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 HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 . T. j. mi 
 
 IN THE 
 
 Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. 
 
 FROM NOVEMBER 4, 1861, TO JUNE 17, 1862. 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM ALLAN, 
 
 FORMERLY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER, SECOND CORPS, A.N.V. 
 
 WITH 
 
 FULL MAPS OF THE REGION AND OF THE BATTLE-FIELDS 
 
 BY 
 
 JED. HOTCHKISS, 
 
 FORMERLY CAPTAIN AND TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEER, SECOND CORPS, A.N.V. 
 
 ^t:z % 
 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
 
 1880. 
 
Copyright, 1880, by William Allan. 
 
 ^0 
 
 
 kA 
 
d;edication. 
 
 TO 
 
 THE PEOPLE OF LEXINGTON, VIEGINIA, 
 
 IN WHOSE MIDST 
 JACKSON MADE HIS HOME IN LIFE, 
 
 AND CHOSE HIS KESTING-PLACE IN DEATH. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The operations of General T. J. Jackson in the Valley of Virginia, 
 during the first half of the year 1862, constitute one of the most bril- 
 liant and interesting episodes of the great Civil War. The theatre 
 on which they took place aiforded a quick and easy approach to the 
 Federal capital and to the northern States. The mountains and 
 rivers of the Valley gave to an active and skilful commander many 
 opportunities of neutralizing great disparity of force. The celerity, 
 energy, and skill which Jackson manifested on this field excited the 
 admiration of his countrymen and produced a feeling nearly akin to 
 consternation among his foes. His campaign had a most important 
 bearing upon all the military operations in Virginia in the spring and 
 summer of 1862, for he caused to be detained, for the defence of 
 Washington and Maryland, forces in the aggregate four or five times 
 as numerous as his own, and thus in a fatal degree hampered and 
 paralyzed McClellan. The story of this campaign will always be 
 interesting to the actors in it on both sides, and not merely to them ; 
 to the student of military art it affords an admirable example of an 
 aggressive-defensive campaign, and one of the best instances in modern 
 times of the degree to which skill and daring may neutralize superi- 
 ority of numbers and resources. 
 
 Our aim has been to give an accurate history of this campaign from 
 official sources. Dr. Dabney's " Life of Jackson" was written during 
 the war, and without access to the Federal sources of information. 
 Much has been ^vritten since, but generally in the shape of personal 
 narratives, or of statements based upon the newspaper correspondence 
 of the time. Such accounts are of coiu-se imperfect, and some of them 
 are so partisan in cliaracter as to be of no value. Until recently the 
 
 6 
 
6 PREFACE. 
 
 official reports were in a large degree iuaccessible, hut this Is uo longer 
 the case. As will he seen by the foot-notes, we have been at pains 
 to verify all important statements about numbers, — in a great many 
 instances from the original MS. returas themselves. 
 
 Our thanks are due to Adj.-Gen. Townseud and to Gen. M. W. 
 Wright for facilities extended to as in the examination of papers in 
 theii" offices, to Dr. Jones, secretary of the Southern Historical Society, 
 for many favors, and to A. P. Tasker, Esq., of the Confederate 
 archive office, and J. Vs^ . Kirkly, Esq., of the adjutant-general's office 
 (the well-known historian of the First Federal Maryland regiment), 
 for frequent and valued courtesies. 
 
 In addition to the official rej)orts, we have been indebted to the 
 various lives of Jackson by Maj. J. Esten Cooke, Miss Randolph, 
 and an " Ex-Cadet," and especially to the earliest and very valuable 
 biography of Jackson by his former chief of staff, Dr. R. L. Dabney. 
 We have also drawn from the Historical Papers of Gen. G. H. 
 Gordon, of Massachusetts, and the reminiscences of Gen. Strother, 
 and from many others, to whom our obligations are acknowledged in 
 the text or notes. 
 
 A full diary kept by Maj. Hotclikiss during the greater part of this 
 campaign has been of great value. AVe are also indebted to a diary 
 kept by J. A. Waddell, Esq., of Staunton, Virginia. 
 
 The maps have been prepared by D. C. Humphreys, C. E. of the 
 United States river surveys, under the direction of, and from the 
 material furnished by, Maj. Jed. Hotclikiss, of Staunton, Virginia. 
 Maj. Hotclikiss was topographical engineer for Gen. Jackson during 
 this and his subsequent campaigns, and possesses by far the most 
 valuable mass of topographical data now in existence relating to 
 these campaigns. Maj. Hotchkiss has also furnished much valuable 
 information besides that directly credited in the narrative. 
 
 W. A. 
 
 McDONOGH, Md., 
 May 1, 1880. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ROMNEY 9 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Kernstottx .33 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 McDowell 65 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Winchester 83 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 Cross Keys and Port Republic ........ 130 
 
]% 
 
 B 
 
HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 OF 
 
 GEN. T. J. (STONEWALL) JACKSON 
 
 IN THE 
 
 SHENANDOAH VALLEY OF VIRGINIA. 
 1861-62. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ROMNEY. 
 
 The long struggle between the two great sections of the United 
 States came to an issue of arms in the spring of 1861. For years 
 the course of events had tended to this result. The North, great and 
 growing, filled with the most advanced ideas as to popular govern- 
 ment, human rights, universal equality and fraternity, and tending, 
 because of the immense expansion of commerce and manufactures, to 
 a centralized government, chafed and fretted against the barriers 
 interposed by a strict construction of the Constitution to an exten- 
 sion of its civilization over the entire country. The foundations on 
 which the Union had been reared seemed narrow and antiquated to a 
 people whose growth had been unprecedented, and who, by an im- 
 mense infusion of un-English immigration, had lost much of their 
 reverence for the traditions and principles of the Fathers of the 
 Republic. The South, more conservative in principle and practice ; 
 less changed by immigration ; believing slavery the best relation for 
 the negro, and a necessary condition of permanence in a purely 
 democratic state; saw no safety for its institutions, except in strict 
 adherence to constitutional guarantees, and watched with the utmost 
 jealousy any encroachments attempted upon the defences which the 
 Constitution had thrown around the weaker party. When the long 
 political struggle culminated in the election of Mr. Lincoln to the 
 presidency in 1860, some of the southern States thought it time to 
 
 2 9 
 
ISTo.! 
 
10 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 dissolve the Union, and seek safety in a separate government from the 
 anti-shivcry dehige whieh seemed to them about to spread over the 
 land. The border slave States held baek for a time, and Virginia 
 especially, whieh had contril)uted so largely to the formation of the 
 Union originally, exertod all her influence to bring about a peace 
 between the conflicting sections, but in vain. Meantime, Mr. Lin- 
 coln entered upon office March 4, 1861. In a few weeks his concilia- 
 tory sentiments yielded to the pressure of the public opinion of his 
 political associates in the North. Early in April a decided stand 
 was taken against further concession to the seceding States. It was 
 determined to reinforce Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor. On the 
 13th of April the fort was attacked by the Confederates and taken. 
 On April 15, President Lincoln issued his call for seventy-five 
 thousand troops to suppress " insurrectionary combinations." On 
 April 17, Governor Letcher, of Virginia, refused to obey the Presi- 
 dent's call for troops, and on the same day the Virginia convention, 
 all its efforts for peace having failed, and the issue being now war on 
 the one side or the other, repealed the ordinance by which the State 
 had originally adopted the Federal constitution, and seceded from 
 the Union. 
 
 The authorities of Virginia at once took steps to organize such 
 military force as she possessed. Volunteers were called for, and such 
 as were not ready for immediate service were ordered to Richmond, 
 where a camp of instruction was established. In a few days it was 
 determined to bring down the senior cadets from the Virginia Mili- 
 tary Institute, at Lexington, to be used in drilling the recruits. On 
 Sunday morning, April 21, the order reached Lexington, Virginia, 
 requiring those cadets to report at Richmond, under command of 
 Maj. T. J. Jackson, then Professor of Natural and Experimental 
 Philosophy in the Virginia Military Institute. 
 
 Maj. Jackson was born at Clarksburg, Western Virginia, January, 
 1824, entered West Point in 1842, graduated in 1846, distinguished 
 himself in the march on the city of Mexico in 1847 as a lieutenant 
 in Magruder's battery, was brevetted captain for gallant and meritori- 
 ous conduct at Churubusco, August 20, and major at Chapultepec, 
 September 13, 1847. He accompanied his command after the close 
 of the Mexican war to Fort Hamilton, whence he was sent to Fort 
 Meade, near Tampa bay, Florida. While here he was elected, in 
 1851, to the above-named professorship in the Virginia Military 
 Institute, and resigning from the army he removed to Lexington. 
 Here he resided for the next ten years. 
 
ROMNEY. 11 
 
 At one o'clock on Sunday, the 21st of April, 1861, the cadets, under 
 Maj. Jackson, took up their line of march for Staunton, en route to 
 Richmond. He then left his home for the last time. A little more 
 than two years afterwards all that was mortal of "Stonewall" Jackson 
 Avas borne, amid the tears and lamentations of his countrymen, to 
 the simple village churchyard of Lexington. Maj. Jackson was first 
 assigned to duty at the camp of instruction, near Richmond, but at 
 the end of a week he was commissioned as colonel by the State of 
 Virginia, and ordered to take command at Harper's Ferry, Virginia. 
 He arrived there on the 29th of April, and held command until 
 superseded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston,* who, upon the adhesion of 
 Virginia to the Confederate States, was sent by the authorities of the 
 latter to take charge of this important post. Col. Jackson was then 
 placed in command of one of the brigades of the army gradually 
 collecting under Gen. Johnston. He was made brigadier-general on 
 July 3, and marched to Manassas on the 18th and 19th, when Gen. 
 Johnston moved to the assistance of Beauregard. At Manassas, July 
 21, Jackson contributed materially to the victory won by the Con- 
 federates, his brigade checking the tide of Federal success, and ren- 
 dering conspicuous service. It was on this occasion that he received 
 the sobriquet of " Stonewall," from an expression used by Gen. Bee 
 in reference to Jackson's brigade.^ 
 
 * Gen. Johnston assumed command on the 23d of May. 
 
 * The first battle of Manassas was fought on Sunday, July 21, 1861, between 
 the Federal army, under Gen. Irwin McDowell, and the Confederate forces, 
 under Gens. J. E. Johnston and Beauregard. The latter commanded the army 
 which had gradually gathered at Manassas to resist the Federal advance from 
 Washington, while Gen. Johnston, with the "Army of the Shenandoah," con- 
 fronted Gen. Patterson, who was advancing from the Potomac, at Williamsport, 
 towards Winchester, in the " Valley of Virginia." A forward movement by 
 McDowell being imminent, Gen. Johnston was ordered to unite " if practicable" 
 with Beauregard to resist it. Slipping away from Patterson's front on the 18th 
 of July, he arrived with a part of his command, including Jackson's brigade, 
 at Manassas on the 20th, and, after consultation with Beauregard, determined 
 to attack McDowell the next day, in order to fight him before Patterson could 
 join him. McDowell, however, who was moving without reference to Patterson, 
 had determined upon an advance on the same day. Johnston's plan was to 
 throw forward his right across Bull Kun and advance directly upon Centreville, 
 the heart of the Federal position. For this purpose the mass of the Confeder- 
 ates were placed in the vicinity of the lower fords of Bull Run, near the direct 
 road from Manassas to Centreville, while the upper fords, opposite the Con- 
 federate left, were guarded by small bodies. McDowell, on the other hand, 
 determined, by a wide circuit, to cross the stream entirely beyond the Confeder- 
 ate left and thus turn and overwhelm that flank. A miscarriage of orders 
 
/! 
 
 12 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 On the 7th of October he was made major-general, in recognition 
 of his services at the battle of Manassas, and soon after was assigned, 
 under Gon. Johnston, to the command of the Valley district, with 
 head(iuarters at A\'inchostcr, A^irginia. (jNIap No. I.) On November 4 
 he left Manassas for the latter place. He held this command, in a 
 considerable degree an independent one, until the middle of the fol- 
 lowing June. This period in his career is in many respects the most 
 interesting. It embraces the difficulties and struggles through whicli 
 he rose to fame, and covers that wonderful campaign in the Valley of 
 Virginia which filled the South with unbounded admiration of his 
 genius, and has placed his name, in the estimation of the world, high 
 on the roll of captains. It is a sketch of Jackson's career during this 
 eriod that we propose now to give. 
 
 The birthplace and early home of Gen. Jackson was Clarksburg, 
 in Western Virginia, and from the opening of the war he had burned 
 with a desire to be ordered to service in that region. He had fre- 
 quently expressed his wish to aid in expelling the Federal troops from 
 the home of his childhood, and when assigned to the Valley district 
 his first thoughts were turned towards the execution of such a design. 
 
 delayed the Confederates until McDowell's march to their left was discovered, 
 when new dispositions became necessary. On the Confederate left Evans, rein- 
 forced by Bee .and Bartow, and still later by Hampton, threw his command in the 
 path of the Federal army (which, having crossed Bull Run unopposed at Sudley's 
 ford, was pouring down on the flank), and stubbornly contested the ground until 
 forced to retreat before the mass of McDowell's troops. As the Confederates 
 were being borne back Jackson's brigade reached the field, and, promptly form- 
 ing, checked the Federal advance and gave the broken commands time to rally. 
 Then succeeded an hour or two of severe fighting. A bold eSbrt on the part of 
 the Confederates was made to drive back the Federals and regain the lost 
 ground. They succeeded in sweeping back McDowell's lines and capturing a 
 number of guns, but the Federals soon made a countercharge and retook the 
 position and artillery. Again, mustering all his strength, Beauregard, who 
 commanded in person on this part of the field, hurled it against the Federal 
 lines. Fresh troops were arriving, which he sent against the Federal right flank. 
 Jackson firmly held the centre of the advance. The Federal lines were ag.ain 
 broken, the guns again captured. The arrival of Kirby Smith's and of Early's 
 troops enabled Beauregard to press his advantage, to drive back McDowell's 
 right flank, and to throw it into confusion. The defeat quickly changed into a 
 rout, and this rout into one of the most remarkable panics on record. It was 
 in the last successful effort of the Confederates that Bee and Bartow wore slain, 
 and it was just before the former fell that, to animate his thinned and wavering 
 lines, he pointed to Jackson's brigade, and said, " See, there is Jackson stand- 
 ing like a stone wall ; let us determine to die here and we will conquer." Such 
 was the origin of the sobriquet of " Stonewall." It is now immortal. 
 
ROMNEY. 13 
 
 The campaign of the summer and fall in Western Virginia had 
 not been favorable to the South. Gen. Robert S. Garnett, who had 
 commanded the first considerable force in that region, had been out- 
 manoeuvred by Gen. McClellan, compelled to retreat from his posi- 
 tions at Leedsville and Rich mountain \Wth loss, and when overtaken 
 at Carrick's ford, on Cheat river, July 13, had been defeated and 
 killed. This gave the Federals control of the greater part of the 
 State of Virginia, west of the Alleghanies and north of the Great 
 Kanawha river. In the valley of this river an effort was made a 
 month later, by Gen. Floyd, with a Confederate brigade, to wrest a 
 portion of this territory from them, but because of his small force, and 
 the ^vant of co-operation on the part of Gen. Wise (commanding a 
 part of the Confederate troops in that region), he failed to effect any 
 results of permanent value. 
 
 Gen. Lee, who had been sent to take command after the death of 
 Garnett,^ with a considerable reinforcement, either through the diffi- 
 culties of the coimtry, or the inexperience of his subordinates, or both, 
 failed to regain the advantages lost by Garnett, and was reduced to 
 merely preventing any further encroachments of the enemy. He 
 directed an advance upon the Federal positions on Cheat mountain and 
 at ElkAvater on September 12, but it miscarried because the column 
 under Col. Rust failed to attack. He then drew off a large part of 
 Loring's force to unite with Floyd and Wise in opposing Rosecrans's 
 movement up the Kanawha valley, but the Federal commander with- 
 di-ew, and active operations ceased. About the 1st of November Gen. 
 Lee was ordered elsewhere, and the approach of winter and the inac- 
 cessible character of the country rendered further operations almost 
 impossible. ""^^ 
 
 AVhen, therefore, Gen. Jackson was assigned to the command of 
 the Valley of Virginia, the enemy had possession of all the State 
 north of the Great Kanawha and west of the Alleghanies, and had 
 pushed their outposts into that mountain region itself, and, in some 
 cases, eastward of the main range. Thus Gen. Kelly, under direction 
 of Gen. Rosecrans who commanded all the Federal forces in Western 
 Virginia, had captured Romney, the county-seat of Hampshire, forty 
 miles west of Winchester, and now occupied it with a force of five 
 
 ^ Gen. Lee was sent to Western Virginia immediately after the first battle of 
 Manassas, wliich occurred on July 21, (Taylor's "Four Years with General 
 Lee," p. 16.) At that time Gen. Loring commanded the forces lately under Gar- 
 nett, and Gens. Floyd and Wjse each had a brigade in the Kanawha valley. The 
 three were independent of each other. 
 
14 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61.-62. 
 
 thousand (5000) men. This movement gave tlie Federals control 
 of the fertile valley of the South Branch of the Potomac. Another 
 force oconj)ie(l Bath, the county-seat of Morgan, almost due north of 
 Winchester, while the north bank of the Potomac was everywhere 
 guarded by Union troops. (Maps Nos. I and II.) 
 y The Baltimore and Ohio railroad was open, and available for the 
 supply of the Union troops from Baltimore to Harper's Ferry, and 
 again from a point opposite Hancock westward. The section of 
 about forty miles, from Harper's Ferry to Hancock, lying for the 
 most part some distance wathin the Virginia border, had been inter- 
 rupted and rendered useless by the Confederates, but this gap was 
 . supplied by the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, Avhich w^as open all the 
 way from Cumberland, Maryland, to Georgetown, in the District of 
 Columbia. 
 
 Jackson recommended a bold plan of operations to dispossess the 
 enemy and recover the territory that had been lost. He had seen 
 how his predecessors had been hampered in trying to operate from 
 Staunton westward, by the difficult and inaccessible nature of the 
 country. On that route a wide belt of mountains, destitute of sup- 
 plies and for the most part penetrated by nothing but indifferent 
 wagon roads, intervened between the scene of operations and the 
 Confederate base of supplies. This had proved a most serious 
 hindrance. Jackson proposed now to move along the Baltimore and 
 1/ Ohio railroad and the turnpikes parallel to it, and thus enter Western 
 Virginia from the northeast. In this way he could turn the left 
 flank of the enemy's forces, place himself on their communications, 
 and force them to evacuate, or fight under circumstances of his own 
 selection. This mode of approach, it was true, was far more exposed 
 to the enemy, but it was easier ; it lay through a much more popu- 
 lous and cultivated region ; it would aiford, to some extent, the use 
 of a railroad for supplies ; and it would soon place him in the midst 
 of some of the most fertile parts of West Virginia. To carry out this 
 plan he asked that his old brigade, which had been left at Manassas, 
 and all the forces operating along the line of the Alleghanies, south- 
 west of Winchester, should be concentrated under his command. 
 This would have given him fifteen or sixteen thoiLsand (15,000 or 
 16,000) men, the least force with Mdiich he thought it possible to 
 undertake so considerable an enterprise. 
 
 The Confederate authorities deemed it impossible to comply fully 
 with his wishes. His own brigade was promptly sent to him, and 
 one of the brigades of Loring's trooj)S reached him early in De- 
 
ROMNEY. 15. 
 
 cember.^ Subsequently two more brigades, under Gen. Loring him- 
 self, were added, but all these troops only increased the small force 
 of two or three thousand State militia, which had been assembled 
 in the district itself, to about eleven thousand (11,000) men.^ The 
 greater part of Gen. Loring's force did not arrive until Christmas, 
 thus preventing any important movements during November and 
 December. 
 
 But meantime Gen. Jackson Avas not idle. When he entered upon 
 his new command there were but three fragmentary brigades of State 
 militia and a few detached companies of cavalry in the Valley dis- 
 trict. These troops were poorly armed, and the militia was almost 
 entirely without discipline or experience. In order to increase this 
 force he first caused the militia which had not yet been summoned, 
 or which had been released, to be called out, and in a short time 
 the brigades under Brig.-Gens. Carson, Meem, and Boggs were in- 
 creased in the aggregate to about three thousand (3000) men. He 
 consolidated the cavalry companies into a regiment, under the com- 
 mand of Lieut.-Col. Ashby. Prompt measures were taken to 
 equip and discipline these troops. About the middle of November, 
 the first brigade — his own — was sent up from Manassas, and by 
 the 1st of December he had at hand some four thousand (4000) 
 troops, and knew that a part of Loring's command was en route to 
 join him.' 
 
 * Gen. Loring, after the withdrawal of Gen. Lee, had command of all the 
 troops west of Staunton, except those under Floyd, in the Kanawha valley. 
 Gen. Wise had been ordered to duty elsewhere about the 1st of October. 
 When Loring was ordered to Winchester to join Jackson, Gen. Edward John- 
 son was left with a brigade and some artillery and cavalry at Camp Alle- 
 ghany, where the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike crosses the Alleghany 
 mountains. 
 
 * Gen. J. E. Johnston says (Johnston's Narrative, pp. 83, 84) the "effective 
 total" of troops in the Valley district at the end of November was 3700. Add 
 nine per cent, for officers, and Jackson's force at that time (consisting of the 
 militia and the " Stonewall" brigade) may be placed at about 4000. At the 
 end of December the " effective total" under Jackson, from the returns, was 
 10,241, or, adding officers, about 11,200. 
 
 ' Jackson's notions of discipline are illustrated by an incident of this time. 
 Immediately after the arrival of the " Stonewall" brigade in the Valley, a 
 stringent order was issued which prevented officers of even the highest grades 
 from passing the pickets around the camps except upon passes from head- 
 quarters, and it was required that these passes should specify whether the 
 officer was on public or private business. This order led to the following 
 protest and reply : 
 
16 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 While waiting for tlie reinforcementB that would enable him to 
 strike a blow, he detcrniincd to annoy the enemy by preventing any 
 attempt to reconstriK^t the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and by doing 
 such damage as was possible to the Chesapeake and Ohio eanal, which 
 runs along the north bank of the Potomac. For this purpose the 
 cavalry was actively engaged in scouting the country along that 
 river, and early in December a small force of infantry and a battery 
 were sent down to break Dam No. 5, seven miles above Williamsport, 
 which supplied a long level of the canal with water. This force 
 appearetl at Dam No. 5 on the afternoon of December 6, and during 
 the next two days kept up an active skirmish with the Federal troops 
 on the north side of the river. Under cover of this fire the Confed- 
 erates attempted to break the dam on the night of the 7th, but effected 
 
 "Camp near Wixchester. Virginia, 
 "November 16, 1801. 
 "Major: — The undersigned, having read General Orders No. 8, transmitted 
 from the headquarters of the Army of the Valley, so far as it includes and 
 relates to officers of their rank, respectfully submit: That it is an unwarranted 
 assumption of authority, and involves an improper inquiry into their private 
 matters, of vrhich, according to the official usage and courtesy of the army, the 
 major-general commanding has no right to require information ; it implies their 
 abuse of the privileges accorded in every other department of the army to 
 officers of their rank, which there has been nothing in their conduct to justify ; 
 it disparages the dignity of the offices which they have the honor to hold, and, 
 in consequence, detracts from that respect of the force under their command 
 which is necessary to maintain their authority and enforce obedience. There- 
 fore they complain of the order, and ask that it may be modified. 
 
 "Respectfully submitted." 
 (Signed by all the regimental commanders of the brigade.) 
 " Maj. a. H. Jackson, 
 
 "A. A. Gen'l." 
 
 " Headquarters Vallev District, 
 "November 17, 1861. 
 " The major-general commanding desires me to say that the within-combined 
 protest is in violation of the Army Regulations and subversive of military dis- 
 cipline. He claims the right to give his pickets such instructions as in his 
 opinion the interests of the public service require. 
 
 " Colonels , on the day that their regiments arrived at their 
 
 present encampment, either from incompetency to control their commands or 
 from neglect of duty, so permitted their commands to become disorganized and 
 their officers and men to enter Winchester without permission, as to render 
 several arrests of officers necessary. 
 
 " If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain 
 habitually with them, and industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, 
 and in battle lead them well, and in such a manner as to command their 
 admiration. 
 
 " Such officers need not apprehend loss of respect resulting from inserting in 
 a written pass the words ' on duty,' or ' on private business,' should they 
 have occasion to pass the pickets. 
 
 "By command of Maj.-Gen. .Jackson. 
 
 "A. H. Jackson, 
 
 "A. A. Gen'l." 
 
ROMNEY. 17 
 
 little or no damage. The next evening they retired. Not satisfied 
 with the result, Jackson made another effort a few days later to break 
 Dam No. 5. Taking the cavalry, a part of the militia, and his old 
 brigade ("Stonewall"), he left Winchester on the 16th. Next day, 
 having disposed troops between Falling Waters and Dam No. 5, so 
 as to provide against a flank movement, and having sent forces to 
 make demonstrations at Dam No. 4 and at Williamsport, he collected 
 the main body for an attack on Dam No. 5. Under cover of the 
 infantry and artillery stationed on the hills on the south side of the 
 river, parties were sent to break away this dam at the end nearest the 
 Virginia side. Col. Leonard, with a part of the Thirteenth Massa- 
 chusetts, the Fifth Connecticut, and a battery, was guarding this part 
 of the Federal line. He kept up a vigorous and annoying fire on the 
 working parties. Not much was accomplished by the Confederates 
 until Capt. Holliday,^ of the Thirtj'-third Virginia, and Capt. Robin- 
 son, of the Twenty-seventh Virginia, volunteered to go down by night 
 with their companies and cut out the cribs. They made brave efforts 
 to do this, standing waist-deep in the cold water, and under the con- 
 stant fire of the enemy. A partial breach was effected, and the cribs 
 so loosened that the next freshet made a wide gap in the dam, 
 and rendered useless, for the time, a long stretch in the canal. While 
 this attack was in progress several regiments were sent up from Fred- 
 erick, Maryland, to reinforce Col. Leonard,^ and the short time in 
 which the whole of Banks's command, at the latter place, could reach 
 Williamsport, rendered it inadvisable for Jackson to cross the river. 
 Having done all the damage he could to the canal from the south 
 side, he withdrew on the 21st, and returned to Winchester. 
 
 While engaged in this expedition, news had come of the decisive 
 repulse by Gen. Edward Johnson of the attack made by the Federals 
 upon his position at Camp Alleghany. This occurred on the 1 3th of 
 December.^ Gen. Jackson advised that this force be now sent to 
 
 1 Afterwards colonel of the Thirty-third Virginia regiment, and subsequently 
 Governor of Virginia. 
 
 ^ The " Record of Events" on Banks's division return for this period says 
 that on the 18th of December the Fifth Connecticut, Twenty-ninth Pennsyl- 
 vania, and First Maryland regiments, Company F, of the Fourth United States 
 artillery, and two companies of Maryland cavalry were ordered to Williams- 
 port. 
 
 ' Gen. Edward Johnson, with from 1200 to 1500 men and two batteries, occu- 
 pied Camp Alleghany, which is fifteen miles west of Monterey, on the Staunton 
 and Parkersburg turnpike. lie was attacked by Gen. Milroy, with from 1700 
 
^ 
 
 18 CAMPAIGN IN THE "^ ALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1801-6!?. 
 
 reinforce liini or be moved towards JMoorefield, so as to co-operate 
 with liim in an advance on Romney.^ This was not done, and later 
 in the winter Johnson was forced to fall back to the Shenandoah 
 mountain, to avoid the danger of a flank movement against him from 
 Romncy. 
 
 Jackson, soon after his return to Winchester, was gratified to 
 meet Gen. Loring;, the last two of whose brigtides arrived there at 
 Christmas.^ 
 
 Gen. Loring, who was to retain command of his own troops and to 
 be second to Jackson, had three infantry brigades, under Col. W. B. 
 Taliaferro, Col. Wm. Gilham, and Brig.-Gen. S. R. Anderson re- 
 spectively, and Mayre's and Shumaker's batteries. These troops 
 numbered nearly six thousand (GOOO), and increased Jackson's entire 
 force to about eleven thousand (11,000) men.^ 
 
 Jackson had now all the troops that his superiors thought it judi- 
 cious to spare him. He had been most anxious to make an effort to 
 recover Western Virginia from the Federals, but the force at hand 
 
 to 1800 men, on December 13. After a fierce struggle, lasting the greater part 
 of the day, the Federals were repulsed at every point, and retreated to their 
 camp on Cheat mountain. (" Rebellion Record," vol. iii., Doc. 226.) 
 
 ^ Jackson's letter, dated December 23, and sent both to Gen. J. E. Johnston and 
 Adjt.-Gen. Cooper, is as follows : " I respectfully recommend that such of Brig.- 
 Gen. Loring's forces as are on or near the Alleghany mountains be ordered to 
 march forthwith to Moorefield, in Hardy county, with a view to forming a 
 junction with the troops now at or near this point (Winchester). If it is the 
 design of the government to commence oflFensive operations against Romney 
 soon, the troops asked for should move to my aid at once. Recent intelligence 
 fi'om Romney gives reason to believe that the force of the enemy in Hampshire 
 county is about 10,000, and that reinforcements are continuing to arrive. I 
 regret to say that the occupation of Hampshire county by the enemy is exor- 
 cising a demoralizing influence upon our people, who are gradually yielding to 
 outward pressure and taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. There 
 are noble spirits in and about Romney who have given up their earthly all, and 
 are now, for our cause and institutions, exiles from their homes. I have en- 
 deavored to cheer them, and to deter those who remained behind from taking 
 the oath of allegiance to the enemy, by holding out to them the prospect of a 
 speedy deliverance-, but this, I fear, will prove a delusion, unless the asked for 
 -Jbrces, or their equivalent, come soon. I fear that the forces that were recently 
 defeated on the Alleghany will be in Romney before Gen. Johnson leaves his 
 position." 
 
 * Loring arrived December 26. The same day the Hon. C. J. Faulkner, but 
 recently released from a northern prison, offered his services to Gen. Jackson, 
 and was appointed aide-de-camp. 
 
 ^ Jackson reports his strength on January 10 to Gen. J. E. Johnston as 10,178 
 infantry and 648 cavalry. He had also 26 pieces of artillery. 
 
ROMNEY. 19 
 
 was felt to be inadequate to so large an undertaking. The season, 
 too, was so far advanced that a mountain campaign would be attended 
 with very great difficulties. He, nevertheless, decided to persevere. 
 An immediate movement was determined upon against the forces 
 stationed within the limits of his military district. This district ex- 
 tended over the region bounded on the southeast by the Blue Ridge, 
 on the north and northeast by the Potomac, from Harper's Ferry to 
 its source, and on the northwest by the crest of the Alleghanies, until 
 it joins the district recently commanded by Gen. Lee, and still held 
 by the troops left there under Gen. Edward Johnson. He would 
 first clear his own district of the foe, do all possible damage to the 
 railroad and canal, and then be guided by circumstances. The prepa- 
 rations were hurried forward, and by the last day of the year all was 
 in readiness to move. (Map No. I.) 
 
 The forces and positions of the enemy opposed to Jackson at the 
 beginning of 1862 were as follows : Gen. Banks, commanding the 
 Fifth corps of McClellan's army, with headquarters at Frederick, 
 Maryland, had sixteen thousand (16,000) effective men,^ the greater 
 part of whom were in winter quarters near that city, while the re- 
 mainder guarded the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to Williamsport. 
 Gen. Rosecrans, still holding command of the Department of Western 
 Virginia, had twenty-two thousand (22,000) men scattered over that 
 region,^ but was concentrating them on the Baltimore and Ohio rail- 
 road. He says in his report : ^ " On the 6th of December, satisfied 
 that the condition of the roads over the Alleghanies into Western 
 Virginia, as well as the scarcity of subsistence and horse-feed, would 
 preclude any serious operations of the enemy against us until the 
 opening of spring, I began quietly and secretly to assemble all the 
 spare troops of the department in the neighborhood of the Baltimore 
 and Ohio railroad, under cover of about five thousand men I had 
 posted at Roimiey, with the design of obtaining Gen. McClellan's 
 permission to take nearly all these troops and suddenly seize, fortify, 
 and hold Wmchester, whereby I should at once more effectually cover 
 the northeastern and central parts of Western Virginia, and at the 
 same time threatening the left of the enemy's position at Manassas, 
 
 ^ See Federal Congressional Report on Conduct of the War, 1863, Part II. 
 p. 414, Gen. Banks's testimony. 
 
 ^ See same Report, Part I. p. 202, Rosecrans's testimony, given December 31, 
 ISGl. 
 
 ^ See Report on Conduct of the War, 1865, vol. iii. p. 14, of Rosecrans's 
 campaigns. 
 
20 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 compel him to lengthen his line of defence in front of the Army of 
 the Potomac, and throw it farther south. That I might more fully 
 lay my views before the general commanding, I requested his permis- 
 sion to visit him at Wa><hington, whither I proceeded about tlie 28th 
 of December, and found Gen. McClellan sick of typhoid fever. Be- 
 fore an interview could be had with him on the subject, Stonewall 
 Jackson, with a column of ten thousand men, began an advance in 
 the direction of Cumberland, which threatened such serious conse- 
 quences that, although ordered to send all my troops to Gen. Lander 
 and to remain jiersonally idle, I was obliged to return to AVheeling 
 for the purpose of seeing this order executed, and supplies and sub- 
 sistence sent to Gen. Lander." 
 
 The same plan of Federal operations was urged by Gen. Lander, 
 who, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War, December 27, 1861, says: "I have also stated to gentlemen 
 high in authority that if I could be furnished with three hundred pack- 
 mules and with five thousand men, with liberty in the quartermaster's 
 department to purchase beef cattle, and to employ some of my old 
 mountaineers, so that I could move with celerity — such men now 
 being in this city — I would engage to penetrate the Blue Ridge 
 mountains, and endeavor to take the town of Winchester, and break 
 
 / the northern branch of the Manassas Gap railway. In all these 
 matters I rely fully and completely on the co-operation of Gen. 
 Kelly, now at Romney." ^ A few days after this Gen. Lander was 
 
 J ordered to duty on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and 
 the troops at Hancock, Cumberland, and Romney, and the inter- 
 mediate points, were placed under his command. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs, and such the plans of his enemy, 
 when, on January 1, 1862, Jackson set out from Winchester in the di- 
 rection of Bath. With him were Garnett's (the " Stonewall") brigade,^ 
 the three brigatles under Gen. Loring,^ a part of the militia, five bat- 
 teries, and Ashby's regiment of cavalry, the whole numbering some 
 eight or nine thousand (8000 or 9000) men. His movement discon- 
 certed all plans for an aggressive campaign against Winchester, and 
 threw his opponents on the defensive. By moving against Bath, and 
 dispei'sing the force there and at Hancock, he hoped to destroy com- 
 munications between Banks and Kelly, threaten the latter's rear, and 
 
 1 Report on the Conduct of the War, 1863, Part I. p. 160. 
 ' Brig.-Gen. Richard B. Garnett had been assigned to the command of Jackson's 
 old brigade. 
 ^ The troops brought by Loring were known as the " Army of the Northwest." 
 
ROMNEY. 21 
 
 force him to evacuate Romncy or fight single-handed. The weather 
 during December had been fine, and the roads were in good condition. 
 The morning of New Year's day was bright and pleasant, and the 
 army set forth in fine spirits. But the fine weather was, unfortunately, 
 of short duration. Before the evening of the first day a cold storm 
 arrived from the northwest. This was the beginning of a violent 
 and protracted spell of bad weather, which continued for the next 
 three weeks, and interfered most seriously with the expedition. The 
 second day was cold and stormy, and the wagons being delayed by 
 difficult roads, — by-ways being selected to conceal the movement, — 
 the troops passed the night without anything to eat,^ and, in many 
 cases, without covering. Next morning, when the wagons had caught 
 up, a short time was allowed for cooking and eating, and the march 
 was renewed. Snow and sleet during the latter part of the day added 
 much to the discomfort of the soldiers, and rendered the roads so 
 slippery that the wagons were again unable to keep up with the 
 troops. The night of January 3 was passed in the midst of the 
 storm, about four miles from Bath. A scouting party of the enemy 
 had been dispersed and partly captured during the afternoon. Next 
 morning, Saturday, January 4, as soon as it was possible. Gen. Jack- 
 son made his dispositions to surround the town. A detachment was 
 sent over the mountain to the left, with orders to approach the place 
 from the west. The main body pushed along the road, while a regi- 
 ment was thrown forward on the right and another on the left of the 
 village. But the troops moved slowly. They were exhausted by the 
 cold and suffering of the preceding night, the ground was covered 
 with ice, and a large part of the day was consumed before the Con- 
 federates, headed by Col. Baylor of the general's staff, dashed into 
 the town. The enemy, after skirmishing for some hours, had retired 
 hastily. The village had been held by a part of the Thirty-ninth 
 Illinois regiment, with a squadron of cavalry and a section of ar- 
 tillery. These troops had been reinforced on the morning of the 4th 
 by the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania regiment from Hancock, and at 
 mid-day the Thirteenth Indiana had arrived at Sir John's Run, on 
 the cars, and had marched towards Bath. But in the presence of 
 a large hostile force, Col. Murray, of the Eightj'^-fourth Pennsyl- 
 vania, who was in command, decided not to M'ait for an attack. 
 Under his orders the Thirteenth Indiana was turned back, and the 
 Eight^'-fourth Pennsylvania and the Illinois troops both retreated 
 
 ^ The first night the army camped near Pughtown, the second at Unger's. 
 
22 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, ISGl-CS. 
 
 to Hancock, leaving the stores and camp equipage of the force tliat 
 had been stationed at Bath to be captured. From Batli two principal 
 roa<Is lead to the Potomac, one in the direction of Ilancocjk, which is 
 about six miles distant, on the Maryland side of tiie river ; the other, 
 farther west, to Sir John's Run, a station on the Baltimore and Ohio 
 railroad, which is only three miles away. A road, still farther to 
 the west, leads to the Great Cacapon river, at the railroad bridge 
 over that stream. 
 
 Finding the enemy gone, Jackson ordered an immediate pursuit. 
 With the main body of his command he pushed on towards Hancock, 
 driving the rear of the retreating enemy over the river. Gilliam's 
 brigade was sent towards Sir John's Run, but did not succeed in in- 
 flicting any damage on the forces retreating by that route. The road 
 led along the narrow and precipitous defile of Sir John's Run, where 
 a few men were easily able to check Gilham's advance until dark, and 
 after nightfall the Federals retreated over the river. Col. Rust, with 
 the Third Arkansas and the Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments, and 
 two guns, was sent to destroy the railroad bridge over the Great 
 Cacapon. The guard made a stout resistance, but the next morning 
 were driven off, and the bridge, railroad station, and telegraph were 
 destroyed. 
 
 The main Confederate force bivouacked on the night of the 4th 
 opposite Hancock. Next morning Jackson sent Col. Ash by to 
 demand the surrender of that town, and in the event of a refusal, to 
 give notice that two hours would be allowed for the removal of non- 
 combatants before the Confederate batteries would open upon it. 
 Gen. Lander had just arrived and assumed command at Hancock, 
 and he refused to surrender, and prepared to resist until reinforce- 
 ments could reach him. Jackson placed several pieces of artillery in 
 position, and kept up a brisk cannonade during the remainder of the 
 day, which he renewed on the morrow. jMeantime, an eifort was 
 made to construct a bridge at a point two miles above, wath the view 
 of crossing to the Maryland side. But it was found that this work 
 would consume several days, in which time Gen. Lander might be 
 reinforced to such an extent as to render the movement impracticable.^ 
 
 ^ Troops were indeed being hastened to Lander as Jackson foresaw. Gen. 
 Williams (of Banks's corps) left Frederick, Maryland, with his brigade for Han- 
 cock at 5 A.M. on the morning of the 6th, and camped at Ilagerstown the same 
 night, and the remainder of Banks's foi'ces were ready to march. Williams con- 
 tinued to Hancock, and on the 8th of January assumed command at that point. 
 Gen. Lander having gone to Romney the day before. Rosecrans had also 
 
ROMNEY. 23 
 
 Hence the Confederate leader, having freed this part of his district 
 from the enemy, after destroying such of the captured stores as he 
 could not carry off, left the vicinity of Hancock on the morning of 
 the 7th and marched in the direction of Romuey, the head of his 
 column reaching Unger's Store the same evening. 
 
 This march was a trying one. The severity of the weather con- 
 tinued without abatement. The snow and sleet, under the tramp of 
 the soldiers, soon became as smooth as glass, so that marching was 
 painful and difficult, while the road was filled with the falling horses 
 of the wagons and artillery, that were unable to stand on their smooth- 
 shod feet. Numbers of horses were disabled and some killed by this 
 day's march. The intense cold added to the suffering of the troops, 
 and caused the bivouac on the night of the 7th of January, 1862, 
 to be long remembered by many of them. The privations endured 
 began to cause discontent and murmuring, especially among the troops 
 which had recently joined Jackson. It was impossible to continue 
 the march until the horses had been rough-shod, and Jackson, though 
 reluctant, was obliged to remain some days at Unger's for this 
 purpose. 
 
 On the day that the Confederates retired from Hancock, January 7, 
 a portion of the Federal force at Romney made a successful recon- 
 noissance on the Winchester road. Just east of the North river, a 
 branch of the Great Cacapon, runs a high ridge, through which, at 
 a narrow and precipitous gap called Hanging Rock, passes the main 
 road from Winchester to Romney. This point, distant about fifteen 
 miles from the latter place, was held by about seven hundred militia 
 and a section of artillery, under Col. Munroe.^ On the night of the 
 6th, Col. Dunning, of the Fifth Ohio, under orders from Gen. Kelly, 
 set out from Romney with a portion of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
 and Eighth Ohio, Fourteenth Indiana, and First Virginia regiments, 
 
 hurried troops to Hancock, and Williams found there when he arrived " the 
 Eighty-fourth and One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, Thirty-ninth Illinois, 
 four companies of the Thirteenth Massachusetts, two companies of the First 
 Virginia, a company of sharpshooters, a detachment of 261 cavalry, and 8 guns, 
 with 92 men from Best's, Hampton's, Knapp's, and Mathews's batteries." 
 There were also six companies of the First Maryland regiment of infontry at 
 Milestone Point, five miles below Hancock. To these forces he added his 
 brigade of four regiments. (See " Record of Events" on return of Williams's 
 brigade, assistant adjutant-general's oflBce.) 
 
 ^ The force consisted of 650 militia infantry, Capt. Sheets's company of cavalry 
 of 56 men, and 2 pieces of artillery and 30 men under Lieut. Cutshaw. (Jack- 
 son's letter to Gen. J. E. Johnston, January 10.) 
 
24 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G-2. 
 
 five companies of cavalry, and six pieces of artillery, in all about 
 two thousand (2000) men.' They reached the vicinity of Hanging 
 Rock about daylight, and, having captured the Confederate pickets, 
 took the main body by surprise. Col. Munroe's main force wjis on 
 the bluff to the north of the road. The hill on the south was deemed 
 inaccessible, and so was left comparatively undefended. INIunroe's 
 artillery, under Lieut. Cutshaw, commanded the road, and the advance 
 was instructed to burn the bridge over North river upon retiring. 
 Col. Dunning, however, pressed forward so quickly and with such 
 overwhelming force, that he drove the Confederates away from the 
 bridge and seized it before it was materially injured. Having crossed 
 the stream, he deployed* his force, and while he sent one regiment 
 over the hill south of the road by an unfrequented path, and another 
 along the road itself, he led another to attack Munroe's force on the 
 north hill. The Confederates were soon overpowered, and, seeing 
 themselves flanked, fled, to escape capture.^ The two guns fell into 
 the enemy's hands, with a part of the baggage of the troops, and seven 
 prisoners.' The Federal troops set fire to the private houses, mills, 
 etc., in the vicinity, and then returned to Romney, burning many 
 
 ^ Col. Dunning, in his report, says he had six companies each of the Fourth, 
 Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Ohio, First Virginia, and Fourteenth Indiana in- 
 fantry ; Daura's battery and one section of Baker's, three companies of the 
 First Virginia cavalry, and the Ringgold and Washington cavalry, in all " not 
 over 2000 men." He and Gen. Kelly report the movement as made on the night 
 of the 7th, though all other authorities place it on the night of the 6th. (See 
 also Doc. 8, vol. iv., "Rebellion Record.") 
 
 * Col. (then Lieut.) Cutshaw says, in a letter to the author: "On the 7th 
 of January, 1862, a force from Romney surprised our camp at daylight, their 
 advance coming in with part of our pickets. Instead of attempting a passage 
 of the gap the enemy hurried immediately to the more accessible ridge on our 
 right, and were there as soon as our militia, and with a volley scattered them." 
 Cutshaw's guns were left without support, the gunners shot down or put to 
 flight, and the pieces captured. 
 
 ' Jackson's report of this affair to Gen. J. E. Johnston, dated Unger's Store, 
 January 11, 1862, says: "Though on the 4th instant Bath and all that part of 
 Morgan county east of the Big Capon river was recovered from the enemy, . . . 
 yet on the 7th the enemy surprised our militia at Hanging Rock pass, distant 
 fifteen miles from Romney, drove back our troops from their fortifications, 
 burnt their huts, captured two pieces of artillery (one a four-pounder rifle, the 
 other a four-pounder smooth-bore) ... As soon as they had accomplished this 
 and burnt the buildings of Col. Charles Blue, near by, and killed his live-stock, 
 leaving it on the ground, they returned to Romney." 
 
 Col. Dunning, in his report, says : " Seven prisoners were taken and seven 
 dead were found." 
 
ROMNEY. 25 
 
 houses and killing much cattle on the way. Of this conduct a north- 
 ern correspondent, writing from Romney at the time, says : " The 
 burning of dwellings along the road was a piece of vandalism which 
 should be punished with the death, not only of the men who did it, 
 but of the officers who countenanced and encouraged it." ^ 
 
 Jackson got his troops all up and into camp at Unger's on Wed- 
 nesday, the 8th. Here, while he rested, the teams were prepared for 
 better service on the ice. He was not ready to move the main body 
 until the morning of Monday, the 13th, when the march to Romney 
 was resumed. While waiting, however. Gen. Meem, with part of his 
 militia, was sent on the 10th towards Moorefield, and Gen. Carson 
 towards Bath, for the purpose of distracting the enemy ; while Ashby, 
 with a small force of cavalry, watched the movements of the Federal 
 forces in Romney.^ Meantime, Gen. Lander, who had been placed 
 
 ^ Jackson says in his official report : " I do not feel at liberty to close this 
 report without alluding to the conduct of the reprobate Federal commanders, 
 who, in Hampshire county, have not only burned valuable mill-property, but 
 also many private houses. Their track from Ilomney to Hangiflg Rock, a dis- 
 tance of fifteen miles, was one of desolation. The number of dead animals 
 lying along the roadside, where they had been shot by the enemy, exemplified 
 the spirit of that part of the northern army." (Dabney's Life, p. 271.) 
 
 Col. Dunning says in his report that he ordered the mill and hotel (Col. Blue's 
 house) to be burned, and adds : " I am sorry to say that some straggling soldiers 
 burnt other unoccupied houses on their return march." (Federal official reports, 
 adjutant-general's office.) 
 
 * Jackson, on January 10, reported the distribution of his forces as follows : 
 
 183] 
 
 nfantry 
 
 . 
 
 . at Winchester. 
 
 650 
 
 " 56 
 
 cavalry . 
 
 . at Hanging Rock. 
 
 
 50 
 
 u 
 
 . at North River Mills. 
 
 100 
 
 " 56 
 
 (( 
 
 . at Martinsburg. 
 
 
 60 
 
 a 
 
 . at Shepherdstown. 
 
 100 
 
 " 26 
 
 (( 
 
 . at Duffield's Depot (Baltimore and 
 Ohio railroad). 
 
 400 
 
 (( 
 
 . 
 
 . at Moorefield. 
 
 8000 
 
 " 375 
 
 cavalry . 
 
 . at Unger's Store. 
 
 And adds that " Brig.-Gen. Meem left here this morning for Moorefield with 
 545 infantry, and Brig.-Gen. Carson for Bath, sixteen miles ofi", with 200 infantry 
 and 25 mounted militia." 
 Jackson's artillery consisted at this time of 
 
 McLaughlin's (Rockbridge) battery 6 guns. 
 
 Waters' s battery 4 
 
 Carpenter's battery 4 
 
 Shumaker's battery . 4 
 
 Marye's battery 4 
 
 Cutshaw's section (lost January 7) 2 
 
 3 
 
26 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 in comnumd of all the Federal forces in this vicinity, evacuated 
 Romney on the 10th, and fell back to the railroad at Patterson's 
 creek. At this point he concentrated the troops from Hancock and 
 Cumberland, as well as those from Romney and S])ringfield. The 
 advance of the Confederates camped for the night of the 13th near 
 Slancsville, headquarters being at Sherrard's, at Bloomery gap. Next 
 day the march was continued through a cold and driving sleet. Jack- 
 son and the advance entered Romney in the evening. The retreating 
 enemy had left some stores and equipage, which fell into his hands. 
 (Map No. 1.) 
 
 On the 15th, the troops being all up, Jackson began to prepare for 
 another forward movement. At Cumberland^ the Potomac, which 
 approaches that town from the southwest, makes a sharp bend, and, 
 though tortuous, pursues, after leaving it, a direction but little east of 
 south until it receives the waters of Patterson's creek. At the latter 
 point the Baltimore and Ohio railroad crosses the creek going west- 
 ward on an extensive bridge, and a short distance up the river crosses 
 the Potomac itself to the north bank, on which side it continues past 
 Cumberland to New creek, where it recrosses to the Virginia side. 
 The bridges over the Potomac were important and valuable struc- 
 
 and a section of heavy guns (twenty- four-pounder Parrotts) sent out to Bath 
 under Capt. Wood McDonald, but afterwards returned to Winchester because 
 of the difficulty of transporting them over the bad roads. 
 
 The organization of the regular infantry under Jackson (which was all at 
 Unger's Store) was as follows : 
 
 Loring's troops: 
 
 Garnett's brigade: Taliaferro's brigade : Gilham's brigade ; Anderson's brigtide. 
 
 2d Virginia regt. 23d Virginia regt. 2lst Virginia regt. 1st Tennessee regt. 
 4th " " 37th " " 42d " " 7th " " 
 
 5th " " 3d Arkansas " 48th " " 14th " ** 
 
 27th '• " Irish battalion. 
 
 33d " " 
 ' Gen. Jackson had written on the 14th to Secretary Benjamin as follows : 
 
 *' Bloomery Gap, January 14, 1862. 
 " Hon. J. P. Benjamin : 
 
 " Sir : — Through the blessing of God I regard this district as essentially in 
 our possession. 
 
 " There is reason to believe that there are medical and other stores in Cum- 
 berland which would, if in our possession, be of great value to our government. 
 If you desire them to be secured, in addition to the other advantages resulting 
 from the occupation of Cumberland and the dispersion or capture of their army 
 near there, please send me at once 4000 infantry and 350 cavalry. An engineer 
 officer is much needed. 
 
 "T. J. Jackson, 
 " Major-General." 
 
ROMNEY. 27 
 
 tures, and the demolition of them would render the railroad useless 
 from New creek (now called Keyser) eastward. This Jackson desired 
 to accomplish, and at the same time to do such damage as he could to 
 the forces guarding them. As a first step he determined to destroy 
 the bridge at New creek, so as to break Lander's western communi- 
 cations and threaten his flank and rear. The "Stonewall" brigade 
 and that of Col. Taliaferro were selected for this undertaking. 
 
 Now it was that a new difficulty confronted the Confederate leader, 
 and forced him to relinquish for the time all further movements. 
 The severe privations of the soldiers at Bath and Hancock had not 
 been endured without murmuring; the painful march to Unger's 
 Store had not allayed the dissatisfaction, and that to Romney, in still 
 more severe weather, had caused the discontent, especially in Gen. 
 Loring's command, to become open and outspoken. Many men were 
 in hospital from the effects of the exposure. It was commonly de- 
 clared that the cold was more fatal than the enemy. A campaign at 
 such a season, among inhospitable mountains, was pronounced mad- 
 ness. This feeling was not confined to the men. Many of the 
 officers, under Jackson for the first time, sympathized with it, or did 
 nothing to repress it. Rain and a partial thaw were converting the 
 ice-bound roads into slush and mire. The sufferings of the march, 
 now proposed, promised to be greater than those already endured. 
 The result was that Avhen Jackson was ready to set out he found the 
 troops, and especially Taliaferro's brigade, so discontented, and op- 
 position to further movements with the present roads and weather 
 so wide-spread, as to render his proposed undertaking inexpedient. 
 " With deep mortification and reluctance," ^ says his biographer, " he 
 therefore relinquished further aggressive movements, and prepared to 
 defend what he had already won." 
 
 In two weeks, and with trifling loss, he had placed the troops op- 
 posed to him, while preparing for an aggressive movement, upon the 
 defensive ; had expelled them virtually from his whole district ; had 
 liberated three counties from their rule, and secured the supplies in 
 them for the subsistence of his own troops. 
 
 He now proceeded to place his army in winter quarters. Gen. 
 Loring's three brigades, and thirteen pieces of artillery, were quartered 
 around Romney ; Boggs's brigade of militia was spread along the 
 South Branch of the Potomac, as far as Moorefield, and his pickets 
 joined those of Gen. Edward Johnson on the Alleghany, while three 
 
 ^ Dr. Dabney. 
 
28 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 companies of cavalry were left with Loring for outpost duty. Car- 
 son's brigade of militia was stiitioned at Bath ; Meem's brigade at and 
 beyond JNIartinsburg; and Ashby with the greater part of his cavalry 
 regiment on the line of the Potomac. Garnctt's brigade was ordered 
 to Winchester to watch and oppose Banks, and to this place Gen. 
 Jackson removed his own headquarters on the 24th of January. 
 He thus left the larger part of his force at Romncy, where it could 
 subsist from the rich valley of the South Branch, and where it would 
 be in position to meet an advance of the enemy from the northwest, 
 or be ready to tidce advantage of the return of good weather to re- 
 sume the offensive. A line of telegraph from Winchester was to put 
 Jackson in communication with Romney. Garnett's brigade was 
 stationed at the former place that it might be at hand to resist any 
 movement of Gen. Banks, who menaced liis front from Harjier's 
 Ferry to Williamsport, or might go to the assistance of Loring, if 
 circumstances required.^ 
 
 ^ Gen. Jackson's views are thus given in a letter to the Secretary of War, 
 Hon. J. P. Benjamin, dated January 20, 1862: "Though the enemy have re- 
 treated to the Potomac, yet they continue in possession of the frontiers of this 
 district from seven miles below Cumberland to the Alleghany. On the first of 
 this month there was not a single loyal citizen of Morgan county who, in my 
 opinion, could with safety remain at home, and the same may be said respecting 
 the most valuable portion of Hampshire county. A kind Providence has re- 
 stored to us the entire county of Morgan, and nearly the entire county of Hamp- 
 shire, but so long as the enemy hold possession of the railroad bridge, five miles 
 below Cumberland, and the two railroad bridges above Cumberland, they can 
 make dangerous inroads upon us. On last Friday night I designed moving 
 rapidly, with my old brigade and one of Loring's, for the purpose of destroying 
 one of the railroad bridges across the North Branch of the Potomac west of 
 Cumberland, and thus cutting off their supplies from the west, and consequently 
 forcing tliem to reduce their army in front of me ; but as Gen. Loring's leading 
 brigade, commanded by Col. Taliaferro, was not in a condition to move, the 
 enterprise had to be abandoned. Since leaving Winchester, the 1st instant, the 
 troops have suffered greatly, and Gen. Loring has not a single brigade in a con- 
 dition for active operations, though in a few days I expect they will be much 
 improved, and will, if placed in winter quarters, be able to hold this important 
 portion of the Valley ; but these quarters should be well selected and the position 
 strengthened, and hence the great importance of having an engineer officer. It 
 will not do for me to remain here much longer, lest Gen. Banks should cross 
 the Potomac; consequently, in a few days I expect to leave this place, taking 
 with me Garnett's brigade. I have written to Gen. J. E. Johnston that, unless 
 otherwise directed, Gen. Loring's command will go into winter quarters in the 
 South Branch valley, Gen. Carson's at Bath, Gen. Meem's at Martinsburg, and 
 Gen. Garnett's at Winchester. The cavalry will be distributed at various points 
 along the northern frontier. Gen. Boggs's brigade, which principally belongs to 
 
ROMNEY. 29 
 
 "When Jackson returned to Winchester, on the 24th of January, 
 everything betokened some weeks of quiet, undisturbed by any im- 
 portant military movements. He was not aware, however, of the 
 extent of the discontent excited among Gen. Loring's troops, and did 
 not imagine that by leaving them at Romney this feeling would be 
 increased. Yet such was the case. They complained bitterly of the 
 campaign which had been conducted at the expense of so much suf- 
 fering; a campaign now suspended, they said, only to leave them in 
 an exposed and dangerous position, in the midst of an inhospitable 
 mountain region, out of reach of adequate supplies and of timely 
 succor. They declared their position untenable in case of an attack, 
 and even attributed the removal of the " Stonewall" (Garnett's) brigade 
 to Winchester, to favoritism. Jackson, silent and reserved in manner, 
 never taking counsel even with his next in command as to his plans, 
 most rigid and exacting as a commander, had not yet acquired that 
 wonderful control over his soldiers which a few months later would 
 have rendered such murmiu-ing impossible. Indeed, it is difficult to 
 realize the feeling of distrust then manifested, when we consider the 
 unbounded enthusiasm and devotion with which many of these same 
 men afterwards followed Jackson to victory and death. 
 
 As soon as the troops had gone into winter quarters furloughs were 
 freely given, and in the course of a few days the complaints and 
 criticisms which had become so rife at Romney wei:e carried to Rich- 
 mond, and were pressed upon the attention of the War Department. 
 The Secretary was beset with accounts of what was termed Jackson's 
 rash and ill-advised campaign, and his interference was most earnestly 
 invoked in behalf of a gallant body of troops now, it was said, in 
 danger of being overwhelmed in Romney by Gen. Lander's largely 
 superior forces, whenever the latter should choose to make a dash 
 at them from the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. The Secretar}^, far 
 from the scene of operations, with no information as to the real state 
 of the case, except such as reached him in the above way, and with 
 little knowledge of Jackson's character and capacity, unfortunately 
 yielded to the pressure brought upon him. 
 
 On the 31st of January, just one week after his return to Winches- 
 ter, Gen. Jackson received the following telegram from the Secretary 
 of War : " Our news indicates that a movement is making to cut off 
 
 the South Branch valley, will be distributed over the section of country to 
 which it belongs. It is very desirable that the troops should go into winter 
 quarters as soon as possible, so I trust you will send me the best engineer officer 
 you can, though it be for only ten days." 
 
30 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1801-62. 
 
 Gen. L<)rlno;'s command ; order liini back to Windicstcr immediately." 
 This order wa.s sent without (consultation with Gen. J, E. Johnston, 
 then in chief command in Virginia, or with Gen. Jackson himself, 
 and of course reflected upon the latter's judgment and caj)acity. Gen. 
 Jackson at once complied with the order, at the same time ordering 
 back Carson's militia from Bath to Bloomery gap, and directing the 
 troops on the left of Loring, in the South Branch valley, to fiill back if 
 the enemy should advance. He then wrote to the Secretary as follows : 
 
 "Hon. J. P. Benjamin, etc. 
 
 "Sir: — Your order, requiring me to direct Gen. Loring to return 
 with his command to Winchester immediately, has been received 
 and promptly complied with. 
 
 "With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of 
 much service in the field, and, accordingly, res])ectfully request to be 
 ordered to report for duty to the superintendent of the Virginia 
 Militiiry Institute at Lexington, as has been done in the case of other 
 professors. Should this application not be granted, I respectfully 
 request that the President will accept my resignation from the army. 
 " Respectfully, etc., your obed't servant, 
 
 "T. J. Jackson." 
 
 This letter was forwarded through Gen. Johnston, to whose adju- 
 tant he at the same time wrote : " The Secretary of AYar stated in the 
 order requiring Gen. Loring's command to fall back to this place 
 immediately that he had been informed the command was in danger 
 of being cut off. Such danger, I am well satisfied, does not exist, 
 nor did it, in my opinion, exist at the time the order was given, and I 
 therefore respectfully recommend that the order be countermanded, 
 and that Gen. Loring be required to return w'ith his command to the 
 neighborhood of Roniney." But the commander-in-chief, though con- 
 curring in Jackson's opinion of the campaign, did not think it best 
 to assume the responsibility of giving the order, and all of Loring's 
 troops returned to the vicinity of Winchester.^ In regard to the 
 resignation, Gen. Johnston detained it for a time, and wrote urging 
 Jackson to reconsider it.* 
 
 ^ Dabney's Life of Jackson. 
 
 ^ Gen. Johnston's letter is as follows: 
 
 "My dear Friend: — I have just read, with profound re<jret, your letter to 
 the Secretary of War, askinj^ to be relieved from your present command, either 
 by an order to the Virginia Military Institute or the acceptance of your resigna- 
 tion. Let me beg you to reconsider this matter. Under ordinary circumstances, 
 a due sense of one's own dignity, as well as care for professional character and 
 official rights, would demand such a course as yours. But the character of this 
 war, the great energy exhibited by the government of the United States, the 
 danger in which our veiy existence as an independent people lies, require 
 sacrifices from us all who have been educated as soldiers. I receive my infor- 
 
ROMNEY. 31 
 
 On the same day Jackson wrote to Governor Letcher as follows : 
 
 "Winchester, January 31, 1862. 
 
 " Governor : — This morning I received an order from the Secre- 
 tary of War to order Gen. Loring and his command to fall back from 
 Romney to this place immediately. The order was promptly com- 
 plied with ; but as the order was given without consulting me, and is 
 abandoning to the enemy what has cost much preparation, expense, 
 and exposure to secure, and is in direct conflict with my military 
 plans, and implies a want of' confidence in my capacity to judge when 
 Gen, Loring's troops should fall back, and is an attempt to control 
 militaiy operations in detail from the Secretary's desk at a distance, I 
 have, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying paper, reqviested 
 to be ordered back to the Institute, and if this is denied me, then to 
 have my resignation accepted. I ask as a special favor that you will 
 have me ordered back to the Institute. 
 
 "As a single order like that of the Secretary may destroy the 
 entire fruits of a campaign, I cannot reasonably expect, if my opera- 
 tions are thus to be interfered with, to be of much service in the field. 
 A sense of duty brought me into the field, and has thus far kept me. 
 It now appears to be my duty to return to the Institute, and I hope 
 that you will leave no stone unturned to get me there. If I have 
 ever acquired, through the blessing of Providence, any influence 
 over troops, this undoing of my work by the Secretary may greatly 
 diminish that influence. 
 
 "I regard this recent expedition as a great success. Before our 
 troops left here on the 1st instant, there was not, so far as I have been 
 able to ascertain, a single loyal man in Morgan comity who could 
 remain at home in safety. In four days that county was entirely 
 evacuated by the enemy. Romney and the most valuable portion of 
 Hampshire county was recovered without firing a gun, and before we 
 had even entered the county. 
 
 " I desire to say nothing against the Secretary of War. I take it 
 for granted that he has done what he believed to be best, but I regard 
 such a policy as ruinous. 
 
 " Very truly, your friend, 
 
 "T. J. Jackson. 
 " His Excellency John Letcher, Gov. of Ya." 
 
 mation of the order of which you have such cause to complain from your letter. 
 Is not that as great an official wrong to me as the order itself to you ? Let us 
 dispassionately reason with the government on this subject of command, and 
 if we fail to influence its practice, then ask to be relieved from positions the 
 authority of which is exercised by the War Department, while the responsibilities 
 are left to us. 
 
 " I have taken the liberty to detain your letter to make this appeal to your 
 patriotism, not merely from warm feelings of personal regard, but from the 
 official opinion, which makes me regard you as necessary to the service of your 
 country in your present position." (Johnston's Narrative, p. 88.) 
 
 Many soldiers and citizens added their efforts to those of Gen. Johnston and 
 Governor Letcher. 
 
32 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G3. 
 
 Tlie Governor says : " The Secretary of War received the general's 
 resignation before the general's letter reached me, and having been 
 informed of the fact by one of my aides, to whom Mr. Benjamin 
 commnnicated it, I at once went to the War Department, and after 
 some conversation between the Secretar)^ and myself, it was agreed 
 that no action should be taken until I should have an opportunity to 
 write to Gen. Jackson and receive his reply. I accordingly went to 
 my office and wrote him a long and earnest letter, informing him of 
 what had taken place, and urging such reasons as I thought would 
 induce him to remain in the field, and concluding with the request 
 that he would sanction what I had done and permit me to withdraw 
 his resignation. This letter was sent by my aide. Col. Boteler, and I 
 was greatly gratified, on his return, to find that the general acceded 
 to my wishes, and gave me his full consent to the withdrawal of his 
 letter of resignation from the files of the War Department." ^ 
 
 ^ From a communication of Governor Letcher to the " Richmond Whig." 
 Jackson's reply referred to is in the Archive OflSce in Washington, and is as 
 
 follovrs : 
 
 ■ "February 6, 1862. 
 " Governor : — Your letter of the 4th inst. was received this morning. If my 
 retiring from the army vrould produce the effect upon our country that you have 
 named in your letter, I, of course, vrould not desire to leave the service. And 
 if, upon the receipt of this note, your opinion remains unchanged, you are 
 authorized to withdravir my resignation, unless the Secretary of War desires 
 that it should be accepted. My reasons for resigning were set forth in my 
 letter of the 31st ult., and my views remain unchanged ; and if the Secretary 
 persists in the ruinous policy complained of, I feel that no officer can serve his 
 country better than by making his strongest possible protest against it, which, 
 in my opinion, is done by tendering his resignation, rather than be a willing 
 instrument in prosecuting the war upon a ruinous principle. I am much 
 obliged to you for requesting that I should be ordered to the Institute. 
 
 " Yours, etc.. 
 
 "T. J. Jackson." 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 KERNSTOWN. 
 
 The withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Romney was a 
 surrender of whatever had been gained by the expedition, for it soon 
 resulted in the reoccupation by the enemy of all the territory that had 
 been recovered from liim. 
 
 Various causes combined to prevent any further movement on the 
 part of Gen. Jackson for some weeks. After the events narrated in 
 the close of the last chapter it was deemed expedient to make some 
 changes. Gren. Loring was ordered to a new command in the south- 
 west, and all his troops that were not Virginians were gradually 
 removed to the other wing of Gen. Johnston's army. This took away 
 Anderson's brigade, composed of the First, Seventh, and Fourteenth 
 Tennessee regiments, and the First Georgia and Third Arkansas from 
 Taliaferro's, and left to Gen. Jaclvson, besides Garnett's brigade, Gil- 
 ham's brigade (now commanded by Col. J. S. Burks),^ composed of the 
 Twenty-first, Forty-second, and Forty-eighth Virginia regiments, and 
 the First battalion of regulars (commonly known as the Irish battalion), 
 and the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments, under 
 Col. Taliaferro. The militia commands had never been well organ- 
 ized, and they were now dwindling rapidly by details and enlistments 
 in the volunteer forces.'' In accordance with a law passed by the 
 
 1 Col. Gilham and Maj. Ship had been ordered back to the Virginia Military 
 Institute, where they held professorships, and Col. J. T. L. Preston, who had 
 acted as adjutant-general and chief of staff for Jackson during the past few 
 months, was ordered away for the same reason on February 1. 
 
 "^ The ideas of military efficiency in some of these commands were droll, and 
 no doubt vexatious enough to the general. In the absence of Gen. Carson the 
 command of his brigade devolved on Col. Sincindiver, a corpulent and good- 
 humored Dutchman, whose military training had been gained entirely at the 
 annual militia musters which before the war constituted a feature of Virginia 
 life. We find Jackson writing to him on February 11 : "I regret to hear from 
 an officer that it is impossible to execute an order. If your cavalry will not obey 
 your orders you must make them do it, and, if necessary, go out with them your- 
 self. I desire you to go out and post your cavalry where you want them to 
 
 33 
 
34 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G3. 
 
 Confederate Congress to encourage rc-enlistnients, furloughs for thirty 
 days were now given to those soldiers who re-enlisted, and a large 
 number of men were permitted to bo absent in this way. On the 7th 
 of February orders were issued to authorize the giving of furloughs 
 to re-enlisted men to the extent of one-third of the number present 
 for duty. The diminution of his force from these causes would have 
 kej)t Jackson inactive, even had not the condition of the roads, which 
 broke up iis soon as the weather moderated, put a stop to any important 
 movements. The opening of an aggressive campaign by the Federal 
 armies in Virginia, involving as it did an advance of the greatly 
 superior force in his front, was soon to throw him on the defensive. 
 
 Gen. Lander, finding that the Confederates had withdrawn from 
 Romney and the South Branch valley, reoccupied the former place 
 "without opposition on the 7th of February, and a few days later sent 
 an expedition as far south as Moorcfield. This party, under Col. 
 Dunning, of the Fifth Ohio, met with no serious resistance, and 
 brought off more than two hundred cattle. Work was basily resumed 
 on the railroad. Gen. Carson having fallen back from Bath to Bloom- 
 ery gap, and by the 14tli the bridge over the Great Cacapon was 
 rebuilt, and the railroad open once more from the west to Hancock. 
 On this day Lander made a bold dash, with four hundred cavalry 
 and several regiments of infantry, at the militia forces stationed at 
 Bloomery. Leaving Paw-Paw on the evening of the 13th, he con- 
 structed, during the night, a temporary bridge of wagons over the 
 Great Cacapon riv^er, at a point about seven miles south of the 
 railroad, and, crossing over, moved rapidly towards Bloomery, where 
 he took Col. Sincindiver' by surprise. Leading the charge of his 
 cavalry himself. Gen. Lauder dashed in among the Confederates be- 
 fore they had fully formed, and captured some seventy-five prisoners, 
 of whom seventeen were officers. The Confederates, rallying after 
 their first panic, checked the Federals until the trains could be gotten 
 away, when they retreated. The loss in killed and wounded was 
 insignificant on both sides. On the same day a reconnoissance in 
 force was made by Col. Carroll and two regiments of Federal infantry 
 to Unger's Store. As soon as Jackson knew of this affair he ordered 
 
 stay, and arrest any man who leaves his post, and prefer charges and specifica- 
 tions against him, that he may be court-martialed. It will not do to say that 
 your men cannot be induced to perform their duty. They must he made to do it. 
 When you hear of marauding parties, send out and bring them in as prisoners 
 of war." The afiiiir of the 14th of February can hardly be wondered at. 
 ^ Commanding in the absence of Gen. Carson. 
 
KERNSTOWN. 35 
 
 Ashby from INIartinsbnrg, with what force he had at hand, to check 
 the enemy. On the 16th, Col. Ashby drove out the detachment which 
 Lander had left at Bloomery gap, but the territory beyond remained 
 in Federal possession, and this rendered the railroad secure from 
 Hancock westward. Jackson ceased to give furloughs for the time, 
 and took steps, by sending a detachment with boats to Castleman's 
 ferry, on the Shenandoah, to make good his communications with 
 Gen. D. H. Hill, at Leesburg, on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge. 
 (Map No. 1.) These precautions were taken against the advance of 
 the enemy in force, but no fiuiher movements were made by Gen. 
 Lander. That gallant officer was soon disabled by the effects of a 
 wound received the preceding fall, which had been aggravated by 
 active service. He sank rapidly, and died at his headquarters at 
 Paw-Paw on the 2d of ISIarch. 
 
 The month of February wore on, — a month filled with disasters to 
 the Confederate cause. On the 6th of that mouth Fort Hemy, on the 
 Tennessee river, was captured ; on the 8th, Roanoke Island, ISTorth 
 Carolina, fell; on the 12th, the Confederates evacuated Lexington, 
 Missoiu-i; and on the 15th, Bowling Green, Kentucky. Fort Donel- 
 son, Tennessee, fell on the 15th, Nashville on the 26th, and the 
 evacuation of Columbus, Kentucky, was begun on the 27th. It was 
 at this dark hour that Mr. Davis was inaugurated at Richmond, on 
 the 22d of February, as first President of the Confederate States. 
 
 Meantime, the Federal administration was pushing forward its 
 preparations for the campaign against Richmond, and Gen. Johnston 
 was making his dispositions to meet them. President Lincoln was 
 anxious to attack Johnston in his position at Manassas, and, as part of 
 a general advance by all the Federal armies, which he ordered to take 
 place on, or before, February 22, he directed McClellan to advance 
 "with all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after 
 providing safely for the defence of Washington," and seize the Orange 
 and Alexandria railroad in Johnston's rear. This plan he abandoned, 
 on the urgent representations of McClellan, and reluctantly adopted 
 that general's plan of operations, by way of the lower Chesapeake 
 and the York and James rivers.^ But before orders were issued to 
 carry out this last purpose, it was determined to send Banks's and 
 Lander's commands forward to cover the rebuildinsf of the Baltimore 1/ 
 
 ' This plan embraced the transfer of the Federal army by water from the 
 vicinity of Washington and Alexandria to Fort Monroe, and its advance thence 
 up the peninsula formed by the York and James rivers against Richmond. 
 
36 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G2. 
 
 and Ohio railroad from Harper's Ferry to Hancock, and to take and 
 hokl Winchester and Stnisburg. Measures were taken for this purpose 
 about the 20th of February. On the 24th, the advance guard of 
 Gen. Banks's column' occupied Harper's Ferry, and a bateau bridge 
 was soon laid across the Potomac at that point. Canal boats were 
 collected for a more permanent bridge, and on the 26th Gen. McClellan 
 went himself to Harper's Ferry to hasten the forward movement. 
 He had ordered up two of the brigades of Sedgwick's (late Stone's) 
 division to reinforce Banks. The first two brigades that arrived at 
 Harper's Ferry were thrown over on the 26th, and orders were issued 
 for the others to follow, when an unforeseen difficulty caased the 
 Federal commander-in-chief to delay for the time the contemplated 
 movement. The canal boats were found to be too wide to pass 
 through the lock of the branch canal, which at this point was the 
 only outlet to the river. The permanent bridge could not, therefore, 
 be built at once, and a violent gale threatened the safet)^ of the tem- 
 porary one, which formed the only means of communication. " It 
 was evident," says Gen. McClellan, "that the troops under orders 
 would only be in the way should they arrive, and that it would not 
 be possible to subsist them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was, 
 therefore, deemed necessary to countermand the order, content our- 
 selves with covering the reopening of the railroad for the present, 
 and in the mean time use every exertion to establish, as promptly as 
 possible, depots of forage and subsistence on the Virginia side, to 
 supply the troops and enable them to move on to Winchester, 
 independently of the bridge. The next day (Friday, Februar)- 28) 
 I sent a strong reconnoissance to Charlestown, and under its protection 
 went there myself. I then determined to hold that place, and to 
 move the troops composing Lander's and AVilliams's commands at 
 once on Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually covering the 
 reconstruction of the railroad." 
 
 In accordance with these views Banks advanced slowly. ISIartins- 
 biu-g was occupied on the 3d of March, but it was the 6th before all 
 of Lander's division (now under Gen. Shields, who had been sent to 
 it upon Lander's death) were up, and the Federals had occupied 
 Bunker Hill and Smithfield.^ 
 
 * Banks had wintered at Frederick, Maryland. 
 
 * Gen. G. II. Gordon, then of the Second Massachusetts regiment, of Aber- 
 crombie's brigade, says the Federal troops were at that time disposed as follows : 
 "While our brigade moved on and to Charlestown from Harper's Ferry, Gen. 
 Williams moved from Hancock through Martinsburg to Bunker Ilill. . . . 
 
KER^^STO WN. 37 
 
 Jackson wrote to Gen. J. E. Johnston on the 24th of February as 
 follows: "General: — First Lieut. James K. Boswell, of the Pro- 
 visional Engineers, is directed to report to me for duty. I have 
 plenty of work for him, but if you desire additional fortifications 
 constructed for the defence of Winchester, please state what shall be 
 their character, and I will put him at work immediately after his 
 arrival. The subject of fortifying is of such importance as to induce 
 me to consult you before moving in the matter. If you think that 
 this place will be adequately reinforced if attacked, then it appears 
 to me that it should be strongly fortified. I have reason to believe 
 that the enemy design advancing on this place in large force. The 
 Seventh and Fom-teenth Tennessee regiments left, via Snicker's gap, 
 for Manassas on the 22d. The remaining part of Gen. Loring's 
 command can move at any time, but I deem it prudent to detain them 
 until other troops arrive, or until something further is heard from 
 you respecting their marching. The Third Arkansas regiment left 
 here on the 22d, for the purpose of taking the cars at 7 a.m. this 
 morning at Strasburg, en route for Fredericksburg. Gen. Holmes 
 requested that the Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee regiments 
 should move to Manassas, where they should halt until they should 
 receive orders to go to Evansport. I am making arrangements to 
 construct, if possible, a raft bridge at Castleman's, so the troops at 
 Leesburg and this place can co-operate with the least loss of time. 
 If the two places were connected by telegraph several hours would 
 be saved." ^ 
 
 But the retreat of the main Confederate army from the positions it 
 
 Gen. Hamilton, passing through Charlestown, stopped at Smithfield, midway 
 between Charlestown and Bunker Hill. Gen. Shields halted at Martinsburg, and 
 Gen. Sedgwick at Charlestown." Abercrombie, Williams, and Hamilton then 
 commanded the three brigades which constituted Banks's division, (History of 
 Second Massachusetts Regiment, 3d Paper, p. 15.) 
 
 On March 2, Banks, at Charlestown, was informed by a negro scout sent out 
 by Col. Strother (of his staff) of the preparations for the evacuation of Win- 
 chester, etc. Strother says Banks was held back from advancing rapidly by 
 the fear of a concentration from Manassas at Winchester against him, thus 
 reversing the Manassas campaign of July, 1861. (" Harper's Magazine," 
 January, 1867.) 
 
 ^ Jackson's vigor in enforcing discipline is illustrated by an order on Febru- 
 ary 25 to prevent the introduction of liquors into his command, which had 
 been done by means of boxes sent to the soldiers by their friends. He directed 
 " that every wagon that came into camp should be searched, and if any liquor 
 were found, it was to be spilled out, and the wagon and horses turned over to 
 the quartermaster." (Hotchkiss's Diary.) 
 
38 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, ISO 1-63. 
 
 luwl held since July, 18G1, was about to bcf^in. Gen. Johnston, after 
 conference with President Davis, luitl begun the removal of stores and 
 y baggage on February 22. With the limited railroad facilities pos- 
 sessed by the Confederates, two weeks were not sufficient for the 
 transportation of all the supplies that had been accumulated at and 
 about Manassas, but Gen. Johnston did not think it prudent to delay 
 longer. There were signs of activity among the Federal troops 
 opposite his right, w'hich led him to expect a movement by McClellan 
 in the direction of Fredericksburg. The latter, under urgent pressure 
 from President Lincoln, was really preparing to attack the Confederate 
 batteries which partially blockaded the Potomac on Gen. Johnston's 
 right. Johnston deemed that the time had come to place his army 
 behind the Rappahannock, where he w^ould be in position to meet a 
 direct advance, or to oppose McClellan at Fredericksburg, should the 
 Federal army choose that route, or to reach Richmond quickly in 
 case of an advance by the York or James rivers. The movement 
 was begun on the morning of the 7th of ISIarch by the withdrawal of 
 Whiting from the low^er Occoquan to Fredericksburg, and of D. H. 
 Hill from Leesburg, by way of Warrenton, to the Rappahannock. 
 The centre fell back from Centreville and Bull Run on the evening 
 of the 9 th, and on the 11th all the infantry and artillery were on the 
 south side of the Rappahannock. 
 
 Jackson, meanwhile, remained at Winchester, watching closely the 
 advance of Banks, and doing what was possible to impede it. Gen. 
 Johnston thus describes the duty assigned to him : " After it had 
 become evident that the Valley was to be invaded by an army too 
 strong to be encountered by Jackson's division, that officer was 
 instructed to endeavor to employ the invaders in the Valley, but 
 without exposmg himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near 
 the enemy as to prevent him from making any considerable detach- 
 ment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he might be com- 
 pelled to fight." 
 
 Jackson's command at this time consisted of Garnett's brigade 
 (" Stonewall"), containing the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, 
 and Thirty-third Virginia regiments; Burks's brigade, containing 
 the Twenty-first, Forty-second, and Fortj^-eighth A^irginia regiments, 
 and First battalion of regulars (Irish) ; and Fulkerson's brigade, 
 containing the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments. 
 These brigades were now numbered in order, — Fu-st, Second, and 
 Third brigades of the Army of the Valley. There were five 
 batteries of artillery and Ashby's regiment of cavalry. Jackson's entire 
 
KERNSTOWN. 39 
 
 force amounted to about four thousand six hundred (4600) effective 
 men, exclusive of some remnants of the militia brigades, distributed 
 at various points in his district.^ Gen. Banks had his own division, 
 under Williams, and Shields's (late Lander's) troops now incorporated 
 in his corps, and also the three brigades of Sedgwick. On the 1st of 
 April the strength of Banlts's corps (Fifth), embracing Shields, is given 
 by Gen. McClellan as twenty-three thousand three hundred and thirty- 
 nine (23,339), including three thousand six hundred and fifty-two 
 (3652) cavalry, and excluding two thousand one hundred (2100) rail- 
 road guards.^ Sedgwick's division,^ which was with him in the 
 
 1 In J. E. Johnston's field return of February 28, 1862, the force in the 
 " Valley District" under Jackson is as follows (after correcting some mistakes in 
 the addition) : 
 
 Present for duty, officers and men: infantry, 4297; artillery, 369; cavalry, 
 601 ; total, 5267. 
 
 An examination of such regimental returns as are on file among the Con- 
 federate archives in Washington shows that the strength (present for duty, 
 officers and men), on the Ist of March, of the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh 
 Virginia regiments (Fulkerson's brigade), and of the Twenty-first, Forty- 
 second, and Forty-eighth Virginia regiments and the Irish battalion (Burks's 
 brigade), was 1837. No returns of Garnett's brigade of that date are to be 
 found there; but the returns of the Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty- 
 third Virginia regiments for February 1 give their strength as 1403. These 
 regiments, with the Second Virginia, constituted Garnett's brigade. Estimating 
 the Second at the average of the other four, the brigade numbered at that date 
 1754. Adding this to the sum given above for the other brigades on March 1, 
 we have 3591 — say 3600 — as the infantry under Jackson on Mai'ch 1. The dif- 
 ference (about 700) between this and the infantry strength as given by Gen. 
 Johnston is to be accounted for either by supposing that some of the fragments 
 of the militia commands were included in the return used by Johnston, or that 
 some of the non-Virginian regiments ordered elsewhere had not gone at the date 
 of the making of that return. The last of these regiments did not leave Jack- 
 son's district until the 22d or 23d of February. Taking the artillery and cavalry 
 from Gen. Johnston's return, Jackson's effective strength (excluding some rem- 
 nants of militia) was, — infantry, 3600; artillery, 369; cavalry, 601; total, 4570 
 — say 4600 — men. 
 
 "^ McClellan's report, in " Rebellion Record," p. 546, vol. i.. Supplement. 
 
 ' McClellan says, " The whole of Banks's division and two brigades of 
 Sedgwick's division were thrown across the river at Harper's Ferrj', leaving one 
 brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe and guard the Potomac from Great 
 Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy." This last brigade of Sedgwick's (Gor- 
 man's) was subsequently sent forward, March 11, and joined those in advance 
 at Berryville on the 14th. Jackson having retired and Winchester having been 
 occupied, the whole of Sedgwick's division was sent back to Bolivar on March 15. 
 Gen. McClellan's morning report, dated March 2, 1862, gives Banks's strength 
 as follows : 
 
40 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G2. 
 
 advance on Winchester, must have increased his force to more than 
 thirty thousand (30,000) men. 
 
 Jackson sent his stores, baggage, and sick to the rear, but continued 
 to hold his position at AVinchester to the last moment. This town 
 lies in the midst of an open country, and is easily turned on every 
 side. Nevertheless, the Confederate commander ordered the fortifica- 
 tions to be repaired as soon as the movements of the enemy indicated 
 an advance in his direction. Banks, as stated, occupied Charlestown 
 on the 26th of February, and made reconnoLssances on the different 
 roads leading to and around Winchester. But it was not until March 7 
 that his advance reached Stephenson's depot, four miles from Win- 
 chester. Jackson awaited him, drawn up in line of battle, on the 
 plain in front of his fortifications, and between the Berryville and 
 Martinsburg roads. The Federals did not attack, but withdrew to 
 Charlestown. The activity of Ashby's cavalry, and the boldness with 
 which Jackson maintained his position, impressed his adversary with 
 the conviction that the Confederate force was much greater than it 
 was in reality. No attack was made by the wary enemy, and no 
 opportunity afforded of making a dash at some exposed position of 
 his advance. The Federal left was pushed gradually forward, as if 
 to envelop Jackson, and on the 11th occupied Berryville. Sedgwick's 
 division was thrown forward to this point. (Map No. 1.) 
 
 Excellent roads lead from Berryville to Winchester, and to New- 
 town and other points in rear of Winchester. It was no longer safe for 
 the Confederate leader to hold his position. The enemy at Beriy ville 
 was already on his flank, only ten miles distant, and could easily 
 reach his rear. He again drew up his little force, however, north of 
 the town, to meet the advance of the main body of Banks's force from 
 the direction of Smithfield and Charlestown, and remained imder 
 arms all day ; but, though the enemy came on to within four miles 
 of Winchester, they did not attack. Late in the afternoon Jackson 
 reluctantly withdrew, and after night followed his trains, which had 
 
 Officers and men present for duty : 
 
 Banks's division 15,398 
 
 Lander's " (Shields's) 11,869 
 
 Sedgwick's " 11,217 
 
 Total 38,484 
 
 This, no doubt, included railroad guards and other detachments in the rear, 
 but his movable column could hardly have been less than 30,000 men, and was 
 probably more, up to the 15th of March, when Sedgwick's division was ordered 
 to the rear. 
 
KERNSTOWN. 41 
 
 already been sent forward to Kernstown and Ne\\i;own.^ The inde- 
 fatigable Ashby covered the rear, and Banks occupied the town on 
 the morning of the 12th. The same day the main body of the Con- 
 federates reached Strasbiirg, distant eighteen miles from Winchester, 
 where they halted until the 15th. Banks sent forAvard Shields's 
 division, which, on the 19th, entered Strasburg, and Jackson fell 
 back before it to Woodstock and Mount Jackson, the former place 
 being twelve and the latter twenty-four miles southwest of Strasburg. 
 (Map No. I.) 
 
 The antagonism between Gren. McClellan and the Federal admin- 
 istration, that ultimately resulted in the removal of the former from 
 command, assumed definite shape soon after the entrance of Mr. 
 Stanton upon his duties as Secretary of War, in January, 1862. As 
 a consequence, there was much vacillation about the movements of the 
 Federal Army of the Potomac. McClellan strongly urged the plan 
 of campaign by way of the Peninsula, Math Fortress Monroe as a 
 base. President Lincoln refused to approve, then gave his consent, 
 then half withdrew it by loading down the proposed movement with 
 conditions to be first fulfilled. Gen. Johnston's retirement from 
 Manassas relieved the Federal administration, in some degree, of its 
 apprehensions in regard to Washington, and induced an acquiescence 
 for the time in McClellan's plans. The follo^nng extracts from 
 McClellan's report show the Federal plans at this time -? 
 
 ^ Jackson had ordered his trains into camp immediately south of Winchester, 
 but, by some mistake on the part of those in charge, they were taken between 
 Kernstown and Newtown, some five miles or more from Winchester, and the 
 troops had to march that distance to get supper. The general, who had re- 
 mained behind and was ignorant of this, called a council, consisting of Gen. 
 Garnett and the regimental commanders of the "Stonewall" brigade, to meet in 
 Winchester after dark, and to them he proposed a night attack upon the portion 
 of Banks's troops near Stephenson's. He proposed, after the troops had eaten 
 supper and rested for some hours, that they should march to the neighborhood 
 of the enemy and make the attack before daylight. The plan was not approved 
 by the council, and Jackson learned from those present that the troops, instead 
 of being in the suburbs of Winchester, were already five or six miles away. A 
 march of ten miles would thus be needed to bring them into contact with the 
 enemy. This last fact and the disapproval of the council caused him to abandon 
 the plan. He followed the troops and bivouacked in a fence-corner. The fore- 
 going is understood to have been Jackson's first and last council of war. (For 
 the above account I am indebted to Gen. John Echols, of Staunton, Virginia, 
 then colonel of the Twenty-seventh Virginia regiment, who was present at the 
 conference.) 
 
 ' McClellan's report, pp. 531, etc., "Rebellion Record," vol. i., Supplement. 
 
 4 
 
42 CAMPAIGN JN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-6S. 
 
 " Headquarters Army of Potomac. 
 "Fairfax Court-IIocse, March 13, 1862. 
 
 " A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the head- 
 quarters of the Army of the Potomac, were of the opinion — 
 
 *' I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordons- 
 ville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is tlie opinion of the 
 generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on 
 will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York 
 and James rivers. Provided: 
 
 " 1st. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralized. 
 
 " 2d. That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate 
 transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and 
 Alexandria to move doAvn the Potomac ; and 
 
 "3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in 
 silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York river. 
 
 "4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such 
 as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. 
 (Unanimous.) 
 
 " II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved 
 against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible 
 moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, 
 and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army 
 should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alexandria and 
 the Acquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.) 
 
 "N.B. — That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully 
 garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in 
 front of the Virginia line of twenty-five thousand men would suffice. 
 (Sumner.) 
 
 " This was assented to by myself, and immediately communicated to 
 the W ar Department. The following reply was received the same 
 day: 
 
 '"War Department, March 13, 1S62. 
 
 " ' The President having considered the plan of operations agreed 
 upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no 
 objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its 
 execution : 
 
 " ' 1st. Leave such forces at Manassas Junction as shall make it 
 entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that 
 position and line of communication. 
 
 " ' 2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. 
 
 " ' 3d. Move the remainder of the force do^vTi the Potomac, choosing 
 a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there ; 
 or, at all eventSj move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit 
 of the enemy by some route. 
 
 " ' Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 
 "'Maj.-Gen. George B. McClellan.'" 
 
 For the purpose of leaving Washington secure, the defences of that 
 
KERNSTOWN. 43 
 
 city were well manned, and the command of them given to Gen. 
 Wadswortli, and the following instructions were sent to Gen. Banks : 
 
 " Headquarters Army of Potomac, 
 March 16, 1862. 
 
 " Sir : — You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, 
 intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets out to the front. 
 
 " Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Wash- 
 ington to Manassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communi- 
 cations to the Valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas 
 Gup railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say 
 four regiments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the 
 railway, crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of 
 cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and 
 thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shen- 
 andoah valley, as well as through Chester gap, which might, perhaps, 
 be advantageously occupied by a detachment of infantry ; well-in- 
 trenched block-houses should be built at all the railway bridges. 
 Occupy, by grand guards, Warrenton Junction and Warrenton itself, 
 and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexan- 
 dria railroad, as soon as the railway bridge is repaired. 
 
 " Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the 
 two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at 
 your disposal to scout towards the Occoquan, and probably a fourth 
 towards Leesburg. 
 
 " To recapitulate : the most important points which should engage 
 your attention are as follows : 
 
 " 1st. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, 
 perhaps even Centreville, and another force (a brigade), also well 
 intrenched, near Strasburg. 
 
 " 2d. Block-houses at the railway bridges. 
 
 " 3d. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front. 
 
 " 4th. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction, and in advance as far 
 as the Rappahannock, if possible. 
 
 " 5th. Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early informa- 
 tion as to the enemy. 
 
 " 6th. The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and 
 Washington. 
 
 " The above is communicated bv command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 " S. Williams, A. A. G. 
 
 " Maj.-Gen. N. p. Banks, Cora. Fifth Corps, Army of Potomac." 
 
 In compliance with these instructions, Shields's division was recalled 
 from Strasburg, and Williams's division began its movement towards 
 Manassas on the 20th of March. The Confederate force in front was 
 known to be so small that no difficulty was anticipated in carrying 
 out McClellan's instructions, and no apprehensions were entertained 
 
44 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 tliat tlic force designated by him would not be sufficient to hold the 
 lower Valley and " cover the line of the Potomac." 
 
 On the evening of March 21, Col. Ashby, who for several days 
 had been vigorously skirmishing with the enemy between Strasburg 
 and Woodstock, reported that they had evacuated the former place, 
 and Jackson, apprehensive that this indicated their withdrawal from 
 his military district in the direction of Washington, determined at 
 once to pursue with all his available force. Fulkerson's brigade, 
 which was at Woodstock, marched at dawn on the 22d, and at the 
 same time Garnett's (" Stonewall") and Burks's brigades left Mount 
 Jackson. The whole camped at Strasburg on the evening of the 22d. 
 Ashby had followed the retreating enemy on Friday night, 21st, and 
 on Saturday, 22d, came up with the Federal pickets about one mile 
 south of Winchester. He attacked about 5 p.m., and drove them in. 
 Gen. Banks was still in Winchester, and, though the last of Williams's 
 division had left early on the morning of the 22d on the way to 
 Manassas, the Second division, under Shields, was still in the place. 
 This command was ordered under arms, and an infantry brigade and 
 two batteries of artillery and some cavalry were sent out on the 
 Strasburg road to meet Ashby. The latter, who had from two hun- 
 dred to three hundred cavalry and Chew's battery of three guns, after 
 a brief skirmish, retired to Kernstown, three miles south of Win- 
 chester, Avhere he took position for the night. The enemy, having 
 repelled the Confederate cavalry, did not pursue. In the skirmish 
 Gen. Shields was struck by a piece of shell, which fractured his arm 
 and disabled him for a time for service on the field. Gen. Shields 
 says that in this aifair he concealed his troops as much as possible 
 from the Confederates,^ and the impression of the smallness of his 
 force thus produced was confirmed by the information obtained within 
 his lines by Col. Ashby. Report was brought to the latter not only 
 that the mass of the northern troops had left, but that only four regi- 
 ments of infantry remained, and that these were under orders to march 
 to Harper's Ferry in the morning. This information, transmitted to 
 Gen. Jackson, induced the latter to hurry forward the next day. 
 
 During the night Gen. Shields made his dispositions to resist any 
 further attack, by sending forward Kimball's brigade and Daum's 
 artillery on the Strasburg road, nearly to Kernstown. Sullivan's 
 brigade was posted in rear of Kimball's, within supporting distance 
 of it, covering all the approaches to Winchester by way of the Cedar 
 
 * Gen. Shields's report. 
 
KERNSTOWN. 45 
 
 Creek, Front Royal, Berryville, and Eomney roads. Tyler's brigade 
 and Broadhead's cavalry were held in reserve. The effective strength 
 of his whole force Gen. Shields puts at seven thousand (7000).^ 
 
 But though these precautions were taken, the Federal commanders 
 did not expect an attack. The force under Jackson was known to be 
 so greatly inferior to their own that they did not think he would risk 
 a battle so far from support as was Winchester from the position 
 occupied by Gen. Johnston, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan. 
 On the morning of the 23d a Federal reconnoissance was made, of 
 which Gen. Shields says : " Not being able to reconnoitre the front in 
 person, I despatched an experienced officer, Col. J. T. Mason, of the 
 Fom-th Ohio volunteers, about 9 o'clock a.m., to the front to perform 
 that duty, and to report to me as promptly as possible every circum- 
 stance that might indicate the presence of the enemy. About an hour 
 after, Col. Mason returned, and reported to me that he had carefully 
 reconnoitred the country in front and on both flanks, and found no 
 indications of any hostile force, except that of Ashby. I communi- 
 cated this information to IVIaj.-Gen. Banks, who was then with me, 
 and, after consulting together, we both concluded that Jackson could 
 not be tempted to hazard himself so far away from his main support. 
 Having both come to this conclusion, Gen. Banks took his departm'e 
 for Washington, being already under orders to that effect. The officers 
 of his staff, however, remained behind, intending to leave for Centre- 
 ville in the afternoon."^ 
 
 Jackson, on the other hand, knowing that a large body of Federal 
 troops had left Winchester, and were marching in the direction of 
 Manassas and Centreville, and believing, from the information re- 
 ceived through Col. Ashby, that the force remaining in Winchester 
 was much smaller than was actually the case, determined to lose no 
 time in attacking the latter, that he might thereby produce a recall of 
 the troops sent off. At daylight on Sunday morning (23d) he sent 
 forward three companies of the Second Virginia regiment and one 
 of the Twenty-seventh Virginia, under Capt. Nadenbousch, as an 
 infantrj^ support to Col. Ashby, and soon after moved forward with 
 his whole force in the direction of Kernsto^vn. The distance to be 
 marched was fourteen miles, and it was ten o'clock in the forenoon 
 
 ^ McClellan says (p. 546 of his report, in "Rebellion Record"), in a letter 
 dated April 1, 18G2, to the adjutant-general U.S.A.: "If Shields's division, 
 leaving out the cavalry, consisted of only 7000, the other division, under Wil- 
 liams, must have contained over 12,000 men." 
 
 ^ Gen, Shields's report, "Rebellion Record," vol. iv. 
 
46 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 before the advance under Nadenbousch readied Ashby, and 1 p.m. 
 when tlie main Confetlerate force reached the vicinity of Kornstown. 
 Col. Mason's report to Gen. Shields of the condition of affairs at 
 9 A.^r. Avas therefore perfectly correct, for at that time Jackson was 
 still miles away. 
 
 When Jackson reached Kernsto^vn his troops were very weary. 
 Three-fourths of them had the day before marched from the neighbor- 
 hood of Mount Jackson to Strasburg, a distance of twenty-two miles, 
 to which had been added the march of fourteen miles from the latter 
 place to Kernstown. He therefore gave directions for bivouacking, 
 and says : " Though it was very desirable to prevent the enemy from 
 leaving the Valley, yet I deemed it best not to attack until morning." 
 He continues : " But subsequently, ascertaining that the Federals had 
 a position from which our forces could be seen, I concluded that it 
 would be dangerous to postpone the attack until the next day, as 
 ^reinforcements might be brought up during the night." ^ 
 
 Meantime, Ashby had been actively skirmishing with the enemy. 
 He had opened on them near the Strasburg turnpike with Chew's bat- 
 tery, and when Nadenbousch arrived he pushed forward the infantry 
 companies under the latter to drive back the Federal skirmishers and 
 protect the guns. For a little time Ashby advanced, and Naden- 
 bousch drove the enemy's skirmishers before him. But Col. Kim- 
 ball, who commanded the First brigade of Shields's division, and as 
 senior Federal officer commanded on the field in the absence of Gen. 
 Shields, soon made his dispositions to counteract this movement of 
 Ashby by sending forward the Eighth Ohio and two companies of 
 the Sixtj^-seventh Ohio as skirmishers, on both sides of the turnpike. 
 He supported them on the right by Jenks's battery, posted on a hill 
 to the west of the village of Kernstown, and on the left by the whole 
 of Sullivan's brigade (the Second of Shields's division), with several 
 batteries so disposed as to protect that flank. Of course this force soon 
 checked Ashby and compelled him to retire. When he had fallen 
 back some four or five hundred yards, he was informed of the arrival 
 of the main body of the Confederates, and received orders to prepare 
 for an advance upon the Federal position, the special duty assigned 
 him being to " threaten the front and right" (Federal left). At the 
 same time a part of his cavalry regiment, under Maj. Funsteu, was 
 detached to operate on the other flank (left) of the Confederate army. 
 This detachment was subsequently increased until it amounted to one 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
KERNSTO WN. 
 
 47 
 
 hundred and forty men, which left mth Ashby only one hundred and 
 fifty cavalry. (Map No. III.) 
 
 ■ Jackson's infantry force consisted of the First ("Stonewall") bri- 
 gade, now under Gen. Garnett, comprising five regiments, and of the 
 Second, now under Col. Burks, comprising three regiments and one 
 battalion, and of the Third brigade, under Col. Fulkerson, compris- 
 ing only two regiments. The Forty-eighth Virginia regiment, of 
 Burks's brigade, was acting as train-guard, and was not on the field 
 during the battle. All these regiments were much reduced by the 
 absence of re-enlisted men still on furlough, and of those who had 
 fallen out of ranks in the severe two days' march. The number 
 present; on the afternoon of the battle was : of infantry, three thousand 
 and eighty-seven (3087), of which two thousand seven hundred and 
 forty-two (2742) were engaged; of artillery, twenty-seven (27) pieces, 
 of which eighteen (18) were engaged; and of cavalry, two hundred 
 and ninety (290).^ Gen. Shields, as above, states his force of all arms 
 at seven thousand (7000).^ 
 
 ^ The forces under Gen. Jackson at Kernstown were as follows (I have ap- 
 pended strength given in the regimental reports of the battle as far as it could 
 be found) : 
 
 First brigade, under Gen. Garnett : 
 
 Second Virginia regiment 
 
 Fourth Virginia regiment 
 
 Fifth Virginia regiment .... 
 
 Twenty-seventh Virginia regiment . 
 
 Thirty-third Virginia regiment 
 
 McLaughlin's battery .... 
 
 AVaters's battery 
 
 Carpenter's battery 
 
 Second brigade, under Col. Burks : 
 
 Twenty-first Virginia regiment 
 
 Forty-second Virginia regiment 
 
 Forty-eighth Virginia regiment 
 
 First battalion of regulars (Irish battalion) 
 
 Marye's battery 
 
 Third brigade, under Col. Fulkerson : 
 
 Twenty-third Virginia regiment 
 
 Thirty -seventh Virginia regiment . 
 
 Shumaker's battery .... 
 
 Ashby's regiment of cavalry 
 
 Chew's battery ...... 
 
 The Forty-eighth Virginia regiment and the batteries of Shumaker and Marye 
 were not engaged. 
 
 ^ Gen. Shields says he " had 6000 infantry and a cavalry force of 750, and 24 
 pieces of artillery." His organization was as follows : 
 
 320 rank and file. 
 203 " " " 
 not found. 
 170 muskets. 
 275 rank and file, 
 not found, 8 guns. 
 90 men, 4 " 
 48 " 4 " 
 
 270. 
 
 293. 
 
 not found. 
 
 187. 
 
 4 guns. 
 
 177 officers and men. 
 
 397 " " " 
 4 guns. 
 290. 
 3 guns. 
 
48 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 A high ridge lies just beyond the western limits of Winchester, 
 and extends for some miles in both a northeast and a south^vest direc- 
 tion from the town. After breaking one mile from the town to let 
 througli Abram's creek, it continues in the southwest direction with- 
 out serious interruption for six miles, until it is again broken by the 
 valley of the Opcquon creek, at J. S. McGill's. The Strasburg or 
 " Valley" turnpike runs not far from the eastern foot of this ridge to 
 a toll-gate about two miles southwest of Winchester. At that point 
 the Calar Creek turnpike branches off to the right, and, pursuing a 
 more westerly direction, soon crosses this ridge at a depression on J. N. 
 Bell's farm. The main or Strasbiu-g road, gradually separating from 
 the ridge, continues nearly due south to Kernstown and some distance 
 beyond, when it again bends to the southwest. To the west of the 
 last-named village a considerable elevation, kno^ioi as Pritchard's 
 hill, intervenes between the turnpike and ridge, affording a good 
 position for artillery. A short distance south of the toll-gate, where 
 the Cedar Creek road leaves the Valley turnpike, a common dirt 
 road also leaves it, on the same side but at a less angle. This road, 
 know^n as the Middle, or old Cedar Creek road, runs along the 
 eastern face of the ridge spoken of, crossing the little spurs that jut 
 out from it, and passes between Pritchard's hill and the ridge, but 
 does not cross the latter. It passes through the ridge at the gap 
 
 First (Kimball's) brigade : 
 8th Ohio regiment. 
 
 67th " 
 
 14th Indiana " 
 
 84th Pennsylvania reg't. 
 
 Second (Sullivan'B) brigade : 
 13th Indiana regiment. 
 
 5th Ohio " 
 
 62d " " 
 
 39th Illinois " 
 
 Third (Tyler's) brigade : 
 7th Ohio regiment. 
 29th " " 
 
 'i/ist Virginia " ' 
 7th Indiana " 
 110th Pennsylvania reg't. 
 
 Daum's artillery : 
 
 Jenks's battery ("A," First Virginia). 
 Clark's " ("E," Fourth artillery). 
 Davis's " ("B," First Virginia). 
 Robinson's " (" L," First Ohio). 
 Huntington's battery (" H," First Ohio). 
 
 Broadhead's cavalry : 
 
 4 companies First Michigan cavalry. 
 Ohio " 
 
 Maryland " 
 
 First Virginia " 
 Ringgold and Washing- 
 ton cavalry. 
 There were also a company of Massachusetts sharpshooters, and Company B, 
 First Maryland infantry (Federal), present. 
 
 Gen. McClellan's return for March gives Shields's strength (officers and men 
 present for duty) as 12,255, and enumerates 203 companies as composing his 
 division. From the above it appears that about 152 or 153 of these companies 
 were present at Kernstown. At the average Gen. Shields would have had over 
 9000 men present. 
 
KERNSTOWN. 49 
 
 made by the Opequon valley. Several country roads or lanes con- 
 nect the " Middle" road with the Valley turnpike on the one hand, 
 and with the Cedar Creek turnpike on the other. The most important 
 of them is one leading from Kernstown over the very crest of the 
 ridge into the valley beyond, and thence to the Cedar Creek turnpike. 
 The ridge we speak of commands the Strasburg road from Kerns- 
 town to Winchester. A level country extends eastward from this 
 last-named road and gradually falls away towards the Opequon. 
 (Map No. III.) 
 
 Jackson, upon his arrival, found the enemy in full force of artillery 
 and infantry upon both sides of the Strasbm^g road, with guns posted 
 also above Kernstown, on Pritchard's hill. The enemy's position in 
 front was good, and Ashby's operations had induced him to guard so 
 heavily his left flank, east of the turnpike, that no favorable oppor- 
 tunity was there offered for attack. Jackson therefore determined 
 to seize the main ridge, turn the enemy's right flank resting on it, and 
 thus render his whole line untenable. He left Col. Burks's brigade 
 with Ashby on the turnpike, to support the latter and to act as reserve, 
 while he led Fulkerson's brigade and part of Carpenter's battery 
 towards the left. "When near Opequon church,* Carpenter halted and 
 fired a few rounds at the enemy on Pritchard's hill. He then 
 followed the infantry farther to the left, under a heavy shelling from 
 the Federal batteries,^ until the high ground was reached. Garnett's 
 brigade was made to follow. Having found a favorable position for 
 artillery, Jackson sent for the remainder of Carpenter's, and also for 
 IMcLaughlin's and Waters's batteries, supported by a portion of Col. 
 Burks's brigade. Jackson directed Ashby to keep up a continuous 
 demonstration on the turnpike, and now opened vigorously on the left 
 with his batteries. These were located along the ridge, parallel to its 
 general direction, and engaged the Federal batteries to the east and 
 
 ^ This church carries one back to the first settlement of the Valley of Vir- 
 ginia. The first regular settlement in this Valley was made in 1732 by a party 
 of colonists, consisting of sixteen families, under Joist Hite, from Pennsylvania, 
 who settled on the Opequon. They were Scotch-Irish Presbyterians. In 1735, 
 William Hoge joined them, and having settled on the land about Kernstown, 
 gave the lot on which the church stands for the use of the first Presbyterian 
 congregation ever organized in Virginia west of the Blue Ridge. Mr. Iloge was 
 the ancestor of the family of that name distinguished in church and state in 
 Virginia. (Foote's Sketches.) 
 
 * Col. Fulkerson speaks of this shelling as very heavy. The remaining in- 
 fantry were ordered to the ridge by a route more to the rear and less exposed 
 to the Federal guns. (Map No. III.) 
 
50 CAMPAIGX IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 uortlioast of tlicm, forcing the enemy to withdraw. The Twenty- 
 seventh A^irginia (Col. John Ecliols) and the Twenty-first Virginia 
 (Col. J. M. Patton) were thrown forward as skirmishers in advance 
 of the artilleiy, and soon became hotly engaged. The Thirty-seventh 
 and Twenty-third Virginia regiments, under Col. Fulkersou, then 
 moved forward on the left of Echols, and, in the face of a heavy 
 musketry fire, occupied a stone fence which ran down the west side 
 of the ridge. This fence ran along the southern edge of a narrow, 
 rocky field, on the northern side of which was a large body of woods. 
 The position of Fulkersou, perpendicular to the direction of the 
 ridge, was nearly at right angles to the line of batteries that consti- 
 tuted the Confederate right wing. Echols and Patton, who were 
 quickly supported by the Thirty-third, Second, and Fourth Vir- 
 ginia regiments, of Garnett's brigade, and the Irish battalion, held 
 the centre, which constituted an angle, since the line did not con- 
 tinue down the east side of the ridge, but having reached the crest 
 was turned back along the top. The Confederate line was thus 
 wedge-shaped : the artillery constituting the right arm, Fulkerson's 
 brigade the left, and four of Garnett's with two of Burks's regiments 
 occupying the centre, to the northwest of the crest of the ridge, and 
 facing, for the most part, in the same direction as Fulkei*son's. 
 (Map No. III.) 
 
 The movements of the Confederates and the fire of their batteries 
 had revealed to Col. Kimball the danger to which his right wing was 
 exposed, and he had taken prompt steps to counteract the threatened 
 onset. Tyler's brigade had reached the toll-gate at the junction of 
 the Cedar Creek and Strasburg roads about 2 p.m., and was waiting 
 there in reserve. This force (composed of the Seventh and Twentj^- 
 ninth Ohio, First Virginia, Seventh Indiana, and One Hundred and 
 Tenth Pennsylvania) was ordered to reinforce the Federal right, and 
 to throw itself upon the Confederate left flank. The movement was 
 promptly executed. On its success depended the day, for it was justly 
 feared by Col. Kimball that his right would not be able to sustain the 
 attack of Jackson. Tyler moved out on the Cedar Creek road to the 
 point where that road crosses the ridge, when he left the road and 
 moved rapidly along the crown and both faces of the ridge itself until 
 he reached the battle-field. This he did by 3.30 p.m., which was just 
 when Jackson had sent forward his infantry to flank the Federal 
 right. Tyler at once led his troops to the attack, his right opposite 
 to Fulkerson. A vigorous onset was made against the Confederate 
 line, but it was everywhere repulsed. Fulkerson had just occupied 
 
KERNSTOWN. 51 
 
 the position behind the stone fence, already mentioned, when he was 
 attacked by two Federal regiments attempting to seize the same cover. 
 His fire at close quarters was so severe that the Federal regiments 
 broke, and one of them, the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, 
 did not recover during the day. The remainder of the Federal line, 
 however, soon rallied and renewed the attack, and a fierce and san- 
 guinary conflict raged, especially along the Confederate centre. A 
 second attempt to turn Fulkerson's left flank was defeated, and the 
 heat of the battle was concentrated on Garnett's part of the line. For 
 two hours the roar of the musketry and artillery was incessant. 
 " Here the struggle became desperate, and for a short time doubtful," 
 says Gen. Shields. Keiuforcements drawn from the Federal left, now 
 that it had become evident that the main attack was against the other 
 flank, were rapidly hurried forward to Tyler. The Fifth and Sixty- 
 second Ohio and Thirteenth Indiana, of Sullivan's brigade. Fourteenth 
 Indiana and Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, and seven companies of 
 the Sixty-seventh Ohio, and three companies of the Eighth Ohio, of 
 Kimball's brigade, went to his assistance, and with these fresh troops 
 a new and more vigorous attack was made on the Confederate 
 position. 
 
 Meantime, Jackson was using every effort to make headway against 
 this force, so much larger than he had believed within reach, and so 
 much greater than his own. His thinned and tired regiments were 
 incited to hold on stubbornly to the advantage gained. The places 
 of the fallen were quickly taken by others, and when the ammunition 
 of some was expended they borrowed from those who yet had it. 
 The Fifth Virginia, which had been left in reserve, and the Forty- 
 second Virginia were ordered up, and a messenger was sent back to 
 the train to hurry forward the Forty-eighth, that the last man might 
 be thrown into the wavering scale. But before these slight reser^^es 
 arrived the onset of Tyler, strengthened as he was by six additional 
 regiments, had stag-o-ered the Confederate line and caused it to waver. 
 Gen. Giirnett, who was bearing the brunt of the attack, felt that his 
 thinned lines could not longer maintain their position without risk of 
 being overwhelmed. He therefore gave the order to fall back. This 
 order was not known to Jackson, who was at the time on a different 
 part of the field, and he bitterly regretted it, always maintaining that 
 his troops could have held their positions until the reserves had gotten 
 up. The Confederate left wing was easily able from its position be- 
 hind the stone fence to maintain itself, but the retirement of Garnett 
 involved the retreat of Fulkerson, whose right and rear were thus 
 
52 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VlIiOINfA, JSCl-C.?. 
 
 exposed. Tlie withdrawal had to be effected in the face of a com- 
 paratively powerful enemy, and was an operation of diificulty and 
 danger/ Gen. Garnett met the Fifth Virginia coming to his as- 
 sistance, but ordered it back. Jackson, seeing the danger now im- 
 pending, stopped this regiment as soon as he saw it filing to the 
 rear, and placed it in position in a piece of woods behind his former 
 position, and ordered the retreating infantry to form upon it. Soon 
 Col. Burks, with the Forty-second regiment, came up on the right 
 of Col. William H. Harman, of the Fifth. In the midst of the 
 fight some guns had been advanced to assist the infantry ; these 
 were now placed near the right of the Forty-second regiment, and 
 these two regiments, with the artillery, made for a time a vigorous 
 resistance to the advancing enemy, and gave the retreating troops 
 time to rally and the remainder of the artillery time to withdraw. 
 Twice were the attacks on their position repulsed ; but the ad- 
 vancing Federals, spreading out on both flanlvs, pressed back the 
 
 ^ Maj. R. M. Copeland, assistant adjutant-general to Gen. Banks, says, in his 
 report: " The centre and right wing (Federal) were composed of three batteries 
 and about five regiments of infantry, with a considerable force of cavalry. A 
 high and commanding position on our right was occupied by the enemy at about 
 3 o'clock P.M., and a severe fire opened on our centre, which compelled the 
 withdrawal of a portion of our force into a more secure position. 
 
 " At about 3.30 p.m. Col. Tyler was ordered to attack the enemy's new posi- 
 tion on our right, and to take their battery. He moved immediately for- 
 ward, with three or four regiments, a battei-y, and about 400 cavalry, through a 
 dense wood, which covered the enemy's centre and left wing. In about half an 
 hour after Col. Tyler's movement his skirmishers exchanged shots with the 
 enemy, who were posted behind high stone walls, a rocky hill, and some woods, 
 a quarter of a mile in front of his battery. The enemy reserved his fire until 
 our line was very near. They then rose and poured a very heavy volley. The 
 suddenness and strength of their fire caused our lines to falter, and the extreme 
 left, composed mainly of the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania volunteers, 
 broke and ran. The I'est of the line soon rallied and maintained a steady fight 
 (falling back on the right and advancing on the left) for at least half an hour, 
 when two regiments came to their assistance up the left flank and through a very 
 severe fire. They advanced steadily, and soon gained a position from which they 
 could flank the enemy delivering their fire. When they received this new fire 
 the enemy fell back rapidly, but still fighting, to the woods nearest the hill, 
 from which the battery had been in the mean time withdrawn. 
 
 " Having in vain attempted to rally the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania 
 volunteers (which, with such company officers as I could see, was in a shameful 
 rout), I gained the advance on the first field which the enemy had held, where 
 there were many dead and wounded." Maj. Copeland says that Tyler then 
 moved slowly forward, supporting Kimball and Sullivan. 
 
KERNSTOWN. 53 
 
 Fifth and Forty-second regiments, and finally forced them from the 
 field.^ 
 
 It was now night, and the Federals had full possession of the field 
 of battle. They picked up two or three hundred prisoners from 
 the Confederates as the latter fell back, and also two guns, both 
 of which had been disabled. The mass of the Confederates marched 
 by way of Shady Elm factory to Bartonsville, on the turnpike. 
 Maj. Funsten checked the Federal cavalry, and soon all pursuit was 
 abandoned. Jackson, having reached the Valley turnpike, fell back 
 five or six miles slowly and sullenly to his trains, which had been 
 parked a short distance south of Ne^vtown. 
 
 The loss of the Confederates in the battle of Kernstown was eighty 
 killed, three hundred and forty-two wounded (of whom about seventy 
 were left on the field), and two hundred and sixty-nine missing ; total, 
 six hundred and ninety-one (691).^ Two pieces of artillery, disabled 
 and left on the field, were captured. In regard to the Federal loss, 
 Gen. Shields says in his report, dated six days after the battle : " The 
 killed and wounded in this engagement cannot even yet be accurately 
 ascertained. Indeed, my command has been so overworked that 
 it has had but little time to ascertain anything. The killed, as re- 
 ported, are one hundred and three, and among them we have to 
 deplore the loss of the brave Col. Murray, of the Eighty-fourth 
 Pennsylvania volunteers, who fell at the head of his regiment while 
 gallantly leading it in the face of the enemy. The wounded are 
 four hundred and forty-one, many of them slightly, and the missing 
 are twenty-four." ^ This gives a total of five hundred and sixty-eight 
 (568). 
 
 ^ Maj. Copeland says of this second stand: "The enemy now opened on our 
 line with a heavier fire than before. We maintained our position from the first, 
 and soon drove them in utter confusion down the hill ; but the near approach 
 of night forbade further, pursuit." 
 
 See reports of Cols. Harman and Burks. 
 
 ' Jackson's report. The brigade and regimental reports of the losses at Kerns- 
 town make them a little greater. Thus : 
 
 Garnett reports for his brigade 
 Burks's losses by regimental reports 
 Fulkerson's losses by regimental reports 
 
 Ash by' s loss was not reported, but it was slight 
 may have reached 725. 
 * Shields's report, "Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 330. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 Total. 
 
 41 
 
 162 
 
 158 
 
 361 
 
 24 
 
 114 
 
 39 
 
 177 
 
 , 15 
 
 76 
 
 71 
 
 162 
 700 
 
 ight. 
 
 The total Confederate loss 
 
54 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 Next (lay the citizens of Winchester, lieaded by Philip AVilllams, 
 Esq., asked and obtained permission to bury the Confederate dead. 
 The troops from that town were mostly in Jackson's command, and 
 its people began a long series of noble deeds, destined to glorify the 
 great struggle, by tenderly laying to rest, where they fell, the soldiers 
 who at Kernstown had died for their country.^ 
 
 Jackson firmly believed that his failure was needlessly brought 
 about by the retirement of Gen. Garnett. The retreat of the latter he 
 considered ill-timed, and a fatal mistake. So strong was his convic- 
 tion on this point that, notwithstanding the fact that the regimental 
 officers of Garnett's brigade supported their brigade commander, he 
 soon after removed Garnett, and preferred charges against him.^ 
 
 Weary and dispirited was the little army which had marched four- 
 teen miles in the morning, had attacked a force more than double its 
 own, and for three hours had wrestled for ^actory in a most vigorous 
 fashion. Baffled and overpowered, it slowly retraced its path for six 
 miles and sank to rest. In the fence-corners, under the trees, and 
 around the wagons they threw themselves down, many too weary to 
 eat, and forgot, in profound slumber, the trials, dangers, and dis- 
 appointments of the day. Jackson shared the open-air bivouac with 
 his men, and found the rest that nature demanded on some fence-rails 
 near the road.^ Next morning he crossed to the south side of Cedar 
 
 ^ After the war, the ladies of Winchester, from the midst of saddened and 
 desolate homes, continued their self-denying care for the ashes of the brave men 
 to whose comfort and encouragement they had contributed so freely in life, and 
 by whose suffering cots they had often watched in sorrow, danger, and death. 
 Under the leadership of Mrs. Philip Williams, they gathered the thousands of 
 Confederate dead from the surrounding battle-fields and placed them in the 
 " Stonewall Cemetery," — a monument not more to the patriotism of man than 
 to the devotion of woman. 
 
 ^ Brig.-Gen. Garnett was relieved on April 1, and Brig.-Gen. C. S. Winder 
 assigned to the command of the First brigade. Gen. Garnett was subsequently 
 assigned to one of Pickett's brigades, and fell, gallantly leading it, in the famous 
 charge of that division on the heights of Gettysburg, July 3, 1863. 
 
 Whether Garnett's judgment at Kernstown was correct will perhaps always 
 remain a question ; not so his splendid courage and unselfish patriotism. 
 
 ' Jackson followed his troops, and when near Newtown halted at a camp-fire 
 and warmed himself for some time. He then remounted and rode back towards 
 the Opequon, followed by several of his staff, who, overcome by weariness, 
 dropped away one by one, until only Maj. W. J. Hawks (chief commissary) re- 
 mained with the general. Then turning from the road into an orchard, he 
 fastened his horse, and asked the major if he could make a fire, adding, "We 
 shall have to burn rails to-night." The majur soon had a roaring fire, and was 
 
[II 
 
 Battle of 
 KERNS TOAVINr, 
 
 S"unday, March 23 ; 
 
 ''k^^ji^^ 
 
KERNSTO WN. 55 
 
 creek, and gradually retired before the advancing enemy, once more, 
 to Mount Jackson. 
 
 The bold attack of Jackson at Kernstown, though unsuccessful, led 
 to many important results. Its first effect was the accomplishment of 
 one of the principal objects of the Confederates, — the recall of the 
 Federal troops then marching from the Valley towards Manassas. 
 Gen. Shields says : " Though the battle had been won, still I could 
 not have believed that Jackson would have hazarded a decisive en- 
 gagement, so far from the main body, without expecting reinforce- 
 ments; so, to be prepared for such a contingency, I set to work 
 during the night (after the battle) to bring together all the troops 
 within" my reach. I sent an express after Williams's division, re- 
 questing the rear brigade, about twenty miles distant, to march all 
 night and join me in the morning. I swept the posts and routes in 
 my rear of almost all their guards, hurrying them forward by forced 
 marches, to be with me at daylight. . . . Gen. Banks, hearing of our 
 engagement on his way to Washington, halted at Harper's Ferry, and, 
 with remarkable promptitude and sagacity, ordered back Williams's 
 whole division, so that my express found the rear brigade already 
 en route to join us. The general himself returned here forthwith, 
 and, after making me a hasty visit, assumed command of the forces in 
 pursuit of the enemy.^ This pursuit was kept up with vigor, energy, 
 and activity until they reached Woodstock." Thus the design of 
 INIcClellan to put Banks's corps at Centreville (see letter of March 16) 
 became impracticable, and that body of twenty thousand troops^ was 
 thought necessary to guard against the further movements of Jackson's 
 three thousand and the reinforcements, in large part imaginary, which 
 they attributed to him. This battle, too, no doubt, decided the ques- 
 tion of the detachment of Blenker's division of ten thousand men 
 from McClellan, and its transfer to Fremont, recently placed in com- 
 mand of the Mountain Department.^ While en route from Alexandria 
 
 making a bed of rails, when the general wished to know what he was doing. 
 "Fixing a place to sleep,"' was the reply. "You seem determined to make 
 yourself and those around you comfortable," said Jackson. Knowing the 
 general had fasted all day, the major soon obtained some bread and meat from 
 the nearest squad of soldiers, and after they had satisfied their hunger, they 
 slept soundly on the rail-bed in a fence-corner. 
 
 ^ Gen. Banks, on the 24th, requested Sedgwick, who was leaving the Valley, 
 to remain at Harper's Ferry some hours longer with his troops. 
 
 ^ McClellan's report, p. 546. 
 
 ' The " Mountain Department" embraced the territory between Banks's dis- 
 tricts and Halleck's. It had the Alleghanies for its eastern boundary, and 
 
56 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 to Fremont, Blcnkcr's division was to join Banks, and remain with 
 liim as long as he thought any attack from Jackson impending.^ 
 More important and more fraught with momentous consequences was 
 the next step. For a few days later the sensitiveness of the Federal 
 government to the danger of Washington, excited by Jackson, led to 
 the detachment of McDowell's corps from McClellan, and its reten- 
 tion in front of the Federal ca})itiil, in place of that of Banks. 
 When ^IcClellan left, on April 1, for Fortress Monroe, to take com- 
 mand of his army on its advance up the Peninsula towards Rich- 
 mond, he left for the defence of Washington and its approaches 
 seventy-three thousand four hundred and fifty-six (73,456) men and 
 
 embraced the present State of West Virginia. A few days before the end of 
 March, President Lincoln informed Gen. McClellan that he had resisted the 
 pressure brought upon him to detach Blenker's division; yet, on March 3L, the 
 President writes: "This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division 
 to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did it with great pain, under- 
 standing that you would wish it otherwise." (McClellan's report.) 
 ^ McClellan's orders to Banks on April 1 were as follows: 
 
 " Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 
 
 "On Board the Commodore, April 1, 1862. 
 
 "General: — The change in affairs in the Valley of the Shenandoah has 
 rendered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, from the 
 plan we some days since agreed upon. 
 
 " In my arrangements I assume that you have with you a force amply suflScient 
 to drive Jackson before you, provided he is not reinforced largely. I also 
 assume that you may find it impossible to detach anything towards Manassas 
 for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army have drawn 
 all the rebel force towards Richmond. ... I will order Blanker to march 
 on Strasburg, and to report to you for temporary duty, so that, should you find 
 a large force in your front, you can avail yourself of his aid as soon as possible. 
 Please direct him to Winchester, there to report to the adjutant-general of the 
 army for orders ; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front. 
 
 " In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at present is to 
 throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position as to enable you 
 to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communications are re-established, 
 it will be probably important and advisa))le to move on Staunton ; but this 
 would require secure communications, and a force of from 25,000 to 30,000 
 for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move 
 on Richmond ; at all events, not so long before it as to enable the rebels to 
 concentrate on you and then return on me. I fear that you Ccinnot be ready 
 in time, although it may come in very well with a force less than that I have 
 mentioned after the main battle near Richmond. When Gen. Sumner leaves 
 Warrenton Junction, Gen. Abercrombie will be placed in immediate command 
 of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your general orders. Please in- 
 form me frequently, by telegraph and otherwise, as to the state of things in 
 your front. 
 
 " I am very truly yours, 
 
 " Geo. B. McClellan, 
 " Major-General Commanding. 
 
 "Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banes, Commanding Fifth Corps." 
 
KERNSTOWN. 57 
 
 one hundred and nine (109) field guns.^ These were distributed 
 
 as follows : ^ 
 
 At Warrenton, Virginia 7,780 
 
 At Manassas 10,859 
 
 In the Shenandoah valley (including Blcnker) . 35,467 
 
 On the lower Potomac ..... 1,350 
 
 In Washington and the forts around it . . 18,000 
 
 Yet the Federal President, after Kernstown, did not consider his capital 
 secure, and on April 3 countermanded the order for the embarkation 
 of McDowell's corps, and detained it in front of Washington. In a 
 letter to Gen. McClellan of April 9, President Lincoln says : " Gen. 
 Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was divided 
 and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not 
 leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Balti- 
 more and Ohio railroad. This presented (or would present, when 
 McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation for the 
 enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. 
 My explicit directions that Washington should, by the judgment 
 of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had been 
 entirely neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain 
 McDowell. I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrange- 
 ment to leave Banks at Manassas Junction, but when that arrange- 
 ment was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course 
 I was not satisfied ; I was constrained to substitute something for it 
 myself."^ 
 
 While these changes were taking place in the dispositions of the 
 
 ^ To these McClellan adds 4000 new troops organizing in New York, and whom 
 he recommends should be brought to Washington at once. 
 
 ^ McClellan' s report, p. 546. 
 
 ' McClellan evidently thought that with Banks occupying Jackson, and with 
 over 36,000 men distributed at Warrenton and Manassas, and around Wash- 
 ington itself, the Federal President and capital were reasonably safe ! But 
 Mr. Lincoln thought otherwise. On April 4, Gen. Banks was placed in chief 
 command of that portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Moun- 
 tain Department (Fremont's) and the Blue Ridge. This region, composed prin- 
 cipally of the valley of the Shenandoah river, was to be styled the " Depart- 
 ment of the Shenandoah." Gen. McDowell, on the same day, was put in chief 
 command of the portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge and west of the 
 Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad, including the District of 
 Columbia and the country between the Potomac and Patuxent. Ilis de- 
 partment was to be known as that of the Rappahannock. Henceforth these 
 officers were to be independent of Gen. McClellan and of each other. 
 
 5 
 
58 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 18G1-G2. 
 
 Federal forces, Jackson was resting and recruiting his little array. 
 He had fallen back by degrees to Mount Jackson. A mile to the south 
 of Mount Jackson the north fork of the Shenandoah river, which 
 drains the western Valley from Harrisonburg to Strasljurg, cro&ses 
 over from the northwest side of the Valley, along which it at first 
 runs, to the southeast side, where it continues to keep its course until 
 it makes its way around the north end of the Massanutton mountains, 
 opposite Strasburg, in order to unite with the main stream near Front 
 Royal. At the point where it crosses the Valley, the meadows which 
 border it are bounded on the south side by a plateau, the front of 
 which, on the Valley turnpike, is known as Rude's hill. To thLs 
 position Jackson finally (April 2) moved the main body of his forces, 
 while Ashby and the cavalry were posted in front to observe the 
 enemy. The latter advanced to Woodstock on April 1, driving 
 Ashby's pickets, and finally forcing him back as far as Edenburg, 
 five miles south of Woodstock.^ Here, however, the line of Stony 
 creek afforded Ashby a good defensive position, and Jackson having 
 reinforced him with a brigade of infantry, he effectually checked the 
 advance of the Federals. This support, with the addition of a sec- 
 tion of artillery, was continued to Ashby for the next two weeks, 
 while he held this line.^ The Confederates destroyed the bridges 
 on the Manassas railroad as they retired. During the next fortnight 
 no further advances were made, though frequent skirmishes occurred 
 along Ashby's line on Stony creek. For this period Jackson re- 
 mained at Rude's hill. At this time his command greatly im- 
 proved in numbers and spirits. The militia of the Valley had 
 been called out, and the regiments from Augusta county, about five 
 hundred men in all, had reached Mount Jackson before the Con- 
 federate advance to Kernstown.^ A considerable portion of the men 
 
 ^ Jackson made his headquarters at Woodstock on the 24th of March, at 
 Narrow Passage on the 26th, at Ilawkinstown on the 29th, and at Rev. Mr. 
 Rude's on April 2. 
 
 "^ On the day that Ashby first took position along Stony creek (April 1), he 
 was at one time riding along the edge of the woods held by his skirmishers, re- 
 connoitring the enemy, followed by a little boy named " Dixie," a sort of pet 
 of the camp. A bullet from a sharpshooter, aimed at Ashby, struck Dixie's 
 horse in the head and killed it. The boy rolled off, and was jumping up to run, 
 when Ashby called him back and told him to get his saddle and bridle, coolly 
 waiting for him, though a mark for a continual fire. 
 
 ' They reached the vicinity of Mount Jackson on March 20. On March 21 
 we find Jackson writing to Col. S. Bassett French, aide-de-camp to Governor 
 Letcher, as follows : 
 
KERNSTOWN. 59 
 
 enlisted within a few days in the regular army, and the remainder 
 were soon absorbed in the same way, under the operation of the orders 
 of the Governor of Virginia and the stringent measures taken by the 
 Confederate States Congress to fill up the southern armies. Militia 
 organizations virtually ceased to exist after this time. 
 
 The evils growing out of the manner in which the Confederate 
 troops had been everywhere organized, and the short terms for which 
 the greater part had enlisted, had been severely felt. The Confederate 
 regiments were all volunteer organizations which had rushed into 
 service at the beginning of the war, in most cases for twelve months. 
 As the end of this time approached, efforts had been made to induce 
 re-enlistment by appeals to the men and by bounties, and furloughs 
 of thirty or sixty days had been granted to those re-enlisting, the 
 result of which was to deplete to an extreme point all the armies in 
 the field. These efforts were only partially successful, and the uncer- 
 tainty thus existing, with the fact that all officers were to be elected 
 
 " Colonel : — Please request the Governor to order three thousand muskets to 
 Staunton at his earliest convenience for the militia of this district. None of 
 the militia beyond this county, except five hundred from Augusta, have yet 
 arrived, but they are turning out encouragingly. There are three religious 
 denominations in this military district who are opposed to vear. Eighteen 
 were recently arrested in endeavoring to make their escape through Pendleton 
 county to the enemy. Those who do not desert will, to some extent, hire sub- 
 stitutes, others will turn out in obedience to the Governor's call, V)ut I under- 
 stand some of them say they will not ' shoot.' They can be made to fire, but 
 can very easily take bad aim. So, for the purpose of giving to this command 
 the highest degree of efficiency, and securing loyal feelings and co-operation, I 
 have, as these non-combatants are said to be good teamsters and faithful to their 
 promises, determined to organize them into companies of one hundred men 
 each, rank and file, and after mustering them, with the legal number of company 
 officers, into service, assign them to the various staff departments without 
 issuing arms to them ; but if at any time they have insufficient labor, to have 
 them drilled, so that, in case circumstances should justify it, arms may be given 
 them. If these men are, as represented to me, faithful laborers and careful of 
 property, this arrangement will not only enable many volunteers to return to 
 the ranks, but will also save many valuable horses and other public property in 
 addition to arms. . . . All I have pledged myself is that, as far as practicable, 
 I will employ them in other ways than fighting, but with the condition that 
 they shall act in good faith with me, and not permit persons to use their names 
 for the purpose of keeping out of service. . . ." 
 
 On March 29 the Governor ordered all the militia to be drafted into existing 
 organizations until these were full. The execution of this order was begun on 
 April 4. On April 14, Gen. Jackson writes to Gen. W. B. Richardson, adjutant- 
 general of Virginia, that "the militia have not turned out as well as I was in- 
 duced to believe, but those who are here are a fine body of men, and bid fair to 
 render good service. ... I fear there will not be enough militia to fill up the 
 old companies. . . ." He advised stringent measures to bring them out, but 
 the conscription bill, passed two days later, made all further action on the part 
 of the State unnecessary. 
 
60 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1361.03. 
 
 upon the new orj^anization, rendered discij)line lax. The oldest 
 regiments had entered the service in April, 1861, so that their terra 
 of service had nearly expired, and a partial disintegration of the army 
 was threatened at the opening of the spring campaign. Fortunately, 
 the Confederate Congress, seeing the impending danger, and stimu- 
 lated, no doubt, by the misfortunes which had everywhere, in Feb- 
 ruary and March, befallen the Confederate arms, solved the difficulty 
 by passing, on the 16th of April, a general conscription bill, placing all 
 the able-bodied men of the country, between eighteen and thirty-five 
 years of age, in the military service. The discussion of this bill, and 
 the prospect of its passage, had stimulated re-enlistment and volun- 
 teering, and the Confederate armies everywhere began to fill up. Jack- 
 son found his skeleton regiments much enlarged from these causes, 
 as well as by the return of furloughed men. The cavalry grew 
 rapidly, and Ashby soon found himself at the head of a large regi- 
 ment. This gallant cavalryman, however, was more at home in lead- 
 ing a dashing charge, or in a hand-to-hand conflict, than in drilling 
 and organizing a mass of raw recruits. As a consequence, while his 
 career was filled with daring and brilliant exploits, the achievements 
 of his cavalry, acting as a mass, did not do justice to the material of 
 which it was composed, nor to his bold leadership. 
 
 On the 2d of April, Jackson was informed that a number of dis- 
 loyal men belonging to the Rockingham militia, and residing in a 
 remote part of the Blue Ridge, had banded together to resist the law 
 calling them into military service. He immediately despatched Lieut.- 
 Col. J. R. Jones, of the Thirty-third Virginia regiment, with four 
 companies of infantry, part of Capt. Harry Gilmor's company of 
 cavalry, and two guns under Capt. Cutshaw, to quell the disturbance. 
 This was soon effected,^ and without bloodshed. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. C. S. Winder having reported to Gen. Jackson, was 
 assigned, April 1, to the command of the " StoncM-all" brigade, and 
 Col. W. B. Taliaferro, having been promoted to brigadier-general, 
 was assigned to the command of the brigade consisting of the Thirty- 
 seventh and Twenty -third Virginia regiments.^ 
 
 ^ Col. (then Capt.) Cutshaw says this force marched into the mountain recesses, 
 but the people fled or hid themselves. From high points the woods were shelled, 
 and this greatly increased the panic among the simple mountaineers. Many 
 came in and surrendered, and no further trouble was Imd. 
 
 * General Order No. 36, April 4, from Jackson's headquarters, announced the 
 organization of the Army of the Valley. Brig.-Gen. C. S. AVinder Avas assigned 
 to the First brigade (" Stonewall"). The Second brigade remained under Col. 
 
KERASTOWN. 61 
 
 The first half of April was cold and raw, with much snow and 
 rain, and the roads, except the turnpikes, were ver}^ deep. But by 
 the middle of the month it had grown milder, and better weather 
 was now to be expected. The Federal commander determined to 
 move forward, and on the 17th his forces were put in motion. A 
 company of Ashby's cavalry, on outpost duty between Moimt Jackson 
 and Columbia Furnace, was surprised by the advance and captured.^ 
 Shields's division soon pressed back the whole of Ashby's force 
 through Mount Jaclcson, and the Federal army occupied that place. 
 At the same time Carroll's brigade, of Shields's division, was sent for- 
 ward on the back road which runs parallel to the main turnpike and 
 west of it, thus turning the Confederate flank. Ashby destroyed the 
 greater part of the railroad property and bridges as he retired, but 
 failed in his attempt to burn the turnpike bridge over the north fork 
 of the Shenandoah. Here the Federals pressed him closely, seized 
 the bridge and extinguished the fire before it had made any headway. 
 Ashby's horse was badly wounded, but bore him safely from the field 
 before it fell dead. On the same day Jackson broke up his camp at 
 Rude's hill and retreated before the advancing enemy in the direc- 
 tion of Harrisonburg. This town, which is twenty-five miles south of 
 Mount Jackson, he reached during the morning of the 18th. Here, 
 instead of continuing towards Staunton, he turned off to the left, at 
 right angles, in the direction of the Blue Ridge, and on the night of 
 the 18th camped at Peale's, six miles from Harrisonburg, at the north- 
 ern end of the Massanutton mountains.^ (Map No. I.) Next day, 
 moving by the village of McGaheysville, he crossed the main Shenan- 
 doah river at Conrad's Store, and went into camp in Elk Run valley, 
 between the Shenandoah and Swift Run gap, in the Blue Ridge.^ 
 
 John Campbell, and the Third bri;!;ade under Col. Fulkerson (Gen. Taliaferro 
 not having yet reported), McLaughlin's and Carpenter's batteries were assigned 
 to the First brigade, Marye's and Waters' s to the Second brigade, and Shu- 
 maker's to the Third. All the cavalry was placed under Ashby. 
 
 ^ This was Capt. Harper's company of cavalry. They were captured by four 
 companies of infantry from Donelly's brigade in conjunction with the Ringgold 
 and Washington cavalry. 
 
 ^ Gen. Edward Johnson, whose force was on Shenandoah mountain, came to 
 confer with Gen. Jackson while he was at Peale's. In his absence Gen. John- 
 eon's troops fell back towards Staunton, in consequence of information having 
 reached them of Jackson's movement towards Swift Run gap. 
 
 ^ This " gap" is that by which Governor Spotswood and his Golden Horse- 
 shoe Knights obtained, in 1716, the first view had by white men of the Valley 
 of the Shenandoah. 
 
62 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-G2. 
 
 Over this gap led a gocxl road to Stanard.sville and Gordoasville, 
 by means of which he was placed in communication with Gen. Ewell, 
 who then held the line of the Rapidan river. 
 
 On the day that Jatikson crossed the river he sent some cavalry with 
 Capt. Hotchkiss to burn the bridges on the south fork of the Shen- 
 andoah, between Conrad's Store and Luray. The southernmost one 
 was burned, but the enemy had seized the Columbia and AVhite- 
 House bridges near Luray, and they drove off the Confederates, who 
 attempted to retake them. The movements of Jackson led Banks to 
 believe for a time that he had left the Valley.^ 
 
 Meantime, the transfer of McClellan's army to the Peninsula had 
 caused the withdrawal of all the Confederate army, except Jackson's 
 and Ewell's divisions, from Northern Virginia, and its concentration 
 in front of the Federal forces. Gen. J. E. Johnston says : " When 
 it was ascertained, about the 5th of April, that the Federal army was 
 marching from Fort Monroe towards Yorktown, D. H. Hill's, D. R. 
 Jones's, and Early's divisions were transferred from the Army of 
 Northern Virginia to that of the Peninsula. The former was thus 
 reduced to four divisions : Jackson's, at Mount Jackson ; Ewell's, on 
 the Rappahannock ; Longstreet's, at Orange Court-House ; and G. W. 
 Smith's, at Fredericksburg. 
 
 "Before the 10th, the President was convinced by Maj.-Gen. 
 Magruder's reports that the entire army just brought down the Poto- 
 mac from Alexandria, by Gen. McClellau, was then on the Peninsula, 
 to move upon Richmond by that route. He therefore directed me 
 to make such defensive arrangements as might be necessary in the 
 Department of Northern Virginia, and put my remaining troops in 
 march for Richmond, and then to report to him for further instruc- 
 tions. In obedience to these orders, Maj.-Gen. Ewell was left with 
 his division and a regiment of cavalry in observation on the upper 
 Rappahannock, and Maj.-Gen. Longstreet was directed to march with 
 his to Richmond. Maj.-Gen. Jackson was left in the Valley to 
 
 ^ Gen. Banks, in a despatch to the Federal War Department, April 19, says : 
 "To-day I have been to the bridges on the south fork of the Shenandoah, in 
 the Massanutton valley, with a force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to pro- 
 tect the two important bridges that cross the river. We were within sight of 
 Luray at tlie south bridge. A sharp skirmish occurred with the rebels, in 
 which they lost several men taken prisoners. Their object was the destruction 
 of the bridges. . . . I believe Jackson left this Valley yesterday. lie is reported 
 to have left Harrisonburg yesterday for Gordonsville by the mountain road, 
 lie encamped last night at McGaheysville, eleven miles from Harrisonburg." 
 (" Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 93.) 
 
KERNSTOWN. 63 
 
 oppose greatly superior Federal forces, and authorized to call Swell's 
 division to his assistance in case of necessity, and Gen. Ewell was 
 instructed to comply with such a call. ]\Iaj.-Gen. G. W. Smith was 
 instructed to leave a mixed force, equal to a brigade, in front of Fred- 
 ericksburg, and move towards Richmond with all his remaining 
 troops."^ Gen. Johnston was called to Richmond, and on April 17 
 was placed in command of all the forces opposing McClellan. 
 
 Jackson, conscious of his inability with five or six thousand men 
 to resist in the open coimtry the advance of Banks, had availed him- 
 self of the nature of the country to take a position where he could 
 be attacked only at great disadvantage, and yet might threaten the 
 flank and rear of the advancing column if it attempted to pass him. 
 Such was his position in Elk Run valley, at the foot of the Blue 
 Ridge. The main Shenandoah river covered his front, — a stream 
 not easily fordable at any time, and now swollen by the spring rains. 
 The spurs of the Blue Ridge, as they run out towards this river, aiford 
 almost impregnable positions for defence ; his flanks could only be 
 turned by toilsome and exposed marches, while good roads led from 
 his rear over the mountains into the country about Gordons ville, and 
 placed him within easy reach of the support he might call for from 
 Gen. Ewell. Thus secure in his position, Jackson at the same time 
 more effectually prevented the farther advance of the Federal column 
 than if he had remained in its front; for he held the bridge nearest him 
 over the Shenandoah, and was but a day's march from Harrisonburg, 
 and should Banks venture to move forward towards Staunton, he was 
 ready to hurl the Confederate forces against the enemy's flank and 
 rear.^ Gen. Banks, at Harrisonburg, was in the midst of a hostile 
 
 ^ Johnston's Narrative, p. 109. 
 
 * Jackson writes to Gen. Lee on April 23 : " Banks's main force is still in the 
 vicinity of Nevr Market, extending from one mile belovF to three above the town. 
 Yesterday he had near one hundred wagons twelve miles above New Market, 
 and a part of his force even entered Harrisonburg, seventeen miles from New 
 Market. My object has been to get in his rear at New Market or Harrisonburg 
 if he gives me an opportunity, and this would be the case if he should advance 
 on Staunton with his main body. It appears to me that if I remain quiet a few 
 days more he will probably make a move in some direction, or send a larger 
 force towards Harrisonburg, and thus enable me, with the blessing of Provi- 
 dence, to successfully attack his advance ; and if I am unsuccessful in driving 
 back his entire force, he may be induced to move forward his command from 
 New Market and attempt to follow me through this gap, when our forces would 
 have greatly the advantage. 
 
 "Without Gen. Ewell's division, Banks can march on to Staunton, though, if 
 he attempts it, I design threatening his flank and rear, and this may prevent his 
 
64 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 country, already one Imndred miles from the Potomac at Harper's 
 Ferry, with which a long line of wagon communication had to be 
 maintained. To push on to Staunton, with Jackson on his flank and 
 rear, was virtually to sacrifice his present line of communication with 
 no practicable substitute in view ; to attack the Confederates on the 
 slopes of the mountains, with even a greatly superior force, was to 
 risk defeat. He therefore determined to rest satisfied for the present 
 with the advantages already gained. The greater part of the Shen- 
 andoah valley was now in his possession. Jackson had been " thrown 
 well back," and had been forced to leave the main highway passing 
 along that Valley, and to seek refuge in the fastnesses of the moun- 
 tains. Staunton was but twenty-five miles away ; another column 
 from the west was threatening it. In a short time, by co-operation 
 with this column, the place might be taken ; or, to take a wider view, 
 operations in front of Richmond might soon force Jackson from the 
 Valley altogether. 
 
 Jackson rested a few days in Elk Rmi valley, at the foot of Swift 
 Run gap, in the Blue Ridge mountains. Here the reorganization of 
 his regiments was completed, and some further additions were made 
 to his numbers by enlistments. His strength now approached six 
 thousand (6000).' 
 
 reaching Staunton ; but without doing this he could advance so far as to 
 threaten Gen. Edward Johnson's rear so seriously as to make him fall back, and 
 thus let Staunton fall into the hands of the Federal force in his front. . . ." 
 
 Later on the same day Jackson writes that the news from Fredericksburg 
 induces him to believe that Ewell's division may be more needed there than with 
 him, and says he will " make arrangements so as not to be disappointed should 
 he (Ewell) be ordered to Fredericksburg." 
 
 A few days later the news from Fredericksburg was more reassuring, and this 
 led Jackson to apply for troops from that point. (See next chapter.) 
 
 The letters from which the above extracts are taken are in the Confederate 
 archives in Washington. 
 
 ^ The Tenth Virginia regiment of infantry was transferred at this time from 
 Ewell's division to Jackson's. It reached Swift Run gap on April 21, and was 
 assigned to the Third (Taliaferro's) brigade. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 MCDOWELL, 
 
 On the 28th of April Jackson applied to Gen. Lee, then ax^ting as 
 conimander-in-chief under President Davis, for a reinforcement of 
 five thousand men, which addition to his and Ewell's forces he 
 deemed necessary to justify him in marching out and attacking 
 Banks, and asked if the troops oould not be spared from the force 
 covering Fredericksburg. On the next day Gen. Lee replied as 
 follows : 
 
 "Headquarters, Richmond, Virginia, April 29, 18C2. 
 "Maj.-Gen. T. J. Jackson, Commanding, etc., Swift Run Gap, 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 " General : — I have had the honor to receive your letter of yester- 
 day's date. From the reports that reach me, that are entitled to 
 credit, the force of the enemy opposite Fredericksburg is represented 
 as too large to admit of any diminution whatever of our army in that 
 vicinity at present, as it might not only invite an attack on Richmond, 
 but jeopard the safety of the army in the Peninsula. I regret, there- 
 fore, that your request to have five thousand men sent from that army 
 to reinforce you cannot be complied with. Can you draw enough 
 from the command of Gen. Edward Johnson to warrant you in 
 attacking Banks ? The last return received from that army shows a 
 present force of upwards of three thousand five hundred, which, it is 
 hoped, has been since increased by recruits and returned furloughs. 
 As he does not appear to be pressed, it is suggested that a portion of 
 his force might be temporarily removed from its present position and 
 made available for the movement in question. A decisive and suc- 
 cessful blow at Banks's column would be fraught with the happiest 
 results, and I deeply regret my inability to send you the reinforce- 
 ments you ask. If, however, you think the combined forces of Gens. 
 Ewell and Johnson, with youi' own, inadequate for the move. Gen. 
 Ewell might, with the assistance of Gen. Anderson's army, near Fred- 
 ericksburg, strike at McDowell's army, between that city and Aquia, 
 with much promise of success ; provided you feel sufficiently strong 
 alone to hold Banks in check. 
 
 " Very truly yours, 
 
 "R. E. Lee."^ 
 
 ^ Taylor's " Four Years with General Lee," p. 38. 
 
 65 
 
66 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 At this time Gcu. Ewell's division was in the vicinity of Stanards- 
 villc, and tliere was no Federal force south of the Rajjpahannock in 
 his front, McDowell having drawn his forces to the neighborhood of 
 Fredericksburg. Gen. Edward Johnson/ who had so successfully 
 repulsed tlie attack made on his camp at Alleghany,^ on December 13, 
 had fallen back to the Shenandoah mountain, where it is crossed by 
 the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, to prevent a flank movement 
 from the direction of Moorefield. The retreat of Jackson from 
 Harrisonburg to Swift Run gap had uncovered the roads to the rear 
 of this force, and on April 20 it had fallen back still farther, to West 
 View, only seven miles west of Staunton. (Map No. I.) It consisted 
 of six regiments of infantry, three batteries, and a small force of 
 cavalry, and numbered, according to the inspector-general. Col. A. 
 Smead, at McDowell, a week after this time, about three thousand 
 (3000) effective men.' 
 
 The force opposing Johnson consisted of a brigade under Milroy, 
 supported by another under Schenck, the two containing some six 
 thousand (6000) men.* This formed a part of the command of Gen. 
 Fremont, who was preparing to move forward with other troops to 
 strengthen it.* Schenck was at Franklin, Pendleton county, while 
 
 ^ Now placed under Jackson's command. 
 
 * Camp Alleghany is fifteen miles west of Monterey, on the Staunton and 
 Parkersburg turnpike. 
 
 ^ Gen. Edward Johnson, in a letter dated March 18, reports his strength as : 
 
 Aggregate present for duty 2425 
 
 Aggregate present 2784 
 
 This is the latest report (giving his strength) I could find among the Confed- 
 erate archives. 
 
 * Fremont puts Schenck's force at "about 3000," and Milroy's at "3500 
 eflfective men." (Fremont's report.) 
 
 * Gen. Fremont says that he relieved Rosecrans on March 29, 1862, that the 
 total troops then turned over to him consisted of thirty-five and two-tenths 
 regiments of infantry, thirty-six companies of cavalry, and nine batteries of ar- 
 tillery •, total number of men, 34,271. A few days after, the troops in South- 
 west Virginia and Eastern Kentucky, amounting to 9195, were detached from 
 his command. He adds to this 6269 as the usual percentage " for sick, etc., 
 and not available for duty," and states 18,807 — "say in round numbers 
 19,000 men" — as his effective force left. "A small but not appreciable 
 increase of this was made by enlistments in the department, but the policy 
 of the War Department did not foster this." He continues: "When sent to 
 the department I was promised 17,000 men as reinforcements. On April 1 
 was despatched that Blenker's division was en route to join me ; as it had not 
 reached Harper's Ferry by the 12th of April, I asked what had become of it, 
 and that it be sent to Moorefield by the shortest route." Rosecrans was tern- 
 
MCDOWELL. 67 
 
 Milroy was at McDowell, and had — after the retreat of Gen. John- 
 son — pushed his advance over the Shenandoah mountain to the 
 neighborhood of the Harrisonburg and Warm Springs turnpike. 
 This road would afford an easy and direct means of communication 
 with Banks at Harrisonburg, and Jackson feared a union of the two 
 armies and a movement on Staunton, which might result in sepa- 
 rating him from Edward Johnson and in the capture of that town. 
 Jackson says : " At this time Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson, with his 
 troops, was near West View, west of Staunton, so that if the enemy 
 was allowed to effect a junction it would probably be followed not 
 only by the seizure of a point so important as Staunton, but must 
 compel Gen. Johnson to abandon his position, and they might succeed 
 in getting between us. To avoid these results I determined, if practi- 
 cable, after strengthening my own division by a union with Johnson's, 
 first to strike at Milroy, and then to concentrate the forces of Ewell, 
 
 porarily conducting it. It was dreadfully in want of horses and transportation. 
 On April 21, Fremont was informed it could not move for want of shoes. It 
 was thus greatly delayed, but finally joined him at Petersburg, Hardy county, 
 May 11. Fremont's plan of campaign, submitted to President Lincoln on 
 April 21, was as follows: "The first base of operations being the Baltimore 
 and Ohio railroad, the division of Gen. Blenker, which, from the best informa- 
 tion I can obtain, numbers about 9000 men, will take position at Moorefield. At 
 this point, or at Franklin, it will unite with the troops now under command 
 of Gen. Schenck, numbering about 3000 men. With these, acting in conjunction 
 with Gen. Banks, I propose to move up the Valley of Virginia by a course 
 which you will see on the accompanying map, over roads which are as dry 
 and as good at all seasons of the year as any in Virginia, and through a country 
 where forage is easily obtained. At Monterey I shall be joined by the troops 
 under Gen. Milroy, numbering 3500 effective men, and can then strike the rail- 
 road at or near Salem, while Gen. Cox (in command along the Kanawha), 
 with his 7000 men, takes possession of Newburn ; or can first effect a junction 
 with Gen. Cox and seize the railroad with a force thus increased to about 
 22,000 men. 
 
 " The base of operations will then be changed to Gauley. To this place, by 
 the Ohio and Kanawha rivers, abundant supplies for the army can be trans- 
 ported with the means now at hand and being prepared. Having thus destroyed 
 the connection between Knoxville and the army in Eastern Virginia, and per- 
 haps seized some rolling-stock, we can advance rapidly along the railroad 
 towards Knoxville, turning the position at Cumberland gap. The forces now 
 under Gen. Kelly, and the Virginia troops will be left, as we proceed, to guard 
 the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and to protect the loyal inhabitants of the State 
 from guerrillas." 
 
 This plan was approved by President Lincoln, but with the "view of the 
 ultimate closing in of my (Gen. Fremont's) column towards Richmond rather 
 than Knoxville." 
 
68 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 18G1-G2. 
 
 Jolinson and my own afi;ain.st Banks. To carry ont my design 
 against Milroy, Gen. Ewell was directed to march his division to the 
 position which I then occupied in Elk Run valley, with a view to 
 holding Banks in check, whilst I pushed on with my division to 
 Staunton." ^ 
 
 Jackson's plans were matured, and the execution of them was 
 begun at once upon the rece})tion of the information that no other 
 troops besides those of Ewell and Johnson could be placed at his dis- 
 posal at present. This gave him about seventeen thousand (17,000) 
 men, of which about six thousand (6000) were at Swift Run gap, 
 eight thousand (8000), under Ewell, one day's march in his rear, 
 east of the Blue Ridge, and three thousand (3000) with Edward 
 Johnson at West View, seven miles west of Staunton, and over forty- 
 miles from Swift Run gap. On the other hand. Banks was at 
 Harrisonburg, twelve or fifteen miles in Jackson's front, with nine- 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. On April 29, Jackson wrote to Gen. Lee as follows : "As 
 I do not believe that Banks will advance on me in my present position, I am 
 disposed, unless you send nie large reinforcements, to adopt one of three plans, 
 viz. : either to leave Gen. Ewell here to threaten Banks's rear in the event of 
 his advancing on Staunton, and move with my command rapidly on the force in 
 front of Gen. Edward Johnson ; or else, co-operating with Gen. Ewell, to attack 
 the enemy's detached force between New Market and the Shenandoah, and if 
 successful in this, then to press forward and get in Banks's rear at Newmarket, 
 and thus induce him to fall back. The third is, to pass down the Shenandoah 
 to Sperryville, and thus threaten Winchester via Front Royal. I believe that 
 this would cause the enemy to fall back. From Sperryville I could move either 
 in the direction of Front Royal, or Warrenton, or, if my command should be 
 opposed by too large a Federal force, it could turn off towai-ds Culpeper Court- 
 Ilouse. 
 
 " To get in Banks's rear with my present force would be rather a dangerous 
 undertaking, as I would have to cross the river and immediately cross the Mas- 
 sanutton mountains, during which the enemy would have decidedly the advan- 
 tage of position. Of the three plans I give the preference to attacking the force 
 west of Staunton, for if successful I would afterwards only have Banks to con- 
 tend with, and in doing this would be reinforced by Gen. Edward Johnson, and 
 by that time you might be able to give me reinforcements, which, united with the 
 troops now under my control, would enable me to defeat Banks ; and if he should 
 be routed and his command destroyed, nearly all our forces here could, if neces- 
 sary, cross the Blue Ridge to Warrenton, Fredericksburg, or any other threatened 
 point. I have written to Gen. Edward Johnson to know what force, in addition 
 to his command, would be required for a successful blow in his vicinity. If I 
 receive an answer justifying a move in that direction, I may leave here to-morrow 
 via Port Republic." Gen. Lee replies. May 1 : " I have carefully considered the 
 three plans of operations proposed by you. I must leave the selection of the 
 one to be adopted, to your judgment." 
 
Mf^DOWELL. 69 
 
 teen thousand (19,000) men.^ Milroy and Schenck, commanding 
 Fremont's advance of six thousand (6000) men, were in front of Ed- 
 ward Johnson, and Fremont Avas preparing to join them with a force 
 sufficient to give him a movable column of fifteen thousand (15,000). 
 McDowell having drawn away from the upper Rappahannock 
 towards Fredericksburg, was out of the question. It was necessary 
 to strike before Banks and Fremont could unite, and thus oppose 
 Jackson with double numbers. Banks was nearest at hand, but his 
 forces M'cre concentrated, while Fremont's column was yet widely 
 separated. A quick and well-concealed junction of his own division 
 with Edward Johnson's forces might enable Jackson to fall upon 
 Fremont's advance before the main body could join it. 
 
 The route for this movement was selected with reference to mis- 
 leading the enemy, as well as with regard to security from attack. 
 Gen. Jackson determined to march up the east side of the Shenandoah 
 river to Port Republic, a distance of sixteen miles, and then to cross 
 the Blue Ridge mountains, by way of Brown's gap, to Mechum's 
 River station, on the Virginia Central railroad. (Map No. I.) He 
 designed to reach Staunton from this point by railroad. The first 
 part of his route would be protected by the Shenandoah river, and 
 the crossing of the mountains would leave a doubt as to his destina- 
 tion, and suggest the notion that he was en route for Richmond. He 
 was never in the habit of informing his subordinates, even those of 
 the highest rank, of his plans, and his staif were more frequently 
 ignorant of them than otherwise. On this occasion only one or two, 
 whose duties made it necessary, knew the general's designs, so that 
 friends as well as foes were mystified. 
 
 On the 29th of April, Ashby made demonstrations in force in the 
 direction of Harrisonburg, and this was repeated on the 30th. On 
 the latter day a scouting party was sent to the top of the Peaked 
 mountain, the southwest end of the Massanutton mountains, to ob- 
 serve the enemy, who appeared to be quietly camped about Harrison- 
 burg.^ In the afternoon of the 30th, Jackson left his camp, which 
 was occupied in a few hours by Ewell's division, and began his 
 march. The route to Port Republic was over an unpaved country 
 road, which runs along the narrow plain that intervenes between the 
 eastern bank of the Shenandoah and the foot of the Blue Ridge. 
 
 ^ See Banks's return for May 1, There were about 8000 men for duty in 
 Banks's own division (including cavalry), and 11,000 in Shielda's. 
 
 * Capt. Hotchkiss, who had charge of this party, says that Ashby drove the 
 enemy's pickets into Peale's, six miles from Harrisonburg. 
 
70 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 The soil of this plain, formed by the washings from the sandstone 
 foot-hills of the Bhie Ridge, was in many places deep quicksands, 
 and under the excessive rains of this season had become miry. The 
 past ten days had been marked by very heavy rains, and the streams 
 were everywhere swollen. The Confederates left their camp in the 
 midst of a rain, and proceeded but a few miles.* Next day (May 1) 
 was wet, and the miry earth soon became, under the movement of 
 artillery and wagons, a perfect quagmire. Men and horses floun- 
 dered on through the mud, which was hourly becoming worse. 
 Those who tried to find more solid paths through the fields sank 
 deeper into the mire, and were glad to get back into the road. The 
 utmost exertions were able to carry the army forward but five miles 
 more this day. The troops bivouacked in the woods along the road, 
 while Gen. Jackson continued his headquarters at Gen. Lewis's.* 
 The whole of this day was spent m helping the trains through the 
 mud. Large details were made to mend the road and to keep it in 
 a passable condition as train after train moved along. The general 
 himself took part in the work. He urged on the laborers, encour- 
 aged the soldiers, and, having dismounted, assisted in carrying rails 
 and stones. Next day (May 2) the same struggle with the mud con- 
 tinued, and by nightfall the army had passed Lewiston, and bivou- 
 acked, again in the rain, betAveen that place and the foot of Brown's 
 gap. The following day (May 3) the march was resumed by way 
 of Brown's gap and Whitehall to Mechum's River station, on the 
 Virginia Central railroad. On this morning the clouds broke away 
 and the sun brought a glorious May day. The hard mountain road 
 was an infinite relief after the toil of the past two days. With quick 
 and cheerful step the army wound its way through the pass of the 
 Blue Ridge, and poured down into the beautiful Piedmont country 
 that rolls away from the eastern base of the mountains. Saturday 
 night (May 3) found the advance of the Confederates pleasantly en- 
 camped on the hills and in the meadows about the railroad station. 
 While struggling forward against the elements, Jackson had taken 
 precaution to close his lines, so as to prevent the knowledge of his 
 movements from reaching the enemy. 
 
 Next day, Sunday, IVIay 4, the movement was continued, the artil- 
 lery and trains taking the road to Staunton, and recrossing the moun- 
 
 ^ Gen. Jackson made his headquarters on the 30th at Lewiston (Gen. Lewis's 
 home), thirteen miles from Conrad's Store, but the troops only made five miles, 
 and bivouacked along the roadside. 
 
 ' Afterwards the scene of the battle of Port Republic, June 9, 1862. 
 
MCDOWELL. 71 
 
 tains at Rockfish gap, while the troops were sent by railroad. Gen. 
 Jackson reached Staunton on Simday afternoon, and by the close of 
 the next day all the troops and trains had arrived at the same point 
 and were put into camp, the "Stonewall" brigade two miles east of the 
 town, and the remainder of the division west of it, and between the 
 town and Gen. Johnson's position at West View.^ So secret had 
 been kept his design that the people of Staimton were taken entirely 
 by surprise, and when they had convinced themselves that Jackson was 
 on the way to Richmond were astonished by his appearance in their 
 midst. A day was spent in resting the troops, in making the arrange- 
 ments for the march, and in getting information ; and early on the 
 morning of the 7th the array set out against the enemy. Gen. Ed- 
 ward Johnson's brigade, which had started the preceding afternoon,^ 
 led the column, followed by Jackson's three brigades in inverse order, 
 Taliaferro's (the Third) being next to Johnson, the Second, under 
 Col. Campbell, coming next, and the First, or " Stonewall" brigade, 
 under Brig.-Gen. C. S. Winder, bringing up the rear. " The corps 
 of cadets of the Virginia Military Institute (where Jackson had for- 
 merly been a professor), under their superintendent. Gen. F. H. Smith, 
 was also attached to the expedition. The spruce equipments and exact 
 drill of these youths, as they stepped out full of enthusiasm to take 
 their first actual look upon the horrid visage of war, under their 
 renowned professor, formed a strong contrast with the war-worn and 
 nonchalant veterans who composed the army."' 
 
 The army moved on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. 
 Eighteen miles west of Staunton this road crosses the Big Calf- 
 Pasture river, and at the same point intersects the Warm Springs 
 and Harrisonburg turnpike. Soon after passing this point the Con- 
 federate advance came up with the first outposts of Gen. Milroy. 
 The Federal picket was dispersed and in part captured, and Gen. 
 Johnson continued his march. 
 
 ^ West View is six or seven miles west of Staunton, on the Parkersburg 
 turnpike, and four miles from Buffalo gap, a water-way in the Little North 
 mountain, through which passes this turnpike, as well as the Chesapeake and 
 Ohio railroad. 
 
 ^ Johnson, in the afternoon of Tuesday, May 6, marched through Buffalo gap 
 and up the eastern slope of the Great North mountain, resting his advance in the 
 notch known as Dry Branch gap, fifteen miles from Staunton, Here, between 
 Crawford's mountain and Elliot's knob, he bivouacked part of his troops in line 
 on the crest of the mountain, Milroy's advance was at the eastern base of the 
 Shenandoah mountain, on the opposite side of the Big Calf-Pasture valley. 
 
 ' Dabney's Life of Jackson, p, 341. 
 
72 CAMPAIGN JN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 18G1-G2. 
 
 ^leantinic, Milroy liad on tliis day learned for the first time from 
 his scouts and spies that a junction had been made between the forces 
 of Jackson and Johnson, and that they were advancing to attack him 
 at McDowell. He says : " Having the day previous (May 6) sent 
 out a large portion of the Third A'^irginia, Seventy-fifth Ohio, and 
 Thirty-second Ohio to^ Shaw's ridge, upon the Shenandoah moun- 
 tain, for the purpose of protecting my foraging and reconnoitring 
 parties, I immediately ordered my whole force to concentrate at 
 McDowell, and, expecting reinforcements, prepared for defence there. 
 In the afternoon of the 7th a laro:e force of the rebels was discovered 
 descending the west side of the Shenandoah mountain, along the 
 Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. I ordered a section of the 
 Ninth Ohio battery (Capt. Hyman) on Shaw's ridge to shell them, 
 and endeavor to retard their progress.'"' The reinforcements he 
 expected consisted of Schenck's brigade, then on the way from Frank- 
 lin, and which, by a forced march, reached McDowell before mid- 
 day on the 8th.^ 
 
 In consequence of the withdrawal of Milroy's advance on the 7th, 
 Gen. Johnson found only the hastily-evacuated camps of the Federals 
 in his ascent of Shenandoah mountain. The greater part of the 
 transportation of this Federal force was not with it at the time, and 
 hence the troops abandoned their stores and camp equipage to the 
 Confederates. Nor was Johnson's descent on the western side ob- 
 structed by Capt. Hyman's battery. The latter fired a few shots 
 without effect and then withdrew. Johnson bivouacked for the 
 night on Shaw's Fork,* and the other Confederate brigades at dif- 
 ferent points in the rear. The mountains of this region aiford good 
 camping-grounds only at considerable intervals, and, as the army 
 moved upon a single road, it was eight or ten miles between the 
 front and rear.^ (Map No. I.) 
 
 "On Thursday morning (May 8) the march was resumed early, 
 
 ^ This should be "beyond," as Shaw's ridge is west of the Shenandoah 
 mountain. 
 
 "^ Milroy's report, "Rebellion Record," vol. v. p. 34. 
 
 ' Gen. Schenck says : " By leaving my baggage-train under a guard in my last 
 camp on the road, fourteen miles from McDowell, I was able to push forward 
 so as to make the whole distance, thirty-four miles, in twenty-three hours." As 
 he reached McDowell at 10 a.m. on May 8, he must have left Franklin at 11 a.m. 
 on the preceding day, (Schenck's report, "Rebellion Record," vol. v. p. 35,) 
 
 * Twenty-nine miles from Staunton. 
 
 ^ Jackson's headquarters were at Rogers's toll-gate, at the eastern foot of the 
 Shenandoah mountain, twenty-three miles from Staunton. 
 
r 
 
 M<^DOWELL. 73 
 
 with Gen. Johnson's regiments still in advance, and the ascent of the 
 Bull-Pasture mountain was commenced. This ridge, unlike its 
 neighbors, has a breadth of a couple of miles upon its top, which 
 might be correctly termed a table-land, were it not occupied by- 
 clusters of precipitous hills which are themselves almost mountainous 
 in their dimensions and ruggedness. The Parkersburg turnpike, 
 proceeding westward, ascends to this table-land, passes across it, and 
 descends to the Bull-Pasture river by a sinuous course along the 
 ravines which seam the sides and top of the mountain alike, so that 
 it is almost everywhere commanded, on one or both sides, by the 
 steep and wooded banks of the valleys which it threads. On the right 
 and left of the road the western portions of the rough plateau which 
 has been described were occupied by pasture-lands, covered with the 
 richest greensward, with here and there the prostrate trunk of a forest- 
 tree long since girdled and killed. The chasm which separates the 
 higher reaches of these lofty pastures is a mile in width, and far 
 down in its bottom the turnpike descends toward the river, until it 
 debouches, through a straight gorge of a few hundred yards in length, 
 upon the bridge. Artillery planted upon a hillock beyond the river 
 commanded this reach of the road with a murderous fire. 
 
 " Gens. Jackson and Johnson, having cautiously ascended the moun- 
 tain, and driven away a picket of the enemy which quartered on its 
 top, proceeded to the western ridge of the pasture-lands on the left of 
 the road, and occupied the forenoon in examining the position of the 
 enemy." ^ 
 
 The open ground here is known as Sitlington's hill, and the high 
 pasture-land on the opposite side of the turnpike, and in a north- 
 easterly direction, is called Hull's hill. The open field on top of 
 Sitlington's hill is a mile in length, while the foot of the hill is on 
 all sides steep and heavily wooded. The Confederates reached the 
 open top by way of a ravine which meets the turnpike about one 
 and a half miles east of McDowell, at a point where the turnpike 
 turns sharply to the north, to find its way around the base of the hill. 
 This ravine is narrow and very steep, and, besides being wooded, is 
 filled with boulders washed down from above. From the open field 
 on top it was easy to look down upon the village of McDowell and 
 the Federal camps in the valley of the Bull-Pasture. The open 
 ground on the top of Hull's hill was a mile away. It was occupied 
 by Federal riflemen, but their fire was harmless at that distance. 
 (Map No. IV.) 
 
 ^ Dabney's Life of Jackson, p. 342. 
 6 
 
74 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-63. 
 
 The small escort accompanying the Confederate generals in their 
 reconnoissance having attracted his notice, Gen. Milroy sent out 
 parties of skirmishers through tlie forest which covered the western 
 side and base of Sitlington's hill, and also opened witli a section of 
 artillery from the farther side of the McDowell valley. The eleva- 
 tion was too great, however, for the guns to effect anything, and the 
 escort kept the skirmishers at bay. The hill would have afforded the 
 Confederates a plunging fire upon the Federal camps, but Jackson 
 declined to order up artillery. Two reasons prevented him. The 
 mode of access to the hill was so rugged and difficult as to forbid the 
 use of horses, and the guns could only have been gotten up by hand 
 with great exertion. In case of a successful advance by the enemy, 
 there would have been no possibility of withdrawing them. Another 
 and a controlling motive was found in his determination not to attack 
 the enemy at once from the commanding position of Sitlington's hill, 
 but merely to occupy him until a flanking column could find its way, 
 by a considerable detour, to a point beyond ]\IcDowell, seize the turn- 
 pike between that village and Monterey, and thus block Milroy's 
 direct line of retreat. The Confederate engineers had discovered that 
 a route practicable for artillery passed to the right of Hull's hill, 
 and, making a circuit, re-entered the turnpike five miles west of 
 McDowell. Jackson decided to move a considerable force of artiller}'-, 
 with adequate infantry supports, by this road during the night, with 
 the hope of crushing his foe when hemmed in on the morrow. Gen. 
 Johnson's brigade, though out of sight, was close at hand, in case the 
 enemy should make any effort in force to occupy Sitlington's hill, 
 and Taliaferro's and Campbell's were within supporting distance, 
 while the " Stonewall" brigade was ordered to encamp some distance 
 in the rear. 
 
 While the Confederates were thus employed, IVIilroy had been 
 reinforced by the arrival of Schenck's brigade, which, omitting " sev- 
 eral companies then on detached and other duty, brought into the field 
 an aggregate of only about thirteen hundred (1300) infantry, besides 
 De Beck's battery of the First Ohio artillery, and about two hundred 
 and fifty (250) cavalry." ^ His skirmishers had reported that the Con- 
 federate force was increasing, and that there were indications of the 
 planting of artillery on Sitlington's hill. In such an event the Fed- 
 eral position at McDowell was entirely untenable. Gen. ]\Iilroy, there- 
 fore, with the approval of Gen. Schenck, who, as senior, now com- 
 
 ^ Gen. Schenck's report. 
 
I 
 
 MCDOWELL. 75 
 
 manded, moved forward with portions of his own brigade and one 
 regiment of Schenck's brigade to seize the hill. Milroy's brigade 
 consisted of the Twenty-fifth, Seventj'-fifth, and Thirty-second Ohio, 
 and Third Virginia regiments. Numerous detachments of these regi- 
 ments were absent on other duty, and several companies were already 
 engaged as sku-mishers, and Gen. Milroy reports that the force he 
 carried forward to this main attack, including the Eighty-second Ohio, 
 of Schenck's brigade, was between two thousand two hundred (2200) 
 and two thoasand three hundred (2300) men. It was now after 
 three o'clock in the afternoon. As soon as Jackson perceived the 
 advance of the Federals in force, he ordered up four regiments of 
 Johnson's brigade. The Fifty-second Virginia came first, and was 
 placed on the left. It was deployed as skirmishers, and sent forward 
 to engage the enemy. The Twelfth Georgia was posted in the centre 
 of the Confederate position, on the crest of the hill, and the Forty- 
 fourth Virginia on the right, near a ravine. The Fifty-eighth 
 Virginia was sent to the left to support the Fifty-second. The Con- 
 federate line was a curve, with the convexity towards the enemy, so 
 that the right of it was in a direction nearly perpendicular to the 
 left. The advance of the Federals was protected for some distance 
 by the convexity of the hill, and in part by the wood that covered its 
 base and lower sides. As the Federals emerged from the wood and 
 attained the face of the hill, they became engaged with the skirmishers 
 of the Fifty-second Virginia, Col. M. G. Harman. It was the 
 Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth Ohio, under Col. McLean, of the 
 Seventy-fifth, that led the attack on the Confederate left. Resolutely 
 climbing the hill, they pushed back the skirmish line opposed to 
 them, until they came upon the Confederate line of battle on the 
 brow of the hill. Here the struggle became fierce and sanguinary. 
 Meantime, Milroy had sent the Thirty-second and Eightj^-second 
 Ohio and Third Virginia (Federal) farther to his left, that they might 
 attack the right of the Confederates, and, if possible, turn it. The 
 two Ohio regiments pressed up the face of the hill, and vigorously 
 attacked Johnson's right, while the Third Virginia (Federal) pushed 
 along the turnpike and tlireatened to turn his flank. Anticipating the 
 latter movement, Jackson had placed the Thirty-first Virginia to hold 
 the turnpike in advance of the point at which the Confederates had 
 diverged from it to ascend the hill. The attack which was made on 
 Johnson's right, on the hill where only the Forty-fourth Virginia was 
 posted, caused Jackson to withdraw the Thirty-first from the turnpike, 
 and to send it and the Twenty-fifth Virginia to Gen. Johnson, who 
 
76 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G2. 
 
 placed them in support of the Forty-fourth. The guarding of the 
 turnpike was then committed to the Twent}'-first Virginia (Col. 
 Cumiingham), of Campbell's brigade, which was directed to hold it 
 at all hazards. But the Federals did not press in this direction, and 
 Col. Cunningham was not seriously attacked. Gen. Milroy states 
 that he ordered two twelve-pounders to be placed on the turnpike, 
 but did not get them into position " until after twilight." The attack 
 upon the Confederate right was vigorous and well sastained, and now, 
 by the junction of the two attacking Federal columns, the battle 
 became general. Repeated efforts were made to carry the crest of the 
 hill, but these were repulsed. The firing was incessant and at close 
 quarters. • The Confederates had the advantage of position, and in 
 some parts the undulations of the ground gave them some cover ; but, 
 for the most part, their line showing plainly against the evening sky, 
 afforded an excellent mark for the Federal soldiers. On the other 
 hand, though the Federal troops had to push up the steep acclivity of 
 the hill, they reaped the usual advantage in such cases, resulting from 
 the high firing of the Confederates. The most advanced portion 
 of the Confederate line was the centre, where, without any protection 
 from the nature of the ground, the Twelfth Georgia regiment bore 
 the brunt of numerous attacks and gallantly held its position. It 
 was suffering heavily, but refused to yield, or even to take advantage 
 of such cover as the place afforded. 
 
 Gen. Jackson says : " The engagement had now not only become 
 general along the whole line, but so intense that I ordered Gen. 
 Taliaferro to the support of Gen. Johnson.^ Accordingly, the Twenty- 
 third and Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments were advanced to the 
 centre of the line, which was then held by the Twelfth Georgia with 
 heroic gallantry. ... At this time the Federals were pressing 
 forward on our right, with a view of flanking that position. This 
 movement of the enemy was speedily detected, and met by Gen. 
 Taliaferro's brigade and the Twelfth Georgia with great promptitude. 
 Further to check it, portions of the Twenty-fifth and Thirtj'-first 
 Virginia regiments were sent to occupy an elevated piece of wood- 
 land on our right and rear, so situated as to fully command the 
 position of the enemy. The brigade commanded by Col. Campbell 
 coming up about this time, was, together with the Tenth Virginia 
 (the rear regiment of Taliaferro's brigade), ordered down the ridge 
 into the woods, to guard against movements against our right flank, 
 
 ' To Gen. Johnson had been intrusted the command of the troops engaged. 
 
M<^ DO WELL. 77 
 
 which they, in connection with the other force, eifectiially prevented. 
 The battle lasted four hours, — from half-past four in the afternoon 
 until half-past eight. Every attempt, by front or flank movement, to 
 attain the crest of the hill, where our line was formed, was signally 
 and effectually repulsed. Finally, after dark, their force ceased firing, 
 and the enemy retreated. The enemy's artillery, posted on a hill in 
 our front, was active in throwing shot and shell up, to the period when 
 the infantry fight commenced ; but, in consequence of the great angle 
 of elevation at which they fired and our sheltered position, inflicted 
 no loss upon our troops." ^ This artillery consisted of a section which 
 had been firing all the day from the western side of the McDowell 
 valley. There was also a gun in action from the Twelfth Ohio 
 battery, which. Gen. Milroy says, "was placed in position on the 
 mountain on the left of the turnpike (Hull's hill) with the greatest 
 difficulty," whilst his troops were advancing against the Confederate 
 right. 
 
 The Confederate forces actually in the battle consisted of Johnson's 
 brigade (six regiments) and of Taliaferro's brigade (three regiments) ; 
 Col. Campbell's brigade arrived in time to be used in protecting the 
 right flank, but was not engaged, and the " Stonewall" brigade was 
 some miles in the rear. The nine regiments engaged numbered about 
 four thousand five hundred (4500) men, and Col. Campbell's brigade 
 contained about fifteen hundred (1500) more. The Federal strength, 
 under Schenck and Milroy, was over six thousand (6000) men,^ but, 
 according to the reports of those officers, not more than two thousand 
 five hundred (2500) of these were in the battle. The Confederate 
 official report gives Jackson's loss as seventy-one killed and three 
 hundred and ninety wounded, — total, four hundred and sixty-one 
 (461). Among the Confederate killed was Col. Gibbons, of the 
 Tenth Virginia, who fell while gallantly leading his regiment. Gen. 
 Edward Johnson, who commanded the troops engaged, was seriously 
 wounded in the foot, near the close of the fight. Col. M. G. Harman, 
 
 ^ Jackson's report of the battle of McDowell. 
 
 "^ Fremont, in his official report, already quoted, says that Milroy and Schenck 
 had together 6500 men. His official return for May 10 gives as the present for 
 duty, officers and men : 
 
 Under Milroy 3694 
 
 " Schenck 2335 
 
 Total 6029 
 
 On April 30 the return gives the strength of the two as 6422. 
 
78 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G2. 
 
 of tlie Fifty-second Virginia, Col. Smith and Maj. Higginbotham, 
 of the Twenty-fifth Virginia, and Maj. Campbell, of the Forty- 
 second Virginia, were also wounded. Gen. Schenck reports twenty- 
 eight killed, and two hundred and twenty-five wounded, and three 
 missing, — total, two hundred and fiftj-^-six (256), as the Federal loss.^ 
 Though Gen. Milroy failed altogether to obtain possession of 
 Sitlington's hill, or to effect any lodgment from which he might 
 renew the attack on the morrow, he maintained the fight in the most 
 spirited manner until dark, and in this way saved himself from 
 disaster ; for, under cover of the darkness and fog, he quietly with- 
 
 ^ The troops actually engaged at McDowell, with the losses in detail, so far as 
 the regimental reports give them, are as follows : 
 
 
 CONFEDERATE. 
 
 
 
 Edward Johnson's brigade : 
 
 Strength. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. Missing. Total Los* 
 
 Twenty-fifth Virginia 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 Thirty-first " 
 
 
 
 
 
 Twelfth Georgia 
 
 . 540 
 
 40 
 
 140 
 
 180 
 
 Forty-fourth Virginia 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fifty-second " 
 
 
 6 
 
 47 
 
 53 
 
 Fifty-eighth " 
 
 
 
 
 
 Taliaferro's brigade : 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tenth Virginia 
 
 . 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 Twenty-third Virginia 
 
 . 
 
 6 
 
 35 
 
 41 
 
 Thirty-seventh " 
 
 
 5 
 
 34 
 
 39 
 
 Campbell's brigade : 
 
 
 
 
 
 Forty-second Virginia 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 Forty-eighth " 
 
 . 
 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 Twenty-first " 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 Irish battalion . 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Total strength, about 600C 
 
 ). Total loss, 461 
 
 
 
 
 FEDERAL 
 
 
 
 
 Of Milroy's brigade, parts of the 
 Twenty-fifth Ohio 
 Seventy-fifth " 
 Thirty-second 
 
 Strength. 
 
 . 469 
 . 444 
 . 416 
 
 Third Virginia 439 
 
 Of Schenck's brigade, part of the 
 
 Eighty-second Ohio 500 
 
 Also, some of Second Virginia, as skirmishers. 
 
 Part of Ilyman's battery, and part of Johnson's (Twelfth Ohio) 
 
 battery. 
 Strength, about 2500. Loss, 256. 
 
M<^DOWELL. 79 
 
 drew from the field, unmolested by the Confederates, the country 
 being too broken and difficult to admit of pursuit at night. McDowell 
 was entirely untenable with the Confederates holding Sitlington's 
 hill, and so Gen. Schenck, as soon as the Federal troops had been 
 safely withdrawn from the battle-field, having lighted his camp-fires, 
 evacuated the place, and fell back during the night in the direction of 
 Franklin. He says : " The withdrawal was effected without the loss 
 of a man, and without loss or destruction of any article of public 
 propert}', except of some stores for which Gen. Milroy was entirely 
 without the means of transportation." ^ 
 
 Meanwhile, the Confederates, having collected the wounded and left 
 . a guard on the field, sought needed rest in their bivouac. This rest 
 was short, for it was late in the night before all was quiet, and with 
 the early morning the army was astir. At dawn Jackson was in 
 the saddle, but when he had ascended again to the battle-field, it was 
 only to look down on the deserted camps and smouldering camp- 
 fires of the foe. He occupied McDowell without delay, and, having 
 provided for the captured stores, prepared to follow the retreating 
 army. 
 
 The following was Jackson's laconic despatch announcing his 
 victory to the adjutant-general : 
 
 " Valley District, May 9, 1862. 
 
 " To Gen. S. Cooper : 
 
 " God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday. 
 
 " T. J. Jackson, Major-General." 
 
 Gen. Schenck fell back by gradual stages to Franklin, taking ad- 
 vantage of the rugged country to hold the pursuers in check. On 
 Friday (9th) he halted for some hours at the intersection of the 
 Monterey and Franklin roads, but, before any considerable portion 
 of Jackson's force was up, he moved on.^ Next day the Confederates 
 pursued closely, but were easily prevented in these mountains from 
 doing any serious damage. 
 
 The plan of the Confederate leader was to beat the armies opposed 
 to him in detail. The force under Gen. Schenck had been repulsed, 
 but it was still formidable. If reinforced from Gen. Banks, the 
 
 ^ Schenck's report. A considerable quantity of camp equipage was left, and 
 many tents, the latter standing. 
 
 ^ Jackson was compelled to spend some hours at McDowell, in order that his 
 troops might be fed. 
 
80 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 strengtlicnetl force might be able in this mountainous country to 
 withstiind him.^ He therefore took steps to prevent reinforcements 
 from being sent from Banks to Schenck, or a union of the two com- 
 mands. For this purpose he sent a party of cavalry, under Capt. 
 Hotohkiss, topographical engineer, to blockade the roads loading 
 from the direction of McDowell and Franklin through North River 
 and Dry River gaps. These roads lead to Harrisonburg, and at the 
 points named pass through narrow defiles, where, by felling trees, 
 they could be made impassable long enough to give time for the 
 making of dispositions to defeat the movement. Another part}'' was 
 sent to do the same on the road leading through Brock's gap, directly 
 west of Harrisonburg, and the citizens were requested to aid by 
 obstructing every available point.^ These detachments having been 
 sent off, the army continued its march in the wake of the retreating 
 Federals. 
 
 On the succeeding day (Hth), as Jackson again closed up to the 
 rear of the Federal army, the latter adopted the expedient of setting 
 fire to the forests along the road. " Soon the sky was overcast wth 
 volumes of smoke which almost hid the scene, and wrapped every 
 distant object in a veil impenetrable to the eyes and the telescopes 
 of the officers alike. Through this sultry fog the pursuing army felt 
 its way very cautiously along, cannonaded by the enemy from every 
 advantageous position, while it was protected from ambuscades only 
 by detachments of skirmishers who scoured the burning M'oods on 
 each side of the highway. As fast as these could scramble over the 
 precipitous hills and the blazing thickets, the great column crept 
 along the main road like a lazy serpent, the general often far in 
 advance of its head, in his eagerness to overtake the foe. He declared 
 that this smoke was the most adroit expedient to which a retreating 
 army could resort to embarrass pursuit, and that it entailed upon him 
 all the disadvantages of a night attack. By slow approaches and 
 constant skirmishing the enemy were driven to the village of Frank- 
 lin, when the double darkness of the night and the fog again arrested 
 his progress."' Gen. Schenck says: "From McDowell I fell back 
 by easy marches on the 9th, 10th, and 11th to this place (Franklin), 
 
 ^ He was not aware how large a portion of Banks's troops were about to go 
 to reinforce Gen. McDowell at Fredericksburg. 
 
 '^ The blockading of these roads was one of the causes which subsequently 
 prevented Fremont from marching on Harrisonburg when ordered to go to the 
 relief of Banks, and induced him to go by a circuit to Strasburg. 
 
 ' Dabney's Life of Jackson, p. 351. 
 

M<^DO WELL. 81 
 
 the enemy cautiously pursuing. . . . While awaiting the arrival of 
 the general commanding (Fremont), with reinforcements at this point, 
 on the 11th, 12th, and 13th, the rebel army having advanced within 
 two miles of our position, we were kept constantly engaged in watch- 
 ful preparations for an expected attack."^ 
 
 On Monday morning, May 12, Jackson, finding Schenck strongly 
 posted, and knowing that affairs in the east would not admit of his 
 protracted stay in the mountains, determined to withdraw from the 
 Federal front without further battle. He had found it impossible to 
 do any considerable injury to an army retreating in such a country. 
 Now the Federals were within reach of Fremont's main body, and 
 having taken a stand at Franklin in a strong position, might either 
 hold him in check until the reinforcements arrived or continue their 
 retreat until a junction with Fremont was effected. Such a junction 
 once made, the Confederate general might be forced to fight a superior 
 force ^ without the aid of Ewell's division, which had been left in Elk 
 Run valley to watch Banks. Again, time was all-important. The 
 enemy could make a campaign in the mountains tedious. An emer- 
 gency at Fredericksburg or Richmond might cause the recall of 
 Ewell's division, which had been ordered to co-operate with Jackson 
 for making some movement against Banks which would relieve Fred- 
 ericksburg and prevent troops from that point or the Valley going 
 to reinforce McClellan. He decided to unite his whole force without 
 more delay and strike at Banks, who in the open country of the Val- 
 ley could be more readily assailed. Milroy and Schenck had been 
 driven away from the position that enabled them to threaten Staun- 
 ton; had been pushed away, too, from Banks, so that there was no 
 longer any danger of a junction of the two commands. Jackson 
 believed that by a prompt movement against the latter officer, he 
 might defeat him before Fremont would sufficiently recover from 
 the disarrangement of his plans, produced by the defeat and retreat 
 of Schenck, to interfere actively with the operations of the Confed- 
 erates. 
 
 Having so decided, Jackson sent a courier to Gen. Ewell to 
 announce his coming, and prepared for the return. He granted the 
 soldiers the half of Monday (12th) as a season of rest, in lieu of the 
 Sabbath which had been devoted to warfare, and issued the following 
 order to them : 
 
 ^ Schenck's report. 
 
 * Jackson had with him near 9000 men ; Fremont 15,000. 
 
82 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G2. 
 
 "Soldiers of the Army of the Valley and Northwest: 
 
 " I congratulate you on your recent victory at McDowell. I request 
 you to unite with me this morning in thanksgiving to Almighty God 
 ior thus having crowned your arms with success, and in praying that 
 he will continue to lead you on from victory to victory until our 
 independence shall be established, and make us that people whose 
 God is the Lord. The chaplains will hold Divine Service at 10 
 o'clock A.M. this day, in their respective regiments." ^ 
 
 ' Dabney's Life of Jackson, p. 353. 
 
CHAPTER ly. 
 
 WINCHESTER. 
 
 In the afternoon of May 12 the Confederate army began to return, 
 and on the evening of Wednesday, 14th, reached McDowell. On 
 the latter day, Fremont arrived at Franklin with the troops he was 
 bringing to the assistance of Schenck. Here he remained quietly for 
 the following ten days repairing his losses, and, as Jackson had an- 
 ticipated, made no attempt to interfere with his operations.^ Jackson 
 continued his march in the direction of Staunton. On the night of 
 the 15th he camped at Lebanon Springs, where the road forks, the 
 
 ^ Fremont had been joined by Blenker's division at Petersburg, in Hardy 
 county, May 11. Next day he set out for Franklin, which place he reached on 
 the 14th. On the 16th, Secretary Stanton telegr.iphs to know if he still designs 
 to move on the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, and how long it will take him 
 to reach it. Fremont says he was then busy trying to equip his destitute men, 
 and he did not move until the news of the overthrow of Banks was sent to him. 
 Fremont seems to have been very largely occupied in " equipping his destitute 
 men," and from his and Rosecrans's reports, this division of Blenker must have 
 been the most improvident or unfortunate set of poor devils that ever took up 
 arms. They were detached from McClellan about April 1, and ordered to Fre- 
 mont. Their route lay through one of the finest countries in the world. They 
 were probably never more than thirty miles from a railroad which put them 
 within from two to five hours of Washington. They were not at any time 
 within fifty miles of an enemy, and yet it took them until May 11 to reach their 
 destination, — a distance not more than one hundred and sixty or one hundred 
 and seventy miles. At one time they seem to have lost themselves, for Gen. 
 Rosecrans was sent by the Federal Secretary of War about the middle of April 
 to hunt them up and lead them to Fremont. He says he went to Winchester 
 via Harper's Ferry, "despatching messengers from two or three points in my 
 route in search of Gen. Blenker's division-," found that a boat-load had drowned 
 themselves in crossing the Shenandoah at Berry's ferry, and ordered the 
 division to Snicker's ferry, where there was a "flying bridge." He says they 
 were " unfed, unclothed, and unpaid, between 8000 and 10,000 men, bare- 
 footed," etc. He had them supplied, and finally delivered them to Gen. Fre- 
 mont. The latter says that Blenker reported his efiective force when they 
 reached him at 8000, but that "subsequent investigation placed the number of 
 men and ofiicers actually present and fit for duty at considerably below 7000." 
 They had left Alexandria 10,000 strong. 
 
 83 
 
84 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 one branch leading to Staunton and the otlier to Harrisonburg. The 
 next day was spent in camp, in deference to the proclamation of the 
 Confederate President appointing May 16 as a day of fasting and 
 prayer. On Saturday, 17th, the troops turned towards Harrisonburg, 
 and moved on over roatls made heavy by the rain of the preceding 
 day. They camjaed for the night at Moasy creek and Bridgewater, 
 and here they rested during Sunday, the 18th. 
 
 We must now glance at affairs in the Valley. During the nine- 
 teen days that had clasped since Jackson left his camp at Elk run, 
 important changes had taken place in the disposition of the Federal 
 troops in Northern Virginia. President Lincoln, as heretofore stated, 
 had given a reluctant assent to Gen. McClellan's plan of campaign, 
 which involved the transfer of the main Federal army to the penin- 
 sula between the York and James rivers, and the movement by that 
 route upon Richmond. To the apprehensions of the Federal Presi- 
 dent and his cabinet this movement seemed to uncover AVashington. 
 They feared an irruption of the Confederates, which might place the 
 Federal capital in hostile hands before an adequate force could be 
 recalled for its defence. Hence the most stringent orders were given 
 McClellan to leave a force so disposed as to cover Washington, and 
 amply sufficient to protect it in any emergency. The latter officer 
 thought he had complied fully with this order when he left over 
 sixty-three thousand (63,000) men and eighty-five (85) pieces of 
 artillery in the various commands that were located in the Shen- 
 andoah valley, at Warrenton, at Manassas, and in and around Wash- 
 ington.^ In addition to this force, ten thousand (10,000) men and 
 twenty-four (24) guns, under Blenker, had been detached and ordered 
 to Fremont, whose movable column was thus increased to twelve 
 or fifteen thousand (12,000 or 15,000) men, even after deducting 
 Blenker's mass of stragglers. This aggregate of over seventy-five 
 thousand (75,000) men was really equal to the entire Confederate 
 strength available for oifence in Virginia at this time. But with 
 fears greatly aroused by Jackson's attack at Kernstown, and no doubt 
 
 * McClellan says, in his report, p. 546 : " From the following letter to the 
 adjutant-general, dated April 1, 1862, it will be seen that I left for the defence 
 of the national capital and its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, 
 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, including the 32 pieces in Wash- 
 ington, alluded to, but not enumerated in my letter to the adjutant-general." 
 (This includes Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 guns.) "It will also 
 be seen that I recommended other available troops in New York (more than 
 4000) to be at once ordered forward to reinforce them." (See p. 57, ante.) 
 
WINCHESTER. 85 
 
 Stimulated by want of confidence in Gen. McClellan, the Washington 
 authorities deemed it inadequate, and so the Federal commander had 
 hardly reached Fortress Monroe (April 2), to assume the personal 
 direction of the operations there, before the President ordered (April 
 3) McDowell's corps to remain in front of Washington.^ On the 4th 
 of April, Gen. McDowell was detached altogether from McClellan's 
 command and placed in charge of the Department of the Rappahan- 
 nock, and Gen. Banks was given independent command of the Depart- 
 ment of the Shenandoah.^ To McDowell was assigned the duty of 
 protecting the capital, by the following order : 
 
 "War Department, April 11, 1862. 
 " Sir : — For the present, and until further orders from this Depart- 
 ment, you will consider the national capital as especially under your 
 protection, and make no movement throwing your force out of position 
 for the discharge of this primary duty. 
 
 " E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 " Maj.-Gen. McDowell." 
 
 McDowell at first moved out towards Catlett's station, rebuilding 
 the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and pushed his advance in the 
 direction of the Rappahannock and Culpeper. Subsequently he asked 
 and obtained permission to move down to Fredericksburg, but was 
 prohibited from crossing the river there, or making any advance be- 
 yond occupying the town with a small force. The early days of May 
 foimd him opposite Fredericksburg, where he remained inactive for 
 three weeks. When McDowell's corps had been detached from Mc- 
 Clellan's army, one division (Franklin's) had been allowed to go to 
 the Peninsula, and this deficiency was to be made up from the com- 
 mands about Washington and in Northern Virginia. Thus a new 
 division was organized under Gen. Ord, partly of troops drawn from 
 Banks's and Abercrombie's^ commands, and partly of troops from 
 Washington. This new division, added to those left with him (Mc- 
 Call's and King's), gave McDowell a force of thirty thousand (30,000) 
 men.* To increase his strength still farther, with reference to opera- 
 tions against Richmond, President Lincoln ordered Shields's division 
 to be detached from Banks's corps and sent to McDowell.' 
 
 ^ See page 57, ante. ^ See page 57, note. 
 
 ' Abercrombie was in command at Warrenton. 
 
 * McDowell's "return" for May 17 (excluding Shields) shows his strength, 
 ofiBcers and men present for duty, to have been 29,652. 
 
 * See McDowell's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
 Part I., 1863. 
 
86 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 -^Whcn Gen. Banks learned, on the 1st of May, that Ewcll's division 
 had entered the Valley, and that Jackson was moving, fearing an 
 attack from their combined forces, he evacuated Harrisonburg and 
 gradually withdrew to New Market, and thence, after the detachment 
 of Shields's division, to Strasburg. He thus drew nearer to his base 
 and the forces on which he might call for succor in case of need. 
 Ashby followed the retreating army with his cavalry, and frequent 
 skirmishes occurred between his forces and the Federal rear guard. 
 
 On the 7th of May an affair of outposts occurred between the 
 Seventh Louisiana infantry and a part of the Sixth Virginia cavalry, 
 of Ewell's division, and a company of Federal cavalry, supported by 
 the Thirteenth Indiana regiment, at a little place called Summersville, 
 on the eastern side of the main Shenandoah river, in the Luray val- 
 ley. The Federal cavalry were partly surrounded, and compelled to 
 swim the river for safety, while the infontry was driven from the 
 field.^ A few days after, Shields's division left the Valley by w^ay of 
 Luray and Front Royal, and thence over the Blue Bidge towards 
 Fredericksburg.^ This transfer deprived Banks of more than one- 
 half his forces, for Shields took with him eleven thousand (11,000) 
 men, and left about eight thousand (8000).' Gen. Banks now retired 
 from the upper Valley entirely, posting the main body of his forces 
 at Strasburg,* and sending Col. Kenly, with the First Maryland regi- 
 ment and some cavalry and artillery, — in all about one thousand (1000) 
 men, — to Front Royal (May 16) to protect the railroad and the bridges 
 at that place over the north and south forks of the Shenandoah. 
 
 Thus it was that the middle of May found Fremont, who had 
 hurried forward with Blenker's division to the assistance of Schenck, 
 resting from the fatigues of the march at Franklin, while Shields was 
 in full march to join McDowell at Fredericksburg, and Banks had 
 assumed a strictly defensive attitude at Strasburg to hold the lower 
 valley of the Shenandoah, and especially to cover the Baltimore and 
 Ohio railroad. 
 
 McClellan's urgent and repeated calls for reinforcements, and 
 earnest representations that the holding of such a mass of troops idle 
 
 ^ See report of Col. Foster, of Thirteenth Indiana, "Rebellion Record," vol. v. 
 p. 27. 
 
 2 Shields left New Market May 12. 
 
 ^ The returns of Gens. Williams and Hatch for May 1 show that Banks then 
 had in these commands "present for duty" at Harrisonburg 6032 infantry and 
 artillery (under Williams), and about 2000 cavalry (under Hatch). McDowell 
 states that Shields's strength (effective) was at this time 11,000 men. 
 
 * Here he constructed earthworks, and prepared to hold his position. 
 
WINCHESTER. 87 
 
 in front of Washington was endangering his success, had at last 
 induced the Federal administration to agree to an advance on the 
 part of McDowell from Fredericksburg. The quiet which had 
 existed for some weeks in the Shenandoah valley and on the line of 
 the Eappahannock, and the absence of Jackson in the mountains of 
 Western Virginia, where he was still supposed to be, seem to have 
 reassured the Federal cabinet.^ On May 17 the following order was 
 sent to McDowell : 
 
 " General : — Upon being joined by Shields's division you will 
 move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and 
 Fredericksburg railroad, co-operating with the forces under Gen. 
 McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey 
 and York rivers. While seeking to establish as soon as possible a 
 communication between your left wing and the right wing of Gen. 
 McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such a position as to 
 cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash by any large 
 body of the rebel forces."^ 
 
 The transfer of Shields's forces from Banks to McDowell at 
 Fredericksburg, and the indications of an advance on Richmond from 
 that direction, convinced the Confederate authorities that no time was 
 to be lost in meeting this new danger. For weeks they had watched 
 with anxiety the army gathering at Fredericksburg, as well as the 
 movements of Gen. Banks. The forces of McDowell, moving down 
 from the north on Richmond, cutting the railroads that united that 
 city with the great Valley and Western Virginia, and joining the 
 splendid army under McClellan, which was advancing from the east 
 upon it, threatened the most serious consequences, and was to be pre- 
 vented if possible. The burden of Gen. Lee's' despatches to Gens. 
 Jackson and Ewell for some time past had been to strike Banks, and 
 
 ^ This confidence was no doubt increased by the falling back of the Con- 
 federate army from Yorktown on the 3d of May, the battle of Williamsburg 
 on the 5th, and the subsequent advance of McClellan to the line of the Chick- 
 ahominy. 
 
 ^ President Lincoln would not allow McDowell to join McClellan by way of 
 the Peninsula, but adopted the middle course by ordering the former to advance 
 on Richmond by way of the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad. By this 
 route McDowell would still be between Washington and the enemy, and it was 
 thought could unite with McClellan's right wing in four days. (See McClellan's 
 report, p. 565.) 
 
 ^ Gen. Lee was acting as commander-in-chief under President Davis at this 
 time. 
 
gg CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 thus prevent his reinforcing McDowell or McClellan, and possibly 
 caase the recall of troops to his aid. If no chance offered for this, 
 and he moved towards Fredericksburg, Ewell was to go to the assist- 
 ance of the Confederate troops before that town. Thus, on JMay 8, 
 while Jackson was fighting at McDowell, Gen. Lee writes Ewell that 
 there is no necessity for his remaining at Swift Run gap if Banks is 
 retreating, and if the latter is making towards Fredericksburg, Ewell 
 is to try to strike him while en route. On the 12th, Gen. Lee ap- 
 proves of Ewell remaining at Swift Kun gap " so long as, the enemy 
 remains stationary in the Valley, or while it is necessary to the move- 
 ments of Gen. Jackson." On the 14th, Gen. Lee's assistant adju- 
 tant-general, Col. Taylor, -wTites to Jackson congratulating him on 
 his victory (at McDowell), and says Lee is " of opinion that Banks 
 cannot be as strong as he has been represented ; if so, his course is 
 inexplicable. He thinks that if you can form a junction with Gen. 
 Ewell, that with your combined forces you would be able to drive 
 Banks from the Valley." On the 14th, Gen. Lee was informed by 
 Ewell of the movement of Shields's division towards Front Royal, 
 and on the 16th writes to Jackson: "Whatever may be Banks's inten- 
 tion, it is very desirable to prevent him from going either to Freder- 
 icksburg or to the Peninsula, and also to destroy the Manassas road. 
 A successful blow struck at him would delay, if it did not prevent, 
 his moving to either place, and might also lead to the recall of the 
 reinforcements sent to Fremont (Blenker's division) from "Winchester, 
 as reported by you. Gen. Ewell telegraphed yesterday that in pur- 
 suance of instructions from you he was moving down the Valley. . . . 
 But you will not, in any demonstration you may make in that direc- 
 tion, lose sight of the fact that it may become necessary for you to 
 come to the support of Gen. Johnston. . . . Whatever movement you 
 make against Banks do it speedily, and if successful, drive him back 
 towards the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as practicable, 
 that you design threatening that line." 
 
 Gen. Ewell rode across the Valley to confer in person with Gen. 
 Jackson. He reached Mount Solon, where Jackson was encamped, 
 on Sunday morning, May 18, and these two officers decided upon the 
 plan for a most energetic pursuit of Banks. It was agreed that one 
 of Ewell's brigades (Taylor's Louisianians), which constituted, too, the 
 bulk of his command, should march from Elk Run valley, by way 
 of Keezletown, and unite with Jackson on the Valley turnpike at 
 Sparta, a few miles south of New Market, while the remainder of his 
 force followed the course of the south fork of the Shenandoah to 
 
WINCHESTER. 89 
 
 Luray. Ewcll returned on the afternoon of the 18th to direct the 
 movement of his troops.^ 
 
 That portion of the great Valley of Virginia, called the Valley 
 of the Shenandoah, extends in a southwesterly direction from Har- 
 per's Ferry, where the Shenandoah empties into the Potomac, to 
 the head-waters of the former, a distance of about one hundred and 
 forty miles. It is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge mountains, 
 to the base of which finally gather all the waters of the Valley, and 
 on the west by the North mountain and other ridges which run 
 parallel to the principal range of the Alleghanies. The width varies 
 from twelve to twenty -four miles. An important subdivision of this 
 Valley exists for a part of its length. Near Front Royal, thirty-six air- 
 line miles from its mouth, the Shenandoah divides into t^vo branches 
 or " forks." A mountain chain called the Massanutton rises abruptly 
 between these two branches, and runs in a direction parallel to the 
 Blue Ridge for fifty miles to the southwest, when it sinks, as sud- 
 denly, into the general level at a point a few miles east of Harrison- 
 burg. This chain, being much nearer to the Blue Ridge than to the 
 North mountain, divides the Valley very unequally. The western 
 side, or main Valley, is known as the " Valley" simply, while the 
 narrow portion, betw^een the Massanuttons and the Blue Ridge, is 
 called tlie Page^ or Luray valley. The north fork, which is the 
 smaller branch of the Shenandoah, rising in the North mountain, 
 west of Harrisonburg, drains the main Valley between the North 
 and Massaiiutton ranges. It runs for some distance on the north- 
 western side, but at Mount Jackson crosses to the base of the Mas- 
 sanutton mountains, which it follows with a tortuous course to 
 
 ^ Two days after, instructions received from Gen. J. E. Johnston seemed to 
 Jackson to seriously restrict his operations. "We find the following telegram in 
 the Confederate archives, Washington : 
 
 " Camp near New Market, May 20, 
 "ma Staunton, May 21, 
 "Gen, R. E. Lee: — I am of the opinion that an attempt should be made to 
 defeat Banks, but under instructions just received from Gen. Johnston I do not 
 feel at liberty to make an attack. Please answer by telegraph at once. 
 
 " T. J. Jackson." 
 
 The reply to this, and the letter of Gen. Johnston giving the instructions, have 
 not been found. Gen, Johnston (p, 129 of his Narrative) says his instructions 
 to Gen, Jackson " were to advance and attack unless he found the enemy too 
 strongly intrenched." It was perhaps some emphasis on the last clause that 
 made the instructions appear to Jackson to hamper him, 
 
 ^ " Page" is the name of the county comprising the greater part of this 
 valley, and Luray is the county-seat of Page. 
 
 7 
 
90 CAMPAIGN IN TIIK VALLFA' OF VIRGINIA, 18G1-G2. 
 
 Strasburg, where it finds its way around the north end of tliat chain, 
 and finally joins the south fork near Front lloyal. The south fork, 
 which is the principal river, M'atei's the narnnv Luray valley. As- 
 cending this stream beyond the south end of the Massjunitton moun- 
 tains, we find that it again branches at and near Port Republic. 
 Three streams — the North, ISIiddle, and South rimvH — constitute the 
 liead-waters of the principal fork of the Shenandoah, and, spreading 
 over the whole width of the Valley from the Blue Ridge to the 
 North mountain, drain the upjxn- part of Rockingham and nearly the 
 whole of Augusta county. The two first named unite three or four 
 miles southwest of Port Republic, and the South river, having found 
 its way along the base of the Blue Ridge, joins the others at that 
 village. 
 
 The principal means of communication between Staunton and Win- 
 chester was, then, the Valley turnpike, an excellent macadamized 
 road, which passes through Harrisonburg, New Market, Blount 
 Jackson, and Strasburg. Leaving Staunton, it crosses, by wooden 
 bridges, the ]\Iiddle and North rivers before reaching Harrisonburg, 
 and the north fork of the Shenandoah at INlount Jackson. Common 
 dirt roads run jiarallel to it for the greater jjart of its length. From 
 New INIarket a turnpike leads at right angles over the Massanuttou 
 mountains, crosses the south or main Jork of the Shenandoah at 
 White-House bridge, passes Luray, and crosses the Blue Ridge by 
 Thornton's gap, to Sperryville and Culpeper. An unpaved road 
 runs down the Luray valley from Port Republic to Front Royal, 
 and from the latter point a good turnpike leads to Winchester, and 
 ungraded country roads to Strasburg, IMiddletown, and other places 
 on the Valley turnpike. From AVinchester excellent macadamized 
 roads leatl to Harper's Ferry, and through Martinsburg to AA^illiams- 
 port, on the Potomac. (Maps Nos. 1. and VI.) 
 
 At Strasburg, going northward, just before the principal and Luray 
 valleys unite, the principal valley contracts in width, in consequence 
 of the approach of the North and ISIassanutton mountains. The latter 
 is here three parallel ranges, containing between them two small val- 
 leys known as Powell's Big Fort valley and Powell's Little Fort 
 valley. At this part of the principal valley the country is broken 
 and cut up by deep ravines, and the heights around aiford good 
 defensive positions. Here it Avas that Gen. Banks had taken posi- 
 tion, his pickets being thrown out a few miles towards AVoodstock. 
 He deemed his force sufficient to resist any attack in front that was 
 likely to be made, and, besides, believed Jaclcson to be fully occupied 
 
WINCHESTER. 91 
 
 with Fremont, whose forces were now concentrated in the mountains ^ 
 about Franklin. He had sent Col. Kenly with about a thousand 
 men to hold Front Royal, but this was not so much to guard against 
 a flank attack as to protect the stores at that point, and the railroad y 
 and the bridges over the Shenandoah, from a dash of cavalry or the 
 depredations of guerrillas. He saw no indications of a serious attack ^ 
 upon his position. 
 
 Jackson left Mossy creek on Monday morning, the 19th, and moved 
 forward rapidly towards New Market. He reached this point next 
 day, having been joined en route by Taylor's brigade of Ewell's 
 division. Ashby had already occupied the Valley below this point 
 upon the withdrawal of Shields and the retreat of Banks to Stras- 
 burg. Gen. Jackson says: "To conceal my movements as far as pos- a 
 sible from the enemy, Brig.-Gen. Ashby, who had remained in front 
 of Banks during the march against Milroy, was directed to continue 
 to hold that position until the following day, when he was to join the 
 main body, leaving, however, a covering force sufficient to prevent 
 information of our movements crossing; our lines." Having: taken 
 these steps to keep the enemy in ignorance, Jackson, on the 21st, 
 turned off at New Market to the right, on the way to Luray. He 
 crossed the Massanutton mountains, and the south fork of the Shen- 
 andoah at White-House bridge. Here he met Gen. Ewell -svith the 
 other brigades of his division, which had marched down the Luray 
 valley, and encamped at the eastern entrance of the New Market gap 
 of the Massanuttons. (Map No. V.) 
 
 Ewell's division consisted of the brigades of Taylor (Sixth, Seventh, 
 Eighth, and Ninth Louisiana regiments, and Wheat's battalion), Trim- 
 ble (Twenty-first North Carolina, Twenty-first Georgia, Fifteenth 
 Alabama, and Sixteenth ISIississippi), and Elzey (Thirteenth Virginia 
 and First Maryland),^ of Courtenay's (six-gun) and Brockenbrough's 
 (four-gun) batteries-, and of the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry, 
 
 ^ On the 21st of May the First Maryland and Brockenbrough's battery were 
 constituted the " Maryland Line," intended as the nucleus of a brigade to be 
 commanded by Gen. George II. Steuart, who had been recently commissioned 
 by the Confederate government to collect the Maryland troops into one body. 
 Elzey was put in command of a brigade composed of the Thirteenth Virginia 
 regiment and three of Gen. Edward Johnson's regiments (Twelfth Georgia 
 and Thirty-first and Twenty-fifth Virginia regiments). The remaining three 
 regiments of Johnson (Forty-fourth, Fifty-second, and Fifty-eighth Virginia) 
 continued under command of Col. Scott, of the Forty-fourth Virginia, until 
 early in June, when, on the retreat from Strasburg, they were united with the 
 other troops under Steuart, and were commanded by him at Cross Keys. 
 
92 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 under Cols. Munford and Flournoy. This division numbered, in- 
 cluding the cavalry, about eight thousand (8000), and increased 
 Jackson's effective force to some sixteen or seventeen thousand (16,000 
 or 17,000) men, with eleven batteries, containing forty-eight (48) 
 guns.^ 
 
 ^ I have been able to 6nd no complete returns of Ewell's, Jackson's, or John- 
 son's forces for the period between March and July, 1862, in the Confeder- 
 ate archives ; hence the Confederate strength has been deduced from various 
 data. 
 
 I. Gen. Ewell writes to Gen. Lee, April 16 (see letter on file among Confed- 
 erate archives): "This division numbered, on the 12th, 6500 men aggregate. 
 Large accessions have been and are coming in, and the strength is now some- 
 what over 8000, exclusive of two regiments of cavalry, mounting over 500 men. 
 I have 14 pieces of artillery." 
 
 In Gen. J. E. Johnston's return for February 28, Ewell's division (the Third) 
 is given as: effective, 4918; total, 5251 ; aggregate, 5598. 
 
 "Effective"' means all the privates and non-commissioned officers present for 
 duty; "total," all the privates and non-commissioned officers jjrese?!^, including 
 those sick, in arrest, and on extra duty ; " aggregate," all the officers and men 
 present. The difference between the " total" and the " aggregate" equals all the 
 officers present, both for duty and sick, etc. The real strength for action is to 
 be gotten by adding to the " effective" strength the officers " present for duty." 
 The above return does not give this last, but it was of course less than 347 
 (the difference between "total" and "aggregate"). The difference between 
 " effective" and " total" (equal 333 above) represents the men sick, on extra duty, 
 or in arrest, and was equal to about six per cent, of the aggregate. Now de- 
 ducting from Ewell's aggregate (8000) for April 16, six per cent, for sick, etc., 
 we have, say 7500, for his effective strength, including all officers present at that 
 time. Add the cavalry, and we get the 8000 estimated in the text. Between 
 the 16th of April and the middle of May, Ewell lost Bowyer's battery, ordered 
 elsewhere, and the Tenth Virginia regiment, transferred to Taliaferro's brigade, 
 of Jackson's division ; but I suppose these losses to have been made up by men 
 joining. (This estimate of the strength of Ewell's division agrees with that fur- 
 nished me by Maj. G. Campbell Brown, of Spring Hill, Tennessee, then assistant 
 adjutant-general on Gen. Ewell's staff.) 
 
 II. Gen. Edward Johnson's return for February, 1862, shows his officers and 
 men then present for duty to have been 2418, and a letter of his, dated March 
 18, reports his " present for duty" at that time as 2425. 
 
 In a letter of Gen. Lee to Jackson, April 29, he speaks of Gen. Edward John- 
 son as having a " present force of upwards of 3500," and Col. A. Smead, assistant 
 adjutant-general to Gen. Johnson, says that the latter had an effective strength 
 of 3000 at McDowell. Deducting the losses at that Vjattle, the total strength 
 of this brigade may have been about 3000 at the middle of May. 
 
 III. Jackson's division consisted of three brigades, containing eleven and a 
 half regiments of infantry, five batteries of artillery, and Ashby's cavalry. Five 
 of these regiments were in the " Stonewall" (Winder's) brigade. The strength 
 of this brigade at Winchester, on May 25, was 1529, rank and file, and adding in 
 
WINCHESTER. 93 
 
 On Thursday, tlie 22cl, the Confederates moved quietly down the 
 Luray valley in the direction of Front Royal, and Ewell's division, 
 which was in advance, bivouacked at night ten miles from the latter 
 place. Next morning Jackson made his dispositions to attack and 
 capture the force stationed at Front Royal. In order to get as close 
 as possible without being discovered, he diverted the head of his 
 column from the main road^ to the right until it reached the Gooney 
 Manor road, at Mrs. King's, by which he approached the town from 
 the south instead of the southwest, and was in a better position to 
 prevent the enemy's retreat by way of Manassas gap. At the same 
 time the cavalry under Ashby and Flom-noy, leaving the main col- 
 umn at Spangler's cross-roads, were sent across the south fork of the 
 Shenandoah, at McCoy's ford, to destroy railroad and telegraphic ^_ 
 communication between Front Royal and Strasburg, and to prevent 
 reinforcements being sent from the latter place. This done, Flour- 
 noy, with the Second and Sixth regiments of Virginia cavalry, was 
 to move down between the rivers to take the enemy in flank and 
 rear if they should retreat towards Winchester or Strasburg.^ 
 
 officers, it could not have exceeded 1700 in all, or an average of 340 per regiment. 
 Col. Campbell's brigade of three and a half regiments in the same division 
 numbered, officers and men present for duty, April 1, 1391, an average strength 
 of nearly 400 per regiment. Taking the larger average, the division may have 
 contained say 4600 infantry, and adding from 300 to 400 for artillery, and say 
 700 for cavalry (Ashby had twenty-three companies), Jackson's division, in- 
 cluding his cavalry, must have numbered about 5500 or 6000. The sum of his 
 forces then did not exceed 17,000 men. Dr. Dabney (then adjutant-general to ^ 
 Gen. Jackson) puts his force at 16,000 men, and so does Gen. Banks, in a tele- 
 gram to his government dated May 21. (See below.) 
 
 ^ At Asbury Chapel, four and one-half miles from Front Royal. At this point 
 the main road approaches the river and runs along under the river bluffs for 
 some three miles. At the Front Royal end of this defile, and about a mile from 
 the town, was stationed the principal Federal picket. 
 
 ^ Banks telegraphed his government, May 21 : " My force at Strasburg is 4476 
 infantry (two brigades), 2600 cavalry, 10 Parrott guns, and 6 smooth-bore. On 
 the Manassas railroad, between Strasburg and Manassas, 2500 infantry, 6 com- 1 
 panics of cavalry, and 6 guns. There are five companies cavalry of First 
 Maine near Strasburg, belonging to Col. Miles's command. Jackson is within 
 eight miles of Harrisonburg. He and Ewell have 16,000 men together." 
 (Federal official telegrams.) 
 
 The Federal troops concerned in Banks's operations were distributed as 
 follows. May 23 : 
 
 At Strasburg : 
 
 2 brigades of infantry 4,476 
 
 Hatch's and Broadhead's cavalry 2,600 
 
94 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-G2. 
 
 The First Maryland regiment, Col. Bradley T. Johnson, and 
 Wheat's Louisiana battalion of five companies, were thrown forward 
 as the advance of the infantry, and they were supported by the 
 remainder t)f Taylor's brigade. No o[)position was met with, and no 
 pickets found, until about 2 p.m., when the Confederates, under John- 
 son and Wheat, had reached the innnediate vicinity of the town. 
 Here, about one and a half miles from the village, Col. Kenly's 
 infantry pickets were placed. They w^ere driven in and rapidly 
 followed up. Two companies of Kenly's regiment were supporting 
 the pickets, and one company occupied the town. Another company 
 was on detached service, guarding the Manassas railroad at Linden 
 station, some distance off. The remaining six were in camp on a hill 
 on the Front Royal side of the river, near the bridge. Col. Kenly 
 had also a section of Knapp's battery, — two ten-pounder Parrotts, — 
 in camp, while two companies of the Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania 
 infantry were stationed between the rivers to protect the railroad 
 
 5 companies First Maine cavalry 300^- 
 
 3 companies artillery, 16 guns 280^ 
 
 At bridge near Strasburg : 
 
 1 company of Second Massachusetts regiment . . . 60' 
 
 At Buckton : 
 
 1 company of Twenty-seventh Indiana and 1 company Third 
 Wisconsin 100* 
 
 At Front Royal : 
 
 9 companies First Maryland infantry >. 
 
 2 companies Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania I qqqs 
 Mapes's pioneers (56 men) ( 
 
 2 guns Knapp's battery (38 men) J 
 
 At Linden Station : 
 
 1 company of First Maryland infantry 80 
 
 At Winchester: 
 
 Tenth Maine infantry ........ 856* 
 
 5 companies Maryland cavalry (estimated) .... 300 ' 
 
 5 companies Eighth New York cavalry (estimated) . . 300'' 
 
 10,252 
 
 The troops at Winchester and the First Maine cavalry belonged to Col. Miles's 
 command. Col. Miles was at Harper's Ferry. 
 
 1 Estimated. * Banks's return, May 1. 
 
 3 Estimated from Gen. Gordon's report. * Estimated from Gen. Gordon's report. 
 
 * Camper and Kirkley. 
 
 6 This regiment lost 83 on the 25th, and had 773 at Williamsport on May 31. 
 
 ■f Arrived at Winchester on May 24. 
 
WINCHESTER. 95 
 
 bridges. The two companies supporting the picket and the one in 
 the town were soon driven back, and a charge by the Confederates 
 sent them through the town in haste to join their main body. This 
 they did, witli the loss of eighteen or twenty killed, wounded and 
 captured. 
 
 Col. Kenly quickly posted his guns and the main body of his 
 regiment on a " commanding height" ^ to the right of the turnpike 
 which leads from Front Royal to Winchester, and near his camp, and 
 disposed a portion of his force to protect his flanks. During the con- 
 tinuance of the fight at this point he was joined by two companies of 
 the Fifth New York cavalry, which had just arrived from Strasburg. 
 Here he made a spirited resistance for a time. His artillery was well 
 served, and his infantry kept up a steady fire. The Confederates had 
 in the advance no rifled artillery, and it was some time before an 
 effective fire could be made upon the Federal position. At length 
 Col. Crutchfield, chief of artillery for Jaclvson, got three guns — one 
 of them rifled — into position, and replied to the Federal battery. But 
 the Confederate infantry had not waited for this. The Sixth Louisiana 
 was sent to the Confederate left, through some woods, to flank the 
 enemy's battery, while Maj. Wheat and Col. Johnson (the latter's 
 troops all excitement when they found their opponents to be from 
 the same State) pressed forward in front with the greatest ardor. 
 Meantime, Col. Flournoy, with his cavalry, was moving down between 
 the rivers, and threatening the Federal rear. Col. Kenly, seeing him- 
 self about to be surrounded, did not await the infantry attacks in 
 front, but retreated rapidly across the two rivers, having set fire to his 
 camp and attempted to burn the bridges. Though he failed in this 
 last attempt, he succeeded in doing sufficient damage to the bridge 
 over the North Fork to impede the Confederates. The Federal com- 
 mander made a further attempt to check his pursuers on the hill — 
 known as Guard hill — overlooking the North Fork, but a few shells 
 from Lusk's battery, and the approach of the forces in pursuit, caused 
 him speedily to retreat.^ Leaving the two New York cavaliy com- 
 panies to cover the rear, he hurried the artillery and infantry forward 
 on the Winchester road. The damage to the bridge detained the 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. This is a cherty ridge, some one hundred and fifty feet 
 above the river, that extends to the northeast of the turnpike. It lies between 
 the south fork of the Shenandoah and Happy creek. 
 
 * Mr. Kirkley says that "the river below was alive with (Confederate) horse- 
 men crossing in two different places by fording." (History of First Maryland 
 Infantry, Federal.) 
 
96 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1801-03. 
 
 Confedcnitcs for a little while, but Col. Floiirnoy at last suooceded in 
 getting four companies of his cavalry regiment over, and Gen. Jack- 
 son, without waiting for more, dashed with this force up the turnpike 
 after the retreating enemy. They were soon overtaken. Flournoy 
 was at once ordered to charge the New York cavalrj^, which constituted 
 the rear guard. These last make but a feeble resistance, are soon 
 thrown into confusion and routed, and now demoralized, take to 
 flight. Col. Kenly, learning that the cavalry are being hard pressed, 
 has meantime halted his infantry and artillery, ordering the latter to 
 hold the road, and forming his infantry in the fields on each side. 
 But the Confederates, under Jackson's own guidance, and inspired by 
 his enthusiasm, do not stop. Company B, Capt. Grimsby, charges 
 directly up the turnpike, supported by Company E, Capt. Flournoy, 
 on the left, and Companies A and K, Capts. Dulaney and Baxter, on 
 the right. The Federal lines do not stand the charge. They are 
 broken and thrown into confusion. Col. Kenly makes another gallant 
 effort to stay the disaster. He reforms a portion of his command a 
 little to the rear, in an orchard, on the east side of the turnpike, and 
 makes a last desperate struggle to check defeat. But it is in vain. 
 His troops are thoroughly demoralized by the events of the day. 
 The cavalry is flying in confusion to the rear, — the artillery is trying 
 to get away. The panic-struck Federal soldiers magnify Col. Flour- 
 noy's four companies of cavalry into an army. The latter dash among 
 them with the boldness of assured victory. Col. Kenly's personal 
 efforts to restore order only result in his falling desperately wounded. 
 The rout quickly becomes hopeless and complete. The Confederates 
 ride around the broken infantry on every side. The mass, seeing no 
 chance of escape, throw down their arms and surrender. By this 
 time two more of Flournoy's companies (D and I) have reached the 
 field, and they join in pursuit of the Federal cavalry, wagons, and 
 artillery. One gun is overhauled near the field. The wagon-train 
 soon falls into the hands of the victors. Scattered cavalrymen are 
 picked up along the road. The Confederates continue to chase the 
 fugitives until within four miles of AYinchester. There they find 
 the other Parrott gun abandoned in the road, and two of the Con- 
 federates take some plough-horses from a field and bring it back with 
 them. 
 
 The victory is complete. The Federal loss is thirty-two (32) killed, 
 one hundred and twenty-two (122) wounded, and seven hundred and 
 fifty (750) prisoners; total, nine hundred and four (904), by the report 
 of the Federal surgeon-general. The historians of the First Mary- 
 
WINCHESTER. 97 
 
 land regiment^ (Federal) make it nineteen (19) killed, sixty-three 
 (63) wounded, and six hundred and ninety-one (691) prisoners; total, 
 seven hundred and seventy-three (773). The Confederate loss is 
 thirty-six (36) killed and wounded.^ Gen. Banks reports Kenly's 
 force present for duty as about nine hiuidred (900) men, though Capt. 
 Smith and other officers present of the First Maryland regiment 
 (Federal) put the force at one thousand and sixty-three (1063).^ Not 
 over one hundred and thirty (130) have escaped under cover of the 
 woods, for on the 28th, Capt. Smith reports but eight (8) officers and 
 one hundred and twenty (120) men present. The scene of this en- 
 gagement is near Cedarville, a small village about five miles from 
 Front Royal, where an ungraded road leaves the Winchester turnpike 
 and leads to Middletown on the Valley turnpike. (Map No. VT.) 
 The credit of the final overthrow of Col. Kenly's command lies 
 entirely \n\h. Flournoy's cavalry. The advance of the Confederate 
 infantry and artillery, jaded by the day's long march, was not able to 
 come up with the enemy until the fight was over, while the mass of 
 the Confederate forces only reached Front Royal at nightfall.^ 
 
 " While these occurrences were in progress, Gen. Ashby, who, after 
 crossing at McCoy's ford, had moved with his command farther to 
 
 ^ "Historical Record of First Maryland Regiment of Infantry," Camper and 
 Kirkley. Some of the wounded are included also among the prisoners. 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
 ' Company E, of Kenly's regiment, on guard duty at Linden station, was not 
 present. Capt. Smith and other officers of the First Maryland regiment, who 
 escaped, report officially on May 28 that the troops at Front Royal were as fol- 
 lows : nine companies First Maryland, containing 775 available rank and file ; 
 two companies Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania, containing about 120 men ; Mapes's 
 pioneers, 40 men ; the New York cavalry detachment, 90 men ; artillery, 38 
 men ; total, 10G3. Of these, as above stated, but 8 officers and 120 men had 
 reported up to the date of the report. 
 
 * Dabney says: "At the time of the combat of Front Royal the duty of 
 couriers was performed for Gen. Jackson by a detachment from one of Ashby's 
 undisciplined companies, of whom many were raw youths just recruited, and 
 never under fire. As soon as the first Federal picket was driven in, and free 
 access to the village won, orders were despatched to the rear "brigades to avoid 
 the laborious and circuitous route taken by the advance, and to pursue the direct 
 highway to the town, a level tract of three miles, in place of a precipitous one 
 of seven or eight. The panic-struck boy, by whom the orders were sent, thought 
 of notliing but to hide himself from the dreadful sound of the cannon, and was 
 seen no more." As a consequence, the whole of Ewell's division followed the 
 advance and made the long circuit, only reaching Cedarville at dark. Jackson's 
 division, however, followed the main road, but, after a march of twenty-four 
 miles from Luray, camped at Front Royal. 
 
98_ CAMPAIGN IN THE V ALL FA' OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G.?. 
 
 tlie west, so as to skirt the hiise of the Massunutton inountiiins, ctime 
 suddenly upon the infantry guard, consisting of two comjianies 
 (Davis's, of the Twenty-seventh Indiana, and IIubl)ard's, of the Third 
 Wiseonsin) that had l)een posted at and near liuckton for the ]n'o- 
 tection of tlie raih'oad. This force, liowever, quickly threw them- 
 selves into the depot building, and Mr. Jenkins's hoase and stable, 
 and from this cover maintained a very spirited contest Avith the Con- 
 federate cavalry, in which fell Capts. Sheets and Fletcher, two of the 
 best of Ashby's officers. The Federals were finally overpowered and 
 dispersed, and the railroad track was torn u[).' 
 
 " The result of this first day's operations was the capture of about 
 seven hundred (700) prisoners, among them about twenty officers, a 
 complete section of rifled artillery (ten-pounder Parrotts), and a very 
 large amount of quartermaster and commissary stores.^ The fruits 
 of the movement were not restricted to the stores and prisoners cap- 
 tured : the enemy's flank was turned, and the road opened to AViu- 
 chester."' 
 
 ^ Jackson's movements took Gen. Banks, who was at Strasburg, 
 entirely by surprise. The first information he received of the appear- 
 ance of this strong force on his flank was from Col. Kenlv, who, 
 finding the telegraph cut, had sent a courier in the earlier stages of 
 the fight, before he had fallen back over the Shenandoah, to report 
 to Banks the overwhelming attack that was being made upon him.* 
 
 ^ See Gordon's "History of the Second Massachusetts Regiment," Third 
 Paper, pp. 79-81. 
 
 ^ The quartermaster and commissary supplies referred to (except the train of 
 Kenly's command) were chiefly stored in the railroad depot and an adjoining 
 store-house at Front Royal. They were so great in amount and value as to be 
 estimated by the Confederate quartermasters as worth three hundred tliousand 
 dollars. They were only partially removed before the recapture of the town, a 
 week later, by the advance of Gen. Shields's division, when the remainder were 
 burned by the retiring Confederates. (See Maj. John A. Ilarman's official re- 
 port. Maj. Ilarman was chief quartermaster for Gen. Jackson.) 
 
 ' Jackson's report. 
 
 * The following account by Col. Kenly's courier is found in " Rebellion 
 Record," vol. v.. Incidents, p. 22: 
 
 "WiLLiAMSPORT, Md., May 26, 1862. 
 
 "Dear Father and Mother: — You have probably heard by this time of the 
 three days' fighting from Strasburg and Front Royal to Martinsburg. Our com- 
 pany and Company B were ordered to Front Royal, in the mountains, twelve 
 miles from Strasburg, last Friday, and when we got within two miles of our 
 destination we heard cannonading. The major ordered the baggage to stop, and 
 our two companies dashed on, and found several companies of our infantry and 
 two pieces of artillery engaged with several thousand of the enemy. Just as 
 we arrived on the field, Col. Parem, who had command of our forces, rode up to 
 
WINCHESTER. 99 
 
 Gen. Banks says : " Information was received on the evening of May 
 23 that the enemy in very large force had descended on the guard 
 at Front Royal (Col. Kenly, First Maryland regiment, commanding), 
 burning the bridges and driving our troops towards Strasburg with 
 great loss. Owing; to Avhat was deemed an extravagant statement of 
 the enemy's strength, these reports were received with some distrust ; 
 but a regiment of infantry, with a strong detachment of cavalry and 
 a section of artillery, were immediately sent to reinforce Col. Kenly."* 
 
 The statement that a large force was at Front Royal evidently 
 seemed incredible to the Federal commander, who took steps to 
 reinforce Col. Kenly as if against a dash of cavalry or a raid of 
 guerrillas. 
 
 Gen. Banks continues : " Later in the evening despatches from fugi- 
 tives who had escaped to Winchester informed us that Col. Kenly's 
 force had been destroyed, with but few exceptions, and the enemy, 
 fifteen or twenty thousand (15,000 or 20,000) strong, were advancing 
 by rapid marches on Winchester. 
 
 " Orders were immediately given to halt the reinforcements sent to 
 Front Royal, which had moved by different routes, and detachments 
 of troops under experienced officers were sent in every direction to 
 explore the roads leading from Front Royal to Strasburg, Middle- 
 town, Newtown, and Winchester, and ascertain the force, position, 
 and purpose of this sudden movement of the enemy. It was soon 
 found that his pickets were in possession of every road, and rumors 
 
 me and ordered me to take one man and the two fastest horses in our company, 
 and ride for dear life to Gen. Banks's headquarters, in Strasburg, for reinforce- 
 ments. The direct road to Strasburg was occupied by the enemy, so I was 
 obliged to ride round by another, seventeen miles. I rode the seventeen miles in 
 fifty-five minutes. Gen. Banks didn't seem to think it very serious, but ordered 
 one regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery off. I asked Gen. Banks for a 
 fresh horse to rejoin my company, and he gave me the best horse that I ever rode, 
 and I started back. I came out on the Front Royal turnpike, about two miles 
 this side of where I left our men. Saw two men standing in the road and their 
 horses standing by the fence. I supposed they were our pickets. They didn't 
 halt me, so I asked them if they were pickets. They said no. ' Who are you?' 
 ' We are part of Gen. Jackson's staff.' I supposed they were only joking. . . . 
 I left them and rode towards Front Royal, till I overtook a soldier and asked 
 him what regiment he belonged to. He said he belonged to the Eighth Louisi- 
 ana. ... I turned back. . . . The officers in the road did not stop me, and I 
 was lucky enough not to meet any of their pickets. . . . When I got out of the 
 enemy's lines I rode as fast as the horse could carry me to Gen. Banks, and re- 
 ported what I had seen and heard. He said I had saved the army, etc. 
 
 "Charles H. Greenleaf, 
 " Company D, Fifth New York Cavalry." 
 
 ^ Gen. Gordon says he was instructed to send the Third Wisconsin regiment 
 and a section of his battery to Kenly's assistance. 
 
 ^ 
 
100 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 from every quarter represented him in movement in rear of his 
 pickets in the direction of our camp. 
 
 " Tlic extraordinary forc^e of the enemy could no longer be doubted. 
 It was apparent also that they had a more extended purpose than the 
 capture of the brave little band at Front Royal. 
 
 " This purpose could be nothing less than the defeat of my own 
 command or its possible capture, by occupying Winchester, and by 
 this movement intercepting supplies and reinforcements, and cutting 
 off all possibility of retreat. . . . 
 
 " Under this interpretation of the enemy's plans, our position 
 demanded instant decision and action. Three courses were open to 
 us : first, a retreat across Little North mountain to the Potomac 
 river on the west; second, an attack on the enemy's flank on the 
 Front Royal road ; third, a rapid movement direct upon AVinchester, 
 with a view to anticipate his occupation of the town by seizing it 
 ourselves, and thus placing my command in communication with its 
 original base of operations, and in the line of reinforcements by Har- 
 per's Ferry and Martinsburg, and securing a safe retreat in case of 
 disaster. To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded; to move 
 over the mountain was to abandon our train at the outset, and to sub- 
 ject my command to flank attacks without possibility of succor ; and 
 to attack, the enemy being in such overwhelming force, could only 
 result in certain destruction. It was therefore determined to enter 
 the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for 
 the possession of Winchester, the key of the Valley, and for us the 
 position of safety. 
 
 "At three o'clock a.m., the 24th of May, the reinforcements — 
 infantry, artillery, and cavalry — sent to Col. Kenly were recalled ; 
 the advance guard. Col. Donelly's brigade, were ordered to return to 
 Strasburg; several hundred disabled men, left in our charge by 
 Shields's division, were put upon the march, and our wagon-train 
 ordered forward to Winchester, under escort of cavalry and infantry. 
 Gen. Hatch, with nearly our whole force of cavalry and six pieces of 
 artillery, was charged with the protection of the rear of the column 
 and the destruction of army stores for which transportation was not 
 provided, with instructions to remain in front ^ of the town as long 
 as possible, and hold the enemy in check, our expectations of attack 
 being in that direction. All these orders were executed with incred- 
 ible alacrity, and soon after nine o'clock the column was on the march, 
 
 ^ That is, on the south or Staunton side. 
 
WINCHESTER. JOl 
 
 Col. Donelly in front, Col. Gordon in the centre, and Gen. Hatch in 
 the rear."^ 
 
 TIius Banks, having partly realized his danger, was taking steps to 
 avert it. He did not yet realize, however, that Jackson's whole force 
 was on his flank at Front Royal, but expected the principal attack to 
 be made from the direction of Woodstock. Gen. Hatch, with a con- 
 siderable cavalry force, was sent to reconnoitre in that direction, but, 
 finding no enemy, he returned to follow the main column, which, 
 meantime, had moved out from Strasburg towards Winchester.^ 
 
 ^ Banks's report, "Rebellion Record." Donelly and Gordon commanded the 
 two infantry brigades, which, with Broadhead's First Michigan cavalry, con- 
 stituted Williams's division. Hatch commanded all the cavalry except Broad- 
 head's. 
 
 * Gen. Gordon (commanding one of the Federal brigades) criticises Banks's 
 hesitation and delay with great severity. He says he twice urged Gen. Banks, 
 early in the night of the 23d, to retreat to AVinchester, but without effect. He 
 left Banks to put his own brigade in readiness to move at a moment's notice, 
 and continues : " It was eleven o'clock at night when I left him. As I returned 
 through the town I could not perceive that anybody was troubled with anticipa- 
 tions for the morrow. The sutlers were driving sharp bargains with those who 
 had escaped from, or were not amenable to, military discipline ; the strolling 
 players were moving crowds to noisy laughter in their canvas booth, through 
 which the lights gleamed and the music sounded with startling shrillness. I 
 thought, as I turned towards my camp, how unconscious all are of the drama 
 Jackson is preparing for us, and what merriment the morning will reveal ! As 
 my troops were aroused from their slumbers, a low murmur ran through camp, 
 followed by the louder noise of packing camp equipage and baggage, the 
 liarnessing of artillery horses, and hitching-up of trains. AVe were ready for 
 action. But the night sped on ; silence fell upon the town, and slumber was as 
 deep that night in Strasburg as if without there was no cause for watchfulness. 
 My brigade, however, found little comfort sitting around dismal camp-fires, 
 reduced to expiring embers by the falling rain. Unsheltered and unprotected, 
 in a damp clover-field, the morning dawned upon a cheerless group. Some 
 unimportant steps had been taken for the security of the sick and for the safety 
 of public property. I had ordered my brigade and regimental trains forward 
 to Winchester, and they were saved. After three o'clock in the morning Banks 
 had sent off some ambulances with sick and disabled, and this was all. 
 
 " After daylight of the 24th we remained inactive until between ten and 
 eleven o'clock in the morning, at which time I received the following note from 
 Gen. Banks : 
 
 " ' Headquarters Department of Shenandoah. 
 " ' Strasburg, Va., May 24, 1862. 
 
 *' ' Col. Geo. II. Gordon, Commanding Brigade. 
 
 " ' Sir : — Our information this morning shows that the enemy returned to Front 
 
102 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 Jackson's conception of the situation and his plan of operations 
 for Saturday, May 24, are given in liis report as follows: "In the 
 event of Banks loavinj; .Stra.sl)urt^, he might escape towards the 
 Potomac; or if we moved directly to AVinchester, he might move 
 via Front Royal towards Washington city. In order to watch both 
 directions, and at the same time advance upon him if he remained at 
 Strasburg, I determined, with the main body of the army, to strike 
 the Valley turnpike near Middletown, a village five miles north 
 of Strasburg, and thirteen south of AVinchcster. Accordingly, the 
 following morning. Gen. Ashby advanced from Ccdarville towards 
 Middletown, supported by skirmishers from Taylor's brigade, with 
 Chew's battery and two Parrott guns from the Rockbridge artillery 
 (Capt. Poague), followed by the whole command, except the troops left 
 under command of Gen. Ewell near Cedarville. Gen. Ewell, with 
 Trimble's brigade, the First Maryland regiment, and the batteries 
 of Brockenbrough and Courtenay, had instructions to move towards 
 Winchester. Ashby was directed to keep scouts on his left, to prevent 
 Banks from passing unobserved to Front Royal. Brig.-Gen. George 
 H. Steuart, who was now temporarily in command of the Second and 
 Sixth Virginia cavalry, had been previously despatched to Newtown, 
 a point farther north than Middletown, and eight miles from Win- 
 chester, with instructions to observe the movements of the enemy at 
 that point. He there succeeded in capturing some prisoners, and 
 several wagons and ambulances with arms and medical stores. He 
 also advised me of movements which indicated that Banks was 
 preparing to leave Strasbiu"g." 
 
 Jackson moved toAvards Middletown as fast as his troops, weary 
 from severe marches, could go. The cavalry, under Steuart, was in 
 advance, and struck the Valley turnpike near Newtown, while the 
 main body was still some distance in the rear. They found the 
 Federal wagon-train passing, and, dashing into it and up the road 
 towards Middletown, with a few shots threw ever}i:hing into confu- 
 sion. A part of Broadhead's First Micliigan cavalry, supported by 
 
 -^ Royal last night, and will not, now at least, attempt our rear. Our force will 
 remain in Strasburg, therefore, until further orders. 
 
 ********** 
 
 " * Respectfully yours, 
 
 " ' N. P. Banks, 
 " ' Major-General Commanding, etc' " 
 
 Immediately after, however (says Gen. Gordon), information was received of 
 the attack on the Federal train beyond Middletown, and orders were at once 
 issued for the movement of all the Federal forces towards Winchester. 
 
WINCHESTER. 103 
 
 the Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania regiment, had been reconnoitring 
 from jSIiddletown towards Front Royal, and having discovered Jack- 
 son's advance, was at this moment returning to the former place. 
 The head of the main Federal infantry column (Donelly's brigade) 
 had just crossed Cedar creek, and was also approaching the town. 
 Information soon reached Gen. Banks " that the enemy had attacked 
 the train, and was in full possession of the road at JVIiddletown. 
 This rejjort was confirmed by the return of fugitives, refugees, and 
 wagons, which came tumbling to the rear in fearful confusion.^ The 
 train was halted, and Donelly's infantry ordered to the front to clear 
 the way, while orders were sent to Gen. Hatch to follow from Stras- 
 burg."with all his available cavalry, leaving Col. De Forrest to cover 
 the rear and destroy stores not provided with transportation." At 
 the same time a company of infantry was stationed at the Cedar 
 creek bridge, to prepare it for the flames in case Banks should be 
 forced to recross it and return to Strasbura;. 
 
 Broadhead and Donelly hastened forward through Middletown, 
 and speedily drove back the Confederate cavalry which had caused 
 such a commotion. The Michigan cavalry went on to Newtown and 
 held the road, while the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania infantry and a 
 section of artillery pushed back the Confederate cavalry on the right 
 of the turnpike for some distance. When this had been done, the 
 Federals tm-ned back to the main road, and their column resumed its 
 march, after only an hour's loss of time. Col. Broadhead, with the 
 First ]\Iichigan cavalry, was ordered " to advance, if possible, cut his 
 way through, and occupy Winchester. It was the report of this 
 energetic officer that gave us the first assurance that our course was 
 yet clear, and he was the first of our column to enter the town." ^ No 
 time was lost by the Federal commander in hurrying forward his 
 column. The knapsacks of the soldiers were left where they had 
 been put, along the roadside, when Donelly's brigade had gone for- 
 ward to clear the turnpike. There was no time to return or send for 
 them. The Confederate cavalry, under Gen. Steuart, at Newtown, 
 was not strong enough to impede the march seriously, so that the 
 Federal advance reached Winchester without further molestation. 
 
 So rapid was his enemy's progress, that when Jackson reached the 
 vicinity of ^Middletown, two or three hours afterwards, with his main 
 body, the whole of the Federal infantry had already passed that 
 point, and the cavalry, under Gen. Hatch, were beginning to go 
 
 ^ Banks's report. ^ Banks's report. 
 
104 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 through. Driving back the cavalry guard sent to observe his move- 
 ments/ by a few shots from Poague's battery, Jackson pressed eagerly 
 forward. " Wlicn the little village of Middletown came in view, 
 across the broad and level lields, tiie highway, passing through it at 
 right angles to the direction of Gen. Jackson's approach, was seen, 
 canopied with a viust cloud of gray dust, and crowded beneath, so far 
 as the eye could reach, with a column of troops. At the sight the 
 artillery dashed forward in a gallop for a rising ground, whence to 
 tear their ranks with shell ; Ashby swooped down on their right like 
 an eagle, cut through their path, and arrested their escape on that side; 
 while Gen. Taylor, throwing his front regiment into line, advanced at 
 a double-quick to the centre of the village, his men cheering, and 
 pouring a terrific volley into the confused mass which filled the street."^ 
 
 Gen. Jackson says : " The road was literally obstructed with the 
 mingled and confused mass of struggling and dying horses and riders. 
 The Federal column was pierced, but what proportion of its strength 
 had passed north towards Winchester I had then no means of know- 
 ing. Among the surviving cavalry the wildest confusion ensued, 
 and they scattered in disorder in various directions, leaving, however, 
 some two hundred prisoners with their equipments in our hands. A 
 train of wagons was seen disappearing in the distance towards Win- 
 chester, and Ashby, Mdth his cavalry, some artillery, and a supporting 
 infantry force from Taylor's brigade, was sent in pursuit."^ 
 
 The Confederates had struck the head of Banks's cavalrj^ under 
 Hatch. When these last had recovered a little from the confusion 
 and disorder into which they were thrown. Hatch, with the main 
 body,* turned to his left and attempted, by a circuit through roads 
 northwest of the turnpike and in its general direction, to rejoin the 
 main body of the Federal army. So hurried was the march of the 
 latter that for a time his efforts were unavailing. Several times he 
 
 1 Gen. Hatch had under his command this day the Fifth New York cavalry 
 (Col. De Forrest), First Vermont (Col. Tompkins), five companies of the First 
 Maine (Lieut.-Col. Douty), Hampton's battery, and a section of Best's battery. 
 The half regiment of the First Maine and two companies of the First Vermont 
 had accompanied the infantry column, and at Middletown were sent towards 
 Front Royal to observe Jackson's advance. They were driven back to Middle- 
 town just as Hatch, at the head of the remainder of his force, was coming into 
 it from Strasburg. 
 
 "^ Dabney, p. 371. ' Jackson's report. 
 
 * Maj. Collins with three companies, blinded by the dust, charged, unknow- 
 ingly, into the Confederate lines, and his command was nearly all killed or 
 captured. 
 
WINCHESTER. 105 
 
 tried to regain the turnpike, hoping to find the rear of the Federal 
 infantry, but was driven oif. Finally, at Newtown, fivx miles north 
 of Middleto^vn, he came up with Gordon's brigade, which had 
 there made a stand to check the pursuit and save the trains and 
 artillery. 
 
 While Gen. Hatch with the advance of the Federal cavalry was 
 making efforts to pass round the Confederates and rejoin Banks, the 
 rear of his command was attempting to open the way along the turn- 
 pike. "But a few moments elajised before the Federal artillery,^ 
 whicli had been cut off with the rear of the column, opened upon us, 
 with the evident intention to cut its way through to Winchester. 
 Our batteries were soon placed in position to return the fire, and Gen. 
 Taylor was ordered with his command to the attack. After a spirited 
 resistance this fragment of the Federal army retreated to Strasburg." ^ 
 Gen. Banks says : " Six companies of the Fifth New York, Col. 
 De Forrest, and six companies of the First Vermont cavalry. Col. 
 Tompkins, after repeated and desperate efforts to form a junction 
 with the main body, — the road being now filled with (Confederate) 
 infantry, artillery, and cavalry, — fell back to Strasburg, where they 
 found the Zouaves d'Afrique.^ The Fifth New York, failing to effect 
 a junction at Winchester, and also at Martinsburg, came in at Clear 
 Spring * with a train of thirty-two wagons and many stragglers. The 
 First Vermont, Col. Tompkins, joined us at Winchester with six 
 pieces of artillery, and participated in the fight of the next morn- 
 ing."^ The latter body took a country road leading from Strasburg 
 to Winchester, considerably west of the turnpike. The other, having 
 followed the same road for a time, bore still more to the west, leaving 
 Winchester and Martinsburg some distance to the right. 
 
 Wliile Jackson was engaged in disposing of the Federal rear guard, 
 Ashby had been sent forward, as above stated, towards Winchester. 
 The main body of the Confederates had been halted at Middleto^\Ti 
 until the Confederate commander could ascertain whether or not 
 the whole of Banks's infantry had passed him. The overthrow of 
 
 ^ This was Hampton's battery and a howitzer of Best's. 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
 ^ These had been stationed at Cedar Creek bridge early in the day. 
 
 * In Maryland, north of the Potomac. 
 
 ^ Banks's report. De Forrest was behind Tompkins, and found the way into 
 "Winchester blocked when he approached the town. He then made a circuit 
 and attempted to enter it next morning by the Romney road, only to find Banks 
 retreating and the Confederates in possession. He then marched in the direction 
 of Hancock, and crossed the Potomac at Cherry Run ford. 
 
106 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 the Federal ea vain' soon satisfied him that the main bmly was already 
 between him and AN'^iucliester, and witliout further delay Jackson, with 
 the mass of his forces, followed Ashby in that direction. In regard 
 to this pui'suit, Jackson says : " The large number of wagons loaded 
 with stores and abandoned by the enemy between Middletown and 
 Newtown plainly indicated his hurried retreat.^ From the attack 
 upon Front Royal up to the present moment eveiy opposition had 
 been borne down, and there was reason to believe if Banks reached 
 Winchester it would be without a train, if not without an army ; but 
 in the midst of these hopes I Avas pained to see, as I am now to 
 record, the fact that so many of Ashby's command, both cavalry and 
 infantry, forgetful of their high trust as tlie advance of a pursuing 
 army, deserted their colors and abandoned themselves to pillage to 
 such an extent as to make it necessarj' for that gallant officer to dis- 
 continue further pursuit.^ The artillery, which had pushed on with 
 energy to the vicinity of Newtown, found itself, from this discredita- 
 ble conduct, without a proper support from either infantry or cavalry. 
 This relaxation of the pursuit "vvas unfortunate, as the enemy was 
 encouraged by it to bring up, about two hours later, four pieces of 
 artilleiy, which were planted upon the northern skirt of NeA\i:own, 
 and opened upon our batteries. This fire was replied to by Capt. 
 Poague's two rifled guns with skill and accuracy. When I overtook 
 the advance it was thus held in check by the enemy's artiller)\"^ 
 
 Banks had hurried on to Ne^vtown and beyond. Here the train 
 was threatened by the cavalry under Gen. Steuart, which had been 
 watching the passing army all day, and harassing it as opportunity 
 offered on the march. Some confusion was produced by this force in 
 the train following the Federal infantry, and the Twenty-seventh 
 Indiana and a section of artillery were ordered to remain and do 
 what was possible to protect the rear. This was sufficient for a time 
 to check Steuart's cavalry, while Ashby's pursuit, as above stated, was 
 not pressed with vigor. As the Confederates continued to push for- 
 ward, this rear guard was strengthened, and a strong effort made to 
 
 ^ The road was lined with captured wagons from Cedar creek to Newtown. 
 Nearly all the transportation of Hatch's cavalry, besides a large number of 
 other wagons, were captured at this time. (See Gen. Gordon's "History of 
 Second Massachusetts Regiment," Third Paper. lie speaks of " six miles of 
 wagons" as captured on this occasion.) 
 
 ^ Among the abandoned wagons that lined the road were many loaded with 
 sutler stores. These were especially attractive to the Confederate troops. 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
WINCHESTER. 107 
 
 save the trains from further loss. The head of Gordon's brigade was 
 already beyond Bartonsville, and only five miles from Winchester. 
 Col. Gordon was ordered to take two regiments (Twenty-eighth New 
 York and Second Massachusetts) and two sections of artillery, and 
 return to Newtown, there to hold the Confederates in check. He 
 countermarched as rapidly as possible, and joined the regiment already 
 there. He checked the confusion into which the rear Avas being 
 thrown, and boldly drove the Confederate advance back through the 
 town. Gen. Hatch soon joined him with the cavalry he had suc- 
 ceeded in bringing round the Confederate flank, and this united force 
 prevented the fiirther advance of the Confederates, until Jackson's 
 infantry had in part closed up. The display of increasing force, the 
 advance of Ewell along the Front Royal road on his flank, as well as 
 the information brought by Gen. Hatch of the dispersion of all the 
 Federal troops in the rear, induced Col. Gordon to retreat at dusk. 
 His skill and determination had eifected the object in view. The 
 trains and artillery that had passed Ne^vtown were enabled to reach 
 Winchester. A number of wagons, in the haste and confusion that 
 existed before Gordon's stand, had been overturned, or had been left 
 without horses in the road. These, including a pontoon-train, he 
 fired. Leaving the Second Massachusetts (Lieut.-Col. Andrews) and 
 a section of artillery to cover the rear, he retreated with great expedi- 
 tion to Winchester, which he reached at midnight. 
 
 It was now dark, but Jackson continued to press forward after the 
 retreating enemy. His march was skilfully impeded by Lieut.-Col. 
 Andrews, who, taking advantage of the darkness, contested stub- 
 bornly the Confederate advance at every favorable point. The ability 
 and courage with which Col. Andrews managed his regiment (Second 
 Massachusetts) on this night march were admirable. Jackson, with 
 various regiments in turn of the " Stonewall" brigade, which was in 
 front, drove back this rear guard from point to point ; but all the 
 impatient energy of the Confederate leader could not make his prog- 
 ress other than slow. Anxious to occupy the heights overlooking 
 Winchester before daAvn, he continued the pursuit all night. The 
 troops in advance (Fifth Virginia regiment. Col. Baylor) were not 
 allowed to lie down at all; to the others was given only an hour's 
 rest. 
 
 Meantime, Gen. Ewell had advanced during the day Avith Trimble's 
 brigade, the First Maryland regiment, and Brockenbrough's and 
 Courtenay's batteries, on the direct road from Front Royal to W^in- 
 chester. After halting, when eight miles from Front Royal, for 
 
108 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 some hours, to await the results of Gen. Jackson's attacrk, he moved 
 on late in the afternoon, when it became apparent that the enemy- 
 were retreating towards Winchester. As he approached the latter 
 town he Avas joined by Steuart's cavalry from Newt(^)wn. When 
 between two and three miles from Winchester, Col. Kirkland, with 
 the Twenty-first North Carolina regiment, drove in the enemy's 
 pickets. He held the position thas gained during the night. The 
 remainder of this command "slept on their arms" one mile in the 
 rear.^ 
 
 The results of the day's operations were altogether faA'orable to the 
 Confederates. Forced to a precipitate evacuation of his position at 
 Strasburg, the Federal commander had made a retreat of eighteen 
 miles upon Winchester, so hurried, and marked by so considerable a 
 loss of stores and wagons, as to give it the aspect of a flight. His 
 cavalry had been attacked, and for the time dispersed, the fragments 
 of it rejoining him at intervals afterwards. Many prisoners had been 
 taken from him, and only the prompt haste of his movement, the 
 fatigue of the march-worn Confederates, and the inefficiency of Ashby's 
 command at a critical moment, had saved his whole army from a 
 complete rout. At best, it was but a broken and dispirited force 
 which rested at Winchester during the night, and prepared to resist 
 the advance of the Confederates on the morrow. 
 
 The movement of Jackson had been so sudden and unexpected that 
 Gen. Banks was slow in realizing the true state of the case. The 
 latter says: "The strength and purpose of the enemy were to us 
 unknown when we reached Winchester, except upon surmise and vague 
 rumors from Front Royal. These rumors were strengthened by the 
 vigor with which the enemy had pressed our main column, and defeated 
 at every point the efforts of detachments to effect a junction with the 
 main column. At Winchester, however, all suspicion was relieved on 
 that subject. All classes — secessionists, unionists, refugees, fugitives, 
 and prisoners — agreed that the enemy's force at or near Winchester 
 was overwhelming, ranging from twenty-five to thirty thousand. . . . 
 I determined to test the substance and strength of the enemy by 
 
 ^ Gen. Ewell's report. Gen. Ti'imble informs the author that Ewell's division 
 was ordered to halt at the point mentioned (near Nineveh) until Jackson, after 
 having struck the enemy and discovered his intentions, should send orders for 
 Ewell's further movements. These orders (to move on Winchester), Gen. 
 Trimble says, were sent by Jackson early in the afternoon, but, in consequence 
 of the courier's losing his way and not finding Gen. Ewell promptly, they did 
 not reach the latter for several hours. 
 
WINCHESTER. 
 
 109 
 
 actual collision, and measnres were promptly taken to prepare our 
 troops to meet them."^ 
 
 ^ Banks's report, "Rebellion Record," vol. v. 
 
 Gen. Banks states his force at AVinchester as follows: "My own command 
 consisted of two brigades of infantry of less than 4000 men, all told, with 900 
 cavalry, 10 Parrott guns, and one battery of sis-pounders, smooth-bore cannon. 
 To this should be added the Tenth Maine regiment of infantry and five com- 
 panies of Maryland cavalry, stationed at Winchester, which were engaged in 
 the action." To this should be added also five companies of the Eighth New 
 York cavalry, which arrived in Winchester from Harper's Ferry on the evening 
 of the 24th, and which were involved, if not in the action, at least in the rout 
 of the next day. (See report of Lieut.-Col. Babbitt.) Banks's force at Win- 
 chester, from the above, must have been about 6400. Jackson's was about 
 15,000. 
 
 The organization of the Federals was as follows (the strength and losses being 
 given in detail so far as they have been found) : 
 
 Williams's division. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Donelly's (First) brigade : 
 Forty-sixth Pennsylvania 
 Twenty-eighth New York 
 Fifth Connecticut . 
 
 Gordon's (Third) brigade: 
 Second Massachusetts 
 Third Wisconsin 
 Twenty-seventh Indiana . 
 Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania 
 Tenth Maine regiment . 
 
 strength. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total Loss. 
 
 1700 3 47 251 301 
 
 (7) (51) Medical report. 
 
 7 28 133 168 
 
 ■2102 (25) (71) Medical report. 
 
 856 6 77 83 
 
 Cavalry. 
 Broadhead : 
 
 Part of First Michigan . 
 Hatch : 
 
 Part of First Vermont 
 
 Part of Fifth New York . 
 
 5 companies First Maryland . 
 
 5 companies Eighth New York 
 
 900 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 600 (Estimated). 
 
 34 
 
 24 
 
 54 
 
 26 
 
 Artillery. 
 Best's battery, 6 guns 
 
 Cothran's battery, 6 " 
 Hampton's battery, 4 " 
 
 250 (Estimated.) 
 
 6408 
 
110 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 For this purpose Gordon's (Federal) brigade was stationed south 
 of tlie town, on the Valley turnpike. The right of his command was 
 
 The Confederate organization was as follows : 
 
 Jackson's division. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Winder's (First) brigade : 
 Second Virginia 
 Fourth " . . 
 
 Fifth " 
 
 Twenty-seventh Virginia 
 Thirty-third " 
 
 Campbell's (Second) brigade : 
 Twenty-first Virginia 
 Forty-second " 
 Forty-eighth " 
 Irish battalion " 
 
 Taliaferro's (Third) brigade: 
 Tenth Vii'ginia 
 Twenty-third Virginia 
 Thirty-seventh " 
 
 Strength. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total Loss. 
 
 1529 
 
 (r.&f.) 
 
 f 4 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 I 1 
 
 300 1 
 
 ewell's division. 
 
 Taylor's brigade : 
 Sixth Louisiana 
 Seventh " 
 Eighth " 
 Ninth " 
 Wheat's battalion 
 
 Trimble's brigade : 
 
 Twenty-first North Carolina 
 Twenty-first Georgia 
 Fifteenth Alabama . 
 Sixteenth Mississippi 
 
 Elzey's brigade: 
 Thirteenth Virginia 
 Thirty-first '' 
 Twenty-fifth " 
 Twelfth Georgia 
 
 Scott's brigade : 
 
 Forty-fourth Virginia 
 Fifty-second " 
 Fifty-eighth " 
 
 Maryland line : 
 First Maryland 
 
 14 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 7 
 19 
 
 22 
 1 
 
 65 
 18 
 
 18 
 
 4 
 4 
 8 
 
 3 
 9 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 
 15 90 105 
 
 (Whole brigade.) 
 
 87 
 19 
 
WINCHESTER. HI 
 
 posted on the ridge ruuniug southwest from the town and west of the 
 turnpike, about half a mile from the suburbs.^ The left rested on 
 the turnpike itself, to which the line was perpendicular. Pickets 
 were thrown out on the hills that continue the ridge in front. The 
 Second Massachusetts regiment was on Gordon's right, the Third 
 Wisconsin on his left, near the turnpike, and the Twenty-seventh 
 Indiana and Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania were in reserve, ready to 
 take position wherever needed. Six guns, placed on the crest of the 
 ridge, strengthened Gordon's right, beyond which, under cover of the 
 hill, was Broadhead's cavalry. Near the turnpike, and constituting 
 the centre of the line, were two guns, supported by Hatch's cavalry. 
 On the left was Donelly's brigade, extending across the Front Royal 
 and Millwood roads, thus covering the approaches to the town from 
 the southeast. Here, too, in commanding positions, were placed 
 eight pieces of artillery. The two last-mentioned roads, as they 
 approach Winchester, unite about a mile from the town. In front 
 of this junction a short distance, on a ridge running in the direction 
 of the Front Royal road, was Donelly's crescent-shaped line. Here 
 the battle opened. Gen. Ewell had bivouacked not far in front of 
 the Federal line, and, moving his troops at dawn, he soon came up to 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Under Geo. H, 
 
 , Steuart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mun ford's Second Vir 
 
 ginia 
 
 
 
 Flournoy's Sixth 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 Ashby's Seventh Virginia 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 Ar\ 
 
 tillery. 
 
 
 Strength. Killed. Wounded. 
 
 Missing. Total Loss. 
 
 Poague's 
 
 Carpenter's 
 
 Cutshaw's 
 
 battery, 6 j 
 " 4 
 4 
 
 guns. 
 
 89(r.&f.) 2 16 
 52 1 5 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 Wooding's 
 Caskie's 
 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 Raine's 
 
 (( 
 
 4 
 
 (( 
 
 
 
 Rice's 
 
 (i 
 
 4 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 Lusk's 
 
 u 
 
 4 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 Courtenay's 
 Brockenbrou 
 Chew's 
 
 (1 
 
 igh's " 
 
 6 
 4 
 4 
 
 
 (with Maryland line.) 
 (with cavalry.) 
 
 
 48 
 Total strength, about 15,000 or 16,000. 
 ' This is the same ridge which two miles farther to the southwest was the 
 scene of the battle of Kernstown. 
 
112 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1801-G2. 
 
 the enemy, drove in liis outposts, and attiiekcd liiin. The Twenty- 
 first North Carolina regiment, Col. Kirkland, was in advance, and 
 at 5 A.M. boldly made a dash at the position held by Donelly across 
 the roatl. The North Carolinians met with a bloody reception. The 
 Federals, taking advantage of the stone fences with which that 
 country is everywhere interscctctl, had posted their line behind some 
 of these fences, and poured a well-directed front and flank fire into 
 the Confederates as they advanced across the open field. In a few 
 moments the TAventy-first North Carolina, having lost botli the field 
 officers present, and a large number of men killed and wounded, fell 
 back.' This check was, however, but brief in its duration. AVhen 
 Kirkland advanced in the centre. Col. Johnson, with the First Mary- 
 land regiment, moved forward on his left, nearer the Valley tiu-n- 
 pike, and, meeting with little opposition, reached the suburbs of the 
 town. On the right of the Twenty-first North Carolina, Col. Mer- 
 cer, with the Twenty-first Georgia, advanced, turned the flank of 
 the enemy on that side, and, by means of an enfilading fire, quickly 
 drove them from the position unsuccessfully attacked by Col. Kirk- 
 land. Latin\er (in command of Courtenay's guns) and Brocken- 
 brough contributed to this result with their batteries. The Federals 
 took a new position nearer the town. The remainder of Trimble's 
 brigade (Sixteenth Mississippi and Fifteenth Alabama regiments) 
 now joined the Twenty-first Georgia ; but instead of attacking in front 
 again, Gen. Ewell adopted the suggestion of Trimble, and moved 
 farther to the right, so as to threaten the Federal flank and rear. 
 This manoeuvre, combined with Jackson's success on the other flank, 
 caused the whole to give way. 
 
 It is time to return to the main Confederate attack. All night 
 had Jackson pressed forward at the head of the " StoncAvall" brigade. 
 Soon after dawn, as he approached Winchester, he saw the Federal 
 skirmishers on a hill belonging to the ridge on his left, and ordered 
 Gen. AYinder to " seize the hill as speedily as possible. The Fifth 
 Virginia regiment. Col. Baylor, was accordingly thrown out in 
 
 ^ Donelly's regiments were placed, the Twenty-eighth New York on the left, 
 Fifth Connecticut in the centre, and Forty-sixth Pennsylvania on his right, the 
 wings thrown forward crescent-like. As the Twenty-first North Carolina ad- 
 vanced against the centre, — not seeing the position of the Forty-sixth Pennsyl- 
 vania in the mist, — they received a raking flank fire at close quarters from 
 that regiment as well as the front fire from the Fifth Connecticut, to which was 
 added as they retired that of the Twenty-eighth New York. The Twenty-first 
 North Carolina lost 87 men killed and wounded. (See Donelly's and Trimble's 
 reports.) 
 
WINCHESTER. 113 
 
 advance as skirmishers, and the Second, Fourth, Twenty-seventh, 
 and Thirty-third Virginia regiments being placed in order of battle, 
 the whole line was ordered to advance, which was done in handsome 
 style, and the position on the crest secured, although the enemy made 
 a resolute but unsuccessful effort to dislodge our troops from so com- 
 manding a position. Two Parrott guns from the Rockbridge artil- 
 lery, and the batteries of Carpenter and Cutshaw, were promptly 
 posted on the height to dislodge a battery of the enemy, which was 
 playing from the front with great animation and effect upon the hill."^ 
 The Second brigade, Col. Campbell, was sent to support the batteries, 
 while Taliaferro's brigade, under Col. Fulkerson, was placed on the 
 left in support of Winder, and to extend his line. 
 
 It was at this time that Gordon moved the Second Massachusetts 
 farther up on the ridge, where he already had the six guns that had 
 opened upon Winder when the latter was driving back the Federal 
 outposts. As the regiment moved to the Federal right it had to bear 
 a heavy fire from the Confederate batteries already in position, but 
 the movement was completed in good order. Some of the Federal 
 guns were now moved more to the right, and took a position which 
 enabled them to enfilade the section of Poague's (Rockbridge) battery. 
 A company of the Second Massachasetts was thrown out before these 
 guns as sharpshooters, and, sheltering themselves behind a stone fence, 
 they poured a destructive fire into the midst of Poague's horses and 
 men. Turning his guns, Poague directs his fire upon these assail- 
 ants ; but the fire of artillery is not effective against sharpshooters. 
 Another company of the Second Massachusetts reinforces the first 
 behind the stone wall, and Poague sees his men and horses falling 
 fast. Withdrawing and placing his guns to the left and rear, he 
 opens vigorously from the new position upon the battery that has 
 enfiladed and the sharpshooters that have so seriously annoyed him. 
 At this point he is joined by the remaining four guns of his battery. 
 He disconcerts the Federal sharpshooters by firing solid shot at the 
 stone fence which protects them. Meantime, Cutsliaw and Carpenter 
 hold their positions to the right of Poague, and pour an effective 
 artillery fire upon the enemy. The Federal commander now moves 
 up the Twenty-seventh Indiana and Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania 
 regiments from the turnpike, and places them on the right of the 
 Second Massachusetts, with the design of holding the crest of the 
 ridge, and, if possible, turning the Confederate left. Jackson, seeing 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
114 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLFA' OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 this strengthening and extending of his enemy's right, orders up Tay- 
 lor's Louisianians, who, passing behind Winder, form on his left and 
 overlap the Federal flank. The Tenth and Twenty-third Virginia, 
 of Taliaferro's brigade, extend Taylor's line, the former regiment on 
 his left, and the other on his right. Regardless of the artillery fire 
 and the masketry of the sharpshooters, this strong body formed in 
 line, and, moving to the crest of the hill, " swept magnificently down 
 the declivity and across the field, driving back the Federal troops and 
 bearing down all opposition before it. In this gallant advance all the 
 troops of Gen. AViuder joined except those left as supports to the 
 batteries." ^ 
 
 Col. Gordon says of this charge of the Confederates : " They were 
 received with a destructive fire of musketry poured in from all parts 
 of my brigade that could reach them. Confident in their numbers, 
 and relying upon large sustaining bodies, . . . the enemy's lines 
 moved on but little shaken by our fire. At the same time in our 
 front a long line of infantry showed themselves, rising the crest of the 
 hills just beyond our position. My little brigade, numbering in all 
 two thousand one hundred and two (2102), in another moment would 
 have been overwhelmed. On the right, left, and centre immensely 
 superior columns were pressing; not another man was available, — 
 not a support to be found in the remnant of the army corps left Gen. 
 Banks. To withdraw was now possible ; in another moment it would 
 have been too late. At this moment I should have assumed the re- 
 sponsibility of requesting permission to withdraw, but the right fell 
 back under great pressure, and compelled the line to yield." ^ 
 
 Jackson now ordered Elzey's brigade forward on the Valley turn- 
 pike, while Taylor and Winder swept back the enemy rapidly over 
 the hills into the town. It was at the time of Taylor's successful charge, 
 between 8 and 9 a.m., that Ewell, having pushed back Donelly on the 
 Front Royal road into the suburbs of the toAvn, was moving to the Con- 
 federate right and threatening the Federal rear. Ashby took possession 
 of the Berryville road, which leaves Winchester on the east side, and 
 thus cut off a retreat by that route to Harper's Ferry. Finding him- 
 self beaten on both flanks and his line of retreat endangered. Banks 
 made no further attempt to hold the town or check the progress of 
 the Confederates. Passing quickly through Winchester, and in such 
 order as was possible, he fled northward with great haste by the Mar- 
 tinsburg road, leaving many prisoners in the hands of his antagonist. 
 
 ' Jackson's report. ^ Gordon's report. 
 
WINCHESTER. 115 
 
 Jackson followed through the town, and without delay continued 
 the pursuit. He says : " Notwithstanding the fatiguing marches and 
 almost sleepless night to which the mass of our troops had been sub- 
 jected, they continued to press forward with alacrity. The Federal 
 forces upon falling back into the town preserved their organization 
 remarkably well. In passing through its streets they were thrown 
 into confusion, and shortly after debouching upon the plain and turn- 
 pike to Martinsburg, and after being fired upon by our artillery, they 
 presented the aspect of a mass of disordered fugitives. Never have I 
 seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a 
 richer harvest of the fruits of victory. Hoping that the cavalry would 
 soon -come up, the artillery, followed by infantry, was pressed forward 
 for about two hours for the purpose of preventing, by artillery fire, 
 a reforming of the enemy ; but as nothing was heard of the cavalry, 
 and as but little or nothing could be accomplished without it in the 
 exhausted condition of our infantry, between whom and the enemy the 
 distance was continually increasing, I ordered a halt, and issued orders 
 for going into camp and refreshing the men."^ 
 
 Two causes prevented an efficient pursuit by the Confederate cav- 
 alry. Ashby's command had become scattered in the pillage of the 
 day before, and during the night march and fight of the morning he 
 had had but little opportunity to collect them. With such as were at 
 hand he had moved to the enemy's left to prevent a retreat by way 
 of Berryville to Harper's Ferry, and with the hope of " cutting off a 
 portion of his force." From this cause he only entered the Martins- 
 burg road and joined the cavalry under Steuart some ten or twelve 
 miles from Winchester, and after Banks had passed. Gen. George H. 
 Steuart, of the Maryland line, now in command of the Second and 
 Sixth Virginia cavalry regiments, was with Ewell during the morn- 
 ing, and when Lieut. Pendleton, of Jackson's staff, found him, with 
 an urgent order to follow the enemy, he wasted valuable time on a 
 point of military etiquette,^ and consequently did not overtake the 
 advance of the Confederate infantry until an hour after it hatl halted. 
 Gen. Steuart then pushed on with vigor and picked up a good many 
 prisoners, but the delay had enabled the Federal army to make such 
 headway that it was " beyond the reach of successful pursuit." ' 
 Banks halted in his rapid course at Martinsburg for an hour or two, 
 and then continued his retreat to Williamsport, which he reached at 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
 ^ lie declined to obey the order until it came through Gen, Ewell. 
 
 * Jackson's report. 
 
116 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S01-C2. 
 
 sundown. Here, during the night and next morning, he crossed to 
 the north side of the river. The Federal army, after the defeat of 
 the morning, tluis marched the distiince from Wincliestcr to the Poto- 
 mac (thirty-four miles) in one day. Steuart witli his cavalry followed 
 it to Martinsburg, where lie ca[)tured a large amount of stores. " There 
 is gootl reason for believing that, had the cavalry played its part in 
 this j)ursuit as well as the four companies had done under Col. Flour- 
 ncy two days before, in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a small 
 portion of Banks's army would have made its escape to the Potomac." ^ 
 But the victory was complete and glorious, even if Jackson's weary 
 and march-worn command had not achieved all that their tireless and 
 indomitable leader thought possible. In forty-eight hours the enemy 
 had been driven between fifty and sixty miles from Front Royal and 
 Strasburg to the Potomac, with the loss of more than one-third 
 of his entire strength. His army had crossed the latter river a dis- 
 organized mass. Hundreds of wagons had been abandoned or burnt. 
 Two pieces of artillery and an immense quantity of quartermaster, com- 
 missary, medical, and ordnance stores had fallen into the hands of the 
 victor.^ " Some two thousand three hundred (2300) prisoners" were 
 
 ' Jackson's report. 
 
 ^ Gen. Jackson says in his report: "The public property captured in this 
 expedition at Front Royal, Winchester, Martinsburg, and Charlestown was of 
 great value, and so large in quantity that much of it had to be abandoned for 
 want of necessary means of transportation. Maj. Ilarman, my chief quarter- 
 master, had but one week within which to remove it; and, although his efiForts 
 were characterized by his usual energy, promptitude, and judgment, all the 
 conveyances that within that short period could be hired or impressed were 
 inadequate to the work. The medical stores, which filled one of the largest 
 storehouses in Winchester, were fortunately saved. Most of the instruments 
 and some of the medicines, urgently needed at that time by the command, were 
 issued to the surgeons. The residue were sent to Charlottesville and turned 
 over to a medical purveyor. Two large and well-furnished hospitals, capable of 
 accommodating some 700 patients, were found in the town, and left undisturbed, 
 with all their stores, for the use of the sick and wounded of the enemy. 
 
 " Commissary supplies, consisting of upwards of 100 head of cattle, 34,000 
 pounds of bacon, flour, salt, sugar, coffee, hard bread, and cheese, were turned 
 over to the proper authorities, besides large amounts taken by the troops and 
 not accounted for. Sutlers' stores valued at $25,000, and for want of transpor- 
 tation abandoned to the troops, were captured. Quartermasters' stores to the 
 value of $125,185 were secured" (at Winchester), "besides an immense amount 
 destroyed. Many horses were taken by the cavalry. 
 
 " Among the ordnance stores taken and removed in safety were 9354 small 
 arms, and 2 pieces of artillery and their caissons." A large amount of ammu- 
 nition was also among the ordnance captures. 
 
WINCHESTER. 117 
 
 taken to the rear when Jackson fell back, besides seven hundred and 
 fifty (750) wounded and sick paroled and left in the hospitals at Win- 
 chester and Strasburg, making a total of about three thousand and 
 fifty (3050).^ The Federal surgeons captured in attendance at their 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
 Gen. Banks's report of his losses is apt to mislead, and has done so, at least 
 in the case of the Comte de Paris, the distinguished French histoi-ian of the war. 
 Banks says (see his report, vol. v., " Rebellion Record") : " Our loss is stated in 
 detail, with the names of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the full report of 
 Brig.-Gen. A. S. Williams, commanding division, to which reference is made. 
 
 '' The whole number of killed is 38 ; wounded, 155 ; missing, 711 ; total loss, 
 904. 
 
 " It is undoubtedly true that many of the missing will yet return, and the 
 entire loss may be assumed as not exceeding 700. It is also probable that the 
 number of killed and wounded may be larger than that above stated, but the 
 aggregate loss will not be changed thereby. All our guns were saved. 
 
 "Our wagon-train consisted of nearly 500 wagons. Of this number, 55 were 
 lost. They were not, with but few exceptions, abandoned to the enemy, but 
 were burned upon the road. Nearly all of our supplies were thus saved. The 
 stores at Front Royal, of which I had no knowledge until my visit to that post 
 on the 21st instant, and those at Winchester, of which a considerable portion 
 was destroyed by our troops, are not embraced in this statement." 
 
 In this statement Gen. Banks confines himself to the losses reported by Gen. 
 Williams. Gen. Williams says that his report embraced a " complete list of 
 killed, wounded, and missing of the troops under my (his) command, except 
 that of the First Maryland (infantry), detached on duty at Front Royal." I 
 could not find this list, but from subordinate reports it appears that the losses 
 of his troops in killed and wounded were : 
 
 Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wounded. 
 
 Donelly's brigade (official report) . 3 47 (Med. report) 7 51 
 
 Gordon's " " " . " " 25 71 
 
 Broadhead's cavalry " " . 10 10 
 
 Artillery — no report found. 
 
 Killed. Wounded. 
 
 The least sum of the above is 38 128 
 
 Banks reports . . .38 155 
 
 The troops just enumerated constituted Gen. Williams's command. That 
 command did not include Hatch's cavalry brigade, nor the parts of the First 
 Maryland cavalry and Eighth New York cavalry present, nor the Tenth Maine 
 infantry. The last-named regiment lost in all 83 men, and the five companies 
 of the First Maine cavalry lost 127. The other cavalry, under Hatch, no doubt 
 lost in proportion. Again, Gen. Banks says there were nearly 1000 sick and 
 disabled soldiers of Shields's division left behind at Strasburg. Several hun- 
 dreds of these were "put upon the march" towards Winchester early on the 
 24th. A number of them were captured. If the losses of prisoners at Front 
 Royal (expressly omitted by Gen. Williams), and those of the troops not under 
 
118 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 hosjiitals were at first paroled, but next day, at the su<;gcstion of 
 Medical Director Hunter McGuirc, of Jackson's staff, they were un- 
 conditionally released.' Jackson's loss during the entire expedition 
 was four hundred (400) nien.^ 
 
 But the most imjiortant result of Jackson's victory did not consist 
 in the overthrow of the small army under Gen. Banks and the capture 
 of the large stores accunudated in the lower Valley. It disorganized 
 the plan of campaign against Richmond, and, for a time, paralyzed 
 McClellan's movements. President Lincoln had yielded, as hereto- 
 fore stated, to Gen. McClellan's urgent ai)peal for reinforcements, 
 so fiiras to order McDowell, on the 17th of May, to prepare to move 
 / down the Fredericksbiu-g and Richmond railroad, in order to unite 
 with the main Federal army in front of Richmond. Shields's division 
 was sent from the A^alley to swell his force to forty thousand (40,000) 
 men for this purpose. On Friday, May 23, President Lincoln and Sec^ 
 retary Stanton went to Fredericksburg to confer with Gen. McDowell, 
 found that Shields had already reached that point, and determined, 
 after consultation, that the advance should begin on the following 
 Monday, 26th of May. McClellan was informed of the contemplated 
 movement, and instructed to assume command of JMcDowell's corps 
 when it joined liim.^ This fine body of troops, moving from the north 
 
 Gen. "Williams's command, and those of Gen. Shields's convalescents, were 
 added to Gen. Banks's report, it would, no doubt, agree with Jackson's. In 
 the same way, the artillery lost at Front Royal is not reported by Banks, and 
 the wagons he reports as lost, and which, no doubt, represents the loss in Wil- 
 liams's division, constituted but a small part of those that actually fell into the 
 hands of the victors. Hatch, for instance, according to Gen. G. H. Gordon, lost 
 all his baggage. (See History Second Massachusetts, Third Paper, pp. 100, etc.) 
 
 ^ For the terms of this parole, see Appendix to "Medical and Surgical History 
 of the War," p. 118. 
 
 ^ Jackson's rejiort. He reports his loss as 68 killed, 329 wounded, and 3 
 missing. This, probably, does not include Ashby's loss at Buckton, or the 
 infantry loss at Front Royal. No report of Ashby's loss has been found. It 
 may have been 20 or 30. The loss in the Louisiana troops at Front Royal was 
 10 (Gen. Taylor's report). That in the First Maryland not reported. It was 
 slight, if any. Hence, possibly, about 40 should be added to the number in 
 Gen. Jackson's report. 
 
 ^ President Lincoln telegraphed McClellan on May 24 : "I left Gen. Mc- 
 Dowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so 
 worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. . . . McDowell 
 and Shields both say they can and positively will move Monday morning. I 
 wish you to move cautiously and safely. You will have command of McDowell 
 after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the 
 21st." (McClellan's report.) 
 
WINCHESTER. 119 
 
 against the Confederate capital, would have seized all the roads enter- 
 ing the city from that direction, and would have increased McClellan's 
 available force by forty or fifty per cent. There was strong reason 
 to expect that this combined movement would effect the downfall of 
 Richmond. 
 
 The Federal President returned to Washington on the night of the 
 23d to await the result. He there received the first news of Jackson's 
 operations at Front Royal on that same afternoon. The first de- 
 spatches indicated only an unimportant raid, and McDowell was 
 directed to leave his " least effective" brigade at Fredericksburg, in 
 addition to the force agreed upon for the occupation of that town.^ 
 Later, on the 24th, the news from Banks became more alarming, and 
 Gren. McDowell was telegraphed that " Gen. Fremont has been ordered 
 by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg, to relieve Gen. 
 Banks and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are 
 instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, 
 to put twenty thousand (20,000) men in motion at once for the 
 Shenandoah, moving on the line, or in advance of the line of the 
 Manassas Gap railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces 
 of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation \\\i\\ Gen. Fremont, 
 or, in case want of supj)lies or of transportation interferes with his 
 movement, it is believed that the force with which you move will be 
 sufiicient to accomplish the object alone.^ . . ." The following was 
 
 sent to McClellan : 
 
 "Washington City, May 24, 1862, 
 "4 p.m. 
 
 "In consequence of Gen. Banks's critical position, I have been 
 compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell's movement to join you. The 
 enemy are making a desperate push on Harper's Ferry, and we are 
 trying to throw Fremont's force and part of McDowell's in their 
 rear. 
 
 "A. Lincoln." 
 
 Next day the news from Banks seems to have greatly increased the 
 excitement in Washington. The follo"\ving telegrams were sent to 
 Gen. McClellan : 
 
 ' Secretary Stanton's despatch to McDowell is as follows : "In view of the op- 
 erations of the enemy on the line of Gen. Banks, the President thinks the whole 
 force you designed to move from Fredericksburg should not be taken away, and 
 he therefore directs that one brigade, in addition to what you designed to leave 
 at Fredericksburg, should be left there. This brigade to be the least eflFective of 
 your command." (McDowell's testimony.) 
 
 ^ Report on Conduct of the War, Part I. p. 274. (McDowell's testimony.) 
 
120 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 " U. S/MlMTAKV TELEGRArn. 
 
 "War r>Ei'ARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C, May 25, 1862. 
 
 "The enemy is moviiii^ north in snfficient force to drive Banks before 
 liini, in i)recisely what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening 
 Leesburg, and Geary' on tlie Manassas Gap railroad, from both north 
 and south, in precisely what force we cannot tell.^ I think the move- 
 ment is a general and concerted one, such as could not be if he was 
 acting ujxm the ])urpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. 
 I think the time is near wlien you nuist either attack Richmond or 
 give up the job and come to the defence of Witshington. Let me hear 
 from you instantly. 
 
 "A. Lincoln. 
 
 " Gen. McClellan." 
 
 " U. S. Military Telegraph. 
 "War Department, Washington, D. C, May 25, 1862. 
 
 "Your despatch received. Banks was at Strasburg Avith about six 
 thousand (6000) nien,^ Shields having been taken from him to swell a 
 column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of liis force 
 scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of seven to ten 
 thousand (7000 to 10,000) men fell upon one regiment and two com- 
 panies, guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely, 
 crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed to get 
 north of Banks on the road to Winchester. Banks ran a race with 
 them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morn- 
 ing a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten 
 
 ^ Gen. Geary commanded a force guarding this railroad. His strength present 
 for duty May 17 was about 1900. 
 
 ^ There was no foi'ce after him except possibly some guerrillas. Tenney, in 
 his "Military and Naval History of the Rebellion," p. 235, says: "When the 
 news of the attack on the Maryland regiment at Front Royal on the 23d reached 
 Gen. Geary, who, with his force, was charged with the protection of the Ma- 
 nassas Gap railroad, he immediately began to move to Manassas Junction. His 
 troops hearing the most extravagant stories of the fate of the Maryland regi- 
 ment, and supposing that they were about to be swallowed up, burnt their tents 
 and destroyed a quantity of arms. Gen. Duryea, at Catlett's Station, became 
 alarmed on learning of the withdrawal of Gen. Geary, took his three New York 
 regiments, leaving the Pennsylvania one behind, and hastened back to Centre- 
 ville, and telegraphed to Washington for help. He left a large quantity of army 
 stores behind, and also, for two days, his camp equipage. A panic prevailed at 
 Catlett's Station and Manassas Junction for two days. At night the camps were 
 kept in constant alarm by the sentinels firing at stumps or bowing bushes, which 
 they mistook for Confederate guerrillas. The alarm spread to Washington, and 
 Secretary Stanton issued orders calling for the militia of the loyal States to 
 defend that city." 
 
 It is hard to see how any " stories" as to the A\te of the Maryland regiment 
 could have been " extravagant." It was very nearly " swallowed up." 
 
 ' See statement of Banks's forces, page 109. 
 
WINCHESTER. 121 
 
 back into full retreat towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken 
 up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas gap railroad, just now 
 reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with ten thousand 
 (10,000), following up and supporting, as I understand, the force 
 now pursuing Banks; also that another force of ten thousand (10,000) 
 is near Orleans, following on in .the same direction/ Stripped bare, 
 as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them crossing the 
 Potomac at Harper's Ferry, or above. We have about twenty 
 thousand (20,000) of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity 
 of Front Royal, and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to 
 Harrisonburg. Both of these movements are intended to get in the 
 enemy's rear. One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through 
 here to Harper's Feriy. The rest of his forces remain for the present 
 at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from 
 here and Baltimore as we can spare to Haq^er's Ferry, supplying their 
 place in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We 
 also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferrv, of which 
 arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our situa- 
 tion. If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach we should be 
 utterly helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no un- 
 willingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding 
 McDoAvell's forces from you. Please understand this, and do the best 
 you can with the forces you have. " A. Lincoln.^ 
 
 " Gen. McClellan." 
 
 ^ These were of course entirely imaginary creations of Gen. Geary's inform- / 
 ant, and show the consternation that Jackson's movement had inspired. C 
 
 '^ The government of the United States, on the same day, May 25, called for 
 additional troops, and issued an order taking " military possession of all the 
 railroads in the United States," for the transportation of troops and munitions 
 of war. 
 
 "The news of Gen. Banks's defeat and the sudden call of the Secretary of 
 War upon the State militia created the utmost excitement at the North, not only 
 among the military themselves, but among the thousands connected with them." 
 ("Rebellion Record," vol. v.. Diary, p. 17.) 
 
 The following is Secretary Stanton's despatch, dated May 25, to the Governor 
 of Massachusetts : 
 
 " Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great 
 force are marching on Washington. You will please organize and forward 
 immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State." 
 
 Tenney says : " This alarm at Washington, and the call for its defence, pro- 
 duced a most indescribable panic in the cities of the northern States on Sunday 
 the 25th, and two or three days afterwards. . . . 
 
 " Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, issued the following order May 26 : 
 
 " ' On pressing requisition of the President of the United States in the present 
 emergency, it is ordered that the several major-generals, brigadier-generals, and 
 colonels of regiments throughout the Commonwealth muster, without delay, all 
 military organizations within their respective divisions or under their control 
 
 9 
 
 -^- 
 
122 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 The operations of Jackson thus not only occupied all the troops in 
 and around Washington, together with Fremont's forces, but for the 
 time completely neutralized tlie forty thousand men under McDowell, 
 and disconcerted McClellan's plans. It is true that both McDowell 
 and McClellan, deeming the fears of the Federal administration ex- 
 aggerated, deprecated tlie interference with McDowell's mlvanc^ on 
 Richmond, but in vain. McDowell says. May 24, in reply to the 
 order sending half his corps after Jackson : " I beg to say that co- 
 operation between Gen. Fremont and myself, to cut off Jackson and 
 Ewell, is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practical impossi- 
 bility; next, tliiit I am entirely beyond helping distance of Gen. 
 Banks, and no celerity or vigor Avill avail, so far as he is concerned ; 
 next, that by a glance at the map it will be seen that the line of re- 
 treat of the enemy's forces up the Valley is shorter than mine to go 
 against him. It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to 
 the Valley by the route which .will give it food and forage, and by 
 
 together with all persons willing to join their commands, and proceed forthwith 
 to the city of Washington, or such other points as may be indicated by future 
 orders.' 
 
 " The Governor of Massachusetts issued the following proclamation : 
 
 " ' Men of Massachusetts ! The wily and barbarous Iiorde of trai tors to the 
 people, to the government, to our country, and to liberty, menace again the 
 national capital. They have attacked and routed Maj.-Gen. Banks, are ad- 
 vancing on Harper's Ferry, and are marching on AVashington. The President 
 calls on Massachusetts to rise once more for its rescue and defence. 
 
 " ' The whole active militia will be summoned by a general order, issued from 
 the office of the adjutant-general, to report on Boston Common to-morrow; they 
 will mai'ch to relieve and avenge their brethren and friends, and to oppose with 
 fierce zeal and courageous patriotism the progress of the foe. 
 
 " ' May God encourage their hearts and strengthen their arms, and may he 
 inspire the government and all the people! 
 
 " ' Given at headquarters, Boston, eleven o'clock, this (Sunday) evening. May 
 25, 1862. 
 
 " * John A. Andrew.' 
 
 " The Governor of Ohio began his proclamation as follows : 
 
 " ' To the Gallant Men of Ohio : I have the astounding intelligence that the 
 seat of our beloved government is threatened with invasion, and am called 
 upon by the Secretary of AVar for troops to repel and overwhelm the ruthless 
 invaders.' "... 
 
 But enough of gubernatorial rhetoric. The effect of Jackson's movement 
 was unmistakable. "Almost half a million of men offered themselves for the 
 defence of Washington within twenty-four hours after the issue of the procla- 
 mation." 
 
 Tenney adds that this "panic" was "extremely disastrous to the Federal 
 cause." 
 
WINCHESTER. 123 
 
 that time the enemy will have retired.' I shall gain nothing for you 
 there, and shall lose much for you here. It is therefore not only on 
 personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but that I 
 feel it throws us all back ; and from Richmond north we shall have 
 all om- large masses paralyzed, and shall have to iiepeat what we have 
 just accomplished." ^ McClellan says : " It will be remembered that 
 the order for the co-operation of Gen. McDowell was simply sus- 
 pended, not revoked, and therefore I was not at liberty to abandon 
 the northern approach to Richmond."^ This fact, together with the 
 necessity of protecting his communications with the York river, 
 caused him to retain a part of his army on the north side of the Chick- 
 ahominy, while the remainder was separated from him by that trouble- 
 some stream, — a circumstance that contributed not a little to his 
 subsequent defeat. 
 
 The Federal administration, however, adhered to its plans, and 
 hastened McDowell's movement to the Valley. The moral effect of 
 a Confederate advance to the neighborhood of Washington was 
 dreaded, and still more, perhaps, the irruption of a victorious south- 
 ern force into the State of Maryland. The mass of the people of this 
 State sympathized with the South. They were kept down only by 
 the presence of Federal troops. It was a matter of grave consequence 
 that Jackson should not be able to maintain himself north of the 
 Potomac, even for a short time. Such considerations outweighed 
 even the prosjiect of taking Richmond. 
 
 While President Lincoln was thus " taking counsel of his fears," * 
 and promptly ordering troops from all directions to overwhelm Jack- 
 son, the latter was resting from the fatigues of his forced marches. 
 Having turned over the pursuit of the enemy to the cavalry at mid- 
 day on Sunday (25th), he placed liLs army in camp at Stephenson's, 
 five miles north of Winchester, and, returning himself to the town, 
 took up his headquarters there. This historic town and its beautiful 
 environs presented on that glorious May afternoon an aspect of quiet 
 and repose strangely in contrast with the stormy scenes of the morn- 
 ing. Several warehouses filled with stores had been fired by the flying 
 Federals, and thLs involved the burning of a considerable number of 
 other buildings. But now the fire was over ; the citizens were busy 
 
 ^ He little appreciated Jackson's boldness, who remained at Harper's Ferry 
 until McDowell's advance had occupied Front Royal. 
 ^ McDowell's testimony. 
 ' McClellan' s report. 
 * A favorite aphorism of Jackson's was: " Never take counsel of your fears." 
 
124 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-6S, 
 
 looking after the wounded, or paying the last sad rites to the dead. 
 Universal joy, even when mingled with sorrow at the loss of loved 
 ones, was manifested at Gen. Jackson's return. 
 
 Next morning Jackson issued an order in the followinfj terms : 
 " Within four weeks this army has made long and rapid marches, 
 fought six combats and two l)attles, signally defeating the enemy in 
 each one, cajjtured several stands of colors and pieces of artillery, with 
 numerous prisoners, and vast medical, ordnance, and army stores; 
 and finally driven the boastful host, which was ravaging our beau- 
 tiful country, into utter rout. The general commanding would 
 w'armly express to the oificers and men under his command liis joy in 
 their achievements, and his thanks for their brilliant gallantry in 
 action and their patient obedience imder the hardships of forced 
 marches, often more painful to the brave soldier than the dangers 
 of battle. The explanation of the severe exertions to which the 
 commanding general called the army, which were endured by them 
 with such cheerful confidence in him, is now given in the victory of 
 yesterday. He receives this proof of their confidence in the past 
 with pride and gratitude, and asks only a similar confidence in the 
 future. 
 
 " But his chief duty to-day, and that of the army, is to recognize 
 devoutly the hand of a protecting Providence in the brilliant suc- 
 cesses of the last three days (which have given us the results of a 
 great victory without great losses), and to make the oblation of our 
 thanks to God for his mercies to us and our country in heartfelt acts 
 of religious worship. For this purpose the troops will remain in camp 
 to-day, suspending, as far as possible, all military exercises ; and the 
 chaplains of regiments will hold divine service in their several 
 charges at 4 o'clock p.m." ^ 
 
 Another day was spent in resting, and then the Confederate leader 
 was ready for action. " Immediately after the battle of Winchester 
 he had sent a trusty officer to the capital with despatches explaining 
 his views. The decision of the government was that he should press 
 the enemy at Harper's Ferry, threaten an invasion of Maryland and 
 an assault U2)on the Federal capital, and thus make the most energetic 
 diversion possible to draw a portion of the forces of McDowell and 
 McClellan from Richmond."^ Early on the 28th, Gen. A^^inder,' 
 with four regiments and tw^o batteries of his brigade, was sent for- 
 ward towards Charlestown by way of Summit Point. He picked up 
 
 ^ Dabney, p. 384. ^ Dabney, p. 386. 
 
WINCHESTER. 125 
 
 a few cavalry scouts on tlic way, through whom he learned, when 
 witliin five miles of Charlestown, that the enemy occupied it in force. 
 He communicated this information to Jackson, Avho then ordered 
 Ewell to move in the same direction. 
 
 The troops in front of Winder were part of a force that had been 
 rapidly concentrated at Harper's Ferry. Col. Miles had held that 
 post for some time with a small force, but with no artillery.^ Upon 
 the reception of the news of Banks's defeat, Gen. R. Saxton had been 
 sent to take command, and troops and artillery were hurried forward. 
 Saxton arrived on the 26th, and by the evening of the 27th a force 
 of some seven thousand (7000) men^ and eighteen (18) pieces of artil- 
 lery^ had been gathered there. He at once occupied Bolivar heights, 
 the high plateau in the fork of the Shenandoah and the Potomac, with 
 his troops, and placed a naval battery of Dahlgren guns on the point 
 of the mountain north of the Potomac, known as " Maryland Heights." 
 This last position completely commands the town and the Bolivar 
 heights. He attempted, on the evening of the 27th, to take posses- 
 sion of the point of the mountain opposite the Maryland heights, on 
 the Virginia side, and known as the Loudoun heights, but the two 
 companies sent for this pm'pose were driven off by some guerrillas. 
 Next day a " reconnoissance in force was made towards Charlestown 
 by the One Hundred and Eleventh Pennsylvania regiment, the First 
 ISIaryland cavalry, and a section of Reynolds's battery." * This force 
 drove the Confederate cavalry scouts out of the town, and took up a 
 position near its southern limits. It was soon after that Gen. Winder 
 reached the vicinity of the to^vn; and, forcing back the Federal 
 cavalry pickets through a piece of woodland, he found the main body 
 drawn up in line of battle beyond. Seeing that the Federal force 
 was far less than had been reported, he made arrangements to attack 
 at once. To reply to the two Federal guns that had opened on him, 
 he placed Carpenter's four pieces in position, and supported them by 
 the Thirty-third Virginia regiment. " This battery was admirably 
 worked, and in tw^enty minutes the enemy retired in great disorder, 
 throwing away arms, blankets, haversacks, etc. TJje pursuit was con- 
 tinued rapidly with artillery and infantry. Capt. Poague was ordered 
 up with a gun and howitzer. These, with Carpenter's guns, were 
 
 ^ See President Lincoln's despatch, p. 119. 
 ^ Saxton's report, " Rebellion Record," vol. v. p. 159. 
 ^ President Lincoln's despatch, above referred to. 
 * Saxton's report. 
 
126 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 placed in position wherever ])ra('tic'al)le."^ Saxton, hearing of the 
 repulse of his atlvan(«, sent forward the Seventy-eighth New York 
 and the remainder of Reynolds's battery to cover the retreat. The 
 Federals reached Bolivar heights with the loss of nine jirisoners, 
 and Saxton formed his main body " in line of battle extending along 
 the crest of Bolivar heights across the peninsula from the Potomac 
 to the Shenandoah."^ The Confederates continued the pursuit to 
 Halltown, when, finding the enemy in position at Bolivar, and tired 
 from a march of over twenty-one miles, they were content to return 
 and go into camp in the vicinity of Charlestown. Gen. Ewell arrived 
 at nightfall. (Map No. VI.) 
 
 Next day (29th) the main body of the Confederate army " took 
 position near Halltown, and the Second regiment of Virginia in- 
 fantry was sent to the Loudoun heights, with the hope of being able 
 to drive the enemy from Harper's Ferry across the Potomac." ^ 
 
 These movements consumed the greater part of the day, which was 
 not marked otherwise on the Confederate side, save by the driving 
 in of the Federal pickets and the repulse of the reconnoitring parties 
 sent out by Gen. Saxton. 
 
 The latter continued throughout the day to hold the Federal forces 
 in order of battle on Bolivar heights. In the afternoon, the fact 
 that no attack had been make in front, the appearance of a Confederate 
 force on Loudoun heights, and a report that Jackson was crossing one 
 division over the Potomac, above Harper's Ferry, caused him to fear 
 an attack on Maryland heights in his rear. He therefore deter- 
 mined to move part of his infantry to the north side of the Potomac, 
 and place it on those heights, so as to secure his battery, already there, 
 and to withdraw the remainder from Bolivar to the hill immediately 
 above Harper's Ferry, where his line would be shorter and his troops 
 more completely protected by the guns on the Maryland heights. 
 Thase changes he effected during the night of the 29th. 
 
 These precautions, however, were unnecessary. Jackson had no 
 time at his disposal for crossing the Potomac and investing the enemy 
 on all sides. He;^had already carried his instructions, to threaten an 
 invasion of Marjdand and a movement upon Washington, to the 
 extreme point consistent with safety. The movements of the large 
 bodies of troops which the Federal President had been for some days 
 urging with such haste towards his rear, now imperatively demanded 
 his attention. Jackson's strength was not over fifteen thousand 
 
 ^ Winder's report. ^ Saxton' s report. ^ Jackson's report. 
 

 
hi-.. 
 
 Hi 
 
WINCHESTER. 127 
 
 (15,000) men.* All the energy of a great government was now 
 being expended in gathering about him a force of between fifty-five 
 and sixty thousand (55,000 and 60,000) men.^ 
 
 The despatch of President Lincoln to Gen. McDowell, already 
 given, required him to send half his corps after Jackson. Subsequent 
 orders du'ected him to increase still further this force. McDowell 
 moved King's division after those of Shields and Ord. The front 
 division (Shields's) was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and by 
 the evening of the 29th was so far advanced as to be within striking 
 distance of Front Royal the next day. Gen. McDowell was himself 
 directing the march of the other divisions towards the same point, 
 and reached Rectortown on the 30th.^ 
 
 On the other hand, Gen. Fremont, who had been quietly resting 
 at Franklin for ten days, Avhile Jackson was making forced marches 
 after Banks, was startled by the news from the latter on the 24th, and 
 next day (Sunday, 25th) took up his march, under President Lin- 
 coln's orders, for Strasburg.* The route he chose was by way of 
 
 ' Dabney. Jackson's force has been greatly exaggerated in many of the ac- 
 counts of this campaign. 
 
 ^ McDowell was moving towards Front Royal and Strasburg with the divisions 
 of Shields, Ord, and King, containing 30,000 men (see his i-eturn for May 17, 
 and his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the AYar). Fremont 
 was marching towards the same points, by way of "Wardensville, with a force 
 of 14,672 (officers and men for duty, by return of May 30). Saxton had at 
 Harper's Ferry 7000 troops (Saxton's report), and Banks was at Williamsport, 
 where the remains of his army had grown to over 7000 men (see his return for 
 May 31). All were to join in the general movement against Jackson. 
 
 ^ Shields's division entered Front Royal first; Ord's (Rickett's) division 
 followed. King, who was in the rear, sent two of his brigades (Augur's and 
 Patrick's) as far as Front Royal, which they entered June 1. The other 
 brigade (Gibbons' s) stopped at Haymarket, to which point the advance brigades 
 of King returned on June 2. 
 
 * Fremont says : " With the intelligence of these events" (Jackson's attack on 
 Banks), "despatched to me under date of May 24, came also an order from the 
 President directing me to break camp and march against Jackson at Harrison- 
 burg. 
 
 " Of the different roads leading from Franklin to Harrisonburg, all but one 
 had been obstructed by Jackson in his retreat. . . . The road still left open ran 
 southwardly, reaching Harrisonburg by a long detour." 
 
 Fremont was afraid to lengthen his line of supply, and especially was fearful, 
 if he went to Harrisonburg, that Jackson might go from Strasburg or Winchester 
 to Romney or Moorefield. A despatch from Secretary Stanton, May 25, left 
 him free to choose his route, and he chose to go back from Franklin to Peters- 
 burg, and then to go by way of AVardensville to Strasburg. He reached 
 
128 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 Petersburg (where he left all .surplus baggage and tents) and Moore- 
 flold. His progress was delayed by rain and bad roads, so that it was 
 Friday night (30th) wlicn he reac-hed Wardensville. 
 
 Note. — Some interesting reminiscences of the battle of Winchester were 
 received from Gen. Trimble after the foregoing chapter was in print. It seems 
 that Ewell's division moved forward early on the morning of the 24th May 
 towards Winchester, Trimble's brigade in front. At eight o'clock the troops 
 halted to rest, when Gen. Trimble descried the smoke of burning stores in the 
 direction of Strasburg, and suggested a march directly to Newtown to cut the 
 main road from Strasburg to Winchester. Jackson, however, thinking it more 
 probable that Banks was retreating from Strasburg westwards towards the 
 Potomac, left Ewell with Trimble's brigade and some other troops at this point, 
 and, taking Taylor's brigade with the remainder of the army, moved towards 
 Middletown that he might the sooner strike Banks if he had taken the route 
 supposed. Ewcll remained at Nineveh the greater part of the day waiting for 
 orders. These orders, by the failure of the courier to find him, instead of being 
 delivered by mid-day, did not reach him until 3.30 p.m. They directed him to 
 move on Newtown, but when received, the artillery fire indicated that Jackson 
 with the main body, in following up Banks, had already advanced to that point. 
 Hence, after consultation. Gens. Ewell and Trimble marched towards Win- 
 chester, the vicinity of which they reached at dusk. 
 
 Next morning the artillery fire on Jackson's wing was heard by seven o'clock. 
 Trimble's brigade was then moving forward on the other flank. " Gen. Ewell 
 in person directed the Twenty-first North Carolina regiment to enter the suburbs 
 at a mill on the southeast part of the town, directing the other regiments of 
 Trimble's brigade and the artillery to ascend the high grounds and take a posi- 
 tion on the east of Winchester, a half-mile or so distant from that place. 
 
 "As soon as the North Carolina regiment passed the mill-stream they were 
 met by a destructive fire from behind stone fences, and could not advance. Col. 
 Mercer, of the Twenty-first Georgia, skilfully moved farther to the right, charged 
 the enemy in flank and drove them off. Gen. Ewell relinquished the attack at 
 that point, and marched his whole command to the high ground before named, 
 ordering his artillery to open fire on the enemy's batteries, which could be dis- 
 covered on the south edge of the town. After a cannonade of fifteen minutes, 
 a dense fog obscured the Valley completely and laid over the town for perhaps 
 half an hour, during which the firing ceased on both sides entirely. It was 
 about nine o'clock. After this, the fog was lifted as a curtain, displaying every- 
 thing, houses and the enemy's troops, in full view. Then a fierce artillery fire 
 at once opened, displaying in the bright sunshine as inspiring a battle-scene as 
 was ever witnessed. . . . 
 
 Petersburg on the afternoon of May 26, resumed his march at daybreak on 
 the 27th, reached Moorefield at night, and on the 28th went to Fabius, ten 
 miles east of Moorefield, on Branch mountain. Here he halted on the 29th, 
 because, he says, of the urgent representations of his surgeon and others that 
 the men needed rest, and could not properly go on. On the 30th he moved 
 forward, and on the 31st reached Cedar creek. 
 
WINCHESTER. 129 
 
 " A lialf-hour after the fog rose, the southern yell of Taylor's brigade was 
 heard far off on the opposite heights, as they charged down on the flank of the 
 enemy's position. Gen. Jackson had ordered Taylor to pass in the rear, out of 
 view, gain the enemy's right flank and charge down on him." 
 
 Gen. Trimble now desired to move to the north end of the town and seize the 
 Martinsburg road. Gen. Ewell, after some delay, directed the movement to be 
 made, but when Gen, Trimble reached the Martinsburg road the mass of the 
 Federal troops had already passed the point, and their rapid flight soon placed 
 them out of reach of the Confederate infantry. The severity of the service 
 undergone by Jackson's troops in this expedition may be gathered from the fact, 
 stated by Gen. Trimble, that at Winchester twenty per cent, of his brigade were 
 barefooted. The abundant stores captured were a God-send to the ill-provided 
 Confederates. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 
 
 ~^ Jackson had been watehing the approach of his enemies, and con- 
 cluded, on Friday morning (30th), that it was time for him to with- 
 draw if he would pass between the converging armies of Fremont 
 and McDowell.^ Accordingly, " orders were issued for all tlie Con- 
 federate troops, except AVinder's brigade, the First Maryland regi- 
 ment, and the cavalry, to return to Winchester on the 30th. Directions 
 were given to Gen. Winder to recall the Second Virginia regiment 
 from Loudoun heights, and, so soon as it should return to its brigade, 
 to move with his command, including the cavalry, and rejoin the main 
 body of the army." ^ 
 
 While Jackson, with the main body of his forces, was thus retiu-n- 
 ing to Winchester from the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, Shields, with 
 a small body of cavalry and the advance infantry brigade of his 
 division, was already crossing the Blue Ridge, and pom'ing down 
 from the mountain-pass upon Front Royal. The Twelfth Georgia 
 regiment. Col. Conner, and a section of Rice's battery, had been left 
 by the Confederate commander to hold this post and cover the removal 
 of the very large amount of stores there captured. These last were 
 being removed as fast as Maj. John A. Harman, chief quartermaster, 
 could effect it. All the captured wagons, and those that could be 
 spared from the army, as well as all that could be hired or impr&ssed 
 in the vicinity, had been for some days engaged in taking the stores 
 from Winchester and Front Royal to the rear. Trains of wagons 
 were loading, under the direction of Capt. Cole, assistant quarter- 
 master. Thirty-seventh Virginia regiment, at the time of Shields's 
 approach. Col. Conner seems not to have been aware of the vicinity 
 of the enemy until they were almost upon him. He then hastily 
 
 A ^ On Thursday night a messenger brought him information of the movement 
 of Fremont towards Strasburg, and on the morning of the 30th he received 
 definite information of the progress of Shields and McDovrell towards Front 
 Royal, and of the condition of Banks's troops at Williamsport. 
 * Jackson's report. 
 130 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 131 
 
 abandoned the town, and with his small force fell back over the 
 Shenandoah on the road to Winchester. Capt. Cole was with 
 difficulty able to send his wagons beyond the reach of pursuit, and 
 had barely time to fire the depot and buildings containing the 
 remainder of the Federal stores. The recapture of them by Shields 
 was thus prevented. The latter officer pursued the retreating Con- 
 federates some distance on the road to Winchester, Col. Conner making 
 but a feeble resistance, and losing in the retreat six Federal prisoners 
 that were in his hands, as well as a considerable number of his own 
 men, and one piece of artillery.^ 
 
 The condition of affiiirs when Jackson reached Winchester on the 
 evening of that day (the 30th) was as follows : McDowell was in 
 possession of Front Royal, which is but twelve miles from Strasburg, 
 while Winchester is eighteen. Fremont was at Wardensville, distant 
 twenty miles from Strasburg, and had telegraphed the Federal Presi- 
 dent that he would enter the latter place by 5 p.m. on the next day.^ 
 The mass of Jackson's forces had marched twenty-five miles to reach 
 Winchester, and his rear guard, under Winder, after skirmishing with 
 the enemy at Harper's Ferry for the greater part of the day, had, 
 
 ^ A Federal account in the " Rebellion Record," vol. v., puts the number of 
 Cx>nfederates captured at 156, and so does the report of the surgeon-general in 
 the " Medical and Surgical History of the War." The latter puts the Federal 
 loss at 14. I have found no official reports of the oflBcers engaged. 
 
 It is said that when the officer in command reported to Gen. Jackson, at 
 Winchester, in the evening, and gave a rather sensational account of the re- 
 capture of Front Royal and the repulse of his own regiment, Gen. Jackson 
 looked up, and in his quick, nervous way, asked : " Colonel, how many men had 
 you killed?" "None, I am glad to say, general." " How many wounded ?" 
 " Few or none, sir." " Do you call that fighting, sir?" said Jackson, and a few 
 minutes afterwards the colonel was put under arrest. 
 
 ^ The following despatches are from Gen, Fremont's report: 
 
 "Washington, May 29. 
 " Maj.-Gen. Fremont : 
 
 "Gen. McDowell's advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, and 
 probably will be, at Front Royal by 12 noon to-morrow. His force, when up, 
 will be about 20,000. 
 
 " Please have your force at Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does 
 not lead to that point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by that time. . . . 
 
 " A. Lincoln." 
 
 " Washington, May 30, 4 p.m. 
 "Maj.-Gen. Fremont: 
 
 '' Yours saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity by 5 p.m., Saturday, has 
 been received and sent to Gen. McDowell, and he directed to act in view of it. 
 You must be up to time of your promise if possible. 
 
 " A. Lincoln." 
 
132 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 upon the reimion of the Second Virginia regiment with it, camped 
 in the vicinity of Halltown, which Ls about forty-three miles distant 
 from Strasburg. Thas, while the head of Jackson's column was still 
 eighteen miles from Strasburg, and the rear forty miles distant, the 
 head of McDowell's army was but twelve miles from the same 
 point, and Fremont's forces were but twenty miles away. The com- 
 bined forces of McDowell and Fremont were nearly triple the Con- 
 federate strength. They were hastening from o})posite directions to 
 cut off Jackson's retreat, and once at Strasburg the way would be 
 barred. From the Potomac side the combined forces of Banks and 
 Saxton amounted to fourteen thousand (14,000) men, and were ready 
 to close in on the rear of the retreating Confederates. In this perilous 
 situation the Confederate leader decided to occupy Strasburg in ad- 
 vance of his enemies, and to pass swiftly between the two principal 
 armies gathering for his destruction. It was a case in which supreme 
 audacity was the most consummate skill. 
 
 No time was to be lost if the Confederates Avere to escape from the 
 dangers that threatened them, and Jackson lost none. Orders were 
 issued for everything at Winchester to move early the next morning 
 (May 31). The two thousand three hundred (2300) Federal pris- 
 oners were first sent forward, guarded by the Twenty-first Virginia 
 regiment ; next, the long trains, including many loaded with captured 
 stores ; then followed the whole of the army except the rear guard 
 under Winder. Capt. Hotchkiss was sent with orders to Winder to 
 hasten on to Winchester and not to camp until he had made some part 
 of the distance between that place and Strasburg.^ 
 
 The march was made without molestation, and during the after- 
 noon the main body of the Confederates reached Strasbiu-g, and 
 camped there for the night. Gen. Winder, late in the day, passed 
 through Winchester to the neighborhood of Newtown, where he went 
 into camp, some parts of his command having marched thirty-five, 
 and all of it twenty-eight, miles ! 
 
 Jackson thiLS in a single day put thirty miles between himself and 
 the tardy columns of Saxton and Banks, and took position directly 
 between the two armies of Fremont and McDowell, which had been 
 sent to crash him. But the latter were moving with too great caution 
 
 * Capt. Hotchkiss says that Gen. Jackson sent him, at 10 p.m., to Winder, 
 saying : " I want you to go to Charlestown and bring up the First brigade. I 
 will stay in Winchester until you get here, if I can ; but if I cannot, and the 
 enemy gets here first, you must conduct it around through the mountains." 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 133 
 
 for their purpose towards the appointed rendezvous. Gen. Shields con- 
 sumed the day in getting the whole of his division into Front Royal, 
 and in posting it out on the various roads leading from that village. 
 He had exaggerated ideas of Jackson's strength, and was also imposed 
 upon by a report that a force under Longstreet was approaching to 
 the relief of Jackson by the Luray valley. ^\^hen Gen. McDowell, 
 therefore, who had during the day urged forward Ord's (now Rickett's) 
 division towards Front Royal, came up with Shields at nightfall, he 
 found that one of the latter's brigades had been posted with reference 
 to a force approaching from Luray, while another was at the fords of 
 the Shenandoah, a third in the direction of Strasburg, and the fourth 
 in Front Royal itself.^ Shields had not ventured, however, to push 
 out to any coasiderable distance from the latter place. He made 
 no attempt to occupy Strasburg, or to impede and harass Jackson's 
 retreat by striking the Valley turnpike, on which the latter was 
 moving. He awaited the arrival of McDowell and the remaining 
 divisions. 
 
 Fremont, on the other hand, left Wardensville on Saturday morn- 
 ing. He was to have entered Strasbm-g on that afternoon, according 
 to his despatches to Mr. Lincoln, but he stopped several miles short 
 of the town, at Cedar creek. The heavy roads, and a violent rain- 
 storm in the afternoon, may have induced him to cut short his march 
 before he reached the Confederate outposts ; but, whatever the cause, 
 the result was the loss of all opportunity to seriously hinder the 
 retreat of Jackson. 
 
 Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, had moved out, and, finding that 
 Winder was gone, advanced as far as Charlestown, but there went 
 into camp, and made no further eifort to follow. He reports his men 
 as having been "completely worn out by fatigue and exposure" 
 consequent upon the skirmishes and movements of the preceding 
 days. , 
 
 Next morning (Sunday, June 1) the clouds broke away, and a 
 bright day succeeded the rain-storm of the preceding afternoon and 
 night, — a welcome change to the weary soldiers of both armies as they 
 rose from their wet bivouac. 
 
 Jackson, during the morning, continued the movement of his 
 prisoners and all surplus trains to the rear, while he retained the 
 bulk of his force at Strasburg to keep possession of the road until 
 Winder should arrive. Finding that Fremont was preparing to force 
 
 ^ McDowell's testimony. 
 
134 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 in his cavalry outposts, under Ashby, on the Wardensville road, he 
 ordered Gen. Ewell, with his division, to support them, and sub- 
 sequently strengthened Ewell by other troops, so as to make a display 
 of force. Fremont's effort to advance was, liowever, veiy feeble. 
 Cluseret's brigade was in the front of his command, and engaged the 
 Confederate advance, but, after a spirited skirmish, the brigade was 
 withdi'awu, because of the advantageoas })osition of the Confederate 
 artillery, and Fremont took position a short distance to the rear. 
 Here he remained the greater part of the day,^ making no further 
 attack on the Confederate lines, evidently hesitating to bring down 
 
 ^-^ the whole of Jackson's force on himself, while uncertain that 
 McDowell was within supporting distance. 
 _. Meantime, Jackson's rapid movements seem to have completely 
 
 -^ bewildered McDowell and Shields. The former gives the following 
 account of the day's operations : " The next morning (June 1)1 en- 
 deavored to get in the division of Gen. Ord, then Gen. Rickett's 
 division. They were wet, had no tents, and were very much exposed, 
 but they got along the best way they could. They kept coming in 
 in driblets, sometimes in considerable bodies. We heard firing, and 
 that animated them somcAvhat, and they began to come in pretty fast. 
 The firins: seemed to be in the direction of Winchester. I saw Gen. 
 Shields, and it was arranged that he should take the road at once with 
 his division, as he knew the country and we did not. He said if he 
 could only get his troops in from the diiferent places where they had 
 been posted, he could accomplish the movement. I told him that he 
 could give orders that they should take up their march, and I would 
 see that those positions they then occupied were cared for. He was 
 to go on the direct road to Strasburg, and not cross the North Fork 
 of the Shenandoah until near Strasburg, and that if he should inter- 
 pose between Jackson's advance, Ord's division should tlirow itself 
 upon his flank. 
 
 "After some time in getting Ord's, or rather Rickett's, division 
 together, I started out to the front. I met one of Gen. Shields's 
 aides-de-camp coming in from (to?) Front Royal, and asked him how 
 far out he had met Gen. Shields. He said he had not met him at 
 all. I told him he had started to go out, and he said he nuist have lost 
 his way. Without stopping to see what had become of him, I took 
 Bayard's cavalry brigade, the only one ready to move, and sent it 
 
 1 On the water-shed between Cedar creek and the Shenandoah, about three 
 miles from Strasburg. 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 135 
 
 forward by the direct road to Strasburg.^ I then went to see where 
 Gen. Shields was, and found him over on the road towards Win- 
 chester. He had sent his troops on that road, instead of on the one 
 I had ordered him to send them on. He said that he had received 
 information from his aide-de-camp that Jackson had fallen back, and 
 he had sent his troops this way. When I got up there they were 
 coming in. 
 
 " Well, it was too late to get ahead of Jackson then. The only 
 way then was this : I expected Gen. Fremont would be coming into 
 Strasburg, and to come in from the south, instead of the north. But 
 we heard the firing in another direction, showing that the force was 
 not coming the way we expected. So Gen. Shields went oif with my 
 consent to Luray, as giving the only chance to effect anything. He 
 knew the country, the roads, bridges, etc., better than I did, and I 
 sent forward this cavalry brigade of Bayard's to hang upon the rear 
 of the enemy." ^ 
 
 Thus Shields's division was sent forward first on the Strasburg 
 road;^ then had its line of march changed, under information entirely ■ 
 worthless, to the Winchester road ; * and lastly, in despair of over- 
 hauling Jackson by moving directly on his line of retreat, it was 
 moved over to the Lm-ay road. The day was thus wasted, and 
 Shields was finally sent in pursuit by a longer and rougher route, 
 with the sanguine expectation of " heading oif" Jackson, who had 
 gained a day's start, and was moving by the shorter and better road. 
 
 Winder reached Strasburg about noon. Jackson in the afternoon 
 withdi'ew the troops that had been holding Fremont in check, and his 
 whole force, now reunited, continued to retreat in the direction of 
 Harrisonbm'g. The rear of the Confederates was covered by the 
 cavalry. The latter camped some four miles south of Strasburg, 
 while Jackson, with the mass of his army, rested for the night at 
 Woodstock. 
 
 ^ Lieut. Boswell, of Gen. Jackson's staflf, scouting with five men, found the 
 Federal cavalry on the road from Strasburg to Front Royal. Jackson sent some 
 cavalry to stop their advance, but no serious efiFort was made to force a way. 
 
 ^ Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, Part I. p. 265. 
 
 ^ Saturday having been lost, Shields could not have reached Strasburg in time 
 to " intercept" any portion of Jackson's command, as Winder was only nine or 
 ten miles from that place on Sunday morning with the Confederate rear guard, 
 while Shields was twelve miles off, with a hilly country road to move on and a 
 river to cross. 
 
 * The roads to Strasburg and Winchester from Front Royal are the same for 
 two miles out from the latter village, and separate in the fork of the rivers. 
 
136 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 On Friday morning Jackson was in front of Harper's Ferry, which 
 place is fifty miles from Strasburg; Fremont was at Moorefield, thirty- 
 eight miles from Strasbnrg, with his advance ten miles on the way to 
 the latter place ; Shields was not more than twenty miles from Stras- 
 burg, for his advance entered Front Royal, which is but twelve miles 
 distant, before mid-day on Friday ; while McDowell w^as following 
 with two divisions Avithin supporting distance. Yet by Sunday night 
 Jackson had marched a distance of between fifty and sixty miles, 
 though encumbered with prisoners and captured stores, had reached 
 Strasburg before either of his adversaries, and had passed safely between 
 their armies, while he held Fremont at bay by a show of force, and 
 blinded and bewildered McDo^vell by the rapidity of hLs movements. 
 
 As the Confederates withdrew from Strasburg, Cluseret's brigade, 
 of Fremont's forces, followed them and occupied the town. A force, 
 sent forward to reconnoitre the Confederates, came up with the rear, 
 consisting of the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry regiments, 
 some four or five miles south of Strasburg. In the darkness of the 
 night a small party of Federal cavalry, being mistaken for some of 
 Ashby's men, passed the Confederate picket and produced some con- 
 fusion in the Sixth regiment. They were soon repulsed, however, 
 and thus ended the operations of the day. The main body of Fre- 
 mont's army bivouacked for the night in the position it had occupied 
 during the day. It was only next morning that this general entered 
 Strasburg with the mass of his troops, at about the same time as 
 Bayard's cavalry brigade, wdiich had been sent forward by McDowell 
 the day before. Ordering Bayard to take the advance, Fremont now 
 pressed forward in pursuit with a vigor which might have been more 
 effective if it had been manifested tw^o or three days sooner. 
 
 Simultaneously, Shields was advancing from Front Royal towards 
 Luray. McDowell turned over to this officer the further pursuit of 
 Jackson by that route, and held Ord's division for the time at Front 
 Royal. McDowell says : " Just as Gen. Shields left, he seemed to 
 be disturbed about the question of supplies. He had been in that 
 country before, and his command had suffered somewhat. He wrote 
 me a letter stating his apprehensions, saying that if troops instead of 
 supplies kept coming over, the troops would starve, and asking why 
 I should bring so many there ; that he had enough men to clear the 
 Valley out, and for God's sake not to send him any more men, but 
 to send him supplies. I wrote back to him that the road^ had been 
 
 * Manassas Gap railroad. 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 137 
 
 finished, and that there were supplies in abundance at Front Royal, 
 and he could supply himself at that place with the trains that he had, 
 and that I was willing he should follow up Jackson as far as his 
 better knowledge of the roads of that country would, in his judgment, 
 render it profitable and advisable, with the single direction that when 
 he moved he should move with his whole division together, so that the 
 different parts of it should be in supporting distance of each other." ^ 
 The fact that though McDowell's advance had entered Front Royal 
 on Friday morning, it had not appeared near Strasburg as late as 
 Simday afternoon, caused Jackson to suspect the movement by the 
 Luray valley.^ The graded road up this valley runs on the east side 
 of the main or South Fork of the Shenandoah, a river in ordinary 
 stages fordable at but few points, and now swollen so as to be impass- 
 able except at the bridges. It was now crossed by but three bridges 
 in the whole distance of over fifty miles from Front Royal to Conrad's 
 Store, where the Luray valley merges into the great Valley by the 
 sinking of the Massanutton mountain into the general level.' One of 
 these, the most southerly, was at Conrad's Store; two were on the road 
 that leads from New Market across the Massanutton mountains. This 
 road divides at the eastern base of the Massanuttons, the one branch 
 going northeast via Luray and Thornton's gap in the Blue Ridge to 
 Culpeper, the other east by Alma and Fischer's* gap to Madison 
 Com't-HoiLse. The first of these roads crosses the Shenandoah by the 
 White-House, the other by the Columbia bridge. It was by the 
 former that Jackson had crossed, when ten days before he had moved 
 down to turn Banks's flank at Front Royal. To prevent Shields 
 from crossing at these two bridges w'as to prevent his junction with 
 Fremont, and to keep him from making any eifort to " head off" 
 Jackson short of Harrisonburg, as well as to condemn him to a march 
 of sixty miles over muddy roads to reach a point not over fifty miles 
 distant now from the Confederates, and which they were approaching 
 by a good MacAdam road. The Confederate commander despatched 
 a detachment of cavalry to burn the bridges, which was effected without 
 opposition.' 
 
 ^ McDowell's testimony, Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, Part I. 
 p. 266. 
 
 ^ See Jackson's report. Confederate Official Reports, vol. i., 1862. 
 
 ^ The Red bridge, the first one north of Conrad's Store, had been destroyed in 
 April. 
 
 * Sometimes erroneously called Milam's. The latter is farther southwest. 
 
 ^ Gen. Shields says he was ordered up the Luray valley, June 1, to fall on 
 
 10 
 
138 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 Having taken this measure to free liimself for the time from one of 
 his pursuers, Jackson fell back more leisurely before the other. On 
 Monday (June 2) he retreated to Mount Jackson. All day his rear 
 was closely followed by Fremont's advance. Ashby, who had re- 
 ceive<l his commission a.s brigadier-general at Winchester a few days 
 before, wa.s now placed in command of all the cavalry, and to him 
 was committed the duty of protecting the rear. He skirmished con- 
 stantly with the enemy, checking them whenever they advanced too 
 close. At one time the enemy, securing a favorable position for artil- 
 lery, shelled the rear guard so as to throw it into confusion. Bayard 
 threw his cavalry quickly forward to take advantage of this. Ashby 
 sees the coming charge, and the Confederate cavalry retreating in 
 confusion. He dismounts, and gathering a few stragglers of the in- 
 fantiy, who, too foot-sore and tired to keep up, are at hand, posts 
 them in a wood near the roadside, and pours a volley at close quar- 
 ters into the charging column. The column is checked and partly 
 thrown into disorder. The advance, however, keep on, and ride 
 through the rear of the nearest infantry regiment. The brigade 
 commander. Col. J. M. Patton, files another regiment to the roadside, 
 and a volley from this sends all who are not killed or wounded back 
 in confusion.^ 
 
 Jackson moved his trains over the North Fork of the Shenandoah, 
 near Mount Jackson, on the afternoon of the 2d, and on the 3d fell 
 back to New Market. Ashby again covered his rear, burning the 
 bridge over the Shenandoah as he retired, notwithstanding the enemy's 
 efforts to prevent it. Here this gallant officer had his horse killed, 
 and narrowly escaped with his life. The destruction of the bridge 
 checked Fremont's advance for a day.^ 
 
 Next day Jackson continued his retreat, and on the 5th reached 
 Harrisonburg, which he entered before mid-day. Here he changed 
 
 Jackson's flank while Fremont attacked him in rear. He continues: "About 
 5 P.M. next day my advance reached the Shenandoah at Honeyville, but found 
 the Whitchouse bridge and the Columbia bridge both burned, thus cutting off 
 all hope of attacking his flank at New Market. ... I then pushed forward the 
 advance as rapidly as possible in hope of finding the bridge at Conrad's Store 
 still standing, but that bridge was also found burned.'' (Shields's report.) 
 
 ^ Jackson's report, Dabney, p. 397. 
 
 '^ There was a tremendous rain in the afternoon. Fremont replaced the burnt 
 bridge by a pontoon, but the rapidly-rising river broke it, and thus delayed him 
 one day. On the night of the 2d, Jackson sent Capt. Ilotchkiss, with a party 
 of signal-men, to the south end of the Massanutton mountain, to keep him 
 advised of the movements of both Shields and Fremont. 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 139 
 
 his line of inarch, and leaving the Valley tnrnpike, moved in the 
 direction of Port Republic and BroA^Ti's gap. 
 
 When he retired before Banks, six weeks before, he had gone to 
 Elk Run valley, at the foot of Swift Run gap. His special object in 
 selecting that route had been that it placed him most readily in com- 
 munication with Ewell at Madison Court-House. 
 
 Now in retiring towards Port Republic Jackson secured a better 
 and shorter route to the Virginia Central railroad, if it should become 
 necessary to lea^^e the Valley, while the configuration of the moun- 
 tains at Brown's gap gave him an almost impregnable position, 
 should he desire to hold it.^ At Port Republic there was no danger 
 that Fremont would attempt to pass him towards Staunton. 
 
 To leave Harrisonburg, however, by this route was to leave open 
 a means of communication between Fremont and Shields over the 
 road Jackson had himself formerly used from Harrisonburg to 
 Conrad's Store. His first care was to prevent a union of these forces 
 by this means in his front. The only bridge over the Shenandoah 
 between Port Republic and those he had destroyed was at Conrad's 
 Store. A detachment of cavalry was sent to destroy it. Shields had 
 not yet advanced to this point, but had sent some cavalry to learn the 
 condition of the bridge and to guard it. While this party was absent 
 on a scout after some stores reported to be in the hands of a small 
 Confederate guard a few miles off, the cavalry sent by Jackson reached 
 the place and burnt the bridge. Jackson now held the only ready 
 means of communication between his enemies, — the bridge at Port 
 Republic. By destroying the other bridges he had placed a very 
 troublesome barrier between his two pursuers, and now he occupied 
 the point where their two routes converged. No farther to the rear 
 would the Shenandoah serve as a barrier to their junction, for south 
 of Port Republic its head-waters are easily fordable. 
 
 On the 5th, Jackson sent the sick and wounded to Staunton, cross- 
 ing them over North river at Mount Crawford by means of a ferry. 
 The bridge at this place had been destroyed when Banks advanced 
 
 ^ " Two arms of the mountain, lofty and rugged as the mother-ridge, project 
 from it on the right and left hand, embracing a deep vale of many miles' circuit, 
 watered by a copious mountain stream ; and while the mighty rim of this cup is 
 everywhere impracticable for artillery and cavalry, the narrow gorge through 
 which the road enters it from the west affords scarcely room to set a regiment 
 in battle ai-ray between the two promontories of the mountain. Here was ob- 
 viously the place for a small army to stand at bay against superior numbers." 
 (Dabney, p. 403.) 
 
140 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-G2. 
 
 some weeks before, and the river was now so much swollen as to 
 make fording and even ferrying apparently impossible. But Jackson 
 would not be balked by this difficulty. From midnight of the 4th 
 he continued to send officers and messengers to hurry forward the 
 preparations. Early in the day on the 5th, Capt. C. R. Mason, in 
 charge of pioneers, succeeded, after much labor and some risk, in 
 constructing a ferry which carried over the ambulances and sick, and 
 thus saved them the long and muddy detour by Port Republic. By 
 means of the signal station established by Capt. Hotchkiss a day or 
 two before on the end of the Massauutton chain, Jackson kept himself 
 informed of the movements of Shields. He continued to occupy 
 Harrisonburg with his rear guard until Fremont's advance once more 
 came up. This was about mid-day on the 6tli. Ashby allowed the 
 enemy to occupy Harrisonburg without opposition, and retired to 
 a position about two miles south, on the Port Republic road. Here 
 he was attacked an hour later by a body of Fremont's cavalry under 
 Col. Sir Percy Wyudham.^ This cavalry fight is vividly described 
 by a Federal officer engaged in it, in a letter to the " New York Tri- 
 bune," dated Fremont's headquarters, June 7. He says: "When all 
 the cavalry had come up, a force consisting of the First New Jersey, 
 First Pennsylvania, two companies of the Fourth New York, and two 
 companies of Connecticut cavalry, in all about eight hundred (800), 
 under command of Col. Wyudham, of the First New Jersey regiment, 
 was ordered forward by Gen. Fremont to take possession of the town 
 and reconnoitre a short distance beyond. Before this column moved, 
 a report was brought by a scout that there were three hundred rebel 
 cavalry within a mile of the town, who were prevented from retreat- 
 ing by the destruction of a bridge a short distance in advance, and 
 that they were rapidly rebuilding the bridge, and would be able to 
 advance in an hour. This information was communicated to Col. 
 Wyndham.^ 
 
 " About half-past one o'clock Col. Wyndham moved his force, and 
 went through the long main street of the town at a rapid trot. Ar- 
 riving on the other side, the column turned to the left and advanced 
 through two or three fields to the summit of a hill overlooking an 
 open valley, from which rose another hill beyond, covered with 
 woods. No enemy was in sight. The cavalry were halted, and 
 
 ^ This was an English officer who had taken service in the Federal cause, and 
 was now commander of the First New Jersey cavalry. 
 ^ This information was unreliable. 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 141 
 
 skirmishers sent ahead and on the flanks. They were gone some 
 time, and returned with no satisfactory report. Nevertheless, Col. 
 Wyndham, though he had reached the point beyond which he was 
 ordered not to piLsh his reconnoissance, decided to advance. With 
 full knowledge that the enemy was somewhere in front of him, whom 
 he might have to charge at any moment, he nevertheless hurried on 
 his tired horses, advancing for more than two ^ miles at an unbroken 
 trot. The enemy's cavalry were suddenly discovered in front, drawn 
 up, as usual, across the road, and extending into the woods on either 
 side. It was impossible to determine their force, and there was no 
 support within three or four miles. But Col. Wyndham determined 
 to attack, and, without any attempt to discover by skirmishing the 
 strength or position of his enemy, or whether any infantry were 
 opposed to him, ordered a charge, and rashly led his o\vn regiment, 
 the Fu'st New Jersey cavalry, straight up the hill. 
 
 " On the left of the road was nothing but woods. On the right, 
 for some distance before the rebel line was reached, was a field of 
 w^heat. In this field was concealed a strong body, not less than a 
 regiment, of rebel infantry.^ They w^ere not completely screened 
 from view by the tall grain, but were visible at least to the officers 
 and men of the second squadron. Utterly unsuspicious of such a 
 force on his flank. Col. Wyndham charged with speed up the hill. 
 When the first squadron was fairly within the line of flanking fire 
 the rebels poured in a volley, which, coming so close at hand and on 
 the flank, threw the whole squadron into confusion. Col. Wynd- 
 ham's horse was shot under him, and he was taken prisoner. Capt. 
 Shellmere, Company A, bravely striving to rally his men, was killed 
 by a rifle-shot. All the officers bravely but vainly endeavored to 
 rally their men, and after one or two feeble effi)rts to hold their 
 ground the first battalion was driven down the hill. Capt. Janeway, 
 Company L, who was leading the second squadron, perceiving as he 
 advanced up the hill that the wheat-field covered a force of infantry, 
 as soon as the first squadron was thrown into disorder by the unex- 
 pected fire on the flank, endeavored to lead his men through the 
 woods on the left of the road, in order both to shelter them from the 
 infantry fire and to flank the cavalry on the hill. This movement 
 was skilfully planned, but before it could be wholly executed part of 
 
 ^ Really one mile. 
 
 ^ A mistake. The troops referred to were some of Ashby's dismounted 
 cavalry. 
 
142 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 the squadron \va.s thrown into confusion by tlic retreat of the advance, 
 which came down the liill in disorderly flight, and nothing wa.s left 
 but to retire. . . . The regiment lost thirty-six killed and wounded." ^ 
 
 Besides Col. Wyndham, sixty-three of his men were taken pris- 
 oners.^ The Confederate loss was Maj. Green, of the Sixth Virginia 
 cavalry, severely wounded.^ 
 
 Gen. Ewell, whose division was nearest Ashby, now coming on the 
 field, the latter asked for an infantry support, anticipating confidently 
 a renewal of the attack in stronger force. Gen. Ewell sent him the 
 First INIaryland regiment. Col. B. T. Johnson, and the Fifty-eighth 
 Virginia, Col. Letcher. 
 
 " As soon as news of the repulse of Wyndham's attack was received 
 at Fremont's headquarters, Gen. Bayard with the Bucktail rifles, four 
 companies, and the First Pennsylvania cavalry, and Col. CliLseret 
 with his brigade, comprising the Sixtieth Ohio and Eighth Virginia 
 (Federal) infantry, were ordered forward to hold the farther end of 
 the town and the approaches on that side." * When this force reached 
 the vicinity of the Confederates, Col. Cluseret with one regiment ad- 
 vanced on the left, while Kane's Bucktails, supported by the Eighth 
 Virginia, moved forward on the right. 
 
 Maj. Dabney, Gen. Jackson's chief of staff, thus describes the 
 combat that followed : " Ashby disposed the Marylandei-s in the 
 woods so as to take the Federal advance in flank while he met them 
 in front at the head of the Fifty-eiglith. Indicating to Gen. Ewell 
 the dispositions of the enemy, which he had exactly anticipated, and 
 his own arrangements to meet them, he seemed to the spectators to be 
 instinct with unwonted animation and genius. At this moment the 
 enemy's infantry advanced, and a fierce combat began. They, ap- 
 proaching through the open fields, had reached a heavy fence of tim- 
 ber, whence under the partial cover they poured destructive volleys 
 into the ranks of the Fifty-eighth Virginia regiment. Ashby seeing 
 at a glance their disadvantage, galloped to the front and ordered them 
 to charge and drive the Federals from their vantage-ground. At 
 this moment his horse fell, but extricating himself from the dying 
 animal, and leaping to his feet, he saw his men wavering. He shouted, 
 * Charge, men ! for God's sake charge !' and waved his sword, when a 
 bullet pierced him full in the breast and he fell dead. The regiment 
 took up the command of their dying general and rushed upon the 
 
 ^ "Rebellion Record," vol. v. p. 185. * Jackson's report. 
 
 * Col. Munford's report. * " New York Tribune." Letter above quoted. 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 143 
 
 enemy, while the Mary landers dashed upon their flank. Thus pressed, 
 the Federals gave way; the Confederates occupied the fence, and 
 poured successive volleys into the fleeing mass until they passed out 
 of musket range." ^ 
 
 While this was going on, the Federal left had driven in the Confed- 
 erate skirmishers, over ground that had been recently occupied as a 
 camp, but without loss to either side; and the defeat of the Federal 
 right involved the retreat of the whole. In this attack the Bucktails, 
 on whom fell the greatest part of the loss, left their commander, Lieut.- 
 Col. Kane, a prisoner, and had fifty-five (55) killed, wounded, and 
 missing out of the one hundred and twenty-five (125) carried into 
 the battle.^ The Confederate loss, besides Gen. Ashby, was seventeen 
 (17) killed, fifty (50) wounded, and three (3) missing.^ When the 
 dead and wounded, as far as possible, had been cared for, the Con- 
 federate rear guard followed the army towards Port Republic. 
 
 The interest attaching to this fight between Jackson's rear guard 
 and Fremont's advance does not grow mainly out of the engagement 
 itself, which was comparatively unimportant, but out of the fact that 
 it was the occasion of the fall of Gen. Turner Ashby.* This gallant 
 soldier had led the life of a Virginia country gentleman on his prop- 
 erty in Fauquier county, Virginia, until the outbreak of the war. 
 He at once took up arms, and entered the service at the head of a 
 company of horsemen (known as the Mountain Rangers) composed 
 of his friends and neighbors. He soon became pre-eminent for dash 
 and courage. Nor for these alone. In him the qualities that most 
 excite admiration in a soldier were happily united to those that most 
 excite enthusiastic aflection and devotion. Insensible to danger, or 
 oblivious of it, the more daring an enterprise the greater was its at- 
 tractiveness for him. Of great energy and ceaseless activity, he was 
 ever on the alert, and his name had become a dreaded one by the foe. 
 With such qualities were united the utmost generosity and unselfish- 
 ness, a delicacy of sentiment and feeling equal to a woman's, and a 
 respect for the rights of others which permitted, within the limits of 
 his authority, no outrage on friend or foe. Says Jackson in his official 
 report : " An official report is not an appropriate place for more than 
 a passing notice of the distinguished dead ; but the close relation 
 which Gen. Ashby bore to my command for most of the previous 
 
 ^ Dabney's Life of Jackson, pp. 399, 400. 
 
 ^ Letter in "New York Tribune," 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
 * Ashby was killed on the farm of Mr. Joseph Good. 
 
144 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGL-62. 
 
 twelve months, will justify nic in sayinj^ that as a jiartisan officer I 
 never knew his superior. His daring wa.s proverbial, his powers of 
 endurance almost incredible, his tone of character heroic, and his 
 saga<!ity almost intuitive in divining the purposes and movements of 
 the enemy." 
 
 The remains of Ashby were removed to Port Republic and pre- 
 pared for burial.^ His home in Fauquier county being within the 
 Federal lines, it was resolved to bury him at the State University at 
 Charlottesville, Virginia. On Saturday the corpse was sent under 
 military escort to AVaynesboro', whence it was carried by railroad to 
 the University. The day was one of the most beautiful that can be 
 conceived. Summer covered with glory the mountains and valleys 
 of this beautiful region. The bright green fields and darker wood- 
 lands, the rolling hills, intersected everywhere by the valleys of the 
 streams, the bold mountains towering above the Shenandoah and 
 showing in the distance the softest and most delicate of outlines against 
 the June sky, presented a picture to charm the dullest imagination. 
 The storm of battle, even, seemed to have ceased out of respect for 
 the dead. No gun was to be heard in the distance. Both armies 
 were resting, taking breath, as it were, for the morrow's struggle. 
 Along the base of the mountains, up the valley of South river, winds 
 the road to Waynesboro'. Slowly and sadly the funeral cortege passed 
 on its way. An escort of the brave comrades of Ashby, with bowed 
 heads and sad mien, their arms reversed, accompanied the hearse. 
 Behind it came the chieftain's horse and trappings, led by his negro 
 servant, whose grief was more demonstrative. His personal staff 
 next followed. The whole, as it wound along the quiet country road 
 in the broad sunlight, seemed to recall some rite of ancient chivalry ; 
 and surely no nobler, braver, truer knight was ever borne by more 
 devoted hearts to a glorious tomb. 
 
 The infantry of Jackson's army enjoyed a sorely-needed rest on 
 the 6th and 7th. In the twenty-four days that had intervened be- 
 tween the time that Jackson had withdrawn from Fremont's front at 
 Franklin and his arrival at Port Republic his army had marched 
 three hundred miles, besides driving Banks over the Potomac. Lying 
 
 ^ "After all the sad rites -were completed Gen. Jackson came to the room 
 where he lay and demanded to see him. They admitted him alone. He re- 
 mained for a time in silent communion with the dead, and then left him with a 
 solemn and elevated countenance. It requires little use of the imagination to 
 suppose that his thoughts were in part prophetic of a similar scene when his 
 corpse was to receive the homage of all the good and brave." (Dabney, p. 401.) 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 145 
 
 on the north side of the Shenandoah, along Mill creek, a few miles 
 in front of Port Republic, these exhausted and march-worn men 
 refreshed themselves, and at the end of two days were as ready as ever 
 for battle. 
 
 Meantime, Jackson, having prevented the junction of his two oppo- 
 nents by burning the bridges across the South Fork of the Shenan- 
 doah, below Port Republic, was preparing to take advantage of their 
 enforced separation. He adapted his strategy to the character of the 
 country and the rivers. About four miles southwest of Port Repub- 
 lic the North and Middle rivers, the principal tributaries that go to 
 form the Main or South Fork of the Shenandoah, unite, and flow 
 thence in a northeast direction to this village. At this place the third 
 tributary, South river, coming from the southwest along the base of 
 the Blue Ridge, joins the stream. It is smaller than either of the 
 other two, and is fordable. Port Republic lies in the angle formed 
 by South river and the main stream. (Map No. VII.) The bridge over 
 North river, on the Valley turnpike, was destroyed, and that river 
 was past fording in its swollen state. Just above the junction of the 
 main stream with South river was the bridge, now held by Jackson, 
 which carried the road from Harrisonburg to Brown's gap into Port 
 Republic. The latter village is but twelve miles from Harrisonburg, 
 and the intervening country is high and rolling. This country ter- 
 minates along the river in an abrupt, bluif-like terrace, which con- 
 tinues for some miles below. This bluff completely commands the 
 bridge, the village, and the eastern bank below the village. For 
 many miles the country on the eastern side consists of a plain from 
 one to two miles broad, sloping in successive terraces from the foot of 
 the Blue Ridge to the river's brink. Beyond this a densely-wooded 
 tract ascends gradually to the mountain-side. The low grounds were 
 covered with cultivated fields or meadows. Through them, and for 
 the most part not over half a mile from the river, runs the road to 
 Conrad's Store and Luray, — the road Jackson had himself used when 
 on the 30th of April he had left his camp in Elk Run valley for 
 Port Republic, and the road by which Shields must now approach. 
 The road from Harrisonburg, after crossing the bridge into Port Re- 
 public, divides, and while one branch leads to Staunton, the other, 
 crossing the South river by afford, leads through the wooded plain on 
 the east side to Brown's gap, five miles distant.^ (Map No. VII.) 
 
 ' The road leads up Madison run, a stream so named from the ancestors of 
 President and of Bishop Madison. 
 
146 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSOl-62. 
 
 Frcmout was C(jual to Jackson in force, Shields was inferior.^ 
 Together they largely outnumbered him. Jackson determined to 
 retreat no farther, but to fight them in detail, while sej)arated. To 
 retire towards Brown's gap was to allow his enemies to unite. To 
 concentrate on the east side at once agaiast Shields as the weaker, and 
 burn the bridge to keep Fremont back, was to run the risk of having 
 the battle-field in the plain on the eastern side commanded by Fre- 
 mont's guns, which would then crown the heights on the left bank. 
 While it might not thus entirely paralyze Fremont in the struggle with 
 Shields, it would certainly prevent Jackson from returning in case of 
 success to attack Fremont. The Confederate commander, therefore, 
 took the other plan remaining to him, and, having sent oif hLs 
 prisoners to the railroad at Waynesboro' and removed his trains to 
 Port Republic, placed his army in position on the north side of the 
 river; Gen. Ewell's division^ at Cross Keys, half-way on the road to 
 
 ^ Fremont's return for May 30 gives the " present for duty" of Schenck's, Mil- 
 roy's, Cluseret's, and Blenker's commands as 14,672. Yet Gen. Fremont, with- 
 out explaining this "stuliborn fact," says that on the 29th of May he had 
 " something over 11,000" effectives (official report written long after), and esti- 
 mates this force as 10,500 on June 8. Adding Bayard's cavalry, which he says 
 numbered 800, and Kane's Bucktails (about 125 or 150), his effective strength 
 by this estimate was about 11,500 at Cross Keys. 
 
 Shields's division numbered 10,000 effectives May 17. See McDowell's re- 
 turn. McDowell did not send Ord's or King's divisions farther than Front 
 Royal, so that Shields had but one-third of the force that had been sent from 
 Fredericksburg against Jackson. 
 
 Jackson had moved against Banks, on May 19, with a total effective force of 
 16,000 or 17,000 men, and since that time his troops had been subjected to a 
 series of forced marches far exceeding anything endured by those of Shields 
 or Fremont, and which had diminished his strength in a much greater degree 
 than battle. His effective force could not have exceeded 13,000, even if it reached 
 that amount, as is apparent from the strength of the commands reported. 
 Thus Ewell says the three brigades of Trimble, Elzey, and Steuart numbered less 
 than 5000 on June 8, at Cross Keys. Winder reports his brigade as 1313 rank 
 and file, and adding officers it did not exceed 1450. Patton's (CampbelPs) bri- 
 gade had about 800 men present (the Twenty-first Virginia having gone off as 
 an escort to prisoners). There were besides these but Taylor" s (the strongest 
 in the army) and Taliaferro's. Putting Taylor's four and one-half regiments at 
 2500 effectives and Taliaferro's three regiments at 1200, we have a total infontry 
 force of about 11,000. Add 1000 for cavalry and 500 or 600 for artillery, and 
 we see that Jackson's strength for battle was short of 13,000. The only addi- 
 tion made to Jackson's force between 23d May and 8th June was Carrington's 
 battery (four guns). 
 
 * Ed. Johnson's brigade had been incorporated into Ewell's division, the 
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CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 147 
 
 Harrisonburg, and Gen. Winder's^ division on the heights above the 
 bridge along the river. Here artillery was at hand to command the 
 town and bridge and plain by which Shields must approach. Fre- 
 mont was well closed up, and his vigorous pursuit of the last few 
 days indicated a prompt attack without waiting for the co-operation 
 of Shields. The latter was not so well up as Fremont, but his ad- 
 vance under Col. Carroll came within six miles of Port Republic on 
 Saturday evening, June 7. 
 
 Jackson thus took a position where he might receive the attack of 
 Fremont, while it was in the power of a small part of his force to 
 hold Shields in check. His position, if the latter attempted to attack 
 in aid of Fremont, was impregnable. Gen. Tyler thought it " one to 
 defy an army of fifty thousand (50,000) men." ^ Defeat by Fremont 
 would have rendered Jackson's condition precarious, but this contin- 
 gency he did not anticipate. 
 
 His sagacity was made manifest, and his strategy approved by 
 the movements of his adversaries. Fremont had failed to seize the 
 Confederate line of retreat at Strasburg when it was possible, and 
 had permitted Jackson, encumbered with prisoners and captures, to 
 pass by him unmolested. His pursuit of the retreating Confederates 
 had emboldened him, and now, having followed them over fifty miles 
 farther, he was ready to attack, in a chosen position, the army he had 
 hesitated to fight when hampered by its trains and captures. Then 
 ]\IcDowell was within reach to aid, now an impassable river prevented 
 all co-operation. Shields, on the other hand, condemned by the burn- 
 ing of the bridges to make his toilsome way along the muddy roads 
 of the Luray valley, had halted at Columbia, and sent forward his 
 advance brigades to harass Jackson's flank, with orders to go as far 
 as Waynesboro' and break the railroad. The movements of Carroll's 
 brigade are thus described by a northern writer : ^ 
 
 " On the 4th instant, while at Conrad's Store, Col. Carroll received 
 orders to go forward at once, with cavalry and guns, to save the bridge 
 at Port Republic. At that time it was impossible for him to move. 
 The heaAy rains which had prevailed for some days had so swollen 
 the streams that Col. Carroll was entirely separated from his com- 
 mand, having with him only his staff, fifteen cavalry, and two 
 
 to Elzey's brigade, and the Fifty-second, Fifty-eighth, and Forty-fourth Virginia 
 to Gen. George II. Steuart, commanding the Maryland line. 
 
 ^ Winder now commanded Jackson's old division as senior brigadier. 
 
 ^ Tyler's report. 
 
 * "National Intelligencer." See "Rebellion Record," vol. v. p. 113. 
 
148 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 pieces of artillery. His infantry was five miles in his rear, and com- 
 pelled to remain there, by the impassable creeks, between two and 
 three days. 
 
 " On Saturday, the 7th, Col. Carroll received orders to move for- 
 ward to AVaynesboro', distant some thirty-five or thirty-seven miles, 
 by the way of Port Republic, for the purpose of destroying the rail- 
 road depot, track, bridge, etc., at that place, and to seize Jackson's 
 train and throw his force upon Jackson's flank. Col. Carroll marched, 
 in obedience to these orders, on Saturday afternoon. His infantry, 
 cavalry, and artillery had in the mean time come up, and he started 
 from Connul's Store with less than a thousand of the former, with 
 one hundred and fifty cavalry, and with a single battery of six guns. 
 
 "Halting in the night, six miles before reaching Port Republic, Col. 
 Carroll sent forward a party of scouts, who returned with the infor- 
 tion that Jackson's train was parked near Port Republic, with a drove 
 of beef cattle herded near by, and the whole guarded by about two or 
 three hundred cavalry." 
 
 On the same day (7th) Gen. Tyler, with his brigade, was ordered 
 forward from Columbia bridge to co-operate with Carroll. He 
 reached the neighborhood of Port Republic at 2 p.m. on the 8th. 
 
 Jackson had placed his headquarters on the southwestern outskirts 
 of the village,' and his trains had been parked in the adjoining fields. 
 Carrington's battery, which had just joined his command, was also 
 camped here ; but with this exception, and that of a few troopei's and 
 train-guards, there was no force on the Port Republic side of the 
 river. Two companies of cavalry had been sent across South river 
 in the direction from which Gen. Shields must approach, the oue to 
 reconnoitre and the other to do picket duty. The mass of Shields's 
 forces were known to be miles away, and the cavalry scouts were 
 expected to give timely warning of his approach. 
 
 Smiday morning, June 8, was bright with all the glory of summer 
 in the Valley of the Shenandoah. Quiet reigned throughout the 
 Confederate camp, and men and animals alike seemed to enjoy the 
 rest which for a day or two had succeeded to the excessive toils and 
 marches of the campaign. Jackson was just mounting his horse to 
 ride to the front when a bold and unexpected dash by Col. Carroll 
 opened the fight at Port Republic itself, and for a few moments 
 threatened serious damage. 
 
 ^ Jackson's headquarters at Mr. Kemper's were near the site of an old fort 
 (built as a protection against Indians in early times), and the first clerk's office 
 of Augusta county. 
 
CROSS KEYS AND FORT REPUBLIC. 149 
 
 Col. Carroll, having learned the evening before, through renegades 
 familiar with the country, the location of Jackson's trains and the 
 sniallness of the guard, pushed on early in the morning. Confirm- 
 ing his previous information by a new reconnoissance when within 
 two miles of the town, he dashed forward with his cavalry and two 
 pieces of artillery, leaving the remainder of his command to follow. 
 The Confederate cavalry pickets are quickly driven in and their sup- 
 ports put to flight. Carroll dashes on without halting, and reaches 
 the bank of South river, opposite the village, almost as soon as the 
 flying Confederates. Jackson, informed of the attack, and followed 
 by his staff*, rides rapidly through the town towards the bridge and 
 the troops stationed a few hundred yards from it on the north-side 
 hills. Carroll stopping but a moment at the South river, boldly 
 crosses it, and rides into the middle of the town so quickly as to in- 
 tercept the two hindmost of Jackson's staff" and make them prisoners.^ 
 One piece of artillery he promptly places at the south end of the 
 bridge so as to command the approaches to it from the north side, the 
 other he prepares to use in attacking the train lying jiLst outside the 
 town to the southwest, and towards which he moves. His unexpected 
 approach has thrown teamsters and camp-followers into great confu- 
 sion. The trains are moving out from their park and taking the Staun- 
 ton road, A few minutes more of unimpeded advance and the Federal 
 cavalry would have produced a general stampede of the trains. But 
 this was not to be. A small company of disabled soldiers acted as 
 guard at headquarters. Some fifteen or twenty of them are at hand, 
 and are quickly placed at the angle where the road emerges from the 
 village into the fields containing the trains. A piece of Carrington's 
 battery is brought a few yards and placed so as to rake the main 
 street of the village. Some of the Federal troopers reach the angle 
 of the road, and a volley from the guard checks them. Before they 
 have time to recover a charge from Carrington's gun is poured into 
 the rear of the column along the main street. The movement is 
 checked ; the Federal cavalry seek the middle of the village. Mean- 
 time, Jackson has reached the troops nearest the bridge on the north 
 side. Three batteries are instantly ordered to the brow of the terrace 
 overlooking the river. Taliaferro's brigade, of Winder's division, is 
 
 ^ Col. Crutchfield and Lieut. Willis. Crutchfield was left in the town as the 
 Federals retreated. Willis was carried over the river and placed in care of a 
 soldier, whom he captured in turn a few hours later and brought back with 
 him. 
 
150 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 the nearest infantry ; Gen. Taliaferro has them drawn up for inspection. 
 Ordering them forward, Jackson places himself at the head of the 
 leading regiment (Thirty-seventh Virginia, Col. Fulkerson) and the 
 first of Poague's guns that is rea<ly, and rushes at a doublc-(|uick 
 towards the bridge. Poague is directed to engage with his piece the 
 enemy's gun near the south end of the bridge. To avoid the line of 
 artillery fire the Thirty-seventh regiment is directed to the north side 
 of the road, and descends obliquely against the upper side of the 
 bridge. At the word from Jackson, Poague fires a charge Avhich 
 disconcerts the enemy, then follows a volley from the infantry and 
 an immediate charge with the bayonet.^ In a moment the Federal 
 gunners are down, their gun is captured, and the bridge is again in 
 Jackson's possession. The Confederates have lost two men wouuded, 
 and the Federals their chance of destroying the bridge. Carroll, 
 seeing himself attacked from both ends of the village, rides out of it 
 as rapidly as he had entered it. He re-fords South river, abandons 
 
 ' A pretty story has been often told about the recapture of this bridge, in 
 ■which Jackson, cut off from his troops, and on the Port Republic side, is made 
 to ride up to the Federal artillery officer and order his gun forward. For a 
 moment the officer is deceived, and prepares to obey, while Jackson, taking 
 advantage of the confusion, spurs his horse forward and crosses the bridge 
 unharmed by the shots fired after him. The foundation for this story is thus 
 given by Col. (then Capt.) W. T. Poague, in a letter dated February 25, 1879: 
 " I recollect v^'ell the incident you ask about. Gen. Jackson finding one of my 
 guns ready to move, directed me to hasten with it towards Port Republic, he 
 himself going along and posting it in the field overlooking and commanding the 
 bridge. I was surprised to see a gun posted at the farther end of the bridge. 
 For I had just come from army headquarters, and, although I had met a cavalry- 
 man who toid me the enemy were advancing up the river, still I did not think 
 it possible they could have gotten any guns into the place in so short a time. It 
 thereupon occurred to me that the gun at the bridge might be one of Carring- 
 ton's, who was on that side and whose men had new uniforms something like 
 those we saw at the bridge. Upon suggesting this to the general, he reflected a 
 moment, and then riding a few paces to the left and front of our piece, he called, 
 in a tone loud enough to be heard by them, ' Bring that gun up hero ;' but 
 getting no reply, he raised himself in his stirrups and in a most authoritative 
 and seemingly angry tone he shouted, ' Bring that gun up here, I say !' At 
 this they began to move the trail of the gun so as to bring it to bear on us, 
 which when the general perceived, he quickly turned to the officer in charge of 
 my gun and said, in his sharp, quick way, ' Let 'em have it.' The words had 
 scarcely left his lips when Lieut. BroAvn, who had his piece charged and aimed, 
 sent a shot right among them, so disconcerting them that theirs in reply went 
 far above us, and in a few minutes, seeing our infantry approaching, they left 
 the place, and, as I was informed, abandoned their gun before crossing South 
 river." 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 151 
 
 another piece of artillery to the Confederates, and soon meets his 
 infantry advancing to his support/ But the Confederate batteries 
 (Wooding's, Poague's, Carpenter's) are now in position on the bluff 
 on the north side, and they rain fire so on all the approaches to the 
 town and bridge from the south and east side that any further attempt 
 is futile, and Carroll's whole force is obliged to retreat. To avoid 
 the galling fire they move out some distance towards the mountain 
 before turning down the river. As Carroll moves towards LewLston ^ 
 the Confederate batteries follow, on the bluff, and continue to shell 
 him until he is entirely out of range, some two and a half miles below. 
 The whole affair has only occupied about an hour, and quiet once 
 more replaces the noise of battle. To provide against any repetition 
 of this attack, Jackson now stations Taliaferro's brigade in the village 
 to hold the fords of South river, and places the " Stonewall" brigade 
 on the north side of the main river, opposite Lewiston, to observe the 
 enemy and impede by artillery any renewed advance. The remainder 
 of Winder's division is held in reserve to assist Ewell if need be.^ 
 
 While these arrangements are being made the battle opens along 
 Ewell's front. On Saturday evening Fremont had made a recon- 
 noissance, and having found the Confederates in force near Cross 
 Keys, gave orders for a general advance the next morning.* Gen. 
 
 ^ Col. Carroll reports his loss on this occasion as 40 men, 2 guns and limbers, 
 and 14 horses. 
 
 ^ The country-seat of the Lewis family. 
 
 ^ It was about the time of Carroll's repulse that Shields was despatching 
 
 Fremont as follows : 
 
 "LuRAY, June 8, 9^ a.m. 
 "I write by your scout. I think by this time there will be 12 pieces of 
 artillery opposite Jackson's train at Port Republic, if he has taken that route. 
 Some cavalry and artillery have pushed on to Waynesboro' to burn the bridge. 
 I hope to have two brigades at Port Republic to-day. I follow myself with two 
 other brigades from this place. If the enemy changes direction you will please 
 keep me advised. If he attempts to force a passage, as my force is not large 
 there yet, I hope you will thunder down on his rear. Please send back informa- 
 tion from time to time. I think Jackson is caught this time. 
 
 " Yours, etc., 
 
 " Jas. Shields. 
 " Maj.-Gen, Fremont." 
 
 * Gen. Fremont's column, June 8, moved as follows : 
 
 I. In advance : Cluseret's brigade of Sixtieth Ohio and Eighth Virginia 
 infantry, reinforced by Thirty-ninth New York (Garibaldi Guard). 
 
 II. Main column, comprising : 
 
 1. Dickel's Fourth New York cavalry. 
 
 2. Stahl's brigade : Eighth, Forty-first, and Forty-fifth New York, and Twenty- 
 seventh Pennsylvania infantry, and Dilger's, Buell's, and Schermer's batteries. 
 (Kane's Bucktails reported to Stahl and fought with him.) 
 
152 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 18G1-G2. 
 
 Ewell has selected for his position one of the ridges with wliich the 
 country is filled, a short distance south of the Keezletown road. In 
 front tlie ground declined rapidly to a small rivulet, and then rose 
 into a lower parallel ridge, which was occupied by the Federals. The 
 ridge held by Ewell was wooded, with cleared fields in front, espe- 
 cially o})posite his centre.^ It was crossed on his left by the Keezle- 
 town road, -with the direction of which it makes nearly a right angle. 
 The road from Harrisonburg to Port Republic crosses the ridge 
 through the centre of the positi(Mi held by Gen. Ewell. The Fif- 
 teenth Alabama infantry. Col. Canty, had been thrown out on picket, 
 and while they were stubbornly resisting Fremont's advance, Ewell 
 carefully disposed his troops along the ridge, placing the four bat- 
 teries of Courtenay, Lusk, Brockenbrough, and Raines in the centre, 
 near the Harrisonburg road, and near Mill Creek Dunkard church, 
 and throwing Trimble's brigade to the right and Steuart's to the 
 left, while Elzey was retained in rear of the centre as a reserve ready 
 to reinforce either wing. The ridge at the point to which Gen. 
 Trimble was ordered was heavily wooded, descended very abruptly 
 to the creek, and was easily turned. Not deeming this position 
 eligible, and seeing one half a mile to the right front which appeared 
 better. Gen. Trimble was permitted to occupy it. The Twenty-first 
 North Carolina regiment had been left to support Courteuay's guns, 
 and the Sixteenth Mississippi, Col. Posey, and the Twenty-first 
 Georgia, Col. Mercer, were now quickly transferred to the new posi- 
 tion in advance, where they were soon joined by the remaining regi- 
 ment of the brigade, — the Fifteenth Alabama, Col. Canty. The 
 latter regiment was placed on the extreme right of Trimble's line. 
 
 3. Bohlen's brigade : Fifty-fourth and Fifty-eighth New York and Seventy- 
 fourth and Seventy-lifth Pennsylvania infantry, and AViedrich's battery. 
 
 4. Milroy's brigade : Twenty-fifth Ohio and Second, Third, and Fifth Virginia 
 infantry, and Ilyman's, Johnson's, and Ewing's batteries. 
 
 5. Schenck's brigade : Thirty-second, Seventy -third, Seventy-fifth, and Eighty- 
 second Ohio infantry, and De Beck's and Kigby's batteries, and a small detach- 
 ment of cavalry. 
 
 III. Rear guard following trains: 
 
 Steinwehr's brigade, under Col. Kolte: Twenty-ninth and Sixty-eighth New 
 York and Seventy-third Pennsylvania infantry, and Dickmann's battery. 
 
 IV. Bayard's cavalry was left at Harrisonburg in charge of trains, but came 
 forward later. (Fremont's report.) 
 
 ^ Gen. Ewell says : " The general features of the ground were a valley and 
 rivulet in my front, woods on both flanks, and a field of some hundreds of acres, 
 where the road crossed the centre of my line ; my side of the valley being more 
 defined and commanding the other." (Ewell' s report.) 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 153 
 
 This new position of Gen. Trimble was on a flat ridge, flanked on 
 the right by a stream, while in front lay a narrow valley, from which, 
 on the opposite side, rose a similar height occupied by the Federals. 
 While these dispositions were being made on the right. Gen. George 
 H. Steuart was posted on the Confederate left wing,^ following the 
 direction of the ridge from the batteries towards the west. His left 
 flank approached the Keezletown road where it crosses the ridge, and 
 was protected by heavy timber. 
 
 Fremont disposed his forces for attack as follows : Stahl's brigade 
 (five regiments), of Blenker's division, was assigned to his left, oppo- 
 site Trimble. Bohlen's brigade, of the same division, supported 
 Stahl, while the remainder of Blenker's troops were held in reserve. 
 Milroy, with five regiments, and Cluseret, with three, were sent 
 against the Confederate centre, while Schenck, with five regiments, 
 constituted Fremont's right, and was to operate against the Confed- 
 erate left wing and flank. Batteries were placed on the spurs of the 
 ridge in front of and parallel to that occupied by Gen. Ewell. For 
 some time a spirited artillery fire was maintained between the oppo- 
 sing batteries, when, though Schenck was not yet in position, Fre- 
 mont's left wing moved forward to the attack. Stahl's brigade 
 advanced boldly across the open space that separated them from 
 Trimble, driving in his skirmishers. Trimble ordered the three 
 regiments with him to " rest quietly in the edge of the open wood" 
 until the enemy, after having crossed " the field and hollow, should 
 
 ^ Gen. Steuart had commanded temporarily the Second and Sixth Virginia 
 cavalry at Winchester, but was subsequently returned to the command of the 
 Maryland line, to which were added the Forty-fourth, Fifty-second, and Fifty- 
 eighth Virginia regiments, in order to form a brigade. 
 
 Ewell's division was organized as follows on June 8 and 9 : 
 
 Trimble's brigade : Elzey's brigade : G. H. Steuart's brigade : Taylor's brigade : i 
 
 2l8t Georgia regt. 13th Virginiaregt. 1st Maryland regt. 6th Louisiana regt. 
 21st N. Carolina regt. 25th " " 44th Virginia " 7th " " 
 
 15th Alabama '• 31st " " 52d " " 8th " " 
 
 16th Mississippi " 12th Georgia " 58th " " 9th " " 
 
 Wheat's battalion. 
 
 Artillery: Courtenay's, Brockenbrough's, Lusk's, Raines's, and Rice's bat- 
 teries. 
 
 The organization of Jackson's (Winder's) division was the same as at Win- 
 chester (see page 92, note), with the addition of Carrington's battery. After 
 the death of Ashby, Col. Munford became commander of the cavalry. 
 
 1 Not engaged on the 8th. 
 11 
 
154 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 come within fifty stops" of his line. Stahl continued to advance until 
 lie had come near enough to receive Trimble's fire. Then deadly 
 volleys are poured in the faces of the Germans ; their advance is at 
 onc« checked, and in a few moments they waver and break. Their 
 supports fail to come forward. Trimble orders an advance, and 
 Stahl's troops arc quickly driven down the hill, across the meadow, 
 and into the wocxls from which they had advanced.^ Here are the 
 reserves on which they reform. The Confederates do not advance 
 beyond the crest of the hill on which they are stationed, but, having 
 driven the enemy out of the open space, remain in their position 
 on the hill to await another attack. But the repulse has been too 
 bloody to invite a speedy renewal. Trimble waits a short time, 
 and, perceiving no indications of a new advance, determines to move 
 against the enemy. On the extreme left of Fremont, and half a mile 
 in front of the Confederates, is a battery which plays on them. 
 Trimble moves out to his right, and, under cover of a ravine and 
 the woods, approaches Blenker's flank. He is joined en route by 
 Col. Walker, of Elzey's brigade, with two regiments (Thirteenth and 
 Twenty-fifth Virginia). Walker moves on Trimble's right and tries 
 to turn the Federal flank. Meanwhile, Trimble presses forward. In 
 a few minutes the Federals retreat, taking off the battery which 
 Trimble had hoped to capture. While this is doing. Walker, who 
 has moved too far to the right, is met and staggered for the moment 
 by a fierce fire of musketry and canister.^ The confusion produced 
 is, however, soon remedied. Walker presses forward, and Trimble 
 throws his regiments once more on the Federal lines. The struggle 
 is short and sharp, the Federals are forced to yield, the artillery 
 limbers up and retires, and in a few minutes the whole Federal left 
 wing is retreating towards the position near Union church, on the 
 Keezletown road, which it had held before the opening of the battle.^ 
 
 ^ One of Stahl's regiments (Eighth New York) lost 65 in killed alone in this 
 attack. (Fremont's report.) 
 
 ^ Gen. Walker says this was in moving to the right of Ever's house and barn. 
 (See Map No. VIII.) 
 
 ^ In a letter to the author, dated February, 1880, Gen. Trimble thus describes 
 the action on his front : " . . . The enemy had crossed the valley and were ad- 
 vancing gallantly up the slope towards Gen. Trimble's position, thus receiving 
 ' the full fire of the two right regiments at about sixty paces distant. They 
 wavered, and then fell back in disorder. . . . Then a charge was ordered, but 
 before the men advanced over the crest of the ridge Gen. Trimble arrested it, 
 as he saw the enemy reforming with supports on the opposite ridge. lie waited 
 twenty minutes for another attack, but as the enemy did not move, though 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 155 
 
 Meantime, Milroy has advanced against the Confederate centre. A 
 fierce artillery duel is here the principal feature of the contest. The 
 Confederate batteries are well located, and in spite of loss of horses 
 and men in some of them, keep up so spirited a fire that no serious 
 attempt is made on this part of the line. The Federals drive in the 
 Confederate skirmishers and feel the lines behind them, but there is 
 no reid attack. Thus, at the centre of the contending armies, the 
 hours pass in which the fate of the day is being decided on Blenker's 
 front. 
 
 Schenck is last to take his post in the Federal line. He arrives 
 on the field at 1 p.m., and moves in rear and to the right of Milroy, 
 to take position to attack the Confederate left. Unacquainted with 
 the ground he proceeds cautiously, and it is some time before he secures 
 an eligible position for his troops. This movement is marked by 
 artillery firing and some skirmishing, the Federals driving back a 
 part of the Forty-fourth Virginia regiment of Steuart's brigade, and 
 being in turn checked by its supports. Gen. Ewell, seeing the move- 
 ment of troops towards his left, strengthens his line there with the 
 part of Elzey's brigade^ yet in reserve, and subsequently sends Pat- 
 formed to do so, he went to the right regiment, Col. Canty's, and marched it by 
 the right flank to the right, as if moving from the field. When concealed by the 
 woods the regiment was marched to the left, and gained, unobserved, the ridge 
 occupied Vjy the enemy at a point not over fifty paces from his left flank in the 
 woods. Before making this flank movement Gen. Trimble had ordered the two 
 regiments left on the ridge to charge across the valley as soon as they heard a 
 brisk fire opened by Col. Canty. As soon as Col. Canty got into position he 
 was ordered to charge. A sharp conflict of a few minutes ensued. The 
 Twenty-first Georgia charged across the valley, followed by Col. Posey, with 
 the Sixteenth Mississippi, when the enemy were driven back in front of our 
 whole line. It was here that Col. Posey, in advancing, did not look to his left, 
 and was attacked on his flank by a force which was stationed in the woods, 
 throwing his regiment into some disorder. Col. Mercer, with much presence of 
 mind and judgment, came to his aid with the Twenty-first Georgia, and, by a 
 charge, drove off the enemy. Gen. Trimble then gave orders to charge a battery 
 on a high plain, but by the time the Fifteenth Alabama reached the top of the 
 hill the battery was moving off Avith precipitation. A few minutes before this 
 Col. J. A. Walker, with the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia regiments, 
 had been sent over by Gen. Ewell, and was directed by Gen. Trimble to advance 
 on the right of the Fifteenth Alabama. Col. Walker, passing too far to the 
 right, was observed by a battery, and for a few moments was under a warm 
 fire •, but his troops gallantly advanced, and as the battery drove off rapidly we 
 saw the infantry force in full retreat towards the Keezletown road. Thus the 
 enemy's force in front of our right was driven by three successive charges from 
 the field to a mile in rear of their first position. . . ." 
 
 ^ Twelfth Georgia and Thirty-first Virginia. 
 
156 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 ton's brigade and two regiments of Taylor's^ to extend liis line on 
 the same flank. Tliis delays Sclienck's aggressive movements, and 
 before he is ready to attack in earnest the battle has been decided 
 by the defeat of Blcnker, and Fremont, alarmed by the disaster on 
 his left wing, orders both centre and right to withdraw. Ewell, con- 
 scions of his inferiority of force,^ and anticipating an attack from 
 Schenck on his left, has been content with tlie advantages already 
 gained nntil his enemy's pnrposes are devehtped. As the Federal 
 right and centre withdraw he follows, pushing forward his skirmishers 
 and occnpying the ground in front of the field. Night is at hand, 
 however, and Gen. Ewell decides to bivouac in the position he holds 
 rather than risk a night attack on the enemy .^ 
 
 Thus ends the battle of " Cross Keys." Ewell has repulsed Fre- 
 mont so decisively on one wing as to paralyze his army and to secure 
 all the advantages of victory. This has been done too with but a 
 small part of the total force at command. The losses are greatly dis- 
 proportioned. Ewell's total loss is tw'O hundred and eighty-seven 
 (287).^ That of Fremont is six hundred and sixty-four (664) (of 
 which four hundred and twenty-seven (427) are in Stahl's brigade), 
 by letter dated June 9, from his headquarters, to the Cincinnati 
 "Commercial."^ 
 
 During this engagement the advance force of Gen. Shields con- 
 tinued quiet on the east side of the river. Col. Carroll remained in 
 
 ^ Seventh and Eighth Louisiana. Patton and Taylor had been sent up from 
 Port Republic to reinforce Gen. Ewell. Patton was in command of Campbell's 
 brigade (Second of Jackson's division), and had but about 800 men for duty. 
 (See Dabney.) 
 
 2 Ewell's force was less than 5000 in the morning. Patton added 800 and 
 Taylor possibly 2500 more. The latter was not engaged. Fremont reports his 
 force present at over 11,000, but, as already said, his returns show a much larger 
 number. 
 
 ^ Trimble earnestly urged a night attack, but Ewell decided against it. (Ti-im- 
 ble's report.) Ewell says : " I did not push my success at once, because I had 
 no cavalry, and it was reported and reaffirmed by Lieut. Hinrichs, topographical 
 engineer, sent to reconnoitre, that the enemy was moving a large column two 
 miles to my left. As soon as I could determine this not to be an attack I ad- 
 vanced both my wings, drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and when night 
 closed was in position on the ground previously held by the enemy, ready to 
 attack him at dawn." (Ewell's report.) 
 
 * Ewell's report. 
 
 ^ Probably written by one of Gen. Schenck's staff, Capt. Piatt. It does not in- 
 clude the loss in Von Steinwehr's brigade or in the cavalry. (" Rebellion Record," 
 vol. V. p. 109.) The "Medical and Surgical History of the War" reports Fre- 
 mont's loss in killed and wounded (without prisoners) as 625. 
 
CRO'^S KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 157 
 
 the position beyond Lewiston, to which he had retired in the morning, 
 and from which he conld observe, but not attack, the Confederate 
 batteries on the northwest bank of the river. Here he was joined by 
 Gen. Tyler with his brigade about 2 p.]\i.^ The latter deemed the 
 combined force still too small and the Confederate position too strong 
 to admit of an aggressive movement.^ Hence no diversion in favor 
 of Fremont was made. 
 
 Jackson, emboldened by the inactivity of Shields's advance, and the 
 easy repulse of Fremont, conceived the audacious design of attacking 
 his two opponents in succession the next day, with the hope of over- 
 whelming them separately. For this purpose he directed that during 
 the night a temporary bridge, composed simply of planks laid upon the 
 running-gear of wagons, should be constructed over the South river 
 at Port Republic, and ordered Winder to move his brigade at dawn 
 across both rivers and against Shields. Ewell was directed to leave 
 Trimble's brigade and part of Patton's to hold Fremont in check, 
 and to move at an early hour to Port Republic to follow Winder. 
 Taliaferro's brigade was left in charge of the batteries along the river, 
 and to protect Trimble's retreat if necessary. The force left in Fre- 
 mont's front was directed to make all the show possible, and to delay 
 the Federal advance to the extent of its power. The Confederate com- 
 mander proposed, in case of an easy victory over Shields in the morn- 
 ing, to return to the Harrisonburg side of the river and attack Fre- 
 mont in the afternoon.^ In case, however, of delay, and a vigorous 
 
 ^ Gen. Tyler says he had about 3000 infantry and IG guns. Gen. Shields 
 puts this brigade at 2500. 
 
 ^ Tylers report. "Rebellion Record," vol. v. 
 
 ^ "It has been already explained that he did not arrest the pursuit of Fre- 
 mont at once by burning the bridge across the Shenandoah, because he was 
 unwilling to deprive himself of the ability to take the aggressive against that 
 general. He now formed the bold purpose to concentrate his army and fight 
 both Shields and him, successively, tlie same day. Hence his eagerness to begin 
 his attack on the former at an early hour. Stronger evidence of this design 
 will be given. During the night he held an interview with Col. Patton, com- 
 manding the Second brigade, which he then proposed to employ as a rear guard 
 to cover the withdrawal of Gen. Ewell's forces from the front of Fremont. 
 This officer found him at two o'clock in the morning of the 9th actively en- 
 gaged in making his dispositions for battle. He immediately proceeded to give 
 him particular instructions as to the management of his men in covering the 
 rear, saying : ' I wish you to throw out all your men if necessary as skir- 
 mishers, and to make a great show, so as to cause the enemy to think the whole 
 army are behind you. Hold your position as well as you can ; then fall back 
 when obliged ; take a new position ; hold it in the same way ; and I will be back 
 
158 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 advance on Fremont's })art, Trimble was to retire by the bridge into 
 Port Republic, and burn it to prevent his antagonist from following. 
 
 Jackson superintended in person the construction of the foot-bridge 
 over South river, and before five o'clock in the morning AVinder was 
 already crossing. Next followed Taylor, and with these two brigades, 
 separated as they were by a considerable interval, Jackson moved at 
 once against the Federal troops at Lewiston, leaving orders for the 
 remaining troops to follow as rapidly as possible. The foot-bridge 
 was defective, and a good deal of time was lost in getting the troops 
 over. Jackson, impatient of delay, without Avaiting for the remainder 
 of his forces, ordered an attack upon Tyler as soon as Winder had 
 reached the vicinity of the Federals. 
 
 The position occupied by Gen. Tyler was an admirable one, on 
 the second terrace from the Shenandoah. His centre was near Gen. 
 Lewis's house, his right extending through the open fields towards the 
 river, while his left rested in the dense wood east of the main road, 
 at the site of an old coal-pit. The ground held by the left and centre 
 was elevated, and commanded all the available approaches from Port 
 Republic. Especially was this the case on his left, which was the key 
 to the whole position. Here he had six guns planted.^ A dense and 
 almost impenetrable forest protected this flank, and made all direct 
 approach to it difficult, while the batteries there placed covered a large 
 part of the front, and enfiladed Winder's advance. In this position 
 Gen. Tyler disposed his force. He seems, though on the alert, not to 
 have been aware ^ of Jackson's rapid approach until the latter was de- 
 ploying in his front, but he was altogether ready to meet the attack. 
 
 Winder deployed his skirmishers, and advancing on both sides 
 of the road, drove in the outposts. He soon found that the Federal 
 batteries commanded the road and its vicinity completely. Jaclvson 
 
 to join you in the morning.'' Col. Patton reminded him that his brigade was 
 email, and that the country between Cross Keys and the Shenandoah offered 
 few advantages for protracting such manoeuvres. lie therefore desired to know 
 for how long a time he would be expected to hold the army of Fremont in 
 check. He replied : ' By the blessing of Providence I hope to be back by ten 
 o'clock,' " (Dabney.) 
 
 ^ Three guns of Clark's and three of Huntington's batteries. One of Robinson's 
 was near. (Daum's report. Col. Daum was chief of artillery for Gen. Shields.) 
 
 ^ Tyler's report, " Rebellion Record," vol. v. His force consisted of the 
 Eighty-fourth and One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania and Sixty-sixth Ohio 
 on his left, and of the First Virginia, Seventh Indiana, and Fifth, Seventh, and 
 Twenty-ninth Ohio on the right, and of a detachment of the First Virginia 
 cavalry, and 16 guns. 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 159 
 
 then directed him to send a force to his right through the woods to turn 
 the Federal left flank. Two regiments under Col. J. W. Allen (Second 
 and Fourth Virginia) ^ were detached for this purpose with two guns 
 of Carpenter's. At the same time he placed two guns of Poague's 
 battery on the west of the road, supporting them by the Twenty- 
 seventh Virginia (Col. Grigsby) and the Fifth Virginia (Col. Funk), 
 the remainder of his brigade present.^ Allen made his way with 
 great difficulty through the dense thickets opposite the Federal left 
 until he reached the vicinity of the hostile battery. Here he found 
 two regiments of infantry sent by Tyler to support the guns, and in 
 a short time two more regiments reinforced them. Carpenter was 
 unable to get his guns through the brush, and Allen's infantry, unable 
 of itself to make headway against the foe, and subjected to a heavy 
 fire of musketry and canister, was soon thrown into confusion and 
 forced to retire. Meantime, Poague's guns on the west of the road 
 had drawn on them a hea\y fire. Gen. Winder finds it necessary to 
 separate them. One is sent some distance to the left, into the low 
 grounds, and Funk's regiment (Fifth Virginia) goes to support it. 
 The enemy soon make dispositions to meet this movement.^ Two 
 gims of Clark's and two of Huntington's battery (Federal) are placed 
 in position to reply to Poague. The Seventh Indiana and the 
 Twenty-ninth and Seventh Ohio are sent to check the attack on the 
 Federal right wing. Poague has tried in vain to find a good posi- 
 tion for his guns ; there is nothing to be done unless the enemy are 
 driven from theirs. Winder, with less than twelve hundred (1200) 
 men,* finds himself unable to cope with the force before him, and 
 seeing signs of an aggressive movement against his left near the river, 
 sends to Jackson for reinforcements. The latter is hurrying them 
 forward as fast as possible. Hays's Seventh Louisiana regiment is 
 sent to the left, and placed between Funk (Fifth Virginia) and 
 Grigsby (Twenty-seventh Virginia), while the whole of Poague's 
 and the section of Carpenter's battery that had returned from its fruit- 
 
 ^ The Fourth numbered 317, and the Second 224, rank and file, by the regi- 
 mental reports. 
 
 ^ The Thirty-third Virginia, under Col. NeflF, having been on picket duty the 
 night before, did not rejoin the brigade until the battle was virtually over. 
 
 * Tyler's report. 
 
 * Strength of his four regiments now in action : Twenty-seventh Virginia, 
 150; Fifth Virginia, 447; Second Virginia, 224; Fourth Virginia, 317; total, 
 rank and file, 1138. 
 
 Gen. Tyler saya the Federal forces " could not have exceeded 3000 men." 
 
160 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1SG1-G2. 
 
 less attempt with Allen are ])lu('e(l to aid a forward movement by 
 the Confederate left. At the same time that Hays is sent to rein- 
 force the left, Jackson sends the mass of Taylor's brigade to make a 
 detonr through the woods on the Confederate right, and renew the 
 attack in which Allen had failed. It requires some time for Taylor 
 to get through the thicket into position, and while he is moving, Win- 
 der has ordered the Confederate left wing to advance and carry the 
 enemy's position with the bayonet. The three regiments (Funk's, 
 Hays's, and Grigsby's) move forward in fine style, and the artillery 
 follows closely. The Seventh Indiana regiment, which is on the 
 extreme Federal right, is forced back a short distance, but soon rein- 
 forced by the Twenty-ninth, Seventh, and Fifth Ohio, the Federals, 
 having the advantage of the terrace, hold their position and receive 
 Winder's trooi)s with a storm of musketry and shell. A most de- 
 termined and stubborn conflict now takes place. The Ohio troops 
 repel every attempt to drive them back, while the Confederates con- 
 tinue for a time their efforts under a storm of fire. At last the Con- 
 federates begin to waver and break. The Thirty-first Virginia 
 regiment (Elzey's brigade) reaches Winder at this moment. Using 
 it to cover his guns. Winder orders them to the rear, and tries to form 
 his line again. Stopping one of Poague's guns, he turns it on the 
 advancing enemy, and for a moment checks the disorder. But it is 
 only for a moment; the enemy dash for^vard; the horses are shot down 
 at the gun, and the Fifth Ohio, charging, drive back the half-formed 
 Confederates across a wheat-field and seize the piece, which they carry 
 oif. Steuart's and Elzey's brigades^ are next to Taylor's in reaching 
 the battle-field. One regiment of Steuart's (Fifty-second Virginia) 
 is sent to aid Winder, but arrives only in time to be involved in his 
 repulse. Two others (Forty-fourth and Fift}'-eighth Virginia) are 
 stationed near the main road, in the wood, and are under Gen. Ewell's 
 own eye. As the Federals advance to drive Winder, they expose 
 their flank, and Ewell leads these two regiments forward. They 
 make a vigorous dash on the enemy, drive him some distance, and, 
 though in turn driven back to the woods, the result of the diversion 
 is to check the farther adv^ance against Winder, and give the latter 
 an opportunity to rally a part of his troops, and to plaee two of 
 Poague's guns where they had been before the Confederate advance. 
 
 ^ Elzey's brigade, except the Thirty-first Virginia, was sent under Col. Walker 
 to the richt to help Gen. Taylor, but became lost in the woods, and only arrived 
 at the proper point after the enemy had been broken. 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 161 
 
 Jackson, finding the resistance of the enemy so much more stub- 
 born than he had expected, and that his first attaclcs had failed, de- 
 termined to concentrate his whole force and give up all intention of 
 recrossing the river. He therefore sent orders to Trimble and Talia- 
 ferro to leave Fremont's front, move over the bridge, burn it, and 
 join the main body of the army as speedily as possible. 
 
 Meantime, Taylor has been moving as rapidly as the tangled forest 
 would permit towards the Federal left. He reaches the point of 
 attack at the time that the loud shouts of the Federals proclaim their 
 success on the other wing. The infantiy supporting the six guns 
 that had played so important a part in the battle had been partly 
 withdrawn to reinforce the troops engaged with Winder,^ and before 
 they can be retm^ned to their former place Taylor has charged and 
 taken the battery. Most stubborn, however, has been the resistance, 
 and so soon as reinforcements can be hurried over from the other 
 wing, where the repulse of Winder relieves the Federals for a time, 
 Taylor is in turn attacked, and his brave Louisianians are forced to 
 yield the ground they had won. Once more the guns are in Federal 
 possession. They attempt to carry them out of danger, but the 
 horses are killed, and the removal requires time. One piece is gotten 
 off, but before any more can be removed Taylor renews the charge. 
 Ewell leads the two regiments under Col. Scott, which had so oppor- 
 tunely checked the pursuit of Winder, to Taylor's assistance. Win- 
 
 ^ "Additional reinforcements of the enemy were coming up on our right, 
 having abandoned their position on the left, and I ordered the Eighty-fourth and 
 One Hundred and Tenth (Pennsylvania) down to the right, but before they 
 reached the position assigned them the enemy was in full retreat before our 
 brave men, and I at once ordered them back into the wood again. Under cover 
 of the engagement on our right the enemy had thrown another force into the 
 woods, and pressed them down upon our batteries on the left. So rapid was 
 this movement that they passed the line on which the Eighty-fourth and One 
 Hundred and Tenth were ordered, unobserved, making a dash upon the battery 
 so sudden and unexpected as to compel the cannoneers to abandon their pieces. 
 
 "Col. Candy met the enemy with his regiment with great coolness, his men 
 fighting with commendable bravery. The Seventh and Fifth Ohio were soon 
 supporting him, driving the enemy from their position and retaking the battery. 
 The artillery officers made a strong eflFort, and used great exertions to remove 
 their guns, but, the horses having been killed or disabled, found it impossible. 
 The enemy had given way along the whole line, but I saw heavy reinforcements 
 crossing from the town that would have been impossible for us to resist. After 
 consulting Gen. Carroll, I ordered the troops to fall back under his direction, 
 with a view of retreating until we should meet the reinforcements of Gens. 
 Kimball and Terry." (Tyler's report, "Rebellion Record.*') 
 
162 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 der renews the attack from his wing with Poague's guas; Chew's 
 battery arrives and is placed in front, and witli guns from the bat- 
 teries of Brockcnbrough, Raines, and Courtcnay, opens on the enemy. 
 Once more Taylor, thus aided, carries the position. The Federals 
 have made a most gallant fight, both with the guns and to save them, 
 but they cannot resist the combined attack now made. They are 
 pushed back at every point, and are soon in full retreat. Not a 
 moment too soon have they yielded the field, for the remainder of 
 Jackson's force is arriving, and in a short time they must have l)een 
 entirely overwhelmed. Taliaferro, who had just reached the field, is 
 sent with Winder in pursuit. They press the retreating enemy in a 
 confused mass for several miles,^ and then hand over the pursuit to 
 the cavalry under Munford, who follow for three miles more. About 
 four hundred and fifty prisoners, a few wagons, one piece of aban- 
 doned artillery (in addition to the five captured by Taylor in his final 
 charge), and eight hundred muskets are the trophies of the pursuit. 
 Some two hundred and seventy-five of the Federal wounded are 
 paroled in the hospitals near the battle-field.^ About two hundred 
 others are carried off.^ 
 
 Jackson's losses were, Idlled, wounded, and missing, in Taylor's 
 brigade, 290; Winder's, 199; Steuart's, 199; Elzey's, 128; total, 
 816. The official reports in the adjutant-general's office make the 
 Federal loss 66 killed, 382 wounded, 382 missing; total, 830. In 
 the " Medical and Surgical History of the War" they are stated as 67 
 killed, 361 wounded, 574 missing ; total, 1002.* 
 
 ^ Col. Carroll, who covered the Federal rear, says : " As soon as we com- 
 menced the retreat the enemy turned and opened upon us portions of Clark's 
 and Huntington's batteries that they had taken from us on the left, which threw 
 the rear of our column in great disorder, causing them to take to the woods and 
 making it, for the earlier part of the retreat, apparently a rout. . . . Their 
 cavalry also charged upon our rear, increasing the confusion." 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. 
 
 ^ On June 13, Surgeon Cox telegraphed the Federal surgeon-general that 180 
 of the wounded of Shields's division had just arrived at Front Royal. Surgeon 
 Stidger, one of the surgeons in charge, puts the number at " perhaps 200.'' 
 (Report on Conduct of the War, Part III., 1863, p. 493, etc.) 
 
 * In the series of engagements on the 6th, 8th, and 9th of June, the losses 
 were : 
 
 Confederate. Federal. 
 
 On June 6 . . . . 70 On June 6 over 155 
 
 " 8 .... 287 "8 704 (including Carroll's.) 
 
 " 9 .... 816 "9 (say) 916 
 
 1173 1775 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 163 
 
 During the forenoou Fremont had advanced against Trimble on 
 the north side of the river, and was driving him slowly back, when 
 the latter was ordered to rejoin Jackson at Lewiston. He, with 
 Taliaferro, then withdrew as rapidly as possible, crossed the bridge 
 without loss, and succeeded in burning it in the face of the advancing 
 Federals. Fremont's army arrived on the heights overlooking Lewis- 
 ton only in time to witness the retreat of Tyler, and were prevented 
 by the river from giving him any assistance. In the afternoon Fre- 
 mont placed some batteries in position, and shelled the parties engaged 
 in attending to the wounded on the field.^ 
 
 The Confederate trains had been moved in the course of the day 
 across South river towards Brown's gap, and during the afternoon 
 and night the weary Confederates returned from the battle-field and 
 pursuit, to camp in the cove at the foot of this mountain-pass. It was 
 midnight before some of them lay down in the rain to rest. 
 
 Thus the day ended with the complete defeat of the two brigades 
 under Tyler. Most gallant and determined had been their resist- 
 ance, and Jacl^on's impetuosity had made his victory more costly 
 than it otherwise would have been. In sending in Winder's brigade 
 before its supports arrived, he had hurled this body of troops against 
 more than twice their number. Taylor next attacked, but the repulse 
 of Winder enabled the Federal commander to concentrate his forces 
 against Taylor and drive him from the battery he had taken. It 
 was then that Jackson renewed the attack with the combined forces 
 of three brigades, and speedily forced the enemy from the field. 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. Fremont thus describes the scene when he reached the 
 heights overlooking the field from which Tyler had been driven; "The battle 
 which had taken place upon the farther bank of the river was wholly at an end. 
 A single brigade sent forward by Gen. Shields" (there were two, Tyler's and 
 Carroll's) " had been simply cut to pieces. Col. Carroll in command had for 
 his own reasons failed to burn the bridge, though occupying it in time with his 
 guards. Jackson hastening across had fallen upon the inferior force, and the 
 result was before us. Of the bridge nothing remained but the charred and 
 smoking timbers. Beyond, at the edge of the woods, a body of the enemy's 
 troops was in position, and a baggage-train was disappearing in a pass among 
 the hills. Parties gathering the dead and wounded, together with a line of 
 prisoners awaiting the movements of the rebel force near by, was all in respect 
 to troops of either side now to be seen. A parting salvo of carefully aimed 
 rifled guns duly charged with shell hastened the departure of the rebels, with 
 their unlucky though most gallant convoy, and the whole were speedily out of 
 sight." (Fremont's report.) In returning from the battle-field to Brown's gap, 
 Jackson took a road through the forest and away from the river to avoid Fre- 
 mont's guns. 
 
164 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, lSGl-62. 
 
 Had he attacked with this force at first, it is probable that one charge 
 would have given him the victory at less cost of life. 
 
 Next day the Confederates rested in camp. Exhausted nature 
 demanded repose, and Jackson now gave it to his tired and battle- 
 worn troops. His enemies were effectually disposed of. Shields, who 
 had advanced to sup])ort Tyler, when the broken and defeated brigades 
 rejoined him,' decided to return by the route by whidi he had moved 
 forward. Orders from McDowell, sent on this day, caused him to 
 continue his retreat to I^uray and Front Royal,^ whence he was moved 
 to Manassas to rejoin McDowell's corps. Fremont, influenced by his 
 own repulse, the disaster sustained by Shields, and the retreat of the 
 latter, retired from the vicinity of Port Republic on the morning of 
 the 10th. On the 11th, Munford, Avith the Confederate cavalry, 
 once more crossed the Shenandoah, and followed the retreating army. 
 Camping at INIount Cra\vford on the night of the 11th, he next day 
 moved into Harrisonburg, which Fremont had evacuated, leaving 
 two hundred wounded in the hospitals, some medicine and other 
 stores, and about two hundred muskets. Fremont continued his 
 retreat on the 11th and 12tli. "Significant demonstrations of the 
 enemy," as Gen. Fremont expresses it, caused him to withdraw 
 farther, and on the 14th of June he joined Banks and Sigel^ at 
 Middletown. Banks and Sigel had not advanced beyond Middle- 
 town while Fremont and Shields were pursuing Jackson. 
 
 Jaclison, on the 12th, moved out from his confined bivouac at the 
 foot of Brown's gap, and, crossing the South river near Weyer's cave, 
 camped in the noble, park-like forest between the latter place and 
 
 ^ Shields says he marched on the night of the 8th, and, reaching Conrad's 
 Store on the morning of the 9th, learned that Tyler was within two miles of 
 Port Republic. He pressed forward as fast as he could, and some miles in 
 advance of Conrad's met the routed and flying brigades. 
 
 ^ Gen. Shields is disposed to attribute his immediate retreat from Conrad's 
 Store not to the defeat of Tyler, but to Gen. McDowell's positive orders to return. 
 He says he desired, in co-operation with Fremont, to again attack Jackson, and 
 anticipated success in such an attempt. McDowell's orders hardly bear Gen. 
 Shields's interpretation. On June 9, McDowell's chief of staff wrote : " If, how- 
 ever, you are in hot pursuit and about to fall on the enemy, and can do so with 
 reasonable chances of success without relying on the troops at Front Royal, who 
 are too far in rear to support you in your extended movements, the general is 
 not disposed to recall you. . . ." Gen. McDowell says: "Both the condition 
 of Gen. Shields's division and that of the roads and rivers as represented by him 
 indicated anything than the success he anticipated." 
 
 * Gen. Sigel had superseded Gen. Saxton in command of the forces gathered at 
 Harper's Ferry to oppose Jackson. 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 165 
 
 Mount Meridian.^ Here for five days of that splendid June he rested 
 and refreshed his army. He says : " For the purpose of rendering 
 thanks to God for having crowned our arms with success, and to 
 implore his contiiuied favor, divine service was held in the army on 
 the 14th. 
 
 "The army remained near Weyer's cave until the 17th, when, in 
 obedience to instructions from the commanding general of the de- 
 partment, it moved towards Richmond."^ 
 
 His order of June 13 to his troops is as follows : " The fortitude 
 of the troops under fatigue and their valor in action have again, under 
 the blessing of Divine Providence, placed it in the power of the 
 commanding general to congratulate them upon the victories of June 
 8 and 9. Beset on both flanks by two boastful armies, you have 
 escaped their toils, inflicting successively crushing blows upon each 
 
 ^ Dr. Dabney thus speaks of this camp : " The troops were encamped in a 
 range of woodland groves between the two rivei-s, surrounded with the verdure 
 of early summer and the luxuriant wheat-fields whitening to the harvest. In 
 this smiling paradise they solaced themselves five days for their fatigues, the 
 men reposing under the shade or bathing in the sparkling waters of the Shen- 
 andoah, and the horses feeding in the abundant pastures. The Saturday follow- 
 ing the battle was proclaimed by Gen. Jackson as a day of thanksgiving and 
 prayer, and all the troops were called to join with their general and their chap- 
 lains in praises to God for his deliverances. The next day a general communion 
 was observed in the Third Virginia brigade, at which the Lord's Supper was 
 dispensed, in the wood, to a great company of Christian soldiers from all the 
 army. At this solemnity the general was present as a worshipper, and modestly 
 participated with his men in the sacred feast. The quiet diffidence with which 
 he took the least obtrusive place and received the sacred elements from the hands 
 of a regimental chaplain was in beautiful contrast with the majesty and authority 
 of his bearing in the crisis of battle." 
 
 ^ Jackson's report. Gen. Lee (now in immediate command of the Confederate 
 forces in Virginia, in consequence of the wounding of Gen. J. E. Johnston on 
 May 31) wrote to Jackson as follows on June 8: "Your letter of the 6th has 
 been received. I congratulate you upon defeating and then avoiding your 
 enemy. Your march to Winchester has been of great advantage, and has been 
 conducted with your accustomed skill and boldness. I hope you will be able to 
 rest and refresh your troops for a few days before compelled to enter upon active 
 service. I desire you to report the probable intentions of the enemy and what 
 steps you can take to thwart them. Should there be nothing requiring your 
 attention in the A^alley so as to prevent your leaving it a few days, and you can 
 make arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your 
 presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with the 
 army near Richmond. Make your arrangements accordingly ; but should an op- 
 portunity occur for striking the enemy a successful blow do not let it escape you." 
 
 When this letter reached its destination the " blow" had been " struck," and 
 Jackson was free to join Lee. 
 
166 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 of your pursuers. Let a few more sucih efforts be made, and you 
 may confidently hope that our beautiful Valley will be cleansed from 
 the j)ollution of the invader's i)resence. The major-general com- 
 manding invites you to observe to-morrow evening, June 14, from 
 3 o'clock P.M., as a season of thanksgiving, by a snspension of all 
 military exercises, and by holding divine service in the several regi- 
 ments." 
 
 The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic closed the Valley 
 campaign of 1862. Just three months had passed since Jackson, 
 with about four thousand six hundred (4600) troops, badly armed 
 and equipped, had fallen back from Winchester before the ad- 
 vance of Banks with thirty thousand (30,000) men. So feeble 
 seemed his force, and so powerless for offence, that when it had been 
 pushed forty miles to the rear. Banks began to send his force towards 
 Manassas to execute his part of " covering the Federal capital" in 
 McClellan's great campaign. While a large part of the Federal 
 ti'oops are on the march out of the Valley, and their commander is 
 himself en route from Winchester to Washington, Jackson, hastening 
 from his resting-place by a forced march, appears most unexpectedly 
 at Ivernstown, and hurls his little army with incredible force and fury 
 against the part of Banks's army which is yet behind. He is mis- 
 taken as to the number of the enemy. Three thousand five hundred 
 (3500) men, worn by a forced march, are not able to defeat the seven 
 thousand (7000) of Shields. After a fierce struggle he suffers a severe 
 repulse ; but he makes such an impression as to cause the recall of 
 Banks and his corps, and to lead to the detachment of a strong force 
 from McClellan to protect Washington. The Federal administration 
 cannot believe that he has attacked Shields with a handful of men. 
 
 Falling back before his pursuers to New Market, and thenCe to 
 Harrisonburg, he there leaves the main road, and crossing over to 
 Elk Run valley, at the foot of the Blue Ridge, he takes a position in 
 which he cannot be readily attacked, and which yet enables him so to 
 threaten the flank of his opponent as effectually to check his further 
 progress up the Valley. Here he gains ten days' time for the reor- 
 ganization of his regiments, tlie time of service of most of which 
 expired in April, and here, too, he finds that the return of furloughed 
 men and the accession of volunteers in the past mouth has doubled 
 his numbers. 
 
 Finding that no more troops could be obtained besides those of 
 Ewell and Edward Johnson, he leaves the former to hold Banks in 
 check, while he makes a rapid and circuitous march, by way of Port 
 
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 167 
 
 Republic and across the mountains at Brown's gap, to Mechum's 
 River station, on the Virginia Central railroad. Hence he goes via 
 Staunton to Gen. Edward Johnson's position at West View. Uniting 
 Johnson's force with his own, he appears suddenly in front of Milroy 
 at McDowell, only eight days after having left Elk Run valley. He 
 has marched a hundred miles and crossed the Blue Ridge twice in 
 this time, and now repulses Milroy and Schenck, and follows them up 
 to Franklin. Then finding Fremont within supporting distance, he, 
 on May 12, begins to retrace his steps. He hastens on through Har- 
 risonburg, New Market, Luray, — Ewell joining him on the road and 
 swelling his force to sixteen thousand (16,000) men, — and on May 23 
 unexpectedly appears at Front Royal (a distance by his route of nearly 
 one hundred and twenty miles from FrankKn) and surprises and com- 
 pletely overwhelms the force Banks has stationed there. Next day 
 he strikes with damaging effect at Banks's retreating column between 
 Strasburg and Winchester, and follows him up all the night. At 
 dawn (May 25) he attacks him on the heights of Winchester, forces 
 him from his position, and drives him in confusion and dismay to the 
 Potomac, with the loss of immense stores and a large number of pris- 
 oners. Resting but two days, Jackson marches to Harper's Ferry, 
 threatens an invasion of Maryland, and spreads such an alarm as to 
 paralyze the movement of McDowell's forty thousand (40,000) men 
 at Fredericksbiu'g, and to cause the attempted concentration of the 
 greater part of this force, together with Fremont's command, in his 
 rear. The militia of the adjoining States is called out. Troops are 
 hurried to Harper's Ferry in his front. Nearly sixty thousand 
 (60,000) troops in all, are hastening under the most urgent telegrams 
 to close in around him. Keeping up his demonstrations until the last 
 moment, until, indeed, the head of McDowell's column was already 
 crossing the Blue Ridge, and but twelve or fourteen miles from his 
 line of retreat, at a point nearly fifty miles in his rear, he, by a forced 
 march of a day and a half, traverses this distance of fifty miles and 
 places himself at Strasburg. Here he keeps Fremont at bay until his 
 long train of prisoners and captured stores has passed through in safety 
 and his rear guard closed up. Then he falls back before Fremont, 
 while by burning successively the bridges over the Main Fork of 
 the Shenandoah, he destroys all co-operation between his two pur- 
 suers. Arrived at a point when he thinks there is no further need 
 for retreat, he turns off from Harrisonbm-g to Port Republic, seizes 
 the only bridge left south of Front Royal over the Shenandoah, and 
 takes a position which enables him to fight his adversaries in succes- 
 
1(58 CAMPAIGN IX THE VALLEV OF VIRGINIA, 1S61-62. 
 
 sion, wliilc tlicy cannot succor cadi otlicr. By wonderful celerity and 
 darinji;, he has extricated himself from tiie dant^ers which a week be- 
 fore gathered around him at Winchester. Then, nearly sixty thousand 
 (60,000) men -were encirclin<2^ him. In a day or two he must have 
 been overwhelmed. Now he has left the great mass of these troops 
 fifty miles in the rear. Fremont alone is for the moment within 
 reach. Jackson deals him a staggering blow, and next morning, with- 
 drawing suddenly from his front and destroying the bridge to prevent 
 his follo^dng, attacks the advance brigades of Shields and completely 
 defeats them, driving them several miles from the battle-field. 
 
 With a force at no time exceeding seventeen thousand (17,000) 
 men Jackson has beaten all his adversaries in succession, and, though 
 they so largely exceeded him in strength, he has managed every- 
 where, except at Kernstown, to concentrate equal or superior num- 
 bers upon the point attacked. Thus at McDowell he throws double 
 their force on Milroy and Schenck. AVhen he leaves Fremont's front 
 at Franklin, on May 12, he is much farther from Banks at Strasburg 
 than any of the large bodies of Federal troops at Fredericksburg or 
 around Washington, and yet he succeeds in overwhelming Banks with 
 greatly superior numbers. Again, Avhen he has completely out- 
 marched the armies which attempt to surround him and turns at bay 
 at Port Eepublic, he is ready to receive Fremont's attack with equal 
 forces, and next day can concentrate two or three times their o'«ti 
 strength against Shields's brigades, if it be necessary. 
 
 Now followed a week of rest, the first since the army had left 
 Swift Run gap on the 30th of April. But to the indefatigable com- 
 mander it was but a week of preparation for another series of great 
 deeds on a different theatre. The great soldier who at this time com- 
 manded the Confederate armies had already (see note, page 165, Lee's 
 letter, June 8) informed Jackson of the intended union of his forces 
 with those near Richmond. On the 11th of June, in congratulating 
 him on his recent successes. Gen. Lee informs him that Lawi:on's and 
 Whiting's commands had been sent to his assistance, but at the same 
 time du-ects that Jackson move rapidly with the whole force to Ash- 
 land, and thence between the Chickahominy and Pamunky rivers, on 
 McClellan's communications.^ 
 
 ^ Gen. Lee's letter is as follows : 
 
 " Headquarters near Richmond, 
 "June 11. 
 " Maj.-Gen. Jackson, etc. : — Your recent successes have been the cause of the 
 liveliest joy in this army as well as in the country. The admiration excited 
 by your skill and boldness has been constantly mingled with solicitude for your 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 169 
 
 Eveiy precaution was taken to deceive the enemy and produce on 
 their part the expectation of an advance along the Valley in stronger 
 force than before. AMiiting's and LaA\'ton's troops were sent from 
 Richmond for this purpose, and Jackson manoeuvred his cavahy so 
 as to create the same impression. The prisoners sent to Richmond 
 by Jackson met the reinforcements coming up. The paroled Federal, 
 officers soon carried this news to Washington, while Federal spies 
 confirmed it. An amusing ruse-de-guerre of Col. Munford, command- 
 ing the cavalry, upon receiving a flag of truce from Gen. Fremont 
 asking for his wounded, strengthened the impression. The Federal 
 officers bearing the flag were brought to Col. INIuuford's quarters, and 
 while awaiting an answer from Gen. Jackson it was arranged that 
 they should overhear a pretended report, brought to the colonel by 
 Mr. W. W. Gilmer, who assumed the role of orderly, in which the 
 road from Staunton was represented as being filled with the troops 
 coming to join Jackson. The news was spread through the town 
 (Harrisonburg), and in the midst of the excitement consequent uj)on 
 it the Federal officers were returned to their own lines, their request 
 having been declined.^ The Confederate lines were made as close as 
 
 situation. The practicability of reinforcing you has been the subject of earnest 
 consideration. It has been determined to do so at the expense of weakenino- 
 this army. Brig.-Gen. Lawton, with six regiments from Georgia, is on the way 
 to you, and Brig.-Gen. Whiting, with eight veteran regiments, leaves here to- 
 day. The object is to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you. Leave 
 your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by 
 your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including Ewell's division 
 and Lawton"s and Whiting's commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or 
 otherwise as you may find more advantageous, sweep down between the Chicka- 
 hominy and Pamunky rivers, cutting up the enemy's communications, etc., 
 while this ai-my attacks Gen. McClellan in front. He will thus, I think, be 
 forced to come out of his entrenchments, where he is strongly posted on the 
 Chickahominy, and apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on 
 Richmond. Keep me advised of your movements, and if practicable precede 
 your troops, that we may confer and arrange for simultaneous attack. 
 
 "R.E.Lee." 
 
 On June 16, Gen. Lee again wrote : 
 
 " I have received your letter by the Hon. Mr. Boteler. I hope you will be 
 able to recruit and refresh your troops sufiiciently for the movement proposed 
 in my letter of the 11th . . . From your account of the position of the enemy, 
 I think it would be difficult for you to engage him in time to reunite with this 
 army in the battle for Richmond. Fremont and Shields are apparently retro- 
 grading, their troops shaken and disorganized ; some time will be required to set 
 them again in the field. If this be so, the sooner you unite with this army the 
 better. ... In moving your troops you could let it be understood that it was 
 to pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the Valley so as to 
 deceive the enemy. . . .'' 
 
 ^ Dabney, p. 432, etc. Gen. Jackson says, in a despatch to Col. Munford, 
 
 June 13 : " Please impress the bearers of the flag of truce as much as possible 
 
 12 
 
170 CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1861-62. 
 
 possible to prevent information getting through, and all passing was 
 prohibited.^ These and such like were the " significant demonstra- 
 tions" which caused Gen. Fremont to retreat until he finally joined 
 Banks's troops at Middletown, on June 24. They were thoroughly 
 effective, for Gen. Banks telegraphed to Washington on the 12th 
 that " Jackson is heavily reinforced and is advancing," and on the 
 19th he says: "No doubt another immediate movement down the 
 Valley is intended with a force of thirty thousand (30,000) or more." 
 He opposed the withdrawal of Shields strongly, in the same telegram. 
 On the 22d he is still on the alert for Jackson's and Ewell's move- 
 ments, and on the 28th, when Jackson was fighting at Richmond, 
 Banks telegraphs that he believes Jackson meditates an attack in the 
 Valley!^ 
 
 Gen. McDowell had been ordered^ as early as June 8 to collect his 
 forces with a view to resuming his march by way of Fredericksburg 
 to join McClellau, but in consequence of the victories of Cross Keys 
 and Port Republic, and of the strong conviction wrought in the minds 
 of Fremont and Banks of another advance by Jackson, he was delayed 
 in getting his troops out of the Valley ; and when they did move, it 
 was towards Manassas, and not Richmond. Rickett's division left 
 Front Royal for Manassas on the 17th of June, and it was followed 
 by Shields's. 
 
 On this same day Jackson, having disposed of his various enemies 
 and effected the permanent withdrawal of the greater part of Mc- 
 Dowell's corps* from the forces operating against Richmond, again 
 
 with an idea of a heavy advance on our part, and let them return under such 
 impression." (See Paper of Col. Munford in Southern Historical Papers, 
 November, 1879.) 
 
 ^ In despatches dated June 17, Jackson says to Col. Munford: "Do all you 
 can to cut off communication across the lines between us and the enemy ; also 
 let there be as little communication as practicable between your command and 
 that of the infantry. Let your couriers be men whom you can trust, and cau- 
 tion them against carrying news forward, as it may reach the enemy." Again : 
 " I will be at Mount Sidney to-night about ten o'clock. Can you meet me there? 
 I will be on my horse at the north end of the town, so you need not inquire 
 after me. I do not desire it to be known that I am absent from this point. . . . 
 Say to those who come on this side (the lines) that for a few days they will 
 have to remain on this side, as no one is permitted to pass the lines to the 
 enemy's side." (See Col. Munford's Paper.) 
 
 ^ See Federal official telegrams, adjutant-general's office, Washington. 
 
 * McDowell's testimony. Report on Conduct of the War, Part I. p. 275. 
 
 * The division that McDowell had left at Fredericksburg (McCall's) was sent 
 to McClellan, but the other three divisions were retained, and became later in 
 the summer a part of Gen. John Pope's " Army of Virginia."' 
 
CROSS KEFS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 171 
 
 began to march, and, wliile Banks, Fremont, and McDoAvell were 
 di.si>osing their broken or baffled forces to cover Washington, liastened 
 to throw his sword into the scale in that great series of battles which, 
 during the last days of June and the early ones in July, resulted in 
 the defeat of McClellan's army and the relief of the Confederate 
 capital. 
 
 But here our present work ends. Brilliant as were the achieve- 
 ments of Gen. Jackson during the succeeding months of his too brief 
 career, it was his Valley campaign which first lifted him into great 
 fame ; nor do any of his subsequent deeds show more strikingly the 
 characteristics of his genius. 
 
N O T E. 
 
 The following is a list of the officers who served during parts, or during the 
 whole of the Valley campaign on Gen. Jackson's staflf. They were not all on 
 duty at the same time, but from the loss of the order books of the command the 
 dates of assignment and the periods of service are in many cases not known. 
 
 As Adjutant^General: 
 
 As Assistant Adjutant-General : 
 As Inspector-General : 
 
 As Chief of Artillery : 
 
 As Assistant to Chief of Artillery 
 
 As Engineer: 
 
 As Topographical Engineer : 
 
 As Medical Director : 
 
 As Acting Medical Director : 
 
 As Ordnance Officer : 
 
 As Chief Quartermaster : 
 
 As Acting Chief Quartermaster; 
 
 As Chief Commissary:. 
 As Aide-de-Camp : 
 
 (Volunteer) 
 
 Lieut.-Col. J. T. L. Preston (to February 
 
 1, 1862). 
 Maj. A. H. Jackson. 
 Maj. R. L. Dabney (assigned April 2-i, 
 
 1862). 
 Lieut. A. S. Pendleton. 
 Lieut.-Col. W. S. 11. Baylor (to April 24, 
 
 1862). 
 Col. A. Smead. 
 Lieut. H. Kyd Douglas. 
 Maj. D. Trueheart. 
 Lieut.-Col. S. Crutchfield. 
 Lieut. Ed. Willis. 
 Lieut. J. K. Boswell. 
 Mr. Jed. Ilotchkiss. 
 Surgeon Hunter McGuire. 
 Surgeon II. Black. 
 Lieut. Jas. M. Garnett. 
 Lieut. II. H. Lee. 
 Lieut. R. II. Meade. 
 Maj. John A. Harman. 
 Lieut.-Col. M. G. Harman (in January, 
 
 1862). 
 Capt. T. R. Sharp (in January, 1862). 
 Maj. Wells J. Hawks. 
 Lieut. A. S. Pendleton (throughout the 
 
 campaign). 
 Lieut. George G. Junkin. 
 Col. Charles J. Faulkeuer. 
 Col. W. L. Jackson. 
 
 172 
 
INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Attack on Hancock and Cacapon bridge. 22 
 Attack of Federals at Hanging Rock... 23 
 
 Advance of Jackson to Kernstown 45 
 
 Advance of Federals to Edenburg, 
 
 April 1 58 
 
 Affair with Rockingham militia 60 
 
 Advance of the Confederates to McDow- 
 ell 73 
 
 Advance of Jackson to Franklin 80 
 
 Attack on Federal train near Middle- 
 town 102 
 
 Advance of Jackson towards Harper's 
 
 Ferry 124 
 
 Attack on Confederate rear guard 136 
 
 Ashby covering the rear, June 2 138 
 
 Attack of Col. Wyndham on Ashby, 
 
 June 6 140 
 
 Attack of Gen. Bayard and death of 
 
 Ashby 142 
 
 Advance of Shields towards Port Re- 
 public 148 
 
 Bath occupied by Federals 14 
 
 Battle of Camp Alleghany {note) 17 
 
 Bath occupied by Confederates 21 
 
 Banks advances across the Potomac 36 
 
 Battle of Kernstown 46-53 
 
 Burial of dead after Kernstown 54 
 
 Blenker's division detached from Mc- 
 
 Clellan 56 
 
 Banks thinks Jackson has left the Val- 
 ley (uote) 62 
 
 Battle of McDowell 74-79 
 
 Banks's position and plans after rout 
 
 of Kenly 99, 100 
 
 Battle of Winchester 110-114 
 
 Bridge at Conrad's Store burnt 139 
 
 Battle of Cross Keys 152-156 
 
 Battle of Port Republic 158-163 
 
 Bridge at Port Republic burnt 161 
 
 Cutshaw's (Col.) account of affair at 
 
 Hanging Rock (note) 24 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Confederate disasters in Februai-y 35 
 
 Copeland's (Maj.) report of Kerns- 
 town (note) 52 
 
 Confederate conscription 60 
 
 Capture of a company of Ashby's cav- 
 alry, April 17 61 
 
 Condition of affairs on evening of May 
 
 30 131 
 
 Destruction of property at Hanging 
 
 Rock 25 
 
 Departments of the Shenandoah and 
 
 Rappahannock (note) 57 
 
 Dispersion of Kenly's command 96 
 
 Dispersion of Hatch's cavalry near Mid- 
 
 dletown 104 
 
 Death of Gen. Turner Ashby 142 
 
 Dash of Col. Carroll into Port Republic. 149 
 
 Expedition against Dam No. 5 16, 17 
 
 Evacuation of Romney by Federals 26 
 
 Evacuation of AVinchester by Confed- 
 erates, March 12 40, 41 
 
 Ewell's advance along Front Royal road. 107 
 Effects of Banks's defeat on McDowell 
 
 and McClellan 122 
 
 Fall of Fort Sumter and secession of 
 
 Virginia 10 
 
 First battle of Manassas (note) 11 
 
 Fight at Bloomery gap 34 
 
 Federal plan of campaign in Virginia... 42 
 
 Fremont's plan of campaign {note) 66, 67 
 
 Fight at Summersville 86 
 
 Fight at Front Royal, May 23 93-96 
 
 Fight at Buckton 98 
 
 Fight with Federal rear guard at New- 
 town 107 
 
 Federal troops hurried forward to Har- 
 per's Ferry 125 
 
 Fight at Charlestown 125 
 
 Fremont's and McDowell's movements. 
 
 May 31 and June 1 134 
 
 173 
 
174 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Fremont's description of the field at 
 
 Port Republic {note) 163 
 
 Garnet (Gen, Robert S.), death of. 13 
 
 Gordon's (Gen. G. H.) account of the 
 
 retreat from Strasburg {note) 10 
 
 Instructions to Jackson early in March. 38 
 
 Jackson's entrance into the war 10 
 
 Jackson ordered to Harper's Ferry 11 
 
 Johnston's (Gen. J. E.) march to Ma- 
 nassas 11 
 
 Jackson, major-general and assigned to 
 
 Valley district 12 
 
 Jackson's plan of campaign against 
 
 West Virginia 14 
 
 Johnson's (Brig.-Gen. Edward) com- 
 mand {note) 15 
 
 Jackson's notions of discipline....(no<e) 15 
 Jackson's letter asking for Gen. Edward 
 
 Johnson's forces 18 
 
 Jackson's report of Hanging Rock.(fio<e) 24 
 Jackson relinquishes movement against 
 
 New Creek 27 
 
 Jackson goes into winter quarters 28 
 
 Jackson's letter to Hon. J. P. Benja- 
 min, January 20 {note) 28 
 
 Jackson resigns his command 30 
 
 Johnston's (Gen. J. E.) letter to Jack- 
 son on his resignation {note) 30 i 
 
 Jackson's letter to Gen. J. E. Johnston, 
 
 February 24 37 
 
 Johnston's retreat from Manassas 38 
 
 Jackson's first and last council of war. 
 
 {jwte) 41 
 
 Jackson, night after Kernstown...(»io<e) 64 
 Jackson's action about Dunkards, etc. 
 
 {note) 59 
 
 Jackson camps at foot of Swift Run 
 
 gap 61 
 
 Jackson's position at Swift Run gap 63 
 
 Jackson's letter to Gen. Lee from Swift 
 
 Run gap {note) 63 
 
 Jackson's plan of campaign 68 
 
 Jackson reaches Staunton, May 4 71 
 
 Jackson's march against Banks 91 
 
 Jackson's plans for May 24 102 
 
 Jackson's order to his troops after Win- 
 chester 124 
 
 Jackson's plans for June 9 157 
 
 Jackson's camp at Mount Meridian 165 
 
 Jackson's order to his troops, June 13.. 165 
 
 Kelly, Gen., occupies Romney 13 
 
 Lee (Gen. R. E.) sent to command in 
 
 West Virginia 13 
 
 Loring (Gen.) joins Jackson 15 
 
 Letcher (Gov.), action in regard to Jack- 
 son's resignation 32 
 
 Losses of Confederates and Federals at 
 
 Kernstown 53 
 
 Lee's (Gen. R. E.) reply to request for 
 
 troops 65 
 
 Lee's instructions to Jackson and Ewell 
 
 early in May 88 
 
 Losses of Confederates and Federals at 
 
 Front Royal and Cedarville 97 
 
 Losses of Banks at Winchester.... (iio<e) 117 
 
 Losses of Confederates and Federals at 
 
 Cross Keys 156 
 
 Losses of Confederates and Federals at 
 
 Port Republic 162 
 
 Lee's letter of June 8 to Jackson. .(>io^e) 165 
 
 Lee's letters of June 11 and 16 to Jack- 
 son {note) 168 
 
 Movement of Jackson against Bath 
 
 and Romney 20 
 
 March from Bath to Unger's 23 
 
 McClellan's (Gen.) plan of campaign... 35 
 McCleilan's instructions to Banks, 
 
 March 16 43 
 
 Mountain Department (limits of). .(note) 55 
 McDowell's corps detached from Mc- 
 
 Clellan 57 
 
 McClellan's instructions to Banks after 
 
 Kernstown {note) 56 
 
 McDowell's (Gen. Irwin) movements in 
 
 A])ril So 
 
 Maryland line {note) 91 
 
 McDowell's march on Richmond coun- 
 termanded 119 
 
 Militia called out by northern Gover- 
 nors {note) 121 
 
 McDowell's and Fremont's movements 
 
 towards Jackson's rear 127 
 
 Organization of militia in the Valley of 
 
 Virginia 15 
 
 Organization of Ashby's cavalry 15 
 
 Organization of Gen. Loring's forces.... 18 
 
 Occupation of Romncj' by Jackson 26 
 
 Opequon church {note) 49 
 
 Order of May 27 to McDowell to move 
 
 on Richmond 87 
 
 Organization of Confederates at Win- 
 chester {note) 110 
 
 Organization of Fremont, June 8. .(note) 151 
 
 Organization of Ewell (note) 153 
 
INDEX. 
 
 175 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Plans of Gen. Rosecrans, January, 1862. 19 
 Plans of Gen. Lander, January, 1862... 20 
 Position of Jackson's forces, January 10, 
 
 1862 (note) 25 
 
 Position of Federal troops about March 
 
 6 ...{note) 36 
 
 Position of Ewell and Edward John- 
 son at end of April 66 
 
 Position of Milroy and Schenck at end 
 
 of April 66, 67 
 
 Position of Federals at middle of May. 86 
 President Lincoln's telegrams to Mc- 
 
 Clellan, May 25... 120 
 
 Precautions to deceive the Federals 169 
 
 Reoccupation of Romney by Federals... 34 
 
 Results of battle of Kernstown 55 
 
 Retreat of Jackson from Rude's Hill... 61 
 
 Route of Jackson against Milroy 69 
 
 Return of Jackson from Franklin 81 
 
 Results of victory at Winchester, etc.... 116 
 Railroads in United States taken for 
 
 military purposes {note) 121 
 
 Retreat of Jackson to Harper's Ferry... 130 
 Reoccupation of Front Royal by Shields 130 
 Retreat of Jackson from Winchester, 
 
 May 31 132 
 
 Retreat of Jackson from Strasburg, 
 
 June 1 135 
 
 Retreat of Jackson towards Port Re- 
 public 139 
 
 Recapture of the bridge of Port Repub- 
 lic 150 
 
 Resume of the campaign 166 
 
 Strength of Jackson's forces, November 
 
 and December, 1861 {note) 15 
 
 Strength of Jackson's forces, January 
 
 10, 1862 {note) 18 
 
 Strength of Banks, January, 1862 19 
 
 Strength of Rosecrans, January, 1862.. 19 
 
 Strength of Jackson, March 1 39 
 
 Strength of Banks, March 2 {note) 40 
 
 Strength of Banks, April 1 39 
 
 Strength and organization of Jackson 
 
 at Kernstown 47 
 
 Strength and organization of Shields 
 
 at Kernstown {note) 48 
 
 Strength of Federal troops covering 
 
 Washington 57 
 
 Strength of Gen. Edward Johnson in 
 
 March, 1862 {note) 66 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Strength of Milroy and Schenck in 
 
 April, 1862 66 
 
 Strength of Fremont {note) 66 
 
 Strength of Jackson at end of April 68 
 
 Strength of Banks at end of April 69 
 
 Strength and losses of Jackson at Mc- 
 Dowell 77, 78 
 
 Strength and losses of Milroy and 
 
 Schenck at McDowell 77, 78 
 
 Strength and organization of Ewell's 
 
 division 91 
 
 Strength of Confederates, May 2\...{note) 92 
 Strength and position of Banks's force. 
 
 May 23 {note) 93 
 
 Strength and organization of Banks at 
 
 Winchester {note) 109 
 
 Stampede of Gens. Geary and Duryea 
 
 {note) 120 
 Strength of Jackson and his enemies. 
 
 May 30 127 
 
 Sketch of Ashby 143 
 
 Strength of Federals and Confederates, 
 
 June 8 146 
 
 Shields's despatch to Fremont, June 8 
 
 {note) 151 
 Strength of Ewell and Fremont at Cross 
 
 Keys {note) 156 
 
 Strength of Federal forces and Winder's 
 
 brigade, June 9 {note) 159 
 
 Shields's and Fremont's retreat 164 
 
 Transfer of main Confederate army to 
 
 Peninsula 62 
 
 Transfer of Shields to McDowell 85 
 
 Topography of the Valley of Virginia.. 89 
 Trimble's (Gen. I. R.) reminiscences of 
 
 battle of Winchester 128 
 
 Topography of the vicinity of Port Re- 
 public 145 
 
 Trimble's description of fight on his 
 
 front, June 8 {note) 154 
 
 Valley district, limits of. 19 
 
 Withdrawal of Federals from Stras- 
 burg, March 21 44 
 
 Withdrawal of Milroy's advance to Mc- 
 Dowell 72 
 
 Withdrawal of Banks from Harrison- 
 burg .^ 86 
 
 Whitehouse and Columbia bridges 
 
 burnt 137