- , << - S V ■ : ■ . -^ & ^ N iU % % $■' f .. ^ <$ ?> r >. •fi ■ - \ o V -/> % \ V ^ v» ^ < •^ O r^ V ^ V * "^ ^ V >A - x G o- c*v ^ -7* V v * o ,. •* S- s- ,f *r - ,0 c? Taot LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. that an attack was to be made on Columbus, but that, if successful, would be another Manassas in the West. It would indeed open a certain distance down the Mississippi, but would leave the interior line un- touched. The state of uncertainty was, however, soon to be ended. Near the boundary line of Kentucky and Ten- nessee, about sixty miles east of Columbus, and about the same distance, on the common roads, from the Ohio River at Smithland, is Dover, on the Tennessee River. At this place, to which the general direction of the Cumberland and Tennessee from the Ohio is nearly parallel, these rivers approach to within twelve miles of each other. To stop the navigation of those streams by the Union boats, and thus to prevent the approaches to Nashville by water, and to Alabama by Tuscumbia and Florence, was to the rebel defenses a matter of supreme importance. This position was, perhaps, the most essential in their line of defense. Accordingly, as soon as they could, and long before it was known to our authorities, the rebels com- menced building the fortification near Dover, now known as Forts Henry and Donelson. They were planned for very extensive and powerful fortifications, which, luckily for us, the rebels never were able to complete. The real object of the forces designated by the President in his Order 1 as the "Army and Flotilla at Cairo," was these fortifications. In his return from the late reconnoissance, General C. F. 1 In a most singular Order, dated January 27, 1862, the President ordered a general movement of land and naval forces on the 22d of February. PREPARING TO STORM FORT HENRY. 69 Smith, who it will be remembered took one column from Smithland, in obedience to Grant's orders, struck the Tennessee River about twenty miles below Fort Henry. 1 "There he met Commander Phelps, of the Navy, with a gun-boat, patrolling the river. After a brief conference with that energetic officer, General Smith decided to get upon the gun-boat and run up for a look at Fort Henry. The boat steamed up sufficiently near to draw the enemy's fire and obtain a just idea of the armament of the work. Smith re- turned at once, and reported to General Grant his conviction that, with three or four of ' the turtle iron- clads,' and a strong cooperating land force, Fort Henry might be easily captured, if the attack should be made within a short time." Time was here of the utmost importance, for the enemy had planned, and were rapidly constructing, an imposing fortress. Grant immediately forwarded the report to Halleck; but Halleck was a slow officer. Four or five days elapsed without a reply, when, on the 28th of Jan- uary, Grant and Foote both sent dispatches to Hal- leck, asking permission to storm Fort Henry, and hold it for ulterior operations. On the 29th Grant wrote an urgent letter, and on the 30th, in the after- noon, a dispatch was received from Halleck, directing him to make preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. To do General Halleck justice, we should remember that he had been making a great concen- tration of troops, and undoubtedly intended an im- portant expedition. ' Coppee's " Grant and His Campaigns " is the authority for this statement. 70 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Let us now see what Fort Henry was, and how taken. The best account of the fort, and the attack, is given by the correspondent of the "Cincinnati Gazette," in a letter, dated February 7, 1862. His account of the fort is thus minutely given : " The fort is of the class known as a full bas- tioned earthwork, standing directly upon the bank of the river, and incloses about two acres. It mounts seventeen heavy guns, including one ten-inch Colum- biad, throwing a round shot of one hundred and twenty-eight pounds weight ; one breech-loading rifled gun, carrying a sixty-pound elongated shot ; twelve thirty-two-pounders ; one twenty-four-pounder rifled, and two twelve-pounder siege-guns. Nearly all the guns are pivoted, and capable of being turned in any desired direction. The fort is surrounded by a deep moat, and, when fully garrisoned, would be almost impregnable against any force which could be brought against it from the land side. Evidently its designers did not anticipate so formidable an attack from the river, and, certainly, nothing less well defended than our iron-clad gun-boats could have attacked it with any hope of success." The forces brought against it consisted of twenty regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, 1 four 1 The division under General MeClernand was composed of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-Seventh, Twenty-Ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-First Illinois Regiments of Infantry, making one brigade ; the Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-Fifth, and Forty-Eighth, making the Second Brigade, with the Fourth Cavalry. The Second Division, General C. F. Smith, was composed of the Seventh, Ninth, Twelfth, Twenty-Eighth, and Forty-First Illinois Regiments; the Eleventh Indiana; the Seventh and Twelfth Iowa; and the Eighth and Thirteenth Missouri, with artil- lery and cavalry. LAND AND NAVAL FORCES. *]\ independent companies of cavalry, and four batteries of artillery, and others not named, attached to Smith's Division ; the whole formed into two divisions, un- der the command of Generals McClernand and C. F. Smith. The naval force consisted of six gun-boats, which had recently been built, and were now to try the force of their batteries. They were the Essex, Com- mander Porter ; the Carondelet, Commander Walke ; the Cincinnati, Commander Stembel ; the St. Louis, Lieutenant-Commanding Paulding ; the Conestoga, Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps ; the Tylor, Lieu- tenant-Commanding Gwyn ; and the Lexington, Lieutenant-Commanding Shirk. The land forces were under the command of Grant, and the naval, of Foote. On the 5 th of Feb- ruary, the whole expedition had arrived below Fort Henry, and Grant issued his order to commence the attack next morning, and make the investment at 11, A. M. 1 It was agreed that the army should land, cut off the communication, and the navy attack the batteries in front. In fact, the army did land, and encamped for the night on the ridges near the fort ; but the navy got to work early in the morning, and actually captured the fort alone. The intermediate proceedings are thus described by the correspondent of the " Cincinnati Gazette : " 2 " That night our troops, with the exception of General Smith's Brigade, which had crossed to the west side of the river, encamped on a ridge of hills parallel with the river, and about half a mile from it. 1 Grant's Report to Halleck, of February 6. 2 Rebellion Record, Vol. IV, page 70. 72 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Their camp-fires, scattered all along the sides of the ridge among the trees, for more than a mile, pre- sented that night one of the most beautiful sights I have ever witnessed, and, no doubt, being observed by the enemy, gave the impression that our force was much larger than was really the case. Probably this might have had something to do in causing their precipitate flight afterward. " During the night, a tremendous storm arose, accompanied with thunder and lightning, thoroughly soaking the soft clay soil, and rendering locomotion, especially in the low grounds, almost impossible. "The writer moved with the troops, who started at II, A. M., according to the order, and were strug- gling along through mud, caused by the rain of the night before. In the mean time the gun-boats com- menced shelling. For some three hours we thus struggled along, when suddenly the roar of a heavy gun came booming over the hills, and another, and another, told us that the gun-boats had commenced the attack. For an instant the entire column seemed to halt to listen, then springing forward, we pushed on with redoubled vigor. But mile after mile of slippery hills and muddy swamps were passed over, and still the fort seemed no nearer. We could plainly hear the roar of the guns, and the whistle of the huge shells through the air, but the high hills and dense woods completely obstructed the view. " Suddenly the firing ceased. We listened for it to recommence, but all was still. We looked in each other's faces, and wonderingly asked : ' What does it mean ? Is it possible that our gun-boats have been FOR T HENR Y S URRENDERED. 73 beaten back ? ' for that the rebels should abandon this immense fortification, on which the labor of thou- sands had been expended for months, after barely an hour's defense, and before our land troops had even come in sight of them, seemed too improbable to believe. Cautiously we pressed forward, but erelong one of our advance scouts came galloping back, an- nouncing that the rebels had abandoned the fort, and seemed to be forming in line of battle on the hills adjoining. With a cheer our boys pressed for- ward. Soon came another messenger, shouting that the enemy had abandoned their intrenchments com- pletely, and were now in full retreat through the woods." The battle of the gun-boats against the fort lasted but an hour and a quarter, in which time all the cannon in the fort were knocked to pieces ; its garrison had literally run away, escaping early in the morning on the road to Dover, leaving Tilghman, the commander, with one company of artillerists, and the sick. It was not till the fort was made utterly untenable that Tilghman hoisted the white flag and surrendered. The surrender was made to Commo- dore Foote and the Navy. Foote immediately turned the fort and prisoners over to General Grant. The official dispatch to Halleck gives • this brief account of the matter: " The gun-boats started up at the same hour to commence the at- tack, and engaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards. In little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp and garrison equipage, etc. The prisoners taken are General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, 7 74 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. I think, must have commenced their retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning. "Had I not felt it an imperative necessity to attack Fort Henry to-day, I should have made the investment complete, and delayed till to-morrow, so as to secure the garrison. I do not now believe, however, the result would have been any more satisfactory. " The gun-boats have proven themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clad boats received more or less shots — the flag-ship some twenty-eight — without any serious damage to any, ex- cept the Essex. This vessel received one shot in her boiler that dis- abled her, killing and wounding some thirty-two men, Captain Porter among the wounded. " I remain your obedient servant, "U. S. Grant, Brigadier- General." The Confederate forces, which really had made the garrison of Fort Henry, but escaped, amounted to five thousand men. 1 These took the road to Do- ver, and subsequently made part of the garrison of Fort Donelson. Grant telegraphed to Halleck that Fort Henry had fallen, and added : " I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th." Badeau says : 2 " This was the first mention of Fort Donelson, whether in conver- sation or dispatches, between the two commanders. Halleck made no reply, but notified Buell on the 7th, " General Grant expects to take Fort Donelson, at Dover, to-morrow." This statement of Col. Badeau, which is confirmed by Halleck's dispatch, is important to the true per- sonal history of the fall of Fort Donelson, for it is conclusive that Grant was the originator of the attack on Donelson, as C. F. Smith was of that on Fort Henry, by his report of the reconnoissance made by himself and Commander Phelps ; but, as he had been 1 Badeau's "Military History," page 33. 2 Idem. IMPORTANCE OF THE VICTORY. 75 sent out by Grant, it seems most probable that the original idea of this campaign belonged to Grant. Halleck's instructions, which were given on the 30th of January, were full, but they were given after Grant's urgent solicitations, and made no mention of Donelson. The news of the fall of Fort Henry was received by the country with universal joy ; President, Con- gress, and people rejoiced together. Nor was it without the best reason. Two weeks before, the battle of Mill Springs had been fought and won by Thomas. That was the first battle we had gained, except the affairs of Western Virginia, and great was the rejoicing. But that battle, it was soon seen, was without consequences. The advance of Zollicoffer was only an inroad from the enemy's general line of defense on the Cumberland into Kentucky. The defeat of his force exhilarated us with the thought of a victory opportune and encouraging ; but it ac- complished nothing. There was no fortification or strategic point in front, to take which would seriously impair their line of defense ; nor did General Thomas attempt any. He was satisfied to cooperate in Ken- tucky with the army of General Buell. The fall of Fort Henry was an event of totally different character. It was not the gaining of a battle to inspire us with the sounds of victory ; but it was vastly more im- portant. It was the gaining of a strategic point which ultimately involved the permanent breaking of the rebel line. Let the reader recollect that we were the invading force, and that invasion must be successful and conquest complete, or the unity of the nation j6 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. could not be restored, and the war would be a worth- less expense of blood and wealth. Now suppose (what was the real fact) that the rebels were able to take and keep a line of defense, which we were con- tinually attacking, but unable to break. While they were able to do this, we would never succeed. But now comes a time when, even without a battle, we have broken that line, and the sun does not rise in heaven with more certainty than that, if we can hold that broken point, we shall drive the whole line back, and make the campaign successful. The great public rejoiced because we had evident successes, when, in- deed, we needed them much ; but it was only the educated soldier, with the coup eFceil for military strategy, who could comprehend what the almost bloodless fall of Fort Henry really accomplished. Let the reader now come with me to far bloodier fields and apparently greater results, but which were all assured consequences of this success. "ALL IS %UIET ON THE POTOMAC" 'J 'J CHAPTER IV. DONELSON. "ALL IS QUIET ALONG THE POTOMAC" — THE SECOND UPRIS- ING^ THE PREPARATION — INVESTMENT OT DONELSON— STRENGTH OF THE FORT — REBEL ASSAULT — SMITH'S STORM AND CAPTURE OF THE REBEL INTRENCHMENTS — GRANT PROPOSES TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY ON THEIR WORKS — BUCK- NER'S SURRENDER — GRAND RESULTS — STRATEGY — BATTLE HYMN — SANITARY COMMISSION. IT was now near the middle of February, and the people had rejoiced for Mill Springs, and were gratified with the successes of Western Virginia ; but for ten long and weary months there was no break in the rebel lines till Fort Henry came. "All is quiet along the Potomac J" was the head-line of every news- paper, and the burden of every reporter. McClel- lan's army had been organized, drilled, marched and countermarched along the Potomac, with a check at Dranesville, and a bad disaster at Ball's Bluff. The months of November and December, with beautiful weather and fine roads, had passed away, with no action and no movement. The Army of the Po- tomac had gone into winter-quarters, and the year 1 86 1 closed with no real advance in the position of the armies. The people were impatient and disap- pointed. But one thing had been done, not very 78 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. obvious to the eye, but great in fact. It had been the day of preparation. Lincoln had called, not seventy- five thousand, but half a million of men into the field. They had come with the alacrity of youth going to the dance. Along the great rivers, in the valleys of the interior, in the thronged cities, the flag waved in the breeze and the drum-beat was heard in the air. There was no cessation in the uprising of the people. Armories were preparing rifles, muskets, and pistols, by the tens of thousands. Great founderies were cast- ing enormous cannon. The graduates of West Point, taunted with the treachery of their companions in the rebel army, every-where volunteered, and, like Grant at the head of the Twenty-First Illinois, were com- manding regiments or brigades, drilling and organ- izing for active war. Long after Grant had left Cairo, regiments were still organizing and marching to the field from every part of the Western States. The Confederate Congress no longer laughed. Richmond no longer exulted in a prospective march to Wash- ington. One fact the rebels had learned, that they were to have war, and war with the united energies of the Government and nation against them. They realized at last that, although their line of defense was yet complete, though the Southern people had rallied to the Confederate Government with unex- pected zeal, yet they had gained nothing, and the best to be expected for them was not peace and pros- perity, but a successful defense, after years of bloody and desolating war. How was that defense to be made against far superior strength and resources? Some of their military ideas may be learned from a FORT DONELSON IN 1862. 79 speech of Mr. Davis, President of the Confederacy, made at the beginning of the war, at the time of adjourning the Confederate Congress to Richmond. He declared that such were the natural advantages of Virginia that it could be defended for twenty years. The advantages of Virginia, as a defensive ground, are unquestionable ; but what would Virginia be but a besieged and insulated fortification, if the lines of communication, west and south, and with them its resources, were cut off? Here was the real solution of the problem, and Mr. Davis, even to the last mo- ment, failed to see this, and utterly failed to compre- hend the elements of the great military question with which he had now to deal. Nor is it very evident that our own Government comprehended it better. For ten weary months, as I have said, no successful attack was made on the rebel lines ; but the prepara- tion was making, and perhaps that was all we could then accomplish. Now we have come to Fort Henry, and it is the first telling blow on the enemy's great defense. If no more was done, it opened the Tennessee River to the gun-boats. But more, much more was to be done. Grant had telegraphed Halleck, that he should attack Donelson on the 8th ; but great armies can not be timed to a day, and so the assault was a little later. Let us first see what Fort Donelson was in February, 1862. Near the town of Dover, on the Cum- berland River, two small streams run into that river, whose mouths were about a mile and a quarter apart, but in the rear were separated by three miles. The whole intermediate space, as well as that around SO LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Dover, was a " conglomerate of hills and valleys, knolls and ravines." 1 The little streams formed the right and left defenses of the rebel line, which ex- tended nearly three miles, and was strongly in- trenched. 2 Within these were detached works and secondary lines, one of which extended round the town of Dover, and part of which commanded the outer line. Then there were rivulets, gullies, ravines, woods, and natural obstacles of all kinds. On some of the commanding hills were posted light batteries, and on the water side below, where a bend enabled them to command the river, were placed heavy water batteries. The main fort, says Badeau, 3 was built on a precipitous hight, or rather range, cloven by a deep gorge opening to the south ; it was about three quarters of a mile from the breastworks, and over- looked both the river and the interior. It covered one hundred acres of ground, and was defended by fifteen heavy guns and two carronades. The lower or main water battery, which was built with massive parapets and embrasures, formed of coffee sacks filled with sand, was armed with eight thirty-two pound guns, and one ten-inch Columbiad. The other water battery was armed with one heavy rifled gun, carrying a hundred and twenty-eight pound bolt, and two thirty-two pound carronades. 4 It is very evident, from this description, that Donelson was one of the strongest fortified points held by the rebels during the war, and at this time altogether the strongest. Its natural defenses were 1 Coppee's description. 3 Badeau's Military History, page 37. 5 Badeau's description. A Coppee's Grant, page 50. ESTIMATE OF REBEL COMMANDERS. 8 1 very great ; the works were extensive, and were fully armed and manned. In addition to the armament already described, there were six light batteries, mak- ing in all sixty-five cannon ; and the garrison was composed of full twenty-one thousand men. 1 The five thousand men who left Fort Henry were there, and strong reinforcements were received from Bowl- ing Green. The garrison was composed of thirteen regiments from Tennessee ; two from Kentucky ; two from Alabama ; six from Mississippi ; one from Texas ; four from Virginia ; two independent battalions of Tennessee infantry ; Forrest's Brigade of Cavalry, and the artillerists necessary to man all the batteries. It has since been ascertained, that the total number was at least twenty-one thousand. Such was Donel- son ; strong by nature, admirably fortified, and fully manned. Yet, Donelson wanted one thing, which is certainly of the greatest importance to an army. It wanted a General! The commander of the South- Western Department, for the rebels, was A. Sydney Johnston, a man who is mentioned by all with respect, and was supposed to have the best military mind in the rebel army. Unfortunately for the rebel army, he did not command at Fort Donelson. Still more unfortunately, the actual commander was Floyd, who was respected by few, and died with no better name than he had lived. He was not only a traitor, says Professor Coppee, but believed to be dishonest, and proved to be a coward. But worse than even all this for the rebels, he was no general, and in truth pos- sessed of little military capacity. The next in com- 1 Badeau, page 51, note. $2 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. mand was Pillow, who was more honest, but no less ignorant than Floyd. The third was Buckner, who did know something of the military art, and although an early and persistent traitor, was brave and intelli- gent. Such was Donclson and its defenders. Let us now follow the attack. The attack was to have been made on the 8th ; but the roads were impassable for artillery, and heavy rains so flooded the country that no movement could be made, and Grant wrote, "We are perfectly locked in." During the days of waiting, reinforcements were brought in from Buell's command, and from Hunter in Missouri. 1 General Halleck, commander of the district in which Grant was, did not seem very much impressed with the possibility of advancing, for his orders were defensive. 2 He said : " Hold on to Fort Henry at all events. Impress slaves, if necessary, to strengthen your position as rapidly as possible. It is of vital importance to strengthen your position as rapidly as possible." It is always of importance to strengthen the position of an army ; so much so, that good officers will throw up some light timber, or abatis, before their encampment at night. But the thing to be done just now is to take Fort Donelson, and let us do it. As we march up, let us note, that by Halleck's order, it seems, the slaves had ceased to be an object of worship, sacred to treason, and protected by the Constitution. They can now be 1 Halleck, in a complimentary acknowledgment, said, that when he wanted troops to reenforce Grant, he applied to Hunter, who cheerfully supplied them. 2 Liadeau, page 36. INVESTMENT OF DONELSON. 83 impressed to serve the country ; that is one step gained. But let us go on. Grant stopped for neither re- enforcements, nor shovels, nor orders. On the 10th he writes to Foote that he is only waiting for the gun-boats. 1 " I feel that there should be no delay in this matter, and yet I do not feel justified in going without some of your gun-boats to cooperate. Can you not send two boats from Cairo immediately up the Cumberland?" News had now come that the rebels were reenforcing Fort Donelson ; every hour was of importance. On the nth Foote with his fleet started by the Ohio and Cumberland. Six regiments of troops, all that were ready, went with him. On the nth McClernand's Division moved out on two roads, and on the 12th the main column, fifteen thousand strong, marched from Fort Henry, leaving a garrison of twenty-five hundred there. 2 There were but few wagons and few rations, but the men carried forty rounds of cartridges. To prevent all retreat of the enemy one brigade was ordered to be thrown into Dover. The distance to march was twelve miles, and a little after noon Grant's army appeared in front of the fort. The first line was formed in open fields opposite the enemy's center. The left rested on Hickman Creek, and the line reached round to near Dover on the right. The overflow of waters pre- vented the completion of the line, but Donelson was practically invested. 3 Thursday, the 13th, was occupied in reconnoiter- ing, skirmishing, and taking positions. McClernand 1 Badeau, page 35. 2 Idem, page 36. 3 Idem, page 38. 84 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. attempted to capture a battery commanding the ridge road, but without orders, and was unsuccessful. In this day's work about three hundred were killed and wounded. The results were, that on the night of the 13th Grant was "established on a line of bights in general parallel with the enemy's works, and extending for a distance of over three miles." 1 Here we note two things of great interest in the siege, and which might have proved fatal. First, Grant found he was actually inferior to the enemy while besieging him. For some reason, not very obvious, the rebel general had not obstructed his march from Fort Henry, nor endeavored to obstruct his taking his position. Nevertheless, Grant found he had got into that position with a force inferior to that of the enemy. He immediately sent for the garrison of Fort Henry, and anxiously expected the fleet with reinforcements. In the mean while (on Thursday) a single gun-boat undertook a little battle on her own account. The correspondent of the " New York Times" says: "During the time that the land forces were engaged, the iron-clad gun-boat Caron- delet went up and singly engaged the rebel batteries. She fired one hundred and two shots, and received no great damage in all the tremendous fire to which she was exposed, save in the case of a single shot. This, a monster mass of iron, weighing at least one hundred and twenty-eight pounds, entered one of her forward ports, and, wounding eight men in its passage, dashed with terrific force against the breast- work of coal-bags in front of the boilers, and there 1 Badeau, page 40. SUFFERINGS OF OUR ARMY. 85 was stopped. Soon after this she retired from the unequal contest, having covered herself with glory for having so long singly withstood the enormous force of the rebels' entire water-battery. 1 But a second event occurred which, if not danger- ous to the army, was very severe upon the men. This was extreme cold. It was one of the coldest nights ever known in that region. Some of the men had thrown away their blankets. They could build no fires, for they were obliged to bivouac in line of battle, with arms in their hands, as they were within point-blank musket-range of the enemy. 2 Some of the men on both sides were frozen, while the wounded, who lay between the armies in that midnight cold, made the air resound with their cries. Such were the sufferings of our noble volunteers, who, encamped on the Cumberland, shivering in the cold, and in sight of a superior enemy, yet looked forward to the battle with confidence, and not in vain, to a coming victory. The night was thus passing, in the cold and gloom of winter, when, before daylight, Commodore Foote with the fleet came up, and the troops from Fort Henry, under Lewis Wallace, arrived, and were put in line. Friday, the 14th, went on with some skirmish- ing, an irregular fire of sharp-shooters, and the rebel shells falling into our line. At three o'clock, P. M., six gun-boats, four of them iron-clad, attacked the fort, but the batteries were heavy, had complete command of the river, and the attack was disastrous. •Rebellion Record, Vol. IV, page 172. 2 Badeau, page 40. 86 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The correspondent of the " New York Times " thus describes it : " I secured a position about half-way between the boats and fort, a little out of the line of fire, and there, for two hours, had the pleasure of listening to a concert of the most gigantic order. At first the roar from fort and boats was unbroken for a single in- stant, so rapid was the firing, while the air high over- head seemed filled with a million of hissings, as the heavy storm of shells tore furiously ahead on their mission of destruction. In about half an hour the fire from the fort began to slacken, and shortly after was continued from only three guns — the rest ap- parently having been silenced by our fire. At this time the boats were within some four hundred yards, and were on the point of using grape-shot, when a shot disabled the steering apparatus of the Louisville, by carrying off the top of the wheel-house, and knock- ing the wheel itself into fragments. There was a tiller aft, and this was instantly taken possession of by the pilot, but he had scarcely reached it ere the rudder was carried away by a shot from the Tylor. Of course the boat became instantly unmanageable, and swung around, receiving a shot in the wood-work to- ward the stern, which, I believe, wounded several seamen. Under these circumstances it was thought best to retire, and accordingly the whole fleet fell back to the position it had occupied in the morning." 1 In fact, four of the six gun-boats were disabled ; the tiller of one and the wheel of another were shot away ; a rifled gun burst upon a third, and a fourth 1 Rebellion Record, Vol. IV, page 172. REE N FOR CEMENTS RECEIVED. 87 was greatly damaged ; and more, Commodore Foote was wounded. At midnight he sent for Grant, and told him that the fleet must put back to Cairo, and advised him to remain quiet till he returned. On that day Grant had himself written : " Appearances now are that we shall have a protracted siege here. I fear the result of an attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops. I feel quite confident, how- ever, of ultimately reducing the place." Even the sturdy and persistent mind of Grant doubted at this time whether Donelson could be immediately reduced. Events were, however, shaping themselves to another and a better result than he had anticipated. The night of the 14th, Friday, was again severely cold. There was a storm of sleet and snow, and the wearied soldier had to endure the sufferings of another dreary night. In the mean time reenforcements had begun to come, and Grant's army had got to be equal, if not superior, to that of the enemy. Wallace, who had come up from Fort Henry, was put at the head of a Third Division, Gomposed of the troops he had brought, and others coming in. This division was put in the center, just fronting Donelson. Now, if the reader look toward the river, with the fort in front of him, he will see C. F. Smith's Division on the left, or hights above Hickman Creek, which is impassable by fording, Wallace next, in the center, and on the right McClernand's Division. Grant's head-quarters were at Mrs. Crops's, just behind Smith. Such was the situation on the night of the 14th; and it has been justly remarked by a military critic, 1 that 1 Coppee, page 57. 88 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. if the rebel commander had been contented with the defensive, and strengthened his position, we might have been compelled to go through with a regular siege. This was Grant's view the day before, but such was not Floyd's idea. He found himself with forces about equal to Grant's, and with stronger de- fenses, and knew that our army was constantly being reenforced ; so, with the aid of a Council of War, he determined to attack our lines. At five o'clock on Saturday morning, the 15th, the rebels poured out of Donelson in heavy columns to attack, and, if possible, crush McClernand. If suc- cessful, it would have placed our army in a dangerous position, and probably compelled its retreat. The battle which ensued was bloody and decisive. Let us follow its fiery and dreadful scenes, as described by one who saw them. 1 The columns advanced by the enemy amounted in all to ten thousand men, with thirty pieces of artil- lery. It seemed as if it must be successful, and, if so, would drive our right and center back upon Smith, on the left, and make it difficult for our army to ex- tricate itself. 2 Reveille was just sounding, the troops 1 The account given in extracts is from the correspondent of the " New York Times," which is very graphic and interesting. 2 The statement of force is given by Coppee thus: "Such were Floyd's plans ; they were to be tried with the early morning of Satur- day, the 15th. Accordingly, at 5, A. M., the rebel column, under Pil- low and Johnston moved out from Dover, the advance being taken by Colonel Baldwin's Brigade, composed of the First and Fourteenth Mis- sissippi, and the Twenty-Sixth Tennessee. These were followed by Wharton's Brigade, of two regiments; McCousland's, of two; David- son's, of three ; Drake's, of five ; and other troops, amounting in all to ten thousand men, with thirty guns, which were to crush McClernand, and clear a pathway through our right." THE FIGHT AT DONELSON. 89 were under arms, but in utter ignorance of the ene- my's designs. The right was obviously threatened, and the commanders of regiments and brigades, changing front a little, rapidly got their men into line. On the right was McArthur's Brigade; then Oglesby and Wallace ; on the left of the Fort Henry road was Cruft's. It was not too soon, for, in a few minutes, the rebel column poured down on McArthur. The eye-witness says : " The fight raged from daylight till nearly noon, without a moment's cessation, and resulted in the enemy's being driven back to his intrenchments. The battle-ground extended over a space some two miles in length, every inch of which was the witness of a savage conflict. The rebels fought with the most determined bravery, and seemed bent upon breaking through the right wing at any cost. They poured against our lines a perfect flood, and it was only by a bravery that equaled their own, and a resolute determination to conquer that outlasted their efforts, that our gallant soldiers were at length ena- bled to stay the fierce tide, and finally to hurl it back to its former boundaries. Our men determined that they would win, and win they did, with a gallantry that entitles every man to the name of hero. " The whole of the fight was of the most terrific character. Without a single moment's cessation, the rebels poured into our forces perfect torrents of can- ister, shell, and round-shot, while their thousands of riflemen hurled in a destructive fire from every bush, tree, log, or obstruction of any kind that afforded shelter. The roar of the battle was like that of a 90 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. heavy tornado, as it sweeps through some forest on its mission of destruction. Small arms kept up an incessant cracking, mingling with which came up occasionally the roar of company or division firing, while over all came every moment or two the reso- nant thunders of the batteries." So raged the battle ; and for a time the advan- tage was with the enemy. Oglesby and McArthur gut out of ammunition ;' they were obliged to fall back ; but they retreated between columns of fresh troops, coming to the rescue, and, when they retired, formed a new line facing to the south. But the advancing rebels were all the time terribly received by the light batteries of McAllister, Taylor, and Draper. Posted on the hights, and shifting their positions to suit the circumstances, they continually poured in a heavy fire of grape and canister, and again and again the enemy's lines recoiled. The rebel troops did not display in their first attack the best order and skill. Buckner had come out to attack our new position; his attack was repulsed; and he said his regiments "withdrew without panic, but in some confusion, to the trenches." Neverthe- less, the rebels had, in the main, been successful. They had driven back our forces into a new position. Some of our officers were demoralized, and Pillow sent to Nashville a dispatch that the day was theirs; and he thought so. But his new attack failed. He moved upon Thayer's Brigade; "but by their im- i This very thing had been foreseen by Grant, and he had written to Halleck for more supplies of ammunition. General Cullum, at Cairo, sent all he could. DECISIVE ORDER OF THE DAT. 9 1 flinching stand and deliberate fire, and especially by the firmness of the First Nebraska, and the excellent handling of the artillery, he was now repulsed." ' We need not pursue in detail the attacks, repulses, move- ments, and vicissitudes on the right. It was a hard- fought field, and here more strikingly than had yet appeared, shone out the true character and valor of the Western volunteer. In cold, with men freezing on their posts, and the storm of battle raging around, there was no flinching, no impatience. But where was Grant ? What were his plans ? What was he doing ? Grant's head-quarters, as I have said, were at Crops's house, in the rear of Smith, and a long way from the immediate field of battle we have now been tracing out. But now is the time to bring out his military resources, if he has them. This is no small fight, no Belmont, not even Fort Henry. It is a crushing battle, and if we fail, it may be a long time before we shall break that long line of rebel defense, which stretches from Manassas to Columbus. At two o'clock in the morning, he had been to visit the wounded Foote, and to consult with him on the future operations of the fleet. It had got to be nine o'clock, when he returned to head-quarters, where he was met by an aid-de-camp, galloping up to inform him of the assault on the right, which was the first information he had of it. He next met C. F. Smith, commanding the left, and ordered him to hold him- self in readiness to assault the right, with his whole command. 2 This was the decisive order of the day, and the reader will see its true meaning. In any 1 Coppee's " Grant and his Campaigns." 2 Badeau, page 44. Q2 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. event, if our right was defeated, it was necessary to hold Smith in readiness ; but, on the other hand, if the enemy were repulsed on our right, then was the decisive moment. The advance of Smith's command to a counter attack on the enemy's right, after the enemy had been repulsed, would in all probability be successful. Grant then rode to the point where the fight was. The rebels had failed to make their way, and were doggedly retiring. Still our troops, also, were disordered ; the ammunition had given out, and the loss of field officers was unusually large. Ba- deau says : " There was no pursuit, and the battle was merely lulled, not ended. The men, like all raw troops, im- agined the enemy to be in overwhelming force, and reported that the rebels had come out with knap- sacks and haversacks, as if they meant to stay out and fight for several days. Grant at once inquired, 'Are the haversacks filled?' Some prisoners were examined, and the haversacks found to contain three days' rations. ' Then they mean to cut their way out ; they have no idea of staying here to fight us ;' and, looking at his own disordered men, not yet recovered from the shock of battle, Grant exclaimed, 'Whichever party first attacks now will whip, and the rebels will have to be very quick if they beat me."" This illustrates the true point of Grant's military genius. Perfectly self-possessed, even in apparently adverse circumstances, persistent in his purpose, he held it a primary principle to be cotistcuitly pouring 1 Badcau, page 45. GEN. C. F. SMITH'S CHARGE. 93 his whole force upon the enemy. This possibly might not have been best in some kinds of war, but it was best here, and best always with the rebels. Riding at once to the left, where the troops had not been engaged, he ordered an immediate assault. As he passed along he assured the broken troops that the attack of the morning was only an attempt of the rebels to cut their way out. The troops caught the idea, re-formed, and went to the front. It was now Smith's turn. He is organizing his columns for a terrible onset. Cook's Brigade is on the left, Cavender's batteries are in the rear to the right and left, so as to fire on the intrenchments ; but the attacking column is Lauman's Brigade, formed in close column of regiments, and it is right to re- member these gallant regiments. They were the Second Iowa, the Seventh and the Fourteenth Iowa, and the Twenty-Fifth and Fifty-Second Indiana. While this is going on, Wallace has formed the troops again on the right, and in the end we see has regained all the positions from which we were driven in the morning. And now comes that glorious charge of Smith on the intrenchments of Donelson. Before advancing he rides to the front, and tells the men he will lead them, and that the rifle-pits must be taken by the bayonet. At the signal Smith rides in advance, with the color-bearer beside him. He is near sixty years of age, with gray hair, and com- manding figure. His advance is thus described by Coppee : " Not far has he moved before his front line is swept by the enemy's artillery with murderous effect. 94 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. His men waver for a moment, but their General, sublime in his valor, reminds them, in caustic words, that while he, as an old regular, is in the line of his professional duty, this is what they have volunteered to do. With oaths and urgency, his hat waving upon the point of his sword, by the splendor of his exam- ple he leads them on through this valley of death, up the slope, through the abatis, up to the intrench- ment — and over. With a thousand shouts they plant their standards on the captured works, and pour in volley after volley, before which the rebels fly in pre- cipitate terror. Battery after battery is brought for- ward, Stone's arriving first, and then a direct and enfilading fire is poured upon the flanks and faces of the work. Four hundred of Smith's gallant column have fallen, but the charge is decisive. Grant's tac- tics and Smith's splendid valor have won the day." The battle was won. The rebels now fought only for darkness. That night Grant slept in a negro hut, and Smith, with his troops, on the frozen ground, within the enemy s works. But Floyd and Pillow were engaged in a different way. They were both contriving how they could save their necks ; for, although our Government hanged no traitors, they had an anxious fear that somebody might be hanged, and they had a suspicion that they were very fitting persons to be made examples of. So Floyd, in a council of his officers, declared he should desert the troops, and Pillow declared the same.' In the 1 Badeau, page 47. In a Supplementary Report made by Floyd to the rebel War Department he had the audacity to say: "The boat on which I was, left the shore and steered up the river. »By this precise mode I effected my escape, and after leaving the wharf, the Depart- GRANT'S TERMS OF SURRENDER. 95 night time both these officers, with some three thou- sand men, escaped by the aid of boats. Buckner was left to surrender his army, and in the morning hoisted the white flag on Fort Donelson. He told Floyd the garrison could not hold out half an hour, and when that worthy left him in command, he immediately sent a messenger to Grant, asking terms of capitula- tion. Buckner said that, " in consideration of all the circumstances, he proposed to the Federal commander to appoint commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation." To this Grant made the memorable reply : "No terms other than an unconditional and im- mediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately up07i your works." ' We need not recite the mere details of a victory. Fifteen thousand prisoners, sixty-five cannon, twenty ment will be pleased to hear, that I encountered no danger whatever from the enemy.'''' 1 The following is the actual correspondence, which should be pre- served in history, as an example of prompt, pointed, and laconic nego- tiation : " Head-quarters, Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862. " Sir — In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day. " I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "S. B. Buckner, Brigadier-General, C. S. A. "Head-quarters, Army in the Field,) " Camp fiear Donelson, February 16, 1862. ) "To General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army: "Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works. " I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "U. S. Grant, Brigadier-General U. S. A., commanding.'' 1 96 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. thousand small arms, and the strongest fortification in the West, were the present fruits of the capture of Fort Donelson. The siege had lasted four days, all but one of which were days of fighting. Of the losses, it seems that, comparing both accounts, four thousand, five hundred men were killed, wounded, or disabled, making very nearly one-tenth part of those engaged. On the morning of the surrender Grant rode over to Buckner's quarters. They had been together at West Point, and now breakfasted together on the banks of the Cumberland, in the most singular and interesting circumstances. Buckner acknowledged it had been the intention of the rebel commander to cut their way out. In the course of the conversation he alluded to Grant's inferior force at the beginning of the siege, and remarked : '* If I had been in com- mand you would n't have reached Fort Donelson so easily." To which Grant replied : " If you had been in command I should have waited for reinforcements, and marched from Fort Henry in greater strength ; but I knew that Pillow would not come out of his works to fight, and told my staff so, though I believed he would fight behind his works." 1 The characters of Floyd and Pillow were too well known to our commander to excite any dread of their achievements. Military critics agree, I believe, that Floyd ought to have obstructed Grant's march from Fort Donelson, and to have made the assault on him before Wallace and fresh troops came up. He arrived before the place with only fifteen thou- sand men, some six or eight thousand less than the • Badeau, page 50. RESULTS OF THE VICTOR T. 97 rebels had, but on the last day of the fight he had twenty- seven thousand available men, and reenforce- ments constantly arriving. After that, all idea of an attack upon him was absurd. Now, what were the results of the capture of Fort Donelson ? The capture of Fort Henry was the key to the taking of Donelson ; but what did the capture of both do? In the view of the great public, an event like that of Donelson is looked on simply as a victory, so many killed, and so many prisoners, and the place captured. This is ground for triumph ; and so the people did triumph. Flags were raised on every house and hill ; streets were filled with rejoic- ing people; thanksgivings were made; and in the Churches, te dcum laudamus x was sung. The rejoic- ing was great ; the moral effect was great ; the hearts of the people were strengthened, and the rebels were startled, 2 if not dismayed, by the fact first brought stunningly to their minds, that they had war, bloody war, on their hands, as the result of their awful crime, not only against their Government, but against the common hopes and interests of mankind, all involved in the success of the American Government. Such was the moral result of that conflict, and perhaps no event in the war had in that respect a greater effect. But what was the military result ? Relatively, it was even greater. Great battles have often been fought, and produced no practical effect on the contest. But Donelson was decisive of grand results. I have 1 Te Deum (Thee, O God, we praise,) was always sung in the French cathedrals, on obtaining a victory. 2 See " Richmond Dispatch," " Charleston Courier," and other rebel papers. Q 98 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. already traced the strategic line of rebel defense ; its right rested on Manassas, and its left on the Missis- sippi, at Columbus. 1 Intermediate were the Valley of Virginia, Cumberland Gap, Knoxville, Bowling Green, Forts Henry and Donelson. Now, the reader will see that, if any one of the important points in this line was taken, that those on each side would be, in military phrase, "flanked" and if a position is flanked, it compels either a change of front and stronger force, or an abandonment of the position. Donelson flanked Columbus and Bowling Green, two of the most important points in the whole rebel line. It did more ; it opened the Cumberland, so that Nashville must fall ; and it opened the Tennessee, so that ultimately we could command North Alabama ; and rendered it almost impossible for the rebels to hold a second line, which must necessarily be, from Memphis, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. What did happen ? Events followed in precisely tJie logical sequence of a problem strategically solved. The public looked on, and rejoiced in astonishment, not at all conscious that these events were an inev- itable result of the fall of Donelson. Let us follow these events by dates, and see how beautifully this strategic problem was solved. The battle of Mill Springs, though in itself unimportant, shook the rebels' faith in their power to hold Bowling Green ; and when Fort Henry fell they knew, that though there might be a protracted siege at Donel- 1 The Trans-Mississippi War never was of any importance to the rebels, and, below Missouri, of no importance to us. This was the opinion <>l" General Joe Johnston, and will be obvious on a review of the war. CHANGE OF DEFENSES. 99 son, yet the probability was it must fall. Buell's army, strong and well organized, was advancing on its front, and now Fort Donelson is besieged. They waited till it was invested, and then, on the 14th of February, they evacuated Bowling Green. On the morning of the 15th, the very day of the bloody battle at Donelson, Mitchel's Division entered Bowl- ing Green, 1 called by the rebels the "Gibraltar of Kentucky." The city of Nashville was surrendered on the 25th, and occupied by the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, Colonel John Kennett. Columbus was evacuated on March 4th, of which General Cullum (writing to McClellan) justly says: "Columbus, the Gibraltar of the West, is ours, and Kentucky is free, thanks to the brilliant strategy of the campaign by which the enemy's center was pierced at Fort Henry and Don- elson, his wings isolated from each other and turned, compelling thus the evacuation of his stronghold of Bowling Green first, and now Columbus." 2 But, stranger still, on March nth, Manassas was evacua- ted. Was that caused by the capture of Donelson ? In part it certainly was. First, Beauregard was obliged to fly to the West with fifteen thousand of the army of Manassas, in order to take a new line, and make it possible to defend it. Thus the old line of rebel defense was abandoned, except in the center, jwhere the Valley of Virginia offered natural defenses, unapproachable till we were ready for a new advance. 1 Y. S., of the " Cincinnati Gazette," describes its capture in a very interesting manner. 2 Cullum's Report, March 4th. IOO L/FE OF GENERAL GRANT. The rebel tight now took the Valley of the Rappa- hannock in the East, and from Memphis to Chatta- nooga in the West. It is true that, often during the war, the rebels penetrated, by raids great or small, to the Potomac and the Ohio, but never to stay — never to take an advanced line. Donelson, Nashville, Bowl- ing Green, Columbus, Manassas — all were gone ! The rebel line in the West was thrown back two hundred miles, with Kentucky and Tennessee gained to the Union territory. Thus Donelson was a great and a decisive event. I always thought its value in the elements of the war was underrated, both by military critics and by the general public. The pub- lic rejoiced most heartily, but, of course, did not fully comprehend the strategic bearings of that event, while military men have been looking at the grander, but not better fought, battles of a later period. But what is thought of Grant? He is acting under the general supervision of Halleck ; but Hal- leck was not present, and does not seem, by any pub- lished evidence, to have conceived the plan. He did all he could to furnish reinforcements, and aided the expedition as much as he could. But Halleck had a very cautious and not very quick mind, and it is curious to see how, when Grant had won Fort Don- elson, and the rebel armies were in full retreat from all their great posts, Halleck telegraphs Grant to be cautious. "Avoid any general engagement with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle.'" Why, he had just fought the most dangerous battle he could fight, and the rebels ' » Ilalleck's Telegram to Grant, dated St. Louis, March ist. STANTON'S ESTIMATE OF GRANT. 10 1 were in hot haste retreating from every point in their whole line ! If the ideas of Halleck had prevailed, the war would have lasted ten years, if the parties to it had not died of exhaustion in the mean time. Far different was the view taken by Stanton, the War Secretary, who, with no military education, never- theless had the true coup d'ceil of a soldier. He saw that, with the rebel contempt (real or professed) for the North, and their swagger and dash, there must be an earnest, bloody, and persevering war. On the 20th of February he wrote to some one: "We may well rejoice at the recent victories, for they teach us that battles are to be won now, and by us, in the same and only manner that they were ever won by any people, or in any age, since the days of Joshua, by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of Providence, I conceive to be the true organization of victory and military combination to end this war, was declared in a few words, by General Grant's message to General Buckner \ ' I propose to move immediately on your works.' This was the beginning of a support bestowed by the Secretary of War on the Western general, which was never inter- mitted, while the need of that support remained." ' "/ propose to move immediately o?i your works!* That was, henceforth, the motto of the war. Was it not hard that, in its own bosom, in its own house- hold, among its own children, the nation should be compelled to have this awful conflict, filled with sor- row, darkness, suffering? It seems to me, even, as I write now, when the scenes of peace have returned, 1 Badeau, page 54. 102 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. and the verdure of prosperity is springing up afresh, that it was a very hard thing for this young nation to have and to do. Why should these scenes exist? Why should the earth be covered with blood? Be- cause it is a law of Providence that the sins of nations should be punished on earth, and in their own grow- ing life. So it has been with every nation, and so it is with Christianity itself. The Gospel announced the law of Peace; but was it to bring peace to the nations? Christ announced that it would bring divi- sions, and that wars and convulsions would come, till his kingdom was established. Was it not so? Has not every nation in Europe been convulsed with wars in its own bosom? While they retained in them- selves antagonistic elements, this was inevitable. We had a vast antagonism of elements, and there was no wisdom to get rid of that antagonism till one of them was destroyed. It was a necessity of nature and a law of Providence. One thing we might have done. We might have destroyed the unity of the nation, and filled this North American Continent with several nations. What would we have saved? One war, to make a hundred. Great calamities are thus, in the order of Divine Providence, made the seeds of a fruit- ful prosperity. We had come to the time when there must be preached a fiery Gospel, but not a Gospel without its salutary teachings, not without its part in the great campaign of Truth, marching on to an Eternal victory. " Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord : He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored; He hath loused the fateful lightning of his terrible swift sword : His truth is marching on. SANITARY COMMISSION. 103 • I have seen him in the watch-fires of a hundred circling camps ; They have builded him an altar in the evening dews and damps ; I have read his righteous sentence by the dim and flaring lamps : His day is marching on. I have read a fiery Gospel writ in burnished rows of steel : ' As ye deal with my contemners, so with you my grace shall deal ; Let the Hero, born of woman, crush the serpent with his heel, Since God is marching on.' " ' The fiery Gospel went on, through stormy battles, and through damp disease, till antagonism ceased, and the star of peace returned. In the mean time, was there no other scene than that of blood? Was there no sound but the trumpet call ? Was there no kindly office to be performed, which would lead the mind from the passions of destruction to those of healing and comfort ? Scarcely had the war begun, or the echoes of Sumpter died away, when a gathering of American women asked, " What can we do ?" Are there no functions for us to perform, which will encourage or strengthen, comfort or heal ? The answer came from their hearts: "We will go to work. We will make gloves, and comforts, and bandages for wounds ; for, by and by, these gallant soldiers will be sick and wounded." On the 20th of April, 1861, five days after the surrender of Sumpter, the " Soldiers' Aid Society, of Cleveland " was formed by the ladies ; and then began the great Sanitary Commission. Time passed on, and it grew up into a great benevolent institution. It fell to the lot of the Cincinnati Branch of the Sanitary Commission, in conjunction with those of 1 " Battle Hymn of the Republic," by Mrs. Julia Ward Howe. 104 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Louisville and St. Louis, to do most of the sanitary- work for the Western armies. The battle of Fort Donelson made not only an era of the war, but an era in the work of the Sanitary Commission. The news of the fall of Donelson was received at Cincin- nati, on the morning of February 16, 1862, and the Board of Commissioners immediately met, 1 and ceased not their labors till steamboats had been chartered, surgeons and nurses employed, and every possible means supplied to bring home and provide for the wounded and the sick. The messengers of mercy were continually in motion ; and, by the consent of General Halleck, hundreds of the wounded were brought to Cincinnati, and carried to the hospitals. The aid societies provided for the Commission ; and the Commission provided for the wounded ; and thus the work of mercy went on. The silver lining was seen on the cloud, amid the flashes of the storm and the darkness of the night. 1 Mansfield's History of the Cincinnati Sanitary Commission. THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER. 1 05 CHAPTER V. SHILOH. THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER — ATTEMPT TO CENSURE GRANT — ITS FAILURE, AND HIS PROMOTION — PREPARATIONS AT PITTSBURG LANDING BATTLE OF SHILOH — A GREAT VIC- TORY — MILITARY CRITICS — GRANT VINDICATED — THE OBJECT OF THE BATTLE — AND THE RESULTS. THE fall of Donelson, of Nashville, of Columbus, and Bowling Green, made a most brilliant cam- paign ; but the year was just begun, and more work, equally decisive, was to be done, both in the field and in the camps at home. The last, though accom- panied by no voice of Fame, was the most important. Lincoln had called for half a million of men, months before, and they were continually gathering to the camps, where they must be organized, drilled, and fitted for the march. This required time. In the mean while the country presented the finest examples of heroic patriotism history had ever recorded. The American Volunteer was a being which the mod- ern world had not produced. Such a soldier had been seen in ancient Sparta; but Sparta was only a camp, and the Spartan only an Indian warrior. His mode of life was barbarous, and the hardships at home almost equal to those of the severest war. He 106 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. was not leaving the refinements of a civilized life, the comforts of a domestic home, and the business which promised individual success. When he marched against the Persian, he was doing what he had been educated to do, and engaging in warfare to which he was already inured. Not so the volunteer in the Union Army. Me was leaving civilized life ; he was giving up a settled business; he was parting from tearful friends ; he was the only son of a widow, or the husband of a young wife; or the father of young children ; he was one on whom the happiness of others depended, and for whom tears were shed, even by heroic hearts, and prayers offered up by the most faithful of Christians. Such was the American Vol- unteer, self-sacrificing, offering his services, it may be his life, on the altar of his country. While such pat- riotism remains, who can fear for his country ? While the memory of it remains, who can cease to believe in human nature, or cease to honor such noble spirits? Let us now return to the movements of Grant. Soon after the foil of Donelson there occurred one of those curious episodes in military history, which are entirely different from any thing we see in civil life, and which are regarded by people of common sense with great surprise. This was nothing less than the suspension of Grant from his command! What had happened? Certainly his success did not entitle him to immunity from the penalties of military law. But what offense had he committed? The actions at Fort Donelson had been so severe, and the constant arrival of troops during the siege had made the numbers so uncertain, that Grant had been GRANT RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND. \0J unable immediately to report the precise losses, casu- alties, and numbers of his troops. It seems, also, that General C. F. Smith had been sent up the Cum- berland to Clarkesville, and Grant, not having heard directly from him, went himself to Nashville on the 27th of February. In the mean time he had written and telegraphed to General Halleck all his move- ments. That General, however, either did not receive the messages, or thought the offense of leaving his immediate command greater than the merit of watch- ing the enemy's movements, and on the 3d of March, without any explanation, wrote : " I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority, and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the vic- tory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satis- fied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it, with- out any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency." The next day, having probably received authority from Washington, he telegraphed to Grant : " You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and position of your command ?" This is one of the most extraordinary documents 108 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. in military history. Grant had gained a great vic- tory ; it was only two weeks after that victory ; for- tress after fortress had fallen in consequence of it ; the army was active at every point; yet Halleck talks of its being demoralized, and wants a daily report of every company and regiment. McClellan was then in command, and probably sympathized profoundly with the genius and sagacity of Halleck. Grant replied that he was not aware of disobey- ing orders, and certainly did not intend to, and that he had almost daily reported the condition of his command, and had averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo. Again Halleck rebuked, and twice Grant asked to be relieved. Soon after, Halleck transmitted to Grant a letter of inquiry from Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General (since quite noted) on the subject of Grant's leaving his command, and his own reply, dated March 15th, 1 in which he said there was " no zvcuit of military subordination on tJic part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained.'* This was just on the part of General Halleck, and relieves him from the suspicion of wanton injustice. This episode was soon over, and Grant restored to his command. In the mean time, General C. F. Smith had been placed in command, while Grant remained at Fort Henry. 2 Smith pushed forward troops to Eastport, on the Tennessee ; but ultimately took Pittsburg Landing as the initial point. Halleck still kept up his cautions. On the 13th of March he telegraphs Grant, "Don't bring on any general 1 Badcau, pages 63, 64. 2 Badeau's statement. PITTSBURG LANDING. IO9 engagement at Paris. If the enemy appear in force, our troops must fall back." Evidently Halleck knew that Grant would fight, and had a wholesome fear of any such performance. In a military point of view, he was at that time right. Our volunteers had been gathering from every part of the country ; and many of them were very ill disciplined, and not prepared for steady and desperate conflicts in the field. Some delay was, no doubt, needed. It is necessary here to refer to some incidental affairs, in order to understand the general position. We have seen the rebels had abandoned Columbus ; but, near the same time, they fortified Island No. 10, on the Mississippi, and although it was not a strong place itself, they expected to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi, and for a short time did. General Pope, however, by judicious movements at and from New Madrid, compelled the enemy to evacuate, and on the 6th of April, the very day of the battle of Shiloh, our transports were descending the river. 1 This cooperative movement was absolutely necessary to the success of the advance in the interior ; for it is very evident we must reenforce and provision our army from the Mississippi in making any advance beyond the Tennessee. Let us now return to the initial point of opera- tions at Pittsburg Landing. This field, on which was soon to be fought the battle of Shiloh, was selected 1 A full account of this affair is given in Professor Coppee's " Grant and his Campaigns." Colonel J. W. Bissell, with his Engineer Regi- ment, under the direction of General Schuyler Hamilton, actually cut a canal twelve miles long, and fifty feet wide, through heavy woods ! and on the night of the 4th of April, the Carondelet ran by to New Madrid. 110 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. by General C. F. Smith. It was on the west bank of the Tennessee; that is, on the same side with the enemy's forces, which were in front; and this fact has been severely criticised on one hand, and firmly defended on the other. The reasons seem about balanced. If our army had been defeated, (and Sidney Johnston, who commanded, and Beauregard, who succeeded him, were convinced it would be,) where was its retreat? It is rare that a com- mander can afford to leave such a question wholly out of view. The gun-boats Tylor and Lexington could do something in securing the re-passage of the river. But it seems to me, and did to Beaure- gard, that if our army had been defeated, it must have become an almost total wreck. On the other hand, the reasons are equally strong. We were the advancing, not the defending army. A river is a material defense, and if we permitted the enemy to hold the other bank, we must have crossed it on pontoons, in face of a powerful armament. Smith was a sagacious and well-educated officer, and look- ing to the fact that we must advance, and that we had some support from the gun-boats, he was proba- bly right. At any rate, there we were, at Pittsburg Landing, with the gathering host of the enemy in front. Beauregard had left the East some time be- fore, with fifteen thousand troops from the Army of Manassas. Albert Sidney Johnston, considered by many as the best military mind in the rebel serv- ice, commanded the formidable force now concen- trated to crush the army of Grant, and defeat what they well knew was our purpose — the conquest of JOHNSTON'S ADDRESS TO THE REBELS. 1 1 1 the Mississippi Valley. Corinth was the central point of the rebel forces, and Pittsburg Landing that of ours. The fact that we were on the west side of the river, and, if defeated, had small chance of safety, was a great temptation to the rebel commander, and he was right in yielding to it. If successful, he could, in a great measure, destroy one of our finest armies; and if unsuccessful, he could retreat. Accordingly, on the 3d of April, Johnston issued an address to his army, of which the following is a paragraph : " Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi : I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country, with the resolution, and discipline, and valor becoming men, fighting, as you are, for all worth living or dying for. You can but march to a deci- sive victory over agrarian mercenaries sent to subju- gate and despoil you of your liberties, property, and onor. This assertion that our troops were "agrarian mercenaries" often repeated during the war, was dis- graceful to the rebel mind, for, in any event, the time must have come when history would have corrected such a falsehood. " Accompanying this address were general orders, dividing the Army of the Mississippi into three corps d\armee. General Beauregard was proclaimed second in command of the whole force. " The first coips d'armee was assigned to Gene- ral Polk, and embraced all the troops of his former command, less detached cavalry, and artillery, and 1 Rebellion Record, page 75 of Diary, Vol. IV. 112 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. reserves, detached for the defense of Fort Pillow and .Madrid tiend. 44 The second corps iVarmce was assigned to Gen- eral Bragg, and was to consist of the Second Divi- sion of the Army of the Mississippi, less artillery and cavalry hereafter detached. 44 The third corps cTarmie was assigned to General Hardee, and consisted of the Army of Kentucky. General Crittenden was assigned a command of re- serves, to consist of not less than two brigades." We now know the rebel plan of attack, and their reasons for it ; but, before we trace out the rebel movement, let us take a view of our position and forces. The following is a brief account, by Coppee, of Pittsburg Landing, and the general reason for the battle: 44 It was on the west bank of the Tennessee, and for the most part densely wooded with tall trees, and but little undergrowth. The landing is immediately flanked on the left by a short but precipitous ravine, along which runs the road to Corinth. On the right and left, forming a good natural flanking arrange- ment, were Snake and Lick Creeks, which would compel the attack of the enemy to be made in front. The distance between the mouths of these creeks is about two and a half miles. The locality was well chosen. The landing was protected by the gun-boats Tylor and Lexington. Buell's Army of the Ohio was coming up to reenforce Grant, and, although the river lay in our rear, that was the direction of advance. Just at that time it was the best possible thing for STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES. 113 our army to fight a battle, and the moral effect of a victory would be invaluable to our cause." What if it had not been a victory ? The authority for the rebel plan of the battle is Mr. Preston, brother-in-law, and confidential aid of A. S. Johnston at Shiloh, 1 which was confirmed by accounts from other sources, both on the Union and the rebel side. The rebel army was from 45,000 to 60,000 ; Grant's near 38,000. The Union troops did not take advantage of the peculiar features of the country, and were, therefore, in a more unfavorable situation than they need have been. I have been in- formed by officers in the battle that some of the divisions had not even axes and shovels to make those temporary defenses which might have been erected. This, however, was no doubt the result rather of the hurry with which the army had been collected at this point than of the officers in com- mand. General De Peyster, criticising the position, says: "Woods, brush, ravines, and similar obstacles afforded opportunities for surprise, and blinds for attack, without corresponding advantages for resist- ance. The ground, however, was easily susceptible of defense. With twenty-four hours' work, felling trees, making abatis, throwing up earthworks, and mounting guns to sweep the ravines, the position could have been rendered impregnable to any sudden assault. 2 The natural obstacles, however, which mili- 1 1 take this account from a very interesting little work by J. Watts De Peyster, entitled, " The Decisive Conflicts of the Late Civil War." 2 Colonel Worthington, of the Forty-Sixth Ohio Regiment, informed me of the same fact at the time, and the omission of that precaution 10 114 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. tary command ignored, were fully taken advantage of by the troops themselves, when they fell back to make their successful individual, irregular defense. When it came to this, and organized resistance had ceased, it realized what Brigadier-General Sweeney said — 'The rebels drove us all day, but it took them all day to drive us.' " ' We have now the entire situation before us, and we come to the plan of the battle, as devised by Johnston. I give it in the words of De Peyster, as derived from the best of rebel authorities : "A. Sidney Johnston's plan of attack was in re- ality the oblique order of battle — that is, in principle. He saw that the weak point of the Union line was Prentiss's left. He knew the ground well, yes, per- fectly well, and intended to amuse and engage the loyal right and center, throw the weight of his force on Prentiss's left, get in its rear, and continually throw off rear and flanking attacks, even as Prentiss fell back, up the ravines which shot out like spurs from mountain ranges, penetrating the Union position. The configuration of the ground or ravines, through which Lick Creek empties itself, can not be better represented than by a section of a ' Silver,' or what they call 'a Ladder Pine,' the main ravine repre- senting the trunk, the spur-ravines the branches. "As this oblique and then flanking attack pro- gressed, A. Sidney Johnston intended to strip his left and center, passing reinforcements behind the can only be excused on the ground that there had not been time to complete the arrangements. 1 De Peyster'a "Conflicts." GRANT AT SA VANNAH. 1 1 5 mask of battle or blind of fire, to his right, leaving only sufficient forces there to occupy McClernand and Sherman's attention, to feed, strengthen, and support the main attack till he had massed his troops on the left, far in the rear of the loyal line of battle ; whence, advancing up along the river, he could cut them off completely from it, and 'bag the whole crowd.' Such a conception, carried out as it was as long as A. Sidney Johnston lived, was worthy of the real father of modern oblique attacks, Frede- rick K., of Prussia. It was in the full tide of success when a bullet (according to one account, according to another a piece of a shell) put an end to the greatest military brain and life of rebeldom." 1 Such was the plan of the rebel attack. What was the position of our forces to receive that attack ? Grant had arrived at Savannah on the 17th of March ; a point from which he could best super- intend the operations of the army, place the divi- sions, and determine on his plans. The forces in the field on the morning of the 6th of April, (Sunday,) were five divisions, thus placed: "Prentiss was on the left, about a mile and a half from the Landing, facing southward ; McClernand at some distance on his right, facing south-west ; Sherman at Shiloh Church, on the right of McClernand, and in advance of him ; Hurl- but and W. H. L. Wallace a mile in rear of McCler- nand, in reserve ; the former supporting the left and the latter the right wing." It will be observed that the whole were within the limits of Lick Creek, 1 Professor Coppee seems to have attributed the plan of the rebels to Beauregard; but such it was not; it belonged to Johnston. Il6 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Snake Crock, and Owl Creek, a branch of Snake. A division under General Lewis Wallace lay at Crump's Landing, and was intended as a reserve, to come earl)- into battle, but lost its way, and did not take part till late in the day. Such was the position of our forces on the night of the 5th ; the rebel forces at that time lying just behind the shield of woods in front, and hearing the drums of our tattoo beat. Sunday the sun rose bright, and the morning was beautiful. Nature takes no note of the greatest con- vulsions of human society, and looks calmly on at the most dreadful scenes of human destruction. The cor- respondent of the " Cincinnati Gazette" wrote : " The sun never rose on a more beautiful morn- ing than that of Sunday, April 6th. Lulled by the general security, I had remained in pleasant quarters at Crump's, below Pittsburg Landing, on the river. By sunrise I was roused by the cry : ' They 're fight- ing above.' Volleys of musketry could, sure enough, be distinguished, and occasionally the sullen boom of artillery came echoing down the stream. Mo- mentarily the volume of sound increased, till it be- came evident it was no skirmish that was in progress, and that a considerable portion of the army must be already engaged. Hastily springing on the guards of a passing steamboat, I hurried up. " The sweet spring sunshine danced over the rip- pling waters, and softly lit up the green of the banks. A few fleecy clouds alone broke the azure above. A light breeze murmured among the young leaves ; the blue-birds were singing their gentle treble to the stern music that still came louder and deeper to us GRANT STARTS FOR THE FRONT. 117 from the bluffs above, and the frogs were croaking their feeble imitation from the marshy islands that studded the channel." On this beautiful morning, and on the verge of a great battle, let us see where the principal com- manders and parties to it were. Buell, whose army was marching to join Grant, was anxiously expected ; for, although Grant intended to attack the enemy, if they did not attack him, yet it having been discovered that Johnston had been greatly reenforced, and that defeat was possible, it is true that Grant looked with anxiety for the arrival of these reinforcements. On the evening of the 5th Nelson's Division arrived in the vicinity of Savannah. Early on the morning of Sunday, (Grant and his staff were breakfasting, with their horses saddled, not more than six miles distant from Pittsburg, in a direct line,) the heavy firing was heard, and an order was instantly dispatched to Gen- eral Nelson to move his entire command to the river bank opposite Pittsburg. 1 Grant, at seven o'clock, started in person for the front, having written a note to Buell, which is important here, as indicating clearly what Grant had anticipated, and how little he was surprised by what occurred : " Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that an attack has been made upon our most advanced positions. I have been looking for this, but did not believe the attack could be made before Mon- day or Tuesday. This necessitates my joining the 1 Grant's written order to Nelson, on the morning of the 6th, to move opposite Pittsburg. The march began at one o'clock, and the division arrived at four, P. M. Suppose it had arrived at noon, as it might, would not Beauregard have been defeated that afternoon ? Il8 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. forces up the river, instead of meeting you to-day, as I had contemplated. I have directed General Nel- son to move to the river with his division. He can march to opposite Pittsburg." Here, then, we have the actual position of all the principal parties to the battle of Shiloh, on the morn- ing of the 6th, (Sunday.) Sidney Johnston had moved his army close up to our camp, and early in the morning had commenced the attack. Nelson's Division of Buell's forces had been ordered up. Grant had breakfasted, and was now galloping to the front. The battle had begun, and the roar of the guns came like the tornadoes of the West, sweeping through the woods and over the plains. The rebel onset was made with tremendous force. The advanced Division of Sherman, and the left under Prentiss, received the first shock, and as they were raw troops, many gave way, and the civilians who were at the landing, and the reporters who crowd round the army like birds of prey to the carcass, were in haste to proclaim a rout, and told of the thousands who crowded to the landing as the troops retreated. There were the skulkers, the civilians, the camp men, who are always numerous in a new army. But the battle raged on, and, notwithstanding the number of skulkers, never did the volunteers fight better. Sherman's Division, though driven back, re-formed and retreated, like the lion as he slowly draws his body back, already wounded by the hunter. McClernand's Division sup- ported Sherman's left ; but on Prentiss came the great shock ; for, as I have shown, it was Johnston's plan to heap repeated attacks on our left, driving \ -{4 + -f-f + + + 4--H Reserve Artillery 120 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. it back, in order to get possession of the landing. Prentiss was not surprised, though totally unaware that a whole army was to be poured upon him. He had pickets out, and had sent four companies to re- connoiter. But this^ reconnoitering party was sud- denly attacked, and the shock came with stunning force. Prentiss is driven back in confusion. Be- tween him and Sherman there is a gap, and into this gap rushes the rebel General Hardee, and he flanks the retreating regiments of Prentiss, and the left of Sherman also. Prentiss has been reenforced by Hurl- but, with the Brigade of Veatch, and endeavors in vain to stem the torrent. In vain, for Bragg has re- enforced Hardee, and on the rebel columns push. Prentiss is soon enveloped, his division driven back, part of his field-officers killed ; but, after a desperate fight, he and portions of his division are captured. So far, Johnston was succeeding in his plan ; our left was broken, and fast drifting toward the landing, and the day there looked dark. Although broken, it is a mistake to suppose those gallant men were, like the skulkers from the front, out of the fight, or demoral- ized. They were no longer available as organizations, but they took to skirmishing in masses, and did ef- fective service. The iMfteenth Wisconsin had nine hundred men, of whom four hundred were marksmen, and it is related of one of them that, falling back from tree to tree, his Colonel came up and said, " How many have you finished ?" " Colonel," replied this cool individual, " I have fired thirty-seven car- tridges, and I do n't feel certain of six." He had brought down tliirty-one rebels ! So raged the battle, THE BATTLE, 121 even where our broken and disordered troops fell back. Let us return to the center. Sherman had been gradually driven back. McClernand had come into line, bearing the brunt of the advancing attack. Hurlbut had endeavored to strengthen the left. Wal- lace was coming in, and had sent a brigade to reen- force Stewart, on the extreme left, who was attacked by Breckinridge's reserves. Sherman had been forced back more and more ; but parts of his division had done most gallant fighting. The regiments of McDowell, and Buckland's Brigade, maintained their lines, fought bravely, and suffered severely. 1 So, all over the field, there was hard fighting and brave conduct ; but still, at 10, A. M., the day was evi- dently going against us ; but then, as one aptly said, we made them take the day to it ; and it was good fighting did it. The battle was confused ; the divisions covered so much space, that we can not follow each regiment, or man, through this terrible day. We must be con- tented to look at general movements, and mark well results, for many mistaken accounts of that battle have been given. " As far as mathematical statements and lines can indicate such a confused condition of things," says Professor Coppee, 2 "the order at ten o'clock was the following: Colonel Stewart, of Sherman's Division, who had been posted on the Hamburg road in the 1 See General Sherman's Report, in which particular regiments and actions are named. 2 " Grant and his Campaigns," page 88. II 122 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. morning, far to the left, and who had held his posi- tion most gallantly against the overwhelming num- bers of Breckinridge's reserves, had been slowly driven back to join Hurlbut's left, in spite of the re- enforcements of McArthur's Brigade, of Wallace's Division. Next came Hurlbut, who had posted him- 1 self to resist the rebel advance ; and behind him were the fugitives of General Prentiss. McClernand was on his right and rear ; and Sherman's left in rear of McClernand." Our men had now found out what I have stated was the rebel plan of the battle — the constant at- tacking and pushing our left. Coppee says : "As it was now manifest that the fury of the rebel attack was to be directed to our left, General Wallace marched his other brigades over to join Mc Arthur, thus filling the space so threatened upon Hurlbut's left, and took with him three Missouri batteries — Stone's, Richardson's, and Webber's — all under Major Cavender. Here, from ten o'clock till four, this devoted force manfully sustained the terrific fire and frequent attack of the continually increasing foe. Upon Wallace and Hurlbut the enemy made four separate charges, which were splendidly repulsed. At length Hurlbut was obliged to fall back, and, their supports all gone, Wallace's Division were satisfied that they too must retire. To add to the disorder, their commander, General Wallace, fell mortally wounded, and was carried from the field." Now we are at the crisis of the battle. Prentiss is a prisoner ; Wallace is mortally wounded. Regi- ment after regiment has been broken ; division after DEATH OF GENERAL JOHNSTON. 1 23 division has retreated slowly back, till our left is fast approaching the Landing. And still the enemy is thundering on. Weary, cut up, and no little de- moralized he is too. 1 For we need not think that, in this bloody field, it is our army alone which has suffered, and has skulkers falling behind. Not so ; the rebels had their full share of all those losses ; but they had the advantage of the advance, and the appearance of victory. The sun of their glory was, however, soon to sink ; and victory, which seemed so sure, was soon to fade away, and be seen no more. At half-past 2, P. M., Albert Sidney Johnston was borne from the field by his friend, Colonel Pres- ton. With him the true genius of the campaign perished. The battle for a time slackened ; not\only on this account, but because the rebel army was greatly shattered and wearied. At length, about 4, P. M., Beauregard was ready for the last charge. On the crest of a ridge on our left, Colonel Web- ster and Major Cavender had hastily planted bat- teries 2 — on the crest of a ridge overlooking a ravine, which still intervened between the enemy and our reduced and shortened line. The enemy placed their artillery on the opposite crest, and determined to seize and cross the ravine. Here were the divisions of Breckinridge, and Chalmers, and Withers, em- battled for their charge. It was in vain. The fire of our artillery was tremendous; and just then the gun-boats (the Tylor and Lexington) got a chance to pour in their fire. The rebels were attacking on Lick 1 See Beauregard's Official Report. 2 See General Hurlbuts Report. 124 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Creek, where our troops had Iain in the morning. The gun-boats entered the mouth of the creek, and opened their guns up the ravine. Three times the rebels charged, under the fire of batteries and boats, and each time were driven back, with great loss. Just as this scene was closing, the advance of General Buell's army, the Brigade of General Ammen, ar- rived, and had no sooner got to the bank than it was put in position by Grant himself, who was in that part of the field. 1 This part of Buell's forces fired but a few volleys that night, and, as appears from the regimental reports, lost but three or four men, killed and wounded. 2 In fact, the battle was ended. John- ston had perished, and Beauregard failed to drive Grant's army into the Tennessee. The night 'was drawing on ; both armies were exhausted ; the enemy retired to his camps; and our troops, inspired by hope, lay upon their arms, expecting victory on the morrow. Before the last charge of the rebels, when the battle was waning, after Johnston's death, and before Buell's troops had arrived, Grant (then with Sherman's Division) gave orders to renew the battle in the morning. Did that look like defeat ? No ! The darkest hour had been in the forenoon, and Grant saw that Beauregard's army had begun to fail. Lewis Wallace's Division was yet fresh for the field ; and batteries and gun-boats were in position. The probability is, that, even left to itself, the Army of 1 Report of Colonel Ammen, and Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Twenty-Fourth Ohio. These reports prove that Grant directed these movements himself. 2 Report of Colonel Grose, Thirty-Sixth Indiana. THE NIGHT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD. \2$ the Tennessee would have achieved a glorious victory under the morrow's sun. The scenes of that night, could they have been pictured on canvas, would have been different, but equally interesting with those of the day. It was a dark and stormy night, and even the rebel com- manders could not find their troops. 1 The National troops had been driven from all their camps, and with their organizations much broken up, formed more a mass of brave fighting men, stubbornly main- taining their ground, than, that of a regularly disci- plined army. So sunk the weary to rest ; so lay the dead under the dark clouds ; so lay and groaned the wounded, where, between two armies, none could at- tend them. Here they sleep, quiet as the infant ; here they lie as quiet, in the arms of death ; here they lie, in the pain and agonies of desperate wounds, longing for some refreshing draught, which is only supplied by the rains of Heaven. But yonder is a different scene. All night long the divisions of Buell were being ferried across the river. Grant visited each division commander in the night, and repeated himself the order to attack in the morning ; and, amidst the silence of the sleepers on one side, and the movements of troops on the other, and the con- sultations of Generals, the gun-boats were dropping shell after shell into the enemy's camps. Thus did 1 " Such was the nature of the ground over which we had fought, and the heavy resistance we had met, that the commands of the whole army were very much shattered. In a dark and stormy night com- manders found it impossible to find and assemble their troops ; each body or fragment bivouacking where night overtook them." — Bragg 's Report. 126 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. nature and man, the storm from the clouds and the wrecks of battle, mingle in that strange scene on the banks of the Tennessee, near the little church of Shiloh, on that memorable Sunday night. And now, before the drum again wakes the sleep- ers, before the harvest of death again begins, let us ask where was Grant, and what he had been doing ? I have said that Grant expected the attack, but not quite so soon, unless the enemy waited for him to attack them, which he meant to do. On the evening before, (Saturday the 5th,) Nelson's Division of Buell's forces had arrived near Savannah. Grant, anxious to meet Buell, breakfasted early with his staff, and had their horses saddled and waiting. It was then he heard the heavy firing, and leaving an order for Nel- son to advance, and a hasty note for Buell, he imme- diately proceeded to the scene of action, several miles distant. Two hours after this, at ten o'clock, when the battle raged fiercest, and the hour was darkest for us, Grant was with Sherman,' on the right of his division, encouraging him to a stubborn resistance, and in answer to an inquiry about cartridges, said he had foreseen and provided for that. So well was this done that "all day long a train of wagons was passing from the Landing to the front, carrying ammunition over the narrow and crowded road." 2 From the front Grant proceeded rapidly to the left, and, at intervals, was engaged in forming new lines and sending strag- glers back to their regiments, a work most necessary 1 Sherman's Letter to the United States Service Magazine. 3 Badeau, in his "Military History," says that Colonel Pride, of Grant's staff, organized this train. CONFIDENCE OF GRANT. 1 27 in the emergency. 1 At half-past four in the after- noon Grant met Buell at the Landing, (for Buell, on hearing of the battle at Savannah, rode up in person,) and explained the situation of affairs to him. Buell inquired : " What preparations have you made for re- treating, General t n Grant at once said: "I have lit despaired of whipping them yet" Buell then went to hurry up his own troops. A little after, at five o'clock, Grant is seen posting the regiments of Gen- eral Ammen's Brigade, (Nelson's Division,) to sup- port the batteries, which, I have said, were planted on the ridge to defeat the enemy's last attack. 2 Soon after the enemy is driven back, and about six o'clock (for it was near and before sunset) Grant rode up to General Sherman, 3 explained to him the situation of affairs on the left, ordered him to get all things ready, and at daylight next day attack the enemy. Sherman says this was before he knew Buell had arrived. Grant knew it ; but at four o'clock in the afternoon, says Sherman, on a deliberate calculation of the avail- able forces, the arrival of Lewis Wallace's Division, and the recovery of the stragglers, Grant thought himself justified in resuming the offensive next morn- ing. Was that a correct judgment? This was before the last grand attack on the left, and before Grant knew the almost fatal force of that attack. It is doubtful whether he or any of our Generals fully 1 Badeau's " Military History." 2 Nelson (see Report) says the head of his column marched up the bank of Pittsburg Landing at 5, P. M. And Ammen (see Ammen's Report) says that General Grant directed him, at the top of the bank, to support a battery assailed by the enemy. 3 Sherman's Letter to the United States Service Magazine. 128 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. comprehended on that day the plan of Johnston in his continued oblique attack on our left. 1 But it was there the heaviest attack was made, there the press- ure was the greatest, and there the enemy's success was the greatest, and there, but for the admirable arrangement of a circle of batteries by Webster and Cavender, their attack might have been fatal. What- ever might have happened, we know that Grant had not despaired of the battle, for so he told Buell ; so he thought when he ordered Sherman to assume the offensive in the morning. Let us now take a glance at the position of the army on the evening of the 6th of April. Our divi- sions had been partly broken, partly driven back, partly disorganized, but not wholly broken. No part of our line had really been pierced in all its retreat ; but it had retreated so that the two wings were just about two miles back from the position of the front line in the morning. The line now extended from Snake Creek bridge on the right to the crest and ravine, a little way from the Landing. This line was nearly two miles long, with an apex projecting toward the right. The gun-boats were on the left, command- ing the ravine, and the bridge over Snake Creek made the extreme right. All night long the troops of Buell were crossing the river and forming in position. 2 " Grant visited each division commander, includ- ing Nelson, after dark, directing the new position of each, and repeating in person his orders for an 1 See the testimony of Col. Preston, given in the " Decisive Con- flicts," by De I'cvster. 2 See Bucll's Kepuit, April 15, 1S62. GRANT INS TR UC TS C OMMA NDERS. 1 29 advance at early dawn. He told each to 'attack with a heavy skirmish line, as soon as it was light enough to see, and then to follow up with his entire command, leaving no reserves.' Before midnight he returned to the Landing, and lay on the ground, with his head against the stump of a tree, where he got thoroughly drenched by the storm, but slept soundly, confident of victory on the morrow." 1 The battle of the 7th (Monday) was comparatively easy. Indeed, if we suppose the rebel commander to have been fully informed of the arrival of reenforce- ments, he could have had no object in the battle of the 7th but to cover his retreat. In fact, however, Beauregard was in doubt, and hoped, from the pre- ceding rains, that Buell had been delayed. 2 In the mean time, however, three divisions of Buell's army had crossed the Tennessee, and were formed pre- cisely where they would be most effective; for, ob- serve that the enemy's main attack had been per- sistently on our left, and opposite our position (that on the ravine) lay the main body of the rebel forces. Buell's three corps (those of Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook) were formed from our center to the left; Sherman on the right, and toward Snake Creek bridge, kept the front. At daylight the attack was made, and Sherman says: "I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the battle had been most severe, and then waited till near noon for Buell's troops to get up abreast, when the entire line 1 This statement is taken from Badeau's " Military History," page 87. 2 See Beauregard's Report of the nth April. 130 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. advanced, and recovered all the ground we had ever held." The sharp fight was on the left, where the divisions of Buell attacked in fine order, and gradu- ally drove the enemy before them. Here we may let General Beauregard tell the story of the result ; for, although he claimed a great victory for the day be- fore, and now considered that he was only defeated by fresh troops, yet, in the concluding facts, he seems to be mainly correct. Beauregard says : "On the left, however, and nearest to the point of arrival of his reenforcements, he drove forward line after line of his fresh troops, which were met with a resolution and courage of which our country may be proudly hopeful. Again and again our troops were brought to the charge, invariably to win the po- sition at issue, invariably to drive back their foe. But hour by hour thus opposed to an enemy constantly reenforced, our ranks were perceptibly thinned under the unceasing, withering fire of the enemy, and by twelve meridian, eighteen hours of hard fighting had sensibly exhausted a large number ; my last reserves had necessarily been disposed of, and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh reenforcements after each repulse ; accordingly, about one, P. M., I determined to withdraw from so unequal a conflict, securing such of the results of the victory of the day before as were practicable." l The result was, he made a hasty retreat, with not half the available strength with which he went into the battle? 1 Beauregard's Report, nth of April. 2 Idem. This admission is important to Grant's military position. GRANT VINDICATED. 131 Such was the Battle of Shiloh, the least un- derstood, and the most misrepresented of any battle or event in that war. It was a battle which some military critics have regarded as most decisive, in which more than twenty thousand men (about equally divided in the two armies) were lost ; at which the best Generals of the whole rebel armies were de- feated, and which, nevertheless, was represented to the country as a battle in which there was no general- ship ; in which the position was wrongly chosen ; in which the General was absent from the field, and at which thousands of men ran away, and thousands of others were slaughtered without a reason ! The sim- ple story of its events, as I have related them, from unquestionable evidence, is a sufficient answer to these misrepresentations. A man who has led an army of raw recruits into the field; fought them, without the slightest fortification, against superior numbers; 1 and found himself ready at night for a victory on the morrow, needs no vindication. Suc- cess may not be a test of merit ; but success there was at least a proof that Grant knew what he was about. Time and victory have vindicated Grant from the criticisms and aspersions cast upon him in rela- tion to his conduct at Shiloh. But it is due to those who wish to know the truth of Grant's conduct at Shiloh, whether military or personal, to make a brief review of his position, both at Donelson and Shiloh ; for they are connected together. This is especially necessary, as most of the unfavorable criticisms have 1 Beauregard's Report admits that he had 41,000 men ; and, with- out Lewis Wallace's Division, Grant had not over 35,000. 132 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. been made by men totally unacquainted with military affairs, and unfit to make any criticism at all. Such critics, however sincere or earnest, are generally conscious of their deficiencies, and will be found very generous in their quotations of military proverbs, from Napoleon, Frederick, Wellington, and Jomini, all of whom would have found their proverbs totally in- applicable in American warfare. They never carried on war in such an extent of country, or with such numerous armies ; and were men of too strong minds, and too much military science, to have marched an American army on European ideas. The criticisms made on General Grant, at Donel- son and Shiloh, were principally these : i. That the plan of the Donelson Expedition was formed by Buell, for which reference is made to a dispatch from Buell to Halleck, dated January 3, 1862. But what had a letter to Halleck to do with it, unless Halleck communicated it to Grant ? This he did not do, and no intimation of such a plan was made to Grant, till Grant and Foote had urged it on Halleck. Grant has made no claim to a general plan of that campaign ; but, if he had, this dispatch of Buell to Halleck would have been no refutation of it. Most probably, no general plan of that campaign was made by any body. 2. It has been said and assumed by those who seem to have forgot that armies move in reference to an object, and battles are fought to obtain that object, that the position of the army on the west side of the Tennessee River, and therefore exposed to an attack, was a blunder. The position was THE POSITION A T SIIIL OIL 1 3 3 selected by General C. F. Smith ; and not only selected, but every division was placed in position by him. 1 But when General Grant came into com- mand, a few days later, he might unquestionably have removed the army to the other side. If, then, the army was at that time in danger from a bad position, Grant is responsible for it. But he did not think so ; and it may be doubted whether any daring General would have thought so. In the first place, the army was already there, placed by General Smith ; and to move back was to show a sense of fear, and to per- form a doubtful operation. In the next place, the position was naturally very strong, and that it was so, ultimately enabled Grant to turn disaster into victory. On either side lay large and deep creeks, heading near together, and breaking the country into rough and difficult ravines ; so that the army could be at- tacked only in front, and was substantially protected on either side. In the third place, the gun-boats af- forded no small defense at the river ; and, lastly, Buell's army was hourly expected. The position of the army was in fact a very strong one ; and the er- rors committed (and it seems to me there were some) were not in choosing the position, but in the man- agement of it. There can, I think, be no doubt, that our troops should have taken possession of the woods in front, or a part of them, and constructed abatis, and light intrenchments in front. There was time enough for this, and the subsequent experience of our armies in the war (when they did do such things) 1 Sherman's Letter to United States Service Magazine. 134 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. proved they were necessary. 1 It was said, on the other hand, that, at this period of the war, our men did not believe in such defenses. Perhaps so ; but the whole art of war proved that they were neces- sary to prevent the effect of sudden attacks. What- ever opinion may be formed of that, the position at Shiloh was a strong one ; and whether the army ought originally to have been placed on that side of the river is a question not to be settled now, except on general principles. Two arguments are decidedly in favor of this position. The first is, that, in spite of all our danger, zve did succeed. The other is, that an attacking army must advance. Suppose we had not crossed the Tennessee then, and Beauregard's army had taken the other side, how long before we would have crossed? 3. Again, it has been said that we were surprised. This is contradicted, both by the facts and the offi- cers. We have seen that Grant said he had expected this ; but he did not expect it so soon, by a day or two. Sherman says, there had been skirmishing the two previous days ; and Prentiss had pickets a mile in advance, and four companies reconnoitering at 3 o'clock in the morning. Grant was telegraphing to Halleck each day, and on the 5th telegraphed him that there had been skirmishing; that the enemy were apparently in considerable force ; that he had no idea a general attack would be made, " but ivill be prepared should such a thing take place! 1 The • Before the Battle of Shiloh was fought, Colonel Worthington, of the Forty-Sixth Ohio, (of Sherman's Division,) wrote me, that these precautions ought to be taken. 2 Badeau's "Military History." MISREPRESENTATIONS REFUTED. 1 35 idea of a surprise arose from the very fact, and fault, I have commented on, the want of abatis and in- trenchments. For want of them, the pickets and first lines of troops were very quickly driven and broken ; and this gave lookers-on the idea of a sur- prise. Beauregard, in his report, says : " At 5, A. M., on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined upon." l Bragg, in his report, says substantially the same thing. The idea of not expecting an attack at Shiloh, or of being surprised on the morning of the battle, must therefore be given up. 4. The grossest misrepresentations as to Grant himself were made ; that he was far from the battle ; that he was negligent ; that he made no plan on the 6th, for the battle of the 7th ; and other charges more gross and equally false were circulated by those whose imagination was greater than their knowledge. The simple narrative of the facts above stated refutes them all. For four days Grant was in constant ac- tivity ; every day dispatching to Halleck ; on the morning of the 6th, breakfasting early for a start ; ordering up Nelson, and riding at once to the front ; consulting with Sherman, at 10 o'clock ; riding and forming men over the whole field of battle ; meeting Buell at 4 o'clock, at the Landing ; putting Ammen's Brigade in position, at 5 o'clock ; ordering Sherman to be ready for a morning attack ; and meeting Buell and Sherman in the evening, to make arrangements 1 Beauregard's Report, 21st of April, 1862. 136 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. for the morrow's battle, (which wore made and per- fectly carried out,) and at midnight sleeping at the foot of a tree amid drenching rains. If this is not care and activity and plan and grit, what is ? 5. What was the theory of the battle, and what was its result ? General Sherman may not have been authorized to announce what was a pre-arranged plan, in his letter to the "United States Service Magazine," but he most certainly stated what was required to be done and what happened, when he says : "It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as we then were, we could fight as well as they." The rebellion was begun and carried on, on the part of the Confederate States, under several great delusions, of which it seemed as impossible to unde- ceive them as it would be to reason a lunatic into sanity. One of them was, that there was a positive personal and military inferiority on the part of North- ern men. This, like the idea that cotton was supreme in commerce, had to be destroyed before the rebels could come to a true perception of their condition. It is not at all probable that the battle of Shiloh was deliberately fought on Sherman's theory, but it is certain that Grant, finding that the rebels rallied as ES TIM A TE OF THE BA TTLE OF SHIL OH. 1 3 J energetically as ever after Donelson and Shiloh, henceforward believed and acted on the idea that nothing but hard blows and crushing force could conquer the rebellion.' Now, what was the actual result of Shiloh ? A very intelligent military critic 2 considered it one of the most decisive battles of the war. At any rate it did produce the moral effect, which we see was needed, as testified to by rebel soldiers. The following para- graph sums up the main facts : "If any battle of the rebellion comes up to the estimate of Creasy as to decisiveness, that battle was Shiloh. In many respects it was the battle of the war. It disposed of the rebels' best General, dissi- pated their highest hopes, reversed all their life-long- learned theories. By their camp-fires the rebel sol- diers discussed, in after days, that conflict — drew con- clusions which obliterated all their former traditional beliefs and ideas. With bitter oaths, an ear-witness reports, they were wont to exclaim : ' Do n't tell us the Yanks won't fight ; we know how they fought at Shiloh!' The South did not believe that the war really meant killing till after Donelson and Pittsburg Landing." Shiloh was a military sequel to Donelson, and so it ought to have been, in a well-arranged and suc- cessful campaign. But had that campaign any plan ? Perhaps we shall be able to answer that hereafter. I think Shiloh was not decisive, but that it ought to, and would have been, but for the inefficient conduct of 1 Badeau's " Military History." 2 The " Decisive Conflicts," by De Peyster. 12 133 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. General Ilalleek, who subsequently took command. Whether this is a correct opinion we shall see by a comparison of dates and facts. At present we shall leave the victorious Union army resting on the night of the 7th of April, and Beauregard retreating to Corinth. There stands the little log church at Shiloh. It was built in the wilderness. It had, doubtless, seen many a gathering of peaceful people, listening to the messenger of the Cross, and looking with hope to the Shiloh to come. It now realized the declaration of the living Shiloh, that war would attend the preaching of his Word, and destruction wait on its progress.' The little church had seen the beautiful light of Sunday morning, heard the birds sing their sweet music, beheld the crash of battle, as it rolled over the living and the dead, saw the dark storm of the night as it rained on the wounded and the dying, and looked out on the victor and the vanquished, as weary they sank to rest! Soon the little church is gone, 2 and now we look into the heavens for the Shiloh which is to come! 1 Mark xiii. 2 In a few days Shiloh Church fell and was gone 1 SHILOH A VICTORY, 1 39 CHAPTER VI. HALLECK TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY — GRANT A SUB- ORDINATE — SHERMAN'S RECONNOISSANCE — GRANT PUT IN THE SHADE — LINCOLN'S SUPPORT — HALLECK GETS TO COR- INTH AND INTRENCHES — CORINTH EVACUATED — THE NEW STRATEGIC LINE — BEAUREGARD DISCOVERS CHATTANOOGA, AND HALLECK SEES IT TOO — THE ARMY IS SCATTERED, AND HALLECK DEPARTS — GRANT AGAIN IN COMMAND — BATTLE OF IUKA — BATTLE OF CORINTH — SANITARY COM- MISSION — CHRISTIAN WOMEN. B Y the gallant fighting of the volunteers in the army of Grant, by Grant's own unbroken firm- ness and inflexible daring, by the effective fire of the gun-boats, and by the arrival and fine conduct of Buell, Shiloh was not only retrieved, but turned into a glorious victory. The nation rejoiced, Congress thanked, and in spite of all misrepresentations, the people began to see the truth, that Shiloh was not planned poorly, nor fought badly, 1 but that it was not only successful, but successful for good reasons, and that Grant was in fact an able and noble soldier. We are now to see Grant in the part of a subordinate, and to trace out a chapter of events, which, contain- ing no very decisive movements, is yet remarkably 1 Time and truth have at length cleared away both the mystery and misrepresentation of Shiloh. 140 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. curious, iu both military and personal history. On the 9th of April, (two days after the great battle,) Halleck (who was commander of the Western De- partment) left St. Louis for the scene of action. Perhaps he thought there might be jealousy between Grant and Buell, who had commanded separate armies, or perhaps had a laudable ambition to share in the glory of the campaign. At any rate he quickly arrived at Pittsburg Landing, and on the 13th of April issued a General Order, 1 " congratulating the troops on their glorious successes," and directing Generals Grant and Buell to retain the " immediate command of their respective armies in the field." If the events follow- ing were to happen just as they did, it was well for Grant's reputation that he could prove precisely the date when he ceased to be a commander and became a subordinate. The rebels were retreating with a broken army, reduced on the evening of the 6th (first day's battle) to a half of its available strength. 2 We shall see that, till our delays allowed them to be re- enforced, and even then, they did not really expect to hold Corinth. If there be any principle, either of common-sense or military science, it is that a de- feated and broken enemy should not be allowed to re-form, reenforce, and recuperate himself. He should be pressed and destroyed, if possible. No doubt our wearied troops should have been allowed some rest, and some reorganization was necessary; but Buell's army was fresh and strong, and it does not appear 1 Halleck's General Order, dated Pittsburg, April 13th. 2 Beauregard's Report of April nth, in which he states that his army was 40,350 strong, and that on that evening it could only muster 20,000 availables. ACTIVITY OF GRANT. 141 that Lewis Wallace's Division had lost any thing. Here, then, we had an army stronger than that of Beauregard's, even when the first divisions, which fought the first day at Shiloh, were left out of the account. What happened? We shall see. Grant did not lie still. On the 8th Sherman went out on the Corinth road, with two brigades of his fatigued troops ; had a skirmish, but found the enemy had re- treated in confusion. 1 Sherman says : " The roads are very bad, and are strewed with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and limber-boxes. The enemy has succeeded in carrying off the guns, but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxes of at least twenty guns. I am satisfied that the enemy's infantry and cavalry passed Lick Creek this morning, traveling all last night, and that he left behind all his cavalry, which has protected his retreat. But the signs of confusion and disorder mark the whole road." But, in spite of all weariness, and losses, Grant was not idle a day. On the 12th, he sent out an ex- pedition of four thousand men, on five transports, with the gun-boats Tylor and Lexington, to Eastport, Mississippi, where they landed, proceeded to Bear. Creek Bridge, and destroyed two bridges over the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The expedition returned in the evening, and the army was now ready to renew the campaign. On the morning of the next day (13th) Halleck assumed the command, and, for the next three months, Grant was a subordinate to Hal- leck ; and for the two months of that time seems to have 1 Sherman's Report, dated 8th of April. 142 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. known nothing of any general plan of operations, and only once to have made a suggestion of an important movement, when he was informed by the commander, that he might keep his advice till it was asked. 1 In fact, with the misrepresentations made of Shiloh, and Halleck's evident belief that Grant was a second-rate sort of a person, the victor in the greatest of battles was as much under a cloud, as if he had been the defeated general, very mercifully treated if he es- caped censure ! There was one man in the country who thought Grant had the qualities most available in war, and fortunately that man had the power to sustain him. Abraham Lincoln was seldom mis- taken in his judgment of men, and although having no military study or education himself, was several times, during the war, compelled to order movements and make changes in defiance of the conservative military, as well as civil, leaders about him. It is quite probable that Grant would more than once have been sacrificed to military jealousy, if it had not been for the firmness of Lincoln. In addition to this, Grant's own good qualities saved him from any col- lision with his superior officers. He was eminently a soldier, truly loyal to his country, and put that loyalty above any considerations of private feeling. Besides, he was calm in temperament, and self-confi- dent. So now he told Halleck he was only intent on his duty, and should perform any service assigned' him. I need not go into many details about Halleck's march to Corinth, and the imaginary siege of that place. It can all be told very briefly. 1 Badeau's "Military History," page 102. MOVEMENT ON CORINTH. 1 43 The distance from Pittsburg Landing direct to Corinth was nineteen miles. Perhaps, by the road taken by the army, it may have been more. At any rate, it was not a two days' march. Then the ques- tion was a very simple one. Ought our army to move immediately on, and attack the broken forces of the enemy at once ? or ought we to wait for reinforce- ments, and by that loss of time to allow the enemy to be reenforced and intrench ? General Halleck seems to have preferred the latter course; for, with nearly fifty thousand men in the armies of Buell and Grant, he seems to have made no move whatever in more than two weeks! On the 1st of May, he issued a general order, transferring Thomas's Division from the Army of the Ohio to the Army of Tennessee, and giving Thomas the command of Grant's Army, Grant retaining the command of the District of Ten- nessee. Having made this extraordinary expenditure of intellectual vigor (and being reenforced by twenty- five thousand men under General Pope) the Com- manding General thought it was time to begin. On the 1st of May, Monterey, a little town about half way to Corinth, was occupied ; and on the 3d of May, General Paine, of Pope's Corps, occupied Farmington, another little village, from which the rebels hastily retired to Corinth ; but, on the 9th, they recaptured it, with a large force under Van Dorn and Price. We hear no more till we learn that, on the 17th, Sherman had carried a position called " Russell's House," ' where he could hear distinctly the drums beating in Corinth. At last, we are before Corinth ; and now 1 Sherman's Report, dated May 19th. 144 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. let us see what we have done, and what the enemy has done. Ilalleck assumed command of the army on the 13th of April ; he has been reenforced twenty- five thousand men, and he has now, on the 17th of May, (thirty-five days,) arrived in front of Corinth. He has averaged just half a mile per day, without meeting any serious resistance. In the mean time, the enemy, seeing we had lost the real advantage of the victory at Shiloh, began to take courage, reen- force, intrench, and make a bold front. Beauregard was an engineer officer, and he laid out and began to arm fortifications at Corinth, large enough and strong enough to have covered an army of a hundred thousand men ; and he came near getting them. Van Dorn and Price, from Arkansas and Missouri, and the garrison of New Orleans, (for we had taken New Orleans in April,) came gathering in, and the sup- posed strength of the rebel army was not less than seventy-five thousand men ; but, one half this great army had come there after we ought to have been in Corinth. But, in this sort of business, Halleck was not to be outdone. He had an immense department, and he gathered more than a hundred thousand men in front of Corinth. If we had failed to use the spade at Shiloh, no such charge could be made against us now. The more Beauregard fortified, the more we fortified ; and it seemed as if the generals of the two armies were making an experiment on the possibilities of unlimited digging. The position of affairs is thus described by Badeau, who was present: 1 " The National army moved slowly up toward 1 Badeau's "Military History," page ioi. HALLECK' S SLOW PROGRESS. 145 Corinth, from the battle-field of Shiloh, after Halleck arrived, making no advance except when protected by intrenchments. This was greatly to the dissatis- faction of both officers and men, to whom such operations were new, and seemed to savor of timidity. But Halleck had derived a lesson from the assaults of Shiloh, and the outcry in consequence ; he was determined not to be attacked unawares, and col- lected his forces from every quarter of his immense department, concentrating a hundred and twenty thousand bayonets ; yet it took him six weeks to ad- vance less than fifteen miles, the enemy in all that while making no offensive movement ; on the con- trary, the rebels constructed defenses still more elab- orate than those behind which Halleck advanced. Beauregard's strength was estimated at seventy thou- sand ; he himself reported it at forty-seven thousand, and the officers and men of the National army were anxious to avail themselves of their vast superiority in numbers." There must, however, be an end of such perform- ances, and at length, on the 30th, Halleck reports to Stanton, 1 that our divisions are in the enemy's ad- vanced works ; and sure enough the siege of Corinth is at an end. This was not, however, till good oppor- tunities of fighting and destroying the rebel army had been lost. But what has become of the enemy? It was be- lieved, by Grant and other officers, that Beauregard did not intend to remain at Corinth, but was only endeavoring to gain time. This was well established 1 Halleck's Dispatch to Stanton, May 30, 1862. 13 146 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. by a reconnoissance of General T. W. Sherman, on the 15th of May.' Corinth entered, and the rebels already far away, Halleck sent out strong forces in pursuit ; but it is not to be supposed Beauregard in- tended to be taken, and he was not. He got to Tu- pelo when our men got to Baldwin, on the 10th. and here the siege and flight of Corinth ended. In the mean time, Halleck's Reports were mag- nificent. On the 4th of June, he reports Pope thirty miles from Florence, Alabama, with forty thousand men, and making great numbers of prisoners. On the 9th of June, he dispatches, that "the enemy has fallen back fifty miles, and that the rebel losses are estimated at forty thousand." Time, however, proved that considerable deductions had to be made from these accounts. We may now ask, where was Grant ? He was quietly remaining with his troops ; not charged with any expedition, or responsible for any conduct of the army. Whatever may have been the cause, Grant and Buell seem to have been left to their own reflec- tions, with the least possible to do with any active operations. Grant might be likened to Achilles rest- ing in his tent, while Agammemnon led the forces of the Greeks ; only that, unlike Achilles, he was not inactive by his own will. Once, he ventured to sug- 1 T. W. Sherman says : "The result of this reconnoissance was re- ported to your head-quarters," [those of Major-Genera] Thomas, com- manding right wing,] "together with the information obtained from the prisoners, among which was the important fact that the rebel com- mander had issued orders the day before, that all baggage of the troops, except what could be carried in knapsacks, was to be immediately sent by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Okolona." THE REBEL LINE. 147 gest a movement on the enemy's lines ; but his ad- vice being scouted, he never offered it again. Time passes on. It was two months before the termina- tion of Halleck's Corinthian movement, and now we may ask, what is the sum of the results of Shiloh ? What is our present situation ? On June 6th, Memphis was surrendered to Com- modore C. H. Davis,' who in an engagement with the rebel flotilla had destroyed or captured it. Memphis, as I have observed, was the left or Mississippi point of the second line formed by the enemy after Donel- son. Corinth was a principal railroad point on that line : hence it followed inevitably that, if those points were taken and held by us, the enemy's line must fall back and be re-formed. They would not like to give us Northern Mississippi, nor was it a territory very im- portant to us ; but its fall was inevitable, and the rebel left wing must fall back on a new defensible line. Henceforward, therefore, the rebel left wing rested on Vicksburg, its right stretching east to Jackson and Meridian, on the Mississippi Railroad ; thence to Selma, bearing up to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and resting at the center on Chattanooga. The right wing of the rebel defenses remained un- changed, resting at the east on the Rappahannock, passing down through the Valley of Virginia, and pivoted on Chattanooga, with Knoxville and Cum- berland in front of it. Their line ran north from Chattanooga just as long as we permitted it, and that was till Rosecrans took Chattanooga, which was the most important single event, in a strategic point of 1 Commodore Davis's Report, dated June 6, 1862. 148 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. view, during the war. From the time the rebel army fell back from .Manassas, (March, 1862,) till Grant passed the Rapidan, (May, 1864,) more than two years, we had marched and countermarched grand armies, fought bravely and nobly in twenty battles, had victories and defeats, lost one hundred thousand men, and not advanced one mile in the actual line of attack on the enemy's right or east wing. The reason was not in the conduct of the armies, but an error in the strategic plan, if plan there was. A vital and successful attack on the enemy's line of defenses could only be made from the West, and no such a one was made till the Mississippi was taken, and the whole left wing and center of the rebel forces turned, driven back, and the right wing at Richmond cut off from its resources. But we need not consider this now. It is enough to note that the rebel line, first driven back from Columbus, Donelson, and Bowling Green, was now driven back from Memphis and Corinth. The first line was broken ; the second is now broken, and the third line is formed through Vicksburg, Jackson, Me- ridian, Selma, and Chattanooga. In the mean time the brilliant and energetic Mitchel (in these particu- lars unsurpassed) had left Buell at Nashville, and dashing down over the Tennessee, had arrived at Huntsville, 1 North Alabama, and astonished the peo- ple on both sides of the line very much as if a me- teor had fallen from the skies ; but meteors are not 1 Mitchel occupied Huntsville May 2d and Rogersville May 14th. He remained a few days longer, when he was ordered to South Car- olina, and died at Beaufort. IMPORTANCE OF CHATTANOOGA. 1 49 permanent bodies, and this brilliant expedition had no permanent results. It was only a raid. Nothing short of a hundred thousand men could have main- tained Mitchel at Huntsville. The art of war does not permit raids to be turned into conquests ; and so, whether it was Mitchel or Morgan, Grierson or Pleasanton, Bragg or Lee, 1 nothing was made by raids which pass tJiroicgJi the enemy's line of de- fense without holding it. But this raid of Mitchel's, and the driving back of the rebel line from Memphis and Corinth, evidently gave the rebel leaders a new idea of the importance of Chattanooga, 2 and as evi- dently impressed the same idea upon us. Why did we not seize Chattanooga in the summer of 1861? It matters not. We began to see now what it meant, and the rebels saw it clearer than we did. But let us hasten to events. Halleck saw Chattanooga looming up in the distance, and in the middle of June sent off Buell with four divisions, stretching along the Ten- nessee, and trying to see if they could not get ahead of Bragg, who was going in the same direction. Here occurred the first great error of this campaign. We had been successful at every point, and now Halleck had the finest army which had been assembled, greater than that which McClellan led on the Pen- insula. What was its object ? It should have accom- 1 The several marches of Lee across the Potomac, and of Bragg in Kentucky, were mere raids across the lines, and resulted in nothing but loss, except the capture of provender. 2 1 was at the Suck of the Tennessee twenty-five years before, when Chattanooga was not yet built. I marked the extraordinary defensi- bility of the country, and wondered why we did not seize it in the be- ginning of the war. 150 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. plished some great thing, and that great thing lay before it. Vicksburg was at that time comparatively weak, and if it could be taken at all from the land side, then was the time to do it. But the army was divided and scattered, and on the Mississippi a year of precious time was lost. On the 17th of July Halleck was called to the chief command at Washington, and left the command of the Army of Tennessee to Grant. 1 On the fall of Memphis, Grant had been ordered to make his head- quarters there, and was then removed to Corinth. Now he is left in command of the Army of Tennes- see. He has got into his element again, and he will not get out of it soon. With five divisions of the grand army of Halleck sent away, for such was the fact, he is left in a difficult and trying position ; for the rebels very soon see that error, and forthwith begin to try whether they can not break through, and get back their lost line. Grant is greatly annoyed, and for several months he is to travel a hard road. Leaving Memphis in command of Sherman, and held strongly enough, Grant remained at Corinth, fortify- ing as well as he could these points, (on two leading railroads,) Corinth and Jackson, (at the Junction,) on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and Bolivar, on the Mississippi Central. Every man that Grant could possibly spare was sent to Buell, who had already 1 A singular story is told about this, that when Halleck received the appointment of General-in-Chief, he offered the command of the army in Mississippi to a Colonel Allen, who was a quarter-master, (supersed- ing Grant,) but that Allen had more sense than Halleck, and rejected it. I was always skeptical about this, and it may not be true ; but it rests on the authority of a letter from Allen himself, quoted by Badeau in his "Military History." GRANT'S DISPATCH TO HALLE CK. 1 5 I been out-marched and out-bragged by General Brax- ton Bragg, who had already reached Chattanooga. Grant had comparatively few troops, and was held so insignificant at the time, that he was troubled with few orders. The magnificent march on the peninsula of Virginia had been turned into the magnificent raid of Lee into Maryland ; both of them, in the end, of little importance. Van Dorn and Price, however, felt that in such an active state of society they ought to take some part. Accordingly, Van Dorn com- menced a movement to the east of Grant, either with a view of crossing the Tennessee, or of making some ulterior operation to the east. This move was made by the division under Price, who, on the 13th of Sep- tember, advanced from the South and seized Iuka, a point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and twenty-one miles east of Corinth. On the 15th, Grant telegraphed Halleck : " If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent the design either to go north, or to unite forces and attack here." He had been collecting his forces, and when the enemy struck Iuka, cutting the railroad and telegraph wires be- tween them and Corinth, Grant began operations. Van Dorn was far to the south-west, threatening Cor- inth, and he meant to divide them and destroy Price. Rosecrans, (who then commanded Pope's troops,) moved south of the railroad, to cut off the roads by which Price could retreat ; and Ord, with a corps of eight thousand, was moved out on the railroad, (and a train of cars ready,) so that he could move up to help Rosecrans, or back to defend Corinth, (for Van 152 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Dorn might attack Corinth.) The arrangement was a good one ; but bad roads (as is often the case) de- layed Rosecrans, so that he got up only in the after- noon instead of the morning. The result was, the enemy were prepared, and attacked him. There was a hard fight,' but the rebels, finding themselves likely to be cut off, retreated on the only road left. The rebels were foiled entirely in their plans, and escaped destruction only by treachery. 2 The rebels were foiled, but not crippled. Price moved back and joined Van Dorn, and the same old game of annoyance to Grant was continued. It seems, from what followed, and the new rebel officers who appeared on the scene, that the enemy was largely reen forced, probably from Arkansas and Louisiana. They had over thirty thousand men, (Rosecrans said thirty-eight thousand,) and were bent on striking a blow. The object was soon perceived to be Corinth. About this time, Grant telegraphed to Washington: "My position is precarious, but I hope to get out of it all right." Rosecrans then cora- 1 " Head-quarters Army of the Mississippi, two miles ) South of Iuka, September 19, 1862 — 10 1-2, P. M. J "Major-General U. S. Grant: " Genera/ — We met the enemy in force just above this point. The engagement lasted several hours. We have lost two or three pieces of artillery. Firing was very heavy. You must attack in the morning and in force. The ground is horrid, unknown to us, and no room for devel- opment. Could n't use our artillery at all ; fired hut few shots. Push in on them till we can have time to do something. We will try to get a position on our right which will take Iuka. "W. S. Rosecrans, Brigadier-General.'" 2 Badeau says, that Colonel Thompson, a Confederate officer, told General Ord, that a Dr. Burton had passed himself on Rosecrans as a I 'nion spy, and then returned to Price, and gave him the information he required. REBELS IN FRONT OF CORINTH. 1 53 manded at Corinth, 1 and Grant immediately directed him to call in his troops, and ordered McPherson, with a brigade, to his support. On the 2d of Octo- ber, Van Dorn, with the Confederate Generals Price, Lovell, Villipigue, and Rust, appeared in front of Corinth, to light again for Northern Mississippi. A month before, as I have said, Grant had been fortify- ing, as far as he could, Corinth, Jackson, and Bolivar, and we now see the end gained by it. Rosecrans, having about nineteen thousand men, had pushed out to see whether he could not be the one to attack ; but he was mistaken in that, for, on the afternoon of the 3d of October, Van Dorn attacked, and drove him back to the town. New dispositions were made, and the line of our forts was far stronger than the enemy supposed. General Van Dorn, having driven our forces, telegraphed to Richmond a great victory ! In the art of prophetic telegraphing, the rebel Generals seem to have had a remarkable faculty. Most proba- bly they thought every battle must be a Bull Run. Never were they more disastrously disappointed than now. We had inner works, 2 with strong forts. There was Fort Robinette on the left, and Battery William, and Battery Powell. On the 4th of October a great battle was fought. The rebel lines were closed within a thousand yards 1 Rosecrans had arrived at Corinth, from Iuka, on the 26th. 2 Coppee says : " Immediately upon General Halleck's departure for Washington, these works were pushed forward with energy, and by the 25th of September, when Rosecrans took command, they were nearly completed. To Major Prime, under General Grant's orders, belongs the credit of laying out and constructing the fortifications against which the enemy was now about to hurl his masses, with impetuous but un- availing valor." 154 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. of our works, and during the night they had thrown up some batteries in our front. In the morning they began with an artillery fire, which was soon silenced; then, at half-past nine, A. M., they stormed the right, at Battery Powell, where Generals T. A. Davies and Hamilton were posted. Here they made some im- pression, but the fight was terrific. The account of it is thus given by Professor Coppee: "The battle raged upon Davies and Fort Powell. The Bolivar road, by which they came, was swept by our guns ; huge gaps were made in their column, but, without halting, they opened out in a loose deploy- ment, encircling our lines, and losing fearfully as they came up. Nothing stopped them. 'They came up,' (writes an eye-witness to the 'Cincinnati Commercial,' October 9th,) ' with their faces averted, like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail' They reach the broad glacis ; our troops are on the rude covered way, and will certainly repel them, were it not for an unaccountable panic which struck a por- tion of Davies's Division. This will never do. Davies struggles manfully to check it. Rosecrans flies into their midst, fights like a simple grenadier, and, with entreaties, threats, and the flat of his saber, puts an end to the 'untimely and untoward stampede,' which was but partial after all." Davies's men rally. Sullivan comes to his aid ; they retake Battery Powell, (into which a few of the enemy had got,) and Hamilton sweeps the avenues of approach. Price has lost the fight, and on his side it is over. On our left, (the enemy's right,) says Coppee, REBEL DEFEA T AT CORINTH. I 5 5 " the attack was conducted by Van Dorn in person. Under cover of a cloud of skirmishers he had formed his men in column of attack, and twenty minutes after Price moved forward he launched four columns upon Battery Robinette and our adjacent lines. His heavy guns are disposed in rear. Then began those 'gorgeous pyrotechnics of the battle,' spoken of by General Rosecrans, the description of which he leaves to 'pens dipped in poetic ink.' The fighting was in- deed Homeric. From the moment they came in sight, till they were within fifty yards of the work, they were mowed, and torn, and shattered by grape, shell, and canister ; and when, after a gallant advance, these brave Mississippi and Texas troops pause for a breathing space, before a final charge, the Ohio and Missouri regiments, which have been lying flat, rise at a signal, and pour in a volley, before which the enemy reel and fall back in horror. But even this does not keep them long dismayed. They came to take Cor- inth, and they are not going to give it up so easily." Again and again the rebel columns charged, and again and again were routed. At length they gave way and retired. They had lost the battle ; a battle to them at least of immense importance; for, had they succeeded, we should have lost all we had gained by the battle of Shiloh. But their star in the West had sunk, and sunk darkly on their fortunes. They never did regain any thing which they lost at Donel- son and Shiloh. Raids, from Bragg' s down to Mor- gan's, they did make ; but never again did they win back the great battle-field of the West. The sun of victory continued to shine gloriously on Grant, and 156 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. he won in the West more than enough to counter- balance the failure on the Potomac. The rebels, in addition to their defeat, lost heavily, 1 and were glad, by a rapid retreat, to save themselves from destruction. 2 Rosecrans well deserved all the applause which followed him for this battle, which, as a battle, was fought by him ; but Grant had directed the movement and combination of forces which resulted in victory. After the end he issued an Order, of which the follow- ing is a paragraph : "It is with heart-felt gratitude the General com- manding congratulates the armies of the West for another great victory won by them on the 3d, 4th, and 5 th instant, over the combined armies of Van Dorn, Price, and Lovell. " The enemy chose his own time and place of at- tack, and knowing the troops of the West as he does, 1 1 see no rebel account of losses, and it is said our Government has no detailed account of the battle, but Rosecrans made a full Re- port, from which I take the following account of rebel loss : "The enemy's loss in killed was 1,423 officers and men; their loss in wounded, taking the general average, amounts to 5,692. We took 2,248 prisoners, among whom are one hundred and thirty-seven field officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, six battalions, and thirteen batteries, besides separate companies. " We took also fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, 3,300 stand of arms, 4,500 rounds of ammunition, and a large lot of accouterments. The enemy bjew up several wagons between Corinth and Chewalla, and beyond Chewalla many ammunition wagons and carriages were destroyed, and the ground was strewn with tents, officers' mess-chests, and small arms. We pursued them forty miles in force and sixty miles with cavalry." 2 A letter in the "Grenada Appeal," in the Rebellion Record, Vol. V, page 505, praises their Generals for making their escape on the Hatchie. GENERAL ROSECRANS, 1 57 and with great facilities for knowing their numbers, never would have made the attempt, except with a superior force numerically. But for the undaunted bravery of officers and soldiers, who have yet to learn defeat, the efforts of the enemy must have proven successful." 1 Badeau, in his "Military History," intimates that Grant was dissatisfied with Rosecrans, and that the latter was not quick to obey. This is zeal without discretion. There was no officer of the army whose military career will bear criticism better than that of Rosecrans, and probably not a General in command during the war who \yas more competent to his place. Grant made no complaint of Rosecrans, and his mili- tary character needs no support from the glossing of prejudice or partiality. Since the departure of Hal- leck, Grant had been left free to pursue his own judgment,, and though compelled by the reduction of his forces to keep on the defensive, we see that his defensive was in reality offensive by becoming vic- tory. After the second Corinth, Grant combined the divisions of Ord, Hurlbut, and Rosecrans, in pursuit of the enemy, so that Price barely escaped in cross- ing the Hatchie. When, however, the forces of the enemy had got beyond the Hatchie, Grant recalled his divisions, and for a few weeks there was com- parative quiet. On the 8th of October, Lincoln congratulated Grant, in a dispatch, and asked, " How does it all sum upf 1 Certainly, this is a very pertinent question. 1 Grant's Order, October 2d. 2 Rebellion Record, Vol. V, page 500. 158 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The sum of those operations was twofold. First, we secured what we had got, by Shiloh and the first Corinth. We maintained North Mississippi, and opened the way to Vicksburg. I said, that as each line of rebel defense was broken, it was never re- gained, nor even passed, except by mere raids. But, suppose the battle of Corinth had been lost, what then ? Why, we should have inevitably lost the whole ground we had got after the battle of Shiloh. Grant directed all the movements by which we were successful ; but, suppose a less skillful and less de- termined commander than Rosecrans had fought that battle, defeat would have been very possible, and the results might have been very different. 1 But the enemy was defeated and driven back, with another effect, not less important. This was the moral effect. Throughout the war this was of the greatest import- ance. The war was largely the result of a conflict of moral ideas. I have stated how profoundly im- pressed the rebel mind was with the fighting of our soldiers at Shiloh. It was scarcely less impressed with the fighting at Iuka and Corinth. The rebel generals were inferior in capacity; their loss very great, and their shattered forces retreated, with a salutary conviction that Western men were brave, daring, and enduring. We have a month before us now in which to look round and consider our condition. The armies came 1 A very fine account of the battle of Corinth was given at the time, by Mr. Bickham, correspondent of the "Cincinnati Commercial," now fcditor of the " Dayton Journal," who gives the whole credit to Rose- crans. Badeau gives it all to Grant. The battle of Corinth was due to Rosecrans, and the general movement to Grant. PHTSICIANS AND NURSES. 1 59 from the people ; and as the rivers can not live without springs, so the armies were continually recruited and refreshed from the people. I have described how, when Sumpter was fired on, the American women asked, " What shall we do ?" how the Sanitary Com- mission was formed ; and how, when the Cumberland ran with the blood of Donelson, the Sanitary Com- mission of Cincinnati flew, with healing on its wings, to comfort the weary and the wounded soldiers. The guns of Shiloh had scarcely ceased their roar, when the Sanitary Commission entered the field. The Commission at Cincinnati chartered the Tycoon and the Monarch, two large vessels, furnished them with volunteer physicians and nurses, supplied them with all the necessaries, comforts, and delicacies which suffering men might need, and proceeded at once to the scene of action. 1 To this work General Halleck gave his full authority, 2 and requested boats to be sent, and Camp Dennison to be fitted up for the wounded. The Tycoon, the first boat, left Cincin- nati with fifteen surgeons, twenty-four medical stu- dents, thirty-eight citizen nurses, and two druggists. She was fitted with every thing the body of man could need, contributed in a few hours by the citizens of Cincinnati. As she passed down the river, the moral victory of Donelson and Shiloh was every- where evident. A gentleman, who had been down the river the year before, remarked that there was a great change. Then, both sides of the Ohio seemed to show the signs of disloyalty. The flag of the 1 Mansfield's " History of the Cincinnati Sanitary Commission." 2 Halleck's Dispatch, 10th of April, 1862. 160 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Union was seldom seen,' and the people were de- claiming against the Government. Now the scene was changed. As the boat descended the river, on her mission of patriotic charity, she was constantly greeted with the waving of flags and handkerchiefs from either shore. On the 17th the "Tycoon" re- turned, loaded with wounded soldiers. On the Com- mission went in its noble work. The people spared no offerings. The Commission spared no labor or zeal. How many of the wounded and the suffering must have owed their lives to this noble work of the Christian patriot ! As the army still pursued its course to the South, the Sanitary Commission was more needed, and more zealously put forth its energies. In the summer of 1862 the Cincinnati Commission put forth an appeal to the women. " Women of the North-West ! Your husbands, brothers, sons, your and our dearest, are, or soon will be, in the field. If one of them, by any want of effort, suffers, it will be your and our irremediable fault. The business of the men of the country is now war. Let it be also the business of her women. The former are to march, toil, and fight ; let the latter work with equal energy and patriotism in their own sphere, and labor for the common good. Then will the march be bereft of half its fatigue, the battle of more than half its danger, and the bless- ings of generations to come shall rest upon you." Such was the ardent appeal of the Commission 1 A lady in Kentucky told me, that for three miles on one side of her home, and eight on the other, there was not a loyal man ! This shows what Kentucky neutrality was worth. RESPONSE TO SANITART COMMISSION. l6l to the women of the West, and most nobly did they respond ! Hundreds of villages, scattered over the North-West, heard and answered that appeal. Aid societies of every kind were formed. Church circles met and sewed garments for the soldiers, with all the zeal which they would have put forth in the holy cause of missions. Daily the contributions came in from every quarter of the land ; daily the Commis- sion met, and sent forth its charities; daily the wounded and sick returned from the far-distant bat- tle-fields ; daily they were put in hospitals and camps, and often did the delicate lady and the young girl volunteer to watch by the soldier's side, and nurse his sick form and beguile his weary hours. It seems to me, as I look back upon the scenes of that war, that nothing in it was more beautiful or glorious than this work of Christian charity. Shall we de- spair of the Republic, when patriotism nerves to such heroism, and Christianity impels to such noble benev- olence ? It was not merely Republicanism, it was Christianity, whose strength was illustrated by that war. The Republic stands not only on the strength of the people, but on the strength of Christianity. If it did not, we might well despair ; but, with it, the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. The Chris- tian at home thought of the soldier in the field : " No base ambitions quickened these ; They saw but Freedom's need ; No dreams of flow'ry paths of ease, No bribe but valor's meed ; And some shall win the hero's grave, The battle-smoke their pall ; But honor dwells where fall the brave, And God is over all ! " 14 1 62 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. CHAPTER VII. VICKSBURG. Lincoln's order to mcclernand — grant's bold proposi- tion TO HALLECK — HIS ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY — HIS MARCH ON HOLLY SPRINGS AND OXFORD — HIS FAILURE SHERMAN ASSAULTS VICKSBURG, AND FAILS — TROOPS WITH- DRAWN, AND NEW PLAN OF ACTION — GRAND ARMY AS- SEMBLES AT YOUNG'S POINT — DIGS CANALS — TRIES THE YAZOO — THE MISSISSIPPI CONQUERS THE CANAL, AND THE ARMY WAITS FOR NEW MOVEMENTS. AFTER the battles terminating with the 6th of October, Grant felt a strong desire to advance, and if possible seize Vicksburg, by a land route. But this seems to have been subsequent to the determin- ation of Mr. Lincoln to proceed immediately with the Mississippi campaign. This appears from the follow- ing "confidential" Order, issued by Mr. Lincoln, and dated October 21, 1862: " Ordered, that Major-General McClernand be, and he is directed to proceed to the States of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those States and to be raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be designated by the General-in- Chief, to the end that, when a sufficient force, not recpiired by the operations of General Grant's command, shall be raised, an expedi- tion may be organized under General McClernand's command, against GRANTS BOLD PROPOSITION. 1 63 Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi River and open navigation to New Orleans." Indorsement: "This order, though marked 'confidential,' maybe shown by General McClernand to governors, and even others, when, in his discretion, he believes so doing to be indispensable to the progress of the expedition. I add, that I feel deep interest in the success of the expedition, and desire it to be pushed forward with all possible dispatch, consistently with the other parts of the military service. A. Lincoln." This Order l evidently aims at an expedition down the river, and independent of Grant's command. The result proved, that, as an independent expedition, it was ill-advised, and, we shall see, by Grant's subse- quent movements, that an independent land expedi- tion was equally so. On the 26th of October, Grant wrote to Halleck, making the bold proposition to abandon Corinth and the inferior posts about it — destroy all the railroads leading to and from Corinth — and (said he) " with small reinforcements at Memphis, I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central Road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg. I am ready, however, to do with my might whatever you may direct, without criticism." Grant was a little mistaken in this plan ; but the close of this letter shows one of his greatest virtues — his perfect willingness to do what he was directed to do, without jealousy, and without criticism. Grant assumed nothing. He was not vain enough to believe he was the only man of sense in the world, and he had none of that impuls- ive, or rather thoughtless, spirit, which took fire at some small or imaginary slight. He was above all 1 I am indebted to Badeau's " Military History " for this Order, which I have not found elsewhere. 164 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. such weakness. Mere vanity, self-importance, and jealousy cost some of the really able generals of the war their places and their means of usefulness. Whether it was temperament or self-command, Grant gained by a want of these weaknesses, and hence was perfectly willing to follow Halleck's plan, if his own was rejected. Halleck, however, before receiving Grant's letter, had coolly telegraphed him, " Be pre- pared to concentrate your troops in case of attack." The commanding General at Washington was always prepared to resist attacks. In the mean while, Grant had been exercising his administrative ability to great advantage. He limited the number and kinds of trains, baggage, etc., cutting down impedimenta to the smallest amount ; and, it has been humorously said, reducing his own baggage to a — tooth-brush ! There is no question that almost all armies carry too much baggage ; and, as I have read the accounts of the comfortable provisions, and even luxuries, in the tents of some of our officers, I have felt that a com- manding general, who knew his duty and the true science of war, would suffer no such things. A re- publican army should be a Spartan army, filled with the fire of patriotism, and willing to endure all hard- ships for love of country. Grant had divided his army into four corps : the first, under Major-General Sherman, had its head-quarters at Memphis ; the sec- ond, Major-General Hurlbut, at Jackson ; the third, under Brigadier-General C. S. Hamilton, at Corinth ; and the fourth, General T. A. Davies, at Columbus. On the 2d of November, Grant, having received no orders to the contrary, moved with three divisions MARCH ON HOLLY SPRINGS AND OXFORD. 1 65 from Corinth and two from Bolivar, writing this to Halleck. Halleck approved of his advance, but did not authorize the abandonment of the position ; so Grant moved with three divisions. His army amounted to about thirty thousand men, McPherson commanding the right wing, and C. S. Hamilton the left. He knew the enemy was about equal to him, but felt perfectly confident. 1 In a few days he had made a rapid and successful advance. On the 4th he occupied La Grange, (near Grand Junction,) on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad ; and on the 13th Colonel Lee, Chief of Cavalry, took possession of Holly Springs, (Miss.) ; and on the morning of the 29th Grant passed that place with the main body. In the mean time the cavalry were far in advance, keeping up a constant skirmishing. Holly Springs is about twenty-five miles from Grand Junction, and in the richest part of Mississippi. In the next five or six days several skirmishes took place, and, on the 17th of December, Grant had his head-quarters at Oxford, Mississippi, about twenty-five miles in advance of Holly Springs and fifty miles from Grand Junc- tion. The cavalry had penetrated to CofTeeville. This was the situation of Grant on the 18th of De- cember, and, leaving him there, we must return and try to find out what he had planned, and what this campaign means. I have already stated that the war could only end by a campaign carried on from the West. Hence the Mississippi River was the axis on which the war turned ; and when we fully possessed : He wrote Sherman that the enemy was thirty thousand, and he could handle him without gloves. — Badeau. 1 66 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. the Mississippi, it was the grand base from which our columns poured cast, cutting off resources and lines of communication as we went. In the progress of the campaign on the Mississippi we had taken New Orleans, (April, 1862,) and previously Columbus, Isl- and No. 10, and Memphis, driving the rebels from both their first and their second line of defense, rest- ing on the Mississippi ; and now, their third and only line from the Mississippi rested on Vicksburg ; and below that, they held Port Hudson, making a reach on the Mississippi, which they had perfect command of, and which was of vast importance to them. Noth- ing they had was of more importance. Through that they brought their beef cattle from Texas, the only portion of the Confederacy which had a surplus ; through that they kept communication with the im- portant States of Arkansas and Texas, receiving re- enforcements of men and provisions. The Trans- Mississippi (except Missouri) was of no consequence to us, (and the Banks raid up Red River was an absurd expedition,) but of the greatest consequence to them. Hence, about the time that Grant was get- ting up his combined attack on Vicksburg, (that is, his first one, of which we are now speaking,) the rebels clearly foresaw the absolute necessity of hold- ing Vicksburg and Port Hudson. They accordingly fortified them in the strongest manner. We have the testimony of Jefferson Davis precisely to this point. In his speech before the Legislature of Mississippi, on December 26, 1862, ' he says: "Vicksburg and Port Hudson are the real points of attack. Every 1 See " Rebellion Record," Vol. VI, page 297. DEFENSES OF VICKSBURG. 1 67 effort will be made to capture those places, with the view of forcing the navigation of the Mississippi, of cutting off our communications with the Trans-Mis- sissippi Department, and of severing the Western from the Eastern portion of the Confederacy." He dwelt largely upon the defenses of Vicksburg. After stating the failure of the attack by the fleet, (which had been made some time before,) he says, "a few earth-works were thrown up, a few guns were mounted," and Vicksburg received the shock of both fleets. The important point made, and which must be remembered in considering the movement now go- ing on, is this : " Now, we are far better prepared in that quarter. The woi r ks, tJien weak, have been greatly strengthened ; the troops assigned for their defense are better disciplined, atid better instructed ; and that great soldier who came witli me has been pouring in his forces to assist in its protection." Who was this great soldier ? This was Joseph E. Johnston. Davis says he brought him with him. Pemberton had been in command ; but, as early certainly as the 26th of De- cember, Johnston took command of the Department, and Pemberton of the particular forces at Vicksburg. This being the situation of the rebels, and the condition of their defenses, let me ask, What was Grant's plan ? It seems, from numbers of letters and dispatches,' that Grant wanted to move forward by land in connection with the river expedition, which, as we have seen by Lincoln's order, had been previously directed. This was fully assented to by Halleck, who firmly supported Grant at this time, 'These are quoted in Badeau's "Military History." l68 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. and fully approved by General Sherman, who was to take part in it. Accordingly, the plan agreed upon was this : Grant was to move down by Holly Springs and Oxford to Grenada, there to hold Pemberton in check, while Sherman was to descend the Mississippi and attack Vicksburg. At the same time a force under General Washburn was to land at Delta (Yazoo Pass) and strike for Grenada, with a view of cutting Pemberton's communication. Sherman stated the case thus: 1 "Grant moved direct on Pemberton, while I moved from Memphis, and a smaller force under General Washburn struck directly for Gre- nada ; and the first thing Pemberton knew the depot of his supplies was almost in the grasp of a small cavalry force, and he fell back in confusion, and gave us the Tallahatchie without a battle." It would have been better if Pemberton had not been scared back. It was Grant's idea to fight, and, if possible, to destroy the enemy's armies ; but Pemberton's retreat gave no opportunity to fight, while the prolongation of Grant's line did give oppor- tunity, as we shall presently see, for a very different feat on the part of the enemy. This combined move- ment on the part of Grant, Sherman, and Washburn has been called by a military critic a very brilliant piece of strategy. 2 Whatever it might have been in theory, it was disastrous in fact. Besides, it had one essential defect. To move an army parallel with the Mississippi without supports on it, could only be done with overwhelming forces, able to garrison and 1 Sherman's speech at St. Louis. 2 See criticism in Coppee's "Grant and his Campaigns." GRANT'S ONLY FAILURE. 1 69 hold each depot beyond the power of assault. Grant's forces were not large enough for this. This might easily have been done and Vicksburg captured, in my opinion, if Halleck had pushed promptly on from Corinth. The defenses of Vicksburg were then weak, and it would have inevitably fallen. But the time for this was now passed. This combined movement being planned, let us now see what actually happened. On the night of the 1 8th of December the telegraph wires in the rear of Grant were cut at several points, and on the 20th Van Dorn, who had moved round Grant's army in a well-devised and well-executed raid, captured Holly Springs, with Grant's main depot of supplies, and millions of dollars in property. It is true, this at- tack at Holly Springs might have been resisted, and that the place was unnecessarily and disgracefully surrendered. But, whether taken or not, the plan of Grant's expedition had this essential fault, that it was prolonging a land line without water supports, which was at any time liable to this very misfortune. Here, I must remark, that this was Grant's only fail- ure, 1 and there is no great military commander who has been without failures. General Sherman em- barked at Memphis, on a hundred transports, with thirty thousand men, on the same day, (20th of De- cember,) and at Helena was reenforced with twelve thousand more, making an army of forty-two thou- 1 Trenton and Humboldt were entered and captured by the rebel forces on the same day by Forrest, showing that it was not merely the capture of Holly Springs which made the difficulty ; it was that the communications could be cut at any time. I? 170 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. sand men. For one week Grant's communications with the Mississippi were entirely cut off, and Sher- man heard nothing of him, so that this grand river expedition was entirely independent of any support from Grant, and, in fact, needed none. On the 24th Sherman reached Milliken's Bend, and on the 26th successfully disembarked near the mouth of Yazoo River. Vicksburg lies on a bluff, which is part of a long line of bluffs and hills, nearly three hundred feet in hight, and touching the Yazoo at Haines's Bluff, which was strongly fortified, and from which down the fortifications extended. These fortifications Sher- man attacked on the 27th with four divisions, and utterly failed. He lost heavily, 1 and the enemy but little, and on the 30th raised the siege, (if an assault can be called a siege,) reembarked, and sailed out of the Yazoo. This was the end of the grand land and water combined attack on Vicksburg. Grant had all his communications cut, his main depot of supplies destroyed, and, for one week, was isolated. On the 23d he was back at Holly Springs. Sherman sailed the very day Grant's communications were destroyed, was defeated at Vicksburg, and on the 30th was back again. Sherman very naively says that his failure was owing " to the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial." Very probable ! Vicks- burg was strong naturally, but what made it so strong artificially? I have already quoted (page 167) Davis's statement, in his speech to the Legislature, made on the 26th of December, that, after the fall 'He lost 175 killed, 930 wounded, and 743 missing, making 1,848, being eightfold the loss of the enemy. McCLERNAND IN COMMAND. ijl of Corinth, Vicksburg had been strongly fortified, and that J. E. Johnston had been put in command. The time had passed when Vicksburg was to be taken by a coup de main. The truth is very simple, and now evident to all, that the long delays of Hal- leck after Corinth, and his subsequent division of the army for fear of Bragg s movement, (which actually took place,) were the cause of losing the golden oppor- tunity of capturing Vicksburg in July or August. In the mean time Grant had learned a very im- portant fact, (which was afterward successfully applied by Sherman,) that our army could subsist itself in tlie South. For a week Grant had to get his supplies as he could from the country. The enemy were re- joicing that he would have to starve or retreat ; but he soon informed them, to their astonishment, that he should live on their provisions. These he found were more than enough ; and he found out that when there was need of it, the army could subsist in the enemy s country without depots ; for at that time Mis- sissippi, and indeed all the South, was rich in food. On the 4th of January, 1863, 1 McClernand assumed the command of the whole Mississippi expedition. To understand this it is only necessary to read Lincoln's Order, at the head of this chapter, which McClernand claimed, and Lincoln subsequently admitted and in- dorsed, gave him the command of the Mississippi expedition. It has been said that Sherman hurried the expedition off out of jealousy of McClernand. It was hurried off to get rid of McClernand, but for a very different reason. The fact was, that neither 1 Sherman's Order, January 4th. Rebellion Record, Vol. VI, p. 317. 172 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Halleck, Grant, Sherman, nor the officers generally, had any confidence in McClernand's military abilities. 1 Lincoln had given him the command, against the ad- vice of all the regular officers, for McClernand had been a friend, and I believe partner, of Lincoln's in Illinois. At any rate, here is McClernand at Milli- ken's Bend, in command. What next is to be done ? One good thing McClernand did immediately. Up the Arkansas was Fort Hindman, or, as generally called, "Arkansas Post." This was of very little mili- tary consequence, but had, at that time, a large body of the enemy's forces, and considerable artillery. Against this post McClernand immediately moved his forces, by White River and a cut-off, into the Arkansas. The fort, artillery, and thousands of prisoners were taken. It was a fair set-off against the failure at Vicksburg, and answered the purpose of inspiriting the people, who, at that time, were discouraged by several reverses. 2 On the ioth of January, 1863, Grant established his head-quarters at Memphis, writing to McClernand that he had heard nothing from the expedition since Sherman left, and adding, that " if there is force enough within the limits of my control to secure a certain victory at Vicksburg, they will be sent there." On the 17th of January Grant paid a visit to the transport fleet lying at Napoleon, and there he seems to have intimated his first conviction of the plan, 1 A full statement of this affair is given in Badeau's "Military His- tory," pages 128-130, and it is fully sustained by the letters, telegrams, orders, etc., at the time. 2 Sec ficneral McClernand's Report, dated January 20, 1863. Re- bellion Record, Vol. VI, page 360. OPERA TIONS A GAINS T VICKSB UR G. 1 73 which, after various trials, was at last fully successful. He wrote to Halleck : " Our troops must get bclozv the city to be used effectually!' After his return from Napoleon, he wrote, on the 20th, that " the work of reducing Vicksburg will take time and mcu, but can be accomplished" Here, then, Grant seems to have arrived at a full comprehension of the nature of the problem, and of the means of solving it. He was to get below Vicksburg, and then cut off its supplies, and invest it from the interior. But the problem for the time seemed literally impossible. Not only Vicks- burg and its bluff, but from Haines's Bluff, on the ridge of hills some twelve miles above, to Warrenton, six miles below, was almost a continued line of bat- teries, so that it did not seem possible to get supplies, with provisions and munitions, to say nothing of troops, below. Then, as for going round, while the whole country was intersected with rivers, bayous, swamps, and the low grounds overflowed at high water, that seemed impracticable. The problem was a hard one ; and we shall soon see that Grant had his own ideas on the subject, and was not much in- debted to any plans at Washington. Grant now commenced operations. He ordered the whole army lying at Napoleon to Young's Point, where they arrived on the 21st. Young's Point is on the western side of the Mississippi, about nine miles above Vicksburg, and nearly opposite the mouth of the Yazoo. Grant's own army was moved to Mem- phis, and embarked on one hundred and twenty-five transports. These were the veteran soldiers of the West. To the vast army now concentrating at 174 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Young's Point was added a large number of gun- boats — the Chillicothe, Indianola, Lafayette, East- port, and a number of others, many of them iron- clads, formed a most formidable river navy. Soon this vast armament was assembled. On the 29th Grant himself arrived, and on the 30th assumed com- mand. The old difficulty with McClernand remained, but was soon settled. Grant was commander of the Department, and, therefore, had a right to command. But he and Halleck, who was now supporting Grant most effectually, at last prevailed with Lincoln, and Grant received authority to put whomsoever he pleased in command. Accordingly Grant issued a General Order, which put McClernand in command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. McClernand inquired if it was the intention of that Order to limit his command to that Corps? To which Grant emphatically replied it was. 1 So that matter was settled ; but Grant wrote to Halleck he was not ambitious of the command, and with the same discreet prudence he had hereto- fore displayed, said he was willing to do all he could in any position assigned him; 7 but he determined to go with the expedition himself. Grant saw that the long line of fortifications in front, at, and around Vicksburg, could not be assaulted with success, and, therefore, the problem was, how to get below. Here we must remember that Port Hud- son below shut up the river there, else Banks and his army, which, in the mean time, were to cooperate ' Mi I demand's letters of January 30th and February 1st, and Grant's, January 31st. 2 Grant's Letter to Halleck, February I, 1863. CANALS AND CUT-OFFS. 1 75 with Grant, (but which never did,) might have come up and helped. But Banks and his flotilla were com- pletely cut off, and the problem for Grant was, not to join Banks below Port Hudson — that would do no good — but to get on the Mississippi, between Vicks- burg and Port Hudson, so that he could be fed there long enough to invest Vicksburg and complete his communications. It did not, as we shall see, make much difference as to the particular point, provided it was low enough to flank the Vicksburg outworks. But how to get below, that is the question. Grant's first idea, as a possibility, was a cut-off of the pen- insula in front of Vicksburg, or, an approach by a succession of water-courses from Yazoo Pass ; in one word, some water communication, by which he could transport his men and stores. On the 22d he wrote to McClernand, " I hope the work of changing the channel of the Mississippi is begun ;" and also, " On the present rise it is barely possible that the Yazoo Pass might be turned to good account in aid- ing our enterprise." [ This was his first thought ; but it does not seem ever to have impressed his mind with any conviction of success. Indeed, for three months, the army and the public were amused with a succession of efforts to make canals and cut-offs on the Mississippi. I shall not trace out these various operations, which are really interesting only to the engineers and soldiers employed on them. The first was " Williams's Canal," which had been begun before Grant went there. The river, several miles above Vicksburg, turned nearly north-east, and run in that 1 Badeau's "Military History," page 154. iy6 LIFE OF GENERAL OFAYT. direction till it struck the Vicksburg Bluffs, and, seem- ingly turned by them, ran in almost a contrary direc- tion ; so that nearly opposite Vicksburg was a long, narrow peninsula, at the narrowest part of which it was only necessary to dig a canal about a mile long to make a new channel for the Mississippi, (provided it was willing to go there,) which would leave Vicks- burg high and dry. The work progressed very well till, all at once, the river objected to this proceeding, carried off the lower end or mouth of the canal, and came near flooding out the soldiers, who escaped in great haste. Grant said the canal had the small diffi- culty of being perpendicular at both ends to the river, which, of course, had no idea of going into it. So ended that scheme, which the rebels laughed at, and Grant cared but little about. The next fancy with projectors of internal navi- gation in the army was the Lake Providence route. The lake was seventy miles to the 'north of Vicksburg, and but one mile from the Mississippi ; that mile was cut through, and if we could have employed a year upon it, we should probably have got through Red River to a point near Port Hudson ; but the Bayous Bertie and Macon, which made the commu- nication, were filled with timber, and overflowed into swamps, and, in one word, no steamboats went through. But it was a fine field of enterprise for the ingenuity of engineers and speculators in rich lands. The next scheme was Yazoo Pass, which is far above Vicksburg, but which goes into Moon Lake, and from that into Coldwater River, and thence into the Tallahatchie River, which is one branch of the TAZOO PASS. 177 Yazoo. This made an actual opening to the Yazoo above Vicksburg, and was navigable. Here was something which was tangible and possible. Grant did hope something from this route. The enemy were building gun-boats on the Tallahatchie, and it was very desirable to destroy them. He hoped to get the gun-boats through and down the Tallahatchie so as to cooperate with a land force in attacking Haines's Bluff. Accordingly, a division of troops, under Gen- eral Ross, embarked on twenty-two transports, pre- ceded by two gun-boats, and accompanied by a squad- ron of light craft. By working away at the outlet, and removing obstructions, they got into the Yazoo Inlet ; but when there, the difficulties encountered were almost incredible. The Pass was in most places not more than a hundred feet wide ; the trees met across it ; fallen timbers were in the way ; the channel turned and twisted in every direction. The enemy put all possible obstructions in front, and when the fleet passed, renewed them behind, so that the passage was a continual struggle of labor and skill, and not of fighting. Nevertheless, the expedition got through, and finally emerged into the Coldwater, and from the Coldwater into the Tallahatchie. In the mean while a great deal of time was lost, of which the rebels availed themselves. In the Yazoo, just below the Tallahatchie, was Greenwood, and there the rebels had built Fort Pemberton, well-placed, armed, and fortified. Ross, with his troops and gun-boats, got there, made an assault, and failed completely. So they retired, and the Yazoo expedition was ended. While this was going on Grant found another 178 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. pass. This was by Steele's Bayou, which, after going through a dozen bayous and rivers — in all only about a hundred and fifty miles — led finally to a point above Haines's Bluff, and consequently flanked both that and Greenwood. This was altogether the most promising of these wandering enterprises. Grant saw this, and went there reconnoitering himself. The greatest difficulty was the continual obstruction of the trees. He returned, and hurried up Porter with his flotilla and Sherman with a division of troops. They got into the bayou, and through half a dozen streams, till they actually got within a short distance of the Yazoo. But the rebels found out the course and object of the expedition, and made such preparations that Grant thought it prudent to abandon the plan. Here we are, then, on the 23d of March, after having failed in several attempts at internal naviga- tion for war purposes, at Milliken's Bend, just about as well off as when we began, six weeks before. The nation was impatient, and people wondered what Grant was about, and why he did not attempt some decisive blow. But Grant was not impatient. That was not in his nature ; and now was the time for him to show that determined will and firmness of purpose which, with his calm temperament, made the chief elements of his character. The time was not lost, for who that knows the Mississippi expects that an army can move with facility on its banks in February and March ? The troops, however, were used to labor, marches, and endurance. Luckily they kept in good health in what is generally an unhealthy ARMY AND NAVY AT MILL /KEN'S BEND. 1 79 region. So the grand army of Grant and the river fleet of Porter are now at Milliken's Bend ; while there the spring is just opening out, and the ground will be soon available for the march and encamp- ments of troops. Now we are ready, and soon we shall enter upon one of the most admirable and suc- cessful campaigns, not only of this war, but of any which modern history can exhibit. 11 A P Tin: ^^'llu in i ■<> It VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN, or tf\ COOPERATIVE EXPEDITION. l8l CHAPTER VIII. VICKSBURG. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO GENERAL PLAN — GRANT MAKES A PLAN FOR HIMSELF — ACTS CONTRARY TO THE ADVICE OF HIS GENERALS, AND TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY — ARMY MOVES TO NEW CARTHAGE — MIDNIGHT PASSAGE OF THE GUN-BOATS — ARMY CROSSES THE MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON — FALL OF GRAND GULF — BATTLES OF RAY- MOND, OF JACKSON, OF CHAMPION'S HILL, AND OF BIG BLACK — GRANT'S MILITARY GENIUS — REBEL ERRORS — VICKSBURG INVESTED — INEFFICIENCY OF JOHNSTON — SUR- RENDER OF VICKSBURG. THE Government had planned a cooperative ex- pedition, under Banks, to proceed up the Mis- sissippi, capture Port Hudson, and unite with Grant in an investment of Vicksburg. This plan had two essential defects : one, that it divided our forces with- out any probable advantage ; and the other, that Port Hudson was in the way of the cooperation, which place Banks might not find easier to take than Grant did Vicksburg. This turned out to be the fact. Banks had forty thousand, with all of Farragut's fleet. On the 14th of March Farragut attacked the rebel bat- teries at Port Hudson, and after a terrible bombard- ment, of several hours' duration, was compelled to retire. 1 How was Banks to cooperate ? 1 " Rebellion Record," Vol. VI, page 55. 1 82 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The fact was, that Banks, at a subsequent period, attacked Port Hudson and failed ; that place fell only as a sequel to the capture of Vicksburg. The Gov- ernment, however, thought a good deal of this idea. On the 2d of April, Halleck wrote to Grant, using these words : " What is most desired (and your atten- tion is again called to this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks should be brought into cooperation as early as possible. If he can not get up to cooperate with you on Vicksburg, can not you get troops down to help him at Port Hudson, or, at least, can you not destroy Grand Gulf before it be- comes too strong ?" If Grant had sent troops down to Banks, it would have been a clear loss of men and time.- The rebels had fortified Port Hudson, and it could only be taken by investment, or, as actually happened, by the fall of Vicksburg. In all this time Grant had in his view only the destruction of the enemy 's forces. After Shi- loh, this became his one leading military idea. He found the enemy re-rallying after defeat, even when the strong strategic lines were broken, and, therefore, concluded that they would continue to rally, in such an extensive country, unless their armies were de- stroyed ; and this was the rebel idea also. Davis said they could defend themselves twenty years in Vir- ginia. Grant's idea was correct, but he seems to me never to have fully understood the necessity of a com- prehensive strategy to the execution and success of his own idea. Nor is he to be blamed for this ; for he was not Commander-in-Chief, and, strange as it may seem, there is no evidence whatever that the GRANT'S PLAN TO CAPTURE VICKSBURG. I S3 Government had, up to this time, any general plan of conducting the war. 1 The attacks in the East and in the West were isolated. Different commanders had formed different plans ; and Mr. Lincoln himself at one time took command. Then McClellan — then Halleck — and, long subsequent to this time, Grant. McClellan seems to have cast no eye beyond the mountains at all. Halleck, in command of the West- ern Department, had a plan ; but, at Washington, seems to have had no general scheme of strategic op- erations. But we must return to Grant. Whatever ideas were revolving in his mind, it is plain he can only be held responsible for his department. The old problem, how to get behind or below Vicksburg, is still before him, and now it is to be solved. On the 4th of April we have the germ, the initial, of the true idea of taking Vicksburg. On that day Grant wrote to Halleck: "The discipline and health of this army is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest confidence of success prevails." He thus described to Halleck the plan he now proposed : "There is a system of bayous running from Mil- liken's Bend, also from near the river at this point, [Young's Point], that are navigable for large and small steamers, passing around by Richmond to New Carthage. There is also a good wagon-road from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage. The dredges are now engaged cutting a canal from here into these 1 I have tried to find any general plan or system of strategy adopted by the Government in the first three years of the war, and am satisfied none existed. Particular generals claimed merit for particular plans, and controversies have arisen on this subject ; but a general system of the war for the whole vast field of strategy did not exist. 184 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT, bayous. I am having all the empty coal-boats and other barges prepared for carrying troops and artil- lery, and have written to Colonel Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to tow them. With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage, and any point south of that. My expectation is for some of the naval fleet to run the batteries of Vicks- burg, while the army moves through by this new route. Once there, I will move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the latter. From either of these points, there are good roads to Jackson and the Black River bridge, without crossing Black River. I will keep my army together, and see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beat in any other way than a fair fight." ' There was one objection to this plan, which, how- ever, I think more apparent than real. This was, that Grant would cut himself off from his supplies, and seemingly put himself where he would put the enemy. Colonel Badeau states, in his "Military History," that Sherman, McPherson, Logan, Wilson, and others, op- posed this plan, and considered it a fatal error. Sher- man said that the only way to take Vicksburg was from the north. " Then," said Grant, " that requires me to go back to Memphis." " Exactly so," said Sher- man, " that is what I mean." Grant thought a retro- grade movement would be disastrous to the country, which would not endure another reverse ; and he de- clared fie would take no step backward. Sherman sent, 1 This letter of Grant's is taken from Badeau's " Military History ;" but all these military letters, reports, and telegrams are in course of pub- lication by the Government, but will not be out in time for this work. GRANT'S DETERMINATION. 1 85 through Colonel Rawlins, a written communication, urging him to take the line of the Yallabusha. Grant read it in silence, 1 but made no change of plan. On- ward ! was Grant's command. It has been said that Grant's successes were accidents /' Can any body in- form me where the accident was here ? Grant, with determined will — if you please, obstinacy — went on, in spite of the opinions and judgment of his military advisers. If he failed, it was ruinous ; if he suc- ceeded, no one can share the credit with him. But the fact is, Grant was right in every view of the case. It would not do to retrograde. Nor was there any great danger in the movement as to his supplies. He had learned (what Sherman afterward learned in Georgia) that the central portions of the South were full of food, and that, if necessary, he could support his army there. Then a rapid march would enable him to join Banks, if such a movement were desirable; and, finally, what was to prevent supplying his army by the route he came? In all aspects of the case he was right. But let those who talk of accidents re- member that he made his grand move round Vicks- burg against the opinion of such men as Sherman and McPherson. On the 29th of March the grand march began. McClernand's Division took Richmond, a point below, and made a march of twenty-seven miles to New 1 Badeau's " Military History." 2 In an article in the " Southern Home Journal," recently, the no- torious Pollard, who is no military authority, and speaks only rebel opinions, says that Grant has risen only by "accident." It is a most extraordinary series of accidents, which always run one way, and that, too, in opposition to the opinions and judgments of able men! 16 1 86 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Carthage. But the last point was not occupied till the 6th of April. The country was in many places deluged, the levees were broken in places, and the road but a few inches out of water. Grant wrote : " The embarrassment I have had to contend against on account of extreme high water can not be appre- ciated by any one not present to witness it." Bridges had to be built, round-about roads taken, and the distance marched by the army was doubled. Indeed, the labor, exposure, and difficulties of this route were almost incredible. At length McCler- nand's Division is safe at New Carthage. But of what use is this advance without transportation ? The Mississippi is a mighty river ; to cross in small bodies would be dangerous, for the enemy is strong. Porter's ' fleet and transports are above Vicksburg. What is to be done ? Grant had solved the problem in his own mind, and told Halleck, " My expecta- tion is, that some of the fleet will run the batteries of Vicksburg." Was that possible ? Now we are to answer that question. The night of the 16th of April was fixed upon for the enterprise. Seven gun-boats and four trans- ports formed the squadron, under Commodore Porter, which was to pass under the fire of the tremendous batteries, and, if possible, reach New Carthage with supplies and means of transportation. Such enter- prises had failed heretofore, and, to the minds of even sailors, the idea was surrounded with horrors. A call for volunteers was made, and what the fleet could not supply the army did, for in the army were pilots, engi- neers, and craftsmen of all descriptions. The fleet is MIDNIGHT PASSAGE OF THE GUN- BOATS. 1 87 manned ; the transports are piled up with cotton on the sides ; the gun-boats on the Vicksburg side are lined with chains, timbers, or whatever will resist the shock of balls. The gun-boats take the side of the batteries, and the transports hug the other shore. And now it is night, a dark night, for no moon shines above. The sun had set beautifully, and the stars came out ; but the night deepened, and the boats are only seen as dark masses in the water. 1 All were anx- ious. Grant stood on the shore ; Sherman was there. Officers and men were on board boats, gazing in almost breathless silence. 2 At eleven o'clock the Benton, with the gallant Porter on board, noiselessly goes into the dark waters. Another and another fol- low, and for a little time all is quiet ; the enemy were unsuspicious. The boats pass on, and, stealing slowly along, are scarcely distinguishable from the foliage on the opposite bank. The crowd on our side of the river had been full of talk and noise; but now all is hushed. The boats are passing into the darkness of the opposite shore. " Will they get by?" and quick beats every heart. " Three-quarters of an hour passed. People heard nothing save their own suppressed breathings ; saw nothing save a long, low bank of darkness, which, like a black fog, walled the view below, and joined the sky and river in the direction of Vicksburg. And all watched this gathering of darkness, for in it were thunders, and lightnings, and volcanoes, which at any instant might light up the night with fierce 1 Letter to " New York Tribune," dated April 17, 1863. 2 Badeau's " Military History." 1 88 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. irruptions. So long a time passed without any thing occurring that people began to believe the enemy had determined, for some malevolent purpose, to allow the fleet to pass below without obstruction." Ah, no! The rebels knew too well what was meant, and would have given half their hopes to have sunk that fleet. It is sixteen minutes past eleven, and the alarmed sentinel on Vicksburg bluff has seen the dark ships. In a moment the scene lights up, the sullen thunder of the first gun is heard, and crash after crash roars through the midnight air — and Porter joins in with a rapid and tremendous fire from the gun-boats. It is now past twelve, and they are just passing the little city, and the shot and shell are thick in the air. 1 It is dark, but the rebels set fire to houses and beacons, and the streets of Vicks- burg can be seen. The Henry Clay (transport) is on fire, and soon sends up its lurid blaze. The boats are all struck, and one of the transports, disabled, floats down to Carthage. 2 " The currents were strong, and dangerous eddies delayed the vessels ; the lights glaring in every direc- tion, and the smoke enveloping the squadron, con- fused the pilots ; the bulwarks, even of the iron-clads, were crushed ; and the uproar of artillery, reechoing from the hills, was incessant. One of the heaviest guns of the enemy was seen to burst in the streets of Vicksburg, and the whole population was awake and out of doors, watching the scene on which its destinies depended. For two hours and forty min- 1 Grant was in the midst of the fire, anxiously looking on. 2 The Forest Queen was disabled, and towed down by a gun-boat. AN ANXIOUS REBEL. 1 89 utes the fleets were under fire. But, at last, the transports and the gun-boats had all got out of range, the blazing beacons on the hills and on the stream burned low, the array of batteries belching flame and noise from the embattled bluffs had ceased their ut- terance, and silence and darkness resumed their sway- over the beleaguered city, and the swamps and rivers that encircle Vicksburg." l Thus ended one of the most remarkable scenes which occurred in that terrible war, and one of the most interesting which has occurred in any war. One scene told by Badeau is worth repeating, to show the effect on the rebel mind, and the sad inci- dents of such a war. One of the finest plantations of the South was the head-quarters, at that time, of General McClernand. It was clad in the beauty of the sunny South, surrounded with lawns, and planted with the fruits and flowers of a balmy clime. The fig-tree, the magnolia, and the oleander grew and bloomed there. But its unfortunate owner was pos- sessed with the demon of rebellion. The " Yankee " was to him the spirit of evil. Perhaps, if he had known a Yankee better, or even known his country better, he would not have so hated him. Perhaps ignorance was his misfortune, as it is of countless multitudes who are the hapless victims of an ill-lot, not perhaps of altogether their own making. But here is a Yankee on his plantation, and here are the Yankees coming on in their midnight passage of Vicksburg. He is as anxious as Grant. He do n't believe they will get by ; and the first thing that does 1 Badeau's " Military History," page 192. icp LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. come is the burning fragment of the Henry Clay; and then the barge cut loose comes floating down ; certainly this does not look like Yankee success, and the rebel planter is rejoicing. He shouts, "The Yankees are defeated ;" and he comes up and says : " Where are your gun-boats now ? Vicksburg has put an end to them all ;" and the National officers feared lest his elation might prove well-founded. By daylight, however, the wrecks had all passed by ; and, after awhile, a gun -boat appeared below the bend ; and then a transport ; then, one after an- other, the whole fleet of iron-clads and army steam- ers hove in sight from their perilous passage. The " Yankees " now had their turn of rejoicing, and thanked the rebel for teaching them the word. " Where are your gun-boats now ?" they said. " Did Vicksburg put an end to them all ?" But the old man was too much exasperated at the National suc- cess to endure the taunts he had himself provoked, and rushed away in a rage. The next day he set fire to his own house, rather than allow it to shelter his enemies. This may be Spartan, but it was not civil- ized, and seems sad to look upon in the light of our American institutions. On the 17th Grant telegraphed Halleck that seven gun-boats and three transports passed the Vicksburg batteries last night, and, " if it is possible, I will oc- cupy Grand Gulf within four days." He did not get there in four days, but still in time for the great object. On the 2d of April six boats and a number of barges ran the Vicksburg batteries, and Grant said DEVELOPMENT OF GRANT'S IDEA. 191 they were all more or less injured, 1 and the Tigress sunk, but concluded, " I look upon this as a great success." And well he might, for he had now got gun-boats and transports enough below Vicksburg to transport and manage his army ; and this was the first thing to be done in the solution of the great problem. Grant had said he would take Grand Gulf, but it was not to be quite in the way he imagined. Two corps (McClernand's and McPherson's) had arrived when he thought to attack Grand Gulf in front. In fact, the navy did attack the forts, and, for several hours, rained upon them shot and shell, disabling part of the batteries, but in vain, for they could not reach the top batteries, and found the forts were not to be taken in that way. What next ? Now comes the development of the idea, which Grant held tenaciously to the end of the war, to flank the enemy till lie brought him to battle, and then destroy him. Grand Gulf was not taken by the navy, and could not be by landing ; so he looks below, and finds he can land below Grand Gulf and flank it. In one word, he now determines to turn the enemy's left, which would result in cutting the Jackson Railroad and reducing the rebel commander to the alternative of either shutting himself up in Vicksburg, or of abandoning it. No finer tactical movement on a large field was ever made. It was the most admirable of Grant's operations, and the most admirable made during the war; yet let us recollect that this whole movement was made in opposition to the opinions of his Generals, and looked upon at 1 Grant's telegram to Halleck. IQ2 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Washington with fear and anxiety. It was Grant's own plan, and no result either of accident or advice. "Once at Grand Gulf," says Grant, "I do not feel a doubt of success in the entire driving out of the enemy from the banks of the river." In the mean time Grant superintended every thing personally. His orders were given in detail, so that the commanders could make no mistakes unless they disobeyed orders. In the commissary, the quarter-master's, the adjutant's departments, every- where, Grant was the chief administrator. We see here exactly what gave Grant success ; not merely sagacity in military enterprise, but that cool, per- severing, energetic, administrative ability, which en- abled him to keep every thing in its place, and direct every thing to its proper end. I copy from Badeau's "Military History" the following paragraphs, which fully illustrate this point in his character. Badeau was his secretary, and can testify to what no one else can. On the 30th of April he issued a variety of or- ders, of which the following are part : "The same day the chief commissary of the Thir- teenth Corps received the following directions: 'You will issue to the troops of this command, without pro- vision returns, for their subsistence during the next five days, three rations ;' and corps commanders were instructed to direct their 'chief quarter-masters to seize, for the use of the army in the field during the ensuing campaign, such land transportation as may be necessary, belonging to the inhabitants of the country through which they may pass.' "These orders and dispatches were all written in THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON. 1 93 Grant's own hand, and nearly all signed with his own name. Like most of the important papers emanating from his head-quarters during the war, they were his own composition, struck out at the moment they were needed by the emergency of the moment, and sent off without emendation or change. Dates and names, and matter of that description, in the larger reports were, of course, often supplied by others, but the gist and the text were Grant's own. None of his staff-officers ever attempted to imitate his style." On the 30th of April, from early day, gun-boats, transports, barges, every thing which could be used for transportation, were busy ferrying McClernand's Corps across to Bruinsburg, below Bayou Pierre. The Seventeenth (McPherson's) followed as fast as possible. Four miles below Port Gibson they were met by the rebel General Bowen. His force was posted where two roads meet, upon ridges, with a brokeji country on each side. The action was a serious one, and Grant came on to the ground aware of all its importance. The result was not doubtful. With heavy forces continually coming up, Grant drove the enemy from their position with heavy loss, 1 and they fled over the Bayou Pierre, destroying the bridges. Next day McPherson built a new bridge, and the pursuit of the enemy was continued. Thus ended the battle of Port Gibson, the first step in Grant's turning the enemy and driving him in. These movements compelled the evacuation of Grand Gulf, which, on the 3d of May, was taken possession of by Admiral Porter ; and on the evening 1 The rebels lost 150 killed, 300 wounded, and 600 prisoners. 17 194 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. of the same day Grant rode in with his staff. Porter and Grant were both surprised at the strength and defenses of that place, Porter describing 1 them as the strongest on the Mississippi, except Vicksburg. For- tunately the rapid advance of Grant reduced the enemy to the necessity of abandoning Grand Gulf immediately, and a large amount of heavy artillery and ammunition were taken there. Fortunately, also, no time was left to complete the new defenses. One grand point was now gained. The enemy abandoned all the country from Bayou Pierre to Big Black, and Pemberton, who commanded that particular district, dispatched to Johnston that Grant was turning their defenses below, and intended to inclose them in Vicksburg. The enemy, as well as our Government, was surprised. Grand Gulf was now made the base of supplies, and the army lay at Hawkinson's Ferry of the Big Black, waiting for wagons, supplies, and Sherman. At this place let us look at two or three inci- dental })< tints in the drama. What was the condition of the army at this time? for it has been much ex- posed, and I recollect that every body thought there would be much sickness. Grant says, writing to Halleck, on the 3d of May: " My force, however, was too heavy for his, and composed of well-disciplined and hardy men, who know no defeat, and are not willing to learn what it is. This army is in the finest health and spirits. Since leaving Milliken's Bend they have marched as much by night as by day, through mud and rain, 1 Porter's Report, May 3, 1S63. GRIERSON'S RAID. 1 95 without tents or much other baggage, and on irregu- lar rations, without a complaint, and with less strag- gling than I have ever before witnessed. Where all have done so well, it would be out of place to make invidious distinction." This is certainly extraordinary, and equally fortu- nate. In fact, Grant was now coming into the active campaign, with a large army in admirable order. Another incident to be noticed, and one of much importance at this time, is Grierson's raid. This ex- pedition originated with Grant himself. His idea was to dispatch Grierson, with about five hundred men, and cut the railroad beyond Jackson. He said to Hurlbut, it would be hazardous, but would pay well if successful. This was two months before his present movement. Delays and obstacles (as it turned out luckily for us) prevented the start of this expedition till the middle of April. On the 17th of April, Grierson set out from La Grange, with some fifteen hundred cavalry, and, after seventeen days of most extraordinary performance in riding and hard work, arrived at Baton Rouge, on the Lower Missis- sippi. He broke up railroads, destroyed stores, and paroled prisoners, making an almost marvelous raid through an enemy's country, fresh in the memory of the people and to be memorable in history. It accomplished all that was expected, and was very opportune. I mention it here, because it was one element — although a minor one — in the general plan which Grant had formed for himself. Grant sat up the night of the 3d, writing dis- patches, letters, orders. First, in the order of busi- 196 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. ness, is the supply question ; and so he writes off to Sullivan above, and to Sherman, detailed directions as to the quantity of supplies, and how they must be furnished. Having gained the grand object of four months' operations — dry ground on the enemy's interior line — the army felt encouraged, and Grant inspirited. But there was still something to be determined as to im- mediate movements. There were really but two lines of advance, and they were quite obvious. Grant might move directly on Vicksburg, and he might also move on Jackson, cut the railroads, and effectu- ally prevent the enemy's reenforcing Pemberton. He took the last course. But it turned out afterward that Halleck had issued a positive order for Grant to join Banks, if possible, between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and that Lincoln himself feared Grant had made a fatal mistake in turning north from Port Gibson.' Such was the strange fatuity — the night- mare of fear — which prevailed at Washington during the greater part of the war. Luckily Grant did not know any thing of all this, and boldly pushed on to success and victory. Finding Pemberton very strong in front and hearing, from every quarter, that John- ston was advancing troops from the East, so that it was quite obvious, if the forces of Pemberton and Johnston were united, they would be greater than his own, 2 and there might be a failure of his plan, he 1 I jncoln subsequently wrote a letter to Grant acknowledging his error. 2 The field reports of Pemberton proved that he had in all 52,000 men. Grant's three corps, then available, did not amount to more than that number. SUBSISTING ON THE ENEMT. 1 97 came at once to the conclusion that he would antici- pate this and advance on Jackson between the forces of the enemy. This required an abandonment of Grand Gulf, and consequently his base of supplies from Hard Times and Milliken's Bend. Sherman, who was on the other side of the river hurrying up supplies, was alarmed, and wrote to Grant that if they were to come by that single road, the road would soon be choked. Grant immediately replied that he did not expect to rely on that road, but merely wanted to get up coffee, hard bread, and salt ; for all the rest he would rely on the country, in which there was plenty of beef and corn. In fact, Grant had then more rations on hand than he had when he left New Carthage. 1 He had cut away from his base at Milliken's Bend, and he was now about to cut away from his new base at Grand Gulf. The Government at Washington was aston- ished, and the rebel Government at Richmond more so. But on the night of the 3d of May, Grant ar- rived at Hawkinson's Ferry, with his total amount of baggage — a tooth-brush! He had lodged and eaten where he could, and his staff had done the same. And now the army cuts loose from Grand Gulf to practice that great military principle— forage on the enemy. He had learned, as I said, in his march to Oxford (Mississippi) and return, after his communi- cations were cut off, that the enemy had abundance of food. He wanted coffee and salt ; for the rest he could get along well enough without a base. And now he has formed the plan of a short but 1 Badeau's " Military History." 198 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. decisive campaign, which, if it did not capture Vicks- burg, must inevitably result in shutting up Pemberton. Two things were absolutely necessary, if possible : to deceive Pemberton with the idea that Grant was ad- vancing immediately on Vicksburg, and then to cut off his communications, so that he could receive neither provisions nor reinforcements. For the first, he advanced bodies of troops to within six or seven miles of Vicksburg. The Big Black River, in its course to the east of that place, runs nearly parallel with the Mississippi, as far as Hawkinson's Ferry, and then soon enters the Mississippi, at Grand Gulf, where that river makes a bend to the east. The rail- road from Vicksburg to Jackson crosses the Big Black about fifteen miles from the town ; Edwards's Station is eighteen, Clinton thirty-five, and Jackson forty miles ; but on the roads traveled by the troops the distances were longer. Leaving Hawkinson's Ferry, there were two roads leading to the north, east of Black River. One was near the river, leading up to Edwards's Station, and the other considerably to the east, through the villages of Utica and Ray- mond, to Clinton, on the railroad, ten miles from Jackson. Grant put McClernand's Corps on the first, hugging Black River, and threatening to cross its bridges in an advance on Vicksburg. This perplexed Pemberton, and masked, in a good degree, the move- ment of McPherson's Corps, which took the Raymond road, with the design of taking Jackson and cutting the communications. The plan worked with entire success. In the mean time Sherman had crossed the Mississippi with his corps, and advanced up to support GRANT AT CLINTON. 1 99 either McClernand or McPherson. On the 12th of May Grant was with Sherman, encamped on the road to Edwards's Station, seven miles west of Ray- mond, and on the day previous (nth) Grant wrote Halleck, " I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more." On that same day Halleck had telegraphed to Grant that he must unite with Banks. In the meanwhile McPherson moved on, and, on the 12th, was encountered by the enemy near Raymond. The rebels, under the command of General Gregg, made a brisk and determined battle, but in vain. They were defeated ; and on the 14th Grant telegraphs Halleck from Raymond, " McPherson took this place on the 1 2th, after a brisk fight of more than two hours." 1 McPherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jackson road, and McClernand bringing up the rear. Now we can see the most important part of these grand tactics have succeeded. Grant is at Clinton, on tJie Jacksoii road. On the 13th Mc- Pherson reached Clinton, and began tearing up all the railroad tracks, burning bridges, and destroying tele- graphs. Finding that Johnston, who had now taken command at Jackson, was trying to hold on while he could get reinforcements, Grant at once ordered up McClernand and Sherman's Corps to join McPherson in his attack on Jackson. At the same time John- ston directed Pemberton to bring up his forces to attack Grant in the rear ; 2 but it was too late — Pem- 1 The loss on our side was 69 killed, 341 wounded, 30 missing; on the enemy's, 100 killed, 305 wounded, and 45 prisoners. 2 "I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to reestab- lish communications, that you may be reenforced. If practicable, come 200 FIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. berton had been deceived, and his forces were at Edwards's Station on the 14th. On the 14th of May Jackson was, in fact, well fortified with long lines of intrenchments ; but, un- like Vicksburg, it had no great natural defenses, and required more troops than Johnston had. He had now the troops driven back from Raymond, the gar- rison of Jackson, and some reinforcements from Georgia and South Carolina, altogether a consider- able body, but unequal to the veteran corps of Grant. Johnston was attacked in his defenses by the Corps of McPherson and Sherman, and defeated. The result is told by Grant, writing from Jackson : " This place fell into our hands yesterday, after a fight of about three hours. Joe Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicksburg force. I am concentrating my force at Bolton, to cut them off, if possible." l The night before, Johnston had passed a gay even- ing in the house now occupied by Grant. It is quite common, however, for men to appear most gay, when in fact most sad. Johnston could not have expected to defeat Grant, but he evidently did expect to save Pemberton's army. But that was a vanity. We have gained another great step in this decisive campaign. Jackson, as a rail- road center, and the roads leading to it, arc destroyed? up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of im- mense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought Time is all-important." — Johnston to Pemberton, May \yh. 1 Grant's telegram from Jackson, May 15th. 2 Sherman's Corps took charge of Jackson, and Badeau says : "He set about his work in the morning, and utterly destroyed the railroads GRANT GETS JOHNSTON'S DISPATCHES. 201 It is no longer possible to unite the rebel forces. It is no longer possible to save Vicksburg; but it may be possible to save Pemberton's army. What shall be done with it? Johnston went to Canton, and thence dispatched two brigades forty miles from Jackson ; and this he did, as he said in his report, to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from the East. Johnston was as much deceived as Pemberton ; for Grant had no idea of remaining in Jackson. He did not dream that Grant had cut his own communications, and got plenty of provisions where he was. He told Pemberton that when the reenforcements were up, the rest of the army must be united with him. But that was just what Grant did not mean to have done. There was, however, danger of it ; but Grant had got possession of Johnston's dispatches. He instantly converged all his forces on Bolton's Station, which was twenty-eight miles from Vicksburg, and seventeen from Jackson. This was, in fact, placing himself where he separated and cut off from each other all the enemy's forces ; for Pemberton, utterly deceived, as well as Johnston, disobeyed the order of Johnston to move toward Clinton, and in every direction, north, east, south, and west, for a distance, in all, of twenty miles. All the bridges, factories, and arsenals were burned, and whatever could be of use to the rebels, destroyed. The importance of Jackson, as a railroad center and a depot of stores and military fac- tories, was annihilated, and the principal object of its capture attained. A hotel and a church in Jackson were burned without orders, and there was some pillaging by the soldiers, which their officers sought in every way to restrain." This was not all. Pictures were shot through, pianos broken up, and a great deal of private property destroyed. This was not the work of the officers, but of men who had been in- sulted and injured by rebels, and were determined to make rebels fed the consequences of their own conduct. 202 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. actually went to Dillon's, south of Edwards's Station, in order, as he said, to cut Grant's communications ! Both of them were evidently deluded with the idea that Grant depended on his communications. So, if we look on the map, we shall find Johnston running to Canton, (north,) Gregg, east, and Pemberton at Dillon's, (south,) and Grant concentrated at Bolton's Station, central between them. No general could desire a better position than this. Pemberton, how- ever, soon finds out his mistake, and at once moves up to Champion's Hill, west of Bolton, determined to make a stand. Grant is delayed somewhat by the necessity of renewing bridges, which had been de- stroyed, over Baker's Creek. But, during the 16th, the work was done, and the enemy now in complete force, (Pemberton, Bowen, and Loring all being there,) were brought to battle, without being entirely conscious of their situation, or with whom they had to deal. 1 This delusion of Pemberton and Johnston was one of the great advantages we had ; but it must be remembered that this delusion was a direct con- sequence of Grant's movements. It was the excel- 1 "When General Johnston, on the 13th of May, informed me that Sherman was at Clinton, and ordered me to attack him in the rear, neither he nor I knew that Sherman was in the act of advancing on Jackson, which place he entered at twelve o'clock on the next day; that a corps of the enemy was at Raymond, following Sherman's march upon Jackson; and that another corps was near Dillon's, probably moving in the same direction; and, consequently, that the orders to attack Sher- man could not be executed. Nor was I myself aware till, several hours after I had received and promised to obey the order, that it could not be obeyed without the destruction of my army; but on my arrival at Edwards's depot, two hours after I received the order, I found a large force of the enemy at Dillon's, on my right flank, and ready to attack me in the flank or rear if I moved on Clinton." — rcmbertoiis add. ReJ>. BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 203 lence of Grant's plan that it must deceive the enemy, and that it must almost inevitably be successful. McPherson was in front, and outranked by Mc- Clernand, under whom he was unwilling to risk the battle. The position of the enemy is thus described by Badeau : "At six and a half o'clock McPherson dispatched to Grant : ' I think it advisable for you to come for- ward to the front as soon as you can.' Grant started at once, at forty minutes past seven, for the advance. On the way he found Hovey's Division at a halt, and the road blocked up with wagon trains. Grant soon cleared a way for the troops, and the battle was evi- dently coming on. " The enemy was strongly posted, with his left on a high, wooded ridge, called Champion's Hill, over which the road to Edwards's Station runs, making a sharp turn to the south, as it strikes the hills. This ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surround- ing country, and is the highest land for many miles around ; the topmost point is bald, and gave the rebels a commanding position for their artillery ; but the remainder of the crest, as well as a precipitous hill-side to the east of the road, is covered by a dense forest and undergrowth, and scarred with deep ra- vines, through whose entanglements troops could pass only with extreme difficulty. To the north the tim- ber extends a short distance down the hill, and opens into cultivated fields. The enemy's line extended over ridge and hills for two or three miles. McPher- son commenced the attack, with Hovey's Division, and two brigades of Logan, and steadily drove the 204 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. enemy back till our troops approached the hill. The road over the hill was a natural fortification. It was cut through the crest of the ridge at the steepest part, the bank on the upper side commanding all be- low ; so that even when the National troops had ap- parently gained the road, the rebels stood behind this novel breastwork, covered from every fire, and mas- ters still of the whole declivity. These were the only fortifications at Champion's Hill, but they an- swered the rebels well." The enemy, seeing that they lost ground, sent reinforcements rapidly. Grant, who, standing on a spur of a hill, saw this, sent forward Crocker's Divi- sion. But the tide of battle ebbed and flowed. Ho- vey's exhausted troops were at one time compelled to fall back. In fact, the National line was in danger. Grant was fighting the battle with one-third of his army, for he had tried to hurry up McClernand in vain. On the right, however, Stevenson's Brigade, of Logan's Division, made a successful charge, fairly cutting off the enemy's retreat to Edwards's Station; and the enemy, seeing this, abandoned his position in front, and Hovey and Crocker pressed on, and the rebel line rolled back. The rebels fled ; Logan's charge precipitated the rout, and the battle of Cham- pion's Hill was won at four o'clock in the afternoon. The battle had been fought with McPherson's Corps and Hovey's Division of the Thirteenth Corps. In all, Grant had in the actual battle about fifteen thou- sand men, and of these he lost heavily. It was the bloodiest field since Grant commenced operations BATTLES ROUND VICKSBURG ENDED. 205 around Vicksburg. 1 We took about three thousand prisoners, and about thirty pieces of artillery. The battle was very disastrous to the rebels in every way. Loring's Division of the rebel force, which held their right, got separated by the rapidity of Grant's ad- vance, fled to the southward, and, after making a wide circuit, and losing many men, at length succeeded in joining Johnston at Jackson, with about five thousand troops. Thus this division was cut off from the defense of Vicksburg. At this time Johnston was resting, in utter ignorance of what either Grant or Pemberton was doing. On the same day, also, Sher- man left Jackson, marched twenty miles, reached Bolton, and was informed of the battle of Champion's Hill. He was immediately ordered north to Bridge- port, on the Big- Black, obviously with the view of preventing any attempt of Pemberton to escape. In the mean time, McClernand's Corps is moved forward, and, arriving at the Big Black Bridge, finds the enemy in a very strong position. The river makes a bend to the east. On the west side were high bluffs ; on the east, a wide bottom, surrounded by a deep bayou, making a natural ditch. The bridge was fortified in front by a tete-de-pont, (bridge-head,) with twenty pieces of artillery, and four thousand men. The struggle was not long, however ; a successful charge drove the enemy from his intrenchments, in confusion and dismay, over the river. All the battles round Vicksburg are now ended — Grand Gulf, Ray- mond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, Big Black — all are 1 Our army lost 426 men killed, 1,842 wounded, and 189 missing. Hovey alone lost 1,200, being nearly one-third of his command. 206 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. over. The (.beams of the enemy are vanished. On the night of the 17th of May his broken, dispirited troops enter the little city of Vicksburg. The inhab- itants are dismayed and astonished. The Avenger of crimes seems, to their excited imaginations, to be rushing on for their destruction! On the 22d of May Grant drew his own lines round Vicksburg, with a grasp which none could escape. Some time was to elapse, and many a man sank in the darkness of death, but the end was certain. The strategy with which Grant moved from Milliken's Bend to Carthage, from Carthage to Bruinsburg, thence to Grand Gulf, and thence (cutting himself clear of his base) to Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Vicksburg, is as brill- iant as any to be found in military annals. Some writers say, "Grant had no genius? They look upon him as a sort of hard-headed, pounding machine, who, with a strong will and a hard ham- mer, hammered the enemy to death. The rebel his- torian says he is an accident! Our own writers, civilians y (for no military man says such things,) say Grant has not genius. Why, what would they have? What is genius? Especially, what is military genius? Do they know? The best definition of genius is, strong natural faculties, fnlly put forth on some one subject. Had not Grant strong natural faculties, and did he not put them forth to the utmost degree? The campaign around Vicksburg was his ozvn, em- phatically his own, in opposition to the views of the Government, and the advice of his generals. Can the captious critics of Grant's career show me any plan in the movements of the greatest generals more JOHNSTON OUTGENERALED BY GRANT. 207 original, better performed, or more far-sighted, than the campaign of Vicksburg ? Let us now turn to the rebel mind. What did the rebel generals think ? What did they intend ? It is quite evident that Johnston, who seems to be much admired as an officer, by both rebel and Union writers, was completely outgeneraled by Grant, and defeated in every purpose. We have the cor- respondence and reports of Johnston and Pemberton, which show that both were bewildered, and that when the game was lost, Johnston was intent only to put the blame on Pemberton. But how does he clear himself? Where was he in the thirteen days from the 3d to the 16th of May? He made a pre- tense of defending Jackson, but if he had any (as he must have had) correct information about Grant's forces, he must have known that to be impossible. Why did he scatter himself and Gregg off in differ- ent directions? If he could be of any use to Pem- berton, he had an opportunity, in those thirteen days, of uniting with him, or provisioning Vicksburg, if it could be done. The truth is, Johnston did not then, or at any time in the war, vindicate the reputation he had acquired. One thing he did, which, at first sight, seems sound judgment. He told Pemberton to leave Vicksburg, and save his army.' But, if he left Vicksburg, he left the Mississippi. The whole of it must at once fall into our hands, and the sun 1 Pemberton was actually moving to join Johnston when Grant attacked him at Champion's Hill. He dispatched to Johnston particu- larly about his route, when he added, " Heavy skirmishing now going on in my front." Grant had been too quick for him. 208 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. did not shine more certainly than that the loss of the Mississippi was the loss of the war. They did not clearly see this either at Washington or Richmond ; but it was not the less a fact. But let us pursue our march. Vicksburg was invested fully on the 22d of May, and, to all practical purposes, this must be the end of Vicksburg. There was the possibility that the rebel Government could get another army together and raise the siege. There was great reliance at Richmond on Johnston. There were constant rumors in the Northern newspapers of rebel armies coming to the relief of Pemberton, and endangering Grant. But let us see what did happen. The events of any decisive importance in the siege are few. Haines's Bluff, that most formida- ble post, had been abandoned by the enemy, and its garrison withdrawn to Vicksburg. It was no longer worth any thing. Strategy had done what Sherman, with forty thousand men, had been unable to do by storm. It is said that on the 1 8th — six long months after Sherman's attack — Grant and Sherman met on the farthest hight of Walnut Hills, and looked down on the Yazoo River, and the very bluff which Sher- man had stormed in vain ; and Sherman acknowl- edged that he could not see the end till then ; but now the campaign was a success, if they never took the town.' Grant smoked his cigar and said noth- ing. To him the campaign was a success when he crossed the Mississippi and turned the enemy's left, so as to command the Jackson road. 1 This statement rests wholly on the authority of Badeau in his "Military History." A NAPOLEONIC PROCLAMATION. 209 We are now before Vicksburg, cutting the unfor- tunate Pemberton off from any possibility of escape. And here we come to one of Grant's characteristics, in this case quite remarkable. The critics say he had no genius. I have shown he had a genius for war. But there was one sort of genius he had not a bit of. He had no genius for brag and bluster. In- deed, he was singularly deficient in the art of boast- ing. It never struck him, when standing on the bluffs of Walnut Hills, what a wonderful proclaim tion he might have made. In this he was something like the great Frederick, whose proclamations were the briefest possible, and whose brag was nothing. But what a genius Napoleon had for it! Napoleon is the great admiration of young writers, and such imaginative critics as read Jomini, and Thiers, and Napoleon's Conversations, and then think they know the whole theory of the art of war, and are able to pronounce at once that Grant had no genius, that he was himself an accident, and that a long line of un- interrupted successes are all due to a series of happy accidents ! I leave such people to the judgment of posterity, at whose bar they will appear no more ridiculous than have many of the historians of past ages. But let us read Grant's proclamation as Napo- leon would have written it. Here it is : "Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi! From the hights of Vicksburg you look down upon your defeated enemy, and share in the joy of glorious vic- tory! In a campaign of twenty days you have marched two hundred miles, beaten the enemy in five successive battles, taken eighty-eight pieces of 18 210 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. field and heavy artillery, captured six thousand, five hundred prisoners, and put six thousand hors de combat ! You have seized the capital of the enemy, destroyed his railroad communications, and driven him into his last refuge, whence he can not escape! Soldiers, your commander congratulates you, and the Republic is grateful !" Such would have been the proclamation of Na- poleon, with the advantage, in Grant's case, that every word would have been true. But, alas ! for the sol- dier who wants either the stimulus of vanity, or the genius of imagination ! He will be contented with success, and allow facts to make history, and his- torians to proclaim that he was deficient in genius, in manners, and in humanity. 1 On the 22d of May, Grant, either from misinfor- mation or misapprehension of the enemy's strength, ventured on an assault, which proved to be a mistake. Vicksburg was naturally and artificially strongly for- tified, and fortified places are never attempted by as- sault in European warfare, and ought not to be any where. When we come to set down with an army before a strongly fortified and fully garrisoned place, we can have no resource but regular approaches. Here the engineer is the real commander, and by his skill alone can the place be taken, unless starved out. Grant had not hesitated to depart from all European precedents in his strategy over our great plains, and forests, and rivers. No precedents were applicable to 1 All these charges are brought against Grant by intelligent men, both rebel and Union. It is disgraceful to their information and to their intellect. GRA NT A ND Mc CLERNA ND. 2 1 1 such a case, and he followed none. But here was a new experience. He was not an engineer officer, and knew nothing about fortified cities. So he made a furious assault, and the Corps of Sherman, McPher- son, and McClernand bravely, but uselessly, assaulted parapets and forts, manned with an army inside. It was in vain ; and we lost, in one form and another, nearly three thousand men. This was rather a sad comment on our victories. But it could make no difference in the result. It only taught Grant he must take another course. In the mean time Grant had a personal trouble, which gave him much uneasiness, 1 and which he now got rid of. This was General McClernand, who with the most patriotic motives, and good service in the war, seems to have been very unfit to command a corps, and who now, by misinformation to Grant on the field, caused a large part of the loss in the assault. The difficulty with McClernand was still further in- creased by his congratulatory order to his troops, dated May 31st, 2 by which those who read it, and know 1 This will be best understood by a paragraph from Grant's Report to Halleck, dated May 24th : " The loss on our side was not very heavy at first, but receiving repeated dispatches from Major-General McCler- nand, saying that he was hard pressed on his right and left, and calling for reinforcements, I gave him all of McPherson's Corps but four brigades, and caused Sherman to press the enemy on our right, which caused us to double our losses for the day. They will probably reach fifteen hundred killed and wounded. General McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the facts, and caused much of this loss. He is entirely unfit for the position of corps commander, both on the march and on the battle-field. Looking after his corps gives me more labor and in- finitely more uneasiness than all the remainder of my department." 2 See McClernand's Order, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VI, p. 637. The paragraph in relation to Champion's Hill, in which he speaks of 212 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. no more, would learn that the battles had all been fought, and the work all done, by MeClernand's Corps. He seems to have been very nervous, easily excited, and not fully to have comprehended military positions. With all this, he had much merit, and had done much service. He was, however, removed, and General Ord put in command of his corps. I need not enter into the details of the siege of Vicksburg. They will interest few except engineers. Grant found that the place was to be taken only by ordinary approaches, and he must have reinforce- ments. Lammon's Division from Memphis, and two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, came; on the iith of June, General Kinney's Division, from the Depart- ment of Missouri, arrived ; and on the 14th of June, two divisions of the Ninth Corps, under General Parke. Thus we see that Grant was soon reenforced enough to put him beyond any possibility of danger from an attack on his rear — the east. Johnston was com- pelled to look on at a distance, and see his enemy's success. Grant raised counter-fortifications to the rebels, and drew his lines closer and stronger. He made mines, and blew them up ; but there is only one case in which mines are useful — that is, when they are actually under the enemy's ramparts, and blow open a passage. They are the last things to be used previous to the assault. So they went on mining till the 25th of June, when a grand mine exploded, and they prepared for a storm of the intrenchments. The winning the battle, "with the assistance of ARPhersou's Corps" is most extraordinary. Hovey's Division did belong to MeClernand's Corps, but it was the only one in the battle, and was directed that day by Grant. SURRENDER OF VICE'S BURG. 213 parallels of Grant's army had got so near, in some places, that the Union and the rebel soldiers talked to each other over the parapets, and even went so far as to interchange supplies of tobacco and crackers. This is very much like gleams of sunshine in the midst of a storm. Poor human nature will speak out its human sympathy in the midst of the terrors of war. Alas ! is there no remedy for the ills of Gov- ernment but these terrible ills of war ? At last, when our men were almost near enough to the enemy to touch them — when they were just peeping over the parapets — when the citizens and rebel soldiers had been for days living on mule flesh — when the last hope had expired in Pemberton's breast, and he had vindicated to the world that he was not a traitor to his cause, (for they had charged him with being one,) on the 3d of July he asked for terms of surrender. The terms were agreed upon, the delivery of the place to be made next day. So, at 10 o'clock on Saturday, the glorious 4th of July, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out and stacked their arms in front of their conquerors. " All along the rebel works they poured out, in gray, through the sally-ports and across the ditches, and laid down their colors, sometimes on the very spot where so many of the besiegers had laid down their lives ; and then, in sight of the National troops, who were standing on their own parapets, the rebels returned inside the works, prisoners of war. Thirty- one thousand, six hundred men were surrendered to Grant. Among these were two thousand, one hund- red and fifty-three officers, of whom fifteen were gQi\- 2T4 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. erals. One hundred and seventy-two cannon also fell into his hands, the largest capture of men and material ever made in war" ' Logan's Division entered first, and the Forty- Fifth Illinois placed its battle-flag on the Court- House of Vicksburg. Two thousand officers were surrendered ; and their temper and behavior is thus described in the concluding scene by Badeau, who, I suppose, was present : " Grant rode into the town, with his staff, at the head of Logan's Division. The rebel soldiers gazed curiously at their conqueror, as he came inside the lines that had resisted him so valiantly, but they paid him no sign of disrespect. He went direct to one of the rebel head-quarters : there was no one to re- ceive him, and he dismounted and entered the porch where Pemberton sat with his generals ; they saluted Grant, but not one offered him a chair, though all had seats themselves. Neither the rank nor the rep- utation of their captor, nor the swords he had allowed them to wear, prompted them to this simple act of courtesy. Pemberton was especially sullen, both in conversation and behavior. Finally, for very shame, one of the rebels offered a place to Grant. The day was hot and dusty ; he was thirsty from his ride, and asked for a drink of water. They told him he could find it inside ; and, no one showing him the way, he groped in a passage till he found a negro, who gave him the cup of cold water only, which his enemy had 1 Badeau's " Military History." At the surrender of Ulm only thirty thousand men and sixty pieces of cannon were captured. Pem- berton had thirty-two thousand. EFFECTS OF CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG. 21 5 almost denied. When he returned, his seat had been taken, and he remained standing during the rest of the interview, which lasted about half an hour." I suppose it is not easy for human nature to feel pleasant under the circumstances in which Pemberton and his officers were placed. But it was not the con- duct which a Bayard or a Washington would have displayed, nor one which we should have expected from Southern chivalry. So ended the drama of Vicksburg ; and though the war lasted nearly two years longer, they were years, on the part of the rebels, of hopeless controversy. Port Hudson imme- diately fell. We turned back the whole left line of rebel defenses, and folded their armies back on Chat- tanooga and Richmond. Vicksburg was decisive, and Grant came out of that campaign with the congratu- lations of a nation, and victorious over the opinions of the Government, as well as the armies of the rebels. 2l6 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. CHAPTER IX. THE PREPARATION. GRANT ORDERS SHERMAN TO ADVANCE — JACKSON RETAKEN, AND THE CAMPAIGN ENDED — GRANT IS OPPOSED TO TRADE ON THE LINES — PROTECTS NEGRO SOLDIERS — WANTS TO MOVE ON MOBILE — FAILURE OF THE POTOMAC CAMPAIGNS AND SUCCESS OF ROSECRANS — GOVERNMENT FAILS TO RE- ENFORCE HIM — LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION AND ITS MORAL EFFECT. " Hail, Father of Waters ! again thou art free ! And miscreant treason hath vainly enchained thee ; Roll on, mighty river, and bear to the sea The praises of those who so gallantly gained thee J From fountain to ocean, from source to the sea, The West is exulting — ' Our river is free !' Fit emblem of freedom ! thy home is the North ! And thou wert not forgot by the mother that bore thee; From snows everlasting thou chainless burst forth, And chainless we solemnly swore to restore thee. O'er river and prairie, o'er mountain and lea, The North is exulting — ' Our river is free !' " ' "She comes from St. Louis ! Away with the plea That river or people divided may be ! One current sweeps past us, one likeness we wear; One flag through the future right proudly we '11 bear; All hail to the day without malice or jar ! She comes from St. Louis ! Hurrah and hurrah !" 3 'From "Opening of the Mississippi." by Captain R. H. Crittenden. a ()n the 16th of July, 1863, the steamboat Imperial arrived at New Orleans from St Louis, and this verse is taken from a spirited Ode, written for that event, by Edna Dean Proctor. JOHNS TON AGAIN O UTGENERALED. 2 1 7 THE Mississippi was free, indeed, and the tide of war ebbed back from its banks. Grant did not sleep upon his achievements. Before the prisoners were paroled (on the evening of the 3d of July) Grant wrote to Sherman : " Make all your calcula- tions to attack Johnston, and destroy the road north of Jackson." For Johnston, on the investment of Vicksburg, had taken possession of Jackson, had been reenforced by several divisions of troops, and had been making vain efforts to attack Grant on a weak point, or get Pemberton to do so. He now lay at Jackson, in a sullen humor, brooding over what he called Pemberton's blunders and his own ill-fortune. 1 Sherman promptly obeyed the order to march. Ord and Steele, with their corps, followed, and by the 1 2th of July the army was again in front of Jackson. This place was on Pearl River, and on the 13th both flanks of our army touched on the river. Johnston was well fortified, and got the idea that Sherman meant to attack him, in which case he hoped to suc- ceed behind his defenses ; but this General would make no such mistake, and quietly began to throw up intrenchments. Johnston is again outgeneraled. 1 1 have already stated my conviction, founded only on his own orders, reports, and movements, that Johnston was an overrated man. His true course was, even if he had but small force, to keep up an incessant attack on Grant, and keep near him, to give Pemberton some chance of escape. He did exactly the contrary. He kept as far off as he could, and talked of cutting off Grant's supplies. He says in his report: "On the 12th I said to him, 'To take from Bragg a force which would make this army fit to oppose Grant, would involve yield- ing Tennessee. It is for the Government to decide between this State and Tennessee.' " They had no part of Tennessee but Chatta- nooga, and all they did with Bragg's army was to make worthless raids, 19 2i8 LIFE OF GENFRAL GRANT* He writes to the rebel President : u If the enemy will not attack, we must, at the last moment, withdraw;" and he did. Again, Jackson is made a scene of deso- lation. Railroads, locomotives, cars, and bridges are destroyed on every side for many miles. The cam- paign is at an end ; the capital of Mississippi is a second time occupied ; all the rebel fortifications on the river captured or destroyed, and the army of Pemberton, which had exceeded fifty thousand men, taken, destroyed, or scattered. 1 It is most fortunate for Grant that his merit (and no critic or historian can think it small) in the Vicksburg campaign can be shared with no other generals, nor with the Government itself. Nor was there wanting proof to establish this, nor generosity in the Administration to acknowledge it. The nation rejoiced, and Lincoln was surprised. On the 13th of July he wrote that memorable letter to Grant — one of the curiosities of literature, for its magnanim- ity, and as characteristic of the man : "My Dear General, — I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did — march the troops across the neck, run 1 I have s;iid that the armv of Pemberton numbered on the rolls, at the beginning "t tin- < ampaign, 52,000 men. The following statement is the nearest I can come to the losses of Pemberton: Surrendered at Vicksburg, 31,600; captured at Champion's Hill, 3,000; captured at Big black ami Port Gibson, 3,000; killed and wounded, 10,000; est aped under Loring, 5,000. Aggregate, 52,600 men. LAST DISPA TCH FR OM VICKSB URG. 2 1 9 the batteries with the transports, and thus go below ; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks ; and when you turned north- ward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mis- take. I now wish to make a personal acknowledg- ment that you were right, and I was wrong." Halleck also was liberal in his praise — compared his campaign to that of Napoleon at Ulm, and spoke of his report as " brief, soldierly, and in every respect creditable and satisfactory." I have said Grant did not know how, and has not yet learned how, to pro- claim his own merits, or even that of the army ; so his report was "brief and soldierly" — nothing more. 1 Grant's last words in the campaign of Vicksburg were sent in the telegram of the 18th of July, an- nouncing the retreat of Johnston. And now, looking out for new preparations, he said : " It seems to me now that Mobile should be captured, the expedi- tion starting from some point on Lake Pontchar- train." He was looking from the ruins of Vicksburg into the future of the drama, as its scenes drew toward the end. And now, before we turn our eyes toward Chat- tanooga, let us turn to some points in the conduct of the war which concern Grant's administrative ability, 1 Some newspaper said : Grant neither made a speech to his sol- diers, nor inarched at the head of a column ! The last is false, but the former is true. 220 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. in which he has shown himself superior to any man of the day, and, therefore, fully competent to take charge of the most extensive executive duties. As soon as we got possession of Kentucky and Ten- nessee on the Cumberland and the Mississippi, it was perfectly natural that the commercial public should immediately want to trade there. The war had straitened trade, especially that in the Missis- sippi Valley. The merchants panted to renew it, and the speculators more than the merchants ; the vul- tures who follow in the track of the eagle are ever watchful for the carcass ; the jackal is waiting for the prey left by the lion. 1 One of the most disgrace- ful chapters in the history of modern civilization is that which describes the attempt to trade over the dead bodies of fallen men, and make profit out of the sufferings of a country ! This conduct is natural, and perhaps human nature is not to be blamed for its in- stincts. However this may be, a body of traders in the wake, or near the camps of an army, is hostile, if not fatal, to its success ; and Grant, who had all the qualities of a good soldier, was utterly opposed to it. The traders were continually pressing the Secretary of the Treasury to open trade, and he wrote to Grant that "this rigorous line" gives rise to "serious, and some well-founded, complaints." The Secretary sug- gested bonds to be given by parties having permits. Grant replied, with truth and sound judgment : " No matter what the restrictions thrown around trade, if any whatever is allowed, it will be made the means of 1 Every body remembers the story of John Hook entering the camp of the Revolutionary Army, crying, "Beef! beef!" NEGROES AS SOLDIERS. 221 supplying the enemy with all they want." All history proves this, and it is only surprising that the Govern- ment could have thought of permitting it. There is no doubt that this border trade did a great deal of mischief during the war. Grant said, however, that, whatever he thought, he would obey. Badeau quotes this passage from him: "No theory of my ozuu will ever stand in the ivay of my executing in good faith any order I may receive from those in authority over me ; but my position has given me an opportunity of seeing what could not be known by persons away from the scene of war, and I venture, therefore, great caution in opening trade with rebels." Such was Grant's sound judgment on the question of trade with enemies. He was equally sound and ju- dicious on the question arising out of the employ- ment of negro soldiers. When the history of these times is read by posterity, nothing will appear so strange, so fatuitous, as our hesitation to employ ne- gro soldiers, or our doubts about emancipation. A large part of the American people seemed laboring under awful delusions. In the South, we know they were ; and we were scarcely less so in the North. What is the object of war? Destruction — certainly so far as to subdue your enemy! Do you use a gun to kill with ? then why not a negro, if he can be made a soldier ? Is the negro your enemy's property ? then why not destroy that property by emancipation ? All this was plain to true military men, but it came slowly to the country. Gradually we accepted the negroes as soldiers, and finally Lincoln's glorious emancipation destroyed property in them. Grant looked upon the 222 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. negro simply as a soldier. When we enlisted negroes in our defense, he knew they must be protected. It would demoralize the Government, the army, and the nation not to protect the negro soldier. The rebels, however, thought they could punish the negro, and not the white soldier. Not so thought Grant, and so he taught them. He went into no physiology or met- aphysics about whether the negro was a man or a baboon — whether he was a slave or a freeman — he knew him as an American soldier, entitled to all the rights of other soldiers ; and he meant those rights should be protected. " The rebels at first refused to recognize black troops as soldiers, and threatened that, if captured, neither they nor their white officers should receive the treatment of prisoners of war ; the former were to be regarded as runaway slaves, the latter as thieves and robbers, having stolen and appropriated slave property. Grant, however, was determined to protect all those whom he commanded ; and when it was re- ported to him that a white captain and some negro soldiers, captured at Milliken's Bend, had been hung, he wrote to General Richard Taylor, then command- ing the rebel forces in Louisiana : ' I feel no inclina- tion to retaliate for the offenses of irresponsible per- sons, but, if it is the policy of any general intrusted with the command of troops to show no quarter, or to punish with death prisoners taken in battle, I will accept the issue.' " l The rebels made a pretense of referring the mat- ter to the State authorities, but took care to do noth- 1 Badeau's " Military History," page 408. EFFECTS OF WASHINGTON INFLUENCE. 223 ing which would bring upon them the retaliation with which Grant had threatened them. On the 24th of July Grant again urged the at- tack on Mobile, and suggested, what was true, that it would make a diversion from Bragg's army. But one of the finest opportunities of the war was lost, and that for reasons which had no force whatever. Rosecrans was left without sufficient forces, and, as a consequence, to lose the battle of Chickamauga ; and we failed to take Mobile, at an inviting moment, because Banks, with a large army, had been sent to Texas. 1 And what became of Banks ? No part of all our military movements in Louisiana and Texas was worth one-fourth part the men we lost there. It was the weakest part of all the military conduct of the Government. Washington was continually coun- teracting all that Grant, or Rosecrans, or any good officer could do, and its treatment of Rosecrans was what no honest man can regard without pain. 2 Mobile was not attacked. Banks was sent to Louisiana and Texas, to waste a fine army in useless expeditions ; Rosecrans was left without reinforce- ments ; and Bragg allowed, uninterrupted, to collect an immense force in front of Chattanooga, and almost, but happily not altogether, to succeed in taking that key-point in the strategy of the war. In fact, from 1 Lincoln and Halleck both wrote to Grant that this was the reason. 2 I am glad that the evidence, both oral and documentary, shows that Grant was entirely innocent of the wrong done Rosecrans. What that wrong was, and who did It, will be seen in the next pages. Grant seems to have had none of that malicious weakness which strives to elevate himself by putting other people down. He was just to his generals, and willing to obey. 224 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. the middle of July to the middle of October, three precious months were wasted, illustrating one great principle of war, that to take advantage of a victory- is as important as to gain it. In the last days of August, Grant went to New Orleans, and, at a review there, unfortunately was thrown from his horse, which confined him to one position for a month, and for two months he had to use crutches. To understand what now became the part of Grant and of the Western armies, we must glance for a single moment at what had been done in other parts of the battle- field, in the long time since Grant left Cairo for the conquest of the Mississippi. McClellan had made his grand march on the Peninsula, fought a dozen battles, and fought them well, but had been compelled to return to the Poto- mac to drive Lee out of Maryland ; had won victo- ries at South Mountain and Antietam, and at last terminated his career by inglorious delay. Then Burn side had made his disastrous assault on Freder- icksburg, losing thousands, and nothing accomplished. Then Hooker had crossed the Rapidan, and made masterly dispositions, fought a great battle, and re- tired, because the water was high ! Such, for two years, had been the proceedings on the Potomac ; armies after armies marching and fighting with no result whatever, except the loss of more men than Grant was charged with losing in his grand cam- paign for the conquest of Richmond.' Nor had the 1 ( »ne of the gravest charges made against Grant is, that, to obtain success, he sacrificed a vast number of men before Richmond Let such critics count up the losses of two years of failures, and see whether they are any lebs than Grant's luss in one year of success. VALUE OF MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN. 225 rebel general done any better. Lee had made two grand raids with his whole army into Maryland and Pennsylvania, each time losing thousands of men he could not afford to lose, and accomplishing nothing. At length, in his last raid, on the same 4th of July on which Vicksburg surrendered, he met with our army at Gettysburg, and suffered a most disastrous defeat. But even Gettysburg was decisive in only a negative sense. It was what we were saved from, and not what we gained, which made it important. We did not advance to Richmond by Gettysburg. In one word, all the military schemes and strategy of the Potomac campaigns had been indecisive and worthless. 1 The reason was obvious. The whole idea of the Richmond campaign at that time was wrong, because, if we had taken Richmond, the mountains and valleys of Virginia, as Davis had declared, would have been easily defended. Armies in the field, as well as fortified towns, are only successfully attacked when they are turned, and their resources are cut off. The army of Lee, even if beaten in the field, must be practically successful till his resources in the South- West were cut off, and the Mississippi became our base of operations. It was not till Grant had con- quered the Mississippi that the conquest of Virginia became possible, and then it was only possible by enabling us to hold and operate from Chattanooga. Now let us turn to another field of the West. We have seen Rosecrans in the successful battles of Iuka and Corinth, exhibiting the qualities of a brill- 1 The only way to disprove this verdict is to show that in October, 1863, we were nearer Richmond than in October, 1861. 226 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. iant and brave soldier. It is evident he was one of the men the Government wanted. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1862, he was appointed to command the army forming in Middle Tennessee to act against Bragg, and with Chattanooga as the objective point. Soon after, he fought the great battle of Stone River, in which he showed the talent of a great general. Following this up with successful strategy through Tullahoma, he drove Bragg back, and, on September 9, 1863, triumphantly entered Chattanooga. This was the key-point of the rebel line of defense, with- out which, any attempts to defend the South-West, or prevent the fall of Richmond, would be in vain. The captures of Vicksburg and Chattanooga were twin events. At the time this happened, it will be remembered, Grant was confined to his bed with a fall from his horse at New Orleans, and that Sher- man had just closed up the campaign with Johnston, and that for some reason — which did not lie at the door of Grant, but was clearly the offspring of Wash- ington management — the troops were scattered in various directions, and not sent, as they ought to have been, to Rosecrans. The consequence was, the battle of Chickamauga, called a defeat, but which was only partially so, (for nothing is a defeat where the enemy gains nothing,) by which Rosecrans fell, for a time, under a shadow. It was only a shadow, for a careful examination of the facts by any impar- tial mind will prove that the most charged againsl Rosecrans was only some temporary indiscretion Was this ground to dismiss a successful and a popu- lar general ? In the West it was a very unpopular GRANT AT INDIANAPOLIS. 227 act of the Government, nor can I get rid of the im- pression that it was equally unjust. But with its policy or its injustice Grant had nothing to do. He was far distant from Chattanooga, and unmixed with the personal or political intrigues which in our war, as in all others, mingled in the operations of the army, as in the proceedings of the Cabinet. It hap- pened, fortunately for himself as well as the country, that Grant's temperament, as well as disconnection with party intrigues, enabled him to arrive at calm and impartial judgments without doing any thing unjust to individuals, or contrary to the policy of the Government. When, therefore, Grant was offered the command of the army at Chattanooga, he accepted it on grounds of duty and policy, without reference to the particular position of Rosecrans, or the plans for the Potomac. He was simply aiming at the suc- cess of the whole military system. 1 The Secretary of War had gone to the West, and met Grant at Indianapolis for a conference. The Secretary gave Grant the command of the armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. On this Colonel Badeau makes the following extraordi- nary statement : "The Secretary of War accompanied him as far as Louisville ; there both remained a day, discussing the situation of affairs, and Grant gathering the views 1 It is proper to say that, on the 13th of September, Halleck had telegraphed that Grant's available force should be sent to Memphis, and thence to Rosecrans. This dispatch did not arrive till after the battle of Chickamauga was fought ; and for this long and unnecessary delay of two months in sending Rosecrans reinforcements, Halleck, as it appears, is responsible. 228 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT, of the Government. During this clay the minister received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, his sub- ordinate, at Chattanooga, intimating that the danger of an abandonment of Chattanooga was instant; that Rosecrans was absolutely preparing for such a move- ment. The Secretary at once directed Grant to im- mediately assume his new command, and to relieve Rosecrans before it was possible for the apprehended mischief to be consummated." There is no evidence whatever that Rosecrans had the least idea of abandoning Chattanooga at any time. Why should he want to? Chattanooga was the fruit of his own success ; the laurel which adorned his own brow. Why should he give it up? No man has charged Rosecrans with want of resolution or of courage. The dispatch from Dana arrived several days after Chickamauga, when there was no imme- diate danger whatever; nor did Grant set out till the 19th of October, nearly a month after. It is difficult to see what business Mr. Dana had in the army at that particular time, or from what quarter he derived his information. He did not get it from General Rosecrans, and it looks like a figment of his own imagination. One other event (memorable in the affairs of men and nations) I must mention before we proceed. This was the Proclamation of Emancipation, issued as Order No. 1, on the 1st of January, 1863. What- ever legal effect might, on the return of peace, (in case slavery had not been abolished by the States,) attach to this document, three consequences fol- lowed of vast importance. As a military order, it THE EM A NCIPA TION PR O CLAM A TION. 2 29 was conclusive on the army, and at once did away with the absurd idea of many officers, that property in slaves was to be respected. It was most absurd and most mischievous, that, in the beginning of the war, some commanders in the army actually believed and acted on the idea that they must respect prop- erty in man ! War, of necessity, abolished slavery in all that concerned war. I have already shown that Grant compelled the rebels to respect the rights of negro soldiers. Fremont, in Missouri, had proclaimed them free, and the Government was so frightened that it instantly repealed the order!- Such is the terrible effect, even on the strongest minds, of a moral insanity, which seems to corrupt even the constitution of the human soul. But this order, if it did not destroy the moral delusion, became the law of the army, and Grant was very willing to live up to it. Another effect was, a decided reaction on the public opinion of Europe, especially that of En- gland. France was ready to declare against us, con- quer Mexico, and extend, as Napoleon expressed it, the limits of the Latin race. But Napoleon had not the moral courage to act without England, and the English aristocracy (naturally detesting republican- ism) dared not act with the workingmen against them. Such was the situation of affairs when Lin- coln's Proclamation threw the whole antislavery people of England (and that was a vast number) in our favor. Thus England was held fast, and France dared not act alone. But a greater effect was produced on the opinion of this country. Perhaps very few people, if any, 230 LIFE OF GENERAL CI? A XT. were added to the numerical strength of the Govern- ment, and in the South the majority of Unionists were carried over to the rebels. But the moral effect was of far greater weight than all that. A moral idea of tremendous force now impelled and stimu- lated the supporters of Government, while, on the other hand, the moral depression on the rebel mind was equally great. They saw clearly that all hope of help from Europe was gone, and that nothing but a miraculous military success could save the thou- sands of millions in slave property from utter de- struction. In fine, the moral crisis of the war was passed when Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proc- lamation, though Vicksburg and Gettysburg had not yet come. Of all the heroic acts which live in his- tory, none was nobler than that of Lincoln ; and of all the laurels which adorn the memories of heroes and of statesmen, none are greener, or will live longer, than those of the great American President. CHATTANOOGA. 23 1 CHAPTER X. CHATTANOOGA. THE SWITZERLAND OF AMERICA — THE SUCK OF THE TENNES- SEE — CHATTANOOGA — GRANT TAKES COMMAND — BRAGG BOASTS — ROSECRANS'S PREPARATIONS — HOOKER MOVES ON LOOKOUT — ROADS SAFE — BRAGG DETACHES LONGSTREET — GRANT MAKES ALL ARRANGEMENTS SENDS ORDER TO BURNSIDE — BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS — HOOKER STORMS LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN — SHERMAN ATTACKS MISSIONARY RIDGE — THOMAS BREAKS THE ENEMY'S CENTER — GREAT VICTORY — SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE — CAMPAIGN ENDED. " The day had been one of dense mists and rains, and much of General Hooker's battle was fought above the clouds, which concealed him from our view, but from which his musketry was heard."— General Meigs to Secretary Stanton. " By the banks of Chattanooga, watching with a soldier's heed, In the chilly autumn morning, gallant Grant was on his steed ; For the foe had climbed above him with the banners of their band, And the cannon swept the river from the hills of Cumberland. Like a trumpet rang his orders : ' Howard, Thomas, to the bridge ! One brigade aboard the Dunbar ! storm the hights of Mission Ridge, On the left the ledges, Sherman, charge and hurl the rebels down ! Hooker, take the steeps of Lookout, and the slopes before the town !' "T. B." " 'T was the legion so famed of the White Star, and led on by Geary the brave, That was chosen to gather the laurel, or find on the mountain a grave. O ! long as the mountains shall rise o'er the waters of bright Ten- nessee, Shall be told the proud deeds of the White Star, the cloud-treading host of the free ! 232 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The camp-fire shall blaze to the chorus, the picket-post peal it on high, How was fought the fierce battle of Lookout — how won the Grand Fight of the Sky !" ' THIRTY years ago I descended the Tennessee River in a little steamboat. At Knoxville I had attended a railroad convention, whose object was to unite the South and the West. Had the original plan been successfully carried out, who can tell whether the mutuality of interests and acquaintance might not have even prevented the terrible struggle which, twenty years after, took place ? Such was not the purpose of Providence. A great crime had to be avenged ; a great evil to be abolished ; a nation to be disciplined, and a great experiment to be tried on the possibility of self-government in a state of uninter- rupted freedom. At Knoxville I saw the Holston coming from the valley of Virginia to join the Ten- nessee, and both together roll toward the Father of Waters. The mountains stood around to sentinel the land, and as we passed below Kingston we came to the Suck of the Tennessee, where the river breaks through the Cumberland Ridges. There are but two other spots which compare with this : one is the pas- sage of the Hudson, through the mountain ridge, at West Point ; and the other that of the Potomac, at Harper's Ferry. They are very much alike in the main feature. The Tennessee was compressed at the Suck into so narrow and rocky a channel that it seemed impossible to pass by steamboat. To me, standing on the deck, it seemed scarcely as broad as 1 " Lookout Mountain," by Alfred B. Street. THE S WITZERLA ND OF A MER ICA . 233 the steamboat itself. On the south of the Suck was the grand Lookout Mountain, since so memorable in history. Above Lookout was Chattanooga Valley, and where it opens on the Tennessee was formerly Ross's Landing. This spot is the present Chatta- nooga ; but, when I was there, there was no town whatever; that is of recent creation. On the other side of Lookout, between that and Raccoon Ridge, was Lookout Valley. Chattanooga Valley was be- tween Missionary Ridge and Lookout. It will be seen there were three ridges — Mission, Lookout, and Rac- coon ; that between the first two was Chattanooga Valley, and between the last two Lookout Valley. The main ridge was Lookout Mountain, over two thousand feet in hight, which looked down upon the winding Tennessee in rugged and gloomy grandeur. It was winding round its base that the Tennessee made the " Suck," so called from the rapid whirl of the waters, tumbling over rocks, and compressed to a narrow breadth. On the opposite side were ridges also, but with broader valleys. Passing through these mountain gorges, in our little steamboat, I was forci- bly reminded of West Point, and its almost impreg- nable defenses. This was a Switzerland, which hardy freemen might defend against half a world. When the war broke out, in 1861, I urged upon General Mitchel the necessity of occupying East Tennessee and its principal points. He actually got an order to do that, when, soon after, it was countermanded, and he ordered to join Buell. McClellan said that he was anxious to occupy East Tennessee. Why did he not do it ? The fact is, the Government had no 20 ROSECRANS AT CHATTANOOGA. 235 general plan of strategy, and constantly suffered itself to be diverted from its true objects by the raids and threatenings of the enemy. Grant took command of the army on the 19th of October. He telegraphed to Thomas, (who was that day put in command,) who replied : " I will hold the town till we starve /" This was the answer of a brave soldier, but it had been the decision of Rose- crans also ; and there was no great merit in it, for no good soldier would abandon Chattanooga while it was possible to hold it ; and the question was precisely the same to Rosecrans, to Thomas, and to Grant. That question was, simply, to starve or not to starve. The case was fairly stated by Bragg, who said : " Pos- sessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we hold him at our mercy, and his destruction is only a question of timer ' So Bragg thought ; but he was very apt to be mistaken ; and we shall see how it turned out. 2 The position of Rosecrans at Chatta- nooga was this: Partially defeated at Chickamauga, with very heavy losses of men, he was compelled to shut himself up in Chattanooga, and draw his line of defense around it, so that its safety should be made 1 Bragg's Report. 2 1 have said Chickamauga was not a defeat, and so said the rebels. The following is from a writer in the " Richmond Whig :" " That the campaign, so far, is a failure, and the battle of Chickamauga, though a victory, is not a success, are propositions too plain for denial. We have not recovered Chattanooga as yet, much less Tennessee, and it may be well for the country to inquire, whether the fault lies with a subordinate officer, or is to be traced to the inefficiency and incom- petency of one higher in rank — one who is presumed intellectually to direct the operations of the Army of Tennessee." 236 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. certain. In doing this be lost, as Bragg said, his short communication by the Tennessee, and was compelled to carry his provisions by a circuitous route of sixty miles over Walden's Ridge. The re- sult was, that in the very bad state of the roads, and only wagons to rely on, that this became almost im- possible, and the army really was near starvation. The phrase of Thomas, that he would remain till he was starved, was very significant, though not very remarkable. On the 23d of October, Grant, having gone part of the way by rail and part on horseback, over almost impassable roads, (over which, being lame, he had sometimes to be carried,) arrived at Chattanooga. Here he saw, at once, that the first object was to regain the short line of supplies by Lookout Mountain and Valley. This was so obvious that Halleck had written him three days before to this effect, and Rosecrans had foreseen and made the arrangements by which it was to be done.' Colonel 1 Halleck wrote to Grant on the 20th, (which Grant did not get, probably,) that the communication must he opened. That Rosecrans had made the arrangements, which (mainly) Grant adopted, is proved by the sworn testimony of Rosecrans, uncontradicted by any body. I take the following paragraph from Mr. Whitelaw Rcid's "Ohio in the War :" "General Rosecrans, in testimony under oath before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, specifically stated that he had formed these plans, had made reconnoissances preliminary to carrying them out, and had explained them (fifteen days, in fact, before his removal) to Generals Thomas and Garfield, and, some time later, to General William F. Smith, ('.rant afterward acknowledged, in terms, his indebtedness to General William F. Smith for the crossing below Chattanooga, and the i onnection with Hooker. " In the course of his testimony, just referred to, General Rosecrans said : ' As early as the 4th of October, I called the attention of Gen- erals Thomas and Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, R OSE CRANS 1 S DETERMINATION. 237 Badeau, after stating, as I have previously related, that Dana informed the Government that Rosecrans was about to abandon Chattanooga, on which Grant sent his hasty order of the 19th to Thomas, admits, in his " Military History," that Rosecrans had de- termined to hold Chattanooga. " When Rosecrans discovered the extent of his misfortune, he determ- ined, if possible, to hold Chattanooga, but thought himself unable to do more. The whole army was at once withdrawn into the town, and in two days a formidable line of works was thrown up, so close that some of the houses were left outside." This is the fact, and it is not necessary to the clear and just fame of General Grant, to misrepresent or diminish the merits of Rosecrans. This officer, relieved of his command, returned to Cincinnati, where, in the winter months, he served as President of the Sanitary Commission — a service whose laurels are as green, and whose memory will be longer than those won on the battle-field, for they will live among the immortals. On the 23d of September, Halleck ordered the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that, as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose, I would take posses- sion of Lookout Valley (the point on the south side, reached by the march across the peninsula) and fortify it, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport. ... To effect this General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stephenson and Bridgeport, and advised that, as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army, ten or twelve miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley. . . . On the 19th, I directed General William F. Smith to reconnoiter the shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank, which was afterward made by General Sherman.' " 238 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Potomac, and sent them by rail to the support of Rosecrans, just three weeks too late. They came to Bridgeport, for, had they gone into Chattanooga, they would only have made bad worse by consuming pro- visions. In October, Burnside, with a large number of troops and the Ninth Corps, had taken Knoxville, and held the greater part of East Tennessee, but made no connection with Rosecrans. Here, then, was the position : Rosecrans in Chattanooga, with his army approaching starvation, and two corps at Bridge- port, ready to join him, and Burnside to the East, who ought to connect with him. The problem to be solved, as I have remarked, was very obvious. A junction must be made with Hooker, and the direct commu- nication opened. Brown's Ferry was near the foot of Raccoon Mountain, near Lookout Valley, and op- posite the Suck, or west side of Lookout Mountain. Near the foot of Lookout, and at the outlet of the val- ley, the rebels held position with a brigade. Now that was the very position to be taken ; for the distance from Brown's Ferry to Chattanooga, across Moccasin Point, was not very great. The plan was to send down a body of men in pontoons to Brown's Ferry, seize it, and build a bridge there. At the same time Hooker was to advance from Bridgeport by a wagon road, through a gap of Raccoon, to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley ; to seize the position of the enemy on the sides of Lookout Mountain ; all of which, if successful, would result in our getting a short com- munication by Bridgeport and Brown's Ferry. 1 1 " Rosecrans had contemplated some movement of this sort, and had ordered a pontoon bridge to be prepared, but had been content HOWARD'S VICTOR T. 239 The plan was successful. On the night of the 26th, dark and foggy, Hazen descended, with eighteen hundred men, in sixty pontoon boats, rounded Look- out, and, by five o'clock, had seized the hills covering the ferry. Another body, with materials for a bridge, was moved across Moccasin Point, and, in two or three hours more, the hights rising from Lookout Valley were secured, and made safe from attack. On the same day, (the 26th,) Hooker crossed the Tennessee on pontoons, at Bridgeport, with the Eleventh and part of the Twelfth Corps, under How- ard and Geary ; descending through a gorge of Rac- coon Mountain, he arrived safely in Lookout Valley, and encamped at night within a mile of Brown's Ferry. The next night he was furiously attacked by Longstreet, who, after a severe battle, was repulsed. The enemy had attempted to dislodge Howard's Corps from hights considerably above him ; but he not only repulsed them, but seized the hights. Thus Lookout Valley and Brown's Ferry were seized and held, and, come what may, the army would be pro- visioned, and Bragg's boast be in vain. At the same time General Johnson marched from Chattanooga, with a part of the Fourth Corps, to hold the road passed over by Hooker, and command the hights near Kelly's Ferry, (a ferry between Brown's and Bridgeport,) and thus, by these ferries and a part of the river, the supply line was reduced to a com- paratively small distance. Thus one of the main parts of the strategic movement in the Chattanooga with such remote preliminaries." He had done all he could, and was then building two steamboats at Bridgeport. 240 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. campaign was well and most successfully com- pleted. Grant now formed the design of attacking the reb- els on Missionary Ridge ; for Bragg's army lay in an "arc, with its right resting on Missionary Ridge, its center in Chattanooga Valley, and its left on Lookout Mountain. The strength of the position was on Mis- sionary Ridge, about four hundred feet above the valley of Chattanooga, and extending back for miles. Here lay the best part of the rebel army. The im- mediate object of the attack was to relieve Burnside's army in East Tennessee. To understand this, we must return for a moment to the position of Burnside. He had, as I have said, gone into East Tennessee with a large body of troops, and been reenforced with the Ninth Corps. Failing, however, to connect with Rosecrans's army at Chattanooga, he was now in danger of being cut off, and of suffering, if not of being absolutely captured, for want of food. A con- siderable body of rebel forces were coming down against him from Virginia, (which, however, turned out not to be very important,) and he was threatened with serious attack from Bragg. This last attack turned out, in the order of Providence, (as many other things did,) very contrary to the rebel expecta- tions, and very advantageous to Grant and Burnside. On the 4th of November, Longstreet, one of the best generals in the rebel army, received orders to take a corps and move into East Tennessee as rapidly as possible, give sudden blows, and, if possible, drive Burnside out, or better, capture or destroy him. 1 1 Bragg's order to Longstreet, on the 4th of November. GENERAL BRAGG S MISTAKE. 24 1 Longstreet accordingly set out, with about twenty thousand men, of which part were cavalry, under Wheeler. Bragg and Longstreet, who planned this expedition together, were both utterly mistaken as to the true position of affairs. Longstreet told Bragg that he had overestimated our army, that it would be no greater than his, after the proposed force was with- drawn. Perhaps, at that day, it was not. But Sher- man, with the Fifteenth Corps, and all the troops he could collect, was then marching in the Valley of the Tennessee for Chattanooga. Grant was fully aware that he must have a large army to drive Bragg back; and, therefore, had made arrangements for all the men and all the provisions he could get, to be hurried on to Chattanooga. He had anticipated this very movement, and was afraid that Bragg would burst through to the east of him, and so he wrote Sherman to hurry up. When, therefore, Bragg came to send twenty thousand men from his army on the chase for Burnside, Grant saw his advantage, and, writing to Burnside to hold on, even if he lost half his army, immediately prepared for the final shock at Chattanooga. We can now understand the posi- tion: Bragg sending off Longstreet to the east, and thus greatly weakening his own army, while Sherman (already arrived at Hunts ville) is hurrying up to Grant with an entire corps and several divisions ; Long- street rushing furiously after Burnside, and most sig- nally failing in the storm of Knoxville ; Sherman soon coming up; and Bragg resting in security, while Grant is preparing the storm to overwhelm him. 21 242 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. This is the real position on the 7th of November, although Sherman had not arrived. On that day (the 7th) Grant telegraphed Halleck that Longstreet was moving against Burnside, and said: "I have ordered Thomas to attack the north end of Missionary Ridge, and when that is carried to threaten or attack the enemy's line of communi- cation between Cleveland and Dalton/" But this was not to be quite so soon. The artillery was in the mud ; there were not horses to draw it ; things were not ready. In fine, the army could not move. Grant was compelled to do what was for the best under any circumstances, wait for Sherman to come up. No doubt Burnside was in great danger. Hal- leck was in great anxiety about him, and kept up a succession of telegrams to Grant. Grant saw all this, and had already told Burnside to do the only thing possible, and which, in fact, did save him. First, to rely on the loyal Tennesseans for provisions ; which he did, and got enough; and to fight to the last at Knoxville ; which he did, and was victorious. In fact, there was not so much real danger to Burnside as had been apprehended. It turned out, by comparing his dispatches to Grant and Halleck, in the middle of November, that, though the men might suffer in the winter, if Longstreet remained on the railroad south of him, yet there was no danger of starvation. He had plenty of beef, and kept the mills round grinding for him. He was on the Tennessee, be- tween Knoxville and Kingston, and had no idea of 1 This, if successful, was to cut the communications between Bragg and Longstreet. A GRAND RECONNOISSANCE. 243 falling back. He was ready for fight, if fight was necessary. In the mean time, during the first half of November, Grant was making every possible prep- aration for the support and movement of troops. Never was his administrative ability more strikingly exhibited. He was constantly dispatching all the commanders in his wide department to collect troops, munitions, provisions, and transportation. From every quarter they were coming. He got Porter to convey transports up the Cumberland. He ordered the Louis- ville and Nashville Railroad to be put to its utmost capacity of transportation, in order to supply the de- pots at Nashville, and got all the locomotives and steamboats possible to carry the supplies to Bridge- port. From every quarter troops and materials were concentrating to make the grand move from Chatta- nooga effective and decisive. At last, on the 16th, the Corps of Sherman arrived at Bridgeport, 1 and on the 18th at Chattanooga. On the 20th, Bragg performed a little maneuver which, if such deception were not justifiable in war, would be extremely ridiculous. He sent a note to Grant, that, as there were some non-combatants in Chat- tanooga, he would recommend their speedy with- drawal! Grant at once inferred that Bragg meant to withdraw his own forces. Accordingly, he imme- diately ordered a grand reconnoissance toward Mis- sionary Ridge, which was performed by General Thomas and four divisions. This was done on the 23d of November, and was remarkably successful ; 1 The reader should examine the little map, and get an idea of the localities. 244 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. for General Wood's Division charged up and took Orchard Knob, a rather important spur of Missionary Ridge, and drove the enemy from their advanced in- trenchments. This encouraged the troops, and was a good beginning for the great conflict. It was dis- covered that the enemy actually were sending troops to Longstreet, and thus this movement was most opportune. The great object of attack was the north end of Missionary Ridge, an attack to be made by General Sherman ; but other attacks and arrangements were to be made before that came. So, on the next day, (24th,) came Hooker's decisive assault on Lookout Mountain. The enemy's whole line (altogether too long, as they knew) extended from Lookout Valley (holding the top of Lookout) to Chickamauga Valley, east of Missionary Ridge. This was an arc of some six or seven miles in length, altogether too much for Bragg to hold. Around the foot of Lookout, and commanding the river, lay Hooker with his force. The present object is to take the summit of Lookout, and then be able to attack and turn the enemy's left. Bragg, in his official Report, 1 says the resistance was made by only one brigade ; but also adds, that the commander on that field (General Stevenson) had six brigades available, and one would think that was enough to defend a mountain cliff. But we shall get a clearer view by turning to Hooker's account of it. He says : 2 " At this time the enemy's pickets formed a con- 1 Bragg's Report, dated Dalton, November 30th. 2 Hooker's Report, dated February 4, 1S64. GENERAL HOOKER'S REPORT. 245 tinuous line along the right bank of Lookout Creek, with the reserves in the valleys, while his main force was encamped in the hollow, half-way up the slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson's Division, and these were comparatively safe, as the only means of access from the west, for a distance of twenty miles up the valley, was by two or three trails, admitting of the passage of but one man at a time, and even these trails were held at the top by rebel pickets. For this reason no direct attempt was made for the dislodg- ment of this force. On the Chattanooga side, which is less precipitous, a road of easy grade has been made, communicating with the summit by zig-zag lines running diagonally up the mountain-side ; and it was believed that before our troops should gain possession of this, the enemy on the top would evac- uate his position, to avoid being cut off from his main body, to rejoin which would involve a march of twenty or thirty miles. Viewed from whatever point, Lookout Mountain, with its high, palisaded crest and its steep, ragged, rocky, and deeply furrowed slopes, presented an imposing barrier to our advance, and when to these natural obstacles were added almost interminable well-planned and well-constructed de- fenses, held by Americans, the assault became an enterprise worthy of the ambition and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted." After various arrangements had been made of divisions and corps for the general assault, Hooker says : " The troops on the mountain rushed on in their advance, the right passing directly under the 246 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and bowlders, uphill and downhill, furi- ously driving the enemy from his camp, and from position after position. This lasted till twelve o'clock, when Geary's advance heroically rounded the peak of the mountain." The enemy were driven panic- stricken from their positions. The success was unin- terrupted and irresistible. Hooker again says : " It was now near two o'clock, and our operations were arrested by the darkness. The clouds, which had hovered over and enveloped the summit of the mountain during the morning, and to some extent favored our movements, gradually settled into the valley, and completely vailed it from our view. In- deed, from the moment we rounded the peak of the mountain, it was only from the roar of battle, and the occasional glimpse our comrades in the valley could catch of our lines and standards, that they knew of the strife in its progress ; and when, from these evidences, our true condition was revealed to them, their painful anxiety yielded to transports of joy, which only soldiers can feel in the earliest mo- ments of dawning victory." General Meigs described this assault as " Hooker's battle above the clouds," and it had all the elements of poetic grandeur. The clouds were seen far below, while, from the summit of that hoary mountain, the deep boom of cannon came, and occasionally the red flash of its fire could be seen from below ; and then the clouds, bursting away, disclosed to their friends below the heroes of Lookout Mountain. As the night came on, the falling fire of musketry could be THE ENEMY'S CONDITION HOPELESS. 247 heard, and away in the valley below, those on the mountain could behold the camp-fires of the hostile armies stretching far away. This movement was decisive of all the coming operations. Bragg did not underrate it, although he was in hopes to defend successfully what he deemed the almost impregnable position of Missionary Ridge. He says, in his report : " Arriving just before sunset, I found we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were im- mediately given for the ground to be disputed, till we could withdraw our forces across Chattanooga Creek, and the movement was commenced. This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces were concentrated on the Ridge, and extended to the right, to meet the movement in that direction." Any one can see that, with the command of Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, the en- emy's positions on Missionary Ridge must be event- ually turned, (as they really were,) and finally fall. There might be hard fighting and much loss, but Missionary Ridge must fall. And, beyond doubt, it was the conviction of this fact which caused the moral defection of the rebel army, of which trie rebel writers from the field all complain. They said, the veteran troops of Bragg did not fight as well as usual. From Missionary Ridge, looking upon Look- out Mountain, they could see clearly enough the hopelessness of their condition. And yet Bragg hoped on, and wondered why his troops faltered. But still the battle is to be fought, and we must return to Missionary Ridge. 248 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The position of our army on the morning of the 25th of November has been very well described by Colonel Badeau, and I extract it fr,om his "Military History:" " The morning of the 25th of November broke raw and cold, but the sun shone brilliantly from a cloudless sky, and the great battle-field was all dis- closed. To the north and east was the railroad junc- tion of Chattanooga, which gave the position so much of its value ; the roads by which Grant sought communication with Burnside, and those along which the rebel general was drawing his supplies. Behind the National forces, the impetuous river made its tortuous way, never for a mile pursuing the same course ; while the Cumberland Mountains and Wal- den's Ridge formed the massive background. Grant's main line faced south and east, toward Missionary Ridge, now not a mile away. Lookout Mountain, on the National right, bounded the view, Hooker march- ing down its sides, and through the valley of Chat- tanooga Creek, to Rossville Gap. Sherman had gained the extreme left of the Ridge, but immense difficulties in his front were yet to overcome ; and, all along the crest were the batteries and trenches, filled with rebel soldiers, in front of the Army of the Cumberland. Bragg's head-quarters were plainly visible, on the Ridge, at the center of his now con- tracted line, while Grant's own position was on the knoll that had been wrested from the rebels the clay before. From this point the whole battle-field was displayed ; trees, houses, fences, all landmarks in the valley had been swept away for camps." SHERMAN MO VING. 249 Grant, Thomas, and the Division officers of the Army of the Cumberland stood on Orchard Knoll, surveying the field, and ready for the combat. On the east side of Missionary Ridge the two Chicka- maugas (North and South) ran. As the north end of the Ridge was the main point to be attacked, Grant had assembled there pontoon bridges, and a steam- boat, to transport men and artillery, ready for Sher- man's attack. Grant, in his official report, describes this operation thus : ' " On the night of the 23d of November, Sher- man, with three divisions of his army, strengthened by Davis's Division of Thomas's Corps, which had been stationed along the north bank of the river, convenient to where the crossing was to be effected, was ready for operations. At an hour sufficiently early to secure the south bank of the river, just below the mouth of South Chickamauga, by dawn of day, the pontoons in the North Chickamauga were loaded with thirty armed men each, who floated quietly past the enemy's pickets, landed, and cap- tured all but one of the guard, twenty in number, before the enemy was aware of the presence of a foe. The steamboat Dunbar, with a barge in tow, after having finished ferrying across the river the horses procured from Sherman, with which to move Thomas's artillery, was sent up from Chattanooga to aid in crossing artillery and troops ; and by daylight of the morning of the 24th of November, eight thousand men were on the south side of the Ten- nessee, and fortified in rifle-trenches. 1 Grant's Official Report, dated December 23, 1863. 250 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. "By twelve o'clock, M., the pontoon bridges across the Tennessee and the Chickamauga were laid, and the remainder of Sherman's forces crossed over, and at half-past three, P. M., the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, to near the railroad tunnel, was in Sherman's possession. During the night he fortified the position thus secured, making it equal, if not superior, in strength to that held by the enemy." It was the 25th when the brilliant sun and cloudless sky looked down on the great battle of Missionary Ridge. Sherman's charge was on the front of and up Missionary Ridge. Bragg saw the danger, and charged heavily upon him, committing the error of weakening his center to strengthen his left. Grant, who stood on Orchard Knoll, saw the weak place, and at once threw in Thomas, with four divisions, among which were Sheridan and Baird. It was decisive, and henceforward the enemy, broken and dispirited, had no more to do than to make the best of their retreat. Here I leave the scene to be described by Mr. Furay, the able and interesting correspondent of the " Cincinnati Gazette." After describing the charge of Granger and Palmer, Wood and Sheridan, (of Thomas's Corps,) he says : "Here, according to original orders, our lines should have halted ; but the men were no longer con- trollable. Baird had carried the rifle-pits in front of his position, and the shout of triumph, rousing the blood to a very frenzy of enthusiasm, rang all along BA TTLE OF MISSIONAR T RID GE. 2 5 I the line. Cheering each other forward, the three divisions began to climb the ridge, 1 A fiery mass Of living valor rolling on the foe ! 7 "The whole Ridge blazed with artillery. Direct, plunging, and cross-fire, from a hundred pieces of cannon, was hurled upon that glorious band of he- roes scaling the Ridge, and when they were half-way up, a storm of musket-balls was flung into their very faces. In reply to the rebel cannon upon the Ridge, Fort Wood, Fort Negley, and all our batteries that could be placed in position, opened their sublime music. "The storm of war was now abroad with super- natural power, and as each successive volley burst from the cloud of smoke which overspread the con- tending hosts, it seemed that ten thousand mighty echoes wakened from their slumbers, went groaning and growling around the mountains, as if resolved to shake them from their bases, then rolled away down the valleys, growing fainter and fainter, till ex- tinguished by echoes of succeeding volleys, as the distant roar of the cataract is drowned in the nearer thunders of the cloud. "And still the Union troops pressed on, scaling unwaveringly the sides of Missionary Ridge. The blood of their comrades renders their footsteps slip- pery ; the toil of the ascent almost takes away their breath; the rebel musketry and artillery mow down their thinned ranks; but still they press on! Not once do they even seem to waver. The color-bearers press ahead, and plant their flags far in advance of 252 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. the troops ; and at last, moment of supremest triumph! they reach the crest, and rush like an avalanche upon the astonished foe. Whole regiments throw down their arms and surrender, the rebel artil- lerists are bayoneted by their guns, and the cannon, which had a moment before been thundering on the Union ranks, are now turned about, pouring death and terror into the midst of the mass of miserable fugitives who are rushing down the eastern slope of the Ridge. "Almost simultaneously with this immortal charge Hooker threw his forces through a gap in the ridge upon the Rossville road, and hurled them upon the left flank of the enemy, while Johnston charged this portion of their line in front. Already demoralized by the spectacle upon their right, they offered but a feeble resistance, were captured by hundreds, or ran away like frightened sheep." Such was the battle of Chattanooga, well planned, well fought, and entirely decisive in its results. Bragg had to fall back at once to Dalton, (Georgia,) and never again advanced to the front. The tide of war had ebbed back upon the rebels, and all that remained was to fight with the desperation of a dying gladiator. The drama might have, and did have, some other scenes, but they were all tending, as if drawn by the Omnipotent hand of Providence, toward one complete, perfect, and final catastrophe. No tragedy, drawn out by the highest skill of poetic art, could be more per- fectly directed toward an inevitable end than had been the campaigns of Grant, from the time he assumed command at Cairo, till the victory of Chattanooga. REBEL VIEW OF OUR VICTOR T. 253 The true view of Chattanooga and its results was taken by the rebels as quickly as by ourselves. The "Richmond Dispatch" contained an interesting letter from the battle-ground, written at Chickamauga, No- vember 25th, midnight, from which I take the follow- ing paragraphs : " The Confederates have sustained to-day the most ignominious defeat of the whole war — a defeat for which there is but little excuse or palliation. For the first time during our struggle for National inde- pendence, our defeat is chargeable to the troops them- selves, and not to the blunders or incompetency of their leaders. It is difficult to realize how a defeat so complete could have occurred on ground so favorable, notwithstanding the great disparity in the forces of the two hostile armies "The day was lost. Hardee still maintained his ground ; but no success of the right wing could re- store the left to its original position. All men — even the bravest — are subject to error and confusion ; but to-day some of the Confederates did not fight with their accustomed courage. Possibly the contrast be- tween the heavy masses of the Federals, as they rolled across the valley and up the mountain ridge, and their own long and attenuated line, was not of a character to encourage them." Certainly not. A Spartan would have fought just the same against any odds. But an American is not a Spartan, and has a moral and an intellectual sense, which enables him quickly to perceive and weigh results. The rebel soldiers saw and knew well the consequences of Hooker's march down the sides of 254 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Lookout Mountain upon Rossville, and folding up, as he moved, their whole rear guard. The time for re- treat had come, and the sun of that rebel army set forever ! It is now necessary for us to take a glance at Burnside. Grant, Halleck, and Lincoln had all been in anxiety about him. Halleck could get no peace of mind, and the burden of his dispatches to Grant was — Burnside. He scarcely overrated the import- ance of a disaster there ; but, in fact, Burnside was in a better condition than he was supposed to be. As I have said, he found plenty of beef, and had mills to grind flour. But at length he was shut up in Knoxville, and when there, was reduced to half rations. Longstreet had been, as happened to our forces at Chattanooga, delayed. On the 14th of November, Burnside was between Knoxville, Kings- ton, and London. On the 15 th, he withdrew from London, slowly, toward Knoxville, with the view of drawing Longstreet on, for, at this time, Long- street had not got up to him. The rebel commander crossed the Tennessee at London, and came up with our men at Campbell's Station, south of Knoxville, where there was a smart fight, and Burnside fell back to Knoxville ; but Longstreet did not immedi- ately follow, and Burnside went to work with great vigor and skill in fortifying, and getting troops and provisions. In all this he succeeded very well, and on the 20th of November he considered the line of defenses perfectly secure. He availed himself of all possible fortifications, from creeks turned into ditches, abatis, and wire-works, up to regular forts. The ^2c%<>. ^U/'/./'/^k 256 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT principal of these was Fort Sanders, on the north- west of the town, which was a commanding position. He had a pontoon bridge over the Holston, which facilitated his operations, and which the rebels tried vainly to break with a floating raft. For some reason, not apparent, Longstreet lost his usual sagacity and energy, engaging himself in establishing his own lines, reconnoissances, and skirmishes. It got to be the 27th of November, two days after the battle of Chattanooga, when Buckner (detached from Bragg most foolishly) reached him, with two brigades. Longstreet, however, began to hear of Bragg's defeat, and heroically resolved on an assault. Accordingly, on the 29th, he stormed Fort Sanders, which was very strong, having a deep ditch and high parapet. The assault was most furious, and the rebels fought with desperate valor, but in vain. In attempting to cross the ditch and carry the parapets, they lost heavily, and the garrison but little. Longstreet then received a dispatch from the rebel President, stating that Bragg was defeated, and he should withdraw to his assistance. Longstreet, however, continued the siege, in hopes of withdrawing a large body from Grant, which he did ; for Grant, like Halleck, was very anxious about Burnside, and, after the battle of Chattanooga, sent Sherman with a large force to his relief. Foster was also coming to him from the north side, and Grant was in some hope of disorgan- izing or capturing Longstreet. But he heard of this plan, and, on the 3d of December, put his troops in motion, crossed the Holston at Strawberry, and transferred his army to the east side, unmolested by END OF THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE. 257 Burnside. On the 5th, Sherman had arrived near enough to communicate with Burnside. This ended the siege of Knoxville, and for the present the cam- paign in the West. The grand concentration of forces in the American Switzerland had not been in vain. The rebel armies had been most signally de- feated, Burnside's force saved from what seemed in- evitable disaster, and, far more important than either, Chattanooga and its mountain defenses made the point (Tapptii — the strategic base of future move- ments, which should conquer and sever from the rebel Confederacy all the broad fields of the South- West. The hour of destiny was near at hand, and the news from Chattanooga came like the music of glori- ous song to the hearts of the people. " Widows weeping by their firesides, loyal hearts despondent grown, Smile to hear their country's triumph from the gate of heaven blown, And the patriot poor shall wonder, in their simple hearts to know, In the land above the thunder their embattled champions go." 22 258 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. CHAPTER XI. PREPARATION. GRANT'S PERSONAL CONDUCT — HIS PRESENCE IN BATTLE — REJOICINGS OF THE PEOPLE — HONORS TO GRANT — DINNER AT ST. LOUIS — HIS CIGAR-CASE — PLANS FOR THE FUTURE — SHERMAN'S RAID ON MERIDIAN — RESULTS — AN INCIDENT — REBEL BOASTS — GRANT MADE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL — GIVEN COMMAND OF ALL FORCES — TAKES COMMAND, AND MAKES A NEW PLAN. IS it a law of our nature that the more conspicuous, useful, or successful any man may become, he is, therefore, the more to be assailed by the shafts of envy and malignity ? It seems so, and history seems scarcely to have found an exception. 1 But even if this must be, it seems almost incredible that the defamer should select points of attack which to people of com- mon-sense must appear almost impossible ; yet, while I write these pages, various incredible charges are made against Grant. It is not at all necessary to exhibit him as a very extraordinary man in order to defend him against them. It is only necessary to show that he does not fall behind other people in the common qualities of human nature. One of these charges I will notice here, because he had now arrived at the 1 At this distance of time we may suppose Washington to have been an exception ; but he was not. He was libeled severely by those whom his success had injured, and whose schemes he had disappointed. GRANT'S PERSONAL CONDUCT. 259 hight of military fame ; and, one would think, to acquire that required some courage in conduct, cool- ness in command, and self-possession of mind. These are qualities which Grant actually has in a high de- gree ; and yet he has been represented as not ex- posing himself to danger, and intoxicated on the field of battle! I feel ashamed to notice such things, and should be ashamed to notice them if they were said of General Lee. But some truth on this subject ought to be told. I have already related that Grant stood with General Smith in the terrible assault on the enemy's right at Donelson. I have traced him through the day at Shiloh, from sunrise at Savannah, through the whole field of battle, to sunset ; leading Ammen's Brigade to the defense of the batteries ; sleeping till midnight, in the rain, at the foot of a tree; and I have also shown him standing with Thomas on Orchard Knob, at Chattanooga. This is enough ; but I find, in Professor Coppee's " Grant and his Campaigns," the statement of a staff officer, which is conclusive on this subject. It should be remem- bered that a general commanding ought not, except in urgent cases, to lead troops himself ; for the loss of a commander may occasion the loss of an army, as Sidney Johnston's death at Shiloh did very much to derange, and ultimately defeat, Beauregard's army. I quote here the staff officer's evidence. It was written of the battle of Chattanooga : " It has been a matter of universal wonder in this army that General Grant himself was not killed, and that no more accidents occurred to his staff; for the General was always in the front, (his staff with him, 260 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. of course,) and perfectly heedless of the storm of hiss- ing* bullets and screaming shell flying around him. His apparent want of sensibility does not arise from heedlessness, heartlessness, or vain military affectation, but from a sense of the responsibility resting upon him when in battle. When at Ringgold we rode for halt a mile in the face of the enemy, under an inces- sant fire of cannon and musketry ; nor did we ride fast, but upon an ordinary trot ; and not once do I believe did it enter the General's mind that he was in danger. I was by his side, and watched him closely. In riding that distance we were going to the front, and I could see that he was studying the positions of the two armies ; and, of course, planning how to defeat the enemy, who was here making a most despe- rate stand, and was slaughtering our men fearfully." After this no more need be said of Grant's per- sonal conduct in battle. The part of a great general is not to be a cavalier of romantic gallantry, but to be the skillful and prudent commander, to whom is committed the lives of an army and the interests of a country. Grant had now reached the culmination of his military success; for, even though greater battles might be fought, the rebellion ended, the Govern- ment restored, and a new career opened to him, it was improbable that greater campaigns, or occasion for more successful strategy, would ever come to him than those of Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Accord- ingly the rejoicings of the people, and the honors bestowed by the Government, could scarcely be ex- ceeded. Illumination lit up the cities, salutes were HONORS TO GRANT. 26 1 fired, and, on the 7th of December, the President issued Ris Proclamation for a general thanksgiving to God "for this great advancement for the National cause." The next day he sent to Grant the following brief and characteristic dispatch, which Grant em- bodied in orders to the army: "Washington, Decembers, 1863. "Major-General Grant: " Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks — my profoundest gratitude — for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all ! "A. Lincoln." December 17th, a joint resolution of thanks to Grant, and to the officers and soldiers of both armies, passed both Houses of Congress, which also directed that a gold medal, with suitable emblems and de- vices, 1 be struck and presented to Major-General Grant. Professor Copp6e makes the following enu- meration of the honors conferred upon him: 2 " Learned, religious, temperance societies elected him honorary or life member. Cigars, revolvers, and gifts of various kinds were showered upon him. To none of which does he revert with so much pleasure as to a brier-wood cigar-case, made with a pocket- knife by a poor soldier, and presented to him with feelings of veneration and regard, but with no desire for any return. The Legislatures of Ohio and New 1 On one side was the profile of Grant, surrounded by a wreath of laurels, with his name, the year 1863, and a galaxy of stars. On the reverse, a figure of Fame, with a trump and a scroll, bearing the names of his victories. The motto was : " Proclaim Liberty throughout the Land." 2 "Grant and His Campaigns," page 250. 262 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. York voted him thanks. Mothers call their children after him, and a large generation of little U. S.'s and Grants date their birthdays at this time.". In the mean time, Grant made a tour to Knox- ville, and a general inspection of his troops and posts. This led him to a very curious journey, which was a visit to Cumberland Gap, and thence to Louisville, on horseback, in mid-winter. This was so severe a route that he had to walk in some places. On the nth he was in Louisville, and on the 13th in Nash- ville, ordering on immense bodies of stores for the depot at Chattanooga, in readiness for the future grand movement from that point. Thence he quickly returned to Chattanooga. Soon after, one of his sons being dangerously ill at St. Louis, he went there and spent a few days among old friends. He had lived there in former years. No sooner was " U. S. Grant, Chattanooga," plainly written on the hotel book than St. Louis went into general commotion. The news flew, and speedily an assembly of gentlemen got together at short notice, invited him to a public din- ner, and, rather strangely for him, it was accepted for the 29th of January, 1864. He had been an almost unknown citizen there, at one time engaged in selling wood from his farm, and it is not surpris- ing that he was willing to receive honor from a peo- ple among whom he had lived obscure, now that he was risen to fame and prosperity. He was received by two hundred gentlemen, at the Lindell Hotel, and after a complimentary toast, returned the briefest possible thanks. The common Council of St. Louis presented their thanks in glowing terms ; he was EXPEDITION TO MERIDIAN PLANNED. 263 serenaded at night, and the crowd gathered round his door to see the extraordinary man, who, at St. Louis, nobody guessed to be a hero, but who had now become renowned. To all these demonstrations, Grant is said to have exhibited the philosophy of the inveterate smoker — who takes refuge from calamities in the exhaustless resources of a cigar-case — and resolutely smoked away! We must now return for a moment to Grant's view of the future campaign, and his arrangements for some great and important raids. In the middle of January he had written to Halleck, that he looked upon the next line to be taken to be that from Chat- tanooga to Mobile, Montgomery and Atlanta being the important intermediate points. 1 He then pro- posed to establish large supplies on the Tennessee River, so as to be independent of the railroads. This is a general idea of what was actually done by Sher- man. In order to do this, he had planned an expe- dition by Sherman to Meridian, on the east side of the State of Mississippi, which was not understood by the general public, and was very much misunder- stood by the rebels, till they subsequently felt the effects of it. Grant had found that the interior of Mississippi and Alabama was full of food and provi- sions, and he knew that the railroads running through the sea-board States in the South, carried thence sup- plies, in any quantity, to the rebel armies. Hence, in operating from the line of the Mississippi, one of the 1 It is plain that the march from Atlanta (which was to be a com- mon point) to Mobile was by no means as good a plan as that which was performed by Sherman to Savannah. 264 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. advantages would be to cut off and destroy the sup- plies and railroads of the South-West. As early as December 11th, he wrote to McPherson, in command at Vicksburg : " I shall start a cavalry force through Mississippi in about two weeks, to clear out the State entirely of all rebels." And on the 23d, he wrote Halleck that he was collecting a large cavalry force at Savannah, to cross the Tennessee, clear out For- rest, and destroy, as far as possible, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. It is very obvious, no permanent occupation was intended by such a force ; and when, subsequently, the rebels rejoiced at what they sup- posed the compulsory return from Meridian, and dis- appointment of Sherman, they were very much mis- taken in the object, and in what was really done, as we shall soon see. Sherman set out from Vicksburg on February the 3d, reached Jackson, February the 6th, and ar- rived at Meridian on the 14th. In the mean time, however, Smith, with seven thousand cavalry, had set out from Memphis, to cooperate with Sherman, but, in consequence of delays and difficulties, did not meet him. Sherman, however, remained a week at Meridian, and, as he said, " made the most complete destruction of the railroads ever beheld — south below Quitman, east to Cuba Station, twenty miles north to Lauderdale Springs, and west all the way back to Jackson." ' He thus sums up the destruction made by his own and Smith's raids — and it is certainly enough to make a perfect success in the objects proposed : " The general result of the expedition, including ' Sherman's dispatch, February 27, 1864. AN INCIDENT OF THE WAR. 265 Smith's and the Yazoo River movements, are about as follows: One hundred and fifty miles of railroad, sixty-seven bridges, seven thousand feet of trestle, twenty locomotives, twenty-eight cars, ten thousand bales of cotton, several steam-mills, and over two million bushels of corn were destroyed. The rail- road destruction is complete and thorough. The capture of prisoners exceeds all loss. Upward of eight thousand contrabands and refugees came in with various columns." This was really the greatest "raid" of the war, and the stories and incidents told of it were in- numerable. The following is told of the Mayor of Brandon : " Before I had dismounted I was somewhat amused, and a little sorry, for a venerable-looking Southern gentleman, who came riding with great dignity into our camp on a very fine horse. He had scarcely got into the yard when three cavalrymen rode up to him and demanded his horse ; he refused at first, but finally succumbed, dismounted, and one of the soldiers got off an old, poor, jaded-looking animal, handed the venerable gentleman the reins, mounted the old fellow's blooded steed, and all three rode off in a hurry. Seeing the old gentleman looking rather dis- tressed, I rode up and asked, ' What 's the matter, neighbor?' 'Why, sir,' he answered, 'I am the Mayor of the town ; I came here in search of General McPherson, to make some arrangement by which we could be protected, and they have -taken my horse from me.' ' Bad enough,' we replied ; ' these Yan- kees are terrible fellows, and you had better watch 23 266 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. very closely, or they will steal your town before morning.' As he turned and rode away on his poor, old, worn-out cavalry-horse, looking like the personi- fication of grief, seated on a very badly carved monu- ment of the equine race, we thought it about the best instance of stealing a horse and selling a mare (mayor) on record, and was worthy of being kept among the archives of the Southern Confederacy." ' In this expedition Sherman had subsisted the army a month on the country, and done incalculable mischief; yet the rebels had so utterly misconceived its o*bject, and knew so little of the real results, that, on the retreat of Sherman, they boasted of great suc- cess ! Nothing could be more ridiculous, or illustrate more forcibly the actual condition of the rebels at that time than the Order 2 issued by Lieutenant-Gen- eral Leonidas Polk. He talked of our defeat and rout, and losses of men, arms, and artillery ! This General Polk had been a Bishop of the Episcopal Church, but having graduated at West Point, thought himself justified in exchanging his ecclesiastical robes for the epaulets of a general. It is to be hoped that in the judgment of Heaven he was found better qualified for the first than the last, and that the mantle which covers a multitude of sins may be broad enough to cover his in the cause of secession. The winter had now passed away, and there was no more campaigning for Grant till the opening of that grand campaign which terminated the war by the surrender at Appomattox Court-House. 1 F. McC, Sixteenth Iowa Volunteers. 2 Order No. 22, issued from Demopolis, (Ala.,) February 26th. GRANT APPOINTED LIEUT.- GENERAL. 267 We have now arrived at an altogether new stage in Grant's career. He had heretofore acted a first part in results, but a second part in command. The time had come when the Government felt that, if Grant could perform a first part in the field, it was well to give him a choice of positions and the direc- tion of operations. Accordingly, on the 26th of February, the very time Sherman returned to Vicks- burg, and terminated the last of Grant's minor cam- paigns, Congress passed an act creating (or rather reviving) the office of Lieutenant-General, and author- izing the President to put the person appointed in command of the armies of the United States. This office had existed, and still existed, in the person of Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott. 1 It was originally created for General Washington, who commanded the army in 1798, when war with France was threatened. It was conferred also on Scott, who still survived, but was retired from active service. In regard to the grades of generals, the rebel government was wiser than ours, for it had created two new grades, those of General and Lieutenant-General. The commander of an army ought to be simply General, and if we had Lieutenant-Generals, they would be the commanders of corps. On the creation of the grade of Lieutenant- General, Lincoln immediately appointed Grant, who was confirmed by the Senate, on the 2d of March, 1864. Halleck immediately telegraphed Grant to come to Washington, where, on the 8th of March, 1 General Scott was on the retired list, and was Lieutenant-General by brevet. 268 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. he arrived at Willard's Hotel, almost unknown to any one present, as that city had by no means been a fashionable resort with him. That renowned place is thronged much more by those who want to do with- out work than by those who, like Grant, are hard workers in the service of their country. Grant had come to Washington, but had nothing to ask before he came, and nothing to seek after he arrived. Mr. Washburn, the representative of the Galena District in Congress, makes the following statement, as remarkable as it is honorable. Speak- ing of Grant, he says : "No man, with his consent, has ever mentioned his name in connection with any position. I say what I know to be true, when I allege that every promotion he has received since he first entered the service to put down this rebellion, was moved without his knowl- edge or consent. And in regard to this very matter of Lieutenant-General, after the bill was introduced and his name mentioned in connection therewith, he wrote me, and admonished me that he had been highly honored already by the Government, and did not ash or deserve any thing more in the shape of honors or pro- motion; and that a success over the enemy was what he craved above every tiling else; that he only desired to hold such an influence over those tinder his com- mand as to use them to the best advantage to secure that end!' No Roman triumphal procession awaited Grant at Washington ; for, except what Grant himself had done in his successful campaigns, there was noth- ing to triumph over. The whole line of the rebel PRESENTED WITH HIS COMMISSION. 269 defense, east of the Alleghanies, remained intact. Lee was encamped on the Rapidan, as calm and auda- cious as ever. The Shenandoah Valley remained in possession of the rebels. The South-Western Valley, down nearly to Knoxville, was theirs also. Their great defenses at Mobile, Charleston, and Wilmington were still theirs. In fine, notwithstanding the rebels had lost the Mississippi and Chattanooga, the Govern- ment at Washington, looking over its fruitless and yet destructive campaigns on the Potomac, felt a sort of mournful joy instead of a hopeful confidence. Hence there was no ecstasy on the appearance of Grant. The Americans are neither Romans nor Frenchmen ; so, when Lee looked at them from the Rapidan, with a bold and taunting defiance, and had looked at them so for three long years, they got up no triumphal procession, as Romans or Frenchmen might have done, even for the victories of Grant. But Lincoln quietly presented him with his com- mission : " General Grant, — The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great strug- gle, are such that you are now presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant-General in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding re- sponsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." 2/0 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The words of General Grant are few and far between ; but now he did reply briefly : "Mr. President, — I aceept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men." On the ioth of March, an order assigned the new Lieutenant-General to the command of all the armies of the United States. To understand the prompt manner in which things were done, and the readiness with which Grant put himself to the work, I transcribe his first order : " Head-Quarters of the Armies of the United States, ) "Nashville, Term., March 17, 1864. ) " In pursuance of the following order of the President : "'Executive Mansion, Washington, March 10, 1864. "'Under the authority of the act of Congress to appoint to the grade of Lieu- tenant-General in the army, of March 1, 1S64, Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, United States Army, is appointed to the command of the armies of the United States. "'Abraham Lincoln.' I assume command of the armies of the United States. Head-quarters will be in the field, and, till further orders, will be with the Army of the Potomac. There will be an office head-quarters in Washington, to which all official communications will be sent, except those from the army where the head-quarters are at the date of their address. " U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." "Head-quarters will be in the field? That is the first announcement, and it was a joy to hear it ; for certain it was that the atmosphere of Washington was exceedingly uncongenial to genius in war. Stan- HEAD-QUARTERS IN THE FIELD. 27 T ton was energetic ; Lincoln had the fervor of warlike patriotism ; but there was one dark phantom rose to their minds, and was drawn like a pall over the faces of the generals — fear for Washington! In a moral and political sense, this was just. For a long period of the war we had a difficult task to prevent the in- terference of England and France ; and, undoubtedly, if Washington was taken by the rebels, (although of little importance in a military point of view,) it would have a disastrous moral and political effect. But now Grant has a new scheme of tactics. He will defend Washington in the field. Head-quarters in the field — that means hard fighting; it means continuous and fearful blows ; and if the enemy can not meet them, they will be smashed ; that is all of it, and there is no more to be thought of. But these blows are not to fall only on Lee's Virginia Army; they are to fall at all points where there is an enemy's army, or forti- fication. We had come to the time when we really had greatly superior forces, and the great point of generalship was to make superior forces available. Grant set about it in the true way. First, we must oppose superior armies to the enemy's armies; and, secondly, we must organize cooperative armies against their fortresses and commercial points ; so that while our armies were breaking up their armies, our coop- erative forces should cut off or destroy all the re- sources by which new armies might be formed. While we had strong enough armies in the field, we should also attack other important points ; so that when the final blow was struck, every thing would be ended. This is the task Grant now set himself to 272 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. perform ; and as we trace his career on the broad theater of events, we must recollect that he is now to be responsible for the whole conduct of the war, and not for single armies or departments. It had become obvious to all minds that we must have some general and unitized plan ; and this could only be done with one commander. I have already said there is no evi- dence that, up to this time, the Government had any general plan of the war. No general in one depart- ment could form one, and there is no evidence that any was ever formed at Washington. This is a re- markable feature of the war, and one which military critics should hereafter carefully consider. It was certainly by no means creditable to the statesman- ship of the country. ARMY OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 273 CHAPTER XII. THE WILDERNESS. THE GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN — ORGANIZATION OF THE GRAND ARMY — LEE'S POSITION — HUNDRED DAYS' MEN — OFFER OF THE GOVERNORS — MEADE'S ADDRESS — GRAND ARMY CROSSES THE RAPIDAN — THE WILDERNESS — LINE OF BATTLE — TWO DAYS' FIGHT IN THE WILDERNESS — LEE'S DISPATCHES — CAN NOT SUCCEED, AND MARCHES BY THE RIGHT FLANK — GRANT'S GENERALSHIP — HIS POSITION IN THE BATTLE. •' Down by the rushing Rapidan, hark ! how the muskets crack ! The battle-smoke rolls up so thick, the very heavens are black ! No blossom-scented winds are there, no drops of silver rain ; The air is thick with sulphurous heat, and filled with moans of pain, O ! let us not forget them — our brave, unselfish boys — Who have given up their loved ones, their happy household joys, And stand to-night in rank and file, determined to a man, To triumph over treason, down by the Rapidan ! And let our hearts be hopeful ; our faith, unwavering, strong ; Right must be all victorious when battling with the Wrong. Let us bear up our heroes' hands ! Pray, every soul that can, ' God bless our boys who fight to-night, down by the Rapidan !' " l THE war clouds were now gathering from every point of the horizon ; but most they gathered round the army on the Rappahannock. This army lay, during the winter, near the Rapidan, and was commanded by General George Gordon Meade — an 1 " Rebellion Record," Vol. VIII— last page. 274 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. officer to whom the country owes a profound debt of gratitude, not only for the greatest successes, but for the most constant, earnest, and devoted services to his country. Grant, with good sense and sound judg- ment, left him in the immediate command of the grand army in its march on Richmond. A knowl- edge of men, and especially of military men, is one of Grant's characteristics, and we shall see that his selections for the staff of the army were admirable ; but we have not got quite to that point. We must first take a glance at the general situation, in order to see where the enemy are, what we have done, and what we mean to do. What was beyond the Mississippi — the rebel army under Kirby Smith, and the Union army under Banks, we may disregard ; for neither of them had any important bearing on the war. If Banks had been entirely successful in Louisiana, by capturing Shreveport, it would have been of no practical use to us ; and, to the rebels, their armies in Louisiana and Texas were entirely useless. The points in the rebel defenses we were to reach were these : The armies of Lee, in Virginia, of Johnston, in Georgia, and the cities of Mobile, Wilmington, Savannah, and Charles- ton, together with the supplies in the South-West and the Shenandoah Valley. Having these objects before us, it is easy to comprehend the general scheme of Grant's campaign. It was, i. To find and crush the rebel armies. Lee's Army of Virginia was to be attacked, and crushed by as many blows as might be necessary, by the army of General Meade, with which Grant went himself. Johnston's army was GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. 27$ to be crushed in the same way by Sherman, whose troops and supplies were now collecting at Chatta- nooga, and who, when arrived at Atlanta, was to move against Mobile, Savannah, or Augusta, as seemed most judicious to the commander. 2. The ports of Wil- mington, Charleston, etc., were to be attacked by sub- sidiary forces ; and, in fine, by attacks on the interior of the rebel States, all their forces were to be em- ployed in such a manner that no reinforcements could be spared to Lee and Johnston. 3. The Shenandoah Valley was to be occupied, so that the supplies Lee's army was constantly drawing from thence should be cut off. In addition to these general plans there were certain auxiliary expeditions to be made. Early in April, Grant had informed Butler of the plan of the campaign, and directed him to move on to the south side of the James, seize City Point, and close on Rich- mond, as far as he could, with the view to cooperate with Grant, when he should drive back Lee, and finally unite with him on the south side of the James. A large expedition, under General Crook, was also to move for the Kanawha, in order to cut communi- cations in the Valley of Virginia. General Sigel also had a Corps in the Shenandoah Valley. All these movements come, when we consider them together, to two points: 1st. To destroy the enemy's armies; and, 2d, by lateral movements, to prevent the possi- bility of reenforcing and supplying them. I shall now confine myself to the army of Grant in the march on Richmond, and to the part he performed. It must be left to other writers, in other times, to present a com- plete and critical history of the grand transactions, 276 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. military and civil, which terminated the war of the rebellion. In the conflict with Lee — so fierce, bloody, and protracted — upon which Grant was now about to enter, the first thing we must notice is the strength and the organization of the forces. I shall not relate the military details of the campaign, for they would only confuse the unmilitary reader, and are unneces- sary to a correct view of Grant's acts, character, or generalship. It is, however, necessary for us to dis- tinguish between the several Corps of the Army, their line of march, and principal actions, in order to see clearly the strategy which he adopted, and the degree of its success. The Army of the Potomac — I should say more properly the Army of Richmond — was reorganized, at the close of March, in the following manner : Second Corps, commanded by General Winfield Scott Hancock, of the infantry, who had exhibited great gallantry and good conduct in previous cam- paigns with the Army of the Potomac. This corps had four divisions, commanded by Barlow, Gibbon, Bisney, and Barr. Fifth Corps, commanded by Gouvernuer K. War- ren, originally an officer of engineers, promoted for his valor and skill. This corps also had four divi- sions, commanded by Wadsworth, Crawford, Robin- son, and Griffin. Sixth Corps, commanded by Major-General John Sedgwick, a very popular officer, originally of the artillery. This corps had three divisions, commanded by II. G. Wright, Getty, and Prince. ORGANIZATION OF THE GRAND ARMY. 277 The Cavalry Corps was commanded by General Philip H. Sheridan, originally an officer of regular infantry, and whose dashing qualities had made him distinguished at Chattanooga and various other points. The Park of Artillery was under the general direction of General Henry J. Hunt, and the immedi- ate command of Colonel H. S. Benton. The Engineer troops and pontoons were under the command of Major J. C. Duane, of the engineers. The Quarter-Master's Department was under the command of General Rufus Ingals. The Staff Officers were principally General John A. Rawlins, Chief; Colonel Bower, Adjutant- General ; Colonel Duff, Inspector-General ; Colonel Badeau, Secretary, with numerous aids, adjutants, quarter-masters, and inspectors. The Ninth Corps, commanded by General Am- brose E. Burnside, consisted chiefly of colored troops, and had been recruiting and drilling at Annapolis, but in the latter part of April was suddenly marched to join the Army of Meade, at Culpepper. The entire aggregate of available men in the Army of the Potomac on the 1st of May, 1864, was (120,384) one hundred and twenty thousand three hundred and eighty-four men, 1 the largest army which had ever been collected at one spot in the United States. It is said by some writers that Lee's Army, which lay near Orange Court-House, was but (52,000) fifty-two thousand men. This may have been the case in the winter, but was evidently incorrect at this period, for, in the next thirty days, Lee lost twenty thousand 1 Secretary of War's Report, November, 1865. 278 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. men, disabled in some way, and yet was able to fight a battle with Grant. History should not attempt to contradict probabilities. The fact was, Lee was con- tinually reenforced from the day the campaign opened till his communications with the South were mainly cut off, and the South, exhausted, refused to furnish men. We had a great superiority of forces, then numbering (in all quarters) 622,000 availables, 1 and the rebels (in all) over 350,00a 2 But to make this superiority available was the very thing in .which Grant's skill and administrative ability was to be exercised. It was for this he was made commander of the army, and in this he achieved the successes which terminated the war. Here we must note one of those outbursts of patriotism which signalized our arms at that time, and, in fact, made one of the glorious features in the conduct of the loyal people, and one of the most successful instruments in putting down the rebellion. We made many errors and blunders in our practical conduct of the war, but we made none of the heart. The heart of the loyal people beat fervently, warmly, heroically for their country. From first to last there was no faintness of the heart, no yielding of the mind, no cessation of hope and faith. Knowing this, and relying upon it, the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, 1 This is the number of availables on the Returns of the Army, May 1, 1864. 2 The rebel army was much underrated, but it was not all available to them. For example, we held at that time 88,000 prisoners; and there were 70,000 men under Kirby Smith and Taylor, which were entirely useless to them. Under Lee and Johnston, at Mobile, Charles- ton, Wilmington, etc., were about 200,000 men. HUNDRED DATS' MEN 279 Illinois, and Iowa offered the Government one hund- red thousand men for one hundred days, independ- ent of, and not to be counted in, any regular calls or drafts made by the President. The object of this was to supply the place of veterans sent to Grant's army, and taken from garrisons, posts, lines, etc., where the veterans had been employed. Many of the troops with Grant were raw troops, and it was very important not only that he should have enough men, but that he should have those experienced and inured to war. If Lee's army was inferior in num- bers, it was composed of veteran troops, who would not be easily vanquished, even with twice their num- bers of raw men. The tremendous magnitude of the campaign was well known to the patriotic Governors of the States, and the danger of relying wholly on raw troops equally obvious. To avoid this danger, the Governors of Western States offered to relieve thousands of veterans in posts and garrisons by vol- unteers from their States. Accordingly, a proposi- tion to furnish hundred days' men for this purpose was made by Governors Brough, of Ohio, Morton, of Indiana, Yates, of Illinois, and Stone, of Iowa, and was promptly accepted by President Lincoln. Ohio had at that time an enrolled militia, called the " Na- tional Guard," composed of nearly forty regiments. Governor Brough immediately called these into the field, and Ohio actually furnished the Government 36,- 000 of these men. The Governors of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa called for volunteers, and many thousands were furnished, though I have no account of the whole number. No more patriotic act was done 2 80 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. during the war than this of the hundred days' men. Many of them, like Putnam in the Revolution, left their plows in the field, and their wives to till the farm. These men went right to the front, and some of the regiments were engaged in battle, and suffered severely. Thus it was that Grant's army was filled up and moved on to its conquests — brave men in reserve, and self-sacrificing women at home. The march of armies and the crash of battle-fields I can relate, but where shall I find the pen to record these triumphs of the heart, these heroic emotions, which kindled souls with the love of country, and fired them with energy for successful achievement ? I must leave these scenes for the field down on the Rapidan. Head-quarters is in the field. The army is organized, and, on the 3d of May, General Meade issued a stirring address to the soldiers. A part of his address is worthy to be remembered : " Soldiers ! The eyes of the whole country are looking with anxious hope to the blow you are about to strike in the most sacred cause that ever called men to arms. Remember your homes, your wives, and children, and bear in mind that the sooner your enemies are overcome, the sooner you will be returned to enjoy the benefits and blessings of peace. Bear with patience the hardships and sacrifices you will be called upon to endure. Have confidence in your officers, and in each other. " Keep your ranks, on the march and on the battle-field, and let each man earnestly implore God's blessing, and endeavor by his thoughts and actions to render himself worthy of the favor he seeks. With THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 28 1 clear conscience and strong arms, actuated by a high sense of duty, righting to preserve the Government and the institutions handed down to us by our fore- fathers, if true to ourselves, victory, under God's bless- ing, must and will attend our efforts." The blessing of God did attend them ! For, though they were to march where McClellan had marched in vain — where Burnside had lost his thousands — and where Hooker, after a brilliant advance, had re- treated — where Lee had made his bold advances on the capital of the country — where, in every field, was buried the dead, and where thousands of his own number were soon again to wet with their blood those fatal fields — yet, with all this before them, they marched with the confidence of hope to the music of victory ! Grant was their leader, the country their supporter, and God, our all, was looking down upon them, and from the mid-heaven inspiring them with the smiles of His favor, and pointing to the unfading star of their glorious destiny! The Army of the Po- tomac was no more to be beaten — no more to re- treat — no more to despond! So rose the sun on the morning of the 3d upon the Army of the Potomac, which, by midnight, was to be crossing the Rapidan : M O ! let us not forget them — our brave, unselfish boys — Who have given up their loved ones, their happy household joys, And stand to-night in rank and file, determined to a man, To triumph over treason, down by the Rapidan !" Before we cross the river, let us take a glance at the position of the rebel army under Lee. Lee had been bivouacked all winter near Orange Court-House, 24 282 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. and had made an intrenched camp of nearly twenty miles in length, to cover the crossings of the Rapidan. His army, like Grant's, was divided into three main corps, commanded by Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet, with a Cavalry Corps, under the command of General J. E. B. Stuart. Lee's army lay on each side of Or- ange Court-House, on the left, (as we look north to the Rapidan,) to Gordonsville, near which Long- street's Corps lay, and on the right to Mine Run, (a creek emptying into the Rapidan,) about twelve miles from Orange Court-House. Stuart's Cavalry lay on the south side of the river, and Ewell and Hill's, in succession, after him. The general idea of Lee was to defend the line of the Rapidan, by in- trench ments extending from near the fords on the right, through and beyond Orange Court-House, in front of the Rapidan. It was, unquestionably, a well- chosen position ; but he could not guard the whole line, from Fredericksburg to the mountains, and, therefore, there must be an opportunity to cross the Rapidan, either to the right or to the left. Grant chose to Av/7/ Lee's army (if he could) by Lee's right — that is, between Lee and Fredericksburg. If he could not succeed fully in this, then he intended pushing him by his own left (Lee's right) flank, in the oblique movement, which, if Lee could not drive him back, would result in making Lee retreat on a curve, and carry Grant round him to the East, in a more extended curve, till Grant swung round Rich- mond on to the James. As this actually happened) it is well for us to note the plan in advance. The head-quarters of the army leaves Culpepper, ten miles "THE WILDERNESS." 283 north of the Rapidan, crosses that river, proceeds to Spottsylvania ; then eastwardly, crossing the Matta- pony ; then to the Pamunkey, at Hanover ; then to Mechanicsville ; then round Richmond to the James. An examination of any common map will show that this march was a curve, at first turning slowly, and then, at Richmond, narrowing more rapidly. It is very evident that if Grant could have beaten Lee in a great battle, Lee must have gone at once into Rich- mond, and been besieged, terminating the campaign much more speedily. On the other hand, if Lee could have beaten Grant, he would, of course, have arrested the campaign there, as it had been arrested in the case of Hooker and Burnside. But he could not do this, and the most he could do was to fight his way slowly back to Richmond. Let us see how he was driven back. To the right of Lee's defenses, at Mine Run, (looking north,) and about six miles from each other, were Germania and Ely's Fords, over the Rapidan. The road from Culpepper, through Stevensburg, led over Germania Ford ; east of that, a road branched off, through Richardsville, to Ely's Ford. These were the roads through which Grant's army passed the Rapidan. Nearly opposite these fords (south) was a singular district of country, called the "Wilderness." As this little district has become memorable, and might, with great propriety, be called " the dark and bloody ground," I give here a brief description of it, from the pen of Professor Coppee :" ' " The Wilderness is a broken table-land, covered over with dense undergrowth, with but few clearings, 1 " Grant and His Campaigns," page 288. 284 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. in which the rebels could conceal themselves, which proved a formidable obstacle to our advance. It was intersected by numerous cross roads, generally nar- row, and bounded on either side by a dense growth of low-limbed and scraggy pines, stiff and bristling chincapins and scrub oaks. The undergrowth was principally of hazel. There were many deep ravines, but not sufficiently precipitous to offer us much trouble on that account, the principal difficulty being in the almost impenetrable undergrowth, which would impede our advance in line of battle, and render the artillery almost useless. Besides the cross roads mentioned, numerous narrow wood roads pass through the Wilderness in all directions." Such was the " Wilderness," and in the midst of it stood the " Wilderness tavern," and to the right of that, some six miles toward Fredericksburg, was the now noted " Chancellorsville." At the Wilder- ness tavern two roads, the "plank road" and the u turnpike road " from Orange to Fredericksburg, in- tersected. It will be easy to find these localities on a tolerable map, and thus the movement of the sev- eral corps of our army will be understood. At night, on the 3d of May, two cavalry divi- sions moved down the roads from Culpepper (one on each) to Germania and Ely's Fords. They carried pontoon trains and engineers with them, laid the bridges, and a division of cavalry moved at once to the Wilderness tavern and Chancellorsville without opposition. Now the reader sees that the Wilder- ness tavern was an important strategic point, for there the two roads from Orange met, and thence CROSSING THE RAPID AN. 285 went a branch-road to Spottsylvania. It was Grant's intention and wish to gain the Wilderness roads, and secure them in advance of Lee. In that case, he would have turned Lee entirely, if not cut him off from Richmond ; but that he was not destined to do entirely, though enough of it to compel Lee to oblique, and pursue a curve to Richmond. The cavalry, as I said, secured the pontoons, and marched to the Wilderness without opposition. At three, A. M., the Second Corps (Hancock's) moved by Stevensburg and Richardsville to Ely's Ford. At the same time the Fifth Corps (Warren's) marched through Stevensburg to Germania Ford. This was closely followed by the Sixth Corps, (Sedgwick's.) During the day the whole army had crossed the Rapidan, the Second Corps encamping on the old battle-field of Chancellorsville, the Fifth at the Wil- derness tavern, and the Sixth from the tavern to Germania Ford. The Ninth Corps (Burnside's) did not cross, but followed to the Rapidan, and remained as a reserve. So far the movement was entirely suc- cessful, and if Lee continued on the defensive, his communications were likely to be cut off. This would not do, and he commenced a rapid movement to prevent it. Lee immediately left his position and intrenchments behind him, moving Ewell on the old turnpike and Hill on the plank road. 1 Our line was formed, it will be seen, on several miles, extending from Chancellorsville by the Wilderness tavern to the Orange road and Germania Ford. The attack really came from us ; for when Ewell came up on the 'Lee's dispatch, May 5, 1864. 286 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Orange turnpike, Warren (Fifth Corps) was ordered to halt and attack the enemy's front furiously, when he could find it, which he did at twelve o'clock (on the 5th.) Having got into line, he attacked Ewell with the divisions of Griffin and Wadsworth. At first, he drove back Ewell, but the Sixth Corps was not up in time, and the left of Warren was exposed, because Hancock had not got in from Chancellors- ville. Then Hill's Corps of the enemy came down on the plank road, and there was great danger for Warren, till Hancock's Corps came in and checked the enemy's attack. And so the battle went on in the afternoon of the 5 th, furious and bloody, on broken ground and thick undergrowth, where little artillery could be used, and where the enemy, know- ing the ground, had greatly the advantage. It was a bloody day, and two of the most signalized men of our army fell on that field — Wadsworth and Hays. What Lee thought of that day he very candidly expressed in his dispatch of the 5th. He says : " By the blessing of God, we maintained our position against every effort till night, when the combat closed. We have to mourn the loss of many brave officers and men." Maintained his position ! Yes, and had it been a contest for a battle-field, this would have been very well, but to do no more in the Wilderness was fatal. The very thing in question was, Whether we could cross the Rapidan and stay there? But we are not through. To-morrow is to be bloodier yet, and we shall see whether Lee can stand there. On the night of the 5th Grant saw clearly that the BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS, 287 great shock of the battle would be on Hancock, who, with the Second Corps, had come up from Chancel- lors ville to the Wilderness tavern, as he was ordered by Grant, not a minute too soon, for Hill was com- ing down on that vital point, and Longstreet follow- ing him. Still there was, on the day before, a gap there, through which the enemy at one time pene- trated, and, with desperate exertions, were driven back. Now we are, on the night of the 5th, pre- paring for the battle of the 6th. Grant had no idea of standing on the defensive. His word was, always, attack, attack! And attack it must be, at five o'clock in the morning. As I said, Hancock could not fill the whole space to Warren, and there Grant knew the storm was coming. So Burnside now crossed the river, and took post in the gap, between the Second and Fifth Corps, and between the plank road and the turnpike, which, as I have said, con- verged till they intersected at the Wilderness tavern. Getty's Division, of the Sixth Corps, and Wads- worth's, of the Fifth, were near the same place, to reen force and strengthen Hancock's right, for there was to be the struggle. Ewell was still in front of Warren and Sedgwick, and Longstreet had come up to the help of Hill. Hancock began, at five o'clock, with a furious attack on Hill, and drove him back in some confusion ; but just then Longstreet came up, with the best corps of Lee's army, and, driving Han- cock back, threatens the left of our army with being turned and driven back on the river. But Lee is no Sidney Johnston, nor is this the field of Shiloh. Lee, like Beauregard, is an engineer officer, and, by the 288 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. very element which makes him a good engineer, loses that tact in strategy, and that brilliancy of movement, which is necessary to the success of a great battle. This idea of pouring the strength of his army on Hancock's left is a good one ; but, after succeeding for a moment, he is successfully resisted by the very divisions (Wadsworth's and Getty's) which Grant had provided for that purpose. Wads- worth, a noble spirit, is killed, but the work is done, nobly done, and Hill is brought to a stand, as if by a rampart of rocks. Here the battle, for a time, stops. Like Beauregard, on the field of Shiloh, Lee takes time to think, and gather up his strength. This is good engineering, but bad tactics. At four o'clock he has massed his troops, and is ready again, and it is evident the main struggle is again to be with Han- cock. Grant, with the same accurate sagacity and true military discernment, had seen the whole of it, and threw in, at the weak point, between Hancock and Warren, a large part of Burnside's Ninth Corps, and thus was prepared. Hill and Longstreet came down, with heavy lines, and all their available men. They came as with the shock of the tornado. It seemed as if every thing would be swept away, and, for a moment, it was so. Two whole divisions of Hancock were driven back ; but two other divisions came in, and with such force as made the rebel lines shake and retreat. It is said that at this time Lee rushed forward, and was about to head the charge of a brigade himself, but was restrained by his officers. If true, as it may be, it shows that Lee thoroughly comprehended that to drive back Hancock and seize BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 289 that position was essential to his success in the battle and the campaign. But let us go on. His attack failed, and all the military objects of the battle were to him lost. In the mean time other attacks were made by Ewell, on our right, which were apparently more successful, but which, in no event, could be de- cisive. Lee and Grant were both too good generals to rely much on the event of these collateral affairs. General Gordon, toward night, moved from the ene- my's left, outflanked our right, made a furious charge, captured two generals, and the greater part of two brigades, which afforded Lee an opportunity to boast a little, but which he, of all men, knew best was a worthless success. Sedgwick, of the Sixth Corps, soon drove Gordon back, and the battle of the Wil- derness was, to all practical intents, closed. Night closed around the weary and exhausted armies. They slept on one of the bloodiest fields America had ever seen. 1 In that dark and tangled wilderness, how many slept the sleep of death ! how many groaned in anguish ! how many tired sleepers, in dreams, looked through those shadows of the night, to the far-off home they were to see no more! For again and again the fields were to be crimsoned, and again the brave were to fall. In dreams only will thousands of the wearied sleepers see their homes again. " Our bugles sang truce, for the night-cloud had lowered, And the sentinel stars set their watch in the sky ; 1 The losses in the battles of the Wilderness were estimated, at the time, at 15,000 ; but they were much more, and probably the greatest in any one conflict of the war. In the final reports of the War Depart- ment the return of losses is thus given, including all to the I2th of May: Killed, 3,288 ; wounded, 19,278; missing, 6,844. 25 200 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT* And thousands had sunk on the ground overpowered— weary to sleep, and the wounded to die. • • • • * At dead of the night a sweet vision I saw, And thrice ere the morning I dreamt it again. Methought from the battle-field's dreadful array, Far, lar I had roamed on a desolate track : '1 was autumn — and sunshine arose on the way To the home of my fathers, that welcomed me back. Stay, stay with us ! rest, thou art weary and worn ; And fain was their war-broken soldier to stay ; But sorrow returned with the dawning of morn, And the voice in my dreaming ear melted away." * The morn returned but to renew the fight. The orders were still to advance ; but soon it is apparent that Lee wants no more fight there. He could not drive Grant away, and knows that we are on the road to Richmond. So he is moving off to the right flank in his retreat by curve lines. On the 8th, his dispatch to Richmond was : " The enemy have aban- doned their position, and are marching toward Fred- ericksburg. I am moving on the right flank." 2 Yes, wo arc in Fredericksburg; that is no longer an ob- jective point, and General Lee will keep moving by his right flank for a good while. He will be fond of curvilinear movements! But where was Grant in this grand fight? How did he carry himself? What he did as General we know. Not one of his movements failed. Every corps, division, and regiment went into its place. The Army of the Potomac was no more to know retreat. Now it had a general, and Lee learned the 1 " Soldier's Dream," by Campbell. 3 Lee's dispatch to Seddon, May 8, 1864. THE BATTLE GAINED BT GRANT. 29 1 greatest lesson he ever learned. McClellan, and Hooker, and Burnside he knew how to deal with, and, notwithstanding Gettysburg, he stood in no great awe of Meade. But now we may imagine he did not feel quite sure of the future. Dark clouds gathered round him. a The twenty years' war in Vir- ginia, which the short-sighted Davis had predicted, was evidently drawing rapidly to a close. Armies, States, rebellions, all want mind as well as men. Mind moves them, and mind alone can give them success. Sidney Johnston was killed at Shiloh ; the dashing Jackson was dead ; and here is Longstreet, the best of corps commanders, wounded in the Wil- derness, so that he can no longer head the battle. The position of Hancock in the Wilderness is not carried, and here is Lee moving to the right flank ! How delusive to the great public is the battle-field ! Here is Lee, dispatching to Richmond that he has taken thousands of prisoners. Here is a critic on Grant, denouncing him for the slaughter of men ; and here is another critic saying it is a drawn battle. But look again. Why are our troops in Fredericks- burg ? Why is Grant in full march for Spottsyl- vania ? and why is Lee moving by the right flank ? The battle is gained ; but where was Grant ? The head-quarters of General Grant, says Coppee, were in the rear of the center, near the plank road, and most of the time he was on a piny knoll with Meade, in the rear of Warren. " Those who observed him during the actions were struck with his unpretending appearance and his imperturbable manner. Neither danger nor responsibility seemed to affect him ; but 292 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. he seemed at times Inst in thought, and occasionally, on the receipt of information, would mount his horse and gallop off to the point where he was needed, to return with equal speed to his post of observation." 1 Such was Grant in the Wilderness — the same firm, sagacious, calm, unpretending, and imperturba- ble being that he had been at Donelson, at Shiloh, and at Vicksburg. This sort of character is not easily understood at first, because we are continually looking out for something extraordinary, something uncommon, brilliant, and striking in a great com- mander. But when the people do understand such a character, they soon learn to regard it with con- fidence, and to admire it the more for its uncon- scious simplicity. 1 Coppee's " Grant and His Campaigns," page 301. ]VTAI» OF" THE WILDERNESS. 2 4 L/F-fi OF GENERAL GRANT, CHAPTER XIII. ON TO RICHMOND. "ON TO RICHMOND" — OUT OF THE WILDERNESS — BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA — "I PROPOSE TO FIGHT IT OUT ON THIS LINE, IF IT TAKES ALL SUMMER" — AT NORTH ANNA — CROSS- ING THE PAMUNKEY — BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR — CROSSING THE JAMES — RAIDS — THE ARMY RESTS. OF all our blunders in the war, (and we made many,) "On to Richmond" had been the great- est ; because Richmond, taken in the early period of the war, would have been of no practical advantage. It would have given us 6clat, but not success. Let the reader suppose General Lee to have been driven from Richmond into Lynchburg — would he not have been as defensible there as in Richmond? He would have lost some advantage in defending the sea-board, but he would have gained more in defending the Valley of Virginia, and covering the approaches to Chattanooga. But we already had Norfolk, securing Chesapeake Bay. Whatever opinions may be formed of that matter, it is certain that we had lost three years, and nearly three armies, in a useless attack on the defenses of Richmond. The critics who com- plain of the losses sustained by Grant's army should remember this, and consider whether it was not better to finish the work in one vigorous campaign, however GENERAL SEDGWICK KILLED. 29$ bloody, than to take three years, and slaughter three armies But here we are moving out of the Wilderness, (and we shall all be glad to get out,) and we are not going to Fredericksburg, for we have got Fredericksburg. We are obliquing to Lee's right. He was not quick enough to get in front of us ; and if he had got there, and could have successfully resisted us, we should have turned his left. He was not strong enough to prevent the movement, which was inevitable. On the 8th our army is on the road to Spottsylvania — Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Corps — all of them, with the cavalry and trains. Two of our corps took the road to Todd's tavern, half a dozen miles west of Spottsyl- vania, and others the plank-road toward Fredericks- burg. Lee took another road on the south, and, in general, parallel to the course of our troops. Satur- day night and Sunday morning, (the 9th,) the Second and Fifth Corps passed on toward Spottsylvania. In the next five days Lee made repeated attacks laterally, endeavoring to flank and drive back our columns, and, at Spottsylvania, fought a hard and bloody battle. On Sunday there was an engagement with a part of War- ren's Corps, and on Monday, one with Hancock ; during which day General Sedgwick, a good and much admired officer, was killed in a skirmish. On Tuesday, the 10th of May, Grant's army lay along the Po, (one of the small streams which make the Mattapony,) near Spottsylvania Court-House. The enemy held a fortified position directly opposite, partly on the Ny, (another little branch of the Mattapony,) on a rising ground, with breastworks, and the marshy 296 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. ground of the Xv in front. And now it is very plain we arc to have another battle. Lee had got into Spottsylvania a little ahead of us, and if we are to go on, we must fight him ; and, moreover, my reader, the more he fights the better for us. We shall lose gal- lant men, but we shall win the campaign. On the 10th a gallant charge was made by the Fifth Corps, with part of the Second, under Gibbons and Birney. Repeated charges were made, till the enemy was driven to his rifle-pits. In the mean time Barlow's Division, on the right, had been turned, and suffered some loss ; but, in the afternoon, General Upton, of the Sixth Corps, made a successful charge on the enemy, scaling his works, capturing a thou- sand prisoners and several guns. So closed the 10th of May, with heavy losses, but with no decisive re- sults. Spottsylvania was not taken, but we were there to begin again. So far it was nothing but fighting, and so it was likely to continue. We com- menced fighting on the 4th, and it is now the morn- ing of the 1 ith, when Grant sent to the War Depart- ment a very celebrated dispatch : "Head-quarters in the Field, May u, 1864, 8, A. M. " We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result, to this time, is much in our favor. "<>ur losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater. " We have taken over five thousand prisoners by battle, while he has taken from us but few, except stragglers. " I PKOPOSI TO FIGHT IT OUT ON THIS LINE, IF IT TAKES ALL SUMMER. U. S. Grant, u LiaUenant-Generali Commanding the Armies of the United States." I remember when that dispatch came to Cincin- nati. 1 1 was noon of a bright day — a glorious May GRANT S CELEBRATED MOTTO. 297 day. "I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." Some persons have criticised this, by saying Grant did not go on that line. He did go on that line precisely, for the line he was on was after Lee and his army, 1 whether that was a straight line or a curved line. It did take all summer, and all winter too, but it was the same line, and the Army of the Potomac never again retreated. When the people heard that Grant was determined to "fight it out on that line" they rejoiced, for they knew that was the line which would lead to victory and peace. All was not quiet on the Potomac, but all was the march of armies and the shock of battles. On the nth there was no fighting. The positions of the armies were the same, and Lee covered Spott- sylvania in a crescent-shaped line. On the 1 2th, (Thursday,) the dawn of day came on with a dense fog, and in this dim light Hancock again advanced to the attack. The noble Second, led by its dashing commander, was again to be crimsoned with blood. The Second Corps was formed in two heavy lines, with double columns of battalions, Bar- low and Birney in the first line, and Gibbon and Mott in the second. The attack was on the enemy's right center, at a salient angle of earthworks held by Johnson's Division of Ewell's Corps. Our columns moved silently, and, from what followed, it seems un- seen by the enemy. Professor Coppee thus describes what followed : " They passed over the rugged and densely wooded 1 This was distinctly stated in Grant's Order to Meade, (in March,) that Lee's army was the objective point, and where Lee went he was to go. 298 life of general grant. space, the enthusiasm growing at every step, till, with a terrible charge, and a storm of cheers, they reached the enemy's works, scaled them in front and flank, surprising the rebels at their breakfast, surrounding them, and capturing Edward Johnson's entire divi- sion, with its general, two brigades of other troops, with their commander, Brigadier-General George H. Stuart, and thirty guns. The number of prisoners taken was between three and four thousand. It was the most decided success yet achieved during the campaign. When Hancock heard that these generals were taken, he directed that they should be brought to him. Offering his hand to Johnson, that officer was so affected as to shed tears, declaring that he would have preferred death to captivity. He then extended his hand to Stuart, whom he had known before, saying, 'How are you, Stuart?' but the rebel, with great haughtiness, replied, 'I am General Stuart, of the Confederate Army ; and, under present circum- stances, I decline to take your hand.' Hancock's cool and dignified reply was: 'And under any other cir- cumstances, General, I should not have offered it.' " l An hour after the column of attack had been formed, Hancock sent to Grant a pencil dispatch, which went over the country like electric fire: u I have captured from thirty to forty guns. I have finished up Johnson, and am now going into Early." His going into Early was not quite so successful; still he pushed on to the second line of rifle pits, stormed and took it. The enemy now rallied with desperate energy, and for fourteen long hours, weary 1 Coppec's " Grant and I lis Campaigns," page 313. GRANT'S CA VALR V AT RICHMOND. 299 and bloody, the armies fought on, with various for- tune. Burnside and Hill had a furious fight; but the success of Hancock was the main achievement of the day. We had taken part of the enemy's intrench- ments, and, on the night of the 12th, Lee again ad- vanced backward, and gave evidence of having beaten Grant by taking the road to Richmond! Lee was both too sensible and too honest a man to make more of the thing than there was in it. It is not easy to make Lee a great general, but we may readily admit he was fair and candid ; so, in his General Or- der of May 14th, he announced a series of successes; but what were they ? Imboden had driven somebody back on the Potomac ; Jones had driven back Averill, (who, by the way, had done immense damage on the Virginia and Tennessee Road) ; Banks had been de- feated in Western Louisiana, and Grant's Cavalry had been repulsed at Richmond. At Richmond! How came they there ? The fact was, Grant's Cavalry had ridden into the suburbs of Richmond ; the alarm bells were rung; but, being only cavalry, they thought it safer to ride round the city, and finally arrived on the James! 1 But what of Lee and his army? Here he becomes quite modest, and is justly thankful and grateful that his army has not been destroyed, and that he has checked the principal army of the enemy. How did he check it? On the night of the. 12th he retreats; and on the 13th General Meade issues a 1 Perhaps this brief notice of these expeditions is enough. They were all side expeditions, to keep the enemy busy, and from reenforcing Lee. Banks was miserably defeated in Louisiana ; but his army was of no use there. Averill had been successful. 300 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. different kind of an Order. He congratulates the army on its successes, and says : "For eight days and nights, almost without any intermission, through rain and sunshine, you have been fighting a desperate foe in positions naturally st roil--, and rendered doubly so by intrenchments. You have compelled him to abandon his fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire and to attempt to stop your progress, and now he has abandoned the last in- trenched position, so tenaciously held, suffering in all a loss of eighteen guns, twenty-two colors, eight thousand prisoners, including two general officers. Your heroic deeds, noble endurance of fatigue and privation, will ever be memorable. Let us return thanks to God for the mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for its continuance." For several days nothing important was done. The rains had been heavy, the roads almost impassa- ble, and great numbers of the wounded had to be provided for. We now held Fredericksburg, and most of the wounded were carried to the hospitals at Washington. In these eight days' fighting the army had lost enormously ; but so had Lee's army, and so it must be till the end. Up to May 21st, (when the army was moving on the Anna,) the losses were, killed, 5,434; wounded, 27,234; and missing, 6,915. Of these, 27,000 were in the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps. It was found, however, that a very large proportion of the wounded were but slightly injured, so that probably more than half the wounded were returned to the army in a few weeks. The actual losses were never so great as they were represented CITY POINT AND BERMUDA OCCUPIED. 301 to be. They were losses, for the time being, from the army; but of all that 39,000 returned among the losses, not more than one-third (13,000) were killed, died, or were permanently injured. General Grant, in a subsequent report, (July, 1865,) left it to the calm judgment of the country, and especially of those who mourned, whether better plans might have been conceived or better executed ; but for himself, he said, he had acted conscientiously and faithfully. When Lee left Spottsylvania, the heaviest battles of the Richmond campaigns were over. Other battles and other tragedies were enacted for nearly a year to come ; but I do not propose to recite their details, for they amount to but little more than the weari- some processes of a siege. I shall hasten on to the last scene of the drama. But, in the mean time, two or three incidental enterprises must be mentioned. First, on the same day on which Grant crossed the Rapidan, (the 4th,) Butler moved up the James, was joined by a division under Gilmore, and, on the 5th, occupied both City Point and Bermuda, having com- pletely surprised the enemy. He intrenched himself here, and made an attack on the railroad, but was not entirely successful in cutting off the enemy's approaches. Beauregard arrived from the South, and Butler was really held fast at Bermuda. In this posi- tion, his force was of no use, except as a garrison for Bermuda — a position from which to operate in the future. But the losses of both Grant and Lee made reinforcements necessary. Breckinridge was sent up from the South- West to Lee, and Beauregard sent forward part of his army from Petersburg ; and thus 302 LIFE OF GENERAL (.RANT. Lee was heavily reenforced, and so was Grant. Stan- tun announced, from the War Department, that it was the purpose of Government to keep Grant reenforced to the end. And so he was. Thus matters stood on the 19th of May, when we recommenced our march to Richmond. All the night of the 20th, the troops were moving to new positions. The cavalry were near Gaines's Station, on the Fredericksburg Rail- road, and the Second Corps on the way, near Spott- sylvania; and at 6, A. M., of the 21st, the Fifth Corps (Warren's) took up its line of march, and all was again motion. Forward! is the order. Grant was marching to the North Anna, and Lee was going there too , and it seems, from what took place, that Lee had prepared intrenchments at all these places. The advance of the army reached the North Anna on the morning of the 22d of May. The bridge over the North Anna was defended by a redan, and commanded by batteries ; but a brilliant charge of Berry's Division carried it. The army crossed the Anna on the 24th ; but Grant was rather surprised to find Lee's army drawn up in strong intrenchments in a triangle, with the apex toward the Anna, and the wings very strongly defended. So Grant con- tinued his plan — the oblique — flanking the enemy's right. lie recrossed the Anna on the 27th, under cover of a false attack on Lee, and took his march terly to the Pamunkey. So poor Lee lost all his labor on intrenchments. His position was admirable, but he was flanked! On the 28th, Sheridan entered Hanovertown, on the Pamunkey River, fifteen miles from Richmond. The infantry divisions began to arrive POSSESSION OF COLD HARBOR. 303 that day. The crossing of the Pamunkey was secured, and transports were already arriving by York River for the support of the army. On the 29th, the whole army crossed the Pamunkey, and took position about three miles from it. On Tuesday, the 31st, the army was reenforced by the Eighteenth Corps, (General C. F. Smith,) from Bermuda. On that day Grant ordered the cavalry to take possession of Cold Harbor, and hold it, which it did, but not without a hard fight. Cold Harbor was a very important position, and the enemy did not mean we should hold it, if possible to prevent it ; so, on the 1st of June, a division under Hoke made a furious attack on Sheridan, which was repulsed ; but Hoke was soon reenforced heavily, and on our side the Sixth Corps (now Wright's) and the Eighteenth (C. F. Smith's) came in, and the enemy was defeated in all attempts to dislodge us. And thus we held complete possession of Cold Harbor, which was to us quite important. But now came an affair (very bloody) in which we had nothing to boast of. Grant thought he could drive the enemy over the Chickahominy by an assault, which he accord- ingly made, on the 3d of June, but without success. His own account of it, and his view of the situa- tion, was given in his report, as follows : "On the 3d of June we again assaulted the ene- my's works, in the hope of driving him from his posi- tion. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was com- paratively light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own 304 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them ; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion." This was the battle of Cold Harbor, of which Grant dispatched, on June the 5th, that he thought the killed, wounded, and missing, in three days' oper- ations, would be about seven thousand five hundred. In fact, it was much greater, the total losses amount- in ir to about thirteen thousand. For the next seven o days there was intrenching and counter-intrenching, by both armies, on lines near and nearly parallel to one another. But Grant had, long before, determined to take the James River as his base, unless he could succeed in a forward attack on Lee ; but Lee's de- fensive movements prevented this, and he now de- termined to leave the base of York River, and the line of Chickahominy, and swing round upon the James. Now, let it be observed, that lie did this on Jus own responsibility, and against the opinions of other generals, 1 as he did at Vicksburg. If, therefore, there be any merit in his campaigns, I say he is fully entitled to it, and unquestionably he is willing to take the responsibility for his errors. The enemy had fortified Bottom's Bridge, and lay from that along the Chickahominy. Below that (six miles) was Long's Bridge, and below that Jones's. l S«e Ilalleck's letter to Grant, dated May 27, 1864, in which he gives the opinions of McClellan and other generals on the best mode of attacking Richmond. ARMY CROSSES THE JAMES. 305 On the 1 2th, the grand army began to move. The Second and Fifth Corps moved over Long's Bridge ; the Sixth and Ninth over Jones's, and the Eighteenth marched to the White House, embarked in trans- ports, and went to Bermuda Hundred by water. On Tuesday, the 14th, the army began crossing the James, on pontoon bridges, and on Wednesday had completed its magnificent movement. And now Grant's army is where McClellan ought to have put his in the first place, on the James, with our navy for its base. For the next four or five days, there were attacks on Petersburg, and skirmishes in various directions ; but the enemy had now arrived in force, and it was vain to expect any thing from a mere assault. We must now sit down to a regular siege, and yet not quite a siege, because the enemy's communications to the west and south were kept open, mainly by three rail- roads ; one to Weldon, North Carolina ; one to Dan- ville, on the Roanoke ; and one to Lynchburg. These supplied Lee's army with men and provisions ; and now the reader must understand that the great object of the siege was to cut off these communications. I shall not now detail the various assaults, maneuvers, enterprises, and raids which, for the next eight months, occupied Grant's army. It is unnecessary to understand the movements which brought about success, and uninteresting to the general reader. Deep Bottom, only ten miles from Richmond, was occupied on the 21st of June, and immediately con- nected with Bermuda Hundred by a pontoon bridge. In the latter part of June, Wilson and Kautz (cav- alry officers) made great and important raids on the 26 306 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Weldon and Danville Railroads, destroying a great many miles of road, and doing immense damage. All this, however, was not decisive. The army had done much, but now had to rest for a time. In the mean while a great expedition had been sent up the Shenandoah Valley, under Hunter, whose object was Lynchburg. It was very successful till it got before Lynchburg, when it was found that Lee, with his communications all open, had thrown for- ward nearly a corps of troops for the support of that place, and that Hunter was nearly without provisions. The consequence was, that Hunter retreated, and failed in his main object. In truth, looking to the objective points, our half dozen lateral expeditions had accomplished little ; but, in another point of view, they had accomplished very much. They held fifty thousand good troops from joining Lee, and they had destroyed an immense amount of supplies, which had been accumulated at various points for his army. It had now got to be the beginning of July, the atmosphere scorching hot, the ground parched, and the troops wearied out, greatly needing rest ; so Grant ordered no more marches or battles just then, but left the troops to rest for a time, while the officers were preparing various episodes to the campaign, some of which were neither very successful nor very com- mendable. But here let us rest, glad to know that no more such battles as those of the Wilderness and of Spottsylvania are to be fought again till our war-worn troops return in victory and peace. THE PETERSBURG MINE. 307 CHAPTER XIV. CLOSE OF THE WAR. THE PETERSBURG MINE — GRANT'S LETTER ON THE REBELS — TAKES THE WELDON RAILROAD — SENDS SHERIDAN AFTER EARLY — BATTLES OF WINCHESTER, OF FISHER'S HILL, AND OF MIDDLETOWN — EARLY'S FORCES DESTROYED — HOOD GOES TO NASHVILLE AND SHERMAN GOES TO SAVANNAH — ■ SHERMAN'S CHRISTMAS PRESENT — MOBILE AND WILMING- TON TAKEN — SHERMAN MARCHES TO RALEIGH — STORM OF PETERSBURG — BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS — SURRENDER OF LEE — SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON — GRAND REVIEW AT WASH- INGTON. THE army was now comparatively at rest, in the hot days of a Southern summer ; but the officers wanted something to do; so they proceeded to dig a mine. Now a mine can be useful only in one case — when the enemy has a strong rampart, perhaps a bastion, strongly defended, which you can not then storm. If you can manage to blow up a part of that work, and storm the breach instantly, you can proba- bly make a lodgment in the enemy's works, and that is what you want. But such an operation was not applicable to the case of Petersburg, and probably would not have succeeded if no accident or mis- understanding had occurred in the arrangements. However that may be, the mine at Petersburg did GRANT'S LETTER TO WASHBURN. 309 not succeed. It exploded on the 30th of July. The storming party failed to be on time ; the enemy en- filaded the breach with the fire of artillery, and had a second line in the rear. The result was, we lost heav- ily, and the mine was, in fact, a great disaster. The memory of it brings to my mind the loss of many fair and promising young men, needlessly cut down in the bloom of their youth. The summer was now closing, and it is not to be disguised that our operations from the middle of June till September had been unfortunate. All was successful till we arrived on the James ; but when there, it seems to have taken several months to arrive at the true conception of what was to be done. It was a simple thing, but hard to do. It was to cut off the three railroads which supplied Lees army with men a?id food. Till then, there was no need of mak- ing bloody assaults on the enemy's works — digging mines and canals, and dreaming of the surrender of Richmond. Grant saw all this; but his enterprising generals wanted employment. Grant saw more than this. He saw the rebellion was exhausted, and he expressed this very well in a letter, written on the 1 6th of August, to Mr. Washburn, his representative in Congress. He says : "The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons for intrenched positions. A man lost by them can not be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in fre- 310 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. quent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertions and other causes at least one regi- ment per day." This was true and terse. They had robbed the cradle and the grave, and no more men could be got. This was not wholly for the want of men, for, in fact, the South had double as many men able to take the field as were in the armies ; but the Southern people saw and knew, as well as we did, that the war was practically drawing to a close, and that the rebel Confederacy could in no possible event succeed. The people, therefore, no longer supported the war with any heart, and the rebel Government could no longer get reinforcements except by force. In the months of autumn no really important operation was performed by Grant's army, after that of taking and holding the Weldon Railroad, which was done by Warren's Corps, on the 20th of August. Over and over again had this been attempted in vain ; but our lines were gradually extending to the left, and now we got and kept the Weldon Railroad, which was one of the main lines of supply to the rebel army. That gained, little was done for several months. In the mean time, let us briefly trace out the collateral movements — one of them, at least, on a grand scale — which, although not under the immedi- ate command of Grant, were, nevertheless, parts of the magnificent plan he had formed to destroy the rebellion. We have seen that Hunter's expedition up the Shenandoah to take Lynchburg was a failure. In consequence of the withdrawal of his troops, (part GENERAL EARL Y DRIVEN BA CK. 3 1 1 of them were sent in other directions,) Early, with a corps of the rebel army, moved down the Shenan- doah, carrying all before him — entered Maryland, robbing and plundering in every direction, and finally arrived near the fortifications of Washington. This, of course, threw the Government into consternation ; but Grant did not, like Frederick to his queen, write, "Remove the archives!" Nor was he to be moved from his own position ; but he quietly sends the Sixth Corps (Wright's) and the Nineteenth to Wash- ton by water. He could afford this, for his army had been heavily reenforced. He had now the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Corps. He sent the Sixth and Nineteenth to Wash- ington, who quickly drove back Early, and kept on driving him back, till he got to near Winchester. But now something new must be done. To the dis- grace of our military genius, this see-saw operation up and down the Shenandoah Valley had been going on all through the war. It ought to have been stopped in the beginning ; but, I have already said, the Government had no general plan, which should cover the country, and be persistently carried out, till Grant was put in complete command ; and now there was a plan. Hunter's expedition was to have taken and kept the Shenandoah Valley, but failed ; and in the mean while, Grant had hoped to have brought Lee to a final battle, and destroyed his army, which, with our superior forces, could have been done, sooner or later. But Lee assumed the defensive, and con- tinually fought behind intrenchments ; hence he was able to keep Early in the Valley. But it was time 3 12 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. to stop this, and Grant put a man at the head of the army in the Valley who would fight, and whose cease- less energy would leave the enemy no opportunity for their customary raids. This man was General Philip H. Sheridan, a native of Ohio, who has well earned the reputation of the American Murat. On the 7th of August, West Virginia, Washing- ten, and the Susquehanna and the Shenandoah were formed into a new department, called the "Middle Military Division," and General Sheridan assigned to its command. The divisions of cavalry under Tor- bert and Wilson were sent to him from the Army of the Potomac. The latter part of August and begin- ning of September were occupied in skirmishes and preparations, and by the middle of September the two armies were in position near Winchester. The enemy, under Early, lay on the west bank of Ope- quan Creek, covering Winchester ; and our army, under Sheridan, lay in front of Berryville. From Perryville south were two roads, one leading directly to Winchester, and the other leading more easterly to White Post. Early lay across the Winchester road on the Opequan, in order to cover Winchester and command the roads south. Grant, who had the direction of all movements, hesitated about giving Sheridan permission to move on the enemy, for, if defeated, it certainly would not be very comfortable. There were Maryland and Washington right before the enemy; so he went to see Sheridan, and was so well satisfied that all the order he gave was, "Go in." Grant asked, if he could be ready Tuesday? Sheri- dan said, "Yes, Monday." Grant said, in his report, " SHERIDAN'S RIDE." 313 "He was off promptly to time, and, I may here add, that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders." 1 Sheridan's campaign lasted about five weeks, and it was decisive. On the morn- ing of the 19th of September he attacked Early at the crossing of Opequan Creek, and, in a hard-fought, sanguinary battle, utterly defeated him, capturing five pieces of artillery and several thousand prisoners, driving him through Winchester to Fisher's Hill. There Early again made a stand, and was again de- feated. Sheridan pursued him to the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and, after stripping the country of its provisions, returned to Strasburg. In the beginning of October, Early, reenforced, returned. On the 9th his cavalry was totally defeated; but, on the 19th, near Middletown, while Sheridan was in Winchester, he succeeded in surprising and turning our army, which retreated some distance. A messenger had in- formed Sheridan of the enemy's attack, and, just at the crisis, he arrived on the field, having galloped hard from Winchester. The effect was instantaneous. The army was at once re-formed — at once attacked the enemy, who was defeated, with great slaughter, losing his artillery and trains. Early escaped in the night, with the wreck of his army, and no more returned. The brilliant poet of Ohio, T. Buchanan Read, em- bodied the memory of this battle in the Ode, called " Sheridan's Ride :" " He dashed down the line, 'mid a storm of huzzas, And the wave of retreat checked its course there, because 1 Grant's Report, July 22, 1865. 27 314 LITE OF GENERAL GRANT. The sight of the master compelled it to pause. With foam and with dust, the black charger was gray; By the Hash of his eye, and the red nostril's play, He seemed to the whole great army to say, ' 1 have brought you Sheridan all the way From Winchester, down to save the day!'" We shall see Sheridan once more, in the last de- cisive battle, when the war-clouds pass away. In the mean time Sherman was carrying on a most brilliant campaign in Georgia. On the 6th of May he moved from Chattanooga, with the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded respectively by Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army, at Dalton. After battles and skirmishes of various character at Resaca, New Hope, Dallas, Kenesaw, and Atlanta, steadily forcing John- ston's army back from point to point, he took and occupied Atlanta, on the 2d of September. In the bloody battle of the 22d of July, in front of Atlanta, was killed the "brave, accomplished, and noble- hearted" McPherson, who had been with and near Grant in nearly all his long and successful campaigns in the West, and whose loss was lamented by the whole country. The rebels were so displeased with the ill-suc- cess of Johnston that Davis was compelled to put Hood, a Texas officer, in command. This officer had more fight and less skill than Johnston ; so he (after fighting, with great loss, the battles round Atlanta) thought he would cut Sherman's communi- cations, and thus drive him back. He did cut the communications for a time effectually, but was him- self driven off. After that he devised a new plan, THE REBEL G O VERMENT AT FAULT. 3 I 5 which he thought would certainly succeed — moving to the West, with a view of moving on Middle Tennessee and destroying our great storehouse of supplies at Nashville. At the same time Sherman conceived the counterpart of this. If General Hood chooses to amuse himself in going to Tennessee, why not let him ? Nashville can be defended, and I can move on Savannah, Augusta, or Charleston. It is perfectly clear, from what followed, that the rebel Govern- ment never imagined what actually happened. "Cut- ting communications" was a great idea with them throughout the war. Hood thought that if he got a clear road to Nashville, Sherman would follow him, or detach a large part of his army, and the rebel Government never dreamed that Sherman would venture on marching through the country without supplies or communications with our depots. But Grant had learned in Mississippi the great lesson that he could subsist an army in the interior of the South ; and he had since then learned another great truth, that the South could raise no more armies. Hence, if Hood could be induced to do the very thing he did do, (get out of the way,) it was quite obvious Sherman would have an unobstructed march. To my mind, at the time, there was not a doubt on the subject. I did not see the slightest danger in Sherman's march to the sea. It seemed to me a very easy thing. But what better could the rebels have done? If Hood had kept in front of Sherman, it would have varied the movement only in this: Hood could not then have cut Sherman's communications, and Sherman would have driven him back, just as he 3l6 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. had done Johnston. In fact, the rebel generals were blamed for not doing impossibilities. They could not raise new armies, and the war was drawing to an in- evitable close. All they fought for, after Vicksburg, was to secure some advantages by negotiation which they would not have by a surrender. This was proved by the escapade at Niagara, at which poor Clay and Ilolcomb endeavored to draw Greeley into a negoti- ation on the part of the Government. Mr. Lincoln very happily answered them, in his brief answer, "To all whom it may concern," which it gave them much concern to receive. Fighting in this desperate way, without a gleam of real hope, Hood rushed off to Nashville, and Sher- man took advantage of it. He had already burned Atlanta, and now, destroying all the railroads about it, he turned his face toward the capital of Georgia. But I here remark, that this plan of Sherman's was formed at a late hour, as is proved by the dispatches between Sherman and Grant. About the beginning of October, Sherman sent a letter to Grant, pro- posing that, if Hood went West, he should march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston. Grant be- lieved a good deal more in fighting than he did in a mere march through the country, and, moreover, did not believe in leaving an enemy's army at liberty to go on its own way : "If he does this, he ought to be met and pre- vented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad-guards SHERMAN'S DISPA TCH. 3 1 7 v as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that, by going north, he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that; but I must trust to your own judgment." This whole scheme will be best understood by the following dispatches between Grant and Sherman, on the nth of October: " We can not remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city — send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. " Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long. " W. T. Sherman, Major- General. "Lieutenant-General Grant." "City Point, Va., October 11, 1864— 11.30, P. M. " Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. "Major-General W. T. Sherman." Most fortunately for Shermans plan, Hood acted precisely as he should, if he was in the council, and favored the scheme. He marched off toward Nash- ville; and Sherman, leaving the Fourth and Twenty- Third Corps, under Thomas, to meet Hood, took up his march on the 14th of November. There was, in fact, nothing in his way. The rebels had no army 3l8 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. but Hood's which was available, and that had de- liberately marched out of the way. Sherman had nothing to do but to take the main roads to Augusta and Savannah, keep his army in good order, and send out his cavalry and bummers to gather pro- visions from the surrounding country. A few guer- rilla cavalry hovered about him, doing but little harm. Johnston was again called upon to resist the invader; but to what purpose, without an army? Sherman went regularly and easily on, with a skirmish here and a skirmish there, keeping the main road to Au- gusta to the point where the highway to Savannah turned off, and then as steadily on that. Passing along between the Ogechee and the Savannah, Sher- man reached Savannah at Christmas; presenting, as he said in his letter, Savannah, with its artillery, mu- nitions, and twenty-five thousand bales of cotton, to the Government, as a Christmas present! It was well done, and was one of the conclusive evidences the rebels were now constantly receiving that the Con- federacy was in a dying condition. Let us now turn to General Hood. This person had a great deal of energy, courage, and determination. When Sherman left Atlanta, he kept on his way to- ward Nashville. So did Thomas, who had the Fourth Corps, under Stanley, and the Twenty-Third, under Schofield, and a large body of reinforcements, daily arriving from various parts of the West. In Decem- ber, Hood arrived before Nashville, having occupied Columbia on the 26th of November, and on the 30th advanced to Franklin. Hood having divided his forces into two heavy columns, one of which was GENERAL THOMAS'S VICTORY. 319 intended to flank our troops at Franklin by moving round east of it, attacked that place on the evening of the 30th with his main column. General Schofield commanded at Franklin, and managed to maintain his position there during the day, beginning his retreat at night. It was a most fortunate retreat ; for the enemy's column to the east had nearly succeeded in getting to our rear, and actually marched for some distance near and parallel to our army on the turn- pike. The result was, our forces were all driven back to within three miles of Nashville. Great alarm prevailed, and the Government laborers were armed. Hood then seems to have formed the bold plan of cutting off Thomas, in Nashville, from his communi- cations with Louisville and Bridgeport — actually in- vesting him. In the mean while our army was con- stantly reenforced, and in a few days Thomas became strong enough to take the offensive. Hood occupied the Overton range of hills. On the 15th of December, Thomas made a feint on his right, and a real attack on his left, driving him back from the river below the city, a distance of eight miles, capturing many prisoners, and sixteen pieces of artillery. Hood con- tracted his lines on the Brentwood hills ; but, on the morning of the 16th, was again attacked by Thomas, and totally defeated, losing most of his artillery, and several thousand prisoners. That night General Thomas reported to the War Department a complete victory. Hood retreated with the wreck of his army into North Alabama. The battle of Nashville was complete and decisive. It ended the war in the West, and no more military events of any importance 320 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. occurred there. In fact, the capture of Chattanooga by Rosecrans, and the capture of Vicksburg and the opening of the Mississippi by Grant, had made any successful defense in the South-West by the rebels impossible. And now the march of Sherman to Sa- vannah, and the final destruction of Hood's army, had utterly destroyed the rebel power in the whole West and South-West. There remained in the once strong and haughty Confederacy, east of the Mississippi, only the three States of Virginia, South and North Caro- lina, in which the rebels had any strength. In one word, it was reduced to Lee's army, and the fortifi- cations of Wilmington and Charleston. The year 1864 closed with the moral certainty, apparent to all intelligent men, that the Confederacy was conquered ; yet there seemed at Richmond the same blind fatuity which, in all history, seems to actuate those whom God has destined to destruction. The rebel Congress continued to deliberate on their plans and resources, in the same style of defiant folly which they had man- ifested from the beginning. Lee called for more men. Where were they to be had ? Conscript and arm the negroes ; but the rebel Congress refused to do this till the last moment. The wiser and more sagacious members of the rebel Assembly refused, probably for reasons which history will fail properly to record. They saw that the Confederacy was dying, and if, to save its existence for a few months, (all that was pos- sible,) they raised a negro army, that negro soldiery would be ready (when peace returned) to keep them in s ubj eet ion. They were looking to ulterior results, and were wise in so doing ; for there can be no doubt that STRAITS OF THE REBEL CONFEDERACY. 32 1 if the negroes had been armed to defend their mas- ters, they would have used those arms against their masters when the war ended. We must now return to the great field at Rich- mond, and see what became of Lee and his army, and the few remaining fortresses of the rebels. After driving Lee from the Weldon Railroad, little had been done in Grant's army. Large forces, as I have already described, had been detached to Sheridan, and it was necessary to destroy the possi- bilities of Early's movements North, and, as Sheri- dan did, destroy the grain crops of the Valley, and thus cut off Lee's resources in that quarter, before any thing more decisive could be done. In the mean time, Lee tried to use the Weldon road by wagon- ing supplies through the country from a certain point on the road ; but, in December, an expedition from Grant's army destroyed twenty miles of the road, and thus cut off that resource. The new year, 1865, opened with the moral certainty that the great work of the war would soon be over, and the rebel Con- federacy be numbered among the lost things of his- tory. Early's army in the Valley had been destroyed ; so had Hood's before Nashville. Mobile had been taken, the Shenandoah Valley had been devastated, and cavalry expeditions from Vicksburg, Baton Rouge, and other points had laid waste the lower part of Mississippi, and carried terror through the South. Grant had declared that the Confederacy was hollow, and wasted of its resources; that the rebel com- manders had robbed the cradle and the grave to sup- ply the army. And so they had. But the South had 322 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. lost its will, its hope, and its courage. It was useless to prolong a desperate conflict only to end in destruc- tion. But the last scene must be gone through with, however bloody, however disastrous. In the beginning of February, General Grant marched a large part of his army on to Hatcher's Run, to the enemy's right, there threw up intrench- ments, and was able to maintain them, after a most furious attack by Lee. This was an advanced posi- tion, and one step farther in the direction by which we were to turn the enemy's right. In the beginning of March the line of Grant's army was thirty miles in length, the right resting at Chapin's farm, on James River, thence crossing the James at Bermuda Hundred, extending round Peters- burg as far as Hatcher's Run. This whole line was intrenched, but the greater part of the army lay on the left, for it was necessary we should be contin- ually pressing toward the Southside Railroad, in order to cut off Lee's last communication. In the mean time, Grant had sent orders to Sheridan to take his cavalry and go on toward Lynchburg, de- stroying, if he could, the canal and railroad, and finally, if he chose, join Sherman in North Carolina, as Grant was afraid Sherman was deficient in cavalry. Sheridan did not do exactly that, but he did, on the whole, quite as well, if not better. He proceeded rapidly up the Valley to Staunton, routed the rem- nant of poor Early's forces, and then, proceeding to the James River canal and the Lynchburg Railroad, destroyed a large portion of the canal and an im- mense quantity of provisions and munitions. It was GRANTS ARMY AT THE WHITE HOUSE. 323 found that the James River canal was the great feeder of Lee's army. Grant's order to Sheridan contains a paragraph which shows how completely the rebel country was now at our mercy, and how fully Grant realized that to cut off their supplies would put an end to the rebel forces. He says: " This additional raid, with one now about start- ing from East Tennessee, under Stoneman, number- ing four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicks- burg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops — these three latter, pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sher- man, with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon." 1 To use a common expression, the rebellion was on its last legs, and nothing can be conceived of more hopeless or useless than the struggle the rebels made now, or had made from the fall of Vicksburg. Sheridan finally arrived at the White House, and joined Grant's army. At this time, in the siege of Richmond, the final destruction of Lee, if he remained in Richmond, seemed inevitable, and the real question was one for Lee's solution. Was he to remain, and there surrender to Grant ? or was he to march out, and trv to gain Lynchburg, and prolong the war a little wnile ? The last, to be sure, was useless ; but the beaten do n't like to surrender. They look round the whole horizon, to see whether there are any means ' Grant's dispatch to Sheridan from City Point, February 20th. 324 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. of escape. From what followed, it seems that Lee was in a state of irresolution. lie could not bear to leave Richmond, and yet he would rather leave it than to surrender there. He thought he would try one desperate assault. A happy turn of fortune, an unforeseen accident, might give a temporary success. So he resolved on storming a portion of our in- trenchments. On the right of our line, investing Petersburg, was Fort Steadman ; on the west of it, Fort Haskell ; and still further on the extreme right, was Fort McGilvry. All these were mutually en- filading, which was necessary to their defense, in case any one of them should be captured. On the morn- ing of the 25th of March, two rebel divisions, under General Gordon, rushed over our intrenchments and captured Fort Steadman, and the batteries immedi- ately adjoining it. It was a brilliant movement, but only for a moment successful. The guns of Fort Haskell were immediately brought to bear upon them. The division of Hartrauft rush forward and push the enemy out of Steadman into the open space, where our batteries have a cross fire upon them, and the battle ends, with our capture of two thousand prisoners. Of this sudden and brilliant affair, Presi- dent Lincoln was a spectator, and had the satisfac- tion of seeing the victory of the Union troops. At the same time that Gordon was repulsed, the left of our line (the Second and Sixth Corps) moved for- ward, captured the enemy's intrenched picket line on their right, with several hundred prisoners. The day ended with the signal success of the Union army. Lee had now lost his opportunity. A week CHARLESTON SURRENDERED. 325 or two sooner he could have left Richmond ; but now it was too late. He seems to have been wholly ir- resolute what to do, and so held on. We must now return for a moment to General Sherman. He left Savannah about the 1st of Feb- ruary, on his march through South Carolina. The renel commanders supposed it absolutely impossible to cross the swamps of lower Carolina with a large army ; and, in fact, this was the main difficulty. But our army had thousands of all sorts of craftsmen in it — lumbermen, engineers, steam boatmen, mechanics of every description, and capable of doing or devis- ing any kind of work. Many miles of the worst swamps were corduroyed, and many streams and rivers were bridged. Thus the army moved on in parallel columns. On the 17th of February, How- ard's Corps, with General Sherman, entered Columbia, the capital of South Carolina. The enemy had piled up cotton and lint in the streets, which, by some means, took fire, and destroyed the largest part of Columbia. General Hampton complained very much, and charged it upon the Union troops. Sherman had, in fact, given orders to the contrary, but it was hardly worth a controversy, and probably few Union people regretted that such a retribution should fall on the people of a State which had caused so useless and bloody a war. In consequence of the march of our army on its rear, and the necessity of preserving, if possible, its garrison, Charleston was evacuated and surrendered on the 1 8th. The garrison, under General Hardee, marched to the East, to join the scattering bodies of 326 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. troops now assembling under Johnston. The army crossed the Pedee near Cheraw, (South Carolina,) and, on the i i tli of March, reached Fayetteville, on Cape Fear River, (North Carolina.) Here, again, every thing which could be made use of by an enemy was destroyed. Heretofore, Sherman had really no enemy in front of him, except light cavalry and guerrillas. But he was now made aware that there was really a large army gathering in around him. 1 Beauregard's shattered troops at Columbia had gone on. The remains of Hood's Corps had crossed the Savannah at Augusta, and were proceeding rapidly to the front. Hardee had left Charleston with about 15,000 men, and now Sherman had to move cautiously. In the mean time, General Thomas, who no longer had need of his army at Nashville, had sent round the Twenty-Third Corps, under General Schofield, to join in the operations round Wilmington. These were entirely successful, and, on the 2 2d of February, General Cox's Division entered that city. The whole coast, with its towns and fortresses, was in our pos- session. General Sherman knew this, and sent twenty messengers to Schofield, to inform him that he would move on Goldsboro, and that he wanted Schofield and Terry to join him from Newberne. 2 He com- menced his own march from Fayetteville on the 15th. On the 1 8th, Slocum's Corps encamped on the Goldsboro road, five miles from Bentonville. Here a severe battle occurred, but the result was that Sherman held possession of Goldsboro, with the two railroads to Wilmington and Beaufort. We may 'Sherman's Report. 2 Idem. CONSUL TA TION A T CITY POINT. 327 here leave the Army of Sherman, which, after a series of signal successes, went into camp at Golds- boro, and performed no more active service. All had now come, on the rebel part, to depend entirely on the fate of Lee, and that was, to discern- ing eyes, in no way uncertain. On the 27th of March, Sherman made a hurried visit to Grant at City Point. There was a meeting which can never more be made on earth ; for Lin- coln, who was the chief personage of the scene, was soon made the victim of that dark and malicious spirit which brought on and still actuated the rebell- ion. There at City Point, consulting together, were Lincoln, Grant, Sheridan, Meade, and Sherman. Sherman said he could move on Johnston by the 10th of April, with twenty days' supplies; but that did not suit Grant, who was afraid Lee would get away, and somehow join Johnston. So he fixed a grand movement for his army on the 29th of March, and, if unsuccessful, intended to throw his cavalry on their communications, prevent the junction of Lee and Johnston, and beat them in detail. In fact he had issued orders for this movement on the 24th of March, prior to Sherman's arrival. 1 On the 28th of March, General Sheridan had or- ders to move next morning, and was informed that the Fifth Corps would move at 3, A. M., on the Vaughn road; the Second at 9, A. M., having only three miles to march to get on the right of the Fifth. Sheridan had nine thousand cavalry, and was to move 1 Grant's Order to Generals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan, dated March 24, 1865. 328 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. at his discretion on the enemy's right — the object be- ing to reach the Danville or Southside road, and not to attack the enemy in his intrenchments. "Should he come out," says Grant, "move in with your entire force, in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage, or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field. 1 After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road farther south." Sheridan pushed out, on the morning of the 29th, to Dinwiddie Court-House, where he arrived at 5, P. M. Our position then was, Sheridan on the extreme left ; Warren, with the Fifth, next ; the Second Corps next ; then the Twenty-Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth, covering Petersburg. On the afternoon of the 29th Grant sent a dis- patch to Sheridan, stating the position of affairs, and closing with this significant and decisive paragraph : " I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push round the enemy, if ymi can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army here, till it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at 11.30, A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond toward Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General. "Major-General P. II. Sheridan." On the 30th, when rain had made the roads too muddy for infantry, Sheridan started forward with his ' Grant's Order to Sheridan on the 28th. BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 329 cavalry. He went on the White Oak road for Five Forks, where he knew the enemy was in force. War- ren, with the Fifth, was directed to cross the Boyd- town road, and hold it. Sheridan seized the Five Forks, but was driven back to Dinwiddie Court- House. Grant, who was at Gravelly Run, watching all these movements, immediately put the Fifth Corps (Warren's) under the command of Sheridan, and thus reenforced, Sheridan again moved forward, while the other Corps attacked in front. Sheridan was also strengthened with McKenzie's Division of Cavalry ; and now he began a series of capital maneuvers. He directed General Merritt to make a feint on the enemy's right flank, while the Fifth Corps struck their left. In the mean time the sun was declining, and Sheridan rode over to the Fifth Corps and hurried it up. The Fifth Corps advanced gallantly, routed the enemy, and pursued him. As soon as Merritt heard the firing he assaulted the enemy's right and carried it. Sheridan said: "The enemy were driven from their strong line of works, and completely routed, the Fifth Corps doubling up their left flank in con- fusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them, and riding into their broken ranks, so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder." So ended the battle of Five Forks, which was entirely decisive. We took five or six thousand pris- oners, and the enemy were entirely demoralized. On the morning of April 2d, a general assault 28 330 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. was made on the lines of Petersburg, and "General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping every thing before him, and to his left to- ward Hatcher's Run." This, also, was decisive. Lee immediately telegraphed Davis that the lines were broken, and Richmond could no longer be held. The rebel President was in church, and immediately packed up, and, with his pretended Cabinet, left the capital that night on the railroad, for Danville. Lee rushed off, with the utmost speed, and Sheridan and Ord after him. Sheridan struck the Danville road in time to head off Lee. We need not trace the few remaining military operations. On the 7th, Grant addressed a note to Lee, stating that farther resist- ance was vain, and asking the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee asked, before considering the proposition, the terms of surrender. To this Grant replied, saying that peace was his great desire, and there was but one condition of surrender, " that the men and officers surrendered" shall be disqualified for taking up arms against the Government of the United States till properly exchanged. On the 8th, Lee replied that he would meet Grant on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the pickets of the two armies. Grant declined that ; but, on the 9th, (his situation in the mean time having become worse,) Lee asked an interview in accordance with Grant's offer. It was short and decisive. On the 9th of April, at Appomattox Court-House, Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to General Grant, and thus ended the war ; for all that followed was a mere sequel to this main fact. SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. 331 The description of the surrender of Lee from a rebel pen is worth recording. It is true, and almost draws sympathy — certainly pity — from loyal hearts: "There is no passage of history in this heart- breaking war which will, for years to come, be more honorably mentioned, and gratefully remembered, than the demeanor, on the 9th of April, 1865, of General Grant toward General Lee. I do not so much allude to the facility with which honorable terms were ac- corded to the Confederates, as to the bearing of General Grant, and the officers about him, toward General Lee. The interview was brief. Three com- missioners upon either side were immediately ap- pointed. The agreement to which these six commis- sioners acceded is known. v< In the mean time, immediately that General Lee was seen riding to the rear, dressed more gayly than usual, and begirt with his sword, the rumor of imme- diate surrender flew like wildfire through the Con- federates. It might be imagined that an army, which had drawn its last regular rations on the 1st of April, and, harassed incessantly by night and day, had been marching and fighting till the morning of the 9th, would have welcomed any thing like a termination of its sufferings, let it come in what form it might. Let those who idly imagine that the finer feelings are the prerogative of what are called the 'upper classes,' learn from this and similar scenes to appreciate 'common men.' As the great Confederate captain rode back from his interview with General Grant, the news of the surrender acquired shape and consistency, and could no longer be denied. The effect on the 332 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. worn and battered troops— some of whom had fought since April, 1861, and, sparse survivors of hecatombs of fallen comrades, had passed unscathed through such hurricanes of shot as, within four years, no other men had ever experienced — passes mortal de- scription. " Whole lines of battle rushed up to their beloved old chief, and, choking with emotion, broke ranks, and struggled with each other to' wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of that moment must be to him, strove, with a refinement of unselfishness and tenderness which he alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, General Lee at length commanded voice enough to say, ' Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best that I could for you.' Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry. Nor was this the emotion of sickly sentimentalists, but of rough and rugged men, familiar with hardships, danger, and death, in a thousand shapes, mastered by sympathy and feeling for another which they never experienced on their own account. I know of no other passage of military history so touching, unless, in spite of the melo-dramatic coloring which French historians have loved to shed over the scene, it can be found in the Adieu de Fontainebleau." ' The officers and men were all paroled, not to take up arms till regularly exchanged. As Grant knew 1 I copy this from CoppeVs " Grant and His Campaigns," as I do not know from what paper it was taken. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON'S AGREEMENT. 333 there was no probability that they ever would be exchanged, but, on the contrary, that this was, in fact, the end of the war, he provided, in the pa- roles, that while they remained peaceful, violating no law of the United States, they should be protected. This was the basis of all the paroles given to the Confederate troops ; and it was claimed by Grant, and has been conceded by the Government, that the rebel soldiers could not, under this parole, be seized, tried, or punished, for military offenses, during the war. They have not been ; and this immunity from punishment, and, in fact, protection by the Govern- ment, they owe to the generous and liberal conduct of General Grant. No man was more determined to put an end to the war, by the destruction of the rebel armies, than General Grant; but he had no particle of personal or unkind feeling to the people; and, while maintaining and enforcing, as far as he could, the reconstruction acts of Congress, he has wished to see peace, order, and humanity prevail in the con- quered States. In consequence of these events, a correspondence was entered into between Generals Sherman and Johnston, which resulted, on the 18th of April, in an agreement for the suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum for a treaty of peace. How General Sherman, or any General, came by power to make terms of peace, we have never been informed ; but the sagacity and common-sense of Grant avoided this difficulty in the beginning. Lee, in his letter to Grant, sought to bring him into a treaty of peace; but Grant explicitly informed him that he had no 334 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. power to make peace, but would treat for a surrender. This memorandum, signed by Sherman and Johnston, is the most extraordinary document which was ever put forth in this country ; l but the war gave rise to extraordinary acts and delusions, and the errors of gallant soldiers should be set down rather to the dis- temper of the times than to any intentional disrespect of the Government. General Sherman said, in his report, that Mr. Lincoln having been assassinated, he thought to pay respect to his memory by following the policy he felt certain Lincoln would have ap- proved. How very much he was mistaken may be known by the following copy of instructions from Lincoln to Grant : "War Department, Washington, March 3, 1865. "To Lieutenant-General Grant: " The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor and purely military matter. He wishes me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meantime you are to press to your utmost your military advantages. "Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of Wary That was Lincoln's policy; and nothing could better prove his good sense and sagacity. Grant hurried off to see Sherman, while Stanton issued a peremptory order, disapproving the agreement. Soon after, Johnston surrendered, by a military conven- tion; so did Kirby Smith, in the West, and Taylor, in Louisiana. In a few days more, Davis, having 1 A copy of that "basis of agreement" may be found in the Ameri- can Encyclopedia for 1865, page 68. It undertakes to settle the status of the States, the people, and the armies of the Confederates, between two Generals ! DEATH OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 335 escaped into Georgia, accompanied by two or three of the miserable men who had followed his for- tunes at Richmond, was also taken by a squadron of cavalry. The last acts of this unhappy being would be supremely ridiculous, if they had not oc- curred in the midst of a tragedy. On the 5 th of April, after leaving Richmond, he issued one of those bombastic Proclamations, 1 so entirely characteristic of his career. He represented Lee as having been trammeled by "watching over the approaches" to the capital, but now free to move, and strike the enemy, and said he (Davis) would never make peace with the infamous invaders of Virginia! Could folly go any further, or delusion be greater? By the 1st of June the last armies of the Southern Confederacy had sur- rendered. After all its terrible crimes and sanguinary battles, its loud boasts and real valor, its dream of imperial greatness, and its visions of morbid am- bition, the Southern Confederacy, which had sent its embassadors to claim the support of foreign powers, which had startled the world, as with the sudden ap- pearance of some gigantic creation of the night, as suddenly vanished away! The laugh of scorn, which had issued from the demoniac Congress at Mont- gomery, had been reechoed from the gloomy vaults of despair, and was now heard only in dying groans from the distant horizon. Were it not for its too dreadful realities, we might imagine it to have been a creation of Prospero's wand : "These our actors, As I foretold yoit, were all spirits, and 1 Davis's Proclamation, dated Danville, April 5, 1865. 336 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Are melted into air, into thin air; And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, The solemn temples, the great globe itself, Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve; And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded. Leave not a rack behind." With the dispersion of armies ended, also, that work of beneficence which had raised war in our country from the condition of barbarism which, in most periods of the world, it has held to the condi- tion of civilization, attended with the Christian chari- ties. The Sanitary and the Christian Commissions had given evidence of substantial progress in the very elements of society. They had gone into the very midst of disease and danger to comfort the soldiers, carry balm to the wounded, and consolation to the dying. They will make an illuminated page in the histories carried down to posterity, and be remembered with gratitude by thousands of hearts when the storms of war have long been past. Grant, I said, was utterly deficient in a genius for proclamations, and when Vicksburg was taken — cer- tainly one of the most decisive events of the war — made no proclamation, and quietly went on doing his duty. But now something must be said, and he said it well. He issued Order No. 108, the great point of which was its truth. The concluding paragraph is this. Addressing the soldiers of the army, he said : "Your marches, sieges, and battles, in distance, duration, resolu- tion, and brilliancy of results, dim the luster of the world's past mili- tary achievements, and will be the patriot's precedence in defense of liberty and right in all time to come. In obedience to your country's NUMBER OF REBELS SURRENDERED. 337 call, you left your homes and families, and volunteered in its defense. Victory has crowned your valor, and secured the purpose of your patriotic hearts ; and, with the gratitude of your countrymen, and the highest honors a great and free nation can accord, you will soon be permitted to return to your homes and families, conscious of having discharged the highest duty of American citizens. To achieve these glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the blessings of free institutions, tens of thousands of your gallant comrades have fallen and sealed the priceless legacy with their lives. The graves of these a grateful nation bedews with tears, honors their memories, and will ever cherish and support their stricken families. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." It may be interesting to know how many men composed the rebel armies in the last year of the war. The following facts, taken from authentic sources, will show nearly the truth. The number of men surrendered in the different armies amounted to 174,223, as follows: Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by Gen. Lee, . . 27,805 Army of Tennessee, and others, commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, 31,243 Army of Gen. Jeff. Thompson, in Missouri, .... 7,978 Miscellaneous paroles in the Department of Virginia, . . 9,072 Paroled at Cumberland, Md., and other stations, . . . 9,377 Paroled by Gen. McCook in Alabama and Florida, . . 6,428 Army of the Department of Alabama, under Lieut.-Gen. Taylor, 42,293 Army of the Trans-Mississippi Department, under Gen. E. K. Smith 17,686 Paroled in the Department of Washington, .... 3»39° Paroled in Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas, I3>9 22 Surrendered at Nashville and Chattanooga, Tenn., . . 5,029 In addition to those surrendered at the close of the war, there were in the Federal custody, between January 1st and 20th of October of the same year, 98,802 prisoners of war. But to these must be added the killed or disabled by wounds. We will suppose only one-third of the 29 Killed. Disabled. 14,650 20,500 7,660 4,200 6,250 5,800 4,310 4,IOO 338 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. wounded to be disabled or kept from the field, and, taking the estimate, results are as follows : In Lee's Department, . . . In Georgia " ■ • • < In Tennessee " • • • In all other " .... Total, 3 2 > 8 70 34>6oo Here are no less than 67,470 men of the rebel army killed or totally disabled after Grant crossed the Rapidan, in May, 1864. This includes only the great battles or sieges. There are, no doubt, some thousands of others omitted. Taking the above data, we have this result: Surrendered in the different armies, . . . I74»3 2 3 Prisoners, 98,802 Killed and disabled in the last year, . . . 67,470 Total 340,595 This corresponds very well with the statements made in one of the last debates of the rebel Con- gress, in which the available men were stated at various numbers, from 200,000 to 500,000. I suppose that, including their guerrillas, they had 300,000 men available in the last year of the war. But now we must close the scene with what I consider one of the finest lessons which the history of our country can carry down to posterity. The army was an army of volunteers. It was no merce- nary army. It was no army of some ambitious con- queror. It could be made to fight for no cause not its own. When the cause was gained, when the enemy left the field, the army had no more to do. FINAL REVIEW OF THE GRAND ARMY. 339 It was composed of citizens. It dreamed of no for- eign conquests, and no leader dared to ask its aid for any other than a patriotic object. It wanted only home. And now the battalions of Sherman, and the grand Army of the Potomac, wearied with war, march quietly to the capital, to be reviewed by the Chief Magistrate. Gay pennons, bright uniforms, brilliant dresses, beautiful women, grave senators, and noble chiefs receive the war-worn defenders of their country. The glorious flag of the nation waves in triumph. Shouts rend the heavens. The President feelingly thanks the army, and the army peacefully returns to the quietude of home. The soldier's dream is now true, and he again sees wife, children, and home. 340 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. CHAPTER XV. GRANT IN PEACE. CRITICISMS ON GRANT — THEIR ERRORS — LOSSES IN THE CAM- PAIGNS BEFORE RICHMOND — HIS EDUCATION — HIS ADMINIS- TRATIVE ABILITY — HIS INTEGRITY — HIS MORAL QUALITIES — ANECDOTES OF HIM — DISBANDMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. WE have now pursued the career of Grant through long years of war — through weary marches and bloody fields — till we find him victorious over enemies, and applauded by friends. It is time now to review his conduct, as far as we properly may, and consider his character as a citizen. It is an old adage, de mortuis nil nisi bonnm — to say of the dead nothing but good — and of the living one would think it was almost equally a practice to say, de vivendis nil nisi malum — nothing but evil. The severest criti- cism upon public men may safely be allowed, in a free country ; but it is evidence, not merely of coarse manners, but of positive injustice, when criticism de- generates into abuse. I said, in the beginning of this volume, that it was not necessary to make General Grant either more or less than he is, in order to com- mend him to the favor of his countrymen. Saints and heroes are rarely found in history ; and, certain it is, that I have found them very rare in our time — ERRONEOUS CRITICISM OF GRANT. 34 1 so rare that I think they have not been very com- mon in any age of the world. But, however we may suspect the most eminent men of faults and weak- nesses, it will be admitted, by all just minds, that they are entitled to be treated fairly, and if their faults are severely condemned, their virtues should be frankly admitted. General Grant has been charged with some serious faults, both as a general and a citizen. So far as it may be done with propriety, I shall make a brief comment on these criticisms. It has been said, (which, if true, is no crime,) that Grant had no genius, and succeeded only by pounding. If he had sense to see that pounding was necessary, that was more than his superiors or his critics seem to have had. Genius, in the popular sense, is a rare quality, and, when possessed, is often more destructive than it is useful. It is a very dan- gerous quality, and it is one which a republican Government seldom needs, and, however strange it may appear, seldom tolerates. The genius of admin- istration is what a republican Government needs, and that Grant exhibited in a remarkable degree. It is said, again, that Grant, especially in his Rich- mond campaign, caused an unnecessary loss of men, and succeeded by slaughter. This was exactly what the rebels said ; and I remember well that the Rich- mond papers boasted that Grant had lost one hund- red thousand men in getting to Richmond, and ex- claimed against his inhuman butchery. This rebel horror was caught up with avidity by the enemies of Grant, and has been adopted by ignorant critics. Was it true? Had the charge any such foundation 342 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. as should condemn Grant's military conduct? In the first place, it was not true; and in the next, it is impossible for any one to say that more or less loss was necessary to the capture of Richmond. War is, in all its forms, a bloody (I may say most cruel) ne- cessity — necessity, I say, because, in this period of the world, no war should exist without necessity. There was but one alternative presented to the American Government — either to dissolve the American Union or to maintain its unity by war. The American people judged the Union a necessity to freedom and civilization, and, therefore, chose war, as a cruel, but an inevitable necessity. In this judgment Grant per- fectly agreed. From his peaceful home in Galena he rushed into the ranks of the volunteers, and rose, by a series of unceasing labors and successes, to the highest military rank the nation had ever conferred. He succeeded by skillful, and, at the same time, un- ceasing pursuit of the enemy from post to post, from camp to camp, from army to army, till the last armed traitor was compelled to surrender. That this was done by fighting, by pounding, and by carnage, no one denies. Did any sensible man expect to succeed by any other means ? These statements were not true. The actual losses of life or limb were greatly ex- aggerated, and were no greater in our army than in that of the rebels. If we can ascertain what the losses of killed or wounded in Grant's Virginia cam- paign were, and then see what the losses were in McClellan's, Burnside's, and Hooker's, we shall have the means of making an accurate comparison, and determining whether Grant's successful campaign was GRANT AND McCLELLANS LOSSES. 343 any more destructive than their unsuccessful ones. This is the true way to determine what was, and what was not, necessary to success. In the General Reports of the Army, and in a tabular statement in the "American Cyclopedia," we have the statistics of losses sufficiently accurate. The summary of Grant's losses in the Virginia campaign is: Killed. Wounded. Wilderness, 3> 288 I 9» 2 7 8 Spottsylvania, 2,296 9.086 Cold Harbor, I,7°5 9>°42 Petersburg Mines, .... 4 T 9 x >679 Hatcher's Run 232 1,062 Five Forks, i> 200 3* 800 Miscellaneous 3»375 7> 2 94 Petersburg assault, . . ~. • i> x 9 8 6,853 Aggregate, .... I3»7I3 5 8 >°94 This may fall short a little; but it is near the whole loss. Certainly we did not have more than 80,000 men killed and wounded in Grant's campaign, from the 3d of May, 1864, on the Rapidan, to the surrender of Lee at Appomattox Court-House, nearly a year after. Undoubtedly it was a great loss, though fall half the whole number of wounded recovered entirely. Now let us examine the losses of previous cam- paigns : r Killed. Wounded. McClellan's campaign, . . • 5> 2 9i 23,909 Burnside's campaign, . . • l i° 2 % 9> io 5 Hooker's campaign, .... 4,S°o IO > 20C Pope's campaign, .... 2,100 4,000 Meade's campaign, .... 2,837 13 J lS Aggregate, 16,056 60,932 344 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. Here we see that the commanders of the Army of the Potomac had lost more men (and if we include sickness a great many more) in two years' useless ex- peditions than Grant did in the grand and final cam- paign, which terminated the rebel Confederacy. Here I leave this branch of military criticism. I do not think success a test of merit; but then, no man ought to be condemned because he is successful. If any one thinks that we ought to have spared the army more, and made the war longer, I think the country will not agree with him. It would have saved some lives on our side, and added incalculably to the burdens of the loyal and the destruction of the rebels. We may safely leave the military conduct of Grant to the judgment of posterity. Other criticisms (or, rather, abuse) have been made upon Grant. He is said to want education, sobriety, and polish. It is positively certain that he did not receive a university education ; that he sold wood in St. Louis market ; and that he smokes cigars. But let us look seriously at this charge. Our only right to comment upon it at all, (for we hold all private life to be sacred to all honorable minds,) is that his acts have made him conspicuous, and that, in the Government of the country, he is a public and re- sponsible man. The real question, in looking at the character of Grant, (the one that concerns the coun- try,) is, "What are his qualifications ', morally and in- tellectually, for high and important public duties?" Any other question than that, we have no right to consider. The principal traits of his mind have already been brought out by his actions and decisions GEN. GRANT'S EARLT EDUCATION. 345 in the army; but it is well to inquire into his early training and known habits, in order to form a just judgment on his public character. His earliest train- ing was by a Christian mother; and there is no evi- dence that that training has ever lost its weight and influence. He was also trained to habits of business ; and his life at St. Louis and Galena, as well as his ceaseless care and watchfulness in the army, prove that he never sought for pleasure or for idleness where there were duties to perform. His early intel- lectual discipline was far better than some persons have supposed. Long before he went to West Point he had studied the best arithmetics then in use, and was fond of mathematics. His father had sent him to the best academies ; and it is very evident that he had received a good moral and intellectual training before he went to West Point. There is nothing un- common in this ; but I mention it to contradict au- thoritatively the idea that he was an illiterate boy. It was not so. What he was at West Point I have related. And here let it be said, that in all the solid parts of a good education, West Point is not excelled by any institution in the world. The department in which West Point is deficient is the classical and literary, for the reason that the object of the Military Academy is to make men good officers, and not clas- sical scholars; but there is teaching enough in the department of history and ethics not to leave the graduates wholly destitute of literary acquirements. We find, therefore, that when we look into Grant's orders, letters, and dispatches, they show no want of common literary ability. He has at least that 346 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. command of language which enables him to express himself clearly. Colonel Badeau states that Grant's orders and letters were mainly written by himself, and that none of his staff could imitate his style. 1 In Badeau's "Military History" will be found copies of numerous orders, directions, and letters to division commanders and quarter-masters, with con- stant correspondence with the War Department. These prove not only that he formed plans of all his own operations, but that he kept a continual watch over the details of his army. Read the dispatches to his officers at Vicksburg, and his correspondence with Halleck, and you can not fail to see that Grant possesses great administrative ability ; and this is the very kind of ability most necessary to republi- can government. Notwithstanding all these evidences of skill, talent, and discretion, Grant is spoken of as being poor in intellect and acquirements ! How many of the public men of our country have had more intellect and acquirements than Grant? How much better was the education of Washington or Jackson? Neither of them, as young men, was as well educated as any cadet at West Point. But they, as well as all really great men, acquired a vast deal by experience, and had the original vigor and good sense to apply the knowl- edge acquired by experience to the best advantage. I admire science and love letters, but I can not con- ceal from myself the fact that it is not by such acquirements only that our country has attained to freedom and greatness. Washington was a Virginia badeau's "Military History." GRANT'S MORAL QUALITIES. 347 surveyor ; Adams a poor lawyer of Boston ; Putnam a farmer in the field ; and Hamilton a young ad- venturer from the West Indies. There were other and more highly cultivated men than these in the American Congress, but none that did more service. We shall always have in our Congress men of high cultivation ; but the men of affairs, those who have the practical administration of public business, need not be men of great science or of refined literary tastes. The moral qualities of a public man are, in my opinion, of more importance to the country by far than the most shining abilities or the most courtly manners. In the stern virtues of integrity, of true loyalty, of justice, of prudence, of frugality, and of obedience to law, the country can have more reliance than in the eloquence of Cicero or the genius of Napoleon. It is to these homely virtues that God has given more of success to men and nations than to all the other talents of the human race. These were the real talents which gave success to our Rev- olutionary ancestors, and founded this Government on principles of justice and of freedom. How far has General Grant exhibited these virtues ? He has never been charged by any one with want of integ- rity, which, in these latter times, is evidence that he is not suspected of any. Loyalty, obedience to law, prudence, were all exhibited by him in the conduct of the war. A sense of justice was proved by his treatment of the negro, and his uniform kindness to his officers. Nor does he seem to have exhibited bad temper, or made unreasonable demands, which is rather uncommon among officers of the army. I 348 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. say these things because, having gone over the his- tory of his conduct in the service of the Govern- ment, these are the impressions left on my mind, and seem characteristic of one with whom I am person- ally unacquainted. Grant seems to have been considerate and gener- ous to his officers, but not at all convivial in habits. Notwithstanding so many rumors were circulated to the contrary, yet all the evidence we have from those who knew him best, to those who were lookers-on in the army, agrees that he was rather serious in his deportment — simple and temperate. The following article is written with so much circumstantiality as to bear the air of truth, and may serve, in place of numerous stories told of him, to illustrate his man- ners in the army. It is from a fady correspondent of the "Philadelphia Press:" "During the first three years of the war I was actively identified with the Western branch of the Sanitary Commission, and had abundant opportunity of judging for myself in regard to the character and ability of our generals. During the entire campaign of the opening of the Mississippi it was my privilege to aid in caring for our noble patriots, both in hos- pital and camps, and I have been for weeks together where I saw General Grant frequently, heard his name constantly, and never did I hear intemperance mentioned in connection with it. Facts are stubborn things. I will relate a few of the many that came directly to my knowledge. In the winter of 1862-63, when the army arrived at Memphis, after long, weary marching, and trials that sicken the heart to think GRANTS TEMPERATE HABITS. 349 «)f, two-thirds of the officers and soldiers were in hospitals. General Grant was lying sick at the Gay- oso House. One morning Mrs. Grant came into the ladies' parlor, very much depressed, and said the medical director had just been to see Mr. Grant, and thought he would not be able to go any further if he did not stimulate. Said she, 'And I can not persuade him to do so. He says he will not die, and he will not touch a drop upon any consideration.' In less than a week he was on board the advance boat on the way to Vicksburg. "Again, a few months after, I was on board the head-quarters boat at Milliken's Bend, where quite a lively gathering of officers and ladies had assembled. Cards and music were the order of the evening. General Grant sat in the ladies' cabin, leaning upon a table covered with innumerable maps and routes to Vicksburg, wholly absorbed in contemplation of the great matter before him. He paid no attention what- ever to what was going on around, neither did any one dare to interrupt him. For hours he sat thus, till the loved and lamented McPherson stepped up to him, with a glass of liquor in his hand, and said, 'General, this won't do; you are injuring yourself. Join with us in a few toasts, and throw this burden off your mind.' Looking up, and smiling, he replied, ' Mac, you know your whisky won't help me to think. Give me a dozen of the best cigars you can find, and, if the ladies will excuse me for smoking, I think, by the time I have finished them, I shall have this job pretty nearly planned.' Thus he sat, and, when the 350 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. company retired, we left him there, still smoking and thinking. " When the army lay around Vicksburg, during that long siege, the time that tried men's souls, I watched every movement it was possible for me to do, feeling almost certain that he would eventually succumb to the custom, alas! too universal among the officers. I was in company with a gentleman from Chicago, who, while calling upon the General, remarked, 'I have some very fine brandy on the boat, and, if you will send an orderly with me to the river, I will send you a case or two.' ' I am greatly obliged,' replied the General, ' but I do not use the article. I have a big job on hand, and, though I know I shall win, I know I must do it with a cool head. Send all the liquor you intend for me to my hospital in the rear ; I do n't think a little will hurt the poor fellows clown there.' "At a celebration on the 22d of February before the surrender of Vicksburg, while all around were drinking toasts in sparkling champagne, I saw Gen- eral Grant push aside a glass of wine, and, taking up a glass of Mississippi water, with the remark, 'This suits the matter in hand,' drink to the toast, 'God gave us Lincoln and liberty ; let us fight for both.' " Lincoln and Liberty! In that toast much of the real character of Grant is shown. Lincoln and liberty were the ideas of the war. Lincoln repre- sented the sovereignty of the nation, and liberty was its object. When Grant adopted these as his text, he entered fully into the spirit, the objects, and the principles of the war for unity and freedom. REDUCTION OF THE ARMY. 351 The war had closed, but a great work remained to be done. Nearly a million of men were in sonic way enrolled in the service of the country. The ex- penses were immense. The burdens upon the people were unprecedented, and the public debt had grown to enormous proportions. The problem before the Government was no longer to win battles and subdue rebels, but to disband the army, to reduce expenses, and reconstruct loyal States from the ruins of the lost Confederacy. The task was not easy, the labors great, and the patriotism required scarcely less than that needed for the most arduous duties of war. On the first of March, 1865, there were 602,593 men present and available for duty. There were, in general and field hospitals, 179,147 sick. Those on detached duty, on furlough, or absent, were 180,000. In all, there were 965,591 men in service, and recruiting still going on. The Government commenced instantly the work of depletion and reorganization. In this work Grant had, as chief of the army, much to do, and probably no important arrangements were made without his advice. On April 28, 1865, twenty days after the surrender of Lee, Secretary Stanton issued an order for the reduction of the expenses of the army, and from that day the work of reduction went on, till, on the 7th of August, 640,806 men had been discharged from service. No country of Europe has ever witnessed a scene like this, and, if we were to select something from the history of our country to illustrate the strength and excellence of republican government, we could take nothing so characteristic and striking as the raising and reduction of the army. 352 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. The first blow of rebellious arms against the country brought half a million of men into the field, not recruited for a regular army, not brought out by arbitrary power, not seeking the paths of ambition or of glory, but simply volunteers for the love of country. And now the last scene has come, and these vast armies, returning from the field where their valor has conquered rebellion, are reviewed by the Chief Magistrate of the nation, and peacefully return to their homes. Such is the result of repub- lican institutions in bringing out the strength of a nation. One of the most striking traits of Grant's charac- ter exhibited in the war was his knoivledge of men; and in the administration of armies, or of govern- ments, there is no talent more valuable than this. In recording what I have endeavored to trace of his mili- tary conduct, I see that there were very few instances in which he complained of the conduct of his subor- dinates, or had reason to. Where he had his choice he almost invariably selected the best materials for his work, and was seldom disappointed in them. A more enthusiastic, impulsive man, might have had many more personally attached followers ; but, on the other hand, would have made more enemies, and com- mitted greater mistakes. In the reduction of the army, in which he must have had a large share, it is singular how few complaints were made, and how little injustice was done. The great body of the army was very willing to return home ; but there were, also, many ambitious aspirants for preferment, and still more urged forward by their friends. REDUCTION OF THE ARMY. 353 Officially this work of reduction fell chiefly on Mr. Stanton, who did it well ; but for two years this re- duction and reorganization of the army was going on, and in that time there were four persons on whom, more than upon any others, the labor fell, and to whom the country is greatly indebted for accomplish- ing this great business well and thoroughly. These were Mr. Stanton, (Secretary of War,) General Grant, and the Chairmen of the Military Committees in the House and the Senate. 1 And now we bid farewell to these scenes of bloody war, and return to those of peace and pros- perity. God has favored this nation as no country was ever favored; and I seem to see visions of re- stored unity, of a happy people, and of a successful example to other nations of the possibility of a per- manent Christian Republic. 'The Chairmen of these Committees were General Schenck and General Wilson. 30 354 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. CHAPTER XVI. GRANT IN POLITICS. POLITICAL QUESTIONS OF THE DAY — WHAT THEY ARE — GRANT'S PUBLIC CONDUCT IN THEM — HIS VIEWS ON THE GREAT ISSUES — ON CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC — HIS ADMINISTRA- TIVE ABILITIES — VIEWS OF THE FATHERS ON THE PRESI- DENCY — CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT. IT has been said of Grant, first, that he is ignorant of politics ; second, that he has no politics ; and third, that he has no opinions. This could not be said with truth of any man in the United States, much less of an intelligent, educated man, who had fought for the Government through the whole of the last war. Every man has influences about him, social, religious, commercial, and political, which incline him to one or the other side of the great questions which concern the community in which he lives. Grant, therefore, has politics, and he knows something of political matters. The questions are, What are the politics on which he has opinions ? and what are his opinions upon them? There is no uncertainty upon these in regard to any of the great issues before the country. Let us analyze the subject. What questions of politics do we mean ? Those of Europe or Amer- ica ? Those of the old Federal and Democratic A NEW ERA IN POLITICS. 355 parties ? Those of the Whigs and Democrats ? Or those of the Unionists and Rebels? A moment's thought will show any intelligent man that, in regard" to the party politics of this country, old things have passed away, and all things have become new. The war made a revolution, and the results of that revolu- tion are accomplished facts. No revolution in Europe made such fundamental changes as the abolition of American slavery. Slavery entered into the social and political life of fifteen States. It was related in poli- tics and commerce to all the others. It was imbed- ded in the American Constitution. Its abolition has torn it out of the Constitution, out of society, and out of commerce. That is the first great fact of the revolution ; but it is by no means all. The slaves became free ; became, by that fact also, constituent elements of political society. With or without suf- frage, the fact remains that they are a part of the free population, which is the basis of representation and of popular government. Nor was this all. The war, maintained for the defense of slavery, left an immense debt, which the nation owes both to the citizens of our own country, and to the citizens of other countries. Contingent on that fact is the obli- gation to pay that debt justly, and to raise taxes to meet the interest. To do this, there is the further obligation to raise those taxes as justly and expend them as frugally as is consistent with the necessities and the honor of the country. Lastly, there remains the great ruins left by the war. The country was united in territory and population, but disunited politically. These being immutable facts, which no 356 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. state of politics coulcl change, there arose from them certain political issues. These issues can not be avoided, and they can not be put aside for any old party divisions. The questions are mainly these : i. That of accepting and faithfully recognizing the result of the war ; 2. That of reconstruction ; 3. That of the faithful payment of the principal and in- terest of the public debt ; and 4. That of an econom- ical and rigid administration of the public finances. These are the great questions of the day. Our for- eign policy is settled. No American will permit for- eign interference on this continent such as was attempted by France. No honest American wishes to interfere in the affairs of other nations. No American will permit any wanton insult to the flag or people of the American republic. Such are the questions of domestic and foreign policy, which are important at this time ; and on which of these ques- tions do the opponents of General Grant suppose him ignorant ? The great issue of the war was to conquer the rebels, and into that Grant went with his heart and soul. But some persons who had well and fairly fought for the war, with the whole Demo- cratic organization, thought it was entirely right to conquer rebels in the field, but was not right to con- quer them politically ; and on that arises the political conflict of the day. Is there the least doubt about Grant's position upon that subject? Has he not bowed to and faithfully obeyed all the acts of Con- gress on reconstruction ? Did he not sustain Sheri- dan? Did he not sustain Stanton? Does he not sustain the Tenure of Office Act? If there be an GRANT AN ECONOMIST. 357 honest man in this country, who is noted for his obedience to law, and who strictly and consistently adheres to the policy of Congress, it is Ulysses S. Grant. He does not follow that policy so much because it is or is not, in his opinion, the best policy, but on the higher and better ground that it is the ACT AND POLICY OF THE LAW-MAKING POWER. This is the great issue of the day. Shall we have a gov- ernment of the people or of the President? Again: Grant's whole conduct since the peace proves that he is utterly opposed to the restoration of the rebels to power, except in such way as Congress, in its generosity, may provide. Again : as Grant has not himself been suspected of any want of integrity, so he does not suspect the American people and Government of being any worse than himself. He is for the integrity of the Govern- ment, in the payment of all its obligations. Lastly. Since the return of peace he has been un- tiring in his attempt to reduce the expenses of the army, and to introduce a rigid economy into all its Departments. The few days of his services as Sec- retary of War ad iiiterim were signalized by the re- duction of many expenditures, and his views on that subject have been fully proved by his conduct. It is unnecessary to go into farther inquiries into his political opinions. If a public man be not honest in his character, it will be in vain to estimate his future conduct by his past opinions. He has a right to change them, and the vows written on the sand will be washed away by the first waves of interest and ambition. 358 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. From what is known to the public, and what I have recorded in this book, I infer and assert that on the great questions now before the people, Grant holds these views: i. That he accepts all the results of the war, and is opposed to the restoration of rebels to power, un- less by act of Congress. 2. That he is in favor of executing all the laws of Congress, and will consider all laws Constitutional till declared otherwise by the Supreme Court. 3. That he will conform to the Tenure of Office Act as long as it is in existence. 4. That he is in favor of the reconstruction of the States on the plan of Congress. 5. That he is in favor of maintaining the honor, credit, and faith of the Government. 6. That he is in favor of the most rigid economy in all departments. These principles substantially cover the whole ground of our political conflict. In fact, from April, 1 86 1, to the present time, there have been but two parties and two issues before the country. The one either directly aided or sympathized with the rebels, and constantly has endeavored to restore them to power. The other endeavored to destroy their power in war, and prevent its restoration in peace ; and be- tween these two there is no middle ground. General Grant has consistently opposed the rebels, and main- tained the Government from first to last. He will take no backward steps; he will support the Con- gress and the Government of the United States. If this be not politics, what is? What politics had PATRONAGE OF THE PRESIDENT. 359 Washington when the war of the Revolution ended ? Was it not to maintain the results of that Revolution ? And who has ever paid more respect to the acts and opinions of Congress than did George Washington ? The idea that a President is deliberately to oppose and counteract the acts and opinions of Congress is wholly a modern one. It is contrary to the genius and spirit of the Constitution, and it will be well when we cease to look upon the President as the fountain of power and patronage. Since the foundation of the Government the pat- ronage of the President has been increasing. When the Constitution was formed, there were scarcely three millions of people in the United States. The increase since then has been thir teen-fold! But the number of offices has increased at a more rapid rate ; and the necessity of raising an internal revenue, a necessity which is not likely soon to cease, has multiplied them yet more. The land is almost literally covered with Government officers, and these officers are all looking to Washington as their Mecca, and the President as their Prophet. In an evil hour the first Congress, acting in the presence of Washington, whom they re- garded as the political Savior of their country, and with reference to the small number of the people, de- cided that the President had the power of removal from office. At that time it did no harm, nor for the terms of the first three or four Presidents. Jefferson, with whom the old Democratic party came into power, made a few removals, and was censured for it by his opponents. It was on that occasion that he made the celebrated reply, "Few die a?id none resign" as an 360 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. apology for the removals he had made. We should remember that, up to the administration of John Quincy Adams, this power of removal was never assumed to be exercised for mere party purposes, and for that reason was never really injurious. The right of the President to select his own heads of departments, (commonly called his Cabinet,) and the principal subordinates in the revenue, was not ques- tioned, for reasons of propriety. After the formation of new parties, in the time of Jackson, the removal of old officers and the appointment of partisans was demanded as a party right. In fact, the number of active partisans and aspirants who were engaged in party warfare became too numerous and powerful to be disregarded. They demanded the offices of the country from the President whom they had elected. The result is, that for thirty years, on the incom- ing of a new administration, Washington has been crowded with office-seekers, entering, as a victorious army would a conquered city, and demanding of the President, not merely the political control, but the official patronage of the Government. This fact had become so obvious and so dangerous, in the time of Mr. Van Buren and his successors, that nearly all the great men of that day denounced it. Mr. Calhoun, Judge McLean, Clay, and Webster, all denounced and treated as dangerous this fearfully enormous power of patronage. Mr. Calhoun called it " the co- hesive power of public plunder." Something may be abated from these denunciations by the fact that they were uttered by the opponents of the existing admin- istration ; but it was then, and is now, the conviction TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT. 3G1 of calm and enlightened statesmen, that the immense increase of official patronage was a great, growing, and dangerous evil. How to lessen it, after half a century of usage, and to place the great offices of the country more nearly within reach of the people, was a problem which seemed almost impossible of so- lution. There was but one way. The Constitution has made the appointment of officers to depend on the "advice and consent of the Senate," and the Senate is the representative of the States, and, indi- rectly, of the people. Removal obviously ought to be made by the same power which appoints. Hence Congress passed what is called the "Tenure-of -Office Bill!' If this act continues in force, it makes re- movals depend on the consent of the Senate. General Grant's position on this act is, as it is on all laws, that an act of Congress is the law till the Supreme Court pronounces it unconstitutional. This is the true ground. To admit that any man in the country may violate laws because he thinks them unconsti- tutional, would be to make law a mockery, and give the power of revolution to every one who chooses to exercise it. Nor is it at all certain that the Supreme Court will choose to pronounce it a purely political act, or that the nation will justify any such proceed- ing. Hence the Tenure-of-Office Act must, for the present, remain the law of the land ; to which Grant fully assents while it is in existence, and which he will cheerfully enforce, should it ever be his duty to act upon it. Grant's published views and opinions on this subject were brought out fully in the course of his 31 362 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. administration and correspondence while acting as Secretary of War ad interim. It has been said that Grant never speaks his opinions ; or, in the phrase of the day, is reticent on all subjects. There is no more truth in this than in other slanders which have been so freely uttered against him. When should a general of the army utter his political opinion ? Cer- tainly, when his duties, his position, or his relations to public affairs demand it, and not till then. No political body has, I believe, asked Grant for his opinions ; and, until they do, it may be safely assumed that they are- willing to accept his acts for his words. But, on every important issue of the day, he has given his opinions. Let us take them up as he has given them : 1. As to the results of the war in relation to the negro. The errand fact in relation to that is the abo- lition of slavery. In the midst of the war, in that great campaign round Vicksburg, Grant wrote to Mr. Washburn, the representative in Congress from the Galena District: " I have never been an antislavery man, but I try to judge justly of what I see. I made up my mind, when this war commenced, that the North and South could only live together, in peace, as one nation, and they could only be one nation by being a free nation. Slavery, the corner-stone of the so-called Confeder- acy, is knocked out, and it will take more men to keep black men slaves than to put down the rebel- lion. Much as I desire peace, I am opposed to any peace till this question of slavery is forever settled." This was decisive of his views on the slavery GRANT ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. 363 question. In 1864 he supported Abraham Lincoln for President, declaring that his defeat would be a calamity to the country. When Congress came to act on the questions of protecting the loyal blacks and whites, securing the equal rights of all, and restoring the rebel States to all their practical relations, Grant was in full accord with Congress. It is known that among the most strenuous in carrying out the views of Congress was General Philip Sheridan. When the President became hostile to Sheridan on this account, Grant indorsed Sheridan in a letter. Senator Wilson says: "When the pending Constitutional amendment was before Congress, Grant was for its submission to the people ; and, when it was submitted, he urged the leading men of the rebel States to vote for its adop- tion. After its rejection by the rebel Legislatures, he pressed Southern men, who sought his advice, to re- consider their action, adopt it, and give suffrage to the freedmen. To leading Southern men he said: 'You must look to Congress. The Republicans have the power; consult them. Do not seek the counsels of men in the North who opposed the war. The people will never trust that class of men with power. The more you look to them for advice, the more exacting Congress will be, and ought to be. The rejection of the amendment, and the legislation against the freed- men, will cause Congress to require universal suffrage, and you should at once give it.'" Observe, that Grant told them that, if they rejected the counsels of the Republicans, the more exacting Congress would be, and the more exacting tJuy ought 364 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. to be; and this in view, as he said, of the coming event of universal suffrage. On this subject, therefore, there is no doubt. Grant accepts, and, as far as he can, will enforce, the results of the war in the abolition of slav- ery, the political equality of the freedmen, and the bringing back of the rebel States under the acts and policy of Congress. 2. On the 1 2th of August, 1867, Grant was ap- pointed Secretary of War ad interim, on the attempted removal of Stanton. He remained such till the sub- ject of Stanton's removal was acted upon by the Sen- ate, and, on the refusal of the Senate to advise or consent to that act, Grant quietly gave up his office to Stanton. The President asserted that this was done contrary to an agreement between himself and General Grant. This assertion Grant positively denied. A discussion and correspondence ensued, which is important on several accounts, and which I will analyze here, in order to bring out some of Grant's characteristics. February 4, 1868, Secretary Stanton communi- cated to the Senate copies furnished by Grant of his correspondence with the President, of which the fol- lowing are extracts : GENERAL GRANT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. "Head-quarters Army of the United States, \ "Washington, D. C, January 25, 1868. J u To His Excellency, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States: « sir : — On the 24th inst. I requested you to give me, in writing, the instructions which you had previously given me verbally, not to obey any oidcr from Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, unless I knew it came from yourself To this written request I received a message that has left doubt in my mind of your intention. To prevent any possible misunderstanding, therefore, I renew the request that you will GENERAL GRANT TO THE PRESIDENT. 365 give me written instructions, and until they are received, will suspend action on your verbal ones. I am compelled to ask these instructions in writing, in consequence of the many gross misrepresentations affecting my personal honor circulated through the press for the last fortnight, purporting to come from the President, of a conversation which occurred either with the President privately in his office, or in Cab- inet meeting. What is written admits of no misunderstanding. In view of the misrepresentation referred to, it will be well to state the facts in the case : " Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim, the President asked my views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My reply was, in sub- stance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the Courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing the grounds I had taken in the case of the Baltimore Police Commissioners. In that case I did not doubt the technical right of Governor Swann to remove the old Com- missioners and appoint their successors. As the old Commissioners refused to give up, however, I contended that no resource was left but to appeal to the courts. Finding that the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or not, I stated I had not looked particularly into the Tenure of Office Bill, but that what I had stated was on general principles, and if I should change my mind in this particular case, would inform him of the fact "Subsequently, on reading the Tenure of Office Bill closely, I found I could not, without violation of law, refuse to vacate the office of Sec- retary of War the moment Mr. Stanton was reinstated by the Senate, even though the President ordered me to retain it, which he never did. Taking this view of the subject, and learning, on Saturday, the nth test., that the Senate had taken up the subject of Mr. Stanton's suspen- sion, after some conversation with Lieut.-Gen. Sherman and some members of my staff, in which I stated that the law left me no discretion as to my action, should Mr. Stanton be reinstated, and that I intended to inform the President, I went to the President for the sole purpose of making this decision known, and did make it so known. In this I fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on the subject. "The President, however, instead of accepting my view of the requirements of the Tenure of Office Bill, contended that he had sus- pended Mr. Stanton under authority given by the Constitution, and that the same authority did not preclude him from reporting, as an act of courtesy, his reasons for the suspension, to the Senate ; that having 366 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. been appointed under authority given by the Constitution, and not under an act of Congress, I could not be governed by the act. " I stated that the law was binding on me, Constitution or not, till set aside by the proper tribunal. An hour was consumed, each reitera- ting his views on this subject, till, it getting late, the President said he would see me again. I did not agree to call again on Monday, nor at any other definite time, nor was I sent for by the President till the following Tuesday. "From the nth inst., to the Cabinet meeting on the 14th inst., a doubt never entered my mind about the President fully understanding my position ; namely, That if the Senate refused to concur in the sus- pension of Mr. Stanton, my powers as Secretary of War ad interim would cease, and Mr. Stanton's right to resume at once the functions of his office, would, under the law, be indisputable ; and I acted ac- cordingly." Now, no matter what the misunderstanding with the President was, there are certain facts in regard to Grant established here. I. Grant said, in the very outset, that the law was binding so far that Mr. Stan- ton could not be ousted till an appeal had been made to the courts. This he illustrated by his former ac- tion in the case of the Police Commissioners. 2. He examined the Tenure of Office Act, and found that he could not remain in office after the Senate refused to consent to Stanton's removal. Grant's position, then, is that all laws are to be obeyed till the courts have acted upon them. GENERAL GRANT TO THE PRESIDENT. "Head-quarters Army of the United States, ) "Washington, Jcuiuary 24, 1S68. ) "His Excellency, Andmu Johnson, President of the United States : "Sir: — I have the honor very respectfully to request to have in writing the order which the President gave me verbally on Sunday, the 19th inst., to disregard the orders of the Hon. E. M. Stanton as Secre- tary of War, till I knew from the President himself that they were his orders. 11 1 have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "U. S. Grant, General." GENERAL GRANT TO THE PRESIDENT. 367 THE PRESIDENT'S INDORSEMENT. " The following is the indorsement of the above note : " As requested in this communication, General Grant is instructed in writing not to obey any order from the War Department assumed to be issued by the direction of the President, unless such order is known by the General commanding the armies of the United States to have been authorized by the Executive. Andrew Johnson. "January 20, 1868." GENERAL GRANT TO THE PRESIDENT. "Head-quarters Army of the United States, j "Washington, D. C, January 30, 1868. J "His Excellency, Andrew Johnson, President: » Str : — I have the honor to acknowledge the return of my note of the 24th inst., with your indorsement thereon, that I am not to obey any order from the War Department, assumed to be issued by order of the President, unless such order is known by me to be authorized by the Executive, and, in reply thereto, to say that I am informed by the Sec- retary of War that he has not received from the Executive any order or instruction, limiting or impairing his authority to issue orders to the army, as has heretofore been his practice, under the laws and custom of the Department. " While this authority to the War Department is not countermanded, it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any orders issued from the War Department by direction of the President, are authorized by the Executive. " I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, " U. S. Grant, General:'' The point of this correspondence is this : the Pres- ident orders Grant to disobey orders received from Stanton, unless they were known to be authorized by him. Grant goes to the War Department, and finds that the President has not limited Stanton's authority, and hence, that any orders issued from the War De- partment are presumed to be from the President. The President answered Grant, differing with him as to the purport of their conversation, and charging Grant substantially with having deceived him. The letter contains this paragraph : 368 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. "You failed, however, to fulfill the engagement, and on Tuesday notified me in writing of the receipt of your official notification of the action of the Senate in reference to Mr. Stanton, and at the same time in- formed me that, according to the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, your functions of Sec- retary of War ad interim ceased from the moment. At receipt of notice, you thus, in disregard of the understanding between us, vacated the office without having given notice of your intent to do so. It is but just to say, however, that in your communication you claim you did inform me of your purpose, and thus fulfilled the promise made in our last preceding conversation on the subject." The President thus gives his testimony to two facts — that Grant, on being notified of the Senate's action, promptly obeyed the law ; and that he claimed to have fulfilled his promise to the President. The President, however, declared he had been deceived by Grant's not meeting him at a subsequent confer- ence, to notify him that he should deliver up the office, and appealed to the testimony of several mem- bers of the Cabinet. In his answer to the President, Grant was yet more explicit. GENERAL GRANT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. "Head-quarters Army cf the United States, ) "Washington, D. C, February 3, 1868. ) " To His Excellency, Andrew Johnson, President: " Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your commu- nication of the 31st ult., in answer to mine of the 28th ult. After a careful reading and comparison of it with the article in the ' Intelligencer ' of the 15th ult., and the article over the initials 'J. B. S.,' in the 'New York World' of the 27th ult., purporting to be based upon your state- GENERAL GRANT TO THE PRESIDENT. 369 ment, and that of the members of the Cabinet therein named, I find it to be but a reiteration, only somewhat more in detail, of the many and gross misrepresentations contained in these articles, and which my statement of facts, set forth in my letter of the 24th ult., was intended to correct ; and herein I reassert the correctness of my statements in that letter, any thing in yours in reply to the contrary notwithstanding. " I confess my surprise that the Cabinet officers referred to should so greatly misapprehend the facts in the matter of admissions alleged to have been made by me at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th ult., as to suffer their names to be made the basis of the charges in the newspaper article referred to, or agree to the accuracy, as you affirm they do, of your account of what occurred at that meeting. " You know we parted on the nth ult., without any promise, on my part, expressed or implied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office of Secretary of War ad interim, against the action of the Senate, or declining to do so, would surrender it to you before such action was had, or that I would see you again, at any fixed time, on the subject. " The performance of the promises alleged to have been made by me, would have involved a resistance of the law, and an inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton. From our conversations, and my written protest of August I, 1867, against the removal of Mr. Stanton, you must have known that my greatest objection to his removal was the fear that some one would be appointed in his stead, who would, by opposition to the laws relating to the restoration of the Southern States to their proper relations to the Government, embarrass the army in the performance of the duties espe- cially imposed upon it by the laws, and that it was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the appointment of Secretary of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stan- ton, by withholding it from him in opposition to law, or, not doing so myself, surrender to one who, as the statement and assumption in your communication plainly indicate, was sought. And it was to avoid this danger, as well as to relieve you from the personal embarrassment in which Mr. Stanton's reinstatement would place you, that I urged the appointment of Governor Cox, believing it would be agreeable to you and also to Mr. Stanton, satisfied, as I was, that the good of the coun- try and not the office was what the latter desired." This paragraph contains another most important fact; that on the 1st of August, 1867, Grant pro- tested against the removal of Stanton, and that be- cause he feared the appointment of some one who was opposed to the laws of Congress for the restoration of 370 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. the Southern States, and who would embarrass the officers of the army in the performance of their duties. In conclusion, Grant said: " And now, Mr. President, when my honor as a soldier, and integrity as a man, have been so violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from beginning to end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of the law for which you hesitated to as- sume the responsibility, in order thus to destroy my character before the country. I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion by your recent orders, directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, my superior and your subordinate, without having countermanded his au- thority, whom I am to disobey. With assurance, Mr. President, that nothing less than a vindication of my personal honor and character could have induced this correspondence on my part, "I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "U. S. GRANT, General^ Grant here charges upon the President what all intelligent men must have seen — that this was an attempt on his part, in a matter in which he hesitated to assume the responsibility, to involve Grant in a resistance of the law, and to destroy his character before the country." This was honestly said, and to its truth all the events of the day bore witness. A soldier, who is a true soldier, is always sensitive to his honor and his character. Hence Grant was indignant at an attempt to make him appear to do what of all things was most abhorrent to his charac- ter — an act in disobedience of law. On February nth, the President replied to Gen- eral Grant, taking issue with him on matters of fact, and putting in the testimony of several Cabinet offi- cers. In the course of this reply the President has this paragraph : "You say that a performance of the promises GRANT'S POSITION ON RECONSTRUCTION. 37 1 alleged to have been made by you to the President would have involved 'a resistance to law, and an in- consistency with the whole history of my connection with the suspension of Mr. Stanton.' You then state that you had fears the President would, on the re- moval of Mr. Stanton, appoint some one in his place who would embarrass the army in carrying out the Reconstruction acts, and add: 'It was to prevent such an appointment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from him in opposition to the law, or not doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would/" Now it is this very point that, we should remem- ber, as clearly proved, not only on the testimony of General Grant, but of the President himself, that Grant was in favor of the acts of Congress ; that he would not disobey them ; and that he would not be made the instrument of thwarting them by aiding the Presi- dent. The position of Grant, therefore, on the acts of Reconstruction can not be mistaken. He was for crushing the Rebellion, not merely by armies in the field, but by such acts of reconstruction as would pre- vent the rebel element from regaining an ascendency in the Government. In regard to the controversy as to an agreement with the President, and its non-fulfillment, the evi- dence seems to show that it was a misunderstanding on the President's part as to a subsequent meeting on the subject. This appears from the evidence of Mr. Seward, who says: 3/2 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. " General Grant admitted that it was his expecta- tion, or purpose, to call upon you on Monday. Gen- eral Grant assigned reasons for the omission. He said that he was in conference with General Sher- man ; that there were many little matters to be attended to ; he had conversed upon the matter of the incumbency of the War Department with General Sherman, and expected that General Sherman would call upon Monday. My own mind suggested a fur- ther explanation, but I do not remember whether it was mentioned or not ; namely : it was not supposed by General Grant, on Monday, that the Senate would decide the question so promptly as to anticipate fur- ther explanation between yourself and him, if delayed beyond that day. " General Grant made another explanation, that he was engaged on Sunday with General Sherman, and, I think, also on Monday, in regard to the War Department, (with a hope, though he did not say so,) in an effort to procure an amicable settlement of the affair of Mr. Stanton, and still hoped it would be brought about." Supposing this to be a misunderstanding on either or both sides, it is, in a public point of view, of lit- tle consequence. The point established most clearly is, that Grant sympathized with Congress, and in- tended to obey their acts and pursue their policy. The object of the President was to defeat that policy, and to secure his own ; and what the correspondence most emphatically brought out was, that Grant was- against the President's policy, and in favor of that of Congress. GRANTS FINAL REPLY. 373 General Grant made a final reply on February nth, which closed the correspondence: "Head-Quarters Army of the United States, ) "Washington, D. C, February n, 1S68. J u His Excellency, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States : " Sir, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com- munication of the 10th instant, accompanied by the statements of five Cabinet ministers, of their recollections of what occurred in the Cabinet meeting on the 14th January. Without admitting any thing contained in these statements, when they differ from any thing heretofore stated by me, I propose to notice only the portion of your communication wherein I am charged with insubordination. " I think it will be plain to the reader of my letter of the 30th of January, that I did not propose to disobey any legal order of the Presi- dent distinctly given, but only gave an interpretation of what would be regarded as satisfactory evidence of the President's sanction to orders communicated by the Secretary of War. I will say here that your letter of the 10th instant contains the first intimation I have had that you did not accept my interpretation. " Now for the reasons for giving that interpretation : It was clear to me, before my letter of January 30th was written, that I, the person having more public business to transact with the Secretary of War than any other of the President's subordinates, was the only one who had been instructed to disregard the authority of Mr. Stanton, where his authority was derived as agent of the President. On the 27th of Janu- ary I received a letter from the Secretary of War (copy herewith) di- recting me to furnish an escort to the public treasure from the Rio Grande to New Orleans, etc., at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury to him. I also send two other inclosures, showing a recogni- tion of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War by both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster-General, in all of which cases the Secre- tary of War had to call upon me to make the orders requested, or give the information desired, and where his authority to do so is derived, in my view, as agent of the President. With an order so clearly ambiguous as that of the President's, here referred to, it was my duty to inform the President of my interpretation of it, and to abide by that interpretation till I received other orders. "Disclaiming any intention, now or heretofore, of disobeying any legal order of the President distinctly communicated, " I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, " U. S. Grant, General." 374 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. This closed the correspondence, and no friend of General Grant's will wish to withhold it from the pages of history. 3. It remains only to notice Grant's position on the finances of the country. In his administration of the War Department, as I have said, he immedi- ately retrenched all possible expense, and showed a great desire for economy. The same spirit which made him earnest for the supremacy of the Govern- ment during the war, makes him earnest for the sup- port of the National credit, and General Grant does not withhold his opinion that the National faith and integrity should be sustained to the utmost extent. He is for sustaining the credit of the country, and, for this purpose, exercising the most rigid economy. While I am writing these pages it seems quite manifest that Grant will be nominated for the Presi- dency by one of the great parties of the country. Looking to that possible event, we may look, for a moment, at some of the objections made to him. Some persons seem to have the idea that he lacks the education or the business qualities which a Presi- dent ought to have. Those who read this volume will hold no such opinion, for it is impossible to look upon his long and successful career at the head of great armies, at his letters, dispatches, and orders, without seeing at once that such a career is impossi- ble without education and talent. An education at West Point is the very best the country affords. If it be said he wants literary ability, we need only refer to this correspondence with the President ; and, if more HIS ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY, 375 evidence be required, it may be found in his letters and dispatches throughout the war. What, then, is wanting ? It can not be prudence, discretion, loyalty, or integrity, for if ever man came through a fiery or- deal safely in these particulars Grant has. In what respect, in any of these qualities, does he fall short of Mr. Monroe, who was eight years a most popular and successful President of the United States? The quality most necessary for a President, after the moral qualities, is administrative ability. And has not Grant given evidence of the highest ability in the adminis- tration of affairs ? If any one has doubts on this sub- ject, he may refer to Colonel Badeau's "Military His- tory of Grant," and read the numerous letters and dispatches concerning the conduct of the war. It is impossible to be a great general without being a great administrator. There are some persons, in fact a great number, who suppose that a President of the United States, occupying, perhaps, the most important executive office in the world, must be a man of shining quali- ties, whose genius, or manners, or dignity should com- mand the admiration of mankind. But this has not been the opinion of those most competent to judge, nor has it been the practice of the American people, nor can such Presidents be easily found. Certainly, Monroe, and Van Buren, and Polk were not men of this description. When I was a student at law in Litchfield, Conn., Oliver Wolcott, who had been Sec- retary of the Treasury under Washington, was Gov- ernor of the State, and resident in the village. I used 376 LIFE OF GENERAL GRANT. frequently to visit him, and converse on public affairs. He was a plain man, but thoroughly acquainted with the Revolutionary period. It was then a time of political calm, (1824,) and Mr. Adams, Mr. Calhoun, and Mr. Clinton were talked of for the Presidency. These were all, in some sense, men of genius — bril- liant men. I was looking for men of illustrious quali- ties, and, on a bright summer afternoon, we talked over the subject. Governor Wolcott said that "it was a mistake to look for men of genius in the Govern- ment ; that the administration of government did not require genius or eloquence, but plain business talents, with integrity and fidelity." Said he, "There is old S , in Pennsylvania, would make as good a Presi- dent as any man." I was struck with surprise, for I recollected S as industrious, and full of statistics, but as not at all representing the ideal of an illustri- ous man. I went away with my admiration for genius undiminished, and rejoiced in the election of Mr. Adams. It has turned out that the country has had Presidents whom it would gladly have exchanged for old S , and I earnestly hope it may never have worse. The moral qualities are far the highest ; and if we can get a man of unimpeachable integrity, who is FAITHFUL TO THE COUNTRY, OBEDIENT TO LAW, RE- SPECTFUL TO RELIGION, and LOYAL IN THE FIERY CON- FLICT of arms, we shall have secured enough, at least, to hope for a successful administration in the times of trial and of trouble which the country has yet evidently to pass through. The patriot will believe in its wel- CONCLUSION. 377 fare. The Christian will do more. He will not be- lieve that God has brought the Nation through great calamities only to cast it away on shallow sands. He will hope and believe that the great Christian Re- public will long survive, to be the Defense of Liberty and the Leader of Nations. LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. CHAPTER I. BORN IN NEW YORK — GOES TO SCHOOL — IS CLERK — GOES TO INDIANA — DEPUTY AUDITOR — REPORTER OF THE SENATE- EDITOR OF ST. JOSEPH'S REGISTER — WHIG IN POLITICS — ADOPTS THE ANTISLAVERY DOCTRINES — ELECTED TO CONGRESS — SPEAKS AGAINST THE NEBRASKA BILL — RE- ELECTED. SCHUYLER COLFAX is a descendant of the Revolutionary stock. His grandfather, General William Colfax, was Captain of General Washington's body-guard, through the Revolutionary war. His grandmother was Hester Schuyler, of the old New York family of Schuylers, and a cousin of General Philip Schuyler. His father was an officer of one of the New York city banks, and died before his son was born. Schuyler is an only son, and was born in a house in North Moore Street, near West Broad- way, in the city of New York, March 23, 1823. ' He went to a common school in New York, was always ''Putnam's Magazine, June, 1 868. 384 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. at the head of his class, and finished his education at the remarkably early age of ten years. But this is speaking in common parlance, and in a mistaken sense ; for education is never ended, and there are some young men who understand this. Of these was Mr. Colfax, who, as we shall see, carried on his edu- cation for himself, in the then backwoods of Indiana. His school-life then ended, because, when he was ten years old, his mother married again, to a Mr. Matthews, who kept a store in New York. The next three years were spent in his step-father's store.' The family were not rich, and therefore did what so many thousands did before them, emigrated to the West. In 1836, when Schuyler was thirteen years of age, they moved, going through Michigan, with all their worldly goods in a wagon. They settled at New Carlisle, St. Joseph's county, Indiana. At that time this re- gion was comparatively a wilderness, although it now blooms with the beauty of a rich soil, cultivated by the hand of Industry. Here, for thirty-two years, has been his real home, although exiled most of the time by the duties of public office conferred on him by his fellow-citizens. Five years after he went there, his step-father, Mr. Matthews, was elected County Auditor, and appointed him a deputy. The County Auditor's office in the West is a pretty good school for a young man to learn general business in, and es- pecially any thing about lands. Schuyler soon became master of all the usages and precedents relating to the assessment of lands, the laying out of roads, and building of county bridges ; in all which learning he 1 Ladies' Repository, September, 1867. REPORTER OF THE SENATE. 385 was deemed high authority. 1 But what became of him in the five years before ? Mr. Colfax is called a "printer's boy," but there is no evidence of that at all. 2 After he went to New Carlisle, he served again as clerk, in that village, till, in his eighteenth year, he went into Mr. Matthews's office as Deputy Auditor. Before there is any evidence of his being a printer, Mr. Colfax had an education of another sort, which was probably the very cause of his subsequent suc- cess in public life. While in the Auditor's office the young men got up a Debating Society, and resolved themselves into a Moot Legislature, where Schuyler figured as "the gentleman from Newton county." 3 Here, of course, the members were exercised in de- bating, and studied the rules of Parliamentary pro- cedure. Of all the exercises to bring out the mind, and make a ready man, the best are the oral discus- sions. More men of distinction in public life owe their success and fame to exercises of literary socie- ties than to any one cause. But Colfax had another advantage. In the next two years he served as Sen- ate Reporter to the State Journal, at Indianapolis. Here he learned the practice of Parliamentary usages. We can now see how Mr. Colfax was educated to be Speaker of the House of Representatives, and one of the best it ever had. When we trace up men and events to their real causes, we see that a destiny shapes our ends. Men are educated to certain ends, 1 Ladies' Repository, September, 1867. 2 1 have examined four different accounts of Mr. Colfax, one of which was prepared by his Secretary, and there is no statement what- ever that he was a "printer's boy" 3 Ladies' Repository, September, 1867. 33 386 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. without any intention of their own, and when, per- haps, no fancy or ambition directed them to any such results. The article on Mr. Colfax, in Putnam's Magazine,' says he was bred a printer ; but I can find no author- ity for that statement, and his first appearance in a printing office seems to have been when, after serv- ing as a Reporter at Indianapolis, he got a taste for newspapers, and became editor and proprietor of the " St. Joseph's Valley Register." He was then just twenty-one, and is described, at that time, as a light, spindling, flaxen-haired youth, with a delicate tem- perament, and no particular indication of rising to any great hight of ambition. But there are two pro- fessions in the country which have been the stepping- stones of many a distinguished man, and yet, at first sight, would not seem to inspire much ambition, or create much popular talent : these are those of the schoolmaster and the editor. Many of the early fathers of the Republic were schoolmasters, and many of the men now in active public life have been edi- tors. And here let us pause one moment, to consider the profession of an editor ; and since Mr. Colfax was more years in that profession than in any other, it is proper to look at it as an educator of mind, and a power in the country. Much is said about the power of the press, and its usefulness ; but this is, in some degree, a misnomer. It is not the press, but the newspaper, which is a power in the land. The press may issue a book, which is a work of science, a poem, or a novel, but it exercises no influence. Its 1 Putnam, June, 1868. THE NE WSPAPER. 387 readers are few compared with those of a newspaper, and it announces no opinions in the current style and coloring of the day. A quarterly or monthly does little more, except on merely literary subjects. All these fail as organs of thought on the important and interesting subjects of the clay. The subjects on which men talk and think are religion, politics, society, and business. These are the subjects of thought and conversation, and these are the ones on which newspapers are constantly employed — con- stantly giving information — constantly advocating or opposing. The newspaper is the great channel of human thought, and the great purveyor of facts and news. Hence it is that almost all intelligent men take newspapers, and get from them information on all subjects, except those of mere science or litera- ture, and even of the last get most of their views. It is the newspaper, therefore, that is the power in the land, and it is the editor who directs that power. It is most fortunate that the demand for newspapers has created a great number ; so that this vast power is not confined to few hands. If it were, it would be in the power of the newspaper press to turn, direct, or distort the opinions of the country in almost any way. Happily we have newspapers of every shade of opinion, and of every sect, business, or profession. In this view of the case, the office of editor is the most responsible one in the country. It is not so high in rank as that of the minister of the Gospel, nor are its statements so supremely im- portant as those of the Gospel ; but its utterances reach far greater numbers, and on a far greater 388 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. variety of topics, and its means are far more power- ful. Imagine some Hume or Voltaire, some Talley- rand or Burr, editing a widely circulated newspaper, knowing enough of the world not to oppose the re- ligion or morals of the country directly, but suppress- ing and keeping out of sight the great Christian doctrines, sneering at fanatics and enthusiasts in any good cause, treating all sorts of practices as equally moral, flattering the vanities and fashions of society, and speaking of its vices with indifference ; imagine this, and you will see how numbers of readers will be gradually educated to a skepticism on religion, and an indifference to morals. Such examples of news- papers we already have in this country, and it is only by the fact that there are good, prudent Christian men, in the great body of the newspaper press, that the country is saved from a deluge of false opinions and corrupt practices. Mr. Colfax was the editor of a local country pa- per, and therefore not able to wield that wide influ- ence on society which such a man would wield in a great city, and which he now does wield in the dif- ferent career of statesman and patriot. Those who have written accounts of him have passed lightly over this part of his life ; but it was precisely in this he exercised the most influence, and it was this which made him what he is. Mr. Colfax here showed both his virtues and his business capacity. He took the South Bend Register when he was twenty-one years old, with two hundred and fifty subscribers, acting as both foreman and editor. Mrs. Stowe, 1 in her notice 1 u Men of Our Times," p. 349. EDITOR OF ST. JOSEPH REGISTER. 389 of him, says, what not one in one hundred of those who set up newspapers seem to understand, that the first year of a newspaper is not only one of trial and experiment, but one of absolute outlay, which must be counted as part of the capital, and not the ex- penses of the paper. Mr. Colfax, perhaps, did not un- derstand this, but he was industrious, hopeful, and persevering. Mr. Colfax reached the end of the year, owing #1,375, which was quite moderate, considering that he began without knowing any thing about a newspaper. The paper gradually became productive ; but, after a time, the office was burnt down, and was uninsured. So he had to begin again, but with the advantage of experience, and a well-earned character for honesty, fairness, and sound principles. But how did Colfax conduct himself as editor ? That is a test question ; for, even with good men as editors, there are few who will not bend sometimes to popular opinion, even when erroneous, and trim their sails to catch the popular breeze. There were some things twenty years ago, when he was editor, in which it was rather difficult to conduct a newspaper right, and yet retain the public confidence. Two of these were slavery and temperance ; the former was a subject just arising into hot debate, and the latter always divides society, in regard to its application. But young Colfax (for he was then young) never hesitated about such things. He seems, so far as we know any thing about it, to have started in life with right principles, and to have kept them. He has steadily advocated temperance reform, and as steadily sup- ported antislavery principles, but has never been 390 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. harsh, bitter, or unreasonable, and therefore has al- ways commanded the respect, and even favor, of his opponents. After being a reporter at Indianapolis, and the editor of a country newspaper, it was impos- sible to avoid politics, if he would, and his was not a nature to wish it. Politics is a sort of atmosphere in which every body in this country breathes, and, in fact, every freeman on earth must breathe. There is no avoiding it, if we would be free. In the natural course of events, there is one class of people which has more to do with politics than any other ; this is the class of editors. Through the newspaper all polit- ical opinions are uttered, and the editors hear, and generally take part in, all that is said and done on the subject. The county paper of St. Joseph's county, Indiana, could not be silent on such subjects, and Colfax had already formed his opinions. I can speak of his politics with knowledge and sympathy, for when he was editing a paper at South Bend, I was editing one in Cincinnati. We were both of exactly the same school of politics. This school was that of the Progressive Whigs. From the very beginning, the Whig party had within itself two schools — one was what is now called Conservatives, and the other, not exactly Radicals, (although some members might be called so,) but Progressives. The particular subject of difference was slavery. The Progressive Whigs followed the doctrines and views of John Quincy Adams. This eminent states- man was the founder and head of the Antislavery party, which at length abolished slavery, and pro- duced the great social revolution now going on. JOHN Q. ADAMS'S VIEWS. 39 1 Great fame is now given to the sayings and doings of Mr. Chase, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Sumner, and others, of the present Republican school of politics. JUit the great head of this school was Mr. Adams, who was, in every way, vastly superior to his pupils. When history comes to be written of these events — • as in another generation it will be — no doubt proper praise will be given to those who formed and led the Republican party; but to Mr. Adams will be given the praise of what is justly his due — every one of the political doctrines on which they acted. His great speeches on the Amistad Case, the Right of Petition, and the Texas Question, contain all the political doctrines on the question of Human Rights, under the Constitution, from that day to this — and put forth with more power and eloquence than they have been by any of the Republican chiefs. The greatest ques- tion of the war, and the vital one, that, under the war power, slavery could be abolished, was an- nounced and defended in Mr. Adams's great speech on the Texas Question. It was unanswerable. And when the war broke out, the full force and import- ance of his doctrines became obvious ; but we remem- ber with how much slowness Mr. Lincoln carried them into practice, and how long it has taken the nation to rise up to the doctrines of Mr. Adams. Lincoln was himself the only man of the Republi- can party, who rose up to the political philosophy of John Quincy Adams. The Democratic party had men of strong abolition feelings, but the best of them had to get out of the party, before they could get up to the level of Adams and Lincoln. In point of 392 LIFE OF SCHUTLER COLFAX. ability, nobody got up to that level. Adams with his learning, Lincoln with his honesty, and both with the genius of freedom, rose high into that pure atmos- phere of justice and truth which few men ever reach. When I reflect that, notwithstanding all the depravi- ties of politics, and all the weakness of politicians, this country has had, in forty years, two such Presi- dents as John Quincy Adams and Abraham Lincoln, I feel that there is ground for hope and confidence in republican institutions. To the antislavery wing of the Whig party, to which Mr. Colfax belonged, is historically due all the great progress in great principles, which the last ten years have produced. The little sect of original Abolitionists were right, and honest, and energetic, but they were politically powerless. The best and most honest of the sect was William Lloyd Garrison ; but, what was he able to do in a long series of years ? Only to impress a few minds, and, by his own suffer- ings, to show what the cruelties and malign influences of slavery were. What could Wendell Phillips do? Absolutely nothing. With all his classic eloquence he produced no impression on the public mind. What did the little political sect called the Liberty party do ? They did a good deal of political mischief, and no possible good. The leaven of a right principle was working in the country ; but it would have taken generations for that alone to have accomplished the political revolution, which soon after occurred. It was equally in vain to appeal to the antislavery prin- ciples of Mr. Jefferson, as an element of the Demo- cratic party. The Democratic party was governed FIRST PUBLIC SERVICE. 393 by the South, and the South was almost unanimous. There were bright and rising minds in the Demo- cratic party of the North, who felt the galling and degrading moral slavery to which they were reduced ; but there was only here and there one who had the moral courage to resist that slavery. The power of slavery was a political power. It was imbedded in the Constitution, by the right of representation, by the election of President, and by the reclamation of fugitive slaves ; all of which were parts of the solid structure of that instrument. To talk of the Consti- tution being an antislavery instrument, with these provisions in it, was a palpable absurdity, to which the popular mind never for a moment gave assent. The true and great political doctrines, on which alone slavery could be destroyed, were announced by Mr. Adams; namely: 1. That slavery did not exist on the high seas ; 2. That it has no right to a political or territorial extension ; and, 3. That the war power could abolish slavery. Nothing could carry these principles into practical effect, but a political organ- ization ; and nothing could destroy slavery but war. The antislavery Whigs (who were by far the greatest in number), with the antislavery Democrats, accomplished the first, by the organization of the Republican party. Divine Providence, working by invisible, but inevi- table laws, accomplished the last. Slavery perished under the war power of the Constitution. Let us now return to Mr. Colfax. It was in the school of the antislavery Whigs he received his po- litical ideas, to which he has ever been faithful. " Mr. Colfax's first more public service began in 394 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. 1848, as member and Secretary of the Whig Con- vention, which nominated General Taylor for Presi- dent. In 1850 he was an active member of the Convention which framed the present Constitution of Indiana. Here he persistently opposed the un- manly clause prohibiting free colored men from en- tering the State. This clause, submitted separately to the people, was indorsed by majorities of eight thousand in his district, and ninety thousand in the State ; yet, where a mere political trimmer would have waived the personal issue, he, like a man, openly voted with the minority, though he was at the time a candidate for Congress." 1 In 1850, when he opposed the pro-slavery clause of the Indiana Constitution, slavery was triumphant in the country. It forced its doctrine into the Whig platform of 1852, and forced the Democratic party to nominate Franklin Pierce, who had ever been the subservient instrument of its doctrines. Nothing could be more significant of its entire predominance in the country than the fact of its forcing into the Indiana Constitution a clause prohibiting freemen from entering the State because they were colored ! Mr. Colfax was in a minority; but he had the moral courage to resist the rising tide of popular prejudices. He has lived to see the people reject those false doc- trines, and himself rise to a triumphant majority. Mr. Colfax was elected to Congress in 1852, in a district which had been Democratic, but which has reelected him to every Congress since, except one. In those sixteen years, the number of votes given 1 Ladies' Repository, December, 1867. crisis of 1854. 395 in his district has doubled, and his majority has in- creased in proportion. This is due, no doubt, in part, to his suavity of manners and kindness of conduct ; but it is due more to his consistency of principle and his sound judgment on public affairs. In 1854 came one of the great crises of the country ; it was the attempt to force slavery into the new territories. There were three ideas thrown out, and made the pivots of three political sects. The first was the true pro-slavery doctrine, that slavery had a right to go any where within the bounds of the United States, and to be protected every-where. The doctrine was, that a negro slave is, like an ox, property, and being property, his master, the owner, had a right to carry him any where he went himself; and as he had the right to migrate into the territories himself, so he had a right to carry his ox and his slave there. Of course, if this was true, any legislation against it was unconstitutional. The second doctrine, but really a modification of this, was that of Mr. Douglas, which is commonly known as "squatter sovereignty." This really admitted the right claimed by the South, but said, that the people of the territories had a right to regulate the subject of slavery, and make the territory free if they chose. This doctrine was really the same with the doctrine of Mr. Webster, in his speech of the 7th of March, 1850, that Nature would regulate it ; that climate forbade the existence of slavery in some territories, such as New Mexico, and therefore there was no danger from it in the Northern terri- tories. The vice of both the doctrines of Douglas and Webster was the same ; that they admitted the 396 LIFE OF SC1IUTLER COLFAX. right of the slaveholders to carry their slaves into any territory, and protect them there, whether Con- gress chose or not. Of the two modifications, the South evidently preferred Webster's, for they knew that Northern territories would be filled with North- ern people, and they were much more willing to trust Nature than the Northern people in dealing with slavery. The third idea was that of the antislavery Whigs, to which I have alluded, that slavery had no right to extend itself, either territorially or politically ; that man was property only within the limits of the slave States, and that the territory of the United States (not organized into States) was the domain of freedom, where a man was a man, and an ox an ox ; where the latter might be property, but the former could not. This was equally opposed to the pro-slavery and the "squatter sovereignty" doctrines. Mr. Webster was encountered by Mr. Seward, and Mr. Douglas by the whole Whig party, for "squatter sovereignty" was to them equally absurd and obnoxious. The conflict must necessarily be narrowed down to the single is- sue of prohibiting or of protecting slavery in the terri- tories. The Thirty-Third Congress, of which Colfax was not a member, passed what was known as the Ne- braska Bill, permitting the extension of slavery. This act produced an extraordinary political revolution in the North, and astonished the South. The people had for years been wearied out with the pretensions and impositions of the South. If they had great leaders, who were willing to lead them in the career of new ideas, the revolution would have come much sooner ; but Providence shapes our ends, and the course of CONTEST FOR SPEAKER. 397 events was directed much better than we could foresee. The census of i860 was necessary to make the tri- umph of freedom sure. In the mean while, Colfax took ground with the party of the people and of free- dom. He was immediately made a candidate for Congress, and, in 1854, elected by two thousand ma- jority. The Thirty-Fourth Congress met December 3, 1855, with a majority opposed to the Administration. The majority, however, were not united on any one principle. Nearly half were Anti-Nebraska men, so called; but they were not quite a majority. The balance of power was held by about forty members, elected by the "American party." The result was a most remarkable contest for the Speakership, which lasted from December 3, 1855, to February 2, 1856 — two months. The practical importance of electing a Speaker consisted chiefly in this, that, by the rules of the House, he had the appointment of the Committees, and then the controlling of their actions, not the action of the House, by shaping the manner in which measures should be presented. The House presented a curious scene. For a month the voting went on about thus: Banks (Anti-Nebraska) 105 Richardson (Democrat) 75 Fuller (American) 4 1 Pennington (Anti-Nebraska) .... 8 It is plain that the second and third had a major- ity over the other two. The Pennington votes added to those of Banks would not elect him. Unless something could be gained from the American 398 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. clique, an Anti-Nebraska candidate could not be elected. About a month after this contest began, Mr. Campbell, of Ohio, offered a resolution, that Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, "be invited to preside tem- porarily till a Speaker be elected." This was simply a motion to give every thing over to the Pro-Slavery party, and it came nigh succeeding. A motion to lay this resolution on the table failed by twenty ma- jority. At this moment Mr. Colfax rose, and moved that, in order to a fair equality, each of the three parties to the contest be allowed to elect a tempo- rary Chairman, and these to preside alternately, in the order they may agree upon. A debate arose ; a recess was taken, and next day the resolution was withdrawn. Another month passed by, and at last it was agreed that the Speaker should be elected by a plurality. Then Mr. Banks, of Massachusetts, was elected, by a vote of one hundred and three to one hundred for Mr. Aiken, of South Carolina. Congress remained in session a long while ; and it was in this, June 21, 1856, that Mr. Colfax delivered a strong speech on the infamous proceedings in Kansas, which, under the name of constitutions and laws, excited the horror and indignation of almost the entire mass of the free and intelligent citizens. The laws attempted to be imposed upon Kansas, were imposed by Mis- souri ruffians, and enforced by immigrant bullies from the Southern States. One of these laws actually in- flicted imprisonment at hard labor, with ball and chain, upon those who should even say that persons had not the right to hold slaves in that Territory! This was monstrous. It would have sent to jail MR. COLFAX'S SPEECH. 399 nearly all the great men of the nation, and Mr. Col- fax handled this law against the Pro-Slavery party with great effect. The close of Mr. Colfax's speech 1 was a very happy allusion to the course of Mr. Clay, and a prophetic intimation of our civil war. "As I look, sir, to the smiling valleys and fertile plains of Kansas, and witness there the sorrowful scenes of civil war, in which, when forbearance at last ceased to be a virtue, the Free-State men of the Ter- ritory felt it to be necessary, deserted as they were by their Government, to defend their lives, their fam- ilies, their property, and their hearth-stones, the lan- guage of one of the noblest statesmen of the age, uttered six years ago at the other end of the Capitol, rises before my mind — I allude to the great states- man of Kentucky, Henry Clay. And while the party which, while he lived, lit the torch of slander at every avenue of his private life, and libeled him be- fore the American people by every epithet that ren- ders man infamous, as a gambler, debauchee, traitor, and enemy of his country, are now engaged in shed- ding fictitious tears over his grave, and appealing to his old supporters to aid by their votes in shielding them from the indignation of an uprisen people, I ask them to read this language of his, which comes to us as from his tomb to-day. With the change of but a single geographical word in the place of Mex- ico, how prophetically does it point to the very scenes and issues of this year ! And who can doubt with what party he would stand in the coming campaign if he were restored to us from the damps of the 1 1 copy from Mrs. Stowe's "Men of our Times." 4ritv ever given to a Speaker • ii rtioned figure of medium ntenance often radiant with smiles, ment quick and restless, yet calm and teristic of him upon whom In the past a printer and ed- ■. I ngress for the sixth term, ker the second time, Schuyler take the oath of office, and enter • most difficult and responsible use of Representatives, — The . marking as it does the nal history, is always regarded the people for whom it is to legis- not unsafe to say that millions more . North, South, East, and West, are • • • Cor jess which opens its session to- j and solicitude unequaled on ,ns in the past The Thirty-Eighth ed its constitutional existence with the . 1 of war still lowering over us, and after 408 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. nine months' absence, Congress resumes its legisla- tive authority in these council halls, rejoicing that from shore to shore in our land there is peace. " Its duties are as obvious as the sun's pathway in the heavens. Representing in its two branches the States and the people, its first and highest obli- gation is to guarantee to every State a republican form of government. The . rebellion having over- thrown constitutional State governments in many States, it is yours to mature and enact legislation which, with the concurrence of the Executive, shall establish them anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee all necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what our Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of government — protection to all men in their inalienable rights. The world should witness, in this great work, the most inflexible fidelity, the most earnest devotion to the principles of liberty and hu- manity, the truest patriotism and the wisest states- manship. " Heroic men, by hundreds of thousands, have died that the Republic might live. The emblems of mourning have darkened White House and cabin alike ; but the fires of civil war have melted every fetter in the land, and proved the funeral pyre of slavery. It is for you, Representatives, to do your work as faithfully and as well as did the fearless saviors of the Union in their more dangerous arena of duty. Then we may hope to see the vacant and once abandoned seats around us gradually filling up, till this hall shall contain Representatives from every THE SPEAKER'S OATH. 409 State and district; their hearts devoted to the Union for which they are to legislate, jealous of its honor, proud of its glory, watchful of its rights, and hostile to its enemies. And the stars on our banner, that paled when the States they represented arrayed them- selves in arms against the nation, will shine with a more brilliant light of loyalty than ever before." Mr. Colfax, having finished his address, took the following oath, which stood as the most serious ob- stacle in the way of many elected to Congress from the Southern States : " I do solemnly swear that I have never volunta- rily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encourage- ment to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto ; that I have neither sought, nor accepted, nor at- tempted to exercise the functions of any office what- ever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domes- tic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion ; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God !" Mr. Colfax was reelected Speaker of the Fortieth 53 410 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. Congress. He is said to be the most popular, and, except Henry Clay, the ablest Speaker of the House of Representatives. An article in Putnam's Magazine for June, 1867, thus describes Mr. Colfax's characteristics in Con- gress : " Without being bred a lawyer, practical familiar- ity with legislation has taught him all that is most valuable in law, freed from the conservatism and in- aptitude for change and reform which rest like an in- cubus on so many of those minds which are bred by the habits of the legal profession to look for prece- dents which show what the law has been, rather than to broad principles which settle what the law ought to be. Yet Mr. Colfax has frequently shown the happiest familiarity with precedents, especially in questions of parliamentary practice. As a presiding officer he is the most popular the House has had since Henry Clay. His marvelous quickness of thought, and talent for the rapid administration of details, enables him to hold the reins of the House of Representatives, even in its most boisterous and turbulent moods, (and with the exception of the New York Board of Brokers, the British House of Com- mons, or a Fair at Donnybrook, it is the most up- roarious body in the world,) with as much ease and grace as Mr. Bonner would show the paces of Dexter in Central Park, or as Gottschalk would thread the keys of a piano, in a dreamy maze of faultless, quivering melody. As an orator, Mr. Colfax is not argumentative, except as clear statement and sound judgment are convincing. He rides no erratic CHARACTERISTICS OF MR. COLFA V. .\\l hobbies. He demands few policies which the aver sense of intelligent men can not be made to assent to on a clear statement of his position. He ia emi- nently representative. A glance at his broad, well- balanced, practical brain indicates that his leading faculty is the sum of all the faculties — judgment, and that what he believes the majority of the people either believe or can be made to believe. Some men may be further ahead of the age. Mr. Colfax finds sufficient occupation and usefulness in adapting him- self to times and things as they are, without cutting his throat with paradoxes or stealing a march on man- kind with some new light, which they are very likely to regard as a 'will-o'-the-wisp.' He has no eccen- tricities, but great tact. His talents arc administra- tive and executive, rather than deliberative. lie would make good appointments, and adopt sure policies. He would make a better President, or Speaker of the House, than Senator. He knows men well, estimates them correctly, treats them all fairly and candidly. No man will get through his business with you in fewer minutes, and yet none is more free from the horrid brusqiieness of busy men. There are heart and kindness in Mr. Colfax's politeness. Men leave his presence with the impression that he is at once an able, honest, and kind man. Political opponents like him personally, as well as his political friends." The above account of Mr. Colfax is most strik- ingly correct, when it says he is a "representative man." This he would not be if he were a great gen- ius, a great scholar, a great lawyer, or even a great statesman; for such men are not "representative 412 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. men." A representative man must be one who holds the general ideas, sentiments, and manners of the people, but holds them fully up to the best stand- ard ; with full information on the laws, usages, and topics of the day. If there be such a man, he is more likely to rise from the class of editors than from any other in the community; for there is no other class of men brought so much in contact with the general opinions, customs, manners, and men of the day. They always have literature enough to appear well on paper, and information enough not to make blunders on common topics. If we now suppose such a man to have been brought up with sound principles of business and religion ; to have a profound love of country; to have experience as a legislator; and to have mingled much with public men, we shall have such a man as Mr. Colfax is. He has also had the good sense to have availed himself of all possible opportunities of seeing and understanding his own country. In the intervals of Congress, we find him traversing the continent on the overland route, and personally investigating those distant Territories and prolific mines in which he had felt much interest. His observations he condensed into an interesting lecture, and we again find him delivering that lecture in the great cities of the country. This journey and lecturing furnished a wide field of observation, as well as a healthy exercise of the mind. In this he shares a similar experience to that of the Earl of Carlisle, who having traveled in the United States, gave the results of his observations, in a lecture, to the people of England. The office of lecturer may not seem the MR. COLFA X'S LECTURE. 4 1 3 highest in the country; some men have made it a mere profession; but in the case of a clear-headed, well-informed public man it may be made very use- ful. It is one of the ways of educating the people, Mr. Colfax seems to have some literary ability, and be willing to exercise it for the instruction of the people. Just one year ago he delivered an addr on the "Education of the Heart," at Aurora Semi- nary, Illinois; from this I here take some extracts, in which the reader will find a truly religious spirit, which he has carried into all his public addresses, and to which his life has conformed. After noticing that no animal is so helpless as a child, and that the child comes into the world with the mixed principles of good and evil, he says : " It is men that make the State. An island full of savages can be nothing but a savage State. Where the people worship idols of wood and stone, mankind call it a heathen State. A country of impure men must be an impure State. But where Morality and Intelligence prevail, and Right bears sway, and Con- science is respected and obeyed, the onlooking world recognizes that there is a country worthy to be em- braced in the circle of Christendom, and to rank high among the civilized States of the earth "If you concede, then — as you must, for history is full of its proofs — that the hope of a country is with its young, how priceless are the hundreds of in- stitutions like this, and the tens of thousands of schools of other grades in which our land rejoices to- day ! How truly did Cicero declare : ' Study cherishes youth, delights age, adorns prosperity, furnishes 41 4 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. support in adversity, tarries with us by night and by day, and attends us in all our journeyings and wander- ings !' And again, when on another occasion that eloquent orator eulogized Wisdom : ' For what is there,' said he, ' more desirable than Wisdom ? What more excellent and lovely in itself? What more use- ful and becoming for a man ? Or what more worthy of his reasonable nature ?' And in the inspired record Solomon, in even a loftier strain than the master of Roman eloquence, exclaims, 'Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understand- ing. For the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine gold. Length of days is in her right hand, and in her left hand riches and honor. She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her, and happy is every one that retaineth her. Exalt her, and she shall pro- mote thee. She shall bring to thy head an ornament of grace. A crown of glory shall she deliver to thee.'" I do not know where a common, but great truth has been better expressed than in the following para- graph from Mr. Colfax's address: " Truth may have, as in the olden time, but a single worshiper, while Baal has his thousands of priests. And the man who stands fearlessly for the right amid the devotees of wrong; who wars, single-handed if need be, against tyranny or treason where Evil and Injus- tice have their legions of minions ; who loves the good and follows in its ways because it is the right, and eschews error and wickedness however easy or profit- able may be its service; who calmly and confidently RELIGIOUS CHARACTER. 415 looks to the future for his vindication ; and who like Christian in that sacred Iliad, the 'Pilgrim's Progress/ presses forward in the journey of life with steady and fearless step, regardless of Apollyon, of Vanity Fair, or even the Giant Despair — that man, whether in palace or cottage, under a republican or despotic flag, the most learned or the most illiterate of his land, is the true moral victor on the battle-field of life. He shall have his reward ; for in that land where the streets are gold, and the gates are pearl, and the walls are jasper and sapphire, his star of victory shall shine brighter and brighter; while the laurels of scepter and of crown, of office and of fame, shall wither into the dust and ashes out of which they were formed." These extracts from Mr. Colfax's address on the "Education of the Heart" prove three things: that he has good literary abilities ; that he is in favor of good education, and that his views of the great principles of life are those of the true Christian. If, by any contingency, Mr. Colfax should come to be President of this country, it will not be said that the wicked bear rule, or that private vices degrade public station, in the person of the Chief Magistrate. The religious character of Mr. Colfax is such as we may reasonably infer it to be from the facts I have given. On one side he was descended from the Dutch, of New York, and the family attended the Dutch Church. One who knew about them says of Schuyler: "Ay, wise Doctor, 'religion is their only sure and proper source.' That religion gained the early ad- herence of Mr. Colfax, who many years ago began a 416 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. Christian life, joining the Dutch Reformed Church, and serving humbly and usefully as a Sunday school teacher for twelve years. The ' pious passages ' so frequent in his public speeches are not mere senti- ment or oratorical arts, for he loves to talk in private of how God rules, and how distinctly and how often in our history his holy arm has been re- vealed ; and the ascription of praise comes from a worshiping heart, reliant on God through Christ. His personal example at Washington is luminous. When twenty, he made vows of strict abstinence, which have never been broken. Liquors and wines are never used at his receptions, while Presidential din- ners and diplomatic banquets are utterly powerless to abate one jot or tittle of his firmness. Many well remember his late speech at the Congressional tem- perance meeting, and how he banished the sale of liquor from all parts of the Capitol within his juris- diction." l It is said that at the Chicago Convention, the friends of Mr. Colfax offered no liquors during the canvass. His temperance doctrines may not help him in the coming election, but it is an honorable record, and surely no man in this nation, in his calm judg- ment, can regret that the country is saved from such scenes as we have been compelled recently to endure. To give an outline view of Mr. Colfax's appear- ance and manners, I take, from the same authority, 5 the following description : "Mr. Colfax is under medium hight, with brown 1 Ladies' Repository, September, 1867. 2 H. S. Tower, Esq., of Chicago, formerly Secretary to Mr. Colfax. AS A PUBLIC SPEAKER. 417 hair, a brow firmly molded, a blue, open, and gener- ous eye, a frank face full of character, a mouth strongly inclined to smile at the least provocation, al- though clearly showing that firmness, decision, en- ergy, and kindness of heart which have done so much to make him what he is. " Mr. Colfax is not learned in the University sense ; but he possesses great practical wisdom, and a thorough self-education, and his industry was fore- shadowed in his early and very brief school-life. His intellect is clear, his reading wide, perceptions quick, convictions deep, and sense of duty as imperative as a voice from the sky. Honorably unselfish, unques- tionably sincere, no wire-pulling trickster, no preten- tious humbug whose eminence alone protects him from exposure, generous to subordinates and true to all, he deserves the love which he is sure to retain. Having obtained position as a mere incident to duty, he justly estimates the conditions of permanent suc- cess. Believing that a true man has always at hand all legitimate material, he scorns to corduroy his path to eminence with the bodies of competitors. "As a speaker he is ready, seldom hesitating to replace a word, or failing to touch the quick of a question, never employing any thing for stage effect; but straightforward, direct, and often exquisitely ele- gant in image and diction, he is, in the genuine sense, eloquent. His every speech is a success, and though one often wonders how he will extricate himself in the varied and often untimely calls made upon his treasury, he always closes with added wealth of grati- fied admirers. If George Canning was once the 41 8 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. Cicero of the British Senate, Colfax is to-day that of the American House." The latter is not so high a tribute to Mr. Colfax as it might be, for American oratory is now at a very low ebb ; and the House of Representatives has not now a single orator of any real eminence. Mr. Col- fax is, however, a fluent, pleasant speaker, whose lec- ture on his overland journey was every-where re- ceived with applause. When the labors of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were over — the most remarkable Congress that ever assembled — Mr. Colfax returned to his home in Indi- ana, to endure the home-test — the most severe of all. A writer, describing it, says: " On last Wednesday, August I, 1866, Hon. Schuy- ler Colfax reached his home at South Bend, Indiana, where he was greeted in good, old-fashioned Hoosier style by earnest, loyal political and personal friends. These, with heart-felt unanimity, seemed to share a common spirit of enthusiasm. When the morn- ing train reached Laporte and South Bend, crowds were in waiting. At the depot of the latter place were old patriarchs who knew ' our boy Schuy- ler/ middle-aged men whom he had gracefully dis- tanced in the race of life, and wondering children, to whom this was a holiday, attending carriages, wagons, nondescript vehicles of all sorts, flags, ban- ners, and bands playing ' Home, Sweet Home,' all in waiting to honor the return of a distinguished yet simple-hearted citizen. Descending from the railway platform, Mr. Colfax was almost literally carried by the arms to an adjoining rostrum, where, in intense COMPETITORS FOR VICE-PRESIDENCY. 419 silence, the formal yet sincere and touching welcome was pronounced by Judge Wade, formerly Colonel of the Seventy-Third Indiana Infantry, who, during the war, was by Mr. Colfax delivered from actual squalid horrors and impending death in Libby Prison. " For once in our life, amid all this unostentatious, is excitement of that pure inland town, we overed a prophet having honor and enjoying love •in his own country.' We would rather have that honor and love than the Speakership. Twice happy the man who enjoys both at the hands of the Amer- 1 Republic !" The fact is, Mr, Colfax is a representative Ameri- 1 man — a genuine American, and a Christian — thoroughly acquainted with the country — kind, urbane, and courteous. With these personal qualities, he has a large experience in public affairs, and with the rules and usages of business; a sort of knowledge which . even of our ablest men, have, but which is inval- uable in the public service. Such is the man whom the Republican Convention » nominated as Vice-President of the United It was not for want of able and honorable rs that Mr. Colfax was selected. Mr. Wade, iident of the Senate, distinguished for long and useful public service ; Mr. Hamlin, who was Vice- ] sident in Mr. Lincoln's term; Mr. Fenton, the able and honored Governor of New York; Mr. Wil- Bon, Senator from Massachusetts; and others, scarcely known and valued, were his competitors; yet, the fifth ballot, Schuyler Colfax was nominated, 420 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. and his nomination has been received by the country with such universal pleasure that there can be no doubt that it was emphatically a nomination jit to be made. If such a man can not be elected, when such a man as Andrew Johnson has been, it may be taken as strong evidence that our elections are no test of either virtue, talent, or fitness. When the Chicago Convention had nominated Grant and Colfax, that assembly had done all which it was possible to do to present the country with men fit, by virtues, abilities, and public services, to conduct its public affairs to honorable and suc- cessful issues. It remained only to declare their views and principles as to what measures the country should adopt. This it did, in the most explicit man- ner. It declared for the unity of the country on the reconstruction acts of Congress ; for the sacredness of the public debt ; for the equality of all men be- fore the law ; for the utmost economy in the public finances ; for the freedom of citizenship to all na- tions ; and for the pardon and forgiveness of all re- cent enemies, when that act becomes safe and prac- ticable. Was there ever a declaration of principles more explicit or better adapted to the circumstances of the country ? It is clear, explicit, and patriotic. Upon the President of the Convention, General Hawley, and a Committee with him, devolved the duty of notifying General Grant and Mr. Colfax of their nomination. This was officially done at Wash- ington City. They made written replies, which I add here, that the reader may see the positions of the candidates in reference to the platform adopted. LETTER OF A CCEPTANCE. 42 r The following is General Grant's reply to the nomination of the Chicago Convention : « t- ^ 7 ~ , ~ " Washin GTON, D. C, May 29, ,868. To General Joseph R. Hawley, " President National Union Republican Convention : "In formally accepting the nomination of the National Union Republican Convention of the 2ist inst, it seems proper that some statement of views beyond the mere acceptance of the nomination should be expressed. The proceedings of the Convention were marked with wisdom, moderation, and patriotism, and, I believe, ex- press the feelings of the great mass of those who sustained the country through its recent trials. I indorse their resolutions. If elected to the office of President of the United States, it will be my endeavor to ad- minister all the laws in good faith, with economy, and with the view of giving peace, quiet, and protection every-where. In times like the present it is impossible, or at least eminently improper, to lay down a policy to be adhered to, right or wrong, through an administration of four years. New political issues, not foreseen, are constantly arising, the views of the public on old ones are constantly changing, and a purely administrative officer should always be left free to execute the will of the people. I always have respected that will, and always shall. Peace and universal prosperity— its sequence— with economy of admin- istration, will lighten the burden of taxation, while it constantly reduces the National debt. Let us have peace. " With great respect, your obedient servant, U. S. Grant." Mr. Colfax replied at much greater length. The following is the reply of Speaker Colfax to the Committee announcing his nomination by the Chicago Convention : "Washington, D. C, May 30, 1868. "Hon. J. R. Hawley, "President of the National Union Republican Convention: "Dear Sir,— The platform adopted by the patriotic Convention over which you presided, and the resolutions which so happily supple- ment it, so entirely agree with my views as to a just National policy, that my thanks are due to the delegates as much for this clear and aus- picious declaration of principles as for the nomination with which I have been honored, and which I gratefully accept. When a great rebellion, which imperiled the National existence, was at last over- thrown, the duty of all others, devolving on those intrusted with the 422 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. responsibilities of legislation, evidently was to require, that the revolted States should be readmitted to participation in the Government against which they had erred only on such a basis as to increase and fortify, not to weaken or endanger, the strength and power of the nation. Certainly no one ought to have claimed that they should be readmitted under such rule that their organization as States could ever again be used as at the opening of the war, to defy the National authority or to destroy the National unity. This principle has been the pole-star of those who have inflexibly insisted on the Congressional policy your Convention so cordially indorsed. Baffled by Executive opposition, and by persistent refusals to accept any plan of reconstruction proffered by Congress, justice and public safety at last combined to teach us that only by an enlargement of suffrage in those States could the desired end be attained, and that it was even more safe to give the ballot to those who loved the Union than to those who had sought ineffectually to destroy it. The assured success of this legislation is being written on the adamant of history, and will be our triumphant vindication. More clearly so than ever before does the nation now recognize that the greatest glory of a Republic is, that it throws the shield of its pro- tection over the humblest and weakest of its people, and vindicates the rights of the poor and the powerless as faithfully as those of the rich and the powerful. I rejoice, too, in this connection, to find in your platform the frank and fearless avowal that naturalized citizens must be protected abroad at every hazard, as though they were native born. Our whole people are foreigners, or descendants of foreigners ; our fathers established by arms their right to be called a nation. It remains for us to establish the right to welcome to our shores all who are will- ing, by oaths of allegiance, to become American citizens. Perpetual allegiance, as claimed abroad, is only another name for perpetual bond- age, and would make all slaves to the soil where first they saw the light. Our National cemeteries prove how faithfully these oaths of fidelity to their adopted land have been sealed in the life-blood of thousands upon thousands. Should we not then be faithless to the dead if we did not protect their living brethren in the full enjoyment of that Nationality for which, side by side with the native born, our soldiers of foreign birth laid down their lives ? It was fitting, too, that the representatives of a party which had proved so true to National duty in time of war, should speak so clearly in time of peace, for the maintenance untarnished of the National honor, National credit, and good faith as regards its debt, the cost of our National existence. I do not need to extend this reply by further comment on a platform which has elicited such hearty ap- proval throughout the land. The debt of gratitude it acknowledges to the brave men who saved the Union from destruction, the frank ap- proval of amnesty, based on repentance and loyalty, the demand for the most thorough economy and honesty in the Government, the sympathy LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE. 433 of the party of liberty with all throughout the world who long for the liberty we here enjoy, and the recognition of our sublime principles of the Declaration of Independence, are worthy of the organization on whose banners they are to be written in the coming contest Its past record can not be blotted out or forgotten. If there had been no Republican party, slavery would to-day cast its baleful shadow over the Republic. If there had been no Republican party, a free press and free speech would be as unknown from the Potomac to the Rio Grande as ten years ago. If the Republican party could have been stricken from existence when the banner of rebellion was unfurled, and when the response of 'no coercion' was heard at the North, we would have had no nation to-day. But for the Repub- lican party, daring to risk the odium of tax and draft laws, our flag could not have been kept flying in the field till the long-hoped-for vie- tory came. Without a Republican party the Civil Rights bill— the guarantee of equality under the law to the humble and the defenseless, as well as to the strong— would not be to-day upon our National stat- ute book. With such inspiration from the past, and following the example of the founders of the Republic, who called the victorious General of the Revolution to preside over the land his triumphs had saved from its enemies, I can not doubt that our labors will be crowned with success; and it will be a success that shall bring restored hope, confidence, prosperity, and progress, South as well as North, West as well as East, and, above all, the blessings, under Providence, of Na- tional concord and peace. Very truly yours, "Schuyler Colfax." These letters close the proceedings by which Grant and Colfax have been placed before the American people as candidates for the chief offices within their gift — offices unsurpassed in their dig- nity, magnitude, and responsibility by any in the world. In the pages of this volume may be found every act, principle, and purpose by which the intel- ligent voter may judge of their fitness for these august offices. Here is Colfax, exhibited to the open gaze, from the little boy in New York to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is nothing concealed ; nothing doubtful. Here we may trace the career of Grant, from his birth on the Ohio to 424 LIFE OF SCHUYLER COLFAX. West Point; from West Point to Mexico; from Mexico to Galena; and from Galena to Belmont and Donclson ; to Shiloh and Vicksburg ; to Chattanooga and Richmond— a life of activity and industry; of straightforward honesty and of devotion to country ; of great good sense, and of remarkable success. Such was Grant, and, as I close this book, it may be well to note on its last pages what Grant has explic- itly declared in his brief, but meaning and suggestive letter. i. Grant indorses the resolutions of the Conven- tion, and considers its proceedings wise, moderate, and patriotic. 2. If elected, he will endeavor to execute all lazvs in good faith, with economy, and with a view of giving peace to the country. 3. He will execute the will of the people, which he will always respect. In the present condition of the country, these principles cover the whole ground. What is a Presi- dent? By the Constitution, an Executive officer. What is the duty of an Executive officer? Simply and only to execute the laws. It is the attempt to do something else than to execute the laws and obey the will of the people which has brought on the conflict between the President and Congress. The country wants peace, and it wants to reduce the power of the President within the limits of the law and the popular will. If this is not done, the Presi- dency will ultimately become a monarchy. The great principle to be settled now is, that the people, the whole people, equal before the law, shall govern CONCLUSION. 425 according to their own laws, and that the President shall be the mere executor of their will. To this principle Grant promptly and honestly accedes. \( the people do not sustain the great principle of popu- lar government on which he stands, the Presidency becomes a monarchy; for such has been the end of all Republics yet established in the world. Have we virtue enough to resist the corruptions which have overthrown other governments, and established mon- archies on the ruins of republics ? THE END y aluable Works PUBLISHED BY R. W. CARROLL & Co., 1 1 7 we s t fo ur tii-s tr e e j\ Cincinnati. Any Book on this List sent, post-paid, on receipt of Price. Shakspeare's Works, (complete,) 8vo., sheep, $4.50 ; turkey, ant., $10 00 The Far East, by Rev. N. C. Burt, Reason and Revelation, by Rev. R. Milligan, .... An Exposition and Defense of the Scheme of Redemption, by Rev. R. Milligan, (in press,) Sunshine and Firelight, by John J. Piatt, Recollections of Itinerant Life, by Rev. Geo. Brown, . The Christian Baptist, cloth, $3.25 ; roan, .... 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