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LINCOLN 
 
 AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS V. GREENE, U. S. V. 
 
 'J 
 
 [From SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE, July, iqog— Copyright, icpq, by Charles Scribner's Sons\ 
 

 ff^ith thf CnwpUments of the Auth 
 
 oor 
 
^ 
 
 LINCOLN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
 
 By Major-General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V. 
 
 MONG the manifold duties 
 devolving upon Lincoln dur- 
 ing the four years of his Pres- 
 idency none exceeded in im- 
 portance the exercise of his 
 constitutional functions as 
 
 campaign. Lincoln was elected captain, 
 by a large majority, because he had "the 
 necessary muscles and fighting pluck to 
 whip any rough in his company." He 
 maintained discipline by his strong right 
 arm, and any man who could down him 
 in a fair and square fight with his fists 
 
 Commander-in-Chief of the army ; for mani- 
 festly upon the success of the armed forces was welcome to the captaincy. But none 
 in the field depended the issue of the mo- could. Among the many contrasts in 
 mentous political questions at stake. It is Lincoln's career perhaps none is more 
 the purpose of this article to examine the striking than that between his position as 
 manner in which Lincoln performed these a captain and private in the motley col- 
 military functions, and to venture an opin- lection of rough frontiersmen with whom 
 ion upon it; partly from the technical he served in 1832, and his position as 
 
 military stand-point, and partly from the 
 larger, wider stand-point of political ex- 
 pediency; and to support this opinion by 
 Lincoln's own words, penned by his own 
 hand, and showing in a most interesting 
 manner the working of his brain. 
 
 For various reasons it was not necessary 
 for him to devote personal attention to the 
 details of the other departments; but the 
 operations of the army were in Lincoln's 
 thoughts every waking hour for 1502 long 
 
 Commander-in-Chief of nearly 1,000,000 
 veteran soldiers in 1864. 
 
 He had been President less than twenty- 
 four hours when, on the morning of March 
 5, he learned the precarious situation at 
 Fort Sumter, then not publicly known. 
 He at once called on General Scott for re- 
 ports and advice, and on March 12 Scott 
 stated in writing: "It is, therefore, my 
 opinion and advice that Major Anderson 
 be instructed to evacuate the fort . . . and 
 
 days. Scarcely a day passed that he did embark with his command for New York. 
 
 not visit the War Department or the houses 
 of McClellan or Halleck; and hardly, if 
 ever, a day that Stanton or Halleck did not 
 visit the White House. The responsibility 
 of military success or failure was on Lincoln, 
 and he knew it. There were the Secretary 
 
 Scott had served with distinction in the 
 War of 181 2, had conducted a brilHant 
 campaign resulting in the capture of the 
 City of Mexico, was now the senior officer 
 in the army, and the highest military 
 authority in the land. Lincoln instantly 
 
 of War, the General-in-Chief, the generals and wisely overruled him. For various 
 
 in the field, the Committee on the Conduct 
 of the War, with virile men like Ben W^ade 
 and Zach Chandler as members, but the 
 final arbiter was Lincoln. 
 
 How, then, did he perform the duties of 
 his military leadership, wisely or unwisely ? 
 Was his military judgment sound or de- 
 fective ? Let the facts, and his own words, 
 speak for themselves. 
 
 Little need be said of his brief service in 
 the Black Hawk War of 1832, when, at the 
 age of twenty-three, he served first as cap- 
 tain of a company of mounted volunteers, 
 and afterward, when this company was 
 disbanded, as a private in Captain Iles's 
 company until the close of the war. It was 
 a hunting expedition rather than a military 
 
 reasons, stated in his message to Congress 
 of July 14, "this could not be allowed." 
 Lincoln's orders were exactly the opposite, 
 to organize an expedition for the relief of 
 Fort Sumter; and no one worked more 
 loyally to carry them out than General 
 Scott. A few days later it was a question 
 of Fort Pickens in Florida. Scott recom- 
 mended that it be evacuated. Lincoln 
 sought other advice, reached his decision 
 that Fort Pickens should be re-enforced, 
 and sent this order to Scott on Sunday, 
 March 31: "Tell him that I wish this 
 thing done, and not to let it fail unless he can 
 show that I have refused him something he 
 asked for as necessary." Scott, on receiv- 
 ing the order, said in his sententious man- 
 By tr?r>«5fer 
 
 The Wh.-.e Ho--e 
 
 March Srd, i^l3 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 ner, "Sir, the great Frederick used to say, 
 'When the King commands, all things are 
 possible.' It shall be done." It was done; 
 and this fort never passed out of possession 
 of the United States. The expedition to 
 Fort Sumter failed, but through no fault of 
 Lincoln. 
 
 In the Bull Run campaign Lincoln again 
 exercised his full authority. On June 29 
 he received Scott's report, considered it, 
 consulted with his cabinet, and made his 
 decision. Scott advised that no forward 
 movement be made until autumn and that 
 the advance be then made down the Mis- 
 sissippi. Lincoln overruled him and di- 
 rected that an advance be made immedi- 
 ately in Virginia. Scott, always the loyal 
 subordinate, then submitted, with his ap- 
 proval, the plan which McDowell had 
 prepared, and Lincoln ordered it to be 
 carried out. We have General Sherman's 
 word for it that "it was one of the best 
 planned battles of the war, but one of the 
 worst fought." 
 
 During the days which followed the dis- 
 aster Lincoln gave his entire thought to the 
 military problem. Scott and McClellan 
 had both submitted large plans of cam- 
 paigns, beginning on the Potomac or the 
 Ohio and terminating on the Gulf of Mex- 
 ico, but they were crude and undigested, 
 and apparently made little impression on 
 Lincoln's mind. By concentrated study and 
 apparently with but little assistance from 
 his technical advisers, he evolved these 
 ideas and wrote them out in his own hand. 
 
 "JULY 23, 1861 
 
 "i. Let the plan for making the block- 
 ade effective be pushed forward with all 
 possible despatch. 
 
 "2. Let the volunteer forces at Fort 
 Monroe and vicinity, under General 
 Butler, be constantly drilled, disciplined, 
 and instructed without more for the 
 present. 
 
 "3. Let Baltimore be held, as now, with 
 a gentle but firm and certain hand. 
 
 "4. Let the force now under Patterson 
 or Banks be strengthened and made secure 
 in its position. 
 
 "5. Let the forces in western Virginia 
 act till further orders, according to instruc- 
 tions or orders from General McClellan. 
 
 "6. General Fremont push forward his 
 
 organization and operations in the West as 
 rapidly as possible, giving special attention 
 to Missouri. 
 
 "7. Let the forces late before Manassas, 
 except the three months' men, be reorgan- 
 ized as rapidly as possible in their camps 
 here and about Arlington. 
 
 "8. Let the three months' forces who 
 decline to enter the longer service be dis- 
 charged as rapidly as circumstances will 
 permit. 
 
 "9. Let the new volunteer forces be 
 brought forward as fast as possible; and 
 especially into the camps on the two sides 
 of the river here. 
 
 "JULY 27, 1861 
 
 "When the foregoing shall have been 
 substantially attended to: 
 
 "i. Let Manassas Junction (or some 
 point on one or other of the railroads near 
 it) and Strasburg be seized, and perma- 
 nently held, with an open line from Wash- 
 ington to Manassas, and an open line from 
 Harper's Ferry to Strasburg — the military 
 men to find the way of doing these. 
 
 "2. This done, a joint movement from 
 Cairo on Memphis; and from Cincinnati 
 to east Tennessee." 
 
 No professional soldier or writer could 
 state more precisely the military situation 
 then existing or propose a sounder military 
 plan. Lincoln had that faculty of intense 
 application and clear insight, so rare that 
 we call it genius; and he applied it as suc- 
 cessfully to military affairs as to politics, 
 notwithstanding the fact that he was, by 
 instinct, a man of peace, and by training 
 a lawyer, and that military problems never 
 engaged his attention until he was fifty- 
 two years old. 
 
 His memorandum of July 23 and 27, 
 1 86 1, was the first definite and coherent 
 plan for the prosecution of the war. It 
 emanated from his own mind and not 
 from that of any of his generals. The in- 
 strumentality necessary to carry it into 
 effect — an organized, disciplined army with 
 competent commanding officers — did not 
 then exist. Both the army and the com- 
 manders had to be evolved as the war 
 progressed. The plan was interrupted and 
 delayed, now by McClellan's unsuccessful 
 movement by the Peninsula, now by the 
 incapacity of Halleck on the Tennessee, 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 and Pope in Virginia in 1862, and again 
 in 1862 and 1863 by inability to find the 
 competent man to command the Army of 
 the Potomac and by the brilUant cam- 
 paigns of Lee and his great lieutenant 
 Jackson. But Lincoln never swerved from 
 his memorandum of July 27, 1861. He 
 yielded his own judgment at times to that 
 of professional soldiers. But finally he 
 found in Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan 
 the long-sought military commanders, com- 
 petent for their tasks; and then so much 
 of his plan as remained unexecuted was 
 carried into effect. 
 
 Immediately after Bull Run McClellan 
 was placed in command of the Army of the 
 Potomac, Scott remaining as general-in- 
 chief until October when he retired and 
 McClellan succeeded him in that office. 
 For the next year, until McClellan was 
 finally relieved of all active military duty, 
 there was an incessant exchange of views 
 between Lincoln and McClellan in the 
 form of personal interviews, letters, orders, 
 and reports. On August 4 McClellan 
 submitted his report calling for a main 
 army of 275,000 men under his own com- 
 mand. In this he says: "I propose, with 
 the force which I have requested, not only 
 to drive the enemy out of Virginia and 
 occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charles- 
 ton, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, 
 Mobile, and New Orleans; in other words, 
 to move into the heart of the enemy's 
 country and crush the rebellion in its very 
 heart." To Lincoln's more practical mind 
 the thing to do was to attack and defeat 
 the Confederate Army, facing them about 
 twenty miles from Washington. Troops 
 were coming forward at the rate of a regi- 
 ment a day, and Lincoln argued that we 
 had the greater number of men and that 
 the enemy was at least no better organized, 
 equipped, and drilled than we were. 
 McClellan argued that the enemy had su- 
 perior numbers (a complete error, as the 
 records now plainly show) and that no 
 movement could be made until his army 
 was more fully (ever more fully) equipped. 
 Autumn and early winter passed and Lin- 
 coln could get nothing done. He hesitated 
 to impose his own views upon professional 
 soldiers, but finally he made his decision, 
 and on January 27 issued a formal and 
 peremptory order that "the 2 2d day of 
 February, 1862, be the day for a general 
 
 forward movement of the land and naval 
 forces of the United States against the in- 
 surgent forces; . . . that especially . . . 
 the Army of the Potomac be ready to move 
 on that day. ..." A few days later 
 he followed this with a specific order to 
 McClellan to seize and occupy a point 
 on the railroad near Manassas Junction; 
 which, of course, involved an attack on 
 Johnston's army. The official records 
 show that the Army of the Potomac num- 
 bered on December 31, 1861, 183,207 offi- 
 cers and men ^^ present for duty,'' and that 
 on the same day Johnston's aggregate pres- 
 ent was 63,409; and that about the time 
 that Lincoln issued his order Johnston 
 was called to Richmond and instructed to 
 withdraw his army from Manassas. 
 
 But McClellan instead of obeying the 
 order asked for its suspension, and for 
 further argument; and in the course of 
 the argument Lincoln wrote this letter 
 to McClellan on February 3, "You and 
 I have distinct and different plans for a 
 movement of the Army of the Potomac — 
 yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the 
 Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land 
 to the terminus of the railroad on the York 
 River; mine to move directly to a point on 
 the railroads south-west of Manassas." 
 McClellan replied on the same day in a 
 letter of nearly four thousand words. It 
 made no direct answer to Lincoln's ques- 
 tions, but it contained these two sentences 
 — "It is by no means certain that we 
 can beat them at Manassas. On the other 
 line, I regard success as certain by all the 
 chances of war." Lincoln was not con- 
 vinced, but he had no general of proved 
 capacity to put in McClellan's place and he 
 hesitated to impose arbitrarily on McClel- 
 lan a plan which McClellan so obstinately 
 opposed . The result was the disastrous Pen- 
 insular campaign. 
 
 Only a brief reference need be made 
 to McClellan's insubordinate despatch of 
 June 28, 1862, when, in the midst of de- 
 feats, he said to Stanton, "the Government 
 has not sustained this army. ... I owe no 
 thanks to you or to any other persons in 
 Washington. You have done your best to 
 sacrifice this army." 
 
 It would have been well for the discipline 
 of every man then in uniform, high and low, 
 and would probably have saved many a 
 life and shortened the war, if Lincoln had 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 instantly telegraphed back placing McClel- 
 lan in close arrest and assigning any one 
 of his corps commanders to command the 
 army. But that was not Lincoln's way. 
 Instant decision was not his habit. His 
 mental processes were slow — though sure. 
 And thought of personal insult never in- 
 fluenced him. On one occasion he went 
 to McClellan's house and waited several 
 hours to see him, only to have McClellan 
 come in and go to bed without seeing the 
 President at all. On another occasion, 
 when AlcClellan failed to keep an ap- 
 pointment at the White House, and the 
 others, who had come, expressed their im- 
 patience at McClellan's delay, Lincoln 
 only remarked: "Never mind; I will hold 
 McClellan's horse, if he will only bring us 
 success." 
 
 Such patience, such tolerance, such sac- 
 rifice of self to anything that will help 
 accomplish a supremely important result 
 are the marks of a great soul, but not of 
 a great soldier. His military perceptions 
 were more accurate than those of any of 
 his generals in independent command, ex- 
 cept Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and pos- 
 sibly Thomas. But his self-effacement, 
 his diffidence, his doubt whether the coun- 
 try would sustain him, if he peremptorily 
 asserted his opinions against those of his 
 professional military subordinates, left the 
 army with two heads or three heads or no 
 head at all until the really efficient man 
 was found in Grant. From this confusion 
 and lack of unity of command came the in- 
 decisive, inconclusive movements and bat- 
 tles of the Army of the Potomac during the 
 interval between McClellan's defeats on 
 the Peninsula in 1862 and Grant's victories 
 in the Wilderness in 1864. 
 
 In the effort to find a man equal to the 
 task of commanding the Eastern Army and 
 of coping with Lee and Jackson, Lincoln 
 brought from the West two generals who 
 had had some measure of success there; 
 and in July, 1862, Halleck was assigned 
 as general-in-chief, in Washington, and 
 Pope to command the Army of Virginia. 
 Neither succeeded. Halleck was never 
 more than an indifferent chief of staff to 
 Lincoln, disliked and distrusted by all the 
 generals in the field, and incapable of 
 evolving and carrying on a definite plan 
 of campaign. Pope was speedily driven 
 back to Washington by the direct road and 
 
 there met McClellan's army arriving from 
 the Peninsula. Lincoln again turned to 
 McClellan, who, in less than three weeks of 
 September, 1862, brought Lee's invasion 
 to a halt and fought a desperate battle with 
 him at Antietam — the most valuable and 
 effective eighteen days of McClellan's en- 
 tire service. But then McClellan stopped, 
 and Lincoln began again the weary argu- 
 ment in favor of attack. After a personal 
 visit to the army at the beginning of Octo- 
 ber, six weeks after the battle, he sent 
 through Halleck a peremptory order to 
 attack Lee, and as this produced no effect, 
 Lincoln wrote McClellan a letter on Octo- 
 ber 13 which shows a marvellously accurate 
 comprehension of the military situation at 
 that time. 
 
 "Are you not overcautious when you 
 assume that you cannot do what the en- 
 emy is constantly doing ? Should you not 
 claim to be at least his equal in prowess, 
 and act upon the claim ? As I understand, 
 you telegraphed General Halleck that you 
 cannot subsist your army at Winchester 
 unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to 
 that point be put in working order. But 
 the enemy does now subsist his army at 
 Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as 
 great as you would have to do without the 
 railroad last named. He now wagons from 
 Culpeper Court House, which is just about 
 twice as far as you would have to do from 
 Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more 
 than half as well provided with wagons as 
 you are. . . . Again, one of the standard 
 maxims of war, as you know, is to ' operate 
 upon the enemy's communications with- 
 out exposing your own.' You seem to act 
 as if this applies against you, but cannot 
 apply it in your favor. Change positions 
 with the enemy, and think you not he would 
 break your communication with Richmond 
 in twenty-four hours? . . . You are now 
 nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the 
 route you can and he must take. Why can 
 you not reach there before him, unless you 
 admit that he is more than your equal on a 
 march? His route is the arc of a circle, 
 while yours is the chord. The roads are as 
 good on yours as on his. ... If he should 
 move northward, I would follow him closely, 
 holding his communications. If he should 
 prevent our seizing his communications and 
 move toward Richmond, I would press 
 closely to him, fight him, if a favorable 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 opportunity should present, and at least 
 try to beat him to Richmond on the inside 
 track. I say 'Try'; if we never try, we 
 shall never succeed. ... If we cannot 
 beat him when he bears the wastage of 
 coming to us, we never can when we bear 
 the wastage of going to him. ... As we 
 must beat him somewhere or fail finally, 
 we can do it, if at all, easier near to us 
 than far away. ... It is all easy if our 
 troops march as well as the enemy, and 
 it is unmanly to say that they cannot do 
 it." Unfortunately, the letter concludes 
 with the sentence, "This letter is in no 
 sense an order." 
 
 As in July, 1861, so now again in Octo- 
 ber, 1862, Lincoln thus elucidated the mili- 
 tary principles applicable to the situation as 
 it then existed in Virginia. Fifty-six days 
 had elapsed since the battle of Antietam. 
 It was, however, thirteen days longer be- 
 fore McClellan began to cross the Potomac 
 and five days additional before he finished 
 crossing. Lincoln then decided that "if 
 McClellan should permit Lee to cross the 
 Blue Ridge and place himself between 
 Richmond and the Army of the Potomac 
 he would remove him from command." It 
 was a fair test of McClellan's generalship 
 as compared with Lee's. Within four da}'s 
 after McClellan crossed the Potomac, Lee 
 had come through the passes of the Blue 
 Ridge and planted himself squarely in 
 McClellan's path at Culpeper. McClellan 
 was forthwith removed. 
 
 In his intercourse with McClellan be- 
 tween July, 1 86 1, and November, 1862, 
 Lincoln constantly exhibited weakness in 
 allowing McClellan to write him insubor- 
 dinate letters, and in allowing him to act 
 on plans which Lincoln did not approve, 
 and in allowing him to remain inactive 
 when every consideration, military as well 
 as political, required vigorous action — 
 such action as was shown by Grant and 
 Sherman and Sheridan whenever they were 
 in independent command. Whether such 
 weakness on Lincoln's part was justifiable 
 or otherwise is a large question, quite apart 
 from the purpose of this article, which is to 
 show the accuracy of Lincoln's judgment 
 on purely military questions. 
 
 During the short and disastrous period 
 of Burnside's command of the Army of the 
 Potomac, Lincoln exercised a less active 
 control. Burnside's plans did not impress 
 
 him favorably, but he seemed to desire to 
 give Burnside a chance to prove his ca- 
 pacity. When he proved the opposite Lin- 
 coln relieved him. He chose for his suc- 
 cessor the man who had most bitterly criti- 
 cised Burnside — Hooker — and he wrote 
 Hooker a memorable letter, censuring him 
 for his criticisms of Burnside, expressing 
 confidence in his skill, and assuring him of 
 his support. On the nth of April Hooker 
 submitted his plan. Lincoln's comment 
 was as follows, "My opinion is that, just 
 now, with the enemy directly ahead of us 
 there is no eligible route for us into Rich- 
 mond; and consequently a question of 
 preference between the Rappahannock 
 route and the James River route is a con- 
 test about nothing. Hence our prime ob- 
 ject is the enemy's army in front of us, and 
 is not with or about Richmond at all, un- 
 less it be incidental to the main object." 
 He advised against "attacking him in his 
 intrenchments," but preferred to "harass 
 and menace him" so that he could "have 
 no leisure nor safety in sending away de- 
 tachments"; but "if he weakens himself, 
 then pitch into him." 
 
 Hooker's plan for Chancellorsville was 
 a good one, and up to a certain point 
 well executed. Then Hooker failed. Had 
 Jackson or Sheridan had the execution 
 of it, it would probably have resulted in 
 a brilliant success. Before Hooker could 
 make plans for another offensive move- 
 ment Lee took the offensive, in the Get- 
 tysburg campaign. Hooker proposed to 
 attack his rear, first at Fredericksburg and 
 later at Harper's Ferry. Lincoln disap- 
 proved both; the first in his oft-quoted 
 letter in which he expressed a well-known 
 military maxim — against having an army 
 divided by a non-fordable river — by his 
 quaint illustration of "an ox jumped half- 
 way over a fence and liable to be torn by 
 dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance 
 to gore one way or kick another." In the 
 interval Hooker proposed to march to 
 Richmond, which Lee's movement to the 
 Shenandoah Valley had left unguarded. 
 Tempting as this was, Lincoln's clear in- 
 sight discarded it and he answered, June 
 10, "I think Lee's army, and not Rich- 
 mond, is your sure objective point . . . 
 follow on his flank and on his inside track, 
 shortening your lines while he lengthens his; 
 fight him, too, when opportunity offers." 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 Hooker followed these instructions, and on 
 the 27th of June approached the passes of 
 South Mountain, intending to attack Lee's 
 rear, in the vicinity of the ground where 
 McClellan had fought the battle of Antie- 
 tam the previous year. He telegraphed 
 Halleck asking that the troops which gar- 
 risoned Harper's Ferry, about 10,000 men, 
 be placed under his orders. Halleck re- 
 fused consent, and Hooker immediately 
 asked to be relieved. Meade was assigned 
 to command the Army of the Potomac in 
 his place. 
 
 In the telegram assigning Meade to 
 command, Halleck said, "Harper's Ferry 
 and its garrison are under your direct or- 
 ders," thus giving Meade 10,000 men 
 which the day before he had refused to give 
 to Hooker. Meade was so surprised that 
 he at once telegraphed Halleck, "Am I 
 permitted to withdraw a portion of the 
 garrison of Harper's Ferry?" and within 
 three hours received the reply, "The gar- 
 rison at Harper's Ferry is under your or- 
 ders." Meade forthwith ordered its with- 
 drawal. 
 
 In this strange circumstance it does not 
 appear that Lincoln had any part, though 
 it is doubtful if Halleck acted without pro- 
 tecting himself by the President's approval 
 — perhaps obtained without full explana- 
 tion. That it is impossible for an army to 
 be successfully commanded in such man- 
 ner does not admit of doubt. Lincoln was 
 one day issuing orders through Halleck 
 and the next day writing letters direct to 
 Hooker, who in turn addressed his replies 
 to the President. Hooker believed that 
 Halleck deliberately intended to destroy 
 his military reputation; and Halleck said 
 that Hooker ignored him and that all he 
 knew about the Army of the Potomac was 
 what he could learn from the President. 
 Lincoln, considered as a military man, is 
 least satisfactory from the stand-point of 
 discipline. Theoretically he understood 
 its value, but practically he did not apply 
 it, particularly in the higher ranks. If he 
 could have given his whole mind to the 
 military problem, either in the field or at 
 Washington, studied it until he mastered 
 it as he mastered every problem to which 
 he gave his undivided attention, and issued 
 positive instructions in order to give effect 
 to his opinions, he would have made short 
 work of such relations as existed between 
 
 Halleck and Hooker, or of such inaction 
 as followed after Antietam and after Get- 
 tysburg. But he had always other prob- 
 lems on hand in addition to the military 
 problem, and at this particular time, in 
 midsummer of 1863, his mind was filled 
 with two subjects of transcendent import- 
 ance. One of them was the Emancipation 
 Proclamation, which, resolved on as a 
 thank offering for Antietam, had been 
 issued September 22, 1862, confirmed Jan- 
 uary I, 1863, and now was just taking full 
 effect. Would the country sustain him? 
 It seems hard to realize now that in 1863 
 the people of the North were so evenly 
 divided on that question. The other sub- 
 ject was the resistance to the draft (author- 
 ized by the law of March 3, 1863), already 
 ominous and soon to take the form of hor- 
 rible riots in New York. Well might his 
 tired brain refuse to penetrate the essential 
 features of the military situation, when the 
 highest political questions — his very own 
 problems — absorbed the last drop of its 
 energy. 
 
 Whatever the cause, it is noticeable that 
 from the time Lincoln ordered the removal 
 of McClellan in November, 1862, until 
 just after the battle of Gettysburg in July, 
 1863, Lincoln gave no positive orders. 
 He corresponded with the generals, dis- 
 cussed military questions with them, and 
 gave his opinions freely, but always quali- 
 fied them with some such remark as, "This 
 is a suggestion, not an order," "I suggest 
 this plan, incompetent as I may be," "I 
 leave this to the military men," and so 
 on. Just after Gettysburg he believed that 
 Lee's army could be practically destroyed 
 before it crossed the Potomac, and he 
 caused the most vigorous orders to be sent 
 to Meade. Had Lincoln written these 
 orders himself, in his own clear and vigor- 
 ous style, quite possibly they would have 
 spurred Meade to such exertions as would 
 have caused the desired result — although 
 Meade was hardly cast in heroic mould. 
 But interpreted through Halleck they have 
 a bombastic, hysterical sound which per- 
 haps caused Meade to pay so little at- 
 tention to them. July 7, "Push forward 
 and fight Lee before he can cross the Po- 
 tomac." July 8, "My only fear now is 
 that the enemy may escape by crossing the 
 river." July 9, "Do not be influenced by 
 any despatch from here against your judg- 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 ment. Regard them as suggestions only." 
 July lo, "I think it will be best for you to 
 postpone a general battle until you can 
 concentrate your forces." July lo, "Be- 
 ware of partial combats. Bring up and 
 hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good 
 and bad." July 13, "Act upon your own 
 judgment and make your generals execute 
 your orders. Call no council of war. It is 
 proverbial that councils of war never 
 fight." July 14, "I need hardly say to you 
 that the escape of Lee's army without an- 
 other battle has caused great dissatisfac- 
 tion in the mind of the President." 
 
 When Meade received the telegram of 
 July 14 he promptly asked to be relieved 
 of the command; this was declined and 
 a telegram sent to Meade expressing thanks 
 for what he had done, and using the word 
 "disappointment," in place of "dissatis- 
 faction," to express the President's feeling 
 in regard to the escape of Lee's army. 
 
 Lincoln was indeed grievously disap- 
 pointed; yet it must be acknowledged that 
 the course he had pursued during the pre- 
 vious six months had not been such as to 
 breed commanders in the Army of the Po- 
 tomac fit to cope with Robert E. Lee. To 
 have a nominal general-in-chief and yet 
 to carry on a correspondence with his sub- 
 ordinates without his knowledge; to require 
 the general in the field to submit his plans 
 and then to send a reply expressing ap- 
 proval or disapproval of it, but ending with 
 the remark — repeated so often as to be- 
 come almost a formula — "this is a sugges- 
 tion only, not an order" — this is not the 
 way in which military operations are suc- 
 cessfully conducted. 
 
 In the West Lincoln had practically the 
 same difficulties on military questions as 
 in the East. He first assigned Fremont 
 to command at St. Louis and McClellan at 
 Cincinnati; but Fremont soon showed in- 
 subordination and a desire to settle the 
 slavery question on his own account, and 
 was superseded by Halleck; and when 
 McClellan was brought to Washington, 
 Buell took his place. Lincoln had clear, 
 definite plans in his mind, as shown by his 
 memorandum of July 27, "a joint move- 
 ment from Cairo on Memphis and from 
 Cincinnati on east Tennessee." There 
 were good military reasons in support of 
 both, for one would cut the Confederacy 
 
 in two along the line of the Mississippi, and 
 the other would break the railroad commu- 
 nications of the Confederates between 
 Chattanooga and Virginia. There were, 
 moreover, political considerations of an im- 
 perative character in favor of supporting 
 the Unionists of east Tennessee and pos- 
 sibly saving that State and Kentucky and 
 the western part of Virginia for the Union. 
 The autumn passed with nothing done, 
 and on January i, 1862, Lincoln sent tele- 
 grams and letters to Halleck and to Buell 
 asking that they act in concert, Halleck 
 against Columbus, on the Mississippi, and 
 Buell against Cumberland Gap in east 
 Tennessee. Halleck replied, stating that 
 "it would be madness to attempt anything 
 serious" with the force at his command, 
 and that the President's plan was based on 
 a "strategic error." On receiving this, 
 Lincoln wrote on the back of it this melan- 
 choly endorsement, "It is exceedingly dis- 
 couraging. As everywhere, nothing can be 
 done." On January 4 Lincoln again tele- 
 graphed Buell about east Tennessee, 
 "Please tell me the progress and condition 
 of the movement in that direction. An- 
 swer." Buell replied, "I hope to inaugu- 
 rate it soon. . . . While my preparations 
 have had this movement constantly in view 
 o . , my judgment has from the first been 
 decidedly against it." To which, on Jan- 
 uary 6, Lincoln answered : ' ' Your despatch 
 
 . . disappoints and distresses me. I have 
 shown it to General McClellan who says he 
 will write you to-day. I am not competent 
 to criticise your views, and therefore what 
 
 1 offer is in justification of myself. Of the 
 two I would rather have a point on the rail- 
 road south of Cumberland Gap than Nash- 
 ville. First, because it cuts a great artery 
 of the enemy's communication, which 
 Nashville does not; and secondly, because 
 it is in the midst of loyal people who would 
 rally around it, while Nashville is not. 
 Again, I cannot see why the movement in 
 east Tennessee would not be a diversion in 
 your favor rather than a disadvantage, as- 
 suming that a movement toward Nashville 
 is the main object. But my distress is that 
 our friends in east Tennessee are being 
 hanged and driven to despair, and even 
 now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel 
 arms for the sake of personal protection. 
 ... I do not intend this to be an order 
 in any sense, but merely, as intimated 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 before, to show you the grounds of my 
 anxiety." 
 
 This letter was sent by mail, but the fol- 
 lowing day, January 7, Lincoln's feeling on 
 the subject being so intense, he telegraphed 
 Buell to name a day when he could move 
 southward in concert with Halleck, adding, 
 "Delay is ruining us and it is indispensable 
 for me to have something definite." Simul- 
 taneously a triangular correspondence by 
 wire and mail was passing between McClel- 
 lan, General-in-Chief, at Washington, and 
 Halleck and Buell; as a result of whkh 
 Halleck sent orders on January 6 to Grant, 
 then commanding the district at Cairo, to 
 "make a demonstration in force" in the 
 direction of Forts Henry and Donelson, 
 but "be very careful," the order said, "to 
 avoid a battle. We are not ready for that." 
 Grant received the order on the 8th and 
 began the movement on the 9th; he made 
 his "demonstration," the men being out for 
 more than a week, "splashing through the 
 mud, snow, and rain," and then brought 
 his troops back to Cairo. He asked per- 
 mission to go to St. Louis on military busi- 
 ness, and on arriving there laid before Hal- 
 leck a plan for the capture of Fort Henry 
 and Fort Donelson. It was coldly received, 
 and Grant returned to Cairo, as he says, 
 "very much crestfallen." But a few days 
 later, January 28, he ventured to send this 
 telegram to Halleck, "With permission, 
 I will take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, 
 and establish and hold a large camp there." 
 Flag-Officer Foote, commanding the gun- 
 boats on the river, backed him up with 
 a similar despatch. Not being snubbed 
 again, as he feared, on the following day, 
 January 29, he sent a longer telegram ex- 
 plaining his plan more in detail. On the 
 30th Halleck granted his consent by wire 
 and sent instructions by mail. Grant re- 
 ceived them on February i. He sprang 
 forward like a dog let out of leash. His 
 troops moved on the 2nd, and, with the co- 
 operation of Foote's gun-boats, took Fort 
 Henry on the 6th and Fort Donelson on the 
 1 6th, with the "unconditional surrender" 
 of 15,000 Confederate soldiers, the capture 
 of forty pieces of artillery and a large 
 amount of stores, horses, mules, and other 
 property. The Confederate line of defence, 
 from Columbus to Bowling Green, having 
 been pierced, the whole line was promptly 
 abandoned and a new line taken up from 
 
 Memphis to Chattanooga, one hundred and 
 fifty miles to the south. 
 
 Now, what does all this prove ? It seems 
 to me to prove, beyond dispute, that on the 
 military questions at issue on the opening 
 of military operations in the West, Lincoln 
 was right and his generals, McClellan, 
 Halleck, and Buell, were wrong. 
 
 First, Lincoln insisted on a movement 
 southward by Halleck and Buell. Both 
 said it could not be done because they had 
 not enough troops, because such troops as 
 they had were not properly equipped, 
 drilled, and disciplined, because they had 
 not enough arms, and because the roads 
 were so bad. Grant proved he had enough 
 troops for the work required, that the en- 
 emy was at least as badly off as ourselves 
 in equipmicnt, drill, disciphne, and arms, 
 and that, bad as the roads were, they were 
 not bad enough to prevent active military 
 operations. That these things could be 
 done was what Lincoln argued, over and 
 over, in letters and telegrams to IMcClellan 
 and Meade in the East, and to Halleck 
 and Buell in the West. They always said 
 "No"; but the instant Grant got permis- 
 sion to try, he showed that the answer 
 should have been "Yes." 
 
 Second, Halleck told Lincoln and 
 McClellan that Lincoln's plan was "bad 
 strategy," McClellan was in doubt about 
 it, and Buell's judgment was "decidedly 
 against it." Grant showed that one part of 
 it, the movement from Cairo toward Mem- 
 phis, could be carried out with brilliant 
 success, inflicting on the enemy his first 
 defeat in the war, and breaking up his first 
 line of defence in the West; and it must be 
 remembered that the whole movement had 
 its origin in Lincoln's letter and telegram 
 to Halleck of January i. 
 
 Third. As to the second part of it, the 
 movement through Cumberland Gap to 
 cut the railroad from Virginia and turn the 
 enemy's flank, it was just such a movement 
 as Lee and Jackson would have delighted 
 in; and if intrusted to a competent com- 
 mander, such as Sherman, there is no rea- 
 son to doubt that it would have been a great 
 success — as important as the capture of 
 Fort Donelson, in a military sense, and 
 even more important in a political sense. 
 But Buell would not heed the President's 
 suggestions. A force was sent against 
 Cumberland Gap, but too small to accom- 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 plish anything permanent; and it was not 
 until eighteen months later, in September, 
 1863, that an adequate force under Burn- 
 side carried the passes in the Cumberland 
 Mountains and occupied Knoxville and 
 other points in east Tennessee. 
 
 If Lincoln had placed Grant in command 
 of the Western armies in July, 1862, when 
 Halleck was made general-in-chief, in- 
 stead of in October, 1863, it would prob- 
 ably have shortened the war by a year. 
 But Halleck had prejudiced Lincoln against 
 Grant. Instead of giving Grant full credit 
 for Donelson, Halleck began intimating in 
 his despatches to Washington that Grant 
 had been guilty of disobedience of orders, 
 absence from his command, etc. He was 
 authorized at once to put Grant in arrest, 
 but when Halleck looked into the matter, 
 he found that he was mistaken, and^id'so 
 to Grant and also to the Ad jutan}>^ General 
 in Washington. Nevertheless, immedi- 
 ately after the battle of Shilohj^when Hal- 
 leck came from St. Louis to take personal 
 command in the field. Grant was made 
 "Second-in-command" — with no duties — 
 and remained in that position so long as 
 Halleck was in the West. When Halleck 
 left for the East his command was split up 
 into three independent armies, those of the 
 Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi, under 
 Grant, Buell, and Rosecrans; and these 
 acted independently until after Grant had 
 taken Vicksburg and Rosecrans had been 
 defeated at Chickamauga more than a year 
 later. Then everything in the West was 
 put under Grant, to be succeeded by Sher- 
 man when Grant was made general-in- 
 chief, and everything went on to victory — 
 Chattanooga, the relief of Knoxville, Nash- 
 ville, the March to the Sea, and the surren- 
 der of Johnston's army in North Carolina. 
 
 In all of this it does not appear that Lin- 
 coln took an active part. To Halleck be- 
 fore or after Shiloh, or Corinth, to Grant 
 before or after Vicksburg, to Buell on his 
 retreat to Louisville, Lincoln's despatches 
 are few in number, and give little in the 
 way of instruction or even suggestion, ex- 
 cept to reiterate his opinion that east Ten- 
 nessee should be occupied. A telegram to 
 Buell, dated October 19, 1862, signed by 
 Halleck, but sent by the President's order 
 and evidently in Lincoln's own words, con- 
 tains this imperative command, "Your 
 army must enter east Tennessee this fall." 
 
 Not being heeded, Buell was superseded by 
 Rosecrans ten days later. To Rosecrans, 
 after he had succeeded Buell, Lincoln sent 
 several despatches, first congratulating him 
 on his victory at Stone River in January, 
 1S63, then gently chiding him for his 
 complaining telegrams, subsequently sug- 
 gesting that he attack Bragg in order to 
 prevent re-enforcements being sent to 
 Johnston, and finally, when Rosecrans was 
 overwhelmed at Chickamauga and shut up 
 in Chattanooga, sending him encouraging 
 and cheering telegrams. But, except for 
 his never-failing insistence that east Ten- 
 nessee be held, none of these despatches 
 contain the closely reasoned thoughts 
 which are found in his earlier communi- 
 cations to McClellan. The period of Rose- 
 crans's command was coincident with that 
 of Hooker and Meade in the East — the 
 same period of the Emancipation Procla- 
 mation and the draft riots to which refer- 
 ence has already been made. 
 
 On the 29th of February, 1864, Congress 
 passed an act reviving the grade of heuten- 
 ant-general in the army, and within a few 
 days Grant was appointed and confirmed 
 to this office. On March 10 he was "by 
 Executive Order assigned to command the 
 Armies of the United States." It is stated 
 in Nicolay and Hay that Lincoln neither 
 advocated nor opposed this legislation. 
 The bill was introduced by E. B. Wash- 
 burne. Member of Congress from the 
 Galena district in Illinois, an old political 
 friend of Lincoln and a great admirer of 
 Grant. Just why Lincoln was neutral in 
 the matter does not appear. An ungracious 
 comment in Nicolay and Hay reads as fol- 
 lows: "Whether he was or was not the 
 ablest of all our generals is a question 
 which can never be decided. . . . Grant 
 was, beyond all comparison, the most 
 fortunate of American soldiers." There 
 are no facts whatever to justify this depre- 
 ciation. Grant owed his success solely to 
 his clear-sighted appreciation of facts and 
 to the tremendous energy and resourceful- 
 ness with which he carried his plans into 
 effect — as Sheridan expresses it, to "the 
 manifold resources of his well-balanced 
 military mind." 
 
 Grant was ordered to Washington to 
 receive his commission, and met Lincoln 
 for the first time on March 8, 1864. Grant 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 says in his ''Memoirs" that both Stanton 
 and Halleck cautioned him against giving 
 the President his plans of campaign because 
 Lincoln was "so kind-hearted that some 
 friend would be sure to get from him all he 
 knew " — a piece of advice which, in view of 
 Lincoln's discretion and Grant's reticence, 
 seems quite superfluous. Grant's only 
 comment is that the President did not ask 
 him for his plans nor did he communicate 
 them to him — nor to Stanton or Halleck. 
 Lincoln said to him that "all he wanted or 
 ever had wanted was some one who would 
 take the responsibility and act, and call on 
 him for all the assistance needed," and he 
 "pledged himself to use all the power of 
 the government in rendering such assist- 
 ance." In short, Lincoln believed that at 
 last he had found the man competent to 
 command the armies, and he promptly re- 
 tired to the background, limiting his mili- 
 tary activities to the still mighty task of 
 giving Grant the full support of the gov- 
 ernment in every branch. 
 
 With the comprehensive, far-reaching, 
 and correlated plans which Grant made in 
 April, 1864, and with the manner in which 
 he carried them out, it is not possible to 
 speak here in detail. We are dealing only 
 with Lincoln's relation to them. On the 
 30th of April, four days before Grant 
 crossed the Rapidan, Lincoln wrote to 
 Grant, "Not expecting to see you again 
 before the spring campaign opens, I wish 
 to express in this way my entire satisfaction 
 v^ith what you have done up to this time, 
 so far as I understand it. The particulars 
 of your plans I neither know nor seek to 
 know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; 
 and, pleased with this, I wish not to ob- 
 trude any constraints or restraints upon 
 you. ... If there is anything wanting 
 which is within my power to give, do not 
 fail to let me know it. And now with a 
 brave army and a just cause, may God sus- 
 tain you." The terrible lighting in the 
 W'ilderness followed, and on the day of 
 Cold Harbor (June 3) Lincoln, in dechning 
 an invitation to attend a mass meeting in 
 New York, wrote to the presiding officer, 
 "My previous high estimate of General 
 Grant has been maintained and heightened 
 by what has occurred in the remarkable 
 campaign he is now conducting, while the 
 magnitude and difficulty of the task before 
 him do not prove less than I expected." 
 
 Grant telegraphed almost daily to Halleck, 
 and Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary 
 of War, was at Grant's head-quarters, and, 
 with the trained skill of a journalist, was 
 sending almost hourly telegrams to Stan- 
 ton. But Lincoln answered only once. 
 At 7 A. M. on June 15 he saw Grant's tele- 
 gram to Halleck, sent from Bermuda Hun- 
 dred the previous day, saying, " Our move- 
 ment from Cold Harbor to the James River 
 has been made with great celerity and so 
 far without loss or accident." Then Lin- 
 coln sent this cheery message, "I begin to 
 see it. You will succeed. God bless you 
 all." 
 
 But when Early was approaching Wash- 
 ington on July 9, Grant telegraphed Hal- 
 leck that if the President desired him to 
 come to Washington in person he could 
 "leave everything here on the defensive" 
 and come on an hour's notice. Lincoln re- 
 plied the following day, explaining what 
 Halleck told him about the small force 
 available for the defence of Washington 
 and Baltimore, and adding, "Now, what 
 I think is, that you should provide to retain 
 your hold where you are, certainly, and 
 bring the rest with you personally, and 
 make a vigorous effort to destroy the ene- 
 my's forces in this vicinity. I think there 
 is really a fair chance to do this, if the 
 movement is prompt. This is what I 
 think upon your suggestion, but it is not 
 an order." But late that night Grant re- 
 plied to Lincoln telling him what troops 
 he had sent to W^ashington and said: "I 
 think, on reflection, it would have a bad 
 effect for me to leave here. ... I have 
 great faith that the enemy will never be 
 able to get back with much of his force," 
 and Lincoln replied, "Very satisfactory." 
 But the pursuit of Early was feeble and 
 he remained in the Shenandoah Valley. 
 Grant then sent Sheridan to Washington 
 and told Halleck (August i), "I want 
 Sheridan put in command of all the troops 
 in the field, with instructions to put him- 
 self south of the enemy, and follow him to 
 the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let 
 our troops go also." Lincoln saw this 
 despatch, and immediately sent Grant this 
 characteristic reply: "This, I think, is ex- 
 actly right as to how our forces should 
 move; but please look over the despatches 
 you may have received from here, even 
 since you made that order, and discover, if 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 you can, that there is any idea in the head 
 of any one here of ' putting our army 
 south of the enemy,' or of following him to 
 the 'death' in any direction. I repeat to 
 you, it will neither be done nor attempted, 
 unless you watch it every day and hour, 
 and force it." This was savage language 
 for a gentle President to use about his own 
 Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, but 
 doubtless it was deserved. Grant's answer, 
 the same day, was brief, " I will start in two 
 hours for Washington and will spend a day 
 or two with the army under General Hunt- 
 er." He did not, however, go to Washing- 
 ton, but went direct to General Hunter's 
 head-quarters at Monocacy, relieved Hunt- 
 er, telegraphed Sheridan to join him at once, 
 and on Sheridan's arrival placed him in 
 command. Grant met Sheridan at the sta- 
 tion and remained only long enough to give 
 him his orders, and then returned to Peters- 
 burg in order to attack Lee and prevent re- 
 enforcements being sent to Early. The re- 
 sult was Sheridan's brilliant campaign in 
 the Shenandoah Valley and his complete 
 defeat of Early's army two months later. 
 
 In all this how similar are Lincoln's de- 
 spatches to those he had sent in the previous 
 years to McClellan and Meade and Halleck 
 and Buell, and how different the result! 
 And what hearty support on Lincoln's part 
 is shown in this despatch of August 1 7 to 
 Grant, "I have seen your despatch express- 
 ing your unwillingness to break your hold 
 where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold 
 on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke 
 as much as possible." 
 
 Sheridan's campaign in the valley was, 
 however, no holiday affair, and on two occa- 
 sions in September Lincoln telegraphed to 
 Grant expressing his anxiety. The second 
 despatch, September 29, is very charac- 
 teristic — "I hope it will have no constraint 
 on you, nor do harm anyway, for me to say 
 I am a little afraid lest Lee sends re-en- 
 forcements to Early, and thus enable him 
 to turn upon Sheridan." To which Grant 
 replied the same afternoon, "I am taking 
 steps to prevent Lee sending re-enforce- 
 ments to Early by attacking him here." 
 The result was a two days' battle, Fort 
 Harrison on the right and Poplar Spring 
 Church on the left — names almost forgotten 
 in the almost continuous fighting around 
 Petersburg, but involving a loss of more 
 than 6,200 men on these two days. 
 
 And so the death struggle around Peters- 
 burg continued during the winter, to end 
 at Appomattox in the spring. To Grant, 
 Lincoln sent no military despatches subse- 
 quent to the one of September 29, above 
 quoted. To Sherman he sent nothing ex- 
 cept a warm-hearted, generous, and most 
 flattering message of congratulations when 
 his March to the Sea terminated at Savan- 
 nah; to Thomas, only a similar but more 
 guarded telegram after the battle of Nash- 
 ville; to Banks, a message in December, 
 1864, refusing to grant an important re- 
 quest of Banks's because "he whom I must 
 hold responsible for military results is not 
 agreed"; to the other generals, nothing at 
 all except on civil matters. But if Lincoln 
 abstained from suggestions on purely mili- 
 tary movements, he never for an instant 
 relaxed his grasp of supreme control of the 
 military situation. There is an imperative 
 tone in his despatch to Grant of February 
 I — at the time the Confederate Peace 
 Commissioners had reached Grant's head- 
 quarters — "Let nothing which is transpir- 
 ing change, hinder, or delay your military 
 movements or plans "; and again on March 
 3, when Stanton sent this telegram, "The 
 President directs me to say that he wishes 
 you to have no conference with General 
 Lee unless it be for capitulation of General 
 Lee's army, or on some minor or purely 
 military matter. He instructs me to say 
 that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer 
 upon any political questions. Such ques- 
 tions the President holds in his owti hands, 
 and will submit them to no military confer- 
 ences or conventions. Meanwhile, you are 
 to press to the utmost your military advan- 
 tages." Grant welcomed such instruc- 
 tions which defined his duties so clearly, 
 and he carried them out in letter and spirit, 
 assuring Stanton "that no act of the enemy 
 will prevent me from pressing all advan- 
 tages gained to the utmost of my ability. 
 Neither will I, under any circumstances, 
 exceed my authority, or in any way embar- 
 rass the government." It was a grave 
 oversight on the part of Lincoln, Stanton, 
 and Grant that no copy of these explicit 
 instructions of March 3 were sent to 
 Sherman, then commanding a separate 
 army in North Carolina and liable at any 
 moment to be confronted with the problem 
 of what terms of surrender he should offer 
 Jolmston. That Sherman made a mistake 
 
Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief 
 
 when the contingency of Johnston's sur- 
 render arrived, after Lincoln's death, is 
 universally conceded; but neither Lincoln, 
 Stanton, nor Grant can escape their share 
 of responsibility for it, in not sending him 
 the same positive directions that were sent 
 to Grant. 
 
 In January, 1865, Lincoln wrote to 
 Grant a most delightfully courteous and 
 modest letter in regard to his son Robert, 
 then twenty-two years old, recently gradu- 
 ated from Harvard, and desirous "to see 
 something of the war before it ends. . . . 
 Could he, without embarrassment to you 
 or detriment to the service, go into your 
 military family with some nominal rank, 
 I, and not the public, furnishing his nec- 
 essary means? If no, say so without the 
 least hesitation, because I am as anxious 
 and as deeply interested that you shall not 
 be encumbered as you can he yourself." 
 Grant instantly replied, "I will be most 
 happy to have him in my military family in 
 the manner you propose," and suggested 
 that he be given the rank of captain. He 
 was accordingly appointed captain and 
 aide-de-camp, and joined Grant on Feb- 
 ruary 21. This circumstance — and per- 
 haps others — led Grant to send a telegram 
 to Lincoln on March 20: "Can you not 
 visit City Point for a day or two? I would 
 like very much to see you, and I think the 
 rest will do you good." Lincoln accepted 
 the invitation and arrived on March 24. 
 He remained at City Point, living on the 
 steamer River Queen, fourteen days, until 
 Friday, April 7. He had long talks with 
 Grant; he visited the troops, saw a battle 
 in progress, met General Sherman and 
 Admiral Porter, who came to consult 
 Grant, entered Richmond on April 4. 
 Nicolay and Hay speak of his "enjoying 
 what was probably the most satisfactory 
 relaxation in which he had been able to in- 
 dulge during his whole ^Presidential ser- 
 vice." 
 
 On March 29 Grant started with his 
 army on the Appomattox campaign. He 
 kept Lincoln well advised by telegrams of 
 
 the progress of events, and Lincoln an- 
 swered him: "Having no great deal to do 
 here, I am sending the substance of your 
 despatches to the Secretary of War." Lin- 
 coln, in fact, turned correspondent, and 
 every day for a week reported to Stanton 
 the progress of the day's battle or march — 
 short, but clear, incisive despatches, giving 
 a distinct account of what was happening. 
 On the 7th of April Lincoln started down 
 the James River on his return to Washing- 
 ton. But early in the morning he received 
 a telegram sent by Grant about midnight 
 repeating Sheridan's report of the battle 
 of Burkesville, April 6. Sheridan con- 
 cluded with the words: "If the thing is 
 pressed, I think Lee will surrender." Lin- 
 coln answered Grant at 11 A. M. April 7, 
 "Gen. Sheridan says, 'If the thing is 
 pressed, I think that Lee will surrender.' 
 Let the thing be pressed." Lincoln then 
 proceeded to Washington. It was his last 
 military order. Eight days later he was 
 dead. 
 
 As time goes on Lincoln's fame looms 
 ever larger and larger. Great statesman, 
 astute politician, clear thinker, classic 
 writer, master of men, kindly, lovable man. 
 These are his titles. To them must be 
 added — military leader. Had he failed in 
 that quality, the others would have been 
 forgotten. Had peace been made on any 
 terms but those of surrender of the insur- 
 gent forces and restoration of the Union, 
 his career would have been a colossal fail- 
 ure and the Emancipation Proclamation 
 a subject of ridicule. The prime essential 
 was military success. Lincoln gained it. 
 Judged in the retrospect of nearly half a 
 century, with his every written word now 
 in print and with all the facts of the period 
 brought out and placed in proper perspec- 
 tive by the endless studies, discussions, and 
 arguments of the intervening years, it be- 
 comes clear that first and last and at all 
 times during his Presidency, in military 
 affairs his was not only the guiding but the 
 controlling hand. 
 

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