Alsace, after having been for centuries a possession 
 of Germany, is then snatched from it, the latter coun- 
 
17.6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 try has an historic right to the portion wrested from it. 
 
 So much the more, when to its historic right is 
 added an ethnographic one. Supposing a race, such 
 as the Alsace-Lorrainers, the Swiss, the Flemings, the 
 Baltese, etc., are actually of German descent, use the 
 German tongue, and have German customs and habits, 
 then the great community to which it thus belongs 
 has a sacred right to absorb it, in the interest of the 
 cultural unit, and to draw it into the great racial fam- 
 ily of which it is a member. 
 
 Again to this historic-ethnographic right may be 
 added an etymological one, which will carry us a good 
 step further. Nancy, for instance, is a patent mutila- 
 tion of the good old Imperial city Nantzig, and Dun- 
 kirk can only be derived from Diinkirchen; down to 
 the present day the Bretons, in the north-west of 
 France, employ an affirmative that sounds like the 
 German ''J a'' ; and so forth. Whence it not only fol- 
 lows that all territories and races whose language and 
 local and proper names show Celtic-Germanic roots 
 were, originally, German peoples and territories, but 
 that Prusso-Germany has also, in the name of Ger- 
 man culture, a sacred right to make them German 
 once more. 
 
 The French professor of international law says: 
 Alsace is certainly German, it belonged to Germany 
 for centuries, and Strassburg, in the Middle Ages, 
 was a Mecca of Teutonism. Yet Germany has, on 
 that account, no right to lay claim to Alsace as its 
 own property. Everything depends upon the wishes 
 of the Alsatians. Since, in bygone days, out of af- 
 fection for our Republic, Alsace voluntarily chose to 
 become a part of France, and since every people is 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 177 
 
 the sovereign master of its destiny, there can be here 
 no other "right" than the right of the Alsatian people. 
 What concern is it of Prussia that Neuenbtirg was 
 once upon a time Prussian? What concern is it of 
 us French that French is spoken in Geneva, and that 
 we can trace thousands of French roots in the lan- 
 guages of England, Spain, Italy, and even Roumania, 
 if we trouble to investigate the matter? A community 
 governed by the principle of nationalities does not 
 build up its rights upon excavations, linguistic roots, 
 popular customs, and historical events and investiga- 
 tions. For such a community the sole question is: 
 What does the Neuenburger want? What does the 
 Genevese desire? Does he wish to be a Swiss citizen? 
 His will is law and "right"; and when once he has 
 clearly expressed it, all further discussion is superflu- 
 ous. For us French there are no other rights save 
 the universal right of all nations to their autonomy.^ 
 
 "It is difficult" — so writes the French historian 
 Ernest Lavisse^ — "to get foreigners to understand why 
 France cannot forgive the loss of her provinces. The 
 Germans say *it is the law of war.' In the eighteenth 
 century, such a view would have caused no surprise; 
 and, even now, it appears quite natural to the poli- 
 ticians of the old regime. But, in the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, France stands for quite another policy. Among 
 the nations of the world, France is conspicuous by her 
 rationalism and her sense of right and wrong. She 
 maintains that a human community is not to be treated 
 like a flock of sheep. She believes in the existence 
 of a national soul. She has sympathised deeply with 
 the sufferings of the victims of force. She wept over 
 
 *G. Seailles, "L' Alsace-Lorraine," p. 21. 
 
178 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Athens, Warsaw, and Venice, and she gave the *op- 
 pressed' something more tangible than tears. The 
 Peace of Frankfort did not only leave us the humilia- 
 tion of defeat; it did not merely violate our frontiers 
 and bring our country Into a condition of unendurable 
 Insecurity. It was when the victor robbed us of souls 
 who were ours, and wished to remain so, that he 
 outraged our religion. And this is at the bottom of 
 the Alsace-Lorraine question. It brings two civilisa- 
 tions face to face, and In our defeat we have a con- 
 soling honour : that the reparation of the wrong done 
 us would be a satisfaction to the most lofty sentiments 
 and to the spirit of the age." 
 
 "You appeal to the principle of nationalities, but 
 you interpret It differently from the rest of Europe,'' 
 wrote the French International jurist Fustel de Coul- 
 anges to Mommsen. "In your view, this principle 
 entitles a powerful State to forcibly annex a province, 
 without other justification than the fact that this prov- 
 ince is peopled by the same race as Is the annexing 
 State. According to normal public opinion In Europe, 
 and In the civilised world at large, the principle of 
 nationalities simply forbids a province or a people to 
 obey a foreign dictator against its will. I will give 
 an example, by way of illustration; the principle of 
 nationalities did not permit Piedmont to forcibly annex 
 Milan and Venice, but it allowed Milan and Venice 
 to emancipate themselves from Austria and volun- 
 tarily to join themselves to Piedmont. You perceive 
 the difference. Consequently this principle may well 
 give Alsace a right, but It cannot give you a right 
 over Alsace. It creates a right for the weak, but It 
 affords no pretext for the ambitious. The principle 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 179 
 
 of nationalities is, by no manner of means, the old 
 right of the stronger, under a new name."^ 
 
 Treitschke and the German School of International 
 Philosophers were not tardy with their reply: 
 
 The Alsatians are German ; they have been forcibly 
 wrested from the great German family. Hence, we 
 Germans have not merely a mission of culture to 
 execute in Alsace, but, considering that we are, ob- 
 viously, the more highly organised and civilised race, 
 we have to secure the peace of the world. 
 
 "Who can plead, in the face of our duty to secure 
 the world's peace, that the Alsace-Lorraine rs do not 
 want to belong to us ? Confronted by the sacred neces- 
 sity of these great days, the doctrine of the autonomy 
 of all German races, that alluring theme of outlaw 
 demagogues, will come to a miserable end. These 
 lands are ours by the right of the sword and we will 
 deal with them by virtue of a higher right, by the 
 right of the German nation not to allow its sons for 
 ever to estrange themselves from the German Em- 
 pire."2 
 
 As, then, according to the Prusso-Hegelian doctrine, 
 nations themselves never know what they want, they 
 must be made happy against their will. Treitschke 
 solemnly declared : "We Germans, who know both 
 Germany and France, know what suits the Alsatians 
 far better than that miserable people knows itself. . . . 
 We wish to restore to them, against their will, their 
 own real self."^ 
 
 *C/. Gabr. Seailles, "Alsace-Lorraine," Paris, 1915, p. 11. 
 ^ Preussische Jahrbiicher, Juli, 1870. H. v. Treitschke : "Was 
 fordern wir von Frankreich?" 
 
 * Ibidem. 
 
i8o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 "By the right of the sword!" *That miserable 
 people!" "Against their will!" Here we find our- 
 selves in the midst of the neo-German notion of con- 
 stitutional law and culture. Hegel's fundamental idea 
 of the stupidity of the people is brilliantly demon- 
 strated to us by Treitschke with reference to those 
 "miserable" Alsace-Lorrainers. It is apparent, at the 
 first glance, that this "modern" German conception of 
 constitutional and international law is not only very 
 convenient for the dynastic will to power, but is really 
 nothing else than a learned term for it. The funda- 
 mental difference in the legal conceptions of the two 
 hostile nations is now rendered apparent, and also the 
 reason why this antagonism, which has troubled Eu- 
 rope for forty years past, could never be adjusted. 
 
 The whole history of France and Italy during the 
 last century is entirely animated by the new religion 
 of popular rights. England accorded to all its colonies 
 having a white population (even to the Boer Republic 
 it had vanquished) free autonomy; that the Irish have 
 no Home Rule is not England's fault, but the fault of 
 the religious differences obtaining in Ireland itself.^ 
 
 ^ It is a proof either of ignorance or of deliberate calumny 
 that, since the beginning of the World War, it has frequently 
 been asserted in Germany that England treated the Irish no 
 better than Prussia has treated the Poles, the inhabitants of 
 Alsace-Lorraine, and the Danes. During the last decade Eng- 
 land has given generous proof of her respect for the right 
 of the Irish to control their own destinies. In 1898 Ireland 
 received from the English Government the so-called "Local Gov- 
 ernment Act," in 1899 a special department for agricultural and 
 technical instruction, in 1903 the Wyndham "Land Purchase 
 Act" (the direct antithesis of Prussia's Polish Eviction Acts), 
 in 1908 a national university (just imagine a Polish university 
 at Posen or a French university at Strassburg), and finally, 
 in 191 1, the possibility of political self-government (Home 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 181 
 
 Even Russia granted the Finns and Baltese a kind of 
 self-government, such as German Poland and Alsace- 
 Lorraine have never known. Russia was even a 
 pioneer in this new international law and helped the 
 Bulgarians and Roumanians to their national inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 But in Prusso-Germany there was nothing but a 
 policy of '^Blood and Iron in the hands of potentates 
 and princes."^ Not even theoretically might the new 
 
 Rule). What, in spite of this, caused that disaffection in Ire- 
 land which, in Easter week of 1916, found expression in armed 
 and open revolt? Because a quarter of Ireland (the province 
 of Ulster) declared that they would rather die than submit 
 to such a Home Rule Act, and thereupon raised up the vol- 
 untary army and the revolutionary movement of 1912-13. Be- 
 cause a small but very active group of propagandists (the 
 Gaelic League) demanded complete separation from England, 
 and the revival and forcible introduction of the long-dead 
 Gaelic language, and because (O temporal O mores! Herr 
 v. Billow) the English Government, until Easter week, 1916, 
 not only did nothing to cope with this movement but even 
 indirectly encouraged it (by financial contributions towards the 
 teaching of the Gaelic language in Irish schools, by tolerating 
 the more than revolutionary propaganda of the Gaelic League, 
 by not opposing the formation of a voluntary army in Ulster, 
 designed to resist the Home Rule measure proposed by the 
 Government, etc., etc.). England's policy toward Ireland is thus 
 the direct opposite of the policy of Prussia towards the Poles, 
 the Danes, and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The treat- 
 ment of Ireland by the English Government may not always 
 have been above reproach, but the chief offenders were in this 
 case the Irish politicians, the Gaelic League, and the fomenters 
 of religious hate. 
 
 ^The proclamation of the Allied Emperors (November sth, 
 1916) touching Poland's autonomy is a striking instance of this. 
 The new "independent State with an hereditary Monarchy 
 and a Constitution" does not arise by reason of any suffrage 
 or parliamentary deliberation. It is solely the will of two 
 God-ordained dynasties, by right of the sword and as the tool 
 of dynastic interests. The term autonomy is here but the mod- 
 
i82 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 doctrine of international law raise its head among us. 
 It is remarkable that even our German Social Dem- 
 ocrats (with a few exceptions) ignored it.^ 
 
 ernised phrase for annexation. For this is what it actually 
 means. If it be realised that this proclamation of an inde- 
 pendent Poland is only a pretext for the raising of a Polish 
 army, then, viewed from a democratic standpoint, it can only 
 be regarded as a sheer mockery of the international law of 
 modern times. A similar mockery is contained in the very 
 style of the proclamation : in order to show plainly that the 
 population have no voice in the matter of the creation of 
 States, William II. here again, as is his wont, confronted the 
 German Reichstag and Poland with a fait accompli. By a 
 Cabinet order he adjourned the Reichstag on November 4th, 
 and then, on the 5th, without giving an opportunity for any 
 discussion on the matter, proclaimed the creation of a new 
 kingdom and simultaneously announced that the Prussian Poles 
 would still remain Prussians, and that there was no thought of 
 a change in Prussia's brutal Polish policy. Truly, the Middle 
 Ages and Prussia in all their glory ! 
 
 ^When, a year after the outbreak of the World War, I 
 translated a book by Gustav Herve, in which he advocated 
 for the better assurance of world-peace, the autonomy of 
 Alsace-Lorraine and thereby a Franco-German understanding, 
 this proposal was rejected with scorn in Germany at large, 
 and by the Socialists in particular. The work of the former 
 Revolutionist, Paul Lensch, ''Die Sozial Demokratie, ihr Ende 
 und ihr Gluck," openly scoffs at the idea of the right of na- 
 tions to autonomy. German Social Democracy was, theoret- 
 ically, the champion of the autonomy of nations. But it re- 
 garded this, according to schedule, as "civic ideology," and 
 only awaited its realisation as a result of the great anti- 
 capitalist revolution, without which no social amelioration was 
 thinkable. Social democracy regarded the eight-hour day 
 movement as more important than all the "petty" ideals of 
 the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 taken together. Marx alone 
 is a praiseworthy exception to this narrow-minded party pro- 
 gramme. Writing from London in 1870, in the name of true 
 internationalism, he protested against the annexation of Alsace- 
 Lorraine, and with extraordinary perspicacity foretold the pres- 
 ent war. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 183 
 
 How little the Franco-English notion of interna- 
 tional law was known, as a theory, in Prusso-Germany 
 is apparent from the correspondence which David 
 Friedr. Strauss had with Renan, and Mommsen with 
 Fustel de Coulanges. The French savants might ex- 
 plain to their German colleagues a thousand times 
 over that it was not their grief at the military down- 
 fall of France which led them to protest against the 
 annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but the fact that, in 
 the nineteenth century, no territory ought to be an- 
 nexed unless the population declared themselves in 
 favour of the change. All to no purpose. The Ger- 
 man philosophers either regarded this only as a fur- 
 ther proof of their claim, that the stronger is always 
 in the right, and that the French standpoint was only 
 the hypocrisy of the weaker, appealing in the name of 
 international law only so long as he felt himself im- 
 potent to try fresh conclusions on the battlefield. Or 
 else, if they felt the justice of the French claim, they 
 held their peace. Bebel, Liebknecht, and Jacoby were, 
 in modern Germany, the sole upright men who dared 
 to speak in the name of the free autonomy of nations, 
 that is to say, to call the annexation of Alsace-Lor- 
 raine a crime against international law. For this 
 boldness they had to suffer within prison walls, and 
 their fate awed all those who secretly disapproved the 
 Bismarck-Treitschke modernisation of dynastic des- 
 potism. 
 
 Accordingly, an idea that in most civilised countries 
 had passed into political practice remained, in Prusso- 
 Germany, punishable even as a theory. And this ex- 
 plains to us the fact why, during the past forty years 
 in Germany, not a single voice has been raised to tell 
 
i84 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 us Germans what "International Law" really means. 
 At all the international pacifist and socialist con- 
 gresses hitherto held, in which a mutual understanding 
 between nations has been aimed at as the goal, there 
 was ever an oppressive silence regarding this funda- 
 mental principle of international policy. All the truly 
 progressive German authors and politicians of the past 
 forty years who took part in these proceedings were 
 not free agents. A condemnation of the Hegel- 
 Treitschke legal doctrine would be equivalent to a con- 
 demnation of the Bismarck policy of conquest, i.e., a 
 condemnation of the dynasty, or High Treason. 
 
 There was, and still is, among the Germans a 
 secret barrier to our flights of thought. And this is 
 the dread of certain penal paragraphs in our Code. 
 While we, sitting at our firesides, may, as private in- 
 dividuals, entertain the same views and ideals as the 
 French and English, directly we begin to speak and 
 write for the public we become learned metaphysicians 
 and sophists, and execute veritable egg-dances in order 
 to escape the necessity of speaking the truth. French 
 representatives at international congresses have often 
 expressed to me their astonishment that the Germans, 
 while, in private conversations, condemning the Ger- 
 man point of view as being at variance with consti- 
 tutional law, actually defended it in public meetings. 
 As if we dared to profess any other ideas concerning 
 international law save those prescribed for us by our 
 Constitution and laws! 
 
 For all these reasons, there exists in Germany down 
 to the present day only a caricature of true inter- 
 national law. That is, the German savants of to-day 
 understand by "international law" only such rules as 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 185 
 
 have been mutually agreed upon, with the humane 
 purpose of lessening the horrors of war, as, for in- 
 stance, those embodied in the Paris Declaration con- 
 cerning Maritime Warfare, in the Geneva Convention, 
 or in the various Hague agreements. A German pro- 
 fessor of international law who should declare in- 
 ternational law to mean the unfettered right of na- 
 tions to autonomy, and to therefore denounce the an- 
 nexation of Alsace-Lorraine and of Bosnia, or even 
 the violation of Belgium, as being crimes against the 
 law of nations, would at once be arraigned on a charge 
 of high treason. 
 
 The logical thinking out of the principle of the free 
 right of nations to autonomy, which was proclaimed 
 by the French Revolution and has been acknowledged 
 by the whole civilised world as, at least, a theory of 
 international law, is a crime in Germany, because it 
 inevitably leads to a condemnation of the whole 
 Prusso-German policy. And, therefore, such a logical 
 thinking out has never been publicly attempted in the 
 Fatherland of Logic. Is it likely that a Government 
 will appoint and pay professors who condemn its policy 
 as contrary to the law of nations? In the same way 
 that Schopenhauer's colleagues did not live for, but by 
 philosophy, so Schiicking's^ colleagues live not for, but 
 
 ^ Prof. W. Schiicking is almost the sole teacher of inter- 
 national law in modern Germany who has had the courage 
 to take his stand upon the ground of true international law 
 and has not left it even since the war began. His treatment of 
 the Polish question in "Das Nationalitaten-problem" (Dresden, 
 1908), his ideas on "Die Organisation der Welt" (Leipzig, 1909), 
 his "Neue Ziele der Staatlichen Entwicklung" (Marburg, 1913), 
 and finally, his masterly treatise, "Das Werk vom Haag" (Leip- 
 zig, 1912), are all written in the spirit of democracy and the 
 
i86 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 by international law. "I stick up for my master" — this 
 is applicable to newspaper editors, Privy Councillors 
 and Excellencies alike. 
 
 German Racial Science and Deductions 
 Therefrom 
 
 The German constitutional and international law 
 we have just described was the scientific complement 
 of Bismarck's policy of conquest. And here, in the 
 realm of science and philosophy, we are confronted 
 by a phenomenon similar to that of the Reichstag in 
 the domain of politics. In the same way that the 
 latter looks modern and democratic, so also does this 
 science, with its numerous foreign words, awake a 
 feeling of respect and modernity. However, the 
 Reichstag is really only the democratic mask of an 
 autocratic regime, and, similarly, historical right and 
 the philosophy of the divinity of the State are but the 
 modern veneer of mediseval despotism. 
 
 But, after the foundation of the German Empire 
 there arose, side by side with this Hegel-Treitschke 
 philosophy of constitutional law (which, after all, has 
 historical tradition behind it), quite a new science, 
 which complements it. Its reaction upon the German 
 foreign policy of the past twenty years is so manifest 
 that it cannot be dismissed without some notice. It 
 IS, moreover, an integral part of German culture. 
 
 This science was originally called Aryan anthro- 
 pology, and on its further development was split up 
 into various subsections: craniometry, Germanistics, 
 
 true science of international law, and thus have not, unfor- 
 tunately, in modern Germany, met with the appreciation they 
 deserve. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 187 
 
 etymology, ethnography, philology, etc., etc. Certain 
 of these sciences had already been in existence, but, 
 after the war of 1870-71, they were given an entirely 
 new form and significance. 
 
 The father of this completely new science was Gobi- 
 neau, a Frenchman who made his mark in the 'fifties 
 of last century. His work "Essai sur I'inegalite des 
 Races," published in many volumes (i85!4) was prac- 
 tically ignored in France, but its German translation 
 was eagerly bought and became the theme of much 
 discussion. This Count Gobineau did us Germans 
 an inestimable service. Firstly, he established the 
 contrast between the long-skulled, blue-eyed, and 
 fair-haired Germans (the Aryans) and the round- 
 skulled, black-eyed, and black-haired Latins, the latter 
 saturated with Jewish blood; and, secondly, the 
 intellectual superiority of these fair-haired Aryans 
 over the decadent Latins. 
 
 This doctrine, which this highly imaginative French- 
 man, with characteristic French facility, reeled lightly 
 off from his finger-tips, is the most wonderful rubbish 
 of modern days, and, down to 1870, was never taken 
 seriously, even in Germany; but it fitted in so well 
 with the German military successes from 1864 to 
 1870, that it was at once raised to the rank of a 
 science. Had the German not proved in these wars 
 that the Latin "races" had actually played their 
 last role in the world, and that the fair-haired German 
 was stronger, more moral, and more capable of higher 
 culture than his Western neighbours? Yes, the war 
 of 1870-71 was a glorious proof of the decline of the 
 Latin races, and this Gobineau was now, in truth, not 
 only a great thinker, but also a prophet. 
 
i88 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Thousands of German savants now began tO' dig up 
 and measure skulls, to invent Aryan aboriginal lan- 
 guages, religions, and civilisations, to determine the 
 first home of this early Teutonic stock, and to formu- 
 late no end of theories as to the rise and fall of races. 
 Down to 1870 this ^'science" had been quietly laughed 
 at and Gobineau regarded as a wag who was bam- 
 boozling the poor honest Teuton for the amusement of 
 serious science. Now, however, the whole thing gained 
 a politico-scientific background, and, instead of being 
 a wag, this Gobineau is really the inspirer of the 
 present World War. 
 
 For if , afterwards, Mommsen, Woltmann, Driesmans, 
 Reimer, Bopp, Chamberlain, and a thousand other 
 "Germanists" were zealous in developing this racial 
 science, it was done with the secret intention of prov- 
 ing that the Teuton was the highest type of man and 
 consequently the only trustworthy creator of culture. 
 
 The demonstration was brilliantly successful. The 
 German savants unanimously proved that the brachy- 
 cephalists {i.e., the flat-heads) were the inferior and 
 the dolychocephalists (the oval-heads) the higher 
 intellectual element in Europe. The former, as the 
 war of 1870 showed, had finished playing their part, 
 and thus the oval-heads have the divine right to 
 dominate and (if they resist) to exterminate them. 
 The fair-haired German is the born, God-appointed 
 vehicle of European civilisation. To him alone be- 
 longs the world's future. Science has proved it ! God 
 has willed it ! 
 
 Thus arose those superman and super-race theories 
 to which not merely a Richard Wagner fell a victim, 
 but to a certain degree even Nietzsche, with the result 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 189 
 
 that in foreign countries these great Germans have, 
 very unjustly, been placed in the same category with 
 Treitschke and Bernhardi. 
 
 As in German politics one Armament Bill ousted its 
 predecessor, so also, in this field, one scientific theory 
 dispossessed the other, and the last always excelled 
 the preceding one in learned mystification. Reimer, 
 Driesmans, Woltmann, and Chamberlain proved to the, 
 listening world not only the superiority of Teutonism in 
 the present but also in the past. All the glorious 
 achievements of mankind are, beyond question, those of 
 the German race. Woltmann's works, "Die Germanen 
 und die Renaissance in Italien" and "Die Germanen 
 in Frankreich," will in future days be marvelled at as 
 monuments of German learned stupidity. Every 
 sentence in these books is an invitation to satire; 
 if Heine were alive to-day, he would have wrung 
 from us tears of laughter over this "colossal" science. 
 And his sound common sense would have discovered 
 in Reimer's "Ein Pan-Germanistischer Deutschland" 
 and in Chamberlain's epoch-making work, "The 
 Foundations of the Nineteenth Century" (in the 
 circulation of which William 11. took a personal 
 interest), an equally inviting target for his wit. 
 
 We are confronted here by a development similar to 
 that we have just been obliged to recognise in the case 
 of the political philosophy of the State. Hegel was as 
 little an Imperialist as Gobineau was a Pan-Germanist ; 
 Mommsen's Racial Science can, like Treitschke's 
 doctrine of Constitutional Law, still claim to be based 
 upon logic and historical facts. But In the cases of 
 Reventlow, Bernhardi, etc., we are face to face with 
 fanatics such as Hegel would scarcely have dreamed 
 
190 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 of. In the same way, Gobineau would be utterly 
 indignant and astonished could he perceive what 
 Reimer, Woltmann, Driesmans, and Chamberlain have 
 made of his theories. After these leading spirits of 
 a literally world-subverting science had proved 
 that all the celebrated men of the Middle Ages 
 and of recent times were of German origin (La- 
 fayette ="^ typical representative of Germanism" ; 
 Murillo = a palpable mutilation of the German Moerl; 
 Da Vinci's forebears were called Wincke; Diderot = 
 corrupted from Tieteroth; Briand = Brandt, etc., 
 etc.), one can readily understand that Reimer 
 arrived at the scientific conclusion that Jesus of 
 Nazareth must, if he ever existed, have been a 
 German ! 
 
 Our German eggs (to the glory of German science 
 laid by a Frenchman and hatched by an Englishman) 
 have in contradistinction to other eggs two yolks: 
 an ordinary yolk, and a special yolk created expressly 
 by the Lord God for us Germans, from which all 
 civilisation has been born and which gives the whole 
 world a Germanic character ! 
 
 Such scatterbrained theories were not, as one would 
 expect, confined to the narrow circles of professional 
 philosophers, but attained universal popularity. Their 
 political deductions found, for instance, an energetic 
 expression in the Pan-German League: this Pan- 
 German League was not, be it marked, a political 
 party, but had its influential representatives among 
 almost all parties (even, it is said, among Social 
 Democrats). Although the fundamental ideas of this 
 pseudo-science remained entirely unknown to the 
 common herd, yet in freemason, military, intellectual, 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 191 
 
 and exclusive circles they were warmly welcomed, and, 
 like the Hegel and Treitschke doctrines, enjoyed official 
 esteem and approbation. The imperialistic application 
 of this racial and craniological science was popularised 
 in the text-books of our schools and in the encyclo- 
 paedias,^ and was the secret inspiration of German 
 foreign policy. More frequently than was pleasant to 
 the citizen of cosmopolitan sympathies, it was openly 
 expressed in imperial speeches. 
 
 On February 24th, 1892, William II. said in the 
 Provincial Diet in Berlin : "To this is added the feeling 
 of responsibility towards our All Highest Lord above 
 and my irrefragable conviction that our ally of Ross- 
 bach and Dennewitz will not leave me in the lurch. 
 He has taken such infinite pains with our Mark and 
 our House that we cannot believe that he has done 
 this to no end. No; on the contrary, Branden- 
 burgers, we are destined to higher things, and I shall 
 lead you to more glorious days in the future." On the 
 celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
 foundation of the German Empire (January i8th, 
 1896), as also in the famous imperial speech of June 
 19th, 1902, at Aix-la-Chapelle, there is also a Pan-Ger- 
 
 * For example, Meyer's "Konversations-Lexikon" contains a 
 graphic map of the distribution of the Germans in Central 
 Europe, which includes the whole of Belgium and Holland (thus 
 regarding both countries as legally appertaining to Germany). 
 Another chart illustrating German dialects denotes the vulgar 
 tongue as spoken from Antwerp to Dunkirk and from Liege 
 to Brussels as "low-Frankish/' while the language spoken in 
 Holland is partly "Frisian" and partly "Westphalian." That is 
 to say there is not, in fact, a Dutch nation or a Dutch language ; 
 when Verhaeren and Maeterlinck wrote in French, they were in 
 error, because scientific investigations have established that Bel- 
 gium does not speak French, but Lower-Frankish ! 
 
192 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 manistic undercurrent perceptible, appealing, m the one 
 case, more to the commercial, in the other to the moral 
 and religious superiority of Teutonism, yet on both oc- 
 casions every idea of a war of conquest was relegated 
 to the Greek Calends; and stress was laid upon the 
 necessity for peace. Again, in his speech to the Berlin 
 Academy of Arts (December i8th, 1901), he says: 
 "For us Germans great ideals have become permanent 
 blessings, whereas other nations have more or less lost 
 them. There only remains the German nation, which 
 has been called upon to guard, foster, and perpetuate 
 these grand ideals.'* But, in the notorious Bremen 
 speech (March 22nd, 1905), the Woltmann-Chamber- 
 lain theories are very evident : ". . . to abandon our- 
 selves to the firm conviction that our Lord God would 
 never have given Himself so much trouble about our 
 German Fatherland and its people, had He not destined 
 us for higher things. We are the salt of the earth, 
 but we must be worthy of being so." The famous 
 toast on the 105th anniversary of the birth of Moltke 
 (October 26th, 1905) at Berlin was less inspired by the 
 Pan-Germanic theories than by the resulting imperial- 
 istic conception of war. "My second glass is drained to 
 both the future and the present. You have seen, gen- 
 tlemen, how it stands with us in the world. Therefore, 
 powder dry; sword sharpened, the aim in view; our 
 energies at tension, and down with pessimists!" On 
 August 31st, 1907, he again said at Miinster: "Then 
 our German nation will become a block of granite, upon 
 which our Lord God can erect and complete His civilis- 
 ing work in the world. Then the words of the poet 
 will be realised, who wrote : *Teutonism will one day 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 193 
 
 prove the salvation of the world.' "^ Few comments 
 are necessary. It is, besides, known how much William 
 11. interested himself in the investigations of Aryan 
 anthropology. The racial scientist, Houston Stewart 
 Chamberlain, who is of English birth, was his favour- 
 ite author. '*I particularly advise you to read what 
 Chamberlain has so admirably said in the preface to 
 his 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* on this 
 point," said William II. to the masters and first form 
 of the Friedrich Public School at Cassel on August 
 29th, 191 1. In the fourth chapter of this book I have 
 already shown how such lines of thought were turned 
 to practical use by German foreign poHcy. In particu- 
 lar, the attitude of our dynasty at The Hague Confer- 
 ences is a clear proof that the German foreign policy 
 was not only permeated by the tacit presumption of 
 Germanic superiority, but also by the fact that by 
 "superiority" nothing else was meant than the brute 
 force of the stronger. 
 
 *"An deutschem Wesen wird einmal noch die Welt genesen." 
 Geibel had written this verse cited by the Emperor as early as 
 1861. But Geibel was, like his colleague, Hoffmann von Fallers- 
 leben (the author of "Deutschland iiber Alles"), by no manner 
 of means a Pan-Germanist, but a democratic patriot, who ex- 
 pected the regeneration of the world from the union of German 
 races and the resulting political liberty of the German people. 
 It is strange that the song "Deutschland iiber Alles" was first 
 sung in Hamburg, on the occasion of a manifestation in favour 
 of the liberty of the Press. Now, however, since the unity of 
 the German races has been effected in a manner so utterly dif- 
 ferent from that which our democratic national poets ever imag- 
 ined, their words have been given another, namely, an imperialis- 
 tic meaning. 
 
il94 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Concerning the Freedom of German Culture 
 
 It may possibly be suggested here that I am confus- 
 ing cause with effect, and it will certainly be suggested 
 that every nation has the culture that it deserves. Is 
 the dynasty really to blame for the fact that, during the 
 last hundred years, we have developed a constitutional, 
 a military, and a racial science, that has earned us 
 the hatred of the whole world? Was it not rather 
 the theories and researches of Hegel, Treitschke, 
 Chamberlain, and Bernhardi that exercised a decisive 
 influence on the attitude of the dynasty? And, if 
 Germany failed to produce any effective antidote to 
 these teachings, is not this a proof that the German 
 people were at fault ? How came it that the teachings 
 of Hegel, Treitschke, Gobineau, and Chamberlain won 
 such an enormous following? How was it that 
 Schopenhauer — a far more distinguished thinker — 
 did not become a "spiritual force" in Germany, 
 instead of Hegel? And so forth. 
 
 We do not put these questions, and we dO' not fall 
 back on the popular assertion that every nation 
 possesses what it deserves. Perhaps at some future 
 time, when we have nothing better to do, we may 
 argue the question whether man is a product of his 
 environment, or whether the environment is a product 
 of man, or whether mediaeval scholasticism was dic- 
 tated by the Papacy, or whether the power of the Pa- 
 pacy was the fruit of a scholasticism. But we have lit- 
 tle desire to argue the question whether the nature and 
 direction of German culture in the nineteenth century 
 was dictated by the dynasty, or whether the dynasty 
 was a fruit of German culture, because the matter is so 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 195 
 
 perfectly clear. Just as It is obvious that neither 
 Germany's gigantic armaments nor her aggressive 
 foreign policy are the products of the will of the Ger- 
 man nation, so also the German culture of Treitschke, 
 Chamberlain, Bernhardi, and their school, with its 
 glorification of war and conquest, is not a result of the 
 national spirit of Germany, but a result of the thirst 
 for power of the dynasty. It is this thirst for power of 
 the dynasty, and not any national ideal, which has been 
 the animating and directing force behind all the German 
 intellectuals since Kant, Goethe, and Humboldt. It 
 has been the German dynasty which, for the last hun- 
 dred years, for the safeguarding of its existence, has 
 brutally and systematically stifled all free expression 
 of opinion, all sound criticism, all democratic senti- 
 ments and aspirations. It has been the German dy- 
 nasty which has always stood, watchful and suspicious, 
 behind its professors. Over the most distiguished 
 professors no less than the most insignificant school- 
 teachers it has exercised relentless control. 
 
 As Germans, we can only reflect with secret melan- 
 choly upon the fact that since the age of Goethe the 
 dynasty has lain like a gravestone over the intelligence 
 and the aspiration for freedom of Germany. Every 
 German who since that time has felt himself to 
 possess the right and the talent to come forward as 
 the champion of democratic liberties has always been 
 confronted with the choice either of wearing himself 
 out in fruitless opposition, or of taking refuge in a 
 foreign country, or of bowing to circumstances, that 
 is to say, becoming tacitly or openly a panegyrist of 
 the dynasty. 
 
 In this struggle with their conscience and their 
 
196 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 better self, very many talented Germans have 
 succumbed. In their youth they have, for the most 
 part, nourished democratic and international sympa- 
 thies, but sooner or later they have given up the 
 struggle and, in order not to be compelled to stifle 
 their talent and their longing for recognition, they 
 have decided to serve the dynasty. This dynasty, 
 which, in Prusso-Germany, disposes of every dignity, 
 title, and office, has exercised over the nation for the 
 last hundred years an intellectual terrorism v^^hich 
 scarcely weighs upon the present generation, which 
 outwardly is scarcely perceptible, and which it is quite 
 impossible for foreign nations to understand. 
 
 Therefore, almost everything that has been said 
 about German culture in France, England, and Italy, 
 since the beginning of the war, is false; because it is 
 impossible for the people of those countries to con- 
 ceive that the national idea of right and of culture can 
 be a dictate from above and consequently they believe 
 that it emanates from the people.^ 
 
 * When, in October, . 1914, that notorious "Appeal to the Civil- 
 ised World" was published, about which we shall speak later, the 
 famous French Socialist, Gustav Herve, in his indignation, cried 
 to the French soldier : *'Now fire into their ranks without any 
 scruple !" Questioned concerning his point of view, said Anatole 
 France, Herve gave in this phrase the only possible answer. 
 Since then, the conviction that the idea of culture expressed in 
 the manifesto is that of the whole German people has in France 
 (and to some extent also in England, Italy and the neutral 
 countries) become almost a dogma, which every good patriot is 
 bound to accept. In the interest of the German people and of 
 the coming peace, this notion is all the more to be regretted, 
 in that it will be extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate to those 
 who are at present our enemies how the case really stands. For 
 supposing that the German dynasty is conquered in this war and 
 that Germany produces a thousand new representatives of cul- 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 197 
 
 Many French and English chauvinists went so far 
 as to assert that it was this culture emanating from 
 the German people, with its sinister dream of world- 
 power, which had urged on our Government in its 
 dangerous world-policy. The fact is, however, that 
 we Germans for the last hundred years have not dared 
 to be what we actually are and would like to show 
 ourselves, namely, the descendants and the upholders 
 of the classical Germanism of Leibnitz, Herder, 
 Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Humboldt, Uhland, etc. — that 
 is to say, eminently peaceful natures, perhaps somewhat 
 heavy, but always of cosmopolitan sympathies. 
 
 It was our dynasty that compelled us to become 
 Prussianised. Even Bismarck, as is discernible on 
 the first page of his "Reflections and Reminiscences," 
 was, as a youth, a Republican, although he would 
 never have become Bismarck had he not betimes dis- 
 carded his youthful follies. Until his mature years, 
 Moltke was a devotee of the old German idea of eternal 
 peace, which is developed by Kant, but as soon as he 
 perceived that Kant and Peace were in Prussia less 
 estimated than war and conquest, he became our most 
 famous strategist, and glorified war (by which he 
 gained £45,000 and recognition as a national hero) as 
 
 ture, who unanimously condemn the present regime and uphold 
 democracy and internationalism, then it is to be feared that they 
 will be received in France (and elsewhere) much in the same 
 way that in their time Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, and other 
 distinguished Frenchmen were received by the German intellec- 
 tuals. That is to say, they will be told that their sudden dem- 
 ocratic and international sympathy is merely the hypocrisy of 
 the vanquished, and so forth. For decades the German intellec- 
 tuals will have lost their credit in the world. This is a tragedy, 
 the full bitterness of which will only be tasted by our children 
 and our children's children. 
 
198 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the spring of healing for nations and an element in the 
 divine order of the world. Treitschke was feted in 
 Paris in 1864 by the Republicans there as a spirited 
 opponent of Prussian despotism; but when he saw 
 that the future belonged to Prussian despotism, he 
 altered his course, and became our most uncompromis- 
 ing philosopher of War and the State, receiving as his 
 reward the coveted title of Prussian "Wirklicher 
 Geheimrath" (Privy Councillor).^ The same hap- 
 pened in the case of Sybel, the historian, in his 
 younger years a great opponent of Bismarck, and 
 who' later became one of the most reliable of 
 "Geheimrathe." Likewise, the author Arnold Ruge, 
 who in the 'forties instigated a revolution against Prus- 
 sia and, later, became one of Bismarck's great ad- 
 mirers. David Friedrich Strauss wrote in his youth- 
 ful days a learned pamphlet against *'the Romanticists 
 on the throne," and, after the war of 1870, defended 
 against Renan the conquering romanticism of the 
 Hohenzollerns as a divine right. Even a man like 
 Ferdinand Freiligrath, the spirited champion and poet 
 of the Revolution of 1848, received unexpectedly, the 
 protection of Bismarck, and in 1870 made mock of 
 his whole past career by pouring out verses lauding 
 the glorious German victories. 
 
 So it went on and sO' it still goes on in Prusso- 
 Germany to-day. When the philosopher Kant had a 
 severe snub administered him by the King of Prussia 
 for his revolutionary writings; when the antiquarian 
 
 *A title not really translatable into English. It carries the 
 further appellation of "Excellency," perhaps equivalent to "Sir," 
 the Knight's title. The author sets these titles out at length, 
 post. [Translator.] 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 199 
 
 Delitzsch was sternly reproved by William II. (Letter 
 to Admiral von Hollmann, February 15th, 1903) 
 because he had permitted himself to publish the 
 results of his Babylonian investigations in the sense 
 demanded by true science; or v^hen charges of Use 
 majeste have been based on pure suppositions, pastors 
 like Traub and Jatho deprived of their offices for a 
 liberal phrase, trivial comedy-writers like Blumenthal 
 honoured, and genuine poets like Hauptmann severely 
 reprimanded : always and everywhere the same spirit 
 and the same will were predominant. Nothing manly 
 and democratic could be tolerated; and, instead, the 
 shallow, self-seeking, and subservient were extolled. 
 
 Not even in Russia or China are there so many or- 
 ders, titles, and official berths as we possess and there- 
 fore there are in those countries fewer sycophants, 
 lickspittles, and intellectual lackeys. Prusso-Germany 
 is the happy hunting ground for titles, uniforms, and 
 orders. From the Iron Cross, Second Class, tO' the 
 Red Eagle, First Class with diamonds, it Is a long, long 
 way. The badges of servility (so-called orders) at the 
 disposal of our Government might well be used to 
 embellish the corridors of the Reichstag, and so effec- 
 tively stifle in our popular representatives any taste for 
 opposition. With us, much adroitness is required in 
 order not to sin against etiquette. Even the number 
 of "councillors" makes a novice giddy. There are 
 provincial government, engineering, juristic, account- 
 ant, medical, court, ambassadorial, commercial, and 
 other councillors, all of whom, in reward for the 
 faithful discharge of their duty, await their advance- 
 ment to "Privy" and thence to "acting Privy" 
 
200 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 councillors. If the novice has contrived to understand 
 all these distinctions of rank, and is then actually 
 introduced into the presence of a representative of the 
 realm of Excellencies, lie has, meanwhile, become very 
 humble and asks himself whether on God's earth there 
 can possibly be anything grander than to be "acting 
 Privy Councillor of a Legation, with the prefix Excel- 
 lency." But even this exalted station is surpassed by 
 that of a lieutenant in the reserves; for the latter is 
 admissible at Court, even more admissible than the 
 nobility itself. 
 
 "The gross extent to which the position of officer in 
 the German Army is overestimated is not in the least 
 realised by the people at large. Among all the varied 
 ambitions which throng about the Court, it is only the 
 military ambitions which are practically unrealisable. 
 Herr Friedlander, for instance, might become Privy 
 Councillor of Commerce {Geheimer Kommerziensrat) ; 
 he might be raised to the nobility; he might even 
 receive the Order of the Red Eagle, Second Class, with 
 diamonds, but never will he be created lieutenant in 
 the reserves. Herr Dernburg was nominated Acting 
 Privy Councillor (Wirklicher Geheimrat), with the 
 prefix "Excellency," without any hesitation, but he 
 will have to perform wonders in his new office before 
 he will achieve promotion from vice-colour-sergeant 
 ( Vizefeldwehel) to lieutenant in the reserves."^ 
 
 "Prince von Biilow, whose disposition is so entirely 
 unmilitary, had to become General in the Hussars, in 
 order to hold his own against the toadies of the Court.''^ 
 
 No one in Germany can boast of a full understand- 
 
 *"Unser Kaiser und sein Volk," p. 109. 
 ^Ihidem, p. T07. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 201 
 
 ing of these matters. Merely to acquire a knowledge 
 of all the new uniforms, badges, chains, ribbons, oak- 
 leaves, order-clasps, medals, titles and other decorations 
 which have sprung into existence during the reign of 
 William II. has become a veritable science, demanding 
 special study of the most arduous nature. In the mat- 
 ter of etiquette and of heraldry we have reached a per- 
 fection which a Chinaman would by no means envy us. 
 For the feature of it all which would arouse the laugh- 
 ter of a Chinaman, namely, the fact that the wives 
 proudly claim for themselves any title possessed by 
 their husbands, no matter how insignificant, is a bit- 
 terly serious matter in Prusso-Germany. Just as the 
 German Crown Prince was indignant that the Czar 
 should take precedence of his father, so every Frau 
 Oberpostdirektor (i.e., wife of a manager of a District 
 Post Office) will deprive you of her friendship if you 
 address her merely as Frau Postdirektor (i.e., wife of 
 a postmaster), and if you should address her merely 
 as Frau Schulze, then her husband will challenge you 
 to a duel with pistols. 
 
 The German fondness for titles has always excited 
 the merriment of the world. The great philologists 
 of other nations have vainly endeavoured to find 
 English, French or Russian equivalents for expressions 
 like "Allerhochstdieselben," ''Unterthanigst," "Durch- 
 lauchtlgst," "in Gehorsam ersterben," etc., etc. No 
 other language in the world possesses like word- 
 combinations. For even if the spirit of etiquette and 
 caste apparent in such expressions is to be taken as 
 characteristic of every monarchic community, yet this 
 science exists nowhere in such servile perfection as it 
 does in Germany. 
 
202 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 In order to avoid any errors in passing judgment 
 on the German people, we must be quite clear on the 
 point that all this is not a product of genuine Teuton- 
 ism, but is only the fruits of dynastic culture. The 
 servility and class-distinction it has so magnificently 
 nurtured, coupled with the most petty intellectual 
 tutelage and the most reactionary policy any country 
 has ever known, explain how it happens that all the 
 really great Germans of the last century (great not 
 only in talent, but in character) have either fled to 
 foreign countries, or have risen to fame and have 
 laboured in foreign countries, or have studiously held 
 aloof from all political activity. 
 
 Wagner laboured in Paris and In Switzerland, and 
 finally, after renouncing his republican ideals, found a 
 home at the Court of a small dynasty which had, at 
 least with regard to art, remained liberal. Like the 
 poets of the Young German school, Marx fled from 
 Prussian reaction and spent the greatest part of his life 
 in Paris and London. Nietzsche lived in Italy and 
 Switzerland and called himself a "good Swiss." Scho- 
 penhauer remained in Germany, and virulently at- 
 tacked Hegel, but he had to wait fully thirty years for 
 recognition, and, moreover, carefully avoided descend- 
 ing from his high pedestal in order to wage that war 
 against the political powers which in other countries 
 was receiving the support of Victor Hugo, John Stuart 
 Mill, Herbert Spencer, etc. Friedrich Albert Lange, 
 one of those quiet German savants who, like Karl Vogt, 
 combine knowldege with conscience, proceeded, like 
 the latter, to Switzerland, from which country he 
 vainly protested against the shrieks of victory set up 
 by the Bismarck fanatics. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 203 
 
 There is, I believe, no other State in the world that, 
 like Prusso-Germany, has driven continually its best 
 men into foreign lands, leaving us only broken reeds 
 and strictly tutored Privy Councillors. A Tolstoi, who 
 was possible in Russia, would have had to emigrate 
 had he been a German. As far as Prussia itself is con- 
 cerned, it has not, since Kant, produced a man of 
 genius and character who would have held out in 
 Prussia. A man like William von Humboldt may suc- 
 ceed for a time in remaining near the throne and yet 
 in energetically championing popular liberty, but he 
 cannot remain there long. Even Humboldt fell into 
 disgrace and had to smother his bitterness of soul in 
 foreign travel; his brother, Alexander von Humboldt, 
 a genius of whom Prussia may well be proud, held 
 aloof from all political activity (which did not prevent 
 his intervening with Frederick William IV. for a poet 
 like Prutz), and so forth. 
 
 German Culture, Then and Now 
 
 The matadors of the divine order of things (Metter- 
 nich, Hegel, Bismarck, Treitschke) ruthlessly sundered 
 the threads woven from the German classic epoch 
 to modern days. When, in 1859, the centenary of 
 Schiller's birth was celebrated as a German national 
 fete-day, the public jubilation rang out like a cry of 
 yearning for the return and continuation of that 
 genuine culture as embodied in Schiller and his era. 
 
 It was too late! Schiller and his epoch were offi- 
 cially outlawed. Their works still lived on, but not 
 their free, German ideals. In the classical sense, 
 liberty, progress, and public weal had vanished in Ger- 
 
204 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 many. Within the past forty years we have managed 
 to banish the free ideas and cosmopoHtanism of our 
 classical school so utterly that we have been obliged to 
 import cosmopolitans. Despite all official discourage- 
 ment, the instinctive demand of German readers and 
 theatre-goers for cosmopolitans was so strong, and 
 German cosmopolitanism was so thoroughly dis- 
 heartened by the German Empire, that people like 
 Ibsen, Tolstoi, Gorki, Zola, Maupassant, Anatole 
 France, Wilde, Bergson, Maeterlinck, Verhaeren, and 
 others became our gods. 
 
 The roles were changed. The country of poets 
 and philosophers had, at the beginning of last century, 
 become the intellectual teacher of the world; we 
 were the fountain-source of ideas. Our philosophers 
 and musicians, our poets and men of science, were 
 admired and quoted in foreign lands. Madame de 
 Stael drew for her countrymen an enthusiastic and 
 sympathetic picture of the Germany of Weimar days, 
 and all the world then spoke with the highest respect of 
 our intellectual, artistic, and scientific culture. 
 
 But now foreign countries, with astonishment and 
 apprehension, interested themselves only in the "views" 
 of our "racial scientists" and military authors. 
 Nietzsche was the last German cosmopolitan 
 that foreigners translated into their languages and 
 discussed. With silent amazement our neighbours 
 heard (on November loth, 1908) from the Emperor's 
 lips that Count Zeppelin was the greatest German of 
 the twentieth century. General Bernhardi became 
 Germany's most lamentable celebrity; his books 
 were translated into most civilised languages, and, 
 together with other productions of our "Realpolitik," 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 205 
 
 were everywhere regarded as the symbols of modern 
 Teutonism. A nation of philosophers and poets, 
 which had now apparently become a greedy race of 
 fire-eaters and warriors. In all the innumerable 
 speeches William IL has made during his twenty-eight 
 years' rule, names like Goethe and Schiller occur at 
 most two or three times (not to mention Kant, Herder, 
 and Lessing). Bombast and arrogance had taken the 
 place of the Weimar peaceful liberty of thought. 
 We were no longer the disciples of our classicists, but 
 the devotees of Bismarck and Treitschke. Politically 
 isolated by our policy of the "mailed fist," we had, 
 intellectually and artistically, sunk to the level of the 
 tolerated and rapacious. The cleverest of our 
 so-called ''moderns" were not equal to the task of 
 dimming the lustre of a Count Zeppelin or lessening 
 the influence of the works of a Chamberlain, a Liman, 
 or a Frymann. 
 
 A general cloud of uneasiness brooded over the land 
 of poets and philosophers. We were discontented 
 with ourselves, stood in our own light, and did 
 not quite know why. We had a sort of misgiving 
 that we were loathed by the rest of the world, and 
 a dim sense of how little we could now offer 
 it compared with formerly. Of course, we were 
 comforted to some degree by the reflection that we 
 had become the leading merchants, men of science, 
 chemists, and organisers in the world, yet, after all, 
 we instinctively felt that this could not be the true 
 role we had to play in the world. Everyone spoke 
 sentimentally of German culture, but no one knew 
 really what this implied. But, in our innermost 
 hearts, we wanted this culture to be actuated by 
 
2o6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 cosmopolitan ideals. Openly, however, we scoffed 
 (even in the halls of German Freemasonry) at this 
 "cosmopolitanism" of our ancestors. Ridicule of 
 the ideal of a thoroughly German and democratic 
 period was considered good taste under a monarchical 
 regime. But here, as always, we spoke without real 
 conviction. We would so gladly have become what we 
 really are, by virtue of our national gifts and tradition, 
 but could we ever become it ? Not even in the province 
 that is furthest removed from any dynastic influence, 
 namely, in art, were we allowed liberty. "An art 
 that disregards the laws and limits I have laid down 
 is no longer an art," said William II. to the Berlin 
 artists, who, under his direction, had sculptured the 
 statues of the Siegesallee (December i8th, 1901). 
 And he added : "This much I can tell you : the im- 
 pression the Siegesallee makes upon the foreigner is 
 quite overpowering ; everywhere we find an enormous 
 respect for German sculpture. I trust you will main- 
 tain this high reputation. ..." 
 
 What William II. here said about the Siegesallee is 
 generally applicable to German culture ; the impression 
 it made upon the foreigner was overwhelming, and 
 everywhere in the world it was regarded with 
 the greatest respect. Yet only externally. Secretly, 
 the foreigner was amazed, perturbed, and depressed at 
 the sight of its uniformity and stiffness. The 
 foreigner was as far as the German people itself from 
 guessing that in Prusso-Germany everything is shaped 
 on the same last, and that this is a dynastic last. 
 Political Constitution, Siegesallee, or German culture — 
 it is all one; all alike are inspired by the dynasty, 
 executed according to orders, and forced upon the 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 207 
 
 German people as a glorification of the hereditary 
 despotic house. 
 
 But Heaven has granted the German people the 
 gift of good temper ; vexed, at times, about this excess 
 of military discipline, it yet secretly admired the versa- 
 tility of a ruler who not only interested himself in 
 soldiers and battleships, but, also, in art and artists. 
 
 To be sure the German people failed to realise how 
 matters really stood. For just as it yearned in secret 
 for a really national government, army, and policy, 
 without actually attaining it, so it dared not foster 
 a really national culture that would have satisfied 
 the true German ideal. As, in the realm of politics, 
 our constitution and army were only a semblance, 
 and not the reality of true German thought, so since 
 Hegel our official German culture had long ceased to 
 be a product of true Germanism, and had become 
 merely the will-to-power of the dynasty expressed in 
 scientific and artistic forms. 
 
 This fact, realised only by a few (among them, 
 Nietzsche), was revealed to us with the most unmis- 
 takable clearness on the outbreak of the World War. 
 When in October, 19 14, that appeal "An die Kultur- 
 welt" was issued, which was signed by ninety-three 
 of the leading German intellectuals, and caused so 
 much amazement and excitement in the civilised world 
 (even in the real though muzzled Germany), then 
 this German culture threw off the mask and showed 
 itself in its true form, a protective bulwark of the 
 dynasty. 
 
 There is no longer any question here of that scien- 
 tific logic which in Kant's days had Its home in Ger- 
 many: "It is untrue!" *Tt is untrue!" This is not 
 
2o8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the language of logicians, scientists, and free Ger- 
 mans, but of lackeys, whose views may well be dis- 
 counted. 
 
 Investigation of truth, reflection and objectivity, 
 once the hall-marks of German science, are foreign 
 to this modern culture. ''Often enough, during his 
 reign of twenty-eight years, has William II. proved 
 himself the protector of the world's peace . . . And 
 only when a superior enemy long lurking at our 
 frontiers fell, from three sides, on our nation did it 
 arise as one man." Thus do people speak who, for 
 a century past, have been drilled to express them- 
 selves not in accordance with their convictions but 
 in accordance with the wishes of their Government. 
 Whenever the dynastic Government is assailed, all 
 sense of honour and scientific evidence is for such 
 persons non-existent. 
 
 The quintessence of this appeal, the spiritual bal- 
 ance, as it were, of a hundred years of intellectual 
 tutelage, is contained in the following sentence, which 
 will bring a blush to the cheek of our grandchildren 
 and great-grandchildren : ''But for German mili- 
 tarism, German culture would long since have been 
 wiped off the face of the earth." After this, all doubt 
 must cease. Everyone who feels within himself a 
 spark of true Germanism will be forced to admit that 
 this sentence amounts to a declaration of the bank- 
 ruptcy not only of classical Germanism, but of every 
 human aspiration towards culture. Even though we 
 were able to emerge victorious from this war, and to 
 build up a German world-empire from Antwerp to 
 Bagdad, this sentence would proclaim us eternally 
 vanquished. It is a Sedan of the German spirit. 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 209 
 
 Militarism as the pre-requisite and basis of German 
 culture! It looks as if these ninety-three champions 
 of culture had struck themselves in the face, in order 
 then with blushing cheeks to confess that a free man 
 does not allow himself to be struck in the face, he 
 only performs the act himself — on command. 
 
 The fact that these ninety-three intellectuals include 
 not only official professors and dignitaries, but also 
 persons who, before the war, were honoured as citi- 
 zens of the world and as affording the highest hopes 
 for a free Germany — Dehmel, Eucken, Eulenburg, 
 Wilhelm Forster,^ Hackel, the two Hauptmanns, Ost- 
 wald, Sudermann, Ludwig Thoma, etc., etc., whose 
 signature is thus a voluntary act — is only a fresh proof 
 that the official control of the German idea of culture 
 had already demoralised a great many of the free 
 German writers and artists, and that they too, in re- 
 turn for titles and decorations, are now ready to sell 
 their consciences.^ 
 
 That true culture can only be born in a world out- 
 side the prejudices of countries and dynasties, of this, 
 as the appeal shows, the ''champions of culture" in 
 modern Germany have no idea. Talk to the world- 
 renowned jurists Laband and Liszt about the aggres- 
 sion in Serbia and the violence done to Belgium, and 
 they will only reply, not as unprejudiced jurists, but 
 as staunch patriots : German necessity knows no law ; 
 and be very cautious not to seek any valid evidence 
 of such necessity. Speak to our Dehmel and Fulda 
 
 * Not to be confused with his son, the Munich Professor F. W. 
 Forster. 
 
 ^ Hauptmann, Sudermann, and others have meantime received 
 the Fourth Class of the Red Eagle, the lowest m that series. 
 
210 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 of the destruction of Invaluable libraries and churches, 
 and it would not surprise me if they dilated on the 
 tragical beauty of a cathedral blazing in the service of 
 German culture. Complain, again, to Hauptmann 
 about Germany's questionable methods of warfare, 
 and he will, like any chance German lieutenant of 
 the Guard, tell you that any desecration is not more 
 than Germany's power and dignity demand. Speak 
 to Scheidemann and Siidekum of the necessity of at 
 last bringing the European nations under a democ- 
 racy, and of utilising the potentialities of this World 
 War for the acquisition of new international rights, 
 and, with scarcely veiled admiration for the model 
 German social legislation, they will reply that even 
 the most liberal republic conceivable, considering that 
 it is always controlled by accursed capitalists, is no 
 better for the labouring man than an absolute mon- 
 archy. 
 
 For Emperor and Empire! Between these ever- 
 lasting blinkers, our historians view their documents, 
 the professors their antiquities, the freemasons their 
 corner stones, the classical scholars their Pegasus, and 
 the Social Democrats the ark of the covenant of the 
 sacred Marx. 
 
 German culture in the German Empire? No! A 
 Ptolemaic cosmic system of superstitious theories, 
 which circle round the stationary level of their dy- 
 nasty; a graciously tolerated cloak of militarism; a 
 puerile phantom machine with ''energetic imperatives" 
 and thousands of empty phrases ; a Ptolemaic religion 
 of fawning mandarins ; at the best, a musing on pious 
 sentiments and a splendid naivete of prophetic souls; 
 
THE GERMAN DYNASTY 211 
 
 here and there, perchance, a subservient attempt to 
 curb the war-thirsty beast. Nothing more. 
 
 The German ^'champions of cukure"? Among a 
 hundred there is hardly one who dares to play the 
 man: slaves, who carry their master's whip; pedants, 
 who belaud as liberty what all the rest of the world 
 has long felt to be serfdom ; acrobats and court jesters, 
 who are permitted by their grand lords to present 
 all manner of burlesques of freedom to the people; 
 occasionally an earnest eccentric who has heard it said 
 that dynasties are not indispensable in our modern 
 world; but the overwhelming majority of them, in- 
 tellectual lieutenants in the Hohenzollern Guard, ready 
 to obey at the word of command. 
 
 Learning without character, knowledge without con- 
 science, organisation without humanity, discipline 
 without liberty, ideal without dignity; such is the re- 
 sult of a mental development that, commencing with 
 the disappearance of the Weimar Germanism, and po- 
 litically trained by Metternich, Bismarck, and Wil- 
 liam 11. , and intellectually by Hegel, Treitschke, and 
 their disciples, could only play its part as a protecting 
 power of the dynasty. The World War is the absolute 
 proof of this. It has shown the culmination of this 
 development in a complete victory of Potsdam over 
 Weimar. I believe that, after this catastrophe, we 
 require an entirely new generation of men to answer 
 by entirely new conduct this — for Germany — entirely 
 new question, namely, what Culture really means. 
 
VI 
 
 THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 
 
 In the foregoing pages we have embarked on a 
 strictly judicial voyage of discovery through modern 
 Prusso-Germany, basing all our observations upon 
 actual facts. As a subject of the Fatherland of scien- 
 tific logic my aim was to apply this logic, as far as 
 in me lay, and without prejudice or malice, to a topic 
 hitherto totally excluded from free German investiga- 
 tion — namely, the legal, military, political, and intel- 
 lectual relation of our dynasty to our country. I do 
 not claim completeness for my studies. The materials 
 I have collected on these subjects would have suf- 
 ficed to fill a book of fully threefold the volume I 
 now present to my readers. In Germany things exist 
 which afford the most valuable evidence in support 
 of the views here urged,^ concerning which, however, 
 
 *The reader will, perhaps, have noticed that I have said noth- 
 ing about the Prussian Constitution, the Prussian franchise and 
 Upper House, the privileged position of the Junkers in the 
 Prussian political system, the infamous Prussian Polish policy, 
 etc. I have also left unmentioned numerous expressions of 
 William II. which, though indubitably uttered, have not been 
 officially confirmed. A special chapter, which really belongs 
 here, and would do much to elucidate the psychology of dynas- 
 ties, would be an honest account of those numerous scandals 
 at the Berlin Court (Stocker, Schrader-Kotze, Hammerstein, 
 Waldersee, Eulenburg, etc.) which, since Bismarck's fall, have 
 disclosed the secret workings of the Berlin Camarillas and exer- 
 cised an unsuspected influence upon German politics. 
 
 212 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 213 
 
 a good patriot prefers to keep silence. Yet the little 
 evidence I have above adduced will, I trust, suffice. 
 
 If, for instance, by the word "fatherland" we mean 
 what all civilised nations to-day, except the Russians 
 and Turks, mean by it, then by the light of our in- 
 vestigations we arrive at the result that we Germans 
 have no Fatherland at all. For what the French, 
 English, Swiss, Americans understand by "father- 
 land," namely, the country in the government of which 
 they have a voice, does not exist in Germany. 
 
 The modern notion of "Fatherland" was first cre- 
 ated by the French Revolution and is, essentially, an 
 ideal of public weal and justice; it is (let Germans 
 realise this fact) inseparable from the notion of the 
 sovereignty of the people. The Frenchman, the 
 Italian, the Englishman, and the Swiss (lately, per- 
 haps, the Chinese) is willing to give his life for his 
 country, because he feels himself a responsible part 
 of a sovereign whole, a member of a national organism 
 striving towards a continually higher ideal of justice 
 and welfare — in short, free citizens; possessing equal 
 rights in a political and constitutional community. 
 
 But we Germans are not permitted to attach such a 
 meaning to the word "fatherland," since, as already 
 shown, the antecedent conditions to such a conception 
 are wanting. Any German who honestly investigates 
 this question must admit this fact. Both as a function 
 and in its effects, our electoral right is only a pretence. 
 We have neither ruling statesmen nor responsible min- 
 isters, neither a legally guaranteed position as against 
 our Government, nor soldiers, sworn to uphold our 
 Constitution. Thus, we are not the free citizens of 
 a constitutional State, but, as William II. in his 
 
214 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 speeches has again and again insisted, the subjects of 
 a God-appointed ruler. 
 
 First of all, there is no question with us of real 
 spiritual liberty. There are many Germans who 
 proudly boast of our liberty of the Press; but, alas! 
 the German liberty of the Press is the same demo- 
 cratic illusion as the German Reichstag and the Ger- 
 man popular army. As German policy is exclusively 
 the business of the German Emperor, and the speeches 
 and actions of the Emperor may not be criticised (the. 
 mere supposition of an intention to insult the sov- 
 ereign^ suffices, in Germany, to get anyone into 
 prison), in Germany our much vaunted liberty of the 
 Press stops just where, in other countries, it begins, 
 that is to say, where it begins to fulfil the purpose for 
 which it was founded. There is nothing worse and 
 more stupid than liberties, which are counted upon, 
 and yet, at the very moment when they ought to prove 
 their use, become crimes. Liberties that prove value- 
 less, as soon as they are to be employed for the pur- 
 poses for which they were ostensibly created, are, in 
 truth, Hegelian speculations on the stupidity of the 
 people. If we made no pretence of having liberty of 
 the Press, then we should, at least, know how we 
 stood. But as things are, one has to take infinite 
 
 * One instance out of a hundred. In January, 1899, the editor 
 of a Magdeburg SociaHst paper was sentenced to four years 
 and one month's imprisonment for an article written in the 
 form of a legend, but which, unfortunately for him, the Court 
 held to bear upon German politics. By the aid of that suppo- 
 sition (that German politics were intended), the Attorney-Gen- 
 eral made out a case of Use majeste of the Emperor and the 
 twelve-year-old Prince Eitel Fritz and was entirely success- 
 ful. 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 215 
 
 trouble to bring a German to comprehend that liberty 
 of the Press, absolute government, and lese majeste 
 are three things, like surgeon, sickness, and belief in 
 miracles, i.e., the last produces the second and scoffs 
 at the first.^ 
 
 As far as human despotic power can reach, the Ho- 
 henzollern dynasty is in Germany politically omnipo- 
 tent. Despite all advances in civilisation, the words ad- 
 dressed in 1 71 7 by Frederick William I. to the Prus- 
 sian Estates — *'the authority of the Junkers will go 
 to the wall; but I establish the *souverainete' as a 
 'rock of bronze' " — and, again, to the General Di- 
 rectory, on December 20th, 1722 — "we are, after all, 
 the King and we do what we please" — have 180 years 
 subsequently been repeated emphatically by William 
 II. in countless speeches : thus, "my course is the right 
 one and I shall go on steering it" (February 24th, 
 1892) ; or again, "the descendant of him who by his 
 own right became sovereign duke in Prussia will pur- 
 sue the same paths as his immortal ancestor; just as 
 once the first King said 'ex mea nata corona' (my 
 crown I have myself created), and his illustrious son 
 established his authority as a 'rocher de hronzef so 
 do I, like my imperial grandfather, represent the mon- 
 archy by divine right." (Konigsberg, September 6th, 
 1894). 
 
 ^This criticism refers, of course, to the constitutionally guar- 
 anteed liberty of the Press before the war. That since the out- 
 break of war we have been completely deprived of even the 
 semblance of liberty of the Press, and that (despite solemn 
 undertakings to the contrary) it has not been restored, is well 
 known. Moreover, it is only in England, among all the belliger- 
 ent countries, that any real liberty of the Press has survived 
 since the outbreak of the war. 
 
2i6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 The sovereignty by Divine Right is not, in Germany, 
 a meaningless phrase, not a dynastic fiction, and, cer- 
 tainly, not an imagination, as alleged, of so-called un- 
 patriotic subjects. It is an absolute fact; and two 
 centuries of human development have not altered it a 
 jot. As we, as good Christians, have to believe that 
 God created the world in six days and rested the 
 seventh, so have we, as good patriots, to believe that 
 the dynasty with God's help arranges everything for 
 the best. Come what may, and be it ever so much in 
 conflict with the times, we know that it is a part of 
 the Divine order and that behind it is concealed a 
 higher plan. 
 
 We Germans are, in truth, born critics; we have 
 probed the mysteries of the universe, established the 
 limits of human knowledge, and conceive ourselves to 
 be the cleverest and most highly educated people in 
 the world; yet, in matters of political government, we 
 have been struck blind by the gods and by Hegel. 
 And, our dynasty has, to simplify matters, forbidden 
 the nation of thinkers to think about these matters. 
 
 What then have we Germans left? Upon what do 
 we found our German patriotism ? As a fact we base 
 it upon our affection for the imperial house. Any 
 other devotion to country would be senseless. William 
 II., Professor Delbriick, and other authorities assure 
 us, and with truth, that the army "Is the basis of our 
 political system." But, since this army is sworn to 
 allegiance not to our country and its Constitution, but 
 to the person of the Emperor-King, it follows, by 
 mathematical logic, that our whole German political 
 system does not exist for the behoof of us German 
 citizens, but is merely a creation and possession of 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 217 
 
 the German dynasty. And so it is; Emperor and 
 Fatherland are in Germany one and the same. The 
 Emperor is not only the supreme authority under the 
 Constitution, but the born incorporation of our po- 
 litical system, the leader of our national fortunes in 
 peace and war, umpire in matters of art and science, 
 and sovereign plenipotentiary of the German people — 
 in short, the sole initiating and guiding force of the 
 German Empire within and without. 
 
 As he is all this, the notion of Fatherland implies 
 for the German only the person of the German Em- 
 peror. Our devotion to him is our love of country. If 
 a German were to love his country, as other civilised 
 nations do theirs (as a political community of which 
 he is an active member), he would be a revolutionary. 
 Even to-day the idea of a Fatherland belonging to the 
 German nation is regarded as a crime. 
 
 Of course, it may certainly be disputed which no- 
 tion of Fatherland is the higher, that of the French, 
 the English, and so forth, or that of the Germans. 
 But it cannot possibly be disputed that on this point, 
 as on most others, we have sundered ourselves from 
 the rest of the civilised world, that is to say, we have 
 placed ourselves in diametrical opposition to it. For 
 State and Fatherland, which elsewhere form a natural 
 entity, are in our case only notions artificially welded 
 together. In reality, the Prussian conception of the 
 State is the absolute negation of the conception of 
 the Fatherland obtaining in other countries. 
 
 :ji :js jji 5fc s(j 
 
 It has been shown that in all vital questions Ger- 
 man domestic and foreign policy has been guided not 
 with the co-operation of, but in opposition to, the 
 
2i8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 German people, and that, therefore, logically, where 
 the policy "of Germany" is referred to, it ought rather 
 to be described as the policy of the German dynasty. 
 I wish here, once more, to emphasise that in all im- 
 portant questions in which the German people have 
 been allowed to have a voice. They have invariably 
 given it against the policy of their Government. The 
 fable that the German people are one heart and one 
 soul for their dynasty ought to be finally discredited. 
 Foreign countries, who have, as a rule, no idea how 
 things stand in a country where Use majeste, tele- 
 grams from the Crown Prince, and adoration of the 
 military uniform are taken for granted, have an idea 
 that the German people are delighted with their dy- 
 nasty. At this crisis, no stone must be left unturned to 
 dispel this illusion. Had the dynasty been really so 
 assured of the support of its people, it would long since 
 have dispensed with those protective laws behind which 
 it has so carefully shielded itself. But during the last 
 twenty years those laws have become both more se- 
 vere and more frequently applied than ever. The 
 dynasty went yet further. It demanded the applica- 
 tion of these laws to the Reichstag and forbade any 
 discussion of speeches from the throne. Finally, de- 
 nunciations for lese majcste had become such a public 
 nuisance, that William II. (1907) reduced the period 
 of limitation for actions of the kind from five years 
 to six months (without, however, making the crime 
 dependent upon publicity). This shows that the dy- 
 nasty was, in Germany, only popular because by every 
 available resource it enforced this popularity and ruth- 
 lessly suppressed every other sentiment. It further 
 shows that the proverbial obedience of the German 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 219 
 
 is not a natural trait in his character, but only the 
 result of brutal and long compulsion. A monarchical 
 Government that has never tolerated the smallest 
 openly republican association within its realms may 
 easily assert that its citizens are loyal to the back- 
 bone. As no counter-evidence is allowed, and as this 
 fealty has not sprung from the soil of liberty and 
 free will, it may be regarded with suspicion. 
 
 There is no large party in Germany which desires 
 the monarchy for the monarchy's sake. The funda- 
 mental factor in genuine monarchical fealty, namely, 
 unselfishness, is to be sought for in vain among our 
 so-called monarchical parties. We have, in Germany, 
 men who regard monarchy as a political ideal, disin- 
 terested politicians, journalists and scholars, who are 
 anxious to further this ideal, but no political party, 
 supported by a popular majority, disinterestedly serv- 
 ing the monarchy in its present form. Those very 
 parties, who are reckoned pillars of the throne and 
 the Church, support the throne not for the sake of 
 God and King, but only because God and King serve 
 their own ends best. That is the plain truth, which 
 is naturally contradicted most vehemently by those 
 who live by and not for the monarchy. 
 
 The Prusso-German people, as a whole, have for 
 decades past regarded the divine right of the monarchy 
 with some scepticism. Whenever opportunity offered, 
 they have protested against this divine right. In the 
 National Assembly of October 12th, 1848, Schultze- 
 Delitzsch declared in the discussion of the Constitu- 
 tional Charter : "It is usual, when a commercial house 
 goes bankrupt, not to make use of the old name for 
 the new business. Now I believe that in past history 
 
220 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 absolutism has come to complete bankruptcy under the 
 old title *by God's Grace/ Accordingly, I suggest that 
 we do not adopt this old, bankrupt name for our new 
 business." And by 217 to 143 votes the "bankrupt 
 God's-grace firm" was then struck out of the Draft 
 of the Constitution. Was it the fault of the Prussian 
 nation that Frederick William IV. forcibly dissolved 
 this assembly, and, in defiance of all popular demands, 
 forced upon it a Constitution (which has continued to 
 this day) beginning with the words "We, Frederick 
 William, by God's Grace, etc."? 
 
 Had the spirit of the German people been really as 
 monarchical, slavish, and imperialistic as our enemies 
 of to-day allege, then it could never have come into 
 conflict with its Government. But, as a matter of fact, 
 these conflicts have been frequent and numerous.^ 
 
 ^ Some of the acutest conflicts of the past decade between 
 the Government and the people have already been noted in 
 the fourth chapter of this work. How strong is the opposition 
 of the German people to its Government is evidenced not only 
 by these conflicts, not only by the unconstitutional character 
 of the German popular assembly, a character which has been 
 preserved in defiance of every protest, but, in particular, by the 
 attitude of the Reichstag since the commencement of this World 
 War. The so-called "Burgfrieden" and the boasted "sacred unity 
 of all parties" have not been able to prevent the Reichstag from 
 protesting, almost unanimously, and vigorously, against protec- 
 tive detention and censorship, against the exclusion of Jews and 
 dissenters from the corps of officers, against the disregard of the 
 German popular representation in matters of foreign policy, etc. 
 All in vain. What in England, in 1629, was abolished by the 
 so-called Petition of Rights (namely, the arbitrary power of 
 the royal officials and the unprotected state of the citizens) the 
 German citizen demanded the Imperial Government to abolish 
 (unanimously but fruitlessly) at the end of October, 1916. The 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 221 
 
 That the German people never emerged from them 
 victorious was not their fault, but rather a consequence 
 of that law of the world's history which ordains that 
 the people only begin to gain the upper hand when 
 the dynasty has suffered a loss of prestige outside. 
 But Prussia has suffered no such loss of prestige since 
 the period from 1806 to 1813. 
 
 Our democratic neighbours and present foes, who 
 tax us with not being ripe for democracy and declare 
 that we have slavish minds and no understanding of 
 liberty, should give a little consideration to their own 
 history. The French, especially, w^ho are regarded 
 as the most revolutionary nation in the world, should 
 reflect that they, too, in the past, and under like cir- 
 cumstances, possessed almost the same (apparent) 
 faults as those they tax us with to-day. For instance, 
 so long as the two Napoleons returned from their 
 campaigns flushed with victory, the French never 
 dreamt of a revolution. And, at that time, they were 
 just as hated and feared in the world as we Germans 
 have been for the last few decades. Since the French 
 dynasty was boastful and eager for war, the story was 
 spread about the world that the whole of France was 
 Intoxicated with militarism and vanity and was a men- 
 ace to Europe. Here, as elsewhere, the faults and 
 errors of the victorious dynasty were thoughtlessly 
 placed to the account of the people. 
 
 A French revolution between 1798 and 18 10, or 
 between 185 1 and 1869, might have saved us from 
 
 tragi-comic element of the whole business is that, with the same 
 unanimity, the same Reichstag voted all war credits, which were 
 demanded under the plea that Germany was fighting a crusade 
 against — Czarism. 
 
222 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the catastrophes that the Bonaparte dynasty brought 
 upon the world, just as a German revolution could 
 have saved us from this present war. Why did not 
 the French revolt at that time ? The answer is simple : 
 because they could not. The course of events is every- 
 where alike; victorious dynasties bring despotism; 
 against this despotism arises a secret revolt, which, 
 however, is shouted down by the loud praises of those 
 who live in the pay of dynasties and wield the power. 
 The louder these praises resound in the land, the 
 stronger and the more embittered becomes the silent 
 dissatisfaction of the real nation. In order to exer- 
 cise the growing popular discontent, dynasties must 
 have recourse to war as the sovereign remedy. And 
 only when it is proved that their calculations were 
 wrong, and when the eagle flutters wounded to the 
 ground, can this popular indignation burst out and 
 be victorious. Jena and Auerstatt, which strengthened 
 the dynastic rule in France, were for Prussia the sig- 
 nal for a popular uprising culminating in a conspiracy 
 against the Prussian King. But as the Prussian Rev- 
 olution of those days needed for its victory both the 
 Russian and the Austrian dynasties, it could not, un- 
 fortunately, gather its fruits. On the other hand, 
 Sedan marked the birth of the German Empire "with 
 its Prussian summit," and in France the birth of the 
 Third Republic. 
 
 There are, after all, rigid laws in history. One of 
 these ordains that dynasties which are victorious out- 
 side their realms are at the same time victorious at 
 home over the politics, logic, science, and liberal as- 
 pirations of their peoples. When Lamartine said, "It 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 223 
 
 is not the country, but liberty that is most imperilled 
 in war," he should have said "in victorious war." For 
 every victorious war means for the victorious nation 
 a loss of political liberties, whilst for the vanquished 
 it is a fountain of inspiration and democratic progress. 
 Had there been no Koniggratz, Austria would still 
 be without a Constitution and Hungary still under 
 the Austrian scourge ; yet, on the other hand, without 
 a Koniggratz the National-Liberals in Prussia would 
 not have unexpectedly become "Reptiles/' Without 
 a Sedan, no Bismarck regime but, also, no Gambetta. 
 Had Russia been victorious over Japan, the Russian 
 people would to-day have no Constitution. And so on. 
 Hence, just as the victories of Wagram, Austerlitz, 
 Jena, Sebastopol, and Solferino could not unchain 
 revolutions in France, so from us Germans no revolu- 
 tions could be expected after Diippel, Koniggratz, 
 Sedan and Paris. Victorious revolutions are only ren- 
 dered possible by lost campaigns,^ and it is the mis- 
 fortune of us Prussians that we have not lost a cam- 
 paign since Jena. Yes, my dear readers, it was in 
 truth a misfortune, for had Prussia been only once 
 overcome, "the old bankrupt firm" would have been 
 long since extinguished and the present war would 
 not have come to pass. For then there would not 
 
 *We must lay stress here upon the term "victories." The 
 Revolutions of 1848 were not begotten of wars and not waged 
 against dynasties conquered in the field. But in France, as also 
 in Germany and Austria, they were victorious for a moment 
 only, and immediately after made room for a fresh reaction. 
 Something similar can be said of the great French Revolution, 
 which dethroned a King in order to bring home an Emperor who 
 set all Europe in a ferment. 
 
224 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 have arisen the arrogant dream of a German world- 
 empire and the Pan-Germanism of the present day. 
 
 Rather more historical logic is seriously needed by 
 our friends across the Vosges and the Channel. They 
 would then realise that we, as a people, have done 
 what we were able to do. They would no longer 
 reproach us on account of faults and bad habits which, 
 under similar circumstances, they themselves evidently 
 possessed, and which are merely due to the dictates of 
 victorious dynasties. The recognition of this fact 
 would be of vital importance in securing a sensible 
 conclusion of peace. 
 
 So far as the militarism and foreign policy of the 
 German Empire is especially concerned, I have al- 
 ready Indicated that it Is quite correct to say of the 
 German people that It has been militarised to the mar- 
 row. But one ought not to confound militarism with 
 eagerness for war. The indubitably strong (arti- 
 ficially created) military spirit of the German people 
 was no menace to peace, but, as our nation honestly 
 believed and was again and again assured by William 
 II. in his speeches, a means of maintaining the peace. 
 This Is to say, the German people, like all other peo- 
 ples, considered militarism as a necessary evil for the 
 defense of the Fatherland. It could not, would not, 
 dared not realise the fundamental idea of the dynas- 
 tlcally nurtured German militarism — that is to say, its 
 eagerness for war. 
 
 This was strikingly proved at the outbreak of the 
 war. In the first chapter of this book I have, by the 
 light of German documents, unearthed a few of the 
 numerous contradictions and forgeries to which the 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 225 
 
 German Government was obliged to have recourse in 
 order to represent a patently offensive war as a holy 
 war of self-defence. It would not have needed these 
 very compromising contradictions and forgeries, had it 
 not been well aware that any policy of war as a means 
 of conquest was absolutely repugnant to the German 
 people as a whole (in spite of all attempts to militarise 
 them). But after the Government had spoken of 
 Cossacks in East Prussia and bombs on Nuremberg 
 and all this had been expressly confirmed by ^'ofhcial" 
 reports; after it had suppressed, in the Press and the 
 Reichstag, the mediation proposals of the Czar and 
 those of the English Foreign Office, it was a mere 
 trifle to announce solemnly : "Envious foes compel us 
 to a just defence. The sword has been forced into 
 our hand" (speech of William II. on July 31st, 1914, 
 delivered from the balcony of the Palace). Thanks 
 to these imperial and official announcements, German 
 patriots believed themselves faced with that sacred 
 need of self-protection and self-preservation which in 
 the view of every civilised nation is always the justi- 
 fication for armament; the sacred wish and will to 
 defend one's country. When, then, the German peo- 
 ple, proudly and as one man, rushed to arms in August, 
 1 9 14, what were the objects of its enthusiasm? The 
 plans of conquest, as enunciated by Bernhardi, Harden, 
 Reventlow, Keim, Frobenius, and their like? Was it 
 the world-power policy of the Hohenzollerns, the 
 "Greater Germany," the "liberation" of the Flemish, 
 the Baltic races, etc. ? Not a bit of it. Anyone w?^ 
 imputes this kind of enthusiasm for war to th^ mft^- 
 
226 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 jority of the German people is doing them injustice. 
 If so many and such mad plans of annexation crop 
 up, at the present time, everywhere in Germany, while, 
 on the other hand, protests against them are both few 
 and far between, and then only shyly expressed, that is 
 no proof whatsoever that our politicians who desire 
 conquest have the majority of the German people be- 
 hind them. This alleged lust of the German people 
 for conquest is on a par with its loyalty to the Crown. 
 The Government will not suffer any counter argu- 
 ment, and anyone who at present should advocate an 
 immediate conclusion of peace without annexations 
 would be compelled to hold his tongue. For instance, 
 the Berliner Tagehlatt was suppressed for several days 
 because it ventured to describe the demands for an- 
 nexation of the six agricultural unions as calculated 
 to prolong the war. In this way, the impression can 
 readily be engendered abroad that the whole German 
 people is dominated by a barbaric lust of conquest. 
 
 Here again, as everywhere in considering this Ger- 
 man problem, appearances must be distinguished from 
 actualities. The actuality is that the German people 
 in August, 1 91 4, waxed enthusiastic for the patriotic 
 idea of defence of country. We should not have de- 
 served to remain a nation had we not been animated 
 by this idea. As soon as our national honour and 
 independence are assailed, we, like all other nations, 
 become bellicose; and on the authority of the official 
 German description of the causes of the war we were 
 compelled to believe that this was what had happened. 
 What German, in the confusion of those days, could 
 for a moment conceive that in Prusso-Germany of the 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 227 
 
 twentieth century those theories of divine constitu- 
 tional right still prevailed which Machiavelli com- 
 mended to the princes of mediaeval times? The most 
 vigilant democrats, the staunchest opponents of war, 
 could not believe in such a monstrosity; even persons 
 like Liebknecht, Haase, and Bernstein voted the war 
 credits in honest belief that it was for the defence of 
 their country. 
 
 In this w^ay, and no other, can the psychology of the 
 German war enthusiasm be explained. It was en- 
 gendered by the aid of falsifications and the solemn 
 assurance that "we enter upon war with a clear con- 
 science and in the conviction that we did not wish for 
 war" (speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the popu- 
 lace on August 1st, 19 14). 
 
 It is a simple task (and, perchance, a not unwelcome 
 one to foreign lands) to refute the correctness of this 
 account. Let us, for this purpose, suppose for the 
 nonce a Germany under parliamentary rule. Let us 
 suppose that, in Articles 11 and 68 of the German 
 Imperial Constitution, the phrase "German Reichs- 
 tag" is substituted for that of "German Emperor," 
 or else that to the latter are added the words "by 
 consent of the German Reichstag." Then, in the 
 realm of German politics, there would be no longer 
 room for the insolent application of the doctrines of 
 Machiavelli. In their place there would be an army 
 subservient to the popular will, Ministers responsible 
 to Parliament, and who could be impeached, reason- 
 ably formed electoral divisions, that is to say, a Reichs- 
 tag with about 660 deputies (instead of 397, as to- 
 day). Then let the election results of 191 2 be ex- 
 amined. Out of a total of twelve million votes, almost 
 
228 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 eight million are in manifest opposition to the Pan- 
 Germanistic idea of conquest.^ These eight million 
 of German electors, all of more or less democratic 
 sympathies, would have to be represented, in this rea- 
 sonably constituted Reichstag, by about 440 deputies, 
 whereas the real Pan-Germanists, for whom, in the 
 elections of 1912, about four million votes were given, 
 would, in such a Reichstag, have secured about 220 
 seats. 
 
 Now imagine the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian 
 dispute. This Parliament is convened in accordance 
 \uith the Constitution, and there is presented to it not 
 only the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia together with 
 the latter's almost obsecjuious reply, but also Grey's 
 proposal for a Conference of the four Powers (Nos. 
 67 and 84 of the English Blue Book), the telegram 
 of the Czar to William II. of July 29th, which sug- 
 gested the settlement of the dispute by The Hague 
 
 *The following can obviously not be regarded as Pan-Ger- 
 manist: Social Democrats, Liberals, Poles, Alsatians, Guelphs, 
 and Lorrainers. On the other hand, the following are con- 
 fessedly Pan-Germanist : — National-Liberals, Conservatives, the 
 Imperial Party, Anti-Semites. The Catholic "Centre" occupies 
 an intermediate position. It secured over two million votes in 
 the election of 1912. As the supporters of this party are mostly 
 people in humble circumstances and the candidates of this "Cen- 
 tre Party" in many electoral districts (such as the Rhine Prov- 
 inces, Alsace-Lorraine, and Upper Silesia) hold definitely dem- 
 ocratic views (the Centre has more than once voted against the 
 Army Bills, it opposed the Polish policy, and was, in 1907, even 
 the ally of the Social Democrats), we shall not be far wrong if 
 we halve the Centre votes, and allow about one million as being 
 non-Pan-Germanist. Had the plain question been put to them, 
 Do you wish for a war of conquest? four-fifths of the Centre 
 Party of 1912 would have responded with a loud "No." 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 229 
 
 Tribunal, and, finally, also, the further mediation pro- 
 posals of Sazonow (Russian Orange Book, Nos. 50 
 and 6y^ and of Grey (Nos. loi and 103 of the Eng- 
 lish Blue Book). Instead, then, after the declaration 
 of war, of acquainting an unconstitutionally organised 
 and constitutionally impotent Reichstag four full days 
 after the declaration of war with accomplished facts 
 and grossly deceiving it with fables of Cossack in- 
 vasions, bombs dropped by aviators, and by the sup- 
 pression of the most vital proposals for mediation, 
 etc. (which, be it repeated, is only possible under 
 Articles 11 and 68 of the German Imperial Constitu- 
 tion), our Reichstag, reconstituted upon a rational 
 basis, and endowed with full powers, would, consti- 
 tutionally, have had to decide on war or peace. 
 
 Realise this fact, and then honestly reply: Would 
 the German Government, in the face of these pro- 
 posals for mediation, have ever been empowered by 
 such a Parliament to deliver to Russia on July 31st, 
 1 9 14, that twelve-hour ultimatum which rendered war 
 unavoidable? 
 
 I reply to this question most emphatically, and I 
 believe that all who possess any logical sense will also 
 reply, ''NoT With the same determination with 
 which the German nation, deceived by falsifications 
 and suppressions of the truth, embarked upon a holy 
 war of self-defence, it would then have demanded 
 (seeing that two-thirds of the German electors are not 
 Pan-Germanists) that all the endeavours and proposals 
 for a reconciliation should first be discussed, and that 
 all possibilities of maintaining the peace compatible 
 with the dignity and independence of the nation should 
 first be exhausted, before the General Staff was sum- 
 
230 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 moned and entrusted with the continuation of politics 
 "by other means/* 
 
 As a German patriot, I am proud to state here in 
 the name of my country that two-thirds of the Ger- 
 man electorate have a horror of a war of conqujest, 
 they secretly condemn the crimes committed against 
 Belgium, and can only conceive the World War as the 
 result of Cossack invasions, bombs dropped by avi- 
 ators, and "actual attacks.'* Two-thirds of the Ger- 
 man soldiery have taken the field with "a clear con- 
 science," in the proud conviction that they are defend- 
 ing their country and in the firm belief that "we" 
 did not want the war. 
 
 I only wish that this fact could at length be clearly 
 realised. The constant reproach that we are a servile 
 nation, unripe for self-government and craving for 
 world-dominion, has not been levelled at us only by 
 foreign nations, but, alas ! even by those few German 
 Socialists and Democrats who are, to-day, in opposi- 
 tion to the German Government. They shrug their 
 shoulders and inquire: What do you expect? The 
 whole German people stands behind its dynasty. It 
 is poisoned with militarism. If William II. had not 
 declared war on August ist, 19 14, our people would 
 have forced him to do so. 
 
 The election results of 1907 and 191 2 show, at a 
 glance, the criminal absurdity of such a statement, and 
 it is a gross insult to our peaceable, industrious Ger- 
 man people. A people that dreams only of booty and 
 robbery need not be worked up to enthusiasm for Em- 
 peror and Empire and defence of the Fatherland by 
 means of laws concerning lese majeste and violations 
 of constitutional rights, and certainly not by "actual 
 
THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 231 
 
 attacks." On the contrary, such a people might have 
 been calmly told, what our Pan-Germanists had al- 
 ready vociferously proclaimed, "We are stifled. We 
 need more space under the sun! As we possess the 
 strongest army and the highest civilisation, we have a 
 sacred right to expand." But the Government took 
 good care not to approach our people in this way (al- 
 though they would thereby have avoided the respon- 
 sibility for those subterfuges). Sufficient proof has 
 been adduced to show that we Germans are, at heart, 
 as peace-loving as other nations, but that we were 
 artificially and forcibly inoculated with a belief with- 
 out which our Government could not have carried on 
 this war. 
 
 To sum up : the German Fatherland is embodied in 
 a God-appointed dynasty — ^that is to say, a dynasty 
 ruling with all the mediaeval attributes of power. Be- 
 lief in this dynasty is a patriotic dogma, to which the 
 Prusso-German people assents not of free will but by 
 coercion. The true German national sense has long 
 ago declared the old firm "by God's grace" bankrupt. 
 That is to say, the dynasty has not been able to prevent 
 our nation passing through the same development and 
 evolving the same democratic ideals of culture as other 
 nations. And, as far as war in particular is con- 
 cerned, it thoroughly abhors any idea of conquest and, 
 like every other civilised nation, is only moved to en- 
 thusiasm for the sacred ideal of defence of the Father- 
 land. 
 
 But, unfortunately with us Germans, this sacred 
 ideal fares in the same way as other political ques- 
 tions. As our idea of the Fatherland, in accordance 
 
232 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 with the Constitution, culminates in the dynasty, as 
 German soldiers, in accordance with the Constitution, 
 fight not for their country but for their War Lord, 
 so our sense of nationality is regarded by our rulers 
 only as a means to ^'higher ends," which we have the 
 less right to know or to criticise, in that it is our 
 bounden duty to come whenever the King calls. Since, 
 then, the sum of the German national sense is simply 
 the patriotic sum of the dynastic dogma, it follows 
 mathematically that our own desire and will are in 
 such matters both immaterial and troublesome to our 
 masters, and that hence they obtained from the gods 
 the right to deal with them according to their pleasure. 
 This is then the unvarnished constitutional and (by 
 the aid of the German documents) scientifically proven 
 truth. We are not to blame if to-day it sounds mon- 
 strous and revolutionary. It none the less remains 
 the truth, and it has to be said. 
 
VII 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF AND MEANING OF THE 
 WAR 
 
 The Opinions of German Pacifists and 
 Socialists 
 
 Having discussed the Germany dynasty and the 
 World War from the German point of view, let us 
 now essay to treat succinctly the dynastic problem from 
 the European point of view and to realise the universal 
 import of this World War. First of all, we must be 
 perfectly clear in our minds that all wars arise from 
 a dynastic craving for power. In these days of **mod- 
 ern ideas,'' this truth seems, it is true, somewhat "anti- 
 quated," and many intellectuals will dismiss it with a 
 superior smile. We have seen that intellectuals do 
 not, by any means, always follow their inward craving 
 for truth. Here, in particular, where the investiga- 
 tion of truth is compelled to respect certain legal para- 
 graphs and patriotic dogmas, the True, the Simple, 
 and the Obvious easily come under the heading of 
 Revolutionary. Consequently, the question as to the 
 origin of wars has been needlessly complicated. The 
 views held by our German official philosophers and 
 other intellectuals rarely satisfy present-day common- 
 sense and frequently give the impression of avoiding 
 
 233 
 
234 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the truth. Only our great Kant had the courage sim- 
 ply and straightforwardly to characterise "insensate 
 war-waging" "as the affair of the monarchs, who are 
 never tired of war." A confirmation of this state- 
 ment of Kant has been furnished by his diametrical 
 opposite, Bismarck, whose authority, it may be hoped, 
 no one will question. "The majority has, as a rule, 
 no inclination for war; war is kindled by minorities 
 or, in absolute States, by Sovereigns or Cabinets," he 
 said with laudable frankness in his speech in the 
 Reichstag of February 2nd, 1876. 
 
 In fact, war has always been the business of mon- 
 archs. And so it will continue as long as the latter 
 remain endued with divine power. 
 
 Accordingly, whoever sets himself the task of de- 
 nouncing war (and who would not do so to-day?) 
 must first, if he be honest, commence with an attack 
 upon the dynasties. Yet since Kant's day few have 
 undertaken this. In Germany, in particular and for 
 obvious reasons, nobody has dared to develop Kant's 
 doctrines. The more numerous, during the past 
 twenty years, the "scientific" pacifists in Germany be- 
 came, the more carefully did they avoid Kant's re- 
 publican thesis. Instead of dwelling upon the dynastic 
 will for power, they only criticised its external phe- 
 nomena (armament policy, militarism, secret diplo- 
 macy, Chauvinism, Pan-Germanism, inflammatory 
 Press, etc., etc.). The chief German exponent of so- 
 called German Pacifism, Dr. A. H. Fried, nowhere, 
 for instance, in his voluminous writings speaks of dy- 
 nasties, constitutional powers, supreme control of the 
 army, universal military service, autonomy of nations, 
 etc., but has a great deal to say on the topic of "inter- 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 235 
 
 national anarchy," of the workings for force, of the 
 irrational organisation of international society and 
 other matters, concerning the origin and effects of 
 which he tells us a great deal, but he does not tell us 
 who originates, develops, and employs them. Thus, 
 Fried and his school do not pose as politicians, demo- 
 crats, or even revolutionaries, but only as cautious 
 scientists, rhetoricians, or (as Fried likes best to de- 
 scribe himself) "pioneers of peace." 
 
 When, shortly before the outbreak of the war, I 
 privately Inquired of a distinguished German pacifist 
 what he honestly believed to be the real cause of war, 
 he replied, with the candour that we Germans only 
 dare to display in our private conversations, "Oh, 
 we have long known that : — the dynasties !" He gave 
 me certain information touching the already very 
 threatening world-situation at that time (which I can- 
 not repeat here), and when I said to him that, under 
 these circumstances, it was essential to make our strug- 
 gle firstly a political one, that is to say, to oppose the 
 dynastic principle of power, he replied dejectedly, 
 "What can we do? If we were to say in public who 
 and what drives us into war we should be got rid 
 of on the spot. We have to be glad that we are 
 suffered to remain as we are. The initiated know all 
 the same that we are Republicans." This conversation 
 made such a deep impression upon me that it finally 
 induced me to write this book. From that time forth 
 it became clear to me that every German fighting for 
 peace, popular liberty, and democratic progress must 
 perforce employ a special kind of phraseology, so as 
 not to offend the "powers that be" in Germany. 
 
236 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 What Dr. Fried, for instance, cautiously styled "in- 
 ternational anarchy" is, when it is thought out to a 
 logical conclusion and clearly expressed, "dynastic will 
 to power." The advantage of the term "interna- 
 tional anarchy" lies in its scientific sound, which does 
 not afford the Attorney-General the pretext of look- 
 ing behind it for any "revolutionary" meaning. 
 
 Whom does the army obey? To put this question, 
 examine it, answer it, and extract from it any prin- 
 ciple which may be used to serve the maintenance of 
 peace, has, as far as I know, never occurred to the 
 German Pacifists. Woe to the German who, whether 
 Democrat or Republican, ever posed this, the most vital 
 of all questions. 
 
 And so modern Germany might be instanced as a 
 proof of the fact that, in a State ruled entirely by 
 technical science, the dynasty need not abate one jot 
 or tittle of its divine and military powers. A closer 
 investigation has proved to us, moreover, that in mod- 
 ern Germany our much boasted "culture" is entirely 
 subservient to dynastic will-power, and, instead of be- 
 coming a counterpoise to war, it in fact became its 
 secret tool. What does Dr. Fried make of the fact 
 that in modern Germany, despite its highly perfected 
 technical science, Articles 11 and 68 of the German 
 Imperial Constitution, based as they are upon mediaeval 
 ideas, remain unaltered ? How was it possible that, in 
 spite of the continuous development of commercial 
 science and the resulting desire for political freedom, 
 any demand for such a democratic modification of the 
 Constitution as would secure this was punished as lese 
 majeste ! 
 
 It was possible because, as we see, the most modem 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 237 
 
 technical science is absolutely compatible with the 
 darkest political mediaevalism. The more "scientifi- 
 cally," that is to say, the more timidly, the leaders of 
 the intellectual and political opposition protest against 
 it, the easier it is for the rulers of the country to bring 
 about this strange harmony. As long as the "scien- 
 tific" pacifists are afraid of openly becoming demo- 
 crats, so long will that technical science which is sup- 
 posed to promote international brotherhood be a curse 
 rather than a blessing to mankind. For, under these 
 circumstances, modern technical science labours en- 
 tirely in the interest of war; the World War proves 
 that the horrors of warfare have increased to a degree 
 that fills us with loathing. Whoever, like Dr. Fried and 
 his disciples, expects true culture — that is to say, 
 peace — as a result of technical science, and holds aloof 
 from all constitutional questions and the fundamental 
 demands of democracy, will, like Ostwald (who, more- 
 over, also styles himself a pacifist, and is one in his 
 own way), regard culture merely as technical organisa- 
 tion and social discipline. But true culture is no ideal 
 for mechanicians and technical scientists ; man did not 
 invent the machine in order afterwards to be enslaved 
 by it. No ! the essential condition of every true culture 
 is and remains the political liberty and dignity of the 
 citizen. 
 
 Sovereignty of the people, human dignity, and in- 
 tellectual liberty — where these are lacking there is no 
 culture whatever, and pacifism. Socialism, etc., be- 
 come mere caricatures. The collectivist war economy 
 prevailing in Germany to-day furnishes a proof that 
 even Socialism (so long as it is only a question of the 
 needs of the stomach, and confines its demands to 
 
238 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 questions of household economy) can perfectly well 
 subsist by the side of an absolute dynasty. If there 
 exist people who give the name "Culture" to this 
 blending of a seemingly most revolutionary principle 
 (collectivism) with the most arbitrary feudal dictator- 
 ship (Btirgfriedcn) — and some people have in fact 
 been heard to declare that it is only necessary to trans- 
 plant the present-day war economy into the coming 
 state of peace, in order to realise the chief aims of 
 Socialism — we must beg to differ from them most 
 emphatically. For as long as, in the midst of the most 
 gigantic technical and economic organisation, dynasties 
 are left in possession of their divine privileges, so 
 long will this culture be not the work of man, but a 
 gift of the gods; a constant threat of war will hover 
 above it, and a bomb dropped from an aeroplane upon 
 Nuremberg will be able to bring the whole structure 
 to the ground. 
 
 Is earthly culture in general, and the German in 
 particular, any longer to depend upon the incalculable 
 caprices of the gods and the god-ordained? We ask 
 this question of all who, like Dr. Fried, expect "cul- 
 ture" to bring about a pacifist ordering of the world, 
 without first inquiring as to the political and constitu- 
 tional foundation of this culture. The antecedent his- 
 tory and the outbreak of the World War show that 
 our much vaunted culture is not ours, but belongs to 
 others. So, my dear Dr. Fried, nations look for their 
 happiness as the result first of all of political Constitu- 
 tions, and not of technical science, culture, and organi- 
 sation; these and other similar blessings are, after all, 
 of no value for safeguarding the world's peace, so long 
 as they are under the control of "God's grace." 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 239 
 
 Peace and war are, after all, not so much the results 
 of foreign policy as (strange though it may appear) 
 the inevitable consequences of the inward constitu- 
 tion of the State. "International anarchy" is not a 
 thing apart, but only the natural consequence of feudal- 
 military Constitutions! Hence away with these Con- 
 stitiitions. All else is only puling pacifist quackery. 
 What have they to do with our great Kant ? ChercheB 
 la dynastie! My dear Doctor, wars are never de- 
 clared by "International anarchies," but only by dy- 
 nasties. Cherches la dynastie! 
 
 The Socialists attack war with equal prudence. 
 Whenever they bring themselves to speak of dynasties 
 (and they do it charily and un frequently), they de- 
 clare them to be the representatives of the capitalist 
 interests of the ruling classes, and maintain that wars 
 will be inevitable as long as that evil thing, capital, 
 rules the world. If anyone speaks to them of the 
 dynastic will to power, they smile at this '^plebeian 
 ideology" and prove from the height of their "ma- 
 terialistic conception of history" that this so-called 
 dynastic will to power is only a small portion of that 
 "capitalist spirit" to which we are indebted for all 
 (yes, absolutely all) the evils in this world. 
 
 Yet, merely to represent universal military service 
 as an outcome of the "capitalist spirit" is in itself a 
 big undertaking. For universal military service is an 
 achievement of the French Revolution and has evi- 
 dently not the least connection with capitalism. For 
 those very wars which are waged in the interests of 
 capitalists (namely. Colonial wars) are waged without 
 resort to universal military service. Very highly de- 
 
240 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 veloped capitalist States, such as the United States 
 and England, had no universal military service at all, 
 v^hile, on the other hand, undeveloped capitalist States, 
 such as Russia and Austria-Hungary, possessed it. 
 
 And then, if war is really the necessary consequence 
 of capitalist interests, why, I ask, have very highly 
 developed capitalist countries, like the United States, 
 England, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, etc., not 
 waged any wars for the past hundred years,^ whilst 
 it was those very European States whose capitalist 
 
 *(7/. note to p. Z7 — England's wars since Waterloo have been 
 all Colonial wars and waged by volunteers. Wars fought by 
 volunteers (as the war of the North American Union against 
 Spain) are never really national affairs, but capitalist under- 
 takings. Whether a contractor sends workmen into a mine, or 
 whether a syndicate dispatches for its own purposes mercenary 
 troops to the Transvaal, Cuba, etc., it is, really, all the same. 
 Although, of course, we strongly condemn a bellicose Colonial 
 policy, yet we cannot quarrel with a person who, for good pay, 
 is ready to risk his life for the interests of others. Our hope is 
 that, henceforth, no mercenary soldiers will be found available 
 for such capitalist marauding expeditions. Moreover, England's 
 past history affords a very apposite instance of the incorrectness 
 of the Socialist thesis. In the course of the past century, Eng- 
 land has allowed numerous and frequently very serious disputes 
 to be adjusted by arbitration, despite the fact that she, more 
 than any other State in the world, possessed the means of com- 
 pelling a settlement favourable to her own interests. In 1863, 
 the King of Belgium settled a dispute between England and 
 Brazil; in 1869, the President of the United States another 
 between England and Portugal; in 1872, the Court of Arbitra- 
 tion at Geneva that pending between the United States and 
 England; in 1893, the Paris Court of Arbitration determined 
 the differences between England and North America touching 
 the seal fishery; in 1904, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal ad- 
 justed the serious dispute between England and Russia in the 
 matter of the Hull affair, etc. Whence comes this predilection 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 241 
 
 economy is a hundred years behind the others, namely, 
 Russia and Turkey, who, in the nineteenth century, 
 waged the most numerous and the most sanguinary 
 wars? 
 
 The attentive reader who, as in my case, scrutinises 
 without prejudice the actual causes of war will in- 
 stinctively feel that the Socialist theory that capitalism 
 is at the root of war contains, it is true, a grain of 
 truth (especially in relation to Colonial wars), but is 
 in the main nothing but a web of sophistry, which, like 
 the scientific pacifists, they wish to weave round the 
 core of the problem. 
 
 2i: ^ ^ :ic >i: 
 
 One great curse of our days is that erudition which 
 intermeddles with matters with which it is not in the 
 least concerned. War is a blackguardly and irrational 
 thing and requires no learned exposition. But our 
 age so revolts against the natural brutality of certain 
 things which have been taken over from the Middle 
 Ages, that it demands "scientific" investigations and 
 justifications even where they cannot possibly be 
 found. And, therefore, our professors narrate to us 
 the most extraordinary stories as to the origin and 
 purpose of wars. The scholar, who is diametrically 
 opposed to the philosopher, may, it is true, have a 
 good grasp of things lying within his own domain, but 
 he is timid and circumscribed in his views, that is to 
 say, incapable of bringing his special knowledge into 
 relation with the world and mankind at large. Thus, 
 
 for arbitration in a country wholly controlled by capitalism? 
 The answer is clear. In England the dynastic will to power 
 was wanting. If England is economically ruled by capital, yet 
 politically it is ruled by Parliament and Liberalism. 
 
242 THE COMING DExMOCRACY 
 
 the biologist proves that the stern law of the preserva- 
 tion of the race and the individual is the cause of 
 war; the Marxist bewails the evils of capitalism, the 
 "civilian" national economist the aspirations for eman- 
 cipation of the Fourth Estate, the theologian the lack 
 of religion in the world, the scientific pacifist the in- 
 ternational anarchy, and the vegetarian, perchance, 
 the wantonness of a flesh-eating society, as the origin 
 of war. There are even in Germany representatives 
 of the so-called "yellow" trade-unions who seriously 
 maintain that the English trade-unions have been the 
 impelling force towards war! 
 
 Thus, every party and sect enlightens us with its 
 own particular fad as to the origin and import of 
 wars; and while Europe is passing through a catas- 
 trophe, the simple causes of which every man in the 
 street knows full well, our professors, with pathetic 
 helplessness, present us with their theories, like the 
 Byzantines, who at the very moment when the Turks 
 had made the first breaches in their walls spoke in 
 oracles concerning the light of Tabor. 
 
 Smiling and exalted, the world of the dynasties 
 stands above this learned chatter. It is quite content 
 that a thousand theories should be invented as to the 
 causes of war, for the express purpose of avoiding the 
 mention of the real causes. In this way, the people 
 are sustained in that belief in the unavoidability of 
 wars, which is just what the dynasties require for the 
 maintenance of their absolute rule. Should a new 
 Kant one day arise, who, with his brilliant simplicity, 
 will merely call things by their right name, then the 
 dynasty will find a way to bring him to reason. Even 
 in the case of Kant, it has succeeded to such an extent 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 243 
 
 that our Konigsberg philosopher is to-day not known 
 at any university as a RepubHcan and champion of 
 international law; his name is associated only with 
 the theory of knowledge. 
 
 Whenever I talk with a socialist, and he explains 
 that capital is at the root of all evil, that wars will 
 cease as soon as the villainous capitalist domination 
 is got rid of, etc., I always think of an incident which 
 befell an officer's orderly. 
 
 He brought his master's sick horse to a veterinary 
 surgeon for advice. After examination the surgeon 
 gave him a powder with the following instructions : 
 "Take a piece of thick paper, make a roll of it, put the 
 powder inside, put the roll into the animal's mouth, 
 and then vigorously blow the powder into its throat." 
 The following day the servant came back with a woe- 
 begone, sallow face, and, when the veterinary surgeon 
 inquired whether he had carried out his instructions, 
 faintly replied : "Yes, doctor, but the animal blew 
 first." For years the Social Democrats boasted of 
 their powder for the sick horse. Two years before 
 the outbreak of war, in Berne and Bale, they threat- 
 ened it with a terrible Revolution by way of a laxative. 
 But when it came to action, the Junkers — blew first. 
 Yes, and since then the Scheidemanns, Davids, Heines, 
 Lensches, Siidekums, and their associates have been 
 running about the country with sallow faces and hid- 
 ing their chagrin under loud abuse of the capitalism — 
 of others. 
 
 Dynastic Statesmanship and War 
 
 If wars, as is proved by universal history, arise, 
 on the one side, from a dynastic will to power, yet 
 
244 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 they, on the other, demand justification in the eyes 
 of the people. Before the introduction of universal 
 military service, when wars were still the unquestioned 
 private concern of monarchs, the people (excepting 
 perhaps those inhabiting the theatres of war) were 
 mostly disinterested lookers on. But since every citi- 
 zen has become liable to general military service, a 
 dynasty can only wage such wars as have the consent 
 of their peoples. This consent it creates by an appeal 
 to the need of defence and the patriotism of its citi- 
 zens. 
 
 If, then, wars are, on the one hand, the means of 
 existence and the object in life of dynasties, they are, 
 on the other hand, from the point of view of the 
 peoples, struggles for safeguarding the national exis- 
 tence. That is to say, what for the dynasties is only 
 a pretext for the attainment of their secret ends is, in 
 the eyes of the people, a sacred, serious actuality. 
 
 Dynasties have been commissioned by the gods to 
 look after the happiness and independence of the peo- 
 ples under their sway. Hence, they pose as guardians 
 and promoters of national interests, and the people 
 have all the greater confidence in them, in that, in the 
 hour of peril, any opposition is made a penal ofYence. 
 In principle, therefore, the policy of every dynasty is 
 directed to the end of proving to its subjects their 
 incapacity for self-defence and self-government, while 
 holding itself up as the indispensable instrument of 
 national independence. This policy, which is summed 
 up under the name of ^'Statesmanship," is only in 
 the rarest cases dictated by the demands of the general 
 welfare. When, for example, a war breaks out, it is 
 always concluded with an eye to dynastic interests. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 245 
 
 Intentionally, or accidentally, but in any event, in- 
 stinctively, the demands of the common weal are 
 passed over, so that the peace just concluded contains 
 the germ of a fresh conflict, by the successful settle- 
 ment of which the dynasties may reap fresh laurels 
 and once more demonstrate their indispensability. 
 
 Let us adduce a few instances : After the Russo- 
 Turkish war, Bismarck prevented the absorption by 
 Bulgaria of Macedonia, though the latter was Bul- 
 garian both in language and sentiment. He thus ran 
 counter to the justifiable aspirations of the Mace- 
 donians, who remained under the detested Turkish 
 yoke. Why did Bismarck act thus? He, as the repre- 
 sentative of dynastic interests, regarded the national 
 aspirations of the Macedonians as an absolutely un- 
 important matter. His purpose was not to pacify the 
 Balkan States and to group the peoples according to 
 the principle of nationalities. No! his chief object 
 was not to weaken, to any great extent, the friendly 
 Osmanli dynasty as against the semi-inimical Roma- 
 noff dynasty. This pre-eminently important object 
 was worth several wars, and Bismarck attained it by 
 reversing the Peace of San Stefano, which, to some 
 degree, satisfied the principle of nationalities, and by 
 restoring Bulgarian Macedonia to Turkey. The prac- 
 tical issue of this statesmanship was three sanguinary 
 revolutions of the Macedonians against the loathed 
 Turkish despotism and almost half a dozen Balkan 
 wars. Had the Macedonians and Bulgarians been ac- 
 corded their due rights on the previous occasion, the 
 notorious Balkan problem would have been practically 
 settled and there would no longer have been a "witches' 
 cauldron" in Europe. But would not the '^Russian 
 
246 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 predominance" in the Balkans have then become in- 
 tolerable? Could the Hapsburgs and HohenzoUerns 
 tolerate that? No! the important thing was, on the 
 one hand, to prevent the Romanoff trees from grow- 
 ing too high, and, on the other hand, to keep the 
 "witches' cauldron" seething in the Balkans. For, 
 if the diplomacy working for dynastic ends no longer 
 possessed such a 'Vitches' cauldron," this would in- 
 volve the loss of a number of things without which 
 politics would be very tedious, for instance, the 
 "menace to the Austrian sphere of interest in the 
 Balkans," or the "peril of Russian preponderance," 
 or the "machinations of Panslavism," etc., etc. This 
 cauldron had to be kept boiling in Europe. It afforded 
 occupation for the diplomats, provided the nations with 
 endless disputes and occasions for mutual abuse, and 
 finally served Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in 19 13, 
 with a pretext for his tremendous Army Bill. All 
 this is infinitely more important than all the interests 
 of the Macedonians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks 
 put together! 
 
 In 1 87 1, Bismarck annexed Alsace-Lorraine in spite 
 of the protests of its inhabitants.^ The consequences 
 
 * Bismarck was no blind enthusiast for annexation in the sense 
 of our modern Pan-Germanists. In 1866 he prevented the in- 
 tended annexation of Austrian territories, not merely in the 
 hope of a subsequent alliance, but, as he writes in his "Reflec- 
 tions and Reminiscences": "I asked myself, as regards terri- 
 torial aggrandisement at the expense of Austria and Bavaria, 
 whether it was probable, in any future wars, that after Prussian 
 officials and military had been withdrawn they would yet remain 
 faithful to Prussia and receive orders at its hands." Similarly, 
 in 1871, he vigorously (though in vain) raised his voice against 
 the incorporation of the French-speaking part of Lorraine. This 
 attitude of Bismarck does not alter, but, rather, on the contrary, 
 confirms the fact that his policy was everywhere only determined 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 247 
 
 are well known: the French thirst for revenge (which, 
 as we have seen, is really a demand founded on inter- 
 national law). From that time forth, Germany was 
 haunted by a terrible bogey ; each time that the Reichs- 
 tag makes a show of resisting the arch-reactionary 
 policy of its rulers, this bogey is brought up and it 
 never fails in its effect. Triple Alliance, Dual Al- 
 liance, colossal armaments, encirclement, etc., are, as 
 it were, developed automatically by the agency of this 
 bogey, and make it more formidable every day. Thus, 
 we must be grateful that we have the strongest army 
 in the world, and must take care that it remains the 
 strongest. For "our peace only depends upon our 
 military equipment." In view of this constantly in- 
 creasmg insecurity, we must, as Professor Delbriick 
 tells us, be more than glad that "the decision lies with 
 those who look far ahead." Who, in the face of this 
 serious situation, would dare to prate about democratic 
 constitutional changes, less severe military discipline, 
 etc.? Alas! for us, if we, like .France, possessed 
 a miserable "Parliamentary Arrrjy"; immediately the 
 French revanche would destroy us. Every German 
 feels that under such circumstances the dynastic su- 
 preme control of army and policy is an iron necessity 
 
 by regard for dynastic interests and future wars. He does not 
 protest against the annexations in the name of the peoples con- 
 cerned, but only in the interest of his lord and master. He fears 
 not the hate of the annexed or the disapproval of the civilised 
 v^orld, but only the possibility of disastrous wars in the future. 
 Thus, from the democratic standpoint, Bismarck can only be 
 regarded as the most violent opponent of the modern ideal of 
 international arbitration, that is, as the most thorough and most 
 successful regenerator of the dynastic policy of power in the 
 last century. 
 
248 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 for Germany. Thus, in the most natural manner in 
 the world, these continual menaces from without be- 
 come the most cogent reasons against all reforms from 
 within, and the astutest statesman is the man who 
 knows how to furnish a constant supply of fresh 
 menaces. 
 
 In 1908, in defiance of the existing treaties, Austria 
 annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby caused 
 in Serbia an irritation similar to that caused in France 
 by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. In the same way 
 as the French thirst for revenge hangs like a perpetual 
 threat above the head of Germany, so have, hitherto, 
 "Serbian intrigues'' hung like a millstone round the 
 neck of Austria-Hungary; they finally imperilled the 
 existence of the Dual Monarchy to such an extent 
 that the latter was, in dire necessity, compelled to 
 appeal to arms. Had Bismarck, in 1878, humoured 
 the national aspirations of the Bulgarians, had not Aus- 
 tria annexed Bosnia, and by the artificial creation of 
 Albania blocked out Serbia from the seaport she had so 
 painfully won, then this whole policy would have found 
 a simple solution, in accordance with the national weal 
 and the principle of nationalities. But then the business 
 of the world-power politicians would have been at an 
 end : the Austrian politicians, with their brazen-faced 
 falsifications (vide the Friedjung case, the Agram 
 case, the Prochaska case, etc.), would not have been in 
 a position to testify to the Serbian intrigues, and 
 everything would have become very dull. 
 
 The obvious result of these simple solutions would, 
 however, have been that the nations living at peace 
 would eventually have demanded democratic reform, 
 and might, perchance, have asked what purpose was 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 249 
 
 served by divine dynasties, standing armies, etc., when 
 there was no menace to be feared from without. Na- 
 tions who have nothing else to do begin philosophising. 
 But philosophising nations are revolutionary, danger- 
 ous nations. Metternich and Bismarck knew this full 
 well. They and their successors took good care to 
 stifle this threatening development. The simplest 
 method for the purpose is never to allow the people to 
 enjoy peace of mind, to keep them by perpetual threats 
 in constant apprehension, and so prove to them contin- 
 ually that they are incapable of self-government. 
 
 Hence, the most marked feature of dynastic state- 
 craft is the art of, from time to time, conjuring up new 
 bogeys, which are held up before the people on suitable 
 occasions, in order to keep them in a state of sub- 
 mission, to wean them from all democratic aspirations, 
 and, one fine day, to utilise the artificially created 
 witches' cauldron and bogeys as pretexts for fresh 
 wars. It is all a policy of poking the fire with the 
 sword. In the same way as beasts of burden are, in 
 North Africa, goaded on by having their festering 
 wounds constantly tickled with a stick, so are the peo- 
 ples of Europe ever driven forward into new dangers 
 of war and armaments by never allowing the old 
 wounds to heal, but always opening and irritating them 
 afresh. Hence It results that wars are an unavoidable 
 and indispensable element of the divine order of things. 
 
 Down almost to 1900, Germany's bogey was "French 
 revanche" ; then it was the "encirclement" brought 
 about at The Hague, or the *Tanslavist danger" threat- 
 ening in the Balkans. Poor Austria, on the contrary, 
 had constantly to struggle against the Russian designs 
 in the Balkans and against "Serbian intrigues." At 
 
250 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 length this ^'higher poHcy" became a wondrous chain 
 of effects, and these effects became causes, until the 
 ordinary human intelligence was absolutely bewildered. 
 For, as it is almost invariably forbidden by the 
 police to call the secret ambitions and ideals of this 
 dynastic secret diplomacy by their right names, at 
 length they come to be regarded as merely instances 
 of "superior judgment," and the humble citizen bows 
 respectfully before the high authorities who ^'look so 
 far ahead." 
 
 But, by means of this statecraft, the dynasties, as 
 clearly pointed out, also secure the internal political 
 conditions requisite for the maintenance of their 
 despotism. It is clear that dynasties faced by loud 
 threats of and preparations for war cannot possibly 
 have either time or money for democratic reforms. 
 Armaments become, under such circumstances, the 
 first law for the safety of the State, the Alpha and 
 Omega of all financial and taxation policy. A State 
 which argues logically (and Germany has in this re- 
 spect remained the fatherland of logic) is bound, under 
 such conditions, to devote all its energies to the perfect- 
 ing of its armaments ; whoever now talks of democratic 
 and social and political reforms is a traitor and wants 
 to reduce us to a state of defencelessness, etc. 
 
 What, then, is the secret of this God-inspired dynas- 
 tic policy, which is constantly engendering quarrels 
 and war? What is its position? A terribly simple 
 and commonplace one. It is the purely instinc- 
 tive impulse of dynasties for self-preservation and self- 
 aggrandisement ; the very same impulse that causes the 
 artisan to demand such an increase of wages as he 
 deems necessary for his existence and general comfort 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 251 
 
 is, mutatis mutandis, the cause of wars. Were the 
 dynasties no longer the rulers of the nations, were 
 they, for their higher wages, compelled to rely upon 
 their own resources, then wars would be impossible. 
 
 If the concern of the dynasties for their own exist- 
 ence and for the extension of their power were not the 
 secret mainspring of European politics, that is to say, if 
 politics were guided in conformity with the views of 
 the people, we should no longer have in Europe an 
 Alsace-Lorraine, a Polish, a Macedonian, or an Irre- 
 dentist question to deal with. The peoples would long 
 since have settled these points comformably with their 
 own interests and wishes, and not troubled their heads 
 about "spheres of interests" and "world-power 
 policy." Europe would have long since become a 
 gigantic Switzerland with a thousand cantons, a 
 hundred tongues, terrible wars of the pen, amazingly 
 revolutionary "modern ideas," serious collisions be- 
 tween Capital and Labour — would be, in short, engaged 
 in a heated and continuous struggle for progress, but 
 yet would be a Europe of true culture living in peace. 
 But all this would have been too human, too simple, 
 and too beautiful. In a Europe constituted on such 
 lines the dynasties would have become superfluous. 
 And so it is only they who have thwarted this free 
 autonomy of the. nations, that is to say, have obstructed 
 the beautiful policy of simple solutions and have 
 promoted the welfare of the people after their own 
 fashion. Everything may be demanded of a man and 
 even of a dynasty, save only the renunciation of the 
 basis of its existence. Whoever attacks this will 
 always meet with the most bitter resistance. This 
 free autonomy of the nations is not, to be sure, a direct 
 
252 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 attack upon the existence of the dynasties (England, 
 Italy, Denmark, Sweden, etc., are proofs of this), but 
 it is, none the less, a step in this direction, that is to 
 say, it is a limitation of their powers and influence. 
 Hence their open or secret, but always embittered, 
 resistance against International Law and everything to 
 do with it.^ 
 
 The Meaning of the Present World War 
 
 We have formulated the conditions under which 
 war must remain an inevitable and periodically recur- 
 
 *C/. here note to p. i8i. The Proclamation — in defiance of 
 every conception of International Law and of Nationality — of 
 the Kingdom of Poland on November 5th, 1916, is a fresh proof 
 of the fact that the dynasties now as ever are intent upon pur- 
 suing their arbitrary policy of self-interest, despite the fact that 
 this is bound to bring about fresh wars. Owing to the fact that 
 the Prussian Poles — as expressly set out in that manifesto — 
 remain Prussians, and the Austrian Poles remain Austrians, the 
 new kingdom (if it ever materialises) by its composition and 
 situation will present grave dangers. Instinctively and inevi- 
 tably it would strive for the emancipation of its brothers "op- 
 pressed" by Prussia and Austria. In this it would, of course, 
 be able to reckon upon the open or covert assistance of the — 
 in this case, defeated — Entente. There would be no end to in- 
 trigues, and these would, of course, immediately be made a pre- 
 text for reprisals on the part of the Central Powers. Thence 
 would ensue, on the part of Germany, the same policy against 
 Russia that Austria has hitherto pursued against Serbia, and 
 Germany against France. Fresh conflicts and frictions would 
 be the inevitable result, until, one day, the sword would again 
 have to ward off those machinations, and secure the peace of 
 the world. An absolutely free Poland would be one of the most 
 powerful guarantees for the peace of Europe. But a free and 
 united Poland would comprise not only Warsaw, but also Lem- 
 berg, Cracow, Ratibor, Beuthen, and Posen. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 253 
 
 ring evil. Yet many a monarch has gone to war under 
 the pretext of furthering his people's good, and with 
 the secret intention of adding a fresh pearl to his 
 crown, but, instead of this, has secured the victory of a 
 principle which had served him only as a pretext. 
 Thus, Gustavus Adolphus was desirous of increasing 
 the fame and power of his dynasty, and became in fact 
 the executor of the Reformation. It was Napoleon's 
 dream to become Emperor of Europe and make vassal 
 kings of all the members of his dynasty. As a result of 
 this endeavour, he became the pioneer of the new 
 social principles established by the Revolution. 
 
 The present World War affords a perfect instance 
 of this ''dualism" of war. At its root is, manifestly, 
 the world-power dream of the Hohenzollerns. Like all 
 dynasties which have acquired power and prestige, the 
 Hohenzollerns became intoxicated with the idea of 
 world-power. This is so logical and is so grounded in 
 the very nature of all dynasties, that we have not the 
 smallest right to upbraid the Hohenzollerns on this 
 account. Take whatever dynasty you please (includ- 
 ing the Papacy of the Middle Ages) : they all had their 
 dream of world dominion, w^hich they sought to realise, 
 sword in hand. Only Rome succeeded in attaining it, 
 for a few centuries. But always a military defeat was 
 necessary in order to induce the dynasties to forego 
 their aims. The Merovingians and the Lancasters, the 
 Hapsburgs and the Capets, the Hohenstaufens and 
 the Bonapartes, the Caliphs and the Popes, had first 
 to be convinced, on sanguinary fields of battle, that 
 world-empires have no place in the plans of Divine 
 Providence. 
 
 But side by side with this Hohenzollern bid for 
 
254 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 world-power, the present war presents another aspect, 
 given it by the peoples concerned. In fact, if we leave 
 the privy dynastic ambitions out of account for a 
 moment, and only view this war from the standpoint 
 of the nations, it presents itself to us as a terrible 
 collision between two conceptions of the world which 
 are now striving together for predominance in Europe. 
 This antagonism which is now being brought to a 
 sanguinary issue may be expressed in a great many 
 equally correct formulae. For instance, the Right of 
 Might, or the Might of Right? Machiavelli or Kant? 
 Sparta or Athens? The nation which possesses an 
 army, or the army which possesses a nation? Bis- 
 marck or Jaures? The right of the nations to free 
 autonomy, or the right of the dynasties to their policy 
 of self-interest? Idealism or Materialism? The pol- 
 icy of nationalities or of despotic rulers? A Civil or 
 a Military Constitution? And so on. 
 
 Any one of these antitheses might be used to sym- 
 bolise the cause of the World War. 
 
 For us democrats and pacifists, this World War 
 represents the final struggle of the dynastic coercive 
 policy against the demands of modern humanity. It 
 was not these demands of modern humanity that 
 brought about this war, but the arrogance of the dynas- 
 tic idea. This war, like others before it, might have 
 been avoided, had dynasties only understood their age 
 and made concessions to it. But what dynasty has 
 ever understood the age? What dynasty has ever 
 made concessions at the right moment ? It is they and 
 they alone who, with their divine rights and powers, 
 have always and everywhere opposed the spirit of the 
 age and have made a sanguinary settlement inevitable. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 255 
 
 One would have to be a narrow-minded partisan, a 
 half-dead Pan-Germanist, or a professor grown with- 
 ered in the service of the State, in order, in the face of 
 this conflict of principles now being decided in Europe 
 with all the infernal devices of the modern science of 
 murder, to represent side-issues as being the real 
 origins of the war, and to say, for instance : English or 
 German world commerce? English naval supremacy 
 or the freedom of the seas? Economic throttling or 
 economic expansion of Germany? And so forth. 
 
 Every book published in Germany, in the course of 
 this World War, has repeated the same old theme. 
 German scholars and statesmen, with their ingrained 
 dynastic conceptions, are simply incapable of seeing 
 anything in a war except plain, material questions of 
 power. And they always employ the term "power" 
 in the most material sense of the word. Thus, for 
 example, Herr von Biilow writes : — 
 
 "Germany will in future require protection against 
 hostility and desires for revenge, both old and new, in 
 the West, the East and beyond the Channel ; such pro- 
 tection can only be found in the increase of her own 
 power. . . . Only if our power, political, economic 
 and military, emerges from this war so strengthened 
 that it considerably outweighs the feelings of enmity 
 that have been aroused, shall we be able to assert with 
 a clear conscience that our position in the world has 
 been bettered by the war."^ 
 
 In an essay on "The Meaning of the War," Profes- 
 sor Otto Hintze says^ : "The two Central Powers of 
 
 * Prince von Bulow, "Imperial Germany." London : Cassell & 
 Co., p. xlii. 
 ^ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 678 et seq. 
 
256 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Europe are in danger of being crushed by the sur- 
 rounding countries of our continent. . . . Everything 
 must be directed towards frustrating this attempt. We 
 intend to maintain our place in the sun ; we intend not 
 to allow ourselves to be squeezed out of the rank of the 
 World Powers in spite of our closed-in position. . . . 
 The predominance of Britain must be broken. ... In 
 this struggle against the British naval and world domi- 
 nation, we are fighting in the interests of the free 
 intercourse of all nations/' and so on. 
 
 Questions of material power, aims of domination, 
 increased hostility on every side and immediate prep- 
 arations for another war; such, according to our 
 statesmen and philosophers, is the meaning and natural 
 result of all wars. They are as delighted as children 
 as long as we are the strongest. And although they 
 maintain that the stronger is always in the right, they 
 bewail the ill-success of their country's arms as a na- 
 tional shame and a crying wrong. They are incapable 
 of discarding for a moment their narrow, nationalist 
 conception of the world and of taking a wider view of 
 the world's history. If they did so, they would be 
 forced to recognise, in the first place, that the dream of 
 power has been fatal to every nation (increase of 
 material power has always involved both the prepara- 
 tion for fresh conflicts and also decadence) ; and, in 
 the second place, that the military defeat of a nation 
 is invariably followed by a progressive development in 
 respect of freedom and culture, by means of which it 
 recovers its former political significance. (France, 
 after 1870, is the latest and most glorious example of 
 this. ) The fact that, in war, it is really not nations but 
 only dynasties that are vanquished, and that vanquished 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 257 
 
 dynasties imply victorious nations, finds abundant 
 proof in the world's history, but it has never been 
 admitted by our scholars, and for very obvious reasons. 
 For them war is, what it has always been for the 
 dynasties, a duel between brutal appetites for power. 
 Or if, like Professor Ostwald, they regard it as a duel 
 between two Cultures, the word "culture" is used in 
 such a revolting materialistic sense that those who re- 
 spect human dignity and freedom are alarmed and dis- 
 tressed. 
 
 But only the mediocre intelligence can be content 
 with such Central European ideas. No! the World 
 War is not a question of the larder ! It is not waged, 
 as our Pan-Germanists and Social Democrats imagine, 
 for the sake of a few thousand square miles of terri- 
 tory, for seaports, colonies, commercial outlets, or, in 
 fact, for any material benefits. Like all wars, this one 
 will result in alterations in the map and new commer- 
 cial treaties. But these are only the most obvious 
 among its secondary issues. 
 
 The World War of to-day is actually a struggle 
 between two conceptions of the world. Dynasties, 
 which always go to war with the secret intention of 
 increasing their material and moral power, are, in 
 reality, the puppets of the world's history. Against 
 their wish and will, they invariably bring about the 
 triumph or defeat of some conception of the world. 
 The victorious nation gains a new or rejuvenated 
 dynasty (with all its reactionary consequences) ; the 
 vanquished nation gains a new liberty and a fairer 
 human ideal. And this triumph or defeat of a con- 
 ception of the world is the real meaning of wars and 
 
258 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 their significance in relation to the progress and culture 
 of mankind. 
 
 Not that we share the opinion of Bernhardi and 
 Treitschke that war is one of the principal instruments 
 in effecting human civilisation. On the contrary: 
 since war brings reaction to the one and liberty to the 
 other, its results are, from the point of view of world- 
 citizenship, to promote strife and disunion and to hin- 
 der the progress of civilisation. During the last forty 
 years there have existed, side by side, two powerful 
 States, which, as a result of war, not only developed on 
 diametrically opposite lines, but were in every sense 
 hostile to one another : France and Germany. On the 
 one side, liberty and progress; on the other, reaction 
 and decadence in all the true human values. Sedan 
 brought France liberty, it brought us reaction ; and it 
 was inevitable that this contrast should result in the 
 present World War. Thus the culture gained as a 
 result of war by the vanquished nation (that is to say, 
 by the nation that has been freed from the yoke of its 
 dynasty) is always intensely national and not uni- 
 versal. From the point of view of world-citizenship 
 (and we emphatically repudiate any other) war is con- 
 sequently the enemy of culture. 
 
 "The history of the world is the judgment of the 
 world." This statement of Schiller is one of the few 
 truths that our scholars and journalists have been 
 energetic in popularising since the beginning of the 
 war, and we unconditionally ourselves endorse it. 
 
 It seems to be a divine and undeviating law of the 
 world that in every war victory falls to the protagonist 
 possessing the higher right and the nobler culture. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 259 
 
 Kant declares emphatically: "We see then that 
 Nature is absolutely determined that right shall 
 conquer in the end." And the history of the past 
 century is a striking proof of the truth of these sayings 
 of Schiller and Kant. 
 
 But what is Right? We have already compared 
 the dynastic and the democratic conceptions of the 
 world and we have seen that all civilised communities, 
 with the exception of Germany, Austria, Russia, and 
 Turkey, have developed in accordance with the demo- 
 cratic idea outlined by the great French Revolution. 
 We may therefore assume that **Right" is where the 
 majority of civilised mankind feel it to be, hence, in 
 this case, undoubtedly, where the right of the nations 
 to self-government is recognised, if only in theory. In 
 like manner, the nobler culture must be sought for 
 where this right to self-government, both within and 
 without, is felt to be the unalterable basis (or, at all 
 events, the ideal) of the modern State. 
 
 If we examine the results of the chief wars of the 
 past century in relation to this question, we can easily 
 prove that, in every case, dynastic and historical right 
 has had to lay down its arms before the right of the 
 nations to self-government. 
 
 The newly founded French Republic was victorious 
 all along the line, against the coalition of the European 
 dynasties. And why? It was defending the principle 
 of the sovereignty of the people which it had itself 
 proclaimed. Similarly, Napoleon remained victorious 
 over his opponents so long as he remained the cham- 
 pion of the rights of humanity proclaimed by the Great 
 Revolution; but as soon as he deserted the cause of 
 ,freedom and scoffed openly at the new principle of 
 
26o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 nationalities, the national sense of honour, both in 
 Prussia and elsewhere, was stirred to such indignation 
 that his fall became inevitable. In all the Balkan wars 
 of the past century the principle of nationalities 
 prevailed over the dynastic idea of absolutism. From 
 1827 down to 19 12, the Turks were worsted in almost 
 every campaign and forced to yield their independence 
 to Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, and Roumanians in 
 succession. Similarly, Prussia, in 1866 and 1870, found 
 herself, as against Austria and France, playing the role 
 of a champion of a national ideal. Granted that God be 
 omniscient. He could scarcely have foreseen that the 
 Prussian dynasty would subsequently take advantage of 
 the German ideal of national unity in order to outrage 
 the principle of nationalities ; although Bismarck had, 
 after 1866, presented us with a Reichstag, and from 
 1866 until 1870 ruled on fairly liberal lines. At that 
 time, the Hohenzollern dynasty represented the higher 
 right as against the craving for domination of the 
 Hapsburgs and the Bonapartes; the latter had to 
 succumb because they disputed this higher right.^ 
 Consider the military history of Russia. Why has she 
 been vanquished in all the wars of the past century? 
 Because, both within and without, she was revealed as 
 the bitter foe of popular autonomy. And why was she 
 
 *We have already seen (pp. 112-4) to what extent the wars 
 of 1864- 1871 served "purely dynastic interests." The assertion 
 that none the less, from the standpoint of the principle of na- 
 tionalities, they had right on their side does not entail contra- 
 diction. It is, on the contrary, a striking illustration of what 
 we have said above (p. 253) concerning the "dualism" of wars. 
 If the German idea of unity was a deeply serious matter for the 
 German races, for the German dynasty (as the events of 1848 
 prove) it was only a pretext for the furtherance of their ambi- 
 tions by means of war. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 261 
 
 victorious in 1877-78 over Turkey? Because, in this 
 case, she chanced to come forward as the Hberator of 
 oppressed races and helped Bulgaria and Roumania to 
 their independence. 
 
 Yes, the history of the world is the judgment of the 
 world ; and Kant's saying will remain eternally true. 
 
 Dear readers! We have seen what ideas and 
 principles the German dynasty represents in this 
 World War. They are manifestly not such as lie in the 
 direction of the higher progress of mankind. He who 
 stands face to the sun loses the battle. Alas! We 
 Germans in this war stand face to the sun of inter- 
 national law and liberty. Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
 and Turkey have, for the last forty years, held 
 themselves aloof from the movement for popular 
 self-government. From Armenia to Alsace-Lorraine, 
 from Schleswig-Holstein to Bosnia-Herzegovina, they 
 have, both at home and abroad, by word and 
 by deed, opposed to the right of the nations to free 
 self-government their divine rights and despotic prin- 
 ciples, which are the very abnegation of all popular 
 liberty. The good God may have been "our Ally of 
 Rossbach and Dennewitz," and may love us dearly; 
 but He cannot make any exception in our favour from 
 the eternal laws of His world. 
 
 I, as both democrat and pacifist, must confess that I 
 do not desire that He should. For what would happen 
 if we Germans emerged victorious from this war? 
 Our victory would only mean a strengthening of the 
 dynastic principle of arbitrary power all along the line. 
 Those of us who bewail the political backwardness of 
 our Fatherland must realise that a "German" victory 
 
262 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 would prolong this backward condition for centuries. 
 And not only Germany but the whole of Europe would 
 have to suffer the consequences. All the political 
 liberties painfully achieved during two centuries would 
 give way before the omnipotence of the victorious 
 dynasty and only their shadow would remain. Our 
 Polish policy, which even Professor Delbriick severely 
 censured, would be extended to the newly conquered 
 territories and in an even more brutal form. There 
 would be in Europe only as much liberty of thought 
 and of the Press as the German dynasty would 
 allow ; and we are well aware how little it does allow. 
 The Burgfricden, which has been developed into a 
 systematic negation of all citizen rights, would (just 
 like the Socialist law after 1871) become a permanent 
 institution in the land of intellectual liberty. And, 
 just as Professor Delbriick blessed Bismarck because 
 he had known how to mutilate the Ems telegram in the 
 interests of German unity, so now a hundred Delbriicks 
 would rise up and glorify the man who invented 
 Cossack invasions and bombs from aeroplanes in 
 order to win popularity for this victorious war. The 
 victor is not accountable to anybody; in his honour, 
 new sciences and new codes of morals are invented, 
 applauding nations wait upon his wishes, and whoever, 
 amid this lofty enthusiasm, ventures a word as to the 
 universal morality is at once outlawed and imprisoned. 
 To talk of a right of nations to self-government 
 would be Use majeste. States such as Switzerland, 
 Holland, and Denmark would only with the greatest 
 difficulty preserve their national independence, and, 
 at most, for ten years. For a thousand learned pro- 
 fessors, following in the footsteps of Treitschke and 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 263 
 
 Chamberlain, would perpetually demonstrate that the 
 Dutch, the Swiss, the Danes, etc., are but "lost sons 
 of the great Germanic family," until these unhappy 
 nations would themselves believe in it at last, or be 
 compelled "by the right of the sword" to believe in it. 
 
 All republican ideas would pale before the brilliancy 
 of the divine dynasty now ruling in Europe. Europe 
 would become a China (and not even a modern 
 China), in which learned Mandarins, after the manner 
 of Ostwald, would realise their "energetic impera- 
 tive" — in other words, succeed in subordinating all 
 human activities to the higher honour of the dynasty, 
 in a kind of Taylorian theorem. 
 
 And all this glorious technical culture would be 
 under the supervision of the noble officer, with his 
 divine privileges. Whenever anyone dared open his 
 mouth in the name of intellectual liberty and human 
 dignity, as being outside the dynastic sphere, he 
 would soon bring the "reptiles" to their senses and 
 receive congratulatory telegrams and decorations from 
 Berlin. What little Switzerland dared do in the 
 'eighties, namely, to reject forthwith Bismarck's 
 insolent demands (the affair Wohlgemuth), she would 
 now have to suffer for. And not only this "nest of 
 democracy" (as Bismarck then called Switzerland) 
 would be at once cleared out and lose all its indepen- 
 dence ; but all other European States in which "demo- 
 cratic intrigues" could be detected would have to 
 expect a second Wohlgemuth or Prochaska affair, 
 and, probably, an Ultimatum. Democracy would be 
 dead in Europe, and any reference of it would be a 
 crime. 
 
 Where would there be any check upon this dynasty 
 
264 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 ruling from Antwerp to Bagdad absolutely, and from 
 Haparanda to Gibraltar morally? Perhaps German 
 Social Democracy? The very idea provokes a smile. 
 The noisy champions of revolution have, owing to 
 a few bombs from aeroplanes and inroads of Cos- 
 sacks, become so submissive, that a dynasty returning 
 triumphant from the war would not need a new 
 Socialist law to keep them in subjection. 
 
 There would, in fact, be no longer checks upon the 
 dynasty. France, to which, for a hundred years past, 
 the nations have looked up with quiet hopes, would 
 now be utterly crushed. England, the home of 
 Liberalism, would be forced, in order not to lose her 
 independence, to expend all her energies on armaments 
 (that is to say, to renounce Liberalism). Neighbourly 
 relations would be opened up with Russia, and the 
 whole of Europe would be forced into a fresh, terrible 
 armament policy (as foretold by Herr von Biilow). 
 On the one hand, under England's leadership, the 
 nations great and small (which are to-day neutral) 
 which had been entirely or partially annexed, as well 
 as the threatened States, would be thirsting for 
 revenge, that is to say, for liberty; and, on the other, 
 the new German World-power, which in another 
 twenty years would be encompassed with so many 
 fresh threats, intrigues, jealousies, and witches' caul- 
 drons, that, once again, with a "clear conscience," 
 she would be compelled to take the field in order to 
 safeguard the world's peace. 
 
 And do you, dear reader, wish us to take this 
 terrible backward step into the Middle Ages? You 
 wish Napoleon's prophecy, "Europe will within a 
 century be either democratic or Cossack," to be 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 265 
 
 realised in the sense of this latter possibility? Can 
 we, as Germans, really desire that? But whether 
 we wish it or not, the world's history takes its own 
 inexorable course. And, since it is impossible that a 
 Cossack Europe should form part of the design of the 
 world's history, the German dynasty cannot and will 
 not be victorious in this war. Europe will be demo- 
 cratic ! 
 
 That the victory of democracy need not imply 
 the annihilation of the German people and its future 
 part in the world is also vouched for by the history 
 of the world. Vanquished dynasties are not only not 
 vanquished nations, but even emancipated nations. 
 This was not only the case in England, France, Hol- 
 land, and Switzerland, but even in China. Why should 
 it not be equally the case in Germany? Is universal 
 history to make an exception in our case? Are we 
 more stupid than the Chinese? 
 
 And supposing we were: the world's history is 
 remorseless; it would cut off our pigtails, however 
 much Scheidemann and Siidekum might bewail that 
 our nation was being destroyed. 
 
 "It is the implacable will of Nature that right should 
 finally prevail." 
 
 "The history of the world is the judgment of the 
 world." 
 
 We should be interested to know whether all the 
 gentlemen w^ho at the commencement of the war 
 triumphantly shouted this sentence will still testify 
 to its truth when, as is inevitable, the German people, 
 as the result of this war, will be found to have 
 conquered not provinces but only liberties. Will they 
 have the courage to admit that our dynasty could not 
 
266 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 conquer because she was not defending the higher 
 right and the nobler culture? Or will they have the 
 effrontery to contest the logic of the world's history 
 which they themselves only yesterday proclaimed, 
 merely because the history of the world is, in fact, 
 the judgment of the world? 
 
VIII 
 
 ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 
 
 Dynasty or Humanity? 
 
 To THE German Reader! 
 
 You may, for the first moment, feel that the 
 freedom with which I have spoken of German condi- 
 tions, and of the origin and meaning of the World 
 War, shows a want of patriotism. And even if, as I 
 know is bound to happen, your own investigation of 
 the Constitution and politics of Germany completely 
 confirms the above conclusions (for there can be no 
 refutation of actual facts), yet you will perhaps still 
 hesitate to give me your countenance. Our German 
 Constitution is so wreathed about with democratic 
 garlands, and, on the other hand, respect for the 
 dynasty is so deeply rooted in the German spirit, that, 
 although at bottom we have the same democratic 
 yearnings as other nations, we instinctively oppose the 
 logical establishment of the real truth. 
 
 This has been my own experience. That one should 
 maintain, as the result of studies in history and consti- 
 tutional law, that we really possess not a Fatherland 
 but only a dynasty, and this at a time when millions 
 
 267 
 
268 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 of Germans are bleeding and dying, weeping and 
 wasting, for this supposed Fatherland? Is this not 
 betrayal of the Fatherland? Is this justifiable in any 
 German at the present time ? 
 
 While I was still weighing this question in my mind, 
 I thought of Bernhardi, Ostwald, Chamberlain, 
 Schlidemann, Frymann, Liman, Harden, Georg Bern- 
 hard, Leimdorfer, Lasswitz, who are among the most 
 famous people in Germany. I was even so lacking in 
 modesty as to compare myself for a moment with these 
 celebrities. I admired their patriotism, their deep 
 understanding of culture, their style, in short, all their 
 profoundly flaunted Germanism, and I began to lose 
 confidence in myself. For to my shame I must admit 
 that I am neither so learned nor yet of such exotic 
 origin as they. For all these gentlemen are of Russian 
 or Polish or English origin, and as it has become an 
 established custom in our country that foreigners 
 and Jews should represent pure and undefiled Ger- 
 manism, I have really no right, under these circum- 
 stances, to speak as a German to Germans. 
 
 It is, then, to some extent an act of presumption 
 if a German, who is neither Russian nor English nor 
 Slav nor Jew, but a Prussian who in his youth excelled 
 his schoolmates in the enumeration of the Prussian 
 kings and their battles, should to-day present himself 
 before his countrymen with the intention of speaking 
 to them about Germany. The development of German 
 culture has raised the intellectual charlatans and half- 
 castes to such high consequence among us that, at 
 the present day, in the German Fatherland, the true 
 German wears a somewhat pitiable aspect. 
 
 It seems to me that here, more than anywhere, we 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 269 
 
 have indeed been "actually attacked"; attacked in 
 our true Germanism, our most sacred feelings and 
 traditions. And it was just because I felt that, from 
 the standpoint of classical Germanism, we have to 
 wage a sacred defensive war against the representatives 
 of culture in present-day Germany, that the examina- 
 tion which I have made in this book — however revo- 
 lutionary it may appear at the first glance — seemed 
 to me necessary for the restoration to health of the 
 German nation. 
 
 Is it necessary or possible or right that to-day, 
 when the World War has slaughtered and crippled 
 and ruined millions of men, and has destroyed 
 innumerable cultural values, we should accord 
 unconditional approval to the wisdom of these intel- 
 lectual celebrities? Ought we to look upon 
 this world-drama (the greatest in the history of the 
 world) with that enforced respect for the dynasty 
 w^hich has been drilled into us? Must we give 
 credence to the official description of a "maliciously 
 attacked Germany," despite all the documentary 
 evidence and the conduct and traditions of Prussia 
 during the last decade ? Is it right that, following the 
 example of certain pacifists and socialists, we should 
 explain the World War with learned phrases, merely 
 in order to evade the painful necessity of calling the 
 true cause of the war by Its right name? 
 
 Our Government may possibly have succeeded, by 
 the aid of its foreign and Jewish champions of culture. 
 In breeding among our nation a kind of fetish belief 
 in the dynasty; but we remain none the less a people 
 who have learnt to think logically, and who, like all 
 genuinely civilised nations, strive instinctively towards 
 
270 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 democracy. In the end, as Napoleon said, the spirit 
 always triumphs over the sword. And even supposing 
 that our dynasty were to emerge completely victorious 
 from this war, none the less it could not prevent 
 inexorable logic from bringing us at last to the bitter 
 recognition that in this war the dynasty set itself 
 against our nation and against the whole of humanity. 
 
 Dynasty or Humanity? That is the question here. 
 That is the meaning of the World War. 
 
 And being confronted with this question, we declare 
 ourselves frankly for Humanity. For a dynasty is 
 never more than an accident in the world's history. 
 Even if it be descended from the gods, it is 
 prone to error and to evil purposes. But Humanity 
 is not an accident; Humanity too is descended from 
 the gods, and with this advantage over the dynasties, 
 that it can neither err nor fulfil evil purposes. 
 Humanity is the meaning of the world; and, what- 
 ever Prussian Privy Councillors may say. Humanity 
 is also the meaning of history. 
 
 The conscience of Humanity is eternal and infallible. 
 Even for dynasties the fatal saying is true, that man 
 is longer under the earth than on it. But this is not 
 true of Humanity. A hundred dynasties, fatherlands, 
 and nations pass away; Humanity remains. Un- 
 touched by catastrophes and individual purposes, it 
 marches on. Slowly but surely. Humanity marches 
 ever onwards and upwards, towards more light, free- 
 dom, happiness, and human dignity. 
 
 In the light of this truth, what are high treason, 
 unpatriotic sentiments, and the like? Merely the 
 conception of a moment, a crime in a space of a 
 few square miles, the anger of a government of a few 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 271 
 
 years. Certainly it is our duty, as members of a 
 fatherland, to serve it and obey its laws. But when, 
 as here, our Fatherland obeys an alien will, thereby 
 setting itself in opposition to the eternal laws of 
 humanity, we have no longer the right to affront 
 humanity with patriotic stubbornness. 
 
 The dynasties have, in fact, always set themselves 
 against humanity. Every other page of the world's 
 history furnishes proof of it. At the very beginning, 
 when we were still half brutes, when you and I still 
 instinctively fell upon one another, whenever we 
 encountered each other at some turn of the road, the 
 chiefs and the dynasties which sprang from them may 
 have exercised a certain influence on humanity in the 
 direction of order and civilisation. It is possible to 
 go further and to say that (with the possible exception 
 of the United States) national unity has in every case 
 been due to the dynasties. The proudest French 
 republicans admit that it was the Capets who made 
 their Fatherland great, so that the Revolution was 
 able to take it over from them on behalf of the people. 
 Even though Switzerland was never actually ruled by 
 a dynasty, its national unity was indirectly brought 
 into being by dynasties. 
 
 But at the present day, when the national develop- 
 ment has been, as it were, accomplished entirely, 
 and when it is only a question of rounding off the 
 national unities in accordance with the wishes of the 
 people, and of securing their political independence? 
 To-day, when throughout the civilised world we 
 find organised administrative bodies? What higher 
 meaning and function can the dynasties by divine 
 right have in this modern world? In ancient times. 
 
272 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 when they themselves, at the head of their tribe, were 
 the first to go forth to battle and the last to come 
 home, they might still, with some justification, claim 
 the governing authority. For then they lived, fought, 
 thought and spoke in the midst of their tribe; they 
 had grown up with them, they knew their feelings and 
 needs, and, in virtue of their spiritual and physical 
 superiority, they had a natural right to leadership and 
 authority. But the times have changed. Among the 
 old Germans, leadership conferred upon the man not 
 only dignity, but also an obligation; at the present 
 day, on the contrary, it confers dignity on the man 
 but relieves him from all obligation. The dynasty 
 of the Hohenzollerns is a warrior dynasty of the 
 first rank, yet every member of it has died in his 
 bed. Your grandfather and mine perchance, though 
 members of no warrior dynasty, have yet died a 
 soldier's death. And although the World War is not 
 yet ended, we know already that the Imperial family 
 will have been the only family in all Germany who 
 will have sent six sons to the field, and not have lost 
 one of them at the conclusion of peace, unless, of 
 course, through some unforeseen mishap. Progress 
 and the resultant modernisation of war have brought 
 it about that the members of the dynastic families no 
 longer fight in person, and that their quarrels and 
 ambitions have become national concerns. If, in 
 former days, it was their duty and their ambition to 
 fight at the head of their armies, in these stern days 
 of ours it is their highest duty to preserve themselves 
 for their peoples ! 
 
 But not only on the field of battle has a new 
 morality superseded the old. In other respects progress 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 273 
 
 has wrought important changes. In ancient days 
 and in the Middle Ages it was easy for a dynasty to 
 reign with absolute power. Their States were for the 
 most part small, their subjects numerically incon- 
 siderable, superstitious, maintained in serfdom, and 
 indifferent to politics. The rulers had only to settle 
 their affairs with the nobility and the priesthood, 
 and governing was therefore a straightforward and 
 humanly possible operation, which even now and then 
 might bear good fruits, as in the case of Henry IV. 
 in France, Henry I. in Germany, and the Great Elector 
 in Brandenburg. In the meantime men and conditions 
 developed. At the present day Germany alone contains 
 as many inhabitants as the whole of Europe in the 
 time of Charlemagne. The populations are no longer 
 superstitious; they are no longer in a state of serfdom, 
 and they are no longer indifferent to politics. Numer- 
 ous discoveries have revolutionised our commerce, our 
 ideas, and our needs, and have brought into being that 
 which we describe collectively as culture. In such an 
 age, with such States and ideas, the greatest genius of 
 all the centuries would no longer have been capable of 
 ruling and deciding absolutely in all things. We have 
 been gratified to observe from the various speeches of 
 William II. that he understands all things, and that 
 all things are subject to his direction and rule! We 
 have stood amazed before that proficiency both in 
 peace and war which borders on universality ! Yet we 
 are compelled to recognise in his case also that which 
 applies to every dynasty at the present day ruling by 
 divine right : they live in a world completely separated 
 from the nation at large; they are so hedged about 
 with an artificial barrier that they are deprived of any 
 
274 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 free outlook upon the world and mankind; and they 
 are maintained by their advisers in a more or less 
 complete ignorance of the spirit of the age and of the 
 real needs and demands of humanity. 
 
 All our present-day science and technology is op- 
 posed to the idea of the divine and the arbitrary. In 
 such a world, is it possible that a God-appointed 
 dynasty should be the rational embodiment of the 
 whole life of a great State? 
 
 To put this question is to answer it. In fact, the 
 cultural development of humanity tends in all depart- 
 m.ents towards the elimination of arbitrary rule and 
 of capricious divinity. Culture is the elimination of 
 individual despotism, and the subduing and utilisation 
 of the divine natural forces to the service of humanity. 
 And we Germans, in particular, have rendered impor- 
 tant service in this field. We have even, apart from 
 politics, become one of the most democratic nations in 
 the world. Our whole organisation in respect of jus- 
 tice, finance, local government, taxation, insurance, co- 
 operation, is so democratic that it has, at any rate in 
 part, become the model for other countries. No other 
 nation (least of all France, the fatherland of democ- 
 racy) can boast such a democratically organised in- 
 come-tax as we. Nowhere, save in England, have the 
 co-operative societies and the democratic organisation 
 connected with them attained such proportions as in 
 Germany. No one claims that our courts of justice 
 are perfect, but everyone in Germany is of opinion 
 that they afford the best guarantees against possible 
 bias and arbitrariness on the part of the judges, and 
 that they are one of the most excellent achievements 
 of civilisation. Our German town councils are for 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 275 
 
 the most part organised on thoroughly democratic 
 Hnes. None of my German readers would buy shares 
 in a society unless he knew that it submitted every 
 year a clear balance-sheet of its proceedings. None 
 of my German readers would feel disposed to join an 
 association which did not vouchsafe to its members 
 at the least a voting right in return for their subscrip- 
 tions, or whose managing committee were sedulous in 
 inventing a whole philosophy respecting the stupidity 
 of its members, and endeavoured to prove that they 
 were empowered by God to make whatever use they 
 might see fit of the funds of the society. 
 
 All these things we Germans treat as a matter of 
 course. The most inveterate supporter of the monarchy 
 would not have them otherwise. Now the State is, 
 as it were, the biggest joint-stock company and the 
 biggest association. We belong to it not of our choice 
 and will, but because we were born in it. This State 
 demands from us not only taxes, obedience, and 
 patriotism, but also, in cases of necessity, our lives. 
 It might have been imagined that, under these circum- 
 stances, the State would, as a matter of course, be 
 subject to the control of its members, and that every- 
 thing would be done to fulfil their wishes as far as 
 possible. But, in fact, just the opposite is the case : 
 the State recognises no duties whatever towards us. 
 That which for the board of directors of a joint-stock 
 company or the committee of management of an 
 association is a matter of course, namely, the voting 
 right acquired by the shareholders or members in 
 virtue of their subscription, it is a crime on the part 
 of the German citizen even to ask for. The dynasty. 
 
276 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 which IS the embodiment of the State, rules by divine 
 right, that is to say, arbitrarily. 
 
 Dynastic Politics and Culture 
 
 Dynasties which plead divine authority for the 
 conduct of their political affairs and obstinately reject 
 any popular control can have but one motive for their 
 attitude, namely, that their interests are not coincident 
 with those of the popular weal. 
 
 In fact, between "politics" as understood and 
 desired by nations and politics as conceived by dynas- 
 ties there is a deep gulf which apparently can in no 
 way be bridged over. 
 
 Ever since Plato there has existed the idea of a 
 polity based primarily upon justice and liberty and 
 having as its supreme goal the attainment of the 
 greatest possible general well-being for the greatest 
 possible number of human beings. Since the days 
 of ancient Greece there has existed in the world a 
 conception of justice and liberty that is sufficient for 
 all purposes and is the real criterion of civilisation. 
 This conception is not dependent upon any political 
 power; its blessings descend upon the just and the un- 
 just; it is not bound to any time or to any circum- 
 stances, and ought not to be diminished or destroyed 
 for the sake of any advantage or in the face of any 
 peril. With the immortal proclamation of human and 
 citizen rights, it again became the guiding motive of 
 State-policy and was proclaimed to the nations as the 
 goal of all political endeavour. 
 
 Were dynastic interests compatible with those of 
 human welfare, the dynasties would have approved 
 this conception of human dignity and international 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 277 
 
 right. But history teaches us that they always opposed 
 it with all their power. Why? Because their divinely 
 inherited right is really incompatible with this 
 humanly created right, that is to say, because their 
 whole existence was menaced. Therefore they stood 
 on their defence and marred and interrupted the work 
 of the Great Revolution. Even if, here and there, 
 they had to make certain concessions, yet we have 
 seen that their fundamental rights (and particularly 
 in Germany) have remained entirely unaffected. 
 These fundamental rights are, above all, a danger 
 to Peace. Hitherto political life has been controlled by 
 dynasties; the history of the world has been not 
 the work of nations, but a "give and take, and hither 
 and thither" of dynastic interests, and thus entirely 
 the work of individuals. Wars are the "inevitable,'* 
 that is to say, the entirely natural, consequences of 
 this state of things. And they will remain so as long 
 as European politics, instead of being directed with a 
 view to the welfare of the nations, continues to serve 
 only dynastic ambitions and intrigues. 
 
 The secret aims of all dynastic politics are its own 
 aggrandisement or the prevention of the aggrandise- 
 ment of a neighbouring dynasty. These aims are 
 served by the military-political organisation of their 
 States, by diplomacy and its continuation — war. 
 
 "Augustus drank, and Poland became drunk !" The 
 history of the past century proves, alas! that the 
 dynasties, in spite of all revolutions, have dipped deeper 
 into their cups and have, moreover, kept their peoples 
 in a state of intoxication. And in the case of us 
 Germans they scored a success, in that we, like most 
 drunken people, always maintained we were quite 
 
278 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 sober. We have been told by a thousand professors 
 that we are the freest people in the world because the 
 dynasty was nowhere freer than it is with us.^ But 
 one must have long enjoyed freedom in order to 
 understand and love freedom. Alas! the dynasties 
 never gave us time to become sober and to attain a 
 true perception of freedom. It is both their mission 
 and their divine right to think only of continual 
 aggrandisement, to keep the nations uneasy by a dis- 
 play of their power, and to wean them from their 
 natural civilising occupations. What right, what lib- 
 erty, what peace is possible, when the Fatherland is in 
 danger and we have continuously to protect it, by in- 
 cessant increase of armaments, against future attacks? 
 
 The dynasties oppose their ideal of a State based 
 upon Power to the democratic ideal of a constitutional 
 State. Whenever the nations dreamt for a moment of 
 the solidarity of all human interests, of justice, peace, 
 of a constitution and autonomy, straightway the dynas- 
 ties, in the name of their eternally menaced Father- 
 land, replied with a demand for veneration of, blind 
 obedience to, and confidence in the God-appointed 
 rule. In the place of Constitutions, they gave us 
 conquered provinces, thereby flattered our national 
 vanity, and compelled us to look to the preservation 
 of the conquered lands. 
 
 Despite all the achievements of the last century, 
 they contrived in this way to keep alive among their 
 peoples that sense of ''enmity" which is a necessary 
 
 ^ *'We feel ourselves," says Professor Ernst Troltsch, "Deutsch- 
 land und der Weltkrieg" (p. 71, Berlin, 1915), "in any event 
 freer and more independent in many respects than the citizens 
 of the great democracies." We? Professor Troltsch speaks, no 
 doubt, in the name of his colleagues. 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 279 
 
 factor in their politics, but which, in our modern 
 world, has no longer any natural foundation. The 
 various nations exhibit differences of ideas, customs, 
 temperaments, languages and religions, in the same 
 way as they exhibit contrasting interests and aims. 
 [But it is only the dynasties who, with their primitive 
 and mystic policy of force, have persuaded us that 
 war must always be the natural consequence of this 
 peaceful rivalry.^ 
 
 ''Quidquid delirant reges, plectiintur Achivi" so said 
 Horace, and Heine has expressed it, in his own way, 
 in German: *'If princes itch, nations must scratch 
 themselves.'* And, hitherto, the w^orld's history has 
 been nothing but an everlasting itching of dynasties 
 and a scratching of the nations for their sake. Inter- 
 
 ^How often have not our racial scientists and statesmen em- 
 phasised the natural enmity that is supposed to exist between 
 Germans and ^Slavs, and is bound to culminate in war. This 
 "natural hostility" between Germans and Slavs was nothing but 
 a dogma of our racial science, and, when the World War broke 
 out, it was declared in Germany (at all events at first) to be a 
 crusade against "arrogant Panslavism." Compare with this the 
 fact that it was German thinkers and poets who showed the 
 deepest sympathy with the tragic fate of Poland. On the first 
 division of Poland, Schubert, Zacharias Werner, and J. G. Seume 
 lamented in inspired verse the sorrows of our Polish neighbours 
 and found a grateful echo in the German people. In the 'thirties 
 of last century, in consequence of the ill-starred Polish revolu- 
 tion, and its sequel, there sprang up in Germany a whole poetical 
 literature on the subject of Poland: Grabbe, Holtei, Lenau, 
 Platen, Hebbel (only to name the more important lyricists) 
 wrote moving verses on Poland and its unhappy people. The 
 whole of Germany applauded them, and some of these poems 
 are, even to-day, popular in Germany. This German poetry in 
 celebration of Poland is not merely a noble monument for the 
 land of poets, but is likewise a striking proof that, despite the 
 learned polemics and intrigues of dynastic State politics, no 
 natural feeling of enmity exists between the peoples concerned. 
 
28o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 national history was like a long-continued serial story 
 of brigandage. In each part, for the furtherance of 
 ^'higher aims," some crime was committed, and at 
 the end of each part stood the words: **to be con- 
 tinued." 
 
 War engenders war. Until now almost every peace 
 has been concluded in accordance with dynastic views, 
 and therefore has contained within it the germ of a new 
 war. If nations regarded and waged every war only 
 as a step towards peace, dynasties, on the contrary, 
 regarded it only as a step towards another war. In 
 ancient days the exercise of power was limited to the 
 duration of war; can we be surprised, therefore, that 
 the leaders continued the wars as long as possible, 
 and then used all the means at their disposal to conjure 
 up fresh wars? Their rank and very existence were 
 at stake. No war without leaders, no leaders without 
 war. Dynasty and war: the one is inconceivable 
 without the other. The world's history shows us on 
 every page that not peace but war is the aim of 
 dynasties. Peace is for them not an ideal, but only 
 the natural intermediate stage before the next war. 
 
 A wolf cannot be expected to fill the part of 
 shepherd. It is in the nature of sheep to keep the 
 peace and to seek good feeding-ground. It is in the 
 nature of wolves to keep the sheep in perpetual fear, 
 and to devour them till they can devour no more. 
 Civilised nations are, without exception, peace-loving, 
 and even if they desire to protect their feeding-ground, 
 they have, by the aid of international commerce, so 
 organised the world that the feeding problem has long 
 since been solved, and is no longer a motive for war 
 enterprises. The much-talked of ^'craving for expan- 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 281 
 
 sion" of this or that people, even if it existed, would 
 nowhere lead to war. But it does not exist; like the 
 "enmity" between peoples, it is an artificial product 
 of dynastic sophistry and politics. The most densely 
 populated countries (China in Asia, and Belgium in 
 Europe) have ever been the most peaceful. 
 
 But dynasties, by their very nature, have always 
 been soldiers and conquerors. In the House of Hohen- 
 zoUern, for example, royal princes are made lieutenants 
 of the Guard on the completion of their tenth year.^ 
 Can it be marvelled at that all their later actions and 
 thoughts are controlled by military conceptions ? Men 
 with such an education and habit of thought would 
 of necessity feel themselves very superfluous in a world 
 of unbroken peace. A world without war and adven- 
 ture would necessarily seem to them an insipid and 
 tedious world. One who is dubbed a soldier in his 
 cradle and surrounded his whole life through by none 
 but soldiers is led finally to believe that the whole 
 world was only created for soldiers. And what is to 
 become of soldiers, if matters are so arranged, that 
 henceforth they will find no employment ? A man who 
 regards the organisation of armies and the elaboration 
 of strategic plans as his life-work is naturally de- 
 pressed at seeing all his work and genius become only 
 
 ^ Still more pronounced is the military tradition of the House 
 of Hapsburg. One of the first orders issued by Emperor Charles 
 I. of Austria on his recent accession to the throne was that of 
 November 28th, 1916: "I desire that my first-born son, sent me 
 by God's grace, shall from now be a member of my brave, heroic 
 army, and I therefore make him honorary Colonel-in-Chief of 
 my Infantry Regiment No. 17, which henceforth shall bear the 
 title 'Crown Prince.'" This new Colonel-in-Chief was then but 
 four years old. 
 
282 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 of theoretical importance. "Heavens ! If it were only 
 the real thing!" exclaimed the German Crown Prince 
 on the occasion of a sham cavalry charge. What else 
 should he say? It must necessarily appear absurd 
 to him that an army should always remain a plaything. 
 How galling then it must be to generals and diplomats 
 to see their splendid genius packed away as of no 
 further practical use. 
 
 If the world were organised for peace, it would at 
 length inquire, Why all these armies and generals? 
 Why these manoeuvres for the delight of Crown 
 Princes? But the world is not organised for peace. 
 "Should anyone attempt to assail or violate our good 
 right, then strike out with the mailed fist ! And, if God 
 wills, wreathe about your young brow with laurels, 
 that no one in the German Empire will begrudge you." 
 These were the words of William II. to his brother 
 Henry on his expedition (December 15th, 1897) to East 
 Asia. And God wills it always ! The old German god 
 has never allowed eternal peace to last eternally. Al- 
 ways there comes a day on which the dynasty is in the 
 sad necessity of having to show that army and navy 
 are in truth no playthings and that it has been sum- 
 moned by God to wreathe laurels round its brow. 
 ''Diplomacy is traffic in human flesh"; so said Bis- 
 marck, who must have known. 
 
 We are no Jacobins and fanatics. It would be 
 absurd to reproach us with hating the monarchy per se. 
 The lessons of history have not been lost on us. 
 
 And it was in fact a Hohenzollern who defined 
 monarchy in a way that we democrats and pacifists 
 would subscribe to with alacrity. Frederick IL, 
 named the Great, wrote in the year 1738: "Here lies 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 283 
 
 the error of most princes. They believe that God has 
 created this multitude of men, whose welfare is com- 
 mitted to their charge, expressly and out of special 
 consideration for their greatness, their happiness and 
 their pride, and that their subjects are only destined 
 to be the tools and servants of their lower passions. 
 Since the principle from which one starts is itself false, 
 all the consequences from it must also be unsound : 
 for instance, the craving for false glory, the burning 
 desire to conquer everything, the burdening of the 
 people with crushing taxation, the sloth of the princes, 
 their pride, their injustice, their inhumanity, their 
 tyranny and all those other vices which degrade human 
 nature. If princes would only be persuaded to emanci- 
 pate themselves from such erroneous views and to 
 recognise once again the purpose for which they were 
 instituted, they would perceive that this office of 
 which they are so proud, and their elevation to it, has 
 been purely the work of the peoples; that these 
 thousands of human beings committed to their charge 
 by no means made themselves the slaves of a single 
 man in order to make him more terrible and more 
 powerful still ! that they by no means subjected them- 
 selves to a fellow citizen in order to be the victims of 
 his caprices and the plaything of his fantasy; but 
 that they chose from their midst him whom they 
 considered the most upright, to rule over them for 
 their good, and to care for them like a father; him 
 whom they deemed the most humane, that he should 
 sympathise with and aid them in their afflictions; 
 him whom they deemed the strongest, that he should 
 protect them against their foes; him whom they 
 deemed the shrewdest, that he might not involve them 
 
284 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 at a wrong time in destructive and ruinous wars; in 
 short, the man whom they deemed fittest to repre- 
 sent the whole body pohtic, whose sovereign power 
 should be a pillar of law and justice and not a means 
 of committing crimes and practising tyranny with 
 impunity."^ Thus wrote Frederick the Great 175 
 years ago. Let us now compare these truly kingly 
 words of a Hohenzollern with the imperial words 
 of another Hohenzollern and note that between 
 the two lies a period of 150 years of democratic 
 development : 
 
 "As he (William I.) thought, so do I also think 
 and I see in the people and country which I have 
 inherited a talent entrusted to me by God, which — 
 as it is written in the Bible — it is my duty to increase, 
 and concerning which I shall one day have to render 
 account. I intend to devote all my energies to putting 
 out this talent to such good usury that I shall add to 
 it, I trust, many talents more. Those who desire to 
 aid me in my task are heartily welcome, whoever they 
 may be; but those who oppose me in this work I 
 will crush" (Berlin, March 5th, 1890). 
 
 "I may remark, moreover, that the fact that we 
 have been enabled to achieve what has been achieved 
 is primarily due to the fact that in our House the 
 tradition prevails, that we regard ourselves as ap- 
 pointed by God, to rein over the peoples whom we have 
 been called to rule, and to guide them in accordance 
 with their welfare and the furtherance of their 
 
 *"K6mgliche Gedanken und Ausspriiche Friedrichs des 
 Grossen," published by the Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, pp. 
 5 and 6. 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 285 
 
 material and spiritual interests" (Bremen, April 21st, 
 1890). 
 
 "I do not believe that the Mark of Brandenburg 
 will hesitate to follow me on the paths I am treading. 
 You know that I regard my whole position and my 
 mission as one entrusted to me by God, and that I 
 am called to execute the mandates of a Higher Being 
 to whom I shall hereafter have to render account" 
 (Berlin, February 20th, 1891). 
 
 "He (William I.) came forth from Coblence, on 
 ascending the throne, as a chosen vessel of the Lord, 
 and as such he regarded himself. For us all, and 
 especially for us Princes, he has once more lifted on 
 high a jewel and endowed it with greater brilliancy, 
 a jewel that we must keep high and holy ; I mean, the 
 monarchy by God's grace. The monarchy with its 
 heavy duties, its never ending, ever continuing toil and 
 labour, with its fearful responsibility to the Creator 
 alone, from which no man, no minister, no house of 
 deputies and no people can relieve its prince" 
 (Coblence, August 31st, 1897). 
 
 I do not believe that there are many Germans who, 
 comparing these views of two Hohenzollerns, would be 
 inclined to give the preference to that of William 11. 
 For, just because Frederick the Great regards the 
 monarchy as the work of the people and the King as a 
 citizen among citizens, he appears to us more human, 
 greater and nobler than his imperial successor, who no 
 longer speaks as the "first servant of the State" and 
 as a man to his fellow-men, but convulsively clings to 
 that divine authority so vigorously denounced by 
 his great ancestor, belauds the monarchy as the 
 work of Heaven, and speaks to us, on every occasion, 
 
286 THE COMING DEMOCRACYi 
 
 as the governor of the State, the ruler of his 
 subjects. 
 
 To repeat: We are not Jacobins and demagogues. 
 We are writing without hatred and passion, as uphold- 
 ers of free States and free peoples. We leave to the 
 dynasties what belongs to dynasties. Frederick the 
 Great found no imitators, least of all in his own house. 
 For humanity, genius, and liberalism are, on thrones 
 as elsewhere in life, only exceptions. The average in- 
 telligence of dynasties will always regard the monarch 
 as the earthly representative of God and thus always 
 choose out of two possible solutions the one that is 
 the less liberal and the less well disposed towards the 
 people. The limitations of human dynasties will 
 always lead them to discover in Liberalism a direct 
 menace to their existence. Kant says ironically: 
 "It is not to be expected that kings should become 
 philosophers or philosophers kings, nor is it to be 
 wished; because the possession of power inevitably 
 renders the mind incapable of free judgment." And 
 Nietzsche adds (in reference to Germany and the 
 Germans) : *The cost of power is high; power 
 destroys the intelligence." 
 
 The possession of power does actually rob dynasties 
 of their free judgment, of a noble sense of justice, and 
 of a rational regard for the interests of others. It is, 
 accordingly, only what might have been expected if 
 they recognise no limits and laws, in respect to the 
 satisfaction of their own energies and ambitions, and 
 if they view the world's history as merely a chain of 
 glorious martial achievements, for the renewal of 
 which they must constantly provide, inasmuch as 
 they are the representatives of God and wars 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 287 
 
 are an element of the Divine ordering of the world. 
 
 In the eyes of dynasties a nation is a mere rude mass 
 and chaos which God has placed in the world for their 
 sole pleasure. Dynasties may have the best inten- 
 tions, but they are and remain the prisoners of their 
 origin and upbringing. Even Frederick II. is not 
 styled "the Great'^ because he was a philosopher 
 and poet, a friend of Voltaire and the author of the 
 "Antimachiavell," but because, in spite of his philo- 
 sophical and liberal ideas, he became a great strategist 
 and the conqueror of new provinces. And, in our own 
 times, we have the case of William II., which, like 
 so many others, furnishes a striking proof of the fact 
 that a dynasty, even where it regards peace as a 
 good thing in principle, is none the less, as a result 
 of its mystical, in some degree practical, but 
 always profoundly traditional policy of armaments 
 and provocations, finally driven into yet another 
 war. 
 
 As long as there are dynasties endued with divine 
 prerogatives, they will remain, what they must be 
 from their very origin, adventurers and not statesmen. 
 When their adventures are successful they become 
 heroes; when they fail, they forfeit a portion or the 
 whole of their power. But, in any event, their concep- 
 tion of the world and humanity will remain primitive, 
 mystic, pagan and romantic. He who enjoys inter- 
 course with the gods can claim a separate moral code 
 for himself. Perfidy, deceit, treachery and brutality 
 are the necessary accompaniments of all statecraft 
 which serves dynastic interests. Military victory 
 hallows everything. Guilt is here the necessary 
 
288 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 condition of greatness; honour and truth a subject 
 for mockery. 
 
 The craving for power knows no other hmit than 
 the power of another. In the realm of dynastic poHcy 
 everything is a question of brute force. The theory of 
 all dynastic policy is competition for the greater power, 
 its practice — the butt-end of the musket. The question 
 Who is the stronger, the more influential, the wealthier, 
 you or I? dominates all. Popular weal and progress 
 are merely a phrase and a pretext. Their true phi- 
 losophy is the cannon, their right the right of the 
 stronger, who remains a darling of the gods so long as 
 he does not meet one stronger than himself. The right 
 of the brigand too is divine, as long as he does not 
 allow himself to be caught ; he too can pose as a darling 
 of the gods as long as he can defend himself success- 
 fully against the police. 
 
 Why should one blame dynasties for this? The 
 thirst for power and riches is in all of us. It is a law 
 of our existence, without which there would be no 
 progress in the world. In order to keep this "will to 
 power" within such bounds as are essential to civil 
 order and security we established codes and courts of 
 law. These set limits to the "will to power" in private 
 life and create what we call "Culture," administration 
 of justice, civilisation, morals, and so forth. 
 
 But, thanks to their divine origin and calling, 
 dynasties stand beyond and above all legal control. 
 For them, there are neither laws nor judges, and, even, 
 in most cases not even critics. They prescribe laws for 
 themselves, they alone control their actions and are 
 only responsible to the "Almighty," to whom they 
 will "one day" have to render account. Altogether, 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 289 
 
 a most envious position, from which, as they them- 
 selves say, "no Minister, no Parliament, no people" 
 can release them. Hence, everything that they do is 
 "done well," for all their acts are done in accordance 
 with directions from above. Why then should it 
 surprise us if the dynasties, in order to satisfy their 
 craving for power, resort to means which we, in pri- 
 vate life, should call criminal? The idea of guilt and 
 crime does not exist for a dynasty, or, rather, only be- 
 gins to exist when its vital interests are imperilled. If, 
 for example, it is a crime to doubt the divinity of the 
 dynasty, it is not a crime to violate, in the higher 
 interests of the State, treaties that have been solemnly 
 ratified, and to send hundreds of thousands of citizens 
 to their death for a matter that in reality is of quite a 
 different complexion from that in which it has been 
 represented to them. 
 
 We must, once and for all, make clear to ourselves 
 that the "dynasty by God's grace'' is nothing else 
 than lawlessness reduced to legal forms. What is 
 prohibited to the citizen is enjoined upon the soldier; 
 where the one is punished, the other is rewarded, and 
 vice versa. The dynasty has the right to change the 
 highest into the lowest, the common into the sacred, 
 and lies into truth, without anyone having the right 
 to protest. There is something of an adjuration in 
 the words that Gustav Freytag used with regard to 
 the Hohenzollerns — "To stand above others, as God 
 of Battles and as the earthly Fate of hundreds of 
 thousands, renders the best and noblest man at last 
 susceptible to the hateful idea: I am the State!" 
 Freytag forgets that this thought is never hateful 
 to dynasties; it rather belongs to the logic of their 
 
290 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 case, it is noble and God-ordained. For the "will to 
 power" is a law of life that cannot disappear until 
 the world ceases to be a world. It would be folly to 
 attempt to deny or suppress this will to power. It 
 is sufficient to reckon with its existence and to pre- 
 scribe for it those limits that must be prescribed in the 
 interest of the common weal. 
 
 Just as a servant girl who, by her good looks and 
 coquetry, has come to dress in silk will at once 
 want to become a countess, so a dynasty that, with 
 wars and victories, has arrived at the purple will be 
 at once possessed by the idea that it has not its due 
 place in the sun. A dynasty without a dream of 
 power would be as absurd as an artisan without the 
 desire for increased wages. And every dynasty which 
 has in part realised its dream of power has imme- 
 diately transformed it into a dream of world power. 
 And yet every dynasty has suffered shipwreck through 
 this dream of world-domination; at last, the eagle is 
 brought low by the arrow its own feathers have 
 furnished. 
 
 All this is so logical that we, as psychologists and 
 historians, have not the right to make it a reproach 
 against the dynasties. At the most, it is the nations 
 who deserve reproaches because they were not willing 
 or able to perceive at the right time the "will to 
 power" of their dynasties, and so to restrict it in 
 accordance with the general ideas of justice that it 
 could no longer menace the general weal. This restric- 
 tion — wherever it has been carried into effect — has 
 rarely been a free and voluntary act, dictated by deep 
 philosophical or moral conviction, but, for the most 
 part, the result of external circumstances and bitter 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 291 
 
 economic necessity. The curse of an avenging God 
 seems to lie upon the nations. They must wade 
 through a Red Sea of blood and tears before they can 
 escape from the Pharaohs. In the days of Moses 
 our Lord God mercifully divided the Red Sea for the 
 benefit of the Israelites, so that they could cross on 
 dry foot into the Promised Land, but to-day, alas! 
 He no longer performs miracles. It appears to-day, 
 as it did in the days of Napoleon, as if the nations of 
 Europe would drown in the Red Sea. But this is only 
 appearance. The nations will reach the further shore, 
 and above the bloodstained and hideous fields of battle 
 the sun of the Promised Land of Liberty will at length 
 rise. 
 
 Every dynasty once dwelt in a fisherman's cottage 
 and was, like Frau Ilsebill in Grimm's well-known 
 fairy-tale, discontented with its fate. In the fisher- 
 man's hut she dreamt of ducal and royal thrones and 
 ordered her husband to tell the flounder, which he had 
 set at liberty, of her desire. And scarcely was it 
 fulfilled when Frau Ilsebill in her new royal palace 
 dreamt of an imperial palace. When she had procured 
 this also from the flounder and had dreamt for some 
 time of boundless realms on which the sun never set, 
 she next wanted to become like the Lord God Himself, 
 and demanded of the flounder that he should find her 
 a place in Heaven. And so her husband had to go 
 once again and beg the wrathful flounder to satisfy 
 his wife's ambition, as otherwise his house would be 
 a hell. And whenever Frau Ilsebill secured a higher 
 rank, the sea surged high and became dark and violet 
 and blood- red, until the wrathful flounder at length 
 
292 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 caused the imperial and papal palace to be destroyed 
 with thunder and lightning, and the good fisherman 
 found his Frau Ilsebill once more back in the wretched 
 fisherman's hut on the shore. 
 
 Thus it was in China and in Rome, in Persia 
 and Spain, in Egypt and Mexico, in the Papal 
 States and in France. Thus it was, has remained, 
 and will always remain, as long as there are dynasties 
 which enjoy direct intercourse with God and are served 
 by an obliging fisherman who is always ready to defy 
 the elements in order to satisfy his wife's vanity. 
 
 For, in contrast to the servant girl who wants to 
 become a countess and thereby at the worst ruins a 
 few lovers, the history of Frau Ilsebill is at the same 
 time the history of nations; she does not dream her 
 dream of power like other mortals at her own risk and 
 peril, but for the use and delectation of her subjects. 
 Almost twenty years of war and a Red Sea of human 
 blood were necessary in order to extinguish the dream 
 of power of the great Corsican and to bring him back 
 again to the fisherman's hut whence he had come. 
 
 ^ Jjf sji Jjf ^ 
 
 We might now, when we consider the rise and the 
 disastrous fall of every dynasty, say with Nietzsche 
 that "history is an eternal repetition," and this 
 would, at the close of our investigation, bring us back 
 to the standpoint of the Treltschkes, Moltkes, and 
 Bernhardis. That is to say, we should join with them 
 in declaring war to be a law of nature and a civilising 
 and educational force and in regarding its perpetual 
 recurrence as a matter of course. 
 
 Fortunately, however, history can only remain an 
 eternal repetition so long as the essential conditions 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 293 
 
 remain the same. Hitherto, as we have seen, dynasties 
 have been an essential condition of the world's history. 
 But are they to remain so in the future? We say 
 frankly. No! The Revolutions in England, France, 
 and elsewhere, the declaration of human and civic 
 rights and their more or less successful application 
 to politics, have furnished the proof that dynasties 
 have long ceased to be an essential condition, but, on 
 the contrary, are only an artificially fostered attri- 
 bute of modern humanity. For example, the history 
 of Germany during the past century may be taken as 
 a proof that dynasties constantly force their peoples 
 into opposition to the great aspirations of humanity, 
 and are thus only a hindrance to the only progress 
 of mankind that is desirable. 
 
 Destruction by lightning was an "eternal repeti- 
 tion" until the lightning-conductor was discovered. 
 But man set a limit to the divine and abso- 
 lute power of the lightning, and since then no 
 one asserts any longer that destruction by lightning is 
 inevitable, divine, and the will of Nature. - The heated 
 room and the fur cloak are, as it were, a protest against 
 the Divine order, which intends that we shall feel cold 
 in winter. We invented insurance companies as a 
 protection against fires, damage by hail, disease, 
 robberies, etc., all of which latter are also divine 
 institutions. That is to say: Whenever mankind 
 felt the eternal recurrence of certain events to be both 
 painful and avoidable, it contrived to get rid of many 
 divine institutions. Consider, for instance, the Plague, 
 against which, in the Middle Ages, the only remedies 
 were fast days and processions. 
 
 Though dynasties by God's grace are not the Plague, 
 
294 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 they are, like the Plague, an eminently divine institu- 
 tion, the very existence of which is in direct antago- 
 nism to everything that modern humanity must de- 
 mand for the security of its existence and liberty. 
 
 The present World War is in every sense so terrible 
 that it is to be hoped that it has thoroughly disgusted 
 nations with this "eternal repetition" of history. 
 The desire for final emancipation from this scourge 
 of mankind was never more general, more ardent, and 
 more urgent than it is to-day. And therefore the 
 nations will derive from this World War a sacred 
 right to exclaim to the dynasties : 
 
 "Enough, more than enough! Your day is over. 
 We need you no more. You are adventurers and not 
 statesmen. We wish at length to be ourselves. Away 
 with your divine rights! Away with all the sacred 
 trumpery of bygone days! We wish, at length, to 
 have a policy of our own choosing. For we, and not 
 you, express the meaning of the world. We, and not 
 you, are vessels of God's grace. Hitherto we have 
 been your chattels. We believed that you meant well 
 by us. We now perceive that (less out of malice than 
 by instinct and tradition) you have remained as you 
 were, that you can never possibly entertain that idea 
 of general weal and culture that we must demand at 
 the present day. That which increases your fame 
 increases our unhappiness; that which seems to you 
 an element of the divine order of things seems to us 
 a crime against humanity and civilisation. You wish 
 to make us happy by means of war? To-day we have 
 other tasks. We are no longer barbarians, for whom 
 war meant livelihood, glory and sport. We desire 
 peace. If your lust for adventure can only be satisfied 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 295 
 
 by war, go to the Indians and the negroes. Europe 
 is no longer an arena for swashbucklers and tyrants. 
 The taxpaying citizen, pledged to military service, 
 shall be, henceforth, the sole sovereign of Europe. 
 Even if it were proved that all the wielders of divine 
 prerogatives were men of genius (and the world's 
 history shows the opposite to be the case), we will 
 not and cannot trust ourselves any longer to their 
 mercy.'' 
 
 The Prkrequisite Conditions for a European 
 
 Peace 
 
 What, therefore, we ask in the name of the future 
 peace and civilisation of Europe is, in general terms, 
 the continuation, completion, and the widest possible 
 application of the principles proclaimed by the great 
 French Revolution. The World War must complete 
 the work of that Revolution, which has been inter- 
 rupted by the dynasties, or, at all events, it must open 
 the way to mankind for the gradual realisation of 
 these immortal human ideals. 
 
 And what we, in particular, ask of Germany is a 
 general transformation of generally accepted ideas and 
 institutions. 
 
 The first and the most general demand that we 
 German democrats and pacifists urge is : Germany for 
 the Germans! German government by the German 
 People. And in order that this popular government 
 shall not, as hitherto, be merely a comedy for the 
 delectation of exalted personages, we make this second 
 fundamental demand : The German Army for the 
 
296 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 German People! The armed force must be the sup- 
 port and servant of the popular sovereignty ! 
 
 Universal military service without popular sover- 
 eignty is political serfdom. That an army composed 
 of all the citizens of the nation should take the oath 
 to the person of the sovereign may be very well for 
 a negro or Aztec State, but in the case of a great 
 modern nation it is a scandal which at length must 
 cease. 
 
 By the carrying out of these two fundamental 
 reforms all the rest are achieved automatically : a 
 thorough revision of the German Imperial Constitu- 
 tion, abolition of the Prussian "three class" franchise, 
 reasonably proportioned electoral districts, Ministers 
 selected from the Parliamentary body and responsible 
 to it, the abolition of all the political privileges of the 
 Junkers and officers; in short, a safeguarding of the 
 sovereignty of the will of the German people in all 
 departments. 
 
 How this new Constitution and popular assembly 
 will deal with the monarchy (assuming that we are ab- 
 solutely bound to have one) is a secondary matter. We 
 shall be satisfied, in the first instance, with those fun- 
 damental reforms as a result of which the will of the 
 German people shall be declared supreme in Germany 
 and shall retain the effective political power. Whether 
 the head of the State holds the title of President, King, 
 or Emperor, whether his dignity is hereditary or not, 
 matters not a jot. The most progressive European 
 democracy (Denmark) is not a republic, but a kingdom. 
 Italy, England, Sweden, Norway, to some extent also 
 Spain, are republics under monarchical titles. We are 
 not concerned with phrases and etiquette, but with 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 297 
 
 actualities. And the actuality to be achieved must 
 be that the head of the German State shall no longer, 
 by divine right, satisfy his personal craving for power 
 above the heads of the people, but that he shall become 
 the executive organ of the will of the German people, 
 and that the actual political power, at home and 
 abroad, shall be in the hands of the German people. 
 
 The World War has proved that a radical change in 
 all those political Constitutions that still concede to 
 the dynasties divine rights and the supreme command 
 of their armed might is no longer to-day merely a 
 question of home politics for any people, but a Euro- 
 pean necessity. 
 
 The World War has brought about an exceptional 
 state of things, which, in the interests of Europe, must 
 be utilised in every State which maintains an army, 
 for the purpose of altering the Constitution In such a 
 way that, henceforth, the people and not a dynasty 
 by divine right shall dispose of the army, which is 
 both paid for by, and composed of, the people. 
 
 It may be that the creation of this exceptional state 
 of things will prove the most Important advantage 
 which the nations of Europe will reap from this sac- 
 rifice of millions of lives. For that which, for the 
 past century, could only exist as a vague theory, and, 
 at The Hague and elsewhere, was openly scoffed at 
 by high personages, namely, the idea of an under- 
 standing between the nations based upon International 
 agreements, may now, after the war has Inevitably led 
 to a general discussion and settlement between the 
 nations of Europe, be easily realised. Although the 
 formation of a League of Nations for the securing of 
 
298 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the world's peace, advocated by Kant and all serious 
 pacifists, has hitherto been wrecked on the divine rights 
 of dynasties, the World War has now seen to it that 
 this resistance shall not only cease, but shall be recog- 
 nised as the chief cause of modern wars. 
 
 A hundred years ago Kant demanded: that (a) 
 the inhabitants of a State, in virtue of their citizen- 
 right; (b) the States in their mutual relations, in vir- 
 tue of international law; and (c) men and States in 
 their mutual relations, in virtue of cosmopolitan law, 
 may be "regarded as citizens of one world State," and 
 he adds : ''This classification is not an arbitrary one, 
 but is essential in reference to the idea of eternal peace. 
 For, if even one of these were in a position physically 
 to influence another and were yet in a natural state, 
 then a state of war would be implied, from which we 
 desire to emancipate ourselves."^ 
 
 And as Kant insisted a hundred years ago, it is no 
 longer a question of putting an end to one war, but to 
 all wars. Since almost all the European nations are 
 engaged in this World War, they will all, without ex- 
 ception, be agreed with regard to ''the enforcement 
 of Kant's first definite article of perpetual peace," 
 which states clearly and positively : "The Civil Con- 
 stitution of every State must be republican." 
 
 We therefore demand that the exceptional condi- 
 tions resulting from this war shall be utilised for the 
 realisation of this fundamental reform in Europe, a 
 reform equally applicable to, equally desired by, and 
 equally efficacious for all countries and peoples, and 
 
 ^ Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden," published b}'- Reclam 
 (Leipzig), note to p. 12, 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 299 
 
 without which no really sound state of peace can be 
 brought to pass. 
 
 All that respect for and belief in the authority of 
 God-appointed dynasties, which has been bequeathed 
 to us from the past, must give way before this funda- 
 mental reform. And, especially in the case of Ger- 
 many, there can be no "ifs" and *'buts." The foolish 
 chatter of German professors about all that has *'be- 
 come historic" must cease, for it is only that which is 
 in process of ^'becoming historic" that must influence 
 us. 
 
 If, as we sincerely hope, the statesmen of the West- 
 ern Democracies will have to speak the decisive word 
 in the peace negotiations, then they will employ the 
 power that they have won through the war to for- 
 mulate and insist upon the satisfaction of demands ex- 
 pressed somewhat as follows, and applicable to and 
 binding upon all nations and States. 
 
 1. The Civil Constitution in every State shall be 
 republican. That is to say: no State shall, hereafter, 
 be governed by divine rights and arbitrary principles. 
 The chief command of the armed forces and the 
 decision as to war and peace shall, henceforth, in 
 all States reside in Parliaments formed on a basis 
 of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and endowed 
 with responsible Ministers. 
 
 2. So soon as in any State a coup d'etat is threat- 
 ened or put into effect, which might in any way limit 
 or even abolish these supreme powers of the Parlia- 
 ment, the other States shall, in the name of the 
 world's peace, have a right to protest aga'nst and, if 
 
300 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 necessary, to frustrate by force of arms any attempt 
 to restore personal despotism. 
 
 This last condition is of the most vital importance. 
 The coming peace must reckon, once and for all, with 
 the invariable existence of the will to power; it must 
 treat it as a law of nature, deeply rooted in the human 
 heart, and therefore keep a tight rein on it, in that 
 sphere in which it might become dangerous to the 
 welfare of Europe, namely, in politics. 
 
 States must, therefore, possess the common right to 
 frustrate the warlike ambitions of individuals. The 
 history of France, during a period of less than fifty 
 years, displays two painful instances of the sorcery 
 that gifted men with warlike ambitions are able to 
 exercise upon the popular mind. Twice were the re- 
 publican institutions of the country overruled by a 
 Napoleon, and twice did the consequences of these 
 coups d'etat bring Europe to desperation. It may 
 happen, in fact we may confidently predict that it will 
 happen, that in the future also warlike "supermen" 
 will rise up, and that a nation will prove too weak to 
 resist the force and fascination of their personality. 
 We earnestly trust that the men who will presently be 
 called upon to secure for Europe a lasting peace will 
 do their work completely, and contrive to secure Eu- 
 rope against the possibility of new wars in the future. 
 
 International politics have been called "a concert of 
 the Great Powers." If anyone makes a disturbance 
 in a concert-hall he will probably, in the interests of 
 the rest of the audience, be turned out. But if in the 
 sphere of international politics some disturber of the 
 peace has at his disposal such a powerful army that 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 301 
 
 he can hope to pit his strength successfully against the 
 rest, it is not sufficient merely to turn him into the 
 street ; he must be brought to reason by means of war. 
 In order that the concert of the Great Powers may at 
 length become harmonious and contribute to the hap- 
 piness of the nations, care must be taken that any dis- 
 turbers of the peace are henceforth deprived of the 
 opportunity of making an interruption. Attacks upon 
 the parliamentary regime of a State are attacks upon 
 its peace. Anyone who endangers the Republican 
 Constitution of the State endangers (even though at 
 first only indirectly and instinctively) the peace and 
 security of the nations, and must, in case of need, be 
 prevented from carrying out his designs by the inter- 
 vention of the neighbouring States. 
 
 For, as we have said, peace does not depend so 
 much upon the foreign policy as upon the internal 
 Constitution of the States. If the Constitution is 
 mediaeval, militarist, and generally autocratic, then 
 sooner or later the foreign policy of the State will 
 tend towards war. 
 
 All the nations will be in favour of an arrangement 
 of this kind; the German nation more than any; for 
 no nation has suffered more from this war and no 
 nation desired it less than the German nation. 
 
 The speech of the German Imperial Chancellor on 
 November Qtli, 191 6, compels me to make a digression. 
 
 In this speech, for the first time in Prusso-German 
 history, a German statesman expressed himself, in the 
 name of the German Government, in favour of an idea 
 which, as we have seen, has hitherto been strictly for- 
 
302 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 bidden in the Fatherland of Kant. That which Kant 
 and his disciples proposed, and which Prussian Min- 
 isters and diplomatists have lustily abused in the 
 Reichstag and in the Press and systematically thwarted 
 at all the Hague Conferences, namely, the formation 
 of a general League of Nations for the safeguarding 
 of the world's peace, has now finally become the aim 
 of the German Government. The Imperial Chancellor 
 said: "If, when the w^ar is ended, this terrible de- 
 struction of property and life is at length fully realised 
 by the world, then throughout the whole world a cry 
 will go up for peaceful settlements and for Constitu- 
 tions which, as far as lies in human power, shall pre- 
 vent the recurrence of such monstrous calamities. This 
 cry will be so strong and so justifiable that it is bound 
 to lead to this result : that Germany will honestly co- 
 operate in considering any attempt to find a practical 
 solution and in working for its realisation. All the 
 more so if the war, as we confidently expect, produces 
 political conditions which will further the free de- 
 velopment of all nations, great and small." 
 
 Golden words, which had they been only spoken 
 ten years earlier and been accompanied by corre- 
 sponding acts would have prevented this World War. 
 But, unfortunately, they were not spoken until after 
 twenty-seven months of the most hopeless war that 
 the German Government has ever waged. And, un- 
 fortunately also, they are in absolute contradiction 
 with the speeches which the same statesman delivered 
 on December 9th, 1915, and April 5th, 1916, when the 
 military situation of Germany was more favourable 
 than it is to-day. 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 303 
 
 And instead of showing by wise moderation that he 
 is in earnest about this idea, the Imperial Chancellor 
 immediately falls into the exaggerations typical of the 
 newly converted, who by their obtrusive zeal give 
 rise to the suspicion that they discarded their errors 
 of yesterday only under compulsion. In fact, he not 
 only answers for Germany's willingness to co-operate 
 in creating this League of Nations, but he also at the 
 same time demands that Germany should preside over 
 it : "Germany is willing at any time to join this 
 League of Nations. Yes, and even place herself at the 
 head of a League of Nations which would keep dis- 
 turbers of the peace in check.'* 
 
 That is too much of a good thing. Your Excel- 
 lency: one does not immediately make a bishop of a 
 converted heathen. It would be ridiculous in peace 
 time to place Germany "liber alles" after having pre- 
 vented her at the cost of enormous sacrifices from be- 
 coming "liber alles" by means of war. 
 
 The pacifist ideal is still so unfamiliar to the leaders 
 of the German State, that they view it from a military 
 standpoint, as they do everything else, that is to say, 
 they claim a controlling and commanding position in 
 it. As if in the League of Nations dreamed of by 
 Kant and his disciples there could ever be such a thing 
 as a leader! 
 
 But how lamentably far the leaders of Germany are 
 from a true understanding of pacifist ideas and prac- 
 tice is apparent not only from these turns of phrase, 
 not only from the military traditions and mode of 
 thought of our dynasty, but, above all, from their 
 actions in the present unhappy time. Four days be- 
 fore this beautiful pacifist speech was delivered, Wil- 
 
304 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 Ham II. proclaimed the "autonomy" of Poland with- 
 out consulting the people interested, that is, with de- 
 liberate disregard of that international law the strict 
 observance of which must be an essential condition for 
 the formation of such a League of Nations. And at 
 the same moment that the Imperial Chancellor was 
 proclaiming this new ideal of peace to the nations of 
 Europe, thousands of "lazy" Belgians were being de- 
 ported to Germany, in open mockery of The Hague 
 Conventions (which had been subscribed to by the 
 German Emperor), to do forced labour. What con- 
 fidence can the world have in a man who at the be- 
 ginning of the war called treaties "scraps of paper," 
 and at the very moment when he is inviting the na- 
 tions to enter into new treaties is still treating them 
 as scraps of paper? 
 
 We must ask the same question when we consider 
 the attitude of the German Government relative to 
 its own nation. The German Reichstag has during 
 the course of this World War frequently and emphati- 
 cally put forward various democratic demands. It 
 is true that, in its humility, it did not dare to begin 
 at the beginning, that is to say, to demand the re- 
 sponsibility of Ministers, redistribution of electoral di- 
 visions, and parliamentary control over the army. But, 
 with surprising unanimity, it demanded the control of 
 foreign policy by the Reichstag, the abolition of the 
 disgraceful state of "siege," of the precautionary su- 
 pervision and censorship, the exemption of princes 
 from taxation, the special privileges of the nobility, 
 etc. The German Government either abruptly refused 
 these demands, or, with pompous speeches, phrases, 
 and promises, postponed them for later consideration. 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 305 
 
 A paltry inscription over the doorway of the Reichs- 
 tag Palace and a few trifling reforms : this is all that 
 the war, which in Russia has already brought about a 
 sort of parliamentary regime, has done for Germany 
 as yet. 
 
 And is this Government, which before the war did 
 everything in its power to discredit the ideals of 
 pacifism, and which, since the beginning of the war, 
 has, both at home and abroad, systematically trampled 
 under foot any treaties and constitutional guarantees 
 that happened to be inconvenient, now to be considered 
 eligible for co-operating in the creation of a League 
 of Nations, and even for presiding over its activities? 
 This illusion can only be entertained by those ''scien- 
 tific pacifists" who, like Dr. Fried, still continue to 
 imagine that the European peace-omelette can be made 
 of hard-boiled feudal eggs. 
 
 The rest of us know only too well that it is easier 
 for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than 
 for a representative of God's grace to pass through 
 the portals of a democratic temple of international 
 rights. If we tried to explain to the German Imperial 
 Chancellor upon what conditions those "peaceful 
 agreements and Constitutions" must necessarily be 
 based, if they are really "as far as lies in human 
 power" to safeguard peace, he would probably be 
 highly indignant, and at once declare that this was not 
 the meaning of his words. Then we should have to 
 reply to him: 
 
 Is your Excellency, in the name of His Majesty, 
 in favour of the creation of a League of Nations for 
 the safeguarding of the world's peace? Your Excel- 
 lency has read Kant and, as we are delighted to ob- 
 
3o6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 serve, understood him better than those scientific 
 pacifists who are not democrats ; otherwise, Your Ex- 
 cellency would not have used the significant word 
 ''Constitutions" in your speech. Kant, in fact, realised 
 125 years ago that international conventions without 
 democratic national governments are a trick, which 
 can ensnare only arch-revolutionists like Scheide- 
 mann, or peace specialists like Fried. The first thing, 
 therefore, that Your Excellency ought to do, if the 
 Government of Germany desires honestly to establish 
 a League of Nations for safeguarding the peace of the 
 world, is to lay before the Reichstag to-morrow, in 
 the name of the German Emperor and the Federal 
 Council, a draft of a Constitution which would com- 
 pletely transform the German political system. There- 
 fore, enough of those trifling reforms and inscriptions 
 with which you have hitherto delighted men like 
 Scheidemann for whom revolution is merely a subject 
 for oratory; but concede to the German people what 
 they have most ardently desired for decades past: a 
 parliamentary regime , reconstruction of the electoral 
 districts, abolition of the supreme command of the 
 army by the monarch, and so forth. 
 
 What ? Your Excellency thinks these demands "re- 
 volutionary" in the highest degree, ''dangerous to the 
 State"? That seems a proof that you are afraid to 
 think out Kant's idea to its logical conclusion. For 
 these demands are only the logical and necessary con- 
 ditions for the League of Nations that Your Excel- 
 lency so heartily desires. If this League of Nations 
 were not based on these democratic reforms, it would 
 be only "a Holy Alliance" which once again would be 
 subject to the pleasure of our God-appointed rulers 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 307 
 
 and would in a few days be annulled in accordance 
 with the will of God. The fundamental idea of a 
 monarchy by God's grace is in the most flagrant con- 
 tradiction with the fundamental idea of the proposed 
 League of Nations. Anyone who should attempt to 
 reconcile these two opposites, that is to say, to make 
 out of one who executes divine laws a representative 
 of earthly reason, would be only acting a farce, even 
 if he were unconscious of the fact. And, therefore, 
 in the phrase "League of Nations'' we lay the em- 
 phasis upon the last word. 
 
 Your Excellency is perhaps of opinion that this 
 international League of Peace can have nothing to do 
 with the internal affairs of Germany, but that later 
 we may be able to arrange something? No! Your 
 Excellency, it must be now! At this very moment! 
 Immediate peace is to be had at this price. Your Ex- 
 cellency knows the true war aim of the Allied West- 
 ern Powers just as well as we do. They are fighting 
 for the democratising of Germany and — based upon 
 this — the realisation of the plans for disarmament and 
 a court of arbitration which Germany frustrated at 
 The Hague, whatever Scheidemann and his like may 
 say. Your Excellency has in your heart, as we know, 
 the same sympathy with these Don Quixotes as we 
 have. For your Excellency knows positively that the 
 Entente is only an ^'Entente" because in Germany the 
 monarchy by God's grace rules with absolute rights 
 over war and peace. The Entente wants what Kant 
 wanted! So do the German people! So does the 
 whole of Europe! And Europe has learnt, with su- 
 preme satisfaction, that at the bottom of your heart 
 Your Excellency wants the same ! 
 
3o8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 But begin to be serious about it, Your Excellency! 
 Begin now! Europe is bleeding to death! Peace can 
 be concluded to-morrow if Your Excellency would 
 take the first step towards the promised League of 
 Nations by proclaiming the rights of the German 
 people. 
 
 A hundred years of Prusso-German history have 
 taught us (apart from a few Scheidemanns) some 
 wisdom. Whenever the storm has rattled the Palace 
 windows we have received abundant promises of 
 heavenly and earthly blessing, of Constitutions and 
 liberties ; but when the storm had passed, not a word 
 of all these promises was ever kept, and anti-democracy 
 and divine rights flourished even more vigorously than 
 before. The German people is not made up of 
 Scheidemanns. The latter preached revolution and 
 then became an enthusiastic champion of Emperor and 
 Empire, when Tsarism began to be supreme in Ger- 
 many. The German people is less ridiculous and more 
 democratic. It has devoted itself with courage and in 
 good faith to the defence of the Fatherland, and all 
 the thanks it has got for it is absolute rule enforced 
 by the sword, and this absolutism has been mitigated 
 neither as a result of the fair promises of the Gov- 
 ernment nor yet by the economic distress prevailing 
 to-day in Germany. 
 
 The German people is democratic in the real sense 
 of the term. And, therefore, Your Excellency cannot 
 expect that the German people will for all time be con- 
 tent with democracy in the shape of inscriptions and 
 promises. Set to work in earnest. Your Excellency! 
 An immediate and an honourable peace is possible if 
 you will prove to the German people (and at the same 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 309 
 
 time to the world at large) by democratic actions that 
 the German Government from this day onward swears 
 allegiance to the International principles of pacifism. 
 This is the only way. 
 
 Accordingly, it is a question first of all of the cre- 
 ation and of the putting into operation of democratic 
 republican Constitutions in all countries, and, secondly, 
 of the appointment of an International police who shall 
 not obtrude themselves in normal times but shall be 
 constantly ready to check any threatened violation of 
 these Constitutions. As the desire for war of a single 
 individual suffices to force twelve desirous of peace to 
 make war, it must be seen to that individuals who have 
 an inclination towards war do not attain a position of 
 supreme authority. Europe will not and dare not any 
 longer tolerate an irresponsible dynastic policy of 
 force. Every attempt of this kind must be stifled at 
 the outset by common endeavour. Any recurrence of 
 a Napoleon or a Bismarck must be made absolutely 
 impossible. Humanity asks only for legislators, states- 
 men, philosophers, poets, and not for conquerors. 
 
 And even if the Bernhardis, Rohrbachs, Reventlows, 
 Hardens, Keims, Delbrucks, LImans, Frymanns, 
 Scheidemanns and their like are beside themselves 
 with anger, that does not trouble us. Those among 
 them who possess a conscience will understand that 
 the days of the policy of force, when a few had a di- 
 vine right over all others and when the fate of mil- 
 lions was callously settled behind closed doors are at 
 last at an end. The rest will doubtless continue from 
 time to time to favour us with their scribbllngs in the 
 cause of bloodshed. But, firstly, they will be talking 
 
310 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 in the name of a principle that has become impotent ; 
 and secondly, we shall, after this war, have a right 
 to laugh at them openly until they are ashamed of 
 themselves, and finally spare us their dreams of world- 
 power. 
 
 The Errors and Advantages of Democracy 
 
 Only from this starting-point do the paths open out 
 to further reforms. For only when the democratisa- 
 tion of the Constitutions of all the States has been 
 achieved can those further demands that have been 
 already put forward by pacifists and socialists be dis- 
 cussed and gradually realised — an international court 
 of arbitration for the adjustment of all conflicts aris- 
 ing between nations, special legislation against the 
 bellicose tendencies of the so-called national Press, 
 nationalisation of armament industries, conversion of 
 standing armies into national militia, the pubHcity and 
 parliamentary control of diplomacy, the opening of an 
 era of free trade, and, finally, even, the abolition of 
 that defence of country which is ingenuously con- 
 demned outright by our present-day "anti-militarists" 
 as being "militarism" and which is alleged to be the 
 cause of the war. 
 
 Whoever demands these and similar guarantees of 
 peace without previously demanding that the expres- 
 sion of the dynastic will-to-power should be eliminated 
 from the Constitutions of the various States is like 
 one preaching in a desert,^ and is either a Utopian or 
 
 ^For instance, a neutral (Nos. 1459 and 1633 of the Neiie 
 Ziircher Zeitung, 1916) made quite a rational proposal to create 
 an international Fund, in which all States should join and in 
 which each should deposit a considerable sum in minted gold. 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 311 
 
 an intellectual coward. The political liberty of citi- 
 zens is the liberty of liberties. The sovereignty of the 
 peoples is and remains the indispensable condition for 
 all earnest culture and guarantees of peace. Anyone 
 proposing to reform society without giving society 
 beforehand its indisputable right to autonomy is not 
 proposing a reform, but only a mockery. 
 
 If, then, we are looking for a rock upon which we 
 can build a lasting and reasonable peace, let us take 
 the popular will. The sovereignty of the popular will 
 expressed in a democratic form of government must 
 after this war become the ruler of Europe. Just as 
 dynasties are born of war, have through wars arrived 
 at the zenith of their power, and can only continue 
 their existence by means of further wars, so, on the 
 other hand, is democracy born from the will-to-peace 
 of nations, develops its power in peace, and is des- 
 tined to fulfil its most sublime purposes in internal 
 peace. The existence and the conception of culture of 
 the dynasty are inseparable from the employment of 
 
 If a State declares war, and the universal opinion is that it has 
 acted rashly and culpably, then its contribution will be confis- 
 cated, and so forth. The control of the fund shall be entrusted 
 to neutral delegates, whose special task it will be to see that no 
 more secret treaties are concluded, etc. The significant word 
 in this proposal is the word "control." This control can only 
 exist in States having a republican Constitution; States with 
 dynastic Constitutions have always from time immemorial re- 
 jected any control over their actions {cf. the speeches of Wil- 
 liam II). Accordingly, if any such proposals are to be rendered 
 practicable, Kant's fundamental demand must first of all be 
 satisfied, and this, unfortunately, has not been mentioned in 
 these and similar proposals. All the world feels the "control" 
 of politics to be the sole effectual guarantee of the future peace 
 of the world, but no one says who it is that has always obsti- 
 nately and dogmatically opposed it 
 
312 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 military force. The existence and the conception of 
 culture of democracy are, on the other hand, based 
 upon the furthering and the safeguarding of the pop- 
 ular weal. 
 
 We modern democrats and pacifists are not roman- 
 ticists, or Utopians, or metaphysicians. We are, in 
 truth, further than any from regarding democracy as 
 a paradise. No one knows the weakness of democratic 
 government better than we do. As far as I am con- 
 cerned, I think that in my book, *'Die franzosische 
 Democratie'' (Leipzig, 1914), I have shown up these 
 weaknesses better than many whose aim has been to 
 attack democracy on principle. 
 
 We know as well as our opponents do that the pop- 
 ular will, even with the best electoral system in the 
 world, is never quite accurately expressed ; that a great 
 proportion of citizens will always remain politically in- 
 different and will not go to the poll, so that the par- 
 liamentary regime is, strictly speaking, a delusion. 
 We perfectly understand that it may be a danger to a 
 country if only one party rules, and that this party 
 with its petty interests may hamper the establishment 
 and development of great human principles. 
 
 German scholars and politicians are not a little proud 
 of the "stability" of the German Government and its 
 independence of party groupings; they contrast it fa- 
 vourably with the instability of democratic party gov- 
 ernment, as a result of which a party that has arrived 
 at power often completely annihilates the work of its 
 predecessor. 
 
 But for us, this instability of the democratic regime 
 is also a guarantee for the prevention of war. It is 
 true that the party government and nepotism of a 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 313 
 
 democracy may, here and there, corrupt a Minister 
 and bring about a scandal, and, for a time, plunge the 
 nation into such violent party feuds that it may seem 
 as if the whole political system were entirely out of 
 gear. But what are these evils in comparison with 
 those born of the "stability'' of absolutism? In the 
 first case, a Dreyfus or Rochette affair, which con- 
 cerns only the French ; in the second case, the Kruger 
 telegram, the Daily Telegraph interview, the jeers at 
 The Hague Conferences — that is to say, things that 
 are felt far beyond the black-white-and-red boundary 
 posts, that alarm our neighbours, and necessarily ap- 
 pear to them a menace to the world's peace. In the 
 first case, a Panama scandal, a mutiny of soldiers, a 
 railway ^strike, which our official representatives of 
 culture regard with pity, as though they would say: 
 Lord, we thank Thee that we are not like these de- 
 cadent communities ! In Germany, on the other hand, 
 we see official theories of State and international law 
 of a mediaeval nature, description of treaties as scraps 
 of paper, systematic disregard of all guarantees of 
 justice and liberty both at home and abroad. Hence, 
 that which, in the more loosely constructed democracy, 
 attacks (or apparently attacks )the foundation of the 
 nation, in a monarchy by divine right, thanks to its 
 "stability," attacks and disintegrates the whole of 
 human civilisation. On the one hand, the "corrup- 
 tion" of a political system, on the other, the "cor- 
 ruption" of an ideal of humanity. We have the less 
 hesitation in giving preference to the former, in that 
 it is for the most part only superficial. For who 
 would deny that we, with our much-boasted "stability," 
 did not at the same time possess a very flourishing 
 
314 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 corruption within our frontiers? (Only read what 
 the ^Tessimist'' in his book "Unser Kaiser und sein 
 Volk" had to say about it as early as 1906). The 
 only difference between us and France is that In our 
 case scandals come to light solely by chance, and are 
 at once suppressed, whereas their detection and dis- 
 cussion (thanks to the rivalry for political power) be- 
 longs, as it were, to the system of democratic gov- 
 ernment. And as we are by no means all angels, a 
 modern political system inevitably exhibits a certain 
 amount of corruption. Let there be no illusion on this 
 head. But, here too, publicity is the best guarantee 
 for a gradual improvement. 
 
 The boastful eloquence of German professors con- 
 cerning the stability of a monarchical government is 
 very strikingly refuted by the judgments of a man 
 who, because he himself was an absolute monarch, was 
 certainly more qualified to judge of such matters than 
 all our Privy Councillors taken together. Frederick 
 the Great wrote as early as 1747-8 as follows: 
 
 "In monarchies the sole basis of government is the 
 sovereign power of the ruler. Laws, military systems, 
 industry, commerce, and all other component parts of 
 the State are subjected to the arbitrary power of a 
 single individual, among whose successors not a single 
 one resembles the other. It follows that, as a rule, 
 with the accession of each new prince the State is 
 governed according to new principles. And that is 
 the disadvantage of this form of government. Unity 
 resides in the aims that republics place before them- 
 selves and in the means which they employ towards 
 their attainment. Hence it ensues that they rarely 
 miss their aims^ In monarchies, on the other hand, 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 315 
 
 an ambitious prince is succeeded in turn by an idler, 
 a pietist, a warrior, a scholar, a voluptuary. And 
 whilst Fortune's shifting stage is ever displaying some 
 new scene, the mind of the people, dazzled by the 
 variety of the spectacle, takes no definite shape.*'^ 
 
 From this it is clear that we republicans and paci- 
 fists, in our views concerning the best form of State, 
 are in very good company. We can, it is clear, re- 
 fute the present-day panegyrists of the Hohenzollerns 
 by the aid of the Hohenzollerns themselves, and Pro- 
 fessor Delbriick would have some difficulty in recon- 
 ciling his respect for the hereditary dynasty with in- 
 sistence on the correctness of his ^'stability" theories. 
 
 Nothing is perfect in this world. We human beings 
 are everywhere compelled to choose the lesser of two 
 evils. The finest democracy in the world is a poor 
 affair compared with the grand ideal that great spirits 
 have framed for it. But anyone who seriously aspires 
 to free modem humanity at length from the scourge 
 of war (and that is to-day the supreme task) must 
 judge the worst democracy to be infinitely better than 
 the best feudal monarchy. 
 
 "Eternal peace'' is not a decree. It must, like every- 
 thing else, be won step by step. And if even the best 
 democracy in the world does not furnish any absolute 
 protection against war, we must humbly confess that 
 absolute protection against war is impossible in this 
 imperfect world. The main point is that we finally 
 recognise that without a will-to-war no wars are pos- 
 sible, and that this will-to-war can only be dangerous 
 
 1 «i 
 
 'Konigliche Gedanken und Ausspriiche Friedrichs des 
 Grossen," Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, pp. 46-7. 
 
3i6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 when It IS backed up by a political Constitution; and 
 that after we have clearly recognised this, we seek 
 for and establish that form of State and government 
 in which the satisfaction of this craving for war is 
 rendered as difficult as possible. 
 
 This form of political government is beyond all 
 doubt the sovereignty of the popular will, that is to 
 say, democracy. For, whilst in all dynastic forms of 
 government the will-to-war is, and will remain, a com- 
 mand of God, that is to say, a necessary condition of 
 human life, on the other hand, in democratic forms 
 of government, the will-to-peace is a command of the 
 people — that is to say, a necessary element of the State 
 itself. 
 
 No philosopher ever made a more absurd remark 
 than Hegel when he said : 'The people is that portion 
 of the State that does not know what it wants !" All 
 history from the time when it first began to be written 
 recounts the continuous conflict between people and 
 dynasty. The existence of this conflict is a proof of 
 the fact that peoples do, in fact, always know exactly 
 what they want. I think that I have in this work, by 
 a few examples, proved beyond contradiction that this 
 was particularly the case in Prusso-Germany during 
 the last century. We Germans (whatever the Chau- 
 vinists across the Vosges and across the Channel may 
 say to the contrary) are a nation like any other; we 
 are subject to the same historical laws and necessities, 
 we have the same ideals of humanity, and we are 
 fighting against the same obstacles to true progress 
 as other nations. 
 
 The people, each and every people, has always and 
 everywhere a will. It may cry "Hurrah !'' and applaud 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 317 
 
 military parades and the pomp of the head of the 
 State, and this in the age of universal military service 
 and of a settled code of law and morals, but it will 
 never support a war of conquest. If it is ready, 
 unanimously and resolutely, to protect its country, the 
 home of its ancestors, and the treasures of its culture 
 until the last drop of blood, yet it will never for the 
 sake of a world-policy plunge into adventures and 
 contend for spheres of influence in Further India or 
 for railways in Patagonia. The question is to discover 
 a form of government in which conquest can no 
 longer be represented as an act of self-defence and 
 the violation of solemn treaties as necessary for the 
 safety of the country. 
 
 This form of government is democracy. 
 
 The will of all peoples to defend their fatherland 
 and to reject every idea of conquest is universal. It 
 is the same from Lisbon to Yokohama, from Mel- 
 bourne to Stockholm. Let us, therefore, in full con- 
 fidence commit the peace of Europe to the sovereignty 
 of the popular will. It alone can be the basis of the 
 era of true and peaceful culture now dawning in 
 Europe. 
 
 That a German at the beginning of this twentieth 
 century had to write this book (yes: had to!), and 
 that his mode of thought should appear so terribly 
 revolutionary, is certainly no proof of the pre-eminence 
 of German culture. For what does this book contain? 
 It contains a description of conditions that existed in 
 England and France 150 years ago. It contains a 
 demand for reforms which in all the civilised coun- 
 tries of the world have for decades past appeared to 
 
3i8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 the dullest peasant an understood thing. In fact, what 
 I here demand for Germany has been possessed by 
 the English, French, Americans, and Swiss for the 
 past 150 years, by the Italians, Swedes, Norwegians, 
 Danes, Dutch, Serbs, Bulgarians, Roumanians, Greeks, 
 etc., etc., for some decades, and by the Chinese since 
 quite recently. Only think of it! The Chinese! 
 
 The storm-wind of history will and must finally 
 bring political emancipation to Germany also. The 
 romanticism of the revolutionary periods of 1789 and 
 1848; the period of "storm and stress"; the categori- 
 cal imperative of self -emancipation; these will and 
 must be the fruits of this World War for Germany. 
 
 Right, Right, and again Right : that is the founda- 
 tion of a humanity ready for peaceful culture. Who- 
 ever says "Right" says equality; the divine, traditional, 
 and mystic special prerogatives of dynasties. States, 
 and castes are mockeries of Right. 
 
 Divine right in the sense of pomp, parade, phrase, 
 and fiction? As much as you like, if you cannot exist 
 without images of saints, incense, and ermine. But 
 divine right as the supreme and guiding principle of 
 European politics? Divine right in the sense of a 
 right of possession over the individual members, the 
 fate, the will, and the destiny of the nations, and the 
 right to decide concerning war and peace ? A million 
 fists would clench and threaten the slavish souls who, 
 after the catastrophe of these days, would still answer 
 yes! 
 
 No half-measures, no lamentations, no cowardly 
 compromise, no subtleties, no putting off till later! 
 That would be treachery to our fallen brothers. No ! 
 [All the high things must be brought low, all the 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 319 
 
 earthly divinities be swept away, all exceptions ban- 
 ished and all special prerogatives abolished root and 
 branch, and for all time! The earth for human be- 
 ings, the heavens for the gods! Thus and only thus 
 will the hunger of the nations for justice and peace 
 at last be appeased. Only in this way will humanity 
 be able to justify this massacre of millions before the 
 tribunal of history. 
 
 And, therefore, Germany has to begin to-day where 
 the English, French, Americans, Swiss, etc., began 
 250 and 125 years ago, and where the German classi- 
 cists and champions of liberty broke down helplessly. 
 
 That is in truth the great lesson which the World 
 War imperatively demands that we should learn to-day. 
 
 We have not been called barbarians, Boches, and 
 Huns because our soldiers in Belgium and elsewhere 
 are alleged to have wrought such devastation as did 
 Attila's hordes. No; our political serfdom, our appar- 
 ently servile adherence to mediaeval theories of the 
 State, our barbarous religion of the sanctity and beauty 
 of wars, our eminently un-German reliance upon 
 discipline by force and our emphatic reiteration that 
 *^Might overrules Right'' — all this together with the 
 ferocious scholarship and the servility of our Privy 
 Councillors of the Ostwald stamp, has won for us the 
 name of "barbarians" ! A great, vigorous, and highly 
 gifted people like ours can only play its true part in 
 the world when it is its own master and proudly shapes 
 its own destinies. But if, as was the case with us, it 
 entrusts the public weal both at home and abroad to a 
 handful of soldiers and learned mandarins, then it will 
 be diverted from its true path, and will become a dan- 
 ger to the world and an offence against civilisation. 
 
320 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 
 
 If Bismarck was not Germany's blunder, then he 
 was Germany's fate. In these days, no fatherland can 
 be cemented by "blood and iron." Blood and iron 
 can only be renewed and maintained by yet more blood 
 and iron. Bismarck was our glory and our fate. 
 
 Away from Bismarck! that is the lesson of this 
 iWorld War for Germany. Justice and liberty, not blood 
 and iron, are the cement of modem fatherlands. 
 
 Let us take up again the threads of classic Ger- 
 manism. Let us remember our intellectual heroes 
 of the age of Schiller and Goethe, of our democratic 
 national poets of the 'forties of last century. Only 
 with their help, and only in their spirit, can the Ger- 
 man problem be finally solved to the blessing of 
 Germany and the world. 
 
 Let us break with the development of the last 
 century. The World War signifies the collapse of a 
 system and a spirit of culture that were thoroughly 
 un-German, that is, thoroughly Prussian. Let us 
 join hands with the other civilised nations of the 
 world as peaceable, equally privileged, and equally 
 efficient labourers in the field of culture. Let us 
 begin by creating that quite new, quite free, quite 
 democratic culture the direction of which was indi- 
 cated to us by Herder and Kant, by Lessing and 
 Humboldt, by Goethe and Schiller. No longer 
 "Deutschland iiber alles," but Germany with and by 
 the side of all. Only so shall we be able to fulfil 
 our true mission in the world. 
 
 Onward! . . to Democracy. 
 
 Democracy, in the world as it is to-day, is the only 
 possible, the only desirable basis of any genuine cul- 
 
ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 321 
 
 ture. It is only this mother that is able to bear all 
 the beautiful, promising children of whom we Ger- 
 mans spoke all too soon: socialism, a true law of 
 nations, intellectual liberty, and, possibly, complete 
 disarmament. Without democracy these things will 
 continue to be what they have been hitherto: carica- 
 tures and abortions. 
 
 Onward! . . to Democracy. 
 
 Democracy is the only possible, only enduring 
 basis of the future peace of nations. A peace con- 
 cluded without a realisation of Kant's fundamental 
 demand would be only patchwork and self-deception. 
 
 Onward! . . to Democracy. 
 
 This will and must to-morrow be the battle-cry of 
 Europe in general, and of Germany in particular. 
 
 Away from Bismarck! Germany for the Germans. 
 
 Let that be the fruit of this terrible World War for 
 Germany. 
 
THE MOST HUMAN BOOK OF THIS MOST 
 INHUMAN WAR 
 
 In the Claws of the 
 German Eagle 
 
 BY 
 
 ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS 
 
 Special War Correspondent for The Outlook 
 
 Some winced and cried aloud, others 
 turned white with terror, still others 
 laughed defiant to the end. Caught in the 
 Claws, the author shared with these fellow 
 prisoners the torments of trial as a spy by 
 the German Military Coiirt in Brussels. 
 
 Humor brightens the book where is de- 
 scribed the faking of war photographs, 
 and eternal romance lifts you above the 
 red reek in the tale of the American girl 
 the author aided in her search for her 
 officer lover. 
 
 Net $1.50 
 
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 681 Fifth Avenue New York City 
 
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PASSED BY THE 
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 BY 
 
 WYTHE WILLIAMS 
 
 of the New York Times 
 
 Paris in War-time; the Trials of the 
 U.S. Embassy ; the Fighting on the French 
 Front; the Soul and Organization of re- 
 generated France; as seen by the Paris 
 Correspondent of the New York Times, 
 who was officially accredited to the French 
 Armies on the Western Front, and was 
 three times on the actual fighting front, 
 as well as in a French military prison for 
 trying to get there before he received a 
 pass. 
 
 Here is the real story of those early days 
 of the war ; those days of confusion, of con- 
 flicting rumor, and of fear; when the Ger- 
 man hordes swept down on the Paris they 
 had doomed. 
 
 Net $1.50 
 
 E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
 681 Fifth Avenue New York City 
 
 (6) 
 
The 
 
 German Republic 
 
 BY 
 
 WALTER WELLMAN 
 
 How is the Great War to end? 
 
 What is to come after the war? 
 
 What is the "Irresistible Force now 
 shaping the thoughts of the German peo- 
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 Here is a book that offers a sane and 
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 It is a book of vision, a book of creative 
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 sure to influence the minds and imagina- 
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 Net $i.oo 
 
 E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
 68 1 Fifth Avenue New York City 
 
 (7) 
 
A 
 
 Student in Arms 
 
 BY 
 
 DONALD HANKEY 
 
 Published originally in the columns of 
 the London Spectator, these short articles, 
 sketches, and essays, written by a man in 
 the trenches, form a "war-book" of quite 
 unusual kind, dealing with the deeper 
 things of himian life. 
 
 The high spiritual idealism which act- 
 uates so many thousands in the ranks of 
 the Allies finds a voice in it, and the men- 
 tal attitude of the fighting-men towards 
 religion, the Church, their officers and their 
 comrades, is exhibited not only with san- 
 ity and sympathy, but with a fine simplic- 
 ity of language and an inspiring nobility 
 of outlook. 
 
 Twenty-four thousand copies of this book 
 
 were sold in the first month of 
 
 its publication in England 
 
 Net $1.50 
 
 E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
 681 Fifth Avenue New York City 
 
 (8) 
 
N 302 85 
 

 
 
 
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